@prefix vivo: . @prefix edm: . @prefix ns0: . @prefix dcterms: . @prefix skos: . vivo:departmentOrSchool "Arts, Faculty of"@en, "Political Science, Department of"@en ; edm:dataProvider "DSpace"@en ; ns0:degreeCampus "UBCV"@en ; dcterms:creator "Moens, A. Alexander"@en ; dcterms:issued "2010-10-07T19:55:42Z"@en, "1988"@en ; vivo:relatedDegree "Doctor of Philosophy - PhD"@en ; ns0:degreeGrantor "University of British Columbia"@en ; dcterms:description """The increasing complexity and high stakes of foreign policy decisions, especially of major powers such as the United States, have generated specialized studies of decision making. One approach, called "multiple advocacy," maps a strategy of role tasks and process norms to guide the decision-makers towards an optimal decision-making process. This process allows the President to make an informed policy choice as a result of having heard a variety of options debated freely and openly among his advisors in his presence. A crucial actor in this process is the National Security Advisor. As process manager or "custodian," he must ensure that the key provisions of the strategy are met while abstaining from personal involvement in the substance of policy advice and execution. This thesis examines the internal coherence and usefulness of the strategy. The first two years of the Carter administration provide a close approximation of the strategy. Four important policy issues during this period form the empirical basis of this test: the "Deep Cuts" proposals in SALT II, the war in the Horn of Africa, Sino-American Normalization, and the fall of the Shah of Iran. While the basic principles of the strategy are found useful and sound, several of its provisions are challenged. First, in spite of its claim, the strategy does not produce multiple options when the advisors have no wide divergence of opinion. Second, contrary to the strategy's prescriptions, the custodian can improve the process in such situations by joining the policy debate. Third, custodial engagement in activities such as diplomacy and public speaking need not be prohibited too strictly. Last, the demise of the strategy can be more narrowly defined as the result of custodial disregard for a free flow of information and open participation among the advisors. Though further studies are needed to widen the empirical base, several tentative suggestions are offered to improve the strategy. The president must insist on a reasonable range of opinions when appointing advisors. While the National Security Advisor may join the policy debate to widen the range of options, his policy advice should not become the rule. At all times the President must insist that all policy debates among his advisors be brought to his attention, and that all policy options receive a fair hearing."""@en ; edm:aggregatedCHO "https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/29025?expand=metadata"@en ; skos:note "THE MULTIPLE ADVOCACY STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF THE CUSTODIAN: THE CARTER YEARS By A. ALEXANDER MOENS B.A., U n i v e r s i t y of L e t h b r i d g e , 1982 M.A., McMaster U n i v e r s i t y , 1983 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA January 1988 © A. Alexander Moens, 1988 3 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6(3/81) i i ABSTRACT The i n c r e a s i n g complexity and high stakes of f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y of major powers such as the United S t a t e s , have generated s p e c i a l i z e d s t u d i e s of d e c i s i o n -making. One approach, c a l l e d \" m u l t i p l e advocacy,\" maps a s t r a t e g y of r o l e t asks and process norms to guide the decision-makers towards an optimal decision-making p r o c e s s . T h i s process allows the P r e s i d e n t to make an informed p o l i c y c h o i c e as a r e s u l t of having heard a v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s debated f r e e l y and openly among h i s a d v i s o r s i n h i s presence. A c r u c i a l a c t o r i n t h i s process i s the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r . As process manager or \" c u s t o d i a n , \" he must ensure t h a t the key p r o v i s i o n s of the s t r a t e g y are met while a b s t a i n i n g from p e r s o n a l involvement i n the substance of p o l i c y advice and e x e c u t i o n . T h i s t h e s i s examines the i n t e r n a l coherence and u s e f u l n e s s of the s t r a t e g y . The f i r s t two years of the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p rovide a c l o s e approximation of the s t r a t e g y . Four important p o l i c y i s s u e s during t h i s p e r i o d form the e m p i r i c a l b a s i s of t h i s t e s t : the \"Deep Cuts\" proposals i n SALT I I , the war i n the Horn of A f r i c a , Sino-American N o r m a l i z a t i o n , and the f a l l o f the Shah of I r a n . i i i While the b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s of the s t r a t e g y are found u s e f u l and sound, s e v e r a l of i t s p r o v i s i o n s are c h a l l e n g e d . F i r s t , i n s p i t e of i t s c l a i m , the s t r a t e g y does not produce m u l t i p l e o p t i o n s when the a d v i s o r s have no wide divergence of o p i n i o n . Second, c o n t r a r y to the s t r a t e g y ' s p r e s c r i p t i o n s , the c u s t o d i a n can improve the process in such s i t u a t i o n s by j o i n i n g the p o l i c y debate. T h i r d , c u s t o d i a l engagement in a c t i v i t i e s such as diplomacy and p u b l i c speaking need not be p r o h i b i t e d too s t r i c t l y . L a s t , the demise of the s t r a t e g y can be more narrowly de f i n e d as the r e s u l t of c u s t o d i a l d i s r e g a r d f o r a f r e e flow of i n f o r m a t i o n and open p a r t i c i p a t i o n among the a d v i s o r s . Though f u r t h e r s t u d i e s are needed to widen the e m p i r i c a l base, s e v e r a l t e n t a t i v e suggestions are o f f e r e d to improve the s t r a t e g y . The p r e s i d e n t must i n s i s t on a reasonable range of o p i n i o n s when a p p o i n t i n g a d v i s o r s . While the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r may j o i n the p o l i c y debate to widen the range of o p t i o n s , h i s p o l i c y advice should not become the r u l e . At a l l times the P r e s i d e n t must i n s i s t t h a t a l l p o l i c y debates among h i s a d v i s o r s be brought to h i s a t t e n t i o n , and t h a t a l l p o l i c y options r e c e i v e a f a i r h e a r i n g . i v CONTENTS A b s t r a c t i i Acknowledgement v i I The M u l t i p l e Advocacy S t r a t e g y 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 2 D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g : The Background t o the S t r a t e g y . . 5 The M u l t i p l e Advocacy S t r a t e g y . . / . 12 The Development o f the S t r a t e g y 19 The S t r a t e g y ' s Reviews and C r i t i c i s m s 33 T e s t i n g the Role P r e s c r i p t i o n s o f the S t r a t e g y . . . . 38 Notes 48 I I M u l t i p l e Advocacy and C a r t e r ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s 55 The P r e s i d e n t ' s S t y l e 56 The S t r u c t u r e o f D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g 61 Advocate Resources 65 Advocate C o m p e t i t i o n and Advocate D i v e r s i t y 74 The C u s t o d i a n 78 Summary and C o n c l u s i o n 85 Notes 89 I I I SALT I I : The \"Deep C u t s \" P r o p o s a l s o f March 1977 96 The Background 97 The P r e s i d e n t ' s View 102 The D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s 105 The Advocate's Views and the R a t i o n a l e Behind t h e D e c i s i o n 110 Vance's T r i p t o Moscow 115 The M u l t i p l e Advocacy S t r a t e g y and E x p l a i n i n g the F a i l u r e 119 Notes 126 IV The War i n the Horn o f A f r i c a 131 The War and I t s Background 132 C a r t e r ' s A f r i c a P o l i c y and the B e g i n n i n g o f the Ogaden War 138 The D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s 141 P u b l i c Speaking and the C u s t o d i a n 146 E v a l u a t i n g the D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s and the C u s t o d i a n 151 The D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s and the D e c i s i o n 154 Notes 157 V V N o r m a l i z i n g R e l a t i o n s With t h e Pe o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f China 162 The Background 164 C a r t e r ' s B e l i e f s and O b j e c t i v e s Toward China 168 The D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s 170 Vance's T r i p t o China 175 E v a l u a t i n g the D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s and Outcome 177 The D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s Continued 181 B r z e z i n s k i ' s T r i p , N o r m a l i z a t i o n and a P o l i c y i n D i s a r r a y 185 E v a l u a t i n g the D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s and Outcome I I 190 C o n c l u s i o n 194 Notes 196 VI , The F a l l o f the Shah 202 Background 204 C a r t e r and I r a n 210 The D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s and the D e v e l o p i n g C r i s i s 215 E v a l u a t i n g the Opti o n s and D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s 222 The D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s and the F a l l o f the Shah 225 An E v a l u a t i o n o f the D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g P r o c e s s 237 E v a l u a t i n g the Outcome: Could the U n i t e d S t a t e s Have Done B e t t e r ? 241 C o n c l u s i o n 247 Notes 248 V I I C o n c l u s i o n 257 The Implementation o f the S t r a t e g y 258 D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g Flaws and How t o Improve the S t r a t e g y 260 M a l f u n c t i o n s i n the D e c i s i o n P r o c e s s and Outcomes 268 Recommendations f o r Improving t h e S t r a t e g y 280 C o n c l u s i o n 282 Notes 287 B i b l i o g r a p h y 290 v i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would l i k e to express my thanks to my s u p e r v i s o r K a l H o l s t i f o r always keeping the pace on the t h e s i s . A l s o , Doug Ross and Paul Marantz have c o n t r i b u t e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y to the eventual success of t h i s u n dertaking. My h e a r t f e l t g r a t i t u d e goes towards two key soures of support f o r my education i n g e n e r a l and my d o c t o r a l s t u d i e s i n p a r t i c u l a r . F i r s t , my parents whose emotional and f i n a n c i a l help was of such value to me th a t i t seems f u t i l e to search f o r l o f t y words to represent my a p p r e c i a t i o n . Second, my wife Marsha who provided the s t a b l e background and l o v i n g environment which makes the s t r e s s of w r i t i n g b e a r a b l e . As i f tha t was not enough, she typed the e n t i r e t h e s i s . 1 CHAPTER ONE THE MULTIPLE ADVOCACY DECISION STRATEGY 2 INTRODUCTION T h i s t h e s i s e v a l u a t e s the m u l t i p l e advocacy d e c i s i o n s t r a t e g y . The s t r a t e g y was de v e l o p e d by A l e x a n d e r George i n the e a r l y 1970's t o h e l p American p r e s i d e n t s i n the realm of f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . The s t r a t e g y a l l o c a t e s d i f f e r e n t r o l e t a s k s t o v a r i o u s p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , and o u t l i n e s s e v e r a l p r o c e d u r e s t o s t r u c t u r e i t . The p r e s i d e n t , l i k e a m a g i s t r a t e , i s the f i n a l a r b i t e r of the p o l i c y c h o i c e s s u b m i t t e d t o him. The s e n i o r a d v i s o r s f u n c t i o n as ad v o c a t e s of the v a r i o u s p o l i c y o p t i o n s . The N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r , c a l l e d the c u s t o d i a n , i s the p r o c e s s manager. He must ensure t h a t the f o l l o w i n g p r o c e d u r e s a re met: the p r e s i d e n t must p a r t i c i p a t e i n the d i s c u s s i o n of the o p t i o n s , the advoc a t e s must have a f a i r chance t o v o i c e t h e i r f a v o u r e d p o l i c y s o l u t i o n s , and r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l r e s o u r c e s t o do so. The p r e s i d e n t i s t o s t a y i n f o r m e d about p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s among h i s a d v i s o r s . F i n a l l y , t he c u s t o d i a n has t o i n v i t e o t h e r a d v i s o r s i f he f e e l s not enough d i f f e r e n t o p t i o n s a re p r e s e n t e d t o the p r e s i d e n t . W h i l e p e r f o r m i n g t h e s e d u t i e s , the c u s t o d i a n must not engage i n o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s t h a t may compromise h i s a b i l i t y t o be an e f f e c t i v e p r o c e s s manager. Among these a r e p o l i c y advocacy, p u b l i c s p e a k i n g on p o l i c y , d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s , and p o l i c y enforcement and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . George s t a t e s t h a t any of t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s w i l l undermine 3 t h e c u s t o d i a n ' s a b i l i t y t o ensure the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the p r o c e s s p r o c e d u r e s . George's s t r a t e g y i s a d i r e c t attempt t o remedy s e v e r a l problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g as o u t l i n e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the s t r a t e g y aims t o overcome the d i s t o r t i o n s caused by B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s and s m a l l group i n t e r a c t i o n . I t a l s o p r o v i d e s guidance f o r the p r e s i d e n t t o manage h i s time more e f f e c t i v e l y , and t o d e a l b e t t e r w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n u n c e r t a i n t y and v a l u e c o m p l e x i t y . The s t r a t e g y d i d not undergo a comprehensive e v a l u a t i o n u n t i l D a v i d H a l l ' s s t u d y of 1982. B e f o r e t h e n , s e v e r a l a u t h o r s q u e s t i o n e d i n d i v i d u a l a s p e c t s of i t . Some f e l t t h a t the s t r a t e g y d i d not account s a t i s f a c t o r i l y f o r the d i f f e r e n c e s i n p e r s o n a l s t y l e among p r e s i d e n t s . O t h e r s were c r i t i c a l of the r o l e p r e s c r i p t i o n s and p r o s c r i p t i o n s imposed on the v a r i o u s p a r t i c i p a n t s , e s p e c i a l l y on the c u s t o d i a n . S t i l l o t h e r s were s k e p t i c a l about the f e a s i b i l i t y of s e n i o r a d v i s o r s competing on a r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l b a s i s f o r the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e i r p o l i c y c h o i c e s . H a l l examined the f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s from 1947 t o 1980 i n an attempt t o e v a l u a t e the f e a s i b i l i t y of implementing the s t r a t e g y . H a l l found t h a t the s t r a t e g y was p r a c t i c a l and q u i t e f e a s i b l e t o implement. A l s o , a l l o w i n g f o r minor v a r i a t i o n s i n the r o l e t a s k p r e s c r i p t i o n s , H a l l c o n c l u d e d t h a t the s t r a t e g y was g e n e r a l l y sound and t h a t i t p r o v i d e d a u s e f u l t o o l f o r i d e n t i f y i n g m a l f u n c t i o n s i n the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s . T h i s t h e s i s examines the f u n c t i o n i n g of the s t r a t e g y 4 d u r i n g the f i r s t two y e a r s of the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . D u r i n g t h i s t i m e , most of i t s r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e d u r e s were ap p r o x i m a t e d . The t h e s i s c h a l l e n g e s the f o r m u l a t i o n of the r o l e t a s k s f o r the c u s t o d i a n . I w i l l show t h a t the c u s t o d i a n can advocate on p o l i c y , e s p e c i a l l y when the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s f a i l s t o produce a d i v e r s i t y of o p t i o n s among the a d v o c a t e s . Indeed, by d o i n g so, he improves the f u n c t i o n i n g of the s t r a t e g y and, as a r e s u l t , the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . Moreover, the c u s t o d i a n c a n, a t t i m e s , engage i n p u b l i c s p e a k i n g as w e l l as diplomacy w i t h o u t compromising h i s c u s t o d i a l d u t i e s . The s t r a t e g y i s o n l y undermined when the c u s t o d i a n b l o c k s the o t h e r a d v o c a t e s from a c c e s s t o the d e c i s i o n forums, when he f a i l s t o e l e v a t e p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s among the a d v o c a t e s t o the p r e s i d e n t , when he f a i l s t o engage the p r e s i d e n t i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , and when he a t t e m p t s p e r s o n a l l y t o e n f o r c e or implement the p r e s i d e n t ' s p o l i c y . C o n t r a r y t o George and H a l l ' s arguments, thes e c u s t o d i a l v i o l a t i o n s do not n e c e s s a r i l y f l o w from h i s p o l i c y advocacy r o l e . The t h e s i s p r o v i d e s an e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s of the f u n c t i o n i n g of the s t r a t e g y . W h i l e the s t r a t e g y i s found u s e f u l and sound i n i t s b a s i c p u r p o s e s , s e v e r a l improvements a r e needed. The t h e s i s c o n t r i b u t e s t o the stu d y of d e c i s i o n -making by r e f o r m u l a t i n g the r o l e t a s k s of the c u s t o d i a n . W h i l e the s t r a t e g y emphasizes c o r r e c t l y the importance of the p r o c e d u r e s , and the c u s t o d i a n ' s r e s p o n s i b l i t y i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e s e , i t has u n n e c e s s a r i l y r e s t r i c t e d the a c t i v i t i e s of the c u s t o d i a n . Moreover, t h i s t h e s i s 5 i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t a c l o s e a p p r o x i m a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y may s t i l l not produce a d i v e r s i t y of o p i n i o n among the a d v o c a t e s . In such a c a s e , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o broaden the r o l e t a s k s of the c u s t o d i a n . DECISION-MAKING: THE BACKGROUND TO THE STRATEGY George's p r e s c r i p t i v e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g model i s p a r t of a much l a r g e r e f f o r t i n the f i e l d of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s t o improve our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . I t i s p a r t of a body of s t u d i e s i n p s y c h o l o g y , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t u d i e s , as w e l l as s t r a t e g i c s t u d i e s , a l l a t t e m p t i n g t o i d e n t i f y weaknesses i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g and p r e s c r i b e improvements t o the p r o c e s s . The dominant c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i n the 1940's and 1950's was c a l l e d the r a t i o n a l a c t o r model. As b e s t s y m b o l i z e d i n Morgenthau's major t e x t of 1948, most w r i t e r s d i s c u s s e d and a n a l y z e d the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s as an a n a l y t i c p r o c e s s i n which r a t i o n a l a c t o r s sought t o maximize t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s by means of a c l e a r l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s of the c o s t s and b e n e f i t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the v a r i o u s c o u r s e s of a c t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o them. 1 They c o n c e p t u a l i z e d the s t a t e as i t s o f f i c i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s and s t a t e a c t i o n as the a c t i o n taken by th o s e who r e p r e s e n t i t . These a c t o r s were assumed t o be one i n a c t i o n . T h i s u n i t a r y a c t o r i s engaged i n r a t i o n a l problem 6 s o l v i n g . 2 The d e c i s i o n - m a k e r h o l d s c e r t a i n v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s which can be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o some method of p r e f e r e n c e r a n k i n g , u s i n g a u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n or c o s t - b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s . The d e s i r a b i l i t y of e x p e c t e d outcomes of a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n can be e v a l u a t e d i n l i g h t of t h e s e ranked v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s . Whenever a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r p e r c e i v e s an o p p o r t u n i t y or a t h r e a t v i s - a - v i s t h e s e v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s , he or she i s moved t o c o n s i d e r a response. He or she then assembles a v a i l a b l e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The e x p e c t e d consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n a r e then e v a l u a t e d v i s - a - v i s h i s or her v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s , u s i n g the best a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n . I t i s assumed t h a t the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s a b l e t o rank l o g i c a l l y and compare h i s or her v a l u e s . The r a t i o n a l a c t o r s e l e c t s the o p t i o n whose e x p e c t e d consequences maximize h i s or her v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s . W i t h the e x p a n s i o n of the r o l e of the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n w o r l d a f f a i r s , more and more s c h o l a r s began t o q u e s t i o n t h i s o p t i m i s t i c c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . I s s u e s such as d e t e r r e n c e and c r i s i s management f o c u s s e d American s c h o l a r s h i p on the d a i l y management of government and i t s d e c i s i o n s on t h e s e major i s s u e s . At f i r s t , a group of s c h o l a r s drew a t t e n t i o n t o a f a c t o r i n t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s not a c c o u n t e d f o r i n the r a t i o n a l a c t o r c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . Snyder, Bruck and S a p i n , as w e l l as H a r o l d and Margaret Sprout i l l u s t r a t e d t h a t t h e r e o f t e n e x i s t s a d i s c r e p a n c y between the o b j e c t i v e environment i n which a d e c i s i o n t a k e s p l a c e and the way the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r 7 p e r c e i v e s t h a t e n v i r o n m e n t . 3 S i n c e i t i s t h e p e r c e p t i o n of the d e c i s i o n maker t h a t i n f l u e n c e s h i s d e c i s i o n , we must stu d y the f a c t o r s t h a t e x p l a i n how and why they p e r c e i v e the environment as they do. A l s o , Snyder e t a l . showed t h a t most d e c i s i o n s a r e made w i t h i n the c o n t e x t of l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . I t i s t h e r e f o r e inadequate t o assume t h a t the d e c i s i o n maker a c t s as a u n i t a r y a c t o r . R a t h e r , the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s such as s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , h i e r a r c h y and s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s as w e l l as i n t e r a g e n c y b a r g a i n i n g , w i l l i n f l u e n c e the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . In a d d i t i o n t o co n c e r n s about the p e r c e p t i o n of d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s and the environments i n which they o p e r a t e , a n o t h e r f i e l d , c o g n i t i v e p s y c h o l o g y , began t o c o n t r i b u t e t o the study of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . De R i v e r a , J a n i s , J e r v i s and Cottam drew a t t e n t i o n t o c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the human mind which d i r e c t l y c o n c e r n i t s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g c a p a c i t y . De R i v e r a and J e r v i s , f o r example, showed t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g by a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s not as easy or p e r f e c t a p r o c e s s as assumed by the r a t i o n a l a c t o r c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . \" I n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d by a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s o f t e n ambiguous, complex and even c o n t r a d i c t o r y . Moreover, the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r has a v a r i e t y of b i a s e s and images t h a t d i s t o r t the way he p e r c e i v e s the i n f o r m a t i o n . W h i l e o f f e r i n g no s o l u t i o n s t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r , J e r v i s recommends t h a t he or she a n a l y z e the i n f o r m a t i o n from as many competing images and m u l t i p l e p e r s p e c t i v e s as p o s s i b l e . The study of the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s images, b e l i e f 8 systems and b i a s e s gave r i s e t o a f u r t h e r body of work. F e s t i n g e r l a i d the b a s i s on which many s c h o l a r s s t a r t e d t o stud y the v a r i o u s d i s t o r t i o n s t o o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g caused by b e l i e f s y s t e m s . 5 Works by Ole H o l s t i and N o r t h among o t h e r s , have i l l u s t r a t e d how a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s b i a s e s can impede h i s a b i l i t y t o make an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n . 6 In a d d i t i o n t o the study of g e n e r a l i z e d p s y c h o l o g i c a l p a t t e r n s of i n d i v i d u a l problem s o l v i n g , s e v e r a l a u t h o r s began t o i n v e s t i g a t e the p s y c h o l o g i c a l a t t r i b u t e s of d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s as w e l l as the e f f e c t s of time c o n s t r a i n t s and c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s on the thought p r o c e s s e s of d e c i s i o n -makers. S t u d i e s by C h a r l e s Hermann and Ole H o l s t i showed t h a t c r i s i s - i n d u c e d s t r e s s caused a b e r r a t i o n s i n l o g i c a l problem s o l v i n g . 7 P e r s i s t e n t h i g h l e v e l s of s t r e s s narrow the range of a l t e r n a t i v e s c o n s i d e r e d by the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r , i n c r e a s e s t e r e o t y p i n g , i n c r e a s e e a r l y consensus s e e k i n g and the s e l e c t i v i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g , and reduce the t o l e r a n c e f o r a m b i g u i t y . R e s e a r c h i n t o the b e h a v i o r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s m a l l group i n t e r a c t i o n s f u r t h e r c o n t r i b u t e d t o the study of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . W h i l e s m a l l group i n t e r a c t i o n can improve the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of v a r i o u s c o u r s e s of a c t i o n f o r the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r , J a n i s - h a s shown t h a t such i n t e r a c t i o n can a l s o l e a d t o v a r i o u s d i s t o r t i o n s . 8 V a r i o u s p r e s s u r e s f o r c o n f o r m i t y w i t h i n the group can cause i t t o reduce i t s a n a l y t i c a l powers. I n s t e a d of p r o v i d i n g the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r w i t h a v a r i e t y of o p i n i o n s , the group may f u n c t i o n as a source of support f o r i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s on a consensus view . 9 The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l environment of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , d i s c u s s e d i n the Snyder e t . a l . s t u d y , was f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d by such s c h o l a r s as N e u s t a d t , W i l e n s k y and H i l s m a n , and l a t e r a p p l i e d s p e c i f i c a l l y t o f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g by H a l p e r i n and D e s t l e r . 9 V a r i o u s r e s u l t s from t h e s e s t u d i e s have d i r e c t r e l e v a n c e f o r the study of d e c i s i o n making. F i r s t , s p e c i a l i z a t i o n of t a s k s and r o l e s w i t h i n l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s can cause i n d i v i d u a l s t o pursue the i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r departments w i t h more v i g o r than t h e i n t e r e s t s of the government as a whole. As a r e s u l t , the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s may become s c a t t e r e d and i n c o m p l e t e . Second, the b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s among departments and branches of government may a f f e c t the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s i n ways t h a t do not c o n t r i b u t e t o the q u a l i t y of the f i n a l d e c i s i o n outcome. A l l i s o n , i n h i s study of t h r e e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g models, c a l l e d t h i s phenomenon \" B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s . \" 1 0 As a r e s u l t of t h i s phenomenon, f i n a l d e c i s i o n s may be d e t e r m i n e d by the tug of war between t h e v a r i o u s departments r a t h e r than by the a n a l y t i c a l m e r i t of the choosen o p t i o n . T h i r d , the s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s by which l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s f u n c t i o n may s t i f l e the s e a r c h f o r f r e s h o p t i o n s and n o v e l approaches and thus i n h i b i t the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . W h i l e most of the above mentioned s t u d i e s c h a l l e n g e many fundamental assumptions i n the c l a s s i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , they do not c h a l l e n g e the n o t i o n t h a t the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i s a more or l e s s o r d e r l y p r o c e s s i n which t h e a c t o r ( s ) seek t o get the 10 b e s t p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n by means of a more or l e s s a n a l y t i c a l or l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of s e v e r a l i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n the p r o c e s s . A l s o , as S t e i n e r p o i n t s o u t , w h i l e they a c c e p t a more \"bounded\" view of the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s r a t i o n a l i t y , they seek t o p r e s c r i b e measures t o improve the r a t i o n a l i t y of the p r o c e s s . 1 1 March, Simon, L i n d b l o m and Braybrooke have d e s c r i b e d the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n terms t h a t q u e s t i o n the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s d e s i r e t o maximize h i s or her o b j e c t i v e s . 1 2 I n s t e a d , they argue, the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r merely seeks t o \" s a t i s f i c e \" . D e c i s i o n - m a k e r s seldom jump a t g r e a t o p p o r t u n i t e s t o b r i n g about s u b s t a n t i a l change. I s s u e s a r e d e a l t w i t h when something f i n a l l y needs t o be done and a r e t r e a t e d as problems t h a t need temporary a m e l i o r a t i o n . D e c i s i o n - m a k e r s move away from problems r a t h e r than toward g o a l s . The s e a r c h f o r i n f o r m a t i o n s t o p s when an o p t i o n i s found t h a t i s \"good enough.\" V a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s a r e not \" s a c r e d \" o b j e c t i v e s . t o which the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s d e e p l y a t t a c h e d . Nor can they be e a s i l y ranked or compared. I n s t e a d of m a x i m i z i n g t h e i r v a l u e s , the a v a i l a b l e means determine the e x t e n t t o which c e r t a i n v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d d e s i r a b l e . They a l s o p e r c e i v e the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s as a h i g h l y d e c e n t r a l i z e d p r o c e s s i n which t h e r e a re many o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r re v i e w and ad j u s t m e n t . F i n a l l y , the c h o i c e of a p o l i c y o p t i o n i s not n e c e s s a r i l y g u i d e d by i t s a n a l y t i c a l m e r i t but a l s o by the degree of a c c e p t a b i l i t y the o p t i o n has among the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the p r o c e s s . 11 S t e i n b r u n e r has drawn f u r t h e r a t t e n t i o n t o the non r a t i o n a l a s p e c t s of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . 1 3 He argues t h a t a c o g n i t i v e / c y b e r n e t i c view of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g can e x p l a i n s e v e r a l a s p e c t s of the p r o c e s s b e t t e r than the r a t i o n a l / a n a l y t i c p e r s p e c t i v e . The d e c i s i o n - m a k e r , i n t h i s v i e w , makes ample use of h i s i n t u i t i o n and p a s t e x p e r i e n c e i n problem s o l v i n g . He m o n i t o r s o n l y a r e s t r i c t e d s e t of i m p o r t a n t v a r i a b l e s when f a c e d w i t h a c h o i c e . In so d o i n g , he a v o i d s i n f o r m a t i o n o v e r l o a d . H i s p a s t e x p e r i e n c e t e l l s him which v a r i a b l e s a r e c r i t i c a l . When problems a r e complex, he b r e a k s them down i n t o l i m i t e d d i m e n s i o n s . S t e i n e r a g r e e s w i t h S t e i n b r u n e r t h a t s e v e r a l a s p e c t s of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s can not be d e a l t w i t h by the \" c o n v e n t i o n a l \" a n a l y t i c p a r a d i g m s . 1 * She accuses the a n a l y t i c a l models of p r e s c r i b i n g r a t i o n a l i s t i c p r e s c r i p t i o n s t o a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r who f a c e s many i r r a t i o n a l e v e n t s . I n s t e a d , S t e i n e r a d v o c a t e s t h a t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t u d i e s c o n c e n t r a t e on such f a c t o r s as s u b j e c t i v e awareness and i n c o n g r u i t y i n the s i t u a t i o n s f a c e d by the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r , and p r e s c r i b e c r e a t i v e accommodation t o s o l v e t h e s e dilemmas. W h i l e the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of Simon e t a l . , S t e i n b r u n e r and S t e i n e r have v a l i d i t y , they themselves c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e i r f i n d i n g s do not r e p l a c e the a n a l y t i c a l models. In f a c t t h e i r w r i t i n g s a r e more d e s c r i p t i v e than p r e s c r i p t i v e . T h e r e f o r e , i n h i s attempt t o improve the p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , George has c o n c e n t r a t e d on tho s e a n a l y t i c a l a s p e c t s of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s t h a t l e n d 12 t h e m s e l v e s t o a c l e a r p r e s c r i p t i v e a n a l y s i s . H i s s t r a t e g y seeks t o i n t e g r a t e the major f i n d i n g s i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g l i t e r a t u r e a t the i n d i v i d u a l , group and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l e v e l s . S t r u c t u r a l or i n s t i t u t i o n a l changes a r e not c o n s i d e r e d as u s e f u l as improvements i n the e x e c u t i v e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . The next s e c t i o n d e s c r i b e s the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . The s e c t i o n f o l l o w i n g w i l l d i s c u s s i n d e t a i l how the p r o c e d u r e s and r o l e t a s k s of the s t r a t e g y have been d e r i v e d from a v a r i e t y of s t u d i e s i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g f i e l d and how George a t t e m p t s t o i n t e g r a t e t h e s e i n t o a more or l e s s complete p r e s c r i p t i v e model. THE MULTIPLE ADVOCACY STRATEGY The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i s a p r e s c r i p t i v e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g m o d e l . 1 5 I t i s a s t r a t e g y i n the sense t h a t i t p r o v i d e s f o r a l o g i c a l l i n k between the means and ends of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . I t o u t l i n e s a s e t of r o l e t a s k s f o r the p l a y e r s and a s e t of p r o c e s s norms f o r t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n . These r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e s s norms must be seen as a means towards a p a r t i c u l a r end. The end g o a l f o r which t h e s e means s e r v e i s t o g e n e r a t e a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t o p t i o n s on any g i v e n p o l i c y problem, and a f r e e debate on these o p t i o n s . Such a m u l t i p l i c i t y of o p t i o n s and debate i s b e l i e v e d t o p r o v i d e the p r e s i d e n t w i t h the b e s t forum t o s e l e c t the most 13 o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n t o the problem a t hand. I t i s a l s o a p r e s c r i p t i v e model i n the sense t h a t i t o u t l i n e s e x a c t l y which b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s must be f o l l o w e d . The p r e s c r i p t i o n of c e r t a i n b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s a u t o m a t i c a l l y i m p l i e s the p r o h i b i t i o n or p r o s c r i p t i o n of o t h e r b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s . George has d e f i n e d c e r t a i n p r o s c r i p t i o n s e s p e c i a l l y f o r the r o l e t a s k of c u s t o d i a n . These w i l l a l s o be d i s c u s s e d below. The s t r a t e g y p r o v i d e s f o r a s e t of b e h a v i o u r a l norms f o r the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n a complex h i e r a r c h i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n where i n d i v i d u a l e x e c u t i v e s a r e u l t i m a t e l y a c c o u n t a b l e f o r major p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . 1 6 An example of such a s e t t i n g i s the American f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . The p r e s i d e n t , though surrounded by v a r i o u s c a b i n e t o f f i c e r s and p e r s o n a l a d v i s o r s i s u l t i m a t e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the d e c i s i o n s made by the e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h . The p r o c e s s of p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , r a t h e r than the l a r g e r p r o c e s s of e x e c u t i v e - l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n on p o l i c y , i s the f o c u s of t h i s s t r a t e g y . T h i s p r o c e s s i s b e s t c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a more or l e s s f r e e f l o w i n g i n t e r a c t i o n between the p r e s i d e n t and h i s a d v i s o r s i n which s e v e r a l p o l i c y o p t i o n s a r e c o n s i d e r e d . The p r o c e s s i s completed when the p r e s i d e n t s e l e c t s an o p t i o n f o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y a t t e m p t s t o s t r u c t u r e t h i s p r o c e s s i n such a way t h a t t h e p r e s i d e n t a c h i e v e s a maximum number of o p t i o n s and a thorough debate on them. The s t r a t e g y p o s i t s the p r e s i d e n t as the u l t i m a t e a r b i t e r of p o l i c y , but a l s o seeks t o enhance the c o m p e t i t i o n 14 among h i s a d v i s o r s f o r the a d o p t i o n of t h e i r p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n s . T h i s c o m p e t i t i o n w i l l b r i n g t o l i g h t t he v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s i n h e r e n t i n the p o l i c y i s s u e . The e x p o s i t i o n of a l l the p o s s i b l e c o s t s , b e n e f i t s , and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h each o p t i o n w i l l enhance the p r e s i d e n t ' s a b i l i t y t o make the be s t c h o i c e p o s s i b l e . George has l i s t e d the s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e s of the s t r a t e g y . 1 7 F i r s t , i t seeks t o ensure s u f f i c i e n t a c q u i s i t i o n and a n a l y s i s of i n f o r m a t i o n t o p r o v i d e a v a l i d d i a g n o s i s of the i s s u e . Second, i t a t t e m p t s t o p r o v i d e a p r o c e s s i n which a l l t he major v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s a f f e c t e d by t h e i s s u e a r e c o n s i d e r e d , a l l p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s t o d e a l w i t h i t a r e brought t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n , and a l l o p t i o n s a r e s u b j e c t e d t o a thorough e v a l u a t i o n of t h e i r c o s t s and b e n e f i t s . L a s t , the s t r a t e g y aims t o keep the p r e s i d e n t a l e r t t o i n d i c a t o r s t h a t h i s p o l i c y c h o i c e i s not a c h i e v i n g i t s i n t e n d e d o b j e c t i v e s . A d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s which meets t h e s e c r i t e r i a w i l l enhance the l i k e l i h o o d Of a good or o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n . At l e a s t , i t w i l l reduce the chances of a v e r y poor d e c i s i o n . C l e a r l y , the s t r a t e g y a d d r e s s e s o n l y the \"how\" of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . I t s p r o v i s i o n s d e a l w i t h the p r o c e s s of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , not i t s s u b s t a n c e . Other f a c t o r s , c a l l e d d e c i s i o n a l p r e m i s e s by George, determine the \"what\" of p o l i c y . 1 8 Most o b v i o u s among t h e s e a r e the i d e o l o g y and c o g n i t i v e b e l i e f s of the p a r t i c i p a n t s , the i n f l u e n c e of p u b l i c o p i n i o n , and the s u b s t a n t i v e s k i l l s and knowledge of the p a r t i c i p a n t s . W h i l e the s t r a t e g y seeks t o o p t i m i z e the 1 5 \" r a t i o n a l i t y \" of the p r o c e s s of c o n s i d e r i n g t h e s e f a c t o r s , i t cannot i n i t s e l f guarantee an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n . Even a p e r f e c t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y may not overcome the t h r u s t of the d e c i s i o n a l p r e m i s e s . Y e t , George a r g u e s , and I b e l i e v e c o n v i n c i n g l y so, t h a t the p r o c e s s must be c o n s i d e r e d as one f a c t o r among many i n the e x p l a n a t i o n of the e f f e c t i v e n e s s or s u c c e s s f u l n e s s of a d e c i s i o n . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y , he a r g u e s , enhances the l i k e l i h o o d of a \"good\" d e c i s i o n or a t l e a s t reduces the p r o b a b i l i t y of a v e r y \"bad\" d e c i s i o n . The s t r a t e g y d i v i d e s t h r e e r o l e t a s k s among the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the p r o c e s s . F i r s t , the s e n i o r a d v i s o r s t o the p r e s i d e n t f o r m u l a t e p o l i c y o p t i o n s and s e r v e as t h e i r a d v o c a t e s t o the p r e s i d e n t . These a d v o c a t e s can be any a d v i s o r the p r e s i d e n t chooses but a r e u s u a l l y s e v e r a l of h i s c a b i n e t s e c r e t a r i e s and s e n i o r White House s t a f f . Second, one s e n i o r o f f i c i a l i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o r g a n i z e s and c o o r d i n a t e s the f l o w of o p t i o n s , the v a r i o u s meetings between the p r e s i d e n t and h i s a d v o c a t e s , and the im p l e m e n t a t i o n of the p r e s i d e n t ' s p o l i c y c h o i c e . T h i s r o l e t a s k of p r o c e s s manager or c u s t o d i a n i s g i v e n t o the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r . The a l l o c a t i o n of t h i s r o l e t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r o f f i c i a l i s based on the o r i g i n a l f u n c t i o n s g i v e n t o the E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y of the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l i n the 1947 NSC a c t . 1 9 T h i s a c t g i v e s the E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y , who l a t e r became the S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t t o the P r e s i d e n t f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s (or N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r ) , the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o a s s i s t the C o u n c i l 16 i n i t s d e l i b e r a t i o n s on f o r e i g n and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . He must p r o v i d e f o r the s t a f f work and p o l i c y papers i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the me e t i n g s . D u r i n g the Kennedy a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r expanded h i s r o l e t o c h a i r i n g subcommittee meetings of the NSC, as w e l l as c o o r d i n a t i n g v a r i o u s o t h e r meetings between the p r e s i d e n t and h i s s e n i o r f o r e i g n p o l i c y a d v i s o r s . 2 0 As a p e r s o n a l a s s i s t a n t t o the p r e s i d e n t , the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r i s i n a p o s i t i o n t o ensure t h a t d e p a r t m e n t a l p o l i c y making i s made c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the p r e s i d e n t ' s p e r s o n a l o b j e c t i v e s . As most postwar p r e s i d e n t s have become i n c r e a s i n g l y engaged p e r s o n a l l y i n the conduct of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , they have come t o r e l y on the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r f o r the c o o r d i n a t i o n of p o l i c y a d v i c e between the departments and the White House. The t h i r d r o l e t a s k i s a l l o c a t e d t o the p r e s i d e n t . L i k e a m a g i s t r a t e , he d e c i d e s which p o l i c y o p t i o n i s adopted. W h i l e i t i s b e n e f i c i a l t o the p r o c e s s t h a t he d e l e g a t e s the f o r m u l a t i o n of the v a r i o u s o p t i o n s t o h i s a d v o c a t e s , he must attempt t o make a c l e a r p o l i c y c h o i c e r a t h e r than a c c e p t a consensus or compromise s o l u t i o n . By s u b m i t t i n g h i s f i n a l c h o i c e t o a review by h i s a d v i s o r s , he w i l l ensure t h a t a l l p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e h e a r d . F u r t h e r m o r e , the s t r a t e g y p r e s c r i b e s f o u r p r o c e d u r e s or p r o c e s s norms t o s t r u c t u r e the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . F i r s t , the p r o c e s s s h o u l d be s t r u c t u r e d i n such a way t h a t the p r e s i d e n t p a r t i c i p a t e s a c t i v e l y i n the p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n s . Second, the v a r i o u s a d v o c a t e s must have a 1 7 r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o argue t h e i r o p t i o n s . The p r o c e s s s h o u l d be f a i r i n the sense t h a t the a d v o c a t e s s h o u l d have comparable a c c e s s t o i n f o r m a t i o n and t o the p o l i c y m e e t i n g s . They s h o u l d a l s o have adequate r e s o u r c e s and s t a f f s u p p o r t t o f o r m u l a t e t h e i r o p t i o n s . A l s o , they s h o u l d have r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l a c c e s s t o the p r e s i d e n t , e i t h e r by means of memoranda or p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t . T h i r d , the p o l i c y d ebates must take p l a c e i n the form of f r e e d i s c u s s i o n s and a l l o w the a d v o c a t e s t o c h a l l e n g e the p r e s i d e n t ' s p r e f e r r e d c h o i c e . The a d v o c a t e s must compete o p e n l y f o r the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e i r f a v o u r e d o p t i o n s and s h o u l d b r i n g a l l t h e i r d i s a g r e e m e n t s t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n . L a s t , when t h i s open p o l i c y debate s t i l l f a i l s t o produce a wide v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s h o u l d c o n s i d e r b r i n g i n g i n o u t s i d e r s t o widen the d i s c u s s i o n . 2 1 W h i l e the p r e s i d e n t i s u l t i m a t e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a d o p t i o n of t h e s e p r o c e s s norms, i t i s the c u s t o d i a n who must l o o k a f t e r the day-to-day management of the p r o c e s s . Once the p r e s i d e n t has i n d i c a t e d h i s p r e f e r e n c e f o r a p r o c e s s based on t h e s e p r o c e d u r e s , the c u s t o d i a n must ensure t h a t i t i s m a i n t a i n e d . I t i s h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o b r i n g t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n i s s u e s t h a t r e q u i r e the s t r a t e g y ' s p r o c e e d i n g s . He s e t s i n m o t i o n , o r g a n i z e s and o v e r s e e s the i n t e r a g e n c y p r o c e s s i n which th e v a r i o u s p o l i c y o p t i o n s a r e f o r m u l a t e d . He must ensure t h a t a l l a d v o c a t e s r e c e i v e a f a i r h e a r i n g f o r t h e i r o p t i o n s and t h a t t h e i r memoranda ar e d i s t r i b u t e d t hroughout the v a r i o u s d e c i s i o n forums. Moreover, he must a l e r t the p r e s i d e n t t o p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s 1 8 w i t h i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and c a l l meetings t o d i s c u s s t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s . He must remind the p r e s i d e n t t o submit h i s p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e t o a c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s by the a d v o c a t e s . F i n a l l y , whenever the c u s t o d i a n b e l i e v e s the p r o c e s s i s not f u n c t i o n i n g , he must a l e r t the p r e s i d e n t . C l e a r l y , the r o l e t a s k s of the c u s t o d i a n a r e most c r u c i a l f o r the o p e r a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y . In e s s e n c e , he a c t s as the \"honest b r o k e r \" of the v a r i o u s p o l i c y o p t i o n s . W ithout l e t t i n g h i s own p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h i s t a s k , he promotes o p t i o n s t h a t have not r e c e i v e d adequate a t t e n t i o n even though he may not f a v o u r them. S i m i l a r l y , he h e l p s o t h e r a d v o c a t e s c h a l l e n g e t h o s e o p t i o n s he p e r s o n a l l y p r e f e r s . H i s r o l e as p r o c e s s manager g i v e s him c o n s i d e r a b l e power t o c o n t r o l whose o p t i o n r e c e i v e s a t t e n t i o n and who g e t s t o be heard by the p r e s i d e n t . H i s c h i e f purpose i n t h i s p r o c e s s i s t o b a l a n c e the o p t i o n s , g e n e r a t e a wide d e b a t e , and keep the p r e s i d e n t i n v o l v e d . I t i s because of the many r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the c u s t o d i a n and h i s p o w e r f u l p o s i t i o n i n the p r o c e s s , t h a t the s t r a t e g y adds s e v e r a l p r o s c r i p t i o n s t o h i s r o l e t a s k s . George b e l i e v e s t h e r e are s e v e r a l t y p e s of a c t i v i t i e s t h a t may i n h i b i t the c u s t o d i a n from b e i n g a honest b r o k e r as w e l l as an e f f e c t i v e p r o c e s s manager. 2 2 T h e r e f o r e , he s h o u l d be p r o h i b i t e d from engaging i n t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s . F i r s t , he s h o u l d not advocate on p o l i c y . When he f e e l s not enough o p t i o n s are p r e s e n t e d , he may t r y t o b r i n g i n o u t s i d e a d v i s o r s . A l s o , he can, a t t i m e s , a c t l i k e a d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e . However, George acknowledges t h a t i t i s u n l i k e l y 19 t h a t one can be a c r e d i b l e d e v i l ' s a dvocate over a s u s t a i n e d p e r i o d of t i m e . 2 3 N e v e r t h e l e s s , he s h o u l d not be a genuine p o l i c y advocate s i n c e t h a t undermines h i s d u t i e s as honest b r o k e r . Second, he cannot make p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s on p o l i c y or a c t as a d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t o r . T h i r d , he s h o u l d not e n f o r c e or implement p e r s o n a l l y the p r e s i d e n t s p o l i c y or merely lo o k a f t e r the p o l i t i c a l f o r t u n e s of the p r e s i d e n t . A l l t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s a r e a l l e g e d t o reduce h i s e f f e c t i v e n e s s as a p r o c e s s manager because they compromise h i s n e u t r a l i t y v i s - a - v i s the v a r i o u s p o l i c y o p t i o n s . Moreover, a c u s t o d i a n who engages i n the s e a c t i v i t i e s i s l e s s l i k e l y t o c a l l f o r a re v i e w of p o l i c y . THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGY The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i s based on the assumptions of c l a s s i c a l r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . 2 \" The d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s p e r c e i v e d as a r a t i o n a l problem s o l v e r who seeks t o o p t i m i z e h i s o b j e c t i v e s . These o b j e c t i v e s can be l o g i c a l l y d e r i v e d from h i s v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s . When c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a t h r e a t or c h a l l e n g e v i s - a - v i s h i s i n t e r e s t s , the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r weighs the c o s t s and b e n e f i t s of the v a r i o u s c o u r s e s of a c t i o n a v a i l a b l e . H i s f i n a l c h o i c e i s t h a t o p t i o n which maximizes h i s i n t e r e s t s . T h i s c o n c e p t i o n of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , as we have d i s c u s s e d above, r e j e c t s an a l t e r n a t i v e view d e v e l o p e d by 20 March, Simon, L i n d b l o m and B r a y b r o o k e . 2 5 The c l a s s i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y c o n c e p t i o n has a l s o been c r i t i c i z e d f o r i t s emphasis on the l o g i c a l and a n a l y t i c a l a s p e c t s of d e c i s i o n -m a k i n g . 2 6 S t e i n e r , f o r example, s t a t e s t h a t c r i t e r i a such as o r d e r l y p r o c e d u r e s and l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s o v e r l o o k the s u b j e c t i v e and i n t u i t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s . Moreover, s i n c e the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r i s f a c e d w i t h many ev e n t s t h a t cannot be e x p l a i n e d r a t i o n a l l y , we cannot expect him t o respond e f f e c t i v e l y by p r e s c r i b i n g p u r e l y r a t i o n a l r e m e d i e s . 2 7 However, these c r i t i c s have so f a r been unable t o o f f e r a c o h e r e n t a l t e r n a t i v e c o n c e p t i o n . For the time b e i n g , d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g t h e o r i s t s have l i t t l e c h o i c e but t o attempt t o improve the r a t i o n a l a s p e c t s of the p r o c e s s . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y p r o v i d e s f o r a l o g i c a l o r d e r t o a p r o c e s s i n which the p r e s i d e n t and h i s a d v i s o r s a r e assumed t o seek the maximum f u l f i l m e n t of t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s . However, George does not s i m p l y take the r a t i o n a l i t y of the p r o c e s s or i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s as g i v e n . R a t h e r , the s t r a t e g y a t t e m p t s t o compensate f o r v a r i o u s f a c t o r s t h a t l i m i t or d i s t o r t r a t i o n a l i t y . These d i s t o r t i o n s and l i m i t a t i o n s have been amply d i s c u s s e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e . George, i n e s s e n c e , has proposed h i s s t r a t e g y i n an attempt t o remedy or compensate f o r some of the s e d i s t o r t i o n s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the s t r a t e g y a d d r e s s e s s e v e r a l problems g e n e r a t e d by i n f o r m a t i o n u n c e r t a i n t y and v a l u e c o m p l e x i t y a t the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l , as w e l l as problems caused by \" g r o u p t h i n k \" and \" B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s \" a t t h e group l e v e l . 21 J e r v i s , a m o n g o t h e r s , has p o i n t e d out t h a t d e c i s i o n -makers must r e c o g n i z e and d i a g n o s e i s s u e s amidst c o n t r a d i c t o r y and c o n f u s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . 2 8 Moreover, on the b a s i s of u n c e r t a i n and i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n , they must e v a l u a t e the v a r i o u s o p t i o n s and make c h o i c e s . In r e s p o n s e , they may r e s o r t t o c e r t a i n t e c h n i q u e s t h a t make them more c o n f i d e n t about t h e i r c h o i c e but a t the same time reduce the a n a l y t i c a l q u a l i t y of the p r o c e s s . 2 9 For example, the d e c i s i o n - maker may p r o c r a s t i n a t e i n making h i s or her c h o i c e , hoping t h a t a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l show t h a t no d e c i s i o n i s n e c e s s a r y or t h a t the problem w i l l c o r r e c t i t s e l f . C a l c u l a t e d or r a t i o n a l p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n denotes the b e h a v i o u r of a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r who postpones a d e c i s i o n because he f e e l s t h e r e i s no r u s h , new i n f o r m a t i o n may come s h o r t l y , or t h a t the problem may c o r r e c t i t s e l f . D e f e n s i v e p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n i s p o t e n t i a l l y more h a r m f u l because the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r r a t h e r than h a v i n g reasons t o postpone a c h o i c e , s i m p l y hopes t h a t the problem w i l l go away by dodging i t . A d e c i s i o n - m a k e r b o l s t e r s when he a r t i f i c i a l l y r a i s e s or l o w e r s the e x p e c t e d c o s t s or b e n e f i t s of an o p t i o n so as t o make h i s c h o i c e l o o k more r a t i o n a l . A l s o , he or she may i n v o k e a h i s t o r i c a l a n a l o g y , b e l i e v i n g t h a t the i s s u e can be b e t t e r u n d e r s t o o d by m o l d i n g i t i n t o the image of a p a s t o c c u r r e n c e . T h i r d , he or she, based on on h i s or her p e r s o n a l b e l i e f s and b i a s e s , can a t t r i b u t e a r t i f i c i a l weight t o one p a r t i c u l a r view of an i s s u e , even though the f a c t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n does not warrant i t : i n f o r m a t i o n which c o n f i r m s one's b i a s e s i s upgraded, w h i l e c o n t r a r y i n f o r m a t i o n i s 22 d i s c a r d e d . The d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s a b i l i t y t o weigh the c o s t s and b e n e f i t s of v a r i o u s p o l i c y o p t i o n s i s i m p a i r e d f u r t h e r by the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s among h i s own i n t e r e s t s and o b j e c t i v e s . George c a l l s t h i s the v a l u e c o m p l e x i t y i m p e d i m e n t . 3 0 O f t e n , d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s r e s o l v e t h e s e c o n f l i c t s by an i n c o m p l e t e or d i s t o r t e d a n a l y s i s of a l l the a s p e c t s i n v o l v e d i n the i s s u e . 3 1 Three methods or t e c h n i q u e s can be i d e n t i f i e d . V a l u e - c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n denotes the attempt by the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r t o r e c o n c i l e and s a t i s f y as many competing v a l u e s as p o s s i b l e a r o u s e d by an i s s u e . T h i s i s a f o r m i d a b l e t a s k and i s seldom completed s u c c e s s f u l l y . O f t e n i t l e a d s t o a compromise or t r a d e - o f f among v a l u e s based on the l o w e s t common denominator. W h i l e t h i s may enhance the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the d e c i s i o n , i t may e q u a l l y w e l l d e c r e a s e i t s q u a l i t y . V a l u e - c o n f l i c t a c c e p t a n c e d e s c r i b e s the b e h a v i o u r of a d e c i s i o n - m a k e r who r e a l i z e s t h a t he must make a c h o i c e among competing v a l u e s . However, when he b e l i e v e s t o o q u i c k l y t h a t a v a l u e - c o n f l i c t i s u n a v o i d a b l e , he may make premature and i m p u l s i v e d e c i s i o n s . V a l u e - c o n f l i c t a v o i d a n c e , the t h i r d method, t a k e s p l a c e i n the form of two mechanisms c a l l e d \" c o g n i t i v e r e s t r u c t u r i n g \" and \" d e v a l u a t i o n \" . In the f i r s t , t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r downgrades or i g n o r e s the incoming i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t c h a l l e n g e s h i s v a l u e s . In the second, he downgrades or i g n o r e s h i s v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s . Of the t h r e e methods d i s c u s s e d , v a l u e - c o n f l i c t a v o i d a n c e i s p o t e n t i a l l y t h e most h a r m f u l . A l l i n a l l , t h ese a c t i v i t i e s hamper a c l e a r s e a r c h and e v a l u a t i o n of a l l r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n as 23 w e l l as a thorough c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s i n t e r e s t s i n the i s s u e . How does the s t r a t e g y a d d r e s s t h e s e problems? I t s r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e d u r e s o f f e r a s e t of checks so t h a t when th e s e d i s t o r t i o n s o c c u r , they a r e r e c o g n i z e d and c o r r e c t e d . 3 2 The open debate among the a d v o c a t e s , w i t h the p r e s i d e n t ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i s a v e h i c l e t h a t b r i n g s t o l i g h t the v a r i o u s b i a s e s among the p a r t i c i p a n t s and examines them f o r what they a r e . The a d v o c a t e s must c h a l l e n g e the p r e s i d e n t when they b e l i e v e h i s i n f o r m a t i o n base and a n a l y s i s a r e ina d e q u a t e or when he d e c i d e s too h a s t i l y . Moreover, the c u s t o d i a n must a l e r t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n when he f e e l s a s u p e r f i c i a l consensus or a compromise view i s h i n d e r i n g i t s a b i l i t y t o examine n e g l e c t e d a s p e c t s of an i s s u e . In c o n t r a s t t o the c l a s s i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y c o n c e p t i o n of the s t a t e as a u n i t a r y a c t o r , the l i t e r a t u r e i d e n t i f i e s most d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s e s as a group a c t i v i t y . 3 3 The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i n c o r p o r a t e s many of the f i n d i n g s from t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e . The v a r i o u s a d v i s o r s s u r r o u n d i n g the p r e s i d e n t p r o v i d e him w i t h a d v i c e , a l l o w him t o d e l e g a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , o f f e r him e m o t i o n a l s u p p o r t , and i n c r e a s e the l e g i t i m a c y of h i s d e c i s i o n s . S t u d i e s i n s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y have shown t h a t groups can enhance the q u a l i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g , reduce memory l a p s e s , and p r o v i d e s t i m u l a t i o n . 3 \" Y e t , group i n t e r a c t i o n can a l s o g e n e r a t e s e v e r a l d i s t o r t i o n s t o the p r o c e s s . Having s e v e r a l a d v i s o r s s t u d y an 24 i s s u e does not n e c e s s a r i l y produce a w i d e r v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s . W i t h i n the group, c e r t a i n c o n f o r m i t y p r e s s u r e s may a r i s e . 3 5 D i s s e n t i n g members from the m a j o r i t y view may not speak o u t , f e a r i n g they w i l l be viewed as t r o u b l e makers or be o s t r a c i z e d . A l s o , i n d i v i d u a l members or the group i t s e l f may not f e e l c o n f i d e n t enough t o c h a l l e n g e the p r e s i d e n t . 3 6 J a n i s d e s c r i b e s another p o s s i b l e d i s t o r t i o n caused by group d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . 3 7 F a c i n g h i g h l e v e l s of s t r e s s and d i f f i c u l t i s s u e s w i t h p o t e n t i a l l y grave consequences, group members may seek one a n o t h e r ' s e m o t i o n a l s u p p o r t r a t h e r than s t i m u l a t e the group's c r i t i c a l a b i l i t i e s . T h i s f o r t r e s s m e n t a l i t y , c a l l e d \" g r o u p t h i n k , \" l e a d s t o i l l u s i o n s of i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y and u n a n i m i t y , as w e l l as a l a c k of v i g i l a n c e , and a d i s r e g a r d f o r i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t c h a l l e n g e s the group's mind s e t . The s t r a t e g y ' s p r o c e s s norms a r e i n t e n d e d t o reduce th e s e s h o r t c o m i n g s of group d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . F i r s t , the p r e s i d e n t must a l l o w the ad v o c a t e s t o f o r m u l a t e the o p t i o n s , and not s p e l l out h i s own p r e f e r e n c e e a r l y i n the d i s c u s s i o n . In so d o i n g , the a d v o c a t e s have a b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t y t o argue f o r t h e i r o p t i o n s w i t h o u t d i r e c t l y c h a l l e n g i n g the p r e s i d e n t . Second, the ad v o c a t e s must compete among t h e m s e l v e s . The \" g u a r d i a n \" of t h i s c o m p e t i t i o n i s the c u s t o d i a n , who ensures t h a t the ad v o c a t e s have adequate r e s o u r c e s t o do so. Fu r t h e r m o r e , when he f e e l s not enough p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e a i r e d , he must t a k e measures t o widen the debate. L a s t , the p r e s i d e n t must a l l o w d i s s e n t and the r e v i e w of h i s p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e . 25 W h i l e the s t r a t e g y encourages c o m p e t i t i o n and d i s s e n t , N e u s t a d t , S c h i l l i n g and A l l i s o n have argued t h a t p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s among s e n i o r a d v i s o r s may cause o t h e r t y p e s of d i s t o r t i o n s i n the p r o c e s s . 3 8 The s e n i o r a d v i s o r s a r e a l s o the heads of the v a r i o u s d e p a rtments. As suc h , they might pursue the i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r departments more v i g o r o u s l y than the i n t e r e s t s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as a whole. The d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i s t o some e x t e n t e x p l a i n e d by the b a r g a i n i n g on p o l i c y o p t i o n s among the v a r i o u s departments. T h i s p r o c e s s , c a l l e d B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s by A l l i s o n , may not produce a f a i r h e a r i n g of a l l o p t i o n s , s i n c e some departments a r e more r e s o u r c e f u l and may have more b a r g a i n i n g power than o t h e r s . 3 9 As a r e s u l t , the f i n a l c h o i c e of an o p t i o n may be more the r e s u l t of t h e b a r g a i n i n g s k i l l of i t s advocate than of i t s a n a l y t i c a l m e r i t . A l s o , p u l l i n g and h a u l i n g among a d v o c a t e s may l e a d t o compromises or t o a s i m p l e d e a d l o c k w i t h i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The s t r a t e g y seeks t o reduce the c o s t s of p o l i c y c o n f l i c t and i n t e r p e r s o n a l b a r g a i n i n g . F i r s t , the a d v o c a t e s must compete i n open debate forums, and not among themselves w i t h o u t the p r e s i d e n t ' s knowledge. Second, the c u s t o d i a n must e l e v a t e t h e i r c o n f l i c t s , compromises or t r a d e o f f s t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n . T h i r d , the p r e s i d e n t must make a c l e a r c h o i c e among o p t i o n s , and not merely a c c e p t papered over d i s a g r e e m e n t s . L a s t , the p r o c e s s management by the c u s t o d i a n imposes some degree of s t r u c t u r e on the c o m p e t i t i o n among a d v o c a t e s . He p r o v i d e s f o r p r o p e r a c c e s s 2 6 and i n f o r m a t i o n so t h a t no adv o c a t e i s e x c l u d e d from the r e l e v a n t p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n s . As a r e s u l t of t h e s e p r o c e d u r e s , the p r e s i d e n t w i l l be a b l e t o make h i s f i n a l c h o i c e based on the m e r i t s of each o p t i o n , w i t h o u t b e i n g s u b j e c t t o the v a r i o u s compromises h i s a d v i s o r s may have made w i t h o u t him. The s t r a t e g y a d d r e s s e s o n l y m a r g i n a l l y s e v e r a l o t h e r a s p e c t s of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g d i s c u s s e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e . F i r s t , the r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e s s norms do not compensate f o r p s y c h i a t r i c or p e r s o n a l i t y d i s t o r t i o n s t h a t may hamper the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r . \" 0 Second, c r i s i s i n d u ced s t r e s s may cause b e h a v i o u r a b e r r a t i o n s t h a t a re beyond the remedies o f f e r e d by the s t r a t e g y . \" 1 W h i l e i t p r o v i d e s f o r an o r d e r l y p r o c e s s of e v a l u a t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , and i s thus u s e f u l f o r c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s , the p r o c e s s i s a l s o time consuming, and may not a l l e v i a t e the s t r e s s e x p e r i e n c e d by the d e c i s i o n -maker. T h i r d , C o g n i t i v e P s y c h o l o g y t e a c h e s us t h a t we a l l have, and indeed need t o have, b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e s t h a t h e l p s e l e c t and o r g a n i z e d a t a from the w o r l d around us i n o r d e r t o make i t m e a n i n g f u l . However, t h e s e s t r u c t u r e s can a l s o d i s t o r t our c o g n i t i v e a b i l i t i e s when i t comes t o problem-s o l v i n g . W h i l e the s t r a t e g y does not p r o v i d e the d e c i s i o n -maker w i t h a b e l i e f system, i t does p r o v i d e f o r an open d i s c u s s i o n which may make him more aware of h i s b e l i e f s and b i a s e s . \" 2 F i n a l l y , March and Simon, as w e l l as A l l i s o n , have p o i n t e d out t h a t l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s have c e r t a i n s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s whereby they p r o c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n and ex e c u t e p o l i c y i n a l o g i c a l l t h e i r own.\" 3 As a r e s u l t , the 27 p r e s i d e n t ' s a d v i s o r s may r e c e i v e p o l i c y o p t i o n s from t h e i r departments t h a t a r e more a p r o d u c t of the needs or r u l e s of t h a t p a r t i c u l a r department than a r a t i o n a l response t o the i s s u e a t hand. A g a i n , a l l the s t r a t e g y o f f e r s i s a c r i t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n of the o p t i o n s , which might b r i n g t o l i g h t the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l b i a s e s a t the e x e c u t i v e l e v e l . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i s not the o n l y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g model a t the p r e s i d e n t i a l l e v e l . In f o r m u l a t i n g the s t r a t e g y , George draws upon elements found i n o t h e r models and indeed uses a s p e c t s of t h e s e t o c o n s t r u c t h i s arguments. Nor does George p o s i t the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y as the o n l y u s e f u l s t r a t e g y or as a s a t i s f a c t o r y model under a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . B e s i d e s the B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s model d i s c u s s e d above, George d i s c u s s e s the C e n t r a l i z e d Management Model or Formal O p t i o n s Model.'\" In t h i s model, the p r e s i d e n t r e l i e s on one c e n t r a l manager t o s c r e e n a l l o p t i o n s proposed i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h i s c e n t r a l manager i n e f f e c t a c t s as a g a t e k e e p e r . W h i l e the \" s e a r c h \" and \" e v a l u a t i o n \" s t a g e s of t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s remain open t o a l l o t h e r a d v i s o r s and b u r e a u c r a t i c a c t o r s , the \" c h o i c e \" stage i s m o n o p o l i z e d by the c e n t r a l manager. T h i s model, a c c o r d i n g t o George, was b e s t e x e m p l i f i e d by the N i x o n - K i s s i n g e r s t r u c t u r e of p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . T h i s model may c o r r e c t an o b v i o u s s h o r t c o m i n g produced by b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i t i c s : as a r e s u l t of the b a r g a i n i n g and i n t e r n a l n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s among a d v i s o r s , the p r e s i d e n t may a t times be p r e s e n t e d w i t h a f i n a l o p t i o n which s e r v e s 28 the i n t e r e s t s of one b u r e a u c r a t i c a c t o r ( t h a t a c t o r which \"won\" t h e i n t e r n a l b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s ) more than the o v e r a l l i n t e r e s t s of the p r e s i d e n t or the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as a whole. The c e n t r a l manager's monopoly on the p r e s e n t a t i o n of the f i n a l o p t i o n s t o the p r e s i d e n t may a v o i d t h i s p i t f a l l . However, i t i s o b v i o u s t h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n may e q u a l l y l i k e l y become s u b j e c t t o the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s of the c e n t r a l manager. W h i l e t h i s model may s e r v e a p r e s i d e n t who i s u n w i l l i n g t o t o l e r a t e c o m p e t i t i o n among h i s a d v i s o r s or who wants t o c o n f i n e f o r e i g n p o l i c y making t o an e x c e s s i v e degree t o h i s own o f f i c e , George i d e n t i f i e s s e v e r a l o v e r a l l weaknesses i n t h i s model. F i r s t , i t reduces the r o l e of the a d v i s o r s who a r e not i n charge of c e n t r a l management to * \" b a c k g r o u n d r e s e a r c h e r s \" f o r the c e n t r a l manager. When the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r f i l l s the o f f i c e of the c e n t r a l manager, as was the case under N i x o n , the r o l e s of the S e c r e t a r i e s of S t a t e and Defense a r e l i m i t e d f a r beyond the o r i g i n a l i n t e n t of t h e i r mandates. Second, when the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r i s the c e n t r a l manager, he w i l l p e r f o r m s u b s t a n t i a l p o l i c y advocacy f u n c t i o n s which George b e l i e v e s c o n f l i c t w i t h h i s custodial/management d u t i e s . T h i r d , such a system can e a s i l y l e a d t o a work o v e r l o a d f o r the c e n t r a l manager, r e s u l t i n g i n s u b o p t i m a l c h o i c e f o r m u l a t i o n and a f a l t e r i n g d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . What i s u s e f u l about the model i s i t s p r o v i s i o n of management. George argues t h a t u n b r i d l e d c o m p e t i t i o n ( b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i t i c s ) as much as o v e r l y c o n t r o l l e d a d v i c e I 2 9 ( c e n t r a l management) do not produce o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y borrows the b e s t a s p e c t s of bot h models. Whi l e i t i n v i t e s a d vocate c o m p e t i t i o n , i t s t r u c t u r e s t h i s c o m p e t i t i o n by means of the r o l e t a s k s of the c u s t o d i a n . Moreover, the p r e s i d e n t , as a m a g i s t r a t e , b e n e f i t s more from the o r g a n i z e d , y e t f r e e a d v i c e , of a l l h i s a d v i s o r s than from the f i l t e r e d a d v i c e of one c e n t r a l a d v i s o r . The p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n of a managed d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i s f u r t h e r h i g h l i g h t e d by George when viewed i n r e l a t i o n t o the \" i n c r e m e n t a l i s t \" model of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . T h i s model i s a l s o c a l l e d P a r t i s a n M u t u a l A d justment. W h i l e George acknowledges t h a t C h a r l e s L i n d b l o m , i n d e s c r i b i n g t h i s model, was r e f e r r i n g t o the l a r g e r n a t i o n a l p r o c e s s of p o l i c y making i n g e n e r a l , i t a l s o sheds some l i g h t on the p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . * 5 In t h i s model, d e c i s i o n i s s u e s a r e \" a d j u s t e d \" by each r e l e v a n t a d v i s o r t o accommodate h i s i n t e r e s t s . The i s s u e moves th r o u g h the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n a more or l e s s s e r i a l o r d e r r e c e i v i n g a d j u s t m e n t s and accommodations but i s never r e a l l y s o l v e d . The f i n a l p o l i c y c h o i c e i s a p r o d u c t of t h i s p r o c e s s , and g i v e n the c o m p l e x i t y of the i s s u e and the v a r i e t y of i n t e r e s t s i n v o l v e d , i s as good a s o l u t i o n as can be o b t a i n e d . A g a i n , as George p u t s i t , t h i s \" q u a s i r e s o l u t i o n of c o n f l i c t \" or p r o d u c t of \" n e g o t i a t i o n s i n the i n t e r n a l e nvironment\" can be g r e a t l y improved by means of the management p r o c e d u r e s proposed by the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t a t e g y . * 6 30 In f o r m u l a t i n g h i s s t r a t e g y , George a l s o d i s c u s s e s an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e v i c e commonly c a l l e d the d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e . \" 7 T h i s d e v i c e has been used or recommended as a way of e n s u r i n g t h a t unpopular views r e c e i v e a h e a r i n g . E s s e n t i a l l y , the d e v i l ' s a dvocate i s a r o l e p r e s c r i p t i o n . I t i n v o l v e s a r g u i n g f o r an unpopular o p t i o n which none of the o t h e r a d v i s o r s want t o b r i n g f o r w a r d but which the d e v i l ' s a d vocate does not p e r s o n a l l y f a v o u r e i t h e r . W h i l e the advocacy of unpopular o p t i o n s i s a l s o an i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y , George i s h e s i t a n t about the u s e f u l n e s s of the d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e . He i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s k e p t i c a l about the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h i s r o l e i n t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . A d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e may q u i c k l y become an i n e f f e c t i v e r o l e when the o t h e r a d v i s o r s p e r c e i v e i t as such. Indeed, they may c o n s i d e r i t a \" t i m e - w a s t i n g gimmick\" s i n c e the d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e does not r e a l l y f a v o u r h i s proposed o p t i o n , and i s t h u s not s e r i o u s about b u i l d i n g a b u r e a u c r a t i c c o a l i t i o n i n support of h i s o p t i o n . Moreover, p r e s i d e n t s have tended t o brand genuine d i s s e n t e r s as d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e s t o \" d o m e s t i c a t e \" t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n . \" 8 For t h e s e r e a s o n s , George does not p r e s c r i b e a d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e r o l e f o r the c u s t o d i a n . The c u s t o d i a n may a p p o i n t someone t o p l a y t h i s r o l e but he h i m s e l f cannot a f f o r d t o be branded a d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e : \"the two r o l e s a r e d i s t i n c t and s h o u l d not be c o n f u s e d . \" \" 9 Moreover, George b e l i e v e s t h a t a p r e s i d e n t may g a i n more from genuine d i s s e n t e r s from h i s p o l i c y c h o i c e than from d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e s . The p r o c e s s of 3 1 r e b u t t i n g a d i s s e n t i n g view may h e l p c l a r i f y t he p o l i c y p o s i t i o n of the o t h e r a d v i s o r s and thus enhance the \" r a t i o n a l i t y \" of the e v a l u a t i o n of o p t i o n s . For p o l i c y i m p l e m e n t a t i o n p u r p o s e s , i t may be b e t t e r i f the d i s s e n t e r f e e l s h i s views have been a i r e d p r o p e r l y . I f he f e e l s he had a f a i r h e a r i n g , he may be more i n c l i n e d t o c l o s e ranks w i t h the proponents a t the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n s t a g e . L a s t l y , i t may make a d v i s o r s more c o m f o r t a b l e d e f e n d i n g the p o l i c y c h o i c e t o the media and the p u b l i c i f th e y had t o defend i t w i t h i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . F i n a l l y , the o p e r a t i o n of any d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g model must be e v a l u a t e d i n l i g h t of the d e c i s i o n s t y l e s of the p r e s i d e n t . George d i s c u s s e s t h r e e d i s t i n c t s t y l e s . The f o r m a l i s t i c p r e s i d e n t p r e f e r s t o r e c e i v e a d v i c e from the a d v i s o r or a s s i s t a n t who i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h a t p a r t i c u l a r d o m a i n . 