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President Theodore Roosevelt and United States foreign policy, 1901-1907 Roy, Reginald Herbert 1951

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President Theodore Roosevelt  and 1 United States Foreign Policy. 1901—1907 by Reginald Herbert Roy A Thesis Submitted i n P a r t i a l Fulfilment of the Requirements f o r the Degree of Master of Arts i n the Department of History The University of B r i t i s h Columbia A p r i l 18, 1951 Abstract i During the most active years of his l i f e , Theodore Roosevelt lived in an age which v/as characterized by imperial-ism, i'rom the time of his youth u n t i l the time of his retire-ment, the Great Powers of Europe were busily engaged extending their p o l i t i c a l domination ovefe large areas of the- world with a view of exploiting these areas economically and otherwise. The United States had been practicing a similar form of im-perialism within the limits of North America as i t s frontier moved westwards. At the turn of the century the country turned from expansion on the American continent to expansion overseas. Roosevelt participated in this l a t t e r wave of American imperialism, and the terms of his presidency were wedged in between this and a minor wave of American Imperialism in the Caribbean area which took place in the decades following his period, i'or fthis reason many people have come to regard Roosevelt as an imperialist and his presidency as an era of imperialism also. The purpose of this thesis i s to prove that, although not untainted by the s p i r i t of 'Manifest Destiny' himself, as President of the United States, Roosevelt pursued a nationalist course in his relations with the other nations of the world. Roosevelt's aims in foreign affairs were basically simple. An ultra-nationalist and super-patriot, he believed that his country had a mission in l i f e . This mission was to serve as the beacon of light of progressive c i v i l i z a t i o n in a world of states struggling to better themselves and so reach the goal so happily attained by the United States. The methods he employed i n foreign affairs were dominated i i by this belief. Thus he f e l t i t not improper to use, at times, unethical means to achieve his i d e a l i s t i c ends. The main instrument he employed in this f i e l d was his 'big stick' which served him i n as many ways as the occasion warranted. And since the 'stick' was used in defence of the 'honor', security and prestige of the United States, Roosevelt assumed that i t was of l i t t l e moment i f heads were knocked within the area the 'big stick' was wielded. As a nationalist, and from a short-range and rather narrow point of view, Roosevelt's foreign policy was success-f u l . But viewed from the standpoint of two generations later, his success was mediocre. TABLE OF ..CONTENTS Chapter ' Page Abstract . . . . . . . • . . . . i I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . 1 I I Roosevelt—* Policeman of the C a r i b b e a n 1 . . . . . . . . . . SO I I I Roosevelt and the 'Panama.Canal Matter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 IV Roosevelt and the Alaska Boundary Dispute, . . . . . . 100 V Roosevelt and Europe . . . . . . 119 VI Roosevelt and the Far East . . . 156 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . 170 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . 180 Bi b l i o g r a p h i c a l Note . . . . . . 199 Chapter I Introduction 1 In lTJf$9, when Great Britain recognized the United States of America as a sovereign nation, i t s existence was compara-tively unnoticed by the Great Powers of Europe. Unlike the creation of the German Empire i n 1871, the birth of the United states presented no immediate threat by i t s geopolitical position. On the European continent, British prestige had been lowered temporarily, but in i t s e l f , the United States' entry into the world family of nations caused no major realignment of power or policy by the nations of Europe. Today the situation i s almost completely reversed. In th,\,s. present era, the United States i s one of the two strong-est nations of the world. In material strength i t i s perhaps the most powerful nation, while i t s material potentialities w i l l equal or surpass those of i t s most potent r i v a l for some time to come. As such, what the United States' government thinks or does i s of the utmost concern to the other world powers, and the Foreign Offices of a l l nations are greatly concerned with any real or supposed course of action upon which the United States might embark. This sweeping change of status and importance of the Units! States has taken place over the past century and a half, the change being marked by f a i r l y definite stages during that time. The f i r s t and longest stage was that period between the Revolutr• ionary War and the C i v i l War, one which might be termed the period of national adolescence. This was the era when the United States was comparatively free from warfare, and a time when a predominantly rural people began to move southward and westward by settlement, purchase and conquest. The next period was that from the C i v i l War to the Spanish-American War, or the era of national unification and consolidation. The third period was one wherein the United States was universally recognized as a Great Power, which might be called the present or contemporary era. This thesis has to do with the foreign policy of the United States during the f i r s t decade following the general recognition of the Great Powers status of the United States, This recognition came as a result of American victory in the Spanish-American War. The acquisition of Spanish overseas colonies by the United States suggested to many that America was about to follow i n the imperialist steps of the contempor-ary European Great Powers. But the deeply-rooted traditions of the American republic favored a return to the isolationist policy of the past century. President Theodore Roosevelt was to determine the path the United States would take in those crucial years, and i t was to be his guiding hand which was to steer the ship of state past the reefs of isolationism while avoiding getting stranded on the shoals of imperialism. A general survey of the power and position of the United States at the turn of the century w i l l provide the background of Roosevelt's presidency. Then a brief sketch of Theodore Roosevelt's l i f e prior to his presidency w i l l help explain the motives of the type of person wielding executive power during the period covered by this thesis. The material and human strength of the American nation in 1901 was enviable by the standards of any Great Power of 3 Europe. It was a united nation of some-lip/OOO,000 persons whose s k i l l and energy were constantly raising the standard of li v i n g of the country as a whole. In productive power, the United States stood second to no other nation, and i t s potentialities in this f i e l d were greater than most. Indus-t r i a l l y , the nation had undergone a change since the ..end. of the C i v i l War which had resulted in the rapid transformation of the country from one predominantly rural to one predominantly industrial. Yet with the greater use of labor saving machinery and the.opening up of new land tracts, the agricultural pro-ductivity of the United Staifces increased tremendously. The industrial East and the agricultural West were knit together by a network of railroads and telegraph wires which were of incomparable value in furthering the exploitation of the nation's wealthy natural resources. No country in Europe or the world ha*"d the railroad milage of the United States, and few, i f any, the efficiency of her vast communication system. Of equal importance was the fact that by the turn of the century the United States found i t no longer need rely upon Europe for i t s development. The great quantities of manufactur-ed gapital goods once imported were now being made, and even exported, by the great factories of the United States. Also, the flood of European capital into the United States had diminished to a trickle by 1900, and the financing required to open the mines, o i l fields, timber stands and other industries was being undertaken by Americans themselves. With surplus capital, a s k i l l f u l labor force and tremend-ous natural resources, the United States f e l t i t s e l f able to measure i t s strength with the other Great Powers at the turn of the century. As a developed economic and geographic unit i t was unsurpassed, despite the fact that as a p o l i t i c a l force i t s power was a l l too frequently overlooked by the distant European nations. But even the appreciation of the United States as a world power had greatly changed since the C i v i l War, and f u l l recognition of her status in the world was to come in 1898. In that year the United States became involved i n a war with Spain, a conflict typical of the imperialistic wars fought throughout the world on a greater or lesser scale i n the decades after 1870. With the righteous feeling of one seeking the Holy Grail, and under the twin banners of democracy and republicanism, the United States declared war on Spain over the question of Spain's treatment of the Cuban a f f a i r . The sentim-ent which swept the country during this short war was one which indicated that for the time being, at least, the American peop]e had. caught the jingoist s p i r i t which hitherto had been more common to Europe. But such jingoism as existed was the result of the nationalist emotions of the generation that had grown up since the C i v i l War more than any deep-seated mi l i t a r i s t tradition in the country or of a full-throated cry for imper-i a l i s t i c adventures. The Spanish-American War lasted but a few weeks, yet that was time enough to revolutionize the world status of the United States. Despite the mutual blunders and incompetent general-ship of the conflicting forces, United States' victory was a foregone conclusion. With victory over Spain, the United States not only gained tacit recognition as a Great Power, but emerged as a potential r i v a l of the imperialist powers. What followed after the United States reached this stage w i l l be the subject of future chapters. But for the present we must examine the background of one of the most publicized participants in the Spanish-American War, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, and see how his charge up San Juan H i l l led him not only past the Spanish fortifications but through the doors of the White House and into the Presidential office. Theodore Roosevelt was one of that new generation which grew up during the years following the C i v i l War, and most active during the turn of the century. He was born in New York in a well-to-do, old-stock family whose forebears settled with the Dutch i n the Hudson River Valley, As a boy he v/as sickly, but urged on by his father, he set out to build up his physique by hard, relentless practice, a thing which he kept up a l l his l i f e . As a youth Roosevelt's delicate health prevented him from attending either public or private schools with any regularity, so that until he entered Harvard University he was taught by tutors. Asca college student he took the conventional courses, v/as rather studious, careful of the friendships he made, and tended to be a rather quiet, though impulsive, undergraduate. He became editor of the Harvard Advocate, a Phi Beta Kappa man, and the member of various other fraternities in whose selected circles he would frequently join in the inevitable 'bull-sessions' with l i t t l e urging. He was neither a snob nor a 'social climber'. His confidence in himself, his family's social station and financial standing eliminated any such psychological quirk. Indeed his background, plus his a b i l i t y as an amateur boxer, gave him over-confidence in himself i f anything. In 1880 Roosevelt graduated from Harvard, married a Boston g i r l and settled in New York where he joined social and l i t e r -ary clubs and extended his athletic interests to include hunt-ing, polo, and r i f l e practice. Within a matter of months, to the surprise of his friends, he plunged with his usual vigor into state p o l i t i c s . His aim was to seek election to the New York State Assembly on the Republican ticket, and " he was soon making stump speeches while his friends alternated between amusement and indignation that a young man of good blood ... 1 should stoop to the gutter of American p o l i t i c s . " 1 H. F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1931, p. 48. The Republican party had come into being about three decades ago as the party of progress. It was at this time,(1881), the party which had preserved the Union and under which an extraordinary growth of wealth had occurred. But the stench of scandal and corruption had permeat-ed the party for years. A Secretary of War had been subjected to impeachment proceedings. Five federal judges had resigned under pressure. Poli t i c s , In 1881, were thus looked upon as no profession for a gentleman of the American upper classes. Rather i t was regarded as a machine oiled by judicious monetary contributions to the party 'bosses', operating to secure law and order as conceived by the large contributors. Roosevelt often expressed the opinion that men of his social class only think they run the nation, and he was determined that such 'rule' should be more direct. 7 'Young Roosevelt 1 won h i s seat i n the Assembly by a comfortable margin, and during his f i r s t year made a name f o r himself as an active, out-spoken c r i t i c of the corruption i n New York state. His reformist e f f o r t s resulted i n h i s re-election i n the next two terms, during which he gained more experience not only i n parliamentary procedure but with the' Republican party i t s e l f . While i n the Assembly Roosevelt exhibited many of the t r a i t s he was to have as president. "The vigorous expression of hi s opinions, the directness of his statements, the moral emphasis of h i s point of view, had c r y s t a l l i z e d i n t h e i r mold." Such a crusader, then as l a t e r , could frequently embarrass h i s would-be friends and supporters. Thus when Roosevelt decided to go West and take up ranching 3 i n 1884 the New York Republican 'bosses' heaved a sigh of r e l i e f . L i f e i n the Dakota Badlands pleased Roosevelt tremendous-l y . He bought two ca t t l e ranches and soon " established him-s e l f with the cowboys whose riding, recklessness and exhibit-4 ionism he admired tremendously." This s p i r i t of the f r o n t i e r never l e f t him i n l a t e r l i f e , and accounts perhaps f o r h i s 'hail-fellow-well-met' attitude i n s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e 2 Lewis E i n s t e i n , Roosevelt, His Mind In Action, New York, Houghton, M i f f l i n , Co., 1930, pp. 44-45. 3 Roosevelt's f i r s t wife died i n 1883 a f t e r the b i r t h of t h e i r daughter, and h i s mother died shortly thereafter. This was the reason f o r h i s leaving the p o l i t i c a l scene temporarily at t h i s time. He was married again within two years. 4 Pringl e, op£ c i t . , p. 97 . 8 as well as for his approach to foreign affairs when he became president. Despite his academic-political background, he entered into and enjoyed every phase of frontier l i f e , took great pride in his adventures and achievements while ranching, 5 and wrote to his friends in the last a constant stream of b letters pasaising the outdoor l i f e and bed-rock 'Americanism' he found among his Western neighbors. From 1885 to 1889 Roosevelt led a busy but rather barren l i f e p o l i t i c a l l y . A 'party man' above a l l , he campaigned for Blaine as president although cherishing a personal dislike for the candidate. His eloquence on the platform was needed, however, and to one whose p o l i t i c a l career had just started, he realized the fallacy of deviating from the party l i n e . Roosevelt made an unsuccessful attempt for the mayoralty of 6 New York city during this period, but i t was not until 1889 when,, with the aid of Lodge, he was appointed C i v i l Service Commissioner in Washington, that he held a p o l i t i c a l post. Roosevelt was a C i v i l Service Commissioner for six years, during which time he stirred up frequent storms and caused 5 One of whom was Henry Cabot Lodge, an ardent Republic-an and firm friend and mentor of Roosevelt. " A similarity of origin and education; a cultivated interest in l i f e and in the amenities of l i f e ; a fondness for American history, and ... for riding; above a l l , a real taste for practical p o l i t i c s made for this friendship." ( Einstein, op_. c i t . , p. 34 ) 6 In 1886, after his defeat in the New York mayoralty race,"Roosevelt took advantage of the following period of enforced idleness to v i s i t England and meet in person the celebrated folk with whom he had been carrying on a correspond-ence. I t was while he was in London that he married his second wife. headaches by his bull-headed determination to carry out the duties of his office as he imagined they were meant to be carried out. He had a f a c i l i t y for grasping every particle of power which the office of commissionership devolved upon the occupant; and he was not above trying to gain additional power in order to further his plans. As an administrator he shirked no responsibility nor dodged any unwelcome or p o l i t i c -ally dangerous task which he thought needed completion. He was efficient, demanding of his staff, often tactless to the point of impetuousity, but a hard and conscientious worker with seemingly limitless energy and drive l i b e r a l l y sprinkled with amour propre. The combination of moralist and realist in his character was quite evident in the reforms he instituted in the C i v i l Service, and his work as Commissioner again drew the plaudits of the public. In 1895 he resigned his office to become the head of the police board of New York city. With characteristic dash he started a campaign to clean up the corruption and graft prevalent for decades in the New York police force. He streamlined the police organization, raised the morale of the force by his impartial efforts to further police efficien-cy, and gained the respect of both Democrats and Republicans for his honesty and fearlessness while in office, Roosevelt l e f t the police board in 1897 to become Assistant Secretary of the Navy under President McKinley.. The time and the place were eventful, for a year later the United States, for the f i r s t time in about eighty years, would be at IP-war with a European power; and Roosevelt's hyper-sensitivity to the responsibility of his office was to result indirectly in Dewey's victory at Manila Bay. In the years since Roosevelt had f i r s t entered office his; popularity had risen steadily except among the Republican •bosses' such as Mark Hanna and among those int the wealthier classes who looked upon him as bombastic, rather radical and quite unpredictable at times. He was not easily controlled in a p o l i t i c a l sense, and was an extremely d i f f i c u l t person to advise once he had made up his mind t h a t his course was the right course. Yet his enemies never underestimated his ab i l i t y as a campaigner, his natural i f boisterous charm socially, his knack of coloring his actions so that they appealed to the public, nor the large personal following he could rally to his standard. In his personal l i f e , Theodore Roosevelt was the epitome of a good father and husband. At his home i n Oyster Bay he was the American prototype of the English country squire, and indulged in his passion for outdoor sports to his heart's content, usually in company with many friends and neighbors. Roosevelt's intellectual interests were as wide and varied as his physical pursuits. Yet he was not a profound thinker nor an exceptional scholar. He wrote a number of books whose themes showed his deep admiration for the adventurous l i f e , for American heroes off bygone days, and his belief i n the greatness — present and future — of his country. Moreover, he carried on a voluminous correspondence with his friends and wrote magazine articles which, for the most part, were noted 1 1 for their 'Americanism'. Socially, Roosevelt was a gregarious person, usually t h r i l l e d by the sound of his own voice and the wisdom of his opinions. In this l a t t e r respect he was as dogmatic as he was righteous, and those who did not share his opinions he thought of condescendingly as friendly but foolish at best, and as un-speakable demagogues at worst. In practical matters he was net i unwilling to take advice, but "ultimately made up his mind by 7 a flashing sort of intuitive process...." which for better or worse he would stubbornly follow to the end. 8 One of Roosevelt's main interests was in foreign affairs, an interest which increased steadily as he matured. He was greatly fascinated by the imperialist drama going on in Africa, Asia and elsewhere, and caught some of the imperialist s p i r i t as he watched Great Britain, France and others extend their dominion and influence over the globe. Even before he accepted the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt had reached such a stage of ultra-nationalism and super-patriotism that he may be termed a 7 Lord Charnwood, Theodore Roosevelt, London, Constable and Company, 1 9 2 3 , p. 6 3 . 8 He shared this interest with Senator Lodge, to whom he wrote on February 2 5 , 1 8 9 6 : " The only thing outside my present work ( as Police Commissioner) i n which I -take a real interest i s the question of our attitude toward foreign powers and therefore to our defence. What has been doie i n the navy....?" ( H. C. Lodge, ed., Selections From the Correspond-ence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, -New York, Charles Scribner's S©ns, 1 9 2 5 , vol. 1 , p. 2 1 4 ) f 12 9 'jingoist'. Thus as the threat of war with Spain drew closer, Roosevelt did a l l i n his power to improve the preparedness of the navy while at the same time, in speeches and interviews, be supported the stand taken by the pro-war party within the government. His reason for supporting a declaration of war is revealing. In a lett e r to the Secretary of War i n 1897 he wrote: I would regard a war with Spain from two viewpoints: Firstj the advisability on the ground both o f humanity and self-interest of interfering on behalf of the Cubans, and of taking one m o r e s t e p t o w a r d the c o m p l e t e f r e e d o m of America from European domination; second, the benefit dons to our people by giving them something to think about other than material gain (sic), and especially the benefit done our military forces by trying both the Army and Navy in actual practice. 10 Cf Rarely has such an open and frank opinion been given by a responsible government o f f i c i a l regarding the motive for a war, and rarely has a statement of such pure jingoism smother-11 U ed in moralistic wrappings been penned in a l l sincerity. 9 "The indictment that brands Roosevelt as a jingoist i s supported by ample evidence. In 1886, elated by headlines pre-dicting trouble with Mexico, he had offered to organize his -Medora ranch hands into a cavalry battalion.... That same year at a Fourth of July celebration in the West, he said that he hoped*to see the day when not a foot of American s o i l w i l l be held by any European power.' In 1892 he watched"with eager interest the f r i c t i o n with Chile and approved the American demands that an indemnity be paid to soldiers in Valpariaso. Roosevelt reached the highest point of excitement that year when Great Britain declined to concede the rights of the United States i n the Venezuela Boundary dispute."(Pringle, op. cit.,p. 167) 10 Ibid., p. 176. 11 Later in the year, " when he was denounced by Presid-ent. E l i o t of Harvard as a jingoist, he struck back at the 'futile sentimentalists of the international arbitration type' who would bring about a flabby, timid type of character which 13 Roosevelt, along with many other adventurous sp i r i t s craving action and excitement, believed that the United States should have the opportunity to exercise her armed virtue. Thus once the bugles had sounded, Roosevelt quickly resigned his position in the Wavy department in order to be 'in on the k i l l . * Together with an army physician, Leonard Wood, he organized a cavalry unit, the famous Rough Riders, and after a brief period of training the regiment sailed for the war i n Cuba. The war i n Cuba was short, and American military successes on land were on a minor scale out of proportion to their effect. Roosevelt took part in several skirmishes, the most famous being the frontal assault on the Spanish positions atop San Juan H i l l . "That Roosevelt was both brave and reckless i s beyond 12 question," and within a short time his popularity In the armed forces and at- home reached hero-like proportions. When he returned home, Roosevelt was willingly drafted by the New York state Republican party to run for the governor-13 ship. His popularity as a military hero together with his eats away the great fighting qualities of our race." ( Richard Hofstader, The American P o l i t i c a l Tradition, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, p. 210). 12 Pringle, op_. c i t . , p. 195 . 13 Roosevelt's campaign was rapid and dramatic. Using government, patriotism and Americanism as his chief campaign themes to swamp the Democrats' accusations of Republican corrup-tion, he swung through the state making speeches whenever and wherever possible. He waved the flag mightily, was escorted by six Rough Riders wherever he went, and at the towns the people were summoned to hear him speak from the railroad platform by a bugler sounding the ChargeJ Nevertheless, his majority was not large. Republican corruption had been widespread. 14 clean p o l i t i c a l record were great assets, and he was elected to o f f i c e i n November, 1898. He seon proved h i s a b i l i t y to f i l l the o f f i c e and to handle i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , and again showed h i s disregard f o r the s e n s i b i l i t i e s of the state's p o l i t i c a l 'bosses 1. Roosevelt's i n t e r e s t i n foreign a f f a i r s was increased by the a c q u i s i t i o n of the Philippine Islands by the United States. He believed that since these islands had, i n a sense, f a l l e n into the lap of the United States, anyone who proposed handing them back to Spain was a f o o l , a mountebank, and un-American. His reasons why the United States should r e t a i n the P h i l i p -pines were expressed i n a speech he made i n September, 1899. He. declared: In every case the expansion [of a nation} has taken place because the race was a great race. I t was a sign and proof of greatness i n the expanding nation, and moreover bear i n mind that i n each instance I t was of incal c u l a b l e benefit to mankind...• When great nations fear to ex-pand, shrink from expansion, i t Is because t h e i r greatness Is coming to an end. Are we s t i l l i n the prime of our lu s t y youth, s t i l l at the beginning of our glorious man-hood, to s i t down among the outworn people, to take place with the weak and the craven? A thousand times no! 14 While Governor of New York, Roosevelt worked d i l i g e n t l y f o r the public good and i n so doing succeeded i n cramping the p o l i t i c a l power of men such as Senator Piatt and others. He was so p o l i t i c a l l y unmanageable that i n 1900, when the Re-publicans met i n a national convention to select the candi-dates f o r the coming elections, P i a t t and other p o l i t i c o e s 14 Hofstader, op.' b i t . , p. 209. 15 majle every e f f o r t to have Roosevelt nominated as the v i c e -p r e s i d e n t i a l candidate and so get him out of New York p o l i t i c s . 15 Although he held back at f i r s t , the enthusiasm Roosevelt's nomination generated i n the West plus h i s l o y a l t y to the Re-publican party resulted i n h i s acceptance and consequent e l e c t i o n . Together with McKinley as President, Roosevelt was sworn into o f f i c e i n March, 1901, and resigned himself to a back seat i n national p o l i t i c s . Six months l a t e r President McKinley was assassinated. On September 14, 1901, while not yet quite 43 years of age, Theodore Roosevelt became the youngest President of the United States to take the oath of o f f i c e . llllllliUiiilliillllUII Many historians hold the opinion that the chief business McKinley l e f t behind f o r Roosevelt to deal with concerned im-perialism. This i s not quite true. Rather i t was the r e s u l t s of imperialism, or at l e a s t , the shaping of the nation's course as a Great Power. The majority of the problems caused by the Spanish-American war r e l a t i n g to the a c q u i s i t i o n of lands not contiguous to the American continent had been solved before Roosevelt became president. Although the United States 15 Roosevelt was aware of the f a c t that the promotion of h i s candidacy to the v i c e - p r e s i d e n t i a l chair by P i a t t , Quay and others was not out of a f f e c t i o n . The o f f i c e of Vice-Pre-sident was t r a d i t i o n a l l y one which l e d to Obscurity, and as such, Roosevelt had l i t t l e desire to "take the v e i l " , as he termed-it. Lodge urged him to accept, and i n the end h i s persuasion won. 16 had gone to war with the sole purpose of obtaining Cuba'3 free-dom, i t had emerged from the c o n f l i c t with Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines, together with the guardianship over Cuba 16 u n t i l i t s inhabitants were ready to govern themselves. Thus the great American i n t o x i c a t i o n of imperialism wa^s e s s e n t i a l l y the product of the McKinley era, despite the fact that McKinley himself was one of the l e a s t i m p e r i a l i s t i c a l l y minded Republicans, And although Roosevelt supported and took part i n the American i m p e r i a l i s t experiment, yet h i s own era as president was no more an era of empire than was the adminis-t r a t i o n of Jefferson or of Monroe, The immediate problems of the Spanish-American war Roose-v e l t handled as McKinley would have done. The i s l a n d posses-sions the United States had gained Roosevelt retained. The f i g h t i n g i n the Philippines Roosevelt supported to i t s l o g i c a l end; and a f t e r native opposition had been ended, Roosevelt carried on the long, slow process of educating the Philippinoes f o r self-government as McKinley had proposed a few years befogs, Cuba was given i t s 'independence', and such r e s t r i c t i o n s as existed under the P i a t t Amendment to absolute sovereignty also were products of the McKinley administration. Nonetheless, Roosevelt rejoiced i n American imperialism. 16 "To i t s honor, the Roosevelt Administration r e s i s t e d a l l -pressure o a l l i n g f o r repudiation of the agreement to grant Independence to Cuba." (Pringle, op, c i t . , p. 297.) In 1898 the United States also annexed Hawaii, and the Island of Tutui l a i n the Samoan islands, with i t s excellent coaling station and naval base of Pago-Pago, was secured as a r e s u l t of a British-German-American agreement. 17 To him imperialism meant national strength, the acknowledgement by the American people that the United States are a world power and that they would not shrink from taking up any burden which that d i s t i n c t i o n involved. 17 The burden, i n Roosevelt's mind, revolved around two main issues i n foreign p o l i c y . F i r s t was h i s determination that i n the Western Hemisphere the United States, as the dominant power, must have the f i n a l say i n the r e l a t i o n s of Europe and Asia with that hemisphere. In t h i s respect he clung to the Monroe Doctrine which he interpreted as "a declaration that there must be no t e r r i t o r i a l expansion by any non-American 18 power at the expense of an American power on American s o i l . " Second was Roosevelt's determination that his nation should receive the recognition of the other Great Powers as a nation to be highly respected i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomatic scene. He was conscious of the prestige gained by the United States due to the Spanish-American war, and r e a l i z e d that one way to overcome the past indifference towards the United States by the Great Powers was by projecting American influence and power so asi jto.jfocus attention on the nation's new status. In thus shouldering the burden which greatness brought, 17 W. R. Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt, An Intimate Bio- graphy New York, Grossei and Dunlap, 1919, p. 172. 18 This message was delivered on December 3, 1901. The way In which Roosevelt's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Monroe Doctrine changed w i l l be apparent i n l a t e r chapters. lames D. Richard-son, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the  Presidents, Washington, Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1910., v o l . IX, p. "6662. 18 Roosevelt followed a path of aggressive nationalism i n a f f a i r s concerning the Western Hemisphere, and entered with zeal the diplomatic r e l a t i o n s the United States conducted abroad. Aa a n a t i o n a l i s t , h i s fundamental anxiety was f o r the security and honor of h i s country. And, "believing that country to be honest, he thought i t good f o r t h i s world that i t should be 19 strong." The f i r s t l i n e of defence of the nation rested on the navy, Roosevelt's "big s t i c k " , f o r as he said i n h i s f i r s t message to Congress: The Navy o f f e r s us the only means of making our i n s i s -tence upon the Monroe Doctrine anything but a subject of derision to whatever nation chooses to disregard i t . We desire the peace as of r i g h t to the just man armed.... SO Roosevelt's concept of j u s t i c e i n foreign a f f a i r s was colored by h i s patriotism. Deeply impressed with the righteous-ness of h i s own b e l i e f s and the high p r i n c i p l e s f o r which h i s nation stood, he found the conduct of foreign a f f a i r s essenti-a l l y simple. Right was r i g h t , and the United States defined and en-forced the rules of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l game. A r b i t r a t i o n of disputes was laudable, except when America was a party to the issue. Peace was secondary to honor, and America defined honor. The Monroe Doctrine was the cornerstone of American diplomacy or belligerency; and before P r e s i -dent Roosevelt had concluded h i s interpretations I t had been changed almost beyond recognition. 31 19 Char^nwood, op_. c i t . , p. 1S5. SO Richardson, op_. c i t . t p. 6664 / 4 SI Pringle, op_. c l t . , p. S80. 19 I t was with the background of the 'just man armed' that President Roosevelt interpreted and fashioned the foreign policy of the united Spates during h i s term of o f f i c e . I t i s to the f i r s t of the major incidents i n foreign a f f a i r s with which he had to deal that one must now turn to examine how 'armed justice' operated. Chapter I I Roosevelt—  'Policeman of the Paribbean' 20 From 1823 onward one of the cardinal p r i n c i p l e s of Ameri-can foreign policy has been the insistence that the European Powers should respect the Monroe Doctrine. In a passive sense, the Doctrine might be construed as "America f o r the Americans." Interference by European nations i n the a f f a i r s of the Western Hemisphere were looked upon with grave suspicion. Interference i n the form of t e r r i t o r i a l aggrandizement or colonization by European powers was regarded as a breach of the Doctrine Ts p r i n c i p l e s , and a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n by the United States' government was usually swift and e f f e c t i v e . At the turn of the century, there was no area i n the Western Hemisphere where the American government held the Monroe Doctrine i n greater value than i n the area of the Caribbean Sea. Here were fought the major battles of the Spanish-American war,- and with victory, the United States tended to look upon the Caribbean scene with an; i n c r e a s i n l y p a t e r n a l i s t i c eye. But of greater importance," here lay the approaches to the proposed Isthmian canal whose construction and control the United States f e l t v i t a l to i t s national security. As might well be expected, President Roosevelt was greatly concerned with the r e l a t i o n s of tie Caribbean states not only with the United States, but with the European powers as w e l l . Roosevelt had good reason f o r his concern, f o r not only were the Caribbean states subject to frequent revolutions, but they were also generally irresponsible i n the matter of foreign debts. During the l a t t e r part of the nineteenth century, the non-payment of debts by a weak state to a strong 21 state had been the excuse f o r armed intervention by the l a t t e r on many occasions. Moreover, i n keeping withcthe i m p e r i a l i s t s p i r i t of the age, such armed intervention usually resulted i n the occupation of the weaker debtor state to a degree and length whereby that state became ei t h e r a protectorate or colony. In other words, weakness, i n s t a b i l i t y and debt were three common i n v i t a t i o n s to imperialism as practiced by the European Great Powers. Between European i m p e r i a l i s t theory and i t s practice i n the Caribbean area stood Roosevelt, h i s 'big s t i c k ' and the Monroe Doctrine. I t i s with the interplay of these factors, plus the evolution of the so-called Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, that t h i s chapter w i l l deal. One of the f i r s t problems confronting President Roosevelt i n the Caribbean area was the Venezuela c r i s i s of 1901—2. The opening of the twentieth century found Venezuela i n a distressed and bankrupt condition. For several years the state had been rent by f a c t i o n and turmoil, and was groaning under the dictatorship of Oipriano Castro. Between 1898 and 1902, a bloody c i v i l war was being waged, with the consequent r e s u l t of great damage and destruction of both domestic and foreign owned property. Germany, Great B r i t a i n , I t a l y , and numerous other nations, had important i n t e r e s t s i n Venezuela. These int e r e s t s were i n the form of loans, private property, r a i l -ways and c a p i t a l investments t o t a l l i n g many m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s . During the c i v i l disturbanoes, the persons and property of foreign residents had suffered severely, but demands f o r compensation were ignored. In time, payment on 22 the external debt of Venezuela was stopped," and the Castro government continually "winked at the wide-spread v i o l a t i o n of 1 contractual agreements." In February, 1901, matters were aggravated when Venezuelan a u t h o r i t i e s seized four B r i t i s h ships near Trinidad. Indeed, throughout the entire year a series of such incidents together with fresh i n d i g n i t i e s to european nationals i n Venezuela caused mounting anger and frequent strong protests by the European nations involved. In the summer of 1901, Germany proposed a scheme f o r the a r b i t r a t i o n of her claims against Venezuels which Castro re-fused to consider. During the l a t t e r part of 1901 and early i n 1902, Great B r i t a i n sent special representatives to Caracas, the Venezuelan c a p i t a l , to eliminate the f r i c t i o n over damage done to B r i t i s h ships by Venezuelan gunboats. These representa-tions were also spurned by Castro. I t became evident to both Germany and Great B r i t a i n that there was l i t t l e i f anything to be gained through using the normal diplomatic channels. Since s a t i s f a c t i o n could not be obtained by peaceful methods, the only course l e f t open was to use coercion. The d i f f i c u l t y here, however, was the attitude the United States might take towards armed intervention by European nations i n the United States sphere of influence. On December 11, 1901, the German Ambassador i n Washington stated the problem Germany faced i n regard to Venezuela i n a 1 Lionel Gelber, The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship. London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1938, p. 109. 23 note to Secretary of State John Hay. In t h i s note he mentioned that i f Germany were unable to obtain s a t i s f a c t i o n from Vene-zuela over the money owed her, Germany "would have to consider the temporary occupation on ^Germany's} part of d i f f e r e n t Venezuelan harbor places and the levying of duties i n those 2 places." To assure the American government of Germany's good intention, the German Ambassador hastened to add that "we declare e s p e c i a l l y that under no circumstances do we consider i n our proceedings the a c q u i s i t i o n or the permanent occupation 3 of Venequelan t e r r i t o r y . " Secretary Hay r e p l i e d to the German note a few days l a t e r . In t h i s reply Hay quoted from President Roosevelt's i message to Congress of a few days before, wherein Roosevelt had said: The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign.policy of the Americas, as i t i s of the United States.... The Monroe Doctrine i s a declaration that there must be n o . t e r r i t o r i a l aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American s o i l . We do not guarantee any state against punishment i f i t misconducts i t s e l f , provided that punishment does not take the form of a c q u i s i t i o n of t e r r i t o r y by any non-American power. 4 2~ United States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations  of the United States T Washington, Government Prin t i n g O f f i c e . 1901,.pi 1 9 4 . ( H e r e a f t e r c i t e d as U. S., Foreign Relations.) 3 I b i d . , p. 195. ~4 I b i d . , pp XXXVI—XXXVII 24 There was nothing i n Hay's reply which suggested the United States would move to block the proposed move by Germany, In fact there were indications that the American government would regard Venezuela'3 'chastizement' with mild favor, Germany took no action i n the f i r s t months of 1902 f o r several reasons. One was the Kaiser's desire that no move be made i n the matter u n t i l a f t e r the v i s i t of hi s brother, Prince Henry, to the United States. Nothing was to mar t h i s good-will tour designed to cement German-American friendship which had been strained i n the Spanish-American war. Another reason was the growing p o s s i b i l i t y of the co-operation of Great B r i t a i n i n forcing Castro's government to attend i t s obligations. In the winter of 1901—02 the B r i t i s h Under-Secretary of State^ V i l l i e r s , did bring up the p o s s i b i l i t y of j o i n t action with the German Ambassador i n London. On July 23, 1902, formal talk s were held on the matter, and during the following months d i s -cussions between Great B r i t a i n and Germany took place as to the nature and extent of the course to be taken. I t a l y also sug-gested that she be a partner i n t h i s j o i n t enterprise, 'The I t a l i a n o f f e r was not warmly received at f i r s t , but by the end of November, her p a r t i c i p a t i o n was agreed upon by Germany and Great B r i t a i n . By the end of November, 1902, the course of action had been decided upon, and the participants were ready 5 to carry out t h e i r plan. 5 The reasons behind B r i t a i n ' s collaboration with Germany are not f u l l y known. The American charge'" i n London, Henry WhitB wrote Hay shortly thereafter: "I cannot imagine,... and have not succeeded i n ascertaining, what ever possessed t h i s govern-25 In the meantime steady e f f o r t s were made by both Germany and Great B r i t a i n to keep informed of American public and governmental opinion regarding t h e i r proposed action, Ameri-can opinion during 1902 appeared to be favorable on the whole, so much so that on July 10 "von Quadt, the German Charge', cabled that to one who enjoyed h i s confidence the President had said that he would be glad 1 i f such unruly republics as VenezueJa 6 were taught a lesson,..," Similar reassurances followed, so that by the end of November, the German government enjoyed a "profound confidence,,, i n the attitude of the American govern-7 ment...." The same confidence was f e l t i n B r i t i s h govern-mental c i r c l e s , while I t a l y f e l t secure i n the company of her 8 partners. On December 7, 1902, the B r i t i s h and German rep-resentatives at Caracas separately presented t h e i r ultimata to the Venezuelan government demanding s a t i s f a c t i o n f o r the various charge^ mentioned above. Having received no reply ment to gib i n with Germany, and i f the whole matter i s not se t t l e d before Parliament meets, you may be certain that they w i l l have a pretty time of i t when that body assembles." (Alan Nevinsy Henry White, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1930, p. 212.).: A review of the biographies of the major English states-men of the time by the author f a i l s to throw any further l i g h t on the matter. One view i s that "the precise reasons f o r ( B r i t i s h collaboration with Germany) w i l l remain unknown u n t i l B r i t i s h c o n f i d e n t i a l archives are unlocked," (S, F, Benis. A Diplomatic History of the united States. KewVorK, He^v^j fys^-f Gow^p^-n «j, p. 5 3 3 ) I 6 Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine. 1867—1907. B a l t i -more, tftie John Hopkins Press, 1937, p. 330. ' 7 Ibid., p. 331. 