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Recruitment of the Burmese political elite in the second Ne Win regime : 1962-1967 Parchelo, Joseph John 1969

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RECRUITMENT OF THE BURMESE POLITICAL ELITE IN THE SECOND NE WIN REGIME: 1962-1967 by Joseph John P a r c h e l o B.A., C a r l e t o n U n i v e r s i t y , 1966 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA March, 1969 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, I a g r e e t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and Study. I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s thes.is f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f Poc t T i l A (_ S<Ci£,kJCtz The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date HAfca4 . >9 4>^ ABSTRACT This thesis examines the recruitment of the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e i n Burma from 1962 to 1967, the f i r s t f i v e years of the second Ne Win regime. The p o l i t i c a l e l i t e i s defined as con-s i s t i n g of o f f i c e r s of the rank of Colonel or higher, and c i v i l i a n s who hold administrative or party o f f i c e s s i m i l a r to those held by these high-ranking o f f i c e r s . The aspects of recruitment considered are (1) the extent of representation of ethnic groups; (2) the extent of achievement orientation; and (3) the nature and scope of recruitees' experience i n dealing with the leadership of minority ethnic groups. These recruitment variables are chosen for t h e i r r e l e -vance to p o l i t i c a l development, and thi s w i l l be demonstrated by consideration of some of the implications of e l i t e re-cruitment practices i n Burma for the development of equality, system capacity, and s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . Research into the ethnic origins and career experience of the current Burmese e l i t e was conducted by a review of the ex i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e and secondary h i s t o r i c a l sources, as well as a survey of the English-language press of Burma and foreign p e r i o d i c a l s for the years 1962 to 1967. The Burmese p e r i o d i -cals surveyed were The Guardian (daily) and Forward ( f o r t -n i g h t l y ) ; and the non-Burmese peri o d i c a l s were The New York  Times and the Far Eastern Economic Review. Use was also made of a Who's Who i n Burma, published i n 1961. I t was found that according to the rank of o f f i c e s held, the Burmese p o l i t i c a l e l i t e i s by no means exclusively m i l i -tary. The m i l i t a r y component of the e l i t e consists of a large proportion of the veterans of the Burma Independence Army, which has comprised the o f f i c e r corps of the Burma Army since shortly a f t e r Independence. Many of the administrative o f f i c e s continue to be held by veterans of the c o l o n i a l C i v i l Service, although t h e i r superiors are Army o f f i c e r s . In addition, many posts i n the single Army-sponsored party are held by veterans of former extremist "left-wing" p a r t i e s . Very few positions i n the current regime are held by former p o l i t i c a l leaders. I t was found that representation of ethnic groups other than the Burman majority was very low, being r e s t r i c t e d to 2 out of 54 from the m i l i t a r y component and 9 out of 44 of the c i v i l i a n component, 6 of the l a t t e r being Ambassadors. The current e l i t e - i s shown to be considerably less representative of minority ethnic groups than that of the c i v i l i a n govern-ments, and t h i s difference i s p a r t l y explained by i n s t i t u t i o n a l changes. The extent of achievement orientation i n recruitment i s considered by an examination of the formal education and pro-f e s s i o n a l experience of e l i t e members. I t i s shown that the l e v e l of formal education of the current e l i t e i s at least s l i g h t l y lower than that of the c i v i l i a n governments, with less than hal f holding u n i v e r s i t y degrees. The period i n question also shows a decline i n the professionalism of the m i l i t a r y as compared to the period of c i v i l i a n government and to the m i l i t a r y Caretaker Government of 1958 to 1960. This i s explained as a consequence of the recruitment to party and administrative posts of former "oppositionist" p o l i t i c i a n s , which has upset a balance between professional and p o l i t i c a l orientations i n the m i l i t a r y . The experience of e l i t e members i s also found to include service as m i l i t a r y administrators i n minority ethnic group areas, a p o s i t i o n not conducive to the stimulation of a t t i -tudes of equality and non-discrimination. This, then, elimin-ates a possible substitute for ethnic group representation i n the e l i t e . I t i s concluded, f i n a l l y , that none of these r e c r u i t -ment practices are conducive to further p o l i t i c a l development i n Burma, but constitute part of a defensive posture oriented towards counter-insurgency, minority-group regulation, and the short-run p o l i t i c a l security of the e l i t e . i v TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION ' 1 I I . THE ELITE 13 D e f i n i t i o n s . . 13 H i s t o r i c a l Background 24 I I I . ETHNIC GROUP REPRESENTATION 30 The Context 30 Representativeness of the Army 36 'y The C i v i l i a n Component 37 IV. ACHIEVEMENT ORIENTATION IN RECRUITMENT . . . . 39 General 39 Formal E d u c a t i o n 40 P r o f e s s i o n a l i s m 45 V. EXPERIENCE WITH THE ELITES OF MINORITY ETHNIC GROUPS . 58 VI. CONCLUSIONS 67 Summary. 67 I m p l i c a t i o n s . 68 The Future 73 FOOTNOTES. 75 BIBLIOGRAPHY 88 APPENDIX A: LISTS OF ELITE GROUPS . . . . . . . . . . 96 APPENDIX B: COUNTER-ELITES 109 V LIST OF TABLES TABLES PAGE I. Overlap of M i l i t a r y and C i v i l i a n Hierarchies i n Burma 15 II . Other High-Ranking M i l i t a r y O f f i c i a l s and Their O f f i c e s . . 20 I I I . Summary of the National P o l i t i c a l E l i t e i n Burma 23 IV. Origins of the C i v i l i a n Component of the Burmese E l i t e . 24 V. The Major Ethnic Groups of Burma (1963) 32 VI. Representation of Central Burma and Minority Group Areas from 1947 to 1958 34 VII. Ethnic Composition of the Current Burmese E l i t e . 36 VIII. University Education i n Three Burmese E l i t e Groups 40 IX. A Comparison of the University Education of C i v i l i a n Cabinet Ministers with That of the Revolutionary Council. .41 X. Available Indications of Formal Education i n the Current Burmese E l i t e . 42 XI. Education of M i l i t a r y and C i v i l i a n E l i t e Members 43 XII. Comparison of the Formal Education of the Current and Previous E l i t e s . 44 XIII. Stages i n the Career of the M i l i t a r y E l i t e . . . 46 XIV. C o n f l i c t i n g Roles i n the M i l i t a r y E l i t e 50 XV. Turnover of M i l i t a r y Personnel Performing C i v i l i a n Functions (From 1958 to 1967) . . . . 53 XVI. Experience of Ambassadors 56 XVII. C e n t r a l i z a t i o n of Regional Administration. . . . 62 XVIII. Rotation of Colonels from D i s t r i c t s to the Centre 6 4 XIX. State Budgets i n Burma 66 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would l i k e to thank Professor R.S. Milne of the P o l i t i c a l Science Department of the University of B.C. for his constant challenging and a s s i s -tance ever since 412. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The purpose of t h i s thesis i s to examine three aspects of the recruitment of the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e of Burma, as i t existed from 1962 to 1967. These three aspects are: (1) ethnic group representation; (2) educational, technical, and professional q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ; and (3) the experience which e l i t e members have had i n dealing with the e l i t e s of minority ethnic groups. In any e l i t e study, a number of important questions a r i s e . One of these, of course, i s "Who are the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e ? " This question which c a l l s for both formal and oper-a t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n s , w i l l be considered i n Chapter I I . Another, perhaps more fundamental, set of questions i s "Why study e l i t e s ? " "What can one learn about p o l i t i c s from studying e l i t e s ? " Or, more p r e c i s e l y , "What variables i n the recruitment of the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e are relevant to other im-portant p o l i t i c a l variables?""'" I t may be of i n t e r e s t to f i n d out simply "Who rules?" and what c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , i f any, the rulers have i n common. Marx and Engels, for example, claimed that the rulers i n any society were chosen from and by the members of a dominant cl a s s , and that they acted i n the interests of that c l a s s . V i l f r e d o Pareto presented evidence for the conclusion that 2 although there were e l i t e s i n every sphere of l i f e , the p o l i -t i c a l e l i t e (those with the most power) tended to overlap with 2 the economic e l i t e (those with the most wealth). Such approaches to e l i t e studies are concerned with the "agglutination hypothesis"; that those with some forms of 3 power and influence tend also to acquire other forms. When Gaetano Mosca considered t h i s hypothesis with reference to democratic s o c i e t i e s , he came to the conclusion that there i s a wide variety of interests i n society, and that these are a l l 4 represented i n the e l i t e . Pareto and Mosca also developed the concept of the " c i r c u l a t i o n " of e l i t e s . Here they attempted to rel a t e s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of new personnel recruited into the p o l i t i c a l 5 e l i t e with changes i n the society as a whole. This concept was elaborated by Harold Lasswell, i n his attempts to re l a t e . e l i t e theory to the cataclysmic p o l i t i c a l changes of his time. Lasswell contends that i n the twentieth century revolu-tions are led and carr i e d through by e l i t e s which have i n common cer t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; namely, origins i n the middle c l a s s , a high degree of professional and technical q u a l i f i -cation, and i n s u f f i c i e n t opportunity, under the e x i s t i n g regime, g to use these a b i l i t i e s . Thus Lasswell advocates e l i t e studies as a means of coming to grips with the dynamics of comparative p o l i t i c s , the processes of p o l i t i c a l change. More recently, i n p o l i t i c a l science, a s i m i l a r concern has led to a kind of synthesis of 3 the f i e l d s of p o l i t i c a l theory and comparative p o l i t i c s and administration, i n a search for a comparative theory of p o l i -7 t i c a l change. Various dimensions of p o l i t i c a l change have been put forward as aspects of p o l i t i c a l development. I n i -t i a l l y there were attempts to define the p o l i t i c a l prerequisites of economic development. Sometimes th i s was done by focusing on the nature of p o l i t i c s i n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s , and attempting to show how p o l i t i c s i n developing countries d i f f e r s from th i s model. Although t h i s approach points out the importance of r a t i o n a l i t y i n p o l i t i c s , i n the sense of emphasizing constraints on p o l i t i c a l leadership, i t very often merged into a view of development as modernization i n the Western pattern. This weakness i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important when i t comes to evaluating the appropriateness of Western i n s t i t u t i o n s to developing countries. A more modest concept of p o l i t i c a l development i s the view that i t consists of the growth of any forms of organi-zation, so long as they make possible the operation of a modern nation state. This approach suggests the element of "capacity" or " c a p a b i l i t y , " which'has since come to the fore-front of the study. In t h i s context, the growth of l e g a l order and administration becomes important, and with i t "the spread of r a t i o n a l i t y , the strengthening of secular l e g a l concepts, and the elevation of technical and spec i a l i z e d know-g ledge i n the d i r e c t i o n of human a f f a i r s . " 4 In addition, various degrees of emphasis are given to the elements of mass mobilization, and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n some form of democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s . I f these aspects of p o l i t i c a l change are to be considered as part of development, i t becomes important to consider to what extent a l l groups i n the society are represented i n the decision-making process, and the extent to which extra-bureaucratic i n s t i t u t i o n s exert control over the administration. As to the problem of the compatibility of these various aspects of development, there are as many d i f f e r e n t positions as there are writers i n the f i e l d . Some of these positions w i l l be discussed i n the remainder of t h i s introduction. There now appears to be some agreement as to what are the essentials of p o l i t i c a l development. Both Lucian Pye and other members of the Committee on Comparative P o l i t i c s , and Fred W. Riggs, one of the leaders of the Comparative Adminis-t r a t i o n Group, seem to agree on the following: (1) a change from widespread subject status to an increasing number of contributing c i t i z e n s . . .[the] spread of mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a greater s e n s i t i v i t y to the p r i n c i p l e s of equality, and a wider acceptance of univer-s a l i s t i c laws. (2) . . .an increase i n the capacity of the system to manage public affaxrs, control controversy, and cope with popular demands. (3) . . .greater s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , greater functional s p e c i f i c i t y , and greater integration of a l l the p a r t i c i -pating i n s t i t u t i o n s and organizations.^ The study of the e l i t e of a developing country should 5 emphasize those variables which have the greatest relevance to these questions. This i s the reason for the choice of those aspects of e l i t e recruitment i n Burma, which are to be the subject of t h i s paper. The most general reason for examining these three as-pects of e l i t e recruitment i s to see to what extent recruitment procedures have made possible greater s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and the emergence of i n s t i t u t i o n s which are not dependent for t h e i r s u r v i v a l on the continuation of m i l i t a r y r u l e . Morris Janowitz argues that i n order to ensure s t a b i l i t y , i t i s necessary for a m i l i t a r y regime to develop a v e r s a t i l e set of i n s t i t u t i o n s , rather than continuing to r e l y s o l e l y on control of the instruments of v i o l e n c e . 1 ^ In most developing nations, authority i s predominantly personal, and i n s t i t u t i o n s which usually channel the behaviour of s o c i a l groups are i n a state of f l u x . Under such conditions, e l i t e recruitment practices are l i k e l y to have a great e f f e c t on r o u t i n i z i n g behaviour into new patterns, and i n laying the foundations for new i n s t i t u -11 tions. This approach d i f f e r s from others i n the f i e l d of p o l i -t i c a l development i n taking, as given, a predominantly per-s o n a l i s t i c form of authority. Riggs, for example, emphasizes the outcomes of the paradox of a high degree of formal regu-12 l a t i o n and a wide range of personal power i n avoiding i t . In Burma, however, formal i n s t i t u t i o n s are secondary i n impor-6 tance to personal variables. This i s because the network of personal relationships among e l i t e members has shown more continuity than the forms of i n s t i t u t i o n a l organization, which have changed abruptly within the l a s t twenty-five years. I t i s hoped that t h i s w i l l be made clear i n the material to 13 follow, e s p e c i a l l y i n Chapter I I . The p a r t i c u l a r aspects of e l i t e recruitment dealt with i n t h i s paper are also i n d i v i d u a l l y relevant to aspects of p o l i t i c a l development. The representation of minority ethnic groups i n the e l i t e i s one step i n expanding the capacity of the system since i t allows these groups' spokesmen, at lea s t , i n the c i r c l e s of decision-making. Lacking t h i s form of access, minority groups may have to communicate with the e l i t e 14 through such forms of "instrusive access" as Riggs describes, or through the medium of re v o l t . In addition, such represen-t a t i o n may be a step i n the evolution of representative i n s t i t u t i o n s , since i t allows minority group members some say i n the future structuring of relationships between the majority and the minorities."^ The amount of attention given to educational, technical, or professional q u a l i f i c a t i o n s for o f f i c e has an e f f e c t on the capacity of the e l i t e to solve problems of economic development. In Riggs' prismatic model, for example, a concern for p o l i t i c a l a b i l i t y outweighs considerations of professional competence and th i s i s considered to have adverse e f f e c t s on development. "^ 7 Almond and Powell likewise point to an increase i n achievement 17 orientation i n recruitment as a mark of development. The discussion i n thi s paper w i l l concentrate on the s k i l l areas of economic planning and administration. The degree of attention paid to representation of ethnic minorities and the application of u n i v e r s a l i s t i c c r i t e r i a res-p e c t i v e l y , constitutes a d i f f i c u l t problem i n establishing the legitimacy of a regime, i n terms of j u s t i c e or equity. To the extent that grievances are f e l t by minority groups or s k i l l e d personnel as a r e s u l t of recruitment procedures, they are l i k e l y to withdraw t h e i r support from the regime. This question w i l l also receive attention throughout the paper. The t h i r d aspect of e l i t e recruitment has some of the ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the other two. I t i s the nature and extent of p r i o r relationships between e l i t e members and the leaders of minority ethnic groups. This constitutes, for the e l i t e , a kind of ethnic representation and also, i n part, a kind of q u a l i f i c a t i o n f or o f f i c e . This variable i s of sp e c i a l concern i n cases such as Burma where there i s a majority group pre-18 dominance i n the e l i t e . Here, p r i o r relationships between e l i t e members and leaders of minority ethnic groups w i l l s i g -n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t the evolution of i n s t i t u t i o n s for structuring the relationships between them. Those who are used to getting along with minority group members as professional associates and equals w i l l be better prepared to pa r t i c i p a t e i n the growth 8 of integrative i n s t i t u t i o n s and further non-ascriptive re-cruitment. On the other hand, e l i t e members whose experience has been i n supervising or c o n t r o l l i n g minority groups w i l l be i n c l i n e d to perpetuate such a re l a t i o n s h i p . Here again i t becomes important to the development of the system whether or not e l i t e experience w i l l be conducive to the growth of e f f e c t i v e communication between e l i t e and c l i e n t groups. Lacking such channels, minority group members w i l l attempt to gain influence through bribery, corruption, or r e v o l t , and so l i m i t the capacity of the system. I t may be possible to postulate a sequence of p r i o r i t i e s i n the c r i t e r i a of recruitment, according to hypotheses re-garding stages of development. This i s suggested, for example, by Bert F. Hoselitz, who puts forward a