5 0 The p r e s i d e n t does not encourage communication among a d v i s o r s nor a group e f f o r t a t problem s o l v i n g . At the same t i m e , the p r e s i d e n t does not attempt t o open \" b a c k c h a n n e l s \" b e h i n d the s e c r e t a r i e s ' b a c k s , but r i g i d l y adheres t o the o f f i c i a l c h a n n e l s of i n f o r m a t i o n . In the end, the p r e s i d e n t a t t e m p t s p e r s o n a l l y t o i n t e g r a t e a l l p i e c e s of a d v i c e , and the f i n a l d e c i s i o n i s a p r o d u c t of h i s own i n t e l l e c t u a l s y n t h e s i s . T h i s p r e s i d e n t i a l s t y l e a l l o w s f o r a v e r y o r d e r l y d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s . However, s e v e r a l weaknesses a r e a p p a r e n t . The p r e s i d e n t i s o b v i o u s l y d e p r i v e d of a c o m p e t i t i v e debate among h i s a d v i s o r s and must r e l y on i n d i v i d u a l c a b i n e t s e c r e t a r i e s t o r e c e i v e the be s t 32 i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e i r departments. T h i s s t y l e i s not b e l i e v e d t o be v e r y s u i t a b l e t o m u l t i p l e advocacy p r o c e e d i n g s , and as such the s t r a t e g y would be d i f f i c u l t t o implement. A second s t y l e , l a b e l l e d the \" c o m p e t i t i v e model\" seems more s u i t a b l e t o the s t r a t e g y . Here, the p r e s i d e n t d e l i b e r a t e l y encourages c o m p e t i t i o n and c o n f l i c t among h i s a d v i s o r s by g i v i n g o v e r l a p p i n g a s signments and c o n f l i c t i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n s . 5 1 However, t h e r e i s s t i l l no req u i r e m e n t f o r the a d v i s o r s t o communicate w i t h one an o t h e r s i n c e each r e p o r t s d i r e c t l y t o the p r e s i d e n t . A l s o , a t t i m e s the p r e s i d e n t l e a v e s t h e r e s o l u t i o n of a c e r t a i n c o n f l i c t t o h i s a d v i s o r s . W h i l e the p r e s i d e n t o c c a s s i o n a l l y reaches down below the l e v e l of h i s immediate a d v i s o r s t o o b t a i n independent a d v i c e and thus enhances h i s a b i l i t y t o p r o f i t from the be s t a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n , George f e e l s the system a l l o w s f o r too much u n s t r u c t u r e d a d v i s o r c o m p e t i t i o n . As a r e s u l t , b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i t i c s may impede the f l o w of o p t i m a l a d v i c e . Moreover, the p r e s i d e n t may end up spending t o o much of h i s time r e s o l v i n g c o n f l i c t s among h i s s t a f f . The c o l l e g i a l model of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i s best p i c t u r e d as a s t r u c t u r e where the p r e s i d e n t i s a t the c e n t r e of a wheel w i t h spokes c o n n e c t i n g t o i n d i v i d u a l a d v i s o r s . 5 2 A d v i s o r s a r e i n v i t e d t o form a c o l l e g i a l team and t o engage i n group problem s o l v i n g . Moreover, a d v i s o r s a re asked t o a c t as \" g e n e r a l i s t s \" , n o t j u s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r \" t u r f \" i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s resembles a s e t of i n f o r m a l d i s c u s s i o n s among a l l 33 r e l e v a n t a d v i s o r s w i t h the p r e s i d e n t a t t e n d i n g and a s k i n g q u e s t i o n s . The two foremost drawbacks p o t e n t i a l l y p r e s e n t i n t h i s system a r e a s u b s t a n t i a l demand on the p r e s i d e n t ' s time and the o c c u r r e n c e of g r o u p t h i n k . George's s t r a t e g y seeks t o use the b e s t elements of b o t h the c o l l e g i a l and c o m p e t i t i v e models. An i n t e n s i v e p r e s i d e n t i a l i n v o l v e m e n t , though c o s t l y i n terms of t i m e , b e n e f i t s the p r o c e s s of s e l e c t i n g p o l i c y o p t i o n s . Advocate c o m p e t i t i o n i s d e s i r a b l e t o b r i n g out a t horough e v a l u a t i o n of a l l o p t i o n s but must be \" c o n t r o l l e d \" by the c u s t o d i a n r a t h e r than the p r e s i d e n t . The c u s t o d i a n i s t o make sure r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l r e s o u r c e s a r e a v a i l a b l e t o each a d v i s o r and t h a t each a d v i s o r has an o p p o r t u n i t y t o make h i s c a s e t o the p r e s i d e n t . THE STRATEGY'S REVIEWS AND CRITICISMS The s t r a t e g y ' s s u g g e s t i o n s f o r i m p r o v i n g the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s have r e c e i v e d s u pport i n both the p r o f e s s i o n a l and academic l i t e r a t u r e . For example, Sorensen, a former Kennedy a i d e , and Ole H o l s t i agree t h a t a v a r i e t y of a d v i s o r s and d i f f e r e n t d e p a r t m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , who compete f o r t h e i r f a v o u r e d o p t i o n s , w i l l f o s t e r more a l t e r n a t i v e s , expose e r r o r s , and c h a l l e n g e a s s u m p t i o n s . 5 3 J a n i s s t a t e d t h a t the s t r a t e g y ' s p r o c e s s norms \"might go a l o n g way toward r e d u c i n g the chances of g r o u p t h i n k . \" 5 \" 34 P o r t e r , who examined the decision-making process i n the Economic P o l i c y Board from 1974 to 1976, found t h a t the s t r a t e g y o f f e r e d a u s e f u l model to improve the p r o c e s s . 5 5 Yet, the s t r a t e g y was not su b j e c t e d to an in-depth e m p i r i c a l e v a l u a t i o n i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y domain u n t i l H a l l ' s study of 1982. Before then, s e v e r a l s c h o l a r s c r i t i c i z e d i n d i v i d u a l aspects of the s t r a t e g y . For example, Thomas and Hargrove questioned the f e a s i b i l i t y of the r o l e tasks f o r the p r e s i d e n t . 5 6 Not a l l p r e s i d e n t s are w i l l i n g to sub j e c t t h e i r p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e to a debate among t h e i r a d v i s o r s . Moreover, some p r e s i d e n t s may f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to accept open c r i t i c i s m and debate. A l s o , not a l l p r e s i d e n t s d e s i r e an a c t i v e r o l e i n the decision-making p r o c e s s . They conclude that the s t r a t e g y may only be a p p l i c a b l e to p r e s i d e n t s who enjoy a c o m p e t i t i v e or c o l l e g i a l s t y l e of decision-making. Hess adds that the s t r a t e g y ' s procedures are q u i t e time-consuming. 5 7 Moreover, they may l e a d to p o l i c y leaks which embarrass the p r e s i d e n t . For some p r e s i d e n t s , the c o s t s of the s t r a t e g y may outweigh the b e n e f i t s . D e s t l e r , among o t h e r s , doubts that the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Advisor can ever assume the r o l e of an honest b r o k e r . 5 8 Since the Kennedy yea r s , he argues, the a d v i s o r has g r a d u a l l y i n c r e a s e d h i s r o l e to that of a s u b s t a n t i v e p o l i c y a d v i s o r supported by a l a r g e White House s t a f f . Unless h i s p o s i t i o n i s r e d e f i n e d i n the s p i r i t of the 1947 NSC a c t , he w i l l have too much pe r s o n a l i n f l u e n c e to be a mere \" n e u t r a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r . \" Turning the c o i n completely, 35 Hargrove and Rockman argue t h a t i f the c u s t o d i a n was reduced t o a mere a d m i n i s t r a t o r , he would not have enough \" l e v e r a g e \" t o e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l over the p o w e r f u l c a b i n e t s e c r e t a r i e s . 5 9 To them, o n l y the p r e s i d e n t can p e r f o r m the d u t i e s the s t r a t e g y p r e s c r i b e s f o r the c u s t o d i a n . O t h e r s have q u e s t i o n e d the s t r a t e g y ' s attempt t o e q u a l i z e the r e s o u r c e s of the v a r i o u s departments. Y a r m o l i n s k y , f o r example, argues t h a t the Department of Defense i s a c o n s i s t e n t l y more e f f e c t i v e a dvocate than the Department of S t a t e . 6 0 Fenno b e l i e v e s t h a t the White House a s s i s t a n t s have become so p o w e r f u l t h a t the c a b i n e t s e c r e t a r i e s a r e no l o n g e r a match f o r t h e m . 6 1 H a l l o f f e r s an e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s of George's p r e s c r i p t i o n s . H a l l argues t h a t George's s t r a t e g y o f f e r s a s e t of b e h a v i o u r a l norms which must govern the day-to-day p r o c e s s i n g of f a c t and o p i n i o n w i t h i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s environment. W h i l e H a l l b e l i e v e s t h i s t o be a \" f r e s h \" approach i n l i g h t of t h e u s u a l recommendations f o r s t r u c t u r a l change i n the e x e c u t i v e government, he notes t h a t t h e s e p r e s c r i p t i o n s have never been c a r e f u l l y t e s t e d f o r t h e i r e m p i r i c a l r e l e v a n c e or v a l i d i t y . H a l l does a d e t a i l e d study of the s t r a t e g y ' s norms whenever they were a p p r o x i m a t e d i n the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . He o b s e r v e d the b e h a v i o u r of the p r e s i d e n t , the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a d v i s o r and the o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s d u r i n g the major f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s i n each a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 6 2 W i t h the use of i n t e r v i e w s and d a t a from the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l 3 6 f i l e s , he examined s e v e r a l q u e s t i o n s . Which p r e s i d e n t i a l s t y l e s u i t s the s t r a t e g y b e s t ? How d i d the p r e s i d e n t s d e f i n e the r o l e of the c u s t o d i a n ? What a c t i v i t i e s d i d the c u s t o d i a n engage i n , and what was t h e i r i n f l u e n c e on the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s ? He found s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t h a t the s t r a t e g y can be implemented. Moreover, when used, i t tended t o improve the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . A l s o , i t p r o v i d e d u s e f u l t o o l s t o i d e n t i f y m a l f u n c t i o n s i n the p r o c e s s g e n e r a l l y . S p e c i f i c a l l y , H a l l examined whether the p r e s i d e n t ' s s t y l e a f f e c t s the p o s s i b l i t y of imp l e m e n t i n g the s t r a t e g y , how e s s e n t i a l the r o l e t a s k f o r m u l a t i o n of the c u s t o d i a n i s , and which a c t i v i t i e s harm or enhance h i s c u s t o d i a l r o l e t a s k s . F u r t h e r m o r e , H a l l examined whether the c u s t o d i a n has enough power or \" l e v e r a g e \" t o muster a d v i c e which c h a l l e n g e s the a d v i c e of such p o w e r f u l a g e n t s as the S e c r e t a r y of Defense and the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e . In response t o the s p e c i f i c c r i t i c i s m s l e v e l l e d a t the s t r a t e g y , H a l l found t h a t the s t r a t e g y ' s f e a s i b i l i t y i s indee d dependent on the s t y l e of the p r e s i d e n t . P r e s i d e n t s who f a v o u r a c o m p e t i t i v e or c o l l e g i a l s t y l e of d e c i s i o n -making use the s t r a t e g y more than those who p r e f e r a f o r m a l i s t i c s t y l e . 6 3 Those p r e s i d e n t s who t o l e r a t e h i g h l e v e l s of i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o n f l i c t and who a r e a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d i n the p r o c e s s w i l l b e n e f i t most from the s t r a t e g y . A l s o , t h e s e p r e s i d e n t s a r e w i l l i n g t o make time a v a i l a b l e t o b e n e f i t from the p o l i c y d e b a t e s . H a l l a l s o found t h a t when the p r e s i d e n t d e f i n e s the r o l e of the c u s t o d i a n c l e a r l y , he w i l l have enough l e v e r a g e 37 t o do h i s j o b . 6 \" There i s no need f o r a p r e s i d e n t t o be h i s own c u s t o d i a n . Moreover, H a l l ' s f i n d i n g s r e j e c t the a s s e r t i o n t h a t the r e s o u r c e s of the a d v o c a t e s cannot be b a l a n c e d . As l o n g as the a d v o c a t e s have e q u a l a c c e s s t o the p r e s i d e n t and t o the p o l i c y forums, t h e i r r e s o u r c e d i f f e r e n c e s can be evened ou t . The most c r u c i a l a s p e c t of H a l l ' s f i n d i n g s concern the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r . Can he r e a l l y p e r f o r m the r o l e of a c u s t o d i a n ? H a l l argues t h a t d u r i n g most of the Truman and Kennedy y e a r s , the NSA indeed performed the r o l e of p r o c e s s manager, honest b r o k e r , and g e n e r a l c o o r d i n a t o r of p o l i c y . 6 5 However, h i s r o l e changed when he began t o a d v o c a t e p o l i c y . H i s p o l i c y advocacy, H a l l a r g u e s , caused him t o n e g l e c t h i s o t h e r d u t i e s . I n s t e a d , he became one of the p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r s t o the p r e s i d e n t . H a l l s t a t e s t h a t the p o l i c y advocacy r o l e cannot c o e x i s t w i t h h i s o t h e r t a s k s . As a r e s u l t of a d v o c a t i n g p o l i c y , the c u s t o d i a n can no l o n g e r be an o b j e c t i v e and e f f e c t i v e p r o c e s s o r of o p t i o n s he does not f a v o u r . Moreover, he w i l l no l o n g e r widen the debate whenever h i s o p t i o n has r e c e i v e d a h e a r i n g . F i n a l l y , he w i l l be l e s s w i l l i n g t o c a l l f o r a r e v i e w of h i s o p t i o n , even though i t might not be a c h i e v i n g the p r e s i d e n t ' s o b j e c t i v e s . H a l l c o n c l u d e s t h a t the NSA can o n l y p e r f o r m the c u s t o d i a l r o l e as l o n g as George's p r e s c r i p t i o n s as w e l l as p r o s c r i p t i o n s of the r o l e t a s k s a r e s t r i c t l y e n f o r c e d . H a l l a l s o t e s t e d the o t h e r r o l e v i o l a t i o n s i d e n t i f i e d by G e o r g e . 6 6 W h i l e George s t a t e s t h a t p u b l i c s p e a k i n g , d i p l o m a c y , and p o l i c y enforcement w i l l a l s o undermine the 38 r o l e of the c u s t o d i a n , H a l l found t h a t the s t r a t e g y need not d e f i n e these a c t i v i t i e s as r i g i d l y as the p o l i c y advocacy r o l e . Only when the c u s t o d i a n engages i n s u b s t a n t i a l d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s or when he s t a t e s h i s p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s i n p u b l i c , or when he e n f o r c e s and implements p e r s o n a l l y the p r e s i d e n t ' s p o l i c y , w i l l he l o s e h i s i m p a r t i a l i t y . W h i l e H a l l a l l o w e d the c u s t o d i a n more leeway i n t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s , he d i d not c h a l l e n g e George's p r o s c r i p t i o n s f u n d a m e n t a l l y . H a l l ' s f i n d i n g s , i n e s s e n c e , p r o v i d e f o r a defense of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . H a l l not o n l y r e d r e s s e s s e v e r a l c r i t i c i s m s , but a l s o shows the s t r a t e g y t o be q u i t e f e a s i b l e . H a l l defends Georges's o r i g i n a l f o r m u l a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y , e m p h a s i z i n g t h a t i t s s u c c e s s l i e s i n the c a r e f u l o b s e r v a t i o n of the c u s t o d i a n ' s r o l e t a s k s . Both he and George b e l i e v e p o l i c y advocacy on the p a r t of the c u s t o d i a n c o n s t i t u t e s the c h i e f c h a l l e n g e t o the s t r a t e g y ' s e f f e c t i v e n e s s . TESTING THE ROLE PRESCRIPTIONS OF THE STRATEGY T h i s t h e s i s w i l l show t h a t c u s t o d i a l advocacy per se i s not d e t r i m e n t a l t o t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . When the a d v o c a t e s do not propose a wide range of o p t i o n s , the c u s t o d i a n w i l l improve the p r o c e s s by a d v o c a t i n g a new o p t i o n . Even when the a d v o c a t e s do propose s e v e r a l o p t i o n s , 39 the c u s t o d i a n may s t i l l improve the p r o c e s s by a d d i n g an e x t r a p e r s p e c t i v e . B oth George and H a l l d e a l i n s u f f i c i e n t l y w i t h the s t r a t e g y ' s a b i l i t y t o p r o v i d e f o r a d i v e r s i t y of o p t i o n s . I t i s u n c l e a r whether a wide range of o p i n i o n s among the a d v o c a t e s i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r the s t r a t e g y t o work or whether the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y w i l l produce such a range. For example, H a l l n otes t h a t the ad v o c a t e s i n the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n were of d i v e r s e i d e o l o g i c a l b a c k g r o u n d s . 6 7 Y e t , as t h i s study w i l l show, they o f t e n f a i l e d t o r a i s e s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t o p t i o n s . What i s the c u s t o d i a n t o do i n such a s i t u a t i o n ? George w r i t e s t h a t the c u s t o d i a n , i n such a c a s e , may choose t o a p p o i n t a d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e . Y e t , he a l s o r e c o g n i z e s t h a t d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e s l o s e t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y q u i t e q u i c k l y . 6 8 The o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s may not pay much a t t e n t i o n t o such advocacy, knowing t h a t i t i s i n t e n d e d m erely t o c h a l l e n g e t h e i r v i e w p o i n t s r a t h e r than p r o v i d e a genuine a l t e r n a t i v e view. A l s o , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n can i n v i t e o u t s i d e r s t o the p o l i c y forums t o widen the range of o p t i o n s . However, I b e l i e v e t h i s i s the most i m p r a c t i c a l a s p e c t of the s t r a t e g y . The s t r a t e g y a l r e a d y p u t s g r e a t demands on the p r e s i d e n t . W h i l e he may t o l e r a t e d i s s e n t among h i s c l o s e s t a d v i s o r s , he may be l e s s w i l l i n g t o a l l o w o u t s i d e r s t h a t p r i v i l e g e . Moreover, i t may ta k e c o n s i d e r a b l e time and stu d y f o r o u t s i d e r s t o c h a l l e n g e the arguments of the a d v o c a t e s . A l s o , an o u t s i d e r cannot e a s i l y j o i n the c l o s e r a p p o r t which d e v e l o p s between a p r e s i d e n t and h i s 40 i n n e r c i r c l e . 6 9 W h i l e George and H a l l p r o v i d e l i t t l e i n the way of e n s u r i n g d i v e r s e o p t i o n s , they c l e a r l y p r o s c r i b e the c u s t o d i a n from d i v e r s i f y i n g the debate by means of genuine advocacy. Advocacy, p u b l i c s p e a k i n g and d i p l o m a c y , on the p a r t of the c u s t o d i a n , a re a l l e g e d t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h h i s o t h e r r o l e t a s k s . S e v e r a l case s t u d i e s i n t h i s t h e s i s w i l l show t h a t t h e s e p r o s c r i p t i o n s a r e too s t r i c t , i f not c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . These a c t i v i t i e s w i l l o n l y harm the p r o c e s s when they a r e combined w i t h the c u s t o d i a n ' s n e g l e c t of the p r o c e s s norms. Only when the c u s t o d i a n f a i l s t o p r o v i d e a f a i r h e a r i n g f o r the a d v o c a t e s or when he b l o c k s them from p o l i c y m e e tings, or when he does not e l e v a t e t h e i r c o n f l i c t s t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n w i l l t he p r o c e s s be harmed. Moreover, I w i l l show t h a t c u s t o d i a l n e g l e c t of the p r o c e s s norms i s not n e c e s s a r i l y l i n k e d t o h i s advocacy r o l e . The c u s t o d i a n can advocate p o l i c y and manage the p r o c e s s a t the same t i m e . E s p e c i a l l y , when the a d v o c a t e s do not produce a wide v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s , the c u s t o d i a n ' s genuine advocacy w i l l a c t u a l l y improve the p r o c e s s . These arguments a r e based on a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of f o u r f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s d u r i n g the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Whether or not c o n s c i o u s l y adopted, t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n implemented many of the r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e s s norms p r e s c r i b e d by the s t r a t e g y . As such, i t p r o v i d e s a good t e s t i n g ground f o r an e v a l u a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y . Both George and H a l l o f f e r a few o b s e r v a t i o n s on t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 7 0 They found C a r t e r ' s s t y l e c o n d u c i v e t o a 4 1 open p o l i c y debate p r o c e s s . He was w i l l i n g t o f o s t e r p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n s and a l l o w d i s s e n t among h i s t o p a d v i s o r s . Moreover, he was w i l l i n g t o engage p e r s o n a l l y i n the debates among h i s a d v i s o r s and kept a c l o s e r e i n on the f i n a l p o l i c y c h o i c e s . A l s o , he i n s t i t u t e d p r o c e d u r e s whereby most s e n i o r a d v i s o r s were a b l e t o have d i r e c t a c c e s s t o him. B r z e z i n s k i ' s r o l e was d e f i n e d s u f f i c i e n t l y c l o s e t o the g u i d e l i n e s of the s t r a t e g y . He was i n charge of the i n t e r a g e n c y p o l i c y p r o c e s s and was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the c o o r d i n a t i o n of the v a r i o u s o p t i o n s as w e l l as the v a r i o u s p o l i c y m e e t i n g s . Y e t , H a l l argues c o r r e c t l y t h a t the p o l i c y p r o c e s s d e t e r i o r a t e d towards the end of C a r t e r ' s second y e a r . The open debate forums and the e q u a l a c c e s s of the a d v i s o r s were g r a d u a l l y r e p l a c e d by b u r e a u c r a t i c b a t t l e s among them and i n d i v i d u a l end runs on the p r e s i d e n t . As a r e s u l t , the f o u r case s t u d i e s a l l f a l l w i t h i n the f i r s t two y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . However, they w i l l a l s o i l l u s t r a t e why the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s d e t e r i o r a t e d . 7 1 W h i l e George and H a l l blame the demise of the p r o c e s s on B r z e z i n s k i ' s p o l i c y advocacy and o t h e r r o l e t a s k v i o l a t i o n s , the f o u r c a s e s show t h a t the s t r a t e g y was hampered from the s t a r t as a r e s u l t of the l a c k of d i v e r s i t y of o p i n i o n among C a r t e r ' s a d v o c a t e s . T h e i r c o n s e n s u a l views d i d not p r o v i d e C a r t e r w i t h a s u f f i c i e n t range of o p t i o n s . B r z e z i n s k i c o r r e c t e d t h i s f l a w by a d v o c a t i n g those o p t i o n s l e f t out of the debate by the o t h e r a d v o c a t e s . T h i s c u s t o d i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n improved the p r o c e s s . The p r o c e s s 42 f u n c t i o n e d w e l l u n t i l B r z e z i n s k i abandoned the maintenance of the s t r a t e g y ' s p r o c e s s norms. The hypotheses proposed i n t h i s s tudy a r e t e s t e d by means of an i n d e p t h a n a l y s i s of f o u r d e c i s i o n i s s u e s d u r i n g the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The s e l e c t i o n of c r i t e r i a f o r the case s t u d i e s f o l l o w s c l o s e l y the g u i d e l i n e s which George uses t o i n d i c a t e the scope of a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the s t r a t e g y . At a v e r y g e n e r a l l e v e l , t he s t r a t e g y c o n s t i t u t e s a system of managed a d v e r s a r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s aimed a t o f f e r i n g a c r i t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n of p o l i c y o p t i o n s b e f o r e they a r e adopted by the t o p d e c i s i o n - m a k e r . As such, the s t r a t e g y i s not r e s t r i c t e d t o any type of p o l i c y i s s u e per s e . 7 2 Y e t , George adds t h a t the s t r a t e g y i s more a p p l i c a b l e t o c r i t i c a l than t o r o u t i n e i s s u e s . Without i m p l y i n g t h a t the s t r a t e g y cannot be a p p l i e d t o a wider v a r i e t y of i s s u e s , George l i m i t s h i s d i s c u s s i o n , i n h i s 1972 a r t i c l e , t o c r i t i c a l i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g a c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n i n which the U n i t e d S t a t e s must make a d e c i s i o n i n v o l v i n g e i t h e r commitment, i n t e r v e n t i o n or e s c a l a t i o n . 7 3 The c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n i s s u e s a re more u s e f u l f o r George's a n a l y s i s than r o u t i n e i s s u e because they b r i n g w i t h them a sense of urgency and a r e a b l e t o f o c u s the a t t e n t i o n of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i m m e d i a t e l y . As such, they i l l u s t r a t e more c l e a r l y any p o s s i b l e m a l f u n c t i o n s i n the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s and o f f e r \" d i d a c t i c v a l u e \" t o h i g h l i g h t the s t r e n g t h of m u l t i p l e advocacy p r o c e e d i n g s . In a f o o t n o t e , however, George adds t h a t a \"broader e m p i r i c a l base would be d e s i r a b l e t o d e f i n e more c l e a r l y the scope of the 43 s t r a t e g y . \" 7 0 In h i s 1972 s t u d y , George d i s c u s s e s such i s s u e s as the American response t o the N o r t h Korean a t t a c k on South Korea i n 1950, the C h i n e s e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h i s c o n f l i c t i n l a t e 1950, the i n c r e a s e of American m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s i n South Vietnam i n l a t e 1961, and P r e s i d e n t Johnson's d e c i s i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o the M u l t i l a t e r a l F o r c e f o r NATO i n October 1 9 6 4 . 7 5 B e s i d e s b e i n g c r i t i c a l i s s u e s which r e q u i r e d e i t h e r commitment, i n t e r v e n t i o n or e s c a l a t i o n , George s e l e c t e d t h e s e i s s u e s on the b a s i s of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s , a dding t h a t \"no p a r t i c u l a r s a m p l i n g s t r a t e g y was e m p l o y e d . \" 7 6 F i n a l l y , George uses h i s case s t u d i e s o n l y t o e v a l u a t e the degree t o which the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s c o n t r i b u t e d t o the f a i l u r e or s u c c e s s of the e v e n t u a l outcome. U n l i k e some h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s , he does not attempt t o g i v e a d e f i n i t i v e h i s t o r i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the causes of f a i l u r e or s u c c e s s . H a l l expanded c o n s i d e r a b l y the scope of i s s u e s a p p l i c a b l e t o the s t r a t e g y . Rather than a d h e r i n g t o \" c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g c o n f l i c t , \" he l o o k e d a t a l l major f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s which i n v o l v e l a r g e change and low l e v e l s of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H a l l ' s c r i t e r i a a r e d e r i v e d from Lindblom's f a m i l i a r t y p o l o g y of i s s u e s on the b a s i s of the degree of change they cause and the degree of u n d e r s t a n d i n g the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r has c o n c e r n i n g t h e m . 7 7 R u l e d out f o r m u l t i p l e advocacy p r o c e e d i n g s a r e i s s u e s t h a t i n c u r o n l y s m a l l changes and which a r e r a t h e r w e l l u n d e r s t o o d . Such \" a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and t e c h n i c a l i s s u e s \" a r e 44 d e s c r i b e d b e t t e r by i n c r e m e n t a l i s t models which account f o r a d j u s t m e n t s made t o e x i s t i n g p o l i c y . However, the c a t e g o r y of i s s u e s i n v o l v i n g wars, r e v o l u t i o n s , c r i s e s and \"grand o p p o r t u n i t i e s \" a r e c o n s i d e r e d by H a l l t o be w e l l s u i t e d f o r m u l t i p l e advocacy p r o c e e d i n g s . In h i s study of most postwar a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , H a l l d e s c r i b e s the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s norms of each a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the v a r i o u s r o l e t a s k s of the p a r t i c i p a n t s by means of a n a l y z i n g most major f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s f a c e d by each a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . As mentioned above, t h i s t h e s i s o n l y e v a l u a t e s the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s d u r i n g the f i r s t two y e a r s of the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . H a l l and o t h e r s have shown t h a t the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s d u r i n g the l a t t e r two y e a r s resembled c l o s e l y the B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s model. The c o n d i t i o n s which p r e v a i l e d d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d p r e v e n t any a p p r o x i m a t i o n of the norms of m u l t i p l e advocacy and t h u s cannot be used t o e v a l u a t e or t e s t the s t r a t e g y . The t h e s i s e v a l u a t e s f o u r case s t u d i e s . T h i s number i s c o n s i d e r e d l a r g e enough t o a l l o w c e r t a i n g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s but s m a l l enough t o keep the s t u d y manageable. S e v e r a l c r i t e r i a g u i de the s e l e c t i o n of t h e s e i s s u e s . F i r s t , t h ey a r e major f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s as d e s c r i b e d by H a l l . They i n c l u d e wars, c r i s e s , r e v o l u t i o n s and grand o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Second, more o f t e n than not they a l s o i n v o l v e what George has d e s c r i b e d as commitment, i n t e r v e n t i o n or e s c a l a t i o n . T h i r d , l i k e George, I am not u s i n g any p a r t i c u l a r s a m p l i n g s t r a t e g y e x c ept t h a t t h e r e must be s u f f i c i e n t d a t a on the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s a v a i l a b l e . 45 The f o u r cases, a r e : the deep c u t s p r o p o s a l s i n the SALT I I n e g o t i a t i o n s , the American response t o the war i n the Horn of A f r i c a i n 1977 and e a r l y 1978, the n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between China and the U n i t e d S t a t e s , and the f a l l of t he Shah of I r a n . The war i n the Horn of A f r i c a as w e l l as the r e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n f a l l c l e a r l y w i t h i n George's g u i d e l i n e s . Both were c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s i n the sense t h a t an immediate American response was c o n s i d e r e d n e c e s s a r y . As c r i s i s i s s u e s , they a l s o f a l l i n t o L i n d b l o m ' s c r i t i c a l c a t e g o r y s i n c e any American response would have a c o n s i d e r a b l e impact upon the s i t u a t i o n , w h i l e a t the same time the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was o p e r a t i n g under c o n d i t i o n s of u n c e r t a i n and i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n . The i n n o v a t i v e and b o l d p r o p o s a l s i n the SALT I I t a l k s , proposed by C a r t e r i n March 1977, as w e l l as the c o m p l e t i o n of the n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s w i t h C h i n a , must be c o n s i d e r e d as grand o p p o r t u n i t i e s . These d e c i s i o n s sought t o e f f e c t l a r g e changes i n American d i p l o m a c y . They a l s o q u a l i f y as d e c i s i o n s of commitment. W h i l e not a commitment i n the narrow m i l i t a r y sense as used by George, both the American p r o p o s a l t o c u t d r a s t i c a l l y the amounts of s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r weapons, and the move t o t e r m i n a t e o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan and acknowledge o f f i c i a l l y the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of Chi n a must be c o n s i d e r e d as more than r o u t i n e d e c i s i o n s by the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . C a r t e r made s e v e r a l o t h e r i m p o r t a n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s d u r i n g h i s f i r s t two y e a r s . Most prominent a r e the 4 6 Camp David Accord, the Panama Canal Treaties, human rights policy, i n i t i a t i v e s towards majority rule in Southern A f r i c a , and several defense issues, including the decision not to deploy the neutron bomb. These issues are excluded not because they do not f a l l into the above discussed categories or because they are unimportant. Rather, they are excluded because of a lack of available data on them or because the decision-making process on the issue was so e r r a t i c as to defeat any attempt to examine multiple advocacy proceedings in l i g h t of i t . Carter's Middle East p o l i c y , for example, started out as a broad discussion within the administration on who to inv i t e and how to proceed with a Geneva Conference. When this approach f a i l e d to produce any re s u l t s , Carter's prospects for a Middle East Peace settlement dimmed u n t i l Sadat v i s i t e d Jerusalem. While so far the issue would be useful to examine in l i g h t of the multiple advocacy strategy, i t appears that the l a t t e r part of Carter's Middle East policy, including the Camp David Summit was largely monopolized by Carter personally. It i s very d i f f i c u l t to piece together a meaningful decision-making process when the president personally deals with a l l decisions and most d e t a i l s without a larger debate in the ad m i n i s t r a t i o n . 7 8 It is only for this reason that t h i s issue i s excluded from this study. The decision to return ownership of the Panama Canal to the Panamanians appears to have been made by the president-elect and his preliminary team. Most sources indicate that 47 t h e r e was a w i d e s p r e a d consensus on t h i s i s s u e . 7 9 As a r e s u l t of the e a r l y consensus and the l a c k of d a t a , t h i s i s s u e does not l e n d i t s e l f t o a d e t a i l e d s t u d y . In s p i t e of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s f r e q u e n t r h e t o r i c on human r i g h t s , i t never adopted a c o h e r e n t or comprehensive p o l i c y on the i s s u e . 8 0 A s i m i l a r f a t e b e f e l l C a r t e r ' s i n i t i a t i v e s towards m a j o r i t y r u l e i n S o u t h e r n A f r i c a . D e c i s i o n s on t h e s e i s s u e s a r e fragmented and a t t i m e s t a k e n q u i t e s e p a r a t e l y from one a n o t h e r . As such, they can h a r d l y be o r g a n i z e d i n t o one c l a s s of \"grand o p p o r t u n i t i e s . \" F i n a l l y , C a r t e r ' s d e c i s i o n not t o deploy the n e u t r o n bomb as w e l l as s e v e r a l o t h e r d e f e n s e p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s must a w a i t f u r t h e r d a t a b e f o r e they can be a n a l y z e d . The next c h a p t e r w i l l p r o v i d e a g e n e r a l o u t l i n e of the d e i c i s i o n environment i n the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . An o v e r v i e w of the p r e s i d e n t ' s s t y l e as w e l l as t h e r o l e s p l a y e d by the v a r i o u s a d v i s o r s w i l l i l l u s t r a t e the e x t e n t t o which the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s a p p r o x i m a t e d the c o n d i t i o n s o u t l i n e d by the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . 4 8 ENDNOTES 1 Hans J . Morgenthau, P o l i t i c s Among N a t i o n s : The S t r u g g l e For Power and Peace, New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1948. Other examples a r e A. W o l f e r s and L. M a r t i n ( e d s . ) , The A n g l o - American T r a d i t i o n i n F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1956; N i c h o l a s John Spykman, America's S t r a t e g y i n World P o l i t i c s : The U n i t e d S t a t e s and The Balan c e of Power, New York: H a r c o u r t , Brace & Wor l d , 1942; A. F. K. O r g a n s k i , World P o l i t i c s , New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1958; E. H. C a r r , The Twenty Year's C r i s i s : 1919-1939 , London: M a c M i l l a n , 1939. W h i l e the r a t i o n a l a c t o r model was s t i l l used i n the 1960's and beyond, o t h e r a n a l y s e s e m p h a s i z i n g e n v i r o n m e n t a l , p e r s o n a l i t y and p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s t h a t m o d i f i e d or reduced the \" r a t i o n a l i t y \" of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s were i n t r o d u c e d . For the e n v i r o n m e n t a l f a c t o r s see e.g. R i c h a r d C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and B u r t o n S a p i n , F o r e i g n P o l i c y D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g , New York: The Free P r e s s , 1962; Glenn D. P a i g e , The Korean D e c i s i o n , New York: The Fr e e P r e s s . E a r l y examples of the i n f l u e n c e of p e r s o n a l i t y on d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a r e A l e x a n d e r L. and J u l i e t t e L. George, Woodrow W i l s o n and C o l o n e l House: A P e r s o n a l i t y Study, New York: Dover, 1964; Ole R. H o i s t i e t . a l . ( e d s . ) , Enemies i n P o l i t i c s , C h i c a g o : Rand M c N a l l y , 1967. An e a r l y example of the i n f l u e n c e of p s y c h o l o g y i s Joseph H. de R i v e r a , The P s y c h o l o g i c a l Dimension of F o r e i g n P o l i c y , Columbus, Ohio: C h a r l e s E. M e r i l l , 1968. 2 For a d i s c u s s i o n of the \" r a t i o n a l a c t o r \" c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n see Graham T. A l l i s o n , Essence of D e c i s i o n , B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, 1971; Glen H. Snyder and P a u l D i e s i n g , C o n f l i c t Among N a t i o n s , P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1977. 3 R i c h a r d C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Bur t o n S a p i n , F o r e i g n P o l i c y D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g , New York: The Free P r e s s , 1962; H a r o l d and Margaret S p r o u t , \" E n v i r o n m e n t a l F a c t o r s i n the Study of I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , \" J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , No. 1, 1957. * Joseph de R i v e r a , The P s y c h o l o g i c a l Dimension of F o r e i g n P o l i c y , Columbus, Ohio: C. E. M e r r i l l , 1968; Robert J e r i v s , P e r c e p t i o n and M i s p e r c e p t i o n i n I n t e r n a t i o n a t P o l i t c s , P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976. 5 Leon F e s t i n g e r , A Theory of C o g n i t i v e D i s s o n a n c e , E v a n s t o n : Row and P p e t e r s o n , 1957. 6 Ole R. H o l s t i , \"The B e l i e f System and N a t i o n a l Images: A Case Study,\" J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , No. 6, 1962, pp. 244-252; Ole R. H o l s t i , Robert C. N o r t h and R i c h a r d A. Brody, \" P e r c e p t i o n and A c t i o n i n the 1914 C r i s i s , \" i n J . D a v i d S i n g e r ( e d . ) , Q u a n t i t a t i v e I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , New York: The Free P r e s s , 1968. 7 C h a r l e s F. Hermann ( e d . ) , I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i s i s : I n s i g h t s 49 from B e h a v i o r a l R e s e a r c h , New York: The F r e e P r e s s , 1972; Ole \\T. H o l s t i , C r i s i s , E s c a l a t i o n , War, M o n t r e a l : M c G i l l -Queens P r e s s , 1972. 8 I r v i n g L. J a n i s , G r o u p t h i n k , (2nd. e d . ) , B o s t o n : Houghton, M i f f l i n , 1982. 9 R i c h a r d E. N e u s t a d t , P r e s i d e n t i a l Power, New York: W i l e y & Sons, 1960; Roger H i l s m a n , To Move a N a t i o n , New York: D e l l , 1967; H a r o l d W i l e n s k y , O r g a n i z a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e , New Y o rk: B a s i c Books, 1967; Morton H. H a l p e r i n , B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t c s and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , Washington: The B r o o k i n g s I n s t i t u t i o n , 1974; I . M. D e s t l e r , P r e s i d e n t s , B u r e a u c r a t s and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972. 1 0 Graham T. A l l i s o n , Essence of D e c i s i o n , B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, 1971. 1 1 M i r i a m S t e i n e r , \"The S e a r c h f o r Order i n a D i s o r d e r l y W orld: Worldviews and P r e s c r i p t i v e D e c i s i o n Paradigms,\" I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , No. 3, 1983, p. 373-413. 1 2 James G. March and H e r b e r t A. Simon, O r g a n i z a t i o n s , New Y o rk: John W i l e y & Sons, 1958; H e r b e r t A. Simon, Models of Man, New York: John W i l e y & Sons, 1957; D a v i d Braybrooke and C h a r l e s E. L i n d b l o m , A S t r a t e g y of D e c i s i o n , New York: The F r e e P r e s s , 1963. 1 3 John D. S t e i n b r u n e r , The C y b e r n e t i c Theory of D e c i s i o n , P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974. 1 • S t e i n e r (1983), p.379 1 5 The f o r m u l a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y can be found i n A l e x a n d e r L. George, \"The Case f o r M u l t i p l e Advocacy i n Making F o r e i g n P o l i c y , \" American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, September 1972, pp 751-785; A l e x a n d e r L. George, \"Towards a More Soundly Based F o r e i g n P o l i c y : Making B e t t e r Use of I n f o r m a t i o n , \" Commission on the O r g a n i z a t i o n of the Government f o r the Conduct of F o r e i g n P o l i c y , Volume 2, Appendix D, Washington: Gov't. P r i n t . O f f . , 1975; A l e x a n d e r L. George, P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g i n F o r e i g n P o l i c y , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1980. The s t r a t e g y i s based on s e v e r a l s t u d i e s i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . George c a l l s the s t r a t e g y a p o l i c y s c i e n c e s t h e o r y . As such, the s t r a t e g y i s not a n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y which can be used t o judge p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . I t i s a l s o not an e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y which can o f f e r broad g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s t h a t e x p l a i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s e s or d e c i s i o n phenomena i n g e n e r a l . R a t h e r , l i k e the George et a l . study on d e t e r r e n c e ( A l e x a n d e r L. George and R i c h a r d Smoke, D e t e r r e n c e i n American F o r e i g n P o l i c y , New Y o rk: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974 ) and H a l l and Simons' stu d y on c o e r c i v e d i p l o m a c y ( D a v i d K. H a l l and W. E. Simons, The L i m i t s of C o e r c i v e Diplomacy, B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, 1971 5 the s t r a t e g y o f f e r s d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s c o n t i n g e n t 50 g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s on how t o s t r u c t u r e o p t i m a l l y t h e i r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . W h i l e i n r e a l i t y , we can a t b e s t e x p e c t d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s t o approximate the p r o v i s i o n s p r e s c r i b e d by the s t r a t e g y , the p r e s c r i p t i o n s t hemselves a r e f i r m l y based on h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and cannot s i m p l y be l a b e l l e d \" i d e a l t y p e \" p r o v i s i o n s . 1 6 D a v i d K. H a l l , Implementing M u l t i p l e Advocacy i n the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l : 1947-1980, Ph.D t h e s i s , S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , 1982, p.58. 1 7 George (1980), p.10. 1 8 George (1972), p.752 1 9 See S t a n l e y L. F a l k , \"The NSC under Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy,\" P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Q u a r t e r l y , September 1964, pp.403-434; B e r t A. Rockman, \"America's Department of S t a t e : I r r e g u l a r and R e g u l a r Syndromes of P o l i c y Making,\" American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, No.4, December 1981. pp.91 1-927 2 0 I r v i n g M. D e s t l e r , \"A Job t h a t Doesn't Work,\" F o r e i g n P o l i c y , 38, 1980, pp.80-88; P e t e r S z a n t o n , \"Two J o b s , not One,\" F o r e i g n P o l i c y , 38, 1980. pp.89-91 2 1 H a l l (1982), pp.58-62 l i s t s the f o u r p r o c e s s norms as the p a r t i c i p a t i o n , f a i r n e s s , c o m p e t i t i o n and d i v e r s i t y pr i n c i p l e s . 2 2 George (1980), c h a p t e r 11. 2 3 Idem., p.173. 2 0 George (1972), p.785. For a d i s c u s s i o n of the C l a s s i c a l R a t i o n a l i t y c o n c e p t i o n of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g see i . a . Graham T. A l l i s o n , Essence of D e c i s i o n , B o s t o n : L i t t l e Brown & Co., 1971; R i c h a r d C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, B u r t o n S a p i n , F o r e i g n P o l i c y D e c i s i o n - Making, New York: The F r e e P r e s s , 1982; D a v i d Braybrooke and C h a r l e s E. L i n d b l o m , A S t r a t e g y of D e c i s i o n , New York: The F r e e P r e s s , 1963; J a n i c e Gross S t e i n and Raymond T a n t e r , R a t i o n a l D e c i s i o n Making: I s r a e l ' s S e c u r i t y C h o i c e , 1967, Columbus, Ohio: Ohio U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1980 2 5 James G. March and H e r b e r t A. Simon, O r g a n i z a t i o n s , New York: John W i l e y & Sons, 1958; Braybrooke and L i n d b l o m (1963); C h a r l e s H. L i n d b l o m , \"The S c i e n c e of M u d d l i n g Through,\" P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Review, No. 2, 1959. pp.79-88; Aaron W i l d a v s k y , The P o l i t i c s of the Budgetary P r o c e s s , B o s t o n : L i t t l e Brown & Co., 1974 i s an example of the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s c o n c e p t i o n . 2 6 For example see John D. S t e i n b r u n e r , The C y b e r n e t i c Theory of Decision', P r i n c e t o n , New J e r s e y : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974; M i r i a m S t e i n e r , \"The S e a r c h f o r Order i n a D i s o r d e r l y World: Worldviews and P r e s c r i p t i v e 51 D e c i s i o n Paradigms,\" I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , No.3, 1983. pp.373-413 2 7 S t e i n e r (1983), p.392. 2 8 . Robert J e r v i s , P e r c e p t i o n and M i s p e r c e p t i o n i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , P r i n c e t o n , New J e r s e y : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976; Joseph de R i v e r a , The P s y c h o l o g i c a l Dimension of F o r e i g n P o l i c y , Columbus, Ohio: C. E. M e r i l l , 1968, p.53; I r v i n g L. J a n i s & Leon Mann, D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g , New York: The Free P r e s s , 1977, p.54. 2 9 Examples of t h e s e t e c h n i q u e s can be found i n s o u r c e s l i s t e d i n p r e v i o u s quote as w e l l as George (1980); R i c h a r d E. Neustadt and E r n e s t R. May, T h i n k i n g i n Time, New York: The Free P r e s s , 1986; Lawrence S. F a l k o w s k i ( e d . ) , P s y c h o l o g i c a l Models i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1979; George V. Coelho e t a l . ( e d s . ) , Coping and A d a p t a t i o n , New York: B a s i c Books I n c . , 1974. 3 0 George (1980), p.25 3 1 S t e i n b r u n e r (1974), Chapter 2; R i c h a r d Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War, B a l t i m o r e : Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1981, p.106; J e r v i s (1976), Chapter 4. 3 2 George (1972), p.752, de R i v e r a (1968), p.98. 3 3 B. Aubrey F i s h e r , S m a l l Group D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g , New York: McGraw H i l l ; George (1980), p.81. 3\" P a u l Hare Handbook of S m a l l Group R e s e a r c h , New York: The F r e e P r e s s , 1976, p.307; Norman R. F. M a i e r , Problem S o l v i n g and C r e a t i v i t y i n I n d i v i d u a l s and Groups, Belmont, C a l i f o r n i a : Wadsworth P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1970, pp.348, 349, 432, 433; V i c t o r H. Vroom and P h i l i p W. Y e t t o n , L e a d e r s h i p and D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g , P i t t s b u r g h : U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g P r e s s , 1973, p.25. 3 5 Vroom and Y e t t o n (1973), p.30; de R i v e r a (1968), p.209. 3 6 M a i e r (1970), p.433; Hare (1976), c h a p t e r 2; Dan C a l d w e l l , \" B u r e a u c r a t i c F o r e i g n P o l i c y Making,\" American B e h a v i o r a l S c i e n t i s t , No.1, September 1977, p.97. 3 7 I r v i n g L. J a n i s , G r o u p t h i n k , 2nd ed. B o s t o n : Houghton M i f f l i n Co, 1982. 3 8 R i c h a r d E. N e u s t a d t , P r e s i d e n t i a l Power, New York: W i l e y , 1960; Warner R. S c h i l l i n g , P a u l T. Hammond and Glen H. Snyder, S t r a t e g y , P o l i t i c s and Defense Budgets, New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962; A l l i s o n (1971), c h a p t e r 5. See a l s o Morton H. H a l p e r i n , B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , Washington: The B r o o k i n g s I n s t i t u t i o n , 1974; and I . M. D e s t l e r , P r e s i d e n t s , B u r e a u c r a t s and F o r e i g n 52 P o l i c y , P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e s i t y P r e s s , 1972. 3 9 A l l i s o n (1971), c h a p t e r 5; Robert J . A r t , \" B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s and American F o r e i g n P o l i c y ,\" P o l i c y S c i e n c e s , No.4, 1973, pp.467-490 a o George (1980), p.4. A u t h o r s who have e x p l o r e d t h e s e problems i n c l u d e R i c h a r d W. Cottam, F o r e i g n P o l i c y M o t i v a t i o n , P i t t s b u r g h : U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h P r e s s , 1977; Margaret G. Hermann ( e d . ) , A P s y c h o l o g i c a l E x a m i n a t i o n of P o l i t i c a l L e a d e r s , New York: The Free P r e s s , 1977; James D. B a r b e r , The P r e s i d e n t i a l C h a r a c t e r , Englewoods C l i f f s , N.J: P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1972. * 1 A d i s c u s s i o n of th e s e f a c t o r s can be found i n i . a . C h a r l e s F. Hermann, ( e d . ) , I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i s e s : I n s i g h t s from B e h a v i o r a l R e s e a r c h , New York: The F r e e P r e s s , 1972; Ole R. H o l s t i , C r i s i s , E s c a l a t i o n , War, M o n t r e a l : M c G i l l -Queen's U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972; Lebow (1981). \" 2 George (1980), c h a p t e r 3. See a l s o de R i v e r a (1968), pp.23-28; J e r v i s (1976), c h a p t e r s 3 and 7; Ole R. H o l s t i , \"The B e l i e f System and N a t i o n a l Images,\" J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , No.6, 1962, pp.244-252; Lebow (1981), p.103. \" \" 3 A l l i s o n (1971), p.83; March and Simon (1958), p.218. See a l s o H a r o l d L. W i l e n s k y , O r g a n i z a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e , New York: B a s i c Books, 1967, pp.42-48. George (1972), p.754; George (1980), c h a p t e r . 10 4 5 C h a r l e s E. L i n d b l o m , The I n t e l l i g e n c e of Democracy: D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g Through M u t u a l Adjustment, New York: The Free P r e s s , 1965; see George (1972), p.760. a s George (1972), p.761. \" 7 See e s p e c i a l l y George (1980), c h a p t e r 9. * 8 For example see George's d i s c u s s i o n of P r e s i d e n t Johnson's t r e a t m e n t of George B a l l d u r i n g t h e Vietnam War. George (1980), p.171. \" 9 George (1980), p.170. 5 0 Idem, pp.151 , 152. T h i s s t y l e i s most o f t e n a t t r i b u t e d t o H a r r y Truman. 5 1 Idem, pp.150, 151. T h i s s t y l e i s based l a r g e l y on F r a n k l i n R o o s e v e l t ' s system of a d v i c e . 5 2 Idem, pp.157, 158; George (1972), pp.763-765. P r e s i d e n t Kennedy's s t r u c t u r e of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g d u r i n g the Cuban m i s s i l e c r i s i s resembles t h i s model. 5 3 Theodore Sorenson, Decison-Making i n the White House, New 53 York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963, pp.59-72; H o l s t i ( 1972), pp.207-212. See a l s o C a l d w e l l (1977), p.101. 5 f t J a n i s (1982), p.250. 5 5 Roger B. P o r t e r , P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g : The Economic P o l i c y Board, Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1980, p.217. 5 6 Norman C. Thomas, \"Reforming the P r e s i d e n c y : Problems and P r o s p e c t s , \" i n Thomas E. C r o n i n and R e x f o r d G. T u g w e l l ( e d s . ) , The P r e s i d e n c y R e a p p r a i s e d , New York: Harper & Row, 1977, pp.340-341; E r w i n C. Hargrove, The Power of the Modern P r e s i d e n c y , P h i l a d e l p h i a : Temple U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974, pp.145, 146. 5 7 Stephen Hess, O r g a n i z i n g the P r e s i d e n c y , Washington: The B r o o k i n g s I n s t i t u t i o n , 1976, p.176. 5 8 D e s t l e r (1980), p.86 and \" N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i c e t o US P r e s i d e n t s : Some l e s s o n s from 30 y e a r s , \" World P o l i t i c s , 2 9 ( 2 ) , 1980. pp.143-176; See a l s o Szanton (1980), pp.89-91 5 9 Hargrove (1974), p.145; Rockman (1981), p.923. 6 0 Adam Y a r m o l i n s k y , \" B u r e a u c r a t i c S t r u c t u r e s and P o l i t i c a l Outcomes,\" J o u r n a l of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 23, 1969, pp.225-235 6 1 R i c h a r d F. Fenno, The P r e s i d e n t ' s C a b i n e t , Cambridge: H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1959. 6 2 H a l l (1982), A l e s s i n depth a n a l y s i s of the N i x o n , F o r d and C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f o l l o w s a f t e r . However, H a l l acknowledges h i s i n f o r m a t i o n f o r th e s e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s i s s c a n t . 6 3 H a l l does not r u l e out the use of the s t r a t e g y f o r f o r m a l i s t i c p r e s i d e n t s . However, h i s study shows c l e a r l y t h a t t h i s s t y l e i s not as r e c e p t i v e t o the s t r a t e g y as the c o m p e t i t i v e and c o l l e g i a l s t y l e s . See H a l l (1982), pp.700-705. 6 4 H a l l (1982), p.734, 735. 6 5 Idem., pp.708-721. 6 6 For the p o l i c y advocacy r o l e see H a l l (1982), pp.77, 78, 711, f o r p u b l i c s p e a k i n g see pp.715, 716, f o r the d i p l o m a t i c r o l e see pp.721-725, and f o r the p o l i c y enforcement r o l e see 717-720. 6 7 H a l l (1982), p.661. 6 8 George (1980), c h a p t e r 9. 54 6 9 Lebow (1981), pp.297-298; Thomas E. C r o n i n , The S t a t e of the P r e s i d e n c y , B o s t o n : L i t t l e Brown & Co.,.1975, p.276. 7 0 George (1980), pp.160, 200; H a l l (1982), pp.654-681. 7 1 The main change i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , as i d e n t i f i e d by H a l l , i s the demise of the open debate forum and the r e s t r i c t i o n of a c c e s s of s e v e r a l a d v o c a t e s t o the p r e s i d e n t . T h i s change took p l a c e g r a d u a l l y i n l a t e 1978 and e a r l y 1979. Most commentators a t t r i b u t e the change t o the growing p o l i c y disagreement between Vance and B r z e z i n s k i . As a r e s u l t of t h i s d i s a g r e e m e n t , most d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s e s d u r i n g the l a t t e r h a l f of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n resembled A l l i s o n ' s B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s model. The i n d i v i d u a l end runs on the p r e s i d e n t as w e l l as the l a c k of open debate among the a d v i s o r s which c h a r a c t e r i z e t h i s model, p r e c l u d e an e v a l u a t i o n of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . Examples of such commentators a r e : Gaddis S m i t h , M o r a l i t y , Reason and Power, New York: H i l l and Wang, 1986; D a v i d S. M c l e l l a n , Cyrus Vance, New York: Rowman and A l l a n h e l d 1985; M. Glenn Abernathy e t a l . ( e d s ) , The C a r t e r Y e a r s , London: F r a n c e s P i n t e r , 1984. 7 2 George (1972), p.751. 7 3 Idem, p.752. 7 4 Idem, p.767. 7 5 Idem, p.767. 7 6 Idem d i t t o . 7 7 H a l l (1982), p.49 and p.67. 7 8 Jimmy C a r t e r , Keeping F a i t h , New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p.316; Vance (1983), p.217. See a l s o John Havemann, \"White House R e p o r t , \" The N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , J u l y 16, 1977. 7 9 Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , Power and P r i n c i p l e , New York: F a r r a r , S t r a u s , G i r o u x , 1983, p.134; Cyrus Vance, Hard C h o i c e s , New York: Simon & S c h u s t e r , 1983, p. 140; Gaddis S m i t h , M o r a l i t y , Reason and Power, New York: H i l l and Wang, 1986, p.48. 0 B r z e z i n s k i ( 1 983), pp.126-127 CHAPTER TWO MULTIPLE ADVOCACY AND CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 56 T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l o f f e r a d e s c r i p t i o n of the g e n e r a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I t w i l l p r o v i d e e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g the e x t e n t t o which the p r o c e s s norms and r o l e t a s k s of m u l t i p l e advocacy were appr o x i m a t e d . The d i s c u s s i o n a l s o o u t l i n e s the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g environment i n which the f o u r i s s u e s , s t u d i e d i n d e p t h , can be u n d e r s t o o d . The memoirs of s e v e r a l p a r t i c i p a n t s , v a r i o u s i n t e r v i e w s and a number of academic s t u d i e s a r e now a v a i l a b l e and a l l o w a r e a s o n a b l y comprehensive l o o k a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , g o i n g beyond the p r e l i m i n a r y o b s e r v a t i o n s of George (1980) and H a l l (1982). A d e f i n i t i v e account must a w a i t the opening of the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y F i l e s . The d i s c u s s i o n i s d i v i d e d i n t o f i v e s e c t i o n s : the p r e s i d e n t ' s s t y l e , the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e , the r e s o u r c e s of the a d v o c a t e s , advocate c o m p e t i t i o n and d i v e r s i t y , and the c u s t o d i a n . Each s e c t i o n d e a l s w i t h one i m p o r t a n t c o n d i t i o n of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y and examines a s p e c t s from both the p r o c e s s norms and r o l e t a s k s r e l e v a n t t o the c o n d i t i o n . THE PRESIDENT'S STYLE An i m p o r t a n t theme i n C a r t e r ' s e l e c t i o n campaign was the need f o r an open, d e c e n t r a l i z e d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n the White House. 1 C a r t e r d i d not want a \" p a l a c e guard\" or 57 even a c h i e f of s t a f f . He a p p o i n t e d n i n e a s s i s t a n t s w i t h r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l s t a t u s but w i t h d i f f e r e n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n the White House. 2 A l l e g a t i o n s t h a t H a m i l t o n J o r d a n a c t e d as a de f a c t o c h i e f of s t a f f do not s t a n d up t o c a r e f u l s c r u t i n y . H i s r o l e has been d e s c r i b e d by s e v e r a l White House a i d e s , as w e l l as by h i m s e l f , as t h a t of a p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g i s t and watchdog f o r the p r e s i d e n t . J o r d a n d i d not p e r f o r m \" c h i e f of s t a f f \" f u n c t i o n s . He d i d not c o n t r o l the paper f l o w t o and from the p r e s i d e n t , d i d not s c r e e n a c c e s s t o the p r e s i d e n t and d i d not s e t the p r e s i d e n t ' s d a i l y s c h e d u l e . 3 T h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n l e f t C a r t e r as h i s own c h i e f of s t a f f ; as the \"hub i n the wheel\" i n Kennedy's now famous \"spokes i n the wheel\" s t a f f s t r u c t u r e . The hub was most l i k e l y not i n the c e n t r e of the wheel s i n c e \"the G e o r g i a n s , \" and p a r t i c u l a r l y Jody P o w e l l and H a m i l t o n J o r d a n , were f i r s t among e q u a l s . However t h i s s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p d i d not g i v e them a p o l i c y a d v i c e s t a t u s t o the e x c l u s i o n of o t h e r s . E v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t C a r t e r ' s w o r k i n g s t y l e s u i t e d h i s r o l e as h i s own c h i e f of s t a f f . C a r t e r b e l i e v e d he c o u l d c o o r d i n a t e the v a r i o u s arguments coming t o him on any i s s u e . He f e l t c o n f i d e n t about p e r s o n a l l y s c r e e n i n g the i n f o r m a t i o n sent t o him. Indeed, c o n c e r n i n g d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n g e n e r a l , he s a i d \" I l i k e t o be p e r s o n a l l y i n v o l v e d so t h a t I can know the thought p r o c e s s e s t h a t go i n t o f i n a l d e c i s i o n s . \" \" Robert Hunter, an o f f i c i a l i n the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , o b s e r v e d t h a t C a r t e r was always s t r i v i n g t o be p e r s o n a l l y on t o p of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 5 Both B r z e z i n s k i and Hedley Donovan (an a s s i s t a n t t o C a r t e r i n 1979) s t a t e t h a t C a r t e r was 58 f a m i l i a r w i t h James D. B a r b e r ' s t y p o l o g y of p r e s i d e n t i a l s t y l e s . They agree t h a t C a r t e r saw h i m s e l f as an a c t i v i s t p r e s i d e n t who wanted t o be h i s own S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e and c o n t r o l f o r e i g n p o l i c y from the White House. 6 A p r e s i d e n t who \" a p p o i n t s \" h i m s e l f as the g a t e k e e p e r of a l l i n f o r m a t i o n f o r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g must be w i l l i n g and a b l e t o read through a l a r g e amount of documents each day. C a r t e r was such a p r e s i d e n t . He d i d not h i d e h i s a p p e t i t e f o r d e t a i l s . A c o n s u l t a n t on a White House O r g a n i z a t i o n study c o n c l u d e d : \"The p r e s i d e n t reads a l o t , comments on memos a l o t and has a p a s s i o n f o r g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d i n t h e d e t a i l s of a l o t of q u e s t i o n s . \" 7 Even though C a r t e r had Watson, E i z e n s t a t and B r z e z i n s k i as p o l i c y c o o r d i n a t o r s , he read a p p r o x i m a t e l y 300 t o 400 pages per day. C a r t e r d i d not r e q u e s t h i s c a b i n e t members and s t a f f t o hammer out a f i n a l o p t i o n f o r a problem t o be sent t o him f o r a c c e p t a n c e or r e j e c t i o n , but encouraged a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s t o submit t h e i r o p t i o n memoranda t o h i m . 8 W i l l i a m H y l a n d , a NSC s t a f f who had a l s o s e r v e d w i t h N i x o n , n o t e d : Much more goes t o the p r e s i d e n t t h rough the system than i n the p a s t . B e f o r e , i s s u e s were not brought t o him u n t i l t h ey were t a l k e d out a t the C a b i n e t or s u b - c a b i n e t l e v e l . I s s u e s now a r e v e n t i l a t e d much e a r l i e r . 9 C a r t e r ' s i n t e n s e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p o l i c y -f o r m u l a t i o n p r o c e s s and h i s d e s i r e t o command a l l d e t a i l s g i v e credence t o the s u i t a b i l i t y of h i s s t y l e f o r i m p l e m e n t i n g m u l t i p l e advocacy. However, a p r e s i d e n t who 59 a l l o w s m u l t i p l e v i e w p o i n t s and immerses h i m s e l f i n the p r o c e s s of w e i g h i n g d i f f e r e n t o p t i o n s , must a l s o be a b l e t o c u t the rope and make a c l e a r d e c i s i o n when i t s time has come. S e v e r a l a u t h o r s c l a i m t h a t C a r t e r was i n d e c i s i v e . E i t h e r as a r e s u l t of d i f f e r e n t v i e w p o i n t s among h i s a d v i s o r s or as a r e s u l t of C a r t e r ' s p e r s o n a l ambivalence about many i s s u e s , they argue t h a t C a r t e r was unable t o pursue a c o n s i s t e n t and c o h e r e n t s e t of p o l i c i e s . 1 0 W h i l e i t i s t r u e t h a t C a r t e r d i d not always f u l l y u n d e r s t a n d the p o t e n t i a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between d i f f e r e n t d e c i s i o n s , most e v i d e n c e shows t h a t on i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n s he was q u i t e d e c i s i v e . A g a i n s t the a d v i c e of most of h i s p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r s , f o r example, he c a n c e l l e d the p r o d u c t i o n and deployment of the N-bomb, convened the Camp D a v i d meetings w i t h Begin and Sadat, and asked the Senate t o c o n s i d e r American t r o o p w i t h d r a w a l s from South K o r e a . 1 1 C a r t e r ' s s e c r e t a r y t o the c a b i n e t o b s e r v e d , \"When a d e c i s i o n i s made, i t w i l l be h i s d e c i s i o n . He l i s t e n s t o many pe o p l e but when i t i s time f o r a d e c i s i o n , he doesn't t a k e a v o t e . \" C a r t e r , however, u s u a l l y a l l o w e d h i s f i n a l d e c i s i o n t o be ap p e a l e d by h i s a d v i s o r s but d i d not o f t e n change h i s m i n d . 1 2 C a r t e r not o n l y t o l e r a t e d but a l s o encouraged h i s a d v i s o r s t o be c o m p e t i t i v e i n t h e i r advocacy. G e n e r a l l y , C a r t e r would commission an i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l committee of the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l t o study an i s s u e and t o ge n e r a t e a v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s f o r h i s e v a l u a t i o n . O f t e n t h i s p r o c e s s was f o l l o w e d by a meeting between the p r i n c i p a l 6 0 a d v i s o r s and C a r t e r i n which t h e v a r i o u s o p t i o n s were d i s c u s s e d . The p r e s i d e n t c h a i r e d t h e s e meetings and q u e r i e d the p a r t i c i p a n t s . 1 3 B r z e z i n s k i d e s c r i b e d such meetings: He would l i s t e n v e r y a t t e n t i v e l y t o debates among us, and on one. o c c a s i o n he t o l d me t h a t he p a r t i c u l a r l y e n j o y e d d i s a g r e e m e n t s between H a r o l d Brown and me, s i n c e the debates between us i n v o l v e d such q u i c k and sh a r p s p a r r i n g . 1 \" Vance's account a l s o c o n f i r m s t h a t C a r t e r encouraged f r a n k n e s s and a c c e p t e d d i s a g r e e m e n t s on p o l i c y from h i s a d v i s o r s . 1 5 Joseph C a l i f a n o ( S e c r e t a r y of HEW) and Jordan o f f e r many examples of C a r t e r ' s ease w i t h p o l i c y c o n f l i c t among h i s a d v i s o r s , s eemingly r e l i s h i n g the d i f f e r e n t i d e a s t h a t such c o n f l i c t s g e n e r a t e . 1 6 S e v e r a l o b s e r v e r s argue t h a t C a r t e r became overwhelmed by c o n f l i c t among h i s a d v i s o r s t o the e x t e n t t h a t i t i m p a i r e d h i s a b i l i t y t o s t a y the c o u r s e of h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 1 7 T h i s q u e s t i o n w i l l be e x p l o r e d i n more d e t a i l below. However, i t i s m i s l e a d i n g t o assume t h a t such p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s o c c u r r e d a g a i n s t C a r t e r ' s w i l l . In f a c t , he s t a t e d h i s i n t e n t i o n t o b e n e f i t from i t : The d i f f e r e n t s t r e n g t h s of B r z e z i n s k i and Vance matched the r o l e s they p l a y e d and a l s o p e r m i t t e d the n a t u r a l c o m p e t i t i o n between the two o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o s t a y a l i v e . I a p p r e c i a t e d those d i f f e r e n c e s . In making the f i n a l d e c i s i o n s on f o r e i g n p o l i c y , I needed t o weigh as many p o i n t s of view as p o s s i b l e . 1 8 61 THE STRUCTURE OF DECISION-MAKING On January 20 1977, C a r t e r i s s u e d two p r e s i d e n t i a l d i r e c t i v e s which l a i d down the f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e f o r p o l i c y -f o r m u l a t i o n on f o r e i g n and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i s s u e s . 1 9 Two i n t e r a g e n c y committees were c r e a t e d t o study i s s u e s and t o pr e p a r e p o l i c y p o s i t i o n p a p e r s . The P o l i c y Review Committee was i n charge of both t o p i c a l and r e g i o n a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s , defense i s s u e s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic i s s u e s . The Chairman was s e l e c t e d on the b a s i s of the type of i s s u e under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . For example, g e n e r a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s were c h a i r e d by the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , and d e f e n s e i s s u e s by the S e c r e t a r y of Defense. In p r a c t i c e , the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e c h a i r e d the b u l k of the me e t i n g s . The S p e c i a l C o o r d i n a t i o n Committee o v e r l o o k e d i n t e l l i g e n c e and arms c o n t r o l i s s u e s and a l s o f u n c t i o n e d as the c r i s i s management committee. The N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r was i t s permanent c h a i r m a n . S e v e r a l members of b o t h committees were a l s o s t a t u t o r y members of the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . They i n c l u d e d the P r e s i d e n t , the V i c e -P r e s i d e n t , the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , and the S e c r e t a r y of Defense. The Chairman of the J o i n t C h i e f s and the D i r e c t o r of C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e a c t e d as a d v i s o r s t o the C o u n c i l . In a d d i t i o n t o the s t a t u t o r y and a d v i s o r y members, both J o r d a n and P o w e l l o f t e n a t t e n d e d the NSC meetings as w e l l as meetings of the S p e c i a l C o o r d i n a t i o n Committee and the P o l i c y Review Committee. A l o n g s i d e t h e s e two committees, 62 m i n i PRC's and SCC's de v e l o p e d where a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r i e s and NSC s t a f f a i d e s c l e a r e d some ground work f o r the PRC and SCC meetings. The N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r was a s s i g n e d t o f a c i l i t a t e , c o o r d i n a t e and i n t e g r a t e the paper f l o w i n both committees. In c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the s e c r e t a r i e s , the NSA s e t the agenda f o r the s e meetings as w e l l as f o r the f u l l NSC meetings which u s u a l l y f o l l o w e d PRC and SCC meetings t o re v i e w the o p t i o n s i n f r o n t of the P r e s i d e n t . The NSA was a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g the paper f l o w between the PRC and SCC on the one hand and the NSC on the o t h e r . The u s u a l p r o c e s s s t a r t e d w i t h the p r e s i d e n t r e q u e s t i n g B r z e z i n s k i t o p r e p a r e a P r e s i d e n t i a l Review Memorandum (PRM) on a s p e c i f i c i s s u e . B r z e z i n s k i would then a s s i g n a NSC s t a f f a i d e t o s e t i n motion the p r o c e s s of g a t h e r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n i n e i t h e r the PRC or SCC s e t t i n g . The v a r i o u s o p t i o n s and u s u a l l y the minutes of the meetings would be for w a r d e d t o C a r t e r by B r z e z i n s k i . The PRM's were o r g a n i z e d i n t h r e e s e c t i o n s : the s u b j e c t , i t s problems, agency o p t i o n s and t h e i r a n a l y s e s . To t h i s , B r z e z i n s k i would u s u a l l y a t t a c h a c o v e r memo i n d i c a t i n g h i s a n a l y s i s of the problem as w e l l as h i s p r e f e r e n c e or l a c k of p r e f e r e n c e f o r any of the opt i o n s . Depending on the importance of the i s s u e , the l e v e l of disagreement or consensus among the a d v i s o r s and C a r t e r ' s p e r s o n a l ( d i s ) s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the PRM, C a r t e r would e i t h e r choose an o p t i o n and i s s u e a P r e s i d e n t i a l D i r e c t i v e ( c a l l e d P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c i s i o n Memorandum d u r i n g the C a r t e r 63 a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) or ask f o r a f a c e - t o - f a c e meeting w i t h the r e l e v a n t a d v i s o r s . In the case of the former, B r z e z i n s k i would d i s t r i b u t e t h e d i r e c t i v e t o the r e l e v a n t departments and ensure an a c c u r a t e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of C a r t e r ' s d e c i s i o n . S e c r e t a r i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s , speeches and d i r e c t i v e s t o \" f i e l d w o r k e r s \" were a l l c l e a r e d by the NSC s t a f f a t the White House. By September 1977,Carter had i s s u e d j u s t over 30 PRM's on a wide range of i s s u e s i n c l u d i n g Panama,SALT, N u c l e a r P r o l i f e r a t i o n and the Law of the Sea. At t h i s d a t e , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 17 PRM's had been p r o c e s s e d and had become PDM's w h i l e the r e m a i n i n g were s t i l l d e b a t e d . 2 0 On most i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s C a r t e r wanted t o f o l l o w up on the PRM by meeting w i t h h i s a d v i s o r s . E a r l y i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , C a r t e r convened the f u l l NSC f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . 2 1 However, more i n f o r m a l m e e t i n g s , c a l l e d the F r i d a y F o r e i g n P o l i c y B r e a k f a s t s , d e v e l o p e d e v e n t u a l l y between C a r t e r , Mondale, Vance and B r z e z i n s k i . In Ja n u a r y 1978, J o r d a n j o i n e d , w i t h Brown f o l l o w i n g a few months l a t e r . I t was e s p e c i a l l y i n the f o r m a l NSC and i n f o r m a l F r i d a y B r e a k f a s t meetings t h a t C a r t e r ' s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s emphasized f r e e c o m p e t i t i o n i n f r o n t of the p r e s i d e n t . Both p a r t i c i p a n t s and o b s e r v e r s of the s e meetings have t e s t i f i e d t o t h e i r importance i n p r o v i d i n g C a r t e r w i t h f r e e d i s c u s s i o n , w i t h a v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s , and w i t h a forum i n which C a r t e r made d e c i s i o n s . 2 2 Vance p r o v i d e s d i r e c t e v i d e n c e f o r t h i s c o n c l u s i o n : 64 I t was a v a l u a b l e forum f o r f r a n k d i s c u s s i o n s . I s s u e s were a i r e d t h o r o u g h l y and we were a b l e t o c o n s i d e r the i n t e r a c t i o n between domest i c and f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a t t e r s . 2 3 I n f o r m a l meetings a t t e n d e d o n l y by Vance, B r z e z i n s k i and Brown, a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s u r g i n g , came i n t o use on the Thursdays p r e c e d i n g the F r i d a y B r e a k f a s t m e e t i n g s . I s s u e s f o r the F r i d a y meetings as w e l l as any p r e s s i n g or c u r r e n t c o n c e r n s were d i s c u s s e d . W h i l e t h e s e meetings enhanced the c o o r d i n a t i o n of p o l i c y among t h e s e t h r e e a d v i s o r s , they a l s o a l l o w e d Vance, B r z e z i n s k i and Brown t o s o l v e c o n f l i c t s among thems e l v e s w i t h o u t the p r e s i d e n t ' s i n v o l v e m e n t . Vance and B r z e z i n s k i both noted t h a t t h e s e meetings were p r o d u c t i v e i n s e t t l i n g i s s u e s q u i c k l y , a t t i m e s b y p a s s i n g the l o n g e r d e l i b e r a t i o n s of the PRC and SCC. 2\" T h i s a s p e c t of the meeting v i o l a t e s the p r o c e s s norm of m u l t i p l e advocacy which s t i p u l a t e s t h a t the p r e s i d e n t must be a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d i n the p r o c e s s of r e s o l v i n g a dvocate c o n f l i c t s . However, t h e r e i s e v i d e n c e t h a t the r e s o l u t i o n of c o n f l i c t among the t h r e e d i d not o f t e n a p p l y t o im p o r t a n t p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s . Hunter (a NSC s t a f f a i d ) o b s e r v e d t h a t the Thursday meetings u s u a l l y s t e e r e d c l e a r of i s s u e s t h a t had not been p r e p a r e d by the PRC or SCC. 2 5 Moreover, the r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t the c o n f l i c t s between B r z e z i n s k i and Vance were not e a s i l y r e s o l v e d and u s u a l l y needed C a r t e r h i m s e l f . Indeed, C a r t e r i n s i s t e d t h a t B r z e z i n s k i r e p o r t the p r o c e e d i n g s of the meeting t o him on the same day. F u r t h e r m o r e , C a r t e r ' s memoirs r e v e a l t h a t the F r i d a y 65 meetings u s u a l l y i n v o l v e d c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n f l i c t among h i s a d v i s o r s , which i n d i c a t e s t h a t the Thursday meetings d i d not r e s u l t i n compromises or s o l u t i o n s t h a t d i d not r e q u i r e the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n . 2 6 In s p i t e of C a r t e r ' s c l a i m t o the c o n t r a r y d u r i n g the e l e c t i o n campaign, the c a b i n e t never became a d e c i s i o n -making forum. The c a b i n e t met f r e q u e n t l y but o n l y t o a l l o w C a r t e r t o make announcements about h i s l e g i s l a t i v e agenda and t o share g e n e r a l i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h h i s s e c r e t a r i e s . C a r t e r artd o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s acknowledge t h a t i t s u s e f u l n e s s e v e n t u a l l y faded i n t o o b l i v i o n . 2 7 ADVOCATE RESOURCES In a d d i t i o n t o C a r t e r ' s t h r e e p r i n c i p a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y a d v i s o r s , Vance, B r z e z i n s k i and Brown, V i c e - P r e s i d e n t Mondale and J o r d a n , C a r t e r ' s p e r s o n a l a s s i s t a n t , appear as im p o r t a n t a d v o c a t e s on f o r e i g n and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i s s u e s . 2 8 The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y s t a t e s t h a t a l l ad v o c a t e s must have adequate s t a f f s u p p o r t and i n f o r m a t i o n , a c c e s s t o the d e c i s i o n forums and t o the p r e s i d e n t , and adequate b a r g a i n i n g and p e r s u a s i o n s k i l l s i n o r d e r t o compete w i t h one another on a r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l b a s i s . I n t h i s s e c t i o n , I w i l l examine these r e s o u r c e s f o r each a d v i s o r . Vance, as the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , was i n charge of the second l a r g e s t u n i t of s t a f f and i n f o r m a t i o n r e s o u r c e s i n 66 t h e a r e a of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . He c h a i r e d the m a j o r i t y of t h e PRC meetings and was a c r u c i a l p a r t i c i p a n t i n a l l o t h e r d e c i s i o n forums. The memoirs of C a r t e r and Vance r e v e a l t h a t they had d a i l y t e l e p h o n e c o n t a c t and t h a t C a r t e r never r e s c i n d e d on h i s promise t h a t Vance c o u l d c a l l on him a t any t i m e . Vance p r e p a r e d a n i g h t l y r e p o r t f o r the p r e s i d e n t i n which he gave h i s a n a l y s i s of c u r r e n t c o n c e r n s and h i s p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n s t o d e a l w i t h them. T h i s r e p o r t was sent t o C a r t e r w i t h o u t NSC s c r u t i n y and was r e a d by C a r t e r the next morning b e f o r e the d a i l y i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g w i t h B r z e z i n s k i . 2 9 Whenever Vance b e l i e v e d t h a t B r z e z i n s k i d i d not a d e q u a t e l y summarize the p r o c e e d i n g s of the PRC or SCC, he was i n v i t e d t o read B r z e z i n s k i ' s summaries a t the White House and make the n e c e s s a r y c h a n g e s . 3 0 C a r t e r a p p o i n t e d Vance as S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e because he v a l u e d h i s d i p l o m a t i c e x p e r i e n c e i n the Johnson a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and thought Vance had the n e c e s s a r y s k i l l s t o a d m i n i s t e r the complex S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t . 