

RECRUITMENT OF THE BURMESE POLITICAL ELITE
IN THE SECOND NE WIN REGIME: 1962-1967

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the recruitment of the political elite in Burma from 1962 to 1967, the first five years of the second Ne Win regime. The political elite is defined as consisting of officers of the rank of Colonel or higher, and civilians who hold administrative or party offices similar to those held by these high-ranking officers. The aspects of recruitment considered are (1) the extent of representation of ethnic groups; (2) the extent of achievement orientation; and (3) the nature and scope of recruits' experience in dealing with the leadership of minority ethnic groups.

These recruitment variables are chosen for their relevance to political development, and this will be demonstrated by consideration of some of the implications of elite recruitment practices in Burma for the development of equality, system capacity, and structural differentiation.

Research into the ethnic origins and career experience of the current Burmese elite was conducted by a review of the existing literature and secondary historical sources, as well as a survey of the English-language press of Burma and foreign periodicals for the years 1962 to 1967. The Burmese periodicals surveyed were The Guardian (daily) and Forward (fort-

nightly); and the non-Burmese periodicals were The New York Times and the Far Eastern Economic Review. Use was also made of a Who's Who in Burma, published in 1961.

It was found that according to the rank of offices held, the Burmese political elite is by no means exclusively military. The military component of the elite consists of a large proportion of the veterans of the Burma Independence Army, which has comprised the officer corps of the Burma Army since shortly after Independence. Many of the administrative offices continue to be held by veterans of the colonial Civil Service, although their superiors are Army officers. In addition, many posts in the single Army-sponsored party are held by veterans of former extremist "left-wing" parties. Very few positions in the current regime are held by former political leaders.

It was found that representation of ethnic groups other than the Burman majority was very low, being restricted to 2 out of 54 from the military component and 9 out of 44 of the civilian component, 6 of the latter being Ambassadors. The current elite is shown to be considerably less representative of minority ethnic groups than that of the civilian governments, and this difference is partly explained by institutional changes.

The extent of achievement orientation in recruitment is considered by an examination of the formal education and professional experience of elite members. It is shown that the level of formal education of the current elite is at least

slightly lower than that of the civilian governments, with less than half holding university degrees. The period in question also shows a decline in the professionalism of the military as compared to the period of civilian government and to the military Caretaker Government of 1958 to 1960. This is explained as a consequence of the recruitment to party and administrative posts of former "oppositionist" politicians, which has upset a balance between professional and political orientations in the military.

The experience of elite members is also found to include service as military administrators in minority ethnic group areas, a position not conducive to the stimulation of attitudes of equality and non-discrimination. This, then, eliminates a possible substitute for ethnic group representation in the elite.

It is concluded, finally, that none of these recruitment practices are conducive to further political development in Burma, but constitute part of a defensive posture oriented towards counter-insurgency, minority-group regulation, and the short-run political security of the elite.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to examine three aspects of the recruitment of the political elite of Burma, as it existed from 1962 to 1967. These three aspects are:

(1) ethnic group representation; (2) educational, technical, and professional qualifications; and (3) the experience which elite members have had in dealing with the elites of minority ethnic groups.

In any elite study, a number of important questions arise. One of these, of course, is "Who are the political elite?" This question which calls for both formal and operational definitions, will be considered in Chapter II. Another, perhaps more fundamental, set of questions is "Why study elites?" "What can one learn about politics from studying elites?" Or, more precisely, "What variables in the recruitment of the political elite are relevant to other important political variables?"¹

It may be of interest to find out simply "Who rules?" and what characteristics, if any, the rulers have in common. Marx and Engels, for example, claimed that the rulers in any society were chosen from and by the members of a dominant class, and that they acted in the interests of that class. Vilfredo Pareto presented evidence for the conclusion that

although there were elites in every sphere of life, the political elite (those with the most power) tended to overlap with the economic elite (those with the most wealth).²

Such approaches to elite studies are concerned with the "agglutination hypothesis"; that those with some forms of power and influence tend also to acquire other forms.³ When Gaetano Mosca considered this hypothesis with reference to democratic societies, he came to the conclusion that there is a wide variety of interests in society, and that these are all represented in the elite.⁴

Pareto and Mosca also developed the concept of the "circulation" of elites. Here they attempted to relate social characteristics of new personnel recruited into the political elite with changes in the society as a whole.⁵ This concept was elaborated by Harold Lasswell, in his attempts to relate elite theory to the cataclysmic political changes of his time.

Lasswell contends that in the twentieth century revolutions are led and carried through by elites which have in common certain characteristics; namely, origins in the middle class, a high degree of professional and technical qualification, and insufficient opportunity, under the existing regime, to use these abilities.⁶

Thus Lasswell advocates elite studies as a means of coming to grips with the dynamics of comparative politics, the processes of political change. More recently, in political science, a similar concern has led to a kind of synthesis of

the fields of political theory and comparative politics and administration, in a search for a comparative theory of political change.⁷ Various dimensions of political change have been put forward as aspects of political development. Initially there were attempts to define the political prerequisites of economic development. Sometimes this was done by focusing on the nature of politics in industrial societies, and attempting to show how politics in developing countries differs from this model. Although this approach points out the importance of rationality in politics, in the sense of emphasizing constraints on political leadership, it very often merged into a view of development as modernization in the Western pattern. This weakness is particularly important when it comes to evaluating the appropriateness of Western institutions to developing countries.

A more modest concept of political development is the view that it consists of the growth of any forms of organization, so long as they make possible the operation of a modern nation state. This approach suggests the element of "capacity" or "capability," which has since come to the forefront of the study. In this context, the growth of legal order and administration becomes important, and with it "the spread of rationality, the strengthening of secular legal concepts, and the elevation of technical and specialized knowledge in the direction of human affairs."⁸

In addition, various degrees of emphasis are given to the elements of mass mobilization, and participation in some form of democratic institutions. If these aspects of political change are to be considered as part of development, it becomes important to consider to what extent all groups in the society are represented in the decision-making process, and the extent to which extra-bureaucratic institutions exert control over the administration.

As to the problem of the compatibility of these various aspects of development, there are as many different positions as there are writers in the field. Some of these positions will be discussed in the remainder of this introduction.

There now appears to be some agreement as to what are the essentials of political development. Both Lucian Pye and other members of the Committee on Comparative Politics, and Fred W. Riggs, one of the leaders of the Comparative Administration Group, seem to agree on the following:

- (1) a change from widespread subject status to an increasing number of contributing citizens . . . [the] spread of mass participation, a greater sensitivity to the principles of equality, and a wider acceptance of universalistic laws.
- (2) . . . an increase in the capacity of the system to manage public affairs, control controversy, and cope with popular demands.
- (3) . . . greater structural differentiation, greater functional specificity, and greater integration of all the participating institutions and organizations.⁹

The study of the elite of a developing country should

emphasize those variables which have the greatest relevance to these questions. This is the reason for the choice of those aspects of elite recruitment in Burma, which are to be the subject of this paper.

The most general reason for examining these three aspects of elite recruitment is to see to what extent recruitment procedures have made possible greater structural differentiation and the emergence of institutions which are not dependent for their survival on the continuation of military rule. Morris Janowitz argues that in order to ensure stability, it is necessary for a military regime to develop a versatile set of institutions, rather than continuing to rely solely on control of the instruments of violence.¹⁰ In most developing nations, authority is predominantly personal, and institutions which usually channel the behaviour of social groups are in a state of flux. Under such conditions, elite recruitment practices are likely to have a great effect on routinizing behaviour into new patterns, and in laying the foundations for new institutions.¹¹

This approach differs from others in the field of political development in taking, as given, a predominantly personalistic form of authority. Riggs, for example, emphasizes the outcomes of the paradox of a high degree of formal regulation and a wide range of personal power in avoiding it.¹² In Burma, however, formal institutions are secondary in impor-

tance to personal variables. This is because the network of personal relationships among elite members has shown more continuity than the forms of institutional organization, which have changed abruptly within the last twenty-five years. It is hoped that this will be made clear in the material to follow, especially in Chapter II.¹³

The particular aspects of elite recruitment dealt with in this paper are also individually relevant to aspects of political development. The representation of minority ethnic groups in the elite is one step in expanding the capacity of the system since it allows these groups' spokesmen, at least, in the circles of decision-making. Lacking this form of access, minority groups may have to communicate with the elite through such forms of "intrusive access" as Riggs describes,¹⁴ or through the medium of revolt. In addition, such representation may be a step in the evolution of representative institutions, since it allows minority group members some say in the future structuring of relationships between the majority and the minorities.¹⁵

The amount of attention given to educational, technical, or professional qualifications for office has an effect on the capacity of the elite to solve problems of economic development. In Riggs' prismatic model, for example, a concern for political ability outweighs considerations of professional competence and this is considered to have adverse effects on development.¹⁶

Almond and Powell likewise point to an increase in achievement orientation in recruitment as a mark of development.¹⁷ The discussion in this paper will concentrate on the skill areas of economic planning and administration.

The degree of attention paid to representation of ethnic minorities and the application of universalistic criteria respectively, constitutes a difficult problem in establishing the legitimacy of a regime, in terms of justice or equity. To the extent that grievances are felt by minority groups or skilled personnel as a result of recruitment procedures, they are likely to withdraw their support from the regime. This question will also receive attention throughout the paper.

The third aspect of elite recruitment has some of the characteristics of the other two. It is the nature and extent of prior relationships between elite members and the leaders of minority ethnic groups. This constitutes, for the elite, a kind of ethnic representation and also, in part, a kind of qualification for office. This variable is of special concern in cases such as Burma where there is a majority group predominance in the elite.¹⁸ Here, prior relationships between elite members and leaders of minority ethnic groups will significantly affect the evolution of institutions for structuring the relationships between them. Those who are used to getting along with minority group members as professional associates and equals will be better prepared to participate in the growth

of integrative institutions and further non-ascriptive recruitment. On the other hand, elite members whose experience has been in supervising or controlling minority groups will be inclined to perpetuate such a relationship.

Here again it becomes important to the development of the system whether or not elite experience will be conducive to the growth of effective communication between elite and client groups. Lacking such channels, minority group members will attempt to gain influence through bribery, corruption, or revolt, and so limit the capacity of the system.

It may be possible to postulate a sequence of priorities in the criteria of recruitment, according to hypotheses regarding stages of development. This is suggested, for example, by Bert F. Hoselitz, who puts forward a succession of stages which emphasizes, in turn, integration, goal-attainment, and adaptation.¹⁹ In each of these stages, recruitment should be directed to the accomplishment of a particular societal function. As an example, only when there are procedures for structuring the relationships among ethnic and other social groups, is it possible to direct attention away from ascriptive considerations, and focus on criteria of administrative efficiency.²⁰

This treatment bears some resemblance to Max Weber's characterization of the types of traditional authority, from which in fact it is derived. Weber's typology may be inter-

preted as hypothesizing conditions for the transition from one type of personalistic regime to another.²¹ Under patriarchy and patrimonialism, institutions are in a rudimentary stage of development; that is, they are little more than extensions of the ruler's personal household. As the kingdom expands to include peoples and groups formerly beyond its limits, problems of integration gain importance. The regime may become "feudalistic," in which case elites in outlying areas remain relatively autonomous, and connected to the centre only by a set of mutually advantageous contracts. Alternatively, there might be a military force directly loyal to the ruler and his followers which is strong enough to force compliance from the outlying kingdoms. This emphasis on territorial integration by force Weber called "sultanism." A third solution to the problem of integration is the "party of notables," a ruling elite composed of an alliance among representatives of territorially-based groups. Finally, in a collegium, a type of regime which is transitional from traditional to rational-legal authority, the problems of integration have been overcome, and the emphasis is on the accomplishment of other, more concrete goals. Here high standards of technical and professional competence are sought in the recruitment of the elite.

Such a succession of stages can be detected in the development of Japan. Here the feudal Shogunate was overthrown

by a form of sultanism which concentrated on the creation of a military power capable of putting down rebellions in the outer islands. When the regime was successful in this regard, it attempted to give representation to all the areas brought under its control. Integration being facilitated by cultural homogeneity, it was possible to move rapidly into an emphasis on professional qualifications.²²

Various other combinations of developmental priorities are suggested elsewhere in the literature, and these also have implications for elite recruitment. In his study of the bureaucracy of Thailand, Riggs points out that institutional complexity or differentiation is not always indicative of a high degree of performance or efficiency.²³ It would be necessary to ensure that institutions in a developing country expand and multiply only at a pace which is in keeping with the availability of talent. Otherwise, as has often been the case when complex institutions are introduced exogenously, they are either vitiated by formalism and corruption, or deliberately replaced.²⁴

It has, however, already been shown that one constraint on the availability of talent is the tendency to recruit ascriptively, which varies inversely with the degree of integration of the system. It may even be that although recruitment reflects a direct ratio of the population of each ethnic group, training and education are unevenly distributed among ethnic groups. In such a case representative recruitment for the sake

of integration occurs at the cost of a loss in efficiency.

Riggs also suggests that the level of integration itself depends on the adequacy of performance levels to maintain the system at the given level of institutional differentiation.²⁵ In the case of Burma again, malintegration was aggravated by attempts to maintain a degree of differentiation beyond the capacity of the elite.²⁶ This suggests the need for less complex institutions and an emphasis, in the recruitment of the elite, on representativeness and versatility.

This discussion should give some idea of the relevance which elite recruitment has for many issues in political development. This, in turn, should warrant a thorough examination of these three aspects of recruitment in Burma: ethnic representativeness, skills, and prior experience with ethnic minorities. It will then be possible to offer some judgment on the possible consequences of the Burmese pattern of elite recruitment for institutional development, and the handling of developmental problems.

In this paper, Chapter II will present the three main elite groups of Burma in historical context. Chapter III will consider the extent of ethnic group representation, especially as compared with previous regimes. Chapter IV will survey the educational and technical qualifications of the elite, and Chapter V the nature and the extent of their relationships with

the leadership of minority ethnic groups. Finally, Chapter VI will summarize this material, and offer some conclusions.

CHAPTER III

THE ELITE

A. Definitions

In Chapter I, the terms "elite" and "bureaucracy" were used almost interchangeably in reference to their recruitment. This is not quite accurate. Since 1947, the most significant foci of political power have been the political parties, the administration, and the army. Since 1962, the personnel of these institutions have rearranged themselves in such a way that the one legal political party consists of both military personnel and former politicians, while the civil administration is manned not only by the military and experienced civil servants, but also by former politicians. Thus, these institutions are a complex and constantly changing network of overlapping hierarchies.

