THE MULTIPLE ADVOCACY STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF THE CUSTODIAN: THE CARTER YEARS

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ABSTRACT

The increasing complexity and high stakes of foreign policy decisions, especially of major powers such as the United States, have generated specialized studies of decision-making. One approach, called "multiple advocacy," maps a strategy of role tasks and process norms to guide the decision-makers towards an optimal decision-making process. This process allows the President to make an informed policy choice as a result of having heard a variety of options debated freely and openly among his advisors in his presence. A crucial actor in this process is the National Security Advisor. As process manager or "custodian," he must ensure that the key provisions of the strategy are met while abstaining from personal involvement in the substance of policy advice and execution.

This thesis examines the internal coherence and usefulness of the strategy. The first two years of the Carter administration provide a close approximation of the strategy. Four important policy issues during this period form the empirical basis of this test: the "Deep Cuts" proposals in SALT II, the war in the Horn of Africa, Sino-American Normalization, and the fall of the Shah of Iran.

While the basic principles of the strategy are found useful and sound, several of its provisions are challenged. First, in spite of its claim, the strategy does not produce multiple options when the advisors have no wide divergence of opinion. Second, contrary to the strategy's prescriptions, the custodian can improve the process in such situations by joining the policy debate. Third, custodial engagement in activities such as diplomacy and public speaking need not be prohibited too strictly. Last, the demise of the strategy can be more narrowly defined as the result of custodial disregard for a free flow of information and open participation among the advisors.

Though further studies are needed to widen the empirical base, several tentative suggestions are offered to improve the strategy. The president must insist on a reasonable range of opinions when appointing advisors. While the National Security Advisor may join the policy debate to widen the range of options, his policy advice should not become the rule. At all times the President must insist that all policy debates among his advisors be brought to his attention, and that all policy options receive a fair hearing.

CONTENTS

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CHAPTER ONE

THE MULTIPLE ADVOCACY DECISION STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

This thesis evaluates the multiple advocacy decision strategy. The strategy was developed by Alexander George in the early 1970's to help American presidents in the realm of foreign policy decision-making. The strategy allocates different role tasks to various participants in the decision-making process, and outlines several procedures to structure it.

The president, like a magistrate, is the final arbiter of the policy choices submitted to him. The senior advisors function as advocates of the various policy options. The National Security Advisor, called the custodian, is the process manager. He must ensure that the following procedures are met: the president must participate in the discussion of the options, the advocates must have a fair chance to voice their favoured policy solutions, and relatively equal resources to do so. The president is to stay informed about policy conflicts among his advisors. Finally, the custodian has to invite other advisors if he feels not enough different options are presented to the president. While performing these duties, the custodian must not engage in other activities that may compromise his ability to be an effective process manager. Among these are policy advocacy, public speaking on policy, diplomatic negotiations, and policy enforcement and implementation. George states that any of these activities will undermine

the custodian's ability to ensure the implementation of the process procedures.

George's strategy is a direct attempt to remedy several problems associated with decision-making as outlined in the literature. Specifically, the strategy aims to overcome the distortions caused by Bureaucratic Politics and small group interaction. It also provides guidance for the president to manage his time more effectively, and to deal better with information uncertainty and value complexity.

The strategy did not undergo a comprehensive evaluation until David Hall's study of 1982. Before then, several authors questioned individual aspects of it. Some felt that the strategy did not account satisfactorily for the differences in personal style among presidents. Others were critical of the role prescriptions and proscriptions imposed on the various participants, especially on the custodian. Still others were skeptical about the feasibility of senior advisors competing on a relatively equal basis for the implementation of their policy choices. Hall examined the foreign policy decision-making process from 1947 to 1980 in an attempt to evaluate the feasibility of implementing the strategy. Hall found that the strategy was practical and quite feasible to implement. Also, allowing for minor variations in the role task prescriptions, Hall concluded that the strategy was generally sound and that it provided a useful tool for identifying malfunctions in the decision-making process.

This thesis examines the functioning of the strategy

during the first two years of the Carter administration. During this time, most of its role tasks and procedures were approximated. The thesis challenges the formulation of the role tasks for the custodian. I will show that the custodian can advocate on policy, especially when the decision-making process fails to produce a diversity of options among the advocates. Indeed, by doing so, he improves the functioning of the strategy and, as a result, the decision-making process. Moreover, the custodian can, at times, engage in public speaking as well as diplomacy without compromising his custodial duties. The strategy is only undermined when the custodian blocks the other advocates from access to the decision forums, when he fails to elevate policy conflicts among the advocates to the president, when he fails to engage the president in the decision-making process, and when he attempts personally to enforce or implement the president's policy. Contrary to George and Hall's arguments, these custodial violations do not necessarily flow from his policy advocacy role.

The thesis provides an empirical analysis of the functioning of the strategy. While the strategy is found useful and sound in its basic purposes, several improvements are needed. The thesis contributes to the study of decision-making by reformulating the role tasks of the custodian. While the strategy emphasizes correctly the importance of the procedures, and the custodian's responsiblity in maintaining these, it has unnecessarily restricted the activities of the custodian. Moreover, this thesis

illustrates that a close approximation of the strategy may still not produce a diversity of opinion among the advocates. In such a case, it is important to broaden the role tasks of the custodian.

DECISION-MAKING: THE BACKGROUND TO THE STRATEGY

George's prescriptive decision-making model is part of a much larger effort in the field of international relations to improve our understanding of decision-making. It is part of a body of studies in psychology, organizational and administrative studies, as well as strategic studies, all attempting to identify weaknesses in decision-making and prescribe improvements to the process.

The dominant conceptualization of decision-making in international relations in the 1940's and 1950's was called the rational actor model. As best symbolized in Morgenthau's major text of 1948, most writers discussed and analyzed the decision-making process as an analytic process in which rational actors sought to maximize their objectives by means of a clear logical analysis of the costs and benefits associated with the various courses of action available to them.[1] They conceptualized the state as its official decision-makers and state action as the action taken by those who represent it. These actors were assumed to be one in action. This unitary actor is engaged in rational problem

solving.[2] The decision-maker holds certain values and interests which can be translated into some method of preference ranking, using a utility function or cost-benefit analysis. The desirability of expected outcomes of alternative courses of action can be evaluated in light of these ranked values and interests. Whenever a decision-maker perceives an opportunity or a threat vis-a-vis these values and interests, he or she is moved to consider a response. He or she then assembles available courses of action for consideration. The expected consequences of alternative courses of action are then evaluated vis-a-vis his or her values and interests, using the best available information. It is assumed that the decision-maker is able to rank logically and compare his or her values. The rational actor selects the option whose expected consequences maximize his or her values and interests.

With the expansion of the role of the United States in world affairs, more and more scholars began to question this optimistic conceptualization of decision-making. Issues such as deterrence and crisis management focussed American scholarship on the daily management of government and its decisions on these major issues. At first, a group of scholars drew attention to a factor in the decision-making process not accounted for in the rational actor conceptualization. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, as well as Harold and Margaret Sprout illustrated that there often exists a discrepancy between the objective environment in which a decision takes place and the way the decision-maker

perceives that environment.[3] Since it is the perception of the decision maker that influences his decision, we must study the factors that explain how and why they perceive the environment as they do.

Also, Snyder et al. showed that most decisions are made within the context of large organizations. It is therefore inadequate to assume that the decision maker acts as a unitary actor. Rather, the characteristics of large organizations such as specialization, hierarchy and standard operating procedures as well as interagency bargaining, will influence the decision-making process.

In addition to concerns about the perception of decision-makers and the environments in which they operate, another field, cognitive psychology, began to contribute to the study of decision-making. De Rivera, Janis, Jervis and Cottam drew attention to certain characteristics of the human mind which directly concern its decision-making capacity. De Rivera and Jervis, for example, showed that information processing by a decision-maker is not as easy or perfect a process as assumed by the rational actor conceptualization.[4] Information received by a decision-maker is often ambiguous, complex and even contradictory. Moreover, the decision-maker has a variety of biases and images that distort the way he perceives the information. While offering no solutions to the decision-maker, Jervis recommends that he or she analyze the information from as many competing images and multiple perspectives as possible.

The study of the decision-maker's images, belief

systems and biases gave rise to a further body of work. Festinger laid the basis on which many scholars started to study the various distortions to optimal decision-making caused by belief systems.[5] Works by Ole Holsti and North among others, have illustrated how a decision-maker's biases can impede his ability to make an optimal decision.[6]

In addition to the study of generalized psychological patterns of individual problem solving, several authors began to investigate the psychological attributes of decision-makers as well as the effects of time constraints and crisis situations on the thought processes of decision-makers. Studies by Charles Hermann and Ole Holsti showed that crisis-induced stress caused aberrations in logical problem solving.[7] Persistent high levels of stress narrow the range of alternatives considered by the decision-maker, increase stereotyping, increase early consensus seeking and the selectivity of information processing, and reduce the tolerance for ambiguity.

Research into the behavioral characteristics of small group interactions further contributed to the study of decision-making. While small group interaction can improve the consideration of various courses of action for the decision-maker, Janis has shown that such interaction can also lead to various distortions.[8] Various pressures for conformity within the group can cause it to reduce its analytical powers. Instead of providing the decision-maker with a variety of opinions, the group may function as a source of support for its participants on a consensus view.

The organizational environment of decision-making, discussed in the Snyder et. al. study, was further developed by such scholars as Neustadt, Wilensky and Hilsman, and later applied specifically to foreign policy decision-making by Halperin and Destler.[9] Various results from these studies have direct relevance for the study of decision making. First, specialization of tasks and roles within large organizations can cause individuals to pursue the interests of their departments with more vigor than the interests of the government as a whole. As a result, the decision-making process may become scattered and incomplete. Second, the bargaining process among departments and branches of government may affect the decision process in ways that do not contribute to the quality of the final decision outcome. Allison, in his study of three decision-making models, called this phenomenon "Bureaucratic Politics."[10] As a result of this phenomenon, final decisions may be determined by the tug of war between the various departments rather than by the analytical merit of the choosen option. Third, the standard operating procedures by which large organizations function may stifle the search for fresh options and novel approaches and thus inhibit the decision process.

While most of the above mentioned studies challenge many fundamental assumptions in the classical rationality conceptualization of decision-making, they do not challenge the notion that the decision-making process is a more or less orderly process in which the actor(s) seek to get the

best possible solution by means of a more or less analytical or logical consideration of several issues involved in the process. Also, as Steiner points out, while they accept a more "bounded" view of the decision-maker's rationality, they seek to prescribe measures to improve the rationality of the process.[11]

March, Simon, Lindblom and Braybrooke have described the decision-making process in terms that question the decision-maker's desire to maximize his or her objectives.[12] Instead, they argue, the decision-maker merely seeks to "satisfice". Decision-makers seldom jump at great opportunites to bring about substantial change. Issues are dealt with when something finally needs to be done and are treated as problems that need temporary amelioration. Decision-makers move away from problems rather than toward goals. The search for information stops when an option is found that is "good enough." Values and interests are not "sacred" objectives to which the decision-maker is deeply attached. Nor can they be easily ranked or compared. Instead of maximizing their values, the available means determine the extent to which certain values and interests are considered desirable.

They also perceive the decision-making process as a highly decentralized process in which there are many opportunities for review and adjustment. Finally, the choice of a policy option is not necessarily guided by its analytical merit but also by the degree of acceptability the option has among the participants in the process.

Steinbruner has drawn further attention to the non rational aspects of the decision-making process.[13] He argues that a cognitive/cybernetic view of decision-making can explain several aspects of the process better than the rational/analytic perspective. The decision-maker, in this view, makes ample use of his intuition and past experience in problem solving. He monitors only a restricted set of important variables when faced with a choice. In so doing, he avoids information overload. His past experience tells him which variables are critical. When problems are complex, he breaks them down into limited dimensions.

Steiner agrees with Steinbruner that several aspects of the decision-making process can not be dealt with by the "conventional" analytic paradigms.[14] She accuses the analytical models of prescribing rationalistic prescriptions to a decision-maker who faces many irrational events. Instead, Steiner advocates that decision-making studies concentrate on such factors as subjective awareness and incongruity in the situations faced by the decision-maker, and prescribe creative accommodation to solve these dilemmas.

While the contributions of Simon et al., Steinbruner and Steiner have validity, they themselves conclude that their findings do not replace the analytical models. In fact their writings are more descriptive than prescriptive.

Therefore, in his attempt to improve the presidential decision-making process, George has concentrated on those analytical aspects of the decision-making process that lend

themselves to a clear prescriptive analysis. His strategy seeks to integrate the major findings in the decision-making literature at the individual, group and organizational levels. Structural or institutional changes are not considered as useful as improvements in the executive decision process.

The next section describes the multiple advocacy strategy. The section following will discuss in detail how the procedures and role tasks of the strategy have been derived from a variety of studies in the decision-making field and how George attempts to integrate these into a more or less complete prescriptive model.

THE MULTIPLE ADVOCACY STRATEGY

The multiple advocacy strategy is a prescriptive decision-making model.[15] It is a strategy in the sense that it provides for a logical link between the means and ends of decision-making. It outlines a set of role tasks for the players and a set of process norms for their interaction. These role tasks and process norms must be seen as a means towards a particular end. The end goal for which these means serve is to generate a variety of different options on any given policy problem, and a free debate on these options. Such a multiplicity of options and debate is believed to provide the president with the best forum to select the most

optimal solution to the problem at hand. It is also a prescriptive model in the sense that it outlines exactly which behaviour patterns must be followed. The prescription of certain behaviour patterns automatically implies the prohibition or proscription of other behaviour patterns. George has defined certain proscriptions especially for the role task of custodian. These will also be discussed below.

The strategy provides for a set of behavioural norms for the decision-making process in a complex hierarchical institution where individual executives are ultimately accountable for major policy decisions.[16] An example of such a setting is the American foreign policy decision-making process. The president, though surrounded by various cabinet officers and personal advisors is ultimately responsible for the decisions made by the executive branch. The process of presidential decision-making, rather than the larger process of executive-legislative interaction on policy, is the focus of this strategy.

This process is best characterized by a more or less free flowing interaction between the president and his advisors in which several policy options are considered. The process is completed when the president selects an option for implementation. The multiple advocacy strategy attempts to structure this process in such a way that the president achieves a maximum number of options and a thorough debate on them.

The strategy posits the president as the ultimate arbiter of policy, but also seeks to enhance the competition

among his advisors for the adoption of their preferred options. This competition will bring to light the values and interests inherent in the policy issue. The exposition of all the possible costs, benefits, and contradictions associated with each option will enhance the president's ability to make the best choice possible.

George has listed the specific objectives of the strategy.[17] First, it seeks to ensure sufficient acquisition and analysis of information to provide a valid diagnosis of the issue. Second, it attempts to provide a process in which all the major values and interests affected by the issue are considered, all possible options to deal with it are brought to the president's attention, and all options are subjected to a thorough evaluation of their costs and benefits. Last, the strategy aims to keep the president alert to indicators that his policy choice is not achieving its intended objectives. A decision-making process which meets these criteria will enhance the likelihood of a good or optimal decision. At least, it will reduce the chances of a very poor decision.

Clearly, the strategy addresses only the "how" of decision-making. Its provisions deal with the process of decision-making, not its substance. Other factors, called decisional premises by George, determine the "what" of policy.[18] Most obvious among these are the ideology and cognitive beliefs of the participants, the influence of public opinion, and the substantive skills and knowledge of the participants. While the strategy seeks to optimize the

"rationality" of the process of considering these factors, it cannot in itself guarantee an optimal decision. Even a perfect implementation of the strategy may not overcome the thrust of the decisional premises. Yet, George argues, and I believe convincingly so, that the process must be considered as one factor among many in the explanation of the effectiveness or successfulness of a decision. The multiple advocacy strategy, he argues, enhances the likelihood of a "good" decision or at least reduces the probability of a very "bad" decision.

The strategy divides three role tasks among the participants in the process. First, the senior advisors to the president formulate policy options and serve as their advocates to the president. These advocates can be any advisor the president chooses but are usually several of his cabinet secretaries and senior White House staff. Second, one senior official in the administration organizes and coordinates the flow of options, the various meetings between the president and his advocates, and the implementation of the president's policy choice. This role task of process manager or custodian is given to the National Security Advisor. The allocation of this role to this particular official is based on the original functions given to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council in the 1947 NSC act.[19] This act gives the Executive Secretary, who later became the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (or National Security Advisor), the responsibility to assist the Council

in its deliberations on foreign and national security policy. He must provide for the staff work and policy papers in preparation for the meetings.

During the Kennedy administration, the National Security Advisor expanded his role to chairing subcommittee meetings of the NSC, as well as coordinating various other meetings between the president and his senior foreign policy advisors.[20] As a personal assistant to the president, the National Security Advisor is in a position to ensure that departmental policy making is made consistent with the president's personal objectives. As most postwar presidents have become increasingly engaged personally in the conduct of foreign affairs, they have come to rely on the National Security Advisor for the coordination of policy advice between the departments and the White House.

The third role task is allocated to the president. Like a magistrate, he decides which policy option is adopted. While it is beneficial to the process that he delegates the formulation of the various options to his advocates, he must attempt to make a clear policy choice rather than accept a consensus or compromise solution. By submitting his final choice to a review by his advisors, he will ensure that all perspectives are heard.

Furthermore, the strategy prescribes four procedures or process norms to structure the decision-making process. First, the process should be structured in such a way that the president participates actively in the policy discussions. Second, the various advocates must have a

relatively equal opportunity to argue their options. The process should be fair in the sense that the advocates should have comparable access to information and to the policy meetings. They should also have adequate resources and staff support to formulate their options. Also, they should have relatively equal access to the president, either by means of memoranda or personal contact. Third, the policy debates must take place in the form of free discussions and allow the advocates to challenge the president's preferred choice. The advocates must compete openly for the implementation of their favoured options and should bring all their disagreements to the president's attention. Last, when this open policy debate still fails to produce a wide variety of options, the administration should consider bringing in outsiders to widen the discussion.[21]

While the president is ultimately responsible for the adoption of these process norms, it is the custodian who must look after the day-to-day management of the process. Once the president has indicated his preference for a process based on these procedures, the custodian must ensure that it is maintained. It is his responsibility to bring to the president's attention issues that require the strategy's proceedings. He sets in motion, organizes and oversees the interagency process in which the various policy options are formulated. He must ensure that all advocates receive a fair hearing for their options and that their memoranda are distributed throughout the various decision forums. Moreover, he must alert the president to policy conflicts

within the administration and call meetings to discuss these differences. He must remind the president to submit his policy preference to a critical analysis by the advocates. Finally, whenever the custodian believes the process is not functioning, he must alert the president.

Clearly, the role tasks of the custodian are most crucial for the operation of the strategy. In essence, he acts as the "honest broker" of the various policy options. Without letting his own policy preferences interfere with this task, he promotes options that have not received adequate attention even though he may not favour them. Similarly, he helps other advocates challenge those options he personally prefers. His role as process manager gives him considerable power to control whose option receives attention and who gets to be heard by the president. His chief purpose in this process is to balance the options, generate a wide debate, and keep the president involved.

It is because of the many responsibilities of the custodian and his powerful position in the process, that the strategy adds several proscriptions to his role tasks. George believes there are several types of activities that may inhibit the custodian from being a honest broker as well as an effective process manager.[22] Therefore, he should be prohibited from engaging in these activities. First, he should not advocate on policy. When he feels not enough options are presented, he may try to bring in outside advisors. Also, he can, at times, act like a devil's advocate. However, George acknowledges that it is unlikely

that one can be a credible devil's advocate over a sustained period of time.[23] Nevertheless, he should not be a genuine policy advocate since that undermines his duties as honest broker. Second, he cannot make public statements on policy or act as a diplomatic negotiator. Third, he should not enforce or implement personally the presidents policy or merely look after the political fortunes of the president. All these activities are alleged to reduce his effectiveness as a process manager because they compromise his neutrality vis-a-vis the various policy options. Moreover, a custodian who engages in these activities is less likely to call for a review of policy.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGY

The multiple advocacy strategy is based on the assumptions of classical rational decision-making.[24] The decision-maker is perceived as a rational problem solver who seeks to optimize his objectives. These objectives can be logically derived from his values and interests. When confronted with a threat or challenge vis-a-vis his interests, the decision-maker weighs the costs and benefits of the various courses of action available. His final choice is that option which maximizes his interests.

This conception of decision-making, as we have discussed above, rejects an alternative view developed by

March, Simon, Lindblom and Braybrooke.[25] The classical rationality conception has also been criticized for its emphasis on the logical and analytical aspects of decision-making.[26] Steiner, for example, states that criteria such as orderly procedures and logical analysis overlook the subjective and intuitive characteristics of the decision-making process. Moreover, since the decision-maker is faced with many events that cannot be explained rationally, we cannot expect him to respond effectively by prescribing purely rational remedies.[27] However, these critics have so far been unable to offer a coherent alternative conception. For the time being, decision-making theorists have little choice but to attempt to improve the rational aspects of the process.

The multiple advocacy strategy provides for a logical order to a process in which the president and his advisors are assumed to seek the maximum fulfilment of their objectives. However, George does not simply take the rationality of the process or its participants as given. Rather, the strategy attempts to compensate for various factors that limit or distort rationality. These distortions and limitations have been amply discussed in the literature. George, in essence, has proposed his strategy in an attempt to remedy or compensate for some of these distortions. Specifically, the strategy addresses several problems generated by information uncertainty and value complexity at the individual level, as well as problems caused by "groupthink" and "Bureaucratic Politics" at the group level.

Jervis,among others, has pointed out that decision-makers must recognize and diagnose issues amidst contradictory and confusing information.[28] Moreover, on the basis of uncertain and incomplete information, they must evaluate the various options and make choices. In response, they may resort to certain techniques that make them more confident about their choice but at the same time reduce the analytical quality of the process.[29] For example, the decision- maker may procrastinate in making his or her choice, hoping that additional information will show that no decision is necessary or that the problem will correct itself. Calculated or rational procrastination denotes the behaviour of a decision-maker who postpones a decision because he feels there is no rush, new information may come shortly, or that the problem may correct itself. Defensive procrastination is potentially more harmful because the decision-maker rather than having reasons to postpone a choice, simply hopes that the problem will go away by dodging it. A decision-maker bolsters when he artificially raises or lowers the expected costs or benefits of an option so as to make his choice look more rational. Also, he or she may invoke a historical analogy, believing that the issue can be better understood by molding it into the image of a past occurrence. Third, he or she, based on on his or her personal beliefs and biases, can attribute artificial weight to one particular view of an issue, even though the factual information does not warrant it: information which confirms one's biases is upgraded, while contrary information is

discarded.

The decision-maker's ability to weigh the costs and benefits of various policy options is impaired further by the contradictions among his own interests and objectives. George calls this the value complexity impediment.[30] Often, decision-makers resolve these conflicts by an incomplete or distorted analysis of all the aspects involved in the issue.[31] Three methods or techniques can be identified. Value-conflict resolution denotes the attempt by the decision-maker to reconcile and satisfy as many competing values as possible aroused by an issue. This is a formidable task and is seldom completed successfully. Often it leads to a compromise or trade-off among values based on the lowest common denominator. While this may enhance the acceptability of the decision, it may equally well decrease its quality. Value-conflict acceptance describes the behaviour of a decision-maker who realizes that he must make a choice among competing values. However, when he believes too quickly that a value-conflict is unavoidable, he may make premature and impulsive decisions. Value-conflict avoidance, the third method, takes place in the form of two mechanisms called "cognitive restructuring" and "devaluation". In the first, the decision-maker downgrades or ignores the incoming information that challenges his values. In the second, he downgrades or ignores his values and interests. Of the three methods discussed, value-conflict avoidance is potentially the most harmful. All in all, these activities hamper a clear search and evaluation of all relevant information as

well as a thorough consideration of the decision-maker's interests in the issue.

How does the strategy address these problems? Its role tasks and procedures offer a set of checks so that when these distortions occur, they are recognized and corrected.[32] The open debate among the advocates, with the president's participation,is a vehicle that brings to light the various biases among the participants and examines them for what they are. The advocates must challenge the president when they believe his information base and analysis are inadequate or when he decides too hastily. Moreover, the custodian must alert the administration when he feels a superficial consensus or a compromise view is hindering its ability to examine neglected aspects of an issue.

In contrast to the classical rationality conception of the state as a unitary actor, the literature identifies most decision-making processes as a group activity.[33] The multiple advocacy strategy incorporates many of the findings from this perspective. The various advisors surrounding the president provide him with advice, allow him to delegate responsibility, offer him emotional support, and increase the legitimacy of his decisions. Studies in social psychology have shown that groups can enhance the quality of information processing, reduce memory lapses, and provide stimulation.[34]

Yet, group interaction can also generate several distortions to the process. Having several advisors study an

issue does not necessarily produce a wider variety of options. Within the group, certain conformity pressures may arise.[35] Dissenting members from the majority view may not speak out, fearing they will be viewed as trouble makers or be ostracized. Also, individual members or the group itself may not feel confident enough to challenge the president.[36]

Janis describes another possible distortion caused by group decision-making.[37] Facing high levels of stress and difficult issues with potentially grave consequences, group members may seek one another's emotional support rather than stimulate the group's critical abilities. This fortress mentality, called "groupthink," leads to illusions of invulnerability and unanimity, as well as a lack of vigilance, and a disregard for information that challenges the group's mind set.

The strategy's process norms are intended to reduce these shortcomings of group decision-making. First, the president must allow the advocates to formulate the options, and not spell out his own preference early in the discussion. In so doing, the advocates have a better opportunity to argue for their options without directly challenging the president. Second, the advocates must compete among themselves. The "guardian" of this competition is the custodian, who ensures that the advocates have adequate resources to do so. Furthermore, when he feels not enough perspectives are aired, he must take measures to widen the debate. Last, the president must allow dissent and the review of his policy preference.

While the strategy encourages competition and dissent, Neustadt, Schilling and Allison have argued that policy conflicts among senior advisors may cause other types of distortions in the process.[38]

The senior advisors are also the heads of the various departments. As such, they might pursue the interests of their departments more vigorously than the interests of the administration as a whole. The decision-making process is to some extent explained by the bargaining on policy options among the various departments. This process, called Bureaucratic Politics by Allison, may not produce a fair hearing of all options, since some departments are more resourceful and may have more bargaining power than others.[39] As a result, the final choice of an option may be more the result of the bargaining skill of its advocate than of its analytical merit. Also, pulling and hauling among advocates may lead to compromises or to a simple deadlock within the administration.

The strategy seeks to reduce the costs of policy conflict and interpersonal bargaining. First, the advocates must compete in open debate forums, and not among themselves without the president's knowledge. Second, the custodian must elevate their conflicts, compromises or trade offs to the president's attention. Third, the president must make a clear choice among options, and not merely accept papered over disagreements. Last, the process management by the custodian imposes some degree of structure on the competition among advocates. He provides for proper access

and information so that no advocate is excluded from the relevant policy discussions. As a result of these procedures, the president will be able to make his final choice based on the merits of each option, without being subject to the various compromises his advisors may have made without him.

The strategy addresses only marginally several other aspects of decision-making discussed in the literature. First, the role tasks and process norms do not compensate for psychiatric or personality distortions that may hamper the decision-maker.[40] Second, crisis induced stress may cause behaviour aberrations that are beyond the remedies offered by the strategy.[41] While it provides for an orderly process of evaluating information, and is thus useful for crisis situations, the process is also time consuming, and may not alleviate the stress experienced by the decision-maker. Third, Cognitive Psychology teaches us that we all have, and indeed need to have, belief structures that help select and organize data from the world around us in order to make it meaningful. However, these structures can also distort our cognitive abilities when it comes to problem-solving. While the strategy does not provide the decision-maker with a belief system, it does provide for an open discussion which may make him more aware of his beliefs and biases.[42] Finally, March and Simon, as well as Allison, have pointed out that large organizations have certain standard operating procedures whereby they process information and execute policy in a logic all their own.[43] As a result, the

president's advisors may receive policy options from their departments that are more a product of the needs or rules of that particular department than a rational response to the issue at hand. Again, all the strategy offers is a critical examination of the options, which might bring to light the organizational biases at the executive level.

The multiple advocacy strategy is not the only decision-making model at the presidential level. In formulating the strategy, George draws upon elements found in other models and indeed uses aspects of these to construct his arguments. Nor does George posit the multiple advocacy strategy as the only useful strategy or as a satisfactory model under all circumstances.

Besides the Bureaucratic Politics model discussed above, George discusses the Centralized Management Model or Formal Options Model.[44] In this model, the president relies on one central manager to screen all options proposed in the administration. This central manager in effect acts as a gatekeeper. While the "search" and "evaluation" stages of the decision-making process remain open to all other advisors and bureaucratic actors, the "choice" stage is monopolized by the central manager. This model, according to George, was best exemplified by the Nixon-Kissinger structure of presidential decision-making.

This model may correct an obvious shortcoming produced by bureaucratic politics: as a result of the bargaining and internal negotiation process among advisors, the president may at times be presented with a final option which serves

the interests of one bureaucratic actor (that actor which "won" the internal bargaining process) more than the overall interests of the president or the administration as a whole. The central manager's monopoly on the presentation of the final options to the president may avoid this pitfall. However, it is obvious that the administration may equally likely become subject to the particular interests of the central manager.

While this model may serve a president who is unwilling to tolerate competition among his advisors or who wants to confine foreign policy making to an excessive degree to his own office, George identifies several overall weaknesses in this model. First, it reduces the role of the advisors who are not in charge of central management to "background researchers" for the central manager. When the National Security Advisor fills the office of the central manager, as was the case under Nixon, the roles of the Secretaries of State and Defense are limited far beyond the original intent of their mandates. Second, when the National Security Advisor is the central manager, he will perform substantial policy advocacy functions which George believes conflict with his custodial/management duties. Third, such a system can easily lead to a work overload for the central manager, resulting in suboptimal choice formulation and a faltering decision-making process.

What is useful about the model is its provision of management. George argues that unbridled competition (bureaucratic politics) as much as overly controlled advice

(central management) do not produce optimal decision-making. The multiple advocacy strategy borrows the best aspects of both models. While it invites advocate competition, it structures this competition by means of the role tasks of the custodian. Moreover, the president, as a magistrate, benefits more from the organized, yet free advice, of all his advisors than from the filtered advice of one central advisor.

The positive contribution of a managed decision-making process is further highlighted by George when viewed in relation to the "incrementalist" model of decision-making. This model is also called Partisan Mutual Adjustment. While George acknowledges that Charles Lindblom, in describing this model, was referring to the larger national process of policy making in general, it also sheds some light on the presidential decision-making process.[45] In this model, decision issues are "adjusted" by each relevant advisor to accommodate his interests. The issue moves through the administration in a more or less serial order receiving adjustments and accommodations but is never really solved. The final policy choice is a product of this process, and given the complexity of the issue and the variety of interests involved, is as good a solution as can be obtained. Again, as George puts it, this "quasi resolution of conflict" or product of "negotiations in the internal environment" can be greatly improved by means of the management procedures proposed by the multiple advocacy stategy.[46]

In formulating his strategy, George also discusses an organizational device commonly called the devil's advocate.[47] This device has been used or recommended as a way of ensuring that unpopular views receive a hearing. Essentially, the devil's advocate is a role prescription. It involves arguing for an unpopular option which none of the other advisors want to bring forward but which the devil's advocate does not personally favour either.

While the advocacy of unpopular options is also an important aspect of the multiple advocacy strategy, George is hesitant about the usefulness of the devil's advocate. He is particularly skeptical about the institutionalization of this role into the decision-making process. A devil's advocate may quickly become an ineffective role when the other advisors perceive it as such. Indeed, they may consider it a "time-wasting gimmick" since the devil's advocate does not really favour his proposed option, and is thus not serious about building a bureaucratic coalition in support of his option. Moreover, presidents have tended to brand genuine dissenters as devil's advocates to "domesticate" their opposition.[48]

For these reasons, George does not prescribe a devil's advocate role for the custodian. The custodian may appoint someone to play this role but he himself cannot afford to be branded a devil's advocate: "the two roles are distinct and should not be confused."[49] Moreover, George believes that a president may gain more from genuine dissenters from his policy choice than from devil's advocates. The process of

rebutting a dissenting view may help clarify the policy position of the other advisors and thus enhance the "rationality" of the evaluation of options. For policy implementation purposes, it may be better if the dissenter feels his views have been aired properly. If he feels he had a fair hearing, he may be more inclined to close ranks with the proponents at the implementation stage. Lastly, it may make advisors more comfortable defending the policy choice to the media and the public if they had to defend it within the administration.

Finally, the operation of any decision-making model must be evaluated in light of the decision styles of the president. George discusses three distinct styles. The formalistic president prefers to receive advice from the advisor or assistant who is responsible for that particular domain.[50] The president does not encourage communication among advisors nor a group effort at problem solving. At the same time, the president does not attempt to open "backchannels" behind the secretaries' backs, but rigidly adheres to the official channels of information. In the end, the president attempts personally to integrate all pieces of advice, and the final decision is a product of his own intellectual synthesis.

This presidential style allows for a very orderly decision making process. However, several weaknesses are apparent. The president is obviously deprived of a competitive debate among his advisors and must rely on individual cabinet secretaries to receive the best

information from their departments. This style is not believed to be very suitable to multiple advocacy proceedings, and as such the strategy would be difficult to implement.

A second style, labelled the "competitive model" seems more suitable to the strategy. Here, the president deliberately encourages competition and conflict among his advisors by giving overlapping assignments and conflicting jurisdictions.[51] However, there is still no requirement for the advisors to communicate with one another since each reports directly to the president. Also, at times the president leaves the resolution of a certain conflict to his advisors. While the president occassionally reaches down below the level of his immediate advisors to obtain independent advice and thus enhances his ability to profit from the best available information, George feels the system allows for too much unstructured advisor competition. As a result, bureaucratic politics may impede the flow of optimal advice. Moreover, the president may end up spending too much of his time resolving conflicts among his staff.

The collegial model of decision-making is best pictured as a structure where the president is at the centre of a wheel with spokes connecting to individual advisors.[52] Advisors are invited to form a collegial team and to engage in group problem solving. Moreover, advisors are asked to act as "generalists", not just representatives of their particular "turf" in the administration. The decision process resembles a set of informal discussions among all

relevant advisors with the president attending and asking questions. The two foremost drawbacks potentially present in this system are a substantial demand on the president's time and the occurrence of groupthink.

George's strategy seeks to use the best elements of both the collegial and competitive models. An intensive presidential involvement, though costly in terms of time, benefits the process of selecting policy options. Advocate competition is desirable to bring out a thorough evaluation of all options but must be "controlled" by the custodian rather than the president. The custodian is to make sure relatively equal resources are available to each advisor and that each advisor has an opportunity to make his case to the president.

THE STRATEGY'S REVIEWS AND CRITICISMS

The strategy's suggestions for improving the decision-making process have received support in both the professional and academic literature. For example, Sorensen, a former Kennedy aide, and Ole Holsti agree that a variety of advisors and different departmental representatives, who compete for their favoured options, will foster more alternatives, expose errors, and challenge assumptions.[53] Janis stated that the strategy's process norms "might go a long way toward reducing the chances of groupthink."[54]

Porter, who examined the decision-making process in the Economic Policy Board from 1974 to 1976, found that the strategy offered a useful model to improve the process.[55]

Yet, the strategy was not subjected to an in-depth empirical evaluation in the foreign policy domain until Hall's study of 1982. Before then, several scholars criticized individual aspects of the strategy. For example, Thomas and Hargrove questioned the feasibility of the role tasks for the president.[56] Not all presidents are willing to subject their policy preference to a debate among their advisors. Moreover, some presidents may find it difficult to accept open criticism and debate. Also, not all presidents desire an active role in the decision-making process. They conclude that the strategy may only be applicable to presidents who enjoy a competitive or collegial style of decision-making. Hess adds that the strategy's procedures are quite time-consuming.[57] Moreover, they may lead to policy leaks which embarrass the president. For some presidents, the costs of the strategy may outweigh the benefits.

Destler, among others, doubts that the National Security Advisor can ever assume the role of an honest broker.[58] Since the Kennedy years, he argues, the advisor has gradually increased his role to that of a substantive policy advisor supported by a large White House staff. Unless his position is redefined in the spirit of the 1947 NSC act, he will have too much personal influence to be a mere "neutral administrator." Turning the coin completely,

Hargrove and Rockman argue that if the custodian was reduced to a mere administrator, he would not have enough "leverage" to exercise control over the powerful cabinet secretaries.[59] To them, only the president can perform the duties the strategy prescribes for the custodian.

Others have questioned the strategy's attempt to equalize the resources of the various departments. Yarmolinsky, for example, argues that the Department of Defense is a consistently more effective advocate than the Department of State.[60] Fenno believes that the White House assistants have become so powerful that the cabinet secretaries are no longer a match for them.[61]

Hall offers an empirical analysis of George's prescriptions. Hall argues that George's strategy offers a set of behavioural norms which must govern the day-to-day processing of fact and opinion within the decision-maker's environment. While Hall believes this to be a "fresh" approach in light of the usual recommendations for structural change in the executive government, he notes that these prescriptions have never been carefully tested for their empirical relevance or validity.

Hall does a detailed study of the strategy's norms whenever they were approximated in the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations. He observed the behaviour of the president, the national security advisor and the other participants during the major foreign policy decision processes in each administration.[62] With the use of interviews and data from the National Security Council

files, he examined several questions. Which presidential style suits the strategy best? How did the presidents define the role of the custodian? What activities did the custodian engage in, and what was their influence on the decision-making process? He found sufficient evidence that the strategy can be implemented. Moreover, when used, it tended to improve the decision-making process. Also, it provided useful tools to identify malfunctions in the process generally. Specifically, Hall examined whether the president's style affects the possiblity of implementing the strategy, how essential the role task formulation of the custodian is, and which activities harm or enhance his custodial role tasks. Furthermore, Hall examined whether the custodian has enough power or "leverage" to muster advice which challenges the advice of such powerful agents as the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State.

In response to the specific criticisms levelled at the strategy, Hall found that the strategy's feasibility is indeed dependent on the style of the president. Presidents who favour a competitive or collegial style of decision-making use the strategy more than those who prefer a formalistic style.[63] Those presidents who tolerate high levels of interpersonal conflict and who are actively involved in the process will benefit most from the strategy. Also, these presidents are willing to make time available to benefit from the policy debates.

Hall also found that when the president defines the role of the custodian clearly, he will have enough leverage

to do his job.[64] There is no need for a president to be his own custodian. Moreover, Hall's findings reject the assertion that the resources of the advocates cannot be balanced. As long as the advocates have equal access to the president and to the policy forums, their resource differences can be evened out.

The most crucial aspect of Hall's findings concern the National Security Advisor. Can he really perform the role of a custodian? Hall argues that during most of the Truman and Kennedy years, the NSA indeed performed the role of process manager, honest broker, and general coordinator of policy.[65] However, his role changed when he began to advocate policy. His policy advocacy, Hall argues, caused him to neglect his other duties. Instead, he became one of the principal advisors to the president. Hall states that the policy advocacy role cannot coexist with his other tasks. As a result of advocating policy, the custodian can no longer be an objective and effective processor of options he does not favour. Moreover, he will no longer widen the debate whenever his option has received a hearing. Finally, he will be less willing to call for a review of his option, even though it might not be achieving the president's objectives. Hall concludes that the NSA can only perform the custodial role as long as George's prescriptions as well as proscriptions of the role tasks are strictly enforced.

Hall also tested the other role violations identified by George.[66] While George states that public speaking, diplomacy, and policy enforcement will also undermine the

role of the custodian, Hall found that the strategy need not define these activities as rigidly as the policy advocacy role. Only when the custodian engages in substantial diplomatic negotiations or when he states his policy preferences in public, or when he enforces and implements personally the president's policy, will he lose his impartiality. While Hall allowed the custodian more leeway in these activities, he did not challenge George's proscriptions fundamentally.

Hall's findings, in essence, provide for a defense of the multiple advocacy strategy. Hall not only redresses several criticisms, but also shows the strategy to be quite feasible. Hall defends Georges's original formulation of the strategy, emphasizing that its success lies in the careful observation of the custodian's role tasks. Both he and George believe policy advocacy on the part of the custodian constitutes the chief challenge to the strategy's effectiveness.

TESTING THE ROLE PRESCRIPTIONS OF THE STRATEGY

This thesis will show that custodial advocacy per se is not detrimental to the decision-making process. When the advocates do not propose a wide range of options, the custodian will improve the process by advocating a new option. Even when the advocates do propose several options,

the custodian may still improve the process by adding an extra perspective.

Both George and Hall deal insufficiently with the strategy's ability to provide for a diversity of options. It is unclear whether a wide range of opinions among the advocates is a necessary condition for the strategy to work or whether the implementation of the strategy will produce such a range. For example, Hall notes that the advocates in the Carter administration were of diverse ideological backgrounds.[67] Yet, as this study will show, they often failed to raise significantly different options. What is the custodian to do in such a situation?

George writes that the custodian, in such a case, may choose to appoint a devil's advocate. Yet, he also recognizes that devil's advocates lose their credibility quite quickly.[68] The other participants may not pay much attention to such advocacy, knowing that it is intended merely to challenge their viewpoints rather than provide a genuine alternative view. Also, the administration can invite outsiders to the policy forums to widen the range of options. However, I believe this is the most impractical aspect of the strategy. The strategy already puts great demands on the president. While he may tolerate dissent among his closest advisors, he may be less willing to allow outsiders that privilege. Moreover, it may take considerable time and study for outsiders to challenge the arguments of the advocates. Also, an outsider cannot easily join the close rapport which develops between a president and his

inner circle.[69]

While George and Hall provide little in the way of ensuring diverse options, they clearly proscribe the custodian from diversifying the debate by means of genuine advocacy. Advocacy, public speaking and diplomacy, on the part of the custodian, are alleged to interfere with his other role tasks. Several case studies in this thesis will show that these proscriptions are too strict, if not counterproductive. These activities will only harm the process when they are combined with the custodian's neglect of the process norms. Only when the custodian fails to provide a fair hearing for the advocates or when he blocks them from policy meetings, or when he does not elevate their conflicts to the president's attention will the process be harmed. Moreover, I will show that custodial neglect of the process norms is not necessarily linked to his advocacy role. The custodian can advocate policy and manage the process at the same time. Especially, when the advocates do not produce a wide variety of options, the custodian's genuine advocacy will actually improve the process.