3 1 In s p i t e of the w e l l known p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s between B r z e z i n s k i and Vance, B r z e z i n s k i thought Vance t o be \" v e r y w e l l i n f o r m e d , v e r y much t o the p o i n t and w e l l b r i e f e d . \" 3 2 M c L e l l a n notes t h a t though Vance was not as a g g r e s s i v e and i n n o v a t i v e as B r z e z i n s k i i n d e v e l o p i n g p o l i c y i d e a s , Vance was more s k i l l e d i n a s s e s s i n g the f e a s i b i l i t y of p o l i c y o p t i o n s . 3 3 These d i f f e r e n t s t r e n g t h s between Vance and B r z e z i n s k i i l l u s t r a t e the d i f f e r e n t e x p e c t a t i o n s C a r t e r had from both men. C a r t e r b e l i e v e d he would b e n e f i t from h e a r i n g b oth the 67 c a u t i o u s , b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of a c o u r s e of a c t i o n and the more a c t i o n o r i e n t e d and a b s t r a c t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . J o r d a n d e s c r i b e s a t y p i c a l m e e t i n g , c o n s t i t u t i n g a b a l a n c e between the two v i e w p o i n t s : As u s u a l , Vance and B r z e z i n s k i . . . s t a t e d t h e i r arguments d i r e c t l y and w i t h o u t emotion. C a r t e r gave h i s u n d i v i d e d a t t e n t i o n f i r s t t o the one and then t o the o t h e r , l i s t e n i n g c a r e f u l l y , w e i g h i n g what both had t o s a y . 3 \" The f a c t t h a t B r z e z i n s k i was the more a g g r e s s i v e of the two a d v i s o r s d i d not mean t h a t h i s p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n s persuaded the p r e s i d e n t more o f t e n than Vance's. J o r d a n , Andrew Young and Robert S t r a u s s ( a s s i s t a n t t o C a r t e r ) as w e l l as s e v e r a l o b e r v e r s b e l i e v e the c o n t r a r y was t r u e . 3 5 A l t h o u g h C a r t e r e x p e c t e d Vance t o be o c c u p i e d w i t h d i p l o m a c y , p o l i c y i m p l e m e n t a t i o n and w i t h a d m i n i s t e r i n g the S t a t e Department, Vance appears as one of C a r t e r ' s c e n t r a l p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s on a l l i s s u e s . The NSC s t a f f under B r z e z i n s k i , though l e a n e r than under K i s s i n g e r , was h i g h l y p r o f e s s i o n a l and s p e c i a l i z e d . 3 6 W h i l e t h i s s t a f f cannot match the numbers and r e s o u r c e s of the Department of S t a t e or Defence, i t has advantages which the b i g g e r departments l a c k . I t s s m a l l e r s t a f f can p r o v i d e a n a l y s e s more q u i c k l y as a r e s u l t of fewer o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and b u r e a u c r a t i c o b s t a c l e s . I t does not have t o implement p o l i c y and can t h e r e f o r e c o n c e n t r a t e on p o l i c y a n a l y s i s and the development of o p t i o n s . A l l f i e l d i n f o r m a t i o n g o i n g t o the S t a t e Department must a l s o go t h r o u g h the NSC s t a f f i n 68 the E x e c u t i v e O f f i c e b u i l d i n g or the s i t u a t i o n room i n the White House. T h i s p r o v i d e s the s t a f f w i t h i t s own \"raw d a t a \" t o f o r m u l a t e i t s a n a l y s e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , the c l o s e p r o x i m i t y of the s t a f f , and e s p e c i a l l y i t s D i r e c t o r , t o the p r e s i d e n t keeps i t more a t t u n e d t o the wishes of the p r e s i d e n t . B r z e z i n s k i , i n a d d i t i o n t o h a v i n g a c c e s s t o a l l d e c i s i o n forums, e n j o y e d f r e e a c c e s s t o the O v a l O f f i c e and c o u l d see the p r e s i d e n t w i t h o u t an appointment. Each morning, B r z e z i n s k i spent a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30 minutes w i t h the p r e s i d e n t g o i n g over the d a i l y i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g , c o m p i l e d by a l l the i n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c i e s . D u r i n g t h e s e s e s s i o n s , B r z e z i n s k i a l s o r e v i e w e d w i t h the p r e s i d e n t h i s agenda f o r the day c o n c e r n i n g f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s as w e l l as the agendas of PRC and SCC m e e t ings. F i n a l l y , he d i s c u s s e d w i t h the p r e s i d e n t h i s views on i s s u e s . B r z e z i n s k i had been C a r t e r ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y mentor d u r i n g the campaign and c o n t i n u e d t o be an i m p o r t a n t a d v i s o r on p o l i c y . C a r t e r d i d not o n l y want B r z e z i n s k i t o c o o r d i n a t e p o l i c y but a l s o t o p r o v i d e p o l i c y i n n o v a t i o n . 3 7 B r z e z i n s k i ' s a g g r e s s i v e n e s s i n a d v o c a t i n g new i d e a s i s w e l l known. Ro s a l y n n C a r t e r wrote t h a t the P r e s i d e n t a p p r e c i a t e d B r z e z i n s k i ' s i d e a s , l i s t e n e d t o them c a r e f u l l y but a l s o had t o s i f t t h r o ugh them t o a v o i d e x c e s s i v e i m p u l s i v e n e s s . Vance, on the o t h e r hand, she d e s c r i b e s as sound i n judgment, c a u t i o u s and r e l u c t a n t t o \"rock the b o a t . \" 3 8 I t appears t h a t C a r t e r a p p r e c i a t e d b o t h s t y l e s and was not c o n s i s t e n t l y persuaded by e i t h e r of the two. Brown, as S e c r e t a r y of Defense, had more than ample 6 9 s t a f f and r e s o u r c e s t o match the NSC and S t a t e Department. Brown, l i k e Vance and B r z e z i n s k i , was one of the s e n i o r p a r t n e r s i n the PRC and SCC o r g a n i z a t i o n . H i s s t a f f worked t o g e t h e r w i t h the NSC and S t a t e s t a f f on a l l f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s . From the b e g i n n i n g , Brown was a l s o a p a r t i c i p a n t i n the Thursday m e e t i n g s . Yet i t took u n t i l 1978 b e f o r e Brown j o i n e d the F r i d a y b r e a k f a s t meetings w i t h the p r e s i d e n t . However, s i n c e C a r t e r convened f u l l NSC meetings more f r e q u e n t l y d u r i n g 1977 than l a t e r on, Brown may not have been s e r i o u s l y i s o l a t e d from the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . None of the p a r t i c i p a n t s o f f e r s an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r Brown's d e l a y e d e n t r a n c e t o t h e F r i d a y forum. Brown d i d not have as much a c c e s s t o C a r t e r as B r z e z i n s k i or even Vance. W h i l e Brown and Vance sent memoranda t o C a r t e r d a i l y and t e l e p h o n e d him f r e q u e n t l y , Brown d i d not have the e q u i v a l e n t of a \" n i g h t l y r e p o r t \" t o the p r e s i d e n t . Brown was r e g a r d e d a good c h o i c e f o r S e c r e t a r y of Defense because of h i s wide r e s p e c t i n Washington. He was d e s c r i b e d as a l o o f , b r i l l i a n t , and as a f a s t l e a r n e r . 3 9 Throughout C a r t e r ' s memoirs we f i n d deep r e s p e c t f o r Brown's a n a l y t i c mind and command of d e t a i l s . Y e t , some a s s e r t t h a t Brown d i d not a d v o c a t e f o r c e f u l l y enough, t h a t he was l o a t h t o t a k e a c l e a r p o l i c y s t a n d and t h a t he spent t o o much time r u n n i n g h i s d e p a r t m e n t . 4 0 B r z e z i n s k i wrote t h a t the p r e s i d e n t asked him t o t e l l Brown t o be more a s s e r t i v e and l e s s ambiguous i n h i s a d v o c a c y . \" 1 Smith o b s e r v e d t h a t Brown was t h e most i n f l u e n t i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y a d v i s o r b e s i d e s 70 Vance and B r z e z i n s k i . * 2 I f so, i t was l e s s because of h i s b a r g a i n i n g s k i l l s than of C a r t e r ' s r e s p e c t f o r Brown's e x p e r t i s e and d e t a i l e d knowledge of i s s u e s . The V i c e - P r e s i d e n t ' s r o l e d u r i n g the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was unique, f o r i t i n c l u d e d the r o l e of a c r u c i a l a d v i s o r i n both domestic and f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Mondale was g i v e n an o f f i c e i n the West Wing of the White House and was i n c l u d e d i n the \"paper l o o p . \" Mondale saw a l l papers g o i n g t o C a r t e r , even the d a i l y i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g . The p r e s i d e n t g e n u i n e l y c o n s u l t e d him on i s s u e s and c a r e f u l l y e v a l u a t e d h i s o p i n i o n . * 3 Mondale had a s t a f f of between 55 and 65 p e o p l e . By a l l a c c o u n t s , t h i s s t a f f was a c t i v e i n p r o v i d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f o r him and i n h e l p i n g C a r t e r ' s s t a f f make and implement p o l i c y . Moe, Mondale's c h i e f of s t a f f , and E i z e n s t a t , C a r t e r ' s a s s i s t a n t f o r Domestic P o l i c y , j o i n t l y made or c o o r d i n a t e d a l l d o mestic p o l i c y . * * S i n c e Mondale was i n the r e l e v a n t \"paper l o o p \" i n the White House, h i s s t a f f p r o v i d e d him w i t h independent a n a l y s e s of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s , which e n a b l e d Mondale t o make s u b s t a n t i a l recommendations t o p o l i c y o p t i o n s d u r i n g the PRC and SCC meetings. D a v i d Aaron, Mondale's former a s s i s t a n t i n the Senate, became deputy d i r e c t o r of NSC. Mondale was a l e r t e d by him on upcoming i s s u e s and Mondale f r e q u e n t l y walked the few s t e p s t o Aaron's o f f i c e f o r a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n . * 5 Mondale a l s o had f r e e a c c e s s t o C a r t e r . Mondale c o u l d a t t e n d any meeting of h i s c h o i c e . A l s o Mondale, or someone from h i s s t a f f , a t t e n d e d the PRC and SCC meetings. Mondale 71 was always p r e s e n t , when i n town, a t the NSC and F r i d a y b r e a k f a s t m e e t i n g s . 4 6 Once a week, C a r t e r had l u n c h w i t h Mondale t o d i s c u s s any matter e i t h e r man had on h i s mind. Mondale's c h i e f b a r g a i n i n g c h i p w i t h C a r t e r was t h a t he knew C a r t e r v a l u e d h i s e x p e r i e n c e i n Washington p o l i t i c s . A l t h o u g h C a r t e r seldom thought of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n terms of domestic p o l i t i c s w h i l e Mondale d i d so f r e q u e n t l y , the V i c e -P r e s i d e n t was more than a mere \" p o l i t i c a l watchdog.\" D u r i n g m e e t i n g s , C a r t e r would o f t e n ask Mondale f o r h i s a n a l y s i s of the d i s c u s s i o n j u s t p r i o r t o making a d e c i s i o n . 4 7 In t h i s r o l e , Mondale can be c o n s i d e r e d a l s o as a \" g e n e r a l i s t \" a d v i s o r . Mondale was not a f r a i d t o d i s a g r e e w i t h the p r e s i d e n t or w i t h the o t h e r a d v i s o r s , and \"fought h a r d \" , a c c o r d i n g t o J o r d a n , f o r h i s b e l i e f s . Y e t , Mondale a l s o used p r i v a t e meetings w i t h C a r t e r t o v o i c e h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h p o l i c y or h i s su p p o r t f o r p o l i c y . 4 8 Such p r i v a t e meetings are c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i n the sense t h a t the p r e s i d e n t ' s o p t i o n s may be expanded i n the meeting. However, such meetings do not conform t o the o p t i m a l s t a n d a r d s of the s t r a t e g y ' s norms. The s t r a t e g y p o s i t s meetings w i t h m u l t i p l e a c t o r s and f r e e debate as more c o n s t r u c t i v e . As such, t h i s a s p e c t of Mondale's b e h a v i o r d i d not n e c e s s a r i l y c o n t r i b u t e t o the f u n c t i o n i n g of t h e s t r a t e g y . J o r d a n d i d not have a s t a f f comparable t o the o t h e r a d v o c a t e s . However, h i s r o l e was not t o f o r m u l a t e o p t i o n s i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y but t o e v a l u a t e the o p t i o n s p r e s e n t e d by t h e o t h e r s i n l i g h t of t h e i r d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l consequences. 72 J o r d a n was C a r t e r ' s p r i n c i p a l \" p o l i t i c a l watchdog,\" ind e e d C a r t e r ' s p r i n c i p a l p o l i t i c a l t r o u b l e s h o o t e r . J o r d a n c o u l d read whatever memorandum he wanted and a t t e n d any meeting of h i s c h o i c e . Among a l l a d v i s o r s , J o r d a n , and a l s o P o w e l l were c l o s e s t p e r s o n a l l y t o C a r t e r . 4 9 C a r t e r t o l d J o r d a n t o a t t e n d the F r i d a y meetings t o e v a l u a t e the p o l i t i c a l consequences of f o r e i g n p o l i c y o p t i o n s . P o w e l l a l s o o f f e r e d f r e e w h e e l i n g a d v i c e on any i s s u e . However, h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o f o r e i g n p o l i c y seems s m a l l e r than J o r d a n ' s . None of the p a r t i c i p a n t s ' s memoirs spends any time on P o w e l l as an ad v o c a t e . Though P o w e l l would a t times a t t e n d the F r i d a y b r e a k f a s t s , he d i d not do so f r e q u e n t l y . J o r d a n ' s d i s a d v a n t a g e i n s t a f f s u p port and r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n was e a s i l y made up by h i s p r o x i m i t y t o C a r t e r and h i s l o n g a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h C a r t e r which guaranteed him the p r e s i d e n t ' s e a r . There i s no e v i d e n c e t o add S t a n s f i e l d Turner ( D i r e c t o r CIA) t o the l i s t of c l o s e a d v i s o r s . A s i d e from the t w i c e weekly i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g s , Turner d i d not have m e a n i n g f u l a c c e s s t o C a r t e r . 5 0 Turner acknowledged t h a t a t those meetings he seldom a d v o c a t e d p a r t i c u l a r c o u r s e s of a c t i o n f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 5 1 A l t h o u g h Turner or h i s s t a f f p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the PRC, SCC and NSC m e e t i n g s , he was not i n c l u d e d i n the Thursday or F r i d a y m e e t i n g s . B r z e z i n s k i s u g g e s t e d t o C a r t e r t h a t he i n v i t e Turner t o t h e s e meetings but C a r t e r never d i d . 5 2 I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t T u r n e r ' s i n c l u s i o n i n the c i r c l e of a d v i s o r s would have widened the range of o p t i o n s . However, p r e v i o u s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s had been 73 c r i t i c i z e d f o r a l l o w i n g the CIA a p o l i c y - m a k i n g r o l e . C a r t e r h i m s e l f , had been c r i t i c a l of many CIA a c t i v i t i e s and was t h e r e f o r e r e l u c t a n t t o g i v e the D i r e c t o r a h i g h p r o f i l e i n h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . In law and p r a c t i c e , the CIA d i r e c t o r i s not i n t e n d e d t o be a p o l i c y a d v o c a t e . C a r t e r was aware of t h i s . W h i l e the D i r e c t o r ' s i n v o l v e m e n t i n m u l t i p l e advocacy p r o c e e d i n g s may be b e n e f i c i a l t o the s t r a t e g y ' s performance, i t i s i n a d v i s i b l e f o r \"good government\" t o g i v e him such a r o l e . O b v i o u s l y , o t h e r p e o p l e a d v i s e d or i n f l u e n c e d C a r t e r on the c o u r s e of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . However, t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t i m a t e a d v i s o r s such as R o s a l y n n C a r t e r and C h a r l e s K i r b o i s d i f f i c u l t t o t r a c e . 5 3 A d v i s o r s who d i d not p l a y a r o l e u n t i l 1979 or 1980, such as L l o y d C u t l e r , Robert S t r a u s s and Donovan, f a l l o u t s i d e the purview of my case s t u d i e s . I n c o n c l u s i o n , a l l a d v o c a t e s had enough s t a f f s u p p o r t , r e s o u r c e s , a c c e s s and/or i n f l u e n c e w i t h the p r e s i d e n t t o be a b l e t o advocate t h e i r o p t i o n s a d e q u a t e l y . No s i n g l e a d v i s o r f u n c t i o n e d as a gatekeeper t o the p r e s i d e n t . As a White House a i d e commented i n 1977: t h e r e ' s no s i n g l e guy w i t h p r i m a r y i n f l u e n c e . I don't t h i n k the p r e s i d e n t has become o v e r l y c l o s e w i t h any of them. I t ' s s c r a m b l e d . I t i s not as i f t h e r e were two or t h r e e v e r y i m p o r t a n t p e r s o n s . 5 4 C a r t e r d i d not v a l u e c o n s i s t e n t l y the a d v i c e of one advocate over the o t h e r s but b e n e f i t t e d from m u l t i p l e a d v i s o r s . As C a r t e r h i m s e l f n o t e d : \"When B r z e z i n s k i and Vance were j o i n e d by Mondale and Brown, p l u s o t h e r s as r e q u i r e d t o a d d r e s s a 74 p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e , they c o m p r i s e d a good t e a m . \" 5 5 ADVOCATE COMPETITION AND ADVOCATE DIVERSITY C a r t e r came t o o f f i c e w i t h the i n t e n t i o n of h a v i n g an open, c o l l e g i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s where \" e q u a l \" a d v i s o r s would b r i n g m u l t i p l e o p t i o n s t o h i s a t t e n t i o n . 5 6 As d i s c u s s e d above, C a r t e r t o l e r a t e d d i s s e n t i n g views and h i s p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r s had the n e c e s s a r y r e s o u r c e s t o compete among each o t h e r . Whenever t h e r e was d i s a g r e e m e n t , t h i s p r o c e s s appeared t o work. The p r e s i d e n t upon b e i n g n o t i f i e d of disagreement i n e i t h e r the PRC or SCC would d e a l w i t h i t by s t u d y i n g a l l the p o s i t i o n papers or by c a l l i n g a meeting of h i s a d v i s o r s . 5 7 Vance and B r z e z i n s k i d e s c r i b e the c o m p e t i t i o n and the p r e s i d e n t ' s r o l e i n a remark a b l y s i m i l a r way. The p r e s i d e n t l i s t e n e d , encouraged f r a n k n e s s and d i d not want t o be s h i e l d e d from u n p l e a s a n t f a c t s , h a r d o p t i o n s or d i f f i c u l t d e c i s i o n s . He absorbed e v e r y d e t a i l b e f o r e making a d e c i s i o n . 5 8 C a r t e r p i c k e d i d e a s from d i f f e r e n t a d v i s o r s , now from the one, then from the o t h e r . 5 9 D e s p i t e the open d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e , the a d v i s o r s r a r e l y d i s a g r e e d except f o r the f r e q u e n t d i s a g r e e m e n t s between B r z e z i n s k i and a l l the o t h e r s ! Except f o r B r z e z i n s k i ' s d i s s e n t i n g v i e w, C a r t e r r e c e i v e d remarkably s i m i l a r a d v i c e from Vance, Brown and Mondale d u r i n g the 75 f i r s t two y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 6 0 Important d e v i a t i o n s t o t h i s p a t t e r n a r e the Panama C a n a l and SALT i s s u e s . In the case of the f o rmer, a l l a d v i s o r s , i n c l u d i n g B r z e z i n s k i f a v o u r e d a q u i c k t r a n s f e r of o w n e r s h i p of the c a n a l t o the Panamanians. On the i n i t i a l American p o s i t i o n i n the SALT I I n e g o t i a t i o n s , o n l y Vance and Warnke opposed a \"deep c u t s \" p r o p o s a l t h a t would go beyond the 1974 V l a d i v o s t o k a g r e e m e n t s . 6 1 In a d d i t i o n t o the i s s u e s s t u d i e d i n t h i s t h e s i s , the p a t t e r n of a l a c k of disagreement among the a d v i s o r s on the one hand and disagreement between them and B r z e z i n s k i on the o t h e r hand i s a l s o apparent i n the the human r i g h t s i s s u e , American p o l i c y towards R h o d e s i a , American p o l i c y towards E a s t e r n Europe, s e v e r a l a s p e c t s of the M i d d l e East n e g o t i a t i o n s and American p o l i c y towards Angola and Z a i r e . 6 2 In Southern A f r i c a , B r z e z i n s k i was a l o n e i n l i n k i n g Cuban a c t i v i t y w i t h US-USSR r e l a t i o n s , i n r e l a t i o n t o Rhodesian r e f o r m and A n g o l a - Z a i r e f r i c t i o n . The o t h e r a d v i s o r s b e l i e v e d t h a t c o n f l i c t s i n t h i s r e g i o n were p u r e l y l o c a l and t h a t such a l i n k a g e would not s e r v e American i n t e r e s t s . A l s o , B r z e z i n s k i c h a l l e n g e d the consensus among Vance, Mondale and C a r t e r t h a t Mondale v i s i t South A f r i c a even b e f o r e the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had a c o h e r e n t p o l i c y towards the a r e a . C a r t e r , Mondale, Vance and Jordan wanted a Geneva c o n f e r e n c e on the M i d d l e E a s t e a r l y i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i a l s o wanted t o e x p l o r e t h i s o p t i o n , he a l o n e advocated a s t r a t e g y q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from the o t h e r s . 7 6 He warned t h a t I s r a e l d i d not a c c e p t such a c o u r s e of a c t i o n and t h a t i t might not be i n the American i n t e r e s t t o i n c l u d e the USSR i n the c o n f e r e n c e . H i s s u p p o r t f o r a Geneva c o n f e r e n c e was merely t a c t i c a l : the p r o s p e c t of USSR-US c o o p e r a t i o n would s o f t e n the Arab p o s i t i o n w h i l e s i m u l t a n o u s l y p r e s s u r i n g the I s r a e l i s . C o n c e r n i n g E a s t e r n Europe, B r z e z i n s k i a d v o c a t e d t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s f o c u s on those c o u n t r i e s t h a t were more l i b e r a l i n t e r n a l l y w h i l e the o t h e r a d v o c a t e s b e l i e v e d American p o l i c y s h o u l d be c o n s i s t e n t among a l l the c o u n t r i e s . A l s o , B r z e z i n s k i was a l o n e i n a d v o c a t i n g t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s t a k e a more a g g r e s s i v e p o s i t i o n on human r i g h t s i n the Conference on S e c u r i t y and C o o p e r a t i o n i n Europe. The o t h e r s f e a r e d t h a t t h i s b e h a v i o r would harm US-USSR r e l a t i o n s . An a n a l y s i s of the v a l u e s , i n t e r e s t , g o a l s and o b j e c t i v e s of the p r e s i d e n t on the one hand and h i s a d v i s o r s on the o t h e r hand shows s i g n i f i c a n t s i m i l a r i t i e s between C a r t e r and Vance, and few s i m i l a r i t i e s between them and B r z e z i n s k i . 6 3 B r z e z i n s k i ' s h a r d l i n e view of the USSR has been w e l l documented. 6' 1 But o f t e n n e g l e c t e d i s the h i g h degree of convergence between the views of C a r t e r , Vance, Mondale, Warnke, Young and even the i n f l u e n t i a l a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r i e s and d i r e c t o r s a t the S t a t e Department: R i c h a r d H o l b r o o k e (E a s t A s i a ) , R i c h a r d Moose ( A f r i c a ) , Anthony Lake ( P o l i c y P l a n n i n g S t a f f ) and L e s l i e G e l b ( P o l i t i c o - M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s ) . 6 5 They sh a r e d the b e l i e f , m a i n l y based on the Vietnam e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t the use of m i l i t a r y f o r c e i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y was o f t e n c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . They b e l i e v e d 77 t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d a d d r e s s i s s u e s of c o n f l i c t between i t and the USSR w i t h o u t l i n k a g e . F i n a l l y , they wanted t o f o c u s American a t t e n t i o n away from East-West i s s u e s towards N o r t h - S o u t h i s s u e s . B r z e z i n s k i , i n c o n t r a s t , b e l i e v e d t h a t the c a r e f u l use of f o r c e , when n e c e s s a r y , enhanced the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of p o l i c y , t h a t d e t e n t e s h o u l d be \"comprehensive and r e c i p r o c a l \" and t h a t l i n k a g e was u n a v o i d a b l e . Though B r z e z i n s k i i n h i s books had a l s o argued f o r an emphasis on N o r t h - S o u t h i s s u e s , h i s r e c o r d i n the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n shows a p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h East-West i s s u e s . The views of Brown and Turner c o v e r the m i d d l e ground between B r z e z i n s k i and the o t h e r s . 6 6 As d i s c u s s e d above, Brown's s l i g h t l y d i v e r g e n t w o r l d view from Vance d i d not t r a n s l a t e i n t o p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s between the two men d u r i n g the f i r s t two y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , e x cept i n the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t Brown's attempt t o i n c r e a s e the m i l t a r y budget from 1978 on as w e l l as the i n c r e a s i n g US-USSR c o n f r o n t a t i o n caused him t o t a k e s t a n d s d i f f e r e n t from Vance d u r i n g the l a s t two y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Turner c o u l d have b a l a n c e d the o p t i o n s because h i s vi e w s were much c l o s e r t o B r z e z i n s k i ' s . Yet h i s p o s i t i o n as CIA d i r e c t o r d i s q u a l i f i e d him as a p o l i c y a d v o c a t e , a t l e a s t i n t he C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The f i n a l p r o c e s s norm p r e s c r i b e d by the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y d e a l s w i t h the use of a d v i c e o u t s i d e the customary c i r c l e of a d v i s o r s . C a r t e r seldom made use of t h i s 78 o p t i o n . The p r i n c i p a l e x c e p t i o n was George B a l l ' s study d u r i n g the I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n . I t appears t h a t C a r t e r d i d not a p p r e c i a t e a d v i s o r s who d i d not s i m u l t a n e o u s l y have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of implementing p o l i c y . 6 7 As w e l l , C a r t e r had an enormous problem w i t h l e a k s . He a d m i t t e d t h a t he c o u l d not c o n t r o l them and was t h e r e f o r e l o a t h t o expand h i s c i r c l e of a d v i s o r s . 6 8 C a r t e r ' s i n a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l or even l o c a t e the s o u r c e s of l e a k s made him v e r y r e l u c t a n t t o ask o u t s i d e r s i n , even though many l e a k s may have come from h i s c i r c l e of i n s i d e a d v i s o r s . Many p r e s i d e n t s become adamant about s t o p p i n g h a r m f u l l e a k s and C a r t e r was no e x c e p t i o n . Y e t , they can o f t e n o n l y c o n t r o l them m a r g i n a l l y . Even so, the p r e s i d e n t d i d narrow h i s c i r c l e of a d v i s o r s . C l e a r l y , t h i s phenomenon h i n d e r s the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y . THE CUSTODIAN The e v i d e n c e l e a v e s no doubt t h a t B r z e z i n s k i was a p o l i c y advocate throughout the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . B r z e z i n s k i ' s j o b i s b e s t d e f i n e d i n terms of two d i s t i n c t a s p e c t s : d i r e c t i n g the p r e s i d e n t ' s o p e r a t i o n a l s t a f f by i n t e g r a t i n g and implementing p o l i c y and a c t i n g as the p r e s i d e n t ' s p r i v a t e a d v i s o r and f o r e i g n p o l i c y t h i n k t a n k . T h i s s e c t i o n w i l l e v a l u a t e the c u s t o d i a l r o l e as w e l l as s e v e r a l o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s which George and H a l l a l l e g e c o n f l i c t w i t h t h i s r o l e . The reader w i l l r e c a l l t h a t the c u s t o d i a l r o l e t a s k s 79 a r e t o i d e n t i f y p o l i c y i s s u e s , p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n , ensure a d v i s o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n and h e l p f o s t e r f r e e debate among the a d v i s o r s . R o l e t a s k v i o l a t i o n s c o n s i s t of such a c t i v i t i e s as p o l i c y advocacy, p u b l i c s p e a k i n g and d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s . B r z e z i n s k i , i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the v a r i o u s d epartments, c r e a t e d a f o r e i g n p o l i c y agenda book f o r each year of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and s u p e r v i s e d the development, of l o n g term p o l i c i e s . 6 9 For example, i n p r e p a r i n g o p t i o n s on the American p o s i t i o n i n the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s , B r z e z i n s k i had h i s s t a f f p r e p a r e a \" h i s t o r y book\" of the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s t o p r o v i d e p e r s p e c t i v e f o r C a r t e r and the o t h e r a d v i s o r s . 7 0 F a l l o w s g i v e s B r z e z i n s k i h i g h marks f o r b r i n g i n g new i s s u e s t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n as w e l l as new i d e a s f o r o l d p r o b l e m s . 7 1 When B r z e z i n s k i s u b m i t t e d a q u e s t i o n n a i r e t o C a r t e r on t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n October 1977, C a r t e r r e p o r t e d t h a t he was g e n e r a l l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h p o l i c y c o o r d i n a t i o n but s t i l l wanted t o see more p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s . B r z e z i n s k i r e p o r t s t h a t whenever C a r t e r chose an o p t i o n p r e m a t u r e l y , he p r o t e s t e d i t . 7 2 B r z e z i n s k i was i n charge of the paper f l o w i n the development of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Some o b s e r v e r s b e l i e v e he h a n d l e d t h i s a s p e c t of h i s j o b w e l l . 7 3 The most c r u c i a l p a r t of t h i s j o b i s not t o mix one's own o p t i o n s or i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h t h a t of the a d v o c a t e s . None of the a d v i s o r s has accused B r z e z i n s k i of t h i s and s e v e r a l o b s e r v e r s have p r o v i d e d examples of B r z e z i n s k i ' s f a i r n e s s i n t h i s r e g a r d . 7 * T a l b o t t s t a t e s t h a t w h i l e B r z e z i n s k i f a v o u r e d a \"deep c u t s \" 80 n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n beyond the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d i n the i n i t i a l SALT p o s i t i o n , he d i d c a r e f u l l y p r o c e s s the o t h e r o p t i o n s and g e n e r a l l y l i m i t e d h i m s e l f t o c h a i r i n g m e e t ings. In the f i n a l meeting on the s u b j e c t , B r z e z i n s k i summarized f o r C a r t e r the e s t i m a t e d p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s of o p t i o n s which he h i m s e l f d i d not f a v o u r . 7 5 Henry Owen (a NSC s t a f f a i d e ) o b s e r v e d : The q u e s t i o n you have t o ask i s t h i s . Does the pe r s o n i n t h a t j o b have the w i t t o d e f i n e the s e p a r a t e f u n c t i o n s ? Can he p r o v i d e the p r e s i d e n t w i t h i n t e l l i g e n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y a d v i c e , s e p a r a t e i t from h i s own a d v i c e and expose i t t o the o t h e r a g e n c i e s ? My i m p r e s s i o n i s t h a t he d o e s . 7 6 In a d d i t i o n t o p r e p a r i n g p o l i c y papers and c o o r d i n a t i n g the paper f l o w , B r z e z i n s k i a t t e m p t e d t o a v o i d premature d e c i s i o n s by C a r t e r . B r z e z i n s k i w r i t e s t h a t he p r o t e s t e d whenever C a r t e r t r i e d t o c l o s e an i s s u e b e f o r e a l l a d v i s o r s were aware of a l l i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s . B r z e z i n s k i appears t o have been a genuine c a r e t a k e r of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s d u r i n g the e a r l y y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . W h i l e he o b v i o u s l y f a v o u r e d c e r t a i n p o l i c y o p t i o n s above o t h e r s , a c e r t a i n amount of \"uncommitted\" p o l i c y p r o c e s s i n g d i d o c c u r . A good c u s t o d i a n not o n l y a l e r t s the p r e s i d e n t on p r o c e s s f a i l u r e s l e a d i n g t o p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s t h a t the former does not f a v o u r , but a l s o c a u t i o n s the p r e s i d e n t when he makes a premature d e c i s i o n on an i s s u e which the c u s t o d i a n a c t u a l l y f a v o u r s . B r z e z i n s k i d i d t h i s o c c a s i o n a l l y . For example, he urged 8 1 C a r t e r t o c o n s u l t amply w i t h Congress b e f o r e a c t i n g t o c u t down American t r o o p s i n South Korea. B r z e z i n s k i , a l t h o u g h he does not c l a r i f y i t , a c t u a l l y f a v o u r e d American t r o o p w i t h d r a w a l s from South K o r e a . 7 7 However, B r z e z i n s k i was not p e r f e c t l y evenhanded. There a r e s e v e r a l examples where h i s sup p o r t f o r one p o l i c y o p t i o n over the o t h e r s caused him t o n e g l e c t c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . 7 8 Indeed the purpose of t h i s t h e s i s i s not t o defend the argument t h a t B r z e z i n s k i always f u l f i l l e d an o p t i m a l c u s t o d i a l r o l e . George h i m s e l f notes t h a t \" m u l t i p l e advocacy does not have t o work p e r f e c t l y i n or d e r t o be v a l u a b l e . \" 7 9 The importance of the r o l e t a s k s performed by B r z e z i n s k i f o r t h i s t h e s i s i s t h a t he g e n e r a l l y managed the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s w i t h c a r e , and t h a t he f i l l e d t he v o i d i n p o l i c y advocacy l e f t by those a d v i s o r s who were a c t u a l l y supposed t o g i v e C a r t e r many v a r i e d o p t i o n s but who o f t e n f a i l e d t o do so. There i s l i t t l e e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g two a s p e c t s of the c u s t o d i a l r o l e i n the b e h a v i o u r of B r z e z i n s k i . Few o u t s i d e r s were i n v i t e d t o widen the debate. W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i ensured the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Chairman of the J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f d u r i n g the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s , he f a i l e d t o b r i n g i n o t h e r a d v o c a t e s t o c h a l l e n g e the S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e . 8 0 Indeed, o n l y d u r i n g the I r a n i a n c r i s i s d i d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b r i n g i n an o u t s i d e a d v i s o r . The answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n l i e s m a i n l y i n C a r t e r ' s c o n c e r n w i t h l e a k s . T h i s made him r e l u c t a n t t o go beyond h i s f a m i l i a r c i r c l e of a d v i s o r s . Second, B r z e z i n s k i seldom p l a y e d the r o l e of the 82 d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e . I t appears t h a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s d u a l r o l e of a d vocate and c u s t o d i a n d i d not compromise an open d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s . As Smith o b s e r v e d : B r z e z i n s k i s t a y e d b e h i n d the s c e n e s , d i r e c t i n g the s t a f f of the NSC, o r g a n i z i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f o r the p r e s i d e n t , s e t t i n g out o p t i o n s , and making no attempt t o d o m i n a t e . 8 1 B r z e z i n s k i d i d not appear as a p u b l i c spokesman f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n u n t i l the s p r i n g of 1 9 7 8 . 8 2 Some commentators have a l l e g e d t h a t B r z e z i n s k i e n j o y e d b e i n g i n the l i m e l i g h t and t h a t he a s p i r e d t o become the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e . 8 3 However, C a r t e r and J o r d a n as w e l l as s e v e r a l o b s e r v e r s a l s o f a u l t Vance f o r p o o r l y h a n d l i n g t h i s a s p e c t of h i s j o b . Indeed, Vance h i m s e l f acknowledged t h a t he d i d not always a r t i c u l a t e the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p o s i t i o n w e l l . 8 * As a r e s u l t , B r z e z i n s k i f i l l e d t h i s p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s gap. At t i m e s , C a r t e r encouraged him t o do so. B r z e z i n s k i ' s p u b l i c comments may have a i d e d the p e r c e p t i o n of an i n t e r n a l l y d i v i d e d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n but i t i s not c l e a r whether they a f f e c t e d the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . S i n c e C a r t e r never rebuked B r z e z i n s k i f o r h i s comments, i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t h a t C a r t e r b e l i e v e d he c o u l d b e n e f i t from p u r s u i n g one l i n e of p o l i c y , w h i l e B r z e z i n s k i reminded the r e s t of the w o r l d t h a t o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s d i d not go u n n o t i c e d i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . In the c o n f l i c t i n the Horn of A f r i c a , C a r t e r pursued an o f f i c i a l p o l i c y of n o n - l i n k a g e between S o v i e t s u p p o r t f o r r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t s and the S a l t 83 I I n e g o t i a t i o n s , w h i l e B r z e z i n s k i h i n t e d t h a t i t was p o s s i b l e f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o l i n k the t w o . 8 5 B r z e z i n s k i d i d not become an \" a l l round\" d i p l o m a t i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n except i n two i n s t a n c e s : the PRC-US n o r m a l i z a t i o n n e g o t i a t i o n s and the n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the f a l t e r i n g government of the S h a h . 8 6 B r z e z i n s k i s t a t e d i n an i n t e r v i e w t h a t when he d i d t a l k t o d i p l o m a t s or ambassadors, he r e p o r t e d h i s d i s c u s s i o n t o V a n c e . 8 7 H a l l s t a t e s t h a t B r z e z i n s k i a t no time r e p e a t e d the e x t e n s i v e b a c k c h a n n e l d e a l i n g s so common under K i s s i n g e r . 8 8 B r z e z i n s k i i n d i c a t e d t o D o b r y n i n i n e a r l y 1977 t h a t w h i l e he i n t e n d e d t o keep c o n t a c t w i t h him, Vance would be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the conduct of n e g o t i a t i o n s . In the l a s t two y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h e r e i s ample e v i d e n c e t h a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s b e h a v i o u r undermined an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s as d e f i n e d by the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . I r a n , as w e l l as s e v e r a l US-USSR c o n f l i c t s , appear among the f i r s t major i s s u e s t o r e v e a l t h i s emerging p a t t e r n . 8 9 An i n i t i a t i v e d e v e l o p e d by the I r a n desk i n the Department of S t a t e , i n the f a l l of 1978, t o cease support f o r the Shah and t o c o n t a c t t h e o p p o s i t i o n l e a d e r s was s u p r e s s e d by B r z e z i n s k i and l a r g e l y kept away from the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n . 9 0 In the case of the S o v i e t B r i g a d e s i n Cuba i n 1979, B r z e z i n s k i e x c l u d e d s e v e r a l p a r t i c i p a n t s from the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n o r d e r t o advance h i s p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n . 9 1 Vance c o m p l a i n e d t h a t he was e x c l u d e d from the l a s t c r u c i a l meeting on the attempt t o f r e e the hostages i n A p r i l 1 9 8 0 . 9 2 84 In 1979, a s t u d y group under P h i l i p Odeen e v a l u a t e d the f u n c t i o n i n g of the NSC s t a f f on the b a s i s of i n t e r v i e w s c o n d u c t e d w i t h h i g h l e v e l o f f i c i a l s i n t h a t y e a r . 9 3 The s t u d y c o n c l u d e d t h a t the s t a f f performed w e l l as a p e r s o n a l s t a f f f o r the p r e s i d e n t and a l s o d i d w e l l i n f o r m u l a t i n g new p o l i c y p r o p o s a l s . However, Odeen was c r i t i c a l of the s t a f f ' s p o l i c y c o o r d i n a t i o n and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n f u n c t i o n s . He accused B r z e z i n s k i and h i s s t a f f of uneven a n a l y s i s . O p t i o n papers were not f u l l y p r e p a r e d f o r a l l a d v i s o r s and the r e s u l t s of meetings were not always summarized c o r r e c t l y . Odeen's f i n d i n g s c o n f i r m s e v e r a l o b s e r v a t i o n s i n the memoirs of Vance and B r z e z i n s k i . Vance c o m p l a i n e d t h a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s summaries of meetings or p o l i c y o p t i o n s d i d not always r e p r e s e n t the whole range of the d i s c u s s i o n as Vance saw i t . Vance p r e f e r r e d a c o o r d i n a t i o n p r o c e d u r e which a l l o w e d the a d v o c a t e s t o read and e v a l u a t e the p o l i c y summaries b e f o r e t hey were forwarded t o the p r e s i d e n t . C a r t e r o b j e c t e d t o t h i s f o r f e a r of l e a k s . However, C a r t e r d i d i n v i t e the a d v i s o r s t o \"double check\" the summaries a t the White House. Vance's c o m p l a i n t appears l e s s pronounced i n the f i r s t few y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . For example, T a l b o t t ' s account of the SALT I I d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s as w e l l as Vance's own account of the p o l i c y p r o c e s s on the M i d d l e E a s t show B r z e z i n s k i as f a i r l y p r e s e n t i n g the whole range of o p t i o n s . However, \" i n the l a t t e r phases of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n \" , as B r z e z i n s k i p u t s i t h i m s e l f , B r z e z i n s k i i n t e r p r e t e d the SCC and PRC s e s s i o n s w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s c oncern f o r a f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a l l the v i e w s , \" l e a v i n g i t up t o any 85 i n d i v i d u a l t o a p p e a l t o the p r e s i d e n t i f he so wish e d \" . C l e a r l y , t h i s undermined the a b i l i t y of the a d v i s o r s t o compete f o r t h e i r o p t i o n s on an e q u a l b a s i s . 9 4 T h i s e v i d e n c e g i v e s credence t o the charge t h a t B r z e z i n s k i abandoned a f a i r p r o c e s s so as t o enhance h i s advocacy p o s i t i o n . Indeed, B r z e z i n s k i almost s a i d as much i n an i n t e r v i e w i n 1982: On t h e s e two i s s u e s (USSR a d v e n t u r i s m and I r a n ) t h e r e d e v e l o p e d a c o n f l i c t . . . and as a consequence, my r o l e became t h a t a l s o of the p r o t a g o n i s t as w e l l as the a r t i c u l a t o r and f o r m u l a t o r . 9 5 W h i l e t h i s t h e s i s does not e v a l u a t e why B r z e z i n s k i changed h i s r o l e , i t i s p l a u s i b l e t h a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s i s o l a t e d v i e w s i n r e l a t i o n t o the o t h e r a d v i s o r s drove him t o c u r t a i l t h e i n f o r m a t i o n and a c c e s s of the o t h e r a d v i s o r s so as t o s t r e n g t h e n h i s p o s i t i o n . Whatever the cause, B r z e z i n s k i ' s s e l f - s e r v i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p o l i c y o p t i o n s and h i s a t t e m p t s t o e x c l u d e a d v i s o r s w i t h o p p o s i n g v i e w p o i n t s from h i s own harmed C a r t e r ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s more than B r z e z i n s k i ' s p u b l i c s p e a k i n g or d i p l o m a c y . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION A d e s c r i p t i o n of the f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s r e v e a l s t h a t C a r t e r ' s s t y l e and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g 86 s t r u c t u r e f a c i l i t a t e d the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the p r o c e s s norms of m u l t i p l e advocacy. The d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e a l l o w e d s e v e r a l a d v i s o r s t o c o n t r i b u t e f r e e l y t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s by p r o v i d i n g a c c e s s t o the p r e s i d e n t and s e v e r a l d e c i s i o n forums i n which t o debate p o l i c y . G e n e r a l l y , the a d v i s o r s had s u f f i c i e n t r e s o u r c e s t o p a r t i c i p a t e . W h i l e some had more s t a f f s u p p o r t and i n f o r m a t i o n r e s o u r c e s , o t h e r s were c l o s e r t o the p r e s i d e n t . C a r t e r a l l o w e d a l l a d v i s o r s a c c e s s t o the r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n and d i d not c o n s i s t e n t l y r e l y on one a d v i s o r more than o t h e r s . C a r t e r encouraged open d i s c u s s i o n and i n s i s t e d t h a t h i s a d v i s o r s b r i n g p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s t o h i s a t t e n t i o n . D u r i n g the f i r s t two y e a r s , the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r c o o r d i n a t e d and i n t e g r a t e d the paper f l o w as w e l l as the range of o p t i o n s on p o l i c y and s u p e r v i s e d t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of p o l i c y . He e nsured t h a t a l l a d v o c a t e s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the p r o c e s s . As such, h i s r o l e a pproximated the c u s t o d i a n i n the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . W h i l e c o o r d i n a t i n g the p r o c e s s , the c u s t o d i a n a l s o a dvocated p o l i c y and from 1978 on spoke on p o l i c y p u b l i c l y and o c c a s s i o n a l l y engaged i n d i p l o m a c y . D u r i n g 1977 and e a r l y 1978 t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s appeared not t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h h i s t a s k s of c o o r d i n a t i o n and p o l i c y f a c i l i t a t i o n . They d i d not p r e c l u d e a f a i r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . The c u s t o d i a n both i n t e g r a t e d the advocacy of o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s and added h i s p e r s o n a l advocacy. W h i l e most r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e s s norms were met d u r i n g 87 t h i s p e r i o d , the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y appeared not t o produce a s i g n i f i c a n t range of d i v e r s e o p t i o n s among the a d v o c a t e s . I f i t were not f o r the advocacy of the c u s t o d i a n , the p r e s i d e n t would have r e c e i v e d a v e r y narrow range of o p t i o n s on i m p o r t a n t p o l i c y i s s u e s , the most i m p o r t a n t e x c e p t i o n b e i n g the SALT I I i s s u e . As such, the advocacy of the c u s t o d i a n a c t u a l l y improved the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . C a r t e r d i d not i n v i t e many o u t s i d e r s t o the d e c i s i o n forums. Broader p a r t i c i p a t i o n might have widened the o p t i o n range. H o w e v e r , i t i s q u e s t i o n a b l e t o what degree such o u t s i d e a d v i s o r s would be a b l e t o match the p r o x i m i t y and t r u s t a d v i s o r s such as Mondale, B r z e z i n s k i , J o r d a n and Vance e n j o y e d . Two f a c t o r s may have worsened the narrow range of o p t i o n s i n the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The g o a l s , v a l u e s and b e l i e f s of most a d v o c a t e s , e x c e p t B r z e z i n s k i , were s i m i l a r t o C a r t e r ' s views and b e l i e f s . Moreover, C a r t e r c o u l d a t t i m e s show c o n s i d e r a b l e s t u b b o r n n e s s and d e c i d e on p o l i c y i n s p i t e of w e l l a i r e d warnings by h i s a d v i s o r s . These f i n d i n g s c h a l l e n g e the p r e l i m i n a r y o b s e r v a t i o n s of George and H a l l on the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 9 6 H a l l found s u f f i c i e n t i d e o l o g i c a l d i v e r s i t y among the a d v o c a t e s . However, t h i s a l l e g e d i d e o l o g i c a l d i v e r s i t y d i d not t r a n s l a t e i n t o a d i v e r s i t y of p o l i c y o p t i o n s . H a l l and George blame the f a i l u r e of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y , i n s p i t e of C a r t e r ' s a p p r o p r i a t e s t y l e and s u i t a b l e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e , on c u s t o d i a l advocacy, p u b l i c s p e a k i n g and d i p l o m a c y . However, the e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t 88 t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s d i d not harm the p r o c e s s . Indeed, c u s t o d i a l advocacy enhanced i t a t t i m e s . The e v i d e n c e shows t h a t when the c u s t o d i a n b l o c k e d a d v o c a t e s from a c c e s s t o the d e c i s i o n forums or t o the p r e s i d e n t and b l o c k e d t h e i r o p t i o n s from c o n s i d e r a t i o n , as he d i d from l a t e 1978 onwards, the a p p r o x i m a t i o n of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y ended. These f i n d i n g s and i . f e D e n c e s c h a l l e n g e s e v e r a l a s p e c t s of the p u l t i p l e advocacy t h e o r y : does i t a c t u a l l y produce a v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s ? S h o u l d the c u s t o d i a n never advocate on p o l i c y ? I s p u b l i c s p e a k i n g and d i p l o m a c y by the c u s t o d i a n r e a l l y h a r m f u l ? In the f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s t h e s e q u e s t i o n s a r e e x p l o r e d by e v a l u a t i n g i n depth the e v i d e n c e on the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s f o r s e v e r a l i s s u e s . 89 ENDNOTES 1 Jimmy C a r t e r , \"Making F o r e i g n and Defense P o l i c y : Openness, Coherence and E f f i c i e n c y , \" N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , October 23, 1976, p.1109; Haynes Johnson, In The Absence of Power, New York; The V i k i n g P r e s s , 1980; I n t e r v i e w w i t h C a r t e r by N e i l . R . P e i r c e i n Thomas E. C r o n i n and R e x f o r d G. T u g w e l l , ( e d s . ) , The P r e s i d e n c y R e a p p r a i s e d , (2nd e d . ) , New York: P r a e g e r , 1977,pp.44-45 2 Dom Bonafede, \"White House R e p o r t , \" N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , F e b r u a r y 12, 1977, p.232; R i c h a r d E. N e u s t a d t , \" S t a f f i n g the P r e s i d e n c y : Premature Notes on the New A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , \" P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Q u a r t e r l y , No.1, S p r i n g 1978, pp.8-10 3 Dom Bonafede \"White House R e p o r t , \" N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , A p r i l 30, 1977, p.667; John Osborne, The New R e p u b l i c , October 29, 1977, p.6; H a r r i s o n W e l l f o r d , \" S t a f f i n g the P r e s i d e n c y , An I n s i d e r ' s Comment,\" P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Q u a r t e r l y , No.1, S p r i n g 1978, p. 11. ft P e i r c e i n C r o n i n and T u g w e l l ( e d s . ) , 1977, p. 44. 5 Robert E. Hunter, P r e s i d e n t i a l C o n t r o l of F o r e i g n P o l i c y , New York: P r a e g e r , 1980, p. 37. 6 Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , Power and P r i n c i p l e , New Y ork: F a r r a r , S t r a u s s , G i r o u x , 1983; p.5, Hedley Donovan, R o o s e v e l t t o Reagan, New York: Harper and Row, 1985, p. 162,3; See a l s o Time, August 8, 1977, p. 9; C a r t e r b r i e f l y h i n t s a t t h i s i n Keeping F a i t h , New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p. 52; Vance acknowledged C a r t e r ' s a c t i v i s t s t y l e i n an i n t e r v i e w w i t h Time, A p r i l 24, 1978, p.24 7 W e l l f o r d ( 1978), p. 1 1 . 8 C a r t e r (1982), pp. 53, 54, 55 and 60; R. Gordon H o x i e , \" S t a f f i n g the F o r d and C a r t e r P r e s i d e n c i e s , \" P r e s i d e n t i a l S t u d i e s Q u a r t e r l y , No. 3, 1980, p. 389. 9 N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , October 15, 1977, p. 1601; A l e x a n d e r L. George, P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g i n F o r e i g n P o l i c y , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1980, p. 157, b e l i e v e s t h a t C a r t e r ' s absence i n the PRC and SCC meetings t o some degree o f f s e t t h i s b e n e f i t . 1 0 Gaddis Smith, M o r a l i t y , Reason and Power, New York: H i l l and Wang, 1986; M.Glenn Abernathy. e t . a l . ( e d s . ) , The C a r t e r Y e a r s , London: F r a n c e s P i n t e r , 1984; Theodore White, America In Search of I t s e l f : The Making of the P r e s i d e n t : 1976-1980, New York: Harper & Row, 1982; S t a n l e y Hoffmann, \"The h e l l of Good I n t e n t i o n s , \" F o r e i g n P o l i c y , No. 29, W i n t e r 1977, pp.3-26 1 1 Smith (1986), p. 81; E l i z a b e t h Drew, \"A R e p o r t e r a t 90 L a r g e : B r z e z i n s k i , \" New Y o r k e r , May 1, 1978, p.101-122; Dom Bonafede, \"White House R e p o r t , \" A p r i l 9, 1977,p.549; John Havemann, \"White House R e p o r t , \" N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , J u l y 16, 1977, p.1104-1112; C a r t e r (1982), p. 316; B u r t o n M. S a p i n , P r e s i d e n t i a l S t u d i e s Q u a r t e r l y , No. 1, 1980, p. 21. 1 2 John Watson i n N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , October 30, 1976,p.1546; C a r t e r (1982), p. 60. 1 3 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 67. 1* Idem, p. 67. 1 5 Cyrus Vance, Hard C h o i c e s , New York: Simon and S c h u s t e r , 1983, p. 35. 1 6 H a m i l t o n J o r d a n , C r i s e s , New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1982, p. 47; Joseph A. C a l i f a n o , G o v e r n i n g A m e r i c a , New York: Simon and S c h u s t e r , 1981, p. 396. 1 7 B a r r y R u b i n , S e c r e t s of S t a t e , New York: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1980; Smith (1986). 1 8 C a r t e r (1982), p. 54. 1 9 The f o l l o w i n g account draws upon Hunter (1980); B r z e z i n s k i (1983); Dom Bonafede, \"White House R e p o r t , \" N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , October 15, 1977, p.1596-1601; P h i l i p Odeen, \"Report of a Study of the P r e s i d e n t ' s R e o r g a n i z a t i o n P r o j e c t , \" 1979; I n t e r v i e w w i t h B r z e z i n s k i i n Washington Q u a r t e r l y , by M i c h a e l R. B e s c h l o s s and A l a n W e i n s t e i n , W i n t e r 1982, pp.54-79, and D. K i r s c h t e n , \"White House R e p o r t , \" N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , May 17, 1980. More fragmented i n f o r m a t i o n can be found i n Vance (1983); C a r t e r (1982); and J o r d a n (1982). 2 0 Lawrence Korb i n Sam C. S a r k e s i a n (ed.) Defense P o l i c y and the P r e s i d e n c y : C a r t e r ' s F i r s t Y e a r s , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1979, pp. 120-130. 2 1 E.g. the i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n on the SALT I I n e g o t i a t i o n s was formed i n the p r o c e s s of two NSC meetings; on March 19 and 22, 1977. B r z e z i n s k i (1982), pp. 159, 160 and p. 67; Hunter (1980), p. 35 n o t e s t h a t NSC meetings g r a d u a l l y became l e s s f r e q u e n t , o n l y d e a l i n g w i t h t h e most i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s e.g. the i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n and the r e s c u e attempt of the h o s t a g e s i n I r a n . B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 67. 2 2 Donovan (1985), p. 152; S a r k e s i a n (1979), p.82; Hunter (1980), p. 34; C a r t e r (1982), p. 56; Jordan (1982) p r o v i d e s examples of t h e s e d i s c u s s i o n s on a v a r i e t y of i s s u e s throughout the book e.g. see p. 44, 64. 2 3 Vance (1982), p. 39. Vance (1983), p. 39; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 70. 91 2 5 Hunter (1980), p. 33. 2 6 C a r t e r ( 1982), p. 36. 2 7 Donovan (1985), p. 153; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 67 s t a t e s t h a t c a b i n e t meetings never d e a l t w i t h f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s . ; C a r t e r (1982), p. 60; C a l i f a n o (1981), p. 403. 2 8 C a r t e r (1982), pp. 39, 54, 55; J o r d a n (1982), pp. 45, 68,; Time, August 8 , 1977, pp. 8, 9; W e l l f o r d (1980), p. 11. 2 9 Vance (1983), p. 39. 3 0 Idem, p. 37. 3 1 C a r t e r (1982), p. 54; D a v i d S. M c l e l l a n , Cyrus Vance, New J e r s e y : Rowman & A l l a n h e l d , 1 9 8 5 , p. 25. 3 2 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 37. 3 3 M c l e l l a n (1985), p. 32. 3 4 J o r d a n (1982), p.45; R. C a r t e r agrees t h a t the p r e s i d e n t e n j o y e d the range of o p i n i o n s the two men r e p r e s e n t e d : R. C a r t e r (1984), p. 310. See a l s o Turner (1985), p. 88. 3 5 Robert S t r a u s s i n Washington P o s t , December 20, 1979, p. 61; Andrew Young, p. C3; J o r d a n (1982), p. 48; R i c h a r d B u r t , New York Times, December 25, 1977, p. 1. Jordan wrote (p. 48) \"When they d i d d i f f e r . . . the p r e s i d e n t would s i d e w i t h Vance 3 out of 4 t i m e s . \" See a l s o M c l e l l a n (1985), p. 168. 3 6 Dom Bonafede, \"White House R e p o r t , \" N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , October 15, 1977, p. 1599; Odeen (1979), p. 46. 3 7 C a r t e r (1982), p. 51; J o r d a n (1982), p. 46. 3 8 R. C a r t e r (1984), p. 310; See F a l l o w s (1979), p. 76.; J o r d a n a s s e r t s t h a t each man d e s c r i b e d one a s p e c t of C a r t e r ' s p e r s o n a l i t y : Vance's the c a u t i o u s C a r t e r , B r z e z i n s k i : C a r t e r the r i s k t a k e r , J o r d a n (1982), p. 47. 3 9 C a r t e r (1982), p. 55; The New R e p u b l i c , January 15, 1977, p. 16. 4 0 I r v i n g . M . D e s t l e r , L e s l i e H. G e l b and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy, New York: Simon and S c h u s t e r , 1984, p. 219; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 44. S i n c e B r z e z i n s k i saw Brown as a u s e f u l a l l y i n h i s d i s a g r e e m e n t s w i t h Vance, we must be c a r e f u l t o i n t e r p r e t B r z e z i n s k i ' s e v a l u a t i o n of Brown. Brown was more i n agreement w i t h Vance d u r i n g the f i r s t y e a r s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w h i c h , though u n f o r t u n a t e f o r B r z e z i n s k i , does not n e c e s s a r i l y make him l e s s a r t i c u l a t e . 4 1 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 46. See comment i n p r e v i o u s n o t e . 92 4 2 Smith (1986), p. 45.; S t r o b e T a l b o t t c l a i m s Brown was the s i n g l e most i n f l u e n t i a l a d v i s o r on SALT, S t r o b e T a l b o t t , Endgame, New York: Harper & Row, 1979, p. 50. a 3 P a u l C. L i g h t , V i c e - P r e s i d e n t i a l Power, Bathmore: Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1984, pp. 76, 152, 177; The New R e p u b l i c , A p r i l 23, 1977, p.10;, Dom Bonafede, \"White House R e p o r t , \" The N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , March 11, 1978,p.376; C a r t e r ( 1 9 82), pp. 37-39; Jordan (1982), p. 77; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp. 33-35. 4 4 L i g h t (1984), p. 75. 4 5 L i g h t (1984), p. 90; Bonafede,March 11 (1978), On Mondale's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the PRC and SCC. See B r z e z i n s k i ( 1 9 85), p. 33,34. 4 6 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 68; L i g h t (1984), p. 80; C a r t e r (1982), p. 55. 4 7 F i n l a y L e w i s , Mondale, New York: Harper & Row, p. 242., J o r d a n ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of f o r e i g n p o l i c y meetings c o n s i s t e n t l y shows t h i s phenomenon, J o r d a n (1982). 4 8 J o r d a n (1982), p. 68; The New R e p u b l i c , A p r i l 4, 1983. 4 9 Hoxie (1980), p. 387. 5 0 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 64; S t a n s f i e l d T u r n e r , S e c r e c y and Democracy, Bos t o n : Houghton, M i f f l i n Co., 1985, p. 131. 5 1 Turner (1985), p. 134. 5 2 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 68. Turner does not mention t h i s i n h i s book. 5 3 D e s p i t e Rosalynn's w e l l w r i t t e n memoir: R o s a l y n n C a r t e r , F i r s t Lady from P l a i n s , New York: B a l l e n t i n e Books, 1984. 5 4 Havemann (1977), p. 1109; Time, A p r i l 12, 1978, p. 14 n o t e s e q u a l a c c e s s of Vance and B r z e z i n s k i t o C a r t e r . 5 5 C a r t e r (1982), pp. 54, 55. 5 6 C a r t e r (1982), p. 59; P e i r c e (1977), p. 47. 5 7 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 66. 5 8 Vance (1983), p. 35; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 66. 5 9 Smith (1986), p. 245. 6 0 Abernathy e t . a l . (1984), p. 71; Time, June 12, 1978. A l t h o u g h B r z e z i n s k i ' s memoir (p. 43, 44) a l s o s t a t e s t h i s , we must be aware of the p o s s i b i l i t y of s e l f s e r v i n g a c c o u n t s . I n t e r v i e w w i t h Brown i n New York Times, December 93 7, 1980,p.44. H a l l found t h a t t h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e d i v e r s i t y i n i d e o l o g i c a l background among C a r t e r ' s a d v i s o r s . H a l l d e s c r i b e d Mondale, Warnke and Vance as l i b e r a l democrats, B r z e z i n s k i , Turner and Brown as c o n s e r v a t i v e democrats. However H a l l d i d not p r o v i d e any e v i d e n c e t h a t t h i s i d e o l o g i c a l d i v e r s i t y t r a n s l a t e d i n t o d i v e r s e o p t i o n s . Moreover, Turner was e x c l u d e d from the p r o c e s s . See D a v i d K. H a l l , Implementing M u l t i p l e Advocacy i n the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l : 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 8 0 , Ph.D T h e s i s , S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , 1982, pp. 661, 662. 6 ' For the Panama Ca n a l i s s u e see B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 134; and Vance (1983), p. 143. For the SALT i s s u e see T a l b o t t (1979), p. 58,59; M c l e l l a n (1985), p. 39 and Vance (1983), p. 48. 6 2 For the human r i g h t s i s s u e see C a r t e r (1982), p. 145;, B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 127. For Rhodesian p o l i c y : B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 140, 141; Vance (1983), p. 261. On the. M i d d l e E a s t see Vance (1983), p. 192; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 87. On A n g o l a / Z a i r e see Vance (1983), pp. 89-92; Smith (1986), p. 47. On E a s t e r n Europe see B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp. 296-301 6 3 J e r e l A. R o s a t i , \"The F o r e i g n P o l i c y of the C a r t e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n \" i n Donald A. S y l v a n and Steve Chan ( e d s . ) , F o r e i g n P o l i c y D e c i s i o n Making, New York: P r a e g e r , 1984, conducted a c o n t e n t a n a l y s i s study of the p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s of C a r t e r and h i s o f f i c i a l s and found t h a t C a r t e r and Vance sh a r e d the same image of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system (p. 171). He a l s o found t h a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s image was a t odds w i t h Vance's and C a r t e r ' s (p. 171). For a summary of Vance's and C a r t e r ' s views see Smith (1986) c h a p t e r 2; C o r a l B e l l , P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r and F o r e i g n P o l i c y : The C o s t s of V i r t u e , C a n b e r r a : A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y , 1982, esp. p. 26; Drew (1978), pp.101-122; James F a l l o w s , \"The P a s s i o n l e s s P r e s i d e n c y , \" A t l a n t i c M o n t h l y , May/June, 1979 esp. p. 43. 6 f t Smith (1986), pp. 35-40; S t a n l e y Hoffmann, \"Requiem,\" F o r e i g n P o l i c y , No. 42, s p r i n g 1981, pp.3-21; Abernathy e t . a l . (eds.) (1984), p. 60, 61; Washington P o s t , December 20, 1979. 6 5 S a r k e s i a n ( e d . ) , (1979), p. 87; V i c t o r L a s k y , Jimmy C a r t e r : The Man and The Myth, New York: Marek P u b l i s h e r s , 1979, p. 334. Lake and G e l b acknowledged t h a t w h i l e Brown and B r z e z i n s k i had some \"hawks\" i n t h e i r s t a f f s , the t o p e c h e l o n of the S t a t e Department had v e r y few: D e s t l e r e t . a l . (1984) p. 118. They a l s o c o n f i r m the s i m i l a r i t y between Vance and Warnke (p. 222). See a l s o Smith (1986), p. 44. 6 6 New York Times, December 7, 1980, p.E1-5; The New R e p u b l i c , J anuary 15, 1977, p.24; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp. 44-48; Washington P o s t , June 11, 1978, p. 1; Turner (1985), p. 47. 6 7 C a r t e r (1982), p. 59; Donovan (1985), p. 214. However, t o 94 a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , Donovan h i m s e l f was an a d v o c a t e w i t h o u t l i n e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 6 8 C a r t e r (1982) p. 60; The New R e p u b l i c , March 3, 1979; C a l i f a n o (1981), pp. 404, 410. 6 9 N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , December 16, 1978, p.2009; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp. 53-55. 7 0 Smith (1986), p. 113; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 44. 7 1 F a l l o w s (1979), p. 76. 7 2 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 71. 7 3 Abernathy e t . a l . (eds.) (1984), p. 71; N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , December 16, 1978. pp.2009-2011, I t r e p o r t e d : \" B r z e z i n s k i i s the c o o r d i n a t o r , e n e r g i z e r and i n t e l l e c t u a l s t i m u l a t o r i n the F o r e i g n P o l i c y a r e n a \" (p. 2011); Drew (1978). 7 4 The New R e p u b l i c , June 4, 1977, p. 10; New York Times, December 25, 1977, p. 1. See a l s o B e s c h l o s s and W e i n s t e i n (1982), p. 72. 7 5 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 59; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 158 7 6 Washington P o s t , December 20, 1979, p. C3. 7 7 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.126-128; Vance (1983), pp.127-130. Vance s t a t e s t h a t most s e n i o r a d v i s o r s opposed the p l a n . B r z e z i n s k i d i d not attempt t o \"push\" t h i s i s s u e t h r o u g h but a d v i s e d C a r t e r t o take the o pposing views s e r i o u s l y . E v e n t u a l l y , the i s s u e s i m p l y v a n i s h e d from the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s agenda, c h i e f l y due t o Vance's o p p o s i t i o n . 7 8 D u r i n g the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s on the N-bomb, f o r example, B r z e z i n s k i ' s s t r o n g s u pport f o r d e p l o y i n g the weapon c l o u d e d h i s d u t i e s t o communicate c l e a r l y w i t h the p r e s i d e n t . In the end, the f a i l u r e t o manage the p r o c e s s p r o p e r l y , l e d t o the e m b a r r a s s i n g c l a s h between C a r t e r and Helmut Schmidt. See: Vance (1983), pp.94-96 ; C a r t e r (1982), pp.225-229 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.301-306. 7 9 George (1972), p.785 8 0 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.71 8 1 Smith (1986), p. 43. See a l s o Drew (1978) and Bonafede (1977). See a l s o R. G o t t e m o e l l e r , \" E v o l u t i o n of the US O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Setup For D e a l i n g W ith SALT\", Rand Monograph, November 1978, p.23; Hunter (1982), p. 29, b e l i e v e s t h a t an a d vocate c u s t o d i a n can e f f e c t i v e l y c o o r d i n a t e d e c i s i o n -making. 8 2 N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , December 16, 1978, p.2009-2011; Time, May 29, 1978; New York Times, October 19, 1977; N a t i o n a l 95 J o u r n a l , October 15, 1977, p.1596-1601; M c l e l l a n (1985), p. 48. 8 3 Washington P o s t , December 20, 1977, p.7 8 f l C a r t e r (1982), p. 54; Jo r d a n (1982), p. 49; I n t e r v i e w w i t h Vance i n Time, A p r i l 24, 1978. 8 5 C a r t e r (1982), p. 53. I t i s a l s o argued t h a t C a r t e r was a m b i v a l e n t towards the USSR and c o u l d not come down on e i t h e r s i d e of the argument. See Hoffmann (1981), pp 3-8. The problem w i t h t h i s argument i s t h a t t h e r e was n o t h i n g a m b i v a l e n t about C a r t e r ' s a c t u a l p o l i c y i n the c o n f l i c t . The US s t a n d remained u n a l t e r e d t h r o u g h o u t . 8 6 Time, J u l y 18 (1977). 8 7 B e s c h l o s s and W e i n s t e i n (1982), p. 76. R i c h a r d E a r l e ( D i r e c t o r ACDA) a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t a l l d i p l o m a t i c c o n t a c t s by the White House were r e p o r t e d t o DOS, Arms C o n t r o l Today, no.3, March 1981, p. 6 8 8 H a l l (1982), p. 663. 8 9 Smith (1986), p. 43 c l a i m s t h a t such v i o l a t i o n s s t a r t e d i n e a r l y 1978. To some degree they can a l s o be i d e n t i f i e d i n the PRC-US n o r m a l i z a t i o n i s s u e as I w i l l e x p l a i n i n a pur s u a n t c h a p t e r . 9 0 Gary S i c k , A l l F a l l Down, New York: Random House, 1985, pp. 117-122. 9 1 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 349. For example, B r z e z i n s k i would q u i c k l y change PRC s e s s i o n s i n t o NSC s e s s i o n s by b r i n g i n g i n the p r e s i d e n t , merely t o ous t the a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r i e s (from S t a t e ) from the meet i n g . 9 2 Vance (1983), p. 409; J o r d a n (1982), p. 251. 9 3 Odeen (1979), P h i l i p Odeen, \" O r g a n i z i n g f o r N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , \" I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , summer 1980, pp.111-129. 9 f l Vance (1983), p. 37 ( f o r the M i d d l e E a s t see pp. 162-166); B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.66; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 58,59; R i c h a r d E. Neustadt and E r n e s t R. May, T h i n k i n g i n Time, New York: The Free P r e s s , 1986, p. 118. 9 5 B e s c h l o s s and W e i n s t e i n (1982), p. 72. 9 6 George (1980), pp. 157-163; H a l l (1982), pp. 654-681. 96 CHAPTER THREE SALT I I : THE \"DEEP CUTS\" PROPOSALS OF MARCH 1977 97 T h i s c h a p t e r a n a l y z e s the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s which produced the \"Deep C u t s \" p r o p o s a l s of March 1977 i n t h e SALT I I t a l k s between the USA and the USSR. I t w i l l show t h a t the t a l k s f a i l e d c h i e f l y because of c e r t a i n f l a w s i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s t h a t l e d t o the American p o s i t i o n . W h i l e the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y was t o a l a r g e e x t e n t a p p r o x i m a t e d , c e r t a i n key sho r t c o m i n g s e x p l a i n why the p r o c e s s f a i l e d t o produce an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n . As such, the s t r a t e g y e x p l a i n s both the s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses of the p r o c e s s . F i n a l l y , on the b a s i s of thes e weaknesses i n the p r o c e s s , I w i l l argue t h a t changes i n the r o l e t a s k p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r the c u s t o d i a n can improve the s t r a t e g y and thu s the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . THE BACKGROUND The SALT I I t a l k s commenced s h o r t l y a f t e r the s i g n i n g of t he SALT I t r e a t y i n 1972. Both the S o v i e t s and Americans e x p r e s s e d t h e i r d e s i r e t o f o l l o w up on the SALT I t r e a t y by c o m p l e t i n g a t r e a t y t h a t would f u r t h e r l i m i t the arms race and which would be v a l i d u n t i l the mid 1980's. In s p i t e of t h i s common g o a l , the two p a r t i e s e n t e r e d the t a l k s w i t h q u i t e d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s . The American demands were the f o l l o w i n g . 1 The U n i t e d S t a t e s sought an agreement t h a t would g i v e both p a r t i e s n u m e r i c a l l y e q u a l numbers of n u c l e a r l a u n c h e r s . The SALT I 98 t r e a t y had a l l o w e d the S o v i e t s a g r e a t e r number of l a u n c h e r s because the American d e l e g a t i o n f e l t c o n f i d e n t t h a t , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e i r l e a d i n the number of warheads would o f f s e t t h i s n u m e r i c a l i n e q u a l i t y . C ongress, however, d i d not a g r e e . I t passed a r e s o l u t i o n f o r c i n g the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o seek e q u a l numbers i n any new t r e a t y . In a d d i t i o n t o n u m e r i c a l e q u a l i t y , the Americans sought t o l i m i t the number of l a u n c h e r s t h a t c o u l d be MIRVed and sought t o reduce the number of S o v i e t heavy n u c l e a r l a u n c h e r s . The r a t i o n a l e b e h i n d t h e s e demands was q u i t e s i m p l e . W h i l e the A m e r icans, a t the time of the t a l k s , were s t i l l ahead i n the number of MIRVed l a u n c h e r s , the S o v i e t p o t e n t i a l f o r o v e r t a k i n g the Americans was merely a m a t t e r of t i m e . Moreover, w h i l e the U n i t e d S t a t e s had r e p l a c e d i t s heavy m i s s i l e s w i t h s m a l l e r and more a c c u r a t e m i s s i l e s , the S o v i e t s had n o t . I t was f e a r e d , t h e r e f o r e t h a t , s i n c e the S o v i e t s were a l l o w e d a h i g h e r number of l a u c h e r s and s i n c e they had a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of heavy l a u n c h e r s , which can because of t h e i r l a r g e r throwweight l i f t o f f v e r y l a r g e MIRVed warheads, they c o u l d e v e n t u a l l y s u r p a s s the American l e a d i n warheads. I f t h i s happened, combined w i t h an i n c r e a s e i n the a c c u r a c y of S o v i e t l a u n c h e r s , the U n i t e d S t a t e s f e a r e d i t might be v u l n e r a b l e t o a S o v i e t f i r s t s t r i k e i n the l a t e 1970's or e a r l y 1980's. F i n a l l y , t h e Americans wanted t o put r e s t r i c t i o n s on a new bomber the S o v i e t s were d e v e l o p i n g , c a l l e d the B a c k f i r e . The S o v i e t s argued t h a t i t was a medium-range bomber and t h u s not s u b j e c t t o the S t r a t e g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n T a l k s . However, the Americans b e l i e v e d t h a t 99 b o t h i t s p a y l o a d and range were s u f f i c i e n t l y ambiguous t o count i t as a s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r bomber. The S o v i e t p o s i t i o n g o i n g i n t o the t a l k s was the f o l l o w i n g . Because of t h e i r d i s a d v a n t a g e i n the number of warheads and MIRVed l a u n c h e r s , the S o v i e t s r e s i s t e d American demands f o r n u m e r i c a l e q u a l i t y and l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e i r MIRV p o t e n t i a l and heavy l a u n c h e r s . A l s o , the S o v i e t s wanted t o i n c l u d e the US B-52 and B-1 s t r a t e g i c bombers i n t o the o v e r a l l numbers on s t r a t e g i c l a u n c h e r s . T h i r d l y , the S o v i e t s demanded t h a t American n u c l e a r weapons i n Europe be counted as s t r a t e g i c l a u n c h e r s s i n c e they c o u l d r e a c h the S o v i e t h e a r t l a n d . F i n a l l y , the S o v i e t s sought r e s t r i c t i o n s on both the range and number of a new American weapon, the C r u i s e M i s s i l e . A f t e r two y e a r s of n e g o t i a t i o n s , the two s i d e s were a b l e t o s o l v e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s on most of t h e s e i s s u e s a t the 1974 summit i n V l a d i v o s t o k . The agreements reached a t t h i s summit r e q u i r e d c o n c e s s i o n s on the i s s u e s by both s i d e s . The S o v i e t s a c c e p t e d the American demand f o r n u m e r i c a l e q u a l i t y i n l a u n c h e r s and MIRVed l a u n c h e r s . In r e t u r n , the Americans agreed t o s e t the numbers h i g h enough so t h a t the S o v i e t s would not have t o d i s m a n t l e a l a r g e amount of t h e i r e x i s t i n g l a u n c h e r s and c o u l d s t i l l expand t h e i r s m a l l e r f o r c e of MIRVed l a u n c h e r s . They agreed on a t o t a l c e i l i n g of 2400 l a u n c h e r s and a MIRV s u b c e i l i n g of 1320. The Americans dropped t h e i r demand f o r a r e d u c t i o n i n heavy S o v i e t l a u n c h e r s i n r e t u r n f o r the S o v i e t c o n c e s s i o n not t o i n c l u d e American n u c l e a r weapons i n Europe. The 100 S o v i e t s were a l l o w e d t o keep t h e i r p r e s e n t number of 300 heavy m i s s i l e s . F i n a l l y , the U n i t e d S t a t e s agreed t o i n c l u d e i t s s t r a t e g i c bombers i n the t o t a l of 2400. 2 The V l a d i v o s t o k summit d i d not produce an agreement on two i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s : the B a c k f i r e bomber and the C r u i s e M i s s i l e . The S o v i e t s r e f u s e d t o count the B a c k f i r e as a s t r a t e g i c bomber, w h i l e the Americans r e j e c t e d the S o v i e t demand t o count the C r u i s e M i s s i l e as a n u c l e a r l a u n c h e r and t o l i m i t i t s range t o 600 km. In s p i t e of the disagreement on t h e s e two i s s u e s , b oth s i d e s c o n s i d e r e d the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s a major b r e a k t h r o u g h and the b a s i s f o r SALT I I . S e v e r a l American c r i t i c s of the t a l k s argued t h a t the c e i l i n g s d i d not r e a l l y l i m i t the n u c l e a r a r s e n a l s of b oth powers but merely \"capped\" them. However, the US a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o u n t e r e d t h a t w i t h o u t the agreed l i m i t s , the S o v i e t s would be a b l e t o \"out MIRV\" the U n i t e s S t a t e s and as such a c c e l l e r a t e the arms r a c e . The S o v i e t r e a c t i o n t o the V l a d i v o s t o k agreements was q u i t e p o s i t i v e . O f f i c i a l S o v i e t news a c c o u n t s h a i l e d the agreements as \"a l o n g term b a s i s \" f o r the l i m i t a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c arms between the two c o u n t r i e s . 3 Throughout 1975, b o t h s i d e s o f f e r e d s e v e r a l p r o p o s a l s and c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s t o break the d eadlock on the B a c k f i r e and C r u i s e i s s u e s . However, w h i l e i n c h i n g c l o s e r t o an agreement, the two s i d e s c o u l d not agree on an e x a c t number, range or method t o count the two weapons. At one p o i n t , K i s s i n g e r s a i d t h a t SALT I I was 90% completed.\" Yet h i s f i n a l e f f o r t , i n J a n u a r y 1976, d i d not produce a 1 0 1 b r e a k t h r o u g h . Most a n a l y s t s agree t h a t the p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n campaign of 1976 p r e v e n t e d F o r d from o f f e r i n g any compromises on the C r u i s e M i s s i l e t h a t c o u l d f i n a l i z e the SALT I I a c c o r d . F o r d was under a t t a c k from s e v e r a l Democrats as w e l l as the c o n s e r v a t i v e wing of the R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y . The Democrats condemned him f o r not r e a c h i n g lower c e i l i n g s w h i l e s e v e r a l R e p u b l i c a n s a c c u s e d him of making t o o many c o n c e s s i o n s t o the S o v i e t s . To t r y another way t o get out of the d e a d l o c k , F o r d proposed, i n F e b r u a r y 1976, t o s i g n the SALT I I t r e a t y on the b a s i s of the V l a d i v o s t o k agreements w h i l e d e f e r r i n g the C r u i s e and B a c k f i r e i s s u e s t o the SALT I I I t a l k s . The S o v i e t s , however, r e f u s e d t o d e f e r the C r u i s e i s s u e . D u r i n g the e l e c t i o n campaign, C a r t e r ' s p o s i t i o n on the SALT I I n e g o t i a t i o n s appears ambiguous, perhaps d e l i b e r a t e l y so. W h i l e e c h o i n g Senator J a c k s o n ' s dismay over the h i g h a g g r e g a t e s of the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s , and p r o m i s i n g \" t o r i d n u c l e a r weapons from the f a c e of the e a r t h \" , C a r t e r a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t he would t r y t o c o n c l u d e an agreement based on V l a d i v o s t o k as soon as p o s s i b l e . 5 In s e v e r a l i n t e r v i e w s and speeches, C a r t e r emphasized h i s d e s i r e t o a c h i e v e deeper c u t s i n the o v e r a l l c e i l i n g s when e l e c t e d . 6 However, a f t e r h i s n o m i n a t i o n , C a r t e r a u t h o r i z e d Harriman t o t e l l Brezhnev t h a t , i f e l e c t e d , he would q u i c k l y s i g n SALT I I based on V l a d i v o s t o k . In J a n u a r y 1977, he s a i d the same i n an i n t e r v i e w w i t h Time magazine. 7 As w i l l be shown below, C a r t e r ' s ambivalence about how t o c o n t i n u e the SALT t a l k s 102 was not r e s o l v e d u n t i l s e v e r a l weeks i n t o h i s term i n o f f i c e . THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW On January 24, 1977, C a r t e r i s s u e d a P r e s i d e n t i a l Review Memorandum (PRM), i n s t r u c t i n g the NSC committee s t r u c t u r e t o p r e p a r e a s e t of n e g o t i a t i n g o p t i o n s f o r SALT I I . B e f o r e h i s i n a u g u r a t i o n C a r t e r had a l r e a d y announced t h a t Vance would go t o Moscow a t the end of March t o reopen the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s . In a s t a f f meeting j u s t p r i o r t o i s s u i n g the PRM, C a r t e r had i n d i c a t e d b oth a d e s i r e f o r deeper r e d u c t i o n s i n the n u c l e a r l a u n c h e r s of b o t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union and f o r a q u i c k c o m p l e t i o n of the s t a l l e d V a l d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . White House o f f i c i a l s t e s t i f i e d t h a t C a r t e r was not s u r e how t o p r o c e e d ; \" i n one s t e p ( V l a d i v o s t o k ) or two.