The "elite" and the "bureaucracy" do, for the most part, comprise the same personnel, because the organs of administration are directed by military personnel, and these military administrators are usually also Party officials. The only exceptions occur in the case of a small number of Party officials who are not also administrators in non-Party functions. There is very little information available about this group, but it should and will be kept in mind.¹

For the purposes of this paper, political power will be taken to follow from a position in a high office in either the military, the civil administration, or the party. Although there may be problems of comparability here, the methodological problems involved in other techniques are even more formidable.² Furthermore, the overlap at the highest levels makes it relatively easy to tell who are the most influential.

The highest offices distinguishable are membership in the Council of Ministers, membership in Party committees, and senior military offices. As of September, 1967, there were twenty ministerial offices held by a total of twelve persons. The organization and activities of the single party, the B.S.P.P. or Lanzin Party, are directed by three committees: the Central Organizing Committee, the Discipline Committee, and the Socialist Economy Planning Committee. Of these, the first two have been operative since July of 1962 and the third since October, 1967. At this time there were, in all, twenty positions held by thirteen people, only one of whom (Brig. Tin Pe) was not also a member of the Council of Ministers. Moreover, of these thirteen, only U Thi Han was not also a senior military officer. The overlaps at the highest levels of these three hierarchies is illustrated in Table I.

Since the highest offices are held by those of the rank of Colonel or higher in the army, this may serve as a starting point for a definition of the elite, which will be taken to

TABLE I

OVERLAP OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN HIERARCHIES IN BURMA

Ministry	Name, Rank and Military Office	Party Offices
Defence	General Ne Win, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces	Chairman of Central Organizing Committee Discipline Committee Socialist Economy Planning Committee
Foreign Affairs National Planning	U Thi Han (civilian)	Vice-Chairman of Socialist Economy Planning Committee
Finance and Revenue	Brigadier San Yu, Vice Chief of Staff (Army)	General Secretary of Central Organizing Committee; member of Discipline Committee; member of Socialist Economy Planning Committee
Agriculture and Forests; Land Nationalization	Colonel Thaung Kyi	Secretary of Peasants' Affairs Division of Central Organizing Committee; member of Socialist Economy Planning Committee
Health and Education	Colonel Hla Han	Secretary of Mass Affairs Division of Central Organizing Committee; member of Discipline Committee

TABLE I. Continued

Ministry	Name, Rank, and Military Office	Party Offices
Industry and Labour	Colonel Maung Shwe	Secretary of Workers' Affairs Division of Central Organizing Committee; member of Socialist Economy Planning Committee
Transport and Communications	Colonel Than Sein	Joint General Secretary of Central Organizing Committee; member of Socialist Economy Planning Committee
Trade and Co-operatives; Social Welfare; Relief, Re-settlement and National Solidarity	Colonel Maung Lwin (Commander of South-east Command)	Member of Central Organizing Committee
Home Affairs; Judicial Affairs; Local Administration; Religious Affairs; immigration; National Registration and Census	Colonel Kyaw Soe	Member of Central Organizing Committee
Public Works and Housing	Colonel Sein Win	Member of Discipline and Socialist Economy Planning Committees

TABLE I Continued

Ministry	Name, Rank and Military Office	Party Offices
Information and Culture	Brigadier Thaung Dan (Vice Chief of Staff-Air)	
Mines	Commodore Thaung Tin (Vice Chief of Staff- Navy)	Member of Socialist Economy Planning Committee
	Brigadier Tin Pe	Vice Chairman of Socialist Economy Planning Committee

consist of the following:

- (1) All military officers of the rank of Colonel or higher in the Army, or of corresponding rank in one of the other forces.
- (2) Those who hold civilian offices similar to those held by the officers in (1); namely,
 - a) other members of the Council of Ministers;
 - b) civil servants of the rank of Secretary;
 - c) Other officials of the B.S.P.P. central hierarchy;
 - d) other prominent civil servants;
 - e) Ambassadors.

Groups (1) and (2)a are listed in Tables I and II. Groups (2)b, (2)c, (2)d, and (2)e are listed in Appendix A in Tables AII, AIII, and AIV. The lists of groups (1), (2)a, and (2)e are more comprehensive and up-to-date than any other of their kind available, but cannot, for several reasons, be guaranteed perfect. They are compiled from numerous sources, many of them fragmentary, and with few guides as to what would constitute complete listings. Furthermore, although an attempt has been made to standardize the date of tenure at September 1, 1967, some office-holders are reported on the basis of information culled from up to two years earlier, when there have been no subsequent reports of change.

The list of members of the Council of Ministers is complete and up-to-date as of September 1, 1967. The list in Table II includes all those who are mentioned in Forward or The Guardian, or other direct sources, after January 1, 1965, as holding these offices, and for whom there is no subsequent report of death or retirement.

The list of Ministerial Secretaries (Table AII) is complete and up-to-date within the same limits, except that there is no report available of who holds the office of Secretary in the Ministries of Immigration, National Registration and Census, Local Administration, and Relief and Resettlement. These, however, are the least active Ministries, and their functions have, for the most part, been taken over by the Security and Administrative Councils. Note (in Table XVII, Chapter V) that Col. Kyaw Soe, the Minister of Home Affairs, Immigration, National Registration, and Census, is also the Chairman of the Central Security and Administrative Council. Thus, one would expect that Col. Maung Kyaw, the Vice-Chairman of the Central S.A.C., performs many of the functions of the Secretary of these Ministries.

The list of Ambassadors (Table AIII) is almost complete and is up-to-date as of April 1, 1968. At this time, the name of the new Ambassador to the United Kingdom had not been announced (U Hla Maung having just been transferred from London to Washington).

TABLE II
OTHER HIGH-RANKING MILITARY OFFICIALS AND
THEIR OFFICES

Name	Offices
Col. Aung Pa	Commander, Eastern Command
Col. Aung Zin	Vice-Commander, Southeast Command
Col. Chit Ko Ko	Senior Navy Staff Officer
Col. Hkun Nawng	Principal of the Defence Services Academy
Col. Hla Aung	Director-General of the Petroleum and Mineral Development Corporation, and Director-General of Survey
Col. Hla Hpone	Commander, Rangoon Command, Mayor of Rangoon
Col. Khin Za Mong	Vice-Commander, Southeast Command
Col. Ko Ko	Secretary to the Revolutionary Council
Col. Kyaw Zaw	Secretary of the Ministry of Trade
Col. Kyi Han	Military Attache to the United States
Col. Kyi Maung	Defence Ministry Official
Col. Kyit Khin	Chief of Military Intelligence
Col. Lun Tin	Senior Army Staff Officer
Col. Lwin	Defence Ministry Official
Col. Maung Kyaw	Vice-Chairman of the Central Security and Administrative Council
Col. Maung Maung Kha	Secretary of the Ministry of Industry

TABLE II Continued

Name	Offices
Brig. Maung Maung Kyaw Win	Defence Ministry Official
Col. Maung Maung Soe	Counsellor to the Ambassador to the United States
Col. Min Sein	Member of the Burma Medical Association Central Council
Col. Min Thein	Director of Agriculture
Col. San Kyi	Commander, Southwest Command
Col. Sein Lin	Vice-Commander, Southeast Command
Col. Sein Mya	Commander, Northwest Command
Col. Vincent Solomon	Judge Advocate General of the Ministry of Defence
Col. Tan Yu Saing	Chairman of Trade Corporation(2)
Col. Thein Han	Trade Ministry Official
Col. Thein Maung	Commandant of Burma Army Staff College
Col. Tin Soe	Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests
Col. Tin U	Commander, Central Command
Col. Tint Swe	Commandant of Kalaw Staff College
Col. Tun Tha	Senior Air Force Staff Officer
Col. Van Kuhl	Vice-Commander, Northwest Command
Col. Win	Defence Ministry Official

With regard to groups (2)c and (2)d, listed in Table AIV as "Other Civilian Elite Members," a different procedure was followed. The point of these civilian categories is to show that the predominance of the military is by no means total. There is no complete list available of party offices (aside from the three committees considered above), or of Departmental Directorates, or Chairmen of Government Corporations, and the like. Thus, the group selected here consists of those for whom there is a report since January 1, 1965, of their holding some such senior offices, and for whom data regarding the independent variables (ethnicity and career experience) are available. Those in this group also all hold offices similar to those held by military officers of the rank of Colonel or higher.

It is possible to estimate the relative status of military and civilian titles by comparing military and civilian holders of the same post, in terms of the rank of the military incumbent. Thus, for example, the Secretary of a small Ministry has about the same status as a Major in the Army.⁵

From Table III it is possible to compare the weight of the military and civilian components of the groups which comprise the sample studied in this paper. These groups will be referred to collectively as "the national political elite," to distinguish them from minority ethnic group elites, which will be considered in Chapter V.

TABLE III

SUMMARY OF THE NATIONAL POLITICAL ELITE IN BURMA

Group	Military	Civilian	Total
The Highest Levels (Table I)	12	1	13
Other High-Ranking Military (Table II)	33	0	33
Secretaries (except Colonels) (from Table AII)	8	8	16
Other Senior Party Officials (from Table AIV)	0	3	3
Other High-Ranking Civilian Administrators (from Table AIV)	0	17	17
Ambassadors (Table AIII)	1	15	16
Totals	54	44	98

Note: Colonels are excluded from the third group because they are all included in the second.

B. Historical Background

1. Introduction

Table IV analyzes the civilian component of the sample to be examined in this paper, in terms of their former membership in the three historically prominent elite groups in Burma: the civil service, the politicians, and the military. Note that almost half of this group were formerly generalist administrators in the Burma Civil Service. Almost as many are veteran politicians, and almost a fifth are retired army officers. Thus it is appropriate to consider, in the way of background, the history of these three major groups.

TABLE IV

ORIGINS OF THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT OF THE BURMESE ELITE

Career Experience	Number	Percent
Civil Service (Generalist)	21	48
Politics (A.F.P.F.L.-Union)	15	34
Military	8	18
Politics (Opposition)	5	11
Civil Service (Specialist)	4	9
Academic	4	9
Law	3	7
Business	2	5
Total Numbers	44	*

* Since some members of the civilian elite have had considerable experience in more than one career field, the total percentage is more than 100, and the total numbers do not add up.

2. The Civil Service

The civil service in Burma is descended from a branch of the colonial Indian Civil Service (I.C.S.). By the time of the separation of Burma from India in 1937, Burmese held most of the junior, and about half of the senior offices. Recruitment was from the most Anglicized of the population, those who had studied sufficient English to pass the I.C.S. exams. In addition, candidates studied for a year at an English university. Ethnically, most of the generalist service was Burman, while the specialist services included large numbers of Indians and Indo-Burmans.⁶

After independence, relations between the civil servants and the politicians were difficult, because the anti-colonial politicians identified the administrators with the expelled masters. Most politicians felt entitled to exert any kind of pressure on the administrators to keep them "in their place." Such interference took place outside official channels sufficiently often to disrupt administrative procedures, and led to large-scale corruption, demoralization, and inefficiency. At the same time, the administrators scorned the politicians for their youth and inexperience.⁷ It was largely as a result of the inability of these two groups to work together that Burma was unable to overcome the unsettling effects of the struggle for independence and the ensuing civil war.

From 1958 to 1960, the civil service joined with the army under Ne Win to form a Caretaker Government. Since the

beginning of the second military regime in 1962, the Revolutionary Council has attempted to purge the C.S.B., and to control its activities. Nevertheless, it still relies on the administrators' experience and their knowledge of procedures to keep the system going.⁸

3. The Politicians

Both the army and the largest political parties in post-independence Burma originated in the anti-colonial student movement. The Dobama Asiaone (later known as the Thakins) developed from the Rangoon University strike of 1936 into an eclectic radical nationalist movement. Recruitment was primarily on the basis of demonstrated dedication to the cause of immediate independence from Britain. The students were all Burmans, and most chose to sacrifice their degrees for political life.⁹

In 1941, the core of this group, the "Thirty Comrades," left for Hainan Island to train for the liberation of Burma. On their return they formed the Burma Independence Army, recruiting anyone they could trust to carry their colours. These included peasants, lawyers, hoodlums, and clerks, although the officers were better educated and chosen personally by the Thirty Comrades.¹⁰ The history of the B.I.A. and the emergence from it of the military and political elites are shown in Table XIII in Chapter IV. Suffice it to say here that after independence members of the former B.I.A. joined politics or

the army at random, and up to that point were homogeneous in experience.¹¹

In 1947, all the B.I.A. veterans who entered politics united in the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (more commonly called the A.F.P.F.L.). In 1947, the Communists, under Than Tun, were expelled, and formed the Communist Party of Burma (C.P.B.). In 1951, another group (often called above-ground Communists) broke away over a dispute on labour policy to form the Burma Workers' and Peasants' Party.¹² The big split of 1958, into Nu's "Clean," and a rival "Stable" faction, gave the occasion for the Caretaker Government.

During this period, political parties reorganized. In 1960, the three major parties were the Union Party (formerly the "Clean" A.F.P.F.L.), the A.F.P.F.L. (formerly the "Stable" A.F.P.F.L.), and the United Workers' Party (formerly the B.W.P.P.).

