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The multiple advocacy strategy and the role of the custodian : the Carter years Moens, A. Alexander 1988

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THE MULTIPLE ADVOCACY STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF THE CUSTODIAN: THE CARTER YEARS By A. ALEXANDER MOENS B.A., U n i v e r s i t y of L e t h b r i d g e , 1982 M.A., McMaster U n i v e r s i t y , 1983 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA January 1988 © A. Alexander Moens, 1988 3 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6(3/81) i i ABSTRACT The i n c r e a s i n g complexity and high stakes of f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y of major powers such as the United S t a t e s , have generated s p e c i a l i z e d s t u d i e s of d e c i s i o n -making. One approach, c a l l e d " m u l t i p l e advocacy," maps a s t r a t e g y of r o l e t asks and process norms to guide the decision-makers towards an optimal decision-making p r o c e s s . T h i s process allows the P r e s i d e n t to make an informed p o l i c y c h o i c e as a r e s u l t of having heard a v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s debated f r e e l y and openly among h i s a d v i s o r s i n h i s presence. A c r u c i a l a c t o r i n t h i s process i s the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r . As process manager or " c u s t o d i a n , " he must ensure t h a t the key p r o v i s i o n s of the s t r a t e g y are met while a b s t a i n i n g from p e r s o n a l involvement i n the substance of p o l i c y advice and e x e c u t i o n . T h i s t h e s i s examines the i n t e r n a l coherence and u s e f u l n e s s of the s t r a t e g y . The f i r s t two years of the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p rovide a c l o s e approximation of the s t r a t e g y . Four important p o l i c y i s s u e s during t h i s p e r i o d form the e m p i r i c a l b a s i s of t h i s t e s t : the "Deep Cuts" proposals i n SALT I I , the war i n the Horn of A f r i c a , Sino-American N o r m a l i z a t i o n , and the f a l l o f the Shah of I r a n . i i i While the b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s of the s t r a t e g y are found u s e f u l and sound, s e v e r a l of i t s p r o v i s i o n s are c h a l l e n g e d . F i r s t , i n s p i t e of i t s c l a i m , the s t r a t e g y does not produce m u l t i p l e o p t i o n s when the a d v i s o r s have no wide divergence of o p i n i o n . Second, c o n t r a r y to the s t r a t e g y ' s p r e s c r i p t i o n s , the c u s t o d i a n can improve the process in such s i t u a t i o n s by j o i n i n g the p o l i c y debate. T h i r d , c u s t o d i a l engagement in a c t i v i t i e s such as diplomacy and p u b l i c speaking need not be p r o h i b i t e d too s t r i c t l y . L a s t , the demise of the s t r a t e g y can be more narrowly de f i n e d as the r e s u l t of c u s t o d i a l d i s r e g a r d f o r a f r e e flow of i n f o r m a t i o n and open p a r t i c i p a t i o n among the a d v i s o r s . Though f u r t h e r s t u d i e s are needed to widen the e m p i r i c a l base, s e v e r a l t e n t a t i v e suggestions are o f f e r e d to improve the s t r a t e g y . The p r e s i d e n t must i n s i s t on a reasonable range of o p i n i o n s when a p p o i n t i n g a d v i s o r s . While the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r may j o i n the p o l i c y debate to widen the range of o p t i o n s , h i s p o l i c y advice should not become the r u l e . At a l l times the P r e s i d e n t must i n s i s t t h a t a l l p o l i c y debates among h i s a d v i s o r s be brought to h i s a t t e n t i o n , and t h a t a l l p o l i c y options r e c e i v e a f a i r h e a r i n g . i v CONTENTS A b s t r a c t i i Acknowledgement v i I The M u l t i p l e Advocacy S t r a t e g y 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 2 D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g : The Background t o the S t r a t e g y . . 5 The M u l t i p l e Advocacy S t r a t e g y . . / . 12 The Development o f the S t r a t e g y 19 The S t r a t e g y ' s Reviews and C r i t i c i s m s 33 T e s t i n g the Role P r e s c r i p t i o n s o f the S t r a t e g y . . . . 38 Notes 48 I I M u l t i p l e Advocacy and C a r t e r ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s 55 The P r e s i d e n t ' s S t y l e 56 The S t r u c t u r e o f D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g 61 Advocate Resources 65 Advocate C o m p e t i t i o n and Advocate D i v e r s i t y 74 The C u s t o d i a n 78 Summary and C o n c l u s i o n 85 Notes 89 I I I SALT I I : The "Deep C u t s " P r o p o s a l s o f March 1977 96 The Background 97 The P r e s i d e n t ' s View 102 The D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s 105 The Advocate's Views and the R a t i o n a l e Behind t h e D e c i s i o n 110 Vance's T r i p t o Moscow 115 The M u l t i p l e Advocacy S t r a t e g y and E x p l a i n i n g the F a i l u r e 119 Notes 126 IV The War i n the Horn o f A f r i c a 131 The War and I t s Background 132 C a r t e r ' s A f r i c a P o l i c y and the B e g i n n i n g o f the Ogaden War 138 The D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s 141 P u b l i c Speaking and the C u s t o d i a n 146 E v a l u a t i n g the D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s and the C u s t o d i a n 151 The D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s and the D e c i s i o n 154 Notes 157 V V N o r m a l i z i n g R e l a t i o n s With t h e Pe o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f China 162 The Background 164 C a r t e r ' s B e l i e f s and O b j e c t i v e s Toward China 168 The D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s 170 Vance's T r i p t o China 175 E v a l u a t i n g the D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s and Outcome 177 The D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s Continued 181 B r z e z i n s k i ' s T r i p , N o r m a l i z a t i o n and a P o l i c y i n D i s a r r a y 185 E v a l u a t i n g the D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s and Outcome I I 190 C o n c l u s i o n 194 Notes 196 VI , The F a l l o f the Shah 202 Background 204 C a r t e r and I r a n 210 The D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s and the D e v e l o p i n g C r i s i s 215 E v a l u a t i n g the Opti o n s and D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s 222 The D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s and the F a l l o f the Shah 225 An E v a l u a t i o n o f the D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s 237 E v a l u a t i n g the Outcome: Could the U n i t e d S t a t e s Have Done B e t t e r ? 241 C o n c l u s i o n 247 Notes 248 V I I C o n c l u s i o n 257 The Implementation o f the S t r a t e g y 258 D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g Flaws and How t o Improve the S t r a t e g y 260 M a l f u n c t i o n s i n the D e c i s i o n P r o c e s s and Outcomes 268 Recommendations f o r Improving t h e S t r a t e g y 280 C o n c l u s i o n 282 Notes 287 B i b l i o g r a p h y 290 v i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would l i k e to express my thanks to my s u p e r v i s o r K a l H o l s t i f o r always keeping the pace on the t h e s i s . A l s o , Doug Ross and Paul Marantz have c o n t r i b u t e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y to the eventual success of t h i s u n dertaking. My h e a r t f e l t g r a t i t u d e goes towards two key soures of support f o r my education i n g e n e r a l and my d o c t o r a l s t u d i e s i n p a r t i c u l a r . F i r s t , my parents whose emotional and f i n a n c i a l help was of such value to me th a t i t seems f u t i l e to search f o r l o f t y words to represent my a p p r e c i a t i o n . Second, my wife Marsha who provided the s t a b l e background and l o v i n g environment which makes the s t r e s s of w r i t i n g b e a r a b l e . As i f tha t was not enough, she typed the e n t i r e t h e s i s . 1 CHAPTER ONE THE MULTIPLE ADVOCACY DECISION STRATEGY 2 INTRODUCTION T h i s t h e s i s e v a l u a t e s the m u l t i p l e advocacy d e c i s i o n s t r a t e g y . The s t r a t e g y was de v e l o p e d by A l e x a n d e r George i n the e a r l y 1970's t o h e l p American p r e s i d e n t s i n the realm of f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . The s t r a t e g y a l l o c a t e s d i f f e r e n t r o l e t a s k s t o v a r i o u s p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , and o u t l i n e s s e v e r a l p r o c e d u r e s t o s t r u c t u r e i t . The p r e s i d e n t , l i k e a m a g i s t r a t e , i s the f i n a l a r b i t e r of the p o l i c y c h o i c e s s u b m i t t e d t o him. The s e n i o r a d v i s o r s f u n c t i o n as ad v o c a t e s of the v a r i o u s p o l i c y o p t i o n s . The N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r , c a l l e d the c u s t o d i a n , i s the p r o c e s s manager. He must ensure t h a t the f o l l o w i n g p r o c e d u r e s a re met: the p r e s i d e n t must p a r t i c i p a t e i n the d i s c u s s i o n of the o p t i o n s , the advoc a t e s must have a f a i r chance t o v o i c e t h e i r f a v o u r e d p o l i c y s o l u t i o n s , and r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l r e s o u r c e s t o do so. The p r e s i d e n t i s t o s t a y i n f o r m e d about p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s among h i s a d v i s o r s . F i n a l l y , t he c u s t o d i a n has t o i n v i t e o t h e r a d v i s o r s i f he f e e l s not enough d i f f e r e n t o p t i o n s a re p r e s e n t e d t o the p r e s i d e n t . W h i l e p e r f o r m i n g t h e s e d u t i e s , the c u s t o d i a n must not engage i n o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s t h a t may compromise h i s a b i l i t y t o be an e f f e c t i v e p r o c e s s manager. Among these a r e p o l i c y advocacy, p u b l i c s p e a k i n g on p o l i c y , d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s , and p o l i c y enforcement and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . George s t a t e s t h a t any of t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s w i l l undermine 3 t h e c u s t o d i a n ' s a b i l i t y t o ensure the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the p r o c e s s p r o c e d u r e s . George's s t r a t e g y i s a d i r e c t attempt t o remedy s e v e r a l problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g as o u t l i n e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the s t r a t e g y aims t o overcome the d i s t o r t i o n s caused by B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s and s m a l l group i n t e r a c t i o n . I t a l s o p r o v i d e s guidance f o r the p r e s i d e n t t o manage h i s time more e f f e c t i v e l y , and t o d e a l b e t t e r w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n u n c e r t a i n t y and v a l u e c o m p l e x i t y . The s t r a t e g y d i d not undergo a comprehensive e v a l u a t i o n u n t i l D a v i d H a l l ' s s t u d y of 1982. B e f o r e t h e n , s e v e r a l a u t h o r s q u e s t i o n e d i n d i v i d u a l a s p e c t s of i t . Some f e l t t h a t the s t r a t e g y d i d not account s a t i s f a c t o r i l y f o r the d i f f e r e n c e s i n p e r s o n a l s t y l e among p r e s i d e n t s . O t h e r s were c r i t i c a l of the r o l e p r e s c r i p t i o n s and p r o s c r i p t i o n s imposed on the v a r i o u s p a r t i c i p a n t s , e s p e c i a l l y on the c u s t o d i a n . S t i l l o t h e r s were s k e p t i c a l about the f e a s i b i l i t y of s e n i o r a d v i s o r s competing on a r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l b a s i s f o r the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e i r p o l i c y c h o i c e s . H a l l examined the f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s from 1947 t o 1980 i n an attempt t o e v a l u a t e the f e a s i b i l i t y of implementing the s t r a t e g y . H a l l found t h a t the s t r a t e g y was p r a c t i c a l and q u i t e f e a s i b l e t o implement. A l s o , a l l o w i n g f o r minor v a r i a t i o n s i n the r o l e t a s k p r e s c r i p t i o n s , H a l l c o n c l u d e d t h a t the s t r a t e g y was g e n e r a l l y sound and t h a t i t p r o v i d e d a u s e f u l t o o l f o r i d e n t i f y i n g m a l f u n c t i o n s i n the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s . T h i s t h e s i s examines the f u n c t i o n i n g of the s t r a t e g y 4 d u r i n g the f i r s t two y e a r s of the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . D u r i n g t h i s t i m e , most of i t s r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e d u r e s were ap p r o x i m a t e d . The t h e s i s c h a l l e n g e s the f o r m u l a t i o n of the r o l e t a s k s f o r the c u s t o d i a n . I w i l l show t h a t the c u s t o d i a n can advocate on p o l i c y , e s p e c i a l l y when the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s f a i l s t o produce a d i v e r s i t y of o p t i o n s among the a d v o c a t e s . Indeed, by d o i n g so, he improves the f u n c t i o n i n g of the s t r a t e g y and, as a r e s u l t , the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . Moreover, the c u s t o d i a n c a n, a t t i m e s , engage i n p u b l i c s p e a k i n g as w e l l as diplomacy w i t h o u t compromising h i s c u s t o d i a l d u t i e s . The s t r a t e g y i s o n l y undermined when the c u s t o d i a n b l o c k s the o t h e r a d v o c a t e s from a c c e s s t o the d e c i s i o n forums, when he f a i l s t o e l e v a t e p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s among the a d v o c a t e s t o the p r e s i d e n t , when he f a i l s t o engage the p r e s i d e n t i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , and when he a t t e m p t s p e r s o n a l l y t o e n f o r c e or implement the p r e s i d e n t ' s p o l i c y . C o n t r a r y t o George and H a l l ' s arguments, thes e c u s t o d i a l v i o l a t i o n s do not n e c e s s a r i l y f l o w from h i s p o l i c y advocacy r o l e . The t h e s i s p r o v i d e s an e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s of the f u n c t i o n i n g of the s t r a t e g y . W h i l e the s t r a t e g y i s found u s e f u l and sound i n i t s b a s i c p u r p o s e s , s e v e r a l improvements a r e needed. The t h e s i s c o n t r i b u t e s t o the stu d y of d e c i s i o n -making by r e f o r m u l a t i n g the r o l e t a s k s of the c u s t o d i a n . W h i l e the s t r a t e g y emphasizes c o r r e c t l y the importance of the p r o c e d u r e s , and the c u s t o d i a n ' s r e s p o n s i b l i t y i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e s e , i t has u n n e c e s s a r i l y r e s t r i c t e d the a c t i v i t i e s of the c u s t o d i a n . Moreover, t h i s t h e s i s 5 i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t a c l o s e a p p r o x i m a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y may s t i l l not produce a d i v e r s i t y of o p i n i o n among the a d v o c a t e s . In such a c a s e , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o broaden the r o l e t a s k s of the c u s t o d i a n . DECISION-MAKING: THE BACKGROUND TO THE STRATEGY George's p r e s c r i p t i v e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g model i s p a r t of a much l a r g e r e f f o r t i n the f i e l d of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s t o improve our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . I t i s p a r t of a body of s t u d i e s i n p s y c h o l o g y , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t u d i e s , as w e l l as s t r a t e g i c s t u d i e s , a l l a t t e m p t i n g t o i d e n t i f y weaknesses i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g and p r e s c r i b e improvements t o the p r o c e s s . The dominant c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i n the 1940's and 1950's was c a l l e d the r a t i o n a l a c t o r model. As b e s t s y m b o l i z e d i n Morgenthau's major t e x t of 1948, most w r i t e r s d i s c u s s e d and a n a l y z e d the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s as an a n a l y t i c p r o c e s s i n which r a t i o n a l a c t o r s sought t o maximize t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s by means of a c l e a r l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s of the c o s t s and b e n e f i t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the v a r i o u s c o u r s e s of a c t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o them. 1 They c o n c e p t u a l i z e d the s t a t e as i t s o f f i c i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s and s t a t e a c t i o n as the a c t i o n taken by th o s e who r e p r e s e n t i t . These a c t o r s were assumed t o be one i n a c t i o n . T h i s u n i t a r y a c t o r i s engaged i n r a t i o n a l problem 6 s o l v i n g . 2 The d e c i s i o n - m a k e r h o l d s c e r t a i n v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s which can be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o some method of p r e f e r e n c e r a n k i n g , u s i n g a u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n or c o s t - b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s . The d e s i r a b i l i t y of e x p e c t e d outcomes of a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n can be e v a l u a t e d i n l i g h t of t h e s e ranked v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s . Whenever a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r p e r c e i v e s an o p p o r t u n i t y or a t h r e a t v i s - a - v i s t h e s e v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s , he or she i s moved t o c o n s i d e r a response. He or she then assembles a v a i l a b l e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The e x p e c t e d consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n a r e then e v a l u a t e d v i s - a - v i s h i s or her v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s , u s i n g the best a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n . I t i s assumed t h a t the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s a b l e t o rank l o g i c a l l y and compare h i s or her v a l u e s . The r a t i o n a l a c t o r s e l e c t s the o p t i o n whose e x p e c t e d consequences maximize h i s or her v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s . W i t h the e x p a n s i o n of the r o l e of the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n w o r l d a f f a i r s , more and more s c h o l a r s began t o q u e s t i o n t h i s o p t i m i s t i c c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . I s s u e s such as d e t e r r e n c e and c r i s i s management f o c u s s e d American s c h o l a r s h i p on the d a i l y management of government and i t s d e c i s i o n s on t h e s e major i s s u e s . At f i r s t , a group of s c h o l a r s drew a t t e n t i o n t o a f a c t o r i n t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s not a c c o u n t e d f o r i n the r a t i o n a l a c t o r c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . Snyder, Bruck and S a p i n , as w e l l as H a r o l d and Margaret Sprout i l l u s t r a t e d t h a t t h e r e o f t e n e x i s t s a d i s c r e p a n c y between the o b j e c t i v e environment i n which a d e c i s i o n t a k e s p l a c e and the way the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r 7 p e r c e i v e s t h a t e n v i r o n m e n t . 3 S i n c e i t i s t h e p e r c e p t i o n of the d e c i s i o n maker t h a t i n f l u e n c e s h i s d e c i s i o n , we must stu d y the f a c t o r s t h a t e x p l a i n how and why they p e r c e i v e the environment as they do. A l s o , Snyder e t a l . showed t h a t most d e c i s i o n s a r e made w i t h i n the c o n t e x t of l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . I t i s t h e r e f o r e inadequate t o assume t h a t the d e c i s i o n maker a c t s as a u n i t a r y a c t o r . R a t h e r , the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s such as s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , h i e r a r c h y and s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s as w e l l as i n t e r a g e n c y b a r g a i n i n g , w i l l i n f l u e n c e the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . In a d d i t i o n t o co n c e r n s about the p e r c e p t i o n of d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s and the environments i n which they o p e r a t e , a n o t h e r f i e l d , c o g n i t i v e p s y c h o l o g y , began t o c o n t r i b u t e t o the study of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . De R i v e r a , J a n i s , J e r v i s and Cottam drew a t t e n t i o n t o c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the human mind which d i r e c t l y c o n c e r n i t s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g c a p a c i t y . De R i v e r a and J e r v i s , f o r example, showed t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g by a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s not as easy or p e r f e c t a p r o c e s s as assumed by the r a t i o n a l a c t o r c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . " I n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d by a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s o f t e n ambiguous, complex and even c o n t r a d i c t o r y . Moreover, the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r has a v a r i e t y of b i a s e s and images t h a t d i s t o r t the way he p e r c e i v e s the i n f o r m a t i o n . W h i l e o f f e r i n g no s o l u t i o n s t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r , J e r v i s recommends t h a t he or she a n a l y z e the i n f o r m a t i o n from as many competing images and m u l t i p l e p e r s p e c t i v e s as p o s s i b l e . The study of the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s images, b e l i e f 8 systems and b i a s e s gave r i s e t o a f u r t h e r body of work. F e s t i n g e r l a i d the b a s i s on which many s c h o l a r s s t a r t e d t o stud y the v a r i o u s d i s t o r t i o n s t o o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g caused by b e l i e f s y s t e m s . 5 Works by Ole H o l s t i and N o r t h among o t h e r s , have i l l u s t r a t e d how a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s b i a s e s can impede h i s a b i l i t y t o make an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n . 6 In a d d i t i o n t o the study of g e n e r a l i z e d p s y c h o l o g i c a l p a t t e r n s of i n d i v i d u a l problem s o l v i n g , s e v e r a l a u t h o r s began t o i n v e s t i g a t e the p s y c h o l o g i c a l a t t r i b u t e s of d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s as w e l l as the e f f e c t s of time c o n s t r a i n t s and c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s on the thought p r o c e s s e s of d e c i s i o n -makers. S t u d i e s by C h a r l e s Hermann and Ole H o l s t i showed t h a t c r i s i s - i n d u c e d s t r e s s caused a b e r r a t i o n s i n l o g i c a l problem s o l v i n g . 7 P e r s i s t e n t h i g h l e v e l s of s t r e s s narrow the range of a l t e r n a t i v e s c o n s i d e r e d by the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r , i n c r e a s e s t e r e o t y p i n g , i n c r e a s e e a r l y consensus s e e k i n g and the s e l e c t i v i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g , and reduce the t o l e r a n c e f o r a m b i g u i t y . R e s e a r c h i n t o the b e h a v i o r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s m a l l group i n t e r a c t i o n s f u r t h e r c o n t r i b u t e d t o the study of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . W h i l e s m a l l group i n t e r a c t i o n can improve the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of v a r i o u s c o u r s e s of a c t i o n f o r the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r , J a n i s - h a s shown t h a t such i n t e r a c t i o n can a l s o l e a d t o v a r i o u s d i s t o r t i o n s . 8 V a r i o u s p r e s s u r e s f o r c o n f o r m i t y w i t h i n the group can cause i t t o reduce i t s a n a l y t i c a l powers. I n s t e a d of p r o v i d i n g the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r w i t h a v a r i e t y of o p i n i o n s , the group may f u n c t i o n as a source of support f o r i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s on a consensus view . 9 The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l environment of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , d i s c u s s e d i n the Snyder e t . a l . s t u d y , was f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d by such s c h o l a r s as N e u s t a d t , W i l e n s k y and H i l s m a n , and l a t e r a p p l i e d s p e c i f i c a l l y t o f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g by H a l p e r i n and D e s t l e r . 9 V a r i o u s r e s u l t s from t h e s e s t u d i e s have d i r e c t r e l e v a n c e f o r the study of d e c i s i o n making. F i r s t , s p e c i a l i z a t i o n of t a s k s and r o l e s w i t h i n l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s can cause i n d i v i d u a l s t o pursue the i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r departments w i t h more v i g o r than t h e i n t e r e s t s of the government as a whole. As a r e s u l t , the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s may become s c a t t e r e d and i n c o m p l e t e . Second, the b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s among departments and branches of government may a f f e c t the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s i n ways t h a t do not c o n t r i b u t e t o the q u a l i t y of the f i n a l d e c i s i o n outcome. A l l i s o n , i n h i s study of t h r e e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g models, c a l l e d t h i s phenomenon " B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s . " 1 0 As a r e s u l t of t h i s phenomenon, f i n a l d e c i s i o n s may be d e t e r m i n e d by the tug of war between t h e v a r i o u s departments r a t h e r than by the a n a l y t i c a l m e r i t of the choosen o p t i o n . T h i r d , the s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s by which l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s f u n c t i o n may s t i f l e the s e a r c h f o r f r e s h o p t i o n s and n o v e l approaches and thus i n h i b i t the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . W h i l e most of the above mentioned s t u d i e s c h a l l e n g e many fundamental assumptions i n the c l a s s i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , they do not c h a l l e n g e the n o t i o n t h a t the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i s a more or l e s s o r d e r l y p r o c e s s i n which t h e a c t o r ( s ) seek t o get the 10 b e s t p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n by means of a more or l e s s a n a l y t i c a l or l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of s e v e r a l i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n the p r o c e s s . A l s o , as S t e i n e r p o i n t s o u t , w h i l e they a c c e p t a more "bounded" view of the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s r a t i o n a l i t y , they seek t o p r e s c r i b e measures t o improve the r a t i o n a l i t y of the p r o c e s s . 1 1 March, Simon, L i n d b l o m and Braybrooke have d e s c r i b e d the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n terms t h a t q u e s t i o n the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s d e s i r e t o maximize h i s or her o b j e c t i v e s . 1 2 I n s t e a d , they argue, the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r merely seeks t o " s a t i s f i c e " . D e c i s i o n - m a k e r s seldom jump a t g r e a t o p p o r t u n i t e s t o b r i n g about s u b s t a n t i a l change. I s s u e s a r e d e a l t w i t h when something f i n a l l y needs t o be done and a r e t r e a t e d as problems t h a t need temporary a m e l i o r a t i o n . D e c i s i o n - m a k e r s move away from problems r a t h e r than toward g o a l s . The s e a r c h f o r i n f o r m a t i o n s t o p s when an o p t i o n i s found t h a t i s "good enough." V a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s a r e not " s a c r e d " o b j e c t i v e s . t o which the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s d e e p l y a t t a c h e d . Nor can they be e a s i l y ranked or compared. I n s t e a d of m a x i m i z i n g t h e i r v a l u e s , the a v a i l a b l e means determine the e x t e n t t o which c e r t a i n v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d d e s i r a b l e . They a l s o p e r c e i v e the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s as a h i g h l y d e c e n t r a l i z e d p r o c e s s i n which t h e r e a re many o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r re v i e w and ad j u s t m e n t . F i n a l l y , the c h o i c e of a p o l i c y o p t i o n i s not n e c e s s a r i l y g u i d e d by i t s a n a l y t i c a l m e r i t but a l s o by the degree of a c c e p t a b i l i t y the o p t i o n has among the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the p r o c e s s . 11 S t e i n b r u n e r has drawn f u r t h e r a t t e n t i o n t o the non r a t i o n a l a s p e c t s of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . 1 3 He argues t h a t a c o g n i t i v e / c y b e r n e t i c view of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g can e x p l a i n s e v e r a l a s p e c t s of the p r o c e s s b e t t e r than the r a t i o n a l / a n a l y t i c p e r s p e c t i v e . The d e c i s i o n - m a k e r , i n t h i s v i e w , makes ample use of h i s i n t u i t i o n and p a s t e x p e r i e n c e i n problem s o l v i n g . He m o n i t o r s o n l y a r e s t r i c t e d s e t of i m p o r t a n t v a r i a b l e s when f a c e d w i t h a c h o i c e . In so d o i n g , he a v o i d s i n f o r m a t i o n o v e r l o a d . H i s p a s t e x p e r i e n c e t e l l s him which v a r i a b l e s a r e c r i t i c a l . When problems a r e complex, he b r e a k s them down i n t o l i m i t e d d i m e n s i o n s . S t e i n e r a g r e e s w i t h S t e i n b r u n e r t h a t s e v e r a l a s p e c t s of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s can not be d e a l t w i t h by the " c o n v e n t i o n a l " a n a l y t i c p a r a d i g m s . 1 * She accuses the a n a l y t i c a l models of p r e s c r i b i n g r a t i o n a l i s t i c p r e s c r i p t i o n s t o a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r who f a c e s many i r r a t i o n a l e v e n t s . I n s t e a d , S t e i n e r a d v o c a t e s t h a t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t u d i e s c o n c e n t r a t e on such f a c t o r s as s u b j e c t i v e awareness and i n c o n g r u i t y i n the s i t u a t i o n s f a c e d by the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r , and p r e s c r i b e c r e a t i v e accommodation t o s o l v e t h e s e dilemmas. W h i l e the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of Simon e t a l . , S t e i n b r u n e r and S t e i n e r have v a l i d i t y , they themselves c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e i r f i n d i n g s do not r e p l a c e the a n a l y t i c a l models. In f a c t t h e i r w r i t i n g s a r e more d e s c r i p t i v e than p r e s c r i p t i v e . T h e r e f o r e , i n h i s attempt t o improve the p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , George has c o n c e n t r a t e d on tho s e a n a l y t i c a l a s p e c t s of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s t h a t l e n d 12 t h e m s e l v e s t o a c l e a r p r e s c r i p t i v e a n a l y s i s . H i s s t r a t e g y seeks t o i n t e g r a t e the major f i n d i n g s i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g l i t e r a t u r e a t the i n d i v i d u a l , group and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l e v e l s . S t r u c t u r a l or i n s t i t u t i o n a l changes a r e not c o n s i d e r e d as u s e f u l as improvements i n the e x e c u t i v e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . The next s e c t i o n d e s c r i b e s the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . The s e c t i o n f o l l o w i n g w i l l d i s c u s s i n d e t a i l how the p r o c e d u r e s and r o l e t a s k s of the s t r a t e g y have been d e r i v e d from a v a r i e t y of s t u d i e s i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g f i e l d and how George a t t e m p t s t o i n t e g r a t e t h e s e i n t o a more or l e s s complete p r e s c r i p t i v e model. THE MULTIPLE ADVOCACY STRATEGY The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i s a p r e s c r i p t i v e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g m o d e l . 1 5 I t i s a s t r a t e g y i n the sense t h a t i t p r o v i d e s f o r a l o g i c a l l i n k between the means and ends of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . I t o u t l i n e s a s e t of r o l e t a s k s f o r the p l a y e r s and a s e t of p r o c e s s norms f o r t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n . These r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e s s norms must be seen as a means towards a p a r t i c u l a r end. The end g o a l f o r which t h e s e means s e r v e i s t o g e n e r a t e a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t o p t i o n s on any g i v e n p o l i c y problem, and a f r e e debate on these o p t i o n s . Such a m u l t i p l i c i t y of o p t i o n s and debate i s b e l i e v e d t o p r o v i d e the p r e s i d e n t w i t h the b e s t forum t o s e l e c t the most 13 o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n t o the problem a t hand. I t i s a l s o a p r e s c r i p t i v e model i n the sense t h a t i t o u t l i n e s e x a c t l y which b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s must be f o l l o w e d . The p r e s c r i p t i o n of c e r t a i n b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s a u t o m a t i c a l l y i m p l i e s the p r o h i b i t i o n or p r o s c r i p t i o n of o t h e r b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s . George has d e f i n e d c e r t a i n p r o s c r i p t i o n s e s p e c i a l l y f o r the r o l e t a s k of c u s t o d i a n . These w i l l a l s o be d i s c u s s e d below. The s t r a t e g y p r o v i d e s f o r a s e t of b e h a v i o u r a l norms f o r the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n a complex h i e r a r c h i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n where i n d i v i d u a l e x e c u t i v e s a r e u l t i m a t e l y a c c o u n t a b l e f o r major p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . 1 6 An example of such a s e t t i n g i s the American f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . The p r e s i d e n t , though surrounded by v a r i o u s c a b i n e t o f f i c e r s and p e r s o n a l a d v i s o r s i s u l t i m a t e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the d e c i s i o n s made by the e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h . The p r o c e s s of p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , r a t h e r than the l a r g e r p r o c e s s of e x e c u t i v e - l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n on p o l i c y , i s the f o c u s of t h i s s t r a t e g y . T h i s p r o c e s s i s b e s t c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a more or l e s s f r e e f l o w i n g i n t e r a c t i o n between the p r e s i d e n t and h i s a d v i s o r s i n which s e v e r a l p o l i c y o p t i o n s a r e c o n s i d e r e d . The p r o c e s s i s completed when the p r e s i d e n t s e l e c t s an o p t i o n f o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y a t t e m p t s t o s t r u c t u r e t h i s p r o c e s s i n such a way t h a t t h e p r e s i d e n t a c h i e v e s a maximum number of o p t i o n s and a thorough debate on them. The s t r a t e g y p o s i t s the p r e s i d e n t as the u l t i m a t e a r b i t e r of p o l i c y , but a l s o seeks t o enhance the c o m p e t i t i o n 14 among h i s a d v i s o r s f o r the a d o p t i o n of t h e i r p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n s . T h i s c o m p e t i t i o n w i l l b r i n g t o l i g h t t he v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s i n h e r e n t i n the p o l i c y i s s u e . The e x p o s i t i o n of a l l the p o s s i b l e c o s t s , b e n e f i t s , and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h each o p t i o n w i l l enhance the p r e s i d e n t ' s a b i l i t y t o make the be s t c h o i c e p o s s i b l e . George has l i s t e d the s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e s of the s t r a t e g y . 1 7 F i r s t , i t seeks t o ensure s u f f i c i e n t a c q u i s i t i o n and a n a l y s i s of i n f o r m a t i o n t o p r o v i d e a v a l i d d i a g n o s i s of the i s s u e . Second, i t a t t e m p t s t o p r o v i d e a p r o c e s s i n which a l l t he major v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s a f f e c t e d by t h e i s s u e a r e c o n s i d e r e d , a l l p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s t o d e a l w i t h i t a r e brought t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n , and a l l o p t i o n s a r e s u b j e c t e d t o a thorough e v a l u a t i o n of t h e i r c o s t s and b e n e f i t s . L a s t , the s t r a t e g y aims t o keep the p r e s i d e n t a l e r t t o i n d i c a t o r s t h a t h i s p o l i c y c h o i c e i s not a c h i e v i n g i t s i n t e n d e d o b j e c t i v e s . A d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s which meets t h e s e c r i t e r i a w i l l enhance the l i k e l i h o o d Of a good or o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n . At l e a s t , i t w i l l reduce the chances of a v e r y poor d e c i s i o n . C l e a r l y , the s t r a t e g y a d d r e s s e s o n l y the "how" of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . I t s p r o v i s i o n s d e a l w i t h the p r o c e s s of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , not i t s s u b s t a n c e . Other f a c t o r s , c a l l e d d e c i s i o n a l p r e m i s e s by George, determine the "what" of p o l i c y . 1 8 Most o b v i o u s among t h e s e a r e the i d e o l o g y and c o g n i t i v e b e l i e f s of the p a r t i c i p a n t s , the i n f l u e n c e of p u b l i c o p i n i o n , and the s u b s t a n t i v e s k i l l s and knowledge of the p a r t i c i p a n t s . W h i l e the s t r a t e g y seeks t o o p t i m i z e the 1 5 " r a t i o n a l i t y " of the p r o c e s s of c o n s i d e r i n g t h e s e f a c t o r s , i t cannot i n i t s e l f guarantee an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n . Even a p e r f e c t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y may not overcome the t h r u s t of the d e c i s i o n a l p r e m i s e s . Y e t , George a r g u e s , and I b e l i e v e c o n v i n c i n g l y so, t h a t the p r o c e s s must be c o n s i d e r e d as one f a c t o r among many i n the e x p l a n a t i o n of the e f f e c t i v e n e s s or s u c c e s s f u l n e s s of a d e c i s i o n . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y , he a r g u e s , enhances the l i k e l i h o o d of a "good" d e c i s i o n or a t l e a s t reduces the p r o b a b i l i t y of a v e r y "bad" d e c i s i o n . The s t r a t e g y d i v i d e s t h r e e r o l e t a s k s among the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the p r o c e s s . F i r s t , the s e n i o r a d v i s o r s t o the p r e s i d e n t f o r m u l a t e p o l i c y o p t i o n s and s e r v e as t h e i r a d v o c a t e s t o the p r e s i d e n t . These a d v o c a t e s can be any a d v i s o r the p r e s i d e n t chooses but a r e u s u a l l y s e v e r a l of h i s c a b i n e t s e c r e t a r i e s and s e n i o r White House s t a f f . Second, one s e n i o r o f f i c i a l i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o r g a n i z e s and c o o r d i n a t e s the f l o w of o p t i o n s , the v a r i o u s meetings between the p r e s i d e n t and h i s a d v o c a t e s , and the im p l e m e n t a t i o n of the p r e s i d e n t ' s p o l i c y c h o i c e . T h i s r o l e t a s k of p r o c e s s manager or c u s t o d i a n i s g i v e n t o the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r . The a l l o c a t i o n of t h i s r o l e t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r o f f i c i a l i s based on the o r i g i n a l f u n c t i o n s g i v e n t o the E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y of the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l i n the 1947 NSC a c t . 