8 I t a l y made no attempts to c o n c i l i a t e the United States as" did Germany and Great B r i t a i n . 26 within the stipulated 24 hours, both representatives withdrew ' 9 from the country. Two days l a t e r B r i t i s h and German naval vessels seized a l l Venezuelan ships within t h e i r compass, both on the high seas and i n Venezuelan waters. Four of the number seized were gunboats of the Venezuelan navy, two others of t h i s class being sunk by German naval f i r e despite t h e i r u nresisting surrender. On December 10, a B r i t i s h armed force landed at Le Guaya to f a c i l i t a t e the embarkation of B r i t i s h subjects at that port. Three days a f t e r t h i s landing, a German and a B r i t i s h c r u i s e r together shelled the port of Puerto Cabello, and temporarily landed an armed force there i n r e t a l i a t i o n f o r the i l l t r e a t -ment to a B r i t i s h ship then berthed i n the port, A week a f t e r t h i s incident, Germany, Great B r i t a i n and I t a l y together gave formal n o t i f i c a t i o n of the blockade "of tbs [Venezuelan] • ports of La Guaya, Carenero, Guanta, Cumana, Carupano and the 10 mouths of the Orinoco...." The series of events ranging from the blockading to the bombardment of Venezuelan ports during the second week i n December caused a sharp reaction i n Venezuela and an increas-ing a g i t a t i o n of opinion i n the American press. The bombard-ment of La;; Guaya was e s p e c i a l l y frightening to Castro, who immediately "scrambled to o f f e r the a r b i t r a t i o n he had once , 9 I t a l y presented her demand f o r the payment of various claims on December 11, 1902, and receiving no s a t i s f a c t o r y reply, withdrew her minister on December 16. 10 A. H. Oakes and W. Maycock, ed. and comp., B r i t i s h  and Foreign State Papers, 1901—1902, London, His Majesty's Stationery O f f i c e , 1903, p. 425. (Hereafter cited.as State  Papers.) spurned." This offer was made through the American Secretay of State, and was presented to both the German and British Foreign Ministers on December 13, 1903. In the meantime, both Great Britain and Germany were be-coming more apprehensive over the hostile tone of the American press which, as a whole, condemned the measures employed by the blockading powers. During this period, Roosevelt and Hay con-tinued to refrain from expressing any positive opinion on the actions taken by the European powers involved in the matter. Certain steps had been taken, with Roosevelt's approval, to ensure American interests i n the Caribbean. For example in October, 1902, the Navy Department, conscious of the possibility of intervention, had added to the Caribbean squadron of Admiral Coghlan three other squadrons, and put them under the supreme command of Admiral Dewey, with the announcement that they would be there for winter man-oeuvres. 12 If Roosevelt was saying nothing, i t was very obvious that the presence of the American fleet so close at hand warned the blockading powers that his opinions regarding the Monroe Doctrine needed l i t t l e amplification. Along with the hostile American press, a large section of British public opinion was c r i t i c a l of British action in the Venezuela a f f a i r . In Great Britain, criticism was levelled 11 H. F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, New York, Harcourt, Brace and-Co., 1931, p. 284. 12 Perkins, op_. c i t . , p. 335. 28 not only against a possible rupture with the United States, but also against British co-operation with Germany. Two days after the formal announcement of a blockade by Great Britain, a poem by Kipling i n the London Times summed up what a great many people were thinking. It read in part: Last night ye wrote our voyage was done But seaward s t i l l we go; And ye t e l l us now of a secret vow Ye have made with an open foe! That we must l i e off a lightless coast And haul and back and veer, At the w i l l of the breed that have wronged us most For a year and a year and a year. The dead they mocked are scarcely cold, Our wounds are bleeding yet, And yet ye t e l l us not that our strength i s sold To help them press for a debtj 13 Germany, too, was becoming very apprehensive over Ameri-can public opinion, which was especially invective on the occasion when German naval fi r e sunk two Venezuelan gunboats after they had surrendered. Moreover Germany wished to avoid any damage, to Britain's profit, in i t s relations with the United States. Consequently, within a few days after receiving Castro's offer to arbitrate the dispute, both Great Britain and Germany accepted in principle the idea of arbitration. In the note on this subject, Lord Lansdowne added that " i t would be extremely 13 .Quoted in Perkins, op_. c i t . , p. 358. "British public opinion became so alarmed at a possible Anglo-American break that i t threatened to overturn the Government in London i f i t did not settle the case without a rupture with the United States....." (S. F. Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of  State. New .York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1929, vol. 9, p. 147.) 29 agreeable to His Majesty's Government i f the President of the ; 14 United States would consent to act as A r b i t r a t o r , " In the meantime, the 'blockade 1 was to continue u n t i l a more d e f i n i t e settlement had been reached. The role of a r b i t r a t o r held great appeal f o r President Roosevelt. Indeed the entire negotiations pleased him i n one respect since they indicated the growing recognition of the United States as a Great Power. This was the f i r s t i n t e r -vention of which the United States received advance notice, and f o r which European powers sought i t s acquiescence. Furthermore, i t was the f i r s t intervention i n which European powers were ready to accept the President of the United States as the a r b i t e r of t h e i r grievances. Despite Roosevelt's w i l l -ingness 'bo mediate between the contending parties, i t was thought that i t would be more diplomatic to r e f e r the case to the Hague Tribunal. This suggestion was acceptable to the European nations involved, and on February 14, 1903, the blockade of Venezuela was l i f t e d . During the Venezuela controversy, the usually b e l l i c o s e Roosevelt remained comparatively quiescent i n h i s attitude towards the measures taken by the European powers against .15 Venezuela, With the advantage of hindsight, many hi s t o r i a n s have found the mildness of h i s actions and l e t t e r s r e l a t i n g to t h i s c r i s i s quite surprising. Be t h i s as i t may, throughout the entire period Roosevelt, i f he 'spoke quietly', neverthe-14 State Papers, 1901—02, p. 1123. 15 See Appendix, ft 30 l e s s had the advantage of having h i s 'big s t i c k ' c l o s e a t hand i n the form o f the American Caribbean f l e e t . Should the block-ading powers have r e f u s e d to accept the s t r o n g recommendation 16 f o r a r b i t r a t i o n by S e c r e t a r y Hay, o r should n e g o t i a t i o n s ha\e broken down at any time, there i s l i t t l e doubt but t h a t Roose-v e l t would have used the navy to f o r c e them to accept i t . However, as we have seen, Great B r i t a i n and Germany were q u i c k to accept a r b i t r a t i o n o f f e r e d by Venezuela through an American r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , and t h i s acceptance had been agreed upon even before S e c r e t a r y Hay sent h i s 'strong recommendation' t h a t 17 they do so. I f the European powers had meant the Venezuela c r i s i s to a c t as a t e s t of the firmness o f the Monroe Doctrine, they c o u l d s c a r c e l y f a i l t o see t h a t under the Roosevelt Ad-m i n i s t r a t i o n the D o c t r i n e was to remain a cornerstone of American f o r e i g n p o l i c y . But though i n the Venezuelan matter 16" On December 18, 1902. Although the note was sent under Hay's s i g n a t u r e , the g u i d i n g hand was R o o s e v e l t ' s , f o r " i n the Venezuela c o n t r o v e r s y . . . Roosevelt was a c t i n g as h i s own S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e . " ( P r i n g l e , op_. c i t . , p. 293.) 17 The Hague T r i b u n a l f i n a l l y decreed t h a t Venezuela should "... s e t a p a r t a c e r t a i n percentage o f the customs r e c e i p t s of two o f her p o r t s to be a p p l i e d t o the payment of whatever o b l i g a t i o n s might be a s c e r t a i n e d by mixed commissions appointed f o r t h a t purpose t o be due from her, not only t o the threempowers... whose proceedings a g a i n s t h e r had r e s u l t e d i n a s t a t e of war, but a l s o to the U n i t e d S t a t e s , France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway, and Mexico, who had not employed f o r c e f o r the c o l l e c t i o n o f the c l a i m s a l l e g e d to be due to c e r t a i n of t h e i r c i t i z e n s . " ( P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt i n h i s t h i r d annual message to Congress, i n U n i t e d S t a t e s , Bureau of N a t i o n a l L i t e r a t u r e and A r t , A C o m p i l a t i o n of the  Messages and Papers o f the P r e s i d e n t s . Washington^ P u b l i s h e d by the Bureau, 1910, v o l . IX, p. 6868.) 31 Roosevelt was willing and even desirous that the dispute should be settled by an 'international court, in the case of Santo Domingo the American President ?/as to settle the dispute him-self. Santo Domingonwas another of those small Caribbean states which had been torn by c i v i l s t r i f e and burdened by corrupt government during the latter part of the 19th century. Between 1888 and 1898, Santo Domingo's bonded external debt rose from approximately #4,000,000 to |19,;000,000 owing i n part to the lavish spending of her successive dictators as well as to the high interest and financial scheming of the European creditors. To provide for the service of the various large loans made i n this decade the interested European bankers ^'organized a colleo-tion agency called the 'regie' which was given the right to 18 administer and control the customs." This effort to solve Santo Domingo's financial d i f f i c u l t i e s failed. As a result, 5 a small group of interested Americans took over the 'regie' from the bankers, and formed the Santo Domingo Improvement Company. Briefly, this company was to act as a sort of f i n -ancial agent for Santo Domingo. Among other things, i t was to secure foreign loans for the state i f necessary, and also i t was given control of the customs of certain ports, the revenues to be used towards reducing the Dominican debt. Despite the 'assistance' of this American firm, conditions in Sa^nto Domingo went from bad to worse. Further loans were 18 Charles P . Howland, ed., Survey of American Foreign  Relations, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1929, p. 77. 32 made to Santo Domingo, and the company floated successive bond issues i n Europe as stop-gap measures. However, the customs receipts of Santo Domingo wer6 insufficient to meet the i n -terest on a l l the- various loans made. It wa^ s not unusual to have the same revenues and customs pledged several times over in an attempt to satisfy the creditors. In addition chaotic conditions, recklessness and a flagrant disregard for the public welfare by the dictator-presidency of Heureaux was pushing the country towards a revolt. The tyranny and corrup-tion of the Heureaux regime ended in a c i v i l war. Yet with the inauguration of the new President, Jimenez, greater pres-sure was brought to bear on Santo Domingo by foreign governments for the payment of debts owed their nationals. By 1902, the finances of Santo Domingo were in a state of almost helpless confusion. Moreover there was rising indigna-tion at the policy of the Santo Domingo Improvement Company by the Dominican public, especially at \.*i"tS: extravagant claims for compensation for the meager services i t had rendered. So hostile was the opinion that President Jiminez issued a decree cancelling the concessions of the company and excluding the company's agents from the custom-houses. While new schemes were being tried to pay off the external debt by Jimenez, the Santo Domingo Improvement Company appealed to the United States' Department of State for assistance. According to the company's figures the Dominican government owed i t some $11, 000,000 for bonds i t held. The American State Department counselled private settlement, but shortly thereafter a new 33 president was 'elected' in Santo Domingo. The new president, Vasquez, offered to recognize a Dominican debt of #4,500,000 to the company. Thus on January 31, 1903, "a protocol was signed whereby the Dominican Government was to pay over to the United States' Government, for the San Domingo Improvement 19 Company, the sum of |4,500,'000 i n American gold." In ex-change for this sum, the company was to relinquish a l l i t s rights, properties and claims to the Dominican government. The payment of the #4,;500,000 to the Improvement Company was worked out by a board of arbitrators appointed jointly by the American and Dominican governments. This board decided on a monthly payment to be made the company, with the customs revenue of three Dominican ports to be designated as specific security. In case of non-payment, the Vice-President of the Improvement Company, who had been appointed Financial Agent,1 was to take over the revenue of the ports. The conditions in Santo Domingo continued to deteriorate. Almost three quarters of the total national revenue was being devoted by the president i n power to combat insurrectionists. The double pledging of custom house revenues, the nepotism of the government and other corruption, the waste and graft of public o f f i c i a l s — a l l this resulted in Santo Domingo approach-ing a state of complete bankruptcy towards the end of 1904. Payments to foreign creditors and to the Improvement Company had fallen into default as a result of the financial 19 M. M. Knight, The Americans in San Domingo. New York, Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 20. 34 c r i s i s . Under the terms of the agreement with the company,1 tn.e F i n a n c i a l Agent appointed by the board of a r b i t r a t o r s began to take over the customs revenues of several ports, s t a r t i n g with the port of Puerto Plata i n October, 1904. This arrangement was greatly admired by the Dominican Republic's European creditors, and there was a r i s i n g tide of demands made by the French, I t a l i a n , German and other governments to secure payment of t h e i r debts which by t h i s time t o t a l l e d close to $30,000, 000. In December, 1904, the French representative i n Santo Domingo, on behalf of his own and the Belgian government,' threatened to seize the customhouse of Santo Domingo C i t y , the mainstay of the Dominican government's revenue. I t a l y , too, pressed her claims with equal vigor, and an I t a l i a n c r u i s e r sent to Dominican waters attested her impatience. We must now consider the c r i s i s i n Santo Domingo from the American viewpoint, and i n so doing gove special consideration to the opinions held by President Roosevelt. Before the Santo Domingo problem had reached a stage of c r i s i s l a t e i n 1904, the United States had signed a treaty ~ with the new Republic of Panama whereby the American government was permitted to construct, control and f o r t i f y a canal across the isthmus of Panama. This canal was believed v i t a l to the security and economic betterment of the United States, I t followed, therefore, t h a t the approaches to the proposed canal were of equal importance to the nation, and that great concern was warranted f o r the Latin-American states i n the Caribbean area. Roosevelt had seen the extent to which European powers 35 would go in collecting debts owed their subjects in the Venezuelan c r i s i s some months previously. Mutual jealousy to-gether with the increasingly unfriendly attitude of the Ameri-can press had resulted in the powers submitting their dispute to arbitration. This course had been strongly favored by Roosevelt, but he was coming more and more to believe that the United States alone should be the,sole arbiter of disputes in the area covered by the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt was not alone in this opinion by any means, for i t was clear "that the American public was becoming increasingly hostile to the acts of coercion by European nations in the New 20 World...." At the same time, the methods employed by Roose-velt to secure the right to build an Isthmian canal had i n -creased the h o s t i l i t y of various Latin-American countries towards the 'Colossus of the North'. Although such h o s t i l i t y did not penetrate Roosevelt's armour of righteousness very deeply, i t was sufficiently aggravating to make him stop and consider before entering upon a course of action which might further i r r i t a t e the Latin-American states. In February, 1904, there occurred an event which sharpened Roosevelt's apprehension over further European interference in American af f a i r s . On February 22, the Hague Tribunal rendered i t s decision on an aspect of the Venezuelan c r i s i s . Germany, Great Britain and Italy had contended that their claims should receive primary consideration as they had been the blockading 20 Perkins, op_. c i t . , p. 424, 36 powers. The Tribunal had decided in their favor, that i s , that the powers which had resorted to force to secure justice should have a prior right to payment. In international law,-this decision placed a premium upon forceful intervention against a delinquent state. The implication of the Tribunal's decision was not lost on the creditor nations, nor was i t on Roosevelt. Direct interference was s t i l l far from the Pre-sident's mind, however, although he undoubtedly f e l t that the Dominican Republic would benefit by the United States stepping i n . Yet early i n 1904, when the Dominican Minister of Foreign Affairs "visited Washington and besought the help of the United States Government to enable the republic to escape financial and social disorders... [the-} request was... de-21' clined." As the year 1904 wore on, President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State f e l t a greater concern for the position of the Dominican Republic. As the financial s t a b i l i t y and i n -ternal order weakened, the pressure on Santo Domingo by the European creditor nations remained steady, and in some cases increased. For example in April, 1904, the United States' 21 J. B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920, vol. I, p. 430. Roosevelt wrote to his biographer in the same month, and made an interesting—and I believe true—statement in regard to charges that he wan ted to annex the island. He wrote: "I have been hoping and praying for three months that the Santo Domingans would behave so that I would not have to act in any way. I want to do nothing but what'a policeman has to do i n Santo Domingo. As for annexing the island, I have about the same desire to annex i t as a gorged boa constrictor might have to swallow a procupine wrong-end-to." (Ibid.. p? 431.) 3 7 M i n i s t e r i n S a n t o D o m i n g o r e p o r t e d " t h a t I t a l y w a s a b o u t t o i n t e r v e n e w i t h n a v a l f o r c e s t o s e c u r e t h e r i g h t s o f I t a l i a n n a t i o n a l s , f i x e d b y a p r o t o c o l o f 1 9 0 3 . " ' I u n d e r s t a n d , ! ! h e s a i d ' t h a t t h e a c t i o n o f t h e I t a l i a n G o v e r n m e n t i s b a s e d u n o n 2 2 t h e r e c e n t d e c i s i o n a t t h e H a g u e . " ' D e s p i t e t h e t h r e a t s o f i n t e r v e n t i o n a n d o c c u p a t i o n b y s o m e o f t h e E u r o p e a n p o w e r s , t h e y t o o k n o m e a s u r e s w h i c h d e -m a n d e d i m m e d i a t e c o u n t e r - a c t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h e M o n r o e D o c t r i n e , a s i n t e r p r e t e d b y R o o s e v e l t a t t h e t i m e , h a d n o t b e e n v i o l a t e d . H o w e v e r , s i n c e t h e P r e s i d e n t w h o l e h e a r t e d l y a g r e e d w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t a d e b t o r n a t i o n s h o u l d n o t b e p e r m i t t e d t o d e f a u l t o n i t s d e b t , i t w a s q u i t e e v i d e n t t h a t h e w o u l d h a v e t o a c t . H i s p a s s i o n f o r r i g h t e o u s -n e s s r e b e l l e d a t u s i n g ' t h e b i g s t i c k ' i n o r d e r t h a t a w a s t e f u l a n d d i s o r d e r l y g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d d e f y i t s c r e d i t o r s b e h i n d t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e A m e r i c a n n a v y . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d i f E u r o p e a n p o w e r s w e r e p e r m i t t e d a f o o t h o l d o n D o m i n i c a n s o i l , s u c h a c t i o n w o u l d n o t o n l y b e a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e M o n r o e D o c -/ 2 3 t r i n e , b u t i t m i g h t d e v e l o p i n t o a l o d g e m e n t a l a E g y p t , a n d t h u s p r o v i d e t h e b a s e f o r n a v a l o p e r a t i o n w i t h i n e a s y s t r i k i n g d i s t a n c e o f t h e P a n a m a c a n a l s i t e . B y t h e s u m m e r o f 1 9 0 4 , P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t a p p e a r e d t o h a v e r e a c h e d a d e c i s i o n o n t h e s t a n d h i s c o u n t r y w o u l d t a k e 2 2 S . E . B e m i s , T h e L a t i n A m e r i c a n P o l i c y o f t h e U n i t e d  S t a t e s , N e w Y o r k , H a r c o u r t , B r a c e a n d C o m p a n y , 1 9 4 3 , p . 1 5 4 . 2 3 P r i n g l e , o p _ . c i t . , p . 2 9 5 . 38 not only i n regard to the q u e s t i o n o f Santo Domingo, but r e -g a r d i n g the e n t i r e problem of European i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the a f f a i r s o f the Latin-American s t a t e s . He had f r e q u e n t l y been asked why he d i d not step forward and s e t t l e the Dominican problem by u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n . Although Roosevelt wished to a v o i d t h i s , i t became c l e a r to him t h a t the American government c o u l d not much l o n g e r a v o i d t a k i n g some s o r t o f a c t i o n . As he wrote i n a l e t t e r to a f r i e n d , " i f we CAmericans} i n t e n d to say 'hands o f f to the powers o f Europe, sooner or l a t e r we 24 must keep order o u r s e l v e s . " The i d e a o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s a c t i n g as a 'Policeman o f the Caribbean' appealed to Roosevelt, and he e l a b o r a t e d i t i n a l e t t e r to E l i h u Root, h i s S e c r e t a r y o f War. I n t h i s l e t t e r , which Roosevelt suggested should be read a l o u d a t a s m a l l dinner p a r t y , the P r e s i d e n t s t r e s s e d t h a t i t was the s o l e d e s i r e of the U n i t e d S t a t e s ... to see a l l n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s s t a b l e , o r d e r l y and prosperous.... Any country whose people conduct them-s e l v e s w e l l can count upon our h e a r t y f r i e n d l i n e s s . I f a n a t i o n shows t h a t i t knows how to a c t w i t h decency i n i n d u s t r i a l and p o l i t i c a l matters, i f i t keeps o r d e r and pays i t s o b l i g a t i o n s , then i t need f e a r no i n t e r f e r e n c e from the U n i t e d S t a t e s . B r u t a l wrong doing, o r an im-potence—whi-ch--resuits i n a g e n e r a l l o o s e n i n g of the t i e s o f c i v i l i z e d s o c i e t y , may f i n a l l y r e q u i r e i n t e r v e n t i o n by -24 "There have been f i v e o c c a s i o n s on which the U n i t e d S t a t e s has not i n s i s t e d upon the Monroe D o c t r i n e . I n each case' a European power extended i t s c o n t r o l o v e r American t e r r i t o r y . . . . The B r i t i s h i n Nicaragua, Honduras, and the F a l k l a n d I s l a n d s ; the French i n Mexico; the Spanish i n Santo Domingo." (C. L. Jones, H. K. Norton and P, T, Moon, The  Unit.ed S t a t e s and the Caribbean, Chicago, U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago Press, 1929, p. 90.) 39 some c i v i l i z e d nation, and in the Western Hemisphere, the United States cannot ignore this duty. 25 The idea expressed in this l e t t e r to Root became the core of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. As Santo Domingo approached bankruptcy towards the end of the year, President Roosevelt decided to make a formal announcement of this policy i n his annual messagel/toCCongress on December 6, 1904. His announcement of the United States' policy towards other nations of the Western Hemisphere was a paraphrase of has letter to Secretary Root, In part i t read: It i s not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save as such as are for their welfare. A l l that this country desires i s to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count on our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that i t knows huw to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and p o l i t i c a l matters, i f i t keeps order and pays i t s obligations, i t need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of c i v i l i z e d society, may in America, as elsewhere, u l t i -mately require intervention by some c i v i l i z e d nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the united States, however reluctantly in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. Although Santo Domingo was the immediate oause of Roose-velt's warping of the Monroe Doctrine, i t should not be over-looked that his corollary applied to a l l states in Latin 25 Pringle, op_. c i t . , p. 294. This was a ' t r i a l balloon' on Roosevelt's part. 26 U. S., Foreign Relations. 1904, p. XLI America just as i t applied to the powers of Europe. Under the circumstances, i t was a re a l i s t i c move on the President's part, and very much in keeping with the views he held of the United States' position in the Western Hemisphere. I f there was to be any intervention, the United States would shoulder the burden. According to Roosevelt this would automatically insure the inefficient state against unfair treatment, per-manent occupation, exploitation, or the assimilation into an empire. Moreover, i t would be the best guard against further excuses by European powers to trespass in the Americas. That the state undergoing intervention would benefit from closer contact with the United States, and that i t would welcome a strong hand to keep order and guide i t into the path of the American 'way-of-life,' there could be l i t t l e doubt. Roose-velt's nationalism in this respect permeated every sentence of his various statements on the matter. To be f a i r , one should note that his latent imperialism, both i n his later declarations 27" The Roosevelt Corollary was quite welcome to most European nations. The Kaiser thought i t high-handed, but British politicians thoroughly approved i t . Early in 1903, Prime Minister Balfour had spoken of the attitude the British would take. Speaking at Liverpool he had said: "We welcome ... any increase of the influence of the United States of America in the Western Hemisphere. We desire no colonization, we desire no alteration in the balance of power, we desire no acquisition of territory. We have not the slightest intention of interfering with the mode of government in any portion of that ..continent." (Quoted in Dexter Perkins, Hands Off 1 A  History of the Monroe Doctrine, Boston, L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1941, p. 224.) The smaller countries of Europe generally looked upon Roosevelt's new plan as a means whereby they could collect their debts with less d i f f i c u l t y and with greater surj^y than'in former years. 41 and actions, never caused him to vary from the stand he took at this time. Roosevelt's egotism may often have been over-powering, but he was not the type of man to employ subterfuge as a cloak for annexing territory. In Santo Domingo, a c r i s i s had been reached in December, 1904. The government was financially bankrupt. Internal dis-order threatened to degenerate into anarchy. President Roose-velt had made his position clear, and now he was determined to act. On December 30, 1904, Secretary Hay sent a telegram to the American Minister in Santo Domingo, T. C. Dawson, which read in part: Confidential.. You w i l l sound the President of Santo Domingo, discreetly but earnestly... touching the dis-quieting situation which i s developing owing to the pressure of other governments,... Already one European Government strongly intimates that i t may resort to occupation of some Dominican customs ports to secure i t s own payment. There appears to be a concert among them. You w i l l ascertain whether the Government of Santo Domingo would be disposed to request the United States to take charge of the collection of duties and effect an equitable distribution of the assigned quotas among the Dominican Government and the several claimants. 28 Three days later, Dawson was able to send President Morate' formal request that the United States take charge of a l l col-lections of Dominican customs. Commander Dillingham of the United States Navy was immediately dispatched to confer with Morales on the organization of the proposed customs administra-tion. Talks on the matter were carried on with a s p i r i t of mutual friendliness. Public reaction was such that Commander 28 U. S., Foreign Relations--1905; p. 286. 42 Dillingham was able to telegraph Washington on January 21: the "Most peopl we seem to appreciate/generous attitude of the 29 • Government of the United States." Nevertheless, for those who were displeased with the United States' "generous at-titude", the presence of American naval craft i n Dominican waters proved determent enough to discourage the resumption of armed raids on customs-houses. The agreement was signed on January 21, 1905, Briefly, i t called for the United States' government to constitute i t -self before the Dominican government their creditor "for the total am&unt of the various foreign debts and the domestic 30 under contract," In return, and in conjunction with the Dominican government, the United States was to share the con-t r o l of a l l Dominical custom-houses. Furthermore/ a financial agent was to be appointed by the United States to act as superintendent of the customs administration. Forty-five percent of the total revenues collected was to go to pay the administrative budget of Santo Domingo, while f i f t y - f i v e per-cent, excluding administrative expenses, was to be set aside to pay off the debts, both foreign and domestic. There was to be no compensation for the United States i n the agreement—no 29 U. S., Foreign Relations—1905. p. 307, 30 Ibid., p. 310. 43 commercial p r i v i l e g e s were asked, the American debtors were to be paid on the same basis §.s other debtors, and there was no suggestion that American troops should occupy even temporarily any part of the Dominican Republic. Within the agreement i t -s e l f were the assuring words that the United States guaranteed "the complete i n t e g r i t y of the t e r r i t o r y d>f the Dominican 31 Republic....." At the request of the American Department of State, a few minor changes were made i n the agreement, and i t was then drawn up i n &he form of a protocol f o r presentation to the American Senate. The protocol was signed on February 7, 1905, by the Dominican Government, and then rushed to Washington where the American Congress was nearing the end of i t s regular 32 session. On February 15, President Roosevelt submitted the protocol to the American Senate f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n . In his message to the Senate, Roosevelt stressed the f a c t that there was no desire whatever on the part of the United States to annex any part of the Dominican Republic, nor did the government desire to exercise any control other than that necessary to Santo Domingo's f i n a n c i a l r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . In defense of h i s action Roosevelt stated: ' 31 U. S., Foreign Relations—1905, p. 311. 32 There was every need f o r haste on the Dominican side also, f o r that Republic's treasury was empty. U n t i l Roosevelt used h i s executive power i n March, a private banker financed the Dominican governmentI 44_ The j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the United States taking t h i s burden and inc u r r i n g t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s to be found i n the fact that i t i s incompatible with i n t e r n a t i o n a l equity f o r the United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the only means at t h e i r disposal of s a t i s -f y i n g the claims of t h e i r creditors and yet to refuse, 1 I t s e l f , to take any such steps. 33 The President went on to say that "an aggrieved nation" could take what action i t saw f i t i n the adjustment of disputes with American states without i n t e r f e r i n g with the Monroe Doctrine providing that nation d i d not "despoil" or occupy the t e r r i t o r y of the debtor state. But when the question was one of a money claim, ... the only way which remains, f i n a l l y , * to c o l l e c t i t i s a blockade, or bombardment, or the seizure of the customs houses, and t h i s means what i s i n Affect a possession,' even though only.a temporary possession, of t e r r i t o r y . The United States then becomes a party i n i n t e r e s t , be-cause under the Monroe Doctrine i t can not see any Euro-pean power seize and permanently occupy the t e r r i t o r y of one of these republics; and yet such seizure of te r r i t o r y , disguised or undisguised, may eventually o f f e r the only way i n which the power i n question can c o l l e c t any debts,3 unless.there i s interference on the part of the United States. a* Despite Roosevelt's plea f o r quick r a t i f i c a t i o n , the Senate- adjourned i n March without giving i t s consent to the protocol. Although r a t i f i c a t i o n f a i l e d by a slim margin, i t 33 U. S., Foreign Relations—1905.' p. 334. 34 Ibid. , pp. 334—35. In t h i s long message to the Senate, President Roosevelt i n d i r e c t l y points out the necessity of having American naval ships i n Dominican waters. The custom-houses had "become the nuclei of the various revolutions. The f i r s t e f f e c t of r e v o l u t i o n i s t s i s to take possession of a custom-house so as to obtain funds...." (Ibid., pp, 339—40.) The- t e r r a i n of Santo Dominica was such that i t was frequently, f a s t e r to proceed by sea from one port to another rather than use the poor overland routes. 45 was ind i c a t i v e of the increasing determination by the Senate that i t s prerogatives should not be i n the l e a s t impaired by the impetuosity- of the President. Above a l l , the Senate did not want to be regarded as a 'rubber stamp' to Roosevelt's foreign p o l i c y . When the Senate adjourned on March 18 without r a t i f y i n g the protocol, the e f f e c t on Dominican public opinion and on the European cr e d i t o r nations was immediate. The American M i n i s t e r i n Santo Domingo wired that the tension there was great. The r e v o l u t i o n i s t s were encouraged and "conspiracies and prepara-t i o n s " was rumored. On hearing the news from Washington, I t a l y and Belgium made further demands on the Dominican government 35 fo r immediate payment of t h e i r debts. Roosevelt v/as more disgusted than dismayed when informed of the Senate's r e f u s a l to r a t i f y the protocol. He was, at t h i s time, at the height of his power. Four more years of o f f i c e stretched before him, and he saw i n the great vote that swept him back i n t o the p r e s i d e n t i a l chair the public's ap» proval of h i s actions. Determined not to be fr u s t r a t e d i n h i s designs f o r s e t t l i n g the Dominican c r i s i s , he welcomed any plan that might serve to circumvent the Senate's stubbornness. At the i n s t i g a t i o n of Minister Dawson,' President Morales sug-gested to Roosevelt that some modus Vivendi might be employed to t i d e the Dominican Republic over i t s period of acute c r i s i s . 35 An I t a l i a n warship arrived i n Havana on March 14th, which accentuated the urgency of a r r i v i n g at some settlement. 46 This was most acceptable to Roosevelt since the suggestion followed the general terms of the protocol yet provided a more or l e s s l e g a l loophole enabling him to act. Stretching the 36 conception of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l power to the limit,' President Roosevelt ordered Dawson to conclude a l l the necessary arrange-ments leading towards the establishment of a modus Vivendi with the understanding, of course, that the arrangement would t e r -minate as soon as the Senate had acted i n "one way or another". Tv/o weeks a f t e r the American Senate had adjourned, the modus  vivendi was put into e f f e c t by the executive approval of Roose-v e l t and the executive decree of Morales. Roosevelt now became i n t r u t h the 'Policeman of the Caribbean,' despite the fact that he had to pin his barge of o f f i c e on h i s own chest. I t was a position which he did not altogether enjoy, but rather one which he f e l t necessary to accept i f the United States was to avoid future troubles sim-i l a r to those i n Venezuela. He gave an honest opinion of h i s position to John Hay shortly a f t e r the modus vivendi went into operation. In part he wrote: In Santo Domingo we have taken the necessary step; but i t was. one of those cases where trouble was sure to come, 36 In h i s autobiography, Roosevelt wrote: "The Constitu-t i o n d i d not e x p l i c i t l y give me power to bring about the necessary agreement with Santo Domingo. But the Constitution did not forbid my doing what I did. I put the agreement into e f f e c t . . . and I would have continued i t u n t i l the end of my term, i f necessary, without any action by Congress." (Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography. 1 New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920, p. 510.) Roosevelt, l i k e John Hay, frequently found the Senate embarrassingly slow to appreciate the righteousness of his-plans and actions. 47 whether from action o r i n a c t i o n . I f e l t that much l e s s trouble would come from action.... 37 Roosevelt's assumption that action would cause l e s s trouble v/as i n many ways correct. From the time the modus vivendi went into operation on A p r i l 1, 1905, the e f f e c t s were favorable. "The creditors ceased t h e i r pressure, confidence returned, i n t e r i o r trade revived, smuggling was diminished, exports and imports increased, and the receipts covered budget 38 appropiations." Within the Dominican Republic i t s e l f there was not complete s a t i s f a c t i o n with the course taken, although i t was generally agreed that the government had chosen the l e s s e r of the tv/o e v i l s presented. However, the periodic re-volutions that had prevented domestic order and s t a b i l i t y f o r so many years were not permitted to destroy the arrangement 37 A. L. P. Dennis, Adventures i n American Diplomacy, 1896—1906. New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1928, p. 277. At t h i s time Hay was i n Europe t r a v e l l i n g f o r h i s health. He died shortly thereafter, and his position as Secretary of State was taken over by E l i h u Root,*1 Root was to use a.much gentler hand i n dealing with the Latin-American states. Indeed/ one of h i s f i r s t moves was to go on a tour of the South American countries to try to regain the confidence and good-will of these states which had been shaken since the turn of the century. 38 Howland,' op_. c i t . , p. 81. Under the terms of the modus Vivendi, and with the agreement of the foreign creditors, the money co l l e c t e d towards paying o f f the debt was placed i n the National C i t y Bank of New York, with the understanding that i t should remain there u n t i l a f t e r the Senate had r a t i -f i e d the pending treaty. A f t e r r a t i f i c a t i o n , the accumulated money was to be paid to the creditors without fa v o r i t i s m . 48 39 entered 'into, ?-3 and-an.-era of comparative peace and quiet ensued. At home, Roosevelt v/as c a l l e d a d i c t a t o r and a war-monger' because of his heavy-handed treatment of the Dominican a f f a i r . I t i s true that there was a sense of dict a t o r s h i p l a t e n t within him which "was warranted i n h i s eyes by the merit o f a a l l he represented,.the patriotism of h i s intention, and the pro-40 v i s i o n a l tenure of h i s power." Nevertheless, t h i s sense of dictatorship was rarely expressed, and was represented more by the combination of egotism and nationalism coloring h i s char-acter. This combination together v/ith his frequent impetuous actions, l e d many to claim that had he the opportunity, Roose-v e l t would have become a d i c t a t o r of the United States, Nothing could be further from the truth. The charge of war-mongering l e v e l l e d at Roosevelt came from the p a c i f i s t s . In answer to t h i s accusation, Roosevelt 39 Tflien signs of i n t e r n a l trouble appeared i n the i s l a n d l a t e i n 1905, Roosevelt sent an order (September 5) to the Secretary of the Navy, which read i n part: "As to the Santo. Domingo matter, t e l l Admiral Bradley to stop any revolutions. I intend to keep the i s l a n d i n statu quo u n t i l the Senate has had time to act on the treaty, and I s h a l l treat any revolu-tionary movement as an e f f o r t to upset the modus vivendi. That" t h i s i s e t h i c a l l y right I am dead sure, even though there may be some technical or red-tape d i f f i c u l t y . " (Bishop, op. cit._, p. 434.) Nevertheless, the government of President V<. Morales was over-turned i n the winter of 1905—06, being re-placed by that of President Carecess "Throughout the d i s -turbance the United States safe-guarded the custom-houses," but seems to have given neither assistance nor favor to e i t h e r of the .contending f a c t i o n s . . . . " (H. C. H i l l , Roosevelt and the  Caribbean. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927, p. 166.) 40 Lewis E i n s t e i n , Roosevelt, His Mind i n Action." New York, Houghton M i f f l i n Company, 1930, p. 110. 49 re p l i e d : I was immensely amused when at a professional peace meeting the other day, they... alluded to me as having made 'war' on Santo Domingo. The war I have made l i t e r -a l l y consists i n having loaned them a c o l l e c t o r of cus-toms, at t h e i r request.... I f e e l l i k e paraphrasing Patrick Henry: 'If t h i s i s 'war1, make the most of i t . ' 41 Those who believed they saw i n Roosevelt's action an ex-ample of European imperialism attempted to prove that the President had forced the hand of the Dominican government. To the extent that Santo Domingo was forced to turn f o r help to the United Spates rather than to Europe under the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, t h e i r charge i s true. Ameri-can diplomacy was also behind President Morales' 'earnest request' to Roosevelt that a modus Vivendi be employed. In t h i s l a t t e r respect, the modus Vivendi had to appear to come from Santo Domingo so as to avoid the form of a protocol which would have to await the Senate's r a t i f i c a t i o n before being l e g a l . Roosevelt's forcing Morales to appeal to the United States came about as a resu l t of the need for immediate action. 