Under the Revolutionary Council, the military government formed after the 1962 coup, all parties were dissolved to prepare for the formation of the Council-sponsored Burma Socialist Program Party (B.S.P.P.) or Lanzin Party. In recruiting former politicians to the party, the Council gained support from the U.W.P., the Union Party, and the A.F.P.F.L., in that order. Most of the U.W.P. joined the B.S.P.P., even before their own party was dissolved. On the other hand, the Union Party and the A.F.P.F.L. both suffered from political arrests, although

the latter has remained more intransigent in refusing to support the regime.¹³

4. The Army

Except for Ne Win's assumption of the Defence Ministry in 1950, the army remained aloof from politics until 1958. During this time their energies were directed towards counter-insurgency, and Ne Win accepted office in 1958 primarily because the A.F.P.F.L. split made it impossible to do this job properly.¹⁴ In the Caretaker Government, the emphasis was on careful administration and professional competence. Army ties were closer with the Stable A.F.P.F.L. than with any other party.¹⁵ By contrast, in the current regime former politicians have been recruited into the army-sponsored B.S.P.P., and the regime has taken on more of a "political" caste.¹⁶

The army has also had its share of splits. In 1949, after widespread mutinies, especially among the Karen battalions, all Karen officers were relieved of their posts, confined for several years, and eventually discharged.¹⁷ This crisis ended the synthesis of the colonial army (which had been predominantly Karen) with the veterans of the war-time anti-colonial movement, the B.I.A. The new character of the armed forces was symbolized by the replacement of General Smith-Dun, a Karen, as Commander-in-Chief, by Lt. Gen. Ne Win, former Deputy Commander of the B.I.A. Up to the present,

B.I.A. veterans have maintained continuous leadership of the armed forces.¹⁸

By 1960, most battallion commanders were Majors, between thirty and forty years of age, while brigade commanders were Colonels or Lieutenant Colonels in their forties. Thus the dividing line between B.I.A. veterans (recruited in 1942 in their early twenties) and more recent recruits, comes at the level of Major.¹⁹

Service in the B.I.A. is not in itself, however, a guarantee of tenure. In January of 1961, Ne Win forced two Brigadiers and ten Colonels into premature retirement when they opposed his "wait and see" policy towards the civilian government.²⁰ Within the Revolutionary Council, it appears that some free debate is allowed, but opposition to basic decisions, once made, constitutes mutiny. There has been a tendency since 1962 to prune the Council of those who still object when confronted with a majority. This applies to former Brigadier Aung Gyi, who left the Council in February of 1963, and former Colonel Chit Myaing, who was dismissed in March of 1964. Both of these splits appear to have been the result of differences over economic policy.²¹ In addition, in the summer of 1967, Brigadier Tin Pe lost his office as Minister of Trade and Co-operatives, just before the dismantling of his Peoples' Stores Corporations.²² In all of these cases, the expendable members have been those who wished to qualify their loyalty to Ne Win.

CHAPTER III

ETHNIC GROUP REPRESENTATION

A. The Context

Burma has been ruled by each of the military, politicians and administrators at different stages in its history. In the pre-colonial period, overlapping, contending kingdoms exemplified the traditional types of sultanistic or feudalistic regimes. Local authorities (the myosa) might change loyalties overnight, depending on the fortunes of nearby kings.¹

The classification of ethnic groups in Burma is still in dispute among anthropologists.² Perhaps the simplest classification is made by the government of Burma. This assumes, aside from the majority ethnic group, the Burmans, the existence of an ethnic group corresponding to each of the constituent states in the Union.

A number of qualifications to this should be mentioned, however. First of all, the Kayahs are often counted as Karens but there are significant cultural differences.³ Minority sub-groups not closely related to one of the main minorities are usually counted in with the Burmans, since they are usually culturally assimilated.⁴ This may be less tenable for the Arakanese than for the Mons,⁴ but it does make classification easier. Furthermore, the location of ethnic groups does not always correspond to the boundaries of the constituent states,

as Karens are to be found all over southern Burma, not just in Kawthoolei State.⁵

A brief summary of distinguishing characteristics might bring these groups more clearly into focus. The Shans and Kachins, who inhabit the northeastern area of the Union are similar in many respects, and are said to be related to the Thai people. According to Leach, the Shans are Kachins who have moved from the mountains into the plateaus, and have founded more hierarchical social systems. Shans are also geographically closer to the Burmans, and a greater proportion of them are Buddhist.⁶

The Chins are a hill people living on the eastern border of the Union. Although still mostly animists, many Chins were Christianized under the colonial regime. The Chins have a much less complex culture than the Burmans, and tend to look up to them as culturally superior.⁷

The Karens and the Kayahs together constitute the largest group in Burma which speaks a language outside of the Tibeto-Chinese family. Under British rule, they were keenest to adopt characteristics of Western culture, and formed the majority of the non-British component of the colonial army. The Kayahs differ from the Karens most notably in their organization into three hereditary princedoms.⁸

The populations of the major ethnic groups in Burma are given in Table V.⁹

TABLE V
THE MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS OF BURMA (1963)

Group	Population
Chins	344,000
Kachins	750,000
Karens	1,190,000
Kayahs	150,000
Shans	1,200,000
Total	3,634,000
Burma Total	23,664,000

Under British rule, traditional regimes in "Burma Proper" were extinguished by the overlay of colonial administration, while those of the Frontier Areas continued to exercise a local authority.¹⁰ The independence movement developed a solid basis of support in the areas populated by the Burman majority, but its support among minority groups remained dubious.¹¹ The net effect of the colonial period was to stabilize the identification of actors as representing either the majority ethnic group or one of the minority groups described above.

What still remained in doubt, however, because of the discontinuities of the war and the struggle for independence,

was the definition of the relationships among these groups. Some effort was made to allow for the representation of minority groups in the East Asia Youth League (later the All-Burma Youth League) and the Karens in particular were represented in the Karen Central Organization, but these were only two of the five constituent organizations of the A.F.P.F.L.¹²

By the time of the Panglong Conferences convened in 1947 to clarify ethnic group relationships, Aung San, the leader of the A.F.P.F.L., had brought about the adherence of prominent representatives of each minority group to the A.F.P.F.L. movement for Union.¹³ This is suggested by the composition of the 1947-48 Constituent Assembly, the division of seats in the two Houses of Parliament, and in the ethnic origins of the fifty-five Cabinet Ministers who served between 1948 and 1958. These figures are given in Table VI.

The Constituent Assembly elected in April of 1947 to frame the new Constitution and carry on the government over the period of the granting of independence, consisted almost exclusively of members of the A.F.P.F.L. By this time, representatives of minority ethnic groups in the legislature came up to 25% of the total seated.

The Constitution itself, however, formalized a relationship among the peoples of Burma which was more complex than this might indicate.¹⁴ In the first place, the degree of cooperation received from the representatives of minority

TABLE VI

REPRESENTATION OF CENTRAL BURMA AND MINORITY

GROUP AREAS FROM 1947 TO 1958¹⁵

Area of Origin	Constituent Assembly 1947-48		Chamber of Deputies 1948-58		Chamber of Nationali- ties 1948-58		Cabinet Ministers 1948-58	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Shan State	26	10	25	10	25	20	3	6
Kachin State	7	3	7	3	12	10	2	4
Chin Special Division	6	2	6	2	8	6	4	7
Kayah State			2	1	3	2		
	28	12*					6	11*
Karens			20	8	24	20		
Remaining	188	75	190	78	53	42	39	72
Total	255		250		125		54	

* Represents combined total of Karens and Kayahs.

ethnic groups was possible only by the formal grant of the right of secession after a period of ten years. Secondly, although representation in the Chamber of Nationalities favoured the minority groups, this House was overshadowed by the Chamber of Deputies, in which the Burman majority predominated.

In addition, the line between State and Union governments was blurred by the procedure for selecting the personnel of the State governments. The State Councils governing each State were formed from the members of each of the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Nationalities elected from that State. Aside from this degree of autonomy, however, the Head of each State Council was the Minister of the State, in the Union government, and as such, was chosen by the Prime Minister.

One complication here was that State governments were subject to the authority of the A.F.P.F.L. party leadership, and repercussions of Party splits might have adverse effects on minority group autonomy. For example, after the 1958 A.F.P.F.L. split the Prime Minister dismissed the Ministers (and, as such, Heads) of the Karen and Kachin States, even though these had majority support in their respective State assemblies. This move was upheld by the Supreme Court.

Such complexities in the recruitment of the elite explain the need to distinguish, as is done in this paper, between the national elite and the elites of the minority ethnic groups. Under the 1947 Constitution, these elites overlapped. Under

the current regime this is not the case. The nature of the relationships which have existed between members of the current elite and the leaders of the minority ethnic groups will be the subject of Chapter V.

B. Representativeness of the Army

Unfortunately, an insufficient amount of detailed information is available, regarding the military elite, to confirm the conclusion of existing studies, that is composed exclusively on members of the Burman ethnic group. This conclusion follows from data which indicate that the B.I.A., veterans of which comprise the current military elite, was recruited exclusively from the Burman majority. The figures for the military in Table VII are therefore based on the assumption that all the officers in question are Burman, unless their names indicate otherwise.¹⁶

TABLE VII

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE CURRENT BURMESE ELITE

Group	Burman	Karen	Kachin	Chin	Shan	OTH	Total
The Highest Levels	13	0	0	0	0	0	13
Other Military	31	0	1	0	0	1	33
Secretaries (excluding Colonels)	16	0	0	0	0	0	16
Other senior Party officials	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
Other Prominent Civilian Administrators	15	1	0	0	0	2	18
Ambassadors	10	0	1	2	1	2	16
Total	87	1	2	2	1	5	98

C. The Civilian Component

It will be recalled from Table IV in Chapter II, summarizing the origins of the civilian component of the current Burmese elite, that they have been recruited primarily from life-long civil servants, former members of the A.F.P.F.L. and Union parties, former members of left-wing opposition parties, and retired military officers. The administrators and party officials are recruited primarily from the pre-coup civil service and the political parties. Of these groups, the generalist administrators and the former opposition parties were recruited exclusively from the Burman population.¹⁷

The only exceptions which could be detected to this Burman predominance were among the ambassadors and some secondary administrative positions. The non-Burman ambassadors are U Ba Saw and U Nyo Tun, both Arakanese, U Vum Ko Hau and U Zahre Lian, both Chin, the Sama Duwa Sinwa Nawng, a Kachin, and U Pe Khin, a Shan. All of these are former members of the A.F.P.F.L. and Union Parties and served as Cabinet Ministers in the period 1947-1958 (see Tables AIII and AV). It seems that the Revolutionary Government has expanded on the practice of previous governments in recruiting as ambassadors representatives of minority ethnic groups, probably because of their experience as negotiators or representatives. In addition, U Khin Maung Latt, an Indo-Burman, is Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests, U Sein, a Karen is

Director of Labour, and U Thein Tin, an Arakanese, is Deputy Director of Labour (see also Table AIV).

Of the total sample of 44 in the civilian component of the Burmese political elite, then, only nine are non-Burman, and of these, six are posted abroad. Thus it is only to a very limited extent that the civilian component of the elite can be considered as representative of all ethnic groups.

CHAPTER IV

ACHIEVEMENT ORIENTATION IN RECRUITMENT

A. General

In Chapter I, an increase in achievement orientation in recruitment was considered as an aspect of political development.¹ Yet the change from ethnic group particularism to more secular standards may occur in two different ways, each of which has different implications for development. This change may occur through the attempt to make recruitment proportionally representative, for its own sake, or by emphasizing achievement criteria to the disregard of ascriptive considerations. The latter course may discriminate against ethnic groups which, for some reason, are not highly qualified.

This is particularly true in the case of Burma where economic and technological development requires a greater pool of specialized skills than could be had through a policy of representative recruitment. Although the Karens have benefitted to some extent from higher education and professional training, certainly the Shans, the Kachins, and the Chins are very far behind in this regard. Thus, if the Burmese elite is not representative, it may be because achievement criteria are favoured at the expense of representativeness.

This chapter will examine the technical and professional qualifications of the political elite in Burma, with formal education being considered separately from civilian experience.

B. Formal Education

The military core of the current Burmese elite has about the same proportion of university graduates as the group of former politicians. The post-war administrative class included a far greater proportion of graduates than either of the other two groups. At the highest levels, the military have only slightly more formal education than the former politicians.

TABLE VIII
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN THREE BURMESE ELITE GROUPS²

Group	Politicians	Civil Servants	Military
Graduates	30.5%	93.6%	"a few"
Non-graduates, but attended	28.0%	6.4%	"some"
No university	41.5%	0.0%	

A lack of information prevents a more precise breakdown in the analysis of the formal education of the military. It will be recalled from Chapter II, however, that up to 1947, the politicians and the military were one homogeneous group.³ Thus, it may be assumed that the educational achievement of the two groups would be similar.

Other sources of data allow a limited comparison of the group of civilian Cabinet Ministers from 1948-1958 (see Table

AV),⁴ with the current members of the Revolutionary Council, who comprise group (1) (Table I). This comparison is presented in Table IX.

TABLE IX

A COMPARISON OF THE UNIVERSITY EDUCATION OF CIVILIAN
CABINET MINISTERS WITH THAT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

Group	Civilian Ministers (1948-58)		Revolutionary Council (1967)	
	No.	%	No.	%
Graduates	21	39	2	15
Non-graduates, but attended	12	22	3	23
No University	21	39	8	62
Total	54		13	

Table X summarizes the information available regarding the formal education of each of the given groups in the current elite, and is presented on the following page.

Thus information on the university education of individual elite members is available in less than half the cases. Yet aggregate information is available which makes it possible to fill in the gaps. The results are summarized in Table XI.

TABLE X
AVAILABLE INDICATIONS OF FORMAL EDUCATION IN THE CURRENT
BURMESE ELITE

	University Graduates	Attended Only	No Univ.	No Data	Total
1) Highest Levels	2	3	8	0	13
2) Other High Military	2	0	0	31	33
3) Secretaries (except Colonels)	5	0	0	11	16
4) Other Senior Party Officials	1	0	1	1	3
5) Other Prominent Civilian Administrators	15	0	1	1	17
6) Ambassadors	3	5	2	6	16
Total	28	7	12	51	98

TABLE XI

EDUCATION OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ELITE MEMBERS

	University Graduates	Some Univ.	No Univ.	Total
1) Highest Levels	2	3	8	13
(Military)	(2)	(2)	(8)	(12)
(Civilian)	(0)	(1)	(0)	(1)
2) Other High Military	13	8	12	33
3) Secretaries	10	3	3	16
(except Colonels)				
(Civilian)	(8)	(0)	(0)	(8)
(Military)	(3)	(2)	(3)	(8)
4) Other Senior Party Officials	1	1	1	3
5) Other Prominent Civilian Administrators	15	1	1	17
6) Ambassadors	5	7	4	16
Totals	46	23	29	98

The estimates for Group 2 were derived by assuming a distribution midway between those given for politicians in Tables VIII and IX. The same applies for the military in Group 3, while for remaining civilian administrators, 100% graduation is assumed. In other cases, as in Groups 4 and 6, the discrepancies are removed by assuming an even three-way split of the difference.