1 9 T h i s a c t g i v e s the E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y , who l a t e r became the S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t t o the P r e s i d e n t f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s (or N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r ) , the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o a s s i s t the C o u n c i l 16 i n i t s d e l i b e r a t i o n s on f o r e i g n and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . He must p r o v i d e f o r the s t a f f work and p o l i c y papers i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the me e t i n g s . D u r i n g the Kennedy a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r expanded h i s r o l e t o c h a i r i n g subcommittee meetings of the NSC, as w e l l as c o o r d i n a t i n g v a r i o u s o t h e r meetings between the p r e s i d e n t and h i s s e n i o r f o r e i g n p o l i c y a d v i s o r s . 2 0 As a p e r s o n a l a s s i s t a n t t o the p r e s i d e n t , the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r i s i n a p o s i t i o n t o ensure t h a t d e p a r t m e n t a l p o l i c y making i s made c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the p r e s i d e n t ' s p e r s o n a l o b j e c t i v e s . As most postwar p r e s i d e n t s have become i n c r e a s i n g l y engaged p e r s o n a l l y i n the conduct of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , they have come t o r e l y on the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r f o r the c o o r d i n a t i o n of p o l i c y a d v i c e between the departments and the White House. The t h i r d r o l e t a s k i s a l l o c a t e d t o the p r e s i d e n t . L i k e a m a g i s t r a t e , he d e c i d e s which p o l i c y o p t i o n i s adopted. W h i l e i t i s b e n e f i c i a l t o the p r o c e s s t h a t he d e l e g a t e s the f o r m u l a t i o n of the v a r i o u s o p t i o n s t o h i s a d v o c a t e s , he must attempt t o make a c l e a r p o l i c y c h o i c e r a t h e r than a c c e p t a consensus or compromise s o l u t i o n . By s u b m i t t i n g h i s f i n a l c h o i c e t o a review by h i s a d v i s o r s , he w i l l ensure t h a t a l l p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e h e a r d . F u r t h e r m o r e , the s t r a t e g y p r e s c r i b e s f o u r p r o c e d u r e s or p r o c e s s norms t o s t r u c t u r e the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . F i r s t , the p r o c e s s s h o u l d be s t r u c t u r e d i n such a way t h a t the p r e s i d e n t p a r t i c i p a t e s a c t i v e l y i n the p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n s . Second, the v a r i o u s a d v o c a t e s must have a 1 7 r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o argue t h e i r o p t i o n s . The p r o c e s s s h o u l d be f a i r i n the sense t h a t the a d v o c a t e s s h o u l d have comparable a c c e s s t o i n f o r m a t i o n and t o the p o l i c y m e e t i n g s . They s h o u l d a l s o have adequate r e s o u r c e s and s t a f f s u p p o r t t o f o r m u l a t e t h e i r o p t i o n s . A l s o , they s h o u l d have r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l a c c e s s t o the p r e s i d e n t , e i t h e r by means of memoranda or p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t . T h i r d , the p o l i c y d ebates must take p l a c e i n the form of f r e e d i s c u s s i o n s and a l l o w the a d v o c a t e s t o c h a l l e n g e the p r e s i d e n t ' s p r e f e r r e d c h o i c e . The a d v o c a t e s must compete o p e n l y f o r the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e i r f a v o u r e d o p t i o n s and s h o u l d b r i n g a l l t h e i r d i s a g r e e m e n t s t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n . L a s t , when t h i s open p o l i c y debate s t i l l f a i l s t o produce a wide v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s h o u l d c o n s i d e r b r i n g i n g i n o u t s i d e r s t o widen the d i s c u s s i o n . 2 1 W h i l e the p r e s i d e n t i s u l t i m a t e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a d o p t i o n of t h e s e p r o c e s s norms, i t i s the c u s t o d i a n who must l o o k a f t e r the day-to-day management of the p r o c e s s . Once the p r e s i d e n t has i n d i c a t e d h i s p r e f e r e n c e f o r a p r o c e s s based on t h e s e p r o c e d u r e s , the c u s t o d i a n must ensure t h a t i t i s m a i n t a i n e d . I t i s h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o b r i n g t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n i s s u e s t h a t r e q u i r e the s t r a t e g y ' s p r o c e e d i n g s . He s e t s i n m o t i o n , o r g a n i z e s and o v e r s e e s the i n t e r a g e n c y p r o c e s s i n which th e v a r i o u s p o l i c y o p t i o n s a r e f o r m u l a t e d . He must ensure t h a t a l l a d v o c a t e s r e c e i v e a f a i r h e a r i n g f o r t h e i r o p t i o n s and t h a t t h e i r memoranda ar e d i s t r i b u t e d t hroughout the v a r i o u s d e c i s i o n forums. Moreover, he must a l e r t the p r e s i d e n t t o p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s 1 8 w i t h i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and c a l l meetings t o d i s c u s s t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s . He must remind the p r e s i d e n t t o submit h i s p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e t o a c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s by the a d v o c a t e s . F i n a l l y , whenever the c u s t o d i a n b e l i e v e s the p r o c e s s i s not f u n c t i o n i n g , he must a l e r t the p r e s i d e n t . C l e a r l y , the r o l e t a s k s of the c u s t o d i a n a r e most c r u c i a l f o r the o p e r a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y . In e s s e n c e , he a c t s as the "honest b r o k e r " of the v a r i o u s p o l i c y o p t i o n s . W ithout l e t t i n g h i s own p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h i s t a s k , he promotes o p t i o n s t h a t have not r e c e i v e d adequate a t t e n t i o n even though he may not f a v o u r them. S i m i l a r l y , he h e l p s o t h e r a d v o c a t e s c h a l l e n g e t h o s e o p t i o n s he p e r s o n a l l y p r e f e r s . H i s r o l e as p r o c e s s manager g i v e s him c o n s i d e r a b l e power t o c o n t r o l whose o p t i o n r e c e i v e s a t t e n t i o n and who g e t s t o be heard by the p r e s i d e n t . H i s c h i e f purpose i n t h i s p r o c e s s i s t o b a l a n c e the o p t i o n s , g e n e r a t e a wide d e b a t e , and keep the p r e s i d e n t i n v o l v e d . I t i s because of the many r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the c u s t o d i a n and h i s p o w e r f u l p o s i t i o n i n the p r o c e s s , t h a t the s t r a t e g y adds s e v e r a l p r o s c r i p t i o n s t o h i s r o l e t a s k s . George b e l i e v e s t h e r e are s e v e r a l t y p e s of a c t i v i t i e s t h a t may i n h i b i t the c u s t o d i a n from b e i n g a honest b r o k e r as w e l l as an e f f e c t i v e p r o c e s s manager. 2 2 T h e r e f o r e , he s h o u l d be p r o h i b i t e d from engaging i n t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s . F i r s t , he s h o u l d not advocate on p o l i c y . When he f e e l s not enough o p t i o n s are p r e s e n t e d , he may t r y t o b r i n g i n o u t s i d e a d v i s o r s . A l s o , he can, a t t i m e s , a c t l i k e a d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e . However, George acknowledges t h a t i t i s u n l i k e l y 19 t h a t one can be a c r e d i b l e d e v i l ' s a dvocate over a s u s t a i n e d p e r i o d of t i m e . 2 3 N e v e r t h e l e s s , he s h o u l d not be a genuine p o l i c y advocate s i n c e t h a t undermines h i s d u t i e s as honest b r o k e r . Second, he cannot make p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s on p o l i c y or a c t as a d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t o r . T h i r d , he s h o u l d not e n f o r c e or implement p e r s o n a l l y the p r e s i d e n t s p o l i c y or merely lo o k a f t e r the p o l i t i c a l f o r t u n e s of the p r e s i d e n t . A l l t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s a r e a l l e g e d t o reduce h i s e f f e c t i v e n e s s as a p r o c e s s manager because they compromise h i s n e u t r a l i t y v i s - a - v i s the v a r i o u s p o l i c y o p t i o n s . Moreover, a c u s t o d i a n who engages i n the s e a c t i v i t i e s i s l e s s l i k e l y t o c a l l f o r a re v i e w of p o l i c y . THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGY The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i s based on the assumptions of c l a s s i c a l r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . 2 " The d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s p e r c e i v e d as a r a t i o n a l problem s o l v e r who seeks t o o p t i m i z e h i s o b j e c t i v e s . These o b j e c t i v e s can be l o g i c a l l y d e r i v e d from h i s v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s . When c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a t h r e a t or c h a l l e n g e v i s - a - v i s h i s i n t e r e s t s , the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r weighs the c o s t s and b e n e f i t s of the v a r i o u s c o u r s e s of a c t i o n a v a i l a b l e . H i s f i n a l c h o i c e i s t h a t o p t i o n which maximizes h i s i n t e r e s t s . T h i s c o n c e p t i o n of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , as we have d i s c u s s e d above, r e j e c t s an a l t e r n a t i v e view d e v e l o p e d by 20 March, Simon, L i n d b l o m and B r a y b r o o k e . 2 5 The c l a s s i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y c o n c e p t i o n has a l s o been c r i t i c i z e d f o r i t s emphasis on the l o g i c a l and a n a l y t i c a l a s p e c t s of d e c i s i o n -m a k i n g . 2 6 S t e i n e r , f o r example, s t a t e s t h a t c r i t e r i a such as o r d e r l y p r o c e d u r e s and l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s o v e r l o o k the s u b j e c t i v e and i n t u i t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s . Moreover, s i n c e the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s f a c e d w i t h many ev e n t s t h a t cannot be e x p l a i n e d r a t i o n a l l y , we cannot expect him t o respond e f f e c t i v e l y by p r e s c r i b i n g p u r e l y r a t i o n a l r e m e d i e s . 2 7 However, these c r i t i c s have so f a r been unable t o o f f e r a c o h e r e n t a l t e r n a t i v e c o n c e p t i o n . For the time b e i n g , d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g t h e o r i s t s have l i t t l e c h o i c e but t o attempt t o improve the r a t i o n a l a s p e c t s of the p r o c e s s . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y p r o v i d e s f o r a l o g i c a l o r d e r t o a p r o c e s s i n which the p r e s i d e n t and h i s a d v i s o r s a r e assumed t o seek the maximum f u l f i l m e n t of t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s . However, George does not s i m p l y take the r a t i o n a l i t y of the p r o c e s s or i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s as g i v e n . R a t h e r , the s t r a t e g y a t t e m p t s t o compensate f o r v a r i o u s f a c t o r s t h a t l i m i t or d i s t o r t r a t i o n a l i t y . These d i s t o r t i o n s and l i m i t a t i o n s have been amply d i s c u s s e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e . George, i n e s s e n c e , has proposed h i s s t r a t e g y i n an attempt t o remedy or compensate f o r some of the s e d i s t o r t i o n s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the s t r a t e g y a d d r e s s e s s e v e r a l problems g e n e r a t e d by i n f o r m a t i o n u n c e r t a i n t y and v a l u e c o m p l e x i t y a t the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l , as w e l l as problems caused by " g r o u p t h i n k " and " B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s " a t t h e group l e v e l . 21 J e r v i s , a m o n g o t h e r s , has p o i n t e d out t h a t d e c i s i o n -makers must r e c o g n i z e and d i a g n o s e i s s u e s amidst c o n t r a d i c t o r y and c o n f u s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . 2 8 Moreover, on the b a s i s of u n c e r t a i n and i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n , they must e v a l u a t e the v a r i o u s o p t i o n s and make c h o i c e s . In r e s p o n s e , they may r e s o r t t o c e r t a i n t e c h n i q u e s t h a t make them more c o n f i d e n t about t h e i r c h o i c e but a t the same time reduce the a n a l y t i c a l q u a l i t y of the p r o c e s s . 2 9 For example, the d e c i s i o n - maker may p r o c r a s t i n a t e i n making h i s or her c h o i c e , hoping t h a t a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l show t h a t no d e c i s i o n i s n e c e s s a r y or t h a t the problem w i l l c o r r e c t i t s e l f . C a l c u l a t e d or r a t i o n a l p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n denotes the b e h a v i o u r of a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r who postpones a d e c i s i o n because he f e e l s t h e r e i s no r u s h , new i n f o r m a t i o n may come s h o r t l y , or t h a t the problem may c o r r e c t i t s e l f . D e f e n s i v e p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n i s p o t e n t i a l l y more h a r m f u l because the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r r a t h e r than h a v i n g reasons t o postpone a c h o i c e , s i m p l y hopes t h a t the problem w i l l go away by dodging i t . A d e c i s i o n - m a k e r b o l s t e r s when he a r t i f i c i a l l y r a i s e s or l o w e r s the e x p e c t e d c o s t s or b e n e f i t s of an o p t i o n so as t o make h i s c h o i c e l o o k more r a t i o n a l . A l s o , he or she may i n v o k e a h i s t o r i c a l a n a l o g y , b e l i e v i n g t h a t the i s s u e can be b e t t e r u n d e r s t o o d by m o l d i n g i t i n t o the image of a p a s t o c c u r r e n c e . T h i r d , he or she, based on on h i s or her p e r s o n a l b e l i e f s and b i a s e s , can a t t r i b u t e a r t i f i c i a l weight t o one p a r t i c u l a r view of an i s s u e , even though the f a c t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n does not warrant i t : i n f o r m a t i o n which c o n f i r m s one's b i a s e s i s upgraded, w h i l e c o n t r a r y i n f o r m a t i o n i s 22 d i s c a r d e d . The d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s a b i l i t y t o weigh the c o s t s and b e n e f i t s of v a r i o u s p o l i c y o p t i o n s i s i m p a i r e d f u r t h e r by the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s among h i s own i n t e r e s t s and o b j e c t i v e s . George c a l l s t h i s the v a l u e c o m p l e x i t y i m p e d i m e n t . 3 0 O f t e n , d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s r e s o l v e t h e s e c o n f l i c t s by an i n c o m p l e t e or d i s t o r t e d a n a l y s i s of a l l the a s p e c t s i n v o l v e d i n the i s s u e . 3 1 Three methods or t e c h n i q u e s can be i d e n t i f i e d . V a l u e - c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n denotes the attempt by the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r t o r e c o n c i l e and s a t i s f y as many competing v a l u e s as p o s s i b l e a r o u s e d by an i s s u e . T h i s i s a f o r m i d a b l e t a s k and i s seldom completed s u c c e s s f u l l y . O f t e n i t l e a d s t o a compromise or t r a d e - o f f among v a l u e s based on the l o w e s t common denominator. W h i l e t h i s may enhance the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the d e c i s i o n , i t may e q u a l l y w e l l d e c r e a s e i t s q u a l i t y . V a l u e - c o n f l i c t a c c e p t a n c e d e s c r i b e s the b e h a v i o u r of a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r who r e a l i z e s t h a t he must make a c h o i c e among competing v a l u e s . However, when he b e l i e v e s t o o q u i c k l y t h a t a v a l u e - c o n f l i c t i s u n a v o i d a b l e , he may make premature and i m p u l s i v e d e c i s i o n s . V a l u e - c o n f l i c t a v o i d a n c e , the t h i r d method, t a k e s p l a c e i n the form of two mechanisms c a l l e d " c o g n i t i v e r e s t r u c t u r i n g " and " d e v a l u a t i o n " . In the f i r s t , t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r downgrades or i g n o r e s the incoming i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t c h a l l e n g e s h i s v a l u e s . In the second, he downgrades or i g n o r e s h i s v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s . Of the t h r e e methods d i s c u s s e d , v a l u e - c o n f l i c t a v o i d a n c e i s p o t e n t i a l l y t h e most h a r m f u l . A l l i n a l l , t h ese a c t i v i t i e s hamper a c l e a r s e a r c h and e v a l u a t i o n of a l l r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n as 23 w e l l as a thorough c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s i n t e r e s t s i n the i s s u e . How does the s t r a t e g y a d d r e s s t h e s e problems? I t s r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e d u r e s o f f e r a s e t of checks so t h a t when th e s e d i s t o r t i o n s o c c u r , they a r e r e c o g n i z e d and c o r r e c t e d . 3 2 The open debate among the a d v o c a t e s , w i t h the p r e s i d e n t ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i s a v e h i c l e t h a t b r i n g s t o l i g h t the v a r i o u s b i a s e s among the p a r t i c i p a n t s and examines them f o r what they a r e . The a d v o c a t e s must c h a l l e n g e the p r e s i d e n t when they b e l i e v e h i s i n f o r m a t i o n base and a n a l y s i s a r e ina d e q u a t e or when he d e c i d e s too h a s t i l y . Moreover, the c u s t o d i a n must a l e r t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n when he f e e l s a s u p e r f i c i a l consensus or a compromise view i s h i n d e r i n g i t s a b i l i t y t o examine n e g l e c t e d a s p e c t s of an i s s u e . In c o n t r a s t t o the c l a s s i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y c o n c e p t i o n of the s t a t e as a u n i t a r y a c t o r , the l i t e r a t u r e i d e n t i f i e s most d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s e s as a group a c t i v i t y . 3 3 The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i n c o r p o r a t e s many of the f i n d i n g s from t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e . The v a r i o u s a d v i s o r s s u r r o u n d i n g the p r e s i d e n t p r o v i d e him w i t h a d v i c e , a l l o w him t o d e l e g a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , o f f e r him e m o t i o n a l s u p p o r t , and i n c r e a s e the l e g i t i m a c y of h i s d e c i s i o n s . S t u d i e s i n s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y have shown t h a t groups can enhance the q u a l i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g , reduce memory l a p s e s , and p r o v i d e s t i m u l a t i o n . 3 " Y e t , group i n t e r a c t i o n can a l s o g e n e r a t e s e v e r a l d i s t o r t i o n s t o the p r o c e s s . Having s e v e r a l a d v i s o r s s t u d y an 24 i s s u e does not n e c e s s a r i l y produce a w i d e r v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s . W i t h i n the group, c e r t a i n c o n f o r m i t y p r e s s u r e s may a r i s e . 3 5 D i s s e n t i n g members from the m a j o r i t y view may not speak o u t , f e a r i n g they w i l l be viewed as t r o u b l e makers or be o s t r a c i z e d . A l s o , i n d i v i d u a l members or the group i t s e l f may not f e e l c o n f i d e n t enough t o c h a l l e n g e the p r e s i d e n t . 3 6 J a n i s d e s c r i b e s another p o s s i b l e d i s t o r t i o n caused by group d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . 3 7 F a c i n g h i g h l e v e l s of s t r e s s and d i f f i c u l t i s s u e s w i t h p o t e n t i a l l y grave consequences, group members may seek one a n o t h e r ' s e m o t i o n a l s u p p o r t r a t h e r than s t i m u l a t e the group's c r i t i c a l a b i l i t i e s . T h i s f o r t r e s s m e n t a l i t y , c a l l e d " g r o u p t h i n k , " l e a d s t o i l l u s i o n s of i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y and u n a n i m i t y , as w e l l as a l a c k of v i g i l a n c e , and a d i s r e g a r d f o r i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t c h a l l e n g e s the group's mind s e t . The s t r a t e g y ' s p r o c e s s norms a r e i n t e n d e d t o reduce th e s e s h o r t c o m i n g s of group d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . F i r s t , the p r e s i d e n t must a l l o w the ad v o c a t e s t o f o r m u l a t e the o p t i o n s , and not s p e l l out h i s own p r e f e r e n c e e a r l y i n the d i s c u s s i o n . In so d o i n g , the a d v o c a t e s have a b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t y t o argue f o r t h e i r o p t i o n s w i t h o u t d i r e c t l y c h a l l e n g i n g the p r e s i d e n t . Second, the ad v o c a t e s must compete among t h e m s e l v e s . The " g u a r d i a n " of t h i s c o m p e t i t i o n i s the c u s t o d i a n , who ensures t h a t the ad v o c a t e s have adequate r e s o u r c e s t o do so. Fu r t h e r m o r e , when he f e e l s not enough p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e a i r e d , he must t a k e measures t o widen the debate. L a s t , the p r e s i d e n t must a l l o w d i s s e n t and the r e v i e w of h i s p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e . 25 W h i l e the s t r a t e g y encourages c o m p e t i t i o n and d i s s e n t , N e u s t a d t , S c h i l l i n g and A l l i s o n have argued t h a t p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s among s e n i o r a d v i s o r s may cause o t h e r t y p e s of d i s t o r t i o n s i n the p r o c e s s . 3 8 The s e n i o r a d v i s o r s a r e a l s o the heads of the v a r i o u s d e p a rtments. As suc h , they might pursue the i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r departments more v i g o r o u s l y than the i n t e r e s t s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as a whole. The d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i s t o some e x t e n t e x p l a i n e d by the b a r g a i n i n g on p o l i c y o p t i o n s among the v a r i o u s departments. T h i s p r o c e s s , c a l l e d B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s by A l l i s o n , may not produce a f a i r h e a r i n g of a l l o p t i o n s , s i n c e some departments a r e more r e s o u r c e f u l and may have more b a r g a i n i n g power than o t h e r s . 3 9 As a r e s u l t , the f i n a l c h o i c e of an o p t i o n may be more the r e s u l t of t h e b a r g a i n i n g s k i l l of i t s advocate than of i t s a n a l y t i c a l m e r i t . A l s o , p u l l i n g and h a u l i n g among a d v o c a t e s may l e a d t o compromises or t o a s i m p l e d e a d l o c k w i t h i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The s t r a t e g y seeks t o reduce the c o s t s of p o l i c y c o n f l i c t and i n t e r p e r s o n a l b a r g a i n i n g . F i r s t , the a d v o c a t e s must compete i n open debate forums, and not among themselves w i t h o u t the p r e s i d e n t ' s knowledge. Second, the c u s t o d i a n must e l e v a t e t h e i r c o n f l i c t s , compromises or t r a d e o f f s t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n . T h i r d , the p r e s i d e n t must make a c l e a r c h o i c e among o p t i o n s , and not merely a c c e p t papered over d i s a g r e e m e n t s . L a s t , the p r o c e s s management by the c u s t o d i a n imposes some degree of s t r u c t u r e on the c o m p e t i t i o n among a d v o c a t e s . He p r o v i d e s f o r p r o p e r a c c e s s 2 6 and i n f o r m a t i o n so t h a t no adv o c a t e i s e x c l u d e d from the r e l e v a n t p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n s . As a r e s u l t of t h e s e p r o c e d u r e s , the p r e s i d e n t w i l l be a b l e t o make h i s f i n a l c h o i c e based on the m e r i t s of each o p t i o n , w i t h o u t b e i n g s u b j e c t t o the v a r i o u s compromises h i s a d v i s o r s may have made w i t h o u t him. The s t r a t e g y a d d r e s s e s o n l y m a r g i n a l l y s e v e r a l o t h e r a s p e c t s of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g d i s c u s s e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e . F i r s t , the r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e s s norms do not compensate f o r p s y c h i a t r i c or p e r s o n a l i t y d i s t o r t i o n s t h a t may hamper the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r . " 0 Second, c r i s i s i n d u ced s t r e s s may cause b e h a v i o u r a b e r r a t i o n s t h a t a re beyond the remedies o f f e r e d by the s t r a t e g y . " 1 W h i l e i t p r o v i d e s f o r an o r d e r l y p r o c e s s of e v a l u a t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , and i s thus u s e f u l f o r c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s , the p r o c e s s i s a l s o time consuming, and may not a l l e v i a t e the s t r e s s e x p e r i e n c e d by the d e c i s i o n -maker. T h i r d , C o g n i t i v e P s y c h o l o g y t e a c h e s us t h a t we a l l have, and indeed need t o have, b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s t h a t h e l p s e l e c t and o r g a n i z e d a t a from the w o r l d around us i n o r d e r t o make i t m e a n i n g f u l . However, t h e s e s t r u c t u r e s can a l s o d i s t o r t our c o g n i t i v e a b i l i t i e s when i t comes t o problem-s o l v i n g . W h i l e the s t r a t e g y does not p r o v i d e the d e c i s i o n -maker w i t h a b e l i e f system, i t does p r o v i d e f o r an open d i s c u s s i o n which may make him more aware of h i s b e l i e f s and b i a s e s . " 2 F i n a l l y , March and Simon, as w e l l as A l l i s o n , have p o i n t e d out t h a t l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s have c e r t a i n s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s whereby they p r o c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n and ex e c u t e p o l i c y i n a l o g i c a l l t h e i r own." 3 As a r e s u l t , the 27 p r e s i d e n t ' s a d v i s o r s may r e c e i v e p o l i c y o p t i o n s from t h e i r departments t h a t a r e more a p r o d u c t of the needs or r u l e s of t h a t p a r t i c u l a r department than a r a t i o n a l response t o the i s s u e a t hand. A g a i n , a l l the s t r a t e g y o f f e r s i s a c r i t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n of the o p t i o n s , which might b r i n g t o l i g h t the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l b i a s e s a t the e x e c u t i v e l e v e l . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i s not the o n l y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g model a t the p r e s i d e n t i a l l e v e l . In f o r m u l a t i n g the s t r a t e g y , George draws upon elements found i n o t h e r models and indeed uses a s p e c t s of t h e s e t o c o n s t r u c t h i s arguments. Nor does George p o s i t the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y as the o n l y u s e f u l s t r a t e g y or as a s a t i s f a c t o r y model under a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . B e s i d e s the B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s model d i s c u s s e d above, George d i s c u s s e s the C e n t r a l i z e d Management Model or Formal O p t i o n s Model.'" In t h i s model, the p r e s i d e n t r e l i e s on one c e n t r a l manager t o s c r e e n a l l o p t i o n s proposed i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h i s c e n t r a l manager i n e f f e c t a c t s as a g a t e k e e p e r . W h i l e the " s e a r c h " and " e v a l u a t i o n " s t a g e s of t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s remain open t o a l l o t h e r a d v i s o r s and b u r e a u c r a t i c a c t o r s , the " c h o i c e " stage i s m o n o p o l i z e d by the c e n t r a l manager. T h i s model, a c c o r d i n g t o George, was b e s t e x e m p l i f i e d by the N i x o n - K i s s i n g e r s t r u c t u r e of p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . T h i s model may c o r r e c t an o b v i o u s s h o r t c o m i n g produced by b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i t i c s : as a r e s u l t of the b a r g a i n i n g and i n t e r n a l n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s among a d v i s o r s , the p r e s i d e n t may a t times be p r e s e n t e d w i t h a f i n a l o p t i o n which s e r v e s 28 the i n t e r e s t s of one b u r e a u c r a t i c a c t o r ( t h a t a c t o r which "won" t h e i n t e r n a l b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s ) more than the o v e r a l l i n t e r e s t s of the p r e s i d e n t or the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as a whole. The c e n t r a l manager's monopoly on the p r e s e n t a t i o n of the f i n a l o p t i o n s t o the p r e s i d e n t may a v o i d t h i s p i t f a l l . However, i t i s o b v i o u s t h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n may e q u a l l y l i k e l y become s u b j e c t t o the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s of the c e n t r a l manager. W h i l e t h i s model may s e r v e a p r e s i d e n t who i s u n w i l l i n g t o t o l e r a t e c o m p e t i t i o n among h i s a d v i s o r s or who wants t o c o n f i n e f o r e i g n p o l i c y making t o an e x c e s s i v e degree t o h i s own o f f i c e , George i d e n t i f i e s s e v e r a l o v e r a l l weaknesses i n t h i s model. F i r s t , i t reduces the r o l e of the a d v i s o r s who a r e not i n charge of c e n t r a l management to * " b a c k g r o u n d r e s e a r c h e r s " f o r the c e n t r a l manager. When the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r f i l l s the o f f i c e of the c e n t r a l manager, as was the case under N i x o n , the r o l e s of the S e c r e t a r i e s of S t a t e and Defense a r e l i m i t e d f a r beyond the o r i g i n a l i n t e n t of t h e i r mandates. Second, when the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r i s the c e n t r a l manager, he w i l l p e r f o r m s u b s t a n t i a l p o l i c y advocacy f u n c t i o n s which George b e l i e v e s c o n f l i c t w i t h h i s custodial/management d u t i e s . T h i r d , such a system can e a s i l y l e a d t o a work o v e r l o a d f o r the c e n t r a l manager, r e s u l t i n g i n s u b o p t i m a l c h o i c e f o r m u l a t i o n and a f a l t e r i n g d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . What i s u s e f u l about the model i s i t s p r o v i s i o n of management. George argues t h a t u n b r i d l e d c o m p e t i t i o n ( b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i t i c s ) as much as o v e r l y c o n t r o l l e d a d v i c e I 2 9 ( c e n t r a l management) do not produce o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y borrows the b e s t a s p e c t s of bot h models. Whi l e i t i n v i t e s a d vocate c o m p e t i t i o n , i t s t r u c t u r e s t h i s c o m p e t i t i o n by means of the r o l e t a s k s of the c u s t o d i a n . Moreover, the p r e s i d e n t , as a m a g i s t r a t e , b e n e f i t s more from the o r g a n i z e d , y e t f r e e a d v i c e , of a l l h i s a d v i s o r s than from the f i l t e r e d a d v i c e of one c e n t r a l a d v i s o r . The p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n of a managed d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i s f u r t h e r h i g h l i g h t e d by George when viewed i n r e l a t i o n t o the " i n c r e m e n t a l i s t " model of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . T h i s model i s a l s o c a l l e d P a r t i s a n M u t u a l A d justment. W h i l e George acknowledges t h a t C h a r l e s L i n d b l o m , i n d e s c r i b i n g t h i s model, was r e f e r r i n g t o the l a r g e r n a t i o n a l p r o c e s s of p o l i c y making i n g e n e r a l , i t a l s o sheds some l i g h t on the p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . * 5 In t h i s model, d e c i s i o n i s s u e s a r e " a d j u s t e d " by each r e l e v a n t a d v i s o r t o accommodate h i s i n t e r e s t s . The i s s u e moves th r o u g h the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n a more or l e s s s e r i a l o r d e r r e c e i v i n g a d j u s t m e n t s and accommodations but i s never r e a l l y s o l v e d . The f i n a l p o l i c y c h o i c e i s a p r o d u c t of t h i s p r o c e s s , and g i v e n the c o m p l e x i t y of the i s s u e and the v a r i e t y of i n t e r e s t s i n v o l v e d , i s as good a s o l u t i o n as can be o b t a i n e d . A g a i n , as George p u t s i t , t h i s " q u a s i r e s o l u t i o n of c o n f l i c t " or p r o d u c t of " n e g o t i a t i o n s i n the i n t e r n a l e nvironment" can be g r e a t l y improved by means of the management p r o c e d u r e s proposed by the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t a t e g y . * 6 30 In f o r m u l a t i n g h i s s t r a t e g y , George a l s o d i s c u s s e s an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e v i c e commonly c a l l e d the d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e . " 7 T h i s d e v i c e has been used or recommended as a way of e n s u r i n g t h a t unpopular views r e c e i v e a h e a r i n g . E s s e n t i a l l y , the d e v i l ' s a dvocate i s a r o l e p r e s c r i p t i o n . I t i n v o l v e s a r g u i n g f o r an unpopular o p t i o n which none of the o t h e r a d v i s o r s want t o b r i n g f o r w a r d but which the d e v i l ' s a d vocate does not p e r s o n a l l y f a v o u r e i t h e r . W h i l e the advocacy of unpopular o p t i o n s i s a l s o an i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y , George i s h e s i t a n t about the u s e f u l n e s s of the d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e . He i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s k e p t i c a l about the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h i s r o l e i n t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . A d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e may q u i c k l y become an i n e f f e c t i v e r o l e when the o t h e r a d v i s o r s p e r c e i v e i t as such. Indeed, they may c o n s i d e r i t a " t i m e - w a s t i n g gimmick" s i n c e the d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e does not r e a l l y f a v o u r h i s proposed o p t i o n , and i s t h u s not s e r i o u s about b u i l d i n g a b u r e a u c r a t i c c o a l i t i o n i n support of h i s o p t i o n . Moreover, p r e s i d e n t s have tended t o brand genuine d i s s e n t e r s as d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e s t o " d o m e s t i c a t e " t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n . " 8 For t h e s e r e a s o n s , George does not p r e s c r i b e a d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e r o l e f o r the c u s t o d i a n . The c u s t o d i a n may a p p o i n t someone t o p l a y t h i s r o l e but he h i m s e l f cannot a f f o r d t o be branded a d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e : "the two r o l e s a r e d i s t i n c t and s h o u l d not be c o n f u s e d . " " 9 Moreover, George b e l i e v e s t h a t a p r e s i d e n t may g a i n more from genuine d i s s e n t e r s from h i s p o l i c y c h o i c e than from d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e s . The p r o c e s s of 3 1 r e b u t t i n g a d i s s e n t i n g view may h e l p c l a r i f y t he p o l i c y p o s i t i o n of the o t h e r a d v i s o r s and thus enhance the " r a t i o n a l i t y " of the e v a l u a t i o n of o p t i o n s . For p o l i c y i m p l e m e n t a t i o n p u r p o s e s , i t may be b e t t e r i f the d i s s e n t e r f e e l s h i s views have been a i r e d p r o p e r l y . I f he f e e l s he had a f a i r h e a r i n g , he may be more i n c l i n e d t o c l o s e ranks w i t h the proponents a t the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n s t a g e . L a s t l y , i t may make a d v i s o r s more c o m f o r t a b l e d e f e n d i n g the p o l i c y c h o i c e t o the media and the p u b l i c i f th e y had t o defend i t w i t h i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . F i n a l l y , the o p e r a t i o n of any d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g model must be e v a l u a t e d i n l i g h t of the d e c i s i o n s t y l e s of the p r e s i d e n t . George d i s c u s s e s t h r e e d i s t i n c t s t y l e s . The f o r m a l i s t i c p r e s i d e n t p r e f e r s t o r e c e i v e a d v i c e from the a d v i s o r or a s s i s t a n t who i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h a t p a r t i c u l a r d o m a i n . 5 0 The p r e s i d e n t does not encourage communication among a d v i s o r s nor a group e f f o r t a t problem s o l v i n g . At the same t i m e , the p r e s i d e n t does not attempt t o open " b a c k c h a n n e l s " b e h i n d the s e c r e t a r i e s ' b a c k s , but r i g i d l y adheres t o the o f f i c i a l c h a n n e l s of i n f o r m a t i o n . In the end, the p r e s i d e n t a t t e m p t s p e r s o n a l l y t o i n t e g r a t e a l l p i e c e s of a d v i c e , and the f i n a l d e c i s i o n i s a p r o d u c t of h i s own i n t e l l e c t u a l s y n t h e s i s . T h i s p r e s i d e n t i a l s t y l e a l l o w s f o r a v e r y o r d e r l y d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s . However, s e v e r a l weaknesses a r e a p p a r e n t . The p r e s i d e n t i s o b v i o u s l y d e p r i v e d of a c o m p e t i t i v e debate among h i s a d v i s o r s and must r e l y on i n d i v i d u a l c a b i n e t s e c r e t a r i e s t o r e c e i v e the be s t 32 i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e i r departments. T h i s s t y l e i s not b e l i e v e d t o be v e r y s u i t a b l e t o m u l t i p l e advocacy p r o c e e d i n g s , and as such the s t r a t e g y would be d i f f i c u l t t o implement. A second s t y l e , l a b e l l e d the " c o m p e t i t i v e model" seems more s u i t a b l e t o the s t r a t e g y . Here, the p r e s i d e n t d e l i b e r a t e l y encourages c o m p e t i t i o n and c o n f l i c t among h i s a d v i s o r s by g i v i n g o v e r l a p p i n g a s signments and c o n f l i c t i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n s . 5 1 However, t h e r e i s s t i l l no req u i r e m e n t f o r the a d v i s o r s t o communicate w i t h one an o t h e r s i n c e each r e p o r t s d i r e c t l y t o the p r e s i d e n t . A l s o , a t t i m e s the p r e s i d e n t l e a v e s t h e r e s o l u t i o n of a c e r t a i n c o n f l i c t t o h i s a d v i s o r s . W h i l e the p r e s i d e n t o c c a s s i o n a l l y reaches down below the l e v e l of h i s immediate a d v i s o r s t o o b t a i n independent a d v i c e and thus enhances h i s a b i l i t y t o p r o f i t from the be s t a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n , George f e e l s the system a l l o w s f o r too much u n s t r u c t u r e d a d v i s o r c o m p e t i t i o n . As a r e s u l t , b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i t i c s may impede the f l o w of o p t i m a l a d v i c e . Moreover, the p r e s i d e n t may end up spending t o o much of h i s time r e s o l v i n g c o n f l i c t s among h i s s t a f f . The c o l l e g i a l model of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i s best p i c t u r e d as a s t r u c t u r e where the p r e s i d e n t i s a t the c e n t r e of a wheel w i t h spokes c o n n e c t i n g t o i n d i v i d u a l a d v i s o r s . 