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Authentic existence : its individual and social dimensions Green, Claire Catherine 1990

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AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE: ITS INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS By CLAIRE CATHERINE GREEN B.A.j The U n i v e r s i t y of Winnipeg, 1981 M.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of Waterloo, 1983 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming bp t h e l ^ q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA ' August 1990 © C l a i r e Catherine Green, 1990 National Library of Canada Bibliotheque nationale du Canada Canadian Theses Service Service des theses canadiennes Ottawa. Canada K1A0N4 The author has granted an Irrevocable non-exclusive l i c e n c e allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, ban, distribute or sell c o p i e s of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested p e r s o n s . L'auteur a a c c o r d e une li c e n c e irrevocable et non exclusive'permettant a la Bibliotheque nationale du C a n a d a de reproduire, preter, distribuer o u vendre d e s c o p i e s d e s a thes e de quelque maniere et s o u s quelque forme que c e soit pour mettre d e s exemplaires d e cett e these a la disposition d e s p e r s o n n e s io t e r e s s e e s . The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her t h e s i s . Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may b e printed or otherwise r e p r o d u c e d without his/her per-mission. L'auteur conserve l a propriete du droit d'auteur qui protege s a t h e se. Ni la these ni d es extraits substantiels de c e l l e - c i ne doivent etre imprimes o u autrement reproduits s a n s s o n autorisation. ISBN 0 -315-63970-9 0<3Jrt<xC .3. In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. (Signature) Department of f HI LO ^OPH V The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada •ate net. ^ . m o DE-6 (2/88) i 1 Abstract The aim of t h i s t h e s i s i s to provide an e x p l i c a t i o n and analy-s i s of the e x i s t e n t i a l concept of authentic existence, through an examination of Sartre, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber. I t i s primar-i l y Sartre's treatment of a u t h e n t i c i t y , only i m p l i c i t i n h i s w r i t -ings, which t h i s t h e s i s seeks both to make e x p l i c i t and to defend. The p o s i t i o n s of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber are each used to compare or contrast with key aspects of Sartre's concept of authen-t i c existence, i n order to e s t a b l i s h the strengths and v;eaknesses of the Sartrean p o s i t i o n . Sartre's concept of i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y r e s t s upon an eth-i c s designed to l i b e r a t e the i n d i v i d u a l from l i v i n g i n 'bad f a i t h ' by means of a r e f l e c t i v e comprehension of the nature of human r e a l -i t y . I t i s an ethics of self-recovery or authentic existence, having as i t s i d e a l the development of the morally autonomous i n d i v i d u a l who chooses to take freedom as h i s ultimate value. Sartre also maintains that a u t h e n t i c i t y requires that we take the freedom of others, as w e l l as our own, as our goal. At the same time, however, h i s discussion of r e l a t i o n s with others i n Being and Nothingness i s a profoundly negative one, which contends that con-f l i c t i s the o r i g i n a l meaning of 'being-for-others'. I t v / i l l be argued that Sartre's theory of groups i n C r i t i q u e of D i a l e c t i c a l Reason provides an account of how p o s i t i v e s o c i a l r e-l a t i o n s are indeed possible w i t h i n the parameters of h i s ontology. The theory of groups thus renders i n t e l l i g i b l e that aspect of h i s concept of authentic existence which requires of us common action on behalf of the freedom of a l l . F i n a l l y , Sartre's s o c i o p o l i t i c a l i d e a l , or that towards which i i authentic action i s u l t i m a t e l y d i r e c t e d , i s i d e n t i f i e d as a ' d i r -ect democracy'. Such a community would be the concrete embodiment of a free society of d i s a l i e n a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s mutually choosing to promote each other's freedom. i i i 1 Table of Contents Abstract Table of Contents Acknowledgements Preface Chapter One Chapter Two Chapter Three Chapter Four Chapter Five Chapter S i x Chapter Seven Chapter Eight Chapter Nine Footnotes Bibliography Nietzsche and I n d i v i d u a l A u t h e n t i c i t y Sartre's Concept of Authentic I n d i v i -dual Existence Some Problems with I n d i v i d u a l Authen-t i c i t y i n Nietzsche and Sartre Heidegger and Relations with Others Sartre's Concept of Being-for-Others Some Problems with Relations with Oth-ers i n Heidegger and Sartre Sartre's Theory of Groups Buber's D i a l o g i c a l Approach to Auth-e n t i c i t y Sartre and Authentic Human Existence 1 i i i i v v 1 26 72 1 01 123 149 176 203 22? 239 A i v Acknowledgements I would l i k e to thank my supervisor, Dr. E a r l R. Winkler, for h i s comments, c r i t i c i s m and encouragement, a l l of which were a great help to me throughout the t h e s i s - w r i t i n g process. I would also l i k e to thank the other members of my thes i s committee: Dr. Robert Bunn, for h i s i n s i g h t s regarding Nietzsche, and Mr. Elbridge Rand, for h i s perspectives on Heidegger and Sartre. V Preface The purpose of t h i s thesis i s to o f f e r an e x p l i c a t i o n and analysis of the e x i s t e n t i a l concept of authentic existence, through an examination of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Buber and p a r t i c u l a r l y Sartre. The th e s i s o f f e r s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Sartre's concept of a u t h e n t i c i t y , by way of a dialogue between Sartre and Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber, the basis f o r the dialogue being the concept of a u t h e n t i c i t y i t s e l f as i t i s developed i n the w r i t i n g s of each philosopher. The p o r t r a i t s of authentic existence provided by Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber are each used to compare or con-t r a s t with key aspects of Sartre's concept of a u t h e n t i c i t y , i n order to e s t a b l i s h the strengths and weaknesses of the Sartrean pos i t i o n . F i r s t , with Nietzsche we w i l l explore the notion of i n d i v i -dual a u t h e n t i c i t y ; then, with Heidegger we w i l l focus on the prob-lem of the nature of the r e l a t i o n between i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y and r e l a t i o n s h i p s with others; and f i n a l l y , with Buber we w i l l ex-amine an account of p o s i t i v e personal r e l a t i o n s v/hich w i l l round out our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Sartrean conception of authentic human existence. I t i s p r i m a r i l y Sartre's treatment of a u t h e n t i c i t y , only im-p l i c i t i n h i s w r i t i n g s , which t h i s t h e s i s seeks both to make ex-p l i c i t and to defend: the authentic i n d i v i d u a l i s the i n d i v i d u a l who acquires a r e f l e c t i v e comprehension of the nature of human r e a l i t y , and chooses freedom as h i s primary value. Also c e n t r a l to the thesis i s an exploration of what appears to be an i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t i n Sartre's thought: he maintains on the one hand that a u t h e n t i c i t y requires that we take the freedom of others, as well as our own, as our goal, yet on the other hand he claims i n v i Being and Nothingness that our concrete r e l a t i o n s h i p s with others are i n e v i t a b l y c o n f l i c t - r i d d e n . This profoundly negative p o r t r a i t of i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s has prompted many c r i t i c s to argue that any concept of authentic existence derived from Sartre would n e c e s s a r i l y be excessively i n -d i v i d u a l i s t i c , d i s a l l o w i n g any p o s i t i v e s o c i a l dimension to i n d i -v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y . This t h e s i s contends on the contrary that Sartre's theory of groups i n C r i t i q u e of D i a l e c t i c a l Reason o f f e r s the resources for an account of how p o s i t i v e , constructive s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are indeed possible w i t h i n the parameters of Sartre's ontology. We thus render i n t e l l i g i b l e that aspect of h i s concept of authentic existence which requires of us action on behalf of the freedom of others. The structure of the thesis requires a b r i e f word of explana-t i o n . There are three sections, each section containing three chap-t e r s . The f i r s t section deals with Nietzsche and S a r t r e , the second with Heidegger and Sartre, and the t h i r d with Buber and Sartre. In each se c t i o n , the f i r s t two chapters are p r i m a r i l y expository, ad-dressing for example the basic concept of i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y to be derived from Nietzsche and Sart r e . The t h i r d chapter of each section contains c r i t i c a l analysis of the preceding two chapters, i n the form of comparing and contrasting the p o s i t i o n s of the two thinkers involved, as well as searching out the inherent weknesses and strengths i n each of t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . The thesis begins with Nietzsche, whose theory of value pro-vides a substantive a l t e r n a t i v e to t r a d i t i o n a l values and modes of valuation, and constitutes a fundamental c o n t r i b u t i o n to the notion V l l of authentic existence. I t designates the c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y of i n -d i v i d u a l s as the sole source of value, and u l t i m a t e l y advocates the development of an 'experimental m o r a l i t y 1 , understood i n terms of the 'self-overcoming' of the i n d i v i d u a l , with s e l f - p e r f e c t i o n as i t s goal. Authentic existence i s thus concerned with the c r e a t i o n and r e a l i z a t i o n of i d e a l s : these i d e a l s are ways of l i f e that are the product of autonomous e t h i c a l a c t i v i t y or v a l u e - c r e a t i o n . Sartre's concept of i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y , i m p l i c i t i n Being and Nothingness and also i n h i s e a r l i e r works, r e s t s upon an ethics designed to l i b e r a t e the i n d i v i d u a l from l i v i n g i n 'bad f a i t h ' by means of a r e f l e c t i v e comprehension of the nature of human r e a l i t y . I t i s an e t h i c s of self-recovery or authentic existence, having as i t s i d e a l the development of the morally autonomous i n d i v i d u a l who chooses to take freedom as h i s ultimate value. A study of Heidegger begins our examination of the nature of the r e l a t i o n between i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y and r e l a t i o n s h i p s with others. To become authentic, Heidegger argues, i s to become 'what one already i s ' : a u t h e n t i c i t y i s a matter of being what one already i s with e x p l i c i t awareness of one's e s s e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e . Since man's Being (Dasein) i s e s s e n t i a l l y a Being-with ( M i t s e i n ) , authentic i n -d i v i d u a l existence w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y involve ' s o l i c i t o u s ' r e l a t i o n s with others. In contrast, Sartre's account of r e l a t i o n s with others i n Being and Nothingness i s profoundly negative. The Other i s another s u b j e c t i v i t y who o b j e c t i f i e s me and i s thus the foundation of my object-ness or my ' b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f ' . Sartre i n t e r p r e t s my o b j e c t i -f i c a t i o n by the Other as an a l i e n a t i o n of my own p o s s i b i l i t i e s , and since t h i s o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n i s mutual, he contends that c o n f l i c t i s v i i i the o r i g i n a l meaning of 'being-for-others 1. This renders question-able h i s exhortation that a u t h e n t i c i t y requires that we take the freedom of others, as w e l l as our own, as our goal. I t w i l l be argued, however, that Sartre's account of r e l a t i o n s with others i s not,, and was not intended to be, an exhaustive one. I t w i l l be suggested, on the contrary, that Sartre's discussion takes place w i t h i n the context of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s p r o j e c t to be a ' s e l f - a s - b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f ' , or as Sartre also puts i t , to be God. I f t h i s project to be God may be set aside, as Sartre's e t h i c s of authentic existence suggests, then i t can be argued that an account of p o s i t i v e , constructive r e l a t i o n s with others might indeed be formulated w i t h i n the parameters of h i s ontology. I t i s Sartre's theory of groups i n C r i t i q u e of D i a l e c t i c a l Reason which provides an account of how p o s i t i v e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are possible, and thus renders i n t e l l i g i b l e that aspect of h i s con-cept of authentic existence which requires of us common action on behalf of the freedom of a l l . By h i s t o r i c i z i n g c o n f l i c t , by explain ing i t i n terms of the contingent f a c t of s c a r c i t y , Sartre now acknowledges the p o s s i b i l i t y that cooperation may replace combat-iveness i n a future society of material abundance. Further, Sartre' concept of the mediating 'Third' provides a basis f o r p r a c t i c a l union and common e f f o r t In the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l world, or authentic action by 'common i n d i v i d u a l s ' having as i t s aim the enhancement of t h e i r concrete freedom. Sartre's p o r t r a i t of a u t h e n t i c i t y w i l l be broadened to encom-pass the dimension of personal r e l a t i o n s by means of appealing to Buber's treatment of authentic existence as a fundamentally i n t e r -personal process. Buber maintains that becoming authentic I s 'be-i x coming a whole' by standing i n r e l a t i o n s h i p with others. In my 'I-You' meetings with the Other, I am 'made present' by him i n my wholeness and uniqueness, and my existence i s 'confirmed'. Auth-e n t i c i t y i s thus f o r Buber an i n t e r p e r s o n a l process i n which each ! | requires the aid of the Other, or that mutual comfirmation which J j only d i r e c t d i a l o g i c a l encounter provides. I | F i n a l l y , Sartre's s o c i o p o l i t i c a l i d e a l , or that towards which I authentic action i s u l t i m a t e l y d i r e c t e d , i s I d e n t i f i e d as a ' d i r e c t | | democracy'. True s o c i a l r e c i p r o c i t y demands changes i n those socio-| economic conditions that mediate t h i s r e c i p r o c i t y . Sartre thus ar-gues for debureaucratization, d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and democratization. | He wants a c l a s s l e s s s o c i e t y , with the d i v i s i o n of labour abolished, ] i i | or a d i r e c t democracy, where a s p i r i t of genuine f r a t e r n i t y pre- I I v a i l s . i I t i s my hope to have provided i n t h i s t h e s i s a v i a b l e i n t e r - j | pretation of the Sartrean conception of authentic human existence, • \ an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that e f f e c t i v e l y counters the common c r i t i c i s m I that a Sartrean conception of a u t h e n t i c i t y cannot accomodate any ji dimension of p o s i t i v e , constructive r e l a t i o n s h i p s with others. ji Taking h i s work as a whole, Sartre's p o r t r a i t of authentic human ; existence i s not, In the end, excessively i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ; Instead, i t u l t i m a t e l y has as i t s goal a 'true i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e community', j I which would be the concrete embodiment of a free s o c i e t y of d i s - j | alienated i n d i v i d u a l s mutually choosing to promote each other's s freedom. n I ! s I i i I I. 'i \ A 1 1 Chapter One Nietzsche and I n d i v i d u a l A u t h e n t i c i t y In order to ex p l i c a t e Nietzsche's c o n t r i b u t i o n to the development of the.concept of 'authentic existence', an exam-i n a t i o n of h i s treatment of value, and i n p a r t i c u l a r h i s c r i t -ique of Christian-moral values, i s required. Nietzsche's p o s i -t i o n on the subject of value begins with a consideration of n i h i l i s m , an h i s t o r i c a l phenomenon f o r which he holds C h r i s t -i a n i t y responsible. The C h r i s t i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of existence designates a transcendent realm as the locus of value, and u l -timately succeeds i n making t h i s world and human existence appear valueless by comparison. Nietzsche proceeds to argue that C h r i s t i a n morality i s untenable, since the dualism of good and e v i l upon which i t predicates i t s value-judgements i s i n fact a f a l s e hypothesis. His 'revaluation of values' does not stop here, however, for Nietzsche himself wants to main-t a i n that there i s a measure or standard of value by means of which value-determinations can l e g i t i m a t e l y be made. His theory of the ' w i l l to power' provides value-judgments with an ob-j e c t i v e foundation, and allows him to condemn C h r i s t i a n mor-a l i t y as a mode of valuation borne of weakness and a 'contra-d i c t i o n of l i f e ' . While Nietzsche's appeal to the w i l l to pow-er as the 'essence of l i f e ' i s considerably complicated by h i s own epistemological scepticism, as w e l l as being questionable on independent grounds, h i s new theory of value does provide a substantive a l t e r n a t i v e to t r a d i t i o n a l values and modes of valuation, and constitutes a fundamental c o n t r i b u t i o n to the A 2 notion of 'authentic existence'. I t designates the c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s as the sole source of value, and u l -timately advocates the development of an 'experimental morali-t y ' , understood i n terms of the 'self-overcoming' of the i n -d i v i d u a l , with s e l f - p e r f e c t i o n as i t s goal. ******** 3 The time has come when we have to pay fo r having been C h r i s t i a n s f o r two thousand years: we are l o s i n g the center of gravit y by v i r t u e of which we l i v e d ; we are l o s t for awhile. 1 N i h i l i s m , or the r a d i c a l repudiation of the value of existence, i s not, i n Nietzsche's view, rooted i n some profound i n s i g h t i n -to the a c t u a l nature of l i f e , but rather i n one p a r t i c u l a r i n -t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t ; namely, the C h r i s t i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . C h r i s -t i a n i t y , as Nietzsche defines i t , i s 'Platonism for the people', and thus h e i r to what he i d e n t i f i e s as the worst, most durable and most dangerous of a l l e r r o r s : Plato's invention of the pure s p i r i t and the good as such. We have measured the value of the world according to categories that r e f e r to a purely f i c t i t i o u s world, or a 'true world' of being transcending what i s character-i z e d c o n t r a s t i n g l y as the 'apparent world' of becoming. Against t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , Nietzsche argues that the 'apparent world' i s the only world, and that the 'true world' i s an invention borne of f a l s e conclusions: This world i s apparent: consequently there i s a true world;- t h i s world i s c o n d i t i o n a l : conse-quently there i s an unconditioned world;- t h i s world i s f u l l of con t r a d i c t i o n : consequently there i s a world free of co n t r a d i c t i o n ; - t h i s world i s a world of becoming: consequently there i s a world of being:- a l l f a l s e conclusions ( b l i n d t r u s t i n reason: i f A e x i s t s , then the opposite concept B must also e x i s t ) . 3 To invent f i c t i o n s about a 'true world' has no meaning at a l l , on Nietzsche's account, unless an i n s t i n c t of slander, de-t r a c t i o n and suspicion against t h i s world has gained the upper hand i n us. I t i s thus of c a r d i n a l importance that we should ab-o l i s h the concept of the 'true world' since i t i s the great de-valuator of t h i s world and, i n Nietzsche's terms, 'our most dan-gerous attempt to assassinate l i f e ' . ^ His means of ab o l i s h i n g the 'true world' and r e l a t e d metaphysical concepts i s by way of h i s t o r i c a l r e f u t a t i o n : whereas i n former times one sought to prove, f o r example, that there i s no God, today one i n d i c a t e s how the b e l i e f that, there i s a God could a r i s e and how t h i s be-l i e f acquired i t s importance. y According to Nietzsche, h i s t o r i -c a l r e f u t a t i o n i s d e f i n i t i v e , and he seeks i n t h i s way to pro-vide a n a t u r a l i s t i c account of the o r i g i n or psychology of meta-ph y s i c a l concepts. 'The r e a l and the apparent world'- I have traced t h i s a n t i t h e s i s back to value r e l a t i o n s . We have projected the conditions of our preservation as predicates of being i n general. Because we have to be stable i n our b e l i e f s i f we are to prosper, we have made the 'rea l world' a world not of change and becoming, but one of being. 6 The 'r e a l world' and 'being', therefore, have nothing to do with metaphysical truths: the inventive force that created these categories laboured i n the service of our needs, "...namely, of our need for s e c u r i t y , for quick understanding on the basis of 7 signs and sounds, for means of abbreviation." The categories with which reason provides us, and i n terms of which philos o -phers have been led to conceive of a 'true world' of 'being' are, i n Nietzsche's language, 'conditions of l i f e ' f o r us. L o g i c i z i n g , r a t i o n a l i z i n g and systematizing developed as expedients of l i f e : we needed to f a c i l i t a t e observation and c a l c u l a t i o n of our en-vironment i f we were to survive. The postulation of a 'true world' thus answers to an i n t e r n a l requirement of the human i n -t e l l e c t , or the demand of our reason f o r a world more conform-able to i t s nature than i s the world of experience: the p h i l -osopher "...invents a world of reason, where reason and the l o g i -5 c a l functions are adequate: t h i s i s the o r i g i n of the 'true' world." 8 Nietzsche lik e w i s e explores a number of possible explana-tions of the o r i g i n a t i o n and development of the b e l i e f i n God. On the one hand, he suggests that the p o s t u l a t i o n of God was 'a mis-take of man's', the r e s u l t of "...an error i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n Q of c e r t a i n n atural events, a f a i l u r e of the i n t e l l e c t . . . " , which i s also r e f l e c t e d i n a m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the nature and s i g n i f i c a n c e of l i n g u i s t i c phenomena: "'Reason' i n language... I am a f r a i d we are not r i d of God because we s t i l l have f a i t h i n grammar." ^ On the other hand, Nietzsche hypothesizes that the idea of God i s a 'projection': "...one sets up one's own type as the measure of value i n general; one projects i t i n t o things, be-1 1 hind things, behind the fate of things- as God..."; or, s p e c i f -i c a l l y with respect to C h r i s t i a n i t y , he holds that the concept of God i s a 'construction' which contradicts l i f e : "God- the formula for every slander against ' t h i s world', for every l i e about the 'beyond'." 1 2 V/ith t h i s l a t t e r observation, Nietzsche's n a t u r a l i s t i c account of the o r i g i n of metaphysical concepts i s v i r t u a l l y complete, since he has traced the p h i l o s o p h i c a l attachment to the 'true world' to i t s root. I f the 'true world' i s an invention borne of fa l s e conclusions, then what i s i t that prompts these conclusions? Nietzsche maintains that s u f f e r i n g i n s p i r e s such sentiments; "...fundamentally they are desires that such a world should ex-i s t ; i n the same way, to imagine another, more valuable world i s an expression of hatred for a world that makes one s u f f e r : the ressentiment of metaphysicians i s here c r e a t i v e . " 1 N i e t z s c h e 6 urges, moreover, that as soon as we recognize that the 'true world' i s i n fa c t f a b r i c a t e d from psychological needs, i t becomes cl e a r that we have 'absolutely no r i g h t to i t ' . A l l the values by means of which we have t r i e d so far to render the world estimable for our-selves and which then proved i n a p p l i c a b l e and therefore devaluated the world- a l l these v a l -ues are the r e s u l t s of c e r t a i n perspectives of u t i l i t y . . . and they have been f a l s e l y p r o j e c t -ed i n t o the essence of things. What we f i n d here i s the hyperbolic naivete of man: p o s i t i n g himself as the meaning and measure of value of things. 14 Indeed, i t i s only an ' i n s t i n c t of weakness' which conserves such b e l i e f s as the b e l i e f i n God, and thus Nietzsche maintains that h i s h i s t o r i c a l r e f u t a t i o n of the 'being-hypothesis' together with the 'God-hypothesis' renders i t unreasonable to understand the idea of a transcendent realm as anything other than a f i c t i o n . However, he also recognizes that so much "...was b u i l t upon t h i s f a i t h , propped up by i t . . . " , that i t s abandonment has consequences 1 5 beyond "...the multitude's capacity for comprehension." As Walter Kaufmann notes, while Nietzsche was keenly aware of the sense i n which the conception of God diminishes the value of l i f e and the world, he also f e l t that the death of God threatened ex-istence with a complete loss of a l l s i g n i f i c a n c e : "To escape n i -h i l i s m - which seems involved both i n asserting the existence of God and thus robbing t h i s world of ultimate s i g n i f i c a n c e , and a l -so i n denying God and thus robbing everything of meaning and v a l -1 6 ue- t h i s i s Nietzsche's greatest and most pe r s i s t e n t problem." In Nietzsche's view, n i h i l i s m i s i n fa c t a t r a n s i t i o n a l stage: we have measured the value of the world by means of cate-gories that r e f e r to a f i c t i t i o u s world, and "...the categories which we used to project some value i n t o the world- we p u l l out 7 1 7 again; so the world looks valueless." ' However, t h i s r ecognition that we have 'no r i g h t ' to a transcendent realm, Nietzsche main-t a i n s , provides 'the pathos that impels us to seek new values': "...the value f e e l i n g s that h i t h e r t o have been squandered on the world of being are again set fre e . " The abandonment of b e l i e f i n God i s only the f i r s t step to be taken for those accustomed to thinking i n terms of a theocentric i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of themselves, t h e i r l i v e s , values and r e a l i t y . Indeed, 'the whole of our Eur-opean morality', on Nietzsche's account, r e s t s upon the b e l i e f i n God: " C h r i s t i a n morality i s a command; i t s o r i g i n i s transcendent; . . . i t has tr u t h only i f God i s the t r u t h - i t stands and f a l l s with 1 9 f a i t h i n God." ' Nietzsche maintains, then, that "God i s dead; 20 but... we s t i l l have to vanquish h i s shadow...", and h i s task i s thus to 'naturalize humanity' or to ef f e c t a revaluation of values: "In place of 'moral values', purely n a t u r a l i s t i c values. 21 N a t u r a l i z a t i o n of morality." The f i r s t aspect of Nietzsche's revaluation of values I s a function of h i s b e l i e f that C h r i s t i a n i d e a l s are u l t i m a t e l y un-tenable: Nietzsche 'wages war' against Christian-moral values, i n order to expose "...how much hypocrisy, comfortableness, l e t t i n g oneself go and l e t t i n g oneself drop, how many l i e s lay hidden un-der the best honoured type of... contemporary morality, how much vi r t u e was o u t l i v e d . " The revaluation of values thus consists i n , f i r s t l y , the painstaking examination of prevalent valuations, and s p e c i f i c a l l y Christian-moral values, with a view to e s t a b l i s h -ing that t h i s morality a c t u a l l y rests upon the very things that i t condemns as being immoral: "... a l l the means by which one has so far attempted to make mankind moral were through and through immoral." 23 8 Nietzsche maintains, for example, that h i s h i s t o r i c a l p h i l -osophy has determined that what are customarily regarded as oppo-s i t e types of actions are not opposite at a l l : "Between good and e v i l actions there i s no difference i n type, at most, a d i f f e r -ence i n degree. Good actions are sublimated e v i l actions; e v i l actions are good actions become coarse and s t u p i d . " ^ Nietzsche's i l l u s t r a t i o n s of the dependence of 'good' actions upon ' e v i l ' mo-t i v a t i o n s are numerous: he shows that gratitude and magnanimity 25 may be expressions of revenge; v he holds that asceticism i s the 26 expression of v a n i t y , and that v i r t u e i s desired by C h r i s t i a n 27 s a i n t s f o r i t s b r u t a l e f f e c t s ; he maintains that almost every-? ft thing we c a l l 'higher c u l t u r e ' i s based upon c r u e l t y and, met-29 a p h o r i c a l l y , that war i s the father of a l l good things; y and f i n -a l l y Nietzsche argues at length that moral judgments are a func-t i o n of what he terms ressentiment: Moral judgments and condemnations constitute the f a v o r i t e revenge of the s p i r i t u a l l y l i m i t e d against those les s l i m i t e d - also a sort of com-pensation for having been i l l - f a v o r e d by nature-f i n a l l y an opportunity for acquiring s p i r i t and becoming r e f i n e d - malice s p i r i t u a l i z e d . 