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Japan's security policy during the Ikeda Cabinet (1960-1964) Takemoto, Toru 1969

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JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY DURING THE IKEDA CABINET (1960-1964)  by  TORU  TAKEMOTO  B»A«, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n U n i v e r s i t y , Tokyo, 1967  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n t h e Department of Political  Science  We a c c e p t e d t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o t h e requi^d  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June, 1969  In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s  thesis  an advanced degree at  in p a r t i a l  f u l f i l m e n t of  the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h  the requirements f o r  Columbia,  I agree  the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and I  f u r t h e r agree that p e r m i s s i o n  f o r e x t e n s i v e copying of  this  that  Study. thesis  f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s of t h i s  representatives. thesis  It  for f i n a n c i a l  is understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n gain s h a l l  written permission.  Department The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Vancouver 8, Canada  Date  Columbia  not be allowed without my  ABSTRACT  T h i s t h e s i s i s the. r e s u l t o f r e s e a r c h on t h e n a t u r e o f Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y as pursued by t h e Ikeda Cabinet d u r i n g I960 and 1 9 6 4 .  The main d i s c u s s i o n c o n s i s t s o f  three parts: i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l  impacts on s e c u r i t y p o l i c y  making; e x t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l impacts on s e c u r i t y p o l i c y o f Japan; and Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y p r o p e r . Three p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a r e s t u d i e d as s i g n i f i c a n t d e t e r m i n a n t s o f i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l impacts on t h e d e c i s i o n making s t r u c t u r e o f t h e Japanese p o l i t i c a l  system.  The  r a t i o n a l e i s t h a t t h e s e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s p r o v i d e chann e l s t h a t connect t h e d e c i s i o n making core and t h e o u t e r a r e a o f t h e Japanese p o l i t i c a l system.  Therefore, the  s t u d y o f t h e s e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i s a r e w a r d i n g attempt at o b s e r v i n g p o l i t i c a l i n p u t s t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n making core o f t h e Japanese p o l i t i c a l system  receives.  I n t e r n a t i o n a l exchange o f t h e Japanese p o l i t i c a l  system  i s i n v e s t i g a t e d i n t h e second p a r t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n . subject  This  i s viewed b o t h as i n p u t s and o u t p u t s o f t h e  Japanese p o l i t i c a l environment.  system i n r e l a t i o n t o i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l  The n a t u r e o f t h e e x t e r n a l impacts such as  m i l i t a r y , economic, g e o g r a p h i c , i d e o l o g i c a l o r c u l t u r a l impacts i s not s p e c i f i e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , but i s viewed as a G e s t a l t , o r t o t a l b e i n g which comprises a l l t h e elements s t a t e d  above.  The  t h i r d s e c t i o n d e a l s w i t h what i s u s u a l l y  as defence p o l i c y .  describe  A more m i l i t a r y a s p e c t o f Japan's  security p o l i c y i s studied i n t h i s section. In c o n c l u s i o n ,  a broad g e n e r a l i s a t i o n i s d e r i v e d  from t h e s u r v e y c i t e d i n t h e main d i s c u s s i o n .  The con-  c l u s i o n i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d as t h e p r i n c i p l e o f b a l a n c e i n the  Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s s e c u r i t y p o l i c y .  Throughout t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , ' J a p a n e s e names are w r i t t e n i n t h e Japanese o r d e r , w i t h f a m i l y name f i r s t and  g i v e n name l a s t .  TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CHAPTER  I  CHAPTER  II  CHAPTER  INTRODUCTION POLITICAL PARTIES  13  THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTI THE JAPAN•SOCIALIST PARTY THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTI  13 21 35  III  DIPLOMATIC ARRANGEMENT  THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS THE JAPANESE-KOREAN RELATIONS THE COMMUNIST BLOC RELATIONS CHAPTER  IV  DOMESTIC PROVISIONS  PUBLIC RELATIONS OF THE IKEDA CABINET REINFORCEMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FISCAL POLICI FOR DEFENCE THE SECOND DEFENCE PLAN APPLICATION OF DEFENCE POLICI CHAPTER  6  V  BIBLIOGRAPHI  CONCLUSIONS  47 47 54 61 77 77 8l+ #4 39 94 104 113  LIST OF TABLES  Page  TABLE  I  79  TABLE  II  79  TABLE  III  85  TABLE  IV  87  TABLE  V  108  TABLE  VI  109  6  INTRODUCTION  S e c u r i t y p o l i c y can be d e f i n e d i n v a r i o u s ways, depending  on what a student  o f p o l i t i c s l o o k s a t and emphasises.  I n a narrow sense i t i s a p o l i c y t h a t guarantees b i o l o g i c a l or p h y s i c a l s u r v i v a l of a country  i n t h e face o f v i o l e n t  a t t a c k from o u t s i d e i t s b o r d e r l i n e s .  I n a b r o a d e r sense i t  i s a s e t o f p o l i c i e s t h a t w a r r a n t s not o n l y p h y s i c a l , ' but political, time.-'-  economic, and c u l t u r a l s u r v i v a l o f a c o u n t r y over  Defence S e c r e t a r y McNamara o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s  said,  We s t i l l t e n d t o c o n c e i v e o f n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y almost s o l e l y as a s t a t e o f armed r e a d i n e s s : a v a s t awesome a r s e n a l o f weaponry. We s t i l l t e n d to assume t h a t i t i s p r i m a r i l y t h i s p u r e l y m i l i t a r y i n g r e d i e n t t h a t c r e a t e s safety.. We a r e s t i l l haunted by t h i s concept o f m i l i t a r y hardware.^ I n t h i s t h e s i s , s e c u r i t y p o l i c y i s d e f i n e d as a p o l i c y t h a t i s t o prevent  armed a t t a c k s and/or t o reduce p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f  armed a t t a c k s from o u t s i d e t h e b o r d e r o f a c o u n t r y . The major p o l i c i e s o f Japan's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and t h e major f a c t o r s t h a t c o n t r i b u t e d i n f o r m u l a t i n g these d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f t h e Ikeda Cabinet explored i n t h i s t h e s i s . two  (1960-64) w i l l be  As major Japanese s e c u r i t y p o l i c i e s ,  s u b j e c t s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d .  Government m a n i p u l a t e d  policies  One i s , how t h e Japanese  i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s t o maxi-  mise i t s f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s and m i n i m i s e t h e p o t e n t i a l sources  o f t h r e a t and danger.  T h i s p o l i c y ivas t o s o f t e n t h e  h o s t i l e d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s and t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e e x i s t i n g friendly relations.  The o t h e r p o l i c y i s t h e a c t u a l  7 enforcement o f p h y s i c a l defence power w h i c h i s observed i n t h e Second Defence P l a n Generally  (1961-66).^  speaking, there  i s no o b j e c t i o n t o l a b e l l i n g  an armament p o l i c y as a s e c u r i t y p o l i c y , s i n c e i n i t s narrowe s t meaning a s e c u r i t y p o l i c y i s a defence p o l i c y , o r a governmental p r o v i s i o n f o r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s .  An o b j e c t i o n  may stem from c o n s t i t u t i n g governmental m a n i p u l a t i o n o f i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s as a s e c u r i t y p o l i c y .  For instance,  K. W. Deutsch says, F i r s t , t h e impact o f e x t e r n a l events upon t h e • i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f a c o u n t r y c o u l d be s a i d t o d e c l i n e w i t h t h e s t a b i l i t y and autonomy o f t h e i n t e r n a l d e c i s i o n making system.4 and he f u r t h e r adds, A v e r y l a r g e c o u n t r y , v e r y prosperous and w i t h v e r y s t r o n g h o l d s upon i t s p o p u l a t i o n , may be a b l e t o w i t h s t a n d even major impacts o f f o r e i g n propaganda by t y i n g i t s p o t e n t i a l l i n k a g e groups so s t r o n g l y t o t h e domestic system t h a t a l l t h e f o r e i g n i n p u t s become r e l a t i v e l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 5 A l t h o u g h Japan h a s . q u i t e  an autonomous and s t a b l e  government,  and a l t h o u g h so c a l l e d l i n k a g e groups such as t h e Japan Communist P a r t y  (JCP) and t h e Japan S o c i a l i s t P a r t y (JSP)  t h a t s t r o n g l y r e f l e c t f o r e i g n governments'  standpoints, are  d e e p l y s e t i n t h e Japanese p o l i t i c a l system, D e u t s c h s above T  hypotheses do not seem t o have worked political situation.  i n t h e postwar  The Japanese Government has been h i g h l y  s e n s i t i v e t o f o r e i g n impacts and has r e a c t e d them. ing  Japanese  carefully to  There a r e perhaps two n o t e w o r t h y reasons f o r e x p l a i n -  t h i s p a r t i c u l a r phenomenon.  One i s t h a t Japan's n a t i o n a l  6d e f e n c e has  been o v e r w h e l m i n g l y d e p e n d e n t upon t h e  S t a t e s , w h i c h i s c o m p a r a b l e t o West E u r o p e a n defence the  cannot  United  policy  cannot  the  Far  The  be  the  Chinese  the  reason  JCP  Japanese p o l i t i c s i n c r e a s e s the  the  United  People's  the  Japanese  Peninsula  and  States  i s that  the  the  importance political  Union,  and  J3P,  of  two  to i t s  Strategy  to the  of the  the  two  and  political  l i n k a g e groups i n  communist  communist  gigantic  S o v i e t Union  important  f u n c t i o n as  bloc.  This  b l o c ' s impact  Furthermore, the  i s one  o f the  on  Korean  This gives  there  are  standpoint  a f f i r m a t i v e and  made t o e x p l o r e ,  that  international  negative  over  this  formulation.  opinions  issue.6  i n v e s t i g a t i o n o r r e s e a r c h on So  f a r , few  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y and  p o l i c y making i n Japan.  i n the  trouble.  i n Japan's defence p o l i c y  security policy.  and  Japan p o t e n t i a l m i l i t a r y  o f Japanese p o l i t i c s  been l i t t l e  Japanese  most t r o u b l e d a r e a s  ostensible p o l i t i c a l  students has  American  b l o c , the The  system.  i s important  course,  there  the  referring  Japan borders  Republic.  This t h e s i s adopts the  Of  and  communist  in relation  contemporary world.  influence  w e l l , Japan's s e c u r i t y  w h i c h i s l o c a t e d between Okinawa, J a p a n , C h i n a ,  Soviet  trouble  As  c o n s i d e r i n g NATO w h i c h  d e l i n e a t e d f u l l y without  powers i n t h e  parties,  the  dominates.  c o u n t r i e s whose  East.  other  military  d i s c u s s e d without  States  relations with for  be  United  Therefore,  among  Actually, the  a t t e m p t s have  subject been  e x t e n s i v e l y , the s e c u r i t y i t seems t o be l e g i t i m a t e  and  n e c e s s a r y t o d i s c u s s the  defence p o l i c y As t h e  international influence  on  Japan's  formulation.  o t h e r major source o f Japan's s e c u r i t y  policy  making, t h i s t h e s i s w i l l d i s c u s s the p o l i c i e s o f the p o l i t i c a l parties:  the  JCP,  Democratic P a r t y (the LDP).  the  JSP,  and  the  three  Liberal-  J . K. Rosenau p o i n t s out the  five  important f a c t o r s that  c o l l e c t i v e l y work upon the  of e x t e r n a l  governmental, s o c i e t a l , s y s t e m i c , r o l e ,  and  policies:  idiosyncratic variables.?  The  impact of the  p a r t i e s which w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n the a p p r o x i m a t e l y c o r r e s p o n d s t o the Rosenau t h e o r y .  t i o n s between the  five variables  mutually effect t h e i r influence B e a r i n g t h i s i n mind, the  are a n a l y t i c a l and  p o l i c i e s o f the  and  o f the  policy  JCP,  systemic  and formulation.  JSP and  LDP  influences.  i t s c o n s e r v a t i v e p r e d e c e s s o r s have been the  they have had  cabinet's a c t i v i t i e s . ture  in  intertwined  on e x t e r n a l  permanent government p a r t i e s i n the s i n c e 1948,  study  Of c o u r s e , the d i s t i n c -  v / i l l be d i s c u s s e d s e p a r a t e l y from the and  the  as  e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t i n the  t h e s e f i v e groups o f f a c t o r s are  LDP  chapter,  governmental v a r i a b l e o f  o f Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y making.  The  political  I n c i d e n t a l l y t h e s e f a c t o r s , as w e l l  s y s t e m i c f a c t o r s , seem t o be  practice  following  formulation  the  Japanese N a t i o n a l  greatest influence  In r e a l i t y , the LDP  Diet over  the  i s the main s t r u c -  Japanese p o l i t i c a l system i n a g g r e g a t i n g demands  concerning national  s e c u r i t y , and  i t i s t h e most a c t i v e  i n f l u e n t i a l body i n f o r m u l a t i n g the  and  defence p o l i c y of Japan.  10 The  JSP and the JCP are u s u a l l y e n t i r e l y a g a i n s t  government p a r t y i n i d e o l o g y and portant  i n foreign policy.  the One  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the two p a r t i e s i s t h a t t h e y  imcan  o f t e n generate anti-government c h a i n r e a c t i o n s i n Japanese s o c i e t y by a c t i v a t i n g the a r t i c u l a t e and who  c r i t i c a l intellectuals  e x e r t s t r o n g i n f l u e n c e over t h e mass media, and  t a n t student  radicals.  the  mili-  As D. Hellmann o b s e r v e s ,  D e s p i t e t h e i r m a j o r i t y i n the D i e t , the L i b e r a l Democrats must g i v e c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o the S o c i a l i s t o p p o s i t i o n on major i s s u e s or r i s k a s e r i o u s p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s t h a t may, as i n the I 9 6 0 S e c u r i t y T r e a t y i n c i d e n t , endanger the s t a b i l i t y o f the e n t i r e p o l i t i c a l system.° The  S o c i a l i s t s can a c t i v a t e a g r e a t number o f s e r n i - i n t e l l e c t u a l s  (or  q u a s i - i n t e l l e c t u a l s ) who  t u a l s ' opinions.9 pressures  s i m p l y echo the c r i t i c a l i n t e l l e c -  These c h a i n r e a c t i o n s o f t e n produce  on the government at t h r e e l e v e l s .  At t h e  highest  l e v e l , the JCP and the JSP e x e r t t h e i r i n f l u e n c e over the governmental p o l i c i e s i n t h e N a t i o n a l D i e t .  At the  second  l e v e l , c r i t i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n the mass media c r i t i c i s e governmental p o l i c i e s i n tune w i t h the JCP and t h e JSP, the u n i o n i s t s and  student  the and  r a d i c a l s organise t h e i r m i l i t a n t  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a g a i n s t the government.  At the lowest  level,  p o l i t i c a l l y aware c i t i z e n s s t a r t e c h o i n g what the mass media, i n f l u e n c e d by the d i s s e n t i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l s , t r y t o  implant  i n the mass, and t h e y o f t e n j o i n the mass d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a g a i n s t the government under the l e a d e r s h i p o f the JCP  and  the JSP.  lowest  U s u a l l y the c h a i n r e a c t i o n s do not go t o the  l e v e l , but i n a p a r t i c u l a r case l i k e the I 9 6 0 p o l i t i c a l  crisis,  11  a g r e a t number o f c o m p l i a n t q u a s i - i n t e l l e c t u a l s can be mobil i s e d t o s u p p o r t t h e JCP and the JSP's l i n e o f argument i n Japanese p o l i t i c s .  T h e r e f o r e , not o n l y as d i r e c t  partici-  pants i n government but a l s o as i n d i r e c t f o r c e s which work as deterrent  f a c t o r s on the LDP's c o n s e r v a t i v i s m , t h e JCP  t h e JSP have t o be d e a l t w i t h when Japan's defence  and  policy  formulation i s discussed. In the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s t h e second  chapter  c o v e r s t h e t h r e e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and t h e i r p o l i c i e s .  The  t h i r d c h a p t e r c o v e r s Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s , K o r e a , and the communist b l o c .  The  f o u r t h c h a p t e r covers  the government's domestic p r o v i s i o n s f o r n a t i o n a l  defence.  The l a s t c h a p t e r i s devoted t o a g e n e r a l assessment o f the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s s e c u r i t y p o l i c y w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o the s y n c r a t i c f a c t o r s o f the Ikeda C a b i n e t .  idio-  12 FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I  -Takase S h o j i , "Anzen t o wa n a n i k a , " A s a h i Shimin K y o s h i t s u : Ninon no Anzenhosho, (Tok3^o: A s a h i Shinbunsha, 1968 v o l s . 1 2 ) , V o l . 1, pp. 60-64. J  2j\Iew York Times, May  19,  1966.  3 T h i s p l a n w i l l be d i s c u s s e d e x t e n s i v e l y i n t h e f o u r t h chapter of t h i s t h e s i s . ^ " E x t e r n a l I n f l u e n c e on the I n t e r n a l B e h a v i o r o f S t a t e s , " R. B. F a r r e l l , ed., Approaches t o Comparative and I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , (Evanston: N o r t h w e s t e r n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1966), p. 8. 5 I b i d , p.  11.  6cf. M a r t i n E. W e i n s t e i n , "The O r i g i n s and B a s i c Concepti o n o f Japan's Post-war Defense P o l i c y , " mimeographed paper, d e l i v e r e d at A s s o c i a t i o n o f Asian Studies Meeting, Boston, March 27-30, 1969, pp. 5 - 7 . 7James H. Rosenau, " P r e - t h e o r i e s and T h e o r i e s P o l i c y , " R. B. F a r r o l l , ed., I b i d , pp. 2 7 - 9 2 .  of Foreign  "Japan i n t h e Postwar East A s i a n I n t e r n a t i o n a l System, (McLean, V i r g i n i a : Research A n a l y s i s C o r p o r a t i o n , 1 9 6 9 ) , p. 13. ^ C f . Douglas H. Mendel, J r . , "Japan Reviews Her American A l l i a n c e , " P u b l i c O p i n i o n Q u a r t e r l y , XXX ( S p r i n g , 1966), pp. 1 - 2 .  13  CHAPTER I I  POLITICAL  PARTIES  THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY  POLICIES D u r i n g t h e time o f t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t , t h e Japan Communist P a r t y (JCP) had r o u g h l y t h r e e p o l i c i e s f o r Japanese s e c u r i t y : t o e x p e l American m i l i t a r y bases from Japan; t o d i s b a n d t h e N a t i o n a l Defence F o r c e ; and t o n e u t r a l i s e and d e m i l i t a r i s e Japan.  The JCP's supreme p o l i t i c a l g o a l had been and remains  t o be a communist  r e v o l u t i o n i n Japanese s o c i e t y .  A l ltheir  a c t i v i t i e s were examined and e v a l u a t e d from t h e viewpoint o f the  communist  revolution.  T h e i r c a r d i n a l concern has been  whether a p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n f a c i l i t a t e s o r slows down t h e i r revolutionary  programme•  T h e r e f o r e , Japan's s e c u r i t y q u e s t i o n  has n e v e r been o f c r u c i a l i n t e r e s t f o r them i n any a f f i r m a t i v e sense.  However, as t h e armed f o r c e s have a d e c i s i v e  position  i n c o n t r o l l i n g p e o p l e , as w e l l as i n defence a g a i n s t a g g r e s s i o n , t h e JCP has p a i d e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y c l o s e  foreign  attention  t o Japan's defence arrangement i n a n e g a t i v e sense. In a d d i t i o n , t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f communism was t h e o t h e r r e a s o n t h a t t h e JCP had always been a l e r t about Japan's d e f e n c e ,  what e f f e c t Japan's defence power had  upon t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist J C P s major c o n c e r n . v  Shiryo  a c t i v i t i e s was always t h e  For example, t h e JCP's S e i . j i  ( I n f o r m a t i o n f o r P o l i t i c a l Campaign) s t a t e s ,  Senden  14 American i m p e r i a l i s m and the Japanese monopoly r a t i f i e d a new S e c u r i t y T r e a t y on June 23rd, I 9 6 0 . The nominal end o f t h i s new t r e a t y was c o l l e c t i v e defence. However, the r e a l aims a r e : t o p r e s e r v e American m i l i t a r y bases i n Japan as u s u a l and to e n f o r c e N a t i o n a l Defence Force w i t h n u c l e a r weapons c a r r i e d by m i s s i l e s ; t o send the Defence Force o v e r s e a s ; and t o suppress the l a b o u r movement. In o t h e r words, the S e c u r i t y T r e a t y o f I960 i s i n essence an e n f o r c e d m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e t o t h r e a t e n and t o invade China and t h e S o v i e t Union. This T r e a t y i s the m a n i f e s t r e v i t a l i s a t i o n o f n u c l e a r armed m i l i t a r i s m . ! 'To suppress the l a b o u r movement' i s an i m p l i c i t e x p r e s s i o n o f the JCP's f e a r o f the o r g a n i s e d armed f o r c e , s i n c e the Defence Force has never been used t o suppress o r t o demonstrate a g a i n s t the l a b o u r movement.  In t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t , the word  ' l a b o u r movement' s h o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as risings'  'communist up-  (which have not taken, p l a c e so f a r ) . T h i s r h e t o r i c  shows the c o n f l i c t between the JCP's a s p i r a t i o n f o r the r e v o l u t i o n and the Defence Force as a d e t e r r e n t a g a i n s t the communist r e v o l u t i o n .  O r i g i n a l l y the Defence Force was e s t a b l i s h e d  t o f i l l the power vacuum which was  c r e a t e d a f t e r the American  t r o o p s ' removal from Japan t o Korea at the b e g i n n i n g o f the Korean War.  The duty o f the o r i g i n a l Defence Force  N a t i o n a l P o l i c e Reserve) was  to keep domestic  a n t i c i p a t i o n o f communist u p r i s i n g s i n Japan.  (The  s o c i a l order i n The  JCP's  h y p e r - s e n s i t i v i t y about the Defence Force as the d e t e r r e n t f o r t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement was n a t u r e o f the Defence F o r c e .  generated  by t h i s  original  T h e r e f o r e , c o n s i d e r i n g the os-  t e n s i b l e and p o t e n t i a l power o f the Defence Force, the JCP's view t h a t the Force c o u l d be the most e f f e c t i v e d e t e r r e n t f o r  15  t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n a r y programme was r e a s o n a b l e ,  and t h e i r p o l i c y  t o d i s b a n d the Force was w e l l i n a c c o r d w i t h t h e i r view o f i t . As f o r the JCP's v i e w o f American m i l i t a r y bases i n Japan and o f the enforcement o f the Defence Force, the JCP's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e v e a l s the main e x p e c t a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r the S e c u r i t y T r e a t y .  For example, an a r t i c l e which  appeared i n Zj3nei ( the JCP's monthly o p i n i o n magazine) i n June o f I960, ''The American M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y and Japan's S u b o r d i n a t i o n t o i t " viewed the t r e a t y  as h a v i n g i n c o r p o r -  a t e d Japan i n t o the American defence l i n e i n the Far E a s t . I t viewed t h a t the aim o f the t r e a t y was t o c o n t a i n the  com--  o munist b l o c and t o suppress communist a c t i v i t i e s i n Japan, In 1961, the above i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was f u r t h e r extended i n the a r t i c l e , "The American M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y and the Aim o f Defence Strengthening,"3 t h a t the "American i n v a s i o n " i n t o Laos, Korea, and Southeast A s i a "from J a p a n w a s e n a b l e d p a r t i c u l a r l y because Japan's armed f o r c e s became s t r o n g enough not t o c r e a t e a power vacuum i n Japan and the Far E a s t .  This  v i e w was an e x t e n s i o n o f t h e former v i e w i n the sense t h a t i t r e c o g n i s e d J a p a n s i n d i r e c t r o l e i n American s t r a t e g y as b e i n g an 1  e x p a n s i o n from t h e Far East t o Southeast A s i a .  Such a view o f  Japan's r o l e i n American S t r a t e g y , when d i g e s t e d by t h e c i p l e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism, produced  prin-  a p o l i c y to d i s -  engage Japan from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t o e x p e l American m i l i t a r y bases from Japan. The p o l i c y g o a l s o f the JCP t o n e u t r a l i s e and t o d e m i l i -  16 t a r i s e Japan were as f o l l o w s .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y the n e u t r a l i -  s a t i o n o f Japan was supposed t o c o n t r i b u t e g r e a t l y t o weakening the American p o s i t i o n i n A s i a and was a l s o supposed t o encourage A s i a n communist r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s .  Domestically, t o  d e m i l i t a r i s e Japan i m p l i e d the disbandonment o f the Defence F o r c e , which was t h e p r i m a r y b a r r i e r f o r t h e communist r e v o l u t i o n i n Japan.  Thus, t h e J C P s p o l i c y f o r Japan's  defence  f  c o u l d serve two major g o a l s :  t o h e l p t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l com-  munist movement and t o c a r r y out t h e communist r e v o l u t i o n in  Japan.  ACTIONS The JCP's main s t r a t e g y o f e x e c u t i n g i t s p o l i c y t o r e a c h i t s g o a l s has been b a s i c a l l y t o i n s t i g a t e p o p u l a r movements. Through t h e s e p o p u l a r movements t h e JCP has t r i e d t o  spread  i t s i n f l u e n c e and e n f o r c e i t s p o s i t i o n i n t h e N a t i o n a l D i e t . In t h i s r e g a r d , t h e i960 a n t i - S e c u r i t y T r e a t y movement was i t s most s u c c e s s f u l campaign.  However, a f t e r t h e campaign, I k e d a s 1  p e r i o d (1960-1964) became a r e l a t i v e l y i n a c t i v e p e r i o d f o r t h e JCP f o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s .  First of a l l ,  the Sino-Soviet d i s -  pute became v i o l e n t i n 1961, which dismayed t h e JCP, because the JCP had been i d e o l o g i c a l l y dependent on and dominated by the R u s s i a n and Chinese p a r t y l i n e s .  The JCP a t t h i s  stage  c o u l d not d e c i d e which s i d e i t s h o u l d j o i n , n o r was i t p r e pared t o t a k e an independent  course.  Secondly, t h e Ikeda  C a b i n e t ' s economic p o l i c y s a t i s f i e d p o p u l a r demands f o r  17  m a t e r i a l goods and the Cabinet was on good terms w i t h China and the S o v i e t Union.  C o n s e q u e n t l y the Japanese people became  l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n s e c u r i t y q u e s t i o n s , and the r e l e v a n c e o f the J C P s d i s c u s s i o n s on the Japan's s e c u r i t y was ?  gradually  reduced. D u r i n g the Ikeda p e r i o d , the JCP's immediate g o a l conc e r n i n g Japan's defence became m a i n l y t o l e s s e n the growth o f the Defence activities.  Force and t o r e s t r i c t the Defence  F o r c e ' s range o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y the s t r a t e g y was t o reduce  Japan's r o l e i n the F a r E a s t e r n anti-communism l i n e - u p . Throughout I960,  and a f t e r the a n t i - S e c u r i t y T r e a t y movements o f  the JCP p r o c l a i m e d t h a t the new t r e a t y i n v o l v e d the  danger o f arming the Defence  Force w i t h n u c l e a r weapons; and  t h a t Japan's p o s s e s s i n g n u c l e a r weapons c o u l d provoke the communist c o u n t r i e s ' r e t a l i a t o r y a t t a c k w i t h n u c l e a r weapons. In r e s p o n s e , the Ikeda C a b i n e t f i r m l y and r e p e a t e d l y s t a t e d t h a t n u c l e a r weapons would never be p l a c e d i n Japan and t h a t the Defence Force would not be armed w i t h n u c l e a r weapons as l o n g as the Ikeda C a b i n e t s t a y e d i n power.  