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Will there be war? Analysis of the elements which constitute, respectively, the power of England and… [Unknown] 1846

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*&$?+* V        Povirer of England and the United States.
■ '."i|^'.   RESULT,    AND    CONSEQUENCES     fj|
* or ajt
: W^k CURSORY   REMARKS   |§J| '
Tone and Tactics of the British Organs in America.
^     -J the cause of war.      £
Introduction •       7 to   8
Tone and Tactics of the British Organs in America, and of
the Whig Presses in the Atlantic cities, on the subject of
War and Oregon, agreeing on this point, that England is
clearly right, and the President wilfully wrong       9 to 10
The British Organs backed by the Whig leaders will not succeed in misleading public opinion •• '<$* 9
Republican America stands no chance for a fair arbitrament
in Europe .,  9
False predictions of the organs of British interests, and of the
Whig presses  10
The course of the President on the subject of our foreign relations will be sustained by the people •  10      ^
Will there be War? ,...    10 to 38
The contexture of our Institutions is pre-eminently opposed !S|f
to aggressive War..*•••••  11
Analysis of the elements   which   constitute  the power of
England     11 to 14
Analysis of the principles which give impulse to the Governmental strength of Great Britain     13 to 14
Elaborate examination of the injury that England might inflict to the United States     15 to 17
Analysis of the elements which constitute the power of the
United States     15 to 17
Analysis  of the  principles  which   impart strength to the
American Confederacy •    17 to 18
Result, and consequences of a protracted War. between England and the United States         S. 18
.Disquisition on the Ashburton Treaty      19 to 2%
Formidable organization  and threatening attitude  of Great
Britain in North America, since the Treaty     19 to 20
Reasons, accounting for the silence of the American press on
the disgraceful cession of a passage through the State of
Maine , ••!•••     21 to 22
How Great Britain, by sending over a proper man, obtained
the passage she had been so long coveting, j (See note {.)••   21 to 22
PAG *t.
Explanation of the circumstances which enabled the American
negociator to buy the consent of Maine     23 to 24
Strictures on the course of the Senate in ratifying the Ash-
burton treaty..... *    23 to 24
Mr. Calhoun and some southern senators voted for the treaty
through sectional feeling. •• .••••• •. 25
The passage in Congress of the Oregon resolutions will not
produce War................. •  25
Development of an emergency which would be the cause of
hostilities within two or three years •••••••••••••     25 to 26
Effect of the President's Message in the United States,—it
has silenced for a while the opponents of the Administration   26 to 27
Investigation of its probable effect in Europe     27 to 35
The rebuke of the President to the French Government will
increase in our favour the sympathies of the French people   27 to 30
Remarks of the Organ of M. Guizot in this city, who
threatens the President with " vigoorous reprisals," from
his patron. .............  28
Foul abuse from M. Goizot's organ on Gen. Cass, for having
approved of «the President's rebuke, &c. , 28
Various comments on the tone of the French papers under the
controul of Louis Philippe and of his ministers    28 to 30
The threats of the British Aristocracy on the subject of
Oregon in April, 1845, were a mere theatrical demonstration
to insulate the President: true causes which prompted
those threats ..,...,.....,..•....,    SO to 32
Quotations from the * London Standard,'giving an insight into
the consistency, &c, of the British Aristocracy.•........    32 to 33
Good joke told by Lord Ashburton concerning the proper man
to settle the north-eastern 'boundary. (Note *).... • 33
Quotations from the President's message having reference to
Oregon, international law, -and foreign interference on this
continent. ••     33 to 34
*t*he message takes officially the same ground that had been
•* taken in the hrairgural, by expressing then—an opinion*... 34
The message, although the most offensive to the views of
British statesmen that has been issued, will have a peaceful
tendency in England; the Teasons why     34 to 35
The threats of the British Aristocracy will ba hushed, and
will give way,*for the 'present, to procrastination, toribery,
and intrigues of'all kinds %l  35
ttebpjponentsfcf'&e President are covertly at work....... 35
Mr. Calhoun, under cover of defending the course of the President, takes strong ground in opposing his most important measures • ........ v , 3b'
Conclusions on the question " Will there be War ?"..... 38
The proper course to secure, peaceably, the whole of Oregon    38 to 40
Synopsis of four decisive, but conciliatory measures, which
will give us, in time, the whole of Oregon •     38 to 3')
What is not proper for the President to propose, can effectually
be done by a two-thirds' majority in Congress •• 39
The offer for compromise made by the President last summer
was eminently judicious  40
No compromise can be made as to our right for the exclusive
navigation of the Columbia river •  40
It can be allowed to merchant vessels in pursuance of free
trade principles •    ' 40
Resignation of the Peel Ministry, &c. ••     40 to 43
Illustration of the devices used by the British Aristocracy
•  whenever a change of measures becomes necessary.......    41 to 42
Classification of a majority of the American press in the Atlantic cities     42 to 43
Queries submitted to their consideration ••.•••••.......••• 43
Divergence of opinions and erratic views of the leading members of the Senate deprecated •  43
Hope entertained that a majority of Senators of both parties
will set aside sectional viewy and party spirit, when voting,
finally, on the Oregon resolutions •••••••.•••• 44
Synopsis of the consequences that would ensue if the Oregon
measures recommended by the President were to be defeated in the Senate .••••••.•••• „.. 44
Unanimity in our councils, the most potent weapon wielded by
Congress •• •••»•••••••••••••• •••••••••• 44
In.the fall of the year 1843,1 went over to Europe with my family,
for the purpose of travelling, particularly in France, which is my native
country. While in Paris, where I resided nearly twelve months, I was
grieved to see that the tone of the French press had become altogether
unfriendly to this country, and I noticed that the daily abuse lavished by
the English press on the people, and on the institutions of the United
States, -.vas promptly echoed by the Parisian papers. The organ of the
French Government, the Journal des Debats, was particularly remarkable for its systematic, insidious, malignant, and persevering efforts to
traduce and villify the American character; and in December, 1844, the
virulence of the ministerial paper became so outrageous, that I made up
my mind to expose publicly, in a daily paper, the utter falsity of its
calumnious aspersions. I found, that it was not an easy matter to get
my articles inserted, in extenso, in the daily journals, some of them, such
as the Siecle, the Commerce, and the Constitution^, gave only the spirit
of my manuscripts; the National inserted one or two articles: but it
was only in La Reforme that my views on American affairs appeared
without mutilation; they formed a connected series of articles pub-,
lished over the signature of " Tin Citoyen des Elats Unis ;" and, in course
of time, they were republished in two pamphlets; and although my
arguments did not reventthe French Government from interfering in the
affair of Texas, it exposed, publicly, intrigues which had been kept
in the dark, and a change in the tone of the Parisian press, except in the
organs of the French Government, became, at that time, easily perceptible : that change was entirely in favour of the United States.
On my return to my adopted country, I found that considerable ex-
i citement existed as to the uncertainty of our relations with England ; it
appeared to mej that the press was generally at fault as to the proper
course to follow, in order, on the one hand, to secure peace, and, at the
same time, on the other, to sustain and vindicate with becoming spirit
our national rights. I fell convinced that such a course could be pointed
out; and, moreover, that the propriety and efficiency thereof could be supported by uncontrovertible facts and arguments. The task, at the present time, was personally inconvenient; I have, however, undertaken to
do it in the following pages:—the hesitation and the conflicting views
which appear to prevail in Congress on the subject of our foreign relations, have led me into the belief, that the measures which I propose,
under a firm conviction of their efficacy, may not be untimely.
The first article of this pamphlet, headed u War and Oregon," was
published in the Daily Globe of the 15th of November ;• it is a brief
exposition of the whole subject Eight other articles appeared successively in the same paper, and in reading them the reader ought to bear
in mind Me date of the publication, as it shows strikingly the general
inconsistency of the press, at the same time that it tests the correctness
of the views expressed in said articles. To illustrate my meaning, I will
merely point out one instance relative to the inconsistency of the press.
As early as the beginning of November, the influential papers of this city
were nearly unanimous in daily abusing the President on account of his
stand on the subject of Oregon. The burst of popular approbation which
greeted the Message of Mr. Polk, bore too strongly the stamp of public
opinion to be misunderstood, and the editors of those papers shifted their
ground at once; many of them even went ao far as to express themselves
satisfied with confiding the care of our foreign relations to the prudence
of an Executive, whom, only a few days previously, they were villi fying
at a great rate. By degrees, however, they have broke ground on
another course; they do not abuse the administration—they rather
flatter it; but they are covertly at work, and try what they can to defeat
the measures recommended by the President, by urging delay, &c. Well,
the series of articles contained in this pamphlet takes a space of time
of about two months, and forms a kind of political record of the events
which have occurred within that period: and, as I stated at the outset, it
will be well to bear in mind the date of each article at the time it is read.
In conclusion, I call the attention of the reader, in a special manner,
to that part of the pamphlet which contains the " Analysis of the Elements which constitute the power of Great Britain," &c, from pages 11
to 18. It may not be amiss to remark, while on this subject, that I have
lived eight years in England, where, having plenty of leisure, I devoted
most of my time to study the mechanism of its government, and to make
out and appreciate the springs which give motion aud power to its complicated machinery; and it may be stated, moreover, that I have been an
attentive and disinterested observer of public events for the last forty years.
New York, Jan. 16M, 1845.
• The dates of the articles contained in this pamphlet bare been taken from the
original manuscript!, and as they vary, now and then, a few days from the dates they
appeared in the Daily Globe, I annex herewith, for the convenience of those who
might desire to compare them, a correct list of the dates they appeared first in print
I he articles in the Globe will be found identically the same as those in this pam-
phletj no change whatever has been made, except those necessary to correct typographical errours, and to connect the articles together in their new form.
7th article appeared Dec. 30
8th     H «•      Jan.    1
9th     «■ m        «•     7
1st article appeared Nov. 15
2nd     " «« ««    26
3rd     "        ««        M      6
4 th article appeared Dec 17
5th     «« «« ««   23
6th     '« ** "   24
New York, November 13th, 1845.
The organs of the British interests in this city have been loud, for a
few days past, in their denunciations against the views of the American
Government on the subject of the Oregon Territory. They have received their cue from their patrons by the last steamer from England.
