President Theodore Roosevelt
and
United States Foreign Policy, 1901--1907

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Abstract
During the most active years of his life, Theodore Roosevelt lived in an age which was characterized by imperialism. From the time of his youth until the time of his retirement, the Great Powers of Europe were busily engaged extending their political domination over large areas of the world with a view of exploiting these areas economically and otherwise. The United States had been practicing a similar form of imperialism within the limits of North America as its frontier moved westwards. At the turn of the century the country turned from expansion on the American continent to expansion overseas.

Roosevelt participated in this latter wave of American imperialism, and the terms of his presidency were wedged in between this and a minor wave of American imperialism in the Caribbean area which took place in the decades following his period. For this reason many people have come to regard Roosevelt as an imperialist and his presidency as an era of imperialism also. The purpose of this thesis is to prove that, although not untainted by the spirit of 'Manifest Destiny' himself, as President of the United States, Roosevelt pursued a nationalist course in his relations with the other nations of the world.

Roosevelt's aims in foreign affairs were basically simple. An ultra-nationalist and super-patriot, he believed that his country had a mission in life. This mission was to serve as the beacon of light of progressive civilization in a world of states struggling to better themselves and so reach the goal so happily attained by the United States.

The methods he employed in foreign affairs were dominated
by this belief. Thus he felt it not improper to use, at times, unethical means to achieve his idealistic ends. The main instrument he employed in this field was his 'big stick' which served him in as many ways as the occasion warranted. And since the 'stick' was used in defence of the 'honor', security and prestige of the United States, Roosevelt assumed that it was of little moment if heads were knocked within the area the 'big stick' was wielded.

As a nationalist, and from a short-range and rather narrow point of view, Roosevelt's foreign policy was successful. But viewed from the standpoint of two generations later, his success was mediocre.
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Chapter I

Introduction
In 1789, when Great Britain recognized the United States of America as a sovereign nation, its existence was comparatively unnoticed by the Great Powers of Europe. Unlike the creation of the German Empire in 1871, the birth of the United States presented no immediate threat by its geopolitical position. On the European continent, British prestige had been lowered temporarily, but in itself, the United States' entry into the world family of nations caused no major realignment of power or policy by the nations of Europe.

Today the situation is almost completely reversed. In this present era, the United States is one of the two strongest nations of the world. In material strength it is perhaps the most powerful nation, while its material potentialities will equal or surpass those of its most potent rival for some time to come. As such, what the United States' government thinks or does is of the utmost concern to the other world powers, and the Foreign Offices of all nations are greatly concerned with any real or supposed course of action upon which the United States might embark.

This sweeping change of status and importance of the United States has taken place over the past century and a half, the change being marked by fairly definite stages during that time. The first and longest stage was that period between the Revolutionary War and the Civil War, one which might be termed the period of national adolescence. This was the era when the United States was comparatively free from warfare, and a time when a predominantly rural people began to move southward and
westward by settlement, purchase and conquest. The next period
was that from the Civil War to the Spanish-American War, or
the era of national unification and consolidation. The third
period was one wherein the United States was universally
recognized as a Great Power, which might be called the present
or contemporary era.

This thesis has to do with the foreign policy of the
United States during the first decade following the general
This recognition came as a result of American victory in the
Spanish-American War. The acquisition of Spanish overseas
colonies by the United States suggested to many that America
was about to follow in the imperialist steps of the contemporary European Great Powers. But the deeply rooted traditions
of the American republic favored a return to the isolationist
policy of the past century. President Theodore Roosevelt was
to determine the path the United States would take in those
crucial years, and it was to be his guiding hand which was to
steer the ship of state past the reefs of isolationism while
avoiding getting stranded on the shoals of imperialism.

A general survey of the power and position of the United
States at the turn of the century will provide the background
of Roosevelt's presidency. Then a brief sketch of Theodore
Roosevelt's life prior to his presidency will help explain the
motives of the type of person wielding executive power during
the period covered by this thesis.

The material and human strength of the American nation
in 1901 was enviable by the standards of any Great Power of
Europe. It was a united nation of some 110,000,000 persons whose skill and energy were constantly raising the standard of living of the country as a whole. In productive power, the United States stood second to no other nation, and its potentialities in this field were greater than most. Industrially, the nation had undergone a change since the end of the Civil War which had resulted in the rapid transformation of the country from one predominantly rural to one predominantly industrial. Yet with the greater use of labor saving machinery and the opening up of new land tracts, the agricultural productivity of the United States increased tremendously.

The industrial East and the agricultural West were knit together by a network of railroads and telegraph wires which were of incomparable value in furthering the exploitation of the nation's wealthy natural resources. No country in Europe or the world had the railroad mileage of the United States, and few, if any, the efficiency of her vast communication system.

Of equal importance was the fact that by the turn of the century the United States found it no longer need rely upon Europe for its development. The great quantities of manufactured capital goods once imported were now being made, and even exported, by the great factories of the United States. Also, the flood of European capital into the United States had diminished to a trickle by 1900, and the financing required to open the mines, oil fields, timber stands and other industries was being undertaken by Americans themselves.
With surplus capital, a skillful labor force and tremendous natural resources, the United States felt itself able to measure its strength with the other Great Powers at the turn of the century. As a developed economic and geographic unit it was unsurpassed, despite the fact that as a political force its power was all too frequently overlooked by the distant European nations. But even the appreciation of the United States as a world power had greatly changed since the Civil War, and full recognition of her status in the world was to come in 1898.

In that year the United States became involved in a war with Spain, a conflict typical of the imperialistic wars fought throughout the world on a greater or lesser scale in the decades after 1870. With the righteous feeling of one seeking the Holy Grail, and under the twin banners of democracy and republicanism, the United States declared war on Spain over the question of Spain's treatment of the Cuban affair. The sentiment which swept the country during this short war was one which indicated that for the time being, at least, the American people had caught the jingoist spirit which hitherto had been more common to Europe. But such jingoism as existed was the result of the nationalist emotions of the generation that had grown up since the Civil War more than any deep-seated militarist tradition in the country or of a full-throated cry for imperialistic adventures.

The Spanish-American War lasted but a few weeks, yet that was time enough to revolutionize the world status of the United States. Despite the mutual blunders and incompetent general-
ship of the conflicting forces, United States' victory was a foregone conclusion. With victory over Spain, the United States not only gained tacit recognition as a Great Power, but emerged as a potential rival of the imperialist powers. What followed after the United States reached this stage will be the subject of future chapters. But for the present we must examine the background of one of the most publicized participants in the Spanish-American War, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, and see how his charge up San Juan Hill led him not only past the Spanish fortifications but through the doors of the White House and into the Presidential office.

Theodore Roosevelt was one of that new generation which grew up during the years following the Civil War, and most active during the turn of the century. He was born in New York in a well-to-do, old-stock family whose forebears settled with the Dutch in the Hudson River Valley. As a boy he was sickly, but urged on by his father, he set out to build up his physique by hard, relentless practice, a thing which he kept up all his life.

As a youth Roosevelt's delicate health prevented him from attending either public or private schools with any regularity, so that until he entered Harvard University he was taught by tutors. As a college student he took the conventional courses, was rather studious, careful of the friendships he made, and tended to be a rather quiet, though impulsive, undergraduate. He became editor of the Harvard Advocate, a Phi Beta Kappa man,
and the member of various other fraternities in whose selected circles he would frequently join in the inevitable 'bull-sessions' with little urging. He was neither a snob nor a 'social climber'. His confidence in himself, his family's social station and financial standing eliminated any such psychological quirk. Indeed his background, plus his ability as an amateur boxer, gave him over-confidence in himself if anything.

In 1880 Roosevelt graduated from Harvard, married a Boston girl and settled in New York where he joined social and literary clubs and extended his athletic interests to include hunting, polo, and rifle practice. Within a matter of months, to the surprise of his friends, he plunged with his usual vigor into state politics. His aim was to seek election to the New York State Assembly on the Republican ticket, and "he was soon making stump speeches while his friends alternated between amusement and indignation that a young man of good blood ... should stoop to the gutter of American politics." 1

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1 H. F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1931, p. 48. The Republican party had come into being about three decades ago as the party of progress. It was at this time, (1881), the party which had preserved the Union and under which an extraordinary growth of wealth had occurred. But the stench of scandal and corruption had permeated the party for years. A Secretary of War had been subjected to impeachment proceedings. Five federal judges had resigned under pressure. Politics, in 1881, were thus looked upon as no profession for a gentleman of the American upper classes. Rather it was regarded as a machine oiled by judicious monetary contributions to the party 'bosses', operating to secure law and order as conceived by the large contributors. Roosevelt often expressed the opinion that men of his social class only think they run the nation, and he was determined that such 'rule' should be more direct.
'Young Roosevelt' won his seat in the Assembly by a comfortable margin, and during his first year made a name for himself as an active, out-spoken critic of the corruption in New York state. His reformist efforts resulted in his re-election in the next two terms, during which he gained more experience not only in parliamentary procedure but with the Republican party itself. While in the Assembly Roosevelt exhibited many of the traits he was to have as president. "The vigorous expression of his opinions, the directness of his statements, the moral emphasis of his point of view, had crystallized in their mold." Such a crusader, then as later, could frequently embarrass his would-be friends and supporters. Thus when Roosevelt decided to go West and take up ranching in 1884 the New York Republican 'bosses' heaved a sigh of relief.

Life in the Dakota Badlands pleased Roosevelt tremendously. He bought two cattle ranches and soon "established himself with the cowboys whose riding, recklessness and exhibitionism he admired tremendously." This spirit of the frontier never left him in later life, and accounts perhaps for his 'hail-fellow-well-met' attitude in social and political life.


3 Roosevelt's first wife died in 1883 after the birth of their daughter, and his mother died shortly thereafter. This was the reason for his leaving the political scene temporarily at this time. He was married again within two years.

4 Pringle, op. cit., p. 97.
as well as for his approach to foreign affairs when he became president. Despite his academic-political background, he entered into and enjoyed every phase of frontier life, took great pride in his adventures and achievements while ranching, and wrote to his friends in the East a constant stream of letters praising the outdoor life and bed-rock 'Americanism' he found among his Western neighbors.

From 1885 to 1889 Roosevelt led a busy but rather barren life politically. A 'party man' above all, he campaigned for Blaine as president although cherishing a personal dislike for the candidate. His eloquence on the platform was needed, however, and to one whose political career had just started, he realized the fallacy of deviating from the party line. Roosevelt made an unsuccessful attempt for the mayorality of New York city during this period, but it was not until 1889 when, with the aid of Lodge, he was appointed Civil Service Commissioner in Washington, that he held a political post.

Roosevelt was a Civil Service Commissioner for six years, during which time he stirred up frequent storms and caused

5 One of whom was Henry Cabot Lodge, an ardent Republican and firm friend and mentor of Roosevelt. "A similarity of origin and education; a cultivated interest in life and in the amenities of life; a fondness for American history, and ... for riding; above all, a real taste for practical politics made for this friendship." (Einstein, op. cit., p. 34)

6 In 1886, after his defeat in the New York mayorality race, Roosevelt took advantage of the following period of enforced idleness to visit England and meet in person the celebrated folk with whom he had been carrying on a correspondence. It was while he was in London that he married his second wife.
headaches by his bull-headed determination to carry out the duties of his office as he imagined they were meant to be carried out. He had a facility for grasping every particle of power which the office of commissionership devolved upon the occupant; and he was not above trying to gain additional power in order to further his plans. As an administrator he shirked no responsibility nor dodged any unwelcome or politically dangerous task which he thought needed completion. He was efficient, demanding of his staff, often tactless to the point of impetuosity, but a hard and conscientious worker with seemingly limitless energy and drive liberally sprinkled with amour propre.

The combination of moralist and realist in his character was quite evident in the reforms he instituted in the Civil Service, and his work as Commissioner again drew the plaudits of the public. In 1895 he resigned his office to become the head of the police board of New York city. With characteristic dash he started a campaign to clean up the corruption and graft prevalent for decades in the New York police force. He streamlined the police organization, raised the morale of the force by his impartial efforts to further police efficiency, and gained the respect of both Democrats and Republicans for his honesty and fearlessness while in office.

Roosevelt left the police board in 1897 to become Assistant Secretary of the Navy under President McKinley. The time and the place were eventful, for a year later the United States, for the first time in about eighty years, would be at
war with a European power; and Roosevelt's hyper-sensitivity to the responsibility of his office was to result indirectly in Dewey's victory at Manila Bay.

In the years since Roosevelt had first entered office his popularity had risen steadily except among the Republican 'bosses' such as Mark Hanna and among those in the wealthier classes who looked upon him as bombastic, rather radical and quite unpredictable at times. He was not easily controlled in a political sense, and was an extremely difficult person to advise once he had made up his mind that his course was the right course. Yet his enemies never underestimated his ability as a campaigner, his natural if boisterous charm socially, his knack of coloring his actions so that they appealed to the public, nor the large personal following he could rally to his standard.

In his personal life, Theodore Roosevelt was the epitome of a good father and husband. At his home in Oyster Bay he was the American prototype of the English country squire, and indulged in his passion for outdoor sports to his heart's content, usually in company with many friends and neighbors. Roosevelt's intellectual interests were as wide and varied as his physical pursuits. Yet he was not a profound thinker nor an exceptional scholar. He wrote a number of books whose themes showed his deep admiration for the adventurous life, for American heroes of bygone days, and his belief in the greatness -- present and future -- of his country. Moreover, he carried on a voluminous correspondence with his friends and wrote magazine articles which, for the most part, were noted
for their 'Americanism'.

Socially, Roosevelt was a gregarious person, usually thrilled by the sound of his own voice and the wisdom of his opinions. In this latter respect he was as dogmatic as he was righteous, and those who did not share his opinions he thought of condescendingly as friendly but foolish at best, and as unspeakable demagogues at worst. In practical matters he was not unwilling to take advice, but "ultimately made up his mind by a flashing sort of intuitive process..." which for better or worse he would stubbornly follow to the end.

One of Roosevelt's main interests was in foreign affairs, an interest which increased steadily as he matured. He was greatly fascinated by the imperialist drama going on in Africa, Asia and elsewhere, and caught some of the imperialist spirit as he watched Great Britain, France and others extend their dominion and influence over the globe.

Even before he accepted the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt had reached such a stage of ultra-nationalism and super-patriotism that he may be termed a


8 He shared this interest with Senator Lodge, to whom he wrote on February 25, 1896: "The only thing outside my present work (as Police Commissioner) in which I take a real interest is the question of our attitude toward foreign powers and therefore to our defence. What has been done in the navy...?" (H. C. Lodge, ed., Selections From the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925, vol. 1, p. 214)
'jingoist'. Thus as the threat of war with Spain drew closer, Roosevelt did all in his power to improve the preparedness of the navy while at the same time, in speeches and interviews, he supported the stand taken by the pro-war party within the government. His reason for supporting a declaration of war is revealing. In a letter to the Secretary of War in 1897 he wrote:

I would regard a war with Spain from two viewpoints: First, the advisability on the ground both of humanity and self-interest of interfering on behalf of the Cubans, and of taking one more step toward the complete freedom of America from European domination; second, the benefit done to our people by giving them something to think about other than material gain (sic), and especially the benefit done our military forces by trying both the Army and Navy in actual practice.

Rarely has such an open and frank opinion been given by a responsible government official regarding the motive for a war, and rarely has a statement of such pure jingoism smothered in moralistic wrappings been penned in all sincerity.

9 "The indictment that brands Roosevelt as a jingoist is supported by ample evidence. In 1886, elated by headlines predicting trouble with Mexico, he had offered to organize his Medora ranch hands into a cavalry battalion.... That same year at a Fourth of July celebration in the West, he said that he hoped 'to see the day when not a foot of American soil will be held by any European power.' In 1892 he watched with eager interest the friction with Chile and approved the American demands that an indemnity be paid to soldiers in Valparaiso. Roosevelt reached the highest point of excitement that year when Great Britain declined to concede the rights of the United States in the Venezuela Boundary dispute." (Pringle, *op. cit.*, p. 167)


11 Later in the year, " when he was denounced by President Eliot of Harvard as a jingoist, he struck back at the 'futile sentimentalists of the international arbitration type' who would bring about a flabby, timid type of character which
Roosevelt, along with many other adventurous spirits craving action and excitement, believed that the United States should have the opportunity to exercise her armed virtue. Thus once the bugles had sounded, Roosevelt quickly resigned his position in the Navy department in order to be 'in on the kill.' Together with an army physician, Leonard Wood, he organized a cavalry unit, the famous Rough Riders, and after a brief period of training the regiment sailed for the war in Cuba.

The war in Cuba was short, and American military successes on land were on a minor scale out of proportion to their effect. Roosevelt took part in several skirmishes, the most famous being the frontal assault on the Spanish positions atop San Juan Hill. "That Roosevelt was both brave and reckless is beyond question," and within a short time his popularity in the armed forces and at home reached hero-like proportions.

When he returned home, Roosevelt was willingly drafted by the New York state Republican party to run for the governorship. His popularity as a military hero together with his

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12 Pringle, op. cit., p. 195.

13 Roosevelt's campaign was rapid and dramatic. Using government, patriotism and Americanism as his chief campaign themes to swamp the Democrats' accusations of Republican corruption, he swung through the state making speeches whenever and wherever possible. He waved the flag mightily, was escorted by six Rough Riders wherever he went, and at the towns the people were summoned to hear him speak from the railroad platform by a bugler sounding the Charge! Nevertheless, his majority was not large. Republican corruption had been widespread.
clean political record were great assets, and he was elected to office in November, 1898. He soon proved his ability to fill the office and to handle its responsibilities, and again showed his disregard for the sensibilities of the state's political 'bosses'.

Roosevelt's interest in foreign affairs was increased by the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States. He believed that since these islands had, in a sense, fallen into the lap of the United States, anyone who proposed handing them back to Spain was a fool, a mountebank, and un-American. His reasons why the United States should retain the Philippines were expressed in a speech he made in September, 1899. He declared:

In every case the expansion of a nation has taken place because the race was a great race. It was a sign and proof of greatness in the expanding nation, and moreover bear in mind that in each instance it was of incalculable benefit to mankind.... When great nations fear to expand, shrink from expansion, it is because their greatness is coming to an end. Are we still in the prime of our lusty youth, still at the beginning of our glorious manhood, to sit down among the outworn people, to take place with the weak and the craven? A thousand times no!

While Governor of New York, Roosevelt worked diligently for the public good and in so doing succeeded in cramping the political power of men such as Senator Platt and others. He was so politically unmanageable that in 1900, when the Republicans met in a national convention to select the candidates for the coming elections, Platt and other politicos

14 Hofstader, op. cit., p. 209.
made every effort to have Roosevelt nominated as the vice-presidential candidate and so get him out of New York politics. Although he held back at first, the enthusiasm Roosevelt's nomination generated in the West plus his loyalty to the Republican party resulted in his acceptance and consequent election. Together with McKinley as President, Roosevelt was sworn into office in March, 1901, and resigned himself to a back seat in national politics.

Six months later President McKinley was assassinated. On September 14, 1901, while not yet quite 43 years of age, Theodore Roosevelt became the youngest President of the United States to take the oath of office.

Many historians hold the opinion that the chief business McKinley left behind for Roosevelt to deal with concerned imperialism. This is not quite true. Rather it was the results of imperialism, or at least, the shaping of the nation's course as a Great Power. The majority of the problems caused by the Spanish-American war relating to the acquisition of lands not contiguous to the American continent had been solved before Roosevelt became president. Although the United States

15 Roosevelt was aware of the fact that the promotion of his candidacy to the vice-presidential chair by Platt, Quay and others was not out of affection. The office of Vice-President was traditionally one which led to obscurity, and as such, Roosevelt had little desire to "take the veil", as he termed it. Lodge urged him to accept, and in the end his persuasion won.
had gone to war with the sole purpose of obtaining Cuba's freedom, it had emerged from the conflict with Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines, together with the guardianship over Cuba until its inhabitants were ready to govern themselves.

Thus the great American intoxication of imperialism was essentially the product of the McKinley era, despite the fact that McKinley himself was one of the least imperialistically minded Republicans. And although Roosevelt supported and took part in the American imperialist experiment, yet his own era as president was no more an era of empire than was the administration of Jefferson or of Monroe.

The immediate problems of the Spanish-American war Roosevelt handled as McKinley would have done. The island possessions the United States had gained Roosevelt retained. The fighting in the Philippines Roosevelt supported to its logical end; and after native opposition had been ended, Roosevelt carried on the long, slow process of educating the Philippines for self-government as McKinley had proposed a few years before. Cuba was given its 'independence', and such restrictions as existed under the Platt Amendment to absolute sovereignty also were products of the McKinley administration.

Nonetheless, Roosevelt rejoiced in American imperialism.

16 "To its honor, the Roosevelt Administration resisted all pressure calling for repudiation of the agreement to grant independence to Cuba." (Pringle, op. cit., p. 297.) In 1898 the United States also annexed Hawaii, and the Island of Tutuila in the Samoan islands, with its excellent coaling station and naval base of Pago-Pago, was secured as a result of a British-German-American agreement.
To him

imperialism meant national strength, the acknowledgement by the American people that the United States are a world power and that they would not shrink from taking up any burden which that distinction involved.

The burden, in Roosevelt's mind, revolved around two main issues in foreign policy. First was his determination that in the Western Hemisphere the United States, as the dominant power, must have the final say in the relations of Europe and Asia with that hemisphere. In this respect he clung to the Monroe Doctrine which he interpreted as "a declaration that there must be no territorial expansion by any non-American power at the expense of an American power on American soil." Second was Roosevelt's determination that his nation should receive the recognition of the other Great Powers as a nation to be highly respected in the international diplomatic scene. He was conscious of the prestige gained by the United States due to the Spanish-American war, and realized that one way to overcome the past indifference towards the United States by the Great Powers was by projecting American influence and power so as to focus attention on the nation's new status.

In thus shouldering the burden which greatness brought,


18 This message was delivered on December 3, 1901. The way in which Roosevelt's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine changed will be apparent in later chapters. James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Washington, Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1910., vol. IX, p. 86662.
Roosevelt followed a path of aggressive nationalism in affairs concerning the Western Hemisphere, and entered with zeal the diplomatic relations the United States conducted abroad. As a nationalist, his fundamental anxiety was for the security and honor of his country. And, "believing that country to be honest, he thought it good for this world that it should be strong." The first line of defence of the nation rested on the navy, Roosevelt's "big stick", for as he said in his first message to Congress:

The Navy offers us the only means of making our insistence upon the Monroe Doctrine anything but a subject of derision to whatever nation chooses to disregard it. We desire the peace as of right to the just man armed....

Roosevelt's concept of justice in foreign affairs was colored by his patriotism. Deeply impressed with the righteousness of his own beliefs and the high principles for which his nation stood, he found the conduct of foreign affairs essentially simple.

Right was right, and the United States defined and enforced the rules of the international game. Arbitration of disputes was laudable, except when America was a party to the issue. Peace was secondary to honor, and America defined honor. The Monroe Doctrine was the cornerstone of American diplomacy or belligerency; and before President Roosevelt had concluded his interpretations it had been changed almost beyond recognition.

19 Charnewood, op. cit., p. 125.
20 Richardson, op. cit., p. 6664
21 Pringle, op. cit., p. 280.
It was with the background of the 'just man armed' that President Roosevelt interpreted and fashioned the foreign policy of the United States during his term of office. It is to the first of the major incidents in foreign affairs with which he had to deal that one must now turn to examine how 'armed justice' operated.
Chapter II

Roosevelt--

'Policeman of the Caribbean'
From 1823 onward one of the cardinal principles of American foreign policy has been the insistence that the European Powers should respect the Monroe Doctrine. In a passive sense, the Doctrine might be construed as "America for the Americans." Interference by European nations in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere were looked upon with grave suspicion. Interference in the form of territorial aggrandizement or colonization by European powers was regarded as a breach of the Doctrine's principles, and appropriate action by the United States' government was usually swift and effective. At the turn of the century, there was no area in the Western Hemisphere where the American government held the Monroe Doctrine in greater value than in the area of the Caribbean Sea. Here were fought the major battles of the Spanish-American war, and with victory, the United States tended to look upon the Caribbean scene with an increasingly paternalistic eye. But of greater importance, here lay the approaches to the proposed Isthmian canal whose construction and control the United States felt vital to its national security.

As might well be expected, President Roosevelt was greatly concerned with the relations of the Caribbean states not only with the United States, but with the European powers as well. Roosevelt had good reason for his concern, for not only were the Caribbean states subject to frequent revolutions, but they were also generally irresponsible in the matter of foreign debts. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the non-payment of debts by a weak state to a strong
state had been the excuse for armed intervention by the latter on many occasions. Moreover, in keeping with the imperialist spirit of the age, such armed intervention usually resulted in the occupation of the weaker debtor state to a degree and length whereby that state became either a protectorate or colony. In other words, weakness, instability and debt were three common invitations to imperialism as practiced by the European Great Powers. Between European imperialist theory and its practice in the Caribbean area stood Roosevelt, his 'big stick' and the Monroe Doctrine. It is with the interplay of these factors, plus the evolution of the so-called Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, that this chapter will deal.

One of the first problems confronting President Roosevelt in the Caribbean area was the Venezuela crisis of 1901--2.

The opening of the twentieth century found Venezuela in a distressed and bankrupt condition. For several years the state had been rent by faction and turmoil, and was groaning under the dictatorship of Cipriano Castro. Between 1898 and 1902, a bloody civil war was being waged, with the consequent result of great damage and destruction of both domestic and foreign owned property. Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and numerous other nations, had important interests in Venezuela. These interests were in the form of loans, private property, railways and capital investments totalling many millions of dollars. During the civil disturbances, the persons and property of foreign residents had suffered severely, but demands for compensation were ignored. In time, payment on
the external debt of Venezuela was stopped, and the Castro government continually "winked at the wide-spread violation of contractual agreements." In February, 1901, matters were aggravated when Venezuelan authorities seized four British ships near Trinidad. Indeed, throughout the entire year a series of such incidents together with fresh indignities to European nationals in Venezuela caused mounting anger and frequent strong protests by the European nations involved.

In the summer of 1901, Germany proposed a scheme for the arbitration of her claims against Venezuela which Castro refused to consider. During the latter part of 1901 and early in 1902, Great Britain sent special representatives to Caracas, the Venezuelan capital, to eliminate the friction over damage done to British ships by Venezuelan gunboats. These representations were also spurned by Castro.

It became evident to both Germany and Great Britain that there was little if anything to be gained through using the normal diplomatic channels. Since satisfaction could not be obtained by peaceful methods, the only course left open was to use coercion. The difficulty here, however, was the attitude the United States might take towards armed intervention by European nations in the United States sphere of influence.

On December 11, 1901, the German Ambassador in Washington stated the problem Germany faced in regard to Venezuela in a

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note to Secretary of State John Hay. In this note he mentioned that if Germany were unable to obtain satisfaction from Venezuela over the money owed her, Germany "would have to consider the temporary occupation on [Germany's] part of different Venezuelan harbor places and the levying of duties in those places." To assure the American government of Germany's good intention, the German Ambassador hastened to add that "we declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezueulan territory."

Secretary Hay replied to the German note a few days later. In this reply Hay quoted from President Roosevelt's message to Congress of a few days before, wherein Roosevelt had said:

The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of the Americas, as it is of the United States....

The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil.

We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of acquisition of territory by any non-American power.


3 Ibid., p. 195.

4 Ibid., pp XXXVI--XXXVII
There was nothing in Hay's reply which suggested the United States would move to block the proposed move by Germany. In fact there were indications that the American government would regard Venezuela's 'chastizement' with mild favor.

Germany took no action in the first months of 1902 for several reasons. One was the Kaiser's desire that no move be made in the matter until after the visit of his brother, Prince Henry, to the United States. Nothing was to mar this good-will tour designed to cement German-American friendship which had been strained in the Spanish-American war. Another reason was the growing possibility of the co-operation of Great Britain in forcing Castro's government to attend its obligations. In the winter of 1901-02 the British Under-Secretary of State, Villiers, did bring up the possibility of joint action with the German Ambassador in London. On July 23, 1902, formal talks were held on the matter, and during the following months discussions between Great Britain and Germany took place as to the nature and extent of the course to be taken. Italy also suggested that she be a partner in this joint enterprise. The Italian offer was not warmly received at first, but by the end of November, her participation was agreed upon by Germany and Great Britain. By the end of November, 1902, the course of action had been decided upon, and the participants were ready to carry out their plan.

5 The reasons behind Britain's collaboration with Germany are not fully known. The American charge in London, Henry Whit, wrote Hay shortly thereafter: "I cannot imagine,... and have not succeeded in ascertaining, what ever possessed this govern-
In the meantime steady efforts were made by both Germany and Great Britain to keep informed of American public and governmental opinion regarding their proposed action. American opinion during 1902 appeared to be favorable on the whole, so much so that on July 10 "von Quadt, the German Charge, cabled that to one who enjoyed his confidence the President had said that he would be glad if such unruly republics as Venezuela were taught a lesson..." Similar reassurances followed, so that by the end of November, the German government enjoyed a "profound confidence... in the attitude of the American government..." The same confidence was felt in British governmental circles, while Italy felt secure in the company of her partners. On December 7, 1902, the British and German representatives at Caracas separately presented their ultimata to the Venezuelan government demanding satisfaction for the various charges mentioned above. Having received no reply...
within the stipulated 24 hours, both representatives withdrew from the country.