succession of stages which emphasizes, i n turn, integration, goal-attainment, and 19 adaptation. In each of these stages, recruitment should be directed to the accomplishment of a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t a l func-t i o n . As an example, only when there are procedures for structuring the relationships among ethnic and other s o c i a l groups, i s i t possible to d i r e c t attention away from ascrip.tive considerations, and focus on c r i t e r i a of administrative ... • 20 e f f i c i e n c y . This treatment bears some resemblance to Max Weber's characterization of the types of t r a d i t i o n a l authority, from which i n f a c t i t i s derived. Weber's typology may be i n t e r -9 preted as hypothesizing conditions for the t r a n s i t i o n from one 21 type of p e r s o n a l i s t i c regime to another. Under patr i a r c h -alism and patrimonialism, i n s t i t u t i o n s are i n a rudimentary stage of development; that i s , they are l i t t l e more than ex-tensions of the ruler's personal household. As the kingdom expands to include peoples and groups formerly beyond i t s l i m i t s , problems of integration gain importance. The regime may become " f e u d a l i s t i c , " i n which case e l i t e s i n outlying areas remain r e l a t i v e l y autonomous, and connected to the centre only by a set of mutually advantageous contracts. Alterna-t i v e l y , there might be a m i l i t a r y force d i r e c t l y l o y a l to the r u l e r and his followers which i s strong enough to force com-pliance from the outlying kingdoms. This emphasis on t e r r i -t o r i a l integration by force Weber c a l l e d "sultanism." A t h i r d solution to the problem of integration i s the "party of notables," a r u l i n g e l i t e composed of an a l l i a n c e among repre-sentatives of t e r r i t o r i a l l y - b a s e d groups. F i n a l l y , i n a collegium, a type of regime which i s t r a n s i t i o n a l from t r a d i -t i o n a l to r a t i o n a l - l e g a l authority, the problems of integration have been overcome, and the emphasis i s on the accomplishment of other, more concrete goals. Here high standards of tech-n i c a l and professional competence are sought i n the recruitment of the e l i t e . Such a succession of stages can be detected i n the development of Japan. Here the feudal Shogunate was overthrown 10 by a form of sultanism which concentrated on the creation of a m i l i t a r y power, capable of putting down rebellions i n the outer islands. When the regime was successful i n t h i s regard, i t attempted to give representation to a l l the areas brough under i t s c o n t r o l . Integration being f a c i l i t a t e d by c u l t u r a l homo-geneity, i t was possible to move rapidly into an emphasis on 22 professional q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . Various other combinations of developmental p r i o r i t i e s are suggested elsewhere i n the l i t e r a t u r e , and these also have implications for e l i t e recruitment. In his study of the bureaucracy of Thailand, Riggs points out that i n s t i t u t i o n a l complexity or d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s not always i n d i c a t i v e of a 23 high degree of performance or e f f i c i e n c y . I t would be necessary to ensure that i n s t i t u t i o n s i n a developing country expand and multiply only at a pace which i s i n keeping with the a v a i l a b i l i t y of ta l e n t . Otherwise, as has often been the case when complex i n s t i t u t i o n s are introduced exogenously, they are either v i t i a t e d by formalism and corruption, or de-24 l i b e r a t e l y replaced. I t has, however, already been shown that one constraint on the a v a i l a b i l i t y of tal e n t i s the tendency to r e c r u i t as-c r i p t i v e l y , which varies inversely with the degree of i n t e -gration of the system. I t may even be that although recruitment r e f l e c t s a d i r e c t r a t i o of the population of each ethnic group, t r a i n i n g and education are unevenly d i s t r i b u t e d among ethnic groups. In such a case representative recruitment for the sake 11 of integration occurs at the cost of a loss i n e f f i c i e n c y . Riggs also suggests that the l e v e l of integration i t s e l f depends on the adequacy of performance levels to main-t a i n the system.at the given l e v e l of i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i f f e r -25 en t i a t i o n . In the case of Burma again, malintegration was aggravated by attempts to maintain a degree of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 2 6" beyond the capacity of the e l i t e . This suggests the need for less complex i n s t i t u t i o n s and an emphasis, i n the recruitment of the e l i t e , on representativeness and v e r s a t i l i t y . This discussion should give some idea of the relevance which e l i t e recruitment has for many issues i n p o l i t i c a l development. This, i n turn, should warrant a thorough examin-ation of these three aspects of recruitment i n Burma: ethnic representativeness, s k i l l s , and p r i o r experience with ethnic m i n o r i t i e s . I t w i l l then be possible to o f f e r some judgment on the possible consequences of the Burmese pattern of e l i t e recruitment for i n s t i t u t i o n a l development, and the handling of developmental problems. In t h i s paper, Chapter II w i l l present the three main e l i t e groups of Burma i n h i s t o r i c a l context. Chapter III w i l l consider the extent of ethnic group representation, e s p e c i a l l y as compared with previous regimes. Chapter IV w i l l survey the educational and technical q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of the e l i t e , and Chapter V the nature and the extent of t h e i r relationships with 12 the leadership of minority ethnic groups. F i n a l l y , Chapter VI w i l l summarize t h i s material, and o f f e r some conclusions. CHAPTER III THE ELITE A. Def i n i t i o n s In Chapter I, the terms " e l i t e " and "bureaucracy" were used almost interchangeably i n reference to t h e i r recruitment. This i s not quite accurate. Since 1947, the most s i g n i f i c a n t f o c i of p o l i t i c a l power have been the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , the administration, and the army. Since 1962, the personnel of these i n s t i t u t i o n s have rearranged themselves i n such a way that the one l e g a l p o l i t i c a l party consists of both m i l i t a r y personnel and former p o l i t i c i a n s , while the c i v i l administration i s manned not only by the m i l i t a r y and experienced c i v i l ser-vants , but also by former p o l i t i c i a n s . Thus, these i n s t i t u -tions are a complex and constantly changing network of over-lapping hierarchies. The " e l i t e " and the "bureaucracy" do, for the most part, comprise the same personnel, because the organs of adminis-t r a t i o n are directed by m i l i t a r y personnel, and these m i l i t a r y administrators are usually also Party o f f i c i a l s . The only ex-ceptions occur i n the case of a small number of Party o f f i c i a l s who are not also administrators i n non-Party functions. There i s very l i t t l e information available about t h i s group, but i t should and w i l l be kept i n mind. 1 14 For the purposes of t h i s paper, p o l i t i c a l power w i l l be taken to follow from a p o s i t i o n i n a high o f f i c e i n either the m i l i t a r y , the c i v i l administration, or the party. Although there may be problems of comparability here, the methodological problems involved i n other techniques are even more formidable. Furthermore, the overlap at the highest levels makes i t r e l a -t i v e l y easy to t e l l who are the most i n f l u e n t i a l . The highest o f f i c e s distinguishable are membership i n the Council of Ministers, membership i n Party committees, and senior m i l i t a r y o f f i c e s . As of September, 1967, there were twenty m i n i s t e r i a l o f f i c e s held by a t o t a l of twelve persons. The organization and a c t i v i t i e s of the single party, the B.S.P.P. or Lanzin Party, are directed by three committees: the Central Organizing Committee, the D i s c i p l i n e Committee, and the S o c i a l i s t Economy Planning Committee. Of these, the f i r s t two have been operative since July of 196 2 and the t h i r d since October, 1967. At t h i s time there were, i n a l l , twenty positions held by thirteen people, only one of whom (Brig. Tin Pe) was not also a member of the Council of Ministers. Moreover, of these t h i r t e e n , only U Thi Han was not also a senior m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r . The overlaps at the highest levels of these three hierarchies i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n Table I. Since the highest o f f i c e s are held by those of the rank of Colonel or higher i n the army, th i s may serve as a s t a r t i n g point for a d e f i n i t i o n of the e l i t e , which w i l l be taken to 15 TABLE I OVERLAP OF MILITARY AND C I V I L I A N HIERARCHIES IN BURMA M i n i s t r y - Name , Rank and M i l i t a r y O f f i c e P a r t y O f f i c e s . D e f e n c e G e n e r a l Ne Win, Commander i n C h i e f o f t h e Armed F o r c e s C h a i r m a n o f C e n t r a l O r g a n i z i n g Committee D i s c i p l i n e Committee S o c i a l i s t Economy P l a n n i n g Committee F o r e i g n A f f a i r s U T h i Han ( c i v i l i a n ) N a t i o n a l P l a n n i n g V i c e - c h a i r m a n o f S o c i a l i s t Economy P l a n n i n g - Committee F i n a n c e and Revenue B r i g a d i e r San Yu, V i c e C h i e f o f S t a f f ( A r m y ) G e n e r a l S e c r e t a r y o f C e n t r a l O r g a n i z i n g Committee; member o f D i s c i p l i n e Committee; member o f S o c i a l i s t Economy P l a n n i n g Committee A g r i c u l t u r e and C o l o n e l Thaung K y i F o r e s t s ; L a n d N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n S e c r e t a r y o f P e a s a n t s 1 A f f a i r s D i v i s i o n o f C e n t r a l O r g a n i z i n g Committee; member o f S o c i a l i s t Economy P l a n n i n g Committee H e a l t h and E d u c a t i o n C o l o n e l H l a Han S e c r e t a r y o f Mass A f f a i r s D i v i s i o n o f C e n t r a l O r g a n i z i n g Committee; member o f D i s c i p l i n e Committee 16 TABLE I. Continued Ministry Name, Rank, and M i l i t a r y O f f i c e Party Offices Industry and Labour Colonel Maung Shwe Secretary of Workers' A f f a i r s D i v i s i o n of Central Organizing^-Committee; member of S o c i a l i s t Economy Planning Committee Transport and Colonel Than Sein Communications Joi n t General Secretary of Central Organizing Committee; member of S o c i a l i s t Economy Planning Committee Trade and Co-operatives; S o c i a l Welfare; R e l i e f , Re-settlement and National S o l i d a r i t y Colonel Maung Lwin (Commander of South-east Command) Member of Central Organizing Committee Home A f f a i r s ; J u d i c i a l A f f a i r s ; Local Adminis-s t r a t i o n ; Religious Colonel Kyaw Soe A f f i a r s ; immi-gration; National Regis-t r a t i o n and Census Member of Central-Organizing Committee Public Works and Housing Colonel Sein Win Member of D i s c i p l i n e . and S o c i a l i s t Economy Planning Committees 17 TABLE I C o n t i n u e d M i n i s t r y - Name , Rank and M i l i t a r y O f f i c e P a r t y O f f i c e s I n f o r m a t i o n and C u l t u r e B r i g a d i e r Thaung Dan ( V i c e C h i e f o f S t a f f - A i r ) M i n e s Commodore Thaung T i n ( V i c e C h i e f o f S t a f f -Navy Member o f S o c i a l i s t Economy P l a n n i n g Committee B r i g a d i e r T i n Pe V i c e C h a i r m a n o f S o c i a l i s t Economy P l a n n i n g Committee 18 consist of the following: (1) A l l m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s of the rank of Colonel or higher i n the Army, or of corresponding rank i n one of the other forces. (2) Those who hold c i v i l i a n o f f i c e s s i m i l a r to those held by the o f f i c e r s i n (1); namely, a) other members of the Council of Ministers; b) c i v i l servants of the rank of Secretary; c) Other o f f i c i a l s of the B.S.P.P. central hierarchy; d) other prominent c i v i l servants; e) Ambassadors. Groups (1) and (2)a are l i s t e d i n Tables I and I I . Groups (2)b, (2)c, (2)d, and (2)e are l i s t e d i n Appendix A i n Tables A l l , AIII, and AIV. The l i s t s of groups (1), (2)a, and (2)e are more comprehensive and up-to-date than any other of t h e i r kind ava i l a b l e , but cannot, for several reasons, be guar-anteed perfect. They are compiled from numerous sources, many of them fragmentary, and with few guides as to what would con-s t i t u t e complete l i s t i n g s . Furthermore, although an attempt has been made to standardize the date of tenure at September 1, 1967, some office-holders are reported on the basis of i n f o r -mation c u l l e d from up to two years e a r l i e r , when there have been no subsequent reports of change. 19 The l i s t of members of the Council of Ministers i s complete and up-to-date as of September 1, 1967. The l i s t i n Table II includes a l l those who are mentioned i n Forward or The Guardian, or other d i r e c t sources, a f t e r January 1, 1965, as holding these o f f i c e s , and for whom there i s no subsequent report of death or retirement. The l i s t of M i n i s t e r i a l Secretaries (Table A l l ) i s complete and up-to-date within the same l i m i t s , except that there i s no report available of who holds the o f f i c e of Secretary i n the M i n i s t r i e s of Immigration, National Regis-t r a t i o n and Census, Local Administration, and Relief and Resettlement. These, however, are the least active M i n i s t r i e s , and t h e i r functions have, for the most part, been taken over by the Security and Administrative Councils. Note (in Table XVII, Chapter V) that Col. Kyaw Soe, the Minister of Home A f f a i r s , Immigration, National Registration, and Census, i s also the Chairman of the Central Security and Administrative Council. Thus, one would expect that Col. Maung Kyaw, the Vice-chairman of the Central S.A.C., performs many of the functions of the Secretary of these M i n i s t r i e s . The l i s t of Ambassadors (Table AIII). i s almost complete and i s up-to-date as of A p r i l 1, 1968. At thi s time, the name of the new Ambassador to the United Kingdom had not been an-nounced (U Hla Maung having just been transferred from London to Washington). 20 TABLE II OTHER HIGH-RANKING MILITARY OFFICIALS AND THEIR OFFICES Name Offices Col. Aung Pa Commander, Eastern Command Col. Aung Zin Vice-Commander, Southeast Command Col. Chit Ko Ko Senior Navy Staff O f f i c e r Col. Hkun Nawng P r i n c i p a l of the Defence Services Academy Col. Hla Aung Director-General of the Petroleum and Mineral Development Corporation, and Director-General of Survey Col. Hla Hpone Commander, Rangoon Command, Mayor of Rangoon Col. Khin Za Mong Vice-Commander, Southeast Command Col. Ko Ko Secretary to the Revolutionary Council Col. Kyaw Zaw Secretary of the Ministry of Trade Col. Kyi Han M i l i t a r y Attache to the United States. Col. Kyi Maung Defence Ministry O f f i c i a l Col. K yit Khin Chief of M i l i t a r y Intelligence Col. Lun Tin Senior Army Staff O f f i c e r Col. Lwin Defence Ministry O f f i c i a l Col. Maung Kyaw Vice-Chairman of the Central Security and Administrative Council Col. Maung Maung Kha Secretary of the Ministry of Industry 21 TABLE II Continued Name Offices B r i g . Maung Maung Kyaw Win Col. Maung Maung Soe Col. Min Sein Defence Ministry O f f i c i a l Counsellor to the Ambassador to the United States Member of the Burma Medical Association Central Council Col. Min Thein Director of Agriculture Col. San Kyi Commander, Southwest Command Col. Sein L i n Vice-Commander, Southeast Command Col. Sein Mya Commander, Northwest Command Col. Vincent Solomon Judge Advocate General of the Ministry Col. Tan Yu Saing Col; Thein Han Col. Thein Maung Col.Tin Soe Col. Tin U Col. Tint Swe Col. Tun Tha Col. Van Kuhl Col. Win of Defence Chairman of Trade Corporation(2) Trade Ministry O f f i c i a l Commandant of Burma Army Staff College Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests Commander, Central Command Commandant of Kalaw S t a f f College Senior A i r Force S t a f f O f f i c e r Vice-Commander, Northwest Command Defence Ministry O f f i c i a l 22 With regard to groups (2)c and (2)d, l i s t e d i n Table AIV as "Other C i v i l i a n E l i t e Members," a d i f f e r e n t procedure was followed. The point of these c i v i l i a n categories i s to show that the predominance of the m i l i t a r y i s by no means t o t a l . There i s no complete l i s t available of party o f f i c e s (aside from the three committees considered above), or of Departmental Directorates, or Chairmen of Government Corpor-ations , and the l i k e . Thus, the group selected here consists of those for whom there i s a report since January 1, 1965, of th e i r holding some such senior o f f i c e s , and for whom data regarding the independent variables (ethnicity and career ex-perience) are avai l a b l e . Those i n thi s group also a l l hold o f f i c e s s i m i l a r to those held by m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s of the rank of Colonel or higher. I t i s possible to estimate the r e l a t i v e status of m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n t i t l e s by comparing m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n holders of the same post, i n terms of the rank of the m i l i t a r y incumbent. Thus, for example, the Secretary of a small 5 Ministry has about the same status as a Major i n the Army. From Table III i t i s possible to compare the weight of the m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n components of the groups which com-prise the sample studied i n thi s paper. These groups w i l l be referred to c o l l e c t i v e l y as "the national p o l i t i c a l e l i t e , " to disti n g u i s h them from minority ethnic group e l i t e s , which w i l l be considered i n Chapter V. TABLE III SUMMARY OF THE NATIONAL POLITICAL ELITE IN BURMA Group M i l i t a r y C i v i l i a n Total The Highest Levels (Table I) 12 1 13 Other High-Ranking M i l i t a r y (Table II) 33 0 33 Secretaries (except Colonels) (from Table A l l ) 8 8 16 Other Senior Party O f f i c i a l s (from Table AIV) 0 3 3 Other High-Ranking C i v i l i a n Administrators (from Table AIV) 0 17 17 Ambassadors (Table AIII) 1 15 16 Totals 54 44 98 Note: Colonels are excluded from the t h i r d group because they are a l l included i n the second. 24 B. H i s t o r i c a l Background 1. Introduction Table IV analyzes the c i v i l i a n component of the sample to be examined i n th i s paper, i n terms of t h e i r former member-ship i n the three h i s t o r i c a l l y prominent e l i t e groups i n Burma: the c i v i l service, the p o l i t i c i a n s , and the m i l i t a r y . Note '. that almost h a l f of t h i s group were formerly generalist ad-ministrators i n the Burma C i v i l Service. Almost as many are veteran p o l i t i c i a n s , and almost a f i f t h are r e t i r e d army o f f i c e r s . Thus i t i s appropriate to consider, i n the way of background, the his t o r y of these three major groups. TABLE IV ORIGINS OF THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT OF THE BURMESE ELITE Career Experience Number Percent C i v i l Service (Generalist) 21 48 P o l i t i c s (A.F.P.F.L.