Here is the substance of their vituperations, divested from the foul abuse
with which they are intermixed : They pretend that the United States
have actually acknowledged the title of Great Britain down to latitude 49,
and that therefore President Polk was and is wilfully wrong, in asserting
that the American title to Oregon is unquestionable. The Commercial Advertiser, the Journal of Commerce, the Express, wad the Tribune, maintain
alike that England is clearly right on the subject of Oregon; and the
proof thereof—as they affirm—is, that she is willing to submit the case
to the arbitration of any crowned head in Europe. Tney threaten that
war is inevitable, if the resolutions which passed the House of Representatives last winter are adopted by both Houses in the next session of
Congress; and they point significantly to the immense maritime preparations of Great Britain, which many of the late English papers insinuate, with an air of mystery, squint terribly towards Oregon. The obvious purpose of this simultaneous movement on both sides of the Atlantic is,
no doubt, to intimidate Congress. **
The Morning Courier and Enquirer of last Saturday, awkwardly enough,
lets the cat out of the bag, as follows: ** They (Congress) know now—
which they did not know last winter—that to vole for such a measure, is to
vole for war." The Courier appears to entertain a very mean opinion of
Congress. The House of Bepresentatives passed last winter, by a large
majority, resolutions organising a government in Oregon ; but noio that
they find that England threatens, that war, as is pretended, is inevitable,
they will no doubt back out, says the Courier*
The zealous endeavours of the whole of the corrupt organs of the British
interests will not succeed to mislead public opinion, even backed, as they
appear to be, by the leaders of the Whig party; the great majority of the
people of this country feel confident that the General Government will insist only on what is clearly right; they know that Republican America
has no chance for a fair arbitrament from any of the Sovereigns or the
Monarchies of Europe, particularly at this present time, when European
statesmen, Mr. Guizot in their number, have publicly made known their
opposition and dislike to the extension of Democratic principles. The people of, the United States are generally convinced that the intrigues of
of England are dangerous, but her threats are harmless—regardless of her
threats we have annexed Texas, without a war, and we will ultimately
have Oregon, without a war. '$$
wm        2
It is no longer ago than last year, that the British organs and many of
the Whig presses predicted war with Mexico, war with England, in case
Congress dared to accomplish the annexation of Texas ; and now, when
their false predictions are still fresh in the minds of all, they have the hardihood to make another attempt at intimidation. ; That the organs of British interests should perform the part which is prescribed to them, is to be
expected; but it is certainly very strange that the Whig leaders and the
Whig editors, especially those that are independent of British influence,
should be so infatuated as to take sides with Great Britain against their
own government, on questions of national character * they ought to know
that our system of aggrandizement is entirely in harmony with our free
institutions, and that, no far, it cannot be denied it has been effected without war. The very contexture of' our institutions, and the working of
self-government as it is with us form, altogether, a new era in the history
of nations; and so is our mode of aggrandizement—other nations wage
long wars, possibly for no other purpose than to-take a few towns—we
annex immense territories with no other instrument than the beacon of our
institutions, and the cordial good will of the People who inhabit them.
Some other day, I will proceed to give an analytical statement of incontrovertible facts, which will convince any unprejudiced! mind, that the
adoption by Congress of the resolutions which passed the House of Representatives last winter, will not produce war; and I make bold to proclaim beforehand, that the course taken by President Polk, on the subject
of our foreign relations, will be triumphantly sustained by the People of
No. I.
New York. November 25th, 1845.
Will there be War between the United, States and Great
The Whig papers throughout the county have generally assumed that
war, (immediate war, says the Courier and Enquirer*) will be declared
by England in case Congress adopts the resolutions which last winter
passed the House of Representatives on the subject of Oregon, I asserted
in the Daily Globe of 15th inst., in an article headed '* WarandOregon,"
that u.e threats thrown out against the tenour of those resolutions by the
organs of British interests in this city, were part of a concerted movement
on both sides of the Atlantic for the purpose of intimidating Congress, and
I proceed to-day to give the first part of a detailed and anaiytical statement of facts, which will no doubt convince the unprejudiced reader that
a war between the United States and England would, in a few years,
lead inevitably to the dismemberment of the British Empire. This assertion will startle many; let those suspend their judgement until they have
gone through the following elaborate analysis. In conclusion, I intend
to establish by fair argument that the adoption by Congress of the Oregon
resolutions does not afford England reasonable ground of complaint. Great
Britain will try hard to bully us out of our rights, but when she finds out
that we are resolved and. united to stand by them, she will let us alone.
The analytical disquisition underneath Was first published in Paris, in
one of the daily papers of that metropolis, and formed part of a brochure
in the French language. . That language, on account of its clearness and
perspicuity, is generally used by the statesmen of Europe for drawing out
treaties and international stipulations; it is peculiarly adapted to subjects
requiring close reasoning. I have done my best to be both clear and
concise, but I apprehend that the following translation may not be altogether satisfactory to those who have read the original.
Paris, February 22d, 1845.
What would be the Result, and the probable Consequences,
or a War between the United States and England?
In order to treat this question with the serious deliberation that it deserves, it will be necessary to examine carefully what are the elements
which constitute the power of the two nations, respectively, and what
are the principles which impart action to the governmental strength of
the two countries.
The available force that England can dispose of, for an aggressive war,
has increased considerably since 1838. It was about that period when
armed steamers were first built for the Royal Navy : the naval armament
of Great Britain, has reached, at the present time, unmatched magnitude ;
and for efficiency to strike a blow on a sudden emergency, she has no
rival in the world ; and yet, on the other hand, England has never been
in such a precarious situation as she would soon be, if she was to undertake a war with any maritime nation that could stand the first brunt, and
protract the struggle for a few years. If such an occurrence was to happen, her situation would, indeed, be much more perilous than it ever
was before 1815. This discrepancy will strike one at first as being very
strange ; but it is accounted for by the material change that has taken
place in the principal element of her power. In order to appreciate fully
the effect of that material change, it is incumbent to trace minutely the
incipient beginning thf x>f—its progressive importance—its direct tendency, and the actual result.
From the year 1793 to 1815, at the time when the British Aristocracy
were waging war against revolutionary France and against the French
Emperor, the whole of English funds and capital was invested at home,
chiefly in manufactories; the monopoly of manufacturing for all Europe
was then the principal element of the power of England j there was not
any other manufacturing nation on the continent, and the people thereof
could not do without British manufactures ; and although Napoleon tried
his might to exclude them, they were in such request that they found
their way to the continent, partly through smuggling, partly through the
secret connivance of the authorities on the seaboard, and Napoleon himself was constrained, through absolute necessity, to adopt the system of
granting licenses, and whenever the aggregate exportation of British
goods was less, the profits were larger ; England through these means
was able to struggle until the time that the blunders of Napoleon enabled her, in 1813 and 1814, to literally overstock the whole continent
with her goods, and to realize thereby enormous profits.
Meanwhile, a general peace took place in 1815, and the various nations
of Europe, feeling no longer any'apprehensions of war, turned their at-
tention to manufacturing, and within the short space of two or three
years, the competition of these rising manufactories .was more effective
to curtail the gains of England, than had ever been the famous continental system of Napoleon; and while Europe was gradually getting over
the evito of war, England waa overtaken by a most violent commercial
revulsion. The massacres of the operatives at Manchester took place
in 1819, public order was threatened in many of the populous counties,
conspiracies against the government were detected, a number of persons
were hung for treason, civil war was rife, and the situation of the country, altogether, was, for some time, very critical.
The contrast that existed then between the situation of Great Britain
and that of the other countries of Europe, exhibits in a most striking
light the artificial basis upon which rests British prosperity; on the one
hand, the various nations of the continent, in establishing manufactures
for their own consumption, released themselves from paying tribute to
England, and increased thereby essentially the welfare of the masses ;
while on the other, the working classes of Great Britain were reduced to
the greatest wretchedness; and this took place almost as soon as she
lost the monopoly of manufacturers ; the principal element of her supremacy being tnus impaired the superstructure of the British Empire was
violently shaken, and while peace was a blessing to Europe, it was a
blight to the system of the British Aristocracy.
This critical state of things, if it had lasted long, would have left no
other remedy to the English people than that of rising en masse against
the privileged class, and at once to put down a grasping Aristocracy that
allows them the means of living merely, by encroaching on the just rights
of other nations. .  N
In the meantime, the revolt of the Spanish colonies had, since 1815,
opened the whole of South America to British commerce, but the war
that existed between Spain and her Colonies prevented this new market
from being, at first, very profitable, hut gradually an increase took place,
part of the enormous capital that was inert in England on account of the
prostration of business was invested in the New World by various companies, who thereby monopolized the valuable produce, and the rich
mines of those extensive countries, and the immediate result of these
operations was to relieve England from her. critical situation: it was then
that began the material chanae that has taken place in the principal element of her power; England did not discontinue manufacturing, but she
became by degrees, pre-eminently a loaning-moncy nation—i mean a
nation loaning on pledges ; it was by loaning money to the governments of
Mexico, of Peru, of Columbia, of Chili, of Brazils, &c, &c, than England obtained exclusive privileges, mortgages on the land and on the
revenue, special treaties of commerce, and lastly, a spirited revival of her
transactions with Europe, which she laid* under contribution by supplying it with the various productions of South America.
