PERVASIVENESS OF SELF: A CRITIQUE OF P.F. STRAWSON'S REACTIVE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY by ANDREA JACQUELINE SCOTLAND B.A. (Hon.), Simon Fraser University, 1999 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Philosophy We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 2001 © Andrea Jacqueline Scotland, 2001 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT In this thesis, I argue that P.F. Strawson seriously underestimates the controversial nature of the beliefs and attitudes of which the retributive reactive attitudes (RAs) often involve. Although he acknowledges that the RAs involve a "seamy side," he fails to admit they frequently commit the reactive person to psychological, if not metaphysical, beliefs that violate principles of impartiality and rationality. As we shall, this is important in the dialectical context of "Freedom and Resentment", because Strawson's goal of reconciling the compatibilists and incompatibilists about moral responsibility requires the RAs to be free of such controversial presuppositions. I argue that because more modest versions of "seamy" retributive RAs are grounded in false and egoistic beliefs, the incompatibilist will remain skeptical that the gap in consequentialist compatibilism can be filled by the won-metaphysical fact of our "natural proneness" to take up the reactive stance. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii Table of Contents iii Acknowledgements v Dedication vi INTRODUCTION 1 Notes 24 CHAPTER I Strawson's Reconciliation Project 28 Section One Strawsonian Minimalism and the Vindication of the Reactive Attitudes 28 Section Two Incompatibilist Objections, Dialectical Impasse 35 Notes 39 CHAPTER II Some Explanatory Failings of Strawsonian Minimalism 42 Section One Watson Psychopathy and Child Abuse 43 Section Two Wallace on Exempting Normative Incompetence 50 Notes 58 CHAPTER III The Seamy Side of Retributive Reactivity 60 Section One Explanatory Inadequacies of Strawsonian Minimalism 62 Section Two The Projection Hypothesis 66 Section Three Projection as One Breach of Impartiality 76 Section Four Commonplace Breaches of Reactive Impartiality 81 Notes 84 iii CHAPTER IV Purifying the Retributive Attitudes? 85 Section One The Institutional Protection of Reactivity From Partiality? 86 Section Two The Sympathy Defense 88 Notes 98 CHAPTER V Conclusion: The Dialectical Implications of the Seamy Side 99 Notes 109 Works Cited 111 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS "It has been said that the highest praise of God consists in the denial of Him by the atheist, who finds creation so perfect that he can dispense with a creator." — Marcel Proust The love and assistance of the following people have given me the ability to write this thesis, and, more importantly, to find "creation so perfect": John Christianson, Kari Coleman, the Dick family (especially my stepmother Marlies), Professor Jim Dybikowski, Mary Graydon, Professor Phil Hanson, Bill Hay, Professor Ray Jennings, Joanne Miller, Professor Paul Russell, Jeff and Deanna Scotland, Miller Scotland-Sobolewski, Joe Sheridan, Sondra Sterling, and Tanya Wulff. I am particularly indebted to Mahri Mackenzie, Earl Marsh, Val and Gordon Scotland, and Jacqueline and Ed Unger for their unbounded parental love, and to Debbie B., Dawn D., Wendy L., Lisa P. and other girlfriends of Bill for (my Higher Power) their inspiration. Finally, the "highest praise" to the blissful reprieve of Wendy Miko and Judith Stapleton, the technical genius of Nicole Friedrich and Chuck Robinson, the untiring devotion of Saint Jimbo (Jim Cullina), and, especially, the love (and enduring patience) of Steve Sobolewski. DEDICATION Mon raison d'etre Nathanael and Donovan Dick. vi INTRODUCTION What sort of 'true' moral responsibility is being said to be both impossible and widely believed in? An old story is helpful in clarifying this question. This is the story of heaven and hell. As I understand it, true moral responsibility is responsibility of such a kind that, if we have it, then it makes sense, at least, to suppose that it could be just to punish some of us with (eternal) torment in hell and reward others with (eternal) bliss in heaven (Galen Strawson, "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility" 9). One does not have to believe in heaven and hell to be among those for whom the existence of moral responsibility "makes sense." In fact, we may ordinarily assume holding persons morally responsible, for at least some of their actions, at least some of the time, is appropriate. While most people do not hold roses morally responsible for pricks of thorns nor snakes for venomous bites, many do hold persons morally responsible, at least sometimes, for things like murder or neglecting a child. Although we acknowledge persons commit wrongs for which they are not responsible, such as those committed accidentally, many suppose there are others, whether Nazi war crimes, corporate tax evasion or sexual harassment, for which persons should be held morally responsible. But, although many in society assume we ought to hold persons morally responsible at least sometimes, under what conditions (if any) does it "make sense" to do so? If the terrain were not hazardous enough, the question of human freedom and moral responsibility becomes particularly daunting when we ponder the truth of metaphysical determinism: Is moral responsibility compatible with a causally determined world? If all our choices, decisions and actions are necessitated by preceding causes, how can it be right to blame or 1 punish persons for the wrongs they commit? Is it appropriate for wrongdoers, and those holding them to account, to experience negative moral emotions such as guilt, or resentment — if everything (including human action) is determined by causal antecedents?1 What if many, if not all, ordinary assumptions about moral responsibility are mistaken? We may be right, children, the mentally ill, the compelled and coerced — to say nothing of rose bushes and slithering snakes — should not be held morally responsible. But, contrary to what many in society think, the truth of metaphysical determinism may mean roses pricking fingers and snakes that bite, may share important similarities with parents abusing children and mercenaries that fight. A causally determined world could mean everything, from the stings of nettles to human slavery, is caused by prior events over which persons possess little to no control. Consequently, many, perhaps all, beliefs presupposed by the practice of attributing moral responsibility may turn out to be false. Moreover, over and beyond the problems involved with the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, providing a satisfactory account that coheres with our sense of justice also proves elusive. Historically, full personhood or moral responsibility for actions was thought to require such odd prerequisites as being male, the ownership of private property, the possession of a human soul, free will, even Christian baptism (Lloyd). Today, in spite of metaphysical and theological controversies such as grace and predestination, many continue to support the idea that moral responsibility requires free will (if not private property, maleness, or Christian baptism). Attempts are made to strip free will of it's obscure metaphysical and theological pretensions as being morally responsible is said to require 'free choice,' 'free action,' 'alternative possibilities' or the 'ability to act otherwise' (Kane, Van Inwagen). Although the association of moral responsibility with free will continues to play a 2 strong roll in the Western psyche, many reject the notion as superstitious and unsubstantiated by the human and social sciences. Rather than grounding moral responsibility in free will and a conception of persons as the "ultimate, buck-stopping originator(s)" of their actions (Galen Strawson, Freedom and Belief 26), there are others who argue moral responsibility requires certain sorts of "control" over actions, and the completion of a series of antecedent deliberative processes (Fisher and Ravizza). Here, however, we focus on yet another alternative to the free will legacy. According to this perspective, rather than deliberation and control, appropriate attributions of praise and blame, punishment and reward presuppose little more than beliefs about another's "intentions" (P.F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment"). Rather than such dubious criteria as owning private property, or belonging to the right race or gender, the nature of a person's intentions may (somehow) represent something morally meaningful about them, such as the expression of their higher-order commitments (Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will"). For some of us this may sound right. We may, in fact, blame or hold perpetrators to account upon discovering the presence of intentions to harm, or the lack of good intentions or care. But, what makes a person's intentions morally significant? What if the source of a person's intentions raises doubts about their importance to moral responsibility? Versions of the following problem pose a perennial haunt for theorists of all stripes in the moral responsibility debate. Suppose we find at least some of the proceeding makes sense. We may agree, for instance, people do ordinarily attribute moral responsibility or experience resentment towards those who harm us, upon coming to believe the perpetrator freely chose or intends to harm us. But, we may also agree part of what it means to act freely or intend to inflict harm is wanting or desiring that one's actions inflict harm. After all, it is 3 hard to imagine someone who freely chooses or intends to inflict harm, who is morally responsible, who does not want to inflict the harm they are morally responsible for inflicting. It just doesn't seem right to hold someone morally responsible for harming us if we discover the perpetrator did not want to harm us. It seems whether the solution to the moral responsibility debate involves free will, control, or intentional action, all seem to involve the nature of human wants or preferences. But, if the nature of wants or desires is central to any adequate account of moral responsibility, how do we know someone does, in fact, wants to act the way they do? Some theorists argue persons do want to act the way they do, unless they are physically forced to do so by some external force (Hobbes). In other words, according to this minimalist position, persons want to do pretty much all they actually do, (including inflict harms). Unless pushed, shoved or are otherwise forced by some external physical source, we ought to hold all wrongdoers morally responsible, blame, even punish, them. But, clearly, this won't do. There are all sorts of actions committed (or omitted) without the involvement of a push or a shove (or any other external physical force or impediment) for which persons do not seem morally responsible. For instance, the mentally ill and children act without being physically forced. It does not, however, seem right to hold them morally responsible. If "wanting" or "desiring" to act is defined minimally as acting in the absence of physical coercion or impediment, then, sufferers of childhood abuse, addiction, brainwashing, psychological coercion, desperation, hypnotism and so on, would be held morally responsible, blamed, even punished for most (if not all) their wrongs. If moral responsibility involves such things as free will, control, or intentional action, but these also involve personal preferences or desires, then any adequate account of moral responsibility 4 may face the problem of not only identifying, but also evaluating the source of preferences and desires. After all, acquiring preferences or desires may involve such morally dubious sources as propaganda, hypnotism, addiction or fear. Praising someone for donating blood seems odd — if the desire to donate is, in some sense, implanted by something or someone else, e.g., a benevolent hypnotist or brainwashing (Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will"). Similarly, if the source of a person's desire or intentions to commit such things as violence against women, is also, in some meaningful sense, "implanted," then perhaps these perpetrators should not be held morally responsible. A shocking conclusion indeed. Perhaps parental cruelty, life in the ghetto, or even the media, can be said to "implant" desires or cultivate intentions. If it is not appropriate to blame persons for wrongs they commit as the result of "implanted" desires, and, such forces as racial and gender stereotypes, child abuse, addiction, learning disabilities, neural-chemical imbalances, inadequate nutrition, low self esteem, economic inequalities, and so on, do, in some meaningful sense, "implant" desires, perhaps most persons (if not all) should not be held morally responsible or blamed for their wrongs. An even more shocking conclusion. When are we morally responsible for the actions resulting from our desires? What kind of moral education, family, role models, nutrition, esteem is necessary for the formation of morally relevant human desires? Are certain political rights and economic advantages required? Unless we develop historical criteria by which the source of a person's preferences and desires can be identified and evaluated, concerns remain about the prospects of a satisfactory account of moral responsibility. Holding persons morally responsible for actions they "freely choose" or "intend" to commit — particularly when blame, the negative moral attitudes and punishment are involved:— may be inappropriate (if not unjust). Whether a satisfactory account of moral 5 responsibility involves either the notion of free will or intentional action, the problem of the source of another's desires looms large. But what about the desire to hold others morally responsible itself! If the source of desires to act is important to appropriate attributions of moral responsibility, perhaps the source of desires to attribute moral responsibility is also important. For instance, we may want to blame bad drivers for cutting us off in rush hour traffic. But, we may tend to blame them when we are late or worried about arriving on time. We may seldom wag our fingers or utter a "tsk tsk" in response to rude drivers when we are on time and relaxed. Similarly, we may find ourselves wanting accountability from those who harm children. But, our feelings of moral indignation may markedly increase if the children harmed are our own. And, perhaps the fervent desire to hold persons like Bill Clinton morally responsible for his sexual crimes stem, at least in part, from the guilt or feelings of inadequacy of those who most zealously sought accountability. If the source of desires to act is important to appropriate attributions of moral responsibility, perhaps the source of desires to attribute moral responsibility is also important. Our discussions here may lead to the conclusion that, accounting for the source of our desires to hold another morally responsible, may prove as important to moral responsibility as accounting for the source of another's desires to act. Developing an account of moral responsibility that is compatible with the truth of metaphysical determinism and principles of justice is, then, profoundly important and highly contentious — if not out right baffling. Philosophers have traditionally distinguished themselves in response to the former, namely, difficulties raised by the free will determinism debate in one of two ways: Compatibilists believe the practice of moral responsibility is, or can be "compatible" or 6 appropriate in a world governed by deterministic laws. Incompatabilists believe the practice is not. Compatibilists such as P.F. Strawson3 seek to vindicate the practice of moral responsibility in part by arguing the conditions constraining appropriate retributive reactive attitudes (hereafter, retributive RAs)4 do not involve false or unjustified beliefs about the world. In "Freedom and Resentment" and elsewhere Strawson argues, more specifically, that adopting retributive RAs like resentment and indignation does not, at least ordinarily, involve believing anything controversial about the nature of human action more generally. For instance, many experience feelings of moral indignation towards highjackers for collapsing the World Trade Center and civilian death. Others experience similar feelings towards American politicians for foreign policy and civilian death. Those adopting the indignant stance may believe many things about the world and the people in it — including theoretical beliefs about human nature, the undetermined nature of human action, free will, and so on. Strawson's point, however, is that, ordinarily the person's experience of moral indignation is independent of (any) controversial theoretical beliefs involving the falsity of determinism. Rather than metaphysical beliefs about free will, the undetermined nature of human action, immortal souls, and so on, the retributive attitudes involve nothing more controversial than our "sense of sympathy and common humanity" (P.F. Strawson, Strawson Replies 266), and beliefs about the quality of a perpetrator's intentions. Grounded in deep care and concern for humanity, Strawson suggests indignation towards highjackers (or American politicians) are about the wrongdoers'' will or intentions towards their victims. Do hijackers (or American politicians) display adequate concern for the interests of all humanity? If not, are they burdened by standard excusing and exempting conditions such as insanity or coercion? 