30 Central to t h i s theme of the dependence of 'good* actions on ' e v i l ' motivations i s Nietzsche's i n s i s t e n c e upon the r o l e of ego-ism, condemned by t r a d i t i o n a l morality, i n many actions deemed 'good'. He argues, for example, that egoism i s present i n acts of goodwill,-' j u s t i c e , s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , ^ p i t y , ^ love and 36 making others happy. Indeed, Nietzsche urges that, " I f only those actions are moral which are performed for the sake of an-other and only for h i s sake, as one d e f i n i t i o n has i t , then there 37 are no moral actions." ^ As John Wilcox notes, "Nietzsche thinks that the t r a d i t i o n a l assumptions Incorporated i n t o C h r i s t i a n i t y are 9 that the good i s purely good and the e v i l i s purely e v i l . His analysis has shown that these assumptions are f a l s e : the good and the e v i l are intertwined with one another, they are not 'oppo-s i t e s . " I t i s Nietzsche's conclusion, therefore, that C h r i s -t i a n morality i s founded upon f a l s e assumptions, such as the ass-umption that good and e v i l are genuine c o n t r a r i e s , and that as a r e s u l t C h r i s t i a n morality i s untenable: "Thus I deny morality as 39 I deny alchemy, that i s , I deny t h e i r premises," ^ y However, t h i s conclusion constitutes only one aspect of Nietzsche's revaluation; the second and more c r u c i a l aspect of hi s examination of morality concerns the problem of the value of t r a d i t i o n a l values: "What are our evaluations and moral tables r e a l l y worth? What i s the outcome of t h e i r rule? For whom? In r e l a t i o n to what?- Answer: fo r l i f e . " ^ Nietzsche's revaluation thus requires a standard or c r i t e r i o n i n v i r t u e of which the worth of moral tables may be judged, and he maintains that the r e a l worth of t r a d i t i o n a l values i s s o l e l y a matter of t h e i r v a l -ue 'for l i f e ' . The notion of the value of something f o r l i f e i s explicated i n terms of the extent to which ' i t i s l i f e - p r e s e r v i n g life-enhancing': "But what i s l i f e ? Here we need a new, more d e f i n i t e formulation of the concept ' l i f e ' . My formula f o r i t i s : l i f e i s w i l l to power." ^ According to Nietzsche, l i f e i s w i l l to power i n various forms: "The world viewed from i n s i d e , the world defined and deter mined according to i t s ' i n t e l l i g i b l e - c h a r a c t e r ' - i t would be • w i l l to power' and nothing else." ^ 2 i f l i f e i s w i l l to power, then value can only be 'value for l i f e ' , and can only be under-stood i n terms of what l i f e e s s e n t i a l l y involves: "What i s the 10 objective measure of value? S o l e l y the quantum of enhanced and organized power." ^ The sole objective standard of value, then, recognizes only quanta of enhanced and organized power, and ass-esses them only i n terms of the degree and manner of t h e i r enhance-ment and organization. The w i l l to power, on Nietzsche's account, i s p r e c i s e l y the d i s p o s i t i o n to such enhancement and organization, and i s the condition of t h e i r p o s s i b i l i t y . The w i l l to power i s thus the ultimate basis of a l l value. Nietzsche therefore takes l i f e i n t h i s world to be the sole locus of value, and i t s preservation and enhancement to be de-c i s i v e f o r determinations of value. His indictment of C h r i s t i a n -i t y i s a function of h i s conviction that i t has made an i d e a l of those things that i n fact contradict l i f e : "...value judgments have been stood on t h e i r heads and the concepts of 'true' and 'fa l s e ' are of necessity reversed: whatever i s most harmful to l i f e i s c a l l e d 'true'; whatever elevates i t , enhances, a f f i r m s , j u s t i f i e s i t , and makes i t triumphant, i s c a l l e d ' f a l s e ' . " ^ In Nietzsche's view, C h r i s t i a n i t y represents as 'something ex-alted ' a 'petty, peaceful mediocrity' and an 'equilibrium of a soul that knows nothing of the mighty motivation of great accum-ula t i o n s of strength'. Furthermore, what the C h r i s t i a n does with ' a l l that h i s i n s t i n c t opposes' i s to subject i t to a r a d i c a l de-valuation: "...he s u l l i e s and suspects the b e a u t i f u l , the splen-did, the r i c h , the proud, the s e l f - r e l i a n t , the knowledgeable, the powerful- i n summa, the whole of cul t u r e . " One of the moral values championed by C h r i s t i a n i t y which Nietzsche considers to be a prime candidate for revaluation i s 'selflessness': "...the whole morality of s e l f - d e n i a l must be 11 questioned m e r c i l e s s l y and taken to court." H I t i s Nietzsche's contention that 'for a l l the value that the s e l f l e s s may deserve', nonetheless a 'higher and more fundamental value for l i f e might have to be ascribed to s e l f i s h n e s s ' . What he thus stands opposed to i s the un q u a l i f i e d valuation of s e l f l e s s n e s s , since he holds that s e l f i s h n e s s i s too e s s e n t i a l to l i f e and too c r u c i a l to i t s development for i t s suppression to be de s i r a b l e . As Richard Schacht observes, Nietzsche takes s e l f l e s s n e s s "...to be d e t r i -mental to the development of c e r t a i n creative human powers and ca p a c i t i e s , the p o t e n t i a l i t y for the strengthening and unfolding of which i s shared by r e l a t i v e l y few and i s a c t u a l i z a b l e only i f those happening to possess i t are not induced to r e s t r i c t them-selves to actions aggreeable to others generally." ^ I m p l i c i t i n t h i s l a t t e r observation i s one of Nietzsche's basic contentions with respect to t r a d i t i o n a l values generally and C h r i s t i a n morality i n p a r t i c u l a r : namely, that i n v e s t i g a t i o n of such valuations reveals that they are p r i m a r i l y responses to the needs of groups rather than i n d i v i d u a l s , and of those who constitute the general r u l e i n human s o c i e t i e s rather than the exceptions to i t . Nietzsche designates the morality of a rul e d group 'slave morality', and i t i s the i n t e r e s t s of those who are ruled which are r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r moral valuations. The d i s p o s i -tions and actions which they value negatively are those associated with the 'power and dangerousness' of the r u l i n g group, while "...those q u a l i t i e s are brought out and flooded with l i g h t which serve to ease existence f o r those who s u f f e r . " ^ slave morality i s thus e s s e n t i a l l y a morality of u t i l i t y , grounded i n the ressentiment of the weak against the strong and against existence. 12 . . . t h i s i s Judaeo-Christian morality pure and simple. So that i t could say No to everything on earth that represents the ascending tendency of l i f e , to that which has turned out w e l l , to power, to beauty, to s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n , the i n -s t i n c t of ressentiment, which had here become genius, had to invent another world from whose point of view t h i s a f f i r m a t i o n of l i f e appeared as e v i l , as the reprehensible as such. 49 C h r i s t i a n morality thus constitutes a paradigm case of the species of valuations Nietzsche terms 'decadence-values'. C h r i s -t i a n i t y 'has made an i d e a l of whatever contradicts the i n s t i n c t of the strong l i f e to preserve i t s e l f 1 , and thus subverts 'those i n s t i n c t s which aim at the preservation of l i f e and the enhancement of i t s value'. I t i s important to recognize that f o r Nietzsche i t i s the w i l l to power understood as 'the elevation and strengthening' of man which i s the basic 'standard by which 51 the value of moral valuations i s to be determined'.-^ Thus, on Nietzsche's account, the 'Christian i d e a l ' must be accorded a profoundly negative s i g n i f i c a n c e , because i t involves the " . . . a t -tempt to make the v i r t u e s through which happiness i s possible f o r 52 the l o w l i e s t i n t o the standard i d e a l of a l l values." v However, Nietzsche's appeal to the w i l l to power as the u l -timate basis of a l l value and thus as the standard by means of which the value of valuations i s to be determined r a i s e s serious d i f f i c u l t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n connection with h i s own consider-able epistemoiogical scepticism. On the one hand, Nietzsche wants to hold that 'the world defined and determined according to i t s i n t e l l i g i b l e character' i s w i l l to power, or that t h i s c o n s t i -tutes a fundamental tru t h about the character of the world. On th other hand, Nietzsche declares repeatedly that 'there i s no tr u t h C l e a r l y , with respect to 'metaphysical truths' of a transcendent 13 nature, Nietzsche wants to maintain that the 'true world' to which metaphysical Propositions point does not e x i s t : "The 'true world' and the 'apparent world'- that means: the mendaciously i n -vented world and r e a l i t y . " y y I f there i s no 'true world', then on Nietzsche's account there can be no metaphysical truths: "...there are no eternal f a c t s , nor are there any absolute t r u t h s . " 5 i + Nietzsche's scepticism, however, does not r e s t r i c t i t s e l f to 'metaphysical tr u t h s ' of a transcendent nature: "What are man's truths ultimately? Merely h i s i r r e f u t a b l e e r r o r s . " For Nietzsche 'man's tr u t h s ' are the sorts of propositions which commonly pass as 'truths' i n both ordinary discourse and s p e c i a l i z e d forms of discourse such as l o g i c and science. I t i s h i s contention that perspective i s 'the basic condition of a l l l i f e ' and that as a r e s u l t 'delusion and error are conditions of human knowledge': "Owing to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of which we can become conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, f a l s i f i c a t i o n , reduction to s u p e r f i c i a l i t i e s , and generaliza-56 t i o n . " ^ Nietzsche argues that concepts, i n c l u d i n g the s o - c a l l e d categories of the understanding, do not do j u s t i c e to the empiri-c a l world, since they reduce what i s i n d i v i d u a l to what i s t y p i -c a l , and they equate the unequal. The contrast to the conceptual, or that which concepts s i m p l i f y and f a l s i f y , i s i n Nietzsche's terms 'the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensa-t i o n s . ' 57 Nietzsche's perspectivism i m p l i e s , then, that i f truth i s envisioned as a d i r e c t correspondence of thought and being, there i s and can be nothing of the kind. His thinking here i s Kantian, 14 i n that he maintains that our experience i s as i t i s for us l a r g e -l y i n consequence of the way i n which we constitute i t . The ax-ioms of l o g i c , f o r example, are "...a means and measure for us 58 to create r e a l i t y , the concept ' r e a l i t y 1 , for ourselves...", and thus on Nietzsche's view none of 'man's trut h s ' can be consi-dered to p i c t u r e or model a r e a l i t y which i s as i t i s independent-l y of our experience of i t : " . . . f a c t s i s p r e c i s e l y what there i s 59 not, only i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . " " As Arthur Danto notes, i t would appear to follow that, "We cannot speak of a true perspective, but only of the perspective that p r e v a i l s . Because we cannot ap-peal to any fact independently of i t s r e l a t i o n to the perspective i t i s meant to support, we can do l i t t l e more than to i n s i s t on our own perspective, and t r y , i f we can, to impose i t on other people. " Nevertheless, Nietzsche himself wants to claim that 'the world viewed from i n s i d e ' i s ' w i l l to power, and nothing e l s e ' . His perspectivism implies that h i s own theory of the w i l l to pow-er must be an ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' , as he i s w e l l aware: "Supposing that t h i s also i s only an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n - and you w i l l be eager 61 enough to make t h i s objection?- w e l l , so much the better." The theory of the w i l l to power must be an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , for Nietzsche's perspectivism holds that, "There i s only a perspec-62 t i v e seeing, only a perspective 'knowing'." However, i t i s frequently argued that Nietzsche's contention that there are no f a c t s , but rather only i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , generates a s e l f - r e f e r e n -t i a l paradox. I f the thesis (P) that every view i s an i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n i s true, i n other words, then t h i s would apply to (P) i t -s e l f ; and i f (P) i s indeed only an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , then (P) may 15 be f a l s e , i n which case not every view need be an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a f t e r a l l . However, as Alexander Nehemas observes, the conclusion that (P) i s a c t u a l l y f a l s e does not follow from the fact that (P) i s i t s e l f an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t i s only reached by way of an i n v a l i d inference, by means of equating the fact that (P) i s an i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n and therefore possibly f a l s e with the fa c t that i t i s act-u a l l y f a l s e . As Nehemas puts i t , "This l i n e of c r i t i c i s m presup-poses that to consider a view an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s to concede that i t i s f a l s e . I t assumes that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s a second-best mode of understanding and thus misunderstands perspectivism, which denies that there can be even i n p r i n c i p l e a mode of under-standing that i s be t t e r , more secure, or more accurate than i n -t e r p r e t a t i o n . " ^ In acknowledging i t s own status as an i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n , then, perspectivism concedes that no one i s obliged to believe i t , and on Nietzsche's account t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y how i t d i f f e r s from the dogmatic a t t i t u d e which he so vehemently re-pudiates. I t i s j u s t t h i s dogmatic s p i r i t which, i n Nietzsche's view, assumes that i f a s i n g l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s not good for everyone at a l l times, then no i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s good for anyone at any-time. Nietzsche's perspectivism holds that no p a r t i c u l a r point of view i s inherently superior to other points of view i n the sense that i t represents the world as i t r e a l l y i s : "...as i f a world would s t i l l remain over a f t e r -one deducted the perspec-t i v e . " 64 However, the fact that other points of view are poss-i b l e does not by i t s e l f make them a l l equally l e g i t i m a t e . Per-spectivism i s not equivalent to r e l a t i v i s m : i t does not imply 16 that any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s as good as any other. While Nietzsche's perspectivism does e n t a i l that h i s own theory of the w i l l to pow-er i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n other words, i t i s also c l e a r that for him some i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , l i k e that of the w i l l to power, are better than others. I f we cannot appeal to any fact independently of i t s r e l a t i o n to the perspective i t i s meant to support, however, then there must be some other means of ranking i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s according to t h e i r adequacy. Nietzsche contrasts, for example, h i s own theory 'that i n a l l events a w i l l to power i s operating' with the p i c -ture of 'the mechanistic senselessness of a l l events'; the l a t -t e r , he asserts, i s a function of "...the democratic idiosyncrasy which opposes everything that dominates or wants to dominate."^ Excessive c u l t u r a l or h i s t o r i c a l biases and prejudices thus count against an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of nature, and while there i s no ques-t i o n of 'contemplation without i n t e r e s t ' , a kind of ' o b j e c t i v i t y * i s possible f o r us which, i n Nietzsche's view, makes fo r better i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s : One has to be very l i g h t to drive one's w i l l to knowledge into such a distance and, as i t were, beyond one's time, to create f o r oneself eyes to survey m i l l e n i a . . . One must have l i b -erated oneself from many things that oppress, i n h i b i t , hold down, and make heavy p r e c i s e l y us Europeans today. The human being of such a beyond who wants to behold the supreme measures of value of h i s time must f i r s t of a l l 'over-come' t h i s time i n himself. 66 Thus Nietzsche does i n fact a f f i r m that there are truths d i s -t i n c t from both 'metaphysical truths* and 'man's truth s ' . Nietz-schean truths are necessarily p e r s p e c t i v a l , but they are super-i o r to 'man's truths' i n s o f a r as they are informed by a greater 17 degree of ' o b j e c t i v i t y ' . The theory of the w i l l to power, on t h i s account, provides a better i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of nature than do those modes of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which r e f l e c t excessive anthropomorphisms. I f so, as a value-standard i t requires no further j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and indeed i t c o n s t i t u t e s the only a v a i l a b l e 'objective' standard by means of which value-determinations can be made. As John W i l -cox observes, " I f (Nietzsche) i s r i g h t , we a l l seek power, f i r s t and most fundamentally; and we a l l must- t h i s i s the nature of a l i v i n g being. But i f that i s true, then, i n a sense, the norm of power does not have to be j u s t i f i e d ; we are confronted with a Cn f a i t accompli - i n ourselves." In sum, the w i l l to power w i l l n ecessarily c o n s t i t u t e the ultimate basis of a l l value, and the no of power w i l l condemn valuations borne of weakness, while those that can be shown to express and enhance power w i l l have the only v i n d i c a t i o n p o s s i b l e . Nietzsche's new theory of value thus advocates the adoption of what he c a l l s a 'Dionysian value-standard' for existence, or a value-standard deriving from the apprehension and af f i r m a t i o n of the fundamental character of existence as w i l l to power. This valu standard i s intended to r e f l e c t what goes on i n the world, as i t goes on independently of any 'tables of good' which the wants and needs of p a r t i c u l a r human beings might lead them to formulate. Moreover, i t i s intended to serve as a basis for value-judgments: "Dionysis i s a judge! Have I been understood?" Nietzsche's revaluation of values thus encompasses both a c r i -tique of t r a d i t i o n a l values and modes of valuation, and also the development of a substantive a l t e r n a t i v e to them. As Richard Schacht notes, "Nietzsche holds that the nature of l i f e establishe 18 a standard for the evaluation of everything f a l l i n g w i t h i n i t s compass. The a v a i l a b i l i t y of t h i s standard places evaluation on a footing that i s as firm as that on which the comprehension of l i f e and the world stands." 7 Indeed, Nietzsche i s convinced that t h i s footing i's s u f f i c i e n t l y firm to r u l e out both n i h i l i s m and mere subjectivism i n the theory of value. Nietzsche contends, for example, that there i s an 'order of rank' among men, and that 'what determines your rank i s the 70 quantum of power you are'.' The quantum of power one i s i s not merely a matter of the magnitude of the 'passions and desires' pre sent w i t h i n one, but i s also a function of 'having them under 71 c o n t r o l ' and thus t h e i r 'organization' and " t r a n s f i g u r a t i o n ' by reason, v/hich i s not 'an independent e n t i t y ' but i s rather 72 'a system of r e l a t i o n s between various passions and desires.' In f a c t , Nietzsche characterizes h i s p o s i t i o n along both n a t u r a l -i s t i c ( quantitative) and a r t i s t i c ( q u a l i t a t i v e ) l i n e s . He con-siders the passions to constitute the resources through which a l l q u a l i t a t i v e enhancement of l i f e alone i s possible: "The greater and more t e r r i b l e the passions are that an age, a people, an i n -d i v i d u a l can permit themselves, because they are capable of employ 75 ing them as means, the higher stands t h e i r c u l t u r e . " i y Indeed, Nietzsche asserts that 'there i s nobody from whom I want beauty as much as from you who are powerful', and among his examples of 'higher men' he includes such a r t i s t s as Goethe, Beethoven and Shakespeare. I t must be emphasized, then, that when Nietzsche speaks of a ' n a t u r a l i z a t i o n of morality' or a 'return to nature', he e x p l i c i t -l y states that " . . . i t i s r e a l l y not a going back but an ascent. 19 The l a s t thing that he i s proposing i s a reversion to the l e v e l of the 'beast of prey', our transcendence of which i s something for which he expresses gratitude to t r a d i t i o n a l morality. Nor does Nietzsche propose to revert to the once established but now ec-l i p s e d mode of valuation c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the 'noble races'. 'Master morality', being a morality of abundance rather than want, i s i n f i n i t e l y superior to 'slave morality', but i t nevertheless r e f l e c t s the character of one sort of group and i s bound up with i t s r e l a t i o n to another type of group. What Nietzsche i n fact ad-vocates i s the supersession of both master and slave m o r a l i t i e s , of a l l b a s i c a l l y s o c i a l modes of valuation, i n favour of value-creation rooted i n the self-overcoming of the i n d i v i d u a l . For Nietzsche, then, the w i l l to power i s an e s s e n t i a l l y transformative p r i n c i p l e , and he explicates i t i n terms of h i s concept of the 'self-overcoming' of the i n d i v i d u a l . The process of becoming an i n d i v i d u a l , or 'giving s t y l e to one's character', stands i n sharp contrast to what Nietzsche c a l l s 'the moralist's madness' which seeks the e x t i r p a t i o n of the passions, rather than t h e i r organization and t r a n s f i g u r a t i o n . The 'highest human being', i n Nietzsche's view, would have "...the highest m u l t i -p l i c i t y of drives, i n the r e l a t i v e l y greatest strength that can be endured...",^ but they would be 'controlled' i n t o a coherent whole. Indeed, Nietzsche asserts that so-called ' e v i l i n s t i n c t s ' are 'expedient, species-preserving, and indispensable to as high a degree as the (so-called) good ones; t h e i r function i s merely d i f f e r e n t ' T h e i n t e g r a t i o n of a l l of his passions and desires into a harmony, on Nietzsche's account, accords the i n d i v i d u a l the highest degree of power, over himself and i n his world. 20 I t i s Nietzsche's concept of value-creation defined i n terms of the self-overcoming of i n d i v i d u a l s which constitutes h i s fund-amental c o n t r i b u t i o n to the notion of 'authentic existence'. When Nietzsche speaks of creating values , he means that 'there are 78 altogether no moral f a c t s ' : man has 'placed values i n things' by coming to 'esteem' them. As Schacht notes, " I t i s he who creates i n t h i s sense... who 'creates man's goal and gives the earth i t s meaning and future'- not by f i x i n g any p a r t i c u l a r v a l -ues once and for a l l , but rather by generating esteem and so en-79 r i c h i n g and s t i m u l a t i n g human l i f e . " 1 7 According to Nietzsche, 'valuation i t s e l f i s the w i l l to power; i t i s both an expression of i t and a means whereby the power of those i n question i s i n fact enhanced, for value-creation allows 'the rar e s t and best-constituted men' to a t t a i n 'the highest and most i l l u s t r i o u s (of) human joys, i n which existence celebrates i t s own t r a n s f i g u r a -P)C) t i o n ' . Indeed, i t i s the imbuing of l i f e and the world with value i n t h i s fashion, through the creative a c t i v i t y of exception-a l i n d i v i d u a l s , that on Nietzsche's account constitutes the high-est of a l l forms of the w i l l to power. C l e a r l y , then, Nietzsche repudiates a l l i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t con-ceptions of valuation as knowing, and i n s i s t s instead that valua-t i o n must be understood as a v o l i t i o n a l act. However, as we have noted, Nietzsche argues that i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m i s not simply an error, but rather i t i s a symptom of 'weakness' on the part of 81 human beings: i t i s a ' f l i g h t from r e a l i t y ' or 'mendaciousness Qp i n the face of what i s necessary'; namely, 'distress of a l l kinds', 'waste, decay, e l i m i n a t i o n ' - these are a l l necessary con-sequences of the growth of l i f e . I n t e l l e c t u a l i s m , with i t s inven-21 t i o n of a 'true world' of being and 'the good as such', evidences an unwillingness or incapacity to face the tr u t h about t h i s world: "Error ( f a i t h i n the i d e a l ) i s not blindness, error i s coward-i c e . " ^ T r a d i t i o n a l morality w i l l p e r i s h , on Nietzsche's account, only as the ' w i l l to t r u t h ' gains self-consciousness, and we ac-quire both the courage to face 'the t e r r i b l e aspects of r e a l i t y ' , and the ' o b j e c t i v i t y ' which enables us to 'overcome' our time and 'behold the supreme measures of value of our time', not as meta-phy s i c a l r e a l i t i e s but as the products of our own creative a c t i -v i t y . I t i s t h i s conception of i n d i v i d u a l s having the strength to ' l i v e i n the t r u t h ' and becoming, as a r e s u l t , ' s e l f - l e g i s l a t o r s ' or autonomous e t h i c a l agents which constitutes Nietzsche's spec-i f i c c o n t r i b u t i o n to the notion of i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y . A Nietzschean higher man i s a 'free s p i r i t ' who has acquired a gen-e r a l i z e d awareness that a l l practices are i n t e r p r e t i v e and value-laden, and that h i s own mode of l i f e i s likewise a creati o n , 'Authentic existence' i s thus concerned with the creation and r e a l -i z a t i o n of i d e a l s : these i d e a l s are ways of l i f e that are the pro-duct of autonomous e t h i c a l a c t i v i t y or value-creation. They are the expression of I n d i v i d u a l power and preference, and make no claim to u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y or acceptance, since Nietzsche's free s p i r i t s are aware that t h e i r own chosen modes of l i f e are not the only ones that are possible, desirable or defensible. What Nietzsche's theory of value points toward, therefore, i s an 'ex-perimental morality' according to which one 'gives oneself a goal: "This i s mv_ way; where i s yours?