The system of loaning in foreign lands., having been adopted through
necessity, and the allurement of high interests stimulating besides British
cupidity, things have come to that pass that from one to two hundred
■vLin« °fJ° **? havebe?nJoaned in the United States without obtain-
l^y^eo{^u^^*c^hnnkas it be admitted that the advantage of corrupting thereby part of the population may be considered
as such; and progressively, all the capitalists of England, including, of
course, the aristocracy (viz., the rulers of the coup try,) without hardly
an exception, have invested their funds, either in foreign lands or in foreign speculations and undertakings : the natural consequence of adopting
that system on such a gigantic scale, is to render the whole world tributary
to England, but in case of war with a maritime nation powerful enough
to protract the contest for two or three years, it is self-evident that the now
principal element of her supremacy would be in most imminent jeopardy ; and by reverting to the critical situation of preat Britain from 1817
to 1819, when the then principal element of her power became impaired
by losing part of the monopoly of manufactures, we may form an adequate idea, if a long war were to take place, of the shock and injury that
would be inflicted on an empire whose superstructure, at this present
time, is raised on transacting the commerce, and regulating the finances
of the whole world;
Anterior to 1815, the monopoly of manufactures enabled England to
wage war against France by subsidizing some of the continental powers,
and she thereby succeeded in keeping the whole of Europe in continental
strife t- but now, in case of an obstinate war, her extensive loans to foreign
countries would be completely exposed to exterior casualities; and let it
be borne in mind, that all the riches, all the produce, all the tribute, that
every tide wafts to her shores, has become absolutely necessary, even for
keeping up her peace establishment. The false and iniquitous system
upon which her greatness is established, requires, at all times, a standing
army of mercenaries, and numerous fleets in all parts of the world, ready
to crush down at once all rising resistance to her oppression, and if her
already enormous expenditure was to bo greatly swelled on account of
war, at the same time that her receipts would be materially curtailed, it is
easy to conceive that it would try hard the cohesion of the British empire.
Even now, in time of peace, she cannot get rid of her income tax, that
used to be laid formerly only in time of war J and it has been affirmed last
year in Parliament, by ministerial members, that to grant two hours of
rebt to the wretched children whose life is being shortened by being
bound to toil from 12 to 16 hours in the factories, would put in great
drnger the supremacy, and even the existence of Great Britain.
The principles that impark action to the governmental strength of
Great Britain, proceed from the impulse given by a vigorous and talented
Aristocracy, whose untired and united efforts concentrate at one point,
viz., inordinate aggrandizement: they number but a few hundred individuals, and the greatest part of the land belongs to them, by entail. That
privileged caste whose members die, but whose Michiavelian spirit is invariably caught and sustained by those who take their place, has, since
the revolution of 1688, persevered without intermission ir its encroaching views, going to war or making peace, according to circumstances,
but in all cases consulting only its own selfish interest, without caring
for justice, otherwise than in wordy professions ;* and by spoliatirg, suc-
• By the time the reader will have read this article through, he will understand
the reason why the British Aristocracy has been so pacific in their transactions with
the great powers of the world for these last fifteen to twenty years, while previous to
1815 they took every opportunity to embroil Europe in long wars ; their principles
remain the same, but their interests have materially changed since they have become
wholesale money lenders.
The pretended division of British Aristocracy in two parties denominated the Whig
cessively, Spain, France, Holland, Portugal, India, China, &c, she has
succeeded to raise up a gigantic empire, whereof, Manufactures, Commerce, and Finances, are the three fundamental parts. Paper money has
been the contrivance that has been used to give a monopolizing extension
to these three organic parts, and it has been accomplished by raising the
wind with promises to pav, to the amount of .£800,000,000 ! and the due
payment of the interest of that enormous debt is a powerfuLhold on the
good behaviour of the actual creditors. The branches of that overgrown
Empire have by degrees spread all over the world ; but the basis remains
the same, and instead of increasing in strength, it has grown weaker,
particularly for the last twenty-five years that England has been investing, and involving out of the country, the principal organic element of
that basis, becoming thereby pre-eminently, as I have before stated, a
nation loaning money or* pledges.
The logical inferences of the preceding elaborate exposition, are now
easy to be drawn, and it becomes a matter of evidence that a maritime
war of a few years between the United States and England would hove
the following results, so far as concerns Great Britain.
The revenue, interests, dividends, tribute, that she now collects from
all parts of the world, would fall short more or less—her maritime commerce would be partly ruined by privateers—the immense market of the
United States for the purchase of the raw materials, and for the outlet of
her fabrics would be closed against her—her manufactures could no longer
stand a competition with those of France, of Germany, of Switzerland,
and of those of the continent in general;
It becomes, thus, self-evident, that the fundamental parts* of the British
Empire would be materially impaired, and by giving way, the whole su •
perstructure would tumbl   into fragments.
An analysis of the elements of the power of the United States will he
the subject of the next article.
and the Tory party, is a mere gull-trap to deceive the people into the belief that
there are some patriots amon'sr them; it has the advantage, besides, whenever they
find that a change of measures becomes necessary, to enable them to do it with good
grace by letting the Whigs or the Tories, as the case may be, to take the administration of affairs in opposition to their sham opponents.'
The Tories are generally the most violent and warlike, and the Whigs are the
most liberal and pacific. But in some cases the character of the party is inter-
verted, as it was, by instance, under the Whig administration of Melbourne and
The increase of the influence of France in the Mediterranean, and particularly the
independent course of the Pacha of Egypt in 1839 and 1840, were galling to the feelings of the British Aristocracy, and threatened to blight their lone-cherished plan of
connecting their East India Empire with Europe by controlling Egypt from the Red
Sea to Alexandria. Ibrahim Pacha was in full march on Constantinople; there was
no time to lose for preparing a change of characters. So the Whig Administration
played the part of the Tories, and they did so admirably ; they framed the treaty of the
Quadruple Alliance, landed in Syria, check-mated Ibrahim, settled the affairs of Turkey and Egypt in their own way, gave a terrible kick to their good friend Louis
Philippe, whom Lord Palmerston publicly declared he could at any time shove through
the eye of a needle. Fallowing up the encroaching policy, they sent an armament to
China, slaughtered the defenceless Chinese, took their ports, their bullion, and as
high a tribute as they could extort, The boldness of these movements gave a general alarm to all Europe; but British Aristocracy knows when to push on and when
to stop—they found that the pear was not quite ripe, a change of policy became
necessary, and the Tories as meek aa lambs, took the place of the Whigs.
No. n.
Paris, March 2d, 1843.
What would be the Result, and the Probable Consequences,
of a War between the United States and England 1
I proceed, to-day, to investigate the reasons, the causes, and the circumstances, that will enable the United States to sustain a long and
obstinate war; and, moreover, to analyze their means of resistance
against the immense aggressive means of Great Britain.
The principal element of the force and ascendency of the American
Republic consists in the peculiar energy of the Yeomanry of the country,
united to the immense territorial resources it controls, and to the advantages it holds forth to the oppressed population of the despotic Governments of Europe. In England, the owners by entail of the greatest
portion of the land, count up a few hundreds—in the United States they
number millions. Those millions of Freemen, in the strongest sense of
the word, are inured to hardships by daily labour in the open air, and they
take hold with equal'skill, as circumstances require, the plough, the axe,
or the rillo ; they would light in defence of the soil that belongs to them
with an intelligence and a tenacity not to be found in any other country.
The regular army of the Republican Americans docs not exceed nine
thousand men.* They are conscious of their strength—and the inviolability of the soil is safely entrusted to the well-known devotion of the
masses to a form of government, whereof every individual constitutes a
part, and which every individual has a personal interest to sustain.
There are about a million of citizen soldiers in the United States, annually drilled to militia duty, and two millions—if it was necessary—
would take up arms to defend their institutions, their homes, and their
lands, against foreign invasion. The deadly aim of the American rifle
has become proverbial j it was fully demonstrated at New Orleans, in
1815, when a few thousand of the militia from Tcnncsseo and Kentucky,
with a few hundreds of French sailors, totally routed 15,000 men, said to
be, at the time, the choicest troops of the British army. It was proclaimed by the British organs in America, when these fifteen thousand
men landed, that they were u the conquerors of the conquerors of Europe." They were actually part of the British army which had invaded
France, under Wellington, in 1814. This remarkable victory is not an
exceptionable case ; the battle of St. Jacynth was fought, with a similar
result: about seven hundred of American adventurers completely cut to
pieces the Mexican army of Santa Anna, 6,000 strong.
On the seaboard the United States have nothing serious to apprehend
from England—the means of transportation are so rapid and efficient,
through numberless steamers and railroads, which traverse the country in
all directions, that there is not a single spot from Boston to New Orleans
but where 60 to 80 thousand men might be concentrated in the short
•This was the total number when I left America in 1843:   I find now, by the late
Report of the War Department, that it has been reduced to 6,000 men.
apace of two or three weeks; the British, it ii true, might land ; they
night possibly destroy one or two of the large cities on the Atlantic ;
it is a game, however, they will be slow to undertake, for the loss that
would ensue thereby to the British commerce and to British interests
would be nearly as heavy as that of the Americans. They might, according to their usual warfare, burn a few towns, but they would soon
be compelled to make their escape to their ships, their numbers greatly
diminished by death, the prisoners taken from them, and the missina ;
the British soldiers know well, and their desertion from Canada to the
United States, at the peril of their lives, proves it fluent!/, that the
Democratic institutions of the United States, and a few acres of land to
make themselves independent, are more conducive to their welfare than
the flogging they receive now and then, to entourage them to sustain the
glory of did England*
On the north, northeast, and northwest frontiers of the United States,
England might act with much better chance of success: the passage
which she has obtained through the State of Maine by the Ashburton
treaty* has made her position in North America truly formidable; it
1 enables her to send troops to Canada in the heart of winter—it increases
incalculably her means of organizing and planning aggressive excursions
against the frontier towns on the lakes, and whenever the depredatory
troops would meet with effectual resistance they might fall back on their
fortified points, &c.   The United States would, no doubt, perceive the
dangerous consequences that would ensue of communication being kept
up actively between Halifax and England through the means of steamers;
they might be averted by collecting a large force and marching it, on the
first intimation of hostilities, into Nova Scotia, for the purpose of taking
Halifax, if possible—if not, to blockade it strictly by land, proclaiming
at once the independence of Canada.   But it must be admitted that the
American militia, although superiour to any other when defending their
own soil, are deficient for an offensive war.    Let us concede the worst.
Let us suppose that England would hold her own in Canada, and that her
emissaries should succeed to stir up the Indian tribes against the United
States—-it cannot be denied but that such a cruel border war would inflict
very great individual misery, but no farther advantage would accrue to
Great Britain; it would not enable the English troops to penetrate successfully into the United States.   Any British General that would leave
the protection of the fortified camps on the frontiers, and make an attempt
to advance into the interior of the Union, would meet the fate of Bur-
goyne, who was taken prisoner at Saratoga, in 1777, with 8,000 men.