5 2 A d v i s o r s a r e i n v i t e d t o form a c o l l e g i a l team and t o engage i n group problem s o l v i n g . Moreover, a d v i s o r s a re asked t o a c t as " g e n e r a l i s t s " , n o t j u s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r " t u r f " i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s resembles a s e t of i n f o r m a l d i s c u s s i o n s among a l l 33 r e l e v a n t a d v i s o r s w i t h the p r e s i d e n t a t t e n d i n g and a s k i n g q u e s t i o n s . The two foremost drawbacks p o t e n t i a l l y p r e s e n t i n t h i s system a r e a s u b s t a n t i a l demand on the p r e s i d e n t ' s time and the o c c u r r e n c e of g r o u p t h i n k . George's s t r a t e g y seeks t o use the b e s t elements of b o t h the c o l l e g i a l and c o m p e t i t i v e models. An i n t e n s i v e p r e s i d e n t i a l i n v o l v e m e n t , though c o s t l y i n terms of t i m e , b e n e f i t s the p r o c e s s of s e l e c t i n g p o l i c y o p t i o n s . Advocate c o m p e t i t i o n i s d e s i r a b l e t o b r i n g out a t horough e v a l u a t i o n of a l l o p t i o n s but must be " c o n t r o l l e d " by the c u s t o d i a n r a t h e r than the p r e s i d e n t . The c u s t o d i a n i s t o make sure r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l r e s o u r c e s a r e a v a i l a b l e t o each a d v i s o r and t h a t each a d v i s o r has an o p p o r t u n i t y t o make h i s c a s e t o the p r e s i d e n t . THE STRATEGY'S REVIEWS AND CRITICISMS The s t r a t e g y ' s s u g g e s t i o n s f o r i m p r o v i n g the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s have r e c e i v e d s u pport i n both the p r o f e s s i o n a l and academic l i t e r a t u r e . For example, Sorensen, a former Kennedy a i d e , and Ole H o l s t i agree t h a t a v a r i e t y of a d v i s o r s and d i f f e r e n t d e p a r t m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , who compete f o r t h e i r f a v o u r e d o p t i o n s , w i l l f o s t e r more a l t e r n a t i v e s , expose e r r o r s , and c h a l l e n g e a s s u m p t i o n s . 5 3 J a n i s s t a t e d t h a t the s t r a t e g y ' s p r o c e s s norms "might go a l o n g way toward r e d u c i n g the chances of g r o u p t h i n k . " 5 " 34 P o r t e r , who examined the decision-making process i n the Economic P o l i c y Board from 1974 to 1976, found t h a t the s t r a t e g y o f f e r e d a u s e f u l model to improve the p r o c e s s . 5 5 Yet, the s t r a t e g y was not su b j e c t e d to an in-depth e m p i r i c a l e v a l u a t i o n i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y domain u n t i l H a l l ' s study of 1982. Before then, s e v e r a l s c h o l a r s c r i t i c i z e d i n d i v i d u a l aspects of the s t r a t e g y . For example, Thomas and Hargrove questioned the f e a s i b i l i t y of the r o l e tasks f o r the p r e s i d e n t . 5 6 Not a l l p r e s i d e n t s are w i l l i n g to sub j e c t t h e i r p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e to a debate among t h e i r a d v i s o r s . Moreover, some p r e s i d e n t s may f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to accept open c r i t i c i s m and debate. A l s o , not a l l p r e s i d e n t s d e s i r e an a c t i v e r o l e i n the decision-making p r o c e s s . They conclude that the s t r a t e g y may only be a p p l i c a b l e to p r e s i d e n t s who enjoy a c o m p e t i t i v e or c o l l e g i a l s t y l e of decision-making. Hess adds that the s t r a t e g y ' s procedures are q u i t e time-consuming. 5 7 Moreover, they may l e a d to p o l i c y leaks which embarrass the p r e s i d e n t . For some p r e s i d e n t s , the c o s t s of the s t r a t e g y may outweigh the b e n e f i t s . D e s t l e r , among o t h e r s , doubts that the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor can ever assume the r o l e of an honest b r o k e r . 5 8 Since the Kennedy yea r s , he argues, the a d v i s o r has g r a d u a l l y i n c r e a s e d h i s r o l e to that of a s u b s t a n t i v e p o l i c y a d v i s o r supported by a l a r g e White House s t a f f . Unless h i s p o s i t i o n i s r e d e f i n e d i n the s p i r i t of the 1947 NSC a c t , he w i l l have too much pe r s o n a l i n f l u e n c e to be a mere " n e u t r a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r . " Turning the c o i n completely, 35 Hargrove and Rockman argue t h a t i f the c u s t o d i a n was reduced t o a mere a d m i n i s t r a t o r , he would not have enough " l e v e r a g e " t o e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l over the p o w e r f u l c a b i n e t s e c r e t a r i e s . 5 9 To them, o n l y the p r e s i d e n t can p e r f o r m the d u t i e s the s t r a t e g y p r e s c r i b e s f o r the c u s t o d i a n . O t h e r s have q u e s t i o n e d the s t r a t e g y ' s attempt t o e q u a l i z e the r e s o u r c e s of the v a r i o u s departments. Y a r m o l i n s k y , f o r example, argues t h a t the Department of Defense i s a c o n s i s t e n t l y more e f f e c t i v e a dvocate than the Department of S t a t e . 6 0 Fenno b e l i e v e s t h a t the White House a s s i s t a n t s have become so p o w e r f u l t h a t the c a b i n e t s e c r e t a r i e s a r e no l o n g e r a match f o r t h e m . 6 1 H a l l o f f e r s an e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s of George's p r e s c r i p t i o n s . H a l l argues t h a t George's s t r a t e g y o f f e r s a s e t of b e h a v i o u r a l norms which must govern the day-to-day p r o c e s s i n g of f a c t and o p i n i o n w i t h i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s environment. W h i l e H a l l b e l i e v e s t h i s t o be a " f r e s h " approach i n l i g h t of t h e u s u a l recommendations f o r s t r u c t u r a l change i n the e x e c u t i v e government, he notes t h a t t h e s e p r e s c r i p t i o n s have never been c a r e f u l l y t e s t e d f o r t h e i r e m p i r i c a l r e l e v a n c e or v a l i d i t y . H a l l does a d e t a i l e d study of the s t r a t e g y ' s norms whenever they were a p p r o x i m a t e d i n the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . He o b s e r v e d the b e h a v i o u r of the p r e s i d e n t , the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a d v i s o r and the o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s d u r i n g the major f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s i n each a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 6 2 W i t h the use of i n t e r v i e w s and d a t a from the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l 3 6 f i l e s , he examined s e v e r a l q u e s t i o n s . Which p r e s i d e n t i a l s t y l e s u i t s the s t r a t e g y b e s t ? How d i d the p r e s i d e n t s d e f i n e the r o l e of the c u s t o d i a n ? What a c t i v i t i e s d i d the c u s t o d i a n engage i n , and what was t h e i r i n f l u e n c e on the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s ? He found s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t h a t the s t r a t e g y can be implemented. Moreover, when used, i t tended t o improve the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . A l s o , i t p r o v i d e d u s e f u l t o o l s t o i d e n t i f y m a l f u n c t i o n s i n the p r o c e s s g e n e r a l l y . S p e c i f i c a l l y , H a l l examined whether the p r e s i d e n t ' s s t y l e a f f e c t s the p o s s i b l i t y of imp l e m e n t i n g the s t r a t e g y , how e s s e n t i a l the r o l e t a s k f o r m u l a t i o n of the c u s t o d i a n i s , and which a c t i v i t i e s harm or enhance h i s c u s t o d i a l r o l e t a s k s . F u r t h e r m o r e , H a l l examined whether the c u s t o d i a n has enough power or " l e v e r a g e " t o muster a d v i c e which c h a l l e n g e s the a d v i c e of such p o w e r f u l a g e n t s as the S e c r e t a r y of Defense and the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e . In response t o the s p e c i f i c c r i t i c i s m s l e v e l l e d a t the s t r a t e g y , H a l l found t h a t the s t r a t e g y ' s f e a s i b i l i t y i s indee d dependent on the s t y l e of the p r e s i d e n t . P r e s i d e n t s who f a v o u r a c o m p e t i t i v e or c o l l e g i a l s t y l e of d e c i s i o n -making use the s t r a t e g y more than those who p r e f e r a f o r m a l i s t i c s t y l e . 6 3 Those p r e s i d e n t s who t o l e r a t e h i g h l e v e l s of i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o n f l i c t and who a r e a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d i n the p r o c e s s w i l l b e n e f i t most from the s t r a t e g y . A l s o , t h e s e p r e s i d e n t s a r e w i l l i n g t o make time a v a i l a b l e t o b e n e f i t from the p o l i c y d e b a t e s . H a l l a l s o found t h a t when the p r e s i d e n t d e f i n e s the r o l e of the c u s t o d i a n c l e a r l y , he w i l l have enough l e v e r a g e 37 t o do h i s j o b . 6 " There i s no need f o r a p r e s i d e n t t o be h i s own c u s t o d i a n . Moreover, H a l l ' s f i n d i n g s r e j e c t the a s s e r t i o n t h a t the r e s o u r c e s of the a d v o c a t e s cannot be b a l a n c e d . As l o n g as the a d v o c a t e s have e q u a l a c c e s s t o the p r e s i d e n t and t o the p o l i c y forums, t h e i r r e s o u r c e d i f f e r e n c e s can be evened ou t . The most c r u c i a l a s p e c t of H a l l ' s f i n d i n g s concern the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r . Can he r e a l l y p e r f o r m the r o l e of a c u s t o d i a n ? H a l l argues t h a t d u r i n g most of the Truman and Kennedy y e a r s , the NSA indeed performed the r o l e of p r o c e s s manager, honest b r o k e r , and g e n e r a l c o o r d i n a t o r of p o l i c y . 6 5 However, h i s r o l e changed when he began t o a d v o c a t e p o l i c y . H i s p o l i c y advocacy, H a l l a r g u e s , caused him t o n e g l e c t h i s o t h e r d u t i e s . I n s t e a d , he became one of the p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r s t o the p r e s i d e n t . H a l l s t a t e s t h a t the p o l i c y advocacy r o l e cannot c o e x i s t w i t h h i s o t h e r t a s k s . As a r e s u l t of a d v o c a t i n g p o l i c y , the c u s t o d i a n can no l o n g e r be an o b j e c t i v e and e f f e c t i v e p r o c e s s o r of o p t i o n s he does not f a v o u r . Moreover, he w i l l no l o n g e r widen the debate whenever h i s o p t i o n has r e c e i v e d a h e a r i n g . F i n a l l y , he w i l l be l e s s w i l l i n g t o c a l l f o r a r e v i e w of h i s o p t i o n , even though i t might not be a c h i e v i n g the p r e s i d e n t ' s o b j e c t i v e s . H a l l c o n c l u d e s t h a t the NSA can o n l y p e r f o r m the c u s t o d i a l r o l e as l o n g as George's p r e s c r i p t i o n s as w e l l as p r o s c r i p t i o n s of the r o l e t a s k s a r e s t r i c t l y e n f o r c e d . H a l l a l s o t e s t e d the o t h e r r o l e v i o l a t i o n s i d e n t i f i e d by G e o r g e . 6 6 W h i l e George s t a t e s t h a t p u b l i c s p e a k i n g , d i p l o m a c y , and p o l i c y enforcement w i l l a l s o undermine the 38 r o l e of the c u s t o d i a n , H a l l found t h a t the s t r a t e g y need not d e f i n e these a c t i v i t i e s as r i g i d l y as the p o l i c y advocacy r o l e . Only when the c u s t o d i a n engages i n s u b s t a n t i a l d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s or when he s t a t e s h i s p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s i n p u b l i c , or when he e n f o r c e s and implements p e r s o n a l l y the p r e s i d e n t ' s p o l i c y , w i l l he l o s e h i s i m p a r t i a l i t y . W h i l e H a l l a l l o w e d the c u s t o d i a n more leeway i n t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s , he d i d not c h a l l e n g e George's p r o s c r i p t i o n s f u n d a m e n t a l l y . H a l l ' s f i n d i n g s , i n e s s e n c e , p r o v i d e f o r a defense of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . H a l l not o n l y r e d r e s s e s s e v e r a l c r i t i c i s m s , but a l s o shows the s t r a t e g y t o be q u i t e f e a s i b l e . H a l l defends Georges's o r i g i n a l f o r m u l a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y , e m p h a s i z i n g t h a t i t s s u c c e s s l i e s i n the c a r e f u l o b s e r v a t i o n of the c u s t o d i a n ' s r o l e t a s k s . Both he and George b e l i e v e p o l i c y advocacy on the p a r t of the c u s t o d i a n c o n s t i t u t e s the c h i e f c h a l l e n g e t o the s t r a t e g y ' s e f f e c t i v e n e s s . TESTING THE ROLE PRESCRIPTIONS OF THE STRATEGY T h i s t h e s i s w i l l show t h a t c u s t o d i a l advocacy per se i s not d e t r i m e n t a l t o t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . When the a d v o c a t e s do not propose a wide range of o p t i o n s , the c u s t o d i a n w i l l improve the p r o c e s s by a d v o c a t i n g a new o p t i o n . Even when the a d v o c a t e s do propose s e v e r a l o p t i o n s , 39 the c u s t o d i a n may s t i l l improve the p r o c e s s by a d d i n g an e x t r a p e r s p e c t i v e . B oth George and H a l l d e a l i n s u f f i c i e n t l y w i t h the s t r a t e g y ' s a b i l i t y t o p r o v i d e f o r a d i v e r s i t y of o p t i o n s . I t i s u n c l e a r whether a wide range of o p i n i o n s among the a d v o c a t e s i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r the s t r a t e g y t o work or whether the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y w i l l produce such a range. For example, H a l l n otes t h a t the ad v o c a t e s i n the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n were of d i v e r s e i d e o l o g i c a l b a c k g r o u n d s . 6 7 Y e t , as t h i s study w i l l show, they o f t e n f a i l e d t o r a i s e s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t o p t i o n s . What i s the c u s t o d i a n t o do i n such a s i t u a t i o n ? George w r i t e s t h a t the c u s t o d i a n , i n such a c a s e , may choose t o a p p o i n t a d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e . Y e t , he a l s o r e c o g n i z e s t h a t d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e s l o s e t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y q u i t e q u i c k l y . 6 8 The o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s may not pay much a t t e n t i o n t o such advocacy, knowing t h a t i t i s i n t e n d e d m erely t o c h a l l e n g e t h e i r v i e w p o i n t s r a t h e r than p r o v i d e a genuine a l t e r n a t i v e view. A l s o , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n can i n v i t e o u t s i d e r s t o the p o l i c y forums t o widen the range of o p t i o n s . However, I b e l i e v e t h i s i s the most i m p r a c t i c a l a s p e c t of the s t r a t e g y . The s t r a t e g y a l r e a d y p u t s g r e a t demands on the p r e s i d e n t . W h i l e he may t o l e r a t e d i s s e n t among h i s c l o s e s t a d v i s o r s , he may be l e s s w i l l i n g t o a l l o w o u t s i d e r s t h a t p r i v i l e g e . Moreover, i t may ta k e c o n s i d e r a b l e time and stu d y f o r o u t s i d e r s t o c h a l l e n g e the arguments of the a d v o c a t e s . A l s o , an o u t s i d e r cannot e a s i l y j o i n the c l o s e r a p p o r t which d e v e l o p s between a p r e s i d e n t and h i s 40 i n n e r c i r c l e . 6 9 W h i l e George and H a l l p r o v i d e l i t t l e i n the way of e n s u r i n g d i v e r s e o p t i o n s , they c l e a r l y p r o s c r i b e the c u s t o d i a n from d i v e r s i f y i n g the debate by means of genuine advocacy. Advocacy, p u b l i c s p e a k i n g and d i p l o m a c y , on the p a r t of the c u s t o d i a n , a re a l l e g e d t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h h i s o t h e r r o l e t a s k s . S e v e r a l case s t u d i e s i n t h i s t h e s i s w i l l show t h a t t h e s e p r o s c r i p t i o n s a r e too s t r i c t , i f not c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . These a c t i v i t i e s w i l l o n l y harm the p r o c e s s when they a r e combined w i t h the c u s t o d i a n ' s n e g l e c t of the p r o c e s s norms. Only when the c u s t o d i a n f a i l s t o p r o v i d e a f a i r h e a r i n g f o r the a d v o c a t e s or when he b l o c k s them from p o l i c y m e e tings, or when he does not e l e v a t e t h e i r c o n f l i c t s t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n w i l l t he p r o c e s s be harmed. Moreover, I w i l l show t h a t c u s t o d i a l n e g l e c t of the p r o c e s s norms i s not n e c e s s a r i l y l i n k e d t o h i s advocacy r o l e . The c u s t o d i a n can advocate p o l i c y and manage the p r o c e s s a t the same t i m e . E s p e c i a l l y , when the a d v o c a t e s do not produce a wide v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s , the c u s t o d i a n ' s genuine advocacy w i l l a c t u a l l y improve the p r o c e s s . These arguments a r e based on a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of f o u r f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s d u r i n g the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Whether or not c o n s c i o u s l y adopted, t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n implemented many of the r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e s s norms p r e s c r i b e d by the s t r a t e g y . As such, i t p r o v i d e s a good t e s t i n g ground f o r an e v a l u a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y . Both George and H a l l o f f e r a few o b s e r v a t i o n s on t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 7 0 They found C a r t e r ' s s t y l e c o n d u c i v e t o a 4 1 open p o l i c y debate p r o c e s s . He was w i l l i n g t o f o s t e r p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n s and a l l o w d i s s e n t among h i s t o p a d v i s o r s . Moreover, he was w i l l i n g t o engage p e r s o n a l l y i n the debates among h i s a d v i s o r s and kept a c l o s e r e i n on the f i n a l p o l i c y c h o i c e s . A l s o , he i n s t i t u t e d p r o c e d u r e s whereby most s e n i o r a d v i s o r s were a b l e t o have d i r e c t a c c e s s t o him. B r z e z i n s k i ' s r o l e was d e f i n e d s u f f i c i e n t l y c l o s e t o the g u i d e l i n e s of the s t r a t e g y . He was i n charge of the i n t e r a g e n c y p o l i c y p r o c e s s and was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the c o o r d i n a t i o n of the v a r i o u s o p t i o n s as w e l l as the v a r i o u s p o l i c y m e e t i n g s . Y e t , H a l l argues c o r r e c t l y t h a t the p o l i c y p r o c e s s d e t e r i o r a t e d towards the end of C a r t e r ' s second y e a r . The open debate forums and the e q u a l a c c e s s of the a d v i s o r s were g r a d u a l l y r e p l a c e d by b u r e a u c r a t i c b a t t l e s among them and i n d i v i d u a l end runs on the p r e s i d e n t . As a r e s u l t , the f o u r case s t u d i e s a l l f a l l w i t h i n the f i r s t two y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . However, they w i l l a l s o i l l u s t r a t e why the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s d e t e r i o r a t e d . 7 1 W h i l e George and H a l l blame the demise of the p r o c e s s on B r z e z i n s k i ' s p o l i c y advocacy and o t h e r r o l e t a s k v i o l a t i o n s , the f o u r c a s e s show t h a t the s t r a t e g y was hampered from the s t a r t as a r e s u l t of the l a c k of d i v e r s i t y of o p i n i o n among C a r t e r ' s a d v o c a t e s . T h e i r c o n s e n s u a l views d i d not p r o v i d e C a r t e r w i t h a s u f f i c i e n t range of o p t i o n s . B r z e z i n s k i c o r r e c t e d t h i s f l a w by a d v o c a t i n g those o p t i o n s l e f t out of the debate by the o t h e r a d v o c a t e s . T h i s c u s t o d i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n improved the p r o c e s s . The p r o c e s s 42 f u n c t i o n e d w e l l u n t i l B r z e z i n s k i abandoned the maintenance of the s t r a t e g y ' s p r o c e s s norms. The hypotheses proposed i n t h i s s tudy a r e t e s t e d by means of an i n d e p t h a n a l y s i s of f o u r d e c i s i o n i s s u e s d u r i n g the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The s e l e c t i o n of c r i t e r i a f o r the case s t u d i e s f o l l o w s c l o s e l y the g u i d e l i n e s which George uses t o i n d i c a t e the scope of a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the s t r a t e g y . At a v e r y g e n e r a l l e v e l , t he s t r a t e g y c o n s t i t u t e s a system of managed a d v e r s a r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s aimed a t o f f e r i n g a c r i t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n of p o l i c y o p t i o n s b e f o r e they a r e adopted by the t o p d e c i s i o n - m a k e r . As such, the s t r a t e g y i s not r e s t r i c t e d t o any type of p o l i c y i s s u e per s e . 7 2 Y e t , George adds t h a t the s t r a t e g y i s more a p p l i c a b l e t o c r i t i c a l than t o r o u t i n e i s s u e s . Without i m p l y i n g t h a t the s t r a t e g y cannot be a p p l i e d t o a wider v a r i e t y of i s s u e s , George l i m i t s h i s d i s c u s s i o n , i n h i s 1972 a r t i c l e , t o c r i t i c a l i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g a c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n i n which the U n i t e d S t a t e s must make a d e c i s i o n i n v o l v i n g e i t h e r commitment, i n t e r v e n t i o n or e s c a l a t i o n . 7 3 The c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n i s s u e s a re more u s e f u l f o r George's a n a l y s i s than r o u t i n e i s s u e because they b r i n g w i t h them a sense of urgency and a r e a b l e t o f o c u s the a t t e n t i o n of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i m m e d i a t e l y . As such, they i l l u s t r a t e more c l e a r l y any p o s s i b l e m a l f u n c t i o n s i n the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s and o f f e r " d i d a c t i c v a l u e " t o h i g h l i g h t the s t r e n g t h of m u l t i p l e advocacy p r o c e e d i n g s . In a f o o t n o t e , however, George adds t h a t a "broader e m p i r i c a l base would be d e s i r a b l e t o d e f i n e more c l e a r l y the scope of the 43 s t r a t e g y . " 7 0 In h i s 1972 s t u d y , George d i s c u s s e s such i s s u e s as the American response t o the N o r t h Korean a t t a c k on South Korea i n 1950, the C h i n e s e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h i s c o n f l i c t i n l a t e 1950, the i n c r e a s e of American m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s i n South Vietnam i n l a t e 1961, and P r e s i d e n t Johnson's d e c i s i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o the M u l t i l a t e r a l F o r c e f o r NATO i n October 1 9 6 4 . 7 5 B e s i d e s b e i n g c r i t i c a l i s s u e s which r e q u i r e d e i t h e r commitment, i n t e r v e n t i o n or e s c a l a t i o n , George s e l e c t e d t h e s e i s s u e s on the b a s i s of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s , a dding t h a t "no p a r t i c u l a r s a m p l i n g s t r a t e g y was e m p l o y e d . " 7 6 F i n a l l y , George uses h i s case s t u d i e s o n l y t o e v a l u a t e the degree t o which the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s c o n t r i b u t e d t o the f a i l u r e or s u c c e s s of the e v e n t u a l outcome. U n l i k e some h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s , he does not attempt t o g i v e a d e f i n i t i v e h i s t o r i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the causes of f a i l u r e or s u c c e s s . H a l l expanded c o n s i d e r a b l y the scope of i s s u e s a p p l i c a b l e t o the s t r a t e g y . Rather than a d h e r i n g t o " c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g c o n f l i c t , " he l o o k e d a t a l l major f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s which i n v o l v e l a r g e change and low l e v e l s of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H a l l ' s c r i t e r i a a r e d e r i v e d from Lindblom's f a m i l i a r t y p o l o g y of i s s u e s on the b a s i s of the degree of change they cause and the degree of u n d e r s t a n d i n g the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r has c o n c e r n i n g t h e m . 7 7 R u l e d out f o r m u l t i p l e advocacy p r o c e e d i n g s a r e i s s u e s t h a t i n c u r o n l y s m a l l changes and which a r e r a t h e r w e l l u n d e r s t o o d . Such " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and t e c h n i c a l i s s u e s " a r e 44 d e s c r i b e d b e t t e r by i n c r e m e n t a l i s t models which account f o r a d j u s t m e n t s made t o e x i s t i n g p o l i c y . However, the c a t e g o r y of i s s u e s i n v o l v i n g wars, r e v o l u t i o n s , c r i s e s and "grand o p p o r t u n i t i e s " a r e c o n s i d e r e d by H a l l t o be w e l l s u i t e d f o r m u l t i p l e advocacy p r o c e e d i n g s . In h i s study of most postwar a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , H a l l d e s c r i b e s the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s norms of each a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the v a r i o u s r o l e t a s k s of the p a r t i c i p a n t s by means of a n a l y z i n g most major f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s f a c e d by each a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . As mentioned above, t h i s t h e s i s o n l y e v a l u a t e s the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s d u r i n g the f i r s t two y e a r s of the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . H a l l and o t h e r s have shown t h a t the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s d u r i n g the l a t t e r two y e a r s resembled c l o s e l y the B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s model. The c o n d i t i o n s which p r e v a i l e d d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d p r e v e n t any a p p r o x i m a t i o n of the norms of m u l t i p l e advocacy and t h u s cannot be used t o e v a l u a t e or t e s t the s t r a t e g y . The t h e s i s e v a l u a t e s f o u r case s t u d i e s . T h i s number i s c o n s i d e r e d l a r g e enough t o a l l o w c e r t a i n g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s but s m a l l enough t o keep the s t u d y manageable. S e v e r a l c r i t e r i a g u i de the s e l e c t i o n of t h e s e i s s u e s . F i r s t , t h ey a r e major f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s as d e s c r i b e d by H a l l . They i n c l u d e wars, c r i s e s , r e v o l u t i o n s and grand o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Second, more o f t e n than not they a l s o i n v o l v e what George has d e s c r i b e d as commitment, i n t e r v e n t i o n or e s c a l a t i o n . T h i r d , l i k e George, I am not u s i n g any p a r t i c u l a r s a m p l i n g s t r a t e g y e x c ept t h a t t h e r e must be s u f f i c i e n t d a t a on the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s a v a i l a b l e . 45 The f o u r cases, a r e : the deep c u t s p r o p o s a l s i n the SALT I I n e g o t i a t i o n s , the American response t o the war i n the Horn of A f r i c a i n 1977 and e a r l y 1978, the n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between China and the U n i t e d S t a t e s , and the f a l l of t he Shah of I r a n . The war i n the Horn of A f r i c a as w e l l as the r e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n f a l l c l e a r l y w i t h i n George's g u i d e l i n e s . Both were c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s i n the sense t h a t an immediate American response was c o n s i d e r e d n e c e s s a r y . As c r i s i s i s s u e s , they a l s o f a l l i n t o L i n d b l o m ' s c r i t i c a l c a t e g o r y s i n c e any American response would have a c o n s i d e r a b l e impact upon the s i t u a t i o n , w h i l e a t the same time the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was o p e r a t i n g under c o n d i t i o n s of u n c e r t a i n and i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n . The i n n o v a t i v e and b o l d p r o p o s a l s i n the SALT I I t a l k s , proposed by C a r t e r i n March 1977, as w e l l as the c o m p l e t i o n of the n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s w i t h C h i n a , must be c o n s i d e r e d as grand o p p o r t u n i t i e s . These d e c i s i o n s sought t o e f f e c t l a r g e changes i n American d i p l o m a c y . They a l s o q u a l i f y as d e c i s i o n s of commitment. W h i l e not a commitment i n the narrow m i l i t a r y sense as used by George, both the American p r o p o s a l t o c u t d r a s t i c a l l y the amounts of s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r weapons, and the move t o t e r m i n a t e o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan and acknowledge o f f i c i a l l y the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of Chi n a must be c o n s i d e r e d as more than r o u t i n e d e c i s i o n s by the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . C a r t e r made s e v e r a l o t h e r i m p o r t a n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s d u r i n g h i s f i r s t two y e a r s . Most prominent a r e the 4 6 Camp David Accord, the Panama Canal Treaties, human rights policy, i n i t i a t i v e s towards majority rule in Southern A f r i c a , and several defense issues, including the decision not to deploy the neutron bomb. These issues are excluded not because they do not f a l l into the above discussed categories or because they are unimportant. Rather, they are excluded because of a lack of available data on them or because the decision-making process on the issue was so e r r a t i c as to defeat any attempt to examine multiple advocacy proceedings in l i g h t of i t . Carter's Middle East p o l i c y , for example, started out as a broad discussion within the administration on who to inv i t e and how to proceed with a Geneva Conference. When this approach f a i l e d to produce any re s u l t s , Carter's prospects for a Middle East Peace settlement dimmed u n t i l Sadat v i s i t e d Jerusalem. While so far the issue would be useful to examine in l i g h t of the multiple advocacy strategy, i t appears that the l a t t e r part of Carter's Middle East policy, including the Camp David Summit was largely monopolized by Carter personally. It i s very d i f f i c u l t to piece together a meaningful decision-making process when the president personally deals with a l l decisions and most d e t a i l s without a larger debate in the ad m i n i s t r a t i o n . 7 8 It is only for this reason that t h i s issue i s excluded from this study. The decision to return ownership of the Panama Canal to the Panamanians appears to have been made by the president-elect and his preliminary team. Most sources indicate that 47 t h e r e was a w i d e s p r e a d consensus on t h i s i s s u e . 7 9 As a r e s u l t of the e a r l y consensus and the l a c k of d a t a , t h i s i s s u e does not l e n d i t s e l f t o a d e t a i l e d s t u d y . In s p i t e of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s f r e q u e n t r h e t o r i c on human r i g h t s , i t never adopted a c o h e r e n t or comprehensive p o l i c y on the i s s u e . 8 0 A s i m i l a r f a t e b e f e l l C a r t e r ' s i n i t i a t i v e s towards m a j o r i t y r u l e i n S o u t h e r n A f r i c a . D e c i s i o n s on t h e s e i s s u e s a r e fragmented and a t t i m e s t a k e n q u i t e s e p a r a t e l y from one a n o t h e r . As such, they can h a r d l y be o r g a n i z e d i n t o one c l a s s of "grand o p p o r t u n i t i e s . " F i n a l l y , C a r t e r ' s d e c i s i o n not t o deploy the n e u t r o n bomb as w e l l as s e v e r a l o t h e r d e f e n s e p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s must a w a i t f u r t h e r d a t a b e f o r e they can be a n a l y z e d . The next c h a p t e r w i l l p r o v i d e a g e n e r a l o u t l i n e of the d e i c i s i o n environment i n the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . An o v e r v i e w of the p r e s i d e n t ' s s t y l e as w e l l as t h e r o l e s p l a y e d by the v a r i o u s a d v i s o r s w i l l i l l u s t r a t e the e x t e n t t o which the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s a p p r o x i m a t e d the c o n d i t i o n s o u t l i n e d by the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . 4 8 ENDNOTES 1 Hans J . Morgenthau, P o l i t i c s Among N a t i o n s : The S t r u g g l e  For Power and Peace, New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1948. Other examples a r e A. W o l f e r s and L. M a r t i n ( e d s . ) , The A n g l o - American T r a d i t i o n i n F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1956; N i c h o l a s John Spykman, America's  S t r a t e g y i n World P o l i t i c s : The U n i t e d S t a t e s and The  Balan c e of Power, New York: H a r c o u r t , Brace & Wor l d , 1942; A. F. K. O r g a n s k i , World P o l i t i c s , New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1958; E. H. C a r r , The Twenty Year's C r i s i s : 1919-1939 , London: M a c M i l l a n , 1939. W h i l e the r a t i o n a l a c t o r model was s t i l l used i n the 1960's and beyond, o t h e r a n a l y s e s e m p h a s i z i n g e n v i r o n m e n t a l , p e r s o n a l i t y and p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s t h a t m o d i f i e d or reduced the " r a t i o n a l i t y " of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s were i n t r o d u c e d . For the e n v i r o n m e n t a l f a c t o r s see e.g. R i c h a r d C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and B u r t o n S a p i n , F o r e i g n P o l i c y D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g , New York: The Free P r e s s , 1962; Glenn D. P a i g e , The Korean  D e c i s i o n , New York: The Fr e e P r e s s . E a r l y examples of the i n f l u e n c e of p e r s o n a l i t y on d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a r e A l e x a n d e r L. and J u l i e t t e L. George, Woodrow W i l s o n and C o l o n e l House: A  P e r s o n a l i t y Study, New York: Dover, 1964; Ole R. H o i s t i e t . a l . ( e d s . ) , Enemies i n P o l i t i c s , C h i c a g o : Rand M c N a l l y , 1967. An e a r l y example of the i n f l u e n c e of p s y c h o l o g y i s Joseph H. de R i v e r a , The P s y c h o l o g i c a l Dimension of F o r e i g n  P o l i c y , Columbus, Ohio: C h a r l e s E. M e r i l l , 1968. 2 For a d i s c u s s i o n of the " r a t i o n a l a c t o r " c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n see Graham T. A l l i s o n , Essence of D e c i s i o n , B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, 1971; Glen H. Snyder and P a u l D i e s i n g , C o n f l i c t Among  N a t i o n s , P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1977. 3 R i c h a r d C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Bur t o n S a p i n , F o r e i g n  P o l i c y D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g , New York: The Free P r e s s , 1962; H a r o l d and Margaret S p r o u t , " E n v i r o n m e n t a l F a c t o r s i n the Study of I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t  R e s o l u t i o n , No. 1, 1957. * Joseph de R i v e r a , The P s y c h o l o g i c a l Dimension of F o r e i g n  P o l i c y , Columbus, Ohio: C. E. M e r r i l l , 1968; Robert J e r i v s , P e r c e p t i o n and M i s p e r c e p t i o n i n I n t e r n a t i o n a t P o l i t c s , P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976. 5 Leon F e s t i n g e r , A Theory of C o g n i t i v e D i s s o n a n c e , E v a n s t o n : Row and P p e t e r s o n , 1957. 6 Ole R. H o l s t i , "The B e l i e f System and N a t i o n a l Images: A Case Study," J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , No. 6, 1962, pp. 244-252; Ole R. H o l s t i , Robert C. N o r t h and R i c h a r d A. Brody, " P e r c e p t i o n and A c t i o n i n the 1914 C r i s i s , " i n J . D a v i d S i n g e r ( e d . ) , Q u a n t i t a t i v e I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , New York: The Free P r e s s , 1968. 7 C h a r l e s F. Hermann ( e d . ) , I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i s i s : I n s i g h t s 49 from B e h a v i o r a l R e s e a r c h , New York: The F r e e P r e s s , 1972; Ole \T. H o l s t i , C r i s i s , E s c a l a t i o n , War, M o n t r e a l : M c G i l l -Queens P r e s s , 1972. 8 I r v i n g L. J a n i s , G r o u p t h i n k , (2nd. e d . ) , B o s t o n : Houghton, M i f f l i n , 1982. 9 R i c h a r d E. N e u s t a d t , P r e s i d e n t i a l Power, New York: W i l e y & Sons, 1960; Roger H i l s m a n , To Move a N a t i o n , New York: D e l l , 1967; H a r o l d W i l e n s k y , O r g a n i z a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e , New Y o rk: B a s i c Books, 1967; Morton H. H a l p e r i n , B u r e a u c r a t i c  P o l i t c s and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , Washington: The B r o o k i n g s I n s t i t u t i o n , 1974; I . M. D e s t l e r , P r e s i d e n t s , B u r e a u c r a t s  and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972. 1 0 Graham T. A l l i s o n , Essence of D e c i s i o n , B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, 1971. 1 1 M i r i a m S t e i n e r , "The S e a r c h f o r Order i n a D i s o r d e r l y W orld: Worldviews and P r e s c r i p t i v e D e c i s i o n Paradigms," I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , No. 3, 1983, p. 373-413. 1 2 James G. March and H e r b e r t A. Simon, O r g a n i z a t i o n s , New Y o rk: John W i l e y & Sons, 1958; H e r b e r t A. Simon, Models of Man, New York: John W i l e y & Sons, 1957; D a v i d Braybrooke and C h a r l e s E. L i n d b l o m , A S t r a t e g y of D e c i s i o n , New York: The F r e e P r e s s , 1963. 1 3 John D. S t e i n b r u n e r , The C y b e r n e t i c Theory of D e c i s i o n , P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974. 1 • S t e i n e r (1983), p.379 1 5 The f o r m u l a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y can be found i n A l e x a n d e r L. George, "The Case f o r M u l t i p l e Advocacy i n Making F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, September 1972, pp 751-785; A l e x a n d e r L. George, "Towards a More Soundly Based F o r e i g n P o l i c y : Making B e t t e r Use of I n f o r m a t i o n , " Commission on the O r g a n i z a t i o n of the Government f o r the  Conduct of F o r e i g n P o l i c y , Volume 2, Appendix D, Washington: Gov't. P r i n t . O f f . , 1975; A l e x a n d e r L. George, P r e s i d e n t i a l  D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g i n F o r e i g n P o l i c y , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1980. The s t r a t e g y i s based on s e v e r a l s t u d i e s i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . George c a l l s the s t r a t e g y a p o l i c y s c i e n c e s t h e o r y . As such, the s t r a t e g y i s not a n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y which can be used t o judge p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . I t i s a l s o not an e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y which can o f f e r broad g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s t h a t e x p l a i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s e s or d e c i s i o n phenomena i n g e n e r a l . R a t h e r , l i k e the George et a l . study on d e t e r r e n c e ( A l e x a n d e r L. George and R i c h a r d Smoke, D e t e r r e n c e i n American F o r e i g n P o l i c y , New Y o rk: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974 ) and H a l l and Simons' stu d y on c o e r c i v e d i p l o m a c y ( D a v i d K. H a l l and W. E. Simons, The L i m i t s of C o e r c i v e Diplomacy, B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, 1971 5 the s t r a t e g y o f f e r s d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s c o n t i n g e n t 50 g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s on how t o s t r u c t u r e o p t i m a l l y t h e i r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . W h i l e i n r e a l i t y , we can a t b e s t e x p e c t d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s t o approximate the p r o v i s i o n s p r e s c r i b e d by the s t r a t e g y , the p r e s c r i p t i o n s t hemselves a r e f i r m l y based on h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and cannot s i m p l y be l a b e l l e d " i d e a l t y p e " p r o v i s i o n s . 1 6 D a v i d K. H a l l , Implementing M u l t i p l e Advocacy i n the  N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l : 1947-1980, Ph.D t h e s i s , S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , 1982, p.58. 1 7 George (1980), p.10. 1 8 George (1972), p.752 1 9 See S t a n l e y L. F a l k , "The NSC under Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy," P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Q u a r t e r l y , September 1964, pp.403-434; B e r t A. Rockman, "America's Department of S t a t e : I r r e g u l a r and R e g u l a r Syndromes of P o l i c y Making," American  P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, No.4, December 1981. pp.91 1-927 2 0 I r v i n g M. D e s t l e r , "A Job t h a t Doesn't Work," F o r e i g n  P o l i c y , 38, 1980, pp.80-88; P e t e r S z a n t o n , "Two J o b s , not One," F o r e i g n P o l i c y , 38, 1980. pp.89-91 2 1 H a l l (1982), pp.58-62 l i s t s the f o u r p r o c e s s norms as the p a r t i c i p a t i o n , f a i r n e s s , c o m p e t i t i o n and d i v e r s i t y pr i n c i p l e s . 2 2 George (1980), c h a p t e r 11. 2 3 Idem., p.173. 