Ikeda's statement  was a g r e a t g a i n f o r the JCP s t r a t e g i c a l l y , s i n c e i t s u c c e s s f u l l y p r e v e n t e d the Defence n u c l e a r weapons.  Force from b e i n g equipped w i t h  However, Ikeda's statement was a f a t a l  f o r the JCP i n g e n e r a t i n g p o p u l a r a n t i - n u c l e a r weapon  blow  campaigns.  F o r , a f t e r Ikeda's s t a t e m e n t s , the Force's n u c l e a r armament v i r t u a l l y d i s a p p e a r e d as a p o l i t i c a l i s s u e .  Even worse f o r  the JCP was the S o v i e t Union's resumption o f n u c l e a r t e s t s i n  13 1961 a f t e r b r e a k i n g the mutual Test Ban Moratorium w i t h the United States.  The Japanese Government d i d not n e g l e c t t h i s  o c c a s i o n t o p r o t e s t the R u s s i a n n u c l e a r t e s t s , and  Japan's  p u b l i c o p i n i o n s u p p o r t e d the Government unanimously and denounced the S o v i e t Union.  The JC? was f o r the f i r s t time i n  i t s h i s t o r y c o r n e r e d i n t o a d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n V i s a V i s the Japanese Government c o n c e r n i n g the i s s u e o f n u c l e a r armament and t e s t s . The JGP viewed, the S e c u r i t y T r e a t y o f I960 as a  spring-  board f o r Japan t o e n l a r g e the Defence Force under the American s t r a t e g i c c o n t r o l , and ' a n t i - m i l i t a r i s m ' remained t o be a b i g a n t i - C a b i n e t campaign the K i s h i C a b i n e t .  s l o g a n d u r i n g the Ikeda p e r i o d a f t e r  Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y and i t s  a t t i t u d e towards n a t i o n a l  defence and s e c u r i t y gave a d e t r i -  m e n t a l e f f e c t t o t h i s campaign. the  In Ikeda's f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y ,  p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e defence budget d i d not i n c r e a s e n o t a b l y .  In f a c t i t was even kept f a r below the l e v e l expected by the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the Defence Agency ( B o e i c h o ) . 5  Ikeda  C a b i n e t ' s r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l defence budget a g a i n d i s c o u r a g e d the  JCP's a n t i - m i l i t a r i s m campaign.  T h i s i n v o l v e d almost the  same p r o c e s s and had the same e f f e c t on the JCP's t a c t i c s as Ikeda's n o n - n u c l e a r armament p o l i c y . The JCP's a t t a c k on Japan's defence system b e i n g under American c o n t r o l and c o n s t i t u t i n g American s t r a t e g y ,  was  answered by Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s 'autonomous defence p o l i c y . ' autonomous defence p o l i c y was not Ikeda's o r i g i n a l p o l i c y ,  The  19 but i n essence i t was i n the Ikeda p e r i o d when Japan's armed f o r c e s became an i m p o r t a n t e n t i t y among the Far E a s t e r n m i l i t a r y forces.  In a sense American i n f l u e n c e o v e r the  Defence Force was reduced except i n the A i r Defence Force's c o n t r o l system.  Thus the JCP's g o a l was f u l f i l l e d by the  Ikeda s policy.  As a r e s u l t o f i t ,  ?  however, Japan's Defence  Force a c q u i r e d s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e as w e l l as f i g h t i n g power. T h e r e f o r e , as a whole, Ikeda's defence p o l i c y d i d not reduce the t o t a l amount o f m i l i t a r y power t h a t c o n f r o n t e d the communist b l o c i n the Far E a s t .  On the c o n t r a r y , i t s t r e n g t h e n e d  the anti-communist m i l i t a r y b l o c and gave the U n i t e d S t a t e s g r e a t e r m o b i l i t y i n t h e Far East and i n A s i a . ^  1  As f a r as the  JCP's aim t o disengage the U n i t e d S t a t e s from Japan was cerned, the JCP was l e a s t s u c c e s s f u l , s i n c e  con-  'autonomous Japan'  s t r e n g t h e n e d i t s p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s , and the Japanese people welcomed such a partnership.''  7  The JCP's t a c t i c s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l sphere were more e f f e c t i v e than i n domestic p o l i t i c s .  In 1961,  the Ikeda  C a b i n e t showed a g r e a t i n t e r e s t i n n e g o t i a t i o n s t o n o r m a l i s e d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h South Korea.  H i s t o r i c a l l y the  Korean P e n i n s u l a has been the most c r u c i a l a r e a around  Japan  f o r Japan's n a t i o n a l defence.®  Korea  A f t e r the P a c i f i c War,  r e s t o r e d i t s independence, but was d i v i d e d i n t o N o r t h and South Korea.' South Korea had been i n an i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n t o N o r t h Korea both i n m i l i t a r y and i n economic a s p e c t s .  The  economic weakness o f South Korea was an A c h i l l e s ' h e e l o f  20 the anti«communist b l o c i n t h e F a r E a s t , and i t s p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y i n s t a b i l i t y was a l s o a p o t e n t i a l danger f o r Japan's s e c u r i t y .  Continuous South Korean s o c i a l u n r e s t was  p r o v o c a t i v e t o N o r t h Korean a s p i r a t i o n s t o r e - u n i t e Korea. Both t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan wanted t o s t a b i l i s e t h e South Korean Government by r e i n f o r c i n g i t s economy.  Japan's  economic c o n d i t i o n d u r i n g Ikeda's p e r i o d was a l r e a d y s t r o n g enough t o s u p p o r t t h i s  policy.  The JCP, accompanied by t h e Japan S o c i a l i s t P a r t y  (JSP),  was a g a i n s t t h e Japanese Government's f r i e n d l y approaches t o South Korea, f o r f e a r o f N o r t h Korea's l o s s o f dominance i n the Korean P e n i n s u l a ,  N a t u r a l l y , the s e n s i t i v e area f o r  Japan's n a t i o n a l defence was a l s o t h e s e n s i t i v e a r e a f o r t h e communist b l o c , e s p e c i a l l y f o r N o r t h Korea and t h e Chinese People's R e p u b l i c .  Regardless o f t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l  split,  the communist c o u n t r i e s unanimously p r o t e s t e d Japan's n e g o t i a t i o n s t o n o r m a l i s e n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h South Korea, s i n c e Japan's aim i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s was o b v i o u s l y t o s t a b i l i s e t h e South Korean Government f o r i t s own s e c u r i t y r e a s o n s .  With  the communist c o u n t r i e s ' wide support and w i t h t h e JSP's p a r t n e r s h i p , t h e JCP pursued i t s p o l i c y o f o p p o s i n g t h e JapaneseKorean n e g o t i a t i o n s , by p o i n t i n g out t h r e e r e a s o n s .  Firstly,  the Japanese-Korean p a r t n e r s h i p would r e s u l t i n a k i n d o f N o r t h E a s t A s i a n T r e a t y O r g a n i s a t i o n (JCP's term) which would p r o v i d e optimum m i l i t a r y bases t o American i m p e r i a l i s m ' s war-like policy i n Asia,  Secondly, Japanese 'monopoly c a p i t a l '  21  would go i n t o South Korea and open doors o f an C o - p r o s p e r i t y Sphere.'  'Asian  T h i r d l y , i t would prevent  the p e a c e f u l  r e - u n i f i c a t i o n o f Korea, c o n f i r m t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f Korea, i n t e n s i f y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n Korea, and p o s s i b l y would aim t o a t t a c k berth Korea.^ The Japanese-Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s were prolonged out t h e Ikeda Cabinet ceeding  cabinet.  and were concluded  through-  i n 1965 by t h e suc-  The JCP's t a c t i c s a g a i n s t t h e Japanese-  Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s , a l o n g w i t h domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l support,  c o n t r i b u t e d t o p r o l o n g i n g t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s , and  g a i n e d a success which was not a c q u i r e d i n i t s domestic p o l i cies. In c o n c l u s i o n , d u r i n g the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s  e r a , t h e JCP's  t a c t i c s f o r Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y were i n a c t i v e and i n e f f e c t i v e , because o f t h e S i n o - S o v i e t i d e o l o g i c a l  split,  the JCP's i n t r a - p a r t y power s t r u g g l e , and because o f t h e Ikeda Cabinet's  appealing p o l i c y t o a t t r a c t people's a t t e n t i o n t o  economic a c t i v i t i e s .  The o n l y p a r t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l t a c t i c s o f  the JCP were found i n i t s a n t i - J a p a n e s e - K o r e a n n e g o t i a t i o n s campaign.  THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY DURING THE IKEDA PERIOD  MATURE The b a s i c c h a r a c t e r and nature  o f the Japan S o c i a l i s t  P a r t y (JSP) must be e x p l a i n e d b r i e f l y i n o r d e r t o d i s c u s s t h e  22 JSP's p o l i c y f o r Japan',s s e c u r i t y . l a r g e s t p o l i t i c a l p a r t y i n Japan. ter  The JSP i s the  second  I t has a t w o - f o l d charac-  i n t h e two d i m e n s i o n s : s t r u c t u r e and a c t i v i t i e s .  While  the Japan Communist P a r t y (JCP) i s a p a r t y o f hard core comm u n i s t s w i t h a m o n o l i t h i c s t r u c t u r e , the JSP i s a p o p u l a r s o c i a l i s t p a r t y which c o n s i s t s m a i n l y o f M a r x i s t s and socialists,  Fabian  The JSP members can be d i v i d e d i n t o r i g h t w i n g  and l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n s i n t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n .  The  JSP's major p o l i t i c a l support comes from two s o u r c e s : the General C o u n c i l o f Trade Unions o f Japan  (Ninon Rodo So  g i k a i o r Sohyo) and u n o r g a n i s e d p o p u l a r s y m p a t h i s e r s .  HyoSohyo  e x e r t s a s t r o n g i n f l u e n c e over the JSP's p o l i c y making s i n c e i t i s the l a r g e s t o r g a n i s e d source o f p o l i t i c a l support f o r the JSP.  However, because the JSP has moderate f a c t i o n s  which a n t a g o n i s e the l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n s , i t g a i n s n o n - o r g a n i s e d p o p u l a r support whose n a t u r e i s l e s s m i l i t a n t compared t o the m i l i t a n t l i n e o f the Sohyo.  This gives a t w o - f o l d nature to  the JSP's b e h a v i o r . The p a r t y d o c t r i n e o f the JSP i s v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f a communist p a r t y i n i t s emphasis on c l a s s s t r u g g l e ,  and  l o o k i n g at i t s p r i n c i p l e i t i s h a r d t o d i s t i n g u i s h the J3P from a communist p a r t y . " ^ o f t e n chooses  However i n p r a c t i c e , the JSP v e r y  f o r i t s e x e c u t i v e body r i g h t w i n g f a c t i o n s ' mem-  bers o r members w i t h m i l d i d e o l o g y t o r e c o n c i l e i t s m i l i t a n t p r i n c i p l e w i t h i t s p o p u l a r support which expects o f the JSP l e s s m i l i t a n c y than M a r x i s t s ' i d e o l o g y .  The JSP's  policies  23  w h i c h come out o f t h e p a r t y assembly a r e as m i l i t a n t and r a d i c a l as those o f the JCP, but i n t h e e x e c u t i o n o f them, these m i l i t a n t p o l i c i e s a r e s o f t e n e d and r e - i n t e r p r e t e d by c o n s e r v a t i v e s e n i o r members and a r e t r a n s f o r m e d militant policies.  into less  T h i s i s r o u g h l y t h e p r o c e s s how t h e JSP  produces a compromised p o l i c y t o s a t i s f y both s t r o n g demands o f o r g a n i s e d l a b o u r which a l i g n s w i t h the l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n s and c o n s e r v a t i v i s m o f n o n - o r g a n i s e d p o p u l a r  supporters  who  are a l i g n e d w i t h the r i g h t w i n g f a c t i o n s , W i t h r e g a r d t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , the l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n s are c l o s e t o ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism' i n i d e o l o g y and the r i g h t w i n g f a c t i o n s a r e c l o s e t o democratic and West European communism.  While the JCP r e c e i v e d a hard  blow from t h e S i n o - S o v i e t s p l i t , t h e JSP was o n l y i n f l u e n c e d by i t .  socialism  slightly  That i s because t h e JSP i s f i r s t o f a l l not  a. genuine communist p a r t y and because t h e l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n s t r a d i t i o n a l l y kept c l o s e r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Chinese Communist P a r t y and have supported The  t h e Chinese l i n e from t h e b e g i n n i n g .  r i g h t w i n g f a c t i o n s have always been c r i t i c a l o f t h e l e f t -  wing f a c t i o n s ' pro-communist s t a n d . progressed,  As t h e Sino-Soviet  split  i t became c l e a r t h a t t h e Chinese r i g i d l i n e t o  emphasise p o p u l a r r e v o l u t i o n was n o t s u i t a b l e as a t a c t i c f o r the JSP t o g a i n p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l under the e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n i n Japan.  social  The JSP had t o examine i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l  and g e n e r a l i d e o l o g i c a l s t a n d p o i n t a f t e r t h e s p l i t o f China and t h e S o v i e t Union.  The JSP had t o answer a l s o the p u b l i c  34 a c c u s a t i o n on the q u e s t i o n o f Chinese Communist P a r t y ' s cont r o l over the JSP's p o l i c y making t h r o u g h the  pro-Chinese  factions. In 19'6l due t o the i n i t i a t i v e o f the r i g h t w i n g f a c t i o n s ',, the JSP adopted the  ' S t r u c t u r a l Reform Theory' o f the  Italian  Communist P a r t y i n o r d e r t o answer the above q u e s t i o n . was  This  a t h e o r y o f g r a d u a l s h i f t from c a p i t a l i s m t o s o c i a l i s m  without  v i o l e n t r e v o l u t i o n , and was  presented  p a r t i c u l a r l y to  j u s t i f y the European communist p a r t i e s ' n o n - v i o l e n t r e v o l u tionary strategy.  In V/est European s o c i e t y , the S t r u c t u r a l  Reform Theory p r o v i d e d an answer t o the q u e s t i o n o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e a l i s i n g a communist r e v o l u t i o n w h i l e p r e s e r v i n g the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l system.  With the  still  gradual  W e s t e r n i s a t i o n o f the Japanese s o c i e t y , the t h e o r y seemed -to s a t i s f y the JSP's s e a r c h f o r a new  ideology.  The  welcomed by the moderates i n the part}/ and by the p u b l i c o p i n i o n , but was  s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i s e d by the  f a c t i o n s i n the p a r t y and  theory  was  informed radical  by Sohyo f o r i t s l a c k o f m i l i t a n c y .  Throughout the time o f the Ikeda C a b i n e t ,  the  right-left  antagonism w i t h i n the p a r t y over p a r t y p r i n c i p l e  continued  and the Marxism o r i e n t e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i n e kept i t s f o r m a l dominant p o s i t i o n i n i t s p o l i c y making. e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e JSP's two Of course,  T h i s was  another  sided character.  some r a d i c a l elements w i t h i n the l e f t w i n g  f a c t i o n s had been s u p p o r t i n g the r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i n e both i n i d e o l o g y and i n t a c t i c s , but because the JSP had been an  25  'In-Regime' ( T a i s e i - n a i ) p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , ^ t h e y had t o bear the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f s u s t a i n i n g p a r l i a m e n t a r y t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e government p a r t y .  Therefore,  democracy the v i o l e n t  r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i n e i n t h e JSP has never t a k e n t h e dominant p o s i t i o n i n the execution o f i t s p o l i c i e s .  U n l i k e the JCP,  the JSP has been t o o complex and m u l t i - f a c t i o n a l i n i t s p a r t y s t r u c t u r e t o take one c o n s i s t e n t i d e o l o g i c a l l i n e l i k e t h e JCP's r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i n e .  The p a r t y d o c t r i n e o f t h e JSP i s  aimed a t t h e Kokumin S e i t o , a p a r t y w i t h w i d e s p r e a d For t h e JCP, t h e p o p u l a r accomplish  support.  f r o n t i s o n l y a t a c t i c a l means t o  t h e r e v o l u t i o n , and i t s h o u l d be disbanded a f t e r  the r e v o l u t i o n .  Whereas, f o r t h e JSP, t h e p o p u l a r  not a n o m i n a l but an u l t i m a t e aim. t i n g u i s h e s t h e JSP from t h e JCP.  party i s  This c r u c i a l point  dis-  T h e o r e t i c a l l y , the JSP's  p a r t y d o c t r i n e i s v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f a communist p a r t y , but i t s u l t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l g o a l s a r e a c q u i r e d through t h e present  p o l i t i c a l system, r a t h e r than through a communist  r e v o l u t i o n , where t h e e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l system i s o v e r t u r n e d . In JSP's p o l i t i c s , t h e complex o f t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as a r a d i c a l s o c i a l i s t p a r t y i n i d e o l o g y and as a p o p u l a r  party  produced p o l i c i e s which e v e n t u a l l y f o l l o w e d t h e p u r s u i t o f the e x i s t i n g  'national i n t e r e s t . '  The JSP's p o l i t i c a l a c t -  i o n s d i d n o t go o u t s i d e t h e framework o f t h e ' n a t i o n a l interest. ' 1  This d u a l nature  o f t h e JSP must be c a r e f u l l y  i d e n t i f i e d and t r e a t e d when t h e JSP's p o l i c i e s are s t u d i e d .  26  POLICIES During the Ikeda e r a , JSP's p o l i t i c a l g o a l s were twof o l d : t o extend the s o c i a l i s a t i o n o f the Japanese economy; and t o g a i n a g r e a t e r d i p l o m a t i c autonomy from' the American i n f l u e n c e over Japanese e x t e r n a l p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n .  Regarding  n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , the JSP proposed t h r e e major p o l i c i e s : t o n e u t r a l i s e Japan; t o o f f i c i a l l y r e c o g n i s e the Chinese People's R e p u b l i c as the l e g i t i m a t e government o f China; and t o b l o c k the Japanese-Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g t o the JSP's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the major cause o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n i n the Far East was t i v e nature East.  provoca-  o f the American m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y f o r the  Unless  Japan d i v o r c e d h e r s e l f from the U n i t e d  t h i s t e n s i o n "would never ease and  Far States,  Japan would always be  posed t o the danger o f war a g a i n s t i t s w i l l . important  the  One  o f the most  c o r o l l a r i e s o f t h i s n e u t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y was  complete a b o l i t i o n o f the S e c u r i t y T r e a t y o f the U n i t e d and Japan. ism,  The  ex-  the States  JSP e x p l a i n e d the aim o f i t s a b s o l u t e n e u t r a l -  12 - L<  To e s t a b l i s h f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h a l l the countr i e s . Kot t o make a h y p o t h e t i c a l enemy. Never t o r e l y upon m i l i t a r y f o r c e . To s o l v e c o n f l i c t s t h r o u g h n e g o t i a t i o n s and t o e s t a b l i s h p e a c e f u l coexistence. Not t o j o i n the communist b l o c o r the West.era b l o c . To a b o l i s h the S e c u r i t y Treaty so as to d i s m i s s the a n t i - J a p a n e s e c l a u s e i n the S i n o - S o v i e t P a c t . The a b o l i t i o n o f a l l the m i l i t a r y pacts.. To e n l a r g e t r a d e r e l a t i o n s w i t h a l l the n a t i o n s . To a l t e r Japan's American dominated  27 t r a d e s t r u c t u r e and t o extend the A s i a n , ' C h i n e s e , and R u s s i a n t r a d e s so t h a t Japan's t r a d e s t r u c t u r e be r e a d j u s t e d f o r f u r t h e r economic p r o s p e r i t y . 13 The  JSP was  c o n f i d e n t i n r e c e i v i n g p o p u l a r support  for i t s  unarmed n e u t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y , and i n Moscow, S e c r e t a r y General Kawakami s a i d a t an i n t e r v i e w by the  Pravda,  A g r e a t m a j o r i t y of the Japanese support our abs o l u t e n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y and do not want t o get i n v o l v e d w i t h any war under any c i r c u m s t a n c e . The government p a r t y of Japan says t h a t the S o v i e t Union and the o t h e r communist c o u n t r i e s arc a t h r e a t t o Japan's s e c u r i t y , but as a m a t t e r o f f a c t , such a t h r e a t does not e x i s t i n the Japanese p e o p l e ' s mindso T h e r e f o r e , we s t r o n g l y demand the a b o l i t i o n o f American m i l i t a r y presence and the r e p a t r i a t i o n o f American m i l i t a r y t r o o p s from Japan. We r e s e n t the m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l o f Japan by the American C a p i t a l i s m , 1 4 The n e u t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y a p p a r e n t l y came out o f the  strong  i n f l u e n c e o f the l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n s o f the JSP which are Marxism o r i e n t e d .  For example, the JSP's study and a n a l y s i s  o f the contemporary w o r l d s i t u a t i o n i s w e l l d e t a i l e d c o n c e r n i n g American s t r a t e g y and m i l i t a n c y , w h i l e i t u n b e l i e v a b l y undere s t i m a t e s o r s i m p l y n e g l e c t s the communist b l o c ' s m i l i t a n t activities.  The  JSP's n e u t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y was  n e u t r a l i s a t i o n but an  'absolute n e u t r a l i s a t i o n '  n e u t r a l i s a t i o n ) o f Japan. aimed at k e e p i n g  The  not a  simple  (unarmed  JSP's a b s o l u t e n e u t r a l i s m  f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h the U n i t e d  was  States  w h i l e a t the same time s o f t e n i n g S o v i e t and Chinese m i l i t a n c y towards Japan. was  N a t u r a l l y the unarmed n e u t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y  c r i t i c i s e d by the government p a r t y and to a c e r t a i n degree  by the p u b l i c o p i n i o n f o r i t s h y p e r - o p t i m i s t i c v i e w of n a t i o nal  security.  Although  the JSP accused the U n i t e d S t a t e s o f  28 militant  s t r a t e g y a g a i n s t t h e communist b l o c and advocated  a b s o l u t e n e u t r a l i s m , t h e JSP n e g l e c t e d t h e danger o f t h e American m i l i t a r i s m t o Japan's s e c u r i t y .  T h e r e f o r e , most o f  t h e c r i t i c i s m a g a i n s t the JSP's unarmed n e u t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y was c e n t e r e d around t h e JSP's u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n o f t h e communist b l o c ' s t h r e a t and i t s l a c k o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e p o s s i b l e American t h r e a t t o Japan's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . 1 5  The JSP  emphasised t h e m i l i t a n c y o f 'American i m p e r i a l i s m ' and t h e e x p a n s i o n o f American c a p i t a l i s m .  C o n s e q u e n t l y i t advocated  the a b s o l u t e n e u t r a l i s a t i o n o f J a p a n , o r 'away f r o m t h e dangerous America' p o l i c y ,  and i t emphasised t h e b a s i c a l l y  f r i e n d l y n a t u r e o f t h e communist c o u n t r i e s .  S t r a n g e l y enough,  however, t h e JSP's unarmed n e u t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y n e g l e c t e d Japan's p r e p a r a t i o n f o r defence a g a i n s t American i m p e r i a l i s m . '  entirely 'militant  The JSP's a n t i p a t h y towards m i l i t a n t  American s t r a t e g y a g a i n s t t h e communist b l o c and i t s a b s o l u t e and b l i n d b e l i e f i n America's r e s p e c t f o r Japan's n e u t r a l i t y made a s t r a n g e c o n t r a s t i n i t s p o l i c y .  T h i s was a t y p i c a l  example o f t h e JSP's c o n t r a d i c t o r y c h a r a c t e r as a r a d i c a l s o c i a l i s t p a r t y and as a p o p u l a r p a r t y , which r e f l e c t s  both  the M a r x i a n m i l i t a n c y and p o p u l a r good w i l l o r i n o t h e r words the b l i n d b e l i e f o f t h e Japanese i n American  'good b e h a v i o r . '•'  The second p o l i c y , t o r e c o g n i s e t h e Chinese P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c as t h e l e g i t i m a t e government o f C h i n a , r e p r e s e n t s the g e n e r a l c o n s e n s u s o f t h e J S P .  I t s p o l i c y t o recognise  Communist China and t o withdraw t h e e x i s t i n g r e c o g n i t i o n o f  29 N a t i o n a l i s t China, was of  b a s i c a l l y i n harmony w i t h the  ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism.'  The  policy  JSP's C e n t r a l E x e c u t i v e  Committee (Chuo Shikko I i n k a i ) r e l e a s e d a statement  concerning  i t s s t a n d f o r Japan's p o s i t i o n i n the r e c o g n i t i o n o f China, We r e c o g n i s e China's r i g h t t o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s and t o n o r m a l i s i n g Si.no-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . We do not r e c o g n i s e two C h i n a s . We would i m m e d i a t e l y s t a r t n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the Chinese People's R e p u b l i c t o conclude a peace t r e a t y so t h a t we would r e s t o r e the l e g i t i m a t e and complete d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . We would, abrogate the Sino-Japanese (Japan and Taiwan's) T r e a t y . . . 1 ° The above statement  has two s i g n i f i c a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s .  One  i s t h a t the JSP wanted t o conclude a peace t r e a t y w i t h Communist  C h i n a , which would o f f i c i a l l y end the t e c h n i c a l  of war between Japan and Communist C h i n a .  state  For more than  two  decades, Japan has been t e c h n i c a l l y a t war w i t h Communist China.  T h i s has been a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t t o Japan's s e c u r i t y .  So f a r , no c a b i n e t o f Japan has s o l v e d  t h i s problem.  t h e r e has been the heavy burden o f the Y o s h i d a  Since  Cabinet's  l e g a c y i n which Japan r e c o g n i s e d N a t i o n a l i s t China i n o r d e r to  r e g a i n independence,  i t has been e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t f o r  any c o n s e r v a t i v e -cabinet o f Japan t o n o r m a l i s e the  relations  w i t h C o n t i n e n t a l China.  The  to  system i n t h e o r y and i n p r a c t i c e , '  the p r e s e n t p o l i t i c a l  Japan Communist P a r t y was  opposed  and. i t was u s e l e s s f o r the present government t o expect the JCP t o work f o r the r e s t o r a t i o n o f Sino-Japanese relations.  friendly  N a t u r a l l y i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n the JSP, b e i n g a  p o p u l a r p a r t y , c o n s i d e r e d i t s e l f the o n l y m e d i a t o r i n Japan for  t h i s mission.  N a r i t a Tomomi, S e c r a t a r y - G e n e r a l o f the  30 JSP, wrote i n  1964,  The Sino-Japanese problem i s new s t i r r e d up by the French r e c o g n i t i o n o f Communist C h i n a . The JSP has a p r i n c i p l e t h a t we s h o u l d r e s t o r e d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h China and t h a t China s h o u l d be g i v e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . . . W e need t o arouse p u b l i c o p i n i o n and, as a good example o f our e x p e r i e n c e i n i n f l u e n c i n g the L i b e r a l - D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y , we can r e f e r t o the J a p a n e s e - S o v i e t n e g o t i a t i o n s . For these n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e r e were a f f i r m a t i v e and n e g a t i v e o p i n i o n s i n the LDP, and the P r e s i d e n t o f the JSP, S u z u k i , s t r o n g l y supported the Prime M i n i s t e r Hatoyama's n e g o t i a t i o n s by g i v i n g p o l i t i c a l a i d t o the Cabinet i n c o n t r a s t t o the o p p o s i n g f a c t i o n s w i t h i n the LDP. In the same manner, I t h i n k we need t o e x e r t our e f f o r t s t o i n f l u e n c e Prime M i n i s t e r Ikeda t o r e c o g n i s e the Chinese People's R e p u b l i c . 