These arguments are based on a detailed analysis of four foreign policy issues during the Carter administration. Whether or not consciously adopted, this administration implemented many of the role tasks and process norms prescribed by the strategy. As such, it provides a good testing ground for an evaluation of the strategy.

Both George and Hall offer a few observations on this administration.[70] They found Carter's style conducive to a

open policy debate process. He was willing to foster policy discussions and allow dissent among his top advisors. Moreover, he was willing to engage personally in the debates among his advisors and kept a close rein on the final policy choices. Also, he instituted procedures whereby most senior advisors were able to have direct access to him. Brzezinski's role was defined sufficiently close to the guidelines of the strategy. He was in charge of the interagency policy process and was responsible for the coordination of the various options as well as the various policy meetings.

Yet, Hall argues correctly that the policy process deteriorated towards the end of Carter's second year. The open debate forums and the equal access of the advisors were gradually replaced by bureaucratic battles among them and individual end runs on the president. As a result, the four case studies all fall within the first two years of the administration. However, they will also illustrate why the decision-making process deteriorated.[71]

While George and Hall blame the demise of the process on Brzezinski's policy advocacy and other role task violations, the four cases show that the strategy was hampered from the start as a result of the lack of diversity of opinion among Carter's advocates. Their consensual views did not provide Carter with a sufficient range of options. Brzezinski corrected this flaw by advocating those options left out of the debate by the other advocates. This custodial intervention improved the process. The process

functioned well until Brzezinski abandoned the maintenance of the strategy's process norms.

The hypotheses proposed in this study are tested by means of an indepth analysis of four decision issues during the Carter administration. The selection of criteria for the case studies follows closely the guidelines which George uses to indicate the scope of applicability of the strategy.

At a very general level, the strategy constitutes a system of managed adversarial proceedings aimed at offering a critical examination of policy options before they are adopted by the top decision-maker. As such, the strategy is not restricted to any type of policy issue per se.[72] Yet, George adds that the strategy is more applicable to critical than to routine issues. Without implying that the strategy cannot be applied to a wider variety of issues, George limits his discussion, in his 1972 article, to critical issues concerning a conflict situation in which the United States must make a decision involving either commitment, intervention or escalation.[73]

The critical decision issues are more useful for George's analysis than routine issue because they bring with them a sense of urgency and are able to focus the attention of the administration immediately. As such, they illustrate more clearly any possible malfunctions in the decision-making process and offer "didactic value" to highlight the strength of multiple advocacy proceedings. In a footnote, however, George adds that a "broader empirical base would be desirable to define more clearly the scope of the

strategy."[74]

In his 1972 study, George discusses such issues as the American response to the North Korean attack on South Korea in 1950, the Chinese intervention in this conflict in late 1950, the increase of American military advisors in South Vietnam in late 1961, and President Johnson's decision with regard to the Multilateral Force for NATO in October 1964.[75] Besides being critical issues which required either commitment, intervention or escalation, George selected these issues on the basis of the availability of historical analysis, adding that "no particular sampling strategy was employed."[76] Finally, George uses his case studies only to evaluate the degree to which the decision process contributed to the failure or success of the eventual outcome. Unlike some historical studies, he does not attempt to give a definitive historical explanation concerning the causes of failure or success.

Hall expanded considerably the scope of issues applicable to the strategy. Rather than adhering to "critical decisions concerning conflict," he looked at all major foreign policy issues which involve large change and low levels of understanding. Hall's criteria are derived from Lindblom's familiar typology of issues on the basis of the degree of change they cause and the degree of understanding the decision-maker has concerning them.[77] Ruled out for multiple advocacy proceedings are issues that incur only small changes and which are rather well understood. Such "administrative and technical issues" are

described better by incrementalist models which account for adjustments made to existing policy. However, the category of issues involving wars, revolutions, crises and "grand opportunities" are considered by Hall to be well suited for multiple advocacy proceedings. In his study of most postwar administrations, Hall describes the decision process norms of each administration and the various role tasks of the participants by means of analyzing most major foreign policy issues faced by each administration.

As mentioned above, this thesis only evaluates the decision-making process during the first two years of the Carter administration. Hall and others have shown that the decision process during the latter two years resembled closely the Bureaucratic Politics model. The conditions which prevailed during this period prevent any approximation of the norms of multiple advocacy and thus cannot be used to evaluate or test the strategy.

The thesis evaluates four case studies. This number is considered large enough to allow certain generalizations but small enough to keep the study manageable. Several criteria guide the selection of these issues. First, they are major foreign policy issues as described by Hall. They include wars, crises, revolutions and grand opportunities. Second, more often than not they also involve what George has described as commitment, intervention or escalation. Third, like George, I am not using any particular sampling strategy except that there must be sufficient data on the decision-making process available.

The four cases are: the deep cuts proposals in the SALT II negotiations, the American response to the war in the Horn of Africa in 1977 and early 1978, the normalization of relations between China and the United States, and the fall of the Shah of Iran.

The war in the Horn of Africa as well as the revolution in Iran fall clearly within George's guidelines. Both were critical decisions in the sense that an immediate American response was considered necessary. As crisis issues, they also fall into Lindblom's critical category since any American response would have a considerable impact upon the situation, while at the same time the administration was operating under conditions of uncertain and incomplete information.

The innovative and bold proposals in the SALT II talks, proposed by Carter in March 1977, as well as the completion of the normalization process with China, must be considered as grand opportunities. These decisions sought to effect large changes in American diplomacy. They also qualify as decisions of commitment. While not a commitment in the narrow military sense as used by George, both the American proposal to cut drastically the amounts of strategic nuclear weapons, and the move to terminate official relations with Taiwan and acknowledge officially the People's Republic of China must be considered as more than routine decisions by the administration.

Carter made several other important foreign policy decisions during his first two years. Most prominent are the

Camp David Accord, the Panama Canal Treaties, human rights policy, initiatives towards majority rule in Southern Africa, and several defense issues, including the decision not to deploy the neutron bomb. These issues are excluded not because they do not fall into the above discussed categories or because they are unimportant. Rather, they are excluded because of a lack of available data on them or because the decision-making process on the issue was so erratic as to defeat any attempt to examine multiple advocacy proceedings in light of it.

Carter's Middle East policy, for example, started out as a broad discussion within the administration on who to invite and how to proceed with a Geneva Conference. When this approach failed to produce any results, Carter's prospects for a Middle East Peace settlement dimmed until Sadat visited Jerusalem. While so far the issue would be useful to examine in light of the multiple advocacy strategy, it appears that the latter part of Carter's Middle East policy, including the Camp David Summit was largely monopolized by Carter personally. It is very difficult to piece together a meaningful decision-making process when the president personally deals with all decisions and most details without a larger debate in the administration.[78] It is only for this reason that this issue is excluded from this study.

The decision to return ownership of the Panama Canal to the Panamanians appears to have been made by the president-elect and his preliminary team. Most sources indicate that

there was a widespread consensus on this issue.[79] As a result of the early consensus and the lack of data, this issue does not lend itself to a detailed study. In spite of the administration's frequent rhetoric on human rights, it never adopted a coherent or comprehensive policy on the issue.[80] A similar fate befell Carter's initiatives towards majority rule in Southern Africa. Decisions on these issues are fragmented and at times taken quite separately from one another. As such, they can hardly be organized into one class of "grand opportunities." Finally, Carter's decision not to deploy the neutron bomb as well as several other defense policy decisions must await further data before they can be analyzed.

The next chapter will provide a general outline of the deicision environment in the Carter administration. An overview of the president's style as well as the roles played by the various advisors will illustrate the extent to which the decision-making process approximated the conditions outlined by the multiple advocacy strategy.

ENDNOTES

[1] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power and Peace, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. Other examples are A. Wolfers and L. Martin (eds.), The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956; Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and The Balance of Power, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1942; A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958; E. H. Carr, The Twenty Year's Crisis: 1919-1939 , London: MacMillan, 1939. While the rational actor model was still used in the 1960's and beyond, other analyses emphasizing environmental, personality and psychological factors that modified or reduced the "rationality" of the decision-making process were introduced. For the environmental factors see e.g. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, New York: The Free Press, 1962; Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, New York: The Free Press. Early examples of the influence of personality on decision-making are Alexander L. and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study, New York: Dover, 1964; Ole R. Holsti et. al. (eds.), Enemies in Politics, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967. An early example of the influence of psychology is Joseph H. de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy, Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merill, 1968.

[2] For a discussion of the "rational actor" conceptualization see Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971; Glen H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

[3] Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, New York: The Free Press, 1962; Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 1, 1957.

[4] Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy, Columbus, Ohio: C. E. Merrill, 1968; Robert Jerivs, Perception and Misperception in Internationat Politcs, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

[5] Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Evanston: Row and Ppeterson, 1957.

[6] Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 6, 1962, pp. 244-252; Ole R. Holsti, Robert C. North and Richard A. Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in J. David Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics, New York: The Free Press, 1968.

[7] Charles F. Hermann (ed.), International Crisis: Insights

from Behavioral Research, New York: The Free Press, 1972; Ole R. Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War, Montreal: McGill-Queens Press, 1972.

[8] Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, (2nd. ed.), Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1982.

[9] Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power, New York: Wiley & Sons, 1960; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, New York: Dell, 1967; Harold Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence, New York: Basic Books, 1967; Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politcs and Foreign Policy, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974; I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.

[10] Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.

[11] Miriam Steiner, "The Search for Order in a Disorderly World: Worldviews and Prescriptive Decision Paradigms," International Organization, No. 3, 1983, p. 373-413.

[12] James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958; Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957; David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, New York: The Free Press, 1963.

[13] John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.

[14] Steiner (1983), p.379

[15] The formulation of the strategy can be found in Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review, September 1972, pp 751-785; Alexander L. George, "Towards a More Soundly Based Foreign Policy: Making Better Use of Information," Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Volume 2, Appendix D, Washington: Gov't. Print. Off., 1975; Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980. The strategy is based on several studies in decision-making. George calls the strategy a policy sciences theory. As such, the strategy is not a normative theory which can be used to judge policy decisions. It is also not an empirical theory which can offer broad generalizations that explain decision-making processes or decision phenomena in general. Rather, like the George et al. study on deterrence (Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974) and Hall and Simons' study on coercive diplomacy (David K. Hall and W. E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) the strategy offers decision-makers contingent

generalizations on how to structure optimally their decision-making process. While in reality, we can at best expect decision-makers to approximate the provisions prescribed by the strategy, the prescriptions themselves are firmly based on historical experience and cannot simply be labelled "ideal type" provisions.

[16] David K. Hall, Implementing Multiple Advocacy in the National Security Council: 1947-1980, Ph.D thesis, Stanford University, 1982, p.58.

[17] George (1980), p.10.

[18] George (1972), p.752

[19] See Stanley L. Falk, "The NSC under Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy," Political Science Quarterly, September 1964, pp.403-434; Bert A. Rockman, "America's Department of State: Irregular and Regular Syndromes of Policy Making," American Political Science Review, No.4, December 1981. pp.911-927

[20] Irving M. Destler, "A Job that Doesn't Work," Foreign Policy, 38, 1980, pp.80-88; Peter Szanton, "Two Jobs, not One," Foreign Policy, 38, 1980. pp.89-91

[21] Hall (1982), pp.58-62 lists the four process norms as the participation, fairness, competition and diversity principles.

[22] George (1980), chapter 11.

[23] Idem., p.173.

[24] George (1972), p.785. For a discussion of the Classical Rationality conception of decision-making see i.a. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1971; Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision- Making, New York: The Free Press, 1982; David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, New York: The Free Press, 1963; Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision Making: Israel's Security Choice, 1967, Columbus, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1980

[25] James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958; Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963); Charles H. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, No. 2, 1959. pp.79-88; Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1974 is an example of the application of this conception.

[26] For example see John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974; Miriam Steiner, "The Search for Order in a Disorderly World: Worldviews and Prescriptive

Decision Paradigms," International Organization, No.3, 1983. pp.373-413

[27] Steiner (1983), p.392.

[28] Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976; Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy, Columbus, Ohio: C. E. Merill, 1968, p.53; Irving L. Janis & Leon Mann, Decision-Making, New York: The Free Press, 1977, p.54.

[29] Examples of these techniques can be found in sources listed in previous quote as well as George (1980); Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time, New York: The Free Press, 1986; Lawrence S. Falkowski (ed.), Psychological Models in International Politics, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979; George V. Coelho et al. (eds.), Coping and Adaptation, New York: Basic Books Inc., 1974.

[30] George (1980), p.25

[31] Steinbruner (1974), Chapter 2; Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, p.106; Jervis (1976), Chapter 4.

[32] George (1972), p.752, de Rivera (1968), p.98.

[33] B. Aubrey Fisher, Small Group Decision-Making, New York: McGraw Hill; George (1980), p.81.

[34] Paul Hare Handbook of Small Group Research, New York: The Free Press, 1976, p.307; Norman R. F. Maier, Problem Solving and Creativity in Individuals and Groups, Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970, pp.348, 349, 432, 433; Victor H. Vroom and Philip W. Yetton, Leadership and Decision-Making, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1973, p.25.

[35] Vroom and Yetton (1973), p.30; de Rivera (1968), p.209.

[36] Maier (1970), p.433; Hare (1976), chapter 2; Dan Caldwell, "Bureaucratic Foreign Policy Making," American Behavioral Scientist, No.1, September 1977, p.97.

[37] Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1982.

[38] Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power, New York: Wiley, 1960; Warner R. Schilling, Paul T. Hammond and Glen H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets, New York: Columbia University Press, 1962; Allison (1971), chapter 5. See also Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974; and I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign

Policy, Princeton: Princeton Univesity Press, 1972.

[39] Allison (1971), chapter 5; Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy ," Policy Sciences, No.4, 1973, pp.467-490

[40] George (1980), p.4. Authors who have explored these problems include Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977; Margaret G. Hermann (ed.), A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders, New York: The Free Press, 1977; James D. Barber, The Presidential Character, Englewoods Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1972.

[41] A discussion of these factors can be found in i.a. Charles F. Hermann, (ed.), International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research, New York: The Free Press, 1972; Ole R. Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972; Lebow (1981).

[42] George (1980), chapter 3. See also de Rivera (1968), pp.23-28; Jervis (1976), chapters 3 and 7; Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images," Journal of Conflict Resolution, No.6, 1962, pp.244-252; Lebow (1981), p.103.

[43] Allison (1971), p.83; March and Simon (1958), p.218. See also Harold L. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence, New York: Basic Books, 1967, pp.42-48.

[44] George (1972), p.754; George (1980), chapter. 10

[45] Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision-Making Through Mutual Adjustment, New York: The Free Press, 1965; see George (1972), p.760.

[46] George (1972), p.761.

[47] See especially George (1980), chapter 9.

[48] For example see George's discussion of President Johnson's treatment of George Ball during the Vietnam War. George (1980), p.171.

[49] George (1980), p.170.

[50] Idem, pp.151, 152. This style is most often attributed to Harry Truman.

[51] Idem, pp.150, 151. This style is based largely on Franklin Roosevelt's system of advice.

[52] Idem, pp.157, 158; George (1972), pp.763-765. President Kennedy's structure of decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis resembles this model.

[53] Theodore Sorenson, Decison-Making in the White House, New

York: Columbia University Press, 1963, pp.59-72; Holsti (1972), pp.207-212. See also Caldwell (1977), p.101.

[54] Janis (1982), p.250.

[55] Roger B. Porter, Presidential Decision-Making: The Economic Policy Board, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p.217.

[56] Norman C. Thomas, "Reforming the Presidency: Problems and Prospects," in Thomas E. Cronin and Rexford G. Tugwell (eds.), The Presidency Reappraised, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, pp.340-341; Erwin C. Hargrove, The Power of the Modern Presidency, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974, pp.145, 146.

[57] Stephen Hess, Organizing the Presidency, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976, p.176.

[58] Destler (1980), p.86 and "National Security Advice to US Presidents: Some lessons from 30 years," World Politics, 29(2), 1980. pp.143-176; See also Szanton (1980), pp.89-91

[59] Hargrove (1974), p.145; Rockman (1981), p.923.

[60] Adam Yarmolinsky, "Bureaucratic Structures and Political Outcomes," Journal of International Affairs, 23, 1969, pp.225-235

[61] Richard F. Fenno, The President's Cabinet, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.

[62] Hall (1982), A less in depth analysis of the Nixon, Ford and Carter administration follows after. However, Hall acknowledges his information for these administrations is scant.

[63] Hall does not rule out the use of the strategy for formalistic presidents. However, his study shows clearly that this style is not as receptive to the strategy as the competitive and collegial styles. See Hall (1982), pp.700-705.

[64] Hall (1982), p.734, 735.

[65] Idem., pp.708-721.

[66] For the policy advocacy role see Hall (1982), pp.77, 78, 711, for public speaking see pp.715, 716, for the diplomatic role see pp.721-725, and for the policy enforcement role see 717-720.

[67] Hall (1982), p.661.

[68] George (1980), chapter 9.

[69] Lebow (1981), pp.297-298; Thomas E. Cronin, The State of the Presidency, Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1975, p.276.

[70] George (1980), pp.160, 200; Hall (1982), pp.654-681.

[71] The main change in the decision-making process, as identified by Hall, is the demise of the open debate forum and the restriction of access of several advocates to the president. This change took place gradually in late 1978 and early 1979. Most commentators attribute the change to the growing policy disagreement between Vance and Brzezinski. As a result of this disagreement, most decision-making processes during the latter half of the administration resembled Allison's Bureaucratic Politics model. The individual end runs on the president as well as the lack of open debate among the advisors which characterize this model, preclude an evaluation of the multiple advocacy strategy during this period. Examples of such commentators are: Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986; David S. Mclellan, Cyrus Vance, New York: Rowman and Allanheld 1985; M. Glenn Abernathy et al.(eds), The Carter Years, London: Frances Pinter, 1984.

[72] George (1972), p.751.

[73] Idem, p.752.

[74] Idem, p.767.

[75] Idem, p.767.

[76] Idem ditto.

[77] Hall (1982), p.49 and p.67.

[78] Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p.316; Vance (1983), p.217. See also John Havemann, "White House Report," The National Journal, July 16, 1977.

[79] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983, p.134; Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, p.140; Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986, p.48.

[80] Brzezinski (1983), pp.126-127

CHAPTER TWO

MULTIPLE ADVOCACY AND CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

This chapter will offer a description of the general foreign policy decision-making process in the Carter administration. It will provide evidence concerning the extent to which the process norms and role tasks of multiple advocacy were approximated. The discussion also outlines the decision-making environment in which the four issues, studied in depth, can be understood.

The memoirs of several participants, various interviews and a number of academic studies are now available and allow a reasonably comprehensive look at the administration, going beyond the preliminary observations of George (1980) and Hall (1982). A definitive account must await the opening of the National Security Files.

The discussion is divided into five sections: the president's style, the decision-making structure, the resources of the advocates, advocate competition and diversity, and the custodian. Each section deals with one important condition of the multiple advocacy strategy and examines aspects from both the process norms and role tasks relevant to the condition.

THE PRESIDENT'S STYLE

An important theme in Carter's election campaign was the need for an open, decentralized decision-making process in the White House.[1] Carter did not want a "palace guard" or

even a chief of staff. He appointed nine assistants with relatively equal status but with different responsibilities in the White House.[2] Allegations that Hamilton Jordan acted as a de facto chief of staff do not stand up to careful scrutiny. His role has been described by several White House aides, as well as by himself, as that of a political strategist and watchdog for the president. Jordan did not perform "chief of staff" functions. He did not control the paper flow to and from the president, did not screen access to the president and did not set the president's daily schedule.[3] This organization left Carter as his own chief of staff; as the "hub in the wheel" in Kennedy's now famous "spokes in the wheel" staff structure. The hub was most likely not in the centre of the wheel since "the Georgians," and particularly Jody Powell and Hamilton Jordan, were first among equals. However this special relationship did not give them a policy advice status to the exclusion of others.

Evidence indicates that Carter's working style suited his role as his own chief of staff. Carter believed he could coordinate the various arguments coming to him on any issue. He felt confident about personally screening the information sent to him. Indeed, concerning decision-making in general, he said "I like to be personally involved so that I can know the thought processes that go into final decisions."[4] Robert Hunter, an official in the National Security Council, observed that Carter was always striving to be personally on top of foreign policy.[5] Both Brzezinski and Hedley Donovan (an assistant to Carter in 1979) state that Carter was

familiar with James D. Barber's typology of presidential styles. They agree that Carter saw himself as an activist president who wanted to be his own Secretary of State and control foreign policy from the White House.[6]

A president who "appoints" himself as the gatekeeper of all information for decision-making must be willing and able to read through a large amount of documents each day. Carter was such a president. He did not hide his appetite for details. A consultant on a White House Organization study concluded: "The president reads a lot, comments on memos a lot and has a passion for getting involved in the details of a lot of questions."[7] Even though Carter had Watson, Eizenstat and Brzezinski as policy coordinators, he read approximately 300 to 400 pages per day. Carter did not request his cabinet members and staff to hammer out a final option for a problem to be sent to him for acceptance or rejection, but encouraged all participants to submit their option memoranda to him.[8] William Hyland, a NSC staff who had also served with Nixon, noted:

> Much more goes to the president through the system than in the past. Before, issues were not brought to him until they were talked out at the Cabinet or sub-cabinet level. Issues now are ventilated much earlier.[9]

Carter's intense participation in the policy-formulation process and his desire to command all details give credence to the suitability of his style for implementing multiple advocacy. However, a president who

allows multiple viewpoints and immerses himself in the process of weighing different options, must also be able to cut the rope and make a clear decision when its time has come.

Several authors claim that Carter was indecisive. Either as a result of different viewpoints among his advisors or as a result of Carter's personal ambivalence about many issues, they argue that Carter was unable to pursue a consistent and coherent set of policies.[10] While it is true that Carter did not always fully understand the potential contradictions between different decisions, most evidence shows that on individual decisions he was quite decisive. Against the advice of most of his principal advisors, for example, he cancelled the production and deployment of the N-bomb, convened the Camp David meetings with Begin and Sadat, and asked the Senate to consider American troop withdrawals from South Korea.[11] Carter's secretary to the cabinet observed, "When a decision is made, it will be his decision. He listens to many people but when it is time for a decision, he doesn't take a vote." Carter, however, usually allowed his final decision to be appealed by his advisors but did not often change his mind.[12]

Carter not only tolerated but also encouraged his advisors to be competitive in their advocacy. Generally, Carter would commission an interdepartmental committee of the National Security Council to study an issue and to generate a variety of options for his evaluation. Often this process was followed by a meeting between the principal

advisors and Carter in which the various options were discussed. The president chaired these meetings and queried the participants.[13] Brzezinski described such meetings:

> He would listen very attentively to debates among us, and on one occasion he told me that he particularly enjoyed disagreements between Harold Brown and me, since the debates between us involved such quick and sharp sparring.[14]

Vance's account also confirms that Carter encouraged frankness and accepted disagreements on policy from his advisors.[15] Joseph Califano (Secretary of HEW) and Jordan offer many examples of Carter's ease with policy conflict among his advisors, seemingly relishing the different ideas that such conflicts generate.[16]

Several observers argue that Carter became overwhelmed by conflict among his advisors to the extent that it impaired his ability to stay the course of his administration.[17] This question will be explored in more detail below. However, it is misleading to assume that such policy conflicts occurred against Carter's will. In fact, he stated his intention to benefit from it:

> The different strengths of Brzezinski and Vance matched the roles they played and also permitted the natural competition between the two organizations to stay alive. I appreciated those differences. In making the final decisions on foreign policy, I needed to weigh as many points of view as possible.[18]

THE STRUCTURE OF DECISION-MAKING

On January 20 1977, Carter issued two presidential directives which laid down the formal structure for policy-formulation on foreign and national security issues.[19] Two interagency committees were created to study issues and to prepare policy position papers. The Policy Review Committee was in charge of both topical and regional foreign policy issues, defense issues and international economic issues. The Chairman was selected on the basis of the type of issue under consideration. For example, general foreign policy issues were chaired by the Secretary of State, and defense issues by the Secretary of Defense. In practice, the Secretary of State chaired the bulk of the meetings.

The Special Coordination Committee overlooked intelligence and arms control issues and also functioned as the crisis management committee. The National Security Advisor was its permanent chairman. Several members of both committees were also statutory members of the National Security Council. They included the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Director of Central Intelligence acted as advisors to the Council. In addition to the statutory and advisory members, both Jordan and Powell often attended the NSC meetings as well as meetings of the Special Coordination Committee and the Policy Review Committee. Alongside these two committees,

mini PRC's and SCC's developed where assistant secretaries and NSC staff aides cleared some ground work for the PRC and SCC meetings.

The National Security Advisor was assigned to facilitate, coordinate and integrate the paper flow in both committees. In consultation with the secretaries, the NSA set the agenda for these meetings as well as for the full NSC meetings which usually followed PRC and SCC meetings to review the options in front of the President. The NSA was also responsible for coordinating the paper flow between the PRC and SCC on the one hand and the NSC on the other.

The usual process started with the president requesting Brzezinski to prepare a Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) on a specific issue. Brzezinski would then assign a NSC staff aide to set in motion the process of gathering information in either the PRC or SCC setting. The various options and usually the minutes of the meetings would be forwarded to Carter by Brzezinski. The PRM's were organized in three sections: the subject, its problems, agency options and their analyses. To this, Brzezinski would usually attach a cover memo indicating his analysis of the problem as well as his preference or lack of preference for any of the options.

Depending on the importance of the issue, the level of disagreement or consensus among the advisors and Carter's personal (dis)satisfaction with the PRM, Carter would either choose an option and issue a Presidential Directive (called Presidential Decision Memorandum during the Carter

administration) or ask for a face-to-face meeting with the relevant advisors. In the case of the former, Brzezinski would distribute the directive to the relevant departments and ensure an accurate implementation of Carter's decision. Secretarial instructions, speeches and directives to "field workers" were all cleared by the NSC staff at the White House. By September 1977,Carter had issued just over 30 PRM's on a wide range of issues including Panama,SALT, Nuclear Proliferation and the Law of the Sea. At this date, approximately 17 PRM's had been processed and had become PDM's while the remaining were still debated.[20]

On most important issues Carter wanted to follow up on the PRM by meeting with his advisors. Early in the administration, Carter convened the full NSC for this purpose.[21] However, more informal meetings, called the Friday Foreign Policy Breakfasts, developed eventually between Carter, Mondale, Vance and Brzezinski. In January 1978, Jordan joined, with Brown following a few months later.

It was especially in the formal NSC and informal Friday Breakfast meetings that Carter's decision-making process emphasized free competition in front of the president. Both participants and observers of these meetings have testified to their importance in providing Carter with free discussion, with a variety of options, and with a forum in which Carter made decisions.[22] Vance provides direct evidence for this conclusion:

> It was a valuable forum for frank discussions. Issues were aired thoroughly and we were able to consider the interaction between domestic and foreign policy matters.[23]

Informal meetings attended only by Vance, Brzezinski and Brown, at Brzezinski's urging, came into use on the Thursdays preceding the Friday Breakfast meetings. Issues for the Friday meetings as well as any pressing or current concerns were discussed. While these meetings enhanced the coordination of policy among these three advisors, they also allowed Vance, Brzezinski and Brown to solve conflicts among themselves without the president's involvement. Vance and Brzezinski both noted that these meetings were productive in settling issues quickly, at times bypassing the longer deliberations of the PRC and SCC.[24]

This aspect of the meeting violates the process norm of multiple advocacy which stipulates that the president must be actively involved in the process of resolving advocate conflicts. However, there is evidence that the resolution of conflict among the three did not often apply to important policy questions. Hunter (a NSC staff aid) observed that the Thursday meetings usually steered clear of issues that had not been prepared by the PRC or SCC.[25] Moreover, the record indicates that the conflicts between Brzezinski and Vance were not easily resolved and usually needed Carter himself. Indeed, Carter insisted that Brzezinski report the proceedings of the meeting to him on the same day. Furthermore, Carter's memoirs reveal that the Friday

meetings usually involved considerable conflict among his advisors, which indicates that the Thursday meetings did not result in compromises or solutions that did not require the president's attention.[26]

In spite of Carter's claim to the contrary during the election campaign, the cabinet never became a decision-making forum. The cabinet met frequently but only to allow Carter to make announcements about his legislative agenda and to share general information with his secretaries. Carter and other participants acknowledge that its usefulness eventually faded into oblivion.[27]

ADVOCATE RESOURCES

In addition to Carter's three principal foreign policy advisors, Vance, Brzezinski and Brown, Vice-President Mondale and Jordan, Carter's personal assistant, appear as important advocates on foreign and national security issues.[28] The multiple advocacy strategy states that all advocates must have adequate staff support and information, access to the decision forums and to the president, and adequate bargaining and persuasion skills in order to compete with one another on a relatively equal basis.In this section, I will examine these resources for each advisor.

Vance, as the Secretary of State, was in charge of the second largest unit of staff and information resources in

the area of foreign policy in the administration. He chaired the majority of the PRC meetings and was a crucial participant in all other decision forums. The memoirs of Carter and Vance reveal that they had daily telephone contact and that Carter never rescinded on his promise that Vance could call on him at any time. Vance prepared a nightly report for the president in which he gave his analysis of current concerns and his preferred options to deal with them. This report was sent to Carter without NSC scrutiny and was read by Carter the next morning before the daily intelligence briefing with Brzezinski.[29] Whenever Vance believed that Brzezinski did not adequately summarize the proceedings of the PRC or SCC, he was invited to read Brzezinski's summaries at the White House and make the necessary changes.[30]

Carter appointed Vance as Secretary of State because he valued his diplomatic experience in the Johnson administration and thought Vance had the necessary skills to administer the complex State Department.[31] In spite of the well known policy differences between Brzezinski and Vance, Brzezinski thought Vance to be "very well informed, very much to the point and well briefed."[32] McLellan notes that though Vance was not as aggressive and innovative as Brzezinski in developing policy ideas, Vance was more skilled in assessing the feasibility of policy options.[33]

These different strengths between Vance and Brzezinski illustrate the different expectations Carter had from both men. Carter believed he would benefit from hearing both the

cautious, bureaucratic considerations of a course of action and the more action oriented and abstract considerations. Jordan describes a typical meeting, constituting a balance between the two viewpoints:

> As usual, Vance and Brzezinski... stated their arguments directly and without emotion. Carter gave his undivided attention first to the one and then to the other, listening carefully, weighing what both had to say.[34]

The fact that Brzezinski was the more aggressive of the two advisors did not mean that his preferred options persuaded the president more often than Vance's. Jordan, Andrew Young and Robert Strauss (assistant to Carter) as well as several obervers believe the contrary was true.[35] Although Carter expected Vance to be occupied with diplomacy, policy implementation and with administering the State Department, Vance appears as one of Carter's central participants in the decision process on all issues.

The NSC staff under Brzezinski, though leaner than under Kissinger, was highly professional and specialized.[36] While this staff cannot match the numbers and resources of the Department of State or Defence, it has advantages which the bigger departments lack. Its smaller staff can provide analyses more quickly as a result of fewer organizational and bureaucratic obstacles. It does not have to implement policy and can therefore concentrate on policy analysis and the development of options. All field information going to the State Department must also go through the NSC staff in

the Executive Office building or the situation room in the White House. This provides the staff with its own "raw data" to formulate its analyses. Furthermore, the close proximity of the staff, and especially its Director,to the president keeps it more attuned to the wishes of the president.

Brzezinski, in addition to having access to all decision forums, enjoyed free access to the Oval Office and could see the president without an appointment. Each morning, Brzezinski spent approximately 30 minutes with the president going over the daily intelligence briefing, compiled by all the intelligence agencies. During these sessions, Brzezinski also reviewed with the president his agenda for the day concerning foreign policy issues as well as the agendas of PRC and SCC meetings. Finally, he discussed with the president his views on issues.

Brzezinski had been Carter's foreign policy mentor during the campaign and continued to be an important advisor on policy. Carter did not only want Brzezinski to coordinate policy but also to provide policy innovation.[37] Brzezinski's aggressiveness in advocating new ideas is well known. Rosalynn Carter wrote that the President appreciated Brzezinski's ideas, listened to them carefully but also had to sift through them to avoid excessive impulsiveness. Vance, on the other hand, she describes as sound in judgment, cautious and reluctant to "rock the boat."[38] It appears that Carter appreciated both styles and was not consistently persuaded by either of the two.

Brown, as Secretary of Defense, had more than ample

staff and resources to match the NSC and State Department. Brown, like Vance and Brzezinski, was one of the senior partners in the PRC and SCC organization. His staff worked together with the NSC and State staff on all foreign policy issues. From the beginning, Brown was also a participant in the Thursday meetings. Yet it took until 1978 before Brown joined the Friday breakfast meetings with the president. However, since Carter convened full NSC meetings more frequently during 1977 than later on, Brown may not have been seriously isolated from the decision-making process. None of the participants offers an explanation for Brown's delayed entrance to the Friday forum.

Brown did not have as much access to Carter as Brzezinski or even Vance. While Brown and Vance sent memoranda to Carter daily and telephoned him frequently, Brown did not have the equivalent of a "nightly report" to the president.

Brown was regarded a good choice for Secretary of Defense because of his wide respect in Washington. He was described as aloof, brilliant, and as a fast learner.[39] Throughout Carter's memoirs we find deep respect for Brown's analytic mind and command of details. Yet, some assert that Brown did not advocate forcefully enough, that he was loath to take a clear policy stand and that he spent too much time running his department.[40] Brzezinski wrote that the president asked him to tell Brown to be more assertive and less ambiguous in his advocacy.[41] Smith observed that Brown was the most influential foreign policy advisor besides

Vance and Brzezinski.[42] If so, it was less because of his bargaining skills than of Carter's respect for Brown's expertise and detailed knowledge of issues.

The Vice-President's role during the Carter administration was unique, for it included the role of a crucial advisor in both domestic and foreign policy. Mondale was given an office in the West Wing of the White House and was included in the "paper loop." Mondale saw all papers going to Carter, even the daily intelligence briefing. The president genuinely consulted him on issues and carefully evaluated his opinion.[43]

Mondale had a staff of between 55 and 65 people. By all accounts, this staff was active in providing information for him and in helping Carter's staff make and implement policy. Moe, Mondale's chief of staff, and Eizenstat, Carter's assistant for Domestic Policy, jointly made or coordinated all domestic policy.[44] Since Mondale was in the relevant "paper loop" in the White House, his staff provided him with independent analyses of foreign policy issues, which enabled Mondale to make substantial recommendations to policy options during the PRC and SCC meetings. David Aaron, Mondale's former assistant in the Senate, became deputy director of NSC. Mondale was alerted by him on upcoming issues and Mondale frequently walked the few steps to Aaron's office for additional information.[45]

Mondale also had free access to Carter. Mondale could attend any meeting of his choice. Also Mondale, or someone from his staff, attended the PRC and SCC meetings. Mondale

was always present, when in town, at the NSC and Friday breakfast meetings.[46] Once a week, Carter had lunch with Mondale to discuss any matter either man had on his mind.

Mondale's chief bargaining chip with Carter was that he knew Carter valued his experience in Washington politics. Although Carter seldom thought of foreign policy in terms of domestic politics while Mondale did so frequently, the Vice-President was more than a mere "political watchdog." During meetings, Carter would often ask Mondale for his analysis of the discussion just prior to making a decision.[47] In this role, Mondale can be considered also as a "generalist" advisor. Mondale was not afraid to disagree with the president or with the other advisors, and "fought hard", according to Jordan, for his beliefs. Yet, Mondale also used private meetings with Carter to voice his dissatisfaction with policy or his support for policy.[48] Such private meetings are compatible with the multiple advocacy strategy in the sense that the president's options may be expanded in the meeting. However, such meetings do not conform to the optimal standards of the strategy's norms. The strategy posits meetings with multiple actors and free debate as more constructive. As such, this aspect of Mondale's behavior did not necessarily contribute to the functioning of the strategy.

Jordan did not have a staff comparable to the other advocates. However, his role was not to formulate options in foreign policy but to evaluate the options presented by the others in light of their domestic political consequences.

Jordan was Carter's principal "political watchdog," indeed Carter's principal political trouble shooter. Jordan could read whatever memorandum he wanted and attend any meeting of his choice. Among all advisors, Jordan, and also Powell were closest personally to Carter.[49] Carter told Jordan to attend the Friday meetings to evaluate the political consequences of foreign policy options. Powell also offered free wheeling advice on any issue. However, his contribution to foreign policy seems smaller than Jordan's. None of the participants's memoirs spends any time on Powell as an advocate. Though Powell would at times attend the Friday breakfasts, he did not do so frequently. Jordan's disadvantage in staff support and relevant information was easily made up by his proximity to Carter and his long association with Carter which guaranteed him the president's ear.

There is no evidence to add Stansfield Turner (Director CIA) to the list of close advisors. Aside from the twice weekly intelligence briefings, Turner did not have meaningful access to Carter.[50] Turner acknowledged that at those meetings he seldom advocated particular courses of action for the administration.[51] Although Turner or his staff participated in the PRC, SCC and NSC meetings, he was not included in the Thursday or Friday meetings. Brzezinski suggested to Carter that he invite Turner to these meetings but Carter never did.[52] It is possible that Turner's inclusion in the circle of advisors would have widened the range of options. However, previous administrations had been

criticized for allowing the CIA a policy-making role. Carter himself, had been critical of many CIA activities and was therefore reluctant to give the Director a high profile in his administration. In law and practice, the CIA director is not intended to be a policy advocate. Carter was aware of this. While the Director's involvement in multiple advocacy proceedings may be beneficial to the strategy's performance, it is inadvisible for "good government" to give him such a role.

Obviously, other people advised or influenced Carter on the course of foreign policy. However, the influence of intimate advisors such as Rosalynn Carter and Charles Kirbo is difficult to trace.[53] Advisors who did not play a role until 1979 or 1980, such as Lloyd Cutler, Robert Strauss and Donovan, fall outside the purview of my case studies.

In conclusion, all advocates had enough staff support, resources, access and/or influence with the president to be able to advocate their options adequately. No single advisor functioned as a gatekeeper to the president. As a White House aide commented in 1977:

> there's no single guy with primary influence. I don't think the president has become overly close with any of them. It's scrambled. It is not as if there were two or three very important persons.[54]

Carter did not value consistently the advice of one advocate over the others but benefitted from multiple advisors. As Carter himself noted: "When Brzezinski and Vance were joined by Mondale and Brown, plus others as required to address a

particular issue, they comprised a good team."[55]

ADVOCATE COMPETITION AND ADVOCATE DIVERSITY

Carter came to office with the intention of having an open, collegial decision-making process where "equal" advisors would bring multiple options to his attention.[56] As discussed above, Carter tolerated dissenting views and his principal advisors had the necessary resources to compete among each other.

Whenever there was disagreement, this process appeared to work. The president upon being notified of disagreement in either the PRC or SCC would deal with it by studying all the position papers or by calling a meeting of his advisors.[57] Vance and Brzezinski describe the competition and the president's role in a remarkably similar way. The president listened, encouraged frankness and did not want to be shielded from unpleasant facts, hard options or difficult decisions. He absorbed every detail before making a decision.[58] Carter picked ideas from different advisors, now from the one, then from the other.[59]

Despite the open decision-making structure, the advisors rarely disagreed except for the frequent disagreements between Brzezinski and all the others! Except for Brzezinski's dissenting view, Carter received remarkably similar advice from Vance, Brown and Mondale during the

first two years of the administration.[60] Important deviations to this pattern are the Panama Canal and SALT issues. In the case of the former, all advisors, including Brzezinski favoured a quick transfer of ownership of the canal to the Panamanians. On the initial American position in the SALT II negotiations, only Vance and Warnke opposed a "deep cuts" proposal that would go beyond the 1974 Vladivostok agreements.[61]

In addition to the issues studied in this thesis, the pattern of a lack of disagreement among the advisors on the one hand and disagreement between them and Brzezinski on the other hand is also apparent in the the human rights issue, American policy towards Rhodesia, American policy towards Eastern Europe, several aspects of the Middle East negotiations and American policy towards Angola and Zaire.[62] In Southern Africa, Brzezinski was alone in linking Cuban activity with US-USSR relations, in relation to Rhodesian reform and Angola-Zaire friction. The other advisors believed that conflicts in this region were purely local and that such a linkage would not serve American interests. Also, Brzezinski challenged the consensus among Vance, Mondale and Carter that Mondale visit South Africa even before the administration had a coherent policy towards the area.

Carter, Mondale, Vance and Jordan wanted a Geneva conference on the Middle East early in the administration. While Brzezinski also wanted to explore this option, he alone advocated a strategy quite different from the others.

He warned that Israel did not accept such a course of action and that it might not be in the American interest to include the USSR in the conference. His support for a Geneva conference was merely tactical: the prospect of USSR-US cooperation would soften the Arab position while simultanously pressuring the Israelis. Concerning Eastern Europe, Brzezinski advocated that the United States focus on those countries that were more liberal internally while the other advocates believed American policy should be consistent among all the countries. Also, Brzezinski was alone in advocating that the United States take a more aggressive position on human rights in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The others feared that this behavior would harm US-USSR relations.

An analysis of the values, interest, goals and objectives of the president on the one hand and his advisors on the other hand shows significant similarities between Carter and Vance, and few similarities between them and Brzezinski.[63] Brzezinski's hard line view of the USSR has been well documented.[64] But often neglected is the high degree of convergence between the views of Carter, Vance, Mondale, Warnke, Young and even the influential assistant secretaries and directors at the State Department: Richard Holbrooke (East Asia), Richard Moose (Africa), Anthony Lake (Policy Planning Staff) and Leslie Gelb (Politico-Military Affairs).[65] They shared the belief, mainly based on the Vietnam experience, that the use of military force in foreign policy was often counter productive. They believed

that the United States should address issues of conflict between it and the USSR without linkage. Finally, they wanted to focus American attention away from East-West issues towards North-South issues. Brzezinski, in contrast, believed that the careful use of force, when necessary, enhanced the effectiveness of policy, that detente should be "comprehensive and reciprocal" and that linkage was unavoidable. Though Brzezinski in his books had also argued for an emphasis on North-South issues, his record in the Carter administration shows a preoccupation with East-West issues.

The views of Brown and Turner cover the middle ground between Brzezinski and the others.[66] As discussed above, Brown's slightly divergent world view from Vance did not translate into policy differences between the two men during the first two years of the administration, except in the SALT negotiations. It is possible that Brown's attempt to increase the miltary budget from 1978 on as well as the increasing US-USSR confrontation caused him to take stands different from Vance during the last two years of the administration.

