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Pervasiveness of self : a critique of P.F. Strawson’s reactive theory of responsibility Scotland, Andrea Jacqueline
Abstract
In this thesis, I argue that P.F. Strawson seriously underestimates the controversial nature of the beliefs and attitudes of which the retributive reactive attitudes (RAs) often involve. Although he acknowledges that the RAs involve a "seamy side," he fails to admit they frequently commit the reactive person to psychological, if not metaphysical, beliefs that violate principles of impartiality and rationality. As we shall, this is important in the dialectical context of "Freedom and Resentment", because Strawson's goal of reconciling the compatibilists and incompatibilists about moral responsibility requires the RAs to be free of such controversial presuppositions. I argue that because more modest versions of "seamy" retributive RAs are grounded in false and egoistic beliefs, the incompatibilist will remain skeptical that the gap in consequentialist compatibilism can be filled by the won-metaphysical fact of our "natural proneness" to take up the reactive stance
Item Metadata
Title |
Pervasiveness of self : a critique of P.F. Strawson’s reactive theory of responsibility
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Creator | |
Publisher |
University of British Columbia
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Date Issued |
2001
|
Description |
In this thesis, I argue that P.F. Strawson seriously underestimates the controversial
nature of the beliefs and attitudes of which the retributive reactive attitudes (RAs) often
involve. Although he acknowledges that the RAs involve a "seamy side," he fails to admit
they frequently commit the reactive person to psychological, if not metaphysical, beliefs that
violate principles of impartiality and rationality. As we shall, this is important in the
dialectical context of "Freedom and Resentment", because Strawson's goal of reconciling the
compatibilists and incompatibilists about moral responsibility requires the RAs to be free of
such controversial presuppositions. I argue that because more modest versions of "seamy"
retributive RAs are grounded in false and egoistic beliefs, the incompatibilist will remain
skeptical that the gap in consequentialist compatibilism can be filled by the won-metaphysical
fact of our "natural proneness" to take up the reactive stance
|
Extent |
6248145 bytes
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Genre | |
Type | |
File Format |
application/pdf
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Language |
eng
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Date Available |
2009-08-06
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Provider |
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
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Rights |
For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
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DOI |
10.14288/1.0090136
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URI | |
Degree | |
Program | |
Affiliation | |
Degree Grantor |
University of British Columbia
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Graduation Date |
2001-11
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Campus | |
Scholarly Level |
Graduate
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Aggregated Source Repository |
DSpace
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Item Media
Item Citations and Data
Rights
For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.