41 Bishop, pj). c i t . , pp. 434—35. (Quoted from a speech made before the Harvard Union, February 13, 1907.) To whatever extent'Roosevelt may be accused of jingoism, c e r t a i n l y the accusation i s extremely weak i n t h i s instance. He held the 'Dagoes' i n contempt f o r the most part, and c e r t a i n l y would not have considered a war against them as bringing honor and glory to American arms. Roosevelt's jingoism was i n large part an over-..compensation f o r the fear he f e l t over the United States' small-defensive force r e l a t i v e to the m i l i t a r y and naval strength of smaller European powers. To an extent, therefore, one may say that Roosevelt hoped to keep attention focused on the sound of the sabre he sometimes r a t t l e d , rather than on the size of the sabre r a t t l e d . As one wr i t e r puts i t ; "With CRooseveltJ national defence was a passion; i t was, indeed, almost a r e l i g i o n , " ( H i l l , oj>. c i t . , p. 201) 50 That i t was due to time alone Roosevelt took pains to point out i n various messages to Congress. In one such message he said: Again and again has the Dominican Government invoked on i t s own behalf the a i d of the United States. I t has re-peatedly done so of recent years. In 1899 i t sought to enter into treaty relations by which i t would be placed under the protection of the United States Government. This request was refused. Again, i n January, 1901, i t s minister of foreign a f f a i r s v i s i t e d Washington and be-sought the help of the United States Government to en-able i t to escape from i t s f i n a n c i a l and s o c i a l disorders. Compliance with t h i s request was again declined, f o r t h i s government has been most reluctant to i n t e r f e r e i n any way.... 42 Once interference became necessary, however, Roosevelt's great b e l i e f i n h i s own and h i s country's high motives l e d him to formulate a plan which would hhape the Monroe Doctrine to modern needs. However indignant certain European nations might f e e l over the solution arrived at, the president's 'big s t i c k ' — t h e American navy—forced them to accept i t with waat grace they could muster. The Caribbean area was henceforth to be a desert area for the seeds of European imperialism. 43 Eor a period of approximately two years the modus 42 U. S., Foreign Relations--1905. p. 340. 43 The President's opponents i n the Senate denounced h i s action as unconstitutional, declaring that he was going against the express washes of the Senate, and charged him with t r y i n g to e s t a b l i s h a protectorate over Santo Domingo. The Senate,-a f t e r some few amendments and modifications, a l l favoring Santo Domingo, approved the treaty on February 25, 1907. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the J . P. Morgan banking company, when approached by Secretary of State Root regarding a $20, 000,000 loan to Santo Domingo to enable i t to pay i t s debts, refused to" grant the loan. This company thought the sought a f t e r terms (the loan at 5% payable over 50 years) unattractive. A loan was f i n a l l y secured from Khun/ Loeb and company at the terms required. 51 Vivendi between Santo Domingo and the United States remained i n e f f e c t . At the end of that time, the American Senate f i n a l l y r a t i f i e d the treaty upon which the temporary arrange-ment had been based. Under the modus Vivendi the finances of the Dominican Republic were s t a b i l i z e d and foreign debts a l -most paid o f f . The f o r t y - f i v e per cent allocated from the customs revenues to the Dominican government proved to be a greater sum of money than the t o t a l c o l l e c t i o n s under the old regime. There had been a minimum of interference with the treaty signed by the Senate guaranteed there would be even l e s s . " A l l i n a l l , the Roosevelt policy and action i n regard to the c o l l e c t i o n of debts involving nations was promotive of 44 international amity and peace." The next problem of $a;jor importance i n the Caribbean with which President Roosevelt had to deal was Cuba and her re-l a t i o n with the United States. The i s l a n d of Cuba had been wrested from Spain i n the Spanish-American War, but from the beginning of the c o n f l i c t , the American government made i t clear that once the Spaniards had been driven o f f and the i s l a n d 'pacified', the control of the i s l a n d would remain i n 45 the hands of i t s people. By the terms of the treaty of Paris, American m i l i t a r y occupation and a m i l i t a r y government super-ceded Spanish sovereignty. Under the guidance of General Leonard Wood, the m i l i t a r y commander of Cuba, there was i n -44 H i l l , op_. c i t . , p. 173. 45 Signed December 10, 1898. 52 s t i t u t e d a period of peace and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n such as Cuba had never experienced. American occupation resulted i n vast im-provements i n public works, sanitation, education, and i n t e r n a l and external trade. At the same time steps were taken preparatory to the introduction of self-government i n Cuba. In the l a t t e r part of 1900 a general e l e c t i o n was held, and delegates were sent to a Constitutional Convention i n Havana. Before the end of February, 1901, the delegates had drawn up a constitution based on that of the United States. Despite t h e i r wishes to the contrary the Cuban delegates, i n order to secure the termination of m i l i t a r y occupation, were compelled to include within t h e i r constitution certain p r i n c i p l e s regulating the future relations of Cuba with the United States. These p r i n c i p l e s were those embodied i n the so-called P i a t t Amend-ment, and had the e f f e c t of modifying Cuba's complete indepen-dence. On June 12, 1901, the new Cuban constitution incorp-orating the P i a t t Amendment was adopted. Early i n 1902, a f t e r elections had been held, a Cuban government headed by President Tomas Palma took over the administration of Cuba from the occupation a u t h o r i t i e s . Within a few weeks the m i l i t a r y 46 occupation came to an end. 46 I t should be noted that Pre sident Roosevelt had very l i t t l e to do with the course of events outlined above. The Plait Amendment had been proposed before he became president, and i t was McKinley, not Roosevelt, who t o l d the protesting Cubans that they must adopt the Piatt Amendment. 53 During the next four years, the r e l a t i o n s between Cuba and the United States were r e l a t i v e l y smooth. President Roose-v e l t f e l t quite elated at the progress being made by Cuba, and made frequent favorable comments on i t s s t a b i l i t y and general improvement. However, Cuba's progress i n self-government was more apparent than r e a l . With each passing year, the Palma ad-ministration was becoming more corrupt, and by 1905 the minority p o l i t i c a l party, the L i b e r a l s , had been successfully manoeuvred from .every position of power or r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the Cuban government. Prevented from exercising t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rights by the 'Moderate' Party, the L i b e r a l s resorted to the old Latin-American method of protest-insurrection. In the early months of 1906, sporadic f i g h t i n g occurred between i n s u r r e c t i o n i s t and government troops. With each month the i n s u r r e c t i o n i s t s gained i n strength and aggressiveness, u n t i l by l a t e summer a f u l l scale revolt was underway. To the chagrin of President Palma, the insurrectionary movement was generally favored by the poorer classes of the state. Even h i s own troops were not unaffected. Reporting on t h i s aspect of Cuba's i n t e r n a l troubles, the American charge* wrote i n his report: the (Cuban) government c h i e f l y relys upon the r u r a l guard, i n which... there i s some d i s a f f e c t i o n . In one instance a d e t a i l of about 30 men sent against the i n s u r r e c t i o n i s t s ' deserted to them. I t i s commonly reported that t h i s d i s -a f f e c t i o n extends to nearly one h a l f of the entire guard. 47 Cuba's i n t e r n a l order and s t a b i l i t y deteriorated very 47 U. S., Foreign Relations—1906. p. 454. (Sent August 21, 1906) 54 rapidly. With such widespread d i s a f f e c t i o n among the govern-ment's troops, the rebels were gaining the upper hand. On September 8, the American Consul-General at Havana, Steinhart, telegraphed the Secretary of State informing him that the Cuban government requested President Roosevelt to send two naval vessels to Cuba. He ended on a note of urgency: "They must come at once. The government forces are unable to qu e l l the r e b e l l i o n . The Government i s unable to protect l i f e and 48 propierty." Two days l a t e r the vessels were sent, and with t h e i r departure went an admonitary note from Roosevelt to Steinhart questioning whether he Appreciated the reluctance 49 with which (the United States) would intervene." President Roosevelt was indeed very reluctant to i n t e r -vene i n the Cuban a f f a i r , and exorted the contending factions to s e t t l e t h e i r differences around a table rather than on the b a t t l e - f i e l d . Roosevelt, proud of the American record i n Cuba, was fond of pointing to Cuba's independence to fchose who treated the United States' promise of withdrawal with open cynacism. Cuba was both a test-case and a show-case to the Republican administration, despite the P i a t t Amendment, and to have American troops re-occupy the i s l a n d would be a blow to American prestige as well as to Cuban honor. Anarchy, however, could not be tolerated by the s e l f - s t y l e d 'policeman of the Caribbean*• 48 U. S. Foreign Relations—1906. p. 474. 49 Loc. c i t . 55 In Cuba i t s e l f , a state of anarchy was drawing closer. On September IE, while the two American naval c r a f t were s t i l l on the high seas, steinhart forwarded the following memorandum to Washington: The r e b e l l i o n has increased... and the Cuban Government j-x has no elements to contend i t , to defend the towns and prevent the rebels from destroying property. President Estrade Palma asks f o r American intervention, and begs that President Roosevelt send to Hatoana with r a p i d i t y two or three thousand men to avoid any catastrophe In the capital. 50 Two days a f t e r t h i s announcement of the impotency of the Palma administration, President Roosevelt wrote the Cuban President that he was sending h i s Secretary of War, Wm. H. Taft, and the F i r s t Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Bacon, to Cuba i n an attempt to s e t t l e the Cuban problem without re-sorting, to intervention. The two special commissioners ar-rived i n Havana f i v e days l a t e r , and set up t h e i r headquarters ten miles outside Havana i n order to be eciually accessible to 51 both contending p o l i t i c a l p arties. In the enquiry which followed,the American investigators came to the conclusion that the government procedure i n the 1905 elections had been fraudulent, Taft reported to Roosevelt 50 U. S,, Foreign Relations—1906. p. 476. On the following day, the two American naval ships arrived i n Havana, but so concerned was Roosevelt over intervention that the American consul-general was t o l d that marines from the Vessel could not be ordered to land unless express permission v/as received from the Secretary of State i n Washington. 51 Roosevelt's announcement of h i s intention to sent the commissioners and his adjuration to both parties to agree to mediation brought a halt to a l l h o s t i l i t i e s on the i s l a n d . 56 that i f the United States should intervene in favor of Palma, i t would be going against the wishes of the majority of the Cuban people who heartily disliked their president. As for the rebels, Taft informed the President that the insurrectionist party i s not a government with any of i t s characteristics, but only an undisciplined horde of men under partisan leaders. The £rebel} movement i s large and formidable and commands the sympathy of a majority of the people of Cuba, but they are the poorer classes and the uneducated. The Liberal party, which i s back of the movement, has men of a b i l i t y and substance in i t , but they are not t i t u l a r leaders of the insurgent forces in whom such a government de facto must vest i f in anybody. 52 After a week of investigation and hearings, a compromise was suggested by the commissioners which provided for the con-tinuance of Palma in office, a coalition cabinet, and a new election of members of Congress. The Moderate party refused to consider the suggestion, however, and i t appeared as i f an impasse had been reached. On September 28, President Palma took a step which served to force Roosevelt's hand. On that day Palma and his entire cabinet resigned. The Cuban govern-ment had come to a halt. The situation was grave, and there followed a rapid ex-change of telegrams between Taft and Roosevelt. President Roosevelt ordered Taft "to do anything that i s necessary, no matter how-strong the course, but to try and do i t i n a:s 52 Howland, OJD. c i t . , p. 29. Both p o l i t i c a l parties, the Moderates under Palma and the Liberals under Gomez, favored American intervention for different reasons. G-omez believed that honest elections would sweep his party into power, and Palma1s Moderates wanted annexation generally. 57 xA53 gentle a way as p o s s i b l e . . . i Taft was against setting up a provisional government since the o f f i c e of a provisional pre-sident i n Cuba was unconstitutional. But Roosevelt, facing the r e a l i t y of a state of anarchy, and attempting to avoid armed intervention i f at a l l possible, although he sympathized with Taft, t o l d him bluntly that he did "not care i n the l e a s t f o r the fact that such an agreement ["the setting up of a Cuban pro-54 v i s i o n a l government} i s not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . " Und.er such circumstances, Taft was obliged to act. Thus on September 29, 1906, "a provisional government exercising Cuban sovereignty 55 under the authority of the President of the United States was 56 established...." Once more American occupation troops landed on Cuban s o i l . President Roosevelt announced the future policy of the United States towards Cuba i n h i s annual message to Coqgress i n December, 1906, The core of his policy was as follows: The United States wishes nothing of Cuba save that i s s h a l l prosper morally and materially, and wishes nothing of the Cubans save that they s h a l l be able to preserve ^ order among themselves and therefore to preserve t h e i r independence. I f the elections become a farce, and i f 53^ H i l l , op_. c i t . , p. 100. 54 Ibid., p. 101. 55 Roosevelt based h i s l e g a l authority to intervene on A r t i c l e I I I of the P i a t t Amendment which read: "... the gov-ernment of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene f o r the protection of l i f e , property, and i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y and f o r discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and.undertaken by the Govern-ment of Cuba." (Dennis, op_. c i t . , p. 264.) -56 U. S., Foreign Relations—1906, p. 490. 58 the insurrectionary habit becomes confirmed i n the Island, i t i s absolutely out of the question that the Island should remain independent; and the United States, which has as-sumed the sponsorship before the. c i v i l i z e d world f o r Cuba's career as a nation, would again have to intervene and to see that the government was managed i n such orderly fashion as to secure the safety of l i f e and property. 57 Roosevelt's policy was carried out. Towards the end of 1908 new elections were held i n Cuba, and General Gomez, head of the L i b e r a l Party, was elected president by a large majority. With his inauguration on January 28, 1909, the American m i l i -tary occupation and provisional government came to an end, and Cuba was restored i t s independence. One does not need to look deeply to f i n d the motive be-hind Roosevelt's course of action i n the Caribbean area. His basic motive was to guarantee the safety of h i s country. To Roosevelt, the Monroe Doctrine was the ' f i r e insurance' which protected the United States from the flames of war, both r e a l and p o t e n t i a l . The Monroe Doctrine, however, required amend-ing i f i t was to be applicable to modern times. Roosevelt's age was an age of imperialism. Germany, Great B r i t a i n , Franc*, Russia and others had divided m i l l i o n s of square miles of t e r -r i t o r y among themselves since the time Roosevelt had l e f t college, and the process was s t i l l underway when he was pre-sident. In a great many cases, such t e r r i t o r y had been acquired by the European powers under conditions s i m i l a r to those found 57 Messages and Papers of the Presidents.' v o l . X, p. 7437. 59 i n Venezuela and Santo Domingo. I t i s not surprising, there-fore, that Roosevelt feared s i m i l a r attempts would he made i n the Caribbean. Whether or not he.had good grounds f o r h i s fears i s academic. The fact that he had them was s u f f i c i e n t to influence h i s l o g i c . Since Presidnnt Roosevelt feared the possible occupation of the s t r a t e g i c a l l y situaired Caribbean states, and since he believed that these same states should pay t h e i r debts to t h e i r creditors, i t followed that the l o g i c a l thing he would attempt was to interpret the Monroe Doctrine so as to f i n d a p r a c t i c a l way of dealing with both problems. The r e s u l t was the Roose-v e l t Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, one of the most nation-a l i s t i c explanations of the doctrine's p r i n c i p l e s of the many that have been made since 1823. In e f f e c t i t was a declaration to the world at large that the 'Colossus of the North' f e l t i t s e l f to be the one and only nation able to deal with the Caribbean nations with an equality of j u s t i c e and force so as to prevent European imperialism becoming active i n area, and _ yet, through i t s own high merits, assuming that American imperialism would not replace i t . Roosevelt set himself up to be not only the 'policeman of the Caribbean'; he was to be a Bismarkian 'honest broker' as w e l l . His nationalism and h i s egotism provided t h e i r s i l e n t applause i n approval. The Roosevelt Corollary, i t should he remembered, came as a re s u l t of out s i de pressure on an area believed v i t a l to the nation's l i n e of defence. I t did not caome as the r e s u l t of the unleashing of any overpowering urge i n the United States to-60 wards imperialism. I t cannot be denied that there was every every opportunity f o r imperialism to f l o u r i s h . At the turn of the century, no Great Power i n the world would have regarded such action on the part of the United States as unnatural or disgraceful. Indeed, many European states welcomed the in*- ... . ' creased influence of the United States i n the Caribbean, and several urged her to go to greater lengths. The most surp r i s -ing thing of American policy i n the Caribbean, therefore, i s not the exhibition of imperialism, but under the circumstances, the lack of i t . One of the most i n t e r e s t i n g phases of Roosevelt's Carib-bean policy has been l e f t out of t h i s chapter. This i s the problem President Roosevelt faced i n t r y i n g to get '^permission to s t a r t construction on the Panama Canal. In importance, t h i s subject deserves a chapter to i t s e l f ^ CHAPTER I I I Roosevelt and tne •Panama Canal Matter 1 61 There i s l i t t l e doubt but tha-t the 'Panama matter' was the most important accomplishment of President Roosevelt during h i s term of o f f i c e . He himself "regarded the Panama Canal as the crowning glory of hi s administration... prank-ing i t ] with the Louisiana Purchase and the a c q u i s i t i o n of 1 Texas,..." Because of i t s importance, and because the 2 diplomacy involved i n i t was t y p i c a l of Roosevelt's mind," t h i s chapter w i l l deal i n some d e t a i l with the a c q u i s i t i o n of the ri g h t to b u i l d the canal. The United States had long been interested i n building a canal across the isthmus connecting the two American con-tinents. This i n t e r e s t increased steadily toward the end of the 19th century as the western part of the United States gained i n population, and as the P a c i f i c coast of the United 3 States increased i n importance. One of the most vocal ad-vocates f o r a canal before the Spanish-American war was Captain Mahan. In an a r t i c l e i n the A t l a n t i c Monthly.; September, 1893, he wrote: The Mexican War, the a c q u i s i t i o n of C a l i f o r n i a , the discovery of gold, and the mad rush to the diggings which followed, hastened, but by no means originated, 1 Lewis E i n s t e i n , Roosevelt. His Mind In Action.' New York, Houghton M i f f l i n , 1930, p, 120, 2 "The diplomatic correspondence between the United States and Colombia i n 1902 and 1903 r e f l e c t e d the views of Roosevelt," (H. E. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt,' New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931, p. 308) 3 In the p r e s i d e n t i a l campaign of 1892, the Republican Party "declared the construction of the Nicaraguan canal, under the control of the united States Government, to be of the highest importance to the American people,' both as a 62 the necessity f o r a settlement of the i n t r i c a t e problems involved, i n which the United States, from i t s position on the two seas has the predominant i n t e r e s t . But, though predominant, ours i s not the sole i n t e r e s t , . . . So f a r as the l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between commercial and p o l i t i c a l w i l l hold, i t may be said that our Interest i s both commercial and p o l i t i c a l , that of other states almost wholly commercial. 4 Two years l a t e r , Captain Mahan again emphasized the neces-s i t y of the United States dominating the Caribbean area and having control over any isthmian canal. Nothing should be allowed to prevent t h i s , since i n questions of great importance to nations or to the world, the wishes, or i n t e r e s t s , or technical r i g h t s , of minorities must y i e l d , and there i s not necessarily any more i n j u s t i c e i n t h i s than i n t h e i r y i e l d i n g to a majority at the p o l l s . 5 The importance of a canal across the isthmus was brought to the attention of the nation most dramatically by the Spanish-American war, The long and costly sea route around the southern t i p of South America by American naval ships emphasized the tenuous naval defence available f o r the A t l a n t i c and the P a c i f i c . And i n the years immediately following the war, the a c q u i s i t i o n of the Philippines and measure of national defence and f o r the building up and the maintenance of American commerce," (S. F. Bemis, The L a t i n  American Policy of the United States, New Yorie7 Harcourt and Company, 1943, p. 127,} 4 Captain A. T. Mahan, The Interests of America i n Sea  Power. Pa^st and Future, Boston, L i t t l e , Brown, 1898, p. 83. Captain Mahan, one of America's foremost naval a u t h o r i t i e s and geo- p o l i t i c i a n s , was the f i r m f r i e n d of Theodore Roosevelt> on whom he exerted a profound influence, e s p e c i a l l y i n re-l a t i o n to the need of a large navy by an ' i n s u l a r 1 United States, 5 i b i d . , p, 145, This was to be Koosevelt's argument seven years l a t e r . 63 other strategic islands helped to keep attention on the Panamanian question. P r i o r to 186 J3, the United States had concluded two t r e a t i e s with reference to an A t l a n t i c - P a c i f i c canal. One was the treaty of 1846 with Mew Granada (Colombia) which emphasized the united States' primary ooncern with any pro-posed canal. The other, and most important, was the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with u-reat B r i t a i n i n 1850. When i t was r a t i f i e d i n 1850 the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was thought of i n terms of a diplomatic v i c t o r y f o r the United states since i t prevented the further encoachment of B r i t i s h imperialism i n North Amerioa. But by 1900, the treaty was looked upon as the curtainment of the p r i v i l e g e s of the United States. Although neither treaty gave the united States the right to b u i l d a canal, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty placed certain r e s t r i c t i o n s on American ownership and control of a canal. Both Great B r i t a i n and the united States, under the treaty terms obligated themselves not to obtain exclusive control over any ship canal i n any part of Central America,^ nor to f o r t i f y , occupy, colonize or assume dominion over any part of Central America i n connection with a canal enter-6 p r i s e . 6 Five years l a t e r , a railway was completed across the isthmus by American promoters. In the following years, the French canal company gradually took over the control of t h i s l i n e . 64 i n the decades a f t e r 1850, various attempts were made by iimerican Secretaries of State to have the ulayton-iaulwer treaty modified. The most vigorous attempt was made i n 1881 by James G, Blaine. At that time, i n h i s note to Lord G r e n v i l l e of the B r i t i s h Foreign Office, he pointed out that i n the t h i r t y years since the treaty was r a t i f i e d , the P a c i f i c coast of the United States had undergone a remarkable development,1 and that t h i s had created new duties f o r h i s government and devolved new r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s upon i t . He concluded that the United Stajbes should have sole power to build,- control and f o r t i f y a canal under these new circumstances. In reply Lord Granville -refused to l i f t the r e s t r i c t i o n s of the treaty,' pointing out that the Suez Canal remained u n f o r t i f i e d and open to neutrals even i n wartime. The retirement of Bismark and the increasing imperialism of Germany had a great deal to do with the ending of the period of splendid 'isolationism' i n Great B r i t a i n . This i n turn l e d to an increasingly f r i e n d l y attitude of Great B r i t a i n towards the United States, Thus when Secretary of State, John Hay, took the Panama Canal matter up early i n 1900/ he "£6und that Lord Pauneefote represented a more accomodating 7 government," Hay negotiated a treaty with Great B r i t a i n -7 F, L, Paxson, Recent History of the United States, Boston, Houghton, M i f f l i n , 1929, p, 319, Great B r i t a i n was then at war with the Boers i n South A f r i c a , and could not a f f o r d to incur the enmity of the United States. For the best-source on the s o l i d i f y i n g of British-American f r i e n d -ship, see Lionel M, Gelber, The Rise of Anglo-American Friend-ship, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1938, 65 whereby the obstacles to canal construction by the United States government were eliminated and the canal, "to which the p r i n c i p l e of open door was applied, was given the status of guaranteed n e u t r a l i t y . To h i s great chagrin, the United States Senate was i n s i s t e n t upon making the canal an ex-8 9 elusive advantage and amended the treaty to death." Hay was then ordered to t r y to have the treaty changed to include t h i s advantage, and once more he reluctantly put pressure on hi s B r i t i s h friends to accept the Senate's amendments. In a n t i c i p a t i o n that Hay would succeed i n getting the f i r s t Hay-Pauncefote treaty on terms favorable to the United States, McEinley had appointed a commission headed by Admiral Walker early i n 1899 to investigate the f e a s i b i l i t y of two major canal routes, Panama and Nicaragua. Before the Walker Commission had completed i t s report, and before Hay succeeded i n concluding the second Hay-Pauncefote treaty, McKirtley had been shot and Theodore Roosevelt was President. Roosevelt had followed with keen in t e r e s t the diplomatic manoeuvres concerning the building and control of an isthmian 8 Roosevelt, although f r i e n d l y with Hay stated i n a l e t t e r to Lodge that he thought Hay's i n a b i l i t y to secure 'exclusive advantage 1 was a major blunder. Senator Lodge l a t e r claimed c r e d i t f o r blocking the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the f i r s t Hay-Pauncefote treaty i n the Senate, 9 Paxson, op_. ext., p. 319. Secretary of State Hay had more t r e a t i e s rejected by the Senate than any other Secretary, He was frequently and out-spokenly antagonistic towards, the Senate and Senators, which did not help matters. 66 canal. Both i n public and i n private he had stressed the f a c t that any such canal must be exclusively American and 10 above a l l , must be f o r t i f i e d . His reasoning was based on hi s knowledge of naval a f f a i r s and h i s concept of the Monroe Doctrine. According to Roosevelt, should the completed canal be open to a l l navies, although the United States navy could use i t , so could enemy f l e e t s , which would enable them to attack the ill-defended American west coast. As h i s fr i e n d , Captain Mahan, had explained some years previously, "the chief p o l i t i c a l r e s u l t of the Isthmian Canal w i l l be to bring out P a c i f i c coast nearer, not only to our A t l a n t i c seaboard, but also to the 11 great navies of Europe," Moreover, should the canal zone not be f o r t i f i e d , i t would be an a d d i t i o n a l place to defend with the f l e e t which would cripple I t s effectiveness, A f o r t i f i e d canal, however, would not only leave the fleet; unfettered, but strategy i t s e l f demanded that f o r t s could employ t h e i r guns much better i n defence. Roosevelt's second reason f o r exclusive American owner-10 More pr i v a t e l y , i t should be noted that when Roosevelt became President as a result of McKinley's, death, h i s enemies referred to him i n such terms as *His Accideney,' 'that dammed cowboy,'* and so f o r t h . Bent on showing that he was capable of the o f f i c e , he seized upon the Panama Canal question, then a major f a c t o r i n public attention,, to impress the American public with h i s a b i l i t y and i n i t i a t i v e , 11 Mahan, op_. c i t . , p, 87, 67 ship was based on the Monroe Doctrine. In a l e t t e r to Hay ex-pressing h i s views on the subject, Roosevelt wrote: I f we i n v i t e foreign powers to a j o i n t ownership, a j o i n t guarantee, of what so v i t a l l y concerns us but a l i t t l e way from our borders, how can we possibly object to s i m i l a r action say i n Southern B r a z i l or Argentine, where our i n t e r e s t s are so much l e s s evident? 12 In other words, the United States must have the f i n a l say i n matters concerning the American continent, f o r although the Isthmian canal would become an i n t e r n a t i o n a l highway, i t would be through the courtesy of the United States. In the i n t e r v a l between the renewal of negotiations over the Isthmian canal and the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the second liay-13 Pauncefote treaty, Roosevelt waited impatiently to plunge Into the actual construction of the canal. He r e a l i z e d that the French company which was then attempting to complete a canal through Panama would have l i t t l e success due to a lack .14 of funds, poor organization, and a v a r i e t y of other reasons. 12 S. F. Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State  and t h e i r Diplomacy.' New York, A l f r e d A, Knopf, 1929, v o l , 9, pp, 155—56. 13 A p r i l , 1901 to Frebruary 21, 1902, 14 In h i s f i r s t message to Congress, Roosevelt, speaking of the Isthmian canal, said that " i t i s one of those great works which only.a great nation can undertake with prospects of success,..." ; (United States/ Papers Relating to the Foreign  Relations of the United States. Washington. Government Pr i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1901/ p. 1 X X V . Hereafter c i t e d as U , S.,' Foreign  Relations,) A f t e r the successful completion of the construc-t i o n of the Suez Canal, the French established an i n t e r n a t i o n a l company which secured from Colombia construction r i g h t s across the Isthmus of Panama, This was the De Lesseps company which l a t e r sunk into bankrupcy amidst a great.deal of scandal. During Cleveland's presidency, t h i s company was reorganized as the New Panama Canal Company, which took over the property of the De Lesseps' Company, and had i t s concession to construct a 68 Early i n 1902 Hay was able to lay before the government the revised Hay-Pauncefote treaty which not only abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty but which also permitted the United States to f o r t i f y as well as to construct and control an isthmian canal,' providing that the use of i t by a l l nations under equal terms should be guaranteed. I t was a major victory f o r the United States, and an admission of the United States' 15 predominance i n the Caribbean area by Great B r i t a i n . Shortly before the treaty was r a t i f i e d , the Walker Com-mission, handed i n i t s report which favored a canal route across Nicaragua. The chief reason f o r t h i s was the high price ($109^000,000) demanded by the directors of the New Panama Canal Company f o r t h e i r r i g h t s and properties on the isthmus. Were t h i s amount paid by the United States, the t o t a l cost of a Panamian canal would be greater than one through Nicaragua. The Walker Commission reported that con-struction costs would be: f o r Panama, $144,000,000; f o r Nicaragua, $190,000,000, The addition of $109,000/000 to the canal extended to 1904. Although m i l l i o n s of francs were i n -vested i n the new company, and considerable work done on the digging of the canal, i t became apparent that the project was too large f o r a private company to cope with. Thus, at the time when Roosevelt became President, very l i t t l e wa^s being done towards dompleting the canal, although the New Panama Canal company held the franchise to bu i l d and had a great deal Of money invested i n t h e i r incompleted project, 15 By the l a t t e r part of 1901, "the United States had been singled out as the one Power wib h whom the prospect of war or antagonistic engagements would not be entertained Cby Great B r i t a i n ) . " (Gelber, op_. c i t . . p. 93.) 69 Panama construction costs would therefore make the t o t a l amount f o r a canal through t h i s route #60/000,000 more than one through Nicaragua, President Roosevelt, i r r i t a t e d at the ' p i r a t i c a l t a c t i c s ' of the French directors, refused to consider the payment of such an outrageous sum set by the French canal company,2 and swung h i s weight i n favor of Nicaragua by giving h i s support to the Hepburn B i l l which c a l l e d f o r the construction of a route through Nicaragua. An i n d i c a t i o n of the national i n -dignation at the high price demanded i s shown i n the votes cast f o r the Hepburn B i l l ; i t passed through the House of Representatives early i n January, 1902, by the one sided vote of 308 to 2. The indignant roars of Theodore Roosevelt plus the un-mistakably h o s t i l e tone of the national press were heard i n France even before the Hepburn B i l l was passed i n the House. The New Panama Ganal Company's stockholders, r e a l i s i n g that the Hepburn B i l l would pass the Senate unless something was done, and r e a l i z i n g that t h e i r own rig h t s would be worthless should the Nicaraguan route be taken, forced out the company's o f f i c e r s who had made the #109,000,000 demand. A new board of directors quickly scaled t h e i r s e l l i n g price down to $40/000, 000. According to the Walker Commission, t h i s new o f f e r was reasonable. Thus when the Hepburn B i l l reached the Senate/ the Spooner Amendment was added to i t . The Spooner Amendment sub-s t i t u t e d the Panama route f o r the Nicaraguan route provided the 70 Administration was able to secure the New Panama Ganal Company's rig h t s and properties, together with permission from Colombia to construct the canal, within a 'reasonable time.' Should the Administration be unable to secure the above within t h i s time l i m i t , the President was authorized to revert to the Nicaraguan route. Owing to executive pressure from Roosevelt who had come to 16 favor the Panama route, and owing also to a series of v o l -canic eruptions near the s i t e of the proposed Nicaraguan route, 5 the amended Hepburn B i l l passed both houses by overwhelming majorities, and was signed by President Roosevelt l a t e i n June, 1902. The remaining problem was to secure the consent of the Republic of Colombia to permit the United States to construct the canal across i t s t e r r i t o r y i n the Department of Panama. I t was i n the diplomacy involved i n t h i s problem that the heavy hand of Roosevelt swung h i s 'big s t i c k ' with righteous indigna-t i o n . When the o r i g i n a l French canal company obtained permission 17 to construct a canal across Panama, i t was d e f i n i t e l y stated i n the Salgar-Wyse concession by a r t i c l e s 21 and 22 that the company could not tr a n s f e r to the United States i t s 'rights, 1 16 There was at t h i s time a considerable amount of lobby-ing a c t i v i t y i n favor of the Panama route by agents of the New Panama Canal Company. 17 This was the Salgar-Wyse concession of 1878. 71 p r i v i l e g e s , franchises and concessions' without the consent of Colombia. Thus every e f f o r t was made by the State Department to secure a treaty which would provide the United States with the l e g a w l authority to go forward with i t s plans. Secretary of State Hay, by threatening to turn to Nicara-18 gua and by using other methods of persuasion, f i n a l l y suc-ceeded i n extorting a treaty from the Colombian Gharge^ i n Washington, Tomas Herran. This Hay-Herran treaty was signed with some misgivings on January 22, 1903. flerran's misgivings were well founded, f o r three days l a t e r he received a telegram from President Marroquin of Colombia advising him not to sign. However, Marroquin was informed that the treaty was a f a i t  accompli.- and awaJLted r a t i f i c a t i o n by the respective Congresses of t h e United States and Colombia. B r i e f l y , the Hay-Herran treaty gave the United States, a canal zone s i x miles wide f o r a cash payment of #10,000,000 and a $250,000 annuity. Moreover, the f i r s t a r t i c l e of the treaty dealt with the problem of the tra n s f e r of the Panama Canal Company's ri g h t s , stating e x p l i c i t l y that The Government of Colombia authorizes the New Panama Canal Company to s e l l and t r a n s f e r to the United States i t s rights, p r i v i l e g e s , properties and concessions, as well as the Panama Railroad and a l l the shares or parts of said railway. 19 18 Which he personally would have preferred. 19 United States, Senate Documents. 58th Congress, 2nd. Sess., v o l . II, No. 51, p. 19, Hereafter quoted as U. S.,1  Senate Documents. 72 On March 17, 1903, despite a not inconsiderable amount of opposition from the Democrats, the Senate approved the canal convention without amendment. I t was now up to the Colombian government to r a t i f y the treaty so that i t would become law.' In Bogota, the c a p i t a l of Colombia, that nation's Congress was not i n session, nor had i t been f o r several years. The - Colombian Administration at that time had come into being under President Marroquin following a revolt i n 1900. Thus i t was f e l t that the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n was s t i l l too un-s t a b i l i z e d to hold democratic e l e c t i o n s . News of the Hay-Herran treaty was received with excited speculation by the people of Colombia, and Mr. Beaupre', i n charge of the American legation at Bogota, wrote on March 30, 1903: The matter of the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Panama Canal con-vention i s intensely i n t e r e s t i n g to the people of t h i s c a p i t a l , and there i s much public discussion of i t . Without question public opinion i s strongly against i t s r a t i f i c a t i o n , but, of course, public opinion i n Colombia i s not necessarily a potent f a c t o r i n c o n t r o l l i n g l e g i s l a -t i o n . 20 Within a month, however, both public and o f f i c i a l opinion had become even more opposed to r a t i f i c a t i o n . At the end of March the text of the treaty had been made public, and Mr. Beaupre'informed Washington that since then ... a complete revolution i n f e e l i n g has taken place. -From approbation to suspicion and from suspicion to decided opposition have been the phrases of change i n p u b l i c sentiment during the l a s t mon£h. 21 20 U. S. Foreign Relations—1905. p. 135. 21 Ibi d . , p. 134. 73 The reason f o r the opposition to r a t i f i c a t i o n by Colombia, was that the treaty was looked upon • •• as being the attempt of a strong nation to take an u n f a i r advantage of the c r i s i s through which Colombia i s passing (22), and, f o r a p a l t r y sum, rob her of one of the most valuable sources of wealth which the world con-tains., 23 A month l a t e r the s i t u a t i o n had grown worse. There was s t i l l no o f f i c i a l announcement i n Colombia as to when Congress would meet, and f o r t y days notice of such a meeting was required to allow members s u f f i c i e n t time to present themselves at Bogota. Mr, Beaupre', i n a dispatch to the Department of State In Washington, wrote that .•• opposition to the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the canal convention i s i n t e n s i f y i n g . The press i s teeming with a r t i c l e s ran-corous i n enmity to the proposed tre a t y , . . . I t i s e n t i r e l y impossible to convince these people,,, that the negotiations concerning i t had any other motive than the squeezing of an advantageous bargain out of Colombia; nor that any other than the fanama route w i l l route w i l l ever be selected. Therefore, i t i s contended ,.. that there i s no immediate necessity of confirming the Hay-Herran convention; that the negotiations can be safely prolonged, i n the end securing very much better terms f o r Colombia. The public discussion i s l a r g e l y along the l i n e s of the l o s s of the national honor by the surrender of national sovereignty; that the clause i n the convention guarantee-ing sovereignty means nothing, because the lease i s per-petual; that the whole contract i s favorable to the 22 This refers to one of the innumerable minor revolu-tions to which the country was subject since i t became a Republic, 23 Foreign Relations—1905, pp. 134—5. Lord Charnwood points out that the 110,000,000 offered for the Canal Zone re-presented two t h i r d s of the t o t a l national debt of Colombia i n 1903, 74 United States and determental to Colombia. Private discussion... i s to the e f f e c t that the price i s inadequate; that a much greater sum of money can be obtained.... E4 In Washington, Meanwhile, the tenor of Mr. Beaupre's d i s -patches were causing some anxiety as to whether the Hay-Herran treaty would be r a t i f i e d by Colombia. President Roosevelt, seemingly, was more i r r i t a t e d by the delay than was Secretary of State Hay, who appeared anxious l e s t the negotiations break down e n t i r e l y . Hay cautioned Beaupre' to keep him informed of the h o s t i l e influences working against r a t i f i c a t i o n , and to warn him i f there was any opposition to the treaty from Europeaa 25 powers. On June 9, 1903, Hay brought the strongest pressure to bear on the Colombian government, stating i n a telegram to Beaupre: The Colombian government apparently does not appreciate the gravity of the s i t u a t i o n . The canal negotiations were i n i t i a t e d by Colombia, and were.energetically pressed upon t h i s Government f o r several years.,.. I f Colombia should now reject the treaty or unduly delay i t s r a t i f i c a t i o n , the f r i e n d l y understanding between the two countries would be so seriously compromised that action might be taken by the Congress next winter which every f r i e n d of Colombia would regret. 26 This t h i n l y v e i l e d threat by the American government was 24 U, S,, Senate Documents, No, 51, pp. 14—15, 25 To t h i s Beaupre' r e p l i e d : "At times I have thought,' from the tone of the conversation of certa i n opponents, that foreign h o s t i l e influences were at work, but I have never been able to be certain of t h i s . I f there be opposition from t h i s source, i t i s too secret a nature to be discovered and cannot therefore, be p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e . " (U. S., Foreign  Relations. 1903, p. 165.) 26 Ibi d . , p. 146. 