7 Strawson's strategy involves persuading us that the retributive RAs typically involve answers to these philosophically lean questions — and not presuppositions about determinism or the springs of human action more generally.5 If he is right, the practice of moral responsibility may be compatible with a causally determined world. In this thesis, I argue that this reconciliationist strategy is likely to fail — even if the incompatibilist can be convinced that the reactive stance does not presuppose robust metaphysical beliefs. In this thesis, I argue that Strawson seriously underestimates the controversial nature of the beliefs and attitudes, which the retributive RAs often involve.6 I argue that frequently they commit the reactive person to psychological, if not metaphysical, beliefs that violate principles of impartiality, if not epistemic rationality. As we shall see, this is important in the dialectical context of "Freedom and Resentment," because Strawson wishes to reconcile the compatibilists ("optimists") and incompatibilists ("pessimists"). His strategy is to persuade the pessimists to give up their "panicky metaphysics" (25) of free will, agent-causes, noumenal selves and the like, in return for a major concession from traditional optimists of the sort that place exclusive emphasis on the consequentialist aspects of moral responsibility. While Strawson agrees with incompatibilists that this emphasis on expediency drains moral practice of something crucial, he argues against them that the lacuna cannot be filled at a lower philosophical price. In short, Strawson hopes to reconcile the disputants within the moral responsibility debate by persuading incompatibilists that the "vital thing" (23) missing from the optimist account can be restored without controversial metaphysical beliefs. It seems to me, however, Strawson's reconciliationist strategy of detente is likely to succeed only if the feature he reintroduces into the responsibility arena is truly attractive to 8 the incompatibilist — otherwise the incompatibilist will fail to be convinced that the gap in consequentialist compatibilism can be filled by «0H-metaphysical facts like the "natural proneness" to take up the reactive stance. Strawson suggests incompatibilists suffer "emotional shock?' (21, italics mine) towards consequentialist compatibilism for neglecting that which makes us recognizably human (23), the care and concern for the goodwill of others towards us and all humanity (15). Strawson must bait his hook, then, with something that must be understood as "vital" to the practice of moral responsibility, that salient phenomenology which itself expresses the care and concern for our common humanity. If, on the other hand, Strawson's bait seems seriously tainted in some obvious fashion, incompatibilists will lose their appetite and become skeptical about the prospects of reconciliation with the optimists, based on natural facts. Strawson's idea is to ease the incompatibilists "emotional shock" and ground the vitality of the practice of responsibility in the emotional richness of the RAs, instead of controversial metaphysics. In this thesis I argue that this reconciliationist strategy is likely to fail — even if the incompatibilist can be convinced that the reactive stance does not presuppose robust metaphysical beliefs. I wish to show that there are important features of the retributive stance which are likely to encourage incompatibilists to regard them as "tainted goods" or excessively "seamy" — but not the "vital thing" missing from the optimist account. What is the "seamy side" of the retributive RAs? Strawson admits that the psychological sciences are, of late, becoming increasingly aware that the retributive RAs sometimes involve the "self-deception of the ambiguous and the shady" such as "unconscious sadism and the rest." He argues that although the complete elimination of the 9 network of RAs from our lives is an empirical impossibility, we may, nevertheless, want to redirect and modify our retributive RAs in light of these studies (25). But, according to Strawson, even if we could eliminate the RAs from our lives, these studies should not "increase the difficulty" of acknowledging that the "humanity" of the RAs themselves are the "only possibility of reconciling" the pessimists and the optimists (24). According to Strawson then, acknowledging the "seamy side" of the RAs should not deter reconciliation, for it is "an exaggerated horror, itself suspect, which would make us unable to acknowledge the facts because of the seamy side of the facts" (25). But, contrary to what Strawson might think, I argue he seriously underestimates the dialectical import of the "seamy side" of the retributive attitudes for he neglects the seamy side's more modest versions. When incompatibilists consider both the "shady" and more modest versions of the "seamy side" of the retributive RAs, they will lose their appetite and fail to trade in their metaphysics as Strawson's reconciliationist strategy requires. First, I argue that Strawsonian minimalism, that is, the thesis that uncontroversial psychological beliefs and attitudes about the intentions and histories of others, often fails to explain certain of the temporal and qualitative features — sometimes even the very existence — of the retributive RAs. I argue further that, more often than Strawson thinks, features of the retributive RAs of resentment and indignation can be explained only in terms of certain reflexive psychological beliefs and attitudes that the reactor is unaware of. We will see, that in an alarmingly wide range of cases, positing these unacknowledged self-directed beliefs and attitudes fills an explanatory lacuna in Strawson's account. What makes us right to suspect the "seamy" side of the RAs is more problematic than Strawson supposes? Positing such dubious reflexive beliefs provides the best explanation for the Duration and Intensity of 10 many retributive RAs, for how and whether they Respond to historical pleas, and for whether they come to Exist in the first place. I call this the D.I.R.E. dimension of RA formation. I argue in some detail that accounting for the D.I.R.E. nature of a person's other-directed retributive RAs of resentment and indignation often requires that we posit, in the reactor herself, the existence of unacknowledged reflexive beliefs and attitudes about a plurality of possible factors, such as the person's own moral guilt, her ethnic and familial attachments, or her own role as a victim in similar situations in the past. If I am right, and reflexive beliefs about the reactor's own history and intentions play a critical role in explaining his or her retributive RAs towards others, then, contrary to Strawson, deep doubts do arise about the Strawsonian reconciliationist project; if the so called "moral" attitudes we adopt towards others frequently involve certain beliefs about the reactor herself, then many of the retributive RAs are grounded on the false "meta-belief' that they are merely about and merely caused by beliefs about the histories and intentions of others. Insofar as the reactor is ignorant of the real grounds of his or her own retributive attitudes, the reactor lacks self-knowledge. Insofar as lack of self-knowledge is a defect, the RAs sustained by such a lack are themselves defective in that they are grounded in false beliefs about the real grounds of one's own RAs. Therefore, since the genesis of so many other-directed RAs involves self deception or, at the least, a failure of self-knowledge, Strawson's reconciliationist project of demonstrating that the RAs are generally free of questionable facts is deeply problematical. Moreover, we shall see that concerns about lack of self-knowledge, epistemic rationality, and dubious "facts" are not the only problems raised by the "seamy side" of the retributive RAs. Upon consideration of the seamy side's more modest versions, deep skeptical concerns arise about the human capacity of attaining the impartial or moral point of 11 view. Strawson argues that it is the "impersonal" or "dis-interested" character of retributive emotions that entitle them to the qualification "moral" (14). If, however, it turns out that many retributive attitudes adopted towards others presuppose beliefs and attitudes the reactor adopts towards herself, e.g., reflexive beliefs involving her ethnic origins, her familial attachments, her own role as a victim of a similar sort and so on, then it is hard to see how the retributive RAs — as they occur in the natural world — are entitled to the qualification "moral" by Strawson's own criteria. Contrary to what Strawson might think, the "seamy side" of the RAs does present problems for reconciling the disputants in the moral responsibility debate — and the dark side need not even be typical to taint the RAs. Tainted goods tend to make one lose one's appetite. Tainted RAs will make the libertarian incompatibilist lose the appetite for reconciliation. The idea that the RAs have an important place in the traditional dispute over the problem of the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism originates with P.F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment". Any investigation of the general rationality of the retributive RAs must take this seminal article as its point of departure. Other important contributions to this inquiry include: on the compatibilist side, Jonathan Bennett's "Accountability", R. Jay Wallace's Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments and Gary Watson's "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil," and such incompatibilists as Galen Strawson's Freedom and Belief and Derek Pereboom's "Determinism al Dente". It seems to me that the contemporary debate between Strawson and his incompatibilist opponents over the theoretical rationality of the RAs have neglected to adequately consider the nature, pervasiveness, and dialectical upshot of the "seamy side" of the retributive attitudes. This neglected but crucial aspect of the reactive stance includes, or 12 so I shall argue, dubious epistemic and moral beliefs involving a lack of self-knowledge and partiality, if not pathology and sadism. We will see the explanatory need to posit devices of projection and defense against psychic pain, and more modest versions of seaminess like parochialism, and personal historical beliefs. But, the contemporary dialectic between optimists (P.F. Strawson, Jonathan Bennett, Gary Watson and R. Jay Wallace) about the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, on the one hand, and incompatibilist pessimists (Galen Strawson and Derk Pereboom) on the other, share an almost single-minded focus on the subject's beliefs about the object of the retributive RAs, e.g., beliefs about another's intentions, childhood history, and so on. What the contemporary discussion, all but neglects is any thorough consideration of the explanatory roles which the subject's beliefs and attitudes towards him or herself might play in generating retributive RAs towards others. In this thesis, I intend to fill this gap in the recent literature. What is the incompatibilist response to Strawson and the other compatibilists? In his important book, Freedom and Belief, and in several essays, Galen Strawson, an incompatibilist determinist, insists, among other things, that Strawson senior's intuitions and anthropological observations are seriously flawed. Galen argues over and above the "impossibility of self-determination" required by any satisfactory conception of moral responsibility (Galen Strawson, The Impossibility...) changes in one's metaphysical beliefs, e.g. about agent-causes or noumenal selves do, as a matter of fact, play a crucial role in engendering moral responses. Galen maintains the truth of determinism itself does not make it "rational to try to adopt the objective attitude", and extirpate the reactive attitudes from our lives ("On Freedom and ..." 70, 74). He concludes however, that we ought to be skeptical about P.F. Strawson's attempt to vindicate the theoretical rationality of the RAs because in 13 assuming that only minimal beliefs about intentions, excuses and exemptions ground the RAs, he begs the question against the pessimist. Galen insists that abandoning one's RAs is as natural a response to the truth of determinism as retaining them. Rejecting P.F. Strawson's attempt to vindicate the RAs, other incompatibilists affirm Galen Strawson's conclusion that the RAs do respond to beliefs about determinism. Further attempts to articulate the metaphysically problematic beliefs include Derk Pereboom's "Determinism al Dente". Pereboom agrees with Galen Strawson arguing the RAs come with heavy metaphysical presuppositions and P.F. Strawson is mistaken to worry that the loss of the RAs render inter-personal relationships unsatisfying. According to Pereboom, emotional surrogates compatible with the rejection of true moral desert would survive a belief in determinism, and save our relationships from being diminished. While incompatibilists differ about the content of the theoretical beliefs they think the RAs presuppose, all seem united against the Strawsonian compatibilist anthropological observation that our moral responses to others do not go beyond the Strawsonian minimum. Incompatibilists insist that when we carefully observe our moral practices and reactions, we do see their involvement with beliefs about determinism. The important dialectical point is this: the contemporary dispute between the optimists and the pessimists about moral responsibility has, it seems, reached an impasse on a matter of philosophical anthropology, namely whether the retributive RAs presuppose robust metaphysical beliefs. On the one hand, Strawsonian compatibilists maintain our moral reactions to others do not typically come to exist or respond to information about determinism. On the other hand, incompatibilists insist that our moral reactions do involve theoretical beliefs about determinism. In this thesis I aim to ease, if not break, the current impasse. 