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Japan's security policy during the Ikeda Cabinet (1960-1964) Takemoto, Toru 1969-06-29

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JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY DURING THE IKEDA CABINET (1960-1964) by TORU TAKEMOTO B»A«, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n U n i v e r s i t y , Tokyo, 1967 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accepted t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i ^ d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June, 1969 In presenting th is thesis in p a r t i a l f u l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make i t f r e e l y ava i l ab le for reference and Study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for s cho l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th is thesis for f i n anc i a l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wr i t ten permission. Department The Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date ABSTRACT This t h e s i s i s the. r e s u l t of research on the nature of Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y as pursued by the Ikeda Cabinet during I960 and 1964. The main d i s c u s s i o n c o n s i s t s of three p a r t s : i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l impacts on s e c u r i t y p o l i c y making; e x t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l impacts on s e c u r i t y p o l i c y of Japan; and Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y proper. Three p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s are s t u d i e d as s i g n i f i c a n t determinants of i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l impacts on the d e c i s i o n making s t r u c t u r e of the Japanese p o l i t i c a l system. The r a t i o n a l e i s that these p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s provide chan ne l s t h a t connect the d e c i s i o n making core and the outer area of the Japanese p o l i t i c a l system. Therefore, the study of these p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i s a rewarding attempt at observing p o l i t i c a l inputs that the d e c i s i o n making core of the Japanese p o l i t i c a l system r e c e i v e s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l exchange of the Japanese p o l i t i c a l system i s i n v e s t i g a t e d i n the second part of the d i s c u s s i o n . This subject i s viewed both as inputs and outputs of the Japanese p o l i t i c a l system i n r e l a t i o n to i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment. The nature of the e x t e r n a l impacts such as m i l i t a r y , economic, geographic, i d e o l o g i c a l or c u l t u r a l impacts i s not s p e c i f i e d i n the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , but i s viewed as a G e s t a l t , or t o t a l being which comprises a l l the elements s t a t e d above. The t h i r d s e c t i o n deals w i t h what i s u s u a l l y describe as defence p o l i c y . A more m i l i t a r y aspect of Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y i s studi e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n . In c o n c l u s i o n , a broad g e n e r a l i s a t i o n i s derived from the survey c i t e d i n the main d i s c u s s i o n . The con c l u s i o n i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d as the p r i n c i p l e of balance i n the Ikeda Cabinet's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . Throughout the f o l l o w i n g discussion,'Japanese names are w r i t t e n i n the Japanese order, w i t h f a m i l y name f i r s t and given name l a s t . TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 6 CHAPTER I I POLITICAL PARTIES 13 THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTI 13 THE JAPAN•SOCIALIST PARTY 21 THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTI 35 CHAPTER I I I DIPLOMATIC ARRANGEMENT 47 THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS 47 THE JAPANESE-KOREAN RELATIONS 54 THE COMMUNIST BLOC RELATIONS 61 CHAPTER IV DOMESTIC PROVISIONS 77 PUBLIC RELATIONS OF THE IKEDA CABINET 77 REINFORCEMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 8l+ FISCAL POLICI FOR DEFENCE #4 THE SECOND DEFENCE PLAN 39 APPLICATION OF DEFENCE POLICI 94 CHAPTER V CONCLUSIONS 104 BIBLIOGRAPHI 113 LIST OF TABLES TABLE TABLE TABLE TABLE TABLE TABLE I I I I I I IV V VI Page 79 79 85 87 108 109 6 INTRODUCTION S e c u r i t y p o l i c y can be defined i n various ways, depend ing on what a student of p o l i t i c s looks at and emphasises. In a narrow sense i t i s a p o l i c y that guarantees b i o l o g i c a l or p h y s i c a l s u r v i v a l of a country i n the face of v i o l e n t a t t a c k from outside i t s border l i n e s . In a broader sense i t i s a set of p o l i c i e s t h a t warrants not only p h y s i c a l , ' but p o l i t i c a l , economic, and c u l t u r a l s u r v i v a l o f a country over time.-'- Defence Secretary McNamara o f the United States s a i d , We s t i l l tend t o conceive of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y almost s o l e l y as a state of armed readiness: a vast awesome a r s e n a l of weaponry. We s t i l l tend to assume that i t i s p r i m a r i l y t h i s purely m i l i  t a r y i n g r e d i e n t that creates safety.. We are s t i l l haunted by t h i s concept of m i l i t a r y hardware.^ In t h i s t h e s i s , s e c u r i t y p o l i c y i s defined as a p o l i c y that i s to prevent armed a t t a c k s and/or to reduce p o s s i b i l i t i e s of armed a t t a c k s from outside the border of a country. The major p o l i c i e s o f Japan's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and the major f a c t o r s that c o n t r i b u t e d i n for m u l a t i n g these p o l i c i e s during the per i o d of the Ikeda Cabinet (1960-64) w i l l be explored i n t h i s t h e s i s . As major Japanese s e c u r i t y p o l i c i e s , two subjects w i l l be discussed. One i s , how the Japanese Government manipulated i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s to maxi mise i t s f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s and minimise the p o t e n t i a l sources of t h r e a t and danger. This p o l i c y ivas to soften the h o s t i l e d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s and to strengthen the e x i s t i n g f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . The other p o l i c y i s the a c t u a l 7 enforcement of p h y s i c a l defence power which i s observed i n the Second Defence Plan ( 1 9 6 1 - 6 6 ) . ^ Generally speaking, there i s no o b j e c t i o n to l a b e l l i n g an armament p o l i c y as a s e c u r i t y p o l i c y , since i n i t s narrow est meaning a s e c u r i t y p o l i c y i s a defence p o l i c y , or a governmental p r o v i s i o n f o r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . An o b j e c t i o n may stem from c o n s t i t u t i n g governmental manipulation of i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s as a s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . For instance, K. W. Deutsch says, F i r s t , the impact of e x t e r n a l events upon the • i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of a country could be s a i d to de c l i n e with the s t a b i l i t y and autonomy of the i n t e r n a l d e c i s i o n making system.4 and he f u r t h e r adds, A very l a r g e country, very prosperous and wit h very strong holds upon i t s population, may be able to withstand even major impacts of f o r e i g n propa ganda by t y i n g i t s p o t e n t i a l l i n k a g e groups so s t r o n g l y to the domestic system that a l l the f o r  eign i n p u t s become r e l a t i v e l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 5 Although Japan has.quite an autonomous and st a b l e government, and although so c a l l e d l i n k a g e groups such as the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Japan S o c i a l i s t Party (JSP) that s t r o n g l y r e f l e c t f o r e i g n governments' standpoints, are deeply set i n the Japanese p o l i t i c a l system, Deutsch Ts above hypotheses do not seem to have worked i n the postwar Japanese p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . The Japanese Government has been h i g h l y s e n s i t i v e to f o r e i g n impacts and has reacted c a r e f u l l y to them. There are perhaps two noteworthy reasons f o r e x p l a i n  i n g t h i s p a r t i c u l a r phenomenon. One i s that Japan's n a t i o n a l 6- defence has been overwhelmingly dependent upon the U n i t e d S t a t e s , which i s comparable to West European c o u n t r i e s whose defence cannot be d i s c u s s e d without c o n s i d e r i n g NATO which the U n i t e d States dominates. As w e l l , Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y cannot be d e l i n e a t e d f u l l y without r e f e r r i n g to i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the United States and the American Strategy f o r the Far E a s t . The other reason i s that Japan borders the two g i g a n t i c m i l i t a r y powers i n the communist b l o c , the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's R e p u b l i c . The two important p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , the JCP and the J3P, f u n c t i o n as l i n k a g e groups i n Japanese p o l i t i c s i n r e l a t i o n to the communist b l o c . T h i s i n c r e a s e s the importance of the communist b l o c ' s impact on the Japanese p o l i t i c a l system. Furthermore, the Korean Pe n i n s u l a which i s l o c a t e d between Okinawa, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union, i s one of the most t r o u b l e d areas i n the contemporary world. T h i s g i v e s Japan p o t e n t i a l m i l i t a r y t r o u b l e and o s t e n s i b l e p o l i t i c a l t r o u b l e . Thi s t h e s i s adopts the standpoint t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e i s important i n Japan's defence p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n . Of course, there are a f f i r m a t i v e and negative o p i n i o n s among the students o f Japanese p o l i t i c s over t h i s i ssue.6 A c t u a l l y , there has been l i t t l e i n v e s t i g a t i o n or r e s e a r c h on the subject of Japanese s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . So f a r , few attempts have been made t o e x p l o r e , s y s t e m a t i c a l l y and e x t e n s i v e l y , the s e c u r i t y p o l i c y making i n Japan. Th e r e f o r e , i t seems to be l e g i t i m a t e and necessary to d i s c u s s the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e on Japan's defence p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n . As the other major source of Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y making, t h i s t h e s i s w i l l d iscuss the p o l i c i e s of the three p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s : the JCP, the JSP, and the L i b e r a l - Democratic Party (the LDP). J . K. Rosenau p o i n t s out the f i v e important f a c t o r s that c o l l e c t i v e l y work upon the f o r m u l a t i o n of e x t e r n a l p o l i c i e s : governmental, s o c i e t a l , systemic, r o l e , and i d i o s y n c r a t i c v a r i a b l e s . ? The impact of the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s which w i l l be discussed i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter, approximately corresponds to the governmental v a r i a b l e of the Rosenau theory. I n c i d e n t a l l y these f a c t o r s , as w e l l as systemic f a c t o r s , seem to be extremely important i n the study of Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y making. Of course, the d i s t i n c  t i o n s between the f i v e v a r i a b l e s are a n a l y t i c a l and i n p r a c t i c e these f i v e groups of f a c t o r s are i n t e r t w i n e d and mutually e f f e c t t h e i r i n f l u e n c e on e x t e r n a l p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n . Bearing t h i s i n mind, the p o l i c i e s of the JCP, JSP and LDP v / i l l be discussed s e p a r a t e l y from the systemic i n f l u e n c e s . The LDP and i t s conservative predecessors have been the permanent government p a r t i e s i n the Japanese N a t i o n a l Diet since 1948, and they have had the greatest i n f l u e n c e over the cabinet's a c t i v i t i e s . In r e a l i t y , the LDP i s the main s t r u c  t u r e of the Japanese p o l i t i c a l system i n aggregating demands concerning n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , and i t i s the most a c t i v e and i n f l u e n t i a l body i n f o rmulating the defence p o l i c y of Japan. 10 The JSP and the JCP are u s u a l l y e n t i r e l y against the government party i n ideology and i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . One im portant c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the two p a r t i e s i s t h a t they can o f t e n generate anti-government chain r e a c t i o n s i n Japanese s o c i e t y by a c t i v a t i n g the a r t i c u l a t e and c r i t i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l s who exert strong i n f l u e n c e over the mass media, and the m i l i  t a nt student r a d i c a l s . As D. Hellmann observes, Despite t h e i r m a j o r i t y i n the D i e t , the L i b e r a l - Democrats must give c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n to the S o c i a l i s t o p p o s i t i o n on major i s s u e s or r i s k a ser ious p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s that may, as i n the I 9 6 0 S e c u r i t y Treaty i n c i d e n t , endanger the s t a b i l i t y of the e n t i r e p o l i t i c a l system.° The S o c i a l i s t s can a c t i v a t e a great number of s e r n i - i n t e l l e c t u a l s (or q u a s i - i n t e l l e c t u a l s ) who simply echo the c r i t i c a l i n t e l l e c  t u a l s ' opinions.9 These chain r e a c t i o n s often produce pressures on the government at three l e v e l s . At the highest l e v e l , the JCP and the JSP exert t h e i r i n f l u e n c e over the governmental p o l i c i e s i n the N a t i o n a l D i e t . At the second l e v e l , c r i t i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n the mass media c r i t i c i s e the governmental p o l i c i e s i n tune w i t h the JCP and the JSP, and the u n i o n i s t s and student r a d i c a l s organise t h e i r m i l i t a n t demonstrations against the government. At the lowest l e v e l , p o l i t i c a l l y aware c i t i z e n s s t a r t echoing what the mass media, i n f l u e n c e d by the d i s s e n t i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l s , t r y to implant i n the mass, and they often j o i n the mass demonstrations against the government under the l e a d e r s h i p of the JCP and the JSP. U s u a l l y the chain r e a c t i o n s do not go to the lowest l e v e l , but i n a p a r t i c u l a r case l i k e the I 9 6 0 p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s , 11 a great number of compliant q u a s i - i n t e l l e c t u a l s can be mobi l i s e d t o support the JCP and the JSP's l i n e of argument i n Japanese p o l i t i c s . Therefore, not only as d i r e c t p a r t i c i  pants i n government but a l s o as i n d i r e c t f orces which work as deterrent f a c t o r s on the LDP's conservativism, the JCP and the JSP have t o be d e a l t w i t h when Japan's defence p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n i s discussed. In the c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s the second chapter covers the three p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and t h e i r p o l i c i e s . The t h i r d chapter covers Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the United States, Korea, and the communist b l o c . The f o u r t h chapter covers the government's domestic p r o v i s i o n s f o r n a t i o n a l defence. The l a s t chapter i s devoted to a general assessment of the Ikeda Cabinet's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y w i t h reference to the i d i o  s y n c r a t i c f a c t o r s of the Ikeda Cabinet. 12 FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I J-Takase S h o j i , "Anzen to wa nanika," Asahi Shimin  Kyoshitsu: Ninon no Anzenhosho, (Tok3^o: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1968 v o l s . 12), V o l . 1, pp. 60-64. 2j\Iew York Times, May 19, 1966. 3This plan w i l l be discussed e x t e n s i v e l y i n the f o u r t h chapter of t h i s t h e s i s . ^ " E x t e r n a l Influence on the I n t e r n a l Behavior of States," R. B. F a r r e l l , ed., Approaches to Comparative and I n t e r n a t i o n a l  P o l i t i c s , (Evanston: Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1966), p. 8. 5Ibid, p. 11. 6cf. M a r t i n E. Weinstein, "The O r i g i n s and Basic Concept ion of Japan's Post-war Defense P o l i c y , " mimeographed paper, d e l i v e r e d at A s s o c i a t i o n of Asian Studies Meeting, Boston, March 27-30, 1969, pp. 5 - 7 . 7James H. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign P o l i c y , " R. B. F a r r o l l , ed., I b i d , pp. 2 7 - 9 2 . "Japan i n the Postwar East Asian I n t e r n a t i o n a l System, (McLean, V i r g i n i a : Research A n a l y s i s Corporation, 1969 ) , p. 13. ^Cf. Douglas H. Mendel, J r . , "Japan Reviews Her American A l l i a n c e , " P u b l i c Opinion Quarterly, XXX (Spring, 1966), pp. 1 - 2 . 13 CHAPTER I I POLITICAL PARTIES THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY POLICIES During the time o f the Ikeda Cabinet, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) had roughly three p o l i c i e s f o r Japanese s e c u r i t y : to expel American m i l i t a r y bases from Japan; to disband the N a t i o n a l Defence Force; and to n e u t r a l i s e and d e m i l i t a r i s e Japan. The JCP's supreme p o l i t i c a l goal had been and remains to be a communist r e v o l u t i o n i n Japanese s o c i e t y . A l l t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s were examined and evaluated from the viewpoint of the communist r e v o l u t i o n . Their c a r d i n a l concern has been whether a p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n f a c i l i t a t e s or slows down t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n a r y programme• Therefore, Japan's s e c u r i t y question has never been of c r u c i a l i n t e r e s t f o r them i n any a f f i r m a t i v e sense. However, as the armed forces have a d e c i s i v e p o s i t i o n i n c o n t r o l l i n g people, as w e l l as i n defence against f o r e i g n aggression, the JCP has paid e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y close a t t e n t i o n to Japan's defence arrangement i n a negative sense. In a d d i t i o n , the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of com munism was the other reason that the JCP had always been a l e r t about Japan's defence, what e f f e c t Japan's defence power had upon the i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist a c t i v i t i e s was always the JCP vs major concern. For example, the JCP's Se i . j i Senden  Shiryo (Information f o r P o l i t i c a l Campaign) s t a t e s , 14 American i m p e r i a l i s m and the Japanese monopoly r a t i f i e d a new S e c u r i t y Treaty on June 23rd, I 9 6 0 . The nominal end of t h i s new t r e a t y was c o l l e c t i v e defence. However, the r e a l aims are: to preserve American m i l i t a r y bases i n Japan as usual and to enforce N a t i o n a l Defence Force w i t h nuclear weapons c a r r i e d by m i s s i l e s ; to send the Defence Force overseas; and to suppress the labour movement. In other words, the S e c u r i t y Treaty of I960 i s i n essence an enforced m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e to threaten and to invade China and the Soviet Union. This Treaty i s the manifest r e v i t a l i s a t i o n of nuclear armed m i l i t a r i s m . ! 'To suppress the labour movement' i s an i m p l i c i t expression of the JCP's f e a r of the organised armed f o r c e , since the Defence Force has never been used to suppress or to demonstrate against the labour movement. In t h i s p a r t i c u l a r context, the word 'labour movement' should be i n t e r p r e t e d as 'communist up r i s i n g s ' (which have not taken, place so f a r ) . This r h e t o r i c shows the c o n f l i c t between the JCP's a s p i r a t i o n f o r the r e  v o l u t i o n and the Defence Force as a deterrent against the com munist r e v o l u t i o n . O r i g i n a l l y the Defence Force was e s t a b l i s h e d to f i l l the power vacuum which was created a f t e r the American tr o o p s ' removal from Japan to Korea at the beginning of the Korean War. The duty of the o r i g i n a l Defence Force (The N a t i o n a l P o l i c e Reserve) was to keep domestic s o c i a l order i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of communist u p r i s i n g s i n Japan. The JCP's h y p e r - s e n s i t i v i t y about the Defence Force as the deterrent f o r t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement was generated by t h i s o r i g i n a l nature of the Defence Force. Therefore, c o n s i d e r i n g the os t e n s i b l e and p o t e n t i a l power of the Defence Force, the JCP's view that the Force could be the most e f f e c t i v e deterrent f o r 15 t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n a r y programme was reasonable, and t h e i r p o l i c y to disband the Force was w e l l i n accord w i t h t h e i r view of i t . As f o r the JCP's view of American m i l i t a r y bases i n Japan and of the enforcement of the Defence Force, the JCP's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e v e a l s the main expectations of the United States f o r the S e c u r i t y Treaty. For example, an a r t i c l e which appeared i n Zj3nei ( the JCP's monthly opinion magazine) i n June of I960, ''The American M i l i t a r y Strategy and Japan's Subordination to i t " viewed the t r e a t y as having i n c o r p o r  ated Japan i n t o the American defence l i n e i n the Far East. I t viewed that the aim of the t r e a t y was to contain the com-- o munist bloc and to suppress communist a c t i v i t i e s i n Japan, In 1961, the above i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was f u r t h e r extended i n the a r t i c l e , "The American M i l i t a r y Strategy and the Aim of Defence Strengthening,"3 that the "American i n v a s i o n " i n t o Laos, Korea, and Southeast A s i a "from J a p a n w a s enabled p a r t i c u l a r l y because Japan's armed forces became strong enough not to create a power vacuum i n Japan and the Far East. This view was an extension of the former view i n the sense that i t recognised Japan 1s i n d i r e c t r o l e i n American s t r a t e g y as being an expansion from the Far East to Southeast A s i a . Such a view of Japan's r o l e i n American Strategy, when digested by the p r i n  c i p l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism, produced a p o l i c y to d i s  engage Japan from the United States and to expel American m i l i t a r y bases from Japan. The p o l i c y goals of the JCP to n e u t r a l i s e and to d e m i l i -16 t a r i s e Japan were as f o l l o w s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y the n e u t r a l i  s a t i o n of Japan was supposed to contribute g r e a t l y to weakening the American p o s i t i o n i n As i a and was a l s o supposed to en courage Asian communist r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . Domestically, to d e m i l i t a r i s e Japan i m p l i e d the disbandonment of the Defence Force, which was the primary b a r r i e r f o r the communist r e  v o l u t i o n i n Japan. Thus, the JCP fs p o l i c y f o r Japan's defence could serve two major goals: to help the i n t e r n a t i o n a l com munist movement and to carry out the communist r e v o l u t i o n i n Japan. ACTIONS The JCP's main st r a t e g y of executing i t s p o l i c y to reach i t s goals has been b a s i c a l l y to i n s t i g a t e popular movements. Through these popular movements the JCP has t r i e d t o spread i t s i n f l u e n c e and enforce i t s p o s i t i o n i n the N a t i o n a l D i e t . In t h i s regard, the i960 a n t i - S e c u r i t y Treaty movement was i t s most s u c c e s s f u l campaign. However, a f t e r the campaign, Ikeda 1s period (1960-1964) became a r e l a t i v e l y i n a c t i v e period f o r the JCP f o r s e v e r a l reasons. F i r s t of a l l , the Sino-Soviet d i s  pute became v i o l e n t i n 1961, which dismayed the JCP, because the JCP had been i d e o l o g i c a l l y dependent on and dominated by the Russian and Chinese party l i n e s . The JCP at t h i s stage could not decide which side i t should j o i n , nor was i t pre pared to take an independent course. Secondly, the