-Union) 15 34 M i l i t a r y 8 18 P o l i t i c s (Opposition) 5 11 C i v i l Service (Specialist) 4 9 Academic 4 9 Law 3 7 Business 2 5 Total Numbers 44 * * Since some members of the c i v i l i a n e l i t e have had considerable experience i n more than one career f i e l d , the t o t a l percentage i s more than 100,and the t o t a l numbers do not add up. 25 2. The C i v i l Service The c i v i l service i n Burma i s descended from a branch of the c o l o n i a l Indian C i v i l Service (I.C.S.). By the time of the separation of Burma from India i n 1937, Burmese held most of the junior, and about half of the senior o f f i c e s . Recruitment was from the most Anglicized of the population, those who had studied s u f f i c i e n t English to pass the I.C.S. exams. In addi-t i o n , candidates studied for a year at an English u n i v e r s i t y . E t h n i c a l l y , most of the generalist service was Burman, while the s p e c i a l i s t services included large numbers of Indians and Indo-Burmans.^ After independence, relations between the c i v i l servants and the p o l i t i c i a n s were d i f f i c u l t , because the a n t i - c o l o n i a l p o l i t i c i a n s i d e n t i f i e d the administrators with the expelled masters. Most p o l i t i c i a n s f e l t e n t i t l e d to exert any kind of pressure on the administrators to keep them " i n t h e i r place." Such interference took place outside o f f i c i a l channels s u f f i -c i e n t l y often to disrupt administrative procedures, and led to large-scale corruption, demoralization, and i n e f f i c i e n c y . At the same time, the administrators scorned the p o l i t i c i a n s for 7 t h e i r youth and inexperience. I t was largely as a r e s u l t of the i n a b i l i t y of these two groups to work together that Burma was unable to overcome the u n s e t t l i n g effects of the struggle for independence and the ensuing c i v i l war. From 1958 to 1960, the c i v i l service joined with the army under Ne Win to form a Caretaker Government. Since the 26 beginning of the second m i l i t a r y regime i n 1962, the Revolu-tionary Council has attempted to purge the C.S.B., and to control i t s a c t i v i t i e s . Nevertheless, i t s t i l l r e l i e s on the administrators' experience and t h e i r knowledge of procedures g to keep the system going. 3. The P o l i t i c i a n s Both the army and the largest p o l i t i c a l parties i n post-independence Burma originated i n the a n t i - c o l o n i a l student movement. The Dobama Asiaone (later known as the Thakins) developed from the Rangoon University s t r i k e of 1936 into an e c l e c t i c r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Recruitment was p r i -marily on the basis of demonstrated dedication to the cause of immediate independence from B r i t a i n . The students were a l l Burmans, and most chose to s a c r i f i c e t h e i r degrees for p o l i t i -9 c a l l i f e . In 1941, the core of th i s group, the "Thirty Comrades," l e f t for Hainan Island to t r a i n for the l i b e r a t i o n of Burma. On t h e i r return they formed the Burma Independence Army, re-c r u i t i n g anyone they could t r u s t to carry t h e i r colours. These included peasants, lawyers, hoodlums, and cle r k s , although the o f f i c e r s were better educated and chosen personally by the Thirty Comrades."'"0 The history of the B.I.A. and the emergence from i t of the m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s are shown i n Table XIII i n Chapter IV. Suffice i t to say here that af t e r independence members of the former B.I.A. joined p o l i t i c s or 27 the army at random, and up to that point were homogeneous i n 11 experience. In 1947, a l l the B.I.A. veterans who entered p o l i t i c s united i n the A n t i - F a s c i s t People's Freedom League (more commonly c a l l e d the A.F.P.F.L.). In 1947, the Communists, under Than Tun, were expelled, and formed the Communist Party of Burma (C.P.B-.). In 1951, another group (often c a l l e d above-ground Communists) broke away over a dispute on labour p o l i c y 12 to form the Burma Workers' and Peasants' Party. The big s p l i t of 1958, into Nu's "Clean," and a r i v a l "Stable" f a c t i o n , gave the occasion for the Caretaker Government. During t h i s period, p o l i t i c a l parties reorganized. In 1960, the three major parties were the Union Party (formerly the "Clean" A.F.P.F.L.), the A.F.P.F.L. (formerly the "Stable" A. F.P.F.L.), and the United Workers' Party (formerly the B. W.P.P.). Under the Revolutionary Council, the m i l i t a r y government formed afte r the 1962 coup, a l l parties were dissolved to pre-pare for the formation of the Council-sponsored Burma S o c i a l i s t Program Party (B.S.P.P.) or Lanzin Party. In r e c r u i t i n g former p o l i t i c i a n s to the party, the Council gained support from the U.W.P., the Union Party, and the A.F.P.F.L., i n that order. Most of the U.W.P. joined the B.S.P.P., even before t h e i r own party was dissolved. On the other hand, the Union Party and the A.F.P.F.L. both suffered from p o l i t i c a l arrests, although 28 the l a t t e r has remained more intransigent i n refusing to support the regime."""'"5 4. The Army Except for Ne Win's assumption of the Defence Ministry i n 1950, the army remained aloof from p o l i t i c s u n t i l 1958. During t h i s time t h e i r energies were directed towards counter-insurgency, and Ne Win accepted o f f i c e i n 1958 primarily be-cause the A.F.P.F.L. s p l i t made i t impossible to do t h i s job 14 properly. In the Caretaker Government, the emphasis was on careful administration and professional competence. Army t i e s were closer with the Stable A.F.P.F.L. than with any other 15 party. By contrast, i n the current regime former p o l i t i c i a n s have been recruited into the army-sponsored B.S.P.P., and the regime has taken on more of a " p o l i t i c a l " caste..."""*' The army has also had i t s share of s p l i t s . In 1949, afte r widespread mutinies, e s p e c i a l l y among the Karen b a t t a l -l i o n s , a l l Karen o f f i c e r s were relieved of t h e i r posts, con-17 fined for several years, and eventually discharged. This c r i s i s ended the synthesis of the c o l o n i a l army (which had been predominantly Karen) with the veterans of the war-time a n t i - c o l o n i a l movement, the B.I.A. The new character of the armed forces was symbolized by the replacement of General Smith-Dun, a Karen, as Commander-in-Chief, by L t . Gen. Ne Win, former Deputy Commander of the B.I.A. Up to the present, 29 B.I.A. veterans have maintained continuous leadership of the armed forces. By 1960, most b a t t a l l i o n commanders were Majors, be-tween t h i r t y and forty years of age, while brigade commanders were Colonels or Lieutenant Colonels i n t h e i r f o r t i e s . Thus the d i v i d i n g l i n e between B.I.A. veterans (recruited i n 1942 i n t h e i r early twenties) and more recent r e c r u i t s , comes at the 19 l e v e l of Major. Service i n the B.I.A. i s not i n i t s e l f , however, a guarantee of tenure. In January of 1961, Ne Win forced two Brigadiers and ten Colonels into premature retirement when they opposed his "wait and see" p o l i c y towards the c i v i l i a n govern-20 ment. Within the Revolutionary Council, i t appears that some free debate i s allowed, but opposition to basic decisions, once made, constitutes mutiny. There has been a tendency since 1962 to prune the Council of those who s t i l l object when confronted with a majority.. This applies to former. Brigadier Aung Gyi, who l e f t the Council i n February of 1963, and former Colonel Chit Myaing, who was dismissed i n March of 1964. Both of these s p l i t s appear to have been the r e s u l t of differences 21 over economic p o l i c y . In addition, i n the summer of 1967, Brigadier Tin Pe l o s t his o f f i c e as Minister of Trade and Co-operatives, just before the dismantling of his Peoples/ 22 Stores Corporations. In a l l of these cases, the expendable members have been those who wished to q u a l i f y t h e i r l o y a l t y to Ne Win. 30 CHAPTER III ETHNIC GROUP REPRESENTATION A. The: Context Burma has been ruled by each of the m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c i a n s and administrators at d i f f e r e n t stages i n i t s h i s t o r y . In the pre-c o l o n i a l period, overlapping, contending kingdoms exempli-f i e d the t r a d i t i o n a l types of s u l t a n i s t i c or f e u d a l i s t i c regimes/ Local authorities (the myosa) might change l o y a l t i e s overnight, depending on the fortunes, of nearby kings."'" The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of ethnic groups i n Burma i s s t i l l i n 2 dispute among anthropologists. Perhaps the simplest c l a s s i -f i c a t i o n i s made by the government of Burma. This assumes, aside from the majority ethnic group, the Burmans,: the existence of an ethnic group corresponding to each of the constituent states i n the Union. A number of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to th i s should be mentioned, however. F i r s t of a l l , the Kayahs are often counted as Karens 3 but there are s i g n i f i c a n t c u l t u r a l differences. Minority sub-groups not clo s e l y related to one of the main minorities are usually counted i n with the Burmans, since they are usually 4 c u l t u r a l l y assimilated. This may be less tenable for the 4 Arakanese than for the Mons, but i t does make c l a s s i f i c a t i o n easier. Furthermore, the l o c a t i o n of ethnic groups does not always correspond to the boundaries of the constituent states, • 31 as Karens are to be found a l l over southern Burma, not just i n 5 Kawthoolei State. A b r i e f summary of distinguishing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s might bring these groups more c l e a r l y into focus. The Shans and Kachins, who inhabit the northeastern area of the Union are s i m i l a r i n many respects, and are said to be r e l a t e d to the Thai people. According to Leach,, the Shans are Kachins who have moved from the mountains into the plateaus, and have founded more h i e r a r c h i c a l s o c i a l systems. Shans are also geographically closer to the Burmans, and a greater proportion g of them are Buddhist. The Chins are a h i l l people l i v i n g on the eastern border of the Union. Although s t i l l mostly animists, many Chins were Chr i s t i a n i z e d under the c o l o n i a l regime. The Chins have a much . less complex culture than the Burmans, and tend to look up to . 7 them as c u l t u r a l l y superior. The Karens and the Kayahs together constitute the largest group i n Burma which speaks a language outside of the Tibeto-Chinese family. Under. B r i t i s h r u l e , they were keenest to - adopt c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Western culture, and formed the majority of the non-British component of the c o l o n i a l army. The Kayahs d i f f e r from the Karens most notably i n t h e i r organization into g three hereditary princedoms. The populations of the major ethnic groups i n Burma are 9 given .in Table V. 32 TABLE V THE MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS OF BURMA (1963) Group Population Chins Kachins Karens Kayahs Shans 344,000 750,000 1,190,000 150,000 1,200,000 Total 3,634,000 Burma Total 23,664,000 Under B r i t i s h r u l e , t r a d i t i o n a l regimes i n "Burma Proper" were extinguished by the overlay of c o l o n i a l administration, while those of the Frontier Areas continued to exercise a l o c a l authority."'" 0 The independence movement developed a s o l i d basis of support i n the areas populated by the Burman majority, but i t s support among minority groups remained dubious."""""" The net e f f e c t of the c o l o n i a l period was to s t a b i l i z e the i d e n t i f i -cation of actors as representing e i t h e r the majority ethnic group or one of the minority groups described above. What s t i l l remained i n doubt, however, because of the di s c o n t i n u i t i e s of the war and the struggle for independence, 33 was the d e f i n i t i o n of the relationships among these groups. Some e f f o r t was made to allow for the representation of min-o r i t y groups i n the East Asia Youth League (later the A l l -Burma Youth League) and the Karens i n p a r t i c u l a r were repre-sented i n the Karen Central Organization, but these were only 12 two of the f i v e constituent organizations of the A.F.P.F.L. By the time of the Panglong Conferences, convened i n 1947 to c l a r i f y ethnic group r e l a t i o n s h i p s , Aung San, the leader of the A.F.P.F.L., had brought about the adherence of prominent representatives of each minority group to the 13 A.F.P.F.L. movement for Union. This i s suggested by: the composition of the 1947-48 Constituent Assembly, the d i v i s i o n of seats i n the two Houses of Parliament, and i n the ethnic origins of the f i f t y - f i v e Cabinet Ministers who served between 1948 and 1958. These figures are given i n Table VI. The Constituent Assembly elected i n A p r i l of 1947 to frame the new Constitution and carry on the government over the period of the granting of independence, consisted almost exclusively of members of the A.F.P.F.L. By t h i s time, repre-sentatives of minority ethnic groups i n the l e g i s l a t u r e came up to 2.5% of the t o t a l seated. The Constitution i t s e l f , however, formalized a r e l a -tionship among the peoples of Burma which was more complex 14 than th i s might indicate. In the f i r s t place, the degree of cooperation received from the representatives of minority TABLE VI REPRESENTATION OF CENTRAL BURMA AND MINORITY GROUP AREAS FROM 1947 TO 1958 1 5 Area of Origin Constituent Chamber of Chamber of Cabinet Assembly Deputies N a t i o n a l i - Ministers 1947-48 1948-58 t i e s 1948-58 1948-58 No. % No. - % - No. % ... . No. \ % . Shan State Kachin State Chin Special D i v i s i o n Kayah State Karens 26 7 28 10 25 10 25 3 7 3 12 2 6 2 8 12* 20 8 24 20 10 6 2 20 3 2 6 4 11* Remaining 188 75 190 78 53 42 39 72 Total 255 250 125 54 * Represents combined t o t a l of Karens and Kayahs. 35 ethnic groups was possible only by the formal grant of the r i g h t of secession af t e r a period of ten years. Secondly, although representation i n the Chamber of N a t i o n a l i t i e s fav-oured the minority groups, th i s House was overshadowed by the Chamber of Deputies, i n which the Burman majority predominated. In addition, the l i n e between State and Union govern-ments was blurred by the procedure for s e l e c t i n g the personnel of the State governments. The State Councils governing each State were formed from the members of each of the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of N a t i o n a l i t i e s elected from that State. Aside from th i s degree of autonomy, however, the Head of each State Council was the Minister of the State, i n the Union government, and as such, was chosen by the Prime Minister. One complication here was that State governments were subject to the authority of the A.F.P.F.L. party, leadership, and repercussions of Party s p l i t s might have adverse e f f e c t s on minority group autonomy. For example, afte r the 1958 A.F.P.F.L. s p l i t the Prime Minister dismissed the Ministers r (and, as such, Heads) of the Karen and Kachin States, even though these had majority support i n t h e i r respective State assemblies. This move was upheld by the Supreme Court. Such complexities i n the recuitment of the e l i t e explain the need to d i s t i n g u i s h , as i s done i n t h i s paper,.between the national e l i t e and the e l i t e s of the minority ethnic groups. Under the 1947 Constitution, these e l i t e s overlapped. Under the current regime th i s i s not the case. The nature of the relationships which have existed between members of the current e l i t e and the leaders of the minority ethnic groups w i l l be the subject of Chapter. V. ; B. Representativeness of the Army Unfortunately, an i n s u f f i c i e n t amount of detailed i n -formation i s ava i l a b l e , regarding the m i l i t a r y e l i t e , , to confirm the conclusion of e x i s t i n g studies, that i s composed exclusively on members of the Burman ethnic group. This con-clusion follows from data which indicate that the B.I.A., veterans of which comprise the current m i l i t a r y e l i t e , was recruited exclusively from the Burman majority. The figures for the m i l i t a r y i n Table VII are therefore based on the assumption that a l l the o f f i c e r s i n question are Burman, ' unless t h e i r names indicate otherwise.^ TABLE VII ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE CURRENT BURMESE ELITE Group Burman Karen Kachin Chin Shan OTH Total The Highest Levels 13 0 0 0 0 0 13 Other M i l i t a r y 31 0 1 0 0 l 33 Secretaries (excluding Colonels) 16 0 0 0 0 0 16 Other senior Party o f f i c i a l s 3 0 0 0 . 0 0 3 Other Prominent C i v i l i a n Administrators ,15 1 0 0 0 2 18 Ambassadors .10 0 1 .2 i . ; 2 ; .16 Total 87 1 2 2 I 5 98 37 The C i v i l i a n Component ; I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d from Table IV i n Chapter I I , sum-marizing the origins of the c i v i l i a n component of the current 'Burmese e l i t e , that they have been recruited primarily from l i f e - l o n g c i v i l servants., former members of the A.F.P.F.L. and Union p a r t i e s , former members of left-wing opposition p a r t i e s , and r e t i r e d m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . The .administrators and party o f f i c i a l s are r e c r u i t e d primarily from the pre-coup c i v i l service and the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . Of these groups, the gen-e r a l i s t administrators and the former opposition parties were 17 r e c r u i t e d exclusively from the Burman population. The only exceptions which could be detected to t h i s Burman predominance were among the ambassadors and some sec-ondary administrative p o s i t i o n s . The non-Burman ambassadors are U Ba Saw and U Nyo Tun, both Arakanese, U Vum Ko Hau and U Zahre Lian, both Chin, the Sama Duwa Sinwa Nawng, a Kachin, and U Pe Khin, a Shan. A l l of these are former members of the A.F.P.F.L. and Union Parties and served as Cabinet Ministers i n the period 19 47-1958 (see Tables AIII and AV). I t seems that the Revolutionary Government has expanded on the practice of previous governments i n r e c r u i t i n g as ambassadors repre-sentatives of minority ethnic groups, probably because of t h e i r experience as negotiators or representatives. In addition, U Khin Maung Latt, an Indo-Burman, i s Deputy Secretary i n the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests, U Sein, a Karen i s 38 Director of Labour, and U Thein Tin, an Arakanese, i s Deputy Director of Labour (see also Table AIV). Of the t o t a l sample of 44 i n the c i v i l i a n component of the Burmese p o l i t i c a l e l i t e , then, only nine are non-Burman, and of these,, six are posted abroad. Thus i t i s only to a very li m i t e d extent that the c i v i l i a n component of the e l i t e can be considered as representative of a l l ethnic groups. CHAPTER IV ACHIEVEMENT ORIENTATION IN RECRUITMENT A. General In Chapter I, an increase i n achievement orientation i n recruitment was considered as an aspect of p o l i t i c a l development.^ Yet the change from ethnic group particularism to more secular standards may occur i n two d i f f e r e n t ways, each of which has d i f f e r e n t implications for development. This change may occur through the attempt to make recruitment proportionally representative, for i t s own sake, or by em-phasizing achievement c r i t e r i a to the disregard of a s c r i p t i v e considerations. The l a t t e r course may discriminate against ethnic groups which, for some reason, are not highly q u a l i f i e d . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true i n the case of Burma where economic and technological development requires a greater pool of s p e c i a l i z e d s k i l l s than could be had through a po l i c y of representative recruitment. Although the Karens have benefitted to some extent from higher education and professional t r a i n i n g , c e r t a i n l y the Shans, the Kachins, and the Chins are very far behind i n t h i s regard. Thus, i f the Burmese e l i t e i s not repre-sentative, i t may be because achievement c r i t e r i a are favoured at the expense of representativeness. This chapter w i l l examine the technical and professional q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e i n Burma, with formal education being considered separately from c i v i l i a n experience. 