14 How so? I think the incompatibilists are right — at least to the extent they insist our moral reactions do involve dubious beliefs. My own "philosophical anthropology" is limited however to the narrower, but nevertheless controversial claim that the nature of the dubious beliefs presupposed by many, if not all, retributive RAs are of the psychological — not necessarily the metaphysical -— sort. Since the dubious psychological beliefs I attempt to identity do not entail any particular metaphysical beliefs about determinism per se, I cannot claim to have resolved the perennial dispute about the compatibility of moral responsibility with metaphysical determinism. However, I do launch a version of pessimism (if not incompatibilism) in the hopes of reinforcing, if nothing else, the pessimist's "justified sense" that the RAs do include deeply problematic theoretical assumptions. For my purposes here I focus on the dubious psychological beliefs involved with the "seamy" side of the RAs and its dialectical implications. How seamy is the seamy side of our reactive attitudes? A very strong version of my hypothesis would hold that all tokens of the moral RAs presuppose at least some unacknowledged reflexive beliefs about the subject's own history and current attitudes. The weaker, perhaps more plausible, version is that such unacknowledged reflexive beliefs underlie the RAs much more pervasively in human life than Strawsonian "minimalist" philosophical anthropology suggests. Given my general suspicions about the global unhealthiness of the RAs, I would love to be able to establish the strong thesis. However, this task is beyond me, and I am prepared to grant that some, perhaps many, instances of the RAs are appropriate. But, is the weaker version of my thesis worth defending? Again, it is worth repeating that Strawson makes much of the claim that it "is an exaggerated horror, itself suspect, which would make us unable to acknowledge the facts (about the minimal 15 presuppositions of the RAs) because of the seamy side of the facts" (25). Strawson continues maintaining that: ...psychological studies have made us rightly mistrustful of many particular manifestations of the attitudes I have spoken of. They are a prime realm of self-deception, of the ambiguous and the shady, of guilt transference, unconscious sadism and the rest. But it is an exaggerated horror itself suspect, which would make us unable to acknowledge the facts because of the seamy side of the facts (25). The weaker version of my thesis is worth defending, that the existence of the "seamy side" ought not be taken as lightly as Strawson maintains — even if some RA are appropriate — since the "facts" involved in the "seamy side" of retributive resentment and indignation involve pathological forms (as Strawson acknowledges above), and more modest forms he seems to neglect. When we consider the explanatory power of a more complete spectrum of "seamy" retributive attitudes, for instance, beliefs and attitudes involving prior victim hood, ethnicity, lust and so on, then the pervasiveness of the "seamy side of the facts" should give the incompatibilist significant pause. Seamy retributive attitudes involving pathology, reflexive moral beliefs, dubious desires, personal prejudice, and so on, also involve at worst self-deception and, at best, a deep lack of self-knowledge and partiality on the part of the reactor. If this, a more robust, seamier alternative to Strawsonian minimalism, explains as many of our anthropological observations about inter-personal RAs as I think, this will indicate that philosophers tend to underestimate the dangers and dialectical implications of the reactive stance, not exaggerate them, as Strawson suggests. My "Senecan'V'Nietzchean" challenge to Strawson's "Aristotelian/Humean" vindication of the reactive emotions seems to depend on the truth of an empirical theory about the genesis of these emotions. Is this a problem for a philosophical argument? I do 16 not think so. My aim is modest and does not depend on the universal applicability of the projection hypothesis. Inspired by the explanatory turn in recent literature, I do argue however, that positing such seamy beliefs and attitudes as reflexive guilt, partiality, prejudice, proximity and so on, provide, at least frequently, a better explanation for reactive experience than Strawsonian minimalist presuppositions — including impartial sympathy. Moreover, it is interesting enough that, in spite of Strawson's assurances to the contrary, there are facts about the RAs that Strawsonian belief conditions do not explain. And, it is also important to show that Strawson is mistaken to think that "being true to the facts as we know them," is sufficient to save the RAs from frequent charges of theoretical irrationality. Bringing the reflexive subject back into the moral responsibility debate reveals that the thesis of determinism is not the only condition upon which optimists and pessimists ought to be concerned. Since the genesis of so many other-directed RAs involves self deception, or at the least, a failure of self-knowledge, Strawson's reconciliationist project of demonstrating that the RAs are generally free of questionable facts is deeply problematical. In Chapter One, Section One, I outline an important part of the stand off between "optimists" about moral responsibility, and, their metaphysically attended "pessimist" rivals. I discuss Strawson's hope that his methodological and conceptual toolbox, including what he maintains is the "vital thing" missing from the optimists account, is sufficiently attractive to bring the parties together — without metaphysical accompaniment. In Section Two of Chapter One, I sketch the main incompatibilist responses to Strawson's proposal for unification since the appearance of "Freedom and Resentment." I point out the current impasse seems to involve disputes about matters of fact, namely, the nature of the descriptive and normative beliefs, presupposed by the reactive attitudes. 17 In Chapter Two, Section One, I discuss loosening the post-Strawsonian log jamb over the belief presuppositions of the RAs by, in part, articulating latent methodological themes in this, the post-Strawsonian wave. I articulate this "new" mode of exploring questions about moral responsibility, suggesting a shift to explanatory potency and inference to the best explanation, from the current over reliance on conceptual analysis and philosophical intuitions. I make more explicit the explanatory turn we begin to sense in Gary Watson's important essay, "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme". We explore Watson's argument that we ought to be deeply skeptical about the theoretical rationality of the RAs since philosophical anthropology does not, as Strawson maintains, reveal the genealogy of the RAs to be solely non-controversial beliefs. I argue in response that Watson is mistaken by suggesting that Strawson cannot revise his account with a historical condition — without conceding to the incompatibilist. However bleak the prospects, articulating a satisfactory historical condition remains open to compatibilists. Providing they argue against incompatibilist generalization arguments, compatibilists it seems, can be historicists. In Chapter Two, Section Two we discuss one such historicist compatibilist, R. Jay Wallace, whose Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments also involves a latent methodological shift to explanatory potency. Wallace echoes Watson's worry about the explanatory inadequacies of Strawsonian minimalism. He argues the "sensitivity" of retributive reactions are not explicable merely in terms of beliefs about whether an agent's intentions and histories exclude him from moral and inter-personal communities. As we shall see, Wallace suggests moral responsibility is, what Fisher and Ravizza call "genuinely historical", and not as Strawson implies, "epistemically historical" (Fischer and Ravizza 173-18 194). Wallace suggests moral responsibility cannot, in principle, be explained solely in terms of the present psychological states of agents, for moral responsibility requires abilities to grasp and apply moral reasons, including the "fundamental commitment to fairness", that are themselves acquired from historical sources (Wallace 102). Rather than beliefs about an agent's abused childhood as a mere means to some current feature about them, Wallace argues historical deprivation may show one's capacity for rational self-control has been damaged, and acting according to moral reasons is, in varying degrees, difficult. Although, as we will see, Wallace, more than anyone else, stresses the importance responsiveness to historical considerations plays for the fairness of holding responsible, and seems deeply troubled by the role dubious reflexive beliefs play in the retributive attitudes, I will argue he fails to articulate among the most important aspects of the "seamy side" which jeopardizes the whole Strawsonian reconciliation strategy, namely, emotional akrasia. Phenomena such as akrasia dull the luster of what Strawson hopes is the "glittering prize" of the retributive attitudes. Wallace's treatment of akrasia taints the RAs because his account makes moral judgments the central feature in holding responsible, not the reactive attitudes themselves. Like Strawson and Watson, even Wallace fails, in the end, to take the "seamy side" seriously enough. Although they notice certain explanatory inadequacies of Strawsonian minimalism, Watson and Wallace it seems, fail to provide him with the dialectical leverage needed to vindicate the retributive attitudes. Perhaps, hypotheses for important retributive experience centering upon the reactor's beliefs and attitudes about others, themselves, involve important explanatory gaps. The latent emphasis on explanatory potency has however, provided 19 inspiration for my own hypothesis involving the content of the reactor's beliefs about him or her self. In Chapter Three, Section One, I discuss my take on the explanatory inadequacies of Strawsonian minimalism and present my hypothesis involving dubious reflexive beliefs and attitudes. I offer empirical data supporting the notions that many, if not all, RAs presuppose what amount to dubious epistemic and moral beliefs and attitudes about our own history and interests. I argue that over and above any beliefs about others, on many occasions important aspects of our RAs are best explained in terms of the "seamy side" of the retributive RAs involving certain unacknowledged beliefs and attitudes the reactor has towards him or herself. I continue the argument in Chapter Three, Section Two, maintaining that one way the contingent reflexive beliefs of the self influence the duration, intensity, responsiveness — even the existence — of the retributive attitudes is the projection of guilt. I argue this neurotic (if not pathological) version of the seamy side is problematic because the reactor believes his or her retributive attitudes are solely about others. But, to the extent the retributive attitudes involve the projection of guilt, they are not solely about others. Therefore, the retributive attitudes that involve the projection of guilt involve false beliefs. I extend this argument to Chapter Three, Sections Three and Four, that over and above neurosis and pathology, the "seamy side" of the retributive attitudes also involves more modest versions. Reflexive beliefs and attitudes involving one's proximity to the perpetrator, the person harmed, shared history, ethnicity, religion, victim hood and so on, frequently provide a better explanation than Strawsonian minimalism alone for retributive experience. I argue that although such "modest" retributive attitudes appear, on the face of it, 20 less worrisome than their pathological counterparts, they are "seamy" nonetheless for both presuppose dubious moral and epistemic beliefs involving lapses of impartiality, if not rationality. In Chapter Four, I examine two Strawsonian rejoinders to my argument that he seriously underestimates the nature, extent, and dialectical import of the RA's "seamy side". In Section One, I consider a Strawsonian defense of the retributive attitudes that appeals to a strong role for impartiality ensuring institutions. Although the sober second thought of institutional judgments may go some distance to ensure against retributive bias, an increased need for impersonality, rules and regulations will leave the libertarian more suspicious about the role reactive feelings play within the actual practice of moral responsibility. I argue however, while institutional safeguards sooth some suspicions, they stunt Strawson's reconciliation strategy. In Section Two, I consider a further Strawsonian attempts to calm worries about the epistemic and moral values of retributive RAs, by appealing to the importance of impartial sympathy and the care and concern for our common humanity. I argue that any such defense assumes too much, since, for instance, deep feelings of care and sympathy for human beings do seem compatible with adopting the objective stance. Finally, in Chapter Five, I close with a few reflections on what this more pervasive but modest version of the "seamy side" of reactivity might mean for Strawson's reconciliation project. In short, worries about modest but seamy partiality of the retributive attitudes seem to taint the RAs for Strawson's reconciliationist hopes; the pessimist becomes disinterested, for any increased need for impersonality, rules and regulations will leave the libertarian uninspired and lacking the vitality he misses under consequentialism. More suspicious than ever about the importance reactive feelings play within the actual practice of 21 moral responsibility, the pessimist becomes skeptical about the moral and epistemic prospects of a naturalistic account of moral responsibility. I have four goals in this thesis: First, I hope to show that the kind of philosophical anthropology Strawson employs in his theoretical vindication of the RAs is far too limited in scope to achieve his central goal of reconciling compatibilists and incompatibilists. Second, I broaden the range of evidence that characterizes our anthropological observations about the nature and existence of our other-directed RAs and enter the best explanation of why we often evince them. The range of our other directed RAs, most notably, their Duration, Intensity, Responsiveness to historical pleas and Existence (the D.I.R.E. aspects of reactive attitudes) suggests that their best explanation presupposes that their subject possesses certain moral and psychological beliefs about him or her self. For instance, where S resents R for doing p to her, then S believes that she is also guilty for committing p — or at least some thematically related action of type q. Third, on a more methodological level, I hope to take the current dispute over the presuppositions of the RAs, which divides Strawson and the pessimists beyond mere conceptual intuitions and dubious observations about philosophical anthropology. In short, I want to add an explanatory dimension to the debate. Fourth, I hope to show that the self-reflexive beliefs frequently, if not globally, presupposed by the subject's RAs, are philosophically and psychologically dubious in a way which further undermines Strawson's attempt to save them from incompatibilist doubts, and thus to achieve a detente between incompatibilists and compatibilists. Even //Strawson is 22 correct to suppose that beliefs about the truth of metaphysical indeterminism are not presupposed by RAs, this is not enough to protect his theory of moral responsibility from criticism: the reactive attitudes do involve other false beliefs about the facts, e.g., self and other, and dubious psychological beliefs involving partiality, if not pathology. Contrary to what Strawson might think, the "seamy side" of the RAs need not be "exaggerated" to give us reason to be worried about their rationality, partiality, and importance to human flourishing. Notes To Introduction 1. My line of investigation in this thesis has a long history of the relationship between reason and emotion in both ancient and early modern philosophy. It is illuminating to view P.F. Strawson as providing a contemporary criticism of the ancient Stoical understanding of moral emotions or reactive attitudes. In De Ira, Seneca argued that all emotions, including moral emotions, are irrational because they presuppose false beliefs about human nature. Accordingly, Seneca also argued that getting the facts straight about human beings, especially about what really motivates human action, would, or ought to, dispel moral emotions like resentment and indignation. 2. I am indebted to Professor David Zimmerman for helping me understand the importance of a satisfactory account of autonomy, including the source of our desires, for any satisfactory theory of moral responsibility. 