Ikeda Cabinet's economic p o l i c y s a t i s f i e d popular demands f o r 17 m a t e r i a l goods and the Cabinet was on good terms with China and the Soviet Union. Consequently the Japanese people became l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n s e c u r i t y questions, and the relevance of the JCP ?s d i s c u s s i o n s on the Japan's s e c u r i t y was g r a d u a l l y reduced. During the Ikeda period, the JCP's immediate goal con cerning Japan's defence became mainly to l e s s e n the growth of the Defence Force and to r e s t r i c t the Defence Force's range of a c t i v i t i e s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y the st r a t e g y was to reduce Japan's r o l e i n the Far Eastern anti-communism l i n e - u p . Throughout and a f t e r the a n t i - S e c u r i t y Treaty movements of I 9 6 0 , the JCP proclaimed that the new t r e a t y i n v o l v e d the danger of arming the Defence Force w i t h nuclear weapons; and that Japan's possessing nuclear weapons could provoke the communist c o u n t r i e s ' r e t a l i a t o r y attack w i t h nuclear weapons. In response, the Ikeda Cabinet f i r m l y and repeatedly s t a t e d that nuclear weapons would never be placed i n Japan and that the Defence Force would not be armed with nuclear weapons as long as the Ikeda Cabinet stayed i n power. Ikeda's statement was a great gain f o r the JCP s t r a t e g i c a l l y , since i t success f u l l y prevented the Defence Force from being equipped w i t h nuclear weapons. However, Ikeda's statement was a f a t a l blow f o r the JCP i n generating popular a n t i - n u c l e a r weapon campaigns. For, a f t e r Ikeda's statements, the Force's nuclear armament v i r t u a l l y disappeared as a p o l i t i c a l i s s u e . Even worse f o r the JCP was the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear t e s t s i n 13 1961 a f t e r breaking the mutual Test Ban Moratorium w i t h the United S t a t e s . The Japanese Government d i d not neglect t h i s occasion to protes t the Russian nuclear t e s t s , and Japan's p u b l i c o pinion supported the Government unanimously and de nounced the Soviet Union. The JC? was f o r the f i r s t time i n i t s h i s t o r y cornered i n t o a defensive p o s i t i o n V i s a V i s the Japanese Government concerning the issue of nuclear armament and t e s t s . The JGP viewed, the S e c u r i t y Treaty of I960 as a s p r i n g  board f o r Japan to enlarge the Defence Force under the American s t r a t e g i c c o n t r o l , and ' a n t i - m i l i t a r i s m ' remained to be a b i g anti - C a b i n e t campaign slogan during the Ikeda period a f t e r the K i s h i Cabinet. Ikeda Cabinet's f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y and i t s a t t i t u d e towards n a t i o n a l defence and s e c u r i t y gave a d e t r i  mental e f f e c t to t h i s campaign. In Ikeda's f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y , the p r o p o r t i o n of the defence budget d i d not increase notably. In f a c t i t was even kept f a r below the l e v e l expected by the United States and the Defence Agency (Boeicho).5 Ikeda Cabinet's r e l a t i v e l y small defence budget again discouraged the JCP's a n t i - m i l i t a r i s m campaign. This i n v o l v e d almost the same process and had the same e f f e c t on the JCP's t a c t i c s as Ikeda's non-nuclear armament p o l i c y . The JCP's attack on Japan's defence system being under American c o n t r o l and c o n s t i t u t i n g American strategy, was answered by Ikeda Cabinet's 'autonomous defence p o l i c y . ' The autonomous defence p o l i c y was not Ikeda's o r i g i n a l p o l i c y , 19 but i n essence i t was i n the Ikeda period when Japan's armed for c e s became an important e n t i t y among the Far Eastern m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . In a sense American i n f l u e n c e over the Defence Force was reduced except i n the A i r Defence Force's c o n t r o l system. Thus the JCP's goal was f u l f i l l e d by the Ikeda ?s p o l i c y . As a r e s u l t of i t , however, Japan's Defence Force acquired s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e as w e l l as f i g h t i n g power. Therefore, as a whole, Ikeda's defence p o l i c y d i d not reduce the t o t a l amount of m i l i t a r y power that confronted the com munist bloc i n the Far East. On the contrary, i t strengthened the anti-communist m i l i t a r y bloc and gave the United States g r e a t e r m o b i l i t y i n the Far East and i n Asia.^ 1 As f a r as the JCP's aim to disengage the United States from Japan was con cerned, the JCP was l e a s t s u c c e s s f u l , since 'autonomous Japan' strengthened i t s partne r s h i p with the United States, and the Japanese people welcomed such a partnership.'' 7 The JCP's t a c t i c s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l sphere were more e f f e c t i v e than i n domestic p o l i t i c s . In 1961, the Ikeda Cabinet showed a great i n t e r e s t i n n e g o t i a t i o n s to normalise d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h South Korea. H i s t o r i c a l l y the Korean Peninsula has been the most c r u c i a l area around Japan f o r Japan's n a t i o n a l defence.® A f t e r the P a c i f i c War, Korea r e s t o r e d i t s independence, but was d i v i d e d i n t o North and South Korea.' South Korea had been i n an i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n to North Korea both i n m i l i t a r y and i n economic aspects. The economic weakness of South Korea was an A c h i l l e s ' heel of 20 the anti«communist bloc i n the Far East, and i t s p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y i n s t a b i l i t y was a l s o a p o t e n t i a l danger f o r Japan's s e c u r i t y . Continuous South Korean s o c i a l unrest was provocative to North Korean a s p i r a t i o n s to r e - u n i t e Korea. Both the United States and Japan wanted to s t a b i l i s e the South Korean Government by r e i n f o r c i n g i t s economy. Japan's economic c o n d i t i o n during Ikeda's period was already strong enough to support t h i s p o l i c y . The JCP, accompanied by the Japan S o c i a l i s t Party (JSP), was against the Japanese Government's f r i e n d l y approaches to South Korea, f o r f e a r of North Korea's l o s s of dominance i n the Korean Peni n s u l a , N a t u r a l l y , the s e n s i t i v e area f o r Japan's n a t i o n a l defence was a l s o the s e n s i t i v e area f o r the communist b l o c , e s p e c i a l l y f o r North Korea and the Chinese People's Republic. Regardless of t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l s p l i t , the communist count r i e s unanimously protested Japan's n e g o t i  a t i o n s to normalise n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h South Korea, since Japan's aim i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s was obviously to s t a b i l i s e the South Korean Government f o r i t s own s e c u r i t y reasons. With the communist c o u n t r i e s ' wide support and w i t h the JSP's p a r t  n e r s h i p , the JCP pursued i t s p o l i c y of opposing the Japanese- Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s , by p o i n t i n g out three reasons. F i r s t l y , the Japanese-Korean pa r t n e r s h i p would r e s u l t i n a ki n d of North East Asian Treaty Organisation (JCP's term) which would provide optimum m i l i t a r y bases to American imperialism's w a r - l i k e p o l i c y i n A s i a , Secondly, Japanese 'monopoly c a p i t a l ' 21 would go i n t o South Korea and open doors of an 'Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.' T h i r d l y , i t would prevent the peaceful r e - u n i f i c a t i o n of Korea, confirm the separation of Korea, i n t e n s i f y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n Korea, and p o s s i b l y would aim to at t a c k berth Korea.^ The Japanese-Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s were prolonged through out the Ikeda Cabinet and were concluded i n 1965 by the suc ceeding cabinet. The JCP's t a c t i c s against the Japanese- Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s , along with domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l support, c o n t r i b u t e d to prolonging the n e g o t i a t i o n s , and gained a success which was not acquired i n i t s domestic p o l i  c i e s . In conclusion, during the Ikeda Cabinet's era, the JCP's t a c t i c s f o r Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y were i n a c t i v e and i n e f f e c t i v e , because of the Sino-Soviet i d e o l o g i c a l s p l i t , the JCP's i n t r a - p a r t y power s t r u g g l e , and because of the Ikeda Cabinet's appealing p o l i c y to a t t r a c t people's a t t e n t i o n to economic a c t i v i t i e s . The only p a r t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l t a c t i c s of the JCP were found i n i t s anti-Japanese-Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s campaign. THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY DURING THE IKEDA PERIOD MATURE The basic character and nature of the Japan S o c i a l i s t Party (JSP) must be explained b r i e f l y i n order to discuss the 22 JSP's p o l i c y f o r Japan',s s e c u r i t y . The JSP i s the second l a r g e s t p o l i t i c a l p arty i n Japan. I t has a two-fold charac t e r i n the two dimensions: s t r u c t u r e and a c t i v i t i e s . While the Japan Communist Party (JCP) i s a party of hard core com munists w i t h a m o n o l i t h i c s t r u c t u r e , the JSP i s a popular s o c i a l i s t p arty which c o n s i s t s mainly of M a r x i s t s and Fabian s o c i a l i s t s , The JSP members can be d i v i d e d i n t o r i g h t w i n g and l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n s i n t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n . The JSP's major p o l i t i c a l support comes from two sources: the General C o u n c i l of Trade Unions of Japan (Ninon Rodo So Hyo- g i k a i or Sohyo) and unorganised popular sympathisers. Sohyo exer t s a strong i n f l u e n c e over the JSP's p o l i c y making since i t i s the l a r g e s t organised source of p o l i t i c a l support f o r the JSP. However, because the JSP has moderate f a c t i o n s which antagonise the l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n s , i t gains non-organised popular support whose nature i s l e s s m i l i t a n t compared to the m i l i t a n t l i n e of the Sohyo. This gives a two-fold nature to the JSP's behavior. The party d o c t r i n e of the JSP i s very s i m i l a r to that of a communist party i n i t s emphasis on c l a s s s t r u g g l e , and l o o k i n g at i t s p r i n c i p l e i t i s hard to d i s t i n g u i s h the J3P from a communist p a r t y . " ^ However i n p r a c t i c e , the JSP very of t e n chooses f o r i t s executive body r i g h t w i n g f a c t i o n s ' mem bers or members wi t h m i l d ideology to r e c o n c i l e i t s m i l i t a n t p r i n c i p l e w i t h i t s popular support which expects of the JSP l e s s m i l i t a n c y than M a r x i s t s ' ideology. The JSP's p o l i c i e s 23 which come out of the party assembly are as m i l i t a n t and r a d i c a l as those of the JCP, but i n the execution of them, these m i l i t a n t p o l i c i e s are softened and r e - i n t e r p r e t e d by conservative senior members and are transformed i n t o l e s s m i l i t a n t p o l i c i e s . This i s roughly the process how the JSP produces a compromised p o l i c y to s a t i s f y both strong demands of organised labour which a l i g n s with the l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n s and conservativism of non-organised popular supporters who are a l i g n e d w i t h the r i g h t w i n g f a c t i o n s , With regard to i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , the l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n s are close to ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism' i n ideology and the r i g h t w i n g f a c t i o n s are close to democratic s o c i a l i s m and West European communism. While the JCP re c e i v e d a hard blow from the Sino-Soviet s p l i t , the JSP was only s l i g h t l y i n f l u e n c e d by i t . That i s because the JSP i s f i r s t of a l l not a. genuine communist party and because the l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n s t r a d i t i o n a l l y kept close r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Chinese Communist Party and have supported the Chinese l i n e from the beginning. The r i g h t w i n g f a c t i o n s have always been c r i t i c a l of the l e f t - wing f a c t i o n s ' pro-communist stand. As the Sino-Soviet s p l i t progressed, i t became c l e a r that the Chinese r i g i d l i n e to emphasise popular r e v o l u t i o n was not s u i t a b l e as a t a c t i c f o r the JSP to gain p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l under the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n i n Japan. The JSP had to examine i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l and general i d e o l o g i c a l standpoint a f t e r the s p l i t of China and the Soviet Union. The JSP had to answer a l s o the p u b l i c 34 accusation on the question of Chinese Communist Party's con t r o l over the JSP's p o l i c y making through the pro-Chinese f a c t i o n s . In 19'6l due to the i n i t i a t i v e of the r i g h t w i n g factions ',, the JSP adopted the ' S t r u c t u r a l Reform Theory' of the I t a l i a n Communist Party i n order to answer the above question. This was a theory of gradual s h i f t from c a p i t a l i s m to s o c i a l i s m without v i o l e n t r e v o l u t i o n , and was presented p a r t i c u l a r l y to j u s t i f y the European communist p a r t i e s ' non-violent r e v o l u  t i o n a r y s t r a t e g y . In V/est European s o c i e t y , the S t r u c t u r a l Reform Theory provided an answer to the question of the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e a l i s i n g a communist r e v o l u t i o n while s t i l l p r e s e r v i n g the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l system. With the gradual Westernisation of the Japanese s o c i e t y , the theory seemed -to s a t i s f y the JSP's search f o r a new ideology. The theory was welcomed by the moderates i n the part}/ and by the informed p u b l i c o p i n i o n , but was severely c r i t i c i s e d by the r a d i c a l f a c t i o n s i n the party and by Sohyo f o r i t s l a c k of m i l i t a n c y . Throughout the time of the Ikeda Cabinet, the r i g h t - l e f t antagonism w i t h i n the party over party p r i n c i p l e continued and the Marxism o r i e n t e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i n e kept i t s formal dominant p o s i t i o n i n i t s p o l i c y making. This was another expression of the JSP's two sided character. Of course, some r a d i c a l elements w i t h i n the l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n s had been supporting the r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i n e both i n ideology and i n t a c t i c s , but because the JSP had been an 25 'In-Regime' ( T a i s e i - n a i ) p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , ^ they had to bear the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of s u s t a i n i n g parliamentary democracy together w i t h the government party. Therefore, the v i o l e n t r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i n e i n the JSP has never taken the dominant p o s i t i o n i n the execution of i t s p o l i c i e s . Unlike the JCP, the JSP has been too complex and m u l t i - f a c t i o n a l i n i t s party s t r u c t u r e to take one co n s i s t e n t i d e o l o g i c a l l i n e l i k e the JCP's r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i n e . The party d o c t r i n e of the JSP i s aimed at the Kokumin S e i t o , a party w i t h widespread support. For the JCP, the popular f r o n t i s only a t a c t i c a l means to accomplish the r e v o l u t i o n , and i t should be disbanded a f t e r the r e v o l u t i o n . Whereas, f o r the JSP, the popular party i s not a nominal but an u l t i m a t e aim. This c r u c i a l point d i s  t i n g u i s h e s the JSP from the JCP. T h e o r e t i c a l l y , the JSP's p a r t y d o c t r i n e i s very s i m i l a r to that of a communist party, but i t s u l t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l goals are acquired through the present p o l i t i c a l system, r a t h e r than through a communist r e v o l u t i o n , where the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l system i s overturned. In JSP's p o l i t i c s , the complex of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as a r a d i c a l s o c i a l i s t party i n ideology and as a popular party produced p o l i c i e s which e v e n t u a l l y followed the p u r s u i t of the e x i s t i n g 'national i n t e r e s t . ' The JSP's p o l i t i c a l a c t  ions d i d not go outside the framework of the 'national i n t e r e s t . 1 ' This dual nature of the JSP must be c a r e f u l l y i d e n t i f i e d and t r e a t e d when the JSP's p o l i c i e s are st u d i e d . 26 POLICIES During the Ikeda era, JSP's p o l i t i c a l goals were two f o l d : to extend the s o c i a l i s a t i o n of the Japanese economy; and to gain a greater d i p l o m a t i c autonomy from' the American i n f l u e n c e over Japanese e x t e r n a l p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n . Regarding n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , the JSP proposed three major p o l i c i e s : to n e u t r a l i s e Japan; to o f f i c i a l l y recognise the Chinese People's Republic as the l e g i t i m a t e government of China; and to block the Japanese-Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s . According to the JSP's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the major cause of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l tension i n the Far East was the provoca t i v e nature of the American m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y f o r the Far East. Unless Japan divorced h e r s e l f from the United States, t h i s t e n s i o n "would never ease and Japan would always be ex posed to the danger of war against i t s w i l l . One of the most important c o r o l l a r i e s o f t h i s n e u t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y was the complete a b o l i t i o n of the S e c u r i t y Treaty of the United States and Japan. The JSP explained the aim of i t s absolute n e u t r a l - 12 i sm, -L <- To e s t a b l i s h f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with a l l the count r i e s . Kot to make a h y p o t h e t i c a l enemy. Never to r e l y upon m i l i t a r y f o r c e . To solve c o n f l i c t s through n e g o t i a t i o n s and to e s t a b l i s h peaceful coexistence. Not to j o i n the communist bloc or the West- .era b l o c . To a b o l i s h the S e c u r i t y Treaty so as to dismiss the anti-Japanese clause i n the Sino-Soviet Pact. The a b o l i t i o n of a l l the m i l i t a r y pacts.. To enlarge trade r e l a t i o n s with a l l the n a t i o n s . To a l t e r Japan's American dominated 27 trade s t r u c t u r e and to extend the Asian,'Chinese, and Russian trades so that Japan's trade s t r u c t u r e be readjusted f o r f u r t h e r economic p r o s p e r i t y . 13 The JSP was confident i n r e c e i v i n g popular support f o r i t s unarmed n e u t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y , and i n Moscow, Secretary- General Kawakami s a i d at an i n t e r v i e w by the Pravda, A great m a j o r i t y of the Japanese support our ab s o l u t e n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y and do not want to get i n v o l v e d with any war under any circumstance. The government party of Japan says that the Soviet Union and the other communist count r i e s arc a t h r e a t to Japan's s e c u r i t y , but as a matter of f a c t , such a threat does not e x i s t i n the Japanese people's mindso Therefore, we s t r o n g l y demand the a b o l i t i o n of American m i l i t a r y presence and the r e p a t r i a t i o n of American m i l i t a r y troops from Japan. We resent the m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l of Japan by the American Capitalism,14 The n e u t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y apparently came out of the strong i n f l u e n c e of the l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n s of the JSP which are Marxism o r i e n t e d . For example, the JSP's study and a n a l y s i s of the contemporary world s i t u a t i o n i s w e l l d e t a i l e d concerning American s t r a t e g y and m i l i t a n c y , while i t u n b e l i e v a b l y under estimates or simply neglects the communist bloc's m i l i t a n t a c t i v i t i e s . The JSP's n e u t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y was not a simple n e u t r a l i s a t i o n but an 'absolute n e u t r a l i s a t i o n ' (unarmed n e u t r a l i s a t i o n ) of Japan. The JSP's absolute n e u t r a l i s m was aimed at keeping f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h the United States while at the same time s o f t e n i n g Soviet and Chinese m i l i t a n c y towards Japan. N a t u r a l l y the unarmed n e u t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y was c r i t i c i s e d by the government party and to a c e r t a i n degree by the p u b l i c opinion f o r i t s h y p e r - o p t i m i s t i c view of n a t i o  n a l s e c u r i t y . Although the JSP accused the United States of 28 m i l i t a n t s t r a t e g y against the communist bloc and advocated absolute n e u t r a l i s m , the JSP neglected the danger of the American m i l i t a r i s m to Japan's s e c u r i t y . Therefore, most of the c r i t i c i s m against the JSP's unarmed n e u t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y was centered around the JSP's underestimation of the communist b l o c ' s threat and i t s l a c k of c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the p o s s i b l e American t h r e a t to Japan's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . 1 5 The JSP emphasised the m i l i t a n c y of 'American i m p e r i a l i s m ' and the expansion of American c a p i t a l i s m . Consequently i t advocated the absolute n e u t r a l i s a t i o n of Japan, or 'away from the dangerous America' p o l i c y , and i t emphasised the b a s i c a l l y f r i e n d l y nature of the communist c o u n t r i e s . Strangely enough, however, the JSP's unarmed n e u t r a l i s a t i o n p o l i c y e n t i r e l y neglected Japan's prep a r a t i o n f o r defence against ' m i l i t a n t American i m p e r i a l i s m . ' The JSP's a n t i p a t h y towards m i l i t a n t American s t r a t e g y against the communist bloc and i t s absolute and b l i n d b e l i e f i n America's respect f o r Japan's n e u t r a l i t y made a strange contrast i n i t s p o l i c y . This was a t y p i c a l example of the JSP's c o n t r a d i c t o r y character as a r a d i c a l s o c i a l i s t party and as a popular party, which r e f l e c t s both the Marxian m i l i t a n c y and popular good w i l l or i n other words the b l i n d b e l i e f of the Japanese i n American 'good behavior. '•' The second p o l i c y , to recognise the Chinese People's Republic as the l e g i t i m a t e government of China, represents the general consensus of the JSP. I t s p o l i c y to recognise Communist China and to withdraw the e x i s t i n g r e c o g n i t i o n of 29 N a t i o n a l i s t China, was b a s i c a l l y i n harmony wi t h the p o l i c y of ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism.' The JSP's C e n t r a l Executive Committee (Chuo Shikko I i n k a i ) released a statement concerning i t s stand f o r Japan's p o s i t i o n i n the r e c o g n i t i o n of China, We recognise China's r i g h t to r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the United Nations and to n o r m a l i s i n g Si.no-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . We do not recognise two Chinas. We would immediately s t a r t n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the Chinese People's Republic to conclude a peace t r e a t y so that we would r e s t o r e the l e g i t i m a t e and complete diplomatic r e l a t i o n s . We would, abrogate the Sino-Japanese (Japan and Taiwan's) Treaty...1° The above statement has two s i g n i f i c a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s . One i s t hat the JSP wanted to conclude a peace t r e a t y w i t h Com munist China, which would o f f i c i a l l y end the t e c h n i c a l s t a t e of war between Japan and Communist China. For more than two decades, Japan has been t e c h n i c a l l y at war with Communist China. This has been a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t to Japan's s e c u r i t y . So f a r , no cabinet of Japan has solved t h i s problem. Since there has been the heavy burden of the Yoshida Cabinet's legacy i n which Japan recognised N a t i o n a l i s t China i n order to regain independence, i t has been extremely d i f f i c u l t f o r any conservative -cabinet of Japan to normalise the r e l a t i o n s w i t h C o n t i n e n t a l China. The Japan Communist Party was opposed to the present p o l i t i c a l system i n theory and i n p r a c t i c e , ' and. i t was useless f o r the present government to expect the JCP to work f o r the r e s t o r a t i o n of Sino-Japanese f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . N a t u r a l l y i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n the JSP, being a popular party, considered i t s e l f the only mediator i n Japan f o r t h i s m i s sion. N a r i t a Tomomi, Secratary-General of the 30 JSP, wrote i n 1964, The Sino-Japanese problem i s new s t i r r e d up by the French r e c o g n i t i o n of Communist China. The JSP has a p r i n c i p l e that we should r e s t o r e diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with China and that China should be given r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the United Nations...We need to arouse p u b l i c opinion and, as a good example of our experience i n i n f l u e n c i n g the Liberal-Democratic Party, we can r e f e r to the Japanese-Soviet n e g o t i  a t i o n s . For these n e g o t i a t i o n s , there were a f f i r m  a t i v e and negative opinions i n the LDP, and the President of the JSP, Suzuki, s t r o n g l y supported the Prime M i n i s t e r Hatoyama's n e g o t i a t i o n s by g i v i n g p o l i t i c a l a i d to the Cabinet i n contrast to the opposing f a c t i o n s w i t h i n the LDP. In the same manner, I t h i n k we need to exert our e f f o r t s to i n f l u e n c e Prime M i n i s t e r Ikeda to recognise the Chinese People's Republic.1 7 and Suzuki Mosaburo, former President of the JSP, s a i d to Mr. Utsunomiya Tokuma, a Diet member of the LDP, Recently Japanese business l e a d e r s . . . have r e a l i s e d the importance of the Chinese trade and commerce, but they s t i l l f e a r a s t a b l e and long-term trade w i t h China. Considering the Ikeda Cabinet's i n  a c t i v i t y i n n o r m a l i s i n g Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , we have a question, ,;Who solves t h i s question f o r the Japanese business world?" My c o n v i c t i o n i s that the JSP i s the only p o s s i b l e party to solve i t , succeeding to the Hatoyama's legacy.18 Both N a r i t a , a leader of a r i g h t w i n g f a c t i o n , and Suzuki, a leader of a l e f t w i n g f a c t i o n , were conscious of the JSP's s p e c i a l r o l e to mediate between Japan and Communist China and e v e n t u a l l y to end the t e c h n i c a l s t a t e of war between the two c o u n t r i e s . The second i m p l i c a t i o n was that the JSP's a t t i t u d e toward Taiwan was not the same as that of the JCP. Although the JSP considered Taiwan a domestic problem of China, they d i d not support the immediate u n i f i c a t i o n of Taiwan under Communist 31 China's i n i t i a t i v e . At one stage, N a r i t a released a JSP seni o r members' view on t h i s question at a press conference, The Japan S o c i a l i s t Party does not change i t s stand; that the Chinese People's Republic i n Peking i s the government that represents one China and that Japan must immediately have l e g i t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s w i t h that China. The N a t i o n a l i s t Government i s the government that a c t u a l l y r u l e s Taiwan, a part of China, and i t - should be recognised as a b e l l i g e r e n t body i n i n t e r  n a t i o n a l law.19 N a r i t a withdrew the above view a few days l a t e r on the grounds t h a t i t might create misunderstandings. This was obviously a r e s u l t of the l e f t i s t pressures on the senior members. I t showed th a t there were c o n f l i c t i n g views i n the JSP concerning the treatment of the Taiwan Government. The JSP's f i n a l stand was that the Taiwan issue was China's domestic problem, w i t h  out s p e c i f y i n g the meaning of the term. Since the JSP viewed i t as 'China's domestic problem,' they d i d not need to ex p l a i n the problem i n d e t a i l i n the name of the 'non-interven t i o n p r i n c i p l e ' i n domestic a f f a i r s of other c o u n t r i e s . The t h i r d p o l i c y was to block the Japanese-Korean n e g o t i  a t i o n s . The JSP's view of the n e g o t i a t i o n s was summarised i n the party's o p i n i o n magazine ; Gekkan Shakaito, I t f i r s t l y represents a motive or p o l i c y of 'Japa nese monopoly c a p i t a l ' to invade the Korean market because i t i s f a c i n g over-production caused by'the Ikeda Cabinet's 'Rapid Economic Growth' p o l i c y . Secondly, i t i s a r e s u l t of an American p o l i c y to l e t Japan take over American a i d to Korea i n order to decrease American overseas expenditures and to protect the d o l l a r . T h i r d l y , i t i s an American plan to l e t Japan take part i n her own defence so that the Korean m i l i t a r y regime could i n d i r e c t l y be backed up, which i n c i d e n t a l l y gets unanimous sympathy of the Japanese r u l i n g e l i t e who are a f r a i d of red f l a g s u n f u r l e d i n Pusan.20 32 This view was correct but not complete. Throughout Japanese h i s t o r y , the Korean Peninsula has had a s p e c i f i c g e o - p o l i t i c a l r o l e . When Japan introduced c o n t i n e n t a l c i v i l i s a t i o n s , they were u s u a l l y t r a n s m i t t e d by Korea. When China became a strong m i l i t a r y power, Korea became the f o r e f r o n t of Japan's defence l i n e . Japan waged two major wars i n i t s e a r l y developing stage since i t s Westernisation s t a r t e d i n the l a t e 19th cen t u r y . They were the Sino-Japanese War of 1394-5 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Both wars were fought over the issue of p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l i n the Korean Peni n s u l a . Korea has been the most s e n s i t i v e area f o r Japan's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y v i s a v i s the Asian continent. The above mentioned view of the JSP i s not complete i n that i t does not emphasise Japan's t r a d i t i o n a l g e o - p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n the Korean Peninsula. Since Japan's s e n s i t i v e area was al s o the s p e c i a l concern of the communist bloc, the JSP t r i e d to r e f l e c t and s a t i s f y China and North Korea's expectations by preventing close Japanese-Korean r e l a t i o n s . At l e a s t , the JSP d i d not want to provoke them by concluding a 'Japanese-Korean A l l i a n c e . ' Although the JSP made the accusation that the Japanese Government i n the coming Japanese-Korean f r i e n d s h i p would m i l i t a r i l y strengthen South Korea, there had never been a Japanese proposal to a i d South Korea m i l i t a r i l y ; and, the Ikeda Cabinet repeatedly denied m i l i t a r y i m p l i c a t i o n s i n the Japanese-Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s . A f t e r the a r m i s t i c e i n the Korean War i n 1954, there was a m i l i t a r y balance of power i n 33 the Korean Peninsula, and there was no need f o r Japan to a i d South Korea m i l i t a r i l y . However, economically, North Korea was i n a s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n to South Korea, which was of r e a l concern to the Japanese Government. S o c i a l unrest, economic d i f f i c u l t i e s , and p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y i n South Korea helped North Korea to gain p o l i t i c a l dominance i n the Korean Penin s u l a , and South Korea looked l i k e a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t f o r the Japanese Government. For s e c u r i t y reasons, the Japanese Government wanted to s t a b i l i s e the South Korean economy so that North Korea or the communist bloc's p o l i t i c a l dominance i n the Korean Peninsula could be e f f e c t i v e l y checked. This would immediately guarantee Japan's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . For North Korea and China, p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i s a t i o n of South Korea meant that they would l o s e t h e i r long preserved dominance, and i t would p o s s i b l y go to South Korea. I t was, t h e r e f o r e , a n a t u r a l r e a c t i o n that North Korea and China s t r o n g l y opposed the Japanese-Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s , when the s t r a t e g i c value of i t i n the Far East i s considered. SUMMARY JSP's p o l i c y f o r Japan's s e c u r i t y was, as f a r as l i t e r a l expression i s concerned, not too d i f f e r e n t from that of the JCP. The important d i f f e r e n c e was that the JSP was much more n a t i o n a l i s t i c , p a t r i o t i c , or ethno-centric when i t executed i t s p o l i c i e s . For instance, President Asanuma of the JSP was quoted as saying at Peking i n March, 1959, that '"American 34 i m p e r i a l i s m " was the common enemy of the Japanese and Chinese people. For t h i s statement Asanuma was severely c r i t i c i s e d by h i s opponents and by the p u b l i c to the point where he was f i n a l l y a s s a s s i n a t e d . Asanuma ? s words v/e re very r a d i c a l but not h i s p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . Former President of the JSP, Suzuki, v i s i t e d Peking a f t e r Asanuma and r e a f f i r m e d the Asanuma statement. He explained h i s motives, In the midst of the n e g o t i a t i o n s , I once almost de cided to come back home without s i g n i n g the j o i n t communique. Kov/ever, I thought that the JSP was the only s t r i n g that tied. Japan and China together, and t h a t my impatient d e c i s i o n might discourage Japanese economic i n t e r e s t s which had begun to seek a new market i n China and i n Russia a f t e r the Japanese-American Economic Conference. I thought i t v/as the ul t i m a t e a s p i r a t i o n of the Japanese that we conclude a j o i n t communique f o r the sake, of fu t u r e Sino-Japanese a s s o c i a t i o n , and t h a t the u n s a t i s f a c t o r y points of the communique could g r a d u a l l y be r e v i s e d l a t e r . With our strenuous use of agreements, they may o f f e r us a long, s t a b l e , and la r g e trade i n the future.21 For another example, Iv/ai A k i r a , Secretary-General of Sohyo, the biggest organised supporter of the JSP, t o l d Senator Robert Kennedy when he v i s i t e d Japan, Next i s the problem of export. I w i l l not go i n t o d e t a i l s , but we do wish the United States would accept the p r i n c i p l e of free trade... Japan cannot be i n d i f f e r e n t to Chinese and Russian t r a d e . As w e l l as to improve American trade, v/e f u r t h e r l i k e to expand r e l a t i o n s w i t h China and the Soviet Union.22 As can be seen i n these statements, the JSP's p r i n c i p l e on paper and i t s a c t i v i t i e s are sometimes very d i f f e r e n t . This d i f f e r e n c e should not be neglected as i t represents one of the important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the J3P - the second most popular party i n Japanese p o l i t i c s . 35 The n a t i o n a l i s t i c character of the JSP was f u r t h e r em phasised when the Sino-Sviet s p l i t was widened and China c l e a r l y adhered to i t s m i l i t a n t r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i n e . Some of the s e n i o r members of the JSP o v e r t l y expressed t h e i r views of s o c i a l i s m which d i d not harmonise w i t h tlie< views of the Chinese r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i n e . Chairman of p a r t y 7 s E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s Committee, Wada Hiroo, wrote i n 1963, In the present world there i s no s i n g l e person who denies the j u s t i c e of disarmament., Also, there are few people who do not know that disarmament i s i n r e a l i t y to. use piecemeal e f f o r t s to achieve the ul t i m a t e goal. I t i s not enough only to speak of b e a u t i f u l high i d e a l s . The e f f o r t s should not be to attack people w i t h d i f f e r e n t standpoints but to make as much agreement as p o s s i b l e i n the areas of mutual consensus.23 Wada a l s o urged the JSP's executive members to adopt an i n  dependent p o l i c y from the Chinese i n f l u e n c e . In 196/f, f o r the f i r s t time i n JSP's h i s t o r y , the JSP's mi s s i o n to Peking o f f i c i a l l y opposed China's m i l i t a n t p o l i c y The JSP's mission expressed a 'deep regret and resentment' against China's f i r s t nuclear t e s t which was performed on t h very day they a r r i v e d at Peking.24 Thus forced by circum stances r a t h e r than by spontaneous choice, the JSP adopted during the Ikeda Cabinet's time p r i n c i p l e s that were indepen dent from Chinese domination, THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY DURING THE IKEDA PERIOD The Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) has been a 36 m u l t i - f a c t i o n a l party and has never produced a m o n o l i t h i c a l l y organised cabinet except between 1949 and 1954 during the time of the Yoshida Cabinet. A f t e r the Yoshida Cabinets, however, the Japanese cabinets have been a c o a l i t i o n of inner party f a c t i o n s of the LDP.25 In the Hatoyama Cabinet (1954- 1956), although Hatoyama's f a c t i o n was weak, i t took i n i t i  a t i v e i n the i n t r a - p a r t y power struggle by a l i g n i n g various competing f a c t i o n s i n t o a common f r o n t against the Yoshida f a c t i o n . The I s h i b a s h i Cabinet (1957) was a c o a l i t i o n of small f a c t i o n s against strong f a c t i o n s l e d by K i s h i . Prime M i n i s t e r K i s h i was noted f o r h i s e f f e c t i v e f a c t i o n a l t a c t i c s and outmaneuvered a n t a g o n i s t i c f a c t i o n s u n t i l h i s f i n a l down f a l l i n I960. Since the LDP exerts the most d e c i s i v e i n  fluence over p o l i c y making i n the Japanese p o l i t i c a l system, and since i t c o n s t i t u t e s the Cabinet, i t s various f a c t i o n a l stands i n defence questions w i l l be discussed here. One t h i n g that should be noted here i s that the f a c t i o n s o f the LDP e x i s t p r i m a r i l y to gain p o l i t i c a l power w i t h i n the p a r t y . Each f a c t i o n has i t s own character. In general, the f a c t i o n s are not p o l i c y o r i e n t e d but are power o r i e n t e d . Therefore, the groupings of the f a c t i o n s presented i n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n are not as r i g i d as they sound. There are l i b e r a l members i n conservative f a c t i o n s and conservative members i n l i b e r a l f a c t i o n s . However, f o r a n a l y t i c a l pur poses, these p a r t i a l elements are not taken i n t o account. 37 CONSERVATIVE FACTIONS The K i s h i 'Cabinet's downfall was a great defeat f o r the conservative f a c t i o n s . The main reason f o r K i s h i ' s r e s i g  n a t i o n from o f f i c e was that the Japanese people opposed K i s h i T s p o l i c y f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and the K i s h i Cabinet could not secure the p o l i t i c a l confidence of the Japanese vo t e r s or the m a j o r i t y of the party members'. Since the K i s h i f a c t i o n had been the c e n t r a l core of the conservative f a c t i o n s , K i s h i ' s defeat was regarded as the conservative f a c t i o n s ' defeat. As a r e s u l t , l i b e r a l and progressive f a c t i o n s i n the LDP became more a c t i v e a f t e r K i s h i ' s r e t i r e  ment from o f f i c e . During the Ikeda period the conservative f a c t i o n s ' i n f l u e n c e over s e c u r i t y p o l i c y making was l i m i t e d . Sato Eisaku (the Prime M i n i s t e r of Japan a f t e r Ikeda) l e d the l a r g e s t one of the conservative f a c t i o n s a f t e r h i s brother K i s h i ' s d o w n f a l l . ^ Although the Sato f a c t i o n was p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y defeated i n the I960 t r e a t y r e v i s i o n i s s u e , i t was s t i l l strong i n number and was considered p o t e n t i a l l y the strongest successor of the Ikeda Cabinet. The Sato f a c t i o n was very cautious i n expressing i t s p o l i t i c a l stand and i t s p o l i c y f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , f o r three s p e c i f i c reasons. F i r s t l y , the Sato f a c t i o n was defeated i n I960 along w i t h the K i s h i f a c t i o n b3^  c l i n g i n g t o a hard l i n e p o l i which popular sentiment was agains t . A f t e r t h i s experience, the Sato f a c t i o n became more aware of p u b l i c o p i n i o n . Se condly, i t s power p o s i t i o n i n the LDP was next to the Ikeda 3 8 f a c t i o n ' s , which meant that the Sato f a c t i o n was very l i k e l y to succeed the Ikeda Cabinet, and i t s p u b l i c statements could have a c r u c i a l e f f e c t i n the future competition f o r the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s seat. Moreover, i t was unable to openly s t a t e an i r r e s p o n s i b l e p o l i c y j u s t f o r the sake of an i n t r a - p a r t y power s t r u g g l e , because such a statement would become a burden i f i t formed a cabinet. T h i r d l y , the Ikeda Cabinet was, i n a sense adopting the adjustment p o l i c y to strengthen the LDP's once jeopardised p o p u l a r i t y a f t e r the mistakes of the K i s h i f a c t i o n i n the I960 p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s . For these mistakes the conservative f a c t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y the Sato f a c t i o n , f e l t moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The Sato f a c t i o n ' s p o l i c y f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y was to maintain and, i f p o s s i b l e , strengthen the e x i s t i n g Far Eastern defence l i n e of Japan-Okinawa-South Korea-Taiwan-the P h i l i p  pines against China„ In 196l, a member of the Kennedy ad m i n i s t r a t i o n i n f o r m a l l y released a two-China p r o p o s i t i o n i n which the Ikeda Cabinet showed a great i n t e r e s t . Sato s a i d , I f e e l very uncomfortable when I see the Chinese problem coming up at the same time as the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s v i s i t to the United States. What does he (Ikeda) r e a l l y want when he advocates autonomous diplomacy? The Chinese problem cannot be solved by Japan's i s o l a t e d a c t i o n . He should be occupied w i t h the n e g o t i a t i o n s with Korea. ' Sato's aim as expressed above was made to prevent f u r t h e r weakening of Taiwan's jeopardised s t a t u s so that Taiwan would be secured as a p o t e n t i a l member of the Japanese defence l i n e i n the Far East. He a l s o aimed to strengthen the South 39 Korean Government which had been the weakest l i n k of the de fence l i n e . Apparently, Sato was a f r a i d that the Ikeda Cabi net would recognise Communist China, which could d r a s t i c a l l y change the Far Eastern defence l i n e by weakening Taiwan's p o s i t i o n . Taiwan i s one l i n k i n the defence l i n e , but from Japan's viewpoint of r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g y , Taiwan i s an import- v ant j o i n t connecting Japan and Southeast A s i a . Communist China's r e u n i f i c a t i o n of Taiwan would threaten Japan's South ward t r a n s p o r t a t i o n route. Therefore, securing Taiwan was an i n d i r e c t p o l i c y to protect Japan's e x i s t i n g and prospective trade a c t i v i t i e s i n Southeast A s i a . In 1962, Sato t r i e d to stop the Ikeda Cabinet's extensive approach to Communist China, and s a i d , I g r e a t l y doubt t h e i r i n t e l l i g e n c e i f Japanese p o l i t i c i a n s are t h i n k i n g about e n l a r g i n g Sino- Japanese trade at t h i s time. Prime M i n i s t e r Ikeda once s a i d that i t was a mistake to expect too much i n Chinese t r a d e . I wish he had not changed h i s mind. H i s ^ i n g r a t i a t i n g t a c t i c s are no longer e f f e c t i v e . 2 8 The above statement d e l i n e a t e s the more conservative f a c t i o n s ' l i m i t a t i o n s i n p o l i c y making,, 'His i n g r a t i a t i n g t a c t i c s (harmonious parliamentary t a c t i c s i n r e l a t i o n to the opposi t i o n p a r t i e s ) are no longer e f f e c t i v e ' suggests that they had been e f f e c t i v e so f a r . Compared to the conservative f a c t i o n s ' hard l i n e , the Ikeda Cabinet was f a r more s u c c e s s f u l i n handling the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , and Sato i r o n i c a l l y recog n i s e d the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the Ikeda Cabinet's parliamentary t a c t i c s . 40 As f o r the Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , Sato's c r i t i c i s m was not d i r e c t e d at a b o l i s h i n g Japan's Red Chinese contacts but r a t h e r d i r e c t e d at slowing down the enlargement of the Sino- Japanese tr a d e . The Ikeda Cabinet's p r i n c i p l e i n Chinese r e l a t i o n s of separation of p o l i t i c s and economics,^ W a s fundamentally unchallengeable f o r any conservative f a c t i o n . The Ikeda Cabinet's approach to China was supported by the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s and was not opposed by the United States. Under these circumstances, the conservative f a c t i o n s could not challenge the Cabinet's p r i n c i p l e . The only c r i t i c i s m of the Cabinet by the conservative f a c t i o n s was focused on the d i s c u s s i o n that the p o l i c y might endanger Taiwan's s t a t u s . A jeopardised Taiwan could i n d i r e c t l y e f f e c t Japan's world s t r a t e g y . However, the Ikeda Cabinet's p r i n c i p l e of separa t i o n of p o l i t i c s and economics was assurance that i t would not recognise the People's Republic o f China without con s i d e r i n g the Western blo c ' s general p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n . Therefore, during the Ikeda p e r i o d the a n t i - I k e d a conservative f a c t i o n s ' p o l i c y was not sharply a n t a g o n i s t i c to the Cabinet's p o l i c y . LIBERAL FACTIONS In the Ikeda p e r i o d , l i b e r a l f a c t i o n s of the LDP were represented by Kono I c h i r o and p a r t i a l l y by M i k i Takeo. Both f a c t i o n s j o i n e d the Ikeda f a c t i o n to form the Cabinet, and t h e i r ideas v/e re not as d i s t i n c t i v e from the Ikeda f a c t i o n ' s 41 as were the conservative f a c t i o n s ' . Since they were i n com p e t i t i o n w i t h conservative f a c t i o n s i n the succession race to the Ikeda Cabinet, and since they were i n the Cabinet t h e i r p o l i c y was very close to the Ikeda f a c t i o n ' s . In order to de feat the conservative f a c t i o n s i n the party convention that e l e c t s the successor o f the Ikeda Cabinet, the l i b e r a l f a c  t i o n s d e f i n i t e l y needed the Ikeda f a c t i o n ' s support. Con sequently they were very cooperative w i t h the Ikeda Cabinet t o secure the Ikeda f a c t i o n ' s sympathy. Furthermore, because they j o i n e d the Ikeda Cabinet,, t h e i r ideas were r e l a t i v e l y easy to incorporate i n t o governmental p o l i c i e s . As f a r as se c u r i t y p o l i c y was concerned, t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n was almost n i l i n the Ikeda p e r i o d . In 196.1, Kono I c h i r o , the most prominent f i g u r e among the l i b e r a l f a c t i o n l e a d e r s , s a i d , I t i s dangerous to make a biased d e c i s i o n about a p a r t i a l phase of Japanese diplomacy. I discussed the Chinese problem i n each country I v i s i t e d , and the general opinion was that China would i n e v i t a b l y be accepted by the United Nations. The problem appears to be the time and method of Chinese ac ceptance i n the United Nations...Japan should act c a r e f u l l y when con s i d e r i n g the next generation's Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , and should not be con cerned w i t h an immediate i n t e r e s t such as trad e . We should not make a hasty decision.30 The above statement by Kono d i d break through the b a r r i e r of f a c t i o n a l antagonism i n two respects: i n that he turned down p a r t i a l i t y in. diplomacy; and i n that he s i n c e r e l y advocated c a r e f u l a c t i o n f o r the sake of future Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . Kono's statement was no longer a statement of a f a c t i o n l e a der 42 but that of a cabinet member. His statement was a r e f l e c t i o n of h i s i d e n t i t y with the Cabinet's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y and al s o a r e f l e c t i o n of confidence i n cooperation with the Ikeda f a c t i o n . Another important leader of a l i b e r a l f a c t i o n , M i k i Takeo, Secretary-General (Kan.ji-cho) of the LDP, s a i d , The n o r m a l i s a t i o n of Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s i s being prevented by the Taiwan problem. We cannot deny the f a c t that the Taiwan Government e x i s t s as a r u l i n g body...under such circumstances we have to be c l e a r about what we can and cannot do wi t h regards to Communist China and Taiwan.31 M i k i ' s statement i n v o l v e s no i d e o l o g i c a l tone as Kono's s t a t e  ment. This was f u r t h e r evidence that l i b e r a l f a c t i o n s had l e s s f a c t i o n a l i d e n t i t y i n the Ikeda period. As f a r as se c u r i t y p o l i c y was concerned, they v/e re so close to the Ikeda f a c t i o n which was considered the main stream of the LDP (Hoshu  no Konryu), that t h e i r f a c t i o n a l i d e n t i t y was i n s i g n i f i c a n t . S i t u a t e d between the l i b e r a l f a c t i o n s and conservative f a c t i o n s was the Ikeda f a c t i o n . Since the core of the Ikeda f a c t i o n was i n the Ikeda Cabinet, i t s s e c u r i t y p o l i c y w i l l be discussed s e p a r a t e l y . INDEPENDENTS Besides these three groups of f a c t i o n s i n the LDP, there are people c a l l e d 'Independents.' They are u s u a l l y progres s i v e and f l e x i b l e i n d e a l i n g w i t h communism. In the Ikeda p e r i o d , i t was these people who a c t u a l l y worked f o r the Cabinet i n approaching the communist b l o c . These independents em phasised the p r i o r i t y of Japan's n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s v/hich 43 sometimes d i f f e r e d from American i n t e r e s t s . Their d i s c u s s i o n i n e v i t a b l y l e d to the advocacy of Japan's autonomous or i n  dependent diplomacy from American i n f l u e n c e . Utsunomiya Tokuma (a Diet member of the LDP) s a i d , American m i l i t a r y bases i n Japan were o r i g i n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d to serve American i n t e r e s t s . I be l i e v e that they (Americans) would have abandoned the bases i f i t had not been necessary f o r them to occupy Japan. The basic p r i n c i p l e i s that we have to defend our country by ourselves i f we r e  cognise the n e c e s s i t y of defence. However, under the present s i t u a t i o n there e x i s t s American m i l i  t a r y s t r a t e g y with the S e c u r i t y Treaty to enforce i t . This S e c u r i t y Treaty determines Japan's e x t e r n a l p o l i c y . This s i t u a t i o n i s e x a c t l y reverse to the normal order of f o r e i g n p o l i c y making process and i t s s t r a t e g y i n an independent country. A r e a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y cannot be produced i n a s i t u a t i o n l i k e this.32 I n c i d e n t a l l y , these independents' n a t i o n a l i s t i c and very oft e n anti-American stand was favoured by Communist China's leaders who wanted to re-open Sino-Japanese trade to reduce economic d i f f i c u l t i e s a f t e r the c o l l a p s e of the Great Leap Forward. Not as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Cabinet but as r e  p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the LDP, the independents v i s i t e d China upon i n v i t a t i o n and s t a r t e d n e g o t i a t i o n s to conclude p r i v a t e agree ments f o r opening trade r e l a t i o n s . 