The one hundred and seventy thousand citizen soldiers of the State of
New York, acting in concert with the hardy yeomanry of Maine, of New
Hampshire, of Vermont, and of Michigan, could effectually annihilate
or scatter any force the British might muster in North America.
At the south England would very likely try to stir up the blacks to
rise up against the whites.   It is doubtful whether they could succeed j
* It enables England to keep Canada connected at all times with her other scattered
provinces in North America. Before the Ashburton Treaty, Canada was without
direct intercourse, seven months out of twelve, except through the United States.
The disgraceful concession that has been made by yielding such an important passage
is clearly and forcibly demonstrated in the French brochure, wherelrom the above
is a translation: it will bo the subject of a separate article.
were they able, however, to do it, the Southern States would then be,
no doubt, the theatre of a frightful slaughter; but the general exasperation that such a horrible act would excite all over the country, would
settle the question at once. JPeace with England would become impossible,
so long'as she would own an inch of ground in North America.
On land, Great Britain has no chance to force her terms on the
American Republic. At sea, she might, it is admitted, destroy materially
her maritime commerce; but although maritime commerce has been
greatly conducive to the prosperity of the United States, it is by. no
means an indispensable element of their existence; it may, indeed, bo
asserted, that there is no country on the globe that could so easily dispense with foreign commerce as the United States, considering that the
Union ha* within itself such a variety of productions and raw materials,
of territorial resources, and of manufactories withal, whose business
would increase materially by getting rid of English competition. However, even at sea, the United States have, in the last1 war, from 1812 to
1815, bearded the British Leopard, and the changes and modifications
that the introduction of steam-power in the navy will produce in a maritime war, would be mostly to'the advantage of America. A strict blockade of the coast would be nearly impracticable—steam fireships might be
stationed at the mouth and entrance of every river and harbour—British
cruisers would have to keep away at a distance, and the numerous fleet
A fine sailing packets in port, might be fitted out as privateers, and
would have a rare chance to make depredations on British commerce on
every sea. . England would, no doubt, send, at the outset, a powerful
armament of her armed steamers ; but England has so many places to
guard and protect, that it would be impossible even for her to keep up,
for any length of time, on such extensive coasts, a sufficient force to be
able to resist the steam fireships that might issue from every creek and
outlet, at every favourable opportunity; and thereby the blockading force
might be, night and day, threatened with total destruction.
The reader is by this time, no doubt, satisfied that the United States
are able to sustain a long and obstinate war against Great Britain; but in
order to dispose of this question logically, I will proceed to explain the
principles that impart action to the governmental strength of the United
States. According to the federal contract, the various States have reserved to themselves all the powers which have not been delegated in
clear and precise terms, to the General Government. The Constitution,
it is true, delegates to Congress the right of declaring war; but even that
power is never used, but when a large majority of electors (that is to
say, a large majority of the nation) is actually in its favour; the necessity
of a large majority being needed to warrant a declaration of war, proceeds
from this simple fact, "that all the powers emanate directly from a majority of the people." Under such a system, an unjust war can hardly
ever be attempted, and it accounts for the forbearance of the American
Administration from 1805 to 1812. They protested against the indignities that Great Britain was heaping on American citizens ; but Congress
bore them for seven years, and war was deliberately and coolly declared,
only when n large majority of the nation became aroused to the necessity
of avenging their wrongs. That war, of course, was national, and the
rank and file of the Federalist party, whose leaders fiercely opposed it,
rests and with British capitalists; these individuals, acting in concert
with the numerous class of speculators, use their influence over the
presses under their control, and leave no means untried to promote indirectly the views of Great Britain against the annexation of Texas, &c
Some of these do so in the hope of being able to contract some new loans |
in England, for the purpose of going on, as they say, with what they
call internal improvements; but the most that the opposition of these
men proves, is, that there are selfish men in An;erica, the same as in
other countries; but if war was actually to lake place, many df these egotists would become the most inveterate enemies of Great Britain; they
would try to make up their anticipated gains by fitting out privateers
against British commerce, with the hope of filling their pockets therefrom ; and the popular feeling of the two great American parties, in case
of war, would fully agree upon this point—to make one great effort to
'exclude England altogether from the American continent.
The summing up ox the juxtaposition of facts above minutely exposed,
may now be made briefly, and the underneath inferences must appear irresistible.
A declaration of war by Great Britain against the,United States, on
account of the annexation of Texas, or else, on account of the projected
*t* *f\ J* il 1      *• J 1   •        dX*        mjf .-»
njictai oasis, wnereoi me inree organic and lunuamentai parts are
more or less exposed to be impaired* against a majority government, the
strength whereof proceeds direct from the cordial adhesion 2 the masses,
which government is supported, particularly, by the energy and intelligence of an agricultural population of nearly three millions of freemen,
whose territorial resources and means of living, are beyond the reach of
British aggression.
The inevitable result of such a war, carried on with animosity for a
number of years, must be
The consequences that would naturally ensue, from such an event,
would be the following:
SoTt^'^ ™EIR s,m™'BY ™ ™S.
SeSTe VIS S8tZT0V0UZ'™ ^etS. nJcZ
Nsw York, December 4th, 1845.
No impartial person of common understanding can rise from reading
with attention this translation of the French brochure, without assenting
to its conclusions. The writer thereof proceeds minutely through the
whole article with logical precision, tracing events to their incipient
causes ; and he is particularly careful not to draw any inference until it
is warranted by preceding reasoning or statements. All the facts brought
forward are matter of history, and the writer his classed and grouped
them with such clearness and force, that there is no resisting the evidence.
In corroboration of the views exposed in the French brochure, I here*
with transcribe an extract from the London Globe of the 11th of February last, in an article headed " Fortifications of ILondon" : " But England cannot afford an invasion, her power is based upon commercial
greatness, upon commercial security, and faith, and confidence ; let those
be shaken and the whole fabric falls."
'   No. m.
New York, December 13,1846.
Wiil there be War between the United States and Great
Britain 1
Preparatory to resuming my remarks on the above question, I subjoin
underneath the strictures on the Ashburton Treaty, which I adverted to
in the last number.
Paris, January 20th, 1845.
The Ashburton Treaty, and the Reason* why It ha* made the Annexation of
Texas popular In the United State*.
The news lately received from the United States, represent the popular feeling in favour of the annexation of Texas as daily gaining ground ;
the impulse that produces it, proceeds from a cause that begins to be felt
in the Northern States, although that cause has not yet been publicly
divulged. The reasons why the American press has been silent thereupon; will be easily seen through on reading the following explanation.
It is now given in France, for the purpose of refuting, at once, the daily
abuse belched out by the British press, concerning what it calls the grasping ambition of the United States; the cause alluded to is briefly explained
The Ashburton Treaty has enabled England to assume a threatening,
and a truly formidable attitude on the Northern and Northwestern frontiers of the Federal Union. The new position created by that treaty,
enables her to stir up, on a great scale, the whole of the Indian nations
and tribes which have been of late years mostly concentrated Wesjt of
the Mississippi, many of them with hostile feelings against the United
States. Admitting the assertion as to the effect of the treaty to be true,
it will be easily conceived, by looking over a chart of America, how important it is to prevent Great Britain from extending her protection to
Texas, and from cementing with that country a connexion akin to the
one she established formerly with Portugal; it would, undoubtedly, en-
able her to control altogether (he Gutfof Mexico; end it would give her
an entering wedge to scatter her emissaries among the Indian tribes as
far up as lake Michigan, and thereby encircle with enemies the whole of
the Western frontier of the Union from North to South, which enemies
wo"1d rise op at her bidding; and in order to demonstrate the strict
truth of the above assertion, as to the dangerous consequences of the
Ashburton Treaty, I am going to set forth, as clearly and as forcibly as I
possibly can, the position of England before thr treaty, and compare it
with what it is now, and wbat it may be within a short time*
In the month of November, lb37, a general rising of the people of
Canada took place ngainst the Colonial Government. The liver St.
Lawrence was then hound in icy fetters, and the r ows reached England
through the United States, as no part of CnnnihrcaaT)e approached from
eea in winter time. Halifax, in Nova Scotia, is the only harbour that has
a freo communication with England all the year round ; but Halifax, bo-
fore the Ashburton Treaty, could not communicate with Canada, on account of a strip of land belonging to the State of Maine, which stretched
so far North in those uncultivated and dreary regions as to prevent the
possibility of its being turned. The result was, that England, notwithstanding her large standing army and her numerous fleets, could not send
a single regiment to strengthen the garrison. The St. Lawrence did not
open until the end of the month of May, and England would no doubt
have lost, forever, her colony; if local causes * had not enabled the
Ccionial Government to get over their adversaries without any material
aid from the metropolis.
Anterior to the Ashburton Treaty, the Northern and Western frontiers
of the Union were comparatively safe, as, in case of war, Canada Mas
actually cut out from England seven months out of twelve. It was then
annually dependant on the United States for supplies and intelligence
from abroad—that is, from the month of November to the month of
May. The Ashburton Treaty has brought about a complete change. That
part of the State of Maine which England had been so long coveting, for
the purpose of opening a short and easy communication between Halifax
and Canada, having been given up to her by the United States, a military road has already been completed ; a railway is even talked of, and
now* the British Minintry can send direct, despatches, emissaries, ammunitions, troops, &c, whenever it suits them, in winter as well as in summer. It must be taken into consideration, besides, that England keeps in
North America, since the treaty, a garrison of twelve thousand men, which
is nearly double the number of the whole regular American army, while in
1837 she had hardly three thousand f Englam! has now completed such
a compact and powerful organization in Canada, that she can, through the
means of her steam navy on the Lakes, annoy and harass the American
Union on a frontier extending three thousand miles.
But what ought to be considered the most dangerous features of this
new position, is the rapidity wherewith instructions may be transmitted
from Lonuon to Montreal. Celerity in war movements is well known
to be the most energetic promoter of success, and the British Ministers
might now, in the space of a few weeks, organize a plan of operations
•These causes will be explained io a separate article. The genera? Purport thereof
will be to gire an insight into the foreign policy of Mr. Van Buren.
with the incalculable advantage of being able to superintend its execution - details, and progress, almost daily, from Downing street, in London,
through expeditious,steamers from England to Halifax; and the whole
available force of Great Britain might thus be brought to act wherever it
would be thought to be the most effective.