1 7 and S u z u k i Mosaburo, former P r e s i d e n t o f the JSP, s a i d t o Utsunomiya Tokuma, a D i e t member o f the  Mr.  LDP,  R e c e n t l y Japanese b u s i n e s s l e a d e r s . . . have r e a l i s e d the importance of the Chinese t r a d e and commerce, but they s t i l l f e a r a s t a b l e and l o n g - t e r m t r a d e w i t h China. C o n s i d e r i n g the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s i n a c t i v i t y i n n o r m a l i s i n g Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , we have a q u e s t i o n , Who s o l v e s t h i s q u e s t i o n f o r the Japanese b u s i n e s s w o r l d ? " My c o n v i c t i o n i s t h a t the JSP i s the o n l y p o s s i b l e p a r t y t o s o l v e i t , s u c c e e d i n g t o the Hatoyama's legacy.18 ,;  Both N a r i t a , a l e a d e r o f a r i g h t w i n g f a c t i o n , and l e a d e r o f a l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n , were c o n s c i o u s  Suzuki, a  o f the JSP's  s p e c i a l r o l e t o mediate between Japan and Communist China and e v e n t u a l l y t o end the t e c h n i c a l s t a t e o f war between the  two  countries. The  second i m p l i c a t i o n was  t h a t the JSP's a t t i t u d e toward  Taiwan was  not the same as t h a t o f the JCP.  considered  Taiwan a domestic problem o f China, they d i d not  support  A l t h o u g h the  JSP  the immediate u n i f i c a t i o n o f Taiwan under Communist  31 China's i n i t i a t i v e .  At one s t a g e , N a r i t a r e l e a s e d a JSP  s e n i o r members' view on t h i s q u e s t i o n a t a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e , The Japan S o c i a l i s t P a r t y does not change i t s s t a n d ; t h a t t h e Chinese P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c i n P e k i n g i s the government t h a t r e p r e s e n t s one China and t h a t Japan must i m m e d i a t e l y have l e g i t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h a t C h i n a . The N a t i o n a l i s t Government i s t h e government t h a t a c t u a l l y r u l e s Taiwan, a p a r t o f C h i n a , and i t s h o u l d be r e c o g n i s e d as a b e l l i g e r e n t body i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law.19 N a r i t a withdrew t h e above v i e w a few days l a t e r on t h e grounds t h a t i t might c r e a t e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . T h i s was o b v i o u s l y a r e s u l t o f t h e l e f t i s t p r e s s u r e s on t h e s e n i o r members. I t showed t h a t t h e r e were c o n f l i c t i n g views i n the JSP c o n c e r n i n g the  t r e a t m e n t o f the Taiwan Government.  The JSP's f i n a l  stand  was t h a t t h e Taiwan i s s u e was China's domestic problem, w i t h out  s p e c i f y i n g t h e meaning o f the term.  S i n c e the JSP viewed  i t as 'China's domestic problem,' t h e y d i d not need t o exp l a i n t h e problem i n d e t a i l i n t h e name o f the ' n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n p r i n c i p l e ' i n domestic a f f a i r s o f o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . The t h i r d p o l i c y was t o b l o c k t h e Japanese-Korean n e g o t i ations.  The JSP's view o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s was  i n t h e p a r t y ' s o p i n i o n magazine  ;  summarised  Gekkan S h a k a i t o ,  I t f i r s t l y r e p r e s e n t s a motive o r p o l i c y o f 'Japanese monopoly c a p i t a l ' t o invade t h e Korean market because i t i s f a c i n g o v e r - p r o d u c t i o n caused by'the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s 'Rapid Economic Growth' p o l i c y . Secondly, i t i s a r e s u l t o f an American p o l i c y t o l e t Japan take o v e r American a i d t o Korea i n o r d e r t o decrease American o v e r s e a s e x p e n d i t u r e s and t o p r o t e c t the d o l l a r . T h i r d l y , i t i s an American p l a n t o l e t Japan t a k e p a r t i n h e r own defence so t h a t the Korean m i l i t a r y regime c o u l d i n d i r e c t l y be backed up, which i n c i d e n t a l l y g e t s unanimous sympathy o f t h e Japanese r u l i n g e l i t e who a r e a f r a i d o f r e d f l a g s u n f u r l e d i n Pusan.20  32 T h i s v i e w was c o r r e c t but not complete.  Throughout  h i s t o r y , t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a has had a s p e c i f i c role.  Japanese  geo-political  When Japan i n t r o d u c e d c o n t i n e n t a l c i v i l i s a t i o n s ,  were u s u a l l y t r a n s m i t t e d by Korea.  they  When China became a s t r o n g  m i l i t a r y power, Korea became t h e f o r e f r o n t o f Japan's defence line.  Japan waged two major wars i n i t s e a r l y d e v e l o p i n g  stage s i n c e i t s W e s t e r n i s a t i o n s t a r t e d i n t h e l a t e 19th century.  They were t h e Sino-Japanese War o f 1394-5 and t h e  Russo-Japanese War o f 1904-5.  Both wars were fought over t h e  i s s u e o f p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l i n t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a . has been t h e most s e n s i t i v e a r e a f o r Japan's n a t i o n a l vis  a v i s the Asian continent.  the  JSP i s n o t complete i n t h a t i t does n o t emphasise  Korea security  The above mentioned v i e w o f  t r a d i t i o n a l g e o - p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n the Korean  Japan's  Peninsula.  S i n c e Japan's s e n s i t i v e a r e a was a l s o the s p e c i a l concern o f the  communist b l o c , t h e JSP t r i e d t o r e f l e c t and s a t i s f y  China and N o r t h Korea's e x p e c t a t i o n s by p r e v e n t i n g c l o s e Japanese-Korean r e l a t i o n s .  At l e a s t , t h e JSP d i d n o t want t o  provoke them by c o n c l u d i n g a 'Japanese-Korean  Alliance.'  A l t h o u g h t h e JSP made t h e a c c u s a t i o n t h a t the Japanese Government i n t h e coming Japanese-Korean f r i e n d s h i p would militarily  s t r e n g t h e n South Korea, t h e r e had never been a  Japanese p r o p o s a l t o a i d South Korea m i l i t a r i l y ; and, t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t r e p e a t e d l y d e n i e d m i l i t a r y i m p l i c a t i o n s i n t h e Japanese-Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s .  A f t e r the armistice i n the  Korean War i n 1954, t h e r e was a m i l i t a r y b a l a n c e o f power i n  33 the  Korean P e n i n s u l a , and t h e r e was no need f o r Japan t o a i d  South Korea m i l i t a r i l y .  However, e c o n o m i c a l l y , N o r t h Korea  was i n a s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n t o South Korea, which was o f r e a l concern t o t h e Japanese Government. difficulties,  Social unrest,  and p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y  economic  i n South Korea h e l p e d  N o r t h Korea t o g a i n p o l i t i c a l dominance i n the Korean P e n i n s u l a , and South Korea l o o k e d l i k e a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t f o r the Japanese Government.  For s e c u r i t y r e a s o n s , the Japanese  Government wanted t o s t a b i l i s e the South Korean economy so t h a t N o r t h Korea o r the communist b l o c ' s p o l i t i c a l dominance i n the Korean P e n i n s u l a c o u l d be e f f e c t i v e l y checked. would i m m e d i a t e l y guarantee Japan's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y .  This For  N o r t h Korea and C h i n a , p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i s a t i o n o f South Korea meant t h a t t h e y would l o s e t h e i r l o n g p r e s e r v e d dominance, and i t would p o s s i b l y go t o South Korea.  I t was,  therefore,  a n a t u r a l r e a c t i o n t h a t N o r t h Korea and China s t r o n g l y the of  opposed  Japanese-Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s , when the s t r a t e g i c v a l u e i t i n the Far E a s t i s c o n s i d e r e d .  SUMMARY JSP's p o l i c y f o r Japan's s e c u r i t y was, as f a r as l i t e r a l e x p r e s s i o n i s concerned, not too d i f f e r e n t from t h a t o f the JCP.  The i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e was t h a t the JSP was much more  n a t i o n a l i s t i c , p a t r i o t i c , o r e t h n o - c e n t r i c when i t executed its policies.  For i n s t a n c e , P r e s i d e n t Asanuma o f the JSP was  quoted as s a y i n g a t P e k i n g i n March, 1959,  that  '"American  34 i m p e r i a l i s m " was the common enemy o f the Japanese and Chinese people.  For t h i s statement Asanuma was  severely  criticised  by h i s opponents and by the p u b l i c t o the p o i n t where he f i n a l l y assassinated.  was  Asanuma s words v/e re v e r y r a d i c a l but ?  not h i s p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s .  Former P r e s i d e n t o f the JSP,  S u z u k i , v i s i t e d P e k i n g a f t e r Asanuma and r e a f f i r m e d the Asanuma s t a t e m e n t .  He e x p l a i n e d h i s m o t i v e s ,  In the midst o f the n e g o t i a t i o n s , I once almost dec i d e d t o come back home w i t h o u t s i g n i n g the j o i n t communique. Kov/ever, I thought t h a t the JSP was the o n l y s t r i n g t h a t t i e d . Japan and China t o g e t h e r , and t h a t my i m p a t i e n t d e c i s i o n might d i s c o u r a g e Japanese economic i n t e r e s t s which had begun t o seek a new market i n China and i n R u s s i a a f t e r the Japanese-American Economic Conference. I thought i t v/as the u l t i m a t e a s p i r a t i o n o f the Japanese t h a t we conclude a j o i n t communique f o r the sake, o f f u t u r e Sino-Japanese a s s o c i a t i o n , and t h a t the u n s a t i s f a c t o r y p o i n t s o f the communique c o u l d g r a d u a l l y be r e v i s e d l a t e r . With our strenuous use o f agreements, t h e y may o f f e r us a l o n g , s t a b l e , and l a r g e t r a d e i n the future.21 For a n o t h e r example,  Iv/ai A k i r a , S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l o f Sohyo,  the b i g g e s t o r g a n i s e d s u p p o r t e r o f the JSP, t o l d Senator Robert Kennedy when he v i s i t e d  Japan,  Next i s the problem o f e x p o r t . I w i l l not go i n t o d e t a i l s , but we do w i s h the U n i t e d S t a t e s would a c c e p t the p r i n c i p l e o f f r e e t r a d e . . . Japan cannot be i n d i f f e r e n t to Chinese and R u s s i a n t r a d e . As w e l l as to improve American t r a d e , v/e f u r t h e r l i k e t o expand r e l a t i o n s w i t h China and the S o v i e t Union.22 As can be seen i n these s t a t e m e n t s , the JSP's p r i n c i p l e on paper and i t s a c t i v i t i e s are sometimes v e r y d i f f e r e n t .  This  d i f f e r e n c e s h o u l d not be n e g l e c t e d as i t r e p r e s e n t s one o f the i m p o r t a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the J3P - the second most p o p u l a r p a r t y i n Japanese  politics.  35 The n a t i o n a l i s t i c c h a r a c t e r o f t h e JSP was f u r t h e r emp h a s i s e d when t h e S i n o - S v i e t s p l i t was widened and China c l e a r l y adhered t o i t s m i l i t a n t r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i n e . the of  Some o f  s e n i o r members o f t h e JSP o v e r t l y e x p r e s s e d t h e i r views s o c i a l i s m which d i d not harmonise w i t h tlie< views o f t h e  Chinese r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i n e . A f f a i r s Committee,  Chairman o f p a r t y s E x t e r n a l 7  Wada H i r o o , wrote i n 1963,  In t h e p r e s e n t w o r l d t h e r e i s no s i n g l e person who d e n i e s the j u s t i c e o f disarmament., Also, there are few people who do n o t know t h a t disarmament i s i n r e a l i t y to. use p i e c e m e a l e f f o r t s t o a c h i e v e t h e u l t i m a t e g o a l . I t i s not enough o n l y t o speak o f b e a u t i f u l h i g h i d e a l s . The e f f o r t s s h o u l d not be to a t t a c k people w i t h d i f f e r e n t s t a n d p o i n t s but to make as much agreement as p o s s i b l e i n t h e a r e a s of mutual consensus.23 Wada a l s o urged the JSP's e x e c u t i v e members t o adopt an i n dependent p o l i c y from the Chinese i n f l u e n c e . In 196/f, f o r t h e f i r s t time i n JSP's h i s t o r y , the JSP's m i s s i o n t o Peking o f f i c i a l l y  opposed China's m i l i t a n t  policy  The JSP's m i s s i o n e x p r e s s e d a 'deep r e g r e t and resentment' a g a i n s t China's f i r s t n u c l e a r t e s t which was performed on t h v e r y day t h e y a r r i v e d a t Peking.24  Thus f o r c e d by c i r c u m -  s t a n c e s r a t h e r than by spontaneous  c h o i c e , t h e JSP adopted  d u r i n g t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s time p r i n c i p l e s t h a t were indepen dent from Chinese d o m i n a t i o n ,  THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY DURING THE IKEDA PERIOD  The L i b e r a l - D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y (LDP) has been a  36 m u l t i - f a c t i o n a l p a r t y and has never produced a m o n o l i t h i c a l l y organised  c a b i n e t except between 1949 and 1954 d u r i n g t h e  time o f t h e Yoshida  Cabinet.  A f t e r t h e Yoshida  Cabinets,  however, t h e Japanese c a b i n e t s have been a c o a l i t i o n o f i n n e r p a r t y f a c t i o n s o f t h e LDP.25 1956), a l t h o u g h  In t h e Hatoyama Cabinet  Hatoyama's f a c t i o n was weak, i t took  (1954initi-  a t i v e i n t h e i n t r a - p a r t y power s t r u g g l e by a l i g n i n g v a r i o u s competing f a c t i o n s i n t o a common f r o n t a g a i n s t t h e Y o s h i d a faction.  The I s h i b a s h i Cabinet  (1957) was a c o a l i t i o n o f  s m a l l f a c t i o n s a g a i n s t s t r o n g f a c t i o n s l e d by K i s h i .  Prime  M i n i s t e r K i s h i was n o t e d f o r h i s e f f e c t i v e f a c t i o n a l  tactics  and outmaneuvered a n t a g o n i s t i c f a c t i o n s u n t i l h i s f i n a l downf a l l i n I960.  Since t h e LDP e x e r t s t h e most d e c i s i v e i n -  f l u e n c e over p o l i c y making i n t h e Japanese p o l i t i c a l and  since i t c o n s t i t u t e s the Cabinet,  i t s various  stands i n defence q u e s t i o n s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d One  system,  factional  here.  t h i n g t h a t should be noted here i s t h a t t h e f a c t i o n s  o f t h e LDP e x i s t p r i m a r i l y t o g a i n p o l i t i c a l power w i t h i n the p a r t y .  Each f a c t i o n has i t s own c h a r a c t e r .  In general,  the f a c t i o n s a r e n o t p o l i c y o r i e n t e d but a r e power o r i e n t e d . Therefore,  t h e groupings o f t h e f a c t i o n s p r e s e n t e d  f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n a r e n o t as r i g i d as they sound.  i n the There a r e  l i b e r a l members i n c o n s e r v a t i v e f a c t i o n s and c o n s e r v a t i v e members i n l i b e r a l  factions.  However, f o r a n a l y t i c a l  poses, these p a r t i a l elements a r e n o t taken  pur-  i n t o account.  37 CONSERVATIVE FACTIONS The K i s h i 'Cabinet's d o w n f a l l was a g r e a t d e f e a t f o r the conservative factions.  The main reason f o r K i s h i ' s r e s i g -  n a t i o n from o f f i c e was t h a t t h e Japanese people K i s h i s policy f o rnational T  opposed  s e c u r i t y and the K i s h i  Cabinet  c o u l d not secure t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n f i d e n c e o f t h e Japanese v o t e r s o r the m a j o r i t y o f the p a r t y members'.  Since t h e  K i s h i f a c t i o n had been t h e c e n t r a l core o f the c o n s e r v a t i v e f a c t i o n s , K i s h i ' s d e f e a t was regarded factions' defeat. factions  as t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e  As a r e s u l t , l i b e r a l and p r o g r e s s i v e  i n t h e LDP became more a c t i v e a f t e r K i s h i ' s  ment from o f f i c e . factions' influence  retire-  D u r i n g t h e Ikeda p e r i o d t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e over s e c u r i t y p o l i c y making was l i m i t e d .  Sato E i s a k u (the Prime M i n i s t e r o f Japan a f t e r Ikeda) l e d t h e l a r g e s t one o f t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e f a c t i o n s a f t e r h i s brother Kishi's d o w n f a l l . ^ psychologically i t was s t i l l  A l t h o u g h t h e Sato f a c t i o n was  d e f e a t e d i n t h e I960 t r e a t y r e v i s i o n  s t r o n g i n number and was c o n s i d e r e d p o t e n t i a l l y  the s t r o n g e s t s u c c e s s o r o f the Ikeda C a b i n e t .  The Sato  f a c t i o n was v e r y c a u t i o u s i n e x p r e s s i n g i t s p o l i t i c a l and i t s p o l i c y f o r n a t i o n a l reasons.  issue,  stand  s e c u r i t y , f o r three s p e c i f i c  F i r s t l y , t h e Sato f a c t i o n was d e f e a t e d i n I960  a l o n g w i t h the K i s h i f a c t i o n b3^ c l i n g i n g t o a hard l i n e w h i c h p o p u l a r sentiment  was a g a i n s t .  After this  poli  experience,  the Sato f a c t i o n became more aware o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n .  Se-  c o n d l y , i t s power p o s i t i o n i n the LDP was next t o the Ikeda  38 f a c t i o n ' s , which meant t h a t t h e Sato f a c t i o n was v e r y l i k e l y to  succeed t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t , and i t s p u b l i c statements c o u l d  have a c r u c i a l e f f e c t i n t h e f u t u r e c o m p e t i t i o n f o r t h e Prime Minister's seat.  Moreover,  i t was unable t o o p e n l y s t a t e an  i r r e s p o n s i b l e p o l i c y j u s t f o r t h e sake o f an i n t r a - p a r t y power s t r u g g l e , because  such a statement would become a burden  i f i t formed a c a b i n e t .  T h i r d l y , t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t was, i n a  sense a d o p t i n g t h e adjustment p o l i c y t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e LDP's once j e o p a r d i s e d p o p u l a r i t y a f t e r t h e m i s t a k e s o f t h e K i s h i f a c t i o n i n t h e I960 p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s .  For these m i s t a k e s the  c o n s e r v a t i v e f a c t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e Sato f a c t i o n ,  felt  moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The Sato f a c t i o n ' s p o l i c y f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y was t o m a i n t a i n and, i f p o s s i b l e , s t r e n g t h e n the e x i s t i n g F a r E a s t e r n defence l i n e o f Japan-Okinawa-South p i n e s a g a i n s t China„  Korea-Taiwan-the  Philip-  I n 196l, a member o f t h e Kennedy a d -  m i n i s t r a t i o n i n f o r m a l l y r e l e a s e d a two-China p r o p o s i t i o n i n w h i c h t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t showed a g r e a t i n t e r e s t .  Sato s a i d ,  I f e e l v e r y u n c o m f o r t a b l e when I see t h e Chinese problem coming up a t t h e same time as t h e Prime M i n i s t e r ' s v i s i t t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . What does he (Ikeda) r e a l l y want when he advocates autonomous diplomacy? The Chinese problem cannot be s o l v e d by Japan's i s o l a t e d a c t i o n . He s h o u l d be o c c u p i e d w i t h the n e g o t i a t i o n s with Korea. ' Sato's aim as e x p r e s s e d above was made t o prevent f u r t h e r weakening  o f Taiwan's j e o p a r d i s e d s t a t u s so t h a t Taiwan would  be s e c u r e d as a p o t e n t i a l member o f t h e Japanese defence i n the Far East.  He a l s o aimed t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e South  line  39 Korean Government which had been the weakest l i n k o f the fence l i n e .  A p p a r e n t l y , Sato was  de-  a f r a i d t h a t the Ikeda C a b i -  net would r e c o g n i s e Communist China, which c o u l d d r a s t i c a l l y change the Far E a s t e r n defence l i n e by weakening Taiwan's position.  Taiwan i s one l i n k i n the defence  l i n e , but from  Japan's v i e w p o i n t o f r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g y , Taiwan i s an important j o i n t c o n n e c t i n g Japan and Southeast  Asia.  Communist  China's r e u n i f i c a t i o n o f Taiwan would t h r e a t e n Japan's ward t r a n s p o r t a t i o n r o u t e .  v  South-  T h e r e f o r e , s e c u r i n g Taiwan was  an  i n d i r e c t p o l i c y t o p r o t e c t Japan's e x i s t i n g and p r o s p e c t i v e t r a d e a c t i v i t i e s i n Southeast In 1962,  Asia.  Sato t r i e d t o s t o p the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s e x t e n s i v e  approach t o Communist China, and  said,  I g r e a t l y doubt t h e i r i n t e l l i g e n c e i f Japanese p o l i t i c i a n s are t h i n k i n g about e n l a r g i n g S i n o Japanese t r a d e a t t h i s t i m e . Prime M i n i s t e r Ikeda once s a i d t h a t i t was a mistake t o expect too much i n Chinese t r a d e . I w i s h he had not changed h i s mind. H i s ^ i n g r a t i a t i n g t a c t i c s are no l o n g e r effective.28 The above statement  d e l i n e a t e s the more c o n s e r v a t i v e  l i m i t a t i o n s i n p o l i c y making,,  'His i n g r a t i a t i n g  factions'  tactics  (harmonious p a r l i a m e n t a r y t a c t i c s i n r e l a t i o n t o the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s ) are no l o n g e r e f f e c t i v e ' suggests t h a t t h e y been e f f e c t i v e  so f a r .  Compared t o the c o n s e r v a t i v e  had  factions'  hard l i n e , the Ikeda Cabinet was  f a r more s u c c e s s f u l i n  h a n d l i n g the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s ,  and Sato i r o n i c a l l y r e c o g -  n i s e d the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s p a r l i a m e n t a r y tactics.  40  As f o r the Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , Sato's was  criticism  not d i r e c t e d a t a b o l i s h i n g Japan's Red Chinese c o n t a c t s  r a t h e r d i r e c t e d a t s l o w i n g down the enlargement o f the Japanese t r a d e .  The  The  Sino-  Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s p r i n c i p l e i n Chinese  r e l a t i o n s o f s e p a r a t i o n o f p o l i t i c s and e c o n o m i c s , ^ fundamentally  but  unchallengeable  f o r any c o n s e r v a t i v e  Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s approach t o China was  o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s and was  as  W  faction.  supported  by  the  not opposed by the U n i t e d S t a t e s .  Under these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the c o n s e r v a t i v e f a c t i o n s c o u l d not c h a l l e n g e the C a b i n e t ' s p r i n c i p l e .  The o n l y  o f the C a b i n e t by the c o n s e r v a t i v e f a c t i o n s was  criticism focused  on  the d i s c u s s i o n t h a t the p o l i c y might endanger Taiwan's s t a t u s . A j e o p a r d i s e d Taiwan c o u l d i n d i r e c t l y e f f e c t Japan's w o r l d strategy.  However, the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s p r i n c i p l e o f  t i o n o f p o l i t i c s and economics was not r e c o g n i s e the People's  assurance  t h a t i t would  R e p u b l i c o f China w i t h o u t  s i d e r i n g t h e Western b l o c ' s g e n e r a l p o l i t i c a l  separa-  con-  orientation.  T h e r e f o r e , d u r i n g the Ikeda p e r i o d the a n t i - I k e d a c o n s e r v a t i v e f a c t i o n s ' p o l i c y was  not s h a r p l y a n t a g o n i s t i c t o the  Cabinet's  policy. LIBERAL FACTIONS I n the Ikeda p e r i o d , l i b e r a l f a c t i o n s o f the LDP  were  r e p r e s e n t e d by Kono I c h i r o and p a r t i a l l y by M i k i Takeo. f a c t i o n s j o i n e d the Ikeda f a c t i o n t o form the C a b i n e t ,  Both and  t h e i r i d e a s v/e r e not as d i s t i n c t i v e from the Ikeda f a c t i o n ' s  41  as were t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e f a c t i o n s ' .  Since t h e y were i n com-  p e t i t i o n w i t h c o n s e r v a t i v e f a c t i o n s i n t h e s u c c e s s i o n race t o the Ikeda C a b i n e t , and s i n c e t h e y were i n t h e Cabinet p o l i c y was v e r y c l o s e t o t h e Ikeda f a c t i o n ' s .  their  I n o r d e r t o de-  feat the conservative f a c t i o n s i n the party convention  that  e l e c t s t h e s u c c e s s o r o f t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t , t h e l i b e r a l f a c t i o n s d e f i n i t e l y needed t h e Ikeda f a c t i o n ' s s u p p o r t .  Con-  s e q u e n t l y t h e y were v e r y c o o p e r a t i v e w i t h t h e Ikeda Cabinet t o secure t h e Ikeda f a c t i o n ' s sympathy.  Furthermore, because  t h e y j o i n e d t h e Ikeda Cabinet,, t h e i r i d e a s were r e l a t i v e l y easy t o i n c o r p o r a t e i n t o governmental p o l i c i e s .  As f a r as s e -  c u r i t y p o l i c y was concerned, t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n was almost nil  i n t h e Ikeda In  196.1,  period.  Kono I c h i r o , t h e most prominent f i g u r e among t h e  l i b e r a l faction leaders, said, I t i s dangerous t o make a b i a s e d d e c i s i o n about a p a r t i a l phase o f Japanese diplomacy. I discussed t h e Chinese problem i n each c o u n t r y I v i s i t e d , and the g e n e r a l o p i n i o n was t h a t China would i n e v i t a b l y be a c c e p t e d by t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . The problem appears t o be t h e time and method o f Chinese a c ceptance i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . . . J a p a n s h o u l d a c t c a r e f u l l y when c o n s i d e r i n g t h e next g e n e r a t i o n ' s Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , and s h o u l d not be concerned w i t h an immediate i n t e r e s t such as t r a d e . We s h o u l d not make a h a s t y d e c i s i o n . 3 0 The  above statement by Kono d i d break through  the b a r r i e r o f  f a c t i o n a l antagonism i n two r e s p e c t s : i n t h a t he t u r n e d down p a r t i a l i t y in. diplomacy;  and i n t h a t he s i n c e r e l y advocated  c a r e f u l a c t i o n f o r t h e sake o f f u t u r e Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . Kono's statement was no l o n g e r a statement o f a f a c t i o n l e a d e r  42 but t h a t o f a c a b i n e t member.  H i s statement was a r e f l e c t i o n  o f h i s i d e n t i t y w i t h t h e C a b i n e t ' s s e c u r i t y p o l i c y and a l s o a r e f l e c t i o n o f c o n f i d e n c e i n c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e Ikeda f a c t i o n . Another i m p o r t a n t l e a d e r o f a l i b e r a l f a c t i o n ,  Miki  Takeo, S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l (Kan.ji-cho) o f t h e LDP, s a i d , The n o r m a l i s a t i o n o f Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s i s b e i n g p r e v e n t e d by the Taiwan problem. We cannot deny t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Taiwan Government e x i s t s as a r u l i n g body...under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s we have t o be c l e a r about what we can and cannot do w i t h r e g a r d s t o Communist China and Taiwan.31 M i k i ' s statement i n v o l v e s no i d e o l o g i c a l tone as Kono's s t a t e ment.  T h i s was f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e t h a t l i b e r a l f a c t i o n s had  l e s s f a c t i o n a l i d e n t i t y i n t h e Ikeda p e r i o d .  As f a r as se-  c u r i t y p o l i c y was concerned, t h e y v/e re so c l o s e t o t h e Ikeda f a c t i o n w h i c h was c o n s i d e r e d t h e main stream o f t h e LDP (Hoshu no Konryu), t h a t t h e i r f a c t i o n a l i d e n t i t y was i n s i g n i f i c a n t . S i t u a t e d between t h e l i b e r a l f a c t i o n s and c o n s e r v a t i v e f a c t i o n s was t h e Ikeda f a c t i o n .  