\" 8 O t h e r s i n d i c a t e d t h a t C a r t e r was not y e t l o c k e d i n t o a p o s i t i o n . 9 The p r e s i d e n t i n s t r u c t e d the S p e c i a l C o o r d i n a t i o n Committee, under B r z e z i n s k i ' s c h a i r m a n s h i p , t o e v a l u a t e the m e r i t s of both approaches; c o m p l e t i n g SALT I I on the b a s i s of V l a d i v o s t o k or l o w e r i n g the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s i m m e d i a t e l y as w e l l as o t h e r p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s . B r z e z i n s k i a s s i g n e d NSC s t a f f members V i c t o r U t g o f f , W i l l i a m H yland and R i c h a r d Molander t o s e t i n motion the i n t e r a g e n c y p r o c e s s of d e v e l o p i n g o p t i o n s . The f i r s t e x p l o r a t o r y SCC meeting was 103 h e l d on F e b r u a r y 3, which commissioned an i n t e r a g e n c y w o r k i n g group t o r e p o r t back t o the SCC when i t was ready t o p r e s e n t c o n c r e t e o p t i o n s . 1 0 Meanwhile, B r z e z i n s k i i n s t r u c t e d Molander t o w r i t e a memorandum on the h i s t o r y of the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s t o p r o v i d e p e r s p e c t i v e f o r the a d v i s o r s . T h i s memo was sent t o C a r t e r , Vance, Brown and M o n d a l e . 1 1 W h i l e the SCC d e l i b e r a t e d , C a r t e r made s e v e r a l p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s on SALT, c o n s u l t e d w i t h D o b r y n i n and exchanged l e t t e r s w i t h Brezhnev. In an i n t e r v i e w on J a n u a r y 24, C a r t e r d e s c r i b e d h i s v i s i o n of a t h r e e s t e p arms c o n t r o l approach. F i r s t he sought l i m i t s , t hen r e d u c t i o n s and e v e n t u a l l y m u l t i l a t e r a l d i s a r m a m e n t . 1 2 W h i l e d e s i r i n g deeper c u t s sooner than l a t e r , he s t a t e d t h a t he was w i l l i n g t o d e f e r d i f f i c u l t i s s u e s such as t h e B a c k f i r e and C r u i s e i f the S o v i e t s wanted a q u i c k agreement. In a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e on F e b r u a r y 8, C a r t e r l e a n e d more towards r a t i f y i n g V l a d i v o s t o k f i r s t and s e e k i n g deeper c u t s l a t e r . 1 3 C a r t e r agreed w i t h B r z e z i n s k i ' s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t he s h o u l d t r y t o b u i l d a p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Brezhnev. W i t h t h i s g o a l i n mind, C a r t e r wrote a p r i v a t e l e t t e r t o Brezhnev on January 26. In the l e t t e r , C a r t e r e x p r e s s e d h i s d e s i r e f o r a r a p i d c o n c l u s i o n of SA1T. 1 4 Brezhnev r e p l i e d t h a t the USSR b e l i e v e d V l a d i v o s t o k p r o v i d e d such a b a s i s . On F e b r u a r y 7 C a r t e r wrote a g a i n , s p e l l i n g out two p o s s i b l e r o u t e s : a comprehensive SALT I I w i t h lower c e i l i n g s or a s m a l l e r agreement e x c l u d i n g the B a c k f i r e and C r u i s e . C a r t e r made thes e p r o p o s a l s even though Brezhnev had i n d i c a t e d t o him t h a t he wished t o s t a y w i t h the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s 104 o n l y . C a r t e r had r e v i e w e d t h e s e i d e a s w i t h D o b r y n i n p r i o r t o s e n d i n g the l e t t e r . However, he had not g i v e n D o b r y n i n a c o n c r e t e s e t of p r o p o s a l s s i n c e t h e SALT o p t i o n s were s t i l l b e i n g d e l i b e r a t e d i n the SCC. 1 5 Brezhnev's r e p l y was l e s s c o r d i a l . He r e i t e r a t e d t h a t he would o n l y s i g n a SALT I I t r e a t y t h a t was based on V l a d i v o s t o k and t h a t C a r t e r ' s arms i d e a s appeared t o him as \" d e l i b e r a t e l y u n a c c e p t a b l e . \" 1 6 C a r t e r i m m e d i a t e l y took up the pen a g a i n t o defend h i s s i n c e r i t y t o a c h i e v e arms c o n t r o l . Brezhnev's f i n a l r e p l y t o t h i s exchange d i d not come u n t i l March 15, a f t e r the SCC had p r e s e n t e d C a r t e r w i t h the o p t i o n s . These p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s and p r i v a t e exchanges i n d i c a t e two i m p o r t a n t p o i n t s . F i r s t , C a r t e r had not made up h i s mind on how t o proceed w i t h the t a l k s . W h i l e he s t i l l wanted t o make good on h i s campaign p l e d g e t o c u t the n u c l e a r a r s e n a l s , C a r t e r moved c l o s e r t o the p o s i t i o n of f i r s t r a t i f y i n g the V l a d i v o s t o k l e v e l s , as i s e v i d e n t from h i s F e b r u a r y 8 p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e . Second, C a r t e r was not s u f f i c i e n t l y aware of the S o v i e t commitment t o V l a d i v o s t o k and of the S o v i e t r e f u s a l t o d e f e r the C r u i s e i s s u e . To show h i s g o o d w i l l , C a r t e r endorsed Brown's p l a n s f o r the new d e f e nse budget, c u t t i n g the p l a n n e d c o n s t r u c t i o n of B-1 bombers from 8 t o 5 and d e l a y i n g by one year the development of the MX. 1 7 105 THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS The p r i n c i p a l a c t o r s on the SCC i n t e r a g e n c y w o r k i n g group were W a l t e r Slocombe (Deputy A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s at DOD), L e s l i e G e l b ( D i r e c t o r of P o l i t i c o - M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s a t DOS) and Hyland (NSC s t a f f a i d e f o r the USSR). In e a r l y March, they p r e s e n t e d the SCC w i t h t h r e e o p t i o n s . The f i r s t , c a l l e d \" B a s i c V l a d i v o s t o k , \" argued f o r an agreement based on the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s w i t h t h e B a c k f i r e e x c l u d e d and the A i r Launched C r u i s e M i s s i l e (ALCM) counted i n the 1320 MIRV c e i l i n g . 1 8 The second o p t i o n was c a l l e d \" V l a d i v o s t o k P l u s . \" I t a l s o endorsed the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s but added the i d e a of t r a d i n g o f f S o v i e t heavy l a u n c h e r s f o r American ACLM's. I t proposed an agreement o u t s i d e the SALT t a l k s f o r the B a c k f i r e . The c i v i l i a n s i n DOD f a v o u r e d a t r a d e o f f between the B a c k f i r e and Ground Launced C r u i s e M i s s i l e s (GLCM's), w h i l e the O f f i c e of the J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f wanted t o count the B a c k f i r e as a s t r a t e g i c bomber. 1 9 The t h i r d o p t i o n , \" V l a d i v o s t o k Minus,\" proposed t o endorse V l a d i v o s t o k and d e f e r the C r u i s e and B a c k f i r e i s s u e s . Brown, D a v i d Aaron (Deputy D i r e c t o r , NSC ) and B r z e z i n s k i were not s a t i s f i e d w i t h the range of o p t i o n s and i n s t r u c t e d the group t o add a p r o p o s a l i n v o l v i n g deeper c u t s i n the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s . 2 0 Meanwhile, C a r t e r r e c e i v e d a memorandum from Senator J a c k s o n c a l l i n g f o r c u t s s u b s t a n t i a l l y below the V l a d i v o s t o k l e v e l s . I t recommended a 106 r e d u c t i o n i n S o v i e t heavy m i s s i l e s , the i n c l u s i o n of B a c k f i r e bombers and the e x c l u s i o n of C r u i s e m i s s i l e s . C a r t e r forwarded t h i s memo t o the Department of S t a t e and the Department of D e f e n s e . 2 1 Warnke and Hyland f e l t t h a t i t was an u n r e a l i s t i c p r o p o s a l . However, i t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h i s memo was s t u d i e d s e r i o u s l y by the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Any t r e a t y would have t o be r a t i f i e d by the Senate, i n which J a c k s o n p l a y e d a major r o l e . Moreover, Warnke's c o n f i r m a t i o n as C h i e f Arms N e g o t i a t o r had been a c h i e v e d by a narrow m a r g i n , r e f l e c t i n g l i t t l e t r u s t i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s arms n e g o t i a t i n g a b i l i t y . A l l t hese o p t i o n s were d i s c u s s e d a t the f i n a l SCC meeting on t h i s s u b j e c t on March 1 0 . 2 2 In t h i s m eeting, Brown appeared as the s t r o n g e s t a dvocate f o r deeper c u t s . Brown argued t h a t the American ICBM f o r c e was q u i c k l y becoming v u l n e r a b l e t o a S o v i e t f i r s t s t r i k e . In o r d e r t o st a v e o f f t h i s v u l n e r a b i l i t y , Brown f a v o u r e d lower c e i l i n g s as w e l l as a sha r p r e d u c t i o n i n the number of S o v i e t heavy l a u n c h e r s . Brown's i d e a s were s u p p o r t e d by Mondale and Aaron, though f o r d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s . 2 3 They b e l i e v e d t h a t the V l a d i v o s t o k l e v e l s f e l l s h o r t of genuine arms c o n t r o l . They ad v o c a t e d t h a t the bes t o p p o r t u n i t y t o make good on C a r t e r ' s campaign p l e d g e s was e a r l y i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , d u r i n g C a r t e r ' s \"honeymoon.\" Moreover, they f e l t t h a t the SALT p r o p o s a l s s h o u l d not f o l l o w K i s s i n g e r ' s l e g a c y t oo c l o s e l y . I t was best f o r C a r t e r t o c r e a t e h i s own r e c o r d i n t h i s a r e a as soon as p o s s i b l e . 2 \" Vance and Warnke d i d not a g r e e . They argued i n fa v o u r 107 of the \" B a s i c V l a d i v o s t o k \" o p t i o n . They were s k e p t i c a l about s u r p r i s i n g the S o v i e t s w i t h a r a d i c a l l y new p r o p o s a l . They b e l i e v e d t h a t a q u i c k agreement based on V l a d i v o s t o k s h o u l d be the p r e f e r r e d c h o i c e . They were p r e p a r e d t o l i m i t the number and range of ACLM's, w h i l e e x c l u d i n g the B a c k f i r e . B r z e z i n s k i c o n f i n e d h i s r o l e t o c h a i r i n g the meetings and s o r t i n g out the v a r i o u s o p t i o n s . From h i s memoirs, i t appears t h a t h i s p e r s o n a l p r e f e r e n c e was c l o s e r t o Brown's f a v o u r e d o p t i o n than t o V a n c e ' s . 2 5 The meeting d i d not r e a c h a consensus. B r z e z i n s k i sent the minutes t o C a r t e r and p r e p a r e d a memo summarizing the d i s c u s s e d o p t i o n s . 2 6 I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s meeting d i d not r e s u l t i n any compromises or t r a d e o f f s . The advocate p o s i t i o n s were e s s e n t i a l l y p o l a r i z e d around two o p t i o n s . Vance and Warnke p r e f e r r e d SALT I I t o be b u i l t upon the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s w h i l e Brown and Aaron wanted deeper c u t s . 2 7 N e i t h e r J o r d a n nor P o w e l l appear t o have p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the SCC d e l i b e r a t i o n s on S A L T . 2 8 On March 11, B r z e z i n s k i sent C a r t e r a memo o u t l i n i n g the o p t i o n s d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s meeting. The f i r s t o p t i o n c a l l e d f o r a d e f e r r a l of the C r u i s e and B a c k f i r e i s s u e s and a r a t i f i c a t i o n of the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s . The second o p t i o n proposed m o d e r a t e l y lower c e i l i n g s than the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . On the o t h e r i s s u e s i t resembled the \" V l a d i v o s t o k P l u s \" o p t i o n . The t h i r d was the \" B a s i c V l a d i v o s t o k \" o p t i o n f a v o u r e d by Vance and Warnke. The l a s t o p t i o n proposed deep c u t s t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2,000 l a u n c h e r s and 1,200 MIRVed l a u n c h e r s as w e l l as a cu t b a c k i n S o v i e t 108 heavy m i s s i l e s from 300 t o 150. T h i s l a s t o p t i o n was s u p p o r t e d s t r o n g l y by B r o w n . 2 9 B r z e z i n s k i f a v o u r e d the second o p t i o n , which c a l l e d f o r moderate c u t s . The next morning, Saturday March 12, C a r t e r ' s p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r s g a t h e r e d i n the c a b i n e t room t o d i s c u s s t h e s e o p t i o n s w i t h the p r e s i d e n t . 3 0 P r e s e n t were B r z e z i n s k i , Vance, Brown, Mondale, Aaron, Warnke, Chairman of the J o i n t C h i e f s Brown and T u r n e r . The P r e s i d e n t began by q u e s t i o n i n g the p a r t i c i p a n t s on a v a r i e t y of i s s u e s . He e x p r e s s e d h i s hope f o r r e a l arms c o n t r o l and h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the h i g h V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s . Upon t h i s , Brown and Aaron e x p l a i n e d t h e i r deep c u t s p r o p o s a l . Brown argued p e r s u a s i v e l y , i m p r e s s i n g C a r t e r w i t h h i s d e t a i l e d command of a l l SALT i s s u e s . Next, B r z e z i n s k i e v a l u a t e d the p o s s i b l e consequences of both the deep c u t s and the \" B a s i c V l a d i v o s t o k \" o p t i o n s : To seek an agreement based on the V l a d i v o s t o k l e v e l s would s i g n a l c o n t i n u i t y t o the S o v i e t s and would thus enhance S o v i e t c o n f i d e n c e i n C a r t e r ' s arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s . However, s e e k i n g deeper c u t s would s e r v e American i n t e r e s t s because i t would reduce or a t l e a s t postpone American v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o a S o v i e t f i r s t s t r i k e . B r z e z i n s k i a l s o s t a t e d t h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n might want t o move beyond the K i s s i n g e r e r a and e s t a b l i s h i t s own r e c o r d . Vance and Warnke d i d not defend t h e i r o p t i o n v e r y s t r o n g l y . Nor d i d they q u e s t i o n the ad v o c a t e s of the deep c u t s o p t i o n . 3 1 Warnke d i d mention t h a t i f the S o v i e t s r e j e c t e d the p r o p o s a l , any American c o n c e s s i o n s would l o o k l i k e a r e t r e a t . However, n e i t h e r he nor Vance c l a r i f i e d the 109 p o s s i b l e dangers i n h e r e n t i n moving away from the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . I f they had m i s g i v i n g s , they d i d not v o i c e them. Vance l a t e r acknowledged t h a t he thought the a m b i t i u o u s , f a r r e a c h i n g and r i s k y p r o p o s a l was worth a t r y . 3 2 C a r t e r ended the meeting by i n s t r u c t i n g B r z e z i n s k i t o w r i t e up a n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n based on the deep c u t s o p t i o n , t o be rev i e w e d i n a NSC meeting a week l a t e r . 3 3 On March 17, Vance and Warnke s u b m i t t e d a memo t o C a r t e r s t a t i n g t h e i r h e s i t a t i o n s about h i s d e c i s i o n a t the March 12 m e e t i n g . 3 4 However, as f a r as i s known, the memo d i d not p r o v i d e C a r t e r w i t h an a n a l y s i s of the p o s s i b l e consequences of h i s d e c i s i o n t o abandon the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . I t s t a t e d Vance's disagreement but d i d not r u l e out t h a t C a r t e r ' s gamble might pay o f f . W h i l e Vance thought i t was a \" l o n g s h o t \" he a l s o e x p r e s s e d h i s a m bivalence when he noted : I t might be t h a t the S o v i e t s , c o n f r o n t i n g a new p r e s i d e n t and the p r o s p e c t of h a v i n g t o d e a l w i t h him f o r a t l e a s t f o u r or perhaps e i g h t y e a r s , would be w i l l i n g t o t a k e a b o l d s t e p . We would not know u n l e s s we t r i e d . And s u c c e s s would mean a dr a m a t i c b r e a k t h r o u g h i n t u r n i n g around the arms r a c e . 3 5 On S a t u r d a y March 19, C a r t e r , Mondale, Vance, Brown, and B r z e z i n s k i r e v i e w e d the n e g o t i a t i o n p o s i t i o n drawn up by B r z e z i n s k i ' s s t a f f . 3 6 C a r t e r , encouraged by the p o s i t i v e tone of Brezhnev's l a s t l e t t e r of March 15, lowe r e d the deep c u t s p r o p o s a l even more. Launchers were s e t a t between 1,800 and 2,000 w i t h between 1,100 and 1,200 MIRVed. Heavy 110 m i s s i l e s remained a t the proposed 150 number. The C r u i s e range l i m i t was s e t a t 2,500km, w h i l e the B a c k f i r e was not t o be counted i n the aggregate numbers, p r o v i d e d the S o v i e t s would agree t o c e r t a i n measures l i m i t i n g i t s r a n g e . 3 7 B r z e z i n s k i v o i c e d h i s m i s g i v i n g s about the l o n g range of the C r u i s e but d i d not oppose the i d e a s t r o n g l y . A p p a r e n t l y , t h i s range was i n t e n d e d t o get the J o i n t C h i e f s t o agree on e x c l u d i n g the B a c k f i r e . Vance r e q u e s t e d a d e f e r r a l o p t i o n i n case the S o v i e t s r e j e c t e d the deep c u t s p r o p o s a l . I t was agreed t h a t Vance c o u l d propose as a second o p t i o n the d e f e r r a l of the C r u i s e and B a c k f i r e i s s u e s and the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s . F i n a l l y , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a l s o adopted a \" f a l l back\" o p t i o n . I t s p l i t the d i f f e r e n c e i n numbers between the \"deep c u t s \" and V l a d i v o s t o k l e v e l s . Vance was i n s t r u c t e d t o keep t h i s o p t i o n c o m p l e t e l y s e c r e t , even t o h i s s t a f f . The p l a n was t o propose i t o n l y i f the S o v i e t s e x p r e s s e d w i l l i n g n e s s t o n e g o t i a t e on the b a s i s of the f i r s t or second o p t i o n . W ith t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s Vance l e f t f o r Moscow. THE ADVOCATES' VIEWS AND THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE DECISION B e f o r e d e s c r i b i n g the d e c i s i o n outcome and a n a l y z i n g the s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , i t i s u s e f u l t o r e c o n s t r u c t how the major p a r t i c i p a n t s e v a l u a t e d the o p t i o n s , t h e i r e s t i m a t e d consequences, and 111 reasoned i n f a v o r of t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s . By most a c c o u n t s , Brown was the s t r o n g e s t a d v o c a t e . 3 8 H i s c o n c e r n was s t r a t e g i c f o r e m o s t . U n l e s s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c u r b e d S o v i e t MIRVing, i t would become v u l n e r a b l e . At the same t i m e , Brown was w i l l i n g t o make c o n c e s s i o n s t o the S o v i e t s . He f a v o u r e d s c a l i n g down the B-1 programme and p o s t p o n i n g the MX. Brown's semblance of f a i r n e s s and c o n s i s t e n c y g a i n e d him support from a d v i s o r s such as Aaron, Mondale and Warnke who b e l i e v e d t h a t American m i l i t a r y s p e nding and development was as much t o blame f o r the arms ra c e as S o v i e t MIRVed and heavy m i s s i l e s . 3 9 I t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o p i c t u r e Brown as the weapon, s t r a t e g y and s p ending s p e c i a l i s t b e i n g q u i t e o b l i v i o u s t o S o v i e t c o n c e r n s w i t h c o n t i n u i t y i n arms t a l k s . I t i s a l s o not d i f f i c u l t t o p i c t u r e C a r t e r as b e i n g impressed by Brown's arguments. Brown's advocacy f o r deeper c u t s , as w e l l as r e s t r a i n t on the American s i d e , f i t t e d C a r t e r ' s g o a l s t o a c h i e v e arms r e d u c t i o n s both by means of arms n e g o t i a t i o n s and by American g o o d w i l l . Aaron and Mondale added a more p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r t o the d e bate. T h e i r i n t e r e s t was t o go below the V l a d i v o s t o k c e i l i n g s because C a r t e r had campaigned on arms r e d u c t i o n s , not merely l i m i t a t i o n s . I t was b e s t t o make such a move when the p r e s i d e n t was r i d i n g h i g h i n the p o p u l a r i t y p o l l s , u s i n g h i s advantage i n the honeymoon p e r i o d . Moreover, Brown's o f f e r t o f r e e z e ICBM t e s t i n g , as w e l l as the development of new ICBM's, was e x a c t l y what the l i b e r a l wing of the D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y wanted. As i s w e l l known, Mondale and Aaron 112 (Mondale's p r e v i o u s a s s i s t a n t ) r e p r e s e n t e d t h i s segment of the P a r t y much b e t t e r than C a r t e r . The s k e p t i c s of suddenly moving away from the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s were foremost G e l b , Slocombe, Molander and H y l a n d . 4 0 W h i l e i n f a v o u r of deeper c u t s , they thought i t unwise not t o c a p i t a l i z e f i r s t on a near ready a c c o r d . Vance and Warnke s h a r e d t h e s e c o n c e r n s and brought them t o the a t t e n t i o n of the o t h e r a d v i s o r s as w e l l as C a r t e r . In a memorandum t o C a r t e r i n October 1976, Vance o u t l i n e d h i s i d e a s f o r C a r t e r ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y s h o u l d he be e l e c t e d . 4 1 In i t , Vance argued f o r r e s o l v i n g the B a c k f i r e and C r u i s e i s s u e s , whereupon C a r t e r s h o u l d q u i c k l y complete the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . D u r i n g the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , Warnke and Vance contended t h a t C a r t e r s h o u l d use h i s p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h and momentum t o f i n a l i z e V l a d i v o s t o k . 4 2 However, Vance's advocacy appears weak, even i n c o n s i s t e n t . 4 3 Vance d i d not d i s a g r e e w i t h the concept of p u r s u i n g deeper c u t s . H i s c o n c e r n was t a c t i c a l . He b e l i e v e d t h a t the p r o p o s a l would make the n e g o t i a t i o n s v e r y d i f f i c u l t . Yet he d i d not b e l i e v e or a t l e a s t d i d not make the p o i n t t h a t the p r o p o s a l c o u l d w e l l be u n a c c e p t a b l e and c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . Vance's memoirs r e v e a l two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t weakened h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o the p r o p o s a l . 4 4 F i r s t , Vance was c o n cerned w i t h S e n ator J a c k s o n ' s s t r o n g support f o r deeper c u t s . In l i g h t of J a c k s o n ' s o p p o s i t i o n t o Warnke's n o m i n a t i o n , Vance c o u l d see the need f o r r e s p o n s i v e n e s s t o J a c k s o n ' s p r o p o s a l s i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Second, Vance b e l i e v e d the deep c u t s p r o p o s a l c o u l d be a good opening p o s i t i o n . He e x p e c t e d t h a t 113 the S o v i e t s would t a k e elements from the p r o p o s a l and combine them w i t h elements from the V l a d i v o s t o k agreement. 1\" 5 In s p i t e of t h e s e c a l c u l a t i o n s , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d why Vance r e q u e s t e d a d e f e r r a l o p t i o n which l e f t t he C r u i s e m i s s i l e o u t . Vance c e r t a i n l y must have known t h a t the S o v i e t s had r e j e c t e d t h i s f o r m u l a b e f o r e . In e f f e c t , the second o p t i o n , because of i t s o m i s s i o n of the C r u i s e , made the o v e r a l l p r o p o s a l even l e s s a t t r a c t i v e t o the S o v i e t s , something Vance had never i n t e n d e d . The f i r s t o p t i o n abandoned the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s , w h i l e the second i g n o r e d the r e s u l t s of p r e v i o u s s e s s i o n s . I t must have l o o k e d t o the S o v i e t s as i f V l a d i v o s t o k had never taken p l a c e and as i f the S o v i e t s and Americans had not t r i e d t hroughout 1975 t o r e s o l v e the C r u i s e and B a c k f i r e i s s u e s . T a l b o t t c l a i m s t h a t B r z e z i n s k i was a s t r o n g a d v o c a t e of deeper c u t s . However, a l l o t h e r a c c o u n t s p i c t u r e him as c o v e r i n g the m i d d l e ground between Brown and Vance.\" 6 W h i l e he agreed w i t h Brown's assessment of the need f o r deeper c u t s i n l i g h t of American v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o a S o v i e t f i r s t s t r i k e , h i s p r e f e r e n c e was f o r more moderate c u t s than proposed by Brown and A a r o n . * 7 F u r t h e r m o r e , at the March 12 m e e t i n g , he i n d i c a t e d t h a t s e t t l i n g f o r the V l a d i v o s t o k agreements would s i g n a l c o n t i n u i t y t o t h e S o v i e t s , who were a l r e a d y alarmed a t C a r t e r ' s r a d i c a l l y new approach t o f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The s t u d y he o r d e r e d Molander t o c o m p l e t e , a l s o emphasized t h i s p o i n t . * 8 At the SCC d e l i b e r a t i o n s , B r z e z i n s k i l a r g e l y c o n f i n e d h i s r o l e t o e n s u r i n g t h a t both Brown's and Aaron's p r o p o s a l as w e l l as those of Vance and 1 14 Warnke were w e l l a i r e d . He a l s o e nsured the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the J o i n t C h i e f s t h r o u g h o u t the d i s c u s s i o n , which had not been the case under N i x o n . He v o i c e d h i s c o n c e r n about the l o n g range of the C r u i s e and warned C a r t e r t h a t i t might c o m p l i c a t e the t a l k s . 4 9 B r z e z i n s k i , l i k e Vance, warned t h a t the S o v i e t s would not l i k e l y a c c e p t the p r o p o s a l s a t f a c e v a l u e . 5 0 However, w h i l e Vance e n v i s i o n e d the p r o p o s a l s as a mere opening p o s i t i o n , b r e a k i n g the way f o r compromises and f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s , B r z e z i n s k i argued t h a t whatever p r o p o s a l s the U n i t e d S t a t e s would d e c i d e upon, i t s h o u l d be p r e p a r e d t o s t i c k w i t h them. W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i d i d not \"push h a r d \" f o r any p a r t i c u l a r p o s i t i o n , he f a v o u r e d a tough uncompromising s t a n d once the t a l k s o p e n e d . 5 1 Brown's s t r a t e g i c a n a l y s i s as w e l l as Aaron and Mondale's i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l reasons appear t o have c o n v i n c e d C a r t e r t h a t he s h o u l d t r y deep c u t s a t once. Moreover, C a r t e r shared Vance's e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t the S o v i e t s would at l e a s t take the p r o p o s a l s as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s . A new s t a r t i n g p o i n t indeed but the p r e s i d e n t was new t o o and b e l i e v e d i n a s u b s t a n t i v e approach t o arms c o n t r o l and wanted the S o v i e t s t o know i t . 5 2 C a r t e r hoped t h a t deeper c u t s , combined w i t h a lowered US d e f e n s e budget and postponement of the MX, would s i g n a l American good f a i t h t o the S o v i e t s . 5 3 I f the S o v i e t s a c c e p t e d the p r o p o s a l or a t l e a s t a c c e p t e d i t as the b a s i s of n e g o t i a t i o n s , C a r t e r c o u l d s c o r e s e v e r a l s u c c e s s e s a t once. He c o u l d a c h i e v e a new t r e a t y p r o p o s a l b e f o r e SALT I e x p i r e d i n October 1977. I t 1 1 5 would bear h i s own stamp and not merely complete what K i s s i n g e r had a c h i e v e d b e f o r e . I t s deeper c u t s would p l e a s e the l i b e r a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t . F i n a l l y , a q u i c k s u c c e s s would e s t a b l i s h Congress' c o n f i d e n c e i n C a r t e r ' s n e g o t i a t i n g a b i l i t i e s . T h i s c o n f i d e n c e had been low s i n c e C a r t e r ' s s e l e c t i o n of Warnke as h i s C h i e f Arms N e g o t i a t o r . VANCE'S TRIP TO MOSCOW The p r o p o s a l s f a r e d b a d l y . The S o v i e t s r e j e c t e d c o m p l e t e l y the deep c u t s and d e f e r r a l o p t i o n s . Vance d i d not even have a chance t o p r e s e n t the compromise o p t i o n . The o n l y t h i n g Vance a c h i e v e d was a promise t o meet a g a i n i n May. For a l l i n t e n t s and p u r p o s e s , C a r t e r ' s \"grand o p e n i n g \" was a f a i l u r e . I t was i m m e d i a t e l y p e r c e i v e d as such by most commentators as w e l l as by s e v e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s . 5 \" S i n c e t h e n , n e a r l y a l l s c h o l a r s s t u d y i n g the e p i s o d e have shown the d i s a s t r o u s e f f e c t s i t had on C a r t e r ' s arms n e g o t i a t i o n r e c o r d as w e l l as on h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the S o v i e t s i n g e n e r a l . I t has been argued t h a t as a r e s u l t of t h i s opening move, the t a l k s dragged on f o r 30 months, got the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f t o a bad s t a r t w i t h the S o v i e t s , eroded any c o n f i d e n c e the Senate had l e f t i n C a r t e r ' s a b i l i t i e s t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h the R u s s i a n s , k i l l e d any r e a l i s t i c o p p o r t u n i t y C a r t e r had t o c a p i t a l i z e on a q u i c k arms d e a l , and made a l l the e n s u i n g arms n e g o t i a t i o n s under 1 16 C a r t e r appear as c o n c e s s i o n s t o the S o v i e t s . E s p e c i a l l y t h i s l a s t r e s u l t , r e n d e r e d C a r t e r , and indeed t h e f i n a l SALT I I a c c o r d i t s e l f , v u l n e r a b l e t o the c r i t i c i s m s of American h a r d l i n e r s . 5 5 Moreover, the SALT I I agreement of 1979 was much c l o s e r t o the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d , making C a r t e r ' s a t t e m p t s l o o k f u t i l e , i f not o b f u s c a t i n g . Soon a f t e r h i s r e t u r n t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s , Vance acknowledged t h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had m i s c a l c u l a t e d . 5 6 Warnke was more b l u n t . He c o n f e s s e d t h a t the S o v i e t s c o n s i d e r e d the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s a d e a l and t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s had broken the d e a l . 5 7 S e v e r a l y e a r s l a t e r , C a r t e r c o n f e s s e d i n an i n t e r v i e w t h a t he had m i s j u d g e d the R u s s i a n s . . . . h a d f a i l e d t o see how i m p o r t a n t the V l a d i v o s t o k agreements were t o Brezhnev, how the a i l i n g l e a d e r r e g a r d e d them w i t h p r i d e as a c r o wning p o i n t i n h i s c a r e e r and u n d e r s t a n d a b l y r e a c t e d s t r o n g l y when a new American group came i n , swept the t a b l e , and demanded a new game. 5 8 The a d m i n s t r a t i o n t r i e d i m m e d i a t e l y t o put a b r i g h t f a c e on the f a i l u r e by a s s e r t i n g t h a t the t a l k s were merely e x p l o r a t o r y . K i s s i n g e r , F o r d and J ackson r a l l i e d i n support of C a r t e r even though i n p r i v a t e they were s a i d t o be c r i t i c a l . Both C a r t e r and Vance urged p a t i e n c e . C a r t e r a l s o s a i d t h a t he thought the p r o p o s a l s had been \" f a i r and b a l a n c e d \" and wondered a l o u d i f the S o v i e t s were b a r g a i n i n g i n good f a i t h . 5 9 B r z e z i n s k i l i k e n e d the S o v i e t r e b u f f t o t h e i r r e f u s a l i n 1968 t o d i s c u s s l i m i t a t i o n s on b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e d e f e n s e . 6 0 He t r i e d t o draw a h i s t o r i c a l a n a l o g y : as 117 t h e S o v i e t s r e f u s e d the ABM p r o p o s a l s f i r s t and l a t e r a c c e p t e d them, so they may do w i t h the deep c u t s p r o p o s a l s . However, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d not s t i c k t o i t s p o s i t i o n . A f t e r May 1977, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n dropped the deep c u t s p r o p o s a l . 6 1 D u r i n g the next two y e a r s , i t worked on the u n s o l v e d i s s u e s of V l a d i v o s t o k . The f i n a l a c c o r d , reached i n 1979, s e t the o v e r a l l c e i l i n g a t 2250, w i t h s u b c e i l i n g s of 1320 MIRVed and 300 heavy m i s s i l e s . The Sea and Ground Launched C r u i s e M i s s i l e range was not t o exceed 600 km, the A i r Launced C r u i s e range 2500 km. The B a c k f i r e was e x c l u d e d from the t r e a t y . S e v e r a l e x p l a n a t i o n s have been g i v e n f o r the f a i l u r e of the March p r o p o s a l s . One argument c l a i m s t h a t C a r t e r ' s a t t a c k on the S o v i e t human r i g h t s r e c o r d and h i s open sup p o r t f o r S o v i e t d i s s i d e n t s angered the S o v i e t s so much t h a t t h e y sought an i s s u e t o r e t a l i a t e . 6 2 C a r t e r ' s l e t t e r t o Sakharov and Bukovsky's v i s i t t o the White House were w e l l p u b l i c i z e d . In one of the p r i v a t e l e t t e r s , Brezhnev accused C a r t e r of d e l i b e r a t e l y u ndermining S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s by h i s p r o p a g a n d i s t s e f f o r t s t o i n t e r f e r e i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of the S o v i e t U n i o n . 6 3 O t h e r s have a l l e g e d t h a t the manner i n which C a r t e r h a n d l e d the t a l k s caused the S o v i e t s t o t h i n k t h a t C a r t e r i n t e n d e d t o s c o r e q u i c k p u b l i c o p i n i o n p o i n t s and was not s e r i o u s about the s u b s t a n c e of the p r o p o s a l s . 6 * Indeed, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n ducted the t a l k s i n a manner ve r y d i f f e r e n t from the p r e v i o u s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . D o b r y n i n was not g i v e n a summary of the p r o p o s a l s u n t i l l e s s than a week 118 b e f o r e the t a l k s . 6 5 C a r t e r d i s c l o s e d the essence of the p r o p o s a l s i n a speech t o the UN on March 17 and d u r i n g a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e on March 2 4 . 6 6 Vance's p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e , i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r the t a l k s broke down, as w e l l as C a r t e r ' s comments t h a t the S o v i e t s might not be n e g o t i a t i n g i n good f a i t h , c l e a r l y put the onus of the f a i l u r e of the t a l k s on the S o v i e t s . S u b s e q u e n t l y , Gromyko c a l l e d a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e . T h i s he had never done d u r i n g the p r e v i o u s SALT t a l k s . He accused C a r t e r of abandoning V l a d i v o s t o k , s e e k i n g a p u b l i c o p i n i o n v i c t o r y and p r o p o s i n g a d e l i b e r a t e l y u n a c c e p t a b l e s e t of p r o p o s a l s . 6 7 C a r t e r ' s human r i g h t s campaign and p u b l i c d i p l o m a c y d i d not improve the atmosphere i n which the t a l k s were h e l d . However, t h e s e two f a c t o r s a l o n e cannot e x p l a i n why the t a l k s f a i l e d . In h i s p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e , Gromyko s t a t e d t h a t the USSR o b j e c t e d most t o C a r t e r ' s d e p a r t u r e from the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . In s p i t e of the human r i g h t s i s s u e , Brezhnev's l a s t l e t t e r t o C a r t e r i n d i c a t e d h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o c o n t i n u e the arms t a l k s . As i n a l l h i s l e t t e r s , Brezhnev emphasized t h a t the t a l k s s h o u l d b u i l d upon V l a d i v o s t o k . 6 8 In t h e i r memoirs, b o t h Vance and C a r t e r acknowledge t h a t t h e i r d i s r e g a r d f o r the agreements of V l a d i v o s t o k c o n s t i t u t e d the major reason f o r the breakdown of the t a l k s . 6 9 S e v e r a l a s p e c t s of the p r o p o s a l s must have indeed l o o k e d t o the S o v i e t s as an a b r o g a t i o n of the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d . F i r s t , the lower f i g u r e s f o r MIRVed m i s s i l e s appeared as an attempt t o deny the S o v i e t s the a b i l i t y t o 119 c a t c h up t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n the number of warheads. Second, K i s s i n g e r had agreed not t o i n s i s t on a deep r e d u c t i o n i n S o v i e t heavy m i s s i l e s , c e r t a i n l y not a 50% c u t ! T h i r d , d u r i n g 1975 the S o v i e t s had r e p e a t e d l y r e j e c t e d a 2,500 km range f o r a l l C r u i s e m i s s i l e s . F i n a l l y , the d e f e r r a l o p t i o n proposed t o e x c l u d e the C r u i s e which the S o v i e t s had r e f u s e d i n the p a s t . THE MULTIPLE ADVOCACY STRATEGY AND EXPLAINING THE FAILURE The d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s a p p r o x i m a t e d most r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e s s norms p r e s c r i b e d by the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . C a r t e r d i d not i n i t i a t e the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s w i t h h i s mind made up. W h i l e he wanted t o a c h i e v e deeper c u t s e v e n t u a l l y , he i n s t r u c t e d h i s a d v i s o r s t o p r e p a r e a wide range of o p t i o n s . C a r t e r d i d not choose h i s p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n u n t i l the March 12 meeting w i t h h i s a d v i s o r s . B e f o r e t h a t m e e t i n g , a l l the a d v o c a t e s had ample time and o p p o r t u n i t y t o propose t h e i r f a v o u r e d c o u r s e s of a c t i o n . Indeed, a c o n s i d e r a b l e v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s was p r o duced, c a u s i n g one p a r t i c i p a n t t o comment t h a t \"the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n became something of an o p t i o n s c o l l e c t o r . \" 7 0 None of the a d v o c a t e s or i n t e r e s t e d a g e n c i e s was l e f t out of the d e b a t e . 7 1 The c r u c i a l meeting of March 12 was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by one p a r t i c i p a n t as a \" r e l a x e d and wide r a n g i n g d i s c u s s i o n . \" 7 2 C a r t e r s t i m u l a t e d a debate on the 120 i s s u e and d i d not s e l e c t h i s c h o i c e u n t i l the end of the m e e t i n g . Moreover, Vance and Warnke were a b l e t o submit a memorandum t o C a r t e r a f t e r t h i s m e e t i n g , i n which they s t a t e d t h e i r h e s i t a t i o n s a g a i n . T h e i r c o n c e r n s were d i s c u s s e d a g a i n a t the March 19 NSC m e e t i n g , a f t e r which C a r t e r i n s t r u c t e d B r z e z i n s k i t o w r i t e up the d e c i s i o n . The a d v o c a t e s competed f o r the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e i r o p t i o n s i n f r o n t of the p r e s i d e n t . The f i n a l SCC meeting of March 10 d i v i d e d the a d v o c a t e s between two o p t i o n s . Brown, Mondale and Aaron f a v o u r e d the \"deep c u t s \" p r o p o s a l , Vance and Warnke f a v o u r e d the c o n t i n u a t i o n of V l a d i v o s t o k . There i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t they reached a compromise or some t r a d e o f f . The meeting ended w i t h o u t a consensus and a l l the d i s c u s s e d o p t i o n s were s u b m i t t e d t o the p r e s i d e n t . In the March 12 meeting, the p r e s i d e n t d i s c u s s e d t h e s e o p t i o n s w i t h h i s a d v i s o r s . The c u s t o d i a l r o l e was performed by B r z e z i n s k i . By o r d e r i n g h i s s t a f f t o w r i t e up a h i s t o r y of the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s , B r z e z i n s k i e n s u r e d t h a t b o t h the p r e s i d e n t and the a d v o c a t e s had a f a c t u a l b a s i s upon which t o study the o p t i o n s . U n l i k e K i s s i n g e r ' s o c c a s i o n a l meddling i n the a g e n c i e s ' i n t e r n a l p r o c e s s e s , B r z e z i n s k i d i d not attempt t o i n f l u e n c e t h e i r p o l i c y d e v e l o p m e n t . 7 3 He e nsured t h a t a l l r e l e v a n t a d v o c a t e s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the p r o c e s s . W h i l e he f a v o u r e d moderate c u t s below the V l a d i v o s t o k l e v e l , he d i d not a dvocate s t r o n g l y . R a t h e r , he c o n f i n e d h i s r o l e t o c h a i r i n g the SCC and o r g a n i z i n g the o p t i o n s f o r the p r e s i d e n t . 7 \" B r z e z i n s k i d e s c r i b e s h i s r o l e i n the SCC 121 meetings as s t r u c t u r i n g the debate between the v a r i o u s p o s i t i o n s , so as t o b a l a n c e the h a r d and s o f t l i n e r s . 7 5 B r z e z i n s k i ' s memorandum t o C a r t e r summarized the SCC debate of March 10 and l i s t e d the range of o p t i o n s advanced by the a d v o c a t e s . 7 6 F i n a l l y , i n the March 12 m e e t i n g , B r z e z i n s k i d i d not merely defend Brown's o p t i o n but a l s o d e s c r i b e d the p o s s i b l e b e n e f i t s of the V l a d i v o s t o k o p t i o n . Yet the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s f a i l e d t o produce a l l f i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s as d e f i n e d by G e o r g e . 7 7 I t d i d p r o v i d e f o r s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n , a wide v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s and ample o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n s i d e r the o p t i o n s . However, i t produced n e i t h e r a r e a s o n a b l e e v a l u a t i o n of the e s t i m a t e d consequences of a l l the o p t i o n s nor a r e a s o n a b l e awareness of the d i f f i c u l t i e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h implementing the o p t i o n s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t f e l l s h o r t of e x p o s i n g the odds of s u c c e s s and the consequences of f a i l u r e of C a r t e r ' s p r e f e r r e d \"deep c u t s \" p r o p o s a l . 7 8 At l e a s t f i v e c r u c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s were o v e r l o o k e d or not e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d d u r i n g the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . F i r s t , a s i g n i f i c a n t d e p a r t u r e from the V l a d i v o s t o k agreements might b r i n g about a debate w i t h i n the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p . G i v e n Brezhnev's p u b l i c l y p r o f e s s e d s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s as w e l l as h i s v i s i b l y f a i l i n g h e a l t h , he might r e f u s e t o open t h i s d e b a t e . 7 9 Second, the S o v i e t s had u n d e r s t o o d the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s t o be the b a s i s of SALT I I . As w i t h p r e v i o u s agreements, the S o v i e t s d i d not b e l i e v e t h e s e agreements 122 s h o u l d be s u b j e c t t o changes i n US a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . T h e r e f o r e , the C a r t e r p r o p o s a l s would not o n l y be c o n s i d e r e d as a b r e a c h of agreement but a l s o as a precedent which the S o v i e t s would want t o a v o i d . I f so, the S o v i e t s would not even want t o c o n s i d e r the p r o p o s a l s as a new s t a r t i n g p o i n t . T h i r d , what were the consequences of f a i l u r e ? F a i l u r e t o r e a c h an arms c o n t r o l a c c o r d would a l l o w the S o v i e t s t o c o n t i n u e t h e i r b u i l d up, i f not a c c e l e r a t e i t , and would thus r e q u i r e C a r t e r t o i n c r e a s e American arms p r o d u c t i o n . 8 0 I f so, C a r t e r might have t o r e v e r s e h i s d e c i s i o n t o c u t the defense budget and might have t o b u i l d the MX. As a r e s u l t , C a r t e r would f a i l t o r e a c h e i t h e r g o a l . W h i l e he would f a i l i n r e a c h i n g a new arms t r e a t y , he would a l s o f a i l i n f u l f i l l i n g h i s campaign p l e d g e s t o reduce n u c l e a r weapons and c u t defense s p e n d i n g . F o u r t h , w h i l e i t was wise t o c o n s i d e r Senator J a c k s o n ' s c o n c e r n s about the t a l k s , two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s argued a g a i n s t f o l l o w i n g h i s p r o p o s a l s . J a c k s o n ' s p r o p o s a l t o i n c l u d e the B a c k f i r e as a s t r a t e g i c bomber and t o r e f u s e any l i m i t a t i o n s on the C r u i s e had been r e j e c t e d by the S o v i e t s i n the p a s t . Second, a q u i c k arms d e a l combined w i t h C a r t e r ' s h i g h p o p u l a r i t y would have been hard t o r e s i s t f o r the Senate. I f the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was g o i n g t o t a k e a r i s k , t h i s would be a b e t t e r c a l c u l a t e d r i s k than s u r p r i s i n g the S o v i e t s . L a s t , w h i l e Brezhnev's l a s t l e t t e r t o C a r t e r may have been \" b u s i n e s s l i k e \" i n C a r t e r ' s o p i n i o n , a l l h i s p r e v i o u s l e t t e r s as w e l l as h i s p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s c l e a r l y s t a t e d h i s commitment t o the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . 8 1 There were ample 123 i n d i c a t o r s t h a t the S o v i e t s would r e j e c t any new p r o p o s a l s . How do we e x p l a i n t h i s s h o r t c o m i n g i n t h e d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s and what does i t t e l l us about th e m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y ? W h i l e th e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s produced a s u f f i c i e n t l y wide range of o p t i o n s , i t d i d not produce a b a l a n c e d e v a l u a t i o n of the e s t i m a t e d consequences of the o p t i o n s . The a d v o c a t e s of the V l a d i v o s t o k o p t i o n d i d not emphasize the b e n e f i t s of t h e i r o p t i o n and d i d not c h a l l e n g e the e s t i m a t e d consequences of t h e deep c u t s o p t i o n . Vance d i d not a d v o c a t e s t r o n g l y why he d i s a g r e e d w i t h the deep c u t s p r o p o s a l . I n s t e a d , he subdued h i s d o u b t s , h o p i n g t h a t the p r o p o s a l s would a t l e a s t c r e a t e a framework f o r the n e g o t i a t i o n s . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t the a d v i s o r s ( i n c l u d i n g Vance) were s t i l l q u i t e d e f e r e n t i a l t o C a r t e r and not y e t used t o one a n o t h e r ' s w o r k i n g s t y l e . T h i s i s o f t e n the case d u r i n g the b e g i n n i n g of a p r e s i d e n t ' s term. The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y a p p a r e n t l y f a i l e d t o c o r r e c t t h i s s h o r t c o m i n g . I f the a d v o c a t e s ( i n t h i s case Vance and Warnke) do not p r e s s t h e i r advocacy, what measures does the s t r a t e g y p r e s c r i b e t o \"save\" the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s ? The d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s was s t r u c t u r e d and managed a c c o r d i n g t o the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y and s t i l l d i d not produce a thorough e v a l u a t i o n of a l l t h e o p t i o n s , a s sumptions and consequences. The weak advocacy on the p a r t of Vance as w e l l as the f a i l u r e on the p a r t of B r z e z i n s k i t o s t r e n g t h e n Vance's advocacy c o n s t i t u t e the e x p l a n a t i o n of the f a i l u r e of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s o f f e r e d by the m u l t i p l e 124 r advocacy model. However, the r o l e t a s k of an \"honest b r o k e r , \" was performed by B r z e z i n s k i . The q u e s t i o n then i s , how does the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y expect the c u s t o d i a n t o s t r e n g t h e n weaker a d v o c a t e s and remain an honest b r o k e r a t the same time? H a l l acknowledges t h a t the s t r a t e g y does not c l e a r l y r e c o n c i l e t h e s e two t a s k s . 8 2 George s t a t e s t h a t the c u s t o d i a n s h o u l d n e i t h e r p l a y the r o l e of a d e v i l ' s advocate nor t h e r o l e of a p o l i c y a d v o c a t e . 8 3 The d e l i b e r a t e r o l e p l a y i n g of a d e v i l ' s advocate tends t o be c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . The p r e s i d e n t and o t h e r a d v i s o r s q u i c k l y p e r c e i v e i t as r o l e p l a y i n g and as a r e s u l t pay l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o the arguments of the d e v i l ' s a d v o c a t e . Genuine p o l i c y advocacy on the p a r t of the c u s t o d i a n i s a l l e g e d t o compromise h i s a b i l i t y t o be an honest b r o k e r . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y a l s o a l l o w s f o r the c u s t o d i a n t o i n v i t e o u t s i d e r s t o the debate t o argue u n d e r r e p r e s e n t e d p o s i t i o n s . B r z e z i n s k i d i d not do t h i s . Indeed, t h i s recommendation appears v e r y u s e f u l . B r z e z i n s k i s h o u l d have i n v i t e d e x p e r i e n c e d a d v i s o r s who c o u l d have in f o r m e d C a r t e r on the l i k e l y r e a c t i o n of the S o v i e t s . An example of such an a d v i s o r was the American ambassador i n Moscow. One would assume t h a t he c o u l d have o f f e r e d a c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s of the S o v i e t r e a c t i o n t o the p r o p o s a l s . S u r p r i s i n g l y , none of the a c c o u n t s on t h i s d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s mention any r o l e p l a y e d by the ambassador. A l s o , B r z e z i n s k i s h o u l d have g i v e n an e x p e r i e n c e d a d v i s o r l i k e H y l and a b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t y t o c h a l l e n g e the Brown-Aaron o p t i o n . 125 As mentioned b e f o r e , w h i l e the t a c t i c t o i n v i t e o u t s i d e r s i s u s e f u l , i t i s not o f t e n p r a c t i c a l . The main reason f o r t h i s i s the p r e s i d e n t ' s p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h l e a k s . From C a r t e r ' s p o i n t of v i e w, the c i r c l e of a d v i s o r s was a l r e a d y q u i t e l a r g e and v a r i e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t an o u t s i d e r c o u l d have c h a l l e n g e d the p o s i t i o n s u p p o r t e d by Brown and Mondale. R a t h e r , the e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s t h a t n o t h i n g s h o r t of v i g o r o u s advocacy by a t r u s t e d i n s i d e r c h a l l e n g i n g the Deep Cuts p r o p o s a l c o u l d have impressed upon C a r t e r t o r e c o n s i d e r h i s d e c i s i o n . I t appears t h a t B r z e z i n s k i l e a r n e d from the f a i l u r e of t h i s d e c i s i o n t h a t he s h o u l d f i l l t h i s gap. The next c h a p t e r s d e s c r i b e how B r z e z i n s k i c h a l l e n g e d the p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n of the p r e s i d e n t and the m a j o r i t y of h i s a d v i s o r s by means of a s t r o n g advocacy r o l e and as a r e s u l t improved the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s . 126 ENDNOTES 1 The f a c t u a l b a s i s of the f o l l o w i n g account r e l i e s p r i m a r i l y on Thomas W. W o l f e , The SALT E x p e r i e n c e , Cambridge, M a s s a c h u s e t t s : B a l l i n g e r , 1979; R i c h a r d B u r t , \"The Scope and L i m i t s of SALT,\" World P o l i t i c s , No. 4, J u l y 1978; S t r o b e T a l b o t t , Endgame, New York: Harper & Row, 1979; U.S. Congress. 17th Annual Report of the US Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament Agency, May 1978, Washington: US Gov't P r i n t O f f . ; Henry A. K i s s i n g e r , Years of Upheaval, B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, 1982, c h a p t e r s 7 and 22; Roger P. L a b r i e ( e d . ) , SALT Handbook, Washington: American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e , 1979. 2 Other agreements reached a t V l a d i v o s t o k i n c l u d e m o b i l e b a s i n g and m i s s i l e m o d e r n i z a t i o n r u l e s as w e l l as v e r i f i c a t i o n g u i d e l i n e s . 3 See e s p e c i a l l y Wolfe (1979), pp. 181-182. * New York Times, B e r n a r d Gwertzman, October 13, 1975. 5 Washington P o s t , Joseph K r a f t , F e b r u a r y 1, 1977. I w i l l use \" V l a d i v o s t o k \" as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r the l o n g e r term \"the agreements reached a t V l a d i v o s t o k \" . 6 Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , Power and P r i n c i p l e , New York: F a r r a r , S t r a u s s , G i r o u x , 1983, p. 7. 7 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 39; Time, J a n u a r y 3, 1977, p. 17. 8 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 43. 9 New York Times, H e d r i c k S m i t h , F e b r u a r y 9, 1977. 1 0 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 157; Jimmy C a r t e r , Keeping F a i t h , New York: Bantam, 1982, p. 216. 1 1 R i c h a r d E. Neustadt and E r n e s t R. May, T h i n k i n g i n Time, New York: The Free P r e s s , 1986, p. 113. 1 2 New York Times, January 25, 1977, p. 1. 1 3 Wolfe (1979), p. 219; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 47. 1 4 C a r t e r (1982), p. 216; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 152. 1 5 New York Times, F e b r u a r y 4, 1977, p. 6; US News & World R e p o r t , \" F o r e i g n P o l i c y by Committee,\" F e b r u a r y 21, 1977, p. 27. 1 6 C a r t e r (1983), p. 218. 1 7 US News & World R e p o r t , \"Behind C a r t e r ' s Gamble on Defense O u t l a y s , \" March 7, 1977, p 17; New York Times, H e d r i c k S m i t h , F e b r u a r y 21, 1977, p. 1. 127 1 8 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 46. 1 9 Idem, Neustadt and May (1986), p. 116; Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 1. 2 0 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 47. 2 1 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 53. 2 2 For a c c o u n t s of t h i s meeting see T a l b o t t (1979), pp. 55-58; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 158; Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 1 and p. 7; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 116. 2 3 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 53, The New R e p u b l i c , A p r i l 23, 1977, p. 12; John Edwards, Super WeapontThe Making of MX, New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1982, p. 129. 2 < l D a v i d S. M c L e l l a n , Cyrus Vance, New J e r s e y , Rowman and A l l a n h e l d , 1985, p. 40; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 46 c l a i m s t h a t B r z e z i n s k i s h a red t h i s b e l i e f . 2 5 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 158; N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , Dom Bonafede, December 11, 1976, p. 1821. 2 6 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 58; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 159. 2 7 Cyrus Vance, Hard C h o i c e s , New York: Simon & S c h u s t e r , 1983, p. 48; M c L e l l a n (T985), p. 39; Newsweek, March 28, 1977. p. 88. 2 8 B a r r y M. Blechman ( e d . ) , R e t h i n k i n g the U.S. S t r a t e g i c P o s t u r e , Cambridge: B a l l i n g e r , 1982, p. 167. 2 9 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 159; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117. 3 0 Accounts of t h i s meeting a r e p r o v i d e d by T a l b o t t (1979), pp. 58, 59; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117; Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977. See a l s o Vance (1983), p. 49. 3 1 See a l s o Seymour Brown, The Faces of Power, New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1983, p. 538; M c L e l l a n (1985), p. 40. 3 2 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 59. 3 3 Newsweek, May 9, 1977, p. 58; New York Times, March 15, 1977, p. 1. 3 1 t Vance (1983), p. 49; B r z e z i n s k i ( 1983), p. 159. 3 5 Vance (1983), p.49; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 118, note the memo was vague and d e f e r e n t i a l so much so t h a t Vance's p o s i t i o n was q u i t e ambiguous. 3 6 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 159. For the f i n a l p o s i t i o n of the 128 a d m i n i s t r a t i o n see a l s o Vance (1983), p. 52; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 60. 3 7 A l s o i n c l u d e d i n the p r o p o s a l were a f r e e z e on ICBM t e s t i n g , an agreement not t o d e v e l o p new ICBM's and a p r o v i s i o n not t o modify e x i s t i n g ICBM's. 3 8 Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 1; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 50; New York Times, A p r i l 5, 1977, p. 7; Sam C. S a r k e s i a n ( e d . ) , Defense P o l i c y and the P r e s i d e n c y , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1979, p. 246; Newsweek, March 28, 1977, p. 88; M c L e l l a n (1985), p. 40; Brown (1983), p. 538. Neustadt and May c l a i m C a r t e r had h i s mind made up b e f o r e the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . However, most o t h e r s o u r c e s do not su p p o r t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . 3 9 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 53, 57; Time, March 21, 1977, p. 18; John F. Lehman, Beyond the SALT I I F a i l u r e , New York: P r a e g e r , 1981, p. 106 c l a i m s s e v e r a l a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r i e s i n v o l v e d i n SALT a l s o s h a red t h i s b e l i e f . A l t h o u g h Lehman mentions no names, he c l e a r l y i m p l i e s L e s l i e G e l b and W a l t e r Slocombe as i s e v i d e n t from T a l b o t t (1979), p. 41. 4 0 Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 7; T a l b o t t (1979), pp. 44-46; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 158; Neus t a d t and May (1986), p. 116. * 1 Vance ( 1983), p. 446. * 2 Idem, p. 48 See a l s o E l i z a b e t h Drew, \"A R e p o r t e r a t L a r g e : Arms C o n t r o l , \" New Y o r k e r , A p r i l 4, 1977, p. 113. P a u l Warnke, i n h i s t e s t i m o n y b e f o r e the Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee, r e v e a l e d t h a t he had f a v o u r e d a q u i c k c o m p l e t i o n of the V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d s . See \" B r i e f i n g s on SALT N e g o t i a t i o n s , \" U.S. Congress. Senate F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee, November 3 and 29, 1977. Washington, US Gov't P r i n t O f f . 4 3 M c L e l l a n (1985), p. 40; Gaddis S m i t h , M o r a l i t y , Reason and Power, New York: H i l l and Wang, 1986, p. 74. 4 4 Vance (1983), p. 48. 4 5 Washington P o s t , A p r i l 2, 1977, p. 1; Vance (1983), p. 54; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 70. 4 6 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 49. T a l b o t t acknowledges, however, t h a t Brown was both a more a r t i c u l a t e and i n f l u e n t i a l a d v i s o r i n t h i s case than B r z e z i n s k i . ; N eustadt and May (1986), pp. 116-118, Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 1; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 158; Brown (1983), p. 538; Wolfe (1979), p. 36; I n t e r v i e w w i t h D a v i d Aaron i n Arms C o n t r o l Today, No. 3, March 1981, p. 4. 4 7 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 159. 129 4 8 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 44. 4 9 For a more d e t a i l e d a ccount of B r z e z i n s k i ' s c u s t o d i a l d u t i e s see below. 5 0 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 160. 5 1 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 162 n o t e s t h a t Mondale agreed w i t h h i s i n s i s t e n c e on a tough s t a n d . 5 2 C a r t e r (1982), pp. 216, 217. 5 3 New York Times, F e b r u a r y 21, 1 977, p. 1 . 5 4 Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 7; New York Times, A p r i l 2, 1977, p. 7; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 78; Newsweek, A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 26. 5 5 One or s e v e r a l of t h e s e arguments have been advanced by i n t e r a l i a , N eustadt and May (1979); Hedley Donovan, From R o o s e v e l t t o Reagan, New York: Harper and Row, 1985; M. Glenn Abernathy e t . a l . ( e d s . ) , The C a r t e r Y e a r s , London: F r a n c e s P i n t e r , 1984; L. Freedman, The World Today, v o l . 33, 1977; George Kennan, Time, August 3, 1977; Adam Ulam, \"US-S o v i e t R e l a t i o n s : Unhappy C o e x i s t e n c e , \" F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , v o l . 57, 1979, pp.555-571;, S t a n l e y Hoffmann, \"The H e l l of Good I n t e n t i o n s , \" F o r e i g n P o l i c y , W i n t e r 1977, pp.3-26;, and Gaddis S m i t h , M o r a l i t y , Reason and Power, New York: H i l l and Wang, 1986. 5 6 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 77. 5 7 Gregg Herken, C o u n s e l s of War, New York: A. A. Knopf, 1985, p. 283. 5 8 Haynes Johnson, In the Absence of Power, New York: The V i k i n g P r e s s , 1980, p. 183. 5 9 New York Times, March 31, 1977, pp. 1, 12. 6 0 Washington P o s t , A p r i l 2, 1977, p. 14. 6 1 I t o r d e r e d a new PRM on the i s s u e which r e s u l t e d i n PDM 20, s i g n e d by C a r t e r i n September, 1977, S a r k e s i a n (ed.) (1979), p. 122. 6 2 Time, March 28, 1977, p. 16. 6 3 C a r t e r (1982), p. 146 6 4 C o r a l • B e l l , P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r and F o r e i g n P o l i c y : The C o s t s of V i r t u e ? , C a n b e r r a : A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y , 1982, p. 35; M c L e l l a n (1985), p. 41. 6 5 Vance (1983), p. 52. 130 6 6 New York Times, March 18, 1977, p. 10 and March 25, 1977, p. 10. 6 7 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 74; New York Times, A p r i l 8, 1977, pp. 1 , 8 . 6 8 C a r t e r (1982), p. 219; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 154. 6 9 Vance (1983), p. 55, Vance a l s o s t a t e s t h a t he doubts the human r i g h t s i s s u e b l o c k e d the t a l k s . ; C a r t e r (1982), p. 217. See a l s o B e t t y G l a d , Jimmy C a r t e r , New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1980, p. 429. 7 0 Washington P o s t , A p r i l 11, 1977, p. 7. 7 1 Wolfe (1979), p. 29, 17th Annual Report of the US Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament Agency, U.S. Congress. Senate. Gov't. P r i n t . O f f . , May 1978, p. 11; T a l b o t t (1979), p. 42. 7 2 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 58. 7 3 Wolfe (1979), p. 36. 7\" Wolfe (1979), p.\"36; R. E. G o t t e m o e l l e r , \" E v o l u t i o n of the US O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Setup For SALT,\" Rand Monograph P6197, November 1978; B r z e z i n s k i ( 1 983), p. 158; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117. 7 5 B r z e z i n s k i (1985), p. 158. 7 6 Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p. 159. 7 7 . A l e x a n d e r L. George, P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g i n F o r e i g n P o l i c y , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1980, p. 10. 7 8 Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117. 7 9 T a l b o t t (1979), p. 32; Wolfe (1979), p. 171; P i e t e r M.E. V o l t e n , Brezhnev's Peace Program, B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1982, c h a p t e r 4. 8 0 Neustadt and May (1986), pp. 120, 121. Indeed, t h i s d e s c r i b e d s c e n a r i o u n f o l d e d i n 1978 and 1979. 8 1 New York Times, J a n u a r y 19, 1977, p. 4, J a n u a r y 28, 1977, p. 7; Newsweek, F e b r u a r y 21, 1977, p. 17; C a r t e r (1982), pp. 218, 219. 8 2 D a v i d K. H a l l , Implementing M u l t i p l e Advocacy i n the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , Ph.D t h e s i s , S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , 1982, p. 711. 8 3 George (1980), pp. 170, 196. 1 3 1 CHAPTER FOUR THE WAR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 132 T h i s c h a p t e r a n a l y z e s the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n which the American p o s i t o n i n the 1977-1978 war between E t h i o p i a and Som a l i a was f o r m u l a t e d . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t examines the r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of American p o l i c y , which o c c u r r e d i n e a r l y 1978 as a r e s u l t of the c o n s i d e r a b l e involvement of the USSR i n the war. In a d d i t i o n t o the S o v i e t i n v o l v e m e n t , Washington was concerned w i t h t h i s c o n f l i c t because of the s t r a t e g i c importance of the Horn of A f r i c a v i s - a - v i s the P e r s i a n G u l f and the A r a b i a n o i l f i e l d s . Moreover, i t was the f i r s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s c o n f r o n t i n g the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and was seen by many as a t e s t of S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s as w e l l as a t e s t of C a r t e r ' s A f r i c a p o l i c y . I w i l l argue t h a t p o l i c y advocacy on t h e p a r t of the c u s t o d i a n c h a l l e n g e d the consensus view among the o t h e r a d v i s o r s and improved the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . T h i s advocacy d i d not compromise the r o l e t a s k s and p r o c e s s norms of t he m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . F u r t h e r m o r e , I w i l l show t h a t s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s of p u b l i c s p e a k i n g by the c u s t o d i a n d i d not harm the p r o c e s s or the e x e c u t i o n of p o l i c y . THE WAR AND ITS BACKGROUND The source of c o n f l i c t i n the Horn of A f r i c a and p a r t i c u l a r l y between E t h i o p i a and Som a l i a d a t e s back t o p r e c o l o n i a l t i m e s . 1 H i s t o r i c a l l y , the dominant t r i b e s i n 1 3 3 E t h i o p i a , who a r e C o p t i c C h r i s t i a n s , have had an uneasy r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the v a r i o u s I s l a m i c p e o p l e s t h a t n e a r l y s u r r o u n d them. The a r b i t r a r i l y drawn c o l o n i a l b o u n d a r i e s , which became the independence b o u n d a r i e s , a g g r a v a t e d t h i s t e n s i o n . The Somali p e o p l e , who e t h n i c a l l y , r e l i g i o u s l y and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y form an homogeneous group, now f i n d t h e mselves s c a t t e r e d throughout the Horn i n the N o r t h E a s t e r n p a r t of Kenya, the Ogaden p r o v i n c e of E t h i o p i a , D j i b o u t i and S o m a l i a . The U n i t e d Kingdom, as w e l l as s e v e r a l o t h e r c o l o n i z e r s , were unable or u n w i l l i n g t o c h a l l e n g e the c o l o n i a l a s p i r a t i o n s of E t h i o p i a i n the Ogaden. A l s o , B r i t a i n s u p p o r t e d Kenya i n 1963 i n i t s c l a i m t o the N o r t h e r n F r o n t i e r D i s t r i c t , though i t was l a r g e l y i n h a b i t e d by S o m a l i s . France g r a n t e d independence t o D j i b o u t i i n 1977 but kept a l a r g e t r o o p presence t o secure i t s independence, i n l i g h t of S o m a l i a ' s c l a i m t o the a r e a . As a r e s u l t , the t r u n c a t e d Somali t r i b e s , who i n 1960 formed the R e p u b l i c of S o m a l i a , have harboured s t r o n g i r r e d e n t i s t c l a i m s . The dream of a g r e a t e r Somalia^ w i t h Mogadishu a t i t s c e n t r e , has been the g o a l of the Somali l e a d e r s h i p s i n c e independence. The p u r s u i t of t h i s dream was most pronounced i n the Ogaden r e g i o n , i n h a b i t e d by a p p r o x i m a t e l y one m i l l i o n S o m a l i s . Border c l a s h e s between the two c o u n t r i e s i n t h i s a r e a were f r e q u e n t . A l s o , S o m a l i a has s u p p o r t e d , a t t i m e s o v e r t l y , the West Somali L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t , which has o p e r a t e d i n the Ogaden s i n c e the 1960's. Both E t h i o p i a and Somalia have over the l a s t s e v e r a l decades c u l t i v a t e d s t r o n g t i e s w i t h e i t h e r of the two 134 superpowers. E t h i o p i a and t h e US s i g n e d a mutual defense agreement i n 1953. From 1953 t o 1975, E t h i o p i a r e c e i v e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 200 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n m i l i t a r y a i d from the U n i t e d S t a t e s In r e t u r n , the U n i t e d S t a t e s o p e r a t e d the Kagnew r a d a r and communications f a c i l i t y i n the E t h i o p i a n p r o v i n c e of E r i t r e a . D u r i n g t h i s t i m e , E t h i o p i a was one of Ameri c a ' s most i m p o r t a n t a l l i e s i n A f r i c a , r e c e i v i n g n e a r l y 20% of a l l US economic a i d and 50% of a l l m i l i t a r y a i d t o A f r i c a . S o m a l i a has r e c e i v e d S o v i e t a i d s i n c e 1963. In a 1969 coup, the m i l i t a r y took c o n t r o l of So m a l i a and s e t out t o b u i l d a s o c i a l i s t r e p u b l i c . S i a d B a r r e , the new l e a d e r , e n t e r e d i n t o a defense p a c t w i t h the USSR and s t a r t e d t o b u i l d a s t r o n g army w i t h t h e h e l p of S o v i e t a d v i s o r s and m a t e r i e l . In r e t u r n , the S o v i e t s were g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y t o b u i l d p o r t f a c i l i t i e s f o r the S o v i e t navy i n the G u l f of Aden p o r t of B e r b e r a . As a r e s u l t of t h i s b u i l d up, S o m a l i a ' s m i l i t a r y power was s l i g h t l y s u p e r i o r t o t h a t of E t h i o p i a i n 1977, even though S o m a l i a had about l / 9 t h of E t h i o p i a ' s p o p u l a t i o n and GNP. 2 The c h a i n of e v e n t s which p r e c i p i t a t e d the 1977-78 Ogaden war s t a r t e d w i t h the 1974 m i l i t a r y coup by a group of j u n i o r o f f i c e r s a g a i n s t the E t h i o p i a n emperor H a i l e S e l a s s i e . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s group, c a l l e d the Dergue, was d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the way the emperor d e a l t w i t h the se v e r e famine which p l a g u e d the c o u n t r y i n the e a r l y s e v e n t i e s , as w e l l as w i t h the l a c k of p r o g r e s s the E t h i o p i a n f o r c e s were making i n the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the 135 E r i t r e a n L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t . I n a d d i t i o n , the Dergue espoused a r a d i c a l i d e o l o g y and was e s p e c i a l l y c r i t i c a l of E t h i o p i a ' s good r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s , which i t saw as the foremost c o l o n i a l t h r e a t i n A f r i c a . In 1976, a f t e r a p e r i o d of i n t e r n a l s t r u g g l e , the Dergue, under the l e a d e r s h i p of M e n g i s t u , d e c l a r e d E t h i o p i a a M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t s t a t e . I t a l s o began t o a c c e p t S o v i e t a i d and s e t out t o improve E t h i o p i a n - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s . Meanwhile, the F o r d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , though uneasy about the r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of E t h i o p i a n p o l i t i c s , was not eager t o abandon i t s l o n g time a l l y . However, s i n c e the development of t h e UK-US base a t Diego G a r c i a , the U n i t e d S t a t e s was s c a l i n g down i t s base a t Kagnew and indeed no l o n g e r r e q u i r e d the m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n E t h i o p i a . The b r u t a l p o l i t i c a l murders conducted by the Dergue as w e l l as i t s human r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s i n i t s s t r u g g l e w i t h the E r i t r e a n s put p r e s s u r e on the U n i t e d S t a t e s t o reduce i t s m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o the new r e g i m e . 3 W h i l e F o r d had reduced US m i l i t a r y a i d t o E t h i o p i a i n 1976, C a r t e r c u t o f f a l l m i l i t a r y g r a n t a i d i n F e b r u a r y 1977 as p a r t of h i s o v e r a l l human r i g h t s p o l i c y . The Dergue wasted no t i m e . I t e x p e l l e d a l l American m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s , c l o s e d the Kagnew f a c i l i t i e s and a b r o g a t e d the mutual defense p a c t . In May 1977, i t s i g n e d a t r e a t y of f r i e n d s h i p w i t h the USSR and began r e c e i v i n g a i d f o r the E r i t r e a n war. The S o v i e t l e a d e r s may have thought i n i t i a l l y t h a t they c o u l d s u s t a i n t h e i r f r i e n d s h i p w i t h b oth E t h i o p i a and S o m a l i a . Indeed, C a s t r o , on a d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n i n e a r l y 136 1977, t r i e d t o u n i t e E t h i o p i a , S o m a l i a and D j i b o u t i i n t o a M a r x i s t f e d e r a t i o n . T h i s i d e a , however, was r e j e c t e d by b o t h B a r r e and M e n g i s t u . In any c a s e , the S o v i e t s c a l c u l a t e d c o r r e c t l y t h a t i f they were t o l o s e t h e i r f r i e n d s h i p w i t h S o m a l i a , the much l a r g e r and r i c h e r E t h i o p i a was w e l l worth i t . Moreover, M e n g i s t u promised the S o v i e t s p o r t f a c i l i t i e s i n t he Red Sea. S i a d B a r r e , c l e a r l y w o r r i e d about S o v i e t b e h a v i o u r i n the Horn, c o n t a c t e d the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n the s p r i n g of 1977, t o improve r e l a t i o n s . A l t h o u g h the U n i t e d S t a t e s was w i l l i n g t o complete the \"renversement des a l l i a n c e s , \" i t o n l y p romised Somalia d e f e n s i v e m i l i t a r y a i d . B a r r e , b e l i e v i n g t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s would be eager t o make up f o r i t s \" l o s s \" and t o o f f s e t the growing S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n the Horn, must have c a l c u l a t e d t h a t i t was w i l l i n g t o accommodate h i s i r r e d e n t i s t c l a i m s t o the Ogaden. I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t B a r r e c o n s i d e r e d s e v e r a l o t h e r f a c t o r s t o be i n h i s fa v o u r t o t r y and c l a i m the Ogaden a t t h i s p o i n t i n t i m e . F i r s t , he c o u l d count on Saudi and E g y p t i a n h e l p , as they had made e x t e n s i v e o f f e r s i n the p a s t . These s t a t e s as w e l l as I r a n were now p a r t i c u l a r l y c oncerned about R u s s i a ' s i n r o a d s i n t o E t h i o p i a . \" Second, the Dergue had s t i l l not completed i t s c o n s o l i d a t i o n of power and had t i e d down a l a r g e p a r t of the E t h i o p i a n army i n E r i t r e a . L a s t , though both E t h i o p i a and Som a l i a were i n the p r o c e s s of changing arms s u p p l i e r s , S o v i e t a i d might be sl o w e r i n coming, a l l o w i n g Somalia t o g a i n the momentum.5 1 37 In J u l y 1977, the Somali f o r c e s i n v a d e d . 6 In a few month's time they took n e a r l y 90% of the Ogaden. However, Somalia was unable t o t a k e the key mountain passes of Harar and D i r e Dawa. In September, the Somali o f f e n s i v e s t a l l e d as a r e s u l t of a l a c k of m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s . The U n i t e d S t a t e s r e f u s e d t o s u p p l y S o m a l i a w i t h any m i l i t a r y a i d and forbade i t s a l l i e s , i n c l u d i n g I r a n and Saudi A r a b i a , t o s e l l American arms t o S o m a l i a . 7 The S o v i e t Union d i d not r e s u p p l y the S o m a l i s e i t h e r , c a u s i n g B a r r e t o revoke the USSR-Somali t r e a t y of f r i e n d s h i p . Meanwhile, The S o v i e t s had s t a r t e d a massive a i r - and s e a l i f t of m i l i t a r y hardware t o E t h i o p i a . In a d d i t i o n , a t o t a l of 20,000 Cuban a d v i s o r s and s o l d i e r s h e l p e d E t h i o p i a c o u n t e r the Som a l i i n v a s i o n . They s t a r t e d t h e i r c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e i n January 1978. By e a r l y March, the Cuban and E t h i o p i a n f o r c e s had r e t a k e n the Ogaden and the S o v i e t s and Cubans t u r n e d t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the E r i t r e a n s . The war c o n s o l i d a t e d the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the USSR and E t h i o p i a . I t i s e s t i m a t e d t h a t the USSR, between September 1977 and March 1978, p r o v i d e d between one and two b i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n m i l i t a r y a i d , i n c l u d i n g heavy a r t i l l e r y , the newest S o v i e t t a n k s and modern j e t f i g h t e r s . The Cubans p r o v i d e d a t o t a l of a t l e a s t 20,000 p e r s o n n e l , i n c l u d i n g f i g h t e r p i l o t s and combat b r i g a d e s . The war was d i r e c t e d by t h r e e S o v i e t g e n e r a l s on the ground i n E t h i o p i a . 8 The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and Somalia remained c o o l t hroughout 1978 as a r e s u l t of S o m a l i a ' s r e f u s a l t o renounce a l l c l a i m s t o the Ogaden. However, the r e v o l u t i o n 138 i n I r a n as w e l l as the f o r m u l a t i o n of the C a r t e r D o c t r i n e p r o v i d e d a s t r o n g r a t i o n a l e f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s t o improve i t s t i e s w i t h S o m a l i a . CARTER'S AFRICA POLICY AND THE BEGINNING OF THE OGADEN WAR C a r t e r took a s e r i o u s i n t e r e s t i n A f r i c a n i s s u e s . H i s c o n c e r n w i t h arms s a l e s t o T h i r d World N a t i o n s , human r i g h t s and b l a c k m a j o r i t y r u l e made him an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n the p o l i c y making p r o c e s s and the f i n a l a r b i t e r on most A f r i c a n d e c i s i o n s . 9 C a r t e r announced t h a t he d i d not i n t e n d t o use arms s a l e s t o d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s as a f o r e i g n p o l i c y t o o l t o o f f s e t S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e . A l l s a l e s would be e v a l u a t e d i n l i g h t of the p u r c h a s e r ' s human r i g h t s r e c o r d and i t s a b i l i t y t o pursue domestic economic development. The U n i t e d S t a t e s would not be t h e f i r s t one t o i n t r o d u c e a new weapon t o a r e g i o n . 1 0 I n s t e a d of u s i n g A f r i c a as a e x t e n s i o n of S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n c o m p e t i t i o n , C a r t e r i n t e n d e d t o use h i s i n f l u e n c e t o f u r t h e r the p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s of d i s e n f r a n c h i z e d b l a c k s i n such s t a t e s as R h o d e s i a and South A f r i c a . He was the f i r s t p r e s i d e n t , s i n c e Kennedy, t o v i s i t the c o n t i n e n t . The appointment of Young, as the f i r s t b l a c k American ambassador t o the UN, was i n i t s e l f a symbol of C a r t e r ' s c o n c e r n w i t h A f r i c a . I t was w e l l known t h a t Young was a c l o s e a d v i s o r t o C a r t e r on A f r i c a n i s s u e s . C a r t e r was d e t e r m i n e d t o change f u n d a m e n t a l l y American 139 p o l i c y towards A f r i c a . He b e l i e v e d the l a s t two R e p u b l i c a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s had l a r g e l y n e g l e c t e d A f r i c a , w h i l e , when they d i d concern t h e m s e l v e s w i t h A f r i c a n i s s u e s , they d i d so w i t h an e x c l u s i v e East-West g e o p o l i t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . C a r t e r i n t e n d e d t o t r e a t l o c a l or r e g i o n a l problems i n t h e i r own r i g h t , avowing t h a t : Superpower r i v a l r y i n A f r i c a i s something we hope t o a v o i d . We nor the S o v i e t s must y i e l d t o the t e m p t a t i o n t o use A f r i c a as a forum f o r Great Power c o n f r o n t a t i o n . 1 1 I n s t e a d , C a r t e r c o n c e n t r a t e d on b r i n g i n g about m a j o r i t y r u l e i n R h o d e s i a , Namibia and South A f r i c a as w e l l as on p r o v i d i n g economic development a i d t o A f r i c a . I f t h e r e was t o be S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n c o m p e t i t i o n , C a r t e r b e l i e v e d the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e on the l a t t e r a r e a , i n which he f e l t c o n f i d e n t i t c o u l d outdo the USSR. C a r t e r b e l i e v e d t h a t a n e g a t i v e , r e a c t i v e American p o l i c y , one t h a t o n l y sought t o c o n t a i n S o v i e t i n v o l v e m e n t i n A f r i c a , would be f u t i l e and c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . 1 2 When, i n March 1977, a group of Katangan r e b e l s l a u n c h e d an i n c u r s i o n i n t o Z a i r e , w i t h the p o s s i b l e c o l l a b o r a t i o n of the Cubans i n A n g o l a , C a r t e r d e c i d e d not t o r e a c t beyond the s u p p l y of a s m a l l amount of non l e t h a l a i d t o Z a i r e . 1 3 W h i l e Young's statement t h a t the Cubans p r o v i d e d an element of s t a b i l i t y i n A f r i c a was not r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s v i e w , C a r t e r h i m s e l f had s t a t e d : We s h o u l d a l s o r e a l i z e t h a t the R u s s i a n and Cuban 140 p r e s e nce i n A n g o l a , w h i l e r e g r e t t a b l e and c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e of peace, need not c o n s t i t u t e a t h r e a t t o US i n t e r e s t s . 