Combining the data from Tables VIII (on Civil Servants), Table IX (on Civilian Cabinet Ministers) with those of Table XI gives the following comparison of the current elite with that of 1948 to 1958. (The figure of 43 for "Civil Servants (1948-58)" is only to allow numerical comparability; the essential datum is the percentage.)

TABLE XII
COMPARISON OF THE FORMAL EDUCATION OF THE CURRENT AND
PREVIOUS ELITES

Educational Level	Cabinet Ministers (1948-58)		Civil Servants (1948-58)		Total (48-58)		Military Elite (1967)		Civilian Elite (1967)		Total (1967)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
University Graduates	21	39	40	94	61	63	18	34	29	64	46	47
Some University	12	22	1	2	13	13	12	23	10	22	23	23
No Univ.	<u>21</u>	39	<u>2</u>	4	<u>23</u>	24	<u>23</u>	43	<u>6</u>	14	<u>29</u>	30
Totals	54		43		97		53		45		98	

Although the reliability of its details is admittedly imperfect, the table does illustrate and validate the conclusions of this and other research, that the formal educational level of the current elite is only slightly lower than that of the post-independence civilian regimes. If the mix of politicians, administrators, and military at any given time is considered, however, it would have to be admitted that the current regime, with fewer civilian administrators, is considerably less educated.

C. Professionalism

1. The Military

It has been suggested that the military in developing countries is qualified for a role as a modernizing force because exposure to modern weapons systems makes it necessary for them to develop technical and organizational skills. Supposedly, secular criteria are constantly reinforced in the processes of recruitment and promotion by the demands of the life and death struggle of the active military life.⁵

In Burma, however, the strictly professional role of the military has been so discontinuous that it has been possible for non-professional criteria to play an important part in recruitment. Table XIII attempts to show the extent to which professional and non-professional criteria of recruitment were applied at each stage of attrition or augmentation to the

TABLE XIII

STAGES IN THE CAREER OF THE MILITARY ELITE

Time Period	Institutional Form	Numbers	Criteria of Recruitment	Military Experience	Civilian Experience
Dec.26, 1941- July 24, 1942	Burma Independence Army	23,000	"marginal men" over 1/2 were peasants-- also students,lawyers hoodlums; officers better educated chosen by the 30 Comrades	one major battle (Shwedaung) and minor skirmishes	administration of 80% of rural municipalities in Burma Proper
Aug. 26, 1942- Sept.16, 1943	Burma Defence Army	2,700, then up to 7,000	From B.I.A., screened for loyalty by Japanese	negligible	served in tan- dem with Ba Maw supporters as "political commisars" locally
Sept.16, 1943- June 11, 1945	Burma National Army	up to 25,000 by 1945	loyalty to anti- Japanese resis- tance;willingness to fight British if necessary	air raid and garrison duty; engaged Japanese at Toungoo and Pyinmana	planning of resistance move- ment while holding adminis- trative offices; remaining sep- arate from Ba Maw group
June 30, 1945- Oct.1945	Patriotic Burmese Forces	as above	from B.N.A.excluding those arrested by the British	clearing up Jap- anese resistance in Shan mountains	politics of self-perpetu- ation

TABLE XIII Continued

Time Period	Institutional Form	Numbers	Criteria of Recruitment	Military Experience	Civilian Experience
Oct.1945 Feb.1947	part of the Burma army; i.e. 1st, 3rd,4th, 5th,and 6th Burma Rifles	4,700	selected by British from P.B.F. eliminating "more unruly" elements	negligible	3rd Battalion served as Aung San's bodyguard others involved in pre-independence agitation
Feb.1947 Feb.1949	4th Burma Rifles and most of 5th Burma Rifles	about 2,000	refusal to mutiny in 1948,along with other battalions	counter-insurgency	negligible
Feb.1949 Jan.4, 1954	most of Army officer corps	about 1,000	reorganization of Army in 1951 saw B.I.A. veterans get most commissions on basis of loyalty to Ne Win	successful prosecution of counter-insurgency: training by British military mission	Ne Win as Minister of Defence and Home Affairs, 1949-50.
Jan. 1954- Oct. 1958	"	"	"	some Counter-insurgency; training from Yugoslav and Israeli missions	negligible
Oct., 1958- Feb., 1960	Brigadiers, Colonels, Lt.Cols.,and some Majors	about 500 including 3 Brig.,23 Cols.,50 Lt.Cols, 400 Majors	trusted by Ne Win: some promise as economic managers	good record in cleaning up insurgent outbreaks	administration of economic agencies;rural government,in-cluding para-political structures;urban renewal;some internal dispute

TABLE XIII Continued

Time Period	Institutional Form	Numbers	Criteria of Recruitment	Military Experience	Civilian Experience
Feb., 1960- March 3, 1962	Brigadiers, Colonels, Lt.Cols., and some Majors	about 500 including 3 Brigs., 23 Cols., 50 Lt.Cols., and about 400 Majors	survivors of Jan. 1961 purge of 2 Brigadiers and 10 Colonels	some counter- insurgency	political activity pro- hibited during election; administration of States; retail trade

group which eventually became the current military elite. Thus, from the original 23,000 members of the B.I.A., only officers of the rank of Major or higher remain in the military elite. In addition, the table attempts to show the extent of civilism and military experience acquired at each stage.

This table illustrates the original tempering of the military elite in the fires of insurrection, its political decimations and only eight consecutive years in a purely professional role. The officers which comprise the current military elite have received training under British, Yugoslav, and Israeli missions, and most have spent some time, however short, in training overseas.⁶ Training of this nature is conducive to professional attitudes, and has, in fact, given many of the officers a thorough familiarity with modern technology.

Yet from their political experience, most of these officers tend to regard politics as a clandestine or subversive activity. It will be recalled from Chapter II that the B.I.A. originated as a revolutionary movement, and remained as such until 1947.⁷ Thus, while decision-making is carried on in the style of the staff meeting, the prevailing image of opposition is the underground cell.⁸

As a consequence, there has arisen a conflict within the present elite, as some of its members seem to favour one role at the expense of the other. This is the conflict which Pye refers to as "two approaches to finding a new identity" and it

resembles the "Red vs. expert" contradiction in Communist China.¹⁰ The roles in question may be characterized as "the professional" and "the politician." Their characteristics are summarized in Table XIV.¹¹

TABLE XIV
CONFLICTING ROLES IN THE MILITARY ELITE

	Professional	Politician
Skills	the management of violence; i.e. equipping, training, and planning	personal relations; i.e. mass organization, exhortation, political infighting
Loyalty	to the State as such justifies prompt, effective action without regard for political consequences	to a vaguely-defined "people" - opposes technicians and bureaucrats as impersonal and exploitative
Identification	discipline and chain of command sets group apart from society, with a separate identity	aspires to and demands from others a constant involvement with "the people"

When the Revolutionary Council came to power in 1962, it instituted large-scale arrests of politicians and, soon afterwards, purged the civil service. In attempts to fill these offices in the civil service, and to staff a new cadre party,

it called for the support of former politicians. It was predominantly members of the U.W.P. and the C.P.B. who accepted these positions. Presumably, most members of the other parties were not willing to support the regime under conditions which the Council found acceptable and they were kept in jail.¹² Some of the former politicians who were recruited into the regime were now in positions, in administrative and party offices, which allowed them to affect decisions regarding elite membership.¹³

This shift of personnel came about in three steps. The first was in February and March of 1963. On Feb. 9 a Col. Kyi Win was arrested by Military Intelligence. On Feb. 10, Brig. Aung Gyi announced his retirement because of his unwillingness to accept the economic techniques of the Revolutionary Council. It is reported that, at the same time, U Thi Han, a follower of Aung Gyi in the professionally-oriented "Paungde Group" was kept from retiring only at the latter's insistence. Within the next few days came the first spell of full-scale nationalization, and the elevation of U Ba Nyein to the office of Financial Advisor to the Minister of Finance and Revenue.¹⁴

On April 1, the Revolutionary Council announced an offer of amnesty to all rebels who would lay down their arms before the end of the year and come over to the government.¹⁵ Members of the A.F.P.F.L. who opposed this offer vehemently were arrested in one swoop in August, and in another in December.

The latter group was referred to by official releases as an "underground cell."¹⁶ By the end of the year, a number of former members of the C.P.B. joined the B.S.P.P. Also, in December there were a number of prominent changes in the Revolutionary Council, including promotions to Brigadier San Yu, Colonel Than Sein and Colonel Maung Lwin.¹⁷

The third series of changes began in February of 1964 with the promotion of Colonel Tan Yu Saing and Colonel Kyaw Soe. In a list of the Revolutionary Council members published on March 3,¹⁹ Colonel Kyi Maung was missing, and, on March 31, Colonel Chit Myaing was dismissed for "undesirable activities."²⁰ At this same time there were large-scale dismissals in the lower ranks of the Army. The second wave of nationalization and Burmanization began at this time, led by Brigadier Tin Pe, the newly appointed Minister of Trade Development.

This series of changes may be explained as the outcome of an imbalance in the military, between the professionals and the politicians. Beginning in early 1963 newly-recruited former politicians were able to lend their support to the more "political" of the military elite, who were led by Brigadier Tin Pe, Colonel Tan Yu Saing and Colonel Aung Thein.²¹ Following the formal banning of pre-existing political parties and the wave of arrests in late 1963, the ground was set for the final showdown within the Council. Somewhere in early 1964, Colonels Kyi Maung and Khin Nyo also disappear from sight. These two,

Colonel Chit Myaing, Brigadier Aung Gyi, and Colonel Saw Myint (dismissed in August of 1964 for a violation of the demonetization order) had all had commendable records in economic development posts under the Caretaker Government,²² and were probably the most experienced and competent in the Council, in economic affairs.

The volume of turnover in the military component of the elite since the Caretaker Government is shown in Table XV.

TABLE XV
TURNOVER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL PERFORMING CIVILIAN
FUNCTIONS (FROM 1958 TO 1967)²³

	Held Over	New Recruits	Total
Non-military Posts in Caretaker Government (1958-1960)			27
Original Revolutionary Council (1962)	10	7	17
Military Personnel Now in Civilian Posts (1967)	10	13	23

Of 27 high-ranking military officers known to have held non-military offices in the Caretaker Government, only 10 were members of the Revolutionary Council at its founding. (Of these

only six currently hold similar offices.) Of the seventeen original Revolutionary Council members, only ten still hold office. Of the twenty-three military officers currently holding other than purely military positions (or Security and Administrative Council offices in conjunction with regional commands) only ten have been in office since 1962. The rest have been transferred from field commands.

Particularly noticeable by their absence are four Colonels, Chit Myaing, Kyi Maung, Saw Myint, and Khin Nyo, and Brigadier Aung Gyi.

2. The Civilians

The composition of the civilian elite of former politicians and former administrators suggests a similar cleavage. Table VII in Chapter 3 summarized the experience of civilian elite members.

Most of the civilians who now hold high office in Burma are veterans of the generalist Civil Service. Although they are closely supervised by military counterparts, and exercise little autonomy in decision-making, their services are still essential to the execution of policy.²⁴ Many (although not most) of the Cabinet Ministers from the political period are now serving as senior administrators or diplomats, while former opposition politicians staff the B.S.P. Party. Although the latter seem to be few in number, this is because so little

information is available about the Party hierarchy.²⁵ By all accounts, the number of professionals in the civilian elite is small.

It is possible, to some extent, to locate a greater concentration of "professionals" or "politicians" in some government departments. It appears that relevant experience is more highly regarded in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Planning which maintain relations with the outside world. These include U Kyaw Nyunt, Secretary of National Planning, a capable economist trained in Australia, who was for many years with Finance and Revenue, and U Ohn Khin, Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, who was also Secretary of National Planning before U Kyaw Nyunt.²⁶ U Soe Tin, Executive Secretary of the Foreign Office, and U Tun Shein, the Secretary of the Ministry have had each over 20 years' experience, while U Thet Tun, an Honours B.Sc. from London, now Director of the Central Statistics and Economics Department of National Planning has had over 18 years continuous service.²⁷ Relevant experience is also taken seriously in the Diplomatic Service. Table XVI summarizes the distribution of experience among Ambassadors, counting service as a minority ethnic group representative as relevant experience.²⁸

The Ministry which seems most under the control of the "politicians" is Finance and Revenue. U Chit Maung, the Secretary, and U Ba Nyein, the Special Advisor, are both former

TABLE XVI

EXPERIENCE OF AMBASSADORS

Years of Experience	Number	Percent
0 - 5	4	25
6 -10	5	31
11 -15	0	0
16 -20	3	19
21 -25	4	25

members of the B.W.P. Politbureau.²⁹ This group was initially predominant in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests. When Tin Pe was Minister, a 27-man committee called the Agrarian Revolution and Co-operatives Systematization Planning Committee was formed under the leadership of Than Sein and Tan Yu Saing.³⁰ When this collapsed, Tin Pe was moved to the Ministry of Trade Development, which soon absorbed the Ministry of Co-operatives and Supply, to handle the nationalization of internal trade.³¹ Tan Yu Saing became Manager of the Myanma Import-Export Corporation and Than Sein Minister of Labour, Mines, and Industry.³² By 1967, only Tan Yu Saing had the same position while Tin Pe

was out of office, and Than Sein was demoted to Transport and Communications.³³

Former opposition politicians were particularly prominent in the formation of the B.S.P.P. When all other parties were broken up, their members were invited to join the B.S.P.P.,^b but only the members of the U.W.P. came over en masse. A number of leaders of the C.P.B. also joined the Party in 1963. In 1965, the Party's Central Organizing Committee consisted of Ne Win, Tin Pe, Aung Than, Than Sein, and Kyaw Soe,³⁴ all of whom but the first and last are extreme "leftists." The completion of the organization of the B.S.P.P. was probably the zenith of the power of the "politicians."

Thus the economic stagnation of Burma from 1963 to 1967 reflected the lack of trained professional people in positions of leadership. The influence of self-styled populist politicians was such as to prevent the development of a collegial regime. The predominance of the Burman majority in the national political elite, then, cannot be explained in terms of its superior skill qualifications. The strategy for political development was clearly not one of the secularization of recruitment to the elite in either of the two senses of proportional representation or selection by achievement. It remains, then, to decide whether the strategy is one of accommodation with minority groups in some form of confederal relationship, or integration entirely through military administration.