Since t h e core o f t h e Ikeda  f a c t i o n was i n t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t , i t s s e c u r i t y p o l i c y w i l l be discussed  separately.  INDEPENDENTS B e s i d e s these t h r e e groups o f f a c t i o n s i n t h e LDP, t h e r e are people c a l l e d  'Independents.'  They a r e u s u a l l y p r o g r e s -  s i v e and f l e x i b l e i n d e a l i n g w i t h communism.  I n t h e Ikeda  p e r i o d , i t was t h e s e people who a c t u a l l y worked f o r t h e C a b i n e t i n a p p r o a c h i n g t h e communist b l o c .  These independents  em-  p h a s i s e d t h e p r i o r i t y o f Japan's n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s v/hich  43 sometimes d i f f e r e d from American i n t e r e s t s .  Their discussion  i n e v i t a b l y l e d t o the advocacy o f Japan's autonomous o r i n dependent  diplomacy from American i n f l u e n c e .  Tokuma (a D i e t member o f the LDP)  Utsunomiya  said,  American m i l i t a r y bases i n Japan were o r i g i n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d t o s e r v e American i n t e r e s t s . I bel i e v e t h a t t h e y (Americans) would have abandoned the bases i f i t had not been n e c e s s a r y f o r them t o occupy Japan. The b a s i c p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t we have t o defend our c o u n t r y by o u r s e l v e s i f we r e c o g n i s e the n e c e s s i t y o f d e f e n c e . However, under the p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n t h e r e e x i s t s American m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y with the S e c u r i t y Treaty to enforce it. T h i s S e c u r i t y T r e a t y determines Japan's e x t e r n a l p o l i c y . T h i s s i t u a t i o n i s e x a c t l y r e v e r s e t o the normal o r d e r o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y making process and i t s s t r a t e g y i n an independent c o u n t r y . A r e a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y cannot be produced i n a s i t u a t i o n l i k e this.32 I n c i d e n t a l l y , t h e s e independents' n a t i o n a l i s t i c and v e r y o f t e n a n t i - A m e r i c a n s t a n d was f a v o u r e d by Communist China's l e a d e r s who wanted t o re-open Sino-Japanese t r a d e t o reduce economic  d i f f i c u l t i e s a f t e r the c o l l a p s e o f the Great Leap  Forward.  Not as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e Cabinet but as r e -  p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the LDP, the independents v i s i t e d China upon i n v i t a t i o n and s t a r t e d n e g o t i a t i o n s t o conclude p r i v a t e agreements f o r opening t r a d e r e l a t i o n s . 3 3  M a i n l y by Matsumura,  Kawasaki, Utsunomiya, and Okazaki's e f f o r t s , the S i n o Japanese r e l a t i o n s were r e s t o r e d i n 1962  t o the l e v e l o f  However, i n the LDP, t h e s e independents were not s t r o n g enough i n number t o c r u c i a l l y i n f l u e n c e the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s security policy.  T h e i r s u c c e s s f u l a c t i v i t i e s were due t o the  44 coincidental factors. to  F i r s t o f a l l , t h e Ikeda Cabinet wanted  ease the Sino-Japanese  b i l a t e r a l tension.  The Japanese  Government c o u l d not send o f f i c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the Government t o Communist China f o r f e a r o f the p r o v o c a t i v e e f f e c t on anti-communist  l i n e - u p i n the Far E a s t .  The Cabinet  t r i e d t o m i n i m i s e i t s appearance o f h a v i n g o f f i c i a l w i t h Communist C h i n a ,  Secondly, the i n d e p e n d e n t s  ?  relations sympathetic  a t t i t u d e towards the communist b l o c was f a v o u r e d by the Chinese leaders.  T h i r d l y , s i n c e these independents were b a s i c a l l y  c o n s e r v a t i v e p o l i t i c i a n s who r e s p e c t e d Japan's n a t i o n a l e s t s above a l l , t h e y g a i n e d the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s  inter-  confidence.34  Because o f these f a c t o r s , the Ikeda Cabinet g r a n t e d the i n dependents an ambiguous s t a t u s as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the LDP who were t o work f o r the C a b i n e t . by the C a b i n e t as a g e n t s  ;  That i s , t h e y were u t i l i s e d  but at t h e l e v e l o f p o l i c y making  t h e i r i n f l u e n c e was not n o t a b l y s i g n i f i c a n t .  45  FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I I  ^"Nihon Kyosanto, ed., (Tokyo: Nihon Kyosanto Senden K y o i k u - k a , 1961), p. 19. Kanagawa Y u k i o , "Amerika no G u n j i Senryaku t o Nihon no J i e i t a i , " Z e n e i , June, I 9 6 0 , No. 169, pp. 85-93 . 3]jayashi Shigeo, "Amerika no G u n j i Senryaku t o B o e i r y o k u Zokyo no N e r a i , Z e n e i , June, 1961, No. 181, pp. 1 5 4 - 9 . i ?  ^ I n the Far E a s t , American t r o o p s i n Japan were b e i n g reduced i n number w h i l e the U n i t e d S t a t e s was i n c r e a s i n g i t s t r o o p s i n Southeast A s i a . These two phenomena were combined i n the JCP's p o l i c y as i n t e r r e l a t e d a c t i o n s o f the U n i t e d St a e s c ~J  ^Cf.  Chapter IV, on Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s f i s c a l  ^Hayashi Shigeo, I b i d , p. 7cf.  policy.  155.  Chapter I I I , on the Japanese-American  relations.  ^The Sino-Japanese War o f 1894 and the Russo-Japanese War o f 1904 v/e re b o t h fought over the c o n t r o l o f t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a . Japan's i n v a s i o n o f N o r t h China o r Manchuria can be i n t e r p r e t e d as the e x t e n s i o n o f these wars. ^Terao 'Goro, " S h i n Anpo Joyaku t o N i k k a n K a i d a n , " Z e n e i , December, 1962, No. 204, p. l l o . l^Cf. The JSP's s o c i a l a n a l y s i s and the t e r m i n o l o g y used by the JSP cannot be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h a t o f the JCP. - ^ T h i s term r e f e r s t o a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y which b a s i c a l l y agrees t o the sustenance o f the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l system. 1 °-  i n JSP's usage, the a b s o l u t e n e u t r a l i s m always means unarmed n e u t r a l i s m . A s a h i Shinbun, September 22, l 4  I b i d , March 22,  i960.  1961.  -^Cf. Nagai Yonosuke's t h e s i s on Japanese defence and Far E a s t e r n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , i e , Heiv/a no Daisho, (Tokyo: Chuo Koron-sha. 1 9 6 7 ) , p. 62. l ^ A s a h i Shinbun, F e b r u a r y 15,  1961.  46  17  " S h a k a i t o no susuinubeki M i c h i , " Skonomisuto, V o l . 42, Ho. 10, p. 36. 18  R o u n d t a b l e d i s c u s s i o n by Utsunomiya Tokuma and S u z u k i Mosaburo i n Chuo Koron, March, 1962, p. 38. • ^ A s a h i Shinbun, February 18, 1964. i 0  20  I s h i n o H i s a o , Shinkyokumen o mukaeta N i k k a n K a i d a n , " Gekkan S h a k a i t o , A p r i l , 1963, No. 70, p. 42. c u  ;?  21Round t a b l e d i s c u s s i o n by Utsunomiya  P*  43.  and S u z u k i , Op_Cit*  ^ R e c o r d o f c o n v e r s a t i o n s between I w a i A k i r a and Robert Kennedy, the S e c r e t a r y o f J u s t i c e , i n Ekonomisuto, V o l . 40, No. 13, p. 21. 3.?Chuso Ronso t o S h a k a i t o no T a c h i b a , " J i y u , October, " , p. 5. 2  24Asahi  Shinbun, F e b r u a r y 23,  1962.  2S  •^Cf. Frank C. Langdon, '''Japanese L i b e r a l Democratic F a c t i o n a l D i s c o r d on C h i n a , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , X L I , (No. 3,  1968), pp. 26  Kishis.  27  403-15.  Sato Nobusuke was adopted by h i s u n c l e ' s f a m i l y , t h e K i s h i Nobusuke i s an e l d e r b r o t h e r o f Sato S i s a k u .  'Asahi Shinbun, May 13, 2  %bid,  October 25,  1961.  1962.  29 -'This p r i n c i p l e was t o s e p a r a t e Japan's d i p l o m a t i c rel a t i o n s , and economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a . A l t h o u g h Japan had economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h the m a i n l a n d , she r e s e r v e d t h e d i p l o m a t i c r e c o g n i t i o n f o r t h e N a t i o n a l i s t Government. °Asahi Shinbun, May 13, 1961. 3  3 T h e i n t e r v i e w by Ekonomisuto, V o l . 42, No. 34, 1  p. pp.  60.  32«Heiwa Undo e no T e i g e n , '•' J i y u , September,  122-3.  33 -^us x o r t h i s m i s s i o n , the f o u r Independents i n the d i s c u s s i o n s h o u l d be p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t e d .  1964,  1964,  mentioned  3^Cf. Chapter I I I , s e c t i o n on Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the communist b l o c .  47 CHAPTER  III  DIPLOMATIC ARRANGEMENT  D u r i n g t h e Ikeda p e r i o d , t h e M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan c o n s t i t u t e d t h e main p a r t o f Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y .  R e f l e c t i n g t h e dominant  opinion o f  the c o n s e r v a t i v e p a r t y , t h e b a s i c p r i n c i p l e o f t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s defence p o l i c y was t h e maintenance and enforcement of the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty - a r e v i s i o n o f the S e c u r i t y T r e a t y o f 1951.  I t was a l o n g - l a s t i n g n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a r -  rangement c o n c l u d e d by t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e p a r t y .  The o r i g i n a l  i d e a in' t h e S e c u r i t y T r e a t y t h a t Japan use American m i l i t a r y f o r c e f o r i t s n a t i o n a l defence, was i n h e r i t e d by t h e Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty o f I960.  However, t h e p e r i o d o f the Ikeda  C a b i n e t t u r n e d out t o be t h e t r a n s i t i o n a l time f o r Japan: moving from a dependent  t o a r e l a t i v e l y independent c o u n t r y  i n i t s defence e f f o r t .  The t h r e e major a r e a s o f d i p l o m a t i c  e f f o r t e x p l o r e d by t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t were r o u g h l y , JapaneseAmerican r e l a t i o n s , Japanese-Korean r e l a t i o n s , and Japanesecommunist b l o c  relations.  THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS NATIONAL CONCERN  The Ikeda Cabinet acknowledged t h e i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y o f the Japanese-American  c l o s e t i e both f o r Japan's n a t i o n a l s e -  c u r i t y and f o r economic p r o s p e r i t y .  T h i s p e r s p e c t i v e was no  43 d i f f e r e n t than t h a t o f K i s h i ' s p r e v i o u s c a b i n e t .  The t r u l y  d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s American r e l a t i o n was t h a t t h e Cabinet r e c o g n i s e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n n a t i o n a l concern and i n t e r e s t between t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan, and t r i e d t o a c q u i r e as much as p o s s i b l e f o r t h e n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t o f Japan.1 There were two b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e s o f n a t i o n a l concern between t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan i n t h e problem o f Japan's defence.  F i r s t of a l l ,  Japan's g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n was v u l -  n e r a b l e t o Chinese o r R u s s i a n a t t a c k s from t h e c o n t i n e n t , whereas t h a t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was r e l a t i v e l y safe f o r a t t a c k s by l o n g range m i s s i l e s .  except  This geographical p o s i -  t i o n was such t h a t i t was t o o r i s k y f o r Japan t o adopt as h o s t i l e a p o l i c y a g a i n s t China as d i d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . o t h e r d i f f e r e n c e was t h e v i e w o f the Chinese t h r e a t .  The  American  r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e Chinese t h r e a t was b a s i c a l l y a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e Chinese t h r e a t on American a l l i e s i n t h e Southeast and t h e F a r East such as Indo-China, and oouth Korea.  Asia  Taiwan, t h e P h i l i p p i n e s ,  The U n i t e d S t a t e s d i d n o t n o r m a l l y f e e l any  d i r e c t t h r e a t from C h i n a , but i t s p e c i f i c a l l y emphasised t h e Chinese t h r e a t because i t was expected i n f l u e n c e from spreading i n A s i a .  t o prevent t h e Chinese  Japan d i d not share an  e q u a l l y e x t e n s i v e commitment t o A s i a n p o l i t i c s , w h i c h made Japan u n a b l e t o have t h e same image o f China as d i d t h e U n i t e d States.  Moreover, Japan had been i n d u s t r i a l i s e d r a p i d l y and  Japan's economic s i t u a t i o n was i m p r o v i n g q u i c k l y .  This  49  d i s t i n g u i s h e d Japan from most o f the A s i a n c o u n t r i e s which were v u l n e r a b l e t o Chinese i d e o l o g i c a l a g g r e s s i o n o f Maoism because o f t h e i r p o v e r t y and l a c k o f p o l i t i c a l u n i t y .  Japan's  r e l a t i v e l y h i g h l i v i n g s t a n d a r d and i t s c u l t u r a l b i a s towards the West European c i v i l i s a t i o n c r e a t e d a f i r m immunity a g a i n s t i n d i r e c t a g g r e s s i o n o f communism, and Japan c o u l d h a r d l y share t h e t h r e a t o f communism a t as h i g h l e v e l as most o f the A s i a n non-communist c o u n t r i e s .  3  Japan's n a t i o n a l concern w h i c h thus d i f f e r e d from t h a t o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s and A s i a n non-communist c o u n t r i e s , r e q u i r e d a s p e c i f i c defence p o l i c y which would s a t i s f y Japan's tances.  circums-  In o r d e r t o b a l a n c e the enormous m i l i t a r y f o r c e s o f  the communist b l o c i n the Far E a s t , Japan c o u l d not h e l p acc e p t i n g the m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s , which was t o make the b a s i c p a r t o f Japan's defence system.  Un-  f o r t u n a t e l y f o r Japan, the M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y was an imp o r t a n t p a r t o f American S t r a t e g y f o r the Far East as w e l l as a defence p r o v i s i o n o f Japan.  Japan wanted t h e S e c u r i t y  T r e a t y j u s t t o m a i n t a i n i t s own n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , -which unf o r t u n a t e l y d i d not c o m p l e a t l y harmonise w i t h the American S t r a t e g y f o r the Far East as a whole.  The U n i t e d  States  wanted t o s e c u r e as much f r e e use o f Japanese bases as poss i b l e t o m a i n t a i n i t s h i g h m i l i t a r y m o b i l i t y i n t h e Far E a s t . But, f o r Japan t o have a c t i v e m i l i t a r y bases o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was v e r y dangerous s i n c e i t c o u l d provoke communist c o u n t r i e s ' p r e c a u t i o n a r y o r r e t a l i a t o r y a t t a c k s en the bases  49 d i s t i n g u i s h e d Japan from most o f the A s i a n c o u n t r i e s which were v u l n e r a b l e t o Chinese i d e o l o g i c a l a g g r e s s i o n o f Maoism because o f t h e i r p o v e r t y and l a c k o f p o l i t i c a l u n i t y . ^  Japan's  r e l a t i v e l y h i g h l i v i n g s t a n d a r d and i t s c u l t u r a l b i a s towards the West European c i v i l i s a t i o n c r e a t e d a f i r m immunity a g a i n s t i n d i r e c t a g g r e s s i o n o f communism, and Japan c o u l d h a r d l y share t h e t h r e a t o f communism a t as h i g h l e v e l as most o f the A s i a n non-communist c o u n t r i e s . ^ Japan's n a t i o n a l concern w h i c h thus d i f f e r e d from t h a t o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s and A s i a n non-communist c o u n t r i e s , r e q u i r e d a s p e c i f i c defence p o l i c y 'which would s a t i s f y Japan's tances.  circums-  In o r d e r t o b a l a n c e the enormous m i l i t a r y f o r c e s o f  the communist b l o c i n the Far E a s t , Japan c o u l d not h e l p acc e p t i n g the m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s , which was t o make the b a s i c p a r t o f Japan's defence system.  Un-  f o r t u n a t e l y f o r Japan, t h e M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y was an imp o r t a n t p a r t o f American S t r a t e g y f o r t h e Far East as w e l l as a defence p r o v i s i o n o f Japan.  Japan wanted t h e S e c u r i t y  T r e a t y j u s t t o m a i n t a i n i t s own n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , which unf o r t u n a t e l y d i d net c o m p l e t e l y harmonise w i t h the American S t r a t e g y f o r the Far East as a whole•  The U n i t e d S t a t e s  wanted t o s e c u r e as much f r e e use o f Japanese bases as poss i b l e t o m a i n t a i n i t s h i g h m i l i t a r y m o b i l i t y i n the Far E a s t . But, f o r Japan t o have a c t i v e m i l i t a r y bases o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was v e r y dangerous s i n c e i t c o u l d provoke communist c o u n t r i e s ' pre c a u t i o n a r y o r r e t a l i a t o r y a t t a c k s on the bases  50  i n Japan.  T h e r e f o r e , the Ikeda C a b i n e t hoped to a c h i e v e as  much detachment from the American Strategy f o r t h e Far E a s t as p o s s i b l e w i t h i n a range t h a t would not d i s t u r b the f u n c t i o n i n g o f the M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y g u a r a n t e e i n g Japan's own d e f e n c e . THE RULES The Ikeda C a b i n e t s e t up two c o n d i t i o n s f o r Japan's n a t i o n a l defence by the M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y .  One was the  p r i n c i p l e o f autonomous defence and the o t h e r was n o n - n u c l e a r armament o f a l l f o r c e s i n Japan i n c l u d i n g the American i n Japanese b a s e s .  The autonomous defence meant t h a t  would r e p l a c e American f o r c e s i n Japan with i t s own  forces Japan  f o r c e s at  the e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e date w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g steady economic growth, and the o t h e r i m p l i c a t i o n o f autonomous defence  was  t h a t Japan r e s e r v e d t o a c e r t a i n degree the r i g h t t o c o n t r o l t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f American f o r c e s i n Japan.  Non-nuclear arm-  ament was i n t e n d e d t o p r e v e n t an arms r a c e between the communist b l o c and the Far E a s t e r n anti-communist b l o c ,  especially  between the communist b l o c and Japan. Japan's autonomous defence which was a p a r t i a l  deviation  from the American S t r a t e g y f o r the Far E a s t , was f a v o u r e d i n one sense and not i n a n o t h e r sense by the U n i t e d S t a t e s .  The  American Government f a v o u r e d Japan's autonomous defence- and I t s c l a i m f o r a l a r g e r r o l e i n the F a r E a s t as a n a t i o n o f the Western b l o c .  Both P r e s i d e n t Kennedy and Prime M i n i s t e r  Ikeda emphasised t h e p a r t n e r s h i p between the U n i t e d S t a t e s  51  and Japan.  The U n i t e d S t a t e s encouraged Japan as a p a r t n e r  i n t h e Far E a s t , w h i c h changed t h e Japanese-American r e l a t i o n s from t h a t o f g u a r a n t o r - g u a r a n t e e .  For the f i r s t t i m e a f t e r  —>  o  1  the  P a c i f i c War, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan J o i n t Communique  of  June, 1961 acknowledged t h a t Japan had an e q u a l commitment  to  t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n the F a r E a s t e r n i n t e r n a t i o n a l problem.  However, Japan's f i e l d  o f commitment was l i m i t e d because o f  i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n f o r m i l i t a r y action outside its  territory.  THE ACTION For  t h e f i r s t p r a c t i c a l s t e p towards Japanese-American  p a r t n e r s h i p , i n March o f 1962 t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s sent a m i l i t a r y t e c h n i c a l s u r v e y group t o the Far E a s t and Southeast A s i a . The group's m i s s i o n was t o i n v e s t i g a t e Japan's c a p a b i l i t y t o produce weapons f o r f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y f o r o t h e r Asian countries.  They s t u d i e d t h e n a t u r e and t y p e s o f weapons  t h a t t h e s e c o u n t r i e s needed.^  The U n i t e d S t a t e s a c c e p t e d  Japan's p r o p o s a l o f g r e a t e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s own defence and e x p e c t e d Japan t o a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e American defence e f f o r t i n E a s t A s i a * However, the U n i t e d S t a t e s r e a l i s e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n between i t s e l f and Japan c o n c e r n i n g Japan's i d e a o f an autonomous d e f e n c e . Department  The U n i t e d S t a t e s Defense  i n f o r m a l l y communicated t o the Japanese Government  i t s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h Japan's response t o the American  52  policy for Asia.  The Pentagon was p a r t i c u l a r l y  dissatisfied  w i t h Japan's i n f l e x i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y and i t s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o s u p p o r t American m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n Southeast A s i a . 5 understanding  There was indeed a c r u c i a l m i s -  between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan  concerning  the Japanese i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f autonomous d e f e n c e . The Japanese Government c o n s i d e r e d t h a t 'autonomous def e n c e ' gave Japan a c e r t a i n amount c f freedom t o d e v i a t e from American S t r a t e g y f o r t h e Far E a s t , w h i l e the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t e r p r e t e d i t as meaning Japan would more a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n i t s p o l i c y f o r the Far E a s t . 1963  For example, i n January o f  a t t h e Japanese-American J o i n t S e c u r i t y Conference, the  American r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s p o i n t e d out the danger o f Japan's l o w e s t i m a t i o n o f Chinese power i n c l u d i n g i t s m i l i t a r y f o r c e , and t h e y asked Japan t o study China more e x t e n s i v e l y . ^ the c o n f e r e n c e ,  After  A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f Defense, G i l p a t r i c k ,  communicated America's e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t Japan p l a y a l a r g e r r o l e i n American w o r l d p o l i c y .  Oliira, the Foriegn M i n i s t e r of  Japan, answered, For the sake o f peace and p r o s p e r i t y i n t h e F a r E a s t , Japan must m a i n t a i n an independent defence p o l i c y , and a t t a i n t h i s g o a l by f i r s t l y c o n s o l i d a t i n g our domestic p o l i t i c s . T h i s s h o u l d be the immediate s t e p f o r Japan.< Prime M i n i s t e r Ikeda's answer was more d i r e c t , I t i s I n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t you ( G i l p a t r i c k ) think, t h a t you can p r o v i d e an adequate defence f o r c e f o r Japan s i m p l y by l e t t i n g Japan possess as many subm a r i n e s and a i r p l a n e s as p o s s i b l e . What i s c r u c i a l i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l preparedness o f t h e Japanese f o r  53 The germ o f t h i s d i s p u t e was i n t h e f i r s t s t e p o f the JapaneseAmerican p a r t n e r s h i p .  The U n i t e d S t a t e s - J a p a n e s e J o i n t Com-  munique o f June, 1961, says, The P r e s i d e n t and the Prime M i n i s t e r e x p r e s s e d t h e i r concern over the u n s t a b l e a s p e c t s o f the s i t u a t i o n i n A s i a and agreed t o h o l d c l o s e cons u l t a t i o n i n the f u t u r e w i t h a view o f d i s c o v e r i n g the ways and means by which s t a b i l i t y and w e l l b e i n g might be a c h i e v e d i n t h a t area.9 The American Government p l a c e d emphasis on t h e s t a b i l i t y o f Asia.  T h i s i n e v i t a b l y r e q u i r e d a c e r t a i n amount o f m i l i t a r y  c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the communists a c t i n g i n A s i a .  The  Japanese  Government, however, emphasised the w e l l - b e i n g o f the people in Asia.  Japan's v i e w was based on the u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t  A s i a n p o l i t i c a l problems were b a s i c a l l y problems o f l a c k o f economic  dovelopaent.  I n s h o r t , Japan's p o l i c y was a war  a g a i n s t p o v e r t y whereas American p o l i c y was m i l i t a r y - such as war a g a i n s t A s i a n communism. D i f f e r e n c e s i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan o f the autonomous defence p o l i c y brought b i t t e r  dis-  i l l u s i o n m e n t t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s as i t e x p e c t e d Japan t o take a l a r g e r r o l e i n world p o l i c y .  However, Japan's autono-  mous defence e f f o r t s t r e n g t h e n e d Japan's m i l i t a r y power cons i d e r a b l y , which was f a v o u r a b l e t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s .  By ac-  c e p t i n g Japan's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the U n i t e d S t a t e s g a i n e d a s t r o n g e r defence f o r c e a t the expense o f i t s f r e e use o f and f r e e a c t i o n i n the m i l i t a r y bases i n Japan.  A l t h o u g h these  bases make an i m p o r t a n t l i n k i n the American defence l i n e i n the Par E a s t , t h e y would not have n u c l e a r weapons and  54 would not be used f o r a g g r e s s i v e p u r p o s e s .  As f o r t h e Japa-  nese Government, i t succeeded i n e s t a b l i s h i n g an independent defence f o r c e w h i c h was not e n t i r e l y s u b j e c t t o American command, and w h i c h c o u l d a c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y .  THE JAPANESE-KOREAN NEGOTIATIONS BACKGROUND E s t a b l i s h i n g Korean d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s was one o f t h e i m p o r t a n t d i p l o m a t i c aims o f t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t f o r J a p a n s 1  national security.  N o r m a l i s a t i o n o f t h e Japanese-Korean r e -  l a t i o n s was a p r o d u c t o f t h e a s p i r a t i o n s between Japan, Korea, and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .  The American a s p i r a t i o n t o s t a b i l i s e  N o r t h e a s t A s i a by Japanese-Korean f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s can be t r a c e d back h i s t o r i c a l l y as f a r as 1950, when G e n e r a l MacArthur i n v i t e d Mr. Syngman Rhee, t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f Korea, t o T o k y o . ^  D u r i n g t h e Korean War, Japan was i n d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e d i n American m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a . Japan was a p r i n c i p a l s t a g i n g a r e a and base f o r t h e American f o r c e s f i g h t i n g i n Korea.  T h i s s i t u a t i o n h e l p e d t o form a  vague p o l i t i c a l t i e between South Korea and Japan f o r a short period.  However, i n t h e 1 9 5 0 s , t h e a t t e m p t s t o agree on f  d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s d i d n o t p r o g r e s s a t a l l , m a i n l y because South Korea d i d not r e c o g n i s e any p r e s s i n g need t o r e c o n c i l e i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Japan, The a n t i - J a p a n e s e f e e l i n g among the Koreans was s t r o n g  55  t h r o u g h o u t the 1950's.  The South Korean Government used t h e  p e o p l e ' s a n t i - J a p a n e s e s e n t i m e n t f o r i t s maintenance as w e l l as i t e x p l o i t e d the p e o p l e ' s anti-communist  i n power sentiment.  Anti-communist sentiment and a n t i - J a p a n e s e f e e l i n g were the s t r o n g e s t p o l i t i c a l f e e l i n g s t h a t the South Korean Government 1 2  c o u l d f i n d i n t h e postwar Korean p o l i t i c a l chaos.  