75 quickly answered by the Colombian Foreign Minister, M. Luis Rico, who pointed out that because Colombia i n i t i a t e d the negotiations d i d not automatically demand that she approve thenm. i n t h e i r f i n a l form. He reminded the United States of a similar i n s t a n c e — t h e f i r s t Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which was i n i t i a t e d by the American government, and was not acceptable to the American Senate, M, Rico emphasized further that delay should not be the cause of any misunderstanding between two f r i e n d l y countries, since the delay was due to the necessity of having the Colombian Congress meet and r a t i f y the t r e a t y — a l e g a l process with which the American government was thoroughly f a m i l i a r . Two days a f t e r the above memorandum was sent, the Colom-bian Congress met, but i t was not u n t i l almost two weeks a f t e r t h i s meeting that a paraphrase of Hay's threat was read i n the Colombian Senate i n secret session. I t created a sensation,' being construed as a threat of d i r e c t action against Colombia i n case the treaty was not r a t i f i e d . Added alarm was f e l t since the Panamanian members reported t h e i r department would revolt i f such were the case, Mr, Beaupre reported that as a r e s u l t of "this alarm, the 'effect was favorable f o r r a t i f i c a -tion,' Nevertheless, the Colombian government was not i n c l i n e d to be stampeded i n t o quick r a t i f i c a t i o n of the treaty. On July 20, a commission of nine men was appointed to report on the matter of the Hay-Herran treaty by the end of the month. During t h i s i n t e r v a l , constant diplomatic f e e l e r s were put out by rankig-members of the Colombian government to f i n d 76 out i f the United States was w i l l i n g to increase the proposed payment f o r the canal and other concessions. Such suggestions 27 were promptly denounced by Hay and Roosevelt, Any proposed amendments by the Colombians were thought of i n terms of blackmail and undue procrastination. Moreover, such amend-ments, i f accepted, would prolong negotiations perhaps beyond the 'reasonable time' mentioned i n the Spooner Amendment, a l -though the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s time l i m i t was l e f t to President Roosevelt himself. And Roosevelt, determined 'to make the d i r t f l y ' , f e l t that time was growing short. Despite constant and even threatening pressure by the American government, i t became apparent from the adverse re-28 port given by the commission appointed by Colombia would re s u l t i n n o n - r a t i f i c a t i o n of the treaty. Such apprehension was warranted, f o r shortly a f t e r the report was received, the Colombian Congress rejected the Hay-Herran treaty when i t was given the vote, (August 12). A new commission was appointed to attempt to revise the treaty i n such a manner as to please 27 On July 31, 1903, Hay informed Beaupre,' regarding a l l such proposed monetary amendments favoring Colombia that "no a d d i t i o n a l payment by the United States can hope f o r approval by CtheJ United States Senate, while any amendment whatever requiring reconsideration by that body would most c e r t a i n l y imperil i t s consummation." (U.S., Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 168.) 28 The report of the commission proposed 1—a greater payment of money to Colombia f o r the canal concessions and 2 — the elimination of a l l the aspects of e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y i n -herent i n the Hay-Herran treaty. 77 bothhthe United States and Colombia. However, by September i t was generally believed that the commission's' e f f o r t s would be wasted. Indeed, the commission's recommendations were l i t t l e changed from those of i t s predecessor, and i n the f i r s t debate on them i n Congress, the Colombians voted approval of the action taken by the Senate on August 12. By the end of September Roosevelt and Hay were of the opinion that the Colombian government would not even t r y to have a second and f i n a l debate on the oommissions's report. Since the United States had not taken any dire c t action against Colombia as many had feared, i t was thought by the leaders of the government that Colombia might be able to gain the ad-vantages i t sought without any fear of r e t a l i a t i o n . On Sep-tember 30, Beaupre informed h i s government: i t i s said, and generally believed... that there i s a projection on foot among ce r t a i n Senators to annul the arrangement entered into by the Colombian Government and the French Canal Company i n 1900, extending the f r a n c h i s e and p r i v i l e g e d of that company. ... i f tbs arrangement made extending the contract i s declared n u l l and void, 1 the French company's r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s on the Isthmus would cease to e x i s t , and Colombia could then arrange with the United States to receive not only the $10,000,000 offered her, but the $40,000,000 offered the oompany. 29 In other words, Colombia was attempting a sharp business deal, not altogether e t h i c a l , but not unknown to such hard-headed businessmen i n the United States as t y p i f i e d by Rockerfeller, Carnegie and others. The rumors that Beaupre'' 29 U. S.,' Senate Documents.- No. 51, p. 77. 78 heard were once again well founded. On October 14, the second commission on the canal appointed by Colombia intimated i n i t s report that the government of Colombia should examine the 30 benefits i t would receive i f tba extension wa_& annulled. The suggestion was most obvious, e s p e c i a l l y to the keen minds of the agents of the French canal company i n Colombia, Bea^upre" also wrote the Department of State about the growing fear i n Colombia of the action the United States might take regarding the growing restlessness of the p^eople i n Panama. Since the l a t t e r part of September, the Panamanians had become increasingly vocal i n t h e i r opposition t> the course taJken at Bogota i n the canal matter, and an undercurrent of revolt which might occur i n Panama as i t had i n the past, the Colombian Congress adjourned on October 31, 1903, without r a t i f y i n g the Hay-Herran treaty. When news of the f i r s t r e fusal of the Colombian Congress to r a t i f y the treaty reached Washington,-' Roosevelt gave vent to h i s f e e l i n g of disgust that the progress of such a noble e f f o r t should be halted by the short-sighted p o l i t i c i a n s at Bogota. The President and h i s Secretary of State "matched each other i n finding suitable epithets f o r the Colombian ; 30 A treaty signed on A p r i l 4, 1893, between Colombia and the New Panama Canal Company granted to the company an extension of i t s franchise giving i t an ad d i t i o n a l ten years," that i s , u n t i l December 31, 1904, A second agreement was entered i n t o i n 1900, For the sum of 5,000,000 francs, the canal company was granted a further extension u n t i l October 31, 1910. 79 p o l i t i c i a n s . Roosevelt c a l l e d them 'contemptible l i t t l e creatures',- 1 jack-rabbits•, and ' f o o l i s h and homicidal cor-r u p t i o n i s t s ' . Hay won; to him they were the 'greedy l i t t l e 31 anthropoids'" I t was a f t e r this f i r s t r e fusal that Hay wrote Roosevelt advising the president: I t i s altogether l i k e l y that there w i l l be an insu r r e c t i o n on the Isthmus against the regime of f o l l y and graft that now rules Bogota. I t i s f o r you to decide whether you w i l l (1) await the r e s u l t of that movement, or (2) take a hand i n r e c r u i t i n g the Isthmus from anarchy, or (3) treat with Nicaragua. Something we s h a l l be forced to do In case of a serious insurrectionary movement i n Panama,' to keep the t r a n s i t c l e a r . 32 To the Impatient Roosevelt, the s i t u a t i o n was more c l e a r cut. He r e p l i e d to Hay on September 15 i n part: At present I f e e l that there are two a l t e r n a t i v e s . F i r s t to take up Nicajragua; second, i n some shape or way to i n t e r f e r e when " i t becomes necessary as to secure the Panama route without further dealing with the f o o l i s h and homieidal corruptionists at Bogota. I am not i n c l i n e d to have any further dealings whatever with those Bogota people. 33 So strong were Roosevelt's fee l i n g s on the matter that he 34 wrote a message which he proposed to send to Congress should Colombia refuse to r a t i f y the treaty at a l l . I t was t y p i c a l l y 31 Tyler Dennett, John Hay, New York, Dodd Mead, 1933, p . 376. . . . . 32 I b i d . / p. 377. 33 J . B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time.: New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920, v o l . 1, p. 278.' 34 See Appendix. B. 80 Rooseveltian—moralistic, aggressive and dynamic, an outpouring of the theme that nothing must stand i n the way of American defence, American progress and American policy i n the Western Hemisphere. I t was an example of the imperialism always latent i n Roosevelt. However, the message was never sent, even though the Colombian Congress adjourned tbe next month with the Hay-Herran treaty u n r a t i f i e d . Roosevelt wrote h i s proposed message to Congress some time" a f t e r he received a memorandum from John Bassett Moore,' and the i m p e r i a l i s t i c passages i n i t were based on Moore's l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r u n i l a t e r a l action on the part of the United States. About the middle of August, Roosevelt had been shown a memorandum written by John Bassett Moore on the 35 Panamian question. Moore was as ardent a n a t i o n a l i s t as Roosevelt, and h i s patriotism, too, rebelled at the idea that the ' c o r r u p t i o n i s t s 1 at Bogota should stop the construction of a canal through Panama. Therefore he drew the President's attention to A r t i c l e XXSV of the American-Colombian treaty of 36 1846. As construed by Dr. Moore, Colombia, by t h i s a r t i c l e / offered to the United States a free and open t r a n s i t or r i g h t of way to the government of the United States, and t h i s proviso applied to 'any modes of communication that now exist or that may hereafter be constructed.' In return f o r t h i s 35 John Bassett Moore was then at Columbia University, and had been an Assistant Secretary and l e g a l adviser to the Department of State. 36 See Appendix, c 81 concession, the United States guaranteed the 'perfect neutral-i t y ' of the Isthmus under the conditions mentioned i n the treaty. Dr. Moore emphasized the fact that the object i n securing Panama's n e u t r a l i t y was to secure a canal/ and that since f o r over f i v e decades the United States had upheld her part of the bargain, Colombia was not i n a position to ob-struct the building of a canal. This thin, though legal^' excuse f o r open interference was brought to Hay's attention by Roosevelt, while the President himself meanwhile mulled over the various avenues open to him other than the imperial path chartered i n h i s message. Perhaps the most obvious path open to Roosevelt was to cease any further negotiations with Colombia and take up the Nicaraguan route as he was e n t i t l e d to do by the Hepburn B i l l . This was the course favored by Hay, who was i l l and disheart-ened by the endless squabbles of the Colombians. To him i t was an easier way to achieve the same ends. But Roosevelt had other ideas on the subject. I t was against h i s nature to 'give up* on any matter i n the f i r s t place, and es p e c i a l l y so to the coterie of p o l i t i c i a n s that ruled at Bogota. Roosevelt had come to favor the Panama route f o r two reasons. F i r s t , i t was the cheapest route. Second, an i n t e r n a t i o n a l group of engineers hir e d by the French Qanal Company had picked the Panama route as the best across the isthmus, and the American engineers had seconded t h e i r opinion. Any other would be i n the nature of a 'second best' route, and that again went a gainst Roosevelt's nature. Since Panama would be the cheapest and best route f o r the 82 canal, Roosevelt gave but s l i g h t thought to the alternative Nicaraguan route, The problem that remained was whether or not to wait, upon the slow moving Colombian Congress to r a t i f y the treaty. I t became increasingly c l e a r that the passage of the Hay-Herran treaty through the Colombian Congress would be speeded only through the bribing of key Colombians by large amounts of money. This tended to make Roosevelt lean more towards the actions which a Bhodes or a Delcasse might take. As we have seen, Roosevelt toyed with the idea of an outright m i l i t a r y occupation. His j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r such an action was wrapped up i n righteousness and nationalism, 1 and i s perhaps best expressed i n a l e t t e r he wrote to Senator Mark Hanna on the subject. Referring to Hanna's suggestion that he exercise patience, Roosevelt wrote: I am not as sure as you are that the only virtue we need exercise i s patience. I think i t well worth considering whether we had not better warn those Bogota p o l i t i c i a n s that grea_t though our patience has been, i t can be ex-hausted. This does not necessarily mean that we must necessarily go to Nicaragua, I f e e l we are c e r t a i n l y  j u s t i f i e d i n morals, and therefore i n law, under the  Treaty of 1846. i n i n t e r f e r r i n g summarily and saying that  the canal i s to be b u i l t and that they m u 3 t not stop i t . 37 Certainly i f Roosevelt had taken such a step he would have been well within the bounds of current European morality, i f such may be said to e x i s t i n foreign a f f a i r s . Typical of European thought on the problem was a remark made to an American by the King of Italy,' when he s a i d ; 37 Bishop, op_. c i t . , p. 278. I t a l i c s mine. Note Dr. Moore's influence here. 83 I should think that your President would send a f l e e t down there and take possession of the Isthmus. I t would create an excitement f o r a week, but then a l l would be over and i n the end i t would be a benefit to the whole world. 38 Such a program tempted Roosevelt, as we have seen. Whether he might have c a r r i e d i t out i s a matter of conjecture,' but the f a c t remains that i t was a course of open and flagrant imperialism which he did not follow. His egotism,* h i s sincere and profound b e l i e f i n his own righteousness, plus h i s deep f a i t h i n what he considered the goal of the United States i n the Western Hemisphere a l l supported h i s conviction that Colombia should not be permitted to block so great and noble a work as a canal across Panama. His stubborness combined with h i s righteousness to make him b l i n d to an alternate route. Moreover, Roosevelt was by no means alone i n h i s opinion of the Colombian t a c t i c s , and there was something to be said for the opinion held by the American public generally that a l l was not well between Colombia and Panama. The opinion was f r e -quently expressed that the mountain gentry who conducted the Colombian Govern-ment at Bogota treated Panama l i k e a conquered province, to be squeezed to the utmost f o r the benefit of the p o l i t i c i a n s . There was neither community of i n t e r e s t nor r a c i a l sympathy between the Panamians and the Colombians, and, as i t required a journey, of f i f t e e n days to go from Panama to the Ca p i t a l , geography, also, added i t s sunder-ing influence. 39 38 Bemis,- pj>. c i t . . p. 184. 39 W. R. Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt. An Intimate Biography New York, Grosset and Dunlop, 1919, p. 184. 84 However, influences were at work that were to open s t i l l another course to Roosevelt—influences r e s u l t i n g from the machinisms of the New Panama Ganal company's agents and the natives of Panama. During the period of anxious waiting while Colombia was deciding on the Hay-Herran treaty, the two chief 40 agents -of the French company, M. Buanau-Varilla and W. N. 41 Cromwell had done a l l i n t h e i r power to impress.on the chief figures i n Washington the necessity of the canal route going through Panama. During the f i r s t months of the negotiations between Colombia and the United States, the New Panama Canal Company had remained a l o o f . But l a t e r , the company was "obliged to intervene i n regard to the questions raised before the Colom-bian Congress r e l a t i v e to the extension which, had been granted 42 CthemJ i n the month of A p r i l , 1900." The Colombian commission 40 M. Bunau-Varilla was a former chief engineer of the o r i g i n a l French ^anal Company, and held, according to h i s own statement, $115,000 worth of New Panama Canal Company stock. He had been.sent to the United States by the l a t t e r company to do a l l he could to further the i n t e r e s t s of that company. Provided with a generous expense account, h i s influence was great both as a lobbyist and l a t e r i n the revolutionary i n -trigue at Panama. 41 William Nelson Cromwell was a Wall street corporation lawyer—an o f f i c e r , d i r e c t o r or counsel f o r more than 30 of the largest corporations i n the United States.' He was also the attorney of the New Panama Canal Company. He was thus extremely interested i n having the Hay-Herran treaty r a t i f i e d , and ex-erted a l l the influence he could on Washington p o l i t i c i a n s and even Hay himself. As a contributor of $60,000 to the Republican campaign chest, h i s influence was not s l i g h t . 42 U. S. Senate Documents, No. 133, p. 4. 85 appointed to look into the a f f a i r made a report wherein i t d i l a t e d i n s i s t a n t l y upon the advantages which would re-sul t to Colombia from a refusal to approve Cthe extension! I t pointed out p a r t i c u l a r l y that the Congress by thus refusing to r a t i f y and by waiting u n t i l 1904, the date of the expiration of Cthe New Panama Canal Company's]} former contracts, would enable Colombia to enter into possession of a l l the company's righ t s and properties, and to con-clude a much more advantageous treaty with the United States. Indeed, i n provision of a decision contrary Cto ratification!) the commission p^roposed the immediate i n s e r t i o n i n the budget of an appropiation of 5,000,000 francs destined to repay t o the company the price which i t had paid f o r the extension. 43 The prospect of $40,000,000 s l i p p i n g through the hands of the company was more than enough to agitate both Bunau-Varilla and Cromwell. Both men set themselves to solve the problem, Bunau-Varilla found out that Roosevelt remained interested i n the Panama route despite Hay's in d i f f e r e n c e , A few days l a t e r , "on October 10 he v i s i t e d Francis B, Loomis, the f i r s t a ssistant secretary of state, who happened to be one of h i s acquaintances. Through Loomis an interview was secured with President Roosevelt, who was looking forward to the e l e c t i o n of 1904. There Bunau-Varilla deduced that Roosevelt would not 44 be adverse to a revolution i n Panama." The idea of a revolution i n Panama, and therefore i n -dependence, was not o r i g i n a l with M. Bunau-Varilla or with the agents of the New Panama Canal company's agents i n Panama. Periodic revolutions on the isthmus were as common to the "43 U. S., Senate Documents, No. 133, p. 4. 44 W. D. MacGain, The United States and the Republic of Panama, Durham, Duke University Press, 1937, p. 13. 86 Panamanians as changing dictators, and were regarded as an only s l i g h t l y abnormal condition. The p o s s i b i l i t y of s t i r r i n g up a r e v o l t i n Panama had been taken under favorable considera-t i o n by the' canal company's agents early i n 1903, and as the year progressed without the Hay-Herran treaty being r a t i f i e d , f e e l e r s were put out by the agents tov sound out the p o s s i b i l i -t i e s f o r a successful r e v o l t . President Roosevelt was not ignorant of the p o s s i b i l i t y of an attempt by Panama to secede from Colombia. As early as July 14, 1903, the New York World had published an a r t i c l e on the canal, the obstacles to the pending treaty, and the d i s -t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y of a domestic Panamanian revolution being the 45 only and best way to surmount them. Immediate recognition of a new state of Panama by Roosevelt was believed probable, and the editors thought favorably on the matter. A month l a t e r , on July 5, the World predicted the revolt would take place on November 3, of the same year. Although a revolution would have been a welcome r e l i e f to Roosevelt, he was unwilling to have any d i r e c t hand i n formenV ing one. As he wrote i n a l e t t e r to Dr. Albert Shaw, edit o r of 'She Review of Reviews on October 10, 1903: I cast aside the proposition made at t h i s time to foment the suceession of Panama. Whatever other governments can do, the United States can not go into the securing by such underhand means the cession. Privately, I f r e e l y say to you that I should be delighted i f Panama were an independ-ent state, or i f i t made i t s e l f so at t h i s moment. 46 . 45 This was thought to be one of several a r t i c l e s i n -spired by Cromwell to hasten the passage of the Ha#-Herran treaty through the Colombian Congress, 46 Bishop, op. c i t . , p. 279. 87 Since Bunau-Varilla had personally confirmed h i s view that Roosevelt s t i l l favored the Panama route,' the idea of promot-ing a revolution v/as uppermost i n h i s mind"; Together wit h other agents of the New Panama Canal Company, he conspired with various Panamanian leaders to bring the revolt to a head. He was quite successful i n h i s e f f o r t s . During t h i s l a t t e r part of October, Roosevelt was aware of the increasing possi-b i l i t y of a revolt i n Panama. On October 16/ the President received two o f f i c e r s of the army who had just returned by way of Panama from a four months' tour i n Venezuela and Colombia. They int> rmed him that a revolutionary party was organizing i n Panama with the object of separation from Colombia... and that i t was the general b e l i e f on the Isthmus that the revolution might occur at any moment..,. 47 Accordingly, three days l a t e r Roosevelt "directed the Navy Department to s t a t i o n various ships within easy reach of the 48 Isthmus,- to be ready to act i n the event of need a r i s i n g . The f i r s t three of these were sent on October 19. Two days l a t e r a note from Mr. Beaupr/ i n Bogota, saying that i n the Colombian c a p i t a l ... there i s no disguising the alarm e x i s t i n g as to the possible action of the Government of the United States should the f e e l i n g of d i s a f f e c t i o n undoubtedly e x i s t i n g i n the department of Panama f i n d expression i n overt acts. 49 So imminent was the danger that a fourth America n ship was 47 Bishop, o_p_. c i t . , pp. 281—82. 48 Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920, p. 522. 49 U. S., Foreign Relations^-! 905/ p. 214, 88 sent to Colon, Panama. But despite the obvious danger or revolt, the Colombian government, as we have seen, adjourned without r a t i f y i n g the treaty. The conspirators set November 4, f o r the re v o l t . There i s l i t t l e doubt that at t h i s time Roosevelt had planned the course of action he would take. Should the revolt break out, the United States, acting under the a r t i c l e s of the Treaty of 1846 with Colombia, would land troops to keep the Isthmian right of way open, and i n so doing, put an end to any fi g h t i n g that might occur along the Panamanian t r a n s i t . This would include preventing the Colombian forces from landing and entering into c o n f l i c t with the rebels, which would naturally permit the rebels to declare t h e i r independence. The plan worked p e r f e c t l y . On the evening of November 3, 1903, the Consul-General of the United States at Panama wired Hay that an up r i s i n g had occurred on the isthmus. A body of Colombian troops had landed at Colon on the P a c i f i c side of the isthmus on the same evening. Measures had been taken by the leaders of the revolt to prevent the troops using the r a i l r o a d to transport so l d i e r s across the isthmus to Panama C i t y . To further ensure t h i s , Hay orderedt j ie commander of the U. S. S. Nashville ' i n the i n t e r e s t s of peace' and to 'keep the t r a n s i t of the Isthmus open and order maintained' to prevent the Colombian troops from moving inland. This was done,' and the following day the Colombian army was persuaded to reembark and return to t h e i r base. A Colombian gunboat, a f t e r sending a few sh e l l s 89 50 into Panama, also withdrew. On the same day, the Consul-G-eneral wired Hay that a Republic of Panama had been formed, independent of Colombia, and on November 6, Hay was informed that "Bunau-Varilla has been appointed o f f i c i a l l y as the con-51 f i d e n t i a l agent of the Republic of Panama at Washington." At noon, on November 6, the American Consul-general was t o l d that when he was s a t i s f i e d that a de facto government republican i n form, and without substantial opposition from i t s own people, has been established i n the State of Panama,' you w i l l enter into r e l a t i o n s with i t as the responsible govern-52 ment of the t e r r i t o r y . . . . " Less than three hours a f t e r being t o l d that the situ a t i o n was peaceful, Hay cabled Beaupre at Bogota that the President of the United States wished to see an end of the c o n f l i c t on the isthmus, and that the govern-ment of the United States had entered into r e l a t i o n s with the .53 Republic of Panama. On November 7,1 Secretary of State Hay received a telegram from Bunau-Varilla stating that "the Government of the Republic of Panama has been pleased to designate me as i t s envoy extraordinary and minister p l e n i -50 "Somewhere over i n the c i t y there was a dead China-man, k i l l e d by a s h e l l ; and i n the slaughterhouse was a wounded burro. These were the two casualties of thB revolution.' (W. F. McCaleb, Theodore Roosevelt, New York,' Albert and Charles Boni, 1931, p. 165.) - 51 U. S. Foreign Relations—1905. p. 235. 52 Loo, c i t . 55 For the text of t h i s important communique,- see Appendix. v> 90 54 potentiary near the Government of the United States." An a^udience with President Roosevelt was requested on November 11, and was granted tv/o days l a t e r . On November 13,' the President f u l l y recognized the Republic of Panama. Negotiations f o r a treaty to permit the United States government to con-struct a canal across Panama were started at once, and were completed and signed by Hay and Bunau-Varilla at Washington on November 18, 1903, I t was r a t i f i e d by Panama on December 2, and by the United States shortly thereafter. The treaty was satisfactory to a l l concerned. Under A r t i c l e I, the United States guaranteed the independence of the New Republic of Panama, A r t i c l e II stated: The Republic of Panama grants to the United States i n perpetuity the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water f o r the construction, mainten-ance, operation, sanitation and protection of said canal of the width of ten miles,., the said zone beginning i n the Caribbean Sea three marine miles from mean low-water mark and extending to and across the Isthmus of Panama into the P a c i f i c Ocean to a distance of three marine miles from means low-water mark, with the proviso that the c i t i e s of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to said c i t i e s , which are included within the boundaries of the zone above described, s h a l l not be included within the grant, 55 Other a r t i c l e s gave the New Panama Canal Company the ri g h t to s e l l i t s rights and properties to the American government/ gave the United States permission to f o r t i f y the zone, and so f o r t h . 54 U. S. Foreign Relations—1905. p. 240. 55 United States, Bureau of National Literature and Art, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents/ Washington, Government Prin t i n g Of f i c e , 1910, v o l . IX, p. 6871," 91 I t i s commonly acknowledged that "the quick decisions of the administration i n Washington, which accompanied the revolu-t i o n i n Panama and the recognition of the new Republic, were 56 made by Roosevelt." He intimates t h i s i n h i s autobiography, and although Secretary of State Hay worked hard and d i l i g e n t l y on the mechanics of the negotiation, Roosevelt had the f i n a l say In the course to be followed. Roosevelt's n a t i o n a l i s t i c sentiment behind h i s action in the Panama matter came out time and again i n h i s l e t t e r s during the period of negotiations. There i s no doubt whatso-ever that he f e l t he was acting i n the best i n t e r e s t s of h i s country, for i t s defence, f o r i t s economic betterment and consequently f o r i t s future greatness. He never regretted h i s actions e i t h e r at the time he took them nor l a t e r . Some years a f t e r the episode he wrote: The i n t e r e s t s of the American people demanded that I should act just exactly as I did act; and I would have taken the action I a c t u a l l y did take even though I had been cert a i n that.to do so meant my prompt retirement from public l i f e at the next election; f o r the only thing which makes i t worth while to hold a big o f f i c e i s taking advantage of the opportunities the o f f i c e o f f e r s to do, some big thing that ought to be done and i s worth doing. 57 And again: Yes, I took tjie Isthmus, and I am i n a wholly unrepentant frame of mind i n reference thereto. The e t h i c a l concep-t i o n upon which I acted was that I did not intend that Uncle Sam should be held up while we were doing a great 56 Thayer, op_. c i t . , p. 187. 57 Roosevelt, The Outlook. Oct., 1911, p. 315. 92 work f o r himself and a l l mankind. 58 Quite naturally, the Colombians did not remain s i l e n t or f a i l to lodge indignant protests once they r e a l i z e d what had happened. To generalize, the Colombian government j u s t i f i e d i t s action i n not r a t i f y i n g the Hay-Herran treaty and protested against the American action during November, 1903, i n the following manner: In defence of the n o n - r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Hay-Herran treaty, i t was pointed out that the Colombian Senate had as much ri g h t l e g a l l y to reject any treaty as had the American Senate, and that such a rejection should not be an excuse f o r an attack, open or subversive, upon Colombia. To other charges i t was emphasized that Colombia had already twice renewed the franchise of the French canal company a f t e r i t had lapsed. Moreover, the Colombians said that the o r i g i n a l French con-cession stipulated that the company oould not t r a n s f e r i t s franchise to a foreign government without the express concent of Colombia, and thus accusations that the Colombians were greedy were not true, but that the greed l a y with the Panama Canal company. The Colombian Government brought out the following ad-d i t i o n a l points: (a) The well known favorable attitude of the United States toward a r e b e l l i o u s u p r i s i n g i n the Department of Panama was the determining cause of the revolt, and to t h i s extent i t was a v i o l a t i o n of the express s t i p u l a t i o n s of the treaty of 1846. 58 MacCaleb, op_. c i t . , p. 137. 93 (b) The United States, by means of t h e i r armed forces,' prevented the Republic of Panama from repressing the aforesaid r e b e l l i o n and so preserving the dignity of her national t e r r i t o r y , t h i s being also i n v i o l a t i o n of the posit i v e s t i p u l a t i o n s of the treaty of 1846, (c) The United States recognized with undue haste 1h e so-called Republic of Panama,,., (d) The United States guaranteed to maintain by force the separation of Panama from the Republic of Colombia,.., 59 I t i s not my purpose to defend Roosevelt's agressive, n a t i o n a l i s t i c p o l i c i e s , but the American side of the argument should not go unheard. And when we r e a l i z e Roosevelt's char-acter, h i s Western t r a i n i n g , h is impulsiveness and s e l f -righteous nature, then the motive behind h i s actions becomes quite understandable. I t i s true that i t was completely within the power of the Colombian Senate to refuse to r a t i f y the Hay-Herran treaty. But both Roosevelt and Hay, during 1903, took the pos i t i o n that President Marroquin, by authorizing h i s representative i n Washington to sign the treaty, had assumed an ob l i g a t i o n to defend i t s terms i n Bogota. Three days a f t e r he signed the treaty i n s t r u c t i o n s reached Herran i n Washington not to sign i t , but the deed had been done. Also, there i s no denying that "Marroquin unquestionably had favored the treaty and . 60 encouraged negotiations," Thus when Marroquin not only f a i l e d to defend the treaty i n the Colombian Senate but also 59 United States, Senate Documents, 60th Congress, 2d. Session, Doc, No, 542, p. 7. 60 Dennett, op. c i t . , p. 375. 94 advocated non-ratification,.Roosevelt took i t as an act of bad f a i t h . The most common charge against the Colombian government was that i t was greedy. The Colombians answered that such a charge should be l a i d at the feet of the New Panama Canal Company. A l l the evidence points to the fact that the company's agents did everything i n t h e i r power to c o l l e c t the $40,000/ 000 due them should the Hay-Herran treaty go through. Nor should one overlook the company's willingness to s t i r up a revolution i n Panama to protect i t s investment. The Colombian government was equally intent on squeezing more money out of e i t h e r the United States or the New Panama Canal company or both. .This i s shown i n Beaupre's reports and i n the speeches made i n the Colombian Senate. The demand f o r more money also l e d to the serious suggestion by the Colombian commission on the canal that the extension of the canal company's franchise be declared i l l e g a l . This could have been done quite readily, f o r President Marroquin had granted the extension by l e g i s l a -t i v e decree, whereas the Colombian Congress should have con-firmed the grant. I t was f e l t i n the United States, and I believe r i g h t l y so, that the purpose behind the adjournment of the Colombian Congress before the treaty had been signed was to delay matters u n t i l the company's franchise became void, thus allowing Colombia to c o l l e c t the $40,000,000 designed f o r the French stockholders. I t might be termed a smart or r e a l i s t i c move to do so, but looking at i t with Roosevelt's eyes, i t was a-greedy, underhand, obstructionist movement 95 designed to delay the progress of one of the most important works undertaken by the United States since the Louisiana Purchase. Delay, with elections near, was l i k e waring a red f l a g i n front of the bull-headed President, and one can imagine the indignation i n Roosevelt's mind when both delay and evident unrighteousness urged him to impulsive action. The money problem meant nothing to Roosevelt. No one can accuse him of being bribed or even being susceptible to bribery. But p r i n c i p l e meant a great deal to him,: e s p e c i a l l y as he construed p r i n c i p l e , which was usually one-sided. Colombian spokesman frequently l a i d the accusation that the favorable attitude towards the proposed r e b e l l i o n i n the United States was the determining cause of the r e v o l t . This i s but p a r t i a l l y true, f o r throughout i t s existence, Panama "was almost continuously i n disorder and was a crater of re-volution and disturbance; furthermore/ the c i v i l wa rs and 61 outbreaks i n Colombia i t s e l f were a source of anxiety." President Roosevelt, i n h i s message to Congress explaining the action he took, mentioned that i n the past 53 years there had been 53 occasions of revolt, u p r i s i n g or disturbance. Later, 1 i n h i s autobiography, he wrote: In 1856, i n 1860, i n 1876, i n 1885, i n 1901, and again i n 1902, s a i l o r s and marines from United States' warships were forced to land {jm Panama] i n order to patrol the Isthmus, to protect l i f e and property, and to see that t r a n s i t across the Isthmus was kept open. In 1861, i n 1885, and i n 1900, the Colombian Government asked that the United States Government would land troops to protect Colombian i n t e r e s t s and maintain order on the Isthmus. 61 A. L. P. Dennis, Adventures i n American Foreign  Policy. New York, E. P. Dutton, 1928, p. 313 96 The people of Panama during the proceeding twenty years had three times sought to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r independence by revolution or s e c e s s i o n — i n 1885, i n 1895, and i n 1899. 62 Revolution i n Panama was almost as periodic as the seasons. The b e l i e f of the Panamanians that they were to be deprived of a huge source of income by the opportunists" of Bogota, plus tha conspiracy of agents of the Panama Canal Company during the l a t t e r part of 1903 were the twin causes of the r e v o l t . Roose-v e l t ' s favorable attitude towards secession confirmed Bunau-V a r i l l a * s b e l i e f that a revolt was assured of success. But the opposition to the Marroquin government, i t s e l f based on revolution, was such that revolt might have occurred i n Bogota had Roosevelt announced that henceforth the Nicaraguan route would be sought. Roosevelt's favorable attitude was, t h e r e f o ^ a determining cause i n time, but l i t t l e more. There i s more to be said f o r the a c t i o n of the United States'navy during the r e v o l t . I t should be understood at the outset that there was no d i r e c t collaboration between the naval ships' a r r i v a l i n the Caribbean Sea and the time announced f o r the rev o l t . In f a c t , i t was known by the conspirators that American naval ships were i n the v i c i n i t y p r i o r to the revolt taking place, and the revolt was more or l e s s timed so as to take advantage of t h e i r a r r i v a l , not vice versa. Roosevelt argued that the ships were sent to the area, as they had been time and again i n past years, to keep the isthmian t r a n s i t 62 Roosevelt, Autobiography, p. 517. 97 open; and that troops were landed to protect the l i v e s of American nationals and American property. The Colombians countered that such protective measures had not been requested as heretofore. That was true, but i n July,' of the same year, 3 American marines had landed on the Colombian coast to restore, order i n a minor disturbance, and at that time, although t h e i r presence was also not requested, the a f f a i r caused only a ri p p l e of protest and was quickly forgotten. But i f the con-spirators behind the Panamanian revolt took advantage of the presence of American warships nearby, i t i s unquestionably true that Roosevelt took advantage of A r t i c l e XXXV of-the treaty of 1846 to prevent action on the part of the Colombian force went to put down the r e v o l t . His excuse, as we have seen, was based on precedent, to keep the t r a n s i t open across the isthmus. His purpose, however, was to put an end to the negotiations with Colombia by permitting the revolt to succeed, A f i n a l charge by the Colombian government against Ameri-can action i n the Panama a f f a i r needs comment, and t h i s was the recognition of the Republic of Panama by the United States 'with undue haste'. This charge would carry more weight had hot the Colombian government been g u i l t y of a remarkably hasty volte face on i t s own account shortly a f t e r the revolt was under way. P r i o r to the re v o l t , Colombia had based her refusal to r a t i f y the Hay-Herran treaty l a r g e l y on a matter of principle that her sovereignty would be i n t e r f e r e d with. Money, accord-ing to them, was a secondary matter. When the revolt was underway, however, i t would appear that p r i n c i p l e became a 98 secondary matter. On November 6, 1903, Mr. Beaupre' at Bogota wired Secretary Hay the following message: Knowing that the revolution has already commenced i n Pan-a ma, La high Colombian O f f i c i a l ] says that i f the Govern-ment of the United States w i l l land troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty, and the t r a n s i t , i f requested by the Colombian charge' d'affaires, t h i s Government w i l l declare martial law, and by virtue of vested constitutional authority, when public order i s disturbed, w i l l approve by decree the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the canal treaty as signed; or, i f the Government of the United States prefers, w i l l c a l l extra session of Congress with new; and f r i e n d l y  members next May to approve the treaty. 63 The Colombian government performed an almost equally rapid turnabout i n i t s stand on renouncing the extension of the granchise to the New Panama Canal Company. A l e t t e r to the . 64 company was sent by M. Rodulfo Sampir informing i t of Colombia's , v ferme resolution de reprimer l e mouvement m i l i t a i r e separatists de Panama par tous l e s moyens qui ^ o i a n t en son pouvoir, a f i n de maintenir sa souverainete dans cette paartie de son t e r r i t o i r e ; et, a^ cette occasion i l me eharge egalement de renouveler a l a Compagnie sa l o y a l decision de l a maintenirtdans l a jouissance du contrat de concession et dans c e l l e des provogations, pour l'ouvera-ture et 1'exploitation du Canal de Panama. 65 In other words, the Colombian government was w i l l i n g to act with undue haste In a matter which concerned t h e i r v i t a l i n t e r e s t s just as Roosevelt was prepared to take speedy action 63 Pr e s i d e n t i a l Papers and Messages, op. c i t . , pp. 6798 — 9 . Underlining mine. 64 A representative of Colombia on the board of directors of the New Panama Canal Company. Colombia was the second largest bondholder! 65 United States, Senate Documents, 58th Congress, 2d. Sess., Doc. No. 133, p. IS.' 99 when an opportunity furthering American i n t e r e s t s was pre-sented to him. The leaders i n Colombia and the United States government both r e a l i z e d that a revolt was pending by la t e summer i n 1903. The government of Bogota placed t h e i r f a i t h i n being able to outride the storm by using American forces to que l l the revolution as they bad done i n the pasti. They f a i l e d to take into account the aggressive nationalism of a young, ambitious president to whom action was as dear a p r i n c i p l e as righteousness—and the president defined righteous-66 ness. Righteousness may be more properly c a l l e d nationalism i n accounting f o r Roosevelt's action concerning the Panama canal. The construction of the canal meant cutting between 8,000 and 9,000 nautical miles o f f the then distance between the major A t l a n t i c and P a c i f i c coast ports. I t s use to the national de-fence of the United States was recognized as the prime import-ance. I t s value to the trade and commerce of the world i n general and to the United States i n p a r t i c u l a r was tremendous. In a project of such consequence to h i s country, Roosevelt thought of the i n t e r e s t s of h i s nation f i r s t and those of Colombia second. I t was i n h i s nature to judge the means by ends, and to act on t h i s premise i n the Panama canal matter. Had he been a Wilhelm I I or C e c i l Rhodes, Colombia i t s e l f would probably have become a second Hawaii, 66 World opinion of Roosevelt's action was rather favor-able. By January 5, 1904, the Republic of Panama had been f o r -mally recognized by France, China, Austria-Hungar, Germany, Denmark, Russia, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Nicaragua, Peru, Cuba, Great B r i t a i n , I t a l y , Japan, Costa Rica and Switzerland. The lack of South American-^-as compared to European—countries re-cognizing Panama i s s i g n i f i c a n t . Chapter IV Roosevelt and the  Alaska Boundary Dispute 100 Apart from the 'Panama matter 1, there i s no instance i n foreign a f f a i r s when President Roosevelt wielded the 'big stick* i n diplomacy with more zeal than i n the Alaska boundary dispute. Moreover, there are few times when his nationalism was more evident and aggressive. The major part of the long, drawn-out boundary dispute belongs i n large part to the MeKinley and Cleveland administrations. This 6hapter, therefore, w i l l deal mainly with Roosevelt's e f f o r t s to bring the dispute to an end,1 rather than the d e t a i l s of the dispute i t s e l f . P r i o r to 1896, the United States had comparatively l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n Alaska. U n t i l that time, Americans had been con-cerned with the f i s h i n g and seal-hunting i n d u s t r i e s i n Alaskan waters, together with some fur-hunting i n the i n t e r i o r . But a^side from these moderately Important in d u s t r i e s , there was nothing to i n t e r e s t the American public as a whole In "Seward's 1 Ice-Box". This attitude underwent a decided change when gold was discovered i n the Klondike area i n 1896—97. The gold st r i k e s caused a rush to Alaska so that within a few years a population of approximately 30,000 existed i n what was hitherto a very sparcely populated d i s t r i c t . The new importance of Alaska r e s u l t i n g from the Klondike finds brought in t o sharperrlight the dispute between the United States and Great B r i t a i n over the actual boundary of Alaska. This boundary l i n e had been f i x e d between Russia and Great 1 Alaska had been bought from Russia by the United States i n 1867 at the i n s t i g a t i o n of Secretary of State Seward, who managed'to purchase i t at the bargain price of- about one and one h a l f cents ancacre. 