3 3 Mainly by Matsumura, Kawasaki, Utsunomiya, and Okazaki's e f f o r t s , the Sino- Japanese r e l a t i o n s were r e s t o r e d i n 1962 to the l e v e l of However, i n the LDP, these independents were not strong enough i n number to c r u c i a l l y i n f l u e n c e the Ikeda Cabinet's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . Their s u c c e s s f u l a c t i v i t i e s were due to the 44 c o i n c i d e n t a l f a c t o r s . F i r s t of a l l , the Ikeda Cabinet wanted to ease the Sino-Japanese b i l a t e r a l t e n s i o n . The Japanese Government could not send o f f i c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Government to Communist China f o r f e a r of the provocative ef f e c t on anti-communist l i n e - u p i n the Far East. The Cabinet t r i e d to minimise i t s appearance of having o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h Communist China, Secondly, the independents ? sympathetic a t t i t u d e towards the communist bloc was favoured by the Chinese l e a d e r s . T h i r d l y , since these independents were b a s i c a l l y conservative p o l i t i c i a n s who respected Japan's n a t i o n a l i n t e r  ests above a l l , they gained the Ikeda Cabinet's confidence.34 Because of these f a c t o r s , the Ikeda Cabinet granted the i n  dependents an ambiguous sta t u s as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the LDP who were to work f o r the Cabinet. That i s , they were u t i l i s e d by the Cabinet as agents ; but at the l e v e l of p o l i c y making t h e i r i n f l u e n c e was not notably s i g n i f i c a n t . 45 FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I I ^"Nihon Kyosanto, ed., (Tokyo: Nihon Kyosanto Senden Kyoiku-ka, 1961), p. 19. Kanagawa Yukio, "Amerika no Gunji Senryaku to Nihon no J i e i t a i , " Zenei, June, I960, No. 169, pp. 85-93 . 3]jayashi Shigeo, "Amerika no Gunji Senryaku to Boeiryoku Zokyo no N e r a i , i ? Zenei, June, 1961, No. 181, pp. 154-9. ^In the Far East, American troops i n Japan were being reduced i n number while the United States was i n c r e a s i n g i t s troops i n Southeast A s i a . These two phenomena were combined i n the JCP's p o l i c y as i n t e r r e l a t e d a c t i o n s of the United St a ~J e s c ^Cf. Chapter IV, on Ikeda Cabinet's f i s c a l p o l i c y . ^Hayashi Shigeo, I b i d , p. 155. 7 c f . Chapter I I I , on the Japanese-American r e l a t i o n s . ^The Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 v/e re both fought over the c o n t r o l of the Korean Peni n s u l a . Japan's i n v a s i o n of North China or Manchuria can be i n t e r p r e t e d as the extension of these wars. ^Terao 'Goro, "Shin Anpo Joyaku to Nikkan Kaidan," Zenei, December, 1962, No. 204, p. l l o . l ^ C f . The JSP's s o c i a l a n a l y s i s and the terminology used by the JSP cannot be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from that of the JCP. -^This term r e f e r s to a p o l i t i c a l party which b a s i c a l l y agrees to the sustenance of the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l system. 1 ° - i n JSP's usage, the absolute n e u t r a l i s m always means unarmed n e u t r a l i s m . Asahi Shinbun, September 22, i 9 6 0 . l 4 I b i d , March 22, 1961. - ^ C f . Nagai Yonosuke's t h e s i s on Japanese defence and Far Eastern i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , i e , Heiv/a no Daisho, (Tokyo: Chuo Koron-sha. 1967), p. 62. l ^ A s a h i Shinbun, February 15, 1961. 46 17 "Shakaito no susuinubeki M i c h i , " Skonomisuto, V o l . 42, Ho. 10, p. 36. 18 i 0Round t a b l e d i s c u s s i o n by Utsunomiya Tokuma and Suzuki Mosaburo i n Chuo Koron, March, 1962, p. 38. •^Asahi Shinbun, February 18, 1964. 20 c u I s h i n o Hisao, ; ?Shinkyokumen o mukaeta Nikkan Kaidan," Gekkan Shakaito, A p r i l , 1963, No. 70, p. 42. 21Round t a b l e d i s c u s s i o n by Utsunomiya and Suzuki, Op_Cit* P* 43. ^ R e c o r d of conversations between Iwai A k i r a and Robert Kennedy, the Secretary of J u s t i c e , i n Ekonomisuto, V o l . 40, No. 13, p. 21. 23.?Chuso Ronso to Shakaito no Tachiba," J i y u , October, " , p. 5. 24Asahi Shinbun, February 23, 1962. 2 S •^Cf. Frank C. Langdon, '''Japanese L i b e r a l Democratic F a c t i o n a l Discord on China," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , XLI, (No. 3, 1968), pp. 403-15. 26 Sato Nobusuke was adopted by h i s uncle's f a m i l y , the K i s h i s . K i s h i Nobusuke i s an e l d e r brother of Sato S i s a k u . 27 'Asahi Shinbun, May 13, 1961. 2 % b i d , October 25, 1962. 29 -'This p r i n c i p l e was to separate Japan's diplomatic re l a t i o n s , and economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. Although Japan had economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h the mainland, she reserved the d i p l o m a t i c r e c o g n i t i o n f o r the N a t i o n a l i s t Government. 3°Asahi Shinbun, May 13, 1961. 3 1The i n t e r v i e w by Ekonomisuto, V o l . 42, No. 34, 1964, p. 60. 32«Heiwa Undo e no Teigen, '•' J i y u , September, 1964, pp. 122-3. 3 3 -^us xor t h i s mission, the four Independents mentioned i n the d i s c u s s i o n should be p a r t i c u l a r l y noted. 3^Cf. Chapter I I I , s e c t i o n on Japan's r e l a t i o n s with the communist b l o c . 47 CHAPTER I I I DIPLOMATIC ARRANGEMENT During the Ikeda period, the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty of the United States and Japan c o n s t i t u t e d the main part of Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . R e f l e c t i n g the dominant opinion of the conservative party, the basic p r i n c i p l e of the Ikeda Cabinet's defence p o l i c y was the maintenance and enforcement of the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty - a r e v i s i o n of the S e c u r i t y Treaty of 1951. I t was a l o n g - l a s t i n g n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a r  rangement concluded by the conservative p a r t y . The o r i g i n a l idea in' the S e c u r i t y Treaty t h a t Japan use American m i l i t a r y f o r c e f o r i t s n a t i o n a l defence, was i n h e r i t e d by the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty of I960. However, the pe r i o d of the Ikeda Cabinet turned out to be the t r a n s i t i o n a l time f o r Japan: moving from a dependent to a r e l a t i v e l y independent country i n i t s defence e f f o r t . The three major areas of diplomatic e f f o r t explored by the Ikeda Cabinet were roughly, Japanese- American r e l a t i o n s , Japanese-Korean r e l a t i o n s , and Japanese- communist bloc r e l a t i o n s . THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS NATIONAL CONCERN The Ikeda Cabinet acknowledged the i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y of the Japanese-American close t i e both f o r Japan's n a t i o n a l se c u r i t y and f o r economic p r o s p e r i t y . This perspective was no 43 d i f f e r e n t than that of K i s h i ' s previous cabinet. The t r u l y d i s t i n c t i v e character of the Ikeda Cabinet's American r e l a t i o n was that the Cabinet recognised the d i f f e r e n c e s i n n a t i o n a l concern and i n t e r e s t between the United States and Japan, and t r i e d to acquire as much as p o s s i b l e f o r the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t of Japan.1 There were two basic d i f f e r e n c e s of n a t i o n a l concern between the United States and Japan i n the problem of Japan's defence. F i r s t of a l l , Japan's geographical p o s i t i o n was v u l  nerable to Chinese or Russian attacks from the continent, whereas that of the United States was r e l a t i v e l y safe except f o r a t t a c k s by long range m i s s i l e s . This geographical p o s i  t i o n was such that i t was too r i s k y f o r Japan to adopt as h o s t i l e a p o l i c y against China as d i d the United States. The other d i f f e r e n c e was the view of the Chinese t h r e a t . American r e c o g n i t i o n of the Chinese t h r e a t was b a s i c a l l y a r e f l e c t i o n of the Chinese t h r e a t on American a l l i e s i n the Southeast A s i a and the Far East such as Indo-China, Taiwan, the P h i l i p p i n e s , and oouth Korea. The United States d i d not normally f e e l any d i r e c t t h r e a t from China, but i t s p e c i f i c a l l y emphasised the Chinese t h r e a t because i t was expected to prevent the Chinese i n f l u e n c e f rom spreading i n A s i a . Japan d i d not share an eq u a l l y extensive commitment to Asian p o l i t i c s , which made Japan unable to have the same image of China as d i d the United States. Moreover, Japan had been i n d u s t r i a l i s e d r a p i d l y and Japan's economic s i t u a t i o n was improving q u i c k l y . This 49 d i s t i n g u i s h e d Japan from most of the Asian c o u n t r i e s which were vulnerable to Chinese i d e o l o g i c a l aggression of Maoism because of t h e i r poverty and l a c k of p o l i t i c a l u n i t y . Japan's r e l a t i v e l y high l i v i n g standard and i t s c u l t u r a l bias towards the West European c i v i l i s a t i o n created a f i r m immunity against i n d i r e c t aggression of communism, and Japan could hardly share the threat of communism at as high l e v e l as most of the Asian non-communist c o u n t r i e s . 3 Japan's n a t i o n a l concern which thus d i f f e r e d from that of the United States and Asian non-communist c o u n t r i e s , required a s p e c i f i c defence p o l i c y which would s a t i s f y Japan's circums tances. In order to balance the enormous m i l i t a r y f o r c e s of the communist bloc i n the Far East, Japan could not help ac cepting the m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e w i t h the United States, which was to make the basic part of Japan's defence system. Un f o r t u n a t e l y f o r Japan, the Mutual Security Treaty was an im portant part of American Strategy f o r the Far East as w e l l as a defence p r o v i s i o n of Japan. Japan wanted the S e c u r i t y Treaty j u s t to maintain i t s own n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , -which un f o r t u n a t e l y d i d not compleatly harmonise w i t h the American Strategy f o r the Far East as a whole. The United States wanted to secure as much free use of Japanese bases as pos s i b l e to maintain i t s high m i l i t a r y m o b i l i t y i n the Far East. But, f o r Japan to have a c t i v e m i l i t a r y bases of the United States was very dangerous since i t could provoke communist c o u n t r i e s ' precautionary or r e t a l i a t o r y a t t a c k s en the bases 49 d i s t i n g u i s h e d Japan from most of the Asian c o u n t r i e s which were vulnerable t o Chinese i d e o l o g i c a l aggression of Maoism because of t h e i r poverty and l a c k o f p o l i t i c a l u n i t y . ^ Japan's r e l a t i v e l y high l i v i n g standard and i t s c u l t u r a l bias towards the West European c i v i l i s a t i o n created a f i r m immunity against i n d i r e c t aggression of communism, and Japan could hardly share the threat of communism at as high l e v e l as most of the Asian non-communist c o u n t r i e s . ^ Japan's n a t i o n a l concern which thus d i f f e r e d from that of the United States and Asian non-communist c o u n t r i e s , required a s p e c i f i c defence p o l i c y 'which would s a t i s f y Japan's circums tances. In order to balance the enormous m i l i t a r y f o r c e s o f the communist bloc i n the Far East, Japan could not help ac cepting the m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e w i t h the United States, which was to make the basic part of Japan's defence system. Un f o r t u n a t e l y f o r Japan, the Mutual Security Treaty was an im portant part of American Strategy f o r the Far East as w e l l as a defence p r o v i s i o n of Japan. Japan wanted the S e c u r i t y Treaty j u s t to maintain i t s own n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , which un f o r t u n a t e l y d i d net completely harmonise with the American Strategy f o r the Far East as a whole• The United States wanted to secure as much free use of Japanese bases as pos s i b l e to maintain i t s high m i l i t a r y m o b i l i t y i n the Far East. But, f o r Japan to have a c t i v e m i l i t a r y bases of the United States was very dangerous since i t could provoke communist c o u n t r i e s ' pre cautionary or r e t a l i a t o r y a t t a c k s on the bases 50 i n Japan. Therefore, the Ikeda Cabinet hoped to achieve as much detachment from the American Strategy f o r the Far East as p o s s i b l e w i t h i n a range that would not d i s t u r b the f u n c t i o n i n g of the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty guaranteeing Japan's own defence. THE RULES The Ikeda Cabinet set up two c o n d i t i o n s f o r Japan's n a t i o n a l defence by the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty. One was the p r i n c i p l e of autonomous defence and the other was non-nuclear armament of a l l f o r c e s i n Japan i n c l u d i n g the American forces i n Japanese bases. The autonomous defence meant that Japan would replace American forces i n Japan with i t s own forces at the e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e date while maintaining steady economic growth, and the other i m p l i c a t i o n of autonomous defence was th a t Japan reserved t o a c e r t a i n degree the r i g h t to c o n t r o l the a c t i v i t i e s of American forces i n Japan. Non-nuclear arm ament was intended to prevent an arms race between the com munist bloc and the Far Eastern anti-communist b l o c , e s p e c i a l l y between the communist bloc and Japan. Japan's autonomous defence which was a p a r t i a l d e v i a t i o n from the American Strategy f o r the Far East, was favoured i n one sense and not i n another sense by the United States. The American Government favoured Japan's autonomous defence- and I t s c l a i m f o r a l a r g e r r o l e i n the Far East as a n a t i o n of the Western b l o c . Both President Kennedy and Prime M i n i s t e r Ikeda emphasised the p a r t n e r s h i p between the United States 51 and Japan. The United States encouraged Japan as a partner i n the Far East, which changed the Japanese-American r e l a t i o n s from that of guarantor-guarantee. For the f i r s t time a f t e r o 1—> the P a c i f i c War, the United States and Japan J o i n t Communique of June, 1961 acknowledged that Japan had an equal commitment to the United States i n the Far Eastern i n t e r n a t i o n a l problem. However, Japan's f i e l d of commitment was l i m i t e d because of i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n f o r m i l i t a r y a c t i o n outside i t s t e r r i t o r y . THE ACTION For the f i r s t p r a c t i c a l step towards Japanese-American p a r t n e r s h i p , i n March of 1962 the United States sent a m i l i t a r y t e c h n i c a l survey group to the Far East and Southeast A s i a . The group's mission was to i n v e s t i g a t e Japan's c a p a b i l i t y to produce weapons f o r f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y f o r other Asian c o u n t r i e s . They st u d i e d the nature and types of weapons that these count r i e s needed.^ The United States accepted Japan's proposal of greater r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s own defence and expected Japan to a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n the American defence e f f o r t i n East A s i a * However, the United States r e a l i s e d the d i f f e r e n c e i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n between i t s e l f and Japan concerning Japan's idea of an autonomous defence. The United States Defense Department i n f o r m a l l y communicated to the Japanese Government i t s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with Japan's response to the American 52 p o l i c y f o r A s i a . The Pentagon was p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h Japan's i n f l e x i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty and i t s u n w i l l i n g n e s s to support American m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n Southeast A s i a . 5 There was indeed a c r u c i a l mis understanding between the United States and Japan concerning the Japanese i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of autonomous defence. The Japanese Government considered that 'autonomous de fence' gave Japan a c e r t a i n amount c f freedom to deviate from American Strategy f o r the Far East, while the United States i n t e r p r e t e d i t as meaning Japan would more a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n i t s p o l i c y f o r the Far East. For example, i n January of 1963 at the Japanese-American J o i n t S e c u r i t y Conference, the American r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s pointed out the danger of Japan's low e s t i m a t i o n of Chinese power i n c l u d i n g i t s m i l i t a r y f o r c e , and they asked Japan to study China more e x t e n s i v e l y . ^ A f t e r the conference, A s s i s t a n t Secretary of Defense, G i l p a t r i c k , communicated America's expectation that Japan play a l a r g e r r o l e i n American world p o l i c y . O l i i r a , the Foriegn M i n i s t e r of Japan, answered, For the sake of peace and p r o s p e r i t y i n the Far East, Japan must maintain an independent defence p o l i c y , and a t t a i n t h i s goal by f i r s t l y c o n s o l i d a t i n g our domestic p o l i t i c s . This should be the immediate step f o r Japan.< Prime M i n i s t e r Ikeda's answer was more d i r e c t , I t i s Inconceivable that you ( G i l p a t r i c k ) think, that you can provide an adequate defence force f o r Japan simply by l e t t i n g Japan possess as many sub marines and a i r p l a n e s as p o s s i b l e . What i s c r u c i a l i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l preparedness of the Japanese f o r 53 The germ of t h i s dispute was i n the f i r s t step of the Japanese- American p a r t n e r s h i p . The United States-Japanese J o i n t Com munique of June, 1961, says, The President and the Prime M i n i s t e r expressed t h e i r concern over the unstable aspects of the s i t u a t i o n i n A s i a and agreed to hold close con s u l t a t i o n i n the future w i t h a view of d i s c o v e r i n g the ways and means by which s t a b i l i t y and w e l l - being might be achieved i n that area.9 The American Government placed emphasis on the s t a b i l i t y of A s i a . This i n e v i t a b l y r e quired a c e r t a i n amount of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the communists a c t i n g i n A s i a . The Japanese Government, however, emphasised the w e l l - b e i n g of the people i n A s i a . Japan's view was based on the understanding that Asian p o l i t i c a l problems were b a s i c a l l y problems of l a c k of economic dovelopaent. In short, Japan's p o l i c y was a war against poverty whereas American p o l i c y was m i l i t a r y - such as war against Asian communism. Dif f e r e n c e s i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n between the United States and Japan of the autonomous defence p o l i c y brought b i t t e r d i s  i l l u s i o n m e n t to the United States as i t expected Japan to take a l a r g e r r o l e i n world p o l i c y . However, Japan's autono mous defence e f f o r t strengthened Japan's m i l i t a r y power con s i d e r a b l y , which was favourable to the United States. By ac cepting Japan's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the United States gained a stronger defence force at the expense of i t s fr e e use of and f r e e a c t i o n i n the m i l i t a r y bases i n Japan. Although these bases make an important l i n k i n the American defence l i n e i n the Par East, they would not have nuclear weapons and 54 would not be used f o r aggressive purposes. As f o r the Japa nese Government, i t succeeded i n e s t a b l i s h i n g an independent defence force which was not e n t i r e l y subject to American com mand, and which could act independently. THE JAPANESE-KOREAN NEGOTIATIONS BACKGROUND E s t a b l i s h i n g Korean diplomatic r e l a t i o n s was one of the important d i p l o m a t i c aims of the Ikeda Cabinet f o r Japan 1s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . Normalisation of the Japanese-Korean r e  l a t i o n s was a product of the a s p i r a t i o n s between Japan, Korea, and the United States. The American a s p i r a t i o n to s t a b i l i s e Northeast A s i a by Japanese-Korean f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s can be tr a c e d back h i s t o r i c a l l y as f a r as 1950, when General MacArthur i n v i t e d Mr. Syngman Rhee, the President of the Republic of Korea, to Tokyo.