3. P.F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," 1-25. Unless noted otherwise, all citations will be from this work. 4. In this thesis I employ, roughly, R. Jay Wallace's amended version (25-33) of Strawson's moral reactive attitudes, according to which the moral reactive attitudes involved with the practice of moral responsibility are the other directed negative attitudes of resentment and indignation, and the self directed negative attitude of guilt. Unless noted otherwise however, when I use the terms "retributive RAs" or "retributive reactive attitudes", I am speaking more specifically about the other 24 directed negative moral attitudes of resentment and indignation. I will call the third and final moral reactive attitude of guilt by name. In The Nichomachean Ethics (Aristotle Vol. IX), Aristotle foreshadows the Strawsonian response, arguing against Seneca that our moral emotions do not, at least globally, violate standards of rationality. For instance, Aristotle argues the moral emotions do not generally violate practical standards of good reasoning, but rather, contribute greatly to human flourishing. Strawson embraces the Aristotelian thesis that there is no global, practical reason to give up the reactive emotions. In this thesis I focus on Strawson's reconciliationist hopes. But, persuading the pessimist libertarian to trade her prized metaphysical commitments for the reactive attitudes does require the assurance the attitudes are free of controversial or false beliefs-theoretical or otherwise. We will see, although there is no global theoretical nor practical reason to completely eradicate the retributive RAs from our lives, deep worries about the pervasiveness of theoretical and practical irrationality remain. Contrary to what Strawson might think, worries about the retributive RAs are not "exaggerated" (25). In the early modern period, David Hume took up a version of the Aristotelian defense of the reactive emotions. Hume famously held that our passions are, strictly speaking, beyond the assessment of theoretical rationality. ("Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions") (Hume, A Treatise Of, Book II, Part III, 415). Nonetheless, he was a kind of "cognitivist" about the intentional structure of passions, or reactive attitudes like pride suggesting that at least some passions are, at least in 25 part, constituted by beliefs. So, like both Seneca and Aristotle, Hume did seem to allow that the passions or moral reactive attitudes can be rationally assessed or based on empirical beliefs about their objects. However, in contrast to Seneca, Hume maintained that moral emotions do not always presuppose false, pathological, or otherwise dubious beliefs. According to Hume, moral emotions like sympathy and a sense of justice, though subject to certain conditions of appropriateness, are natural and desirable, even indispensable features of a civilized human life. In the modern period Friedrich Nietzsche and, to some extent, Sigmund Freud resurrected Senecan skepticism about the philosophical integrity of moral responses to others, like resentment and indignation. Like Seneca, Nietzsche, in The Genealogy of Morals, argues that all retributive emotions are pathological. But, rather than embracing the Senecan notion that all persons — except the Stoic sage — are sick (to one degree or another), and thus prone to anger and resentment towards others as a means of distraction, Nietzsche argues that only the weak are sick and suffer from this tendency. According to Nietzsche, the weak develop Judeo-Christian or, "slave morality", because they need the reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation to deflect themselves from the painful realization of their own frailties. The weak resent the strong, trying to make the strong feel guilty, in order to bring them down, and boost themselves up. In some respects Nietzsche shares with Seneca a premonition of what we will see is Freud's theory of projection. My sympathies are more akin to Senecan egalitarianism then to Nietzschean elitism and I reject most of what he says about the nobility of the "masters" and the 26 repugnancy of the "slaves". In somewhat of a Nietzschean spirit however, I argue that the "reasonableness" of a person's reactive attitudes towards others is suspect, since, unbeknownst to the person experiencing the attitude, they frequently pre-suppose self-referential beliefs about the person's own inadequacy, personal preferences and so on. Nietzsche seems to foreshadow the central feature of my argument against Strawson since like Nietzsche I argue that the theoretical rationality of the reactive attitudes is seriously suspect because their source or genealogy includes (at least frequently) dubious beliefs about their subject. 27 CHAPTER ONE Strawson's Reconciliationist Project P.F. Strawson argues that being morally responsible is grounded in the practice of appropriately holding people morally responsible, that the vital core of this practice is our natural proneness to take up the reactive stance towards people, and that the general appropriateness of our feeling resentment, indignation and the like is not jeopardized by the "facts as we know them". He concludes that this is enough to vindicate the very existence of moral responsibility in the face of incompatibilist worries. In Section One of this Chapter, I outline the basic elements in the methodological and conceptual toolbox, which Strawson puts to work in his attempt to reconcile the optimist with the pessimist about moral responsibility. In Section Two, I sketch the main incompatibilist responses to Strawson from several sources after "Freedom and Resentment" was first published. Section One: Strawsonian Minimalism and the Vindication of the Reactive Attitudes Strawson's account of moral responsibility is designed to resolve the perennial feud between the compatibilist and incompatibilist. Concerning moral responsibility the incompatibilist ("the pessimists") worries that if determinism is true, then human actions and their origins are caused in ways that are not compatible with moral responsibility. Incompatibilists are divided into two camps, "hard determinists" who believe that the world is actually determined and that moral responsibility is illusory, and "libertarians" who believe that there is moral responsibility in the world since it is indeterministic, and that such a metaphysical structure allows room for noumenal selves, contra-causal freedom, agent-28 causation, or some such freedom permitting thing. Compatibilists ("the optimists"), on the other hand, believe that supposing the truth of metaphysical determinism gives us no reason to worry about the philosophical and practical integrity of the institutions, concepts and practices associated with moral responsibility. According to the compatibilist, the kind of free will presupposed by praising and blaming, rewarding and punishing fits nicely with the existence of causal explanations for human actions. Strawson's goal is to reconcile the pessimists and the optimists by, as he puts it, exacting "a formal withdrawal on the one side in return for a substantial concession on the other" (2). The reactive attitude centered compatibilist account of moral responsibility admits that the kind of exclusively consequentialist rationale offered by traditional optimists from Hume to Schlick, "leaves out something vital" from what we are doing when we hold people responsible. He grants, moreover, that "the pessimist is rightly anxious to get this vital thing back." However, he worries that "in the grips of his anxiety (the pessimist) feels that he has to go beyond the facts as we know them," and that he can secure that "vital thing" only if "there is the further fact that determinism is false" (2). Strawson argues that the libertarian way of preserving the "vital thing" (vis-a-vis the practice of responsibility) is philosophically dubious or excessively controversial. According to Strawson, the pessimist need not opt for anything as "panicky" (25) as an indeterminist metaphysical self in order to restore that "vital thing" missing from the compatibilist conception of responsibility qua expediency. Rather, the two sides can be reconciled, provided that is, that the consequentialist compatibilist fulfills his side of the bargain, and admits that there is more to the practice of holding people responsible than mere behavior control, and the incompatibilist abandons metaphysical presuppositions involving 29 controversial notions of the self and human action. But, what is this "something more," this "vital thing," which the optimist can concede to the pessimist in exchange for the latter's giving up his baroque metaphysical notions? Strawson argues that the "vital thing" that the pessimist thinks is missing from the consequentialist conception of responsibility must include "desert, responsibility, guilt, condemnation, and justice". Rather than responsibility qua utility, the pessimist longs for responsibility qua "all we mean, when speaking the language of morals" (23). While the "vital thing" missing from the consequentialist conception of condemnation and punishment must be both compatibilist friendly and vindicate such important moral notions as "desert" and "justice", Strawson makes it clear that whatever this "vital thing" is, it must not go "beyond the facts as we know them." Strawson shifts the focus of the free will/determinism debate by emphasizing the kinds of moral emotions presupposed by the practice of responsibility — including, namely, the "non-detached attitudes and reactions of people directly involved in transactions with others" (4), which are grounded in "the very great importance that we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards us of other human beings" (4). Strawson calls these "reactive attitudes" (6). They include emotions like resentment, indignation, gratitude, and forgiveness (5). They are "personal feelings and reactions (which) depend upon, or involve, our beliefs about these attitudes and intentions (of others)" (5). Strawson contrasts the reactive stance associated with ordinary inter-personal relationships with what he calls the "objective" stance. The pivotal distinction between the two stances is that abandoning the reactive stance in favor of the objective stance is to see the other as an object of curiosity, care or manipulation, rather than as one to whom we are involved in certain "adult" reciprocal relationships. The objective stance is frequently 30 "teleological" or goal-directed (Bennett 36) and, although it is compatible with a robust array of emotions, e.g., repulsion, fear, pity and some forms of love, Strawson maintains that taking up the objective stance is not compatible with the RAs that characterize our "attachments" to persons, such as resentment, gratitude, indignation, forgiveness, or "the sort of love that two adults can sometimes be said to feel reciprocally for each other" (9). Strawson argues we are not the kind of creatures that permanently reside in the realm of objectivity. Rather, we are prone to adopt the reactive stance towards others and ourselves because of "human nature" (16). What is human nature according to Strawson? Strawson maintains that humans are, at least for the most part, deeply concerned about the good and ill will of people towards not just ourselves — but also others. More specifically, Strawson claims the retributive RAs are motivated by impartial (".. .vicarious or impersonal or disinterested..." (14)) care and concern for the well being of "our common humanity". They express the "generalized" sympathy one feels "on behalf of another" when our own "interest and dignity are not involved" (14). We are not, according to Strawson, "moral solipsists" (16), or "egoists" (18). Strawson hopes to persuade the pessimist that the reactive stance is an integral part of what makes us distinctly human and that we do not, for the most part, have "a choice" about its adoption (12). Strawson maintains he is not so much concerned with why humans are prone to reactivity (6), but more with articulating the variations or patterned ways humans do, in fact, abandon the reactive for the objective stance. He is convinced that this sort of descriptive investigation, a kind of "philosophical anthropology," will also reveal the conditions under which we ought to abandon the reactive for the objective stance. Thus, the first step in Strawson's reconciliationist strategy is basically a descriptive one: to argue that as a matter of fact our RAs are not, as the pessimist maintains, based on 31 controversial philosophical beliefs about agent causes, noumenal selves or any other troubling notions involving the falsity of determinism. Rather than dubious philosophical beliefs, the practice of moral responsibility and the RAs pre-suppose nothing more controversial than beliefs about the intentions and histories of others. Strawson argues the world of personal relationships reveals the RAs respond, at least typically, to our concern that good will be shown towards all humanity. The basic demand for good will is grounded in our care and concern that, in general, all humanity be shown a certain degree of good will, or at least, the absence of "active ill will or indifferent disregard" (14). We react in various ways to the quality of another's intentions as displayed in their attitudes and actions. More specifically, Strawson argues, we typically adopt negative reactive stances when we believe that the other person fulfills two minimal psychological conditions: first, that he has failed to satisfy the "basic demand," and second, that he cannot plead any of the standard excusing or exempting conditions. For instance, when we come to believe that another person has harmed us malevolently, manipulatively, or as the result of avoidable ignorance, we are inclined to feel resentment. We become indignant upon realizing that a person has exhibited a similar absence of good will towards a third party. We adopt the reactive stance provided that is, that we also believe the offender is not subject to any excusing or exempting conditions. The qualification just noted is significant, however, for under certain conditions we do inhibit our RAs, sometimes even when we do believe that the other person has failed to meet the basic demand. Strawson notes that there are two kinds of inhibiting conditions: The first involves the standard list of excuses, for example, the agent is ignorant or coerced. When we excuse another, we do believe that the person is "a responsible agent, but we see 32 the injury as one for which he was not fully, or at all, responsible" (7). For instance, committing harm inadvertently or from ignorance is compatible with an agent's upholding the basic demand. When the second kind of inhibiting condition, an exemption, obtains, then the other person is not subject to the basic demand in the first place (8). By virtue of being psychologically or morally underdeveloped or disabled exempted agents lack "membership in the moral community." Therefore, they are not subject to the demand for good will. Examples are children, the insane, and those who are, in general, incapable of controlling themselves in accordance with the basic demand. Also, those who are typically capable of controlling themselves in accordance with the basic demand, but fail to do so on a particular occasion by virtue of being drugged, hypnotized, or subject to great stress. According to Strawsonian anthropological philosophy, RAs like resentment and indignation do have conditions under which we believe they are appropriate. When RAs do not conform to these conditions, they become subject to criticism. Like most emotions, RAs are intentional states, which have proposition-like objects. Therefore, RAs are, at least in part, constituted by beliefs. Since RAs are intentional, RAs have conditions of theoretical appropriateness. In other words, one condition of their appropriateness or inappropriateness lies in certain features of the empirical beliefs of the person who evinces them, namely, whether the beliefs are true, justifiable and consistent. So, for instance, A appropriately resents B only z/A's belief that B has violated the basic demand for good will is itself justifiable, consistent with the facts and true, and B has, as a matter of empirical fact, violated the basic demand for good will. 33 For Strawson, these conditions of the theoretical appropriateness or epistemic rationality of the RA are minimal or unproblematic.1 They do not, according to him, involve controversial metaphysical beliefs about undetermined selves, involving only commonplace empirical beliefs about whether the other has failed to satisfy the basic demand for good will, and whether the other is subject to the standard excusing and exempting conditions. Strawson argues that, because these appropriateness conditions presuppose neither dubious metaphysical beliefs involving the falsity of determinism nor any controversial notion of self, they are immune from incompatibilist theoretical worries. Strawson asks the pessimist to consider this crucial question: Would or should the acceptance of the truth of the thesis of determinism lead to the decay or the repudiation of all such attitudes? Would it mean the end to gratitude, resentment, and forgiveness; of all reciprocated adult loves; of all the essentially personal antagonisms (10, italics mine). Strawson's answer to both the anthropological ("would") and the normative ("should") question is a resounding no. Because the RAs depend only upon minimal beliefs about an agent's abnormality or immaturity, and since "it cannot be a consequence of determinism" that human abnormality or immaturity is "the universal condition" (11), he insists that "no acceptance of the truth of the thesis of determinism" would lead to our repudiation of the RAs. He goes even further, insisting that even //the reactive stance did somehow theoretically presuppose the falsity of determinism, our "human commitment to participation in ordinary inter-personal relationships" is too deep-rooted to allow any "general theoretical conviction" to end relationships as we know them. According to Strawson, the abandonment of the reactive stance entails that we relegate ourselves to the "human isolation" of the objective stance. Strawson insists, that no "general theoretical 34 truths" could provide enough practical reason for our succumbing to the purely objective condition which is barely recognizable as human (11-12). Note that Strawson's reconciliation project seeks to persuade the pessimist that there is neither theoretical nor practical reason to abandon the retributive RAs and