- thus I answered those who asked me 'the way'. For the way- that does not e x i s t . " 8 / 4 22 The symbol of the Ubermensch represents Nietzsche's i d e a l : he maintains that there has never yet been an Ubermensch, but there have been higher men or exceptional i n d i v i d u a l s , who con-s t i t u t e approximate r e a l i z a t i o n s of t h i s i d e a l . Our h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y i s characterized by n i h i l i s m , and t h i s appears to preclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of a f u l l y integrated, l i f e - a f f i r m i n g i n d i v i d u a l . For example, Goethe i s i d e n t i f i e d by Nietzsche as a higher man, but consider what Goethe wrote i n 1824: " I w i l l say nothing against the course of my existence. But at bottom i t has been nothing but pain and burden, and I can af f i r m that during the whole of my 75 years, I have not had four weeks of genuine well-being. I t i s but the perpetual r o l l i n g of a rock that must be rai s e d up again f o r -ever." Thus while Goethe might indeed constitute an example of a higher man, s p e c i f i c a l l y an a r t i s t - free s p i r i t , he does not and perhaps cannot e x h i b i t the j o y f u l a f f i r m a t i o n of l i f e which char-ac t e r i z e s the a t t i t u d e of Nietzsche's Ubermensch. I t i s c l e a r , however, that Nietzsche's theory of value i s far from unproblematic. He contends that the creation and r e a l i z a -t i o n of i d e a l s by exceptional i n d i v i d u a l s constitutes the highest of a l l forms of the w i l l to power, yet the meaning of 'power' i s i t s e l f ambiguous, as i s the method for determining what does and does not 'enhance' power. In f a c t , Nietzsche himself recognizes that 'the determination of the order of rank among values' i s an unresolved problem, and he appeals to ' a l l the sciences' to add-ress themselves to l o c a t i n g a s o l u t i o n . ' What remains question-able, however, i s the theory of the w i l l to power i t s e l f . As Wal-ter Kaufmann notes, the w i l l to power i s , f i r s t and foremost, the key concept of a psychological hypothesis, i n that Nietzsche con-23 ceived of the w i l l to power as a u n i v e r s a l feature of the human c o n s t i t u t i o n . The suggestion here, then, i s that the theory of the w i l l to power might be the one and only i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of hu-man behaviour of which we are capable when we consider the empir-i c a l evidence at hand. When Nietzsche claims, moreover, that the w i l l to power i s not only the basic drive of man, but also the fundamental force operating i n the universe, Kaufmann maintains that t h i s extreme gen e r a l i z a t i o n i s likewise offered i n an empir-i c a l s p i r i t : "...the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the human mind might con-ceivably require i t to i n t e r p r e t not only human behaviour but the entire cosmos i n terms of the w i l l to power." I f Nietzsche based h i s theory on empirical data, however, then the most ob-vious objection to i t would be that i t appears to be e m p i r i c a l l y untrue that the human mind i s so constituted. While h i s theory of the w i l l to power may thus be e m p i r i c a l l y f a l s e , Nietzsche's treatment of value does o f f e r a substantive a l t e r n a t i v e to t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t views of value, as w e l l as to C h r i s t i a n morality s p e c i f i c a l l y , by affirming that t h i s world i s the sole locus of value and by i d e n t i f y i n g the creative a c t i v i t y of In d i v i d u a l s as the source of that value. However, Nietzsche has been c r i t i c i z e d for proposing a new code of conduct that i s , among other things, vague and u n o r i g i n a l . For example, the character of Nietzsche's exceptional i n d i v i d u a l has been des-cribed by Danto as, "A s u l t r y heart plus a cool head, minus the human-all-too-human... Here i s an ancient, vaguely pagan i d e a l , the passions d i s c i p l i n e d but not denied." ^9 T h e p r o b i e m , then, i s that the s p e c i f i c character of the higher man, what he i s a c t u a l l y l i k e and how p r e c i s e l y self-mastery or s e l f - p e r f e c t i o n i s to be 24 achieved, remains unclear. I t must be emphasized, however, that i t i s not Nietzsche's i n t e n t i o n to provide a new 'table of values' as such, or a p o s i -t i v e code of conduct of his own, but rather to present a new con-ception of valuation as a human a c t i v i t y . Moreover, the project of s e l f - p e r f e c t i o n or of becoming an i n d i v i d u a l i s not one which can be described s p e c i f i c a l l y . As Nehemas observes, "A true i n d i -v i d u a l i s p r e c i s e l y one who i s d i f f e r e n t from the rest of the world, and there i s no formula, no set of r u l e s , no code of con-duct that can possibly capture i n informative terms what i t i s to be l i k e that." There are, i n other words, no general p r i n c i -ples that we can follow i n order to become unique; the very no-t i o n of an i n d i v i d u a l makes i t impossible for Nietzsche to des-cribe In any d e t a i l e d way how one can become that. The most that can be hoped for i n the way of a p o s i t i v e char a c t e r i z a t i o n of Nietzschean 'authentic existence' i s a number of less than s p e c i f i c guidelines, as when Nietzsche describes h i s free s p i r i t s as those who have gained ' o b j e c t i v i t y ' by distanc-ing themselves from and hence 'overcoming' the conventions of t h e i r own time. Further, Nietzschean higher men are said to poss-ess 'the highest m u l t i p l i c i t y of drives i n the r e l a t i v e l y great-est strength that can be endured', but they c o n t r o l and organize them i n order to c r e a t e and r e a l i z e t h e i r own i d e a l s . Nietzsche does o f f e r us concrete examples of s e l f - l e g i s l a t o r s , such as Goethe, Beethoven and Shakespeare, but i t i s clear that the great est example of the nature of i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y i s provided by Nietzsche himself. F i r s t , he overcame the prejudices of h i s time: he l i v e d "...with one foot beyond i i f e . . . " , ^ 1 and as a 25 r e s u l t he became capable of making those s h i f t s of perspective which c o n s t i t u t e o b j e c t i v i t y : "...the more eyes, d i f f e r e n t eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete w i l l our... 92 ' o b j e c t i v i t y ' be." y Second, Nietzsche was, i n h i s own words, one who " . . . e x p l o i t s bad accidents to h i s advantage... c o l l e c t s 93 from everything he sees, hears, l i v e s through, h i s sum..."; ^ and was "...strong enough to turn even what i s most questionable and dangerous to my advantage and thus to become stronger." ^ Despite numerous personal d i f f i c u l t i e s , i n c l u d i n g a v a r i e t y of d e b i l i t a t i n g p h y s i c a l ailments, Nietzsche therefore was able to conclude nevertheless: "How could I f a i l to be g r a t e f u l to my whole l i f e ? " , 7^ for i t was the u t i l i z a t i o n of a l l aspects of h i s experience which on h i s own account provided him with the strength necessary not only to l i v e ' i n the t r u t h ' and to produce a un-ique body of work, but also u l t i m a t e l y to a f f i r m l i f e , even i n -cluding i t s ' t e r r i b l e aspects': "My formula for greatness i n a human being i s amor f a t i : that one wants nothing to be d i f f e r e n t , not forward, not backward, not i n a l l e t e r n i t y . Not merely to bear what i s necessary, s t i l l l e s s to conceal i t . . . but love i t . " ^ 26 Chapter Two Sartre's Concept of Authentic I n d i v i d u a l Existence My purpose i n t h i s chapter i s to elucidate Sartre's concept of i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y . In order to achieve t h i s end, a b r i e f presentation of his ontology i s required, as w e l l as a more lengthy discussion of his theory of value as i t i s put forward i n Being and Nothingness. Nothing possesses i n t r i n s i c value, on Sartre's account, but instead values are created by means of our free choices. The most prevalent c r i t i c i s m s of Sartre's p o s i t i o n w i l l be addressed, such as the contention that h i s ontology implies for e t h i c s a thoroughgoing subjectivism and r e l a t i v i s m . I t w i l l be argued, however, that these c r i t i c i s m s of Sartre's theory of value cannot u l t i m a t e l y be sustained, because they f a i l to recog-nize or appreciate h i s discussion of our s i t u a t i o n i n the world, the r o l e of others i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n of that s i t u a t i o n , and hence what he terms our 'objective encounter' v/ith values i n the world. Sartre's doctrine of freedom w i l l be examined i n t h i s con-nection, together with h i s e x p l i c a t i o n of the nature of 'bad f a i t h ' . I t w i l l be suggested that i m p l i c i t i n Being and Nothingness i s an ethics designed to l i b e r a t e the I n d i v i d u a l from l i v i n g i n bad f a i t h by means of a r e f l e c t i v e comprehension of the nature of human r e a l i t y . I t i s an ethics of self-recovery or authentic ex-istence, having as i t s i d e a l the development of the morally aut-onomous i n d i v i d u a l who chooses to take freedom as his ultimate value. * * * * * * * * 27 Consciousness, according to Sartre, has two fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . F i r s t , i t i s i n t e n t i o n a l : " A l l consciousness, as Husserl has shown, i s consciousness of something. This means that there i s no consciousness which i s not a p o s i t i n g of a tran-scendent object, o r - i f you prefer, that consciousness has no 1 'content'." Second, i t i s self-conscious: "In other words, every p o s i t i o n a l ( t h e t i c ) consciousness of an object i s at the same time a non-positional (non-thetic) consciousness of i t s e l f . " Non-positional self-consciousness i s , for Sartre, an immediate, non-cognitive r e l a t i o n of the s e l f to i t s e l f . R e f l e c t i o n , on the other hand, i s a secondary act i n which the r e f l e c t i n g conscious-ness po s i t s the consciousness r e f l e c t e d on as i t s object. I t i s Sartre's contention that non-thetic self-consciousness makes re-f l e c t i o n p o s s i b l e , or that "...there i s a p r e - r e f l e c t i v e cogito which i s the condition of the Cartesian cogito." ^ Unlike consciousness, which i s described as a 'lack of being' or a 'nothingness', Sartre characterizes b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f as ' s o l -i d ' or a 'coincidence with i t s e l f which i s ' f u l l p o s i t i v i t y ' . Sartre argues that b e i n g - f o r - i t s e l f (consciousness, human r e a l i t y ) can e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f only i n terms of and against b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f (non-conscious being, the given); s p e c i f i c a l l y , the f o r - i t s e l f e x i s t s as the negation or • n i h i l a t i o n ' of the i n - i t s e l f . In order to be non-thetic self-consciousness, consciousness must be a th e t i c consciousness of something, of an object; but i t i s imposs-i b l e to construct the notion of an object i f we do not have o r i g -i n a l l y a negative r e l a t i o n designating the object as that which i s not consciousness. Sartre thus contends that negation Is the a p r i o r i foundation of a l l experience: "...what makes a l l experience 2 8 possible i s an a p r i o r i upsurge of the object for the subject-or since the upsurge i s the o r i g i n a l fact of the f o r - i t s e l f , an o r i g i n a l upsurge of the f o r - i t s e l f as presence to the object which i t i s not." ^  On Sartre's account, then, the f o r - i t s e l f determines i t s e l f by means of what i t i s not, and t h i s n i h i l a t i o n of being i s an 'i n t e r n a l negation' which reveals the i n - i t s e l f while determining the being or defining the i n t r a - s t r u c t u r e of the f o r - i t s e l f : "For example... the r e v e l a t i o n of the s p a t i a l i t y of being i s one with the /Of i t s e l f c non-positional apprehension by the f o r - i t s e l r as unextended." To say that the f o r - i t s e l f determines i t s being by means of a be-ing which i t i s not i s to say, i n Sartre's terminology, that the f o r - i t s e l f i s the foundation of i t s e l f as a lack of being. Indeed, on Sartre's account human r e a l i t y , which i s i t s e l f a lack, i s that by which lack appears i n the world: " . . . i n the human world, the incomplete being which i s released to i n t u i t i o n as la c k i n g i s con-s t i t u t e d i n i t s being by the lacked- that i s , by what i s not. I t i s the f u l l moon which confers on the crescent moon i t s being as crescent; what-is-not determines what-is." ^ Sartre contends that the existence of desire as a human fact i s s u f f i c i e n t to prove that human r e a l i t y i s a lack. Desire i s a lack of being: "...the s e l f - a s - b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f i s what human r e a l -7 i t y lacks and what makes i t s meaning." Sartre maintains that, i n i t s p r i m i t i v e r e l a t i o n to i t s e l f , human r e a l i t y i s not what I t i s . The r e l a t i o n denied i n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of the f o r - i t s e l f i s a r e l -ation between the f o r - i t s e l f and i t s e l f i n the mode of i d e n t i t y . Thus, what the f o r - i t s e l f lacks i s the s e l f as a s u b s t a n t i a l be-ing, or i t s e l f as b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f . As Sartre puts i t , the cogito 29 i s haunted by being, and t h i s constitutes the o r i g i n of transcen-dence: "Human r e a l i t y i s a perpetual surpassing toward a c o i n c i -Q dence with i t s e l f which i s never given." The perpetually absent being which haunts the f o r - i t s e l f i s , on Sartre's account, the impossible synthesis of the f o r - i t s e l f and the i n - i t s e l f . Sartre argues i n Being and Nothingness that the s e l f can ex-i s t only as a 'lack of t o t a l i t y ' , whereas t h i s perpetually absent being would be the s e l f as a s u b s t a n t i a l being. I t would combine wi t h i n i t s e l f , i n other words, the incompatible c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the i n - i t s e l f and the f o r - i t s e l f , v i z . the coincidence with i t -s e l f or f u l l p o s i t i v i t y of b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f , and the self - s u r p a s s i n g self-awareness which i s consciousness. I t i s ju s t t h i s impossible synthesis which, when hypostatized as a transcendence beyond the world, takes on the name of God; that i s , God conceived of as a s e l f - i d e n t i c a l plenitude of being who i s also self-conscious or self-aware. Moreover, while Sartre characterizes the i n - i t s e l f and the f o r - i t s e l f as 'de trop' or r a d i c a l l y contingent, he describes God as a necessary being or 'the necessary foundation of himself'.^ In Sartre's view, then, what human r e a l i t y lacks and hence desires to be i s just such a s e l f - i d e n t i c a l and necessary being, and he contends that t h i s desire to be God implies that the being of hu-man r e a l i t y i s s u f f e r i n g : "(Human r e a l i t y ) r i s e s i n being as per-petually haunted by a t o t a l i t y which i t i s without being able to be i t , p r e c i s e l y because i t could not a t t a i n the i n - i t s e l f without lo s i n g i t s e l f as f o r - i t s e l f . Human r e a l i t y i s therefore an unhappy consciousness with no p o s s i b i l i t y of surpassing i t s unhappy s t a t e . " Value, on Sartre's account, i s 'the lacked', and value there-fore makes a 'dyad' with human r e a l i t y , which i s a lack. Indeed, 30 human r e a l i t y i n the broad sense includes both the f o r - i t s e l f and value. The impossible synthesis of the f o r - i t s e l f and i n - i t s e l f , or God, i s the supreme value: "The supreme value toward which con-sciousness at every i n s t a n t surpasses i t s e l f by i t s very being i s the absolute being of the s e l f with i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of ident-1 1 i t y , of p u r i t y , of permanence, etc., and as i t s own foundation." Value i s 'beyond being', but Sartre wants to maintain that none-theless i t possesses being i n the sense that i t i s t h i s absent be-ing which haunts the f o r - i t s e l f : " I t i s that toward which a being surpasses i t s being; every value-oriented act i s a wrenching away 1 2 from i t s own being toward ." Concretely, each p a r t i c u l a r f o r - i t s e l f lacks a c e r t a i n p a r t i -cular r e a l i t y : "What i s given as the pecul i a r lack of each f o r -i t s e l f and what i s s t r i c t l y defined as lacking to p r e c i s e l y t h i s f o r - i t s e l f and no other i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of the f o r - i t s e l f . The possible r i s e s on the ground of the n i h i l a t i o n of the f o r - i t s e l f . " 1 My p o s s i b i l i t y , my project i s my choice of myself i n the world, and the f o r - i t s e l f cannot appear without being 'haunted by value', or the 'risen i d e a l ' of coincidence with s e l f : each p a r t i c u l a r f o r -i t s e l f lacks that c e r t a i n p a r t i c u l a r r e a l i t y "...which i f the f o r -i t s e l f were s y n t h e t i c a l l y assimilated with i t , would transform the f o r - i t s e l f i n t o i t s e l f . " 1^ A l l of my i n d i v i d u a l values, i n Sar-tre's view, derive t h e i r meaning from t h i s o r i g i n a l p r o j e c t i o n of myself which stands as my choice of mode of being i n the world. I t i s thus I who sustains values i n being-: nothing makes values ex-i s t , Sartre contends, unless i t i s that freedom which at the same time makes me myself e x i s t . S p e c i f i c a l l y , then, Sartre wishes to maintain that value haunt 31 the for-itself-as-freedom: "(Value) does not d e l i v e r i t s e l f to a contemplative i n t u i t i o n which would apprehend i t as being v a l -ue... On the contrary, i t can be revealed only to an active free-dom which makes i t e x i s t as value by the sole fact of recognizing 1 5 i t as such." y Values, i n other words, do not enjoy an indepen-dent existence. They depend for t h e i r existence on my freedom, and Sartre concludes that "...my freedom i s the unique foundation of value and... nothing, absolutely nothing j u s t i f i e s me i n adopting t h i s or that p a r t i c u l a r value, t h i s or that p a r t i c u l a r scale of 1 6 values." As the being by whom values e x i s t , therefore, I am 'without j u s t i f i c a t i o n and without excuse', and i n t h i s sense there i s what Sartre c a l l s a ' t o t a l contingency of being-for-value'. This constitutes Sartre's i n i t i a l treatment of value i n Being and Nothingness, considered i n r e l a t i o n to h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of the ont o l o g i c a l structure of b e i n g - f o r - i t s e l f . He cautions at t h i s juncture, however, that 'in fact I am engaged i n a world of v a l -ues': i n the world of the immediate, values "...are sown on my 1 7 path as thousands of l i t t l e r e a l demands." At t h i s point i n h i s de s c r i p t i v e ontology, Sartre cannot discuss t h i s 'objective en-counter' with values i n the world, because he has not yet e l u c i -dated the nature of being-for-others. Nevertheless, i t i s against Sartre's i n i t i a l and e s s e n t i a l l y incomplete analysis of value that many of his c r i t i c s d i r e c t t h e i r attacks. The most prevalent of these c r i t i c i s m s w i l l be presented here, but I t w i l l be argued that these objections to Sartre's discussion of value, and speci -f i c a l l y to any e t h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s discussion, cannot be sustained i f h i s treatment of being-for-others, as well as his im-p l i c i t account of authentic existence, are taken into consideration. 32 Richard Bernstein maintains, for example, that i f man i n -e v i t a b l y seeks to become God, then no e t h i c a l theory can possess any s i g n i f i c a n c e . I f a l l of man's actions are directed to a t t a i n -ing the synthesis of the i n - i t s e l f and the f o r - i t s e l f , and t h i s goal i s impossible as Sartre indeed asserts, then there Is no im-port to morality. Sartre holds that the desire to be God implies that human r e a l i t y i s 'by nature an unhappy consciousness with no p o s s i b i l i t y of surpassing i t s unhappy state': a l l of our e f f o r t s are doomed to f a i l u r e , and hence a l l of our actions are rendered equivalent. On Bernstein's account, therefore, "We should have the courage to admit that the consequence of Sartre's analysis of hu-man r e a l i t y i s not only despair, but n i h i l i s m i n the c o l d l y tech-n i c a l sense. There never i s nor can be any basic reason or j u s t i -f i c a t i o n f or one value, end, choice, or action rather than an-other." 1 8 Bernstein continues h i s attack by noting that Sartre maintains that i t i s 'I who sustains values i n being': nothing makes values ex i s t unless i t i s that freedom which makes me myself e x i s t . I t i s i n d i v i d u a l freedom alone, then, that i s the source of a l l v a l -ues. There are no objective norms, and Bernstein holds that t h i s r a d i c a l l y s u b j e c t i v i s t p o s i t i o n undercuts the p o s s i b i l i t y of any genuine e t h i c a l theory. I f , as Sartre states, my freedom i s the unique foundation of values, and i f 'absolutely nothing j u s t i f i e s me i n adopting t h i s or that p a r t i c u l a r value, t h i s or that p a r t i -cular scale of values', then the r e s u l t for ethics i s a thorough-going r e l a t i v i s m . As Bernstein puts i t , " . . . i f we hold fast to Sartre's o n t o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s , we can never j u s t i f y any c r i t e r i a , we can never u l t i m a t e l y say that one thing i s more valuable than 33 1 9 another." y S i m i l a r objections are r a i s e d by R i s i e r i F r o n d i z i , but he pushes h i s points considerably f u r t h e r than does Bernstein. S a r t r e , i n F r o n d i z i ' s view, altogether r e j e c t s the notion of o b j e c t i v e values or moral norms, and he instead bases moral norms and v a l -ues s o l e l y on s u b j e c t i v e choice. On F r o n d i z i ' s account, "Sartre gives the impression that values come to us out of the blue. In contrast to Scheler's and Hartmann's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , which con-s i d e r values as essences that e x i s t up there i n the ether l i k e some kind of P l a t o n i c 'Ideas', Sartre jumps to the other extreme and contends that we can make anything valuable by the mere f a c t 20 that we f r e e l y choose i t . " F r o n d i z i concludes, then, that on Sartre's account we are denied the p o s s i b i l i t y of making a mis-take: i f the mere f a c t of my choosing i t makes a thing valuable, then the very notions of ' r i g h t ' and 'wrong' are destroyed. On Sartre's s u b j e c t i v i s t p o s i t i o n , F r o n d i z i a s s e r t s , one simply invents one's own values without any guidance or c r i t e r i a . To say that the i n d i v i d u a l f r e e l y chooses i n moral matters, i n other words, i s to say "...that he can decide a r b i t r a r i l y , that h i s free choice i s the only foundation of morality and he can 21 ignore f a c t s and circumstances that bear upon moral d e c i s i o n s . " I f i t i s indeed sheer choice and not i t s content that counts, then a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s are rendered equivalent and we end up with what F r o n d i z i terms an 'ethics of i n d i f f e r e n c e ' : anything w i l l do as well as anything e l s e . F r o n d i z i maintains, moreover, that t h i s ethics of i n d i f f e r e n c e i s a d i r e c t consequence of Sartre's notion of human freedom, which i n h i s view acknowledges no l i m i t s to freedom but rather asserts that i t i s absolute and unconditioned. 34 These c r i t i c i s m s of Sartre's p o s i t i o n w i l l be addressed i n two stages: f i r s t , from the point of view of the i n d i v i d u a l l i v i n g i n bad f a i t h (which i s out usual p r e - r e f l e c t i v e s t a t e , on Sartre's view), and second, from the perspective of the i n d i v i d u a l who has made the t r a n s i t i o n from bad f a i t h to an authentic form of e x i s -tence. I t i s true that for Sartre nothing possesses i n t r i n s i c v a l -ue; nothing i s ' o b j e c t i v e l y valuable' i n that sense. However, does t h i s imply that 'values come to us out of the blue', the products of an "absolute and unconditioned' freedom, as Fr o n d i z i claims? Does i t imply that 'there never i s nor can be any basic reason or j u s t i f i c a t i o n for one value, end, choice, or action rather than another', as Bernstein asserts? In order to defend Sartre against c i t i c i s m s such as these, an examination of his doctrine of free-dom i s required. In a bare o n t o l o g i c a l sense, we are absolutely free: we are not free to cease being free, or as Sartre states we are condemned to be free, because the being of human r e a l i t y i s freedom. Sartre does indeed assert that our freedom encounters no l i m i t s , but he means by t h i s that the ' c o e f f i c i e n t of adversity' i n things can-not be used as an argument against our freedom, because i t i s by_ us, i . e . by the preliminary p o s i t i n g of an end, that t h i s c o e f f i -cient of adversity a r i s e s . As Sartre puts i t , "...although brute things can from the s t a r t l i m i t our freedom of action, i t i s our freedom i t s e l f which must f i r s t constitute the framework, the tech nique, and the ends i n r e l a t i o n to which they w i l l manifest them-22 selves as l i m i t s . " I t i s therefore our freedom which constitute the l i m i t s which i t w i l l subsequently encounter, and hence from an ontological standpoint 'no l i m i t s to my freedom can be found ex-35 cept freedom i t s e l f . This does not imply, however, that our freedom i s i n fact 'unconditioned'. E m p i r i c a l l y , we can be free only i n r e l a t i o n to a 'state of things' and i n sp i t e of t h i s state of things. Freedom i s o r i g i n a l l y a r e l a t i o n to the given: " . . . t h i s given i s nothing other than the i n - i t s e l f n i h i l a t e d by the f o r - i t s e l f which has to 23 be i t . " ^ What Sartre c a l l s our ' s i t u a t i o n ' , then, i s the common product of the contingency of the i n - i t s e l f and of freedom. The paradox of freedom, on Sartre's account, i s that there i s freedom only i n a s i t u a t i o n , and there i s a s i t u a t i o n only through free-dom: "Human-reality everywhere encounters resistance and obstacles which i t has not created, but these resistances and obstacles have meaning only i n and through the free choice which human-reality i s . " ^ The given which human r e a l i t y has to be and which i t i l l u m i n -ates by i t s project or i t s choice of i t s e l f i n the world includes: my place (the place which i s assigned to me by my b i r t h ) , my body, my past (a backdrop and a point of view), my environment (the i n -strumental-things which surround me), and my fellowman. In the case of each of these aspects of our s i t u a t i o n , Sartre makes the point that man encounters obstacles only within the f i e l d of h i s freedom: there are no obstacles i n an absolute sense, but rather obstacles reveal t h e i r c o e f f i c i e n t of adversity across f r e e l y i n -vented and f r e e l y acquired techniques. However, Sartre also i n -s i s t s that these techniques are not necessarily or simply mine: to l i v e i n a world with my fellowman i s "...to f i n d myself engaged In a world i n which instrumental-complexes can have a meaning which my free project has not f i r s t given to them." ^  In other words, 36 the world i s already provided with meaning, indeed I have meaning which I have not given to myself: there e x i s t c o l l e c t i v e l y de-fined meanings, an 'innumerable host of meanings', which are i n -dependent of my choice. On Sartre's account (and r e c a l l that we are discussing the case of the i n d i v i d u a l l i v i n g i n bad f a i t h , or our usual pre-r e f l e c t i v e s t a t e ) , our being i s immediately i n s i t u a t i o n : "...that i s , i t a r i s e s i n enterprises and knows i t s e l f f i r s t i n so f a r as i t i s r e f l e c t e d i n those enterprises. We discover ourselves then i n a world peopled with demands, i n the heart of projects 'in the 26 course of r e a l i z a t i o n ' . " The borgeois, for example, c a l l them-selves 'respectable c i t i z e n s ' , but they do not become respectable as a r e s u l t of contemplating moral values. On the contrary, from the moment of t h e i r a r i s i n g i n the world they are throv/n Into a pattern of behaviour the meaning of which i s r e s p e c t a b i l i t y . As Sartre puts i t , " . . . r e s p e c t a b i l i t y acquires a being; i t i s not put i n t o question. Values are sown on my path as thousands of l i t t l e r e a l demands, l i k e the signs which order us to keep o f f the i , 27 grass." I t i s c l e a r , then, that Sartre's treatment of value need not deteriorate i n t o the r a d i c a l l y s u b j e c t i v i s t p o s i t i o n described by Fr o n d i z i : h i s account f a i l s to recognize or appreciate Sartre's discussion of our s i t u a t i o n , and the role of others i n the c o n s t i -t u t i o n of that s i t u a t i o n . Sartre indeed holds that nothing i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y valuable, v i z . nothing i s 'objectively valuable' i n that sense, since a l l values depend for t h e i r existence on freedom or the c o n s t i t u t i v e a c t i v i t y of consciousness. The freedom i n question, however, i s not necessarily or simply nry_ freedom. I am 3 7 engaged i n a world which i s already meaningful, due to the c o l l -ective a c t i v i t i e s of my fellowmen. I t i s t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i v i -t i e s which anchor the objective values which I encounter: values which have 'being', on Sartre's account, or are ' c r y s t a l l i z e d ' i n the s o c i a l world. I t i s true that Sartre's discussion of the o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c -ture of the f o r - i t s e l f considers the f o r - i t s e l f i n i s o l a t i o n , and hence he a r t i c u l a t e s h i s conclusions i n forms such as ' I t i s I who sustains values i n being'. The f o r - i t s e l f so considered, however, p Q i s an a b s t r a c t i o n , as Sartre himself r e a d i l y acknowledges. In f a c t , the f o r - i t s e l f can e x i s t only i n a s i t u a t i o n , and i n any s i t u a t i o n there w i l l be c o l l e c t i v e l y defined values, due to the presence and a c t i v i t i e s of others. Hence, contrary to what Frond-i z i suggests, values do not 'come to us out of the blue'. We cannot 'decide a r b i t r a r i l y ' what we w i l l or w i l l not value, and we cannot 'ignore facts and circumstances'. On the contrary, Sartre main-tains that we are i n e v i t a b l y faced with a s o c i a l world, a world of c o l l e c t i v e meanings and valuations. As Sartre puts i t , i t i s a world 'peopled with demands' which e x i s t independently of my choice. This, i n i t s e l f , does not undermine Bernstein's objection that, given Sartre's ontology, 'there never i s nor can be any basic reason or j u s t i f i c a t i o n for one value, end, choice, or action r a -ther than another'. In order to defuse t h i s c r i t i c i s m , we must con-sider Sartre's analysis of bad f a i t h and the t r a n s i t i o n from l i v -ing i n bad f a i t h to an authentic form of existence. Sartre main-tains that we are, i n f a c t , free to modify the valuations which are ' c r y s t a l l i z e d ' i n the s o c i a l world, we are free to a f f i r m or deny them, but we conceal t h i s fundamental freedom of choice from 38 o u r s e l v e s : we l i v e i n 'bad f a i t h ' . F i r s t l y , s i n c e v a l u e and t h e f o r - i t s e l f c a n a r i s e o n l y i n what S a r t r e c a l l s t h e • c o n s u b s t a n t i a l u n i t y o f a d y a d ' , v a l u e i s n o t o r i g i n a l l y p o s i t e d by t h e f o r -i t s e l f . V a l u e i s n o t t h e o b j e c t o f a t h e s i s , and hence i t i s n o t known a t t h i s s t a g e b u t r a t h e r i t i s l i v e d as 'the c o n c r e t e mean-i n g o f t h a t l a c k w h i c h makes my p r e s e n t b e i n g ' : " V a l u e i s m e r e l y g i v e n w i t h t h e n o n - t h e t i c t r a n s l u c e n c y o f the f o r - i t s e l f , w h i c h 2 9 makes i t s e l f be as t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f b e i n g . " 7 S e c o n d l y , o u r b e i n g i s i m m e d i a t e l y i n s i t u a t i o n : a t each i n s t a n t we a r e t h r u s t i n t o t h e w o r l d and engaged t h e r e . The