^ During the Korean War, Japan was i n d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n American m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n the Korean Peninsula. Japan was a p r i n c i p a l s t a g i n g area and base f o r the American forces f i g h t i n g i n Korea. This s i t u a t i o n helped to form a vague p o l i t i c a l t i e between South Korea and Japan f o r a short p e r i o d . However, i n the 1950 fs, the attempts to agree on diploma t i c r e l a t i o n s d i d not progress at a l l , mainly because South Korea d i d not recognise any pres s i n g need to r e c o n c i l e i t s r e l a t i o n s with Japan, The anti-Japanese f e e l i n g among the Koreans was strong 55 throughout the 1950's. The South Korean Government used the people's anti-Japanese sentiment f o r i t s maintenance i n power as w e l l as i t e x p l o i t e d the people's anti-communist sentiment. Anti-communist sentiment and anti-Japanese f e e l i n g were the strongest p o l i t i c a l f e e l i n g s that the South Korean Government 1 2 could f i n d i n the postwar Korean p o l i t i c a l chaos. The Government could not abandon such a valuable p o l i t i c a l asset only to please the United States or Japan, MOVE TO THE K'EGOTIATIQKS By I960, the s i t u a t i o n i n South Korea had changed dras t i c a l l y from that of the e a r l y 1950's. The most d i s t i n c t i v e change was that the South Korean p o l i t i c a l e l i t e began to recognise t h e i r f a i l u r e in. economic p o l i c y , and t h e i r s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n went to such an extent as to cause the expulsion of President Rhee. South Korea's poor economic c o n d i t i o n i n comparison to North Korea's created p o l i t i c a l unrest i n the South. Informed p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n Korea tended g r a d u a l l y toward the idea of c o a l i t i o n government of South and North Korea. Although they had no i l l u s i o n s about communism, North Korea's economic advancement was s t i l l h i g h l y i n v i t i n g f o r then. A f t e r the f a l l of President Rhee, t h i s tendency became more•and more prominent. The South Korean r u l i n g e l i t e had to immediately f i n d a way to s a t i s f y the people's economic d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n order to q u e l l any v i o l e n t expression of t h e i r f r u s t r a t i o n . 56 In I960 the United States faced a serious ' D o l l a r C r i s i s ' which prevented Her from t a k i n g any e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n towards easing South Korean p o l i t i c a l problems that stemmed from economic d i f f i c u l t i e s . In order to protect South Korea as w e l l as i t s own d o l l a r as standard currency i n world economy, the United States had t o use Japan's economic i n f l u e n c e i n East A s i a . A l s o , from the viewpoint of American Strategy f o r the Far East, the close Japanese-Korean r e l a t i o n s would be valuable since they would strengthen i t s defence p o t e n t i a l as a whole i n Northeast A s i a . N i n e t e e n - s i x t y was the year when the Japanese economy entered i n t o a period of r a p i d e x p a n s i o n . ^ Economic growth n a t u r a l l y made the Japanese r u l i n g e l i t e r e a l i s e the import ance of Japan's economic power. Their confidence i n Japan's economic p o t e n t i a l was r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r e x t e r n a l p o l i c y . In the sphere of n a t i o n a l defence, the Ikeda Cabinet proposed the p o l i c y of autonomous defence. I t f u r t h e r demanded a l a r g e r r o l e f o r Japan i n the Western bl o c . Japan's demand to acquire a l a r g e r r o l e i n the Western bloc was f u l f i l l e d i n t hat i t took over a c e r t a i n p r o p o r t i o n of the American r o l e i n A s i a as an economic guarantor. This p o l i c y was i n c i d e n  t a l l y i n harmony w i t h the American p o l i c y to defend the ' d o l l a r . ' The autonomous defence p o l i c y r e q u i r e d the Japanese Government to maintain a rough balance of power i n the Far East, or i n other words, to maintain the s t a t u s quo. 57 TAutonomous defence' i n i t s e l f was not the supreme goal of the Japanese Government, but a means of pursuing a higher p o l i t i c a l goal of economic p r o s p e r i t y . In t h i s p e r i o d as long as the American forces guaranteed Japan's defence, the supreme goal of the Japanese Government remained to be r a p i d economic growth. The defence e f f o r t i n the domestic p o l i t i c a l sphere was kept at the minimum l e v e l r e q u i r e d f o r a degree of defence autonomy which would not d i s t u r b i t s economic p o l i c y . A l t e r a t i o n i n the status quo or change i n the power balance i n the Far Fast could force Japan to increase the budget f o r defence i n s t e a d of f o r economic investment - a course which the Japanese Government t r i e d to evade. A great p o t e n t i a l danger to the maintenance of the status quo i n the Far East was South Korean economic i n s t a b i l i t y . This i n s t a b i l i t y could provoke North Korea to r e - u n i f y Korea, of which both the United States and Japan thought there was 'something that could be done. NEGOTIATIONS In June of 1961, Prime M i n i s t e r Ikeda and President Kennedy issued a j o i n t communique i n which they agreed to i n  creasing t h e i r a i d to South Korea. The New York Times reported, Two major items then discussed were the question of Chinese r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the United Nations and the prospect f o r p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and economic deve lopment i n South Korea. Sources s a i d , however, that Tokyo and Washington were eager to do what could be done to help the Koreans achieve p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and to cor r e c t the economic stagnation that has t r o u b l e d South Korea since the end of the World War 11.15 58 Upon the agreement of Japan, South Korea, and the United States, the Japanese-Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s started new sessions i n October of 1961, and were continued e n e r g e t i c a l l y a l l through the Ikeda period. 3y the t i n e Prime Minister Ikeda r e t i r e d from o f f i c e , almost a l l the t e c h n i c a l problems of the agreements were solved, yet the t r e a t y was not signed. The f a c t o r s that prevented Japan and South Korea from signing a t r e a t y were many and roughly they can bo d i v i d e d i n t o three groups. ln.;jj J j l r j x O u L l X X S i O The f i r s t group of d i f f i c u l t i e s was South Korea's domes t i c factors. The planned Japanese-Korean treaty was regarded by the Koreans as l i k e l y to con s o l i d a t e the st a t u s quo i n the Korean Peninsula. The consolidation nig h t jeopardise t h e i r r a t h e r d i s t a n t goal to r e - u n i f y Korea. The n e g o t i a t i o n s alone reminded the Koreans of 'Japanese i m p e r i a l i s m ' that c o n t r o l l e d Korea f o r more than t h i r t y years. Because t h a two countries were not equal i n t h e i r economic capacity and because the South Korean Government t r i e d to e x t r a c t as much economic b e n e f i t from Japan as they could, the n e g o t i a t i o n s i n the people's eyes, a m p l i f i e d t h e i r economical!] 7 i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n to Japan. A g i t a t e d by anti-Japanese sentiment, the South Koreans organised l a r g e a n t i - t r e a t y demonstrations i n s p i t e of the f a c t that they were under s t r i c t martial law. The second group of d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o lved genuinely 59 t e c h n i c a l problems. Japan and Korea had a d i r e c t c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t over f i s h i n g r i g h t s i n the same waters as w e l l as a t e r r i t o r i a l controversy over Takeshima (an i s l a n d -without any r e s i d e n t s ) . Korea once had been incorporated i n t o Japan and was placed under the c o n t r o l of the A l l i e d Powers a f t e r the P a c i f i c War. This s i t u a t i o n complicated the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of ownership and the e s t i m a t i o n of value of the Japanese property and debt i n Korea. These t e c h n i c a l problems had to be straightened out through r e p a r a t i o n s , Furthermore, se p a r a t i o n of North and South Korea caused complications w i t h regard to treatment of the Koreans i n Japan. The t h i r d group of d i f f i c u l t i e s stemmed from m i l i t a r y i m p l i c a t i o n i n the expected t r e a t y between Japan and Korea. Japan's Foreign M i n i s t e r once s t a t e d that Japan's l a r g e r r o l e i n the 'Containment of China' as asked f o r by President Kennedy, could only be enacted by concluding the Japanese- Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s . Of course, the coming Japanese-Korean t r e a t y had the immediate purpose of s e t t l i n g the c o n f l i c t s of the two neighbouring c o u n t r i e s . Nonetheless, what motivated Ohira was the American c a l l i n g f o r enforcement of an a n t i - communist defence network.16 p o r the communist b l o c , s t a b i  l i s a t i o n of the South Korean economy by the coming t r e a t y was not only a l o s s of t h e i r economic dominance i n the Korean Peninsula but i t was expected that economically enforced South Korea would reverse the e x i s t i n g economic r e l a t i o n s of North and South Korea. A strengthened South Korea could change the 60 o v e r a l l s t r a t e g i c balance i n the Korean Peninsula where the communist bloc had always maintained m i l i t a r y and economic s u p e r i o r i t y to South Korea. Therefore, the expected t r e a t y between Japan and South Korea was understood by the communist bloc as a ser i o u s p o l i t i c a l t h r e a t . The communist bloc com municated t h e i r a n t i p a t h y f o r the n e g o t i a t i o n s i n two ways. They issued a s e r i e s of statements a t t a c k i n g the n e g o t i a t i o n s , and they a l s o used communist sympathisers i n Japan to oppose the Japanese Government. The Ikeda Cabinet's w e l l designed p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s programme prevented the a n t i - n e g o t i a t i o n s movement from growing as l a r g e as the a n t i - S e c u r i t y T r e aty 17 movement of I960. nevertheless, the movement was e f f e c t i v e enough to threaten the Ikeda Cabinet to such an extent that i t would not take the r i s k of s i g n i n g the t r e a t y immediately. The Ikeda Cabinet's supreme aim i n the Japanese-Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s was the s t a b i l i s a t i o n of South Korea, which was supposed to increase the s e c u r i t y of Japan. Signing the t r e a t y was avoided by the Cabinet so as not to provoke the communist bloc m i l i t a r i l y or to cause domestic unrest. The Ikeda Cabinet had to continue i t s p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s t a c t i c s i n hopes of a more favourable response. When they reached the basic agreements, the Cabinet d i d 'what could be done to help the Korean,' The business Union of Tokyo (Tokyo J i t s u - gyo Rengokai) sent i t s mission f o r research and encouragement c f Japanese-Korean trade i n February of 1963. A lfMemorandom f o r Cooperation" was signed by the Japanese-Korean Commission 61 of Commerce and Industry (IMikkan Shoko Kaigisho) i n J u l y of 1963• The South Korean Government al s o moved towards coopera t i o n and enacted a s p e c i a l law that permitted the i n t r o d u c t i o n of Japanese c a p i t a l , and i t a l s o accepted Japan's f r i e n d s h i p g i f t of twenty-thousand tons of food to meet i t s food crisis.-'-' Thus, having solved almost a l l the t e c h n i c a l questions bet ween South Korea and Japan, i n s t e a d of s i g n i n g the t r e a t y , the Japanese Government s t a r t e d to send economic a i d to South Korea as the f i r s t p r a c t i c a l measure towards f r i e n d l y r e l a  t i o n s . These a c t i o n s were i n accord with Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y to strengthen the South Korean Government. This pro v i s i o n was expected to e l i m i n a t e a p o t e n t i a l source of m i l i  t a r y c o n f l i c t around Japan. THE COMMUNIST BLOC The Ikeda Cabinet was the most a c t i v e of a l l the postwar cabinets i n approaching the communist b l o c , on the v e r b a l l e v e l at l e a s t . The p o l i c y to approach the communist bloc had namely two goals: to respond to the domestic demand f o r good r e l a t i o n s ; and to a i d n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n d i r e c t l y by d i s s o l v i n g the communist c o u n t r i e s ' s u s p i c i o n of Japan's i n  t e n t i o n s under the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty, when these two o b j e c t i v e s are examined i t becomes c l e a r e r why the Ikeda . Cabinet was a c t i v e on the v e r b a l l e v e l and not on the p r a c t i  c a l l e v e l . Since the main theme of t h i s paper i s the s e c u r i t y p o l i c y and not the p o l i c y proper, the f i r s t o b j e c t i v e should 62 be discussed, b r i e f l y . AIMS OF THE CABINET Ikeda's f i r s t statement expressing h i s w i l l i n g n e s s to approach China, was i s s u e d four weeks a f t e r Prime M i n i s t e r K i s h i declared h i s r e s i g n a t i o n from o f f i c e . ^ At t h i s time the p u b l i c sentiment was overwhelmingly r e s e n t f u l of the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty. This was i n t e r p r e t e d by the Japan S o c i a l i s t Party and the Japan Communist Party as a provoca t i v e t r e a t y by nature i n r e l a t i o n to the communist b l o c . The o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s attacked the government's u n f r i e n d l y hand l i n g of i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the communist bloc i n comparison to i t s f r i e n d l y or o f t e n submissive r e l a t i o n s with the United States, In I960, the Ikeda Cabinet had to respond to the a c c i d e n t a l l y a m p l i f i e d popular sentiment opposing Japan's over-involvement i n American Strategy f o r the Far East. Led by the JSP and the JCP, the o p p o s i t i o n and informed p u b l i c opinion demanded an independent f o r e i g n p o l i c y , or more b l u n t l y , Japan's rapproachment with the communist c o u n t r i e s . The energy of the r e b e l l i o u s movement could only be m o l l i f i e d by the c o n c i l i a t o r y moves towards the communist b l o c . Ikeda emphasised h i s w i l l i n g n e s s to seek r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with China and to enlarge trade r e l a t i o n s with communist c o u n t r i e s . Ob v i o u s l y t h i s p o l i c y was i n response to the sweeping popular movement of I960 and Ikeda's p o l i c y was not meant to be an extensive enlargement of Japan's r e l a t i o n s with the communist 63 21 b l o c . Nor clid popular sentiment demand i t to such an extent. The second and s a l i e n t reason that the Ikeda Cabinet t r i e d to maintain f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with the communist bloc, was the defensive i m p l i c a t i o n of Japan's approach to them. Ikeda a t t a i n e d h i s 'diplomatic' t r a i n i n g i n the l o s h i d a Cabinet (1948-54) mostly as the i - l i n i s t e r of Finance (which w i l l be mentioned i n the f i n a l chapter)• In short, the common p r i n  c i p l e of Yoshida and Ikeda 1s diplomacy can be found i n t h e i r respect f o r economic t i e s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . ' - ^ Yoshida was reported to have s a i d , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l loans have a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n maintaining i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n  s h i p s , Ikeda s a i d i n h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e speech, According to our p r i n c i p l e of Peace Diplomacy, we v / i l l strenuously sock f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with com munist c o u n t r i e s . As f o r r e l a t i o n s with c o n t i n e n t a l China, mutual n c n - i n t o r v o n t i o n i n domestic p o l i t i c s and mutual respect of each p o l i t y w i l l g r a d u a l l y increase f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . At the present I s t r o n g l y favour Sino-Japanese trade, which although once ceased, i s now rev i v i n g . 2 4 The Ikeda Cabinet d i d not expect Sino-Japanese trade to grow e x t e n s i v e l y , and i t even, discouraged the trade when i t was about to grow as high as Japan's trade with other coun t r i e s outside the communist b l o c . The Japanese Government d i d not authorise long term loans of the government Export-Import Bank funds f o r Sino-Japanese trade except i n a few cases. Such loans v/e re to bo used to encourage Japan's export to non- communist c o u n t r i e s . ^ Moreover, Ikeda considered that Sino- Japaneso trade would not expand to the extent that i t could e f f e c t a major s t r u c t u r a l change i n Japan's i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade. 64 When Ikeda v i s i t e d West Germany i n 1962, he s a i d to Prime M i n i s t e r Adenauer, Although Communist China has l i t t l e to o f f e r Japan i t wants to buy various goods on our market, and i t i n e v i t a b l y r e quires extending c r e d i t s . Sino- 26 Japanese trade w i l l not grow because of t h i s b a r r i e r . Thus, while not expecting i t s l a r g e scale growth nor ericcour- aging i t , the Ikeda Cabinet maintained Sino-Japanese trade and c u l t u r a l exchange with communist c o u n t r i e s . This ap proach of the Ikeda Cabinet to the communist b l o c , e s p e c i a l l y to China, can best be understood as a scheme to ease the Sino- Japanese t e n s i o n which could threaten Japan's s e c u r i t y , as i t once d i d during the time of the K i s h i Cabinet. ^ 7 OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS The o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s which enabled the Ikeda Cabinet to acquire good terms w i t h the People's Republic of China must be b r i e f l y mentioned before continuing the d i s c u s s i o n of Japan's approach to the communist b l o c . F i r s t l y , having watched China's e x t e r n a l p o l i c y f o r more than a decade a f t e r i t s independence, the Japanese Government could judge w i t h confidence that China had no p a r t i c u l a r i n  t e n t i o n to threaten Japan's s e c u r i t y with m i l i t a r y means. As f o r the i n d i r e c t i n t e r f e r e n c e from China, Ikeda as w e l l as Yoshida, was convinced that the people's w e l l - b e i n g was the best p r o t e c t i o n against i t , and Japan's economic s i t u a t i o n i n I960 was considered strong enough to give immunity against 99 i n d i r e c t aggression from communism.~ 65 Secondly, China's p o l i c y of the 'Great Leap Forward' ended i n f a i l u r e and r e s u l t e d i n a f u r t h e r Sino-Soviet s p l i t , which f o r c e d China to stop short. China could no longer expect a high l e v e l of trade with the Soviet Union and had to look elsewhere f o r the m a t e r i a l to reconst r u c t i t s damaged economy. Japan was one of the countries that could provide goods and s e r v i c e s necessary f o r China to r e v i t a l i s e i t s economy. T h i r d l y , the Japanese Government acquired enough inform a t i o n about China's m i l i t a r y power and could judge China's c a p a b i l i t y to support i t s p o l i t i c a l l y m i l i t a n t but s t r a t e g i  c a l l y d i s c r e e t a c t i o n . Several i n c i d e n t s i n and over the Taiwan S t r a i t i n 195S and a f t e r , revealed China's weakness i n sea and a i r f o r c e s . The Korean War proved that China could w e l l cope w i t h the American forces i n conventional warfare on the l a n d . The obvious conclusion was that China's m i l i t a r y f orce was defensive and i t s o f f e n s i v e capacity was l i m i t e d . F o u r t h l y , China had to accept the p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of Japan, e s p e c i a l l y the consistent support of the people to the conservative government headed by the Liberal-Democratic party. The conservative party won the general e l e c t i o n i n December of I960 despite two unfavourable i n c i d e n t s - the I960 a n t i - Cabinet demonstrations and the a s s a s s i n a t i o n of Asanuma I n a j i r o , Chairman of the JSP. Both i n c i d e n t s had been specu l a t e d as disadvantageous f o r the LDP i n the e l e c t i o n . As a r e s u l t of the LDP's v i c t o r y , the Chinese Government turned i t s a t t e n t i o n to the Japanese Government and favoured the Ikeda 66 Cabinet's cooperative a t t i t u d e towards the communist b l o c . F i f t h l y , the l i b e r a l image of the Kennedy a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the United States encouraged the Ikeda Cabinet to push f o r  ward i t s c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y towards the communist c o u n t r i e s . These were roughly the o b j e c t i v e conditions that gave a frame and a basis to the Ikeda Cabinet's p o l i c y f o r China and other c o u n t r i e s i n the communist b l o c . ACTIONS OF THE CABINET Ikeda's p o l i c y towards the communist bloc was mostly hampered by the f a c t that Japan was incorporated i n t o the American anti-communist m i l i t a r y network i n the Far East. Concerning Japan's p o l i c y f o r China, the f a c t that both Taiwan and China had never t o l e r a t e d one another made an a d d i t i o n a l b a r r i e r . No important government i n the world could recognise China and Taiwan at the same time because both c o u n t r i e s f i r m l y and c o n s i s t e n t l y t u r n down the idea of two Chinas. Con sequently , the Japanese Government could not normalise d i p l o  matic r e l a t i o n s w i t h China without breaking o f f w i t h Taiwan, because t h i s would cause a too r a d i c a l change i n the power balance i n the Far East. The Ikeda Cabinet's s o l u t i o n to such a dilemma was the 'separation of p o l i t i c s and economics' ( S e i k e i B u n r i ) . This p r i n c i p l e had two connotations. One was that Japan would not recognise Communist China even though i t had economic r e l a  t i o n s w i t h her, and the other was mutual non-intervention i n 67 domestic p o l i t i c s . China i n s i s t e d upon the i n s e p a r a b i l i t y of p o l i t i c s and economics (Se ike i Fukabun). In I960, China and Japan reached a strange agreement that they would mutually respect each other's p r i n c i p l e s (which were l o g i c a l l y contra d i c t o r y to each other) and that through the accumulation of economic exchanges both p a r t i e s would expect n o r m a l i s a t i o n of dip l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s i n the future.3 0 The Ikeda Cabinet sent four ' s e m i - o f f i c i a l ' missions to China i n four years. The o s t e n s i b l e r o l e of the missions was the n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the Chinese Government concerning trade. The f i r s t mission was l e d by a conservative Diet member Takasaki Tatsunosuke i n October, I960, and the mission con s i s t e d mainly of businessmen. This mission re-opened the Sino-Japanese s e m i - o f f i c i a l governmental exchange channel. Si x weeks a f t e r the Takasaki mission, the Japanese Government decided to remove a r e s t r i c t i o n on Sino-Japanese tr a d e . The 'Compulsory Balanced-Trade Formula' f o r Sino-Japanese trade was l i f t e d . Ikeda s t a t e d i n December, I960, that Sino-Japanese trade should be encouraged even without governmental agreements. Some of the progress observed i n the e a r l y Ikeda period concerning Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the communist bloc were as f o l l o w s . In January, 1961, the 'Russo-Japanese C u l t u r a l Agree ment and Cooperation Plan' was signed. In A p r i l , the 'Com pulsory Balanced-Trade Formula' was abolished f o r a l l communist c o u n t r i e s . In February, 1962, the Russo-Japanese Trade En largement Commission was organised, which was to make plans 68 to develop S i b e r i a w i t h Japanese c a p i t a l and encourage Russo- Japanese tr a d e . In May, 1962, the Japanese Government autho r i s e d extended c r e d i t f o r trade with China f o r a p e r i o d of l e s s than f i v e years. In September, 1962, a conservative Diot Member Matsumura Kenzo, was sent to Peking and h i s mission was followed by the second Takasaki mission accompanied by a business group. Takasaki signed an agreement, c a l l e d , "Liu-Takasaki Agreement" which was a semi-governmental agreement between the two p a r t i e s . The L-T agreement approved 100 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n trade par year f o r f i v e successive years s t a r t i n g i n 1963. The agreement permitted the use of governmental loans f o r export. The Ikeda Cabinet not only sent s e m i - o f f i c i a l missions, but also encouraged the LDP' Diot members to v i s i t communist