2 0 George (1972), p.785. For a d i s c u s s i o n of the C l a s s i c a l R a t i o n a l i t y c o n c e p t i o n of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g see i . a . Graham T. A l l i s o n , Essence of D e c i s i o n , B o s t o n : L i t t l e Brown & Co., 1971; R i c h a r d C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, B u r t o n S a p i n , F o r e i g n  P o l i c y D e c i s i o n - Making, New York: The F r e e P r e s s , 1982; D a v i d Braybrooke and C h a r l e s E. L i n d b l o m , A S t r a t e g y of  D e c i s i o n , New York: The F r e e P r e s s , 1963; J a n i c e Gross S t e i n and Raymond T a n t e r , R a t i o n a l D e c i s i o n Making: I s r a e l ' s  S e c u r i t y C h o i c e , 1967, Columbus, Ohio: Ohio U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1980 2 5 James G. March and H e r b e r t A. Simon, O r g a n i z a t i o n s , New York: John W i l e y & Sons, 1958; Braybrooke and L i n d b l o m (1963); C h a r l e s H. L i n d b l o m , "The S c i e n c e of M u d d l i n g Through," P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Review, No. 2, 1959. pp.79-88; Aaron W i l d a v s k y , The P o l i t i c s of the Budgetary P r o c e s s , B o s t o n : L i t t l e Brown & Co., 1974 i s an example of the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s c o n c e p t i o n . 2 6 For example see John D. S t e i n b r u n e r , The C y b e r n e t i c  Theory of Decision', P r i n c e t o n , New J e r s e y : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974; M i r i a m S t e i n e r , "The S e a r c h f o r Order i n a D i s o r d e r l y World: Worldviews and P r e s c r i p t i v e 51 D e c i s i o n Paradigms," I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , No.3, 1983. pp.373-413 2 7 S t e i n e r (1983), p.392. 2 8 . Robert J e r v i s , P e r c e p t i o n and M i s p e r c e p t i o n i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , P r i n c e t o n , New J e r s e y : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976; Joseph de R i v e r a , The P s y c h o l o g i c a l  Dimension of F o r e i g n P o l i c y , Columbus, Ohio: C. E. M e r i l l , 1968, p.53; I r v i n g L. J a n i s & Leon Mann, D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g , New York: The Free P r e s s , 1977, p.54. 2 9 Examples of t h e s e t e c h n i q u e s can be found i n s o u r c e s l i s t e d i n p r e v i o u s quote as w e l l as George (1980); R i c h a r d E. Neustadt and E r n e s t R. May, T h i n k i n g i n Time, New York: The Free P r e s s , 1986; Lawrence S. F a l k o w s k i ( e d . ) , P s y c h o l o g i c a l Models i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1979; George V. Coelho e t a l . ( e d s . ) , Coping and A d a p t a t i o n , New York: B a s i c Books I n c . , 1974. 3 0 George (1980), p.25 3 1 S t e i n b r u n e r (1974), Chapter 2; R i c h a r d Ned Lebow, Between  Peace and War, B a l t i m o r e : Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1981, p.106; J e r v i s (1976), Chapter 4. 3 2 George (1972), p.752, de R i v e r a (1968), p.98. 3 3 B. Aubrey F i s h e r , S m a l l Group D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g , New York: McGraw H i l l ; George (1980), p.81. 3" P a u l Hare Handbook of S m a l l Group R e s e a r c h , New York: The F r e e P r e s s , 1976, p.307; Norman R. F. M a i e r , Problem S o l v i n g  and C r e a t i v i t y i n I n d i v i d u a l s and Groups, Belmont, C a l i f o r n i a : Wadsworth P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1970, pp.348, 349, 432, 433; V i c t o r H. Vroom and P h i l i p W. Y e t t o n , L e a d e r s h i p  and D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g , P i t t s b u r g h : U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g P r e s s , 1973, p.25. 3 5 Vroom and Y e t t o n (1973), p.30; de R i v e r a (1968), p.209. 3 6 M a i e r (1970), p.433; Hare (1976), c h a p t e r 2; Dan C a l d w e l l , " B u r e a u c r a t i c F o r e i g n P o l i c y Making," American  B e h a v i o r a l S c i e n t i s t , No.1, September 1977, p.97. 3 7 I r v i n g L. J a n i s , G r o u p t h i n k , 2nd ed. B o s t o n : Houghton M i f f l i n Co, 1982. 3 8 R i c h a r d E. N e u s t a d t , P r e s i d e n t i a l Power, New York: W i l e y , 1960; Warner R. S c h i l l i n g , P a u l T. Hammond and Glen H. Snyder, S t r a t e g y , P o l i t i c s and Defense Budgets, New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962; A l l i s o n (1971), c h a p t e r 5. See a l s o Morton H. H a l p e r i n , B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s and  F o r e i g n P o l i c y , Washington: The B r o o k i n g s I n s t i t u t i o n , 1974; and I . M. D e s t l e r , P r e s i d e n t s , B u r e a u c r a t s and F o r e i g n 52 P o l i c y , P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e s i t y P r e s s , 1972. 3 9 A l l i s o n (1971), c h a p t e r 5; Robert J . A r t , " B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s and American F o r e i g n P o l i c y ," P o l i c y S c i e n c e s , No.4, 1973, pp.467-490 a o George (1980), p.4. A u t h o r s who have e x p l o r e d t h e s e problems i n c l u d e R i c h a r d W. Cottam, F o r e i g n P o l i c y  M o t i v a t i o n , P i t t s b u r g h : U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h P r e s s , 1977; Margaret G. Hermann ( e d . ) , A P s y c h o l o g i c a l E x a m i n a t i o n  of P o l i t i c a l L e a d e r s , New York: The Free P r e s s , 1977; James D. B a r b e r , The P r e s i d e n t i a l C h a r a c t e r , Englewoods C l i f f s , N.J: P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1972. * 1 A d i s c u s s i o n of th e s e f a c t o r s can be found i n i . a . C h a r l e s F. Hermann, ( e d . ) , I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i s e s : I n s i g h t s  from B e h a v i o r a l R e s e a r c h , New York: The F r e e P r e s s , 1972; Ole R. H o l s t i , C r i s i s , E s c a l a t i o n , War, M o n t r e a l : M c G i l l -Queen's U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972; Lebow (1981). " 2 George (1980), c h a p t e r 3. See a l s o de R i v e r a (1968), pp.23-28; J e r v i s (1976), c h a p t e r s 3 and 7; Ole R. H o l s t i , "The B e l i e f System and N a t i o n a l Images," J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t  R e s o l u t i o n , No.6, 1962, pp.244-252; Lebow (1981), p.103. " " 3 A l l i s o n (1971), p.83; March and Simon (1958), p.218. See a l s o H a r o l d L. W i l e n s k y , O r g a n i z a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e , New York: B a s i c Books, 1967, pp.42-48. George (1972), p.754; George (1980), c h a p t e r . 10 4 5 C h a r l e s E. L i n d b l o m , The I n t e l l i g e n c e of Democracy:  D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g Through M u t u a l Adjustment, New York: The Free P r e s s , 1965; see George (1972), p.760. a s George (1972), p.761. " 7 See e s p e c i a l l y George (1980), c h a p t e r 9. * 8 For example see George's d i s c u s s i o n of P r e s i d e n t Johnson's t r e a t m e n t of George B a l l d u r i n g t h e Vietnam War. George (1980), p.171. " 9 George (1980), p.170. 5 0 Idem, pp.151 , 152. T h i s s t y l e i s most o f t e n a t t r i b u t e d t o H a r r y Truman. 5 1 Idem, pp.150, 151. T h i s s t y l e i s based l a r g e l y on F r a n k l i n R o o s e v e l t ' s system of a d v i c e . 5 2 Idem, pp.157, 158; George (1972), pp.763-765. P r e s i d e n t Kennedy's s t r u c t u r e of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g d u r i n g the Cuban m i s s i l e c r i s i s resembles t h i s model. 5 3 Theodore Sorenson, Decison-Making i n the White House, New 53 York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963, pp.59-72; H o l s t i ( 1972), pp.207-212. See a l s o C a l d w e l l (1977), p.101. 5 f t J a n i s (1982), p.250. 5 5 Roger B. P o r t e r , P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g : The  Economic P o l i c y Board, Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1980, p.217. 5 6 Norman C. Thomas, "Reforming the P r e s i d e n c y : Problems and P r o s p e c t s , " i n Thomas E. C r o n i n and R e x f o r d G. T u g w e l l ( e d s . ) , The P r e s i d e n c y R e a p p r a i s e d , New York: Harper & Row, 1977, pp.340-341; E r w i n C. Hargrove, The Power of the Modern  P r e s i d e n c y , P h i l a d e l p h i a : Temple U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974, pp.145, 146. 5 7 Stephen Hess, O r g a n i z i n g the P r e s i d e n c y , Washington: The B r o o k i n g s I n s t i t u t i o n , 1976, p.176. 5 8 D e s t l e r (1980), p.86 and " N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i c e t o US P r e s i d e n t s : Some l e s s o n s from 30 y e a r s , " World P o l i t i c s , 2 9 ( 2 ) , 1980. pp.143-176; See a l s o Szanton (1980), pp.89-91 5 9 Hargrove (1974), p.145; Rockman (1981), p.923. 6 0 Adam Y a r m o l i n s k y , " B u r e a u c r a t i c S t r u c t u r e s and P o l i t i c a l Outcomes," J o u r n a l of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 23, 1969, pp.225-235 6 1 R i c h a r d F. Fenno, The P r e s i d e n t ' s C a b i n e t , Cambridge: H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1959. 6 2 H a l l (1982), A l e s s i n depth a n a l y s i s of the N i x o n , F o r d and C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f o l l o w s a f t e r . However, H a l l acknowledges h i s i n f o r m a t i o n f o r th e s e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s i s s c a n t . 6 3 H a l l does not r u l e out the use of the s t r a t e g y f o r f o r m a l i s t i c p r e s i d e n t s . However, h i s study shows c l e a r l y t h a t t h i s s t y l e i s not as r e c e p t i v e t o the s t r a t e g y as the c o m p e t i t i v e and c o l l e g i a l s t y l e s . See H a l l (1982), pp.700-705. 6 4 H a l l (1982), p.734, 735. 6 5 Idem., pp.708-721. 6 6 For the p o l i c y advocacy r o l e see H a l l (1982), pp.77, 78, 711, f o r p u b l i c s p e a k i n g see pp.715, 716, f o r the d i p l o m a t i c r o l e see pp.721-725, and f o r the p o l i c y enforcement r o l e see 717-720. 6 7 H a l l (1982), p.661. 6 8 George (1980), c h a p t e r 9. 54 6 9 Lebow (1981), pp.297-298; Thomas E. C r o n i n , The S t a t e of  the P r e s i d e n c y , B o s t o n : L i t t l e Brown & Co.,.1975, p.276. 7 0 George (1980), pp.160, 200; H a l l (1982), pp.654-681. 7 1 The main change i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , as i d e n t i f i e d by H a l l , i s the demise of the open debate forum and the r e s t r i c t i o n of a c c e s s of s e v e r a l a d v o c a t e s t o the p r e s i d e n t . T h i s change took p l a c e g r a d u a l l y i n l a t e 1978 and e a r l y 1979. Most commentators a t t r i b u t e the change t o the growing p o l i c y disagreement between Vance and B r z e z i n s k i . As a r e s u l t of t h i s d i s a g r e e m e n t , most d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s e s d u r i n g the l a t t e r h a l f of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n resembled A l l i s o n ' s B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s model. The i n d i v i d u a l end runs on the p r e s i d e n t as w e l l as the l a c k of open debate among the a d v i s o r s which c h a r a c t e r i z e t h i s model, p r e c l u d e an e v a l u a t i o n of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . Examples of such commentators a r e : Gaddis S m i t h , M o r a l i t y , Reason and Power, New York: H i l l and Wang, 1986; D a v i d S. M c l e l l a n , Cyrus Vance, New York: Rowman and A l l a n h e l d 1985; M. Glenn Abernathy e t a l . ( e d s ) , The C a r t e r Y e a r s , London: F r a n c e s P i n t e r , 1984. 7 2 George (1972), p.751. 7 3 Idem, p.752. 7 4 Idem, p.767. 7 5 Idem, p.767. 7 6 Idem d i t t o . 7 7 H a l l (1982), p.49 and p.67. 7 8 Jimmy C a r t e r , Keeping F a i t h , New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p.316; Vance (1983), p.217. See a l s o John Havemann, "White House R e p o r t , " The N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , J u l y 16, 1977. 7 9 Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , Power and P r i n c i p l e , New York: F a r r a r , S t r a u s , G i r o u x , 1983, p.134; Cyrus Vance, Hard  C h o i c e s , New York: Simon & S c h u s t e r , 1983, p. 140; Gaddis S m i t h , M o r a l i t y , Reason and Power, New York: H i l l and Wang, 1986, p.48. 0 B r z e z i n s k i ( 1 983), pp.126-127 CHAPTER TWO MULTIPLE ADVOCACY AND CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 56 T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l o f f e r a d e s c r i p t i o n of the g e n e r a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I t w i l l p r o v i d e e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g the e x t e n t t o which the p r o c e s s norms and r o l e t a s k s of m u l t i p l e advocacy were appr o x i m a t e d . The d i s c u s s i o n a l s o o u t l i n e s the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g environment i n which the f o u r i s s u e s , s t u d i e d i n d e p t h , can be u n d e r s t o o d . The memoirs of s e v e r a l p a r t i c i p a n t s , v a r i o u s i n t e r v i e w s and a number of academic s t u d i e s a r e now a v a i l a b l e and a l l o w a r e a s o n a b l y comprehensive l o o k a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , g o i n g beyond the p r e l i m i n a r y o b s e r v a t i o n s of George (1980) and H a l l (1982). A d e f i n i t i v e account must a w a i t the opening of the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y F i l e s . The d i s c u s s i o n i s d i v i d e d i n t o f i v e s e c t i o n s : the p r e s i d e n t ' s s t y l e , the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e , the r e s o u r c e s of the a d v o c a t e s , advocate c o m p e t i t i o n and d i v e r s i t y , and the c u s t o d i a n . Each s e c t i o n d e a l s w i t h one i m p o r t a n t c o n d i t i o n of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y and examines a s p e c t s from both the p r o c e s s norms and r o l e t a s k s r e l e v a n t t o the c o n d i t i o n . THE PRESIDENT'S STYLE An i m p o r t a n t theme i n C a r t e r ' s e l e c t i o n campaign was the need f o r an open, d e c e n t r a l i z e d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n the White House. 1 C a r t e r d i d not want a " p a l a c e guard" or 57 even a c h i e f of s t a f f . He a p p o i n t e d n i n e a s s i s t a n t s w i t h r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l s t a t u s but w i t h d i f f e r e n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n the White House. 2 A l l e g a t i o n s t h a t H a m i l t o n J o r d a n a c t e d as a de f a c t o c h i e f of s t a f f do not s t a n d up t o c a r e f u l s c r u t i n y . H i s r o l e has been d e s c r i b e d by s e v e r a l White House a i d e s , as w e l l as by h i m s e l f , as t h a t of a p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g i s t and watchdog f o r the p r e s i d e n t . J o r d a n d i d not p e r f o r m " c h i e f of s t a f f " f u n c t i o n s . He d i d not c o n t r o l the paper f l o w t o and from the p r e s i d e n t , d i d not s c r e e n a c c e s s t o the p r e s i d e n t and d i d not s e t the p r e s i d e n t ' s d a i l y s c h e d u l e . 3 T h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n l e f t C a r t e r as h i s own c h i e f of s t a f f ; as the "hub i n the wheel" i n Kennedy's now famous "spokes i n the wheel" s t a f f s t r u c t u r e . The hub was most l i k e l y not i n the c e n t r e of the wheel s i n c e "the G e o r g i a n s , " and p a r t i c u l a r l y Jody P o w e l l and H a m i l t o n J o r d a n , were f i r s t among e q u a l s . However t h i s s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p d i d not g i v e them a p o l i c y a d v i c e s t a t u s t o the e x c l u s i o n of o t h e r s . E v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t C a r t e r ' s w o r k i n g s t y l e s u i t e d h i s r o l e as h i s own c h i e f of s t a f f . C a r t e r b e l i e v e d he c o u l d c o o r d i n a t e the v a r i o u s arguments coming t o him on any i s s u e . He f e l t c o n f i d e n t about p e r s o n a l l y s c r e e n i n g the i n f o r m a t i o n sent t o him. Indeed, c o n c e r n i n g d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n g e n e r a l , he s a i d " I l i k e t o be p e r s o n a l l y i n v o l v e d so t h a t I can know the thought p r o c e s s e s t h a t go i n t o f i n a l d e c i s i o n s . " " Robert Hunter, an o f f i c i a l i n the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , o b s e r v e d t h a t C a r t e r was always s t r i v i n g t o be p e r s o n a l l y on t o p of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 5 Both B r z e z i n s k i and Hedley Donovan (an a s s i s t a n t t o C a r t e r i n 1979) s t a t e t h a t C a r t e r was 58 f a m i l i a r w i t h James D. B a r b e r ' s t y p o l o g y of p r e s i d e n t i a l s t y l e s . They agree t h a t C a r t e r saw h i m s e l f as an a c t i v i s t p r e s i d e n t who wanted t o be h i s own S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e and c o n t r o l f o r e i g n p o l i c y from the White House. 6 A p r e s i d e n t who " a p p o i n t s " h i m s e l f as the g a t e k e e p e r of a l l i n f o r m a t i o n f o r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g must be w i l l i n g and a b l e t o read through a l a r g e amount of documents each day. C a r t e r was such a p r e s i d e n t . He d i d not h i d e h i s a p p e t i t e f o r d e t a i l s . A c o n s u l t a n t on a White House O r g a n i z a t i o n study c o n c l u d e d : "The p r e s i d e n t reads a l o t , comments on memos a l o t and has a p a s s i o n f o r g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d i n t h e d e t a i l s of a l o t of q u e s t i o n s . " 7 Even though C a r t e r had Watson, E i z e n s t a t and B r z e z i n s k i as p o l i c y c o o r d i n a t o r s , he read a p p r o x i m a t e l y 300 t o 400 pages per day. C a r t e r d i d not r e q u e s t h i s c a b i n e t members and s t a f f t o hammer out a f i n a l o p t i o n f o r a problem t o be sent t o him f o r a c c e p t a n c e or r e j e c t i o n , but encouraged a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s t o submit t h e i r o p t i o n memoranda t o h i m . 8 W i l l i a m H y l a n d , a NSC s t a f f who had a l s o s e r v e d w i t h N i x o n , n o t e d : Much more goes t o the p r e s i d e n t t h rough the system than i n the p a s t . B e f o r e , i s s u e s were not brought t o him u n t i l t h ey were t a l k e d out a t the C a b i n e t or s u b - c a b i n e t l e v e l . I s s u e s now a r e v e n t i l a t e d much e a r l i e r . 9 C a r t e r ' s i n t e n s e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p o l i c y -f o r m u l a t i o n p r o c e s s and h i s d e s i r e t o command a l l d e t a i l s g i v e credence t o the s u i t a b i l i t y of h i s s t y l e f o r i m p l e m e n t i n g m u l t i p l e advocacy. However, a p r e s i d e n t who 59 a l l o w s m u l t i p l e v i e w p o i n t s and immerses h i m s e l f i n the p r o c e s s of w e i g h i n g d i f f e r e n t o p t i o n s , must a l s o be a b l e t o c u t the rope and make a c l e a r d e c i s i o n when i t s time has come. S e v e r a l a u t h o r s c l a i m t h a t C a r t e r was i n d e c i s i v e . E i t h e r as a r e s u l t of d i f f e r e n t v i e w p o i n t s among h i s a d v i s o r s or as a r e s u l t of C a r t e r ' s p e r s o n a l ambivalence about many i s s u e s , they argue t h a t C a r t e r was unable t o pursue a c o n s i s t e n t and c o h e r e n t s e t of p o l i c i e s . 1 0 W h i l e i t i s t r u e t h a t C a r t e r d i d not always f u l l y u n d e r s t a n d the p o t e n t i a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between d i f f e r e n t d e c i s i o n s , most e v i d e n c e shows t h a t on i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n s he was q u i t e d e c i s i v e . A g a i n s t the a d v i c e of most of h i s p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r s , f o r example, he c a n c e l l e d the p r o d u c t i o n and deployment of the N-bomb, convened the Camp D a v i d meetings w i t h Begin and Sadat, and asked the Senate t o c o n s i d e r American t r o o p w i t h d r a w a l s from South K o r e a . 1 1 C a r t e r ' s s e c r e t a r y t o the c a b i n e t o b s e r v e d , "When a d e c i s i o n i s made, i t w i l l be h i s d e c i s i o n . He l i s t e n s t o many pe o p l e but when i t i s time f o r a d e c i s i o n , he doesn't t a k e a v o t e . " C a r t e r , however, u s u a l l y a l l o w e d h i s f i n a l d e c i s i o n t o be ap p e a l e d by h i s a d v i s o r s but d i d not o f t e n change h i s m i n d . 1 2 C a r t e r not o n l y t o l e r a t e d but a l s o encouraged h i s a d v i s o r s t o be c o m p e t i t i v e i n t h e i r advocacy. G e n e r a l l y , C a r t e r would commission an i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l committee of the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l t o study an i s s u e and t o ge n e r a t e a v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s f o r h i s e v a l u a t i o n . O f t e n t h i s p r o c e s s was f o l l o w e d by a meeting between the p r i n c i p a l 6 0 a d v i s o r s and C a r t e r i n which t h e v a r i o u s o p t i o n s were d i s c u s s e d . The p r e s i d e n t c h a i r e d t h e s e meetings and q u e r i e d the p a r t i c i p a n t s . 1 3 B r z e z i n s k i d e s c r i b e d such meetings: He would l i s t e n v e r y a t t e n t i v e l y t o debates among us, and on one. o c c a s i o n he t o l d me t h a t he p a r t i c u l a r l y e n j o y e d d i s a g r e e m e n t s between H a r o l d Brown and me, s i n c e the debates between us i n v o l v e d such q u i c k and sh a r p s p a r r i n g . 1 " Vance's account a l s o c o n f i r m s t h a t C a r t e r encouraged f r a n k n e s s and a c c e p t e d d i s a g r e e m e n t s on p o l i c y from h i s a d v i s o r s . 1 5 Joseph C a l i f a n o ( S e c r e t a r y of HEW) and Jordan o f f e r many examples of C a r t e r ' s ease w i t h p o l i c y c o n f l i c t among h i s a d v i s o r s , s eemingly r e l i s h i n g the d i f f e r e n t i d e a s t h a t such c o n f l i c t s g e n e r a t e . 1 6 S e v e r a l o b s e r v e r s argue t h a t C a r t e r became overwhelmed by c o n f l i c t among h i s a d v i s o r s t o the e x t e n t t h a t i t i m p a i r e d h i s a b i l i t y t o s t a y the c o u r s e of h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 1 7 T h i s q u e s t i o n w i l l be e x p l o r e d i n more d e t a i l below. However, i t i s m i s l e a d i n g t o assume t h a t such p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s o c c u r r e d a g a i n s t C a r t e r ' s w i l l . In f a c t , he s t a t e d h i s i n t e n t i o n t o b e n e f i t from i t : The d i f f e r e n t s t r e n g t h s of B r z e z i n s k i and Vance matched the r o l e s they p l a y e d and a l s o p e r m i t t e d the n a t u r a l c o m p e t i t i o n between the two o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o s t a y a l i v e . I a p p r e c i a t e d those d i f f e r e n c e s . In making the f i n a l d e c i s i o n s on f o r e i g n p o l i c y , I needed t o weigh as many p o i n t s of view as p o s s i b l e . 1 8 61 THE STRUCTURE OF DECISION-MAKING On January 20 1977, C a r t e r i s s u e d two p r e s i d e n t i a l d i r e c t i v e s which l a i d down the f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e f o r p o l i c y -f o r m u l a t i o n on f o r e i g n and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i s s u e s . 1 9 Two i n t e r a g e n c y committees were c r e a t e d t o study i s s u e s and t o pr e p a r e p o l i c y p o s i t i o n p a p e r s . The P o l i c y Review Committee was i n charge of both t o p i c a l and r e g i o n a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s , defense i s s u e s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic i s s u e s . The Chairman was s e l e c t e d on the b a s i s of the type of i s s u e under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . For example, g e n e r a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s were c h a i r e d by the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , and d e f e n s e i s s u e s by the S e c r e t a r y of Defense. In p r a c t i c e , the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e c h a i r e d the b u l k of the me e t i n g s . The S p e c i a l C o o r d i n a t i o n Committee o v e r l o o k e d i n t e l l i g e n c e and arms c o n t r o l i s s u e s and a l s o f u n c t i o n e d as the c r i s i s management committee. The N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r was i t s permanent c h a i r m a n . S e v e r a l members of b o t h committees were a l s o s t a t u t o r y members of the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . They i n c l u d e d the P r e s i d e n t , the V i c e -P r e s i d e n t , the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , and the S e c r e t a r y of Defense. The Chairman of the J o i n t C h i e f s and the D i r e c t o r of C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e a c t e d as a d v i s o r s t o the C o u n c i l . In a d d i t i o n t o the s t a t u t o r y and a d v i s o r y members, both J o r d a n and P o w e l l o f t e n a t t e n d e d the NSC meetings as w e l l as meetings of the S p e c i a l C o o r d i n a t i o n Committee and the P o l i c y Review Committee. A l o n g s i d e t h e s e two committees, 62 m i n i PRC's and SCC's de v e l o p e d where a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r i e s and NSC s t a f f a i d e s c l e a r e d some ground work f o r the PRC and SCC meetings. The N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r was a s s i g n e d t o f a c i l i t a t e , c o o r d i n a t e and i n t e g r a t e the paper f l o w i n both committees. In c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the s e c r e t a r i e s , the NSA s e t the agenda f o r the s e meetings as w e l l as f o r the f u l l NSC meetings which u s u a l l y f o l l o w e d PRC and SCC meetings t o re v i e w the o p t i o n s i n f r o n t of the P r e s i d e n t . The NSA was a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g the paper f l o w between the PRC and SCC on the one hand and the NSC on the o t h e r . The u s u a l p r o c e s s s t a r t e d w i t h the p r e s i d e n t r e q u e s t i n g B r z e z i n s k i t o p r e p a r e a P r e s i d e n t i a l Review Memorandum (PRM) on a s p e c i f i c i s s u e . B r z e z i n s k i would then a s s i g n a NSC s t a f f a i d e t o s e t i n motion the p r o c e s s of g a t h e r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n i n e i t h e r the PRC or SCC s e t t i n g . The v a r i o u s o p t i o n s and u s u a l l y the minutes of the meetings would be for w a r d e d t o C a r t e r by B r z e z i n s k i . The PRM's were o r g a n i z e d i n t h r e e s e c t i o n s : the s u b j e c t , i t s problems, agency o p t i o n s and t h e i r a n a l y s e s . To t h i s , B r z e z i n s k i would u s u a l l y a t t a c h a c o v e r memo i n d i c a t i n g h i s a n a l y s i s of the problem as w e l l as h i s p r e f e r e n c e or l a c k of p r e f e r e n c e f o r any of the opt i o n s . Depending on the importance of the i s s u e , the l e v e l of disagreement or consensus among the a d v i s o r s and C a r t e r ' s p e r s o n a l ( d i s ) s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the PRM, C a r t e r would e i t h e r choose an o p t i o n and i s s u e a P r e s i d e n t i a l D i r e c t i v e ( c a l l e d P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c i s i o n Memorandum d u r i n g the C a r t e r 63 a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) or ask f o r a f a c e - t o - f a c e meeting w i t h the r e l e v a n t a d v i s o r s . In the case of the former, B r z e z i n s k i would d i s t r i b u t e t h e d i r e c t i v e t o the r e l e v a n t departments and ensure an a c c u r a t e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of C a r t e r ' s d e c i s i o n . S e c r e t a r i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s , speeches and d i r e c t i v e s t o " f i e l d w o r k e r s " were a l l c l e a r e d by the NSC s t a f f a t the White House. By September 1977,Carter had i s s u e d j u s t over 30 PRM's on a wide range of i s s u e s i n c l u d i n g Panama,SALT, N u c l e a r P r o l i f e r a t i o n and the Law of the Sea. At t h i s d a t e , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 17 PRM's had been p r o c e s s e d and had become PDM's w h i l e the r e m a i n i n g were s t i l l d e b a t e d . 2 0 On most i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s C a r t e r wanted t o f o l l o w up on the PRM by meeting w i t h h i s a d v i s o r s . E a r l y i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , C a r t e r convened the f u l l NSC f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . 2 1 However, more i n f o r m a l m e e t i n g s , c a l l e d the F r i d a y F o r e i g n P o l i c y B r e a k f a s t s , d e v e l o p e d e v e n t u a l l y between C a r t e r , Mondale, Vance and B r z e z i n s k i . In Ja n u a r y 1978, J o r d a n j o i n e d , w i t h Brown f o l l o w i n g a few months l a t e r . I t was e s p e c i a l l y i n the f o r m a l NSC and i n f o r m a l F r i d a y B r e a k f a s t meetings t h a t C a r t e r ' s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s emphasized f r e e c o m p e t i t i o n i n f r o n t of the p r e s i d e n t . Both p a r t i c i p a n t s and o b s e r v e r s of the s e meetings have t e s t i f i e d t o t h e i r importance i n p r o v i d i n g C a r t e r w i t h f r e e d i s c u s s i o n , w i t h a v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s , and w i t h a forum i n which C a r t e r made d e c i s i o n s . 2 2 Vance p r o v i d e s d i r e c t e v i d e n c e f o r t h i s c o n c l u s i o n : 64 I t was a v a l u a b l e forum f o r f r a n k d i s c u s s i o n s . I s s u e s were a i r e d t h o r o u g h l y and we were a b l e t o c o n s i d e r the i n t e r a c t i o n between domest i c and f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a t t e r s . 2 3 I n f o r m a l meetings a t t e n d e d o n l y by Vance, B r z e z i n s k i and Brown, a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s u r g i n g , came i n t o use on the Thursdays p r e c e d i n g the F r i d a y B r e a k f a s t m e e t i n g s . I s s u e s f o r the F r i d a y meetings as w e l l as any p r e s s i n g or c u r r e n t c o n c e r n s were d i s c u s s e d . W h i l e t h e s e meetings enhanced the c o o r d i n a t i o n of p o l i c y among t h e s e t h r e e a d v i s o r s , they a l s o a l l o w e d Vance, B r z e z i n s k i and Brown t o s o l v e c o n f l i c t s among thems e l v e s w i t h o u t the p r e s i d e n t ' s i n v o l v e m e n t . Vance and B r z e z i n s k i both noted t h a t t h e s e meetings were p r o d u c t i v e i n s e t t l i n g i s s u e s q u i c k l y , a t t i m e s b y p a s s i n g the l o n g e r d e l i b e r a t i o n s of the PRC and SCC. 2" T h i s a s p e c t of the meeting v i o l a t e s the p r o c e s s norm of m u l t i p l e advocacy which s t i p u l a t e s t h a t the p r e s i d e n t must be a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d i n the p r o c e s s of r e s o l v i n g a dvocate c o n f l i c t s . However, t h e r e i s e v i d e n c e t h a t the r e s o l u t i o n of c o n f l i c t among the t h r e e d i d not o f t e n a p p l y t o im p o r t a n t p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s . Hunter (a NSC s t a f f a i d ) o b s e r v e d t h a t the Thursday meetings u s u a l l y s t e e r e d c l e a r of i s s u e s t h a t had not been p r e p a r e d by the PRC or SCC. 2 5 Moreover, the r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t the c o n f l i c t s between B r z e z i n s k i and Vance were not e a s i l y r e s o l v e d and u s u a l l y needed C a r t e r h i m s e l f . Indeed, C a r t e r i n s i s t e d t h a t B r z e z i n s k i r e p o r t the p r o c e e d i n g s of the meeting t o him on the same day. F u r t h e r m o r e , C a r t e r ' s memoirs r e v e a l t h a t the F r i d a y 65 meetings u s u a l l y i n v o l v e d c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n f l i c t among h i s a d v i s o r s , which i n d i c a t e s t h a t the Thursday meetings d i d not r e s u l t i n compromises or s o l u t i o n s t h a t d i d not r e q u i r e the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n . 2 6 In s p i t e of C a r t e r ' s c l a i m t o the c o n t r a r y d u r i n g the e l e c t i o n campaign, the c a b i n e t never became a d e c i s i o n -making forum. The c a b i n e t met f r e q u e n t l y but o n l y t o a l l o w C a r t e r t o make announcements about h i s l e g i s l a t i v e agenda and t o share g e n e r a l i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h h i s s e c r e t a r i e s . C a r t e r artd o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s acknowledge t h a t i t s u s e f u l n e s s e v e n t u a l l y faded i n t o o b l i v i o n . 2 7 ADVOCATE RESOURCES In a d d i t i o n t o C a r t e r ' s t h r e e p r i n c i p a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y a d v i s o r s , Vance, B r z e z i n s k i and Brown, V i c e - P r e s i d e n t Mondale and J o r d a n , C a r t e r ' s p e r s o n a l a s s i s t a n t , appear as im p o r t a n t a d v o c a t e s on f o r e i g n and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i s s u e s . 2 8 The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y s t a t e s t h a t a l l ad v o c a t e s must have adequate s t a f f s u p p o r t and i n f o r m a t i o n , a c c e s s t o the d e c i s i o n forums and t o the p r e s i d e n t , and adequate b a r g a i n i n g and p e r s u a s i o n s k i l l s i n o r d e r t o compete w i t h one another on a r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l b a s i s . I n t h i s s e c t i o n , I w i l l examine these r e s o u r c e s f o r each a d v i s o r . Vance, as the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , was i n charge of the second l a r g e s t u n i t of s t a f f and i n f o r m a t i o n r e s o u r c e s i n 66 t h e a r e a of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . He c h a i r e d the m a j o r i t y of t h e PRC meetings and was a c r u c i a l p a r t i c i p a n t i n a l l o t h e r d e c i s i o n forums. The memoirs of C a r t e r and Vance r e v e a l t h a t they had d a i l y t e l e p h o n e c o n t a c t and t h a t C a r t e r never r e s c i n d e d on h i s promise t h a t Vance c o u l d c a l l on him a t any t i m e . Vance p r e p a r e d a n i g h t l y r e p o r t f o r the p r e s i d e n t i n which he gave h i s a n a l y s i s of c u r r e n t c o n c e r n s and h i s p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n s t o d e a l w i t h them. T h i s r e p o r t was sent t o C a r t e r w i t h o u t NSC s c r u t i n y and was r e a d by C a r t e r the next morning b e f o r e the d a i l y i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g w i t h B r z e z i n s k i . 2 9 Whenever Vance b e l i e v e d t h a t B r z e z i n s k i d i d not a d e q u a t e l y summarize the p r o c e e d i n g s of the PRC or SCC, he was i n v i t e d t o read B r z e z i n s k i ' s summaries a t the White House and make the n e c e s s a r y c h a n g e s . 3 0 C a r t e r a p p o i n t e d Vance as S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e because he v a l u e d h i s d i p l o m a t i c e x p e r i e n c e i n the Johnson a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and thought Vance had the n e c e s s a r y s k i l l s t o a d m i n i s t e r the complex S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t . 3 1 In s p i t e of the w e l l known p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s between B r z e z i n s k i and Vance, B r z e z i n s k i thought Vance t o be " v e r y w e l l i n f o r m e d , v e r y much t o the p o i n t and w e l l b r i e f e d . " 3 2 M c L e l l a n notes t h a t though Vance was not as a g g r e s s i v e and i n n o v a t i v e as B r z e z i n s k i i n d e v e l o p i n g p o l i c y i d e a s , Vance was more s k i l l e d i n a s s e s s i n g the f e a s i b i l i t y of p o l i c y o p t i o n s . 3 3 These d i f f e r e n t s t r e n g t h s between Vance and B r z e z i n s k i i l l u s t r a t e the d i f f e r e n t e x p e c t a t i o n s C a r t e r had from both men. C a r t e r b e l i e v e d he would b e n e f i t from h e a r i n g b oth the 67 c a u t i o u s , b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of a c o u r s e of a c t i o n and the more a c t i o n o r i e n t e d and a b s t r a c t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . J o r d a n d e s c r i b e s a t y p i c a l m e e t i n g , c o n s t i t u t i n g a b a l a n c e between the two v i e w p o i n t s : As u s u a l , Vance and B r z e z i n s k i . . . s t a t e d t h e i r arguments d i r e c t l y and w i t h o u t emotion. C a r t e r gave h i s u n d i v i d e d a t t e n t i o n f i r s t t o the one and then t o the o t h e r , l i s t e n i n g c a r e f u l l y , w e i g h i n g what both had t o s a y . 3 " The f a c t t h a t B r z e z i n s k i was the more a g g r e s s i v e of the two a d v i s o r s d i d not mean t h a t h i s p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n s persuaded the p r e s i d e n t more o f t e n than Vance's. J o r d a n , Andrew Young and Robert S t r a u s s ( a s s i s t a n t t o C a r t e r ) as w e l l as s e v e r a l o b e r v e r s b e l i e v e the c o n t r a r y was t r u e . 3 5 A l t h o u g h C a r t e r e x p e c t e d Vance t o be o c c u p i e d w i t h d i p l o m a c y , p o l i c y i m p l e m e n t a t i o n and w i t h a d m i n i s t e r i n g the S t a t e Department, Vance appears as one of C a r t e r ' s c e n t r a l p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s on a l l i s s u e s . The NSC s t a f f under B r z e z i n s k i , though l e a n e r than under K i s s i n g e r , was h i g h l y p r o f e s s i o n a l and s p e c i a l i z e d . 3 6 W h i l e t h i s s t a f f cannot match the numbers and r e s o u r c e s of the Department of S t a t e or Defence, i t has advantages which the b i g g e r departments l a c k . I t s s m a l l e r s t a f f can p r o v i d e a n a l y s e s more q u i c k l y as a r e s u l t of fewer o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and b u r e a u c r a t i c o b s t a c l e s . I t does not have t o implement p o l i c y and can t h e r e f o r e c o n c e n t r a t e on p o l i c y a n a l y s i s and the development of o p t i o n s . A l l f i e l d i n f o r m a t i o n g o i n g t o the S t a t e Department must a l s o go t h r o u g h the NSC s t a f f i n 68 the E x e c u t i v e O f f i c e b u i l d i n g or the s i t u a t i o n room i n the White House. T h i s p r o v i d e s the s t a f f w i t h i t s own "raw d a t a " t o f o r m u l a t e i t s a n a l y s e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , the c l o s e p r o x i m i t y of the s t a f f , and e s p e c i a l l y i t s D i r e c t o r , t o the p r e s i d e n t keeps i t more a t t u n e d t o the wishes of the p r e s i d e n t . B r z e z i n s k i , i n a d d i t i o n t o h a v i n g a c c e s s t o a l l d e c i s i o n forums, e n j o y e d f r e e a c c e s s t o the O v a l O f f i c e and c o u l d see the p r e s i d e n t w i t h o u t an appointment. Each morning, B r z e z i n s k i spent a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30 minutes w i t h the p r e s i d e n t g o i n g over the d a i l y i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g , c o m p i l e d by a l l the i n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c i e s . D u r i n g t h e s e s e s s i o n s , B r z e z i n s k i a l s o r e v i e w e d w i t h the p r e s i d e n t h i s agenda f o r the day c o n c e r n i n g f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s as w e l l as the agendas of PRC and SCC m e e t ings. F i n a l l y , he d i s c u s s e d w i t h the p r e s i d e n t h i s views on i s s u e s . B r z e z i n s k i had been C a r t e r ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y mentor d u r i n g the campaign and c o n t i n u e d t o be an i m p o r t a n t a d v i s o r on p o l i c y . C a r t e r d i d not o n l y want B r z e z i n s k i t o c o o r d i n a t e p o l i c y but a l s o t o p r o v i d e p o l i c y i n n o v a t i o n . 