Two days later British and German naval vessels seized all Venezuelan ships within their compass, both on the high seas and in Venezuelan waters. Four of the number seized were gunboats of the Venezuelan navy, two others of this class being sunk by German naval fire despite their unresisting surrender. On December 10, a British armed force landed at Le Guaya to facilitate the embarkation of British subjects at that port. Three days after this landing, a German and a British cruiser together shelled the port of Puerto Cabello, and temporarily landed an armed force there in retaliation for the ill treatment to a British ship then berthed in the port. A week after this incident, Germany, Great Britain and Italy together gave formal notification of the blockade "of the [Venezuelan] ports of La Guaya, Carenero, Guanta, Cumana, Carupano and the mouths of the Orinoco...."

The series of events ranging from the blockading to the bombardment of Venezuelan ports during the second week in December caused a sharp reaction in Venezuela and an increasing agitation of opinion in the American press. The bombardment of La Guaya was especially frightening to Castro, who immediately "scrambled to offer the arbitration he had once

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9 Italy presented her demand for the payment of various claims on December 11, 1902, and receiving no satisfactory reply, withdrew her minister on December 16.

spurned." This offer was made through the American Secretary of State, and was presented to both the German and British Foreign Ministers on December 13, 1902.

In the meantime, both Great Britain and Germany were becoming more apprehensive over the hostile tone of the American press which, as a whole, condemned the measures employed by the blockading powers. During this period, Roosevelt and Hay continued to refrain from expressing any positive opinion on the actions taken by the European powers involved in the matter. Certain steps had been taken, with Roosevelt's approval, to ensure American interests in the Caribbean. For example in October, 1902,

the Navy Department, conscious of the possibility of intervention, had added to the Caribbean squadron of Admiral Coghlan three other squadrons, and put them under the supreme command of Admiral Dewey, with the announcement that they would be there for winter manoeuvres.

If Roosevelt was saying nothing, it was very obvious that the presence of the American fleet so close at hand warned the blockading powers that his opinions regarding the Monroe Doctrine needed little amplification.

Along with the hostile American press, a large section of British public opinion was critical of British action in the Venezuela affair. In Great Britain, criticism was levelled

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12 Perkins, op. cit., p. 335.
not only against a possible rupture with the United States, but also against British co-operation with Germany. Two days after the formal announcement of a blockade by Great Britain, a poem by Kipling in the London Times summed up what a great many people were thinking. It read in part:

Last night ye wrote our voyage was done
But seaward still we go;
And ye tell us now of a secret vow
Ye have made with an open foe!
That we must lie off a lightless coast
And haul and back and veer,
At the will of the breed that have wronged us most
For a year and a year and a year.
The dead they mocked are scarcely cold,
Our wounds are bleeding yet,
And yet ye tell us not that our strength is sold
To help them press for a debt!  

Germany, too, was becoming very apprehensive over American public opinion, which was especially invective on the occasion when German naval fire sunk two Venezuelan gunboats after they had surrendered. Moreover Germany wished to avoid any damage, to Britain's profit, in its relations with the United States.

Consequently, within a few days after receiving Castro's offer to arbitrate the dispute, both Great Britain and Germany accepted in principle the idea of arbitration. In the note on this subject, Lord Lansdowne added that "it would be extremely

agreeable to His Majesty's Government if the President of the United States would consent to act as Arbitrator." In the meantime, the 'blockade' was to continue until a more definite settlement had been reached.

The role of arbitrator held great appeal for President Roosevelt. Indeed the entire negotiations pleased him in one respect since they indicated the growing recognition of the United States as a Great Power. This was the first intervention of which the United States received advance notice, and for which European powers sought its acquiescence. Furthermore, it was the first intervention in which European powers were ready to accept the President of the United States as the arbiter of their grievances. Despite Roosevelt's willingness to mediate between the contending parties, it was thought that it would be more diplomatic to refer the case to the Hague Tribunal. This suggestion was acceptable to the European nations involved, and on February 14, 1903, the blockade of Venezuela was lifted.

During the Venezuela controversy, the usually bellicose Roosevelt remained comparatively quiescent in his attitude towards the measures taken by the European powers against Venezuela. With the advantage of hindsight, many historians have found the mildness of his actions and letters relating to this crisis quite surprising. Be this as it may, throughout the entire period Roosevelt, if he 'spoke quietly', neverthe-

14 State Papers, 1901--02, p. 1123.
15 See Appendix.
less had the advantage of having his 'big stick' close at hand in the form of the American Caribbean fleet. Should the blockading powers have refused to accept the strong recommendation for arbitration by Secretary Hay, or should negotiations have broken down at any time, there is little doubt but that Roosevelt would have used the navy to force them to accept it. However, as we have seen, Great Britain and Germany were quick to accept arbitration offered by Venezuela through an American representative, and this acceptance had been agreed upon even before Secretary Hay sent his 'strong recommendation' that they do so. If the European powers had meant the Venezuela crisis to act as a test of the firmness of the Monroe Doctrine, they could scarcely fail to see that under the Roosevelt Administration the Doctrine was to remain a cornerstone of American foreign policy. But though in the Venezuelan matter

16 On December 18, 1902. Although the note was sent under Hay's signature, the guiding hand was Roosevelt's, for "in the Venezuela controversy... Roosevelt was acting as his own Secretary of State." (Pringle, op. cit., p. 293.)

17 The Hague Tribunal finally decreed that Venezuela should "... set apart a certain percentage of the customs receipts of two of her ports to be applied to the payment of whatever obligations might be ascertained by mixed commissions appointed for that purpose to be due from her, not only to the three powers... whose proceedings against her had resulted in a state of war, but also to the United States, France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway, and Mexico, who had not employed force for the collection of the claims alleged to be due to certain of their citizens." (President Roosevelt in his third annual message to Congress, in United States, Bureau of National Literature and Art, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Washington, Published by the Bureau, 1910, vol. IX, p. 6868.)
Robert Roosevelt was willing and even desirous that the dispute should be settled by an 'international court, in the case of Santo Domingo the American President was to settle the dispute himself.

Santo Domingo was another of those small Caribbean states which had been torn by civil strife and burdened by corrupt government during the latter part of the 19th century. Between 1888 and 1898, Santo Domingo's bonded external debt rose from approximately $4,000,000 to $19,000,000 owing in part to the lavish spending of her successive dictators as well as to the high interest and financial scheming of the European creditors. To provide for the service of the various large loans made in this decade the interested European bankers "organized a collection agency called the 'regie' which was given the right to administer and control the customs." This effort to solve Santo Domingo's financial difficulties failed. As a result, a small group of interested Americans took over the 'regie' from the bankers, and formed the Santo Domingo Improvement Company. Briefly, this company was to act as a sort of financial agent for Santo Domingo. Among other things, it was to secure foreign loans for the state if necessary, and also it was given control of the customs of certain ports, the revenues to be used towards reducing the Dominican debt.

Despite the 'assistance' of this American firm, conditions in Santo Domingo went from bad to worse. Further loans were

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made to Santo Domingo, and the company floated successive bond issues in Europe as stop-gap measures. However, the customs receipts of Santo Domingo were insufficient to meet the interest on all the various loans made. It was not unusual to have the same revenues and customs pledged several times over in an attempt to satisfy the creditors. In addition chaotic conditions, recklessness and a flagrant disregard for the public welfare by the dictator-presidency of Heureaux was pushing the country towards a revolt. The tyranny and corruption of the Heureaux regime ended in a civil war. Yet with the inauguration of the new President, Jimenez, greater pressure was brought to bear on Santo Domingo by foreign governments for the payment of debts owed their nationals.

By 1902, the finances of Santo Domingo were in a state of almost helpless confusion. Moreover there was rising indignation at the policy of the Santo Domingo Improvement Company by the Dominican public, especially at its extravagant claims for compensation for the meager services it had rendered. So hostile was the opinion that President Jimenez issued a decree cancelling the concessions of the company and excluding the company's agents from the custom-houses. While new schemes were being tried to pay off the external debt by Jimenez, the Santo Domingo Improvement Company appealed to the United States' Department of State for assistance. According to the company's figures the Dominican government owed it some $11,000,000 for bonds it held. The American State Department counselled private settlement, but shortly thereafter a new
president was 'elected' in Santo Domingo. The new president, Vasquez, offered to recognize a Dominican debt of $4,500,000 to the company. Thus on January 31, 1903, "a protocol was signed whereby the Dominican Government was to pay over to the United States' Government, for the San Domingo Improvement Company, the sum of $4,500,000 in American gold." In exchange for this sum, the company was to relinquish all its rights, properties and claims to the Dominican government.

The payment of the $4,500,000 to the Improvement Company was worked out by a board of arbitrators appointed jointly by the American and Dominican governments. This board decided on a monthly payment to be made the company, with the customs revenue of three Dominican ports to be designated as specific security. In case of non-payment, the Vice-President of the Improvement Company, who had been appointed Financial Agent, was to take over the revenue of the ports.

The conditions in Santo Domingo continued to deteriorate. Almost three quarters of the total national revenue was being devoted by the president in power to combat insurrectionists. The double pledging of custom house revenues, the nepotism of the government and other corruption, the waste and graft of public officials—all this resulted in Santo Domingo approaching a state of complete bankruptcy towards the end of 1904.

Payments to foreign creditors and to the Improvement Company had fallen into default as a result of the financial

crisis. Under the terms of the agreement with the company, the Financial Agent appointed by the board of arbitrators began to take over the customs revenues of several ports, starting with the port of Puerto Plata in October, 1904. This arrangement was greatly admired by the Dominican Republic's European creditors, and there was a rising tide of demands made by the French, Italian, German and other governments to secure payment of their debts which by this time totalled close to $30,000,000. In December, 1904, the French representative in Santo Domingo, on behalf of his own and the Belgian government, threatened to seize the customhouse of Santo Domingo City, the mainstay of the Dominican government's revenue. Italy, too, pressed her claims with equal vigor, and an Italian cruiser sent to Dominican waters attested her impatience.

We must now consider the crisis in Santo Domingo from the American viewpoint, and in so doing give special consideration to the opinions held by President Roosevelt.

Before the Santo Domingo problem had reached a stage of crisis late in 1904, the United States had signed a treaty with the new Republic of Panama whereby the American government was permitted to construct, control and fortify a canal across the isthmus of Panama. This canal was believed vital to the security and economic betterment of the United States. It followed, therefore, that the approaches to the proposed canal were of equal importance to the nation, and that great concern was warranted for the Latin-American states in the Caribbean area. Roosevelt had seen the extent to which European powers
would go in collecting debts owed their subjects in the Venezuelan crisis some months previously. Mutual jealousy together with the increasingly unfriendly attitude of the American press had resulted in the powers submitting their dispute to arbitration. This course had been strongly favored by Roosevelt, but he was coming more and more to believe that the United States alone should be the sole arbiter of disputes in the area covered by the Monroe Doctrine.

Roosevelt was not alone in this opinion by any means, for it was clear "that the American public was becoming increasingly hostile to the acts of coercion by European nations in the New World...." At the same time, the methods employed by Roosevelt to secure the right to build an Isthmian canal had increased the hostility of various Latin-American countries towards the 'Colossus of the North'. Although such hostility did not penetrate Roosevelt's armour of righteousness very deeply, it was sufficiently aggravating to make him stop and consider before entering upon a course of action which might further irritate the Latin-American states.

In February, 1904, there occurred an event which sharpened Roosevelt's apprehension over further European interference in American affairs. On February 22, the Hague Tribunal rendered its decision on an aspect of the Venezuelan crisis. Germany, Great Britain and Italy had contended that their claims should receive primary consideration as they had been the blockading

powers. The Tribunal had decided in their favor, that is, that the powers which had resorted to force to secure justice should have a prior right to payment. In international law, this decision placed a premium upon forceful intervention against a delinquent state. The implication of the Tribunal's decision was not lost on the creditor nations, nor was it on Roosevelt. Direct interference was still far from the President's mind, however, although he undoubtedly felt that the Dominican Republic would benefit by the United States stepping in. Yet early in 1904, when the Dominican Minister of Foreign Affairs "visited Washington and besought the help of the United States Government to enable the republic to escape financial and social disorders... [the] request was... declined."

As the year 1904 wore on, President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State felt a greater concern for the position of the Dominican Republic. As the financial stability and internal order weakened, the pressure on Santo Domingo by the European creditor nations remained steady, and in some cases increased. For example in April, 1904, the United States'...

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21 J. B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920, Vol. I, p. 430. Roosevelt wrote to his biographer in the same month, and made an interesting—and I believe true—statement in regard to charges that he wanted to annex the island. He wrote: "I have been hoping and praying for three months that the Santo Domingans would behave so that I would not have to act in any way. I want to do nothing but what a policeman has to do in Santo Domingo. As for annexing the island, I have about the same desire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor might have to swallow a procupine wrong-end-to." (Ibid., p. 431.)
Minister in Santo Domingo reported "that Italy was about to intervene with naval forces to secure the rights of Italian nationals, fixed by a protocol of 1903. "'I understand,' he said 'that the action of the Italian Government is based upon the recent decision at the Hague."

Despite the threats of intervention and occupation by some of the European powers, they took no measures which demanded immediate counter-action on the part of the United States. The Monroe Doctrine, as interpreted by Roosevelt at the time, had not been violated. However, since the President wholeheartedly agreed with the principle that a debtor nation should not be permitted to default on its debt, it was quite evident that he would have to act. His passion for righteousness rebelled at using 'the big stick' in order that a wasteful and disorderly government should defy its creditors behind the protection of the American navy. On the other hand if European powers were permitted a foothold on Dominican soil, such action would not only be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but it might develop into a lodgement a la Egypt, and thus provide the base for naval operation within easy striking distance of the Panama canal site.

By the summer of 1904, President Roosevelt appeared to have reached a decision on the stand his country would take

23 Pringle, op. cit., p. 295.
not only in regard to the question of Santo Domingo, but regard­ing the entire problem of European interference in the affairs of the Latin-American states. He had frequently been asked why he did not step forward and settle the Dominican problem by unilateral action. Although Roosevelt wished to avoid this, it became clear to him that the American government could not much longer avoid taking some sort of action. As he wrote in a letter to a friend, "if we [Americans] intend to say 'hands off' to the powers of Europe, sooner or later we must keep order ourselves."

The idea of the United States acting as a 'Policeman of the Caribbean' appealed to Roosevelt, and he elaborated it in a letter to Elihu Root, his Secretary of War. In this letter, which Roosevelt suggested should be read aloud at a small dinner party, the President stressed that it was the sole desire of the United States

... to see all neighboring countries stable, orderly and prosperous.... Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendliness. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, then it need fear no interference from the United States. Brutal wrong doing, or an impotence—which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may finally require intervention by

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24 "There have been five occasions on which the United States has not insisted upon the Monroe Doctrine. In each case a European power extended its control over American territory.... The British in Nicaragua, Honduras, and the Falkland Islands; the French in Mexico; the Spanish in Santo Domingo." (C. L. Jones, H. K. Norton and F. T. Moon, The United States and the Caribbean, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929, p. 90.)
some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere, the United States cannot ignore this duty.

The idea expressed in this letter to Root became the core of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. As Santo Domingo approached bankruptcy towards the end of the year, President Roosevelt decided to make a formal announcement of this policy in his annual message to Congress on December 6, 1904. His announcement of the United States' policy towards other nations of the Western Hemisphere was a paraphrase of his letter to Secretary Root. In part it read:

It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save as such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count on our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

Although Santo Domingo was the immediate cause of Roosevelt's warping of the Monroe Doctrine, it should not be overlooked that his corollary applied to all states in Latin

25 Pringle, op. cit., p. 294. This was a 'trial balloon' on Roosevelt's part.

26 U. S., Foreign Relations, 1904, p. XLI
America just as it applied to the powers of Europe. Under the circumstances, it was a realistic move on the President's part, and very much in keeping with the views he held of the United States' position in the Western Hemisphere. If there was to be any intervention, the United States would shoulder the burden. According to Roosevelt this would automatically insure the inefficient state against unfair treatment, permanent occupation, exploitation, or the assimilation into an empire. Moreover, it would be the best guard against further excuses by European powers to trespass in the Americas. That the state undergoing intervention would benefit from closer contact with the United States, and that it would welcome a strong hand to keep order and guide it into the path of the American 'way-of-life,' there could be little doubt. Roosevelt's nationalism in this respect permeated every sentence of his various statements on the matter. To be fair, one should note that his latent imperialism, both in his later declarations

27 The Roosevelt Corollary was quite welcome to most European nations. The Kaiser thought it high-handed, but British politicians thoroughly approved it. Early in 1903, Prime Minister Balfour had spoken of the attitude the British would take. Speaking at Liverpool he had said: "We welcome ... any increase of the influence of the United States of America in the Western Hemisphere. We desire no colonization, we desire no alteration in the balance of power, we desire no acquisition of territory. We have not the slightest intention of interfering with the mode of government in any portion of that continent." (Quoted in Dexter Perkins, Hands Off! A History of the Monroe Doctrine, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1941, p. 224.) The smaller countries of Europe generally looked upon Roosevelt's new plan as a means whereby they could collect their debts with less difficulty and with greater surity than in former years.
and actions, never caused him to vary from the stand he took at this time. Roosevelt's egotism may often have been overpowering, but he was not the type of man to employ subterfuge as a cloak for annexing territory.

In Santo Domingo, a crisis had been reached in December, 1904. The government was financially bankrupt. Internal disorder threatened to degenerate into anarchy. President Roosevelt had made his position clear, and now he was determined to act. On December 30, 1904, Secretary Hay sent a telegram to the American Minister in Santo Domingo, T. C. Dawson, which read in part:

Confidential. You will sound the President of Santo Domingo, discreetly but earnestly... touching the disquieting situation which is developing owing to the pressure of other governments.... Already one European Government strongly intimates that it may resort to occupation of some Dominican customs ports to secure its own payment. There appears to be a concert among them. You will ascertain whether the Government of Santo Domingo would be disposed to request the United States to take charge of the collection of duties and effect an equitable distribution of the assigned quotas among the Dominican Government and the several claimants. 28

Three days later, Dawson was able to send President Morales' formal request that the United States take charge of all collections of Dominican customs. Commander Dillingham of the United States Navy was immediately dispatched to confer with Morales on the organization of the proposed customs administration. Talks on the matter were carried on with a spirit of mutual friendliness. Public reaction was such that Commander

Dillingham was able to telegraph Washington on January 21:
the "Most people seem to appreciate/generous attitude of the
Government of the United States." Nevertheless, for those
who were displeased with the United States' "generous at-
titude", the presence of American naval craft in Dominican
waters proved deterrent enough to discourage the resumption
of armed raids on customs-houses.

The agreement was signed on January 21, 1905. Briefly, it
called for the United States' government to constitute it-
self before the Dominican government their creditor "for the
total amount of the various foreign debts and the domestic
under contract." In return, and in conjunction with the
Dominican government, the United States was to share the con-
trol of all Dominical custom-houses. Furthermore, a financial
agent was to be appointed by the United States to act as
superintendent of the customs administration. Forty-five
percent of the total revenues collected was to go to pay the
administrative budget of Santo Domingo, while fifty-five per-
cent, excluding administrative expenses, was to be set aside
to pay off the debts, both foreign and domestic. There was to
be no compensation for the United States in the agreement--no

30 Ibid., p. 310.
commercial privileges were asked, the American debtors were to be paid on the same basis as other debtors, and there was no suggestion that American troops should occupy even temporarily any part of the Dominican Republic. Within the agreement itself were the assuring words that the United States guaranteed "the complete integrity of the territory of the Dominican Republic...."

At the request of the American Department of State, a few minor changes were made in the agreement, and it was then drawn up in the form of a protocol for presentation to the American Senate. The protocol was signed on February 7, 1905, by the Dominican Government, and then rushed to Washington where the American Congress was nearing the end of its regular session.

On February 15, President Roosevelt submitted the protocol to the American Senate for ratification. In his message to the Senate, Roosevelt stressed the fact that there was no desire whatever on the part of the United States to annex any part of the Dominican Republic, nor did the government desire to exercise any control other than that necessary to Santo Domingo's financial rehabilitation. In defense of his action Roosevelt stated:


32 There was every need for haste on the Dominican side also, for that Republic's treasury was empty. Until Roosevelt used his executive power in March, a private banker financed the Dominican government!
The justification for the United States taking this burden and incurring this responsibility is to be found in the fact that it is incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors and yet to refuse, itself, to take any such steps. 33

The President went on to say that "an aggrieved nation" could take what action it saw fit in the adjustment of disputes with American states without interfering with the Monroe Doctrine providing that nation did not "despoil" or occupy the territory of the debtor state. But when the question was one of a money claim,

... the only way which remains, finally, to collect it is a blockade, or bombardment, or the seizure of the customs houses, and this means what is in effect a possession, even though only a temporary possession, of territory. The United States then becomes a party in interest, because under the Monroe Doctrine it can not see any European power seize and permanently occupy the territory of one of these republics; and yet such seizure of territory, disguised or undisguised, may eventually offer the only way in which the power in question can collect any debts, unless there is interference on the part of the United States. 34

Despite Roosevelt's plea for quick ratification, the Senate adjourned in March without giving its consent to the protocol. Although ratification failed by a slim margin, it

34 Ibid., pp. 334–35. In this long message to the Senate, President Roosevelt indirectly points out the necessity of having American naval ships in Dominican waters. The custom-houses had "become the nuclei of the various revolutions. The first effect of revolutionists is to take possession of a custom-house so as to obtain funds...." (Ibid., pp. 339–40.) The terrain of Santo Dominica was such that it was frequently faster to proceed by sea from one port to another rather than use the poor overland routes.
was indicative of the increasing determination by the Senate that its prerogatives should not be in the least impaired by the impetuosity of the President. Above all, the Senate did not want to be regarded as a 'rubber stamp' to Roosevelt's foreign policy.

When the Senate adjourned on March 18 without ratifying the protocol, the effect on Dominican public opinion and on the European creditor nations was immediate. The American Minister in Santo Domingo wired that the tension there was great. The revolutionists were encouraged and "conspiracies and preparations" was rumored. On hearing the news from Washington, Italy and Belgium made further demands on the Dominican government for immediate payment of their debts.

Roosevelt was more disgusted than dismayed when informed of the Senate's refusal to ratify the protocol. He was, at this time, at the height of his power. Four more years of office stretched before him, and he saw in the great vote that swept him back into the presidential chair the public's approval of his actions. Determined not to be frustrated in his designs for settling the Dominican crisis, he welcomed any plan that might serve to circumvent the Senate's stubbornness. At the instigation of Minister Dawson, President Morales suggested to Roosevelt that some modus vivendi might be employed to tide the Dominican Republic over its period of acute crisis.

35 An Italian warship arrived in Havana on March 14th, which accentuated the urgency of arriving at some settlement.
This was most acceptable to Roosevelt since the suggestion followed the general terms of the protocol yet provided a more or less legal loophole enabling him to act. Stretching the conception of his constitutional power to the limit, President Roosevelt ordered Dawson to conclude all the necessary arrangements leading towards the establishment of a modus vivendi with the understanding, of course, that the arrangement would terminate as soon as the Senate had acted in "one way or another". Two weeks after the American Senate had adjourned, the modus vivendi was put into effect by the executive approval of Roosevelt and the executive decree of Morales.

Roosevelt now became in truth the 'Policeman of the Caribbean,' despite the fact that he had to pin his barge of office on his own chest. It was a position which he did not altogether enjoy, but rather one which he felt necessary to accept if the United States was to avoid future troubles similar to those in Venezuela. He gave an honest opinion of his position to John Hay shortly after the modus vivendi went into operation. In part he wrote:

In Santo Domingo we have taken the necessary step; but it was one of those cases where trouble was sure to come,

36 In his autobiography, Roosevelt wrote: "The Constitution did not explicitly give me power to bring about the necessary agreement with Santo Domingo. But the Constitution did not forbid my doing what I did. I put the agreement into effect... and I would have continued it until the end of my term, if necessary, without any action by Congress." (Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920, p. 510.) Roosevelt, like John Hay, frequently found the Senate embarrassingly slow to appreciate the righteousness of his plans and actions.
Whether from action or inaction. I felt that much less trouble would come from action....

Roosevelt's assumption that action would cause less trouble was in many ways correct. From the time the *modus vivendi* went into operation on April 1, 1905, the effects were favorable. "The creditors ceased their pressure, confidence returned, interior trade revived, smuggling was diminished, exports and imports increased, and the receipts covered budget appropriations." Within the Dominican Republic itself there was not complete satisfaction with the course taken, although it was generally agreed that the government had chosen the lesser of the two evils presented. However, the periodic revolutions that had prevented domestic order and stability for so many years were not permitted to destroy the arrangement

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37 A. L. P. Dennis, *Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896—1906*, New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1928, p. 277. At this time Hay was in Europe travelling for his health. He died shortly thereafter, and his position as Secretary of State was taken over by Elihu Root. Root was to use a much gentler hand in dealing with the Latin-American states. Indeed, one of his first moves was to go on a tour of the South American countries to try to regain the confidence and good-will of these states which had been shaken since the turn of the century.

38 Howland, *op. cit.*, p. 81. Under the terms of the *Modus Vivendi*, and with the agreement of the foreign creditors, the money collected towards paying off the debt was placed in the National City Bank of New York, with the understanding that it should remain there until after the Senate had ratified the pending treaty. After ratification, the accumulated money was to be paid to the creditors without favoritism.
entered into, and an era of comparative peace and quiet ensued.

At home, Roosevelt was called a dictator and a war-monger because of his heavy-handed treatment of the Dominican affair. It is true that there was a sense of dictatorship latent within him which "was warranted in his eyes by the merit of all he represented, the patriotism of his intention, and the provisional tenure of his power." Nevertheless, this sense of dictatorship was rarely expressed, and was represented more by the combination of egotism and nationalism coloring his character. This combination together with his frequent impetuous actions, led many to claim that had he the opportunity, Roosevelt would have become a dictator of the United States. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The charge of war-mongering levelled at Roosevelt came from the pacifists. In answer to this accusation, Roosevelt

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39 When signs of internal trouble appeared in the island late in 1905, Roosevelt sent an order (September 5) to the Secretary of the Navy, which read in part: "As to the Santo Domingo matter, tell Admiral Bradley to stop any revolutions. I intend to keep the island in statu quo until the Senate has had time to act on the treaty, and I shall treat any revolutionary movement as an effort to upset the modus vivendi. That this is ethically right I am dead sure, even though there may be some technical or red-tape difficulty." (Bishop, op. cit., p. 434.) Nevertheless, the government of President Morales was over-turned in the winter of 1905--06, being replaced by that of President Careces; "Throughout the disturbance the United States safe-guarded the custom-houses, but seems to have given neither assistance nor favor to either of the contending factions...." (H. C. Hill, Roosevelt and the Caribbean, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927, p. 166.)

replied:

I was immensely amused when at a professional peace meeting the other day, they... alluded to me as having made 'war' on Santo Domingo. The war I have made literally consists in having loaned them a collector of customs, at their request.... I feel like paraphrasing Patrick Henry: 'If this is 'war', make the most of it.'

Those who believed they saw in Roosevelt's action an example of European imperialism attempted to prove that the President had forced the hand of the Dominican government. To the extent that Santo Domingo was forced to turn for help to the United States rather than to Europe under the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, their charge is true. American diplomacy was also behind President Morales' 'earnest request' to Roosevelt that a *modus vivendi* be employed. In this latter respect, the *modus vivendi* had to appear to come from Santo Domingo so as to avoid the form of a protocol which would have to await the Senate's ratification before being legal. Roosevelt's forcing Morales to appeal to the United States came about as a result of the need for immediate action.

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41 Bishop, *op. cit.*, pp. 434--35. (Quoted from a speech made before the Harvard Union, February 13, 1907.) To whatever extent Roosevelt may be accused of jingoism, certainly the accusation is extremely weak in this instance. He held the 'Dagoes' in contempt for the most part, and certainly would not have considered a war against them as bringing honor and glory to American arms. Roosevelt's jingoism was in large part an over-compensation for the fear he felt over the United States' small defensive force relative to the military and naval strength of smaller European powers. To an extent, therefore, one may say that Roosevelt hoped to keep attention focused on the sound of the sabre he sometimes rattled, rather than on the size of the sabre rattled. As one writer puts it; "With [Roosevelt] national defence was a passion; it was, indeed, almost a religion." (Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 201)
That it was due to time alone Roosevelt took pains to point out in various messages to Congress. In one such message he said:

Again and again has the Dominican Government invoked on its own behalf the aid of the United States. It has repeatedly done so of recent years. In 1899 it sought to enter into treaty relations by which it would be placed under the protection of the United States Government. This request was refused. Again, in January, 1901, its minister of foreign affairs visited Washington and besought the help of the United States Government to enable it to escape from its financial and social disorders. Compliance with this request was again declined, for this government has been most reluctant to interfere in any way....