The  Government c o u l d not abandon such a v a l u a b l e p o l i t i c a l  asset  o n l y t o p l e a s e the U n i t e d S t a t e s o r Japan, MOVE TO THE K'EGOTIATIQKS By I960, the s i t u a t i o n  i n South Korea had changed  t i c a l l y from t h a t o f t h e e a r l y 1950's.  dras-  The most d i s t i n c t i v e  change was t h a t the South Korean p o l i t i c a l e l i t e began t o r e c o g n i s e t h e i r f a i l u r e in. economic p o l i c y ,  and t h e i r  self-  r e f l e c t i o n went t o such an e x t e n t as t o cause the e x p u l s i o n o f P r e s i d e n t Rhee.  South Korea's poor economic  condition i n  comparison t o N o r t h Korea's c r e a t e d p o l i t i c a l u n r e s t i n the South.  Informed p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n Korea tended  gradually  toward the i d e a o f c o a l i t i o n government o f South and N o r t h Korea.  A l t h o u g h t h e y had no i l l u s i o n s about communism, N o r t h  Korea's economic advancement was s t i l l h i g h l y i n v i t i n g f o r then.  A f t e r t h e f a l l o f P r e s i d e n t Rhee, t h i s tendency became  more•and more prominent. to  The South Korean r u l i n g e l i t e  i m m e d i a t e l y f i n d a way t o s a t i s f y the people's  dissatisfaction their  had  economic  i n o r d e r t o q u e l l any v i o l e n t e x p r e s s i o n o f  frustration.  56  In I960 the U n i t e d S t a t e s f a c e d a s e r i o u s ' D o l l a r  Crisis'  which p r e v e n t e d Her from t a k i n g any e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n towards e a s i n g South Korean p o l i t i c a l problems t h a t stemmed from economic d i f f i c u l t i e s .  In o r d e r t o p r o t e c t South Korea as  w e l l as i t s own d o l l a r as s t a n d a r d c u r r e n c y i n w o r l d economy, the  U n i t e d S t a t e s had t o use Japan's economic i n f l u e n c e i n  East A s i a . the  A l s o , from the v i e w p o i n t o f American S t r a t e g y f o r  Far E a s t , the c l o s e Japanese-Korean r e l a t i o n s would be  v a l u a b l e s i n c e t h e y would s t r e n g t h e n i t s defence p o t e n t i a l as a whole i n N o r t h e a s t A s i a . N i n e t e e n - s i x t y was the y e a r when the Japanese economy entered i n t o a period of r a p i d e x p a n s i o n . ^  Economic  growth  n a t u r a l l y made the Japanese r u l i n g e l i t e r e a l i s e t h e i m p o r t ance o f Japan's economic power.  T h e i r c o n f i d e n c e i n Japan's  economic p o t e n t i a l was r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r e x t e r n a l p o l i c y . In the sphere o f n a t i o n a l defence, the Ikeda C a b i n e t proposed the  p o l i c y o f autonomous d e f e n c e .  I t f u r t h e r demanded a  l a r g e r r o l e f o r Japan i n t h e Western b l o c .  Japan's demand  to a c q u i r e a l a r g e r r o l e i n t h e Western b l o c was  fulfilled  i n t h a t i t t o o k over a c e r t a i n p r o p o r t i o n o f the American r o l e i n A s i a as an economic g u a r a n t o r . T h i s p o l i c y was  inciden-  t a l l y i n harmony w i t h the American p o l i c y t o defend the 'dollar.' The autonomous defence p o l i c y r e q u i r e d t h e Japanese Government t o m a i n t a i n a rough balance o f power i n the Far E a s t , o r i n o t h e r words, t o m a i n t a i n the s t a t u s quo.  57 T  Autonomous d e f e n c e ' i n i t s e l f was not the supreme g o a l of  the  Japanese Government, but a means o f p u r s u i n g a h i g h e r  p o l i t i c a l g o a l o f economic  prosperity.  I n t h i s p e r i o d as  l o n g as the American f o r c e s guaranteed Japan's defence, the supreme g o a l o f the Japanese Government remained t o be r a p i d economic  growth.  The defence e f f o r t i n t h e domestic  political  sphere was kept at the minimum l e v e l r e q u i r e d f o r a degree o f defence autonomy which would not d i s t u r b i t s economic  policy.  A l t e r a t i o n i n the s t a t u s quo o r change i n t h e power b a l a n c e i n the Far F a s t c o u l d f o r c e Japan t o i n c r e a s e t h e budget f o r defence i n s t e a d o f f o r economic the  Japanese Government t r i e d  i n v e s t m e n t - a course w h i c h  t o evade.  A great p o t e n t i a l  danger t o the maintenance o f the s t a t u s quo i n the Far E a s t was  South Korean economic  instability.  This  instability  c o u l d provoke N o r t h Korea t o r e - u n i f y Korea, o f which b o t h the  U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan thought t h e r e was  'something t h a t  c o u l d be done. NEGOTIATIONS In June o f 1961,  Prime M i n i s t e r Ikeda and P r e s i d e n t  Kennedy i s s u e d a j o i n t communique i n which t h e y agreed t o i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r a i d t o South Korea.  The New York Times r e p o r t e d ,  Two major items t h e n d i s c u s s e d were the q u e s t i o n o f Chinese r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s and the p r o s p e c t f o r p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and economic development i n South K o r e a . Sources s a i d , however, t h a t Tokyo and Washington were eager t o do what c o u l d be done t o h e l p the Koreans a c h i e v e p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and t o c o r r e c t the economic s t a g n a t i o n t h a t has t r o u b l e d South Korea s i n c e the end o f the World War 11.15  58 Upon the agreement o f Japan, South Korea, and the U n i t e d S t a t e s , the Japanese-Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s s t a r t e d new i n October of 1961,  sessions  and were c o n t i n u e d e n e r g e t i c a l l y a l l  t h r o u g h the Ikeda p e r i o d .  3y the t i n e Prime M i n i s t e r Ikeda  r e t i r e d from o f f i c e , almost a l l the t e c h n i c a l problems of the agreements  were s o l v e d , y e t the t r e a t y was not signed.  The  f a c t o r s t h a t p r e v e n t e d Japan and South Korea from s i g n i n g a t r e a t y were many and r o u g h l y they can bo d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e groups. ln.;jj J j l r j x O u L l X X S i O  The f i r s t group o f d i f f i c u l t i e s was South Korea's domest i c factors.  The planned Japanese-Korean t r e a t y was  regarded  by the Koreans as l i k e l y t o c o n s o l i d a t e the s t a t u s quo i n the Korean P e n i n s u l a .  The  c o n s o l i d a t i o n n i g h t jeopardise t h e i r  r a t h e r d i s t a n t g o a l t o r e - u n i f y Korea.  The n e g o t i a t i o n s a l o n e  reminded t h e Koreans o f 'Japanese i m p e r i a l i s m ' t h a t Korea f o r more t h a n t h i r t y y e a r s . were not e q u a l i n t h e i r economic  Because t h a two  controlled countries  c a p a c i t y and because the  South Korean Government t r i e d t o e x t r a c t as much economic b e n e f i t from Japan as they c o u l d , the n e g o t i a t i o n s i n the p e o p l e ' s eyes, a m p l i f i e d t h e i r e c o n o m i c a l ! ] i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n 7  to  Japan.  A g i t a t e d by a n t i - J a p a n e s e s e n t i m e n t , the South  Koreans o r g a n i s e d l a r g e a n t i - t r e a t y d e m o n s t r a t i o n s i n s p i t e o f the f a c t t h a t t h e y were under s t r i c t m a r t i a l law. The second group o f d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d g e n u i n e l y  59 t e c h n i c a l problems.  Japan and Korea had a d i r e c t c o n f l i c t o f  i n t e r e s t o v e r f i s h i n g r i g h t s i n the same w a t e r s as w e l l as a t e r r i t o r i a l c o n t r o v e r s y over Takeshima residents).  (an i s l a n d -without any  Korea once had been i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o Japan and  was p l a c e d under the c o n t r o l o f the A l l i e d Powers a f t e r the P a c i f i c War.  T h i s s i t u a t i o n c o m p l i c a t e d the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f ownership and the e s t i m a t i o n o f v a l u e o f t h e Japanese p r o p e r t y and debt i n Korea.  These t e c h n i c a l problems had t o  be s t r a i g h t e n e d out through r e p a r a t i o n s ,  Furthermore, se-  p a r a t i o n o f North and South Korea caused c o m p l i c a t i o n s w i t h r e g a r d t o t r e a t m e n t o f the Koreans i n Japan. The t h i r d group o f d i f f i c u l t i e s stemmed from m i l i t a r y i m p l i c a t i o n i n t h e e x p e c t e d t r e a t y between Japan and Korea. Japan's F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r once s t a t e d t h a t Japan's l a r g e r r o l e i n the 'Containment o f C h i n a ' as asked f o r by P r e s i d e n t Kennedy,  c o u l d o n l y be enacted by c o n c l u d i n g the Japanese-  Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s .  Of c o u r s e , the coming  Japanese-Korean  t r e a t y had t h e immediate purpose o f s e t t l i n g the c o n f l i c t s o f the  two n e i g h b o u r i n g c o u n t r i e s .  N o n e t h e l e s s , what m o t i v a t e d  O h i r a was the American c a l l i n g f o r enforcement o f an a n t i communist defence network.16  p  o r  the communist b l o c ,  stabi-  l i s a t i o n o f t h e South Korean economy by the coming t r e a t y not o n l y a l o s s o f t h e i r economic  was  dominance i n the Korean  P e n i n s u l a but i t was e x p e c t e d t h a t e c o n o m i c a l l y e n f o r c e d South Korea would r e v e r s e the e x i s t i n g economic and South Korea.  r e l a t i o n s of North  A s t r e n g t h e n e d South Korea c o u l d change the  60  o v e r a l l s t r a t e g i c b a l a n c e i n t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a where t h e communist b l o c had a l w a y s m a i n t a i n e d m i l i t a r y and economic s u p e r i o r i t y t o South Korea. between  T h e r e f o r e , t h e expected t r e a t y  Japan and South Korea was understood by t h e communist  b l o c as a s e r i o u s p o l i t i c a l t h r e a t .  The communist b l o c com-  municated t h e i r a n t i p a t h y f o r t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s i n two ways. They i s s u e d a s e r i e s o f statements a t t a c k i n g t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s , and t h e y a l s o used communist s y m p a t h i s e r s i n Japan t o oppose the Japanese  Government.  The Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s w e l l  designed  p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s programme p r e v e n t e d t h e a n t i - n e g o t i a t i o n s movement from growing a s l a r g e a s t h e a n t i - S e c u r i t y  Treaty  17  movement o f I 9 6 0 .  n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e movement was e f f e c t i v e  enough t o t h r e a t e n t h e Ikeda Cabinet t o such an e x t e n t t h a t i t would n o t t a k e t h e r i s k o f s i g n i n g t h e t r e a t y The  immediately.  Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s supreme aim i n t h e Japanese-Korean  n e g o t i a t i o n s was t h e s t a b i l i s a t i o n o f South Korea, which was supposed  t o i n c r e a s e t h e s e c u r i t y o f Japan.  Signing the  t r e a t y was a v o i d e d by t h e Cabinet so as not t o provoke t h e communist b l o c m i l i t a r i l y o r t o cause domestic u n r e s t . Ikeda Cabinet had t o c o n t i n u e i t s p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s i n hopes o f a more f a v o u r a b l e r e s p o n s e . the b a s i c agreements, h e l p t h e Korean,' gyo Rengokai)  The  tactics  When t h e y reached  t h e Cabinet d i d 'what c o u l d be done t o  The b u s i n e s s Union o f Tokyo (Tokyo  Jitsu-  sent i t s m i s s i o n f o r r e s e a r c h and encouragement  c f Japanese-Korean  t r a d e i n February o f 1963.  A Memorandom lf  f o r C o o p e r a t i o n " was s i g n e d by t h e Japanese-Korean  Commission  61  of  Commerce and I n d u s t r y (IMikkan Shoko K a i g i s h o ) i n J u l y o f  1963•  The South Korean Government a l s o moved towards coopera-  t i o n and enacted a s p e c i a l law t h a t p e r m i t t e d the i n t r o d u c t i o n of  Japanese c a p i t a l , and i t a l s o a c c e p t e d Japan's  friendship  g i f t o f twenty-thousand t o n s o f f o o d t o meet i t s f o o d crisis.-'-' Thus, h a v i n g s o l v e d almost a l l the t e c h n i c a l q u e s t i o n s b e t ween South Korea and Japan, i n s t e a d o f s i g n i n g the t r e a t y , the  Japanese Government s t a r t e d t o send economic a i d t o South  Korea as the f i r s t p r a c t i c a l measure towards f r i e n d l y tions.  These a c t i o n s were i n a c c o r d w i t h Japan's  p o l i c y t o s t r e n g t h e n the South Korean Government.  rela-  security This pro-  v i s i o n was e x p e c t e d t o e l i m i n a t e a p o t e n t i a l source o f m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t around Japan.  THE COMMUNIST BLOC The Ikeda C a b i n e t was the most a c t i v e o f a l l the postwar c a b i n e t s i n a p p r o a c h i n g the communist b l o c , on the v e r b a l l e v e l at l e a s t .  The p o l i c y t o approach the communist b l o c  had namely two g o a l s : t o respond t o t h e domestic demand f o r good r e l a t i o n s ; and t o a i d n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n d i r e c t l y by d i s s o l v i n g the communist c o u n t r i e s ' s u s p i c i o n o f Japan's i n t e n t i o n s under the M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y ,  when these two  o b j e c t i v e s a r e examined i t becomes c l e a r e r why the Ikeda . C a b i n e t was a c t i v e on the v e r b a l l e v e l and not on the p r a c t i cal level.  S i n c e t h e main theme o f t h i s paper i s the s e c u r i t y  p o l i c y and not the p o l i c y p r o p e r , the f i r s t o b j e c t i v e s h o u l d  62  be discussed, b r i e f l y . AIMS OF THE  CABINET  Ikeda's f i r s t statement e x p r e s s i n g h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o approach China, was  i s s u e d f o u r weeks a f t e r Prime M i n i s t e r  K i s h i d e c l a r e d h i s r e s i g n a t i o n from o f f i c e . ^  At t h i s time  the p u b l i c sentiment was  overwhelmingly r e s e n t f u l o f the  Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty.  This was  i n t e r p r e t e d by the  S o c i a l i s t P a r t y and t h e Japan Communist P a r t y as a t i v e t r e a t y by n a t u r e  Japan provoca-  i n r e l a t i o n t o the communist b l o c .  The  o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s a t t a c k e d the government's u n f r i e n d l y handl i n g o f i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the communist b l o c i n comparison t o i t s f r i e n d l y o r o f t e n submissive  r e l a t i o n s w i t h the  States,  had t o respond t o the  In  I960,  the Ikeda Cabinet  a c c i d e n t a l l y a m p l i f i e d popular over-involvement  United  sentiment o p p o s i n g Japan's  i n American S t r a t e g y f o r the Far E a s t .  by the JSP and the JCP, the o p p o s i t i o n and informed  Led  public  o p i n i o n demanded an independent f o r e i g n p o l i c y , o r more b l u n t l y , Japan's rapproachment w i t h the communist c o u n t r i e s .  The  energy o f the r e b e l l i o u s movement c o u l d o n l y be m o l l i f i e d the c o n c i l i a t o r y moves towards the communist b l o c .  by  Ikeda  emphasised h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o seek r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h China and to e n l a r g e t r a d e r e l a t i o n s w i t h communist c o u n t r i e s . v i o u s l y t h i s p o l i c y was movement o f  I960  i n response t o the sweeping  and Ikeda's p o l i c y was  Ob-  popular  not meant to be  an  e x t e n s i v e enlargement o f Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the communist  63  bloc.  Nor clid p o p u l a r sentiment The  demand i t t o such an e x t e n t .  second and s a l i e n t reason t h a t t h e Ikeda  21  Cabinet  t r i e d t o m a i n t a i n f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e communist b l o c , was t h e d e f e n s i v e i m p l i c a t i o n o f Japan's approach t o them. Ikeda a t t a i n e d h i s ' d i p l o m a t i c ' t r a i n i n g i n t h e l o s h i d a Cabinet (1948-54) m o s t l y as the i - l i n i s t e r o f Finance mentioned i n t h e f i n a l c h a p t e r ) • c i p l e o f Yoshida  (which w i l l be  I n s h o r t , t h e common p r i n -  and I k e d a s diplomacy  can be found i n t h e i r  1  r e s p e c t f o r economic t i e s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . ' - ^ Yoshida  was r e p o r t e d t o have s a i d , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l l o a n s have  a s i g n i f i c a n t role i n maintaining international ships,  relation-  Ikeda s a i d i n h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e speech,  A c c o r d i n g t o our p r i n c i p l e o f Peace Diplomacy, we v / i l l s t r e n u o u s l y sock f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h communist c o u n t r i e s . As f o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h c o n t i n e n t a l C h i n a , mutual n c n - i n t o r v o n t i o n i n domestic p o l i t i c s and mutual r e s p e c t o f each p o l i t y w i l l g r a d u a l l y i n c r e a s e f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . At t h e p r e s e n t I s t r o n g l y f a v o u r Sino-Japanese t r a d e , which a l t h o u g h once ceased, i s now r e v i v i n g . 2 4 The  Ikeda Cabinet d i d not expect  Sino-Japanese t r a d e t o  grow e x t e n s i v e l y , and i t even, d i s c o u r a g e d t h e t r a d e when i t was about t o grow as h i g h as Japan's t r a d e w i t h o t h e r count r i e s o u t s i d e t h e communist b l o c .  The Japanese Government d i d  not a u t h o r i s e l o n g term l o a n s o f t h e government Bank funds f o r Sino-Japanese t r a d e except  Export-Import  i n a few cases.  Such l o a n s v/e r e t o bo used t o encourage Japan's export t o noncommunist c o u n t r i e s . ^  Moreover, Ikeda  considered that Sino-  Japaneso t r a d e would not expand t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t c o u l d e f f e c t a major s t r u c t u r a l change i n Japan's i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e .  64 When Ikeda v i s i t e d West Germany i n 1962,  he s a i d t o Prime  M i n i s t e r Adenauer, A l t h o u g h Communist China has l i t t l e t o o f f e r Japan i t wants t o buy v a r i o u s goods on our market, and i t i n e v i t a b l y requires extending c r e d i t s . Sino26 Japanese t r a d e w i l l not grow because o f t h i s b a r r i e r . Thus, w h i l e not e x p e c t i n g i t s l a r g e s c a l e growth nor ericcouraging i t ,  the Ikeda Cabinet m a i n t a i n e d  Sino-Japanese t r a d e  and c u l t u r a l exchange w i t h communist c o u n t r i e s .  This  ap-  p r o a c h o f the Ikeda Cabinet t o t h e communist b l o c , e s p e c i a l l y to China,  can best be understood  as a scheme t o ease the  Japanese t e n s i o n which c o u l d t h r e a t e n Japan's s e c u r i t y , i t once d i d d u r i n g the time o f the K i s h i  Sinoas  Cabinet.^7  OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS The  o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s which enabled t h e Ikeda  t o a c q u i r e good terms w i t h the People's must be b r i e f l y mentioned b e f o r e  Republic of  Cabinet China  c o n t i n u i n g the d i s c u s s i o n o f  Japan's approach t o the communist b l o c . F i r s t l y , h a v i n g watched China's e x t e r n a l p o l i c y f o r more t h a n a decade a f t e r i t s independence, the Japanese Government c o u l d judge w i t h c o n f i d e n c e  t h a t China had no p a r t i c u l a r i n -  t e n t i o n t o t h r e a t e n Japan's s e c u r i t y w i t h m i l i t a r y means. As f o r the i n d i r e c t i n t e r f e r e n c e from China, Ikeda as w e l l as Y o s h i d a , was  c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e people's  best p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t i t , I960 was  w e l l - b e i n g was  the  and Japan's economic s i t u a t i o n i n  c o n s i d e r e d s t r o n g enough t o g i v e immunity a g a i n s t  99 i n d i r e c t a g g r e s s i o n from communism.~  65 Secondly, China's p o l i c y o f t h e 'Great Leap Forward' ended i n f a i l u r e and r e s u l t e d i n a f u r t h e r S i n o - S o v i e t  split,  which f o r c e d China t o stop s h o r t . China c o u l d no l o n g e r expect a h i g h l e v e l o f t r a d e w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union and had t o l o o k elsewhere f o r t h e m a t e r i a l t o r e c o n s t r u c t i t s damaged economy. Japan was one o f t h e c o u n t r i e s t h a t c o u l d p r o v i d e goods and s e r v i c e s necessary  f o r China t o r e v i t a l i s e i t s economy.  T h i r d l y , t h e Japanese Government a c q u i r e d enough i n f o r m a t i o n about China's m i l i t a r y power and c o u l d judge China's c a p a b i l i t y t o support  i t s p o l i t i c a l l y m i l i t a n t but s t r a t e g i -  cally discreet action.  S e v e r a l i n c i d e n t s i n and o v e r t h e  Taiwan S t r a i t i n 195S and a f t e r , r e v e a l e d China's weakness i n sea and a i r f o r c e s .  The Korean War proved t h a t China c o u l d  w e l l cope w i t h t h e American f o r c e s i n c o n v e n t i o n a l warfare on the l a n d .  The o b v i o u s c o n c l u s i o n was t h a t China's m i l i t a r y  f o r c e was d e f e n s i v e and i t s o f f e n s i v e c a p a c i t y was l i m i t e d . F o u r t h l y , China had t o accept t h e p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y o f Japan, e s p e c i a l l y t h e c o n s i s t e n t support  o f the people t o t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e government headed by t h e L i b e r a l - D e m o c r a t i c The  party.  c o n s e r v a t i v e p a r t y won t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n i n December  o f I960 d e s p i t e two u n f a v o u r a b l e Cabinet  i n c i d e n t s - t h e I960 a n t i -  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s and t h e a s s a s s i n a t i o n o f Asanuma  I n a j i r o , Chairman o f t h e JSP. Both i n c i d e n t s had been specul a t e d as d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s f o r t h e LDP i n t h e e l e c t i o n .  As a  r e s u l t o f t h e LDP's v i c t o r y , t h e Chinese Government t u r n e d i t s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e Japanese Government and favoured  t h e Ikeda  66 C a b i n e t ' s c o o p e r a t i v e a t t i t u d e towards t h e communist b l o c . F i f t h l y , t h e l i b e r a l image o f t h e Kennedy a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s encouraged t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t t o push f o r ward i t s c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y towards t h e communist c o u n t r i e s . These were r o u g h l y t h e o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t gave a frame and a b a s i s t o t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s p o l i c y f o r China and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s i n t h e communist b l o c . ACTIONS OF THE CABINET Ikeda's p o l i c y towards t h e communist b l o c was m o s t l y hampered by t h e f a c t t h a t Japan was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e American anti-communist m i l i t a r y network i n t h e F a r E a s t . Concerning  Japan's p o l i c y f o r China, t h e f a c t t h a t both Taiwan  and China had n e v e r t o l e r a t e d one another made an a d d i t i o n a l barrier.  No i m p o r t a n t government i n the w o r l d c o u l d r e c o g n i s e  China and Taiwan a t t h e same time because both c o u n t r i e s f i r m l y and c o n s i s t e n t l y t u r n down t h e i d e a o f two Chinas. s e q u e n t l y , the Japanese Government c o u l d not n o r m a l i s e  Con-  diplo-  m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h China w i t h o u t b r e a k i n g o f f w i t h Taiwan, because t h i s would cause a t o o r a d i c a l change i n t h e power balance The  i n the Far East. Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s s o l u t i o n t o such a dilemma was t h e  ' s e p a r a t i o n o f p o l i t i c s and economics' ( S e i k e i B u n r i ) . p r i n c i p l e had two c o n n o t a t i o n s .  This  One was t h a t Japan would not  r e c o g n i s e Communist China even though i t had economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h her, and t h e o t h e r was mutual n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i n  67 domestic p o l i t i c s .  China i n s i s t e d upon t h e i n s e p a r a b i l i t y o f  p o l i t i c s and economics  (Se i k e i Fukabun).  I n I 9 6 0 , China and  Japan reached a s t r a n g e agreement t h a t t h e y would m u t u a l l y r e s p e c t each o t h e r ' s p r i n c i p l e s  (which were l o g i c a l l y c o n t r a -  d i c t o r y t o each o t h e r ) and t h a t t h r o u g h t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f economic exchanges  both p a r t i e s would expect n o r m a l i s a t i o n o f  d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s i n the f u t u r e . 3 0 The Ikeda C a b i n e t sent f o u r ' s e m i - o f f i c i a l ' m i s s i o n s t o China i n four y e a r s .  The o s t e n s i b l e r o l e o f t h e m i s s i o n s was  the n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e Chinese Government c o n c e r n i n g t r a d e . The f i r s t m i s s i o n was l e d by a c o n s e r v a t i v e D i e t member T a k a s a k i Tatsunosuke i n October, I960, and the m i s s i o n cons i s t e d m a i n l y o f businessmen.  T h i s m i s s i o n re-opened t h e  Sino-Japanese s e m i - o f f i c i a l governmental exchange c h a n n e l . S i x weeks a f t e r t h e T a k a s a k i m i s s i o n , t h e Japanese  Government  d e c i d e d t o remove a r e s t r i c t i o n on Sino-Japanese t r a d e .  The  'Compulsory Balanced-Trade Formula' f o r Sino-Japanese t r a d e was l i f t e d .  Ikeda s t a t e d i n December, I 9 6 0 , t h a t Sino-Japanese  t r a d e s h o u l d be encouraged even w i t h o u t governmental  agreements.  Some o f the p r o g r e s s observed i n t h e e a r l y Ikeda p e r i o d c o n c e r n i n g Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the communist b l o c were as follows.  I n January, 1961, t h e 'Russo-Japanese  ment and C o o p e r a t i o n P l a n ' was s i g n e d .  Cultural  Agree-  I n A p r i l , t h e 'Com-  p u l s o r y Balanced-Trade Formula' was a b o l i s h e d f o r a l l communist countries.  I n F e b r u a r y , 1962, t h e Russo-Japanese  Trade En-  largement Commission was o r g a n i s e d , which was t o make p l a n s  68 t o develop  S i b e r i a w i t h Japanese c a p i t a l and encourage Russo-  Japanese t r a d e .  In May,  1962,  the Japanese Government  autho-  r i s e d extended c r e d i t f o r t r a d e w i t h China f o r a p e r i o d o f l e s s than f i v e y e a r s . In September, 1962, Kenzo, was  a c o n s e r v a t i v e D i o t Member Matsumura  sent t o Peking and h i s m i s s i o n was  f o l l o w e d by  the second T a k a s a k i m i s s i o n accompanied by a b u s i n e s s group. T a k a s a k i s i g n e d an agreement, c a l l e d ,  " L i u - T a k a s a k i Agreement"  which was a semi-governmental agreement between the parties.  The L-T  two  agreement approved 100 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n  t r a d e par y e a r f o r f i v e s u c c e s s i v e y e a r s s t a r t i n g i n 1963. The agreement p e r m i t t e d the use o f governmental l o a n s f o r export. The  Ikeda Cabinet not o n l y sent s e m i - o f f i c i a l m i s s i o n s ,  but a l s o encouraged the LDP' D i o t members t o v i s i t  communist  c o u n t r i e s as w e l l as Communist and S o c i a l i s t D i e t members. Such a l i b e r a l a t t i t u d e o f the Ikeda Cabinet towards the communist b l o c annoyed the Taiwan Government. L-T  agreement was  Above a l l , the  t a k e n as a t h r e a t t o Taiwan's s t a t u s because  i t l o o k e d l i k e Japan's f i r s t s t e p t o r e c o g n i s e Communist China. The  Taiwan Government communicated a s t r o n g p r o t e s t t o the •  Ikeda C a b i n e t . v e r y much.  