3 7 B r z e z i n s k i ' s a g g r e s s i v e n e s s i n a d v o c a t i n g new i d e a s i s w e l l known. Ro s a l y n n C a r t e r wrote t h a t the P r e s i d e n t a p p r e c i a t e d B r z e z i n s k i ' s i d e a s , l i s t e n e d t o them c a r e f u l l y but a l s o had t o s i f t t h r o ugh them t o a v o i d e x c e s s i v e i m p u l s i v e n e s s . Vance, on the o t h e r hand, she d e s c r i b e s as sound i n judgment, c a u t i o u s and r e l u c t a n t t o "rock the b o a t . " 3 8 I t appears t h a t C a r t e r a p p r e c i a t e d b o t h s t y l e s and was not c o n s i s t e n t l y persuaded by e i t h e r of the two. Brown, as S e c r e t a r y of Defense, had more than ample 6 9 s t a f f and r e s o u r c e s t o match the NSC and S t a t e Department. Brown, l i k e Vance and B r z e z i n s k i , was one of the s e n i o r p a r t n e r s i n the PRC and SCC o r g a n i z a t i o n . H i s s t a f f worked t o g e t h e r w i t h the NSC and S t a t e s t a f f on a l l f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s . From the b e g i n n i n g , Brown was a l s o a p a r t i c i p a n t i n the Thursday m e e t i n g s . Yet i t took u n t i l 1978 b e f o r e Brown j o i n e d the F r i d a y b r e a k f a s t meetings w i t h the p r e s i d e n t . However, s i n c e C a r t e r convened f u l l NSC meetings more f r e q u e n t l y d u r i n g 1977 than l a t e r on, Brown may not have been s e r i o u s l y i s o l a t e d from the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . None of the p a r t i c i p a n t s o f f e r s an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r Brown's d e l a y e d e n t r a n c e t o t h e F r i d a y forum. Brown d i d not have as much a c c e s s t o C a r t e r as B r z e z i n s k i or even Vance. W h i l e Brown and Vance sent memoranda t o C a r t e r d a i l y and t e l e p h o n e d him f r e q u e n t l y , Brown d i d not have the e q u i v a l e n t of a " n i g h t l y r e p o r t " t o the p r e s i d e n t . Brown was r e g a r d e d a good c h o i c e f o r S e c r e t a r y of Defense because of h i s wide r e s p e c t i n Washington. He was d e s c r i b e d as a l o o f , b r i l l i a n t , and as a f a s t l e a r n e r . 3 9 Throughout C a r t e r ' s memoirs we f i n d deep r e s p e c t f o r Brown's a n a l y t i c mind and command of d e t a i l s . Y e t , some a s s e r t t h a t Brown d i d not a d v o c a t e f o r c e f u l l y enough, t h a t he was l o a t h t o t a k e a c l e a r p o l i c y s t a n d and t h a t he spent t o o much time r u n n i n g h i s d e p a r t m e n t . 4 0 B r z e z i n s k i wrote t h a t the p r e s i d e n t asked him t o t e l l Brown t o be more a s s e r t i v e and l e s s ambiguous i n h i s a d v o c a c y . " 1 Smith o b s e r v e d t h a t Brown was t h e most i n f l u e n t i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y a d v i s o r b e s i d e s 70 Vance and B r z e z i n s k i . * 2 I f so, i t was l e s s because of h i s b a r g a i n i n g s k i l l s than of C a r t e r ' s r e s p e c t f o r Brown's e x p e r t i s e and d e t a i l e d knowledge of i s s u e s . The V i c e - P r e s i d e n t ' s r o l e d u r i n g the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was unique, f o r i t i n c l u d e d the r o l e of a c r u c i a l a d v i s o r i n both domestic and f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Mondale was g i v e n an o f f i c e i n the West Wing of the White House and was i n c l u d e d i n the "paper l o o p . " Mondale saw a l l papers g o i n g t o C a r t e r , even the d a i l y i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g . The p r e s i d e n t g e n u i n e l y c o n s u l t e d him on i s s u e s and c a r e f u l l y e v a l u a t e d h i s o p i n i o n . * 3 Mondale had a s t a f f of between 55 and 65 p e o p l e . By a l l a c c o u n t s , t h i s s t a f f was a c t i v e i n p r o v i d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f o r him and i n h e l p i n g C a r t e r ' s s t a f f make and implement p o l i c y . Moe, Mondale's c h i e f of s t a f f , and E i z e n s t a t , C a r t e r ' s a s s i s t a n t f o r Domestic P o l i c y , j o i n t l y made or c o o r d i n a t e d a l l d o mestic p o l i c y . * * S i n c e Mondale was i n the r e l e v a n t "paper l o o p " i n the White House, h i s s t a f f p r o v i d e d him w i t h independent a n a l y s e s of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s , which e n a b l e d Mondale t o make s u b s t a n t i a l recommendations t o p o l i c y o p t i o n s d u r i n g the PRC and SCC meetings. D a v i d Aaron, Mondale's former a s s i s t a n t i n the Senate, became deputy d i r e c t o r of NSC. Mondale was a l e r t e d by him on upcoming i s s u e s and Mondale f r e q u e n t l y walked the few s t e p s t o Aaron's o f f i c e f o r a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n . * 5 Mondale a l s o had f r e e a c c e s s t o C a r t e r . Mondale c o u l d a t t e n d any meeting of h i s c h o i c e . A l s o Mondale, or someone from h i s s t a f f , a t t e n d e d the PRC and SCC meetings. Mondale 71 was always p r e s e n t , when i n town, a t the NSC and F r i d a y b r e a k f a s t m e e t i n g s . 4 6 Once a week, C a r t e r had l u n c h w i t h Mondale t o d i s c u s s any matter e i t h e r man had on h i s mind. Mondale's c h i e f b a r g a i n i n g c h i p w i t h C a r t e r was t h a t he knew C a r t e r v a l u e d h i s e x p e r i e n c e i n Washington p o l i t i c s . A l t h o u g h C a r t e r seldom thought of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n terms of domestic p o l i t i c s w h i l e Mondale d i d so f r e q u e n t l y , the V i c e -P r e s i d e n t was more than a mere " p o l i t i c a l watchdog." D u r i n g m e e t i n g s , C a r t e r would o f t e n ask Mondale f o r h i s a n a l y s i s of the d i s c u s s i o n j u s t p r i o r t o making a d e c i s i o n . 4 7 In t h i s r o l e , Mondale can be c o n s i d e r e d a l s o as a " g e n e r a l i s t " a d v i s o r . Mondale was not a f r a i d t o d i s a g r e e w i t h the p r e s i d e n t or w i t h the o t h e r a d v i s o r s , and "fought h a r d " , a c c o r d i n g t o J o r d a n , f o r h i s b e l i e f s . Y e t , Mondale a l s o used p r i v a t e meetings w i t h C a r t e r t o v o i c e h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h p o l i c y or h i s su p p o r t f o r p o l i c y . 4 8 Such p r i v a t e meetings are c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i n the sense t h a t the p r e s i d e n t ' s o p t i o n s may be expanded i n the meeting. However, such meetings do not conform t o the o p t i m a l s t a n d a r d s of the s t r a t e g y ' s norms. The s t r a t e g y p o s i t s meetings w i t h m u l t i p l e a c t o r s and f r e e debate as more c o n s t r u c t i v e . As such, t h i s a s p e c t of Mondale's b e h a v i o r d i d not n e c e s s a r i l y c o n t r i b u t e t o the f u n c t i o n i n g of t h e s t r a t e g y . J o r d a n d i d not have a s t a f f comparable t o the o t h e r a d v o c a t e s . However, h i s r o l e was not t o f o r m u l a t e o p t i o n s i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y but t o e v a l u a t e the o p t i o n s p r e s e n t e d by t h e o t h e r s i n l i g h t of t h e i r d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l consequences. 72 J o r d a n was C a r t e r ' s p r i n c i p a l " p o l i t i c a l watchdog," ind e e d C a r t e r ' s p r i n c i p a l p o l i t i c a l t r o u b l e s h o o t e r . J o r d a n c o u l d read whatever memorandum he wanted and a t t e n d any meeting of h i s c h o i c e . Among a l l a d v i s o r s , J o r d a n , and a l s o P o w e l l were c l o s e s t p e r s o n a l l y t o C a r t e r . 4 9 C a r t e r t o l d J o r d a n t o a t t e n d the F r i d a y meetings t o e v a l u a t e the p o l i t i c a l consequences of f o r e i g n p o l i c y o p t i o n s . P o w e l l a l s o o f f e r e d f r e e w h e e l i n g a d v i c e on any i s s u e . However, h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o f o r e i g n p o l i c y seems s m a l l e r than J o r d a n ' s . None of the p a r t i c i p a n t s ' s memoirs spends any time on P o w e l l as an ad v o c a t e . Though P o w e l l would a t times a t t e n d the F r i d a y b r e a k f a s t s , he d i d not do so f r e q u e n t l y . J o r d a n ' s d i s a d v a n t a g e i n s t a f f s u p port and r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n was e a s i l y made up by h i s p r o x i m i t y t o C a r t e r and h i s l o n g a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h C a r t e r which guaranteed him the p r e s i d e n t ' s e a r . There i s no e v i d e n c e t o add S t a n s f i e l d Turner ( D i r e c t o r CIA) t o the l i s t of c l o s e a d v i s o r s . A s i d e from the t w i c e weekly i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g s , Turner d i d not have m e a n i n g f u l a c c e s s t o C a r t e r . 5 0 Turner acknowledged t h a t a t those meetings he seldom a d v o c a t e d p a r t i c u l a r c o u r s e s of a c t i o n f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 5 1 A l t h o u g h Turner or h i s s t a f f p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the PRC, SCC and NSC m e e t i n g s , he was not i n c l u d e d i n the Thursday or F r i d a y m e e t i n g s . B r z e z i n s k i s u g g e s t e d t o C a r t e r t h a t he i n v i t e Turner t o t h e s e meetings but C a r t e r never d i d . 5 2 I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t T u r n e r ' s i n c l u s i o n i n the c i r c l e of a d v i s o r s would have widened the range of o p t i o n s . However, p r e v i o u s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s had been 73 c r i t i c i z e d f o r a l l o w i n g the CIA a p o l i c y - m a k i n g r o l e . C a r t e r h i m s e l f , had been c r i t i c a l of many CIA a c t i v i t i e s and was t h e r e f o r e r e l u c t a n t t o g i v e the D i r e c t o r a h i g h p r o f i l e i n h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . In law and p r a c t i c e , the CIA d i r e c t o r i s not i n t e n d e d t o be a p o l i c y a d v o c a t e . C a r t e r was aware of t h i s . W h i l e the D i r e c t o r ' s i n v o l v e m e n t i n m u l t i p l e advocacy p r o c e e d i n g s may be b e n e f i c i a l t o the s t r a t e g y ' s performance, i t i s i n a d v i s i b l e f o r "good government" t o g i v e him such a r o l e . O b v i o u s l y , o t h e r p e o p l e a d v i s e d or i n f l u e n c e d C a r t e r on the c o u r s e of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . However, t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t i m a t e a d v i s o r s such as R o s a l y n n C a r t e r and C h a r l e s K i r b o i s d i f f i c u l t t o t r a c e . 5 3 A d v i s o r s who d i d not p l a y a r o l e u n t i l 1979 or 1980, such as L l o y d C u t l e r , Robert S t r a u s s and Donovan, f a l l o u t s i d e the purview of my case s t u d i e s . I n c o n c l u s i o n , a l l a d v o c a t e s had enough s t a f f s u p p o r t , r e s o u r c e s , a c c e s s and/or i n f l u e n c e w i t h the p r e s i d e n t t o be a b l e t o advocate t h e i r o p t i o n s a d e q u a t e l y . No s i n g l e a d v i s o r f u n c t i o n e d as a gatekeeper t o the p r e s i d e n t . As a White House a i d e commented i n 1977: t h e r e ' s no s i n g l e guy w i t h p r i m a r y i n f l u e n c e . I don't t h i n k the p r e s i d e n t has become o v e r l y c l o s e w i t h any of them. I t ' s s c r a m b l e d . I t i s not as i f t h e r e were two or t h r e e v e r y i m p o r t a n t p e r s o n s . 5 4 C a r t e r d i d not v a l u e c o n s i s t e n t l y the a d v i c e of one advocate over the o t h e r s but b e n e f i t t e d from m u l t i p l e a d v i s o r s . As C a r t e r h i m s e l f n o t e d : "When B r z e z i n s k i and Vance were j o i n e d by Mondale and Brown, p l u s o t h e r s as r e q u i r e d t o a d d r e s s a 74 p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e , they c o m p r i s e d a good t e a m . " 5 5 ADVOCATE COMPETITION AND ADVOCATE DIVERSITY C a r t e r came t o o f f i c e w i t h the i n t e n t i o n of h a v i n g an open, c o l l e g i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s where " e q u a l " a d v i s o r s would b r i n g m u l t i p l e o p t i o n s t o h i s a t t e n t i o n . 5 6 As d i s c u s s e d above, C a r t e r t o l e r a t e d d i s s e n t i n g views and h i s p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r s had the n e c e s s a r y r e s o u r c e s t o compete among each o t h e r . Whenever t h e r e was d i s a g r e e m e n t , t h i s p r o c e s s appeared t o work. The p r e s i d e n t upon b e i n g n o t i f i e d of disagreement i n e i t h e r the PRC or SCC would d e a l w i t h i t by s t u d y i n g a l l the p o s i t i o n papers or by c a l l i n g a meeting of h i s a d v i s o r s . 5 7 Vance and B r z e z i n s k i d e s c r i b e the c o m p e t i t i o n and the p r e s i d e n t ' s r o l e i n a remark a b l y s i m i l a r way. The p r e s i d e n t l i s t e n e d , encouraged f r a n k n e s s and d i d not want t o be s h i e l d e d from u n p l e a s a n t f a c t s , h a r d o p t i o n s or d i f f i c u l t d e c i s i o n s . He absorbed e v e r y d e t a i l b e f o r e making a d e c i s i o n . 5 8 C a r t e r p i c k e d i d e a s from d i f f e r e n t a d v i s o r s , now from the one, then from the o t h e r . 5 9 D e s p i t e the open d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e , the a d v i s o r s r a r e l y d i s a g r e e d except f o r the f r e q u e n t d i s a g r e e m e n t s between B r z e z i n s k i and a l l the o t h e r s ! Except f o r B r z e z i n s k i ' s d i s s e n t i n g v i e w, C a r t e r r e c e i v e d remarkably s i m i l a r a d v i c e from Vance, Brown and Mondale d u r i n g the 75 f i r s t two y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 6 0 Important d e v i a t i o n s t o t h i s p a t t e r n a r e the Panama C a n a l and SALT i s s u e s . In the case of the f o rmer, a l l a d v i s o r s , i n c l u d i n g B r z e z i n s k i f a v o u r e d a q u i c k t r a n s f e r of o w n e r s h i p of the c a n a l t o the Panamanians. On the i n i t i a l American p o s i t i o n i n the SALT I I n e g o t i a t i o n s , o n l y Vance and Warnke opposed a "deep c u t s " p r o p o s a l t h a t would go beyond the 1974 V l a d i v o s t o k a g r e e m e n t s . 6 1 In a d d i t i o n t o the i s s u e s s t u d i e d i n t h i s t h e s i s , the p a t t e r n of a l a c k of disagreement among the a d v i s o r s on the one hand and disagreement between them and B r z e z i n s k i on the o t h e r hand i s a l s o apparent i n the the human r i g h t s i s s u e , American p o l i c y towards R h o d e s i a , American p o l i c y towards E a s t e r n Europe, s e v e r a l a s p e c t s of the M i d d l e East n e g o t i a t i o n s and American p o l i c y towards Angola and Z a i r e . 6 2 In Southern A f r i c a , B r z e z i n s k i was a l o n e i n l i n k i n g Cuban a c t i v i t y w i t h US-USSR r e l a t i o n s , i n r e l a t i o n t o Rhodesian r e f o r m and A n g o l a - Z a i r e f r i c t i o n . The o t h e r a d v i s o r s b e l i e v e d t h a t c o n f l i c t s i n t h i s r e g i o n were p u r e l y l o c a l and t h a t such a l i n k a g e would not s e r v e American i n t e r e s t s . A l s o , B r z e z i n s k i c h a l l e n g e d the consensus among Vance, Mondale and C a r t e r t h a t Mondale v i s i t South A f r i c a even b e f o r e the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had a c o h e r e n t p o l i c y towards the a r e a . C a r t e r , Mondale, Vance and Jordan wanted a Geneva c o n f e r e n c e on the M i d d l e E a s t e a r l y i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i a l s o wanted t o e x p l o r e t h i s o p t i o n , he a l o n e advocated a s t r a t e g y q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from the o t h e r s . 7 6 He warned t h a t I s r a e l d i d not a c c e p t such a c o u r s e of a c t i o n and t h a t i t might not be i n the American i n t e r e s t t o i n c l u d e the USSR i n the c o n f e r e n c e . H i s s u p p o r t f o r a Geneva c o n f e r e n c e was merely t a c t i c a l : the p r o s p e c t of USSR-US c o o p e r a t i o n would s o f t e n the Arab p o s i t i o n w h i l e s i m u l t a n o u s l y p r e s s u r i n g the I s r a e l i s . C o n c e r n i n g E a s t e r n Europe, B r z e z i n s k i a d v o c a t e d t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s f o c u s on those c o u n t r i e s t h a t were more l i b e r a l i n t e r n a l l y w h i l e the o t h e r a d v o c a t e s b e l i e v e d American p o l i c y s h o u l d be c o n s i s t e n t among a l l the c o u n t r i e s . A l s o , B r z e z i n s k i was a l o n e i n a d v o c a t i n g t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s t a k e a more a g g r e s s i v e p o s i t i o n on human r i g h t s i n the Conference on S e c u r i t y and C o o p e r a t i o n i n Europe. The o t h e r s f e a r e d t h a t t h i s b e h a v i o r would harm US-USSR r e l a t i o n s . An a n a l y s i s of the v a l u e s , i n t e r e s t , g o a l s and o b j e c t i v e s of the p r e s i d e n t on the one hand and h i s a d v i s o r s on the o t h e r hand shows s i g n i f i c a n t s i m i l a r i t i e s between C a r t e r and Vance, and few s i m i l a r i t i e s between them and B r z e z i n s k i . 6 3 B r z e z i n s k i ' s h a r d l i n e view of the USSR has been w e l l documented. 6' 1 But o f t e n n e g l e c t e d i s the h i g h degree of convergence between the views of C a r t e r , Vance, Mondale, Warnke, Young and even the i n f l u e n t i a l a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r i e s and d i r e c t o r s a t the S t a t e Department: R i c h a r d H o l b r o o k e (E a s t A s i a ) , R i c h a r d Moose ( A f r i c a ) , Anthony Lake ( P o l i c y P l a n n i n g S t a f f ) and L e s l i e G e l b ( P o l i t i c o - M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s ) . 6 5 They sh a r e d the b e l i e f , m a i n l y based on the Vietnam e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t the use of m i l i t a r y f o r c e i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y was o f t e n c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . They b e l i e v e d 77 t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d a d d r e s s i s s u e s of c o n f l i c t between i t and the USSR w i t h o u t l i n k a g e . F i n a l l y , they wanted t o f o c u s American a t t e n t i o n away from East-West i s s u e s towards N o r t h - S o u t h i s s u e s . B r z e z i n s k i , i n c o n t r a s t , b e l i e v e d t h a t the c a r e f u l use of f o r c e , when n e c e s s a r y , enhanced the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of p o l i c y , t h a t d e t e n t e s h o u l d be "comprehensive and r e c i p r o c a l " and t h a t l i n k a g e was u n a v o i d a b l e . Though B r z e z i n s k i i n h i s books had a l s o argued f o r an emphasis on N o r t h - S o u t h i s s u e s , h i s r e c o r d i n the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n shows a p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h East-West i s s u e s . The views of Brown and Turner c o v e r the m i d d l e ground between B r z e z i n s k i and the o t h e r s . 6 6 As d i s c u s s e d above, Brown's s l i g h t l y d i v e r g e n t w o r l d view from Vance d i d not t r a n s l a t e i n t o p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s between the two men d u r i n g the f i r s t two y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , e x cept i n the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t Brown's attempt t o i n c r e a s e the m i l t a r y budget from 1978 on as w e l l as the i n c r e a s i n g US-USSR c o n f r o n t a t i o n caused him t o t a k e s t a n d s d i f f e r e n t from Vance d u r i n g the l a s t two y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Turner c o u l d have b a l a n c e d the o p t i o n s because h i s vi e w s were much c l o s e r t o B r z e z i n s k i ' s . Yet h i s p o s i t i o n as CIA d i r e c t o r d i s q u a l i f i e d him as a p o l i c y a d v o c a t e , a t l e a s t i n t he C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The f i n a l p r o c e s s norm p r e s c r i b e d by the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y d e a l s w i t h the use of a d v i c e o u t s i d e the customary c i r c l e of a d v i s o r s . C a r t e r seldom made use of t h i s 78 o p t i o n . The p r i n c i p a l e x c e p t i o n was George B a l l ' s study d u r i n g the I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n . I t appears t h a t C a r t e r d i d not a p p r e c i a t e a d v i s o r s who d i d not s i m u l t a n e o u s l y have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of implementing p o l i c y . 6 7 As w e l l , C a r t e r had an enormous problem w i t h l e a k s . He a d m i t t e d t h a t he c o u l d not c o n t r o l them and was t h e r e f o r e l o a t h t o expand h i s c i r c l e of a d v i s o r s . 6 8 C a r t e r ' s i n a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l or even l o c a t e the s o u r c e s of l e a k s made him v e r y r e l u c t a n t t o ask o u t s i d e r s i n , even though many l e a k s may have come from h i s c i r c l e of i n s i d e a d v i s o r s . Many p r e s i d e n t s become adamant about s t o p p i n g h a r m f u l l e a k s and C a r t e r was no e x c e p t i o n . Y e t , they can o f t e n o n l y c o n t r o l them m a r g i n a l l y . Even so, the p r e s i d e n t d i d narrow h i s c i r c l e of a d v i s o r s . C l e a r l y , t h i s phenomenon h i n d e r s the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y . THE CUSTODIAN The e v i d e n c e l e a v e s no doubt t h a t B r z e z i n s k i was a p o l i c y advocate throughout the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . B r z e z i n s k i ' s j o b i s b e s t d e f i n e d i n terms of two d i s t i n c t a s p e c t s : d i r e c t i n g the p r e s i d e n t ' s o p e r a t i o n a l s t a f f by i n t e g r a t i n g and implementing p o l i c y and a c t i n g as the p r e s i d e n t ' s p r i v a t e a d v i s o r and f o r e i g n p o l i c y t h i n k t a n k . T h i s s e c t i o n w i l l e v a l u a t e the c u s t o d i a l r o l e as w e l l as s e v e r a l o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s which George and H a l l a l l e g e c o n f l i c t w i t h t h i s r o l e . The reader w i l l r e c a l l t h a t the c u s t o d i a l r o l e t a s k s 79 a r e t o i d e n t i f y p o l i c y i s s u e s , p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n , ensure a d v i s o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n and h e l p f o s t e r f r e e debate among the a d v i s o r s . R o l e t a s k v i o l a t i o n s c o n s i s t of such a c t i v i t i e s as p o l i c y advocacy, p u b l i c s p e a k i n g and d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s . B r z e z i n s k i , i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the v a r i o u s d epartments, c r e a t e d a f o r e i g n p o l i c y agenda book f o r each year of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and s u p e r v i s e d the development, of l o n g term p o l i c i e s . 6 9 For example, i n p r e p a r i n g o p t i o n s on the American p o s i t i o n i n the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s , B r z e z i n s k i had h i s s t a f f p r e p a r e a " h i s t o r y book" of the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s t o p r o v i d e p e r s p e c t i v e f o r C a r t e r and the o t h e r a d v i s o r s . 7 0 F a l l o w s g i v e s B r z e z i n s k i h i g h marks f o r b r i n g i n g new i s s u e s t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n as w e l l as new i d e a s f o r o l d p r o b l e m s . 7 1 When B r z e z i n s k i s u b m i t t e d a q u e s t i o n n a i r e t o C a r t e r on t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n October 1977, C a r t e r r e p o r t e d t h a t he was g e n e r a l l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h p o l i c y c o o r d i n a t i o n but s t i l l wanted t o see more p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s . B r z e z i n s k i r e p o r t s t h a t whenever C a r t e r chose an o p t i o n p r e m a t u r e l y , he p r o t e s t e d i t . 7 2 B r z e z i n s k i was i n charge of the paper f l o w i n the development of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Some o b s e r v e r s b e l i e v e he h a n d l e d t h i s a s p e c t of h i s j o b w e l l . 7 3 The most c r u c i a l p a r t of t h i s j o b i s not t o mix one's own o p t i o n s or i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h t h a t of the a d v o c a t e s . None of the a d v i s o r s has accused B r z e z i n s k i of t h i s and s e v e r a l o b s e r v e r s have p r o v i d e d examples of B r z e z i n s k i ' s f a i r n e s s i n t h i s r e g a r d . 7 * T a l b o t t s t a t e s t h a t w h i l e B r z e z i n s k i f a v o u r e d a "deep c u t s " 80 n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n beyond the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d i n the i n i t i a l SALT p o s i t i o n , he d i d c a r e f u l l y p r o c e s s the o t h e r o p t i o n s and g e n e r a l l y l i m i t e d h i m s e l f t o c h a i r i n g m e e t ings. In the f i n a l meeting on the s u b j e c t , B r z e z i n s k i summarized f o r C a r t e r the e s t i m a t e d p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s of o p t i o n s which he h i m s e l f d i d not f a v o u r . 7 5 Henry Owen (a NSC s t a f f a i d e ) o b s e r v e d : The q u e s t i o n you have t o ask i s t h i s . Does the pe r s o n i n t h a t j o b have the w i t t o d e f i n e the s e p a r a t e f u n c t i o n s ? Can he p r o v i d e the p r e s i d e n t w i t h i n t e l l i g e n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y a d v i c e , s e p a r a t e i t from h i s own a d v i c e and expose i t t o the o t h e r a g e n c i e s ? My i m p r e s s i o n i s t h a t he d o e s . 7 6 In a d d i t i o n t o p r e p a r i n g p o l i c y papers and c o o r d i n a t i n g the paper f l o w , B r z e z i n s k i a t t e m p t e d t o a v o i d premature d e c i s i o n s by C a r t e r . B r z e z i n s k i w r i t e s t h a t he p r o t e s t e d whenever C a r t e r t r i e d t o c l o s e an i s s u e b e f o r e a l l a d v i s o r s were aware of a l l i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s . B r z e z i n s k i appears t o have been a genuine c a r e t a k e r of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s d u r i n g the e a r l y y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . W h i l e he o b v i o u s l y f a v o u r e d c e r t a i n p o l i c y o p t i o n s above o t h e r s , a c e r t a i n amount of "uncommitted" p o l i c y p r o c e s s i n g d i d o c c u r . A good c u s t o d i a n not o n l y a l e r t s the p r e s i d e n t on p r o c e s s f a i l u r e s l e a d i n g t o p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s t h a t the former does not f a v o u r , but a l s o c a u t i o n s the p r e s i d e n t when he makes a premature d e c i s i o n on an i s s u e which the c u s t o d i a n a c t u a l l y f a v o u r s . B r z e z i n s k i d i d t h i s o c c a s i o n a l l y . For example, he urged 8 1 C a r t e r t o c o n s u l t amply w i t h Congress b e f o r e a c t i n g t o c u t down American t r o o p s i n South Korea. B r z e z i n s k i , a l t h o u g h he does not c l a r i f y i t , a c t u a l l y f a v o u r e d American t r o o p w i t h d r a w a l s from South K o r e a . 7 7 However, B r z e z i n s k i was not p e r f e c t l y evenhanded. There a r e s e v e r a l examples where h i s sup p o r t f o r one p o l i c y o p t i o n over the o t h e r s caused him t o n e g l e c t c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . 7 8 Indeed the purpose of t h i s t h e s i s i s not t o defend the argument t h a t B r z e z i n s k i always f u l f i l l e d an o p t i m a l c u s t o d i a l r o l e . George h i m s e l f notes t h a t " m u l t i p l e advocacy does not have t o work p e r f e c t l y i n or d e r t o be v a l u a b l e . " 7 9 The importance of the r o l e t a s k s performed by B r z e z i n s k i f o r t h i s t h e s i s i s t h a t he g e n e r a l l y managed the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s w i t h c a r e , and t h a t he f i l l e d t he v o i d i n p o l i c y advocacy l e f t by those a d v i s o r s who were a c t u a l l y supposed t o g i v e C a r t e r many v a r i e d o p t i o n s but who o f t e n f a i l e d t o do so. There i s l i t t l e e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g two a s p e c t s of the c u s t o d i a l r o l e i n the b e h a v i o u r of B r z e z i n s k i . Few o u t s i d e r s were i n v i t e d t o widen the debate. W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i ensured the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Chairman of the J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f d u r i n g the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s , he f a i l e d t o b r i n g i n o t h e r a d v o c a t e s t o c h a l l e n g e the S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e . 8 0 Indeed, o n l y d u r i n g the I r a n i a n c r i s i s d i d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b r i n g i n an o u t s i d e a d v i s o r . The answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n l i e s m a i n l y i n C a r t e r ' s c o n c e r n w i t h l e a k s . T h i s made him r e l u c t a n t t o go beyond h i s f a m i l i a r c i r c l e of a d v i s o r s . Second, B r z e z i n s k i seldom p l a y e d the r o l e of the 82 d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e . I t appears t h a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s d u a l r o l e of a d vocate and c u s t o d i a n d i d not compromise an open d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s . As Smith o b s e r v e d : B r z e z i n s k i s t a y e d b e h i n d the s c e n e s , d i r e c t i n g the s t a f f of the NSC, o r g a n i z i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f o r the p r e s i d e n t , s e t t i n g out o p t i o n s , and making no attempt t o d o m i n a t e . 8 1 B r z e z i n s k i d i d not appear as a p u b l i c spokesman f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n u n t i l the s p r i n g of 1 9 7 8 . 8 2 Some commentators have a l l e g e d t h a t B r z e z i n s k i e n j o y e d b e i n g i n the l i m e l i g h t and t h a t he a s p i r e d t o become the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e . 8 3 However, C a r t e r and J o r d a n as w e l l as s e v e r a l o b s e r v e r s a l s o f a u l t Vance f o r p o o r l y h a n d l i n g t h i s a s p e c t of h i s j o b . Indeed, Vance h i m s e l f acknowledged t h a t he d i d not always a r t i c u l a t e the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p o s i t i o n w e l l . 8 * As a r e s u l t , B r z e z i n s k i f i l l e d t h i s p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s gap. At t i m e s , C a r t e r encouraged him t o do so. B r z e z i n s k i ' s p u b l i c comments may have a i d e d the p e r c e p t i o n of an i n t e r n a l l y d i v i d e d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n but i t i s not c l e a r whether they a f f e c t e d the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . S i n c e C a r t e r never rebuked B r z e z i n s k i f o r h i s comments, i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t h a t C a r t e r b e l i e v e d he c o u l d b e n e f i t from p u r s u i n g one l i n e of p o l i c y , w h i l e B r z e z i n s k i reminded the r e s t of the w o r l d t h a t o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s d i d not go u n n o t i c e d i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . In the c o n f l i c t i n the Horn of A f r i c a , C a r t e r pursued an o f f i c i a l p o l i c y of n o n - l i n k a g e between S o v i e t s u p p o r t f o r r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t s and the S a l t 83 I I n e g o t i a t i o n s , w h i l e B r z e z i n s k i h i n t e d t h a t i t was p o s s i b l e f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o l i n k the t w o . 8 5 B r z e z i n s k i d i d not become an " a l l round" d i p l o m a t i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n except i n two i n s t a n c e s : the PRC-US n o r m a l i z a t i o n n e g o t i a t i o n s and the n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the f a l t e r i n g government of the S h a h . 8 6 B r z e z i n s k i s t a t e d i n an i n t e r v i e w t h a t when he d i d t a l k t o d i p l o m a t s or ambassadors, he r e p o r t e d h i s d i s c u s s i o n t o V a n c e . 8 7 H a l l s t a t e s t h a t B r z e z i n s k i a t no time r e p e a t e d the e x t e n s i v e b a c k c h a n n e l d e a l i n g s so common under K i s s i n g e r . 8 8 B r z e z i n s k i i n d i c a t e d t o D o b r y n i n i n e a r l y 1977 t h a t w h i l e he i n t e n d e d t o keep c o n t a c t w i t h him, Vance would be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the conduct of n e g o t i a t i o n s . In the l a s t two y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h e r e i s ample e v i d e n c e t h a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s b e h a v i o u r undermined an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s as d e f i n e d by the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . I r a n , as w e l l as s e v e r a l US-USSR c o n f l i c t s , appear among the f i r s t major i s s u e s t o r e v e a l t h i s emerging p a t t e r n . 8 9 An i n i t i a t i v e d e v e l o p e d by the I r a n desk i n the Department of S t a t e , i n the f a l l of 1978, t o cease support f o r the Shah and t o c o n t a c t t h e o p p o s i t i o n l e a d e r s was s u p r e s s e d by B r z e z i n s k i and l a r g e l y kept away from the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n . 9 0 In the case of the S o v i e t B r i g a d e s i n Cuba i n 1979, B r z e z i n s k i e x c l u d e d s e v e r a l p a r t i c i p a n t s from the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n o r d e r t o advance h i s p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n . 9 1 Vance c o m p l a i n e d t h a t he was e x c l u d e d from the l a s t c r u c i a l meeting on the attempt t o f r e e the hostages i n A p r i l 1 9 8 0 . 9 2 84 In 1979, a s t u d y group under P h i l i p Odeen e v a l u a t e d the f u n c t i o n i n g of the NSC s t a f f on the b a s i s of i n t e r v i e w s c o n d u c t e d w i t h h i g h l e v e l o f f i c i a l s i n t h a t y e a r . 9 3 The s t u d y c o n c l u d e d t h a t the s t a f f performed w e l l as a p e r s o n a l s t a f f f o r the p r e s i d e n t and a l s o d i d w e l l i n f o r m u l a t i n g new p o l i c y p r o p o s a l s . However, Odeen was c r i t i c a l of the s t a f f ' s p o l i c y c o o r d i n a t i o n and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n f u n c t i o n s . He accused B r z e z i n s k i and h i s s t a f f of uneven a n a l y s i s . O p t i o n papers were not f u l l y p r e p a r e d f o r a l l a d v i s o r s and the r e s u l t s of meetings were not always summarized c o r r e c t l y . Odeen's f i n d i n g s c o n f i r m s e v e r a l o b s e r v a t i o n s i n the memoirs of Vance and B r z e z i n s k i . Vance c o m p l a i n e d t h a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s summaries of meetings or p o l i c y o p t i o n s d i d not always r e p r e s e n t the whole range of the d i s c u s s i o n as Vance saw i t . Vance p r e f e r r e d a c o o r d i n a t i o n p r o c e d u r e which a l l o w e d the a d v o c a t e s t o read and e v a l u a t e the p o l i c y summaries b e f o r e t hey were forwarded t o the p r e s i d e n t . C a r t e r o b j e c t e d t o t h i s f o r f e a r of l e a k s . However, C a r t e r d i d i n v i t e the a d v i s o r s t o "double check" the summaries a t the White House. Vance's c o m p l a i n t appears l e s s pronounced i n the f i r s t few y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . For example, T a l b o t t ' s account of the SALT I I d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s as w e l l as Vance's own account of the p o l i c y p r o c e s s on the M i d d l e E a s t show B r z e z i n s k i as f a i r l y p r e s e n t i n g the whole range of o p t i o n s . However, " i n the l a t t e r phases of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n " , as B r z e z i n s k i p u t s i t h i m s e l f , B r z e z i n s k i i n t e r p r e t e d the SCC and PRC s e s s i o n s w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s c oncern f o r a f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a l l the v i e w s , " l e a v i n g i t up t o any 85 i n d i v i d u a l t o a p p e a l t o the p r e s i d e n t i f he so wish e d " . C l e a r l y , t h i s undermined the a b i l i t y of the a d v i s o r s t o compete f o r t h e i r o p t i o n s on an e q u a l b a s i s . 9 4 T h i s e v i d e n c e g i v e s credence t o the charge t h a t B r z e z i n s k i abandoned a f a i r p r o c e s s so as t o enhance h i s advocacy p o s i t i o n . Indeed, B r z e z i n s k i almost s a i d as much i n an i n t e r v i e w i n 1982: On t h e s e two i s s u e s (USSR a d v e n t u r i s m and I r a n ) t h e r e d e v e l o p e d a c o n f l i c t . . . and as a consequence, my r o l e became t h a t a l s o of the p r o t a g o n i s t as w e l l as the a r t i c u l a t o r and f o r m u l a t o r . 9 5 W h i l e t h i s t h e s i s does not e v a l u a t e why B r z e z i n s k i changed h i s r o l e , i t i s p l a u s i b l e t h a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s i s o l a t e d v i e w s i n r e l a t i o n t o the o t h e r a d v i s o r s drove him t o c u r t a i l t h e i n f o r m a t i o n and a c c e s s of the o t h e r a d v i s o r s so as t o s t r e n g t h e n h i s p o s i t i o n . Whatever the cause, B r z e z i n s k i ' s s e l f - s e r v i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p o l i c y o p t i o n s and h i s a t t e m p t s t o e x c l u d e a d v i s o r s w i t h o p p o s i n g v i e w p o i n t s from h i s own harmed C a r t e r ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s more than B r z e z i n s k i ' s p u b l i c s p e a k i n g or d i p l o m a c y . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION A d e s c r i p t i o n of the f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s r e v e a l s t h a t C a r t e r ' s s t y l e and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g 86 s t r u c t u r e f a c i l i t a t e d the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the p r o c e s s norms of m u l t i p l e advocacy. The d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e a l l o w e d s e v e r a l a d v i s o r s t o c o n t r i b u t e f r e e l y t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s by p r o v i d i n g a c c e s s t o the p r e s i d e n t and s e v e r a l d e c i s i o n forums i n which t o debate p o l i c y . G e n e r a l l y , the a d v i s o r s had s u f f i c i e n t r e s o u r c e s t o p a r t i c i p a t e . W h i l e some had more s t a f f s u p p o r t and i n f o r m a t i o n r e s o u r c e s , o t h e r s were c l o s e r t o the p r e s i d e n t . C a r t e r a l l o w e d a l l a d v i s o r s a c c e s s t o the r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n and d i d not c o n s i s t e n t l y r e l y on one a d v i s o r more than o t h e r s . C a r t e r encouraged open d i s c u s s i o n and i n s i s t e d t h a t h i s a d v i s o r s b r i n g p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s t o h i s a t t e n t i o n . D u r i n g the f i r s t two y e a r s , the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r c o o r d i n a t e d and i n t e g r a t e d the paper f l o w as w e l l as the range of o p t i o n s on p o l i c y and s u p e r v i s e d t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of p o l i c y . He e nsured t h a t a l l a d v o c a t e s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the p r o c e s s . As such, h i s r o l e a pproximated the c u s t o d i a n i n the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . W h i l e c o o r d i n a t i n g the p r o c e s s , the c u s t o d i a n a l s o a dvocated p o l i c y and from 1978 on spoke on p o l i c y p u b l i c l y and o c c a s s i o n a l l y engaged i n d i p l o m a c y . D u r i n g 1977 and e a r l y 1978 t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s appeared not t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h h i s t a s k s of c o o r d i n a t i o n and p o l i c y f a c i l i t a t i o n . They d i d not p r e c l u d e a f a i r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . The c u s t o d i a n both i n t e g r a t e d the advocacy of o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s and added h i s p e r s o n a l advocacy. W h i l e most r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e s s norms were met d u r i n g 87 t h i s p e r i o d , the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y appeared not t o produce a s i g n i f i c a n t range of d i v e r s e o p t i o n s among the a d v o c a t e s . I f i t were not f o r the advocacy of the c u s t o d i a n , the p r e s i d e n t would have r e c e i v e d a v e r y narrow range of o p t i o n s on i m p o r t a n t p o l i c y i s s u e s , the most i m p o r t a n t e x c e p t i o n b e i n g the SALT I I i s s u e . As such, the advocacy of the c u s t o d i a n a c t u a l l y improved the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . C a r t e r d i d not i n v i t e many o u t s i d e r s t o the d e c i s i o n forums. Broader p a r t i c i p a t i o n might have widened the o p t i o n range. H o w e v e r , i t i s q u e s t i o n a b l e t o what degree such o u t s i d e a d v i s o r s would be a b l e t o match the p r o x i m i t y and t r u s t a d v i s o r s such as Mondale, B r z e z i n s k i , J o r d a n and Vance e n j o y e d . Two f a c t o r s may have worsened the narrow range of o p t i o n s i n the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The g o a l s , v a l u e s and b e l i e f s of most a d v o c a t e s , e x c e p t B r z e z i n s k i , were s i m i l a r t o C a r t e r ' s views and b e l i e f s . Moreover, C a r t e r c o u l d a t t i m e s show c o n s i d e r a b l e s t u b b o r n n e s s and d e c i d e on p o l i c y i n s p i t e of w e l l a i r e d warnings by h i s a d v i s o r s . These f i n d i n g s c h a l l e n g e the p r e l i m i n a r y o b s e r v a t i o n s of George and H a l l on the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 9 6 H a l l found s u f f i c i e n t i d e o l o g i c a l d i v e r s i t y among the a d v o c a t e s . However, t h i s a l l e g e d i d e o l o g i c a l d i v e r s i t y d i d not t r a n s l a t e i n t o a d i v e r s i t y of p o l i c y o p t i o n s . H a l l and George blame the f a i l u r e of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y , i n s p i t e of C a r t e r ' s a p p r o p r i a t e s t y l e and s u i t a b l e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e , on c u s t o d i a l advocacy, p u b l i c s p e a k i n g and d i p l o m a c y . However, the e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t 88 t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s d i d not harm the p r o c e s s . Indeed, c u s t o d i a l advocacy enhanced i t a t t i m e s . The e v i d e n c e shows t h a t when the c u s t o d i a n b l o c k e d a d v o c a t e s from a c c e s s t o the d e c i s i o n forums or t o the p r e s i d e n t and b l o c k e d t h e i r o p t i o n s from c o n s i d e r a t i o n , as he d i d from l a t e 1978 onwards, the a p p r o x i m a t i o n of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y ended. These f i n d i n g s and i . f e D e n c e s c h a l l e n g e s e v e r a l a s p e c t s of the p u l t i p l e advocacy t h e o r y : does i t a c t u a l l y produce a v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s ? S h o u l d the c u s t o d i a n never advocate on p o l i c y ? I s p u b l i c s p e a k i n g and d i p l o m a c y by the c u s t o d i a n r e a l l y h a r m f u l ? In the f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s t h e s e q u e s t i o n s a r e e x p l o r e d by e v a l u a t i n g i n depth the e v i d e n c e on the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s f o r s e v e r a l i s s u e s . 