101 B r i t a i n by treaty i n 1825. However, at the time the treaty was signed, there were no accurate maps of the i n t e r i o r of AlaJsRa.. Thus the boundary l i n e was quite vague and i t s actual l o c a t i o n open to question. Periodic e f f o r t s were made to have the boundary surveyed both by the United States and Canada a f t e r 1872, but with no p?.ractical r e s u l t s . But with the rush to the Klondike, the boundary dispute became a major issue since the chief route of access to the gold f i e l d s f o r Canadians and Americans al i k e was through the area In q i e s t i o n . In 1898, the Alaska boundary problem was placed before the Joint High Commission as one among various other Canadian-American disputes. Canada's contention was that the boundary ran ten marine miles inside the main trend of the coast, and as such i t s course cut across the numerous long i n l e t s o f f e r i n g access from the sea. This boundary would leave the United States i n possession of numerous, frequently unconnected pro-mo^taries along the B r i t i s h Columbian coast, and would deprive her of important harbors and passes leading i n t o the i n t e r i o r . The United States' claim, therefore, was that the boundary i n dispute followed the si n u o s i t i e s of the coast, and that the ten marine mile s t r i p of land which went to make up the Alaskan panhandle should be measured from the t i p s of the arms of the i n l e t s . The Joint High Commission inded i n deadlock over the - 2 boundary dispute. The United States was unwilling to com-2 Great B r i t a i n attempted to secure a favorable compromise f o r Canada i n the Alaska boundary dispute i n return f o r the con-cessions Great B r i t a i n made the United States i n the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. This attempt was unsuccessful. 102 promise or to submit the problem to a t h i r d party f o r a r b i t r a -t i o n , although Secretary of State Hay did suggest submitting the oase to a commission of s i x j u r i s t s . This i n turn was un-acceptable to Canada. However, u n t i l such time as a decision could be reached, both nations agreed to a modus Vivendi which would eliminate such over-lapping j u r i s d i c t i o n as existed while giving access to the i n t e r i o r to nationals of both countries. The modus Vivendi over the Alaska boundary was s t i l l i n e f f e c t when Roosevelt became president i n 1901. Although f u l l y convinced of the righteousness of the United States* claim, the President f e l t no urgency about the matter. Great B r i t a i n was then at war with the Boers and to raise the question would have embar^issed her. Furthermore, Roosevelt was anxious to have B r i t a i n ' s signature on the second Hay-Pauncefote tr e a t y . Thus when Choate, the American ambassador to Great B r i t a i n , wrote asking the attitude he whould take on the Alaska problem 4 i n January, 1902, Roosevelt r e p l i e d : "Let sleeping dogs l i e . " The boundary dispute became active again i n the summer of 1902. In June of that year the Governor-General of Canada,1 Lord Minto, and the Canadian Prime Minister, S i r Wilfred Laur-i e r , were both i n London. Lord Lansdowne, the B r i t i s h Secret-ary of Foreign A f f a i r s , suggested to Choate that he should see 3 In October, 1899. 4 Quoted i n A. L. P. Dennis, Adventures i n American  Diplomacy. New York, E. P. Dutton and Co., 1928, p. 143. 105 Laurier regarding means to ef f e c t a f i n a l settlement of the boundary dispute. Before Choate got around to t h i s v i s i t / Henry White, the F i r s t Secretary at the American Embassy, v i s i -ted Laurier as a matter of courtesy. Laurier brought the boundary matter up, and suggested to White that he would be happy to see the problem amicably s e t t l e d . White wrote Secret-ary Hay about the conversation with La u r i e r / and mentioned that the Canadian Prime Minister appeared " r e a l l y anxious to s e t t l e the matter and w i l l go as f a r as he can i n the way of conces-5 sions which he can make h i s people swallow toward the end." Very shortly a f t e r receiving t h i s note from White, Hay forwarded i t to Roosevelt, pointing out to the President: F i r s t . That Laurier i s anxious to have the boundary question.settled...; that he wants to save h i s face by having the matter decided against him. S t i l l , he pre-tends that he believes h i s own cause to be j u s t . . . . Second. I t i s evident that Lansdowne i s also anxious to have some settlement.... 6 Roosevelt r e p l i e d to the e f f e c t that he thought the Can-adian claims outrageous and u t t e r l y f o o l i s h . Hay agreed with him i n the weakness of the Canadian contentions, but pressed Roosevelt f o r in s t r u c t i o n s as to whether Choate should carry on discussions or not. Hay added that h i s own suggestion was 5 -Alan Nevins, Henry White. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1930, p. 193. This story of how the boundary dispute was raised by Laurier i s not discussed i n the biographies of Laurier, Minto or Lansdowne, although there Is no doubt that these"men strongly desired to s e t t l e the matter once and f o r a l l . 6 Dennis, pj>. c i t . , p. 144. 104 the one he presented several years ago,' that i s , a commission of s i x members to decide the question, three members from each side, and the decision to go by a majority vote. Roosevelt was not opposed to the idea, though he thought i f such a group were to meet he would " i n s t r u c t our three commissioners when appointed ' 7 that they are i n no case to y i e l d any of our claim." Already Roosevelt laaTs assuming the attitude of the 'just man armed', and was preparing to combat any move which might impinge on the nation's righteous demands or s u l l y the nation's escutcheon. During the remainder of 1902 negotiations on the boundary dispute continued a t a l e i s u r e l y pace. Laurier hoped to the 8 l a s t to have the matter submitted to a board of a r b i t r a t i o n , but the American government i n s i s t e d on a judio&al commisfeioa or t r i b u n a l as recommended by Hay. With many misgivings, and under pressure from London, Laurier gave i n to the American demands. From October to December, 1902, preparations were 9 made to draw up a convention s e t t i n g up the t r i b u n a l , and the B r i t i s h ambassador i n Washington, S i r Michael Herbert. Under the terms of the convention, the t r i b u n a l was to <. -10 consist o f - " s i x impartial j u r i s t s of repute" three to be ag-7' Charles C . T a n s i l l , Canadian-American Relations. 1875  —1911."New Haven, Yale University Press, 1943, p. 226. 8 "The besetting s i n of which i s to s p l i t the flifferencey said Hay. - .•: 9 Roosevelt was careful zo point out that i t was to be a .judicial t r i b u n a l , not an a r b i t r a t i o n t r i b u n a l . 10 For the f u l l text of the convention fcee United States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United S t a t e s —  1905. Washington, Government Prin t i n g Oflfice, 1903, pp. 488— 493. 105 pointed by the President of the United States and three by His Britannic Majesty; the decision to be by a majority and to be accepted as f i n a l . Each party agreed to d e l i v e r i t s evidence to the other within two months of the exchange of r a t i f i c a t i o n . In two more months each side was required to f i l e i t s reply. Within the next two months the or a l arguments were to be made before the t r i b u n a l , and f i n a l l y , the points of reference were l i m i t e d to the geographical meaning of the vague or disputed terms of the treaty of 1825. In Brief, i t was a j u d i c i a l t r i b u n a l whose aim was "not to arrange a p r a c t i c a l and reason-able solution of the d i f f i c u l t y , but to int e r p r e t l e g a l l y a 11 document that was geographically absurd." Having signed the convention, Hay's next problem was to have i t r a t i f i e d i n the Senate. Roosevelt c a l l e d : upon h i s o l d f i r e n d , Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, to steer the treaty through the Senate where opposition was expected from Senators from the northwestern states. What happened when he introduced the treaty i s best expressed i n Lodge's own words: Several Senators came to see me, es p e c i a l l y Senators from the northwest, and said that they must be assured as to the men whom the President would now appoint members of the Tribunal.... I t o l d the President of the s i t u a t i o n and asked i f he.would allow me to t e l l Senators i n confidence whom he intended to appoint. He gave me permission to do so.... When these selections of the President were made known i n confidence to the 11J H. L. Keenleyside, Canada and the United States. New York, A l f r e d A. Knopf, Inc., 1929, p. 217. 106 Senators there was no further objection to the treaty.... 12 Most c e r t a i n l y the Senators had good reason to be s a t i s -/-^ f i e d . Determined to permit no occasion to pass where by Ameri-can claims might be s a c r i f i c e d , Roosevelt had chosen three gentlemen whose i m p a r t i a l i t y to the question was non-existant. The f i r s t of these was Senator Lodge himslef, who was and had been p u b l i c l y outspofaen i n h i s denunciation of Canada's asser-tions i n the boundary matter. Lodge was an extreme national!st^ t r i e d to out-Roosevelt Roosevelt i n 'one-hundred-per-cent-Americanism ,, and was an Anglophobe at heart. The second man appointed was Senator Turner of the state of Washington, a man representing the northwestern states' cry f o r no quarter on the boundary dispute and an advocate of the school which would see the United States occupy the disputed t e r r i t o r y by force rather than compromise with Canada. The t h i r d member of t h i s impartial panel was Secretary of War Root, a member of Roosevelt's cabinet, and a staunch upholder of the Republican administration. To his cr e d i t i t must be said that he was reluctant to accept the appointment and that he had a better l e g a l mind than h i s brother members. But under no stretch of the Imagination could he be c a l l e d t r u l y i m p a r t i a l . 12 Senator Lodge gave a paper on the part he played i n the dispute i n 1925. A large part of Lodge's paper i s re-produced, i n the a r t i c l e "Henry Cabot Lodge and the Alaska Boundary Dispute" by a Canadian geographer, James White. This a r t i c l e appeared.in the December,- 1925 issue.of the Canadian  H i s t o r i c a l Review. The Senate consequently r a t i f i e d the convention on February 11, 1903, and Great B r i t a i n on February 16, 1903. 107 The public announcement of the American members of the t r i b u n a l brought f o r t h a storm of protest i n Canada, Great B r i t a i n and to some extent, i n the United States. S i r Michael Herbert was "disgusted and dismayed",' and bemoaned the part 13 p o l i t i c s played i n American foreign a f f a i r s . Lord Minto be-l i e v e d the United States behaved "quite d i s g r a c e f u l l y . " In the United States one of the usually pro-Republican newspapers expressed the opinion held by many others of the sele c t i o n : I f the President were to seek the country over f o r men who were e n t i r e l y without j u d i c i a l quality on t h i s question, he could not f i n d persons whose minds are more set than Messrs. Lodge, Turner and Root. Their selection cannot be interpreted i n any other way than that the President intends to block the s l i g h t e s t chance of decision i n the least favorable to Canada. 14 From London White reported that the B r i t i s h were surp r i s -15 ed, dismayed and embarrassed, and were f e a r f u l of Canadian reaction. In the Dominion i t s e l f , " the storm of protest that 13 Writing to Lord Lansdowne on February E l , 1903, Herbert added:" The question i s : what is to be done? I r e a l i z e the impossible position i n which the Laurier Government has been placed i n Canada, and they have every right to complain... but i n spite o f - t h i s , i t would be useless and inadvisable f o r them to protest,-and f o l l y to break o f f as Laurier suggests, f o r the consequences would be too grave to contemplate. Moreover, the more I appreciate the temper of the p o l i t i c i a n s i n Washington i n regard "to the Alaska Boundary, the more I r e a l i z e the paramount "importance of having the question.settled." ( Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne, London, Macmillan and Co., 19S9, p.26S) 14 Quoted inKeenleyside, op_. c i t . , pp. E19-E0, from the S p r i n g f i e l d Republican. February S37~T903. 15 Hay r e p l i e d that he understood the B r i t i s h objections, but stated that " the President thought i t was impossible to get the treaty through the Senate without the earnest and devoted assistance of Lodge and Turner and of the groups they represented." ( Nevins, op_. c i t . , p. 195) 108 followed... was vigorous, wide-spread and sustained beyond any-16 thing i n the country's annals." The Canadian protest was voiced i n London i n no uncertain terms. The C o l o n i a l Office,' i n reply, informed the Governor-General: His Majesty's government were as much surprised as your ministers at the selection of the American members of the t r i b u n a l . His Majesty's government are convinced that i t would be useless to press the United States to withdraw the names put forward, and arguments against the personal f i t n e s s of the three American representatives, however convincing, would f a i l to lead to any p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t . 17 In any event, the B r i t i s h government had r a t i f i e d the convent-ion on February 16. Placed i n a p o s i t i o n where i t could break o f f negotiations altogether or accept the uncompromising demands of Roosevelt, Great B r i t a i n choose the l a t t e r alterna1> ive i n the b e l i e f that i t was to Canada's i n t e r e s t — and e s p e c i a l l y i n the Empire's i n t e r e s t — that the t r i b u n a l 18 should be held. Canada bowed to the i n e v i t a b l e . 16 0. D. Skelton, The L i f e and Letters of S i r Wilfred Laurier, Toronto, Oxford.University Press, 1921, vol.2, p. 153, 17 Quoted i n John S Ewart, The Kingdom of Canada and  Other Essays. Toronto, Morang and Co., Ltd., 1908, p. 308. (Chamberlain to Lord Minto, February 26, 1903) 18 Laurier appealed d i r e c t l y to Hay to have the American selection revised. In a l e t t e r to Hay, (February 24, 1903), the Canadian Prime Minister wrote: " I appeal to you that these gentlemen, under e x i s t i n g circumstances, cannot with any fairness be styled ' impartial j u r i s t s . * I do not press the point with Mr. Root; I learn on good authority that before assuming hi s duties as.a member of the court he w i l l have ceased to be a member of the Administration, and therein l i e s the sole ground of objection against him as an impartial j u r i s t . " ( P.C. Jessup, E l i h u Root, New York, Dodd, Mead and Co.,; 1938,. v o l . 1, p. 393.1 Root's prof erred resignation did not take place u n t i l some time a f t e r h i s service on the t r i b u n a l . 109 On her side, Canada chose as members of the t r i b u n a l S i r Louis A. Jette, a former pusine judge of the Quebec Supreme Court and the Lieutenant-Governor of that province; and Mr. 19 Justice George Armour of the Supreme Court of Canada. The t h i r d member was Lord Alyerstone, the Lord Chief Justice of England, who was chosen by the B r i t i s h government as i t s re-presentative. I t was generally considered that Alverstone would cast the decisive vote i n the t r i b u n a l , and as i t turned out the supposition was correct. During March and A p r i l the United States and Great Britain were busy preparing t h e i r respective cases which were to be ex-changed on May 8. In the midst of these negotiations Roosevelt became convinced that Laurier was not acting i n the f r i e n d l y , impartial s p i r i t which the President expected. Therefore Roosevelt sent a memorandum to the three American members i n which he gave h i s views as to what he expected the American members to do on the t r i b u n a l . In i t Roosevelt vigorously de-nounced the chief Canadian claims as untenable, and one i n pa r t i c u l a r so out of l i n e as to render i t improper to bring into open discussionJ Roosevelt warned them that there should 19 When Mr. Justice Armour died a few months l a t e r , h i s place was taken by A l l e n B. Aylesworth, K. C , a distinguished Toronto b a r r i s t e r . One writer says of Ganclda's choice: "To the United States the selection of such men must have seemed a quiet yet eloquent rebuke." (Lionel M. Gelber, The Rise of  Anglo-American Friendship, Oxford University Press, 1938, p. 148.) However, i t i s very doubtful i f such a rebuke ever penetrated the armour of national;self-righteousness which Roosevelt donned on t h i s occasion. 110 be no compromise on the pr i n c i p l e involved i n the American con-tention f o r the Alaska panhandle, and that i n h i s judgment "the question i s not one... i n which i t i s possible f o r a moment to consider a reconciling of c o n f l i c t i n g claims by 20 mutual concession." Roosevelt l e f t no question i n the minds of the American commissioners as to the ver d i c t he exp^ected. La^te i n May and early i n June the B r i t i s h government requested permission to photograph a large number of prima^ry documents i n Washington pertaining to the dispute f o r trans-mission to London where they could be studied by the B r i t i s h delegates and t h e i r a dvisers. Secretary Hay agreed to t h i s •unusual 1 request but pointed out that "the United States i s : 21 desirous of avoiding a l l unnecessary delay...." shortly thereafter Hay was informed by S i r Michael Herbert that further extensions mightobe requested i n order to give time to the B r i t i s h counsels to prepare the B r i t i s h counter-case, f o r them were many documents s t i l l unexamined yet pertinent to the case. Some suggestion was made that the o r a l argument should be set back u n t i l October i n order to allow the B r i t i s h more time,' but with l i t t l e e f f e c t . The B r i t i s h endeavours to postpone the meeting of the tr i b u n a l and the general d i l a t o r i n e s s of the B r i t i s h began to rouse Roosevelt's temper. Senator Lodge was even more angry. He protested to Roosevelt that delaying the meeting of the tr i b u n a l to October would not only be personally inconvenient to him, but suggested that the proposed delay to a time so 2 i U. S., Foreign Relations—1905. p. 504. I l l $ear the meeting of Congress was a B r i t i s h attempt to keep him-28 s e l f and Root from serving on the t r i b u n a l . I f there was to be any delay, Lodge preferred that i t be extended u n t i l next summer. Roosevelt b r i s t l e d with indignation at the thought of delay and at possible B r i t i s h t r i c k e r y behind i t . He r e p l i e d to Lodge: I am by no means certain that I would acquiesce i n deferr-ing the matter u n t i l next summer. I do not want i t hanging on during the p r e s i d e n t i a l campaign. I d i s l i k e making any kind of threat ( s i c ) , but my present judgment i s that i f the B r i t i s h play f a s t and loose the thing to do i s to declare the negotiations o f f , r e c i t e our case i n the message to Congress, and ask f o r an appropriation to run the boundary as we deem i t should be run.... The English behaved badly i n the Venezuela dispute despite the f a c t that we had behaved with scrupulous care and i m p a r t i a l i t y during the Boer War. I o'on't intend that they should do any s h u f f l i n g now. 83 In t h i s same mood of truculence and righteousness, Roose-v e l t decided that the B r i t i s h should c l e a r l y understand h i s determination to have the tr i b u n a l give a 'correct' verdict,* and that they should be informed what to expect i f t h i s y.er-dic t was not forthcoming. Avoiding the regular diplomatic 24 channels, he wrote a l e t t e r to h i s f r i e n d , Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then v i s i t i n g i n England, with the idea In mind that Holmes would show the contents of the l e t t e r to 22 There i s no i n d i c a t i o n i n Canadian or B r i t i s h sources that such was the intention of the B r i t i s h or Canadian govern-ment, 23 Lodge, op_, c i t , . p. 37, 24 June 23, 1903. For the f u l l text of t h i s l e t t e r , see Appendix 9F. 113 the B r i t i s h Colonial Secretary and other men i n high govern-mental o f f i c e . I t was a demanding and uncompromising l e t t e r , 5 well sprinkled with t h i n l y v e i l e d threats of u n i l a t e r a l action should disagreement or deadlock result i n the t r i b u n a l . I t was a perfect example of the sword-rattling t a c t i c s one usually associates -@ith the Kaiser, but i t was t y p i c a l of the 'big s t i c k 1 t a c t i c s Roosevelt employed i n the following months. The double theme of speed and American righteousness was used by Roosevelt time and a gain during the summer of 1903.' Denouncing the continued B r i t i s h e f f o r t s to postpone the hear-ings, Roosevelt t o l d Hay that ... i f the English decline to come to an agreement t h i s f a l l , under any pretense, I s h a l l f e e l i t i s simply due to bad f a i t h , — t h a t they have no sincere desire to se t t l e the matter equitably. I think that they ought to be made to understand that... the agreement must be kept.... 85 A short time l a t e r he threatened: With England over the Alaska business, I do hope she w i l l understand that i f we can't come to an agreement now nothing w i l l be l e f t the United States but to act i n a way which w i l l necessarily wound B r i t i s h pride. 36 The numerous strong notes Roosevelt sent Seoretary Hay were i n turn forwarded by Hay to Choate, White, and others i n England i n order that the President's opinions would "percolate' 35 dames M. Callihan, - American Foreign Policy i n Canadian  Relations. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1937', p. 483. 36 Dennis, o£. c i t . , p. 145. Choate, i n London,' "ex-pressed the opinion that the B r i t i s h were so 'staggered' by the strength of the American case that they would keep on str i v -ing to 'get a l l the delay they can"*. ( T a n s i l l , on. c i t . t p. 40.) . ... 115 through to the B r i t i s h government. The various requests made by Great B r i t a i n i n July that the o r a l arguments be postponed were looked upon with suspicion,and i n d i c a t i v e of the weakness of the Canadian claim. Roosevelt sent out constant reminders to Hay and Choate that Great B r i t a i n "must be kept up to the mark" and that no s h i l l y - s h a l l y i n g would be permitted. Due to these constant proddings by Roosevelt, the counter-cases were exchanged on time, and the date f o r the o r a l argu-ments was set f o r September. In the meantime, Senator Lodge had gene to London f t o prepare the ground 1, as he c a l l e d i t , ' and to see f o r himself what progress was being made. He added h i s weight to the constant u n o f f i c i a l pressure on the B r i t i s h government f o r a decision favorable to the United States, and intimated strongly to Chamberlain, Balfour and others that Roosevelt looked upon the present t r i b u n a l as Great B r i t a i n ' s l a s t chance to come to an agreement over the boundary problem by consultation. E a r l y i n August he wrote Roosevelt of the situ a t i o n as i t appeared to him. He believed The only question i s whether Lord Alverstone w i l l go with us on the main points.... Very l i k e l y he w i l l , but England i s i n such mortal t e r r o r of Canada that I f e e l more than doubtful i n regard to i t . The fact i s that Gandda i s i n the worst possible of positions of possessing powers unaccompanied By any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 27 The f i r s t meeting of the boundary t r i b u n a l took place on September 5, 1905, and a f t e r a method of procedure had been 27 Lodge, OJD. c i t . . pp. 41—42. 114 agreed upon, the members got down to work on September 15. I t soon became apparent that the two leading points of controversy-were whether the Alaska panhandle included the, heads of the salt-water i n l e t s and whether the water boundary through the o Portland Canal i n the v i c i n i t y of 54 40' was located north or south of a few uninhabited i s l a n d s . Furthermore, both the Canadians and Americans became more f u l l y convinced that Lord Alverstone's judgment would be the deciding vote. The Canad-ians, therefore, stressed Imperial i n t e r e s t s , w h i l e the Ameri-can delegates stressed the dire consequences of a pro-Canadian decision. Roosevelt continued to keep up a steady stream of correspondence with the American delegates i n London and others who might i n some way promote the American cause. In a l l the l e t t e r s the theme was rarely varied; the United States must be granted i t s c l a i m s — o r e l s e . On September 26 he wayote White: I t would be a bad thing f o r us i f there was a deadlock i n the present Commission; but i t would be a very much worse thing f o r the Canadians and the English, because i t would leave me with no alternative but to declare as courteously, but as strongly as possible, that the e f f o r t s to reach an agreement having f a i l e d , I should be obliged to treat the t e r r i t o r y as ours, as being for the most part i n our possession, and the remainder to be reduced to possession as soon as i n our judgment i t was advisable—and to declare furthermore that no add i t i o n a l negotiations of any kind would be entered i n t o . 28 28 Nevins, op, c i t . , p. 199. " I t was evident that White was expected to convey the g i s t of these l e t t e r s to members of the B r i t i s h government, and... he did so." (Loc. c i t . ) 115 Early i n October, when the Canadians were protesting t h e i r case with more than usual vigor, Hay sent two l e t t e r s to White t e l l i n g him s p e c i f i c a l l y to see Balfour and to impress on him the American stand. White saw the B r i t i s h Prime Minister on the following weekend, and on October 4,' he reported that he had had a long t a l k with Balfour during which I l e f t no doubt upon h i s mind as to the im-portance of a settlement nor as to the result of a f a i l u r e to agree. He fBalfour] said that he attached f a r more importance to the agreement of the t r i b u n a l than to any of the Cabinet questions... With which he was then bothered/ and that he thought i t would be l i t t l e short of disaster i f the t r i b u n a l broke up without a decision. 29 About the same time Roosevelt was wr i t i n g to Root: I do wish they £the B r i t i s h ] could understand that t h i s i s t h e i r l a s t chance, and that though i t would be unpleasant f o r us, i f they force me to do what I must do i n case they f a i l to take advantage of t h i s chance, i t w i l l be a thous-and-fold more unpleasant to them. 30 There i s l i t t l e doubt that the American representatives i n London were r e l y i n g upon p o l i t i c a l pressure rather than a j u d i c i a l decision to achieve a 'correct 1 v e r d i c t , despite the undoubted strength of t h e i r own case. Moreover, Lodge and several other associates b e l i e v e d — o r hoped—that the B r i t i s h government would act according to such pressure. Roosevelt's notes to White, Root, Lodge and others were not written with the idea of strengthening the resolution of the American 29 Nevins, op_. c i t . , p. 200. White then suggested to the Prime Minister that Alverstone be t o l d that the B r i t i s h govern-ment, "without i n any way wishing to influence him," was most anxious f o r a decision. White's suggestion can hardly be called subtle. '30 Jessup'v, op. c i t . , p. 379. 116 members, nor were Hay's frequent memoranda to the same people written as d i r e c t i v e s of p o l i c y . Rather they were excellent l e t t e r s to have on hand when v i s i t i n g i n f l u e n t i a l B r i t i s h ministers and c i v i l servants, to be ' d i s c r e e t l y ' shown at the proper time and place as representing the a l t e r n a t i v e to a decision against the American contentions. Such were the methods used to make the B r i t i s h government thoroughly aware of the consequences should the imperial bonds prove too strong, and " i t i s inconweivable that Lord Alverstone whould have 31 remained unaware of i t . " The l a s t days of the tribunal seem to bear out the general b e l i e f that Alverstone r e a l i z e d the serious e f f e c t s a deadlock would bring. A f t e r the o r a l arguments had come to an end,'; Alverstone remained stubborn i n h i s opinion that the width of the l i s l e r e that went around the i n l e t s should be r e s t r i c t e d . 32 The l i n e he had choseft "was i n e f f e c t a compromise l i n e , " and from t h i s point on, the decisions reached appeared to be through compromise rather than through j u d i c i a l review. For example on October 12 Lord Alverstong gave h i s written opinion to h i s collegues on the t r i b u n a l that the boundary l i n e ran north of the four islands at the mouth of the Portland Canal. Two days l a t e r he revised h i s decision, conceding the two northern Islands to the United States, despite the f a c t that the s i x delegates were c a l l e d upon to e s t a b l i s h whether the l i n e ran 31 Jessupr, op. cit.., p. 400. -32 T a n s i l l , op_. c i t . . p. 259. 117 either completely north or completely south of the i s l a n d s . I t i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine that such an action was e n t i r e l y devoid of diplomatic pressure and founded solely on j u d i c i a l consideration. The award of the t r i b u n a l was made public on October 20, 33 1903. Lord; Alverstone voted with the American delegates up-holding t h e i r contention that i n the o r i g i n a l Anglo-Russian treaty of 1825, the wording was such that the l i s i e r e was meant to follow the s i n u o s i t i e s of the coast rather than the general trend of the coast-line. The American reaction, quite 34 naturally, was that ju s t i c e had triumphed. President Roosevelt, as usual, was quite pleased with himself i n the way he handled the Alaska boundary dispute. He had no compunction, either during the s i t t i n g of the t r i b u n a l or afterwards, about the methods he employed to secure a favorable decision. In fact he l a t e r boasted of h i s open, i f i n d i r e c t , methods by remarking: "While John Hay was a fin e Secretary of State, he was much too gentle a person to handle the kind of a big s t i c k that was necessary i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 35 connection." It_i.s d i f f i c u l t to fathom Roosevelt's reasoning when he 33 The Canadian members accused Alverstone of a breach of f a i t h , and refused to a f f i x t h e i r signatures to the award. Both then and afterwards, i n speeches and i n letters,' a l v e r -stone maintained that he gave a j u d i c i a l decision, and that i f the Ca nadians did not l i k e h is decision, they 'should not have chosen a B r i t i s h judge' to s i t on the Tribunal. 34 A discussion of the deep Canadian reactions i s outside the scope of t h i s t h e s i s . - 35 Ta n s i l l , ' op_. c i t . , ' p. 263. 118 speaks of the 'big s t i c k ' being necessary on t h i s occasion, e s p e c i a l l y so when one remembers that the American case was s u f f i c i e n t l y strong at the outset, and that i n 1902 and 1903 the boundary dispute was not a dangerous problem. The modus  Vivendi had worked well, 1 and although awkward and sometimes i r r i t a t i n g , could have continued to work u n t i l sach time as a calm, j u d i c i a l decision could be reached or a p r a c t i c a l com-promise worked out. Giving strength to t h i s l a t t e r theory i s the f a c t that the Klondike f i e l d s were becoming l e s s important yearly a ^ f t e r 1898. Thus to understand Roosevelt's actions one must look not so much to his reasoning but to h i s nationalism. I t was t h i s emotion, more than any other, that l e d him to i n s i s t on the t r i b u n a l a r r i v i n g at a 'correct' decision. He believed h i s country to be i n the r i g h t — o f that there i s no doubt. What i s more, i t i s generally conceded by Canadian h i s t o r i a n s that the Canadian claim was weak. But Roosevelt, once he had seized upon a "righteous cause," e s p e c i a l l y when i t concerned the United States' r e l a t i o n with another nation, was not content to follow the usual procedure to s e t t l e such differences as ex-i s t e d v i a the normal diplomatic channels. Whether the dispute was with a weak power such as Colombia or a strong power such as Great B r i t a i n , the claims of the United States needs must be given p r i o r i t y , and since,' as Roosevelt believed, the United States was i n e v i t a b l y i n the r i g h t , j u s t i c e must triumph. The haze of nationalism surrounding Roosevelt usually prevented him from seeing that Justice held a two-edged sword. Chapter V Theodore Roosevelt and Europe  The Algeciras Conference 119 Almost a l l the diplomatic problems between the .United States and the European powers during Roosevelt's presidency were those having to do with the p r i n c i p l e s of the Monroe Doctrine as applied to the Western Hemisphere. The main ex-ception was the Algegiras Conference, where to an extent at l e a s t , Roosevelt again strained the concepts of the doctrine and meddled i n the a f f a i r s of Europe. This chapter w i l l deal with the part Roosevelt played i n that conference, with emphasis on the American viewpoint, and with due regard to the r e l a t i v e l y small part Roosevelt had i n the negotiations, both d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y . Roosevelt had l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n Morocco, and h i s know-ledge, of the tangled web of European diplomacy was quite meager. Thus when the Moroccan c r i s i s of 1905 loomed over Europe, he was unable to grasp the significance of the aims and motives of the various powers at the conference. In essence, the Moroccan c r i s i s came about as a r e s u l t of the long-standing r i v a l r y between France and Germany which had i t s most immediate origins i n 1871 and i t s re s u l t s i n 1914. There were f i v e European nations which had or claimed a prim-ary i n t e r e s t i n Morocco: France, I t a l y , Spain, Great B r i t a i n and Germany. A f t e r the turn of the century, the i n t e r e s t of these countries was heightened f o r Morocco was rapidly becom-ing a vacuum of power owing to th© corruption and weakness of the Sultan. I t was a s i t u a t i o n i n which European imperialism flourished, and one also where the r i v a l r y of the powers was quite l i k e l y to come into c o n f l i c t . The French government, through i t s Foreign Minister, M.' 120 Delcasse/oworked hard and dexterously to prevent sueh a con-f l i c t . France was extremely interested in the fate of Morocco. To the French, "the safety and destiny of Algeria, as well as their aspirations for a great North African Colonial Empire/ made i t imperative [that theyj extend their control over Morocco either by police supervision, or by a protectorate, or 1 by direct annexation." Italy also had looked upon Morocco as presenting a pos-sible opportunity for f u l f i l l i n g her dreams of an empire in tte Mediterranean. However, in 1900, Italy's claim to Morocco had been bought off by France by a secret agreement whereby France promised not to oppose Italian aspirations i n Tripoli in re-turn for Italy's recognition of France's primary interest i n Morocco. Spain's interest in Morocco was primarily geographical, and on the whole did not interfere with French interests. Nevertheless, Delcasse tooKpains to cl a r i f y this divergence of interest by a secret agreement i n 1902 which provided for the eventual partition of Morocco on f a i r l y definite geographical lines. The relations of France and Great Britain in the Moroccan question were much more involved, but can be stated here i n general terms. Both nations v/e re concerned with the control of the Mediterranean, and both had been rivals in the partition of Africa. However, since the Fashoda incident, responsible 1 Sidney B . Fay, The Origins of the World War, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1930, v o l , 1, p. 157. 121 men in both countries had sought to bring their respective nations into closer and more friendly relations with each other. Great Britain had been impressed with the necessity of retreating from her 'splendid isolation.' France, and es-pecially M. Delcasse'/ wanted British friendship to offset the increasing armed strength of Germany and the decreasing strength. 2 of her all y , Russia. As a result, Franco-British relations _-; improved steadily, and in 1903 especially, g#eat strides were made towards solving the outstanding differences existing be-tween the two countries. In the following year Great Britain and France inaugurated an Entente Cordiale. Among other pro-blems solved v/as that of Morocco. The basic agreement was that Great Britain would support French plans in Morocco with the understanding that France henceforth recognize*: Britain's 3 primary interest in Egypt. In April, 1 1904, the news of the Anglo-French rapproche-ment was made public. In Germany the news was received with considerable apprehension. Germany's interest in Morocco v/as largely -commercial,' and up u n t i l the time of the announcement 2 The Russo-Japanese War broke out i n February, 1904/ and was to last almost two years. Russia was the a l l y of France, and Japan the all y of Great Britain. However neither country was drawn into the war since the Franco-Russian a l l i -ance-was confined to Europe and the Anglo-Japanese alliance v/as defensive, not offensive. 3 For obvious reasons, those articles dealing with the eventual partition of Morocco i n the agreement were kept sec-ret. For the texts of a l l the secret conventions mentioned above, see G. W. Prothero, French Morocco, London/ H. M. Stationery Office, 1 1920/ pp. 64—74. 132 of the Entente Cordiale. her chief aim i n Morocco was to se-cure an 'open door' f o r her businessmen. Af t e r the announcement, Germany waited to be o f f i c i a l l y n o t i f i e d by France of the agreements entered into and f o r guarantees of Germany's commercial i n t e r e s t s . When t h i s n o t i -f i c a t i o n f a i l e d to materialize, "Bulow f e l t that Germany had been slighted, and that prestige ws well as her material i n -4 terests had been injured." Moreover, there was a growing fear i n Germany that the Entente might turn into an a l l i a n c e , a prospect that was to be combatted with a l l vigor. With each passing month i t became increasingly c l e a r to Germany that Delcasse had no intention of revealing the details of the Anglo-French agreement. Early i n 1905/ Bulow devised a plan whereby German prestige might be regained i n the Moroccan problem and which might also r e s u l t i n the sundering of the 5 Entente Gordiale. Acting according to t h i s plan, German re-presentatives i n Morocco began to encourage the Sultan of Morocco to r e s i s t French e f f o r t s to bring order out of near chaos i n that country. They were quite successful i n t h e i r olesigns. When France attempted to reorganize Morocco's f i n -ances, and urged that the Moroccan police be o f f i c e r e d by Frenchmen-, - the Sultan protested that such actions would be an 4 Fay, on. c i t . , p. 179. 5 To break up the Anglo-French "allignment and safe-guard t h e i r own prestige and diplomatic prepondemence was the task "to which henceforth the German Government dedicated them-selves; and by contesting French conduct i n Morocco they could undertake i t the more readily because about that t h e i r protest did not lack j u s t i f i c a t i o n . " (Lionel M. Gelber, The Rise of  Anglo-American Friendship, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, p. 187). 125 infringement OTS h i s sovereignty. At t h i s psychological mement, 6 the German Kaiser landed at Tangier. There he announced his conviction that the Sultan was, and should continue to be, an 7 independent monarch. I t was a challenge to France and to 8 French prestige, and caused a major c r i s i s . The second part of the German plan was to c a l l a con-ference of the interested powers to determine the future of Morocco. Such a conference would not only check what secret plans France had f o r Morocco, but what i s more, Germany could pose as one interested s o l e l y i n the 'open door' p r i n c i p l e and a protector of Moroccan independence. Under such circumstances, Germany turned to President Roosevelt as one most l i k e l y to support her i n achieving the success of her plan. During the Spring of 1905, Roosevelt and the Kaiser had been i n correspondence with each other over the p o s s i b i l i t y of 9 p^eace i n the Russo-Japanese War, and f o r various reasons,-6. On March 31,' 1905. -7 On March 10, 1905, Russia had been badly defeated at Mukden. France r e a l i z e d she could not count upon e f f e c t i v e as-sistance from her a l l y i n case of war at t h i s time,' Great B r i t a i n was also alarmed. The B r i t i s h wanted no Kaiser to act as the protector of Islam, nor a German naval base i n the Mediterranean Sea. - 8 "Both f o r Paris and B e r l i n i t was a question not merely of ma t e r i a l i n t e r e s t s but of national prestige." (G. P. Gooch, Before the War, Studies i n Diplomacy. London,' Longmans Green and Co., 1938, v o l . 1,- p. 6) Z 9 The Kaiser t r i e d to make Roosevelt believe that Britain and France wished to intervene i n the peace negotiations and so claim compensation from China as the price of intervention. For other instances of the Kaiser's attempts to use Roosevelt against the Dual A l l i a n c e and Entente, see Tyler Dennett, Roose-v e l t and the Russo-Japanese War, New York, Doubleday, Page and Co., 1925, pp. 78—9 f f . 124 the Kaiser was l e d to the erroneous b e l i e f that he had some influence over the American President. In the midst of t h i s correspondence, the Kaiser instructed the German ambassador i n Washington, Von Sternberg, to hand Roosevelt a memorandum on the Moroccan problem. The Memorandum stressed the Kaiser's apprehension over French and Spanish aims i n Morocco,' which he thought favored 'a policy of proh i b i t i v e r e s t r i c t i o n ' . Also, Roosevelt was t o l d that: The Emperor fe&ls sure that It a keen i n t e r e s t were shown i n the maintenance of the open door i n Morocco and i n the improvement of her i n t e r n a l conditions by a power outside of France, the whole question of Morocco could be rapidly and peacefully s e t t l e d . 10 The memorandum ended with the suggestion that Germany and the United States independently announce t h e i r conviction that a conference of powers would be i n the best i n t e r e s t s of a l l concerned. Roosevelt's reply v/as courteous but not enthusiastic. On A p r i l 5 the Kaiser again communicated with Roosevelt through Von Sternberg. This time the Kaiser maintained that France and Great B r i t a i n were a l l i e s , were p l o t t i n g to gain holds on Korea as well as Morocco, and that German dignity "makes i t necessary f o r QGermanyl to point out to France that her natiomL i n t e r e s t s cannot be disposed of without asking f o r her consent 10 A. L..P. Dennis, Adventures i n American Diplomacy. New-York, E. P. Button and Co., 1928, p. 514. 125 11 and co-operation." Similar communications followed, a l l stressing the necessity of calling a conference/ and each ex-pressing the Kaiser's fear of a variety of alliances which he f e l t being formed against Germany. The repeated appeals of the Kaiser had l i t t l e effect on Roosevelt at f i r s t . He had been receiving similar warnings from Cecil Spring-Rice, the First Secretary of the British Embassy in St. Petersburg. Spring-Rice, Roosevelt's close friend for a score of years, was equally urgent i n warning Roosevelt that Germany had plans involving an alliance with Russia, was seeking compensation in the Far East, and had sim-i l a r dark schemes. Thus Roosevelt believed that both Germany and Great Britain were unnecessarily afraid of each other's motives. He wrote to Secretary Taft on the matter: ... I am sincerely desirous to bring about a better state of feeling between England and Germany." Each nation i s working i t s e l f up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other, each from sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser i s dead sure that England intends to attack him. The English Government... and a large share of the English people are equally sure that Germany intends to attack England. Now, in my view, this action of Germany i n em-broiling herself with France over Morocco i s proof posi-tive * that she has not the slightest intention of attack-ing England. 12 It was with such 'proof positive' reasoning as this that Presi-dent Roosevelt viewed European a f f a i r s . The war scare continued to grow in Europe, and the Kaisers messages to Roosevelt continued to emphasize Germany's 11 J. B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, New York/ Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920,, vol. 1, p. 468. 