40 B. Formal Education The m i l i t a r y core of the current Burmese e l i t e has about the same proportion of university graduates as the group of former p o l i t i c i a n s . The post-war administrative class included a far greater proportion of graduates than either of the other two groups. At the highest l e v e l s , the m i l i t a r y have only s l i g h t l y more formal education than the former p o l i t i c i a n s . TABLE VIII UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN THREE BURMESE ELITE GROUPS2 Group P o l i t i c i a n s C i v i l Servants M i l i t a r y Graduates 30.5% 93.6% "a few" Non-graduates, but attended 28.0% 6.4% "some" No unive r s i t y 41.5% 0.0% A lack of information prevents a more precise breakdown i n the analysis of the formal education of the m i l i t a r y . I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d from Chapter I I , however, that up to 1947, . . 3 the p o l i t i c i a n s and the m i l i t a r y were one homogeneous group. Thus, i t may be assumed that the educational achievement of the two groups would be s i m i l a r . Other sources of data allow a limited comparison of the group of c i v i l i a n Cabinet Ministers from 1948-1958 (see Table AV), with the current members of the Revolutionary Council, who comprise group (1) (Table 'I). This comparison i s pre-sented i n Table IX. :< TABLE IX A COMPARISON OF THE UNIVERSITY EDUCATION OF CIVILIAN CABINET MINISTERS WITH THAT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL Group C i v i l i a n (1948-N.o. Ministers -58) g. "6 Revolutionary Council (1967) No.. % Graduates 21 39 2 15 Non-graduates, but attended •12 22 3 23 No University 21 39 8 62 Total 54 13 Table X summarizes the information available regarding the formal education of each of the given groups i n the current e l i t e , and i s presented on the following page. Thus information on the univer s i t y education of i n d i -vidual e l i t e members i s available i n less than hal f the cases. Yet aggregate information i s available which makes i t possible to f i l l i n the gaps. The res u l t s are summarized i n Table XI. 42 TABLE X AVAILABLE INDICATIONS OF FORMAL EDUCATION IN THE CURRENT BURMESE ELITE University Attended No No Graduates Only Univ. Data Total 1) Highest Levels 2 2) Other High M i l i t a r y 2 3) Secretaries (except Colonels) 5 4) Other Senior Party O f f i c i a l s 1 5) Other Prominent C i v i l i a n Administrators 15 6) Ambassadors 3 3 0 0 5 8 0 1 2 0 31 11 1 6 13 33 16 17 16 Total 28 12 51 98 43 TABLE XI EDUCATION OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ELITE MEMBERS University Some No Total Graduates Univ. Univ. 1) Highest L e v e l s * ' 2 3 8 13 (Military) (2) (2) (8) (12) (Ci v i l i a n ) (0) (1) (0) ( 1) 2) Other High M i l i t a r y 13 8 12 33 3) Secretaries i n ^ -3 u / • • • . „ , x 10 . 3 3 16 (except Colonels) (C i v i l i a n ) ( 8 ) (0) (0) ( 8 ) (Military) ( 3) (2) (3) ( 8 ) 4) Other Senior ^ ^ ^ 2 Party O f f i c i a l s •5) Other Prominent C i v i l i a n 15 1 1 17 Admini strators 6) Ambassadors 5 7 4 16 Totals 46 23 29 9 8 44 The e s t i m a t e s f o r Group 2 were d e r i v e d by a s s u m i n g a d i s t r i b u t i o n midway between t h o s e g i v e n f o r p o l i t i c i a n s i n T a b l e s V I I I and IX. The same a p p l i e s f o r t h e m i l i t a r y i n Group 3, w h i l e f o r r e m a i n i n g c i v i l i a n a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , 100% g r a d u a t i o n i s assumed. I n o t h e r c a s e s , as i n Groups 4 and 6, t h e d i s c r e p a n c i e s a r e removed by a s s u m i n g an e v e n t h r e e - w a y s p l i t o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e . C o m b i n i n g t h e d a t a f r o m T a b l e s V I I I (on C i v i l S e r v a n t s ) , T a b l e IX (on C i v i l i a n C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r s ) w i t h t h o s e o f T a b l e XI g i v e s t h e f o l l o w i n g c o m p a r i s o n o f t h e c u r r e n t e l i t e w i t h t h a t o f 1948 t o 1958. (The f i g u r e o f 43 f o r " c i v i l S e r v a n t s ( 1 9 4 8 - 5 8 ) " i s o n l y t o a l l o w n u m e r i c a l c o m p a r a b i l i t y ; t h e e s s e n t i a l datum i s t h e p e r c e n t a g e . ) TABLE X I I COMPARISON OF THE FORMAL EDUCATION OF THE CURRENT AND PREVIOUS E L I T E S E d u c a t i o n a l C a b i n e t C i v i l M i l i t a r y C i v i l i a n L e v e l M i n i s t e r s S e r v a n t s T o t a l E l i t e E l i t e T o t a l (1948-58) (1948-58) (48-58) (1967) (1967) (1967) No. % No. % ; No. % No. % No. % No. % U n i v e r s i t y G r a d u a t e s 21 39 40 94 61 63 18' 34 29 64 46 47 Some , U n i v e r s i t y 12 22 1 2 13 13 12 23 10 22 23 23 No U n i v . 21 39 2 4 23 24 2_3 43 6_ 14 29 30 T o t a l s 54 43 97 53 45 98 45 Although the r e l i a b i l i t y of i t s d e t a i l s i s admittedly imperfect, the table does i l l u s t r a t e and validate the con-clusions of t h i s and other research, that the formal educational l e v e l of the current e l i t e i s only s l i g h t l y lower than that of the post-independence c i v i l i a n regimes. If the mix of p o l i -t i c i a n s , administrators, and m i l i t a r y at any given time i s considered, however, i t would have to be admitted that the current regime, with fewer c i v i l i a n administrators, i s con-siderably less educated. C. Profe s s1onal1sm 1. The M i l i t a r y I t has been suggested that the m i l i t a r y i n developing countries i s q u a l i f i e d for a role as a modernizing force be-cause exposure to modern weapons systems makes i t necessary for them to develop technical and organizational s k i l l s . Supposedly, secular c r i t e r i a are constantly reinforced i n the processes of recruitment and promotion by the demands of the 5 l i f e and death struggle of the active m i l i t a r y l i f e . In Burma, however, the s t r i c t l y professional role of the m i l i t a r y has been so discontinuous that i t has been pos-s i b l e for non-professional c r i t e r i a to play an important part i n recruitment. Table XIII attempts to show the extent to which professional and non-professional c r i t e r i a of recruitment were applied at each stage of a t t r i t i o n or augmentation to the TABLE XIII STAGES IN THE CAREER OF THE MILITARY ELITE Time I n s t i t u t i o n a l Numbers C r i t e r i a of M i l i t a r y C i v i l i a n Period . Form Recruitment Experience -Experience Dec.26, Burma "marginal men" over one major b a t t l e administration 1941- Independence 23,000 1/2 were peasants— (Shwedaung) and of 80% of r u r a l July 24, Army also students,lawyers minor skirmishes municipalities 1942 hoodlums; o f f i c e r s i n Burma Proper better educated chosen by the 30 - Comrades Aug. 26, Burma 2,700, From B.I.A., screened n e g l i g i b l e served i n tan-1942- Defence then up for l o y a l t y by dem with Ba Sept.16, Army to Japanese Maw supporters 1943 7,000 as " p o l i t i c a l commisars" l o c a l l y Sept.16, Burma up to l o y a l t y to a n t i - a i r r a i d and planning of 1943- National 25,000 Japanese r e s i s - garrison duty; resistance move-June 11, Army by 1945 tance;willingness engaged Japanese ment while 1945 to f i g h t B r i t i s h i f at Toungoo and holding adminis-necessary Pyinmana t r a t i v e o f f i c e s ; remaining sep-arate from Ba . Maw group . . . June 30, P a t r i o t i c as from B.N.A.excluding clearing up Jap- p o l i t i c s of 1945- Burmese above those arrested by anese resistance self-perpetu-Oct.1945 Forces the B r i t i s h i n Shan mountains ation as TABLE XIII Continued Time I n s t i t u t i o n a l Numbers Period Form C r i t e r i a of Recruitment M i l i t a r y Experience C i v i l i a n Experience Oct.1945 Feb.1947 part of the Burma army; i . e . 1st, 3rd,4th, 5th,and 6th Burma R i f l e s 4,700 selected by B r i t i s h from P.B.F. elimin-ating "more unruly" elements ne g l i g i b l e 3rd Battalion served as Aung San 1s bodyguard others involved i n pre-indepen-dence agitation Feb.1947 Feb.1949 4th Burma about R i f l e s and 2,000 most of 5th Burma R i f l e s r e f u s a l to mutiny i n 1948,along with other battalions counter-insurgency n e g l i g i b l e Feb.1949 most of Army about reorganization of Army successful pros- Ne Win as Jan.4, o f f i c e r corps 1,000 i n 1951 saw B.I.A. ecution of Minister of 1954 veterans get most missions on basis l o y a l t y to Ne Win com-of counter-insurgency:Defence and t r a i n i n g by B r i t i s h Home A f f a i r s , m i l i t a r y mission 1949-50. Jan. 1954-Oct. 1958 Oct. , 1958-Feb. , 1960 some Counter-insurgency; t r a i n i n g from Yugoslav and I s r a e l i missions-n e g l i g i b l e Brigadiers, Colonels, Lt.Cols.,and some Majors about 500 trusted by Ne Win; including some promise as 3 Brig.,23 economic managers Cols.,50 Lt.Cols, 400 Majors good record i n cleaning up insur-gent outbreaks administration of economic agencies;rural government,in-cluding para-p o l i t i c a l struc-tures; urban renewal;some in t e r n a l dispute TABLE X I I I C o n t i n u e d Time P e r i o d I n s t i t u t i o n a l Numbers Form C r i t e r i a o f R e c r u i t m e n t M i l i t a r y E x p e r i e n c e C i v i l i a n E x p e r i e n c e Feb. , 1960-M a r c h 3, 1962 B r i g a d i e r s , C o l o n e l s , L t . C o l s . , and some M a j o r s a b o u t s u r v i v o r s o f J a n . 500 1961 p u r g e o f 2 i n c l u d i n g B r i g a d i e r s and 3 B r i g s . , 10 C o l o n e l s 23 C o l s . , 50 L t . C o l s . , and a b o u t 400 M a j o r s some c o u n t e r -i n s u r g e n c y p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y p r o -h i b i t e d d u r i n g e l e c t i o n ; a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f S t a t e s ; r e t a i l t r a d e CO 4 9 group which eventually became the current m i l i t a r y e l i t e . Thus, from the o r i g i n a l 23,000 members of the B.I.A., only o f f i c e r s of the rank of Major or higher remain i n the m i l i t a r y e l i t e . In addition, the table attempts to show the extent of c i v i l i s m and m i l i t a r y experience acquired at each stage. This table i l l u s t r a t e s , the o r i g i n a l tempering of the m i l i t a r y e l i t e i n the f i r e s of insurrection, i t s p o l i t i c a l decimations and only eight consecutive years i n a purely pro-f e s s i o n a l r o l e . The o f f i c e r s which comprise the current m i l i -tary e l i t e have received t r a i n i n g under B r i t i s h , Yugoslav, and I s r a e l i missions, and most have spent some time, however short, i n t r a i n i n g overseas.^ Training of t h i s nature i s conducive to professional attitudes, and has, i n f a c t , given many of the o f f i c e r s a thorough f a m i l i a r i t y with modern technology. Yet from t h e i r p o l i t i c a l experience, most of these o f f i c e r s tend to regard p o l i t i c s as a clandestine or subversive a c t i v i t y . I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d from Chapter II that the B.I.A. originated as a revolutionary movement, and remained as such 7 u n t i l 1947. Thus, while decision-making i s carried on i n the s t y l e of the s t a f f meeting, the p r e v a i l i n g image of opposition g i s the underground c e l l . As a consequence,, there has arisen a c o n f l i c t within the present e l i t e , as some of i t s members seem to favour one r o l e at the expense of the other. This i s the c o n f l i c t which Pye refers to as "two approaches to finding a new i d e n t i t y " and i t 50 resembles the "Red vs. expert": contradiction i n Communist China."'"0 The roles i n question may be characterized as "the professional" and "the p o l i t i c i a n . " Their c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are summarized i n Table XIV."''"'' TABLE XIV CONFLICTING ROLES IN THE MILITARY ELITE Professional P o l i t i c i a n S k i l l s the management of violence; i . e . equipping, t r a i n i n g , and planning personal r e l a t i o n s ; i . e . mass organi-zation ,exhortation, p o l i t i c a l i n -f i g h t i n g Loyalty to the State as such jus-t i f i e s prompt, e f f e c t i v e action without regard for p o l i t i c a l consequences to a vaguely-defined "people" - opposes technicians and bureaucrats as im-personal and ex p l o i t a t i v e I d e n t i f i c a t i o n d i s c i p l i n e and chain of aspires to and command sets group apart demands from others from society, with a a constant involve-separate i d e n t i t y ment with "the people" When the Revolutionary Council came to power i n 1962, i t i n s t i t u t e d large-scale arrests of p o l i t i c i a n s and, soon a f t e r -wards, purged the c i v i l service. In attempts to f i l l these o f f i c e s i n the c i v i l service, and to s t a f f a new cadre party, 51 i t c a l l e d for the support of former p o l i t i c i a n s . I t was pre-dominantly members of the U.W.P. and the CP.B. who accepted these p o s i t i o n s . Presumably, most members of the other parties were not w i l l i n g to support the regime under conditions which 12 the Council found acceptable and they were kept i n j a i l . Some of the former p o l i t i c i a n s who were recruited into the regime were now i n p o s i t i o n s , i n administrative and party offices., which allowed them to a f f e c t decisions regarding e l i t e membership."'"^ This s h i f t of personnel came about i n three steps. The f i r s t was i n February and March of 1963. On Feb. 9 a Col. Kyi Win was arrested by M i l i t a r y Intelligence. On Feb.; 10, Br i g . Aung Gyi announced his retirement because of his unw i l l -ingness to accept the economic techniques of the Revolutionary Council. I t i s reported that, at the same time, U Thi Han, a follower of Aung Gyi i n the professionally-oriented "Paungde Group" was kept from r e t i r i n g only at the l a t t e r ' s insistence. Within the next few days came the f i r s t s p e l l of f u l l - s c a l e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , and the elevation of U Ba Nyei'n to the o f f i c e 14 of F i n a n c i a l Advisor to the Minister of Finance and Revenue.. On A p r i l 1, the Revolutionary Council announced an o f f e r of amnesty to a l l rebels who would lay down th e i r arms 15 before the end of the year and come over to the government. Members of the A.F.P.F.L. who opposed th i s o f f e r vehemently were arrested i n one swoop i n August, and i n another i n December. The l a t t e r group was referred to by o f f i c i a l releases as an 16 "underground c e l l . " By the end of the year, a number of former members of the C.P.B. joined the B.S.P.P. Also, i n December there were a number of prominent changes i n the Revolutionary Council, including promotions to Brigadier San 17 Yu, Colonel Than Sein and Colonel Maung Lwin. The t h i r d series of changes began i n February of 1964 with the promotion of Colonel Tan Yu Saing and Colonel Kyaw Soe. In a l i s t of the Revolutionary Council members published 19 on March 3, Colonel Kyi Maung was missing, and, on March 31, 2 Colonel Chit Myamg was dismissed for "undesirable a c t i v i t i e s . " At t h i s same time there were large-scale dismissals i n the lower ranks of the Army. The second wave of na t i o n a l i z a t i o n and Burmanization began at thi s time, led by Brigadier Tin Pe, the newly appointed Minister of Trade Development. This series of changes may be explained as the outcome of an imbalance i n the m i l i t a r y , between the professionals and the p o l i t i c i a n s . Beginning i n early 1963 newly-recruited former p o l i t i c i a n s were able to lend t h e i r support to the more " p o l i -t i c a l " of the m i l i t a r y e l i t e , who were led by Brigadier Tin Pe, 21 Colonel Tan Yu Saing and Colonel Aung Thein. Following the formal banning of pre-existing p o l i t i c a l parties and the wave of arrests i n late 1963, the ground was set for the f i n a l show-down within the Council. Somewhere i n early 1964, Colonels Kyi Maung and Khin Nyo also disappear from sight. These two, 53 Colonel Chit Myaing, Brigadier Aung Gyi, and Colonel Saw Myint (dismissed i n August of 196 4 for a v i o l a t i o n of the demoneti-zation order) had a l l had commendable records i n economic 22 development posts under the Caretaker Government, and were probably the most experienced and competent i n the Council, i n economic a f f a i r s . The volume of turnover i n the m i l i t a r y component of the e l i t e since the Caretaker Government i s shown i n Table XV. TABLE XV TURNOVER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL PERFORMING CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS (FROM 1958 TO 1967) 2 3 Held Over New Recruits Total Non-military Posts i n Caretaker Government (1958-1960) 27 O r i g i n a l Revolutionary Council (1962) 10 17 M i l i t a r y Personnel Now i n C i v i l i a n Posts (1967) 10 13 23 Of 27 high-ranking m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s known to have held non-military o f f i c e s i n the Caretaker Government, only 10 were members of the Revolutionary Council at i t s founding. (Of these 54 only six currently hold s i m i l a r o f f i c e s . ) Of the seventeen o r i g i n a l Revolutionary Council members, only ten s t i l l hold o f f i c e . Of the twenty-three m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s currently holding other than purely m i l i t a r y positions (or Security and Administrative Council o f f i c e s i n conjunction with regional commands) only ten have been i n o f f i c e since 1962. The r e s t have been transferred from f i e l d commands. P a r t i c u l a r l y noticeable by t h e i r absence are four Colonels, Chit Myaing, Kyi Maung, Saw Myint, and Khin Nyo, and Brigadier Aung Gyi. 2. The C i v i l i a n s The composition of the c i v i l i a n e l i t e of former p o l i -t i c i a n s and former administrators suggests a s i m i l a r cleavage. Table VII i n Chapter 3 summarized the experience of c i v i l i a n e l i t e members. Most of the c i v i l i a n s who now hold high o f f i c e i n Burma are veterans of the generalist C i v i l Service. Although they are c l o s e l y supervised by m i l i t a r y counterparts, and exercise l i t t l e autonomy i n decision-making, t h e i r services are s t i l l 24 e s s e n t i a l to the execution of p o l i c y . Many (although not most) of the Cabinet Ministers from the p o l i t i c a l period are now serving as senior administrators or diplomats, while former opposition p o l i t i c i a n s s t a f f the B.S.P. Party. Although the l a t t e r seem to be few i n number, t h i s i s because so l i t t l e information i s available about the Party hierarchy. By a l l accounts, the number of professionals i n the c i v i l i a n e l i t e i s small. I t i s possible, to some extent, to locate a greater concentration of "professionals" or " p o l i t i c i a n s " i n some government departments. I t appears that relevant experience i s more highly regarded i n the M i n i s t r i e s of Foreign A f f a i r s and National Planning which maintain r e l a t i o n s with the outside world. These include U Kyaw Nyunt, Secretary of National Planning, a capable economist trained i n A u s t r a l i a , who was for many years with Finance and Revenue, and U Ohn Khin, Permanent Secretary at the Foreign O f f i c e , who was also Secretary of 2 6 National Planning before U Kyaw Nyunt. U Soe Tin, Executive Secretary of the Foreign O f f i c e , and U Tun Shein, the Secretary of the Ministry have had each over 20 years' experience, while U Thet Tun, an Honours B.Sc. from London, now Director of the Central S t a t i s t i c s and Economics Department of National Planning 27 has had over 18 years continuous service. Relevant experience i s also taken seriously i n the Diplomatic Service. Table XVI summarizes the d i s t r i b u t i o n of experience among Ambassadors, counting service as a minority ethnic group representative as , . . . 