CHAPTER V

EXPERIENCE WITH THE ELITES OF MINORITY

ETHNIC GROUPS

In Chapter III, it was demonstrated to what extent the elites of the constituent States overlapped with the national political elite up to the 1962 coup.¹ This was a convenient device for facilitating communication between these groups, but its main effect was to obscure the de facto centralizing or assimilationist tendencies of the A.F.P.F.L. beneath a cloak of formal legal safeguards of minority group autonomy.²

It was also shown in Chapter III that insofar as incomplete information warrants any conclusion, this must be that the Burman majority currently maintains almost exclusive control of national elite membership.³ This is, of course, partly a consequence of the suspension of the 1947 Constitution which made the Heads of the State Assemblies Cabinet Ministers.

Under the current regime the supreme decision-making body is not a Cabinet but the Revolutionary Council. The State governments are called State Supreme Councils and are selected by the Revolutionary Council from outside its number. Each Supreme Council is chaired by a prominent member of the local community, and consists, except for a military delegate, of civilian members of the locally predominant ethnic group. The Councils exercise jurisdiction over a limited range of functions

in each of the four constituent States and the Chin Special Division.

Since the population of each State is in itself also extremely heterogeneous, the problem of representation re-occurs on the State level. Unless the State Supreme Council includes representatives of each sub-group, its constituency will be incomplete and its authority limited. The Revolutionary Council has sought to avoid this problem by disestablishing hereditary rulership in the States, and recruiting to the Supreme Councils only those who are willing to accept the eradication of traditional institutions.

The Shan State, for example, was traditionally ruled by five hereditary Sawbwas, whose disestablishment by the Caretaker Government was the causus belli of the Shan-Kayah anti-Union movement in the early 1960's.⁴ The Revolutionary Council, in fact, boasted of redrawing the units of local government in Shan State on the basis of revenue, population, and area, to reduce the number of Assistant Township Officers, many of whom had been patronage appointments of the Sawbwas. The extension of a uniform legal code and administrative regulations to Shan State was also intended, at least in part, to undermine the Sawbwas' influence.⁵ The authority of the State Supreme Council, however, appears to be least effective in Shan State, where the Shan National Army, led by royalists, commanded the loyalty of all the inhabitants of Kengtung, one of the three Divisions, for over a year.⁶

The Karens of Kayah State distinguish themselves from other Karens by their adherence to a Sawbwa system similar to that of the Shans, and have also resisted efforts by the central government to eradicate it. The Sawbwa of the largest Kayah kingdom, Kantarawadi, Sao Wunnah, who had headed the Kayah State since 1948, was implicated in the Shan-Kayah conspiracy and imprisoned.⁷ The subsequent (and present) head of the Kayah State government is a career civil servant, and not a member of any royal house.⁸

In the Kachin State, the "anti-monarchist" movement is stronger, partly because most Kachins have always opposed monarchy as such.⁹ Nevertheless, the K.I.A., which posed a major problem to the central government in 1964, was led by Zau Seng and his brother Zau Dan, one of the three Kachin Duwas.¹⁰

The pattern that emerges from the Shan, Kayah, and Kachin States is one of rivalry between the legal local government and the traditional rulers. The leaders and personnel of the Supreme Councils, installed by the Revolutionary Government in the first years of its rule,¹¹ owe their influence to the support of the central government, whereas the insurgent leaders base their authority on their inherited titles.

The situations in the Karen State and the Chin Special Division are quite different. The Chins have traditionally aspired to the emulation of the Burman culture, and are thus

content to go along with the Chin Affairs Council. In addition, they lack the pre-existing large-scale political structures which might serve as an alternative focus of loyalty.¹² The Karens, especially those in the Irawaddy Delta, have a history of hostile relations with the B.I.A. group.¹³ This hostility now takes the form of demands to include more Karen-populated areas within the State, rather than an attempt to preserve traditional institutions.¹⁴

Despite their function as an alternative focus of loyalty for the ethnic minority groups, the Revolutionary Council has taken steps to limit further the authority of the State governments. This was mainly a reaction to the threat of some States to exercise the formal right of secession which came into effect in 1958.¹⁵

In the first place, the military representative on each Council exercises more authority than he would as just another member. As regional military commander, he has at his disposal all the military resources of the central government in the area, and is also immediately subordinate to the Chief of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief. He is, similarly, a key link in the centralized chain of command of both the Administrative and Party structures, as both Chairman of a District S.A.C., and Secretary of a B.S.P.P. Supervisory Committee.

TABLE XVII

CENTRALIZATION OF REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION¹⁶

State Office	Officer	Military Command	Administrative Office	Party Office
Minister of Home Affairs, Judicial Affairs, Local Admin., Religious Affairs and Immigration	Col.Kyaw Soe		Chairman of the Central S.A.C.	Member of Discipline Committee and Central Organizing Committee
Member of Supreme Councils of Shan State and Kayah State	Col.Aung Pe	Eastern Command (Lashio)		Chairman of Lashio Dist. Supervisory Committee
Mayor of Rangoon	Col.Hla Hpone	Rangoon Command	Chairman of Rangoon Div., S.A.C.	Secretary of Rangoon Div.Super- visory Committee
Member of Chin Affairs Council	Col.Sein Mya	Northwest Command (Mandalay)	Chairman of Mandalay Div., S.A.C.	
Member of Kawthoolei State Supreme Council	Col.Maung Lwin	Southwest Command		Member of Central Organizing Committee
Member of Kachin State Affairs Council	Col. Van Kuhl	Vice-Com- mander of Northwest Command	Chairman of Kachine State S.A.C.	

The possibility of acquiring a local interest and loyalties apart from this chain of command is further hindered by a frequent rotation of officers from one state to another and then to the central government, as is demonstrated in Table XVIII on the following page.

When to these factors is added the dependence of the civilian members of the Supreme Councils on the Revolutionary Council, which appointed them, rather than on their status with the population of the respective States, it becomes clear that the Councils are more like field agencies of the central government than autonomous organs of local government. This and the preponderant power of the military chain of command make it possible to qualify the regime as sultanistic.

The State governments are also limited, however, in the range of functions allowed them. Under the political government, the State Councils had legislative authority over local matters in the fields of agriculture, fisheries, land, excise, public works, public health, and primary education.¹⁷ State control over these matters has been reduced since 1962 and the primary emphasis now is on the preservation of the language, literature, religion, and customs of the ethnic minorities.¹⁸ An indication of the limited scope of the activities of State governments is the size of the State budgets, compared to that of the Union as a whole.

TABLE XVIII

ROTATION OF COLONELS FROM DISTRICTS
TO THE CENTRE

Name	1963	1964	1965	1966
	Jan.Apr.Jul.Oct.	Jan.Apr.Jul.Oct.	Jan.Apr.Jul.Oct.	Jan.Apr.Jul.Oct.
Col. Aung Pe	Deputy Centr.Comm.	Deputy East Command	Commander Eastern Command	
Col. Aung Zin		Deputy, S.E.Command		
Col. Hla Hpone	Commander, Rangoon Command			
Col.Khin Za Mong		Second Deputy, S.E. Command		
Col.Kyi Maung	Command, S.E. Command			
Col.Lun Tin	Commander, N.W. Command			
Col.Maung Lwin	Deputy, Centr. Comm.	Commander, of S.E. Command, Several Ministries		
Col.Maung Shwe	Commander Eastern Command	Minister of Industry and Labour		

TABLE XVIII Continued

	1963	1964	1965	1966
Name	Jan.Apr.Jul.Oct.	Jan.Apr.Jul.Oct.	Jan.Apr.Jul.Oct.	Jan.Apr.Jul.Oct.
Col. San Kyi	Deputy, S.W.Command Commander, Southwest Command			
Brig. San Yu	Commander, N.W.Command	Army Vice Chief of Staff and Minister of Finance and Revenue		
Col. Sein Lin	Deputy, S.E. Command	Deputy S.W.Command	Deputy, S.E.Command	Deputy, S.W. Command
Col. Sein Mya	Commander East Command		Commander of N.W. Command	
Col. Sein Win	Commander, Central Command	Minister of Public Works and Housing		
Brig. Thaung Kyi	Commander, S.W. Command	Minister of Agriculture and Forests		
Col. Tin U	Depty.S.E. Command	Commander, S.W.Command	Commander, Central Command	
Col. Tint Swe	Deputy, S.W.Command			
Col.Van Kuhl	Deputy Commander, Northwest Command (to date)			

TABLE XIX

STATE BUDGETS IN BURMA (MILLIONS OF KYATS)¹⁹

State	1963-64 Rev. Estimates			1964-65 Estimates		
	Current Receipts	Current Expend.	Capital Expend.	Current Receipts	Current Expend.	Capital Expend.
Shan	7.9	17.5	6.9	7.3	19.5	6.0
Kachin	2.6	11.2	3.8	2.8	11.8	1.5
Kayah	0.2	2.1	0.9	0.1	2.4	2.1
Kawthoolei	1.7	6.5	2.6	1.8	7.5	2.2
Total States (Except Chin)	12.4	37.3	14.2	12.0	41.2	11.8
Union Total	1,378	1,164		1,995	1,317	

In each case, then, the total expenditures of all State governments is about 3% of the total expenditures of the Union government, and receipts are about 1%. This indicates a low level of fiscal responsibility, considering that the population of these four States comprises over 20% of the population of the Union as a whole.

In sum, then, military personnel recruited from central Burma control State governments whose personnel are chosen by the central government, and which have a limited range of independent authority.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

A. Summary

The foregoing material has been presented as an analysis of the recruitment of the Burmese political elite under three headings: its representativeness; its skill qualifications; and its prior experience with minority ethnic groups. It has been shown that, to a remarkable extent, neither ethnic group representation nor skill qualifications may be considered as criteria in the recruitment of the elite from 1962 to 1967. In addition, personnel recruited into the elite tend to be those whose experience in dealing with the leadership of minority ethnic groups has been confined to either a superior-subordinates relationship, or the position of combatants.

It must be concluded that during this period the emphasis in recruitment to the elite was predominantly defensive since it was directed to the removal of opposition from the political arena, and to the administration of counter-insurgency activity. As a result, the prevailing criterion of recruitment was unquestioning loyalty to the leadership and program of General Ne Win.

Because of the recruitment of former opposition politicians to positions in administrative and party offices, a

conflict of roles among the military has been resolved in favour of the more "political" officers. This has followed very closely the pattern which Riggs describes.¹ Political aptitude and potential for mobility have, at least in the short run, replaced professional competence as criteria of recruitment.

Aside from this, the army's professional resources were from the beginning only adequate for its military duties. This and its lack of experience in commerce and industry help explain the short duration of the Caretaker Government.² Now, however, the Army has committed itself to holding office indefinitely. The current regime has had to deal with more far-reaching problems, especially regarding the systems maintenance function.³ Here, however, a lack of experience has led to a tendency to accept oversimplified solutions and a failure to respect the claims of professionalism. Also, the extinction of competing groups and institutions has given the political syndrome the potential for self-reinforcement, because it allows the elite to insulate itself from external checks.

B. Implications

Chapter I reviewed a number of hypotheses concerning the place of elite recruitment in political development. It was pointed out here how elite recruitment related to each of

of three aspects of development--equality, capacity and structural differentiation--and how criteria applied in recruitment might vary according to various stages of development. It might be of interest now to see how each of the aspects of elite recruitment dealt with in this paper could affect prospects for development.

The lack of representation for minority ethnic groups in the recruitment of the political elite is probably detrimental to the prospects of political development on all three counts. Minority group leaders will continue to be able to incite resistance to the regime on the grounds that they have no other form of access but revolt. Although the possibility of "intrusive access" is not precluded by the results of this paper, certainly the lack of both formal access and elite representation is itself conducive to unrest.

Lack of elite representation also limits the capacity of the system if minority group demands are not articulated before the outbreak of violence. Insufficient time is available then for responding to demands, and if a rapid satisfaction is possible, it appears as a concession to violence. The only alternative, a continued reliance on military administration, imposes costs on the regime and diverts resources away from economic development.

A more indirect result is the maintenance of structural diffuseness. The creation of the Security and Administrative

Councils and the whole network of overlapping party-administrative and military offices is a result of the need for long-term military administration.

A similar set of implications follow from the sacrifice of an achievement orientation in recruitment. Departures from universalistic criteria weaken the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the professionally qualified, most of whom have withdrawn their support from the regime. The rejection of expertise has not only obvious results for economic development, but also inhibits structural differentiation through the lack of qualified personnel. Thus elite members are required to double up (or treble up) in their role performance. Examples of this are in the incidence of multiple ministries, the overlap of Home and Justice with the Security and Administrative Councils and also the frequency of overlapping political, administrative and military roles.

The nature and scope of elite members' previous experience with the leadership of minority ethnic groups is also dysfunctional. Experience as military administrators in the State Councils is unlikely to predispose elite members to treat minority group members as equals. The limitation in the jurisdiction of the State Councils further predisposes elite members to consider minority group rights only in terms of the forms of cultural expression.

It was also suggested in Chapter I that the criteria of elite recruitment might have some effect on the possibilities of the resumption of civilian rule because of the precedents which they establish for institutional development. In the first place, the administrative organs are the core of the new "steel frame"⁴ although their authority rests on the military offices of their Chairmen. State Councils and Security and Administrative Councils are hierarchically directed from the Revolutionary Council and are thus subject to the repercussions of political manouverings at the top, the incidence of which inhibits administrative efficiency.

The Party has an indefinite role in controlling bureaucracy since it is interwoven with the civil administration through joint membership. There may be some control by the Officers on Special Duty, experienced politicians who act for the B.S.P.P. to supervise the administrators, but little information is available on this count. It should be recalled here that the Party is controlled by former politicians and the most "political" (in Riggs' case) of the military. Thus the Party may act, to some extent, as a controlling device, yet it is in itself subject to the drives for bureaucratic power.

It would probably be more useful at this stage to apply any checks and balances analysis to the cliques and power groups

described in terms of their experience and dispositions, as has been done in this paper, than to try to sort out institutions or structures. The complex overlapping of offices in all three of the Army, party, and civil administration, does suit the need for economy in the distribution of personnel, as was mentioned above. It may be, however, that effective communication is hindered by the need to register interactions between institutions, or to conduct business without keeping records. Thus one could never be sure, unless the distinction was constantly made whether an official was serving in his Army, party, or administrative capacity. This, if done regularly, would be a time-consuming process.