1 \" In s p i t e of C a r t e r ' s i n t e n t t o change American p o l i c y towards A f r i c a , i t i s i n c o r r e c t t o a s s e r t t h a t he was i n d i f f e r e n t t o S o v i e t and Cuban a c t i v i t i e s i n A f r i c a . Nor d i d C a r t e r c o m p l e t e l y abandon the East-West i n f l u e n c e game i n A f r i c a . He r e f u s e d t o r e c o g n i z e the Cuban s u p p o r t e d regime i n A n g o l a , i n s p i t e of Young's s t r o n g u r g i n g t o do so. Perhaps he was w o r r i e d about the domesti c p o l i t i c a l b a c k l a s h . 1 5 When the Sudanese e x p e l l e d the S o v i e t s from t h e i r c o u n t r y , C a r t e r , i n s p i t e of h i s i n t e n t i o n s t o change American arms s a l e s p o l i c y , was q u i c k t o s u p p l y arms t o N i m e i r y . 1 6 In November 1977, he commissioned the NSC t o do a study on the e x t e n t of Cuban a s s i s t a n c e t hroughout A f r i c a . 1 7 Indeed, as we s h a l l see, when E t h i o p i a e n t e r e d i n t o a t r e a t y of f r i e n d s h i p w i t h the USSR, C a r t e r i m m e d i a t e l y c o n s i d e r e d i m p r o v i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h S o m a l i a . T h e r e f o r e , i t was by no means c e r t a i n how C a r t e r would r e a c t t o a new S o v i e t move on the c o n t i n e n t . The f i r s t t e s t of C a r t e r ' s approach t o A f r i c a n c o n f l i c t s o c c u r r e d i n the Horn of A f r i c a . E t h i o p i a ' s a b r u p t r e v e r s a l of a l l i a n c e s caused S o m a l i a t o c o n t a c t t h e C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , i n the s p r i n g of 1977, about p o s s i b l e arms s u p p l i e s . W h i l e C a r t e r was eager t o improve r e l a t i o n s w i t h S o m a l i a , he o n l y made promise s f o r d e f e n s i v e m i l i t a r y a i d . 1 8 The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was s t i l l h o p e f u l t h a t i t c o u l d improve i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h E t h i o p i a . When Som a l i a invaded the 141 Ogaden, i n J u l y 1977, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n withdrew i t s pledge t o s u p p l y arms. At the end of August, C a r t e r announced h i s o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n i n the war. Upon Vance's recommendation, C a r t e r had d e c i d e d t o a v o i d d i r e c t involvement i n the c o n f l i c t , not t o s u p p l y e i t h e r p a r t y w i t h m i l i t a r y a i d i n any form, t o p r o h i b i t American a l l i e s from s u p p l y i n g US arms t o e i t h e r of the p a r t i e s , t o encourage the O r g a n i z a t i o n of A f r i c a n U n i t y (OAU) t o mediate i n the d i s p u t e , and t o use d i p l o m a t i c p r e s s u r e t o persuade the USSR not t o get i n v o l v e d i n the c o n f l i c t . 1 9 T h i s f i v e t i e r approach remained C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y towards the war u n t i l i t was r e c o n s i d e r e d i n e a r l y 1978. B e f o r e t h e n , C a r t e r ' s o b j e c t i v e was t o end the war. A l s o , he wanted t o be sure t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s was not seen as h a v i n g an i n t e r e s t i n t h i s c o n f l i c t . The OAU, which has s i n c e i t s s t a r t u p h e l d the v a l i d i t y of c o l o n i a l b o u n d a r i e s , condemned So m a l i a as the a g g r e s s o r i n the Horn. S o m a l i a , i n t u r n , b o y c o t t e d a l l OAU a t t e m p t s a t m e d i a t i o n . 2 0 Though the S o m a l i s r e p e a t e d l y asked f o r arms, C a r t e r i n s i s t e d t h a t they withdraw from the Ogaden f i r s t . However, the massive S o v i e t / C u b a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war, i n e a r l y 1978, caused C a r t e r t o r e c o n s i d e r h i s p o s i t i o n . THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS I t was B r z e z i n s k i who c h a l l e n g e d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p o s i t i o n towards the war. He became i n c r e a s i n g l y c o n cerned 142 t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s was too p a s s i v e i n l i g h t of the growing in v o l v e m e n t of the USSR and Cuba. C l a s s i f y i n g the i s s u e a c r i s i s , B r z e z i n s k i c a l l e d s e v e r a l S p e c i a l C o o r d i n a t i o n Committee (SCC) meetings i n December 1977 and J a n u a r y 1 9 7 8 . 2 1 In t h e s e m e e t i n g s , he warned t h a t the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n E t h i o p i a , combined w i t h t h e i r p resence i n South Yemen would endanger the s e c u r i t y of the Suez and the A r a b i a n o i l f i e l d s . He urged t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s t a k e more a c t i o n t o s t o p t h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of E t h i o p i a and a l s o t h a t i t make the war more c o s t l y t o b oth the E t h i o p i a n s and R u s s i a n s . The o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the SCC d i d not f e e l t h a t the problem had become a c r i s i s y e t . They ad v o c a t e d a w a i t and see p o s i t i o n . B r z e z i n s k i a l s o used the d a i l y i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g w i t h the p r e s i d e n t t o a l e r t C a r t e r t o the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the war and the S o v i e t r o l e i n i t . W i t h C a r t e r ' s a p p r o v a l , he began t o g i v e s e v e r a l background b r i e f i n g s t o the p r e s s on S o v i e t and Cuban a c t i v i t i e s i n the H o r n . 2 2 In a p r i v a t e l e t t e r t o Brezhnev, i n mid- December, C a r t e r p r o t e s t e d the S o v i e t i n v o l v e m e n t i n the war. In a d d i t i o n , the US d e l i v e r e d a f o r m a l p r o t e s t note t o the USSR i n the I n d i a n Ocean D e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n T a l k s and s e n t l e t t e r s t o s e v e r a l prominent n o n - a l i g n e d s t a t e s u r g i n g them t o e x p r e s s t h e i r c o n c e r n s t o Moscow. The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t u r n e d down an o f f e r of j o i n t US-USSR m e d i a t i o n by Gromyko, a r g u i n g t h a t the d i s p u t e s h o u l d be s o l v e d by A f r i c a n s w i t h o u t superpower i n t e r f e r e n c e . W h i l e D o b r y n i n had a s s u r e d both Vance and B r z e z i n s k i t h a t E t h i o p i a would not c r o s s i n t o S o m a l i a , C a r t e r became 143 c o n c e r n e d about the massive E t h i o p i a n - C u b a n c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e , which began i n January 1 9 7 8 . 2 3 In a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e on January 21, C a r t e r proposed a c e a s e - f i r e and a n e g o t i a t e d end t o the d i s p u t e . 2 \" He a l s o postponed the I n d i a n Ocean D e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n T a l k s . On F e b r u a r y 17, D a v i d Aaron (Deputy D i r e c t o r NSC) was sent t o E t h i o p i a t o d i s c u s s the war and U S - E t h i o p i a n r e l a t i o n s . W h i l e M e n g i s t u promised not t o invade S o m a l i a , he was i n no mood t o s c a l e down the Sovi e t - C u b a n involvement i n the w a r . 2 5 D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , E g y p t, Saudi A r a b i a and I r a n made s e v e r a l r e q u e s t s t o p r o v i d e arms t o Somalia and asked the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o t a k e a s t r o n g e r s t a n d . 2 6 D u r i n g two SCC meetings on F e b r u a r y 10 and 21, C a r t e r ' s a d v i s o r s met t o r e c o n s i d e r the American p o s i t i o n and t o o f f e r recommendations t o C a r t e r . 2 7 B r z e z i n s k i argued t h a t the US c o u l d no l o n g e r a f f o r d t o s i t i d l e . To do so, would g i v e the S o v i e t s the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t they c o u l d a g g r e s s i v e l y expand t h e i r i n f l u e n c e i n the T h i r d World w i t h o u t any n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s on U S - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s . T h i s would s e t a dangerous p r e c e d e n t . He argued t h a t S o v i e t b e h a v i o u r was a g a i n s t the s p i r i t of d e t e n t e , which he b e l i e v e d was based on mutual r e s t r a i n t . F u r t h e r m o r e , American p r e s t i g e i n the eyes of i t s M i d d l e E a s t a l l i e s would s u f f e r b a d l y i f the U n i t e d S t a t e s d i d not c o u n t e r the S o v i e t s . Moreover, the U n i t e d S t a t e s needed t o determine i t s r e a c t i o n i n case the E t h i o p i a n s c r o s s e d i n t o S o m a l i a . He proposed t h a t the US a l l o w i t s a l l i e s i n the r e g i o n t o s u p p l y arms t o Somalia and t h a t i t send a C a r r i e r Task F o r c e (CTF) o f f the Somalian 144 c o a s t . He b e l i e v e d t h i s CTF would r e s t r a i n USSR involvement i n t he war. I t would be a s i g n a l i n d i c a t i n g t h a t i f the USSR moved i n t o S o m a l i a , the U n i t e d S t a t e s might r e a c t : I t would c e r t a i n l y make the Cubans t h i n k t w i c e about p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the i n v a s i o n of S o m a l i a , w h i l e t a n g i b l y d e m o n s t r a t i n g our co n c e r n and p r e s e n c e . . . J u s t p l a c i n g the CTF i n t h e a r e a d i d not mean t h a t we were g o i n g t o w a r . 2 8 Vance d i s a g r e e d . He i n s i s t e d t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d c o n s i d e r the war a l o c a l c o n f l i c t and not repeat the S o v i e t m i s t a k e of t r y i n g t o e x p l o i t e v e r y T h i r d World o p p o r t u n i t y . He f a v o u r e d a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t and was a f r a i d t h a t an American show of f o r c e would i s o l a t e i t from most OAU members, who had i d e n t i f i e d S o m a l i a as the a g g r e s s o r . He thought i t unwise t o d e p l o y a CTF i n the r e g i o n : We a r e g e t t i n g sucked i n . The S o m a l i s brought t h i s on t h e m s e l v e s . They a r e no g r e a t f r i e n d of o u r s , and they a r e r e a p i n g the f r u i t s of t h e i r a c t i o n s . For us t o put our p r e s t i g e on the l i n e i s a r i s k we s h o u l d not t a k e . 2 9 B r z e z i n s k i c o u n t e r e d t h a t more was a t s t a k e than \"a p i e c e of d e s e r t \" and t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d not a l l o w the USSR t o dete r m i n e the outcome of e v e r y l o c a l c o n f l i c t . 3 0 Brown, however, shared Vance's s k e p t i c i s m about B r z e z i n s k i ' s p l a n s f o r US a c t i o n . He opposed sending a CTF, a r g u i n g t h a t such an t a s k f o r c e w i t h o u t a s p e c i f i c purpose may prove 145 c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . 3 1 What was the CTF g o i n g t o do a f t e r i t got t h e r e ? Moreover, i n the case t h a t S o m a l i a was invaded and the CTF d i d n o t h i n g , the U n i t e d S t a t e s would have i t s b l u f f c a l l e d . I f so, i t would s e v e r e l y i m p a i r the f u t u r e use of such t a s k f o r c e s . Unmoved by B r z e z i n s k i ' s arguments h i s p o s i t i o n was c l e a r t h a t : \" i f we do not know how the s i t u a t i o n w i l l come o u t , or do not i n t e n d t o use the a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r i n S o m a l i a , then we s h o u l d not put i t i n . \" 3 2 The A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r i e s of S t a t e , p r e s e n t a t the me e t i n g s , a l s o opposed B r z e z i n s k i ' s i d e a s . R i c h a r d Moose ( A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y f o r A f r i c a n A f f a i r s ) b e l i e v e d t h a t the be s t way t o c o u n t e r S o v i e t moves i n the Horn was th r o u g h w o r l d o p i n i o n . 3 3 G i v e n enough rope, the USSR would e v e n t u a l l y hang i t s e l f . I t would be o u s t e d , as i t was i n Egypt and Sudan. W h i l e the i d e a of c o v e r t American a i d was d i s c u s s e d b r i e f l y , i t was r e j e c t e d on account of the many l e g a l and c o n g r e s s i o n a l problems f e a r e d by S t a t e Department o f f i c i a l s . 3 \" These o p t i o n s and the v a r i o u s arguments f o r and a g a i n s t them were d i s c u s s e d i n the presence of C a r t e r i n a N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l meeting on F e b r u a r y 2 3 3 5 and p o s s i b l y a l s o d u r i n g a F o r e i g n P o l i c y B r e a k f a s t meeting the f o l l o w i n g day. Young, Mondale and the Chairman of the J o i n t C h i e f s a l s o e x p r e s s e d t h e i r h e s i t a t i o n s about B r z e z i n s k i ' s o p t i o n s . 3 6 Young argued t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d \" p l a y i t c o o l \" and l e t A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s m p r e v a i l over S o v i e t and Cuban d e s i g n s i n A f r i c a . C a r t e r appears t o have made h i s f i n a l 146 d e c i s i o n on t h i s i s s u e d u r i n g t h e s e m e e t i n g s , r e j e c t i n g the change i n p o l i c y advocated by B r z e z i n s k i . In the f i r s t week of March, C a r t e r i n formed h i s c a b i n e t of h i s d e c i s i o n t o remain n e u t r a l and i n a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e r e i t e r a t e d h i s p o l i c y towards the H o r n . 3 7 By March 15, S o m a l i a had been d r i v e n out of the Ogaden. E t h i o p i a , t r u e t o i t s word, d i d not c r o s s i n t o S omalia p r o p e r . PUBLIC SPEAKING AND THE CUSTODIAN D u r i n g and a f t e r the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , B r z e z i n s k i made s e v e r a l p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s about the c o n c e r n s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and i t s p o l i c y . The comments d u r i n g the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s were l a r g e l y i n the form of background b r i e f i n g s t o the p r e s s . However, s e v e r a l p u b l i c remarks a f t e r C a r t e r had d e c i d e d t o s t i c k w i t h h i s p o l i c y d e a l t w i t h the i m p o r t a n t i s s u e of whether the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n t e n d e d t o impose \" l i n k a g e \" between S o v i e t a c t i v i t i e s i n the Horn on the one hand and the p r o g r e s s of the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s on the o t h e r . H i s remarks appeared t o d i v e r g e so much from C a r t e r and Vance's comments t h a t s e v e r a l commentators and s c h o l a r s a c c u s e d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of i n c o h e r e n c e and a m b i v a l e n c e . 3 8 Both H a l l and George a s s e r t t h a t the c u s t o d i a n cannot p e r f o r m a d e q u a t e l y the r o l e t a s k s p r e s c r i b e d i n the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y when he a l s o engages i n p u b l i c s p e a k i n g . 3 9 147 H a l l mentions t h r e e \" m a l f u n c t i o n s \" which w i l l o c cur as a r e s u l t of such a c t i v i t y on the p a r t of the c u s t o d i a n . 4 0 F i r s t , i t w i l l i m p a i r the c u s t o d i a n ' s a b i l i t y t o encourage t i m e l y and o b j e c t i v e review of p a s t p o l i c y commitments. Second, i t w i l l undermine the b u r e a u c r a t i c s t a n d i n g of the o t h e r a d v i s o r s . L a s t , i t w i l l cause the c u s t o d i a n t o l o s e h i s i m p a r t i a l i t y . In e s s e n c e , George and H a l l argue t h a t a c u s t o d i a n whose p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s a r e p u b l i c l y known, can no l o n g e r f u n c t i o n as an honest b r o k e r of the v a r i o u s o p t i o n s w i t h i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n because he i s no l o n g e r \" n e u t r a l \" . B r z e z i n s k i ' s p u b l i c s p e a k i n g d u r i n g the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s does not appear t o support H a l l ' s a s s e r t i o n s . In a l e r t i n g C a r t e r and the o t h e r a d v i s o r s t o the ' need t o r e c o n s i d e r the American p o s i t i o n , B r z e z i n s k i e nsured t h a t one of the c o n d i t i o n s of an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s was met, namely, \" t h a t the p r o c e s s m a i n t a i n s r e c e p t i v e t o i n d i c a t o r s t h a t the e x i s t i n g p o l i c y i s f a i l i n g . \" 4 1 B r z e z i n s k i ' s comments a l s o do not seem t o have undermined the a d v i s o r y s t a t u s of the o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s . C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s on A f r i c a was d e s c r i b e d by one commentator as \"open t o a f r e e exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n and i d e a s . \" 4 2 In the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s on the Horn i s s u e , as d e s c r i b e d above, B r z e z i n s k i d i d not attempt t o s t i f l e or d i s c r e d i t the p o s i t i o n s of any of the o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s . 4 3 B r z e z i n s k i appears t o have been one v o i c e among many. Indeed, i n s p i t e of the s e r i o u s disagreement on p o l i c y between Vance and B r z e z i n s k i , they were d e s c r i b e d as s t i l l 148 w o r k i n g \"smoothly t o g e t h e r \" i n March 1 978. 4 * H a l l ' s l a s t p o i n t , which s t a t e s t h a t t h e c u s t o d i a n cannot advocate p o l i c y p u b l i c l y w h i l e r e m a i n i n g an i m p a r t i a l c u s t o d i a n , o v e r l a p s w i t h the l a r g e r q u e s t i o n of whether the c u s t o d i a n can a dvocate a t a l l w i t h o u t n e g a t i n g the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . T h i s problem w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n the next s e c t i o n . B r z e z i n s k i ' s p u b l i c comments, a f t e r C a r t e r had made h i s f i n a l d e c i s i o n , c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d h i s p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e . B r z e z i n s k i , more than the o t h e r v o i c e s i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , seemed t o i m p l y t h a t the S o v i e t r o l e i n the Horn was l i n k e d t o the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s . B r z e z i n s k i t h e r e b y compromised h i s \"honest b r o k e r \" r o l e . However, s i n c e they succeeded C a r t e r ' s d e c i s i o n , t hey d i d not i n t e r f e r e w i t h the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . A l s o , we cannot c o n c l u d e t h a t h i s comments i n t e r f e r e d w i t h the e x e c u t i o n of C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y or t h a t t hey were p r o o f of a d i v i d e d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . D u r i n g the SCC and NSC s e s s i o n s on the Horn, both Vance and B r z e z i n s k i had a greed not t o l i n k the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s t o t h i s c r i s i s . \" 5 Indeed, the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n n e i t h e r slowed down the t a l k s nor m o d i f i e d i t s n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n as a r e s u l t of the Horn c r i s i s . * 6 I n s t e a d , s e v e r a l i m p o r t a n t b r e a k t h r o u g h s were a c h i e v e d i n the s p r i n g of 1 9 7 8 . 4 7 Y e t , a l t h o u g h C a r t e r ' s a c t u a l p o l i c y was c o n s i s t e n t , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d not p u b l i c l y appear u n i t e d . B r z e z i n s k i , on March 1, s t a t e d : \"We a r e not imposing any l i n k a g e , but l i n k a g e s may be imposed by unwarranted e x p l o i t a t i o n of l o c a l c o n f l i c t s f o r l a r g e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l 149 p u r p o s e s . \" * 8 The next day, when asked whether he was a p p l y i n g l i n k a g e , C a r t e r s a i d : The S o v i e t s ' v i o l a t i n g of t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s (of d e t e n t e ) would be a cause of c o n c e r n t o me, would l e s s e n the c o n f i d e n c e of the American p e o p l e i n the word and p e a c e f u l i n t e n t i o n s of the S o v i e t U n i o n , would make i t more d i f f i c u l t t o r a t i f y a SALT agreement ...and t h e r e f o r e the two a r e l i n k e d because of a c t i o n s by the S o v i e t s . We don't i n i t i a t e the l i n k a g e . * 9 On the same day, however, Vance and the spokesman f o r the S t a t e Department emphasized t h a t t h e r e was no l i n k a g e w h a t s o e v e r . 5 0 W h i l e s e v e r a l o b s e r v e r s i n t e r p r e t e d t h e s e e v e n t s as p r o o f of an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n d i s a r r a y , t h e r e i s some e v i d e n c e t h a t C a r t e r i n t e n d e d t o send a more ambiguous message than Vance's l i n e . C a r t e r d i d not i n t e n d t o l i n k the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s t o S o v i e t b e h a v i o u r i n o t h e r a r e a s s i n c e the S o v i e t s , i n t u r n , c o u l d then l i n k h i s human r i g h t s a c c u s a t i o n s a g a i n s t the USSR t o the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s as w e l l . And C a r t e r had a c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t i n a c h i e v i n g an arms a c c o r d . 5 1 T h e r e f o r e , Vance's comments den y i n g l i n k a g e had the purpose of p u t t i n g the S o v i e t SALT n e g o t i a t o r s a t ease. However, C a r t e r a l s o wanted t o communicate t h a t he would not l e t the S o v i e t s expand t h e i r i n f l u e n c e w i t h i m p u n i t y , i f f o r no o t h e r reason than t o s t a v e o f f domestic c r i t i c i s m of h i s weakness i n d e a l i n g w i t h the USSR. S e v e r a l d o m e s t i c a d v i s o r s had warned C a r t e r t h a t he must show some toughness w i t h the S o v i e t s i n o r d e r t o get the SALT t r e a t y r a t i f i e d . 5 2 In a memo t o B r z e z i n s k i , C a r t e r w r o t e : \"the US must make i t c l e a r t o the S o v i e t s t h a t t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s i n 150 A f r i c a a r e u n a c c e p t a b l e . \" 5 3 In h i s A n n a p o l i s speech of June 7, he s i g n a l l e d t o the S o v i e t s t h a t i t was up t o them t o seek e i t h e r a c o o p e r a t i v e or a c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and t h a t he was p r e p a r e d f o r e i t h e r . The t h e s i s t h a t C a r t e r d i d not o b j e c t t o Vance and B r z e z i n s k i s e n d i n g d i f f e r e n t messages i s f u r t h e r c o r r o b o r a t e d by ample e v i d e n c e t h a t B r z e z i n s k i spoke w i t h C a r t e r ' s a p p r o v a l and was not a c t i n g merely on h i s own. 5\" As such, B r z e z i n s k i ' s p u b l i c s p e a k i n g cannot be c o n s i d e r e d as s i m p l y a d v a n c i n g h i s b u r e a u c r a t i c s t a n d i n g , but as an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the e x e c u t i o n of C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y . The s t r a t e g y p o s s i b l y enhanced the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y . C a r t e r used h i s two c l o s e s t f o r e i g n p o l i c y a s s i s t a n t s q u i t e s k i l f u l l y i n t h i s c a s e . In e s s e n c e , C a r t e r was a b l e t o use two d i f f e r e n t p u b l i c spokesmen t o a c h i e v e two d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t i v e s . W h i l e Vance's comments se t the S o v i e t n e g o t i a t o r s a t ease, B r z e z i n s k i ' s comments appeased the domestic c r i t i c s of C a r t e r and s i g n a l l e d t o the S o v i e t s t h a t C a r t e r c o u l d not be \"pushed around\" i n d e f i n i t e l y . As such, B r z e z i n s k i ' s p u b l i c s p e a k i n g was an i m p o r t a n t i n g r e d i e n t of the e x e c u t i o n of C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y and not n e c e s s a r i l y h a r m f u l t o the m u l t i p l e advocacy p r o c e e d i n g s . 1 5 1 EVALUATING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE CUSTODIAN The d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s f o c u s s e d on a r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of e x i s t i n g p o l i c y . T h i s r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n took p l a c e because the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g the i n i t i a l d e c i s i o n - non-involvement - had changed s u b s t a n t i a l l y . An e s s e n t i a l l y l o c a l war had grown i n t o a much l a r g e r c o n f l i c t w i t h the involvement of two o u t s i d e a c t o r s : t h e USSR and Cuba. I t was the c u s t o d i a n who a l e r t e d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o thes e changed c o n d i t i o n s and who p r e s s e d f o r a r e v i e w of p o l i c y . I n so d o i n g , he performed a t a s k a s c r i b e d t o him by the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y , namely: \" t o i d e n t i f y major p o l i c y i s s u e s a p p r o p r i a t e f o r m u l t i p l e advocacy p r o c e e d i n g s . \" 5 5 As a r e s u l t of the c u s t o d i a n ' s performance of t h i s a s p e c t of h i s r o l e , the h a n d l i n g of the Ogaden i s s u e met the f i f t h c r i t e r i o n of an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , as d e f i n e d by George and H a l l : i t remained r e c e p t i v e t o i n d i c a t o r s t h a t e x i s t i n g p o l i c y may be f a i l i n g . 5 6 There was v i r t u a l l y no d i v e r s i t y of o p i n i o n on American p o l i c y among the major a d v o c a t e s i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , d u r i n g the e a r l y s t a g e s of t h i s c o n f l i c t . 5 7 Vance, Brown, Young and Mondale a l l o f f e r e d C a r t e r s i m i l a r a d v i c e : t r e a t the i s s u e as a l o c a l c o n f l i c t o n l y , do not su p p l y arms d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , and l e t the A f r i c a n s and w o r l d o p i n i o n judge the S o v i e t r o l e i n the c o n f l i c t . T h e i r p o s i t i o n was by no means n a i v e or u n r e a l i s t i c . A f t e r a l l , 152 the S o m a l i s were the nominal a g g r e s s o r s and most A f r i c a n s t a t e s condemned them. Moreover, the E t h i o p i a n s had r e q u e s t e d S o v i e t h e l p o n l y a f t e r they had been i n v a d e d . C a r t e r ' s a c t i v e i n v o l v e m e n t might w e l l have a l i e n a t e d many A f r i c a n s t a t e s . However, the consensus d i d not p r o v i d e f o r \"a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l l major v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s a f f e c t e d by the i s s u e \" nor d i d i t \" a s s u r e a s e a r c h f o r a r e l a t i v e l y wide range of o p t i o n s \" and a \"thorough e v a l u a t i o n of a l l the e s t i m a t e d consequences of the o p t i o n s . \" 5 8 I t was B r z e z i n s k i ' s assumption of the-advocacy r o l e t h a t improved the p r o c e s s . H i s o p t i o n s and e s t i m a t e d consequences c h a l l e n g e d the consensus and p r o v i d e d an added p e r s p e c t i v e t o the d ebate. He argued t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s must not o n l y a s s e s s the o p i n i o n of the A f r i c a n s t a t e s but must a l s o c o n s i d e r the c o ncerns of i t s a l l i e s i n the r e g i o n . Indeed, t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t h a t I r a n , Egypt and Saudi A r a b i a were not happy w i t h American p o l i c y . 5 9 F u r t h e r m o r e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s must c o n s i d e r t h a t i t s p a s s i v e s t a n d might s e t a p r e c e d e n t f o r subsequent S o v i e t i n v o l v e m e n t i n A f r i c a and c o u l d i n v i t e a d o m e s t i c b a c k l a s h on U S - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s i n g e n e r a l . As a r e s u l t of B r z e z i n s k i ' s advocacy, s e v e r a l o p t i o n s were s u b j e c t e d t o c a r e f u l s c r u t i n y . B r z e z i n s k i had q u e s t i o n e d the p o s s i b l e consequences of American i n a c t i o n . I f the E t h i o p i a n s d i d invade S o m a l i a , the U n i t e d S t a t e s would be a t a l o s s on how t o respond and would indeed be too l a t e . I f the S o v i e t s b e l i e v e d they c o u l d expand t h e i r i n f l u e n c e w i t h i m p u n i t y , they may w e l l do so next i n the 153 d e v e l o p i n g s t r u g g l e i n R h o d e s i a . At the same t i m e , however, Vance and Brown argued c o n v i n c i n g l y t h a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s proposed CTF c o u l d prove c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . A l s o , s i n c e , as they b e l i e v e d , the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d not do a n y t h i n g s u b s t a n t i a l i n the c o n f l i c t , i t would be c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e t o l i n k i t t o the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s and s h o u l d thus not even mention i t . I t appears t h a t C a r t e r improved h i s f i n a l d e c i s i o n as a r e s u l t of t h i s debate. W h i l e he r e j e c t e d B r z e z i n s k i ' s o p t i o n s f o r d i r e c t American i n v o l v e m e n t , he a l s o r e j e c t e d Vance's argument t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d not warn the S o v i e t s of the p o s s i b l e n e g a t i v e consequences of t h e i r a c t i o n s on US-USSR r e l a t i o n s . C a r t e r announced i n the NSC meeting of F e b r u a r y 23 t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s must f o c u s on g i v i n g g r e a t e r p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n t o the S o v i e t i n v o l v e m e n t i n the Horn and the danger i t r a i s e d f o r w o r l d t e n s i o n . 6 0 George and H a l l ' s c o n c e r n t h a t p o l i c y advocacy by the c u s t o d i a n w i l l \"impede the f r e e f l o w of i n f o r m a t i o n and a d v i c e t o the p r e s i d e n t \" 6 1 appears unfounded i n t h i s c a s e . The c u s t o d i a n d i d not deny any a d v o c a t e a c c e s s t o the d e c i s i o n forum. A l l the a d v o c a t e s had a r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o make t h e i r case b e f o r e t h e p r e s i d e n t . A l s o , the c u s t o d i a n c o n t i n u e d t o be an e f f e c t i v e p r o c e s s manager, c o o r d i n a t i n g the paper f l o w as w e l l as the v a r i o u s p o l i c y m eetings among the a d v i s o r s . I n s t e a d , the advocacy of the c u s t o d i a n c h a l l e n g e d the consensus i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and p r o v i d e d the p r e s i d e n t w i t h a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a l l t h e major a s p e c t s i n v o l v e d i n the i s s u e , which i s indeed the 154 fundamental g o a l of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE DECISION W h i l e the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s met the c r i t e r i a of an o p t i m a l p r o c e s s , as d e f i n e d by the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y , what can be s a i d of the a c t u a l d e c i s i o n taken by C a r t e r ? The p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r showed t h a t a d e e p l y f l a w e d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s c o i n c i d e d w i t h a poor d e c i s i o n , c a u s i n g a s e r i o u s p o l i c y s e t b a c k f o r C a r t e r . Though i t i s f a r more d i f f i c u l t t o a s s e s s the p r e s e n t d e c i s i o n , i t appears a t l e a s t adequate, g i v e n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . To B r z e z i n s k i , i t comes as no s u r p r i s e , the d e c i s i o n seemed b a d l y f l a w e d . With h i s p o p u l a r l i n e t h a t \"SALT l i e s b u r i e d i n the sands of the Ogaden\" he i m p l i e d two t h i n g s . 6 2 F i r s t , t h a t the USSR saw C a r t e r ' s d e c i s i o n as a s i g n of weakness and as an i n v i t a t i o n t o advance i t s i n t e r e s t s . T h i s r e s u l t e d e v e n t u a l l y i n the i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n . Second, t h a t the US Senate saw i t the same way and thus grew more s u s p i c i o u s of C a r t e r ' s SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s . These arguments may be more or l e s s c o n v i n c i n g a c c o r d i n g t o one's b e l i e f s about S o v i e t b e h a v i o u r . S e v e r a l commentators ac c u s e d C a r t e r of appeasement and of g i v i n g away the i d e a of d e t e n t e , w h i l e o t h e r s l a u d e d C a r t e r f o r w i s e l y a v o i d i n g an \" A f r i c a n Bay of P i g s . \" 6 3 These c o n c e r n s a s i d e , t h e r e i s not much C a r t e r c o u l d 155 have done t h a t would have been b e t t e r f o r American i n t e r e s t s than d o i n g n o t h i n g . Foremost, t h e r e was t h e problem w i t h the s t a u n c h A f r i c a n b e l i e f i n the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of c o l o n i a l b o r d e r s . S o m a l i a had v i o l a t e d t h i s p r i n c i p l e and was condemned by o t h e r A f r i c a n s t a t e s even though i t s c l a i m t o the Ogaden was not e n t i r e l y unfounded. However, C a r t e r ' s A f r i c a p o l i c y c o u l d not a f f o r d t o q u e s t i o n t h i s p r i n c i p l e . Second, by r e q u e s t i n g S o v i e t h e l p , a f t e r i t had been in v a d e d , E t h i o p i a a p p l i e d a l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r a c t i c e . Even though S o v i e t a i d was e x c e s s i v e and r a i s e d s u s p i c i o n s about a l a r g e r S o v i e t m o t i v e , any American a i d t o S o malia would have been condemned s i m p l y because S o m a l i a was i d e n t i f i e d as the a g g r e s s o r . T h i r d , B r z e z i n s k i ' s i d e a of d e p l o y i n g a n a v a l t a s k f o r c e was u n c l e a r . Would the U n i t e d S t a t e s e n t e r the war i f S o m a l i a was invaded or was i t merely a d e t e r r e n t ? What was the use of t h i s d e m o n s t r a t i o n of f o r c e when C a r t e r had c l e a r l y s t a t e d t h a t he d i d not i n t e n d t o e n t e r i n t o the c o n f l i c t ? F o u r t h , l i n k i n g S o v i e t b e h a v i o u r t o the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s would be r i s k y f o r C a r t e r s i n c e the S o v i e t s c o u l d e a s i l y l i n k C a r t e r ' s human r i g h t s b e h a v i o u r i n t u r n . Moreover, i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t by t h i s t i me C a r t e r was more eager t o complete SALT than the S o v i e t s , s i n c e he had i n v e s t e d much time and p u b l i c p r e s t i g e i n i t . F i f t h , a l t h o u g h i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t the E t h i o p i a n s used t h e i r o c c a s i o n a l c o n t a c t w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s t o b a r g a i n f o r more S o v i e t a i d and t o l u r e i t out of s u p p l y i n g arms t o S o m a l i a , the US a d m i n i s t r a t i o n thought i t c o u l d s t i l l p a t c h up i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h E t h i o p i a . 6 4 F i n a l l y , the 156 a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o u l d g i v e c o v e r t a i d t o S o m a l i a . C o v e r t a i d , however, was a f o r e i g n p o l i c y t o o l C a r t e r had vowed t o d i s c o n t i n u e . A l s o , C o n g r e s s , i n the a f t e r m a t h of K i s s i n g e r ' s p o l i c i e s towards A n g o l a , was i n no mood t o l e n d i t s support t o such a c t i v i t i e s . In l i g h t of a l l the problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e s e o p t i o n s , C a r t e r had l i t t l e c h o i c e but t o p u b l i c l y condemn the USSR, w h i l e s t a y i n g out of the c o n f l i c t i t s e l f . 157 ENDNOTES 1 The f a c t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h i s s e c t i o n can be found i n the f o l l o w i n g s o u r c e s : C o l i n Legum and B i l l Lee, \" C r i s i s i n t h e Horn of A f r i c a , \" A f r i c a Contemporary Record, New York: A f r i c a n a P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1979-80, pp.46-57; G e r a r d C h a l i a n d , \"The Horn of A f r i c a ' s Dilemma,\" F o r e i g n P o l i c y , No. 30, S p r i n g 1978,pp.116-131; Robert F. Gorman, P o l i t i c a l C o n f l i c t i n the Horn of A f r i c a , New York: P r a e g e r , 1981; Tom J . F a r e r , War Clouds on the Horn of A f r i c a , New York: C a r n e g i e Endowment f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace, 1976; M a r i n a Ottaway, S o v i e t and American I n f l u e n c e i n the Horn of A f r i c a , New York: P r a e g e r , 1982; Mohammed Ayoob, The Horn of A f r i c a : R e g i o n a l C o n f l i c t and Superpower Involvement, C a n b e r r a : A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y , 1978; C o n g r e s s i o n a l D i g e s t , V o l . 57, 1978; Joseph Churba, The American R e t r e a t , C h i c a g o : Regnery Gateway, 1984; B e r e k e t Habte S e l a s s i e , C o n f l i c t and I n t e r v e n t i o n i n the Horn of A f r i c a , New York: Monthly Review P r e s s , 1980; Don O b e r d o r f e r , Washington P o s t , March 5, 1978, p. 10.; L a r r y C. Napper, \"The Ogaden War: Some I m p l i c a t i o n s For C r i s i s P r e v e n t i o n , \" i n A l e x a n d e r L. George, Managing US- S o v i e t R i v a l r y , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1983, pp.225-253. 2 Tom J . F a r e r , \"Dilemmas on the Horn,\" A f r i c a R e p o r t , March 1977, p.2. Somalia was s u p e r i o r i n i t s number of t a n k s , armored v e h i c l e s and a i r c r a f t . The two r e g u l a r a r m i e s were n e a r l y e q u a l i n number, though E t h i o p i a ' s m i l i t i a was much l a r g e r . See t a b l e i n Gorman (1981), p.66. 3 F a r e r (1976), pp.144,145. * New York Times, F e b r u a r y 12, 1978, p.1. 5 I t was a l s o r e p o r t e d t h a t o i l and gas had been found i n the Ogaden: F a r e r (1976), p.147. 6 S o m a l i a d e n i e d i t s i n v o l v e m e n t i n the Ogaden u n t i l F e b r u a r y 1978. 7 A l t h o u g h t h e r e i s some e v i d e n c e t h a t Egypt and o t h e r s were a b l e t o f u n n e l some non US weapons t o S o m a l i a , t h e s e amounts were to o s m a l l t o make a d e c i s i v e impact upon the war. Washington P o s t , F e b r u a r y 17, 1978, p.26. 8 The war was q u i t e c o s t l y i n human l i v e s . An e s t i m a t e d 40,000 S o m a l i s were dead or wounded as a r e s u l t of the f i g h t i n g . E t h i o p i a n e s t i m a t e s a r e not a v a i l a b l e . Newsweek, F e b r u a r y 20, 1978. pp.39-40 9 R i c h a r d Deutsch, \" C a r t e r ' s A f r i c a Record,\" A f r i c a n R e p o r t , March 1978, p.47. 1 0 C a r t e r announced a p r e s i d e n t i a l d i r e c t i v e on arms s a l e s i n May 1977. See Roger P. L a b r i e e t . a l . , US Arms S a l e s 158 P o l i c y Washington: American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e , 1982 1 1 I n t e r v i e w i n A f r i c a Magazine, No. 76, December 1977.p.24 1 2 Gaddis Smith, M o r a l i t y , Reason and Power, New York: H i l l and Wang, 1986, p.135. 1 3 Cyrus Vance, Hard C h o i c e s , New York: Simon & S c h u s t e r , 1983, p.70 1\" I n t e r v i e w i n A f r i c a R e p o r t , June 1977, p.19. 1 5 Vance (1983), p.275. 1 6 Deutsch (1978), p.50. 1 7 C o n g r e s s i o n a l D i g e s t , V o l . 57, 1978, p.39. 1 8 O f f i c i a l Somali s o u r c e s c l a i m e d , i n the f a l l of 1977, t h a t the US had promised e x t e n s i v e m i l i t a r y a i d and was not s t r o n g l y opposed t o Somali c l a i m s t o the Ogaden. I t was r e p o r t e d t h a t B a r r e ' s p e r s o n a l p h y s i c i a n , an American, had been g i v e n these a s s u r a n c e s i n Washington. These a c c o u n t s , however, appear s u s p e c t and s e l f s e r v i n g . Moreover, they have been d e n i e d by s e v e r a l t o p S t a t e Department o f f i c i a l s and indeed appear c o n t r a d i c t o r y t o C a r t e r ' s o v e r a l l p o l i c y on arms t r a n s f e r s . See Newsweek, September 26, 1977; and G e r a l d J . Bender, James S. Coleman and R i c h a r d L. S k l a r ( e d s . ) , A f r i c a n C r i s i s A r eas and US F o r e i g n P o l i c y , B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1985, p.196; Vance (1983), p.73. 1 9 Vance (1983), p.73; C o l i n Legum and B i l l Lee, The Horn of A f r i c a i n C o n t i n u i n g C r i s i s , New York: A f r i c a n a P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1979, p.78; Henry B i e n e n , \"US F o r e i g n P o l i c y i n a Changing A f r i c a , \" P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Q u a r t e r l y , No.3, F a l l 1978, p.453. 2 0 Gorman (1981), p.116. 2 1 Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , Power and P r i n c i p l e , New York: F a r r a r , S t r a u s , G i r o u x , 1983, p.181. 2 2 B r z e z i n s k i ( 1 983), p.180. 2 3 Vance (1983), p.87. 2\" C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y , J a n u a r y 28, 1978, p.215. 2 5 Washington P o s t , F e b r u a r y 22, 1978, p.14; New York Times, F e b r u a r y 17, 1978, p.9; B r z e z i n s k i (-1983) , p.182; 2 S Washington P o s t , F e b r u a r y 3, 1978, p.24; C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r , F e b r u a r y 10, 1978, p.4; Jimmy C a r t e r , Keeping F a i t h , New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p.283. 159 2 7 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.182; Vance (1983), p.87; E l i z a b e t h Drew, \"A R e p o r t e r a t .Large,\" New Y o r k e r , May 1, 1978, p.115. 2 8 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.183. 2 9 Idem, p.182; Vance (1983), p.85. 3 0 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.183; Newsweek, March 1 3, 1978, p.38. 3 1 Vance (1983), p.87; Drew (1978), p.115. 3 2 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.183. 3 3 Washington P o s t , March 2, 1978, p.23; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.182; Gorman (1981), p.193. 3 4 Drew (1978), p.116; S t a n s f i e l d T u r n e r , S e c r e c y and Democracy, Bo s t o n : Houghton, M i f f l i n , 1985, p.88. 3 5 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.183. 3 6 Smith (1986), p.47; Washington P o s t , F e b r u a r y 14, 1978, p.10; B r z e z i n s k i ( 1 983~T^ p. 183; Newsweek, March 13, 1978, p.38. 3 7 New York Times, March 13, 1978, p.10; Legum (1979), p.A73. A l s o , a memo from B r z e z i n s k i t o C a r t e r i n d i c a t e s t h a t C a r t e r made h i s f i n a l d e c i s i o n a t about t h i s t i m e . 3 8 E.g. see D a v i d S. M c L e l l a n , Cyrus Vance, New J e r s e y : Rowman & A l l a n h e l d , 1985, p.52; Tad S z u l c , The New R e p u b l i c , March 18, 1978, p.14; I r v i n g M. D e s t l e r , L e s l i e H. Gel b and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy, New York: Simon & S c h u s t e r , 1984, p.220; J e r e l A. R o s a t i , \"The Impact of B e l i e f s on B e h a v i o u r : The F o r e i g n P o l i c y of the C a r t e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , \" i n Donald A. S y l v a n & Steve Chan ( e d s . ) , F o r e i g n P o l i c y D e c i s i o n Making, New York: P r a e g e r , 1984, p.184. 3 9 A l e x a n d e r L. George, P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g i n F o r e i g n P o l i c y , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1980, p.197; D a v i d K. H a l l , Implementing M u l t i p l e Advocacy i n the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , Ph.D t h e s i s , S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , 1 9 8 2 , p.82. a o H a l l (1982), pp.79,716. George o n l y d i s c u s s e s the f i r s t , George (1980), p.197. 4 1 George (1980), p.10. 4 2 Deutsch (1978), p.51. 4 3 Washington P o s t , March 6, 1978, p.8. 4 1 1 New York Times, March 21, 1978, p. 16; Washington P o s t , March 6, 1978, p.8. 160 0 5 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.184; Vance (1983), p.87. 4 6 C a r t e r ( 1982), p. 194, M. Glenn Abernathy e t a l . ( e d s . ) , The C a r t e r Y e a r s , London: F r a n c e s P i n t e r , 1984, p.97; U.S. Senate Subcommittee on A f r i c a n A f f a i r s H e a r i n g s . May 12, 1978, p.8. 4 7 Vance (1983), p.103. 4 8 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.185. 4 9 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y Weekly R e p o r t , March 11, 1978. 5 0 Washington P o s t , March 2, 1978. See a l s o Vance's p r i v a t e comments t o B r z e z i n s k i : B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.186.; Napper i n George (1983), p.239. 5 1 C o r a l B e l l , \" V i r t u e Unrewarded: C a r t e r ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y a t Mid Term,\" I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , No. 4, 1978. 5 2 Drew (1978), p.123; R i c h a r d Rovere, \" A f f a i r s of S t a t e , \" New Y o r k e r , June 12, 1978, p.108. See a l s o Jody P o w e l l ' s statement i n Washington P o s t , March 2, 1978, p.21. See a l s o B r z e z i n s k i ' s comment i n an i n t e r v i e w w i t h George Urban, E n c o u n t e r , May 1981, p.13. 5 3 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.561.The memo was d a t e d A p r i l 7, 1978. 5 4 Rovere (1978), p.108; Washington P o s t , March 3, 1978 ( e d i t o r ' s comment); Jody P o w e l l i n Washington P o s t , March 2, 1978, p.21; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.524; H a m i l t o n J o r d a n , C r i s e s , New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1982, p.49; I n t e r v i e w w i t h B r z e z i n s k i , Washington Q u a r t e r l y , 1982, p.73. 5 5 H a l l (1982), p.61. 5 6 George (1980), p.10; H a l l (1982), p.62. 5 7 Vance (1983), p.87, B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.183. 5 8 A l l th e s e c o n s t i t u t e c r i t e r i a of an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s . George (1980), p.10. 5 9 C a r t e r (1982), p.283; Newsweek, March 3, 1978, p.41. Drew comments t h a t t h e r e appeared no one i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , b e s i d e s B r z e z i n s k i , who was concerned about the s t r a t e g i c i mportance of the Horn. Drew (1978), p.114. 6 0 Washington P o s t , March 2, 1978, p.21. 6 1 George (1980), p.196. 6 2 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.189. 6 3 Senator J a c k s o n quoted i n F r e d H a l l i d a y , \"US P o l i c y i n 161 the Horn of A f r i c a : A b o u l i a or Proxy I n t e r v e n t i o n , \" Review of A f r i c a n P o l i t i c a l Economy, No. 8, 1978, p.9; The New R e p u b l i c , Tad S z u l c , May 6, 1978, p.14; W i l l i a m H. L e w i s , \"US Debacle i n the Horn,\" Washington Q u a r t e r l y , Summer 1978, p.99; C o r a l B e l l , P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r and F o r e i g n P o l i c y : The C o s t s of V i r t u e ? , C a n b e r r a : A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y , 1982, p.66 condemned the d e c i s i o n . S e v e r a l o t h e r s who thought the d e c i s i o n a s u c c e s s i n c l u d e : S t a n l e y Hoffmann, \" The H e l l Of Good I n t e n t i o n s , \" F o r e i g n P o l i c y , W i n t e r 1977, pp.3-26; Bienen (1978), p.453; D e s t l e r e t . a l . (1984), p.74. 6 4 The r o l e of the major European S t a t e s i n t h i s i s s u e appears l i m i t e d . B r z e z i n s k i r e p o r t s t h a t France wanted t o see more a c t i v e s u p p o r t f o r S o m a l i a . However, Vance r e p o r t s t h a t t h e Europeans shared the American demand f o r OAU m e d i a t i o n i n the war. In any c a s e , the Europeans s u p p o r t e d the American p o s i t i o n o f f i c i a l l y and d i d not s u p p l y the S o m a l i s w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t amounts of arms: B r z e z i n s k i ( 1 983), p. 179, Vance (1983), p. 85; Washington P o s t , F e b r u a r y 8, 1978, p.24. 162 CHAPTER FIVE NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 163 T h i s c h a p t e r a n a l y z e s the p r o c e s s which l e d t o C a r t e r ' s d e c i s i o n t o seek f u l l d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of China (PRC). W h i l e the Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had ended a l o n g e r a of American i s o l a t i o n and containment of the PRC, C a r t e r s o l v e d the c o n s i d e r a b l e o u t s t a n d i n g i s s u e s t h a t p r e v e n t e d the two n a t i o n s from h a v i n g n o r m a l i z e d r e l a t i o n s . As i n the p r e v i o u s two a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , the q u e s t i o n d u r i n g the C a r t e r p r e s i d e n c y was not whether t o n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s but how and when. The i s s u e of n o r m a l i z a t i o n i n v o l v e d t h r e e a s p e c t s of US-PRC r e l a t i o n s : the s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s of the two n a t i o n s , the r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Taiwan, and s e v e r a l b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and C h i n a . I w i l l argue t h a t the f i r s t a s p e c t was by f a r the most i m p o r t a n t and c o n t e n t i o u s i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s and p r o v e d t o be the c r u c i a l v a r i a b l e i n a c h i e v i n g n o r m a l i z a t i o n . P o l i c y advocacy by the c u s t o d i a n widened the range of o p t i o n s c o n s i d e r e d by C a r t e r and c o n t r i b u t e d t o the achievement of n o r m a l i z a t i o n . A l s o , the c u s t o d i a n ' s a d o p t i o n of a d i p l o m a t i c r o l e d i d not harm the p r o c e s s nor the e x e c u t i o n of C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y . I n s t e a d , t h i s d i p l o m a t i c a c t i v i t y was l a r g e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the achievement of n o r m a l i z a t i o n . However, t h i s case s t u d y a l s o shows t h a t the c u s t o d i a n v i o l a t e d s e v e r a l r o l e t a s k s of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . In so d o i n g , he undermined an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s . W h i l e t h e s e r o l e v i o l a t i o n s d i d not p r e v e n t 164 t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n from a c h i e v i n g n o r m a l i z a t i o n , i t d i d cause d i s a r r a y i n C a r t e r ' s o v e r a l l p o l i c y towards the PRC and the USSR. THE BACKGROUND Throughout the 1950's and 60's, US p o l i c y towards the PRC remained v i r t u a l l y unchanged. 1 The U n i t e d S t a t e s saw the communist government on the ma i n l a n d as p a r t of a m o n o l i t h i c communist t h r e a t t h a t had t o be c o n t a i n e d and i s o l a t e d . C l o s e USSR-PRC c o o p e r a t i o n i n the 1950's as w e l l as the Korean and Vietnam wars r e i n f o r c e d t h i s b e l i e f . In 1 9 4 9 , a f t e r the communist v i c t o r y on the m a i n l a n d , the U n i t e d S t a t e s r e f u s e d t o r e c o g n i z e the PRC and c o n t i n u e d t o view the n a t i o n a l i s t regime on Taiwan as the l e g i t i m a t e government of C h i n a . 2 I t p r o t e c t e d and b u i l t up Taiwan as w e l l as o t h e r f r i e n d l y A s i a n n a t i o n s t o s t o p the spre a d of communism. A l s o , t o c o u n t e r C h i n e s e a m b i t i o n s , the U n i t e d S t a t e s e n t e r e d i n t o s e v e r a l mutual defense p a c t s w i t h key A s i a n s t a t e s and c r e a t e d the SEATO a l l i a n c e . I t was not uncommon f o r many American p o l i c y makers, d u r i n g t h i s e r a , t o c o n c e i v e of the PRC as the more a g g r e s s i v e of the two communist powers i n A s i a . Indeed, American d e f e n s e s t r a t e g y a t the time a l l o w e d f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f i g h t i n g a European war w i t h the S o v i e t s and an A s i a n war w i t h the C h i n e s e . 165 I t was not u n t i l the Ni x o n p r e s i d e n c y t h a t i t was r e a l i z e d t h a t most of the c o n d i t i o n s on which the American f e a r s were based had changed. The 1969 U s s u r i R i v e r b o r d e r c l a s h e s proved t h a t S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s were not merely c o o l but o u t r i g h t h o s t i l e . Now t h e r e appeared good s t r a t e g i c r e asons f o r both s i d e s t o c o n s i d e r a rapprochement. The Chinese l e a d e r s h i p came t o r e a l i z e t h a t the USSR had r e p l a c e d the US as the g r a v e s t t h r e a t t o t h e i r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . The breakdown of S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s i n the e a r l y 60's was f o l l o w e d by f r e q u e n t border c l a s h e s . Chinese a n x i e t y about S o v i e t a g g r e s s i o n grew when the S o v i e t s i n v a d e d C z e c h o s l o v a k i a i n 1968. They f e a r e d a S o v i e t p r e e m p t i v e s t r i k e on t h e i r n u c l e a r f a c i l i t i e s . A l s o , the S o v i e t s were making o v e r t u r e s t o o t h e r A s i a n n a t i o n s t o form economic and s e c u r i t y p a c t s d e s i g n e d t o c o n t a i n C h i n a . The U n i t e d S t a t e s , on the o t h e r hand, was e m b r o i l e d i n an A s i a n war from which i t seemed eager t o withdraw. In a d d i t i o n , the Nixon d o c t r i n e i n d i c a t e d t o the Chinese t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s was s e r i o u s about s c a l i n g down i t s i n v o l v e m e n t i n A s i a . The Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n saw the S i n o - S o v i e t s p l i t as an o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n c r e a s e i t s l e v e r a g e a g a i n s t the USSR by i m p r o v i n g i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC. Moreover, improved r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC might h e l p the US e x i t from the Vietnam war and e s t a b l i s h a degree of s t a b i l i t y i n A s i a a f t e r i t s w i t h d r a w a l . As a r e s u l t of the s e s h a r e d s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s , both p a r t i e s f o r the f i r s t t i m e showed some degree of f l e x i b i l i t y 1 6 6 on the Taiwan i s s u e . 3 D u r i n g the Warsaw t a l k s i n 1970, the U n i t e d S t a t e s s t a t e d t h a t the Taiwan i s s u e was an i n t e r n a l C h inese a f f a i r which s h o u l d be s o l v e d , though p e a c e f u l l y , by the C h i n e s e o n l y . In t u r n , the Chinese acknowledged t h a t S i n o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s c o u l d improve t o a c e r t a i n degree b e f o r e the Taiwan i s s u e was s o l v e d . In the Shanghai Communique, the C h i n e s e s t a t e d t h a t i t was p o s s i b l e t o share c e r t a i n s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s d e s p i t e the disagreement on Taiwan. The Americans p l e d g e d t o withdraw e v e n t u a l l y from Taiwan and t o r e c o g n i z e the PRC as the s o l e and l e g a l C h i n a . T h i s rapprochement brought about a c o n s t a n t s t r a t e g i c d i a l o g u e and i n c r e a s e d b i l a t e r a l t r a d e and s c i e n t i f i c exchanges. In 1973, l i a i s o n o f f i c e s were opened i n B e i j i n g and Washington, which i n e f f e c t f u n c t i o n e d as u n o f f i c i a l e mbassies. Y e t , the r e l a t i o n s h i p was s t i l l marred by c o n s i d e r a b l e t e n s i o n , and c o o l e d s h o r t l y a f t e r N ixon's 1972 v i s i t t o the PRC. The C h i n e s e became uneasy about the American p u r s u i t of d e t e n t e w i t h the USSR and i t s slowness i n d i s e n g a g i n g from Taiwan. Indeed, f u t u r e y e a r s would show t h a t the PRC became i n f l e x i b l e and u n c o o p e r a t i v e when i t p e r c e i v e d the U n i t e d S t a t e s as s e e k i n g d e t e n t e too e a g e r l y , and when the U n i t e d S t a t e s prodded f o r p r o g r e s s on n o r m a l i z a t i o n w i t h o u t b r e a k i n g o f f i c i a l l i n k s w i t h Taiwan. The Chinese were c r i t i c a l of the SALT I a c c o r d , the B a s i c P r i n c i p l e s agreement, and i n c r e a s e d S o v i e t p u r chases of Western t e c h n o l o g y . They c r i t i c i z e d the US f o r u s i n g i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC as a means t o improve US-USSR r e l a t i o n s . They 167 a c c u s e d the US of appeasement s i n c e they b e l i e v e d t h a t the USSR was i n s i n c e r e i n i t s p u r s u i t of d e t e n t e . In f a c t , they were p r o b a b l y a f r a i d t h a t a US-USSR d e t e n t e would e n a b l e the USSR t o r e d e p l o y i t s European f o r c e s i n A s i a . A f t e r N i x o n ' s r e s i g n a t i o n , whom the Chi n e s e had hoped would n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g h i s second term, r e l a t i o n s d e t e r i o r a t e d f u r t h e r . They p e r c e i v e d F o r d and K i s s i n g e r as p u t t i n g d e t e n t e f a r ahead of US-PRC n o r m a l i z a t i o n . The V l a d i v o s t o k a c c o r d , the H e l s i n k i t r e a t y and the r e s i g n a t i o n of the hawkish S e c r e t a r y of Defense S c h l e s i n g e r were seen as e v i d e n c e of t h i s a l l e g a t i o n . As a r e s u l t , the s t r a t e g i c d i a l o g u e almost c o l l a p s e d . D u r i n g h i s 1975 v i s i t t o B e i j i n g , F o r d and Deng X i a o p i n g d i s a g r e e d on t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l p o l i c i e s towards the USSR and t h e i r o v e r a l l s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s . Deng was p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n c erned w i t h the weak American response t o S o v i e t a c t i v i t i e s i n Angola and the M i d d l e E a s t . The d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n the s t r a t e g i c r e a l m of S i n o -American r e l a t i o n s was combined w i t h i n c r e a s e d t e n s i o n on the Taiwan i s s u e . The \" l o s s \" of Vietnam i n 1975 p r e v e n t e d F o r d from s p e e d i n g up the American disengagement from Taiwan. The Reagan c h a l l e n g e , i n the e l e c t i o n y e a r , f o r c e d F o r d t o be uncompromising on h i s commitment t o Taiwan. Moreover, d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , Congress a l l o w e d Taiwan t o open s e v e r a l a d d i t i o n a l c o n s u l a t e s i n the US and t o purchase a new s e r i e s of j e t f i g h t e r s . To make m a t t e r s worse, b o t h Mao Zedong and Zhou E n l a i d i e d i n 1976. These l e a d e r s had been the c o r n e r s t o n e s of the 168 C h i n e s e rapprochement p o l i c y . I t took u n t i l the s p r i n g of 1977 b e f o r e the moderates, under Deng X i a o p i n g , were a b l e t o s t a v e o f f the c h a l l e n g e of the r a d i c a l s , w h o opposed any S i n o - A m e r i c a n c o o p e r a t i o n . T h i s reminded American o f f i c i a l s t h a t C h i n e s e pragmatism and m oderation s h o u l d not be taken f o r g r a n t e d . CARTER'S BELIEFS AND OBJECTIVES TOWARDS CHINA C a r t e r e n t e r e d o f f i c e w i t h the b e l i e f t h a t s e v e r a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r American p o l i c y towards A s i a c o u l d now be g r a s p e d . The end of the Vietnam war and the c o n t i n u i n g S i n o -S o v i e t s p l i t p r o v i d e d the U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h the o p p o r t u n i t y t o f u r t h e r disengage from A s i a , w h i l e u p g r a d i n g i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC. He b e l i e v e d the Watergate s c a n d a l had p r e v e n t e d Nixon from c o m p l e t i n g the S i n o-American rapprochement and i n t e n d e d t o f i n i s h what Nixon had begun.\" D u r i n g the e l e c t i o n campaign, C a r t e r was p o l i t i c a l l y a s t u t e enough not t o a l i e n a t e the i n f l u e n t i a l Taiwan l o b b y . H i s o f f i c i a l C hina p o l i c y was based on an a f f i r m a t i o n of the Shanghai Communique and a p l e d g e t o n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s , as l o n g as i t d i d not endanger the s e c u r i t y and freedom of the p e o p l e of Taiwan. The C hina i s s u e d i d not r e c e i v e much a t t e n t i o n d u r i n g the campaign and n e i t h e r of the c a n d i d a t e s was p r e s s e d t o s p e l l out h i s s p e c i f i c t i m e t a b l e or c o n d i t i o n s f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n . 5 169 In an i n f o r m a l p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n s h o r t l y a f t e r the e l e c t i o n , C a r t e r and Vance agreed t h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s h o u l d , a t an e a r l y d a t e , i n d i c a t e i t s i n t e n t t o seek f u l l d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC. However, the two men a l s o a g reed t h a t the i s s u e was not a p r i o r i t y , s h o u l d be c a r e f u l l y t r e a t e d i n l i g h t of the s e n s i t i v i t y of the Taiwan i s s u e , and s h o u l d not a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t Sino-American r e l a t i o n s . 6 A p r e l i m i n a r y NSC m e e t i n g , on January 5 1977, r e v e a l e d t h a t the o t h e r a d v i s o r s agreed on the d e s i r a b i l i t y of n o r m a l i z a t i o n . 7 However, d u r i n g t h i s m e e t i n g , the a d v i s o r s i d e n t i f i e d s e v e r a l o t h e r i s s u e s as t a k i n g p r i o r i t y over n o r m a l i z a t i o n . D u r i n g i t s f i r s t months, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s e t out t o n e g o t i a t e a SALT I I t r e a t y , t r a n s f e r ownership of the Panama C a n a l , seek a s o l u t i o n f o r peace i n the M i d d l e E a s t and f o r m u l a t e an o v e r a l l human r i g h t s p o l i c y . 8 A f t e r the f i r s t d i s a p p o i n t i n g i n i t i a t i v e s on SALT and the M i d d l e E a s t , C a r t e r i n s t r u c t e d B r z e z i n s k i t o s e t i n motion a r e v i e w of S i n o-American n e g o t i a t i o n s under Nixon and F o r d , and the i n t e r a g e n c y p r o c e s s of p r e p a r i n g o p t i o n s f o r a P r e s i d e n t i a l Review Memorandum on C h i n a (PRM 2 4 ) . 9 U n t i l t h i s p o i n t , C a r t e r had no c l e a r n o t i o n what the American p o s i t i o n s h o u l d be on the v a r i o u s i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s . 1 0 170 THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS PRM 24 was completed i n June 1977. I t p r o v i d e d a p o l i c y background from which the a d v i s o r s c o u l d make recommendations t o the p r e s i d e n t . The p r i n c i p a l a u t h o r s of PRM 24 were Romberg, Roy, and Abramowitz. The PRM was w r i t t e n under DOS s u p e r v i s i o n w i t h S t a t e c h a i r i n g the PRC meetings on the s u b j e c t . They g a t h e r e d p o l i c y o p t i o n s from the v a r i o u s departments and o r g a n i z e d them i n t o t h r e e s u b j e c t a r e a s : Taiwan, b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s such as t r a d e , t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r s and m i l i t a r y exchanges, and S i n o -American s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s . 1 1 C o n c e r n i n g Taiwan, th e S t a t e Department recommended t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s a c c e p t the t h r e e c o n d i t i o n s f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n put f o r w a r d by the PRC i n 1973. The PRC demanded t h a t the US break a l l o f f i c i a l t i e s w i t h Taiwan, i m m e d i a t e l y a b r o g a t e i t s d e f ense t r e a t y w i t h Taiwan, and withdraw a l l i t s m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s and p e r s o n n e l . The US c o u l d a c c e p t t h e s e terms i f the PRC a l l o w e d i t t o c o n t i n u e t o have u n o f f i c i a l economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan and i f i t c o u l d t e r m i n a t e i t s defense t r e a t y w i t h Taiwan i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s w i t h i n t h a t t r e a t y , i . e . on a one y e a r ' s n o t i c e . F u r t h e r m o r e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s must be a b l e t o c o n t i n u e t o s e l l \" s e l e c t i v e d e f e n s i v e arms\" t o Taiwan a f t e r the t e r m i n a t i o n of the t r e a t y and the PRC must s t a t e i t s i n t e n t t o s o l v e the Taiwan i s s u e p e a c e f u l l y . 1 2 None of the o t h e r a g e n c i e s d i s a g r e e d 171 s u b s t a n t i v e l y w i t h t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s . 1 3 C o n c e r n i n g b i l a t e r a l t e c h n o l o g i c a l and m i l i t a r y i s s u e s , t h e Department of Defense recommended t h a t C a r t e r a l l o w the s a l e of some d u a l use t e c h n o l o g y and p e r m i t some degree of m i l i t a r y / s e c u r i t y c o o p e r a t i o n between the US and the PRC s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h or even p r i o r t o n o r m a l i z a t i o n . 1 4 The S t a t e Department d i s a g r e e d w i t h t h i s recommendation. I t argued t h a t the S i n o-American r e l a t i o n s h i p was too u n c e r t a i n t o w a r r a n t such a degree of c o o p e r a t i o n and t h a t i t would produce a s t r o n g b a c k l a s h i n S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s . I t a l s o b e l i e v e d t h a t S i n o - A m e r i c a n t r a d e s h o u l d not expand to o q u i c k l y . Moreover, the S t a t e Department b e l i e v e d t h a t n o r m a l i z a t i o n s h o u l d i n no way be c o n s t r u e d as an a n t i -S o v i e t move. I t argued t h a t a c l o s e s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and C h ina would cause th e S o v i e t s t o abandon t h e i r p o l i c y of d e t e n t e . As a r e s u l t , the USSR might s t i f f e n i t s p o s i t i o n i n the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s and i n t e n s i f y i t s c o n f l i c t w i t h the PRC. 1 5 The S t a t e Department d i d not t h i n k the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d or s h o u l d use i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h China t o p r e s s u r e the USSR. On June 27 1977, C a r t e r ' s p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r s met i n a P o l i c y Review Committee meeting t o d i s c u s s PRM 24 and t o p r e p a r e recommendations f o r the p r e s i d e n t . 1 6 The a d v i s o r s a g r e e d on the c o n d i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g Taiwan. However, the d i sagreement i n PRM 24 c o n c e r n i n g b i l a t e r a l s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s c o n t i n u e d between Vance and Brown. Brown was l e s s c o n c e r n e d about a S i n o - A m e r i c a n s t r a t e g i c d i a l o g u e than 172 c o n c r e t e m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n t o enhance US d e f e n s e . He f a v o u r e d such c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h or w i t h o u t n o r m a l i z a t i o n and proposed the s a l e of d u a l use t e c h n o l o g y and the exchange of m i l i t a r y a t t a c h e s . Vance argued s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t t h i s o p t i o n : I was persuaded t h a t any a s s i s t a n c e we or our a l l i e s c o u l d f e a s i b l y p r o v i d e would be l i m i t e d and would make l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e i n C h i n a ' s o v e r a l l m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . Because of the S o v i e t ' s e x c e s s i v e f e a r of C h i n a , however, any US s e c u r i t y c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h B e i j i n g would have s e r i o u s r e p e r c u s s i o n s on U S - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s . 1 7 W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i s u p p o r t e d Brown's argument on b i l a t e r a l s e c u r i t y measures ( a l s o c a l l e d c o l l a t e r a l measures d u r i n g t h i s d e b a t e ) , he recommended t h a t the US engage the PRC i n an o v e r a l l s t r a t e g i c d i a l o g u e t o make American and Chinese i n t e r e s t s more c o m p a t i b l e . In e s s e n c e , B r z e z i n s k i proposed t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s improve i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC, and a t the same time p r e s s u r e the S o v i e t s t o be more f o r t h c o m i n g on S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n i s s u e s . W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i i n t e n d e d t o use b e t t e r S i no-American r e l a t i o n s as a means t o i n f l u e n c e S o v i e t p o l i c y , he a l s o foresaw an e n d u r i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two s t a t e s . In t h i s sense, B r z e z i n s k i ' s p l a n was l e s s a t a c t i c a l p l o y ( p l a y i n g the \"China Card\") than K i s s i n g e r ' s endeavors i n the l a t e 1960's. B r z e z i n s k i b e l i e v e d t h a t American p o l i c y would be f a c i l i t a t e d by c l o s e r s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC and f o r t h a t reason f a v o u r e d r a p i d p r o g r e s s towards n o r m a l i z a t i o n : \"Perhaps i f the S o v i e t s worry a l i t t l e more 173 about our p o l i c y towards C h i n a , we w i l l have l e s s cause t o worry about our r e l a t i o n s w i t h the S o v i e t s . \" 1 8 Vance d i s a g r e e d w i t h t h i s r e a s o n i n g . He argued t h a t the US s h o u l d c o n f i n e i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC t o a narrow d i p l o m a t i c sphere. Trade and o t h e r b i l a t e r a l exchanges s h o u l d expand o n l y g r a d u a l l y over t i m e . 1 9 D u r i n g the meeting i t a l s o became e v i d e n t t h a t Vance was more c a u t i o u s about n o r m a l i z a t i o n than h i s own C h i n a e x p e r t s i n the S t a t e Department. Vance e x p e c t e d t h a t the Chinese would want t o p r o c e e d s l o w l y w i t h n o r m a l i z a t i o n . The U n i t e d S t a t e s , i n t u r n , s h o u l d a l s o proceed s l o w l y , making sure t h a t the s t r a t e g i c and r e g i o n a l b a l a n c e of power would not be u p s e t . 2 0 On J u l y 30, C a r t e r met w i t h Vance, Brown, B r z e z i n s k i , R i c h a r d Holbrooke ( A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y P a c i f i c and E a s t A s i a n A f f a i r s ) and M i c h e l Oksenberg (NSC s t a f f a i d e ) t o d i s c u s s the proposed o p t i o n s . 2 1 Persuaded by Vance's worry about S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s and p a r t i c u l a r l y SALT I I , C a r t e r r e j e c t e d Brown's recommendation f o r i n c r e a s e d c o l l a t e r a l measures and B r z e z i n s k i ' s o p t i o n t o seek a s t r a t e g i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h the PRC a g a i n s t the USSR. But the p r e s i d e n t a l s o d e c i d e d t o move towards n o r m a l i z a t i o n f a r more r a p i d l y than Vance i n t e n d e d . C a r t e r approved the c o n d i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g Taiwan, as o u t l i n e d i n PRM 24, and i n s t r u c t e d Vance t o use them as the framework f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s . 2 2 Having r e j e c t e d Brown and B r z e z i n s k i ' s s u g g e s t i o n s f o r c l o s e r s t r a t e g i c S i n o-American r e l a t i o n s , C a r t e r b e l i e v e d he 174 merely needed t o f a c e the tough p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n t o change the s t a t u s of Taiwan. T h i s , C a r t e r was p r e p a r e d t o do: The p r e s i d e n t t o l d Vance t o go d i r e c t l y t o the i s s u e s (Taiwan) and t o move as r a p i d l y as i s p o s s i b l e . He s a i d h i s e n t i r e p o l i t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e has been t h a t i t does not pay t o p r o l o n g or postpone d i f f i c u l t i s s u e s . 2 3 B r z e z i n s k i , however, r a i s e d the c o n c e r n t h a t the C h i n e s e may be l e s s than f o r t h c o m i n g i f the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n f i n e s i t s approach t o the Taiwan i s s u e . Moreover, a narrow S i n o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s h i p would a l l o w the Taiwan i s s u e t o p o i s o n the atmosphere. In h i s memoirs, B r z e z i n s k i n o t e s t h a t he was w o r r i e d t h a t Vance's s c h e d u l e d v i s i t t o C h i n a , i n August, would f a i l as a r e s u l t of C a r t e r ' s i n c o m p l e t e approach t o the PRC. 2 1 1 However, s i n c e C a r t e r had a l r e a d y r e j e c t e d Brown and B r z e z i n s k i ' s a l t e r n a t i v e or supplementary approaches, and s i n c e he a t l e a s t a g r e e d t h a t n o r m a l i z a t i o n s h o u l d be sought p r o m p t l y , B r z e z i n s k i d i d not o b j e c t s t r o n g l y t o C a r t e r ' s d e c i s i o n or c l e a r l y warn him of the p o s s i b i l i t y of a s e t b a c k i n S i n o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s . C a r t e r i n s t r u c t e d h i s a d v i s o r s t o p r e p a r e a d r a f t communique i n case the C h i n e s e responded f a v o u r a b l y t o Vance's p r o p o s a l s . On August 17, j u s t f i v e days b e f o r e Vance's t r i p t o the PRC, Vance, B r z e z i n s k i and C a r t e r d i s c u s s e d the d r a f t communique. 2 5 However, d u r i n g t h i s m e e t i n g , C a r t e r was f a r l e s s e n t h u s i a s t i c about p u r s u i n g n o r m a l i z a t i o n r a p i d l y . B r z e z i n s k i r e p o r t s t h a t s i n c e the J u l y 30 m e e t i n g , Mondale and J o r d a n had warned C a r t e r t h a t 1 7 5 now was not the time t o d e a l w i t h the c o n t r o v e r s i a l Taiwan i s s u e . 2 6 I t was now c l e a r t h a t the Panama Ca n a l T r e a t i e s would f a c e s e r i o u s o p p o s i t i o n i n Congress and t h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o u l d not a f f o r d t o a l i e n a t e f u r t h e r the c o n s e r v a t i v e s e n a t o r s i n Congress. W h i l e C a r t e r s t i l l wanted Vance t o make p r o g r e s s towards n o r m a l i z a t i o n , he now i n s t r u c t e d him t o p r o c e e d more c a u t i o u s l y and t o prod the C h i n e s e f o r f u r t h e r c o n c e s s i o n s on T a i w a n . 2 7 P u b l i c l y , the t r i p was c a l l e d merely \" e x p l o r a t o r y . \" As a r e s u l t , B r z e z i n s k i n o t e d , Vance went t o B e i j i n g w i t h a somewhat \"a m b i v a l e n t US p o s i t i o n . \" 2 8 VANCE'S TRIP TO CHINA C a r t e r ' s l a s t minute h e s i t a t i o n s about p u r s u i n g n o r m a l i z a t i o n s u i t e d Vance f i n e . He had been u n e n t h u s i a s t i c about i t s i n c e he f e a r e d i t would harm the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s most v a l u e d i n i t i a t i v e : S A L T . 2 9 C a r t e r ' s i n s t r u c t i o n t o probe the C hinese f o r f u r t h e r c o n c e s s i o n s on Taiwan was e x p l o i t e d by Vance t o the f u l l e s t : \" f o r p o l i t i c a l r e a s o n s , I i n t e n d e d t o r e p r e s e n t a maximum p o s i t i o n t o the C hinese on the Taiwan i s s u e . \" 3 0 A l t h o u g h PRM 24 had argued t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d a c c e p t u n o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan upon r e c o g n i t i o n of the PRC, Vance proposed t o the C hinese t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s keep an o f f i c i a l L i a s o n o f f i c e on T a i w a n . 3 1 The C h i n e s e c o n s i d e r e d t h i s a r e t r e a t from the 176 N i x o n and F o r d p o s i t i o n and, as a r e s u l t , d i d not want t o d i s c u s s the Taiwan i s s u e s e r i o u s l y . Indeed, Vance had e x p e c t e d t h i s : \"I d i d not expect the C h i n e s e t o a c c e p t our p r o p o s a l , but I f e l t i t wise t o make, even though we might e v e n t u a l l y have t o abandon i t . \" 3 2 Vance appeared a l s o u n w i l l i n g t o engage the C h i n e s e i n a m e a n i n g f u l s t r a t e g i c d i a l o g u e , something t o which they had been accustomed d u r i n g K i s s i n g e r ' s t i m e . Vance based h i s s t r a t e g i c d i s c u s s i o n s on the o p t i m i s t i c elements of P r e s i d e n t i a l Review Memorandum (PRM) 1 0 . 3 3 T h i s PRM a n a l y z e d the o v e r a l l b a l a n c e between American and S o v i e t m i l i t a r y , economic and p o l i t i c a l r e s o u r c e s . The S t a t e Department's v e r s i o n c o n c l u d e d t h a t w h i l e S o v i e t and American m i l i t a r y f o r c e s were r o u g h l y e q u a l , the l o n g term economic and p o l i t i c a l t r e n d was i n f a v o r of the U n i t e d S t a t e s . 3 \" F u r t h e r m o r e , Vance t o l d the Chinese t h a t the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was s e r i o u s about d e t e n t e and the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s . The Chinese were taken q u i t e aback by t h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n . 3 5 Deng's a s c e n t t o the l e a d e r s h i p was based p a r t l y on the moderates' b e l i e f t h a t the S o v i e t Union was q u i c k l y becoming the s t r o n g e s t superpower and t h a t the PRC s h o u l d pursue a c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the US. Vance's p r e s e n t a t i o n c h a l l e n g e d t h i s b e l i e f . Indeed, i f the b a l a n c e of power was i n f a v o r of the US, why s h o u l d the PRC be c o n c erned about S o v i e t e x p a n s i o n i s m and why s h o u l d i t even want c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s ? I n a d v e r t e n t l y , Vance s t r e n g t h e n e d C h i n a ' s p e r c e p t i o n 1 7 7 t h a t C a r t e r d i d not r e c o g n i z e the S o v i e t t h r e a t and v a l u e d d e t e n t e f a r above Sino-American n o r m a l i z a t i o n . 3 6 Chinese unease about Vance's approach was e v i d e n t i n the l i t t l e time the c r u c i a l C h i n e s e l e a d e r s ( V i c e Chairman Deng and P r e m i e r Hua Guofeng) spent w i t h him. Indeed, Vance d i d not even p r e s e n t a l l the American c o n d i t i o n s on Taiwan and never mentioned the American d r a f t communique. 3 7 As a r e s u l t , the C h inese f e l t t h a t the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n wa's not y e t p r e p a r e d t o s o l v e the Taiwan i s s u e . Upon Vance's r e t u r n , b o th s i d e s acknowledged t h a t l i t t l e p r o g r e s s had been made. American o f f i c i a l s s t a t e d p r i v a t e l y t h a t , b e s i d e s the l i t t l e p r o g r e s s on Taiwan, Vance's t r i p had f a i l e d t o produce any S i n o - A m e r i c a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g on s t r a t e g i c views and i n t e r e s t s . 3 8 D u r i n g an i n t e r v i e w i n 1982, C a r t e r a d m i t t e d \" t h a t the s e c r e t a r y of S t a t e had r e t u r n e d w i t h o u t a c c o m p l i s h i n g h i s m i s s i o n . \" 3 9 In an i n t e r v i e w i n e a r l y September, Deng went as f a r as t o say t h a t Vance's v i s i t had a c t u a l l y been a s e t b a c k t o S i n o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s . 4 0 EVALUATING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND OUTCOME An a n a l y s i s of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s shows t h a t the NSC i n t e r a g e n c y a p p a r a t u s p r o v i d e d the p r e s i d e n t w i t h s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n on which t o base h i s d e c i s i o n . The n e g o t i a t i n g r e c o r d of N i x o n and F o r d was r e v i e w e d and a comprehensive PRM was p r e p a r e d on the s u b j e c t . As a r e s u l t 178 of t h i s p r o c e s s , two d i f f e r e n t approaches were suggested on how t o improve r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC. In a d d i t i o n t o Vance, the C hina s p e c i a l i s t s i n the S t a t e Department recommended t h a t C a r t e r c o n f i n e h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the C h i n e s e t o a narrow b i l a t e r a l .sphere, a v o i d i n g the p u r s u i t of any shared i n t e r e s t s a g a i n s t the USSR. Holbrooke and o t h e r s t a t e o f f i c i a l s a l s o b e l i e v e d t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d p r o ceed r a p i d l y w i t h n o r m a l i z a t i o n s i n c e t h e r e was no i n t e r n a l disagreement on the c o n d i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g Taiwan. Vance, b e i n g a n x i o u s about SALT, wanted t o move more s l o w l y . A q u i t e d i s t i n c t approach was o f f e r e d by Brown. The Defense Department was l e s s concerned about n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s than f i n d i n g ways t o enhance the American defense p o s t u r e , and thus a d v o c a t e d b i l a t e r a l m i l i t a r y and t e c h n o l o g i c a l measures as a way of i m p r o v i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p . A l t h o u g h the S t a t e Department was aware of the o p t i o n of u s i n g improved S i n o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s t o i n f l u e n c e the USSR, i t o f f e r e d o n l y an a n a l y s i s a g a i n s t d o i n g so. I t was B r z e z i n s k i who emphasized i t s advantages t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s . In so d o i n g , he widened the debate and improved the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . A l t h o u g h he c o n t r i b u t e d h i s a n a l y s i s t o the d e b a t e , B r z e z i n s k i d i d not attempt t o s t i f l e t he p o s i t i o n s of t h e o t h e r a d v i s o r s or t o reduce t h e i r a c c e s s t o C a r t e r and the d e c i s i o n forum. C a r t e r d e c i d e d on h i s C h ina p o l i c y a f t e r r e c e i v i n g a l l the o p t i o n s and t h e i r e x p e c t e d consequences from h i s a d v i s o r s . 