28 relevant experience. The Ministry which seems most under the control of the " p o l i t i c i a n s " i s Finance and Revenue. U Chit Maung, the Secretary, and U Ba Nyein, the Special Advisor, are both former 56 TABLE X V I EXPERIENCE OP AMBASSADORS Y e a r s o f E x p e r i e n c e Number P e r c e n t 0 - 5 4 25 6 -10 5 31 11 -15 0 0 16 - 2 0 3 19 21 -25 4 25 members o f t h e B.W.P. P o l i t b u r e a u . T h i s g r o u p was i n i t i a l l y p r e d o m i n a n t i n t h e M i n i s t r y o f A g r i c u l t u r e and F o r e s t s . When T i n Pe was M i n i s t e r , a 27-man co m m i t t e e c a l l e d t h e A g r a r i a n R e v o l u t i o n and C o - o p e r a t i v e s S y s t e m a t i z a t i o n P l a n n i n g Committee 3 was f o r m e d u n d e r t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f Than S e i n and T a n Yu S a i n g . When t h i s c o l l a p s e d , T i n Pe was moved t o t h e M i n i s t r y o f T r a d e D e v e l o p m e n t , w h i c h s o o n a b s o r b e d t h e M i n i s t r y o f C o - o p e r a t i v e s 31 and S u p p l y , t o h a n d l e t h e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f i n t e r n a l t r a d e . T a n Yu S a i n g became Manager o f t h e Myanma I m p o r t - E x p o r t C o r -p o r a t i o n and Than S e i n M i n i s t e r o f L a b o u r , M i n e s , and I n d u s t r y . By 1967, o n l y T a n Yu S a i n g h a d t h e same p o s i t i o n w h i l e T i n Pe was out of o f f i c e , and Than Sein was demoted to Transport and 33 Communications. Former opposition p o l i t i c i a n s were p a r t i c u l a r l y pro-minent i n the formation of the B.S.P.P. When a l l other parties were broken up, t h e i r members were i n v i t e d to j o i n the B.S.P.P., b . but only the members of the U.W.P. came over en masse. A number of leaders of the C.P.B. also joined the Party i n 1963. In 1965, the Party's Central Organizing Committee consisted of 34 Ne Win, Tin Pe, Aung Than, Than Sein, and Kyaw Soe, a l l of whom but the f i r s t and l a s t are extreme " l e f t i s t s . " The com-pl e t i o n of the organization of the B.S.P.P. was probably the zenith of the power of the " p o l i t i c i a n s . " Thus the economic stagnation of Burma from 1963 to 1967 r e f l e c t e d the lack of trained professional people i n positions of leadership. The influence of s e l f - s t y l e d populist p o l i t i -cians was such as to prevent the development of a c o l l e g i a l regime. The predominance of the Burman majority i n the national p o l i t i c a l e l i t e , then, cannot be explained i n terms of i t s superior s k i l l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . The strategy for p o l i t i c a l development was c l e a r l y not one of the s e c u l a r i z a t i o n of re-cruitment to the e l i t e i n either of the two senses of propor-t i o n a l representation or selection by achievement. I t remains, then, to decide whether the strategy i s one of accomodation with minority groups i n some form of confederal r e l a t i o n s h i p , or integration e n t i r e l y through m i l i t a r y administration. CHAPTER V EXPERIENCE WITH THE ELITES OF MINORITY ETHNIC GROUPS In Chapter I I I , i t was demonstrated to what extent the e l i t e s of the constituent States overlapped with the national p o l i t i c a l e l i t e up to the 1962 coup."'" This was a convenient device for f a c i l i t a t i n g communication between these groups, but i t s main e f f e c t was to obscure the de facto c e n t r a l i z i n g or a s s i m i l a t i o n i s t tendencies of the A.F.P.F.L. beneath a cloak of 2 formal l e g a l safeguards of minority group autonomy. I t was also shown i n Chapter III that insofar as i n -complete information warrants any conclusion, t h i s must be that the Burman majority currently maintains almost exclusive con-3 t r o l of national e l i t e membership. This i s , of course, p a r t l y a consequence of the suspension of the 1947 Constitution which made the Heads of the State Assemblies Cabinet Ministers. Under the current regime the supreme decision-making body i s not a Cabinet but the Revolutionary Council. The State governments are c a l l e d State Supreme Councils and are selected by. the Revolutionary Council from outside i t s number. Each Supreme Council i s chaired by-a prominent member of the l o c a l community, and consists, except for a m i l i t a r y delegate, of c i v i l i a n members of the l o c a l l y predominant ethnic group. The Councils exercise j u r i s d i c t i o n over a limited range of functions 59 i n each of the four constituent States and the Chin Special D i v i s i o n . Since the population of each State i s i n i t s e l f also extremely heterogeneous, the problem of representation re-currs on the State l e v e l . Unless the State Supreme Council includes representatives of each sub-group, i t s constituency w i l l be incomplete and i t s authority l i m i t e d . The Revolutionary Council has sought to avoid t h i s problem by d i s e s t a b l i s h i n g hereditary rulership i n the States, and r e c r u i t i n g to the Supreme Councils only those who are w i l l i n g to accept the eradication of t r a d i t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . The Shan State,, for example, was t r a d i t i o n a l l y ruled by f i v e hereditary Sawbwas, whose disestablishment by the Caretaker Government was the causus b e l l i of the Shan-Kayah 4 anti-Union movement i n the early,1960's. The Revolutionary Council, i n f a c t , boasted of redrawing the units of l o c a l government i n Shan State on the basis of revenue, population, and area, to reduce the number of Assistant Township O f f i c e r s , many of whom had been patronage appointments of the Sawbwas. The extension of a uniform l e g a l code and administrative regu-lations to Shan State was also intended, at least i n part, to 5 undermine the Sawbwas' influence. The authority of the State Supreme Council, however, appears to be least e f f e c t i v e i n Shan State, where the Shan National Army, led by r o y a l i s t s , commanded the l o y a l t y of a l l the inhabitants of Kengtung, one g of the three D i v i s i o n s , for over a year. 60 The Karens of Kayah State d i s t i n g u i s h themselves from other Karens by t h e i r adherence to a Sawbwa system s i m i l a r to that of the Shans, and have also r e s i s t e d e f f o r t s by the central government to eradicate i t . The Sawbwa of the largest Kayah kingdom, Kantarawadi, Sao Wunnah, who had headed the Kayah State since 1948, was implicated i n the Shan-Kayah con-7 spiracy and imprisoned. The subsequent (and present) head of the Kayah State government i s a career c i v i l servant, and g not a member of any royal house. In the Kachin State, the "anti-monarchist" movement i s stronger, p a r t l y because most Kachins have always opposed 9 monarchy as such. Nevertheless, the K.I.A., which posed a major problem to the central government i n 1964, was led by Zau Seng and his brother Zau Dan, one of the three Kachin Duwas. The pattern that emerges from the Shan, Kayah, and Kachin States i s one of r i v a l r y between the l e g a l l o c a l government and the t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e r s . The leaders and per-sonnel of the Supreme Councils, i n s t a l l e d by the Revolutionary Government i n the f i r s t years of i t s rule,""*.""" owe t h e i r influence to the support of the central government, whereas the insurgent leaders base t h e i r authority on t h e i r inherited t i t l e s . The situations i n the Karen State and the Chin Special D i v i s i o n are quite d i f f e r e n t . The Chins have t r a d i t i o n a l l y aspired to the emulation of the Burman culture, and are thus 61 content to go along with the Chin A f f a i r s Council. In addi-t i o n , they lack the pre-existing large-scale p o l i t i c a l structures which might serve as an alternative focus of 12 lo y a l t y . The Karens, e s p e c i a l l y those i n the Irawaddy Delta, 13 have a history of h o s t i l e r e l a t i o n s with the B.I.A. group. This h o s t i l i t y , now takes the form of demands to include more Karen-populated areas within the State, rather than an attempt 14 to preserve t r a d i t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . Despite t h e i r function as an alternative focus of lo y a l t y for the ethnic minority groups, the Revolutionary Council has taken steps to l i m i t further the authority of the State governments. This was mainly a reaction to the threat of some States to exercise the formal r i g h t of secession which 15 came into e f f e c t i n 1958. In the f i r s t place, the m i l i t a r y representative on each Council exercises more authority than he would as just another member. As regional m i l i t a r y commander, he has at his d i s -posal a l l the m i l i t a r y resources of the .central government i n the area, and i s also immediately subordinate to the Chief of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief. He i s , s i m i l a r l y , a key l i n k i n the centralized chain of command of both the Adminis-t r a t i v e and Party structures, as both Chairman of a D i s t r i c t S.A.C., and Secretary of a B.S.P.P. Supervisory Committee. 62 TABLE XVII CENTRALIZATION OF REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION16 State O f f i c e O f f i c e r M i l i t a r y Administrative Party Command Office'. O f f i c e Minister of Home A f f a i r s , J u d i c i a l A f f a i r s , Local Admin., Religious A f f a i r s and Immigration . Col.Kyaw Soe Chairman of the Central S.A.C. Member of Di s c i p l i n e Committee and Central Organizing Committee Member of Supreme Councils of Shan State and Kayah State, Col.Aung Pe Eastern Command (Lashio) Chairman of Lashio Dist. Supervisory Committee Mayor of Rangoon Col.Hla Hpone Rangoon Command Chairman of Rangoon Div. S • A,. 0 • Secretary of Rangoon Div.Super-visory Committee Member of Chin A f f a i r s Council Col.Sein My a Northwest Chairman of Command Mandalay Div., (Mandalay)S.A.C. Member of Kawthoolei State Sup-reme Council Col.Maung Lwin Southwest Command Member of Central Organizing Committee Member, of Col. Van Kachin Kuhl State A f f a i r s Council Vice-Corn- Chairman of mander of Kachine State Northwest S.A.C. Command 63 The p o s s i b i l i t y of acquiring a l o c a l i n t e r e s t and l o y a l t i e s apart from th i s chain of command i s further hin-dered by a frequent rotation of o f f i c e r s from one state to another and then to the central government, as i s demonstrated i n Table XVIII on the following page. When to these factors i s added the dependence of the c i v i l i a n members of the Supreme Councils on the Revolutionary Council, which appointed them, rather than on t h e i r status with the population of the respective States, i t becomes clear that the Councils are more l i k e f i e l d agencies of the central government than autonomous organs of l o c a l government. This and the preponderant power of the m i l i t a r y chain of command make i t possible to q u a l i f y the regime as s u l t a n i s t i c . The State governments are also lim i t e d , however, i n the range of functions allowed them. Under the p o l i t i c a l government, the State Councils had l e g i s l a t i v e authority over l o c a l matters i n the f i e l d s of agricult u r e , f i s h e r i e s , land, 17 excise, public works, public health, and primary education. State control over these matters has been reduced since 1962 and the primary emphasis now i s on the preservation of the language, l i t e r a t u r e , r e l i g i o n , and customs of the ethnic 18 minori t i e s . An i n d i c a t i o n of the limited scope of the a c t i v i t i e s of State governments i s the size of the State bud-gets, compared to that of the Union as a whole. TABLE X V I I I ROTATION OF COLONELS FROM DISTRICTS TO THE CENTRE Name 1963 J a n . A p r . J u l . O c t . 1964 1965 1966 J a n . A p r . J u l . O c t . J a n . A p r . J u l . O c t . J a n . A p r . J u l . O c t . C o l . Aung Pe C o l . Aung Z i n C o l . H l a Hpone C o l . K h i n Za Mong C o l . K y i Maung C o l . L u n T i n Col.Maung L w i n Deputy Centr.Comm. De p u t y E a s t Command Dep u t y , S.E.Command Commander E a s t e r n Command Commander, Rangoon Command Se c o n d D e p u t y , S.E. Command Command, S.E. Command Commander, N.W. Command D e p u t y , C e n t r . Comm. Commander, o f S.E. Command, S e v e r a l M i n i s t r i e s Col.Maung Commander E a s t e r n M i n i s t e r o f I n d u s t r y and L a b o u r Shwe Command TABLE X V I I I C o n t i n u e d Name 1963 1964 1965 1966 Jan.Apr.-. J u l .Oct. J a n . A p r . J u l . O c t . J a n . A p r . J u l . O c t . J a n . Apr-. J u l . O c t . C o l . San K y i B r i g . San Yu C o l . S e i n L i n C o l . S e i n Mya De p u t y , S.W.Command Commander, S o u t h w e s t Command Commander, Army V i c e C h i e f o f S t a f f and M i n i s t e r o f F i n a n c e and Revenue N.W.Command De p u t y , S . E . Command Deputy D e p u t y , S.W.Command S.E.Command De p u t y , S.W. Command Commander E a s t Command Commander o f N.W. Command C o l . S e i n Win B r i g . Thaung K y i C o l . T i n U C o l . T i n t Swe Commander, C e n t r a l Command Commander, S.W. Command D e p t y . S . E . Command Commander, S .W.Command M i n i s t e r o f P u b l i c Works and H o u s i n g M i n i s t e r o f A g r i c u l t u r e and F o r e s t s Commander, C e n t r a l Command De p u t y , S.W.Command C o l . V a n Deputy Commander, N o r t h w e s t Command ( t o d a t e ) K u h l 66 TABLE XIX STATE BUDGETS IN BURMA (MILLIONS OF KYATS) 1963-64 R e v . E s t i m a t e s 1964-65 E s t i m a t e s S t a t e C u r r e n t C u r r e n t C a p i t a l C u r r e n t C u r r e n t C a p i t a l R e c e i p t s . E x p e n d . E x p e n d . R e c e i p t s E x p e n d . E x p e n d . Shan 7.9 17.5 6.9 7.3 19.5 6.0 K a c h i n 2.6 11.2 3.8 2.8 11.8 1.5 Kayah 0.2 2.1 0.9 0.1 2.4 2.1 K a w t h o o l e i 1.7 6.5 2.6 1.8 7.5 2.2 T o t a l S t a t e s ( E x c e p t C h i n ) 12.4 37.3 14.2 12.0 41.2 11.8 U n i o n T o t a l 1,378 1,164 1,995 1,317 I n e a c h c a s e , t h e n , t h e t o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e s o f a l l S t a t e g o v e r n m e n t s i s a b o u t 3% o f t h e t o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e s o f t h e U n i o n g o v e r n m e n t , and r e c e i p t s a r e a b o u t 1%. T h i s i n d i c a t e s a low l e v e l o f f i s c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e s e f o u r S t a t e s c o m p r i s e s o v e r 20% o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e U n i o n as a w h o l e . I n sum, t h e n , m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l r e c r u i t e d f r o m c e n t r a l Burma c o n t r o l S t a t e g o v e r n m e n t s whose p e r s o n n e l a r e c h o s e n by t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t , and w h i c h have a l i m i t e d r a n g e o f i n d e p e n d e n t a u t h o r i t y . CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS A. Summary The foregoing material has been presented as an analysis of the recruitment of the Burmese p o l i t i c a l e l i t e under three headings: i t s representativeness; i t s s k i l l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ; and i t s p r i o r experience with minority ethnic groups. I t has been shown that, to a remarkable extent, neither ethnic group representation nor s k i l l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s may be considered as c r i t e r i a i n the recruitment of the e l i t e from 1962 to 1967. In addition, personnel recruited into the e l i t e tend to be those whose experience i n dealing with the leadership of minority ethnic groups has been confined to either a superior-subordinates r e l a t i o n s h i p , or the p o s i t i o n of combatants. I t must be concluded that during t h i s period the em-phasis i n recruitment to the e l i t e was predominantly defensive since i t was directed to the removal of opposition from the p o l i t i c a l arena, and to the administration of counter-insurgency a c t i v i t y . As a r e s u l t , the p r e v a i l i n g c r i t e r i o n of recruitment was unquestioning l o y a l t y to the leadership and program of General Ne Win. Because of the recruitment of former opposition p o l i t i -cians to positions i n administrative and party o f f i c e s , a 68 c o n f l i c t of roles among the m i l i t a r y has been resolved i n favour of the more " p o l i t i c a l " o f f i c e r s . This has followed very c l o s e l y the pattern which Riggs describes."'" P o l i t i c a l aptitude and p o t e n t i a l for mobility have, at least i n the short run, replaced professional competence as c r i t e r i a of recruitment. Aside from t h i s , the army's professional resources were from the beginning only adequate for i t s m i l i t a r y duties. This and i t s lack of experience i n commerce and industry help 2 explain the short duration of the Caretaker Government. Now, however, the Army has committed i t s e l f to holding o f f i c e i n -d e f i n i t e l y . The current regime has had to deal with more f a r -reaching problems, e s p e c i a l l y regarding the systems maintenance 3 function. Here, however, a lack of experience has led to a tendency to accept oversimplified solutions and a f a i l u r e to respect the claims of professionalism. Also, the extinction of competing groups and i n s t i t u t i o n s has given the p o l i t i c a l syndrome the p o t e n t i a l for self-reinforcement, because i t allows the e l i t e to insulate i t s e l f from external checks. B. Implications Chapter I reviewed a number of hypotheses concerning the place of e l i t e recruitment i n p o l i t i c a l development. I t was pointed out here how e l i t e recruitment related to each of 69 of three aspects, of development—equality, capacity and s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n — a n d how c r i t e r i a applied i n recruitment might vary according to various stages of development. I t might be of in t e r e s t now to see how each of the aspects of e l i t e recruitment dealt with i n t h i s paper could a f f e c t prospects for development. The lack of representation for minority ethnic groups i n the recruitment of the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e i s probably d e t r i -mental to the prospects of p o l i t i c a l development on a l l three counts. Minority group leaders w i l l continue to be able to i n c i t e resistance to the regime on the grounds that they have no other form of access but r e v o l t . Although the p o s s i b i l i t y of "intrusive access" i s not precluded by the res u l t s of th i s paper, c e r t a i n l y the lack of both formal access and e l i t e representation i s i t s e l f conducive to unrest. Lack of e l i t e representation also l i m i t s the capacity of the system i f minority group demands are not a r t i c u l a t e d before the outbreak of violence. I n s u f f i c i e n t time i s a v a i l -able then for responding to demands, and i f a rapid s a t i s -f a c t i o n i s possible, i t appears as a concession to violence. The only a l t e r n a t i v e , a continued reliance on m i l i t a r y adminis-t r a t i o n , imposes costs on the regime and diverts resources away from economic development. A more i n d i r e c t r e s u l t i s the maintenance of s t r u c t u r a l diffuseness. The creation of the Security and Administrative 70 Councils and the whole network of overlapping party-adminis-t r a t i v e and m i l i t a r y o f f i c e s i s a r e s u l t of the need for long-term m i l i t a r y administration. A s i m i l a r set of implications follow from the s a c r i f i c e of an achievement orientation i n recruitment. Departures from u n i v e r s a l i s t i c c r i t e r i a weaken the legitimacy of the regime i n the eyes of the profe s s i o n a l l y q u a l i f i e d , most of whom have withdrawn t h e i r support from the regime. The re j e c t i o n of expertise has not only obvious results for economic develop-ment, but also i n h i b i t s s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n through the lack of q u a l i f i e d personnel. Thus e l i t e members are required to double up (or treble up) i n t h e i r role performance. Examples of th i s are i n the incidence of multiple m i n i s t r i e s , the overlap of Home and Justice with the Security and Adminis-t r a t i v e Councils and also the frequency of overlapping p o l i -t i c a l , administrative and m i l i t a r y r o l e s . The nature and scope of e l i t e members' previous exper-ience with the leadership of minority ethnic groups i s also dysfunctional. Experience as m i l i t a r y administrators i n the State Councils i s unl i k e l y to predispose e l i t e members to trea t minority group members as equals. The l i m i t a t i o n i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the State Councils further predisposes e l i t e members to consider minority group rights only i n terms of the forms of c u l t u r a l expression. 