Finally, with reference to stages of development, the results of this examination of elite recruitment suggest that by any classification, Burma must be considered as in an elementary stage. It is not yet in a sufficient state of order and stability for the elite to be able to recruit for either representation or achievement.

The problems which the Revolutionary Council inherited left it little alternative to this emphasis on military control. In post-independence Burma, the problem of heterogeneity extended beyond the ethnic division into a central region and the five constituent States. Within each of these States, there were also different patterns of competition between more

and less traditional forms of rule. In addition, the Constitutional provision for secession made it impossible for the central government to maintain a coherent national policy, which would require some predictability in the relationship between State and Union governments. The threat of secession, in turn, depended on the ever-changing political constellations within the States.

The foremost task of the current regime in Burma, as is the case in many other developing countries, is to establish the minimum conditions of political order over an extremely heterogeneous population.⁵ Unfortunately, however, the current regime bears a strong resemblance to the historical patterns of sultanism in Burma, which were very unstable. The sultanistic ruler was regularly overthrown by an alliance of subject minority ethnic groups, which, in turn, divided into a feudal system. This was eventually reunited by the strongest patrimony, which maintained its position until it too was overthrown.⁶

C. The Future

The foregoing is intended to describe the state of affairs which existed up to mid-1967. There are indications since then of a few changes from these trends.

For example, the announcement in May of 1967 that Burma would host the Colombo Plan Consultative Conference was the first indication in years of an attempt to come to terms with "the professionals." Since then, Brigadier Tin Pe has lost his position as Minister of Trade and Co-operatives, and has been absent from top-level policy committees. In addition, the fall budget report was exposed to detailed public criticism by two of the country's foremost economists.⁷

There are also indications of a recent trend toward a greater separation of offices. As more personnel come up through the ranks, it becomes less necessary for officials to hold all three of military, party, and administrative offices. For example, Tin Pe now only holds a party office. In the Council of Ministers, there are more Ministers and fewer multiple offices than there were in 1962. There are also signs of a greater degree of differentiation at regional and local levels.⁸

The first five years of the Revolutionary Council were important years in the political development of Burma. Practices of elite recruitment seemed likely to lead to continued reliance on military administration and control, at the cost of ethnic group representation and administrative efficiency. Hopefully the Ne Win regime will be able to emerge from this defensive posture and attempt to meet numerous other demands of development as well.

NOTES

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1. Dankwart Rustow, "The Study of Elites: Who's Who When, and How," World Politics, XVIII:4 (July, 1966), 701-5.
2. T.B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (London: Watts, 1964), 1-4.
3. Harold D. Lasswell, "Introduction: The Study of Political Elites," in H.D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T., 1965).
4. Bottomore, op. cit., 4-5.
5. Ibid., 42-5.
6. H.D. Lasswell, "The World Revolution of Our Time: A Framework for Basic Policy Research" in Lasswell and Lerner, op. cit., 80-94. Compare Bottomore, op. cit., 86-104.
7. This discussion is taken from Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), 31-48, and Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of Political Development" in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary Political Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 327-331.
8. Pye, op. cit., 38. 9. Ibid., 45-8; Riggs, op.cit., 329.
10. Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of the New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 27-9.
11. Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism and Empire-Building in the New States," World Politics, XX:2 (Jan.1968), 194-206; Henry Bienen, "What Does Political Development Mean in Africa?" World Politics, XX:1 (Oct.1967), Some Lessons from Ghana and Nigeria," World Politics, XX:2 (Jan.1968), 179-193.
12. Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1964), 12-19; 226-8, 237.
13. Infra, 24-9.
14. Riggs, Administration. . ., 142-9; 274.

15. Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 80-6. Almond distinguishes our kinds of access: physical demonstrations and violence, personal connection, elite representation and formal and institutional channels.
16. Riggs, op. cit., 273.
17. Almond and Powell, op. cit., 47-8.
18. Infra, 36-8.
19. Bert F. Hoselitz, "Levels of Economic Performance and Bureaucratic Structures" in Joseph La Palombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1963), 188.
20. Ibid., 191.
21. The following discussion is derived from Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford U. Press, 1946), 100-106, 235-9, 244-5, 296-301; and Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Patriot (New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1962), 329-381. See also Roth's article referred to in Note 11 above.
22. Frank Langdon, Politics in Japan (Boston: Little, Brown 1967), 18-53.
23. Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East-West Centre Press, 1966), 374-5.
24. Paul E. Sigmund (ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Praeger, 1967), revised edition, 22-5; S.P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay" World Politics, XVII:3 (April, 1965) and S.N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization" in Jason Finkle and Richard Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change (New York: Wiley, 1966), 573-6.
25. Riggs, Thailand. . . , 386.
26. See Chapter II, infra, 25-7; and 35.61.

CHAPTER II: THE ELITE

1. For a political system in which the personnel of the civil administration, the party and the military overlap to the extent that they do in Burma and where they all perform many functions commonly performed separately by these structures in other systems one may even be able to consider the three as one indimentary bureaucracy. In such a system, there is a fairly clear differentiation between political and non-political structures, but political structures are not clearly differentiated from one another. At each hierarchical level, there is an institution which controls and, to some extent, performs the functions of all three. At the highest level, there is the Revolutionary Council whose membership is presented in Table I.

This is the supreme authority for all civil and military institutions. At the state level, the highest authority is the State Supreme Council, which is discussed in Chapter V. Here the key member is a Colonel who is also a B.S.P.P. official. Finally, at each of the other local levels, the district division and subdivisions, the unit of "government" in some vague sense is the Security and Administrative Committee, a committee consisting of representatives of the civil service, the military and the police. Although its members have different titles, they all receive very similar training in courses for administration, political leadership, and counter-insurgency, and the military member, who is the Chairman, is usually also a Party official. Role differentiation is at a level where there is a "specialized officialdom" but the roles of the officials are not clearly distinguished.

See Riggs, Administration. . . , 173-9, where he discusses the formation of a party by the bureaucracy; also Almond and Powell, op. cit., 45-7, 232-51, 304-6; and my own paper "Debureaucratization in Local Administration in Burma," submitted for Political Science 502 at the University of B.C.

2. Rustow, op. cit., 701-5; Lasswell, "Introduction," 8-9.

3. See also Frank N. Trager, Burma: From Kingdom to Republic (New York: Praeger, 1966), 401; and Forward, vi:5. (Oct. 15, 1967). U Thi Han was for a long time Director of Procurement in the Defense Ministry.

James F. Guyot, "Bureaucratic Change in Burma," in Ralph Brailanti (ed.), Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent From the British Imperial Tradition (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966), 428.

4. Tables II, III and IV were compiled from a survey of The Guardian and Forward as indicated in the bibliography. Table IV also drew upon articles on postings as published in The New York Times.
5. Compare Moshe Lissak, "Social Change, Mobilization and the Exchange of Services Between the Military Establishment and the Civil Society: The Burmese Case," Economic Development and Cultural Change, XIII:1(Part 1) (Oct.1967), 8,9; P.K. McCabe, "When China Spits, We Swim," New York Times Magazine (Feb.27, 1966), 51.; Guyot, op. cit., 426, n.135 and 432 n.143.
6. Guyot, op. cit., 354-384. Note that in this paper "Burman" is used as an ethnic category and "Burmese" as a national category.
7. Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale, 1966), 164-5.
8. See Tables AII and AIV.
9. John Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), 373-82, 428-32.
10. Dorothy Guyot, "The Burma Independence Army: A Political Movement in Military Garb" in Joseph Silverstein (ed.), Southeast Asia in World War II (Southeast Asia Monograph Series No. 7; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 51-65. See especially page 55.
11. Lucian W. Pye, "The Army in Burmese Politics," in John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in the Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), 231-2.
12. Tunker, op. cit., 64-5, 70-1.
13. Trager, op. cit., 173, 179, 188, 201.
14. Ibid., 178-9. See also Burma, Government in the Union of Burma: 1958 Nov.1959 (Rangoon: Directorate of Information 1959).
15. The best analysis of the Caretaker Government is the article by Lissak cited in not 5 above. See also Trevor N. Dupuy, "Burma and Its Army: A Contrast in Motivations and Characteristics" Antioch Review, XX:4 (Winter, 1960-1), 428-440.
16. Infra, 38-40.

17. Tinker, op. cit., 39-41, 324.

18. Dorothy Guyot, op. cit., 61.

19. Tinker, op. cit., 328; James Guyot, op. cit., 439; John H. Badgley, "Burma's Military Government: A Political Analysis" Asian Survey, II:6 (August 1962), 31.

20. Richard Butwell, "Four Failures of Nu's Second Premiership" Asian Survey, II:1 (March 1962), 4-5. These officers including Brigadiers Aung Shwe and Maung Maung had been "openly discussing the possibility of restoring military rule." Brigadier Maung Maung had helped arrange the transfer of power in 1958. Pye analyzes in general terms, the division along the lines of enthusiasm for the restoration of military rule in "The Army in Burmese Politics" 250.

21. James Guyot, op. cit., 433-4; John Ashdown, "Burma's Political Puzzle" Far Eastern Economic Review, XLV:12 (Sept. 17, 1964), 516. Aung Gyi was associated with Ne Win from the beginning of the B.I.A., as were Maung Maung and Tin Pe, his closest rivals. He is described as a politically-minded intellectual, a socialist, who it has been said, "knows more about socialism than most politicians." He led the execution of economic policy under the Caretaker Government as Chairman of the Budget Allocation Supervisory Committee and is described as "an outstanding economic modernizer" who favours limited state intervention in the economy. The policy of radical nationalization was publicly announced two months after Aung Gyi retired because of disagreement regarding the techniques of implementing socialism." For references, see Tinker, op. cit., 328, 395; James Guyot, op. cit., 429; Trager, op. cit., 396; Willard Hannah, Eight Nation Makers (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 254; Butwell "Four Failures. . .", 3. The Guardian, Feb. 10, 1963 gives the story of Aung Gyi's retirement.

Chit Myaing was dismissed from the Revolutionary Council for practices "incompatible with the Burmese Way to Socialism." He was Director-General of the National Registration and Census Department under the Caretaker Government and also considered by Guyot as "an outstanding economic modernizer." The announcement of his dismissal is in the March 31, 1964 edition of The Guardian. The second wave of extreme nationalization under the Revolutionary Council followed in April and May. See also John Badgley, "Burma's Zealot Wungyis: Maoists or St. Simonists" Asian Survey, V:1 (Jan. 1965), 56.

22. Tin Pe replaced Chit Myaing as Minister of Trade Development, and was defended by Ne Win in spite of disastrous failures in commodity distribution until his phasing out in 1967. His

semi-retirement is probably due partly to his age and ill-health, and partly to his objections to a tougher stand towards China. See P.K. McCabe, op. cit., 51; John H. Badgley, "Burma's China Crisis: The Choices Ahead" Asian Survey, VII;11 (November 1967), 753-8; Ashdown, op. cit., 516; Trager, op. cit., 206-7.

CHAPTER III: ETHNIC GROUP REPRESENTATION

1. D.G.E. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia (London: MacMillan, 1964), Chapters 6, 13, 19, 20-22, 31; Hall, Burma (London: Hutchinson, 1958), Chapters 2-12; Cady, op. cit., Chapters 1 and 2.
2. On this complex subject see F.K. Lehman, "Ethnic Categories in Burma and the Theory of Social Systems" in Peter Kunstadter (ed.), Southeast Asian Tribes Minorities and Nations (2 vols.; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton, 1967), I, 93-124 and The Structure of Chin Society (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1963); Peter Kunstadter, "Introduction" and "Burma: Introduction" in Kunstadter, op.cit. I, 3-91; and E.R. Leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954).
3. Lehman, "Ethnic Categories. . .," 99-101.
4. Trager, op. cit., 191, 194; Tinker, op. cit., 68.
5. Trager, op. cit., 80.
6. Leach, op. cit., 29-61.
7. Lehman, The Structure of Chin Society, ix-xii, 1-3, 29-30.
8. Lehman, "Ethnic Categories. . .," 99.
9. This is from Kunstadter, "Burma: Introduction" in Kunstadter (ed.), op. cit., I, 87-8.
10. Hall, History of Southeast Asia, Chapters 32,40; Burma Chapters 13-17; Cady, op.cit., Chapter 4; James Guyot, op.cit., 354-84.
11. Cady, op. cit., Chapters 13 and 14; Dorothy Guyot, op.cit., 53-4; Hugh Tinker, op.cit., 9-11.

12. Cady, op. cit., 451, 465, 472, 474, 484.
13. Trager, op. cit., 81-83; Tinker, op. cit., 24.
14. The following discussion is derived from two articles; Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution" in Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States (London: Free Press, 1963), 136-8; and Josef Silverstein, "The Federal Dilemma in Burma," Far Eastern Survey, XXVIII:7 (July 1959), 100-103. See also J.S. Furnivall, The Governance of Modern Burma (New York: The Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958), 100; Tinker, op. cit., 24; Trager, op. cit., 78-88.
15. Column 1 is derived from Trager, op. cit., 81-3; columns 2 and 3 from J.S. Furnivall, op. cit., 37-8; and column 4 from Tinker, op. cit., 389-400; The Asia Who's Who, 1957 (Hong Kong: Pan-Asia Newspaper Alliance, 1957), Who's Who in Burma: 1961 (Rangoon: People's Literature Committee and House, 1961) and Trager, op. cit., 90.
16. Dorothy Guyot, op. cit., 53-4, 61; James Guyot, op. cit., 420; Tinker, op. cit., 40. Col. Van Kuhl is taken to be Kachin and Col. Vincent Solomon, Anglo-Burman.
17. On the former opposition parties, see Tinker, op. cit., 64-65, 70-71, 89; Cady, op. cit., 609, 614, 622, 640; Furnivall, op. cit., 61. On the administrators, see Tinker, op. cit., 151-2, and notes 1 and 2 to page 151.

CHAPTER IV: SECULAR RECRUITMENT AND PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION

1. Supra, 6.
2. From James Guyot, op. cit., 430.
3. Supra, 26-7.
4. The three for whom no information is available, namely U Ba Tin, U Ohn Khin and U Sein, are assigned one to each category.
5. Dupuy, op. cit., 436; Edward Shils, "The Military in the political Development of the New States" in Johnson, op. cit., 40; Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in Ibid., 68-89; Pye, "The Army in Burmese Politics," in Ibid., 239; Jarowitz, op. cit., 40-67.