179 However, the p r o c e s s a l s o r e v e a l s two s h o r t c o m i n g s on the p a r t of the c u s t o d i a n . C a r t e r p a r t l y r e v e r s e d and g r e a t l y c o n f u s e d h i s d e c i s i o n when h i s domestic a d v i s o r s warned him of the impending p o l i t i c a l b a t t l e on the Panama C a n a l t r e a t i e s . Had the domesti c a d v i s o r s been i n v o l v e d i n the d ecison-making p r o c e s s e a r l i e r , t h i s r e v e r s a l might have been p r e v e n t e d . I t i s the c u s t o d i a n ' s r o l e t o ensure t h a t a l l r e l e v a n t a d v i s o r s be p a r t of the p r o c e s s . B r z e z i n s k i f a i l e d t o f u l f i l t h i s a s p e c t of h i s r o l e . Second, as a r e s u l t of C a r t e r ' s r e v e r s a l , B r z e z i n s k i r e a l i z e d t h a t Vance's i n s t r u c t i o n s were now a m b i v a l e n t and might w e l l produce a n e g a t i v e response from the C h i n e s e . I f so, C a r t e r ' s C h ina p o l i c y would s u f f e r a s e r i o u s s e t b a c k s i m i l a r t o the f a i l e d Vance t r i p t o Moscow i n March of 1977. I t i s p a r t of the r o l e t a s k of the c u s t o d i a n t o a l e r t the p r e s i d e n t when he b e l i e f s \" e x i s t i n g p o l i c y may be f a i l i n g . \" \" 1 B r z e z i n s k i noted h i s worry about a p o s s i b l e d i s a p p o i n t m e n t i n B e i j i n g i f Vance proceeded w i t h an i n c o m p l e t e commitment on the p a r t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , and r e i t e r a t e d t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d c o n s i d e r s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e approaches s h o r t of n o r m a l i z a t i o n . \" 2 However, C a r t e r had a l r e a d y p u b l i c l y s t a t e d t h a t Vance would t r a v e l t o C h i n a and B r z e z i n s k i d i d not o b j e c t v e r y s t r o n g l y . Perhaps he f e a r e d t h a t h i s warnings would cause C a r t e r t o abandon the i n i t i a t i v e a l t o g e t h e r . Vance's t r i p f a i l e d f o r two r e a s o n s . As a r e s u l t of C a r t e r ' s w a v e r i n g , Vance o f f e r e d a m a x i m a l i s t s t a n d on Taiwan. Oksenberg noted t h a t as a r e s u l t of C a r t e r ' s 180 h e s i t a t i o n s , Vance \" b u i l t some room f o r maneuver i n t o h i s e a r l i e r l e a n e r p r e s e n t a t i o n . \" \" 3 The Chinese were e s p e c i a l l y d i s a p p o i n t e d about Vance's p r o p o s a l t o c o n t i n u e a l i a i s o n o f f i c e on Taiwan. Oksenberg, who t r a v e l l e d i n Vance's p a r t y , n o t e d t h a t : \"The Chi n e s e f a s t e n e d upon t h i s p o r t i o n of Vance's p r e s e n t a t i o n , c l a i m i n g i t was a r e t r o g r e s s i o n from F o r d ' s e a r l i e r s t a t e m e n t s on the i s s u e . \" \" \" However, the Taiwan i s s u e was not the o n l y s t u m b l i n g b l o c k . As Nixon and K i s s i n g e r had shown many tim e s i n the p a s t , the Chinese c o u l d be f l e x i b l e on Taiwan i f they sensed a l a r g e r purpose i n Sin o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s . \" 5 Vance not o n l y f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e a s t r a t e g i c r a t i o n a l e f o r S i n o -American r e l a t i o n s but a c t u a l l y argued t h a t such a r e l a t i o n s h i p was n e i t h e r n e c e s s a r y nor wanted by the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Y e t , t h e r e was ample e v i d e n c e of Chi n e s e s i g n a l s f o r a c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p . In 1977, S e v e r a l i n f l u e n t i a l American v i s i t o r s t o the PRC were i n f o r m e d of t h i s C h i n e s e d e s i r e . \" 6 A l s o , the PRC made s e v e r a l c o n c i l i a t o r y remarks about Taiwan d u r i n g t h i s t i m e . \" 7 Indeed, t h e head of the Chinese L i a i s o n o f f i c e i n Washington had t o l d C a r t e r , i n the S p r i n g of 1977, t h a t the PRC was ready t o move on n o r m a l i z a t i o n a f t e r C a r t e r i n f o r m e d him t h a t he i n t e n d e d t o send Vance i n the f a l l of 1977 t o the PRC \" t o f i n d a common f o r m u l a \" f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n . \" 8 The f l a w e d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s d i d c o n t r i b u t e t o the f a i l u r e . In l i g h t of C a r t e r ' s p o l i t i c a l h e s i t a t i o n s , Vance's t r i p s h o u l d have been c a n c e l l e d or h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s changed c o m p l e t e l y . What p r e v e n t e d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n from 181 n e g o t i a t i n g i n s e c r e t w i t h the C h i n e s e ? Indeed, i t d i d so i n 1978. However, C a r t e r a l s o l e a r n e d t h a t the C h i n e s e c o u l d not be prodded w i t h o u t a s t r a t e g i c d i a l o g u e . The next s e c t i o n w i l l show t h a t C a r t e r r e c o n s i d e r e d B r z e z i n s k i ' s o p t i o n . When Vance r e t u r n e d , C a r t e r put the i s s u e on the b a c k b u r n e r . None of h i s a d v i s o r s spent much time on i t u n t i l the Panama Ca n a l T r e a t i e s were r a t i f i e d i n the s p r i n g of 1 9 7 8 . 4 9 THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS CONTINUED S h o r t l y a f t e r Vance's r e t u r n from C h i n a , the C h i n e s e i n d i c a t e d p r i v a t e l y t h a t they wished t o c o n t i n u e the t a l k s . Vance, however, recommended t o C a r t e r t h a t \"we s h o u l d s t i c k t o our c o u r s e , and t h a t we s h o u l d not i m p l y t h a t we would move any f a s t e r on n o r m a l i z a t i o n than we a c t u a l l y c o u l d . \" 5 0 In the f a l l of 1977, aware of h i s h a r s h e r a t t i t u d e towards the USSR and h i s g r e a t e r commitment t o S i no-American r e l a t i o n s , the C h i n e s e i n v i t e d B r z e z i n s k i t o v i s i t the PRC. 5 1 B r z e z i n s k i was v e r y eager t o a c c e p t the i n v i t a t i o n : My own t a l k s w i t h the C h i n e s e c o n v i n c e d me t h a t I was the top o f f i c i a l i n the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n whom they had genuine c o n f i d e n c e and whose s t r a t e g i c p e r s p e c t i v e s t o some e x t e n t they s h a r e d . A c c o r d i n g l y , I t r u l y b e l i e v e d t h a t a t r i p by me would be h e l p f u l i n g i v i n g a new impulse t o the s t a g n a t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p , and t h a t t h i s i n t u r n c o u l d pave the way f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n . 5 2 182 Vance o b j e c t e d t o B r z e z i n s k i ' s t r a v e l p l a n s . He f e a r e d t h a t B r z e z i n s k i would push n o r m a l i z a t i o n t o o q u i c k l y , t r a n s f o r m i t i n t o an a n t i - S o v i e t move, and t h u s endanger the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s . Moreover, the t r i p would b r i n g i n t o q u e s t i o n the r o l e of the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e as the o f f i c i a l spokesman f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 5 3 From l a t e 1977 t o e a r l y 1978, b oth a d v i s o r s urged C a r t e r t o a c c e p t t h e i r p o s i t i o n . 5 4 The debate d i d not t a k e p l a c e i n an open forum w i t h a l l the a d v i s o r s p r e s e n t , but i n the form of p r i v a t e p e t i t i o n s t o C a r t e r . B r z e z i n s k i even asked Brown and Mondale t o l o b b y on h i s b e h a l f . Vance suggested t h a t Mondale go i n s t e a d . C a r t e r r e j e c t e d t h i s s u g g e s t i o n , f e a r i n g t h a t i t might r a i s e e x p e c t a t i o n s about a S i no-American b r e a k t h r o u g h . In March 1978, w i t h the Panama Canal T r e a t i e s r a t i f i e d , C a r t e r f i n a l l y d e c i d e d on the m a t t e r . 5 5 In l i g h t of a g g r e s s i v e S o v i e t b e h a v i o u r i n A f r i c a and s e v e r a l s e t b a c k s i n the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s , C a r t e r was w i l l i n g t o improve Sino-American r e l a t i o n s and gave p e r m i s s i o n f o r B r z e z i n s k i ' s t r i p . Upon some p r i v a t e p r o d d i n g by B r z e z i n s k i , C a r t e r d e c i d e d t o ask Vance t o c o n c e n t r a t e on SALT, w h i l e B r z e z i n s k i would f o c u s on C h i n a . 5 6 D u r i n g t h a t same month, C a r t e r ' s a d v i s o r s met s e v e r a l t i m e s t o d i s c u s s American p o l i c y towards C h i n a . 5 7 Brown and B r z e z i n s k i r e i t e r a t e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n t h a t the US s h o u l d show i t s g o o d w i l l by a l l o w i n g some d u a l use t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r s t o the PRC and by l i f t i n g i t s o b j e c t i o n t o arm s a l e s by o t h e r n a t i o n s . Vance s t i l l m a i n t a i n e d t h a t such measures were i n a p p r o p r i a t e . C o n c e r n i n g Taiwan, they agreed t h a t 183 B r z e z i n s k i would s p e l l out t h e American p o s i t i o n f o r m u l a t e d i n PRM 24. W h i l e the a d v i s o r s d i s c u s s e d some l i m i t e d c o l l a t e r a l measures and the c o n d i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g Taiwan, no mention was made of t y i n g S i n o - A m e r i c a n s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s c l o s e r t o g e t h e r . On May 16, C a r t e r met w i t h h i s a d v i s o r s t o re v i e w h i s p o l i c y on China and t o d i s c u s s B r z e z i n s k i ' s upcoming t r i p t o the PRC. 5 8 A memorandum from the S t a t e Department was d i s c u s s e d which argued t h a t t h e r e now was a \"window of o p p o r t u n i t y \" t o seek n o r m a l i z a t i o n . I t would occur between the f a l l c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s and the SALT r a t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s . A l l agreed on t h i s t i m i n g . C a r t e r r e j e c t e d Vance's a d v i c e a g a i n s t c o l l a t e r a l measures and i n s t r u c t e d B r z e z i n s k i t o t e l l the Chinese t h a t some t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r s would go ahead and t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s would be \" n e u t r a l \" about t h i r d p a r t y m i l i t a r y s a l e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , i f the Chi n e s e were p r e p a r e d t o move ahead on Taiwan, B r z e z i n s k i was i n s t r u c t e d t o t e l l them t h a t the American r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n B e i j i n g would s t a r t the n e g o t i a t i o n s s h o r t l y a f t e r B r z e z i n s k i ' s t r i p . C a r t e r e x p r e s s e d the hope of a c h i e v i n g n o r m a l i z a t i o n by the end of the y e a r . W h i l e the i s s u e s of Taiwan and the c o l l a t e r a l measures were d i s c u s s e d i n an open forum and d e c i d e d on i n the presence of a l l the r e l e v a n t a d v i s o r s , i t appears t h a t B r z e z i n s k i and C a r t e r d i s c u s s e d the s t r a t e g i c a s p e c t of Sino-American r e l a t i o n s p r i v a t e l y . 5 9 D u r i n g t h e s e d i s c u s s i o n s , B r z e z i n s k i argued t h a t the USSR had v i o l a t e d the s p i r i t of d e t e n t e i n s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s . More so than i n 184 1977, the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d now a p p l y p r e s s u r e on the S o v i e t s by p l a y i n g the China c a r d . 6 0 C a r t e r agreed t h a t B r z e z i n s k i s h o u l d e x p l o r e common ground between the two n a t i o n s i n t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o the USSR. B r z e z i n s k i p r e p a r e d a s e c r e t p r e s i d e n t i a l i n s t r u c t i o n f o r h i s t r i p w hich o u t l i n e d the c o n t e n t s of h i s m i s s i o n . 6 1 The i n s t r u c t i o n memorandum f o c u s e d on the s t r a t e g i c a s p e c t of Sino-American r e l a t i o n s and emphasized the convergence of Sino-American i n t e r e s t s . One passage s t a t e d : The U n i t e d S t a t e s and C h i n a share c e r t a i n common i n t e r e s t s and we have p a r a l l e l , l o n g - t e r m s t r a t e g i c c o n c e r n s . The most i m p o r t a n t of t h e s e i s our common o p p o s i t i o n t o g l o b a l or r e g i o n a l hegemony by any s i n g l e power. T h i s i s why your v i s i t i s not t a c t i c a l ; i t i s an e x p r e s s i o n of our s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t i n a c o o p e r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h C h i n a ... 6 2 The memorandum i n s t r u c t e d B r z e z i n s k i t o emphasize American d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o respond t o \" S o v i e t a g g r e s s i o n \" and a l l o w e d him t o e x p l o r e avenues where the PRC and the US might c o o p e r a t e i n t h a t p u r s u i t . C a r t e r approved the memorandum and s t a t e d t o B r z e z i n s k i t h a t : ...he would l i k e t o move r a p i d l y , and I s h o u l d t e l l the Chinese so. He says he doesn't want t o p l a y games beh i n d Cy's back, but he would p r e f e r t o t e l l t h i s t o me d i r e c t l y . And i f I f i n d the o p p o r t u n i t y t o move, I s h o u l d move. 6 3 In e f f e c t , B r z e z i n s k i ' s t r i p had become f a r more s u b s t a n t i a l than i n i t i a l l y i n t e n d e d . I t appears t h a t Vance 1 8 5 and o t h e r s were not aware t h a t i t s main purpose was no l o n g e r the Taiwan i s s u e . 6 \" Vance was not kept i n f o r m e d a d e q u a t e l y t h a t C a r t e r and B r z e z i n s k i were s e c r e t l y l a y i n g the groundwork f o r a S i n o - A m e r i c a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a g a i n s t the USSR. BRZEZINSKI'S TRIP, NORMALIZATION AND A POLICY IN DISARRAY B r z e z i n s k i based h i s t a l k s on the \"common s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s \" of the two n a t i o n s . 6 5 In h i s opening and c l o s i n g t o a s t s , he emphasized the shared Sino-American o p p o s i t i o n t o \"hegemony.\" Hegemony, as w e l l known by B r z e z i n s k i , i s the Chinese code word f o r S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 6 6 A passage i n h i s opening t o a s t s t a t e d : \"We r e c o g n i z e and share C h i n a ' s r e s o l v e t o r e s i s t the e f f o r t s of any n a t i o n which seeks t o e s t a b l i s h g l o b a l or r e g i o n a l hegemony.\" 6 7 B r z e z i n s k i ' s v i s i t was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an e f f o r t t o make Si n o - A m e r i c a n s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s p a r a l l e l . He b r i e f e d the C h i n e s e e x t e n s i v e l y on SALT, C a r t e r ' s o v e r a l l s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y and American p o l i c y i n A f r i c a and the M i d d l e E a s t . 6 8 Deng and B r z e z i n s k i ' s s t r a t e g i c d i s c u s s i o n s resembled the c l o s e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t had c h a r a c t e r i z e d K i s s i n g e r and Zhou E n l a i ' s m eetings. However, Deng and B r z e z i n s k i were w i l l i n g t o p u l l the r e l a t i o n s h i p much c l o s e r . The C h i n e s e had r e c e n t l y r e j e c t e d S o v i e t o v e r t u r e s f o r a new d i a l o g u e . Moreover, they f e a r e d the d e v e l o p i n g s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p 186 between the USSR and V i e t n a m . 6 9 Deng was d e l i g h t e d t o see a s t r o n g e r American s t a n d a g a i n s t the USSR. The two d i s c u s s e d ways i n which they c o u l d c o u n t e r S o v i e t e x p a n s i o n i s m i n South A s i a and A f r i c a . B r z e z i n s k i argued: \"We have been a l l i e s b e f o r e , we s h o u l d c o o p e r a t e a g a i n i n the f a c e of a common t h r e a t . . . the emergence of the USSR as a g l o b a l p o w e r . \" 7 0 F u r t h e r m o r e , B r z e z i n s k i announced t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s would a l l o w the t r a n s f e r of some t y p e s of t e c h n o l o g y and would no l o n g e r o b j e c t t o European arms s a l e s t o the PRC. C o n c e r n i n g Taiwan, B r z e z i n s k i s t a t e d t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s a c c e p t e d the t h r e e c o n d i t i o n s l a i d out by the Chi n e s e and t h a t i t was now p r e p a r e d f i n a l l y t o b r i n g the i s s u e t o a c o n c l u s i o n . 7 1 Deng i m m e d i a t e l y a c c e p t e d B r z e z i n s k i ' s o f f e r t o s t a r t o f f i c i a l n e g o t i a t i o n s t h r o u g h the American r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n B e i j i n g . Deng appeared q u i t e c o n c i l i a t o r y on Taiwan. He i n d i c a t e d t h a t the PRC c o n s i d e r e d Taiwan \"a minor problem t h a t w i l l be s o l v e d by h i s t o r y . \" 7 2 Deng was a l s o p r e p a r e d t o s t o p the c o n s t a n t f l o w of Chi n e s e p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m of American f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 7 3 The American and Chi n e s e p r e s s agreed t h a t the v i s i t had been h i g h l y s u c c e s s f u l . 7 \" C a r t e r noted t h a t the Chi n e s e had e n j o y e d \"the s t r a t e g i c and p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h Z b i g \" and t h a t B r z e z i n s k i had l a i d the groundwork f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n : U n t i l t h i s t i m e , the c o n t a c t s between Washington and B e i j i n g had f o l l o w e d the p a t t e r n of the p r e v i o u s s i x y e a r s . Now, however, we were ready t o b e g i n our s u b s t a n t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s towards a f i n a l 187 a g r e e m e n t . 7 5 A l t h o u g h B r z e z i n s k i ' s t r i p paved the way f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n , Vance was alarmed a t the degree t o which the t r i p had been c a s t i n t o an a n t i - S o v i e t mold. B r z e z i n s k i had not t a k e n any r e p o r t e r s a l o n g but h i s r e p e a t e d use of the word \"hegemony\" became w e l l known. Vance r e g i s t e r e d h i s c o n c e r n s w i t h C a r t e r . However, i t appears t h a t C a r t e r was u n w i l l i n g t o open the debate a g a i n . A l t h o u g h C a r t e r t o l d Vance t h a t h i s approach t o the USSR and the PRC remained \"evenhanded,\" the c o n t r a d i c t o r y a c t i v i t i e s of Vance and B r z e z i n s k i were b e g i n n i n g t o cause d i s a r r a y i n C a r t e r ' s o v e r a l l p o l i c y . 7 6 B r z e z i n s k i ' s t r i p t o the PRC was g e n e r a l l y seen as an example of p l a y i n g t h e C h i n a c a r d . Vance, however, r e a s s u r e d the S o v i e t s t h a t i t was n o t . To show t h i s , Vance had s c h e d u l e d a meeting between C a r t e r and Gromyko d u r i n g B r z e z i n s k i ' s v i s i t t o the PRC. J u s t b e f o r e h i s d e p a r t u r e , B r z e z i n s k i l o b b i e d C a r t e r p r i v a t e l y t o postpone the m e e t i n g . 7 7 F u r t h e r m o r e , the S t a t e Department, d u r i n g t h i s t i m e , made s i g n i f i c a n t p r o g r e s s i n n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h Vietnam. A g a i n B r z e z i n s k i l o b b i e d C a r t e r t o h a l t t h i s p r o c e s s s i n c e i t would d i s p l e a s e the C h i n e s e . 7 8 S h o r t l y a f t e r B r z e z i n s k i ' s r e t u r n , C a r t e r d e c i d e d t o conduct the n e g o t i a t i o n s i n s e c r e t . 7 9 To a s s u r e such s e c r e c y , C a r t e r s e t up a White House team composed of Vance, B r z e z i n s k i , Oksenberg and H olbrooke t o m o n i t o r and guide the US r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n h i s t a l k s . In a d d i t i o n t o t h i s c h a n n e l , C a r t e r a l l o w e d B r z e z i n s k i t o c o n t i n u e the s t r a t e g i c d i a l o g u e 1 8 8 w i t h the C h i n e s e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Washington. I t appears t h a t Vance was not aware of the e x t e n t of t h e s e p r i v a t e c o n t a c t s by B r z e z i n s k i . 8 0 C a r t e r h i m s e l f r e v i e w e d a l l the i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t were f o r m u l a t e d by h i s White House t e a m . 8 1 For f e a r of l e a k s , a s w e l l as r a i s i n g h i g h e x p e c t a t i o n s , C a r t e r r e j e c t e d Vance and H o l b r o o k e ' s r e q u e s t t o b r i e f Congress on the n e g o t i a t i o n s . 8 2 On December 4, 1978, the US r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r e p o r t e d t h a t a compromise on Taiwan was i m m i n e n t . 8 3 The U n i t e d S t a t e s was p r e p a r e d t o break o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan, t e r m i n a t e the d e f ense t r e a t y and withdraw a l l i t s m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s and p e r s o n n e l . In r e t u r n , t h e C h i n e s e agreed t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d m a i n t a i n u n o f f i c i a l economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan. F u r t h e r m o r e , they agreed t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d t e r m i n a t e i t s d e f e n s e t r e a t y on a one y e a r ' s n o t i c e and t h a t i t c o u l d c o n t i n u e t o s e l l d e f e n s i v e arms t o Taiwan. However, the PRC would e x p r e s s i t s disagreement w i t h such s a l e s . In a d d i t i o n , the PRC would not p u b l i c l y a s s u r e a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n of the Taiwan i s s u e but would a l s o not c o n t r a d i c t the American statement t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s e x p e c t e d the i s s u e t o be s o l v e d p e a c e f u l l y . 8 \" W h i l e C a r t e r had i n i t i a l l y i n t e n d e d t o seek n o r m a l i z a t i o n by January 1979, he now d e c i d e d t o move the d a t e of the announcement t o December 1 5 . 8 5 A l a s t minute r o a d b l o c k i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s o c c u r r e d on December 13. The C hinese r e q u e s t e d t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s e l l no arms t o Taiwan d u r i n g the one y e a r n o t i c e term of the d e f ense 189 t r e a t y . B r z e z i n s k i met i m m e d i a t e l y w i t h the C hinese r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Washington and s o l v e d the c o n t r o v e r s y by p r o m i s i n g t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s would s i g n no new c o n t r a c t s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . 8 6 On December 13, C a r t e r i n s t r u c t e d Vance t o c u t s h o r t h i s d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n i n the M i d d l e E a s t f o r the impending announcement. Vance came home c o m p l a i n i n g t h a t he had not been c o n s u l t e d on s e v e r a l i s s u e s d u r i n g the l a s t s t a g e s of the n e g o t i a t i o n s . 8 7 A g a i n , C a r t e r ' s o v e r a l l p o l i c y towards the PRC and the USSR appeared i n d i s a r r a y . Vance c o m p l a i n e d t h a t he had a r r a n g e d a major meeting on SALT f o r the l a s t week of December s i n c e C a r t e r had o r i g i n a l l y s e t the announcement date of n o r m a l i z a t i o n f o r J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 7 9 . 8 8 Now t h a t the n o r m a l i z a t i o n date was put b e f o r e the SALT meeti n g , Vance e x p e c t e d the USSR t o be annoyed about the t i m i n g of the two e v e n t s . F u r t h e r m o r e , C a r t e r and B r z e z i n s k i had i n v i t e d Deng t o v i s i t the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n January 1979. A g a i n , t h i s i n v i t a t i o n c o n t r a d i c t e d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s o r i g i n a l g o a l t o have a meeting between C a r t e r and Brezhnev i n e a r l y 1979. C e r t a i n l y , Brezhnev was not g o i n g t o t a k e second p l a c e t o Deng! Meanwhile, however, C a r t e r c o n t i n u e d t o say t h a t h i s approach was evenhanded. F i n a l l y , over Vance's o b j e c t i o n , C a r t e r a l l o w e d B r z e z i n s k i t o i n s e r t the word \"hegemony\" i n t o the f i n a l communique. 8 9 T h i s communique prompted a sharp S o v i e t condemnation of C a r t e r ' s h a n d l i n g of the n o r m a l i z a t i o n i s s u e . C l e a r l y , C a r t e r ' s C h ina p o l i c y was b e g i n n i n g t o compromise h i s o b j e c t i v e t o complete the SALT I I t r e a t y and t o pursue a p o l i c y of d e t e n t e w i t h the USSR. 190 I t i s u n c l e a r t o what e x t e n t C a r t e r r e a l i z e d t h e d i s a r r a y , but i t i s c l e a r t h a t B r z e z i n s k i had s t r a y e d f a r from h i s c u s t o d i a l t a s k s . EVALUATING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND OUTCOME: PART I I I t was B r z e z i n s k i who reopened the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n e a r l y 1978. He b e l i e v e d t h e r e now appeared even b e t t e r reasons f o r b u i l d i n g a Sino-American s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p . However, he was l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n g e t t i n g the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o debate the i s s u e than i n t a k i n g p e r s o n a l c o n t r o l of i t . The p r e s i d e n t and h i s a d v i s o r s c o n s i d e r e d the c o n d i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g Taiwan as w e l l as the c o l l a t e r a l measures i n a d i s c u s s i o n forum which resembled the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . However, the c r u c i a l s t r a t e g i c a s p e c t of Sin o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s was l e f t out of the debate. I n s t e a d , B r z e z i n s k i pursued t h i s t o p i c p r i v a t e l y w i t h C a r t e r . C a r t e r and B r z e z i n s k i reached a mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t B r z e z i n s k i s h o u l d b r i n g S i n o-American s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s c l o s e r t o g e t h e r . T h i s o p t i o n was not o p e n l y d i s c u s s e d and the o t h e r a d v i s o r s were not i n f o r m e d t h a t C a r t e r had d e c i d e d t o pursue i t . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i d e n t i f i e s t h i s t y pe of c u s t o d i a l b e h a v i o u r as a c l e a r r o l e v i o l a t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , H a l l d e s c r i b e s t h i s b e h a v i o u r as v i o l a t i n g the f a i r n e s s and c o m p e t i t i o n p r i n c i p l e s of m u l t i p l e a d v o c a c y . 9 0 As t o the 191 f a i r n e s s c o n d i t i o n , the c u s t o d i a n i s r e q u i r e d t o keep the d e c i s i o n forum open t o a l l r e l e v a n t a d v i s o r s . B r z e z i n s k i ' s p r i v a t e c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h C a r t e r were meant t o e x c l u d e Vance as w e l l as o t h e r s . A l t h o u g h the i s s u e s had been d i s c u s s e d i n 1977, B r z e z i n s k i sought a r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the o p t i o n s and of C a r t e r ' s d e c i s i o n and thus s h o u l d have reopened the f u l l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . A c c o r d i n g t o the c o m p e t i t i o n p r i n c i p l e , the c u s t o d i a n i s r e q u i r e d t o \" e l e v a t e s u b s t a n t i a l c o n f l i c t among the a d v i s o r s t o the p r e s i d e n t \" by o r g a n i z i n g meetings i n which the p r e s i d e n t can hear a l l s i d e s t o an i s s u e . B r z e z i n s k i knew t h a t Vance opposed the s t r a t e g i c c o n n e c t i o n as w e l l as h i s v i s i t t o the PRC. By t r y i n g t o c i r c u m v e n t Vance's advocacy, B r z e z i n s k i sought t o enhance h i s own p o s i t i o n . As a r e s u l t , Vance l o b b i e d p r i v a t e l y a g a i n s t B r z e z i n s k i ' s t r i p , s i n c e he was aware of i t , but was s u c c e s s f u l l y e x c l u d e d from the s t r a t e g i c debate. In a l l l i k e l i h o o d , Vance b e l i e v e d C a r t e r had not s u b s t a n t i a l l y changed h i s p o l i c y of 1977 not t o p l a y the C h i n a c a r d . The p r e s i d e n t , as a r e s u l t of these c u s t o d i a l v i o l a t i o n s , d i d not hear a v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s or arguments why he s h o u l d now seek a s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p which he had r e j e c t e d i n 1977. A l l he heard were B r z e z i n s k i ' s reasons t h a t i t was i m p o r t a n t . The p r e s i d e n t was s h i e l d e d from the d e b a t e s which had c h a r a c t e r i z e d the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s on the \"Deep C u t s \" p r o p o s a l s i n e a r l y 1977 and the \"Horn of A f r i c a \" c r i s i s i n e a r l y 1978. Such a debate, the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y a r g u e s , b r i n g s t o the open the v a l u e s and 192 a s s umptions t h a t l i e b e h i n d the o p t i o n s . As a r e s u l t , the p r e s i d e n t w i l l be a b l e t o make a b e t t e r c h o i c e . Moreover, the c u s t o d i a l v i o l a t i o n s l e f t C a r t e r w i t h a p o l i c y d e c i s i o n unknown t o s e v e r a l of h i s key a d v i s o r s . B r z e z i n s k i d i d not b r i n g i t t o the a t t e n t i o n of the o t h e r a d v i s o r s and d i d not f a c i l i t a t e a d i s c u s s i o n on i t so as t o g i v e the o t h e r a d v i s o r s a chance t o c h a l l e n g e i t . As a consequence, the d i s a r r a y i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s was f o l l o w e d by a d i s a r r a y i n s u b s t a n t i v e p o l i c y . Vance and B r z e z i n s k i pursued d i f f e r e n t d e c i s i o n s t h a t were not o n l y u n c o o r d i n a t e d but o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t o r y . W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i \" p l a y e d the C h ina c a r d , \" Vance c l a i m e d p u b l i c l y t h a t the a d m i n s t r a t i o n \" d i d not t r y t o d e v e l o p t i e s w i t h C h ina i n o r d e r t o p r e s s u r e or p u n i s h the USSR.\" 9 1 W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i and Deng d i s c u s s e d ways t o \" c o n t a i n \" Vietnam, Vance and the S t a t e Department pursued the n o r m a l i z a t i o n of US-Vietnam r e l a t i o n s . Even the t i m e t a b l e s of the two men c l a s h e d . Vance's s c h e d u l e d meeting between C a r t e r and Gromyko and h i s SALT meeting i n l a t e December c o l l i d e d w i t h major S i n o -Amer i c a n developments. O b v i o u s l y , the USSR became q u i t e annoyed about t h i s \"heavy handed\" approach. As a r e s u l t , the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s were d e l a y e d f u r t h e r and S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s d e t e r i o r a t e d r a p i d l y . 9 2 A l t h o u g h the c u s t o d i a l v i o l a t i o n s caused a d i v i d e d and fragmented o v e r a l l p o l i c y , C a r t e r s c o r e d an i m p o r t a n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y s u c c e s s by n o r m a l i z i n g Sino-American r e l a t i o n s . T h i s s u c c e s s was l a r g e l y due t o B r z e z i n s k i ' s d i p l o m a c y . B r z e z i n s k i ' s s t r a t e g i c d i a l o g u e w i t h the C h i n e s e 193 p r o v i d e d the needed i n c e n t i v e f o r a compromise on T a i w a n . 9 3 As w i t h p u b l i c s p e a k i n g , the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y s t a t e s t h a t c u s t o d i a l d i p l o m a c y w i l l harm the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s and as a r e s u l t reduce the l i k e l i h o o d of a s u c c e s s f u l d e c i s i o n . However, H a l l found t h a t c u s t o d i a l d i p l o m a c y per se need not harm the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . 9 * O c c a s i o n a l \" f a c t f i n d i n g \" t r i p s or c o n t a c t s w i t h f o r e i g n d i p l o m a t s w i l l not undermine the c u s t o d i a n ' s r o l e . But, when the c u s t o d i a n engages i n f r e q u e n t d i p l o m a t i c a c t i v i t y on s u b s t a n t i a l i s s u e s , he might be u n w i l l i n g t o c a l l f o r a r e v i e w of the p r e s i d e n t ' s p o l i c y . H a l l ' s a n a l y s i s of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s of the l a s t seven American a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s r e v e a l s t h a t o n l y d u r i n g K i s s i n g e r ' s t e n u r e d i d c u s t o d i a l d i p lomacy undermine the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . Indeed, i t undermined the p r o c e s s o n l y because i t o c c u r r e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h o t h e r c u s t o d i a l r o l e v i o l a t i o n s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the p r o c e s s was f l a w e d because the o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s were d e l i b e r a t e l y e x c l u d e d from the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . H a l l ' s a n a l y s i s shows t h a t the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s s u f f e r e d l e s s because of the c u s t o d i a n ' s diplomacy than as a r e s u l t of the b l o c k i n g of a c c e s s of the o t h e r a d v i s o r s . H a l l does not prove t h a t the c u s t o d i a l v i o l a t i o n s r e s u l t e d d i r e c t l y from h i s d i p l o m a t i c r o l e . T h i s case study c o n f i r m s most of H a l l ' s f i n d i n g s . B r z e z i n s k i ' s t r i p t o China was h i s f i r s t s u b s t a n t i a l d i p l o m a t i c u n d e r t a k i n g . 9 5 The t r i p i t s e l f d i d not b r i n g C a r t e r ' s o v e r a l l p o l i c y i n t o d i s a r r a y . R a t h e r , i t a c h i e v e d 194 an i m p o r t a n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y s u c c e s s . B r z e z i n s k i ' s v i s i t shows t h a t the c u s t o d i a n may a t t i m e s be a b e t t e r communicator of the P r e s i d e n t ' s c o n c e r n s and be more s u c c e s s f u l i n implementing the p r e s i d e n t ' s p o l i c y . However, a f t e r r e c e i v i n g p e r m i s s i o n t o t r a v e l t o the PRC, B r z e z i n s k i went on t o monopolize the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . T h i s was by no means n e c e s s a r y t o a s c e r t a i n the s u c c e s s of h i s t r i p . G i v en C a r t e r ' s c o n c e r n about S o v i e t b e h a v i o u r i n A f r i c a , C a r t e r may w e l l have d e c i d e d i n f a v o u r of s e e k i n g c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h China i n a open d e c i s i o n forum. In so d o i n g , C a r t e r might have been a b l e t o d e c i d e t o what e x t e n t he c o u l d p l a y the China c a r d w i t h o u t u n r a v e l l i n g h i s p o l i c y of d e t e n t e . Had B r z e z i n s k i i n s i s t e d on a c o o r d i n a t e d p o l i c y p r o c e s s , C a r t e r might have a c h i e v e d n o r m a l i z a t i o n as w e l l as a c o h e r e n t p o l i c y towards the USSR. CONCLUSION T h i s case shows t h a t the c u s t o d i a n went beyond h i s r o l e of p r o c e s s manager and even beyond h i s r o l e of a p o l i c y a d v o c a t e . W h i l e the e v o l u t i o n of B r z e z i n s k i ' s r o l e w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n depth i n the f i n a l c h a p t e r of t h i s t h e s i s , a few o b s e r v a t i o n s can be made h e r e . B r z e z i n s k i ' s warnings and a d v i c e i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s on SALT I I , the Horn of A f r i c a and on S i n o - A m e r i c a n n o r m a l i z a t i o n i n 1977 went unheeded by the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . In a l l , B r z e z i n s k i was 195 v i r t u a l l y a l o n e i n c h a l l e n g i n g the consensus among C a r t e r ' s a d v i s o r s . When Vance's t r i p t o the PRC f a i l e d and the U n i t e d S t a t e s had s u f f e r e d s e v e r a l s e t b a c k s i n SALT and i n the M i d d l e E a s t , B r z e z i n s k i must have d e c i d e d t h a t the time had come t o take more p e r s o n a l c o n t r o l . However, i n so d o i n g , he v i o l a t e d h i s c u s t o d i a l d u t i e s and undermined C a r t e r ' s o v e r a l l p o l i c y . My t h r e e case s t u d i e s i n d i c a t e t h a t the m u l t i p l e advocacy p r o c e s s does not f u n c t i o n w e l l when the ad v o c a t e s f a i l t o p r o v i d e a wide range of o p t i o n s f o r the p r e s i d e n t . C o n t r a r y t o the s t r a t e g y ' s p r e s c r i p t i o n s , c u s t o d i a l advocacy improves the p r o c e s s when t h i s o c c u r s . Moreover, the s t r a t e g y need not f o r b i d a l l t y p e s of c u s t o d i a l p u b l i c s p e a k i n g or d i p l o m a t i c i n v o l v e m e n t . These a c t i v i t i e s may a t ti m e s enhance the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the p r e s i d e n t ' s p o l i c y w i t h o u t n e c e s s a r i l y compromising the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . However, the s t r a t e g y i s e f f e c t i v e l y undermined when t h e c u s t o d i a n v i o l a t e s the f a i r n e s s and c o m p e t i t i o n p r i n c i p l e s . The next c h a p t e r w i l l f u r t h e r e x p l o r e t h i s l a s t p r o p o s i t i o n . 196 ENDNOTES 1 The a n a l y s i s i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s based on the f o l l o w i n g a c c o u n t s : Golam W. Choudhury, China i n World A f f a i r s , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1982; Greg O'Leary, The Shaping of Chinese F o r e i g n P o l i c y , London: Croom Helm, 1980; Gene T. H s i a o and M i c h a e l W i t u n s k i , S i n o - A m e r i c a n N o r m a l i z a t i o n and I t s P o l i c y I m p l i c a t i o n s , New York: P r a e g e r , 1983; Robert G. S u t t e r , China Watch, B a l t i m o r e : Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1978; F r e d e r i c k T. Chen (ed..)., China P o l i c y and N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , New York: T r a n s n a t i o n a l , 1984; Kenneth A. Oye e t . a l . ( e d s . ) , E a g l e D e f i a n t , B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, 1 983; M i c h e l Oksenberg, \"A Decade of S i no-American R e l a t i o n s , \" F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , F a l l 1982, pp.175-195; Henry A. K i s s i n g e r , White House Y e a r s , B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, 1979; M a r t i n L. L a s a t e r , The Taiwan I s s u e i n Sino-American S t r a t e g i c R e l a t i o n s , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1984; M i c h e l Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam ( e d s . ) , Dragon and E a g l e , New York: B a s i c Books, 1978.; J a n - L i n g Joanne Cheng, U n i t e d S t a t e s - C h i n a N o r m a l i z a t i o n : An E v a l u a t i o n of F o r e i g n P o l i c y D e c i s i o n - Making, D e n v e r , C o l o r a d o : Monograph S e r i e s i n W orld A f f a i r s , Volume 22, Book 4, 1986 2 The US and the PRC d i d from time t o time engage i n a m b a s s a d o r i a l t a l k s i n Geneva and Warsaw but t h e s e d i d not produce any rapprochement. 3 Choudhury (1982), p.70; Oksenberg (1982), p.177; L a s a t e r (1984), p.153. * Jimmy C a r t e r , Keeping F a i t h , New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p. 187; Sam C. S a r k e s i a n ( e d . ) , Defense P o l i c y and The P r e s i d e n c y : C a r t e r ' s F i r s t Y e a r s , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1979, p.192. 5 Leonard A. K u s n i t z , P u b l i c O p i n i o n and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , H a r t f o r d , C o n n e c t i c u t : Greenwood P r e s s , 1984, p.141. In the Shanghai Communique, the U n i t e d S t a t e s had acknowledged t h a t t h e r e was o n l y one C h ina w i t h B e i j i n g as i t s l e g a l government, t h a t i t i n t e n d e d t o withdraw from Taiwan and n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h B e i j i n g and t h a t i t e x p e c t e d the Taiwan i s s u e be s o l v e d p e a c e f u l l y by the C h i n e s e . 6 Cyrus Vance, Hard C h o i c e s , New York: Simon & S c h u s t e r , 1983, p.32. 7 Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , Power and P r i n c i p l e , New York: F a r r a r , S t r a u s , G i r o u x , 1983, p.53; Department of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , \" S e l e c t e d S t a t e m e n t s , \" May , 1977. 8 Vance (1983), p.75; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.81; C a r t e r (1982), p.190. 9 PRM 24 was commissioned on A p r i l 5, 1977. 197 1 0 Robert G. S u t t e r , The Ch i n a Quandary, B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1983, p.4; Newsweek, A p r i l 25, 1977, p.42. B r z e z i n s k i notes t h a t he had s e t the g o a l of n o r m a l i z a t i o n f o r the end of 1978, B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.197. 1 1 PRM 24 was l e a k e d i n p a r t t o the New York Times, June 24, 1977, p.13. See a l s o Oksenberg (1982), p.181; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.197; Vance (1983), p.77; Time, August 29, 1977, p.24; Banning N. G a r r e t t , \"The China C a r d : To P l a y Or Not t o P l a y , \" Contemporary C h i n a , No.1, S p r i n g 1979, p.4. 1 2 Vance (1983), p.77; Washington Review, January 1978, p.100. 1 3 Vance (1983), p.78; New York Times, June 24, 1977, p.3; Raymond L. G a r t h o f f , Detente and C o n f r o n t a t i o n , Washington: B r o o k i n g s I n s t i t u t i o n , 1985, p.694. 1• Vance (1983), p.78; New York Times, June 24, 1977, p. 1; G a r n e t t (1979), p.4. 1 5 G a r n e t t (1979), p.4; Chen (1984), p.34, 35; Newsweek, August 29, 1977, p.33. 1 6 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.200; Vance (1983), p.78; Oksenberg (1982), p.181. 1 7 Vance (1983), p.78. 1 8 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.200. 1 9 I b i d . , p.403; Gaddis S m i t h , M o r a l i t y , Reason and Power, New York: H i l l and Wang, 1986, p.87. 2 0 Vance (1983), p.449, 75; Newsweek, August 29, 1977, p.33; New R e p u b l i c , January 13, 1979. p.11. 2 1 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.201; Vance (1983), p.79; Oksenberg (1982), p.182. 2 2 C a r t e r (1983), p.191; G a r t h o f f (1985), p.697; New R e p u b l i c , J anuary 13, 1979, p.11; Washington P o s t , August 17, 1977, p.27; G a r r e t t i n Oye ( e d . ) , (1983), p.246. 2 3 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.201. 2\" B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.201. See a l s o p.403. W h i l e t h i s comment o b v i o u s l y s e r v e s t o g l o r i f y h i s own r o l e , i t a l s o shows t h a t B r z e z i n s k i wanted Vance's t r i p t o be s u c c e s s f u l . 2 5 C a r t e r (1982), p.191. 2 6 B r z e z i n s k i ( 1 983), p.20.; Oksenberg (1982), p.182, Washington P o s t , August 17, 1977, p.27; Jerome Chen, The US and F r e e C h i n a , Washington: A c r o p o l i s Books L t d . , 1983, p.214. See a l s o Steve Barber i n F a r E a s t e r n Economic Review, 198 August 26, 1977, p.10. 2 7 Vance (1983), p.79; C a r t e r (1982), p.191. 2 8 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.201; Newsweek, September 5, 1977, p.16; Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, September 9, 1977. 2 9 S u t t e r (1983), p.4; Vance (1983), p.427,428; Smith (1986), p.87 3 0 Vance(1983), p.79 3 1 idem, p.79, Oksenberg (1982), p.182 3 2 idem, p.79, Washington P o s t , September 7, 1977, pp.1,21; Oksenberg (1982), p.182; L a s a t e r (1984), p.157. 3 3 G a r r e t t (1979), pp.4,5. 3 4 I t i s u n c l e a r t o the a u t h o r t o what e x t e n t Vance was i n s t r u c t e d t o b r i e f t he Chi n e s e on PRM 10. C a r t e r d e c i d e d on t h i s i s s u e (PD 18) a f t e r Vance's t r i p and d i d not f u l l y a c c e p t the o p t i m i s t i c recommendation of the S t a t e Department. PRM 10 i s d i s c u s s e d i n S a r k e s i a n (1979), pp.120-132, M. Glenn Abernathy e t . a l . ( e d s . ) , The C a r t e r Y e a r s , London: F r a n c e s P i n t e r , 1984, p.91. I t was a c o l l o s a l s tudy t o which a t l e a s t 170 peopl e from v a r i o u s a g e n c i e s c o n t r i b u t e d . The S t a t e Department's a n a l y s i s d i f f e r e d c o n s i d e r a b l y from the more p e s s i m i s t i c a n a l y s i s of Samuel P. H u n t i n g t o n from the NSC. 3 5 Chen p.5, 6, Newsweek, June 5, 1978. Some Chinese e x p e r t s i n 1978 accused Vance of b e i n g a n t i C h i n e s e ! See G a r r e t t (1979), p.6. 3 6 Washington P o s t , September 5, 1977, p.21; New R e p u b l i c , J a n u a r y 13, 1979, p.10; Oksenberg (1982), p.183. 3 7 See Vance (1983), pp.81-83. 3 8 G a r r e t t i n Oye ( e d . ) , (1983), p.246. 3 9 As quoted i n G a r t h o f f (1985), p.695. 4 0 Washington P o s t , September 5, 1977, p.1. Vance c l a i m s t h a t Deng's remark was prompted by a m i s l e a d i n g p r e s s r e l e a s e by the White House t h a t the t a l k s had made some p r o g r e s s . However, C a r t e r notes t h a t he r e c e i v e d \"a m i l d l y e n c o u r a g i n g r e p o r t \" from Vance. Moreover, Ch i n e s e p r e s s r e p o r t s d u r i n g Vance's v i s i t were a l s o n e g a t i v e . See Vance (1983), p.83; C a r t e r (1982), p.191; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.202. 4 1 A l e x a n d e r L. George, P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g i n F o r e i g n P o l i c y , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1980, p. 1 0. 1 9 9 4 2 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.201. 4 3 Oksenberg (1982), p.182. 4 4 Idem. D u r i n g the Nixon y e a r s , the Chinese had a l r e a d y mentioned t h a t they would c o n s i d e r the \"Japanese f o r m u l a \" f o r S i n o -American n o r m a l i z a t i o n . T h i s arrangement of 1972, a l l o w e d Japan t o c o n t i n u e t o have u n o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan by means of a p r i v a t e i n s t i t u t e . In l i g h t of t h i s , Vance's m a x i m a l i s t s t a n c e was most d i s a p p o i n t i n g t o the C h i n e s e . See: U.S.Congress.House Subcommittee on A s i a n and P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , \" R e c o g n i z i n g the PRC,\" May 1979, p . V I I I . 4 5 L a s a t e r (1984), p.153. 4 6 Washington P o s t , August 23, 1977, p.17; Time, August 29, 1977. 4 7 Oksenberg and Oxnam ( e d s . ) , (1978), p.269. 4 8 C a r t e r (1982), p.189; Washington P o s t , December 17, 1978, p. 1 2. 4 9 C a r t e r (1982), p.192; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.202. 5 0 Vance (1983), p.83. 5 1 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.202; Oksenberg (1982), p.183; New R e p u b l i c , J anuary 13, 1979, p.10. 5 2 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.206. 5 3 Vance (1983), p.114. For the same r e a s o n , Vance a l s o opposed a t r i p by Brown.; Time, A p r i l 10, 1978, p.14; Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, May 19, 1978, p.24. 5 4 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.203, 204; US News and World R e p o r t , June 19, 1978, p.39; Vance (1983), p.114; Newsweek, May 8, 1978, p.49. 5 5 C a r t e r (1982), p.194; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.204; G a r r e t t i n Oye ( e d . ) , (1983), p.247; Chen (1984), p.35. 5 6 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.189, 190. 5 7 Idem.; Vance (1983), p.114. 5 8 C a r t e r (1982), p.194; Oksenberg (1982), p.184; Washington P o s t , June 22, 1978; Vance (1983), p.114; New York Times, May 18, 1978, p.6. 5 9 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.207; C a r t e r (1982), p.195. 6 0 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.202-204. 6 1 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), Annex I . 200 6 2 B r z e z i n s k i (1983)> p.207. 6 3 Idem. See a l s o i n t e r v i e w w i t h B r z e z i n s k i i n E n c o u n t e r , May 1981, p.28 and B r z e z i n s k i ' s comments on \"Meet the P r e s s , \" May 28, 1978 i n Department of S t a t e , \" S e l e c t e d Documents,\" Washington, 1977, p.39. 6 4 Vance (1983), p.115. 6 5 E n c o u n t e r , (1981), p.28. 6 6 „ B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.207; Contemporary C h i n a , No.1, S p r i n g 1979, pp.43-46; Oksenberg (1982), p.185; New York Times, May 21, 1978; D. P. Moynihan, P o l i c y Review, S p r i n g 1 979. 6 7 Department of S t a t e , \" S e l e c t e d Documents,\" Washington, 1979, p.38. 6 8 G a r r e t t (1979), p.3; Choudhury (1982), p.119; G a r t h o f f (1985), p.704. 6 9 G a r r e t t (1979), p.8; Oksenberg (1982), p.185. 7 0 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.211. 7 1 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.213, 214. 7 2 Choudhury (1982), p.119; Washington P o s t , December 17, 1978, p.12; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.214; G a r r e t t (1979), p.12. 7 3 C a r t e r (1982), p.196. 7 4 US News and World R e p o r t , June 19, 1978, p.12; New R e p u b l i c , J anuary 6, 1979, p.10; Newsweek, June 5, 1978, p.61; Time, December 25, 1978, p.9. 7 5 C a r t e r (1982), pp.196,197. 7 6 Vance (1983), pp.192,116; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.221 7 7 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.208 7 8 C a r t e r (1982), p.195; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.228 7 9 C a r t e r (1982), p.197; Oksenberg (1982), p.185; B r z e z i n s k i ( 1 9 8 3 ) , pp.229,230; I r v i n g M. D e s t l e r , L e s l i e H. G e l b , Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy, New York: Simon and S c h u s t e r , 1984, p.221. 8 0 Oksenberg (1982), p.185; Washington P o s t , December 17,1978, p.12; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.40, 41. In a meeting i n J a n u a r y 1979, Vance c o m p l a i n e d t o C a r t e r t h a t B r z e z i n s k i had c o n t a c t s w i t h the Ch i n e s e M i s s i o n i n Washington beyond the knowledge of DOS. 201 8 1 C a r t e r (1982), p.197. 8 2 Vance (1983), p.118. 8 3 Oksenberg (1982), p.187; Time, December 25, 1978; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.229,230. 8\" Shen (1983), p.229; New York Times, December 17, 1978, p.22; C a r t e r (1982), p.197. 8 5 C a r t e r (1982), p.199; Oksenberg (1982), p.188. Aga i n C a r t e r made t h i s move f e a r i n g t h a t e a r l y l e a k s would p r e v e n t him from r e c e i v i n g the c r e d i t f o r t h i s b r e a k t h r o u g h . 8 6 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.231; C a r t e r (1982), p.198. 8 7 Vance (1983), p.119; C a r t e r (1982), p.199. 8 8 Vance ( 1983), p.. 109; G a r t h o f f (1985), p.709; Chen (1984), p.36. 8 9 Vance (1983), p.110; Time, December 25, 1979, p.9. 9 0 D a v i d K. H a l l , Implementing M u l t i p l e Advocacy i n the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l 1947-1980, Ph.D. T h e s i s , S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , 1982. p.61. 9 1 S u t t e r (1983), p.4.; J a n - L i n g Joanne Cheng (1986), p.114 9 2 G a r t h o f f (1985), p.709; Vance (1983), p.112; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.418,419. 9 3 Oksenberg (1982), p.183; Choudhury (1982), pp.117, 118; Smith (1986), p.89. 9 4 H a l l (1982), pp. 79 and 721-725. H a l l a l s o d i s c u s s e s B r z e z i n s k i ' s d i p l o m a t i c r o l e i n the I r a n c r i s i s , see next c h a p t e r . 9 5 H a l l (1982), p.670. In h i s a n a l y s i s of the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , H a l l does not d i s c u s s the Ch i n a v i s i t as an example of c u s t o d i a l r o l e v i o l a t i o n s . 202 CHAPTER SIX THE FALL OF THE SHAH 203 T h i s c h a p t e r examines the American response t o the 1978-79 I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n which l e d t o the f a l l of the shah. The replacement of America's s t r o n g e s t a l l y i n the P e r s i a n G u l f w i t h a h o s t i l e I s l a m i c r e p u b l i c c o n s t i t u t e d one of the l a r g e s t f o r e i g n p o l i c y s e t b a c k s f o r the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l show t h a t a b a d l y f l a w e d d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s can e x p l a i n , t o a l a r g e e x t e n t , the ambiguous and i n e f f e c t i v e American h a n d l i n g of t h i s c r i s i s . W h i l e the U n i t e d S t a t e s had a major i n t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i n I r a n as w e l l as c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e i n I r a n i a n p o l i t i c s , i t f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e c l e a r guidance f o r the Shah and l o s t a m i l i t a r i l y and e c o n o m i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t a l l y . The c u s t o d i a n added a v a l u a b l e p e r s p e c t i v e t o the p o l i c y debate and o f f e r e d the p r e s i d e n t an o p t i o n , which none of the o t h e r a d v i s o r s wanted t o c o n s i d e r i n i t i a l l y . However, h i s p e r s i s t e n t advocacy hampered the p r e s i d e n t i n h i s attempt t o make a f i n a l p o l i c y c h o i c e . Moreover, he v i o l a t e d the p r o c e s s norms of the s t r a t e g y by b l o c k i n g s e v e r a l of C a r t e r ' s a d v i s o r s from the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . They c o u l d no l o n g e r get a f a i r h e a r i n g f o r t h e i r o p t i o n s and the p r e s i d e n t was s h i e l d e d from s u b s t a n t i a l p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s among them. In a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e v i o l a t i o n s , the c u s t o d i a n a t t e m p t e d t o i n f l u e n c e the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the p r e s i d e n t ' s p o l i c y by r e l a y i n g p e r s o n a l l y the p r e s i d e n t ' s d e c i s i o n s t o f o r e i g n o f f i c i a l s . Q u i t e o f t e n , t h e s e messages d i f f e r e d from the o f f i c i a l messages communicated by the US embassy i n Tehran. 204 C o n s e q u e n t l y , the government of I r a n became c o n f u s e d about the a c t u a l American p o s i t i o n . T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l show t h a t the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i s c o r r e c t i n c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e s e t y p e s of c u s t o d i a l r o l e v i o l a t i o n s produce a s u b o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . BACKGROUND American i n f l u e n c e i n I r a n d a t e s back t o the Second World War. 1 In 1941, B r i t a i n and the S o v i e t Union o c c u p i e d I r a n i n o r d e r t o pr e v e n t the Germans from e n c i r c l i n g the M e d i t e r r a n e a n and c o n t r o l i n g the I r a n i a n o i l f i e l d s . M oreover, the A l l i e d f o r c e s i n t e n d e d t o s u p p l y the USSR th r o u g h i t s s o u t h e r n f l a n k v i a I r a n . The UK and the USSR d i v i d e d the c o u n t r y i n t o v i r t u a l l y two spheres of i n f l u e n c e : the E n g l i s h i n the south and the S o v i e t s i n the n o r t h . The o c c u p y i n g f o r c e s i n s t a l l e d Mohammad Reza, the young son of the r e c e n t l y e x i l e d Shah, as the head of a new puppet government. I t was t h i s de f a c t o r u l e by the UK and the USSR t h a t prompted I r a n i a n l e a d e r s t o ask f o r American h e l p i n g a i n i n g independence. D u r i n g the 1943 Tehran c o n f e r e n c e , R o o s e v e l t promised the I r a n i a n s t h a t he would support t h e i r independence as soon as the war was won. He got C h u r c h i l l and S t a l i n t o agree t h a t a l l A l l i e d f o r c e s would be withdrawn from I r a n s i x months a f t e r the A x i s powers 205 s u r r e n d e r e d . R o o s e v e l t hoped t o make I r a n an example of g r e a t power c o o p e r a t i o n . However, w i t h the dawn of the C o l d War, I r a n became one of the t e n s i o n p o i n t s between the US and the USSR. Soon a f t e r the A l l i e d v i c t o r y , the USSR appeared r e l u c t a n t t o withdraw from I r a n . I t c r e a t e d \" f r i e n d l y r e p u b l i c s \" i n the n o r t h and i n c r e a s e d i t s t r o o p s . In res p o n s e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s began t o h e l p the I r a n i a n government by s e n d i n g economic and m i l i t a r y a i d . A l s o , i t warned the USSR t h a t i t i n t e n d e d t o g u a r a n t e e , by f o r c e i f n e c e s s a r y , I r a n ' s independence. By l a t e 1946, the S o v i e t s f i n a l l y w ithdrew. The I r a n i a n s then t u r n e d t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o the B r i t i s h owned A n g l o - I r a n i a n O i l Company (AIOC), which c o n t r o l l e d t h e i r o i l f i e l d s . N e g o t i a t i o n s were s t a r t e d t o n a t i o n a l i z e the AIOC. Soon a f t e r , the I r a n i a n s asked the U n i t e d S t a t e s t o mediate i n the d i s p u t e . W h i l e i t put some p r e s s u r e on the B r i t i s h t o compromise, i t d i d not want t o c h a l l e n g e them i n an a r e a t h a t was t r a d i t i o n a l l y acknowledged as t h e i r sphere of i n f l u e n c e . Moreover, B r i t i s h - A m e r i c a n s t r a t e g i c c o o p e r a t i o n e l s e w h e r e outweighed the cause of I r a n i a n n a t i o n a l i s m . The r e s u l t i n g s t a l e m a t e over the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of o i l p r o d u c t i o n gave r i s e t o the r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of I r a n i a n p o l i t i c s . A l t h o u g h the c o n s t i t u t i o n of 1906 s t i p u l a t e d t h a t I r a n was t o be governed by a prime m i n i s t e r and c a b i n e t , s e l e c t e d from the I r a n i a n p a r l i a m e n t ( M a j l i s ) , and d e s c r i b e d the r o l e of the monarch i n terms s i m i l a r t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarchies i n Europe, Reza Shah had always 206 r u l e d as an a u t o c r a t . When the A l l i e s put h i s son on the t h r o n e , he had c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s power than h i s f a t h e r . In the y e a r s f o l l o w i n g the war, s t r o n g prime m i n i s t e r s s e t I r a n i a n government p o l i c y and merely c o n s u l t e d the Shah. In 1952, the s t r o n g n a t i o n a l i s t t i d e i n the M a j l i s f o r c e d the Shah t o a p p o i n t the l e a d e r of the N a t i o n a l F r o n t c o a l i t i o n , Mossadegh, as the new prime m i n i s t e r . Mossadegh, s u p p o r t e d by a l a r g e p o p u l a r o u t c r y a g a i n s t B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l i s m , a t t e m p t e d t o i n c r e a s e h i s power base. He d i s m i s s e d the M a j l i s and stopped c o n s u l t i n g the Shah. As a r e s u l t of the s e a c t i o n s , h i s support base s h i f t e d away from the N a t i o n a l F r o n t t o the s o c i a l i s t and communist camp, l e d by the *Tudeh p a r t y . When Mossadegh demanded f u l l c o n t r o l over the I r a n i a n army, the Shah t h r e a t e n e d t o go i n t o e x i l e . W h i l e t h i s was s c a r c e l y a t h r e a t t o Mossadegh, i t d i d a l a r m Washington and London. A f r a i d of a communist t a k e o v e r , the Eisenhower a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n s t r u c t e d the CIA t o st a g e a coup t o oust Mossadegh. The coup was q u i c k and b l o o d l e s s . Most a n a l y s t s agree t h a t w i t h o u t a s i g n i f i c a n t o u t p o u r i n g of p o p u l a r support f o r the Shah, the coup c o u l d not have succeeded. A f t e r a few days i n e x i l e , the Shah r e t u r n e d . W i th i n c r e a s e d American a s s i s t a n c e , the Shah now took f i r m c o n t r o l over the government. W i t h i n a few y e a r s , he monop o l i z e d a l l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g power, a p p o i n t e d and d i s m i s s e d prime m i n i s t e r s a t w i l l , and t r a n s f o r m e d the M a j l i s i n t o a rubber stamp body. As the Shah's powers grew and American m i l i t a r y and economic a d v i s o r s began t o e n t e r the c o u n t r y , many I r a n i a n s b e l i e v e d the B r i t i s h p resence had 207 s i m p l y been r e p l a c e d by American i n f l u e n c e . Y e t , American m i l i t a r y a i d remained q u i t e s m a l l d u r i n g the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . 2 Based on the Eisenhower D o c t r i n e , which g u a r a n t e e d d i r e c t American a s s i s t a n c e t o any M i d d l e E a s t s t a t e c o n f r o n t e d w i t h open communist a g g r e s s i o n , t h e s e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s d i d not b e l i e v e I r a n c o u l d or s h o u l d arm i t s e l f i n response t o the S o v i e t t h r e a t . I t was f e a r e d t h a t such a m i l i t a r y b u i l d up would anger the N a t i o n a l i s t f o r c e s and s t i f l e economic development i n I r a n . The Shah, however, had d i f f e r e n t p l a n s . Upon h i s r e s t o r a t i o n , he s e t two g o a l s : t o d e v e l o p I r a n e c o n o m i c a l l y a t the f a s t e s t pace p o s s i b l e , and t o t r a n s f o r m the c o u n t r y i n t o a r e g i o n a l m i l i t a r y g i a n t . The l a t t e r g o a l was f u r t h e r s p u r r e d by I r a q ' s 1958 t i l t towards the USSR. In 1962, w i t h Kennedy's b l e s s i n g , the Shah embarked upon a s o c i a l and economic development programme, which he c a l l e d the White R e v o l u t i o n . I r a n ' s o i l f i e l d s were g r a d u a l l y n a t i o n a l i z e d and the Shah j o i n e d OPEC a t i t s s t a r t . W h i l e the s e c u l a r n a t i o n a l i s t s had formed t h e main p o l i t i c a l f o r c e i n the 1950's, the S h i ' i t e c l e r g y became the major o p p o s i t i o n t o the Shah i n the 1960's. The S h i ' i t e l e a d e r s , the m u l l a h s , saw the White R e v o l u t i o n as a l a r g e s c a l e import of w e s t e r n v a l u e s . They r e s i s t e d the Shah's l a n d and s o c i a l r e f o r m s . In 1963, massive r i o t s l e d by Khomeini were put down v i o l e n t l y by the Shah and h i s newly formed i n t e l l i g e n c e and s e c u r i t y agency, SAVAK. Khomeini was e x i l e d and the u n r e s t a b e t t e d . From 1963 t o 1975 I r a n 208 e x p e r i e n c e d r a p i d economic p r o g r e s s , f u e l l e d by s p i r a l l i n g o i l revenues. The Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n r e d e f i n e d American i n t e r e s t i n I r a n . No l o n g e r w i l l i n g or a b l e t o defend i t s a l l i e s d i r e c t l y , the U n i t e d S t a t e s sought t o b u i l d r e g i o n a l s t r o n g h o l d s who c o u l d p r o v i d e the n e c e s s a r y s e c u r i t y l o c a l l y . I t i d e n t i f i e d I r a n as the key s t a t e i n the r e g i o n f o r t h i s purpose. Now the U n i t e d S t a t e s was w i l l i n g t o arm I r a n a t a r a p i d pace. Moreover, by the l a t e s i x t i e s , the Shah was a b l e t o buy the weapons he wanted. In 1972, the N i x o n White House i n s t r u c t e d a l l a g e n c i e s t o c o o p e r a t e f u l l y w i t h the Shah's demand f o r weapons. In f a c t , the Shah r e c e i v e d a \" c a r t e b l a n c h e \" t o buy whatever he wanted, w h i l e the U n i t e d S t a t e s saw a l a r g e p a r t of i t s p e t r o d o l l a r s r e t u r n . D u r i n g t h i s t i m e , American i n t e r e s t s i n I r a n i n c r e a s e d g r e a t l y . I r a n had become a c r u c i a l b u f f e r s t a t e a g a i n s t S o v i e t e x p a n s i o n i s m i n the M i d d l e E a s t . A l s o , the U n i t e d S t a t e s p e r c e i v e d I r a n as a moderate c o u n t e r w e i g h t t o such r a d i c a l Arab s t a t e s as I r a q , Egypt and S y r i a . In 1973, I r a n r e f u s e d t o j o i n the o i l embargo a g a i n s t I s r a e l and a c t u a l l y s u p p l i e d i t w i t h most of i t s o i l needs. F u r t h e r m o r e , I r a n was now America's most i m p o r t a n t l i n k i n the p r o t e c t i o n of the o i l f i e l d s i n the e n t i r e G u l f region.The U n i t e d S t a t e s h e l p e d i t b u i l d a navy t o p a t r o l the P e r s i a n G u l f . F i n a l l y , i n the e r a of the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s , I r a n became a v a l u a b l e l o c a t i o n f o r US i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g of S o v i e t m i s s i l e t e s t i n g i n C e n t r a l R u s s i a . By 1975, some 20,000 US m i l i t a r y 209 a d v i s o r s worked i n I r a n . The c o n s i d e r a b l e m i l i t a r y and economic c o o p e r a t i o n depended h e a v i l y on the Shah. Both the s e c u l a r n a t i o n a l i s t and S h i ' i t e groups opposed the s t r o n g l i n k s between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and I r a n . However, by the mid 1970's, s e v e r a l v o i c e s i n Washington s t a r t e d t o q u e s t i o n the good r e l a t i o n s h i p between America and the Shah. In s p i t e of h a v i n g a c h i e v e d overwhelming m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y i n the G u l f r e g i o n by 1975, the Shah d i d not reduce h i s programme f o r p u r c h a s i n g American weaponry. Some American c r i t i c s argued t h a t t h i s s u p e r i o r i t y was d e s t a b i l i z i n g , w h i l e o t h e r s f e a r e d t h a t s e n s i t i v e m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y might some day f a l l i n t o the hands of the S o v i e t s . A l s o , the Shah grew more a s s e r t i v e i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s . When q u e s t i o n e d about h i s shopping l i s t f o r American arms, he t h r e a t e n e d t o go t o the Europeans or even t o the S o v i e t s i f h i s demands were not met. In the a f t e r m a t h of Vietnam, Congress t r i e d t o a s s e r t i t s c o n t r o l over arms s a l e s . The 1975 N e l s o n amendment s t i p u l a t e d t h a t a l l arms s a l e s over $25 m i l l i o n must be approved by both the Senate and the House. C o n g r e s s i o n a l checks on arms s a l e s o c c a s i o n a l l y caused f r i c t i o n between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the Shah. B e s i d e arms s a l e s , s e v e r a l c r i t i c s i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s became more outspoken about the l a c k of p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m under the Shah and the a l l e g e d human r i g h t s abuses of SAVAK. In 1975, the Shah reduced the p a r l i a m e n t a r y p r o c e s s t o a one p a r t y system, t h e r e b y f u r t h e r c o n s o l i d a t i n g h i s a u t o c r a t i c r u l e . I t i s i n t h i s c o n t e x t of f i r m U S - I r a n i a n r e l a t i o n s 210 based on many sh a r e d i n t e r e s t s as w e l l as i n c r e a s i n g c r i t i c i s m about t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h a t C a r t e r assumed the p r e s i d e n c y i n 1976. CARTER AND IRAN Gary S i c k , B r z e z i n s k i ' s p r i n c i p a l NSC a i d e f o r I r a n , noted i n h i s memoirs t h a t the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had no i n i t i a t i v e s on I r a n and e x p e c t e d t o c o n t i n u e the c l o s e s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p e s t a b l i s h e d d u r i n g the p r e v i o u s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . 3 C a r t e r agreed w i t h B r z e z i n s k i ' s assessment t h a t I r a n was a s t r a t e g i c s t r o n g h o l d i n the M i d d l e E a s t , worthy of c o n t i n u e d American s u p p o r t : \" I c o n t i n u e d , as o t h e r p r e s i d e n t s had b e f o r e me, t o c o n s i d e r the Shah a s t r o n g a l l y . \" \" However, C a r t e r ' s human r i g h t s and arms t r a n s f e r p o l i c i e s soon became the t e s t i n g ground of h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Shah. W h i l e some a n a l y s t s have c l a i m e d t h a t C a r t e r ' s human r i g h t s p o l i c y undermined the r u l e of the Shah, and a l t h o u g h the Shah h i m s e l f was uneasy about C a r t e r ' s e l e c t i o n , a c a r e f u l s tudy of C a r t e r ' s words and a c t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h i s i s s u e shows t h a t he went out of h i s way t o exempt the Shah from h a r s h c r i t i c i s m a l l o t e d t o s t r a t e g i c a l l y l e s s i m p o r t a n t c o u n t r i e s . 5 I f the Shah was indeed weakened by C a r t e r ' s human r i g h t s campaign, i t was d e s p i t e C a r t e r ' s a t t e m p t s t o a v o i d i t . The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d not f o r m u l a t e an o f f i c i a l 21 1 human r i g h t s p o l i c y u n t i l F e b r u a r y 1978. Even t h e n , i t remained a r a t h e r vague p o l i c y d i r e c t i v e which c o u l d be a p p l i e d s t r i c t l y or l o o s e l y , depending on the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s o t h e r p r i o r i t i e s and i n t e r e s t s . 6 B r i e f l y , the p o l i c y d i r e c t i v e s t a t e d t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t e n d e d t o emphasize c i v i l and p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s and t h a t i t would c o n s i d e r t h e s e f a c t o r s i n the a l l o c a t i o n of economic and m i l i t a r y a i d , as w e l l as arms s a l e s . Of c o u r s e , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had made s e v e r a l pronouncements on t h i s i s s u e b e f o r e the p r o m u l g a t i o n of t h i s d i r e c t i v e . However, th e s e were u s u a l l y d i r e c t e d a t the USSR and s t r a t e g i c a l l y l e s s i m p o r t a n t r i g h t wing d i c t a t o r s h i p s such as Paraguay and T h a i l a n d . 7 The Shah, i n e f f e c t , had preempted C a r t e r on t h i s i s s u e . S h o r t l y b e f o r e C a r t e r ' s assumption of o f f i c e , the Shah announced s e v e r a l p o l i t i c a l and j u d i c i a l r e f orms which somewhat i n c r e a s e d p o l i t i c a l freedom i n I r a n . C a r t e r p r a i s e d the Shah p u b l i c l y f o r the s e a c t i o n s . 8 Whatever o t h e r c r i t i c i s m s C a r t e r h a r b o u r e d , he c o n f i n e d them t o h i s p r i v a t e c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h the Shah d u r i n g the Shah's v i s i t i n November and C a r t e r ' s v i s i t t o Tehran i n December 1977. 9 On th e s e o c c a s i o n s , as w e l l as d u r i n g Vance's v i s i t t o I r a n i n May of the same y e a r , C a r t e r emphasized t h a t he d i d not i n t e n d t o l i n k human r i g h t s t o the Shah's arms p u r c h a s e s . 1 0 In e f f e c t , C a r t e r exempted the Shah from a c r u c i a l a s p e c t of h i s o v e r a l l human r i g h t s p o l i c y : t o l i n k arms t r a n s f e r s t o human r i g h t s c o n d i t i o n s . C a r t e r a l s o t o l d W i l l i a m S u l l i v a n , the new ambassador t o I r a n , t h a t CIA-SAVAK c o o p e r a t i o n on 212 i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g would c o n t i n u e i n s p i t e of the poor human r i g h t s r e c o r d of SAVAK. 1 1 I r o n i c a l l y , i t appears t h a t the o p p o s i t i o n f o r c e s i n I r a n i n i t i a l l y took courage from C a r t e r ' s human r i g h t s pronouncements. 1 2 However, C a r t e r d e c l i n e d t o g i v e h i s p u b l i c support t o s e v e r a l r e f o r m s t a t e m e n t s i s s u e d by the s e c u l a r n a t i o n a l i s t s . H i s l a v i s h p r a i s e f o r the Shah, d u r i n g h i s 1977 v i s i t t o I r a n , and h i s r e f u s a l t o meet w i t h t h i s o p p o s i t i o n group put t o r e s t whatever hope they had i n him. From then on, the o p p o s i t i o n p e r c e i v e d him i n f i r m a l l i a n c e w i t h the S h a h . 1 3 In the p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n campaign, C a r t e r had promised \" s i g n i f i c a n t r e s t r a i n t s i n arms t r a n s f e r s . \" 1 \" Immediately a f t e r h i s i n a u g u r a t i o n , C a r t e r commissioned a p r e s i d e n t i a l r e view memorandum on t h i s s u b j e c t . In May 1977, C a r t e r p u b l i c l y announced h i s new d i r e c t i v e . 1 5 I t s t a t e d t h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n t e n d e d t o make arms s a l e s the e x c e p t i o n r a t h e r than the r u l e among i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y t o o l s . A l s o , the onus was now on those who f a v o u r e d the s a l e t o make t h e i r c a s e , r a t h e r than on those who opposed i t . The U n i t e d S t a t e s would no l o n g e r be the f i r s t t o i n t r o d u c e a new weapon system i n t o a r e g i o n , nor would i t d e v e l o p or produce weapons merely f o r e x p o r t . F i n a l l y , i t would c o n s i d e r the s a l e of arms i n l i g h t of the p u r c h a s e r ' s human r i g h t s r e c o r d and i t s a b i l i t y t o pursue dome s t i c economic d e v e l o p m e n t . 1 6 C a r t e r a l s o announced t h a t he would s e l l fewer arms i n f i s c a l y e a r 1978 than i n the p r e v i o u s y e a r , and t h a t he would p e r s o n a l l y r e v i e w major arms s a l e s . 1 7 213 As i n the case of human r i g h t s , C a r t e r exempted I r a n from t h i s p o l i c y d i r e c t i v e . W h i l e s e v e r a l s t u d i e s i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n argued t h a t the Shah's arms pu r c h a s e s harmed I r a n ' s economy and t h a t h i s human r i g h t s r e c o r d d i d not w a r r a n t them, n e i t h e r C a r t e r nor h i s t o p a d v i s o r s were w i l l i n g t o change the s t a t u s q u o . 1 8 Y e t , C a r t e r d i d review the arms c o n t r a c t s w i t h I r a n and d i d make p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s i n d i c a t i n g h i s p l a n s t o reduce the l a r g e volume of p u r c h a s e s . However, the r e c o r d shows no s u b s t a n t i a l changes. P r i v a t e l y , C a r t e r t o l d the shah and S u l l i v a n t h a t the volume of the arms s a l e s need not change. R a t h e r , he wanted t o revoke the Shah's \" c a r t e b l a n c h e \" as a m a t t e r of p r i n c i p l e , w i t h o u t a c t u a l l y r e f u s i n g many weapons. 1 9 In the f i r s t two y e a r s of h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , C a r t e r fought a b i t t e r f i g h t w i t h Congress t o s e l l the Shah seven AWAC a i r p l a n e s . 2 0 In c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o h i s own arms s a l e d i r e c t i v e , the p r e s i d e n t became the f i r s t t o i n t r o d u c e t h i s advanced r a d a r system i n t o the P e r s i a n G u l f r e g i o n . Moreover, C a r t e r approved n e a r l y a l l the Shah's r e q u e s t s f o r advanced a i r c r a f t , t a n k s and o t h e r m a t e r i e l . He a l s o a greed t o s e l l I r a n s e v e r a l n u c l e a r power p l a n t s . 2 1 In o r d e r t o keep the t o t a l p r i c e t a g down, the c o n s t r u c t i o n of s e v e r a l f r i g a t e s was c o n t r a c t e d out t o t h e Europeans, and arms were p r o c u r e d over a l o n g e r p e r i o d of t i m e . Even t h e n , C a r t e r ' s 1978 f i s c a l year arms s a l e s budget exceeded 1977 by some $4 b i l l i o n . Arms s a l e s t o I r a n a c c o u n t e d f o r a l a r g e share of the t o t a l . 2 2 B e s i d e s the s t r a t e g i c importance of I r a n t o the US, 214 C a r t e r had o t h e r reasons not t o a l i e n a t e the Shah. The Shah had o f f e r e d t o support one of C a r t e r ' s p r i z e d p r o j e c t s : a M i d d l e E a s t peace a c c o r d . I n c o n t r a s t t o many o t h e r governments i n the r e g i o n , the Shah warmly applauded Sadat's e f f o r t t o n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h I s r a e l . 2 3 Moreover, the Shah was w i l l i n g t o h e l p C a r t e r e s t a b l i s h a o v e r a l l energy p o l i c y f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s by r e d u c i n g sudden p r i c e h i k e s i n crude o i l . When C a r t e r asked the Shah t o moderate an ex p e c t e d OPEC p r i c e i n c r e a s e i n 1978, he p r o m p t l y d e l i v e r e d ! 2 * The f i r s t two y e a r s of the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n show t h a t the p r e s i d e n t made a c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t t o have good p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Shah, and t o seek the Shah's c o o p e r a t i o n f o r h i s own p r o j e c t s , w h i l e a s s u r i n g t h a t US-I r a n i a n r e l a t i o n s would not s u f f e r as a r e s u l t of the human r i g h t s and arms s a l e s q u e s t i o n s . There i s ample e v i d e n c e t h a t C a r t e r d i d not want the regime of the Shah t o f a l l and t h a t he i n no way i n t e n d e d t o h e l p the o p p o s i t i o n . 2 5 Yet the Shah was uneasy about the r h e t o r i c coming from the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h i s unease grew when C a r t e r , i n the eyes of the Shah, responded weakly t o the war i n the Ogaden and the 1978 S o v i e t i n s p i r e d coup i n A f g h a n i s t a n . 2 6 Thus, w h i l e C a r t e r wanted t o c o n t i n u e c l o s e r e l a t i o n s between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the Shah, the Shah needed t o be r e a s s u r e d of t h i s as the i n t e r n a l I r a n i a n s i t u a t i o n g r a d u a l l y worsened t h r o u g h o u t 1 9 7 8 . 2 7 215 THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPING CRISIS In the s p r i n g of 1978, I r a n w i t n e s s e d massive r i o t s and d e m o n s t r a t i o n s which i t had not seen s i n c e the u n r e s t of 1963. The r i o t s were s p u r r e d by a mix of economic d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and r e l i g i o u s o p p o s i t i o n t o the Shah's s o c i a l and economic p o l i c i e s . 2 8 As i n 1963, the Shah r e a c t e d i n i t i a l l y by a v i o l e n t s u p p r e s s i o n of the r i o t s . However, f e a r i n g American c r i t i c i s m p a r t i c u l a r l y , t h e Shah a l s o announced f u r t h e r p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m s . 2 9 T h i s combined c a r r o t and s t i c k p o l i c y came t o c h a r a c t e r i z e the Shah's response throughout the e n t i r e c r i s i s . U n l i k e the 1963 r i o t s , however, the Shah was now c o n f r o n t e d by o p p o s i t i o n from b o t h the s e c u l a r n a t i o n a l i s t s and the S h i ' i t e l e a d e r s . The S h i ' i t e f o r c e s responded t o the Shah's b l o o d y crackdown by more d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , mourning the v i c t i m s a f t e r a 40 day i n t e r v a l , as t h e i r r e l i g i o n p r e s c r i b e d . T h i s l e d t o a s e l f p e r p e t u a t i n g c y c l e of u n r e s t . 3 0 The s e c u l a r f o r c e s were l e s s w i l l i n g t o c h a l l e n g e the Shah's s e c u r i t y f o r c e s but were emboldened t o keep up t h e i r demands s i n c e t h e y appeared t o produce p o l i t i c a l c o n c e s s i o n s . 3 1 The C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d not respond t o the u n r e s t i n I r a n u n t i l the f a l l of 1 9 7 8 . 3 2 S e v e r a l reasons e x p l a i n t h i s slow r e s p o n s e . F i r s t , v i r t u a l l y a l l i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t s d u r i n g the s p r i n g and summer of 1978 c o n c l u d e d t h a t the r i o t s d i d not pose a r e a l c h a l l e n g e t o the Shah. In August, the CIA r e p o r t e d t o C a r t e r t h a t \" I r a n i s not i n a 216 r e v o l u t i o n a r y or even a p r e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n . \" 3 3 The DIA a n a l y s e s p r e d i c t e d t h a t the Shah's r u l e was s t a b l e f o r a t l e a s t a n o t h e r d e c a d e . 3 \" The r e p o r t s from the US embassy i n Tehran were e q u a l l y o p t i m i s t i c . Ambassador S u l l i v a n , who was on h o l i d a y s i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s d u r i n g the summer months, a s s u r e d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s t h a t he saw no t h r e a t t o the S h a h . 