c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f man i n a c -t i o n , on S a r t r e ' s a c c o u n t , i s a n o n - r e f l e c t i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s : i t i s c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h o s e s t r u c t u r e s o f e x i g e n c y I n the w o r l d w h i c h a r e c o l l e c t i v e l y d e f i n e d v a l u a t i o n s . I t i s n o t , however, a r e f l e c t i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f my r e l a t i o n t o t h o s e s t r u c t u r e s , v i z . t h e i r dependence on the c o n s t i t u t i v e a c t i v i t y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and hence my f reedom t o m o d i f y them. What i s c o n c e a l e d , t h e n , i s my own o r i g i n a l r e l a t i o n t o v a l -ues; t h a t t h e y d e r i v e t h e i r meaning f o r me i n r e l a t i o n t o an o r i g -i n a l p r o j e c t i o n o f m y s e l f w h i c h s t a n d s as my c h o i c e o f m y s e l f i n the w o r l d . T h i s i s why, on S a r t r e ' s a c c o u n t , 'everyday m o r a l i t y ' i s d e v o i d o f e t h i c a l a n g u i s h : e v e r y d a y m o r a l i t y does n o t r e c o g -n i z e t h e e s s e n t i a l ' i d e a l i t y o f v a l u e s ' , o r t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y de-pend upon freedom. A n g u i s h , on t h e o t h e r hand, i s the r e f l e c t i v e a p p r e h e n s i o n o f freedom by i t s e l f , and i t a p p e a r s a t the moment t h a t I d i s e n g a g e m y s e l f from t h e w o r l d i n w h i c h I had been engaged " I n each i n s t a n t o f r e f l e c t i o n a n g u i s h i s b o r n as a s t r u c t u r e o f the r e f l e c t i n g c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n so f a r as t h e l a t t e r c o n s i d e r s c o n s c i o u s n e s s as an o b j e c t o f r e f l e c t i o n . " ^° Through r e f l e c t i o n , 39 then, I am i n a p o s i t i o n to recognize that values depend for t h e i r existence on the a c t i v i t y of consciousness, and that consequently they can be put i n t o question and modified. However, i t i s one of Sartre's c e n t r a l theses i n Being and Nothingness that 'everything takes place as i f our e s s e n t i a l and immediate behaviour with respect to anguish i s f l i g h t ' . Psycholog-i c a l determinism, i n Sartre's view, i s a r e f l e c t i v e defense ag-ai n s t anguish: " I t attempts to f i l l the void which e n c i r c l e s us, to r e - e s t a b l i s h the l i n k s between the past and present, between present and future. I t provides us with a nature productive of our acts, and these very acts i t makes transcendent." - ^ F l i g h t before anguish can take the form of ' d i s t r a c t i o n ' i n r e l a t i o n to the future; s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t i s an attempt at d i s t r a c t i o n d i r e c t -ed at the p o s s i b i l i t i e s opposed to m^  p o s s i b i l i t y : " I force my-s e l f to see them as endowed with a transcendent, purely l o g i c a l 32 being, i n short, as things." y They are thus no longer threaten-in g , since they surround my p o s s i b i l i t y as merely conceivable e v e n t u a l i t i e s . F l i g h t before anguish, on Sartre's account, also attempts to disarm the past of i t s threat. What I attempt to fl e e here i s my very transcendence, i n so far as i t sustains and sur-passes my essence: I assert that I am my essence i n the mode of being of the i n - i t s e l f . Freedom then becomes one of the proper-t i e s of t h i s opaque being, and i s thus disarmed; my being i s no longer free qua being, but rather, "My s e l f becomes the o r i g i n of i t s acts as the other i s of h i s , by vi r t u e of having a personality already constituted." I t i s such processes of d i s t r a c t i o n before anguish, or such patterns of f l i g h t i n the face of our fundamental freedom, that 40 Sartre terms instances of 'bad f a i t h ' . Bad f a i t h i s an immediate and permanent threat to every project of the human being: "...con-sciousness conceals i n i t s being a permanent r i s k of bad f a i t h . " ^ ^ The r i s k of bad f a i t h i s permanent, on Sartre's account, because of the o n t o l o g i c a l .structure of the f o r - i t s e l f . Human r e a l i t y i s a lack: i t i s haunted by being. As we have seen, Sartre maintains that i t i s the desire for an impossible synthesis of the f o r -i t s e l f and the i n - i t s e l f , the desire to be God, which character-i z e s human r e a l i t y . Bernstein contends, however, that i f man does indeed seek t h i s impossible goal, then a l l of our e f f o r t s are doom' ed to f a i l u r e , and hence a l l of our actions are rendered equiva-l e n t . As a r e s u l t , i n h i s view, no e t h i c a l theory can possess any sig n i f i c a n c e i f Sartre's ontology i s taken s e r i o u s l y . I t w i l l be argued, however, that i m p l i c i t i n Being and Nothingness, and also i n Sartre's e a r l i e r works, Is an ethics designed to l i b e r a t e the i n d i v i d u a l from l i v i n g i n bad f a i t h ( i f not from i t s permanent thr e a t ) , v i a a r e f l e c t i v e comprehension of h i s condition. I t i s an ethics of 'self-recovery' or 'authentic existence*, centred around the pure r e f l e c t i v e consciousness as a moral consciousness and having as i t s i d e a l the development of the morally autonomous i n d i v i d u a l . In The Transcendence of the Ego, for example, Sartre d i s t i n -guishes r e f l e c t i v e consciousness from u n r e f l e c t i v e consciousness, i n that the l a t t e r i s p o s i t i o n a l consciousness of an object other than i t s e l f , together with non-thetic- self-consciousness, whereas the former i s p o s i t i o n a l consciousness of I t s e l f , v i z . of another act of consciousness, together with non-thetic self-consciousness. On the u n r e f l e c t i v e l e v e l , objects appear as though they have 41 "...the q u a l i t i e s of re p u l s i v e , a t t r a c t i v e , d e l i g h t f u l , u s e f u l , etc., and as i f these q u a l i t i e s were forces having a c e r t a i n pow-35 er over us." On the r e f l e c t i v e l e v e l , as Thomas Busch observes, two p o s s i b i l i t i e s present themselves: "A r e f l e c t i o n (impure) can occur that grasps consciousness i n such a way as to prolong t h i s state of the power of objects over us. A r e f l e c t i o n (pure), which i s phenomenological, can occur that grasps the true being of con-sciousness." In the case of impure r e f l e c t i o n , Sartre maintains that con-sciousness "...imprisons i t s e l f i n the world i n order to f l e e from i t s e l f ; consciousnesses are given as emanating from states and 37 states as produced by the ego." y < I t i s impure r e f l e c t i o n togeth-er with i t s patterns of f l i g h t which, i n Being and Nothingness, Sartre c a l l s 'bad f a i t h ' . In the case of pure r e f l e c t i o n , on the contrary, the 'true being of consciousness' (which was aware of i t s e l f only n o n - t h e t i c a l l y ) i s recovered and known, with the re-s u l t s that objects no longer appear to have power over us, since t h e i r r e l a t i o n to and dependence upon consciousness i s apprehended and the ego i t s e l f i s recognized as being a product of the con-s t i t u t i v e a c t i v i t y of consciousness. In pure r e f l e c t i o n , therefore consciousness comprehends both i t s fundamental freedom and, cor-r e l a t i v e l y , i t s absolute r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t s e l f , and i t i s t h i s comprehension which i n Sartre's view renders ethics (as d i s t i n c t from 'everyday morality') possible. However, as we have noted, the very structure of the f o r -i t s e l f Implies that impure r e f l e c t i o n and bad f a i t h are permanent r i s k s . Sartre proposes e x i s t e n t i a l psychoanalysis as a method by means of which the i n d i v i d u a l can become aware of his choice of 42 himself i n the world: "...we w i l l discover the i n d i v i d u a l person i n the i n i t i a l project which constitutes him." ^ S While man i s indeed the being whose project i s to become God, Sartre maintains that t h i s project i s p a r t i c u l a r i z e d i n each case i n terms of the s i t u a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l . As Sartre puts i t , "While the mean-ing of the desire i s u l t i m a t e l y the project of being God, the desire i s never constituted by t h i s meaning; on the contrary, i t always represents a p a r t i c u l a r discovery of i t s ends." ^9 The or-i e n t a t i o n of e x i s t e n t i a l psychoanalysis i s thus empirical and i t s method i s comparative: "...by a comparison of the various empiri-c a l drives of the subject... we t r y to discover and disengage the fundamental project which i s common to them a l l . " ^ Two d i s t i n c t kinds of 'choice' must here be distinguished. My o r i g i n a l choice of myself i n the world i s a non-thetic choice, which i s characterized by Sartre as absurd or u n j u s t i f i e d . ^ A l l of my i n d i v i d u a l ' l i v e d ' values derive t h e i r meaning from t h i s o r i g i n a l p r o j e c t i o n of myself which stands as my non-thetic choice of myself i n the world. E x i s t e n t i a l psychoanalysis, then, i s de-signed to enable the i n d i v i d u a l to become aware of t h i s non-thetic choice by e f f e c t i n g a t r a n s i t i o n from the u n r e f l e c t i v e plane of immediacy, or the plane of impure r e f l e c t i o n , to the l e v e l of pure r e f l e c t i o n . As Sartre notes, furthermore, " . . . r e f l e c t i v e con-sciousness i n fact accomplishes two things by the same stroke; the Erlebnis reflected-on i s posited i n i t s nature as lack, and value i s disengaged as the out-of-reach meaning of what i s lacked." ^ Pure r e f l e c t i o n , then, can properly be c a l l e d a moral con-sciousness, because I t cannot arise without at the same time d i s -closing my valuations and t h e i r status as choices. At t h i s juncture, 43 moreover , Sartre's second kind of 'choice' comes in t o play, or the notion of choice as voluntary d e l i b e r a t i o n . Voluntary d e l i b e r -ation i s a 'deception* at the l e v e l of non-thetic choice, because such choice i s 'prior to l o g i c ' and p r i n c i p l e s of decision-4 3 making. ^ At the r e f l e c t i v e l e v e l , however, p a r t i c u l a r choices can be j u s t i f i e d by reference to the fundamental project and the framework of meanings i t provides. As P h y l l i s Morris observes, "Voluntary d e l i b e r a t i o n can c e r t a i n l y take place within t h i s frame-work, since on t h i s l e v e l a decision has been made about what w i l l count as a reason." ^ By means of pure r e f l e c t i o n , then, I am i n a p o s i t i o n to evaluate my i n d i v i d u a l ' l i v e d ' values, to question them, modify them, a f f i r m or deny them. According to Bernstein, however, i f man i s the being whose project Is to be God, then a l l of h i s e f f o r t s are doomed to f a i l -ure, and hence a l l of h i s actions are rendered equivalent. As Fr o n d i z i puts i t , s i m i l a r l y , the only e t h i c a l theory i m p l i c i t In Sartre's ontology i s an ethics of i n d i f f e r e n c e : any choice, any value w i l l do as w e l l as any other, for we are always i n bad f a i t h . This l i n e of argumentation i s , however, quite f a l l a c i o u s . F i r s t l y , while Sartre does maintain that the structure of human r e a l i t y implies that bad f a i t h i s a permanent threat, i t does not follow that we are always i n bad f a i t h . Indeed, the object of ex-i s t e n t i a l psychoanalysis i s p r e c i s e l y to l i b e r a t e the i n d i v i d u a l from l i v i n g i n bad f a i t h by means of a r e f l e c t i v e comprehension of h i s condition. Through the methods'of e x i s t e n t i a l psychoanaly-s i s and pure r e f l e c t i o n , then, bad f a i t h becomes a matter of de-gree and a function of l u c i d i t y . Secondly, while Sartre does con-tend that man i s the being whose project i s to be God, he also 44 suggests that we need not value the God-project: we may r e f l e c -t i v e l y apprehend the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of the synthesis of the f o r -i t s e l f and the i n - i t s e l f , and choose to 'turn our back upon t h i s value ' . Indeed, the suggestion i m p l i c i t i n Being and Nothingness i s that we can cease to value the God-project, and choose freedom i n i t s place as our primary value. In the f i n a l section of Being and Nothingness, Sartre implies that the r e j e c t i o n of God as man's u l -timate value can come about only when man sees and accepts the truth concerning the human condition; namely, that freedom alone i s the source of a l l values. In other words, p r e - r e f l e c t i v e v a l -ues, and s p e c i f i c a l l y the p r e - r e f l e c t i v e adoption of the God-project, may be set aside i n favour of r e f l e c t i v e values, or v a l -ues chosen i n l i g h t of a r e f l e c t i v e apprehension of human r e a l i t y as the source of a l l values. I t i s not cl e a r , however, why t h i s r e f l e c t i v e apprehension e n t a i l s the choice of freedom over every-thing else as one's primary value. Indeed, i f nothing has any i n t r i n s i c value, as Sartre I n s i s t s throughout, then there would appear to be no compelling reason to prefer freedom as one's primary value over any number of other p o s s i b i l i t i e s , such as pleasure or power. However, Sartre argues i n E x i s t e n t i a l i s m and Humanism that "...once a man has seen that values depend upon himself, i n that state of forsakenness he can w i l l only one thing, and that i s free-45 dom as the foundation of a l l values." ^ The 'attitude of s t r i c t consistency', a fundamental feature of i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y , requires the choice of freedom as one's primary value. The choice of freedom i s most consistent with the human condition and the 45 nature of value, since human freedom alone i s the source of a l l value. As Thomas Anderson observes, "...since freedom i s on t o l o g i -c a l l y e n t a i l e d i n a l l values as t h e i r source, the choice of any 46 and a l l values l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l s the p r i o r valuing of freedom." In sum, i n the choice of anything as a value, such as pleasure or power, there i s l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l e d the more fundamental choice of freedom as a value; otherwise that choice of anything else as a value would i t s e l f be repudiated, for I f a man does not value h i s freedom, he cannot c o n s i s t e n t l y value any value i t creates. Sartre's ethics of authentic existence i s thus f a r from an 'ethics of i n d i f f e r e n c e ' : i t i s the on t o l o g i c a l structure of human r e a l i t y which provides the basic reason or j u s t i f i c a t i o n f or the choice of freedom as one's primary value. The strengths and weak-nesses of t h i s p o s i t i o n w i l l be explored and discussed at length i n the chapters to come, but at present we should note that the ethics of a u t h e n t i c i t y i s centred around the pure r e f l e c t i v e con-sciousness as a moral consciousness, having as i t s i d e a l the de-velopment of the morally autonomous i n d i v i d u a l . We need not as in d i v i d u a l s r e f l e c t i v e l y a f f i r m as valuable any p r e - r e f l e c t i v e or l i v e d values which we f i n d i n the world as given. Most important-l y , we can cease to value the God-project and, following a re-f l e c t i v e apprehension of the nature of human r e a l i t y , value our freedom i n i t s place. In other words, instead of valuing the 'Self as a s u b s t a n t i a l being', we can choose to value that freedom which, on Sartre's account, " . . . i s characterized by a constantly renewed o b l i g a t i o n to remake the Self which designates the free being." ^ Authentic existence i s just t h i s ongoing process of re-making the 'Self which designates the free being', or as Francis 46 Jeanson puts i t , l i v i n g with 'the rent i n consciousness': "This involves maintaining a perpetually invented and perpetually un-stable e q u i l i b r i u m between action that c a l l s for a coherent en-gagement and r e f l e c t i o n that c a l l s for an e x p l i c i t distancing or r a t i f i c a t i o n of the rent, which usually l i e s l a t e n t i n one's pre-sence to s e l f . " ^ In other words, because freedom e x i s t s only i n r e l a t i o n to a s i t u a t i o n , valuing freedom involves not only the r e f l e c t i v e com-prehension of our condition, but also action i n the world which has as i t s goal the enhancement of our e x i s t i n g freedom. As we have seen, Sartre contends that we should take freedom as our primary value because i t i s the source of value: s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t i s man's freedom of choice which i s the source of value, since i t i s by means of h i s choices that he creates a l l of h i s values. Valuing freedom therefore means, i n Sartre's view, that man should endeavour to modify h i s s i t u a t i o n i n the world so as to remove r e s t r i c t i o n s to h i s freedom of choice, and to increase the range of choices a v a i l a b l e to him. As Anderson observes, "Freedom of choice i s i n r e a l i t y inseparable from freedom to a t t a i n goals; thus to value the former demands valuing the l a t t e r and conse-quently valuing the modification of the s i t u a t i o n so as to broad-49 en the attainable goals." Hence, i n Sartre's words, i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y "...con-s i s t s i n having a true and l u c i d consciousness of the s i t u a t i o n , (and) i n assuming the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and r i s k s that i t i n -volves." ^° Sartre's ethics of authentic existence thus requires of man that he acknowledge h i s freedom, that he accept the fact that he i s the source of values and cannot abrogate t h i s basic 47 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and that he s t r i v e to act accordingly. This means, then, that any repressive s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s or sys-tems would be unacceptable, while any p o l i c i e s or systems that maximize freedom of choice by enabling man to achieve h i s goals would be supported.•In sum, the authentic i n d i v i d u a l i s the i n d i -v i d u al who recognizes that freedom i s the source of values, chooses that freedom as h i s ultimate value, and accepts that t a i s choice c a r r i e s with i t a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y r e q u i r i n g of him action on behalf of freedom In the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l world. 4 8 Chapter Three Some Problems with I n d i v i d u a l A u thenticity i n Nietzsche and Sartre Certain problems with the p o r t r a i t s of i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y presented by both Nietzsche and Sartre w i l l be examined i n t h i s chapter. For example, I t has been suggested that Nietzsche's new theory of value a c t u a l l y provides j u s t i f i c a t i o n for 'the unlimited use of power by the higher human being'. Nietzsche's theory of the w i l l to power, on t h i s account, i s nothing more than a device f o r j u s t i f y i n g a l l forms of domination of the weak by the strong. On the other hand, Sartre's portrayal of the autonomous e t h i c a l agent who chooses freedom as h i s primary value has been c r i t i c i z e d for a number of reasons, not the l e a s t of which being that i t i s act-u a l l y u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . These and other d i f f i c u l t i e s w i l l be consid-ered, with p a r t i c u l a r attention being paid to the question of how to reconcile these p o r t r a i t s of i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y with any kind of s o c i a l existence: Nietzsche's higher men appear to stand wholly outside the s o c i a l nexus, while Sartre's contention that c o n f l i c t i s the ' o r i g i n a l meaning of being-for-others' renders questionable any p o s i t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the notion of a moral community. 49 I t has been argued that Nietzsche's new theory of value i n fact provides j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r what might be termed an 'immoralist use of power'. O f e l i a Schutte maintains that Nietzsche's revalua-t i o n of values involves two contradictory goals: the eradication of previous values, and the r e v e r s a l of previous values. In the case of the f i r s t of these goals, Schutte notes that Nietzsche ne-gates the m o r a l i s t i c p o s i t i o n which r e l i e s upon the dualism of good and e v i l to warrant a l l of i t s value-judgments. This negation does not constitute grounds for c a l l i n g Nietzsche an 'immoralist', since the i n d i v i d u a l who transcends t h i s dualism i s only an immor-a l i s t ' i n the eyes of one s t i l l trapped i n the d u a l i s t i c moral perspective'. However, Schutte maintains that Nietzsche's second and contradictory goal does imply that he i s an immoralist; on t h i s account, Nietzsche himself continues to be a d u a l i s t , but reverses the value of h i s opponent's i d e a l s : "The p o s i t i o n attack-ed by Nietzsche i s that of the 'moralist', namely, the slave or democrat who claims that a l l persons have moral di g n i t y regard-less of sex, c l a s s , or race. Nietzsche here defends the immoral-i s t master or a r i s t o c r a t who denies the slave's values." Schutte concludes, then, that Nietzsche's theory of the w i l l to power and h i s Dionysian value-standard ultimately turn into devices for j u s t i f y i n g ' a l l forms of domination', or 'the unlimited use of power by the higher human being'. Schutte i n s i s t s , therefore, that Nietzsche's p o r t r a i t of authentic i n d i v i d u a l existence i s highly questionable. In Nietz-sche's view, i n d i v i d u a l authenticity i s concerned with the crea-tion and r e a l i z a t i o n of i d e a l s or comprehensive s t y l e s of l i f e that express a preference that i s not j u s t i f i a b l e by any standard 50 except i t s e l f . The danger here, as Schutte sees i t , i s that i n -stead of s o c i a l morality determining what i d e a l s are to be admiss i b l e , the i d e a l s of a c o n t r o l l i n g e l i t e w i l l take precedence over the demands of the s o c i a l moral code. Nietzsche himself r e l a t e s the Ubermensch to the a r t i s t i c free s p i r i t and declares that a l l creation involves destruction, but as Schutte sees i t , to defend destruction as a necessary part of l i f e i s to j u s t i f y violence i n a l l of i t s forms: "...the will-to-power idea turns i n t o a device for j u s t i f y i n g a l l forms of domination, just as the Ubermensch symbol turns i n t o a preliminary j u s t i f i c a t i o n f or the creation of 2 a s o l i p s i s t i c monster." Schutte concludes, then, that Nietzsche notion of the overcoming of morality by the higher man i s ultimat l y nothing more than an instrument of manipulation by which the most powerful human beings may mold the rest of humanity i n t o con formity v/ith t h e i r goals. As we have seen, Nietzsche does take the p o s i t i o n that there Is an 'order of rank' among men, and that 'what determines your rank i s the quantum of power you are'. ^ However, what Schutte's discussion neglects to take into account i s that the 'quantum of power one i s ' i s not simply a function of the magnitude of the forces and drives present within one, but i s also a function of 'having them under c o n t r o l ' , ^ and thus t h e i r 'organization' and 'tran s f i g u r a t i o n ' . In f a c t , as we have noted, Nietzsche character izes h i s p o s i t i o n on the matter of value along both n a t u r a l i s t i c or quantitative and a r t i s t i c or q u a l i t a t i v e l i n e s : he considers the 'passions' to constitute the resources through which a l l qual-i t a t i v e enhancement of l i f e alone i s possible. Indeed, far from advocating an immoral use of power, Nietzsche asserts that "What 51 I f i g h t against: that an exceptional type should make war on the r u l e . " ^ On the contrary, Nietzsche holds "...there i s nobody from whom I want beauty as much as from you who are powerful: l e t your kindness be your f i n a l self-conquest." ^ What Schutte's- analysis thus f a i l s to recognize i s that for Nietzsche the w i l l to power i s an e s s e n t i a l l y transformative p r i n -c i p l e , explicated i n terms of h i s concept of the 'self-overcoming' of the i n d i v i d u a l . In f a c t , Schutte considers that Nietzschean higher men and the Ubermensch represent c o n f l i c t i n g i d e a l s : "The Ubermensch stands for w i l l to power as c r e a t i v i t y . The higher man 7 stands for w i l l to power as power." The inadequacy of t h i s i n -t e r p r e t a t i o n becomes apparent when Nietzsche's examples of higher men are examined: while they include the l i k e s of Caesar and Nap-oleon, they are predominantly philosophers and a r t i s t s , and i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how one vrould i d e n t i f y Goethe, Beethoven or Shake-speare as being an example of the w i l l to power as power, rather than as c r e a t i v i t y . I t would seem c l e a r , on the contrary, that these i n d i v i d u a l s constitute approximate r e a l i z a t i o n s of Nietz-sche's f u l l y integrated, l i f e - a f f i r m i n g Ubermensch. Without doubt, Nietzsche asserts that so-called ' e v i l i n -s t i n c t s ' are 'expedient, species-preserving, and indispensable to as high a degree as the (so-called) good ones; t h e i r function i s merely d i f f e r e n t ' , ^ However, when Nietzsche speaks of a 'natural-i z a t i o n of morality' or a 'return to nature', he e x p l i c i t l y states Q that " . . . i t i s not r e a l l y a going back but an ascent." y In f a c t , as we have seen, Nietzsche does not advocate a return to the once established mode of valuation c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the 'noble races', yet t h i s i s just what Schutte contends when she says that for 5 2 Nietzsche's higher men "...the w i l l to power i s narrowed down to the exercise of domination on the part of the 'strong' to suppress the 'weak'." 1 0 Instead of such a 'going back', Nietzsche proposes an 'ascent': he advocates the transcendence of a l l fundamentally s o c i a l modes of v a l u a t i o n , both master and slave m o r a l i t i e s , i n favour of value-creation rooted i n the self-overcoming of the i n d i v i d u a l . Nietzsche does indeed maintain that higher men 'overcome' t r a d i t i o n a l morality: by r e f l e c t i n g upon the o r i g i n and nature of morality, these i n d i v i d u a l s a r r i v e at the conclusion that i t has no absolute power to command them. However, t h i s r e a l i z a t i o n does not necessitate the subordination of the weak to the strong, nor does Nietzsche advocate such subordination. On the contrary, h i s free s p i r i t s have a generalized awareness that a l l points of view, in c l u d i n g t h e i r own, are i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Their own mode of l i f e i s t h e i r own c r e a t i o n , but i t i s not the only mode that i s poss-i b l e or desirable:- "This i s mv_ way; where i s yours?- thus I answer-ed those who asked me 'the way'. For the way- that does not ex-i s t . " 1 1 Nietzschean authentic existence i s concerned with the creation and r e a l i z a t i o n of unique s t y l e s of l i f e , but i n terms of t h e i r content, these l i f e s t y l e s make no claim to u n i v e r s a l v a l -i d i t y or acceptance. On Nietzsche's account, his higher men do not seek to impose t h e i r own perspectives on others; instead, he sug-gests that they w i l l maintain "My judgment i s mx judgment: no one 1 2 else i s e a s i l y e n t i t l e d to i t . " Indeed, t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y how such exceptional i n d i v i d u a l s d i f f e r from dogmatists of a l l per-suasions, who attempt to mask t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and to present them as views that are binding on everyone. 