89 ENDNOTES 1 Jimmy C a r t e r , "Making F o r e i g n and Defense P o l i c y : Openness, Coherence and E f f i c i e n c y , " N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , October 23, 1976, p.1109; Haynes Johnson, In The Absence of  Power, New York; The V i k i n g P r e s s , 1980; I n t e r v i e w w i t h C a r t e r by N e i l . R . P e i r c e i n Thomas E. C r o n i n and R e x f o r d G. T u g w e l l , ( e d s . ) , The P r e s i d e n c y R e a p p r a i s e d , (2nd e d . ) , New York: P r a e g e r , 1977,pp.44-45 2 Dom Bonafede, "White House R e p o r t , " N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , F e b r u a r y 12, 1977, p.232; R i c h a r d E. N e u s t a d t , " S t a f f i n g the P r e s i d e n c y : Premature Notes on the New A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , " P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Q u a r t e r l y , No.1, S p r i n g 1978, pp.8-10 3 Dom Bonafede "White House R e p o r t , " N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , A p r i l 30, 1977, p.667; John Osborne, The New R e p u b l i c , October 29, 1977, p.6; H a r r i s o n W e l l f o r d , " S t a f f i n g the P r e s i d e n c y , An I n s i d e r ' s Comment," P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Q u a r t e r l y , No.1, S p r i n g 1978, p. 11. ft P e i r c e i n C r o n i n and T u g w e l l ( e d s . ) , 1977, p. 44. 5 Robert E. Hunter, P r e s i d e n t i a l C o n t r o l of F o r e i g n P o l i c y , New York: P r a e g e r , 1980, p. 37. 6 Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , Power and P r i n c i p l e , New Y ork: F a r r a r , S t r a u s s , G i r o u x , 1983; p.5, Hedley Donovan, R o o s e v e l t t o Reagan, New York: Harper and Row, 1985, p. 162,3; See a l s o Time, August 8, 1977, p. 9; C a r t e r b r i e f l y h i n t s a t t h i s i n Keeping F a i t h , New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p. 52; Vance acknowledged C a r t e r ' s a c t i v i s t s t y l e i n an i n t e r v i e w w i t h Time, A p r i l 24, 1978, p.24 7 W e l l f o r d ( 1978), p. 1 1 . 8 C a r t e r (1982), pp. 53, 54, 55 and 60; R. Gordon H o x i e , " S t a f f i n g the F o r d and C a r t e r P r e s i d e n c i e s , " P r e s i d e n t i a l  S t u d i e s Q u a r t e r l y , No. 3, 1980, p. 389. 9 N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , October 15, 1977, p. 1601; A l e x a n d e r L. George, P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g i n F o r e i g n P o l i c y , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1980, p. 157, b e l i e v e s t h a t C a r t e r ' s absence i n the PRC and SCC meetings t o some degree o f f s e t t h i s b e n e f i t . 1 0 Gaddis Smith, M o r a l i t y , Reason and Power, New York: H i l l and Wang, 1986; M.Glenn Abernathy. e t . a l . ( e d s . ) , The  C a r t e r Y e a r s , London: F r a n c e s P i n t e r , 1984; Theodore White, America In Search of I t s e l f : The Making of the P r e s i d e n t : 1976-1980, New York: Harper & Row, 1982; S t a n l e y Hoffmann, "The h e l l of Good I n t e n t i o n s , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y , No. 29, W i n t e r 1977, pp.3-26 1 1 Smith (1986), p. 81; E l i z a b e t h Drew, "A R e p o r t e r a t 90 L a r g e : B r z e z i n s k i , " New Y o r k e r , May 1, 1978, p.101-122; Dom Bonafede, "White House R e p o r t , " A p r i l 9, 1977,p.549; John Havemann, "White House R e p o r t , " N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , J u l y 16, 1977, p.1104-1112; C a r t e r (1982), p. 316; B u r t o n M. S a p i n , P r e s i d e n t i a l S t u d i e s Q u a r t e r l y , No. 1, 1980, p. 21. 1 2 John Watson i n N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , October 30, 1976,p.1546; C a r t e r (1982), p. 60. 1 3 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 67. 1* Idem, p. 67. 1 5 Cyrus Vance, Hard C h o i c e s , New York: Simon and S c h u s t e r , 1983, p. 35. 1 6 H a m i l t o n J o r d a n , C r i s e s , New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1982, p. 47; Joseph A. C a l i f a n o , G o v e r n i n g A m e r i c a , New York: Simon and S c h u s t e r , 1981, p. 396. 1 7 B a r r y R u b i n , S e c r e t s of S t a t e , New York: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1980; Smith (1986). 1 8 C a r t e r (1982), p. 54. 1 9 The f o l l o w i n g account draws upon Hunter (1980); B r z e z i n s k i (1983); Dom Bonafede, "White House R e p o r t , " N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , October 15, 1977, p.1596-1601; P h i l i p Odeen, "Report of a Study of the P r e s i d e n t ' s R e o r g a n i z a t i o n P r o j e c t , " 1979; I n t e r v i e w w i t h B r z e z i n s k i i n Washington  Q u a r t e r l y , by M i c h a e l R. B e s c h l o s s and A l a n W e i n s t e i n , W i n t e r 1982, pp.54-79, and D. K i r s c h t e n , "White House R e p o r t , " N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , May 17, 1980. More fragmented i n f o r m a t i o n can be found i n Vance (1983); C a r t e r (1982); and J o r d a n (1982). 2 0 Lawrence Korb i n Sam C. S a r k e s i a n (ed.) Defense P o l i c y  and the P r e s i d e n c y : C a r t e r ' s F i r s t Y e a r s , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1979, pp. 120-130. 2 1 E.g. the i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n on the SALT I I n e g o t i a t i o n s was formed i n the p r o c e s s of two NSC meetings; on March 19 and 22, 1977. B r z e z i n s k i (1982), pp. 159, 160 and p. 67; Hunter (1980), p. 35 n o t e s t h a t NSC meetings g r a d u a l l y became l e s s f r e q u e n t , o n l y d e a l i n g w i t h t h e most i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s e.g. the i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n and the r e s c u e attempt of the h o s t a g e s i n I r a n . B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 67. 2 2 Donovan (1985), p. 152; S a r k e s i a n (1979), p.82; Hunter (1980), p. 34; C a r t e r (1982), p. 56; Jordan (1982) p r o v i d e s examples of t h e s e d i s c u s s i o n s on a v a r i e t y of i s s u e s throughout the book e.g. see p. 44, 64. 2 3 Vance (1982), p. 39. Vance (1983), p. 39; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 70. 91 2 5 Hunter (1980), p. 33. 2 6 C a r t e r ( 1982), p. 36. 2 7 Donovan (1985), p. 153; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 67 s t a t e s t h a t c a b i n e t meetings never d e a l t w i t h f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s . ; C a r t e r (1982), p. 60; C a l i f a n o (1981), p. 403. 2 8 C a r t e r (1982), pp. 39, 54, 55; J o r d a n (1982), pp. 45, 68,; Time, August 8 , 1977, pp. 8, 9; W e l l f o r d (1980), p. 11. 2 9 Vance (1983), p. 39. 3 0 Idem, p. 37. 3 1 C a r t e r (1982), p. 54; D a v i d S. M c l e l l a n , Cyrus Vance, New J e r s e y : Rowman & A l l a n h e l d , 1 9 8 5 , p. 25. 3 2 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 37. 3 3 M c l e l l a n (1985), p. 32. 3 4 J o r d a n (1982), p.45; R. C a r t e r agrees t h a t the p r e s i d e n t e n j o y e d the range of o p i n i o n s the two men r e p r e s e n t e d : R. C a r t e r (1984), p. 310. See a l s o Turner (1985), p. 88. 3 5 Robert S t r a u s s i n Washington P o s t , December 20, 1979, p. 61; Andrew Young, p. C3; J o r d a n (1982), p. 48; R i c h a r d B u r t , New York Times, December 25, 1977, p. 1. Jordan wrote (p. 48) "When they d i d d i f f e r . . . the p r e s i d e n t would s i d e w i t h Vance 3 out of 4 t i m e s . " See a l s o M c l e l l a n (1985), p. 168. 3 6 Dom Bonafede, "White House R e p o r t , " N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , October 15, 1977, p. 1599; Odeen (1979), p. 46. 3 7 C a r t e r (1982), p. 51; J o r d a n (1982), p. 46. 3 8 R. C a r t e r (1984), p. 310; See F a l l o w s (1979), p. 76.; J o r d a n a s s e r t s t h a t each man d e s c r i b e d one a s p e c t of C a r t e r ' s p e r s o n a l i t y : Vance's the c a u t i o u s C a r t e r , B r z e z i n s k i : C a r t e r the r i s k t a k e r , J o r d a n (1982), p. 47. 3 9 C a r t e r (1982), p. 55; The New R e p u b l i c , January 15, 1977, p. 16. 4 0 I r v i n g . M . D e s t l e r , L e s l i e H. G e l b and Anthony Lake, Our  Own Worst Enemy, New York: Simon and S c h u s t e r , 1984, p. 219; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 44. S i n c e B r z e z i n s k i saw Brown as a u s e f u l a l l y i n h i s d i s a g r e e m e n t s w i t h Vance, we must be c a r e f u l t o i n t e r p r e t B r z e z i n s k i ' s e v a l u a t i o n of Brown. Brown was more i n agreement w i t h Vance d u r i n g the f i r s t y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w h i c h , though u n f o r t u n a t e f o r B r z e z i n s k i , does not n e c e s s a r i l y make him l e s s a r t i c u l a t e . 4 1 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 46. See comment i n p r e v i o u s n o t e . 92 4 2 Smith (1986), p. 45.; S t r o b e T a l b o t t c l a i m s Brown was the s i n g l e most i n f l u e n t i a l a d v i s o r on SALT, S t r o b e T a l b o t t , Endgame, New York: Harper & Row, 1979, p. 50. a 3 P a u l C. L i g h t , V i c e - P r e s i d e n t i a l Power, Bathmore: Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1984, pp. 76, 152, 177; The New  R e p u b l i c , A p r i l 23, 1977, p.10;, Dom Bonafede, "White House R e p o r t , " The N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , March 11, 1978,p.376; C a r t e r ( 1 9 82), pp. 37-39; Jordan (1982), p. 77; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp. 33-35. 4 4 L i g h t (1984), p. 75. 4 5 L i g h t (1984), p. 90; Bonafede,March 11 (1978), On Mondale's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the PRC and SCC. See B r z e z i n s k i ( 1 9 85), p. 33,34. 4 6 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 68; L i g h t (1984), p. 80; C a r t e r (1982), p. 55. 4 7 F i n l a y L e w i s , Mondale, New York: Harper & Row, p. 242., J o r d a n ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of f o r e i g n p o l i c y meetings c o n s i s t e n t l y shows t h i s phenomenon, J o r d a n (1982). 4 8 J o r d a n (1982), p. 68; The New R e p u b l i c , A p r i l 4, 1983. 4 9 Hoxie (1980), p. 387. 5 0 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 64; S t a n s f i e l d T u r n e r , S e c r e c y and  Democracy, Bos t o n : Houghton, M i f f l i n Co., 1985, p. 131. 5 1 Turner (1985), p. 134. 5 2 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 68. Turner does not mention t h i s i n h i s book. 5 3 D e s p i t e Rosalynn's w e l l w r i t t e n memoir: R o s a l y n n C a r t e r , F i r s t Lady from P l a i n s , New York: B a l l e n t i n e Books, 1984. 5 4 Havemann (1977), p. 1109; Time, A p r i l 12, 1978, p. 14 n o t e s e q u a l a c c e s s of Vance and B r z e z i n s k i t o C a r t e r . 5 5 C a r t e r (1982), pp. 54, 55. 5 6 C a r t e r (1982), p. 59; P e i r c e (1977), p. 47. 5 7 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 66. 5 8 Vance (1983), p. 35; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 66. 5 9 Smith (1986), p. 245. 6 0 Abernathy e t . a l . (1984), p. 71; Time, June 12, 1978. A l t h o u g h B r z e z i n s k i ' s memoir (p. 43, 44) a l s o s t a t e s t h i s , we must be aware of the p o s s i b i l i t y of s e l f s e r v i n g a c c o u n t s . I n t e r v i e w w i t h Brown i n New York Times, December 93 7, 1980,p.44. H a l l found t h a t t h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e d i v e r s i t y i n i d e o l o g i c a l background among C a r t e r ' s a d v i s o r s . H a l l d e s c r i b e d Mondale, Warnke and Vance as l i b e r a l democrats, B r z e z i n s k i , Turner and Brown as c o n s e r v a t i v e democrats. However H a l l d i d not p r o v i d e any e v i d e n c e t h a t t h i s i d e o l o g i c a l d i v e r s i t y t r a n s l a t e d i n t o d i v e r s e o p t i o n s . Moreover, Turner was e x c l u d e d from the p r o c e s s . See D a v i d K. H a l l , Implementing M u l t i p l e Advocacy i n the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l : 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 8 0 , Ph.D T h e s i s , S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , 1982, pp. 661, 662. 6 ' For the Panama Ca n a l i s s u e see B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 134; and Vance (1983), p. 143. For the SALT i s s u e see T a l b o t t (1979), p. 58,59; M c l e l l a n (1985), p. 39 and Vance (1983), p. 48. 6 2 For the human r i g h t s i s s u e see C a r t e r (1982), p. 145;, B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 127. For Rhodesian p o l i c y : B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 140, 141; Vance (1983), p. 261. On the. M i d d l e E a s t see Vance (1983), p. 192; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 87. On A n g o l a / Z a i r e see Vance (1983), pp. 89-92; Smith (1986), p. 47. On E a s t e r n Europe see B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp. 296-301 6 3 J e r e l A. R o s a t i , "The F o r e i g n P o l i c y of the C a r t e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n " i n Donald A. S y l v a n and Steve Chan ( e d s . ) , F o r e i g n P o l i c y D e c i s i o n Making, New York: P r a e g e r , 1984, conducted a c o n t e n t a n a l y s i s study of the p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s of C a r t e r and h i s o f f i c i a l s and found t h a t C a r t e r and Vance sh a r e d the same image of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system (p. 171). He a l s o found t h a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s image was a t odds w i t h Vance's and C a r t e r ' s (p. 171). For a summary of Vance's and C a r t e r ' s views see Smith (1986) c h a p t e r 2; C o r a l B e l l , P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r and F o r e i g n P o l i c y : The C o s t s of V i r t u e , C a n b e r r a : A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y , 1982, esp. p. 26; Drew (1978), pp.101-122; James F a l l o w s , "The P a s s i o n l e s s P r e s i d e n c y , " A t l a n t i c M o n t h l y , May/June, 1979 esp. p. 43. 6 f t Smith (1986), pp. 35-40; S t a n l e y Hoffmann, "Requiem," F o r e i g n P o l i c y , No. 42, s p r i n g 1981, pp.3-21; Abernathy e t . a l . (eds.) (1984), p. 60, 61; Washington P o s t , December 20, 1979. 6 5 S a r k e s i a n ( e d . ) , (1979), p. 87; V i c t o r L a s k y , Jimmy  C a r t e r : The Man and The Myth, New York: Marek P u b l i s h e r s , 1979, p. 334. Lake and G e l b acknowledged t h a t w h i l e Brown and B r z e z i n s k i had some "hawks" i n t h e i r s t a f f s , the t o p e c h e l o n of the S t a t e Department had v e r y few: D e s t l e r e t . a l . (1984) p. 118. They a l s o c o n f i r m the s i m i l a r i t y between Vance and Warnke (p. 222). See a l s o Smith (1986), p. 44. 6 6 New York Times, December 7, 1980, p.E1-5; The New  R e p u b l i c , J anuary 15, 1977, p.24; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp. 44-48; Washington P o s t , June 11, 1978, p. 1; Turner (1985), p. 47. 6 7 C a r t e r (1982), p. 59; Donovan (1985), p. 214. However, t o 94 a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , Donovan h i m s e l f was an a d v o c a t e w i t h o u t l i n e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 6 8 C a r t e r (1982) p. 60; The New R e p u b l i c , March 3, 1979; C a l i f a n o (1981), pp. 404, 410. 6 9 N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , December 16, 1978, p.2009; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp. 53-55. 7 0 Smith (1986), p. 113; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 44. 7 1 F a l l o w s (1979), p. 76. 7 2 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 71. 7 3 Abernathy e t . a l . (eds.) (1984), p. 71; N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , December 16, 1978. pp.2009-2011, I t r e p o r t e d : " B r z e z i n s k i i s the c o o r d i n a t o r , e n e r g i z e r and i n t e l l e c t u a l s t i m u l a t o r i n the F o r e i g n P o l i c y a r e n a " (p. 2011); Drew (1978). 7 4 The New R e p u b l i c , June 4, 1977, p. 10; New York Times, December 25, 1977, p. 1. See a l s o B e s c h l o s s and W e i n s t e i n (1982), p. 72. 7 5 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 59; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 158 7 6 Washington P o s t , December 20, 1979, p. C3. 7 7 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.126-128; Vance (1983), pp.127-130. Vance s t a t e s t h a t most s e n i o r a d v i s o r s opposed the p l a n . B r z e z i n s k i d i d not attempt t o "push" t h i s i s s u e t h r o u g h but a d v i s e d C a r t e r t o take the o pposing views s e r i o u s l y . E v e n t u a l l y , the i s s u e s i m p l y v a n i s h e d from the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s agenda, c h i e f l y due t o Vance's o p p o s i t i o n . 7 8 D u r i n g the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s on the N-bomb, f o r example, B r z e z i n s k i ' s s t r o n g s u pport f o r d e p l o y i n g the weapon c l o u d e d h i s d u t i e s t o communicate c l e a r l y w i t h the p r e s i d e n t . In the end, the f a i l u r e t o manage the p r o c e s s p r o p e r l y , l e d t o the e m b a r r a s s i n g c l a s h between C a r t e r and Helmut Schmidt. See: Vance (1983), pp.94-96 ; C a r t e r (1982), pp.225-229 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.301-306. 7 9 George (1972), p.785 8 0 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.71 8 1 Smith (1986), p. 43. See a l s o Drew (1978) and Bonafede (1977). See a l s o R. G o t t e m o e l l e r , " E v o l u t i o n of the US O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Setup For D e a l i n g W ith SALT", Rand Monograph, November 1978, p.23; Hunter (1982), p. 29, b e l i e v e s t h a t an a d vocate c u s t o d i a n can e f f e c t i v e l y c o o r d i n a t e d e c i s i o n -making. 8 2 N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , December 16, 1978, p.2009-2011; Time, May 29, 1978; New York Times, October 19, 1977; N a t i o n a l 95 J o u r n a l , October 15, 1977, p.1596-1601; M c l e l l a n (1985), p. 48. 8 3 Washington P o s t , December 20, 1977, p.7 8 f l C a r t e r (1982), p. 54; Jo r d a n (1982), p. 49; I n t e r v i e w w i t h Vance i n Time, A p r i l 24, 1978. 8 5 C a r t e r (1982), p. 53. I t i s a l s o argued t h a t C a r t e r was a m b i v a l e n t towards the USSR and c o u l d not come down on e i t h e r s i d e of the argument. See Hoffmann (1981), pp 3-8. The problem w i t h t h i s argument i s t h a t t h e r e was n o t h i n g a m b i v a l e n t about C a r t e r ' s a c t u a l p o l i c y i n the c o n f l i c t . The US s t a n d remained u n a l t e r e d t h r o u g h o u t . 8 6 Time, J u l y 18 (1977). 8 7 B e s c h l o s s and W e i n s t e i n (1982), p. 76. R i c h a r d E a r l e ( D i r e c t o r ACDA) a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t a l l d i p l o m a t i c c o n t a c t s by the White House were r e p o r t e d t o DOS, Arms C o n t r o l Today, no.3, March 1981, p. 6 8 8 H a l l (1982), p. 663. 8 9 Smith (1986), p. 43 c l a i m s t h a t such v i o l a t i o n s s t a r t e d i n e a r l y 1978. To some degree they can a l s o be i d e n t i f i e d i n the PRC-US n o r m a l i z a t i o n i s s u e as I w i l l e x p l a i n i n a pur s u a n t c h a p t e r . 9 0 Gary S i c k , A l l F a l l Down, New York: Random House, 1985, pp. 117-122. 9 1 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 349. For example, B r z e z i n s k i would q u i c k l y change PRC s e s s i o n s i n t o NSC s e s s i o n s by b r i n g i n g i n the p r e s i d e n t , merely t o ous t the a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r i e s (from S t a t e ) from the meet i n g . 9 2 Vance (1983), p. 409; J o r d a n (1982), p. 251. 9 3 Odeen (1979), P h i l i p Odeen, " O r g a n i z i n g f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , summer 1980, pp.111-129. 9 f l Vance (1983), p. 37 ( f o r the M i d d l e E a s t see pp. 162-166); B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.66; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 58,59; R i c h a r d E. Neustadt and E r n e s t R. May, T h i n k i n g i n Time, New York: The Free P r e s s , 1986, p. 118. 9 5 B e s c h l o s s and W e i n s t e i n (1982), p. 72. 9 6 George (1980), pp. 157-163; H a l l (1982), pp. 654-681. 96 CHAPTER THREE SALT I I : THE "DEEP CUTS" PROPOSALS OF MARCH 1977 97 T h i s c h a p t e r a n a l y z e s the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s which produced the "Deep C u t s " p r o p o s a l s of March 1977 i n t h e SALT I I t a l k s between the USA and the USSR. I t w i l l show t h a t the t a l k s f a i l e d c h i e f l y because of c e r t a i n f l a w s i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s t h a t l e d t o the American p o s i t i o n . W h i l e the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y was t o a l a r g e e x t e n t a p p r o x i m a t e d , c e r t a i n key sho r t c o m i n g s e x p l a i n why the p r o c e s s f a i l e d t o produce an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n . As such, the s t r a t e g y e x p l a i n s both the s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses of the p r o c e s s . F i n a l l y , on the b a s i s of thes e weaknesses i n the p r o c e s s , I w i l l argue t h a t changes i n the r o l e t a s k p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r the c u s t o d i a n can improve the s t r a t e g y and thu s the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . THE BACKGROUND The SALT I I t a l k s commenced s h o r t l y a f t e r the s i g n i n g of t he SALT I t r e a t y i n 1972. Both the S o v i e t s and Americans e x p r e s s e d t h e i r d e s i r e t o f o l l o w up on the SALT I t r e a t y by c o m p l e t i n g a t r e a t y t h a t would f u r t h e r l i m i t the arms race and which would be v a l i d u n t i l the mid 1980's. In s p i t e of t h i s common g o a l , the two p a r t i e s e n t e r e d the t a l k s w i t h q u i t e d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s . The American demands were the f o l l o w i n g . 1 The U n i t e d S t a t e s sought an agreement t h a t would g i v e both p a r t i e s n u m e r i c a l l y e q u a l numbers of n u c l e a r l a u n c h e r s . The SALT I 98 t r e a t y had a l l o w e d the S o v i e t s a g r e a t e r number of l a u n c h e r s because the American d e l e g a t i o n f e l t c o n f i d e n t t h a t , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e i r l e a d i n the number of warheads would o f f s e t t h i s n u m e r i c a l i n e q u a l i t y . C ongress, however, d i d not a g r e e . I t passed a r e s o l u t i o n f o r c i n g the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o seek e q u a l numbers i n any new t r e a t y . In a d d i t i o n t o n u m e r i c a l e q u a l i t y , the Americans sought t o l i m i t the number of l a u n c h e r s t h a t c o u l d be MIRVed and sought t o reduce the number of S o v i e t heavy n u c l e a r l a u n c h e r s . The r a t i o n a l e b e h i n d t h e s e demands was q u i t e s i m p l e . W h i l e the A m e r icans, a t the time of the t a l k s , were s t i l l ahead i n the number of MIRVed l a u n c h e r s , the S o v i e t p o t e n t i a l f o r o v e r t a k i n g the Americans was merely a m a t t e r of t i m e . Moreover, w h i l e the U n i t e d S t a t e s had r e p l a c e d i t s heavy m i s s i l e s w i t h s m a l l e r and more a c c u r a t e m i s s i l e s , the S o v i e t s had n o t . I t was f e a r e d , t h e r e f o r e t h a t , s i n c e the S o v i e t s were a l l o w e d a h i g h e r number of l a u c h e r s and s i n c e they had a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of heavy l a u n c h e r s , which can because of t h e i r l a r g e r throwweight l i f t o f f v e r y l a r g e MIRVed warheads, they c o u l d e v e n t u a l l y s u r p a s s the American l e a d i n warheads. I f t h i s happened, combined w i t h an i n c r e a s e i n the a c c u r a c y of S o v i e t l a u n c h e r s , the U n i t e d S t a t e s f e a r e d i t might be v u l n e r a b l e t o a S o v i e t f i r s t s t r i k e i n the l a t e 1970's or e a r l y 1980's. F i n a l l y , t h e Americans wanted t o put r e s t r i c t i o n s on a new bomber the S o v i e t s were d e v e l o p i n g , c a l l e d the B a c k f i r e . The S o v i e t s argued t h a t i t was a medium-range bomber and t h u s not s u b j e c t t o the S t r a t e g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n T a l k s . However, the Americans b e l i e v e d t h a t 99 b o t h i t s p a y l o a d and range were s u f f i c i e n t l y ambiguous t o count i t as a s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r bomber. The S o v i e t p o s i t i o n g o i n g i n t o the t a l k s was the f o l l o w i n g . Because of t h e i r d i s a d v a n t a g e i n the number of warheads and MIRVed l a u n c h e r s , the S o v i e t s r e s i s t e d American demands f o r n u m e r i c a l e q u a l i t y and l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e i r MIRV p o t e n t i a l and heavy l a u n c h e r s . A l s o , the S o v i e t s wanted t o i n c l u d e the US B-52 and B-1 s t r a t e g i c bombers i n t o the o v e r a l l numbers on s t r a t e g i c l a u n c h e r s . T h i r d l y , the S o v i e t s demanded t h a t American n u c l e a r weapons i n Europe be counted as s t r a t e g i c l a u n c h e r s s i n c e they c o u l d r e a c h the S o v i e t h e a r t l a n d . F i n a l l y , the S o v i e t s sought r e s t r i c t i o n s on both the range and number of a new American weapon, the C r u i s e M i s s i l e . A f t e r two y e a r s of n e g o t i a t i o n s , the two s i d e s were a b l e t o s o l v e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s on most of t h e s e i s s u e s a t the 1974 summit i n V l a d i v o s t o k . The agreements reached a t t h i s summit r e q u i r e d c o n c e s s i o n s on the i s s u e s by both s i d e s . The S o v i e t s a c c e p t e d the American demand f o r n u m e r i c a l e q u a l i t y i n l a u n c h e r s and MIRVed l a u n c h e r s . In r e t u r n , the Americans agreed t o s e t the numbers h i g h enough so t h a t the S o v i e t s would not have t o d i s m a n t l e a l a r g e amount of t h e i r e x i s t i n g l a u n c h e r s and c o u l d s t i l l expand t h e i r s m a l l e r f o r c e of MIRVed l a u n c h e r s . They agreed on a t o t a l c e i l i n g of 2400 l a u n c h e r s and a MIRV s u b c e i l i n g of 1320. The Americans dropped t h e i r demand f o r a r e d u c t i o n i n heavy S o v i e t l a u n c h e r s i n r e t u r n f o r the S o v i e t c o n c e s s i o n not t o i n c l u d e American n u c l e a r weapons i n Europe. The 100 S o v i e t s were a l l o w e d t o keep t h e i r p r e s e n t number of 300 heavy m i s s i l e s . F i n a l l y , the U n i t e d S t a t e s agreed t o i n c l u d e i t s s t r a t e g i c bombers i n the t o t a l of 2400. 2 The V l a d i v o s t o k summit d i d not produce an agreement on two i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s : the B a c k f i r e bomber and the C r u i s e M i s s i l e . The S o v i e t s r e f u s e d t o count the B a c k f i r e as a s t r a t e g i c bomber, w h i l e the Americans r e j e c t e d the S o v i e t demand t o count the C r u i s e M i s s i l e as a n u c l e a r l a u n c h e r and t o l i m i t i t s range t o 600 km. In s p i t e of the disagreement on t h e s e two i s s u e s , b oth s i d e s c o n s i d e r e d the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s a major b r e a k t h r o u g h and the b a s i s f o r SALT I I . S e v e r a l American c r i t i c s of the t a l k s argued t h a t the c e i l i n g s d i d not r e a l l y l i m i t the n u c l e a r a r s e n a l s of b oth powers but merely "capped" them. However, the US a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o u n t e r e d t h a t w i t h o u t the agreed l i m i t s , the S o v i e t s would be a b l e t o "out MIRV" the U n i t e s S t a t e s and as such a c c e l l e r a t e the arms r a c e . The S o v i e t r e a c t i o n t o the V l a d i v o s t o k agreements was q u i t e p o s i t i v e . O f f i c i a l S o v i e t news a c c o u n t s h a i l e d the agreements as "a l o n g term b a s i s " f o r the l i m i t a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c arms between the two c o u n t r i e s . 3 Throughout 1975, b o t h s i d e s o f f e r e d s e v e r a l p r o p o s a l s and c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s t o break the d eadlock on the B a c k f i r e and C r u i s e i s s u e s . However, w h i l e i n c h i n g c l o s e r t o an agreement, the two s i d e s c o u l d not agree on an e x a c t number, range or method t o count the two weapons. At one p o i n t , K i s s i n g e r s a i d t h a t SALT I I was 90% completed." Yet h i s f i n a l e f f o r t , i n J a n u a r y 1976, d i d not produce a 1 0 1 b r e a k t h r o u g h . Most a n a l y s t s agree t h a t the p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n campaign of 1976 p r e v e n t e d F o r d from o f f e r i n g any compromises on the C r u i s e M i s s i l e t h a t c o u l d f i n a l i z e the SALT I I a c c o r d . F o r d was under a t t a c k from s e v e r a l Democrats as w e l l as the c o n s e r v a t i v e wing of the R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y . The Democrats condemned him f o r not r e a c h i n g lower c e i l i n g s w h i l e s e v e r a l R e p u b l i c a n s a c c u s e d him of making t o o many c o n c e s s i o n s t o the S o v i e t s . To t r y another way t o get out of the d e a d l o c k , F o r d proposed, i n F e b r u a r y 1976, t o s i g n the SALT I I t r e a t y on the b a s i s of the V l a d i v o s t o k agreements w h i l e d e f e r r i n g the C r u i s e and B a c k f i r e i s s u e s t o the SALT I I I t a l k s . The S o v i e t s , however, r e f u s e d t o d e f e r the C r u i s e i s s u e . D u r i n g the e l e c t i o n campaign, C a r t e r ' s p o s i t i o n on the SALT I I n e g o t i a t i o n s appears ambiguous, perhaps d e l i b e r a t e l y so. W h i l e e c h o i n g Senator J a c k s o n ' s dismay over the h i g h a g g r e g a t e s of the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s , and p r o m i s i n g " t o r i d n u c l e a r weapons from the f a c e of the e a r t h " , C a r t e r a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t he would t r y t o c o n c l u d e an agreement based on V l a d i v o s t o k as soon as p o s s i b l e . 5 In s e v e r a l i n t e r v i e w s and speeches, C a r t e r emphasized h i s d e s i r e t o a c h i e v e deeper c u t s i n the o v e r a l l c e i l i n g s when e l e c t e d . 6 However, a f t e r h i s n o m i n a t i o n , C a r t e r a u t h o r i z e d Harriman t o t e l l Brezhnev t h a t , i f e l e c t e d , he would q u i c k l y s i g n SALT I I based on V l a d i v o s t o k . In J a n u a r y 1977, he s a i d the same i n an i n t e r v i e w w i t h Time magazine. 7 As w i l l be shown below, C a r t e r ' s ambivalence about how t o c o n t i n u e the SALT t a l k s 102 was not r e s o l v e d u n t i l s e v e r a l weeks i n t o h i s term i n o f f i c e . THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW On January 24, 1977, C a r t e r i s s u e d a P r e s i d e n t i a l Review Memorandum (PRM), i n s t r u c t i n g the NSC committee s t r u c t u r e t o p r e p a r e a s e t of n e g o t i a t i n g o p t i o n s f o r SALT I I . B e f o r e h i s i n a u g u r a t i o n C a r t e r had a l r e a d y announced t h a t Vance would go t o Moscow a t the end of March t o reopen the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s . In a s t a f f meeting j u s t p r i o r t o i s s u i n g the PRM, C a r t e r had i n d i c a t e d b oth a d e s i r e f o r deeper r e d u c t i o n s i n the n u c l e a r l a u n c h e r s of b o t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union and f o r a q u i c k c o m p l e t i o n of the s t a l l e d V a l d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . White House o f f i c i a l s t e s t i f i e d t h a t C a r t e r was not s u r e how t o p r o c e e d ; " i n one s t e p ( V l a d i v o s t o k ) or two." 8 O t h e r s i n d i c a t e d t h a t C a r t e r was not y e t l o c k e d i n t o a p o s i t i o n . 9 The p r e s i d e n t i n s t r u c t e d the S p e c i a l C o o r d i n a t i o n Committee, under B r z e z i n s k i ' s c h a i r m a n s h i p , t o e v a l u a t e the m e r i t s of both approaches; c o m p l e t i n g SALT I I on the b a s i s of V l a d i v o s t o k or l o w e r i n g the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s i m m e d i a t e l y as w e l l as o t h e r p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s . B r z e z i n s k i a s s i g n e d NSC s t a f f members V i c t o r U t g o f f , W i l l i a m H yland and R i c h a r d Molander t o s e t i n motion the i n t e r a g e n c y p r o c e s s of d e v e l o p i n g o p t i o n s . The f i r s t e x p l o r a t o r y SCC meeting was 103 h e l d on F e b r u a r y 3, which commissioned an i n t e r a g e n c y w o r k i n g group t o r e p o r t back t o the SCC when i t was ready t o p r e s e n t c o n c r e t e o p t i o n s . 1 0 Meanwhile, B r z e z i n s k i i n s t r u c t e d Molander t o w r i t e a memorandum on the h i s t o r y of the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s t o p r o v i d e p e r s p e c t i v e f o r the a d v i s o r s . T h i s memo was sent t o C a r t e r , Vance, Brown and M o n d a l e . 1 1 W h i l e the SCC d e l i b e r a t e d , C a r t e r made s e v e r a l p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s on SALT, c o n s u l t e d w i t h D o b r y n i n and exchanged l e t t e r s w i t h Brezhnev. In an i n t e r v i e w on J a n u a r y 24, C a r t e r d e s c r i b e d h i s v i s i o n of a t h r e e s t e p arms c o n t r o l approach. F i r s t he sought l i m i t s , t hen r e d u c t i o n s and e v e n t u a l l y m u l t i l a t e r a l d i s a r m a m e n t . 1 2 W h i l e d e s i r i n g deeper c u t s sooner than l a t e r , he s t a t e d t h a t he was w i l l i n g t o d e f e r d i f f i c u l t i s s u e s such as t h e B a c k f i r e and C r u i s e i f the S o v i e t s wanted a q u i c k agreement. In a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e on F e b r u a r y 8, C a r t e r l e a n e d more towards r a t i f y i n g V l a d i v o s t o k f i r s t and s e e k i n g deeper c u t s l a t e r . 1 3 C a r t e r agreed w i t h B r z e z i n s k i ' s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t he s h o u l d t r y t o b u i l d a p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Brezhnev. W i t h t h i s g o a l i n mind, C a r t e r wrote a p r i v a t e l e t t e r t o Brezhnev on January 26. In the l e t t e r , C a r t e r e x p r e s s e d h i s d e s i r e f o r a r a p i d c o n c l u s i o n of SA1T. 1 4 Brezhnev r e p l i e d t h a t the USSR b e l i e v e d V l a d i v o s t o k p r o v i d e d such a b a s i s . On F e b r u a r y 7 C a r t e r wrote a g a i n , s p e l l i n g out two p o s s i b l e r o u t e s : a comprehensive SALT I I w i t h lower c e i l i n g s or a s m a l l e r agreement e x c l u d i n g the B a c k f i r e and C r u i s e . C a r t e r made thes e p r o p o s a l s even though Brezhnev had i n d i c a t e d t o him t h a t he wished t o s t a y w i t h the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s 104 o n l y . C a r t e r had r e v i e w e d t h e s e i d e a s w i t h D o b r y n i n p r i o r t o s e n d i n g the l e t t e r . However, he had not g i v e n D o b r y n i n a c o n c r e t e s e t of p r o p o s a l s s i n c e t h e SALT o p t i o n s were s t i l l b e i n g d e l i b e r a t e d i n the SCC. 1 5 Brezhnev's r e p l y was l e s s c o r d i a l . He r e i t e r a t e d t h a t he would o n l y s i g n a SALT I I t r e a t y t h a t was based on V l a d i v o s t o k and t h a t C a r t e r ' s arms i d e a s appeared t o him as " d e l i b e r a t e l y u n a c c e p t a b l e . " 1 6 C a r t e r i m m e d i a t e l y took up the pen a g a i n t o defend h i s s i n c e r i t y t o a c h i e v e arms c o n t r o l . Brezhnev's f i n a l r e p l y t o t h i s exchange d i d not come u n t i l March 15, a f t e r the SCC had p r e s e n t e d C a r t e r w i t h the o p t i o n s . These p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s and p r i v a t e exchanges i n d i c a t e two i m p o r t a n t p o i n t s . F i r s t , C a r t e r had not made up h i s mind on how t o proceed w i t h the t a l k s . W h i l e he s t i l l wanted t o make good on h i s campaign p l e d g e t o c u t the n u c l e a r a r s e n a l s , C a r t e r moved c l o s e r t o the p o s i t i o n of f i r s t r a t i f y i n g the V l a d i v o s t o k l e v e l s , as i s e v i d e n t from h i s F e b r u a r y 8 p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e . Second, C a r t e r was not s u f f i c i e n t l y aware of the S o v i e t commitment t o V l a d i v o s t o k and of the S o v i e t r e f u s a l t o d e f e r the C r u i s e i s s u e . To show h i s g o o d w i l l , C a r t e r endorsed Brown's p l a n s f o r the new d e f e nse budget, c u t t i n g the p l a n n e d c o n s t r u c t i o n of B-1 bombers from 8 t o 5 and d e l a y i n g by one year the development of the MX. 1 7 105 THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS The p r i n c i p a l a c t o r s on the SCC i n t e r a g e n c y w o r k i n g group were W a l t e r Slocombe (Deputy A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s at DOD), L e s l i e G e l b ( D i r e c t o r of P o l i t i c o - M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s a t DOS) and Hyland (NSC s t a f f a i d e f o r the USSR). In e a r l y March, they p r e s e n t e d the SCC w i t h t h r e e o p t i o n s . The f i r s t , c a l l e d " B a s i c V l a d i v o s t o k , " argued f o r an agreement based on the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s w i t h t h e B a c k f i r e e x c l u d e d and the A i r Launched C r u i s e M i s s i l e (ALCM) counted i n the 1320 MIRV c e i l i n g . 1 8 The second o p t i o n was c a l l e d " V l a d i v o s t o k P l u s . " I t a l s o endorsed the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s but added the i d e a of t r a d i n g o f f S o v i e t heavy l a u n c h e r s f o r American ACLM's. I t proposed an agreement o u t s i d e the SALT t a l k s f o r the B a c k f i r e . The c i v i l i a n s i n DOD f a v o u r e d a t r a d e o f f between the B a c k f i r e and Ground Launced C r u i s e M i s s i l e s (GLCM's), w h i l e the O f f i c e of the J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f wanted t o count the B a c k f i r e as a s t r a t e g i c bomber. 