71 I t was also suggested i n Chapter I that the c r i t e r i a of e l i t e recruitment might have some e f f e c t on the p o s s i b i -l i t i e s of the resumption of c i v i l i a n rule because of the precedents which they e s t a b l i s h for i n s t i t u t i o n a l development. In the f i r s t place, the administrative organs are the core 4 of the new "s t e e l frame" although t h e i r authority rests on the m i l i t a r y o f f i c e s of t h e i r Chairmen. State Councils and Security and Administrative Councils are h i e r a r c h i c a l l y directed from the Revolutionary Council and are thus subject to the repercussions of p o l i t i c a l manouverings at the top, the incidence of which i n h i b i t s administrative e f f i c i e n c y . The Party has an i n d e f i n i t e role i n c o n t r o l l i n g bureau-cracy since i t i s interwoven with the c i v i l administration through j o i n t membership. There may be some control by the O f f i c e r s on Special Duty, experienced p o l i t i c i a n s who act for the B.S.P.P. to supervise the administrators, but l i t t l e information i s available on t h i s count. I t should be r e c a l l e d here that the Party i s controlled by former p o l i t i c i a n s and the most " p o l i t i c a l " (in Riggs' case) of the m i l i t a r y . Thus the Party may act, to some extent, as a c o n t r o l l i n g device, yet i t i s i n i t s e l f subject to the drives for bureaucratic power. I t would probably be more useful at t h i s stage to apply any checks and balances analysis to the cliques and power groups 72 described i n terms of t h e i r experience and d i s p o s i t i o n s , as has been done i n t h i s paper, than to "try to sort out i n s t i -tutions or structures. The complex overlapping of o f f i c e s i n a l l three of the Army, party, and c i v i l administration, does s u i t the need for economy i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of personnel, as was mentioned above. I t may be, however, that e f f e c t i v e communication i s hindered by the need to r e g i s t e r interactions between i n s t i t u t i o n s , or to conduct business without keeping records. Thus one could never be sure, unless the d i s t i n c t i o n was constantly made whether an o f f i c i a l was serving i n his Army, party, or administrative capacity. This, i f done regu-l a r l y , would be a time-consuming process. F i n a l l y , with reference to stages of development, the r e s u l t s of t h i s examination of e l i t e recruitment suggest that by any c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , Burma must be considered as i n an elementary stage. I t i s not yet i n a s u f f i c i e n t state of order and s t a b i l i t y for the e l i t e to be able to r e c r u i t for eith e r representation or achievement. The problems which the Revolutionary Council inherited l e f t i t l i t t l e a lternative to t h i s emphasis on m i l i t a r y con-t r o l . In post-independence Burma, the problem of heterogeneity extended beyond the ethnic d i v i s i o n into a central region and the f i v e constituent States. Within each of these States, there were also d i f f e r e n t patterns of competition between more 73 and less t r a d i t i o n a l forms of r u l e . In addition, the Con-s t i t u t i o n a l provision for secession made i t impossible for the central government to maintain a coherent national p o l i c y , which would require some p r e d i c t a b i l i t y i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between State and Union governments. The threat of secession, i n turn, depended on the ever-changing p o l i t i c a l constellations within the States. The foremost task of the current regime i n Burma, as i s the case i n many other developing countries, i s to e s t a b l i s h the minimum conditions of p o l i t i c a l order over an extremely 5 heterogeneous population. Unfortunately, however, the current regime bears a strong resemblance to the h i s t o r i c a l patterns of sultanism i n Burma, which were very unstable. The s u l t a n i s t i c r u l e r was regularly overthrown by an a l l i a n c e of subject minority ethnic groups, which, i n turn, divided into a feudal system. This was eventually reunited by the strongest patrimony, which maintained i t s p o s i t i o n u n t i l i t g too was overthrown. C. The Future The foregoing i s intended to describe the state of a f f a i r s which existed up to mid-1967. There are indications since then of a few changes from these trends. 74 For example, the announcement i n May of 1967 that Burma would host the Colombo Plan Consultative Conference was the f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n i n years of an attempt to come to terms with "the professionals." Since then, Brigadier Tin Pe has l o s t his pos i t i o n as Minister of Trade and Co-operatives, and has been absent from top-level p o l i c y committees. In addition, the f a l l budget report was exposed to detailed public c r i t i c i s m 7 by two of the country's foremost economists. There are also indications of a recent trend toward a greater separation of o f f i c e s . As more personnel come up through the ranks, i t becomes less necessary for o f f i c i a l s to hold a l l three of m i l i t a r y , party, and administrative o f f i c e s . For example, Tin Pe now only holds a party o f f i c e . In the Council of Ministers, there are more Ministers and fewer multiple o f f i c e s than there were i n 1962. There are also signs of a greater degree of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n at regional g and l o c a l l e v e l s . The f i r s t f i v e years of the Revolutionary Council were important years i n the p o l i t i c a l development of Burma. Prac-t i c e s of e l i t e recruitment seemed l i k e l y to lead to continued reliance on m i l i t a r y administration and control, at the cost of ethnic group representation and administrative e f f i c i e n c y . Hopefully the Ne Win regime w i l l be able to emerge from this defensive posture and attempt to meet numerous other demands of development as well. N O T E S 76 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1. Dankwart Rustow, "The Study of E l i t e s : Who's Who When, and How," World P o l i t i c s , .XVI111:4 (July, 1 9 6 6 ) , 7 0 1 - 5 . 2. T.B. Bottomore,: E l i t e s and Society (London: Watts, 1 9 6 4 ) , 1-4. 3. Harold D. Lasswell, "Introduction: The Study of P o l i t i c a l E l i t e s , " i n H.D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, World Revolutionary  E l i t e s : Studies i n Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. , 1965);. - : 4. Bottomore, op. c i t . , 4-5. 5. I b i d . , 4 2 - 5 . 6. H.D. Lasswell, "The World Revolution of Our Time: A Framework for Basic Policy Research" i n Lasswell and Lerner, op. c i t . , 80-94. Compare Bottomore, op. c i t . , 86-104. 7. This discussion i s taken from Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of  P o l i t i c a l Development (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1 9 6 5 ) , 3 1 - 4 8 , and.Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of P o l i t i c a l Development" i n James C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary P o l i t i c a l Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1 9 6 7 ) , 3 2 7 - 3 3 1 . 8. Pye, op. c i t . , 38. 9. I b i d . 4 5 - 8 ; Riggs, o p . c i t . , 329. 10. Morris Janowitz, The Military, i n the Political"Development  of the New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 9 6 4 ) , 2 7 - 9 . 1 1 . Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimohialism and Empire-Building i n the New States," World P o i l t i c s , • XX:2 (Jan.1968), 1 9 4 - 2 0 6 ; Henry Bienen, "What Does P o l i t i c a l Development Mean i n A f r i c a ? " World P o l i t i c s , XX:1 (Oct.1967), Some Lessons from Ghana and Nigeria," World P o l i t i c s , XX:2 (Jan.1968), 1 7 9 - 1 9 3 . 12. Fred W. Riggs, Administration i n Developing Countries: The  Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton, M i f f l i n , 1 9 6 4 ) , 1 2 - 1 9 ; 2 2 6 - 8 , 237. 13. Infra,, 2 4 - 9 . 14. Riggs, Administration. . ., 14 2 - 9 ; 274. 77 15. Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative P o l i t i c s : A Developmental Approach (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1966), 80-6. Almond distinguishes our kinds of access: physical demonstra-tions and violence, personal connection, e l i t e representation and formal and i n s t i t u t i o n a l channels. 16. Riggs, lo^p. c l t « t f c i a . 17. Almond and Powell, op. c i t . , 47-8. 18. Infra, 36-B. 19. Bert F. Hosel i t z , "Levels of Economic Performance and Bureaucratic Structures" i n Joseph La-Palombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and P o l i t i c a l Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1963), 188. 20. Ibid., 191. 21. The following discussion i s derived from Hans Gerth and C. Wright M i l l s (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays i n Sociology (New York: Oxford U. Press, 1946), 100-106, 235-9, 244-5, 296-301; and Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An I n t e l l e c t u a l P a t r i o t (New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1962), 329-381. See also Roth 1s a r t i c l e referred to i n Note 11 above. 22. Frank Langdon, P o l i t i c s i n Japan (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown 1967), 18-53. 23. Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureau-c r a t i c P o l i t y (Honolulu: East-West Centre Press, 1966), 374-5. 24. Paul E. Sigmund (ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing  Nations (New York: Praeger, 1967), revised e d i t i o n , 22-5; S.P.. Huntington, " P o l i t i c a l Development and P o l i t i c a l Decay" World P o l i t i c s , XVII:3 ( A p r i l , 1965) and S.N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization"in Jason Flnkle and Richard Gable (eds.), P o l i t i c a l Development and Soc i a l Change (New York: Wiley, 1966), 573-6. 25. Riggs, Thailand. . ., 386. 26. See Chapter I I , i n f r a , 25-7 ; and •fcS.&l. 78 CHAPTER I I : : THE ELITE 1. For a p o l i t i c a l system i n which the personnel of the c i v i l administration, the party and the m i l i t a r y overlap to the ex-tent that they do i n Burma and where they a l l perform many functions commonly performed separately by these structures.in other systems one may even be able to consider the three as one indimentary bureaucracy. In such a system, there i s a f a i r l y clear d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between p o l i t i c a l and n o n - p o l i t i c a l structures, but p o l i t i c a l structures are not c l e a r l y d i f f e r -entiated from one another. At each h i e r a r c h i c a l l e v e l , there i s an i n s t i t u t i o n which controls and, to some extent, performs the functions of a l l three. At the highest l e v e l , there i s the Revolutionary Council whose membership i s presented i n Table I. This i s the supreme authority for a l l c i v i l and m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s . At the state l e v e l , the highest authority i s the State Supreme Council, which i s discussed i n Chapter V. Here the key member i s a Colonel who i s also a B.S.P.P. o f f i c i a l . F i n a l l y , at each of the other l o c a l l e v e l s , the d i s t r i c t d i v i s i o n and subdivisions, the u n i t of "government" i n some vague sense i s the Security and Administrative Committee, a committee con-s i s t i n g of representatives of the c i v i l service, the m i l i t a r y and the p o l i c e . Although i t s members have d i f f e r e n t t i t l e s , they a l l receive very s i m i l a r t r a i n i n g i n courses for adminis-t r a t i o n , p o l i t i c a l leadership, and counter-insurgency, and the m i l i t a r y member, who i s the Chairman, i s usually also a Party o f f i c i a l . Role d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s at a l e v e l where there i s a "specialized officialdom" but the roles of the o f f i c i a l s are not c l e a r l y distinguished. See Riggs, Administration. . ., 173-9, where he discusses-the formation of a party by the bureaucracy; also Almond and Powell, op. c i t , 45-7, 232-51, 304-6; and my own paper "Debureaucratization i n Local Administration i n Burma," sub-mitted for P o l i t i c a l Science 502 at the University of B.C. 2. Rustow, op. c i t . , 701-5; Lasswell, "Introduction," 8-9. 3. See also Frank N. Trager, Burma: From Kingdom to Republic (New York: Praeger, 1966) , 401; and Forward, vi:5.(Oct.15, 1967) . U Thi Han was for a long time Director of Procurement i n the Defense Ministry.. James F. Guyot, "Bureaucratic Change i n Burma," i n Ralph B r a i l a n t i (ed.), Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent From the  B r i t i s h Imperial T r a d i t i o n (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966), 428. 79 4. T a b l e s I I , I I I and I V were c o m p i l e d f r o m a s u r v e y o f The G u a r d i a n and F o r w a r d as i n d i c a t e d i n t h e b i b l i o g r a p h y . T a b l e I V a l s o drew, upon a r t i c l e s on p o s t i n g s as p u b l i s h e d i n T he New Y o r k T i m e s / 5. Compare Moshe L i s s a k , " S o c i a l Change, M o b i l i z a t i o n and t h e E x c h a n g e o f S e r v i c e s Between t h e M i l i t a r y E s t a b l i s h m e n t and t h e C i v i l S o c i e t y : The Burmese C a s e , " E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t and C u l t u r a l Change, X I I I : 1 ( P a r t 1 ) ( O c t . 1 9 6 7 ) , 8,9; P.K. McCabe, "When C h i n a S p i t s , We Swim," New Y o r k Times M a g a z i n e ( F e b . 2 7 , 1 9 6 6 ) , 51.; G u y o t , op. c i t . , 426, n.135 and 432 n.143. 6. G u y o t , op. c i t . , 354-384. N o t e t h a t i n t h i s p a p e r "Burman" i s u s e d as an e t h n i c c a t e g o r y and "Burmese" as a n a t i o n a l c a t e g o r y . 7. L u c i a n W. P y e , P o l i t i c s , P e r s o n a l i t y and N a t i o n - B u i l d i n g : Burma's S e a r c h f o r I d e n t i t y (New Haven: Y a l e , 1 9 6 6 ) , 164-5. 8. See T a b l e s A l l and A I V . : 9. J o h n Cady, A H i s t o r y o f Modern Burma ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 8 ) , 373-82, 428-32. 10. D o r o t h y G u y o t , "The Burma I n d e p e n d e n c e Army: A P o l i t i c a l Movement i n M i l i t a r y G a r b " i n J o s e p h S i l v e r s t e i n ( e d . ) , S o u t h e a s t A s i a i n W o r l d War I I ( S o u t h e a s t A s i a Monograph S e r i e s No. 7; New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 6 ) , 51-65. See e s p e c i a l l y page 55. 11. L u c i a n W. P y e , "The Army i n Burmese P o l i t i c s , " i n J o h n J . J o h n s o n ( e d . ) , T h e R o l e o f t h e M i l i t a r y i n t h e U n d e r d e v e l o p e d  C o u n t r i e s ( P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962)., 231-2. 12. T u n k e r , op. c i t . , 64-5, 70-1. 13. T r a g e r , op. c i t . , 173, 179, 188, 201. 14. I b i d . , 178-9. See a l s o Burma, Government i n the; U n i o n o f  Burma: 1958 Nov.1959 (Rangoon: D i r e c t o r a t e , o f I n f o r m a t i o n 1 9 5 9 ) . 15. The b e s t a n a l y s i s o f t h e C a r e t a k e r Government i s t h e a r t i c l e by L i s s a k c i t e d i n n o t 5 a b o v e . See a l s o T r e v o r N. Dupuy, "Burma and I t s Army: A C o n t r a s t i n M o t i v a t i o n s and C h a r a c t e r -i s t i c s " Anjto Loch_ JRfevlOw / XX:4 ( W i n t e r , 1960-1) , 428-440. 16. I n f r a , 38-40. 80 17. Tinker, op. c i t . , 39-41, 324. 18. Dorothy Guyot, op. c i t . , 61. 19. Tinker, op. c i t . , 328; James Guyot,: op. c i t . , 439; John H. Badgley, "Burma's M i l i t a r y Government: A P o l i t i c a l Analysis" Asian Survey, 11:6 (August 1962), 31. 20. Richard Butwell, "Four Failures of Nu's Second Premier-ship" Asian Survey, 11:1 (March 1962), 4-5. These o f f i c e r s including Brigadiers Aung Shwe and Maung Maung had been "openly discussing the p o s s i b i l i t y of restoring m i l i t a r y r u l e . " Brigadier Maung Maung had helped arrange the transfer of power In 1958. Pye analyzes i n general terms, the d i v i s i o n along the l i n e s of enthusiasm for the restoration of m i l i t a r y rule i n "The Army i n Burmese P o l i t i c s " 250. 21. James Guyot, op. c i t . , 433-4; John Ashdown, "Burma's P o l i t i c a l Puzzle" Far Eastern Economic Review,, XLV: 12 (Sept. 17, 1964), 516. Aung Gyi was associated with Ne Win from the beginning of the B.I.A., as were Maung Maung and Tin Pe, his closest r i v a l s . He i s described as a politically-minded i n t e l l e c t u a l , a s o c i a l i s t , who i t has been said, "knows more about socialism than most p o l i t i c i a n s . " He led the execution of economic p o l i c y under the Caretaker Government as Chairman of the Budget A l l o c a t i o n Supervisory Committee and i s des-cribed as "an outstanding economic modernizer" who favours lim i t e d state intervention i n the economy. The p o l i c y of r a d i c a l - n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n was p u b l i c l y announced two months aft e r Aung Gyi r e t i r e d because of disagreement regarding the techniques of implementing socialism." For references, see Tinker, op. c i t . , .328, 395; James Guyot, op. c i t . , 429; Trager, o p . c i t . , 396; Willard Hannah, Eight Nation Makers (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 254; Butwell "Four F a i l u r e s . . .",3. The Guardian, Feb. 10, 1963 gives the story of Aung Gyi'&• retirement. Chit Myaing was dismissed from the Revolutionary Council for practices "incompatible with the Burmese Way to Socialism." He was Director-General of the National Registration and Census Department under the Caretaker Government and also con-sidered by Guyot as "an outstanding economic modernizer." The announcement of his dismissal i s i n the March 31, 1964 e d i t i o n of The: Guardian. The second wave of extreme n a t i o n a l i -zation under the Revolutionary Council followed i n A p r i l and May. See also John Badgley, "Burma's Zealot Wungyis: Maoists or St. Simonists" Asian Survey,: V : l (Jan. 1965), 56. 22. Tin Pe replaced Chit Myaing as Minister of Trade Develop-ment, and was defended by Ne Win i n spite of disastrous f a i l u r e s i n commodity d i s t r i b u t i o n u n t i l his phasing out i n 1967. His 81 s e m i - r e t i r e m e n t i s p r o b a b l y due p a r t l y t o h i s age and i l l -h e a l t h , and p a r t l y t o h i s o b j e c t i o n s t o a t o u g h e r s t a n d t o w a r d s C h i n a . S e e P . K . McCabe, op. c i t . , 51; J o h n H. B a d g l e y , "Burma's C h i n a C r i s i s : : The C h o i c e s Ahead" A s i a n  Survey,' V I I ; 11 (November 1967) , 753-8; Ashdown, op. c i t . , 516; T r a g e r , op. c i t . , 206-7. CHAPTER I I I : ETHNIC GROUP REPRESENTATION 1. D.G.E. H a l l , A H i s t o r y o f S o u t h e a s t A s i a (London: M a c M i l l a n , 1 9 6 4 ) , C h a p t e r s 6, 13, 19, 20-22, 31; H a l l , Burma (London: H u t c h i n s o n , 1 9 5 8 ) , C h a p t e r s 2-12; Cady, op. c i t , C h a p t e r s 1 and 2. 