that it is these attitudes upon which any satisfactory practice of moral responsibility depends. The consequentialist conception of moral responsibility leaves out the retributive or the "moral" RAs (14), and Strawson argues that it is their absence that leaves the pessimist with the "justified sense" that there is some "vital thing" missing from the consequentialist conception. In his effort then to assuage pessimist worries, Strawson argues for two distinct theses: 1) that the retributive RAs include no general metaphysical beliefs among the beliefs they do presuppose and 2) that, even if they did, there would be no general practical reason for us to give them up. Section Two: Incompatibilist Objections, Dialectical Impasse Does Strawson's reconciliation of the optimist and the pessimist work? Does he succeed in persuading the pessimist that the RAs presuppose only straight forward empirical "facts as we know them," and not the controversial metaphysics of the libertarian self? It seems not. Why should the pessimist believe that the typical anthropological landscape of our inter-personal relationships and moral reactions is, as Strawson maintains, the philosophically appropriate landscape? What reasons has Strawson given for believing that pur moral reactions in fact do respond, and moreover ought to respond, only to the minimal belief and attitude conditions he articulates? For instance, he may be right that one's beliefs about determinism, as a matter of anthropological fact, make no empirical difference to our 35 feelings of resentment and indignation. And he may also be right that we do, at least typically, respond to information about the psychological states of others, e.g., the nature of their intentions and whether they satisfy standard excusing and exempting conditions. But, the truth of these descriptive claims seems insufficient to satisfy the pessimist. After all, the pessimist will respond to Strawson by arguing that the truth of the determinist thesis itself provides a general excusing or exempting condition, precisely because it undermines the sort of human freedom necessary to sustain moral responsibility. In Freedom and Belief, and in several essays, Galen Strawson, an incompatibilist determinist, launches this version of the pessimist response (among others). Over and beyond the problems the "impossibility of self-determination" (Galen Strawson "On Freedom and Resentment"67, and Freedom and Belief, ch.2, esp.2.1) raises for an intelligible moral responsibility, Galen also insists that Strawson senior's anthropological observations and conceptual intuitions are seriously flawed. According to Galen, empirical observation reveals that changes in one's metaphysical beliefs, e.g., about agent-causes or noumenal selves do as a matter of fact (contra P.F. Strawson) play a crucial role in altering the moral responses we adopt toward people: Consider a man who becomes a determinist. He is often pictured as being faced first and foremost with the problem of what he is to make of other people, given his new belief. ...It seems that most people would find abandonment of the ordinary, strong notion of responsibility intolerable, not to say practically speaking impossible, from a social point of view... For it is not as if one can excise one's inclination to praise and blame people while leaving all one's other attitudes to them untouched. If determinism is called upon to justify such excision, (reactive attitudes are) thereby put at risk... (Galen Strawson, "On Freedom and Resentment" 68). 36 Galen maintains that upon assuming the truth of determinism most people would not be inclined to adopt reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation towards one and other. Compatibilists like Strawson senior thus seriously underestimate: ...the equal naturalness of the pessimists'position... The fact that the basic incompatibilist intuition has such power for us is as much a natural fact about cognitive beings like ourselves as is the fact of our quite unreflective commitment to the reactive (Galen Strawson 70). As we can see, Galen maintains that careful observations of our inter-personal relationships reveal that our moral attitudes do quite naturally cease or respond to metaphysical beliefs about determinism. Moreover, he argues that pessimists have different, yet equally compelling, philosophical intuitions about the necessary conditions for moral responsibility from those of the optimist. His point is that these intuitions are resolutely incompatibilist. Further, he suggests that Strawson senior begs the question when he simply asserts his conceptual intuitions, namely, that the RAs pre-suppose only minimal beliefs about intentions, excuses and exemptions, but no beliefs about determinism. It seems, then, that the debate over the implications of the RAs for the reality of moral responsibility faces a logjam or impasse of sorts. On the one hand, Strawson senior's descriptive anthropology and conceptual analysis maintain that appropriate RAs do not presuppose beliefs about determinism, and are thus beyond specifically theoretical criticism. On the other hand, the descriptive anthropology and conceptual analysis of pessimists like Galen Strawson maintain that the sincere entertainment of these RAs does presuppose robust beliefs about the metaphysical structure of the world which human beings inhabit. Contrary to P.F. Strawson's complacent assumption, there appears to be a genuine philosophical standoff here. 37 Other incompatibilists line up alongside Galen Strawson and respond in similar fashion to P.F. Strawson. They too attempt to articulate the nature of those elusive beliefs that the moral RAs presuppose. For example, in "Determinism al Dente", Derk Pereboom, in attempting to revive the fortunes of "hard determinism", echoes Galen Strawson's argument that the reactive attitudes come with heavy philosophical baggage. He also responds to P.F. Strawson's worry that loss of the RAs would leave inter-personal relationships bankrupt. Pereboom argues that those reactive attitudes that P.F. Strawson would want to retain have "emotional analogues" that are not based on false suppositions. These analogues, according to Pereboom, would survive a belief in determinism, and are emotionally rich enough to preserve inter-personal relationships and facilitate human flourishing (Pereboom 269). Pereboom's concern with the rationality of the RAs is mainly practical. We will return to Pereboom and this practical theme in Chapter Four Section Two when we consider the role impartial sympathy plays in the good life of human flourishing — a Strawsonian defense. I note for now however, that Pereboom joins Galen Strawson in rejecting both P.F. Strawson's (compatibilist) anthropological observations and intuitions that the appropriateness conditions of the RA are minimal. We have seen that the post Strawsonian dispute between optimists and pessimists about moral responsibility has reached an impasse. The Strawsonian compatibilist maintains that the retributive RAs are not grounded, either empirically or normatively, in beliefs about determinism. The incompatibilist pessimist maintains that they are. 38 Notes To Chapter One 1. As we have seen, Strawson argues that the RAs involve only "minimal" or non-controversial theoretical beliefs about the intentions and histories of persons, rather than controversial theoretical beliefs about persons and macroscopic determinism. For Strawson, reactive attitudes are theoretically rational or "appropriate" from the epistemological point of view if and only if the beliefs they presuppose about the intentions and histories of others are true and consistent with the "facts". If the beliefs they presuppose are false or inconsistent then the reactive attitudes are subject to criticism on epistemic grounds. For example, "S resents T" is open to criticism if either S's belief that T acted against an interest of his out of malice or negligence is false. Much of Strawson's article is devoted to persuading the incompatibilist that the reactive attitudes do not involve false beliefs, particularly about metaphysical determinism. Moreover, Strawson suggests that if our general theoretical presuppositions about the unconscious, self-deception, and the efficacy of the reactive attitudes turn out to be false, we may "have good reason" for modifying, and redirecting them or dropping the related practice (25). Strawson argues on practical grounds however, (see note following) that there can be no theoretical reason dictated by our desire to "be true to the facts as we know them", that would, or should, lead us to totally abandon the reactive stance. 2. Strawson argues, on practical grounds, that we are not rationally obligated to give up the reactive attitudes in light of any general theoretical considerations. Instead of theoretical truths, "if we could imagine... a choice in the matter, then we could 39 choose rationally only in the light of an assessment of the gains and losses to human life. .."(13). Although the "dreams of some philosophers" (25) might be realized by so doing, it is practically inconceivable that any mere theoretical belief would or should permit giving the reactive attitudes up. Schlickian compatibilism also supports the notion that the rationality of moral practices is determined along practical grounds. But, according to Strawson, Schlick borrows his theoretical presuppositions from a "one eyed" utilitarianism (23), and, in so doing, fails to endorse the practical rationality of the retributive attitudes. Strawson, on the other hand, seems to borrow his theoretical presuppositions about practical reason from Aristotle. Implicit in Strawson is something like the Aristotelian notion that practical reason and human flourishing require the proper emotional response to the character of human intention and action. And, like Strawson, Aristotle maintains that at least sometimes, the proper emotional response is retributive. According to Aristotle, exhibiting "moral virtue" includes adopting the appropriate retributive emotion "at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive..." (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II). For both Strawson and Aristotle, appropriate indignation is adopted by the virtuous (Strawson's "civilized"), toward the right people, at the right time, on behalf of the ill fortune of another. For both, the failure to adopt the reactive stance thus means the failure of practical reason, and the failure to fully appreciate the value of human beings. The upshot of Strawson's/Aristotelian practical argument? There is no general practical reason to give up the reactive attitudes. To extirpate the retributive emotions from human life would leave life impoverished and lacking the very thing that makes us human, the 40 tendency to make moral demands upon each other: "What is wrong is to forget that these practices, and their reception, the reactions to them, really are expressions of our moral attitudes and not merely devices we calculatingly employ for regulative purposes. Our practices do not merely exploit our human natures, they express them. Indeed our very understanding of the kind of efficacy these expressions of our attitudes have in turns on our remembering this" (25). For Strawson's Aristotelianism, the retributive attitudes and the network of reactive attitudes as a whole are beyond rational assessment in the sense that who we are is beyond rational assessment. The elimination of the retributive attitudes and the sole domination of the objective attitude thus offends "humanity" since what it is to be human just is to be the type of beings that react to ourselves, and others with resentment, indignation, guilt, gratitude. In short, to imagine ourselves without the reactive attitudes is not to imagine ourselves at all, but rather "to change the subject of philosophical anthropology" (Bilgrami 217). As we shall see in Chapter Four Section Two, it is doubtful however, that Strawson's reliance on an Aristotelian conception of practical flourishing, including an Aristotelian conception of sympathetic selves, provides a non-controversial alternative to the metaphysics of libertarian selves. 41 CHAPTER TWO Some Explanatory Failures of Strawsonian Minimalism We closed Chapter One noting the post-Strawsonian dispute between optimists and pessimists about moral responsibility had reached an impasse. The Strawsonian compatibilist maintains that the retributive RAs are not grounded, either empirically or normatively, in beliefs about determinism. The incompatibilist pessimist maintains that that they are. One methodological handicap the current dispute faces then is too much emphasis on controversial conceptual intuitions about the beliefs or intentional content of the RAs, and about the nature of the empirical data which "philosophical anthropology" yields. Perhaps offering a new mode for exploring this contentious question might help. It seems to me that investigating the belief-presuppositions of the RA should, in addition to intuition and observation, appeal to considerations of power. After all, all parties in the responsibility debate want to understand what beliefs the RAs presuppose. I think that this common goal is better served by the search for the best explanation of certain features of the RAs, rather than merely by engaging in highly contentious conceptual analysis and philosophical anthropology. This shift of methodological focus forms the background of this chapter and the next (Chapter Three). However, I should acknowledge that this shift of focus is not entirely original with me. It is implicit in both Gary Watson's "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil" and R. Jay Wallace's Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Both investigate how to identify the content of the beliefs, which our RAs presuppose. Each seems to employ, without explicitly saying as much, something like the method of inference to the best explanation. In this 42 chapter I try to make Watson's and Wallace's explanatory turn more explicit, by outlining what I take to be their discoveries about the RAs. First, however, I will review some of the difficulties they think inherent in Strawson's minimalist belief thesis has in explaining certain features of our RAs. Watson can't seem to find sufficient cognitive and affective resources within Strawson to accommodate important experiential aspects of the retributive RAs. He concludes that something over and above Strawsonian minimalism is required to accommodate the nature of our reactions to (what are purportedly) beliefs about others. In Section Two, Wallace also attempts to fill in the Strawsonian gap. Wallace argues on behalf of a "disjunctive" account of moral responsibility, that the experience of the reactive attitudes is not, strictly speaking, necessary for holding responsible — only the judgment that the reactive attitudes would be appropriate //experienced. But, although Watson and Wallace are right to criticize Strawsonian minimalism on the grounds of explanatory inadequacy, and to emphasize the importance of history to the responsiveness of our attitudes, we will see that even they fail to take the problem of the causal origins of the RAs seriously enough.1 I develop the explanatory turn further in Chapter Three, where I consider several non-Strawsonian hypotheses which, or so I will argue, do provide the best explanation for features of the RAs. Section One: Watson Psychopathy and Child Abuse Watson (Watson, Responsibility and the Limits 120) agrees that the RAs may not be as "innocent of theory" (his phrase) as Strawson's minimalism would suggest. For instance, Watson examines one crucial sort of exempting condition, psychopathology, which he thinks that Strawson's theory cannot adequately account for. I think that Watson is on to something 43 important in assuming that explanatory power is an integral part of any adequate account, and a weakness of Strawsonian minimalism. Although Watson is right to stress the role of history, by stressing the history of the object of the reactive attitudes, he neglects to consider the role played by the history of the subject experiencing them. In neglecting the history of the subject or person evincing the reactive attitudes, Watson also fails to find a satisfactory explanation for Strawsonian exemptions. In Chapter Three, I attempt to fill this explanatory gap. In the meantime, we will look at Watson's provocative discussion of the moral responsibility of the psychopath. Drawing on Strawsonian philosophical anthropology, Watson distinguishes the two types of "pleas" that are said to inhibit or modify the negative RAs. His type-1 pleas correspond to Strawson's category of standardly acknowledged excusing conditions. Persons may be excused by denying that the other temporarily failed to fulfill the basic demand for good will. For instance, if a potential subject of blame is ignorant, then the potential subject has not, in fact, failed to conform to the basic demand. Therefore, any resentment or blame will or should subside. Watson's type-2 pleas represent Strawson's category of the standard exempting conditions like being psychotic or being a child. According to Watson's reading of Strawson, exemptions of the type-2 sort show that: ...the agent, temporarily or permanently, globally or locally, is appropriately exempted from the basic demand in the first place. Strawson's examples are being psychotic, being a child, being under great strain, being hypnotized, being a sociopath ("moral idiot"), and being "unfortunate in formative circumstances". His general characterization of type 2 is that they present the other either as acting uncharacteristically due to extraordinary circumstances, or as psychologically abnormal or morally undeveloped in such a way as to be incapacitated in some or all respects for "ordinary adult interpersonal relationships" (123). 