3 5 Second, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , d u r i n g t h i s t i m e , was p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h t h r e e of i t s major p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s : the Camp D a v i d peace t a l k s , the n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a , and the SALT n e g o t i a t i o n s . D u r i n g the summer and f a l l of 1978, r a p i d p r o g r e s s on a l l t h r e e i s s u e s o v e r t a x e d the r e s o u r c e s of the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 3 6 L a s t , nobody b e l i e v e d s e r i o u s l y t h a t the Shah c o u l d not d e a l a d e q u a t e l y w i t h the u n r e s t . There were no p l a n s or p o l i c y g u i d a n c e s i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n on what t o do i f the Shah was t h r e a t e n e d . 3 7 The US embassy i n Tehran had l o n g ago stopped i t s i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g among the o p p o s i t i o n f o r c e s s i n c e the Shah had i n d i c a t e d h i s d i s p l e a s u r e w i t h the p r a c t i c e . 3 8 T h e r e f o r e , s i n c e nobody c o u l d c o n c e i v e of the Shah's f a l l , nobody b o t h e r e d sounding the a l a r m , i n s p i t e of the w o r s e n i n g s i t u a t i o n i n I r a n . F u r t h e r m o r e , s i n c e the Shah announced, i n August, t h a t he p l a n n e d t o h o l d f r e e e l e c t i o n s i n 1979, most a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s b e l i e v e d the o p p o s i t i o n had a l r e a d y a c h i e v e d more than i t had h o p e d . 3 9 In e a r l y September, the US embassy r e p o r t e d t h a t a r e c e n t v i o l e n t c l a s h between d e m o n s t r a t o r s and p o l i c e had v i s i b l y shaken the Shah. In r e s p o n s e , Vance and B r z e z i n s k i 217 recommended t o C a r t e r t h a t he phone the Shah t o e x p r e s s h i s s u p p o r t . On September 10, C a r t e r d i d so and \"wished the Shah the b e s t i n r e s o l v i n g these problems and i n b e i n g s u c c e s s f u l i n h i s e f f o r t s t o implement r e f o r m s . \" a o The Shah responded by imposing m a r t i a l law i n c e r t a i n a r e a s of the c o u n t r y as w e l l as by r e l e a s i n g s e v e r a l p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s . A g a i n , the mixed response d i d l i t t l e t o s t o p the unrest.'' 1 Throughout e a r l y O c t o b e r , C a r t e r , both p r i v a t e l y and p u b l i c l y , r e p e a t e d h i s message of s u p p o r t f o r the S h a h . 4 2 Meanwhile, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d n o t h i n g t o i n i t i a t e a p o l i c y debate on how i t s h o u l d d e a l w i t h the s i t u a t i o n . The month of September was dominated by the Camp D a v i d t a l k s . To make m a t t e r s worse, a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s were r e c e i v i n g c o n t r a d i c t o r y r e p o r t s on how the Shah was c o p i n g p e r s o n a l l y w i t h the c r i s i s . US embassy r e p o r t s , as w e l l as p e r s o n a l a c c o u n t s of v i s i t o r s t o I r a n , p i c t u r e d the Shah as a l t e r n a t e l y h i g h l y c o n f i d e n t and o p t i m i s t i c or d e p r e s s e d and out of c o n t r o l . Unknown a t the t i m e , t h e s e mood swings of the Shah were p r o b a b l y due t o the t r e a t m e n t he was r e c e i v i n g f o r lymphoma.\" 3 On October 24, the Department of S t a t e produced the f i r s t memorandum on how the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d d e a l w i t h the c r i s i s . \" \" I t argued t h a t the Shah was i n f o r a v e r y c h a l l e n g i n g p e r i o d u n l e s s he moved r a p i d l y towards p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m s . I t a l s o proposed t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d be s t e a d f a s t i n i t s o p p o s i t i o n t o a m i l i t a r y regime t a k i n g over i n I r a n . F i n a l l y , i t recommended t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s t e p up i t s c o n t a c t s w i t h the o p p o s i t i o n f o r c e s , i n c l u d i n g the 218 m u l l a h s l e d by Khomeini. The memo was sent t o the NSC as w e l l as t o ambassador S u l l i v a n . S u l l i v a n a greed w i t h a l l i t s p o i n t s e xcept the recommendation f o r i n c r e a s e d c o n t a c t s w i t h the o p p o s i t i o n , c o n c l u d i n g : \"Our d e s t i n y i s t o work w i t h the Shah, who i s p r e p a r e d t o ac c e p t a t r u l y d e m o c r a t i c regime i f i t i s a c h i e v e d r e s p o n s i b l y . ' \" 1 5 B r z e z i n s k i d i s a g r e e d w i t h the e n t i r e memo. He d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t a d d i t i o n a l c o n c e s s i o n s by the Shah would improve the s i t u a t i o n . Moreover, he f e l t t h a t the US s h o u l d not e x c l u d e a m i l i t a r y o p t i o n and viewed c o n t a c t s w i t h Khomeini as b o r d e r i n g on t r e a s o n . \" 6 I n s t e a d of c a l l i n g a meeting t o d i s c u s s the memo or s e n d i n g the memo t o C a r t e r , he s h e l v e d i t p e r m a n e n t l y . S i c k r e p o r t s t h a t \" C a r t e r never saw i t \" , and o b s e r v e d : \"Strange as i t may seem, by the end of Oc t o b e r , t h e r e s t i l l had not been a s i n g l e h i g h - l e v e l p o l i c y meeting i n Washington on t h i s s u b j e c t . \" \" 7 U n e x p e c t e d l y , S u l l i v a n dropped the bombshell t h a t s e t the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n f u l l m o tion. On November 2, he sent a c a b l e a s k i n g f o r i n s t r u c t i o n s w i t h i n 48 h o u r s . \" 8 The c a b l e came as a shock t o the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s i n c e i t s t a t e d t h a t the Shah was t h i n k i n g about s t e p p i n g down and fo r m i n g a c i v i l i a n c o a l i t i o n or m i l i t a r y government i n h i s p l a c e . The Shah wanted t o know what the U n i t e d S t a t e s wanted him t o do. A f t e r b r i e f i n g C a r t e r on the c a b l e , B r z e z i n s k i c a l l e d an emergency S p e c i a l C o o r d i n a t i o n Committee (SCC) m e e t i n g . B e s i d e s B r z e z i n s k i , C h r i s t o p h e r (Deputy S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ) , Brown, Jones (Chairman J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f ) , T urner ( D i r e c t o r C I A ) , Aaron (Deputy D i r e c t o r NSC) and S i c k a t t e n d e d the m e e t i n g . \" 9 Vance was too busy w i t h the M i d d l e 219 E a s t n e g o t i a t i o n s t o a t t e n d . B r z e z i n s k i opened the meeting by s t a t i n g t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d send a message of f u l l s u p p o r t f o r the Shah, u r g i n g him t o s t a y on. Furthermore,- the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d i n d i c a t e t h a t f u r t h e r l i b e r a l i z a t i o n e f f o r t s s h o u l d be postponed u n t i l \" d e c i s i v e a c t i o n t o r e s t o r e o r d e r \" has been u n d e r t a k e n . B r z e z i n s k i d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t a c i v i l i a n c o a l i t i o n government under the Shah would h e l p . He added t h a t the I r a n i a n ambassador t o the US, A r d e s h i r Z a h e d i , agreed w i t h h i s a n a l y s i s . C h r i s t o p h e r , s u p p o r t e d by T u r n e r , responded t h a t Zahedi c o u l d not be t r u s t e d as an o b j e c t i v e o b s e r v e r of I r a n i a n p o l i t i c s s i n c e he was c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the Shah. However, C h r i s t o p h e r agreed t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d i n d i c a t e i t s s u p port f o r the Shah, and t h a t Vance shared t h i s b e l i e f . But he b e l i e v e d t h a t the Shah c o u l d b e s t enhance h i s p o s i t i o n by f u r t h e r p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m s , even a c i v i l i a n c o a l i t i o n government under him, which c o u l d i n c l u d e members from the o p p o s i t i o n . Aaron added t h a t the US s h o u l d be c a r e f u l not t o g i v e the Shah the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t i t f a v o u r e d l i b e r a l i z a t i o n s over h i s r u l e . Brown commented t h a t i f the Shah opted f o r a m i l i t a r y government, the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d encourage him t o form such a government under him, and not w i t h o u t him. B r z e z i n s k i c o n t i n u e d t o probe the o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s f o r a message t h a t would g i v e the Shah the green l i g h t t o c r a c k down on the o p p o s i t i o n and r e s t o r e o r d e r by f o r c e . However, a l l the o t h e r a d v i s o r s were opposed t o t h i s i d e a . They b e l i e v e d the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d send a message 220 i n d i c a t i n g p r e f e r e n c e f o r a c i v i l i a n government. The meeting ended i n a d e a d l o c k . I n s t e a d of s u b m i t t i n g the v a r i o u s o p t i o n s t o the p r e s i d e n t f o r h i s f i n a l d e c i s i o n , B r z e z i n s k i papered over the s e r i o u s d i s a g r e e m e n t s i n the group and wrote up a message which c o n s t i t u t e d a compromise between h i s o p t i o n and t h a t of the o t h e r s . The r e s u l t i n g message r e f l e c t e d the l a c k of a c l e a r p o l i c y c h o i c e by the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . In f o u r p o i n t s , i t s t a t e d American support f o r the Shah, r e c o g n i t i o n f o r d e c i s i v e a c t i o n t o r e s t o r e o r d e r , agreement w i t h e i t h e r a c i v i l i a n or m i l i t a r y government under the Shah, and f i n a l l y the hope t h a t l i b e r a l i z a t i o n e f f o r t s would c o n t i n u e . 5 0 C a r t e r , who was busy w i t h o t h e r i s s u e s , approved the vague statement the same day. D i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h what he p e r c e i v e d t o be a weak message, B r z e z i n s k i o b t a i n e d C a r t e r ' s a p p r o v a l t o r e i t e r a t e the message i n a phone c a l l t o the Shah the next day. D u r i n g t h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n , he t r i e d s u b t l e l y t o t i l t the American p o s i t i o n towards s u p p o r t f o r m i l i t a r y a c t i o n t o s t o p the u n r e s t . In p u r s u i t of t h i s o b j e c t i v e , B r z e z i n s k i promised the Shah t h a t , \"the US would back him t o the h i l t \" . 5 1 The Shah p e r c e i v e d t h i s message c o r r e c t l y as a p r e f e r e n c e f o r m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . However, the next day, when he asked S u l l i v a n f o r a c o n f i r m a t i o n of the message, S u l l i v a n responded t h a t he had no i n s t r u c t i o n s t o recommend t h a t c o u r s e of a c t i o n t o the S h a h . 5 2 Moreover, i n a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e on November 3, Vance i n d i c a t e d t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n s i d e r e d f u r t h e r p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a l i z a t i o n j u s t as 2 2 1 i m p o r t a n t as the r e s t o r a t i o n of o r d e r . A l s o , i t hoped such a r e s t o r a t i o n c o u l d o ccur w i t h o u t w i d e s p r e a d b l o o d s h e d . 5 3 These v a r i o u s messages l e f t the Shah b a f f l e d as t o what the U n i t e d S t a t e s wanted him t o do. As a r e s u l t , the Shah c o n t i n u e d h i s c a r r o t and s t i c k p o l i c y even though i t had proven u n s u c c e s f u l . On November 6, he a p p o i n t e d a m i l i t a r y government. Y e t , h a l f of i t s members were c i v i l i a n and i t a c t u a l l y reduced the amount of v i o l e n c e used t o r e s t o r e o r d e r . Moreover, i t announced more r e f o r m s , i n c l u d i n g the r e l e a s e of prominent p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s . In a d d i t i o n , the Shah had s e v e r a l w e l l known c o r r u p t o f f i c i a l s , i n c l u d i n g the head of SAVAK, a r r e s t e d . 5 \" C a r t e r announced t h a t he s u p p o r t e d the Shah's new government but t h a t he had not put p r e s s u r e on him t o c r e a t e i t . 5 5 The remainder of November saw a p a r t i a l r e t u r n of calm t o the c o u n t r y . The d e v a s t a t i n g o i l s t r i k e s of October stopped and fewer d e m o n s t r a t i o n s took p l a c e . However, i t was f e a r e d t h a t the h o l y month of S h i ' i t e , which c o v e r e d most of December, would b r i n g new u n r e s t . 5 6 Now f u l l y a l e r t t o the I r a n i a n s i t u a t i o n , B r z e z i n s k i o r d e r e d a new CIA a n a l y s i s . As the o p p o s i t i o n f o r c e s s l o w l y p e r c e i v e d t h a t the m i l i t a r y government was not g o i n g t o crackdown v i o l e n t l y , they g a t h e r e d f o r c e s f o r a n o t h e r r o u n d . 5 7 222 EVALUATING THE OPTIONS AND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS Up t o t h i s p o i n t , the debate i n Washington was c o n f i n e d t o the q u e s t i o n : how can we s t r e n g t h e n the r u l e of the Shah? Nobody had y e t t h o u g h t , or a t l e a s t not o p e n l y e x p r e s s e d : what t o do i f the Shah f e l l ? The debate on how t o s t r e n g h t e n the Shah c e n t r e d around two d i f f e r e n t o p t i o n s and p e r s p e c t i v e s . B r z e z i n s k i argued t h a t American i n t e r e s t i n the r u l e of the Shah was so g r e a t t h a t i t c o u l d t a k e no chances t o undermine i t . C h r i s t o p h e r and Vance b e l i e v e d t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s a l s o had the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o promote d e m o c r a t i c v a l u e s . 5 8 B r z e z i n s k i a l s o d i s a g r e e d w i t h Vance, Turner and Mondale on how t o d e a l w i t h massive u p r i s i n g s i n g e n e r a l . B r z e z i n s k i b e l i e v e d t h a t r e v o l u t i o n s were o n l y won as a r e s u l t of t a c t i c a l e r r o r s or c o n c e s s i o n s by the r u l i n g e l i t e . T h e r e f o r e , he recommended t h a t the Shah s t o p h i s c a r r o t and s t i c k p o l i c y and c r a c k down on the o p p o s i t i o n . The o t h e r s , however, b e l i e v e d t h a t the u n r e s t was due t o the Shah's e x c e s s i v e power and t h a t he c o u l d \" d i s a r m \" them by l a r g e s c a l e p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m s . 5 9 F i n a l l y , B r z e z i n s k i d i s a g r e e d w i t h the o t h e r s on the e x t e n t t o which the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d become i n v o l v e d i n the c r i s i s . Vance, C h r i s t o p h e r and Mondale a l l b e l i e v e d t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d not assume the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a b l o o d b a t h i n I r a n . B r z e z i n s k i , however, argued t h a t s i n c e the Shah appeared so weak, the U n i t e d S t a t e s \"had no c h o i c e 223 b u t . . . t o make the d e c i s i o n f o r h i m \" 6 0 C a r t e r was p e r s o n a l l y much c l o s e r t o t h e Vance group than t o B r z e z i n s k i . Y e t , he a l s o wanted the Shah t o s u r v i v e . In e s s e n c e , C a r t e r was f a c e d w i t h a d i f f i c u l t s e t of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . W h i l e he c o u l d not a l l o w the U n i t e d S t a t e s t o i n i t i a t e a b l o o d y crackdown f o r moral r e a s o n s , he c o u l d a l s o not a f f o r d t o l o s e the Shah. Moreover, he knew t h a t the Shah e x p e c t e d s t r o n g d i r e c t i o n s from the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Y e t , d u r i n g the i n i t i a l s t a g e , C a r t e r d i d not a d d r e s s t h e s e q u e s t i o n s . S i c k n otes t h a t : Whatever the r e a s o n s , C a r t e r d i d not engage h i m s e l f a c t i v e l y i n the day-to-day p o l i c y - m a k i n g d u r i n g the I r a n c r i s i s i n the same way t h a t he d i d i n many o t h e r p o l i c y i s s u e s . 6 1 C a r t e r , n o t e s S i c k , had h i s h e a r t i n the Camp D a v i d t a l k s a t the t i m e . As a r e s u l t , the debates were not s e t t l e d and no c l e a r p o s i t i o n s were f o r m u l a t e d . W h i l e C a r t e r must c a r r y some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h i s f a i l u r e , the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y m a i n t a i n s t h a t the c u s t o d i a n must a l e r t t h e p r e s i d e n t t o such m a l f u n c t i o n s . The c u s t o d i a n , however, d i d not o n l y f a i l t o do so but a l s o engaged i n s e v e r a l o t h e r r o l e v i o l a t i o n s . I t i s the c u s t o d i a n ' s t a s k t o i d e n t i f y p o l i c y i s s u e s t h a t r e q u i r e the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s a t t e n t i o n . A l t h o u g h B r z e z i n s k i was hampered i n t h i s t a s k by poor i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t i n g and an o v e r l o a d e d agenda, he was a l s o r e l u c t a n t t o r a i s e the i s s u e , f e a r i n g t h a t i t would l e a d t o an American response t h a t would undermine the Shah. A major p i e c e of 224 e v i d e n c e f o r t h i s r o l e t a s k f a i l u r e i s the way i n which he t r e a t e d the October 24 memorandum from the S t a t e Department. Rather than u s i n g the document as a b a s i s f o r debate w i t h i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , he k i l l e d i t s message. In so d o i n g , he v i o l a t e d two e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y : the f a i r n e s s and c o m p e t i t i o n p r i n c i p l e s . The f a i r n e s s c o n d i t i o n r e q u i r e s the c u s t o d i a n t o g i v e a l l o p t i o n s i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a f a i r h e a r i n g among a l l a d v o c a t e s . The c o m p e t i t i o n p r i n c i p l e , among o t h e r t h i n g s , r e q u i r e s him t o b r i n g t h e p o l i c y disagreement .among the a d v i s o r s t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n . By r e f u s i n g t o c i r c u l a t e or d i s c u s s the memo, B r z e z i n s k i p r e v e n t e d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n from h a v i n g an open debate on the c r i s i s a t the e a r l i e s t a v a i l a b l e t i m e . 6 2 F o r c e d by S u l l i v a n ' s c a b l e of November 2, B r z e z i n s k i c a l l e d a SCC meeting a t l a s t . D u r i n g the m e e t i n g , he was al o n e i n a d v o c a t i n g a m i l i t a r y crackdown t o r e s t o r e o r d e r i n I r a n . W h i l e h i s o p t i o n c o u l d have improved the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s had C a r t e r been i n v o l v e d i n the debate, B r z e z i n s k i made no e f f o r t t o e l e v a t e the c o n f l i c t t o h i s a t t e n t i o n . W h i l e C a r t e r can be blamed f o r b e i n g too o c c u p i e d w i t h o t h e r i s s u e s , the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y s t a t e s t h a t i t i s the c u s t o d i a n ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y \" t o ensure c h i e f e x e c u t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . \" 6 3 As a r e s u l t of B r z e z i n s k i ' s r o l e v i o l a t i o n s , t h e r e was never a c l e a r p o l i c y c h o i c e made. I n s t e a d , a compromise was f o r g e d , which r e s u l t e d i n an ambiguous and c o n f u s i n g message t o the Shah. To make m a t t e r s worse, B r z e z i n s k i engaged 225 p e r s o n a l l y i n the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of p o l i c y by phoning the Shah. In h i s s t u d y , H a l l e v a l u a t e d t h e r o l e of p o l i c y enforcement on the p a r t of the c u s t o d i a n and found the f o l l o w i n g . The c u s t o d i a n can communicate the p r e s i d e n t ' s c h o i c e t o the department heads as w e l l as c o o r d i n a t e p o l i c y i m p l e m e n t a t i o n t h r o u g h the v a r i o u s committees w i t h o u t harming h i s o t h e r r o l e t a s k s . However, when the c u s t o d i a n a t t e m p t s p e r s o n a l l y t o \" r u n \" the v a r i o u s a g e n c i e s or r e l a y s p e r s o n a l l y the p r e s i d e n t ' s w i l l t o f o r e i g n o f f i c i a l s , he i s l i k e l y t o compromise h i s own a b i l i t y t o p r o c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n f a i r l y , and i s prone t o d i s c r e d i t or b l o c k o t h e r o f f i c i a l s i n t h e i r attempt t o implement p o l i c y . 6 \" The e v i d e n c e i n t h i s case c o n f i r m s H a l l ' s f i n d i n g s . The c o n t e n t of B r z e z i n s k i ' s phone c a l l d i f f e r e d from the message sent the p r e v i o u s day. S u l l i v a n c o u l d not r e c o n c i l e them and the Shah l o s t f u r t h e r c o n f i d e n c e i n C a r t e r ' s suppport f o r h i m . 6 5 THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE FALL OF THE SHAH On November 9, S u l l i v a n sent a c a b l e t i t l e d \" T h i n k i n g the U n t h i n k a b l e \" , which c a l l e d f o r a change i n the debate i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n from how t o support the Shah t o what the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d do t o a f f e c t the s i t u a t i o n i f the Shah f a l l s . 6 6 S u l l i v a n r e p o r t e d t h a t support f o r the Shah i n I r a n was e r o d i n g q u i c k l y . I n s t e a d of s t a t i n g m erely i t s su p p o r t 226 f o r the Shah, the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d improve i t s c o n t a c t s w i t h the moderate n a t i o n a l i s t o p p o s i t i o n . S u l l i v a n b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e s e moderates c o u l d govern i f the Khomeini f o r c e s were a l l o w e d t o p l a y a c o n s t r u c t i v e r o l e i n I r a n as w e l l . He b e l i e v e d t h a t the j u n i o r o f f i c e r s i n the army would a c c e p t Khomeini as a s y m b o l i c f i g u r e h e a d i n an I s l a m i c r e p u b l i c . Moreover, such a r e p u b l i c , i f governed by the moderate n a t i o n a l i s t s , would not be h o s t i l e t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Though not s t a t e d e x p l i c i t l y , S u l l i v a n wanted the U n i t e d S t a t e s t o ease the Shah out of o f f i c e . However, none of C a r t e r ' s s e n i o r a d v i s o r s agreed w i t h S u l l i v a n . 6 7 Though Vance f a v o u r e d the i d e a of more c o n t a c t s w i t h the moderate o p p o s i t i o n , he agreed w i t h B r z e z i n s k i , Mondale and Brown t h a t C a r t e r s h o u l d not \"undermine\" the Shah's r u l e by c o n t a c t i n g K h o m e i n i . As a r e s u l t , C a r t e r r e j e c t e d S u l l i v a n ' s a d v i c e , s t a t i n g t h a t \"the key t o s t a b i l i t y was t h e monarch h i m s e l f s u p p o r t e d by the m i l i t a r y . \" 6 8 A g a i n , B r z e z i n s k i urged C a r t e r t o t e l l the Shah t o use the m i l i t a r y t o r e s t o r e o r d e r but as B r z e z i n s k i h i m s e l f n o t e d : \" C a r t e r became s k e p t i c a l when I p a i n t e d a g r i m p i c t u r e of the s t r a t e g i c consequences f o r us of I r a n ' s and t h e Shah's t r a g e d y . \" 6 9 A l s o , B r z e z i n s k i became s u s p i c i o u s of S u l l i v a n ' s o b j e c t i v i t y i n the c r i s i s . F e a r i n g t h a t S u l l i v a n wanted p e r s o n a l l y t o see the end of the Shah's r u l e , B r z e z i n s k i i n c r e a s e d h i s p r i v a t e c o n t a c t s w i t h Z a h e d i . Z a h e d i , i n t u r n , urged B r z e z i n s k i t o c o n v i n c e C a r t e r of the need f o r m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . 7 0 227 However, as the r i o t s i n c r e a s e d i n e a r l y December, w i t h the S h i ' i t e c e l e b r a t i o n of t h e i r h o l y month, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d not o f f e r any a l t e r n a t i v e s t o S u l l i v a n ' s o p t i o n . Meanwhile, Khomeini, from h i s e x i l e i n P a r i s , urged h i s f o l l o w e r s t o s a c r i f i c e t h emselves i n t h e i r p r o t e s t a g a i n s t the Shah. M a s s i v e r i o t s and a g e n e r a l s t r i k e ensued. The moderate f o r c e s , now gauging Khomeini's s t r e n g t h , d i s t a n c e d themselves from any c o a l i t i o n government p r o p o s a l from the Shah. The Shah responded by j a i l i n g s e v e r a l of t h e i r l e a d e r s and r e l e a s i n g them a g a i n as t h e i r imprisonment caused f u r t h e r r i o t s . 7 1 Throughout a l l t h i s , the American a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was l o s i n g time t o i n f l u e n c e the e v e n t s . S u l l i v a n c o m plained t h a t : \"We d r i f t e d t h r o u g h the remainder of November i n t o December w i t h no guidance from the Department of S t a t e or Washington i n g e n e r a l . \" 7 2 In the l a s t week of November, S e c r e t a r y of the T r e a s u r y , M i c h a e l B l u m e n t h a l , v i s i t e d the Shah. Upon h i s r e t u r n , he t o l d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h a t the Shah l o o k e d d e s p a r a t e and needed American h e l p . B r z e z i n s k i agreed w i t h B l u m e n t h a l ' s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t an o u t s i d e a d v i s o r s h o u l d come i n t o do an independent study of the c r i s i s . The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s e l e c t e d George B a l l , a s e n i o r DOS o f f i c i a l d u r i n g the Kennedy y e a r s , f o r t h i s t a s k . 7 3 D u r i n g B a l l ' s s t u d y , C a r t e r made a p u b l i c s l i p of the tongue which made the s i t u a t i o n c o n s i d e r a b l y worse. On November 7, d u r i n g a b r e a k f a s t meeting w i t h r e p o r t e r s , C a r t e r responded t o a q u e s t i o n of whether he thought the Shah c o u l d s u r v i v e by s a y i n g : 228 I don't know. I hope so. I t i s i n the hands of the I r a n i a n p e o p l e . The US has no i n t e n t i o n t o i n t e r c e d e i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of I r a n . . . We p r i m a r i l y want an absence of v i o l e n c e and blo o d s h e d . We p e r s o n a l l y p r e f e r t h a t the Shah m a i n t a i n a major r o l e i n the government, but t h a t i s a d e c i s i o n f o r the I r a n i a n p e o p l e t o make. 7\" S e v e r a l o f f i c i a l s winced a t t h i s mishap. S i c k r e p o r t s t h a t i t was p e r c e i v e d i n I r a n as a d e c i s i o n by C a r t e r \" t o dump the Shah,\" even though C a r t e r had not y e t made t h a t d e c i s i o n . 7 5 On December 13, a SCC meeting was convened t o d i s c u s s the r e s u l t s of B a l l ' s r e p o r t . 7 6 B a l l s t a t e d t h a t he thought the Shah was damaged beyond r e p a i r . He proposed t h a t the Shah assume i m m e d i a t e l y a l e s s e r r o l e of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarch, as p r e s c r i b e d by the 1906 c o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i l e h anding over power t o a c o u n c i l of n o t a b l e s . T h i s c o u n c i l s h o u l d be composed of a c r o s s s e c t i o n of I r a n i a n p o l i t i c i a n s and c o u l d r u l e u n t i l the 1979 e l e c t i o n s . By a l l means, the Shah s h o u l d be d i s c o u r a g e d from u s i n g m i l i t a r y f o r c e t o c o n s o l i d a t e h i s p o s i t i o n . Vance agreed w i t h t h i s a n a l y s i s and i n d i c a t e d h i s s t r o n g s u pport f o r a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n t o the c r i s i s . 7 7 B r z e z i n s k i , s u p p o r t e d by a CIA r e p o r t of November 30, argued t h a t the moderate f o r c e s were too weak t o r u l e the c o u n t r y . 7 8 Though B a l l b e l i e v e d t h a t the army was not c a p a b l e of g o v e r n i n g , B r z e z i n s k i , s u p p o r t e d by energy S e c r e t a r y James S c h l e s i n g e r , argued i n f a v o u r of a m i l i t a r y government. B r z e z i n s k i c i t e d the s t a b l e m i l i t a r y regimes of Turkey and B r a z i l as e v i d e n c e f o r h i s argument. Brown took a m i d d l e p o s i t i o n , a r g u i n g merely t h a t the 229 m i l i t a r y was becoming the most i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n the I r a n i a n p o l i t i c a l system. Whatever the U n i t e d S t a t e s p r o p o s e s , i t s h o u l d not d i v i d e the m i l i t a r y . A f t e r the m e e t i n g , B r z e z i n s k i p r e p a r e d a memorandum f o r C a r t e r which summarized the o p t i o n s and the d i s c u s s i o n . The next day, B a l l met w i t h C a r t e r and B r z e z i n s k i t o d i s c u s s h i s p r o p o s a l . 7 9 Now s o r r y t h a t he had i n v i t e d B a l l , B r z e z i n s k i argued s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t B a l l ' s p r o p o s a l . C a r t e r l i k e d the i d e a but was r e l u c t a n t t o a c c e p t any p r o p o s a l t h a t might i n d i c a t e t h a t he d i d not su p p o r t the Shah. I n s t e a d , he i n s t r u c t e d Vance t o have S u l l i v a n mention the p r o p o s a l t o the Shah f o r h i s o p i n i o n . D u r i n g the m e e t i n g , B r z e z i n s k i a l s o mentioned t o C a r t e r t h a t e i t h e r he or S c h l e s i n g e r s h o u l d go t o I r a n t o boost the Shah's c o n f i d e n c e . To B r z e z i n s k i ' s c h a g r i n , B a l l was a b l e t o c o n v i n c e C a r t e r t h a t such a b l a t a n t s i g n of US i n t e r f e r e n c e would o n l y provoke more u n r e s t . A f t e r t h i s m e e t i n g , B a l l r e t u r n e d t o h i s law p r a c t i c e . B e f o r e l e a v i n g , however, he i n f o r m e d Vance t h a t B r z e z i n s k i , v i a ambassador Z a h e d i , who had r e c e n t l y r e t u r n e d t o I r a n t o a d v i s e the Shah, was p u t t i n g p r e s s u r e on the Shah t o crackdown on the r i o t e r s . He a d v i s e d Vance a l s o t o become more i n v o l v e d i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s s i n c e B r z e z i n s k i was p i c t u r i n g the s u r v i v a b i l i t y of the Shah i n o v e r l y o p t i m i s t i c terms t o C a r t e r . Moreover, B a l l b e l i e v e d t h a t B r z e z i n s k i was not g i v i n g s e v e r a l a d v o c a t e s i n the Department of S t a t e a f a i r h e a r i n g f o r t h e i r o p t i o n s . 8 0 S u l l i v a n d i s c u s s e d the \" c o u n c i l of n o t a b l e s \" concept w i t h the Shah but found him u n e n t h u s i a s t i c . In f a c t , 230 S u l l i v a n h i m s e l f d i d not t h i n k i t was a good i d e a s i n c e most of t h e s e \" n o t a b l e s \" were h a r d l y on s p e a k i n g terms. I n s t e a d , the Shah t o l d S u l l i v a n t h a t he c o n s i d e r e d f o r m i n g a c i v i l i a n government composed of N a t i o n a l F r o n t l e a d e r s , w h i l e he would o n l y m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l over the m i l i t a r y . Yet b e f o r e d o i n g so, he wanted a c l e a r e r American i n d i c a t i o n what i t wanted him t o d o . 8 1 D u r i n g t h i s t i m e , Henry P r e c h t (Department of S t a t e Desk o f f i c e r f o r I r a n ) proposed a n o t h e r o p t i o n t o B r z e z i n s k i . 8 2 In a p e r s o n a l m e e t i n g , P r e c h t c o m p l a i n e d t h a t he had t r i e d t o put h i s o p t i o n f o r w a r d s i n c e l a t e O c t o b e r . However, the i n t e r a g e n c y p r o c e s s had f a i l e d t o g i v e him a chance. He was now p r e p a r e d t o put h i s j o b on the l i n e , s i m p l y t o be h e a r d . He argued t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d i m m e d i a t e l y remove the Shah from the t h r o n e . Moreover, i t s h o u l d not waste i t s time w i t h c i v i l i a n governments composed of N a t i o n a l F r o n t l e a d e r s s i n c e t h i s group had no l o n g e r any r e a l power. I n s t e a d , the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d seek a \"modus vivendum\" w i t h the Khomeini f o r c e s . P r e c h t b e l i e v e d t h a t Khomeini would prove t o be a moderate w i t h whom the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d work. P r e c h t saw t h e American r o l e now t o be one \" . . . o f f i n d i n g a g r a c e f u l e x i t f o r the Shah w h i l e g a i n i n g a f a i r amount of c r e d i t i n d o i n g s o . \" 8 3 S i c k was more s k e p t i c a l about the moderate n a t u r e of a f u t u r e government under Khomeini but agreed w i t h P r e c h t t h a t the time had come t o abandon the Shah. B r z e z i n s k i , who had been i n s t r u m e n t a l i n s t i f l i n g P r e c h t ' s o p t i o n , was not i n the l e a s t i m p r e s s e d . A g a i n he 231 r e f u s e d t o t r e a t t h i s p r o p o s a l as a d i s c u s s i o n paper w i t h i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . S i c k notes t h a t both P r e c h t ' s and h i s advocacy was s i m p l y i g n o r e d . 8 4 F r u s t r a t e d w i t h the l a c k of American g u i d a n c e , the Shah proposed t h r e e p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s t o S u l l i v a n . 8 5 He c o u l d c o n t i n u e t o t r y f o r m i n g a c o a l i t i o n government w i t h the N a t i o n a l F r o n t . He c o u l d a p p o i n t a government s i m i l a r t o B a l l ' s p r o p o s a l . L a s t , he c o u l d o r d e r h i s m i l i t a r y t o crackdown. The l a s t o p t i o n he c a l l e d the \" I r o n F i s t . \" F u r t h e r m o r e , the Shah wondered whether the U n i t e d S t a t e s wanted him t o s t e p a s i d e or even l e a v e the c o u n t r y . On December 26, S u l l i v a n i n formed Washington of the Shah's proposed s o l u t i o n s . S u l l i v a n added t h a t the Shah was r e l u c t a n t t o t r y the I r o n F i s t , u n l e s s he c o u l d \" be a s s u r e d of complete American b a c k i n g . 8 6 On December 28, Vance, B r z e z i n s k i , Brown, Turner and S c h l e s i n g e r met t o d i s c u s s the Shah's p r o p o s a l s . 8 7 Vance, w i t h T u r n e r ' s s u p p o r t , argued t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d s t a t e i t s f i r m o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e I r o n F i s t . W h i l e the Shah's d e p a r t u r e per se i s no s o l u t i o n , he must t r y a c o a l i t i o n government. Vance reasoned t h a t the army was no l o n g e r a b l e t o r e s t o r e o r d e r and t h a t i t would p r o b a b l y break up i f i t t r i e d t o do so. B r z e z i n s k i and S c h l e s i n g e r d i s a g r e e d . They b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be no c o n t a c t s w i t h the o p p o s i t i o n , and t h a t the Shah s h o u l d be f r e e t o d e c i d e what t o do, i n c l u d i n g the I r o n F i s t s o l u t i o n . In t h i s m eeting, S c h l e s i n g e r was as f o r c e f u l an advocate f o r the I r o n F i s t o p t i o n as B r z e z i n s k i . 232 W i t h C a r t e r a t Camp D a v i d , and the a d v i s o r s not a b l e t o r e s o l v e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s , they agreed t o w r i t e up a compromise message t o S u l l i v a n . B r z e z i n s k i a g a i n t r i e d h i s bes t t o make the message s u b t l e enough t o a l l o w the Shah t o employ the I r o n F i s t o p t i o n . The message s t a t e d t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s p r e f e r r e d a c o a l i t i o n government. However, i t went on t o say t h a t i f t h e r e was u n c e r t a i n t y about the u n d e r l y i n g o r i e n t a t i o n of such a government or i t s c a p a c i t y t o g o v e r n , or i f the army was i n danger of becoming more fragmented: \"then a f i r m m i l i t a r y government under the Shah may be u n a v o i d a b l e . \" 8 8 Vance took the message t o Camp D a v i d f o r C a r t e r ' s a p p r o v a l . C a r t e r , a t Vance's u r g i n g , changed the language so t h a t the Shah would not a p p l y h i s I r o n F i s t o p t i o n . I n s t e a d of recommending a \" f i r m m i l i t a r y government,\" the message now a d v i s e d \"a government which would end d i s o r d e r , v i o l e n c e and b l o o d s h e d . \" Vance was s a t i s f i e d t h i s message was l e s s ambiguous: The Shah c o u l d not f a i l t o see from t h i s message t h a t we would support a m i l i t a r y government o n l y t o end bl o o d s h e d , but not t o a p p l y the I r o n F i s t t o r e t a i n h i s t h r o n e . 8 9 The message f u r t h e r noted t h a t i f the shah d i d not t h i n k e i t h e r o p t i o n f e a s i b l e , he c o u l d form a regency c o u n c i l government, s i m i l a r t o B a l l ' s p r o p o s a l . B r z e z i n s k i was a l s o s a t i s f i e d w i t h the message. He c a l l e d i t the c l e a r e s t and most d i r e c t e f f o r t t o get the Shah t o do what needed t o be done, w i t h o u t the US assuming, i n e f f e c t , the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 233 g o v e r n i n g I r a n on h i s b e h a l f . 9 0 The Shah, however, f a i l e d t o see any guidance i n the message. As b e f o r e , the c o n f u s i n g compromise statement d i d not r e a s s u r e him. On December 29, the Shah asked a g a i n whether he s h o u l d l e a v e . S u l l i v a n t o l d him he had no i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h a t q u e s t i o n but he was sure the shah would be welcome i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s . 9 1 The same day the Shah announced t h a t he had asked a prominent N a t i o n a l F r o n t l e a d e r , B a k h t i a r , t o form a c i v i l i a n government. He a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t he might l e a v e the c o u n t r y f o r a \" v a c a t i o n . \" 9 2 B a k h t i a r a c c e p t e d the Shah's o f f e r on January 2, 1979. At the same t i m e , the o t h e r n a t i o n a l f r o n t l e a d e r s broke w i t h him and j o i n e d the Khomeini camp. Khomeini r e a c t e d t o the news by a t t a c k i n g B a k h t i a r as vehemently as he had a t t a c k e d the Shah. As a r e s u l t , January saw o n l y more r i o t s and s t r i k e s . 9 3 On January 2, S u l l i v a n sent another c a b l e t o W a s h i n g t o n . 9 \" He r e p o r t e d t h a t w h i l e the Shah had a p p o i n t e d B a k h t i a r , he i n t e n d e d t o keep s i g n i f i c a n t powers h i m s e l f . Moreover, the Shah was t r y i n g t o s t a l l h i s d e p a r t u r e . S u l l i v a n b e l i e v e d t h a t i f the Shah f a i l e d t o l e a v e , the m i l i t a r y might t r y by means of a coup d ' e t a t t o r e i n s t a t e him. A l s o , as l o n g as the Shah s t a y e d i n the c o u n t r y , the B a k h t i a r government would not r e c e i v e any c r e d i b i l i t y i n I r a n . S u l l i v a n c o n c l u d e d by a d d i n g t h a t i n h i s o p i n i o n , the B a k h t i a r government had not much chance of s u r v i v i n g . T h e r e f o r e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d open c o n t a c t s w i t h 234 Khomeini. Throughout t h i s time, B r z e z i n s k i and Zahedi remained i n c l o s e touch. While S u l l i v a n was informing the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h a t i t s p o l i c y was f a i l i n g , Zahedi urged B r z e z i n s k i to cont i n u e to support the Shah. B r z e z i n s k i , i n t u r n , gave C a r t e r a more o p t i m i s t i c assessment of the Shah's s i t u a t i o n than Vance. Moreover, i t appears that B r z e z i n s k i and Zahedi were prodding the Shah p r i v a t e l y to implement h i s Iron F i s t o p t i o n . 9 5 On January 3, a f u l l N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l meeting c o n s i d e r e d the q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d by S u l l i v a n . 9 6 C a r t e r asked h i s a d v i s o r s whether he should t e l l the Shah to le a v e . Vance thought so. The Un i t e d S t a t e s should now h e l p c o n s o l i d a t e the Bakhtiar government and t e l l the Shah to step a s i d e . C e r t a i n l y , i t should not gi v e the m i l i t a r y the impression that i t c o u l d stage a m i l i t a r y coup with American b l e s s i n g . B r z e z i n s k i d i d not th i n k that the United S t a t e s should t e l l the Shah to le a v e . C a r t e r s t a t e d that he would put i t i n such a way that i t appeared as an American concurrence i n a d e c i s i o n made s o l e l y by the Shah. B r z e z i n s k i f u r t h e r noted that such a statement might not be very c r e d i b l e to the I r a n i a n s , e s p e c i a l l y to those who counted on American support. However, C a r t e r had made up h i s mind. He decided t h a t the Shah c o u l d come to the Un i t e d S t a t e s and i n d i c a t e d h i s support f o r the Bak h t i a r government, even though S u l l i v a n had warned that the Khomeini f o r c e s d i d not support B a k h t i a r . However, C a r t e r \"thought there was a chance f o r t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to improve.\" 9 7 235 N ext, the Department of Defense o f f i c i a l p r e s e n t ( C h a r l e s Duncan) recommended t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s send a t o p m i l i t a r y o f f i c i a l t o Tehran t o p r o v i d e s u p p o r t f o r the I r a n i a n m i l i t a r y . B r z e z i n s k i s u p p o r t e d t h i s move. I t was a greed t h a t G e n e r a l Huyser (Deputy t o US NATO Commander A l e x a n d e r Haig) would go. H i s i n s t r u c t i o n s were i n the form of t h r e e p r i o r i z e d i t e m s . F i r s t , he was t o a s s u r e m i l i t a r y s u p p ort f o r the B a k h t i a r government. Second, he was t o a s s u r e t h a t the m i l i t a r y remained u n i t e d . L a s t , i n case the c i v i l i a n government c o l l a p s e d and w i d e s p r e a d c i v i l d i s o r d e r f o l l o w e d , he s h o u l d h e l p the m i l i t a r y r e s t o r e o r d e r . 9 8 In the f o l l o w i n g days, B a k h t i a r took over the r e i g n s of power, Huyser went t o I r a n , and the Shah s t a t e d t h a t he would l e a v e on J a nuary 1 6 . 9 9 I t soon became c l e a r , however, t h a t the NSC meeting of J a n u a r y 3 had not r e s o l v e d a l l d i f f e r e n e s w i t h i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Throughout J a n u a r y , t h r e e d i v i s i v e i s s u e s impeded the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n i t s attempt t o manage the c r i s i s i n I r a n . F i r s t , S u l l i v a n kept p r e s s i n g Washington t o s t a r t t a l k i n g w i t h K h o m e i n i . 1 0 0 Vance backed S u l l i v a n on t h i s p o i n t but B r z e z i n s k i warned C a r t e r t h a t i t would undermine the B a k h t i a r g o v e r n m e n t . 1 0 1 C a r t e r f i r s t s i d e d w i t h B r z e z i n s k i but i n the m i d d l e of J a nuary a u t h o r i z e d the US embassy i n P a r i s t o s t a r t i n d i r e c t t a l k s w i t h K h o meini. The t a l k s never l e d t o any agreement. S u l l i v a n r e p l i e d t o C a r t e r ' s d e c i s i o n w i t h open c r i t i c i s m . T h i s i n t u r n , made C a r t e r wonder i f S u l l i v a n was s u p p o r t i n g the B a k h t i a r government a d e q u a t e l y . I t was even r e p o r t e d i n Washington 236 t h a t S u l l i v a n had a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d c o n t a c t s w i t h Khomeini's a s s i s t a n t s , w i t h o u t C a r t e r ' s a p p r o v a l . At one p o i n t , C a r t e r c o n s i d e r e d f i r i n g S u l l i v a n . However, Vance was a b l e t o persuade him t h a t such a move would o n l y weaken American i n f l u e n c e i n I r a n . 1 0 2 Second, B r z e z i n s k i and S c h l e s i n g e r i n t e r p r e t e d Huyser's m i s s i o n d i f f e r e n t l y from t h e o t h e r a d v i s o r s . 1 0 3 S i n c e t h e u n r e s t o n l y i n c r e a s e d i n I r a n , B r z e z i n s k i b e l i e v e d t h a t the time had come t o implement Huyser's t h i r d i n s t r u c t i o n : t o r e s t o r e o r d e r by m i l i t a r y f o r c e . When rumors t h a t s e v e r a l g e n e r a l s might f o r c e f u l l y p r e v e n t the shah's d e p a r t u r e a r o s e , B r z e z i n s k i urged C a r t e r t o implement Huyser's f i n a l o p t i o n . However, C a r t e r would have none of i t . 1 0 \" On J a n u a r y 18, B r z e z i n s k i made a f i n a l attempt i n a l o n g p r i v a t e memorandum t o C a r t e r . 1 0 5 A g a i n , C a r t e r r e f u s e d . L i k e S u l l i v a n ' s independent a c t i o n s , B r z e z i n s k i ' s p e r s i s t e n c e i n a d v o c a t i n g a m i l i t a r y coup eroded the p r e s i d e n t ' s c o n f i d e n c e i n him: ... I s u s p e c t e d t h a t my u r g i n g of a coup... was undermining my c r e d i b i l i t y w i t h the p r e s i d e n t , who found my advocacy of a coup m o r a l l y troublesome as w e l l as i r r i t a t i n g . 1 0 6 T h i r d , Huyser, upon h i s a r r i v a l i n Tehran, had s e t up an independent communications c h a n n e l w i t h the Department of Defense. H i s a n a l y s i s of the events i n I r a n d i f f e r e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y from S u l l i v a n ' s r e p o r t i n g t o the Department of S t a t e . 1 0 7 W h i l e S u l l i v a n r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e B a k h t i a r 237 government was l o s i n g c o n t r o l and t h a t t h e army was r a p i d l y d i s i n t e g r a t i n g , Huyser b e l i e v e d the m i l i t a r y was s t i l l i n f l u e n t i a l and s h o u l d c o n t i n u e t o s u p p o r t B a k h t i a r . These c o n f l i c t i n g r e p o r t s reduced f u r t h e r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s a b i l i t y t o i n f l u e n c e the c o u r s e of e v e n t s i n I r a n . 1 0 8 Moreover, Vance, aware of B r z e z i n s k i ' s c o n t a c t s w i t h Z a h e d i , and h i s advocacy f o r a m i l i t a r y coup, i n s t r u c t e d S u l l i v a n t o d i s c a r d any \" u n a u t h o r i z e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . \" 1 0 9 Towards the end of J a n u a r y , e v e n t s i n I r a n o v e r r a n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s a b i l i t y t o keep up w i t h them, l e t a l o n e i n f l u e n c e them. On F e b r u a r y 1, Khomeini r e t u r n e d t o I r a n and s e t up an a l t e r n a t i v e government t o B a k h t i a r ' s . The subsequent s t a n d o f f l a s t e d u n t i l F e b r u a r y 11, when the army command o r d e r e d i t s t r o o p s back i n t o the b a r r a c k s and B a k h t i a r f l e d the c o u n t r y . 1 1 0 From then on, the Americans c o n c e n t r a t e d on the e v a c u a t i o n of t h e i r c i t i z e n s and the p r o t e c t i o n of the Embassy and o t h e r f a c i l i t i e s . The r e v o l u t i o n was c o m p l e t e d . 1 1 1 AN EVALUATION OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS In s p i t e of S u l l i v a n ' s c a l l f o r a r e v i e w of American s u p p o r t f o r the Shah, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , throughout November and December, d i d l i t t l e t o c o n s i d e r i t s o p t i o n s . The i n t e r a g e n c y p r o c e s s of g a t h e r i n g and d e b a t i n g v a r i o u s o p t i o n s , which had c h a r a c t e r i z e d the e a r l y y e a r s of the 238 a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , had v i r t u a l l y broken down. S i c k notes t h a t : There were s p o r a d i c h i g h - l e v e l m e e t i n g s , but n o t h i n g of a c o n t i n u i n g b a s i s , n o t h i n g t h a t r e a l l y f o r c e d the i s s u e s t o be r a i s e d , i d e n t i f i e d , r e f i n e d , argued out and c a r r i e d back and f o r t h t o the p r e s i d e n t on a r e g u l a r b a s i s . 1 1 2 As a r e s u l t , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n never had a co h e r e n t p o l i c y t o d e a l w i t h the c r i s i s . S e v e r a l a n a l y s t s of t h i s i s s u e have blamed C a r t e r f o r a l a c k of l e a d e r s h i p and an u n w i l l i n g n e s s to b r i n g the v a r i o u s p e r s p e c t i v e s t o g e t h e r i n t o a c l e a r p o l i c y c h o i c e . 1 1 3 Indeed, C a r t e r ' s r o l e t hroughout the c r i s i s can be f a u l t e d . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y d e s c r i b e s h i s r o l e as the* f i n a l a r b i t e r of the v a r i o u s c h o i c e s brought t o him. C a r t e r f a i l e d t o make t h i s c h o i c e . W h i l e he s u p p o r t e d the Shah p u b l i c l y and r e j e c t e d American r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a bloody crackdown, he f a i l e d t o g i v e the Shah any c l e a r g u i d a n c e . The v a r i o u s messages, a u t h o r i z e d by C a r t e r , were ambiguous and eroded the Shah's c o n f i d e n c e i n h i s s u p p o r t . Moreover, C a r t e r f a i l e d t o r e c o n s i d e r h i s s t a n d when t h e r e appeared ample i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t the Shah c o u l d not h o l d . However, an a n a l y s i s of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n l i g h t of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y , r e v e a l s t h a t the p r i n c i p a l blame f o r the f a i l i n g p r o c e s s r e s t s w i t h the c u s t o d i a n . I t i s the c u s t o d i a n ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o a l e r t the p r e s i d e n t when h i s p r e s e n t p o l i c y i s f a i l i n g . As w e l l , the c u s t o d i a n i s the c h i e f o f f i c i a l r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the c o o r d i n a t i o n of the v a r i o u s o p t i o n s . 239 As i n the case of the October 24 memorandum from the Department of S t a t e , B r z e z i n s k i v i o l a t e d the f a i r n e s s and c o m p e t i t i o n p r i n c i p l e s by not g i v i n g P r e c h t ' s o p t i o n a f a i r h e a r i n g i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . In . so d o i n g , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was d e p r i v e d of a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e i n d e a l i n g w i t h the c r i s i s . 1 1 ' 1 D u r i n g the December 28 meeting of C a r t e r ' s p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r s , B r z e z i n s k i wrote up a compromise d e c i s i o n as a r e s u l t of the de a d l o c k among them. The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y , however, r e q u i r e s the c u s t o d i a n t o b r i n g such d i s a g r e e m e n t s t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n . L i k e the November 3 message t o the Shah, the r e s u l t i n g message was ambiguous and c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e t o the American p o s i t i o n i n I r a n . An a s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e commented on the message t h a t \" i t f a i l e d t o c l a r i f y the r o l e of t h e U S \" . 1 1 5 I t i s the c u s t o d i a n ' s r o l e t o a v o i d such \"papered o v e r \" d i s a g r e e m e n t s among the p r e s i d e n t ' s a d v i s o r s . T h i s c r i s i s a l s o r e v e a l s t h a t c u s t o d i a l advocacy went f a r beyond a l e r t i n g C a r t e r t o a \" m i s s i n g o p t i o n . \" Indeed, B r z e z i n s k i ' s c o n t i n u o u s p r o d d i n g proved c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e . The p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s have shown t h a t c u s t o d i a l advocacy i s b e n e f i c i a l when i t o c c u r s t o break a consensus among the o t h e r a d v o c a t e s , and when i t i s not combined w i t h the v i o l a t i o n of the f a i r n e s s and c o m p e t i t i o n p r i n c i p l e s . However i n t h i s c a s e , B r z e z i n s k i kept u r g i n g C a r t e r t o t e l l t he Shah t o use h i s I r o n F i s t o p t i o n , even though C a r t e r had r e j e c t e d i t many t i m e s . Indeed, by December t h e r e was no need f o r B r z e z i n s k i t o promote t h i s o p t i o n , s i n c e 240 S c h l e s i n g e r d i d so on a c o n t i n u a l b a s i s . I n h i s J a n u a r y 18 memorandum, B r z e z i n s k i made h i s f i n a l a t t e m p t t o change C a r t e r ' s mind. Not o n l y had B r z e z i n s k i e x h a u s t e d h i s u s e f u l n e s s as an a d v o c a t e , he now t r i e d t o e nhance h i s s t a t u s by c i r c u m v e n t i n g t h e n o r m a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . F i n a l l y , t h e c u s t o d i a n e x c e e d e d h i s p r e s c r i b e d r o l e by e n g a g i n g i n t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f p o l i c y . In t h e November 3 phone c a l l t o t h e Shah, he a t t e m p t e d t o change C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y i n a s u b t l e manner. L a t e r on, w i t h t h e h e l p of Z a h e d i , he a t t e m p t e d t o g e t t h e Shah t o c r a c k d o w n . S u l l i v a n , m e a n w h i l e , c o n t i n u e d t o t e l l t h e Shah t h a t C a r t e r d i d n o t want t o t a k e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s u c h a c t i o n . The r e s u l t i n g c o n f u s i o n t o t h e Shah i s d e s c r i b e d by L e d e e n and L e w i s : . . . t h e Shah c o u l d n e v e r g e t t h e same s t o r y f r o m t h e W h i t e House and t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t ; t h e one k e p t a s s u r i n g him t h a t t h e US was s o l i d l y b e h i n d him, w h i l e t h e o t h e r k e p t r e m i n d i n g him t h a t f o r c e was n o t a c c e p t a b l e . 1 1 6 S i m i l a r l y , B r z e z i n s k i and Z a h e d i a p p a r e n t l y a t t e m p t e d t o g e t H u y s e r t o s t a g e a coup, w i t h o u t C a r t e r ' s a p p r o v a l . W h i l e S u l l i v a n ' s s u b o r d i n a t i o n t o C a r t e r was q u e s t i o n a b l e , B r z e z i n s k i came t o d i s c a r d h i s r e p o r t s e a r l y i n t h e c r i s i s . I n s t e a d , he r e c e i v e d much i n f o r m a t i o n from Z a h e d i , who had r e t u r n e d t o I r a n i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h e c r i s i s . I t i s p o s s i b l e , t h a t on t h e b a s i s o f Z a h e d i ' s r e p o r t s , B r z e z i n s k i gave C a r t e r a more o p t i m i s t i c a c c o u n t of t h e Shah's f o r t u n e s t h a n was w a r r a n t e d . I t i s p r i n c i p a l l y b e c a u s e o f t h e s e r o l e v i o l a t i o n s t h a t 2 4 1 C a r t e r d i d not r e c e i v e a l l o p t i o n s i n the debate, was not a l e r t e d t o the v a r i o u s p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s among h i s a d v i s o r s , was not c o m p e l l e d t o make a c l e a r p o l i c y c h o i c e , was not o p t i m a l l y informed about the growing s e r i o u s n e s s of the s i t u a t i o n I r a n , and was not p r i v y t o the v a r i o u s c o n f l i c t s i n v o l v e d i n the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h i s p o l i c y . These s h o r t c o m i n g s c o n s t i t u t e a major source of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s f a i l u r e t o respond e f f e c t i v e l y t o the I r a n i a n c r i s i s . EVALUATING THE OUTCOME: COULD THE UNITED STATES HAVE DONE BETTER? Throughout the c r i s i s , t he a d m i n i s t a t i o n c o n s i d e r e d o n l y two a l t e r n a t i v e o p t i o n s . The f i r s t o p t i o n , i n i t i a l l y f a v o u r e d by S u l l i v a n and most of C a r t e r ' s s e n i o r a d v i s o r s , a d v o c a t e d e x t e n s i v e p o l i t i c a l r e f o rms and l i b e r a l i z a t i o n s t o appease the Shah's opponents. E v e n t u a l l y , the p r o p o s a l of a c i v i l i a n government w i t h or w i t h o u t the Shah was added when the p o l i t i c a l r eforms d i d not q u e l l the u n r e s t . B a l l ' s c o u n c i l of n o t a b l e s was a v a r i a t i o n on the same theme. The second o p t i o n , i n i t i a l l y f a v o u r e d by B r z e z i n s k i and l a t e r s u p p o r t e d by S c h l e s i n g e r , c a l l e d f o r an end t o p o l i t i c a l r e f o r ms and suggested a v i o l e n t m i l i t a r y crackdown t o s t o p the r e v o l t . C a r t e r as w e l l as Vance and Mondale r e j e c t e d the second 242 o p t i o n . B r z e z i n s k i n o t e s t h a t they f e l t : t h a t the US - and n o t a b l y the p r e s i d e n t h i m s e l f s h o u l d not assume the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p l u n g i n g a n o t h e r c o u n t r y i n t o a bloody and c r u e l c o n f r o n t a t i o n . 1 1 7 A l t h o u g h C a r t e r f a v o u r e d the f i r s t o p t i o n , he never a c c e p t e d i t f u l l y . I n s t e a d , he p r e f e r r e d p o l i t i c a l reforms o n l y as l o n g as they d i d not undermine the Shah's p o s i t i o n . Moreover, he c o m p l i c a t e d h i s p o s i t i o n f u r t h e r by a s k i n g the Shah f o r p o l i t i c a l r e f o rms w h i l e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i n d i c a t i n g t h a t he d i d not want t o i n t e r f e r e i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of I r a n . Thus C a r t e r s i g n a l l e d t o the Shah t h a t he wanted more reforms but d i d not want t o t e l l the Shah what t o do. P r e c h t , as w e l l as S u l l i v a n towards the end of the c r i s i s , a d v ocated a t h i r d o p t i o n . I t d i d not r e c e i v e f u l l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n because B r z e z i n s k i was s u c c e s s f u l i n k e e p i n g i t out of the debate. I t argued f o r a q u i c k s h i f t of American support from the shah t o Khomeini s i n c e P r e c h t b e l i e v e d the shah had no chance of s u r v i v a l . Were any of t h e s e o p t i o n s v i a b l e and how s u c c e s s f u l was C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y ? E a r l y on i n the c r i s i s i t became e v i d e n t t h a t the Shah's r e f o r m s d i d not s a t i s f y h i s o p p o n e n t s . 1 1 8 H i s c o n c e s s i o n s were p e r c e i v e d as s i g n s of weakness and s e r v e d o n l y t o f u e l the r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e s . Meanwhile, the Shah's p o s i t i o n c o n t i n u e d t o weaken. A l s o , s i n c e the S h i ' i t e f o r c e s , b e g i n n i n g i n the l a t e f a l l of 1978, demanded the complete overthrow of the Shah, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s h o u l d have r e a l i z e d t h a t t h i s \" r e f o r m \" o p t i o n was not w o r k i n g . 243 Moreover, s i n c e C a r t e r d i d not want p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m s a t the r i s k of l o s i n g the Shah, h i s p o l i c y was c l e a r l y c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . C o n c e s s i o n s may have worked b e f o r e the u n r e s t . However, a t t h a t time C a r t e r was more i n t e r e s t e d i n c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h the Shah than i n p u s h i n g r e f o r m s . B r z e z i n s k i , who had argued t h a t r e v o l u t i o n s o n l y succeed when the r u l i n g e l i t e s s t a r t making c o n c e s s i o n s , may have been c o r r e c t i n t h i s c a s e . C a r t e r made h i s p o l i c y more i n e f f e c t i v e y e t by not s t r o n g l y r e s p o n d i n g t o the Shah's c a l l s f o r g u i d a n c e . One must r e c a l l t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s had \"saved\" the Shah i n the 1953 p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s . W h i l e the Shah had become more s e l f c o n f i d e n t and b o l d e r i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s s i n c e t h a t c r i s i s , t he 1978-79 r e v o l u t i o n shows t h a t he a g a i n came t o r e l y on American h e l p . The absence of s t r o n g s i g n a l s of American s u p p o r t made the Shah waver f u r t h e r . Indeed the Shah i n t e r p r e t e d the absence of American i n s t r u c t i o n s as e v i d e n c e of a l a c k of s u p p o r t . 1 1 9 C o u l d the I r o n F i s t o p t i o n have worked? The Shah had a l a r g e army which was w e l l equipped and was l a r g e l y non c o n s c r i p t . Moreover, the army's command was f i e r c e l y l o y a l t o the Shah and remained u n i t e d w e l l i n t o D e c e m b e r . 1 2 0 Some have argued t h a t u n t i l the end of O c t o b e r , i t c o u l d have put down the r e v o l t w i t h o u t much bl o o d s h e d . I t c o u l d s t i l l have st o p p e d the r e v o l u t i o n i n December, a l t h o u g h a t t h i s time w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e b l o o d s h e d . 1 2 1 Others c l a i m , however, t h a t t h e r e v o l u t i o n was so w i d e s p r e a d and the d e m o n s t r a t i o n s so massive t h a t any attempt a t u s i n g the army t o i t s f u l l 244 e x t e n t would have l e d e i t h e r t o wi d e s p r e a d d e s e r t i o n s or . t o a l a r g e s c a l e s l a u g h t e r . Whatever the f e a s i b i l i t y of the I r o n F i s t , C a r t e r c o u l d not a c c e p t the moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e d e c i s i o n , w h i l e the Shah would not implement the p o l i c y u n l e s s he had c l e a r American s u p p o r t , as S i c k s u g g e s t s : \"the Shah might have been persuaded t o l a u n c h a campaign of m i l i t a r y t e r r o r , but he would have done so o n l y on the o r d e r s of the U S . \" 1 2 2 B r z e z i n s k i had argued t h a t the I r o n F i s t o p t i o n was moral o n l y i n the .sense t h a t i t would a v o i d an even more v i o l e n t c i v i l w a r . 1 2 3 W h i l e we now know t h a t t h e r e was some v a l i d i t y t o B r z e z i n s k i ' s argument, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was opposed t o the o p t i o n f o r a n o t h e r r e a s o n . I t f e a r e d t h a t US f o r c e s e v e n t u a l l y might be drawn i n t o the c o n f l i c t . I n l i g h t of the Vietnam e x p e r i e n c e , C a r t e r had l i t t l e stomach f o r t h a t i d e a . 1 2 \" The P r e c h t o p t i o n was premised on the b e l i e f t h a t Khomeini and h i s f o l l o w e r s were n e i t h e r a n t i - A m e r i c a n nor a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c . Indeed, Khomeini's a s s i s t a n t s , throughout e a r l y 1978, p o r t r a y e d h i s p l a n s as moderate i n n a t u r e . P r e c h t and o t h e r s b e l i e v e d t h a t Khomeini would merely p l a y a f i g u r e h e a d r o l e i n a f u t u r e I s l a m i c r e p u b l i c . 1 2 5 A l s o , s i n c e they b e l i e v e d t h a t the Shah c o u l d not s u r v i v e , and s i n c e the S h i ' i t e s were as a n t i - S o v i e t as the Shah, why would the U n i t e d S t a t e s not q u i c k l y s h i f t i t s a l l e g i a n c e and t h e r e b y a s c e r t a i n the c o n t i n u a t i o n of U S - I r a n i a n f r i e n d s h i p ? 1 2 6 J u s t l i k e the I r o n F i s t , t h i s o p t i o n c o u l d have worked, had i t been implemented e a r l y i n the c r i s i s . By December, 245 however, open American support f o r the Shah had t o t a l l y a l i e n a t e d the S h i ' i t e s . W h i l e i t i s , a d m i t t i n g l y , d i f f i c u l t \" t o dump\" a l o y a l f r i e n d , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f a i l e d t o see t h a t i t s i n t e r e s t s s t r e t c h e d beyond one p e r s o n . 1 2 7 A l t h o u g h we now know t h a t Khomeini i s f a r from moderate, t h e r e i s no way of knowing whether e a r l y American s u p p o r t f o r h i s cause c o u l d have l a i d the groundwork f o r c o n t i n u e d U S - I r a n i a n r e l a t i o n s . The f l a w e d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s e x p l a i n s why the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f a i l e d t o r e a c h an o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n and a l s o e x p l a i n s the skewed i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h i s d e c i s i o n . The poor US h a n d l i n g of t h e c r i s i s c o n s t i t u t e s one f a c t o r i n the e x p l a n a t i o n of the c o u r s e of e v e n t s i n I r a n . However, t h e r e a r e a t l e a s t two o t h e r s e t s of f a c t o r s which i n f l u e n c e d the c o u r s e of e v e n t s which cannot be l i n k e d d i r e c t l y t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . F i r s t , the U n i t e d S t a t e s as w e l l as most o t h e r w e s t e r n governments, was hampered by a d i s m a l f a i l u r e i n i n t e l l i g e n c e . The l a c k of good i n f o r m a t i o n about the o p p o s i t i o n f o r c e s i n g e n e r a l , impeded the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n r e c o g n i z i n g the e x t e n t of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n I r a n w i t h the Shah. As a r e s u l t , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d not p e r c e i v e the s e r i o u s n e s s of the s i t u a t i o n u n t i l w e l l i n t o the c r i s i s and d i d not p r o p e r l y a s s e s s the s t r e n g t h of the S h i ' i t e o p p o s i t i o n . Indeed, most w e s t e r n a n a l y s t s were not a t t u n e d t o the r e l a t i v e l y new phenomenon of I s l a m i c fundamentalism. The S h i ' i t e f o r c e s were u n d e r e s t i m a t e d and m i s u n d e r s t o o d throughout the c r i s i s . 1 2 8 F i n a l l y , nobody knew the Shah had 246 t e r m i n a l c a n c e r . 1 2 9 T h i s d i s e a s e had t r a n s f o r m e d the s t r o n g -w i l l e d l e a d e r i n t o a d e p r e s s e d , moody and i n d e c i s i v e man. Second, some a n a l y s t s have argued t h a t the e v e n t s i n I r a n c o u l d not have been i n f l u e n c e d by the Shah or anybody e l s e . To them, the r e v o l u t i o n was i n e v i t a b l e . 1 3 0 The Shah's economic and s o c i a l r e f orms had a l i e n a t e d n e a r l y a l l s t r a t a of the p o p u l a t i o n . The Shah was s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f a c e d w i t h an I s l a m i c r e v o l t a g a i n s t w e s t e r n s t y l e m o d e r n i z a t i o n , a n a t i o n a l i s t r e v o l t a g a i n s t American i n f l u e n c e i n I r a n , a s o c i a l r e v o l t a g a i n s t h i s economic programmes, and a p o l i t i c a l r e v o l t a g a i n s t h i s m o n a r c h i c a l d i c t a t o r s h i p . Whatever the m e r i t s or weight of each f a c t o r , the f a c t remains t h a t C a r t e r t r i e d t o i n f l u e n c e the c o u r s e of e v e n t s . Indeed, the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d not h e l p but be i n f l u e n t i a l due t o i t s c l o s e m i l i t a r y and economic t i e s , and i t s l a r g e r o l e i n the Shah's p e r s o n a l r u l e . But C a r t e r ' s e f f o r t s f a i l e d . The U n i t e d S t a t e s l o s t an i m p o r t a n t a l l y i n a s t r a t e g i c a l l y c r u c i a l a r e a . Combined w i t h the damaging hostage c r i s i s i n 1979, C a r t e r s u f f e r e d p o l i t i c a l l y from the \" l o s s of I r a n . \" B r z e z i n s k i summed up the f a i l u r e : I r a n was the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s g r e a t e s t s e t b a c k . . . the f a l l of the Shah was d i s a s t r o u s s t r a t e g i c a l l y f o r the US and p o l i t i c a l l y f o r C a r t e r h i m s e l f . 1 3 1 247 CONCLUSION T h i s case study shows t h a t the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i s e f f e c t i v e l y undermined when the c u s t o d i a n v i o l a t e s the f a i r n e s s and c o m p e t i t i o n p r i n c i p l e s , i . e . , when the c u s t o d i a n no l o n g e r f u n c t i o n s as the p r o c e s s o r of a l l o p t i o n s and no l o n g e r a t t e m p t s t o get the p r e s i d e n t t o make a c l e a r p o l i c y c h o i c e . B r z e z i n s k i d e p r i v e d C a r t e r of a f u l l d i s c u s s i o n of the P r e c h t o p t i o n , papered over d i s a g r e e m e n t s among the a d v o c a t e s , and impeded an e a r l y r e v i e w of C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y . As a r e s u l t , C a r t e r was not aware of a l l the v a l u e s , i n t e r e s t s and c h o i c e s r a i s e d d u r i n g the c r i s i s , was not in f o r m e d a d e q u a t e l y about the p o s s i b l e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n h i s p o l i c y , and was not kept a l e r t t h a t he was not a c h i e v i n g h i s o b j e c t i v e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , the case s t u d y c o n f i r m s H a l l ' s f i n d i n g s t h a t a c u s t o d i a n cannot be e f f e c t i v e when he engages i n p o l i c y enforcement and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n t a s k s . B r z e z i n s k i ' s phone c a l l t o the Shah and h i s p r i v a t e c o n t a c t s w i t h Zahedi c o n t r a d i c t e d C a r t e r ' s o f f i c i a l p o l i c y , and c o n f u s e d the Shah. L a s t , the st u d y r e v e a l s t h a t c u s t o d i a l advocacy i s c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e when i t exten d s beyond b r e a k i n g the consensus among the o t h e r a d v o c a t e s . W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i i n i t i a l l y added an o p t i o n t o the debate, h i s c o n t i n u a l p u s h i n g of t h i s o p t i o n , a f t e r C a r t e r had r e j e c t e d i t s e v e r a l t i m e s , bogged down the p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n s . 248 ENDNOTES 1 The f a c t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s based on the f o l l o w i n g s o u r c e s : Habib L a d j e v a r d i , \"The O r i g i n s of US Support f o r an A u t o c r a t i c I r a n , \" I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l of M i d d l e E a s t S t u d i e s , No.2, 1983, pp.225-239; R i c h a r d W. Cottam, N a t i o n a l i s m i n I r a n , P i t t s b u r g h : U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h P r e s s , 1979; N i k k i R. K e d d i e , Roots of R e v o l u t i o n , New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1981; R o u h a l l a h K. Ramazani, The U n i t e d S t a t e s and I r a n , New York: P r a e g e r , 1982; C h r i s t o s P. I o a n n i d e s , America's I r a n , New York: U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s of Am e r i c a , 1984; B a r r y R u b i n , Paved w i t h Good I n t e n t i o n s , New York: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1980; Amin S a i k a l , The R i s e and F a l l of the Shah, P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1980; M i c h a e l A. Ledeen and W i l l i a m L e w i s , D e b a c l e , New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1981; A. H. H. A b i d i , \"The I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n : I t s O r i g i n s and Dimensions,\" I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , No.2, 1979, pp.129-161 2 From 1950 t o 1970, I r a n r e c e i v e d $1.8 b i l l i o n i n US arms. In c o n t r a s t , between 1970 and 1976, I r a n bought $12 b i l l i o n w o rth of US arms: Rubin (1980), p.128. 3 Gary S i c k , A l l F a l l Down, New York: Random House, 1985, p.24. 0 Jimmy C a r t e r , Keeping F a i t h , New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p.435; Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , Power and P r i n c i p l e , New York: F a r r a r , S t r a u s , G i r o u x , 1983, p.357. 5 C o r a l B e l l , P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r and F o r e i g n P o l i c y : The C o s t s of V i r t u e , C a n b e r r a : A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y , 1982, p.52 c l a i m s t h a t C a r t e r ' s i n s i s t e n c e on human r i g h t s i n I r a n opened the f l o o d g a t e s of the r e v o l u t i o n . For the Shah's w o r r i e s see Ramazani (1982), p.91; Anthony P a r s o n s , The P r i d e and the F a l l , London: B u t l e r and Tanner, 1984, p.47. 6 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), P.126. The p o l i c y was f o r m u l a t e d i n PD-30. 7 Idem, p.127 8 Cyrus Vance, Hard C h o i c e s , New York: Simon and S c h u s t e r , 1983, p.316; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.79; S i c k (1985), p.23. 9 C a r t e r (1982), p.436. 1 0 Vance (1983), p.318; Rubin (1980), p.196. 1 1 W i l l i a m H. S u l l i v a n , M i s s i o n t o I r a n , New York: N. W. No r t o n & Company, 1981, p.21. 1 2 Keddie (1981), p.231; I o a n n i d e s (1984), p.27. 249 1 3 Cottam (1979), p.353. D u r i n g h i s v i s i t , C a r t e r c a l l e d I r a n \"an i s l a n d of s t a b i l i t y , \" C a r t e r (1982), p. 437. 1 * Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.80. 1 5 PRM 12 was i s s u e d on J a n u a r y 26. I t l a i d the f o u n d a t i o n f o r PD 13, which was s i g n e d by C a r t e r on May 13 1977. I t i s unknown whether t h i s i s s u e caused c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i c y debate w i t h i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . See Sam C. S a r k e s i a n ( e d ) , Defense P o l i c y and the P r e s i d e n c y : C a r t e r ' s F i r s t Y e a r s , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1979, pp.132-133. 1 6 For the c o n t e n t s of PD 13 see S a r k e s i a n (1979), pp. 132-133; Roger P. L a b r i e e t a l . , US Arms S a l e s P o l i c y , Washington: American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e , 1982. Exempted from PD 13 were NATO members, A u s t r a l i a , New Z e a l a n d , Japan and I s r a e l . See a l s o Vance (1983), p.319. 1 7 S i c k (1985), p.25. 1 8 Washington P o s t , October 25, 1980, p.12 1 9 Idem, S u l l i v a n (1981), pp.20-21; S i c k (1985), p.29 2 0 C a r t e r (1982), p.435; Vance (1983), p.320. 2 1 Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.84. The Shah bought 160 F-16's i n t h i s time frame. He was r e f u s e d the F-4G ( W i l d Weasel) a i r c r a f t because of i t s s e n s i t i v e t e c h n o l o g y . S i c k (1985), p.45; Vance (1983), p.317. 2 2 L a b r i e (1982), p.11; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.84. 2 3 C a r t e r (1982), p.435; R i c h a r d Cottam, \" Goodbye t o America's Shah,\" F o r e i g n P o l i c y , no. 34, 1979, p.9. 2 4 Washington P o s t , October 25, 1980, p.12; Vance (1983), p.322. 2 5 John D. Stempel, I n s i d e t h e I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n , B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1980, p.91. Stempel was the Deputy C h i e f of the p o l i t i c a l s e c t i o n of the US Embassy i n Tehran d u r i n g the r e v o l u t i o n . See a l s o James A. B i l l , \" I r a n and the C r i s i s of 1978,\" F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , W i n t e r 1978-79, p.338 2 6 Ledeen and Lewis (1981), pp.85,93,and 95-96. 2 7 Vance (1983), p.317. 2 8 Ramazani (1982), p.102; S i c k (1985), p.34. 2 9 Parsons (1984), pp.48-49, s t a t e s t h a t the Shah a l s o wanted p o l i t i c a l r eforms i n o r d e r t o s e c u r e a s t a b l e c l i m a t e f o r h i s son t o ascend the t h r o n e . See a l s o Cottam (1979), p.356. 250 3 0 S i c k (1985), p.34; Vance (1983), p.324. 3 1 I o a n n i d e s (1984), p.29. 3 2 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.357. 3 3 U.S. Congress. House Permanent S e l e c t Committee on I n t e l l i g e n c e , \" I r a n : E v a l u a t i o n of US I n t e l l i g e n c e Performance P r i o r t o November 1978,\" Govt. P r i n t . O f f . , Washington, J a n u a r y 1979. For the quote see C a r t e r (1982), p.438. 3 4 Washington P o s t , October 27, 1980, p. 12; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.359; Rubin (1980), p.209. No US i n t e l l i g e n c e agency p r e d i c t e d a s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e t o the Shah. 3 5 S i c k (1985), p.46. 3 6 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.358; D a v i d S. M c l e l l a n , Cyrus Vance, New York: Rowman and A l l a n h e l d , 1985, p.129. 3 7 S i c k , (1985), p.42. 3 8 S u l l i v a n (1981), p.144. I n s t e a d , the CIA depended l a r g e l y on SAVAK a n a l y s e s of p o l i t i c a l u n r e s t . Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.124. 3 9 B a r r y R u b i n , S e c r e t s of S t a t e , O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1985, pp.187-188 argues t h a t the thought of the f a l l of the Shah was so u n f i t t i n g t o the image most p o l i c y makers had of him t h a t they s i m p l y d i s r e g a r d e d i t ; Ramazani (1982), p.108. 4 0 C a r t e r (1982), p.438; Vance (1983), p.326; Stempel (1 981), p.118. 4 1 Stempel (1981), p.119. 4 2 C a r t e r d i d so on October 10, 26 and 31.; S i c k (1985), p.346. W i t h the c a p t u r e of the US embassy i n 1979, a group c a l l e d The S t u d e n t s F o l l o w i n g the L i n e of Iman p u b l i s h e d s e v e r a l embassy documents which showed t h a t C a r t e r had s u p p o r t e d the Shah throughout 1978 and had a v o i d e d c o n t a c t s w i t h the o p p o s i t i o n . 4 3 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.361,2; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.146; S u l l i v a n (1981), p.155. 4 4 S i c k (1985), p.59; Vance (1983), p.328. 4 5 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.362; C a r t e r (1982), p.439. 4 6 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.355, 394. 4 7 S i c k (1985), p.60. 251 4 8 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.362; S i c k (1985), p.63. 4 9 Accounts of the meeting a r e i n B r z e z i n s k i ( 1 983), pp.363-364; S i c k (1985), pp.67-68; Herman N i c k e l , \"The US F a i l u r e i n I r a n , \" F o r t u n e , March 12, 1979, pp.99-106 5 0 Vance (1983), p.329; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.364; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.159. 5 1 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.365; S i c k (1985), p.72; Parsons (1984), p.91; Newsweek, A p r i l 28, 1980, p.24. 5 2 M. Reza P a h l a v i , Answer t o H i s t o r y , New York: S t e i n and Day, 1980, p.165; S u l l i v a n (1981), pp.191-192; Parsons (1984) , p.91. 5 3 S i c k (1985), p.73; Vance (1983), p.329. 5 4 Ramazani (1982), pp.111-113. 5 5 New York Times, November 7, 1978. 5 6 Ramazani (1982), p.114. ' 5 7 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.367; S i c k (1985), p.80. 5 8 Idem, pp.'354-355; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p. 144. 5 9 The New R e p u b l i c , November 18, 1978, p.12; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.394. 6 0 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.397; Stempel (1981), p.290. 6 1 S i c k (1985), p.173. See a l s o C a r t e r (1982), p.439. 6 2 S t a r t i n g i n November 1978, the DOS a l s o had s e v e r a l meetings on the c r i s i s , c h a i r e d by A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y D. Newsom. These s e s s i o n s , however, d e a l t w i t h l e s s e r i s s u e s such as measures t o evacuate American c i t i z e n s and crowd c o n t r o l d e v i c e s f o r the Shah. See Washington P o s t , Nov. 7, 1978; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.366. 6 3 D a v i d K. H a l l , Implementing M u l t i p l e Advocacy i n the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l : 1947-1980, Ph.D T h e s i s , S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , 1982, p.61. 6 4 H a l l (1982), pp.717-720, 724. 6 5 Keddie (1981), p.255. 6 6 Vance (1983), p.329; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.367-368; S i c k (1985) , pp.81-84; S u l l i v a n (1981), pp.201-202. 6 7 S i c k (1985), p.86; S u l l i v a n (1981), p.204; Vance (1983), p.330. 252 6 8 C a r t e r (1982), p.440. 6 9 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.382. 7 0 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.370; Rubin (1980), p.214; S u l l i v a n (1981) , p.193. 7 1 Ramazani (1982), pp.115-118; Stempel (1981), p.290. 7 2 S u l l i v a n (1981), p.204. 7 3 Vance (1983), p.330; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.160; George B a l l , The P a s t Has Another P a t t e r n , New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982, pp.475-461. 7 4 As quoted i n S i c k (1985), p.110; Time, F e b r u a r y 5, 1979, p.9. 7 5 Idem; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.164. 7 6 S i c k (1985), pp.114-116; B a l l (1982), pp.459-460; Washington P o s t , October 28, 1980, p.10. 7 7 S i n c e Vance was absent from the meeting, he i n s t r u c t e d C h r i s t o p h e r t o endorse B a l l ' s r e p o r t on h i s b e h a l f . Vance (1983), p.330. 7 8 S i c k ( 1 9 8 5 ) f -p.115; Washington P o s t , October 28, 1980, p. 1 0. 7 9 B a l l (1982), p.460; B r z e z i n s k i (1983) , p.374; C a r t e r (1982) , p.442; Vance (1983), p.331; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), pp.172-173; N i c k e l (1979), p.102. 8 0 B a l l (1980), pp.458, 462; Vance (1983), p.328; S u l l i v a n ( 1981), p.193; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.162. 8 1 S i c k ( 1985), p.118. 8 2 S i c k (1985), pp.119-121; Washington P o s t , October 29, 1980, p.20; Newsweek, A p r i l 28, 1980, p.25. 8 3 Rubin (1985), p.190. 8 3 S i c k (1985), p.122; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.162. D u r i n g t h i s t i m e , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a l s o c o n s i d e r e d sending a C a r r i e r Task F o r c e i n t o the I n d i a n Ocean. However, when t h i s became p u b l i c , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n r e v e r s e d i t s e l f . C r i t i c s have used t h i s o c c u r r e n c e as f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e of C a r t e r ' s v a c i l l a t i o n d u r i n g the c r i s i s . See S i c k (1985), p.125. 