However, i t d i d not change the g e n e r a l t r e n d  In l a t e 1963  a f t e r having e x e r c i s e d gradual pres-  .sure on Japan, the Taiwan Government took a d r a s t i c  action  a g a i n s t Japan a t the end o f the "Chou Heng-ching I n c i d e n t . " 3 1  69 REVERSE TREND Immediately a f t e r the Chou I n c i d e n t , t h e French  Govern-  ment r e c o g n i s e d t h e People's R e p u b l i c o f China as t h e l e g i t i mate Government o f China and Taiwan was r e c o g n i s e d as Taiwan, not as C h i n a .  A c c o r d i n g t o I t s e s t a b l i s h e d p r o c e s s and p r i n -  c i p l e , Taiwan broke o f f i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h F r a n c e .  The French  r e c o g n i t i o n o f China g r e a t l y weakened Taiwan's s t a t u s .in i n t e r national relations.  Taiwan's i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s had been  based on a f i c t i o n t h a t i t r e p r e s e n t e d whole C h i n a , and t h e French r e c o g n i t i o n o f C o n t i n e n t a l China was a severe blow. Now t h a t Taiwan's s t a t u s was weakened, the Ikeda Cabinet  felt  i t had t o support Taiwan i n o r d e r t o p r e s e r v e t h e s t a t u s quo i n the Far E a s t .  The Cabinet d e c i d e d t o t e n t a t i v e l y  check  i t s p o l i c y toward r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h China.32 Four "weeks a f t e r t h e French r e c o g n i t i o n o f C h i n a , t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t sent ex-Prime M i n i s t e r Y o s h i d a S h i g e r u t o Taiwan t o a s s u r e h e r t h a t t h e C a b i n e t would n o t p e r m i t  governmental  c r e d i t t o be extended f o r m a i n l a n d t r a d e any l o n g e r . i m p l i c i t l y meant t h a t Japan would not move towards  This  recogni-  t i o n o f Communist China as t h e l e g i t i m a t e government o f C h i n a . Thus, t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s p o l i c y t o approach t h e communist b l o c e x t e n s i v e l y on c e r t a i n dimensions, such as economic and c u l t u r a l exchange, was checked and r e t a r d e d by t h e French r e c o g n i t i o n o f China.  I t was a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t t h e r e c o g n i t i o n  c o u l d g i v e a d r a s t i c e f f e c t t o t h e e x i s t i n g F a r E a s t e r n power balance.33  70 The  Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s s t r e n u o u s e f f o r t t o encourage o r  p r e t e n d t o encourage t r a d e r e l a t i o n s w i t h the communist b l o c , was  a scheme t c s u p p o r t Japan's s e c u r i t y i n d i r e c t l y .  Ikeda  was  v e r y w e l l aware t h a t more i n t i m a t e economic r e l a t i o n s  would c o n t r i b u t e t o p r o d u c i n g a f r i e n d l y atmosphere between the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d .  Ikeda a l s o encouraged p e r s o n a l exchange  w i t h communist c o u n t r i e s i n o r d e r t o e n r i c h the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of  each c o u n t r y and i t s p o l i t y .  For example, d u r i n g t h e Ikeda  p e r i o d , the JSP sent s e v e r a l m i s s i o n s t o C h i n a , and t h e y app a r e n t l y t r i e d t o e x p l a i n Japan's i n t e n t i o n under the Security Treaty.3^ of  Mutual  This c o n t r i b u t e d t o f u r t h e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g  both c o u n t r i e s ' government by each o t h e r . The LDP's d e l e g a t e s on f o u r o c c a s i o n s t a l k e d about  Japan's defence  scheme and the d e f e n s i v e n a t u r e o f the M u t u a l  S e c u r i t y T r e a t y when they met  Chou E n - l a i , Ch'en X i and o t h e r  h i g h o f f i c i a l s o f the Chinese  Government.  T a k a s a k i Tatsunosuke  on h i s f i r s t m i s s i o n answered Chou E n - l a i ' s a t t a c k on the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty, There i s no Japanese who i n t e n d s t o a t t a c k China w i t h American a i d under t h e S e c u r i t y T r e a t y . Japan was h u r t a f t e r the American conquest and t h e S e c u r i t y T r e a t y i s a r e s u l t o f the wound. The S e c u r i t y T r e a t y i s a n a t u r a l l y grown s h e l t e r t h a t p r o t e c t s wounded Japan from germs. Once Japan has r e c o v e r e d from the wound i t w i l l become unnecessary. For example, the American l a n d f o r c e has a l r e a d y been evacuated from Japan. V-Jhen the U n i t e d N a t i o n s b e g i n s e x e r t i n g i t s s e c u r i t y maintenance f u n c t i o n s , the S e c u r i t y T r e a t y w i l l become unnecessary. Such i s the agreement o f b o t h p a r t i e s i n the t r e a t y . 3 5 Thus, t h e f i r s t T a k a s a k i m i s s i o n s i m p l y communicated the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s 'good w i l l ' towards  China, and  re-opened  71  trade  relations. The Matsumura m i s s i o n o f 1962 f u r t h e r s u p p o r t e d t h e  C a b i n e t ' s scheme.  Matsuraura succeeded i n c o n v i n c i n g Chou En-  l a i and Ch'en I i t h a t t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s u l t i m a t e ' g o a l i n i t s C h i n a p o l i c y was t o r e c o g n i s e China and t h a t t h e accumula t i o n f o r m u l a ( t o p i l e up e m p i r i c a l f a c t s and a c t i o n s , ande v e n t u a l l y t o r e s t o r e d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s ) was a p r a c t i c a l 6  0  s t o p towards t h a t g o a l . " J  The JXiatsumura m i s s i o n was i m m e d i a t e l y  f o l l o w e d by t h e second T a k a s a k i m i s s i o n . ments were c o n c l u d e d .  Thus t h e L-T agree-  T h i s r a p i d p r o c e s s i m p l i e s t h e Matsu-  mura m i s s i o n ' s s i g n i f i c a n c e i n promoting Sino-Japanese  under-  s t a n d i n g , e s p e c i a l l y China's u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Japan's defensive provision i n the Security Treaty, Mot o n l y NLatsumura and T a k a s a k i , but many D i e t members o f t h e LDP v i s i t e d China on a p r i v a t e l e v e l d u r i n g t h e Ikeda period.  They opened p r i v a t e a c c e s s t o t h e Chinese Government,  and t h e s e channels h e l p e d the Cabinet t o communicate i t s i d e a s t o t h e Chinese Government.  However, what s h o u l d be  n o t e d here i s t h a t the Ike dr. C a b i n e t ' s p o l i c y t o approach t h e communist b l o c was e s s e n t i a l l y formed t o ease t h e a n t a g o n i s t i c r e l a t i o n s o f China and Japan t h a t had e x i s t e d s i n c e t h e time of the h i s h i Cabinet.  I n o t h e r words t h e s a l i e n t  objective  was t h e s e c u r i t y o f Japan, and t h e main g o a l was n o t r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h t h e communist c o u n t r i e s .  For example, w h i l e  a p p r o a c h i n g t h e communist b l o c , t h e Ikeda Cabinet communicated s t e r n p r o t e s t s t o t h e S o v i e t Union c o n c e r n i n g t h e recommencing  72  of i t s nuclear t e s t i n g s . Cabinet's basic stand The  Such p r o t e s t s r e v e a l t h e Ikeda  i n i t s p o l i c y f o r t h e communist  world.  LDF's p o l i c y Research Committee (Seimu Chosa-kai) sum-  m a r i s e s i t s defence p o l i c y as f o l l o w s . As f o r o u r n a t i o n a l defiance, u n t i l t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s peace-keeping o r g a n i s a t i o n , o u r p a r t y villi f i r m l y m a i n t a i n t h e M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y t o guarantee o u r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and p r o s p e r i t y with the cooperation o f the United States...At the same t i m e , Japan w i l l e x e r t i t s e f f o r t t o f o s t e r the f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h n e i g h b o u r i n g c o u n t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y w i t h A s i a n n e i g h b o u r s . Being l o c a t e d i n Asia,- we b e l i e v e t h a t Japan has a s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o c o n t r i b u t e t o s t a b i l i s a t i o n and p r o s p e r i t y o f A s i a f o r the sake o f t h e w o r l d peace...38 becomes a p e r f e c t  The  Ikeda C a b i n e t s u c c e s s f u l l y c a r r i e d out i t s p o l i c y  f o r t h e communist b l o c u n t i l t h e end o f 1963.  However,  Taiwan's sharp r e a c t i o n t o Japan's p o l i c y towards M a i n l a n d C h i n a shown i n t h e Chou I n c i d e n t , f o r c e d t h e C a b i n e t t o r e organise  i t s China p o l i c y .  The Japanese Government specu-  l a t e d t h a t t h e u n e x p e c t e d French r e c o g n i t i o n o f C h i n a change t h e s y s t e m i c  s i t u a t i o n o f the Far East  could  considerably.  T h i s s i t u a t i o n o b l i g e d t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t t o appease the Taiwan Government a t t h e expense o f i t s p o l i c y f o r Communist China so t h a t t h e s t a t u s quo i n the F a r E a s t would be m a i n t a i n e d . T h i s change o f p o l i c y was o b v i o u s l y a r e t r e a t from the former p o s i t i o n o f t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t ,  and was a n e c e s s a r y r e t r e a t  f o r t h e sake o f Japan's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y .  73 FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I I I  ^Ekonomisuto, V o l . 39, Ho. 22, 1961, p. 11. o Utsunomiya Tokuma, neiwa kyozon t o Ninon Gaiko, (Tokyo: Kobundo, I 9 6 0 ) , pp. 14-13. ^ A s a h i Shinbun, F e b r u a r y 18, ^hlbid, March 17, 5 I b i d , May  26,  1962.  1962.  I b i d , January 19, ^Ibid,  1964.  F e b r u a r y 7,  1963. 1963.  °Ito Masaya, Ikeda Hayato: Sono S e i t o S h i , (Tokyo: S h i s e i -  do, 1967), p. 199. 9  New York Times, June 23,  1961.  ^ A j i a - A f u r i k a Koza, ed., Nihon t o Chosen, Shobo, 1965), pp. 61-62. • ^ A s a h i Shinbun ,September 4, 1  (Tokyo: K e i s o  1948.  2  i''or such p s y c h o l o g y , c o n s u l t David J . F i n l a y , Ole R. K o l s t i , R i c h a r d R. Fagen, Enemies i n P o l i t i c s , ( C h i c a g o : Rand M c n a l l y and Company, 1967), pp. 13-22. 13cf. Minami R y o s h i n , "The T u r n i n g P o i n t i n the Japanese Economy," Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l o f Economics,XXXII, (August, 1968), 3 82. x  14Nex-/ York Times, June 22,  196I.  -^loc cit. •'•^Kuse Yuzo, "Konohito o h y o t e i s u r u , " Ekonomisuto, V o l . 40, No. $2, 1962, p. 39. 17  ' I t o Masaya, Op. C i t . , pp. 173-4.  18  AA j i a - A f u r i k a Koza, ed., Op. C i t . , p.  83.  7 4  s a h i Shinbun, J u l y 23, I960. i k e d a ' s statement at a f o r e i g n p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e , "China i s our Neighbour and has had e x t e n s i v e h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h us. We would l i k e to e s t a b l i s h f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . But i n p r a c t i c e , i t i n v o l v e s a g r e a t many d i f f i c u l t i e s . 1 1  on  ^Asanuma I n a j i r o , "Kokumin n i u t t a e r u , " A s a h i Shinbun, May 19, I960, and JSP's statement c o n c e r n i n g the S e c u r i t y T r e a t y , A s a h i Shinbun, May 22, I960. ^For example, the Chairman o f the JSP, Asanuma, made a speech i n P e k i n g , s t a t i n g , "American i m p e r i a l i s m i s the common enemy o f the Chinese and the Japanese p e o p l e . " T h i s statement was s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i s e d not o n l y by the Government but a l s o by the p u b l i c o p i n i o n . As a r e s u l t , the c o n s e r v a t i v e p a r t y won the I960 g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n a l t h o u g h i t was p r e d i c t e d t h a t the LDP c o u l d be d e f e a t e d a f t e r the I960 p o l i t i c a l t u r m o i l . Former Chairman o f t h e JSP, Suzuki, was c r i t i c i s e d s e v e r e l y when he c o n f i r m e d the above statement o f Asanuma i n P e k i n g i n 1961. 2 2 f i a j i Fumio, Ningen Ikeda Nayato, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1967), p. 140. " A c c o r d i n g t o I k e d a s c a l c u l a t i o n , even one h a l f o f the n a t i o n a l budget, 300 b i l l i o n Yen, would not make a p o w e r f u l new army. T h e r e f o r e , n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y s h o u l d be m a i n t a i n e d by c o l l e c t i v e defence by the American f o r c e , and d e f e a t e d Japan s h o u l d p r i m a r i l y be concerned w i t h s a v i n g c a p i t a l and r e v i t a l i s i n g economy. Thus, Yoshida and Ikeda's i d e a s o f defence and armament were f u s e d i n t o one.''' !  1  ^ K o s a k a Masataka, " S a i s h o Yoshida S h i g e r u Ron," Chuo Koron, February 1964, P« 84. 24Asahi Shinbun, October 22, I960. 25cf. The Yoshida l e t t e r o f February, 1964, Nenkan, 1965, p. 298. 2^Ito Masaya, Op. C i t . , p.  i n Asahi  153.  27New China News Agency, January 14, I960, (from A s a h i Shinbun) The E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s O f f i c e o f the Chinese Government i s s u e d a statement c o n c e r n i n g the s i g n i n g o f the Japanese-American M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y a t 'Washington, "Prime M i n i s t e r K i s h i of Japan, d i s r e g a r d i n g the Japanese p e o p l e ' s a n t i p a t h y and d i s r e g a r d i n g t h e Chinese and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s ' w a r n i n g , d e c i d e d t o s i g n the Japanese-American m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e pact on the 19th of January i n Washington. T h i s i s an i m p o r t a n t s t e p o f American i m p e r i a l i s m and Japanese r e a c t i o n a r i e s t o prepare a new aggress i v e war t o t h r e a t e n A s i a and the w o r l d . The Chinese people have p a i d a t t e n t i o n t o the Japanese p e o p l e ' s s t r u g g l e t o g a i n n a t i o n a l independence, democracy,  75 peace and n e u t r a l i t y , and oppose r e v i v a l o f m i l i t a r i s m . . . T h e Chinese Government cannot h e l p p o i n t i n g out t h a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f the Japanese-American m i l i t a r y pact v i n d i c a t e s r e v i t a l i s a t i o n o f Japanese m i l i t a r i s m and i t m a n i f e s t l y demonstrates Japan's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e a g g r e s s i v e m i l i t a r y b l o c l e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . "  2^  ~ _p  1.7 „  ex,  wote j%  .  O  29 " I k e d a ' s statement a t a f o r e i g n p r e s s conference on June 13, 1961 (from A s a h i Shinbun). "Communism p e r m i a t e s i n t o and develops i n an a r e a o f l o w l i v i n g s t a n d a r d . When the l i v i n g s t a n d a r d goes up, communism goes under. That i s why we t h i n k our e f f o r t s h o u l d be c o n c e n t r a t e d on economic growth and on improvement o f the people's l i v i n g s t a n d a r d . " Of)  ^ Chou E n - l a i i m p l i c i t l y and v a g u e l y r e c o g n i s e d Japan's s e p a r a t i o n p r i n c i p l e o f p o l i t i c s and economic a t t h e f a r e w e l l p a r t y f o r the Matsumura m i s s i o n o f 1962. Chou's speech was r e c o r d e d i n the A s a h i Shinbun, September 20, 1962. -'Chou Heng-ching I n c i d e n t . A Chinese-Japanese i n t e r p r e t e r , Chou Heng-ching, who came t c Japan w i t h China's machinery ' i n v e s t i g a t i o n group, d e s e r t e d from the group and asked asylum o f the R u s s i a n Embassy i n Tokyo. He was sent t o t h e Japanese i m m i g r a t i o n o f f i c e , where he changed the country o f h i s d e s t i n a t i o n from R u s s i a t o Taiwan, and then t o Japan. He f i n a l l y s t a r t e d a hunger s t r i k e demanding t o be sent back t o the o r i g i n a l c o u n t r y , C h i n a . 3^In January o f 1964, pro-Taiwan f a c t i o n o f the LDP (the I s h i i f a c t i o n , namely) worked a c t i v e l y t o change Ikeda's p o l i c y f o r China and Taiwan. I s h i i M i t s u j i r o ' s f a c t i o n was the most a c t i v e t o change t h e C a b i n e t ' s a t t i t u d e towards Taiwan. I t was b e l i e v e d t h a t I s h i i proposed the i d e a t o send ex-Prime M i n i s t e r l o s h i d a t o Taiwan w i t h a ' p r i v a t e l e t t e r ' t o Chiang K a i - s h e k on l i m i t i n a t r a d e w i t h t h e mainland. T t o Masaya, I b i d , pp. 221-2. •^Cf. o >t-  The p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r , s e c t i o n on t h e J;  - - Shu O n r a i t o Kaidan s h i t e , " Chuo Koron, February, 1961, p. 243. >i?  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l o f the LDP Maoo Shigosaburo i s s u e d a statement, "The a c c u m u l a t i o n f o r m u l a does n o t d i r e c t l y l e a d us to future r e c o g n i t i o n o f China. T h i s agreement w i l l s u r e l y encourage Sino-Japanese t r a d e t o a c e r t a i n degree. I t h i n k t h i s agreement has s o l v e d problems e x t e n s i v e l y . I cannot r e f e r t o t h e d e t a i l s u n t i l Mr. Matsumura comes back." (from A s a h i Shinbun, September 20, 1962) J  76  37cf„ The p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r ,  s e c t i o n on t h e JCP,  ^ The L i b e r a l Democratic P a r t y P o l i t i c a l Research Comm i t t e e , ed., (Tokyo: The L i b e r a l - D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y P u b l i c Rel a t i o n s Committee, 1964), p. 103,  77 CHAPTER  IV  DOMESTIC PROVISIONS  The Ikeda C a b i n e t G domestic p o l i t i c a l arrangement 'for T  n a t i o n a l defence can be viewed from two p e r s p e c t i v e s . One i s the improvement o f p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g the N a t i o n a l Defence Force ( J i e i t a i a n d the o t h e r i s the r e i n f o r c e m e n t of the defence c a p a c i t y o f the Defence F o r c e * PUBLIC RELATIONS OF THE  IKEDA CABINET  In the second c h a p t e r , the t h r e e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ' impact on the Ikeda Cabinet was d i s c u s s e d .  The emphasis was  p l a c e d on the i n p u t s i d e o f the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s p u b l i c tions.: the impact o f the Japan S o c i a l i s t P a r t y ; the  rela-  Japan  Communist P a r t y ; and some groups o f f a c t i o n s i n the L i b e r a l Democratic  P a r t y i n the p r o c e s s o f s e c u r i t y p o l i c y making..  In o r d e r t o a v o i d redundancy,  here the emphasis w i l l be put  on the output s i d e - the C a b i n e t ' s p u r s u i t o f a n t i - n u c l e a r armament p o l i c y . During f o u r y e a r s i n o f f i c e , the Ikeda Cabinet promised t h a t Japan would not be armed w i t h n u c l e a r weapons* as February o f 1961,  As e a r l y  Ikeda, answering Yajima., a D i e t member  of the JSP., s a i d , R e g a r d l e s s o f whether China has n u c l e a r weapons, Japan would not possess n u c l e a r weapons.1 Not o n l y Japan's m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , but a l s o the American  forces  i n Japan w.oro p r o h i b i t e d by the Ikeda Cabinet from b r i n g i n g n u c l e a r weapons i n t o Japan.  M i n i s t e r o f the Defence Agency  73 F u j i e d a , answered Oka  R y o i c h i o f the JSF i n the D i e t ,  We would not a l l o w the American f o r c e s t o d e p l o y t h e i r n u c l e a r weapons i n Japan. We w i l l m a i n t a i n our defence p o l i c y not t o arm our Defence Force w i t h n u c l e a r weapons r e g a r d l e s s o f the s i t u a t i o n t h a t China might produce n u c l e a r weapons,2 Both Ikeda and  F u j i e d a ' s statements c o n t a i n the word Japan,  but i t o b v i o u s l y does not i n c l u d e the Okinawa I s l a n d s . What i s the main p o l i c y g o a l o f the Ikeda C a b i n e t , when it was  so s t r o n g l y emphasised n o n - n u c l e a r armament o f Japan?  What  i t s p e r c e p t i o n o f Japan's i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment w i t h  r e g a r d t o the n u c l e a r armament o f the c o u n t r i e s Japan? The  These two  surrounding  q u e s t i o n s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d r e s p e c t i v e l y .  f i r s t q u e s t i o n concerns the immediate o b j e c t i v e o f  the a n t i - n u c l e a r armament p o l i c y .  The  answer i s t h a t the  Ikeda  Cabinet t r i e d t o a v o i d s t i r r i n g up p u b l i c f e a r o f the Defence Force, War,  As a r e s u l t o f the m i s e r a b l e  defeat i n the  Pacific  the Japanese have been d i s i l l u s i o n e d over t h e i r  possession  past  o f m i l i t a r y f o r c e s as w e l l as t h e i r e x e r c i s e o f i t .  Consequently the Japanese populace have become h i g h l y s u s p i c i o u s o f any form o f m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t , i n the f o l l o w i n g t a b l e .  as demonstrated  A f t e r the Y o s h i d a Cabinet e s t a b l i s h e d  the N a t i o n a l P o l i c e Reserve i n 1950,  Japan's defence f o r c e  grew s t e a d i l y i n m i l i t a r y c a p a c i t y y e a r a f t e r 3^ear.  First, i t  changed the name t o the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Force (Hoantai) t h e n t o the p r e s e n t  N a t i o n a l Defence Force ( J i e i t a i ) .  the Defence Force was  one  o f the most s t a b l e and  m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n the Far E a s t .  Thus, i t was  and  By I960,  balanced  always the  79  Table  I  ( q u e s t i o n : Do you t h i n k i t i s b e t t e r f o r Japan t o have t h e Defence F o r c e ? ) (from S e i s a k u Geppo, No. 96)  It  i s b e t t e r t o have i t  1956  1959  1963  32  39  52  %  %  It i s acceptable A c c e p t a b l e but not n e c e s s a r y  26  26  24  12  12  11  B e t t e r not t o have i t  11  5  3  7  6  3  12  12  7  Not  necessary  Don't know  Table  %  II  ( q u e s t i o n : Do you l i k e t o know about t h e Defence (from A s a h i Shinbun, December 30, 1963)  Force?)  Yes  22  Have i n t e r e s t , but not p a r t i c u l a r l y  22.  Have no i n t e r e s t i n i t  56  %  ( q u e s t i o n : Do you t h i n k t h e number o f t h e Defence Force p e r s o n n e l s h o u l d be i n c r e a s e d ? ) I n c r e a s e as many as p o s s i b l e  16 %  Increase a l i t t l e  13  Do n o t change Decrease a l i t t l e Do n o t know  more  46 5 20  so t a r g e t o f p u b l i c s u s p i c i o n because o f i t s n a t u r e and s t r u c t u r e . The  o n l y e f f e c t i v e means by which the government c o u l d q u e l l  t h e p e o p l e ' s s u s p i c i o n a g a i n s t the Force was  t o permit i t s  t r o o p s t o h e l p c i t i z e n s on v a r i o u s o c c a s i o n s o f n a t u r a l d i s asters.  Ten y e a r s ' o f governmental m a n i p u l a t i o n  r e l a t i o n s was  b a r e l y enough t o keep the people t o l e r a n t o f  t h e e x i s t e n c e o f the F o r c e .  T h i s was  w i t h which the Ikeda Cabinet pre c e d i n g  of public  the i n i t i a l t r o u b l e  had t o cope as w e l l as d i d the  c a b i n e t s.  Beyond t h i s i n i t i a l t r o u b l e , the Japanese have a hypers e n s i t i v i t y a g a i n s t n u c l e a r weapons as the f i r s t the l a s t people t o e x p e r i e n c e and N a g a s a k i .  the atomic bomb a t  and  perhaps  Hiroshima  In the e a r l y y e a r s o f the Ikeda p e r i o d , the  s u b j e c t o f n u c l e a r weapons was  h i g h l y p r o v o c a t i v e f o r the  Japanese t o t a l k about as a means o f n a t i o n a l defence,  and  a t h o u g h t l e s s speech by any c a b i n e t member c o u l d have caused a stormy d e n u n c i a t i o n o f the C a b i n e t . ^ p r e s e n t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y o f Japan  Provoking  people by  h a v i n g n u c l e a r defence  c o u l d have g e n e r a t e d p e o p l e ' s a n t i p a t h y a g a i n s t the whole s t r u c t u r e o f governmental p o l i c y f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , and it  c o u l d have e v e n t u a l l y l e d the Japanese t o f e a r the Defence  Force as a p o t e n t i a l source o f  evil.  An o p i n i o n p o l l by the S e i s a k u Geppo (the L i b e r a l Democratic P a r t y ' s o p i n i o n magazine) and the A s a h i newspaper d e c l a r e s how  d i f f i c u l t i t was  the Defence Force a c c e p t e d  f o r the Ikeda Cabinet  by the  people.  t o have  S\l J u s t b e f o r e Ikeda formed h i s c a b i n e t , l e s s t h a n f o r t y p e r cent o f the Japanese of  p o s i t i v e l y approved o f the e x i s t e n c e  t h e Defence F o r c e , and the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s c a u t i o u s hand-  l i n g o f t h e defence p o l i c y r a i s e d p o p u l a r support o f the Force t o more t h a n f i f t y per cent by the end o f 1963. i m p o r t a n t t h i n g was, of  t h e Japanese  Force.  The  however, t h a t more than f i f t y per cent  d e c l i n e d t o e x p r e s s t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n the  T h i s was a t y p i c a l manner i n which the Japanese  ex-  p r e s s e d t h e i r s u s p i c i o n about the F o r c e . Another e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e i r s u s p i c i o n was t h a t more t h a n f i f t y per cent o f them d i d not approve o f i n c r e a s i n g the number o f the Defence Force p e r s o n n e l nor agreed t o decreasingit.  The p r i n c i p l e o f n a t i o n a l defence was not w e l l  settled  i n the p e o p l e ' s mind, and s o c i a l a p p r o v a l o f the Force by the p e o p l e was  so u n s t a b l e t h a t the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s p o l i c y  and  a t t i t u d e f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y c o u l d change the p o s i t i o n o f the Force i n Japanese depending  societ}*- a f f i r m a t i v e l y o r n e g a t i v e l y ,  on the s u c c e s s o f i t s h a n d l i n g o f the  Hence, i t was  problem.  q u i t e r e a s o n a b l e t h a t the Ikeda Cabinet  was  h i g h l y s e n s i t i v e t o t h e problem o f Japan's n u c l e a r defence and kept i t out o f i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r a w h i l e . From the p o i n t o f v i e w o f Ikeda's economic r a t i o n a l i s m , defence e x p e n d i t u r e was the most u n d e s i r a b l e o f a l l , a l t h o u g h he r e c o g n i s e d I t "was an a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y f o r Japan's In  security.  c o n c l u s i o n , Ikeda f e l t t h a t the s u b j e c t o f n u c l e a r weapons  was a dangerous one as i t t h r e a t e n e d the e x i s t i n g  security  $2  system s i n c e i t c o u l d provoke people's against the Force. a non-productive  emotional r e a c t i o n  A l s o , e c o n o m i c a l l y n u c l e a r weapons were  and.extravagant  p r o j e c t f o r t h e Japanese  economy s i n c e i t s secondary e f f e c t on t h e whole n a t i o n a l economy was c a l c u l a t e d t o be t o o s m a l l f o r i t s g i g a n t i c i n i t i a l investment. Now t h e second q u e s t i o n s h o u l d be answered.  Besides  c o n s i d e r i n g t h e domestic s i t u a t i o n , t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s ception o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n concerning defence and s t r a t e g y s h o u l d be n o t e d . adherence t o a n o n - n u c l e a r  The Ikeda  per-  nuclear Cabinet's  armament p o l i c y was based on two  major p e r c e p t i o n s o f i t s environment.  Firstly,  i t trusted  the s t r e n g t h o f t h e American n u c l e a r u m b r e l l a which  covered  Japan a g a i n s t p o s s i b l e n u c l e a r a t t a c k from the communist b l o c . Secondly,  t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t  simply underestimated  China's  c a p a c i t y t o produce n u c l e a r weapons. As was a l r e a d y mentioned i n t h e e a r l i e r c h a p t e r s ,  Ikeda  was t h e man who a c t u a l l y n e g o t i a t e d w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s to  f o r m u l a t e Japan's s e c u r i t y system under t h e Y o s h i d a  Ikeda was f i r m l y committed t o m a i n t a i n i n g the e x i s t i n g  Cabinet. pro-  v i s i o n t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s guarantee Japan's s e c u r i t y . When T s u j i Masanobu (a D i e t member, Independent) asked  Ikeda  about Japan's defence c a p a c i t y , he answered, P r e s e n t l y i t i s d i f f i c u l t f o r Japan t o p r o t e c t i t s e l f w i t h o n l y i t s own f o r c e s . There i s no a l t e r n a t i v e c h o i c e but t h e e x i s t i n g j o i n t defence scheme between t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan.5 For t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t , t h e r e c o u l d be no s a f e r arrangement  S3  t h a n the M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y o f Japan and the U n i t e d S t a t e s to  guarantee i t s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y .  