Once interference became necessary, however, Roosevelt's great belief in his own and his country's high motives led him to formulate a plan which would shape the Monroe Doctrine to modern needs. However indignant certain European nations might feel over the solution arrived at, the president's 'big stick'--the American navy--forced them to accept it with what grace they could muster. The Caribbean area was henceforth to be a desert area for the seeds of European imperialism.

For a period of approximately two years the modus


43 The President's opponents in the Senate denounced his action as unconstitutional, declaring that he was going against the express wishes of the Senate, and charged him with trying to establish a protectorate over Santo Domingo. The Senate, after some few amendments and modifications, all favoring Santo Domingo, approved the treaty on February 25, 1907. It is interesting to note that the J. P. Morgan banking company, when approached by Secretary of State Root regarding a $20,000,000 loan to Santo Domingo to enable it to pay its debts, refused to grant the loan. This company thought the sought after terms (the loan at 5% payable over 50 years) unattractive. A loan was finally secured from Khun, Loeb and company at the terms required.
between Santo Domingo and the United States remained in effect. At the end of that time, the American Senate finally ratified the treaty upon which the temporary arrangement had been based. Under the *modus vivendi* the finances of the Dominican Republic were stabilized and foreign debts almost paid off. The forty-five per cent allocated from the customs revenues to the Dominican government proved to be a greater sum of money than the total collections under the old regime. There had been a minimum of interference with the treaty signed by the Senate guaranteed there would be even less. "All in all, the Roosevelt policy and action in regard to the collection of debts involving nations was promotive of international amity and peace."  

The next problem of major importance in the Caribbean with which President Roosevelt had to deal was Cuba and her relation with the United States. The island of Cuba had been wrested from Spain in the Spanish-American War, but from the beginning of the conflict, the American government made it clear that once the Spaniards had been driven off and the island 'pacified', the control of the island would remain in the hands of its people. By the terms of the treaty of Paris, American military occupation and a military government superseded Spanish sovereignty. Under the guidance of General Leonard Wood, the military commander of Cuba, there was in-

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45 Signed December 10, 1898.
stituted a period of peace and rehabilitation such as Cuba had never experienced. American occupation resulted in vast improvements in public works, sanitation, education, and internal and external trade.

At the same time steps were taken preparatory to the introduction of self-government in Cuba. In the latter part of 1900 a general election was held, and delegates were sent to a Constitutional Convention in Havana. Before the end of February, 1901, the delegates had drawn up a constitution based on that of the United States. Despite their wishes to the contrary the Cuban delegates, in order to secure the termination of military occupation, were compelled to include within their constitution certain principles regulating the future relations of Cuba with the United States. These principles were those embodied in the so-called Platt Amendment, and had the effect of modifying Cuba's complete independence. On June 12, 1901, the new Cuban constitution incorporating the Platt Amendment was adopted. Early in 1902, after elections had been held, a Cuban government headed by President Tomas Palma took over the administration of Cuba from the occupation authorities. Within a few weeks the military occupation came to an end.

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46 It should be noted that President Roosevelt had very little to do with the course of events outlined above. The Platt Amendment had been proposed before he became president, and it was McKinley, not Roosevelt, who told the protesting Cubans that they must adopt the Platt Amendment.
During the next four years, the relations between Cuba and the United States were relatively smooth. President Roosevelt felt quite elated at the progress being made by Cuba, and made frequent favorable comments on its stability and general improvement. However, Cuba's progress in self-government was more apparent than real. With each passing year, the Palma administration was becoming more corrupt, and by 1905 the minority political party, the Liberals, had been successfully manoeuvred from every position of power or responsibility in the Cuban government. Prevented from exercising their constitutional rights by the 'Moderate' Party, the Liberals resorted to the old Latin-American method of protest-insurrection.

In the early months of 1906, sporadic fighting occurred between insurrectionist and government troops. With each month the insurrectionists gained in strength and aggressiveness, until by late summer a full scale revolt was underway. To the chagrin of President Palma, the insurrectionary movement was generally favored by the poorer classes of the state. Even his own troops were not unaffected. Reporting on this aspect of Cuba's internal troubles, the American chargé wrote in his report:

the (Cuban) government chiefly relies upon the rural guard, in which... there is some disaffection. In one instance a detail of about 30 men sent against the insurrectionists deserted to them. It is commonly reported that this disaffection extends to nearly one half of the entire guard.

Cuba's internal order and stability deteriorated very

47 U. S., Foreign Relations--1906, p. 454. (Sent August 21, 1906)
rapidly. With such widespread disaffection among the govern-
ment's troops, the rebels were gaining the upper hand. On
September 8, the American Consul-General at Havana, Steinhart,
telegraphed the Secretary of State informing him that the
Cuban government requested President Roosevelt to send two
naval vessels to Cuba. He ended on a note of urgency: "They
must come at once. The Government forces are unable to quell
the rebellion. The Government is unable to protect life and
property." Two days later the vessels were sent, and with
their departure went an admonitory note from Roosevelt to
Steinhart questioning whether he "appreciated the reluctance
with which (the United States) would intervene."

President Roosevelt was indeed very reluctant to inter-
vene in the Cuban affair, and exorted the contending factions
to settle their differences around a table rather than on the
battle-field. Roosevelt, proud of the American record in
Cuba, was fond of pointing to Cuba's independence to those who
treated the United States' promise of withdrawal with open
cynacism. Cuba was both a test-case and a show-case to the
Republican administration, despite the Platt Amendment, and to
have American troops re-occupy the island would be a blow to
American prestige as well as to Cuban honor. Anarchy, however,
could not be tolerated by the self-styled 'policeman of the
Caribbean'.

49 Loc. cit.
In Cuba itself, a state of anarchy was drawing closer. On September 12, while the two American naval craft were still on the high seas, Steinhart forwarded the following memorandum to Washington:

The rebellion has increased... and the Cuban Government has no elements to contend it, to defend the towns and prevent the rebels from destroying property. President Estrade Palma asks for American intervention, and begs that President Roosevelt send to Havana with rapidity two or three thousand men to avoid any catastrophe in the capital.

Two days after this announcement of the impotency of the Palma administration, President Roosevelt wrote the Cuban President that he was sending his Secretary of War, Wm. H. Taft, and the First Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Bacon, to Cuba in an attempt to settle the Cuban problem without resorting to intervention. The two special commissioners arrived in Havana five days later, and set up their headquarters ten miles outside Havana in order to be equally accessible to both contending political parties.

In the enquiry which followed, the American investigators came to the conclusion that the government procedure in the 1905 elections had been fraudulent. Taft reported to Roosevelt

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50 U. S., Foreign Relations--1906, p. 476. On the following day, the two American naval ships arrived in Havana, but so concerned was Roosevelt over intervention that the American consul-general was told that marines from the vessel could not be ordered to land unless express permission was received from the Secretary of State in Washington.

51 Roosevelt's announcement of his intention to send the commissioners and his adjuration to both parties to agree to mediation brought a halt to all hostilities on the island.
that if the United States should intervene in favor of Palma, it would be going against the wishes of the majority of the Cuban people who heartily disliked their president. As for the rebels, Taft informed the President that the insurrectionist party

is not a government with any of its characteristics, but only an undisciplined horde of men under partisan leaders. The [rebel] movement is large and formidable and commands the sympathy of a majority of the people of Cuba, but they are the poorer classes and the uneducated. The Liberal party, which is back of the movement, has men of ability and substance in it, but they are not titular leaders of the insurgent forces in whom such a government de facto must vest if in anybody. 52

After a week of investigation and hearings, a compromise was suggested by the commissioners which provided for the continuance of Palma in office, a coalition cabinet, and a new election of members of Congress. The Moderate party refused to consider the suggestion, however, and it appeared as if an impasse had been reached. On September 28, President Palma took a step which served to force Roosevelt's hand. On that day Palma and his entire cabinet resigned. The Cuban government had come to a halt.

The situation was grave, and there followed a rapid exchange of telegrams between Taft and Roosevelt. President Roosevelt ordered Taft "to do anything that is necessary, no matter how strong the course, but to try and do it in as

52 Howland, op. cit., p. 29. Both political parties, the Moderates under Palma and the Liberals under Gomez, favored American intervention for different reasons. Gomez believed that honest elections would sweep his party into power, and Palma's Moderates wanted annexation generally.
gentle a way as possible..." Taft was against setting up a provisional government since the office of a provisional president in Cuba was unconstitutional. But Roosevelt, facing the reality of a state of anarchy, and attempting to avoid armed intervention if at all possible, although he sympathized with Taft, told him bluntly that he did "not care in the least for the fact that such an agreement [the setting up of a Cuban provisional government] is not constitutional." Under such circumstances, Taft was obliged to act. Thus on September 29, 1906, "a provisional government exercising Cuban sovereignty under the authority of the President of the United States was established...." Once more American occupation troops landed on Cuban soil.

President Roosevelt announced the future policy of the United States towards Cuba in his annual message to Congress in December, 1906. The core of his policy was as follows:

The United States wishes nothing of Cuba save that is shall prosper morally and materially, and wishes nothing of the Cubans save that they shall be able to preserve order among themselves and therefore to preserve their independence. If the elections become a farce, and if

53 Hill, op. cit., p. 100.
54 Ibid., p. 101.
55 Roosevelt based his legal authority to intervene on Article LII of the Platt Amendment which read: "...the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba." (Dennis, op. cit., p. 264.)
the insurrectionary habit becomes confirmed in the Island, it is absolutely out of the question that the Island should remain independent; and the United States, which has assumed the sponsorship before the civilized world for Cuba's career as a nation, would again have to intervene and to see that the government was managed in such orderly fashion as to secure the safety of life and property. 57

Roosevelt's policy was carried out. Towards the end of 1908 new elections were held in Cuba, and General Gomez, head of the Liberal Party, was elected president by a large majority. With his inauguration on January 28, 1909, the American military occupation and provisional government came to an end, and Cuba was restored its independence.

One does not need to look deeply to find the motive behind Roosevelt's course of action in the Caribbean area. His basic motive was to guarantee the safety of his country. To Roosevelt, the Monroe Doctrine was the 'fire insurance' which protected the United States from the flames of war, both real and potential. The Monroe Doctrine, however, required amending if it was to be applicable to modern times. Roosevelt's age was an age of imperialism. Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia and others had divided millions of square miles of territory among themselves since the time Roosevelt had left college, and the process was still underway when he was president. In a great many cases, such territory had been acquired by the European powers under conditions similar to those found

in Venezuela and Santo Domingo. It is not surprising, therefore, that Roosevelt feared similar attempts would be made in the Caribbean. Whether or not he had good grounds for his fears is academic. The fact that he had them was sufficient to influence his logic.

Since President Roosevelt feared the possible occupation of the strategically situated Caribbean states, and since he believed that these same states should pay their debts to their creditors, it followed that the logical thing he would attempt was to interpret the Monroe Doctrine so as to find a practical way of dealing with both problems. The result was the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, one of the most nationalistic explanations of the doctrine's principles of the many that have been made since 1823. In effect it was a declaration to the world at large that the 'Colossus of the North' felt itself to be the one and only nation able to deal with the Caribbean nations with an equality of justice and force so as to prevent European imperialism becoming active in area, and yet, through its own high merits, assuming that American imperialism would not replace it. Roosevelt set himself up to be not only the 'policeman of the Caribbean'; he was to be a Bismarkian 'honest broker' as well. His nationalism and his egotism provided their silent applause in approval.

The Roosevelt Corollary, it should be remembered, came as a result of outside pressure on an area believed vital to the nation's line of defence. It did not come as the result of the unleashing of any overpowering urge in the United States to-
wards imperialism. It cannot be denied that there was every opportunity for imperialism to flourish. At the turn of the century, no Great Power in the world would have regarded such action on the part of the United States as unnatural or disgraceful. Indeed, many European states welcomed the increased influence of the United States in the Caribbean, and several urged her to go to greater lengths. The most surprising thing of American policy in the Caribbean, therefore, is not the exhibition of imperialism, but under the circumstances, the lack of it.

One of the most interesting phases of Roosevelt's Caribbean policy has been left out of this chapter. This is the problem President Roosevelt faced in trying to get permission to start construction on the Panama Canal. In importance, this subject deserves a chapter to itself.
CHAPTER III

Roosevelt and the

'Panama Canal Matter'
There is little doubt but that the 'Panama matter' was the most important accomplishment of President Roosevelt during his term of office. He himself "regarded the Panama Canal as the crowning glory of his administration... [ranking it] with the Louisiana Purchase and the acquisition of Texas...." Because of its importance, and because the diplomacy involved in it was typical of Roosevelt's mind, this chapter will deal in some detail with the acquisition of the right to build the canal.

The United States had long been interested in building a canal across the isthmus connecting the two American continents. This interest increased steadily toward the end of the 19th century as the western part of the United States gained in population, and as the Pacific coast of the United States increased in importance. One of the most vocal advocates for a canal before the Spanish-American war was Captain Mahan. In an article in the Atlantic Monthly, September, 1893, he wrote:

The Mexican War, the acquisition of California, the discovery of gold, and the mad rush to the diggings which followed, hastened, but by no means originated,  

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1 Lewis Einstein, Roosevelt, His Mind in Action, New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1930, p. 120.


3 In the presidential campaign of 1892, the Republican Party "declared the construction of the Nicaraguan canal, under the control of the United States Government, to be of the highest importance to the American people; both as a
the necessity for a settlement of the intricate problems involved, in which the United States, from its position on the two seas has the predominant interest. But, though predominant, ours is not the sole interest.... So far as the logical distinction between commercial and political will hold, it may be said that our interest is both commercial and political, that of other states almost wholly commercial. 4

Two years later, Captain Mahan again emphasized the necessity of the United States dominating the Caribbean area and having control over any isthmian canal. Nothing should be allowed to prevent this, since

in questions of great importance to nations or to the world, the wishes, or interests, or technical rights, of minorities must yield, and there is not necessarily any more injustice in this than in their yielding to a majority at the polls. 5

The importance of a canal across the isthmus was brought to the attention of the nation most dramatically by the Spanish-American war. The long and costly sea route around the southern tip of South America by American naval ships emphasized the tenuous naval defence available for the Atlantic and the Pacific. And in the years immediately following the war, the acquisition of the Philippines and


4 Captain A. T. Mahan, The Interests of America in Sea Power, Past and Future, Boston, Little, Brown, 1898, p. 83. Captain Mahan, one of America's foremost naval authorities and geo-politicians, was the firm friend of Theodore Roosevelt, on whom he exerted a profound influence, especially in relation to the need of a large navy by an 'insular' United States.

5 Ibid., p. 145. This was to be Roosevelt's argument seven years later.
other strategic islands helped to keep attention on the Panamanian question.

Prior to 1860, the United States had concluded two treaties with reference to an Atlantic-Pacific canal. One was the treaty of 1846 with New Granada (Colombia) which emphasized the United States' primary concern with any proposed canal. The other, and most important, was the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with Great Britain in 1850.

When it was ratified in 1850 the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was thought of in terms of a diplomatic victory for the United States since it prevented the further encroachment of British imperialism in North America. But by 1900, the treaty was looked upon as the curtainment of the privileges of the United States. Although neither treaty gave the United States the right to build a canal, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty placed certain restrictions on American ownership and control of a canal. Both Great Britain and the United States, under the treaty terms obligated themselves not to obtain exclusive control over any ship canal in any part of Central America, nor to fortify, occupy, colonize or assume dominion over any part of Central America in connection with a canal enterprise.

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6 Five years later, a railway was completed across the isthmus by American promoters. In the following years, the French canal company gradually took over the control of this line.
In the decades after 1850, various attempts were made by American Secretaries of State to have the Clayton-Bulwer treaty modified. The most vigorous attempt was made in 1881 by James G. Blaine. At that time, in his note to Lord Grenville of the British Foreign Office, he pointed out that in the thirty years since the treaty was ratified, the Pacific coast of the United States had undergone a remarkable development, and that this had created new duties for his government and devolved new responsibilities upon it. He concluded that the United States should have sole power to build, control and fortify a canal under these new circumstances. In reply Lord Granville refused to lift the restrictions of the treaty, pointing out that the Suez Canal remained unfortified and open to neutrals even in wartime.

The retirement of Bismarck and the increasing imperialism of Germany had a great deal to do with the ending of the period of splendid 'isolationism' in Great Britain. This in turn led to an increasingly friendly attitude of Great Britain towards the United States. Thus when Secretary of State, John Hay, took the Panama Canal matter up early in 1900, he found that Lord Pauncefote represented a more accommodating government. Hay negotiated a treaty with Great Britain

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7 F. L. Paxson, Recent History of the United States, Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1929, p. 319. Great Britain was then at war with the Boers in South Africa, and could not afford to incur the enmity of the United States. For the best source on the solidifying of British-American friendship, see Lionel M. Gelber, The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship, Oxford University Press, 1938.
whereby the obstacles to canal construction by the United States government were eliminated and the canal, "to which the principle of open door was applied, was given the status of guaranteed neutrality. To his great chagrin, the United States Senate was insistent upon making the canal an exclusive advantage and amended the treaty to death." Hay was then ordered to try to have the treaty changed to include this advantage, and once more he reluctantly put pressure on his British friends to accept the Senate's amendments.

In anticipation that Hay would succeed in getting the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty on terms favorable to the United States, McKinley had appointed a commission headed by Admiral Walker early in 1899 to investigate the feasibility of two major canal routes, Panama and Nicaragua. Before the Walker Commission had completed its report, and before Hay succeeded in concluding the second Hay-Pauncefote treaty, McKinley had been shot and Theodore Roosevelt was President.

Roosevelt had followed with keen interest the diplomatic manoeuvres concerning the building and control of an isthmian canal.

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8 Roosevelt, although friendly with Hay stated in a letter to Lodge that he thought Hay's inability to secure 'exclusive advantage' was a major blunder. Senator Lodge later claimed credit for blocking the ratification of the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty in the Senate.

9 Paxson, op. cit., p. 319. Secretary of State Hay had more treaties rejected by the Senate than any other Secretary. He was frequently and out-spokenly antagonistic towards the Senate and Senators, which did not help matters.
canal. Both in public and in private he had stressed the fact that any such canal must be exclusively American and above all, must be fortified. His reasoning was based on his knowledge of naval affairs and his concept of the Monroe Doctrine.

According to Roosevelt, should the completed canal be open to all navies, although the United States navy could use it, so could enemy fleets, which would enable them to attack the ill-defended American west coast. As his friend, Captain Mahan, had explained some years previously, "the chief political result of the Isthmian Canal will be to bring out Pacific coast nearer, not only to our Atlantic seaboard, but also to the great navies of Europe." Moreover, should the canal zone not be fortified, it would be an additional place to defend with the fleet which would cripple its effectiveness. A fortified canal, however, would not only leave the fleet unfettered, but strategy itself demanded that forts could employ their guns much better in defence.

Roosevelt's second reason for exclusive American owner-

10 More privately, it should be noted that when Roosevelt became President as a result of McKinley's death, his enemies referred to him in such terms as 'His Accidency,' 'that dammed cowboy,' and so forth. Bent on showing that he was capable of the office, he seized upon the Panama Canal question, then a major factor in public attention, to impress the American public with his ability and initiative.

11 Mahan, op. cit., p. 87.
ship was based on the Monroe Doctrine. In a letter to Hay expressing his views on the subject, Roosevelt wrote:

If we invite foreign powers to a joint ownership, a joint guarantee, of what so vitally concerns us but a little way from our borders, how can we possibly object to similar action say in Southern Brazil or Argentine, where our interests are so much less evident? 12

In other words, the United States must have the final say in matters concerning the American continent, for although the Isthmian canal would become an international highway, it would be through the courtesy of the United States.

In the interval between the renewal of negotiations over the Isthmian canal and the ratification of the second Hay-Pauncefote treaty, Roosevelt waited impatiently to plunge into the actual construction of the canal. He realized that the French company which was then attempting to complete a canal through Panama would have little success due to a lack of funds, poor organization, and a variety of other reasons.


13 April, 1901 to February 21, 1902.

14 In his first message to Congress, Roosevelt, speaking of the Isthmian canal, said that "it is one of those great works which only a great nation can undertake with prospects of success...." (United States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1901, p. XXXIV. Hereafter cited as U. S. Foreign Relations.) After the successful completion of the construction of the Suez Canal, the French established an international company which secured from Colombia construction rights across the Isthmus of Panama. This was the De Lesseps company which later sunk into bankruptcy amidst a great deal of scandal. During Cleveland's presidency, this company was reorganized as the New Panama Canal Company, which took over the property of the De Lesseps' Company, and had its concession to construct a
Early in 1902 Hay was able to lay before the government the revised Hay-Pauncefoote treaty which not only abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty but which also permitted the United States to fortify as well as to construct and control an isthmian canal, providing that the use of it by all nations under equal terms should be guaranteed. It was a major victory for the United States, and an admission of the United States' predominance in the Caribbean area by Great Britain.

Shortly before the treaty was ratified, the Walker Commission handed in its report which favored a canal route across Nicaragua. The chief reason for this was the high price ($109,000,000) demanded by the directors of the New Panama Canal Company for their rights and properties on the isthmus. Were this amount paid by the United States, the total cost of a Panamian canal would be greater than one through Nicaragua. The Walker Commission reported that construction costs would be: for Panama, $144,000,000; for Nicaragua, $190,000,000. The addition of $109,000,000 to the

canal extended to 1904. Although millions of francs were invested in the new company, and considerable work done on the digging of the canal, it became apparent that the project was too large for a private company to cope with. Thus, at the time when Roosevelt became President, very little was being done towards completing the canal, although the New Panama Canal company held the franchise to build and had a great deal of money invested in their incompleted project.

15 By the latter part of 1901, "the United States had been singled out as the one Power with whom the prospect of war or antagonistic engagements would not be entertained (by Great Britain)." (Gelber, op. cit., p. 93.)
Panama construction costs would therefore make the total amount for a canal through this route $60,000,000 more than one through Nicaragua.

President Roosevelt, irritated at the 'piratical tactics' of the French directors, refused to consider the payment of such an outrageous sum set by the French canal company, and swung his weight in favor of Nicaragua by giving his support to the Hepburn Bill which called for the construction of a route through Nicaragua. An indication of the national indignation at the high price demanded is shown in the votes cast for the Hepburn Bill; it passed through the House of Representatives early in January, 1902, by the one sided vote of 308 to 2.

The indignant roars of Theodore Roosevelt plus the unmistakably hostile tone of the national press were heard in France even before the Hepburn Bill was passed in the House. The New Panama Canal Company's stockholders, realizing that the Hepburn Bill would pass the Senate unless something was done, and realizing that their own rights would be worthless should the Nicaraguan route be taken, forced out the company's officers who had made the $109,000,000 demand. A new board of directors quickly scaled their selling price down to $40,000,000.

According to the Walker Commission, this new offer was reasonable. Thus when the Hepburn Bill reached the Senate, the Spooner Amendment was added to it. The Spooner Amendment substituted the Panama route for the Nicaraguan route provided the
Administration was able to secure the New Panama Canal Company's rights and properties, together with permission from Colombia to construct the canal, within a 'reasonable time.' Should the Administration be unable to secure the above within this time limit, the President was authorized to revert to the Nicaraguan route.

Owing to executive pressure from Roosevelt who had come to favor the Panama route, and owing also to a series of volcanic eruptions near the site of the proposed Nicaraguan route, the amended Hepburn Bill passed both houses by overwhelming majorities, and was signed by President Roosevelt late in June, 1902.

The remaining problem was to secure the consent of the Republic of Colombia to permit the United States to construct the canal across its territory in the Department of Panama. It was in the diplomacy involved in this problem that the heavy hand of Roosevelt swung his 'big stick' with righteous indignation.

When the original French canal company obtained permission to construct a canal across Panama, it was definitely stated in the Salgar-Wyse concession by articles 21 and 22 that the company could not transfer to the United States its 'rights.'

16 There was at this time a considerable amount of lobbying activity in favor of the Panama route by agents of the New Panama Canal Company.

17 This was the Salgar-Wyse concession of 1878.
privileges, franchises and concessions' without the consent of Colombia. Thus every effort was made by the State Department to secure a treaty which would provide the United States with the legal authority to go forward with its plans.

Secretary of State Hay, by threatening to turn to Nicaragua and by using other methods of persuasion, finally succeeded in extorting a treaty from the Colombian chargé in Washington, Tomas Herran. This Hay-Herran treaty was signed with some misgivings on January 22, 1903. Herran's misgivings were well founded, for three days later he received a telegram from President Marroquin of Colombia advising him not to sign. However, Marroquin was informed that the treaty was a fait accompli, and awaited ratification by the respective Congresses of the United States and Colombia.

Briefly, the Hay-Herran treaty gave the United States a canal zone six miles wide for a cash payment of $10,000,000 and a $250,000 annuity. Moreover, the first article of the treaty dealt with the problem of the transfer of the Panama Canal Company's rights, stating explicitly that

The Government of Colombia authorizes the New Panama Canal Company to sell and transfer to the United States its rights, privileges, properties and concessions, as well as the Panama Railroad and all the shares or parts of said railway.

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18 Which he personally would have preferred.

On March 17, 1903, despite a not inconsiderable amount of opposition from the Democrats, the Senate approved the canal convention without amendment. It was now up to the Colombian government to ratify the treaty so that it would become law.

In Bogota, the capital of Colombia, that nation's Congress was not in session, nor had it been for several years. The Colombian Administration at that time had come into being under President Marroquin following a revolt in 1900. Thus it was felt that the political situation was still too un-stabilized to hold democratic elections.

News of the Hay-Herran treaty was received with excited speculation by the people of Colombia, and Mr. Beaupré, in charge of the American legation at Bogota, wrote on March 30, 1903:

The matter of the ratification of the Panama Canal convention is intensely interesting to the people of this capital, and there is much public discussion of it. Without question public opinion is strongly against its ratification, but, of course, public opinion in Colombia is not necessarily a potent factor in controlling legislation.

Within a month, however, both public and official opinion had become even more opposed to ratification. At the end of March the text of the treaty had been made public, and Mr. Beaupré informed Washington that since then...

... a complete revolution in feeling has taken place. From approbation to suspicion and from suspicion to decided opposition have been the phrases of change in public sentiment during the last month.
The reason for the opposition to ratification by Colombia, was that the treaty was looked upon

... as being the attempt of a strong nation to take an unfair advantage of the crisis through which Colombia is passing (22), and, for a paltry sum, rob her of one of the most valuable sources of wealth which the world contains.  

A month later the situation had grown worse. There was still no official announcement in Colombia as to when Congress would meet, and forty days notice of such a meeting was required to allow members sufficient time to present themselves at Bogota. Mr. Beaupré, in a dispatch to the Department of State in Washington, wrote that

... opposition to the ratification of the canal convention is intensifying. The press is teeming with articles rancorous in enmity to the proposed treaty....

It is entirely impossible to convince these people... that the negotiations concerning it had any other motive than the squeezing of an advantageous bargain out of Colombia; nor that any other than the Panama route will route will ever be selected. Therefore, it is contended... that there is no immediate necessity of confirming the Hay-Herran convention; that the negotiations can be safely prolonged, in the end securing very much better terms for Colombia.

The public discussion is largely along the lines of the loss of the national honor by the surrender of national sovereignty; that the clause in the convention guaranteeing sovereignty means nothing, because the lease is perpetual; that the whole contract is favorable to the

22 This refers to one of the innumerable minor revolutions to which the country was subject since it became a Republic.

23 Foreign Relations--1903, pp. 134--5. Lord Charnwood points out that the $10,000,000 offered for the Canal Zone represented two thirds of the total national debt of Colombia in 1903.
United States and detrimental to Colombia.

Private discussion... is to the effect that the price is inadequate; that a much greater sum of money can be obtained....

In Washington, meanwhile, the tenor of Mr. Beaupré's dispatches were causing some anxiety as to whether the Hay-Herran treaty would be ratified by Colombia. President Roosevelt, seemingly, was more irritated by the delay than was Secretary of State Hay, who appeared anxious lest the negotiations break down entirely. Hay cautioned Beaupré to keep him informed of the hostile influences working against ratification, and to warn him if there was any opposition to the treaty from European powers. On June 9, 1903, Hay brought the strongest pressure to bear on the Colombian government, stating in a telegram to Beaupré:

The Colombian government apparently does not appreciate the gravity of the situation. The canal negotiations were initiated by Colombia, and were energetically pressed upon this Government for several years.... If Colombia should now reject the treaty or unduly delay its ratification, the friendly understanding between the two countries would be so seriously compromised that action might be taken by the Congress next winter which every friend of Colombia would regret.

This thinly veiled threat by the American government was


25 To this Beaupré replied: "At times I have thought, from the tone of the conversation of certain opponents, that foreign hostile influences were at work, but I have never been able to be certain of this. If there be opposition from this source, it is too secret a nature to be discovered and cannot therefore, be particularly effective." (U. S., Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 165.)