co u n t r i e s as w e l l as Communist and S o c i a l i s t Diet members. Such a l i b e r a l a t t i t u d e of the Ikeda Cabinet towards the com munist bloc annoyed the Taiwan Government. Above a l l , the L-T agreement was taken as a threat to Taiwan's status because i t looked l i k e Japan's f i r s t step to recognise Communist China. The Taiwan Government communicated a strong p r o t e s t t o the • Ikeda Cabinet. However, i t d i d not change the general t r e n d very much. In l a t e 1963 a f t e r having e x e r c i s e d gradual pres- .sure on Japan, the Taiwan Government took a d r a s t i c a c t i o n against Japan at the end of the "Chou Heng-ching Incident. " 3 1 69 REVERSE TREND Immediately a f t e r the Chou Incident, the French Govern ment recognised the People's Republic of China as the l e g i t i  mate Government of China and Taiwan was recognised as Taiwan, not as China. According to I t s e s t a b l i s h e d process and p r i n  c i p l e , Taiwan broke o f f i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h France. The French r e c o g n i t i o n of China g r e a t l y weakened Taiwan's sta t u s .in inter n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . Taiwan's i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s had been based on a f i c t i o n that i t represented whole China, and the French r e c o g n i t i o n of C o n t i n e n t a l China was a severe blow. Now that Taiwan's status was weakened, the Ikeda Cabinet f e l t i t had to support Taiwan i n order to preserve the status quo i n the Far East. The Cabinet decided to t e n t a t i v e l y check i t s p o l i c y toward r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with China.32 Four "weeks a f t e r the French r e c o g n i t i o n of China, the Ikeda Cabinet sent ex-Prime M i n i s t e r Yoshida Shigeru to Taiwan to assure her that the Cabinet would not permit governmental c r e d i t to be extended f o r mainland trade any longer. This i m p l i c i t l y meant that Japan would not move towards recogni t i o n of Communist China as the l e g i t i m a t e government of China. Thus, the Ikeda Cabinet's p o l i c y to approach the communist bloc e x t e n s i v e l y on c e r t a i n dimensions, such as economic and c u l t u r a l exchange, was checked and retarded by the French r e c o g n i t i o n of China. I t was a n t i c i p a t e d that the r e c o g n i t i o n could give a d r a s t i c e f f e c t to the e x i s t i n g Far Eastern power balance.33 70 The Ikeda Cabinet's strenuous e f f o r t to encourage or pretend to encourage trade r e l a t i o n s with the communist b l o c , was a scheme t c support Japan's s e c u r i t y i n d i r e c t l y . Ikeda was very w e l l aware that more intimate economic r e l a t i o n s would c o n t r i b u t e to producing a f r i e n d l y atmosphere between the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d . Ikeda also encouraged personal exchange wit h communist count r i e s i n order to e n r i c h the understanding of each country and i t s p o l i t y . For example, during the Ikeda p e r i o d , the JSP sent se v e r a l missions to China, and they ap p a r e n t l y t r i e d to e x p l a i n Japan's i n t e n t i o n under the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty.3^ This c o n t r i b u t e d to f u r t h e r understanding of both c o u n t r i e s ' government by each other. The LDP's delegates on four occasions t a l k e d about Japan's defence scheme and the defensive nature of the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty when they met Chou E n - l a i , Ch'en X i and other high o f f i c i a l s of the Chinese Government. Takasaki Tatsunosuke on h i s f i r s t mission answered Chou E n - l a i ' s attack on the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty, There i s no Japanese who intends to attack China w i t h American a i d under the S e c u r i t y Treaty. Japan was hurt a f t e r the American conquest and the S e c u r i t y Treaty i s a r e s u l t of the wound. The S e c u r i t y Treaty i s a n a t u r a l l y grown s h e l t e r that protects wounded Japan from germs. Once Japan has recovered from the wound i t w i l l become unnecessary. For example, the American land force has already been evacuated from Japan. V-Jhen the United Nations begins e x e r t i n g i t s s e c u r i t y maintenance f u n c t i o n s , the S e c u r i t y Treaty w i l l become unnecessary. Such i s the agreement of both p a r t i e s i n the t r e a t y . 3 5 Thus, the f i r s t Takasaki mission simply communicated the Ikeda Cabinet's 'good w i l l ' towards China, and re-opened 71 trade r e l a t i o n s . The Matsumura mission of 1962 f u r t h e r supported the Cabinet's scheme. Matsuraura succeeded i n convincing Chou En- l a i and Ch'en I i that the Ikeda Cabinet's ultimate' goal i n i t s China p o l i c y was to recognise China and that the accumul a t i o n formula (to p i l e up e m p i r i c a l f a c t s and a c t i o n s , and- e v e n t u a l l y to re s t o r e diplomatic r e l a t i o n s ) was a p r a c t i c a l 0 6 stop towards that g o a l . J " The JXiatsumura mission was immediately f o l l o w e d by the second Takasaki mission. Thus the L-T agree ments were concluded. This r a p i d process i m p l i e s the Matsu- mura mission's s i g n i f i c a n c e i n promoting Sino-Japanese under standing, e s p e c i a l l y China's understanding of Japan's de fe n s i v e p r o v i s i o n i n the S e c u r i t y Treaty, Mot only NLatsumura and Takasaki, but many Diet members of the LDP v i s i t e d China on a p r i v a t e l e v e l during the Ikeda p e r i o d . They opened p r i v a t e access t o the Chinese Government, and these channels helped the Cabinet to communicate i t s ideas t o the Chinese Government. However, what should be noted here i s that the Ike dr. Cabinet's p o l i c y to approach the communist bloc was e s s e n t i a l l y formed to ease the a n t a g o n i s t i c r e l a t i o n s of China and Japan that had e x i s t e d since the time of the h i s h i Cabinet. In other words the s a l i e n t o b j e c t i v e was the s e c u r i t y of Japan, and the main goal was not recon c i l i a t i o n w i t h the communist c o u n t r i e s . For example, while approaching the communist b l o c , the Ikeda Cabinet communicated s t e r n p r o t e s t s to the Soviet Union concerning the recommencing 72 of i t s nuclear t e s t i n g s . Such p r o t e s t s r e v e a l the Ikeda Cabinet's basic stand i n i t s p o l i c y f o r the communist world. The LDF's p o l i c y Research Committee (Seimu Chosa-kai) sum marises i t s defence p o l i c y as f o l l o w s . As f o r our n a t i o n a l defiance, u n t i l the United Nations becomes a p e r f e c t peace-keeping o r g a n i s a t i o n , our party villi f i r m l y maintain the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty t o guarantee our n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and p r o s p e r i t y with the cooperation of the United States...At the same time, Japan w i l l exert i t s e f f o r t to f o s t e r the f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h neighbouring c o u n t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y w i t h Asian neighbours. Being l o c a t e d i n Asia,- we b e l i e v e that Japan has a s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i  b i l i t y to contr i b u t e to s t a b i l i s a t i o n and p r o s p e r i t y of A s i a f o r the sake of the world peace...38 The Ikeda Cabinet s u c c e s s f u l l y c a r r i e d out i t s p o l i c y f o r the communist bloc u n t i l the end of 1963. However, Taiwan's sharp r e a c t i o n to Japan's p o l i c y towards Mainland China shown i n the Chou Incident, forced the Cabinet to r e  organise i t s China p o l i c y . The Japanese Government specu l a t e d that the unexpected French r e c o g n i t i o n of China could change the systemic s i t u a t i o n of the Far East considerably. This s i t u a t i o n o b l i g e d the Ikeda Cabinet to appease the Taiwan Government at the expense of i t s p o l i c y f o r Communist China so t h a t the status quo i n the Far East would be maintained. This change of p o l i c y was obviously a r e t r e a t from the former p o s i t i o n of the Ikeda Cabinet, and was a necessary r e t r e a t f o r the sake of Japan's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . 73 FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I I I ^Ekonomisuto, V o l . 39 , Ho. 22, 1961, p. 11. o Utsunomiya Tokuma, neiwa kyozon to Ninon Gaiko, (Tokyo: Kobundo, I960), pp. 14-13. ^Asahi Shinbun, February 18, 1964. ^hlbid, March 17, 1962. 5 I b i d , May 26, 1962. I b i d , January 19, 1963. ^ I b i d , February 7, 1963. °Ito Masaya, Ikeda Hayato: Sono Sei to S h i , (Tokyo: S h i s e i - do, 1967), p. 199. 9New York Times, June 23, 1961. ^ A j i a - A f u r i k a Koza, ed., Nihon to Chosen, (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1965), pp. 61-62. •^Asahi Shinbun ,September 4, 1948. 1 2 x i''or such psychology, consult David J . F i n l a y , Ole R. K o l s t i , Richard R. Fagen, Enemies i n P o l i t i c s , (Chicago: Rand Mcnally and Company, 1967), pp. 13-22. 13cf. Minami Ryoshin, "The Turning Point i n the Japanese Economy," Quarterly Journal of Economics,XXXII, (August, 1968), 3 82. 14Nex-/ York Times, June 22, 196I. - ^ l o c c i t . •'•^ Kuse Yuzo, "Konohito o h y o t e i suru," Ekonomisuto, V o l . 40, No. $2, 1962, p. 39. 17 'Ito Masaya, Op. C i t . , pp. 173-4. 18 A A j i a - A f u r i k a Koza, ed., Op. C i t . , p. 83. 7 4 s a h i Shinbun, J u l y 23, I960. ikeda's statement at a f o r e i g n press conference, "China i s our Neighbour and has had extensive h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s with us. We would l i k e to e s t a b l i s h f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . But i n p r a c t i c e , i t i n v o l v e s a great many d i f f i c u l t i e s . 1 1 on ^Asanuma I n a j i r o , "Kokumin n i u t t a e r u , " Asahi Shinbun, May 19, I960, and JSP's statement concerning the S e c u r i t y Treaty, Asahi Shinbun, May 22, I960. ^ F o r example, the Chairman of the JSP, Asanuma, made a speech i n Peking, s t a t i n g , "American i m p e r i a l i s m i s the common enemy of the Chinese and the Japanese people." This statement was se v e r e l y c r i t i c i s e d not only by the Government but a l s o by the p u b l i c o p i n i o n . As a r e s u l t , the conservative party won the I960 general e l e c t i o n although i t was p r e d i c t e d that the LDP could be defeated a f t e r the I960 p o l i t i c a l t u r m o i l . Former Chairman of the JSP, Suzuki, was c r i t i c i s e d s everely when he confirmed the above statement of Asanuma i n Peking i n 1961. 22 f i a j i Fumio, Ningen Ikeda Nayato, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1967), p. 140. "According t o Ikeda !s c a l c u l a t i o n , even one h a l f of the n a t i o n a l budget, 300 b i l l i o n Yen, would not make a powerful new army. Therefore, n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y should be maintained by c o l l e c t i v e defence by the American f o r c e , and defeated Japan should p r i m a r i l y be concerned with saving c a p i t a l and r e v i t a l  i s i n g economy. Thus, Yoshida and Ikeda's ideas of defence and armament were fused i n t o one.''1' ^Kosaka Masataka, "Saisho Yoshida Shigeru Ron," Chuo Koron, February 1964, P« 84. 24Asahi Shinbun, October 22, I960. 25cf. The Yoshida l e t t e r of February, 1964, i n Asahi Nenkan, 1965, p. 298. 2^Ito Masaya, Op. C i t . , p. 153. 27New China News Agency, January 14, I960, (from Asahi  Shinbun) The E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s O f f i c e of the Chinese Government issued a statement concerning the s i g n i n g of the Japanese-Ameri can Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty at 'Washington, "Prime M i n i s t e r K i s h i of Japan, d i s r e g a r d i n g the Japanese people's antipathy and d i s  regarding the Chinese and other c o u n t r i e s ' warning, decided to sig n the Japanese-American m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e pact on the 19th of January i n Washington. This i s an important step of American i m p e r i a l i s m and Japanese r e a c t i o n a r i e s to prepare a new aggres s i v e war to threaten Asia and the world. The Chinese people have paid a t t e n t i o n to the Japanese people's struggle to gain n a t i o n a l independence, democracy, 75 peace and n e u t r a l i t y , and oppose r e v i v a l of militarism...The Chinese Government cannot help p o i n t i n g out that the conclusion of the Japanese-American m i l i t a r y pact v i n d i c a t e s r e v i t a l i s a - t i o n of Japanese m i l i t a r i s m and i t m a n i f e s t l y demonstrates Japan's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the aggressive m i l i t a r y bloc l e d by the United S t a t e s . " 2^ ~ _p 1.7 „ . O ex, wote j% 29 " I k e d a ' s statement at a f o r e i g n press conference on June 13, 1961 (from Asahi Shinbun). "Communism permiates i n t o and develops i n an area of low l i v i n g standard. When the l i v i n g standard goes up, communism goes under. That i s why we thi n k our e f f o r t should be concentrated on economic growth and on improvement of the people's l i v i n g standard." Of) ^ Chou E n - l a i i m p l i c i t l y and vaguely recognised Japan's separation p r i n c i p l e of p o l i t i c s and economic at the f a r e w e l l p a r t y f o r the Matsumura mission of 1962. Chou's speech was recorded i n the Asahi Shinbun, September 20, 1962. -'Chou Heng-ching I n c i d e n t . A Chinese-Japanese i n t e r  p r e t e r , Chou Heng-ching, who came t c Japan w i t h China's machi nery ' in v e s t i g a t i o n group, deserted from the group and asked asylum of the Russian Embassy i n Tokyo. He was sent to the Japanese immigration o f f i c e , where he changed the country of h i s d e s t i n a t i o n from Russia to Taiwan, and then to Japan. He f i n a l l y s t a r t e d a hunger s t r i k e demanding to be sent back to the o r i g i n a l country, China. 3^In January of 1964, pro-Taiwan f a c t i o n of the LDP (the I s h i i f a c t i o n , namely) worked a c t i v e l y to change Ikeda's p o l i c y f o r China and Taiwan. I s h i i M i t s u j i r o ' s f a c t i o n was the most a c t i v e to change the Cabinet's a t t i t u d e towards Taiwan. I t was b e l i e v e d that I s h i i proposed the idea to send ex-Prime M i n i s t e r l o s h i d a to Taiwan with a 'private l e t t e r ' to Chiang Kai-shek on l i m i t i n a trade w i t h the mainland. T t o Masaya, I b i d , pp. 221-2. •^Cf. The previous chapter, s e c t i o n on the J; o t-->->i?Shu Onrai to Kaidan s h i t e , " Chuo Koron, February, 1961, p. 243. J Secretary-General of the LDP Maoo Shigosaburo issued a statement, "The accumulation formula does not d i r e c t l y lead us to future r e c o g n i t i o n of China. This agreement w i l l s u r e l y encourage Sino-Japanese trade to a c e r t a i n degree. I th i n k t h i s agreement has solved problems e x t e n s i v e l y . I cannot r e f e r to the d e t a i l s u n t i l Mr. Matsumura comes back." (from Asahi Shinbun, September 20, 1962) 76 37cf„ The previous chapter, s e c t i o n on the JCP, ^ The L i b e r a l Democratic Party P o l i t i c a l Research Com mittee, ed., (Tokyo: The Liberal-Democratic Party P u b l i c Re l a t i o n s Committee, 1964), p. 103, 77 CHAPTER IV DOMESTIC PROVISIONS The Ikeda Cabinet T G domestic p o l i t i c a l arrangement 'for n a t i o n a l defence can be viewed from two p e r s p e c t i v e s . One i s the improvement of p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s concerning the N a t i o n a l Defence Force ( J i e i t a i a n d the other i s the reinforcement of the defence capacity of the Defence Force* PUBLIC RELATIONS OF THE IKEDA CABINET In the second chapter, the three p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ' im pact on the Ikeda Cabinet was discussed. The emphasis was placed on the input side of the Ikeda Cabinet's p u b l i c r e l a  tions.: the impact of the Japan S o c i a l i s t Party; the Japan Communist Party; and some groups of f a c t i o n s i n the L i b e r a l - Democratic Party i n the process of s e c u r i t y p o l i c y making.. In order to avoid redundancy, here the emphasis w i l l be put on the output side - the Cabinet's p u r s u i t of a n t i - n u c l e a r armament p o l i c y . During four years i n o f f i c e , the Ikeda Cabinet promised that Japan would not be armed w i t h nuclear weapons* As e a r l y as February of 1961, Ikeda, answering Yajima., a Diet member of the JSP., s a i d , Regardless of whether China has n u c l e a r weapons, Japan would not possess nuclear weapons.1 Not only Japan's m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , but a l s o the American f o r c e s i n Japan w.oro p r o h i b i t e d by the Ikeda Cabinet from b r i n g i n g nuclear weapons i n t o Japan. M i n i s t e r of the Defence Agency 73 F u j i e d a , answered Oka R y o i c h i of the JSF i n the D i e t , We would not a l l o w the American forces to deploy t h e i r n u c l e a r weapons i n Japan. We w i l l maintain our defence p o l i c y not to arm our Defence Force w i t h nuclear weapons regardless of the s i t u a t i o n that China might produce nuclear weapons,2 Both Ikeda and Fujieda's statements contain the word Japan, but i t o b v i o u s l y does not i n c l u d e the Okinawa I s l a n d s . What i s the main p o l i c y goal of the Ikeda Cabinet, when i t so s t r o n g l y emphasised non-nuclear armament of Japan? What was i t s perception of Japan's i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment w i t h regard t o the nuclear armament of the c o u n t r i e s surrounding Japan? These two questions w i l l be discussed r e s p e c t i v e l y . The f i r s t question concerns the immediate o b j e c t i v e of the a n t i - n u c l e a r armament p o l i c y . The answer i s that the Ikeda Cabinet t r i e d to avoid s t i r r i n g up p u b l i c f e a r of the Defence Force, As a r e s u l t of the miserable defeat i n the P a c i f i c War, the Japanese have been d i s i l l u s i o n e d over t h e i r past possession of m i l i t a r y f o r c e s as w e l l as t h e i r e x e rcise of i t . Consequently the Japanese populace have become h i g h l y s u s p i  cious of any form of m i l i t a r y establishment, as demonstrated i n the f o l l o w i n g t a b l e . A f t e r the Yoshida Cabinet e s t a b l i s h e d the N a t i o n a l P o l i c e Reserve i n 1950, Japan's defence force grew s t e a d i l y i n m i l i t a r y c a p a c i t y year a f t e r 3^ear. F i r s t , i t changed the name to the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Force (Hoantai) and then to the present N a t i o n a l Defence Force ( J i e i t a i ) . By I960, the Defence Force was one of the most st a b l e and balanced m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n the Far East. Thus, i t was always the 79 Table I (question: Do you t h i n k i t Defence Force?) (from i s b e t t e r f o r Seisaku Geppo, Japan to No. 96) have the 1956 1959 1963 I t i s b e t t e r to have i t 32 % 39 % 52 % I t i s acceptable 26 26 24 Acceptable but not necessary 12 12 11 B e t t e r not to have i t 11 5 3 Not necessary 7 6 3 Don't know 12 12 7 Table I I (question: Do you l i k e to know about the Defence Force?) (from Asahi Shinbun, December 30, 1963) Yes 22 % Have i n t e r e s t , but not p a r t i c u l a r l y 22. Have no i n t e r e s t i n i t 56 (question: Do you t h i n k the number of the Defence Force per sonnel should be increased?) Increase as many as p o s s i b l e 16 % Increase a l i t t l e more 13 Do not change 46 Decrease a l i t t l e 5 Do not know 20 so t a r g e t of p u b l i c s u s p i c i o n because of i t s nature and s t r u c t u r e . The only e f f e c t i v e means by which the government could q u e l l the people's s u s p i c i o n against the Force was to permit i t s troops to help c i t i z e n s on v a r i o u s occasions of n a t u r a l d i s  a s t e r s . Ten years' of governmental manipulation of p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s was b arely enough to keep the people t o l e r a n t of the existence of the Force. This was the i n i t i a l t r o u b l e w i t h which the Ikeda Cabinet had to cope as w e l l as d i d the pre c e ding cabinet s. Beyond t h i s i n i t i a l t r o u b l e , the Japanese have a hyper s e n s i t i v i t y against nuclear weapons as the f i r s t and perhaps the l a s t people to experience the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the e a r l y years of the Ikeda p e r i o d , the subject of nuclear weapons was h i g h l y provocative f o r the Japanese to t a l k about as a means of n a t i o n a l defence, and a thoughtless speech by any cabinet member could have caused a stormy denunciation of the Cabinet.^ Provoking people by presenting the p o s s i b i l i t y of Japan having nuclear defence could have generated people's antipathy against the whole s t r u c t u r e of governmental p o l i c y f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , and i t could have e v e n t u a l l y l e d the Japanese to f e a r the Defence Force as a p o t e n t i a l source of e v i l . An o p i n i o n p o l l by the Seisaku Geppo (the L i b e r a l - Democratic Party's o p i n i o n magazine) and the Asahi newspaper declares how d i f f i c u l t i t was f o r the Ikeda Cabinet to have the Defence Force accepted by the people. S\l Just before Ikeda formed h i s cabinet, l e s s than f o r t y per cent of the Japanese p o s i t i v e l y approved of the existence of the Defence Force, and the Ikeda Cabinet's cautious hand l i n g of the defence p o l i c y r a i s e d popular support of the Force to more than f i f t y per cent by the end of 1963. The important t h i n g was, however, that more than f i f t y per cent of the Japanese d e c l i n e d to express t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n the Force. This was a t y p i c a l manner i n which the Japanese ex pressed t h e i r s u s p i c i o n about the Force. Another expression o f t h e i r s u s p i c i o n was that more than f i f t y per cent of them d i d not approve of i n c r e a s i n g the number of the Defence Force personnel nor agreed to decreasing- i t . The p r i n c i p l e of n a t i o n a l defence was not w e l l s e t t l e d i n the people's mind, and s o c i a l approval of the Force by the people was so unstable that the Ikeda Cabinet's p o l i c y and a t t i t u d e f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y could change the p o s i t i o n of the Force i n Japanese societ}*- a f f i r m a t i v e l y or n e g a t i v e l y , depending on the success of i t s handling of the problem. Hence, i t was quite reasonable that the Ikeda Cabinet was h i g h l y s e n s i t i v e to the problem of Japan's nuclear defence and kept i t out of i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r awhile. From the point o f view of Ikeda's economic r a t i o n a l i s m , defence expenditure was the most undesirable of a l l , although he recognised I t "was an absolute n e c e s s i t y f o r Japan's s e c u r i t y . In c onclusion, Ikeda f e l t t hat the subject of nuclear weapons was a dangerous one as i t threatened the e x i s t i n g s e c u r i t y $2 system since i t could provoke people's emotional r e a c t i o n against the Force. A l s o , economically n u c l e a r weapons were a non-productive and.extravagant p r o j e c t f o r the Japanese economy since i t s secondary e f f e c t on the whole n a t i o n a l eco nomy was c a l c u l a t e d to be too small f o r i t s g i g a n t i c i n i t i a l investment. Now the second question should be answered. Besides c o n s i d e r i n g the domestic s i t u a t i o n , the Ikeda Cabinet's per ception of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n concerning nuclear defence and st r a t e g y should be noted. The Ikeda Cabinet's adherence to a non-nuclear armament p o l i c y was based on two major perceptions of i t s environment. F i r s t l y , i t t r u s t e d the strength of the American nuclear umbrella which covered Japan against p o s s i b l e nuclear attack from the communist bl o c . Secondly, the Ikeda Cabinet simply underestimated China's ca p a c i t y to produce nuclear weapons. As was already mentioned i n the e a r l i e r chapters, Ikeda was the man who a c t u a l l y negotiated w i t h the United States to formulate Japan's s e c u r i t y system under the Yoshida Cabinet. Ikeda was f i r m l y committed to maintaining the e x i s t i n g pro v i s i o n that the United States guarantee Japan's s e c u r i t y . When T s u j i Masanobu (a Diet member, Independent) asked Ikeda about Japan's defence c a p a c i t y , he answered, Pre s e n t l y i t i s d i f f i c u l t f o r Japan to protect i t s e l f w i t h only i t s own f o r c e s . There i s no a l t e r  n a t i v e choice but the e x i s t i n g j o i n t defence scheme between the United States and Japan.5 For the Ikeda Cabinet, there could be no s a f e r arrangement S3 than the Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty of Japan and the United States to guarantee i t s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . The t r e a t y i n v o l v e d the American o b l i g a t i o n to defend Japan i n case of n e c e s s i t y . The other perception that should be r e c a l l e d was that the Cabinet underestimated China's c a p a c i t y to produce nuclear weapons, due, perhaps, to the misinformation from the United States. Ikeda s a i d to an American news agent, China may p o t e n t i a l l y be able t o a c t i v a t e n u c l e a r r e a c t i o n , but i t i s not c l e a r that they a c t u a l l y can. Even when they are able to do so, i t w i l l take at l e a s t another ten years f o r them to produce n u c 1 e a r we a p o n s . ° The combination of t r u s t i n the American nuclear umbrella and underestimation of China's p o t e n t i a l to produce nuclear weapons produced the Ikeda Cabinet's o p t i m i s t i c p o l i c y f o r nuclear defence. Mien Ikeda was asked at a f o r e i g n press conference about China's possession of nuclear weapons, he answered, We cannot deny that there are nuclear weapons near Japan, i n such places as K u n a s h i r i , E t r o f u , and Saghalien. I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g to l e a r n that China has them, too. I t i s not a serious question whether or not some cou n t r i e s possess nuclear 'weapons.7 This does not mean that the Ikeda Cabinet was completely i n d i f f e r e n t to the genuine importance of nuclear defence of Japan. On the contrary, whenever the Cabinet stated i t s p o s i t i o n on nuclear armament, i t always l i m i t e d i t s a p p l i c a  t i o n to the present Cabinet. For ins t a n c e , Ikeda s a i d , "As long as the present Ikeda Cabinet l a s t s , we w i l l not possess nuclear 'weapons," which c a r e f u l l y avoided i t s future commitment 84 to non-nuclear armament. Furthermore, Ikeda c l e a r l y s t a t e d t h a t Japan had the l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t to possess nuclear weapons when he s a i d , The Japanese C o n s t i t u t i o n does not p r o h i b i t nuclear armament. However, as a p o l i t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of i t , we do not possess nuclear weapons. The Japanese C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o h i b i t s us from maintaining m i l i t a r y f o rces but not defence f o r c e s . Therefore, i t does not f o r b i d our maintenance of nuclear weapons f o r defensive purposes, but i t does not a l l o w us to make up m i l i t a r y forces.