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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Contract negotiation, incomplete contracting, and asymmetric information : (essays in managerial accounting research) Xie, Jia-Zheng James


This thesis contributes to the managerial accounting research literature. The methodology used is basically analytical modelling. Part I focuses on voluntary financial accounting disclosure. Following a detailed survey of the existing literature, an analytical model of an entry game with continua of types is provided to advance the results of prior research. By explicitly considering both a potential entrant and potential investors, this model incorporates two opposing forces that may influence an incumbent's decision to disclose or withhold private information. Various equilibria are characterized and discussed. Part II of the thesis focuses on firms' contractual relationships. The analyses extend traditional agency theory analysis to situations in which complete contracting is costly. Two models related to incomplete contracting are offered. One model analyzes the influence of contracting costs on a firm's contracting strategy in the context of the firm's internal transfer of goods and services. The results of this analysis provide insights and a new basis for the research of the transfer pricing issue. The second model deals with the incentive issues within organizations. The analysis focuses on the situations in which verifiable performance measures are unavailable. In the model, two kinds of incentives, namely, high-powered and low-powered incentives, are analyzed. We find that contract renewal based on observable (but non-verifiable information) can provide useful low-powered incentives in an hierarchical organization in which employees build up human capital. This may provide useful insights into managerial accounting system design.

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