6. Tinker, op.cit., 327; Lissak, op.cit., 5.
7. Supra, 26-7.
8. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building, 19-20.
9. Ibid., 287-291.
10. Franz Schumann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California, 1966), 163-7, 170-2. Note that in China as in Burma the opposition has changed from one between the "cadre" or political style of leadership and the traditional bureaucrat to one between the cadre and the technologically-oriented manager.
11. See also Pye's "Old Guard Politician" in Politics, Personality and Nation-Building, 267-71 and compare this with Shils, op.cit., 33-5, and Badgley, "Burma's Zealot...", 57; and for the "professional" see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Vintage, 1964), 11-18, and Jarowitz, op.cit., 63-7.
12. Trager, op.cit., 201 and 401-2.
13. See the references to note 25 below.
14. "All Change Soon" (Unsigned Article), Far Eastern Economic Review, LVII:5 (August 3, 1967), 227.
15. Trager, op.cit., 202-3.
16. The Guardian, December 12, 1963.
17. Ibid., December 4, 1963.
18. Ibid., Feb. 8, 1964; Feb. 16, 1964.
19. Ibid., March 3.
20. Ibid., March 31.
21. Badgley, "Burma's Zealot. . .," 56-7; Ashdown, op.cit., 516-20; "Trials on the Way," 195; P.H.M. Jones, "Burmese Deadlock," Far Eastern Economic Review, XLVII:12 (March 25, 1965), 561. Jones also adds the information that Col. Tan Yu Saing is Brig. Tin Pe's brother-in-law. Tin Pe is married to Tan Yu Saing's sister Daw Thein Saing.

22. James Guyot, op. cit., 434.
23. Information on the Caretaker Government and the original composition of the Revolutionary Council comes from Trager, Burma From Kingdom to Republic, 397, 401 and Government in the Union of Burma, while "Present Officers in Civilian Posts" refers to the group listed in Chapter 2 of this paper as Tables II and III as compiled from Forward and The Guardian.
24. Badgley, "Burma's Zealot. . ." 55-6; James Guyot, op.cit., 437.
25. By all accounts the civilian composition of the B.S.P.P. is predominantly veterans of the C.P.B. or the former Burma Workers and Peasants Party, subsequently known as the National Unity Front and the United Workers Party. See The Guardian Oct. 4 and 19, 1963, and March 29, 30, and 31, 1964; Jones, op. cit., 561; Badgley, "Burma: The Nexus...", 93; Trager, Burma From Kingdom to Republic, 201, 402. Some of the more notable leftists not included in the main listing of this paper are U Saw Oo, an Additional Secretary to the Ministry of Information and publisher of Forward; Bo Htein Lin, former insurgent leader, now in the B.S.P.P. hierarchy; Bo Sein Tin, Bo Ye Maung, Bo Tha Doe, and Bo Aung Din, formerly prominent Communist rebels, who accepted the amnesty offer in April of 1963, and who have since been given important government posts or membership in the B.S.P.P., or both; the Central Committee and Politbureau of the United Workers' Party, namely Thakins Chit Maung, Lwin, and Ba Han, and Bo Nyunt Maung, U Ba Hla Aung, and Yebaw Aung Ban, most of whom had been arrested at the same time of the coup, and were among the first to be released; and U Tun Aung Gyaw of the N.U.F., one of the first B.S.P.P. Candidate Members.
 Many members of the U.W.P. joined the B.S.P.P. even before their own party was made illegal. The subsequent influx of "leftists," coming as it did on March 31, 1964, the same day as the expulsion of Col. Chit Myaing, was probably closely related to the following program of radical nationalization and economic extremism. Most of these people have been left out of the "elite," as constituted in this paper, however, since the exact nature of their Party offices is not known.
26. Butwell, op.cit.
27. From Who's Who in Burma: 1961, pages 152, 184 and 194-5.
28. Compiled from Who's Who in Burma: 1961, Who's Who in Asia: 1958, and Tinker, op.cit., 389-400.

29. Tinker, op.cit., 71 n.2.
30. S.C. Banery, "Innovations in Agriculture," Far Eastern Economic Review, XXXIX:5 (Jan.31, 1963), 190-2.
31. The Guardian, April 30, 1964, and June 18, 1965.
32. The Guardian, Dec. 2, 1965, and Dec. 4, 1963.
33. Ibid., Oct. 20, 1965, and Forward, Jan. 1, 1967.
34. The Guardian, July 26, 1964.

CHAPTER V: PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH THE ELITES OF MINORITY ETHNIC GROUPS

1. Supra.,33-6.
2. Geertz, op. cit., 137-8.
3. Supra.,36-7.
4. F.K. Lehman, "Ethnic Categories in Burma...", I, 101.
5. Burma: Administrative and Social Affairs, 1962-63 (Rangoon: Directorate of Information, 1963), 12.
6. George Patterson, "The Shans in Arms," Far Eastern Economic Review, XLIX:4 (july 22, 1965), 177-183.
7. Lehman, op. cit., 93-4.
8. Burma: Administrative and Social Affairs, 1962-63, 12; Who's Who in Burma, 9.
9. E.R. Leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma, 8-9; Tinker, op. cit., 73-4.
10. The Guardian, Sept. 4, 1963, and Nov., 1963. Another K.I.A. leader at this time was Duwa La Yein.
11. See, for example, The Guardian, Jan. 17, 1964, which reports the dismissal of U A Soe Myint and U Saw Chit Than of the Karen State Affairs Council, U Tin Ko Ko and U Ohn Pe of the Shan State Affairs Council, and U Saw Thein of the Kayah State Affairs Council, all of whom had been members of the A.F.P.F.L.; of the Chairmen, only Dr. Saw Hla Tun, of Kawthoolei State continued on from the civilian government.

12. F.K. Lehman, The Structure of Chin Society, 1-6.
13. Cady, op. cit., 433-4, 512, 549-54, 589-93; Tinker, op. cit., 9-11.
14. Trager, Burma From Kingdom to Republic, 105-6.
15. The Guardian, Sept. 2, 1963; Lehman, "Ethnic Categories . . .," 101; Trager, Burma From Kingdom to Republic, 198-9.
16. Tables XVII and XVIII were compiled from the editions of Forward and The Guardian listed in the Bibliography.
17. Patterson, op. cit., 178.
18. Trager, Burma From Kingdom to Republic, 204, 404, n.40; Administrative and Social Affairs, 11, 16; Forward, VI: 3 (Sept. 15, 1967), 4.
19. Burma: Economic Survey, 1964 (Rangoon: Directorate of Information, 1964). Compare Silverstein, "The Federal Dilemma in Burma," p. 101 and note 28. In 1956-7, the Kayal State governments raised only K3-1/2 lakhs out of K 20 lakhs (two millions). There was, under the civilian regime, no fixed appropriation to State governments although the Union paid most of their costs. A similar form of dependence exists, to a higher degree under the Revolutionary Council.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS

1. Riggs, Administration. . ., 213.
2. Tinker, op. cit., 324 and Pye, "The Army in Burmese Politics," 231-2. Dupuy, op. cit., 440, refers to the deterioration of military professionalism under the Caretaker Government.
3. Almond and Powell, op. cit., 29-30.
4. Janes Guyot, op.cit., 438-43.
5. Roth, op. cit., 203.
6. See the references cited in note 1 of Chapter III.
7. Badgley, "Burma's China Crises. . ."; Trager, "Burma: 1967. . ." 116-7; Licensed Gadfly (Unsigned Article), Far Eastern Economic Review, LVIII:7 (Nov. 23, 1967), 352; The New York Times, Jan. 24, 1966.

8. These impressions are gained from a review of promotion notices in Forward in 1967.

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A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX A.

LISTS OF ELITE GROUPS

The following tables summarize the information used as a basis for the tables presented in the text. To allow for a compact presentation, the following symbols will be used:

(1) Under "Ethnic Classification":

A = Arakanese	C = Chin
B = Burman	Kc = Kachin
I.B. = Indo-Burman	Kr = Karen
S.B. = Sino-Burman	S = Shan

(2) Under "Education":

R.	=	Received from Rangoon University
U.K.	=	Received from a British University
U.S.	=	Received from an American University
Some	=	Attended University, but did not graduate
None	=	Did not attend University

TABLE AI
SUMMARY OF DATA ON PERSONNEL OF HIGHEST ELITE
LEVELS

Name	Ethnic Class.	Birth Date	Educational	Former Occupatn.	Present Position
Colonel Hla Han	B	c.1920	M.D. R.	Army Doctor	Minister of Health & Educ.
Colonel Kyaw Soe	B	c.1920	some	Military Secretary War Office	Minister of Home Affairs and c.
Colonel Maung Lwin	B	c.1920	M.D. R.	Regional Commands	Minister of Social Welfare &c.
Colonel Maung Shwe	B	c.1920	some	Regional Commands	Ministers of Industry and Labour
General Ne Win	S.B.	1911	some	Armed Forces Commander	Chairman of the Revolutionary Council
Brigadier San Yu	S.B.	c.1920	some	Regional Commands	Minister of Finance
Colonel Sein Win	B	c.1920	some	Regional Commands	Minister of Public Works
Colonel Than Sein	B	c.1920	some	Counter-insurgency	Minister of Transport & Communications
Brigadier Thaung Dan	B	c.1925	some	Air Force	Minister of Inform. & Culture
Brigadier Thaung Kyi	B	c.1920	some	Regional Commands	Minister of Agriculture & Forests

TABLE AI Continued

Name	Ethnic Class	Birth Date	Educ- tion	Former Occupatn.	Present Position
Commodore Thaung Tin	B	c.1920	some	Navy	Minister of Mines
U Thi Han	B	c.1912	B.A. R.	Business; Defence Min. Supplies Dir.	Minister of Foreign Aff. & National Planning
Brigadier Tin Pe	S.B.	c.1910	some	Several Ministries	B.S.P.P. Official

TABLE AII

SUMMARY OF DATA ON MINISTERIAL SECRETARIES

Name	Birth Date	Educa- tion	Former Occupation	Ministry
Lt.Col. Aye Kyaw	c.1920	some	Army	Culture
U Chit Maung	1915	none	Politics	Finance
U Cho Tun	1916	B.A.(Hons) R.	Civil Service	Land Nationalization
Lt.Col. Hla Maung	c.1920	some	Army	Home and Judicial Aff.
Commander Khin Maung Myint	--	--	Navy	Mines
U Kyaw Nyunt	c.1927	B.A. (Sydney)	Civil Service	National Planning
Colonel Kyaw Zaw	c.1920	some	Army	Trade and Co-operatives
Major Lwin Maung	--	--	Army	Social Welfare
U Maung Maung	1918	B.A.(Hons) R	Civil Service	Defence
Colonel Maung Maung Kha	c.1920	some	Army	Industry
Lt.Col. Myo Myint	c.1920	some	Army	Labour
Dr.Nyi Nyi	c.1930	Ph.D. (U.K.)	Geology	Education
Lt.Col. Soe Tin	c.1920	some	Army	Housing and Public Works
U Tha Hyaw	--	--	--	Transport.& Communication

TABLE AII Continued

Name	Birth Date	Education	Former Occupatn.	Ministry
Lt.Col. Thein Aung	c.1920	some	Army	Health
Colonel Tin Soe	c.1920	some	Army	Agriculture and Forests
Lt.Col. Tin Tun	c.1920	some	Air Force	Information
U Tun Shein	1919	B.A.(Hons) R & B.A.(U.K.)	Civil Service	Foreign Affairs
U Win Pe	1912	B.A.(Hons) R	Civil Service	Religious Affairs

TABLE AIII

SUMMARY OF DATA ON AMBASSADORS (APRIL 1, 1968)

Name	Ethnic Class.	Birth Date	Educ- tion	Former Occupation	Posting
U Aung Shwe	B	c.1920	some	Brigadier	United Arab Rep.
U Ba Ni	B	c.1920	some	Colonel & Minister of Trans.&Comm.	Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary
U Ba Saw	A	1914	some	Cabinet Min.	U.S.S.R.
U Ba Shwe	B	c.1920	some	Col.;Direc. of Supply & Trans.,Min. of Defence	Japan
U Hla Maung	B	1911	B.A., B.L. R	Foreign Office	United States
Col.Hla Maw	B	c.1920	some	Mil.Attache	India and Nepal
U Lwin	B	1914	some	Politician	Federal Germany
U Maung Maung	B	1920	some	Brigadier, Dir.Mil Training	Yugoslavia & Bulgaria
U Nyo Tun	A	--	--	Cabinet Min. & Politician	Australia and New Zealand
U Pe Khin	S	1914	B.A., B.L. R	Ambassador	Malaysia and Singapore
U Sein Bwa	B	1911	B.A., B.L. R	Foreign Office	Indonesia and the Phillipines
Sama Duwa Sinwa Nawng	Kc	1914	none	Politician	Ceylon
U Thein Doke	B	c.1920	some	Col.,Mil.Att.	Israel

TABLE AIII Continued

Name	Ethnic Class.	Birth Date	Educ- tion	Former Occupation	Posting
U Tun Win	S.B.	1917	some	Politician	Thailand
U Vum Ko Hau	C	1917	none	Politician	Cambodia and Laos
U Zahre Lian	C	1923	some	Diplomat, Politician, Cab.Min.	France and Benelux

TABLE AIV

SUMMARY OF DATA ON OTHER CIVILIAN ELITE MEMBERS

Name	Ethnic Class.	Birth Date	Educa- tion	Former Occupatn.	Present Position
U Aung Than	B	1911	B.A. R	N.U.F.Polit.	Secy.B.S.P.P. C.O.C.
U Aye Maung	B	1912	B.Sc., B.L. R	Lawyer	Deputy Dir. Education
Dr.Fred Ba Hli	B	1922	Sc.D. (MIT)	Engineer	Dir.-General Burma Appl. Res.Inst.
U Ba Kyaw	B	1914	B.A.(Hons) R	Civil Servant	Director of Fisheries
U Ba Nyein	B	1914	B.A.(Hons) R	N.U.F. Politician	Dept.of Fin. Advisor; Secy.of B.S.P.P.Soc. Econ.Planning Committee
U Ba Sein	B	1910	B.Sc., B.L. R	Lawyer	Attor.General
U Ba Tin	B	--	--	Parliament. Secretary to Various Min.	Deputy Secy., Ministry of National Planning
U Hla	B	1919	B.Sc. R	Civil Ser.	Chairman of Inland Water Trans.Board
U Khin Maung Latt	I.B.	1913	B.A. R B.L. R	Cabinet Minister	Dputy Secy., Min.Agr. & Forests