Turner could have balanced the options because his views were much closer to Brzezinski's. Yet his position as CIA director disqualified him as a policy advocate, at least in the Carter administration.

The final process norm prescribed by the multiple advocacy strategy deals with the use of advice outside the customary circle of advisors. Carter seldom made use of this

option. The principal exception was George Ball's study during the Iranian revolution. It appears that Carter did not appreciate advisors who did not simultaneously have the responsibility of implementing policy.[67] As well, Carter had an enormous problem with leaks. He admitted that he could not control them and was therefore loath to expand his circle of advisors.[68] Carter's inability to control or even locate the sources of leaks made him very reluctant to ask outsiders in, even though many leaks may have come from his circle of inside advisors. Many presidents become adamant about stopping harmful leaks and Carter was no exception. Yet, they can often only control them marginally. Even so, the president did narrow his circle of advisors. Clearly, this phenomenon hinders the implementation of the strategy.

THE CUSTODIAN

The evidence leaves no doubt that Brzezinski was a policy advocate throughout the administration. Brzezinski's job is best defined in terms of two distinct aspects: directing the president's operational staff by integrating and implementing policy and acting as the president's private advisor and foreign policy think tank. This section will evaluate the custodial role as well as several other activities which George and Hall allege conflict with this role. The reader will recall that the custodial role tasks

are to identify policy issues, provide information, ensure advisor participation and help foster free debate among the advisors. Role task violations consist of such activities as policy advocacy, public speaking and diplomatic negotiations.

Brzezinski, in consultation with the various departments, created a foreign policy agenda book for each year of the administration and supervised the development of long term policies.[69] For example, in preparing options on the American position in the SALT negotiations, Brzezinski had his staff prepare a "history book" of the SALT negotiations to provide perspective for Carter and the other advisors.[70] Fallows gives Brzezinski high marks for bringing new issues to the president's attention as well as new ideas for old problems.[71] When Brzezinski submitted a questionnaire to Carter on the decision-making process in October 1977, Carter reported that he was generally satisfied with policy coordination but still wanted to see more policy initiatives. Brzezinski reports that whenever Carter chose an option prematurely, he protested it.[72]

Brzezinski was in charge of the paper flow in the development of foreign policy. Some observers believe he handled this aspect of his job well.[73] The most crucial part of this job is not to mix one's own options or information with that of the advocates. None of the advisors has accused Brzezinski of this and several observers have provided examples of Brzezinski's fairness in this regard.[74] Talbott states that while Brzezinski favoured a "deep cuts"

negotiating position beyond the Vladivostok accord in the initial SALT position, he did carefully process the other options and generally limited himself to chairing meetings. In the final meeting on the subject, Brzezinski summarized for Carter the estimated positive effects of options which he himself did not favour.[75] Henry Owen (a NSC staff aide) observed:

> The question you have to ask is this. Does the person in that job have the wit to define the separate functions? Can he provide the president with intelligent foreign policy advice, separate it from his own advice and expose it to the other agencies? My impression is that he does.[76]

In addition to preparing policy papers and coordinating the paper flow, Brzezinski attempted to avoid premature decisions by Carter. Brzezinski writes that he protested whenever Carter tried to close an issue before all advisors were aware of all its implications. Brzezinski appears to have been a genuine caretaker of the decision-making process during the early years of the administration. While he obviously favoured certain policy options above others, a certain amount of "uncommitted" policy processing did occur. A good custodian not only alerts the president on process failures leading to policy decisions that the former does not favour, but also cautions the president when he makes a premature decision on an issue which the custodian actually favours.

Brzezinski did this occasionally. For example, he urged

Carter to consult amply with Congress before acting to cut down American troops in South Korea. Brzezinski, although he does not clarify it, actually favoured American troop withdrawals from South Korea.[77] However, Brzezinski was not perfectly evenhanded. There are several examples where his support for one policy option over the others caused him to neglect certain aspects of the decision-making process.[78] Indeed the purpose of this thesis is not to defend the argument that Brzezinski always fulfilled an optimal custodial role. George himself notes that "multiple advocacy does not have to work perfectly in order to be valuable."[79]

The importance of the role tasks performed by Brzezinski for this thesis is that he generally managed the decision process with care, and that he filled the void in policy advocacy left by those advisors who were actually supposed to give Carter many varied options but who often failed to do so.

There is little evidence regarding two aspects of the custodial role in the behaviour of Brzezinski. Few outsiders were invited to widen the debate. While Brzezinski ensured the participation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the SALT negotiations, he failed to bring in other advocates to challenge the Secretary of Defense.[80] Indeed, only during the Iranian crisis did the administration bring in an outside advisor. The answer to this question lies mainly in Carter's concern with leaks. This made him reluctant to go beyond his familiar circle of advisors. Second, Brzezinski seldom played the role of the

devil's advocate. It appears that Brzezinski's dual role of advocate and custodian did not compromise an open decision-making process. As Smith observed:

> Brzezinski stayed behind the scenes, directing the staff of the NSC, organizing information for the president, setting out options, and making no attempt to dominate.[81]

Brzezinski did not appear as a public spokesman for the administration until the spring of 1978.[82] Some commentators have alleged that Brzezinski enjoyed being in the limelight and that he aspired to become the Secretary of State.[83] However, Carter and Jordan as well as several observers also fault Vance for poorly handling this aspect of his job. Indeed, Vance himself acknowledged that he did not always articulate the administration's position well.[84] As a result, Brzezinski filled this public relations gap. At times, Carter encouraged him to do so.

Brzezinski's public comments may have aided the perception of an internally divided administration but it is not clear whether they affected the decision-making process. Since Carter never rebuked Brzezinski for his comments, it is also possible that Carter believed he could benefit from pursuing one line of policy, while Brzezinski reminded the rest of the world that other considerations did not go unnoticed in the administration. In the conflict in the Horn of Africa, Carter pursued an official policy of non-linkage between Soviet support for regional conflicts and the Salt

II negotiations, while Brzezinski hinted that it was possible for the administration to link the two.[85]

Brzezinski did not become an "all round" diplomat in the administration except in two instances: the PRC-US normalization negotiations and the negotiations with the faltering government of the Shah.[86] Brzezinski stated in an interview that when he did talk to diplomats or ambassadors, he reported his discussion to Vance.[87] Hall states that Brzezinski at no time repeated the extensive backchannel dealings so common under Kissinger.[88] Brzezinski indicated to Dobrynin in early 1977 that while he intended to keep contact with him, Vance would be responsible for the conduct of negotiations.

In the last two years of the administration there is ample evidence that Brzezinski's behaviour undermined an optimal decision-making process as defined by the multiple advocacy strategy. Iran, as well as several US-USSR conflicts, appear among the first major issues to reveal this emerging pattern.[89] An initiative developed by the Iran desk in the Department of State, in the fall of 1978, to cease support for the Shah and to contact the opposition leaders was supressed by Brzezinski and largely kept away from the president's attention.[90] In the case of the Soviet Brigades in Cuba in 1979, Brzezinski excluded several participants from the decision-making process in order to advance his preferred option.[91] Vance complained that he was excluded from the last crucial meeting on the attempt to free the hostages in April 1980.[92]

In 1979, a study group under Philip Odeen evaluated the functioning of the NSC staff on the basis of interviews conducted with high level officials in that year.[93] The study concluded that the staff performed well as a personal staff for the president and also did well in formulating new policy proposals. However, Odeen was critical of the staff's policy coordination and implementation functions. He accused Brzezinski and his staff of uneven analysis. Option papers were not fully prepared for all advisors and the results of meetings were not always summarized correctly. Odeen's findings confirm several observations in the memoirs of Vance and Brzezinski. Vance complained that Brzezinski's summaries of meetings or policy options did not always represent the whole range of the discussion as Vance saw it. Vance preferred a coordination procedure which allowed the advocates to read and evaluate the policy summaries before they were forwarded to the president. Carter objected to this for fear of leaks. However, Carter did invite the advisors to "double check" the summaries at the White House. Vance's complaint appears less pronounced in the first few years of the administration. For example, Talbott's account of the SALT II decision-making process as well as Vance's own account of the policy process on the Middle East show Brzezinski as fairly presenting the whole range of options. However, "in the latter phases of the administration", as Brzezinski puts it himself, Brzezinski interpreted the SCC and PRC sessions with considerably less concern for a fair representation of all the views, "leaving it up to any

individual to appeal to the president if he so wished". Clearly, this undermined the ability of the advisors to compete for their options on an equal basis.[94]

This evidence gives credence to the charge that Brzezinski abandoned a fair process so as to enhance his advocacy position. Indeed, Brzezinski almost said as much in an interview in 1982:

> On these two issues (USSR adventurism and Iran) there developed a conflict... and as a consequence, my role became that also of the protagonist as well as the articulator and formulator.[95]

While this thesis does not evaluate why Brzezinski changed his role, it is plausible that Brzezinski's isolated views in relation to the other advisors drove him to curtail the information and access of the other advisors so as to strengthen his position. Whatever the cause, Brzezinski's self-serving interpretation of policy options and his attempts to exclude advisors with opposing viewpoints from his own harmed Carter's foreign policy decision-making process more than Brzezinski's public speaking or diplomacy.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A description of the foreign policy decision-making process reveals that Carter's style and decision-making

structure facilitated the implementation of the process norms of multiple advocacy. The decision-making structure allowed several advisors to contribute freely to the decision-making process by providing access to the president and several decision forums in which to debate policy. Generally, the advisors had sufficient resources to participate. While some had more staff support and information resources, others were closer to the president. Carter allowed all advisors access to the relevant information and did not consistently rely on one advisor more than others. Carter encouraged open discussion and insisted that his advisors bring policy conflicts to his attention.

During the first two years, the National Security Advisor coordinated and integrated the paper flow as well as the range of options on policy and supervised the implementation of policy. He ensured that all advocates participated in the process. As such, his role approximated the custodian in the multiple advocacy strategy. While coordinating the process, the custodian also advocated policy and from 1978 on spoke on policy publicly and occassionally engaged in diplomacy. During 1977 and early 1978 these additional functions appeared not to interfere with his tasks of coordination and policy facilitation. They did not preclude a fair decision-making process. The custodian both integrated the advocacy of other participants and added his personal advocacy.

While most role tasks and process norms were met during

this period, the multiple advocacy strategy appeared not to produce a significant range of diverse options among the advocates. If it were not for the advocacy of the custodian, the president would have received a very narrow range of options on important policy issues, the most important exception being the SALT II issue. As such, the advocacy of the custodian actually improved the decision-making process. Carter did not invite many outsiders to the decision forums. Broader participation might have widened the option range. However,it is questionable to what degree such outside advisors would be able to match the proximity and trust advisors such as Mondale, Brzezinski, Jordan and Vance enjoyed.

Two factors may have worsened the narrow range of options in the Carter administration. The goals, values and beliefs of most advocates, except Brzezinski, were similar to Carter's views and beliefs. Moreover, Carter could at times show considerable stubbornness and decide on policy in spite of well aired warnings by his advisors.

These findings challenge the preliminary observations of George and Hall on the Carter administration.[96] Hall found sufficient ideological diversity among the advocates. However, this alleged ideological diversity did not translate into a diversity of policy options. Hall and George blame the failure of the multiple advocacy strategy, in spite of Carter's appropriate style and suitable decision-making structure, on custodial advocacy, public speaking and diplomacy. However, the evidence indicates that

these activities did not harm the process. Indeed, custodial advocacy enhanced it at times. The evidence shows that when the custodian blocked advocates from access to the decision forums or to the president and blocked their options from consideration, as he did from late 1978 onwards, the approximation of the multiple advocacy strategy ended.

These findings and i.feDences challenge several aspects of the pultiple advocacy theory: does it actually produce a variety of options? Should the custodian never advocate on policy? Is public speaking and diplomacy by the custodian really harmful? In the following chapters these questions are explored by evaluating in depth the evidence on the decision-making process for several issues.

ENDNOTES

[1] Jimmy Carter, "Making Foreign and Defense Policy: Openness, Coherence and Efficiency," National Journal, October 23, 1976, p.1109; Haynes Johnson, In The Absence of Power, New York; The Viking Press, 1980; Interview with Carter by Neil.R. Peirce in Thomas E. Cronin and Rexford G. Tugwell, (eds.), The Presidency Reappraised, (2nd ed.), New York: Praeger, 1977,pp.44-45

[2] Dom Bonafede, "White House Report," National Journal, February 12, 1977, p.232; Richard E. Neustadt, "Staffing the Presidency: Premature Notes on the New Administration," Political Science Quarterly, No.1, Spring 1978, pp.8-10

[3] Dom Bonafede "White House Report," National Journal, April 30, 1977, p.667; John Osborne, The New Republic, October 29, 1977, p.6; Harrison Wellford, "Staffing the Presidency, An Insider's Comment," Political Science Quarterly, No.1, Spring 1978, p. 11.

[4] Peirce in Cronin and Tugwell (eds.), 1977, p. 44.

[5] Robert E. Hunter, Presidential Control of Foreign Policy, New York: Praeger, 1980, p. 37.

[6] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983; p.5, Hedley Donovan, Roosevelt to Reagan, New York: Harper and Row, 1985, p. 162,3; See also Time, August 8, 1977, p. 9; Carter briefly hints at this in Keeping Faith, New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p. 52; Vance acknowledged Carter's activist style in an interview with Time, April 24, 1978, p.24

[7] Wellford (1978), p. 11.

[8] Carter (1982), pp. 53, 54, 55 and 60; R. Gordon Hoxie, "Staffing the Ford and Carter Presidencies," Presidential Studies Quarterly, No. 3, 1980, p. 389.

[9] National Journal, October 15, 1977, p. 1601; Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980, p. 157, believes that Carter's absence in the PRC and SCC meetings to some degree offset this benefit.

[10] Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986; M.Glenn Abernathy. et. al. (eds.), The Carter Years, London: Frances Pinter, 1984; Theodore White, America In Search of Itself: The Making of the President: 1976-1980, New York: Harper & Row, 1982; Stanley Hoffmann, "The hell of Good Intentions," Foreign Policy, No. 29, Winter 1977, pp.3-26

[11] Smith (1986), p. 81; Elizabeth Drew, "A Reporter at

Large: Brzezinski," New Yorker, May 1, 1978, p.101-122; Dom Bonafede, "White House Report," April 9, 1977,p.549; John Havemann, "White House Report," National Journal, July 16, 1977, p.1104-1112; Carter (1982), p. 316; Burton M. Sapin, Presidential Studies Quarterly, No. 1, 1980, p. 21.

[12] John Watson in National Journal, October 30, 1976,p.1546; Carter (1982), p. 60.

[13] Brzezinski (1983), p. 67.

[14] Idem, p. 67.

[15] Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, p. 35.

[16] Hamilton Jordan, Crises, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1982, p. 47; Joseph A. Califano, Governing America, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981, p. 396.

[17] Barry Rubin, Secrets of State, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980; Smith (1986).

[18] Carter (1982), p. 54.

[19] The following account draws upon Hunter (1980); Brzezinski (1983); Dom Bonafede, "White House Report," National Journal, October 15, 1977, p.1596-1601; Philip Odeen, "Report of a Study of the President's Reorganization Project," 1979; Interview with Brzezinski in Washington Quarterly, by Michael R. Beschloss and Alan Weinstein, Winter 1982, pp.54-79, and D. Kirschten, "White House Report," National Journal, May 17, 1980. More fragmented information can be found in Vance (1983); Carter (1982); and Jordan (1982).

[20] Lawrence Korb in Sam C. Sarkesian (ed.) Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter's First Years, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, pp. 120-130.

[21] E.g. the initial position on the SALT II negotiations was formed in the process of two NSC meetings; on March 19 and 22, 1977. Brzezinski (1982), pp. 159, 160 and p. 67; Hunter (1980), p. 35 notes that NSC meetings gradually became less frequent, only dealing with the most important issues e.g. the invasion of Afghanistan and the rescue attempt of the hostages in Iran. Brzezinski (1983), p. 67.

[22] Donovan (1985), p. 152; Sarkesian (1979), p.82; Hunter (1980), p. 34; Carter (1982), p. 56; Jordan (1982) provides examples of these discussions on a variety of issues throughout the book e.g. see p. 44, 64.

[23] Vance (1982), p. 39.

[24] Vance (1983), p. 39; Brzezinski (1983), p. 70.

[25] Hunter (1980), p. 33.

[26] Carter (1982), p. 36.

[27] Donovan (1985), p. 153; Brzezinski (1983), p. 67 states that cabinet meetings never dealt with foreign policy issues.; Carter (1982), p. 60; Califano (1981), p. 403.

[28] Carter (1982), pp. 39, 54, 55; Jordan (1982), pp. 45, 68,; Time, August 8 , 1977, pp. 8, 9; Wellford (1980), p. 11.

[29] Vance (1983), p. 39.

[30] Idem, p. 37.

[31] Carter (1982), p. 54; David S. Mclellan, Cyrus Vance, New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld,1985, p. 25.

[32] Brzezinski (1983), p. 37.

[33] Mclellan (1985), p. 32.

[34] Jordan (1982), p.45; R. Carter agrees that the president enjoyed the range of opinions the two men represented: R. Carter (1984), p. 310. See also Turner (1985), p. 88.

[35] Robert Strauss in Washington Post, December 20, 1979, p. 61; Andrew Young, p. C3; Jordan (1982), p. 48; Richard Burt, New York Times, December 25, 1977, p. 1. Jordan wrote (p. 48) "When they did differ... the president would side with Vance 3 out of 4 times." See also Mclellan (1985), p. 168.

[36] Dom Bonafede, "White House Report," National Journal, October 15, 1977, p. 1599; Odeen (1979), p. 46.

[37] Carter (1982), p. 51; Jordan (1982), p. 46.

[38] R. Carter (1984), p. 310; See Fallows (1979), p. 76.; Jordan asserts that each man described one aspect of Carter's personality: Vance's the cautious Carter, Brzezinski: Carter the risk taker, Jordan (1982), p. 47.

[39] Carter (1982), p. 55; The New Republic, January 15, 1977, p. 16.

[40] Irving.M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, p. 219; Brzezinski (1983), p. 44. Since Brzezinski saw Brown as a useful ally in his disagreements with Vance, we must be careful to interpret Brzezinski's evaluation of Brown. Brown was more in agreement with Vance during the first years of the administration which, though unfortunate for Brzezinski, does not necessarily make him less articulate.

[41] Brzezinski (1983), p. 46. See comment in previous note.

[42] Smith (1986), p. 45.; Strobe Talbott claims Brown was the single most influential advisor on SALT, Strobe Talbott, Endgame, New York: Harper & Row, 1979, p. 50.

[43] Paul C. Light, Vice-Presidential Power, Bathmore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984, pp. 76, 152, 177; The New Republic, April 23, 1977, p.10;, Dom Bonafede, "White House Report," The National Journal, March 11, 1978,p.376; Carter (1982), pp. 37-39; Jordan (1982), p. 77; Brzezinski (1983), pp. 33-35.

[44] Light (1984), p. 75.

[45] Light (1984), p. 90; Bonafede,March 11 (1978), On Mondale's contribution to the PRC and SCC. See Brzezinski (1985), p. 33,34.

[46] Brzezinski (1983), p. 68; Light (1984), p. 80; Carter (1982), p. 55.

[47] Finlay Lewis, Mondale, New York: Harper & Row, p. 242., Jordan's description of foreign policy meetings consistently shows this phenomenon, Jordan (1982).

[48] Jordan (1982), p. 68; The New Republic, April 4, 1983.

[49] Hoxie (1980), p. 387.

[50] Brzezinski (1983), p. 64; Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1985, p. 131.

[51] Turner (1985), p. 134.

[52] Brzezinski (1983), p. 68. Turner does not mention this in his book.

[53] Despite Rosalynn's well written memoir: Rosalynn Carter, First Lady from Plains, New York: Ballentine Books, 1984.

[54] Havemann (1977), p. 1109; Time, April 12, 1978, p. 14 notes equal access of Vance and Brzezinski to Carter.

[55] Carter (1982), pp. 54, 55.

[56] Carter (1982), p. 59; Peirce (1977), p. 47.

[57] Brzezinski (1983), p. 66.

[58] Vance (1983), p. 35; Brzezinski (1983), p. 66.

[59] Smith (1986), p. 245.

[60] Abernathy et. al. (1984), p. 71; Time, June 12, 1978. Although Brzezinski's memoir (p. 43, 44) also states this, we must be aware of the possibility of self serving accounts. Interview with Brown in New York Times, December

7, 1980,p.44. Hall found that there was considerable diversity in ideological background among Carter's advisors. Hall described Mondale, Warnke and Vance as liberal democrats, Brzezinski, Turner and Brown as conservative democrats. However Hall did not provide any evidence that this ideological diversity translated into diverse options. Moreover, Turner was excluded from the process. See David K. Hall, Implementing Multiple Advocacy in the National Security Council:1947-1980, Ph.D Thesis, Stanford University, 1982, pp. 661, 662.

[61] For the Panama Canal issue see Brzezinski (1983), p. 134; and Vance (1983), p. 143. For the SALT issue see Talbott (1979), p. 58,59; Mclellan (1985), p. 39 and Vance (1983), p. 48.

[62] For the human rights issue see Carter (1982), p. 145;, Brzezinski (1983), p. 127. For Rhodesian policy: Brzezinski (1983), p. 140, 141; Vance (1983), p. 261. On the Middle East see Vance (1983), p. 192; Brzezinski (1983), p. 87. On Angola/ Zaire see Vance (1983), pp. 89-92; Smith (1986), p. 47. On Eastern Europe see Brzezinski (1983), pp. 296-301

[63] Jerel A. Rosati, "The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration" in Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision Making, New York: Praeger, 1984, conducted a content analysis study of the public statements of Carter and his officials and found that Carter and Vance shared the same image of the international system (p. 171). He also found that Brzezinski's image was at odds with Vance's and Carter's (p. 171). For a summary of Vance's and Carter's views see Smith (1986) chapter 2; Coral Bell, President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue, Canberra: Australian National University, 1982, esp. p. 26; Drew (1978), pp.101-122; James Fallows, "The Passionless Presidency," Atlantic Monthly, May/June, 1979 esp. p. 43.

[64] Smith (1986), pp. 35-40; Stanley Hoffmann, "Requiem," Foreign Policy, No. 42, spring 1981, pp.3-21; Abernathy et. al. (eds.) (1984), p. 60, 61; Washington Post, December 20, 1979.

[65] Sarkesian (ed.), (1979), p. 87; Victor Lasky, Jimmy Carter: The Man and The Myth, New York: Marek Publishers, 1979, p. 334. Lake and Gelb acknowledged that while Brown and Brzezinski had some "hawks" in their staffs, the top echelon of the State Department had very few: Destler et. al. (1984) p. 118. They also confirm the similarity between Vance and Warnke (p. 222). See also Smith (1986), p. 44.

[66] New York Times, December 7, 1980, p.E1-5; The New Republic, January 15, 1977, p.24; Brzezinski (1983), pp. 44-48; Washington Post, June 11, 1978, p. 1; Turner (1985), p. 47.

[67] Carter (1982), p. 59; Donovan (1985), p. 214. However, to

a certain extent, Donovan himself was an advocate without line responsibility.

[68] Carter (1982) p. 60; The New Republic, March 3, 1979; Califano (1981), pp. 404, 410.

[69] National Journal, December 16, 1978, p.2009; Brzezinski (1983), pp. 53-55.

[70] Smith (1986), p. 113; Talbott (1979), p. 44.

[71] Fallows (1979), p. 76.

[72] Brzezinski (1983), p. 71.

[73] Abernathy et. al. (eds.) (1984), p. 71; National Journal, December 16, 1978. pp.2009-2011, It reported: "Brzezinski is the coordinator, energizer and intellectual stimulator in the Foreign Policy arena" (p. 2011); Drew (1978).

[74] The New Republic, June 4, 1977, p. 10; New York Times, December 25, 1977, p. 1. See also Beschloss and Weinstein (1982), p. 72.

[75] Talbott (1979), p. 59; Brzezinski (1983), p. 158

[76] Washington Post, December 20, 1979, p. C3.

[77] Brzezinski (1983), pp.126-128; Vance (1983), pp.127-130. Vance states that most senior advisors opposed the plan. Brzezinski did not attempt to "push" this issue through but advised Carter to take the opposing views seriously. Eventually, the issue simply vanished from the administration's agenda, chiefly due to Vance's opposition.

[78] During the decision process on the N-bomb, for example, Brzezinski's strong support for deploying the weapon clouded his duties to communicate clearly with the president. In the end, the failure to manage the process properly, led to the embarrassing clash between Carter and Helmut Schmidt. See: Vance (1983), pp.94-96 ; Carter (1982), pp.225-229 ; Brzezinski (1983), pp.301-306.

[79] George (1972), p.785

[80] Brzezinski (1983), p.71

[81] Smith (1986), p. 43. See also Drew (1978) and Bonafede (1977). See also R. Gottemoeller, "Evolution of the US Organizational Setup For Dealing With SALT", Rand Monograph, November 1978, p.23; Hunter (1982), p. 29, believes that an advocate custodian can effectively coordinate decision-making.

[82] National Journal, December 16, 1978, p.2009-2011; Time, May 29, 1978; New York Times, October 19, 1977; National

Journal, October 15, 1977, p.1596-1601; Mclellan (1985), p. 48.

[83] Washington Post, December 20, 1977, p.7

[84] Carter (1982), p. 54; Jordan (1982), p. 49; Interview with Vance in Time, April 24, 1978.

[85] Carter (1982), p. 53. It is also argued that Carter was ambivalent towards the USSR and could not come down on either side of the argument. See Hoffmann (1981), pp 3-8. The problem with this argument is that there was nothing ambivalent about Carter's actual policy in the conflict. The US stand remained unaltered throughout.

[86] Time, July 18 (1977).

[87] Beschloss and Weinstein (1982), p. 76. Richard Earle (Director ACDA) also testified that all diplomatic contacts by the White House were reported to DOS, Arms Control Today, no.3, March 1981, p. 6

[88] Hall (1982), p. 663.

[89] Smith (1986), p. 43 claims that such violations started in early 1978. To some degree they can also be identified in the PRC-US normalization issue as I will explain in a pursuant chapter.

[90] Gary Sick, All Fall Down, New York: Random House, 1985, pp. 117-122.

[91] Brzezinski (1983), p. 349. For example, Brzezinski would quickly change PRC sessions into NSC sessions by bringing in the president, merely to oust the assistant secretaries (from State) from the meeting.

[92] Vance (1983), p. 409; Jordan (1982), p. 251.

[93] Odeen (1979), Philip Odeen, "Organizing for National Security," International Security, summer 1980, pp.111-129.

[94] Vance (1983), p. 37 (for the Middle East see pp. 162-166); Brzezinski (1983), p.66; Talbott (1979), p. 58,59; Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time, New York: The Free Press, 1986, p. 118.

[95] Beschloss and Weinstein (1982), p. 72.

[96] George (1980), pp. 157-163; Hall (1982), pp. 654-681.

CHAPTER THREE

SALT II: THE "DEEP CUTS" PROPOSALS OF MARCH 1977

This chapter analyzes the decision-making process which produced the "Deep Cuts" proposals of March 1977 in the SALT II talks between the USA and the USSR. It will show that the talks failed chiefly because of certain flaws in the decision-making process that led to the American position. While the multiple advocacy strategy was to a large extent approximated, certain key shortcomings explain why the process failed to produce an optimal decision. As such, the strategy explains both the strengths and weaknesses of the process. Finally, on the basis of these weaknesses in the process, I will argue that changes in the role task prescription for the custodian can improve the strategy and thus the decision-making process.

THE BACKGROUND

The SALT II talks commenced shortly after the signing of the SALT I treaty in 1972. Both the Soviets and Americans expressed their desire to follow up on the SALT I treaty by completing a treaty that would further limit the arms race and which would be valid until the mid 1980's. In spite of this common goal, the two parties entered the talks with quite different positions.

The American demands were the following.[1] The United States sought an agreement that would give both parties numerically equal numbers of nuclear launchers. The SALT I

treaty had allowed the Soviets a greater number of launchers because the American delegation felt confident that, among other things, their lead in the number of warheads would offset this numerical inequality. Congress, however, did not agree. It passed a resolution forcing the administration to seek equal numbers in any new treaty. In addition to numerical equality, the Americans sought to limit the number of launchers that could be MIRVed and sought to reduce the number of Soviet heavy nuclear launchers. The rationale behind these demands was quite simple. While the Americans, at the time of the talks, were still ahead in the number of MIRVed launchers, the Soviet potential for overtaking the Americans was merely a matter of time. Moreover, while the United States had replaced its heavy missiles with smaller and more accurate missiles, the Soviets had not. It was feared,therefore that, since the Soviets were allowed a higher number of lauchers and since they had a considerable amount of heavy launchers, which can because of their larger throwweight lift off very large MIRVed warheads, they could eventually surpass the American lead in warheads. If this happened, combined with an increase in the accuracy of Soviet launchers, the United States feared it might be vulnerable to a Soviet first strike in the late 1970's or early 1980's. Finally, the Americans wanted to put restrictions on a new bomber the Soviets were developing, called the Backfire. The Soviets argued that it was a medium-range bomber and thus not subject to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. However, the Americans believed that

both its payload and range were sufficiently ambiguous to count it as a strategic nuclear bomber.

The Soviet position going into the talks was the following. Because of their disadvantage in the number of warheads and MIRVed launchers, the Soviets resisted American demands for numerical equality and limitations on their MIRV potential and heavy launchers. Also, the Soviets wanted to include the US B-52 and B-1 strategic bombers into the overall numbers on strategic launchers. Thirdly, the Soviets demanded that American nuclear weapons in Europe be counted as strategic launchers since they could reach the Soviet heartland. Finally, the Soviets sought restrictions on both the range and number of a new American weapon, the Cruise Missile.

After two years of negotiations, the two sides were able to solve their differences on most of these issues at the 1974 summit in Vladivostok. The agreements reached at this summit required concessions on the issues by both sides. The Soviets accepted the American demand for numerical equality in launchers and MIRVed launchers. In return, the Americans agreed to set the numbers high enough so that the Soviets would not have to dismantle a large amount of their existing launchers and could still expand their smaller force of MIRVed launchers. They agreed on a total ceiling of 2400 launchers and a MIRV subceiling of 1320. The Americans dropped their demand for a reduction in heavy Soviet launchers in return for the Soviet concession not to include American nuclear weapons in Europe. The

Soviets were allowed to keep their present number of 300 heavy missiles. Finally, the United States agreed to include its strategic bombers in the total of 2400.[2]

The Vladivostok summit did not produce an agreement on two important issues: the Backfire bomber and the Cruise Missile. The Soviets refused to count the Backfire as a strategic bomber, while the Americans rejected the Soviet demand to count the Cruise Missile as a nuclear launcher and to limit its range to 600 km.

In spite of the disagreement on these two issues, both sides considered the Vladivostok accords a major breakthrough and the basis for SALT II. Several American critics of the talks argued that the ceilings did not really limit the nuclear arsenals of both powers but merely "capped" them. However, the US administration countered that without the agreed limits, the Soviets would be able to "out MIRV" the Unites States and as such accellerate the arms race. The Soviet reaction to the Vladivostok agreements was quite positive. Official Soviet news accounts hailed the agreements as "a long term basis" for the limitation of strategic arms between the two countries.[3]

Throughout 1975, both sides offered several proposals and counterproposals to break the deadlock on the Backfire and Cruise issues. However, while inching closer to an agreement, the two sides could not agree on an exact number, range or method to count the two weapons. At one point, Kissinger said that SALT II was 90% completed.[4] Yet his final effort, in January 1976, did not produce a

breakthrough.

Most analysts agree that the presidential election campaign of 1976 prevented Ford from offering any compromises on the Cruise Missile that could finalize the SALT II accord. Ford was under attack from several Democrats as well as the conservative wing of the Republican Party. The Democrats condemned him for not reaching lower ceilings while several Republicans accused him of making too many concessions to the Soviets. To try another way to get out of the deadlock, Ford proposed, in February 1976, to sign the SALT II treaty on the basis of the Vladivostok agreements while deferring the Cruise and Backfire issues to the SALT III talks. The Soviets, however, refused to defer the Cruise issue.

During the election campaign, Carter's position on the SALT II negotiations appears ambiguous, perhaps deliberately so. While echoing Senator Jackson's dismay over the high aggregates of the Vladivostok accords, and promising "to rid nuclear weapons from the face of the earth", Carter also indicated that he would try to conclude an agreement based on Vladivostok as soon as possible.[5] In several interviews and speeches, Carter emphasized his desire to achieve deeper cuts in the overall ceilings when elected.[6] However, after his nomination, Carter authorized Harriman to tell Brezhnev that, if elected, he would quickly sign SALT II based on Vladivostok. In January 1977, he said the same in an interview with Time magazine.[7] As will be shown below, Carter's ambivalence about how to continue the SALT talks

was not resolved until several weeks into his term in office.

THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW

On January 24, 1977, Carter issued a Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM), instructing the NSC committee structure to prepare a set of negotiating options for SALT II. Before his inauguration Carter had already announced that Vance would go to Moscow at the end of March to reopen the SALT negotiations. In a staff meeting just prior to issuing the PRM, Carter had indicated both a desire for deeper reductions in the nuclear launchers of both the United States and the Soviet Union and for a quick completion of the stalled Valdivostok accords. White House officials testified that Carter was not sure how to proceed; "in one step (Vladivostok) or two."[8] Others indicated that Carter was not yet locked into a position.[9]

The president instructed the Special Coordination Committee, under Brzezinski's chairmanship, to evaluate the merits of both approaches; completing SALT II on the basis of Vladivostok or lowering the Vladivostok ceilings immediately as well as other possible options. Brzezinski assigned NSC staff members Victor Utgoff, William Hyland and Richard Molander to set in motion the interagency process of developing options. The first exploratory SCC meeting was

held on February 3, which commissioned an interagency working group to report back to the SCC when it was ready to present concrete options.[10] Meanwhile, Brzezinski instructed Molander to write a memorandum on the history of the SALT negotiations to provide perspective for the advisors. This memo was sent to Carter, Vance, Brown and Mondale.[11]

While the SCC deliberated, Carter made several public statements on SALT, consulted with Dobrynin and exchanged letters with Brezhnev. In an interview on January 24, Carter described his vision of a three step arms control approach. First he sought limits, then reductions and eventually multilateral disarmament.[12] While desiring deeper cuts sooner than later, he stated that he was willing to defer difficult issues such as the Backfire and Cruise if the Soviets wanted a quick agreement. In a press conference on February 8, Carter leaned more towards ratifying Vladivostok first and seeking deeper cuts later.[13]

Carter agreed with Brzezinski's suggestion that he should try to build a personal relationship with Brezhnev. With this goal in mind, Carter wrote a private letter to Brezhnev on January 26. In the letter, Carter expressed his desire for a rapid conclusion of SAlT.[14] Brezhnev replied that the USSR believed Vladivostok provided such a basis. On February 7 Carter wrote again, spelling out two possible routes: a comprehensive SALT II with lower ceilings or a smaller agreement excluding the Backfire and Cruise. Carter made these proposals even though Brezhnev had indicated to him that he wished to stay with the Vladivostok accords

only. Carter had reviewed these ideas with Dobrynin prior to sending the letter. However, he had not given Dobrynin a concrete set of proposals since the SALT options were still being deliberated in the SCC.[15] Brezhnev's reply was less cordial. He reiterated that he would only sign a SALT II treaty that was based on Vladivostok and that Carter's arms ideas appeared to him as "deliberately unacceptable."[16] Carter immediately took up the pen again to defend his sincerity to achieve arms control. Brezhnev's final reply to this exchange did not come until March 15, after the SCC had presented Carter with the options.

These public statements and private exchanges indicate two important points. First, Carter had not made up his mind on how to proceed with the talks. While he still wanted to make good on his campaign pledge to cut the nuclear arsenals, Carter moved closer to the position of first ratifying the Vladivostok levels, as is evident from his February 8 press conference. Second, Carter was not sufficiently aware of the Soviet commitment to Vladivostok and of the Soviet refusal to defer the Cruise issue. To show his goodwill, Carter endorsed Brown's plans for the new defense budget, cutting the planned construction of B-1 bombers from 8 to 5 and delaying by one year the development of the MX.[17]

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

The principal actors on the SCC interagency working group were Walter Slocombe (Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs at DOD), Leslie Gelb (Director of Politico-Military Affairs at DOS) and Hyland (NSC staff aide for the USSR). In early March, they presented the SCC with three options. The first, called "Basic Vladivostok," argued for an agreement based on the Vladivostok ceilings with the Backfire excluded and the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) counted in the 1320 MIRV ceiling.[18] The second option was called "Vladivostok Plus." It also endorsed the Vladivostok ceilings but added the idea of trading off Soviet heavy launchers for American ACLM's. It proposed an agreement outside the SALT talks for the Backfire. The civilians in DOD favoured a trade off between the Backfire and Ground Launced Cruise Missiles (GLCM's), while the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to count the Backfire as a strategic bomber.[19] The third option, "Vladivostok Minus," proposed to endorse Vladivostok and defer the Cruise and Backfire issues.

Brown, David Aaron (Deputy Director, NSC) and Brzezinski were not satisfied with the range of options and instructed the group to add a proposal involving deeper cuts in the Vladivostok ceilings.[20] Meanwhile, Carter received a memorandum from Senator Jackson calling for cuts substantially below the Vladivostok levels. It recommended a

reduction in Soviet heavy missiles, the inclusion of Backfire bombers and the exclusion of Cruise missiles. Carter forwarded this memo to the Department of State and the Department of Defense.[21] Warnke and Hyland felt that it was an unrealistic proposal. However, it is likely that this memo was studied seriously by the administration. Any treaty would have to be ratified by the Senate, in which Jackson played a major role. Moreover, Warnke's confirmation as Chief Arms Negotiator had been achieved by a narrow margin, reflecting little trust in the administration's arms negotiating ability.

All these options were discussed at the final SCC meeting on this subject on March 10.[22] In this meeting, Brown appeared as the strongest advocate for deeper cuts. Brown argued that the American ICBM force was quickly becoming vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. In order to stave off this vulnerability, Brown favoured lower ceilings as well as a sharp reduction in the number of Soviet heavy launchers. Brown's ideas were supported by Mondale and Aaron, though for different reasons.[23] They believed that the Vladivostok levels fell short of genuine arms control. They advocated that the best opportunity to make good on Carter's campaign pledges was early in the administration, during Carter's "honeymoon." Moreover, they felt that the SALT proposals should not follow Kissinger's legacy too closely. It was best for Carter to create his own record in this area as soon as possible.[24]

Vance and Warnke did not agree. They argued in favour

of the "Basic Vladivostok" option. They were skeptical about surprising the Soviets with a radically new proposal. They believed that a quick agreement based on Vladivostok should be the preferred choice. They were prepared to limit the number and range of ACLM's, while excluding the Backfire. Brzezinski confined his role to chairing the meetings and sorting out the various options. From his memoirs, it appears that his personal preference was closer to Brown's favoured option than to Vance's.[25]

The meeting did not reach a consensus. Brzezinski sent the minutes to Carter and prepared a memo summarizing the discussed options.[26] It is clear that this meeting did not result in any compromises or trade offs. The advocate positions were essentially polarized around two options. Vance and Warnke preferred SALT II to be built upon the Vladivostok ceilings while Brown and Aaron wanted deeper cuts.[27] Neither Jordan nor Powell appear to have participated in the SCC deliberations on SALT.[28]

On March 11, Brzezinski sent Carter a memo outlining the options discussed in this meeting. The first option called for a deferral of the Cruise and Backfire issues and a ratification of the Vladivostok ceilings. The second option proposed moderately lower ceilings than the Vladivostok accords. On the other issues it resembled the "Vladivostok Plus" option. The third was the "Basic Vladivostok" option favoured by Vance and Warnke. The last option proposed deep cuts to approximately 2,000 launchers and 1,200 MIRVed launchers as well as a cutback in Soviet

heavy missiles from 300 to 150. This last option was supported strongly by Brown.[29] Brzezinski favoured the second option, which called for moderate cuts.

The next morning, Saturday March 12, Carter's principal advisors gathered in the cabinet room to discuss these options with the president.[30] Present were Brzezinski, Vance, Brown, Mondale, Aaron, Warnke, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Brown and Turner. The President began by questioning the participants on a variety of issues. He expressed his hope for real arms control and his dissatisfaction with the high Vladivostok ceilings. Upon this, Brown and Aaron explained their deep cuts proposal. Brown argued persuasively, impressing Carter with his detailed command of all SALT issues. Next, Brzezinski evaluated the possible consequences of both the deep cuts and the "Basic Vladivostok" options: To seek an agreement based on the Vladivostok levels would signal continuity to the Soviets and would thus enhance Soviet confidence in Carter's arms control negotiations. However, seeking deeper cuts would serve American interests because it would reduce or at least postpone American vulnerability to a Soviet first strike. Brzezinski also stated that the administration might want to move beyond the Kissinger era and establish its own record.

Vance and Warnke did not defend their option very strongly. Nor did they question the advocates of the deep cuts option.[31] Warnke did mention that if the Soviets rejected the proposal, any American concessions would look like a retreat. However, neither he nor Vance clarified the

possible dangers inherent in moving away from the Vladivostok accords. If they had misgivings, they did not voice them. Vance later acknowledged that he thought the ambitiuous, far reaching and risky proposal was worth a try.[32] Carter ended the meeting by instructing Brzezinski to write up a negotiating position based on the deep cuts option, to be reviewed in a NSC meeting a week later.[33]

On March 17, Vance and Warnke submitted a memo to Carter stating their hesitations about his decision at the March 12 meeting.[34] However, as far as is known, the memo did not provide Carter with an analysis of the possible consequences of his decision to abandon the Vladivostok accords. It stated Vance's disagreement but did not rule out that Carter's gamble might pay off. While Vance thought it was a "long shot" he also expressed his ambivalence when he noted:

> It might be that the Soviets, confronting a new president and the prospect of having to deal with him for at least four or perhaps eight years, would be willing to take a bold step. We would not know unless we tried. And success would mean a dramatic breakthrough in turning around the arms race.[35]

On Saturday March 19, Carter, Mondale, Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski reviewed the negotiation position drawn up by Brzezinski's staff.[36] Carter, encouraged by the positive tone of Brezhnev's last letter of March 15, lowered the deep cuts proposal even more. Launchers were set at between 1,800 and 2,000 with between 1,100 and 1,200 MIRVed. Heavy

missiles remained at the proposed 150 number. The Cruise range limit was set at 2,500km, while the Backfire was not to be counted in the aggregate numbers, provided the Soviets would agree to certain measures limiting its range.[37] Brzezinski voiced his misgivings about the long range of the Cruise but did not oppose the idea strongly. Apparently, this range was intended to get the Joint Chiefs to agree on excluding the Backfire.