The Colonial authorities in Canada succeeded last war, with limited
means, to stir up against tbe Americans some of the Indian tribes, which
waged on the borders a war of extermination, without distinction of
age or sex. Now that we can appreciate the extent and efficiency of the
means at the disposal of England, we may form some idea of the extension she might give to such a cruel and barbarous warfare. Well^ if
England, over and above the powerful means that the Ashburton Treaty
has supplied her with, was to succeed besides to draw Texas under her
protection, and was thereby, as a matter of course, to control the Gulf of
Mexico, she might, it appears obvious, stir up simultaneously an Indian
war all along the extensive Western frontiers, and at the same time, a
war of revolted slaves at the South; which war of all others, is the most
dangerous to the American Confederacy. To break asunder the Republican Union, has been the secret aim at which British machinations have
been directed ever since 1815.* This is the aim she had in view when
she lavished so much money to abolish slavery in her Colonies on the
Coast of America.
It is needless, no doubt, to enter into further developments. Every
intelligent reader understands now the reasons why the Annexation of
Texas has become so popular. The Ashburton Treaty has made it an
event of sheer necessity for the protection of the American Confederacy ;
so much so, indeed, that many individuals in the Northern States, who
at first opposed annexation on account of honest and conscientious scruples about slavery, admit, now, after a more comprehensive view of the
subject, the urgency of immediate annexation.
But many people will probably exclaim, how is it that the American
Government has been drawn into the discreditable cession of a passage
whereof the consequences might be so disastrous ? I confine myself today to prove the factf—the following remarks will, however, account for the silence of the American press. The fed Attorney of Baring
& Co. was Secretary of State, and was the American negotiator of the
disgraceful treaty.     President TylerJ was so situated with his Whig
* Reasons in support of the above assertion will be found in«n article hereafter, to
be published under the head of *' Origin of Slavery in the United States, and the most
suitable means to promote its^pradual abolition."
f The original causes which have led to this discreditable cession, may be traced up
to the administration of Mr. Van Buren, and will be distinctly developed in the next
X In justice to Mr Tyler, I am led to append herewith the following comment:
When the British Ministers found that General Harriso'i was elected President, and
, that Mr. Webster was to be Secretary of State, they lost no time, and availed themselves at once of tbe golden opportunity, by appointing at once a plenipotentiary to
settle the Northeastern Boundary : they knew that they could get what they wanted
by sending a proper man; and, therefore, a banker came over to this country, with
full powers, fcc. The death of Harrison had like to spoil the comtemplated arrangement, as Mr. Tyler, in hi* inaugural, assumed a tone on the subject of our foreign
relatione very different from that taken by the good-natured Harrison within the abort
•pace of a month ; and Mr. Webster had to use a great deal of management to get the
Cabinet, that be was drawn into signing it—over two-thirds of both the
Whig and Democratic Senators were equally guilty in voting for its ratification. Most of tbe influential presses took sides in its favour, some of
them biased by their political leaders, others through mere corrupt influence.* Those circumstances, and the general disgust they created,
explain tbe sullen silence of the great mass of the community on that in*
famous treaty.
New Yo»k, JJaccmbor 14th, 1845.
The feeling of disgust whereto the French brochure attributes, trulv,
the silence of the American public would have prevented me from publishing the above translation, had I not had, at the present time, an im-
S>rtant object in view. The motives that have influenced the course of
aniel Webster, are understood by every unprejudiced mind, and it
meets the reprobation of every well-thinking man—it is, therefore, useless,
to cavil about it—but what I want to expatiate upon, is, the course of the
American Senate.
The strictures on the coarse of the Senate I will give in another number, in which I will quote a remark made to me by Mr. King, (Ambassador at Paris,) as to the reasons which induced Southern Senators to
vote for the treaty.
Tbe) article underneath was published in tbe Daily Globe on the 23d of December:
No. IV.
New York, December 91,1845.
Will tliere bo Way between tbe United States and Great
Britain 1
Previous to summing up argument on this exciting question, it appears
proper to set forth before the reader, all the information that has a material
consent of the new President The disgrace of giving ap to Great Britain the important passage she was coveting, could not be brooked by Mr. Tyler without obtaining some concession (hat might, at least, seem equivalent. Accordingly, to save appearances, the navigation of fba St. John river, and a strip of land in Canada,
were conceded to the United States; it had the advantage, besides, of giving to Mr.
Webster an argument, which he sight and did use in the Senate, in addressing those
who opposed the treaty: "you complain that we have given up our territory; well,
Great Britain, for tbe sake of compromise, has also, on ber side, given up to us part of
her territory,** &c; and to this day, whenever the Ashburton Treaty is held up as a
reproach on our negotiator, tbe partisans of Mr. Webster will not fail to tell you:
*' Read what the loyalists of Canada say concerning the treaty; there is an outcry that
the British Ministry have sacrificed the honour of the country, &c. Such way of reasoning has an effect on the many who take nc trouble to form an opinion for themselves, but it doea not invalidate tha fact—the stubborn fact—namely, that England,
through that treaty, has been enabled to perfect such a formidable and compact an
organization as to change altogether the former relative position of the two countries, .
while the advantages which have accrued to the United States from that treaty, are,
in comparison, entirely insignificant.   See note 3 of article No. 8.
* I have been told, as a positive fact, by a person well situated to know it, that a
certain editor in this city (whose paper has a great circulation) received from a British functionary, bow in Canada, five hundred dollars as a douceur, to influence hit
editorials on the subject of the Northeastern Boundary.
bearing thereupon ; last Wednesday, I produced in the Daily Globe, the
translation of a remarkable article on the Ashburton Treaty, which was
first published in Paris in a daily paper called La Reforme; this has been
done with a view of setting forth in a strong light the course of the
Senate concerning their ratification of that disgraceful treaty: it is not a
pleasing task to expose publicly the unsound views and principles which
influenced the votes of over two-thirds of our Senators, but it becomes
necessary to do so at the present juncture of our national affairs, when
a similar course might be attended with tftill worse result.
The President of the United States has lately sent to the world a message, wherein he has expressed opinions and recommendations on the
subject of our foreign relations, which, emphatically embody the popular
feeling of the Republic. The House of Representatives, will, no doubt,
sustain the President in the stand he has taken in maintaining our claim
on the Oregon territory, aj well as, in opposing any attempt at Colonization on 'his continent by European powers; but the organs of British
interests appear to be confident that a majority of Senators will refuse
their consent to such measures, that might give offence to Great Britain.
If such is to be the course of the Senate, then, indeed, apprehensions of
war might spring up therefrom.
The elaborate analysis of the elements of the power of Great Britain,
which is the subject of No. 1 of this pamphlet, demonstrates, I trust, conclusively, that England, notwithstanding her immense means of aggression, has never been in such & precarious situation as she is now, to prosecute a protracted maritime war. But if tbe British Ministers perceive
that our councils are distracted—if, moreover, they acquired the conviction that they might enforce.their terms by striking a blow, that blow
would be struck instantly, and without hesitation, entirely regardless of
" our common Anglo-Saxon origin," of kindred ties, and of all the pathos
exhaled by those who profess a holy horrour of war; which fustian, if it
was to influence our counsels, would have the effect of producing that very
war which it is meant to deprecate. I do not apprehend, however, that
the British Ministers will have any such conviction ; they are fully aware
of their weak points, and they appreciate the imminent risk they might
incur, with much greater accuracy than it is generally done on this side
the Atlantic. Their apprehension of the consequences of a war with the
United States, is a sure guarantee that peace will be unbroken on the
part of England. It is, nevertheless, very important, that the measures
proposed by the President should be promptly and cordially supported by
the Senate. The sooner Great Britain is convinced that we will present
an undivided front, the sooner all appearances of war will vanish; and
our Senators should be careful to eschew, at this present juncture, the
unsound views and principles which influenced the Vote of many Senators
on the Ashburton Treaty. J will proceed, now, to expound the course
of the Senate on their ratification of said treaty.
The very day that I published in Paris the French brochure that I have
partly translated, I took it to Mr. King, the American Ambassador* I
knew he was in the Senate at the time the Ashburton Treaty was under
discussion, butj was doubtful, as to what had been his vote for the ratification thereof; being particularly desirous to ascertain his opinion, I
read to him the whole of the article on the Ashburton Treaty, and laid
peculiar emphasis on the following sentence—" The Whig and Democratic Senators were equally guilty in voting for its ratification." Mr. King,
with a degree of candour, highly honourable to him, made, verbatim, the
following remark*!—1* I voted for the Treaty, and I must say, / am very
sorry for it.79   A short pause followed, and then he added—" Massachusetts and Maine, which were most interested, gave their consent;"
the last words of the sentence I do not recollect distinctly, but I recollect
well the purport thereof, which was, that the Southern Senators considered the Northeastern Boundary a sectional question, &c.*L^The consent of Massachusetts and Maine was thus considered, it appears, by
many Senators, of sufficient weight in itself to induce them to give their
votes in favour of a treaty which affected, eminently, vital interests to the
whole of the Union.    As to the consent of Massachusetts, I will merely
remark, that the men who held, and hold now, the political p>wer of that
State, were and are exceedingly anxious at all times to do every thing
that may be agreeable to their friend John Bull—but how was the consent of Maine obtained ?   The noble-minded  Fairfield, who is now in
,    the Senate,might tell his associates all the particulars which preceded and
influenced that consent.    He might disclose to them that Mr. Van Buren
wheedled him to withdraw his volunteers from the 'vantage ground they
had gained over the British—he might whisper to them, that the promises of the ex-President, as to cause the disputed territory to be respected
by the British, proved to be fallacious—he might assert, that both Houses
of Congress, with great unanimity, had voted and delegated to the Executive, ample means and power for the purpose of sustaining our clear
and unquestionable rights,and that said Executive basely betrayed them.