The t r e a t y i n v o l v e d the  American o b l i g a t i o n t o defend Japan i n case o f n e c e s s i t y . The o t h e r p e r c e p t i o n t h a t s h o u l d be r e c a l l e d was the  that  C a b i n e t u n d e r e s t i m a t e d China's c a p a c i t y t o produce n u c l e a r  weapons, due, perhaps, t o the m i s i n f o r m a t i o n from the U n i t e d States.  Ikeda s a i d t o an American news agent,  China may p o t e n t i a l l y be a b l e t o a c t i v a t e n u c l e a r r e a c t i o n , but i t i s not c l e a r t h a t t h e y a c t u a l l y can. Even when t h e y are a b l e t o do so, i t w i l l t a k e a t l e a s t a n o t h e r t e n y e a r s f o r them t o produce n u c 1 e a r we a p o n s . ° The c o m b i n a t i o n o f t r u s t i n the American n u c l e a r u m b r e l l a and u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n o f China's p o t e n t i a l t o produce n u c l e a r weapons produced the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s o p t i m i s t i c p o l i c y f o r n u c l e a r defence.  Mien Ikeda was asked a t a f o r e i g n p r e s s  c o n f e r e n c e about China's p o s s e s s i o n o f n u c l e a r weapons, he answered, We cannot deny t h a t t h e r e are n u c l e a r weapons near Japan, i n such p l a c e s as K u n a s h i r i , E t r o f u , and S a g h a l i e n . I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t o l e a r n t h a t China has them, t o o . I t i s not a s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n whether or not some c o u n t r i e s possess n u c l e a r 'weapons.7 T h i s does not mean t h a t the Ikeda C a b i n e t was c o m p l e t e l y i n d i f f e r e n t t o the genuine importance o f n u c l e a r defence o f Japan.  On the c o n t r a r y , whenever the C a b i n e t s t a t e d i t s  p o s i t i o n on n u c l e a r armament, i t always l i m i t e d i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o the p r e s e n t C a b i n e t .  For i n s t a n c e , Ikeda s a i d ,  "As  l o n g as the p r e s e n t Ikeda Cabinet l a s t s , we w i l l not possess n u c l e a r 'weapons," which c a r e f u l l y a v o i d e d i t s f u t u r e commitment  84 t o n o n - n u c l e a r armament.  Furthermore, Ikeda c l e a r l y  stated  t h a t Japan had the l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t t o possess n u c l e a r weapons when he s a i d , The Japanese C o n s t i t u t i o n does not p r o h i b i t n u c l e a r armament. However, as a p o l i t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f i t , we do not possess n u c l e a r weapons. The Japanese C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o h i b i t s us from m a i n t a i n i n g m i l i t a r y f o r c e s but not defence f o r c e s . T h e r e f o r e , i t does not f o r b i d our maintenance o f n u c l e a r weapons f o r d e f e n s i v e purposes, but i t does not a l l o w us t o make up m i l i t a r y forces.-*' Thus, Ikeda guaranteed Japan's s e c u r i t y under the American n u c l e a r u m b r e l l a , and shunned the t o u c h y s u b j e c t o f n u c l e a r armament f o r a w h i l e i n o r d e r not t o provoke the Japanese p u b l i c .  The p o l i c y was meant t o c a r r y out smooth  and g r a d u a l acceptance o f the Defence Force by the Japanese a p r o v i s i o n which was t o p r e s e r v e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , REINFORCEMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE The second p e r s p e c t i v e t o l o o k a t i n the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s d o m e s t i c arrangement the  f o r defence i s the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n o f  n a t i o n a l defence p o l i c y .  T h i s s u b j e c t w i l l be viewed  from t h r e e p o i n t s o f view: f i s c a l p o l i c y f o r defence; the Second Defence F l a n as a p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e ; and the a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e new defence p o l i c y . FISCAL POLICY FOR DEFENCE The Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s f i s c a l p o l i c y f o r n a t i o n a l defence i s perhaps the most c o n t r o v e r s i a l o f a l l the p o l i c i e s By l o o k i n g a t the f i r s t column o f t a b l e I I I , i t can be  produced. clearly  85 Table I I I  DB/NB  0  (DB--DB' )/DB'  (NB-NB')/NB'  I960  9.4 %  .000  .000  1961  3.9  .174  .184  1962  8.5  .328  .467  1963  0 . JL  .500  .746  1964  o.5  .720  .899  (DB: defence budget, KB: n a t i o n a l budget, DB': t h e I960 defence budget, K B : t h e I960 n a t i o n a l budget) F i g u r e s a r e based on Zair.au T o k e i , o u b l i s h e d by the M i n i s t r y o f F i n a n c e , 1  1966.  seen t h a t t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t reduced t h e r e l a t i v e amount o f the defence budget over t h e t o t a l budget, and kept i t cons t a n t l y under a l o w e r l e v e l than d i d t h e p r e v i o u s c a b i n e t s . To compare i t i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , i n 1961 West Germany's defence budget was 23 p e r cent o f t h e t o t a l n a t i o n a l budget,  which  was more than two and o n e - h a l f t i m e s l a r g e r t h a n t h e f i g u r e f o r Japan.  West Germany's defence e x p e n d i t u r e was 4.3 p e r  cent o f i t s g r o s s n a t i o n a l product was 1.4  (GNP) and t h a t o f Japan  p e r c e n t , t h u s showing t h e r e l a t i v e f i g u r e o f Japan's  defence expenditure„ Ikeda d i d not want t o i n c r e a s e the defence budget r a p i d l y as shown by t h e statement, I t i s o u r m a n i f e s t duty t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e Defence Force w i t h our own e f f o r t , but i t s h o u l d not be beyond o u r n a t i o n a l c a p a c i t y . That i s why Japan has l o o k t o the U n i t e d N a t i o n s and t h e Mutual Secur i t y T r e a t y o f Japan and the U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r i t s b a s i c n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p r o v i s i o n s , and has g r a d u a l l } r i n c r e a s e d i t s N a t i o n a l Defence Force.10  86 He d i d not want t o i n c r e a s e t h e defence budget t o a p o i n t w h i c h would d i s t u r b h i s f i s c a l p o l i c y f o r s t i m u l a t i n g - t h e " n a t i o n a l economy t o r a p i d e x p a n s i o n .  For.example,  i n the  Second Defence P l a n which w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n the l a t e r s e c t i o n s , t h e Defence Agency (Boei-cho) wanted t o have two p e r cent o f Japan's GNP  spent f o r n a t i o n a l defence.  This  demand was t u r n e d down by the C a b i n e t , and the Agency had t o a c c e p t the C a b i n e t ' s r e v i s e d f i g u r e o f 1.5 GNP. 1.5  per cent o f t h e  In p r a c t i c e the Ikeda C a b i n e t never spent as much as per cent o f t h e GNP  f o r n a t i o n a l defence.  T h e r e f o r e , one  i m p l i c a t i o n o f the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s f i s c a l p o l i c y f o r n a t i o n a l defence was t h a t i t s a s p i r a t i o n t o p r o v i d e f o r defence f o r c e s had a c l e a r l i m i t a t i o n . However, i f the second column o f the p r e c e d i n g t a b l e i s o b s e r v e d , i t i s found t h a t the Ikeda C a b i n e t spend a good d e a l o f i t s revenue f o r defence.  The i n c r e a s e r a t i o o f the  defence budget over t h e I960 base y e a r i s e x t r e m e l y h i g h throughout the f o u r f i s c a l y e a r s o f the Ikeda C a b i n e t . average  i n c r e a s e r a t i o i s 18 per cent a y e a r .  The  Although, i n  r e l a t i v e f i g u r e s , the defence budget i s not i n c r e a s i n g , i n a b s o l u t e f i g u r e s i t i s i n c r e a s i n g at a r a t e which i s not comp a r a b l e i n any o t h e r major c o u n t r y i n the w o r l d . at  When l o o k i n g  the .same t h i n g over a l o n g e r p e r i o d as i n the t a b l e IV,  i t can be s a i d t h a t t h e Ikeda' Cabinet i n c r e a s e d i t s defence budget t o a degree w h i c h had not been observed i n the p o l i c y o f any p r e v i o u s c a b i n e t s .  fiscal  Table  IV  300  (Unit:  B i l l i o n Yen)  200  100  0 f  52  54  567  T53  T6Q  "62  molT  L o o k i n g a t the t h i r d column o f t a b l e I I I , i t i s found t h a t the 1964  n a t i o n a l budget i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y 90 p e r cent  l a r g e r t h a n i t was  i n I960.  The average i n c r e a s e r a t i o o f the  n a t i o n a l budget i n the f o u r y e a r s o f the Ikeda C a b i n e t i s 22.5  per cent a y e a r .  When t h i s f i g u r e i s compared t o the  average i n c r e a s e r a t i o o f the defence budget, the i n c r e a s e i n t h e amount o f defence e x p e n d i t u r e i n t h e whole n a t i o n a l budget decreased d u r i n g the Ikeda p e r i o d .  T h i s once a g a i n makes us  f e e l t h a t the Ikeda Cabinet was not w i l l i n g t o s t r e n g t h e n the Defence Force v e r y r a p i d l y . How the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y f o r n a t i o n a l defence i s judged, depends g r e a t l y upon the c r i t e r i o n t a k e n . I f the f i g u r e s o f the defence budget r e l a t i v e t o t h e n a t i o n a l economy are t a k e n , i t can be c o n c l u d e d t h a t the Ikeda Cabinet was  r e l u c t a n t t o enhance the Defence Force r a p i d l y .  On the  o t h e r hand, i f the a b s o l u t e f i g u r e o f the defence e x p e n d i t u r e by the C a b i n e t i s c o n s i d e r e d , i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o say t h a t the Ikeda C a b i n e t 'was the v e r y c a b i n e t t h a t gave the  financial  b a s i s t o e s t a b l i s h the Force as one o f the most p o w e r f u l m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n the F a r F a s t *  To a t t r i b u t e the growth o f the  defence budget i n t h e Ikeda p e r i o d t o the g e n e r a l economic e x p a n s i o n seems t o be v a l i d , but when examining the C a b i n e t ' s defence p r o v i s i o n more p r e c i s e l y , i t can be s a i d t h a t the i n c r e a s e "was not s o l e l y due t o the secondary e f f e c t o r a c - ' c i d e n t a l e f f e c t o f the o v e r a l l economic e x p a n s i o n , but r a t h e r t o a c a r e f u l l y c a l c u l a t e d enlargement  policy of m i l i t a r y  capacity  89 as w i l l THE  be  d i s c u s s e d i n the  SECOND DEFENCE PLAN As  Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s  the  Second Defence  The  content  cussed  into  and  i n the  upon t h e  i n a narrow  discussed  s e c t i o n , and  here the  which the  sense,  in this section.  a c t u a l a p p l i c a t i o n of the  next  beginning  conditions that  defence p l a n . the  o f the  plan w i l l  be  dis-  focus w i l l  be  cast  Second D e f e n c e P l a n  came  As  I k e d a p e r i o d , t h e r e were  invited  Firstly,  informed  diplomacy.  the  public opinion,  c a p a c i t y was  to b u i l d  weaponry w h i c h had military tion  i t s own long  equipment.  o f the  people  p u b l i c as  three  Secondly,  a legitimate entity be  J a p a n ' s autonomous even b e f o r e  Defence  the  of  to  i n order  national industry  been s u b s i d a r y t o A m e r i c a n  i n the  well  independent  i n order  system o f defence  i t was  as  enlargement  necessary  force.  Thirdly,  conditions w i l l  effort  the  g r e a t e r independence i n m a i n t a i n i n g  J a p a n had  elite  demanded a more  felt  roughly  form o f a r e i n f o r c e d  Japanese p o l i t i c a l  a more autonomous d e f e n c e  acquire  some new  a p r e r e q u i s i t e to t h i s ,  Japan's defence  the  be  policy  being.  three  up  security  Plan w i l l  c o n d i t i o n s by  At t h e  as  continuing section.  build to  security, and  system  of  a long l a s t i n g aspira-  Force i n the  t o be  recpgnised  society.  by  These  discussed respectively. course  time o f the  t o r e v i s e the Mutual  o f d i p l o m a c y was  Ikeda C a b i n e t .  The  felt Kishi  S e c u r i t y T r e a t y o f the  necessary Cabinet's  United  90 S t a t e s and Japan was a way i n which t h e Japanese Government t r i e d t o improve Japan's p o s i t i o n v i s a v i s the U n i t e d S t a t e s so t h a t Japan c o u l d employ more independent d i p l o m a t i c noeuvres.  ma-  D u r i n g t h e Ikeda p e r i o d the c r y f o r g r e a t e r d i p -  l o m a t i c independence o r the c r y t o l e s s e n American i n f l u e n c e o v e r Japan's e x t e r n a l p o l i c y , became l o u d e r .  Kono I c h i r o ,  a strongman i n the Ikeda C a b i n e t and a sometimes  colleague,  as w e l l as an o f t e n t i m e s r i v a l f o r I k e d a , e x p r e s s e d such sentiment when he w r o t e , As t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n has changed t h i s ( i n A s i a , China i s g e t t i n g a g g r e s s i v e f r i g h t e n i n g i t s n e i g h b o u r i n g c o u n t r i e s as once d i d t o them), I t h i n k I t i s time f o r t o c l e a r l y map out independent d i p l o m a t i c p l e s o f i t s own„ll  like and i s Japan Japan princi-  and on a d i f f e r e n t o c c a s i o n he w r o t e , World p o l i t i c s has been d i v i d e d i n t o two b l o c s and i s dominated by S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n c o m p e t i t i o n . Howe v e r , the p r e s e n t Japanese n a t i o n a l power i s not i n f e r i o r t o t h a t o f t h e West European n a t i o n s , so i s i t d e s i r a b l e t h a t Japan keep i n a c t i v e i n •world p o l i t i c s ? I b e l i e v e t h a t i t i s the r i g h t time- f o r Japan t o s t a r t moving towards the d e t e r rence o f a t o t a l w a r . . . l e a d i n g n a t i o n s have l o s t t h e i r d i r e c t i o n i n the t h i c k m i s t . I s i t not an i m p o r t a n t time f o r us t o s t o p f o l l o w i n g o t h e r c o u n t r i e s and s t a r t s e a r c h i n g f o r the l i g h t w i t h our own e f f o r t i n t h i s t h i c k m i s t ? 1 2 On e n c o u n t e r i n g such demands f o r independent diplomacy, F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r O h i r a Masayoshi s a i d , Independent d i p l o m a c y I s a word I do not u n d e r s t a n d . Diplomacy i s by d e f i n i t i o n independent and t h e r e can be no non-independent d i p l o m a c y , . . t h e Japanese economy i s based on p o l i t i c a l and economic a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h many c o u n t r i e s . We have t o be c a r e f u l i n r e a l i s i n g what i s best f o r t h e Japanese i n t e r e s t i n t h e whole framework o f d i p l o m a c y . , , 1 3  9 1  This statement implies how strong the demand was to adopt an independent course of diplomacy.  I r o n i c a l l y , an unreasonable  apology such as t h i s , reveals how 'non-independent' the d Japanese diplomacy had been.  Such a strong demand eventually  took a more concrete p o l i c y .  Minister o f the Defence Agency  Fukuda Tokuyasu,  said,  Japan's economic growth has been so high as to be noticed by the world. Japan has paid more than f o r t y per cent of the reparation obligation and i t i s forwarding economic cooperation programmes. The time i s now due f o r us, as an independent country, to be prepared to protect our country with our own forces.. . 1 4 This was a t y p i c a l statement r a t i o n a l i s i n g Japan's m i l i t a r y enlargement plan through the Second Defence Plan. The second condition was Japan's necessity to b u i l d i t s own defence industry so that i t could free i t s e l f from American domination over i t s defence planning and a c t i v i t i e s .  One  of the greatest barriers to Japan's producing t a c t i c a l weapons was the excess weapons that the United States had given to Japan gratuitously.-^  By I960, the t o t a l amount of American  weapons a i d f o r Japan was over two hundred b i l l i o n Yen. In addition to that, a continuous flow of surplus weapons was expected from the United States to Japan.  This flow of weapons  would increase the stockpile of unused and obsolete war materials.  The Defence Force personnel was not i n proportion  to the flow of incoming surplus weapons from the United States. Two problems stemmed from t h i s phenomenon: discouragement o f domestic industry from m i l i t a r y production; and increase o f  92 unused and o b s o l e t e weapons which d i d not f i t the Japanese soldiers.  I n o r d e r t o s t r e n g t h e n Japan's defence c a p a c i t y ,  the Ikeda C a b i n e t had t o e s t a b l i s h a new replacement  long term p l a n f o r  and m o d e r n i s a t i o n o f l a n d and sea f o r c e s ' weapons  as w e l l as f o r domestic p r o d u c t i o n o f a i r p l a n e s .  T h i s was  one o f the most i m p o r t a n t excuses f o r the Second Defence P l a n which was  t o l a s t f o r f i v e y e a r s , s t a r t i n g i n 1962.  The o r i g i n a l d r a f t o f the Second Defence P l a n as w r i t t e n by the Defence A g e n c y . i n v o l v e d two s t r o n g American  interest.  on the a d o p t i o n o f now  difficulties.  The emphasis was  reflected  p l a c e d too h e a v i l y  t y p e s o f weapons which d i d not f i t the  p r e s e n t system o f armament o f the Defence F o r c e . c o n s i s t e d m a i n l y o f o l d American weapons. c u l t y was  One  The  system  The o t h e r d i f f i -  t h a t t h e Defence Agency demanded, t o have two  cent o f the GNP  spent f o r defence e x p e n d i t u r e .  per  This f i g u r e  had almost no r a t i o n a l e , but was made i n o r d e r t o i n c r e a s e the Defence Agency's p r e s t i g e .  These two d i f f i c u l t i e s  p o i n t e d out by the economic m i n i s t e r s a t the defence of the Cabinet members and the J o i n t C h i e f o f S t a f f ,  were conference  1 6  The  c o n f e r e n c e emphasised the i d e a o f i m p r o v i n g the e x i s t i n g weapons r a t h e r than p u r c h a s i n g the l a t e s t weapons i n o r d e r t h a t Japan's domestic war i n d u s t r y c o u l d be p r o t e c t e d . o f t h e members o f the conference s a i d , "Rather than the l a t e s t armament, we  producing  s h o u l d c o n s i d e r r e p l a c i n g o l d guns  and t a n k s w i t h new ones and b u i l d new 17 ships." '  One  ships i n place of obsolete  Consequently, the Defence Agency agreed t o r e - d r a f t  93 t h e p l a n t o I n c l u d e t h i s recommendation.  What s h o u l d be  noted here i s t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e defence conference  criticised  and demanded a g r e a t e r change i n t h e o r i g i n a l d r a f t , i t a c c e p t e d the b a s i c i d e a t h a t t h e Japanese defence  industry  s h o u l d be h e l p e d and p r o t e c t e d . The t h i r d c o n d i t i o n was a l o n g l a s t i n g a s p i r a t i o n o f the Defence Agency and t h e Force t o be r e c o g n i s e d by t h e p u b l i c as a l e g i t i m a t e e n t i t y i n s o c i e t y .  Since t h e Japanese  C o n s t i t u t i o n f i r m l y p r o h i b i t s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f any m i l i t a r y f o r c e i n Japan, t h e f o r c e had been c o n s i d e r e d from t h e moment of  i t s b i r t h , an i l l e g i t i m a t e body i n t h e Japanese s o c i e t y .  T h i s f r u s t r a t e d t h e men i n t h e Defence F o r c e .  Every newly  a p p o i n t e d M i n i s t e r o f t h e Defence Agency has e x p r e s s e d h i s hope t o upgrade t h e agency's s t a t u s t o a m i n i s t r y .  T h i s was  one way t o put t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n t o a c o n c r e t e form. The magic f i g u r e o f 'two p e r cent o f t h e GNF' was a n o t h e r way t o e x p r e s s t h i s t y p e o f hope.  Of c o u r s e , two p e r cent  of t h e GNP would a l s o be i n t e n d e d f o r support o f t h e defence industry.  By p r o t e c t i n g t h e defence i n d u s t r y , i t could. •  secure a f i r m p o s i t i o n i n a s o c i e t y which had been r a p i d l y industrialised.  F a i l i n g t o secure a good d e a l o f t h e budget  i n a r a p i d l j r growing s o c i e t y meant t h a t i t would reduce i t s e x i s t i n g v a l u e i n t h e s o c i e t y over t i m e . Defence Agency N i s h i m u r a ,  M i n i s t e r of the  said,  . . . l o n g term defence p l a n n i n g i s n e c e s s a r y t o p r o t e c t t h e defence i n d u s t r y , and I w i l l do my best to r e a l i s e i t (the Second Defence P l a n ) i n t h e coming D i e t s e s s i o n . The f i r s t t h i n g t o do i s t o  94 make the p l a n more r e a s o n a b l e . I t i s ^ not t o get the p l a n i n the 196l budget,1° Although  Nishimura  crucial  knew i t r e q u i r e d r e v i s i o n , as the  repre-  s e n t a t i v e o f the Agency, he had t o push the u n r e a s o n a b l e original plan.  Such was  the e x p r e s s i o n o f the  irritated  f e e l i n g o f the people i n the Defence Agency i n o r d e r t o impress the Cabinet and t o l e t the p u b l i c r e c o g n i s e i t s exi s t i n g valuey These t h r e e c o n d i t i o n s were f u s e d i n t o the r e v i s e d Second Defence F l a n w h i c h was t h e defence c o n f e r e n c e .  The  t r u e t o the recommendation by r e v i s e d p l a n a c c e p t e d 1.5  cent o f the Grip spent f o r n a t i o n a l d e f e n c e .  The  f i g u r e was  o n l y a " g o a l f o r the e f f o r t " and was  never p r a c t i c a l l y  s e r v e d by the Ikeda  policy,  APPLICATION OF THE  Cabinet's HEW  fiscal  per  ob-  DEFENCE POLICY  The t h i r d p o i n t i s the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the defence p o l i c y by the Ikeda C a b i n e t ,  According to t r a d i t i o n a l categorisa-  t i o n , t h i s s u b j e c t " w i l l be d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e f i e l d s : a i r , l a n d and n a v a l defence f o r c e s .  The  general o r i e n t a t i o n of  t h e u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e o f the Ikeda Cabinet the Defence Force was for  t o e s t a b l i s h Japan's own  i n b u i l d i n g up defence f o r c e s  national security.  From the American p o i n t o f v i e w  about Far .Eastern defence,  such p l a c e s as Hokkaido, Kyushu,  and Okinawa are e x t r e m e l y  important,  Hokkaido p r o v i d e s  an  optimum base t o a t t a c k and/or t o watch the R u s s i a n Far E a s t e r n m i l i t a r y bases,  Kyushu makes a s t a b l e h i n t e r l a n d base f o r  95 South Korea which has been under c o n s t a n t p r e s s u r e o f N o r t h Korean u n i f i c a t i o n moves.  The Okinawa I s l a n d s which a r e  l o c a t e d between Japan and Taiwan, g i v e an i m p o r t a n t p o s i t i o n t o a t t a c k t h e c e n t r a l p a r t o f China.  A l t h o u g h these  geographic  p o s i t i o n s a r e i m p o r t a n t f o r Japan's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , t h e y a r e not as i m p o r t a n t f o r Japan as t h e y a r e f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , because t h e y do not defend Honshu, t h e main i s l a n d o f Japan.  That i s , t h e American  s t r a t e g y f o r the Far Fast  and Japan's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n v o l v e some i n c o f t p a t i b l e o b j e c t i v e s , - ^ which t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t r e a l i s e d and t r i e d to solve. A i r Defence Force (Koku  Jieitai)  In 1 9 6 1 , t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t p r e s e n t e d and passed two defence laws w i t h which t h e C a b i n e t aimed t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e a i r defence o f t h e c e n t r a l p a r t o f Japan.  The l a w s e t up  the S i x t h A i r Squadron a t Komatsu i n I s h i k a w a P r e f e c t u r e and the Seventh A i r Squadron a t Matsushima i n M i y a g i P r e f e c t u r e . The  S i x t h Squadron was expected t o c o v e r t h e Japan Sea which  had been t h i n l y d e f e n d e d .  The Japan Sea i s t h e s h o r t e s t p a t h  between t h e N o r t h e r n p a r t o f China and t h e c e n t r a l p a r t o f Japan. i n Japan.  T h i s a r e a had been c o v e r e d by t h e American a i r f o r c e B e f o r e 1 9 5 1 , no Japanese a i r f o r c e was ever p l a c e d  i n t h e c e n t r a l p a r t o f Honshu - t h e p o l i t i c a l l y and economica l l y most i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f Japan.  Therefore, the S i x t h  Squadron was expected t o form t h e f r o n t l i n e t o defend Tokyo against  a t t a c k from t h e N o r t h e r n p a r t o f China.  96  At the same time i n Matsushima, the Seventh added t o the F o u r t h Squadron.  Squadron was  These two squadrons were ex-  p e c t e d t o form the second f r o n t behind the C h i t o s e base i n Hokkaido which f a c e s the R u s s i a n Far E a s t .  The Matsushima  base i s l o c a t e d on the P a c i f i c coast o f the Honshu I s l a n d and the p o s i t i o n i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y between Tokyo and C h i t o s e . T h i s p o s i t i o n i s i m p o r t a n t w i t h r e g a r d s t o the R u s s i a n a i r f o r c e ' s o p e r a t i o n i n the Far E a s t .  The R u s s i a n o p e r a t i o n ,  w h i c h i s c a l l e d "Tokyo E x p r e s s " by the Defence Force, t a k e s the r o u t e w h i c h by-passes Hokkaido i n the e a s t e r n sea heads t o Tokyo d i r e c t l y from t h e P a c i f i c Ocean.  and  T h i s opera-  t i o n t o a t t a c k Tokyo from the n o r t h e a s t e r n P a c i f i c can o n l y bo stopped by the a i r f o r c e i n Matsushima w i t h the a s s i s t a n c e O'f t h e f o r c e i n C h i t o s e . I n a d d i t i o n , the C a b i n e t d e c i d e d t o a i d the a i r defence f o r c e by l o c a t i n g the g r o u n d - t o - a i r m i s s i l e bases around the K e i h i n (Tokyo-Yokohama) i n d u s t r i a l Area and i n Hokkaido.  u  I t a l s o d e c i d e d t o e q u i p the a i r f o r c e w i t h a l l weather F-104-J" j e t l i g h t e r s , one o f the l a t e s t models o f f i g h t e r s i n the w o r l d a t t h a t t i m e . The  s a l i e n t a c t i o n f o r t h e Japanese a i r defence  by the Ikeda C a b i n e t was t o Japan's a i r f o r c e .  taken  t h a t i t gave an i m p o r t a n t guide  The p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t Japan's a i r de-  fence i s not f o r p r o t e c t i o n o f such p o i n t s as Hokkaido, or  line  the Okinawa I s l a n d s ,  Kyushu,  but f o r p r o t e c t i o n o f the area  which i s c r u c i a l t o the s u r v i v a l o f Japan as a w o r k i n g  unit  97 f o r the Japanese.  F i r s t of a l l ,  i n o r d e r t o p r o t e c t Japan,  the K e i h i n I n d u s t r i a l Area w h i c h i s the p o l i t i c a l and  economic  c e n t r e o f Japan, must be p r o t e c t e d . T h i s i s the g r e a t e s t f i n a l t a s k o f Japan's a i r f o r c e . h e a r t o f Japan i s an i m p o r t a n t the u l t i m a t e  Although,  and  p r o t e c t i n g the  and a p p r o p r i a t e t a s k , i t i s not  g o a l f o r the American f o r c e s i n Japan.  g o a l i s t o p r o t e o t the U n i t e d S t a t e s bases and/or t o  Their maintain  the t h r e a t t o the communist w o r l d by h o l d i n g m i l i t a r y bases surrounding  it.  These bases are a d e t e r r e n t f a c t o r i n t h a t  they  a v o i d t o t a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n o f the two b l o c s , and i n t h i s  regard  t h e y make an i m p o r t a n t  Ikeda  Cabinet's  element o f Japan's d e f e n c e .  a c t i o n vras a s t r i k i n g attempt a t the  The  transition  from a p u r e l y American dominated s t r a t e g y t o a Japanese fence by the  de-  Japanese.  Land Defence Force (Riku.jo J i e i t a i ) In the Second Defence P l a n , the Defence Agency proposed an i d e a t o r e - o r g a n i s e the l a n d f o r c e d i v i s i o n s and i t s number from 9 t o 13 d i v i s i o n s . men  i n each d i v i s i o n was  as b e f o r e .  