44 In short, Type-2 pleas involve assessing whether the agent is an appropriate "object of that kind of demand for goodwill or regard which is reflected in ordinary reactive attitudes," including, as we can see, some consideration of an agent's history, or being "unfortunate in formative circumstances" (Strawson, Freedom and Resentment 9). Recall that, according to Strawson, if a person is exempt from moral demands, then we should take up the objective stance toward his moral failures and treat the person as an object of inquiry or therapy, as one to be "controlled, managed, manipulated and trained..." rather than as an appropriate object for resentment or indignation. Watson thinks that Strawson's minimalist account is incomplete in that it does not fully explain pleas of the second type. The problem is this: RAs are said to depend on an interpretation of conduct. They are "natural human reactions to the good or ill will or indifference of others as displayed in their attitudes and actions" (Strawson, Freedom and Resentment 10). More specifically, negative RAs respond to the conduct and attitudes of one who flouts "the basic demand for reasonable regard" (122). But, Watson objects, something more than this must explain exemptions from the negative RAs since, "a child can be malicious, a psychotic can be hostile, a sociopath indifferent, a person under great strain can be rude, a woman or man "unfortunate in formative circumstances" can be cruel" (125). In other words, there are some persons who do exhibit ill will but who are nevertheless exempted. Consequently, Watson concludes that what it means to be exempt from the basic demand cannot amount to the mere presence of ill will (or the mere absence of good will). Watson also argues that merely being "incapacitated from adult interpersonal relationships" cannot explain exemptions, as Strawson claims, since we obviously do not stop blaming some persons just because we wouldn't want a relationship with them. There 45 are some mass murderers, for instance, who do not have abusive histories, but who, nevertheless, lack communicability or respect for moral tenets. Strawson suggests that part of what it means to be suitable for adult relationships and moral demands is to share given ends or be a "member of the moral community" (Strawson, Freedom and Resentment 17). But, Watson insists, some bad apples lack membership in the "moral community" and the capacity for "adult interpersonal relationships," yet we thoroughly resent them. After all, the incapacity for such relationships, e.g., their lack of respect for our moral beliefs, their lack of civil responsiveness required for relationships may, in fact ground, our responses. In other words, the mass murderer's disregard for our moral standards, and his seeming incapacity for relationships, intensifies rather than mitigates our reactions of indignation. If being a suitable candidate for adult relationships and membership in the moral community adequately explains exemption from the basic demand, then, argues Watson, "some forms of evil will be exempting conditions" and the "paradox results that extreme evil disqualifies one for blame" (131). In sum, Watson rightly concludes that something other than the absence of good will or membership in the moral or inter-personal communities must explain exemptions from the basic demand. One of Watson's main ideas is that the RAs seem to be sensitive to our beliefs about the histories of others. Strawson acknowledges this, maintaining that the RAs do respond to those having "unfortunate formative circumstances." Watson maintains that, given the importance of personal history to moral responsibility, we ought to be deeply worried about our lack of knowledge about how moral violators came to be as they are. Why does our ignorance not give us more pause? If, for whatever reason, reactive attitudes are sensitive to historical considerations, as Strawson acknowledges, and we are largely ignorant of these matters, then it would 46 seem that most of our reactive attitudes are hasty, perhaps even benighted, as skeptics have long maintained. In this respect, our ordinary practices are not as un-problematic as Strawson supposes (145). Watson points out that although the reactive attitudes respond to historical considerations, it remains unclear whether Strawson's account provides the conceptual resources to explain such historical exemptions. He uses the case of the psychopathic murderer Robert Alton Harris to dramatize the point. Harris brutally murdered two teenage boys without provocation, and afterwards displayed heartless brutality by calmly eating his victims' unfinished hamburgers and making jokes about the murders. According to Watson, reading this sordid tale evokes strong indignation. But Watson notes that the very same person learning the facts of this crime, and who has just reviled Harris can almost sympathize with Harris upon learning further the sad facts about his terrible childhood. Although as an adult Harris displayed a willingness to inflict suffering in the most macabre fashion, we suspend our RAs in response to new information — the horrific abuse and neglect he suffered as a little boy. For instance, we learn Robert was the premature baby of an impoverished alcoholic mother who delivered him after being kicked in the stomach by Robert's alcoholic, sexual-molesting father. We learn that little Robert once approached his mother "just to try to rub his little hands on her leg or her arm," only to be pushed away so violently that his nose became bloodied. Watson points out that once we encounter such facts about Harris's abusive childhood, the indignation we first experience wanes and a kind of sympathy develops. We think: "No wonder Harris is as he is!" (136). But Watson asks, "what is the relevance of this thought?" (137). Strawson must tell us more about when the RAs respond 47 to historical considerations. He must tell us more about why he thinks that "being unfortunate in formative circumstances" exempts some people from moral responsibility. Watson does seem to acknowledge that our negative RAs toward Harris would subside, and sympathy, rather than antipathy, would gain a foothold, i f we had known Harris as a child, or were able to keep his childhood vividly in mind (139). However, Watson stresses that our indignation does not completely wane as the incompatibilist determinist maintains. Rather, we experience emotional "ambivalence" toward Harris, which involves a shifting between "sympathy" for the boy he was, and "outrage" towards the man he has become (138). Watson argues that Strawsonian minimalism has a hard time explaining our ambivalent responses to psychopaths like Harris. What is it about Harris' history that diminishes, or even temporarily, extinguishes our RAs? Is there any relationship between lack of membership in the moral and inter-personal communities, and the sensitivity of RAs to historical considerations like childhood abuse? Are we to regard psychopaths like Harris as exempted by virtue of his unfortunate history, or as evil, and flouting the moral and inter-personal relationships he possessed the capacity to have? Watson maintains that we typically do feel indignation and resentment toward Harris, which suggest his evilness. However, we also respond to historical pleas on his behalf, which suggests exemption. Watson suggests that Strawson's account might result in some forms of evil like Harris' — providing their own exemption from moral responsibility (132). Watson offers several additional 'candidate explanations' to explain moral exemptions, and complete Strawson's account, but to no avail. Watson speculates that a compatibilist-friendly explanation for the effect of our beliefs about personal histories on our RAs may come from further development of the concept of being a 48 fit candidate for "intelligible moral address" (148, f. 31). If, however, being the appropriate subject of "intelligible moral address" is a requirement for being subject to the basic demand for regard, and we define this elusive notion in terms of the idea of being willing to enter into a dialogue (134), then, yet again, some evil persons would inappropriately get off the hook. After all, there are evil persons who would not be subjects for "intelligible moral address" in that they reject the very premises of our moral community which make talk about morality possible. Watson admits defining the concept of "intelligible moral address" in a way that satisfactorily explains moral exemptions "requires further delineation" (148, f. 31). Watson argues further that future theorists may provide an account of the compatibility of the reactive attitudes with the truth of determinism. But, since we do not typically exempt psychopaths like Harris because of his abused childhood or lack of membership in our moral and relational communities, we ought to be skeptical about Strawsonian minimalism: contrary to Strawson, philosophical anthropology does not reveal the genealogy of the RAs to be solely non-controversial beliefs. Minimal beliefs about the intentions and histories of others seem insufficient to explain some of our observations and experiences of the reactive attitudes; and it "remains unclear to what extent our ordinary practices involve dubious beliefs about ourselves and our histories (146). But, Watson seems mistaken to think that Strawson cannot revise his account with an historical condition without conceding to the incompatibilist. Answering the question of just what historical conditions are required for moral responsibility is a daunting task. Nevertheless, there are compatibilists that are historicists.2 As we shall see, historicists such as R. Jay Wallace focus their efforts on arguing against the incompatibilist generalization arguments. In suggesting that any appeal to a historical condition entails incompatibilism, 49 Watson merely assumes (rather than argues) that allhistorical conditions entail that determinism itself is an exempting condition. As I suggested at the outset, implicit in Watson's conclusion is the methodological assumption that any adequate theory of moral responsibility must provide, among other things, a satisfactory explanation for our reactive attitude data. Watson argues, in effect, that we ought to be skeptical about Strawsonian minimalism because it lacks explanatory power and fails to adequately explain our responses to psychopaths, their historical pleas, and so on. Does R. Jay Wallace's historicist account of responsibility provide a more successful explanation for our reactive attitudes? Section Two: Wallace on Exempting Normative Incompetence Implicitly furthering the lack of explanatory force critique of Strawson is R. Jay Wallace. One of the important contributions that his Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments makes is to deepen our understanding of the Strawsonian conditions of appropriateness, especially the exemption condition. According to Wallace, we are prone to respond to such "unfortunate formative circumstances" as an abusive childhood because it undermines or reduces the victim's capacity for "reflective self-control." More specifically it undermines and reduces the development of the person's capacity to recognize, apply and act on moral reasons. According to Wallace, it is this, the capacity for reflective self-control, that is the "basic prerequisites for accountability" and that to which our RAs respond (215). The absence of, or diminished capacity for, reflective self-control renders it "extremely difficult" for the person to respond to the basic demand. Wallace argues that since "fairness" requires making the "difficulty of exercising one's general rational powers" an exempting 50 condition (224, f. 28), our negative reactions cease, or ought to cease, towards violators who have suffered abusive childhoods such as Harris'. Wallace might explain Watsonian "ambivalence" toward Robert Harris in the following way. Upon learning about Robert's tortured childhood, we should suspend our indignation and moral disgust out of fairness, since he never had a real chance to develop the capacities, which ground moral capacities. After all, histories of childhood abuse diminish the capacity for reflective self-control, and makes acting morally extremely difficult (215). Contrary to the Watsonian critique, Wallace concludes that Strawson can use facts about an agent's history as exemptions since the incompatibilist generalization arguments fail. Determinism does not entail anything about history, that itself entails that an agent's capacity for reflective self-control is reduced or eliminated. Wallace echoes Watson's worry about the explanatory inadequacies of Strawsonian minimalism. He argues the "sensitivity" of retributive reactions are not explicable merely in terms of beliefs about whether an agent's intentions and histories exclude him from moral and inter-personal communities. Wallace suggests moral responsibility is, what Fisher and Ravizza call, "genuinely historical", and not, as Strawson implies, merely "epistemically historical" (Fischer and Ravizza 173-194). For Wallace, moral responsibility is "genuinely historical", for it cannot, in principle, be explained solely in terms of facts about the present psychological states of agents. For Wallace, moral responsibility also requires abilities to grasp and apply moral reasons, including the "fundamental commitment to fairness", that are themselves historical notions (Wallace 102). Rather than agent history, such as experiencing an abusive childhood, as a mere means to some current feature about them, Wallace argues 51 such historical deprivation may show the capacity for rational self-control has been damaged, and acting according to moral reasons is, in varying degrees, difficult. But, although Wallace makes the historical processes, identifying and acting upon moral reasons and being held morally responsible necessary for being morally responsible, historical facts are not sufficient. As we have seen, in his effort to avoid the source problem, Wallace makes being morally responsible, at least in part, a function of one's history. But, it is hard to say whether Fisher and Ravizza's notion of the "genuinely historical" fits Wallace's account — if not moral responsibility itself. After all, Wallace maintains being responsible involves the fairness of holding responsible. But, if flow-historical conditions such as "fairness" is involved with being morally responsible, this means, two agents with the same degree of rational self-control, and, the same history, could in principle, vary in their responsibility. If normative issues such as fairness are involved with being morally responsible, it is hard to say whether moral responsibility is, as Fisher and Ravizza argue, an "essentially historical" notion (Fisher and Ravizza 207). More importantly, if being morally responsible does not, strictly speaking, require the past to be a certain way, then, how do we know the source of the agent's capacity for rational self-control (in virtue of which he is to be fairly held responsible) is his own, in some morally meaningful sense? Wallace's normative account of moral responsibility does not then avoid the problem of the "implantation" of desires or source problem. Moreover, Wallace's version of historicism and retreat to normativity does not seem to help us with the problem posed by the seamy side of the reactive attitudes, that is, the version of the source problem emphasized here. He is however, highly sensitive to the sort of "emotional vicissitudes" which, I will argue, are a pervasive part of the reactive stance 52 (Wallace, Appendix 1, 237-250). For instance, Wallace seems to share my suspicions about the dubious