Governor Fairfield might declare, that the State of Maine had incurred a
debt of five to six hundred thousand dollars to sustain  national claims,
which he found were in  progress  of being sacrificed by the General
Government.   He might divulge, that the American negotiator offered
to buy the consent of the authorities of Maine, by paying to them, out of
the Treasury of the Union, the amount of expenses they had so promptly
incurred, nobly actuated by a keen sense of national patriotism.    Finally, he might confess that the commissioners and authorities of Mr.ine
made up their minds to accept the bargain that was pressed upon them,
only when they found they had no other chance to be assisted by the
Genera] Government.   Such was the way that the consent of Maine was
obtained, and the Senators who voted for the treaty must have been
aware of all the facts above detailed.   I do not doubt that many gave
their votes with reluctance, and that they did so under the mistaken apprehension that war would have been the result of the rejection of the
treaty; but those who gave their votes under the plea that the consent
of Massachusetts and Maine was of sufficient weight to give up a passage whereof the consequences may be so disastrous to the whole Confederacy, acted under a principle derogatory to the plain duty of the Senator ; specially in his acts as part of the Executive power of the United
States, he ought, when deliberating in that capacity, to divest himself
from all sectional feeling, and give his vote with a sole view of its being
conducive to the welfare of the whole Union.
•Mr. King admitted, in terms of high praise, the correctness of the views expressed in the French brochure; and he told me the next time I saw him, that he had
sent it to Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State.
Although disgust has prevented the people of the United States from
making any public demonstration against the course of the Senate on the
Ashburton Treaty, it must not be supposed that it is forgotten ; a proper
tone of national feeling is gaining ground, and is penetrating tbe masses
throughout the country ; and those Senators who may take upon themselves to vote according to sectional feeling on the Oregon resolutions,
and other questions, which will shortly be under debate, will find out,
in time, the truth of my assertion.
The arrival of the Acadia furnishes us with extracts from various influential organs of the British Aristocracy, extolling to the skies a late
speech of Daniel Webster, recommending the giving up of all claims on
the Oregon territory, &c, and they agree in manifesting the pleasure it
would give them to see *'the great expounder" appointed as negotiator
for the Northwestern Boundary. No wonder they should like such a
negotiator ; they have had already a foretaste of his accommodating spirit,
in the Ashburton Treaty; many of those influential presses, particularly
the Times, intimate views which perfectly coincide with those already
expressed in the Whig papers in this city: they hope that the Senate
will check the popular feeling, and that Mr. Calhoun will interpose his
influence in order that u masterly inactivity" might prevail. At the
time Mr. Calhoun recommended " masterly inactivity," it might have
been a wise measure; but the time has passed by, and Mr. Calhoun is
no doubt aware of it. Mr. Calhoun, as Secretary of State, sustained our
claims on the whole of Oregon with transcendent ability ;* but Mr. Calhoun has voted for the Ashburton Treaty, and he is suspected of being
rather sectional in his views. Some people insinuate that his zeal for
maintaining our claims on Oregon will not equal that which he displayed
for effecting Texas annexation ; I hope that this insinuation will prove
entirely groundless.
An attentive reading of the articles published in the Daily Globe on the
15th and 26th ult., and 6th inst., on the question u Will there be War,"
&c, will carry with it a conviction that the passage, by Congress, of the
Oregon resolutions, will not produce war; but an emergency may arise
in another quarter, that might be, within two or three yearsg a certain cause of hostilities ; the explication of that emergency will be the
subject of a separate article.
No. V.
New York, December 24th, 1845.
Will there lie War between the United States and Great
To the Editor of the Globe :
In your paper of yesterday I made this remark, that an attentive perusal of the series of articles you have published for me, on the question
u Will there be War ?" would carry with it a conviction that the passage, by Congress, of the Oregon resolutions, will not produce war, but
— - -. — A, . _
* It will be recollected that Mr. Webster, in a vehement speech/maintained in Congress that our claim on the whole Maine territory was unquestionable, and that we
ought to take possession of the disputed territory oa the 4th of July. I do not mean by
that, however, an emergency may arise from another quarter, which
might be, within two or three years, a positive cause of hostilities.
England has, for some time past, cast a wistful eye on California: it
is much more impor*ant to her views of aggrandizement than would be
that part of Oregon which is south of the Colombia river. Possibly a
treaty has already been concluded with Mexico tor the cession to Great
Britain of that fine country. Should that be the case, an English fleet
is already more than halfway to the Pacific, for the purpose of taking
immediate possession thereof. If such be tbe course of events, no doubt
but that considerable trepidation has been felt by the British Aristocracy,
previous to making up their minds to take such a decisive step—they are
aware that the dismemberment of the British empire is at stake, if a protracted war takes place; but they know, on the other hand, that the
federate form of this government is a great impediment to a foreign war,
which requires principally celerity ar.d decision; moreover, the apprehension that the United States might purchase California, may have
spurred them to act before having proper time to ponder well the consequences, and possibly they may deceive themselves into the belief that
prompt action, and actual possession by treaty, would distract the councils of the United States, and would thereby prevent any serious opposition.
Taking the above premises as granted, the British Ministers would, no
doubt, send all their available force in Canada and on the Coast of America, for the purpose of watching our movements, and of fomenting the
spirit of party, by exciting the zeal of the numerous partizans of British
interests throughout the country. Such a course, a few years ago,
might have proved successful to prevent hostilities from the United
States, but 1 make bold to say, that it would now prove a failure; extensive preparations would be made in the United States—Great Britain
would soon find that we would be in earnest in preparing for war ; and
then the question arises, whether she would not, at once, commence hostilities ; her stake is so great that she might hesitate for a length of time,
but war would be only delayed thereby, for the United States, acting conformably to what was done in 1812, would coolly and deliberately declare it, as soon as the national, feeling would become united on its necessity, which might make two or three years.
The subject of the next article will be a disquisition on the probable
effect of the President's Message in Europe.
No. VL
New York, December 29th, 1845.
Will there be War between the United States and Great
We have now reports from nearly all parts of the United States as to
the effect produced by the Message of the President. An almost univer-
sal hurst of popular approbation has responded to the clearness of its
this allusion to insinuate that Mr. Calhoun might back out in the same utau that Mr.
Webster did: I mean to say, that there is a difference between an able advocacy of a
claim, and an energetic zeal to enforce it
exposition, to the true American spirit and patriotism which it displays
throughout, and to the soundness of the principles laid down therein as a
basis for our foreign and national policy. It has silenced, for a while, the
opponents of the Administration, and many of them have even gone so
far as to express themselves satisfied with confining the care of our
foreign relations to the prudence• of an Executive, whom only a few
weeks ago they were villifying at a great rate, applying to him such epithets as " rabid," a unprincipeld," &c.
My purpose, in introducing to-day the subject of the President's Message, is to investigate its probable effect in Europe. Will it be received
with the same manifestation of hostile feelings as was the Inaugural ?
The solving of this question will require some preliminary remarks.
On the 12th of April last, I published .in La Reforme, one of the daily
Parisian papers, an article1* beaded, " Threats of the British Aristocracy
on the subject of Oregon," wherein I asserted that the '.warlike denunciation that was made on the 4th of the same month in the British Parliament,
by both shades of the Aristocracy, on account, as was pretended, of the
language of President Polk in his Inaugural, on the subject of Oregon,
was actually nothing else than a theatrical demonstration, which had
been concerted for the purpose of intimidating the American Government—of fomenting the spirit of party throughout the Unionv being intended, particularly, for insulating the President from the support of
the people. We have now a Message from Mr. Polk, taking stronger
ground than the Inaugural on the subject of Oregon, (as 1 will show in
its proper place when reviewing the Message,) asserting, besides, principles of international law which will be most galling to tbe British Aristocracy, and to their vassals, Messrs. Guizot & Co. If the language of
the President on the subject of Oregon, in his Inaugural, had been the real
cause of the warlike demonstration which took place last April, we
ought, of course, to expect a complete outbreak. Well, I venture to assert, beforehand, that the tone of the British Parliament will be, on tbe
contrary, more subdued,"f and if that be the case, it will be a convincing
proof that the warlike demonstration of last April was a mere abortive
attempt to holly us out of our rights.
The portion of the President's Message which alludes to Franc* having been the subject of various comments, 1 transcribe it entK6 underneath, as I mean to introduce some of those comments as weP*s wy °wn
remarks thereon:
»« Even France—the country which had been our ap^»en* a"y—the
country which has a common interest with us in mainiafning the freedom
of the seas—the country which, by the session of Louisiana, first opened
to us access to the Gulf of Mexieo—the country wi>o which we have
been every year drawing more closely the bonds of successful commerce
—roost unexpectedly, and to our unfeigned regr<*$ took part in an effort
to prevent annexation, and to impose op Texae, as a condition of the recognition of her independence by Mexico, that she would never join herself to the United States. We may rejoice that the tranquil and pervading influence of the American principle of self-government was suffi-
•The next number of this series of articles will contain a translation thereof.
' t Unless, peradventure, the emergency I have alluded to in the last article, (that of
the British getting possession of California,) was to prove correct.
cient to defeat the purposes of British and French interference, and that
the almost unanimous voice of the people of Texas has given to that interference a peaceful and effective rebuke. From this example, European governments may learn how vain diplomatic arts and intrigues
must ever prove upon this continent, against that system of self-government which seems natural to our soil, and which will ever resist foreign
Genera] Cass, in a late speech in the Senate, observed with truth, that
the above intimation is a well-deserved rebuke to the French Government for their intrigues in Texas and in Mexico; thereupon, the French
organ of M. Guizot, in this city, came out with foul abuse on tbe General ; calls him a flatterer and a sycophant; because, forsooth, tbe Senator
from Michigan, when in France, wrote a book praising Louis Philippe!
It is true that General Cass wrote such a book, but what does that
prove? It proves that the General, like many other eminent men, has
been for some time hood-winked by the wiles and duplicity of the citizen
King; the noble and patriotic Lafayette praised also Louis Philippe j he
died shortly afterwards, and his memoirs, published by his family, exhibit in words of truth, how the candid and V3nerable patriot was jilted
by the trickish son of Philippe Egalite—how his heart was ulcerated, and
how his last hours were embittered by the sad conviction that he had,
unsuspectingly, delivered over the destinies of his beloved country into
the hands of a, heartless hypocrite and a rapacious despot.