Vance requested a deferral option in case the Soviets rejected the deep cuts proposal. It was agreed that Vance could propose as a second option the deferral of the Cruise and Backfire issues and the ratification of the Vladivostok ceilings. Finally, the administration also adopted a "fall back" option. It split the difference in numbers between the "deep cuts" and Vladivostok levels. Vance was instructed to keep this option completely secret, even to his staff. The plan was to propose it only if the Soviets expressed willingness to negotiate on the basis of the first or second option. With these instructions Vance left for Moscow.

THE ADVOCATES' VIEWS AND THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE DECISION

Before describing the decision outcome and analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the decision-making process, it is useful to reconstruct how the major participants evaluated the options, their estimated consequences, and

reasoned in favor of their objectives.

By most accounts, Brown was the strongest advocate.[38] His concern was strategic foremost. Unless the United States curbed Soviet MIRVing, it would become vulnerable. At the same time, Brown was willing to make concessions to the Soviets. He favoured scaling down the B-1 programme and postponing the MX. Brown's semblance of fairness and consistency gained him support from advisors such as Aaron, Mondale and Warnke who believed that American military spending and development was as much to blame for the arms race as Soviet MIRVed and heavy missiles.[39] It is not difficult to picture Brown as the weapon, strategy and spending specialist being quite oblivious to Soviet concerns with continuity in arms talks. It is also not difficult to picture Carter as being impressed by Brown's arguments. Brown's advocacy for deeper cuts, as well as restraint on the American side, fitted Carter's goals to achieve arms reductions both by means of arms negotiations and by American goodwill.

Aaron and Mondale added a more political factor to the debate. Their interest was to go below the Vladivostok ceilings because Carter had campaigned on arms reductions, not merely limitations. It was best to make such a move when the president was riding high in the popularity polls, using his advantage in the honeymoon period. Moreover, Brown's offer to freeze ICBM testing, as well as the development of new ICBM's, was exactly what the liberal wing of the Democratic Party wanted. As is well known, Mondale and Aaron

(Mondale's previous assistant) represented this segment of the Party much better than Carter.

The skeptics of suddenly moving away from the Vladivostok accords were foremost Gelb, Slocombe, Molander and Hyland.[40] While in favour of deeper cuts, they thought it unwise not to capitalize first on a near ready accord. Vance and Warnke shared these concerns and brought them to the attention of the other advisors as well as Carter. In a memorandum to Carter in October 1976, Vance outlined his ideas for Carter's foreign policy should he be elected.[41] In it, Vance argued for resolving the Backfire and Cruise issues, whereupon Carter should quickly complete the Vladivostok accords. During the decision-making process, Warnke and Vance contended that Carter should use his political strength and momentum to finalize Vladivostok.[42] However, Vance's advocacy appears weak, even inconsistent.[43] Vance did not disagree with the concept of pursuing deeper cuts. His concern was tactical. He believed that the proposal would make the negotiations very difficult. Yet he did not believe or at least did not make the point that the proposal could well be unacceptable and counterproductive. Vance's memoirs reveal two considerations that weakened his opposition to the proposal.[44] First, Vance was concerned with Senator Jackson's strong support for deeper cuts. In light of Jackson's opposition to Warnke's nomination, Vance could see the need for responsiveness to Jackson's proposals in the administration. Second, Vance believed the deep cuts proposal could be a good opening position. He expected that

the Soviets would take elements from the proposal and combine them with elements from the Vladivostok agreement.[45] In spite of these calculations, it is difficult to understand why Vance requested a deferral option which left the Cruise missile out. Vance certainly must have known that the Soviets had rejected this formula before. In effect, the second option, because of its omission of the Cruise, made the overall proposal even less attractive to the Soviets, something Vance had never intended. The first option abandoned the Vladivostok accords, while the second ignored the results of previous sessions. It must have looked to the Soviets as if Vladivostok had never taken place and as if the Soviets and Americans had not tried throughout 1975 to resolve the Cruise and Backfire issues.

Talbott claims that Brzezinski was a strong advocate of deeper cuts. However, all other accounts picture him as covering the middle ground between Brown and Vance.[46] While he agreed with Brown's assessment of the need for deeper cuts in light of American vulnerability to a Soviet first strike, his preference was for more moderate cuts than proposed by Brown and Aaron.[47] Furthermore, at the March 12 meeting, he indicated that settling for the Vladivostok agreements would signal continuity to the Soviets, who were already alarmed at Carter's radically new approach to foreign policy. The study he ordered Molander to complete, also emphasized this point.[48] At the SCC deliberations, Brzezinski largely confined his role to ensuring that both Brown's and Aaron's proposal as well as those of Vance and

Warnke were well aired. He also ensured the participation of the Joint Chiefs throughout the discussion, which had not been the case under Nixon. He voiced his concern about the long range of the Cruise and warned Carter that it might complicate the talks.[49]

Brzezinski, like Vance, warned that the Soviets would not likely accept the proposals at face value.[50] However, while Vance envisioned the proposals as a mere opening position, breaking the way for compromises and further negotiations, Brzezinski argued that whatever proposals the United States would decide upon, it should be prepared to stick with them. While Brzezinski did not "push hard" for any particular position, he favoured a tough uncompromising stand once the talks opened.[51]

Brown's strategic analysis as well as Aaron and Mondale's ideological and political reasons appear to have convinced Carter that he should try deep cuts at once. Moreover, Carter shared Vance's expectation that the Soviets would at least take the proposals as a starting point in the negotiations. A new starting point indeed but the president was new too and believed in a substantive approach to arms control and wanted the Soviets to know it.[52] Carter hoped that deeper cuts, combined with a lowered US defense budget and postponement of the MX, would signal American good faith to the Soviets.[53] If the Soviets accepted the proposal or at least accepted it as the basis of negotiations, Carter could score several successes at once. He could achieve a new treaty proposal before SALT I expired in October 1977. It

would bear his own stamp and not merely complete what Kissinger had achieved before. Its deeper cuts would please the liberal establishment. Finally, a quick success would establish Congress' confidence in Carter's negotiating abilities. This confidence had been low since Carter's selection of Warnke as his Chief Arms Negotiator.

VANCE'S TRIP TO MOSCOW

The proposals fared badly. The Soviets rejected completely the deep cuts and deferral options. Vance did not even have a chance to present the compromise option. The only thing Vance achieved was a promise to meet again in May. For all intents and purposes, Carter's "grand opening" was a failure. It was immediately perceived as such by most commentators as well as by several administration officials.[54] Since then, nearly all scholars studying the episode have shown the disastrous effects it had on Carter's arms negotiation record as well as on his relations with the Soviets in general. It has been argued that as a result of this opening move, the talks dragged on for 30 months, got the administration off to a bad start with the Soviets, eroded any confidence the Senate had left in Carter's abilities to negotiate with the Russians, killed any realistic opportunity Carter had to capitalize on a quick arms deal, and made all the ensuing arms negotiations under

Carter appear as concessions to the Soviets. Especially this last result, rendered Carter, and indeed the final SALT II accord itself, vulnerable to the criticisms of American hard liners.[55] Moreover, the SALT II agreement of 1979 was much closer to the Vladivostok accord, making Carter's attempts look futile, if not obfuscating.

Soon after his return to the United States, Vance acknowledged that the administration had miscalculated.[56] Warnke was more blunt. He confessed that the Soviets considered the Vladivostok accords a deal and that the United States had broken the deal.[57] Several years later, Carter confessed in an interview that

> he had misjudged the Russians....had failed to see how important the Vladivostok agreements were to Brezhnev, how the ailing leader regarded them with pride as a crowning point in his career and understandably reacted strongly when a new American group came in, swept the table, and demanded a new game.[58]

The adminstration tried immediately to put a bright face on the failure by asserting that the talks were merely exploratory. Kissinger, Ford and Jackson rallied in support of Carter even though in private they were said to be critical. Both Carter and Vance urged patience. Carter also said that he thought the proposals had been "fair and balanced" and wondered aloud if the Soviets were bargaining in good faith.[59] Brzezinski likened the Soviet rebuff to their refusal in 1968 to discuss limitations on ballistic missile defense.[60] He tried to draw a historical analogy: as

the Soviets refused the ABM proposals first and later accepted them, so they may do with the deep cuts proposals.

However, the administration did not stick to its position. After May 1977, the administration dropped the deep cuts proposal.[61] During the next two years, it worked on the unsolved issues of Vladivostok. The final accord, reached in 1979, set the overall ceiling at 2250, with subceilings of 1320 MIRVed and 300 heavy missiles. The Sea and Ground Launched Cruise Missile range was not to exceed 600 km, the Air Launced Cruise range 2500 km. The Backfire was excluded from the treaty.

Several explanations have been given for the failure of the March proposals. One argument claims that Carter's attack on the Soviet human rights record and his open support for Soviet dissidents angered the Soviets so much that they sought an issue to retaliate.[62] Carter's letter to Sakharov and Bukovsky's visit to the White House were well publicized. In one of the private letters, Brezhnev accused Carter of deliberately undermining Soviet-American relations by his propagandistic efforts to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.[63]

Others have alleged that the manner in which Carter handled the talks caused the Soviets to think that Carter intended to score quick public opinion points and was not serious about the substance of the proposals.[64] Indeed, the administration conducted the talks in a manner very different from the previous administration. Dobrynin was not given a summary of the proposals until less than a week

before the talks.[65] Carter disclosed the essence of the proposals in a speech to the UN on March 17 and during a press conference on March 24.[66] Vance's press conference, immediately after the talks broke down, as well as Carter's comments that the Soviets might not be negotiating in good faith, clearly put the onus of the failure of the talks on the Soviets. Subsequently, Gromyko called a press conference. This he had never done during the previous SALT talks. He accused Carter of abandoning Vladivostok, seeking a public opinion victory and proposing a deliberately unacceptable set of proposals.[67]

Carter's human rights campaign and public diplomacy did not improve the atmosphere in which the talks were held. However, these two factors alone cannot explain why the talks failed. In his press conference, Gromyko stated that the USSR objected most to Carter's departure from the Vladivostok accords. In spite of the human rights issue, Brezhnev's last letter to Carter indicated his willingness to continue the arms talks. As in all his letters, Brezhnev emphasized that the talks should build upon Vladivostok.[68] In their memoirs, both Vance and Carter acknowledge that their disregard for the agreements of Vladivostok constituted the major reason for the breakdown of the talks.[69]

Several aspects of the proposals must have indeed looked to the Soviets as an abrogation of the Vladivostok accord. First, the lower figures for MIRVed missiles appeared as an attempt to deny the Soviets the ability to

catch up to the United States in the number of warheads. Second, Kissinger had agreed not to insist on a deep reduction in Soviet heavy missiles, certainly not a 50% cut! Third, during 1975 the Soviets had repeatedly rejected a 2,500 km range for all Cruise missiles. Finally, the deferral option proposed to exclude the Cruise which the Soviets had refused in the past.

THE MULTIPLE ADVOCACY STRATEGY AND EXPLAINING THE FAILURE

The decision-making process approximated most role tasks and process norms prescribed by the multiple advocacy strategy. Carter did not initiate the decision-making process with his mind made up. While he wanted to achieve deeper cuts eventually, he instructed his advisors to prepare a wide range of options. Carter did not choose his preferred option until the March 12 meeting with his advisors. Before that meeting, all the advocates had ample time and opportunity to propose their favoured courses of action. Indeed, a considerable variety of options was produced, causing one participant to comment that "the administration became something of an options collector."[70]

None of the advocates or interested agencies was left out of the debate.[71] The crucial meeting of March 12 was characterized by one participant as a "relaxed and wide ranging discussion."[72] Carter stimulated a debate on the

issue and did not select his choice until the end of the meeting. Moreover, Vance and Warnke were able to submit a memorandum to Carter after this meeting, in which they stated their hesitations again. Their concerns were discussed again at the March 19 NSC meeting, after which Carter instructed Brzezinski to write up the decision.

The advocates competed for the implementation of their options in front of the president. The final SCC meeting of March 10 divided the advocates between two options. Brown, Mondale and Aaron favoured the "deep cuts" proposal, Vance and Warnke favoured the continuation of Vladivostok. There is no evidence that they reached a compromise or some trade off. The meeting ended without a consensus and all the discussed options were submitted to the president. In the March 12 meeting, the president discussed these options with his advisors.

The custodial role was performed by Brzezinski. By ordering his staff to write up a history of the SALT negotiations, Brzezinski ensured that both the president and the advocates had a factual basis upon which to study the options. Unlike Kissinger's occasional meddling in the agencies' internal processes, Brzezinski did not attempt to influence their policy development.[73] He ensured that all relevant advocates participated in the process. While he favoured moderate cuts below the Vladivostok level, he did not advocate strongly. Rather, he confined his role to chairing the SCC and organizing the options for the president.[74] Brzezinski describes his role in the SCC

meetings as structuring the debate between the various positions, so as to balance the hard and soft liners.[75] Brzezinski's memorandum to Carter summarized the SCC debate of March 10 and listed the range of options advanced by the advocates.[76] Finally, in the March 12 meeting, Brzezinski did not merely defend Brown's option but also described the possible benefits of the Vladivostok option.

Yet the decision-making process failed to produce all five characteristics of an optimal decision-making process as defined by George.[77] It did provide for sufficient information, a wide variety of options and ample opportunity to consider the options. However, it produced neither a reasonable evaluation of the estimated consequences of all the options nor a reasonable awareness of the difficulties associated with implementing the options. Specifically, it fell short of exposing the odds of success and the consequences of failure of Carter's preferred "deep cuts" proposal.[78]

At least five crucial considerations were overlooked or not explicitly stated during the decision-making process. First, a significant departure from the Vladivostok agreements might bring about a debate within the Soviet leadership. Given Brezhnev's publicly professed satisfaction with the Vladivostok accords as well as his visibly failing health, he might refuse to open this debate.[79]

Second, the Soviets had understood the Vladivostok accords to be the basis of SALT II. As with previous agreements, the Soviets did not believe these agreements

should be subject to changes in US administrations. Therefore, the Carter proposals would not only be considered as a breach of agreement but also as a precedent which the Soviets would want to avoid. If so, the Soviets would not even want to consider the proposals as a new starting point.

Third, what were the consequences of failure? Failure to reach an arms control accord would allow the Soviets to continue their build up, if not accelerate it, and would thus require Carter to increase American arms production.[80] If so, Carter might have to reverse his decision to cut the defense budget and might have to build the MX. As a result, Carter would fail to reach either goal. While he would fail in reaching a new arms treaty, he would also fail in fulfilling his campaign pledges to reduce nuclear weapons and cut defense spending.

Fourth, while it was wise to consider Senator Jackson's concerns about the talks, two considerations argued against following his proposals. Jackson's proposal to include the Backfire as a strategic bomber and to refuse any limitations on the Cruise had been rejected by the Soviets in the past. Second, a quick arms deal combined with Carter's high popularity would have been hard to resist for the Senate. If the administration was going to take a risk, this would be a better calculated risk than surprising the Soviets.

Last, while Brezhnev's last letter to Carter may have been "businesslike" in Carter's opinion, all his previous letters as well as his public statements clearly stated his commitment to the Vladivostok accords.[81] There were ample

indicators that the Soviets would reject any new proposals.

How do we explain this shortcoming in the decision-making process and what does it tell us about the multiple advocacy strategy? While the decision-making process produced a sufficiently wide range of options, it did not produce a balanced evaluation of the estimated consequences of the options. The advocates of the Vladivostok option did not emphasize the benefits of their option and did not challenge the estimated consequences of the deep cuts option. Vance did not advocate strongly why he disagreed with the deep cuts proposal. Instead, he subdued his doubts, hoping that the proposals would at least create a framework for the negotiations. It is possible that the advisors (including Vance) were still quite deferential to Carter and not yet used to one another's working style. This is often the case during the beginning of a president's term. The multiple advocacy strategy apparently failed to correct this shortcoming.

If the advocates (in this case Vance and Warnke) do not press their advocacy, what measures does the strategy prescribe to "save" the decision-making process? The decision-making process was structured and managed according to the multiple advocacy strategy and still did not produce a thorough evaluation of all the options, assumptions and consequences. The weak advocacy on the part of Vance as well as the failure on the part of Brzezinski to strengthen Vance's advocacy constitute the explanation of the failure of the decision-making process offered by the multiple

advocacy model.

However, the role task of an "honest broker," was performed by Brzezinski. The question then is, how does the multiple advocacy strategy expect the custodian to strengthen weaker advocates and remain an honest broker at the same time? Hall acknowledges that the strategy does not clearly reconcile these two tasks.[82] George states that the custodian should neither play the role of a devil's advocate nor the role of a policy advocate.[83] The deliberate role playing of a devil's advocate tends to be counterproductive. The president and other advisors quickly perceive it as role playing and as a result pay little attention to the arguments of the devil's advocate. Genuine policy advocacy on the part of the custodian is alleged to compromise his ability to be an honest broker.

The multiple advocacy strategy also allows for the custodian to invite outsiders to the debate to argue underrepresented positions. Brzezinski did not do this. Indeed, this recommendation appears very useful. Brzezinski should have invited experienced advisors who could have informed Carter on the likely reaction of the Soviets. An example of such an advisor was the American ambassador in Moscow. One would assume that he could have offered a careful analysis of the Soviet reaction to the proposals. Surprisingly, none of the accounts on this decision process mention any role played by the ambassador. Also, Brzezinski should have given an experienced advisor like Hyland a better opportunity to challenge the Brown-Aaron option.

As mentioned before, while the tactic to invite outsiders is useful, it is not often practical. The main reason for this is the president's preoccupation with leaks. From Carter's point of view, the circle of advisors was already quite large and varied. Furthermore, it is unlikely that an outsider could have challenged the position supported by Brown and Mondale. Rather, the evidence suggests that nothing short of vigorous advocacy by a trusted insider challenging the Deep Cuts proposal could have impressed upon Carter to reconsider his decision. It appears that Brzezinski learned from the failure of this decision that he should fill this gap. The next chapters describe how Brzezinski challenged the preferred option of the president and the majority of his advisors by means of a strong advocacy role and as a result improved the decision-making process.

ENDNOTES

[1] The factual basis of the following account relies primarily on Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1979; Richard Burt, "The Scope and Limits of SALT," World Politics, No. 4, July 1978; Strobe Talbott, Endgame, New York: Harper & Row, 1979; U.S. Congress. 17th Annual Report of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, May 1978, Washington: US Gov't Print Off.; Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, Boston: Little, Brown, 1982, chapters 7 and 22; Roger P. Labrie (ed.), SALT Handbook, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1979.

[2] Other agreements reached at Vladivostok include mobile basing and missile modernization rules as well as verification guidelines.

[3] See especially Wolfe (1979), pp. 181-182.

[4] New York Times, Bernard Gwertzman, October 13, 1975.

[5] Washington Post, Joseph Kraft, February 1, 1977. I will use "Vladivostok" as a substitute for the longer term "the agreements reached at Vladivostok".

[6] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983, p. 7.

[7] Talbott (1979), p. 39; Time, January 3, 1977, p. 17.

[8] Talbott (1979), p. 43.

[9] New York Times, Hedrick Smith, February 9, 1977.

[10] Brzezinski (1983), p. 157; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, New York: Bantam, 1982, p. 216.

[11] Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time, New York: The Free Press, 1986, p. 113.

[12] New York Times, January 25, 1977, p. 1.

[13] Wolfe (1979), p. 219; Talbott (1979), p. 47.

[14] Carter (1982), p. 216; Brzezinski (1983), p. 152.

[15] New York Times, February 4, 1977, p. 6; US News & World Report, "Foreign Policy by Committee," February 21, 1977, p. 27.

[16] Carter (1983), p. 218.

[17] US News & World Report, "Behind Carter's Gamble on Defense Outlays," March 7, 1977, p 17; New York Times, Hedrick Smith, February 21, 1977, p. 1.

[18] Talbott (1979), p. 46.

[19] Idem, Neustadt and May (1986), p. 116; Washington Post, April 11, 1977, p. 1.

[20] Talbott (1979), p. 47.

[21] Talbott (1979), p. 53.

[22] For accounts of this meeting see Talbott (1979), pp. 55-58; Brzezinski (1983), p. 158; Washington Post, April 11, 1977, p. 1 and p. 7; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 116.

[23] Talbott (1979), p. 53, The New Republic, April 23, 1977, p. 12; John Edwards, Super Weapon:The Making of MX, New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1982, p. 129.

[24] David S. McLellan, Cyrus Vance, New Jersey, Rowman and Allanheld, 1985, p. 40; Talbott (1979), p. 46 claims that Brzezinski shared this belief.

[25] Brzezinski (1983), p. 158; National Journal, Dom Bonafede, December 11, 1976, p. 1821.

[26] Talbott (1979), p. 58; Brzezinski (1983), p. 159.

[27] Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, p. 48; McLellan (1985), p. 39; Newsweek, March 28, 1977. p. 88.

[28] Barry M. Blechman (ed.), Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture, Cambridge: Ballinger, 1982, p. 167.

[29] Brzezinski (1983), p. 159; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117.

[30] Accounts of this meeting are provided by Talbott (1979), pp. 58, 59; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117; Washington Post , April 11, 1977. See also Vance (1983), p. 49.

[31] See also Seymour Brown, The Faces of Power, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, p. 538; McLellan (1985), p. 40.

[32] Talbott (1979), p. 59.

[33] Newsweek, May 9, 1977, p. 58; New York Times, March 15, 1977, p. 1.

[34] Vance (1983), p.49; Brzezinski (1983), p. 159.

[35] Vance (1983), p.49; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 118, note the memo was vague and deferential so much so that Vance's position was quite ambiguous.

[36] Brzezinski (1983), p. 159. For the final position of the

administration see also Vance (1983), p. 52; Talbott (1979), p. 60.

[37] Also included in the proposal were a freeze on ICBM testing, an agreement not to develop new ICBM's and a provision not to modify existing ICBM's.

[38] Washington Post, April 11, 1977, p. 1; Talbott (1979), p. 50; New York Times, April 5, 1977, p. 7; Sam C. Sarkesian (ed.), Defense Policy and the Presidency, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, p. 246; Newsweek, March 28, 1977, p. 88; McLellan (1985), p. 40; Brown (1983), p. 538. Neustadt and May claim Carter had his mind made up before the decision-making process. However, most other sources do not support this conclusion.

[39] Talbott (1979), p. 53, 57; Time, March 21, 1977, p. 18; John F. Lehman, Beyond the SALT II Failure, New York: Praeger, 1981, p. 106 claims several assistant secretaries involved in SALT also shared this belief. Although Lehman mentions no names, he clearly implies Leslie Gelb and Walter Slocombe as is evident from Talbott (1979), p. 41.

[40] Washington Post, April 11, 1977, p. 7; Talbott (1979), pp. 44-46; Brzezinski (1983), p. 158; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 116.

[41] Vance (1983), p. 446.

[42] Idem, p. 48 See also Elizabeth Drew, "A Reporter at Large: Arms Control," New Yorker, April 4, 1977, p. 113. Paul Warnke, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, revealed that he had favoured a quick completion of the Vladivostok accords. See "Briefings on SALT Negotiations," U.S. Congress. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 3 and 29, 1977. Washington, US Gov't Print Off.

[43] McLellan (1985), p. 40; Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986, p. 74.

[44] Vance (1983), p. 48.

[45] Washington Post, April 2, 1977, p. 1; Vance (1983), p. 54; Talbott (1979), p. 70.

[46] Talbott (1979), p. 49. Talbott acknowledges, however, that Brown was both a more articulate and influential advisor in this case than Brzezinski.; Neustadt and May (1986), pp. 116-118, Washington Post, April 11, 1977, p. 1; Brzezinski (1983), p. 158; Brown (1983), p. 538; Wolfe (1979), p. 36; Interview with David Aaron in Arms Control Today, No. 3, March 1981, p. 4.

[47] Brzezinski (1983), p. 159.

[48] Talbott (1979), p. 44.

[49] For a more detailed account of Brzezinski's custodial duties see below.

[50] Brzezinski (1983), p. 160.

[51] Brzezinski (1983), p. 162 notes that Mondale agreed with his insistence on a tough stand.

[52] Carter (1982), pp. 216, 217.

[53] New York Times, February 21, 1977, p. 1.

[54] Washington Post, April 11, 1977, p. 7; New York Times, April 2, 1977, p. 7; Talbott (1979), p. 78; Newsweek, April 11, 1977, p. 26.

[55] One or several of these arguments have been advanced by inter alia, Neustadt and May (1979); Hedley Donovan, From Roosevelt to Reagan, New York: Harper and Row, 1985; M. Glenn Abernathy et. al. (eds.), The Carter Years, London: Frances Pinter, 1984; L. Freedman, The World Today, vol. 33, 1977; George Kennan, Time, August 3, 1977; Adam Ulam, "US-Soviet Relations: Unhappy Coexistence," Foreign Affairs, vol. 57, 1979, pp.555-571;, Stanley Hoffmann, "The Hell of Good Intentions," Foreign Policy, Winter 1977, pp.3-26;, and Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986.

[56] Talbott (1979), p. 77.

[57] Gregg Herken, Counsels of War, New York: A. A. Knopf, 1985, p. 283.

[58] Haynes Johnson, In the Absence of Power, New York: The Viking Press, 1980, p. 183.

[59] New York Times, March 31, 1977, pp. 1, 12.

[60] Washington Post, April 2, 1977, p. 14.

[61] It ordered a new PRM on the issue which resulted in PDM 20, signed by Carter in September, 1977, Sarkesian (ed.) (1979), p. 122.

[62] Time, March 28, 1977, p. 16.

[63] Carter (1982), p. 146

[64] Coral Bell, President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue?, Canberra: Australian National University, 1982, p. 35; McLellan (1985), p. 41.

[65] Vance (1983), p. 52.

[66] New York Times, March 18, 1977, p. 10 and March 25, 1977, p. 10.

[67] Talbott (1979), p. 74; New York Times, April 8, 1977, pp. 1, 8.

[68] Carter (1982), p. 219; Brzezinski (1983), p. 154.

[69] Vance (1983), p. 55, Vance also states that he doubts the human rights issue blocked the talks.; Carter (1982), p. 217. See also Betty Glad, Jimmy Carter, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1980, p. 429.

[70] Washington Post, April 11, 1977, p. 7.

[71] Wolfe (1979), p. 29, 17th Annual Report of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. Congress. Senate. Gov't. Print. Off., May 1978, p. 11; Talbott (1979), p. 42.

[72] Talbott (1979), p. 58.

[73] Wolfe (1979), p. 36.

[74] Wolfe (1979), p. 36; R. E. Gottemoeller, "Evolution of the US Organizational Setup For SALT," Rand Monograph P6197, November 1978; Brzezinski (1983), p. 158; Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117.

[75] Brzezinski (1985), p. 158.

[76] Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117; Brzezinski (1983), p. 159.

[77]. Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980, p. 10.

[78] Neustadt and May (1986), p. 117.

[79] Talbott (1979), p. 32; Wolfe (1979), p. 171; Pieter M.E. Volten, Brezhnev's Peace Program, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982, chapter 4.

[80] Neustadt and May (1986), pp. 120, 121. Indeed, this described scenario unfolded in 1978 and 1979.

[81] New York Times, January 19, 1977, p. 4, January 28, 1977, p. 7; Newsweek, February 21, 1977, p. 17; Carter (1982), pp. 218, 219.

[82] David K. Hall, Implementing Multiple Advocacy in the National Security Council, Ph.D thesis, Stanford University, 1982, p. 711.

[83] George (1980), pp. 170, 196.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE WAR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

This chapter analyzes the decision-making process in which the American positon in the 1977-1978 war between Ethiopia and Somalia was formulated. Specifically, it examines the reconsideration of American policy, which occurred in early 1978 as a result of the considerable involvement of the USSR in the war. In addition to the Soviet involvement, Washington was concerned with this conflict because of the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa vis-a-vis the Persian Gulf and the Arabian oilfields. Moreover, it was the first international crisis confronting the Carter administration and was seen by many as a test of Soviet-American relations as well as a test of Carter's Africa policy.

I will argue that policy advocacy on the part of the custodian challenged the consensus view among the other advisors and improved the decision-making process. This advocacy did not compromise the role tasks and process norms of the multiple advocacy strategy. Furthermore, I will show that several instances of public speaking by the custodian did not harm the process or the execution of policy.

THE WAR AND ITS BACKGROUND

The source of conflict in the Horn of Africa and particularly between Ethiopia and Somalia dates back to precolonial times.[1] Historically, the dominant tribes in

Ethiopia, who are Coptic Christians, have had an uneasy relationship with the various Islamic peoples that nearly surround them. The arbitrarily drawn colonial boundaries, which became the independence boundaries, aggravated this tension. The Somali people, who ethnically, religiously and linguistically form an homogeneous group, now find themselves scattered throughout the Horn in the North Eastern part of Kenya, the Ogaden province of Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia. The United Kingdom, as well as several other colonizers, were unable or unwilling to challenge the colonial aspirations of Ethiopia in the Ogaden. Also, Britain supported Kenya in 1963 in its claim to the Northern Frontier District, though it was largely inhabited by Somalis. France granted independence to Djibouti in 1977 but kept a large troop presence to secure its independence, in light of Somalia's claim to the area. As a result, the truncated Somali tribes, who in 1960 formed the Republic of Somalia, have harboured strong irredentist claims. The dream of a greater Somalia, with Mogadishu at its centre, has been the goal of the Somali leadership since independence. The pursuit of this dream was most pronounced in the Ogaden region, inhabited by approximately one million Somalis. Border clashes between the two countries in this area were frequent. Also, Somalia has supported, at times overtly, the West Somali Liberation Front, which has operated in the Ogaden since the 1960's.

Both Ethiopia and Somalia have over the last several decades cultivated strong ties with either of the two

superpowers. Ethiopia and the US signed a mutual defense agreement in 1953. From 1953 to 1975, Ethiopia received approximately 200 million dollars in military aid from the United States In return, the United States operated the Kagnew radar and communications facility in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea. During this time, Ethiopia was one of America's most important allies in Africa, receiving nearly 20% of all US economic aid and 50% of all military aid to Africa.

Somalia has received Soviet aid since 1963. In a 1969 coup, the military took control of Somalia and set out to build a socialist republic. Siad Barre, the new leader, entered into a defense pact with the USSR and started to build a strong army with the help of Soviet advisors and materiel. In return, the Soviets were given the opportunity to build port facilities for the Soviet navy in the Gulf of Aden port of Berbera. As a result of this build up, Somalia's military power was slightly superior to that of Ethiopia in 1977, even though Somalia had about 1/9th of Ethiopia's population and GNP.[2]

The chain of events which precipitated the 1977-78 Ogaden war started with the 1974 military coup by a group of junior officers against the Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie. It is possible that this group, called the Dergue, was dissatisfied with the way the emperor dealt with the severe famine which plagued the country in the early seventies, as well as with the lack of progress the Ethiopian forces were making in the struggle against the

Eritrean Liberation Front. In addition, the Dergue espoused a radical ideology and was especially critical of Ethiopia's good relationship with the United States, which it saw as the foremost colonial threat in Africa. In 1976, after a period of internal struggle, the Dergue, under the leadership of Mengistu, declared Ethiopia a Marxist-Leninist state. It also began to accept Soviet aid and set out to improve Ethiopian-Soviet relations.

Meanwhile, the Ford administration, though uneasy about the radicalization of Ethiopian politics, was not eager to abandon its long time ally. However, since the development of the UK-US base at Diego Garcia, the United States was scaling down its base at Kagnew and indeed no longer required the military installations in Ethiopia. The brutal political murders conducted by the Dergue as well as its human rights violations in its struggle with the Eritreans put pressure on the United States to reduce its military assistance to the new regime.[3] While Ford had reduced US military aid to Ethiopia in 1976, Carter cut off all military grant aid in February 1977 as part of his overall human rights policy. The Dergue wasted no time. It expelled all American military advisors, closed the Kagnew facilities and abrogated the mutual defense pact. In May 1977, it signed a treaty of friendship with the USSR and began receiving aid for the Eritrean war.

The Soviet leaders may have thought initially that they could sustain their friendship with both Ethiopia and Somalia. Indeed, Castro, on a diplomatic mission in early

1977, tried to unite Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti into a Marxist federation. This idea, however, was rejected by both Barre and Mengistu. In any case, the Soviets calculated correctly that if they were to lose their friendship with Somalia, the much larger and richer Ethiopia was well worth it. Moreover, Mengistu promised the Soviets port facilities in the Red Sea.

Siad Barre, clearly worried about Soviet behaviour in the Horn, contacted the United States in the spring of 1977, to improve relations. Although the United States was willing to complete the "renversement des alliances," it only promised Somalia defensive military aid. Barre, believing that the United States would be eager to make up for its "loss" and to offset the growing Soviet influence in the Horn, must have calculated that it was willing to accommodate his irredentist claims to the Ogaden. It is possible that Barre considered several other factors to be in his favour to try and claim the Ogaden at this point in time.

First, he could count on Saudi and Egyptian help, as they had made extensive offers in the past. These states as well as Iran were now particularly concerned about Russia's inroads into Ethiopia.[4] Second, the Dergue had still not completed its consolidation of power and had tied down a large part of the Ethiopian army in Eritrea. Last, though both Ethiopia and Somalia were in the process of changing arms suppliers, Soviet aid might be slower in coming, allowing Somalia to gain the momentum.[5]

In July 1977, the Somali forces invaded.[6] In a few month's time they took nearly 90% of the Ogaden. However, Somalia was unable to take the key mountain passes of Harar and Dire Dawa. In September, the Somali offensive stalled as a result of a lack of military supplies. The United States refused to supply Somalia with any military aid and forbade its allies, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, to sell American arms to Somalia.[7] The Soviet Union did not resupply the Somalis either, causing Barre to revoke the USSR-Somali treaty of friendship. Meanwhile, The Soviets had started a massive air- and sealift of military hardware to Ethiopia. In addition, a total of 20,000 Cuban advisors and soldiers helped Ethiopia counter the Somali invasion. They started their counteroffensive in January 1978. By early March, the Cuban and Ethiopian forces had retaken the Ogaden and the Soviets and Cubans turned their attention to the struggle against the Eritreans.

The war consolidated the relationship between the USSR and Ethiopia. It is estimated that the USSR, between September 1977 and March 1978, provided between one and two billion dollars in military aid, including heavy artillery, the newest Soviet tanks and modern jet fighters. The Cubans provided a total of at least 20,000 personnel, including fighter pilots and combat brigades. The war was directed by three Soviet generals on the ground in Ethiopia.[8] The relationship between the United States and Somalia remained cool throughout 1978 as a result of Somalia's refusal to renounce all claims to the Ogaden. However, the revolution

in Iran as well as the formulation of the Carter Doctrine provided a strong rationale for the United States to improve its ties with Somalia.

CARTER'S AFRICA POLICY AND THE BEGINNING OF THE OGADEN WAR

Carter took a serious interest in African issues. His concern with arms sales to Third World Nations, human rights and black majority rule made him an active participant in the policy making process and the final arbiter on most African decisions.[9] Carter announced that he did not intend to use arms sales to developing countries as a foreign policy tool to offset Soviet influence. All sales would be evaluated in light of the purchaser's human rights record and its ability to pursue domestic economic development. The United States would not be the first one to introduce a new weapon to a region.[10] Instead of using Africa as a extension of Soviet-American competition, Carter intended to use his influence to further the political rights of disenfranchized blacks in such states as Rhodesia and South Africa. He was the first president, since Kennedy, to visit the continent. The appointment of Young, as the first black American ambassador to the UN, was in itself a symbol of Carter's concern with Africa. It was well known that Young was a close advisor to Carter on African issues.

Carter was determined to change fundamentally American

policy towards Africa. He believed the last two Republican administrations had largely neglected Africa, while, when they did concern themselves with African issues, they did so with an exclusive East-West geopolitical perspective. Carter intended to treat local or regional problems in their own right, avowing that:

> Superpower rivalry in Africa is something we hope to avoid. We nor the Soviets must yield to the temptation to use Africa as a forum for Great Power confrontation.[11]

Instead, Carter concentrated on bringing about majority rule in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa as well as on providing economic development aid to Africa. If there was to be Soviet-American competition, Carter believed the United States should concentrate on the latter area, in which he felt confident it could outdo the USSR.

Carter believed that a negative, reactive American policy, one that only sought to contain Soviet involvement in Africa, would be futile and counterproductive.[12] When, in March 1977, a group of Katangan rebels launched an incursion into Zaire, with the possible collaboration of the Cubans in Angola, Carter decided not to react beyond the supply of a small amount of non lethal aid to Zaire.[13] While Young's statement that the Cubans provided an element of stability in Africa was not representative of the administration's view, Carter himself had stated:

> We should also realize that the Russian and Cuban

> presence in Angola, while regrettable and counterproductive of peace, need not constitute a threat to US interests.[14]

In spite of Carter's intent to change American policy towards Africa, it is incorrect to assert that he was indifferent to Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa. Nor did Carter completely abandon the East-West influence game in Africa. He refused to recognize the Cuban supported regime in Angola, in spite of Young's strong urging to do so. Perhaps he was worried about the domestic political backlash.[15] When the Sudanese expelled the Soviets from their country, Carter,in spite of his intentions to change American arms sales policy, was quick to supply arms to Nimeiry.[16] In November 1977, he commissioned the NSC to do a study on the extent of Cuban assistance throughout Africa.[17] Indeed, as we shall see, when Ethiopia entered into a treaty of friendship with the USSR, Carter immediately considered improving relations with Somalia. Therefore, it was by no means certain how Carter would react to a new Soviet move on the continent.

The first test of Carter's approach to African conflicts occurred in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia's abrupt reversal of alliances caused Somalia to contact the Carter administration, in the spring of 1977, about possible arms supplies. While Carter was eager to improve relations with Somalia, he only made promises for defensive military aid.[18] The administration was still hopeful that it could improve its relations with Ethiopia. When Somalia invaded the

Ogaden, in July 1977, the administration withdrew its pledge to supply arms. At the end of August, Carter announced his official position in the war. Upon Vance's recommendation, Carter had decided to avoid direct involvement in the conflict, not to supply either party with military aid in any form, to prohibit American allies from supplying US arms to either of the parties, to encourage the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to mediate in the dispute, and to use diplomatic pressure to persuade the USSR not to get involved in the conflict.[19] This five tier approach remained Carter's policy towards the war until it was reconsidered in early 1978. Before then, Carter's objective was to end the war. Also, he wanted to be sure that the United States was not seen as having an interest in this conflict.

The OAU, which has since its start upheld the validity of colonial boundaries, condemned Somalia as the aggressor in the Horn. Somalia, in turn, boycotted all OAU attempts at mediation.[20] Though the Somalis repeatedly asked for arms, Carter insisted that they withdraw from the Ogaden first. However, the massive Soviet/Cuban participation in the war, in early 1978, caused Carter to reconsider his position.

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

It was Brzezinski who challenged the administration's position towards the war. He became increasingly concerned

that the United States was too passive in light of the growing involvement of the USSR and Cuba. Classifying the issue a crisis, Brzezinski called several Special Coordination Committee (SCC) meetings in December 1977 and January 1978.[21] In these meetings, he warned that the consolidation of Soviet influence in Ethiopia, combined with their presence in South Yemen would endanger the security of the Suez and the Arabian oilfields. He urged that the United States take more action to stop this transformation of Ethiopia and also that it make the war more costly to both the Ethiopians and Russians. The other participants in the SCC did not feel that the problem had become a crisis yet. They advocated a wait and see position.

Brzezinski also used the daily intelligence briefing with the president to alert Carter to the intensification of the war and the Soviet role in it. With Carter's approval, he began to give several background briefings to the press on Soviet and Cuban activities in the Horn.[22] In a private letter to Brezhnev, in mid- December, Carter protested the Soviet involvement in the war. In addition, the US delivered a formal protest note to the USSR in the Indian Ocean Demilitarization Talks and sent letters to several prominent non-aligned states urging them to express their concerns to Moscow. The administration turned down an offer of joint US-USSR mediation by Gromyko, arguing that the dispute should be solved by Africans without superpower interference.