26 Ibid., p. 146.
quickly answered by the Colombian Foreign Minister, M. Luis Rico, who pointed out that because Colombia initiated the negotiations did not automatically demand that she approve them in their final form. He reminded the United States of a similar instance—the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which was initiated by the American government, and was not acceptable to the American Senate. M. Rico emphasized further that delay should not be the cause of any misunderstanding between two friendly countries, since the delay was due to the necessity of having the Colombian Congress meet and ratify the treaty—a legal process with which the American government was thoroughly familiar.

Two days after the above memorandum was sent, the Colombian Congress met, but it was not until almost two weeks after this meeting that a paraphrase of Hay's threat was read in the Colombian Senate in secret session. It created a sensation, being construed as a threat of direct action against Colombia in case the treaty was not ratified. Added alarm was felt since the Panamanian members reported their department would revolt if such were the case. Mr. Beaupré reported that as a result of this alarm, the 'effect was favorable for ratification.' Nevertheless, the Colombian government was not inclined to be stampeded into quick ratification of the treaty. On July 20, a commission of nine men was appointed to report on the matter of the Hay-Herran treaty by the end of the month.

During this interval, constant diplomatic feelers were put out by ranking members of the Colombian government to find
out if the United States was willing to increase the proposed payment for the canal and other concessions. Such suggestions were promptly denounced by Hay and Roosevelt. Any proposed amendments by the Colombians were thought of in terms of blackmail and undue procrastination. Moreover, such amendments, if accepted, would prolong negotiations perhaps beyond the 'reasonable time' mentioned in the Spooner Amendment, although the interpretation of this time limit was left to President Roosevelt himself. And Roosevelt, determined 'to make the dirt fly', felt that time was growing short.

Despite constant and even threatening pressure by the American government, it became apparent from the adverse report given by the commission appointed by Colombia would result in non-ratification of the treaty. Such apprehension was warranted, for shortly after the report was received, the Colombian Congress rejected the Hay-Herran treaty when it was given the vote, (August 12). A new commission was appointed to attempt to revise the treaty in such a manner as to please

27 On July 31, 1903, Hay informed Beaupré, regarding all such proposed monetary amendments favoring Colombia that "no additional payment by the United States can hope for approval by [the] United States Senate, while any amendment whatever requiring reconsideration by that body would most certainly imperil its consummation." (U.S., Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 168.)

28 The report of the commission proposed 1--a greater payment of money to Colombia for the canal concessions and 2--the elimination of all the aspects of extraterritoriality inherent in the Hay-Herran treaty.
both the United States and Colombia. However, by September it was generally believed that the commission's efforts would be wasted. Indeed, the commission's recommendations were little changed from those of its predecessor, and in the first debate on them in Congress, the Colombians voted approval of the action taken by the Senate on August 12.

By the end of September Roosevelt and Hay were of the opinion that the Colombian government would not even try to have a second and final debate on the commission's report. Since the United States had not taken any direct action against Colombia as many had feared, it was thought by the leaders of the government that Colombia might be able to gain the advantages it sought without any fear of retaliation. On September 30, Beaupré informed his government:

it is said, and generally believed... that there is a projection on foot among certain Senators to annul the arrangement entered into by the Colombian Government and the French Canal Company in 1900, extending the franchise and privileges of that company.

... if the arrangement made extending the contract is declared null and void, the French company's rights and interests on the Isthmus would cease to exist, and Colombia could then arrange with the United States to receive not only the $10,000,000 offered her, but the $40,000,000 offered the company. 29

In other words, Colombia was attempting a sharp business deal, not altogether ethical, but not unknown to such hard-headed businessmen in the United States as typified by Rockefeller, Carnegie and others. The rumors that Beaupre'

29 U. S., Senate Documents, No. 51, p. 77.
heard were once again well founded. On October 14, the second commission on the canal appointed by Colombia intimated in its report that the government of Colombia should examine the benefits it would receive if the extension was annulled. The suggestion was most obvious, especially to the keen minds of the agents of the French canal company in Colombia.

Beaupré also wrote the Department of State about the growing fear in Colombia of the action the United States might take regarding the growing restlessness of the people in Panama. Since the latter part of September, the Panamanians had become increasingly vocal in their opposition to the course taken at Bogota in the canal matter, and an undercurrent of revolt which might occur in Panama as it had in the past, the Colombian Congress adjourned on October 31, 1903, without ratifying the Hay-Herran treaty.

When news of the first refusal of the Colombian Congress to ratify the treaty reached Washington, Roosevelt gave vent to his feeling of disgust that the progress of such a noble effort should be halted by the short-sighted politicians at Bogota. The President and his Secretary of State "matched each other in finding suitable epithets for the Colombian..."

30 A treaty signed on April 4, 1893, between Colombia and the New Panama Canal Company granted to the company an extension of its franchise giving it an additional ten years; that is, until December 31, 1904. A second agreement was entered into in 1900. For the sum of 5,000,000 francs, the canal company was granted a further extension until October 31, 1910.
politicians. Roosevelt called them 'contemptible little creatures', 'jack-rabbits', and 'foolish and homicidal corruptionists'. Hay won; to him they were the 'greedy little anthropoids'.

It was after this first refusal that Hay wrote Roosevelt advising the president:

It is altogether likely that there will be an insurrection on the Isthmus against the regime of folly and graft that now rules Bogota. It is for you to decide whether you will (1) await the result of that movement, or (2) take a hand in recruiting the Isthmus from anarchy, or (3) treat with Nicaragua.

Something we shall be forced to do in case of a serious insurrectionary movement in Panama, to keep the transit clear.

To the impatient Roosevelt, the situation was more clear cut. He replied to Hay on September 15 in part:

At present I feel that there are two alternatives. First to take up Nicaragua; second, in some shape or way to interfere when it becomes necessary as to secure the Panama route without further dealing with the foolish and homicidal corruptionists at Bogota. I am not inclined to have any further dealings whatever with those Bogota people.

So strong were Roosevelt's feelings on the matter that he wrote a message which he proposed to send to Congress should Colombia refuse to ratify the treaty at all. It was typically

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31 Tyler Dennett, John Hay, New York, Dodd Mead, 1933, p. 376.
32 Ibid., p. 377.
34 See Appendix. G.
Rooseveltian—moralistic, aggressive and dynamic, an outpouring of the theme that nothing must stand in the way of American defence, American progress and American policy in the Western Hemisphere. It was an example of the imperialism always latent in Roosevelt. However, the message was never sent, even though the Colombian Congress adjourned the next month with the Hay-Herran treaty unratified.

Roosevelt wrote his proposed message to Congress some time after he received a memorandum from John Bassett Moore, and the imperialistic passages in it were based on Moore's legal justification for unilateral action on the part of the United States. About the middle of August, Roosevelt had been shown a memorandum written by John Bassett Moore on the Panamanian question. Moore was as ardent a nationalist as Roosevelt, and his patriotism, too, rebelled at the idea that the 'corruptionists' at Bogota should stop the construction of a canal through Panama. Therefore he drew the President's attention to Article XXXV of the American-Colombian treaty of 1846.

As construed by Dr. Moore, Colombia, by this article, offered to the United States a free and open transit or right of way to the government of the United States, and this proviso applied to 'any modes of communication that now exist or that may hereafter be constructed.' In return for this

35 John Bassett Moore was then at Columbia University, and had been an Assistant Secretary and legal adviser to the Department of State.

36 See Appendix. C
concession, the United States guaranteed the 'perfect neutrality' of the Isthmus under the conditions mentioned in the treaty. Dr. Moore emphasized the fact that the object in securing Panama's neutrality was to secure a canal; and that since for over five decades the United States had upheld her part of the bargain, Colombia was not in a position to obstruct the building of a canal. This thin, though legal, excuse for open interference was brought to Hay's attention by Roosevelt, while the President himself meanwhile mulled over the various avenues open to him other than the imperial path chartered in his message.

Perhaps the most obvious path open to Roosevelt was to cease any further negotiations with Colombia and take up the Nicaraguan route as he was entitled to do by the Hepburn Bill. This was the course favored by Hay, who was ill and disheartened by the endless squabbles of the Colombians. To him it was an easier way to achieve the same ends. But Roosevelt had other ideas on the subject. It was against his nature to 'give up' on any matter in the first place, and especially so to the coterie of politicians that ruled at Bogota. Roosevelt had come to favor the Panama route for two reasons. First, it was the cheapest route. Second, an international group of engineers hired by the French Canal Company had picked the Panama route as the best across the isthmus, and the American engineers had seconded their opinion. Any other would be in the nature of a 'second best' route, and that again went against Roosevelt's nature.

Since Panama would be the cheapest and best route for the
canal, Roosevelt gave but slight thought to the alternative Nicaraguan route. The problem that remained was whether or not to wait upon the slow moving Colombian Congress to ratify the treaty. It became increasingly clear that the passage of the Hay-Herran treaty through the Colombian Congress would be speeded only through the bribing of key Colombians by large amounts of money. This tended to make Roosevelt lean more towards the actions which a Rhodes or a Delcasse might take. As we have seen, Roosevelt toyed with the idea of an outright military occupation. His justification for such an action was wrapped up in righteousness and nationalism, and is perhaps best expressed in a letter he wrote to Senator Mark Hanna on the subject. Referring to Hanna's suggestion that he exercise patience, Roosevelt wrote:

I am not as sure as you are that the only virtue we need exercise is patience. I think it well worth considering whether we had not better warn those Bogota politicians that great though our patience has been, it can be exhausted. This does not necessarily mean that we must necessarily go to Nicaragua. I feel we are certainly justified in morals, and therefore in law, under the Treaty of 1846, in interfering summarily and saying that the canal is to be built and that they must not stop it.

Certainly if Roosevelt had taken such a step he would have been well within the bounds of current European morality, if such may be said to exist in foreign affairs. Typical of European thought on the problem was a remark made to an American by the King of Italy, when he said:

37 Bishop, op. cit., p. 278. Italics mine. Note Dr. Moore's influence here.
I should think that your President would send a fleet down there and take possession of the Isthmus. It would create an excitement for a week, but then all would be over and in the end it would be a benefit to the whole world. 38

Such a program tempted Roosevelt, as we have seen. Whether he might have carried it out is a matter of conjecture, but the fact remains that it was a course of open and flagrant imperialism which he did not follow. His egotism, his sincere and profound belief in his own righteousness, plus his deep faith in what he considered the goal of the United States in the Western Hemisphere all supported his conviction that Colombia should not be permitted to block so great and noble a work as a canal across Panama. His stubborness combined with his righteousness to make him blind to an alternate route. Moreover, Roosevelt was by no means alone in his opinion of the Colombian tactics, and there was something to be said for the opinion held by the American public generally that all was not well between Colombia and Panama. The opinion was frequently expressed that

the mountain gentry who conducted the Colombian Government at Bogota treated Panama like a conquered province, to be squeezed to the utmost for the benefit of the politicians. There was neither community of interest nor racial sympathy between the Panamians and the Colombians, and, as it required a journey of fifteen days to go from Panama to the capital, geography, also, added its sundering influence. 39


However, influences were at work that were to open still another course to Roosevelt— Influences resulting from the machinisms of the New Panama Canal Company’s agents and the natives of Panama. During the period of anxious waiting while Colombia was deciding on the Hay-Herran treaty, the two chief agents of the French company, M. Bunau-Varilla and W. N. Cromwell had done all in their power to impress on the chief figures in Washington the necessity of the canal route going through Panama.

During the first months of the negotiations between Colombia and the United States, the New Panama Canal Company had remained aloof. But later, the company was "obliged to intervene in regard to the questions raised before the Colombian Congress relative to the extension which had been granted [them] in the month of April, 1900." The Colombian commission

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40 M. Bunau-Varilla was a former chief engineer of the original French Canal Company, and held, according to his own statement, $115,000 worth of New Panama Canal Company stock. He had been sent to the United States by the latter company to do all he could to further the interests of that company. Provided with a generous expense account, his influence was great both as a lobbyist and later in the revolutionary intrigue at Panama.

41 William Nelson Cromwell was a Wall street corporation lawyer—an officer, director or counsel for more than 30 of the largest corporations in the United States. He was also the attorney of the New Panama Canal Company. He was thus extremely interested in having the Hay-Herran treaty ratified, and exerted all the influence he could on Washington politicians and even Hay himself. As a contributor of $60,000 to the Republican campaign chest, his influence was not slight.

42 U. S. Senate Documents, No. 133, p. 4.
appointed to look into the affair made a report wherein it
dilated insistantly upon the advantages which would re­
sult to Colombia from a refusal to approve [the extension].
It pointed out particularly that the Congress by thus
refusing to ratify and by waiting until 1904, the date of
the expiration of [the New Panama Canal Company's] former
contracts, would enable Colombia to enter into possession
of all the company's rights and properties, and to con­
clude a much more advantageous treaty with the United
States. Indeed, in provision of a decision contrary [to
ratification] the commission proposed the immediate
insertion in the budget of an appropriation of 5,000,000
francs destined to repay to the company the price which
it had paid for the extension.

The prospect of $40,000,000 slipping through the hands of
the company was more than enough to agitate both Bunau-Varilla
and Cromwell. Both men set themselves to solve the problem.
Bunau-Varilla found out that Roosevelt remained interested in
the Panama route despite Hay's indifference. A few days
later, "on October 10 he visited Francis B. Loomis, the first
assistant secretary of state, who happened to be one of his
acquaintances. Through Loomis an interview was secured with
President Roosevelt, who was looking forward to the election
of 1904. There Bunau-Varilla deduced that Roosevelt would not
be adverse to a revolution in Panama."

The idea of a revolution in Panama, and therefore in­
dependence, was not original with M. Bunau-Varilla or with the
agents of the New Panama Canal company's agents in Panama.
Periodic revolutions on the isthmus were as common to the

43 U. S., Senate Documents, No. 133, p. 4.
44 W. D. MacCain, The United States and the Republic of
Panamanians as changing dictators, and were regarded as an
only slightly abnormal condition. The possibility of stirring
up a revolt in Panama had been taken under favorable considera­
tion by the canal company's agents early in 1903, and as the
year progressed without the Hay-Herran treaty being ratified,
feelers were put out by the agents to sound out the possibili­
ties for a successful revolt.

President Roosevelt was not ignorant of the possibility
of an attempt by Panama to secede from Colombia. As early as
July 14, 1903, the New York World had published an article on
the canal, the obstacles to the pending treaty, and the dis­
tinct possibility of a domestic Panamanian revolution being the
only and best way to surmount them. Immediate recognition
of a new state of Panama by Roosevelt was believed probable,
and the editors thought favorably on the matter. A month
later, on July 5, the World predicted the revolt would take
place on November 3, of the same year.

Although a revolution would have been a welcome relief to
Roosevelt, he was unwilling to have any direct hand in forment­
ing one. As he wrote in a letter to Dr. Albert Shaw, editor
of The Review of Reviews on October 10, 1903:

I cast aside the proposition made at this time to foment
the succession of Panama. Whatever other governments can
do, the United States can not go into the securing by such
underhand means the cession. Privately, I freely say to
you that I should be delighted if Panama were an independ­
ent state, or if it made itself so at this moment. 46

45 This was thought to be one of several articles in­
spired by Cromwell to hasten the passage of the Hay-Herran
treaty through the Colombian Congress.

46 Bishop, op. cit., p. 279.
Since Bunau-Varilla had personally confirmed his view that Roosevelt still favored the Panama route, the idea of promoting a revolution was uppermost in his mind. Together with other agents of the New Panama Canal Company, he conspired with various Panamanian leaders to bring the revolt to a head. He was quite successful in his efforts. During this latter part of October, Roosevelt was aware of the increasing possibility of a revolt in Panama. On October 16,

the President received two officers of the army who had just returned by way of Panama from a four months' tour in Venezuela and Colombia. They informed him that a revolutionary party was organizing in Panama with the object of separation from Colombia... and that it was the general belief on the Isthmus that the revolution might occur at any moment. . . .

Accordingly, three days later Roosevelt "directed the Navy Department to station various ships within easy reach of the Isthmus, to be ready to act in the event of need arising. The first three of these were sent on October 19. Two days later a note from Mr. Beaupré in Bogota, saying that in the Colombian capital

... there is no disguising the alarm existing as to the possible action of the Government of the United States should the feeling of disaffection undoubtedly existing in the department of Panama find expression in overt acts. . . .

So imminent was the danger that a fourth American ship was

47 Bishop, op. cit., pp. 281--82.


sent to Colon, Panama. But despite the obvious danger or revolt, the Colombian government, as we have seen, adjourned without ratifying the treaty. The conspirators set November 4, for the revolt.

There is little doubt that at this time Roosevelt had planned the course of action he would take. Should the revolt break out, the United States, acting under the articles of the Treaty of 1846 with Colombia, would land troops to keep the Isthmian right of way open, and in so doing, put an end to any fighting that might occur along the Panamanian transit. This would include preventing the Colombian forces from landing and entering into conflict with the rebels, which would naturally permit the rebels to declare their independence. The plan worked perfectly.

On the evening of November 3, 1903, the Consul-General of the United States at Panama wired Hay that an uprising had occurred on the isthmus. A body of Colombian troops had landed at Colon on the Pacific side of the isthmus on the same evening. Measures had been taken by the leaders of the revolt to prevent the troops using the railroad to transport soldiers across the isthmus to Panama City. To further ensure this, Hay ordered the commander of the U. S. S. Nashville 'in the interests of peace' and to 'keep the transit of the Isthmus open and order maintained' to prevent the Colombian troops from moving inland. This was done, and the following day the Colombian army was persuaded to reembark and return to their base. A Colombian gunboat, after sending a few shells
into Panama, also withdrew. On the same day, the Consul-General wired Hay that a Republic of Panama had been formed, independent of Colombia, and on November 6, Hay was informed that "Bunau-Varilla has been appointed officially as the confidential agent of the Republic of Panama at Washington."

At noon, on November 6, the American Consul-General was told that when he was satisfied that "... a de facto government republican in form, and without substantial opposition from its own people, has been established in the State of Panama, you will enter into relations with it as the responsible government of the territory...." Less than three hours after being told that the situation was peaceful, Hay cabled Beaupré at Bogota that the President of the United States wished to see an end of the conflict on the isthmus, and that the government of the United States had entered into relations with the Republic of Panama. On November 7, Secretary of State Hay received a telegram from Bunau-Varilla stating that "the Government of the Republic of Panama has been pleased to designate me as its envoy extraordinary and minister pleni-

50 "Somewhere over in the city there was a dead Chinese man, killed by a shell; and in the slaughterhouse was a wounded burro. These were the two casualties of the revolution" (W. F. McCaleb, Theodore Roosevelt, New York, Albert and Charles Boni, 1931, p. 165.)

52 Loc. cit.
53 For the text of this important communique, see Appendix. □
potentiary near the Government of the United States." An audience with President Roosevelt was requested on November 11, and was granted two days later. On November 13, the President fully recognized the Republic of Panama. Negotiations for a treaty to permit the United States government to construct a canal across Panama were started at once, and were completed and signed by Hay and Bunau-Varilla at Washington on November 18, 1903. It was ratified by Panama on December 2, and by the United States shortly thereafter.

The treaty was satisfactory to all concerned. Under Article I, the United States guaranteed the independence of the New Republic of Panama. Article II stated:

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of said canal of the width of ten miles... the said zone beginning in the Caribbean Sea three marine miles from mean low-water mark and extending to and across the Isthmus of Panama into the Pacific Ocean to a distance of three marine miles from means low-water mark, with the proviso that the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to said cities, which are included within the boundaries of the zone above described, shall not be included within the grant.

Other articles gave the New Panama Canal Company the right to sell its rights and properties to the American government; gave the United States permission to fortify the zone, and so forth.

54 U. S. Foreign Relations--1903, p. 240.

It is commonly acknowledged that "the quick decisions of the administration in Washington, which accompanied the revolution in Panama and the recognition of the new Republic, were made by Roosevelt." He intimates this in his autobiography, and although Secretary of State Hay worked hard and diligently on the mechanics of the negotiation, Roosevelt had the final say in the course to be followed.

Roosevelt's nationalistic sentiment behind his action in the Panama matter came out time and again in his letters during the period of negotiations. There is no doubt whatsoever that he felt he was acting in the best interests of his country, for its defence, for its economic betterment and consequently for its future greatness. He never regretted his actions either at the time he took them nor later. Some years after the episode he wrote:

The interests of the American people demanded that I should act just exactly as I did act; and I would have taken the action I actually did take even though I had been certain that to do so meant my prompt retirement from public life at the next election; for the only thing which makes it worth while to hold a big office is taking advantage of the opportunities the office offers to do, some big thing that ought to be done and is worth doing.

And again:

Yes, I took the Isthmus, and I am in a wholly unrepentant frame of mind in reference thereto. The ethical conception upon which I acted was that I did not intend that Uncle Sam should be held up while we were doing a great

56 Thayer, op. cit., p. 187.

work for himself and all mankind.

Quite naturally, the Colombians did not remain silent or fail to lodge indignant protests once they realized what had happened. To generalize, the Colombian government justified its action in not ratifying the Hay-Herran treaty and protested against the American action during November, 1903, in the following manner:

In defence of the non-ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty, it was pointed out that the Colombian Senate had as much right legally to reject any treaty as had the American Senate, and that such a rejection should not be an excuse for an attack, open or subversive, upon Colombia. To other charges it was emphasized that Colombia had already twice renewed the franchise of the French canal company after it had lapsed. Moreover, the Colombians said that the original French concession stipulated that the company could not transfer its franchise to a foreign government without the express consent of Colombia, and thus accusations that the Colombians were greedy were not true, but that the greed lay with the Panama Canal company.

The Colombian Government brought out the following additional points:

(a) The well known favorable attitude of the United States toward a rebellious uprising in the Department of Panama was the determining cause of the revolt, and to this extent it was a violation of the express stipulations of the treaty of 1846.

58 MacCaleb, op. cit., p. 137.
(b) The United States, by means of their armed forces, prevented the Republic of Panama from repressing the aforesaid rebellion and so preserving the dignity of her national territory, this being also in violation of the positive stipulations of the treaty of 1846.

(c) The United States recognized with undue haste the so-called Republic of Panama....

(d) The United States guaranteed to maintain by force the separation of Panama from the Republic of Colombia....

It is not my purpose to defend Roosevelt's aggressive, nationalistic policies, but the American side of the argument should not go unheard. And when we realize Roosevelt's character, his Western training, his impulsiveness and self-righteous nature, then the motive behind his actions becomes quite understandable.

It is true that it was completely within the power of the Colombian Senate to refuse to ratify the Hay-Herran treaty. But both Roosevelt and Hay, during 1903, took the position that President Marroquin, by authorizing his representative in Washington to sign the treaty, had assumed an obligation to defend its terms in Bogota. Three days after he signed the treaty instructions reached Herran in Washington not to sign it, but the deed had been done. Also, there is no denying that "Marroquin unquestionably had favored the treaty and encouraged negotiations." Thus when Marroquin not only failed to defend the treaty in the Colombian Senate but also


60 Dennett, op. cit., p. 375.
advocated non-ratification, Roosevelt took it as an act of bad faith.

The most common charge against the Colombian government was that it was greedy. The Colombians answered that such a charge should be laid at the feet of the New Panama Canal Company. All the evidence points to the fact that the company's agents did everything in their power to collect the $40,000,000 due them should the Hay-Herran treaty go through. Nor should one overlook the company's willingness to stir up a revolution in Panama to protect its investment. The Colombian government was equally intent on squeezing more money out of either the United States or the New Panama Canal company or both. This is shown in Beaupré's reports and in the speeches made in the Colombian Senate. The demand for more money also led to the serious suggestion by the Colombian commission on the canal that the extension of the canal company's franchise be declared illegal. This could have been done quite readily, for President Marroquin had granted the extension by legislative decree, whereas the Colombian Congress should have confirmed the grant. It was felt in the United States, and I believe rightly so, that the purpose behind the adjournment of the Colombian Congress before the treaty had been signed was to delay matters until the company's franchise became void, thus allowing Colombia to collect the $40,000,000 designed for the French stockholders. It might be termed a smart or realistic move to do so, but looking at it with Roosevelt's eyes, it was a greedy, underhand, obstructionist movement
designed to delay the progress of one of the most important works undertaken by the United States since the Louisiana Purchase. Delay, with elections near, was like waving a red flag in front of the bull-headed President, and one can imagine the indignation in Roosevelt's mind when both delay and evident unrighteousness urged him to impulsive action. The money problem meant nothing to Roosevelt. No one can accuse him of being bribed or even being susceptible to bribery. But principle meant a great deal to him, especially as he construed principle, which was usually one-sided.

Colombian spokesman frequently laid the accusation that the favorable attitude towards the proposed rebellion in the United States was the determining cause of the revolt. This is but partially true, for throughout its existence, Panama "was almost continuously in disorder and was a crater of revolution and disturbance; furthermore, the civil wars and outbreaks in Colombia itself were a source of anxiety." President Roosevelt, in his message to Congress explaining the action he took, mentioned that in the past 53 years there had been 53 occasions of revolt, uprising or disturbance. Later, in his autobiography, he wrote:

In 1856, in 1860, in 1876, in 1885, in 1901, and again in 1902, sailors and marines from United States' warships were forced to land [in Panama] in order to patrol the Isthmus, to protect life and property, and to see that transit across the Isthmus was kept open. In 1861, in 1885, and in 1900, the Colombian Government asked that the United States Government would land troops to protect Colombian interests and maintain order on the Isthmus.

61 A. L. P. Dennis, Adventures in American Foreign Policy, New York, E. P. Dutton, 1928, p. 313
The people of Panama during the preceding twenty years had three times sought to establish their independence by revolution or secession—in 1885, in 1895, and in 1899. Revolution in Panama was almost as periodic as the seasons. The belief of the Panamanians that they were to be deprived of a huge source of income by the opportunists of Bogota, plus the conspiracy of agents of the Panama Canal Company during the latter part of 1903 were the twin causes of the revolt. Roosevelt's favorable attitude towards secession confirmed Bunau-Varilla's belief that a revolt was assured of success. But the opposition to the Marroquin government, itself based on revolution, was such that revolt might have occurred in Bogota had Roosevelt announced that henceforth the Nicaraguan route would be sought. Roosevelt's favorable attitude was, therefore, a determining cause in time, but little more.

There is more to be said for the action of the United States' navy during the revolt. It should be understood at the outset that there was no direct collaboration between the naval ships' arrival in the Caribbean Sea and the time announced for the revolt. In fact, it was known by the conspirators that American naval ships were in the vicinity prior to the revolt taking place, and the revolt was more or less timed so as to take advantage of their arrival, not vice versa. Roosevelt argued that the ships were sent to the area, as they had been time and again in past years, to keep the isthmian transit

open; and that troops were landed to protect the lives of American nationals and American property. The Colombians countered that such protective measures had not been requested as heretofore. That was true, but in July, of the same year, American marines had landed on the Colombian coast to restore order in a minor disturbance, and at that time, although their presence was also not requested, the affair caused only a ripple of protest and was quickly forgotten. But if the conspirators behind the Panamanian revolt took advantage of the presence of American warships nearby, it is unquestionably true that Roosevelt took advantage of Article XXXV of the treaty of 1846 to prevent action on the part of the Colombian force went to put down the revolt. His excuse, as we have seen, was based on precedent, to keep the transit open across the isthmus. His purpose, however, was to put an end to the negotiations with Colombia by permitting the revolt to succeed.

A final charge by the Colombian government against American action in the Panama affair needs comment, and this was the recognition of the Republic of Panama by the United States 'with undue haste'. This charge would carry more weight had the Colombian government been guilty of a remarkably hasty volte face on its own account shortly after the revolt was under way. Prior to the revolt, Colombia had based her refusal to ratify the Hay-Herran treaty largely on a matter of principle that her sovereignty would be interfered with. Money, according to them, was a secondary matter. When the revolt was underway, however, it would appear that principle became a
secondary matter. On November 6, 1903, Mr. Beaupré at Bogota wired Secretary Hay the following message:

Knowing that the revolution has already commenced in Panama, [a high Colombian Official] says that if the Government of the United States will land troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty, and the transit, if requested by the Colombian chargé d'affaires, this Government will declare martial law, and by virtue of vested constitutional authority, when public order is disturbed, will approve by decree the ratification of the canal treaty as signed; or, if the Government of the United States prefers, will call extra session of Congress with new and friendly members next May to approve the treaty.

The Colombian government performed an almost equally rapid turnaround in its stand on renouncing the extension of the franchise to the New Panama Canal Company. A letter to the company was sent by M. Rodulfo Sampir informing it of Colombia's

... ferme résolution de reprimer le mouvement militaire séparatiste de Panama par tous les moyens qui soient en son pouvoir, afin de maintenir sa souveraineté dans cette partie de son territoire; et, à cette occasion il me charge également de renouveler à la Compagnie sa loyal décision de la maintenir dans la jouissance du contrat de concession et dans celle des provogations, pour l'ouverture et l'exploitation du Canal de Panama.