The liberal and open-bearted Lafitte not only praised Louis Philippe, -
but actually made him a King. Well, a few years afterwards, the undeceived and repentant Lafitte, from the tribune of the Chamber of Deputies, publicly, before the whole world, asked forgiveness " to God and
man to have been the means of placing Louis Philippe on the throne of
France." No doubt that General Cass repents, likewise, to have deceived
his countrymen as to the true character of Louis Philippe ; great many
of them labor, as yet, under the delusion he has created, and it is his duty
to act like Lafitte, and to make a public recantation.
The French organ I have before alluded to, descants as follows on that
portion of the Message which alludes to France : $
" "e French Government will be deeply wounded by the accusation
of treaso* (treachery) and intrigue, (the word is there at full length,)
openly caSxUp0Q jt from the Presidential Chair. And, let us say it, the
French Cab«let wm not De wounded without reason. Whether the
policy it adopts on the Texan question were good or bad, it owes no
account of it otbtr than to its own country and its own conscience, and
it belongs not to my foreign Government to constitute itself the Judge
thereof The accusation preferred by Mr. Polk against the policy of M. .
Guizot will so much the wore irritate the latter, as it will be in the
hands of the opposition Vj Fraace a sharp weapon, the left of the Chamber
will scourge unmercifully with tV* policy of the Ministry. But M. Guizot is not a patient victim, and when he turns upon his adversaries, his
return blow usually brings one or more of them to the ground. We are
much deceived, or Mr. Polk will h^ve his share ia these vigorous
According to the doctrine thus laid down by the French editor, it matters not what low intrigues  the French Government may .ave been
guilty of, to the injury of the United States. *' It belongs not," says he,
44 to any foreign government to constitute itself the judge thereof;" and
accordingly Mr. Polk, for having done so, is threatened with " vigorous
reprisals" from M. Guizot.
The French paper tells us that If the return blow of M. Guizot leaves
one or more of his adversaries on the ground"—this sentence will not be
generally understood ; it requires explanation : nearly half of the whole
number of the deputies of France are salaried functionaries, and the half
of the remainder are striving to get situations for themselves or their relatives ; so, when it is said that M, Guizot leaves his adversaries on the
ground, it means that he takes from them the pap they receive from the
Treasury,* and leaves them, on the ground, to shift for themselves.
The above strange reasoning of M. Guizot's organ, has thus been commented upon by the Morning News: " It is very possible that Sir Robert
Peel may feel a little annoyed, and Monsieur Guizot deeply wounded,
when, to the mortification of the failure—the unmitigated and humiliating failure—of all those abortive labors of monarchial diplomacy, is
added the unpleasant necessity of hearing them thus coolly rebuked."
And further : " Tbe President has used a moderation of expression due
much more to our own self-respect than to M. Guizot's deserts ; and if
the term " intrigue" had been directly applied to his course, (which has
not been done,) and with it that of ** duplicity" added to boot, the
French Premier, might, perhaps, have indeed reddened with anger ; but
full half of the blush would have been due to conscious shame and
detected disgrace."
The French paper, however, has not been left alone to sustain the
cause of M. Guizot; the Courier and Enquirer has the following remark : ** It was indecorous to read a lecture to the French Government."
And further : " It was impolitic, at a moment vhen it was important
not to lose French sympathies."
Now, if the Whig paper just now quoted be in earnest in the above
remark, it laboured under a great mistake; the French Government and
the French People are two very different things, and the event will prove
it. I venture to assert that the sympathies of the French People will be
more and more in our favour, in proportion as we detect and rebuke openly
the crooked policy of M. Guizot, and his notorious subserviency to
British interests. I^ouis Philippe and his ministry hate heartily our
Democratic Institutions: they use all the means in their power to undermine them ; the Journal de Debals, and all the papers under their influence, are daily traducing the American character, and vilifying our
form of government. The most proper way to retaliate, is to let
them understand that we are aware of their views and of their trickery.
They dare not show their anger ; Louis Philippe is fully aware that a
war with the United States, he acting therein as the vassal of England,
would seal  his fate * as a   sovereign.    Let  the press of this country
* The threat of instant removal from office held, like the sword of Damocles, over
the French Deputies, is the principal cause of the support which is given to the most
unpopular Minister that France ever had; the French Ministerial papers, in the attempt to humbug the public, attribute that support to hia eloquence; if Louis Philippe was to withdraw his countenance from his Minister, the eloquence of M. Guizot
would not avail him twenty-four hours.
retaliate vigorously to the recriminations of the French ministerial organs,
and they will soon lower their tone.
On the whole, I sum up the argument as follows: The rebuke of Mr.
Polk will have a salutary influence in France, and the effect of the Message will be, to increase in our favour the sympathies of the French People*
No. vn.
New York, December 31st, 1849.
Will there lie War between the United States and Great
To the Editor of the Globe:
I began to prepare some comments on the following translation, whereto allusion is made in my last communication, but the Parisian article
itself israther lengthy,and, with the addition of those comments, it wo»' \
encroach too much on your columns. Those comments, as well as the
further investigation of the probable effect in Europe of the President's
Message, will be the subject of another number.
Paris, April 0th, 1843.
Threats of the British Arlatocrsvejr on the Subject of Oregon.
The inaugural speech of President Polk has produced an explosion of
high wrought up feelings in the British Parliament: the sullen and concentrated anger which 1 alluded to a few days ago,* has at last exploded
—the Ministers, and several of the leading members of both shades of the
Aristocracy, have matured their parts, and after six days of preparation
have enacted a grand theatrical denunciation.
President Polk has taken the liberty, in addressing the American people, to say that, in his opinion, the title of the United Stales on the Oregon
Territory was " clear and unquestionable," and that he would maintain
it by all constitutional means, with this restriction, "that every obligation imposed by treaty or conventional stipulation should be sacredly
The British Ministry pretend, on their side, that the rights of Great
Britain on the same territory are " clear and unquestionable," and that
" they are ready to maintain them at all hazards."
In contrasting thus the identical terms of tbe two declarations, there
is no difficulty to perceive on which side is the blustering.
If the British Ministers are convinced that the claims of England are
" unquestionable," no one can object at their saying so ; but there is no
need of swaggering on the subject of a question wherein the opinion of
the President can have no hostile effect for a considerable space of time.
What can, then, be the reason of the concerted understanding of the organs
of the two shades of the Aristocracy in threatening the United States ?
To burn down their towns—to stir up a war of revolted slaves—to supply the Mexicans with ships and sailors, to enable them thereby to fit
out privateers against American commerce ?
* On the 2d of April I published .an article in a Parisian daily paper, with comments on the Inaugural of Mr. Polk, remarking, that it had been received in England
with svllen anger, ft-c.
The language of the President on the subject of Oregon is not of that
pressing importance that will warrant such a sudden and violent denunciation. There are several causes that the Aristocracy does not wish to
divulge, which has provoked it—they are the following: The ascendency that the Democratic party has regained in the United States; the
firm and resolute tone wherewith the President has identified himself
with the views and the principles of that party; the mortification felt
by the British Ministers, in finding that the intrigues of their agents, in
Texas and in Mexico, have been detected and derided at. Finally, the
vote of the last Congress for the annexation of Texas, which, confidently,
they did not expect to tr ke place. Those are the true causes of the irritation and of the threats of the British Aristocracy ; the obvious aim of
the British Ministers in getting up with so much eclat a warlike demonstration in Parliament, is to insulate the new President. The English
Aristocracy accuse Mr. Polk, to court popular passions; and it is them,
on the contrary, who, in the most solemn manner, exert all their influence
to excite the feelings of the powerful British interests which exist in
the United States—for the purpose of denouncing the opinion of the
President as tantamount to a declaration of war ; and, in order to prove to
the American people that Parliament are unanimous to sustain the Ministry and the Press in their denunciation, and in the threats that escort it,
they have delayed one day, for that express intent, the departure of the
mail steamer for Boston. But the Americans know that the support of
Parliament has never failed to the Aristocracy, in all its aggressive wars.
Lord North had for him Parliament and the Press, to wage war in
America in 1776.    What has been the result ?
I have, I trust, conclusively demonstrated in former communications
that England, notwithstanding her immense means of aggression, is in a
most precarious situation to wage a protracted maritime *var. Pretexts
are not wanted to pick up a quarrel with the United States—she might
easily find some, if it suited her—it is the apprehension of the' consequences that makes her hold hack; and I assert, in direct opposition to
the language of the British Ministry, that it will not go to war unless
it expects intestine division in the United States.
It is to be hoped that President Polk will not be intimidated by the
warlike demonstration of the British Aristocracy, and that he will evince
the sincerity of his opinion, as to the claims of the United States on the
Oregon Territory, by refusing to negotiate on any other basis than what
are deducible from the terms of his Inaugural Speech.
The course which Congress ought to follow is clear enough. It is indicated in the resolutions which have been passed in the House of Representatives, but not acted upon by the Senate. The next Congress,
will, no doubt, pass resolutions of the same intent, and the effect thereof
will be, to place the United States in Oregon on the same footing that
England has been for some twenty years; beyond those measures of self-
protection, no aggressive steps will be taken by the United States; it
will be left to England, if she wants to prevent the accretive power of the
American settlers, to declare war; and that is the very thing she will
not do, unless she finds that the councils of the United States are distracted. AIL the extensive means under the control of British inter*
ests will be set in motion to create division ; but the masses are intelli-
gent in the United States; they know how to appreciate properly the
honest motives of men who hold the helm of State; and if, as it is to be expected, Mr. Polk does his duty, popular support will give him a prepon-
derancy to put down party spirit, and to sustain the national character and
the dignity of the country. The President is the direct representative
of the whole people taken individually. This peculiar feature of the
American Constitution accounts for a fact that many people wonder at
without perceiving the cause thereof; the fact alluded to is this-—-the
absolute sovereign, and even Congress must abide by it.
Remark—The underneath article was intended, like the preceding
numbers, to appear in the Daily Globe, and accordingly the manuscript
thereof was left in the hands of the person who took charge of the others;
on finding that five or.six days had elapsed without its being inserted, I
withdrew it on the 14th of January, for the purpose of publishing the
whole in pamphlet form.
No. vm.
New Yobk, January 7th, 1816.