53 Here we must r e c a l l Nietzsche's perspectivism ('facts i s p r e c i s e l y what there i s not, only i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ' ) , and i t s spec-i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n to the subject of morality: "My chi e f proposi-t i o n : there are no moral phenomena, there i s only a moral i n t e r -1 3 pretation of phenomena." ^ In the case of the Christian-moral perspective, as we have seen, Nietzsche argues that moral judgments are a function of ressentiment, or 'the f a v o r i t e revenge of the s p i r i t u a l l y l i m i t e d against those less l i m i t e d ' . According to Nietzsche, C h r i s t i a n i t y 'has made an i d e a l of whatever contradicts the i n s t i n c t of the strong l i f e to preserve i t s e l f : ^ i t embod-ies the "...attempt to make the vi r t u e s through which happiness i s possible for the l o w l i e s t i n t o the standard i d e a l of a l l v a l -1 5 ues." y However, Nietzsche i n s i s t s that the Christian-moral i n -ter p r e t a t i o n of phenomena i s not a view that i s binding on every-one: 'the ideas of the herd should rule i n the herd', but for exceptional I n d i v i d u a l s Nietzsche proposes an 'experimental mor-a l i t y ' defined i n terms of self-overcoming and s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n . S t i l l , i t must be acknowledged that c e r t a i n fundamental d i f f i c u l t i e s remain. What Nietzsche's theory of value points to-ward i s an experimental morality according to which one 'gives oneself a goal'. The conception of self-overcoming and s e l f -r e a l i z a t i o n i s an e t h i c a l i d e a l for Nietzsche- at t h i s l e v e l , there i s a claim to general v a l i d i t y , but i t i s directed at a formal conception only, and not to any p a r t i c u l a r type of r e a l i -zation of i t . The problem i s that, a s p e r i t i e s point out, no ex-p l i c i t r e s t r i c t i o n s are placed on what type of l i f e can f u l f i l l t h is form. Thus, while Nietzsche does not advocate the subordina-tion of the weak to the strong, and while h i s theory does not nec-54 e s s a r i l y imply any such subordination, neither does i t rul e i t out. Schutte's ' s o l i p s i s t i c monster' remains a p o s s i b i l i t y , and indeed i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how one might reconcile Nietzsche's p o r t r a i t of i n d i v i d u a l authenticity with any sort of p o s i t i v e so-c i a l existence. For example, what i s the nature of the r e l a t i o n between higher men with t h e i r unique modes of l i f e , and the rest of society with i t s common or shared values? Walter Kaufmann sees 'the l e i t m o t i f of Nietzsche's l i f e and thought' as 'the a n t i - p o l i t i c a l i n d i v i d u a l 1 7 who seeks s e l f - p e r f e c t i o n far from the modern world'. C l e a r l y , Nietzsche i s an intransigent i n d i v i d u a l i s t , and he says of higher men that " . . . s o l i t u d e i s a v i r t u e for us, as a sublime bent and urge for c l e a n l i n e s s which guesses how a l l contact between man and man- ' i n society'- involves i n e v i t a b l e uncleanliness. A l l com-1 Q munity makes men- somehow, somewhere, sometime 'common'." In f a c t , Nietzsche maintains that 'the herd i s a means, no more!', y while exceptional i n d i v i d u a l s constitute the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of l i f e : a ' f u l l , r i c h , great, whole human being' i s said to ' j u s t i -20 fy the existence of whole m i l l e n i a ' . The exceptional i n d i v i d u a l , according to Nietzsche, i s "...something quite new which creates new things, something abso-21 lute; a l l h i s acts are e n t i r e l y h i s own." Moreover, he i s not to be appraised according to how useful he i s to other men: "The value of a man does not reside i n h i s u t i l i t y ; for i t would con-tinue to e x i s t even i f there were no "one to whom he could be of any use." 2 2 In other words, while Nietzschean i n d i v i d u a l s do not seek to tyrannize the herd, neither do they seek to l i b e r a t e i t . Nietzsche i s not a s o c i a l revolutionary: 'the ideas of the herd 55 should r u l e i n the herd', D and the continued existence of the rule i s the precondition for the value of the exception. Thus, while Nietzsche does f i g h t against the notion 'that an exceptional type should make war on the r u l e ' , i t i s also cle a r that h i s high-er men are under no o b l i g a t i o n to play any p o s i t i v e s o c i a l r o l e with respect to 'the average man'. Indeed, Nietzsche r a r e l y chooses to view s o c i a l conventions as such i n a p o s i t i v e l i g h t ; generally, he characterizes any search af t e r such s t a b i l i t y as a f a i l u r e of independence and courage, a symptom of mediocrity, or as a defection from the rigours of sin g -u l a r i t y . However, i n addressing the heroic i n d i v i d u a l as though he could stand wholly outside the s o c i a l nexus, Nietzsche appears oblivious to some of the most s i g n i f i c a n t contributions to s o c i a l theory of h i s time. As J.P. Stern observes, for example, "Early s o c i o l o g i s t s , among them Marx and Durkheim, but also Max Weber, have shown at length that the i n d i v i d u a l s e l f , even as a s e l f , i s already Implicated i n a system of s o c i a l and moral conventions; that i t i s nothing ('the merest vapourings of Idealism', Marx c a l l s i t ) without having some r e l a t i o n s h i p to t h i s system." 2 i + I f the s o c i a l nexus i s i n fact the main condition of i n d i v i d u a l l i f e , then Nietzsche's p o r t r a i t of authenticity owes us some account of the nature of the r e l a t i o n between his s e l f - l e g i s l a t o r s and t h e i r s o c i a l environment. The nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between exceptional i n d i v i d u a l s i s also problematic. For example, Nietzsche at times presents a picture of 'the savage egoisms that have turned, almost exploded, against one another... and can no longer derive any l i m i t , re-25 s t r a i n t , or consideration from t h e i r previous morality'. ^ This 56 'dangerous and uncanny point' has now been reached: "...the ' i n d i v i d u a l ' appears, obliged to give himself laws and to develop his own a r t s and wiles for s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , self-enhancement, 26 self-redemption." C o n f l i c t between Nietzsche's s e l f - l e g i s l a t o r s would appear to be i n e v i t a b l e , each seeking to enhance or maximize his own power. As John T. Wilcox notes, "Even i f we grant that each of us aims at power, and so takes power as the good, what this means i s that each takes h i s own power as the good, and often at the expense of the power of others." 2 ^ Moreover, Nietzsche sees 'the genius of the race overflowing ? ft from a l l cornucopias of good and bad': ° the pursuit of i n d i v i -dual a u t h e n t i c i t y or the process of s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n o f f e r s no guarantee of the character or q u a l i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l or s e l f that i s thus being confirmed. Nietzsche's ' p r i n c i p l e of authenti-c i t y 1 as an e t h i c a l i d e a l i s stated on a number of occasions: "What does your conscience say?- 'You s h a l l become the person you are." y S i m i l a r l y , the s u b t i t l e of Ecce Homo i s 'How one becomes what one i s ' . J.P. Stern notes, then, "Nietzsche i s saying that the only absolute imperative a man should obey i s that of h i s i n -ward p o t e n t i a l : whatever i t i s given to a man to become, that should i n d i c a t e the d i r e c t i o n , and be the goal, of h i s intense s t r i v i n g , h i s w i l l . " ^° Nietzsche describes the process of s e l f -discovery i n some d e t a i l i n an early essay: Let the youthful soul look back on l i f e with the question: what have you t r u l y loved up to now, what has drawn your soul a l o f t , what has mastered i t and at the same time blessed i t ? Set up these revered objects before you and perhaps t h e i r na-ture and t h e i r sequence w i l l give you a law, the fundamental law of your own true s e l f . Compare these objects one with another, see how one com-ple t e s , expands, surpasses, transfigures another, 57 how they constitute a stepladder upon which you have clambered up to yourself as you are now; for your true nature l i e s , not concealed deep within you, but immeasureably high above you, or at l e a s t above that which you usually take yourself to be. 31 This d e s c r i p t i o n of self-discovery (which i s remarkably s i m i -l a r to Sartre's exegesis of e x i s t e n t i a l psychoanalysis and the discovery of one's fundamental project, as discussed i n chapter two) suggests that a u t h e n t i c i t y for Nietzsche i s the 'deliberate coincidence of what a man i s with what he can become': i t i s a v a l -i d a t i o n of the s e l f by means of the process of s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n through 'hardness against o n e s e l f , or self-overcoming. However, while Nietzsche does state that 'your true nature l i e s . . . Immeas-ureably high above... that which you usually take yourself to be' (your conventional and therefore inauthentic s e l f ) , as Stern sees i t , i t would appear to be equally possible that 'your true nature' might l i e immeasureably below 'that which you usually take your-s e l f to be', and that s o c i a l conventions m e r c i f u l l y prevent i t s r e a l i z a t i o n . The p r i n c i p l e of authenticity as an e t h i c a l i d e a l thus not only provides no guarantee of the character of the s e l f that i s being validated; on Stern's account, " . . . i t sets up the quality of 'commitment', i t s i n t e n s i t y and earnestness , as the dominant moral q u a l i t y and the c r i t e r i o n of good and e v i l . " Stern's points are w e l l taken, with one q u a l i f i c a t i o n . The quality of commitment to one's s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n i s not for Nietz-sche the c r i t e r i o n of good and e v i l (or good and bad, as he would prefer to put i t ) . His new theory of value advocates instead the adoption of a 'Dionysian value-standard' for existence, or a v a l -ue-standard deriving from the apprehension and affirmation of the fundamental character of existence as w i l l to power: the quan-58 turn of 'enhanced and organized' power i s the sole objective measure of value. For Nietzsche, as we have seen, the w i l l to power i s an e s s e n t i a l l y transformative p r i n c i p l e , and he explicates i t i n terms of h i s concept of the self-overcoming of the i n d i v i -dual. To 'become what one i s ' , then, i s to become an i n d i v i d u a l , as d i s t i n c t from a member of the herd, by means of 'giving s t y l e ' to one's own unique character. We know that for Nietzsche the idea of the ego as a metaphys-i c a l l y abiding subject i s dismissed as a f i c t i o n . In The W i l l to Power , on the other hand, the idea of 'the subject as m u l t i p l i -c i t y ' constantly emerges: "The assumption of one single subject i s perhaps unnecessary; perhaps i t i s just as permissible to assume a m u l t i p l i c i t y of subjects, whose i n t e r a c t i o n and struggle i s the basis of our thought and our consciousness i n general." ^ Becoming an I n d i v i d u a l , then, w i l l involve examining one's various aspects or 'selves'; and i t w i l l amount to an ongoing, unending process of i n t e g r a t i n g these character t r a i t s , habits and patterns of action with one another. S e l f - c r i t i c i s m w i l l play an i n t e g r a l part i n thi s process, and thus s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n w i l l require, as Nietzsche puts i t , the courage for an attack upon one's convictions. Becoming an i n d i v i d u a l i s hence a perpetual movement towards i n t e g r a t i o n and wholeness, where every decision made or change effected con-tains an i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t appraisal of values. Indeed, as we have seen, value-creation i s defined by Nietzsche i n terms of t h i s process of self-overcoming. 'Valuation i t s e l f i s the w i l l to pow-er: i t i s the imbuing of l i f e and the world with value, through the creative a c t i v i t y of exceptional i n d i v i d u a l s , that constitutes the highest of a l l forms of the w i l l to power. Thus, as has been 59 argued, authentic existence i s i n Nietzsche's view fundamentally concerned with the creation and r e a l i z a t i o n of i d e a l s or unique st y l e s of l i f e . We have already noted some basic d i f f i c u l t i e s with t h i s ac-count: the meaning of 'power' i s ambiguous, as i s the method for determining what does and does not enhance power. These problems are t i e d to the also unresolved d i f f i c u l t y of the determination of an order of rank among values. We can now add that, given these problems, value-creation by exceptional i n d i v i d u a l s does become a p o t e n t i a l l y a r b i t r a r y a c t i v i t y , as Stern observes. Indeed, given no clear account of what does and does not enhance power, given no order of rank among values, what i s to d i s t i n g u i s h good from bad creative a c t i v i t y ? ( R e c a l l that a stand beyond the morality of good and e v i l i s not a stand beyond good and bad.) Moreover, among these s e l f - l e g i s l a t o r s , who as Nietzsche puts i t 'can no longer derive any l i m i t , r e s t r a i n t , or consideration from t h e i r previous moral-i t y ' , the r i s k of self-deception i s surely extremely high. What i s to d i s t i n g u i s h , then, the fanaticism which goes with s e l f -deception from Nietzsche's own description of the 'hardness against o n e s e l f which goes hand i n hand with s e l f - l e g i s l a t i o n ? F i n a l l y , as we noted e a r l i e r , the fundamental d i f f i c u l t y of p o t e n t i a l con-f l i c t s between w i l l s to power, each of us taking h i s own power as the good, remains almost wholly unresolved. Nietzsche does indicate that, "Refraining mutually from i n -jury, violence, and e x p l o i t a t i o n and placing one's w i l l on a par with that of someone else- t h i s may become, i n a ce r t a i n rough sense, good manners among i n d i v i d u a l s i f the appropriate conditions are present." ^ The appropriate conditions are i d e n t i f i e d 60 by Nietzsche as ' s i m i l a r i t y i n strength and value-standards', and 'belonging together i n one body'. However, i f t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s extended and accepted as the fundamental p r i n c i p l e of society, i t immediately proves to be what, i n Nietzsche's view, i t r e a l l y i s : "...a w i l l to the denial of l i f e , a p r i n c i p l e of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n 35 and decay." Given t h i s conclusion, can Nietzsche's 'experimental morality' properly be c a l l e d a 'morality' at a l l ? P. Foot notes that the word 'morality' i s derived from mos with i t s p l u r a l mores, and i n i t s present usage i t has not l o s t t h i s connection with the mores, or the rul e s of behaviour, of a society. She thus argues that Nietzsche i s a f t e r a l l an immoralist: "He keeps some of h i s sharp-est v i t u p e r a t i o n for those who t r y to impose s o c i a l rules and a code of behaviour which s h a l l be uniform throughout the commun-i t y . " ^ However, a d i s t i n c t i o n can be made between a s o c i a l mor-a l i t y and an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ethics: r e c a l l , for example, Sartre's d i s t i n c t i o n between everyday morality as a s o c i a l phenomenon, and the ethics of authentic i n d i v i d u a l axistence. S i m i l a r l y , Nietzsche's i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ethics requires of the higher man that he recog-nize that s o c i a l morality has no absolute authority to command him, and that he embrace the p r i n c i p l e of authenticity instead. Nietz-sche's goal i s the Ubermensch, or the f u l l y integrated, l i f e a f f i r m -ing i n d i v i d u a l , and the route to the Ubermensch i s the au t h e n t i c a l l y e x i s t i n g higher man, who i s not bound by, and indeed must i n some sense be protected from, the decadent, e g a l i t a r i a n values of the s o c i e t a l herd. V/e have thus come f u l l c i r c l e . Nietzsche himself does not In-tend or advocate an immoral use of power; his s e l f - l e g i s l a t i n g i n -61 dividuals do not seek to dominate the herd: 'an exceptional type should not make war on the r u l e ' . However, neither i s the excep-t i o n a l type obliged to attempt to l i b e r a t e others from the herd: 'the ideas of the herd should rule i n the herd'. What, then, i s the nature of the r e l a t i o n between s e l f - l e g i s l a t o r s and average men, between unique l i f e s t y l e s and s o c i a l conventions? Nietzsche's i n d i v i d u a l s cannot stand wholly outside the s o c i a l nexus: t h e i r value-creation must i n some sense take place i n terms of or i n re-l a t i o n to t h i s nexus. Indeed, any viable view of authentic e x i s -tence must address the question of the nature of the r e l a t i o n s be-tween i n d i v i d u a l s and t h e i r s o c i a l environment: i n the case of Nietzsche's p o r t r a i t of i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y , however, no such account i s provided. Sartre, on the other hand, manages to avoid some of Nietzsche d i f f i c u l t i e s by means of his concept of our ' s i t u a t i o n ' i n the world. As we have seen, my s i t u a t i o n includes my place, my body, my past, my environment and also my fellowmen. On Sartre's account we are immediately i n a s i t u a t i o n : we f i n d ourselves i n an already meaningful or value-laden world, due to the c o l l e c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s of our fellowmen. I t i s t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s which anchor the meanings or values which I encounter: values or meanings which have 'being' or are ' c r y s t a l l i z e d ' i n the s o c i a l world. Like Nietz sehe, Sartre wants us to transcend the habit of 'everyday morality and to become autonomous e t h i c a l agents, but for Sartre there i s no question of the ' i n d i v i d u a l s e l f standing wholly outside the 37 s o c i a l nexus: the f o r - i t s e l f can e x i s t only i n a s i t u a t i o n . Sartre's concern i s rather that we acquire a r e f l e c t i v e comprehen-sion of our condition: i n pure r e f l e c t i o n , consciousness comprehem 62 i t s fundamental freedom and, c o r r e l a t i v e l y , i t s absolute respon-s i b i l i t y f o r i t s e l f . I t i s t h i s comprehension which, i n Sartre's view, renders ethics (as d i s t i n c t from everyday morality) possible: those structures of exigency i n the world which are c o l l e c t i v e l y defined values are dependent upon the c o n s t i t u t i v e a c t i v i t y of consciousness. They are our products, and we must assume respon-s i b i l i t y for them and recognize that we are free to modify them. I t i s Sartre's contention, moreover, that authentic i n d i v i -duals w i l l modify these c o l l e c t i v e valuations, not a r b i t r a r i l y but rather i n a manner consistent with t h e i r apprehension of the nature of human r e a l i t y as the source of a l l values. Unlike Nietzschean higher men, who act to maximize t h e i r own pov/er through the crea-tion of unique i d e a l s or s t y l e s of l i f e , Sartre's authentic i n d i v i -duals choose freedom as t h e i r ultimate value. Since freedom e x i s t s only i n r e l a t i o n to a s i t u a t i o n , valuing freedom involves not only the r e f l e c t i v e comprehension of the human condition (and so a f f i r m -ing our o n t o l o g i c a l freedom), but also action i n the world which has as i t s aim the enhancement of our concrete freedom (or valuing our actual freedom of choice). In Sartre's view, valuing freedom means that man should endeavour to modify his s i t u a t i o n i n the world so as to remove r e s t r i c t i o n s to his freedom of choice, and to increase the range of choices available to him. Freedom of choice i s inseparable from freedom to a t t a i n goals: valuing the former also requires valuing the l a t t e r , and hence valuing the mod-i f i c a t i o n of the concrete s i t u a t i o n i n order to broaden attainable goals. In other words, Sartre c l e a r l y envisions his autonomous e t h i c a l agents as having a p o s i t i v e s o c i a l r o l e to play, countering repressive p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s or systems, and supporting 63 any p o l i c i e s or systems that maximize freedom of choice by enab-l i n g man to achieve h i s goals. Indeed, Sartre maintains i n Being and nothingness that our shared techniques and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s imply that "...there i s a truth concerning man and not only concerning i n d i v i d u a l s who cannot be compared." v There i s a 'truth concerning man' for any given h i s t o r i c a l period: i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l structures constitute the s i t u a t i o n i n terms of which the i n d i v i -dual subsequently defines himself. I t i s on the ground of t h i s truth concerning man, moreover, that the freedom of choice of the morally autonomous i n d i v i d u a l i s exercised. C o l l e c t i v e l y defined s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l structures are evaluated and modified, not only or simply i n terms of the s p e c i f i c goals of the i n d i v i d u a l , but rather v/ith a view toward the f u l f i l l m e n t of shared or In t e r -s u b j e c t i v e l y defined needs and desires. For Sartre, i n other v/ords the i n d i v i d u a l i s i n e x t r i c a b l y linked with h i s fellowmen by means of t h e i r shared s i t u a t i o n , and the attainment of a r e f l e c t i v e apprehension of t h i s condition c a r r i e s with i t the ob l i g a t i o n to enhance the concrete freedom e x i s t i n g i n the shared s i t u a t i o n . The suggestion, then, i s that since we do share a common s o c i a l -p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , none of us w i l l enjoy r e a l freedom, concrete freedom of act i o n , unless a l l of us do. Thus, while Nietzsche maintains that the notion of the 'equal i t y of men' i s an 'error', Sartre instead chooses to emphasize that, while we are a l l unique i n d i v i d u a l s , we do nevertheless share a common condition, and the r e f l e c t i v e apprehension of the nature of that condition provides good grounds for choosing to take freedom as one's primary value. The 'attitude i f s t r i c t con-6k sistency' requires the choice of freedom as one's primary value: the choice of freedom i s most consistent with the human condition and the nature of value, since human freedom alone i s the source of a l l value. As we have seen, i n the choice of anything as a v a l -ue there i s l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l e d the more fundamental choice of freedom as a value; otherwise that choice of anything else as a value would i t s e l f be repudiated, for i f man does not value h i s freedom, he cannot c o n s i s t e n t l y value any value i t creates. This l i n e of argument has been c r i t i c i z e d on a number of grounds; f o r example, Richard Bernstein c o r r e c t l y points out that 5 9 i t depends upon a p r i o r decision to value l o g i c a l consistency. y j On Sartre's account, however, l o g i c a l consistency has no i n t r i n s i c value; man i s under no o b l i g a t i o n to be consistent, and thus he i s under no o b l i g a t i o n to choose freedom as his fundamental value. However, Sartre maintains that i t i s up to man to provide h i s l i f e v/ith meaning, or to s a t i s f y his desire for a j u s t i f i e d existence. He can do so by refusing to value the God-project with i t s imposs-i b l e goal, and choosing instead to value goals that are a t t a i n a b l e , goals that are consistent with r e a l i t y . I t i s true that the fact that we desire meaning and j u s t i f i c a t i o n for our existence does not l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l that we must value t h i s desired meaning and j u s t i f i c a t i o n . As T.C. Anderson notes, however, to allow that no l o g i c a l l y compelling reasons can be advanced for valuing a mean-in g f u l and j u s t i f i e d existence does not mean that no reasons at a l l can be given: "Kan's deep longing for j u s t i f i c a t i o n and the fact that a meaningful l i f e (unlike the project to be God) Is attainable are c e r t a i n l y reasons that support the valuing of such a l i f e . " 2 + 0 S t i l l , i t must be acknowledged that the choice of 65 freedom as one's primary value cannot be j u s t i f i e d i n any absolute sense: the fact that man i s the source of values simply precludes such j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Sartre's p o s i t i o n has also been c r i t i c i z e d on the ground that the assertion that freedom should be man's primary value i s actu-a l l y u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . Here, for example, i s what Sartre says about valuation, or the p o s i t i n g of an 'ideal state of a f f a i r s ' by the i n d i v i d u a l i n r e l a t i o n to the s i t u a t i o n i n which he i s presently immersed: "This means that he w i l l have had to give himself room, to withdraw i n r e l a t i o n to i t , and w i l l have to have effected a double n i h i l a t i o n : on the one hand, he must posit an i d e a l state of a f f a i r s as a pure present nothingness; on the other hand, he must posit the actual s i t u a t i o n as nothingness i n r e l a t i o n to t h i s I 1 state of a f f a i r s . " Sartre maintains that value i s that which i s to be 'made r e a l 1 , but the d i f f i c u l t y , as c r i t i c s see i t , i s that his ontology s t i p u l a t e s that man i s already free, which renders senseless the contention that man should value freedom, or make freedom r e a l . However, t h i s p a r t i c u l a r objection r e f l e c t s a basic misunder-standing of Sartre's p o s i t i o n , which considers freedom i n two d i s -t i n c t contexts. F i r s t , there i s a consideration of our on t o l o g i c a l freedom as such, or the co n s t i t u t i v e structure of the f o r - i t s e l f . We are indeed 'already free', i n t h i s sense, but we may or may not choose to value our fundamental freedom. 'We may flee from our aut-onomy and the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i t c a r r i e s with i t by means of bad f a i t h , or we may accept i t and value i t as our fundamental project. How Sartre asks: what does i t mean to value freedom? what i s i n -volved i n valuing freedom? I t i s not, he argues, simply a matter 66 of a f f i r m i n g the fact that we are free beings and responsible for ourselves. Here we must move to Sartre's consideration of 'r e a l freedom': although he has discussed freedom as the o n t o l o g i c a l structure of human r e a l i t y per se, he acknowledges that freedom so considered i s i n fact an abstraction. ^ 2 Freedom e x i s t s only as situated freedom. The question thus becomes 'what i s involved i n valuing s i t u a t e d freedom?'. Sartre maintains that situated free-dom i s concrete freedom of choice, freedom to a t t a i n goals. Valu-ing the former requires also valuing the l a t t e r and hence, he argues, valuing the modification of the s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n order to broaden attainable goals. Moreover, i n E x i s t e n t i a l i s m and Humanism Sartre presents what he takes to be man's e t h i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to others: "I am ob-l i g e d to w i l l the freedom of others at the same time as mine. I cannot make freedom my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim." ^ For example, Sartre maintains that whatever an i n d i v i d u a l chooses, he deems i t a value for a l l men: "I am thus responsible for myself and for a l l men, and I am creating a c e r t a i n image of man as I would have him be. In fashioning myself I fashion man."