12 Ibid., p. 472. (April 20, 1905) 186 fear of encirclement. By May mention was made of the possibil-i t y of Germany fighting a preventative war against France. ,. '.; This time the Kaiser accused England of being instrumental in preventing France from accepting a conference, and he re-quested Roosevelt to suggest to the British that a conference should be held. By the end of May, therefore, Roosevelt was really concerned "lest Germany should actually start marching over the French border where the British fleet would be of no 13 assistance." The same concern was held by the French public. Even after the Kaiser's speech at Tangier, Delcasse remained firm i n his stand that Germany should not be consulted as to the 14 future of Morocco. However, opposition to his stand was i n -creasing steadily, and by the end of May the French government was faced with the alternative of accepting Delcasse^-re-signation or accepting the possibility of war with Germany. With Russia bogged down in the Far East, the former course was taken. Del^casse' resigned on June 6, 1905. With Delcasse removed from Office, the main obstacle to -13 Dennett, op,, c i t . , p. 147. Moreover, Roosevelt "feared that a war in Europe would imperil the peace negotia-tions between Russia and Japan,.precipitating in a l l proba-b i l i t y a world conflict." (Boo;colt.. ) 14 " P o l i t i c a l jealousy because of his long tenure i n office, dislike of his secretiveness, enmity between him and £the French Premier, RouvierJ..., host i l i t y because of his de-fending the Russian government in the massacre of January 22, 1905—all these forces of opposition were now strengthened by the-fact that the Foreign Minister had blundered...." (Eugene N. .Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis, The University of Chicago Press, 1930, p.. 203.) 137 the proposed conference was eliminated. Later in June, Roose-velt added his voice to that of the Kaiser favoring the con-15 16 ference, not because of the Kaiser's influence/ but for the simple reason that he believed i t was the one way to pre-vent war. It had the desired effect. In July, arrangements were made to hold the conference at Algeciras. The Kaiser was most happy, believing he had secured "Roosevelt's assistance in extracting the chestnut of German prestige from the f i r e of 17 European diplomatic manoeuverings." The representatives of the thirteen countries at the Algeciras Conference began their discussions on January 16," ' 1 8 1906. The chief American representatives were Henry White and Samuel Gummere. Roosevelt was not s t r i c t l y impartial as 15 ..The suggestion that a conference be held was made formally-by the Sultan of Morocco, although German diplomacy v/as behind the move. "This proposal France also considered a national- humiliation at the hands of Germany." (Dennis op. c i t . , p." 491) The removal of Delcasse' paved the way for the acceptance of a conference for France, but not for a Franco-German understanding by any means. 16 Roosevelt wrote of the Kaiser to a friend a few weeks previously: "I get exasperated with the Kaiser because of his sudden^vagaries, like this Moroccan policy... and I cannot of course, follow or take too seriously a man whose policy i s one of;such violent and often wholly irrational zigzags." Dennett, op. c i t . , p. 491) 17 Pringle, op_. c i t . , p. 391. 18 18 Secretary Root's estimate of White: "He was an excellent man for that £i. e., as representing the United State's.at the Conference] though not the creator of great thing's. He had great social graces and the training of a . diplomat. He knew how to manoeure with diplomats." (P. C. Jessup, Elihu Root, New York, Dodd, Mead and Co.,, 1938, vol. 11, p. 57.) Gummere was a minor diplomat and unimportant to this! the s i s . 138 to the course the American representatives should take. In a confidential l e t t e r to White before the conference opened, he wrote: I want to keep on good terms with Germany, and i f possible to prevent a rupture between Germany and France. But my sympathies have at bottom been with France and. I suppose w i l l continue so. S t i l l I shall try to hold on an even keel,' 19 Secretary of State Root drafted the o f f i c i a l instructions to White and Gummere. These instructions were i n very general terms. The main interest of the United States was to maintain peace in Morocco and secure an 'open door' for American com-mercial interests. However, Root, too, v/as not without some bias in the a f f a i r . On the same day he forwarded the instruc-tions to White, Root enclosed a confidential letter to him which read in part: I have been told by someone that LGummereJ i s strongly pro-German in Morocco matters. This, i f true, must not be allowed to throw us over into even apparent antagonism to the Anglo-French entente, or to make us a means of breaking that up. It i s useful to us as well as agreeable. 20 It became obvious very quickly that of the problems to be solved by the conference, those concerning the nature of the police control to be established in Morocco and the character of the international bank to be set up for managing Morocco's -19 Alan Neviiis, Henry White, New York, Harper and Bro-thers, 1930, p. 267. There was a definite reaction on Roose-velt Is part to the flow of the Kaiser's'alarms and excursions' within his notes to the President. 20 Jessup, op_, c i t . , p. 54. 139 finances. By far the greatest d i f f i c u l t y was with the former. 21 The French believed they should control the police, or at the most, share i t with the Spanish. Germany wanted police control confided to small neutral countries. The French delegates, as White wrote a friend, ... believed that their national dignity was involved; their officers and police instructors had been in Morocco for some time past, and the government resented any ques-tion of their fairness, while i t was agreed that the French had seventy million francs Invested In Morocco against Germany's five millions. 22 When Germany remained adamant to compromise even after France had offered to share the policing with Spain, White, acting as a modifying influence on the delegates of both nations, turned to Roosevelt to put pressure on Germany. On February 13, acting through Root, Roosevelt asked White what he thought would be a f a i r settlement. White had conversations with the French and German delegates to sound them out as to the limits each would go i n reaching a compromise. Then on February 16 he cabled his opinions to Washington. Briefly, 1 White suggested a police force under the direction of French and Spanish_offleers, „these officers to make an annual report 21 The British backed up their French comrades through-out the conference. "Grey's policy at Algeciras was to keep the Entente Gordiale alive." ~(Gooch? op_. c i t . , vol. 1, p. 271) For an intimate view of how the British supported the French, and often appeared to take the i n i t i a t i v e , in-the Algeciras Conference, see Harold Nicolson, S i r Arthur Nicolson—First  Lord Carnock, London, Constable and Company, Ltd., 1930. .22 Nevlns, op_. c i t . , p. 271.t 130 to the Sultan of Morocco and to Italy, Further, White thought that the proposed bank should be owned equally by a l l the powers with slight preference to France, He summed up the feeling at the conference by concluding: "If Germany be quite resolved not to accept French and Spanish police, I think they ought to 23 say so and break up the Conference,..," 24 The President was quick to forward White's suggestions, with few alterations, to the Kaiser. Four days later the Kaiser replied saying that he remained "of the opinion that tha Sultan should be permitted a free choice among the other 25 nations." Daring the deadlock of the next two weeks White did his best to bring the views of the German and French re-presentatives into closer harmony. The results were discourag-ing, so again Roosevelt used his circuitous diplomatic channels to put pressure on the Kaiser. On March 7, Roosevelt sent a note to the Kaiser in which he referred to the Kaiser's message to him of almost a year ago (June 28, 1905). Thinking he had Roosevelt 'in the palm of his hand', the Kaiser had told the President that "in case, during the coming Conflerence, dif-ferences of opinion should arise between France and Germany,' g/the Kaiser}., in every case, w i l l be ready to bakk up the 23 Nevins, op_. c i t . , p. 274. The German delegates at Algeciras caused a great deal of i r r i t a t i o n by their so called 'smokescreen' diplomatic tactics. .24 Roosevelt did not follow dare f u l l y the negotiations at the conference, "but £he} did step in and bring pressure on the Kaiser when White reported that such action was necessary ...." (Jessup, op_. c i t . , p. 57.) T25 Bishop, op_. c i t . , p. &92. 131 decision which you [RooseveltJ should consider to be the most 26 f a i r and the most p r a c t i c a l , " I t was a most unfortunate suggestion, f o r Roosevelt how thought i t was time f o r the Kaiser to redeem his promise, and consequently 'earnestly urged' the Emperor to accept the views outlined i n h i s note of February 19. Before t h i s note v/as answered, Germany, working thorough Austria-Hungary, offered a new suggestion on the police ques-t i o n . This scheme would divide the control of the police among the French, Spanish, Dutch and Swiss, with each having a certa i n number of seaports under i t s control. White wired Washington that the French were w i l l i n g to compromise on a Dutch or Swiss Inspector-General of police, but never to hav-ing such a d i s t r i b u t i o n of control as had been recently pro-,27 posed. Roosevelt agreed with the French. He saw Ton Sternberg a few days a f t e r he received t h i s wire and pointed out to him the f a l l a c i e s i n the Austrian proposal. Referring to the police question, the President said: The Austrian proposal i n my mind i s absurd, because i t ; favors the very ideas the Conference has been trying to eliminate, namely, p a r t i t i o n and spheres of influence. Placing French and Spanish o f f i c e r s i n the same ports given-according to^rtry views a safer guarantee than plac 26 Bishop, on. c i t . , p. 493 27 Russia and Great B r i t a i n thought France might allow a Dutch or Sv/iss police commander i n Casablanca where German commercial i n t e r e s t s predominated, but they, with the re-mainder of those nations supporting France, continued to present a united front against Germany whenever a vote v/as taken. 132 ing them separately i n single ports. This has distinctly the flavor of a French, a Spanish, and a Dutch or Swiss sphere of influence. I also do not see how the duties of the police inspector can be made compatible with military discipline. Asutria wants an officer, who performs the same duties i n the port of Casablanca as his French and Spanish comrades do, to act in a l l ports as their superior and inspector. This would bring f r i c t i o n at the start. The proposal I suggested i s the better and safer and the ;: only one I can support. 28 This strong oral denunciation of what was really Germany's effort to counter French control of Morocco's police was f o l -lowed up by an equally strong written note to Von Sternberg for transmission to Berlin. This written note was an elabora-tion of the views Roosevelt expressed above. Secretary Root's gentle hand presented the President's opinions with more tact, however, although his opinions were crystal clear, After pointing out the danger which would probably result i f the Austrian suggestion was followed, Root added: If we had sufficient interest in Morocco to make i t worth our while, we si ould seriously object, on our own account, to the adoption of any such arrangement. We have not, however, any such substantial interest in Morocco.... Our chief wish i s to be of service i n promoting a peaceable settlement of the controversy,... Under the guidance of that wish we shall accept whatever arrangement the European powers, represented at Algeciras, agree upon. 29 28 Nevins, op_. c i t . , p. 276—77. 29 Bishop, oj>. c i t . , p. 499. (Sent March 17). To crack the whip over the Kaiser's head and so have him agree with what he considered the moderate French proposals, the President informed Von Sternberg that i f there was a break-up on the issue,- he would publish a l l the correspondence between himself and the Kaiser. This, Roosevelt warned, would cause the Ameri-can public to "feel a.grave suspicion of Germany's justice and good faith.-..." (Loc. cit.) Should the Emperor agree, however, Roosevelt promised to give Germany f u l l credit for what was done," 133 The Kaiser and his advisers had played their f i n a l hand and lost. France, and those supporting her, refused to "be 30 moved by the Austrian—or-German— proposals. Germany was forced to yield to the former French compromise, with the stipulation that there be a Swiss Inspector-General of police, who should report annually to the Diplomatic Corps in Morocco. France agreed to the stipulation. On April 6, 1905, the treaty was signed by a l l the powers at the conference, and i t 32 was r a t i f i e d by the United States' Senate on December 12. The results of the Algegiras Conference meant compara-tively l i t t l e to the United States. Her trade with Morocco was as small as her interest i n the country. The conference did reaffirm the 'open door' principle, and the consequent im-30 - The French ambassador in Washington, Jusserand, was a close "friend of Roosevelt's, and had been kept informed of Roosevelt's views on Morocco. These he had forwarded to the French delegates at Algeciras, which in turn strengthened their stand. On the day Root wrote Von Spernberg, (March 17), Roosevelt cabled White: "The very fact of the division of the ports implies existence of special rights on the part of the three countries in the ports assigned to them respectively. The immediate effect can only be the creation of three separate spheres of influence, with inferior right and opportunity on the part of a l l the other Powers. And the nations to whom these .spheres are assigned may be expected in the ordinary course- of events to enter into complete control." (Nevins, op,  c i t . , p. 277) Roosevelt instructed White to show this note to the British and French delegates at the conference! 31 After this, the problem of the international bank was rapidly solved. 32 When White cabled the text of the General Act i n which the formal results of the Conference ware embodied, Root " i n -structed him to make a reservation in behalf of the United States.... [This reservation] disavowed any p o l i t i c a l interest in Morocco and the assumption of any responsibility for the en-forcement of the provisions agreed upon." (Jessup, op_. c i t . , p. 59). 154 provement of the Moroccan police force afforded greater pro-tection to such American citizens as visited or lived i n Morocco. To. Roosevelt, however, the conference meant that war had been prevented, due in large measure to his own actions. With the wisdom of hindsight, one can see that the Algeciras Conference was but one of the many incidents on the road to the F i r s t World War. Yet remembering Roosevelt's ignorance of the deeper levels of European diplomacy, his lack of knowledge of the various secret conventions and shifting alignments among the European powers, one can easily under-stand his pride of achievement at the time. Roosevelt believed he was acting f a i r l y in relation to the.problem as It unfolded. He was unable to keep an 'even keel' of neutrality or impartiality as he wished, but his change ,of opinion was due largely to the erratic and mis-chievious behaviour of the Kaiser rather than any strong preconceived prejudice on the merits of the case at issue-. Despite the confidential letters of Root and Roosevelt to White before the conference, the American delegates were as neutral as any of the representatives at the conference. The United States had no 'axe to grind' nor backed any ally , openly or secretly. Roosevelt sought no control of territory or naval base, nor did he seek any compensation — for example, a French island in the Caribbean — for such services he rendered. The presence of the American delegates at the con-ference was not the result of following any cardinal principle of American foreign policy. The United States kept entirely 1-35 clear of. the flourishing imperialism i n Africa, and sought merely the protection of i t s national interests, as did the other neutral nations. American interests, both commercial and p o l i t i c a l , were indeed small; and Roosevelt stressed this fact many times to the Kaiser to account for the president's reticence when the subject of a conference was f i r s t broached. In assessing Roosevelt's success in the European diplomatic scene, one must remember that fortune and a set of circumstances beyond his knowledge played a large part in bringing about a solution such as he wished in the Moroccan problem. Yet conceding these factors, Roosevelt gave an interesting performance in his self-cast character as«a 'dove of peace.' Chapter VI Roosevelt and the Far East 136 During the years of h i s presidency, the most important part Theodore Roosevelt played i n Far Eastern a f f a i r s was h i s role of mediator i n the Russo-Japanese war. This chapter w i l l be concerned mainly with t h i s aspect of American foreign re-l a t i o n s , and w i l l touch b r i e f l y on Japanese-American r e l a t i o n s following the end of the war. The Far Eastern policy of the United States had a l l but p r y s t a ^ l l i z d d by 1898. As one h i s t o r i a n describes i t ; I t s fundamental aim was commercial, not p o l i t i c a l . Eq^ual commercial opportunities f o r Americans; no t e r r i t o r i a l " concessions f o r the United States; a strong Eastern Asia to r e s i s t a designing Europe; r e s t r i c t i o n s of- Oriental immigration i n t o the United States; peace, amity, t r a d e — these were i t s objectives. 1 The commercial i n t e r e s t of the United States i n China found ex-pression i n the famous "Open Door" notes of Secretary of State 2 John Hay. Shortly a f t e r these notes were sent to the various interested powers, the Boxer u p r i s i n g broke out. American troops were included i n the int e r n a t i o n a l army that subdued the Chinese u l t r a s - n a t i o n a l i s t s . The i n c l u s i o n of American troops i n such an expedition was a re s u l t of the increased p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t of the United States i n China since President McKinley had decided the Philippines were to remain under American pro-t e c t i o n . The Boxer uprising had l i t t l e e f f e c t on the basic policy of the United States towards the Orient. In a note to .1 .A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the  United States. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938, p. 8. 2 Hay*s "Open Door" policy was based on consent and mutual-suspicion, American influence was to equalize the balance of power i n the Far East whenever possible. 137 the pjywers who participated i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l army, Secret-ary Hay r e i t e r a t e d that ,.. the p o l i c y of the Government of the United States i s to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety ! and peaee to China, preserve Chinese t e r r i t o r i a l and ad-ministrative entity, protect a l l r i g h t s guaranteed to f r i e n d l y powers by treaty and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law/ and safeguard f o r the world the p r i n c i p l e of equal and impar- -t i a l trade with a l l parts of the Chinese Empire. 3 China/ indeed, was the *sick man of A s i a ' . During the 19th century/ e s p e c i a l l y the l a t t e r decades of that century/ the European powers had been taking advantage of her weakness to wring commercial concessions f o r themselves. Great B r i t a i n / Russia, and Germany were the most active powers i n t h i s re-s pect u n t i l the a^dvent of the Sino-Japanese war. At t h i s point Japan made her strongest bid f o r a major share of the Chinese trade, and i n so doing, placed herself i n a po s i t i o n where a clash with Russia seemed i n e v i t a b l e . The sweeping success of Japan i n the Sino-Japanese war 4 of 1895 had momentus r e s u l t s . Almost overnight i t r a i s e d Japan to the status of a Great Power, Further, i t disclosed to the European powers that the Chinese Empire was weak beyond t h e i r suspicions. Greed and fear produced an immediate re-action among the powers interested i n the Far East,' Russia'/ posing as the f r i e n d of China/ persuaded France and Germany to 3 United States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States/ Washington, Government Pr i n t i n g Office/* 1901. ("Affairs i n China" Appendix, p. 12) Hereafter c i t e d as U, S., Foreign Relations.-4 The issue at stake was Korea. This SBven month war em-phasized. Japan* s amazing conversion from a semi-feudal state.to a modem, e f f i c i e n t nation within the space of a few decades. 138 stand by her i n demanding that Japan icelinquish some of the plaims made on China at the end of the War. Japan was una^ble to r e s i s t such an overwhelming combination, and ceded to Russia's demands. B r i t a i n , who had hitherto scorned Japan i n favor of China, now turned to Japan as the power most l i k e l y to be of a i d i n r e s i s t i n g Russia/ whom B r i t a i n thought of as her most feared enemy of her c o l o n i a l empire. This, i n turn, caused China to look to Russia as her protector against further encroachments of European imperialism—a move which Russia welcomed and exploited to the f u l l . Great B r i t a i n t r i e d to i n t e r e s t Germany i n joining the Anglo-Japanese block, but with no success. Germany was most pleased to see Russia's increasing i n t e r e s t i n the Ear East, and Kaiser Wilhelm I I encouraged the Tsar i n that area i n order to keep h i s attention from the European scene. In 1902, Great B r i t a i n and Japan signed an a l l i a n c e which "was i n r e a l i t y directed against Russia and paved the way f o r 5 the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War i n 1904." Great B r i t a i n , r e a l i z i n g the weakness of her "splendid i s o l a t i o n " / thought of the a l l i a n c e as a bulwark against Russia. Japan 5 J . B. Rae and T. H. D. Ma. honey, The United States i n  World History. New York, McGraw-HYll Book Company, 1949, p. 459, For the best d i S H u s s i o n of the events leading up to the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e / see chapter XXIII of William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, New York, A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1935, v o l . 11. Up to the l a s t moment the pro-Russian party i n Japan l e d by Prince Ito, had hopes of reaching a b i l a t e r a l agreement with Russia over Korea and Manchuria, but Russia drowe too hard a bargain to be acceptable to the p r o - B r i t i s h party, then i n o f f i c e . 159 . , wanted a free hand i n Korea,—wanted, i n f a c t , to regain a l l that which Russia, France and Germany had wrested from her i n 1895. To Japan the a l l i a n c e was a positive step toward achiev-6 ing that goal. From the s i d e l i n e s , the United States favored the a l l i a n c e as a measure supporting the 'Open Door 1. The measures taken by Russia to l i m i t Japanese gains a f t e r the Sino-Japanese war were e n t i r e l y s e l f i s h . In the following years t h i s selfishness became most evident as Russia pressed down i n t o Manchuria, took p o s s e s s i o n of Port Arthur, and ex-tended her influence throughout the whole of the Liao-tung 7 Peninsula. In Manchuria, Great B r i t a i n , the, United States and Japan held almost a monopoly of trade, but Russian pene-t r a t i o n went hand i n hand with Russian r e s t r i c t i o n of trade to outsiders. Protests by Great B r i t a i n and the United States .8 were unavailing f o r the most part, Japanese protests to 6 The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was confined to the Far East, Each.side promised that i n the event of a war d e c l a r e d by Russia on e i t h e r signatory, the other would come to that signatory's a i d i f a t h i r d power intervened on Russia's side. To counteract t h i s , Russia attempted to get the Dual A l l i a n c e extended to the Far East, France was reluctant, and although France gave no s p e c i f i c assurance to Russia, Russia took the optom&stic view that she could count on French support should the need a r i s e — a f a t a l mistake, 7 Germany, meanwhile, established h e r s e l f on Kioo-Chau Bay a j i d got concessions i n Shantung; while England,' i n s e l f -defence, leased Wei-hoi-wei 'for so long a period as Port Arthur s h a l l remain i n the occupation of Russia', 8 To c i t e one example of Russia-American f r i c t i o n : In Manchuria the Russians managed to gadm control of the port of Newchang, the only open port i n that area. Thereafter Russia created many d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r Americans importing and exporting goods through t h i s port. A f t e r many unavailing protests, the United States asked China (1905) to open three new ports to foreign trade, thus circumventing further Russian pressure. 140 Russia were treated with alternate contempt and disregard. Faced with the p o s s i b i l i t y of being economically strangled i n Manchuria, and believing that further Russian advances i n Korea would menace her national security, Japan declared war on Russia,.on February 10, 1904, Once the struggle had begun, American public opinion soon sett l e d i n favor of the Japanese cause. There were various reasons behind t h i s sentiment. The American people d i s l i k e d Russian a u t o c r a c y and the treatment i t meted out to p o l i t i c a l opponents. The Jewish pogroms i n Russia had been scorned time and again. Moreover, the aggressive imperialism of Russia i n the Far East was d i s l i k e d and feared, f o r i t presented the gravest threat to the "Open Door" p o l i c y of the United States, The d i s t r u s t of Russia's motives i n Manchuria and Korea had been heightened by the overt anti-American actions of Russia following the Boxer u p r i s i n g , Roosevelt, too, had a very low opinion of Russia and e s p e c i a l l y the Tsar, whom he referre d to as " a preposterous l i t t l e creature" and " that autocratic Russia'countered t h i s move by warning China that should she grant the American request, Russian occupation of Manchuria would be extended. By the summer of 1903, however, the United States had managed to have the a d d i t i o n a l ports opened, Never-, the l e s s , May r e a l i z e d that had Russia not given i n , the 'Open Door' would have been slammed shut, f o r he wrote a f r i e n d i n 1903:" I take i t f o r granted that Russia knows as we do that we w i l l not f i g h t over Manchuria, f o r the simple reason that we cannot,,, we could never get a treaty through the Senate, the object of which was to check Russian aggression," ( Pauline Tomkins, American-Russian Relations i n the Far East, New York,: The Macmillan Company, 1949, p. 21), This statement i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n many ways, and accounts i n part f o r Roosevelt's statement ( p.i^a. ) regarding Japan playing the American 'game,' 141 zigzag." American opinion of Russia had been low f o r many years. In the ponths p r i o r to the Russo-Japanese war, t h i s opinion reached i t s nadir, a fac t of which Japan was quite aware. The favorable attitude, held by the President and public of the United States towards Japan had i t s roots i n the past, f o r "ever since Commodore Perry's memorable v i s i t the United States had regarded Japan not only as a f r i e n d but as a protege 9 ...." Japan's deep apprehension over the fate of Korea was sympathetically appreciated by the United States,- and was com-peared with the concern f e l t over the Caribbean by the Roose-v e l t administration. Moreover, both Japan and.the United States had s i m i l a r i n t e r e s t s i n Manchuria, and both had been . subject to Russian pressure i n that area. I t i s understandably' therefore, that the American public thought of the war as one between unequal opponents—"a £}ig," b u l l y i n g Russia" r a l l y i n g her armed might to subdue a "poor, l i t t l e Japan". President Roosevelt, although declaring the United States' n e u t r a l i t y i n the war, revealed h i s private opinion of the c o n f l i c t to h i s son two days a f t e r Japan's successful naval attack on Port Arthur. He wrote: I t has c e r t a i n l y opened most disasterously f o r the Rus-sians, and t h e i r supine carelessness i s well-nigh i n -credible. For several years Russia has behaved very badly i n the Far last,' her attitude toward a l l nations, including us,1 but es p e c i a l l y toward Japan, being grossly overbearing. We had no s u f f i c i e n t cause f o r war with her. 9 Thomas A. Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese  American C r i s i s . Stanford University Press, 1934, p. 5. 142 Yet I was apprehensive l e s t i f she at the outset whipped. Japan on the sea she might assume a po s i t i o n well-nigh intolerable towa wrd us. I thought Japan would probably whip her on the sea, but I could not be certain; and be-tween ourselves... I was thoroughly well pleased with the Japanese victory,' f o r Japan i s playing our game. 10 Very shortly a f t e r expressing t h i s opinion to his son,' Roosevelt l e t France and Germany know h i s views on the war. Circumventing the usual diplomatic channels, he " n o t i f i e d Germany and France i n the most p o l i t e and discreet fashion that i n the event of a combination..• [Roosevelt would] promptly site with Japan and proceed to whatever leggth was necessary i n her - 11 behalf." Almost simultaneously, 1 the German Kaiser wrote President Roosevelt to suggest that he send a note to a l l the powers emphasizing that the n e u t r a l i t y of China "outside the sphere of m i l i t a r y operations" be respected, Roosevelt was quite agreea^ble, but on Secretary Hay's advice, worded the c i r c u l a r note i n such a f a shion as to close the gap l e f t by the Kaiser w .12 to permit possible occupation by Russia of the b a t t l e f i e l d . 10" Quoted i n H. F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931, p. 375. ( I t a l i c s mine.) "Our game" was i n essence.the balance of power. A possible long, drawn©out war would leave both nations exhausted and a check on each other, and American i n t e r e s t s would benefit, 11 Stephen Gwynn, -ed,, The Letters and Friendships of Sir  C e c i l Spring-Rice, London, Constable and Company, Ltd., 1929, v o l . I, p. 478. Since no record of such a warning has been found i t i s l i k e l y Roosevelt conveyed h i s views on the matter v i a private tatks with the respective Ambassadors. 12 The Russo-Japanese war was fought i n China, and the f i e l d of battle was larg e l y i n Manchuria I China was neutral, despite the fact that the war was being fought on her t e r r i t o r y . 143 In i t s f i n a l form, the c i r c u l a r note Hay sent (February 20, 1904) t o l d American ministers abroad to ... express to the minister of foreign a f f a i r s the earn-est desire of the Government of the United States tha^jt i n the course of the m i l i t a r y operations which have begun between Russia and Japan the n e u t r a l i t y of Ghina and i n a l l p r a ^ c t i c a ^ l ways her administrative e n t i t y s h a l l be respected.... 13 During the remainder of the year 1904, there were no o moment's problems generated by the war i n the Far East with which Roosevelt had to d e a l . None o f the Great Powers of Europe took up arms on the side of eit h e r b e l l i g e r e n t . Neither the Dual A l l i a n c e nor the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was c a l l e d into active operation. In Europe, both France and Great Britain were unhappy over the course of events i n the Far East, and i n 14 t h e i r unhappiness tended to draw closer together. The only s a t i s f i e d power on the continent was Germany, f o r despite the Tsar's frequent intimations to Roosevelt that he wished peace respored, the p w a t t e r n of events i n the Far East suited h i s wishes almost e n t i r e l y . The year 1905 opened with a great v i c t o r y f o r Japan. On New Year's Dawy,4, a f t e r a prolonged and desperate struggle,' the 'impregnable' f o r t of Port Arthur surrendered. The v i c t o r i e s and the e f f i c i e n c y of the Japanese were causing great surprise 13 United States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Washington, Government Prin t i n g O f f i c e / 1904/ p. 2 . (Hereafter—U, S., Foreign Relations.) I t a l i c s mine. . ..14 Yet i n t h e i r misery France continued to finance the Russian war e f f o r t , and Great B r i t a i n , together with the United States, to finance Japan's war e f f o r t s . 144 i n Europe a wnd the United States. On the other hand, the i n -e f f i c i e n c y of the Russian army caused many of the m i l i t a r y 'experts* to perform a rapid volte face i n t h e i r estimates. Japanese v i c t o r i e s had also caused a vague f e e l i n g of uneasi-ness to arise i n the minds of European statesmen. Roosevelt/ too, f e l t a c h i l l wind blow over the warmth of f e e l i n g he had f o r Japan. A few days before the surrender of Port Arthur he had written Spring-Rice: .... I wish I were certa i n that the Japanese down at bottom did not lump Russians, English, Americans, Germans, a l l of us, simply as White d e v i l s i n f e r i o r to themselves not only i n what they regard as the essentials of c i v i -l i z a t i o n , but i n courage and forethought, and to be treated p o l i t e l y only so long as would enable the Japanese to take advantage of our various national jea l o u s i e s The next objective of Japan was Mukden. With a r a p i d i t y that amazed European observers, the main strength of the x Japanese army was r a l l i e d . On February B3, 19,05, the battle f o r Mukden began, and i n a l i t t l e more than two weeks time/ .16 Jap^an had won her t h i r d great v i c t o r y over Russia. The unbroken series of defeats suffered by Russia at the hands of the 'contemptible' Japanese was having a very serious .15 Gwynn, pj>. c i t . . p. 444. 16 During t h i s period, Roosevelt's "impression of events i n Rus^sia was l a r g e l y i n s p i r e d by Spring-Rice, who as Coun-selor of the B r i t i s h Embassy at Petrograd wrote at great length to Mrs. Roosevelt what he wanted the President to know." (Lewis Einstein, Roosevelt, His Mind i n Action. New *ork," Houghton, M i f f l i n , Company, 1930, p. 139.) One should note, however, that despite Japan's successive land V i c t o r i e s , the very, bulk of Russia both i n t e r r i t o r y and i n population pre-vented the Japanese from achieving any decisive 'knockout' blow. I 145 e f f e c t on the domestic t r a n q u i l i t y of Russia. Defeat was fann-ing the embers of Revolution within the country, and there was a general sense of outrage at the corruption, incompetence and mala dministration both i n the government and the armed forces. Even before the flefeaj) of Mukden there had occurred the i n -famous r i o t outside the V/inter Palace. Six weeks a f t e r t h i s incident Spring-Rice wrote Roosevelt: In the spring the misery of the people w i l l be at i t s height because they have had to s e l l t h e i r foodstuffs to pay taxes and the new crops w i l l not be gathered. There a w r e thousands of women and children without support. The men are at the„war. No news comes whether the men a re a l i v e or.dead.... Everyone has news of f r i g h t f u l p^ecula^tion... Land} there i s every sign of the outbreak of disorders of a f e a r f u l description. 17 After the f a l l of Mukden on February 23,' even the Tsar seemed to f e e l the need f o r v i c t o r y or peace, and since the former appeared distant, the l a t t e r became somewhat more a t t r a c t i v e . 18 The f i r s t serious peace fe e l e r s came through France,' Russians partner i n the Dual A l l i a n c e . M, Delcasse, 1 the French foreign minister, l e t i t be known to the Japanese ambassador i n Paris that Russia would not be unwilling to discuss honorable pea^ce terms, preferably through d i r e c t negotiations. This information was forwarded to President Roosevelt through the Japanese Ambassador i n Washington i n such a manner as to i n v i t e Roosevelt to step forward and o f f e r his good o f f i c e s as medi-17 Gwynn, on. c i t . , pp. 457—58. 18 The remainder,of t h i s narrative must be read with the Moroccan C r i s i s as a background, f o r " i t was the Moroccan c r i s i s and the spread of the Russian revolutionary movement, more than the Russian defeats, that brought about the paaee negotiations." (Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War. New York, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1925, p. 151.) 146 ator. The p o s s i b i l i t y of peace between the belli g e r e n t s had been discussed both i n Europe and i n the United States with increasing hope since the battle of Port Arthur. In January Roosevelt, employing informal modes of diplomatic communication, had tentatively offered h i s "good o f f i c e s " but with l i t t l e e f f e c t . With each Russian defeat, the prospects appeared brighter,' The United States was looked upon as the most pro-bable "go between" i n the Ear East, so much so that the Ameri-can Minister i n Peking wrote Secretary Hay on March 31,' 1905; I f peace neogtiations s h a l l begin soon, the time i s most opportune, and her pos i t i o n and influence are s u f f i c i e n t l y potent f o r the United States to take a most e f f e c t i v e / i f not the leading, part i n the approa ching dramaa; and I am sure, from many i n c i d e n t a l remarks made i n frequent c o n f i d e n t i a l conferences with my collogues, that the im-portant European Powers are expecting t h i s . 19 On the same day as thi s dispatch was sent, the Kaiser was making h i s speech at Tangier announcing h i s conviction that the Sultan was an independent monarch. The most immediate r e s u l t of h i s speech, i n s o f a r as the war i n the Far East was concerned, was the mutual desire of French and B r i t i s h to bring the war to a rapid conclusion and so conserve the strength of t h e i r respective a l l i e s . Thus i n A p r i l , the pressure f o r peace was mounting. Roosevelt was equally anxious that the f i g h t i n g i n the Far East should end. In replying to the Japanese note, Roosevelt 19 A, .L. P. Dennis.- Adventures i n American Diplomacy/ New York, E.-P. Dutton and Company, 19S8, p, 400. 147 said he a^greed that d i r e c t negotiation would be preferable, 1 and added that they should include a l l the possible terms of peace, " i t being of course understood that Japan i s adhering to her position of maintaining the Open Door i n Manchuria and 20 of restoring i t to China," Japan promptly agreed to the two conditions contained within Roosevelt's note, and her very .21 a l a c r i t y seemed to indicate an anxiety f o r peace. In a note thanking Roosevelt f o r h i s courtesy i n the matter, the Japanese Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s , Kamura, instructed the Japanese-ambassador i n Washington to say that the Imperial Government, finding that the views of the President coincide with t h e i r own on the subject of d i r e c t negotiations, would be highly g r a t i f i e d i f he has any views of which he i s w i l l i n g or f e e l at l i b e r t y to give them benefit i n regard to the steps to be taken or the measures to be adopted by Japan i n order to pave the way f o r the inauguration of such negotiation, 22 When Roosevelt received t h i s information, he decided to cut h i s holiday i n Colorado short and return to Washington, In the meantime, he t o l d Taft, who was " s i t t i n g on the l i d " i n the nation's c a p i t a l during h i s absence, that there should be 20 Dennett, op_. c i t . , p, 178, Sent A p r i l 20, 1905, Dur-ing the-negotiations, Theodore Roosevelt "was to a l l intents and purposes his own Secretary of State,"- (Griswold, op_. c i t . , p, 92.) Roosevelt was w i l l i n g to o f f e r the "good o f f i c e s " of the United States i n s e t t l i n g the dispute, but i n s i s t e d upon Japan recognizing the p r i n c i p l e of the "Open Door" as h i s price. 21 Japan was anxious f o r peace. The war was costing her $1,000,000 a day, her losses had been considerable, and with each v i c t o r y her l i n e s of communication and supply were ex-tending to the danger point. Conversely, Russia's l i n e s were shortening. 22 Dennett, 6p_. c i t . . p. 180. 148 S3 no reservations on either side, and suggested that Cassini 2 4 and Takahira he brought together as a preliminary step f o r an absolutely frank t a l k . The Japanese were reluctant to have any dealings with Cassini, but intimated to the President that when he returned to Wa shington they womld have a plan of procedure ready to w 25 submit f o r h i s consideration. However, fo r a period of several weeks only small advances were made, towards securing 26 the peace. The Kaiser, meanwhile, had got over h i s i r r i t a -t i o n at Russia using France as an intermediary instead of Germany. His i r r i t a t i o n was replaced by the fear of a pos-s i b l e c o a l i t i o n of Russia, France and England against Germany.5 Consequently he used what influence he had to persuade Roose-v e l t to accept the task. The factor that had slowed the pace of the peace pre-l i m i n a r i e s was the journey of the Russian battle f l e e t from the B a l t i c Sea to the Sea of Japan. A l l nations were speculat-ing upon the outcome of the Impending b a t t l e , and i t was gen-e r a l l y recognized that further peace t a l k s depended upon who 23 The Russian ambassador to the United States. 24 The Japanese ambassador to the United States. 25 Ta^kahira, i n transmitting t h i s message, l e t Roosevelt know informally that i f the President suggested to Japan a p^eace with an indemnity or t e r r i t o r i a l gains, i t would have a "marked e f f e c t " i n strengthening the hand of the peace party i n Japan. 26 The most contentious point i n the proposed terms was the payment of a war indemnity to Japan. The Tsar was absol-utely against t h i s and at f i r s t refused h i s representatives even to t a l k about i t . 149 was the v i c t o r . Roosevelt was anxious about the r e s u l t s . Writing to Spring-Rice on May 13, he said: ... I am of course watching to see what the Russian and Japanese f l e e t s w i l l do i n Eastern waters. The Russian f l e e t i s materially somewhat stronger than the Japanese. My own b e l i e f i s that the Japanese superiority In morale and t r a i n i n g w i l l more than o f f s e t t h i s . But I am not sure and I wish that peace would come. . .< 27 The Russian and Japanese f l e e t s fought i n the Sea of Japan on May 26. Roosevelt's predictions proved true. Despite Russia's superiority i n numbers the Japanese f l e e t won a great and decisive v i c t o r y . The "Admiral of the P a c i f i c " was an admiral without a f l e e t . Japan now moved quickly to take advantage of her victory, 1 f o r the s t r a i n of war was becoming increasingly severe. Three days a f t e r the defeat of the Russian f l e e t , Komura wired Ambassador Takahira to ... express to the President the hope of the Japanese Government that... he w i l l see h i s way d i r e c t l y and en-t i r e l y of h i s own motion and i n i t i a t i v e to i n v i t e the two bel l i g e r e n t s to come together f o r the purpose of dire c t negotiation.... 28 With the advent of t h i s 'face-saving' note, Roosevelt was able to set i n motion the diplomatic machinery which would bring the representatives around the peace table. 27 Gwynn, op_. c i t . . p. 490. 28 Dennett, op_. c i t . . p. 215. Roosevelt was q u i c k to see the humor i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n . 150 29 On June 5, Roosevelt cabled George Mayer, the American ambassador i n St. Petersburg, i n s t r u c t i n g him to see the Tsar personally and urge upon him "the d e s i r a b i l i t y of h i s consent-ing to the request of the President to have representatives of Russia meet with representatives of Japan to confer as to 30 whether peace cannot... be made." Should the Tsar consent, Meyer was t o l d to add that "... the President w i l l t r y to get Japan's consent, acting simply on h i s own i n i t i a t i v e and not saying that Russia has consented, and the President believes 31 he w i l l succeed." Meyer was successful i n his e f f o r t s and was able to inform Roosevelt a few days l a t e r that the Tsar consented that t a l k s should be held. At t h i s point Roosevelt was able to bring the matter into the open. On June 8 he formally i n v i t e d both b e l l i g e r e n t s / " i n the inte r e s t of a l l mankind" and " f o r the prosperity and welfare of each", to open di r e c t negotiations f o r peace. The Japanese reply Was prompt and unreserved. The Russian reply, 29 Meyer was one of the few diplomats i n the American foreign service whose a b i l i t y , t a c t and i n t e l l i g e n c e Roosevelt was w i l l i n g to t r u s t . Meyer was transferred to St., Petersburg a few months previously by Roosevelt i n order that he would be s t r a t e g i c a l l y loca^ted when the need arose. 