In other words, the Colombian government was willing to act with undue haste in a matter which concerned their vital interests just as Roosevelt was prepared to take speedy action


64 A representative of Colombia on the board of directors of the New Panama Canal Company. Colombia was the second largest bondholder!

when an opportunity furthering American interests was presented to him. The leaders in Colombia and the United States government both realized that a revolt was pending by late summer in 1903. The government of Bogota placed their faith in being able to outride the storm by using American forces to quell the revolution as they had done in the past. They failed to take into account the aggressive nationalism of a young, ambitious president to whom action was as dear a principle as righteousness—and the president defined righteousness.

Righteousness may be more properly called nationalism in accounting for Roosevelt's action concerning the Panama canal. The construction of the canal meant cutting between 8,000 and 9,000 nautical miles off the then distance between the major Atlantic and Pacific coast ports. Its use to the national defence of the United States was recognized as the prime importance. Its value to the trade and commerce of the world in general and to the United States in particular was tremendous. In a project of such consequence to his country, Roosevelt thought of the interests of his nation first and those of Colombia second. It was in his nature to judge the means by ends, and to act on this premise in the Panama canal matter. Had he been a Wilhelm II or Cecil Rhodes, Colombia itself would probably have become a second Hawaii.

66 World opinion of Roosevelt's action was rather favorable. By January 5, 1904, the Republic of Panama had been formally recognized by France, China, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Denmark, Russia, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Nicaragua, Peru, Cuba, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Costa Rica and Switzerland. The lack of South American—as compared to European—countries recognizing Panama is significant.
Chapter IV

Roosevelt and the Alaska Boundary Dispute
Apart from the 'Panama matter', there is no instance in foreign affairs when President Roosevelt wielded the 'big stick' in diplomacy with more zeal than in the Alaska boundary dispute. Moreover, there are few times when his nationalism was more evident and aggressive. The major part of the long, drawn-out boundary dispute belongs in large part to the McKinley and Cleveland administrations. This chapter, therefore, will deal mainly with Roosevelt's efforts to bring the dispute to an end, rather than the details of the dispute itself.

Prior to 1896, the United States had comparatively little interest in Alaska. Until that time, Americans had been concerned with the fishing and seal-hunting industries in Alaskan waters, together with some fur-hunting in the interior. But aside from these moderately important industries, there was nothing to interest the American public as a whole in "Seward's Ice-Box". This attitude underwent a decided change when gold was discovered in the Klondike area in 1896--97. The gold strikes caused a rush to Alaska so that within a few years a population of approximately 30,000 existed in what was hitherto a very sparcely populated district.

The new importance of Alaska resulting from the Klondike finds brought into sharper light the dispute between the United States and Great Britain over the actual boundary of Alaska. This boundary line had been fixed between Russia and Great

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1 Alaska had been bought from Russia by the United States in 1867 at the instigation of Secretary of State Seward, who managed to purchase it at the bargain price of about one and one half cents an acre.
Britain by treaty in 1825. However, at the time the treaty was signed, there were no accurate maps of the interior of Alaska. Thus the boundary line was quite vague and its actual location open to question. Periodic efforts were made to have the boundary surveyed both by the United States and Canada after 1872, but with no practical results. But with the rush to the Klondike, the boundary dispute became a major issue since the chief route of access to the gold fields for Canadians and Americans alike was through the area in question.

In 1898, the Alaska boundary problem was placed before the Joint High Commission as one among various other Canadian-American disputes. Canada's contention was that the boundary ran ten marine miles inside the main trend of the coast, and as such its course cut across the numerous long inlets offering access from the sea. This boundary would leave the United States in possession of numerous, frequently unconnected promontories along the British Columbian coast, and would deprive her of important harbors and passes leading into the interior. The United States' claim, therefore, was that the boundary in dispute followed the sinuosities of the coast, and that the ten marine mile strip of land which went to make up the Alaskan panhandle should be measured from the tips of the arms of the inlets.

The Joint High Commission ended in deadlock over the boundary dispute. The United States was unwilling to com-

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2 Great Britain attempted to secure a favorable compromise for Canada in the Alaska boundary dispute in return for the concessions Great Britain made the United States in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. This attempt was unsuccessful.
promise or to submit the problem to a third party for arbitration, although Secretary of State Hay did suggest submitting the case to a commission of six jurists. This in turn was unacceptable to Canada. However, until such time as a decision could be reached, both nations agreed to a modus vivendi which would eliminate such over-lapping jurisdiction as existed while giving access to the interior to nationals of both countries.

The modus vivendi over the Alaska boundary was still in effect when Roosevelt became president in 1901. Although fully convinced of the righteousness of the United States' claim, the President felt no urgency about the matter. Great Britain was then at war with the Boers and to raise the question would have embarrassed her. Furthermore, Roosevelt was anxious to have Britain's signature on the second Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Thus when Choate, the American ambassador to Great Britain, wrote asking the attitude he should take on the Alaska problem in January, 1902, Roosevelt replied: "Let sleeping dogs lie."

The boundary dispute became active again in the summer of 1902. In June of that year the Governor-General of Canada, Lord Minto, and the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Wilfred Laurier, were both in London. Lord Lansdowne, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, suggested to Choate that he should see

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3 In October, 1899.

Laurier regarding means to effect a final settlement of the boundary dispute. Before Choate got around to this visit, Henry White, the First Secretary at the American Embassy, visited Laurier as a matter of courtesy. Laurier brought the boundary matter up, and suggested to White that he would be happy to see the problem amicably settled. White wrote Secretary Hay about the conversation with Laurier, and mentioned that the Canadian Prime Minister appeared "really anxious to settle the matter and will go as far as he can in the way of concessions which he can make his people swallow toward the end."

Very shortly after receiving this note from White, Hay forwarded it to Roosevelt, pointing out to the President:

First. That Laurier is anxious to have the boundary question settled...; that he wants to save his face by having the matter decided against him. Still, he pretends that he believes his own cause to be just....
Second. It is evident that Lansdowne is also anxious to have some settlement....

Roosevelt replied to the effect that he thought the Canadian claims outrageous and utterly foolish. Hay agreed with him in the weakness of the Canadian contentions, but pressed Roosevelt for instructions as to whether Choate should carry on discussions or not. Hay added that his own suggestion was

5 - Alan Nevins, Henry White, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1930, p. 193. This story of how the boundary dispute was raised by Laurier is not discussed in the biographies of Laurier, Minto or Lansdowne, although there is no doubt that these men strongly desired to settle the matter once and for all.

6 Dennis, op. cit., p. 144.
the one he presented several years ago, that is, a commission of six members to decide the question, three members from each side, and the decision to go by a majority vote. Roosevelt was not opposed to the idea, though he thought if such a group were to meet he would "instruct our three commissioners when appointed that they are in no case to yield any of our claim." Already Roosevelt was assuming the attitude of the 'just man armed', and was preparing to combat any move which might impinge on the nation's righteous demands or sully the nation's escutcheon.

During the remainder of 1902 negotiations on the boundary dispute continued at a leisurely pace. Laurier hoped to the last to have the matter submitted to a board of arbitration, but the American government insisted on a judicial commission or tribunal as recommended by Hay. With many misgivings, and under pressure from London, Laurier gave in to the American demands. From October to December, 1902, preparations were made to draw up a convention setting up the tribunal, and the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Michael Herbert.

Under the terms of the convention, the tribunal was to consist of "six impartial jurists of repute" three to be ap-


8 "The besetting sin of which is to split the difference," said Hay.

9 Roosevelt was careful to point out that it was to be a judicial tribunal, not an arbitration tribunal.

pointed by the President of the United States and three by His Britannic Majesty; the decision to be by a majority and to be accepted as final. Each party agreed to deliver its evidence to the other within two months of the exchange of ratification. In two more months each side was required to file its reply. Within the next two months the oral arguments were to be made before the tribunal, and finally, the points of reference were limited to the geographical meaning of the vague or disputed terms of the treaty of 1825. In brief, it was a judicial tribunal whose aim was "not to arrange a practical and reasonable solution of the difficulty, but to interpret legally a document that was geographically absurd."

Having signed the convention, Hay's next problem was to have it ratified in the Senate. Roosevelt called upon his old friend, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, to steer the treaty through the Senate where opposition was expected from Senators from the northwestern states. What happened when he introduced the treaty is best expressed in Lodge's own words:

Several Senators came to see me, especially Senators from the northwest, and said that they must be assured as to the men whom the President would now appoint members of the Tribunal.... I told the President of the situation and asked if he would allow me to tell Senators in confidence whom he intended to appoint. He gave me permission to do so.... When these selections of the President were made known in confidence to the

Senators there was no further objection to the treaty....

Most certainly the Senators had good reason to be satisfied. Determined to permit no occasion to pass where American claims might be sacrificed, Roosevelt had chosen three gentlemen whose impartiality to the question was non-existent. The first of these was Senator Lodge himself, who was and had been publicly outspoken in his denunciation of Canada's assertions in the boundary matter. Lodge was an extreme nationalist, tried to out-Roosevelt Roosevelt in 'one-hundred-per-cent-Americanism', and was an Anglophobe at heart. The second man appointed was Senator Turner of the state of Washington, a man representing the northwestern states' cry for no quarter on the boundary dispute and an advocate of the school which would see the United States occupy the disputed territory by force rather than compromise with Canada. The third member of this impartial panel was Secretary of War Root, a member of Roosevelt's cabinet, and a staunch upholder of the Republican administration. To his credit it must be said that he was reluctant to accept the appointment and that he had a better legal mind than his brother members. But under no stretch of the imagination could he be called truly impartial.

12 Senator Lodge gave a paper on the part he played in the dispute in 1925. A large part of Lodge's paper is reproduced in the article "Henry Cabot Lodge and the Alaska Boundary Dispute" by a Canadian geographer, James White. This article appeared in the December, 1925 issue of the Canadian Historical Review. The Senate consequently ratified the convention on February 11, 1903, and Great Britain on February 16, 1903.
The public announcement of the American members of the tribunal brought forth a storm of protest in Canada, Great Britain and to some extent, in the United States. Sir Michael Herbert was "disgusted and dismayed," and bemoaned the part politics played in American foreign affairs. Lord Minto believed the United States behaved "quite disgracefully." In the United States one of the usually pro-Republican newspapers expressed the opinion held by many others of the selection:

If the President were to seek the country over for men who were entirely without judicial quality on this question, he could not find persons whose minds are more set than Messrs. Lodge, Turner and Root. Their selection cannot be interpreted in any other way than that the President intends to block the slightest chance of decision in the least favorable to Canada.

From London White reported that the British were surprised, dismayed and embarrassed, and were fearful of Canadian reaction. In the Dominion itself, "the storm of protest that

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13 Writing to Lord Lansdowne on February 21, 1903, Herbert added: "The question is: what is to be done? I realize the impossible position in which the Laurier Government has been placed in Canada, and they have every right to complain... but in spite of this, it would be useless and inadvisable for them to protest, and folly to break off as Laurier suggests, for the consequences would be too grave to contemplate. Moreover, the more I appreciate the temper of the politicians in Washington in regard to the Alaska Boundary, the more I realize the paramount importance of having the question settled." (Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne, London, Macmillan and Co., 1929, p.262)

14 Quoted in Keenleyside, op. cit., pp. 219-20, from the Springfield Republican, February 23, 1903.

15 Hay replied that he understood the British objections, but stated that "the President thought it was impossible to get the treaty through the Senate without the earnest and devoted assistance of Lodge and Turner and of the groups they represented." (Nevins, op. cit., p. 195)
followed... was vigorous, wide-spread and sustained beyond anything in the country's annals." The Canadian protest was voiced in London in no uncertain terms. The Colonial Office, in reply, informed the Governor-General:

His Majesty's government were as much surprised as your ministers at the selection of the American members of the tribunal.

His Majesty's government are convinced that it would be useless to press the United States to withdraw the names put forward, and arguments against the personal fitness of the three American representatives, however convincing, would fail to lead to any practical result.

In any event, the British government had ratified the convention on February 16. Placed in a position where it could break off negotiations altogether or accept the uncompromising demands of Roosevelt, Great Britain choose the latter alternative in the belief that it was to Canada's interest -- and especially in the Empire's interest -- that the tribunal should be held. Canada bowed to the inevitable.


17 Quoted in John S Ewart, The Kingdom of Canada and Other Essays, Toronto, Morang and Co., Ltd., 1908, p. 308. (Chamberlain to Lord Minto, February 26, 1903)

18 Laurier appealed directly to Hay to have the American selection revised. In a letter to Hay, (February 24, 1903), the Canadian Prime Minister wrote: "I appeal to you that these gentlemen, under existing circumstances, cannot with any fairness be styled 'impartial jurists.' I do not press the point with Mr. Root; I learn on good authority that before assuming his duties as a member of the court he will have ceased to be a member of the Administration, and therein lies the sole ground of objection against him as an impartial jurist." (P.C. Jessup, Elihu Root, New York, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1938, vol. 1, p. 393.) Root's proffered resignation did not take place until some time after his service on the tribunal.
On her side, Canada chose as members of the tribunal Sir Louis A. Jette, a former puisne judge of the Quebec Supreme Court and the Lieutenant-Governor of that province; and Mr. Justice George Armour of the Supreme Court of Canada. The third member was Lord Alverstone, the Lord Chief Justice of England, who was chosen by the British government as its representative. It was generally considered that Alverstone would cast the decisive vote in the tribunal, and as it turned out the supposition was correct.

During March and April the United States and Great Britain were busy preparing their respective cases which were to be exchanged on May 2. In the midst of these negotiations Roosevelt became convinced that Laurier was not acting in the friendly, impartial spirit which the President expected. Therefore Roosevelt sent a memorandum to the three American members in which he gave his views as to what he expected the American members to do on the tribunal. In it Roosevelt vigorously denounced the chief Canadian claims as untenable, and one in particular so out of line as to render it improper to bring into open discussion! Roosevelt warned them that there should

19 When Mr. Justice Armour died a few months later, his place was taken by Allen B. Aylesworth, K. C., a distinguished Toronto barrister. One writer says of Canada's choice: "To the United States the selection of such men must have seemed a quiet yet eloquent rebuke." (Lionel M. Gelber, The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship, Oxford University Press, 1938, p. 148.) However, it is very doubtful if such a rebuke ever penetrated the armour of national self-righteousness which Roosevelt donned on this occasion.
be no compromise on the principle involved in the American contention for the Alaska panhandle, and that in his judgment
"the question is not one... in which it is possible for a moment to consider a reconciling of conflicting claims by mutual concession." Roosevelt left no question in the minds of the American commissioners as to the verdict he expected.

Late in May and early in June the British government requested permission to photograph a large number of primary documents in Washington pertaining to the dispute for transmission to London where they could be studied by the British delegates and their advisers. Secretary Hay agreed to this 'unusual' request but pointed out that "the United States is desirous of avoiding all unnecessary delay...." Shortly thereafter Hay was informed by Sir Michael Herbert that further extensions might be requested in order to give time to the British counsels to prepare the British counter-case, for there were many documents still unexamined yet pertinent to the case. Some suggestion was made that the oral argument should be set back until October in order to allow the British more time, but with little effect.

The British endeavours to postpone the meeting of the tribunal and the general dilatoriness of the British began to rouse Roosevelt's temper. Senator Lodge was even more angry. He protested to Roosevelt that delaying the meeting of the tribunal to October would not only be personally inconvenient to him, but suggested that the proposed delay to a time so

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20 See, Appendix E
near the meeting of Congress was a British attempt to keep himself and Root from serving on the tribunal. If there was to be any delay, Lodge preferred that it be extended until next summer.

Roosevelt bristled with indignation at the thought of delay and at possible British trickery behind it. He replied to Lodge:

I am by no means certain that I would acquiesce in deferring the matter until next summer. I do not want it hanging on during the presidential campaign. I dislike making any kind of threat (sic), but my present judgment is that if the British play fast and loose the thing to do is to declare the negotiations off, recite our case in the message to Congress, and ask for an appropriation to run the boundary as we deem it should be run.... The English behaved badly in the Venezuela dispute despite the fact that we had behaved with scrupulous care and impartiality during the Boer War. I don't intend that they should do any shuffling now.

In this same mood of truculence and righteousness, Roosevelt decided that the British should clearly understand his determination to have the tribunal give a 'correct' verdict, and that they should be informed what to expect if this verdict was not forthcoming. Avoiding the regular diplomatic channels, he wrote a letter to his friend, Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then visiting in England, with the idea in mind that Holmes would show the contents of the letter to

22 There is no indication in Canadian or British sources that such was the intention of the British or Canadian government.

23 Lodge, op. cit., p. 37.

24 June 23, 1903. For the full text of this letter, see Appendix #f.
the British Colonial Secretary and other men in high governmental office. It was a demanding and uncompromising letter, well sprinkled with thinly veiled threats of unilateral action should disagreement or deadlock result in the tribunal. It was a perfect example of the sword-rattling tactics one usually associates with the Kaiser, but it was typical of the 'big stick' tactics Roosevelt employed in the following months.

The double theme of speed and American righteousness was used by Roosevelt time and again during the summer of 1903. Denouncing the continued British efforts to postpone the hearings, Roosevelt told Hay that

... if the English decline to come to an agreement this fall, under any pretense, I shall feel it is simply due to bad faith,—that they have no sincere desire to settle the matter equitably. I think that they ought to be made to understand that... the agreement must be kept....

A short time later he threatened:

With England over the Alaska business, I do hope she will understand that if we can't come to an agreement now nothing will be left the United States but to act in a way which will necessarily wound British pride.

The numerous strong notes Roosevelt sent Secretary Hay were in turn forwarded by Hay to Choate, White, and others in England in order that the President's opinions would "percolate"


26 Dennis, op. cit., p. 145. Choate, in London, "expressed the opinion that the British were so 'staggered' by the strength of the American case that they would keep on striving to 'get all the delay they can'". (Tansill, op. cit., p. 40.)
through to the British government. The various requests made by Great Britain in July that the oral arguments be postponed were looked upon with suspicion, and indicative of the weakness of the Canadian claim. Roosevelt sent out constant reminders to Hay and Choate that Great Britain "must be kept up to the mark" and that no shilly-shallying would be permitted.

Due to these constant proddings by Roosevelt, the counter-cases were exchanged on time, and the date for the oral arguments was set for September. In the meantime, Senator Lodge had gone to London 'to prepare the ground', as he called it, and to see for himself what progress was being made. He added his weight to the constant unofficial pressure on the British government for a decision favorable to the United States, and intimated strongly to Chamberlain, Balfour and others that Roosevelt looked upon the present tribunal as Great Britain's last chance to come to an agreement over the boundary problem by consultation. Early in August he wrote Roosevelt of the situation as it appeared to him. He believed

> The only question is whether Lord Alverstone will go with us on the main points.... Very likely he will, but England is in such mortal terror of Canada that I feel more than doubtful in regard to it.

> The fact is that Canada is in the worst possible of positions of possessing powers unaccompanied by any responsibility.  

The first meeting of the boundary tribunal took place on September 5, 1905, and after a method of procedure had been

27 Lodge, op. cit., pp. 41--42.
agreed upon, the members got down to work on September 15. It soon became apparent that the two leading points of controversy were whether the Alaska panhandle included the heads of the salt-water inlets and whether the water boundary through the Portland Canal in the vicinity of 54° 40' was located north or south of a few uninhabited islands. Furthermore, both the Canadians and Americans became more fully convinced that Lord Alverstone's judgment would be the deciding vote. The Canadians, therefore, stressed Imperial interests, while the American delegates stressed the dire consequences of a pro-Canadian decision.

Roosevelt continued to keep up a steady stream of correspondence with the American delegates in London and others who might in some way promote the American cause. In all the letters the theme was rarely varied; the United States must be granted its claims—or else. On September 26 he wrote White:

It would be a bad thing for us if there was a deadlock in the present Commission; but it would be a very much worse thing for the Canadians and the English, because it would leave me with no alternative but to declare as courteously, but as strongly as possible, that the efforts to reach an agreement having failed, I should be obliged to treat the territory as ours, as being for the most part in our possession, and the remainder to be reduced to possession as soon as in our judgment it was advisable—and to declare furthermore that no additional negotiations of any kind would be entered into.

28 Nevins, op. cit., p. 199. "It was evident that White was expected to convey the gist of these letters to members of the British government, and... he did so." (Loc. cit.)
Early in October, when the Canadians were protesting their case with more than usual vigor, Hay sent two letters to White telling him specifically to see Balfour and to impress on him the American stand. White saw the British Prime Minister on the following weekend, and on October 4, he reported that he had had a long talk with Balfour during which I left no doubt upon his mind as to the importance of a settlement nor as to the result of a failure to agree. He [Balfour] said that he attached far more importance to the agreement of the tribunal than to any of the Cabinet questions... With which he was then bothered, and that he thought it would be little short of disaster if the tribunal broke up without a decision. 29

About the same time Roosevelt was writing to Root:

I do wish they [the British] could understand that this is their last chance, and that though it would be unpleasant for us, if they force me to do what I must do in case they fail to make advantage of this chance, it will be a thousand-fold more unpleasant to them. 30

There is little doubt that the American representatives in London were relying upon political pressure rather than a judicial decision to achieve a 'correct' verdict, despite the undoubted strength of their own case. Moreover, Lodge and several other associates believed—or hoped—that the British government would act according to such pressure. Roosevelt's notes to White, Root, Lodge and others were not written with the idea of strengthening the resolution of the American

29 Nevins, op. cit., p. 200. White then suggested to the Prime Minister that Alverstone be told that the British government, "without in any way wishing to influence him," was most anxious for a decision. White's suggestion can hardly be called subtle.

30 Jessup, op. cit., p. 379.
members, nor were Hay's frequent memoranda to the same people written as directives of policy. Rather they were excellent letters to have on hand when visiting influential British ministers and civil servants, to be 'discreetly' shown at the proper time and place as representing the alternative to a decision against the American contentions. Such were the methods used to make the British government thoroughly aware of the consequences should the imperial bonds prove too strong, and "it is inconceivable that Lord Alverstone should have remained unaware of it."

The last days of the tribunal seem to bear out the general belief that Alverstone realized the serious effects a deadlock would bring. After the oral arguments had come to an end, Alverstone remained stubborn in his opinion that the width of the lisière that went around the inlets should be restricted. The line he had chosen "was in effect a compromise line," and from this point on, the decisions reached appeared to be through compromise rather than through judicial review. For example on October 12 Lord Alverstone gave his written opinion to his colleagues on the tribunal that the boundary line ran north of the four islands at the mouth of the Portland Canal. Two days later he revised his decision, conceding the two northern islands to the United States, despite the fact that the six delegates were called upon to establish whether the line ran

31 Jessup, op. cit., p. 400.
32 Tansill, op. cit., p. 259.
either completely north or completely south of the islands. It is difficult to imagine that such an action was entirely devoid of diplomatic pressure and founded solely on judicial consideration.

The award of the tribunal was made public on October 20, 1903. Lord Alverstone voted with the American delegates upholding their contention that in the original Anglo-Russian treaty of 1825, the wording was such that the *lisière* was meant to follow the sinuosities of the coast rather than the general trend of the coast-line. The American reaction, quite naturally, was that justice had triumphed.

President Roosevelt, as usual, was quite pleased with himself in the way he handled the Alaska boundary dispute. He had no compunction, either during the sitting of the tribunal or afterwards, about the methods he employed to secure a favorable decision. In fact he later boasted of his open, if indirect, methods by remarking: "While John Hay was a fine Secretary of State, he was much too gentle a person to handle the kind of a big stick that was necessary in this particular connection."

It is difficult to fathom Roosevelt's reasoning when he

33 The Canadian members accused Alverstone of a breach of faith, and refused to affix their signatures to the award. Both then and afterwards, in speeches and in letters, Alverstone maintained that he gave a judicial decision, and that if the Canadians did not like his decision, they 'should not have chosen a British judge' to sit on the Tribunal.

34 A discussion of the deep Canadian reactions is outside the scope of this thesis.

35 Tansill, *op. cit.*, p. 263.
speaks of the 'big stick' being necessary on this occasion, especially so when one remembers that the American case was sufficiently strong at the outset, and that in 1902 and 1903 the boundary dispute was not a dangerous problem. The modus vivendi had worked well, and although awkward and sometimes irritating, could have continued to work until such time as a calm, judicial decision could be reached or a practical compromise worked out. Giving strength to this latter theory is the fact that the Klondike fields were becoming less important yearly after 1898.

Thus to understand Roosevelt's actions one must look not so much to his reasoning but to his nationalism. It was this emotion, more than any other, that led him to insist on the tribunal arriving at a 'correct' decision. He believed his country to be in the right—of that there is no doubt. What is more, it is generally conceded by Canadian historians that the Canadian claim was weak. But Roosevelt, once he had seized upon a "righteous cause," especially when it concerned the United States' relation with another nation, was not content to follow the usual procedure to settle such differences as existed via the normal diplomatic channels. Whether the dispute was with a weak power such as Colombia or a strong power such as Great Britain, the claims of the United States needs must be given priority, and since, as Roosevelt believed, the United States was inevitably in the right, justice must triumph. The haze of nationalism surrounding Roosevelt usually prevented him from seeing that Justice held a two-edged sword.
Chapter V

Theodore Roosevelt and Europe

The Algeciras Conference
Almost all the diplomatic problems between the United States and the European powers during Roosevelt's presidency were those having to do with the principles of the Monroe Doctrine as applied to the Western Hemisphere. The main exception was the Algeciras Conference, where to an extent at least, Roosevelt again strained the concepts of the doctrine and meddled in the affairs of Europe.

This chapter will deal with the part Roosevelt played in that conference, with emphasis on the American viewpoint, and with due regard to the relatively small part Roosevelt had in the negotiations, both directly and indirectly.

Roosevelt had little interest in Morocco, and his knowledge of the tangled web of European diplomacy was quite meager. Thus when the Moroccan crisis of 1905 loomed over Europe, he was unable to grasp the significance of the aims and motives of the various powers at the conference.

In essence, the Moroccan crisis came about as a result of the long-standing rivalry between France and Germany which had its most immediate origins in 1871 and its results in 1914. There were five European nations which had or claimed a primary interest in Morocco: France, Italy, Spain, Great Britain and Germany. After the turn of the century, the interest of these countries was heightened for Morocco was rapidly becoming a vacuum of power owing to the corruption and weakness of the Sultan. It was a situation in which European imperialism flourished, and one also where the rivalry of the powers was quite likely to come into conflict.

The French government, through its Foreign Minister, M.
Delcassé worked hard and dexterously to prevent such a conflict. France was extremely interested in the fate of Morocco. To the French, "the safety and destiny of Algeria, as well as their aspirations for a great North African Colonial Empire, made it imperative [that they] extend their control over Morocco either by police supervision, or by a protectorate, or by direct annexation."

Italy also had looked upon Morocco as presenting a possible opportunity for fulfilling her dreams of an empire in the Mediterranean. However, in 1900, Italy's claim to Morocco had been bought off by France by a secret agreement whereby France promised not to oppose Italian aspirations in Tripoli in return for Italy's recognition of France's primary interest in Morocco.

Spain's interest in Morocco was primarily geographical, and on the whole did not interfere with French interests. Nevertheless, Delcassé took pains to clarify this divergence of interest by a secret agreement in 1902 which provided for the eventual partition of Morocco on fairly definite geographical lines.

The relations of France and Great Britain in the Moroccan question were much more involved, but can be stated here in general terms. Both nations were concerned with the control of the Mediterranean, and both had been rivals in the partition of Africa. However, since the Fashoda incident, responsible

men in both countries had sought to bring their respective nations into closer and more friendly relations with each other. Great Britain had been impressed with the necessity of retreating from her 'splendid isolation.' France, and especially M. Delcasse, wanted British friendship to offset the increasing armed strength of Germany and the decreasing strength of her ally, Russia. As a result, Franco-British relations improved steadily, and in 1903 especially, great strides were made towards solving the outstanding differences existing between the two countries. In the following year Great Britain and France inaugurated an Entente Cordiale. Among other problems solved was that of Morocco. The basic agreement was that Great Britain would support French plans in Morocco with the understanding that France henceforth recognize Britain's primary interest in Egypt.

In April, 1904, the news of the Anglo-French rapprochement was made public. In Germany the news was received with considerable apprehension. Germany's interest in Morocco was largely commercial, and up until the time of the announcement

2 The Russo-Japanese War broke out in February, 1904, and was to last almost two years. Russia was the ally of France, and Japan the ally of Great Britain. However neither country was drawn into the war since the Franco-Russian alliance was confined to Europe and the Anglo-Japanese alliance was defensive, not offensive.

3 For obvious reasons, those articles dealing with the eventual partition of Morocco in the agreement were kept secret. For the texts of all the secret conventions mentioned above, see G. W. Prothero, French Morocco, London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1920, pp. 64--74.
of the Entente Cordiale, her chief aim in Morocco was to secure an 'open door' for her businessmen.