^ Thus, i f I choose freedom as my primary value, I am a c t u a l l y a f f i r m -ing freedom as the ultimate value for a l l men, or urging that a l l men should become free. Sartre's argument does require q u a l i f i c a t i o n , i n as much as i t i s c l e a r l y not the case that 'whatever an i n d i v i d u a l chooses, he deems i t a value for a l l men'. We"are a l l unique i n d i v i d u a l s , with p a r t i c u l a r projects and goals, and i t i s rather when my choice i s based upon the nature of our common condition that I am choosing 'for a l l men' and not simply for myself alone. As we have noted, 67 Sartre holds that the basis for my choice of freedom i s a truth about the u n i v e r s a l human condition; namely, that human freedom i s the source of a l l values. Thus, on Sartre's account, when I choose freedom as my primary value, I am a c t u a l l y asserting that, given our common condition, everyone should likewise choose free-dom as h i s fundamental value. Given our common on t o l o g i c a l condition, and also our shared h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n , then, i t i s Sartre's contention that choos-ing freedom as our primary value requires action i n the s o c i a l world which has as i t s goal the maximization of our concrete free-dom. As Simone de Beauvoir puts i t , "I must then try to create for men s i t u a t i o n s i n which they could accompany and surpass my tran-scendence... I ask for health, knowledge, well-being, l e i s u r e for men so that t h e i r freedom i s not consumed i n f i g h t i n g i l l n e s s , 4 5 ignorance, misery." ^ S i m i l a r l y , Sartre i n s i s t s that, given a re-f l e c t i v e apprehension of the nature of the human condition, i n -cluding the recognition that freedom exi s t s only i n r e l a t i o n to a shared s i t u a t i o n , men should endeavour to j o i n t l y modify t h e i r s i t u a t i o n i n the world so as to remove r e s t r i c t i o n s to t h e i r free-dom of choice and likewise to broaden t h e i r attainable goals. On Sartre's account, therefore, i n d i v i d u a l authenticity requires so-c i a l commitment. A d i f f i c u l t y remains, however, and i t i s a considerable one for Sartre: he has not yet adequately demonstrated that 'I cannot make freedom my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim'. It would seem, on the contrary, that I can choose to make my own freedom my primary value, and In so doing a f f i r m that everyone else should do li k e w i s e , without at the same time choosing t h e i r freedom 68 as a value for me. R e c a l l that a s i m i l a r problem faces Nietzsche: even i f we allow that each of us aims at power, and so takes pow-er as the good, what t h i s means i s that each takes h i s own power as the good. Just as there i s nothing i n Nietzsche's account of i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y which adequately addresses the question of c o n f l i c t s between w i l l s to power, so too i s there thus far nothing i n Sartre's account which demonstrates that I must choose, not just my own freedom, but equally the freedom of others, as my goal. Indeed, as Anderson observes, even the c r i t e r i o n of consis-tency i s of no help here: " A l l that consistency demands i s that I choose my own freedom as my primary goal, since i t i s only an i n -dividual's personal freedom that i s the source of h i s values." ^ Moreover, Sartre's exhortation to make the freedom of others one's own goal becomes increasingly problematic i f h i s treatment of my 'being-for-others' i n Being and Nothingness i s taken into consideration. There Sartre asserts that, " C o n f l i c t i s the o r i g -i n a l meaning of being-for-others." ^ The Other, on t h i s account, i s another s u b j e c t i v i t y who o b j e c t i f i e s me, and t h i s o b j e c t i f i c a -tion constitutes 'the s o l i d i f i c a t i o n and a l i e n a t i o n of my own p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' . In t h i s sense, Sartre maintains, we can consider ourselves 'slaves' i n so far as we appear to the Other: "I am a slave to the degree that my being i s dependent at the center of a freedom which i s not mine and which i s the very condition of my being." ^ The Other's freedom, then, i s the condition of my object-ness, and t h i s me-as-object i s described by Sartre as 'a degraded consciousness': "My o r i g i n a l f a l l i s the existence of the Other." ^ According to Sartre, my concrete r e l a t i o n s with the Other are 69 wholly governed by my attitudes with respect to the object which I am for the Other. The Other's existence can motivate e i t h e r of two opposed a t t i t u d e s : I can turn back upon the Other so as to make an object out of him i n turn, since the Other's object-ness destroys my object-ness for him, or I can seek to possess the Other as freedom. Indeed, i n so far as the Other as freedom i s the foundation of my object-ness, my b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f , i f 1 could re-cover that freedom and i d e n t i f y myself with i t , I would then be my own foundation. As Sartre puts i t , "To transcend the Other's transcendence, or, on the contrary, to incorporate that transcen-dence within me without removing from i t i t s character as tran-scendence- such are the two p r i m i t i v e attitudes v/hich I assume 50 confronting the Other." y Further, since everything which may be said of me i n my r e l a t i o n s with the Other applies to him as w e l l , Sartre maintains that c o n f l i c t i s the fundamental meaning of being-for-others: we each attempt to either eradicate or assimilate one another's s u b j e c t i v i t y , i n order to avoid our own a l i e n a t i n g o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n . Thus, on Sartre's account r e l a t i o n s with others form a c i r c l e of f u t i l i t y . I attempt either to assimilate or eradicate the Oth-er's freedom: each attempt i s the 'death' of the other, the f a i l -ure of one motivates the adoption of the other. As Sartre puts i t , "...there i s no d i a l e c t i c for my r e l a t i o n s toward the Other but rather a c i r c l e . . . " j ^ the f o r - i t s e l f i s " . . . i n d e f i n i t e l y tossed 52 from one to the other of the two fundamental a t t i t u d e s . " Since these r e l a t i o n s are r e c i p r o c a l , while I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other i s t r y i n g to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to 70 enslave me. Hence, Sartre concludes that our concrete r e l a t i o n s are i n e v i t a b l y c o n f l i c t - r i d d e n : "...we s h a l l never place ourselves concretely on a plane of equality; that i s , on the plane where the recognition of the Other's freedom would involve the Other's rec-ognition of our freedom." Given t h i s p o r t r a i t of r e l a t i o n s with others, what are we to conclude about the s o c i a l dimension of Sartre's description of i n d i v i d u a l a u thenticity? Under the circumstances, does Sartre's treatment of our e t h i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to others even make sense? C r i t i c s such as Mary Warnock argue, for example, " I f e t h i c s . . . i s concerned with the f i t t i n g together of the i n t e r e s t s and choices of one person with those of another, there i s no way in t o the subject at a l l i f our aim i s necessarily to dominate the other per-54 son and subordinate h i s freedom to our own." As we have seen, Sartre commands us to w i l l the freedom of others at the same time as our own: 'I cannot make freedom my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim'. However, i f a l l human r e l a t i o n s are nec-e s s a r i l y r e l a t i o n s of c o n f l i c t , or attempts to assimilate or er-adicate the Other's freedom, then Sartre's account of our e t h i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to others appears to be u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . Indeed, I t i s d i f f i c u l t to see at t h i s juncture p r e c i s e l y how to reconcile the notion of i n d i v i d u a l authenticity with a soc-i a l existence. Nietzsche's authentic i n d i v i d u a l s appear to stand wholly outside the s o c i a l nexus: while i t i s not the case that his higher men necessarily seek to dominate the herd, neither are they portrayed as having any r e a l connection with society or as having any p o s i t i v e s o c i a l role to play. On the other hand, Sar-tre's autonomous e t h i c a l agents are firmly situated i n the s o c i a l 71 world, and t h e i r common human condition provides them with a ba-s i s for shared goals. Indeed, unlike Nietzschean higher men, who act to maximize t h e i r own power through the creation of unique ideals or s t y l e s of l i f e , Sartre's authentic i n d i v i d u a l s together choose freedom as t h e i r ultimate value and seek to remove r e s t r i c -tions to t h e i r freedom of choice and to increase the range of choices a v a i l a b l e to them. However, while Sartre thus c l e a r l y en-visions h i s autonomous e t h i c a l agents as having a p o s i t i v e s o c i a l role to play, h i s treatment of my c o n f l i e t ~ r i d d e n r e l a t i o n s with others renders questionable h i s exhortation to make the freedom of others my own goal. C l e a r l y , a more profound consideration of the re l a t i o n s h i p between the i n d i v i d u a l and his s o c i a l environment, and thus the s o c i a l dimension of i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y , i s re-quired. Vie w i l l turn now to the philosophy of Heidegger i n order to begin our examination of the nature of the r e l a t i o n between i n -d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y and rel a t i o n s h i p s with others. 72 Chapter Four Heidegger and Relations with Others In t h i s chapter, Heidegger's concept of authentic existence as i t i s presented i n Being and Time w i l l be examined, with spec-i f i c a t t e n t i o n to the r e l a t i o n between i n d i v i d u a l authenticty and r e l a t i o n s h i p s with others. In order to appreciate Heidegger's d i s -cussion of a u t h e n t i c i t y , a pa i r of terminological d i s t i n c t i o n s must be noted at the outset. The d i s t i n c t i o n between 'ontological' and 'ontic' i s derived from the d i s t i n c t i o n between Being and be-ings. Beings are intr a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s , and in v e s t i g a t i o n s concern ing them, or descriptions of what as a matter of fact i s the case, are 'ontic' studies. The Being of a being, on the other hand, i s i t s fundamental structure, or that which makes t h i s being what i t Is , and i s the focus of 'ontological' i n q u i r y . Ontological i n -quiry seeks to uncover the e s s e n t i a l structures of the ontic; i n an o n t o l o g i c a l study of a being, one attempts to exhi b i t the ess-e n t i a l structures which make t h i s p a r t i c u l a r type of being p o s s i b l In the case of man, Heidegger designates ontic i n v e s t i g a t i o n s by the term ' e x i s t e n t i e l l ' , while ontological inquiry concerning man' Being (Dasein) he ref e r s to as ' e x i s t e n t i a l ' . I t i s Heidegger's contention that the 'Being-in-the-world' which e s s e n t i a l l y characterizes Dasein i s a structure that can assume two d i f f e r e n t fundamental modalities, one 'authentic' and the other 'inauthentic'. We w i l l examine both of these modalities, with a view to understanding the r e l a t i o n between them and the manner i n which, on Heidegger's account, authenticity may be wrest ed from i n a u t h e n t i c i t y . His discussion of 'anxiety' and 'Being-towards-death' w i l l be ce n t r a l here, as w i l l h i s e x p l i c a t i o n of 73 temporality as the meaning of authentic Dasein's Being-in-the-world. To become authentic, Heidegger argues, i s to become 'what one already i s ' : a u t h e n t i c i t y i s a matter of being what one already i s with e x p l i c i t awareness of one's e s s e n t i a l structure. However, Heidegger's account of authentic existence has been c r i t i c i z e d on a number of grounds, many of which concern the nature of the r e l a -tionship between the i n d i v i d u a l seeking a u t h e n t i c i t y and h i s soc-i a l environment. I t i s generally supposed, for example, that Heid-egger's p o r t r a i t of authenticity i s so e x c l u s i v e l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c that i t ru l e s out p o s i t i v e , constructive r e l a t i o n s with others. I t w i l l be argued, however, that most of these c r i t i c i s m s rest upon a m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Dasein and man, and that when c o r r e c t l y un-derstood, Heidegger's account of Dasein and his treatment of auth-e n t i c i t y provide an on t o l o g i c a l basis for p o s i t i v e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . ******** 7 4 Heidegger's purpose i n Being and Time i s to inquire i n t o the meaning of Being, or what i t i s for a being to Be, or for a thing to e x i s t . He maintains that we do not have an answer to the ques-tion of what we r e a l l y mean by the word 'Being'; indeed, the ques-tion of the meaning of Being has today been forgotten: "On the basis of the Greeks' i n i t i a l contributions towards an Interpreta-tion of Being, a dogma has been developed which not only declares the question of the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but sanc-tions i t s complete neglect." 1 I t i s said that 'Being' i s the most universal and the emptiest of concepts, that i t r e s i s t s every at-tempt at d e f i n i t i o n , and that i n any case i t does not require any d e f i n i t i o n , since everyone uses i t constantly and already under-stands what he means by i t . Heidegger, on the contrary, I n s i s t s that we do not have an answer to the question of what we r e a l l y mean by the word 'Being', that i f 'Being' i s the most un i v e r s a l concept, t h i s means not that i t i s the one which i s clearest but rather that i t i s the darkest of a l l , that the i n d e f i n a b i l i t y of Being i s a function of the fact that i t cannot be conceived as an en t i t y , that t h i s i n d e f i n a b i l i t y does not eliminate the question of i t s meaning, and that i t i s therefore necessary to rais e again the question of the meaning of Being. In order to uncover what i t i s for a being to Be, or what i t i s for a thing to e x i s t , Heidegger seeks to investigate v i a a par-t i c u l a r kind of being. There i s one being,and only one, which pro-vides a s t a r t i n g point for the question about the meaning of Being: man i s the being that can question i t s e l f about i t s own Being. What i s i t for man to Be? What makes man what he i s ? What e s s e n t i a l structures make t h i s p a r t i c u l a r type of being possible? Heidegger 75 maintains that i t i s only by means of an analysis of man's essen-t i a l s t r u c t u r e s , man's Being or Dasein, that we can acquire an un-derstanding of the meaning of Being: "...to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an e n t i t y - the i n q u i r e r - trans-parent In h i s own Being. The very asking of t h i s question i s an entity's mode of Being; and as such i t gets i t s e s s e n t i a l char-acter from what i s inquired about- namely, Being." I n t h i s sense, a n examination of man's Being, or Dasein, constitutes a necessary condition for a genuine ontology. Heidegger c a l l s the mode of Being proper to man Existenz or 'standing out toward', because i t i s the d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s -t i c of man that he must 'come out' of himself i n order to r e a l i z e himself. As Heidegger explains i t , " I t i s not the case that man ' i s ' and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-Being to-wards the 'world'... Dasein i s never *proximally' an e n t i t y which i s , so to speak, free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the i n c l i n a t i o n to take up a 'relationship' towards the world. Taking up r e l a t i o n s h i p s towards the world i s possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, i s as i t i s . " ^ In other words, man i s ess-e n t i a l l y an i n t e n t i o n a l and self-transcending being, or as Heid-egger puts i t , man's Being i s Being-in-the-world. Heidegger's phenomenological method of inq u i r y requires that i n our analysis of man's Being we approach man i n his everyday, common character i n the world, rather than from any i d e a l image of man. Our everyday existence i s characterized by our concernful dealings with int r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s or 'equipment', and an examina-tion of t h i s 'average everydayness 1 i s intended to bring to l i g h t that which underlies man's ordinary behaviour; namely, the e s s e n t i a l 76 structures or e x i s t e n t i a l i a of Dasein. These s t r u c t u r a l determin-ations of man are to be c l e a r l y distinguished from the basic deter-minations of e n t i t i e s other than man, which Heidegger c a l l s 'cate-g o r i a l determinations'. The d i s t i n c t i v e character of man l i e s i n the fact that, unlike a l l other e n t i t i e s which merely are, for the entity man " . . . i n i t s very Being, that Being i s an issue for i t . " ^ Man not only i s , but he 'has to be', or as Heidegger puts I t , h i s Being i s a task imposed upon him. The fundamental structures of t h i s Being are i d e n t i f i e d by Heidegger through a consideration of the Da of Dasein, the 'there' or Dasein's 'openness': "In understanding and state-of-mind, we s h a l l see the two c o n s t i t u t i v e ways of being the 'there'; and these are equiprimordial." Heidegger proceeds to add that state-of-mind and understanding are "...characterized equiprimordially by d i s -course." Understanding, state-of-mind and discourse thus comprise the e x i s t e n t i a l i a of Dasein, and while they form an 'unbreakable unity' they can on Heidegger's account be analysed independently i n order to a r r i v e at a f u l l and complete characterization of the nature of man's Being. What follows i s a preliminary description of the fundamental structures of Dasein. What Heidegger i n d i c a t e s o n t o l o g i c a l l y by the term 'state-of-mind' i s o n t i c a l l y or concretely i d e n t i f i e d as our mood. Mood d i s -closes "...the 'thrownness' of t h i s e n t i t y i n t o i t s 'there'; i n -deed, i t i s thrown i n such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, i t i s the 'there'. The expression 'thrownness' i s meant to suggest the f a c t i c i t v of i t s being delivered over." ^ In mood, then, man i s aware of h i s Being, of the fact that he i s , without having f r e e l y chosen i t . His Being appears to him as a Being-thrown among things. 77 Having a mood i s thus not an 'inner condition': Dasein i s essen-t i a l l y Being-in-the-world, and mood discloses man's f a c t i c i t y or his s i t u a t i o n among other e n t i t i e s within the world. Moreover, Heidegger maintains that i n mood man not only becomes conscious of the fact that he i s , but also of the fact that he 'has to be', or that h i s Being has to be r e a l i z e d by himself as a task. The second e x i s t e n t i a l e of Dasein's openness, understanding, indicates that Dasein i s p r i m a r i l y Being-possible: "As long as i t i s , Dasein always has understood i t s e l f and always w i l l understand 7 i t s e l f i n terms of p o s s i b i l i t i e s . " ' Primordial understanding d i s -closes ' e x i s t e n t i a l ! t y ' or Dasein's power to be or to r e a l i z e i t -s e l f . In h i s Being, man i s not determined once and for a l l . His Being i s distinguished from that of things p r e c i s e l y i n that i t can always be further r e a l i z e d . In so far as Dasein always i s i t s poss-i b i l i t i e s , i t i s constantly also already more than i t i s now. In so far as man always transcends himself, i n so far as he i s 'with' his p o s s i b i l i t i e s , he e x i s t s . Understanding i s thus what Heidegger c a l l s a 'project'. In i t s primordial understanding, Dasein pro-jects i t s e l f to an ultimate 'for-the-sake-of-which * or purpose, but at the same time i t projects i t s e l f to a certain 's i g n i f i c a n c e ' or a p a r t i c u l a r worldly structure. Thus, primordial understanding as the c o n s t i t u t i v e disclosure of Dasein's power to be also brings to l i g h t the world as a r e f e r e n t i a l t o t a l i t y . Of Dasein's t h i r d e x i s t e n t i a l e , Heidegger maintains that, o "Discourse i s the A r t i c u l a t i o n of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . " The way i n which discourse gets expressed i s language, and discoursing or t a l k -ing i s the way i n which we a r t i c u l a t e ' s i g n i f i c a n t l y ' the i n t e l l i -g i b i l i t y of Being-in-the-world. In other words, the function of 78 speech i s not to make known 'externally' what i s 'inside' us. On the contrary, we are always already 'out there' i n the world and a r t i c u l a t e what we experience there: "In discourse the i n t e l l i g i -b i l i t y of Being-in-the-world (an i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y which goes with a state-of-mind) i s a r t i c u l a t e d according to s i g n i f i c a t i o n s ; and discourse i s t h i s a r t i c u l a t i o n . " ^ As state-of-mind discloses Dasein's f a c t i c i t y , and understand-ing i t s e x i s t e n t i a l i t y , Heidegger maintains that discourse discloses Dasein*s 'fallenness'. In order to appreciate Heidegger's discussion of fallenness, however, i t i s f i r s t necessary to recognize that on his account Dasein's Being-in-the-world i s e s s e n t i a l l y a Mitsein or a 'Being-with': "The world of Dasein i s a with-world. Being-in i s Being-with Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world 1 0 xs Dasein-with." Heidegger maintains, then, that others are as equiprimordially present to Dasein as equipment i s : i n our dealings with i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s the presence of others i s discovered at the same time because they are also involved i n these pieces of equipment , as users or as makers. As soon as Dasein discovers the world, i n other words, i t has already discovered others who co-exi s t with i t : as Being-in-the-world, our existence i s already a Being together with others. On Heidegger's account, Being-with i s not to be understood i n terms of s p a t i a l proximity but rather i n terms of an openness to and a sharing i n one world. I t i s on the basis of t h i s common poss-ession of one world that a community can be constituted according to the d i f f e r e n t modalities of Being-with, which range from love to hatred and from s o l i d a r i t y to Indifference. Thus for Heidegger 'Being-with' does not imply that we l i v e i n a state of harmony with 79 others, but rather only that man from the f i r s t moment of h i s ex-istence l i v e s as a c e r t a i n openness i n which others are already enclosed, and i t i s t h i s openness which renders possible the var-ious types of Being-with. S i m i l a r l y , Heidegger characterizes Da-sein 's dealings with others by the term ' s o l i c i t u d e ' (Fursorge), but s o l i c i t u d e i s to be understood only as that which makes possible a l l of the p a r t i c u l a r modalities of our behaviour towai d one anoth-er. Thus hate i s a form of s o l i c i t u d e , as i s i n d i f f e r e n c e . In gen-e r a l , then, Being-with merely discloses that others e x i s t with us, that our world i s a with-world, but i t says nothing about the qual-i t y or character of our community with others. Dasein's 'fallenness', on Heidegger's account, i s likewise to be construed i n a n e u t r a l manner: "This term does not express any negative evaluation, but i s used to s i g n i f y that Dasein i s p r o x i -mally and for the most part alongside the 'world' of i t s concern." 1 1 Heidegger maintains, then, that we must not take the fallenness of Dasein as a ' f a l l ' from a purer and higher 'primal st a t e ' . Dasein has f a l l e n i n t o the world, which i t s e l f belongs to i t s Being: " F a l l -1 2 ing i s a d e f i n i t e e x i s t e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Dasein i t s e l f . " Indeed, t h i s i s the kind of Being which i s closest to Dasein and i n which Dasein maintains i t s e l f for the most part. Our fallenness includes two fundamental aspects. F i r s t , man understands h i s own Being i n terms of that of in t r a w o r l d l y beings, and thus conceives of himself as a substance possessing c e r t a i n q u a l i t i e s . Second, the world which i s present here i s the world of everyone or of the 'they': "We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves a s they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about l i t e r a t u r e and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great 80 mass' as they shrink back; we f i n d shocking what they f i n d shock-1 3 in g . " The 'they', on Heidegger's account, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness, i n which Dasein i s fascinated by the world and absorbed i n Being-with-one-another. I t i s Heidegger's contention that the Being-in-the-world which e s s e n t i a l l y characterizes Dasein i s a structure that can assume two d i f f e r e n t fundamental modalities, one authentic and the other i n -authentic. In i t s inauthentic mode, the p a r t i c u l a r Dasein submits to the 'dictatorship of the they': the three e x i s t e n t i a l i a (under-standing, state-of-mind and discourse) here manifest themselves as c u r i o s i t y , ambiguity and i d l e t a l k . For example, c u r i o s i t y "...con-cerns i t s e l f with seeing, not i n order to understand what i s seen (that i s , to come i n t o a Being towards i t ) but .just i n order to see. I t seeks novelty only i n order to leap from i t anew to another nov-e l t y . " S i m i l a r l y , the lack of genuine understanding manifests i t s e l f i n our everydayness as ambiguity and i d l e t a l k , or 'ground-l e s s ' communication. In i t s inauthentic mode, then, Heidegger main-tains that the p a r t i c u l a r Dasein assumes the character of 'Being-l o s t i n the publicness of the they'. The S e l f of everyday Dasein i s thus the they-Self, which Heid-egger distinguishes from the authentic S e l f or "...the S e l f which has been taken hold of i n i t s own way. As they-Self, the p a r t i c u l a r Dasein has been dispersed i n t o the 'they', and must f i r s t f i n d i t -s e l f . " ^ The 'they* c u l t i v a t e s averageness as the norm of everything, but also the p a r t i c u l a r Dasein i s disburdened by the 'they': "...be-cause the 'they' presents every judgment and decision as i t s own, i t deprives the p a r t i c u l a r Dasein of i t s answerability." In order to assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t s e l f , therefore, the p a r t i c u l a r Da-81 sein must become an authentic S e l f : i t must 'find i t s e l f and take hold of i t s e l f ' i n i t s own way', or as Heidegger puts i t , "...be-cause Dasein i s i n each case e s s e n t i a l l y i t s own p o s s i b i l i t y , i t can, i n i t s very Being, 'choose' i t s e l f and win i t s e l f ; i t can also 1 7 lose i t s e l f and never win i t s e l f ; or only 'seem' to do so," In order to understand p r e c i s e l y what i s meant by authentic Being an analysis of 'care' (Sorge) i s f i r s t required, Heidegger defines 'care' as "Being-ahead-of-oneself — in-Being-already-in.. — as Being-alongside." This means that care constitutes the un-i t y of the s t r u c t u r a l determinations of Dasein, or the e x i s t e n t i a l ! The fact that Dasein i s e s s e n t i a l l y a power to be implies that i t i s always 'ahead of i t s e l f i n i t s projection of p o s s i b i l i t i e s . However, Dasein can r e a l i z e i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s only because i t i s thrown or 'already i n ' the world. Moreover, Dasein always discovers i t s e l f 'alongside' the world, or absorbed i n i t s dealings with i n -traworldly e n t i t i e s . Care i s thus the necessary consequence of ex-i s t e n t i a l i t y , f a c t i c i t y and fallenness. According to Heidegger, i t i s the phenomenon of 'anxiety' or Angst which throws l i g h t on the unity of Dasein's s t r u c t u r a l deter-minations: ",..anxiousness as a state-of-mind i s a way of Being-in-the-world; that i n the face of which we have anxiety i s thrown Be-i n g - i n - the-world; that which we have anxiety about i s our p o t e n t i a l -20 ity-for-Being-in-the-world." In anxiety, we f e e l 'uncanny': an-xi e t y brings us back from our absorption i n the 'world'. Everyday f a m i l i a r i t y collapses, and anxiety thus deprives us of the p o s s i b i -l i t y of understanding ourselves i n terms of the 'world' of i n t r a -worldly e n t i t i e s and the way things have been p u b l i c l y interpreted by the 'they'. Anxiety i n d i v i d u a l i z e s us for our 'ownmost Being-8 2 i n - t h e - w o r l d 1 ; i t makes manifest i n Dasein " . . . i t s Being-free-for the freedom of choosing i t s e l f and taking hold of i t s e l f . " Thus on Heidegger's account, anxiety brings Dasein face to face with i t s Being-free f o r the a u t h e n t i c i t y of i t s Being. Moreover, Heidegger maintains that anxiety discloses Dasein's 'thrownness i n t o death': "Anxiety i n the face of death i s anxiety 'in the face o f that p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g which i s one's ownmost 2 2 n o n - r e l a t i o n a l , and not to be outstripped." Death i s defined by Heidegger as the p o s s i b i l i t y of the absolute i m p o s s i b i l i t y of Da-s e i n . Anxiety i n the face of death so understood must not be con-fused with fear In the face of one's demise: rather, as a basic state-of-mind of Dasein, i t amounts to the disclosure of the fact that Dasein e x i s t s as 'thrown Being towards i t s end'. Our everyday understanding of death suggests, on the contray, that i t i s merely a 'well-known event occurring within the world': "'Dying' i s l e v e l -led o f f to an occurrence which reaches Dasein, to be sure, but be-2 3 longs to nobody i n p a r t i c u l a r . " There i s , then, a 'constant t r a n q u i l l i z a t i o n ' about death, or an evasion which conceals: the 'they' does not permit us the courage for anxiety i n the face of death. Our everyday f a l l i n g evasion i n the face of death i s thus an inauthentic Being-towards-death. Authentic Being-towards-death, on the other hand, does not "...evade i t s ownmost non-relational p o s s i b i l i t y , or cover up t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y by thus f l e e i n g from i t , or give a new explanation for i t to accord with the common sense of the 'they'." 