30 Dennett, op_. c i t . . p. 221. 31 Loo, c i t . , The Tsar had received a note from the Kaiser at the same time i n which he was 'advised' that " i f any-body i n the world i s able to influence the Japanese and to i n -duce them, to be. reasonable -in t h e i r proposals, i t i s President Roosevelt." ( J . B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt. Hew York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920, v o l . I, P. 385.) The Kaiser had a mistaken idea of his influence.oh Roosevelt. The B r i t i s h were apprehensive i n t h i s respect also, but not f o r long. 151 however,1 was not altogether s a t i s f a c t o r y . On June 12 Mayer cabled: With regard to the eventual meeting of Russian and Japanese p l e n i p o t e n t i a r i e s ' i n order to see i f i t i s not possible f o r the two powers to agree to terms of peace', the Imperial Government has no objection i n pr i n c i p l e to t h i s endeavour i f the Japanese Government expresses a l i k e desire, 32 The e f f e c t of t h i s note on Roosevelt served to confirm his b e l i e f that Russia was not to be trusted and that Japan was playing the American "game". As he wrote of Russia's reply at the time; The note i s of course much l e s s s a t i s f a c t o r y than Japan's, f o r i t shows a certain slyness and an endeavour to avoid anything l i k e a de f i n i t e committal..., 33 During the month of June, Roosevelt was beset with similar i r r i t a t i o n s i n hi s e f f o r t s to get the conference underway. Arrangements had to be made as to the time of meeting, the place of meeting, and the delegates each proposed to send. Japan was sensitive on t h i s l a t t e r point, but Roosevelt wa„s able to have the Tsar promise that the Russian delegates would be "clothed with f u l l powers to negotiate and conclude a treaty 34 of peace subject to r a t i f i c a t i o n by home governments." Theie was also the problem of where the conference should take place. Japan had suggested Chefflo i n China, While Russia wanted to go to P a r i s . Roosevelt t r i e d to compromise on the Hague. Japan 32 U. S.. Foreign Relations—1905. p. 810. I t a l i c s mine. 33 Bishop. op_. c i t . , p. 389. 34 U. S., Foreign Relations—1905. p. 815. 153 d i s l i k e d the idea of going to Europe, thus a f t e r a f l u r r y of telegrams to both Tokyo and St. Petersburg, both parties agreed 35 to aooept Roosevelt's second compromise—V/ashington. The continual haggling and bickering over the d e t a i l s of the proposed meeting greatly i r r i t a t e d President Roosevelt. Is was a man of swift decision and d i r e c t action himself, and was not one to appreciate the seemingly endless .points of protocol and procedure which required t a c t f u l handling on h i s part be-fore Japanese pride and Russian arrogance could be calmed. Moreover, Roosevelt's stature had grown considerably since he had accepted the position as peacemaker, and he was anxious to .36 prove h i s diplomatic a b i l i t i e s to a watchful world. Through-out June the President urged both Japan and Russia with equal vigor to come to an agreement. On June 16 he wrote Spring-Rice: I have been explaining at leggth to both Russia and Japan the f o l l y of haggling over d e t a i l s . I t o l d Russia that i t was nonsense f o r her to s t i c k 35 - Even a f t e r Russia t e n t a t i v e l y accepted Washington,1 tte Tsar once more t r i e d to have the conference meet i n P a r i s . With c h a r a c t e r i s t i c Rooseveltian brusqjieness, the Tsar was in-formed "that the choice of Washington had been aocepted as f i n a l . 36 "[RooseveltJ was not squeamish about... bloodshed and he was no p a c i f i s t . He Ahad no vain ambition to be a peace-maker. This a l l u r i n g r o l e , which few statesmen are able to push aside when presented, does not appear to have seemed espec i a l l y a t t r a c t i v e to him." But once the b e l l i g e r e n t s had accepted h i s o f f e r to peace parleys, "... the President assumed a grave r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . From that moment he assumed a large personal stake i n making peace." (Dennett, op. c i t . , pp. 341 —431. 153 at t r i f l e s , but i f the war went on she would lose a l l her possessions i n eastern Asia and that the blow to her would be well-night irre p a r a b l e . . . £andj that I should be very sorry to see her driven out of t e r r i t o r y which had been hers f o r a couple of centuries.... To the Japanese I ha\e said that i f they make such terms (37) that Russia would prefer to f i g h t f o r another year... and that to [win such a valueless place as SiberiaJ at the cost of an additional year of lo s s of blood and money and consequent s t r a i n upai Japanese resources seems to me to be wholly useless. 38 At t h i s stage of the negotiations, Roosevelt believed that he was intervening to prevent Russia from being driven out of a l l eastern A s i a . There were two cardinal p r i n c i p l e s upon which the President based h i s opinions. One was that the prin-c i p l e of the 'Open Door' should remain i n force, and the other was that "the safety of American i n t e r e s t s i n the Far 39 East rested upon a balance of power between Russia and Japan." The combination of Japan's "astounding v i c t o r i e s " and Russia's i n t e r n a l disorders made him believe that despite the f i n a n c i a l s t r a i n , Japan might push the Russians back even further. Russia, i n Roosevelt's eyes, was g u i l t y of gross stupidity i n not r e a l i z i n g t h i s , and her statesmen were u t t e r l y devoid of common sense i n not coming to some agreement with the Japanese. He gave h i s opinion to Senator Lodge on the Russians i n terms 37 The war party i n Japan continued to i n s i s t on Russia paying a large war indemnity. .38 Gwynn, op c i t . . p. 501. Between the l i n e s one cans see Roosevelt's desire to have Japan and Russia counterbalance each other in-the Far l a s t , rather than have e i t h e r one achieve a knockout blow and so eliminate the other completely. 59 Pringle, op. c i t . , p . 379. To see the measures ROOSB-v e l t employed to ensure the position of the united States,.see Appendix. Cc, 154 that expressed t h i s view: [The RussiansJ are hopeless creatures with whom to deal. They are u t t e r l y insincere and treacherous; they have no conception of the truth, no willingness to look facts i n the f a ce, no regard f o r others of any sort or kind, no knowledge of t h e i r own strength or weakness; and they are h e l p l e s s l y unable to meet emergencies. 40 Nevertheless, the i n t e r n a l emergencies Russia v/as ex-periencing were having t h e i r e f f e c t on the Tsar. The Kaiser, 1 too, was worrying over the sprea^d of revolution, n i s aim to have Russia involved i n the Far East had been successful. Russia was now weak : and her c r e d i t low. The Kaiser also had hopes of bringing about a Russo-German alliance,' and t h i s would have to be abandoned should the revolution grow i n pro-portion and possibly succeed. Thus he also offered "Dear t Nikki" advice to the e f f e c t that the sooner a peace v/as ne-gotiated/ the better i t would be. Japan, too, was keepihg;:;steady m i l i t a r y pressure on Russia. The date of the conference had f i n a l l y been a greed 41 upon—the f i r s t week i n August/" In J u l y / the Tsar,' through Roosevelt, had t r i e d to arrange an armistice, but the Japanese government f e l t that Russia might be more favorable towards an indemnity i f shown that Japan wa^s s t i l l quite capable of -40 Henry Gabot Lodge, ed., Selections From the Corres- pondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925, v o l . 2, pp. 133—34. 41 "Notwithstanding the appointment of E l i h u Root i n July to the place made vacant by the death of John Hay, Roose-v e l t continued to be his own Secretary of State so f a r as the relations with the peace conference was concerned." (Dennett/ op.- c i t . . p. 249.) 155 exercising her m i l i t a r y might on the f i e l d . In the meantime/ to Roosevelt's delight, the peace envoys were on t h e i r way to .42 the United States. The conference opened i n Portsmouth,1 a navy base i n New Hampshire on August 9, 1905. The conference was underway only a short time when i t became apparent that a deadlock would r e s u l t over the question of an indemnity and cession of t e r r i t o r y to Japan. The Japanese had placed the indemnity at #600,000,000 and also demanded that the entire i s l a n d of Sakhalin, o f f the Siberian coast, come under Japanese contr o l . Russia was equally determined that Japan should receive neither. Ambassa dor Meyer i n St. Petersburg wired the President that r the Tsar/was.most unwilling to accept eith e r of these Japanese conditions/ and that should Japan i n s i s t on them he might re-c a l l the Russian delegates. President Roosevelt, having t r i e d f o r months to have these Japanese conditions moderated without success, r e a l i z e d the urgency of the sit u a t i o n , and decided on a d i r e c t approach. On August 19 he informed Witte that i n view of the fa c t that Japan was i n possession of nearly a l l of the i s l a n d of Sakhalin, Russia might with propriety buy i t back from Japan f o r a sum to be f i x e d by a commission a f t e r the facts had been reviewed. This procedure would allow passions to cool and the conference 42 The chief Russian envoys were M. W i t t i , one of Russia's most respected diplomats, and Baron Rosen, who was also coming, to replace Count Cassini as the Russian ambassador i n the United States. Japan's chief envoys were Baron Komura, the .Japanese Foreign-Minister, and the Japanese ambassador to the United States, Takahira. 156 to continue. Witte approved the. suggestion and forwarded i t to the Tsar with his recommendations. Two days l a t e r Roose-v e l t telegraphed Meyer to see the Tsar personally and urge him to accept the compromise. At the same time, Roosevelt warned the Japanese that Russia, i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , would not a^gree to pa„y an indemnity, that Japan was l o s i n g American public sympa thy since she appeared to be holding out solely f o r money, and further, that to continue the f i g h t f o r an In-demnity would i n r e a l i t y cost Japan more than she would re-ceive from such pa,^yment. i n the week ending August 27, Roosevelt exerted a l l the Influence he had to bring the conference to a successful con-clusion. During that same week he seemed to meet with every 43 possible obstacle and delay to compromise. On August 28 Meyer wired Roosevelt of the new optimism i n Russia: Sit u a t i o n as i t appears here, Russia absolutely decided not to pay any war indemnity. In this respect apparently supported by the-press, the people, even the peasants.... Russia f e e l s that Japan's f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n i s such that i n the long run she w i l l be ruined f i n a n c i a l l y 43 One must sympathize with Roosevelt i n h i s role as peacemaker. He was not renowned f o r t a c t or moderation, and the s t r a i n on him to remain calm and col l e c t e d must have been severe; He expresses such sentiments i n a l e t t e r to a f r i e n d at t h i s period: " Dealing with Senators i s at times excellent t r a i n i n g f o r the-temper, but upon my word dealing with these peace envoys has been an even tougher job. To be p o l i t e and sympathetic and patient i n explaining f o r the hundredth time something perfectly obvious when...I r e a l l y want to give utterance to whoops of rage and jump up and knock t h e i r heads together — well, a l l I can hope i s that the self-repression will-be ultimately good f o r my character." ( Pringle, op_. c i t . , pp. 385 - 86). 157 unless she makes peace. ' 44 On the same day Witte received i n s t r u c t i o n s from the Tsar to make no further concessions or proposals. Since the Japanese had received no further i n s t r u c t i o n s from Tokyo t e l l i n g them to modify t h e i r demands, i t appeared that the conference was a f a i l u r e . Within twenty-four hours, the s i t u a t i o n was completely changed. On August 29 the Japanese envoys received i n s t r u c -tions from t h e i r government which ordered them to make peace on the general l i n e s of Roosevelt's suggested compromise. The Japanese government "decided to withdraw the demand of a money payment f o r the cost of the war e n t i r e l y , i f Russia 45 recognize the occupation of Saghalin Island by Japan...." Thus when Witte, at what was considered the l a s t s i t t i n g of the conference, gave what he said was h i s .final o f f e r to Japan—that i s , the southern h a l f of Sakhalin to go to Japan but without any indemnity—Baron Komura accepted the proffered .46 terms without amendment. 44 Dennett, op_. c i t . , p. 260. 45 Bishop, op. c i t . , p. 412. "46 Witte was amazed. Technically he was not supposed to be attending the meeting, since the Tsar had ordered him to end negotiations on the day before. Naturally, too, he knew nothing of the note handed to the Japanese envoys at the l a s t moment. Roosevelt was also very surprised, believing that Japan could have secured the entire i s l a n d , instead of the proffered h a l f below the 50 degree p a r a l l e l . The peace treaty was -signed by the envoys on September 5, 1905. The complete text-may be found i n Foreign Relations—1905. pp. 824—28. 158 Roosevelt was quite proud of the part he played i n bring-ing the Russo-Japanese war to a close. Indeed, he deserves great cr e d i t , e s p e c i a l l y when one takes into account the l i m i t e d number of s j s i l l e d American diplomats i n Europe upon whose s k i l l and information he could re l y . , This was a serious check to his achieving a f u l l understanding of the tangled web of subterranean diplomacy so important i n Europe at that time. 3 I t i s quite surprising that Roosevelt managed as well as he did, since i n many cases he was forced to r e l y on h i s personal judgment of persona and events frequently working to counteract of delay the peace. To c i t e one example there w a j the case of the German Kaiser who "while professing to Roosevelt so much zeal f o r the i n t e g r i t y of China was deliberately encourag-47 ing the Ts&jr to destroy that i n t e g r i t y . " Yet to Roosevelt, 1 the Kaiser appeared to be helping him more than was Great B r i t a i n , who i n turn was pursuing a course which would enable her to come to an agreement with both belligerents when the ° 48 h o s t i l i t i e s ceased. Another possible source of support f o r Roosevelt was France, but a f t e r the c r i s i s over Morocco came to a head, France was forced to face West instead of East. Thus as f a r as diplomatic a i d from Europe i n bringing an end to the war i s concerned, Roosevelt received comparatively l i t t l e assistance, although the events i n Europe and Russia -47 Dennett, oj>. cit.., p. 67. 48 The Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e was renewed i n August, 1905, and.Great B r i t a i n and Russia s e t t l e d t h e i r outstanding differences i n 1907. 159 I t s e l f were fundamental causes to the coming of the peace. President Roosevelt also displayed considerable s k i l l i n the manner i n which he performed h i s duties as peacemaker. He r e a l i z e d that peace would come only through compromise/ and consequently missed no opportunity to exert pressure, d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y , on both bel l i g e r e n t s to scale t h e i r demands down to the l e v e l of mutual acceptance. He constantly attempted to place the b e l l i g e r e n t s i n such a p o s i t i o n that they would incur public censure f o r continuing the war should e i t h e r re-fuse to modify exorbitant demands or place obstructions i n the negotiations. "No more s k i l l f u l check on the war parties to wielding the 'big s t i c k ' i n negotiations, Roosevelt could be j u s t l y pleased with the way i n which he manipulated the 50 olivelbranch a l s o . The s t r i k i n g v i c t o r y of Japan over Russia d e f i n i t e l y established Japan i n the p o s i t i o n of a Great Power. Moreover, Japan's t e r r i t o r i a l a c q u i s i t i o n s r e s u l t i n g from the war set her upon a course of imperialism which r i v a l l e d that of the European Great Powers. Japan was immensely proud of her achieve-ments i n the war, and immediately set to work to consolidate her gains and expand her influence i n the Far East, However,' ^—->49 Roosevelt received the Nobel Peace prize i n 1906 f o r his a c t i v i t i e s i n t h i s respect. 49 could have been devised," For one who was more accustomed 50 Dennett, op.cit p. 197. 160 the hitherto f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between Japan and the United States deteriorated i n the years that followed. The most im-mediate cause f o r t h i s was the h o s t i l i t y f e l t by the Japanese over t h e i r meager gains as a re s u l t of the Portsmouth con-ference. Roosevelt was unjustly blamed f o r th i s ^ i and h o s t i l i t y towards the United States on t h i s account remained f o r some time. The United States, on the other hand, came to look upon Japan as replacing Russia as an obstacle i n the 'Qpen Door' policy of the Far East. The c o n f l i c t between Japan's 'manifest destiny' and the 'Open Door' policy on the mainland caused an increasing s t r a i n on Japanese-American r e l a t i o n s f o r some time,' although during Roosevelt's term of o f f i c e no c r i s i s arose. The most acute problem on the Japanese-American diplomatic scene before Roosevelt l e f t the presidency was that concerning anti-Japanese a g i t a t i o n i n C a l i f o r n i a . For many years there had been a latent antagonism towards immigrants from the Orient i n the Y/estern American states. This antagonism came into the open on February 23," when the San Francisco Chronicle launched an anti-Ja^panese campaign,1 which other newspapers quickly took up. The campaign was launched mainly on the grounds that the Japanese immigrants were underbidding American 'white' workers on the l&hor market. To t h i s theme were added the usual complaints about the so-called i n f e r i o r i t y of Oriental morals and maniers which had t y p i f i e d previous a n t i - O r i e n t a l outbursts i n the past. State l e g i s l a t o r s and Congressional Representatives supported the campaign on t h e i r respective l e v e l s , demanding that the immigration of Japanese should be 161 d r a s t i c a l l y r e s t r i c t e d . In San Francisco, the Board of Educa-t i o n went so far as to recommend that the Japanese of school 51 age. he segregated, and several months l a t e r i t passed an order for segregation. Roosevelt was most anxious over the whole natter. He,ex-pressed h i s feelings with c h a r a c t e r i s t i c frankness to Senator Lodge: I am u t t e r l y disgusted at the manifestations which have begun to appear on the P a c i f i c slope i n favor of excluding the Japanese exactly as the Chinese are excluded. The C a l i f o r n i a State Legislature and various other bodies- -have acted i n the worst possible taste and i n the most-offensive Banner to Japan. Yet the Senators and Congress-men from these very States were lukewarm about the Navy l a s t year. I t gtes me a f e e l i n g of disgust to see them challenge Japanese h o s t i l i t y . . . While at the same time re-fusing to tat e steps to defend themselves against a f o r -midable foe whom they are ready with such careless i n -solence to antagonize. 52 Very na t u r a l l y the Japanese were equally disgusted at the treatment accorded t h e i r countrymen i n the Western United States, and protested to the American government. Together with Secretary of State Root, Roosevelt attempted to modify -anti-Japanese sentiment on the West Coast on the one hand while soothing the injured pride of the Japanese on the other. .-Roose-v e l t miss-ed--no-chance" to speak out against r a c i a l prejudice, -and both p u b l i c l y and p r i v a t e l y carried out a campaign against those who continued to demand segregation and r e s t r i c t i o n . - 51 In October, 1906. 52 Lodge, op_. c i t . , v o l . I I , p. 122. 162 Afteff several months of negotiation with zhe Western groups and the Japanese- government-- the President was able to reach an agreement with both. This was the so-called 'Gentlemen's 53 Agreement' which came into operation i n the Spring of 1907. Fundamentally, i t provided f o r the r e s t r i c t i o n of Japan im-migration into the United States by the Japanese government i t s e l f , which had the e f f e c t of operating to same Japanese 'face' and of providing a working arrangement which met the modified demands of the Western states. President Roosevelt's policy towards Japan had been one of 'speaking s o f t l y ' rather than" wielding the 'big s t i c k 1 . How-ever, i n 1907 Roosevelt decided that a demonstration of the navaJL strength of the united States would emphasize not only the nation*s i n t e r e s t i n the P a c i f i c , but would be a pointed lesson to the world at large of the Great Power status of the United States. Pri v a t e l y the demonstration was to be primarily for Japan's benefit, but pu b l i c l y i t was announced that the world cruise was f o r the purpose of t e s t i n g and improving the Mavy i t s e l f . As usual, Roosevelt overrode such objections as there were to sending the f l e e t of sixteen battleships around the 53 "The Gentlemen's Agreement i s not embodied i n any one formal document, but the po l i c y which goes by that name was worked out i n a series of- exchanges of messages." (P. C. Jessup, j&Lihu Root, New iork, Dood, Mead and uo., 1938, v o l . 11, p..18. 163 54 world. Many feared i t would r e s u l t i n an armed clash with Japan, despite the 'Gentlemen's Agreement'; others thought i t an unnecessary and wasteful gesture. But Roosevelt, who had had a keen i n t e r e s t i n a strong and e f f i c i e n t Navy since h i s youth, was determined that the cruise should not he c a l l e d o f f . He had h i s way. :ihe f l e e t l e f t i t s A t l a n t i c base i n December, 1907, and the entire cruise was successful from start to f i n i s h . I t i s no exaggeration to say that a l l the Great Powers were greatly impressed, e s p e c i a l l y Japan, and that the purposes f o r sending the f l e e t , both public and private, were f u l f i l l e d . P u blicly the second lar g e s t navy i n the world now had ex-perience and advertisement. Privately, Japan had benefited, but perhaps not to the extent Roosevelt might have wished. Af t e r 1905, Russianbhegemony i n Manchuria was being replaced by Japanese influence. Roosevelt was quite aware of t h i s and the threat i t presented to the p r i n c i p l e of the "Open Door". The United States could enforce t h i s p r i n c i p l e either by being w i l l i n g to f i g h t f o r i t or by using diplomatic pressure, alone or i n collaboration with other powers, so as to make Japan extremely wary of closing the "Open Door", American t r a d i t i o n , 54 On t h i s occasion Roosevelt used ' e f f i c i e n c y ' a s a n excuse" f o r using executive .power. To quote &is own opinion: "I believe that the e f f i c i e n c y of t h i s government depends upon i t s possessing a strong central executive,' and when I could establish a precedent f o r strength i n the executive, as I did, f o r instance, as regards external a f f a i r s i n the case of sending the f l e e t around the world... I have f e l t . . . £thatj I was establishing a presedent of value. (Einstein, op.,.cit., p. 96). 164 sentiment and armed strength prevented the p o s s i b i l i t y of the President being able to threaten war over Manchuria should Japan pursue a course of s t r i c t commercial monopoly. But dip-lomatic pressure i n the form of a naval demonstration was at Roosevelt's disposal, and, during Roosevelt's presidency at least, i t was used with good e f f e c t . Certainly the desired balance of power i n the Far East was nearer achievement than when Roosevelt f i r s t took o f f i c e as president, and the Root-55 Takahira Agreement further protected the Philippines from Japan aggression. President Roosevelt was on hand to greet the battleships upon t h e i r triumphant return to the united States, I t was one of h i s l a s t o f f i c i a l acts as President—and none could be more f i t t i n g than t h i s to a man who held to the o l d adage: 'Speak s o f t l y , but carry a big s t i c k . . . . ' 55 See Appendix, G-. t 1 Conclusion I t might be appropriate at t h i s point to attempt an evaluation of Roosevelt's foreign policy, and to pass judgment on the moves he made to bring h i s aims i n t h i s f i e l d to f u l l r e a l i z a t i o n . Although t h i s thesis has to do with the nature of Roosevelt's foreign policy rather than the policy as a separate entity, i t i s d i f f i c u l t , ' i f not impossible, to d i s -cuss one without the other. There i s another problem which one must face at t h i s point, and that i s , what exactly do we mean by a 'successful' foreign policy? Certainly i n Roosevelt's case one must judge such success from e i t h e r a long-range or short-range point of view. The former would involve comparing the United States' foreign policy as he found It with the problems the nation faced i n t h i s f i e l d long a f t e r h i s presidency, that i s , were the contributions Roosevelt made i n the Sphere of United States'foreign policy as i t affected the nab ion during h i s term of o f f i c e . Roosevelt himself was quite proud of the way i n which he >•• handled the foreign a f f a i r s of his country. As f a r as he was concerned, he had accomplished that which he set out to do. he had both preserved and furthered the security of the United States and had upheld i t s honor while adding to i t s prestige. But the fac t that while wielding h i s 'big s t i c k ' to accomplish the above he had hurt many heads mattered l i t t l e to him. The a b i l i t y of the United States' Navy to move quickly from one ocean to another was f a r more important to him than the feelings or honor of the 'Dago' governments 166 bordering tbe Caribbean. The ends which he sought were bene-f i c i a l to his country, and therefore the means were of second-ary importance, e s p e c i a l l y so when Roosevelt believed that what would benefit the United States would i n due course benefit her neighbors. Moreover, Sin h i s eyes, he saw himself a s a 'knibght i n shining armour 1 when he offered h i s services,' to use a mixed metaphor, as the 'policeman of the Caribbean'. There was l i t t l e thought given to the i n d i v i d u a l wished of the community of states which was to be h i s 'beat'. He merely pinned the badge on h i s own chest and announced h i s p o s i t i o n . I t was no a l t u r i s t i c gesture; rather i t was b a s i c a l l y selfish,-though not i m p e r i a l i s t i c i n the common sense. Roosevelt's nationalism made i t s e l f evident i n every major instance in.which he dealt with the foreign r e l a t i o n s of the United States. I t was e g o t i s t i c a l , self-righteous and generally s e l f i s h , based upon the theory that h i s country— especially i n the Western Hemisphere but also i n the world at large—was a model and virtuous nation to which a l l others could aspire. As such,' Roosevelt f e l t that i t was not 'im-proper to ensure the honor, prestige or security of t h i s model by disregarding, i f necessary, the honor, prestige and security of another nation whose actions or policy might mar or s u l l y the perfection of the United States. But granting the nationalism which lay behind h i s guidance of American foreign a f f a i r s , to what extent may he be c a l l e d successful? Looking at i t from a long-range point of view, Roosevelt's 167 foreign policy was by no means an outstanding success. I t i s true the Panama Canal was constructed and put into operation to the great benefit of the world. This was a s o l i d and f a r -reaching accomplishment. Yet the resentment of Colombia to-wards the united States might e a s i l y have been aboided had Roosevelt approached the problem i n a di f f e r e n t manner. In- . deed, Roosev&lt l e f t a t r a i l of resentment behind him i n h i s dealings with the nations of the western Hemisphere, and i n almost every case there was good reason f o r t h i s sentiment. Since the United States had to contend with but r e l a t i v e l y weak nations i n t h i s hemisphere, such sentiment could at worst be shrugged o f f by the United States. Nevertheless, the resentment and indignation which Roosevelt s t i r r e d up with h i s 'bi& s t i c k 1 detracted from the success of h i s foreign pol i c y . Latin-American resentment of Roosevelt's foreign policy was mixed with fear. Although there i s nothing:1.in Roosevelt's diplomacy to compare with the l a t e r " d o l l a r diplomacy" approach 6f 'Such men as Taft, he nonetheless stretched and wa^rped the Monroe Doctrine so as to provide ample precedence f o r h i s successors. Thus, judging from the oft-spoken ideals of the United States by American statesmen, Roosevelt's 'Corollary' to the Monroe Doctrine v/as not a thing whereof to boast i n l a t e r years. In f a c t the famed 'Corollary' was form-a l l y disavowed i n 1930, an act which gives some i n d i c a t i o n of Roosevelt's long-range success. F i n a l l y , the President's excursion into the a f f a i r s of 168 Europe and Asia neither added nor detracted to or from such long-range success i n foreign a f f a i r s as he achieved. The p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the United States i n the Algeciras Conference neither halted nor hurried the march of the European powers along the road to war. S i m i l a r l y , i n the Far East, Roosevelt's actions delayed, but did not ultimately deter, Japan from establishing her hegemony over Manchuria. Regarding h i s policy from a short-range point of view, and perhaps with the sentiments of an American nationalist,' there i s l i t t l e doubt but that Roosevelt's foreign p o l i c y was successful. He thought of himself as having two main problems i n t h i s f i e l d , that i s , to ensure the security of the United States and to preserve i t s honor. Subconsciously, h i s nationalism - one might almost c a l l i t national self-righteous-ness - was the f i l t e r through which h i s thoughts passed before being transformed into action to grapple with these problems. Combining opportunism with shrewd manoeuvring ha managed to gain construction and f o r t i f i c a t i o n r i g h t s f o r an inthmian canal, and i n so doing immeasurably advanced the fighting effectiveness of the nation's ' f i r s t l i n e of defence,' He believed i t necessary to the security of the United States that no European nation should gain a foothold i n any of the Latin-American states. He was successful here also . Roosevelt was jealous of the honor of his nation - a term he frequently used but one which, i t should be noted, he never defined. But he f e l t himself upholding h i s country's honor when he used unethical means to make cer t a i n that the Alaska Boundary Tribunal would arr i v e at a 'correct' decision. And 169 despite h i s ethics, he was successful. To gain more honor and prestige f o r the United States (and himself),-he dabbled i n the arena of European p o l i t i c s , and although the result was mostly a success of prestige, i t was nevertheless a success. To uphold- the righ t s of h i s country i n Asia, Roosevelt play-ed an active part i n s e t t l i n g the Russo-Japanese War. Here again he v/as more successful than one might expect him io be, f o r on t h i s occasion, as on others, he backed up h i s idealism with the r e a l i s t i c b e l i e f that force, i n the form of the •big s t i c k ' , was a necessary instrument of foreign p o l i c y . From a short-range point of view, therefore, Roosevelt could be proud of h i s record i n foreign a f f a i r s . Unfortunate-l y , h is nationalism also made him short-sighted i n the same f i e l d of endeavour. 170 Appendix A A President Roosevelt played a comparatively minor role i n the Venezuelan a f f a i r despite his famour letter to the con-trary. This letter was written to J, B, Bishop, his ' o f f i c i a l ' biographer, in 1916, when Roosevelt's anti-Germanicism was.at i t s height. In this letter, Roosevelt wrote in part, There was no objection whatever to Castro's b&ing pun-ished as long as the.munishment did not take the form of seizure of territory.w,• At this particular point, such seizure of territory would have been a direct menace to the United States, because i t would have threatened or partially controlled the approach to the projected Isthmian Canal. I speedily became convinced that Germany was the leader, and the really formidable party in the trans-action; and that England was merely following Germany's lead.... I also became convinced that Germany intended to seize some Venezuelan harbor... with a view to ex-ercising some degree of control over the future Isthmian Canal, and over South American affairs generally. For some time the usual methods of diplomatic inter-course were tried. Germany declined to agree to arbit-rate the question at issue.... I assembled our battle fleet... for "manoeuvres", with instructions that the fleet should be... ready.to s a i l at an hour's notice. I saw the (German) Ambassador, and explained that in view of the presence of the German Squadron on the Venezuelan coast, I couid not permit longer delay in answering my request for arbitration.... The Ambassador responded that his government could not agree to ar-bitrate,... I then asked Mm to inform his government that i f no notification for arbitration came within a certain specified number ofl days I should be obliged to order Dewey to take his fleet to the Venezuelan coast and see that the German forces did not take possession of any territory. A few days later the Ambassador came to see me.... I asked him i f he had any answer to make from his govern-ment to my request, and when he said no, I informed him that in such an event i t was useless to wait as long as I had intended, and that Dewey would be ordered to s a i l twenty-four hours in advance of the time I had set. He expressed deep apprehension, and said that his government 171 , • would not arbitrate. However, less than twenty-four houxs before the time I had appointed for cabling the order to Dewey, the Embassy notified me that his Imperial Majesty the German Emperor had directed him to request me to under-take the arbitration myself. ( J . B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, vol. I, pp. 222—24) This resume of what happened in the Venezuelan c r i s i s , despite the fact that i s was written by Roosevelt, i s generally refuted by later historians. For a scholarly expose of the whole matter, see S. W. Livermore, "Theodore Roosevelt, the American Navy, and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902—1903", in L. H, Gepson and others, editors, The American Historical  Review. New York, the Macmillan Company, vol. 51, (April, 1946), pp. 452—471. Mr. Livermore comes to the conclusion that Roosevelt was quite conscious of the availability of the American navy i n case of need, but despite a thorough search of the Roosevelt's papers and the state documents of the United States, Germany and Great Britain, no record can be found of Roosevelt acting i n the way he said he did. •I 172 APPENDIX ^. President Roosevelt's proposed Message to Congress: The Colombian Government, through i t s representative here,* and d i r e c t l y i n communication with our representative i n Colom-bia, has refused to come to any agreement with us, and has delayed action so as to make i t evident that i t intends to make extortionate and improper terms with us. The Isthmian Canal H i l l was, of course, passed upon the assumption that whatever route was used, the benefit to the p a r t i c u l a r section of the Isthmus through which i t passed would be so great that the country c o n t r o l l i n g t h i s part would be eager t o f a c i l i t a t e the building of the canal. I t was out of the question to sub-mit to extortion on the part of a beneficiary of the scheme. A l l the labor, a l l the expense, a l l . t h e r i s k are to be assumed by us and a l l the s k i l l shown by us. Those c o n t r o l l i n g the ground through .which the canal i s to be put are wholly incapable of building i t . Yet the i n t e r e s t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l commerce generally and the i n t e r e s t of t h i s country p a r t i c u l a r l y demands that the canal should be begun with no needless delay. The refusal Of Colombia properly to respond to our sincere and honest e f f o r t s to come to an agreement, or to pay heed to the many concessions we have made, renders i t i n my judgment necessary that the United States should take immediate action on one of two l i n e s : e i t h e r v/e should drop the Panama Canal project and immediately begin work on the Nicaraguan Canal, or else we should purchase a l l the rights of the French company, and,; without further parley with Colombia, enter upon the completion of the canal whick the French company has begun. I f e e l that the l a t t e r course i s the one demanded by the i n t e r e s t s of t h i s nation,-* and I therefore bring t h i s matter to your attention f o r such action i n the premises as you may deem wise. I f i n your judg-ment i t i s better not to take such action, then I s h a l l proceed at once with the Nicaraguan Canal, The reason that I advocate the action above outlined i n regard to the Panama Canal i s , i n the f i r s t place, the strong testimony of the experts that t h i s route i s the most f e a s i b l e ; and i n the next place, the impropriety from an in t e r n a t i o n a l standpoint of permitting such conduct as that to which Colombia seems to i n c l i n e . Reference: . Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography.' pp. 530— 31 APPENDIX A r t i c l e XXXV of the Treaty of 1846 between New Granada (Oplombia) and the United States. The Government of New Granada guarantees to the Govern-ment of the United States that the right of way or t r a n s i t across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of communication that now exist, or that may be hereafter constructed, s h a l l be open and free to the Government and c i t i z e n s of the United States, and f o r the transportation of any a r t i c l e s of produce, manufactures or merchandise, of lawful commerce, belonging to, the c i t i z e n s of the United States; that no other t o l l s or charges s h a l l be l e v i e d or co l l e c t e d upon the c i t i z e n s of the United States, or t h e i r said merchandise thus passing over any road or canal that may be made by the Government of New Granada, or^ by the authority of the same,: than i s , under l i k e circum-stances, l e v i e d upon and c o l l e c t e d from the Granadian c i t i z e n s ; that any lawful produce, manufactures or merchandise belonging to c i t i z e n s of the United States, thus passing from one sea to the other, i n e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n , f o r the purpose of exportation to any other foreign country, s h a l l not be l i a b l e to any import duties whatever; or, having paid such, duties, they s h a l l be.entitled to drawback upon t h e i r exportation; nor s h a l l the c i t i z e n s of the United States be l i a b l e to any duties, t o l l s or charges of any kind, to which native c i t i z e n s are not sub-jected f o r thus passing the said Isthmus. And, i n order to sepure to themselves the t r a n q u i l and.constant enjoyment of these advantages, and as an equal compensation f o r the said advantages, and f o r the favors they have acquired by the 4th, 5th, and 6th a r t i c l e s of t h i s treaty, the United States guaran-tee, p o s i t i v e l y and e f f i c a c i o u s l y , . t o New Granada, by the present s t i p u l a t i o n , the perfect n e u t r a l i t y of the before men-tioned Isthmus, with the view that the free t r a n s i t from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted, or embarrassed i n any future time while t h i s treaty e x i s t s ; and, i n consequence, the United States also guarantee, i n the same manner the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said t e r r i t o r y . Reference: Ruhl I. B a r t l e t t , The Record of American Diplomacy. New York, A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1947, p. 244. 174 APPENDIX ID) The people of Panama having by an apparently unanimous movement dissolved t h e i r p o l i t i c a l connection with the Republic of Colombia and resumed t h e i r independence, and having adopted a government of t h e i r own, republican i n form, with which the Government of the United States of Americanhas entered into relations, the President of the United States, i n accordance with the t i e s of friendship which have so long and so happily existed between the respective nations, most earnestly commends to the Governments of Colombia and of Panama the peaceful and equitable settlement of a l l questions at issue between them. He holds that he i s bound, not merely by treaty obligations,' but by the i n t e r e s t s of c i v i l i z a t i o n , to see that the peaceable t r a f f i c of the world across the Isthmus of Panama s h a l l not longer be disturbed by a constant succession of unnecessary and wasteful c i v i l wars. Reference: U. S., Foreign Relations—1905, p. 243 APPENDIX 5: Memorandum from President Roosevelt to the American members of the Alaska Bounda ry Tribunal, March 35,.1903. S i r s : I have appointed you as the American representatives of the Tribunal to determine the boundary between the t e r r i t o r y of Alaska and the B r i t i s h possessions i n North America. I write you now because, according to reports i n the public press, S i r W i l f r e d Laurier, the Gana dian Premier, has recently i n open Parliament made a speech upon the question which i s i n e f f e c t a mandate authoratively and o f f i c i a l l y given by Mm to the two Canadian members of the Tribunal. In t h i s ppeech he sets fort h the claims which he apparently ex-pects the Canadian members of the Tribunal to uphold as ad-vocates rather than to consider as.judges, inasmuch as i n my judgment I regard t h i s claim as untenable, and inasmuch as further the po s i t i o n taken by Mr. Laurier, and presumably therefore by the two Canadian members, i s as f a r removed as possible from j u d i c i a l , I f e e l that I should b r i e f l y c a l l your attention to my view of the question which you have to decide. You w i l l of course i m p a r t i a l l y judge the questions that come before you f o r decision. . The claim so roundly asserted by Mr. L a u r i e r — a n d therefore presumably to be upheld by the Canadian Commissioners—that i s , the claim to Skagway and Dyea, and therefore of course Pyramid Harbor, i s not i n my judgment one of those which can properly be considered open to d i s -cussion. The treaty of 1835 between Russia and England was undoubtedly intended to cut o f f England,, from access to the sea. The word l i s i e r e used i n the treaty means the s t r i p of t e r r i t o r y bordering a l l the navigatable water of that portion of the Alaskan coast affected by the treaty, and t h i s s t r i p of t e r r i t o r y i s American of course. Equally of course i n int e r p r e t i n g the treaty a prime consideration i s the way i n which a l l a u t h o r i t i e s interpreted i t f o r the sixty years immediately succeeding i t s adoption. There i s entire room fo r discussion and j u d i c i a l and impartial agreement.as to the exact boundary i n any given l o c a l i t y — t h a t i s as to whether i n such l o c a l i t y the boundary i s to be pushed back ten marine leagues, or whether there i s i n actual fact nearer the coast a mountain chain that can be considered as running p a r a l l e l to i t . In the p r i n c i p l e involved there w i l l of course be no com-promise. The question i s not i n my judgment one i n vhich i t i s possible f o r a moment to consider a re c o n c i l i n g of con-f l i c t i n g claims by mutual concessions. I t i s to determine APPENBIXg. (cont'd) whether the th e o r y upon which R u s s i a u n i f o r m l y t r e a t e d the 1 boundary dur i n g h e r e n t i r e p e r i o d of p o s s e s s i o n , upon which the u n i t e d S t a t e s has u n i f o r m l y t r e a t e d i t ever s i n c e i t a c q u i r e d the t e r r i t o r y , and upon which iingland u n i f o r m l y t r e a t e d i t f o r over s i x t y y e a r s a f t e r the T r e a t y was adopted, and a c c o r d i n g to which a l l the E n g l i s h as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the Canadian c a r t o g r a p h e r s have since continued to t r e a t i t , i s r i g h t i n i t s e n t i r e t y o r wrong i n i t s e n t i r e t y . very r e s p e c t f u l l y , Theodore R o o s e v e l t . white House, Washington. Ref.: Lodge, S e l e c t i o n s from the Correspondence o f Theodore - and Henry Qabot Lodge, v o l . 