1 9 The t h i r d o p t i o n , " V l a d i v o s t o k Minus," proposed t o endorse V l a d i v o s t o k and d e f e r the C r u i s e and B a c k f i r e i s s u e s . Brown, D a v i d Aaron (Deputy D i r e c t o r , NSC ) and B r z e z i n s k i were not s a t i s f i e d w i t h the range of o p t i o n s and i n s t r u c t e d the group t o add a p r o p o s a l i n v o l v i n g deeper c u t s i n the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s . 2 0 Meanwhile, C a r t e r r e c e i v e d a memorandum from Senator J a c k s o n c a l l i n g f o r c u t s s u b s t a n t i a l l y below the V l a d i v o s t o k l e v e l s . I t recommended a 106 r e d u c t i o n i n S o v i e t heavy m i s s i l e s , the i n c l u s i o n of B a c k f i r e bombers and the e x c l u s i o n of C r u i s e m i s s i l e s . C a r t e r forwarded t h i s memo t o the Department of S t a t e and the Department of D e f e n s e . 2 1 Warnke and Hyland f e l t t h a t i t was an u n r e a l i s t i c p r o p o s a l . However, i t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h i s memo was s t u d i e d s e r i o u s l y by the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Any t r e a t y would have t o be r a t i f i e d by the Senate, i n which J a c k s o n p l a y e d a major r o l e . Moreover, Warnke's c o n f i r m a t i o n as C h i e f Arms N e g o t i a t o r had been a c h i e v e d by a narrow m a r g i n , r e f l e c t i n g l i t t l e t r u s t i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s arms n e g o t i a t i n g a b i l i t y . A l l t hese o p t i o n s were d i s c u s s e d a t the f i n a l SCC meeting on t h i s s u b j e c t on March 1 0 . 2 2 In t h i s m eeting, Brown appeared as the s t r o n g e s t a dvocate f o r deeper c u t s . Brown argued t h a t the American ICBM f o r c e was q u i c k l y becoming v u l n e r a b l e t o a S o v i e t f i r s t s t r i k e . In o r d e r t o st a v e o f f t h i s v u l n e r a b i l i t y , Brown f a v o u r e d lower c e i l i n g s as w e l l as a sha r p r e d u c t i o n i n the number of S o v i e t heavy l a u n c h e r s . Brown's i d e a s were s u p p o r t e d by Mondale and Aaron, though f o r d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s . 2 3 They b e l i e v e d t h a t the V l a d i v o s t o k l e v e l s f e l l s h o r t of genuine arms c o n t r o l . They ad v o c a t e d t h a t the bes t o p p o r t u n i t y t o make good on C a r t e r ' s campaign p l e d g e s was e a r l y i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , d u r i n g C a r t e r ' s "honeymoon." Moreover, they f e l t t h a t the SALT p r o p o s a l s s h o u l d not f o l l o w K i s s i n g e r ' s l e g a c y t oo c l o s e l y . I t was best f o r C a r t e r t o c r e a t e h i s own r e c o r d i n t h i s a r e a as soon as p o s s i b l e . 2 " Vance and Warnke d i d not a g r e e . They argued i n fa v o u r 107 of the " B a s i c V l a d i v o s t o k " o p t i o n . They were s k e p t i c a l about s u r p r i s i n g the S o v i e t s w i t h a r a d i c a l l y new p r o p o s a l . They b e l i e v e d t h a t a q u i c k agreement based on V l a d i v o s t o k s h o u l d be the p r e f e r r e d c h o i c e . They were p r e p a r e d t o l i m i t the number and range of ACLM's, w h i l e e x c l u d i n g the B a c k f i r e . B r z e z i n s k i c o n f i n e d h i s r o l e t o c h a i r i n g the meetings and s o r t i n g out the v a r i o u s o p t i o n s . From h i s memoirs, i t appears t h a t h i s p e r s o n a l p r e f e r e n c e was c l o s e r t o Brown's f a v o u r e d o p t i o n than t o V a n c e ' s . 2 5 The meeting d i d not r e a c h a consensus. B r z e z i n s k i sent the minutes t o C a r t e r and p r e p a r e d a memo summarizing the d i s c u s s e d o p t i o n s . 2 6 I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s meeting d i d not r e s u l t i n any compromises or t r a d e o f f s . The advocate p o s i t i o n s were e s s e n t i a l l y p o l a r i z e d around two o p t i o n s . Vance and Warnke p r e f e r r e d SALT I I t o be b u i l t upon the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s w h i l e Brown and Aaron wanted deeper c u t s . 2 7 N e i t h e r J o r d a n nor P o w e l l appear t o have p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the SCC d e l i b e r a t i o n s on S A L T . 2 8 On March 11, B r z e z i n s k i sent C a r t e r a memo o u t l i n i n g the o p t i o n s d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s meeting. The f i r s t o p t i o n c a l l e d f o r a d e f e r r a l of the C r u i s e and B a c k f i r e i s s u e s and a r a t i f i c a t i o n of the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s . The second o p t i o n proposed m o d e r a t e l y lower c e i l i n g s than the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . On the o t h e r i s s u e s i t resembled the " V l a d i v o s t o k P l u s " o p t i o n . The t h i r d was the " B a s i c V l a d i v o s t o k " o p t i o n f a v o u r e d by Vance and Warnke. The l a s t o p t i o n proposed deep c u t s t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2,000 l a u n c h e r s and 1,200 MIRVed l a u n c h e r s as w e l l as a cu t b a c k i n S o v i e t 108 heavy m i s s i l e s from 300 t o 150. T h i s l a s t o p t i o n was s u p p o r t e d s t r o n g l y by B r o w n . 2 9 B r z e z i n s k i f a v o u r e d the second o p t i o n , which c a l l e d f o r moderate c u t s . The next morning, Saturday March 12, C a r t e r ' s p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r s g a t h e r e d i n the c a b i n e t room t o d i s c u s s t h e s e o p t i o n s w i t h the p r e s i d e n t . 3 0 P r e s e n t were B r z e z i n s k i , Vance, Brown, Mondale, Aaron, Warnke, Chairman of the J o i n t C h i e f s Brown and T u r n e r . The P r e s i d e n t began by q u e s t i o n i n g the p a r t i c i p a n t s on a v a r i e t y of i s s u e s . He e x p r e s s e d h i s hope f o r r e a l arms c o n t r o l and h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the h i g h V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s . Upon t h i s , Brown and Aaron e x p l a i n e d t h e i r deep c u t s p r o p o s a l . Brown argued p e r s u a s i v e l y , i m p r e s s i n g C a r t e r w i t h h i s d e t a i l e d command of a l l SALT i s s u e s . Next, B r z e z i n s k i e v a l u a t e d the p o s s i b l e consequences of both the deep c u t s and the " B a s i c V l a d i v o s t o k " o p t i o n s : To seek an agreement based on the V l a d i v o s t o k l e v e l s would s i g n a l c o n t i n u i t y t o the S o v i e t s and would thus enhance S o v i e t c o n f i d e n c e i n C a r t e r ' s arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s . However, s e e k i n g deeper c u t s would s e r v e American i n t e r e s t s because i t would reduce or a t l e a s t postpone American v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o a S o v i e t f i r s t s t r i k e . B r z e z i n s k i a l s o s t a t e d t h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n might want t o move beyond the K i s s i n g e r e r a and e s t a b l i s h i t s own r e c o r d . Vance and Warnke d i d not defend t h e i r o p t i o n v e r y s t r o n g l y . Nor d i d they q u e s t i o n the ad v o c a t e s of the deep c u t s o p t i o n . 3 1 Warnke d i d mention t h a t i f the S o v i e t s r e j e c t e d the p r o p o s a l , any American c o n c e s s i o n s would l o o k l i k e a r e t r e a t . However, n e i t h e r he nor Vance c l a r i f i e d the 109 p o s s i b l e dangers i n h e r e n t i n moving away from the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . I f they had m i s g i v i n g s , they d i d not v o i c e them. Vance l a t e r acknowledged t h a t he thought the a m b i t i u o u s , f a r r e a c h i n g and r i s k y p r o p o s a l was worth a t r y . 3 2 C a r t e r ended the meeting by i n s t r u c t i n g B r z e z i n s k i t o w r i t e up a n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n based on the deep c u t s o p t i o n , t o be rev i e w e d i n a NSC meeting a week l a t e r . 3 3 On March 17, Vance and Warnke s u b m i t t e d a memo t o C a r t e r s t a t i n g t h e i r h e s i t a t i o n s about h i s d e c i s i o n a t the March 12 m e e t i n g . 3 4 However, as f a r as i s known, the memo d i d not p r o v i d e C a r t e r w i t h an a n a l y s i s of the p o s s i b l e consequences of h i s d e c i s i o n t o abandon the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . I t s t a t e d Vance's disagreement but d i d not r u l e out t h a t C a r t e r ' s gamble might pay o f f . W h i l e Vance thought i t was a " l o n g s h o t " he a l s o e x p r e s s e d h i s a m bivalence when he noted : I t might be t h a t the S o v i e t s , c o n f r o n t i n g a new p r e s i d e n t and the p r o s p e c t of h a v i n g t o d e a l w i t h him f o r a t l e a s t f o u r or perhaps e i g h t y e a r s , would be w i l l i n g t o t a k e a b o l d s t e p . We would not know u n l e s s we t r i e d . And s u c c e s s would mean a dr a m a t i c b r e a k t h r o u g h i n t u r n i n g around the arms r a c e . 3 5 On S a t u r d a y March 19, C a r t e r , Mondale, Vance, Brown, and B r z e z i n s k i r e v i e w e d the n e g o t i a t i o n p o s i t i o n drawn up by B r z e z i n s k i ' s s t a f f . 3 6 C a r t e r , encouraged by the p o s i t i v e tone of Brezhnev's l a s t l e t t e r of March 15, lowe r e d the deep c u t s p r o p o s a l even more. Launchers were s e t a t between 1,800 and 2,000 w i t h between 1,100 and 1,200 MIRVed. Heavy 110 m i s s i l e s remained a t the proposed 150 number. The C r u i s e range l i m i t was s e t a t 2,500km, w h i l e the B a c k f i r e was not t o be counted i n the aggregate numbers, p r o v i d e d the S o v i e t s would agree t o c e r t a i n measures l i m i t i n g i t s r a n g e . 3 7 B r z e z i n s k i v o i c e d h i s m i s g i v i n g s about the l o n g range of the C r u i s e but d i d not oppose the i d e a s t r o n g l y . A p p a r e n t l y , t h i s range was i n t e n d e d t o get the J o i n t C h i e f s t o agree on e x c l u d i n g the B a c k f i r e . Vance r e q u e s t e d a d e f e r r a l o p t i o n i n case the S o v i e t s r e j e c t e d the deep c u t s p r o p o s a l . I t was agreed t h a t Vance c o u l d propose as a second o p t i o n the d e f e r r a l of the C r u i s e and B a c k f i r e i s s u e s and the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s . F i n a l l y , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a l s o adopted a " f a l l back" o p t i o n . I t s p l i t the d i f f e r e n c e i n numbers between the "deep c u t s " and V l a d i v o s t o k l e v e l s . Vance was i n s t r u c t e d t o keep t h i s o p t i o n c o m p l e t e l y s e c r e t , even t o h i s s t a f f . The p l a n was t o propose i t o n l y i f the S o v i e t s e x p r e s s e d w i l l i n g n e s s t o n e g o t i a t e on the b a s i s of the f i r s t or second o p t i o n . W ith t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s Vance l e f t f o r Moscow. THE ADVOCATES' VIEWS AND THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE DECISION B e f o r e d e s c r i b i n g the d e c i s i o n outcome and a n a l y z i n g the s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , i t i s u s e f u l t o r e c o n s t r u c t how the major p a r t i c i p a n t s e v a l u a t e d the o p t i o n s , t h e i r e s t i m a t e d consequences, and 111 reasoned i n f a v o r of t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s . By most a c c o u n t s , Brown was the s t r o n g e s t a d v o c a t e . 3 8 H i s c o n c e r n was s t r a t e g i c f o r e m o s t . U n l e s s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c u r b e d S o v i e t MIRVing, i t would become v u l n e r a b l e . At the same t i m e , Brown was w i l l i n g t o make c o n c e s s i o n s t o the S o v i e t s . He f a v o u r e d s c a l i n g down the B-1 programme and p o s t p o n i n g the MX. Brown's semblance of f a i r n e s s and c o n s i s t e n c y g a i n e d him support from a d v i s o r s such as Aaron, Mondale and Warnke who b e l i e v e d t h a t American m i l i t a r y s p e nding and development was as much t o blame f o r the arms ra c e as S o v i e t MIRVed and heavy m i s s i l e s . 3 9 I t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o p i c t u r e Brown as the weapon, s t r a t e g y and s p ending s p e c i a l i s t b e i n g q u i t e o b l i v i o u s t o S o v i e t c o n c e r n s w i t h c o n t i n u i t y i n arms t a l k s . I t i s a l s o not d i f f i c u l t t o p i c t u r e C a r t e r as b e i n g impressed by Brown's arguments. Brown's advocacy f o r deeper c u t s , as w e l l as r e s t r a i n t on the American s i d e , f i t t e d C a r t e r ' s g o a l s t o a c h i e v e arms r e d u c t i o n s both by means of arms n e g o t i a t i o n s and by American g o o d w i l l . Aaron and Mondale added a more p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r t o the d e bate. T h e i r i n t e r e s t was t o go below the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s because C a r t e r had campaigned on arms r e d u c t i o n s , not merely l i m i t a t i o n s . I t was b e s t t o make such a move when the p r e s i d e n t was r i d i n g h i g h i n the p o p u l a r i t y p o l l s , u s i n g h i s advantage i n the honeymoon p e r i o d . Moreover, Brown's o f f e r t o f r e e z e ICBM t e s t i n g , as w e l l as the development of new ICBM's, was e x a c t l y what the l i b e r a l wing of the D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y wanted. As i s w e l l known, Mondale and Aaron 112 (Mondale's p r e v i o u s a s s i s t a n t ) r e p r e s e n t e d t h i s segment of the P a r t y much b e t t e r than C a r t e r . The s k e p t i c s of suddenly moving away from the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s were foremost G e l b , Slocombe, Molander and H y l a n d . 4 0 W h i l e i n f a v o u r of deeper c u t s , they thought i t unwise not t o c a p i t a l i z e f i r s t on a near ready a c c o r d . Vance and Warnke s h a r e d t h e s e c o n c e r n s and brought them t o the a t t e n t i o n of the o t h e r a d v i s o r s as w e l l as C a r t e r . In a memorandum t o C a r t e r i n October 1976, Vance o u t l i n e d h i s i d e a s f o r C a r t e r ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y s h o u l d he be e l e c t e d . 4 1 In i t , Vance argued f o r r e s o l v i n g the B a c k f i r e and C r u i s e i s s u e s , whereupon C a r t e r s h o u l d q u i c k l y complete the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . D u r i n g the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , Warnke and Vance contended t h a t C a r t e r s h o u l d use h i s p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h and momentum t o f i n a l i z e V l a d i v o s t o k . 4 2 However, Vance's advocacy appears weak, even i n c o n s i s t e n t . 4 3 Vance d i d not d i s a g r e e w i t h the concept of p u r s u i n g deeper c u t s . H i s c o n c e r n was t a c t i c a l . He b e l i e v e d t h a t the p r o p o s a l would make the n e g o t i a t i o n s v e r y d i f f i c u l t . Yet he d i d not b e l i e v e or a t l e a s t d i d not make the p o i n t t h a t the p r o p o s a l c o u l d w e l l be u n a c c e p t a b l e and c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . Vance's memoirs r e v e a l two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t weakened h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o the p r o p o s a l . 4 4 F i r s t , Vance was c o n cerned w i t h S e n ator J a c k s o n ' s s t r o n g support f o r deeper c u t s . In l i g h t of J a c k s o n ' s o p p o s i t i o n t o Warnke's n o m i n a t i o n , Vance c o u l d see the need f o r r e s p o n s i v e n e s s t o J a c k s o n ' s p r o p o s a l s i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Second, Vance b e l i e v e d the deep c u t s p r o p o s a l c o u l d be a good opening p o s i t i o n . He e x p e c t e d t h a t 113 the S o v i e t s would t a k e elements from the p r o p o s a l and combine them w i t h elements from the V l a d i v o s t o k agreement. 1" 5 In s p i t e of t h e s e c a l c u l a t i o n s , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d why Vance r e q u e s t e d a d e f e r r a l o p t i o n which l e f t t he C r u i s e m i s s i l e o u t . Vance c e r t a i n l y must have known t h a t the S o v i e t s had r e j e c t e d t h i s f o r m u l a b e f o r e . In e f f e c t , the second o p t i o n , because of i t s o m i s s i o n of the C r u i s e , made the o v e r a l l p r o p o s a l even l e s s a t t r a c t i v e t o the S o v i e t s , something Vance had never i n t e n d e d . The f i r s t o p t i o n abandoned the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s , w h i l e the second i g n o r e d the r e s u l t s of p r e v i o u s s e s s i o n s . I t must have l o o k e d t o the S o v i e t s as i f V l a d i v o s t o k had never taken p l a c e and as i f the S o v i e t s and Americans had not t r i e d t hroughout 1975 t o r e s o l v e the C r u i s e and B a c k f i r e i s s u e s . T a l b o t t c l a i m s t h a t B r z e z i n s k i was a s t r o n g a d v o c a t e of deeper c u t s . However, a l l o t h e r a c c o u n t s p i c t u r e him as c o v e r i n g the m i d d l e ground between Brown and Vance." 6 W h i l e he agreed w i t h Brown's assessment of the need f o r deeper c u t s i n l i g h t of American v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o a S o v i e t f i r s t s t r i k e , h i s p r e f e r e n c e was f o r more moderate c u t s than proposed by Brown and A a r o n . * 7 F u r t h e r m o r e , at the March 12 m e e t i n g , he i n d i c a t e d t h a t s e t t l i n g f o r the V l a d i v o s t o k agreements would s i g n a l c o n t i n u i t y t o t h e S o v i e t s , who were a l r e a d y alarmed a t C a r t e r ' s r a d i c a l l y new approach t o f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The s t u d y he o r d e r e d Molander t o c o m p l e t e , a l s o emphasized t h i s p o i n t . * 8 At the SCC d e l i b e r a t i o n s , B r z e z i n s k i l a r g e l y c o n f i n e d h i s r o l e t o e n s u r i n g t h a t both Brown's and Aaron's p r o p o s a l as w e l l as those of Vance and 1 14 Warnke were w e l l a i r e d . He a l s o e nsured the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the J o i n t C h i e f s t h r o u g h o u t the d i s c u s s i o n , which had not been the case under N i x o n . He v o i c e d h i s c o n c e r n about the l o n g range of the C r u i s e and warned C a r t e r t h a t i t might c o m p l i c a t e the t a l k s . 4 9 B r z e z i n s k i , l i k e Vance, warned t h a t the S o v i e t s would not l i k e l y a c c e p t the p r o p o s a l s a t f a c e v a l u e . 5 0 However, w h i l e Vance e n v i s i o n e d the p r o p o s a l s as a mere opening p o s i t i o n , b r e a k i n g the way f o r compromises and f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s , B r z e z i n s k i argued t h a t whatever p r o p o s a l s the U n i t e d S t a t e s would d e c i d e upon, i t s h o u l d be p r e p a r e d t o s t i c k w i t h them. W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i d i d not "push h a r d " f o r any p a r t i c u l a r p o s i t i o n , he f a v o u r e d a tough uncompromising s t a n d once the t a l k s o p e n e d . 5 1 Brown's s t r a t e g i c a n a l y s i s as w e l l as Aaron and Mondale's i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l reasons appear t o have c o n v i n c e d C a r t e r t h a t he s h o u l d t r y deep c u t s a t once. Moreover, C a r t e r shared Vance's e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t the S o v i e t s would at l e a s t take the p r o p o s a l s as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s . A new s t a r t i n g p o i n t indeed but the p r e s i d e n t was new t o o and b e l i e v e d i n a s u b s t a n t i v e approach t o arms c o n t r o l and wanted the S o v i e t s t o know i t . 5 2 C a r t e r hoped t h a t deeper c u t s , combined w i t h a lowered US d e f e n s e budget and postponement of the MX, would s i g n a l American good f a i t h t o the S o v i e t s . 5 3 I f the S o v i e t s a c c e p t e d the p r o p o s a l or a t l e a s t a c c e p t e d i t as the b a s i s of n e g o t i a t i o n s , C a r t e r c o u l d s c o r e s e v e r a l s u c c e s s e s a t once. He c o u l d a c h i e v e a new t r e a t y p r o p o s a l b e f o r e SALT I e x p i r e d i n October 1977. I t 1 1 5 would bear h i s own stamp and not merely complete what K i s s i n g e r had a c h i e v e d b e f o r e . I t s deeper c u t s would p l e a s e the l i b e r a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t . F i n a l l y , a q u i c k s u c c e s s would e s t a b l i s h Congress' c o n f i d e n c e i n C a r t e r ' s n e g o t i a t i n g a b i l i t i e s . T h i s c o n f i d e n c e had been low s i n c e C a r t e r ' s s e l e c t i o n of Warnke as h i s C h i e f Arms N e g o t i a t o r . VANCE'S TRIP TO MOSCOW The p r o p o s a l s f a r e d b a d l y . The S o v i e t s r e j e c t e d c o m p l e t e l y the deep c u t s and d e f e r r a l o p t i o n s . Vance d i d not even have a chance t o p r e s e n t the compromise o p t i o n . The o n l y t h i n g Vance a c h i e v e d was a promise t o meet a g a i n i n May. For a l l i n t e n t s and p u r p o s e s , C a r t e r ' s "grand o p e n i n g " was a f a i l u r e . I t was i m m e d i a t e l y p e r c e i v e d as such by most commentators as w e l l as by s e v e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s . 5 " S i n c e t h e n , n e a r l y a l l s c h o l a r s s t u d y i n g the e p i s o d e have shown the d i s a s t r o u s e f f e c t s i t had on C a r t e r ' s arms n e g o t i a t i o n r e c o r d as w e l l as on h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the S o v i e t s i n g e n e r a l . I t has been argued t h a t as a r e s u l t of t h i s opening move, the t a l k s dragged on f o r 30 months, got the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f t o a bad s t a r t w i t h the S o v i e t s , eroded any c o n f i d e n c e the Senate had l e f t i n C a r t e r ' s a b i l i t i e s t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h the R u s s i a n s , k i l l e d any r e a l i s t i c o p p o r t u n i t y C a r t e r had t o c a p i t a l i z e on a q u i c k arms d e a l , and made a l l the e n s u i n g arms n e g o t i a t i o n s under 1 16 C a r t e r appear as c o n c e s s i o n s t o the S o v i e t s . E s p e c i a l l y t h i s l a s t r e s u l t , r e n d e r e d C a r t e r , and indeed t h e f i n a l SALT I I a c c o r d i t s e l f , v u l n e r a b l e t o the c r i t i c i s m s of American h a r d l i n e r s . 5 5 Moreover, the SALT I I agreement of 1979 was much c l o s e r t o the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d , making C a r t e r ' s a t t e m p t s l o o k f u t i l e , i f not o b f u s c a t i n g . Soon a f t e r h i s r e t u r n t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s , Vance acknowledged t h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had m i s c a l c u l a t e d . 5 6 Warnke was more b l u n t . He c o n f e s s e d t h a t the S o v i e t s c o n s i d e r e d the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s a d e a l and t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s had broken the d e a l . 5 7 S e v e r a l y e a r s l a t e r , C a r t e r c o n f e s s e d i n an i n t e r v i e w t h a t he had m i s j u d g e d the R u s s i a n s . . . . h a d f a i l e d t o see how i m p o r t a n t the V l a d i v o s t o k agreements were t o Brezhnev, how the a i l i n g l e a d e r r e g a r d e d them w i t h p r i d e as a c r o wning p o i n t i n h i s c a r e e r and u n d e r s t a n d a b l y r e a c t e d s t r o n g l y when a new American group came i n , swept the t a b l e , and demanded a new game. 5 8 The a d m i n s t r a t i o n t r i e d i m m e d i a t e l y t o put a b r i g h t f a c e on the f a i l u r e by a s s e r t i n g t h a t the t a l k s were merely e x p l o r a t o r y . K i s s i n g e r , F o r d and J ackson r a l l i e d i n support of C a r t e r even though i n p r i v a t e they were s a i d t o be c r i t i c a l . Both C a r t e r and Vance urged p a t i e n c e . C a r t e r a l s o s a i d t h a t he thought the p r o p o s a l s had been " f a i r and b a l a n c e d " and wondered a l o u d i f the S o v i e t s were b a r g a i n i n g i n good f a i t h . 5 9 B r z e z i n s k i l i k e n e d the S o v i e t r e b u f f t o t h e i r r e f u s a l i n 1968 t o d i s c u s s l i m i t a t i o n s on b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e d e f e n s e . 6 0 He t r i e d t o draw a h i s t o r i c a l a n a l o g y : as 117 t h e S o v i e t s r e f u s e d the ABM p r o p o s a l s f i r s t and l a t e r a c c e p t e d them, so they may do w i t h the deep c u t s p r o p o s a l s . However, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d not s t i c k t o i t s p o s i t i o n . A f t e r May 1977, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n dropped the deep c u t s p r o p o s a l . 6 1 D u r i n g the next two y e a r s , i t worked on the u n s o l v e d i s s u e s of V l a d i v o s t o k . The f i n a l a c c o r d , reached i n 1979, s e t the o v e r a l l c e i l i n g a t 2250, w i t h s u b c e i l i n g s of 1320 MIRVed and 300 heavy m i s s i l e s . The Sea and Ground Launched C r u i s e M i s s i l e range was not t o exceed 600 km, the A i r Launced C r u i s e range 2500 km. The B a c k f i r e was e x c l u d e d from the t r e a t y . S e v e r a l e x p l a n a t i o n s have been g i v e n f o r the f a i l u r e of the March p r o p o s a l s . One argument c l a i m s t h a t C a r t e r ' s a t t a c k on the S o v i e t human r i g h t s r e c o r d and h i s open sup p o r t f o r S o v i e t d i s s i d e n t s angered the S o v i e t s so much t h a t t h e y sought an i s s u e t o r e t a l i a t e . 6 2 C a r t e r ' s l e t t e r t o Sakharov and Bukovsky's v i s i t t o the White House were w e l l p u b l i c i z e d . In one of the p r i v a t e l e t t e r s , Brezhnev accused C a r t e r of d e l i b e r a t e l y u ndermining S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s by h i s p r o p a g a n d i s t s e f f o r t s t o i n t e r f e r e i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of the S o v i e t U n i o n . 6 3 O t h e r s have a l l e g e d t h a t the manner i n which C a r t e r h a n d l e d the t a l k s caused the S o v i e t s t o t h i n k t h a t C a r t e r i n t e n d e d t o s c o r e q u i c k p u b l i c o p i n i o n p o i n t s and was not s e r i o u s about the s u b s t a n c e of the p r o p o s a l s . 6 * Indeed, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n ducted the t a l k s i n a manner ve r y d i f f e r e n t from the p r e v i o u s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . D o b r y n i n was not g i v e n a summary of the p r o p o s a l s u n t i l l e s s than a week 118 b e f o r e the t a l k s . 6 5 C a r t e r d i s c l o s e d the essence of the p r o p o s a l s i n a speech t o the UN on March 17 and d u r i n g a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e on March 2 4 . 6 6 Vance's p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e , i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r the t a l k s broke down, as w e l l as C a r t e r ' s comments t h a t the S o v i e t s might not be n e g o t i a t i n g i n good f a i t h , c l e a r l y put the onus of the f a i l u r e of the t a l k s on the S o v i e t s . S u b s e q u e n t l y , Gromyko c a l l e d a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e . T h i s he had never done d u r i n g the p r e v i o u s SALT t a l k s . He accused C a r t e r of abandoning V l a d i v o s t o k , s e e k i n g a p u b l i c o p i n i o n v i c t o r y and p r o p o s i n g a d e l i b e r a t e l y u n a c c e p t a b l e s e t of p r o p o s a l s . 6 7 C a r t e r ' s human r i g h t s campaign and p u b l i c d i p l o m a c y d i d not improve the atmosphere i n which the t a l k s were h e l d . However, t h e s e two f a c t o r s a l o n e cannot e x p l a i n why the t a l k s f a i l e d . In h i s p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e , Gromyko s t a t e d t h a t the USSR o b j e c t e d most t o C a r t e r ' s d e p a r t u r e from the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . In s p i t e of the human r i g h t s i s s u e , Brezhnev's l a s t l e t t e r t o C a r t e r i n d i c a t e d h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o c o n t i n u e the arms t a l k s . As i n a l l h i s l e t t e r s , Brezhnev emphasized t h a t the t a l k s s h o u l d b u i l d upon V l a d i v o s t o k . 6 8 In t h e i r memoirs, b o t h Vance and C a r t e r acknowledge t h a t t h e i r d i s r e g a r d f o r the agreements of V l a d i v o s t o k c o n s t i t u t e d the major reason f o r the breakdown of the t a l k s . 6 9 S e v e r a l a s p e c t s of the p r o p o s a l s must have indeed l o o k e d t o the S o v i e t s as an a b r o g a t i o n of the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d . F i r s t , the lower f i g u r e s f o r MIRVed m i s s i l e s appeared as an attempt t o deny the S o v i e t s the a b i l i t y t o 119 c a t c h up t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n the number of warheads. Second, K i s s i n g e r had agreed not t o i n s i s t on a deep r e d u c t i o n i n S o v i e t heavy m i s s i l e s , c e r t a i n l y not a 50% c u t ! T h i r d , d u r i n g 1975 the S o v i e t s had r e p e a t e d l y r e j e c t e d a 2,500 km range f o r a l l C r u i s e m i s s i l e s . F i n a l l y , the d e f e r r a l o p t i o n proposed t o e x c l u d e the C r u i s e which the S o v i e t s had r e f u s e d i n the p a s t . THE MULTIPLE ADVOCACY STRATEGY AND EXPLAINING THE FAILURE The d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s a p p r o x i m a t e d most r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e s s norms p r e s c r i b e d by the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . C a r t e r d i d not i n i t i a t e the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s w i t h h i s mind made up. W h i l e he wanted t o a c h i e v e deeper c u t s e v e n t u a l l y , he i n s t r u c t e d h i s a d v i s o r s t o p r e p a r e a wide range of o p t i o n s . C a r t e r d i d not choose h i s p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n u n t i l the March 12 meeting w i t h h i s a d v i s o r s . B e f o r e t h a t m e e t i n g , a l l the a d v o c a t e s had ample time and o p p o r t u n i t y t o propose t h e i r f a v o u r e d c o u r s e s of a c t i o n . Indeed, a c o n s i d e r a b l e v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s was p r o duced, c a u s i n g one p a r t i c i p a n t t o comment t h a t "the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n became something of an o p t i o n s c o l l e c t o r . " 7 0 None of the a d v o c a t e s or i n t e r e s t e d a g e n c i e s was l e f t out of the d e b a t e . 7 1 The c r u c i a l meeting of March 12 was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by one p a r t i c i p a n t as a " r e l a x e d and wide r a n g i n g d i s c u s s i o n . " 7 2 C a r t e r s t i m u l a t e d a debate on the 120 i s s u e and d i d not s e l e c t h i s c h o i c e u n t i l the end of the m e e t i n g . Moreover, Vance and Warnke were a b l e t o submit a memorandum t o C a r t e r a f t e r t h i s m e e t i n g , i n which they s t a t e d t h e i r h e s i t a t i o n s a g a i n . T h e i r c o n c e r n s were d i s c u s s e d a g a i n a t the March 19 NSC m e e t i n g , a f t e r which C a r t e r i n s t r u c t e d B r z e z i n s k i t o w r i t e up the d e c i s i o n . The a d v o c a t e s competed f o r the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e i r o p t i o n s i n f r o n t of the p r e s i d e n t . The f i n a l SCC meeting of March 10 d i v i d e d the a d v o c a t e s between two o p t i o n s . Brown, Mondale and Aaron f a v o u r e d the "deep c u t s " p r o p o s a l , Vance and Warnke f a v o u r e d the c o n t i n u a t i o n of V l a d i v o s t o k . There i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t they reached a compromise or some t r a d e o f f . The meeting ended w i t h o u t a consensus and a l l the d i s c u s s e d o p t i o n s were s u b m i t t e d t o the p r e s i d e n t . In the March 12 meeting, the p r e s i d e n t d i s c u s s e d t h e s e o p t i o n s w i t h h i s a d v i s o r s . The c u s t o d i a l r o l e was performed by B r z e z i n s k i . By o r d e r i n g h i s s t a f f t o w r i t e up a h i s t o r y of the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s , B r z e z i n s k i e n s u r e d t h a t b o t h the p r e s i d e n t and the a d v o c a t e s had a f a c t u a l b a s i s upon which t o study the o p t i o n s . U n l i k e K i s s i n g e r ' s o c c a s i o n a l meddling i n the a g e n c i e s ' i n t e r n a l p r o c e s s e s , B r z e z i n s k i d i d not attempt t o i n f l u e n c e t h e i r p o l i c y d e v e l o p m e n t . 7 3 He e nsured t h a t a l l r e l e v a n t a d v o c a t e s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the p r o c e s s . W h i l e he f a v o u r e d moderate c u t s below the V l a d i v o s t o k l e v e l , he d i d not a dvocate s t r o n g l y . R a t h e r , he c o n f i n e d h i s r o l e t o c h a i r i n g the SCC and o r g a n i z i n g the o p t i o n s f o r the p r e s i d e n t . 7 " B r z e z i n s k i d e s c r i b e s h i s r o l e i n the SCC 121 meetings as s t r u c t u r i n g the debate between the v a r i o u s p o s i t i o n s , so as t o b a l a n c e the h a r d and s o f t l i n e r s . 7 5 B r z e z i n s k i ' s memorandum t o C a r t e r summarized the SCC debate of March 10 and l i s t e d the range of o p t i o n s advanced by the a d v o c a t e s . 7 6 F i n a l l y , i n the March 12 m e e t i n g , B r z e z i n s k i d i d not merely defend Brown's o p t i o n but a l s o d e s c r i b e d the p o s s i b l e b e n e f i t s of the V l a d i v o s t o k o p t i o n . Yet the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s f a i l e d t o produce a l l f i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s as d e f i n e d by G e o r g e . 7 7 I t d i d p r o v i d e f o r s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n , a wide v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s and ample o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n s i d e r the o p t i o n s . However, i t produced n e i t h e r a r e a s o n a b l e e v a l u a t i o n of the e s t i m a t e d consequences of a l l the o p t i o n s nor a r e a s o n a b l e awareness of the d i f f i c u l t i e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h implementing the o p t i o n s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t f e l l s h o r t of e x p o s i n g the odds of s u c c e s s and the consequences of f a i l u r e of C a r t e r ' s p r e f e r r e d "deep c u t s " p r o p o s a l . 7 8 At l e a s t f i v e c r u c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s were o v e r l o o k e d or not e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d d u r i n g the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . F i r s t , a s i g n i f i c a n t d e p a r t u r e from the V l a d i v o s t o k agreements might b r i n g about a debate w i t h i n the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p . G i v e n Brezhnev's p u b l i c l y p r o f e s s e d s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s as w e l l as h i s v i s i b l y f a i l i n g h e a l t h , he might r e f u s e t o open t h i s d e b a t e . 7 9 Second, the S o v i e t s had u n d e r s t o o d the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s t o be the b a s i s of SALT I I . As w i t h p r e v i o u s agreements, the S o v i e t s d i d not b e l i e v e t h e s e agreements 122 s h o u l d be s u b j e c t t o changes i n US a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . T h e r e f o r e , the C a r t e r p r o p o s a l s would not o n l y be c o n s i d e r e d as a b r e a c h of agreement but a l s o as a precedent which the S o v i e t s would want t o a v o i d . I f so, the S o v i e t s would not even want t o c o n s i d e r the p r o p o s a l s as a new s t a r t i n g p o i n t . T h i r d , what were the consequences of f a i l u r e ? F a i l u r e t o r e a c h an arms c o n t r o l a c c o r d would a l l o w the S o v i e t s t o c o n t i n u e t h e i r b u i l d up, i f not a c c e l e r a t e i t , and would thus r e q u i r e C a r t e r t o i n c r e a s e American arms p r o d u c t i o n . 8 0 I f so, C a r t e r might have t o r e v e r s e h i s d e c i s i o n t o c u t the defense budget and might have t o b u i l d the MX. As a r e s u l t , C a r t e r would f a i l t o r e a c h e i t h e r g o a l . W h i l e he would f a i l i n r e a c h i n g a new arms t r e a t y , he would a l s o f a i l i n f u l f i l l i n g h i s campaign p l e d g e s t o reduce n u c l e a r weapons and c u t defense s p e n d i n g . F o u r t h , w h i l e i t was wise t o c o n s i d e r Senator J a c k s o n ' s c o n c e r n s about the t a l k s , two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s argued a g a i n s t f o l l o w i n g h i s p r o p o s a l s . J a c k s o n ' s p r o p o s a l t o i n c l u d e the B a c k f i r e as a s t r a t e g i c bomber and t o r e f u s e any l i m i t a t i o n s on the C r u i s e had been r e j e c t e d by the S o v i e t s i n the p a s t . Second, a q u i c k arms d e a l combined w i t h C a r t e r ' s h i g h p o p u l a r i t y would have been hard t o r e s i s t f o r the Senate. I f the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was g o i n g t o t a k e a r i s k , t h i s would be a b e t t e r c a l c u l a t e d r i s k than s u r p r i s i n g the S o v i e t s . L a s t , w h i l e Brezhnev's l a s t l e t t e r t o C a r t e r may have been " b u s i n e s s l i k e " i n C a r t e r ' s o p i n i o n , a l l h i s p r e v i o u s l e t t e r s as w e l l as h i s p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s c l e a r l y s t a t e d h i s commitment t o the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . 8 1 There were ample 123 i n d i c a t o r s t h a t the S o v i e t s would r e j e c t any new p r o p o s a l s . How do we e x p l a i n t h i s s h o r t c o m i n g i n t h e d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s and what does i t t e l l us about th e m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y ? W h i l e th e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s produced a s u f f i c i e n t l y wide range of o p t i o n s , i t d i d not produce a b a l a n c e d e v a l u a t i o n of the e s t i m a t e d consequences of the o p t i o n s . The a d v o c a t e s of the V l a d i v o s t o k o p t i o n d i d not emphasize the b e n e f i t s of t h e i r o p t i o n and d i d not c h a l l e n g e the e s t i m a t e d consequences of t h e deep c u t s o p t i o n . Vance d i d not a d v o c a t e s t r o n g l y why he d i s a g r e e d w i t h the deep c u t s p r o p o s a l . I n s t e a d , he subdued h i s d o u b t s , h o p i n g t h a t the p r o p o s a l s would a t l e a s t c r e a t e a framework f o r the n e g o t i a t i o n s . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t the a d v i s o r s ( i n c l u d i n g Vance) were s t i l l q u i t e d e f e r e n t i a l t o C a r t e r and not y e t used t o one a n o t h e r ' s w o r k i n g s t y l e . T h i s i s o f t e n the case d u r i n g the b e g i n n i n g of a p r e s i d e n t ' s term. The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y a p p a r e n t l y f a i l e d t o c o r r e c t t h i s s h o r t c o m i n g . I f the a d v o c a t e s ( i n t h i s case Vance and Warnke) do not p r e s s t h e i r advocacy, what measures does the s t r a t e g y p r e s c r i b e t o "save" the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s ? The d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s was s t r u c t u r e d and managed a c c o r d i n g t o the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y and s t i l l d i d not produce a thorough e v a l u a t i o n of a l l t h e o p t i o n s , a s sumptions and consequences. The weak advocacy on the p a r t of Vance as w e l l as the f a i l u r e on the p a r t of B r z e z i n s k i t o s t r e n g t h e n Vance's advocacy c o n s t i t u t e the e x p l a n a t i o n of the f a i l u r e of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s o f f e r e d by the m u l t i p l e 124 r advocacy model. However, the r o l e t a s k of an "honest b r o k e r , " was performed by B r z e z i n s k i . The q u e s t i o n then i s , how does the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y expect the c u s t o d i a n t o s t r e n g t h e n weaker a d v o c a t e s and remain an honest b r o k e r a t the same time? H a l l acknowledges t h a t the s t r a t e g y does not c l e a r l y r e c o n c i l e t h e s e two t a s k s . 8 2 George s t a t e s t h a t the c u s t o d i a n s h o u l d n e i t h e r p l a y the r o l e of a d e v i l ' s advocate nor t h e r o l e of a p o l i c y a d v o c a t e . 