While Dobrynin had assured both Vance and Brzezinski that Ethiopia would not cross into Somalia, Carter became

concerned about the massive Ethiopian-Cuban counteroffensive, which began in January 1978.[23] In a press conference on January 21, Carter proposed a cease-fire and a negotiated end to the dispute.[24] He also postponed the Indian Ocean Demilitarization Talks. On February 17, David Aaron (Deputy Director NSC) was sent to Ethiopia to discuss the war and US-Ethiopian relations. While Mengistu promised not to invade Somalia, he was in no mood to scale down the Soviet-Cuban involvement in the war.[25] During this period, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran made several requests to provide arms to Somalia and asked the Carter administration to take a stronger stand.[26]

During two SCC meetings on February 10 and 21, Carter's advisors met to reconsider the American position and to offer recommendations to Carter.[27] Brzezinski argued that the US could no longer afford to sit idle. To do so, would give the Soviets the impression that they could aggressively expand their influence in the Third World without any negative effects on US-Soviet relations. This would set a dangerous precedent. He argued that Soviet behaviour was against the spirit of detente, which he believed was based on mutual restraint. Furthermore, American prestige in the eyes of its Middle East allies would suffer badly if the United States did not counter the Soviets. Moreover, the United States needed to determine its reaction in case the Ethiopians crossed into Somalia. He proposed that the US allow its allies in the region to supply arms to Somalia and that it send a Carrier Task Force (CTF) off the Somalian

coast. He believed this CTF would restrain USSR involvement in the war. It would be a signal indicating that if the USSR moved into Somalia, the United States might react:

> It would certainly make the Cubans think twice about participating in the invasion of Somalia, while tangibly demonstrating our concern and presence...Just placing the CTF in the area did not mean that we were going to war.[28]

Vance disagreed. He insisted that the United States should consider the war a local conflict and not repeat the Soviet mistake of trying to exploit every Third World opportunity. He favoured a political settlement and was afraid that an American show of force would isolate it from most OAU members, who had identified Somalia as the aggressor. He thought it unwise to deploy a CTF in the region:

> We are getting sucked in. The Somalis brought this on themselves. They are no great friend of ours, and they are reaping the fruits of their actions. For us to put our prestige on the line is a risk we should not take.[29]

Brzezinski countered that more was at stake than "a piece of desert" and that the United States should not allow the USSR to determine the outcome of every local conflict.[30] Brown, however, shared Vance's skepticism about Brzezinski's plans for US action. He opposed sending a CTF, arguing that such an task force without a specific purpose may prove

counterproductive.[31] What was the CTF going to do after it got there? Moreover, in the case that Somalia was invaded and the CTF did nothing, the United States would have its bluff called. If so, it would severely impair the future use of such task forces. Unmoved by Brzezinski's arguments his position was clear that: "if we do not know how the situation will come out, or do not intend to use the aircraft carrier in Somalia, then we should not put it in."[32]

The Assistant Secretaries of State, present at the meetings, also opposed Brzezinski's ideas. Richard Moose (Assistant Secretary for African Affairs) believed that the best way to counter Soviet moves in the Horn was through world opinion.[33] Given enough rope, the USSR would eventually hang itself. It would be ousted, as it was in Egypt and Sudan. While the idea of covert American aid was discussed briefly, it was rejected on account of the many legal and congressional problems feared by State Department officials.[34]

These options and the various arguments for and against them were discussed in the presence of Carter in a National Security Council meeting on February 23[35] and possibly also during a Foreign Policy Breakfast meeting the following day. Young, Mondale and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs also expressed their hesitations about Brzezinski's options.[36] Young argued that the United States should "play it cool" and let African nationalism prevail over Soviet and Cuban designs in Africa. Carter appears to have made his final

decision on this issue during these meetings, rejecting the change in policy advocated by Brzezinski. In the first week of March, Carter informed his cabinet of his decision to remain neutral and in a press conference reiterated his policy towards the Horn.[37] By March 15, Somalia had been driven out of the Ogaden. Ethiopia, true to its word, did not cross into Somalia proper.

PUBLIC SPEAKING AND THE CUSTODIAN

During and after the decision-making process, Brzezinski made several public statements about the concerns of the administration and its policy. The comments during the decision-making process were largely in the form of background briefings to the press. However, several public remarks after Carter had decided to stick with his policy dealt with the important issue of whether the administration intended to impose "linkage" between Soviet activities in the Horn on the one hand and the progress of the SALT negotiations on the other. His remarks appeared to diverge so much from Carter and Vance's comments that several commentators and scholars accused the administration of incoherence and ambivalence.[38]

Both Hall and George assert that the custodian cannot perform adequately the role tasks prescribed in the multiple advocacy strategy when he also engages in public speaking.[39]

Hall mentions three "malfunctions" which will occur as a result of such activity on the part of the custodian.[40] First, it will impair the custodian's ability to encourage timely and objective review of past policy commitments. Second, it will undermine the bureaucratic standing of the other advisors. Last, it will cause the custodian to lose his impartiality. In essence, George and Hall argue that a custodian whose policy preferences are publicly known, can no longer function as an honest broker of the various options within the administration because he is no longer "neutral".

Brzezinski's public speaking during the decision-making process does not appear to support Hall's assertions. In alerting Carter and the other advisors to the need to reconsider the American position, Brzezinski ensured that one of the conditions of an optimal decision-making process was met, namely, "that the process maintains receptive to indicators that the existing policy is failing."[41] Brzezinski's comments also do not seem to have undermined the advisory status of the other participants. Carter's policy-making process on Africa was described by one commentator as "open to a free exchange of information and ideas."[42] In the decision-making process on the Horn issue, as described above, Brzezinski did not attempt to stifle or discredit the positions of any of the other participants.[43] Brzezinski appears to have been one voice among many. Indeed, in spite of the serious disagreement on policy between Vance and Brzezinski, they were described as still

working "smoothly together" in March 1978.[44] Hall's last point, which states that the custodian cannot advocate policy publicly while remaining an impartial custodian, overlaps with the larger question of whether the custodian can advocate at all without negating the multiple advocacy strategy. This problem will be discussed in the next section.

Brzezinski's public comments, after Carter had made his final decision, clearly identified his policy preference. Brzezinski, more than the other voices in the administration, seemed to imply that the Soviet role in the Horn was linked to the SALT negotiations. Brzezinski thereby compromised his "honest broker" role. However, since they succeeded Carter's decision, they did not interfere with the decision-making process. Also, we cannot conclude that his comments interfered with the execution of Carter's policy or that they were proof of a divided administration. During the SCC and NSC sessions on the Horn, both Vance and Brzezinski had agreed not to link the SALT negotiations to this crisis.[45] Indeed, the Carter administration neither slowed down the talks nor modified its negotiating position as a result of the Horn crisis.[46] Instead, several important breakthroughs were achieved in the spring of 1978.[47]

Yet, although Carter's actual policy was consistent, the administration did not publicly appear united. Brzezinski, on March 1, stated: "We are not imposing any linkage, but linkages may be imposed by unwarranted exploitation of local conflicts for larger international

purposes."[48] The next day, when asked whether he was applying linkage, Carter said:

> The Soviets' violating of these principles (of detente) would be a cause of concern to me, would lessen the confidence of the American people in the word and peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union, would make it more difficult to ratify a SALT agreement ...and therefore the two are linked because of actions by the Soviets. We don't initiate the linkage.[49]

On the same day, however, Vance and the spokesman for the State Department emphasized that there was no linkage whatsoever.[50] While several observers interpreted these events as proof of an administration in disarray, there is some evidence that Carter intended to send a more ambiguous message than Vance's line. Carter did not intend to link the SALT negotiations to Soviet behaviour in other areas since the Soviets, in turn, could then link his human rights accusations against the USSR to the SALT negotiations as well. And Carter had a considerable interest in achieving an arms accord.[51] Therefore, Vance's comments denying linkage had the purpose of putting the Soviet SALT negotiators at ease. However, Carter also wanted to communicate that he would not let the Soviets expand their influence with impunity, if for no other reason than to stave off domestic criticism of his weakness in dealing with the USSR. Several domestic advisors had warned Carter that he must show some toughness with the Soviets in order to get the SALT treaty ratified.[52] In a memo to Brzezinski, Carter wrote: "the US must make it clear to the Soviets that their activities in

Africa are unacceptable."[53] In his Annapolis speech of June 7, he signalled to the Soviets that it was up to them to seek either a cooperative or a confrontational relationship and that he was prepared for either.

The thesis that Carter did not object to Vance and Brzezinski sending different messages is further corroborated by ample evidence that Brzezinski spoke with Carter's approval and was not acting merely on his own.[54] As such, Brzezinski's public speaking cannot be considered as simply advancing his bureaucratic standing, but as an integral part of the execution of Carter's policy. The strategy possibly enhanced the effectiveness of Carter's policy.

Carter used his two closest foreign policy assistants quite skilfully in this case. In essence, Carter was able to use two different public spokesmen to achieve two different objectives. While Vance's comments set the Soviet negotiators at ease, Brzezinski's comments appeased the domestic critics of Carter and signalled to the Soviets that Carter could not be "pushed around" indefinitely. As such, Brzezinski's public speaking was an important ingredient of the execution of Carter's policy and not necessarily harmful to the multiple advocacy proceedings.

EVALUATING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE CUSTODIAN

The decision-making process focussed on a reconsideration of existing policy. This reconsideration took place because the conditions underlying the initial decision - non-involvement - had changed substantially. An essentially local war had grown into a much larger conflict with the involvement of two outside actors: the USSR and Cuba. It was the custodian who alerted the administration to these changed conditions and who pressed for a review of policy. In so doing, he performed a task ascribed to him by the multiple advocacy strategy, namely: "to identify major policy issues appropriate for multiple advocacy proceedings."[55] As a result of the custodian's performance of this aspect of his role, the handling of the Ogaden issue met the fifth criterion of an optimal decision-making process, as defined by George and Hall: it remained receptive to indicators that existing policy may be failing.[56]

There was virtually no diversity of opinion on American policy among the major advocates in the administration, during the early stages of this conflict.[57] Vance, Brown, Young and Mondale all offered Carter similar advice: treat the issue as a local conflict only, do not supply arms directly or indirectly, and let the Africans and world opinion judge the Soviet role in the conflict. Their position was by no means naive or unrealistic. After all,

the Somalis were the nominal aggressors and most African states condemned them. Moreover, the Ethiopians had requested Soviet help only after they had been invaded. Carter's active involvement might well have alienated many African states. However, the consensus did not provide for "a consideration of all major values and interests affected by the issue" nor did it "assure a search for a relatively wide range of options" and a "thorough evaluation of all the estimated consequences of the options."[58]

It was Brzezinski's assumption of the advocacy role that improved the process. His options and estimated consequences challenged the consensus and provided an added perspective to the debate. He argued that the United States must not only assess the opinion of the African states but must also consider the concerns of its allies in the region. Indeed, there was sufficient evidence that Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were not happy with American policy.[59] Furthermore, the United States must consider that its passive stand might set a precedent for subsequent Soviet involvement in Africa and could invite a domestic backlash on US-Soviet relations in general.

As a result of Brzezinski's advocacy, several options were subjected to careful scrutiny. Brzezinski had questioned the possible consequences of American inaction. If the Ethiopians did invade Somalia, the United States would be at a loss on how to respond and would indeed be too late. If the Soviets believed they could expand their influence with impunity, they may well do so next in the

developing struggle in Rhodesia. At the same time, however, Vance and Brown argued convincingly that Brzezinski's proposed CTF could prove counterproductive. Also, since, as they believed, the United States could not do anything substantial in the conflict, it would be counterproductive to link it to the SALT negotiations and should thus not even mention it.

It appears that Carter improved his final decision as a result of this debate. While he rejected Brzezinski's options for direct American involvement, he also rejected Vance's argument that the United States should not warn the Soviets of the possible negative consequences of their actions on US-USSR relations. Carter announced in the NSC meeting of February 23 that the United States must focus on giving greater public attention to the Soviet involvement in the Horn and the danger it raised for world tension.[60]

George and Hall's concern that policy advocacy by the custodian will "impede the free flow of information and advice to the president"[61] appears unfounded in this case. The custodian did not deny any advocate access to the decision forum. All the advocates had a relatively equal opportunity to make their case before the president. Also, the custodian continued to be an effective process manager, coordinating the paper flow as well as the various policy meetings among the advisors. Instead, the advocacy of the custodian challenged the consensus in the administration and provided the president with a better understanding of all the major aspects involved in the issue, which is indeed the

fundamental goal of the multiple advocacy strategy.

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE DECISION

While the decision-making process met the criteria of an optimal process, as defined by the multiple advocacy strategy, what can be said of the actual decision taken by Carter? The previous chapter showed that a deeply flawed decision-making process coincided with a poor decision, causing a serious policy setback for Carter. Though it is far more difficult to assess the present decision, it appears at least adequate, given the circumstances.

To Brzezinski, it comes as no surprise, the decision seemed badly flawed. With his popular line that "SALT lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden" he implied two things.[62] First, that the USSR saw Carter's decision as a sign of weakness and as an invitation to advance its interests. This resulted eventually in the invasion of Afghanistan. Second, that the US Senate saw it the same way and thus grew more suspicious of Carter's SALT negotiations. These arguments may be more or less convincing according to one's beliefs about Soviet behaviour. Several commentators accused Carter of appeasement and of giving away the idea of detente, while others lauded Carter for wisely avoiding an "African Bay of Pigs."[63]

These concerns aside, there is not much Carter could

have done that would have been better for American interests than doing nothing. Foremost, there was the problem with the staunch African belief in the inviolability of colonial borders. Somalia had violated this principle and was condemned by other African states even though its claim to the Ogaden was not entirely unfounded. However, Carter's Africa policy could not afford to question this principle. Second, by requesting Soviet help, after it had been invaded, Ethiopia applied a legitimate international practice. Even though Soviet aid was excessive and raised suspicions about a larger Soviet motive, any American aid to Somalia would have been condemned simply because Somalia was identified as the aggressor. Third, Brzezinski's idea of deploying a naval task force was unclear. Would the United States enter the war if Somalia was invaded or was it merely a deterrent? What was the use of this demonstration of force when Carter had clearly stated that he did not intend to enter into the conflict? Fourth, linking Soviet behaviour to the SALT negotiations would be risky for Carter since the Soviets could easily link Carter's human rights behaviour in turn. Moreover, it is possible that by this time Carter was more eager to complete SALT than the Soviets, since he had invested much time and public prestige in it. Fifth, although it is possible that the Ethiopians used their occasional contact with the United States to bargain for more Soviet aid and to lure it out of supplying arms to Somalia, the US administration thought it could still patch up its relations with Ethiopia.[64] Finally, the

administration could give covert aid to Somalia. Covert aid, however, was a foreign policy tool Carter had vowed to discontinue. Also, Congress, in the aftermath of Kissinger's policies towards Angola, was in no mood to lend its support to such activities. In light of all the problems associated with these options, Carter had little choice but to publicly condemn the USSR, while staying out of the conflict itself.

ENDNOTES

[1] The factual information in this section can be found in the following sources: Colin Legum and Bill Lee, "Crisis in the Horn of Africa," Africa Contemporary Record, New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1979-80, pp.46-57; Gerard Chaliand, "The Horn of Africa's Dilemma," Foreign Policy, No. 30, Spring 1978,pp.116-131; Robert F. Gorman, Political Conflict in the Horn of Africa, New York: Praeger, 1981; Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1976; Marina Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa, New York: Praeger, 1982; Mohammed Ayoob, The Horn of Africa: Regional Conflict and Superpower Involvement, Canberra: Australian National University, 1978; Congressional Digest, Vol. 57, 1978; Joseph Churba, The American Retreat, Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1984; Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980; Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, March 5, 1978, p.10.; Larry C. Napper, "The Ogaden War: Some Implications For Crisis Prevention," in Alexander L. George, Managing US-Soviet Rivalry, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983, pp.225-253.

[2] Tom J. Farer, "Dilemmas on the Horn," Africa Report, March 1977, p.2. Somalia was superior in its number of tanks, armored vehicles and aircraft. The two regular armies were nearly equal in number, though Ethiopia's militia was much larger. See table in Gorman (1981), p.66.

[3] Farer (1976), pp.144,145.

[4] New York Times, February 12, 1978, p.1.

[5] It was also reported that oil and gas had been found in the Ogaden: Farer (1976), p.147.

[6] Somalia denied its involvement in the Ogaden until February 1978.

[7] Although there is some evidence that Egypt and others were able to funnel some non US weapons to Somalia, these amounts were too small to make a decisive impact upon the war. Washington Post, February 17, 1978, p.26.

[8] The war was quite costly in human lives. An estimated 40,000 Somalis were dead or wounded as a result of the fighting. Ethiopian estimates are not available. Newsweek, February 20, 1978. pp.39-40

[9] Richard Deutsch, "Carter's Africa Record," African Report, March 1978, p.47.

[10] Carter announced a presidential directive on arms sales in May 1977. See Roger P. Labrie et. al., US Arms Sales

Policy Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1982

[11] Interview in Africa Magazine, No. 76, December 1977.p.24

[12] Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986, p.135.

[13] Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, p.70

[14] Interview in Africa Report, June 1977, p.19.

[15] Vance (1983), p.275.

[16] Deutsch (1978), p.50.

[17] Congressional Digest, Vol. 57, 1978, p.39.

[18] Official Somali sources claimed, in the fall of 1977, that the US had promised extensive military aid and was not strongly opposed to Somali claims to the Ogaden. It was reported that Barre's personal physician, an American, had been given these assurances in Washington. These accounts, however, appear suspect and self serving. Moreover, they have been denied by several top State Department officials and indeed appear contradictory to Carter's overall policy on arms transfers. See Newsweek, September 26, 1977; and Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman and Richard L. Sklar (eds.), African Crisis Areas and US Foreign Policy, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, p.196; Vance (1983), p.73.

[19] Vance (1983), p.73; Colin Legum and Bill Lee, The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis, New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1979, p.78; Henry Bienen, "US Foreign Policy in a Changing Africa," Political Science Quarterly, No.3, Fall 1978, p.453.

[20] Gorman (1981), p.116.

[21] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983, p.181.

[22] Brzezinski (1983), p.180.

[23] Vance (1983), p.87.

[24] Congressional Quarterly, January 28, 1978, p.215.

[25] Washington Post, February 22, 1978, p.14; New York Times, February 17, 1978, p.9; Brzezinski (1983), p.182;

[26] Washington Post, February 3, 1978, p.24; Christian Science Monitor, February 10, 1978, p.4; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p.283.

[27] Brzezinski (1983), p.182; Vance (1983), p.87; Elizabeth Drew, "A Reporter at Large," New Yorker, May 1, 1978, p.115.

[28] Brzezinski (1983), p.183.

[29] Idem, p.182; Vance (1983), p.85.

[30] Brzezinski (1983), p.183; Newsweek, March 13, 1978, p.38.

[31] Vance (1983), p.87; Drew (1978), p.115.

[32] Brzezinski (1983), p.183.

[33] Washington Post, March 2, 1978, p.23; Brzezinski (1983), p.182; Gorman (1981), p.193.

[34] Drew (1978), p.116; Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1985, p.88.

[35] Brzezinski (1983), p.183.

[36] Smith (1986), p.47; Washington Post, February 14, 1978, p.10; Brzezinski (1983), p.183; Newsweek, March 13, 1978, p.38.

[37] New York Times, March 13, 1978, p.10; Legum (1979), p.A73. Also, a memo from Brzezinski to Carter indicates that Carter made his final decision at about this time.

[38] E.g. see David S. McLellan, Cyrus Vance, New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985, p.52; Tad Szulc, The New Republic, March 18, 1978, p.14; Irving M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, p.220; Jerel A. Rosati, "The Impact of Beliefs on Behaviour: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration," in Donald A. Sylvan & Steve Chan (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision Making, New York: Praeger, 1984, p.184.

[39] Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980, p.197; David K. Hall, Implementing Multiple Advocacy in the National Security Council, Ph.D thesis, Stanford University,1982, p.82.

[40] Hall (1982), pp.79,716. George only discusses the first, George (1980), p.197.

[41] George (1980), p.10.

[42] Deutsch (1978), p.51.

[43] Washington Post, March 6, 1978, p.8.

[44] New York Times, March 21, 1978, p.16; Washington Post, March 6, 1978, p.8.

[45] Brzezinski (1983), p.184; Vance (1983), p.87.

[46] Carter (1982), p.194, M. Glenn Abernathy et al. (eds.), The Carter Years, London: Frances Pinter, 1984, p.97; U.S. Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs Hearings. May 12, 1978, p.8.

[47] Vance (1983), p.103.

[48] Brzezinski (1983), p.185.

[49] Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, March 11, 1978.

[50] Washington Post, March 2, 1978. See also Vance's private comments to Brzezinski: Brzezinski (1983), p.186.; Napper in George (1983), p.239.

[51] Coral Bell, "Virtue Unrewarded: Carter's Foreign Policy at Mid Term," International Affairs, No. 4, 1978.

[52] Drew (1978), p.123; Richard Rovere, "Affairs of State," New Yorker, June 12, 1978, p.108. See also Jody Powell's statement in Washington Post, March 2, 1978, p.21. See also Brzezinski's comment in an interview with George Urban, Encounter, May 1981, p.13.

[53] Brzezinski (1983), p.561.The memo was dated April 7, 1978.

[54] Rovere (1978), p.108; Washington Post, March 3, 1978 (editor's comment); Jody Powell in Washington Post, March 2, 1978, p.21; Brzezinski (1983), p.524; Hamilton Jordan, Crises, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1982, p.49; Interview with Brzezinski, Washington Quarterly, 1982, p.73.

[55] Hall (1982), p.61.

[56] George (1980), p.10; Hall (1982), p.62.

[57] Vance (1983), p.87, Brzezinski (1983), p.183.

[58] All these constitute criteria of an optimal decision-making process. George (1980), p.10.

[59] Carter (1982), p.283; Newsweek, March 3, 1978, p.41. Drew comments that there appeared no one in the administration, besides Brzezinski, who was concerned about the strategic importance of the Horn. Drew (1978), p.114.

[60] Washington Post, March 2, 1978, p.21.

[61] George (1980), p.196.

[62] Brzezinski (1983), p.189.

[63] Senator Jackson quoted in Fred Halliday, "US Policy in

the Horn of Africa: Aboulia or Proxy Intervention," Review of African Political Economy, No. 8, 1978, p.9; The New Republic, Tad Szulc, May 6, 1978, p.14; William H. Lewis, "US Debacle in the Horn," Washington Quarterly, Summer 1978, p.99; Coral Bell, President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue?, Canberra: Australian National University, 1982, p.66 condemned the decision. Several others who thought the decision a success include: Stanley Hoffmann, " The Hell Of Good Intentions," Foreign Policy, Winter 1977, pp.3-26; Bienen (1978), p.453; Destler et. al. (1984), p.74.

[64] The role of the major European States in this issue appears limited. Brzezinski reports that France wanted to see more active support for Somalia. However, Vance reports that the Europeans shared the American demand for OAU mediation in the war. In any case, the Europeans supported the American position officially and did not supply the Somalis with significant amounts of arms: Brzezinski (1983), p.179, Vance (1983), p. 85; Washington Post, February 8, 1978, p.24.

CHAPTER FIVE

NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

This chapter analyzes the process which led to Carter's decision to seek full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). While the Nixon administration had ended a long era of American isolation and containment of the PRC, Carter solved the considerable outstanding issues that prevented the two nations from having normalized relations.

As in the previous two administrations, the question during the Carter presidency was not whether to normalize relations but how and when. The issue of normalization involved three aspects of US-PRC relations: the strategic interests of the two nations, the relationship with Taiwan, and several bilateral issues between the United States and China. I will argue that the first aspect was by far the most important and contentious in the decision-making process and proved to be the crucial variable in achieving normalization.

Policy advocacy by the custodian widened the range of options considered by Carter and contributed to the achievement of normalization. Also, the custodian's adoption of a diplomatic role did not harm the process nor the execution of Carter's policy. Instead, this diplomatic activity was largely responsible for the achievement of normalization.

However, this case study also shows that the custodian violated several role tasks of the multiple advocacy strategy. In so doing, he undermined an optimal decision-making process. While these role violations did not prevent

the administration from achieving normalization, it did cause disarray in Carter's overall policy towards the PRC and the USSR.

THE BACKGROUND

Throughout the 1950's and 60's, US policy towards the PRC remained virtually unchanged.[1] The United States saw the communist government on the mainland as part of a monolithic communist threat that had to be contained and isolated. Close USSR-PRC cooperation in the 1950's as well as the Korean and Vietnam wars reinforced this belief.

In 1949,after the communist victory on the mainland, the United States refused to recognize the PRC and continued to view the nationalist regime on Taiwan as the legitimate government of China.[2] It protected and built up Taiwan as well as other friendly Asian nations to stop the spread of communism. Also, to counter Chinese ambitions, the United States entered into several mutual defense pacts with key Asian states and created the SEATO alliance. It was not uncommon for many American policy makers, during this era, to conceive of the PRC as the more aggressive of the two communist powers in Asia. Indeed, American defense strategy at the time allowed for the possibility of simultaneously fighting a European war with the Soviets and an Asian war with the Chinese.

It was not until the Nixon presidency that it was realized that most of the conditions on which the American fears were based had changed. The 1969 Ussuri River border clashes proved that Sino-Soviet relations were not merely cool but outright hostile. Now there appeared good strategic reasons for both sides to consider a rapprochement.

The Chinese leadership came to realize that the USSR had replaced the US as the gravest threat to their national security. The breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations in the early 60's was followed by frequent border clashes. Chinese anxiety about Soviet aggression grew when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. They feared a Soviet preemptive strike on their nuclear facilities. Also, the Soviets were making overtures to other Asian nations to form economic and security pacts designed to contain China. The United States, on the other hand, was embroiled in an Asian war from which it seemed eager to withdraw. In addition, the Nixon doctrine indicated to the Chinese that the United States was serious about scaling down its involvement in Asia.

The Nixon administration saw the Sino-Soviet split as an opportunity to increase its leverage against the USSR by improving its relations with the PRC. Moreover, improved relations with the PRC might help the US exit from the Vietnam war and establish a degree of stability in Asia after its withdrawal.

As a result of these shared strategic interests, both parties for the first time showed some degree of flexibility

on the Taiwan issue.[3] During the Warsaw talks in 1970, the United States stated that the Taiwan issue was an internal Chinese affair which should be solved, though peacefully, by the Chinese only. In turn, the Chinese acknowledged that Sino-American relations could improve to a certain degree before the Taiwan issue was solved. In the Shanghai Communique, the Chinese stated that it was possible to share certain strategic objectives despite the disagreement on Taiwan. The Americans pledged to withdraw eventually from Taiwan and to recognize the PRC as the sole and legal China.

This rapprochement brought about a constant strategic dialogue and increased bilateral trade and scientific exchanges. In 1973, liaison offices were opened in Beijing and Washington, which in effect functioned as unofficial embassies.

Yet, the relationship was still marred by considerable tension, and cooled shortly after Nixon's 1972 visit to the PRC. The Chinese became uneasy about the American pursuit of detente with the USSR and its slowness in disengaging from Taiwan. Indeed, future years would show that the PRC became inflexible and uncooperative when it perceived the United States as seeking detente too eagerly, and when the United States prodded for progress on normalization without breaking official links with Taiwan. The Chinese were critical of the SALT I accord, the Basic Principles agreement, and increased Soviet purchases of Western technology. They criticized the US for using its relations with the PRC as a means to improve US-USSR relations. They

accused the US of appeasement since they believed that the USSR was insincere in its pursuit of detente. In fact, they were probably afraid that a US-USSR detente would enable the USSR to redeploy its European forces in Asia.

After Nixon's resignation, whom the Chinese had hoped would normalize relations during his second term, relations deteriorated further. They perceived Ford and Kissinger as putting detente far ahead of US-PRC normalization. The Vladivostok accord, the Helsinki treaty and the resignation of the hawkish Secretary of Defense Schlesinger were seen as evidence of this allegation. As a result, the strategic dialogue almost collapsed. During his 1975 visit to Beijing, Ford and Deng Xiaoping disagreed on their individual policies towards the USSR and their overall strategic objectives. Deng was particularly concerned with the weak American response to Soviet activities in Angola and the Middle East.

The deterioration in the strategic realm of Sino-American relations was combined with increased tension on the Taiwan issue. The "loss" of Vietnam in 1975 prevented Ford from speeding up the American disengagement from Taiwan. The Reagan challenge, in the election year, forced Ford to be uncompromising on his commitment to Taiwan. Moreover, during this period, Congress allowed Taiwan to open several additional consulates in the US and to purchase a new series of jet fighters.

To make matters worse, both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai died in 1976. These leaders had been the cornerstones of the

Chinese rapprochement policy. It took until the spring of 1977 before the moderates, under Deng Xiaoping, were able to stave off the challenge of the radicals,who opposed any Sino-American cooperation. This reminded American officials that Chinese pragmatism and moderation should not be taken for granted.

CARTER'S BELIEFS AND OBJECTIVES TOWARDS CHINA

Carter entered office with the belief that several opportunities for American policy towards Asia could now be grasped. The end of the Vietnam war and the continuing Sino-Soviet split provided the United States with the opportunity to further disengage from Asia, while upgrading its relations with the PRC. He believed the Watergate scandal had prevented Nixon from completing the Sino-American rapprochement and intended to finish what Nixon had begun.[4]

During the election campaign, Carter was politically astute enough not to alienate the influential Taiwan lobby. His official China policy was based on an affirmation of the Shanghai Communique and a pledge to normalize relations, as long as it did not endanger the security and freedom of the people of Taiwan. The China issue did not receive much attention during the campaign and neither of the candidates was pressed to spell out his specific timetable or conditions for normalization.[5]

In an informal policy discussion shortly after the election, Carter and Vance agreed that the administration should, at an early date, indicate its intent to seek full diplomatic relations with the PRC. However, the two men also agreed that the issue was not a priority, should be carefully treated in light of the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue, and should not adversely affect Sino-American relations.[6]

A preliminary NSC meeting, on January 5 1977, revealed that the other advisors agreed on the desirability of normalization.[7] However, during this meeting, the advisors identified several other issues as taking priority over normalization. During its first months, the administration set out to negotiate a SALT II treaty, transfer ownership of the Panama Canal, seek a solution for peace in the Middle East and formulate an overall human rights policy.[8]

After the first disappointing initiatives on SALT and the Middle East, Carter instructed Brzezinski to set in motion a review of Sino-American negotiations under Nixon and Ford, and the interagency process of preparing options for a Presidential Review Memorandum on China (PRM 24).[9] Until this point, Carter had no clear notion what the American position should be on the various issues involved in the negotiations.[10]

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

PRM 24 was completed in June 1977. It provided a policy background from which the advisors could make recommendations to the president. The principal authors of PRM 24 were Romberg, Roy, and Abramowitz. The PRM was written under DOS supervision with State chairing the PRC meetings on the subject. They gathered policy options from the various departments and organized them into three subject areas: Taiwan, bilateral issues such as trade, technology transfers and military exchanges, and Sino-American strategic relations.[11]

Concerning Taiwan, the State Department recommended that the United States accept the three conditions for normalization put forward by the PRC in 1973. The PRC demanded that the US break all official ties with Taiwan, immediately abrogate its defense treaty with Taiwan, and withdraw all its military installations and personnel. The US could accept these terms if the PRC allowed it to continue to have unofficial economic, social and political relations with Taiwan and if it could terminate its defense treaty with Taiwan in accordance with the provisions within that treaty,i.e. on a one year's notice. Furthermore, the United States must be able to continue to sell "selective defensive arms" to Taiwan after the termination of the treaty and the PRC must state its intent to solve the Taiwan issue peacefully.[12] None of the other agencies disagreed

substantively with these conditions.[13]

Concerning bilateral technological and military issues, the Department of Defense recommended that Carter allow the sale of some dual use technology and permit some degree of military/ security cooperation between the US and the PRC simultaneous with or even prior to normalization.[14] The State Department disagreed with this recommendation. It argued that the Sino-American relationship was too uncertain to warrant such a degree of cooperation and that it would produce a strong backlash in Soviet-American relations. It also believed that Sino-American trade should not expand too quickly.

Moreover, the State Department believed that normalization should in no way be construed as an anti-Soviet move. It argued that a close strategic relationship between the United States and China would cause the Soviets to abandon their policy of detente. As a result, the USSR might stiffen its position in the SALT negotiations and intensify its conflict with the PRC.[15] The State Department did not think the United States could or should use its relations with China to pressure the USSR.

On June 27 1977, Carter's principal advisors met in a Policy Review Committee meeting to discuss PRM 24 and to prepare recommendations for the president.[16] The advisors agreed on the conditions concerning Taiwan. However, the disagreement in PRM 24 concerning bilateral security relations continued between Vance and Brown. Brown was less concerned about a Sino-American strategic dialogue than

concrete military cooperation to enhance US defense. He favoured such cooperation with or without normalization and proposed the sale of dual use technology and the exchange of military attaches. Vance argued strongly against this option:

> I was persuaded that any assistance we or our allies could feasibly provide would be limited and would make little difference in China's overall military capabilities. Because of the Soviet's excessive fear of China, however, any US security cooperation with Beijing would have serious repercussions on US-Soviet relations.[17]

While Brzezinski supported Brown's argument on bilateral security measures (also called collateral measures during this debate), he recommended that the US engage the PRC in an overall strategic dialogue to make American and Chinese interests more compatible. In essence, Brzezinski proposed that the United States improve its relations with the PRC, and at the same time pressure the Soviets to be more forthcoming on Soviet-American issues. While Brzezinski intended to use better Sino-American relations as a means to influence Soviet policy, he also foresaw an enduring relationship between the two states. In this sense, Brzezinski's plan was less a tactical ploy (playing the "China Card") than Kissinger's endeavors in the late 1960's. Brzezinski believed that American policy would be facilitated by closer strategic relations with the PRC and for that reason favoured rapid progress towards normalization: "Perhaps if the Soviets worry a little more

about our policy towards China, we will have less cause to worry about our relations with the Soviets."[18]

Vance disagreed with this reasoning. He argued that the US should confine its relations with the PRC to a narrow diplomatic sphere. Trade and other bilateral exchanges should expand only gradually over time.[19] During the meeting it also became evident that Vance was more cautious about normalization than his own China experts in the State Department. Vance expected that the Chinese would want to proceed slowly with normalization. The United States, in turn, should also proceed slowly, making sure that the strategic and regional balance of power would not be upset.[20]

On July 30, Carter met with Vance, Brown, Brzezinski, Richard Holbrooke (Assistant Secretary Pacific and East Asian Affairs) and Michel Oksenberg (NSC staff aide) to discuss the proposed options.[21] Persuaded by Vance's worry about Soviet-American relations and particularly SALT II, Carter rejected Brown's recommendation for increased collateral measures and Brzezinski's option to seek a strategic understanding with the PRC against the USSR. But the president also decided to move towards normalization far more rapidly than Vance intended. Carter approved the conditions concerning Taiwan, as outlined in PRM 24, and instructed Vance to use them as the framework for negotiations.[22]

Having rejected Brown and Brzezinski's suggestions for closer strategic Sino-American relations, Carter believed he

merely needed to face the tough political decision to change the status of Taiwan. This, Carter was prepared to do:

> The president told Vance to go directly to the issues (Taiwan) and to move as rapidly as is possible. He said his entire political experience has been that it does not pay to prolong or postpone difficult issues.[23]

Brzezinski, however, raised the concern that the Chinese may be less than forthcoming if the United States confines its approach to the Taiwan issue. Moreover, a narrow Sino-American relationship would allow the Taiwan issue to poison the atmosphere. In his memoirs, Brzezinski notes that he was worried that Vance's scheduled visit to China, in August, would fail as a result of Carter's incomplete approach to the PRC.[24] However, since Carter had already rejected Brown and Brzezinski's alternative or supplementary approaches, and since he at least agreed that normalization should be sought promptly, Brzezinski did not object strongly to Carter's decision or clearly warn him of the possibility of a setback in Sino-American relations.

Carter instructed his advisors to prepare a draft communique in case the Chinese responded favourably to Vance's proposals. On August 17, just five days before Vance's trip to the PRC, Vance, Brzezinski and Carter discussed the draft communique.[25] However, during this meeting, Carter was far less enthusiastic about pursuing normalization rapidly. Brzezinski reports that since the July 30 meeting, Mondale and Jordan had warned Carter that

now was not the time to deal with the controversial Taiwan issue.[26] It was now clear that the Panama Canal Treaties would face serious opposition in Congress and that the administration could not afford to alienate further the conservative senators in Congress. While Carter still wanted Vance to make progress towards normalization, he now instructed him to proceed more cautiously and to prod the Chinese for further concessions on Taiwan.[27] Publicly, the trip was called merely "exploratory." As a result, Brzezinski noted, Vance went to Beijing with a somewhat "ambivalent US position."[28]

VANCE'S TRIP TO CHINA

Carter's last minute hesitations about pursuing normalization suited Vance fine. He had been unenthusiastic about it since he feared it would harm the administration's most valued initiative: SALT.[29] Carter's instruction to probe the Chinese for further concessions on Taiwan was exploited by Vance to the fullest: "for political reasons, I intended to represent a maximum position to the Chinese on the Taiwan issue."[30] Although PRM 24 had argued that the United States should accept unofficial relations with Taiwan upon recognition of the PRC, Vance proposed to the Chinese that the United States keep an official Liason office on Taiwan.[31] The Chinese considered this a retreat from the

Nixon and Ford position and, as a result, did not want to discuss the Taiwan issue seriously. Indeed, Vance had expected this: "I did not expect the Chinese to accept our proposal, but I felt it wise to make, even though we might eventually have to abandon it."[32]

Vance appeared also unwilling to engage the Chinese in a meaningful strategic dialogue, something to which they had been accustomed during Kissinger's time. Vance based his strategic discussions on the optimistic elements of Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 10.[33] This PRM analyzed the overall balance between American and Soviet military, economic and political resources. The State Department's version concluded that while Soviet and American military forces were roughly equal, the long term economic and political trend was in favor of the United States.[34] Furthermore, Vance told the Chinese that the Carter administration was serious about detente and the SALT negotiations.

The Chinese were taken quite aback by this presentation.[35] Deng's ascent to the leadership was based partly on the moderates' belief that the Soviet Union was quickly becoming the strongest superpower and that the PRC should pursue a closer relationship with the US. Vance's presentation challenged this belief. Indeed, if the balance of power was in favor of the US, why should the PRC be concerned about Soviet expansionism and why should it even want closer relations with the United States?

Inadvertently, Vance strengthened China's perception

that Carter did not recognize the Soviet threat and valued detente far above Sino-American normalization.[36] Chinese unease about Vance's approach was evident in the little time the crucial Chinese leaders (Vice Chairman Deng and Premier Hua Guofeng) spent with him. Indeed, Vance did not even present all the American conditions on Taiwan and never mentioned the American draft communique.[37] As a result, the Chinese felt that the Carter administration was not yet prepared to solve the Taiwan issue. Upon Vance's return, both sides acknowledged that little progress had been made. American officials stated privately that, besides the little progress on Taiwan, Vance's trip had failed to produce any Sino-American understanding on strategic views and interests.[38] During an interview in 1982, Carter admitted "that the secretary of State had returned without accomplishing his mission."[39] In an interview in early September, Deng went as far as to say that Vance's visit had actually been a setback to Sino-American relations.[40]

EVALUATING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND OUTCOME

An analysis of the decision-making process shows that the NSC interagency apparatus provided the president with sufficient information on which to base his decision. The negotiating record of Nixon and Ford was reviewed and a comprehensive PRM was prepared on the subject. As a result

of this process, two different approaches were suggested on how to improve relations with the PRC.

In addition to Vance, the China specialists in the State Department recommended that Carter confine his relations with the Chinese to a narrow bilateral sphere, avoiding the pursuit of any shared interests against the USSR. Holbrooke and other state officials also believed that the United States could proceed rapidly with normalization since there was no internal disagreement on the conditions concerning Taiwan. Vance, being anxious about SALT, wanted to move more slowly.

A quite distinct approach was offered by Brown. The Defense Department was less concerned about normalizing relations than finding ways to enhance the American defense posture, and thus advocated bilateral military and technological measures as a way of improving the relationship.

Although the State Department was aware of the option of using improved Sino-American relations to influence the USSR, it offered only an analysis against doing so. It was Brzezinski who emphasized its advantages to the United States. In so doing, he widened the debate and improved the decision-making process. Although he contributed his analysis to the debate, Brzezinski did not attempt to stifle the positions of the other advisors or to reduce their access to Carter and the decision forum. Carter decided on his China policy after receiving all the options and their expected consequences from his advisors.

However, the process also reveals two shortcomings on the part of the custodian. Carter partly reversed and greatly confused his decision when his domestic advisors warned him of the impending political battle on the Panama Canal treaties. Had the domestic advisors been involved in the decison-making process earlier, this reversal might have been prevented. It is the custodian's role to ensure that all relevant advisors be part of the process. Brzezinski failed to fulfil this aspect of his role. Second, as a result of Carter's reversal, Brzezinski realized that Vance's instructions were now ambivalent and might well produce a negative response from the Chinese. If so, Carter's China policy would suffer a serious setback similar to the failed Vance trip to Moscow in March of 1977. It is part of the role task of the custodian to alert the president when he beliefs "existing policy may be failing."[41] Brzezinski noted his worry about a possible disappointment in Beijing if Vance proceeded with an incomplete commitment on the part of the United States, and reiterated that the United States should consider several alternative approaches short of normalization.[42] However, Carter had already publicly stated that Vance would travel to China and Brzezinski did not object very strongly. Perhaps he feared that his warnings would cause Carter to abandon the initiative altogether.

Vance's trip failed for two reasons. As a result of Carter's wavering, Vance offered a maximalist stand on Taiwan. Oksenberg noted that as a result of Carter's

hesitations, Vance "built some room for maneuver into his earlier leaner presentation."[43] The Chinese were especially disappointed about Vance's proposal to continue a liaison office on Taiwan. Oksenberg, who travelled in Vance's party, noted that: "The Chinese fastened upon this portion of Vance's presentation, claiming it was a retrogression from Ford's earlier statements on the issue."[44]

However, the Taiwan issue was not the only stumbling block. As Nixon and Kissinger had shown many times in the past, the Chinese could be flexible on Taiwan if they sensed a larger purpose in Sino-American relations.[45] Vance not only failed to provide a strategic rationale for Sino-American relations but actually argued that such a relationship was neither necessary nor wanted by the United States. Yet, there was ample evidence of Chinese signals for a closer relationship. In 1977, Several influential American visitors to the PRC were informed of this Chinese desire.[46] Also, the PRC made several conciliatory remarks about Taiwan during this time.[47] Indeed, the head of the Chinese Liaison office in Washington had told Carter, in the Spring of 1977, that the PRC was ready to move on normalization after Carter informed him that he intended to send Vance in the fall of 1977 to the PRC "to find a common formula" for normalization.[48]

The flawed decision-making process did contribute to the failure. In light of Carter's political hesitations, Vance's trip should have been cancelled or his instructions changed completely. What prevented the administration from

negotiating in secret with the Chinese? Indeed, it did so in 1978. However, Carter also learned that the Chinese could not be prodded without a strategic dialogue. The next section will show that Carter reconsidered Brzezinski's option. When Vance returned, Carter put the issue on the backburner. None of his advisors spent much time on it until the Panama Canal Treaties were ratified in the spring of 1978.[49]

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS CONTINUED

Shortly after Vance's return from China, the Chinese indicated privately that they wished to continue the talks. Vance, however, recommended to Carter that "we should stick to our course, and that we should not imply that we would move any faster on normalization than we actually could."[50] In the fall of 1977, aware of his harsher attitude towards the USSR and his greater commitment to Sino-American relations, the Chinese invited Brzezinski to visit the PRC.[51] Brzezinski was very eager to accept the invitation:

> My own talks with the Chinese convinced me that I was the top official in the Carter administration in whom they had genuine confidence and whose strategic perspectives to some extent they shared. Accordingly, I truly believed that a trip by me would be helpful in giving a new impulse to the stagnating relationship, and that this in turn could pave the way for normalization.[52]

Vance objected to Brzezinski's travel plans. He feared that Brzezinski would push normalization too quickly, transform it into an anti-Soviet move, and thus endanger the SALT negotiations. Moreover, the trip would bring into question the role of the Secretary of State as the official spokesman for the administration.[53] From late 1977 to early 1978, both advisors urged Carter to accept their position.[54] The debate did not take place in an open forum with all the advisors present, but in the form of private petitions to Carter. Brzezinski even asked Brown and Mondale to lobby on his behalf. Vance suggested that Mondale go instead. Carter rejected this suggestion, fearing that it might raise expectations about a Sino-American breakthrough.