2 Z f In other words death must be genuinely understood as the p o s s i b i l i t y of the imposs-i b i l i t y of Dasein. Heidegger's terminology for such Being towards t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y I s ' a n t i c i p a t i o n ' : " A n t i c i p a t i o n turns out to be 83 the p o s s i b i l i t y of understanding one's ownmost and uttermost p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g — that i s to say, the p o s s i b i l i t y of auth-entic existence." y Death i s thus Dasein's 'ownmost' p o s s i b i l i t y , and Being towards t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y discloses to Dasein i t s 'ownmost' p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g , i n which i t s very Being i s an issue: "Here i t can become manifest to Dasein that i n t h i s d i s t i n c t i v e p o s s i b i l -26 i t y of i t s own s e l f , i t has been wrenched away from the 'they'." Death thus lays claim to one's own Dasein as an i n d i v i d u a l Dasein: the n o n - r e l a t i o n a l character of death, as understood i n a n t i c i p a -t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l i z e s Dasein 'down to i t s e l f * . On Heidegger's account, therefore, a genuine understanding of death reveals to Dasein i t s 'lostness i n the t h e y - S e l f , and brings i t face to face with the p o s s i b i l i t y of Being i t s e l f , or of authentic existence. In terms of Dasein's e x i s t e n t i a l i a , then, Angst i s the st a t e -of-mind which allows an i n d i v i d u a l to be immediately affected by his own m o r t a l i t y , opening up or uncovering the p o s s i b i l i t y of auth-entic existence. Heidegger maintains further that conscience i s the discourse which belongs to the authentic mode of self-disclosedness. Heidegger's concept of conscience i s o n t o l o g i c a l , rather than theo-l o g i c a l . For example, he asserts that the r e l i g i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of conscience as the voice of God warning us against sinning i s only one p a r t i c u l a r ( e x i s t e n t i e l l ) way of i n t e r p r e t i n g the univer-s a l ( e x i s t e n t i a l ) phenomenon of being summoned away from our usual way of doing things. What Heidegger c a l l s the ' s i l e n t c a l l of con-science' i s described as the highest form of communication: our very Being summons i t s e l f to function i n i t s most appropriate way. F i n a l l y , Heidegger maintains that i t i s the recognition and acceptance of oneself as f i n i t e temporal openness which Is the un-84 derstanding which constitutes authentic disclosedness. Heidegger argues that i t i s resolute a n t i c i p a t i o n of death which makes Dasein a u t h e n t i c a l l y f u t u r a l : "By the term ' f u t u r a l ' , we do net here have i n view a 'now' which has not yet become actual and which sometime w i l l be for the f i r s t time. We have i n view the coming i n which Da-sei n , i n i t s ownmost p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g , comes towards i t -27 s e l f . " By a n t i c i p a t i n g death, Dasein receives i t s Being precise-l y as i t s own, so that i t genuinely comes to Be i t s e l f . In other words, resolute a n t i c i p a t i o n of death discloses the d i s t i n c t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y of one's existence, one's s p e c i f i c goal, as opposed to 'the endless m u l t i p l i c i t y of p o s s i b i l i t i e s which o f f e r themselves as c l o s e s t to one'. Further, Heidegger contends that t h i s means that a n t i c i p a t i o n not only makes Dasein a u t h e n t i c a l l y f u t u r a l , but also that i t makes i t possible for Dasein to take over i t s own thrownness: "The authentic coming-towards-oneself of antic i p a t o r y resoluteness i s at the same time a coming-back to one's ownmost PR S e l f , which has been thrown into i t s i n d i v i d u a l i z a t i o n . " Dasein thus takes over r e s o l u t e l y that e n t i t y which i t already i s : "In a n t i c i p a t i n g , Dasein brings i t s e l f again forth into I t s ownmost p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g . I f Being-as-having-been i s authentic, we c a l l i t ' r e p e t i t i o n ' . " 2 9 Heidegger thus maintains that genuine self-understanding i s possible because we can e x i s t i n such a way which u n i f i e s our past, present and future. Resolute a n t i c i p a t i o n of death i s the ' s e l f -gathering' by means of which an i n d i v i d u a l ' s future becomes i n t e l l -i g i b l e i n terms of h i s past, and his past likewise becomes i n t e l l -i g i b l e i n terms of h i s future. For the authentic i n d i v i d u a l , then, the future i s the completion or f u l f i l l m e n t of the past; i t pre-85 supposes the past but, on the other hand, t h i s past cannot manifest i t s e l f unless there i s a future. Thus on Heidegger's account there e x i s t s a r e l a t i o n s h i p of r e c i p r o c a l i m p l i c a t i o n between past and future. Further, i n authentic 'making present', Dasein's current s i t u a t i o n i s revealed by means of a future p r o j e c t i o n of i t s own p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g , and i n the l i g h t of i t s own past or thrown-ness. As Heidegger puts i t . "In resoluteness, the Present i s not only brought back from d i s t r a c t i o n with the objects of one's c l o s e s t 50 concern, but i t gets held i n the future and i n having been." y The present s i t u a t i o n i s thus a 'product' of the future and the 'having been', and what i s meant by 'temporality' as such i s p r e c i s e l y the unity of t h i s structured whole, or the future which makes present i n the process of having been. Heidegger maintains, therefore, that temporality reveals i t -s e l f as the meaning of authentic care. As we have seen, Dasein's t o t a l i t y of Being as care means: ahead-of-itself-already-Being-i n (a world) as Being-alongside ( e n t i t i e s encountered within-the-world). I t Is now c l e a r that "...the 'ahead of i t s e l f i s grounded i n the future. In the 'Being already-in...', the character of 'having been' i s made known. 'Being-alongside...' becomes possible i n making present." ^ 1 Thus temporality makes possible the unity of e x i s t e n t i a l i t y , f a c t i c i t y and fallenness, and i n t h i s way i t constitutes p r i m o r d i a l l y the t o t a l i t y of the structure of care. Dasein's temporal structure i s therefore a ' c i r c u l a r ' unity i n which a seemingly separate past, present and future i n fact i n t e r -penetrate each other: what we experience now ( i n the present) i s interpreted i n the l i g h t cast by a p r i o r (past) future-oriented projection. 86 Heidegger thus argues that, contrary to what t r a d i t i o n a l con-ceptions of selfhood suggest, Dasein e x i s t s as f i n i t e temporal openness. More fundamental than the ego-subject with i t s worldly objects, for example, i s the temporality which makes possible the experience of both subject and object. As Heidegger puts i t , Dasein exis t s as the temporal 'clearing' i n which beings, i n c l u d i n g the ego-subject, can be manifest. Indeed, just as for K a n t an object can be experienced and known only i f i t i s organized according to the categories of the human understanding, for Heidegger a being can manifest i t s e l f only within the temporal 'horizons* opened up i n Dasein 1s transcendence. Without these temporal horizons, there would be neither subjects nor objects, since there would be no disclosedness or c l e a r i n g ('world') i n which subjects and objects could be manifest. To be a S e l f , Heidegger maintains, i s p r e c i s e l y to be t h i s temporal openness i n which beings can be revealed. To become authentic, then, i s to become 'what one i s ' , or to recognise Dasein as Dasein. Man for the most part remains concealed from himself i n h i s own r e a l i t y , and sees himself instead as a being among other i n t r a w o r l d l y beings. Becoming authentic means 'owning up' to one's own true nature or Being, which one already i s . As owning up to what one already i s , a u t henticity i s a matter of Being what one already i s with e x p l i c i t awareness of one's own true Be-ing: namely, Dasein i s i t s own e x i s t e n t i a l i a , those c o n s t i t u t i v e ways of Being that together e x h i b i t i t s Existenz, or the way In which Dasein has to Be as 'thrown p o s s i b i l i t y ' . Dasein has to Be as temporal care: i t i s temporality which makes possible the unity of the e x i s t e n t i a l i a and thus reaveals i t s e l f as the meaning of authentic care. 8? I t i s resolute a n t i c i p a t i o n of death which makes f a c t i c a l Dasein a u t h e n t i c a l l y f u t u r a l by wresting Dasein from the 'they' and leaving i t free for i t s own p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g . In authentic having been, the p a r t i c u l a r Dasein r e s o l u t e l y assumes i t s thrown-ness or that e n t i t y which i t already i s by means of the • r e p e t i t i o n 7 of i t s own p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g . F i n a l l y , i n authentic making pre-sent, f a c t i c a l Dasein's present s i t u a t i o n i s revealed by means of a future p r o j e c t i o n of i t s own p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g , and i n the l i g h t of i t s own past or thrownness. As an authentic S e l f , man un-derstands h i s temporal structure as one i n which the past, present and future are i n t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d , such that what we experience now i s interpreted by means of a p r i o r future-oriented p r o j e c t i o n . As an authentic S e l f , therefore, man understands that he i s not a be-ing among other i n t r a w o r l d l y beings, but rather that he i s the 'ground' of such beings: there are beings only i n so far as beings come to pass through the in t r o p l a y of the three temporal 'ecstases' which constitute man's Being, or Dasein. Heidegger's p o r t r a i t of authentic existence has been c r i t i c i z e d on a number of grounds, many of which concern the nature of the rel a t i o n s h i p between the i n d i v i d u a l seeking aut h e n t i c i t y and h i s s o c i a l environment. M. Grene poses the following questions: "What happens to the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p s to others when he re-solves to be, not a mass of conventions, but himself? In other words, what does Heidegger do with the question of our existing-together-with-others outside the conventional and unauthentic l e v e l of ex-istence?" 32 A s G r e n e s e e s i t , Heidegger's Dasein i s l o s t i n the 'they' and i n the d i s t r a c t i n g demands of the everyday, u n t i l t h i s lostness and d i s t r a c t i o n i s substituted by the genuine resolve of 88 the i s o l a t e d but l i b e r a t e d i n d i v i d u a l . When the i n d i v i d u a l resolves to be himself and wrests himself from s o c i a l conventions, on Grene's account, h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p s to others are for a l l i n t e n t s and pur-poses severed: "M^ ; freedom i s mine, and the awareness of i t bears no i n t r u d e r s , f o r i t i s 'freedom to death'; and from my lonel i n e s s i n face of death no one can save me; nor can I , i f I would, save or even p i t y another." Grene allows that Heidegger maintains that 'togetherness' or Mitsein i s e s s e n t i a l to the very nature of the i n d i v i d u a l Dasein. However, she i n s i s t s that i t i s only on the l e v e l of the inauthentic that 'togetherness' i s a c t u a l l y e s s e n t i a l : " . . . f o r i t i s just a fraudulent togetherness, a sense of belonging with nothing genuine to belong to, that constitutes the 'one' (the 'they') i n and by which, on the unauthentic l e v e l , each of us l i v e s . " On the other hand, with h i s resolute emergence into a u t h e n t i c i t y , Heidegger's i n d i v i d u a l learns to subordinate the concerns of everyday, both the things and the people involved i n t h i s inauthentic mode of ex-istence: "Now he i s l i b e r a t e d from the many by binding himself to a true one, that i s , to h i s own s o l i t a r y projection of himself i n -to the future, a future shaped by the f e a r f u l r e a l i z a t i o n of his mortal destiny." The authentic i n d i v i d u a l therefore stands alone, on Grene's account, i s o l a t e d but l i b e r a t e d . Indeed, Grene argues that there i s at the authentic l e v e l of existence no meaningful equivalent of Fursorge or my s o l i c i t o u s dealings with others. At the inauthentic l e v e l , I am indeed con-cerned with others: "...here, of course, neither I nor the others emerge as genuine i n d i v i d u a l s but only as pseudo-centers i n a pat-tern whose whole meaning i s the d i s t r a c t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l from 8 9 •zr h i s true nature." J I t might be supposed, then, that with the t r a n s i t i o n from i n a u t h e n t i c i t y to authenticity my concern for others might be transformed from fraudulent d i s t r a c t i o n to a p o s i t i v e form of s o l i c i t u d e . However, according to Grene, t h i s i s f a r from being the case: "I care for others i n a genuine, rather than a conven-t i o n a l , sense, according to Heidegger, i n so far as I r e f e r my care for them e s s e n t i a l l y and completely to mv_ own free p r o j e c t i o n of myself. This i s , i n other words, the contrary morality to Kant's: the free man i s he who treats other people always as means, never 37 as ends." ^ Grene concludes, then, that there i s i n fact no p o s i -t i v e form of s o l i c i t u d e i n Heidegger's account of i n d i v i d u a l auth-e n t i c i t y . Martin Buber i s likewise highly c r i t i c a l of Heidegger's port-r a i t of authentic existence. Buber maintains that Heidegger " . . . i s -olates from the wholeness of l i f e the realm i n which man i s r e l a t e d to himself, since he absolutizes the temporally conditioned s i t u a -t i o n of the r a d i c a l l y s o l i t a r y man, and wants to derive the essence of human existence from the experience of a nightmare." Buber argues that Heidegger's authentic i n d i v i d u a l turns away from an es s e n t i a l r e l a t i o n to other men, and that there remains for him on-ly "...the sublime i l l u s i o n of detached thought that he i s a s e l f -contained s e l f ; as man he i s l o s t . " ^ 9 Indeed, Buber holds that the authentic i n d i v i d u a l i s not the man who genuinely l i v e s with man, but rather the man who can no longer r e a l l y l i v e with others, or the i n d i v i d u a l who knows a genuine l i f e only i n communication with himself. Buber acknowledges that a l l of t h i s seems to be contradicted by Heidegger's contention that man's Being i s by nature i n the world 90 and together with other men. S t i l l , Buber argues that i n point of fact a r e l a t i o n to others i s not e s s e n t i a l for the authentic i n d i -v i d u a l : "For the r e l a t i o n of s o l i c i t u d e which i s a l l (Heidegger) considers cannot as such be an e s s e n t i a l r e l a t i o n , since i t does not set a man's l i f e i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n with the l i f e of another, but only one man's s o l i c i t o u s help i n r e l a t i o n with another man's lack and need of i t . " i f 0 On Buber's account, e s s e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s are ' d i r e c t , whole r e l a t i o n s ' between man and man, which have a fundamental part i n b u i l d i n g up the 'substance of l i f e ' . Buber's point here i s that i n a r e l a t i o n such as Heidegger's s o l i c i t u d e , an i n d i v i d u a l remains fundamentally within himself: "...the b a r r i e r s of his own being are not thereby breached; he make his assistance, not h i s s e l f , accessible to the other; nor does he expect any r e a l mutuality...he ' i s concerned with the other', but he i s not anxious for the other to be concerned with him s" ^ Buber characterizes an e s s e n t i a l r e l a t i o n as one i n which the b a r r i e r s of I n d i v i d u a l being are i n fact breached and a new phenomenon ap-pears which can appear only i n t h i s way, namely, one l i f e open to another: "...the other becomes present...in the depths of one's substance, so that one experiences the mystery of the other being i n the mystery of one's own." ^ 2 On Buber's account, then, Heid-egger's authentic i n d i v i d u a l knows nothing of an e s s e n t i a l r e l a t i o n between men, or one i n which men ac t u a l l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n one anoth-er's l i v e s . On the contrary, i n Heidegger's view existence i s com-pleted i n s e l f - b e i n g , and Heidegger's s e l f i s a 'closed system'. Following Buber's c r i t i c i s m s of Heidegger's presentation of authentic existence, R. Weber maintains that Heidegger's i m p l i c i t moral theory can be charged with the 'error' of ' e t h i c a l egoism': 91 "The only form of e t h i c s i m p l i c i t i n the major p o r t i o n of Heidegg-er's ontology...can best be described as e t h i c a l egoism...which i s incompatible with Heidegger's claim of Dasein as i r r e d u c i b l y co-Dasein." ^ Only i n the concept of ' s o l i c i t u d e ' , on Weber's account, does Heidegger suggest modes of human behaviour that seem d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to an i n t e r p e r s o n a l e t h i c . S o l i c i t u d e has both p o s i t i v e and negative modes. Heidegger characterizes the negative modes of s o l -i c i t u d e as, f o r example, 'passing one another by' or 'not mattering to one another'. Such i n d i f f e r e n c e to others i s representative of the d e f i c i e n t forms of s o l i c i t u d e generally, and seeing no basis here f o r an i n t e r p e r s o n a l e t h i c , Weber proceeds to Heidegger's d i s -cussion of the p o s i t i v e modes of s o l i c i t u d e . The f i r s t of these Heidegger c a l l s 'leaping i n ' : "This kind of s o l i c i t u d e takes over f o r the Other that with which he i s to concern himself. The Other i s thus thrown out of h i s own p o s i t i o n ; he steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can e i t h e r take i t over as something f i n i s h e d and at h i s d i s p o s a l , or disburden himself of i t completely." ^ In t h i s kind of s o l i c i -tude the Other tends to become one who i s dominated and dependent, unable to assume h i s own p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g , and thus Weber dismisses i t also as a possible basis for an interhuman e t h i c . The second p o s i t i v e form of s o l i c i t u d e Heidegger c a l l s 'leap-ing ahead', "...which does not so much leap i n for the Other as leap ahead of him i n h i s e x i s t e n t i e l l p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g , not i n order to take away h i s 'care* but rather to give i t back to him 4 5 a u t h e n t i c a l l y as such for the f i r s t time." ^ T h i s kind of s o l i c i t u d e , on Heidegger's account, helps the Other to become 'transparent to himself i n h i s care and to become free for i t ' . However, here Weber 92 argues that Heidegger has already s t i p u l a t e d that the basic i n -sight that I myself must grasp through care i s that I am a being-toward-death: "Being-toward-death, Heidegger emphatically asserts, i s o l a t e s each man irremediably from a l l others, an i s o l a t i o n that cannot i n p r i n c i p l e be overcome, and one that i s 'primarily un-supported by concernful s o l i c i t u d e ' . " ^ I f being-toward-death i s so fundamentally n o n - r e l a t i o n a l , and i f authentic a n t i c i p a t o r y re-soluteness f o r death constitutes man's ce n t r a l e x i s t e n t i a l task, then, Weber contends, i t i s not possible for anyone to "leap ahead' of another. Heidegger's account of Dasein i s so e x c l u s i v e l y i n d i -v i d u a l i s t i c that i t precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y of p o s i t i v e construc-ti v e s o l i c i t u d e , and i n so doing precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y of an interpersonal e t h i c . In addition to the charge of e t h i c a l egoism, Weber maintains that Heidegger's concept of authenticity implies ' e t h i c a l permis-siveness': "...inherent i n Heidegger's ontology i s a p o t e n t i a l l y pernicious e t h i c a l permissiveness. For only the s o l i t a r y i n d i v i d u a l who has chosen h i s aloneness can dwell i n the t r u t h . " ^ Weber states that Heidegger refuses to suggest what the 'laws and r u l e s ' for man's communal l i f e ought to be. Instead, he holds that to be auth e n t i c a l l y resolute i s i n i t s e l f the highest human good: "...Heid-egger equates the very a t t i t u d e of resoluteness with action, and moreover with authentic, i . e . r i g h t action, (and) any expectation that the resolute i n d i v i d u a l ought i n addition to manifest active e t h i c a l commitments, i n t e r a c t i o n s , or r e l a t i o n s h i p s with others i s c l e a r l y misplaced." ^ ^ e D e T maintains that Heidegger seems to say that so long as one i s resolved, anything i s permitted: Heidegger's concept of resoluteness contains no apparent safeguards 93 against l i c e n s i n g the i n d i v i d u a l to follow whatever the voice of conscience might d i c t a t e . In order to defend Heidegger against the foregoing c r i t i c i s m s , i t i s f i r s t necessary to r e i t e r a t e that Dasein i s not man, but r a -ther Dasein i s man's Being. I t should be acknowledged, however, that Heidegger himself frequently employs misleading locutions i n Being and Time, locutions which tend to promote the m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Dasein and man. For example, i n his discussion of a u t h e n t i c i t y , Heidegger speaks of 'the p a r t i c u l a r Dasein' being deprived of i t s answerability by the 'they', and that i f i t i s to assume responsi-b i l i t y for i t s e l f , 'the p a r t i c u l a r Dasein' must become an authentic S e l f . However, i t i s the p a r t i c u l a r man who i s deprived of h i s an-sw e r a b i l i t y , and who must assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for himself. Man i s a being, a subject who can be answerable and responsible. At times Heidegger does make a d i s t i n c t i o n between Dasein and ' f a c t i -c a l Dasein' ('the i n d i v i d u a l Dasein'„ 'the p a r t i c u l a r Dasein'), where the l a t t e r r e f e r s to the being, man. Dasein i t s e l f , however, i s not a being, but i s rather the process by which a 'clearing' Is made so that beings (subjects and objects) may make an appearance. As J.P. F e l l notes, "Heidegger's Dasein i s intended as an o r i g i n a l or primordial unity that i s p r i o r to and ground of the d i s t i n c t i o n 49 between subject and object." Dasein may thus be understood as that which renders i n d i v i d u a l selves (as w e l l as objects) possible. However, to say that 'Dasein i s i n each case mine', or that man's Being i s such that he ex i s t s 'for the sake of h i m s e l f , does not imply either a s o l i p s i s t i c i s -olation or an e g o i s t i c e x a l t a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l . Thus when Web-er, for example, characterizes Heidegger's ' i m p l i c i t moral theory' 9k as ' e t h i c a l egoism', she c l e a r l y misunderstands Heidegger's account of Dasein. As he p l a i n l y states, "The proposition 'Dasein e x i s t s for the sake of i t s e l f contains no reference to the eg o i s t i c and s e l f i s h ends of a b l i n d s e l f - l o v e i n f a c t i c a l Dasein. Consequently i t cannot be 'refuted' by pointing out that many men s a c r i f i c e them-selves f o r others and, generally, that men do not e x i s t for them-selves alone but i n socie t y . " 5 0 Indeed, Heidegger states c l e a r l y that the proposition 'Dasein e x i s t s for the sake of i t s e l f implies neither a s o l i p s i s t i c i s o l a t i o n of Dasein, as Buber suggests, nor an e g o i s t i c e x a l t a t i o n of Dasein, as Weber contends. On the con-t r a r y , to say that Dasein e x i s t s for the sake of i t s e l f i s "...the condition of p o s s i b i l i t y for the fact that man can r e l a t e to others 51 either e g o i s t i c a l l y or a l t r u i s t i c a l l y . " v S i m i l a r l y , i t i s not the case that Heidegger's account of Being-towards-death implies that the i n d i v i d u a l Dasein's r e l a t i o n s to the world and to others are irrevocably severed, as both Grene and Weber contend. I t i s true that Heidegger maintains that with death, Dasein stands before i t s e l f i n i t s 'ownmost p o t e n t i a l i t y -for-Being': "When i t stands before i t s e l f i n t h i s way, a l l i t s re-52 l a t i o n s to any other Dasein have been undone." y Heidegger states that the ownmost p o t e n t i a l i t y i s indeed non-relational, but by t h i s he means that Dasein alone can take over i t s own Being: death lays claim to an i n d i v i d u a l Dasein. The non-relational character, as understood i n a n t i c i p a t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l i z e s Dasein 'down to i t s e l f . In other words, as we have seen, Heidegger maintains that a n t i c i -pation of death i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of authentic existence. However, Heidegger also stresses that our r e l a t i o n s to the world (concern) and to others ( s o l i c i t u d e ) are not thereby perman-95 ently severed: "But i f concern and s o l i c i t u d e f a i l us, t h i s does not s i g n i f y at a l l that these ways of Dasein have been cut o f f from i t s a u t h e n t i c a l l y B e i n g - i t s - S e l f . As structures e s s e n t i a l to Dasein' c o n s t i t u t i o n , these have a share i n conditioning the p o s s i b i l i t y of any existence whatsoever." 5^ Thus, while the process of becoming an authentic S e l f requires that the p a r t i c u l a r Dasein wrest i t s e l f from everydayness and the 'they', i t does not imply an irremediable i s o l a t i o n of Dasein. Indeed, Heidegger asserts on the contrary that "Dasein i s a u t h e n t i c a l l y i t s e l f only to the extent that, as con-cernful Being-alongside and s o l i c i t o u s Being-with, i t projects i t -s e l f upon i t s ownmost p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g rather than upon the p o s s i b i l i t y of the they-self." I t i s important to recognize here that a u t h e n t i c i t y and inauth-e n t i c i t y are not, so to speak, mutually exclusive. As Heidegger puts i t , " A u thentically Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an ex-ceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been de-tached from the 'they'; i t i s rather an e x i s t e n t i e l l modification of the 'they' - of the 'they' as an e s s e n t i a l e x i s t e n t i a l e . " Heidegger maintains, then, that authentic existence i s not something which ' f l o a t s above' f a l l i n g everydayness, because f a l l i n g every-dayness i s i n e v i t a b l e and constitutes Dasein's usual 'base sta t e ' . On the contrary Heidegger contends that authentic existence i s on-l y a modified way i n which such everydayness i s seized upon. To become authentic, i n other words, i s to become 'what one i s ' o r to recognize Dasein as Dasein.' Becoming authentic means 'owning up' to man's own true nature or Being, which one already i s . As J.P. F e l l observes, "As owning up to what one already i s , 'authenticity' cannot be a s h i f t to a new or novel state of being. 96 I t can only be a matter of being what one already i s with e x p l i c i t awareness. I t i s a self-awareness, awareness of one's own r e a l or 56 true being." Indeed, Heidegger asserts that "The meaning of Da-sein 's Being i s not something f r e e - f l o a t i n g which i s other than and 'outside o f i t s e l f , but i s the self-understanding Dasein i t s e l f . " 5 7 Thus the i n d i v i d u a l Dasein i s either a u t h e n t i c a l l y or i n a u t h e n t i c a l l y disclosed to i t s e l f as regards i t s Being, but i n neither case i s i t divorced from the world or from others. Heidegger sums h i s p o s i t i o n up as follows: Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one's-Self. does not detach Dasein from i t s world, nor does i t i s o l a t e i t so that i t becomes a free-f l o a t i n g ' I ' . And how should i t , when r e s o l -uteness as authentic disclosedness, i s auth-e n t i c a l l y nothing else than Being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the Self r i g h t into i t s current concernful Being-alongside what i s ready-to-hand, and pushes i t i n t o s o l i c i t o u s Being with Others. 58 Thus, Heidegger does indeed provide an on t o l o g i c a l basis for s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . Dasein's Being-in-the-world i s e s s e n t i a l l y a Being-with Others, regardless of whether our Being i s grasped auth-e n t i c a l l y or In a u t h e n t i c a l l y . In either case, Being-with i s to be understood i n terms of an openness to and a sharing i n one world. Heidegger's Dasein i s thus not, as Buber holds, a 'closed system'. Nor does Heidegger's account of Dasein render p o s i t i v e constructive s o l i c i t u d e impossible, as Weber argues. On the contrary, the world of Dasein i s a with-world, and i t i s p r e c i s e l y on the basis of t h i s common possession of one world that a community can be constituted according to the d i f f e r e n t modalities of Being-with, which as we have noted range from love to hatred and from s o l i d a r i t y to i n d i f f -erence. In other words, our s o l i c i t o u s dealings with others are made 97 possible i n a l l of t h e i r modalities by means of the c o n s t i t u t i v e structure of Dasein i t s e l f . P o s i t i v e constructive s o l i c i t u d e or 'leaping ahead' enables the p a r t i c u l a r Dasein to help the Other to seize h i s own Being. Unlike 'leaping i n ' , which encourages domina-t i o n and dependency, 'leaping ahead' leaves the Other free f o r h i s own Being. Buber appears to believe that such a r e l a t i o n cannot be an e s s e n t i a l one, because the 'barriers of i n d i v i d u a l being' are not breached. This char a c t e r i z a t i o n p l a i n l y reveals Buber*s lack of appreciation of the r a d i c a l nature of Heidegger's Dasein, as opposed to t r a d i t i o n a l conceptions of selfhood. As we have seen, Heidegger argues that Dasein i s not an ego-subject: there are no 'barriers of i n d i v i d u a l being' to be breached. Dasein e x i s t s as that f i n i t e temporal openness which makes possible the appearance of both subjects and objects. In f a c t , Heidegger's account of Dasein as a Mitsein lays the foundation for a l l possible interpersonal r e l a -tions but, as Caputo notes, Heidegger i n s i s t s that "...while the 'I ' can love the o t h e r . . . i t cannot love for him. The ' I ' cannot take away the other's care, that i s , h i s selfhood." ^ J Indeed, Heidegger's account of Dasein i n s i s t s that 'Dasein i s i n each case mine', but t h i s does not i s o l a t e f a c t i c a l Dasein from the Other; on the contrary, i t renders t h e i r mutual self-commitment possible. Weber has also argued, however, that Heidegger's account of authentic existence issues i n 'et h i c a l permissiveness': Heidegger refuses to suggest what the 'laws and r u l e s ' for man's communal l i f e ought to be; provided one i s resolved, he seems to say, any-thing i s permitted. Here, Weber once again misunderstands Heidegg-er's ontology: she i s seeking a set of ontic d i r e c t i v e s governing relations between men, while Heidegger on the other hand i s prim-9 8 a r i l y concerned with the r e l a t i o n s between Dasein and Being. As Caputo observes, " I t i s absurd to think that Being i t s e l f i n some way issues determinate d i r e c t i v e s , for Being i s not a being - God, e.g., or some human l e g i s l a t o r . Beyond any determinate e t h i c , Heid-egger questions i n t o an 'ought' that inheres i n Being i t s e l f , i n vi r t u e of which a l l determinate obligations are rendered p o s s i b l e . " 6 Caputo r e f e r s to what Heidegger c a l l s ' o r i g i n a l e t h i c s ' i n h i s "Letter on Humanism", and o r i g i n a l ethics i s there i d e n t i f i e d as 'thinking committed to Being' and to the r e l a t i o n between Dasein and Being. Such thinking does not, on Heidegger's account, provide any ontic d i r e c t i v e s . Indeed, thinking committed to Being and to the r e l a t i o n between Dasein and Being issues not i n a set of 'laws and r u l e s ' but rather, as we have seen, i n authentic existence. As an authentic S e l f , man understands that he i s not a being among other i n t r a w o r l d l y beings, but rather that he i s the 'ground' of such beings; there are beings only i n so f a r as beings come to pass through the three temporal ecstases which constitute Dasein or man's Being. As an authentic Sel f , man understands h i s temporal structure as one i n which the past, present and future are i n t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d , such that what i s experienced now ( i n the present) i s interpreted i n the l i g h t cast by a p r i o r (past) future-oriented projection. F i n a l l y , as an authentic S e l f , man's Being i s s t i l l Being-in-the-world, and the world of Dasein i s a with-world; thus, as an authentic S e l f , man i s neither divorced from the world nor i s o l a t e d from others, but rather continues to share a common world with others. I t might be argued, however, that Heidegger's account of auth-entic existence i s fundamentally incomplete as i t stands. Heidegger 99 c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e s a u t h e n t i c i t y as an ' e x i s t e n t i e l l modification of the they', but he thus f a r leaves unexplained p r e c i s e l y what i s involved i n such a modification. While Being and Time Is indeed concerned p r i m a r i l y with the e x i s t e n t i a l - o n t o l o g i c a l l e v e l , never-theless since a u t h e n t i c i t y i s defined by Heidegger as an existen-t i e l l m o d i f i c a t i o n , some further account of the nature of t h i s mod-i f i c a t i o n i s required i f the description of authentic existence i s to be rendered s a t i s f a c t o r y . F e l l suggests, for example, that auth-e n t i c i t y means "...a form of self-coincidence or coherence i n which a human being's p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n t i e l l actions are brought i n t o e x p l i c i t accord with one's own r e a l e x i s t e n t i a l s tructure, which i s 6 1 the very p o s s i b i l i t y of those p a r t i c u l a r actions." I t would ap-pear, then, that to be appreciated f u l l y 'authenticity' must be considered more concretely as a mode of human existence which re-f l e c t s genuine e x i s t e n t i a l - o n t o l o g i c a l understanding. Notice, for example, that Heidegger himself allows, "Is there not, however, a d e f i n i t e o n t i c a l way of taking authentic existence, a f a c t i c a l i d e a l of Dasein, underlying our o n t o l o g i c a l Interpreta-62 tion of Dasein's existence? That i s so indeed." D Karsten Harries suggests, then, that the p u r i t y of fundamental ontology i s an i l -lusion: "(Heidegger's) choice of terms communicates the i d e a l un-derlying h i s o n t o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s : Being and Time c a l l s i t s readers to a u t h e n t i c i t y , to that honest acceptance of man's own being which Heidegger terms 'resolve'." ^ Heidegger c a l l s us to a form of l i f e , but man cannot e x i s t as pure form. I f he i s to l i v e a u t h e n t i c a l l y , man must choose himself concretely, i n the world and with others. As Harries puts i t , resolve becomes genuine only when i t i s expressed i n p a r t i c u l a r resolute actions: "Only i n p a r t i c u l a r 100 decisions does man genuinely seize himself and thus become auth-e n t i c . " 6 i f When he e x i s t s inauthentic a l l y , man submits to the 'dic-tatorship of the they', or subordinates himself to an established way of l i f e . Authentic existence, on the contrary, demands that man choose himself and h i s own place, and such choice requires c r i -t e r i a i f authentic action i s not to deteriorate i n t o sheer a r b i -t r a r i n e s s . Heidegger's analysis of authentic existence thus remains incomplete u n t i l i t has shown pr e c i s e l y how authentic action i s possible, or on what basis we choose our place i n the world and with others, and so l i v e a u t h e n t i c a l l y . This discussion w i l l be con-tinued i n chapter s i x , where we w i l l consider Heidegger's treatment of Dasein's ' h i s t o r i c a l i t y ' , which he explicates as 'a more con-crete working out of Dasein 1s temporality'. F i r s t , however, we w i l l turn to an examination of Sartre's analysis of 'being-for-others', i n order to compare and contrast h i s view with that of Heidegger on the subject of i n d i v i d u a l authenticity and r e l a t i o n s h i p s with others. 