After the announcement, Germany waited to be officially notified by France of the agreements entered into and for guarantees of Germany's commercial interests. When this notification failed to materialize, "Bulow felt that Germany had been slighted, and that prestige as well as her material interests had been injured." Moreover, there was a growing fear in Germany that the Entente might turn into an alliance, a prospect that was to be combatted with all vigor.

With each passing month it became increasingly clear to Germany that Delcassé had no intention of revealing the details of the Anglo-French agreement. Early in 1905, Bulow devised a plan whereby German prestige might be regained in the Moroccan problem and which might also result in the sundering of the Entente Cordiale. Acting according to this plan, German representatives in Morocco began to encourage the Sultan of Morocco to resist French efforts to bring order out of near chaos in that country. They were quite successful in their designs. When France attempted to reorganize Morocco's finances, and urged that the Moroccan police be officered by Frenchmen, the Sultan protested that such actions would be an

4 Fay, op. cit., p. 179.

5 To break up the Anglo-French "allignment and safeguard their own prestige and diplomatic preponderence was the task to which henceforth the German Government dedicated themselves; and by contesting French conduct in Morocco they could undertake it the more readily because about that their protest did not lack justification." (Lionel M. Gelber, The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, p. 187).
infringement of his sovereignty. At this psychological moment, the German Kaiser landed at Tangier. There he announced his conviction that the Sultan was, and should continue to be, an independent monarch. It was a challenge to France and to French prestige, and caused a major crisis.

The second part of the German plan was to call a conference of the interested powers to determine the future of Morocco. Such a conference would not only check what secret plans France had for Morocco, but what is more, Germany could pose as one interested solely in the 'open door' principle and a protector of Moroccan independence. Under such circumstances, Germany turned to President Roosevelt as one most likely to support her in achieving the success of her plan.

During the Spring of 1905, Roosevelt and the Kaiser had been in correspondence with each other over the possibility of peace in the Russo-Japanese War, and for various reasons,

6 On March 31, 1905.

7 On March 10, 1905, Russia had been badly defeated at Mukden. France realized she could not count upon effective assistance from her ally in case of war at this time. Great Britain was also alarmed. The British wanted no Kaiser to act as the protector of Islam, nor a German naval base in the Mediterranean Sea.

8 "Both for Paris and Berlin it was a question not merely of material interests but of national prestige." (G. P. Good, Before the War, Studies in Diplomacy, London, Longmans Green and Co., 1938, vol. 1, p. 6)

9 The Kaiser tried to make Roosevelt believe that Britain and France wished to intervene in the peace negotiations and so claim compensation from China as the price of intervention. For other instances of the Kaiser's attempts to use Roosevelt against the Dual Alliance and Entente, see Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, New York, Doubleday, Page and Co., 1925, pp. 78--9 ff.
the Kaiser was led to the erroneous belief that he had some influence over the American President. In the midst of this correspondence, the Kaiser instructed the German ambassador in Washington, Von Sternberg, to hand Roosevelt a memorandum on the Moroccan problem. The Memorandum stressed the Kaiser's apprehension over French and Spanish aims in Morocco, which he thought favored 'a policy of prohibitive restriction'. Also, Roosevelt was told that:

The Emperor feels sure that if a keen interest were shown in the maintenance of the open door in Morocco and in the improvement of her internal conditions by a power outside of France, the whole question of Morocco could be rapidly and peacefully settled. 10

The memorandum ended with the suggestion that Germany and the United States independently announce their conviction that a conference of powers would be in the best interests of all concerned.

Roosevelt's reply was courteous but not enthusiastic. On April 5 the Kaiser again communicated with Roosevelt through Von Sternberg. This time the Kaiser maintained that France and Great Britain were allies, were plotting to gain holds on Korea as well as Morocco, and that German dignity "makes it necessary for [Germany] to point out to France that her national interests cannot be disposed of without asking for her consent

and co-operation." Similar communications followed, all stressing the necessity of calling a conference, and each expressing the Kaiser's fear of a variety of alliances which he felt being formed against Germany.

The repeated appeals of the Kaiser had little effect on Roosevelt at first. He had been receiving similar warnings from Cecil Spring-Rice, the First Secretary of the British Embassy in St. Petersburg. Spring-Rice, Roosevelt's close friend for a score of years, was equally urgent in warning Roosevelt that Germany had plans involving an alliance with Russia, was seeking compensation in the Far East, and had similar dark schemes. Thus Roosevelt believed that both Germany and Great Britain were unnecessarily afraid of each other's motives. He wrote to Secretary Taft on the matter:

... I am sincerely desirous to bring about a better state of feeling between England and Germany. Each nation is working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other, each from sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser is dead sure that England intends to attack him. The English Government... and a large share of the English people are equally sure that Germany intends to attack England. Now, in my view, this action of Germany in embroiling herself with France over Morocco is proof positive that she was not the slightest intention of attacking England.

It was with such 'proof positive' reasoning as this that President Roosevelt viewed European affairs.

The war scare continued to grow in Europe, and the Kaiser's messages to Roosevelt continued to emphasize Germany's


12 Ibid., p. 472. (April 20, 1905)
fear of encirclement. By May mention was made of the possibility of Germany fighting a preventative war against France. This time the Kaiser accused England of being instrumental in preventing France from accepting a conference, and he requested Roosevelt to suggest to the British that a conference should be held. By the end of May, therefore, Roosevelt was really concerned "lest Germany should actually start marching over the French border where the British fleet would be of no assistance."

The same concern was held by the French public. Even after the Kaiser's speech at Tangier, Delcassé remained firm in his stand that Germany should not be consulted as to the future of Morocco. However, opposition to his stand was increasing steadily, and by the end of May the French government was faced with the alternative of accepting Delcassé's resignation or accepting the possibility of war with Germany. With Russia bogged down in the Far East, the former course was taken. Delcassé resigned on June 6, 1905.

With Delcassé removed from Office, the main obstacle to

13 Dennett, op. cit., p. 147. Moreover, Roosevelt "feared that a war in Europe would imperil the peace negotiations between Russia and Japan, precipitating in all probability a world conflict." (Loc. cit.,)

14 "Political jealousy because of his long tenure in office, dislike of his secretiveness, enmity between him and [the French Premier, Rouvier]. . . . . hostility because of his defending the Russian government in the massacre of January 22, 1905— all these forces of opposition were now strengthened by the fact that the Foreign Minister had blundered. . . . ." (Eugene N. Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis, The University of Chicago Press, 1930, p. 203.)
the proposed conference was eliminated. Later in June, Roosevelt added his voice to that of the Kaiser favoring the conference, not because of the Kaiser's influence, but for the simple reason that he believed it was the one way to prevent war. It had the desired effect. In July, arrangements were made to hold the conference at Algeciras. The Kaiser was most happy, believing he had secured "Roosevelt's assistance in extracting the chestnut of German prestige from the fire of European diplomatic maneuverings."

The representatives of the thirteen countries at the Algeciras Conference began their discussions on January 16, 1906. The chief American representatives were Henry White and Samuel Gummere. Roosevelt was not strictly impartial as

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15 The suggestion that a conference be held was made formally by the Sultan of Morocco, although German diplomacy was behind the move. "This proposal France also considered a national humiliation at the hands of Germany." (Dennis op. cit., p. 491) The removal of Delcasse paved the way for the acceptance of a conference for France, but not for a Franco-German understanding by any means.

16 Roosevelt wrote of the Kaiser to a friend a few weeks previously: "I get exasperated with the Kaiser because of his sudden vagaries, like this Moroccan policy... and I cannot of course follow or take too seriously a man whose policy is one of such violent and often wholly irrational zigzags." Dennett, op. cit., p. 491)

17 Pringle, op. cit., p. 391.

18 Secretary Root's estimate of White: "He was an excellent man for that [i.e., as representing the United States at the Conference] though not the creator of great things. He had great social graces and the training of a diplomat. He knew how to manoeuvre with diplomats." (P. C. Jessup, Elihu Root, New York, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1938, vol. 11, p. 57.) Gummere was a minor diplomat and unimportant to this thesis.
to the course the American representatives should take. In a confidential letter to White before the conference opened, he wrote:

I want to keep on good terms with Germany, and if possible to prevent a rupture between Germany and France. But my sympathies have at bottom been with France and I suppose will continue so. Still I shall try to hold on an even keel. 19

Secretary of State Root drafted the official instructions to White and Gummere. These instructions were in very general terms. The main interest of the United States was to maintain peace in Morocco and secure an 'open door' for American commercial interests. However, Root, too, was not without some bias in the affair. On the same day he forwarded the instructions to White, Root enclosed a confidential letter to him which read in part:

I have been told by someone that Gummere is strongly pro-German in Morocco matters.

This, if true, must not be allowed to throw us over into even apparent antagonism to the Anglo-French entente, or to make us a means of breaking that up. It is useful to us as well as agreeable. 20

It became obvious very quickly that of the problems to be solved by the conference, those concerning the nature of the police control to be established in Morocco and the character of the international bank to be set up for managing Morocco's

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19 Alan Nevins, Henry White, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1930, p. 267. There was a definite reaction on Roosevelt's part to the flow of the Kaiser's 'alarms and excursions' within his notes to the President.

20 Jessup, op. cit., p. 54.
The French believed they should control the police, or at the most, share it with the Spanish. Germany wanted police control confided to small neutral countries. The French delegates, as White wrote a friend,

... believed that their national dignity was involved; their officers and police instructors had been in Morocco for some time past, and the government resented any question of their fairness, while it was agreed that the French had seventy million francs invested in Morocco against Germany's five millions.

When Germany remained adamant to compromise even after France had offered to share the policing with Spain, White, acting as a modifying influence on the delegates of both nations, turned to Roosevelt to put pressure on Germany. On February 13, acting through Root, Roosevelt asked White what he thought would be a fair settlement. White had conversations with the French and German delegates to sound them out as to the limits each would go in reaching a compromise. Then on February 16 he cabled his opinions to Washington. Briefly, White suggested a police force under the direction of French and Spanish officers, these officers to make an annual report

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21 The British backed up their French comrades throughout the conference. "Grey's policy at Algeciras was to keep the Entente Cordiale alive." (Gooch, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 271) For an intimate view of how the British supported the French, and often appeared to take the initiative, in the Algeciras Conference, see Harold Nicolson, Sir Arthur Nicolson—First Lord Carnock, London, Constable and Company, Ltd., 1930.

22 Nevins, op. cit., p. 271.
to the Sultan of Morocco and to Italy. Further, White thought that the proposed bank should be owned equally by all the powers with slight preference to France. He summed up the feeling at the conference by concluding: "If Germany be quite resolved not to accept French and Spanish police, I think they ought to say so and break up the Conference." 23

The President was quick to forward White's suggestions, with few alterations, to the Kaiser. Four days later the Kaiser replied saying that he remained "of the opinion that the Sultan should be permitted a free choice among the other nations." During the deadlock of the next two weeks White did his best to bring the views of the German and French representatives into closer harmony. The results were discouraging, so again Roosevelt used his circuitous diplomatic channels to put pressure on the Kaiser. On March 7, Roosevelt sent a note to the Kaiser in which he referred to the Kaiser's message to him of almost a year ago (June 28, 1905). Thinking he had Roosevelt 'in the palm of his hand', the Kaiser had told the President that "in case, during the coming Conference, differences of opinion should arise between France and Germany, [the Kaiser], in every case, will be ready to break up the

23 Nevins, op. cit., p. 274. The German delegates at Algeciras caused a great deal of irritation by their so called 'smokescreen' diplomatic tactics.

24 Roosevelt did not follow closely the negotiations at the conference, "but [he] did step in and bring pressure on the Kaiser when White reported that such action was necessary ...." (Jessup, op. cit., p. 57.)

decision which you [Roosevelt] should consider to be the most fair and the most practical."

It was a most unfortunate suggestion, for Roosevelt how thought it was time for the Kaiser to redeem his promise, and consequently 'earnestly urged' the Emperor to accept the views outlined in his note of February 19.

Before this note was answered, Germany, working through Austria-Hungary, offered a new suggestion on the police question. This scheme would divide the control of the police among the French, Spanish, Dutch and Swiss, with each having a certain number of seaports under its control. White wired Washington that the French were willing to compromise on a Dutch or Swiss Inspector-General of police, but never to having such a distribution of control as had been recently proposed.

Roosevelt agreed with the French. He saw Von Sternberg a few days after he received this wire and pointed out to him the fallacies in the Austrian proposal. Referring to the police question, the President said:

The Austrian proposal in my mind is absurd, because it favors the very ideas the Conference has been trying to eliminate, namely, partition and spheres of influence. Placing French and Spanish officers in the same ports given—according to my views a safer guarantee than plac

26 Bishop, op. cit., p. 493

27 Russia and Great Britain thought France might allow a Dutch or Swiss police commander in Casablanca where German commercial interests predominated, but they, with the remainder of those nations supporting France, continued to present a united front against Germany whenever a vote was taken.
ing them separately in single ports. This has distinctly the flavor of a French, a Spanish, and a Dutch or Swiss sphere of influence. I also do not see how the duties of the police inspector can be made compatible with military discipline. Austria wants an officer, who performs the same duties in the port of Casablanca as his French and Spanish comrades do, to act in all ports as their superior and inspector. This would bring friction at the start. The proposal I suggested is the better and safer and the only one I can support.

This strong oral denunciation of what was really Germany's effort to counter French control of Morocco’s police was followed up by an equally strong written note to Von Sternberg for transmission to Berlin. This written note was an elaboration of the views Roosevelt expressed above. Secretary Root's gentle hand presented the President's opinions with more tact, however, although his opinions were crystal clear. After pointing out the danger which would probably result if the Austrian suggestion was followed, Root added:

If we had sufficient interest in Morocco to make it worth our while, we should seriously object, on our own account, to the adoption of any such arrangement.

We have not, however, any such substantial interest in Morocco.... Our chief wish is to be of service in promoting a peaceable settlement of the controversy.... Under the guidance of that wish we shall accept whatever arrangement the European Powers, represented at Algeciras, agree upon.


29 Bishop, op. cit., p. 499. (Sent March 17). To crack the whip over the Kaiser's head and so have him agree with what he considered the moderate French proposals, the President informed Von Sternberg that if there was a break-up on the issue, he would publish all the correspondence between himself and the Kaiser. This, Roosevelt warned, would cause the American public to "feel a grave suspicion of Germany's justice and good faith...." (Loc. cit.) Should the Emperor agree, however, Roosevelt promised to give Germany full credit for what was done.
The Kaiser and his advisers had played their final hand and lost. France, and those supporting her, refused to be moved by the Austrian—or-German—proposals. Germany was forced to yield to the former French compromise, with the stipulation that there be a Swiss Inspector-General of police, who should report annually to the Diplomatic Corps in Morocco. France agreed to the stipulation. On April 6, 1905, the treaty was signed by all the powers at the conference, and it was ratified by the United States' Senate on December 12.

The results of the Algeciras Conference meant comparatively little to the United States. Her trade with Morocco was as small as her interest in the country. The conference did reaffirm the 'open door' principle, and the consequent im-

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30 The French ambassador in Washington, Jusserand, was a close friend of Roosevelt's, and had been kept informed of Roosevelt's views on Morocco. These he had forwarded to the French delegates at Algeciras, which in turn strengthened their stand. On the day Root wrote Von Spernberg, (March 17), Roosevelt cabled White: "The very fact of the division of the ports implies existence of special rights on the part of the three countries in the ports assigned to them respectively. The immediate effect can only be the creation of three separate spheres of influence, with inferior right and opportunity on the part of all the other Powers. And the nations to whom these spheres are assigned may be expected in the ordinary course of events to enter into complete control." (Nevins, op. cit., p. 277) Roosevelt instructed White to show this note to the British and French delegates at the conference!

31 After this, the problem of the international bank was rapidly solved.

32 When White cabled the text of the General Act in which the formal results of the Conference were embodied, Roosevelt "instructed him to make a reservation in behalf of the United States.... [This reservation] disavowed any political interest in Morocco and the assumption of any responsibility for the enforcement of the provisions agreed upon." (Jessup, op. cit., p. 59).
provement of the Moroccan police force afforded greater protection to such American citizens as visited or lived in Morocco. To Roosevelt, however, the conference meant that war had been prevented, due in large measure to his own actions.

With the wisdom of hindsight, one can see that the Algeciras Conference was but one of the many incidents on the road to the First World War. Yet remembering Roosevelt's ignorance of the deeper levels of European diplomacy, his lack of knowledge of the various secret conventions and shifting alignments among the European powers, one can easily understand his pride of achievement at the time.

Roosevelt believed he was acting fairly in relation to the problem as it unfolded. He was unable to keep an 'even keel' of neutrality or impartiality as he wished, but his change of opinion was due largely to the erratic and mischievous behaviour of the Kaiser rather than any strong preconceived prejudice on the merits of the case at issue.

Despite the confidential letters of Root and Roosevelt to White before the conference, the American delegates were as neutral as any of the representatives at the conference. The United States had no 'axe to grind' nor backed any ally, openly or secretly. Roosevelt sought no control of territory or naval base, nor did he seek any compensation -- for example, a French island in the Caribbean -- for such services he rendered. The presence of the American delegates at the conference was not the result of following any cardinal principle of American foreign policy. The United States kept entirely
clear of the flourishing imperialism in Africa, and sought merely the protection of its national interests, as did the other neutral nations.

American interests, both commercial and political, were indeed small; and Roosevelt stressed this fact many times to the Kaiser to account for the president's reticence when the subject of a conference was first broached. In assessing Roosevelt's success in the European diplomatic scene, one must remember that fortune and a set of circumstances beyond his knowledge played a large part in bringing about a solution such as he wished in the Moroccan problem. Yet conceding these factors, Roosevelt gave an interesting performance in his self-cast character as a 'dove of peace.'
Chapter VI

Roosevelt and the Far East
During the years of his presidency, the most important part Theodore Roosevelt played in Far Eastern affairs was his role of mediator in the Russo-Japanese war. This chapter will be concerned mainly with this aspect of American foreign relations, and will touch briefly on Japanese-American relations following the end of the war.

The Far Eastern policy of the United States had all but crystallized by 1898. As one historian describes it:

Its fundamental aim was commercial, not political. Equal commercial opportunities for Americans; no territorial concessions for the United States; a strong Eastern Asia to resist a designing Europe; restrictions of Oriental immigration into the United States; peace, amity, trade—these were its objectives.

The commercial interest of the United States in China found expression in the famous "Open Door" notes of Secretary of State John Hay. Shortly after these notes were sent to the various interested powers, the Boxer uprising broke out. American troops were included in the international army that subdued the Chinese ultra-nationalists. The inclusion of American troops in such an expedition was a result of the increased political interest of the United States in China since President McKinley had decided the Philippines were to remain under American protection. The Boxer uprising had little effect on the basic policy of the United States towards the Orient. In a note to


2 Hay's "Open Door" policy was based on consent and mutual suspicion. American influence was to equalize the balance of power in the Far East whenever possible.
the powers who participated in the international army, Secretary Hay reiterated that

... the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. 3

China, indeed, was the 'sick man of Asia'. During the 19th century, especially the latter decades of that century, the European powers had been taking advantage of her weakness to wring commercial concessions for themselves. Great Britain, Russia, and Germany were the most active powers in this respect until the advent of the Sino-Japanese war. At this point Japan made her strongest bid for a major share of the Chinese trade, and in so doing, placed herself in a position where a clash with Russia seemed inevitable.

The sweeping success of Japan in the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 had momentus results. Almost overnight it raised Japan to the status of a Great Power. Further, it disclosed to the European powers that the Chinese Empire was weak beyond their suspicions. Greed and fear produced an immediate reaction among the powers interested in the Far East. Russia, posing as the friend of China, persuaded France and Germany to


4 The issue at stake was Korea. This seven month war emphasized Japan's amazing conversion from a semi-feudal state to a modern, efficient nation within the space of a few decades.
stand by her in demanding that Japan relinquish some of the claims made on China at the end of the War. Japan was unable to resist such an overwhelming combination, and ceded to Russia's demands. Britain, who had hitherto scorned Japan in favor of China, now turned to Japan as the power most likely to be of aid in resisting Russia, whom Britain thought of as her most feared enemy of her colonial empire. This, in turn, caused China to look to Russia as her protector against further encroachments of European imperialism—a move which Russia welcomed and exploited to the full.

Great Britain tried to interest Germany in joining the Anglo-Japanese block, but with no success. Germany was most pleased to see Russia's increasing interest in the Far East, and Kaiser Wilhelm II encouraged the Tsar in that area in order to keep his attention from the European scene.

In 1902, Great Britain and Japan signed an alliance which "was in reality directed against Russia and paved the way for the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904." Great Britain, realizing the weakness of her "splendid isolation", thought of the alliance as a bulwark against Russia. Japan

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wanted a free hand in Korea,—wanted, in fact, to regain all
that which Russia, France and Germany had wrested from her in
1895. To Japan the alliance was a positive step toward achieving
that goal. From the sidelines, the United States favored
the alliance as a measure supporting the 'Open Door'.

The measures taken by Russia to limit Japanese gains after
the Sino-Japanese war were entirely selfish. In the following
years this selfishness became most evident as Russia pressed
down into Manchuria, took possession of Port Arthur, and ex­tended her influence throughout the whole of the Liao-tung
Peninsula. In Manchuria, Great Britain, the United States
and Japan held almost a monopoly of trade, but Russian pene­tration went hand in hand with Russian restriction of trade to
outsiders. Protests by Great Britain and the United States
were unavailing for the most part. Japanese protests to

6 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was confined to the Far
East. Each side promised that in the event of a war declared
by Russia on either signatory, the other would come to that
signatory's aid if a third power intervened on Russia's side.
To counteract this, Russia attempted to get the Dual Alliance
extended to the Far East. France was reluctant, and although
France gave no specific assurance to Russia, Russia took the
optimistic view that she could count on French support should
the need arise—a fatal mistake.

7 Germany, meanwhile, established herself on Kiaochau
Bay and got concessions in Shantung; while England, in self-
defence, leased Wei-hoi-wei 'for so long a period as Port
Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia'.

8 To cite one example of Russian-American friction: In
Manchuria the Russians managed to gain control of the port of
Newchang, the only open port in that area. Thereafter Russia
created many difficulties for Americans importing and exporting
goods through this port. After many unavailing protests, the
United States asked China (1903) to open three new ports to
foreign trade, thus circumventing further Russian pressure.
Russia were treated with alternate contempt and disregard. Faced with the possibility of being economically strangled in Manchuria, and believing that further Russian advances in Korea would menace her national security, Japan declared war on Russia on February 10, 1904.

Once the struggle had begun, American public opinion soon settled in favor of the Japanese cause. There were various reasons behind this sentiment. The American people disliked Russian autocracy and the treatment it meted out to political opponents. The Jewish pogroms in Russia had been scorned time and again. Moreover, the aggressive imperialism of Russia in the Far East was disliked and feared, for it presented the gravest threat to the "Open Door" policy of the United States. The distrust of Russia's motives in Manchuria and Korea had been heightened by the overt anti-American actions of Russia following the Boxer uprising. Roosevelt, too, had a very low opinion of Russia and especially the Tsar, whom he referred to as "a preposterous little creature" and "that autocratic

Russia countered this move by warning China that should she grant the American request, Russian occupation of Manchuria would be extended. By the summer of 1903, however, the United States had managed to have the additional ports opened. Nevertheless, May realized that had Russia not given in, the 'Open Door' would have been slammed shut, for he wrote a friend in 1903: "I take it for granted that Russia knows as we do that we will not fight over Manchuria, for the simple reason that we cannot... we could never get a treaty through the Senate, the object of which was to check Russian aggression." (Pauline Tomkins, American-Russian Relations in the Far East, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1949, p. 21). This statement is significant in many ways, and accounts in part for Roosevelt's statement (p. 42) regarding Japan playing the American 'game.'
zigzag." American opinion of Russia had been low for many years. In the months prior to the Russo-Japanese war, this opinion reached its nadir, a fact of which Japan was quite aware.

The favorable attitude held by the President and public of the United States towards Japan had its roots in the past, for "ever since Commodore Perry's memorable visit the United States had regarded Japan not only as a friend but as a protegé ...." Japan's deep apprehension over the fate of Korea was sympathetically appreciated by the United States, and was compared with the concern felt over the Caribbean by the Roosevelt administration. Moreover, both Japan and the United States had similar interests in Manchuria, and both had been subject to Russian pressure in that area. It is understandable, therefore, that the American public thought of the war as one between unequal opponents—"a big, bullying Russia" rallying her armed might to subdue a "poor, little Japan".

President Roosevelt, although declaring the United States' neutrality in the war, revealed his private opinion of the conflict to his son two days after Japan's successful naval attack on Port Arthur. He wrote:

It has certainly opened most disastrously for the Russians, and their supine carelessness is well-nigh incredible. For several years Russia has behaved very badly in the Far East, her attitude toward all nations, including us, but especially toward Japan, being grossly overbearing. We had no sufficient cause for war with her.

Yet I was apprehensive lest if she at the outset whipped Japan on the sea she might assume a position well-nigh intolerable toward us. I thought Japan would probably whip her on the sea, but I could not be certain; and between ourselves... I was thoroughly well pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.

Very shortly after expressing this opinion to his son, Roosevelt let France and Germany know his views on the war. Circumventing the usual diplomatic channels, he "notified Germany and France in the most polite and discreet fashion that in the event of a combination... [Roosevelt would] promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary in her behalf."

Almost simultaneously, the German Kaiser wrote President Roosevelt to suggest that he send a note to all the powers emphasizing that the neutrality of China "outside the sphere of military operations" be respected. Roosevelt was quite agreeable, but on Secretary Hay's advice, worded the circular note in such a fashion as to close the gap left by the Kaiser to permit possible occupation by Russia of the battlefield.

10 Quoted in H. F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931, p. 375. (Italics mine.) "Our game" was in essence the balance of power. A possible long, drawn-out war would leave both nations exhausted and a check on each other, and American interests would benefit.

11 Stephen Gwynn, ed., The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, London, Constable and Company, Ltd., 1929, vol. I, p. 478. Since no record of such a warning has been found it is likely Roosevelt conveyed his views on the matter via private talks with the respective Ambassadors.

12 The Russo-Japanese war was fought in China, and the field of battle was largely in Manchuria! China was neutral, despite the fact that the war was being fought on her territory.
In its final form, the circular note Hay sent (February 20, 1904) told American ministers abroad to

... express to the minister of foreign affairs the earnest desire of the Government of the United States that in the course of the military operations which have begun between Russia and Japan the neutrality of China and in all practical ways her administrative entity shall be respected....

During the remainder of the year 1904, there were no momentous problems generated by the war in the Far East with which Roosevelt had to deal. None of the Great Powers of Europe took up arms on the side of either belligerent. Neither the Dual Alliance nor the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was called into active operation. In Europe, both France and Great Britain were unhappy over the course of events in the Far East, and in their unhappiness tended to draw closer together. The only satisfied power on the continent was Germany, for despite the Tsar's frequent intimations to Roosevelt that he wished peace respored, the pattern of events in the Far East suited his wishes almost entirely.

The year 1905 opened with a great victory for Japan. On New Year's Day, after a prolonged and desperate struggle, the 'impregnable' fort of Port Arthur surrendered. The victories and the efficiency of the Japanese were causing great surprise


14 Yet in their misery France continued to finance the Russian war effort, and Great Britain, together with the United States, to finance Japan's war efforts.
in Europe and the United States. On the other hand, the inefficiency of the Russian army caused many of the military 'experts' to perform a rapid volte face in their estimates. Japanese victories had also caused a vague feeling of uneasiness to arise in the minds of European statesmen. Roosevelt, too, felt a chill wind blow over the warmth of feeling he had for Japan. A few days before the surrender of Port Arthur he had written Spring-Rice:

.... I wish I were certain that the Japanese down at bottom did not lump Russians, English, Americans, Germans, all of us, simply as White devils inferior to themselves not only in what they regard as the essentials of civilization, but in courage and forethought, and to be treated politely only so long as would enable the Japanese to take advantage of our various national jealousies ....

The next objective of Japan was Mukden. With a rapidity that amazed European observers, the main strength of the Japanese army was rallied. On February 23, 1905, the battle for Mukden began, and in a little more than two weeks time, Japan had won her third great victory over Russia.