The  However, the number o f  not m a i n t a i n e d  a t the same l e v e l  p l a n i n c r e a s e d the number o f d i v i s i o n s  not the t o t a l p e r s o n n e l  the number o f men  but  i n the l a n d f o r c e i n p r o p o r t i o n t o  the i n c r e a s e o f d i v i s i o n s .  p l a n had two  increase  Therefore,  i n each d i v i s i o n .  i t v i r t u a l l y decreased  This re-organisation  g o a l s : t o g i v e r e g i o n a l autonomy t o each d i v i -  s i o n ; and t o p r e s e r v e  the p o t e n t i a l c a p a c i t y t o expand the  l a n d f o r c e t o the l e v e l w h i c h , i n case o f need, c o u l d be  98  comparable to the s i z e o f the t h r e a t e n i n g c o u n t r y ' s  land  force. Japan c o n s i s t s o f f o u r e a s i l y be s e p a r a t e d  ' b i g ' I s l a n d s which can  from one  another m i l i t a r i l y .  Kyushu are connected w i t h an under-sea t u n n e l .  very  Honshu and Hokkaido  Honshu w i l l a l s o be connected w i t h an under-sea t u n n e l soon.  and  very  However, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n through one under-sea t u n n e l  i s v e r y l i m i t e d i n c a p a c i t y and c o n s e q u e n t l y the f o u r i s l a n d s can be I s o l a t e d w i t h l i t t l e m i l i t a r y e f f o r t .  Moreover, the  f o u r i s l a n d s o f Japan are almost e n t i r e l y covered by mountains, and o n l y f o u r t e e n t o s i x t e e n per cent o f the whole area i s arable.  The  a r a b l e p l a i n s w h i c h a r e s c a t t e r e d a l l over Japan,  p e r m i t each s m a l l p l a i n to be i s o l a t e d from the next mountains.  Considering  by  these geographic c o n d i t i o n s , each  d i v i s i o n o f the Japanese l a n d f o r c e must have autonomy so that i t maintains  i t s m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y i n case i t i s i s o -  l a t e d from o t h e r n e i g h b o u r i n g divisions  units.  In Japan, v e r y  can expect t o secure a c o n s t a n t  of m a t e r i a l supply i n a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n .  few  and l a r g e amount Consequently, the  r e g i o n a l autonomy c f each d i v i s i o n i s a m a t t e r o f l i f e  and  death f o r each d i v i s i o n and the a r e a i t covers.. The  o t h e r o b j e c t i v e o f r e - o r g a n i s i n g the l a n d f o r c e  was  t o enhance the l a n d f o r c e ' s p o t e n t i a l c a p a c i t y t o expand i t s s i z e t o a degree t h a t c o u l d cope w i t h the g i g a n t i c l a n d f o r c e o f China or R u s s i a .  Each d i v i s i o n had  because the l a n d f o r c e was  been under-manned  not v e r y p o p u l a r among the  Japanese  99  y o u t h , and t h e e x p a n s i o n o f the number o f d i v i s i o n s under t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t exaggerated the; shortage o f each number o f p e r s o n n e l .  division's  The c o n s t a n t s h o r t a g e o f l a n d f o r c e  p e r s o n n e l became a d i s t i n c t i v e phenomenon e s p e c i a l l y  after  t h e Ikeda p e r i o d , because t h e r a p i d e x p a n s i o n o f t h e Japanese economy a t t r a c t e d the Japanese s e r v i c e t o t h e economic f i e l d .  youth away from t h e m i l i t a r y In. a s i t u a t i o n l i k e t h i s , t h e  best t h i n g t h e Force c o u l d do was t o e s t a b l i s h an o r g a n i s a t i o n t o t r a i n mon as q u i c k as p o s s i b l e when needed.  This  g o a l was r e a l i s e d by t h e r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n o f t h e l a n d f o r c e . By i n c r e a s i n g i t s p o t e n t i a l f o r f u t u r e e x p a n s i o n , t h e Force a c q u i r e d a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n than i t had e v e r had b e f o r e i n r e l a t i o n t o i t s h y p o t h e t i c a l enemy: the P e o p l e ' s L i b e r a t i o n Army o f China. ~^~ c  Sea Defence Force (Kai.jo J i e i t a i ) Japan's n a v a l f o r c e s have l o n g l i m i t e d t h e i r r o l e t o Japan's  c o a s t a l defence.  Japan's n a v a l f o r c e was o r i g i n a l l y  p l a n n e d t o defend Japan's l o n g c o a s t l i n e w h i l e t h e American navy was a i d i n g i t s f o r c e s i n Korea d u r i n g t h e Korean War. A f t e r the f a l l o f the I m p e r i a l Navy, Japan a c q u i r e d i t s f i r s t o f f s h o r e f l e e t d u r i n g t h e Ikeda p e r i o d .  I n 1962, t h e Sea 22  Defence Force formed i t s F i r s t Submarine F l e e t , i t showed goal  a  w i t h which  determination to concentrate i t s operational  o f a t t a c k i n g submarines.  Therefore, the e x i s t i n g  Japanese n a v a l f o r c e i s s t r o n g and w e l l equipped f o r a t t a c k i n g submarines, but i t can never be c o n s i d e r e d as a w e l l b a l a n c e d  100 force.  Modern equipment f o r the n a v a l f o r c e i s so  expensive  t h a t i s i s e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t f o r any c o u n t r y except U n i t e d S t a t e s and. the S o v i e t Union t o b u i l d up and a w e l l balanced naval f o r c e .  the  maintain  Hence, Japan's n a v a l defence i s  h e a v i l y dependent on the American Seventh F l e e t i n the  Far  E a s t , and t h e r e f o r e , the n a v a l f o r c e i s the l e a s t independent o f a l l the t h r e e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s o f Japan i n s t r u c t u r e and in strategy. The  Japanese navy's emphasis on a n t i - s u b m a r i n e  operations  has two g o a l s : t o cope w i t h the R u s s i a n Far E a s t e r n F l e e t w h i c h c o n s i s t s mainl]^ o f submarines; and t o defend  Japan's  trans-Oceanic t r a n s p o r t a t i o n route f o r trade a c t i v i t i e s . R u s s i a n n a v a l bases i n the Far E a s t , such as Khabarovsk and V l a d i v o s t o k , are l o c a t e d between S a g h a l i e n and Korea.  The  North  R u s s i a n f l e e t t h a t bases i n t h i s a r e a can  easily  be t r a p p e d i n the Japan Sea when the t h r e e s t r a i t s are c l o s e d . These are the Soya S t r a i t the Tsugaru S t r a i t Tsushima S t r a i t  (between S a g h a l i e n and  Hokkaido),  (between Hokkaido and Honshu), and  ( between Korea and Kyushu)  the  Mien t h e s e  t h r e e s t r a i t s are e f f e c t i v e l y b l o c k e d , Japan's  anti-submarine  f o r c e might be e f f e c t i v e i n d e s t r o y i n g the R u s s i a n Far E a s t e r n F l e e t , o r at l e a s t l i m i t i n g , t o a c e r t a i n degree, the  Russian  f l e e t ' s o p e r a t i o n i n the P a c i f i c Ocean. The  second reason f o r Japan h a v i n g an  anti-submarine  f o r c e i s t h a t the Japanese navy has t o p r o t e c t J a p a n s l o n g 1  t r a n s - O c e a n i c t r a d e r o u t e s , e s p e c i a l l y , the t r a d e r o u t e t h a t  100  force.  Modern equipment f o r the n a v a l f o r c e i s so  expensive  t h a t i s i s e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t f o r any c o u n t r y except U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union t o b u i l d up a w e l l balanced naval f o r c e .  and  the  maintain  Hence, Japan's n a v a l defence i s  h e a v i l y dependent on the American Seventh F l e e t i n the  Far  E a s t , and t h e r e f o r e , the n a v a l f o r c e i s the l e a s t independent o f a l l the t h r e e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s o f Japan i n s t r u c t u r e and in strategy. The  Japanese navy's emphasis on a n t i - s u b m a r i n e  operations  has two g o a l s ; t o cope w i t h the R u s s i a n Far E a s t e r n F l e e t w h i c h c o n s i s t s m a i n l y o f submarines; and t o defend  Japan's  trans-Oceanic t r a n s p o r t a t i o n route f o r trade a c t i v i t i e s . R u s s i a n n a v a l bases i n the Far E a s t , such as Khabarovsk and V l a d i v o s t o k , are l o c a t e d between S a g h a l i e n and Korea.  North  T h e R u s s i a n f l e e t t h a t bases i n t h i s a r e a can  easily  be t r a p p e d i n the Japan Sea when the t h r e e s t r a i t s are c l o s e d . Those a r e the Soya S t r a i t the Tsugaru S t r a i t Tsushima S t r a i t  (between S a g h a l i e n and  Hokkaido),  (between Hokkaido and Honshu), and  ( between Korea and Kyushu)  the  When t h e s e  t h r e e s t r a i t s are e f f e c t i v e l y b l o c k e d , Japan's  anti-submarine  f o r c e might be e f f e c t i v e i n d e s t r o y i n g the R u s s i a n Far E a s t e r n F l e e t , o r a t l e a s t l i m i t i n g , t o a c e r t a i n degree, the  Russian  f l e e t ' s o p e r a t i o n i n the P a c i f i c Ocean. The  second reason f o r Japan h a v i n g an  anti-submarine  f o r c e i s t h a t the Japanese navy has t o p r o t e c t Japan's l o n g t r a n s - O c e a n i c t r a d e r o u t e s , e s p e c i a l l y , the t r a d e r o u t e t h a t  101  connects  Japan and  Southeast  A s i a and the west o f I n d i a .  Such a r o u t e goes i n t o the e a s t e r n sea a l o n g the l o n g Chinese coast line..  I f China r e g a i n s Taiwan, i t can cut o f f Japan's  trade route w i t h i t s ficulty.  submarine o p e r a t i o n s w i t h o u t  Under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  dif-  i t i s not a meaningless  e f f o r t f o r Japan t o emphasise an a n t i - s u b m a r i n e  force rather  than a w e l l balanced n a v a l f o r c e . However, i t i s obvious t h a t Japan's n a v a l defence f o r c e i s dependent upon the Seventh F l e e t o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s , and i s not an independent n a v a l f o r c e i n s t r u c t u r e .  Even t h e  Japan Communist P a r t y c o n s i d e r s t h a t Japan's n a v a l f o r c e "has no c a p a c i t y o f i t s own t o wage a war.'"^ anti-submarine  Strategically,  o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t the R u s s i a n f l e e t i n the  Far e a s t i s more advantageous f o r .the U n i t e d S t a t e s than f o r Japan.  For, the o p e r a t i o n aim t o e n c l o s e the f l e e t i n the  Japan Sea, which i s not as groat a h e l p f o r Japan's defence as i t i s an advantage f o r American n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s i n the ' P a c i f i c Ocean.  Thus,, s t r u c t u r a l l y and s t r a t e g i c a l l y ,  Japan's  n a v a l f o r c e has a c q u i r e d the l e a s t autonomous c h a r a c t e r o f o f t h e t h r e e branches o f Japanese m i l i t a r y f o r c e s d u r i n g the Ikeda p e r i o d .  102 FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV  ^ A s a h i Shinbun, February 2, 1961. 2  lbid,  October 11, 1961.  3CP. O h i r a M a s a y o s h i , Shumpu Shuu, (Tokyo: Kenkyujo Shppankai, 1966), pp. 174-5.  Kashima  ^-In 1968, M i n i s t e r o f A g r i c u l t u r e K u r a i s h i was f o r c e d t o r e s i g n h i s p o s i t i o n by the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s which were supp o r t e d by t h e mass media, when he c a r e l e s s l y advocated Japan's n e c e s s i t y o f h a v i n g s t r o n g e r m i l i t a r y f o r c e and n u c l e a r weapons. T h i s i n c i d e n t shows t h e p o l i t i c a l atmosphere i n t h e Japanese D i e t . For r e f e r e n c e , A s a h i Shinbun, F e b r u a r y 7-24, i960, and K i r o k u X o k k a i Anpo Roriso, l o m i u r i Shinbun S e i j i b u , ed., (Tokyo: Y o m i u r i Shinbunsha, 1968), pp. 50-68. r~  ^ A s a h i Shinbun, F e b r u a r y 2,  1961.  ^ I b i d . F e b r u a r y 12, 1963. 7 l b i d , March 20, 1962. %bid,  J u l y 19, 1962.  ^ I b i d , March 5, I961. 1 0  lbid,  October 21, I960.  -^Bungei Shun.ju, J u l y 1962, p. 76. 1 2  C h u o Koron, J u l y 1962, p. 197.  ^^j^iconomisuto, V o l . 42, No. 5, 1964, p. 16. ^Kokubo, August 1963, p. 57. ^ S h i m a Y o s h i h i k o , G u n j i h i , (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966), p. 170. 1  1  ^ A s a h i 5liinbun, May 3, 1961. 17 l o c . c i t 1^l b i d , January 6, 1961. -^utsunomiya Tokuma, Heiwa Kyozon t o Ninon Gaiko, (Tokyo: Kobundo, I 9 6 0 ) , pp. 14-18. I J  103 A s a h i Shinbun, J u l y 5, 1961. 21Information O f f i c e o f t h e Defence Force ( J i e i t a i Senshi S h i t s u ) has p u b l i s h e d i t s s t u d i e s o f war s t r a t e g y , the s u b j e c t s of which assume China t o be the p o t e n t i a l enemy. Some o f t h e t i t l e s a r e , ''Study o f Chinese P s y c h o l o g i c a l Warfare," "Study of t h e O p e r a t i o n a t H s i a n K u e i , " "Study o f the O p e r a t i o n a t T s i - t s i - h a r , " "Study o f t h e O p e r a t i o n a t Shih-chia-chuang," "Study o f t h e O p e r a t i o n a t Pomonhan," and e c t . Other than t h a t , t h e F o r c e ' s p u b l i c a t i o n s a r e v e r y r i c h i n i n f o r m a t i o n on C h i n a . ^ 2 A s a h i Sh i n b u n , June 3, 1962. ~ 3 A s a h i Shinbunsha, ed,, F i h o n no J i e i r y o k u , (Tokyo: A s a h i Shinbunsha, 1967), p. l o o . 2/ 'The Japan Communist P a r t y , ed., S e i . j i Senden S h i r y o , (Tokyo: The Japan Communist P a r t y P u b l i c d e l a t i o n s and Educ a t i o n S e c t i o n , 1961), p. 3$. !  104  CHAPTER  V  CONCLUSIONS  To summarise t h e p r e c e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n , one g e n e r a l i s a t i o n w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s  Chapter.  The Ikeda  C a b i n e t ' s s e c u r i t y p o l i c y can be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as one o f a p r i n c i p l e o f balance.  T h i s p r i n c i p l e o f balance i n t h e Ikeda  C a b i n e t ' s b e h a v i o r w i l l be viewed from t h r e e d i f f e r e n t p e r spectives. approaches  These a r e : t h e s y s t e m i c impact as s t u d i e d i n t h e t o the communist b l o c and t h e Western b l o c ; t h e  i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l impact as  observed i n i t s r e c e p t i v e -  ness t o the demands o f both t h e o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s and t h e government p a r t y ; and t h e s e c u r i t y p o l i c y as observed i n t h e enlargement nomic  o f the Defence Force and t h e emphasis on eco-  development. B e f o r e d e t a i l i n g these t h r e e a s p e c t s , t h e i d i o s y n c r a t i c  f a c t o r o f the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s p o l i c y making p r o c e s s , o r i n o t h e r words, Prime M i n i s t e r Ikeda's p e r s o n a l i t y and past e x p e r i e n c e has t o be b r i e f l y mentioned.  Ikeda was an a b l e  b u r e a u c r a t o f t h e M i n i s t r y o f Finance (Okura K a n r y o ) .  The  f i n a n c e b u r e a u c r a t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d t o be t h e e l i t e o f t h e e l i t e s i n Japanese  society.  Ikeda j o i n e d t h e L i b e r a l P a r t y i n 1947  and became the M i n i s t e r o f Finance i n t h e Y o s h i d a Cabinet i n 1949,  a f t e r a l o n g c a r e e r as a s u c c e s s f u l c a r e e r o f f i c i a l  in that ministry. Students o f Japanese  p o l i t i c s and economics a t t r i b u t e  the p r e s e n t economic p r o s p e r i t y o f Japan t o the Yoshida  105  C a b i n e t ' s e l a b o r a t e economic p o l i c i e s i n the l a t e 1940's and e a r l y 1950's.  However, Y o s h i d a h i m s e l f was an e x - d i p l o m a t  1  and knew n o t h i n g about economics.  Most o f the economic  poli-  c i e s o f t h e Y o s h i d a C a b i n e t vrere f o r m u l a t e d by the f i n a n c e m i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s under Finance M i n i s t e r Ikeda's  leadership.  Ikeda was noted f o r h i s r i g i d economic p o l i c i e s , ^ and  he  o f t e n d i d not h e s i t a t e t o s a c r i f i c e s m a l l segments o f s o c i e t y i n o r d e r t o a t t a i n a b a l a n c e d development o f the n a t i o n a l economy. to  However, the o t h e r s i d e o f Ikeda's  Japanese  politics  has t o be remembered.  contribution The  contribution  can be seen i n Japan's o r i g i n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y - t h e S e c u r i t y T r e a t y o f o f 1951  between Japan and the U n i t e d S t a t e s .  was worked out i n 1950  It  by the Ikeda m i s s i o n t o the U n i t e d  3  States  under the Y o s h i d a C a b i n e t .  the t r e a t y a c c o m p l i s h e d i n 1953 f e r e n c e , c o n f i r m e d Japan's was  The major amendment o f  by the Ikeda-Robertson con-  security policy.  Japan's  t o be s u p p o r t e d by American m i l i t a r y a i d and  security  protection.  Thus, i n h i s v i e w and p o l i c y , Ikeda always m a i n t a i n e d the b a l a n c e between economic p o l i c y and s e c u r i t y p o l i c y as the M i n i s t e r o f .Finance i n the Yoshida C a b i n e t . The f i r s t  i n s t a n c e o f Ikeda's b a l a n c e d p o l i t i c s  can be  found i n h i s approach t o the communist b l o c and the Western bloc.  The  c l a r e d was especially first  first  e x t e r n a l p o l i c y t h a t the Ikeda C a b i n e t de-  i t s w i l l i n g n e s s t o approach the communist b l o c , t h e ' C h i n e s e People's R e p u b l i c .  T h i s was  Ikeda's  p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n as t h e Prime M i n i s t e r o f Japan i n J u l y ,  106 I960.  The  Ikeda C a b i n e t q u i c k l y resumed Sino-Japanese  r e l a t i o n s and g r a d u a l l y e n l a r g e d i t throughout i t s tenure.  In c o n t r a s t t o t h i s p o l i c y  }  trade  f o u r years  the Cabinet  improved  t o a g r e a t e x t e n t the Japanese-American r e l a t i o n s as can observed  i n the Kennedy-Ikeda t a l k s o f 1961,  of  be  o r the e l a b o r a t e  manoeuvre o f P r o f . R e i s c h a u e r , Ambassador o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s , i n m a n i p u l a t i n g Japanese p u b l i c o p i n i o n .  The  cabinet  f r i e n d l y a t t i t u d e towards the U n i t e d S t a t e s was welcomed by the Americans and.was n e v e r opposed by many Japanese.  The  C a b i n e t ' s approach t o the communist b l o c g r e a t l y improved Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the communist b l o c , but a t t h e same time the Cabinet always c o u n t e r - b a l a n c e d the improvement and enrichment bloc.  i t s approach w i t h  o f i t s t i e s w i t h the Western  In t h i s r e g a r d , Ikeda's two t r i p s t o Europe and  meetings w i t h the Kennedy b r o t h e r s s h o u l d be noted.  two  Conse-  q u e n t l y , when the Cabinet f a c e d a d r a s t i c change i n the power balance i n the Far E a s t , such as the weakening o f Taiwan as observed  i n the French r e c o g n i t i o n o f Communist C h i n a , i t  d i d not h e s i t a t e t o weaken i t s r e l a t i o n s with, the communist bloc.  Thus, Japan m a i n t a i n e d a power balance between the  Western and. the communist b l o c s i n the Far E a s t . Secondly, the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s p o l i t i c s o f balance be observed  i n i t s management o f the N a t i o n a l D i e t .  can  Japanese  p o l i t i c s had never been and has never been so p e a c e f u l and harmonious as i t was  a t the time o f the Ikeda C a b i n e t .  r e l a t i v e p e a c e f u l n e s s can be a t t r i b u t e d t o the Ikeda  This  Cabinet'  107 r e c e p t i v e a t t i t u d e towards the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s ' demands. C o n c e r n i n g t h i s t o p i c , two examples w i l l be c i t e d . are the Japanese-Korean  negotiations  and the  These  anti-nuclear  armament p o l i c y . The n o r m a l i s a t i o n diplomatic the LDP.  and improvement o f the  r e l a t i o n s was  Japanese-Korean  s u p p o r t e d by the government p a r t y ,  As p r e v i o u s l y mentioned,  the Japanese-Korean  nego-  t i a t i o n s r e c e i v e d almost unanimous support o f the LDP, was  but  s t r o n g l y opposed by the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , namely the  JCP and the JSP.  The i n f o r m e d p u b l i c o p i n i o n m a i n t a i n e d a  n e u t r a l p o s i t i o n over t h i s i s s u e .  The Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s a c t i o n  was, t o s o l v e disagreements between the two c o u n t r i e s , t o d r a f t a t r e a t y and t o s t a r t n o r m a l i s i n g . d i p l o m a t i c  relations  on the de' f a c t o l e v e l i n o r d e r t o s a t i s f y the demands o f the government p a r t y .  However, i n o r d e r not t o provoke  the  o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s over t h i s i s s u e , the Cabinet d i d not the t r e a t y which was ready t o be s i g n e d 1964.  sign  a t the b e g i n n i n g o f  While s a t i s f y i n g the two opposing groups t o a c e r t a i n  degree, the Cabinet s t r e n g t h e n e d i t s p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s e f f o r t s i n o r d e r t o c r e a t e a more f a v o u r a b l e  atmosphere f o r s i g n i n g  the t r e a t y . Another example o f the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s p o l i c y o f balance i n p a r t y p o l i t i c s was  i t s a n t i - n u c l e a r armament p o l i c y .  The  t h r e e a n t i - n u c l e a r p r i n c i p l e s (Hot t o produce, Not t o p o s s e s s , Not t o d e p l o y n u c l e a r weapons) were s t r i c t l y  observed  during  the Ikeda p e r i o d and the C a b i n e t s t a t e d i t s a n t i - n u c l e a r  108  armament p o l i c y r e p e a t e d l y .  An a n t i - n u c l e a r p o l i c y was  s t r o n g l y a d v o c a t e d by the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s and was c o n d i t i o n a l l y supported  by the government p a r t y .  Public opinion  d i d not support n u c l e a r i s a t i o n o f the Defence Force. f i f t y p e r cent o f the Japanese supported nuclear principles.  the t h r e e  I f the c o n d i t i o n a l support  Over  anti-  i s included,  over e i g h t y p e r cent o f the Japanese supported the p r i n c i p l e s . Under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  t h e Ikeda C a b i n e t had no c h o i c e but  t o adopt t h e p o l i c y a l t h o u g h the p r i n c i p l e would a p p a r e n t l y l i m i t and weaken the combat c a p a c i t y o f t h e Defence F o r c e .  Tabic  V  ( Q e e s t i o n : Do you t h i n k the t h r e e a n t i n u c l e a r p r i n c i p l e s  Men Should be  maintainec1 f o r good  Could be changed t o c i r c um stances The p r i n c i p l e s a r e Do not know  eaningless  Women  Total  46 %  49 %  31  24  27  12  10  11  5  20  13  52  %  On t h e o t h e r hand, the government p a r t y s t r o n g l y demanded the s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f the Defence Force and the C a b i n e t ' s response t o t h i s demand was i t s p o l i c y o f i n c r e a s i n g the defence f o r c e s as was d i s c u s s e d i n the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r . t h i s p o l i c y , t h e o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s o b j e c t e d but p u b l i c o p i n i o n seemed t o have supported the C a b i n e t .  To  109 Table  VI  ( q u e s t i o n : What do you t h i n k i s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p r o v i s i o n f o r Japan's n a t i o n a l defence?) (from M a i n i s h i Shinbun, J u l y 1", 1968)  The Defence Force and the JapaneseAmerican Mutual S e c u r i t y T r e a t y N e u t r a l i t y w i t h the s t r e n g t h e n e d Defence Force  Men  Women  Total  19  21 %  43  34  38  26  30  28  A l l i a n c e w i t h t h e communist b l o c  2  2  2  Do no know  5  15  11  Unarmed n e u t r a l i t y -  24  fo  N e a r l y s i x t y per cent o f t h e Japanese approved Defence Force f o r Japan's defence.  o f the  A s i t u a t i o n such as t h i s  e n a b l e d the Ikeda Cabinet t o adopt the Second defence p l a n which was t o s t r e n g t h e n the f i g h t i n g c a p a c i t y o f the F o r c e . By t h i s p o l i c y the C a b i n e t c o u n t e r - b a l a n c e d the r e s t r i c t i o n and the weakening e f f e c t o f the a n t i - n u c l e a r armament p o l i c y . Through m a n i p u l a t i o n o f these two p o l i c i e s , the C a b i n e t a t t a i n e d a b a l a n c e d defence t h a t s a t i s f i e d both the o p p o s i t i o n and t h e government  parties.  The f i n a l d i s c u s s i o n i s the C a b i n e t ' s b a l a n c i n g o f def e n c e and economic p o l i c i e s .  The  Ikeda C a b i n e t enacted the  Second Defence P l a n which brought about a d i s t i n c t i v e change i n Japan's defence c a p a c i t y .  The net amount o f t h e  defence  budget i n c r e a s e d 72 per cent o v e r f o u r f i s c a l y e a r s o f the Ikeda C a b i n e t .  However, the C a b i n e t s e t up a c e i l i n g as t o  110  what p r o p o r t i o n the defence I t was  budget c o u l d be over the  d e c i d e d t h a t the f i g u r e s h o u l d not exceed 1 , 5  cent o f the GNP  and t h i s r u l e was  GNP, per  s t r i c t l y observed.  There-  f o r e , under the Ikeda C a b i n e t , the growth o f n a t i o n a l economy always s u r p a s s e d the growth o f the defence.budget.  Of  t h i s does not l e a d t o a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the Cabinet  neglected  n a t i o n a l defence.  force  was  On the c o n t r a r y , Japan's defence  course,  e n l a r g e d t o such an e x t e n t as t o make Japan the second  s t r o n g e s t m i l i t a r y power i n the Far E a s t . V defence  e x p e n d i t u r e was  But the growth o f  kept under the l e v e l which harmonised  w i t h the growth o f Japan's t o t a l economy. The above t h r e e p o i n t s h o p e f u l l y support the theme o f t h i s chapter,, the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s p r i n c i p l e o f balance f o r national security.  Indeed, t h e r e can be c o u n t e r arguments  f o r the t h r e e d i s c u s s i o n s c i t e d above.  The  d i s c u s s i o n would  v a r y a c c o r d i n g t o the l e v e l o f a b s t r a c t i o n . I n the w o r l d a t l a s , I t a l y l o o k s l i k e a boot, but no t r a v e l e r f e e l s t h a t the c o u n t r y l o o k s l i k e a boot when he i s a c t u a l l y i n I t a l y . No ons can judge which p e r c e p t i o n o f the two  i s more v a l i d .  Perhaps the o n l y t h i n g t o be s a i d i s t h a t both p e r c e p t i o n s are v a l i d but are d i f f e r e n t i n t h e i r l e v e l o f a b s t r a c t i o n . As w e l l , a r e s e a r c h e r who  examines the Ikeda C a b i n e t ' s  secu-  r i t y p o l i c y i n f a r more d e t a i l would v e r y l i k e l y a r r i v e a t a d i f f e r e n t type o f g e n e r a l i s a t i o n .  N e i t h e r the one  presented  here n o r the one a r e s e a r c h e r , might a t t a i n alone i s the o n l y v a l i d one.  Rather, both a r e v a l i d w i t h a d i f f e r e n t l e v e l  of  Ill  abstraction.  Therefore.  this chapter is simply  the generalisation presented  one possible  in  generalisation derived  from the survey which was cited in the previous chapters, and i t is valid,  within  the realm of abstraction on which  the whole discussion of this thesis has taken place.  112  FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER  V  Kosaka Masataka, "Saisho Y o s h i d a S h i g e r u Ron," Chuo Koron, February, 1964, pp. 70-111. Ikeda's nickname was "The M i n i s t e r o f Wheat," because he was r e p o r t e d t o have s a i d t h a t t h e poor people s h o u l d e a t wheat i n s t e a d o f r i c e . H i s statement was t a k e n as a l a c k o f sympathy t o t h e poor p e o p l e . 3Miyazawa K i i c h i , Tokyo Washington no M i t s u d a n , (Tokyo: J i t s u g y o no Nihori-sha, 1956), p. 46. ^Number o f men i n t h e t h r e e f o r c e s i s a s f o l l o w s , Country  Land  Sea  Air  171,500 •  35,000  41,000  Korea  540,000  17,000  25,000  N o r t h Korea  340,000  8,000  20,000  Taiwan  400,000  62,000  82,000  2,250,000  140,000  100,000  25,000  5,000  7,000  Japan South  China the  Philippines  '.the f i g u r e s above are based on B o e i Nenkan: 1967, (Tokyo: B o e i Nenkan K a n k o - k a i , 1967), pp. 242, 254, 400-416. Taiwan's f i g u r e s a r e l a r g e r than Japan's, but Taiwan's f i g u r e s o f sea f o r c e and a i r f o r c e equipment are s m a l l e r t h a n Japan's f i g u r e s .  113  BIBLIOGRAPHY  PERIODICALS AND  JOURNALS  Akahata. Asahi Jaiiaru. Asahi  Ncnkan.  A s a h i Shinbun. A s i a n Survey. Bo.ei Nenkan. Bung e i Shun ,j u. 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