genealogy of many (if not all) of our reactive attitudes: Far more interesting is the tendency of indignation to take on a harsh and punitive character, a tendency that can lead to forms of emotional irrationality. Indignation can be a way of channeling aggression onto others; indeed there may be an element of aggression present in all instances of indignation (and other reactive emotions). If this is right, then we can see how (as with guilt) an antecedent aggressive impulse might be the original cause of one's indignation toward a person. Indignation requires the belief that the targets of the emotion have violated some demand that we hold them to, but the reason we hold them to this demand in the first place might be a prior feeling of hatred for which we seek a socially acceptable outlet. A racist for instance, might come to feel indignant toward the blacks who live in his city for what he takes to be their slovenly habits, while the filth of the white workers' districts leaves him completely unmoved (Wallace 250, italics mine). Here, Wallace acknowledges that "all" reactive attitudes may involve "aggression", and that we may hold persons to the moral demand "in the first place" because of some antecedent aggressive impulse. Although a white racist believes that slovenliness is a moral failing, he may only experience the feeling of indignation towards slovenly blacks — not slovenly whites. Wallace worries a lot about the apparently inconsistent nature of our emotional responses. As we have seen, in the attempt to avoid the problem of the dubious genealogies of the RA, Wallace adds a causal condition to the minimal conditions provided by Strawson. According to Wallace, we can distinguish rational from irrational or pathological forms of resentment and indignation since rational RAs are caused by the belief that a moral expectation one accepts has been violated — rather than something else, e.g., prior aggression or hatred (40-50). Unlike Strawson, Wallace takes the "seamy side" of the reactive attitudes very seriously. However, although Wallace maintains that his robust causal condition renders the 53 RAs immune from dubious psychological and otherwise irrational causes, e.g., "self-deception", "guilt transference" and "sadism" (Strawson 26), his version of historicism does not help Wallace dialectically — even he does not take the reactive data serious enough. After all, Wallace does not satisfy the pessimist who longs for that "vital thing" missing from the consequentialist conception of responsibility. Wallace acknowledges that the RAs are culturally contingent: The reactive attitudes are not co-extensive with the emotions one feels towards people with whom one has interpersonal relationships... nothing in the very idea of this quasi-evaluative stance rules out the possibility of cultures whose members are not subject to the distinctly reactive emotions (31). Wallace admits that some cultures (cultures that are not necessarily "psychologically and morally primitive" (31)) include moralities and inter-personal relationships but lack the reactive attitudes. But, Wallace argues that morality and inter-personal relationships do not depend on the actual experience of the reactive attitudes — even in this culture. Wallace worries so much about the "seamy side" of the reactive attitudes and notices the apparent inconsistencies of our reactive responses acknowledging that" it is not the case that we actually feel the relevant emotion..." in all the cases we believe others have violated the basic demand. For instance, although we may believe a "charming acquaintance" is morally responsible for violating an expectation we accept, e.g., to refrain from lying, we may, nevertheless, fail to adopt the reactive stance towards her. But, Wallace maintains, in spite of the absence of such reactive feelings, we can hold our charming acquaintance responsible. For Wallace, although our culture possesses the concepts relevant to the RAs, moral 54 responsibility requires no more than the objective stance and the belief that the RAs would be appropriate, if they were experienced (31). As we can see, Wallace takes the problem of the causal origins of the RAs seriously. He notices the contingent connection between the moral judgments we make and the reactive attitudes we actually experience, and makes only the former necessary for moral responsibility. He does not, however, review the data closely enough and offer an adequate explanation for why these variations occur. Wallace maintains that possessing a certain "resentful temperament" explains why some persons are prone to adopt the RAs while others do not (249). But antecedent hatred and the nature of temperament fail to account for such variations as why we react to some liars, but not our charming colleague. Although Wallace takes the problem of the causal origins of the RAs seriously, he fails to take the data seriously enough. He fails to articulate only the most important aspects of reactivity which jeopardizes the whole Strawsonian reconciliation strategy, namely, emotional akrasia? Wallace defines what it is to accept a moral demand vis-a-vis the "consistent" motivation to act and criticize others accordingly (41). The person who fails to react to a charming colleague believes that an expectation he accepts has been violated, and if asked, he would judge the liar negatively. But, like the racist, this person does not adopt the reactive stance consistently. Describing the manifestations of such a phenomena is tantamount to the philosophical difficulty of describing (let alone explaining), akrasia in general.4 Suffice it to say however that the colleague judges that the attractive colleague has committed a wrong and that he himself ought to feel indignant towards her, but, he fails to do so. 55 Wallace fails to take the variations between our moral judgments and reactive responses seriously enough, since phenomena such as akrasia dull the luster of what Strawson hopes is the "glittering prize" of the retributive attitudes. Recall from Chapter One that the RAs are supposed to fill the void of "vitality" that the pessimist thinks is missing in consequentialist accounts of moral blame and punishment. To the extent he recognizes vindication of the reactive attitudes requires additional causal conditions, Wallace's historicist account seems to be on the right track. To be sure, Strawson wants to avoid specifying additional causal-historical conditions for he then faces the daunting task of denying the incompatibilist generalization arguments. But even if causal historical conditions alleviates some worries about akrasia or the inconsistencies of our emotional responses, any normative account of what ought to be the case does not help Strawson with the problem his reconciliationist strategy currently faces. After all, the pessimist must be persuaded that what is appropriate and "vital" to moral responsibility is grounded in what is the case, namely, the anthropological "fact" that to a "great extent" reactive attitudes are caused by minimal beliefs and attitudes about the intentions of others (Strawson 5). But, in allowing that the experience of the reactive attitudes is never, strictly speaking, necessary for holding responsible — only the judgment that the reactive attitudes would be appropriate if experienced — Wallace's "disjunctive" account de-emphasizes the reactive attitudes as they actually are, in the realm of human inter-personal experience. His treatment of reactive akrasia dulls the luster of the RAs because moral judgments become the central features in holding responsible — not the experience reactive attitudes themselves. Since the latter are dispensable and the former are not, Strawson's RAs become dull and unimportant — not 56 "vital"; the pessimist will remain unconvinced that what is appropriate to moral responsibility is to be found in the natural realm of anthropological "facts". But, perhaps manifestations of the self or reacting subject such as emotional akrasia do not taint the RAs in any significant way. Strawson might respond that while episodes of emotional akrasia undoubtedly occur, they are not pervasive. A judgment based morality like Wallace's need not de-emphasize the experience of the reactive attitudes since "it is an exaggerated horror itself suspect, which would make us unable to acknowledge the facts because of the seamy side of the facts" (Strawson 24). But, as we shall see, emotional akrasia is not the only "seamy" side of the reactive attitudes. We turn now to further worries that the other directed retributive attitudes are all too frequently grounded in unacknowledged guilt and partiality. 57 Notes To Chapter Two 1. On the one hand, Strawson claims he is not concerned with the "general causes" of the reactive attitudes (Strawson 6). On the other, we shall see in Chapter Four that Strawson's account does involve controversial assumptions about general causes. 2. See Fisher and Ravizza and Michael McKenna for compatibilists that are historicists. 3. According to one definition, akrasia is the state in which humans lose power over themselves without obvious exterior agencies forcing them to do so; knowing the good, seemingly able to do the good, yet, doing something other than the good. Akrasia is said to pose a problem for ethics more generally; "Despite the alluring grandeur of its ideal of self-mastery, ethics has a skeleton in its closet, a dark secret in an otherwise perfectly ordered house. Socrates saw the problem at the very inception of ethics, but denied that it really existed. Aristotle attempted to explain it away, but it remains a genuine difficulty in his otherwise coherent system of ethics. The great thinkers of the Enlightenment were sure that reason could overcome it, but the problem did not go away. Rather, it exploded upon the West with such great force during the nineteenth century that we are still reeling from its implications. The Greeks called the problem "akrasia"" (Riker 41). As we shall see in Chapter Three, whether variations between mental judgments and reactive responses are best explained by akrasia or, something else, it is skepticism about the variations themselves that pose a problem for Strawson dialectically. 58 Marx for instance, believed akrasia is not an anomalous state for human beings, but rather, forces beyond their power and awareness constantly control humans. Regardless of virtues, reasoning, social norms, or desires (conscious or unconscious), for Marx, akrasia is best explained by the determining force of material and economic conditions. CHAPTER THREE The Seamy Side of Retributive Reactivity Watson and Wallace seem right to criticize Strawsonian minimalism on the grounds of explanatory inadequacy, and to emphasize the importance of history to the responsiveness of reactive attitudes, but as discussed in Chapter Two they fail to take the problem of the causal origins of the RAs seriously enough. In Section One of this Chapter, I argue that there are important variations in the nature and existence of reactive affect that Strawsonian conceptual resources and cognitive conditions fail to explain, even when augmented with the materials Watson and Wallace provide. What are these unexplained variations? Strawson's minimalist belief conditions do not seem to account for important variations in some of the constitutive aspects of reactive affect, namely, D.I.R.E.: the Duration, Intensity, Responsiveness and Existence of reactive affect. What might provide a better explanation for the nature and existence of the retributive reactive attitudes then Strawsonian minimalism? Conceptual analysis and philosophical anthropology alone have hitherto failed to identify, much less explain, these important features. Instead, I develop the explanatory theme further and consider several non-Strawsonian hypotheses which, or so I will argue, do provide the best explanation for features of the RAs. I argue over and above any beliefs about others, on many occasions important aspects of our RAs are best explained in terms of the "seamy side" of the retributive RAs involving certain unacknowledged beliefs and attitudes the reactor has towards him or herself. I offer empirical data supporting the notions that many, if not all, RAs are caused by what amount to dubious epistemic and moral beliefs and attitudes about our own history and interests. 60 I continue the argument in Section Two, maintaining that one way the self-influences the duration, intensity, responsiveness — even the existence — of the retributive attitudes he adopts towards others is the projection of guilt. I argue this neurotic (if not pathological) version of the "seamy side" is problematic because the reactor believes his or her retributive attitudes are solely about others. But if the retributive attitudes also presuppose the reactor's reflexive moral beliefs, then they are not solely about others. Therefore, the retributive attitudes that involve the projection of guilt are epistemically flawed, involving, as they do, false beliefs about their genesis. I extend this argument, in Sections Three and Four, that over and above the glaring neurotic or pathological versions, there are more modest versions of the retributive attitudes that are "seamy" nonetheless. Aspects of the self such as beliefs and attitudes about one's proximity to the perpetrator or person harmed, personal history, ethnicity, religion, shared victim hood, and so on, also influence the retributive attitudes we adopt. I will argue that positing these modest reflexive beliefs and attitudes within the reactor, frequently provides a better explanation than Strawsonian minimalism alone for our retributive attitudes. These modest (and pervasive) retributive attitudes are part of the "seamy side" because, like their more exotic counterparts, they involve lapses of self-understanding and impartiality. The pervasiveness of the "seamy" retributive attitudes, i.e., of glaring and modest varieties, raises deep worries about Strawson's reconciliation project; the RAs may involve too many dubious beliefs to provide sufficient temptation for the incompatibilist to surrender metaphysics. 61 Section 1: Explanatory Inadequacies of Strawsonian Minimalism (D.I.R.E.) What is the D.I.R.E. nature of reactive affect and how is it best to be explained? I will start by exploring the last of these features, namely the very existence of reactive affect. Suppose that there are graphic stories on the nightly news about murderers like Ted Bundy, Pol Pot and Joseph Stalin, which cause me to believe that all of them are equally responsible for violating the basic demand. Do we always, do we even typically, actually feel indignation towards all the offenders on the nightly news? Suppose that as I sit before the television set I feel indignation only towards one or perhaps two of these moral offenders, or that I fail to adopt the reactive stance towards any of them. As we have seen, Strawson suggests that negative retributive RAs like indignation are grounded in the general expectation that all persons must meet the basic demand for good will and regard. Once we come to believe that a particular offender in fact failed to adhere to the basic demand, and, he is neither excused nor exempted, then we typically come to adopt the retributive stance towards him. However, the variance in our affective responses to the three mass murderers on the nightly news reveals that merely embracing these two beliefs is not always enough to determine the existence of indignation towards them. We may feel indignation towards only one or some of those we believe to be offenders, or we may feel no indignation at all. P.F. Strawson attempts to explain this phenomenon, i.e., failing to adopt the reactive stance towards those we believe are responsible for violating the basic demand (Strawson 6-7). He would argue that watching the nightly news could be an exhausting emotional roller coaster after a hard day of relating to others. Although we may believe that the criminals have violated the basic demand, and are neither excused nor exempted, e.g. they come from backgrounds compatible with membership in the moral community, we might not feel 62 indignation towards them all. What is Strawson's answer to this quandary? Strawson argues that we sometimes refrain from adopting the reactive stance out of a kind of fatigue. Strawson rightly suggests that it is an empirical cum psychological fact that human beings simply cannot react to all moral infractions, since doing so would be an unbearable tax on the limits of our emotional resources. The realm of the objective stance provides a vacation, of sorts, from the stress of inter-personal relationships, since it is by its very nature free of reactive affect. Adopting the reactive stance towards every moral violator would leave us emotionally