TABLE AIV Continued

Name	Ethnic Class.	Birth Date	Educa- tion	Former Occupatn.	Present Position
U Kyaw Nyein	B	1912	B.A. R	Chairman of State Agricul. Bank	Chairman of the Union Bank of Burma
U Ohn Khin	B	--	--	Civil Servant	Foreign Off. Exec.Sec.
Dr.Po E	B	1910	B.Sc., B.L. R Ph.D(U.K.)	Meteorologist	Dir.-General of Meteorology
U San Maung	B	1904	B.Sc. (Hons) R B.L.(U.K.)	Justice	Deputy Secy., Home Ministry
U Saw Lwin	B	1911	B.A. R B.A.(U.K.)	Civil Servant	Financial Commsnr. (Lands & Rur.Dev.)
U Sein	Kr	1898	--	Civil Servant	Dir.of Labour
U Than Htut	B	1922	B.A., B.L. R A.L.A. (U.K.)	Library Official	Dir.of the Cultural Institute
U Thein Maung	B	1896	--	Politician	Trade Council Member
U Thein Tin	A	1919	B.A. R	Labour Off.	Deputy Dir. Labour
U Thet Tun	B	1926	B.A. R B.Sc.(UK)	Statistician	Dir.of Central Stat.& Econ. Dept.
Bo Ye Htut	B	1922	none	C.P.B. Insurgent	Member of B.S.P.P. Centr. Org.Committee

TABLE AV

SUMMARY OF DATA ON CABINET MINISTERS (1948-58)

Name	Ethnic Class.	Birth Date	Univ. Educatn.	Ministry Held	Dates	Present Status
Bohmu Aung	B	1910	None	Rehabil. Deputy PM	1948-1958	Political Prisoner
U Aung Pa	Kr	1919	B.A. R	Various	53-7	Political Pris.
U Aung Zan Wai	A	c.1901	some	Various	48-51	Public Ser. Comm.
U Ba Gyan	B	1909	B.A., B.L. R	Jud.Aff.	48-50	Trustee of Shwedagon Pag.
Mahn Ba Saing	Kr	1906	some	Karen Aff.	48-52	unknown
U Ba Saw	A	1914	some	Various	51-57	Diplomat
U Ba Swe	B	1915	some	Various	52-57	Unknown
Thakin Chit Maung	B	1914	none	Various	54-57	Pol.Prisoner
Dr.E.Maung	B	1898	B.A., R L.L.B.(UK)	Foreign Aff. Jud.Aff.	1949-1958	Political Prisoner
Sao Hkun Hkio	S	1912	B.A.(UK)	Various	48-58	Polit.Prisoner
Dr.Saw Hla Tun	Kr	1906	M.D. R	Karen State	55-58	Chairman of Karen State S.C.
Sao Htun E	S	1914	none	Various	54-57	Unknown
Bo Khin Maung Gale	B	1912	B.A. R	Various	50-58	Pol.Prisoner
U Khin Ma-ng Latt	I.B.	1913	B.A., B.L. R	Various	50-58	Dep.Secy., Arg.& For.
U Ko Ko Gyi	B	1914	some	Commerce	48-49	Unknown

TABLE AV Continued

Name	Ethnic Class.	Birth Date	Univ. Educatn.	Ministry Held	Dates	Present Status
U Kyaw Min	A	1899	B.A., L.L.B., (U.K.)	Finance	1958	Unknown
U Kyaw Myint	B	1913	B.A., B.L. R	Various	48-53	Unknown
Thakin Kyaw Nyein	B	1915	B.A. (Hons) B.L. (Hons) R	Various	48-58	Political Prisoner
Thakin Kyaw Tun	B	--	none	Agr. & For.	52-58	B.S.P.P. member
Bo Let Ya	B	1911	some	Deputy PM	1948	Polit. Pris.
Thakin Lwin	B	1915	some	Public Works Lab.	48-49	Diplomat
Bo Min Gaung	B	1920	none	Various	52-57	Pol. Pris.
Henzada Mya	B	1893	none	National Plan	1948	Unknown
Pyabwe Mya	B	--	--	Trans. & Comm.	1948	Died 1953
Gen. Ne Win	S.B.	1911	some	Defence, Home	49-50	Chairman Revolutny Council
U Nu	B	1907	B.A., B.L. R	P.M.	48-58	Retired
U Ohn	B	--	B.A. R	Commerce	48-49	Retired
Thakin Pan Myine	B	1919	none	Local Admin.	56-57	Unknown
Bohmu Po Kun	B	1898	B.Sc. R	Pub. Wks.	1948	Retired
M.A. Raschid	Ind.	1912	B.A., B.L. R	Various	52-57	Unknown
Thakin San Myint	B	1921	none	Land Nat.	56-57	Pol. Pris.
Saw San Po Thin	Kr	c.1920	none	Education	1948	Underground

TABLE AV Continued

Name	Ethnic Class.	Birth Date	Univ. Educatn.	Ministry Held	Dates	Present Status
Dr. Sein Ban	B	1901	M.D. R	Health	56-57	Unknown
Bo Sein Hman	B	--	--	Without P.	1948	Underground
U Shein Htang	C	1895	none	Various	52-57	Unknown
Sama Duwa Sinwa Nawng	Kc	1914	none	Various	48-58	Diplomat
Thakin Tha Kin	B	1918	none	Various	52-57	Underground
U Than Aung (A.Rivers)	Anglo-Burman	1902	B.L. R	Education	52-56	Retired
Thakin Tin	B	1903	none	Various	48-58	Retired
Myanma Alin U Tin	B	1897	none	Various	48-58	Political Prisoner
Myanaung U Tin	B	1906	some	Health	54-55	Unknown
Thakin Tin Maung	B	1918	none	Agr. & For.	56-57	Unknown
U Tin Nyun	B	1917	B.A. R	Labour	56-58	Unknown
Sao Tun Aye	S	--	--	Immigratn.	53-56	Unknown
U Tun Pe	B	--	some	Various	48-53	Public Ser. Commission
U Tun Tin	B	1908	B.A., B.L. R	Educ. & Culture	56-58	Retired
U Tun Win	S.B.	1917	B.A. R	Various	52-58	Diplomat
U Vamthu Maung	C	1900	none	Chin Aff.	48-52	Retired
U Vum Ko Hau	C	1917	none	Chin. Aff.	1948	Diplomat

TABLE AV Continued

Name	Ethnic Class.	Birth Date	Univ. Educatn.	Ministry Held	Dates	Present Status
U Win	B	1905	B.A., B.Ed.	Various	48-55	Diplomat
Mahn Win Maung	Kr	1916	B.L. R B.A. R	Various	48-57	Unknown
Sao Wunnah	Kr	c.1920	none	Kayah St.	48-58	Pol.Pris.
U Zahre Lian	C	1923	none	Chin.Aff.	54-58	Diplomat
Duwa Zau Lawn	Kc	1910	none	Kachin St.	53-56	Unknown

APPENDIX B
COUNTER-ELITES

In Burma there are two counter-elites--the Council for National Liberation (C.N.L.) and the Community Party of Burma and its National Democratic United Front (C.P.B.-N.D.U.F.) which aspire to control the central government, rather than some form of separation.

The C.N.L. is an underground opposition movement directed by political refugees in Thailand, and operating near Rangoon as the National Liberation Army. Its leadership consists of relatives and associates of the former wartime leader, Dr. Ba Maw; anti-Communist former A.F.P.F.L. members and prominent Karen leaders. The C.N.L. has delayed joining forces with Shan and Kachin leaders and has rejected the advances of Arakanese leaders who aspire to the formation of an autonomous Arakan, but it does have some Mon nationalists among its following. The co-leadership of influential members of the Tennasserim Karen community (particularly Saw Kya Doe) gives the movement a representative scope unequalled since the A.F.P.F.L. after the Panglong Conferences.

The N.D.U.F. is a more complex form of alliance. The C.P.B. is primarily Burman, but since the 1948-50 civil war, it has been attempting to convert minority group leaders ideologically, as a first step to a broader alliance. By 1953, most of the surviving former leaders of the K.N.D.O., which

had been pro-Western and anti-Communist, began to accept the Communist ideology and to form agreements with the White Flags for mutual co-operation and the demarcation of territory. In 1954, the Karens split with the K.M.T. remnants with whom they had been allied, and with the assistance of Communist advisors, reorganized as the Kawthooley Revolutionary Forces. By 1960, this group was attempting to work out agreements with Shans, Kachins, and Kayahs, but these were upset by problems of mobility, and disagreements over K.M.T. support to the Shans.

In 1963, the Kawthooley leadership split over the issue of the government amnesty offer. Saw Hunter Tha Thmwe came to terms with the government, while the most left-wing leader, Mahn Ba Zan, headed the remainder, which he renamed the Karen National Unity Party. This party allied with other Karen, Mon, and Chin groups to form an All-Nationalities Committee, which was, in turn, allied with the C.P.B. to form the N.D.U.F.

In their earlier years, these groups were not strong, but they remained secure in the Delta jungles and near the Thai border, where they extracted tribute from the local villages. The strongest link in this alliance at present is between the C.P.B. and Mahn Ba Zan's group, but this rests on the promise of a fully autonomous Kawthoolei State if the rebellion is successful. Furthermore, Mahn Ba Zan has come to an agreement with the Tennasserin Karens to give up recruiting in their area.

Recent reports of Shan and Kachin adherence to the N.D.U.F. are vague. Up to 1960, the Kachins were one of the most loyal minority groups, with the exception of New Seng, a Kachin Battalion commander who led his men in revolt in 1949 and, on fleeing to China was given command of 1,000 well-trained guerrillas. There is, however, no evidence that this group or the Kachin Independence Army have adhered to the C. P.B. The Shan National Army, the largest Shan group, has always remained separate, through financing itself by the sale of opium, occasionally allying with the K.M.T. remnants, and fleeing, when necessary to Thailand. In fact, this group has attempted, unsuccessfully, to join the anti-Communist C.N.L.

Thus, of the two counter-elites, the C.N.L. may be considered as more representative than the government, since it includes at least some minority group representatives in its leadership. The N.D.U.F., however, is more of a loose alliance.

Of the two counter-elites, the C.N.L. puts more emphasis on secular recruitment than the C.P.B. The personnel of the C.P.B. are exclusively oppositional politicians and guerrillas. The C.N.L. claims to represent the entire educated community of Burma, but though it is plausible that many of the large number of trained people dissatisfied with the government may support the C.N.L. there is no concrete evidence to this effect.

The military leaders are a Sandhurst graduate and a former N.C.O. in the British Army. Bo Yan Naing's experience is similar to that of Ne Win and Aung Gui. Zali Maw, the son of Ba Maw, and the General Secretary of the C.N.L. was a professor of law at the University of Rangoon.

The main indications of a secular outlook, however, are elements in the style of decision-making in the C.N.L. The group refuses to take on more recruits than it can afford to arm with good weapons. It refuses to accept the adherence of minority ethnic groups whose leadership is divided. Furthermore, adherence to a carefully defined policy of federalism is also a condition of membership. Such pragmatism seems to be the work of highly experienced and tactical leaders. These few indications suggest that the C.N.L. is on its way to transcending particularism through adherence to secular standards, and might, at least in this respect provide a government with greater integrative capacity.

The C.P.B.-N.D.U.F. resembles the present elite in its strategy for integration. Although it promises minority group adherents separate states, with the right to secession, the predominance of the exclusively Burman C.P.B. makes it unlikely that this right could be exercised. If secession were attempted, the consequences would probably be similar to the present military regime.

The existence of alternatives to the current elite may attract members of the elite who are unsatisfied with its recruitment and allocation practices. As a result, the political elite must either change to accommodate the discontented, or risk losing them to a counter-elite which will thereby gain new strength. This interaction between the political elite and counter-elites also affects the possibilities of institutional development.

It was found that the Communist Party of Burma and some representatives of minority ethnic groups have formed a loose alliance. This counter-elite is somewhat representative ethnically, and promises the right to secession, but the predominance of the Burman majority in the C.P.B., and the limitation of its technical competence to the skills of political opposition suggest that if this group were to come to power, the present unstable pattern would recur.

The Council for National Liberation seems to present a more stable alternative. The C.N.L. has a pragmatic policy of constitutional reconciliation of the various ethnic groups, and demands, as conditions of adherence, the fulfillment of those conditions which alone make pluralism possible.

The alternatives, to Burma, to continuing the historical process of empire building and dissolution, are suggested by the counter-elites. The military elite has attempted to preempt the C.P.B.-N.D.U.F. by propagating an ideology very

similar to the Communist, and following the advice of "old guard politicians" within its ranks, especially on the issues of economic policy and local administration. Supposedly, the only remaining difference between the Revolutionary Council and the C.P.B. would be the latter's association with Communist China, a liability among nationalistic Burmese. Yet the C.P.B., in stressing the role of the "nationalities" in the N.D.U.F., is attempting to overcome this obstacle by providing a focus for a neo-traditional anti-sultanistic alliance. In this respect, the Revolutionary Council is irrevocally opposed to the C.P.B.-N.D.U.F., since to be otherwise would be to abrogate the legitimacy of its original seizure of power. A victory for the C.P.B.-N.D.U.F. aside from its international repercussions, would probably mean the repetition of the pattern of secession and reintegration.

The Council for National Liberation, it has been suggested, seems to represent an attempt to organize on a more secularistic or pragmatic way. Reports to date indicate that its position has been improving steadily, as it grows in numbers and remains invulnerable in the countryside near Rangoon. It may be that the Revolutionary Council is now confronted with the necessity of recognizing the resources of the C.N.L., and attempting some form of co-optation or alliance or of ultimately facing defeat at their hands. In this case, elite membership would rest on an independent base of

power, independent of loyalty to the "ruler." The sultanistic model would no longer apply, and the analysis in this paper would be restricted to the first five years of the Revolutionary Government of the Union of Burma.