Will tliere 1m War between the United States and Great
The translation from the French of *' Threats of the British Aristocracy
on the subject of Oregon," which was the theme of the last number, sets
in juxta position the identical words of the declaration made by both Mr.
Polk i nd the British Ministry on the Oregon question, and the following
Inference therein drawn must be granted as correct by any person who
will compare the two declarations, namely: uIn contrasting thus the
identical terms of the two declarations, there is no difficulty to perceive
on which side is the blustering.
The principal aim of the British Government, in the blustering alluded
to, was to insulate the President, and to weaken thereby the American
Administration, so as to prevent the accomplishing act of Texas annexation. The following article of the Ministerial paper, the London F'zn-
dard* betrays thus, in an unguarded moment,* th.3 secret motive of the
British Ministers: " London, May 2d. The feverish anxiety which has
prevailed for these two or three weeks had not decreased, as the late
news by the packet Waterloo (from New York, April 11) gives out, that
* The Standard of the 38th of March (the day that Mr. Polk's Inaugural was published in London) has the following comment on the passage of the resolutions for the
annexation of Texas: " All this is interesting, and that is all; for truly, it does not
concern us any more than the acts and the gestures from the Celestial empire.** Let
the reader contrast this dissembled resignation with the anxiety betrayed by the same
paper, in the article above transcribed of the 2nd of May, and it will give him an adequate idea of the sincerity, and of the consistency, of the organs of British Aristocracy.
nothing is to be expected from the Justice of the administration at Washington, and, it is believed, that nothing but the attitude taken by England
and France on the subject of Texas can prevent the American Government from accomplishing annexation. We look out, therefore, with impatience to know what effect the demonstration made by both Houses of.
Parliament (on the 4th of April) may have produced in Hie United
States." It becomes evident from the above avowal that much, to prevent the last act of annexation, was expected from the warlike demonstration of Parliament, &c. Well, the Caledonia arrived on tho 14th of
Mav« brimrimr out the expected news; it tumid out that tho threats
from England had not the anticipated effect, and the agent of the Times
in this country (a Genevese Traveller)# and that of the Morning Chronicle
(Publicus) agreed in advising the British Government to give up, for the
present, the bullying system—that it would not do, that Mr. Polk would
be sustained, &c.; the consequ mce was, that the organs of the aristocracy, although awfully disappointed, declared sullenly, that they were
well satisfied with the news.
The purport of the above disquisition is to enable the reader to form, at
once, a correct view of the reasoning I am going to set forth as to the
probable effect of the President's Message in England, and I proceed,
now, to quote those parts thereof that bear upon the Oregon question.
The President states as follows: "Though entertaining the settled
conviction, that the British pretensions of title could not be maintained to
any portion of the Oregon territory, upon any principle of public law recognised by nations, yet, ifiTdeference to what had been done by my predecessors, and especially in consideration that propositions of compromise had been* thrice made by two preceding administrations, to adjust
the question on the parallel of forty-nine degrees, and in two of them
yielding to Great Britain the free navigation of the Columbia, and that
the pending negotiation had been commenced on the basis of compromise*
I deemed it to be my duty-not absolutely to break it oil'. In consideration, too, that under the conventions of 1818 and 1827, the citizens and
subjects of the two powers held a joint occupancy of the country, and
was induced to make another effort to settle their long pending controversy in the spirit of moderation which had given birth to the renewed
discussion.    A proposition was accordingly made, which was rejected
• The letters in the Times, subscribed «* A Genevese Traveller,'* aro enditcd by a
person in this city named D****, as it appears from tho following anecdote recited by
Lord Ashburton iniocoso conversation; hero is tho substance of tho great banker's
bon-mot: •• A few days after my arrival in New York I wrote a rote to Mr. D., stating
0 at I should be happy to see him at my apartments at the Astor House; he accord-
mgiy called on me, and when we were closeted together I told him—' well Mr. D. wo
value your letters very highly in England, as tbe information thoy convey to us is very
useful, and if I can render you any service, I will be verv happy to do it; your style
is remarkably clear and forcible, and there was a passage in one of your letters which
struck us as being peculiarly significative. You said * If the proper man be sent over,
there is no difficulty to arrange the Northeastern Boundary, You had, no doubt,
something important and particularly in view for using tbe qualifying adjective of
prefer 7' Mr. D. answered me he had not; he meant, that a personage like me, by
instance, he considered a proper man.** His lordship was of course too discreet to'
mention- whether ar.y services were rendered. This anecdote shows that Lord Ashburton liked, occasionally, to crack a joke. - In note 4, of article No. 3,1 have taken the
same view of the subject as had been expressed by •« a Genevese Traveller**—-the,
or tat SAiocxa was, indeed, the,prqper.m*^.^ „. ~?Lx       . „'.._ '$&&    * -1 -
5 g&    S . '
by the British plenipotentiary, who, without submitting any other proposition, suffered the negotiation on his part to drop, expressing his trust
that the United States would offer what he saw fit to call * some farther
proposal for the settlement of the Oregon question, more consistent with
fairness and equity, and with tbe reasonable expectation of the British
Government.' Tne proposition thus offered and rejected, repeated the
offer of tbe parallel of forty-nine degrees of north latitude, which bad
been made by two preceding administrations, but without proposing to
surrender to Great Britain, as they had done, the free navigation of the
Columbia river." Further., the President states: *' Had this been a new
question, coming under discussion for the first time, this proposition would
not have been made. The extraordinary and wholly inadmissible demands
of the British Government, and the rejection of the proposition made in
deference alone to what had been do&e by my predecessors, and the implied obligations which their acts seemed to impose, afford satisfactory
evidence that no compromise that the United States ought to accept can
be effected. With this conviction, the propositi" a which had been made
and rejected, was, by my direction, subsequently withdrawn, and
our title to the whole Oregon Territory asserted, and, as is believed, maintained by irrefragable facts and arguments."
The passages in italics in the above paragraph set forth that Mr. Polk
has no expectation that any " compromise that the United States ought
to accept can be effected;" and, then, that u our title to the whole Oregon
Territory is asserted, and, as is believed, maintained by irrefragable facts,"
&c. The above official declaration, it cannot be denied, is much stronger than that of the Inaugural, which expressed merely an opinion. I
refer on this point to the assertion I made in No. 6 of this series,* and I
make bold to assert, besides, (in case the emergency I have alluded to in
No. 6 does not happen,) that we will not hear this time that the mail
steamer has been delayed for the purpose of threatening us, as in April
last, with the whole budget jf a general denunciation.
The following passages of the Message lay down principles on international law, which will be galling to the British Aristocracy, to wit—
** The United States, sincerely desirous of preserving relations of good
understanding with all nations, cannot in silence permit any European
interference on the North American continent; and should any be attempted, will be ready 'o resist it at all hazards."   And—
" Existing rights of every European nation should be respected; but
it is due alike to our safety and our interests, that the efficient protection
of our laws should be extended over our whole territorial limits, and
that if should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled pob'cy,
that no future European colony or dominion, shall, with our consent, be
planted or established on any part of the North American continent."
On the whole, it may be said that no Message issued from the Presidential chf'r has ever asserted rights and doctrines so offensive to the views of
the statesmen of England, as the one I am reviewing; and yet, I assert in
advance, that no ministerial ebullition will take place. This assertion will
seem at first as bejn°; an anomaly; but those persons who have read my preceding numbers will appreciate the correctness of the following reasoning,
why such am offensive message will, nevertheless, have a peaceful tendency
in England.   The popular enthusiasm that the Message has produced in
* See tat third paragraph thereof.
the United States will be known or foreseen in England at about the
time it will be received there, and the British ministers, on ascertaining
that the great mass of the American people are ready to sustain the President, will give up bullying ; they never meant to go to war for Oregon,
and their secret resolve on the subject will become thus apparent to the
whole world; they know that they can hold, their own in Oregon for
many years to come, and they will trust the result to procrastination,
bribery, and the intrigues of ail kinds which they understand so well
how to manage.
I remarked in No. 6 of this series that the Message had silenced the
opponents of the President for a while ; but they have been covertly at
work; their movements begin to be perceptible—rw,ny of the letter
writers and several of the presses, which were foremost for the whole of
Oregon, have fallen back rather abruptly on 49 degrees, and will fall
lower still whenever it suits the secret influence which is acting upon
them ; the Whig presses in the Atlantic cities, and the British organs in
general, has lately teemed with articles and rumors whose burthen is to
prepare the public mind for concession ; delay, is now the watch-word
among the initiated, and, yesterday, the Editor of the Courier and Inquirer,
who is generally so very ferocious against his opponents in politics, comes
down on his knees to implore u men of all parties to use their influence,
at least to delay the adoption by either house of Congress of any proposition now before it—either for giving'the twelve months notice toGr*»at
Britain, or for extending the jurisdiction of our laws over our citizens in
Oregon, or for increasing our military force with a view to occupying
posu. jn the route, to and within, that territory." The Govtier who
swaggered so much lately about military preparations, is now even opposed to increase " our military force with a view to occupying posts
on the route to Oregon" for fear it might give offence to Great Britain. At
Washington, various insidious means and measures are contrived, also, to
delay, and prevent, if possible, the action of Congress on the express
recommendations of the President; and a debate has lately taken place
in the Senate, whereof a brief synopsis will throw some light on the
tactics of those who, directly or indirectly, act under the influence of
British interests.
On the 30th of December, the resolutions of Mr. Hannegan came up;
they were read, and on motion of Mr. Archer, seconded by the mover,
the consideration thereof was postponed; but Mr. Calhoun, it seems,
thought that this was a fit opportunity " to define his position : " after a
short preamble, he introduced a set of resolutions, and made a speech
which does not bespeak much for his frankness, for he appeared to be
very studious to defend the course of the President on the Oregon question against the implied censure of Mr. Hannegan ; while, on the other
hand, he declares he is opposed to giving the year's notice to England,
which the President expressedly recommends in the following explicit
44 All attempts at compromise having failed, it becomes the duty' of
Congress U$ consider what measures it may be proper to adopt for the
security and protection of our citizens now inhabiting, or who may hereafter inhabit Oregon, and for the maintenance of our just title to that territory. In adopting measures for this purpose, Care should be taken that
nothing be done to violate the stipulations of the convention of 1827,


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