2. On t h i s complex s u b j e c t s e e F.K. Lehman, " E t h n i c C a t e -g o r i e s i n Burma and t h e T h e o r y o f S o c i a l S y s t e m s " i n P e t e r K u n s t a d t e r (ed.) , S o u t h e a s t A s i a n T r i b e s M i n o r i t i e s ; and  N a t i o n s (2 v o l s . ; P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : P r i n c e t o n , 1 9 6 7 ) , I , 93-124 and The S t r u c t u r e o f C h i n S o c i e t y ( U r b a n a , 111.: U n i v e r -s i t y o f I l l i n o i s P r e s s , 1 9 6 3 ) ; P e t e r K u n s t a d t e r , " I n t r o d u c t i o n " and "Burma: I n t r o d u c t i o n " i n K u n s t a d t e r , o p . c i t . I , 3-91; and E.R. L e a c h , P o l i t i c a l S ystems o f H i g h l a n d Burma, (Bos t o n : B e a c o n P r e s s , 1 9 5 4 ) . 3. Lehman, " E t h n i c C a t e g o r i e s . . .," 99-101. 4. T r a g e r , pp.; c i t . , 191, 194; T i n k e r , op. c i t . ; , 68. 5. T r a g e r , op. c i t . : , 80 . 6. L e a c h , op.^ c i t . , 29-61. 7. Lehman, The S t r u c t u r e o f C h i n S o c i e t y , i x - x i i f 1-3, 29-30. 8. Lehman, " E t h n i c C a t e g o r i e s . . , , " 9 9 . 9. T h i s i s f r o m K u n s t a d t e r , "Burma: I n t r o d u c t i o n " i n K u n s t a d t e r ( e d . ) , op. c i t . , I , 87-8. 10. H a l l , H i s t o r y o f S o u t h e a s t A s i a , C h a p t e r s 32,40; Burma C h a p t e r s 13-17; Cady, o p . c i t . , C h a p t e r 4; James G u y o t , o p . c i t . , 354-84. 11. Cady, op. c i t . , C h a p t e r s 13 and 14; D o r o t h y G u y o t , o p . c i t . , 53-4; Hugh T i n k e r , , o p . c i t . , 9-11. 82 12. Cady,: op. c i t . , 451, 465, 472, 474, 484. 13. , T r a g e r , op. c i t . , 81-83; T i n k e r , o p . c i t . , 24. 14. The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n i s d e r i v e d f r o m two a r t i c l e s ; C l i f f o r d G e e r t z , "The I n t e g r a t i v e R e v o l u t i o n " i n G e e r t z ( e d . ) , O l d S o c i e t i e s and New S t a t e s (London: F r e e P r e s s , 1 9 6 3 ) , 136-8; and J o s e f S i l v e r s t e i n , "The F e d e r a l Dilemma i n Burma,"; F a r E a s t e r n S u r v e y , X X V I I I : 7 ( J u l y 1 9 5 9 ) , 100-103. S e e a l s o J . S . F u r n i v a l l , The G o v e r n a n c e o f Modern Burma (New Y o r k : The I n s t i t u t e o f P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s , 1 9 5 8 ) , 100; T i n k e r , op. c i t . , 24; T r a g e r , op." c i t . , 78-88. 15. Column 1 i s d e r i v e d f r o m T r a g e r , op. c i t , 81-3; columns 2 and 3 f r o m J . S . F u r n i v a l l , o p . c i t . , 37-8; and column 4 f r o m T i n k e r , o p . c i t . , 389-400; The A s i a Who's Who, 1957 (Hong Kong: P a n - A s i a Newspaper A l l i a n c e , 1 9 5 7 ) , Who's Who i n Burma: 1961 (Rangoon: P e o p l e ' s L i t e r a t u r e Committee and House, 1961) and T r a g e r , op. c i t . , 90. 16. D o r o t h y Guyot,: o p . c i t . , 53-4, 61; James Guyot,: o p . c i t . , 420; T i n k e r , o p . c i t . , 40. C o l . Van K u h l i s t a k e n t o be K a c h i n and C o l . V i n c e n t Solomon, A n g l o - B u r m a n . 17, On t h e f o r m e r o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , s e e T i n k e r , o p . c i t . , 64-65, 70-71,89; Cady, o p . c i t . , 609, 614, 622, 640; F u r n i v a l l , op. c i t . , 61. On t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , s ee T i n k e r , o p . c i t . , 151-2, and n o t e s 1 and 2 t o page 151. CHAPTER I V: SECULAR RECRUITMENT AND PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION 1. S u p r a , 6. 2. From James G u y o t , op. c i t . , 430. 3. S u p r a , 26*7. 4. The t h r e e f o r whom no i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e , namely U Ba T i n , U Ohn K h i n and U S e i n , a r e a s s i g n e d one t o e a c h c a t e g o r y . 5. Dupuy, o p . c i t . , 436; Edward S h i l s , "The M i l i t a r y i n t h e p o l i t i c a l D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e New S t a t e s " i n J o h n s o n , o p . c i t . , 40; L u c i a n P y e , " A r m i e s . i n t h e P r o c e s s o f P o l i t i c a l M o d e r n i -z a t i o n , " i n I b i d . , 68-89; P y e , "The Army i n Burmese P o l i t i c s , " i n I b i d . , 239; J a r o w i t z , op. c i t . , 40-67. 83 6. Tinker, op. c i t . , 327; Lissak, op.c i t . , 5. 7. Supra, 26*1. 8. Pye, P o l i t i c s , Personality and Nation-Building, 19-20. 9. Ibid . , 287-291. 10. Franz Schumann, Ideology and Organization i n Communist  China (Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a , 1966), 163-7,170-2. Note that i n China as i n Burma the opposition has changed from one between the "cadre" or p o l i t i c a l s t y l e of leadership and the t r a d i t i o n a l bureaucrat t o one between the cadre and the technologically-oriented manager. 11. See also Pye's "Old Guard P o l i t i c i a n " i n P o l i t i c s  Personality and Nation-Building, 267-71 and compare t h i s with S h i l s y o p . c i t . , 33-5, and Badgeley, "Burma's Zealot...", 57; and for the "professional" see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Vintage, 1964), 11-18, and Jarowitz, op.c i t . , 63-7. 12. Trager, o p . c i t . , 201 and 401-2. 13. See the references t o note 25 below. 14. " A l l Change Soon" (Unsigned A r t i c l e ) , Far Eastern Economic  Review, LVII:5 (August 3, 1967), 227. 15. Trager, op.c i t . , 202-3. 16. The Guardian, December 12, 1963. 17. Ibi d . , December 4, 1963. 18. Ibid., Feb. 8, 1964; Feb. 16, 1964. 19. Ibid., March 3. 20. Ibi d . , March 31. 21. Badgley, "Burma's Zealot. . .," 56-7; Ashdown, Op.cit.!, 516-20; " T r i a l s on the Way," 195; P.H.M. Jones, "Burmese Deadlock," Far Eastern Economic Review, XLVII:12 (March 25, 1965) , 561. Jones also adds the information that Col. Tan Yu Saing i s B r i g . Tin Pe's brother-in-law. Tin Pe i s married to Tan Yu Saing's s i s t e r Daw Thein Saing. 84 22. James Guyot,: op. c i t . , 434. 23. Information on the Caretaker Government and the o r i g i n a l composition of the Revolutionary Council comes from Trager, Burma From Kingdom to Republic, 397, 401 and Government.in  the: Union of Burma, while "Present O f f i c e r s i n C i v i l i a n Posts" refers to the group l i s t e d i n Chapter 2 of t h i s paper as Tables II and III as compiled from Forward and The Guardian. 24. Badgley, "Burma's Zealot. . ." 55-6; James Guyot, op. c i t . , 437. 25. By a l l accounts, the c i v i l i a n composition of the B.S.P.P. i s predominantly veterans of the C.P.B. or the former Burma Workers and Peasants Party, subsequently known as the National Unity Front and the United Workers Party. See The Guardian Oct. 4 and 19, 1963, and March 29, 30, and 31, 1964; Jones, op. c i t . , 561; Badgley, "Burma: The Nexus...", 93; Trager, Burma From Kingdom to Republic, 201, 402. Some of the, more notable l e f t i s t s not included i n the main l i s t i n g of t h i s paper are U Saw Oo, an Additional Secretary to the Ministry of Information and publisher of Forward; Bo Htein L i n , former insurgent leader, now i n the B.S.P.P. hierarchy; Bo Sein Tin, Bo Ye Maung, Bo Tha Doe, and Bo Aung Din, formerly prominent Communist rebels, who accepted the amnesty o f f e r i n A p r i l of 1963, and who have since been given important government posts or membership i n the B.S.P.P., or both;, the Central Committee and Politbureau of the United Workers' Party, namely Thakins Chit Maung, Lwin, and Ba Han, and Bo Nyunt Maung, U Ba Hla Aung, and Yebaw Aung Ban, most of whom had been arrested at the same time of the coup, and were among the f i r s t to be released; and U Tun Aung Gyaw of the N.U.F., one of the f i r s t B.S.P.P. Candidate Members. Many members of the U.W.P. joined the B.S.P.P. even before t h e i r own party was made i l l e g a l . The subsequent i n -flux of " l e f t i s t s , " coming as i t did on March 31, 1964,. the same day as the expulsion of Col. Chit Myaing, was probably c l o s e l y related to the following program of r a d i c a l national-i z a t i o n and economic extremism. Most of these people have been l e f t out of the " e l i t e , " as constituted i n t h i s paper, however, since the exact nature of t h e i r Party o f f i c e s i s not known. 26. Butwell, op.c i t . 27. From Who's Who i n Burma: 1961, pages 152, 184 and 194-5. 28. Compiled from Who's Who i n Burma: 1961, Who's Who: i n Asia; 1958, and Tinker, o p . c i t . , 389-400. 85 29. Tinker, o p . c i t . , 7 1 n. 2. 30. S.C. Banery, "Innovations i n Agriculture,"; Far Eastern . Economic Review:, XXXIX:5 (Jan.31, 1963) , 190-2. 31. The- Guardian, A p r i l 30, 1964, and June 18, 1965. 32. The- Guardian, Dec. 2, 1965, and Dec. 4, 1963. 33. Ibid., Oct. 20, 1965, and Forward, Jan. 1, 1967. 34. The- Guardian, July 26, 1964. CHAPTER V: PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH THE ELITES: OF MINORITY  ETHNIC GROUPS 1. . Supra.,33 2. Geertz, op. c i t . , 137-8. 3. Supra.,36-7. 4. F.K. Lehman, "Ethnic Categories i n Burma...," I, 101. 5. : Burma:1 Administrative and Soc i a l A f f a i r s , 1962-63 (Rangoon: Directorate of Information, 1963), 12. 6. George Patterson, "The Shans i n Arms," Far Eastern • Economic Review, XLIX:4 ( J u l y 22, 1965), 177-183. 7. Lehman, op. c i t . , 93-4. 8. Burma: Administrative and Soc i a l A f f a i r s , 1962-63, 12; Who's Who i n Burma, 9. 9. E.R. Leach/: P o l i t i c a l Systems of Highland Burma, 8-9; Tinker, op. c i t . , 73-4. 10. : The Guardian, Sept. 4, 1963, and Nov., 1963. Another K.I.A. leader at t h i s time was Duwa La Yein. 11. See, for example,: The Guardian, Jan. 17, 1964,. which reports the dismissal of U A Soe Myint and U Saw Chit Than of the Karen State A f f a i r s Council, U Tin Ko Ko and U Ohn Pe of the Shan State A f f a i r s Council, and U Saw Thein of the Kayah State A f f a i r s Council, a l l of whom had been members of the A.F.P.F.L.; of the Chairmen, only Dr. Saw Hla Tun, of Kawthoolei State continued on from the c i v i l i a n government. 86 12. F.K. Lehman,: The Structure of Chin Soclety yl-fe. 13. Cady, op. c i t . , 433-4, 512, 549-54, 589-93; Tinker, op. c i t / , 9-11. 14. Trager, Burma From Kingdom to Republic, 105-6. 15. The' Guardian, Sept. 2, 1963; Lehman, "Ethnic Categories . . . , " 101; Trager, Burma From Kingdom to Republic,' 198-9 . 16. Tables XVII and XVIII were compiled from the editions of Forward and The Guardian 1isted i n the Bibliography. 17. Patterson, op. c i t . , 178. 18. Trager, Burma From Kingdom to Republic, 204, 404, n.40; Administrative and S o c i a l A f f a i r s , 11, 16; Forward,: VI: 3 (Sept. 15, 1967), 4. 19. Burma: Economic Survey:, ' 1964 (Rangoon: Directorate of Information, 1964). Compare S i l v e r s t e i n , "The Federal Dilemma i n Burma," p. 101 and note 28. In 1956-7, the Kayal State governments raised only K3-1/2 lakhs out of K 20 lahks (two millions) . There was, under the c i v i l i a n regime,, no fi x e d appropriation to State governments although the Union paid most of t h e i r costs. A s i m i l a r form of dependence e x i s t s , to a higher degree under the Revolutionary Council. CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS 1. Riggs, Administration. . .,115. 2. Tinker, op. c i t . , 324 and Pye, "The Army i n Burmese P o l i t i c s , " 231-2. Dupuy, op. cit.,440, refers to the deter-i o r a t i o n of m i l i t a r y professionalism under the Caretaker Government. 3. Almond and Powell, op. c i t . , 29-30. 4. Janes Guyot,: op.cit. , 4S^ • 1 "b . 5. Roth,: op. c i t . , 203. 6. See the references c i t e d i n note 1 of Chapter I I I . 7. Badgley, "Burma's China Crises. . ."; Trager, "Burma: 1967. . ." 116-7; Licensed Gadfly (Unsigned Article):, Far  Eastern Economic Review,: LVIII :7 (Nov. 23, 1967), 352; The New York Times, Jan.24, 1966. 87 8. T h e s e i m p r e s s i o n s a r e g a i n e d f r o m a r e v i e w o f p r o m o t i o n n o t i c e s i n F o r w a r d i n 1967. B I B L I O G R A P H Y 89 1. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS Burma. Directorate of Information. Administrative and Soc i a l  A f f a i r s / 1 9 6 2 - 6 3 . Rangoon: 1 9 6 3 . Economic Survey, 1964. Rangoon: 1964. Government i n the Union of Burma: 1 9 5 8 , Nov. - 1 9 5 9 / Feb. Rangoon: 1959. ' . . National Economy, 1963-64. Rangoon: 196 4. _. People's Literature Committee and House. Who' s Who  i n Burma. Rangoon: 1961. 2. NEWSPAPERS Far Eastern Economic Review, X X X I X : ! (Jan. 3, 1963) - L V I I I : 1 2 (Dec.28, 1 9 6 7 ) . Forward, 11:9-10 (Dec. 7, 1963-Dec. 2 2 , 1 9 6 3 ) , I I : 1 7 - 2 1 ( A p r i l 7, 1964-June 1 5 , 1 9 6 4 ) , 11:24 (Aug. 1, 1 9 6 4 ) , 111:11-23 (Jan. 1 5 , 1965-July 1 5 , 1 9 6 5 ) , I V : 6 (Nov. 1, 1 9 6 5 ) , I V : 1 6 (Apr. 1, 1 9 6 6 ) , I V : 2 1 - 2 2 (June 1 5 , 1966 and July 1, 1 9 6 6 ) , V:2 (Sept. 1, 1 9 6 6 ) , V:5-21 (Oct. 1 5 , 1966-June 1 5 , 1 9 6 7 ) , V I : 1 - 5 (Aug. 1 5 , 1967 - Oct. 1 5 , 1 9 6 7 ) . The Guardian (Rangoon), March 1, 1962-Dec. 3 1 , 1964 , May 1, 1965 - Dec. 3 1 , 1 9 6 5 , May 1, 1967 - Aug. 3 1 , 1967. The New York Times, March 1, 1962 - Apr. 3 0 , 1968. 3. OTHER PRIMARY SOURCES Ashdown, John. "Burma's P o l i t i c a l Puzzle," Far Eastern  Economic Review, XLV:12 (September 1 7 , 1 9 6 4 ) , 5 1 6 - 2 0 . Asia Who's Who, 1957. Hong Kong: Pan-Asian Newspaper A l l i a n c e , 1 9 5 7 . Ba Maw. Breakthrough i n Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 6 . 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"Social Change, Mobilization, and the Exchange of Services Between the M i l i t a r y Establishment and the C i v i l Society: The Burmese Case," Economic Development and C u l t u r a l Change, XIII:1 (Part 1)(Oct. 1964) , 1-19. " ' Pye, Lucian W. "Burma: Opening on the Lef t i n a M i l i t a r y Manner," (mimeo). Boston: Centre for International Studies, M.I.T., June, 1963. P o l i t i c s , Personality, and Nation-Building: Burma's  Search for Identity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.' "The Army i n Burmese P o l i t i c s , " i n John J . Johnson (ed.). The Role of the M i l i t a r y i n the Underdeveloped Countries. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962, 231-251. S i l v e r s t e i n , Josef. "Burma: Ne Win's Revolution Reconsidered," Asian Survey, VI:2 (Feb., 1966). "The Federal Dilemma i n Burma," Far Eastern Survey, XXVIII:7 (July, 1959), 97-105. ______ " F i r s t Steps on the Burmese Way to Socialism," Asian Survey,-IV:2 (Feb., 1964), 716-22. ______ "Problems i n Burma: Economic, P o l i t i c a l and Diplomatic," Asian Survey,. VII: 2 (Feb. 1967), 110-23. Tinker, Hugh. The Union of Burma. 4th ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Trager, Frank N. Burma: From Kingdom to Republic. New York: Praeger, 1966. "Burma: 1967 - A Better Ending Than a Beginning," Asian Survey, VIII:2 (February, 1968), 110-9. 93 5. GENERAL Almond, Gabriel and G. Bingham Powell. Comparative P o l i t i c s : A Developmerital Approach.'• Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1966.' Bendix, Reinhard. Max Weber: An I n t e l l e c t u a l P o r t r a i t . New York: Basic Books, 1964. Bienen, Henry. "What Does P o l i t i c a l Development Mean i n A f r i c a ? " World P o l i t i c s , XX:1 (Oct. 1967), 128-32. Bottomore, T.B. E l i t e s i n Society. New York: Basic Books, 1964. Braibanti, Ralph. "Introduction," i n Braibanti, op . c i t . , 1-22. Eisenstadt, S.N. "Breakdowns of Modernization," i n Jason Finkle and Richard Gable (eds.). P o l i t i c a l Development  and S o c i a l Change. New York: Wiley, 1966, 573-591. F i e t , Edward. " M i l i t a r y Coups and P o l i t i c a l Development: Some Lessons From Ghana and Nigeria," World P o l i t i c s . XX:2 (Jan., 1968), 179-193. Gerth, Hans and C. Wright M i l l s (eds.). From Max Weber: Essays i n Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. Ho s e l i t z , Bert F. "Levels of Economic Performance and Bureaucratic Structures," i n Joseph La Palombara (ed.). Bureaucracy and P o l i t i c a l D e v e l o p m e n t P r i n c e t o n , N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963. Huntington, Samuel P. " P o l i t i c a l Development and P o l i t i c a l Decay," World P o l i t i c s , XVII:3 ( A p r i l , 1965). ______ The Soldier and the State. New York: Vintage, 1964. Janowitz, Morris. The M i l i t a r y i n the P o l i t i c a l Development  of the New Nations. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1964. Lasswell, Harold and Daniel Lerner (eds.). World Revolutionary  E l i t e s : Studies i n Coercive Ideological Movements. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press", 1966. Pye, Lucian W. "Armies i n the Process of P o l i t i c a l Moderni-zation," i n John J . Johnson, op.ci t . , 69-89. 94 Aspects °f P o l i t i c a l Development. Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1966. Riggs, Fred W. "Bureaucrats and P o l i t i c a l Development: A Paradoxical View," i n La Palombara, op.cit., 120-67. Public Administration i n Developing Countries: The  Theory of Prismatic Society. Boston: Houghton, M i f f l i n , 1964". • - - -™ • - • ______ Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic P o l i t y . Honolulu: East-West Centre Press, 1966. "The Theory of P o l i t i c a l Development" i n James C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary P o l i t i c a l Theory. New York: The Free Press, 1967. Roth, Guenther. "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building i n the New States," World P o l i t i c s , XX:2 (Jan., 1968), 194-206. Rustow, Dankwart A. "The Study of E l i t e s : Who's Who When, and How," World P o l i t i c s , - XVIII: 4 (July, 1966) , 690-717. Schumann, Franz. Ideology and Organization i n .Communist China. Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a , 1966. ShiTs, Edward. "The M i l i t a r y i n the P o l i t i c a l Development of the New States," i n Johnson, op.ci t . , 7-67. A P P E N D I C E S 96 APPENDIX A. LISTS OF ELITE GROUPS The following tables summarize the information used as a basis for the tables presented i n the text. To allow for a compact presentation, the following symbols w i l l be used: (1) Under "Ethnic C l a s s i f i c a t i o n " : A = Arakanese C = Chin B = Burman Kc = Kachin I.B. = Indo-Burman Kr = Karen S.B. = Sino-Burman S = Shan (2) Under "Education": R. = Received from Rangoon University U.K. =• Received from a B r i t i s h University U.S. = Received from an American University Some = Attended University, but did not graduate None = Did not attend University 97 TABLE AI SUMMARY OF DATA ON PERSONNEL OF HIGHEST ELITE LEVELS Name Ethnic B i r t h Educa- Former Present Glass. Date ti o n . Occupatn. Position Colonel Hla Han Colonel Kyaw Soe B B c.1920 M.D. R. c.1920 some Colonel M . D . Maung Lwm R. Colonel Maung Shwe General Ne Win Brigadier San Yu Colonel Sein Win Colonel Than Sein Brigadier Thaung Dan Brigadier Thaung Kyi B c.1920 some S.B. 1911 some S.B. c.1920 some B c.1920 some B c.1920 some B c.1925 some B c.1920 some Army Doctor M i l i t a r y Secretary War Off i c e Regional Commands Regional Commands Armed Forces Commander Regional Commands Regional Commands Counter-insurgency A i r Force Regional Commands Minister of Health & Educ. Minister of Home A f f a i r s and c. Minister of Social Welfare &c. Ministers of Industry and Labour Chairman of the Revolutionary Council Minister of Finance Minister of Public Works Minister of Transport & Communications Minister of Inform. & Culture Minister of Agriculture & Forests 98 TABLE AI Continued Name Ethnic B i r t h Class Date Educa- Former ti o n Occupatn, Present Position Commodore Thaung Tin B c.1920 some Navy Minister of Mines U T h i Han B c.1912 B.A. R. Brigadier s > f i > s o m e Tin Pe Business; Minister of Defence Min. Foreign Aff, Supplies D i r . & National Planning Several M i n i s t r i e s B.S.P.P. O f f i c i a l 99 TABLE A l l SUMMARY OF DATA ON MINISTERIAL SECRETARIES Bi r t h Educa- Former Name Date ti o n Occupation Ministry Lt.Col. Aye Kyaw U Chit Maung U Cho Tun Lt. C o l . Hla Maung Commander Khin Maung Myint U Kyaw Nyunt c.1920 some 1915 none Army P o l i t i c s 1916 B.A.