exhausted and almost incapable of getting on with the other activities of life. Thus, Strawson might conclude, we may not react or react to only some of those we believe have violated the basic demand because the (impartial) over-all economy of our inner resources or random emotional fatigue engenders the retreat to the objective stance. The existential reactive data are accommodated by his conceptual toolbox. This Strawsonian explanation for the variance in our interpersonal reactive affect is fine as far as it goes, but it does not go nearly far enough. For there are clear cases where emotional fatigue and the need to relieve the strains of involvement are not the issue. I maintain that the problem of specifying affect variation includes the need to explain why we do react to J, but do not react to P or S, given our beliefs that all are responsible for violating the basic demand for regard. Why, for instance, do / react with indignation towards Ted Bundy but not towards Pol Pot, or Joseph Stalin? Why, on the other hand, might you react indignantly towards Pol Pot and Joseph Stalin, but not Ted Bundy? And why, might Z react indignantly to the news anchorman's glibness, but none of the mass murderers he is being glib about? The retreat from exhaustive inter-personal relationships may explain why we feel indignation once, rather than three times, or why we can work up a lather towards some, 63 but not all, of those whom we believe to be moral violators. But, needing a break or retreating from the stresses and strains of inter-personal relationships does not satisfactorily explain why I experience affect towards Ted Bundy, but do not experience affect towards Pol Pot and Joseph Stalin. Nor why, on the other hand, you experience affect towards Pol Pot and Joseph Stalin, but not also Ted Bundy. In addition to those unexplained inter-violator discriminations we make among the heinous, we also discriminate among moral violations committed by those we love in a way that is not always easily explainable in Strawsonian terms. I may discover, for instance, that a current lover fails to recycle and neglects the environment. But although I believe he is morally responsible for harming the interests of human beings and violating the basic demand, I fail to adopt the indignant stance towards him. Upon discovering, however, that a former lover also fails to recycle I do experience indignation towards him. Why might this be? In cases like my adopting the indignant stance towards my former but not my current lover, this variance in our retributive RAs does seem to involve our own psychological needs or egos. It seems to have some effect on whether I adopt the reactive stance for instance, that / am currently in a romantic relationship with A but no longer with B, even though they both commit the same offense. Since I do consider my current lover as a member of the moral community and am not under strain, taking the objective stance towards harms perpetrated by others does seem to involve other than Strawsonian excuses, exemptions and exhaustion. Moreover, there seem to be certain kinds of violations that engender RAs no matter who commits them, but other kinds which leave us unmoved, even though we do concede the equal moral seriousness of the violations. For example, I may always feel indignant towards 64 people who fail to make generous donations to the local food bank, but not towards people who fail to recycle, even though I firmly believe that degrading the environment poses a greater harm to humanity than neglecting the local food bank. What explains the nature and existence of such "inter-violator" and "inter-violation" discriminations? Am I merely too tired to react towards my new lover for both his moral crimes? I think not. I am not tired, but full of energy and respect. I am eager to engage in discussions and emotional intimacies. Something over-and-above the Strawsonian desire for reprieve is needed to explain the variance in our retributive reactions to different people and to different kinds of actions. Strawsonian minimalism seems to provide inadequate explanation for the existential variety of what seem to be many common place RAs. Further mysteries appear when we notice that the duration and intensity of RAs also vary in ways that seem unrelated to the desire to relieve the strains of involvement. One might resent both S and T for hurting one in the same sort of way, but one's resentment towards S might linger far longer or be felt with much greater force. For instance, our drycleaner and a colleague at work may both fail to honor our request to make a particular, but relatively unimportant deadline. Our resentment towards our colleague may endure, however, with an intensity that surpasses both the minor nature of the breach and the fact that our resentment towards the drycleaner for a similar offense was brief and mild. Why such variance? Nor does Strawson's notion of taking a reprieve from the strains of involvement does not explain why the resentment I feel towards S for insulting me, is more enduring and intense than the resentment I feel towards the C.E.O.'s of transnational corporations for spewing carcinogens into the air. Why is it that by the time I finish the morning paper, my mild resentment towards the C.E.O.'s subsides, 65 while, on the other hand, my resentment towards S for calling me a name endures, in moderate proportions, for days? If I believe that the polluter has committed a greater violation of my interests than the name-caller, then, what explains the greater duration and intensity of my resentment towards the latter? Furthermore, why does the responsiveness of our RAs to facts about a violator's history so often vary with the violator? That fact that S endured an abusive childhood may quickly dim my resentment, but not the fact that T suffered similar abuse. Why? Yet again, the Strawsonian explanation in terms a desire to relieve the strains of inter-personal commitment is inadequate to explain the variance. Section Two: The Projection Hypothesis: No one is more ferocious in demanding that the murderer or the rapist 'pay' for his crime than the man who has felt strong impulses in the same direction. No one is bitterer in condemning the 'loose' woman than the 'good' women who have in occasion guiltily enjoyed some purple dreams themselves. It is never he who is without sin that cast the first stone. Along with the stone, we cast our own sins onto the criminal. In this way we relieve our own sense of guilt without actually having to suffer the punishment — a convenient and even pleasant device for it not only relieves us of sin, but makes us feel actually virtuous (Weihofen 138). Is, as Weihofen suggests, the D.I.R.E. of our retributive reactions, to "murderers", "rapists", "loose women" and so on, explainable in terms of the contingencies of the evincing self? We have reviewed some of the difficulties that Watson and Wallace think that Strawson's minimalist belief thesis have in accommodating important aspects of our reactive experience. I have maintained that implicit in Watson and Wallace is what we might think of as an explanatory turn in the responsibility debate; rather than relying on conceptual analysis and philosophical intuitions, any adequate theory of reactive responsibility must provide the 66 best explanation of certain features of our RAs. What then might explain our reactions to psychopaths, childhood abuse, the nightly news and former lovers? In this section of Chapter Three, I develop the explanatory theme further and consider several non-Strawsonian hypotheses, which provide, I will argue, the best explanation for features of the RAs. Conceptual analysis and philosophical anthropology alone have hitherto failed to identify, much less explain, these important features. To bring these D.I.R.E. themes together, consider Sarah, a college coed whose financially-strapped parents consistently remind her of the severe financial hardship that parenting imposes. Sarah's parents frequently berate her for her wastefulness and teach her that lessening their economic burden is among the highest of moral obligations. But, in addition to scolding, Sarah's parents also provide her with support and encouragement. Although she imposes financial hardships, Sarah's parents tell her that she is charming and funny and that she is admirably honest and particularly trustworthy, unlike many teenagers. So, like many of us, Sarah believes she has fallen short in some ways, e.g., for failing to address her parent's poor financial situation, but has achieved moral integrity in others, e.g., through behaving in a trustworthy and honest fashion. Upon entering college, Sarah learned, among other more pleasant things, that a coed was brutally stalked and assaulted, that a classmate submitted essays he purchased elsewhere, and that she failed to win a scholarship competition she had so diligently pursued. What is the D.I.R.E. nature of Sarah's intra-violator reactive affect? Suppose that Sarah does not feel any particular indignation towards the cheater, only brief and mild indignation towards the coed attacker, and intense and enduring indignation towards the winner of the scholarship, a 67 young woman named Hillary. What factors might explain the D.I.R.E. variance in Sarah's RAs? First, we notice what specific propositional form Sarah's reactions take. The RAs are intentional states with propositional objects. For instance, Sarah's indignation towards Hillary involves the proposition "that Hillary celebrated winning the scholarship by throwing a decadent party." Although winning a scholarship is not, she supposed, a moral crime, Sarah believed that Hillary failed to fulfill the basic demand by celebrating her good fortune in such a 'decadent' way. Sarah claims that she feels such indignation towards Hillary because "Hillary did not share any of the proceeds from her scholarship with the poor in the Developing World, but instead threw a wild and wasteful party." Although Sarah also believes that the cheater and the attacker have violated the basic demand, why does she feel no indignation towards the cheater and only mild indignation towards the attacker? This seems odd because Sarah would grant that sexual assault is a much worse violation of the basic demand than neglecting the poor. The enduring temporal character and stomach churning severity of Sara's sense of indignation towards Hillary seems to involve other than her impartial concern about Hillary's neglect of the world's poor. What, then explains these types of reactive affect allocations? On the face of it, the beliefs and attitude conditions in Strawsonian minimalism — including his notion of emotional weariness — fail to account for these features of reactive experience. Can we find an explanation for the D.I.R.E. nature of Sara's reactive experience? Over and above any beliefs and attitudes Sarah might hold about others, it seems to me that a fuller explanation of reactive attitude D.I.R.E. posits the existence of certain beliefs and attitudes that Sarah holds about herself. How does the proneness to adopt 68 reactive attitudes, reactive attitudes that is, that are purportedly about others, involve the reflexive attitudes of their subject 'si One way the RAs presuppose their subject's reflexive attitudes focuses on the notion of guilt projection. Recall that Sarah feels sustained intense indignation towards Hillary for Hillary's failure to use surplus money to feed the poor (p). Sarah does not, however, feel sustained intense indignation towards the plagiarist for his dishonesty (d) — even though she consciously avows moral distaste for both negligence and dishonesty. And although she experiences some indignation towards the attacker for brutal assault (b), this token of Sarah's indignation is mild in intensity and short in duration. If Sarah believes that the dishonest cheater has violated the basic demand and is not excused or exempted from forging essays, why does she fail to adopt the indignant stance towards him? As discussed, Strawsonian minimalism fails to provide adequate resources to explain why Sarah does experience indignation towards Hillary, but does not towards the cheater. Also recall how intensely Sarah's parents complained about her wastefulness and neglect of their economic well-being. It is psychologically realistic to suppose that such moral badgering has caused Sarah intense feelings of guilt for these faults (whether real or imagined). If Sarah feels strong guilt for neglecting the financial hardships of others (minimal guilt for committing physical violence, and no guilt at all for cheating), then we can explain the discriminations of Sarah's inter-violator D.I.R.E., that is, why she feels such intense and enduring indignation about Hillary's neglect of the developing world's poor, only mild and fleeting indignation towards the attacker, and none at all towards the cheater. Note that Sarah does not feel intense guilt about neglecting the poverty in the developing world per se. She does feel intense guilt, however, about neglecting the poverty of her parents. In this case, the nature of Sarah's 69 antecedent belief that she is guilty is neither straightforward nor obvious, in that Sarah does not believe that she too has committed p itself, that is, has neglected the poor in the developing world. However, Sarah's projected guilt is about some thematically related q, namely, neglecting her own poor and overworked parents. The target of her most intense guilt, i.e., her own 'neglect of her poor parents', is thematically much more similar to the target of her most intense indignation, i.e., 'Hillary's neglect of the poor (in the developing world)', than to the dishonesty of the cheater or the brutality of the stalker. In other words, the nature of the self's reflexive beliefs, influences the nature of the RAs adopted towards others. The projection hypothesis suggests that rather than merely responding to the intentions and histories of others, the RAs also respond, at least in part, to the dysfunctional mechanism of pain-alleviation of denied guilt. The projection of guilt provides a better explanation than Strawsonian minimalism for why Sarah is more prone to intense and enduring indignation towards Hillary than towards the other offenders, even though she would be prepared to grant that self-indulgence is a less serious violation of the basic demand than either dishonesty or brutal assault. After all, we tend to avoid pain. Guilt is psychologically painful. There are many ways to rid oneself of the pain of guilt. Sometimes we may try to forgive ourselves or make amends and restitution to the person one feels guilty about. However, sometimes these sources of relief are unavailable, for example, when one's guilt is unreasonable or when one's self esteem is low. It seems that the lower one's self-esteem, justifiably, the lower one's capacity to bear still further self displeasure of facing one's moral shortcomings. Sarah is actually quite sensitive to her parent's material needs. When she was living at home she always took summer jobs to help ease their financial burdens, learned how to handle money 70 prudently, and so on. But even though her parent's complaints are quite exaggerated, Sarah nonetheless thinks of herself as a spendthrift. Her guilt in this area is heavy. She tries to relieve it by cutting back even more in her spending, by going to a local college rather than the out of province school she would prefer. But nothing is quite enough for her parents. They continue to badger her about her material neglect of their well-being. How might Sarah find some relief? A common defense against psychic pain involves the projection of the real or imagined flaw onto another person.1 And so it is with Sarah. Although she dislikes having lost the scholarship to Hillary, this turn of events can become psychologically expedient for her, because it gives her an opportunity to focus on or scapegoat someone else's "extravagance" and bask in the considerable pleasures of self-righteousness or increased self esteem. For instance, instead of saying to myself, "/ hate myself," I can say, "He hates me." Instead of saying, "My conscience is bothering me," I can say, "He is violating my interests." In essence, Sarah projects her guilt onto Hillary, thereby avoiding the pain of self-confrontation and moreover, the anxiety or fear of punishment that accompanies her guilt. Psychological projection, or some such functionally equivalent mechanism, relieves anxiety and fear by switching the moral subject. "I am morally responsible for neglecting my poor parents" gets switched into "Hillary is morally responsible for neglecting the poor in the developing world." More generally, projection mechanisms switch "I am guilty for p" for, "She is guilty for p (or some thematically related