2, pp. 4-5. 177 APPENDIX | r L e t t e r from Theodore Roosevelt to Justice O l i v e r Wendell Holme s• . Oyster Bay, N. Y, July 25,: 1903 My Dear Judge Holmes: I thank you very much f o r your l e t t e r , which I thoroughly enjoyed. There i s one point on which I think I ought to give you f u l l information, i n view of Chamberlain's.remark to you. This i s about the Alaska boundary matter, and i f you happen to meet Chamberlain again you are e n t i r e l y at l i b e r t y to t e l l him what I say, although of course i t must be pr i v a t e l y and u n o f f i c i a l l y . Nothing but my very earnest desire to get on well with England and my reluctance to come to a break made me consent to t h i s appointment of a Joint Commission i n t h i s case; f o r I regard the attitude of Canada, which England has backed, as having the scantest possible warrant i n j u s t i c e . However, there were but two a l t e r n a t i v e s . E i t h e r I could appoint a commission and give a change f o r agreement; or I, could do as I s h a l l of course do i n case t h i s commission . f a i l s , and request Congress to make an appropriation which wil l enable me to run the boundary on my own hook. As regards most of Great B r i t a i n ' s claim, there i s not, i n mjs judgment,1 enough to warrant so much as a consideration by the United States; and i f i t were not that there are two or three l e s s e r points on which there i s doubt, I could not, even f o r the object I have mentioned, have consented to appoint a commis-sion. The claim of the Canadians f o r access to deep water along any part of the Canadian coast i s just exactly as i n -defensible as i f they should now suddenly claim the i s l a n d of Nantucket. There i s not a man f i t to go on the commission i n a l l the United States who would treat t h i s claim any more res p e c t f u l l y than he would treat a claim to Nantucket. In the same wa^y the preposterous claim once advanced, but I think now abandoned by the Canadians, that the Portland Channel was not the Portland Channel but something else.unknown, i s no more worth discussing than the claim that the 49th P a r a l l e l meant the 50th P a r a l l e l or else the 48th. But there are points which the commission can genuinely consider. There i s room f o r argument about the islands i n .the mouth of the Portland Channel. I think on t h i s the American case much the stronger of the twoj s t i l l , the B r i t i s h have' a case. Again, i t may well be that there are places i n which there i s room f o r doubt as to whether there a c t u a l l y i s a chain of mountains p a r a l l e l to the coast within the ten-league l i m i t . Here again there i s a chance for honest d i f f e r -ence and honest- f i n a l agreement. I believe that no three men i n the United States could be found who would be more anxious than our own delegates to do justice to the B r i t i s h claim on 178 APPENDIX % (Con't) a l l points where there i s even a color or right on the B r i t i s h side. 'But the objection raised by c e r t a i n Canadian author-i t i e s to" Lodge, Root and Turner, and es p e c i a l l y to Lodge and Root, was that they had committed themselves on the general proposition. No man i n public l i f e i n any p o s i t i o n of prom-inence could have possibly avoided committing himself on the proposition, any more than Mr. Chamberlain could avoid com-mitting himself on the question of the ownership of the Orkneys i f some Scandinavian country suddenly claimed them. I f t h i s claim embodied other points as to whicTi there was legitimate doubt, I believe Mr. Chamberlain would act f a i r l y and squarely i n deciding the matter; but i f he appointed a commission to s e t t l e up a l l those questions, I c e r t a i n l y should not expect him to appoint three men, i f he could f i n d them, who believed that as to the Orkneys the question was an open one. S i m i l a r l y I wish to repeat that no three men f i t f o r the position could be found i n a l l the United States who would not already have come to some conclusion as to cert a i n features of the Canadian claim—not as to a l l of them. Let me add that I earnestly hope that the English under-stand my purpose. I wish to make one l a s t e f f o r t to bring about an agreement through the commission, which w i l l enable the people of both countries to say that the res u l t represents the f e e l i n g of the representatives of. both countries. But i f there i s a disagreement I wish I t d i s t i n c t l y understood, not only that there w i l l be no a r b i t r a t i o n of the matter, but that i n my message to Congress I s h a l l take a p o s i t i o n which w i l l prevent any p o s s i b i l i t y o f . a r b i t r a t i o n hereafter; a position, I am i n c l i n e d to believe, which w i l l render i t necessary f o r Congress to give me the authority to run the l i n e as we claim i t , by our own people, without any further regard to the a t -titude of England and Canada. I f I paid attention to mere abstract rig h t , that i s the position I ought to take anyhow. I have not taken i t because I wish to exhaust every e f f o r t to have the a f f a i r s e t t l e d peacefully and with due regard to England's di g n i t y . F a i t h f u l l y yours, Theodore Roosevelt Hon. 0. W. Holmes Care J . S. Morgan & Co. London, England Ref: Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt,' pp. 259—61. 179  APPENDIX (gr President Roosevelt was very much aware of Japan's naval and m i l i t a r y power. Me was also quite concerned about the Philippines, and wished to ensure t h e i r security. As a result, i n July, 1905, Secretary of War Raft v i s i t e d Japan on h i s way to the Philippines, and i n Tokyo negotiated a secret "agreed memorandum" with the Japanese Prime Minister. There were three main~points to the memorandum. (1) F i r s t , Japan di s -claimed any h o s t i l e intentions towards.the Phi l i p p i n e s . Second Japan was given to understand t h a t the United States would not oppose Japanese suzerainty over Korea. Third, the United States would s i l e n t l y and informally support the p r i n c i p l e s of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n s o f a r as they went to maintain peace i n the Far East, The agreement was made i n sefcret and never submitted to the Senate, I t was a sort of a l l i a n c e binding only upon the Roosevelt administration. I t i s probable that Roosevelt ordered Taft to come to some such arrangement. In any event, when the text of the agreement reached him, he wired Taft: "Your conversation with Count Katsura absolutely correct i n every respect. Wish you would, state to Katsura that I confirm every word you have said." (2) The strained r e l a t i o n s between Japan and America over the immigration problem l e d to Japanese jingoism and t a l k of the "Yellow P e r i l " i n the United States. Again Roosevelt became quite concerned-over the P h i l i p p i n e s . "In 1906 (he) admitted... that he would be glad to be r i d of them, and i n 1907 he c a l l e d them an 'Achillea Heel'." (3) The cruise of the battle f l e e t around the world cooled Japanese jingoism... To further f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s , the Root-Takahira ar b i t r a t i o n , convention of 1908 was si. gned to supplement the former "agreed memorandum." By the terms of the convention, both parties agreed to resort, to the Hague Tribunal to s e t t l e differences "of a l e g a l nature or r e l a t i n g to the i n t e r p r e t a -t i o n of t r e a t i e s e x i s t i n g between the two contracting parties ...." (4) The convention was to l a s t f i v e years, and was more i n the _nature of a gesture of peace than anything eH.se. 1 For f u l l text see Dennett, Roosevelt, and the Japanese War, -pp. -112—114. 2 Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 384, (July 31, 1905), Had Russia known of t h i s agreement, the Tsar would never have accepted Roosevelt as mediator 1, 3 Griswold, Far Eastern Policy of the United States, p. 123. ' 4 U. S., Foreign Relations—1908, p. 503. BIBLIOGRAPHY 180 1 PRIMARY SOURCES (A) Government Documents Dominion of Canada, Department of External A f f a i r s , Treaties and Agreements Affe c t i n g Canada i n Force Between His  Majesty and the United States of America. Ottawa,1. H. M. Printing O f f i c e , 1987, Great B r i t a i n , Foreign O f f i c e , Alaska Boundary Tribunal. Appendix to the Case of His Majesty's Government Before  the Alaska Boundary Tribunal, v o l , 1.., London, McCorquodale and Co., Ltd., 1903. Great B r i t a i n , Foreign Office, Memorandum f o r Counsels (Nos. 1, 2 and 3)— V a r i o u s Documents Bearing on the Question of  the Alaska,Boundary/ London, Harrison and Sons, Printers i n Ordinary, to His Majesty, 1903. Great B r i t a i n , Foreign Office, Alaska Boundary Tribunal. Counter Case Presented on the Part of His Britannic  Majesty.... London, McCorquodale and Co., Ltd., 1903. Great B r i t a i n , Foreign Offic e , Appendix to the Counter Case of  His Majesty's Government..., London, McCorquodale and Co., .Ltd., 1903..: Great B r i t a i n , Foreign Offic e , Alaska Boundary Tribunal. Oral  Arguments. With Index, Award of the Tribunal, and Opinion  of i t s Members. London, Harrison and.Sons, 1903. Oakes, A. H. and Maycock, W., editors and compilers, B r i t i s h  and Foreign State Papers. London, His Majesty's Station-ery O f f i c e / 1900—1901 to 1908—1909. (Inclusive) United States, Bureau of.National L i t e r a t u r e and A r t / (Rep-resentative James D.. Richardson, e d i t o r ) , A Compilation  of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents; Washington, Published by the Bureau, 1910. United States, Congressional Record." Washington, Government Printing O f f i c e , 1901—1908, (Inclusive). 181 United States, Department of State, T r e a t i e s / Conventions. 1  International Acts.- Protocols, and Other Agreements  Between the United States of America and Other Powers....' Washington, Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1910. United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States/ Washington, Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1901—1908. (Inclu s i v e ) . United States Government, Alaska Boundary Tribunal. The Case  of the United States Before the Tribunal.... Washington, Government Pr i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1903. United States Government, Alaska Boundary Tribunal, The Argu- ment of the United States Before the Tribunal Convened at  London. Y/ashington, Government Prin t i n g O f f i c e , 1903. United States Government, Alaska Boundary Tribunal. 1 The Counter  Case of the United States Before the Tribunal Convened at  London. Washington, Government Prin t i n g O f f i c e / 19Q3. United States, Senate Committe on Foreign Relations, Compila- t i o n of Reports of the Committe on Foreign Relations/ United States Senate. 1789—?1901. Treaties and L e g i s l a t i o n  Respecting Them. Washington, Government Prin t i n g O f f i c e , 1901. United States, Senate Documents, 58th Congress, 1st Session/ volume 2, Doc. #8, Parts.1 and 11, " Additional Correspon dence Relating to the Recent Revolution on the Isthmus of Panama." United States, Senate Documents, 58th Congress, 2nd Session, volume 3, Doc. #95, " Relations of the United States with Colombia and the Republic of Panama." United States, Senate Documents. 58th Congress/ 2nd Session, volume 4, Documents f 133 and 143, H O f f i c i a l Proceedings of the New.Panama Canal Company, Etc." and " Use by the United States of a Military. Force i n the Internal A f f a i r s of Colombia, Etc." 182 United States, Senate Documents. 58th Congress, 2nd Session, volume 2, Documents ft 51 and 53/ " Correspondence Concerning-the Convention Between.the United States and Colombia f o r the Construction of an Interoceanic Canal Across the Isthmus of Panama." United states, Senate Documents. 60th Congress, 2nd Session, Doc # 542, .." Correspondence i n Regard to the Relations of the United States with Colombia and Panama." United States, Department of State, Treaties. Conventions,  International Acts.' Protocols, and Other Agreements  Between the United States of America and Other Powers...T Washington, Government Pr i n t i n g Of f i c e , 1910. (B) Compilations of O f f i c i a l Documents, Records/ E t c . B a r t l e t t , Ruhl J . , The Record of American Diplomacy/ New York, A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1947. The volume consists of 'documents and readings' i n the history of American foreign r e l a t i o n s . Limited i n scope, i t i s nevertheless one of the best of i t s kind. Carnigie Endowment,for International Peace, American.Foreign  Policy. Washington, Carnigie Endowment f o r International Peace, 1920. This attempts to trace American foreign policy by p r i n t -ing the statements of Presidents and Secretaries of State of the United-States/ e tc. A great deal of primary source material i s l i s t e d . The period covered being from President Washington to President Wilson. Gooch, G. P. and Temperley, Harold, editors, B r i t i s h Documents  oh the Origins of the War. London, His Majesty Stationery O f f i c e , 1927, 11 v o l s . volumes I, I I , IV/ V and VI most h e l p f u l . Johnson, W i l l i s F., Addresses and Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, New York, The Unit Book Publishing Co., 1909. These addresses and papers have been compiled from o f f i c i a l volumes, newspapers and public speeches and l e t t e r s . As a whole they give an excellent insight into Roosevelt's character. 185 Gantenbein, James W., editor, The Evolution of Our L a t i n - American Policy: A Documentary Record.'New York, Columbia University Press, 1950. An excellent compilation of pertinent p r e s i d e n t i a l speeches, o f f i c i a l notes, memoranda, etc. from Washington to the present. Putnam, G.P. and Sons, editors, Addressees and Presidential  Messages of Theodore Roosevelt. 1902 - 1904, New York, G.P. Putnam1s Sons, 1904 A selection of speeches selected with the view of aiding the American public to understand t h e i r president, then up f o r r e - e l e c t i o n . Despite i t s purpose, the work r e f l e c t s Roosevelt's attitude towards foreign a f f a i r s i n many instances.-(C) Memoirs, Biographies, Letters, etc. Bishop, J . B., Theodore Roosevelt and h i s Time, Shown i n His  Own Letters. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920, 2 v o l s . The author v/as Roosevelt's ' o f f i c i a l ' biographer. Objectivity, and frequently-accuracy, are lacking. The author's chief contribution i s p r i n t i n g many of Roosevelt?s l e t t e r s and memoranda. Buchan, John, Lord Minto: A Memoir, London, Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1924 A well-written and i n t e r e s t i n g biography, valuable i n p i c t u r i n g Minto's position i n the Alaska boundary a f f a i r Dennett, -Tyler, John Hay, From Poetry to P o l i t i c s , New York, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1935. An excellent biography of Hay - and an essential work fo r the t h e s i s . The author draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between Hay as Secretary of State p r i o r to 1901 and during the Rooseveltian period. Ei n s t e i n , Lewis, Roosevelt, His Mind In Action, New York, Houghton, M i f f l i n Co., 1950. The author sees Roosevelt as the 20th century example of the Renaissance man. Altogether a f a i r picture of Roosevelt by one v/ho knew him f a i r l y w e l l . 184 G-ilman, Bradley, Roosevelt, The 'Happy Warrior. Boston, L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1921. Gilinan, a Harvard classmate of Roosevelt's, brings out the cross-grained character of Roosevelt, e s p e c i a l l y p r i o r to his presidency. The tone of the work i s e u l o g i s t i c , and consists mainly of reminesconces. Gwynn, Stephen, editor, The Let t e r s and Friendships of S i r  C e c i l Spring-Rice. London, Constable and Co., Ltd., 1929, 2 v o l s . These volumes are es s e n t i a l to any work on Roosevelt, and are most h e l p f u l and informative. Jessup, .Philip C.. E l i h u Root . New York, Dodd, Mead and Co., .. 1938, 2 v o l s . . An excellent biography, written with s k i l l and a fine l i t e r a r y touch which manages to place Root i n marked contrast both to Hay and Roosevelt. Lodge, Henry Cabot, editor, Selections From the Correspond- ence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925, 2 v o l s . Two supreme n a t i o n a l i s t s ' correspondence provide a most in t e r e s t i n g , and sometimes amusing, source of material ess e n t i a l to an understanding of the motives underlying Roosevelt's foreign p o l i c y , Martin, Edward S., The L i f e of Joseph Hodges Choate, As Gathered Chiefly From His Letters, London, Constable and Co Ltd., 1920, 2 v o l s . Of l i m i t e d value, but Choate's l e t t e r s do reveal the 'salon diplomacy' which characterized Roosevelt's Alaska boundary negotiations through American delegates i n London. McCaleb, Walter F., Theodore Roosevelt, New York, Albert and Charles Boni, 1931 The author, a decided a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t and strong L i b e r a l i s quieg to praise or condemn^Roosevelt's action with i m p a r t i a l i t y . The book i s very readable, brusque, studded with personal opinions bulwarked with hind-sight. 185 Nevins, A l l a n , Henry White, Th i r t y Years of American Diplomacy New York, Harper and Brothers, 1930. A very good biography, valuable to t h i s work fo r i t s reference to the Algeciras Conference. Newton, Lord, Lord Lansdowne. A Biography. London, Macmillan ani Co., Ltd., 1929. An excellent biography giving a revealing insight into the background of European p o l i t i c s at the turn of the century, e s p e c i a l l y from the B r i t i s h viewpoint. Ni col son, Harold, 8afc&Mfefafofc Nicolson - F i r s t Lord Carnock . London, Constable.and Co.., Ltd., 1930. A biased biography of the B r i t i s h representative at the Algeciras Conference by his son. Of minor value. Pringle, Henry F., Theodore Roosevelt. A Biography. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1931. A thorough and•• competent biography of Roosevelt, somewhat marred by cynicism of the 'Bull Moose', but nevertheless q u i t e - f a i r i n most aspects.. Foreign a f f a i r s are dealt with i n more d e t a i l than the average biography. Roosevelt, Theodore. An Autobiography. New iork, Charles Scribner's Sons,.1920. The author finds a great deal to praise i n h i s subject. S c h r i f t g i e s s e r , K a r l , The Gentleman From Massachusetts: Henry  Cabot Lodge, L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1944. A most i n t e r e s t i n g and onjective account of the l i f e of Senator Lodge. The author brings out the Lodge-Roosevelt friendship and t h e i r cooperation i n f u l l account,, but un-fortunately spends too much time on domestic a f f a i r s . Skelton, O.D., L i f e and Letters of S i r Wilfred Laurier. Toronto, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1921,.2 v o l s . Chapter XII, dealing with the Alaska Boundary dispute, y i e l d s a disappointingly meager number of L a u r i e r 1 s private l e t t e r s , etc. on the subject. The author takes the view that the decision reached was diplomatic rather than j u d i c i a l . 186 Thayer, William Roscoe, The L i f e and Letters of John Hay. Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n Co.,1 1929. The numerous l e t t e r s to and from Hay on diplomatic matters contained within the text are quite valuable. Thayer, William Roscoe, Theodore Roosevelt. An Intimate Bio- graphy.' New York, Grosset and Dunlap, 1919. An e u l o g i s t i c biography of the;President by one of his former Harvard classmates. Mr. Roosevelt i s presented as a master-mind par excellence on foreign a f f a i r s by the author. 2 SECOJtDARY SOURCES (A) General Works Akagi, Roy H., Japan's Foreign Relations, Tokyo, The Hokieseido Press,. 1936., Dr. Akagi presents the Japanese viewpoint of the Russo-Japanese war with a n a t i o n a l i s t bias. The volume, a l -though f a c t u a l , i s written c h i e f l y f o r popular consump-t i o n . Anderson, Eugene N., The F i r s t Moroccan C r i s i s . 1904—1906. Chicago, the. University of Chicago Press, 1930. A competent, detailed and scholarly work. The author paints a very thorough and cl e a r picture of.European diplomacy i n 1904—1906. Bailey, Thomas A., A Diplomatic History of The United States. New.York, F. S. Crofts and Co., 1942. One of the best general h i s t o r i e s of the subject. Bailey, Thomas A., Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-Ameri- can C r i s i s . Stanford University Press, 1934. A scholarly and objective treatment of the subject. 187 Barck, Oscar T., and Blake, Nelson M., Since 1900, A History  of the United States i n Our Own Times. New York, The Macmillan Co., .1947. The f i r s t four chapters are e s p e c i a l l y good f o r a view of American domestic and foreign policy between 1900 and 1930, Theodore Roosevelt i s treated quite o b j e c t i v e l y . Beard, C. A., and Smith, G. H. E., The Idea of National Interest, New York, the MacMillan Co., 1934.. The authors make an admiral case that national 'honour1 i s r e a l l y national 'interest'. Bemis, Samuel Flagg, The L a t i n American Policy of the United  States. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943. The author looks upon President Roosevelt as a 'protective i m p e r i a l i s t ' , and views American policy towards.the L a t i n American countries at the turn of the century as j u s t i f i -able under the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt's action toward Colombia, however, he h e a r t i l y condemns. Bemis, S. F.,. editor, The American Secretaries of State and 'Eheir .Diplomacy. New York, A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1929, 10 vols, ( v o l . 9) Volume nine contains sketches of both John Hay (by A. L. P. Dennis) and E l i h u Root (by James Brown S c o t t ) . Both are .biased, and tend to be.overly enthusiastic of the merits of the respective Secretaries of State. As a sketch of the foreign r e l a t i o n s each had to deal with, however, the authors are complete, to the point and i n -formative . Brown, Arthur J., The Mastery of the Far East, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921. The author deals with Japan's r i s e to supremacy i n the Orient. I t i s not a scholarly work, but one i s able to get a better i n s i g h t into the character and thought of tte people of the O r i e n t — e s p e c i a l l y the Japanese—than by more detailed h i s t o r i e s . 188 Callahan, James Morton, American Foreign Policy i n Canadian  Relations. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1937. There i s a short but excellent chapter on the Alaska boundary i n t h i s text. I t i s unbiased, well-documented and authoratively written. C a l l c o t t , V/. H., The Caribbean Policy of the United States. 1890—1980. Baltimore, the John Hopkins Press, 1942. The author sees much to condemn i n American foreign policy i n the Caribbean p r i o r to the 1930's. Charnwood, Lord, Theodore Roosevelt. London, Constable and Company, 1923. A biased and e u l o g i s t i c biography. Clinard, 0. J., Japan's Influence on American Naval Power. 1897—1917. .Berkley. University of C a l i f o r n i a Press T 1947. An excellent book, well-documented, authorative. The author gives a v i v i d though scholarly account of Ameri-can naval policy being based on Japan's increasing power during the period covered. . Clyde, Paul H., A History of the Modern and Contemporary Far l a s t , New York, Prentice-Hall Inc./ 1937. A general h i s t o r y — f a i r l y u s e f u l . Coolidge, A. C . The United States As a World Power. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1908. The book i s a published series of lectures given by the author at the Sorbonne. The author has a n a t i o n a l i s t i c point of view, but aside from that, he gives an excellent summary of the United States' position i n 1908. Dulles, Foster Rhea, Twentieth Century America, New York, Houghton M i f f l i n . Co.,. 1945. Valuable f o r a general view of the United States at the beginning of the century. 189 Dennett, Tyler, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War. New York, Doubleday, Page and Co., 1925, "A c r i t i c a l study of American policy i n Eastern Asia i n 1902—5, based primarily upon the private papers of Theodore Roosevelt.*' These private papers are essential to the understanding of Roosevelt's position and action i n the Russo-Japanese War. The author has great respect, f o r Roosevelt, and points out that American mediation resulted i n no p o l i t i c a l or commercial benefits f o r the United States. Dennis, A l f r e d L. P., Adventures i n American Diplomacy. 1896—  1906. New York, E. P. Dutton and Co.,. 1928. The author does a great service to the student by l i b e r a l ^ s p r i n k l i n g h i s book with o r i g i n a l l e t t e r s and documents otherwise unobtainable. Professor Dennis i s quite objec\> t i v e when dealing with American per s o n a l i t i e s , and iH i n general sympathy with American foreign policy during the period covered by h i s work. Ewart, John S., The Kingdom of Canada and Other Essays. Toronto, Morang and Co., Ltd., 1908. A strong Canadian n a t i o n a l i s t condemns i n no uncertain or ambigious language the 'raw deal' Canada received at the Alaska Boundary Tribunal. Certainly not unbiased or e n t i r e l y accurate, but a most excellent antidote a f t e r reading numerous American versions. Eay, Sidney B., The Origins of the World "War. New York,' the Macmillan Company, 1930, 2 v o l s . Yolume I, "Before Sarajevo: Underlying Causes of the War," i s e s p e c i a l l y pertinent to the t h e s i s . The Moroc-can c r i s i s i s f u l l y and competently dealt with. ' Fish, Carl R., The Path of Empire. New Hasten, Yale University Press, .1919. A s u p e r f i c i a l treatment of American foreign p o l i c y between 1850—1912. Fleming, D. E., The Treaty'Veto of the American Senate. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons,- 1930. A help i n understanding the attitude of President Roose-v e l t regarding h i s widd d e f i n i t i o n of the use of executive power i n dealing with foreign r e l a t i o n s . 190 Farrand, Max, The Development of the United States From Colonies to a World Power. Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n Co., 1926. A general h i s t o r y of the United States up u n t i l 1926, but"with emphasis on the part ibhe Spanish-American War played r e l a t i v e to the re-awakening of American i n t e r -nationalism i n the l a s t chapters. Gelber, Lionel M., The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship. London, Oxford University Press, 1938. An excellent, scholarly work, well written and documented. The author has a s o l i d grasp of h i s subject and a clear knowledge of world a f f a i r s at the turn of the century. Gooch, G. P., Before the War, Studies i n Diplomacy, London, Longmans Green and Co., 1938, v o l . I I . One of the best texts on European diplomacy of the Rooseveltian period, and e s p e c i a l l y h e l p f u l i n seeing the Algeciras Conference from the European viewpoint. Griswold, A. Whitney, The Far Eastern Policy of the United  States, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938. An excellent, well-written, scholarly text on the subject, ranking i n importance with that of Mr, Tyler Dennett. I t i s thorough, thoughtful and f a i r l y objective, although . the author damns Roosevelt's diplomatid e f f o r t s i n the Far East with f a i n t praise. Hacker, Louis M, and Kendrick, Benjamin B., The United States  Since 1865. New York, F. S. Crofts and Co., 1934. Competent, objective, very well written. H i l l , Howard C , Roosevelt and the Caribbean, Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1927. A f a i r , objective and scholarly treatment of the subject matter, quite valuable to t h i s t h e s i s . Hofstader, Richard. - The American P o l i t i c a l Tradition , Now York, A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1948. Although only a b r i e f b i o l o g i c a l sketch of Roosev&lf. i s given, i t i s one of the best I have read. I t i s tolerant and c r i t i c a l , readable, pointed and quite unprejudiced. 191 Howland, Charles P., editor, Survey of American Foreign Rela- tions. New Raven, Yale University Press, 1938 and 1939. (2 volumes) These two excellent books are written by experts i n the f i e l d covered. They are accurate, detailed but not dry, and on the whole quite objective. Howland, C. P., American Relations i n the Caribbean. New Haven, l a l e U niversity Press, 1939. This work was prepared by the author f o r the American Oouncil of Foreign Relations. I t i s a survey of the United States r e l a t i o n s with the Caribbean states, and one of the best i n t h i s f i e l d . Howland, Harold, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1931. A f a i r h i s t o r i c a l treatment of the subject i s given. Jones, C. L., Norton, H. K. and Moon, P. T., The United States  and the Caribbean, Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1939. This i s one volume of the "American P o l i c i e s Abroad" se r i e s . I t i s well written, rather generalized, meant primarily.for the general reader, but nevertheless valuable to the student. Mr, Norton and Mr. Moon take a pro and con view respectively of American p o l i c y to-wards the Caribbean countries. Keenleyside, Hugh Llo£d, Canada and the United States. New York, A l f r e d A. Knopf, Inc., 1939. A thorough, readable, well-documented and scholarly text on both, the major and minor disputes, et cetera, between the U. S. A. and Canada. The Alaska Boundary dispute i s . e s p e c i a l l y competently dealt with. Knight, M. M., The Americans i n San Domingo. New York, Van-guard Press,' 1938. The book deals mostly with American r e l a t i o n s with Santo Domingo a f t e r Roosevelt's period, but there are some ex-c e l l e n t chapters on Roosevelt's handling of the Santo Domingo question. 192 Langer, William L., The Diplomacy of Imperialism. 1890—1902. New York, A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1935,; volume IX,' An excellent, well-document volume dealing i n d e t a i l with the p o l i t i c a l r i v a l r i e s among the Great Powers i n the i m p e r i a l i s t f i e l d . Chapter 23, on the &nglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e , was very h e l p f u l . Latane, John H.,1 A History of American Foreign Policy, New Yod^' Doubleday, Page and Co., 1927, One of the better general h i s t o r i e s of American foreign p o l i c y . Lippmann, Walter, United States Foreign Policy: Shield of the  Republic. Boston, L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1943. The author makes an appeal f o r a consistent and r e a l i s t i c foreign policy f o r h i s nation. In t h i s f i e l d he t r e a t s Roosevelt as one of the few presidents whose r e a l i s t i c viewpoint aided the nation at the turn of the century. Mahan, Captain A. T., The Interest of America i n g&a {Power.' Post and Future;' Boston, L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1898. Captain Mahan's book, i n r e a l i t y a series of a r t i c l e s published between 1890—1897, i s a-plea f o r a stronger American navy based on the assumption that the United States i s an i n s u l a r power. Despite a s t i l t e d s t y l e , the author displays great strategic acumen i n geopolitics, 2 and l i k e many/men, i s r e a l i s t i c , blunt and rather imper-i a l i s t i c , naval Mclnnis, Edgar W,, The Unguarded Frontier. A History of Ameri- can—Canadian Relations. New York/ Doubleday , Doran and Co., Inc., 1942, The author gives a very f a i r though b r i e f account of the Alaska Boundary dispute. He upholds the conventional Canadian view of the r e s u l t s , but points out also the many other good points of Roosevelt's period that made up f o r Canadian resentment of h i s " b i g - s t i c k " policy,' McCain, William P.. The United States and the Republic of  Panama. Durham, N. C , Duke University Press,' 1937, One of the better books on the subject, covering fimerican-Panama re l a t i o n s from the 19th century;to the present. Well documented, authoratively written. 193 Milton, George F., The Use of Pr e s i d e n t i a l Power. 1789-1943. Boston, L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1944. Chapter X of t h i s book gives a good i l l u s t r a t i v e example of how Roosevelt believed a President should employ his powers'under the Constitution. Moon, P.T., Imperialism and World P o l i t i c s . New York,-The Macmillan Co., 1926. A very objective discourse on the position of the United States i n the 1900-1914 and 1918-1924 eras i s given i n the l a t t e r chapters. Quite h e l p f u l . Moore, John Bassett, A Digest of International Law . Washing-tori, Government Prin t i n g Of f i c e , 8 v o l s . ( v o l . I ) . Chapter III of volume I, " States, Their Recognition and Continuity", helps to c l a r i f y , the l e g a l aspects! of Roosevelt's dealings with the South and Central American states. Morison, S.E. and Commager, H.S., The Growth of the American  Republic. New York, Oxford University Press, 1942, ! 2 vols, ( v o l . I I ) . Very good f o r a general survey of American domestic and foreign r e l a t i o n s i n the' Rooseveltian period. Morel, E.D., Morocco In Diplomacy, London, Smith, Elder and •Co., 1912. The author's purpose i n writing the book is to appeal f o r a better Anglo-German understanding and an end to secret, diplomacy. The most valuable part of the book jbs the large section of appendices containing the major treaties, conventions, parliamentary addresses, etc. on Morocco since 1880, by both B r i t i s h and German governments and o f f i c i a l s . Paxson, F.L., Recent History of the United States. 1865-1927. Boston, Houghton, M i f f l i n Co., 1929. Competent; Roosevelt's period i s covered i n somewhat more d e t a i l than i n the usual general h i s t o r y . 194 Perkins, Dexter.--The Monroe Doctrine. 1867-1907. Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1937. In chapters V and VI of this book, on Venezuela and San Domingo respectively, the author has written one of the best and most scholarly accounts of the events occuring there during Roosevelt's presidency, interpreting those events i n relation to the Monroe Doctrine. However, His objectivity i s sometimes marred by his 'Americanism.' Perkins, Dexter,: The United States and the Caribbean. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1947. Emphasis i s placed on the social, p o l i t i c a l and economic relations of the United States with the Caribbean states from the earliest times to the present. Perkins, Dexter, Hands Off! A History of the Monroe Doctrine, Boston, L i t t l e , Brown and.Oo., 1941. The author has several chapters on Roosevelt's policy towards the Caribbean nations, but l i t t l e on-the Panama Canal negotiations. A thorough and learned work. Prothero, G.W/, French Morocco, London, H.M. Stationery Office, ( Foreign Office - Historical Section), Hand-book # 101, 1920. The secret conventions pertaining to Morocco between 1900 and 1905 are given in f u l l i n an appendix to the pamphlet. Rae, John B., and Mahoney, Thomas H. D., The United States i n  World Histroy, Hew York, McGraw-Hill.Book Company, 1949. The text i s one of an increasing number of those- dealing with the united States i n a geopolitical sense. Accurate, f a i r l y objective and sufficiently detailed for the student. Rhodes, J.F., The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897-1909. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1923. Deals mainly with the domestic policy of both presidents. Sullivan, Mark, Our Times, The United States, 1900-1925, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936, volume 1. The author gives an excellent portrayal of the United States at the turn of the century. 195 Tansill, Charles C., Canadian-American Relations. 1875-1911. New Haven, Yale University.Press, 1943. Excellent. The Alaska Boundary Dispute i s dealt with in', f u l l and i n detail..The book i s based on solid research. The author i s one of.the few American writers who agrees that Canada did not get impartial or hust treatment in the boundary dispute. Tomkins, Pauline, American-Russian Relations in the Ear East. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1949. The bulk of the text deals with the post-1914 Russo-American relations in the Far East, but the f i r s t chapters are quite valuable for their sound analysis of European and American ambition in that area. Tupper, Eleanor, and McReynold, G-eorge E.. Japan in American  Public Opinion, New York, 'The Macmillan Company, 19^7. The f i r s t two chapters describe public opinion in the united States during the period covered by this thesis. Well written and very interesting. Williams, Mary W., Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815- 1915,.Washington, ( American Historical Association), Oxford university Press, 1916. Dr. Williams' work stresses the Anglo-American rather than the American-Colombian aspects of Isthmian diplom-acy. The necessity of Britain having American friendship at the turn of the century i s clearly brought out. (B) Periodicals. 'Anglo-American', "A foreign Estimate of Mr. Roosevelt," i n Harvey, George, editor, The North American Review. New York, The North American Review Publishing Co., vol. 179, July, 1904), pp. 118-127. The author gives one of the best estimations of Roosevelt both as a man and president that I have read 196 Bailey, Thomas A., "Theodore Roosevelt and the Alaska Boundary Settlement" i n Hamilton, Louis and others, editors, The  Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Review, Toronto, v o l . 18, (June, 1957)' pp. 123-131. The author brings to l i g h t some i n t e r e s t i n g l e t t e r s of Roosevelt on the Alaska Boundary Settlement, and looks on the president's action as t y p i c a l of h i s nationalism and as an excellent pre-election move. Escobar. Francisco, "President Roosevelt's Message and the Isthmian Canal", i n Harvey, George, editor, The North  American Review, New.'icork, v o l , 178, (January, 1904), pp. 122-132. A Colombian n a t i o n a l i s t s t r i k e s out at Roosevelt's approval of Panama's declaration of independence. Green. J . F.,' "The President's Control of Foreign Polic y , " m Dean, Vera, editor. Foreign Policy Reports. New York, Foreign Policy Association, v o l . 15, ( A p r i l , 1939), pp. 10-20. The a r t i c l e contains an excellent summary of the position of the Executive i n r e l a t i o n to the power constitu-t i o n a l l y granted him to guide the foreign r e l a t i o n s of h i s country. Hart, Albert B., "The Monroe Doctrine and the Doctrine of Permanent Interest" i n Adams, George B. and others, editors, The American H i s t o r i c a l Review. New York, the: Macmillan Company, v o l . 7, (October, 1901),"' pp. 77—91. A well-balanced, ably written exposition of vhat the author believes h i s nation should s t r i v e f o r i n i n t e r -national a f f a i r s — a n appeal to end i s o l a t i o n i s m and adopt a permanent policy based more on geography and trade rather than the Monroe doctrine. Howe, George F., "The Clayton TBulwer Treaty" i n Boak, Arthur E. R. and others, editors, il'he American H i s t o r i c a l  Review. New York, the Macmillan Company, v o l . 42, ( A p r i l , 1937), pp. 491—500. A very good a r t i c l e on the subject 197 Johnson, Emory R,, "The Isthmian Canal and I t s Economic Aspects," i n Johnson, E. R., editor,' The Annals of the  American.Academy of P o l i t i c a l and So c i a l Science. Philadelphia, American Academy of P o l i t i c a l and So c i a l Science, volume XIX, (January, 1902), pp, 1—23, The author gives a v i v i d i n d i c a t i o n of the benefit the canal would give to American foreign trade and commerce. Latane, John H,, "The Treaty Relations of the United States and Colombia" i n Johnson, E, R., editor, The Annals of  the American-Academy of P o l i t i o a n and So c i a l Science. Philadelphia, Published by the Academy hereafter, volume XXII, (July, 1903), pp. 115—126. The author unconsciously emphasizes the reliance of Colombia on American m i l i t a r y forces to r e t a i n control of Panama, Livermore, Seward W., "Theodore Roosevelt, The American Navy } j and the Venezuelan C r i s i s of 1902—1903" i n Gepson/ L, H, and others, The American H i s t o r i c a l Review, New York, the Macmillan Company," volume 51, (April., 1946), pp. 452 —471. The author, employed i n the D i v i s i o n of Research i n the Department of States, gives a thorough and detailed picture from the navy viewpoint of the events centered m the Venezuelan c r i s i s i n 1902—03. Although not eliminat-ing Roosevelt's claim to having used.the navy as a "big s t i c k " , Livermore points out the decided factor of coin-cidence of naval manoeuvres and prearranged mobilization. Loomis, Francis B., "The Position of the United States on the American Continent," i n Johnson, E. R., editor, The  Annals of the American Academy of P o l i t i c a l and So c i a l  Science. Philadelphia, published by the Academy, volume XXEI, (July, 1903) / pp. 1—19. Pasco, Samuel, "The Isthmian Canal Question" i n Johnson, E. R., editor, The.Annals of the American Academy of P o l i t i c a l  and Social Science. Philadelphia, published by the Academy, volume XIK, (January, 1902)/ pp. 24—45. There i s an excellent summary of the history of attempts made to b u i l d a canal on the Isthmus, plus the.then present problems confronting the United States. 198 Roosevelt, Theodore, "How the United States Acquired the Right to Dig the Panama Canal," i n Abbott, Lyman, editor, The Outlook. (October 7, 1911), pp. 314—18. ~ * Roosevelt re-writes h i s message to Congress on the matter iof popular consumption. "Russia and Japan," i n The Quarterly R&view, London, John Murray, ( A p r i l , 1904),' pp. 576—611. (No author nor editor given.) The author elaborates on the theme that Japanese expansion i s every b i t as active as Russian expansion, despite . popular apprehension over-current Russian imperialism. Sontag, Raymond J . , "German Foreign Policy, 1904—1906, i n Adams, George B. and others, editors, The American  H i s t o r i c a l Review, New York,' The Macmillan Company,' volume 33, (January, 1928), pp. 278—301. Mr. Sontag gives a b r i e f but excellent review of the -events leading to the Algeciras Conference from the German point of view. Thorson, Winston B., "American Public Opinion and the Ports-mouth Peace Conference," i n Boyce, Gray G. and others/ editors, The American H i s t o r i c a l Review, New York/ the Macmillan.Company, volume 53, ( A p r i l 1948), pp. 439—464/ White, James, "Henry Cabot Lodge and the Alaska Boundary Award," i n .Wallace., W. S. and others, editors.' The Canadian  H i s t o r i c a l Reveiw, Toronto, university of Toronto Press, Volume 6, (December, 1925),' pp. 332—47. The article, contains a long document by Senator Lodge on h i s r e l a t i o n to the Alaska boundary dispute which he gave i n A p r i l , 1925, to-the-Massachusetts H i s t o r i c a l Society. 199 Bibli o g r a p h i c a l Note I t i s somewhat i r o n i c that when t h i s thesis was com-pleted, a publishing company announced that i t had available f o r public use f o r the f i r s t time f i v e volumes of Theodore Roosevelt's correspondence,' hitherto available only to those having access to the Library of Congress. Roosevelt carried on h i s negotiations i n foreign policy l a r g e l y by means of personal contact, private l e t t e r s and memoranda, and i n other ways which,' f o r the most part, meant that the material found i n government documents were of l i m i t e d value. Up to the present day, therefore, a student studying h i s foreign policy must, of necessity, r e l y upon a variety of sources i n order to uncover Roosevelt's personal l e t t e r s . Several books, such as those by Tyler Dennett and A. L. P. Dennis, are valuable sources f o r these letters:^ while many more can be found i n the biographies, memoirs and compilations of l e t t e r s , et cetera, of Roosevelt's friends, cabinet members and p o l i t i c a l f r i e n d s . Wherever one -may f i n d them, Roosevelt's l e t t e r s are of primary importa nee, and where such of them are reprinted, i n part or i n whole, there the student must go. 

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