(Hons)Civil Service R. c.1920 some c.1927 B.A. (Sydney) Colonel Kyaw Zaw c.1920 some Major Lwin Maung Army Navy C i v i l Service Army Army U Maung Maung Colonel Maung Maung , n 0 n ... y 3.1920 some Kha Lt.Col. Myo Myint c.1920 some Dr.Nyi Nyi c.1930 Ph.D. (U.K.) Lt.Col. Soe Tin U Tha Hyaw 1918 . B.A.(Hons)Civil Service R Army Army Geology Army c.1920 some Culture Finance Land Nationalization Home and J u d i c i a l A f f . Mines National Planning Trade and Co-operatives. Social Welfare Defence Industry Labour Education Housing and Public Works Transport.& Communication 100 TABLE A l l C o n t i n u e d Name B i r t h D a t e E d u c a -t i o n F o r m e r O c c u p a t n , M i n i s t r y L t . C o l . The i n Aung C o l o n e l T i n Soe L t . C o l . T i n Tun U Tun She i n U Win Pe c.1920 some c.1920 some c.1920 some Army Army A i r F o r c e 1919 B . A . ( H o n s ) C i v i l S e r v i c e R & B.A.(U.K.) 1912 B . A . ( H o n s ) C i v i l S e r v i c e R H e a l t h A g r i c u l t u r e and F o r e s t s I n f o r m a t i o n F o r e i g n A f f a i r s R e l i g i o u s A f f a i r s 101 TABLE A l l I SUMMARY OF DATA ON AMBASSADORS (APRIL 1, 1968) Name Ethnic B i r t h Educa-Class. Date ti o n Former Occupation Posting U Aung Shwe U Ba Ni B B U Ba Saw A U Ba Shwe B U Hla Maung Col.Hla Maw U Lwin U Maung Maung U Nyo Tun U Pe Khin U Sein Bwa B B B B B Sama Duwa Sinwa Nawng U Thein Doke Kc B c.1920 some c.1920 some 1914 some c.1920 some 1911 B.A., B.L. R c.1920 some 1914 some 1920 some 1914 B.A., B.L. R 1911 B.A., B.L. R 1914 none c.1920 some Brigadier United Arab Rep. Colonel & Czechoslovakia, Minister of Austria and Trans.&Comm. Hungary Cabinet Min. U.S.S.R. Col.;Direc. Japan of Supply & Trans.,Min. of Defence Foreign Of f i c e United States Mil.Attache India and Nepal P o l i t i c i a n Federal Germany Yugoslavia & Bulgaria Brigadier, D i r . M i l Training Cabinet Min. A u s t r a l i a and & P o l i t i c i a n New Zealand Ambassador Foreign Of f i c e Malaysia and Singapore Indonesia and the P h i l l i p i n e s P o l i t i c i a n Ceylon Co l . , M i l . A t t . I s r a e l 102 TABLE A l l I Continued Name Ethnic B i r t h Educa- Former Class. Date ti o n Occupation Posting U Tun Win S.B, 1917 some P o l i t i c i a n Thailand U Vum Ko Hau 1917 none P o l i t i c i a n Cambodia and Laos U Zahre Lian C 1923 some Diplomat, P o l i t i c i a n , Cab.Min. France and Benelux 103 TABLE AIV SUMMARY OF DATA ON OTHER CIVILIAN ELITE MEMBERS Name Ethnic B i r t h Class. Date Educa-t i o n Former Occupatn, Present Position U Aung Than B 1911 B.A. R N.U.F.Polit.Secy.B.S.P.P. C.O.C. U Aye Maung B 1912 B.Sc., B.L. R Lawyer Deputy Dir. Education Dr.Fred Ba H l i B 1922 Sc.D. (MIT) Engineer Dir.-General Burma Appl. Res.Inst. U Ba Kyaw B 1914 B.A.(Hons) C i v i l R Servant Director of Fisheries U Ba Nye i n U Ba Sein B B 1914 1910 B.A.(Hons) N.U.F. R P o l i t i c i a n B.Sc., B.L. R Lawyer Dept.of F i n . Advisor; Secy.of B.S.P.P.Soc. Econ.Planning Committee Attor.General U Ba Tin U Hla B B 1919 B.Sc. R Parliament, Secretary to Various Min. C i v i l Ser. Deputy Secy., Ministry of National Planning Chairman of Inland Water Trans.Board U Khin I.B. 1913 Maung Latt B.A. R B.L. R Cabinet Minister Dputy Secy., Min.Agr. & Forests 104 TABLE AIV Continued Name E t h n i c C l a s s . B i r t h Educa-Date t i o n Former Occupatn. Present P o s i t i o n U Kyaw Nyein B 1912 B.A. R Chairman of Chairman of Stat e A g r i c u l . the Union Bank Bank of Burma U Ohn Khin Dr.Po E U San Maung B B B 1910 1904 B.Sc., B.L. R Ph.D(U.K.) C i v i l Servant F o r e i g n O f f . Exec.Sec. M e t e o r o l o g i s t D i r . - G e n e r a l of Meteorology B.Sc. J u s t i c e (Hons) R B.L. (U.K.) Deputy Secy., Home M i n i s t r y U Saw Lwin U S e i n U Than Htut U T h e i n Maung U Thein T i n U Thet Tun Bo Ye Htut B Kr B 1911 B.A. R C i v i l Servant F i n a n c i a l B B B 1898 1922 1896 1919 1926 B.A.(U.K.) B.A. , B.L. R A.L.A. (U.K.) Commsnr.(Lands & Rur.Dev.) C i v i l Servant D i r . o f Labour L i b r a r y O f f i c i a l P o l i t i c i a n B.A. R Labour Off, B.A. R S t a t i s t i c i a n B.Sc.(UK) 1922 none C.P.B. Insurgent D i r . o f the C u l t u r a l I n s t i t u t e Trade "Council Member Deputy D i r . Labour D i r . o f C e n t r a l Stat.& Econ. Dept. Member of B.S.P.P. Centr. Org.Committee 105 TABLE AV SUMMARY OF DATA ON CABINET MINISTERS (1948-58) Name Ethnic B i r t h Univ. Ministry Present Class. Date Educatn. Held Dates Status Bohmu Aung B 1910 None Rehabil. 1948 P o l i t i c a l Deputy PM1958 Prisoner U Aung Pa Kr A U Ba Gyan B U Aung Zan Wai Mahn Ba Kr Saing U Ba Saw A U Ba Swe B T h a k i n B C h i t Maung Dr.E.Maung B Sao Hkun S Hkio Dr.Saw Kr Hla Tun Sao Htun E S Bo Khin B Maung Gale U Khin I.B. Ma-ng Latt U Ko Ko B Gyi 1919 c.1901 1909 1906 some 1914 1915 1914 1898 1912 1906 1914 1912 1913 1914 B.A. R Various 53-7 P o l i t i c a l Pris, some Various 48-51 Public Ser. Comm. B.A., Jud.Aff. 48-50 Trustee of B.L. R Shwedagon Pag. Karen Aff.48-52 unknown some Various 51-57 Diplomat some Various 52-57 Unknown none Various 54-57 Pol.Prisoner B.A., R Foreign 1949 P o l i t i c a l L.L.B.(UK) A f f . Jud.Aff. 1958 Prisoner B.A.(UK) Various 48-58 Polit.Prisoner M.D. R Karen 55-5 8 Chairman of State Karen State S.C. none Various 54-57 Unknown B.A. R Various 50-58 Pol.Prisoner B.A., Various 50-58 Dep.Secy., B.L. R Arg.S For. some Commerce 48-49 Unknown TABLE AV Continued 106 E t h n i c B i r t h Univ. M i n i s t r y " Present Name C l a s s . Date Educatn. Held Dates Status U Kyaw Min A 1 8 9 9 B . A . , Finance 1958 Unknown (U.K.) U Kyaw B 1913 B.A., Va r i o u s 48-53 Unknown Myint B.L. R Thakin B 1915 B.A.(Hons) Vari o u s 48-58 P o l i t i c a l Kyaw Nyein B.L.(Hons) P r i s o n e r R Thakin B — none Agr.& For.52-58 B.S.P.P. Kyaw Tun member Bo L e t Ya B 1911 some Deputy PM 1948 P o l i t . P r i s . Thakin Lwin B 1915 some P u b l i c Works Diplomat Lab. 48-49 Bo Min _ B 1920 none Varxous 52-57 P o l . P r i s . Gaung Henzada B 1893 none N a t i o n a l 1948 Unknown Mya P l a n Pyabwe Mya B — — Trans.& 19 48 Died 1953 Comm. Gen.Ne Win S..B. 1911 some Defence, 49-50 Chairman Home Revolutny C o u n c i l U Nu B 1907 B.A., P.M. 48-58 R e t i r e d B.L. R U Ohn B — B.A. R Commerce 48-49 R e t i r e d Thakin Pan B 1919 none L o c a l 56-57 Unknown Myine Admin. Bohmu Po B 1898 B.Sc. R Pub.Wks. 1948 R e t i r e d Kun M.A.Raschid Ind. 1912 B.A., Va r i o u s 52-57 Unknown B.L. R Thakxn San 2 1 n Q n e L a n d 56-57 P o l . P r i s . Myxnt Saw San Po Kr c.1920 none Ed u c a t i o n 1948 Underground T h i n 107 TABLE AV Continued Name E t h n i c . B i r t h . Univ. M i n i s t r y ' Present C l a s s . Date Educatn. Held Dates Status D r . S e i n Ban Bo S e i n Hman B B-C U Shein Htang Sama Duwa Ke Sinwa Nawng Thakin Tha K i n B U Than Anglo-Aung Burman (A.Rivers) Thakin T i n B Myanma B A l i n U T i n 1901- M.D. R Health 56-57 Unknown -- — Without P. 1948 Underground Vari o u s 52-57 Unknown Var i o u s 48-58 Diplomat : Vario u s 52-57 Underground E d u c a t i o n 52-56 R e t i r e d Myanaung U T i n B Thakin T i n B Maung U T i n Nyun B Sao Tun S Aye U Tun Pe B U Tun T i n B 1895 1914 1918 1902 1903 1897 1906 1918 1917 1908 U Tun Win S.B. 1917 C 1900 U. Vamthu Maung U Vum Ko Hau none none none B.L. R none none some none B.A. R some B.A., B.L. R B.A. R none Va r i o u s 48-58 R e t i r e d V a r i o u s 48-58 P o l i t i c a l k P r i s o n e r Health 54-55 Unknown Agr.S For. 56-57 Unknown Labour 56-58 Unknown Immigratn. 53-56 Unknown Var i o u s Educ.& C u l t u r e V a r i o u s Chin A f f , 48-53 P u b l i c Ser. Commission 56-58 R e t i r e d 52-5 8 Diplomat 48-52 R e t i r e d 1917 none C h i n . A f f . 1948 Diplomat 108 TABLE AV Continued Name Ethnic B i r t h Univ. . Ministry Class. Date Educatn. Held Present Dates Status U Win Mahn Win Maung B Kr 1905 1916 Sao Wunnah Kr C U Zahre L i an Duwa Z au Lawn c.1920 1923 Kc B.A. , B.Ed. B.L. R B.A. R none none . 1910 none Various 48-55 Diplomat Various 48-57 Unknown Kayah St. 48-58 Pol.Pris. Chin.Aff. 54-58 Diplomat Kachin St. 53-56 Unknown 109 APPENDIX B COUNTER-ELITES In Burma there are two c o u n t e r - e l i t e s — t h e Council for National Liberation (C.N.L.) and the Community Party of Burma and i t s National Democratic United Front (CP.B.-N.D.U.F.) which aspire to control the central government, rather than some form of separation. The C.N.L. i s an underground opposition movement directed by p o l i t i c a l refugees i n Thailand, and operating near Rangoon as the National Liberation Army. Its leadership consists of r e l a t i v e s and associates of the former wartime leader, Dr. Ba Maw; anti-Communist former A.F.P.F.L. members and prominent Karen leaders. The C.N.L. has delayed joining forces with Shan and Kachin leaders and has rejected the advances of Arakanese leaders who aspire to the formation of an autonomous Arakan, but i t does have.some Mon n a t i o n a l i s t s among i t s f o l -lowing. The co-leadership of i n f l u e n t i a l members of the Tennasserim Karen community ( p a r t i c u l a r l y Saw Kya Doe) gives the movement a representative scope unequalled since the A.F.P.F.L. aft e r the Panglong Conferences. The N.D.U.F. i s a more complex form of a l l i a n c e . The C.P.B. i s primarily Burman, but since the 1948-50 c i v i l war, i t has been attempting to convert minority group leaders ideo-l o g i c a l l y , as a f i r s t step to a broader a l l i a n c e . By 1953, most of the surviving former leaders of the K.N.D.O., which 110 had been pro-Western and anti-Communist, began t o accept the Communist i d e o l o g y and to form agreements w i t h the White F l a g s f o r mutual c o - o p e r a t i o n and the demarcation of t e r r i -t o r y . In 1954, the Karens s p l i t w i t h the K.M.T. remnants wi t h whom they had been a l l i e d , and w i t h the a s s i s t a n c e o f Communist a d v i s o r s , r e o r g a n i z e d as the Kawthooley R e v o l u t i o n -ary F o r c e s . By I960, t h i s group was attempting t o work out agreements w i t h Shans, Kachins, and Kayahs, but these were upset by problems of m o b i l i t y , and disagreements over K.M.T. support t o the Shans. In 1963, the Kawthooley l e a d e r s h i p s p l i t over the i s s u e of the government amnesty o f f e r . Saw Hunter Tha Thmwe came to terms w i t h the government, w h i l e the most l e f t - w i n g l e a d e r , Maihn Ba Zan", headed the remainder, which he renamed the Karen N a t i o n a l U n i t y P a r t y . T h i s p a r t y a l l i e d w i t h other Karen, Mon, and Chin groups t o form an A l l - N a t i o n a l i t i e s Committee, which was, i n t u r n , a l l i e d w i t h the C.P.B. t o form the N.D.U.F. In t h e i r e a r l i e r y e a r s , these groups were not s t r o n g , but they remained secure i n the D e l t a j u n g l e s and near the Th a i border, where they e x t r a c t e d t r i b u t e from the l o c a l v i l l a g e s . The s t r o n g e s t l i n k i n t h i s a l l i a n c e a t pr e s e n t i s between the C.P.B. and Mahn Ba Zan's group, but t h i s r e s t s on the promise of a f u l l y autonomous Kawthoolei S t a t e i f the r e b e l l i o n i s s u c c e s s f u l . Furthermore, Mahn Ba Zan has come to an agreement wi t h the Ten n a s s e r i n Karens t o g i v e up r e c r u i t i n g i n t h e i r area. I l l Recent r e p o r t s of Shan and Kachin adherence t o the N.D.U.F. are vague. Up to I960, the Kachins were one of the most l o y a l m i n o r i t y groups, w i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f New Seng, a Kachin B a t a l l i o n commander who l e d h i s men i n r e v o l t i n 19 49 and, on f l e e i n g t o China was g i v e n command of 1,000 w e l l -t r a i n e d g u e r r i l l a s . There i s , however, no evidence t h a t t h i s group or the Kachin Independence Army have adhered t o the C. P.B. The Shan N a t i o n a l Army, the l a r g e s t Shan group, has always remained s e p a r a t e , through f i n a n c i n g i t s e l f by the s a l e of opium, o c c a s i o n a l l y a l l y i n g w i t h the K.M.T. remants, and f l e e i n g , when necessary t o T h a i l a n d . In f a c t , t h i s group has attempted, u n s u c c e s s f u l l y , t o j o i n the anti-Communist C.N.L. Thus, of the two c o u n t e r - e l i t e s , the C.N.L. may be co n s i d e r e d as more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e than the government, s i n c e i t i n c l u d e s a t l e a s t some m i n o r i t y group r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n i t s l e a d e r s h i p . The N.D.U.F., however, i s more of a loose a l l i a n c e . Of the two c o u n t e r - e l i t e s , the C.N.L. puts more emphasis on s e c u l a r r e c r u i t m e n t than the C.P.B. The personnel of the C.P.B. are e x c l u s i v e l y o p p o s i t i o n a l p o l i t i c i a n s and g u e r r i l l a s . The C.N.L. claims t o r e p r e s e n t the e n t i r e educated community of Burma, but though i t i s p l a u s i b l e t h a t many of the l a r g e number of t r a i n e d people d i s s a t i s f i e d with the government may support the C.N.L. there i s no concrete evidence t o t h i s e f f e c t . 112 The m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s are a Sandhurst graduate and a former N.C.O. i n the B r i t i s h Army. Bo Yan Naing's experience i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t of Ne Win and Aung G u i . Z a l i Maw, the son of Ba Maw, and the General S e c r e t a r y of the C.N.L. was a. pro-f e s s o r of law a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f Rangoon. The main i n d i c a t i o n s of a s e c u l a r o u t l o o k , however, are elements i n the s t y l e of decision-making i n the C.N.L. The group r e f u s e s t o take on more r e c r u i t s than i t can a f f o r d to arm w i t h good weapons. I t r e f u s e s to accept the adherence of m i n o r i t y e t h n i c groups whose l e a d e r s h i p i s d i v i d e d . Furthermore, adherence t o a c a r e f u l l y d e f i n e d p o l i c y of f e d e r a l i s m i s a l s o a c o n d i t i o n of membership. Such pragma-ti s m seems to be t h e work of h i g h l y experienced and t a c t i c a l l e a d e r s . These few i n d i c a t i o n s suggest t h a t the C.N.L. i s on i t s way to t r a n s c e n d i n g p a r t i c u l a r i s m through adherence to s e c u l a r standards, and might, at l e a s t i n t h i s r e s p e c t p r o v i d e a government w i t h g r e a t e r i n t e g r a t i v e c a p a c i t y . The '.C.P..B.-N.D.U.F. resembles the p r e s e n t e l i t e i n i t s s t r a t e g y f o r i n t e g r a t i o n . Although i t promises m i n o r i t y group adherents separate s t a t e s , with the r i g h t t o s e c e s s i o n , the predominance of the e x c l u s i v e l y Burman C.P.B. makes i t u n l i k e l y t h a t t h i s r i g h t c o u l d be e x e r c i s e d . I f s e c e s s i o n were attempted, the consequences would probably be s i m i l a r to the p r e s e n t m i l i t a r y regime. 113 The e x i s t e n c e of a l t e r n a t i v e s t o the c u r r e n t e l i t e may a t t r a c t members of the e l i t e who are u n s a t i s f i e d w i t h i t s r e c r u i t m e n t and a l l o c a t i o n p r a c t i c e s . As a r e s u l t , the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e must e i t h e r change t o accomodate the d i s -contented, or r i s k l o s i n g them to a c o u n t e r - e l i t e which w i l l thereby g a i n new s t r e n g t h . T h i s i n t e r a c t i o n between the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e and c o u n t e r - e l i t e s a l s o a f f e c t s the p o s s i b i -l i t i e s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l development. I t was found t h a t the Communist P a r t y of Burma and some r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of m i n o r i t y e t h n i c groups have formed a loose a l l i a n c e . T h i s c o u n t e r - e l i t e i s somewhat r e p r e s e n t a t i v e e t h n i c a l l y , and promises the r i g h t to s e c e s s i o n , but the p r e - . dominance of the Burman m a j o r i t y i n the C.P.B., and the l i m i -t a t i o n of i t s t e c h n i c a l competence to the s k i l l s of p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n suggest t h a t i f t h i s group were to come to"power, the p r e s e n t u n s t a b l e p a t t e r n would r e c u r r . The C o u n c i l f o r N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n seems to p r e s e n t a more s t a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e . The C.N.L. has a pragmatic p o l i c y of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of the v a r i o u s e t h n i c groups, and demands, as c o n d i t i o n s of adherence, the f u l f i l l m e n t of those c o n d i t i o n s which alone make p l u r a l i s m p o s s i b l e . The a l t e r n a t i v e s , to Burma, to c o n t i n u i n g the h i s t o r i c a l process of empire b u i l d i n g and d i s s o l u t i o n , are suggested by the c o u n t e r - e l i t e s . The m i l i t a r y e l i t e has attempted to p r e -empt the C.P.B.-N.D.U.F. by propagating an i d e o l o g y very 114 s i m i l a r t o the Communist, and f o l l o w i n g the advice of " o l d guard p o l i t i c i a n s " w i t h i n i t s ranks, e s p e c i a l l y on the i s s u e s of economic p o l i c y and l o c a l . a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Supposedly, the only remaining d i f f e r e n c e between the R e v o l u t i o n a r y C o u n c i l and the C.P.B. would be the l a t t e r ' s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Communist China, a l i a b i l i t y among n a t i o n a l i s t i c Burmese. Yet the C.P.B., i n s t r e s s i n g the r o l e of the " n a t i o n a l i t i e s " i n the N.D.U.F., i s attempting t o overcome t h i s o b s t a c l e by p r o v i d i n g a focus f o r a n e o - t r a d i t i o n a l a n t i - s u l t a n i s t i c a l l i a n c e . In t h i s r e s p e c t , the R e v o l u t i o n a r y C o u n c i l i s i r r e v o c a l y opposed t o the CP.B.-N.D.U.F., s i n c e t o be otherwise would be to abro-gate t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f i t s o r i g i n a l s e i z u r e o f power. A v i c t o r y f o r the CP.B.-N.D.U.F. as i d e from i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e p e r c u s s i o n s , would probably mean the r e p i t i t i o n o f the p a t t e r n o f s e c e s s i o n and r e i n t e g r a t i o n . The C o u n c i l f o r N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n , i t has been sug-gested, seems t o r e p r e s e n t an attempt t o org a n i z e on a more s e c u l a r i s t i c or pragmatic way. Reports t o date i n d i c a t e t h a t i t s p o s i t i o n has been improving s t e a d i l y , as i t grows i n numbers and remains i n v u l n e r a b l e i n the c o u n t r y s i d e near Rangoon. I t may be t h a t the R e v o l u t i o n a r y C o u n c i l i s now con-f r o n t e d w i t h the n e c e s s i t y of r e c o g n i z i n g the reso u r c e s of the C.N.L., and attempting some form of c o - o p t a t i o n or a l l i -ance o r of u l t i m a t e l y f a c i n g d e f e a t a t t h e i r hands. In t h i s case, e l i t e membership would r e s t on an independent base of 115 power, independent of l o y a l t y t o the " r u l e r . " The s u l t a n i s t i c model would no longer apply, and the a n a l y s i s i n t h i s paper would be r e s t r i c t e d t o the f i r s t f i v e years of the R e v o l u t i o n -ary Government of the Union of Burma. 

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