The unbroken series of defeats suffered by Russia at the hands of the 'contemptible' Japanese was having a very serious

15 Gwynn, op. cit., p. 444.

16 During this period, Roosevelt's "impression of events in Russia was largely inspired by Spring-Rice, who as Counselor of the British Embassy at Petrograd wrote at great length to Mrs. Roosevelt what he wanted the President to know." (Lewis Einstein, Roosevelt, His Mind in Action, New York, Houghton, Mifflin, Company, 1930, p. 139.) One should note, however, that despite Japan's successive land victories, the very bulk of Russia both in territory and in population prevented the Japanese from achieving any decisive 'knockout' blow.
effect on the domestic tranquility of Russia. Defeat was fanning the embers of Revolution within the country, and there was a general sense of outrage at the corruption, incompetence and maladministration both in the government and the armed forces. Even before the defeat of Mukden there had occurred the infamous riot outside the Winter Palace. Six weeks after this incident Spring-Rice wrote Roosevelt:

In the spring the misery of the people will be at its height because they have had to sell their foodstuffs to pay taxes and the new crops will not be gathered. There are thousands of women and children without support. The men are at the war. No news comes whether the men are alive or dead.... Everyone has news of frightful speculation... [and] there is every sign of the outbreak of disorders of a fearful description. 17

After the fall of Mukden on February 23, even the Tsar seemed to feel the need for victory or peace, and since the former appeared distant, the latter became somewhat more attractive. 18

The first serious peace feelers came through France; Russia’s partner in the Dual Alliance. M. Delcassé, the French foreign minister, let it be known to the Japanese ambassador in Paris that Russia would not be unwilling to discuss honorable peace terms, preferably through direct negotiations. This information was forwarded to President Roosevelt through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington in such a manner as to invite Roosevelt to step forward and offer his good offices as medi-


18 The remainder of this narrative must be read with the Moroccan Crisis as a background, for “it was the Moroccan crisis and the spread of the Russian revolutionary movement, more than the Russian defeats, that brought about the peace negotiations.” (Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, New York, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1925, p. 151.)
ator.

The possibility of peace between the belligerents had been discussed both in Europe and in the United States with increasing hope since the battle of Port Arthur. In January Roosevelt, employing informal modes of diplomatic communication, had tentatively offered his "good offices" but with little effect. With each Russian defeat, the prospects appeared brighter. The United States was looked upon as the most probable "go between" in the Far East, so much so that the American Minister in Peking wrote Secretary Hay on March 31, 1905:

If peace negotiations shall begin soon, the time is most opportune, and her position and influence are sufficiently potent for the United States to take a most effective, if not the leading, part in the approaching drama; and I am sure, from many incidental remarks made in frequent confidential conferences with my colleagues, that the important European Powers are expecting this. 19

On the same day as this dispatch was sent, the Kaiser was making his speech at Tangier announcing his conviction that the Sultan was an independent monarch. The most immediate result of his speech, insofar as the war in the Far East was concerned, was the mutual desire of French and British to bring the war to a rapid conclusion and so conserve the strength of their respective allies. Thus in April, the pressure for peace was mounting.

Roosevelt was equally anxious that the fighting in the Far East should end. In replying to the Japanese note, Roosevelt

said he agreed that direct negotiation would be preferable, and added that they should include all the possible terms of peace, "it being of course understood that Japan is adhering to her position of maintaining the Open Door in Manchuria and of restoring it to China." Japan promptly agreed to the two conditions contained within Roosevelt's note, and her very alacrity seemed to indicate an anxiety for peace. In a note thanking Roosevelt for his courtesy in the matter, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kamura, instructed the Japanese ambassador in Washington to

say that the Imperial Government, finding that the views of the President coincide with their own on the subject of direct negotiations, would be highly gratified if he has any views of which he is willing or feel at liberty to give them benefit in regard to the steps to be taken or the measures to be adopted by Japan in order to pave the way for the inauguration of such negotiation.

When Roosevelt received this information, he decided to cut his holiday in Colorado short and return to Washington. In the meantime, he told Taft, who was "sitting on the lid" in the nation's capital during his absence, that there should be

20 Dennett, op. cit., p. 178. Sent April 20, 1905. During the negotiations, Theodore Roosevelt "was to all intents and purposes his own Secretary of State." (Griswold, op. cit., p. 92.) Roosevelt was willing to offer the "good offices" of the United States in settling the dispute, but insisted upon Japan recognizing the principle of the "Open Door" as his price.

21 Japan was anxious for peace. The war was costing her $1,000,000 a day, her losses had been considerable, and with each victory her lines of communication and supply were extending to the danger point. Conversely, Russia's lines were shortening.

no reservations on either side, and suggested that Cassini and Takahira be brought together as a preliminary step for an absolutely frank talk.

The Japanese were reluctant to have any dealings with Cassini, but intimated to the President that when he returned to Washington they would have a plan of procedure ready to submit for his consideration. However, for a period of several weeks only small advances were made towards securing the peace. The Kaiser, meanwhile, had got over his irritation at Russia using France as an intermediary instead of Germany. His irritation was replaced by the fear of a possible coalition of Russia, France and England against Germany. Consequently he used what influence he had to persuade Roosevelt to accept the task.

The factor that had slowed the pace of the peace preliminaries was the journey of the Russian battle fleet from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan. All nations were speculating upon the outcome of the impending battle, and it was generally recognized that further peace talks depended upon who

23 The Russian ambassador to the United States.

24 The Japanese ambassador to the United States.

25 Takahira, in transmitting this message, let Roosevelt know informally that if the President suggested to Japan a peace with an indemnity or territorial gains, it would have a "marked effect" in strengthening the hand of the peace party in Japan.

26 The most contentious point in the proposed terms was the payment of a war indemnity to Japan. The Tsar was absolutely against this and at first refused his representatives even to talk about it.
was the victor. Roosevelt was anxious about the results. Writing to Spring-Rice on May 13, he said:

... I am of course watching to see what the Russian and Japanese fleets will do in Eastern waters.

The Russian fleet is materially somewhat stronger than the Japanese. My own belief is that the Japanese superiority in morale and training will more than offset this. But I am not sure and I wish that peace would come. 27

The Russian and Japanese fleets fought in the Sea of Japan on May 26. Roosevelt's predictions proved true. Despite Russia's superiority in numbers the Japanese fleet won a great and decisive victory. The "Admiral of the Pacific" was an admiral without a fleet.

Japan now moved quickly to take advantage of her victory, for the strain of war was becoming increasingly severe. Three days after the defeat of the Russian fleet, Komura wired Ambassador Takahira to

... express to the President the hope of the Japanese Government that... he will see his way directly and entirely of his own motion and initiative to invite the two belligerents to come together for the purpose of direct negotiation.... 28

With the advent of this 'face-saving' note, Roosevelt was able to set in motion the diplomatic machinery which would bring the representatives around the peace table.

27 Gwynn, op. cit., p. 490.

28 Dennett, op. cit., p. 215. Roosevelt was quick to see the humor in this situation.
On June 5, Roosevelt cabled George Mayer, the American ambassador in St. Petersburg, instructing him to see the Tsar personally and urge upon him "the desirability of his consenting to the request of the President to have representatives of Russia meet with representatives of Japan to confer as to whether peace cannot... be made." Should the Tsar consent, Meyer was told to add that "... the President will try to get Japan's consent, acting simply on his own initiative and not saying that Russia has consented, and the President believes he will succeed." Meyer was successful in his efforts and was able to inform Roosevelt a few days later that the Tsar consented that talks should be held.

At this point Roosevelt was able to bring the matter into the open. On June 8 he formally invited both belligerents, "in the interest of all mankind" and "for the prosperity and welfare of each", to open direct negotiations for peace. The Japanese reply was prompt and unreserved. The Russian reply,

29 Meyer was one of the few diplomats in the American foreign service whose ability, tact and intelligence Roosevelt was willing to trust. Meyer was transferred to St. Petersburg a few months previously by Roosevelt in order that he would be strategically located when the need arose.

30 Dennett, op. cit., p. 221.

31 Loc. cit., The Tsar had received a note from the Kaiser at the same time in which he was 'advised' that "if anybody in the world is able to influence the Japanese and to induce them to be reasonable in their proposals, it is President Roosevelt." (J. B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920, vol. I, p. 385.) The Kaiser had a mistaken idea of his influence on Roosevelt. The British were apprehensive in this respect also, but not for long.
however, was not altogether satisfactory. On June 12 Mayer cabled:

With regard to the eventual meeting of Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries 'in order to see if it is not possible for the two powers to agree to terms of peace', the Imperial Government has no objection in principle to this endeavour if the Japanese Government expresses a like desire.

The effect of this note on Roosevelt served to confirm his belief that Russia was not to be trusted and that Japan was playing the American "game". As he wrote of Russia's reply at the time;

The note is of course much less satisfactory than Japan's, for it shows a certain slyness and an endeavour to avoid anything like a definite committal....

During the month of June, Roosevelt was beset with similar irritations in his efforts to get the conference underway. Arrangements had to be made as to the time of meeting, the place of meeting, and the delegates each proposed to send. Japan was sensitive on this latter point, but Roosevelt was able to have the Tsar promise that the Russian delegates would be "clothed with full powers to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace subject to ratification by home governments." There was also the problem of where the conference should take place. Japan had suggested Chefoo in China, while Russia wanted to go to Paris. Roosevelt tried to compromise on the Hague. Japan

33 Bishop, op. cit., p. 389.
disliked the idea of going to Europe, thus after a flurry of telegrams to both Tokyo and St. Petersburg, both parties agreed to accept Roosevelt's second compromise—Washington.

The continual haggling and bickering over the details of the proposed meeting greatly irritated President Roosevelt. He was a man of swift decision and direct action himself, and was not one to appreciate the seemingly endless points of protocol and procedure which required tactful handling on his part before Japanese pride and Russian arrogance could be calmed. Moreover, Roosevelt's stature had grown considerably since he had accepted the position as peacemaker, and he was anxious to prove his diplomatic abilities to a watchful world. Throughout June the President urged both Japan and Russia with equal vigor to come to an agreement. On June 16 he wrote Spring-Rice:

I have been explaining at length to both Russia and Japan the folly of haggling over details.

I told Russia that it was nonsense for her to stick

35 Even after Russia tentatively accepted Washington, the Tsar once more tried to have the conference meet in Paris. With characteristic Rooseveltian brusqueness, the Tsar was informed that the choice of Washington had been accepted as final.

36 "[Roosevelt] was not squeamish about... bloodshed and he was no pacifist. He had no vain ambition to be a peacemaker. This alluring rôle, which few statesmen are able to push aside when presented, does not appear to have seemed especially attractive to him." But once the belligerents had accepted his offer to peace parleys, "... the President assumed a grave responsibility. From that moment he assumed a large personal stake in making peace." (Dennett, op. cit., pp. 241--42).
at trifles, but if the war went on she would lose all her possessions in eastern Asia and that the blow to her would be well-night irreparable... [and] that I should be very sorry to see her driven out of territory which had been hers for a couple of centuries.... To the Japanese I have said that if they make such terms (37) that Russia would prefer to fight for another year... and that to [win such a valueless place as Siberia] at the cost of an additional year of loss of blood and money and consequent strain upon Japanese resources seems to me to be wholly useless. 38

At this stage of the negotiations, Roosevelt believed that he was intervening to prevent Russia from being driven out of all eastern Asia. There were two cardinal principles upon which the President based his opinions. One was that the principle of the 'Open Door' should remain in force, and the other was that "the safety of American interests in the Far East rested upon a balance of power between Russia and Japan." The combination of Japan's "astounding victories" and Russia's internal disorders made him believe that despite the financial strain, Japan might push the Russians back even further. Russia, in Roosevelt's eyes, was guilty of gross stupidity in not realizing this, and her statesmen were utterly devoid of common sense in not coming to some agreement with the Japanese. He gave his opinion to Senator Lodge on the Russians in terms

37 The war party in Japan continued to insist on Russia paying a large war indemnity.

38 Gwynn, op. cit., p. 501. Between the lines one cans see Roosevelt's desire to have Japan and Russia counterbalance each other in the Far East, rather than have either one achieve a knockout blow and so eliminate the other completely.

39 Pringle, op. cit., p. 379. To see the measures Roosevelt employed to ensure the position of the United States, see Appendix. &.
that expressed this view:

"[The Russians] are hopeless creatures with whom to deal. They are utterly insincere and treacherous; they have no conception of the truth, no willingness to look facts in the face, no regard for others of any sort or kind, no knowledge of their own strength or weakness; and they are helplessly unable to meet emergencies."

Nevertheless, the internal emergencies Russia was experiencing were having their effect on the Tsar. The Kaiser, too, was worrying over the spread of revolution. His aim to have Russia involved in the Far East had been successful. Russia was now weak and her credit low. The Kaiser also had hopes of bringing about a Russo-German alliance, and this would have to be abandoned should the revolution grow in proportion and possibly succeed. Thus he also offered "Dear Nikki" advice to the effect that the sooner a peace was negotiated, the better it would be.

Japan, too, was keeping steady military pressure on Russia. The date of the conference had finally been agreed upon—the first week in August. In July, the Tsar, through Roosevelt, had tried to arrange an armistice, but the Japanese government felt that Russia might be more favorable towards an indemnity if shown that Japan was still quite capable of

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41 "Notwithstanding the appointment of Elihu Root in July to the place made vacant by the death of John Hay, Roosevelt continued to be his own Secretary of State so far as the relations with the peace conference was concerned." (Dennett, op. cit., p. 249.)
exercising her military might on the field. In the meantime, to Roosevelt's delight, the peace envoys were on their way to the United States.

The conference opened in Portsmouth, a navy base in New Hampshire on August 9, 1905. The conference was underway only a short time when it became apparent that a deadlock would result over the question of an indemnity and cession of territory to Japan. The Japanese had placed the indemnity at $600,000,000 and also demanded that the entire island of Sakhalin, off the Siberian coast, come under Japanese control. Russia was equally determined that Japan should receive neither. Ambassador Meyer in St. Petersburg wired the President that the Tsar was most unwilling to accept either of these Japanese conditions, and that should Japan insist on them he might recall the Russian delegates.

President Roosevelt, having tried for months to have these Japanese conditions moderated without success, realized the urgency of the situation, and decided on a direct approach. On August 19 he informed Witte that in view of the fact that Japan was in possession of nearly all of the island of Sakhalin, Russia might with propriety buy it back from Japan for a sum to be fixed by a commission after the facts had been reviewed. This procedure would allow passions to cool and the conference

42 The chief Russian envoys were M. Wittê, one of Russia's most respected diplomats, and Baron Rosen, who was also coming to replace Count Cassini as the Russian ambassador in the United States. Japan's chief envoys were Baron Komura, the Japanese Foreign Minister, and the Japanese ambassador to the United States, Takahira.
to continue. Witte approved the suggestion and forwarded it to the Tsar with his recommendations. Two days later Roosevelt telegraphed Meyer to see the Tsar personally and urge him to accept the compromise. At the same time, Roosevelt warned the Japanese that Russia, in all probability, would not agree to pay an indemnity, that Japan was losing American public sympathy since she appeared to be holding out solely for money, and further, that to continue the fight for an indemnity would in reality cost Japan more than she would receive from such payment.

In the week ending August 27, Roosevelt exerted all the influence he had to bring the conference to a successful conclusion. During that same week he seemed to meet with every possible obstacle and delay to compromise. On August 28 Meyer wired Roosevelt of the new optimism in Russia:

Situation as it appears here, Russia absolutely decided not to pay any war indemnity. In this respect apparently supported by the press, the people, even the peasants.... Russia feels that Japan's financial position is such that in the long run she will be ruined financially

43 One must sympathize with Roosevelt in his role as peacemaker. He was not renowned for tact or moderation, and the strain on him to remain calm and collected must have been severe. He expresses such sentiments in a letter to a friend at this period: "Dealing with Senators is at times excellent training for the temper, but upon my word dealing with these peace envoys has been an even tougher job. To be polite and sympathetic and patient in explaining for the hundredth time something perfectly obvious when...I really want to give utterance to whoops of rage and jump up and knock their heads together -- well, all I can hope is that the self-repression will be ultimately good for my character." (Pringle, op. cit., pp. 385 - 86).
On the same day Witte received instructions from the Tsar to make no further concessions or proposals. Since the Japanese had received no further instructions from Tokyo telling them to modify their demands, it appeared that the conference was a failure.

Within twenty-four hours, the situation was completely changed. On August 29 the Japanese envoys received instructions from their government which ordered them to make peace on the general lines of Roosevelt's suggested compromise. The Japanese government "decided to withdraw the demand of a money payment for the cost of the war entirely, if Russia recognize the occupation of Sakhalin Island by Japan...."

Thus when Witte, at what was considered the last sitting of the conference, gave what he said was his final offer to Japan—that is, the southern half of Sakhalin to go to Japan but without any indemnity—Baron Komura accepted the proffered terms without amendment.

44 Dennett, op. cit., p. 260.
45 Bishop, op. cit., p. 412.
46 Witte was amazed. Technically he was not supposed to be attending the meeting, since the Tsar had ordered him to end negotiations on the day before. Naturally, too, he knew nothing of the note handed to the Japanese envoys at the last moment. Roosevelt was also very surprised, believing that Japan could have secured the entire island, instead of the proffered half below the 50 degree parallel. The peace treaty was signed by the envoys on September 5, 1905. The complete text may be found in Foreign Relations--1905, pp. 824--28.
Roosevelt was quite proud of the part he played in bringing the Russo-Japanese war to a close. Indeed, he deserves great credit, especially when one takes into account the limited number of skilled American diplomats in Europe upon whose skill and information he could rely. This was a serious check to his achieving a full understanding of the tangled web of subterranean diplomacy so important in Europe at that time. It is quite surprising that Roosevelt managed as well as he did, since in many cases he was forced to rely on his personal judgment of persons and events frequently working to counteract delay the peace. To cite one example there was the case of the German Kaiser who "while professing to Roosevelt so much zeal for the integrity of China was deliberately encouraging the Tsar to destroy that integrity." Yet to Roosevelt, the Kaiser appeared to be helping him more than was Great Britain, who in turn was pursuing a course which would enable her to come to an agreement with both belligerents when the hostilities ceased. Another possible source of support for Roosevelt was France, but after the crisis over Morocco came to a head, France was forced to face West instead of East. Thus as far as diplomatic aid from Europe in bringing an end to the war is concerned, Roosevelt received comparatively little assistance, although the events in Europe and Russia

47 Dennett, op. cit., p. 67.

48 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed in August, 1905, and Great Britain and Russia settled their outstanding differences in 1907.
itself were fundamental causes to the coming of the peace.

President Roosevelt also displayed considerable skill in the manner in which he performed his duties as peacemaker. He realized that peace would come only through compromise, and consequently missed no opportunity to exert pressure, directly and indirectly, on both belligerents to scale their demands down to the level of mutual acceptance. He constantly attempted to place the belligerents in such a position that they would incur public censure for continuing the war should either refuse to modify exorbitant demands or place obstructions in the negotiations. "No more skillful check on the war parties could have been devised." For one who was more accustomed to wielding the 'big stick' in negotiations, Roosevelt could be justly pleased with the way in which he manipulated the olive branch also.

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The striking victory of Japan over Russia definitely established Japan in the position of a Great Power. Moreover, Japan's territorial acquisitions resulting from the war set her upon a course of imperialism which rivalled that of the European Great Powers. Japan was immensely proud of her achievements in the war, and immediately set to work to consolidate her gains and expand her influence in the Far East. However,

49 Roosevelt received the Nobel Peace prize in 1906 for his activities in this respect.

50 Dennett, op. cit., p. 197.
the hitherto friendly relations between Japan and the United States deteriorated in the years that followed. The most immediate cause for this was the hostility felt by the Japanese over their meager gains as a result of the Portsmouth conference. Roosevelt was unjustly blamed for this, and hostility towards the United States on this account remained for some time. The United States, on the other hand, came to look upon Japan as replacing Russia as an obstacle in the 'Open Door' policy of the Far East. The conflict between Japan's 'manifest destiny' and the 'Open Door' policy on the mainland caused an increasing strain on Japanese-American relations for some time, although during Roosevelt's term of office no crisis arose.

The most acute problem on the Japanese-American diplomatic scene before Roosevelt left the presidency was that concerning anti-Japanese agitation in California. For many years there had been a latent antagonism towards immigrants from the Orient in the Western American states. This antagonism came into the open on February 23, when the San Francisco Chronicle launched an anti-Japanese campaign, which other newspapers quickly took up. The campaign was launched mainly on the grounds that the Japanese immigrants were underbidding American 'white' workers on the labor market. To this theme were added the usual complaints about the so-called inferiority of Oriental morals and manners which had typified previous anti-Oriental outbursts in the past. State legislators and Congressional Representatives supported the campaign on their respective levels, demanding that the immigration of Japanese should be
drastically restricted. In San Francisco, the Board of Education went so far as to recommend that the Japanese of school age be segregated, and several months later it passed an order for segregation.

Roosevelt was most anxious over the whole matter. He expressed his feelings with characteristic frankness to Senator Lodge:

I am utterly disgusted at the manifestations which have begun to appear on the Pacific slope in favor of excluding the Japanese exactly as the Chinese are excluded. The California State Legislature and various other bodies have acted in the worst possible taste and in the most offensive manner to Japan. Yet the Senators and Congressmen from these very States were lukewarm about the Navy last year. It gives me a feeling of disgust to see them challenge Japanese hostility... While at the same time refusing to take steps to defend themselves against a formidable foe whom they are ready with such careless insolence to antagonize.

Very naturally the Japanese were equally disgusted at the treatment accorded their countrymen in the Western United States, and protested to the American government. Together with Secretary of State Root, Roosevelt attempted to modify anti-Japanese sentiment on the West Coast on the one hand while soothing the injured pride of the Japanese on the other. Roosevelt missed no chance to speak out against racial prejudice, and both publicly and privately carried out a campaign against those who continued to demand segregation and restriction.

51 In October, 1906.

After several months of negotiation with the Western groups and the Japanese government, the President was able to reach an agreement with both. This was the so-called 'Gentlemen's Agreement' which came into operation in the Spring of 1907. Fundamentally, it provided for the restriction of Japan immigration into the United States by the Japanese government itself, which had the effect of operating to same Japanese 'face' and of providing a working arrangement which met the modified demands of the Western states.

President Roosevelt's policy towards Japan had been one of 'speaking softly' rather than 'wielding the 'big stick'. However, in 1907 Roosevelt decided that a demonstration of the naval strength of the United States would emphasize not only the nation's interest in the Pacific, but would be a pointed lesson to the world at large of the Great Power status of the United States. Privately the demonstration was to be primarily for Japan's benefit, but publicly it was announced that the world cruise was for the purpose of testing and improving the Navy itself.

As usual, Roosevelt overrode such objections as there were to sending the fleet of sixteen battleships around the

53 "The Gentlemen's Agreement is not embodied in any one formal document, but the policy which goes by that name was worked out in a series of exchanges of messages." (P. C. Jessup, Elihu Root, New York, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1938, vol. 11, p. 18.)
world. Many feared it would result in an armed clash with Japan, despite the 'Gentlemen's Agreement'; others thought it an unnecessary and wasteful gesture. But Roosevelt, who had had a keen interest in a strong and efficient Navy since his youth, was determined that the cruise should not be called off. He had his way. The fleet left its Atlantic base in December, 1907, and the entire cruise was successful from start to finish. It is no exaggeration to say that all the Great Powers were greatly impressed, especially Japan, and that the purposes for sending the fleet, both public and private, were fulfilled.

Publicly the second largest navy in the world now had experience and advertisement. Privately, Japan had benefited, but perhaps not to the extent Roosevelt might have wished. After 1905, Russian hegemony in Manchuria was being replaced by Japanese influence. Roosevelt was quite aware of this and the threat it presented to the principle of the "Open Door". The United States could enforce this principle either by being willing to fight for it or by using diplomatic pressure, alone or in collaboration with other powers, so as to make Japan extremely wary of closing the "Open Door". American tradition,

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54 On this occasion Roosevelt used 'efficiency' as an excuse for using executive power. To quote his own opinion: "I believe that the efficiency of this government depends upon its possessing a strong central executive, and when I could establish a precedent for strength in the executive, as I did, for instance, as regards external affairs in the case of sending the fleet around the world... I have felt... [that] I was establishing a precedent of value. (Einstein, op. cit., p. 96)."
sentiment and armed strength prevented the possibility of the President being able to threaten war over Manchuria should Japan pursue a course of strict commercial monopoly. But diplomatic pressure in the form of a naval demonstration was at Roosevelt's disposal, and, during Roosevelt's presidency at least, it was used with good effect. Certainly the desired balance of power in the Far East was nearer achievement than when Roosevelt first took office as president, and the Root-Takahira Agreement further protected the Philippines from Japan aggression.

President Roosevelt was on hand to greet the battleships upon their triumphant return to the United States. It was one of his last official acts as President—and none could be more fitting than this to a man who held to the old adage: 'Speak softly, but carry a big stick....'

55 See Appendix G.
Conclusion
It might be appropriate at this point to attempt an evaluation of Roosevelt's foreign policy, and to pass judgment on the moves he made to bring his aims in this field to full realization. Although this thesis has to do with the nature of Roosevelt's foreign policy rather than the policy as a separate entity, it is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss one without the other.

There is another problem which one must face at this point, and that is, what exactly do we mean by a 'successful' foreign policy? Certainly in Roosevelt's case one must judge such success from either a long-range or short-range point of view. The former would involve comparing the United States' foreign policy as he found it with the problems the nation faced in this field long after his presidency, that is, were the contributions Roosevelt made in the sphere of United States' foreign policy as it affected the nation during his term of office.

Roosevelt himself was quite proud of the way in which he handled the foreign affairs of his country. As far as he was concerned, he had accomplished that which he set out to do. He had both preserved and furthered the security of the United States and had upheld its honor while adding to its prestige.

But the fact that while wielding his 'big stick' to accomplish the above he had hurt many heads mattered little to him. The ability of the United States' Navy to move quickly from one ocean to another was far more important to him than the feelings or honor of the 'Dago' governments
bordering the Caribbean. The ends which he sought were benefi-
cial to his country, and therefore the means were of second-
ary importance, especially so when Roosevelt believed that
what would benefit the United States would in due course
benefit her neighbors. Moreover, in his eyes, he saw himself
as a 'knight in shining armour' when he offered his services,
to use a mixed metaphor, as the 'policeman of the Caribbean'.
There was little thought given to the individual wishes of the
community of states which was to be his 'beat'. He merely
pinned the badge on his own chest and announced his position.
It was no altruistic gesture; rather it was basically selfish,
though not imperialistic in the common sense.

Roosevelt's nationalism made itself evident in every
major instance in which he dealt with the foreign relations of
the United States. It was egotistical, self-righteous and
generally selfish, based upon the theory that his country--
especially in the Western Hemisphere but also in the world at
large--was a model and virtuous nation to which all others
could aspire. As such, Roosevelt felt that it was not 'im-
proper to ensure the honor, prestige or security of this
model by disregarding, if necessary, the honor, prestige and
security of another nation whose actions or policy might mar
or sully the perfection of the United States.

But granting the nationalism which lay behind his guidance
of American foreign affairs, to what extent may he be called
successful?

Looking at it from a long-range point of view, Roosevelt's
foreign policy was by no means an outstanding success. It is true the Panama Canal was constructed and put into operation to the great benefit of the world. This was a solid and far-reaching accomplishment. Yet the resentment of Colombia towards the United States might easily have been aboided had Roosevelt approached the problem in a different manner. Indeed, Roosevelt left a trail of resentment behind him in his dealings with the nations of the Western Hemisphere, and in almost every case there was good reason for this sentiment. Since the United States had to contend with but relatively weak nations in this hemisphere, such sentiment could at worst be shrugged off by the United States. Nevertheless, the resentment and indignation which Roosevelt stirred up with his 'big stick' detracted from the success of his foreign policy.

Latin-American resentment of Roosevelt's foreign policy was mixed with fear. Although there is nothing in Roosevelt's diplomacy to compare with the later "dollar diplomacy" approach of such men as Taft, he nonetheless stretched and warped the Monroe Doctrine so as to provide ample precedence for his successors. Thus, judging from the oft-spoken ideals of the United States by American statesmen, Roosevelt's 'Corollary' to the Monroe Doctrine was not a thing whereof to boast in later years. In fact the famed 'Corollary' was formally disavowed in 1930, an act which gives some indication of Roosevelt's long-range success.

Finally, the President's excursion into the affairs of
Europe and Asia neither added nor detracted to or from such long-range success in foreign affairs as he achieved. The participation of the United States in the Algeciras Conference neither halted nor hurried the march of the European powers along the road to war. Similarly, in the Far East, Roosevelt's actions delayed, but did not ultimately deter, Japan from establishing her hegemony over Manchuria.

Regarding his policy from a short-range point of view, and perhaps with the sentiments of an American nationalist, there is little doubt but that Roosevelt's foreign policy was successful. He thought of himself as having two main problems in this field, that is, to ensure the security of the United States and to preserve its honor. Subconsciously, his nationalism - one might almost call it national self-righteousness - was the filter through which his thoughts passed before being transformed into action to grapple with these problems.

Combining opportunism with shrewd manoeuvring he managed to gain construction and fortification rights for an inter-oceanic canal, and in so doing immeasurably advanced the fighting effectiveness of the nation's 'first line of defence.' He believed it necessary to the security of the United States that no European nation should gain a foothold in any of the Latin-American states. He was successful here also.

Roosevelt was jealous of the honor of his nation - a term he frequently used but one which, it should be noted, he never defined. But he felt himself upholding his country's honor when he used unethical means to make certain that the Alaska Boundary Tribunal would arrive at a 'correct' decision. And
despite his ethics, he was successful. To gain more honor and prestige for the United States (and himself), he dabbled in the arena of European politics, and although the result was mostly a success of prestige, it was nevertheless a success. To uphold the rights of his country in Asia, Roosevelt played an active part in settling the Russo-Japanese War. Here again he was more successful than one might expect him to be, for on this occasion, as on others, he backed up his idealism with the realistic belief that force, in the form of the 'big stick', was a necessary instrument of foreign policy.