-*' Thus, Ikeda guaranteed Japan's s e c u r i t y under the American n u c l e a r umbrella, and shunned the touchy subject of nuclear armament f o r awhile i n order not to provoke the Japanese p u b l i c . The p o l i c y was meant to carry out smooth and gradual acceptance of the Defence Force by the Japanese - a p r o v i s i o n which was to preserve n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , REINFORCEMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE The second perspective t o look at i n the Ikeda Cabinet's domestic arrangement f o r defence i s the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the n a t i o n a l defence p o l i c y . This subject w i l l be viewed from three points of view: f i s c a l p o l i c y f o r defence; the Second Defence Flan as a p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e ; and the a p p l i c a  t i o n of the new defence p o l i c y . FISCAL POLICY FOR DEFENCE The Ikeda Cabinet's f i s c a l p o l i c y f o r n a t i o n a l defence i s perhaps the most c o n t r o v e r s i a l of a l l the p o l i c i e s produced. By l o o k i n g at the f i r s t column of t a b l e I I I , i t can be c l e a r l y 85 Table I I I 0 DB/NB (DB--DB' )/DB' (NB-NB')/NB' I960 9.4 % .000 .000 1961 3.9 .174 .184 1962 8.5 .328 .467 1963 0 . JL .500 .746 1964 o.5 .720 .899 (DB: defence budget, KB: n a t i o n a l budget, DB': the I960 defence budget, KB 1: the I960 n a t i o n a l budget) Figures are based on Zair.au Tokei, oublished by the M i n i s t r y of Finance, 1966. seen t h a t the Ikeda Cabinet reduced the r e l a t i v e amount of the defence budget over the t o t a l budget, and kept i t con s t a n t l y under a lower l e v e l than d i d the previous cabinets. To compare i t i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , i n 1961 West Germany's defence budget was 23 per cent of the t o t a l n a t i o n a l budget, which was more than two and one-half times l a r g e r than the f i g u r e f o r Japan. West Germany's defence expenditure was 4.3 per cent of i t s gross n a t i o n a l product (GNP) and that of Japan was 1.4 per cent, thus showing the r e l a t i v e f i g u r e of Japan's defence expenditure„ Ikeda d i d not want to increase the defence budget r a p i d l y as shown by the statement, I t i s our manifest duty to strengthen the Defence Force with our own e f f o r t , but i t should not be beyond our n a t i o n a l c a p a c i t y . That i s why Japan has look to the United Nations and the Mutual Secu r i t y Treaty of Japan and the United States f o r i t s basic n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p r o v i s i o n s , and has graduall } r increased i t s N a t i o n a l Defence Force.10 86 He d i d not want to increase the defence budget to a point which would d i s t u r b h i s f i s c a l p o l i c y f o r s t i m u l a t i n g - t h e " n a t i o n a l economy to r a p i d expansion. For.example, i n the Second Defence Plan which w i l l be discussed i n the l a t e r s e c t i o n s , the Defence Agency (Boei-cho) wanted to have two per cent of Japan's GNP spent f o r n a t i o n a l defence. This demand was turned down by the Cabinet, and the Agency had to accept the Cabinet's r e v i s e d f i g u r e of 1.5 per cent of the GNP. In p r a c t i c e the Ikeda Cabinet never spent as much as 1.5 per cent of the GNP f o r n a t i o n a l defence. Therefore, one i m p l i c a t i o n of the Ikeda Cabinet's f i s c a l p o l i c y f o r n a t i o n a l defence was that i t s a s p i r a t i o n to provide f o r defence forces had a c l e a r l i m i t a t i o n . However, i f the second column of the preceding t a b l e i s observed, i t i s found t h a t the Ikeda Cabinet spend a good deal o f i t s revenue f o r defence. The increase r a t i o of the defence budget over the I960 base year i s extremely high throughout the four f i s c a l years of the Ikeda Cabinet. The average increase r a t i o i s 18 per cent a year. Although, i n r e l a t i v e f i g u r e s , the defence budget i s not i n c r e a s i n g , i n absolute f i g u r e s i t i s i n c r e a s i n g at a r a t e which i s not com parable i n any other major country i n the world. When l o o k i n g at the .same t h i n g over a longer period as i n the t a b l e IV, i t can be s a i d that the Ikeda' Cabinet increased i t s defence budget to a degree which had not been observed i n the f i s c a l p o l i c y of any previous c a b i n e t s . Table IV 300 200 100 (Unit: B i l l i o n Yen) 0 f52 54 567 T53 T6Q "62 molT Looking at the t h i r d column of t a b l e I I I , i t i s found that the 1964 n a t i o n a l budget i s approximately 90 per cent l a r g e r than i t was i n I 9 6 0 . The average increase r a t i o of the n a t i o n a l budget i n the four years of the Ikeda Cabinet i s 22.5 per cent a year. When t h i s f i g u r e i s compared to the average increase r a t i o of the defence budget, the increase i n the amount of defence expenditure i n the whole n a t i o n a l budget decreased during the Ikeda p e r i o d . This once again makes us f e e l that the Ikeda Cabinet was not w i l l i n g to strengthen the Defence Force very r a p i d l y . How the Ikeda Cabinet's f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y f o r n a t i o n a l defence i s judged, depends g r e a t l y upon the c r i t e r i o n taken. I f the f i g u r e s of the defence budget r e l a t i v e to the n a t i o n a l economy are taken, i t can be concluded that the Ikeda Cabinet was r e l u c t a n t to enhance the Defence Force r a p i d l y . On the other hand, i f the absolute f i g u r e of the defence expenditure by the Cabinet i s considered, i t i s appropriate to say that the Ikeda Cabinet 'was the very cabinet that gave the f i n a n c i a l b a s i s to e s t a b l i s h the Force as one of the most powerful m i l i  t a r y f o r c e s i n the Far Fast* To a t t r i b u t e the growth of the defence budget i n the Ikeda period to the general economic expansion seems to be v a l i d , but when examining the Cabinet's defence p r o v i s i o n more p r e c i s e l y , i t can be s a i d that the increase "was not s o l e l y due to the secondary e f f e c t or ac- ' c i d e n t a l e f f e c t of the o v e r a l l economic expansion, but r a t h e r t o a c a r e f u l l y c a l c u l a t e d enlargement p o l i c y of m i l i t a r y capacity 89 as w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n the c o n t i n u i n g s e c t i o n . THE SECOND DEFENCE PLAN As Ikeda Cabinet's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y i n a narrow sense, the Second Defence Plan w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n . The content and a c t u a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f the p l a n w i l l be d i s  cussed i n the next s e c t i o n , and here the focus w i l l be c a s t upon the c o n d i t i o n s by which the Second Defence Plan came i n t o being. At the beginning o f the Ikeda p e r i o d , there were ro u g h l y three c o n d i t i o n s that i n v i t e d some new form o f a r e i n f o r c e d defence p l a n . F i r s t l y , the Japanese p o l i t i c a l e l i t e as well as the informed p u b l i c o p i n i o n , demanded a more independent diplomacy. As a p r e r e q u i s i t e to t h i s , the enlargement o f Japan's defence c a p a c i t y was f e l t necessary i n order to b u i l d up a more autonomous defence f o r c e . Secondly, i n order to a c q u i r e g r e a t e r independence i n m a i n t a i n i n g n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , Japan had to b u i l d i t s own system o f defence i n d u s t r y and weaponry which had l o n g been s u b s i d a r y t o American system o f m i l i t a r y equipment. T h i r d l y , i t was a l o n g l a s t i n g a s p i r a  t i o n o f the people i n the Defence Force t o be r e c p g n i s e d by the p u b l i c as a l e g i t i m a t e e n t i t y i n the s o c i e t y . These t h r e e c o n d i t i o n s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d r e s p e c t i v e l y . Japan's autonomous course o f diplomacy was f e l t necessary even before the time o f the Ikeda Ca b i n e t . The K i s h i Cabinet's e f f o r t t o r e v i s e the Mutual S e c u r i t y T r e a t y o f the United 90 States and Japan was a way i n which the Japanese Government t r i e d t o improve Japan's p o s i t i o n v i s a v i s the United States so that Japan could employ more independent diplomatic ma noeuvres. During the Ikeda period the cry f o r greater d i p  l o m atic independence or the cry to l e s s e n American i n f l u e n c e over Japan's e x t e r n a l p o l i c y , became louder. Kono I c h i r o , a strongman i n the Ikeda Cabinet and a sometimes colleague, as w e l l as an of t e n times r i v a l f o r Ikeda, expressed such sentiment when he wrote, As the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n has changed l i k e t h i s ( i n A s i a , China i s g e t t i n g aggressive and i s f r i g h t e n i n g i t s neighbouring count r i e s as Japan once d i d to them), I think I t i s time f o r Japan to c l e a r l y map out independent diplomatic p r i n c i  p l e s of i t s own„ll and on a d i f f e r e n t occasion he wrote, World p o l i t i c s has been d i v i d e d i n t o two blocs and i s dominated by Soviet-American competition. How ever, the present Japanese n a t i o n a l power i s not i n f e r i o r to that o f the West European na t i o n s , so i s i t d e s i r a b l e that Japan keep i n a c t i v e i n •world p o l i t i c s ? I b e l i e v e that i t i s the r i g h t time- f o r Japan to s t a r t moving towards the deter rence o f a t o t a l war...leading nations have l o s t t h e i r d i r e c t i o n i n the t h i c k mist. Is i t not an important time f o r us to stop f o l l o w i n g other c o u n t r i e s and s t a r t searching f o r the l i g h t w i t h our own e f f o r t i n t h i s t h i c k mist ? 1 2 On encountering such demands f o r independent diplomacy, Foreign M i n i s t e r Ohira Masayoshi s a i d , Independent diplomacy Is a word I do not understand. Diplomacy i s by d e f i n i t i o n independent and there can be no non-independent diplomacy,..the Japanese economy i s based on p o l i t i c a l and economic a s s o c i a  t i o n s with many c o u n t r i e s . We have to be c a r e f u l i n r e a l i s i n g what i s best f o r the Japanese i n t e r e s t i n the whole framework of diplomacy., , 1 3 9 1 This statement implies how strong the demand was to adopt an independent course of diplomacy. Ironically, an unreasonable apology such as this, reveals how 'non-independent' the d Japanese diplomacy had been. Such a strong demand eventually took a more concrete policy. Minister of the Defence Agency Fukuda Tokuyasu, said, Japan's economic growth has been so high as to be noticed by the world. Japan has paid more than forty per cent of the reparation obligation and i t is forwarding economic cooperation programmes. The time is now due for us, as an independent country, to be prepared to protect our country with our own forces.. . 1 4 This was a typical statement rationalising Japan's military enlargement plan through the Second Defence Plan. The second condition was Japan's necessity to build i t s own defence industry so that i t could free i t s e l f from Ameri can domination over i t s defence planning and ac t i v i t i e s . One of the greatest barriers to Japan's producing tactical weapons was the excess weapons that the United States had given to Japan gratuitously.-^ By I960, the total amount of American weapons aid for Japan was over two hundred b i l l i o n Yen. In addition to that, a continuous flow of surplus weapons was expected from the United States to Japan. This flow of weapons would increase the stockpile of unused and obsolete war materials. The Defence Force personnel was not in proportion to the flow of incoming surplus weapons from the United States. Two problems stemmed from this phenomenon: discouragement of domestic industry from military production; and increase of 92 unused and obsolete weapons which d i d not f i t the Japanese s o l d i e r s . In order to strengthen Japan's defence c a p a c i t y , the Ikeda Cabinet had to e s t a b l i s h a new long term p l a n f o r replacement and modernisation of land and sea f o r c e s ' weapons as w e l l as f o r domestic production of a i r p l a n e s . This was one of the most important excuses f o r the Second Defence Plan which was to l a s t f o r f i v e years, s t a r t i n g i n 1962. The o r i g i n a l d r a f t of the Second Defence Plan as w r i t t e n by the Defence Agency.involved two d i f f i c u l t i e s . One r e f l e c t e d strong American i n t e r e s t . The emphasis was placed too h e a v i l y on the adoption of now types of weapons which d i d not f i t the present system of armament of the Defence Force. The system c o n s i s t e d mainly of o l d American weapons. The other d i f f i  c u l t y was that the Defence Agency demanded, to have two per cent of the GNP spent for defence expenditure. This f i g u r e had almost no r a t i o n a l e , but was made i n order to increase the Defence Agency's p r e s t i g e . These two d i f f i c u l t i e s were pointed out by the economic m i n i s t e r s at the defence conference of the Cabinet members and the J o i n t Chief of S t a f f , 1 6 The conference emphasised the idea of improving the e x i s t i n g weapons r a t h e r than purchasing the l a t e s t weapons i n order t h a t Japan's domestic war indu s t r y could be protected. One of the members of the conference s a i d , "Rather than producing the l a t e s t armament, we should consider r e p l a c i n g o l d guns and tanks w i t h new ones and b u i l d new ships i n place of obsolete 17 s h i p s . " ' Consequently, the Defence Agency agreed to r e - d r a f t 93 the p l a n to Include t h i s recommendation. What should be noted here i s that although the defence conference c r i t i c i s e d and demanded a greater change i n the o r i g i n a l d r a f t , i t ac cepted the basic idea that the Japanese defence i n d u s t r y should be helped and protected. The t h i r d c o n d i t i o n was a long l a s t i n g a s p i r a t i o n of the Defence Agency and the Force to be recognised by the p u b l i c as a l e g i t i m a t e e n t i t y i n s o c i e t y . Since the Japanese C o n s t i t u t i o n f i r m l y p r o h i b i t s the existence of any m i l i t a r y f o r c e i n Japan, the force had been considered from the moment of i t s b i r t h , an i l l e g i t i m a t e body i n the Japanese s o c i e t y . This f r u s t r a t e d the men i n the Defence Force. Every newly appointed M i n i s t e r of the Defence Agency has expressed h i s hope t o upgrade the agency's status to a m i n i s t r y . This was one way t o put t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n t o a concrete form. The magic f i g u r e of 'two per cent of the GNF' was another way to express t h i s type of hope. Of course, two per cent of the GNP would a l s o be intended f o r support of the defence i n d u s t r y . By p r o t e c t i n g the defence i n d u s t r y , i t could. • secure a f i r m p o s i t i o n i n a s o c i e t y which had been r a p i d l y i n d u s t r i a l i s e d . F a i l i n g to secure a good deal of the budget i n a r a p i d l j r growing s o c i e t y meant that i t would reduce i t s e x i s t i n g value i n the s o c i e t y over time. M i n i s t e r of the Defence Agency Nishimura, s a i d , ...long term defence planning i s necessary to pro t e c t the defence i n d u s t r y , and I w i l l do my best to r e a l i s e i t (the Second Defence Plan) i n the coming Diet s e s s i o n . The f i r s t t h i n g to do i s to 94 make the plan more reasonable. I t is^ not c r u c i a l to get the plan i n the 196l budget,1° Although Nishimura knew i t r e q u i r e d r e v i s i o n , as the repre s e n t a t i v e of the Agency, he had to push the unreasonable o r i g i n a l p l a n . Such was the expression of the i r r i t a t e d f e e l i n g of the people i n the Defence Agency i n order to impress the Cabinet and to l e t the p u b l i c recognise i t s ex i s t i n g valuey These three c o n d i t i o n s were fused i n t o the r e v i s e d Second Defence Flan which was true to the recommendation by the defence conference. The r e v i s e d plan accepted 1.5 per cent of the Grip spent f o r n a t i o n a l defence. The f i g u r e was only a "goal f o r the e f f o r t " and was never p r a c t i c a l l y ob served by the Ikeda Cabinet's f i s c a l p o l i c y , APPLICATION OF THE HEW DEFENCE POLICY The t h i r d point i s the a p p l i c a t i o n of the defence p o l i c y by the Ikeda Cabinet, According to t r a d i t i o n a l c a t e g o r i s a  t i o n , t h i s subject " w i l l be d i v i d e d i n t o three f i e l d s : a i r , l a n d and naval defence f o r c e s . The general o r i e n t a t i o n of the u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e of the Ikeda Cabinet i n b u i l d i n g up the Defence Force was to e s t a b l i s h Japan's own defence forces f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . From the American point of view about Far .Eastern defence, such places as Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Okinawa are extremely important, Hokkaido provides an optimum base to attack and/or to watch the Russian Far Eastern m i l i t a r y bases, Kyushu makes a s t a b l e h i n t e r l a n d base f o r 95 South Korea which has been under constant pressure of North Korean u n i f i c a t i o n moves. The Okinawa Islands which are l o c a t e d between Japan and Taiwan, give an important p o s i t i o n to a t t a c k the c e n t r a l part of China. Although these geographic p o s i t i o n s are important f o r Japan's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , they are not as important f o r Japan as they are f o r the United States, because they do not defend Honshu, the main i s l a n d of Japan. That i s , the American s t r a t e g y f o r the Far Fast and Japan's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n v o l v e some inc o f t p a t i b l e o b j e c t i v e s , - ^ which the Ikeda Cabinet r e a l i s e d and t r i e d to s o l v e . A i r Defence Force (Koku J i e i t a i ) In 1961, the Ikeda Cabinet presented and passed two defence laws w i t h which the Cabinet aimed to strengthen the a i r defence of the c e n t r a l part o f Japan. The law set up the S i x t h A i r Squadron at Komatsu i n Ishikawa Prefecture and the Seventh A i r Squadron at Matsushima i n Miyagi P r e f e c t u r e . The S i x t h Squadron was expected to cover the Japan Sea which had been t h i n l y d e f e n d e d . The Japan Sea i s the s h o r t e s t path between the Northern part of China and the c e n t r a l part of Japan. This area had been covered by the American a i r force i n Japan. Before 1 9 5 1 , no Japanese a i r force was ever placed i n the c e n t r a l part of Honshu - the p o l i t i c a l l y and economic a l l y most important part of Japan. Therefore, the S i x t h Squadron was expected to form the f r o n t l i n e to defend Tokyo against attack from the Northern part of China. 