8 3 The d e l i b e r a t e r o l e p l a y i n g of a d e v i l ' s advocate tends t o be c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . The p r e s i d e n t and o t h e r a d v i s o r s q u i c k l y p e r c e i v e i t as r o l e p l a y i n g and as a r e s u l t pay l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o the arguments of the d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e . Genuine p o l i c y advocacy on the p a r t of the c u s t o d i a n i s a l l e g e d t o compromise h i s a b i l i t y t o be an honest b r o k e r . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y a l s o a l l o w s f o r the c u s t o d i a n t o i n v i t e o u t s i d e r s t o the debate t o argue u n d e r r e p r e s e n t e d p o s i t i o n s . B r z e z i n s k i d i d not do t h i s . Indeed, t h i s recommendation appears v e r y u s e f u l . B r z e z i n s k i s h o u l d have i n v i t e d e x p e r i e n c e d a d v i s o r s who c o u l d have in f o r m e d C a r t e r on the l i k e l y r e a c t i o n of the S o v i e t s . An example of such an a d v i s o r was the American ambassador i n Moscow. One would assume t h a t he c o u l d have o f f e r e d a c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s of the S o v i e t r e a c t i o n t o the p r o p o s a l s . S u r p r i s i n g l y , none of the a c c o u n t s on t h i s d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s mention any r o l e p l a y e d by the ambassador. A l s o , B r z e z i n s k i s h o u l d have g i v e n an e x p e r i e n c e d a d v i s o r l i k e H y l and a b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t y t o c h a l l e n g e the Brown-Aaron o p t i o n . 125 As mentioned b e f o r e , w h i l e the t a c t i c t o i n v i t e o u t s i d e r s i s u s e f u l , i t i s not o f t e n p r a c t i c a l . The main reason f o r t h i s i s the p r e s i d e n t ' s p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h l e a k s . From C a r t e r ' s p o i n t of v i e w, the c i r c l e of a d v i s o r s was a l r e a d y q u i t e l a r g e and v a r i e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t an o u t s i d e r c o u l d have c h a l l e n g e d the p o s i t i o n s u p p o r t e d by Brown and Mondale. R a t h e r , the e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s t h a t n o t h i n g s h o r t of v i g o r o u s advocacy by a t r u s t e d i n s i d e r c h a l l e n g i n g the Deep Cuts p r o p o s a l c o u l d have impressed upon C a r t e r t o r e c o n s i d e r h i s d e c i s i o n . I t appears t h a t B r z e z i n s k i l e a r n e d from the f a i l u r e of t h i s d e c i s i o n t h a t he s h o u l d f i l l t h i s gap. The next c h a p t e r s d e s c r i b e how B r z e z i n s k i c h a l l e n g e d the p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n of the p r e s i d e n t and the m a j o r i t y of h i s a d v i s o r s by means of a s t r o n g advocacy r o l e and as a r e s u l t improved the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s . 126 ENDNOTES 1 The f a c t u a l b a s i s of the f o l l o w i n g account r e l i e s p r i m a r i l y on Thomas W. W o l f e , The SALT E x p e r i e n c e , Cambridge, M a s s a c h u s e t t s : B a l l i n g e r , 1979; R i c h a r d B u r t , "The Scope and L i m i t s of SALT," World P o l i t i c s , No. 4, J u l y 1978; S t r o b e T a l b o t t , Endgame, New York: Harper & Row, 1979; U.S. Congress. 17th Annual Report of the US Arms C o n t r o l and  Disarmament Agency, May 1978, Washington: US Gov't P r i n t O f f . ; Henry A. K i s s i n g e r , Years of Upheaval, B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, 1982, c h a p t e r s 7 and 22; Roger P. L a b r i e ( e d . ) , SALT  Handbook, Washington: American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e , 1979. 2 Other agreements reached a t V l a d i v o s t o k i n c l u d e m o b i l e b a s i n g and m i s s i l e m o d e r n i z a t i o n r u l e s as w e l l as v e r i f i c a t i o n g u i d e l i n e s . 3 See e s p e c i a l l y Wolfe (1979), pp. 181-182. * New York Times, B e r n a r d Gwertzman, October 13, 1975. 5 Washington P o s t , Joseph K r a f t , F e b r u a r y 1, 1977. I w i l l use " V l a d i v o s t o k " as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r the l o n g e r term "the agreements reached a t V l a d i v o s t o k " . 6 Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , Power and P r i n c i p l e , New York: F a r r a r , S t r a u s s , G i r o u x , 1983, p. 7. 7 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 39; Time, J a n u a r y 3, 1977, p. 17. 8 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 43. 9 New York Times, H e d r i c k S m i t h , F e b r u a r y 9, 1977. 1 0 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 157; Jimmy C a r t e r , Keeping F a i t h , New York: Bantam, 1982, p. 216. 1 1 R i c h a r d E. Neustadt and E r n e s t R. May, T h i n k i n g i n Time, New York: The Free P r e s s , 1986, p. 113. 1 2 New York Times, January 25, 1977, p. 1. 1 3 Wolfe (1979), p. 219; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 47. 1 4 C a r t e r (1982), p. 216; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 152. 1 5 New York Times, F e b r u a r y 4, 1977, p. 6; US News & World  R e p o r t , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y by Committee," F e b r u a r y 21, 1977, p. 27. 1 6 C a r t e r (1983), p. 218. 1 7 US News & World R e p o r t , "Behind C a r t e r ' s Gamble on Defense O u t l a y s , " March 7, 1977, p 17; New York Times, H e d r i c k S m i t h , F e b r u a r y 21, 1977, p. 1. 127 1 8 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 46. 1 9 Idem, Neustadt and May (1986), p. 116; Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 1. 2 0 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 47. 2 1 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 53. 2 2 For a c c o u n t s of t h i s meeting see T a l b o t t (1979), pp. 55-58; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 158; Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 1 and p. 7; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 116. 2 3 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 53, The New R e p u b l i c , A p r i l 23, 1977, p. 12; John Edwards, Super WeapontThe Making of MX, New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1982, p. 129. 2 < l D a v i d S. M c L e l l a n , Cyrus Vance, New J e r s e y , Rowman and A l l a n h e l d , 1985, p. 40; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 46 c l a i m s t h a t B r z e z i n s k i s h a red t h i s b e l i e f . 2 5 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 158; N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , Dom Bonafede, December 11, 1976, p. 1821. 2 6 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 58; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 159. 2 7 Cyrus Vance, Hard C h o i c e s , New York: Simon & S c h u s t e r , 1983, p. 48; M c L e l l a n (T985), p. 39; Newsweek, March 28, 1977. p. 88. 2 8 B a r r y M. Blechman ( e d . ) , R e t h i n k i n g the U.S. S t r a t e g i c  P o s t u r e , Cambridge: B a l l i n g e r , 1982, p. 167. 2 9 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 159; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117. 3 0 Accounts of t h i s meeting a r e p r o v i d e d by T a l b o t t (1979), pp. 58, 59; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117; Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977. See a l s o Vance (1983), p. 49. 3 1 See a l s o Seymour Brown, The Faces of Power, New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1983, p. 538; M c L e l l a n (1985), p. 40. 3 2 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 59. 3 3 Newsweek, May 9, 1977, p. 58; New York Times, March 15, 1977, p. 1. 3 1 t Vance (1983), p. 49; B r z e z i n s k i ( 1983), p. 159. 3 5 Vance (1983), p.49; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 118, note the memo was vague and d e f e r e n t i a l so much so t h a t Vance's p o s i t i o n was q u i t e ambiguous. 3 6 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 159. For the f i n a l p o s i t i o n of the 128 a d m i n i s t r a t i o n see a l s o Vance (1983), p. 52; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 60. 3 7 A l s o i n c l u d e d i n the p r o p o s a l were a f r e e z e on ICBM t e s t i n g , an agreement not t o d e v e l o p new ICBM's and a p r o v i s i o n not t o modify e x i s t i n g ICBM's. 3 8 Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 1; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 50; New York Times, A p r i l 5, 1977, p. 7; Sam C. S a r k e s i a n ( e d . ) , Defense P o l i c y and the P r e s i d e n c y , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1979, p. 246; Newsweek, March 28, 1977, p. 88; M c L e l l a n (1985), p. 40; Brown (1983), p. 538. Neustadt and May c l a i m C a r t e r had h i s mind made up b e f o r e the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . However, most o t h e r s o u r c e s do not su p p o r t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . 3 9 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 53, 57; Time, March 21, 1977, p. 18; John F. Lehman, Beyond the SALT I I F a i l u r e , New York: P r a e g e r , 1981, p. 106 c l a i m s s e v e r a l a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r i e s i n v o l v e d i n SALT a l s o s h a red t h i s b e l i e f . A l t h o u g h Lehman mentions no names, he c l e a r l y i m p l i e s L e s l i e G e l b and W a l t e r Slocombe as i s e v i d e n t from T a l b o t t (1979), p. 41. 4 0 Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 7; T a l b o t t (1979), pp. 44-46; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 158; Neus t a d t and May (1986), p. 116. * 1 Vance ( 1983), p. 446. * 2 Idem, p. 48 See a l s o E l i z a b e t h Drew, "A R e p o r t e r a t L a r g e : Arms C o n t r o l , " New Y o r k e r , A p r i l 4, 1977, p. 113. P a u l Warnke, i n h i s t e s t i m o n y b e f o r e the Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee, r e v e a l e d t h a t he had f a v o u r e d a q u i c k c o m p l e t i o n of the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . See " B r i e f i n g s on SALT N e g o t i a t i o n s , " U.S. Congress. Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s  Committee, November 3 and 29, 1977. Washington, US Gov't P r i n t O f f . 4 3 M c L e l l a n (1985), p. 40; Gaddis S m i t h , M o r a l i t y , Reason  and Power, New York: H i l l and Wang, 1986, p. 74. 4 4 Vance (1983), p. 48. 4 5 Washington P o s t , A p r i l 2, 1977, p. 1; Vance (1983), p. 54; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 70. 4 6 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 49. T a l b o t t acknowledges, however, t h a t Brown was both a more a r t i c u l a t e and i n f l u e n t i a l a d v i s o r i n t h i s case than B r z e z i n s k i . ; N eustadt and May (1986), pp. 116-118, Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 1; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 158; Brown (1983), p. 538; Wolfe (1979), p. 36; I n t e r v i e w w i t h D a v i d Aaron i n Arms C o n t r o l  Today, No. 3, March 1981, p. 4. 4 7 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 159. 129 4 8 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 44. 4 9 For a more d e t a i l e d a ccount of B r z e z i n s k i ' s c u s t o d i a l d u t i e s see below. 5 0 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 160. 5 1 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 162 n o t e s t h a t Mondale agreed w i t h h i s i n s i s t e n c e on a tough s t a n d . 5 2 C a r t e r (1982), pp. 216, 217. 5 3 New York Times, F e b r u a r y 21, 1 977, p. 1 . 5 4 Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 7; New York Times, A p r i l 2, 1977, p. 7; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 78; Newsweek, A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 26. 5 5 One or s e v e r a l of t h e s e arguments have been advanced by i n t e r a l i a , N eustadt and May (1979); Hedley Donovan, From  R o o s e v e l t t o Reagan, New York: Harper and Row, 1985; M. Glenn Abernathy e t . a l . ( e d s . ) , The C a r t e r Y e a r s , London: F r a n c e s P i n t e r , 1984; L. Freedman, The World Today, v o l . 33, 1977; George Kennan, Time, August 3, 1977; Adam Ulam, "US-S o v i e t R e l a t i o n s : Unhappy C o e x i s t e n c e , " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , v o l . 57, 1979, pp.555-571;, S t a n l e y Hoffmann, "The H e l l of Good I n t e n t i o n s , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y , W i n t e r 1977, pp.3-26;, and Gaddis S m i t h , M o r a l i t y , Reason and Power, New York: H i l l and Wang, 1986. 5 6 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 77. 5 7 Gregg Herken, C o u n s e l s of War, New York: A. A. Knopf, 1985, p. 283. 5 8 Haynes Johnson, In the Absence of Power, New York: The V i k i n g P r e s s , 1980, p. 183. 5 9 New York Times, March 31, 1977, pp. 1, 12. 6 0 Washington P o s t , A p r i l 2, 1977, p. 14. 6 1 I t o r d e r e d a new PRM on the i s s u e which r e s u l t e d i n PDM 20, s i g n e d by C a r t e r i n September, 1977, S a r k e s i a n (ed.) (1979), p. 122. 6 2 Time, March 28, 1977, p. 16. 6 3 C a r t e r (1982), p. 146 6 4 C o r a l • B e l l , P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r and F o r e i g n P o l i c y : The  C o s t s of V i r t u e ? , C a n b e r r a : A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y , 1982, p. 35; M c L e l l a n (1985), p. 41. 6 5 Vance (1983), p. 52. 130 6 6 New York Times, March 18, 1977, p. 10 and March 25, 1977, p. 10. 6 7 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 74; New York Times, A p r i l 8, 1977, pp. 1 , 8 . 6 8 C a r t e r (1982), p. 219; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 154. 6 9 Vance (1983), p. 55, Vance a l s o s t a t e s t h a t he doubts the human r i g h t s i s s u e b l o c k e d the t a l k s . ; C a r t e r (1982), p. 217. See a l s o B e t t y G l a d , Jimmy C a r t e r , New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1980, p. 429. 7 0 Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 7. 7 1 Wolfe (1979), p. 29, 17th Annual Report of the US Arms  C o n t r o l and Disarmament Agency, U.S. Congress. Senate. Gov't. P r i n t . O f f . , May 1978, p. 11; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 42. 7 2 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 58. 7 3 Wolfe (1979), p. 36. 7" Wolfe (1979), p."36; R. E. G o t t e m o e l l e r , " E v o l u t i o n of the US O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Setup For SALT," Rand Monograph P6197, November 1978; B r z e z i n s k i ( 1 983), p. 158; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117. 7 5 B r z e z i n s k i (1985), p. 158. 7 6 Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 159. 7 7 . A l e x a n d e r L. George, P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g i n  F o r e i g n P o l i c y , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1980, p. 10. 7 8 Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117. 7 9 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 32; Wolfe (1979), p. 171; P i e t e r M.E. V o l t e n , Brezhnev's Peace Program, B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1982, c h a p t e r 4. 8 0 Neustadt and May (1986), pp. 120, 121. Indeed, t h i s d e s c r i b e d s c e n a r i o u n f o l d e d i n 1978 and 1979. 8 1 New York Times, J a n u a r y 19, 1977, p. 4, J a n u a r y 28, 1977, p. 7; Newsweek, F e b r u a r y 21, 1977, p. 17; C a r t e r (1982), pp. 218, 219. 8 2 D a v i d K. H a l l , Implementing M u l t i p l e Advocacy i n the  N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , Ph.D t h e s i s , S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , 1982, p. 711. 8 3 George (1980), pp. 170, 196. 1 3 1 CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 132 T h i s c h a p t e r a n a l y z e s the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n which the American p o s i t o n i n the 1977-1978 war between E t h i o p i a and Som a l i a was f o r m u l a t e d . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t examines the r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of American p o l i c y , which o c c u r r e d i n e a r l y 1978 as a r e s u l t of the c o n s i d e r a b l e involvement of the USSR i n the war. In a d d i t i o n t o the S o v i e t i n v o l v e m e n t , Washington was concerned w i t h t h i s c o n f l i c t because of the s t r a t e g i c importance of the Horn of A f r i c a v i s - a - v i s the P e r s i a n G u l f and the A r a b i a n o i l f i e l d s . Moreover, i t was the f i r s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s c o n f r o n t i n g the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and was seen by many as a t e s t of S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s as w e l l as a t e s t of C a r t e r ' s A f r i c a p o l i c y . I w i l l argue t h a t p o l i c y advocacy on t h e p a r t of the c u s t o d i a n c h a l l e n g e d the consensus view among the o t h e r a d v i s o r s and improved the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . T h i s advocacy d i d not compromise the r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e s s norms of t he m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . F u r t h e r m o r e , I w i l l show t h a t s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s of p u b l i c s p e a k i n g by the c u s t o d i a n d i d not harm the p r o c e s s or the e x e c u t i o n of p o l i c y . THE WAR AND ITS BACKGROUND The source of c o n f l i c t i n the Horn of A f r i c a and p a r t i c u l a r l y between E t h i o p i a and Som a l i a d a t e s back t o p r e c o l o n i a l t i m e s . 1 H i s t o r i c a l l y , the dominant t r i b e s i n 1 3 3 E t h i o p i a , who a r e C o p t i c C h r i s t i a n s , have had an uneasy r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the v a r i o u s I s l a m i c p e o p l e s t h a t n e a r l y s u r r o u n d them. The a r b i t r a r i l y drawn c o l o n i a l b o u n d a r i e s , which became the independence b o u n d a r i e s , a g g r a v a t e d t h i s t e n s i o n . The Somali p e o p l e , who e t h n i c a l l y , r e l i g i o u s l y and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y form an homogeneous group, now f i n d t h e mselves s c a t t e r e d throughout the Horn i n the N o r t h E a s t e r n p a r t of Kenya, the Ogaden p r o v i n c e of E t h i o p i a , D j i b o u t i and S o m a l i a . The U n i t e d Kingdom, as w e l l as s e v e r a l o t h e r c o l o n i z e r s , were unable or u n w i l l i n g t o c h a l l e n g e the c o l o n i a l a s p i r a t i o n s of E t h i o p i a i n the Ogaden. A l s o , B r i t a i n s u p p o r t e d Kenya i n 1963 i n i t s c l a i m t o the N o r t h e r n F r o n t i e r D i s t r i c t , though i t was l a r g e l y i n h a b i t e d by S o m a l i s . France g r a n t e d independence t o D j i b o u t i i n 1977 but kept a l a r g e t r o o p presence t o secure i t s independence, i n l i g h t of S o m a l i a ' s c l a i m t o the a r e a . As a r e s u l t , the t r u n c a t e d Somali t r i b e s , who i n 1960 formed the R e p u b l i c of S o m a l i a , have harboured s t r o n g i r r e d e n t i s t c l a i m s . The dream of a g r e a t e r Somalia^ w i t h Mogadishu a t i t s c e n t r e , has been the g o a l of the Somali l e a d e r s h i p s i n c e independence. The p u r s u i t of t h i s dream was most pronounced i n the Ogaden r e g i o n , i n h a b i t e d by a p p r o x i m a t e l y one m i l l i o n S o m a l i s . Border c l a s h e s between the two c o u n t r i e s i n t h i s a r e a were f r e q u e n t . A l s o , S o m a l i a has s u p p o r t e d , a t t i m e s o v e r t l y , the West Somali L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t , which has o p e r a t e d i n the Ogaden s i n c e the 1960's. Both E t h i o p i a and Somalia have over the l a s t s e v e r a l decades c u l t i v a t e d s t r o n g t i e s w i t h e i t h e r of the two 134 superpowers. E t h i o p i a and t h e US s i g n e d a mutual defense agreement i n 1953. From 1953 t o 1975, E t h i o p i a r e c e i v e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 200 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n m i l i t a r y a i d from the U n i t e d S t a t e s In r e t u r n , the U n i t e d S t a t e s o p e r a t e d the Kagnew r a d a r and communications f a c i l i t y i n the E t h i o p i a n p r o v i n c e of E r i t r e a . D u r i n g t h i s t i m e , E t h i o p i a was one of Ameri c a ' s most i m p o r t a n t a l l i e s i n A f r i c a , r e c e i v i n g n e a r l y 20% of a l l US economic a i d and 50% of a l l m i l i t a r y a i d t o A f r i c a . S o m a l i a has r e c e i v e d S o v i e t a i d s i n c e 1963. In a 1969 coup, the m i l i t a r y took c o n t r o l of So m a l i a and s e t out t o b u i l d a s o c i a l i s t r e p u b l i c . S i a d B a r r e , the new l e a d e r , e n t e r e d i n t o a defense p a c t w i t h the USSR and s t a r t e d t o b u i l d a s t r o n g army w i t h t h e h e l p of S o v i e t a d v i s o r s and m a t e r i e l . In r e t u r n , the S o v i e t s were g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y t o b u i l d p o r t f a c i l i t i e s f o r the S o v i e t navy i n the G u l f of Aden p o r t of B e r b e r a . As a r e s u l t of t h i s b u i l d up, S o m a l i a ' s m i l i t a r y power was s l i g h t l y s u p e r i o r t o t h a t of E t h i o p i a i n 1977, even though S o m a l i a had about l / 9 t h of E t h i o p i a ' s p o p u l a t i o n and GNP. 2 The c h a i n of e v e n t s which p r e c i p i t a t e d the 1977-78 Ogaden war s t a r t e d w i t h the 1974 m i l i t a r y coup by a group of j u n i o r o f f i c e r s a g a i n s t the E t h i o p i a n emperor H a i l e S e l a s s i e . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s group, c a l l e d the Dergue, was d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the way the emperor d e a l t w i t h the se v e r e famine which p l a g u e d the c o u n t r y i n the e a r l y s e v e n t i e s , as w e l l as w i t h the l a c k of p r o g r e s s the E t h i o p i a n f o r c e s were making i n the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the 135 E r i t r e a n L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t . I n a d d i t i o n , the Dergue espoused a r a d i c a l i d e o l o g y and was e s p e c i a l l y c r i t i c a l of E t h i o p i a ' s good r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s , which i t saw as the foremost c o l o n i a l t h r e a t i n A f r i c a . In 1976, a f t e r a p e r i o d of i n t e r n a l s t r u g g l e , the Dergue, under the l e a d e r s h i p of M e n g i s t u , d e c l a r e d E t h i o p i a a M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t s t a t e . I t a l s o began t o a c c e p t S o v i e t a i d and s e t out t o improve E t h i o p i a n - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s . Meanwhile, the F o r d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , though uneasy about the r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of E t h i o p i a n p o l i t i c s , was not eager t o abandon i t s l o n g time a l l y . However, s i n c e the development of t h e UK-US base a t Diego G a r c i a , the U n i t e d S t a t e s was s c a l i n g down i t s base a t Kagnew and indeed no l o n g e r r e q u i r e d the m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n E t h i o p i a . The b r u t a l p o l i t i c a l murders conducted by the Dergue as w e l l as i t s human r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s i n i t s s t r u g g l e w i t h the E r i t r e a n s put p r e s s u r e on the U n i t e d S t a t e s t o reduce i t s m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o the new r e g i m e . 3 W h i l e F o r d had reduced US m i l i t a r y a i d t o E t h i o p i a i n 1976, C a r t e r c u t o f f a l l m i l i t a r y g r a n t a i d i n F e b r u a r y 1977 as p a r t of h i s o v e r a l l human r i g h t s p o l i c y . The Dergue wasted no t i m e . I t e x p e l l e d a l l American m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s , c l o s e d the Kagnew f a c i l i t i e s and a b r o g a t e d the mutual defense p a c t . In May 1977, i t s i g n e d a t r e a t y of f r i e n d s h i p w i t h the USSR and began r e c e i v i n g a i d f o r the E r i t r e a n war. The S o v i e t l e a d e r s may have thought i n i t i a l l y t h a t they c o u l d s u s t a i n t h e i r f r i e n d s h i p w i t h b oth E t h i o p i a and S o m a l i a . Indeed, C a s t r o , on a d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n i n e a r l y 136 1977, t r i e d t o u n i t e E t h i o p i a , S o m a l i a and D j i b o u t i i n t o a M a r x i s t f e d e r a t i o n . T h i s i d e a , however, was r e j e c t e d by b o t h B a r r e and M e n g i s t u . In any c a s e , the S o v i e t s c a l c u l a t e d c o r r e c t l y t h a t i f they were t o l o s e t h e i r f r i e n d s h i p w i t h S o m a l i a , the much l a r g e r and r i c h e r E t h i o p i a was w e l l worth i t . Moreover, M e n g i s t u promised the S o v i e t s p o r t f a c i l i t i e s i n t he Red Sea. S i a d B a r r e , c l e a r l y w o r r i e d about S o v i e t b e h a v i o u r i n the Horn, c o n t a c t e d the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n the s p r i n g of 1977, t o improve r e l a t i o n s . A l t h o u g h the U n i t e d S t a t e s was w i l l i n g t o complete the "renversement des a l l i a n c e s , " i t o n l y p romised Somalia d e f e n s i v e m i l i t a r y a i d . B a r r e , b e l i e v i n g t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s would be eager t o make up f o r i t s " l o s s " and t o o f f s e t the growing S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n the Horn, must have c a l c u l a t e d t h a t i t was w i l l i n g t o accommodate h i s i r r e d e n t i s t c l a i m s t o the Ogaden. I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t B a r r e c o n s i d e r e d s e v e r a l o t h e r f a c t o r s t o be i n h i s fa v o u r t o t r y and c l a i m the Ogaden a t t h i s p o i n t i n t i m e . F i r s t , he c o u l d count on Saudi and E g y p t i a n h e l p , as they had made e x t e n s i v e o f f e r s i n the p a s t . These s t a t e s as w e l l as I r a n were now p a r t i c u l a r l y c oncerned about R u s s i a ' s i n r o a d s i n t o E t h i o p i a . " Second, the Dergue had s t i l l not completed i t s c o n s o l i d a t i o n of power and had t i e d down a l a r g e p a r t of the E t h i o p i a n army i n E r i t r e a . L a s t , though both E t h i o p i a and Som a l i a were i n the p r o c e s s of changing arms s u p p l i e r s , S o v i e t a i d might be sl o w e r i n coming, a l l o w i n g Somalia t o g a i n the momentum.5 1 37 In J u l y 1977, the Somali f o r c e s i n v a d e d . 6 In a few month's time they took n e a r l y 90% of the Ogaden. However, Somalia was unable t o t a k e the key mountain passes of Harar and D i r e Dawa. In September, the Somali o f f e n s i v e s t a l l e d as a r e s u l t of a l a c k of m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s . The U n i t e d S t a t e s r e f u s e d t o s u p p l y S o m a l i a w i t h any m i l i t a r y a i d and forbade i t s a l l i e s , i n c l u d i n g I r a n and Saudi A r a b i a , t o s e l l American arms t o S o m a l i a . 7 The S o v i e t Union d i d not r e s u p p l y the S o m a l i s e i t h e r , c a u s i n g B a r r e t o revoke the USSR-Somali t r e a t y of f r i e n d s h i p . Meanwhile, The S o v i e t s had s t a r t e d a massive a i r - and s e a l i f t of m i l i t a r y hardware t o E t h i o p i a . In a d d i t i o n , a t o t a l of 20,000 Cuban a d v i s o r s and s o l d i e r s h e l p e d E t h i o p i a c o u n t e r the Som a l i i n v a s i o n . They s t a r t e d t h e i r c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e i n January 1978. By e a r l y March, the Cuban and E t h i o p i a n f o r c e s had r e t a k e n the Ogaden and the S o v i e t s and Cubans t u r n e d t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the E r i t r e a n s . The war c o n s o l i d a t e d the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the USSR and E t h i o p i a . I t i s e s t i m a t e d t h a t the USSR, between September 1977 and March 1978, p r o v i d e d between one and two b i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n m i l i t a r y a i d , i n c l u d i n g heavy a r t i l l e r y , the newest S o v i e t t a n k s and modern j e t f i g h t e r s . The Cubans p r o v i d e d a t o t a l of a t l e a s t 20,000 p e r s o n n e l , i n c l u d i n g f i g h t e r p i l o t s and combat b r i g a d e s . The war was d i r e c t e d by t h r e e S o v i e t g e n e r a l s on the ground i n E t h i o p i a . 8 The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and Somalia remained c o o l t hroughout 1978 as a r e s u l t of S o m a l i a ' s r e f u s a l t o renounce a l l c l a i m s t o the Ogaden. However, the r e v o l u t i o n 138 i n I r a n as w e l l as the f o r m u l a t i o n of the C a r t e r D o c t r i n e p r o v i d e d a s t r o n g r a t i o n a l e f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s t o improve i t s t i e s w i t h S o m a l i a . CARTER'S AFRICA POLICY AND THE BEGINNING OF THE OGADEN WAR C a r t e r took a s e r i o u s i n t e r e s t i n A f r i c a n i s s u e s . H i s c o n c e r n w i t h arms s a l e s t o T h i r d World N a t i o n s , human r i g h t s and b l a c k m a j o r i t y r u l e made him an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n the p o l i c y making p r o c e s s and the f i n a l a r b i t e r on most A f r i c a n d e c i s i o n s . 9 C a r t e r announced t h a t he d i d not i n t e n d t o use arms s a l e s t o d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s as a f o r e i g n p o l i c y t o o l t o o f f s e t S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e . A l l s a l e s would be e v a l u a t e d i n l i g h t of the p u r c h a s e r ' s human r i g h t s r e c o r d and i t s a b i l i t y t o pursue domestic economic development. The U n i t e d S t a t e s would not be t h e f i r s t one t o i n t r o d u c e a new weapon t o a r e g i o n . 1 0 I n s t e a d of u s i n g A f r i c a as a e x t e n s i o n of S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n c o m p e t i t i o n , C a r t e r i n t e n d e d t o use h i s i n f l u e n c e t o f u r t h e r the p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s of d i s e n f r a n c h i z e d b l a c k s i n such s t a t e s as R h o d e s i a and South A f r i c a . He was the f i r s t p r e s i d e n t , s i n c e Kennedy, t o v i s i t the c o n t i n e n t . The appointment of Young, as the f i r s t b l a c k American ambassador t o the UN, was i n i t s e l f a symbol of C a r t e r ' s c o n c e r n w i t h A f r i c a . I t was w e l l known t h a t Young was a c l o s e a d v i s o r t o C a r t e r on A f r i c a n i s s u e s . C a r t e r was d e t e r m i n e d t o change f u n d a m e n t a l l y American 139 p o l i c y towards A f r i c a . He b e l i e v e d the l a s t two R e p u b l i c a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s had l a r g e l y n e g l e c t e d A f r i c a , w h i l e , when they d i d concern t h e m s e l v e s w i t h A f r i c a n i s s u e s , they d i d so w i t h an e x c l u s i v e East-West g e o p o l i t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . C a r t e r i n t e n d e d t o t r e a t l o c a l or r e g i o n a l problems i n t h e i r own r i g h t , avowing t h a t : Superpower r i v a l r y i n A f r i c a i s something we hope t o a v o i d . We nor the S o v i e t s must y i e l d t o the t e m p t a t i o n t o use A f r i c a as a forum f o r Great Power c o n f r o n t a t i o n . 1 1 I n s t e a d , C a r t e r c o n c e n t r a t e d on b r i n g i n g about m a j o r i t y r u l e i n R h o d e s i a , Namibia and South A f r i c a as w e l l as on p r o v i d i n g economic development a i d t o A f r i c a . I f t h e r e was t o be S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n c o m p e t i t i o n , C a r t e r b e l i e v e d the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e on the l a t t e r a r e a , i n which he f e l t c o n f i d e n t i t c o u l d outdo the USSR. C a r t e r b e l i e v e d t h a t a n e g a t i v e , r e a c t i v e American p o l i c y , one t h a t o n l y sought t o c o n t a i n S o v i e t i n v o l v e m e n t i n A f r i c a , would be f u t i l e and c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . 1 2 When, i n March 1977, a group of Katangan r e b e l s l a u n c h e d an i n c u r s i o n i n t o Z a i r e , w i t h the p o s s i b l e c o l l a b o r a t i o n of the Cubans i n A n g o l a , C a r t e r d e c i d e d not t o r e a c t beyond the s u p p l y of a s m a l l amount of non l e t h a l a i d t o Z a i r e . 1 3 W h i l e Young's statement t h a t the Cubans p r o v i d e d an element of s t a b i l i t y i n A f r i c a was not r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s v i e w , C a r t e r h i m s e l f had s t a t e d : We s h o u l d a l s o r e a l i z e t h a t the R u s s i a n and Cuban 140 p r e s e nce i n A n g o l a , w h i l e r e g r e t t a b l e and c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e of peace, need not c o n s t i t u t e a t h r e a t t o US i n t e r e s t s . 1 " In s p i t e of C a r t e r ' s i n t e n t t o change American p o l i c y towards A f r i c a , i t i s i n c o r r e c t t o a s s e r t t h a t he was i n d i f f e r e n t t o S o v i e t and Cuban a c t i v i t i e s i n A f r i c a . Nor d i d C a r t e r c o m p l e t e l y abandon the East-West i n f l u e n c e game i n A f r i c a . He r e f u s e d t o r e c o g n i z e the Cuban s u p p o r t e d regime i n A n g o l a , i n s p i t e of Young's s t r o n g u r g i n g t o do so. Perhaps he was w o r r i e d about the domesti c p o l i t i c a l b a c k l a s h . 1 5 When the Sudanese e x p e l l e d the S o v i e t s from t h e i r c o u n t r y , C a r t e r , i n s p i t e of h i s i n t e n t i o n s t o change American arms s a l e s p o l i c y , was q u i c k t o s u p p l y arms t o N i m e i r y . 1 6 In November 1977, he commissioned the NSC t o do a study on the e x t e n t of Cuban a s s i s t a n c e t hroughout A f r i c a . 1 7 Indeed, as we s h a l l see, when E t h i o p i a e n t e r e d i n t o a t r e a t y of f r i e n d s h i p w i t h the USSR, C a r t e r i m m e d i a t e l y c o n s i d e r e d i m p r o v i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h S o m a l i a . T h e r e f o r e , i t was by no means c e r t a i n how C a r t e r would r e a c t t o a new S o v i e t move on the c o n t i n e n t . The f i r s t t e s t of C a r t e r ' s approach t o A f r i c a n c o n f l i c t s o c c u r r e d i n the Horn of A f r i c a . E t h i o p i a ' s a b r u p t r e v e r s a l of a l l i a n c e s caused S o m a l i a t o c o n t a c t t h e C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , i n the s p r i n g of 1977, about p o s s i b l e arms s u p p l i e s . W h i l e C a r t e r was eager t o improve r e l a t i o n s w i t h S o m a l i a , he o n l y made promise s f o r d e f e n s i v e m i l i t a r y a i d . 1 8 The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was s t i l l h o p e f u l t h a t i t c o u l d improve i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h E t h i o p i a . When Som a l i a invaded the 141 Ogaden, i n J u l y 1977, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n withdrew i t s pledge t o s u p p l y arms. At the end of August, C a r t e r announced h i s o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n i n the war. Upon Vance's recommendation, C a r t e r had d e c i d e d t o a v o i d d i r e c t involvement i n the c o n f l i c t , not t o s u p p l y e i t h e r p a r t y w i t h m i l i t a r y a i d i n any form, t o p r o h i b i t American a l l i e s from s u p p l y i n g US arms t o e i t h e r of the p a r t i e s , t o encourage the O r g a n i z a t i o n of A f r i c a n U n i t y (OAU) t o mediate i n the d i s p u t e , and t o use d i p l o m a t i c p r e s s u r e t o persuade the USSR not t o get i n v o l v e d i n the c o n f l i c t . 1 9 T h i s f i v e t i e r approach remained C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y towards the war u n t i l i t was r e c o n s i d e r e d i n e a r l y 1978. B e f o r e t h e n , C a r t e r ' s o b j e c t i v e was t o end the war. A l s o , he wanted t o be sure t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s was not seen as h a v i n g an i n t e r e s t i n t h i s c o n f l i c t . The OAU, which has s i n c e i t s s t a r t u p h e l d the v a l i d i t y of c o l o n i a l b o u n d a r i e s , condemned So m a l i a as the a g g r e s s o r i n the Horn. S o m a l i a , i n t u r n , b o y c o t t e d a l l OAU a t t e m p t s a t m e d i a t i o n . 2 0 Though the S o m a l i s r e p e a t e d l y asked f o r arms, C a r t e r i n s i s t e d t h a t they withdraw from the Ogaden f i r s t . However, the massive S o v i e t / C u b a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war, i n e a r l y 1978, caused C a r t e r t o r e c o n s i d e r h i s p o s i t i o n . THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS I t was B r z e z i n s k i who c h a l l e n g e d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p o s i t i o n towards the war. He became i n c r e a s i n g l y c o n cerned 142 t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s was too p a s s i v e i n l i g h t of the growing in v o l v e m e n t of the USSR and Cuba. C l a s s i f y i n g the i s s u e a c r i s i s , B r z e z i n s k i c a l l e d s e v e r a l S p e c i a l C o o r d i n a t i o n Committee (SCC) meetings i n December 1977 and J a n u a r y 1 9 7 8 . 2 1 In t h e s e m e e t i n g s , he warned t h a t the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n E t h i o p i a , combined w i t h t h e i r p resence i n South Yemen would endanger the s e c u r i t y of the Suez and the A r a b i a n o i l f i e l d s . He urged t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s t a k e more a c t i o n t o s t o p t h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of E t h i o p i a and a l s o t h a t i t make the war more c o s t l y t o b oth the E t h i o p i a n s and R u s s i a n s . The o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the SCC d i d not f e e l t h a t the problem had become a c r i s i s y e t . They ad v o c a t e d a w a i t and see p o s i t i o n . B r z e z i n s k i a l s o used the d a i l y i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g w i t h the p r e s i d e n t t o a l e r t C a r t e r t o the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the war and the S o v i e t r o l e i n i t . W i t h C a r t e r ' s a p p r o v a l , he began t o g i v e s e v e r a l background b r i e f i n g s t o the p r e s s on S o v i e t and Cuban a c t i v i t i e s i n the H o r n . 2 2 In a p r i v a t e l e t t e r t o Brezhnev, i n mid- December, C a r t e r p r o t e s t e d the S o v i e t i n v o l v e m e n t i n the war. In a d d i t i o n , the US d e l i v e r e d a f o r m a l p r o t e s t note t o the USSR i n the I n d i a n Ocean D e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n T a l k s and s e n t l e t t e r s t o s e v e r a l prominent n o n - a l i g n e d s t a t e s u r g i n g them t o e x p r e s s t h e i r c o n c e r n s t o Moscow. The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t u r n e d down an o f f e r of j o i n t US-USSR m e d i a t i o n by Gromyko, a r g u i n g t h a t the d i s p u t e s h o u l d be s o l v e d by A f r i c a n s w i t h o u t superpower i n t e r f e r e n c e . W h i l e D o b r y n i n had a s s u r e d both Vance and B r z e z i n s k i t h a t E t h i o p i a would not c r o s s i n t o S o m a l i a , C a r t e r became 143 c o n c e r n e d about the massive E t h i o p i a n - C u b a n c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e , which began i n January 1 9 7 8 . 2 3 In a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e on January 21, C a r t e r proposed a c e a s e - f i r e and a n e g o t i a t e d end t o the d i s p u t e . 2 " He a l s o postponed the I n d i a n Ocean D e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n T a l k s . On F e b r u a r y 17, D a v i d Aaron (Deputy D i r e c t o r NSC) was sent t o E t h i o p i a t o d i s c u s s the war and U S - E t h i o p i a n r e l a t i o n s . W h i l e M e n g i s t u promised not t o invade S o m a l i a , he was i n no mood t o s c a l e down the Sovi e t - C u b a n involvement i n the w a r . 2 5 D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , E g y p t, Saudi A r a b i a and I r a n made s e v e r a l r e q u e s t s t o p r o v i d e arms t o Somalia and asked the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o t a k e a s t r o n g e r s t a n d . 2 6 D u r i n g two SCC meetings on F e b r u a r y 10 and 21, C a r t e r ' s a d v i s o r s met t o r e c o n s i d e r the American p o s i t i o n and t o o f f e r recommendations t o C a r t e r . 2 7 B r z e z i n s k i argued t h a t the US c o u l d no l o n g e r a f f o r d t o s i t i d l e . To do so, would g i v e the S o v i e t s the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t they c o u l d a g g r e s s i v e l y expand t h e i r i n f l u e n c e i n the T h i r d World w i t h o u t any n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s on U S - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s . T h i s would s e t a dangerous p r e c e d e n t . He argued t h a t S o v i e t b e h a v i o u r was a g a i n s t the s p i r i t of d e