In March 1978, with the Panama Canal Treaties ratified, Carter finally decided on the matter.[55] In light of aggressive Soviet behaviour in Africa and several setbacks in the SALT negotiations, Carter was willing to improve Sino-American relations and gave permission for Brzezinski's trip. Upon some private prodding by Brzezinski, Carter decided to ask Vance to concentrate on SALT, while Brzezinski would focus on China.[56]

During that same month, Carter's advisors met several times to discuss American policy towards China.[57] Brown and Brzezinski reiterated their position that the US should show its goodwill by allowing some dual use technology transfers to the PRC and by lifting its objection to arm sales by other nations. Vance still maintained that such measures were inappropriate. Concerning Taiwan, they agreed that

Brzezinski would spell out the American position formulated in PRM 24. While the advisors discussed some limited collateral measures and the conditions concerning Taiwan, no mention was made of tying Sino-American strategic interests closer together.

On May 16, Carter met with his advisors to review his policy on China and to discuss Brzezinski's upcoming trip to the PRC.[58] A memorandum from the State Department was discussed which argued that there now was a "window of opportunity" to seek normalization. It would occur between the fall congressional elections and the SALT ratification process. All agreed on this timing. Carter rejected Vance's advice against collateral measures and instructed Brzezinski to tell the Chinese that some technology transfers would go ahead and that the United States would be "neutral" about third party military sales. Furthermore, if the Chinese were prepared to move ahead on Taiwan, Brzezinski was instructed to tell them that the American representative in Beijing would start the negotiations shortly after Brzezinski's trip. Carter expressed the hope of achieving normalization by the end of the year.

While the issues of Taiwan and the collateral measures were discussed in an open forum and decided on in the presence of all the relevant advisors, it appears that Brzezinski and Carter discussed the strategic aspect of Sino-American relations privately.[59] During these discussions, Brzezinski argued that the USSR had violated the spirit of detente in several instances. More so than in

1977, the United States should now apply pressure on the Soviets by playing the China card.[60] Carter agreed that Brzezinski should explore common ground between the two nations in their opposition to the USSR. Brzezinski prepared a secret presidential instruction for his trip which outlined the contents of his mission.[61] The instruction memorandum focused on the strategic aspect of Sino-American relations and emphasized the convergence of Sino-American interests. One passage stated:

> The United States and China share certain common interests and we have parallel, long-term strategic concerns. The most important of these is our common opposition to global or regional hegemony by any single power. This is why your visit is not tactical; it is an expression of our strategic interest in a cooperative relationship with China...[62]

The memorandum instructed Brzezinski to emphasize American determination to respond to "Soviet aggression" and allowed him to explore avenues where the PRC and the US might cooperate in that pursuit. Carter approved the memorandum and stated to Brzezinski that:

> ...he would like to move rapidly, and I should tell the Chinese so. He says he doesn't want to play games behind Cy's back, but he would prefer to tell this to me directly. And if I find the opportunity to move, I should move.[63]

In effect, Brzezinski's trip had become far more substantial than initially intended. It appears that Vance

and others were not aware that its main purpose was no longer the Taiwan issue.[64] Vance was not kept informed adequately that Carter and Brzezinski were secretly laying the groundwork for a Sino-American understanding against the USSR.

BRZEZINSKI'S TRIP, NORMALIZATION AND A POLICY IN DISARRAY

Brzezinski based his talks on the "common strategic interests" of the two nations.[65] In his opening and closing toasts, he emphasized the shared Sino-American opposition to "hegemony." Hegemony, as well known by Brzezinski, is the Chinese code word for Soviet foreign policy.[66] A passage in his opening toast stated: "We recognize and share China's resolve to resist the efforts of any nation which seeks to establish global or regional hegemony."[67] Brzezinski's visit was characterized by an effort to make Sino-American strategic interests parallel. He briefed the Chinese extensively on SALT, Carter's overall strategic policy and American policy in Africa and the Middle East.[68] Deng and Brzezinski's strategic discussions resembled the close understanding that had characterized Kissinger and Zhou Enlai's meetings. However, Deng and Brzezinski were willing to pull the relationship much closer. The Chinese had recently rejected Soviet overtures for a new dialogue. Moreover, they feared the developing strategic relationship

between the USSR and Vietnam.[69] Deng was delighted to see a stronger American stand against the USSR. The two discussed ways in which they could counter Soviet expansionism in South Asia and Africa. Brzezinski argued: "We have been allies before, we should cooperate again in the face of a common threat... the emergence of the USSR as a global power."[70]

Furthermore, Brzezinski announced that the United States would allow the transfer of some types of technology and would no longer object to European arms sales to the PRC. Concerning Taiwan, Brzezinski stated that the United States accepted the three conditions laid out by the Chinese and that it was now prepared finally to bring the issue to a conclusion.[71] Deng immediately accepted Brzezinski's offer to start official negotiations through the American representative in Beijing. Deng appeared quite conciliatory on Taiwan. He indicated that the PRC considered Taiwan "a minor problem that will be solved by history."[72] Deng was also prepared to stop the constant flow of Chinese public criticism of American foreign policy.[73]

The American and Chinese press agreed that the visit had been highly successful.[74] Carter noted that the Chinese had enjoyed "the strategic and philosophical discussions with Zbig" and that Brzezinski had laid the groundwork for normalization:

> Until this time, the contacts between Washington and Beijing had followed the pattern of the previous six years. Now, however, we were ready to begin our substantive negotiations towards a final

agreement.[75]

Although Brzezinski's trip paved the way for normalization, Vance was alarmed at the degree to which the trip had been cast into an anti-Soviet mold. Brzezinski had not taken any reporters along but his repeated use of the word "hegemony" became well known. Vance registered his concerns with Carter. However, it appears that Carter was unwilling to open the debate again. Although Carter told Vance that his approach to the USSR and the PRC remained "evenhanded," the contradictory activities of Vance and Brzezinski were beginning to cause disarray in Carter's overall policy.[76] Brzezinski's trip to the PRC was generally seen as an example of playing the China card. Vance, however, reassured the Soviets that it was not. To show this, Vance had scheduled a meeting between Carter and Gromyko during Brzezinski's visit to the PRC. Just before his departure, Brzezinski lobbied Carter privately to postpone the meeting.[77] Furthermore, the State Department, during this time, made significant progress in normalizing relations with Vietnam. Again Brzezinski lobbied Carter to halt this process since it would displease the Chinese.[78]

Shortly after Brzezinski's return, Carter decided to conduct the negotiations in secret.[79] To assure such secrecy, Carter set up a White House team composed of Vance, Brzezinski, Oksenberg and Holbrooke to monitor and guide the US representative in his talks. In addition to this channel, Carter allowed Brzezinski to continue the strategic dialogue

with the Chinese representative in Washington. It appears that Vance was not aware of the extent of these private contacts by Brzezinski.[80] Carter himself reviewed all the instructions that were formulated by his White House team.[81] For fear of leaks,as well as raising high expectations, Carter rejected Vance and Holbrooke's request to brief Congress on the negotiations.[82]

On December 4, 1978, the US representative reported that a compromise on Taiwan was imminent.[83] The United States was prepared to break official relations with Taiwan, terminate the defense treaty and withdraw all its military installations and personnel. In return, the Chinese agreed that the United States could maintain unofficial economic, social and cultural relations with Taiwan. Furthermore, they agreed that the United States could terminate its defense treaty on a one year's notice and that it could continue to sell defensive arms to Taiwan. However, the PRC would express its disagreement with such sales. In addition, the PRC would not publicly assure a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue but would also not contradict the American statement that the United States expected the issue to be solved peacefully.[84]

While Carter had initially intended to seek normalization by January 1979, he now decided to move the date of the announcement to December 15.[85] A last minute roadblock in the negotiations occurred on December 13. The Chinese requested that the United States sell no arms to Taiwan during the one year notice term of the defense

treaty. Brzezinski met immediately with the Chinese representative in Washington and solved the controversy by promising that the United States would sign no new contracts during this period.[86]

On December 13, Carter instructed Vance to cut short his diplomatic mission in the Middle East for the impending announcement. Vance came home complaining that he had not been consulted on several issues during the last stages of the negotiations.[87] Again, Carter's overall policy towards the PRC and the USSR appeared in disarray. Vance complained that he had arranged a major meeting on SALT for the last week of December since Carter had originally set the announcement date of normalization for January 1, 1979.[88] Now that the normalization date was put before the SALT meeting, Vance expected the USSR to be annoyed about the timing of the two events. Furthermore, Carter and Brzezinski had invited Deng to visit the United States in January 1979. Again, this invitation contradicted the administration's original goal to have a meeting between Carter and Brezhnev in early 1979. Certainly, Brezhnev was not going to take second place to Deng! Meanwhile, however, Carter continued to say that his approach was evenhanded. Finally, over Vance's objection, Carter allowed Brzezinski to insert the word "hegemony" into the final communique.[89] This communique prompted a sharp Soviet condemnation of Carter's handling of the normalization issue. Clearly, Carter's China policy was beginning to compromise his objective to complete the SALT II treaty and to pursue a policy of detente with the USSR.

It is unclear to what extent Carter realized the disarray, but it is clear that Brzezinski had strayed far from his custodial tasks.

EVALUATING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND OUTCOME: PART II

It was Brzezinski who reopened the decision-making process in early 1978. He believed there now appeared even better reasons for building a Sino-American strategic relationship. However, he was less interested in getting the administration to debate the issue than in taking personal control of it. The president and his advisors considered the conditions concerning Taiwan as well as the collateral measures in a discussion forum which resembled the multiple advocacy strategy. However, the crucial strategic aspect of Sino-American relations was left out of the debate. Instead, Brzezinski pursued this topic privately with Carter. Carter and Brzezinski reached a mutual understanding that Brzezinski should bring Sino-American strategic interests closer together. This option was not openly discussed and the other advisors were not informed that Carter had decided to pursue it.

The multiple advocacy strategy identifies this type of custodial behaviour as a clear role violation. Specifically, Hall describes this behaviour as violating the fairness and competition principles of multiple advocacy.[90] As to the

fairness condition, the custodian is required to keep the decision forum open to all relevant advisors. Brzezinski's private consultations with Carter were meant to exclude Vance as well as others. Although the issues had been discussed in 1977, Brzezinski sought a reconsideration of the options and of Carter's decision and thus should have reopened the full decision-making process. According to the competition principle, the custodian is required to "elevate substantial conflict among the advisors to the president" by organizing meetings in which the president can hear all sides to an issue. Brzezinski knew that Vance opposed the strategic connection as well as his visit to the PRC. By trying to circumvent Vance's advocacy, Brzezinski sought to enhance his own position. As a result, Vance lobbied privately against Brzezinski's trip, since he was aware of it, but was successfully excluded from the strategic debate. In all likelihood, Vance believed Carter had not substantially changed his policy of 1977 not to play the China card.

The president, as a result of these custodial violations, did not hear a variety of options or arguments why he should now seek a strategic relationship which he had rejected in 1977. All he heard were Brzezinski's reasons that it was important. The president was shielded from the debates which had characterized the decision-making process on the "Deep Cuts" proposals in early 1977 and the "Horn of Africa" crisis in early 1978. Such a debate, the multiple advocacy strategy argues, brings to the open the values and

assumptions that lie behind the options. As a result, the president will be able to make a better choice.

Moreover, the custodial violations left Carter with a policy decision unknown to several of his key advisors. Brzezinski did not bring it to the attention of the other advisors and did not facilitate a discussion on it so as to give the other advisors a chance to challenge it. As a consequence, the disarray in the decision-making process was followed by a disarray in substantive policy. Vance and Brzezinski pursued different decisions that were not only uncoordinated but often contradictory. While Brzezinski "played the China card," Vance claimed publicly that the adminstration "did not try to develop ties with China in order to pressure or punish the USSR."[91] While Brzezinski and Deng discussed ways to "contain" Vietnam, Vance and the State Department pursued the normalization of US-Vietnam relations. Even the timetables of the two men clashed. Vance's scheduled meeting between Carter and Gromyko and his SALT meeting in late December collided with major Sino-American developments. Obviously, the USSR became quite annoyed about this "heavy handed" approach. As a result, the SALT negotiations were delayed further and Soviet-American relations deteriorated rapidly.[92]

Although the custodial violations caused a divided and fragmented overall policy, Carter scored an important foreign policy success by normalizing Sino-American relations. This success was largely due to Brzezinski's diplomacy. Brzezinski's strategic dialogue with the Chinese

provided the needed incentive for a compromise on Taiwan.[93]

As with public speaking, the multiple advocacy strategy states that custodial diplomacy will harm the decision-making process and as a result reduce the likelihood of a successful decision. However, Hall found that custodial diplomacy per se need not harm the decision-making process.[94] Occasional "fact finding" trips or contacts with foreign diplomats will not undermine the custodian's role. But, when the custodian engages in frequent diplomatic activity on substantial issues, he might be unwilling to call for a review of the president's policy. Hall's analysis of the decision-making process of the last seven American administrations reveals that only during Kissinger's tenure did custodial diplomacy undermine the decision-making process. Indeed, it undermined the process only because it occurred simultaneously with other custodial role violations. Specifically, the process was flawed because the other participants were deliberately excluded from the decision-making process. Hall's analysis shows that the decision-making process suffered less because of the custodian's diplomacy than as a result of the blocking of access of the other advisors. Hall does not prove that the custodial violations resulted directly from his diplomatic role.

This case study confirms most of Hall's findings. Brzezinski's trip to China was his first substantial diplomatic undertaking.[95] The trip itself did not bring Carter's overall policy into disarray. Rather, it achieved

an important foreign policy success. Brzezinski's visit shows that the custodian may at times be a better communicator of the President's concerns and be more successful in implementing the president's policy. However, after receiving permission to travel to the PRC, Brzezinski went on to monopolize the decision-making process. This was by no means necessary to ascertain the success of his trip. Given Carter's concern about Soviet behaviour in Africa, Carter may well have decided in favour of seeking closer relations with China in a open decision forum. In so doing, Carter might have been able to decide to what extent he could play the China card without unravelling his policy of detente. Had Brzezinski insisted on a coordinated policy process, Carter might have achieved normalization as well as a coherent policy towards the USSR.

CONCLUSION

This case shows that the custodian went beyond his role of process manager and even beyond his role of a policy advocate. While the evolution of Brzezinski's role will be discussed in depth in the final chapter of this thesis, a few observations can be made here. Brzezinski's warnings and advice in the decision-making process on SALT II, the Horn of Africa and on Sino-American normalization in 1977 went unheeded by the administration. In all, Brzezinski was

virtually alone in challenging the consensus among Carter's advisors. When Vance's trip to the PRC failed and the United States had suffered several setbacks in SALT and in the Middle East, Brzezinski must have decided that the time had come to take more personal control. However, in so doing, he violated his custodial duties and undermined Carter's overall policy.

My three case studies indicate that the multiple advocacy process does not function well when the advocates fail to provide a wide range of options for the president. Contrary to the strategy's prescriptions, custodial advocacy improves the process when this occurs. Moreover, the strategy need not forbid all types of custodial public speaking or diplomatic involvement. These activities may at times enhance the implementation of the president's policy without necessarily compromising the decision-making process. However, the strategy is effectively undermined when the custodian violates the fairness and competition principles. The next chapter will further explore this last proposition.

ENDNOTES

[1] The analysis in this section is based on the following accounts: Golam W. Choudhury, China in World Affairs, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982; Greg O'Leary, The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy, London: Croom Helm, 1980; Gene T. Hsiao and Michael Witunski, Sino-American Normalization and Its Policy Implications, New York: Praeger, 1983; Robert G. Sutter, China Watch, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978; Frederick T. Chen (ed.), China Policy and National Security, New York: Transnational, 1984; Kenneth A. Oye et. al. (eds.), Eagle Defiant, Boston: Little, Brown, 1983; Michel Oksenberg, "A Decade of Sino-American Relations," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1982, pp.175-195; Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, Boston: Little, Brown, 1979; Martin L. Lasater, The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Strategic Relations, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984; Michel Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam (eds.), Dragon and Eagle, New York: Basic Books, 1978.; Jan-Ling Joanne Cheng, United States-China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy Decision-Making, Denver,Colorado: Monograph Series in World Affairs, Volume 22, Book 4, 1986

[2] The US and the PRC did from time to time engage in ambassadorial talks in Geneva and Warsaw but these did not produce any rapprochement.

[3] Choudhury (1982), p.70; Oksenberg (1982), p.177; Lasater (1984), p.153.

[4] Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p.187; Sam C. Sarkesian (ed.), Defense Policy and The Presidency: Carter's First Years, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, p.192.

[5] Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Hartford, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984, p.141. In the Shanghai Communique, the United States had acknowledged that there was only one China with Beijing as its legal government, that it intended to withdraw from Taiwan and normalize relations with Beijing and that it expected the Taiwan issue be solved peacefully by the Chinese.

[6] Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, p.32.

[7] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983, p.53; Department of State Bulletin, "Selected Statements," May , 1977.

[8] Vance (1983), p.75; Brzezinski (1983), p.81; Carter (1982), p.190.

[9] PRM 24 was commissioned on April 5, 1977.

[10] Robert G. Sutter, The China Quandary, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983, p.4; Newsweek, April 25, 1977, p.42. Brzezinski notes that he had set the goal of normalization for the end of 1978, Brzezinski (1983), p.197.

[11] PRM 24 was leaked in part to the New York Times, June 24, 1977, p.13. See also Oksenberg (1982), p.181; Brzezinski (1983), p.197; Vance (1983), p.77; Time, August 29, 1977, p.24; Banning N. Garrett, "The China Card: To Play Or Not to Play," Contemporary China, No.1, Spring 1979, p.4.

[12] Vance (1983), p.77; Washington Review, January 1978, p.100.

[13] Vance (1983), p.78; New York Times, June 24, 1977, p.3; Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985, p.694.

[14] Vance (1983), p.78; New York Times, June 24, 1977, p.1; Garnett (1979), p.4.

[15] Garnett (1979), p.4; Chen (1984), p.34, 35; Newsweek, August 29, 1977, p.33.

[16] Brzezinski (1983), p.200; Vance (1983), p.78; Oksenberg (1982), p.181.

[17] Vance (1983), p.78.

[18] Brzezinski (1983), p.200.

[19] Ibid., p.403; Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986, p.87.

[20] Vance (1983), p.449, 75; Newsweek, August 29, 1977, p.33; New Republic, January 13, 1979. p.11.

[21] Brzezinski (1983), p.201; Vance (1983), p.79; Oksenberg (1982), p.182.

[22] Carter (1983), p.191; Garthoff (1985), p.697; New Republic, January 13, 1979, p.11; Washington Post, August 17, 1977, p.27; Garrett in Oye (ed.), (1983), p.246.

[23] Brzezinski (1983), p.201.

[24] Brzezinski (1983), p.201. See also p.403. While this comment obviously serves to glorify his own role, it also shows that Brzezinski wanted Vance's trip to be successful.

[25] Carter (1982), p.191.

[26] Brzezinski (1983), p.20.; Oksenberg (1982), p.182, Washington Post, August 17, 1977, p.27; Jerome Chen, The US and Free China, Washington: Acropolis Books Ltd., 1983, p.214. See also Steve Barber in Far Eastern Economic Review,

August 26, 1977, p.10.

[27] Vance (1983), p.79; Carter (1982), p.191.

[28] Brzezinski (1983), p.201; Newsweek, September 5, 1977, p.16; Far Eastern Economic Review, September 9, 1977.

[29] Sutter (1983), p.4; Vance (1983), p.427,428; Smith (1986), p.87

[30] Vance(1983), p.79

[31] idem, p.79, Oksenberg (1982), p.182

[32] idem, p.79, Washington Post, September 7, 1977, pp.1,21; Oksenberg (1982), p.182; Lasater (1984), p.157.

[33] Garrett (1979), pp.4,5.

[34] It is unclear to the author to what extent Vance was instructed to brief the Chinese on PRM 10. Carter decided on this issue (PD 18) after Vance's trip and did not fully accept the optimistic recommendation of the State Department. PRM 10 is discussed in Sarkesian (1979), pp.120-132, M. Glenn Abernathy et. al. (eds.), The Carter Years, London: Frances Pinter, 1984, p.91. It was a collosal study to which at least 170 people from various agencies contributed. The State Department's analysis differed considerably from the more pessimistic analysis of Samuel P. Huntington from the NSC.

[35] Chen p.5, 6, Newsweek, June 5, 1978. Some Chinese experts in 1978 accused Vance of being anti Chinese! See Garrett (1979), p.6.

[36] Washington Post, September 5, 1977, p.21; New Republic, January 13, 1979, p.10; Oksenberg (1982), p.183.

[37] See Vance (1983), pp.81-83.

[38] Garrett in Oye (ed.), (1983), p.246.

[39] As quoted in Garthoff (1985), p.695.

[40] Washington Post, September 5, 1977, p.1. Vance claims that Deng's remark was prompted by a misleading press release by the White House that the talks had made some progress. However, Carter notes that he received "a mildly encouraging report" from Vance. Moreover, Chinese press reports during Vance's visit were also negative. See Vance (1983), p.83; Carter (1982), p.191; Brzezinski (1983), p.202.

[41] Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980, p.10.

[42] Brzezinski (1983), p.201.

[43] Oksenberg (1982), p.182.

[44] Idem. During the Nixon years, the Chinese had already mentioned that they would consider the "Japanese formula" for Sino-American normalization. This arrangement of 1972, allowed Japan to continue to have unofficial relations with Taiwan by means of a private institute. In light of this, Vance's maximalist stance was most disappointing to the Chinese. See: U.S.Congress.House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, "Recognizing the PRC," May 1979, p.VIII.

[45] Lasater (1984), p.153.

[46] Washington Post, August 23, 1977, p.17; Time, August 29, 1977.

[47] Oksenberg and Oxnam (eds.), (1978), p.269.

[48] Carter (1982), p.189; Washington Post, December 17, 1978, p.12.

[49] Carter (1982), p.192; Brzezinski (1983), p.202.

[50] Vance (1983), p.83.

[51] Brzezinski (1983), p.202; Oksenberg (1982), p.183; New Republic, January 13, 1979, p.10.

[52] Brzezinski (1983), p.206.

[53] Vance (1983), p.114. For the same reason, Vance also opposed a trip by Brown.; Time, April 10, 1978, p.14; Far Eastern Economic Review, May 19, 1978, p.24.

[54] Brzezinski (1983), pp.203, 204; US News and World Report, June 19, 1978, p.39; Vance (1983), p.114; Newsweek, May 8, 1978, p.49.

[55] Carter (1982), p.194; Brzezinski (1983), p.204; Garrett in Oye (ed.), (1983), p.247; Chen (1984), p.35.

[56] Brzezinski (1983), pp.189, 190.

[57] Idem.; Vance (1983), p.114.

[58] Carter (1982), p.194; Oksenberg (1982), p.184; Washington Post, June 22, 1978; Vance (1983), p.114; New York Times, May 18, 1978, p.6.

[59] Brzezinski (1983), p.207; Carter (1982), p.195.

[60] Brzezinski (1983), pp.202-204.

[61] Brzezinski (1983), Annex I.

[62] Brzezinski (1983), p.207.

[63] Idem. See also interview with Brzezinski in Encounter, May 1981, p.28 and Brzezinski's comments on "Meet the Press," May 28, 1978 in Department of State, "Selected Documents," Washington, 1977, p.39.

[64] Vance (1983), p.115.

[65] Encounter, (1981), p.28.

[66] Brzezinski (1983), p.207; Contemporary China, No.1, Spring 1979, pp.43-46; Oksenberg (1982), p.185; New York Times, May 21, 1978; D. P. Moynihan, Policy Review, Spring 1979.

[67] Department of State, "Selected Documents," Washington, 1979, p.38.

[68] Garrett (1979), p.3; Choudhury (1982), p.119; Garthoff (1985), p.704.

[69] Garrett (1979), p.8; Oksenberg (1982), p.185.

[70] Brzezinski (1983), p.211.

[71] Brzezinski (1983), pp.213, 214.

[72] Choudhury (1982), p.119; Washington Post, December 17, 1978, p.12; Brzezinski (1983), p.214; Garrett (1979), p.12.

[73] Carter (1982), p.196.

[74] US News and World Report, June 19, 1978, p.12; New Republic, January 6, 1979, p.10; Newsweek, June 5, 1978, p.61; Time, December 25, 1978, p.9.

[75] Carter (1982), pp.196,197.

[76] Vance (1983), pp.192,116; Brzezinski (1983), p.221

[77] Brzezinski (1983), p.208

[78] Carter (1982), p.195; Brzezinski (1983), p.228

[79] Carter (1982), p.197; Oksenberg (1982), p.185; Brzezinski (1983), pp.229,230; Irving M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, p.221.

[80] Oksenberg (1982), p.185; Washington Post, December 17,1978, p.12; Brzezinski (1983), pp.40, 41. In a meeting in January 1979, Vance complained to Carter that Brzezinski had contacts with the Chinese Mission in Washington beyond the knowledge of DOS.

[81] Carter (1982), p.197.

[82] Vance (1983), p.118.

[83] Oksenberg (1982), p.187; Time, December 25, 1978; Brzezinski (1983), pp.229,230.

[84] Shen (1983), p.229; New York Times, December 17, 1978, p.22; Carter (1982), p.197.

[85] Carter (1982), p.199; Oksenberg (1982), p.188. Again Carter made this move fearing that early leaks would prevent him from receiving the credit for this breakthrough.

[86] Brzezinski (1983), p.231; Carter (1982), p.198.

[87] Vance (1983), p.119; Carter (1982), p.199.

[88] Vance (1983), p.109; Garthoff (1985), p.709; Chen (1984), p.36.

[89] Vance (1983), p.110; Time, December 25, 1979, p.9.

[90] David K. Hall, Implementing Multiple Advocacy in the National Security Council 1947-1980, Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford University, 1982. p.61.

[91] Sutter (1983), p.4.; Jan-Ling Joanne Cheng (1986), p.114

[92] Garthoff (1985), p.709; Vance (1983), p.112; Brzezinski (1983), pp.418,419.

[93] Oksenberg (1982), p.183; Choudhury (1982), pp.117, 118; Smith (1986), p.89.

[94] Hall (1982), pp. 79 and 721-725. Hall also discusses Brzezinski's diplomatic role in the Iran crisis, see next chapter.

[95] Hall (1982), p.670. In his analysis of the Carter administration, Hall does not discuss the China visit as an example of custodial role violations.

CHAPTER SIX

THE FALL OF THE SHAH

This chapter examines the American response to the 1978-79 Iranian revolution which led to the fall of the shah. The replacement of America's strongest ally in the Persian Gulf with a hostile Islamic republic constituted one of the largest foreign policy setbacks for the Carter administration.

This chapter will show that a badly flawed decision-making process can explain, to a large extent, the ambiguous and ineffective American handling of this crisis. While the United States had a major interest in political stability in Iran as well as considerable influence in Iranian politics, it failed to provide clear guidance for the Shah and lost a militarily and economically important ally.

The custodian added a valuable perspective to the policy debate and offered the president an option, which none of the other advisors wanted to consider initially. However, his persistent advocacy hampered the president in his attempt to make a final policy choice. Moreover, he violated the process norms of the strategy by blocking several of Carter's advisors from the decision-making process. They could no longer get a fair hearing for their options and the president was shielded from substantial policy conflicts among them. In addition to these violations, the custodian attempted to influence the implementation of the president's policy by relaying personally the president's decisions to foreign officials. Quite often, these messages differed from the official messages communicated by the US embassy in Tehran.

Consequently, the government of Iran became confused about the actual American position. This chapter will show that the multiple advocacy strategy is correct in claiming that these types of custodial role violations produce a suboptimal decision-making process.

BACKGROUND

American influence in Iran dates back to the Second World War.[1] In 1941, Britain and the Soviet Union occupied Iran in order to prevent the Germans from encircling the Mediterranean and controling the Iranian oilfields. Moreover, the Allied forces intended to supply the USSR through its southern flank via Iran. The UK and the USSR divided the country into virtually two spheres of influence: the English in the south and the Soviets in the north. The occupying forces installed Mohammad Reza, the young son of the recently exiled Shah, as the head of a new puppet government.

It was this de facto rule by the UK and the USSR that prompted Iranian leaders to ask for American help in gaining independence. During the 1943 Tehran conference, Roosevelt promised the Iranians that he would support their independence as soon as the war was won. He got Churchill and Stalin to agree that all Allied forces would be withdrawn from Iran six months after the Axis powers

surrendered. Roosevelt hoped to make Iran an example of great power cooperation.

However, with the dawn of the Cold War, Iran became one of the tension points between the US and the USSR. Soon after the Allied victory, the USSR appeared reluctant to withdraw from Iran. It created "friendly republics" in the north and increased its troops. In response, the United States began to help the Iranian government by sending economic and military aid. Also, it warned the USSR that it intended to guarantee, by force if necessary, Iran's independence. By late 1946, the Soviets finally withdrew.

The Iranians then turned their attention to the British owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which controlled their oilfields. Negotiations were started to nationalize the AIOC. Soon after, the Iranians asked the United States to mediate in the dispute. While it put some pressure on the British to compromise, it did not want to challenge them in an area that was traditionally acknowledged as their sphere of influence. Moreover, British-American strategic cooperation elsewhere outweighed the cause of Iranian nationalism.

The resulting stalemate over the nationalization of oil production gave rise to the radicalization of Iranian politics. Although the constitution of 1906 stipulated that Iran was to be governed by a prime minister and cabinet, selected from the Iranian parliament (Majlis), and described the role of the monarch in terms similar to the constitutional monarchies in Europe, Reza Shah had always

ruled as an autocrat. When the Allies put his son on the throne, he had considerably less power than his father. In the years following the war, strong prime ministers set Iranian government policy and merely consulted the Shah.

In 1952, the strong nationalist tide in the Majlis forced the Shah to appoint the leader of the National Front coalition, Mossadegh, as the new prime minister. Mossadegh, supported by a large popular outcry against British colonialism, attempted to increase his power base. He dismissed the Majlis and stopped consulting the Shah. As a result of these actions, his support base shifted away from the National Front to the socialist and communist camp, led by the Tudeh party. When Mossadegh demanded full control over the Iranian army, the Shah threatened to go into exile. While this was scarcely a threat to Mossadegh, it did alarm Washington and London. Afraid of a communist take over, the Eisenhower administration instructed the CIA to stage a coup to oust Mossadegh. The coup was quick and bloodless. Most analysts agree that without a significant outpouring of popular support for the Shah, the coup could not have succeeded. After a few days in exile, the Shah returned.

With increased American assistance, the Shah now took firm control over the government. Within a few years, he monopolized all decision-making power, appointed and dismissed prime ministers at will, and transformed the Majlis into a rubber stamp body. As the Shah's powers grew and American military and economic advisors began to enter the country, many Iranians believed the British presence had

simply been replaced by American influence.

Yet, American military aid remained quite small during the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations.[2] Based on the Eisenhower Doctrine, which guaranteed direct American assistance to any Middle East state confronted with open communist aggression, these administrations did not believe Iran could or should arm itself in response to the Soviet threat. It was feared that such a military build up would anger the Nationalist forces and stifle economic development in Iran.

The Shah, however, had different plans. Upon his restoration, he set two goals: to develop Iran economically at the fastest pace possible, and to transform the country into a regional military giant. The latter goal was further spurred by Iraq's 1958 tilt towards the USSR. In 1962, with Kennedy's blessing, the Shah embarked upon a social and economic development programme, which he called the White Revolution. Iran's oilfields were gradually nationalized and the Shah joined OPEC at its start.

While the secular nationalists had formed the main political force in the 1950's, the Shi'ite clergy became the major opposition to the Shah in the 1960's. The Shi'ite leaders, the mullahs, saw the White Revolution as a large scale import of western values. They resisted the Shah's land and social reforms. In 1963, massive riots led by Khomeini were put down violently by the Shah and his newly formed intelligence and security agency, SAVAK. Khomeini was exiled and the unrest abetted. From 1963 to 1975 Iran

experienced rapid economic progress, fuelled by spiralling oil revenues.

The Nixon administration redefined American interest in Iran. No longer willing or able to defend its allies directly, the United States sought to build regional strongholds who could provide the necessary security locally. It identified Iran as the key state in the region for this purpose. Now the United States was willing to arm Iran at a rapid pace. Moreover, by the late sixties, the Shah was able to buy the weapons he wanted. In 1972, the Nixon White House instructed all agencies to cooperate fully with the Shah's demand for weapons. In fact, the Shah received a "carte blanche" to buy whatever he wanted, while the United States saw a large part of its petro dollars return.

During this time, American interests in Iran increased greatly. Iran had become a crucial buffer state against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. Also, the United States perceived Iran as a moderate counterweight to such radical Arab states as Iraq, Egypt and Syria. In 1973, Iran refused to join the oil embargo against Israel and actually supplied it with most of its oil needs. Furthermore, Iran was now America's most important link in the protection of the oilfields in the entire Gulf region.The United States helped it build a navy to patrol the Persian Gulf. Finally, in the era of the SALT negotiations, Iran became a valuable location for US intelligence gathering of Soviet missile testing in Central Russia. By 1975, some 20,000 US military

advisors worked in Iran. The considerable military and economic cooperation depended heavily on the Shah. Both the secular nationalist and Shi'ite groups opposed the strong links between the United States and Iran.

However, by the mid 1970's, several voices in Washington started to question the good relationship between America and the Shah. In spite of having achieved overwhelming military superiority in the Gulf region by 1975, the Shah did not reduce his programme for purchasing American weaponry. Some American critics argued that this superiority was destabilizing, while others feared that sensitive military technology might some day fall into the hands of the Soviets. Also, the Shah grew more assertive in his relations with the United States. When questioned about his shopping list for American arms, he threatened to go to the Europeans or even to the Soviets if his demands were not met. In the aftermath of Vietnam, Congress tried to assert its control over arms sales. The 1975 Nelson amendment stipulated that all arms sales over $25 million must be approved by both the Senate and the House. Congressional checks on arms sales occasionally caused friction between the United States and the Shah.

Beside arms sales, several critics in the United States became more outspoken about the lack of political reform under the Shah and the alleged human rights abuses of SAVAK. In 1975, the Shah reduced the parliamentary process to a one party system, thereby further consolidating his autocratic rule. It is in this context of firm US-Iranian relations

based on many shared interests as well as increasing criticism about this relationship, that Carter assumed the presidency in 1976.

CARTER AND IRAN

Gary Sick, Brzezinski's principal NSC aide for Iran, noted in his memoirs that the Carter administration had no initiatives on Iran and expected to continue the close strategic relationship established during the previous administrations.[3] Carter agreed with Brzezinski's assessment that Iran was a strategic stronghold in the Middle East, worthy of continued American support: "I continued, as other presidents had before me, to consider the Shah a strong ally."[4] However, Carter's human rights and arms transfer policies soon became the testing ground of his relations with the Shah.

While some analysts have claimed that Carter's human rights policy undermined the rule of the Shah, and although the Shah himself was uneasy about Carter's election, a careful study of Carter's words and actions concerning this issue shows that he went out of his way to exempt the Shah from harsh criticism alloted to strategically less important countries.[5] If the Shah was indeed weakened by Carter's human rights campaign, it was despite Carter's attempts to avoid it. The administration did not formulate an official

human rights policy until February 1978. Even then, it remained a rather vague policy directive which could be applied strictly or loosely, depending on the administration's other priorities and interests.[6] Briefly, the policy directive stated that the United States intended to emphasize civil and political rights and that it would consider these factors in the allocation of economic and military aid, as well as arms sales. Of course, the administration had made several pronouncements on this issue before the promulgation of this directive. However, these were usually directed at the USSR and strategically less important right wing dictatorships such as Paraguay and Thailand.[7]

The Shah, in effect, had preempted Carter on this issue. Shortly before Carter's assumption of office, the Shah announced several political and judicial reforms which somewhat increased political freedom in Iran. Carter praised the Shah publicly for these actions.[8] Whatever other criticisms Carter harboured, he confined them to his private conversations with the Shah during the Shah's visit in November and Carter's visit to Tehran in December 1977.[9] On these occasions, as well as during Vance's visit to Iran in May of the same year, Carter emphasized that he did not intend to link human rights to the Shah's arms purchases.[10] In effect, Carter exempted the Shah from a crucial aspect of his overall human rights policy: to link arms transfers to human rights conditions. Carter also told William Sullivan, the new ambassador to Iran, that CIA-SAVAK cooperation on

intelligence gathering would continue in spite of the poor human rights record of SAVAK.[11]

Ironically, it appears that the opposition forces in Iran initially took courage from Carter's human rights pronouncements.[12] However, Carter declined to give his public support to several reform statements issued by the secular nationalists. His lavish praise for the Shah, during his 1977 visit to Iran, and his refusal to meet with this opposition group put to rest whatever hope they had in him. From then on, the opposition perceived him in firm alliance with the Shah.[13]

In the presidential election campaign, Carter had promised "significant restraints in arms transfers."[14] Immediately after his inauguration, Carter commissioned a presidential review memorandum on this subject. In May 1977, Carter publicly announced his new directive.[15] It stated that the administration intended to make arms sales the exception rather than the rule among its foreign policy tools. Also, the onus was now on those who favoured the sale to make their case, rather than on those who opposed it. The United States would no longer be the first to introduce a new weapon system into a region, nor would it develop or produce weapons merely for export. Finally, it would consider the sale of arms in light of the purchaser's human rights record and its ability to pursue domestic economic development.[16] Carter also announced that he would sell fewer arms in fiscal year 1978 than in the previous year, and that he would personally review major arms sales.[17]

As in the case of human rights, Carter exempted Iran from this policy directive. While several studies in the administration argued that the Shah's arms purchases harmed Iran's economy and that his human rights record did not warrant them, neither Carter nor his top advisors were willing to change the status quo.[18] Yet, Carter did review the arms contracts with Iran and did make public statements indicating his plans to reduce the large volume of purchases. However, the record shows no substantial changes.

Privately, Carter told the shah and Sullivan that the volume of the arms sales need not change. Rather, he wanted to revoke the Shah's "carte blanche" as a matter of principle, without actually refusing many weapons.[19] In the first two years of his administration, Carter fought a bitter fight with Congress to sell the Shah seven AWAC airplanes.[20] In contradiction to his own arms sale directive, the president became the first to introduce this advanced radar system into the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, Carter approved nearly all the Shah's requests for advanced aircraft, tanks and other materiel. He also agreed to sell Iran several nuclear power plants.[21] In order to keep the total price tag down, the construction of several frigates was contracted out to the Europeans, and arms were procured over a longer period of time. Even then, Carter's 1978 fiscal year arms sales budget exceeded 1977 by some $4 billion. Arms sales to Iran accounted for a large share of the total.[22]

Besides the strategic importance of Iran to the US,

Carter had other reasons not to alienate the Shah. The Shah had offered to support one of Carter's prized projects: a Middle East peace accord. In contrast to many other governments in the region, the Shah warmly applauded Sadat's effort to normalize relations with Israel.[23] Moreover, the Shah was willing to help Carter establish a overall energy policy for the United States by reducing sudden price hikes in crude oil. When Carter asked the Shah to moderate an expected OPEC price increase in 1978, he promptly delivered![24]

The first two years of the Carter administration show that the president made a considerable effort to have good personal relations with the Shah, and to seek the Shah's cooperation for his own projects, while assuring that US-Iranian relations would not suffer as a result of the human rights and arms sales questions. There is ample evidence that Carter did not want the regime of the Shah to fall and that he in no way intended to help the opposition.[25]

Yet the Shah was uneasy about the rhetoric coming from the Carter administration. This unease grew when Carter, in the eyes of the Shah, responded weakly to the war in the Ogaden and the 1978 Soviet inspired coup in Afghanistan.[26] Thus, while Carter wanted to continue close relations between the United States and the Shah, the Shah needed to be reassured of this as the internal Iranian situation gradually worsened throughout 1978.[27]

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPING CRISIS

In the spring of 1978, Iran witnessed massive riots and demonstrations which it had not seen since the unrest of 1963. The riots were spurred by a mix of economic dissatisfaction and religious opposition to the Shah's social and economic policies.[28] As in 1963, the Shah reacted initially by a violent suppression of the riots. However, fearing American criticism particularly, the Shah also announced further political reforms.[29] This combined carrot and stick policy came to characterize the Shah's response throughout the entire crisis. Unlike the 1963 riots, however, the Shah was now confronted by opposition from both the secular nationalists and the Shi'ite leaders. The Shi'ite forces responded to the Shah's bloody crackdown by more demonstrations, mourning the victims after a 40 day interval, as their religion prescribed. This led to a self perpetuating cycle of unrest.[30] The secular forces were less willing to challenge the Shah's security forces but were emboldened to keep up their demands since they appeared to produce political concessions.[31]

The Carter administration did not respond to the unrest in Iran until the fall of 1978.[32] Several reasons explain this slow response. First, virtually all intelligence reports during the spring and summer of 1978 concluded that the riots did not pose a real challenge to the Shah. In August, the CIA reported to Carter that "Iran is not in a

revolutionary or even a prerevolutionary situation."[33] The DIA analyses predicted that the Shah's rule was stable for at least another decade.[34] The reports from the US embassy in Tehran were equally optimistic. Ambassador Sullivan, who was on holidays in the United States during the summer months, assured administration officials that he saw no threat to the Shah.[35]

Second, the administration, during this time, was preoccupied with three of its major policy initiatives: the Camp David peace talks, the normalization of relations with China, and the SALT negotiations. During the summer and fall of 1978, rapid progress on all three issues overtaxed the resources of the decision-makers in the administration.[36] Last, nobody believed seriously that the Shah could not deal adequately with the unrest. There were no plans or policy guidances in the administration on what to do if the Shah was threatened.[37] The US embassy in Tehran had long ago stopped its intelligence gathering among the opposition forces since the Shah had indicated his displeasure with the practice.[38] Therefore, since nobody could conceive of the Shah's fall, nobody bothered sounding the alarm, in spite of the worsening situation in Iran. Furthermore, since the Shah announced, in August, that he planned to hold free elections in 1979, most administration officials believed the opposition had already achieved more than it had hoped.[39]

In early September, the US embassy reported that a recent violent clash between demonstrators and police had visibly shaken the Shah. In response, Vance and Brzezinski

recommended to Carter that he phone the Shah to express his support. On September 10, Carter did so and "wished the Shah the best in resolving these problems and in being successful in his efforts to implement reforms."[40] The Shah responded by imposing martial law in certain areas of the country as well as by releasing several political prisoners. Again, the mixed response did little to stop the unrest.[41] Throughout early October, Carter, both privately and publicly, repeated his message of support for the Shah.[42] Meanwhile, the administration did nothing to initiate a policy debate on how it should deal with the situation. The month of September was dominated by the Camp David talks.