96 At the same time i n Matsushima, the Seventh Squadron was added to the Fourth Squadron. These two squadrons were ex pected t o form the second f r o n t behind the Chitose base i n Hokkaido which faces the Russian Far East. The Matsushima base i s l o c a t e d on the P a c i f i c coast of the Honshu I s l a n d and the p o s i t i o n i s approximately between Tokyo and Chitose. This p o s i t i o n i s important w i t h regards to the Russian a i r for c e ' s operation i n the Far East. The Russian operation, which i s c a l l e d "Tokyo Express" by the Defence Force, takes the route which by-passes Hokkaido i n the eastern sea and heads to Tokyo d i r e c t l y from the P a c i f i c Ocean. This opera t i o n to a t t a c k Tokyo from the northeastern P a c i f i c can only bo stopped by the a i r f o r c e i n Matsushima w i t h the a s s i s t a n c e O'f the force i n Chitose. In a d d i t i o n , the Cabinet decided to a i d the a i r defence force by l o c a t i n g the ground-to-air m i s s i l e bases around the K e i h i n (Tokyo-Yokohama) i n d u s t r i a l Area and i n Hokkaido. u I t a l s o decided to equip the a i r force with a l l weather F-104-J" j e t l i g h t e r s , one o f the l a t e s t models of f i g h t e r s i n the world at that time. The s a l i e n t a c t i o n f o r the Japanese a i r defence taken by the Ikeda Cabinet was that i t gave an important guide l i n e to Japan's a i r f o r c e . The p r i n c i p l e i s that Japan's a i r de fence i s not f o r p r o t e c t i o n of such points as Hokkaido, Kyushu, or the Okinawa I s l a n d s , but f o r p r o t e c t i o n of the area which i s c r u c i a l to the s u r v i v a l of Japan as a working u n i t 97 f o r the Japanese. F i r s t of a l l , i n order t o protect Japan, the K e i h i n I n d u s t r i a l Area which i s the p o l i t i c a l and economic centre of Japan, must be protected. This i s the greatest and f i n a l task of Japan's a i r f o r c e . Although, p r o t e c t i n g the heart of Japan i s an important and appropriate task, i t i s not the u l t i m a t e goal f o r the American forces i n Japan. Their goal i s to proteot the United States bases and/or to maintain the t h r e a t to the communist world by h o l d i n g m i l i t a r y bases surrounding i t . These bases are a deterrent f a c t o r i n t h a t they avoid t o t a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n of the two b l o c s , and i n t h i s regard they make an important element of Japan's defence. The Ikeda Cabinet's a c t i o n vras a s t r i k i n g attempt at the t r a n s i t i o n from a p u r e l y American dominated strategy to a Japanese de fence by the Japanese. Land Defence Force (Riku.jo J i e i t a i ) In the Second Defence Plan, the Defence Agency proposed an idea to re-organise the land force d i v i s i o n s and increase i t s number from 9 to 13 d i v i s i o n s . However, the number of men i n each d i v i s i o n was not maintained at the same l e v e l as before. The plan increased the number of d i v i s i o n s but not the t o t a l personnel i n the land force i n p r o p o r t i o n to the increase o f d i v i s i o n s . Therefore, i t v i r t u a l l y decreased the number of men i n each d i v i s i o n . This r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n plan had two goals: to give r e g i o n a l autonomy to each d i v i  s i o n ; and to preserve the p o t e n t i a l c a pacity to expand the l a n d force to the l e v e l which, i n case of need, could be 98 comparable to the s i z e of the t h r e a t e n i n g country's land f o r c e . Japan c o n s i s t s of four 'big' Islands which can very e a s i l y be separated from one another m i l i t a r i l y . Honshu and Kyushu are connected w i t h an under-sea t u n n e l . Hokkaido and Honshu w i l l a l s o be connected with an under-sea tunnel very soon. However, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n through one under-sea tunnel i s very l i m i t e d i n capacity and consequently the f o u r i s l a n d s can be I s o l a t e d w i t h l i t t l e m i l i t a r y e f f o r t . Moreover, the f o u r i s l a n d s of Japan are almost e n t i r e l y covered by mountains, and only fourteen to s i x t e e n per cent of the whole area i s a r a b l e . The arable p l a i n s which are s c a t t e r e d a l l over Japan, permit each small p l a i n to be i s o l a t e d from the next by mountains. Considering these geographic c o n d i t i o n s , each d i v i s i o n of the Japanese land force must have autonomy so t h a t i t maintains i t s m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y i n case i t i s i s o  l a t e d from other neighbouring u n i t s . In Japan, very few d i v i s i o n s can expect to secure a constant and l a r g e amount of m a t e r i a l supply i n a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n . Consequently, the r e g i o n a l autonomy c f each d i v i s i o n i s a matter of l i f e and death f o r each d i v i s i o n and the area i t covers.. The other o b j e c t i v e of r e - o r g a n i s i n g the land force was to enhance the l a n d force's p o t e n t i a l c apacity to expand i t s s i z e t o a degree th a t could cope w i t h the g i g a n t i c land force of China or Russia. Each d i v i s i o n had been under-manned because the land force was not very popular among the Japanese 99 youth, and the expansion of the number of d i v i s i o n s under the Ikeda Cabinet exaggerated the; shortage of each d i v i s i o n ' s number of personnel. The constant shortage of land force personnel became a d i s t i n c t i v e phenomenon e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the Ikeda p e r i o d , because the r a p i d expansion of the Japanese economy a t t r a c t e d the Japanese youth away from the m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e to the economic f i e l d . In. a s i t u a t i o n l i k e t h i s , the best t h i n g the Force could do was t o e s t a b l i s h an organisa t i o n to t r a i n mon as quick as p o s s i b l e when needed. This goal was r e a l i s e d by the r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n of the land f o r c e . By i n c r e a s i n g i t s p o t e n t i a l f o r future expansion, the Force acquired a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n than i t had ever had before i n r e l a t i o n to i t s h y p o t h e t i c a l enemy: the People's L i b e r a t i o n Army of China.c~^~ Sea Defence Force (Kai.jo J i e i t a i ) Japan's naval f o r c e s have long l i m i t e d t h e i r r o l e to Japan's c o a s t a l defence. Japan's naval force was o r i g i n a l l y planned t o defend Japan's long coast l i n e while the American navy was a i d i n g i t s forces i n Korea during the Korean War. A f t e r the f a l l of the Imperial Navy, Japan acquired i t s f i r s t o f f s h o r e f l e e t during the Ikeda p e r i o d . In 1962, the Sea 2 2 Defence Force formed i t s F i r s t Submarine F l e e t , with which i t showed a determination to concentrate i t s o p e r a t i o n a l goal of a t t a c k i n g submarines. Therefore, the e x i s t i n g Japanese naval force i s strong and w e l l equipped f o r a t t a c k i n g submarines, but i t can never be considered as a w e l l balanced 100 f o r c e . Modern equipment f o r the naval force i s so expensive that i s i s extremely d i f f i c u l t f o r any country except the United States and. the Soviet Union to b u i l d up and maintain a w e l l balanced naval f o r c e . Hence, Japan's naval defence i s h e a v i l y dependent on the American Seventh F l e e t i n the Far East, and t h e r e f o r e , the naval force i s the l e a s t independent of a l l the three m i l i t a r y f o r c e s of Japan i n s t r u c t u r e and i n s t r a t e g y . The Japanese navy's emphasis on anti-submarine operations has two goals: to cope w i t h the Russian Far Eastern F l e e t which c o n s i s t s mainl]^ of submarines; and t o defend Japan's trans-Oceanic t r a n s p o r t a t i o n route f o r trade a c t i v i t i e s . Russian naval bases i n the Far East, such as Khabarovsk and V l a d i v o s t o k , are l o c a t e d between Saghalien and North Korea. The Russian f l e e t that bases i n t h i s area can e a s i l y be trapped i n the Japan Sea when the three s t r a i t s are c l o s e d . These are the Soya S t r a i t (between Saghalien and Hokkaido), the Tsugaru S t r a i t (between Hokkaido and Honshu), and the Tsushima S t r a i t ( between Korea and Kyushu) Mien these three s t r a i t s are e f f e c t i v e l y blocked, Japan's anti-submarine fo r c e might be e f f e c t i v e i n d e s t r o y i n g the Russian Far Eastern F l e e t , or at l e a s t l i m i t i n g , to a c e r t a i n degree, the Russian f l e e t ' s operation i n the P a c i f i c Ocean. The second reason f o r Japan having an anti-submarine force i s t h a t the Japanese navy has t o p r o t e c t Japan 1s long trans-Oceanic trade routes, e s p e c i a l l y , the trade route that 100 f o r c e . Modern equipment f o r the naval force i s so expensive that i s i s extremely d i f f i c u l t f o r any country except the United States and the Soviet Union to b u i l d up and maintain a w e l l balanced naval f o r c e . Hence, Japan's naval defence i s h e a v i l y dependent on the American Seventh F l e e t i n the Far East, and t h e r e f o r e , the naval force i s the l e a s t independent of a l l the three m i l i t a r y f o r c e s of Japan i n s t r u c t u r e and i n s t r a t e g y . The Japanese navy's emphasis on anti-submarine operations has two goals; to cope w i t h the Russian Far Eastern F l e e t which c o n s i s t s mainly of submarines; and t o defend Japan's trans-Oceanic t r a n s p o r t a t i o n route f o r trade a c t i v i t i e s . Russian naval bases i n the Far East, such as Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, are l o c a t e d between Saghalien and North Korea. T h e Russian f l e e t that bases i n t h i s area can e a s i l y be trapped i n the Japan Sea when the three s t r a i t s are c l o s e d . Those are the Soya S t r a i t (between Saghalien and Hokkaido), the Tsugaru S t r a i t (between Hokkaido and Honshu), and the Tsushima S t r a i t ( between Korea and Kyushu) When these three s t r a i t s are e f f e c t i v e l y blocked, Japan's anti-submarine fo r c e might be e f f e c t i v e i n d e s t r o y i n g the Russian Far Eastern F l e e t , or at l e a s t l i m i t i n g , to a c e r t a i n degree, the Russian f l e e t ' s operation i n the P a c i f i c Ocean. The second reason f o r Japan having an anti-submarine force i s that the Japanese navy has to protect Japan's long trans-Oceanic trade routes, e s p e c i a l l y , the trade route that 1 0 1 connects Japan and Southeast A s i a and the west of I n d i a . Such a route goes i n t o the eastern sea along the long Chinese coast line.. I f China regains Taiwan, i t can cut o f f Japan's trade route w i t h i t s submarine operations without d i f  f i c u l t y . Under such circumstances, i t i s not a meaningless e f f o r t f o r Japan to emphasise an anti-submarine force r a t h e r than a w e l l balanced naval f o r c e . However, i t i s obvious that Japan's naval defence force i s dependent upon the Seventh F l e e t of the United States, and i s not an independent naval f o r c e i n s t r u c t u r e . Even the Japan Communist Party considers that Japan's naval force "has no capacity of i t s own to wage a war.'"^ S t r a t e g i c a l l y , anti-submarine operations against the Russian f l e e t i n the Far east i s more advantageous f o r .the United States than f o r Japan. For, the operation aim to enclose the f l e e t i n the Japan Sea, which i s not as groat a help f o r Japan's defence as i t i s an advantage f o r American naval operations i n the ' P a c i f i c Ocean. Thus,, s t r u c t u r a l l y and s t r a t e g i c a l l y , Japan's naval force has acquired the l e a s t autonomous character of of the three branches of Japanese m i l i t a r y f orces during the Ikeda p e r i o d . 102 FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV ^Asahi Shinbun, February 2, 1961. 2 l b i d , October 11, 1961. 3CP. Ohira Masayoshi, Shumpu Shuu, (Tokyo: Kashima Kenkyujo Shppankai, 1966), pp. 174-5. ^-In 1968, M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e K u r a i s h i was forced to r e s i g n h i s p o s i t i o n by the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s which were sup ported by the mass media, when he c a r e l e s s l y advocated Japan's n e c e s s i t y of having stronger m i l i t a r y force and nuclear weapons. This i n c i d e n t shows the p o l i t i c a l atmosphere i n the Japanese D i e t . For reference, Asahi Shinbun, February 7-24, i960, and Kiroku Xokkai Anpo Roriso, l o m i u r i Shinbun S e i j i b u , ed., (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1968), pp. 50-68. r~ ^Asahi Shinbun, February 2, 1961. ^ I b i d . February 12, 1963. 7lbid, March 20, 1962. % b i d , J u l y 19, 1962. ^ I b i d , March 5, I961. 1 0 l b i d , October 21, I960. -^Bungei Shun.ju, J u l y 1962, p. 76. 1 2Chuo Koron, J u l y 1962, p. 197. ^^j^iconomisuto, V o l . 42, No. 5, 1964, p. 16. 1^Kokubo, August 1963, p. 57. 1^Shima Yoshihiko, G u n j i h i , (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966), p. 170. ^ A s a h i 5liinbun, May 3, 1961. 17 l o c . c i t 1^- I J l b i d , January 6, 1961. -^utsunomiya Tokuma, Heiwa Kyozon to Ninon Gaiko, (Tokyo: Kobundo, I960), pp. 14-18. 103 Asahi Shinbun, J u l y 5, 1961. 21Information O f f i c e of the Defence Force ( J i e i t a i Senshi Shitsu) has published i t s stud i e s of war st r a t e g y , the subjects of which assume China to be the p o t e n t i a l enemy. Some of the t i t l e s are, ''Study of Chinese P s y c h o l o g i c a l Warfare," "Study of the Operation at Hsian Kuei," "Study of the Operation at T s i - t s i - h a r , " "Study of the Operation at Shih-chia-chuang," "Study of the Operation at Pomonhan," and e c t . Other than t h a t , the Force's p u b l i c a t i o n s are very r i c h i n i n f o r m a t i o n on China. ^ 2 A sahi Sh inbun, June 3, 1962. ~3Asahi Shinbunsha, ed,, Fihon no J i e i r y o k u , (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1967), p. l o o . 2/ !'The Japan Communist Party, ed., S e i . j i Senden Shiryo, (Tokyo: The Japan Communist Party P u b l i c d e l a t i o n s and Edu c a t i o n Section, 1961), p. 3$. 104 CHAPTER V CONCLUSIONS To summarise the preceding d i s c u s s i o n , one g e n e r a l i s a  t i o n w i l l be discussed i n t h i s Chapter. The Ikeda Cabinet's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y can be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as one of a p r i n c i p l e of balance. This p r i n c i p l e of balance i n the Ikeda Cabinet's behavior w i l l be viewed from three d i f f e r e n t per s p e c t i v e s . These are: the systemic impact as st u d i e d i n the approaches t o the communist bloc and the Western b l o c ; the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l impact as observed i n i t s r e c e p t i v e - ness to the demands of both the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s and the government p a r t y ; and the s e c u r i t y p o l i c y as observed i n the enlargement of the Defence Force and the emphasis on eco nomic development. Before d e t a i l i n g these three aspects, the i d i o s y n c r a t i c f a c t o r of the Ikeda Cabinet's p o l i c y making process, or i n other words, Prime M i n i s t e r Ikeda's p e r s o n a l i t y and past experience has to be b r i e f l y mentioned. Ikeda was an able bureaucrat of the M i n i s t r y of Finance (Okura Kanryo). The finance bureaucrats are considered to be the e l i t e of the e l i t e s i n Japanese s o c i e t y . Ikeda j o i n e d the L i b e r a l Party i n 1947 and became the M i n i s t e r of Finance i n the Yoshida Cabinet i n 1949, a f t e r a long career as a s u c c e s s f u l career o f f i c i a l i n t h a t m i n i s t r y . Students of Japanese p o l i t i c s and economics a t t r i b u t e the present economic p r o s p e r i t y of Japan to the Yoshida 105 Cabinet's elaborate economic p o l i c i e s i n the l a t e 1940's and e a r l y 1950's. 1 However, Yoshida h i m s e l f was an ex-diplomat and knew nothing about economics. Most of the economic p o l i  c i e s of the Yoshida Cabinet vrere formulated by the finance m i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s under Finance M i n i s t e r Ikeda's l e a d e r s h i p . Ikeda was noted f o r h i s r i g i d economic p o l i c i e s , ^ and he oft e n d i d not h e s i t a t e to s a c r i f i c e small segments of s o c i e t y i n order to a t t a i n a balanced development of the n a t i o n a l economy. However, the other side of Ikeda's c o n t r i b u t i o n to Japanese p o l i t i c s has to be remembered. The c o n t r i b u t i o n can be seen i n Japan's o r i g i n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y - the S e c u r i t y Treaty of of 1951 between Japan and the United States. I t was worked out i n 1950 by the Ikeda mission to the United 3 States under the Yoshida Cabinet. The major amendment o f the t r e a t y accomplished i n 1953 by the Ikeda-Robertson con ference, confirmed Japan's s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . Japan's s e c u r i t y was to be supported by American m i l i t a r y a i d and p r o t e c t i o n . Thus, i n h i s view and p o l i c y , Ikeda always maintained the balance between economic p o l i c y and s e c u r i t y p o l i c y as the M i n i s t e r of .Finance i n the Yoshida Cabinet. The f i r s t instance of Ikeda's balanced p o l i t i c s can be found i n h i s approach to the communist bloc and the Western b l o c . The f i r s t e x t e r n a l p o l i c y that the Ikeda Cabinet de c l a r e d was i t s w i l l i n g n e s s to approach the communist bloc, e s p e c i a l l y the'Chinese People's Republic. This was Ikeda's f i r s t p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n as the Prime M i n i s t e r of Japan i n J u l y , 106 I960. The Ikeda Cabinet q u i c k l y resumed Sino-Japanese trade r e l a t i o n s and g r a d u a l l y enlarged i t throughout four years of i t s tenure. In contrast to t h i s p o l i c y } the Cabinet improved t o a great extent the Japanese-American r e l a t i o n s as can be observed i n the Kennedy-Ikeda t a l k s of 1961, or the elaborate manoeuvre of Prof. Reischauer, Ambassador of the United St a t e s , i n manipulating Japanese p u b l i c o p i n i o n . The cabinet f r i e n d l y a t t i t u d e towards the United States was welcomed by the Americans and.was never opposed by many Japanese. The Cabinet's approach to the communist bloc g r e a t l y improved Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the communist bl o c , but at the same time the Cabinet always counter-balanced i t s approach w i t h the improvement and enrichment of i t s t i e s w i t h the Western b l o c . In t h i s regard, Ikeda's two t r i p s to Europe and two meetings w i t h the Kennedy brothers should be noted. Conse quently, when the Cabinet faced a d r a s t i c change i n the power balance i n the Far East, such as the weakening of Taiwan as observed i n the French r e c o g n i t i o n of Communist China, i t d i d not h e s i t a t e to weaken i t s r e l a t i o n s with, the communist b l o c . Thus, Japan maintained a power balance between the Western and. the communist blocs i n the Far East. Secondly, the Ikeda Cabinet's p o l i t i c s of balance can be observed i n i t s management of the N a t i o n a l D i e t . Japanese p o l i t i c s had never been and has never been so peaceful and harmonious as i t was at the time of the Ikeda Cabinet. This r e l a t i v e peacefulness can be a t t r i b u t e d to the Ikeda Cabinet' 107 r e c e p t i v e a t t i t u d e towards the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s ' demands. Concerning t h i s t o p i c , two examples w i l l be c i t e d . These are the Japanese-Korean n e g o t i a t i o n s and the a n t i - n u c l e a r armament p o l i c y . The n o r m a l i s a t i o n and improvement of the Japanese-Korean diplo m a t i c r e l a t i o n s was supported by the government pa r t y , the LDP. As p r e v i o u s l y mentioned, the Japanese-Korean nego t i a t i o n s r e c e i v e d almost unanimous support of the LDP, but was s t r o n g l y opposed by the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , namely the JCP and the JSP. The informed p u b l i c opinion maintained a n e u t r a l p o s i t i o n over t h i s i s s u e . The Ikeda Cabinet's a c t i o n was, to solve disagreements between the two c o u n t r i e s , to d r a f t a t r e a t y and to s t a r t n o r m a l i s i n g . d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s on the de' f a c t o l e v e l i n order to s a t i s f y the demands of the government pa r t y . However, i n order not to provoke the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s over t h i s i s s u e , the Cabinet d i d not s i g n the t r e a t y which was ready to be signed at the beginning of 1964. While s a t i s f y i n g the two opposing groups to a c e r t a i n degree, the Cabinet strengthened i t s p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s e f f o r t s i n order to create a more favourable atmosphere f o r s i g n i n g the t r e a t y . Another example of the Ikeda Cabinet's p o l i c y of balance i n party p o l i t i c s was i t s a n t i - n u c l e a r armament p o l i c y . The three a n t i - n u c l e a r p r i n c i p l e s (Hot t o produce, Not to possess, Not to deploy nuclear weapons) were s t r i c t l y observed during the Ikeda period and the Cabinet st a t e d i t s a n t i - n u c l e a r 108 armament p o l i c y repeatedly. An a n t i - n u c l e a r p o l i c y was s t r o n g l y advocated by the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s and was condi t i o n a l l y supported by the government party. P u b l i c o p i n i o n d i d not support n u c l e a r i s a t i o n of the Defence Force. Over f i f t y per cent of the Japanese supported the three a n t i - n u clear p r i n c i p l e s . I f the c o n d i t i o n a l support i s include d , over e i g h t y per cent of the Japanese supported the p r i n c i p l e s . Under such circumstances, the Ikeda Cabinet had no choice but to adopt the p o l i c y although the p r i n c i p l e would apparently l i m i t and weaken the combat ca p a c i t y of the Defence Force. Tabic V (Qeestion: Do you t h i n k the three a n t i nuclear p r i n c i p l e s Men Women Tot a l Should be maintainec 1 f o r good 52 % 46 % 49 % Could be changed to c i r c um stances 31 24 27 The p r i n c i p l e s are eaningless 12 10 11 Do not know 5 20 13 On the other hand, the government party s t r o n g l y demanded the strengthening of the Defence Force and the Cabinet's response to t h i s demand was i t s p o l i c y of i n c r e a s i n g the defence forces as was discussed i n the previous chapter. To t h i s p o l i c y , the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s objected but p u b l i c opinion seemed to have supported the Cabinet. 109 Table V I (question: What do you t h i n k i s the appropriate p r o v i s i o n f o r Japan's n a t i o n a l defence?) (from M a i n i s h i Shinbun, J u l y 1", 1968) Men Women T o t a l The Defence Force and the Japanese- American Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty 24 fo 19 21 % N e u t r a l i t y w i t h the strengthened Defence Force 43 34 38 Unarmed ne u t r a l i t y - 26 30 28 A l l i a n c e w i t h the communist bloc 2 2 2 Do no know 5 15 11 Nearly s i x t y per cent of the Japanese approved of the Defence Force f o r Japan's defence. A s i t u a t i o n such as t h i s enabled the Ikeda Cabinet to adopt the Second defence plan which was to strengthen the f i g h t i n g c a p acity of the Force. By t h i s p o l i c y the Cabinet counter-balanced the r e s t r i c t i o n and the weakening e f f e c t of the a n t i - n u c l e a r armament p o l i c y . Through manipulation of these two p o l i c i e s , the Cabinet a t  t a i n e d a balanced defence that s a t i s f i e d both the o p p o s i t i o n and the government p a r t i e s . The f i n a l d i s c u s s i o n i s the Cabinet's balancing of de fence and economic p o l i c i e s . The Ikeda Cabinet enacted the Second Defence Plan which brought about a d i s t i n c t i v e change i n Japan's defence c a p a c i t y . The net amount of the defence budget increased 72 per cent over four f i s c a l years of the Ikeda Cabinet. However, the Cabinet set up a c e i l i n g as to 110 what p r o p o r t i o n the defence budget could be over the GNP, I t was decided that the f i g u r e should not exceed 1 , 5 per cent of the GNP and t h i s r u l e was s t r i c t l y observed. There f o r e , under the Ikeda Cabinet, the growth of n a t i o n a l economy always surpassed the growth of the defence.budget. Of course, t h i s does not l e a d to a conclusion that the Cabinet neglected n a t i o n a l defence. On the contrary, Japan's defence force was enlarged t o such an extent as t o make Japan the second strongest m i l i t a r y power i n the Far E a s t . V But the growth of defence expenditure was kept under the l e v e l which harmonised wi t h the growth of Japan's t o t a l economy. The above three points h o p e f u l l y support the theme of t h i s chapter,, the Ikeda Cabinet's p r i n c i p l e of balance f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . Indeed, there can be counter arguments f o r the three d i s c u s s i o n s c i t e d above. The d i s c u s s i o n would vary according t o the l e v e l of a b s t r a c t i o n . In the world a t l a s , I t a l y looks l i k e a boot, but no t r a v e l e r f e e l s that the country looks l i k e a boot when he i s a c t u a l l y i n I t a l y . No ons can judge which perception of the two i s more v a l i d . Perhaps the only t h i n g to be s a i d i s that both perceptions are v a l i d but are d i f f e r e n t i n t h e i r l e v e l of a b s t r a c t i o n . As w e l l , a researcher who examines the Ikeda Cabinet's secu r i t y p o l i c y i n f a r more d e t a i l would very l i k e l y a r r i v e at a d i f f e r e n t type of g e n e r a l i s a t i o n . Neither the one presented here nor the one a researcher, might a t t a i n alone i s the only v a l i d one. Rather, both are v a l i d with a d i f f e r e n t l e v e l of I l l abstraction. Therefore. the generalisation presented i n this chapter i s simply one possible generalisation derived from the survey which was cited in the previous chapters, and i t i s valid, within the realm of abstraction on which the whole discussion of this thesis has taken place. 112 FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V Kosaka Masataka, "Saisho Yoshida Shigeru Ron," Chuo Koron, February, 1964, pp. 70-111. Ikeda's nickname was "The M i n i s t e r of Wheat," because he was reported to have s a i d that the poor people should eat wheat i n s t e a d of r i c e . His statement was taken as a la c k of sympathy to the poor people. 3Miyazawa K i i c h i , Tokyo Washington no Mitsudan, (Tokyo: Jitsugyo no Nihori-sha, 1956), p. 46. ^Number of men i n the three forces i s as f o l l o w s , Country Land Sea A i r Japan 171,500 • 35,000 41,000 South Korea 540,000 17,000 25,000 North Korea 340,000 8,000 20,000 Taiwan 400,000 62,000 82,000 China 2,250,000 140,000 100,000 the P h i l i p p i n e s 25,000 5,000 7,000 '.the f i g u r e s above are based on Boei Nenkan: 1967, (Tokyo: Boei Nenkan Kanko-kai, 1967), pp. 242, 254, 400-416. Taiwan's f i g u r e s are l a r g e r than Japan's, but Taiwan's f i g u r e s of sea force and a i r force equipment are smaller than Japan's f i g u r e s . 113 BIBLIOGRAPHY PERIODICALS AND JOURNALS Akahata. Asahi Jaiiaru. Asahi Ncnkan. Asahi Shinbun. Asian Survey. Bo.ei Nenkan. Bung e i Shun ,j u. Chuo Ivor on. Contemporary Japan. Ekonomisuto. Gekkan Shaka i t o. The Japan Annual. J i y u . 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