8 5 Vance (1983), p.331. 8 6 Stempel (1981), p.290; Parson (1984), p.150; S u l l i v a n ( 1981), p.193. 253 8 7 Vance (1983), p.332; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.375; S i c k (1985), pp.125-126. 8 8 Vance (1983), p.332. 8 9 Vance (1983), p.333.; See a l s o Washington P o s t , October 29, 1980, p.20; S i c k (1985), p.126. 9 0 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.375. 9 1 S i c k (1985), p.126. 9 2 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.376; Parsons (1984), p.121; Rubin (1980), p.238. 9 3 Ramazani (1982), pp.117,118; A b i d i ( 1 979), pp.147-149. 9 4 Vance (1983), p.334; C a r t e r (1982), p.443; S i c k (1985), p.131. 9 5 Stempel (1981), p.295; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.162; S u l l i v a n (1981), p.178; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.360 acknowledges t h a t he and Zahedi were i n r e g u l a r t e l e p h o n e c o n t a c t but a l s o s t a t e s t h a t he knew Zahedi was a b i a s e d source of i n f o r m a t i o n . 9 6 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.376-377; Vance (1983), p.335. 9 7 C a r t e r (1982), p.443. 9 8 S i c k (1985), p.139; S u l l i v a n (1981), p.229; Newsweek, A p r i l 28, 1980, p.25; Washington P o s t , October 29, 1980; Time, F e b r u a r y 12, 1979, p.34; Stempel (1981), p.300 n o t e s t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s made a m i s t a k e by s e n d i n g Huyser. While i t had r e c e i v e d some c r e d i t i n I r a n f o r g e t t i n g the Shah o u t , i t now undermined t h i s c r e d i t by s e n d i n g an a d v i s o r t o the army. A p p a r e n t l y , t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n was not r a i s e d i n the NSC meeting. 9 9 Ramazani (1982), p.118; C a r t e r (1982), p.445; Time, January 15, 1979, pp.22-25. 1 0 0 S u l l i v a n (1981), p.233; S i c k (1985), p.133. 1 0 1 Vance (1983), p.337; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.381; C a r t e r (1982), p.443. 1 0 2 C a r t e r (1982), p.446; S u l l i v a n (1981), p.214; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.168; S i c k (1985), p.140. 1 0 3 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.379; Newsweek, A p r i l 28, 1980. p.24; New R e p u b l i c , F e b r u a r y 3, 1979, p.12. 1 0 a E.g. see C a r t e r ' s p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e on January 17, 1979, New York Times, January 18, 1979, p..18. 254 1 0 5 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.385. 1 0 6 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.382. 1 0 7 S i c k (1985), p.145; S u l l i v a n (1981), p.239; Rubin (1980), p.247. 1 0 8 Ramazani (1982), p.139 n o t e s t h a t American p o l i c y making a t t h i s p o i n t was b e s t c h a r a c t e r i z e d by \" i n c o h e r e n c e . \" ; S i c k (1985), p.123 notes t h a t towards the end of December communications w i t h i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d e t e r i o r a t e d r a p i d l y . 1 0 9 Vance (1983), p.338. In s p i t e of Huyser's more o p t i m i s t i c r e p o r t i n g on the s t a t e of the I r a n i a n army, i t appears t h a t he d i d not persuade them t o stage a coup. See a l s o C a r t e r (1982), p.449. 1 1 0 C a r t e r s u p p o r t e d the B a k h t i a r government p u b l i c l y u n t i l F e b r u a r y 5. See B r z e z i n s k i ( 1 983), p.390. 1 1 1 Vance (1983), p.341; C a r t e r (1982), p.450; S i c k (1985), pp.154- 155. At a l a s t SCC meeting on F e b r u a r y 11, most p a r t i c i p a n t s r e a l i z e d t h a t the U n i t e s S t a t e s had l o s t c o n t r o l of the s i t u a t i o n . Meanwhile, Huyser, f e a r i n g f o r h i s s a f e t y , had l e f t I r a n . 1 1 2 Gary S i c k i n The I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n and the I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c , P r i n c e t o n : Woodrow W i l s o n I n t e r n a t i o n a l C e n t r e f o r S c h o l a r s , May 1982, p.167. 1 1 3 Rubin (1985), p.189; Stempel (1981), p.301 a r e two examples of t h i s l i n e of argument. 1 1 * W h i l e B a l l ' s r o l e as an o u t s i d e a d v i s o r meets the s t r a t e g y ' s d i v e r s i t y p r i n c i p l e , B r z e z i n s k i cannot r e c e i v e much c r e d i t f o r t h i s . F i r s t , i t was B l u m e n t h a l ' s s u g g e s t i o n . Second, B r z e z i n s k i a d v o c a t e d o p e n l y a g a i n s t B a l l ' s o p t i o n . Moreover, B a l l ' s o p t i o n was so c l o s e t o the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s i d e a of a c o a l i t i o n government, t h a t i t cannot be seen as a new p e r s p e c t i v e . I t c e r t a i n l y was not as f a r r e a c h i n g as P r e c h t ' s o p t i o n . 1 1 5 S i c k (1985), p.128. 1 1 6 Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.143. See a l s o Vance (1983), p.328; W i l l i a m H. S u l l i v a n , \"The Road Not Taken,\" F o r e i g n P o l i c y , No.40, 1980, pp.175-186, c o n f i r m s t h a t he had no i n s t r u c t i o n s t o c o n f i r m B r z e z i n s k i ' s and Zahedi's a p p e a l s t o the Shah. 1 1 7 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.396. See a l s o Keddie (1981), p.255. 1 1 8 Ledeen and Le w i s (1981), pp.100-102; Rubin (1980), p.255; Parsons (1984), pp.48-49. Oth e r s have argued t h a t the Shah's reforms were not v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l e.g. S u l l i v a n 255 (1980), p.187. 1 1 9 S i c k (1985), p.34; P a h l a v i (1980), p.170. 1 2 0 Keddie (1981), p.256 p o i n t s o u t , however, t h a t the army was not w e l l p r e p a r e d t o s t o p a c i v i l i a n c h a l l e n g e . I n s t e a d , i t was t r a i n e d and armed t o f i g h t f o r e i g n wars. Moreover, the command of the army had been mo n o p o l i z e d t o such an e x t e n t by the Shah h i m s e l f , t h a t i t was i n c a p a b l e of a c t i n g w i t h o u t him. 1 2 1 Ledeen and Lewis (1981), pp.153,176; Stempel (1981), p.299; Keddie (1981), p.254. 1 2 2 S i c k (1985), p.171. In h i s memoirs, the Shah c l a i m s he d i d not want t o implement the o p t i o n s i n c e i t would d e s t r o y the p o s s i b l i t y f o r the f u t u r e r u l e of h i s son. A l s o , the Shah c l a i m s he c o u l d not do such a c r u e l a c t . However, i n l i g h t of the f o r c e f u l methods used by SAVAK, the Shah has l i t t l e c r e d i b i l i t y i n c l a i m i n g an image of innocence f o r h i m s e l f . Moreover, i f t h i s was so, i t seems odd t h a t the Shah d i d mention the o p t i o n s e v e r a l t i m e s t o S u l l i v a n . ; P a h l a v i (1980), p.167. 1 2 3 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.372. 1 2 4 Moreover, i t was thought t h a t w h i l e a m i l i t a r y government might be a b l e t o put down the r e v o l t , i t might not be a b l e t o r u l e f o r v e r y l o n g . 1 2 5 James A. B i l l , \" I r a n and the C r i s i s of 1978,\" F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , W i n t e r 1978, pp.323-342; Adda B. Bozeman, \" I r a n : US F o r e i g n P o l i c y and the T r a d i t i o n of P e r s i a n S t a t e c r a f t , \" O r b i s , No.2, 1979, pp.387-402. S i c k n o t e s t h a t Khomeini's a s s i s t a n t s , e s p e c i a l l y Y a z d i , d e l i b e r a t e l y m i s l e d Western p u b l i c o p i o n i o n about Khomeini's t r u e i n t e n t i o n s . Moreover, he p o i n t s t o the v a r i o u s w r i t i n g s by Khomeini which c a l l f o r a f u n d a m e n t a l i s t I s l a m i c regime. See S i c k (1985), p.85. 1 2 6 .ji^g s o v i e t f a c t o r i n t h i s c r i s i s d i d not r e c e i v e prominent s t a t u s f o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s . F i r s t , the USSR, because of i t s l a r g e I s l a m i c p o p u l a t i o n and the f i e r c e a n t i -S o v i e t s t a n d of the S h i ' i t e s , appeared as u n e n t h u s i a s t i c about th e c r i s i s as the West. Second, w h i l e the USSR d i d s u p p o r t the s m a l l communist groups, i t s i n f l u e n c e was g e n e r a l l y l i m i t e d . I t s a b i l i t y t o e x p l o i t the c r i s i s was seen by most a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s as q u i t e l i m i t e d . See U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Europe and the M i d d l e E a s t , \"US P o l i c y Toward I r a n , \" January 17, 1979; New York Times, November 20, 1978; S i c k (1985), p.106. 1 2 7 The 1986 c r i s i s i n the P h i l i p p i n e s showed t h a t such a s h i f t i n a l l e g i a n c e i s p o s s i b l e and may a t times f u r t h e r American i n t e r e s t s . 1 2 8 S i c k (1985), pp.165-166; I o a n n i d e s (1984), p.32, 61. 256 1 2 9 P a h l a v i (1980), p.19. 1 3 0 F r e d H a l l i d a y , S o v i e t P o l i c y i n the Arc of C r i s i s , Washington: I n s t i t u t e For P o l i c y S t u d i e s , 1981; Rubin (1980), c h a p t e r 9; J e r o l d D. Green, R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n , New York: P r a e g e r , 1982 a p p l i e s the H u n t i n g t o n t h e s i s t o the c r i s i s : s i n c e the Shah a l l o w e d o n l y economic and s o c i a l development and t h w a r t e d a l l p o l i t i c a l development, an i n e v i t a b l e gap o c c u r r e d which caused the p o l i t i c a l decay (See Samuel P. H u n t i n g t o n , \" P o l i t i c a l Development and Decay,\" World P o l i t i c s , A p r i l 1965, pp.386-430) 1 3 1 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.354. CHAPTER SEVEN CONCLUSION 258 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY D u r i n g most of 1977 and 1978, C a r t e r ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s a p p r o x i m a t e d the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . Both the s t r u c t u r e of the p r o c e s s , and C a r t e r ' s r o l e i n i t resembled the p r o c e s s norms and r o l e t a s k s f o r m u l a t e d by George. U s u a l l y , C a r t e r i n i t i a t e d the p r o c e s s by c o m m i s s i o n i n g a P r e s i d e n t i a l Review Memorandum. PRM 2 on the SALT I I n e g o t i a t i o n s and PRM 24 on Chinese-American n o r m a l i z a t i o n e x e m p l i f y t h i s p r o c e s s . In the f i r s t s i x months of h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , C a r t e r i s s u e d n e a r l y t h i r t y PRM's, t h e r e b y s e t t i n g the agenda f o r p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s t h r o u g h 1980. 1 These PRM's formed the b a s i s f o r p o l i c y debate among C a r t e r ' s a d v i s o r s . Depending on the n a t u r e of the i s s u e , e i t h e r the P o l i c y Review Committee c h a i r e d by S t a t e or the S p e c i a l C o o r d i n a t i o n Committee c h a i r e d by B r z e z i n s k i ' s o f f i c e would s t a r t the p r o c e s s of g a t h e r i n g background papers and p o l i c y o p t i o n s . In b o t h c a s e s , the e f f o r t was a genuine i n t e r a g e n c y p r o c e s s i n which a l l p o l i c y a d v o c a t e s were a b l e t o p a r t i c i p a t e . In the SALT I I PRM, f o r example, o p t i o n s from Defense, S t a t e , the CIA as w e l l as the NSC were g e n e r a t e d t h r o u g h t h i s p r o c e s s . B r z e z i n s k i was the manager i n charge of t h i s i n t e r a g e n c y p r o c e s s . He c o o r d i n a t e d the paper f l o w among the v a r i o u s p a r t i c i p a n t s and kept the p r e s i d e n t i n f o r m e d of the p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n s among h i s a d v i s o r s . C a r t e r took an a c t i v e 259 r o l e i n t h i s p r o c e s s , p e r s o n a l l y r e a d i n g t h e p o l i c y d e t a i l s of n e a r l y every i s s u e . In a d d i t i o n t o the p o l i c y p r o p o s a l s , C a r t e r read the minutes of the p o l i c y meetings of h i s a d v i s o r s . When the time had come f o r a d e c i s i o n , C a r t e r j o i n e d h i s a d v i s o r s t o d i s c u s s the p o l i c y o p t i o n s , u s u a l l y i n a f a c e - t o - f a c e m e e t i n g . Major d e c i s i o n s such as the SALT I I p r o p o s a l s and the American p o s i t i o n i n the Ogaden war were made by C a r t e r i n the p r e s ence of h i s a d v i s o r s . D u r i n g t h e s e m e e t i n g s , C a r t e r i n v i t e d a wide debate and a l l o w e d h i s p r e f e r e n c e s t o be c h a l l e n g e d . 2 C a r t e r was a \"hands on\" p r e s i d e n t who s t u d i e d a l l a s p e c t s of an i s s u e c a r e f u l l y , and who p e r s o n a l l y made a l l f i n a l d e c i s i o n s . Y e t , he had l i t t l e e x p e r i e n c e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s and was w i l l i n g t o l i s t e n t o h i s a d v i s o r s . A l t h o u g h he had s t r o n g p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s h i m s e l f , he u s u a l l y d i d not preempt the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . 3 In the SALT I I and C hinese-American n o r m a l i z a t i o n i s s u e s , he d i d not s t a t e h i s p o l i c y c h o i c e u n t i l h i s a d v i s o r s had f o r m u l a t e d t h e i r p o l i c y o p t i o n s . In the war i n the Horn of A f r i c a , C a r t e r a l l o w e d B r z e z i n s k i t o c a l l f o r a r e v i e w of h i s p o l i c y . W h i l e C a r t e r d i d not e xpect B r z e z i n s k i t o r e f r a i n from p o l i c y advocacy, i t appears t h a t B r z e z i n s k i i n i t i a l l y c o n c e n t r a t e d on h i s r o l e as p r o c e s s manager. Without a c t i v e l y j o i n i n g the p o l i c y d ebate, B r z e z i n s k i c o o r d i n a t e d the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s on the Panama Ca n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , human r i g h t s (PRM 2 8 ) , and n u c l e a r p r o l i f e r a t i o n (PRM 15).\" A l s o , w h i l e B r z e z i n s k i had r e s e r v a t i o n s about Vance's p l a n t o 260 convene a M i d d l e E a s t peace c o n f e r e n c e , he d i d not advocate a g a i n s t i t d i r e c t l y . 5 In t h i s s t u d y , the SALT I I d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s b e s t e x e m p l i f i e s B r z e z i n s k i ' s i n i t i a l r o l e . In t h i s c a s e , B r z e z i n s k i c o n c e n t r a t e d on p r o v i d i n g s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n f o r the a d v o c a t e s and the p r e s i d e n t . A l s o , he d i d not c h a l l e n g e any of the o p t i o n s and d i d not attempt t o i n f l u e n c e p o l i c y development. F i n a l l y , i n the v a r i o u s m e etings, he sought a b a l a n c e between the hard and s o f t l i n e r s on SALT. B r z e z i n s k i ' s b e h a v i o u r d u r i n g t h i s p r o c e s s resembles the \"honest b r o k e r \" r o l e f o r m u l a t e d by the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . DECISION-MAKING FLAWS AND HOW TO IMPROVE THE STRATEGY In s p i t e of the f a v o u r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s p r e s e n t t o f o s t e r a wide p o l i c y d ebate, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n became q u i c k l y hampered by a wide consensus on most i s s u e s among the a d v o c a t e s . The major a d v o c a t e s such as Vance, Mondale, the v a r i o u s A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r i e s of S t a t e , Brown, and C a r t e r ' s c h i e f domestic a d v i s o r s d i d not produce many d i v e r g e n t o p t i o n s nor d i d they c h a l l e n g e one a n o t h e r ' s views v i g o r o u s l y . In the Ogaden war, they a l l agreed the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d not attempt t o c h a l l e n g e the S o v i e t s . C o n c e r n i n g A f r i c a g e n e r a l l y , t h e y , as w e l l as UN ambassador Andrew Young, agreed t h a t b l a c k p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s were f a r more i m p o r t a n t than c o u n t e r i n g S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e . On 261 n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a , most b e l i e v e d the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d not pursue a s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p . D u r i n g the I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n , n e a r l y a l l d i s a p p r o v e d of the use of f o r c e on the p a r t of the Shah. S e v e r a l a u t h o r s have shown t h a t d u r i n g t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the t o p p o s i t i o n s a t the Department of S t a t e were manned by p e o p l e v e r y s i m i l a r i n t h e i r o u t l o o k on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . 6 Vance as w e l l as h i s deputy, C h r i s t o p h e r , had e s s e n t i a l l y the same b e l i e f s and v a l u e s as most A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r i e s such as Holbrooke ( A s i a n and P a c i f i c A f f a i r s ) , Lake ( P o l i c y P l a n n i n g ) , Moose ( A f r i c a ) and G e l b ( P o l i t i c o - M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s ) . For example, they r e j e c t e d as a m a t t e r of p r i n c i p l e the use of f o r c e i n American f o r e i g n p o l i c y . They sought t o promote N o r t h - S o u t h i s s u e s over E a s t -West c o n f l i c t s . A l s o , they b e l i e v e d t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d l e a d a g e n e r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y g o a l s from b a l a n c e of power p o l i t i c s t o w o r l d o r d e r p o l i t i c s . They, as w e l l as Mondale, Warnke and Aaron were a l l c r i t i c s of the Vietnam war and sought t o i n f u s e a new sense of m o r a l i t y i n t o American f o r e i g n p o l i c y . They wanted a f o r e i g n p o l i c y l e s s o c c u p i e d w i t h f i g h t i n g communism. I n s t e a d , the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d pursue r a d i c a l disarmament p o l i c i e s , reduce o v e r a l l arms s a l e s , and promote human r i g h t s as a c r u c i a l element of American i n t e r e s t s . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s g e n e r a l convergence of b e l i e f s p r e v e n t e d these a d v o c a t e s from g e n e r a t i n g a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t o p t i o n s . George, i n f o r m u l a t i n g h i s s t r a t e g y , assumed t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l degree of d i v e r s e o p i n i o n s would 2 6 2 a r i s e on most major d e c i s i o n s . W h i l e George does not p r e s c r i b e t h a t the p r e s i d e n t d e l i b e r a t e l y a p p o i n t p e o p l e w i t h d i f f e r e n t b e l i e f s , the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s u f f e r e d from a too c o n c e n t r a t e d convergence of o p i n i o n . O b v i o u s l y , the p r e s i d e n t i s not a d v i s e d t o a p p o i n t a d v i s o r s who a r e i d e o l o g i c a l l y h o s t i l e t o him. However, C a r t e r may have a l l o w e d h i s S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e t o o much freedom i n a p p o i n t i n g h i s a s s i s t a n t s . In the end, C a r t e r was surrounded both a t the s e n i o r l e v e l and the l e v e l j u s t below by a group of v e r y l i k e - m i n d e d a d v i s o r s . 7 U n l i k e p r e s i d e n t Kennedy, C a r t e r had few \" a l l i e s \" i n the Department of S t a t e . Moreover, the A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r i e s seldom o f f e r e d a d v i c e t h a t was s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e . George assumes a l s o t h a t the major d i f f e r e n c e s i n a d v i c e w i l l come from the d i f f e r e n t department heads. G i v e n the d i f f e r e n t b u r e a u c r a t i c i n t e r e s t s , the v a r i o u s s e c r e t a r i e s w i l l o f f e r d i f f e r i n g o p t i o n s t o the p r e s i d e n t . The problem i n the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was t h a t Brown d i d not d i f f e r o f t e n from Vance, and even when he d i d , he d i d not advocate s t r o n g l y . Only l a t e r , when s u b s t a n t i a l p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s between Vance and B r z e z i n s k i a r o s e , was Brown f o r c e d t o ta k e s i d e s . 8 F i n a l l y , C a r t e r ' s domestic a d v i s o r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y J o r d a n , d i d not j o i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y debates u n t i l l a t e 1978. J o r d a n , who harboured l e s s l i b e r a l views than Vance, c o u l d have o f f e r e d a l t e r n a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e s had he j o i n e d the debates e a r l i e r . F u r t h e r m o r e , because C a r t e r ' s p e r s o n a l v a l u e s and 263 b e l i e f s on America's r o l e i n the w o r l d converged w i t h Vance's and Mondale's, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d not c h a l l e n g e h i s p r e f e r e n c e s s u f f i c i e n t l y . 9 Thus, w h i l e the s t r a t e g y ' s p r o c e s s norms and r o l e t a s k s were a p p r o x i m a t e d , the a d v o c a t e s d i d not p r o v i d e C a r t e r w i t h m u l t i p l e v i e w s . Indeed, the case s t u d i e s i n d i c a t e t h a t the s t r a t e g y does not f u n c t i o n w e l l w i t h o u t s u f f i c i e n t v a r i a t i o n among the a d v o c a t e s . T h i s f i n d i n g does not mean t h a t the s t r a t e g y can o n l y f u n c t i o n when t h e r e a r e sharp i d e o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s among the a d v i s o r s . S t u d i e s of the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s d u r i n g the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s , f o r example, have shown t h a t s u b s t a n t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t o p t i o n s can be f o r m u l a t e d by a not to o i d e o l o g i c a l l y d i v e r s e g r o u p . 1 0 Nor does t h i s t h e s i s deny t h a t B r z e z i n s k i ' s unique r o l e i n the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was not c l e a r l y r e l a t e d t o h i s i d e o l o g i c a l i n c o n g r u i t y w i t h the o t h e r a d v i s o r s . In s p i t e of these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , i t appears t h a t the s t r a t e g y f a c e s c o n s i d e r a b l e odds i f t o o many key a d v i s o r s agree too r e a d i l y on the b a s i c v a l u e s u n d e r l y i n g most f o r e i g n p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s . The f a i l u r e of the \"Deep C u t s \" p r o p o s a l s , t h e M i d d l e E a s t peace i n i t i a t i v e , and the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s e f f o r t s t o h a l t S o v i e t e x p a n s i o n i s m i n A f r i c a may have l e d B r z e z i n s k i t o f i l l the gap i n a d v i c e the p r e s i d e n t was g e t t i n g . For example, he abandoned h i s \"honest b r o k e r \" r o l e t o c h a l l e n g e C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y i n the Horn of A f r i c a . S i m i l a r l y , he ad v o c a t e d a s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h C h i n a , a f t e r Vance's t r i p i n 1977 had f a i l e d t o produce any p r o g r e s s . A l s o , he c h a l l e n g e d C a r t e r and most of h i s a d v i s o r s i n t h e i r b e l i e f 264 t h a t c o n c e s s i o n s by the Shah would a v e r t a r e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n . Most of the l i t e r a t u r e on the C a r t e r p r e s i d e n c y argues t h a t B r z e z i n s k i , as a s k i l l f u l b u r e a u c r a t i c i n f i g h t e r , was s i m p l y t r y i n g t o g a i n dominance over the c o u r s e of C a r t e r ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 1 1 T h i s s t u d y , however, seems t o i n d i c a t e t h a t B r z e z i n s k i was a d d r e s s i n g a s e r i o u s f l a w i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . C a r t e r was c o n s i s t e n t l y r e c e i v i n g a l o p s i d e d and p a r t i a l view of the i s s u e s . As the c h i e f c o o r d i n a t o r of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , B r z e z i n s k i a t t e m p t e d t o widen the range of o p t i o n s . These c o n c l u s i o n s a r e drawn s o l e l y on the b a s i s of o b s e r v i n g the b e h a v i o u r of B r z e z i n s k i and the o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h i s study i s not p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h g i v i n g n o r m a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s of why the a c t o r s a c t e d as they d i d . Thus, w h i l e B r z e z i n s k i may have been concerned w i t h the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s weak p u b l i c image or w i t h a c h i e v i n g h i s own f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s , o n l y h i s a c t i o n s i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s a r e e v a l u a t e d . N e i t h e r the m o t i v a t i o n s of the p l a y e r s nor t h e i r p e t t y p e r s o n a l i t y c l a s h e s form the f o c u s of t h i s s t u d y . On the b a s i s of t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n of b e h a v i o u r , the f o l l o w i n g t e n t a t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s can be drawn from t h i s s t u d y . C o n t r a r y t o George's f o r m u l a t i o n , c u s t o d i a l advocacy improved the p r o c e s s . D u r i n g the Ogaden war, B r z e z i n s k i ' s advocacy c l a r i f i e d C a r t e r ' s o b j e c t i v e s i n the c o n f l i c t . W h i l e C a r t e r d i d not a c c e p t a l l of B r z e z i n s k i ' s recommendations, he r e a l i z e d t h a t a t l e a s t he had t o condemn the S o v i e t r o l e more f o r c e f u l l y . In the Chinese-American 265 n o r m a l i z a t i o n c a s e , B r z e z i n s k i ' s i n p u t c o n t r i b u t e d g r e a t l y t o C a r t e r ' s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y s u c c e s s . D u r i n g the I r a n i a n c r i s i s , B r z e z i n s k i a l o n e argued f o r the b e n e f i t s of the I r o n F i s t o p t i o n . A l s o , B r z e z i n s k i ' s p u b l i c s p e a k i n g d u r i n g the Ogaden c r i s i s and h i s d i p l o m a t i c a c t i v i t i e s i n the US-PRC n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s d i d not harm the American p o s i t i o n . These a c t i v i t i e s have been p r o s c r i b e d by the s t r a t e g y under a l l c o n d i t i o n s . W h i l e the f i n d i n g s i n t h i s study do not warrant support f o r a l l p u b l i c s p e a k i n g on t h e p a r t of the c u s t o d i a n , they do c h a l l e n g e the r i g i d d e f i n i t i o n of c u s t o d i a l a c t i v i t i e s . As i n the case of US-PRC n o r m a l i z a t i o n , the c u s t o d i a n may a t ti m e s be a b e t t e r communicator of the p r e s i d e n t ' s o b j e c t i v e s than the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e . 1 2 D u r i n g the war i n the Ogaden as w e l l as the e a r l y s t a g e of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s on Chinese-American n o r m a l i z a t i o n , B r z e z i n s k i a d v o c a t e d w h i l e a l s o managing the o v e r a l l p r o c e s s . No a d v o c a t e s were b l o c k e d from the d e c i s i o n forums and a l l p o l i c y d i s a g r e e m e n t s were brought t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n . As such, t h e s e c a s e s c h a l l e n g e the s t r a t e g y ' s p r o s c r i p t i o n of c u s t o d i a l advocacy. The second s t a g e i n the Chinese-American n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s as w e l l as the I r a n i s s u e show t h a t the s t r a t e g y b r e a k s down when the c u s t o d i a n n e g l e c t s t o m a i n t a i n the c r u c i a l p r o c e s s norms. W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i merely o f f e r e d an a d d i t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e d u r i n g the Ogaden war, he went one s t e p f u r t h e r d u r i n g the n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s i n 1978, and 266 d u r i n g the r e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n . In e f f e c t , he at t e m p t e d t o b l o c k the o t h e r a d v i s o r s from r e c e i v i n g a f a i r h e a r i n g f o r t h e i r o p t i o n s , and d i d not i n f o r m C a r t e r of a l l the di s a g r e e m e n t s among h i s a d v i s o r s . In the n o r m a l i z a t i o n c a s e , B r z e z i n s k i t r i e d p r i v a t e l y t o get C a r t e r t o emphasize the s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and China w h i l e c i r c u m v e n t i n g Vance's o b j e c t i o n s t o t h i s approach. D u r i n g the I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n , B r z e z i n s k i b l o c k e d P r e c h t (DOS I r a n o f f i c e r ) from g e t t i n g a h e a r i n g on h i s p r o p o s a l t o drop American support f o r the Shah and t o back Khomeini i n s t e a d . As a r e s u l t , C a r t e r d i d not hear a l l s i d e s of the i s s u e and was not inf o r m e d about a l l p o l i c y c o n f l i c t s among h i s a d v i s o r s . W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i had p r e v i o u s l y sought t o have C a r t e r make a l l f i n a l d e c i s i o n s and choose among the v a r i o u s p e r s p e c t i v e s , he now papered over d i s a g r e e m e n t s and p r e s e n t e d compromise s o l u t i o n s t o the p r e s i d e n t . These v i o l a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e the main e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the breakdown of the s t r a t e g y . W h i l e the s t r a t e g y can work w i t h a c u s t o d i a n who widens the debate by means of genuine advocacy, i t cannot work w i t h o u t the o b s e r v a t i o n of t h e p r o c e s s norms. Indeed, B r z e z i n s k i ' s n e g l e c t of the s e p r o c e s s norms e x p l a i n s the r a p i d d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s s t a r t i n g i n 1979. For example, d u r i n g the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s on American defense s t r a t e g y (PD 59), the MX m i s s i l e programme, the C a r t e r D o c t r i n e , and the American response t o the S o v i e t i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n , B r z e z i n s k i abandoned the open debate forums as w e l l as the i n t e r a g e n c y p r o c e s s on f o r m u l a t i n g o p t i o n s . 1 3 I n s t e a d , he 267 l o b b i e d , a t t i m e s p r i v a t e l y , w i t h C a r t e r t o get h i s p o l i c y p r e f e r e n c e s implemented a t the expense of the o t h e r a d v o c a t e s . When the s t r a t e g y ' s p r o c e s s norms were abandoned, t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s r e s o r t e d t o mere B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s . Each a d v i s o r t r i e d h i s be s t t o l o b b y w i t h the p r e s i d e n t f o r h i s p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n . A l s o , the a d v i s o r s s t a r t e d t o make compromises and t r a d e - o f f s among one an o t h e r so as t o secu r e a t l e a s t some a s p e c t s of t h e i r p o l i c y o p t i o n s . C a r t e r no l o n g e r r e c e i v e d a f u l l debate on a l l s i d e s of an i s s u e and c o u l d no l o n g e r depend on h i s N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r f o r a f a i r and b a l a n c e d r e p o r t on a l l the o p t i o n s . As a r e s u l t , he c o u l d no l o n g e r make an o p t i m a l c h o i c e from a range of c o m p e t i t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e s but had t o s e l e c t t h a t o p t i o n on which Vance and B r z e z i n s k i c o u l d agree t o some e x t e n t . Moreover, as the I r a n case i l l u s t r a t e s , Vance and B r z e z i n s k i a l s o c l a s h e d on the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y . The c u s t o d i a n ' s d i r e c t i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e e x e c u t i o n of the p r e s i d e n t ' s p o l i c y does not b e n e f i t the p r e s i d e n t ' s p o l i c y . H i s proper r o l e , as t h i s study s u g g e s t s , i s t o d i v e r s i f y the p o l i c y debate. I t i s c l e a r l y c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e t o extend t h i s d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n i n t o the realm of p o l i c y e x e c u t i o n . Though not the main f o c u s of t h i s t h e s i s , the case s t u d i e s o f f e r an e x p l a n a t i o n why the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s d e t e r i o r a t e d d u r i n g the co u r s e of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The fundamental f l a w i n the p r o c e s s was the l a c k of d i v e r s i t y of o p i n i o n among the a d v o c a t e s . B r z e z i n s k i a t t e m p t e d t o c o r r e c t 268 t h i s f l a w by a d v o c a t i n g a l t e r n a t i v e o p t i o n s . However, he a n n u l l e d the p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s o f . h i s advocacy by n e g l e c t i n g t o u p h o l d the p r o c e s s norms of the s t r a t e g y . W h i l e c u s t o d i a l advocacy a c t u a l l y improved the p r o c e s s , the v i o l a t i o n of the p r o c e s s norms caused i t s t o t a l demise. MALFUNCTIONS IN THE DECISION PROCESS AND OUTCOMES The cases s t u d i e d i n t h i s t h e s i s a l s o o f f e r i n t e r e s t i n g i n s i g h t s i n t o the p o s s i b l e m a l f u n c t i o n s i n the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s as d e f i n e d by George. George p r e s c r i b e d m u l t i p l e advocacy p r o c e e d i n g s t o reduce c e r t a i n r e c u r r e n t f a i l u r e s which he obser v e d i n s e v e r a l h i s t o r i c a l c a s e s of American f o r e i g n p o l i c y making. The m a l f u n c t i o n s , as George sees them, can be bes t d e f i n e d as p r o c e s s management f a i l u r e s . As such, George a t t e m p t s t o i d e n t i f y and d i a g n o s e s e v e r a l problems i n the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s which a r e not p r i m a r i l y r e l a t e d t o p s y c h o l o g i c a l a b e r r a t i o n s i n the p a r t i c i p a n t s , man-machine e r r o r s or o t h e r f l a w s which a r e not p e r c e p t i b l y a f f e c t e d by v a r i a t i o n i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . 1 * In f o r m u l a t i n g a l i s t of such m a l f u n c t i o n s , George asked the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s : D i d a m a l f u n c t i o n o c c u r , and how s u i t a b l e and c e r t a i n i s the d a t a so t h a t we can draw such an i n f e r e n c e w i t h some c o n f i d e n c e ? D i d the m a l f u n c t i o n i n the p r o c e s s a f f e c t the c o n t e n t of the f i n a l p o l i c y d e c i s i o n ? Had the 269 m a l f u n c t i o n not o c c u r r e d , c o u l d the d e c i s i o n have been d i f f e r e n t ? F i n a l l y , how i m p o r t a n t was t h e m a l f u n c t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o the many o t h e r v a r i a b l e s t h a t h e l p e x p l a i n the d e c i s i o n outcome? These q u e s t i o n s , as George acknowledges, r a i s e more m e t h o d o l o g i c a l and e p i s t o m o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s than can be answered. The q u e s t i o n of the r e l a t i v e weight of the p r o c e s s v i s - a - v i s the o t h e r f a c t o r s can not be answered c o n c l u s i v e l y . D e c i s i o n a l p r e m i s e s such as i d e o l o g y and c o g n i t i v e b e l i e f s have a way of i n f l u e n c i n g s u b t l y e v e r y a s p e c t of the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . George responds t o t h i s p roblem by s t a t i n g t h a t he employs these q u e s t i o n s merely t o h i g h l i g h t s e v e r a l problems i n the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . He does not c l a i m t o o f f e r an e x h a u s t i v e or f i n a l h i s t o r i c a l account of t h e causes of f a i l u r e i n s e v e r a l American f o r e i g n p o l i c y c a s e s . I n e v i t a b l y i n v o l v e d i n an a n a l y s i s of the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s i s the l i n k between m a l f u n c t i o n s i n the p r o c e s s and poor d e c i s i o n s as a r e s u l t of the s e m a l f u n c t i o n s . As d i s c u s s e d b e f o r e , George l i m i t s h i s scope of a n a l y s i s t o s a y i n g t h a t a poor d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s i n c r e a s e s the l i k e l i h o o d of poor d e c i s i o n s . But how i s one t o e v a l u a t e \"poor\" or \"good\" p o l i c y outcomes? George r e a l i z e s t h a t t h i s q u e s t i o n i s h i g h l y n o r m a t i v e and r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s about s u b j e c t i v i t y . He e x c l u d e s the n o t i o n t h a t a normative approach n e c e s s a r i l y means whether the i n v e s t i g a t o r merely agrees w i t h the p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s and o b j e c t i v e s of the p o l i c y m a k e r . 1 5 At a more o b j e c t i v e l e v e l , he proposes whether \" i t was the b e s t 270 d e c i s i o n under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t p r e v a i l e d a t the t i m e . \" 1 6 By d e c i s i o n , he means the more narrow d e c i s i o n -making output r a t h e r than the l a r g e r p o l i c y outcome. The l a t t e r i s the l a r g e r outcome or e v o l u t i o n of the d e c i s i o n a l o u tput which i s a f f e c t e d by o t h e r f a c t o r s and subsequent e v e n t s , o f t e n o u t s i d e the p e r c e p t i o n of the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s a t the t i m e . An e v a l u a t i o n of the l a r g e r p o l i c y outcome would i n e v i t a b l y use the b e n e f i t s of h i n d s i g h t and as such demand an u n f a i r l e v e l of wisdom and f o r e s i g h t from the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s . Whether i t was the be s t d e c i s i o n a t the t i m e , a c c o r d i n g t o George, i s measured by the f o l l o w i n g c r i t e r i a : How a t t a i n a b l e were the p o l i c y g o a l s chosen, and how s u i t a b l e were the means employed? How t i m e l y and f l e x i b l e was the American response, and how a c c u r a t e was the c a l c u l a t i o n of sup p o r t f o r i t ? F i n a l l y , how a c c u r a t e was the c a l c u l a t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s and the p r e d i c t e d l o n g term consequences? Wi t h the use of a s m a l l number of h i s t o r i c a l c a s e s , George i d e n t i f i e s n i n e p o s s i b l e m a l f u n c t i o n s i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . 1 7 S e v e r a l of the s e a r e u s e f u l t o i d e n t i f y the m a l f u n c t i o n s i n the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s d u r i n g the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . A l s o , g i v e n the c l o s e a p p r o x i m a t i o n of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y d u r i n g the e a r l y s t a g e s of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , s e v e r a l of George's m a l f u n c t i o n s i l l u s t r a t e the p o s i t i v e e f f e c t of the c u s t o d i a n ' s a c t i o n s t o c o r r e c t s h o r t c o m i n g s i n the p r o c e s s . L i k e George, I do not c l a i m t o p r o v i d e an e x h a u s t i v e or c o n c l u s i v e e x p l a n a t i o n of a l l t he f a c t o r s t h a t produced p o l i c y f a i l u r e s or p o l i c y 271 s u c c e s s e s . A l s o , my a n a l y s i s i s r e s t r i c t e d t o f a i l u r e s i n p r o c e s s management o n l y . As mentioned a t c e r t a i n p o i n t s throughout t h i s t h e s i s and c h a p t e r , n e i t h e r the p r e s i d e n t ' s c o g n i t i v e b e l i e f s nor i d e o l o g i c a l commitments a r e assumed t o be u n i m p o r t a n t . A l s o , my emphasis on the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s i s not i n t e n d e d t o downplay the s i g n i f i c a n c e of o t h e r d e c i s i o n a l p r e m i s e s . Moreover, my b r i e f e v a l u a t i o n s of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g o u t p u t s a r e not i n t e n d e d as s u b s t i t u t e s f o r a comprehensive e v a l u a t i o n of the p o l i c y outcomes of the f o u r d e c i s i o n c a s e s examined h e r e . I n s t e a d , as George, I w i l l o f f e r some comments on the degree t o which the d e c i s i o n s were o p t i m a l under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s a t the t i m e , and the degree t o which t h e s e o u t p u t s can be r e l a t e d t o the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . A l a c k of c r i t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n of a l l a s p e c t s i n v o l v e d i n a p o l i c y o p t i o n b e s t d e s c r i b e s the c h i e f m a l f u n c t i o n d u r i n g the \"Deep C u t s \" d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . One of George's l i s t e d m a l f u n c t i o n s o c c u r s \"when the p r e s i d e n t a s k s a d v i s o r s f o r t h e i r o p i n i o n s on a p r e f e r r e d c o u r s e of a c t i o n but does not r e q u e s t a q u a l i f i e d group t o examine more c a r e f u l y the n e g a t i v e judgment o f f e r e d by one or more a d v i s o r s . \" 1 8 George i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s m a l f u n c t i o n i n l i g h t of the Bay of P i g s i n v a s i o n e a r l y i n the Kennedy a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The advoc a t e s of the i n v a s i o n were not c h a l l e n g e d i n t h e i r arguments because the \"opponents\" d i d not speak up and the p r e s i d e n t d i d not encourage a s u b s t a n t i a l review of the arguments i n f a v o u r of the i n v a s i o n . I n s t e a d , Kennedy a d j u s t e d s l i g h t l y s e v e r a l d e t a i l s of the p l a n t o s u i t h i s p e r s o n a l v a l u e s and 272 i n t e r e s t s . George argues t h a t the r e s u l t i n g f i a s c o can be l i n k e d t o the absence of c r i t i c a l r e v i e w . A s i m i l a r s c e n a r i o u n f o l d e d d u r i n g the f i r s t months of the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . W h i l e Vance had s e r i o u s h e s i t a t i o n s about the Deep Cuts p r o p o s a l s , he d i d not speak up c l e a r l y . C a r t e r was impressed by the c a r e f u l l y p r e p a r e d advocacy i n f a v o u r of Deep Cuts by Brown and Aaron. W h i l e C a r t e r was not committed t o Deep C u t s , he seemed t o l e a n more towards t h a t o p t i o n than towards the more c o n s e r v a t i v e V l a d i v o s t o k o p t i o n . Y e t , t h r o u g h the p o l i c y b r i e f s s u b m i t t e d t o him by B r z e z i n s k i , C a r t e r must have been aware of the h e s i t a t i o n s of Vance and Warnke. However, C a r t e r d i d n o t h i n g t o advance t h e i r o p p o r t u n i t y t o make t h e i r c a s e . I t i s t h i s c o m b i n a t i o n of weak advocacy by s e v e r a l a d v i s o r s and no r e q u e s t of r e v i e w by the p r e s i d e n t t h a t caused C a r t e r t o choose the Deep Cuts o p t i o n w i t h o u t b e i n g s u f f i c i e n t l y aware of i t s p r o b a b l e consequences. The r o l e of the c u s t o d i a n i n t h i s i s s u e was l a r g e l y m a n a g e r i a l and p o l i c y n e u t r a l . However, he f a i l e d t o c a l l f o r a r e v i e w of Vance's h e s i t a t i o n s by a group of o t h e r s p e c i a l i s t s . As mentioned b e f o r e , the US ambassador i n Moscow s h o u l d have been i n v o l v e d i n t h i s p r o c e s s . He would have been i n a good p o s i t i o n t o p r e d i c t the p o s s i b l e S o v i e t response t o the p r o p o s a l s . As argued throughout t h i s t h e s i s , George's c a l l f o r a r e v i e w of the p o l i c y o p t i o n s by a group of s p e c i a l i s t s or o u t s i d e r s i s a t h e o r e t i c a l l y sound i d e a . Y e t , i t i s not always f e a s i b l e . A p r e s i d e n t ' s o b s e s s i o n w i t h p o l i c y l e a k s , 273 even though they may come l a r g e l y from h i s own c l o s e c i r c l e of a d v i s o r s , l e a d s him t o c u r t a i l o f t e n a r b i t r a r i l y t h e number of i n s i d e r a d v i s o r s . As a r e s u l t , I have argued t h a t such a c r i t i c a l r e v i e w can o f t e n be b e t t e r performed by t h e c u s t o d i a n . W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i d i d not always do t h i s c o n s i s t e n t l y and evenhandedly, he d i d p e r f o r m t h i s r o l e i n s e v e r a l key d e c i s i o n s d i s c u s s e d . In the SALT case such a r e v i e w was a b s e n t . I t appears q u i t e l i k e l y t h a t the S o v i e t s r e j e c t e d C a r t e r ' s p r o p o s a l s because of h i s sudden d e p a r t u r e from V l a d i v o s t o k . Y e t , t o a s s e s s t h i s p o l i c y outcome i n the l o n g view i s d i f f i c u l t . W h i l e i t s t a l l e d the SALT t a l k s f o r some time i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , i t d i d not k i l l them. A l t h o u g h some c r i t i c s have argued t h a t t h i s d e l a y proved d e t r i m e n t a l i n l i g h t of the o t h e r o b s t a c l e s t o SALT t h a t kept b u i l d i n g up, we w i l l never know a l l the f a c t o r s t h a t p r e v e n t e d C a r t e r from a c h i e v i n g a r a t i f i e d arms t r e a t y w i t h the S o v i e t s . I b e l i e v e the most d e t r i m e n t a l r e s u l t of t h i s d e c i s i o n was t h a t i t produced a s u b s t a n t i a l s e t b a c k t o C a r t e r ' s pronounced and e a g e r l y sought g o a l t o have a f o r e i g n p o l i c y s u c c e s s e a r l y i n h i s term. Another m a l f u n c t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o George, o c c u r s \"when the p r e s i d e n t and h i s a d v i s o r s agree t o o r e a d i l y on the n a t u r e of the problem f a c i n g them and on a response t o i t . \" 1 9 T y p i c a l l y , George a r g u e s , t h i s m a l f u n c t i o n o c c u r s when the d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s a r e c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a c r i s i s and they a l l agree t h a t something must be done t o p r o t e c t American i n t e r e s t s . T h i s sudden surge f o r a \"need f o r 2 7 4 a c t i o n \" tends t o produce a p o o r l y thought through consensus. I f not c h a l l e n g e d , the t y p i c a l e r r o r made w i l l be t o d e c i d e upon some a c t i o n w i t h o u t a c l e a r e s t i m a t i o n of the r i s k s and c o s t s i n v o l v e d . As an example, George uses the d e c i s i o n d u r i n g p r e s i d e n t Johnson's term t o send, t r o o p s t o the Dominican R e p u b l i c . To a v o i d t h i s m i s t a k e , the consensus must be c h a l l e n g e d . George s t a t e s t h a t G e n e r a l Ridgway d i d e x a c t l y t h i s when he c h a l l e n g e d Eisenhower's a d v i s o r s i n t h e i r consensus t o send U.S. t r o o p s t o h e l p the F r e n c h a t D i e n b i e n p h u . As a r e s u l t of the c h a l l e n g e , the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s improved g r e a t l y . 2 0 The war i n the Horn of A f r i c a o f f e r s an i n t e r e s t i n g case s t u d y i n view of t h i s m a l f u n c t i o n . C o n t r a r y t o the more common phenomenon of a consensus f o r a c t i o n , here we f i n d an e a r l y consensus a g a i n s t any U.S. a c t i o n . N e a r l y a l l of C a r t e r ' s a d v i s o r s b e l i e v e d t h a t the S o m a l i s had brought the havoc of war upon t h e m s e l v e s . Moreover, even though the S o v i e t and Cuban c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e was m a s s i v e , they b e l i e v e d t h a t C a r t e r ' s A f r i c a p o l i c y would be damaged from any American m i l i t a r y i nvolvement i n the c o n f l i c t and t h a t the S o v i e t involvement d i d not a f f e c t American i n t e r e s t s a d v e r s e l y . L e a v i n g a s i d e the q u e s t i o n whether American i n v o l v e m e n t would have been i n the US i n t e r e s t or n o t , the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s was b a d l y marred by a v e r y o n e s i d e d consensus. S i n c e no a d v i s o r c h a l l e n g e d t h i s consensus, B r z e z i n s k i d i d . Even though t h i s c o n s t i t u t e d genuine advocacy, i t 275 g r e a t l y improved the p r o c e s s . The c u s t o d i a n p o i n t e d out the c o n s i d e r a b l e s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s the U n i t e d S t a t e s had i n the Red Sea a r e a . Moreover, he a l e r t e d C a r t e r t o the c o n c e r n of r e g i o n a l l y i m p o r t a n t a l l i e s such as Egypt and I r a n . F i n a l l y , he a l e r t e d C a r t e r t o the p o s s i b l y dangerous p r e c e d e n t s e t by a v e r y p a s s i v e American response t o o v e r t S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a i d i n A f r i c a and S o v i e t s u p p o r t e d Cuban d i r e c t i nvolvement i n the c o n f l i c t . W h i l e C a r t e r d i d not change the s u b s t a n c e of h i s p o l i c y , he d i d , i n response t o B r z e z i n s k i ' s c h a l l e n g e , i n d i c a t e i n a much s t r o n g e r manner t o the S o v i e t s t h a t t h e i r b e h a v i o u r c o u l d worsen o v e r a l l A m e r i c a n - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s . Whether p r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y combined w i t h the p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s of c o n c e r n improved the o v e r a l l d e c i s i o n i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o a s c e r t a i n . Advocates of a reduced American r o l e i n t h i r d p a r t y c o n f l i c t s b e l i e v e d t h a t the p u b l i c comments harmed U S - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s u n n e c e s s a r i l y . O t h e r s , however, have argued t h a t the \"weak\" p o l i c y caused the S o v i e t s t o f e e l more c o m f o r t a b l e i n embarking upon o t h e r e x p l o r a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y A f g h a n i s t a n . O t h e r s y e t , have argued t h a t the two a r e not r e l a t e d i n any m e a n i n g f u l way. W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i ' s views of S o v i e t b e h a v i o u r may be h i g h l y b i a s e d , he performed a c r u c i a l f u n c t i o n i n making C a r t e r more aware of p o s s i b l e r e p e r c u s s i o n s of h i s a c t i o n s i n A f r i c a . Another m a l f u n c t i o n i d e n t i f i e d by George r e s u l t s from a d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s where \" t h e r e i s no advocate f o r an unpopular p o l i c y o p t i o n . \" 2 1 George i d e n t i f i e s t h i s phenomenon as the main weakness i n the American response t o 276 the N o r t h Korean i n v a s i o n of South Korea i n 1950. No one i n the p r e s i d e n t ' s c i r c l e appeared t o c o n s i d e r not t o commit U.S. t r o o p s t o the c o n f l i c t . C l e a r l y , the Horn case as d i s c u s s e d above d e a l s w i t h t h i s m a l f u n c t i o n as w e l l . But the C a r t e r d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s o f t e n f e l l v i c t i m t o t h i s s h o r t c o m i n g . In the C h ina c a s e , s e v e r a l a d v i s o r s were aware of the \" s t r a t e g i c c o o p e r a t i o n \" o p t i o n . Vance, however, r e j e c t e d i t out of hand, f e a r i n g t h a t any Sino-American s t r a t e g i c c o o p e r a t i o n would unduly a l i e n a t e t h e S o v i e t s . Nor d i d i t a p p a r a n t l y a p p e a l t o Vance as a b a r g a i n i n g c h i p v i s -a - v i s the S o v i e t U n i o n . Defense S e c r e t a r y Brown was not opposed t o i n c r e a s e d S i n o - A m e r i c a n c o o p e r a t i o n on s t r a t e g i c m a t t e r s . However, he never became a f o r c e f u l a d v o c a t e f o r i t and c e r t a i n l y d i d not c h a l l e n g e Vance's o p p o s i t i o n t o i t . As a r e s u l t , i t was a g a i n B r z e z i n s k i who was l e f t t o defend the p o s s i b l e advantages of such a r e l a t i o n s h i p . W h i l e he was not l o a t h t o advocate t h i s o p t i o n , h i s r o l e c o u l d have been muted i f some o t h e r a d v i s o r had a dvocated i t . B z e z i n s k i ' s advocacy widened C a r t e r ' s o p t i o n s i n a c h i e v i n g n o r m a l i z a t i o n . W h i l e B r z e z i n s k i improved the p r o c e s s by a d d i n g an u npopular o p t i o n , he d i d not attempt t o improve i t any f u r t h e r . C o n s p i c u o u s l y absent from C a r t e r ' s n o r m a l i z a t i o n debate were the pro-Taiwan a d v o c a t e s . As i n t h e Korean c a s e , nobody c h a l l e n g e d the fundamental q u e s t i o n whether the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d a t a l l n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a . Indeed, i t can be argued t h a t t h e r e was an e a r l y consensus t o n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a w h i l e the p o s s i b l e c o s t s 277 i n US-Taiwanese r e l a t i o n s r e c e i v e d o n l y t a c t i c a l a t t e n t i o n . 2 2 The c u s t o d i a n f a i l e d t o b r i n g i n a d v o c a t e s f o r t h i s o p t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , w h i l e B r z e z i n s k i widened the range of o p t i o n s w i t h h i s v i e w s , he d i d not go f a r enough i n i m p r o v i n g the p r o c e s s . In a narrow view, B r z e z i n s k i ' s s t r a t e g i c o p t i o n h e l p e d C a r t e r a c h i e v e h i s g o a l of Sino-American n o r m a l i z a t i o n . As such, the improved d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s can be r e l a t e d t o a s u c c e s f u l d e c i s i o n a l o u t p u t . O b v i o u s l y , the s t r a t e g i c o p t i o n i s o n l y one f a c t o r among many. Above a l l , the d e c i s i o n outcome c o n s t i t u t e s an agreement between two l a r g e c o u n t r i e s . T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e a r e a ho s t of f a c t o r s a t the Ch i n e s e s i d e t h a t go towards e x p l a i n i n g the outcome. I t a p p e a r s , however, t h a t the Chinese wanted a s t r a t e g i c a l l y c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p , a t l e a s t i n the d i p l o m a t i c s p here, than Vance was w i l l i n g t o o f f e r . C a r t e r , who appears t o have been more i n t e r e s t e d i n g e t t i n g a f o r e i g n p o l i c y s u c c e s s than i n the means by which the s u c c e s s s h o u l d be a c h i e v e d , was not committed t o Vance's p o s i t i o n . W h i l e a c l e a r a l t e r n a t i v e o p t i o n s h o u l d have been ad v o c a t e d by Brown or any o t h e r a d v i s o r , t h e r e was no one t o do so. A p a r t from B r z e z i n s k i ' s p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s , he f i l l e d the vacuum and t h e r e b y improved the p r o c e s s . In a more l o n g e r term view, which George c a l l s the p o l i c y outcome e v a l u a t i o n , s e v e r a l weaknesses can be i d e n t i f i e d as a r e s u l t of B r z e z i n s k i ' s a c t i o n s . George's m a l f u n c t i o n number seven o c c u r s \"when the key assumptions and p r e m i s e s of a p l a n have been e v a l u a t e d o n l y by the 2 7 8 advocates of that o p t i o n . \" 2 3 B r z e z i n s k i ' s and C a r t e r ' s p r i v a t e d e l i b e r a t i o n s on the nature and tone of Sino-American s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s can be seen as an e r r o r of t h i s type. B r z e z i n s k i ' s use of the term hegemony was not subj e c t e d to a s u f f i c i e n t debate w i t h i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Moreover, B r e z e z i n s k i ' s h a n d l i n g of the n e g o t i a t i o n s was a l s o not s c r u t i n i z e d adequately. As a r e s u l t , S o v i e t -American r e l a t i o n s were perhaps u n n e c e s s a r i l y s t r a i n e d i n order to achieve n o r m a l i z a t i o n . Another m a l f u n c t i o n , d i s c u s s e d by George, sheds l i g h t on the problems i n the decision-making process on the American response to the I r a n i a n c r i s i s . M a l f u n c t i o n two i s i d e n t i f i e d \"when a d v i s o r s and advocates take d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s and debate them before the p r e s i d e n t but t h e i r disagreements do not cover the f u l l range of r e l e v a n t hypotheses and a l t e r n a t i v e o p t i o n s . \" 2 \" George o f f e r s the example of the gradual US involvement i n the Vietnam war. While the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , i n the e a r l y stages of the e s c a l a t i n g US involvement, d i s c u s s e d amply the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of American response, no one developed a plan or advocated t o t a l US w i t h d r a w a l . 2 5 C a r t e r ' s d e c i s i o n process d u r i n g the gradual but steady d e c l i n e of the Shah's r u l e was marred by s e v e r a l m a l f u n c t i o n s . While everyone was aware of the \" i r o n f i s t \" s o l u t i o n , no one was w i l l i n g to defend t h i s o p t i o n i n f r o n t of the p r e s i d e n t . To some degree t h i s can be e x p l a i n e d by the f a c t that most a d v i s o r s knew that C a r t e r p e r s o n a l l y was not a b l e or w i l l i n g to use American power i n such a c r u e l or 279 v i o l e n t way. However, the r e s u l t was t h a t t h e r e were no a d v o c a t e s f o r an unpopular o p t i o n . T h i s m a l f u n c t i o n , as d i s c u s s e d above, was a g a i n c o r r e c t e d by B r z e z i n s k i . However, I b e l i e v e a more s e r i o u s s h o r t c o m i n g i n the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s i s i d e n t i f i e d by George as a l a c k of a f u l l range of r e l e v a n t a l t e r n a t i v e h y p o t h e s e s . S i m i l a r t o the Vietnam q u e s t i o n , C a r t e r d i d not hear a comprehensive argument i n f a v o u r of not s u p p o r t i n g the Shah a t a l l . Y e t , t h e r e was a s t r o n g advocate i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n who was ready t o do so a t an e a r l y s t a g e . The P r e c h t o p t i o n c o u l d have improved the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s c o n s i d e r a b l y . However, as i t was, C a r t e r was r e s t r i c t e d t o a p e r s i s t e n t and s u b t l e p r o d d i n g by B r z e z i n s k i on h a r s h e r methods, w h i l e most o t h e r a d v i s o r s sought compromise p o s i t i o n s . As a r e s u l t , C a r t e r muddled t h r o u g h the c r i s i s v a c i l l a t i n g between moderate s u p p o r t f o r the Shah and moderate support f o r r e f o r m s . W h i l e i t i s e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o s p e c u l a t e whether any a l t e r n a t i v e US a c t i o n would have produced d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s i n I r a n , i t i s c l e a r t h a t the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s d i d not f a c i l i t a t e the p o s s i b l i t y of c o n s i d e r i n g d i f f e r e n t c o u r s e s of a c t i o n . As such, the r o l e v i o l a t i o n s by the c u s t o d i a n go a l o n g way towards e x p l a i n i n g t h e s e fundamental f l a w s i n t h i s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . 280 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE STRATEGY The f o u r case s t u d i e s examined i n t h i s t h e s i s p r o v i d e t h e b a s i s f o r the f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s . The s t r a t e g y ' s r o l e p r e s c r i p t i o n s and p r o s c r i p t i o n s f a i l e d t o d e a l a d e q u a t e l y w i t h a l a c k of d i v e r s i t y of o p i n i o n among the a d v o c a t e s . The i d e a of i n v i t i n g o u t s i d e r s t o widen the debate appears u s e f u l but o f t e n not ve r y f e a s i b l e . C a r t e r , who was a v e r y open minded p r e s i d e n t , and who t o l e r a t e d h i g h l e v e l s of d i s s e n t among h i s a d v i s o r s , o n l y used the p r e s c r i p t i o n once. George B a l l e n t e r e d the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s d u r i n g the I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n . However, B a l l ' s v i e w s were not v e r y d i f f e r e n t from the e x i s t i n g o p t i o n s , and he d i d not have enough i n f l u e n c e t o change C a r t e r ' s mind. Even a t o l e r a n t p r e s i d e n t l i k e C a r t e r had b u i l t a c e r t a i n r a p p o r t w i t h h i s c l o s e a d v i s o r s which was not e a s i l y p e n e t r a t e d by an o u t s i d e r . Moreover, C a r t e r , l i k e many p r e s i d e n t s b e f o r e him, became obsess e d w i t h l e a k s . As a r e s u l t , he became l o a t h t o widen h i s c i r c l e of a d v i s o r s . Though l e s s p e r f e c t , an a l t e r n a t i v e way t o c o r r e c t a l a c k of d i v e r g e n t o p t i o n s i s t o l e t the c u s t o d i a n advocate when n e c e s s a r y . However, i f t h e l a c k of o p t i o n s among the a d v o c a t e s p e r s i s t s over a l o n g p e r i o d of t i m e , i t l i k e l y l e a d s t o c u s t o d i a l advocacy a t the expense of the p r o c e s s norms. George and H a l l a r e c o r r e c t i n c l a i m i n g t h a t c u s t o d i a l advocacy c o n f l i c t s w i t h h i s t a s k as p r o c e s s manager o n l y when c u s t o d i a l advocacy i s needed time and 281 a g a i n . However, they a r e i n c o r r e c t i n p r o s c r i b i n g c u s t o d i a l advocacy as a pro c e d u r e t o c o r r e c t a l a c k of o p t i o n s among the a d v o c a t e s per se. A l s o , the s t r a t e g y need not p r o h i b i t a l l p u b l i c s p e a k i n g and di p l o m a c y on the p a r t of the c u s t o d i a n , once the p r e s i d e n t has made a c l e a r p o l i c y d e c i s i o n . On the b a s i s of t h i s s t u d y , the f o l l o w i n g recommendations can be made t o improve the s t r a t e g y . F i r s t , t he p r e s i d e n t may want t o s e l e c t a wide range of ad v o c a t e s w i t h a c o n s i d e r a b l e s p r e a d i n b e l i e f s and v a l u e s c o n c e r n i n g f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . The m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i s l i k e l y made more e f f e c t i v e when the p r e s i d e n t s e l e c t s h i s a d v i s o r s c a r e f u l l y on the b a s i s of t h e i r p o t e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the o v e r a l l p o l i c y debate. T h i s i s by no means an easy re q u i r e m e n t t o meet and has not r e c e i v e d adequate a t t e n t i o n i n George's o r i g i n a l f o r m u l a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y . D u r i n g the e l e c t i o n campaign, the p r e s i d e n t accumulates a c e r t a i n amount of p o l i t i c a l debt which l i m i t s h i s freedom t o a p p o i n t whomever he wants. A l s o , he i s c o n s t r a i n e d by the need t o have p e o p l e around him whom he knows w e l l and whom he can t r u s t . O f t e n , t h e s e p e o p l e have v a l u e s and b e l i e f s c l o s e t o h i s . W h i l e r e c o g n i z i n g t h i s dilemma, the s t r a t e g y , i n i t s p u r s u i t t o improve the p r e s i d e n t i a l a d v i s o r y p r o c e s s , must p r o v i d e the p r e s i d e n t w i t h y e t ano t h e r c r i t e r i o n by which t o s e l e c t a d v i s o r s . W h i l e not easy, t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t i s not i m p o s s i b l e t o a c h i e v e . C e r t a i n l y , the p r e s i d e n t has the r i g h t , and i f he a c c e p t s the s t r a t e g y ' s r a t i o n a l e , the power t o a p p o i n t p e o p l e who can p r o v i d e him w i t h genuine 282 a l t e r n a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e s . A c c o r d i n g t o the e v i d e n c e found i n t h i s t h e s i s , t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t c o n s t i t u t e s an i m p o r t a n t s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r the s t r a t e g y ' s s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n . Second, when the a d v o c a t e s do not produce a wide v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s , the c u s t o d i a n s h o u l d be a l l o w e d t o o f f e r a l t e r n a t i v e s . However, c u s t o d i a l advocacy s h o u l d not become i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d : c u s t o d i a l advocacy s h o u l d not become a permanent c o r r e c t i o n f o r a l a c k of debate among the a d v o c a t e s . Moreover, when the c u s t o d i a n o f f e r s an a l t e r n a t i v e o p t i o n he s h o u l d not be p e r m i t t e d t o a s s i s t i n the e x e c u t i o n of p o l i c y . T h i r d , the p r e s i d e n t must i n s i s t t h a t the c u s t o d i a n c o n t i n u e s t o uphold the p r o c e s s norms w h i l e a d d i n g h i s o p t i o n t o the debate. L a s t , when the a d v o c a t e s c o n s i s t e n t l y f a i l t o produce a wide v a r i e t y of o p t i o n s , i t i s b e t t e r t o r e p l a c e them than t o l e t the c u s t o d i a n c o n t i n u e t o a d v o c a t e . These recommendations do not c h a l l e n g e the c o r e of the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y , but se r v e t o make i t s t r o n g e r and thus more u s e f u l t o p r e s i d e n t s i n t he quest f o r b e t t e r a d v i c e i n an i n c r e a s i n g l y complex w o r l d . CONCLUSION George's m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l t o o l f o r p r e s i d e n t s i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e i r a d v i s o r y p r o c e s s . George has s u c c e s f u l l y assembled v a r i o u s i n s i g h t s 283 from the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g l i t e r a t u r e on how t o s t r e n g t h e n the a n a l y t i c a l a s p e c t s of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . From J e r v i s , f o r example, comes the n o t i o n t h a t the d e c i s i o n -maker i s w e l l s e r v e d by a d v i s o r s who attempt t o a n a l y z e the problem a t hand from as many d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s as p o s s i b l e . B u i l d i n g on J a n i s ' work, George has f o r m u l a t e d s e v e r a l p r o c e d u r e s t o reduce the n e g a t i v e a s p e c t s of s m a l l group i n t e r a c t i o n . Keeping A l l i s o n ' s B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s model i n mind, George has sought t o s t r u c t u r e the a d v i s o r y p r o c e s s i n such a way as t o m i n i m i z e the damage caused by d e p a r t m e n t a l b a r g a i n i n g . T h i s study has shown t h a t i n many ways George's s t r a t e g y improves the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s a l o n g l i n e s o u t l i n e d by him. In h i s 1972 and 1980 s t u d i e s , George i d e n t i f i e s s e v e r a l m a l f u n c t i o n s i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . 2 6 Among th e s e a r e a l a c k of s u f f i c i e n t o p t i o n s brought t o the p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n , an u n w i l l i n g n e s s by the a d v i s o r s t o advocate unpopular o p t i o n s , a tendency toward premature agreement among the a d v i s o r s on a p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n , and an inadequate e v a l u a t i o n of the o p t i o n s by the a d v i s o r s . D u r i n g the f i r s t two y e a r s of the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e s e m a l f u n c t i o n s were o f t e n p r e s e n t . However, w i t h the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the e n l a r g e d r o l e of the c u s t o d i a n , the s t r a t e g y was a b l e t o c o r r e c t t h e s e m a l f u n c t i o n s . Indeed, the case s t u d i e s show t h a t the a d d i t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e s by the c u s t o d i a n improved the p r o c e s s . George's fundamental a s s u m p t i o n t h a t 284 p r e s i d e n t s b e n e f i t from h e a r i n g m u l t i p l e p e r s p e c t i v e s appears sound i n the case of the C a r t e r p r e s i d e n c y . C a r t e r , who was h i g h l y i d e a l i s t i c , y e t i n e x p e r i e n c e d i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , would p r o b a b l y have f a r e d worse had he o n l y r e c e i v e d a d v i c e from one a d v i s o r who shared h i s v a l u e s and b e l i e f s . W h i l e t h i s study d i d not e v a l u a t e s e v e r a l competing models of p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , i t appears t h a t a more f o r m a l i s t i c or h i e r a r c h i c a l a d v i s o r y system such as the one used d u r i n g the Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , where one p e r s o n a l a d v i s o r f i l t e r s a l l the p o l i c y o p t i o n s t o the p r e s i d e n t , would not have b e n e f i t t e d C a r t e r as much as the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . At the same t i m e , however, t h i s p o i n t i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t the m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y i s s t r o n g l y dependent on the s t y l e and p e r s o n a l i t y of the p r e s i d e n t . I t was C a r t e r ' s i n s i s t e n c e on open p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n s and c o l l e g i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g t h a t a l l o w e d the a d v i s o r s t o c o n t r i b u t e competing p e r s p e c t i v e s t o the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . Thus, when C a r t e r became l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n open d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g and more i n t e r e s t e d i n q u i c k f o r e i g n p o l i c y s u c c e s s e s (e.g. i n the case of n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h ina and d u r i n g the I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n ) , the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the s t r a t e g y d e t e r i o r a t e d r a p i d l y . I n e v i t a b l y , d u r i n g a p r e s i d e n t ' s term i n o f f i c e , he becomes l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n the q u a l i t y of h i s d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s than i n the a c t u a l t h i n g s he can get done. T h i s f a c t l i m i t s the a n a l y t i c a l p r e s c r i p t i o n s George seeks t o make t o the p r o c e s s . George i s aware of t h i s problem. He 285 acknowledges t h a t w h i l e the s t r a t e g y emphasizes t h a t the p r e s i d e n t ought t o choose t h a t o p t i o n which i s a n a l y t i c a l l y most s u i t a b l e or which s e r v e s the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t b e s t , the p r e s i d e n t a l s o needs t o c o n s i d e r the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of h i s d e c i s i o n , i t s t i m i n g , and i t s p o l i t i c a l s u r v i v a b i l i t y . As such, t h e r e a r e c l e a r l i m i t s t o the degree t o which the s t r a t e g y can make the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s more r a t i o n a l or a n a l y t i c a l . For example, C a r t e r ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of h i s o p t i o n s on SALT I I and on n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h China was c o n s t r a i n e d by the p o l i t i c a l c o s t s and b e n e f i t s these d e c i s i o n s would produce i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Congress. S i m i l a r l y , the ad v o c a t e s a r e s u b j e c t t o p r e s s u r e s which a re a l s o not e a s i l y a c c o u n t e d f o r by a model l i k e t he m u l t i p l e advocacy s t r a t e g y . Vance, f o r example, was i n i t i a l l y v e r y d e f e r e n t i a l t o the p r e s i d e n t and r e l u c t a n t t o compete i n open debate forums. Y e t , he had d i p l o m a t i c e x p e r i e n c e from s e r v i n g i n p r e v i o u s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s which was not e a s i l y matched by the o t h e r a d v o c a t e s . The s t r a t e g y does not have, at p r e s e n t , a mechanism t o i n c o r p o r a t e v a r i o u s i n t a n g i b l e f a c t o r s nor the a b i l i t y t o weigh these f o r t h e i r importance or u s e f u l n e s s i n the p r o c e s s . As i t s t a n d s , the s t r a t e g y r e l i e s on o r d e r l y p r o c e d u r e s and c l e a r l y d e f i n e d r o l e t a s k s t o produce as many m u l t i p l e p e r s p e c t i v e s as p o s s i b l e t o c o n s i d e r a d e c i s i o n i s s u e . However, i n l i g h t of the p r e s i d e n t ' s need f o r a c c e p t a b l e d e c i s i o n s , as w e l l as the a d v o c a t e s ' v a r i e d e x p e r i e n c e s and knowledge, r e l y i n g on open debates and m u l t i p l e p e r s p e c t i v e s per se t o r e v e a l the c o s t s and b e n e f i t s of v a r i o u s c o u r s e s 286 of a c t i o n , may not be enough. The s t r a t e g y needs t o i n c o r p o r a t e l e s s t a n g i b l e f a c t o r s such as p o l i t i c a l judgement and d i p l o m a t i c e x p e r i e n c e and p r o v i d e f o r a method whereby the s e f a c t o r s can not o n l y be added t o the debate, but a l s o be weighed f o r t h e i r m e r i t and purpose. As d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s s t u d y , H a m i l t o n J o r d a n ' s p o l i t i c a l a d v i c e c l a r i f i e d C a r t e r ' s g o a l s and h e l p e d him i n the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . S i m i l a r l y , had C a r t e r made use of more seasoned d i p l o m a t s d u r i n g the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s on SALT I I , he would have been more r e l u c t a n t t o s u r p r i s e the S o v i e t s w i t h h i s Deep Cuts p r o p o s a l s . The p r e s c r i p t i v e use of such s u b s t a n t i v e f a c t o r s as p o l i t i c a l a d v i c e and d i p l o m a t i c e x p e r i e n c e i s by no means easy. D e v i s i n g a mechanism whereby the t a n g i b l e and i n t a n g i b l e d e c i s i o n f a c t o r s can be a p p r o p r i a t e l y weighed f o r t h e i r m e r i t and purpose i s even more d i f f i c u l t . F o r m u l a t i n g such mechanisms would tend t o narrow even f u r t h e r the s m a l l d i s t a n c e between p r e s c r i b i n g the \"how\" of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g (which George i n t e n d s f o r h i s s t r a t e g y ) and the \"what\" of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . A l s o , l i k e the o t h e r p r e s c r i p t i o n s , t h e s e mechanisms would not guarantee t h a t the p r e s i d e n t w i l l make b e t t e r d e c i s i o n s . However, i t appears u s e f u l t o c o n t i n u e t o improve p r e s c r i p t i v e models of p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s i m p l y because p r e s i d e n t s do make use of l e s s t a n g i b l e f a c t o r s than c o v e r e d by George's s t r a t e g y but not always i n the most o p t i m a l manner. 287 ENDNOTES 1 Sam C. S a r k e s i a n , Defense P o l i c y and the P r e s i d e n c y : C a r t e r ' s F i r s t Y e a r s , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Westview P r e s s , 1979, pp.122-128. 2 See i n t e r v i e w w i t h H a m i l t o n J o r d a n i n US News & World R e p o r t , F e b r u a r y 21, 1977, p.16; N a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , J u l y 16, 1977, p.1108. 3 S e v e r a l e x c e p t i o n s t o t h i s r u l e a r e C a r t e r ' s Camp D a v i d d e c i s i o n and h i s d e c i s i o n not t o de p l o y the Neutron Bomb. * Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , Power and P r i n c i p l e , New York: F a r r a r , S t r a u s , G i r o u x , 1983, p.96; S a r k e s i a n (1979), p.122; Newsweek, May 9, 1977, pp.55-58. 5 B r z e z i n s k i (1983), p.88. 6 I r v i n g M. D e s t l e r , L e s l i e H. G e l b and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy, New York: Simon & S c h u s t e r , 1984; C o r a l B e l l P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r and F o r e i g n P o l i c y : The C o s t s of V i r t u e ? , C a n b e r r a : A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y , 1982; B r i a n K l u n k , Consensus and the American M i s s i o n , Lantam, Mo: U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s of A m e r i c a , 1986; Gaddis S m i t h , M o r a l i t y , Reason and Power, New York: H i l l and Wang, 1986, c h a p t e r 2. 7 C a r l M. B r a u e r , P r e s i d e n t i a l T r a n s i t i o n s , New York: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1986, p.193; Smith (1986), p.44 8 R i c h a r d H a l l o r a n , New York Times, December 7, 1980; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.44-47. 9 Donald A. S y l v a n and Steve Chan ( e d s . ) , F o r e i g n P o l i c y D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g , New York: P r a e g e r , 1984, p.171; Hedley Donovan, From R o o s e v e l t t o Reagan, New York: Harper & Row, 1985, c h a p t e r 16 1 0 E.g. see: Graham T. A l l i s o n , The Essence of D e c i s i o n , B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, 1971 1 1 Raymond L. G a r t h o f f , Detente and C o n f r o n t a t i o n , Washington: The B r o o k i n g s I n s t i t u t i o n , 1985, p.563; Smith (1986); B a r r y R u b i n , S e c r e t s of S t a t e , New York: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1985; M. Glenn Abernathy e t a l . , ( e d s . ) , The C a r t e r Y e a r s , London: F r a n c e s P i n t e r , 1984; S t a n l e y Hoffmann, Dead Ends, Cambridge, Mass: B a l l i n g e r P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1983. 1 2 H a m i l t o n J o r d a n , C r i s e s , New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1982, p.49, argues t h a t Vance's p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s d i d not s a t i s f y C a r t e r and t h a t C a r t e r a l l o w e d B r z e z i n s k i t o f i l l t h i s gap a t t i m e s . For C a r t e r ' s as w e l l as Jody P o w e l l ' s agreement on t h i s see Brauer (1986), p.208. 288 1 3 G a r t h o f f (1985), c h a p t e r 19; B r z e z i n s k i (1983), pp.429-437. 1 0 George (1972), p.767 1 5 Idem, p.769 1 6 Idem. p.768 1 7 The f o l l o w i n g a r e the n i n e m a l f u n c t i o n s : 1. When the p r e s i d e n t and h i s a d v i s o r s agree too r e a d i l y on the n a t u r e of the problem f a c i n g them and on a response t o i t . 2. When a d v i s o r s and ad v o c a t e s t a k e d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s and debate them b e f o r e the p r e s i d e n t but t h e i r d i s a g r e e m e n t s do not cov e r t h e f u l l range of r e l e v a n t hypotheses and a l t e r n a t i v e o p t i o n s . 3. When t h e r e i s no advocate f o r an unpopular p o l i c y o p t i o n . 4. When a d v i s o r s t h r a s h out t h e i r own di s a g r e e m e n t s over p o l i c y w i t h o u t the p r e s i d e n t ' s knowledge and c o n f r o n t him w i t h an unanimous recommendation. 5. When a d v i s o r s agree p r i v a t e l y among themselves t h a t the p r e s i d e n t s h o u l d f a c e up t o a d i f f i c u l t d e c i s i o n , but no one i s w i l l i n g t o a l e r t him t o the need f o r d o i n g so. 6. When the p r e s i d e n t , f a c e d w i t h an im p o r t a n t problem t o d e c i d e , i s dependent upon a s i n g l e c h a n n e l of i n f o r m a t i o n . 7. When the key assumptions and pr e m i s e s of a p l a n have been e v a l u a t e d o n l y by the advoc a t e s of the o p t i o n . 8. When the p r e s i d e n t a s k s a d v i s o r s f o r t h e i r o p i n i o n s on a p r e f e r r e d c o u r s e of a c t i o n but does not r e q u e s t a q u a l i f i e d group t o examine more c a r e f u l l y the n e g a t i v e judgement o f f e r e d by one or more a d v i s o r s . 9. When the p r e s i d e n t i s impressed by the consensus among h i s a d v i s o r s on b e h a l f of a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y but f a i l s t o a s c e r t a i n how f i r m the consensus i s , how i t was a c h i e v e d , and whether i t i s j u s t i f i e d . See George (1979), pp.769-781 1 8 George (1972), p.779 1 9 George (1972), p.769 2 0 George (1972), p.770 2 1 George (1972), p.773 2 2 P e r s o n a l c orrespondence w i t h a s e n i o r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l 2 3 George (1972), p.778 2 4 Idem, p.772 2 5 L a t e r i n the c o n f l i c t , George B a l l performed t h i s r o l e . 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( N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l S t a f f Member:1977-1980) "@en ; edm:hasType "Thesis/Dissertation"@en ; edm:isShownAt "10.14288/1.0058295"@en ; dcterms:language "eng"@en ; ns0:degreeDiscipline "Political Science"@en ; edm:provider "Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library"@en ; dcterms:publisher "University of British Columbia"@en ; dcterms:rights "For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use."@en ; ns0:scholarLevel "Graduate"@en ; dcterms:title "The multiple advocacy strategy and the role of the custodian : the Carter years"@en ; dcterms:type "Text"@en ; ns0:identifierURI "http://hdl.handle.net/2429/29025"@en .