From a short-range point of view, therefore, Roosevelt could be proud of his record in foreign affairs. Unfortunately, his nationalism also made him short-sighted in the same field of endeavour.
Appendix A

President Roosevelt played a comparatively minor role in the Venezuelan affair despite his famous letter to the contrary. This letter was written to J. B. Bishop, his 'official' biographer, in 1916, when Roosevelt's anti-Germanicism was at its height. In this letter, Roosevelt wrote in part,

There was no objection whatever to Castro's being punished as long as the punishment did not take the form of seizure of territory. At this particular point, such seizure of territory would have been a direct menace to the United States, because it would have threatened or partially controlled the approach to the projected Isthmian Canal.

I speedily became convinced that Germany was the leader, and the really formidable party in the transaction; and that England was merely following Germany's lead. I also became convinced that Germany intended to seize some Venezuelan harbor... with a view to exercising some degree of control over the future Isthmian Canal, and over South American affairs generally.

For some time the usual methods of diplomatic intercourse were tried. Germany declined to agree to arbitrate the question at issue.... I assembled our battle fleet... for "manoeuvres", with instructions that the fleet should be... ready to sail at an hour's notice.

I saw the (German) Ambassador, and explained that in view of the presence of the German Squadron on the Venezuelan coast, I could not permit longer delay in answering my request for arbitration.... The Ambassador responded that his government could not agree to arbitrate.... I then asked him to inform his government that if no notification for arbitration came within a certain specified number of days I should be obliged to order Dewey to take his fleet to the Venezuelan coast and see that the German forces did not take possession of any territory.

A few days later the Ambassador came to see me.... I asked him if he had any answer to make from his government to my request, and when he said no, I informed him that in such an event it was useless to wait as long as I had intended, and that Dewey would be ordered to sail twenty-four hours in advance of the time I had set. He expressed deep apprehension, and said that his government...
would not arbitrate. However, less than twenty-four hours before the time I had appointed for cabling the order to Dewey, the Embassy notified me that his Imperial Majesty the German Emperor had directed him to request me to undertake the arbitration myself.

(J. B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, vol. I, pp. 222--24)

This resume of what happened in the Venezuelan crisis, despite the fact that is was written by Roosevelt, is generally refuted by later historians. For a scholarly expose of the whole matter, see S. W. Livermore, "Theodore Roosevelt, the American Navy, and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902--1903", in L. H. Gepson and others, editors, The American Historical Review, New York, the Macmillan Company, vol. 51, (April, 1946), pp. 452--471. Mr. Livermore comes to the conclusion that Roosevelt was quite conscious of the availability of the American navy in case of need, but despite a thorough search of the Roosevelt's papers and the state documents of the United States, Germany and Great Britain, no record can be found of Roosevelt acting in the way he said he did.
APPENDIX B.

President Roosevelt's proposed Message to Congress:

The Colombian Government, through its representative here, and directly in communication with our representative in Colombia, has refused to come to any agreement with us, and has delayed action so as to make it evident that it intends to make extortionate and improper terms with us. The Isthmian Canal Bill was, of course, passed upon the assumption that whatever route was used, the benefit to the particular section of the Isthmus through which it passed would be so great that the country controlling this part would be eager to facilitate the building of the canal. It was out of the question to submit to extortion on the part of a beneficiary of the scheme. All the labor, all the expense, all the risk are to be assumed by us and all the skill shown by us. Those controlling the ground through which the canal is to be put are wholly incapable of building it.

Yet the interest of international commerce generally and the interest of this country particularly demands that the canal should be begun with no needless delay. The refusal of Colombia properly to respond to our sincere and honest efforts to come to an agreement, or to pay heed to the many concessions we have made, renders it in my judgment necessary that the United States should take immediate action on one of two lines: either we should drop the Panama Canal project and immediately begin work on the Nicaraguan Canal, or else we should purchase all the rights of the French company, and, without further parley with Colombia, enter upon the completion of the canal which the French company has begun. I feel that the latter course is the one demanded by the interests of this nation, and I therefore bring this matter to your attention for such action in the premises as you may deem wise. If in your judgment it is better not to take such action, then I shall proceed at once with the Nicaraguan Canal.

The reason that I advocate the action above outlined in regard to the Panama Canal is, in the first place, the strong testimony of the experts that this route is the most feasible; and in the next place, the impropriety from an international standpoint of permitting such conduct as that to which Colombia seems to incline.

Reference: Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography, pp. 530--31
APPENDIX A

Article XXXV of the Treaty of 1846 between New Granada (Colombia) and the United States.

The Government of New Granada guarantees to the Government of the United States that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of communication that now exist, or that may be hereafter constructed, shall be open and free to the Government and citizens of the United States, and for the transportation of any articles of produce, manufactures or merchandise, of lawful commerce, belonging to the citizens of the United States; that no other tolls or charges shall be levied or collected upon the citizens of the United States, or their said merchandise thus passing over any road or canal that may be made by the Government of New Granada, or, by the authority of the same, than is, under like circumstances, levied upon and collected from the Granadian citizens; that any lawful produce, manufactures or merchandise belonging to citizens of the United States, thus passing from one sea to the other, in either direction, for the purpose of exportation to any other foreign country, shall not be liable to any import duties whatever; or, having paid such duties, they shall be entitled to drawback upon their exportation; nor shall the citizens of the United States be liable to any duties, tolls or charges of any kind, to which native citizens are not subjected for thus passing the said Isthmus. And, in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advantages, and as an equal compensation for the said advantages, and for the favors they have acquired by the 4th, 5th, and 6th articles of this treaty, the United States guarantee, positively and efficaciously, to New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before mentioned Isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists; and, in consequence, the United States also guarantee, in the same manner the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory.

The people of Panama having by an apparently unanimous movement dissolved their political connection with the Republic of Colombia and resumed their independence, and having adopted a government of their own, republican in form, with which the Government of the United States of America has entered into relations, the President of the United States, in accordance with the ties of friendship which have so long and so happily existed between the respective nations, most earnestly commends to the Governments of Colombia and of Panama the peaceful and equitable settlement of all questions at issue between them. He holds that he is bound, not merely by treaty obligations, but by the interests of civilization, to see that the peaceable traffic of the world across the Isthmus of Panama shall not longer be disturbed by a constant succession of unnecessary and wasteful civil wars.

Memorandum from President Roosevelt to the American members of the Alaska Boundary Tribunal, March 25, 1903.

Sirs:

I have appointed you as the American representatives of the Tribunal to determine the boundary between the territory of Alaska and the British possessions in North America.

I write you now because, according to reports in the public press, Sir Wilfred Laurier, the Canadian Premier, has recently in open Parliament made a speech upon the question which is in effect a mandate authoritatively and officially given by him to the two Canadian members of the Tribunal. In this speech he sets forth the claims which he apparently expects the Canadian members of the Tribunal to uphold as advocates rather than to consider as judges. Inasmuch as in my judgment I regard this claim as untenable, and inasmuch as further the position taken by Mr. Laurier, and presumably therefore by the two Canadian members, is as far removed as possible from judicial, I feel that I should briefly call your attention to my view of the question which you have to decide.

You will of course impartially judge the questions that come before you for decision. The claim so roundly asserted by Mr. Laurier—and therefore presumably to be upheld by the Canadian Commissioners—that is, the claim to Skagway and Dyea, and therefore of course Pyramid Harbor, is not in my judgment one of those which can properly be considered open to discussion. The treaty of 1825 between Russia and England was undoubtedly intended to cut off England from access to the sea. The word limière used in the treaty means the strip of territory bordering all the navigable water of that portion of the Alaskan coast affected by the treaty, and this strip of territory is American of course. Equally of course in interpreting the treaty a prime consideration is the way in which all authorities interpreted it for the sixty years immediately succeeding its adoption. There is entire room for discussion and judicial and impartial agreement as to the exact boundary in any given locality—that is as to whether in such locality the boundary is to be pushed back ten marine leagues, or whether there is in actual fact nearer the coast a mountain chain that can be considered as running parallel to it.

In the principle involved there will of course be no compromise. The question is not in my judgment one in which it is possible for a moment to consider a reconciling of conflicting claims by mutual concessions. It is to determine...
whether the theory upon which Russia uniformly treated the boundary during her entire period of possession, upon which the United States has uniformly treated it ever since it acquired the territory, and upon which England uniformly treated it for over sixty years after the Treaty was adopted, and according to which all the English as distinguished from the Canadian cartographers have since continued to treat it, is right in its entirety or wrong in its entirety.

Very respectfully,

Theodore Roosevelt.

White House,
Washington.

Ref.: Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore and Henry Cabot Lodge, vol. 2, pp. 4-5.
Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.

Oyster Bay, N. Y.
July 25, 1903

My Dear Judge Holmes:

I thank you very much for your letter, which I thoroughly enjoyed. There is one point on which I think I ought to give you full information, in view of Chamberlain's remark to you. This is about the Alaska boundary matter, and if you happen to meet Chamberlain again you are entirely at liberty to tell him what I say, although of course it must be privately and unofficially. Nothing but my very earnest desire to get on well with England and my reluctance to come to a break made me consent to this appointment of a Joint Commission in this case; for I regard the attitude of Canada, which England has backed, as having the scantest possible warrant in justice. However, there were but two alternatives. Either I could appoint a commission and give a chance for agreement; or I could do as I shall of course do in case this commission fails, and request Congress to make an appropriation which will enable me to run the boundary on my own hook. As regards most of Great Britain's claim, there is not, in my judgment, enough to warrant so much as a consideration by the United States; and if it were not that there are two or three lesser points on which there is doubt, I could not, even for the object I have mentioned, have consented to appoint a commission. The claim of the Canadians for access to deep water along any part of the Canadian coast is just exactly as indefensible as if they should now suddenly claim the island of Nantucket. There is not a man fit to go on the commission in all the United States who would treat this claim any more respectfully than he would treat a claim to Nantucket. In the same way the preposterous claim once advanced, but I think now abandoned by the Canadians, that the Portland Channel was not the Portland Channel but something else unknown, is no more worth discussing than the claim that the 49th Parallel meant the 50th Parallel or else the 48th.

But there are points which the commission can genuinely consider. There is room for argument about the islands in the mouth of the Portland Channel. I think on this the American case much the stronger of the two; still, the British have a case. Again, it may well be that there are places in which there is room for doubt as to whether there actually is a chain of mountains parallel to the coast within the ten-league limit. Here again there is a chance for honest difference and honest final agreement. I believe that no three men in the United States could be found who would be more anxious than our own delegates to do justice to the British claim on
all points where there is even a color or right on the British side. But the objection raised by certain Canadian authorities to Lodge, Root and Turner, and especially to Lodge and Root, was that they had committed themselves on the general proposition. No man in public life in any position of prominence could have possibly avoided committing himself on the proposition, any more than Mr. Chamberlain could avoid committing himself on the question of the ownership of the Orkneys if some Scandinavian country suddenly claimed them. If this claim embodied other points as to which there was legitimate doubt, I believe Mr. Chamberlain would act fairly and squarely in deciding the matter; but if he appointed a commission to settle up all those questions, I certainly should not expect him to appoint three men, if he could find them, who believed that as to the Orkneys the question was an open one. Similarly I wish to repeat that no three men fit for the position could be found in all the United States who would not already have come to some conclusion as to certain features of the Canadian claim—not as to all of them.

Let me add that I earnestly hope that the English understand my purpose. I wish to make one last effort to bring about an agreement through the commission, which will enable the people of both countries to say that the result represents the feeling of the representatives of both countries. But if there is a disagreement I wish it distinctly understood, not only that there will be no arbitration of the matter, but that in my message to Congress I shall take a position which will prevent any possibility of arbitration hereafter; a position, I am inclined to believe, which will render it necessary for Congress to give me the authority to run the line as we claim it, by our own people, without any further regard to the attitude of England and Canada. If I paid attention to mere abstract right, that is the position I ought to take anyhow. I have not taken it because I wish to exhaust every effort to have the affair settled peacefully and with due regard to England's dignity.

Faithfully yours,

Theodore Roosevelt

Hon. O. W. Holmes
Care J. S. Morgan & Co.
London, England

Ref: Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 259--61.
President Roosevelt was very much aware of Japan's naval and military power. He was also quite concerned about the Philippines, and wished to ensure their security. As a result, in July, 1905, Secretary of War Taft visited Japan on his way to the Philippines, and in Tokyo negotiated a secret "agreed memorandum" with the Japanese Prime Minister. There were three main points to the memorandum. (1) First, Japan disclaimed any hostile intentions towards the Philippines. Second, Japan was given to understand that the United States would not oppose Japanese suzerainty over Korea. Third, the United States would silently and informally support the principles of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance insofar as they went to maintain peace in the Far East.

The agreement was made in secret and never submitted to the Senate. It was a sort of alliance binding only upon the Roosevelt administration. It is probable that Roosevelt ordered Taft to come to some such arrangement. In any event, when the text of the agreement reached him, he wired Taft: "Your conversation with Count Katsura absolutely correct in every respect. Wish you would state to Katsura that I confirm every word you have said." (2) The strained relations between Japan and America over the immigration problem led to Japanese jingoism and talk of the "Yellow Peril" in the United States. Again Roosevelt became quite concerned over the Philippines. "In 1906 (he) admitted... that he would be glad to be rid of them, and in 1907 he called them an 'Achilles Heel'." (3) The cruise of the battle fleet around the world cooled Japanese jingoism. To further friendly relations, the Root-Takahira arbitration convention of 1908 was signed to supplement the former "agreed memorandum." By the terms of the convention, both parties agreed to resort to the Hague Tribunal to settle differences "of a legal nature or relating to the interpretation of treaties existing between the two contracting parties ..." (4) The convention was to last five years, and was more in the nature of a gesture of peace than anything else.

1 For full text see Dennett, Roosevelt, and the Japanese War, pp. 112--114.

2 Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 384. (July 31, 1905). Had Russia known of this agreement, the Tsar would never have accepted Roosevelt as mediator!


4 U. S., Foreign Relations--1908, p. 503.
1 PRIMARY SOURCES

(A) Government Documents

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United States, Senate Documents, 58th Congress, 1st Session, volume 2, Doc. #8, Parts I and II, "Additional Correspondence Relating to the Recent Revolution on the Isthmus of Panama."

United States, Senate Documents, 58th Congress, 2nd Session, volume 3, Doc. #95, "Relations of the United States with Colombia and the Republic of Panama."

United States, Senate Documents, 58th Congress, 2nd Session, volume 4, Documents #133 and 143, "Official Proceedings of the New Panama Canal Company, Etc." and "Use by the United States of a Military Force in the Internal Affairs of Colombia, Etc."
United States, Senate Documents, 58th Congress, 2nd Session, volume 2, Documents # 51 and 53, "CorrespondenceConcerning the Convention Between the United States and Colombia for the Construction of an Interoceanic Canal Across the Isthmus of Panama."

United States, Senate Documents, 60th Congress, 2nd Session, Doc # 542, "Correspondence in Regard to the Relations of the United States with Colombia and Panama."


(B) Compilations of Official Documents, Records; Etc.


The volume consists of 'documents and readings' in the history of American foreign relations. Limited in scope, it is nevertheless one of the best of its kind.


This attempts to trace American foreign policy by printing the statements of Presidents and Secretaries of State of the United States, etc. A great deal of primary source material is listed. The period covered being from President Washington to President Wilson.


Volumes I, II, IV, V and VI most helpful.


These addresses and papers have been compiled from official volumes, newspapers and public speeches and letters. As a whole they give an excellent insight into Roosevelt's character.

An excellent compilation of pertinent presidential speeches, official notes, memoranda, etc. from Washington to the present.


A selection of speeches selected with the view of aiding the American public to understand their president, then up for re-election. Despite its purpose, the work reflects Roosevelt's attitude towards foreign affairs in many instances.

(C) Memoirs, Biographies, Letters, etc.


The author was Roosevelt's 'official' biographer. Objectivity, and frequently accuracy, are lacking. The author's chief contribution is printing many of Roosevelt's letters and memoranda.


A well-written and interesting biography, valuable in picturing Minto's position in the Alaska boundary affair.


An excellent biography of Hay - and an essential work for the thesis. The author draws a distinction between Hay as Secretary of State prior to 1901 and during the Rooseveltian period.


The author sees Roosevelt as the 20th century example of the Renaissance man. Altogether a fair picture of Roosevelt by one who knew him fairly well.

Gilman, a Harvard classmate of Roosevelt's, brings out the cross-grained character of Roosevelt, especially prior to his presidency. The tone of the work is eulogistic, and consists mainly of reminescences.


These volumes are essential to any work on Roosevelt, and are most helpful and informative.


An excellent biography, written with skill and a fine literary touch which manages to place Root in marked contrast both to Hay and Roosevelt.

Lodge, Henry Cabot, editor, Selections From the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925, 2 vols.

Two supreme nationalists' correspondence provide a most interesting, and sometimes amusing, source of material essential to an understanding of the motives underlying Roosevelt's foreign policy.


Of limited value, but Choate's letters do reveal the 'salon diplomacy' which characterized Roosevelt's Alaska boundary negotiations through American delegates in London.


The author, a decided anti-imperialist and strong Liberal is quick to praise or condemn Roosevelt's action with impartiality. The book is very readable, brusque, studded with personal opinions bulwarked with hindsight.
Nevins, Allan, *Henry White, Thirty Years of American Diplomacy*  
New York, Harper and Brothers, 1930.  
A very good biography, valuable to this work for its reference to the Algeciras Conference.

An excellent biography giving a revealing insight into the background of European politics at the turn of the century, especially from the British viewpoint.

A biased biography of the British representative at the Algeciras Conference by his son. Of minor value.

A thorough and competent biography of Roosevelt, somewhat marred by cynicism of the 'Bull Moose', but nevertheless quite fair in most aspects. Foreign affairs are dealt with in more detail than the average biography.

The author finds a great deal to praise in his subject.

A most interesting and objective account of the life of Senator Lodge. The author brings out the Lodge-Roosevelt friendship and their cooperation in full account, but unfortunately spends too much time on domestic affairs.

Chapter XII, dealing with the Alaska Boundary dispute, yields a disappointingly meager number of Laurier's private letters, etc. on the subject. The author takes the view that the decision reached was diplomatic rather than judicial.

The numerous letters to and from Hay on diplomatic matters contained within the text are quite valuable.


An eulogistic biography of the President by one of his former Harvard classmates. Mr. Roosevelt is presented as a master-mind par excellence on foreign affairs by the author.

2 **SECONDARY SOURCES**

(A) General Works


Dr. Akagi presents the Japanese viewpoint of the Russo-Japanese war with a nationalist bias. The volume, although factual, is written chiefly for popular consumption.


A competent, detailed and scholarly work. The author paints a very thorough and clear picture of European diplomacy in 1904--1906.


One of the best general histories of the subject.


A scholarly and objective treatment of the subject.

The first four chapters are especially good for a view of American domestic and foreign policy between 1900 and 1910. Theodore Roosevelt is treated quite objectively.


The authors make an admiral case that national 'honour' is really national 'interest'.


The author looks upon President Roosevelt as a 'protective imperialist', and views American policy towards the Latin American countries at the turn of the century as justifiable under the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt's action toward Colombia, however, he heartily condemns.


Volume nine contains sketches of both John Hay (by A. L. P. Dennis) and Elihu Root (by James Brown Scott). Both are biased, and tend to be overly enthusiastic of the merits of the respective Secretaries of State. As a sketch of the foreign relations each had to deal with, however, the authors are complete, to the point and informative.


The author deals with Japan's rise to supremacy in the Orient. It is not a scholarly work, but one is able to get a better insight into the character and thought of the people of the Orient--especially the Japanese--than by more detailed histories.

There is a short but excellent chapter on the Alaska boundary in this text. It is unbiased, well-documented and authoritatively written.


The author sees much to condemn in American foreign policy in the Caribbean prior to the 1930's.


A biased and eulogistic biography.


An excellent book, well-documented, authoritative. The author gives a vivid though scholarly account of American naval policy being based on Japan's increasing power during the period covered.


A general history--fairly useful.


The book is a published series of lectures given by the author at the Sorbonne. The author has a nationalistic point of view, but aside from that, he gives an excellent summary of the United States' position in 1908.


Valuable for a general view of the United States at the beginning of the century.

"A critical study of American policy in Eastern Asia in 1902—5, based primarily upon the private papers of Theodore Roosevelt." These private papers are essential to the understanding of Roosevelt's position and action in the Russo-Japanese War. The author has great respect for Roosevelt, and points out that American mediation resulted in no political or commercial benefits for the United States.


The author does a great service to the student by liberally sprinkling his book with original letters and documents otherwise unobtainable. Professor Dennis is quite objective when dealing with American personalities, and is in general sympathy with American foreign policy during the period covered by his work.


A strong Canadian nationalist condemns in no uncertain or ambiguous language the 'raw deal' Canada received at the Alaska Boundary Tribunal. Certainly not unbiased or entirely accurate, but a most excellent antidote after reading numerous American versions.


Volume I, "Before Sarajevo: Underlying Causes of the War," is especially pertinent to the thesis. The Moroccan crisis is fully and competently dealt with.

Fish, Carl R., *The Path of Empire*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1919.

A superficial treatment of American foreign policy between 1850—1912.


A help in understanding the attitude of President Roosevelt regarding his widely defined use of executive power in dealing with foreign relations.

A general history of the United States up until 1926, but with emphasis on the part the Spanish-American War played relative to the re-awakening of American internationalism in the last chapters.


An excellent, scholarly work, well written and documented. The author has a solid grasp of his subject and a clear knowledge of world affairs at the turn of the century.


One of the best texts on European diplomacy of the Rooseveltian period, and especially helpful in seeing the Algeciras Conference from the European viewpoint.


An excellent, well-written, scholarly text on the subject, ranking in importance with that of Mr. Tyler Dennett. It is thorough, thoughtful and fairly objective, although the author damns Roosevelt's diplomatic efforts in the Far East with faint praise.


Competent, objective, very well written.


A fair, objective and scholarly treatment of the subject matter, quite valuable to this thesis.


Although only a brief biological sketch of Roosevelt is given, it is one of the best I have read. It is tolerant and critical, readable, pointed and quite unprejudiced.

These two excellent books are written by experts in the field covered. They are accurate, detailed but not dry, and on the whole quite objective.


This work was prepared by the author for the American Council of Foreign Relations. It is a survey of the United States relations with the Caribbean states, and one of the best in this field.


A fair historical treatment of the subject is given.


This is one volume of the "American Policies Abroad" series. It is well written, rather generalized, meant primarily for the general reader, but nevertheless valuable to the student. Mr. Norton and Mr. Moon take a pro and con view respectively of American policy towards the Caribbean countries.


A thorough, readable, well-documented and scholarly text on both the major and minor disputes, et cetera, between the U. S. A. and Canada. The Alaska Boundary dispute is especially competently dealt with.


The book deals mostly with American relations with Santo Domingo after Roosevelt's period, but there are some excellent chapters on Roosevelt's handling of the Santo Domingo question.

An excellent, well-document volume dealing in detail with the political rivalries among the Great Powers in the imperialist field. Chapter 23, on the Anglo-Japanese alliance, was very helpful.


One of the better general histories of American foreign policy.


The author makes an appeal for a consistent and realistic foreign policy for his nation. In this field he treats Roosevelt as one of the few presidents whose realistic viewpoint aided the nation at the turn of the century.


Captain Mahan's book, in reality a series of articles published between 1890—1897, is a plea for a stronger American navy based on the assumption that the United States is an insular power. Despite a stilted style, the author displays great strategic acumen in geopolitics, and like many men, is realistic, blunt and rather imperialistic, naval.


The author gives a very fair though brief account of the Alaska Boundary dispute. He upholds the conventional Canadian view of the results, but points out also the many other good points of Roosevelt's period that made up for Canadian resentment of his "big-stick" policy.


One of the better books on the subject, covering American-Panama relations from the 19th century to the present. Well documented, authoratively written.
Chapter X of this book gives a good illustrative example of how Roosevelt believed a President should employ his powers under the Constitution.


A very objective discourse on the position of the United States in the 1900-1914 and 1918-1924 eras is given in the latter chapters. Quite helpful.


Chapter III of volume I, "States, Their Recognition and Continuity", helps to clarify the legal aspects of Roosevelt's dealings with the South and Central American states.


Very good for a general survey of American domestic and foreign relations in the Rooseveltian period.


The author's purpose in writing the book is to appeal for a better Anglo-German understanding and an end to secret diplomacy. The most valuable part of the book is the large section of appendices containing the major treaties, conventions, parliamentary addresses, etc. on Morocco since 1880, by both British and German governments and officials.


Competent; Roosevelt's period is covered in somewhat more detail than in the usual general history.

In chapters V and VI of this book, on Venezuela and San Domingo respectively, the author has written one of the best and most scholarly accounts of the events occurring there during Roosevelt's presidency, interpreting those events in relation to the Monroe Doctrine. However, his objectivity is sometimes marred by his 'Americanism.'


Emphasis is placed on the social, political and economic relations of the United States with the Caribbean states from the earliest times to the present.


The author has several chapters on Roosevelt's policy towards the Caribbean nations, but little on the Panama Canal negotiations. A thorough and learned work.


The secret conventions pertaining to Morocco between 1900 and 1905 are given in full in an appendix to the pamphlet.


The text is one of an increasing number of those dealing with the United States in a geopolitical sense. Accurate, fairly objective and sufficiently detailed for the student.


Deals mainly with the domestic policy of both presidents.


The author gives an excellent portrayal of the United States at the turn of the century.

Excellent. The Alaska Boundary Dispute is dealt with in full and in detail. The book is based on solid research. The author is one of the few American writers who agrees that Canada did not get impartial or just treatment in the boundary dispute.


The bulk of the text deals with the post-1914 Russo-American relations in the Far East, but the first chapters are quite valuable for their sound analysis of European and American ambition in that area.


The first two chapters describe public opinion in the United States during the period covered by this thesis. Well written and very interesting.


Dr. Williams' work stresses the Anglo-American rather than the American-Colombian aspects of Isthmian diplomacy. The necessity of Britain having American friendship at the turn of the century is clearly brought out.

(B) Periodicals.


The author gives one of the best estimations of Roosevelt both as a man and president that I have read

The author brings to light some interesting letters of Roosevelt on the Alaska Boundary Settlement, and looks on the president's action as typical of his nationalism and as an excellent pre-election move.


A Colombian nationalist strikes out at Roosevelt's approval of Panama's declaration of independence.


The article contains an excellent summary of the position of the Executive in relation to the power constitutionally granted him to guide the foreign relations of his country.


A well-balanced, ably written exposition of what the author believes his nation should strive for in international affairs—an appeal to end isolationism and adopt a permanent policy based more on geography and trade rather than the Monroe doctrine.


A very good article on the subject.

The author gives a vivid indication of the benefit the canal would give to American foreign trade and commerce.


The author unconsciously emphasizes the reliance of Colombia on American military forces to retain control of Panama.


The author, employed in the Division of Research in the Department of States, gives a thorough and detailed picture from the navy viewpoint of the events centered in the Venezuelan crisis in 1902--03. Although not eliminating Roosevelt's claim to having used the navy as a "big stick", Livermore points out the decided factor of coincidence of naval manoeuvres and prearranged mobilization.


There is an excellent summary of the history of attempts made to build a canal on the Isthmus, plus the then present problems confronting the United States.

Roosevelt re-writes his message to Congress on the matter for popular consumption.


The author elaborates on the theme that Japanese expansion is every bit as active as Russian expansion, despite popular apprehension over current Russian imperialism.


Mr. Sontag gives a brief but excellent review of the events leading to the Algeciras Conference from the German point of view.


White, James, "Henry Cabot Lodge and the Alaska Boundary Award," in Wallace, W. S. and others, editors, The Canadian Historical Review, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, Volume 6, (December, 1925), pp. 332--47.

The article contains a long document by Senator Lodge on his relation to the Alaska boundary dispute which he gave in April, 1925, to the Massachusetts Historical Society.
Bibliographical Note

It is somewhat ironic that when this thesis was completed, a publishing company announced that it had available for public use for the first time five volumes of Theodore Roosevelt's correspondence, hitherto available only to those having access to the Library of Congress. Roosevelt carried on his negotiations in foreign policy largely by means of personal contact, private letters and memoranda, and in other ways which, for the most part, meant that the material found in government documents were of limited value. Up to the present day, therefore, a student studying his foreign policy must, of necessity, rely upon a variety of sources in order to uncover Roosevelt's personal letters. Several books, such as those by Tyler Dennett and A. L. P. Dennis, are valuable sources for these letters, while many more can be found in the biographies, memoirs and compilations of letters, et cetera, of Roosevelt's friends, cabinet members and political friends. Wherever one may find them, Roosevelt's letters are of primary importance, and where such of them are reprinted, in part or in whole, there the student must go.