To make matters worse, administration officials were receiving contradictory reports on how the Shah was coping personally with the crisis. US embassy reports, as well as personal accounts of visitors to Iran, pictured the Shah as alternately highly confident and optimistic or depressed and out of control. Unknown at the time, these mood swings of the Shah were probably due to the treatment he was receiving for lymphoma.[43]

On October 24, the Department of State produced the first memorandum on how the United States should deal with the crisis.[44] It argued that the Shah was in for a very challenging period unless he moved rapidly towards political reforms. It also proposed that the United States should be steadfast in its opposition to a military regime taking over in Iran. Finally, it recommended that the United States step up its contacts with the opposition forces, including the

mullahs led by Khomeini. The memo was sent to the NSC as well as to ambassador Sullivan. Sullivan agreed with all its points except the recommendation for increased contacts with the opposition, concluding: "Our destiny is to work with the Shah, who is prepared to accept a truly democratic regime if it is achieved responsibly."[45] Brzezinski disagreed with the entire memo. He did not believe that additional concessions by the Shah would improve the situation. Moreover, he felt that the US should not exclude a military option and viewed contacts with Khomeini as bordering on treason.[46] Instead of calling a meeting to discuss the memo or sending the memo to Carter, he shelved it permanently. Sick reports that "Carter never saw it", and observed: "Strange as it may seem, by the end of October, there still had not been a single high-level policy meeting in Washington on this subject."[47] Unexpectedly, Sullivan dropped the bombshell that set the decision-making process in full motion. On November 2, he sent a cable asking for instructions within 48 hours.[48] The cable came as a shock to the administration since it stated that the Shah was thinking about stepping down and forming a civilian coalition or military government in his place. The Shah wanted to know what the United States wanted him to do. After briefing Carter on the cable, Brzezinski called an emergency Special Coordination Committee (SCC) meeting.

Besides Brzezinski, Christopher (Deputy Secretary of State), Brown, Jones (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff), Turner (Director CIA), Aaron (Deputy Director NSC) and Sick attended the meeting.[49] Vance was too busy with the Middle

East negotiations to attend. Brzezinski opened the meeting by stating that the United States should send a message of full support for the Shah, urging him to stay on. Furthermore, the United States should indicate that further liberalization efforts should be postponed until "decisive action to restore order" has been undertaken. Brzezinski did not believe that a civilian coalition government under the Shah would help. He added that the Iranian ambassador to the US, Ardeshir Zahedi, agreed with his analysis. Christopher, supported by Turner, responded that Zahedi could not be trusted as an objective observer of Iranian politics since he was closely associated with the Shah. However, Christopher agreed that the United States should indicate its support for the Shah, and that Vance shared this belief. But he believed that the Shah could best enhance his position by further political reforms, even a civilian coalition government under him, which could include members from the opposition. Aaron added that the US should be careful not to give the Shah the impression that it favoured liberalizations over his rule. Brown commented that if the Shah opted for a military government, the United States should encourage him to form such a government under him, and not without him.

Brzezinski continued to probe the other participants for a message that would give the Shah the green light to crack down on the opposition and restore order by force. However, all the other advisors were opposed to this idea. They believed the United States should send a message

indicating preference for a civilian government. The meeting ended in a deadlock. Instead of submitting the various options to the president for his final decision, Brzezinski papered over the serious disagreements in the group and wrote up a message which constituted a compromise between his option and that of the others. The resulting message reflected the lack of a clear policy choice by the administration. In four points, it stated American support for the Shah, recognition for decisive action to restore order, agreement with either a civilian or military government under the Shah, and finally the hope that liberalization efforts would continue.[50] Carter, who was busy with other issues, approved the vague statement the same day.

Dissatisfied with what he perceived to be a weak message, Brzezinski obtained Carter's approval to reiterate the message in a phone call to the Shah the next day. During this conversation, he tried subtlely to tilt the American position towards support for military action to stop the unrest. In pursuit of this objective, Brzezinski promised the Shah that, "the US would back him to the hilt".[51] The Shah perceived this message correctly as a preference for military action. However, the next day, when he asked Sullivan for a confirmation of the message, Sullivan responded that he had no instructions to recommend that course of action to the Shah.[52] Moreover, in a press conference on November 3, Vance indicated that the United States considered further political liberalization just as

important as the restoration of order. Also, it hoped such a restoration could occur without widespread bloodshed.[53]

These various messages left the Shah baffled as to what the United States wanted him to do. As a result, the Shah continued his carrot and stick policy even though it had proven unsuccesful. On November 6, he appointed a military government. Yet, half of its members were civilian and it actually reduced the amount of violence used to restore order. Moreover, it announced more reforms, including the release of prominent political prisoners. In addition, the Shah had several well known corrupt officials, including the head of SAVAK, arrested.[54] Carter announced that he supported the Shah's new government but that he had not put pressure on him to create it.[55]

The remainder of November saw a partial return of calm to the country. The devastating oil strikes of October stopped and fewer demonstrations took place. However, it was feared that the holy month of Shi'ite, which covered most of December, would bring new unrest.[56] Now fully alert to the Iranian situation, Brzezinski ordered a new CIA analysis. As the opposition forces slowly perceived that the military government was not going to crackdown violently, they gathered forces for another round.[57]

EVALUATING THE OPTIONS AND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Up to this point, the debate in Washington was confined to the question: how can we strengthen the rule of the Shah? Nobody had yet thought, or at least not openly expressed: what to do if the Shah fell? The debate on how to strenghten the Shah centred around two different options and perspectives.

Brzezinski argued that American interest in the rule of the Shah was so great that it could take no chances to undermine it. Christopher and Vance believed that the United States also had the responsibility to promote democratic values.[58] Brzezinski also disagreed with Vance, Turner and Mondale on how to deal with massive uprisings in general. Brzezinski believed that revolutions were only won as a result of tactical errors or concessions by the ruling elite. Therefore , he recommended that the Shah stop his carrot and stick policy and crack down on the opposition. The others, however, believed that the unrest was due to the Shah's excessive power and that he could "disarm" them by large scale political reforms.[59]

Finally, Brzezinski disagreed with the others on the extent to which the United States should become involved in the crisis. Vance, Christopher and Mondale all believed that the United States could not assume the responsibility for a bloodbath in Iran. Brzezinski, however, argued that since the Shah appeared so weak, the United States "had no choice

but... to make the decision for him"[60]

Carter was personally much closer to the Vance group than to Brzezinski. Yet, he also wanted the Shah to survive. In essence, Carter was faced with a difficult set of contradictions. While he could not allow the United States to initiate a bloody crackdown for moral reasons, he could also not afford to lose the Shah. Moreover, he knew that the Shah expected strong directions from the United States.

Yet, during the initial stage, Carter did not address these questions. Sick notes that:

> Whatever the reasons, Carter did not engage himself actively in the day-to-day policy-making during the Iran crisis in the same way that he did in many other policy issues.[61]

Carter, notes Sick, had his heart in the Camp David talks at the time. As a result, the debates were not settled and no clear positions were formulated. While Carter must carry some responsibility for this failure, the multiple advocacy strategy maintains that the custodian must alert the president to such malfunctions. The custodian, however, did not only fail to do so but also engaged in several other role violations.

It is the custodian's task to identify policy issues that require the administration's attention. Although Brzezinski was hampered in this task by poor intelligence reporting and an overloaded agenda, he was also reluctant to raise the issue, fearing that it would lead to an American response that would undermine the Shah. A major piece of

evidence for this role task failure is the way in which he treated the October 24 memorandum from the State Department. Rather than using the document as a basis for debate within the administration, he killed its message. In so doing, he violated two essential conditions of the multiple advocacy strategy: the fairness and competition principles. The fairness condition requires the custodian to give all options in the administration a fair hearing among all advocates. The competition principle, among other things, requires him to bring the policy disagreement among the advisors to the president's attention. By refusing to circulate or discuss the memo, Brzezinski prevented the administration from having an open debate on the crisis at the earliest available time.[62]

Forced by Sullivan's cable of November 2, Brzezinski called a SCC meeting at last. During the meeting, he was alone in advocating a military crackdown to restore order in Iran. While his option could have improved the decision-making process had Carter been involved in the debate, Brzezinski made no effort to elevate the conflict to his attention. While Carter can be blamed for being too occupied with other issues, the multiple advocacy strategy states that it is the custodian's responsibility "to ensure chief executive participation in the decision-making process."[63]

As a result of Brzezinski's role violations, there was never a clear policy choice made. Instead, a compromise was forged, which resulted in an ambiguous and confusing message to the Shah. To make matters worse, Brzezinski engaged

personally in the implementation of policy by phoning the Shah. In his study, Hall evaluated the role of policy enforcement on the part of the custodian and found the following. The custodian can communicate the president's choice to the department heads as well as coordinate policy implementation through the various committees without harming his other role tasks. However, when the custodian attempts personally to "run" the various agencies or relays personally the president's will to foreign officials, he is likely to compromise his own ability to process information fairly, and is prone to discredit or block other officials in their attempt to implement policy.[64]

The evidence in this case confirms Hall's findings. The content of Brzezinski's phone call differed from the message sent the previous day. Sullivan could not reconcile them and the Shah lost further confidence in Carter's suppport for him.[65]

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE FALL OF THE SHAH

On November 9, Sullivan sent a cable titled "Thinking the Unthinkable", which called for a change in the debate in the administration from how to support the Shah to what the United States could do to affect the situation if the Shah falls.[66] Sullivan reported that support for the Shah in Iran was eroding quickly. Instead of stating merely its support

for the Shah, the United States should improve its contacts with the moderate nationalist opposition. Sullivan believed that these moderates could govern if the Khomeini forces were allowed to play a constructive role in Iran as well. He believed that the junior officers in the army would accept Khomeini as a symbolic figurehead in an Islamic republic. Moreover, such a republic, if governed by the moderate nationalists, would not be hostile to the United States. Though not stated explicitly, Sullivan wanted the United States to ease the Shah out of office.

However, none of Carter's senior advisors agreed with Sullivan.[67] Though Vance favoured the idea of more contacts with the moderate opposition, he agreed with Brzezinski, Mondale and Brown that Carter should not "undermine" the Shah's rule by contacting Khomeini. As a result, Carter rejected Sullivan's advice, stating that "the key to stability was the monarch himself supported by the military."[68] Again, Brzezinski urged Carter to tell the Shah to use the military to restore order but as Brzezinski himself noted: "Carter became skeptical when I painted a grim picture of the strategic consequences for us of Iran's and the Shah's tragedy."[69]

Also, Brzezinski became suspicious of Sullivan's objectivity in the crisis. Fearing that Sullivan wanted personally to see the end of the Shah's rule, Brzezinski increased his private contacts with Zahedi. Zahedi, in turn, urged Brzezinski to convince Carter of the need for military action.[70]

However, as the riots increased in early December, with the Shi'ite celebration of their holy month, the administration did not offer any alternatives to Sullivan's option. Meanwhile, Khomeini, from his exile in Paris, urged his followers to sacrifice themselves in their protest against the Shah. Massive riots and a general strike ensued. The moderate forces, now gauging Khomeini's strength, distanced themselves from any coalition government proposal from the Shah. The Shah responded by jailing several of their leaders and releasing them again as their imprisonment caused further riots.[71] Throughout all this, the American administration was losing time to influence the events. Sullivan complained that: "We drifted through the remainder of November into December with no guidance from the Department of State or Washington in general."[72]

In the last week of November, Secretary of the Treasury, Michael Blumenthal, visited the Shah. Upon his return, he told the administration that the Shah looked desparate and needed American help. Brzezinski agreed with Blumenthal's suggestion that an outside advisor should come in to do an independent study of the crisis. The administration selected George Ball, a senior DOS official during the Kennedy years, for this task.[73]

During Ball's study, Carter made a public slip of the tongue which made the situation considerably worse. On November 7, during a breakfast meeting with reporters, Carter responded to a question of whether he thought the Shah could survive by saying:

> I don't know. I hope so. It is in the hands of the Iranian people. The US has no intention to intercede in the internal affairs of Iran... We primarily want an absence of violence and bloodshed. We personally prefer that the Shah maintain a major role in the government, but that is a decision for the Iranian people to make.[74]

Several officials winced at this mishap. Sick reports that it was perceived in Iran as a decision by Carter "to dump the Shah," even though Carter had not yet made that decision.[75]

On December 13, a SCC meeting was convened to discuss the results of Ball's report.[76] Ball stated that he thought the Shah was damaged beyond repair. He proposed that the Shah assume immediately a lesser role of a constitutional monarch, as prescribed by the 1906 constitution, while handing over power to a council of notables. This council should be composed of a cross section of Iranian politicians and could rule until the 1979 elections. By all means, the Shah should be discouraged from using military force to consolidate his position. Vance agreed with this analysis and indicated his strong support for a political solution to the crisis.[77] Brzezinski, supported by a CIA report of November 30, argued that the moderate forces were too weak to rule the country.[78] Though Ball believed that the army was not capable of governing, Brzezinski, supported by energy Secretary James Schlesinger, argued in favour of a military government. Brzezinski cited the stable military regimes of Turkey and Brazil as evidence for his argument. Brown took a middle position, arguing merely that the

military was becoming the most important factor in the Iranian political system. Whatever the United States proposes, it should not divide the military.

After the meeting, Brzezinski prepared a memorandum for Carter which summarized the options and the discussion. The next day, Ball met with Carter and Brzezinski to discuss his proposal.[79] Now sorry that he had invited Ball, Brzezinski argued strongly against Ball's proposal. Carter liked the idea but was reluctant to accept any proposal that might indicate that he did not support the Shah. Instead, he instructed Vance to have Sullivan mention the proposal to the Shah for his opinion. During the meeting, Brzezinski also mentioned to Carter that either he or Schlesinger should go to Iran to boost the Shah's confidence. To Brzezinski's chagrin, Ball was able to convince Carter that such a blatant sign of US interference would only provoke more unrest. After this meeting, Ball returned to his law practice. Before leaving, however, he informed Vance that Brzezinski, via ambassador Zahedi, who had recently returned to Iran to advise the Shah, was putting pressure on the Shah to crackdown on the rioters. He advised Vance also to become more involved in the decision-making process since Brzezinski was picturing the survivability of the Shah in overly optimistic terms to Carter. Moreover, Ball believed that Brzezinski was not giving several advocates in the Department of State a fair hearing for their options.[80]

Sullivan discussed the "council of notables" concept with the Shah but found him unenthusiastic. In fact,

Sullivan himself did not think it was a good idea since most of these "notables" were hardly on speaking terms. Instead, the Shah told Sullivan that he considered forming a civilian government composed of National Front leaders, while he would only maintain control over the military. Yet before doing so, he wanted a clearer American indication what it wanted him to do.[81]

During this time, Henry Precht (Department of State Desk officer for Iran) proposed another option to Brzezinski.[82] In a personal meeting, Precht complained that he had tried to put his option forward since late October. However, the interagency process had failed to give him a chance. He was now prepared to put his job on the line, simply to be heard. He argued that the United States should immediately remove the Shah from the throne. Moreover, it should not waste its time with civilian governments composed of National Front leaders since this group had no longer any real power. Instead, the United States should seek a "modus vivendum" with the Khomeini forces. Precht believed that Khomeini would prove to be a moderate with whom the United States could work. Precht saw the American role now to be one "...of finding a graceful exit for the Shah while gaining a fair amount of credit in doing so."[83] Sick was more skeptical about the moderate nature of a future government under Khomeini but agreed with Precht that the time had come to abandon the Shah.

Brzezinski, who had been instrumental in stifling Precht's option, was not in the least impressed. Again he

refused to treat this proposal as a discussion paper within the administration. Sick notes that both Precht's and his advocacy was simply ignored.[84]

Frustrated with the lack of American guidance, the Shah proposed three possible options to Sullivan.[85] He could continue to try forming a coalition government with the National Front. He could appoint a government similar to Ball's proposal. Last, he could order his military to crackdown. The last option he called the "Iron Fist." Furthermore, the Shah wondered whether the United States wanted him to step aside or even leave the country. On December 26, Sullivan informed Washington of the Shah's proposed solutions. Sullivan added that the Shah was reluctant to try the Iron Fist, unless he could be assured of complete American backing.[86]

On December 28, Vance, Brzezinski, Brown, Turner and Schlesinger met to discuss the Shah's proposals.[87] Vance, with Turner's support, argued that the United States should state its firm opposition to the Iron Fist. While the Shah's departure per se is no solution, he must try a coalition government. Vance reasoned that the army was no longer able to restore order and that it would probably break up if it tried to do so. Brzezinski and Schlesinger disagreed. They believed that there should be no contacts with the opposition, and that the Shah should be free to decide what to do, including the Iron Fist solution. In this meeting, Schlesinger was as forceful an advocate for the Iron Fist option as Brzezinski.

With Carter at Camp David, and the advisors not able to resolve their differences, they agreed to write up a compromise message to Sullivan. Brzezinski again tried his best to make the message subtle enough to allow the Shah to employ the Iron Fist option. The message stated that the United States preferred a coalition government. However, it went on to say that if there was uncertainty about the underlying orientation of such a government or its capacity to govern, or if the army was in danger of becoming more fragmented: "then a firm military government under the Shah may be unavoidable."[88] Vance took the message to Camp David for Carter's approval. Carter, at Vance's urging, changed the language so that the Shah would not apply his Iron Fist option. Instead of recommending a "firm military government," the message now advised "a government which would end disorder, violence and bloodshed." Vance was satisfied this message was less ambiguous:

> The Shah could not fail to see from this message that we would support a military government only to end bloodshed, but not to apply the Iron Fist to retain his throne.[89]

The message further noted that if the shah did not think either option feasible, he could form a regency council government, similar to Ball's proposal. Brzezinski was also satisfied with the message. He called it

> the clearest and most direct effort to get the Shah to do what needed to be done, without the US assuming, in effect, the responsibility of

governing Iran on his behalf.[90]

The Shah, however, failed to see any guidance in the message. As before, the confusing compromise statement did not reassure him. On December 29, the Shah asked again whether he should leave. Sullivan told him he had no instructions on that question but he was sure the shah would be welcome in the United States.[91] The same day the Shah announced that he had asked a prominent National Front leader, Bakhtiar, to form a civilian government. He also indicated that he might leave the country for a "vacation."[92]

Bakhtiar accepted the Shah's offer on January 2, 1979. At the same time, the other national front leaders broke with him and joined the Khomeini camp. Khomeini reacted to the news by attacking Bakhtiar as vehemently as he had attacked the Shah. As a result, January saw only more riots and strikes.[93] On January 2, Sullivan sent another cable to Washington.[94] He reported that while the Shah had appointed Bakhtiar, he intended to keep significant powers himself. Moreover, the Shah was trying to stall his departure. Sullivan believed that if the Shah failed to leave, the military might try by means of a coup d'etat to reinstate him. Also, as long as the Shah stayed in the country, the Bakhtiar government would not receive any credibility in Iran. Sullivan concluded by adding that in his opinion, the Bakhtiar government had not much chance of surviving. Therefore, the United States should open contacts with

Khomeini.

Throughout this time, Brzezinski and Zahedi remained in close touch. While Sullivan was informing the administration that its policy was failing, Zahedi urged Brzezinski to continue to support the Shah. Brzezinski, in turn, gave Carter a more optimistic assessment of the Shah's situation than Vance. Moreover, it appears that Brzezinski and Zahedi were prodding the Shah privately to implement his Iron Fist option.[95]

On January 3, a full National Security Council meeting considered the questions raised by Sullivan.[96] Carter asked his advisors whether he should tell the Shah to leave. Vance thought so. The United States should now help consolidate the Bakhtiar government and tell the Shah to step aside. Certainly, it should not give the military the impression that it could stage a military coup with American blessing. Brzezinski did not think that the United States should tell the Shah to leave. Carter stated that he would put it in such a way that it appeared as an American concurrence in a decision made solely by the Shah. Brzezinski further noted that such a statement might not be very credible to the Iranians, especially to those who counted on American support. However, Carter had made up his mind. He decided that the Shah could come to the United States and indicated his support for the Bakhtiar government, even though Sullivan had warned that the Khomeini forces did not support Bakhtiar. However, Carter "thought there was a chance for their relationship to improve."[97]

Next, the Department of Defense official present (Charles Duncan) recommended that the United States send a top military official to Tehran to provide support for the Iranian military. Brzezinski supported this move. It was agreed that General Huyser (Deputy to US NATO Commander Alexander Haig) would go. His instructions were in the form of three priorized items. First, he was to assure military support for the Bakhtiar government. Second, he was to assure that the military remained united. Last, in case the civilian government collapsed and widespread civil disorder followed, he should help the military restore order.[98]

In the following days, Bakhtiar took over the reigns of power, Huyser went to Iran, and the Shah stated that he would leave on January 16.[99] It soon became clear, however, that the NSC meeting of January 3 had not resolved all differenes within the administration. Throughout January, three divisive issues impeded the administration in its attempt to manage the crisis in Iran.

First, Sullivan kept pressing Washington to start talking with Khomeini.[100] Vance backed Sullivan on this point but Brzezinski warned Carter that it would undermine the Bakhtiar government.[101] Carter first sided with Brzezinski but in the middle of January authorized the US embassy in Paris to start indirect talks with Khomeini. The talks never led to any agreement. Sullivan replied to Carter's decision with open criticism. This in turn, made Carter wonder if Sullivan was supporting the Bakhtiar government adequately. It was even reported in Washington

that Sullivan had already established contacts with Khomeini's assistants, without Carter's approval. At one point, Carter considered firing Sullivan. However, Vance was able to persuade him that such a move would only weaken American influence in Iran.[102]

Second, Brzezinski and Schlesinger interpreted Huyser's mission differently from the other advisors.[103] Since the unrest only increased in Iran, Brzezinski believed that the time had come to implement Huyser's third instruction: to restore order by military force. When rumors that several generals might forcefully prevent the shah's departure arose, Brzezinski urged Carter to implement Huyser's final option. However, Carter would have none of it.[104] On January 18, Brzezinski made a final attempt in a long private memorandum to Carter.[105] Again, Carter refused. Like Sullivan's independent actions, Brzezinski's persistence in advocating a military coup eroded the president's confidence in him:

> ... I suspected that my urging of a coup... was undermining my credibility with the president, who found my advocacy of a coup morally troublesome as well as irritating.[106]

Third, Huyser, upon his arrival in Tehran, had set up an independent communications channel with the Department of Defense. His analysis of the events in Iran differed substantially from Sullivan's reporting to the Department of State.[107] While Sullivan reported that the Bakhtiar

government was losing control and that the army was rapidly disintegrating, Huyser believed the military was still influential and should continue to support Bakhtiar. These conflicting reports reduced further the administration's ability to influence the course of events in Iran.[108] Moreover, Vance, aware of Brzezinski's contacts with Zahedi, and his advocacy for a military coup, instructed Sullivan to discard any "unauthorized communications."[109]

Towards the end of January, events in Iran overran the administration's ability to keep up with them, let alone influence them. On February 1, Khomeini returned to Iran and set up an alternative government to Bakhtiar's. The subsequent standoff lasted until February 11, when the army command ordered its troops back into the barracks and Bakhtiar fled the country.[110] From then on, the Americans concentrated on the evacuation of their citizens and the protection of the Embassy and other facilities. The revolution was completed.[111]

AN EVALUATION OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

In spite of Sullivan's call for a review of American support for the Shah, the administration, throughout November and December, did little to consider its options. The interagency process of gathering and debating various options, which had characterized the early years of the

administration, had virtually broken down. Sick notes that:

> There were sporadic high-level meetings, but nothing of a continuing basis, nothing that really forced the issues to be raised, identified, refined, argued out and carried back and forth to the president on a regular basis.[112]

As a result, the administration never had a coherent policy to deal with the crisis. Several analysts of this issue have blamed Carter for a lack of leadership and an unwillingness to bring the various perspectives together into a clear policy choice.[113] Indeed, Carter's role throughout the crisis can be faulted.

The multiple advocacy strategy describes his role as the final arbiter of the various choices brought to him. Carter failed to make this choice. While he supported the Shah publicly and rejected American responsibility for a bloody crackdown, he failed to give the Shah any clear guidance. The various messages, authorized by Carter, were ambiguous and eroded the Shah's confidence in his support. Moreover, Carter failed to reconsider his stand when there appeared ample indications that the Shah could not hold.

However, an analysis of the decision-making process in light of the multiple advocacy strategy, reveals that the principal blame for the failing process rests with the custodian. It is the custodian's responsibility to alert the president when his present policy is failing. As well, the custodian is the chief official responsible for the coordination of the various options.

As in the case of the October 24 memorandum from the Department of State, Brzezinski violated the fairness and competition principles by not giving Precht's option a fair hearing in the administration. In so doing, the administration was deprived of a viable alternative in dealing with the crisis.[114]

During the December 28 meeting of Carter's principal advisors, Brzezinski wrote up a compromise decision as a result of the deadlock among them. The multiple advocacy strategy, however, requires the custodian to bring such disagreements to the president's attention. Like the November 3 message to the Shah, the resulting message was ambiguous and counterproductive to the American position in Iran. An assistant Secretary of State commented on the message that "it failed to clarify the role of the US".[115] It is the custodian's role to avoid such "papered over" disagreements among the president's advisors.

This crisis also reveals that custodial advocacy went far beyond alerting Carter to a "missing option." Indeed, Brzezinski's continuous prodding proved counter-productive. The previous chapters have shown that custodial advocacy is beneficial when it occurs to break a consensus among the other advocates, and when it is not combined with the violation of the fairness and competition principles. However in this case, Brzezinski kept urging Carter to tell the Shah to use his Iron Fist option, even though Carter had rejected it many times. Indeed, by December there was no need for Brzezinski to promote this option, since

Schlesinger did so on a continual basis. In his January 18 memorandum, Brzezinski made his final attempt to change Carter's mind. Not only had Brzezinski exhausted his usefulness as an advocate, he now tried to enhance his status by circumventing the normal decision-making process.

Finally, the custodian exceeded his prescribed role by engaging in the implementation of policy. In the November 3 phone call to the Shah, he attempted to change Carter's policy in a subtle manner. Later on, with the help of Zahedi, he attempted to get the Shah to crackdown. Sullivan, meanwhile, continued to tell the Shah that Carter did not want to take responsibility for such action. The resulting confusion to the Shah is described by Ledeen and Lewis:

> ...the Shah could never get the same story from the White House and the State Department; the one kept assuring him that the US was solidly behind him, while the other kept reminding him that force was not acceptable.[116]

Similarly, Brzezinski and Zahedi apparently attempted to get Huyser to stage a coup, without Carter's approval.

While Sullivan's subordination to Carter was questionable, Brzezinski came to discard his reports early in the crisis. Instead, he received much information from Zahedi, who had returned to Iran in the middle of the crisis. It is possible, that on the basis of Zahedi's reports,Brzezinski gave Carter a more optimistic account of the Shah's fortunes than was warranted.

It is principally because of these role violations that

Carter did not receive all options in the debate, was not alerted to the various policy conflicts among his advisors, was not compelled to make a clear policy choice, was not optimally informed about the growing seriousness of the situation Iran, and was not privy to the various conflicts involved in the implementation of his policy. These shortcomings constitute a major source of the administration's failure to respond effectively to the Iranian crisis.

EVALUATING THE OUTCOME: COULD THE UNITED STATES HAVE DONE BETTER?

Throughout the crisis, the administation considered only two alternative options. The first option, initially favoured by Sullivan and most of Carter's senior advisors, advocated extensive political reforms and liberalizations to appease the Shah's opponents. Eventually, the proposal of a civilian government with or without the Shah was added when the political reforms did not quell the unrest. Ball's council of notables was a variation on the same theme. The second option, initially favoured by Brzezinski and later supported by Schlesinger, called for an end to political reforms and suggested a violent military crackdown to stop the revolt.

Carter as well as Vance and Mondale rejected the second

option. Brzezinski notes that they felt:

> that the US - and notably the president himself - should not assume the responsibility for plunging another country into a bloody and cruel confrontation.[117]

Although Carter favoured the first option, he never accepted it fully. Instead, he preferred political reforms only as long as they did not undermine the Shah's position. Moreover, he complicated his position further by asking the Shah for political reforms while simultaneously indicating that he did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. Thus Carter signalled to the Shah that he wanted more reforms but did not want to tell the Shah what to do.

Precht, as well as Sullivan towards the end of the crisis, advocated a third option. It did not receive full consideration by the administration because Brzezinski was successful in keeping it out of the debate. It argued for a quick shift of American support from the shah to Khomeini since Precht believed the shah had no chance of survival.

Were any of these options viable and how successful was Carter's policy? Early on in the crisis it became evident that the Shah's reforms did not satisfy his opponents.[118] His concessions were perceived as signs of weakness and served only to fuel the revolutionary forces. Meanwhile, the Shah's position continued to weaken. Also, since the Shi'ite forces, beginning in the late fall of 1978, demanded the complete overthrow of the Shah, the administration should have realized that this "reform" option was not working.

Moreover, since Carter did not want political reforms at the risk of losing the Shah, his policy was clearly counterproductive. Concessions may have worked before the unrest. However, at that time Carter was more interested in close cooperation with the Shah than in pushing reforms. Brzezinski, who had argued that revolutions only succeed when the ruling elites start making concessions, may have been correct in this case.

Carter made his policy more ineffective yet by not strongly responding to the Shah's calls for guidance. One must recall that the United States had "saved" the Shah in the 1953 political crisis. While the Shah had become more self confident and bolder in his relations with the United States since that crisis, the 1978-79 revolution shows that he again came to rely on American help. The absence of strong signals of American support made the Shah waver further. Indeed the Shah interpreted the absence of American instructions as evidence of a lack of support.[119]

Could the Iron Fist option have worked? The Shah had a large army which was well equipped and was largely non conscript. Moreover, the army's command was fiercely loyal to the Shah and remained united well into December.[120] Some have argued that until the end of October, it could have put down the revolt without much bloodshed. It could still have stopped the revolution in December, although at this time with considerable bloodshed.[121] Others claim, however, that the revolution was so widespread and the demonstrations so massive that any attempt at using the army to its full

extent would have led either to widespread desertions or to a large scale slaughter.

Whatever the feasibility of the Iron Fist, Carter could not accept the moral responsibility for the decision, while the Shah would not implement the policy unless he had clear American support, as Sick suggests: "the Shah might have been persuaded to launch a campaign of military terror, but he would have done so only on the orders of the US."[122] Brzezinski had argued that the Iron Fist option was moral only in the sense that it would avoid an even more violent civil war.[123] While we now know that there was some validity to Brzezinski's argument, the administration was opposed to the option for another reason. It feared that US forces eventually might be drawn into the conflict. In light of the Vietnam experience, Carter had little stomach for that idea.[124]

The Precht option was premised on the belief that Khomeini and his followers were neither anti-American nor anti-democratic. Indeed, Khomeini's assistants, throughout early 1978, portrayed his plans as moderate in nature. Precht and others believed that Khomeini would merely play a figurehead role in a future Islamic republic.[125] Also, since they believed that the Shah could not survive, and since the Shi'ites were as anti-Soviet as the Shah, why would the United States not quickly shift its allegiance and thereby ascertain the continuation of US-Iranian friendship?[126]

Just like the Iron Fist, this option could have worked, had it been implemented early in the crisis. By December,

however, open American support for the Shah had totally alienated the Shi'ites. While it is, admittingly, difficult "to dump" a loyal friend, the administration failed to see that its interests stretched beyond one person.[127] Although we now know that Khomeini is far from moderate, there is no way of knowing whether early American support for his cause could have laid the groundwork for continued US-Iranian relations.

The flawed decision-making process explains why the administration failed to reach an optimal decision and also explains the skewed implementation of this decision. The poor US handling of the crisis constitutes one factor in the explanation of the course of events in Iran. However, there are at least two other sets of factors which influenced the course of events which cannot be linked directly to the decision-making process.

First, the United States as well as most other western governments, was hampered by a dismal failure in intelligence. The lack of good information about the opposition forces in general, impeded the United States in recognizing the extent of dissatisfaction in Iran with the Shah. As a result, the administration did not perceive the seriousness of the situation until well into the crisis and did not properly assess the strength of the Shi'ite opposition. Indeed, most western analysts were not attuned to the relatively new phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism. The Shi'ite forces were underestimated and misunderstood throughout the crisis.[128] Finally, nobody knew the Shah had

terminal cancer.[129] This disease had transformed the strong-willed leader into a depressed, moody and indecisive man.

Second, some analysts have argued that the events in Iran could not have been influenced by the Shah or anybody else. To them, the revolution was inevitable.[130] The Shah's economic and social reforms had alienated nearly all strata of the population. The Shah was simultaneously faced with an Islamic revolt against western style modernization, a nationalist revolt against American influence in Iran, a social revolt against his economic programmes, and a political revolt against his monarchical dictatorship.

Whatever the merits or weight of each factor, the fact remains that Carter tried to influence the course of events. Indeed, the United States could not help but be influential due to its close military and economic ties, and its large role in the Shah's personal rule. But Carter's efforts failed. The United States lost an important ally in a strategically crucial area. Combined with the damaging hostage crisis in 1979, Carter suffered politically from the "loss of Iran." Brzezinski summed up the failure:

> Iran was the Carter administration's greatest setback... the fall of the Shah was disastrous strategically for the US and politically for Carter himself.[131]

CONCLUSION

This case study shows that the multiple advocacy strategy is effectively undermined when the custodian violates the fairness and competition principles, i.e., when the custodian no longer functions as the processor of all options and no longer attempts to get the president to make a clear policy choice. Brzezinski deprived Carter of a full discussion of the Precht option, papered over disagreements among the advocates, and impeded an early review of Carter's policy. As a result, Carter was not aware of all the values, interests and choices raised during the crisis, was not informed adequately about the possible contradictions in his policy, and was not kept alert that he was not achieving his objectives.

Furthermore, the case study confirms Hall's findings that a custodian cannot be effective when he engages in policy enforcement and implementation tasks. Brzezinski's phone call to the Shah and his private contacts with Zahedi contradicted Carter's official policy, and confused the Shah.

Last, the study reveals that custodial advocacy is counterproductive when it extends beyond breaking the consensus among the other advocates. While Brzezinski initially added an option to the debate, his continual pushing of this option, after Carter had rejected it several times, bogged down the policy discussions.

ENDNOTES

[1] The factual information in this section is based on the following sources: Habib Ladjevardi, "The Origins of US Support for an Autocratic Iran," International Journal of Middle East Studies, No.2, 1983, pp.225-239; Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979; Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981; Rouhallah K. Ramazani, The United States and Iran, New York: Praeger, 1982; Christos P. Ioannides, America's Iran, New York: University Press of America, 1984; Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980; Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980; Michael A. Ledeen and William Lewis, Debacle, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981; A. H. H. Abidi, "The Iranian Revolution: Its Origins and Dimensions," International Studies, No.2, 1979, pp.129-161

[2] From 1950 to 1970, Iran received $1.8 billion in US arms. In contrast, between 1970 and 1976, Iran bought $12 billion worth of US arms: Rubin (1980), p.128.

[3] Gary Sick, All Fall Down, New York: Random House, 1985, p.24.

[4] Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p.435; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983, p.357.

[5] Coral Bell, President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue, Canberra: Australian National University, 1982, p.52 claims that Carter's insistence on human rights in Iran opened the floodgates of the revolution. For the Shah's worries see Ramazani (1982), p.91; Anthony Parsons, The Pride and the Fall, London: Butler and Tanner, 1984, p.47.

[6] Brzezinski (1983), P.126. The policy was formulated in PD-30.

[7] Idem, p.127

[8] Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, p.316; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.79; Sick (1985), p.23.

[9] Carter (1982), p.436.

[10] Vance (1983), p.318; Rubin (1980), p.196.

[11] William H. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, New York: N. W. Norton & Company, 1981, p.21.

[12] Keddie (1981), p.231; Ioannides (1984), p.27.

[13] Cottam (1979), p.353. During his visit, Carter called Iran "an island of stability," Carter (1982), p. 437.

[14] Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.80.

[15] PRM 12 was issued on January 26. It laid the foundation for PD 13, which was signed by Carter on May 13 1977. It is unknown whether this issue caused considerable policy debate within the administration. See Sam C. Sarkesian (ed), Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter's First Years, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, pp.132-133.

[16] For the contents of PD 13 see Sarkesian (1979), pp. 132-133; Roger P. Labrie et al., US Arms Sales Policy, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1982. Exempted from PD 13 were NATO members, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Israel. See also Vance (1983), p.319.

[17] Sick (1985), p.25.

[18] Washington Post, October 25, 1980, p.12

[19] Idem, Sullivan (1981), pp.20-21; Sick (1985), p.29

[20] Carter (1982), p.435; Vance (1983), p.320.

[21] Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.84. The Shah bought 160 F-16's in this time frame. He was refused the F-4G (Wild Weasel) aircraft because of its sensitive technology. Sick (1985), p.45; Vance (1983), p.317.

[22] Labrie (1982), p.11; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.84.

[23] Carter (1982), p.435; Richard Cottam, " Goodbye to America's Shah," Foreign Policy, no. 34, 1979, p.9.

[24] Washington Post, October 25, 1980, p.12; Vance (1983), p.322.

[25] John D. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980, p.91. Stempel was the Deputy Chief of the political section of the US Embassy in Tehran during the revolution. See also James A. Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of 1978," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1978-79, p.338

[26] Ledeen and Lewis (1981), pp.85,93,and 95-96.

[27] Vance (1983), p.317.

[28] Ramazani (1982), p.102; Sick (1985), p.34.

[29] Parsons (1984), pp.48-49, states that the Shah also wanted political reforms in order to secure a stable climate for his son to ascend the throne. See also Cottam (1979), p.356.

[30] Sick (1985), p.34; Vance (1983), p.324.

[31] Ioannides (1984), p.29.

[32] Brzezinski (1983), p.357.

[33] U.S. Congress. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Iran: Evaluation of US Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978," Govt. Print. Off., Washington, January 1979. For the quote see Carter (1982), p.438.

[34] Washington Post, October 27, 1980, p.12; Brzezinski (1983), p.359; Rubin (1980), p.209. No US intelligence agency predicted a serious challenge to the Shah.

[35] Sick (1985), p.46.

[36] Brzezinski (1983), p.358; David S. Mclellan, Cyrus Vance, New York: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985, p.129.

[37] Sick, (1985), p.42.

[38] Sullivan (1981), p.144. Instead, the CIA depended largely on SAVAK analyses of political unrest. Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.124.

[39] Barry Rubin, Secrets of State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp.187-188 argues that the thought of the fall of the Shah was so unfitting to the image most policy makers had of him that they simply disregarded it; Ramazani (1982), p.108.

[40] Carter (1982), p.438; Vance (1983), p.326; Stempel (1981), p.118.

[41] Stempel (1981), p.119.

[42] Carter did so on October 10, 26 and 31.; Sick (1985), p.346. With the capture of the US embassy in 1979, a group called The Students Following the Line of Iman published several embassy documents which showed that Carter had supported the Shah throughout 1978 and had avoided contacts with the opposition.

[43] Brzezinski (1983), p.361,2; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.146; Sullivan (1981), p.155.

[44] Sick (1985), p.59; Vance (1983), p.328.

[45] Brzezinski (1983), p.362; Carter (1982), p.439.

[46] Brzezinski (1983), pp.355, 394.

[47] Sick (1985), p.60.

[48] Brzezinski (1983), p.362; Sick (1985), p.63.

[49] Accounts of the meeting are in Brzezinski (1983), pp.363-364; Sick (1985), pp.67-68; Herman Nickel, "The US Failure in Iran," Fortune, March 12, 1979, pp.99-106

[50] Vance (1983), p.329; Brzezinski (1983), p.364; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.159.

[51] Brzezinski (1983), p.365; Sick (1985), p.72; Parsons (1984), p.91; Newsweek, April 28, 1980, p.24.

[52] M. Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History, New York: Stein and Day, 1980, p.165; Sullivan (1981), pp.191-192; Parsons (1984), p.91.

[53] Sick (1985), p.73; Vance (1983), p.329.

[54] Ramazani (1982), pp.111-113.

[55] New York Times, November 7, 1978.

[56] Ramazani (1982), p.114.

[57] Brzezinski (1983), p.367; Sick (1985), p.80.

[58] Idem, pp.354-355; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.144.

[59] The New Republic, November 18, 1978, p.12; Brzezinski (1983), p.394.

[60] Brzezinski (1983), p.397; Stempel (1981), p.290.

[61] Sick (1985), p.173. See also Carter (1982), p.439.

[62] Starting in November 1978, the DOS also had several meetings on the crisis, chaired by Assistant Secretary D. Newsom. These sessions, however, dealt with lesser issues such as measures to evacuate American citizens and crowd control devices for the Shah. See Washington Post, Nov. 7, 1978; Brzezinski (1983), p.366.

[63] David K. Hall, Implementing Multiple Advocacy in the National Security Council: 1947-1980, Ph.D Thesis, Stanford University, 1982, p.61.

[64] Hall (1982), pp.717-720, 724.

[65] Keddie (1981), p.255.

[66] Vance (1983), p.329; Brzezinski (1983), pp.367-368; Sick (1985), pp.81-84; Sullivan (1981), pp.201-202.

[67] Sick (1985), p.86; Sullivan (1981), p.204; Vance (1983), p.330.

[68] Carter (1982), p.440.

[69] Brzezinski (1983), p.382.

[70] Brzezinski (1983), p.370; Rubin (1980), p.214; Sullivan (1981), p.193.

[71] Ramazani (1982), pp.115-118; Stempel (1981), p.290.

[72] Sullivan (1981), p.204.

[73] Vance (1983), p.330; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.160; George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982, pp.475-461.

[74] As quoted in Sick (1985), p.110; Time, February 5, 1979, p.9.

[75] Idem; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.164.

[76] Sick (1985), pp.114-116; Ball (1982), pp.459-460; Washington Post, October 28, 1980, p.10.

[77] Since Vance was absent from the meeting, he instructed Christopher to endorse Ball's report on his behalf. Vance (1983), p.330.

[78] Sick (1985), p.115; Washington Post, October 28, 1980, p.10.

[79] Ball (1982), p.460; Brzezinski (1983), p.374; Carter (1982), p.442; Vance (1983), p.331; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), pp.172-173; Nickel (1979), p.102.

[80] Ball (1980), pp.458, 462; Vance (1983), p.328; Sullivan (1981), p.193; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.162.

[81] Sick (1985), p.118.

[82] Sick (1985), pp.119-121; Washington Post, October 29, 1980, p.20; Newsweek, April 28, 1980, p.25.

[83] Rubin (1985), p.190.

[84] Sick (1985), p.122; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.162. During this time, the administration also considered sending a Carrier Task Force into the Indian Ocean. However, when this became public, the administration reversed itself. Critics have used this occurrence as further evidence of Carter's vacillation during the crisis. See Sick (1985), p.125.

[85] Vance (1983), p.331.

[86] Stempel (1981), p.290; Parson (1984), p.150; Sullivan (1981), p.193.

[87] Vance (1983), p.332; Brzezinski (1983), p.375; Sick (1985), pp.125-126.

[88] Vance (1983), p.332.

[89] Vance (1983), p.333.; See also Washington Post, October 29, 1980, p.20; Sick (1985), p.126.

[90] Brzezinski (1983), p.375.

[91] Sick (1985), p.126.

[92] Brzezinski (1983), p.376; Parsons (1984), p.121; Rubin (1980), p.238.

[93] Ramazani (1982), pp.117,118; Abidi (1979), pp.147-149.

[94] Vance (1983), p.334; Carter (1982), p.443; Sick (1985), p.131.

[95] Stempel (1981), p.295; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.162; Sullivan (1981), p.178; Brzezinski (1983), p.360 acknowledges that he and Zahedi were in regular telephone contact but also states that he knew Zahedi was a biased source of information.

[96] Brzezinski (1983), pp.376-377; Vance (1983), p.335.

[97] Carter (1982), p.443.

[98] Sick (1985), p.139; Sullivan (1981), p.229; Newsweek, April 28, 1980, p.25; Washington Post, October 29, 1980; Time, February 12, 1979, p.34; Stempel (1981), p.300 notes that the United States made a mistake by sending Huyser. While it had received some credit in Iran for getting the Shah out, it now undermined this credit by sending an advisor to the army. Apparently, this consideration was not raised in the NSC meeting.

[99] Ramazani (1982), p.118; Carter (1982), p.445; Time, January 15, 1979, pp.22-25.

[100] Sullivan (1981), p.233; Sick (1985), p.133.

[101] Vance (1983), p.337; Brzezinski (1983), p.381; Carter (1982), p.443.

[102] Carter (1982), p.446; Sullivan (1981), p.214; Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.168; Sick (1985), p.140.

[103] Brzezinski (1983), p.379; Newsweek, April 28, 1980. p.24; New Republic, February 3, 1979, p.12.

[104] E.g. see Carter's press conference on January 17, 1979, New York Times, January 18, 1979, p.18.

[105] Brzezinski (1983), p.385.

[106] Brzezinski (1983), p.382.

[107] Sick (1985), p.145; Sullivan (1981), p.239; Rubin (1980), p.247.

[108] Ramazani (1982), p.139 notes that American policy making at this point was best characterized by "incoherence."; Sick (1985), p.123 notes that towards the end of December communications within the administration deteriorated rapidly.

[109] Vance (1983), p.338. In spite of Huyser's more optimistic reporting on the state of the Iranian army, it appears that he did not persuade them to stage a coup. See also Carter (1982), p.449.

[110] Carter supported the Bakhtiar government publicly until February 5. See Brzezinski (1983), p.390.

[111] Vance (1983), p.341; Carter (1982), p.450; Sick (1985), pp.154- 155. At a last SCC meeting on February 11, most participants realized that the Unites States had lost control of the situation. Meanwhile, Huyser, fearing for his safety, had left Iran.

[112] Gary Sick in The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic, Princeton: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, May 1982, p.167.

[113] Rubin (1985), p.189; Stempel (1981), p.301 are two examples of this line of argument.

[114] While Ball's role as an outside advisor meets the strategy's diversity principle, Brzezinski cannot receive much credit for this. First, it was Blumenthal's suggestion. Second, Brzezinski advocated openly against Ball's option. Moreover, Ball's option was so close to the administration's idea of a coalition government, that it cannot be seen as a new perspective. It certainly was not as far reaching as Precht's option.

[115] Sick (1985), p.128.

[116] Ledeen and Lewis (1981), p.143. See also Vance (1983), p.328; William H. Sullivan, "The Road Not Taken," Foreign Policy, No.40, 1980, pp.175-186, confirms that he had no instructions to confirm Brzezinski's and Zahedi's appeals to the Shah.

[117] Brzezinski (1983), p.396. See also Keddie (1981), p.255.

[118] Ledeen and Lewis (1981), pp.100-102; Rubin (1980), p.255; Parsons (1984), pp.48-49. Others have argued that the Shah's reforms were not very substantial e.g. Sullivan

(1980), p.187.

[119] Sick (1985), p.34; Pahlavi (1980), p.170.

[120] Keddie (1981), p.256 points out, however, that the army was not well prepared to stop a civilian challenge. Instead, it was trained and armed to fight foreign wars. Moreover, the command of the army had been monopolized to such an extent by the Shah himself, that it was incapable of acting without him.

[121] Ledeen and Lewis (1981), pp.153,176; Stempel (1981), p.299; Keddie (1981), p.254.

[122] Sick (1985), p.171. In his memoirs, the Shah claims he did not want to implement the option since it would destroy the possiblity for the future rule of his son. Also, the Shah claims he could not do such a cruel act. However, in light of the forceful methods used by SAVAK, the Shah has little credibility in claiming an image of innocence for himself. Moreover, if this was so, it seems odd that the Shah did mention the option several times to Sullivan.; Pahlavi (1980), p.167.

[123] Brzezinski (1983), p.372.

[124] Moreover, it was thought that while a military government might be able to put down the revolt, it might not be able to rule for very long.

[125] James A. Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of 1978," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1978, pp.323-342; Adda B. Bozeman, "Iran: US Foreign Policy and the Tradition of Persian Statecraft," Orbis, No.2, 1979, pp.387-402. Sick notes that Khomeini's assistants, especially Yazdi, deliberately misled Western public opionion about Khomeini's true intentions. Moreover, he points to the various writings by Khomeini which call for a fundamentalist Islamic regime. See Sick (1985), p.85.

[126] The Soviet factor in this crisis did not receive prominent status for several reasons. First, the USSR, because of its large Islamic population and the fierce anti-Soviet stand of the Shi'ites, appeared as unenthusiastic about the crisis as the West. Second, while the USSR did support the small communist groups, its influence was generally limited. Its ability to exploit the crisis was seen by most administration officials as quite limited. See U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, "US Policy Toward Iran," January 17, 1979; New York Times, November 20, 1978; Sick (1985), p.106.

[127] The 1986 crisis in the Philippines showed that such a shift in allegiance is possible and may at times further American interests.

[128] Sick (1985), pp.165-166; Ioannides (1984), p.32, 61.

[129] Pahlavi (1980), p.19.

[130] Fred Halliday, Soviet Policy in the Arc of Crisis, Washington: Institute For Policy Studies, 1981; Rubin (1980), chapter 9; Jerold D. Green, Revolution in Iran, New York: Praeger, 1982 applies the Huntington thesis to the crisis: since the Shah allowed only economic and social development and thwarted all political development, an inevitable gap occurred which caused the political decay (See Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Decay," World Politics, April 1965, pp.386-430)

[131] Brzezinski (1983), p.354.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY

During most of 1977 and 1978, Carter's foreign policy decision-making process approximated the multiple advocacy strategy. Both the structure of the process, and Carter's role in it resembled the process norms and role tasks formulated by George. Usually, Carter initiated the process by commissioning a Presidential Review Memorandum. PRM 2 on the SALT II negotiations and PRM 24 on Chinese-American normalization exemplify this process. In the first six months of his administration, Carter issued nearly thirty PRM's, thereby setting the agenda for policy decisions through 1980.[1]

These PRM's formed the basis for policy debate among Carter's advisors. Depending on the nature of the issue, either the Policy Review Committee chaired by State or the Special Coordination Committee chaired by Brzezinski's office would start the process of gathering background papers and policy options. In both cases, the effort was a genuine interagency process in which all policy advocates were able to participate. In the SALT II PRM, for example, options from Defense, State, the CIA as well as the NSC were generated through this process.

Brzezinski was the manager in charge of this interagency process. He coordinated the paper flow among the various participants and kept the president informed of the policy discussions among his advisors. Carter took an active

role in this process, personally reading the policy details of nearly every issue. In addition to the policy proposals, Carter read the minutes of the policy meetings of his advisors. When the time had come for a decision, Carter joined his advisors to discuss the policy options, usually in a face-to-face meeting. Major decisions such as the SALT II proposals and the American position in the Ogaden war were made by Carter in the presence of his advisors. During these meetings, Carter invited a wide debate and allowed his preferences to be challenged.[2]

Carter was a "hands on" president who studied all aspects of an issue carefully, and who personally made all final decisions. Yet, he had little experience in international affairs and was willing to listen to his advisors. Although he had strong policy preferences himself, he usually did not preempt the decision-making process.[3] In the SALT II and Chinese-American normalization issues, he did not state his policy choice until his advisors had formulated their policy options. In the war in the Horn of Africa, Carter allowed Brzezinski to call for a review of his policy.

While Carter did not expect Brzezinski to refrain from policy advocacy, it appears that Brzezinski initially concentrated on his role as process manager. Without actively joining the policy debate, Brzezinski coordinated the decision process on the Panama Canal negotiations, human rights (PRM 28), and nuclear proliferation (PRM 15).[4] Also, while Brzezinski had reservations about Vance's plan to

convene a Middle East peace conference, he did not advocate against it directly.[5] In this study, the SALT II decision-making process best exemplifies Brzezinski's initial role. In this case, Brzezinski concentrated on providing sufficient information for the advocates and the president. Also, he did not challenge any of the options and did not attempt to influence policy development. Finally, in the various meetings, he sought a balance between the hard and soft liners on SALT. Brzezinski's behaviour during this process resembles the "honest broker" role formulated by the multiple advocacy strategy.

DECISION-MAKING FLAWS AND HOW TO IMPROVE THE STRATEGY

In spite of the favourable conditions present to foster a wide policy debate, the administration became quickly hampered by a wide consensus on most issues among the advocates. The major advocates such as Vance, Mondale, the various Assistant Secretaries of State, Brown, and Carter's chief domestic advisors did not produce many divergent options nor did they challenge one another's views vigorously. In the Ogaden war, they all agreed the United States should not attempt to challenge the Soviets. Concerning Africa generally, they, as well as UN ambassador Andrew Young, agreed that black political rights were far more important than countering Soviet influence. On

normalizing relations with China, most believed the United States should not pursue a strategic relationship. During the Iranian revolution, nearly all disapproved of the use of force on the part of the Shah.

Several authors have shown that during this administration, the top positions at the Department of State were manned by people very similar in their outlook on foreign affairs.[6] Vance as well as his deputy, Christopher, had essentially the same beliefs and values as most Assistant Secretaries such as Holbrooke (Asian and Pacific Affairs), Lake (Policy Planning), Moose (Africa) and Gelb (Politico-Military Affairs). For example, they rejected as a matter of principle the use of force in American foreign policy. They sought to promote North-South issues over East-West conflicts. Also, they believed that the United States should lead a general transformation in foreign policy goals from balance of power politics to world order politics. They, as well as Mondale, Warnke and Aaron were all critics of the Vietnam war and sought to infuse a new sense of morality into American foreign policy. They wanted a foreign policy less occupied with fighting communism. Instead, the United States should pursue radical disarmament policies, reduce overall arms sales, and promote human rights as a crucial element of American interests.

It is possible that this general convergence of beliefs prevented these advocates from generating a variety of different options. George, in formulating his strategy, assumed that a substantial degree of diverse opinions would

arise on most major decisions. While George does not prescribe that the president deliberately appoint people with different beliefs, the Carter administration suffered from a too concentrated convergence of opinion. Obviously, the president is not advised to appoint advisors who are ideologically hostile to him. However, Carter may have allowed his Secretary of State too much freedom in appointing his assistants. In the end, Carter was surrounded both at the senior level and the level just below by a group of very like-minded advisors.[7] Unlike president Kennedy, Carter had few "allies" in the Department of State. Moreover, the Assistant Secretaries seldom offered advice that was substantially different from the Secretary of State.

George assumes also that the major differences in advice will come from the different department heads. Given the different bureaucratic interests, the various secretaries will offer differing options to the president. The problem in the Carter administration was that Brown did not differ often from Vance, and even when he did, he did not advocate strongly. Only later, when substantial policy conflicts between Vance and Brzezinski arose, was Brown forced to take sides.[8] Finally, Carter's domestic advisors, particularly Jordan, did not join the foreign policy debates until late 1978. Jordan, who harboured less liberal views than Vance, could have offered alternative perspectives had he joined the debates earlier.

Furthermore, because Carter's personal values and

beliefs on America's role in the world converged with Vance's and Mondale's, the administration did not challenge his preferences sufficiently.[9] Thus, while the strategy's process norms and role tasks were approximated, the advocates did not provide Carter with multiple views. Indeed, the case studies indicate that the strategy does not function well without sufficient variation among the advocates. This finding does not mean that the strategy can only function when there are sharp ideological differences among the advisors. Studies of the decision process during the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, have shown that substantively different options can be formulated by a not too ideologically diverse group.[10] Nor does this thesis deny that Brzezinski's unique role in the Carter administration was not clearly related to his ideological incongruity with the other advisors. In spite of these considerations, it appears that the strategy faces considerable odds if too many key advisors agree too readily on the basic values underlying most foreign policy questions.

The failure of the "Deep Cuts" proposals, the Middle East peace initiative, and the administration's efforts to halt Soviet expansionism in Africa may have led Brzezinski to fill the gap in advice the president was getting. For example, he abandoned his "honest broker" role to challenge Carter's policy in the Horn of Africa. Similarly, he advocated a strategic relationship with China, after Vance's trip in 1977 had failed to produce any progress. Also, he challenged Carter and most of his advisors in their belief

that concessions by the Shah would avert a revolution in Iran.

Most of the literature on the Carter presidency argues that Brzezinski, as a skillful bureaucratic infighter, was simply trying to gain dominance over the course of Carter's foreign policy.[11] This study, however, seems to indicate that Brzezinski was addressing a serious flaw in the decision-making process. Carter was consistently receiving a lopsided and partial view of the issues. As the chief coordinator of the decision-making process, Brzezinski attempted to widen the range of options. These conclusions are drawn solely on the basis of observing the behaviour of Brzezinski and the other participants. This study is not primarily concerned with giving normative explanations of why the actors acted as they did. Thus, while Brzezinski may have been concerned with the administration's weak public image or with achieving his own foreign policy objectives, only his actions in the decision-making process are evaluated. Neither the motivations of the players nor their petty personality clashes form the focus of this study. On the basis of this observation of behaviour, the following tentative conclusions can be drawn from this study.

Contrary to George's formulation, custodial advocacy improved the process. During the Ogaden war, Brzezinski's advocacy clarified Carter's objectives in the conflict. While Carter did not accept all of Brzezinski's recommendations, he realized that at least he had to condemn the Soviet role more forcefully. In the Chinese-American

normalization case, Brzezinski's input contributed greatly to Carter's significant foreign policy success. During the Iranian crisis, Brzezinski alone argued for the benefits of the Iron Fist option.

Also, Brzezinski's public speaking during the Ogaden crisis and his diplomatic activities in the US-PRC normalization process did not harm the American position. These activities have been proscribed by the strategy under all conditions. While the findings in this study do not warrant support for all public speaking on the part of the custodian, they do challenge the rigid definition of custodial activities. As in the case of US-PRC normalization, the custodian may at times be a better communicator of the president's objectives than the Secretary of State.[12]

During the war in the Ogaden as well as the early stage of the decision-making process on Chinese-American normalization, Brzezinski advocated while also managing the overall process. No advocates were blocked from the decision forums and all policy disagreements were brought to the president's attention. As such, these cases challenge the strategy's proscription of custodial advocacy.

The second stage in the Chinese-American normalization process as well as the Iran issue show that the strategy breaks down when the custodian neglects to maintain the crucial process norms. While Brzezinski merely offered an additional perspective during the Ogaden war, he went one step further during the normalization process in 1978, and

during the revolution in Iran. In effect, he attempted to block the other advisors from receiving a fair hearing for their options, and did not inform Carter of all the disagreements among his advisors. In the normalization case, Brzezinski tried privately to get Carter to emphasize the strategic relationship between the United States and China while circumventing Vance's objections to this approach. During the Iranian revolution, Brzezinski blocked Precht (DOS Iran officer) from getting a hearing on his proposal to drop American support for the Shah and to back Khomeini instead. As a result, Carter did not hear all sides of the issue and was not informed about all policy conflicts among his advisors. While Brzezinski had previously sought to have Carter make all final decisions and choose among the various perspectives, he now papered over disagreements and presented compromise solutions to the president.

These violations constitute the main explanation for the breakdown of the strategy. While the strategy can work with a custodian who widens the debate by means of genuine advocacy, it cannot work without the observation of the process norms. Indeed, Brzezinski's neglect of these process norms explains the rapid deterioration of the decision-making process starting in 1979. For example, during the decision-making process on American defense strategy (PD 59), the MX missile programme, the Carter Doctrine, and the American response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Brzezinski abandoned the open debate forums as well as the interagency process on formulating options.[13] Instead, he

lobbied, at times privately, with Carter to get his policy preferences implemented at the expense of the other advocates.

When the strategy's process norms were abandoned, the decision-making process resorted to mere Bureaucratic Politics. Each advisor tried his best to lobby with the president for his preferred option. Also, the advisors started to make compromises and trade-offs among one another so as to secure at least some aspects of their policy options. Carter no longer received a full debate on all sides of an issue and could no longer depend on his National Security Advisor for a fair and balanced report on all the options. As a result, he could no longer make an optimal choice from a range of competitive alternatives but had to select that option on which Vance and Brzezinski could agree to some extent. Moreover, as the Iran case illustrates, Vance and Brzezinski also clashed on the implementation of Carter's policy. The custodian's direct involvement in the execution of the president's policy does not benefit the president's policy. His proper role, as this study suggests, is to diversify the policy debate. It is clearly counterproductive to extend this diversification into the realm of policy execution.

Though not the main focus of this thesis, the case studies offer an explanation why the decision-making process deteriorated during the course of the administration. The fundamental flaw in the process was the lack of diversity of opinion among the advocates. Brzezinski attempted to correct

this flaw by advocating alternative options. However, he annulled the positive effects of his advocacy by neglecting to uphold the process norms of the strategy. While custodial advocacy actually improved the process, the violation of the process norms caused its total demise.

MALFUNCTIONS IN THE DECISION PROCESS AND OUTCOMES

The cases studied in this thesis also offer interesting insights into the possible malfunctions in the decision-making process as defined by George. George prescribed multiple advocacy proceedings to reduce certain recurrent failures which he observed in several historical cases of American foreign policy making.

The malfunctions, as George sees them, can be best defined as process management failures. As such, George attempts to identify and diagnose several problems in the decision process which are not primarily related to psychological aberrations in the participants, man-machine errors or other flaws which are not perceptibly affected by variation in the decision-making process.[14] In formulating a list of such malfunctions, George asked the following questions: Did a malfunction occur, and how suitable and certain is the data so that we can draw such an inference with some confidence? Did the malfunction in the process affect the content of the final policy decision? Had the

malfunction not occurred, could the decision have been different? Finally, how important was the malfunction in relation to the many other variables that help explain the decision outcome?

These questions, as George acknowledges, raise more methodological and epistomological questions than can be answered. The question of the relative weight of the process vis-a-vis the other factors can not be answered conclusively. Decisional premises such as ideology and cognitive beliefs have a way of influencing subtly every aspect of the decision process. George responds to this problem by stating that he employs these questions merely to highlight several problems in the decision process. He does not claim to offer an exhaustive or final historical account of the causes of failure in several American foreign policy cases.

Inevitably involved in an analysis of the decision process is the link between malfunctions in the process and poor decisions as a result of these malfunctions. As discussed before, George limits his scope of analysis to saying that a poor decision process increases the likelihood of poor decisions. But how is one to evaluate "poor" or "good" policy outcomes? George realizes that this question is highly normative and raises questions about subjectivity. He excludes the notion that a normative approach necessarily means whether the investigator merely agrees with the political values and objectives of the policy maker.[15] At a more objective level, he proposes whether "it was the best

decision under the circumstances that prevailed at the time."[16] By decision, he means the more narrow decision-making output rather than the larger policy outcome. The latter is the larger outcome or evolution of the decisional output which is affected by other factors and subsequent events, often outside the perception of the decision-makers at the time. An evaluation of the larger policy outcome would inevitably use the benefits of hindsight and as such demand an unfair level of wisdom and foresight from the decision-makers.

Whether it was the best decision at the time, according to George, is measured by the following criteria: How attainable were the policy goals chosen, and how suitable were the means employed? How timely and flexible was the American response, and how accurate was the calculation of support for it? Finally, how accurate was the calculation of capabilities and the predicted long term consequences?

With the use of a small number of historical cases, George identifies nine possible malfunctions in the decision-making process.[17] Several of these are useful to identify the malfunctions in the decision process during the Carter administration. Also, given the close approximation of the multiple advocacy strategy during the early stages of the administration, several of George's malfunctions illustrate the positive effect of the custodian's actions to correct shortcomings in the process. Like George, I do not claim to provide an exhaustive or conclusive explanation of all the factors that produced policy failures or policy

successes. Also, my analysis is restricted to failures in process management only. As mentioned at certain points throughout this thesis and chapter, neither the president's cognitive beliefs nor ideological commitments are assumed to be unimportant. Also, my emphasis on the decision process is not intended to downplay the significance of other decisional premises. Moreover, my brief evaluations of the decision-making outputs are not intended as substitutes for a comprehensive evaluation of the policy outcomes of the four decision cases examined here. Instead, as George, I will offer some comments on the degree to which the decisions were optimal under the circumstances at the time, and the degree to which these outputs can be related to the decision process.

A lack of critical examination of all aspects involved in a policy option best describes the chief malfunction during the "Deep Cuts" decision process. One of George's listed malfunctions occurs "when the president asks advisors for their opinions on a preferred course of action but does not request a qualified group to examine more carefuly the negative judgment offered by one or more advisors."[18] George illustrates this malfunction in light of the Bay of Pigs invasion early in the Kennedy administration. The advocates of the invasion were not challenged in their arguments because the "opponents" did not speak up and the president did not encourage a substantial review of the arguments in favour of the invasion. Instead, Kennedy adjusted slightly several details of the plan to suit his personal values and

interests. George argues that the resulting fiasco can be linked to the absence of critical review.

A similar scenario unfolded during the first months of the Carter administration. While Vance had serious hesitations about the Deep Cuts proposals, he did not speak up clearly. Carter was impressed by the carefully prepared advocacy in favour of Deep Cuts by Brown and Aaron. While Carter was not committed to Deep Cuts, he seemed to lean more towards that option than towards the more conservative Vladivostok option. Yet, through the policy briefs submitted to him by Brzezinski, Carter must have been aware of the hesitations of Vance and Warnke. However, Carter did nothing to advance their opportunity to make their case.

It is this combination of weak advocacy by several advisors and no request of review by the president that caused Carter to choose the Deep Cuts option without being sufficiently aware of its probable consequences. The role of the custodian in this issue was largely managerial and policy neutral. However, he failed to call for a review of Vance's hesitations by a group of other specialists. As mentioned before, the US ambassador in Moscow should have been involved in this process. He would have been in a good position to predict the possible Soviet response to the proposals.

As argued throughout this thesis, George's call for a review of the policy options by a group of specialists or outsiders is a theoretically sound idea. Yet, it is not always feasible. A president's obsession with policy leaks,

even though they may come largely from his own close circle of advisors, leads him to curtail often arbitrarily the number of insider advisors. As a result, I have argued that such a critical review can often be better performed by the custodian. While Brzezinski did not always do this consistently and evenhandedly, he did perform this role in several key decisions discussed.

In the SALT case such a review was absent. It appears quite likely that the Soviets rejected Carter's proposals because of his sudden departure from Vladivostok. Yet, to assess this policy outcome in the long view is difficult. While it stalled the SALT talks for some time in the administration, it did not kill them. Although some critics have argued that this delay proved detrimental in light of the other obstacles to SALT that kept building up, we will never know all the factors that prevented Carter from achieving a ratified arms treaty with the Soviets. I believe the most detrimental result of this decision was that it produced a substantial setback to Carter's pronounced and eagerly sought goal to have a foreign policy success early in his term.

Another malfunction, according to George, occurs "when the president and his advisors agree too readily on the nature of the problem facing them and on a response to it."[19] Typically, George argues, this malfunction occurs when the decision-makers are confronted with a crisis and they all agree that something must be done to protect American interests. This sudden surge for a "need for

action" tends to produce a poorly thought through consensus. If not challenged, the typical error made will be to decide upon some action without a clear estimation of the risks and costs involved. As an example, George uses the decision during president Johnson's term to send troops to the Dominican Republic.

To avoid this mistake, the consensus must be challenged. George states that General Ridgway did exactly this when he challenged Eisenhower's advisors in their consensus to send U.S. troops to help the French at Dienbienphu. As a result of the challenge, the decision-making process improved greatly.[20]

The war in the Horn of Africa offers an interesting case study in view of this malfunction. Contrary to the more common phenomenon of a consensus for action, here we find an early consensus against any U.S. action. Nearly all of Carter's advisors believed that the Somalis had brought the havoc of war upon themselves. Moreover, even though the Soviet and Cuban counteroffensive was massive, they believed that Carter's Africa policy would be damaged from any American military involvement in the conflict and that the Soviet involvement did not affect American interests adversely. Leaving aside the question whether American involvement would have been in the US interest or not, the decision-making process was badly marred by a very onesided consensus.

Since no advisor challenged this consensus, Brzezinski did. Even though this constituted genuine advocacy, it

greatly improved the process. The custodian pointed out the considerable security interests the United States had in the Red Sea area. Moreover, he alerted Carter to the concern of regionally important allies such as Egypt and Iran. Finally, he alerted Carter to the possibly dangerous precedent set by a very passive American response to overt Soviet military aid in Africa and Soviet supported Cuban direct involvement in the conflict. While Carter did not change the substance of his policy, he did, in response to Brzezinski's challenge, indicate in a much stronger manner to the Soviets that their behaviour could worsen overall American-Soviet relations. Whether president Carter's policy combined with the public statements of concern improved the overall decision is very difficult to ascertain. Advocates of a reduced American role in third party conflicts believed that the public comments harmed US-Soviet relations unnecessarily. Others, however, have argued that the "weak" policy caused the Soviets to feel more comfortable in embarking upon other explorations, particularly Afghanistan. Others yet, have argued that the two are not related in any meaningful way. While Brzezinski's views of Soviet behaviour may be highly biased, he performed a crucial function in making Carter more aware of possible repercussions of his actions in Africa.

Another malfunction identified by George results from a decision process where "there is no advocate for an unpopular policy option."[21] George identifies this phenomenon as the main weakness in the American response to

the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950. No one in the president's circle appeared to consider not to commit U.S. troops to the conflict. Clearly, the Horn case as discussed above deals with this malfunction as well. But the Carter decision process often fell victim to this shortcoming. In the China case, several advisors were aware of the "strategic cooperation" option. Vance, however, rejected it out of hand, fearing that any Sino-American strategic cooperation would unduly alienate the Soviets. Nor did it apparantly appeal to Vance as a bargaining chip vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Defense Secretary Brown was not opposed to increased Sino-American cooperation on strategic matters. However, he never became a forceful advocate for it and certainly did not challenge Vance's opposition to it. As a result, it was again Brzezinski who was left to defend the possible advantages of such a relationship. While he was not loath to advocate this option, his role could have been muted if some other advisor had advocated it. Bzezinski's advocacy widened Carter's options in achieving normalization.

While Brzezinski improved the process by adding an unpopular option, he did not attempt to improve it any further. Conspicuously absent from Carter's normalization debate were the pro-Taiwan advocates. As in the Korean case, nobody challenged the fundamental question whether the United States should at all normalize relations with China. Indeed, it can be argued that there was an early consensus to normalize relations with China while the possible costs

in US-Taiwanese relations received only tactical attention.[22] The custodian failed to bring in advocates for this option. Therefore, while Brzezinski widened the range of options with his views, he did not go far enough in improving the process.

In a narrow view, Brzezinski's strategic option helped Carter achieve his goal of Sino-American normalization. As such, the improved decision process can be related to a succesful decisional output. Obviously, the strategic option is only one factor among many. Above all, the decision outcome constitutes an agreement between two large countries. Therefore, there are a host of factors at the Chinese side that go towards explaining the outcome. It appears, however, that the Chinese wanted a strategically closer relationship, at least in the diplomatic sphere, than Vance was willing to offer. Carter, who appears to have been more interested in getting a foreign policy success than in the means by which the success should be achieved, was not committed to Vance's position. While a clear alternative option should have been advocated by Brown or any other advisor, there was no one to do so. Apart from Brzezinski's personal interests, he filled the vacuum and thereby improved the process.

In a more longer term view, which George calls the policy outcome evaluation, several weaknesses can be identified as a result of Brzezinski's actions. George's malfunction number seven occurs "when the key assumptions and premises of a plan have been evaluated only by the

advocates of that option."[23] Brzezinski's and Carter's private deliberations on the nature and tone of Sino-American strategic relations can be seen as an error of this type. Brzezinski's use of the term hegemony was not subjected to a sufficient debate within the administration. Moreover, Brezezinski's handling of the negotiations was also not scrutinized adequately. As a result, Soviet-American relations were perhaps unnecessarily strained in order to achieve normalization.

Another malfunction, discussed by George, sheds light on the problems in the decision-making process on the American response to the Iranian crisis. Malfunction two is identified "when advisors and advocates take different positions and debate them before the president but their disagreements do not cover the full range of relevant hypotheses and alternative options."[24] George offers the example of the gradual US involvement in the Vietnam war. While the administration, in the early stages of the escalating US involvement, discussed amply the different levels of American response, no one developed a plan or advocated total US withdrawal.[25]

Carter's decision process during the gradual but steady decline of the Shah's rule was marred by several malfunctions. While everyone was aware of the "iron fist" solution, no one was willing to defend this option in front of the president. To some degree this can be explained by the fact that most advisors knew that Carter personally was not able or willing to use American power in such a cruel or

violent way. However, the result was that there were no advocates for an unpopular option. This malfunction, as discussed above, was again corrected by Brzezinski. However, I believe a more serious shortcoming in the decision process is identified by George as a lack of a full range of relevant alternative hypotheses.

Similar to the Vietnam question, Carter did not hear a comprehensive argument in favour of not supporting the Shah at all. Yet, there was a strong advocate in the administration who was ready to do so at an early stage. The Precht option could have improved the decision process considerably. However, as it was, Carter was restricted to a persistent and subtle prodding by Brzezinski on harsher methods, while most other advisors sought compromise positions. As a result, Carter muddled through the crisis vacillating between moderate support for the Shah and moderate support for reforms.

While it is extremely difficult to speculate whether any alternative US action would have produced different results in Iran, it is clear that the decision process did not facilitate the possiblity of considering different courses of action. As such, the role violations by the custodian go a long way towards explaining these fundamental flaws in this decision-making process.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE STRATEGY

The four case studies examined in this thesis provide the basis for the following conclusions. The strategy's role prescriptions and proscriptions failed to deal adequately with a lack of diversity of opinion among the advocates. The idea of inviting outsiders to widen the debate appears useful but often not very feasible. Carter, who was a very open minded president, and who tolerated high levels of dissent among his advisors, only used the prescription once. George Ball entered the decision process during the Iranian revolution. However, Ball's views were not very different from the existing options, and he did not have enough influence to change Carter's mind. Even a tolerant president like Carter had built a certain rapport with his close advisors which was not easily penetrated by an outsider. Moreover, Carter, like many presidents before him, became obsessed with leaks. As a result, he became loath to widen his circle of advisors.

Though less perfect, an alternative way to correct a lack of divergent options is to let the custodian advocate when necessary. However, if the lack of options among the advocates persists over a long period of time, it likely leads to custodial advocacy at the expense of the process norms. George and Hall are correct in claiming that custodial advocacy conflicts with his task as process manager only when custodial advocacy is needed time and

again. However, they are incorrect in proscribing custodial advocacy as a procedure to correct a lack of options among the advocates per se. Also, the strategy need not prohibit all public speaking and diplomacy on the part of the custodian, once the president has made a clear policy decision.

On the basis of this study, the following recommendations can be made to improve the strategy. First, the president may want to select a wide range of advocates with a considerable spread in beliefs and values concerning foreign affairs. The multiple advocacy strategy is likely made more effective when the president selects his advisors carefully on the basis of their potential contribution to the overall policy debate. This is by no means an easy requirement to meet and has not received adequate attention in George's original formulation of the strategy. During the election campaign, the president accumulates a certain amount of political debt which limits his freedom to appoint whomever he wants. Also, he is constrained by the need to have people around him whom he knows well and whom he can trust. Often, these people have values and beliefs close to his. While recognizing this dilemma, the strategy, in its pursuit to improve the presidential advisory process, must provide the president with yet another criterion by which to select advisors. While not easy, this requirement is not impossible to achieve. Certainly, the president has the right, and if he accepts the strategy's rationale, the power to appoint people who can provide him with genuine

alternative perspectives. According to the evidence found in this thesis, this requirement constitutes an important starting point for the strategy's successful operation.

Second, when the advocates do not produce a wide variety of options, the custodian should be allowed to offer alternatives. However, custodial advocacy should not become institutionalized: custodial advocacy should not become a permanent correction for a lack of debate among the advocates. Moreover, when the custodian offers an alternative option he should not be permitted to assist in the execution of policy. Third, the president must insist that the custodian continues to uphold the process norms while adding his option to the debate. Last, when the advocates consistently fail to produce a wide variety of options, it is better to replace them than to let the custodian continue to advocate. These recommendations do not challenge the core of the multiple advocacy strategy, but serve to make it stronger and thus more useful to presidents in the quest for better advice in an increasingly complex world.

CONCLUSION

George's multiple advocacy strategy provides a useful tool for presidents in the organization of their advisory process. George has succesfully assembled various insights

from the decision-making literature on how to strengthen the analytical aspects of the decision-making process. From Jervis, for example, comes the notion that the decision-maker is well served by advisors who attempt to analyze the problem at hand from as many different perspectives as possible. Building on Janis' work, George has formulated several procedures to reduce the negative aspects of small group interaction. Keeping Allison's Bureaucratic Politics model in mind, George has sought to structure the advisory process in such a way as to minimize the damage caused by departmental bargaining.

This study has shown that in many ways George's strategy improves the decision-making process along lines outlined by him. In his 1972 and 1980 studies, George identifies several malfunctions in the decision-making process.[26] Among these are a lack of sufficient options brought to the president's attention, an unwillingness by the advisors to advocate unpopular options, a tendency toward premature agreement among the advisors on a preferred option, and an inadequate evaluation of the options by the advisors.

During the first two years of the Carter administration, these malfunctions were often present. However, with the incorporation of the enlarged role of the custodian, the strategy was able to correct these malfunctions. Indeed, the case studies show that the addition of alternative perspectives by the custodian improved the process. George's fundamental assumption that

presidents benefit from hearing multiple perspectives appears sound in the case of the Carter presidency. Carter, who was highly idealistic, yet inexperienced in international affairs, would probably have fared worse had he only received advice from one advisor who shared his values and beliefs. While this study did not evaluate several competing models of presidential decision-making, it appears that a more formalistic or hierarchical advisory system such as the one used during the Nixon administration, where one personal advisor filters all the policy options to the president, would not have benefitted Carter as much as the multiple advocacy strategy.

At the same time, however, this point illustrates that the multiple advocacy strategy is strongly dependent on the style and personality of the president. It was Carter's insistence on open policy discussions and collegial decision-making that allowed the advisors to contribute competing perspectives to the decision process. Thus, when Carter became less interested in open decision-making and more interested in quick foreign policy successes (e.g. in the case of normalizing relations with China and during the Iranian revolution), the implementation of the strategy deteriorated rapidly.

Inevitably, during a president's term in office, he becomes less interested in the quality of his decision-making process than in the actual things he can get done. This fact limits the analytical prescriptions George seeks to make to the process. George is aware of this problem. He

acknowledges that while the strategy emphasizes that the president ought to choose that option which is analytically most suitable or which serves the national interest best, the president also needs to consider the acceptability of his decision, its timing, and its political survivability. As such, there are clear limits to the degree to which the strategy can make the decision-making process more rational or analytical. For example, Carter's consideration of his options on SALT II and on normalizing relations with China was constrained by the political costs and benefits these decisions would produce in his relations with Congress. Similarly, the advocates are subject to pressures which are also not easily accounted for by a model like the multiple advocacy strategy. Vance, for example, was initially very deferential to the president and reluctant to compete in open debate forums. Yet, he had diplomatic experience from serving in previous administrations which was not easily matched by the other advocates. The strategy does not have, at present, a mechanism to incorporate various intangible factors nor the ability to weigh these for their importance or usefulness in the process.

As it stands, the strategy relies on orderly procedures and clearly defined role tasks to produce as many multiple perspectives as possible to consider a decision issue. However, in light of the president's need for acceptable decisions, as well as the advocates' varied experiences and knowledge, relying on open debates and multiple perspectives per se to reveal the costs and benefits of various courses

of action, may not be enough. The strategy needs to incorporate less tangible factors such as political judgement and diplomatic experience and provide for a method whereby these factors can not only be added to the debate, but also be weighed for their merit and purpose. As discussed in this study, Hamilton Jordan's political advice clarified Carter's goals and helped him in the decision process. Similarly, had Carter made use of more seasoned diplomats during the decision process on SALT II, he would have been more reluctant to surprise the Soviets with his Deep Cuts proposals.

The prescriptive use of such substantive factors as political advice and diplomatic experience is by no means easy. Devising a mechanism whereby the tangible and intangible decision factors can be appropriately weighed for their merit and purpose is even more difficult. Formulating such mechanisms would tend to narrow even further the small distance between prescribing the "how" of decision-making (which George intends for his strategy) and the "what" of decision-making. Also, like the other prescriptions, these mechanisms would not guarantee that the president will make better decisions. However, it appears useful to continue to improve prescriptive models of presidential decision-making simply because presidents do make use of less tangible factors than covered by George's strategy but not always in the most optimal manner.

ENDNOTES

[1] Sam C. Sarkesian, Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter's First Years, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, pp.122-128.

[2] See interview with Hamilton Jordan in US News & World Report, February 21, 1977, p.16; National Journal, July 16, 1977, p.1108.

[3] Several exceptions to this rule are Carter's Camp David decision and his decision not to deploy the Neutron Bomb.

[4] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983, p.96; Sarkesian (1979), p.122; Newsweek, May 9, 1977, pp.55-58.

[5] Brzezinski (1983), p.88.

[6] Irving M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984; Coral Bell President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue?, Canberra: Australian National University, 1982; Brian Klunk, Consensus and the American Mission, Lantam, Mo: University Press of America, 1986; Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986, chapter 2.

[7] Carl M. Brauer, Presidential Transitions, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p.193; Smith (1986), p.44

[8] Richard Halloran, New York Times, December 7, 1980; Brzezinski (1983), pp.44-47.

[9] Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision-Making, New York: Praeger, 1984, p.171; Hedley Donovan, From Roosevelt to Reagan, New York: Harper & Row, 1985, chapter 16

[10] E.g. see: Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971

[11] Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1985, p.563; Smith (1986); Barry Rubin, Secrets of State, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985; M. Glenn Abernathy et al., (eds.), The Carter Years, London: Frances Pinter, 1984; Stanley Hoffmann, Dead Ends, Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1983.

[12] Hamilton Jordan, Crises, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1982, p.49, argues that Vance's public statements did not satisfy Carter and that Carter allowed Brzezinski to fill this gap at times. For Carter's as well as Jody Powell's agreement on this see Brauer (1986), p.208.

[13] Garthoff (1985), chapter 19; Brzezinski (1983), pp.429-437.

[14] George (1972), p.767

[15] Idem, p.769

[16] Idem. p.768

[17] The following are the nine malfunctions: 1. When the president and his advisors agree too readily on the nature of the problem facing them and on a response to it. 2. When advisors and advocates take different positions and debate them before the president but their disagreements do not cover the full range of relevant hypotheses and alternative options. 3. When there is no advocate for an unpopular policy option. 4. When advisors thrash out their own disagreements over policy without the president's knowledge and confront him with an unanimous recommendation. 5. When advisors agree privately among themselves that the president should face up to a difficult decision, but no one is willing to alert him to the need for doing so. 6. When the president, faced with an important problem to decide, is dependent upon a single channel of information. 7. When the key assumptions and premises of a plan have been evaluated only by the advocates of the option. 8. When the president asks advisors for their opinions on a preferred course of action but does not request a qualified group to examine more carefully the negative judgement offered by one or more advisors. 9. When the president is impressed by the consensus among his advisors on behalf of a particular policy but fails to ascertain how firm the consensus is, how it was achieved, and whether it is justified. See George (1979), pp.769-781

[18] George (1972), p.779

[19] George (1972), p.769

[20] George (1972), p.770

[21] George (1972), p.773

[22] Personal correspondence with a senior administration official

[23] George (1972), p.778

[24] Idem, p.772

[25] Later in the conflict , George Ball performed this role. However, it appears that president Johnson did not take him seriously. George, (1972), pp. 772-774

[26] George (1972), pp.767-781; Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy, Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1980, pp.121-133

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