101 Chapter Five Sartre's Concept of Being-for-Others In t h i s chapter, Sartre's treatment of 'being-for-others' w i l l be examined. We w i l l begin by considering Sartre's c r i t i c i s m of Heidegger's concept of 'Being-with' or Mitsein: Sartre argues that Being-with i s not an o n t o l o g i c a l structure of the f o r - i t s e l f . In-stead, an i n t e r n a l negation i s the co n s t i t u t i v e structure of being-for-others: the Other i s another s u b j e c t i v i t y who i s not me. Sartre analyses my being-for-others i n terms of the concept of the Other's Look: the Other Is another s u b j e c t i v i t y who o b j e c t i f i e s me and i s thus the foundation of my object-ness or my b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f . As we s h a l l see, Sartre i n t e r p r e t s my o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n by the Other as an a l i e n a t i o n of my own p o s s i b i l i t i e s , and since t h i s o b j e c t i -f i c a t i o n i s mutual, he contends that c o n f l i c t i s the o r i g i n a l mean-ing of being-for-others. On Sartre's account, the Other's existence can motivate eith e r of two opposed a t t i t u d e s : I can attempt to destroy my object-ness for him by making an object out of him i n turn, or else I can at-tempt to assimilate h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y so as to recover my own ob-ject-ness and thus become my own foundation. Both of these attempts Sartre i d e n t i f i e s as f a i l u r e s , and h i s profoundly negative des-c r i p t i o n of our concrete r e l a t i o n s with others has prompted num-erous c r i t i c i s m s . His p o s i t i o n can be defended, however, i f i t i s acknowledged that h i s account of r e l a t i o n s with others i s not, and was not intended to be, an exhaustive one. I t w i l l be suggested, on the contrary, that Sartre's discussion takes place within the context of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s project to be a self-as-being-in-i t s e l f , to be the foundation of himself, or as Sartre puts i t , to 102 be God. I f t h i s project to be God may be set aside, as Sartre's ethics of authentic existence suggests, then i t can be argued that an account of p o s i t i v e , constructive r e l a t i o n s with others might indeed be formulated within the parameters of Sartre's on-tology. 103 In h i s treatment of being-for-others, Sartre i s c r i t i c a l of Heidegger's concept of Mitsein or Being-with. Sartre characterizes Heidegger's p o s i t i o n as follows: the r e l a t i o n between 'human r e a l -i t i e s ' i s a r e l a t i o n of being, and t h i s r e l a t i o n causes 'human re-a l i t i e s ' to depend on one another i n t h e i r e s s e n t i a l being. 1 Being with i s an e s s e n t i a l structure or an e x i s t e n t i a l e of Dasein, i n other words, and the r e l a t i o n between Daseins i s a r e l a t i o n of be-ing or an i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n . There are, however, two possible sorts of i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n . F i r s t , there i s i n t e r n a l negation, or "...a negation which p o s i t s the o r i g i n a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the Other and myself as being such that i t determines me by means of the Oth-2 er and determines the Other by means of me." Second, there i s what might be termed Int e r n a l community: " I t expresses rather a sort of o n t o l o g i c a l s o l i d a r i t y for the e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h i s world." Heidegger, Sartre maintains, believes that my r e l a t i o n with the Oth er i s not a f r o n t a l opposition, as i n t e r n a l negation suggests, but rather an oblique interdependence: Dasein i s i n i t s being a member of a community. Sartre notes, for example, that the e x p e r i e n t i a l image which best symbolizes Heidegger's p o s i t i o n i s that of a crew: "The o r i g -i n a l r e l a t i o n of the Other and my consciousness i s not the you and and me; i t Is the we." ^ E x p e r i e n t i a l l y or o n t i c a l l y there are i n -deed crews, teams and a va r i e t y of other forms of communal organi-zation. However, Sartre argues that Heidegger i s not j u s t i f i e d i n passing from such empirical examples 'of Being-with to a p o s i t i o n claiming co-existence as the ontological structure of my being-In-the-world. Communal being, on Sartre's account, i s not the primary r e l a t i o n between Dasein and the Other: Heidegger's p o s i t i o n f a i l s 1 0 4 to preserve the o r i g i n a l negation that makes of the Other an other. Sartre's fundamental presupposition i n his treatment of others does preserve t h i s o r i g i n a l negation: "...others are the Other, that i s the s e l f which i s not myself. Therefore we grasp here a ne-gation as the c o n s t i t u t i v e structure of the being-of-others." 5 This c o n s t i t u t i n g negation i s an i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n , which means a synthetic, active connection of the two terms, each one of which constitutes i t s e l f by denying that i t Is the other. I f we suppress th i s o r i g i n a l negation, as Heidegger does, then i n Sartre's view we are going to f a l l i n t o a monism, and he i n s i s t s that "...the primary f a c t i s the p l u r a l i t y of consciousnesses, and t h i s p l u r a l -i t y i s r e a l i z e d i n the form of a double, r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n of exclusion." ^ The Other i s the one who excludes me by being himself, and the one I exclude by being myself. Moreover, the negation which 7 makes the Other an other constitutes him as non-essential : Being-with i s not an on t o l o g i c a l or es s e n t i a l structure of the f o r -i t s e l f . On the contrary, Sartre contends that "Human-reality remains alone because the Other's existence has the nature of a contingent and i r r e d u c i b l e f a c t . " 8 (The adequacy of Sartre's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Heidegger w i l l be pursued i n chapter s i x . At present we w i l l continue with Sartre's own position.) Sartre notes that i t i s i n the r e a l i t y of everyday l i f e that the Other appears to me: "I am i n a public park. Not f a r away there i s a lawn and along the edge of that lawn there are benches. A man passes by those benches. I see t h i s man; I apprehend him as an object and at the same time as a man." * To apprehend him as a man, on Sartre's account, i s to apprehend him as a d i s t i n c t centre 105 of reference for the objects i n my universe, for instead of a grouping toward me of these objects, there i s now an o r i e n t a t i o n which f l e e s from me. As Sartre puts i t , "...the appearance among the objects of my. universe of an element of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n i n that universe i s what I mean by the appearance of a man i n my u n i v e r s e . " 1 0 The Other i s indeed s t i l l an object for me, but he i s an ob-ject 'which has stolen the world' from me. Everything s t i l l e x i s t s for me, yet everything i s traversed by an i n v i s i b l e f l i g h t and fi x e d i n the d i r e c t i o n of t h i s new object. The appearance of the Other i n the world thus corresponds to a decentralization of the world which undermines the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n which I am simultaneously ef-fecting: " . . . i t appears that the world has a kind of drain hole i n the middle of i t s being and that i t i s perpetually flowing o f f through t h i s hole." 1 1 However, none of t h i s enables us to leave the l e v e l on which the Other i s an object: Sartre maintains that since the Other-as-object i s defined i n connection with the world as that object which, as another centre of reference, sees what I see, then my fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent p o s s i b i l i t y of being seen by the Other. The r e l a t i o n which Sartre c a l l s 'being-seen-by-another' rep-resents the o r i g i n a l r e l a t i o n of myself to the Other: " I t i s i n and through the re v e l a t i o n of my being-as-object for the Other that I must be able to apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject. For just as the Other i s a probable object for me-as-subject, so I can discover myself i n the process of becoming a probable object for only a c e r t a i n subject." 1 2 Thus the fundamental r e l a t i o n by which the Other i s discovered i s not object-ness, on Sartre's account; 106 on the contrary, i n the fundamental r e l a t i o n between my conscious-ness and the Other's, the Other i s revealed to me as a subject for whom I am an object. I cannot be an object for an object, but r a -ther only for another subject, and thus Sartre concludes that 'being-seen-by-another* represents an i r r e d u c i b l e fact which can-not be deduced eithe r from the essence of the Other-as-object, or from my being-as-subject. Indeed, the concept of the Other-as-object has meaning only as a r e s u l t of the conversion and degrada-tion of t h i s o r i g i n a l r e l a t i o n . The Other i s thus o r i g i n a l l y the subject who i s revealed to me i n 'that f l i g h t of myself toward objectivation': the Other i s i n pr i n c i p l e the one who looks at me. In order to explicate what being seen means for me, Sartre provides the example of an i n d i v i d u a l looking through a keyhole. He i s alone and on the l e v e l of a non-thetic self-consciousness: "My attitude...has no 'outside'; i t i s a pure process of r e l a t i n g the instrument (the keyhole) to the end to be attained (the spectacle to be seen), a pure mode of l o s i n g myself i n the world." 1^ In other words, I am my acts, I am a pure con-sciousness of things:I am not a p o s i t i o n a l consciousness of myself, and hence there i s no ' s e l f to inhabit my consciousness. However, with the appearance of the Other my s i t u a t i o n i s rad-i c a l l y a ltered: " . . . I hear footsteps i n the h a l l . Someone i s look-ing at me! What does t h i s mean? I t means that I am suddenly affected i n my being and that e s s e n t i a l modifications appear i n my structure-modifications which I can apprehend and f i x conceptually by means of the r e f l e c t i v e cogito." 1^ When we considered the f o r - i t s e l f i n i s o l a t i o n , Sartre notes, we were able to maintain that the unre-f l e c t i v e consciousness cannot be inhabited by a ' s e l f or 'ego'. 107 Instead, the ' s e l f was given i n the form of an object only for the r e f l e c t i v e consciousness. However, here the 'ego' comes to i n -habit the u n r e f l e c t i v e consciousness, due to the Look of the Other: "...the person i s presented to consciousness i n so far as the per-son i s an object for the Other." 1 5 With the Look of the Other, Sartre contends, I am suddenly conscious of myself as escaping my-s e l f and as having my foundation outside myself, i n the Other. Nevertheless, Sartre maintains, I am that 'ego': "I do not re-ject i t as a strange image, but i t i s present to me as a s e l f which I am without knowing i t ; for I discover i t i n shame and, i n other 1 6 instances, i n p r i d e . " Shame, for example, Is shame of my ' s e l f , or my recognition of the fact that I am indeed that object which the Other i s looking at and judging: I am ashamed of what I am. In i t s primary structure shame i s shame before somebody: the Other i s the indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the Other. Thus, Sartre argues, the Other has not only revealed to me what I have been, but he has established me i n a new type of being, i . e . as an object with an 'outside' or 'nature', which can support new q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . In other words, the Other by his very presence, by the pure upsurge of h i s being, i s responsible for the fact that I have t h i s 'outside' or 'nature', although that very nature 'escapes me', since i t i s an a t t r i b u t e of the object which I am for the Other. Further, Sartre states that "My o r i g i n a l f a l l i s the existence of the Other." ^ The Other's Look constitutes the s o l i d i f i c a t i o n and alienation of my own p o s s i b i l i t i e s : " . . . I s t i l l am my p o s s i b i l i t i e s in the mode of non-thetic consciousness (of) these p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 1 8 But at the same time the Look alienates them from me." Indeed, 108 the Other as a Look i s my transcendence transcended: with the Other's Look I become a spatio-temporal object i n the world, and my p o s s i b i l i t i e s are surpassed and organized i n t o a world by the Other. Sartre thus maintains that being-seen i n i t i a l l y constitutes me as a defenseless being for a freedom which i s not my freedom. To be looked at i s to apprehend oneself as the object of the ap-pr a i s a l s and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , of the value judgments of the Other. A judgment i s the transcendental act of a free being, and Sartre asserts that i n t h i s sense we can consider ourselves as 'slaves' i n so f a r as we appear to the Other: "I am a slave to the degree that my being i s dependent at the centre of a freedom which i s not 1 o mine and which i s the very condition of my being." 7 Indeed, i n so far as I am the object of values which come to q u a l i f y me with-out my being able to act on t h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n , i n so far as t h i s object-ness and these evaluations escape me, I am a 'slave'. In general, Sartre maintains that the Other i s the necessary condition of my o b j e c t i v i t y ; the Other i s the being through whom I gain my object-ness: " I f I am able to conceive of even one of my properties i n the objective mode, then the Other i s already given." 2 0 The Other i s given as a pure subject, another freedom, but the Other-as-subject can i n no way be known nor even conceived as such. On the contrary, i t i s only through experiencing myself as an unrevealed object-ness, Sartre contends, that I experience the inapprehensible s u b j e c t i v i t y of the Other: "That subject's presence...is the necessary condition of a l l thought which I would 21 attempt to form concerning myself." Hence, on Sartre's account, I need the Other i n order to f u l l y r e a l i z e a l l of the structures 109 of my being. However, being-for-others i s not an ontological structure of the f o r - i t s e l f : "...(the Other) appears as a being who arises i n an o r i g i n a l r e l a t i o n of being with me and whose i n d u b i t a b i l i t y and fact u a l necessity are those of my own consciousness." 2 2 Being-for-others i s a constant fact of my concrete human r e a l i t y , and Sartre maintains that I grasp i t with i t s f a c t u a l necessity i n every thought which I form concerning myself: the Other i s present to me everywhere as the one through whom I become an object. However, Sartre i n s i s t s that the existence of the Other i s only a f a c t u a l necessity and not an ont o l o g i c a l structure of b e i n g - f o r - i t s e l f : " I t would perhaps not be impossible to conceive of a F o r - i t s e l f which would be wholly free from a l l For-others and which would ex-i s t without even suspecting the p o s s i b i l i t y of being an object." 2^ According to Sartre, my concrete r e l a t i o n s with the Other are. wholly governed by my attitudes with respect to the object which I am for the Other. The Other's existence can motivate either of two opposed a t t i t u d e s : I can turn back upon the Other so as to make an object out of him i n turn, since the Other's object-ness destroys my object-ness for him, or I can seek to possess the Other as freedom. Indeed, i n so far as the Other as freedom i s the foun-dation of my object-ness, my b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f , i f I could recover that freedom and i d e n t i f y myself with i t , I would then be my own foundation. As Sartre puts i t , "To transcend the Other's transcen-dence, or, on the contrary, to incorporate that transcendence with-in me without removing from i t i t s character as transcendence -such are the two p r i m i t i v e attitudes which I assume confronting the Other." 2 Z + i t i s fundamental to recognize, moreover, that everything 1 10 which may be said of me i n my r e l a t i o n s with the Other applies to him as w e l l : we each attempt to either o b j e c t i f y or assimilate one another, and Sartre thus maintains that c o n f l i c t i s the o r i g i n a l meaning of being-for-others. Sartre considers f i r s t the conduct i n which the f o r - i t s e l f t r i e s to assimilate the Other's freedom. Love, he contends, i s the desire to be loved, and t h i s desire to be loved manifests i t s e l f as follows: " . . . I want the Other to found my being as a p r i v i l e g e d object by maintaining himself as pure s u b j e c t i v i t y confronting 25 me." y The Other's freedom i s the foundation of my object-ness, and i n love I want to possess h i s freedom as freedom, to i d e n t i f y myself with i t , and so to recover my own object-ness. I f love could succeed, I would thus be the foundation of my b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f : I would be secure within the Other's consciousness, and my existence would no longer f e e l 'de trop' but rather j u s t i f i e d . Sartre argues, however, that t h i s i s an unrealizable i d e a l : " . . . f o r the a s s i m i l a -t i o n of the f o r - i t s e l f and the Other i n a single transcendence would necessarily involve the disappearance of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ? 6 of otherness i n the Other." The f o r - i t s e l f cannot assimilate the Other's freedom, because the i n t e r n a l negation which makes of the Other an other simply precludes any such union of s u b j e c t i v i t i e s . Love i s thus a f a i l u r e , and I am thrown back on my own respon-s i b i l i t i e s and on my own power to be: "The lovers remain each one for himself i n a t o t a l s u b j e c t i v i t y ; nothing comes to r e l i e v e them of t h e i r duty to make themselves e x i s t each one for himself; no-thing comes to r e l i e v e t h e i r contingency nor to save them from fac-t i c i t y . " 2 7 I t i s easy to see why Sartre feels that a love which seeks to escape from the burden of personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y s l i p s 111 so r e a d i l y i n t o masochism: I w i l l attempt to cause myself to be absorbed by the Other and to l o s e myself i n h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y i n order to e l i m i n a t e my own. However, S a r t r e observes, the masochis-t i c p r o j e c t of becoming only an o b j e c t i s l i k e w i s e doomed to f a i l -ure; the masochist i s an o b j e c t f o r the Other, and t h i s o b j e c t i v i t y i s i n p r i n c i p l e I n a p p r e h e n s i b l e f o r him: "The more he t r i e s to t a s t e h i s o b j e c t i v i t y , the more he w i l l be submerged by the con-sciou s n e s s of h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y - hence h i s anguish." The f a i l u r e of the f i r s t a t t i t u d e toward the Other can be the oc c a s i o n f o r my assuming the second: I may t u r n back upon the Other so as to make an o b j e c t out of him, s i n c e the Other's o b j e c t - n e s s destroys my o b j e c t - n e s s f o r him. S a r t r e notes t h a t I may begin by adopting an a t t i t u d e of i n d i f f e r e n c e to o t h e r s : " I p r a c t i c e then a s o r t of f a c t u a l s o l i p s i s m ; others are those forms which pass by i n 2 9 the s t r e e t . " J However, t h i s a t t i t u d e i s v u l n e r a b l e to the Look of the Other, which at any moment might undermine my ' b l i n d n e s s ' towards him. I might i n s t e a d attempt to get h o l d of the Other's f r e e s u b j e c t i v i t y through h i s o b j e c t i v i t y - f o r - m e : s e x u a l d e s i r e a t -tempts to ensnare the Other's consciousness i n h i s body and thus to possess an embodied s u b j e c t i v i t y . However, S a r t r e argues t h a t d e s i r e w i l l a l s o n e c e s s a r i l y f a i l i n i t s p r o j e c t : " . . . p l e a s u r e i s the death and the f a i l u r e of d e s i r e . I t i s the death of d e s i r e be-cause i t i s not only i t s f u l f i l l m e n t but i t s l i m i t and end." As love may l e a d to masochism, moreover, so one may f a l l from s e x u a l d e s i r e to sadism: the s a d i s t wants to i n c a r n a t e the Other through v i o l e n c e , or to ensnare the Other i n h i s f l e s h by means of p a i n . Once again, however, i t i s the Other's Look which causes the meaning and goal of sadism to c o l l a p s e : "The s a d i s t d i s c o v e r s that 1 12 i t was that freedom which he wished to enslave, and at the same time he r e a l i z e s the f u t i l i t y of h i s e f f o r t s . " ^ The sadist can never possess the Other's freedom as freedom, and at t h i s point, Sartre observes, the only recourse i s to hate the Other. Hate i s described as a wish for the death of the Other, a wish which i s ex-plained by the fact that I want to rediscover a freedom without f a c t u a l l i m i t s : "...that i s , to get r i d of (my) own inapprehensible being-as-object-for-the-Other and to abolish (my) dimension of 32 a l i e n a t i o n . " ^ Yet here too Sartre contends that t h i s project i s f u t i l e , f or even i f a l l others were eliminated, the memory of the Other's Look would remain with me: my being-for-others, by s l i p p i n g into the past, would become an irremediable dimension of myself. I t i s c l e a r , then, that on Sartre's account r e l a t i o n s with others form a c i r c l e of f u t i l i t y . He remarks about hate, for exam-ple, "After the f a i l u r e of t h i s attempt nothing remains for the f o r -i t s e l f except to re-enter the c i r c l e and allow i t s e l f to be indef-i n i t e l y tossed from one to the other of the two fundamental a t t i -tudes." I attempt eithe r to assimilate or eradicate the Other's freedom: each attempt i s the death of the other, the f a i l u r e of one motivates the adoption of the other. Moreover, these r e l a t i o n s are re c i p r o c a l : "While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other i s t r y i n g to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me." Thus, Sar-tre concludes that c o n f l i c t i s indeed the fundamental meaning of being-for-others: "...we s h a l l never place ourselves concretely on a plane of equality; that i s , on the plane where the recognition of the Other's freedom would involve the Other's recognition of our freedom." ^ 113 I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that Sartre's treatment of r e l a t i o n s with others has been widely c r i t i c i z e d , p r i m a r i l y on the grounds that i t appears to be an e n t i r e l y negative p o r t r a i t of our concrete r e l a t i o n s . M. Grene argues, f o r example, that Sartre's discussion of love i s unacceptable: both h i s d e f i n i t i o n of love as the desire to be loved, as w e l l as the arguments following from t h i s d e f i n i t i o n making of love a b a t t l e of s u b j e c t i v i t i e s , she finds inadequate and one-sided. Sartre's d e f i n i t i o n of love, on t h i s account, i s quite a r b i t r a r y ; Grene points to other d e f i n i t i o n s , such as that of A r i s -tophanes as he i s depicted i n Plato's Symposium: "What the lover of Aristophanes* story wants i s not just to be loved but to be made whole again, to become wholly himself i n union with the Other from Xf. whom an unnatural cleavage has divided him." y The idea here i s that we are not, on Grene's account, dealing with two s u b j e c t i v i t i e s attempting to transcend one another's tran-scendence: "...the transcendence of the lover here neither tran-scends nor i s transcended by another but becomes aware of i t s e l f , I.e., becomes i t s e l f , through the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the very freedom of another i n h i s freedom." y i This p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s mutual or rec-i p r o c a l , as Grene sees i t : the two s u b j e c t i v i t i e s share i n and com-plete one another's freedom, rather than threaten one another with o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n and a l i e n a t i o n . In sum, love can be construed as a mutual or r e c i p r o c a l enrichment, i n and through which two subjec-t i v i t i e s 'become wholly themselves i n union with one another'. Sartre would r e j e c t t h i s account for a number of reasons. F i r s t , h i s account of love i s not described i n terms of the attempt to transcend one another's transcendence. Quite the opposite: i t i s the attempt to assimilate the Other's transcendence, to i d e n t i f y 114 myself with the freedom of the Other, which i s the foundation of my object-ness. I t i s t h i s a s s i m i l a t i o n which Sartre argues w i l l i n e v i t a b l y f a i l : a union of consciousnesses, on h i s account, i s simply impossible, and i t i s just such a union which Grene appears to be proposing i n her analysis of love. Her t a l k of union with one another, and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the very freedom of another, must, i n Sartre's view, be regarded as metaphorical exaggeration. There can be no merging of s u b j e c t i v i t i e s , since as Sartre points out, any such i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s precluded i n p r i n c i p l e by that i n t e r n a l negation which makes of the Other a d i s t i n c t s u b j e c t i v i t y . I f Grene wishes to dispute t h i s , then she must challenge Sartre's theory of consciousness, and not simply h i s d e f i n i t i o n of love. However, Sartre's view of being-for-others has also been c r i t -i c i z e d on the grounds that i t renders ethics impossible. Sartre does i n s i s t that c o n f l i c t i s the o r i g i n a l meaning of being-for-others: we each attempt to either o b j e c t i f y or assimilate one anoth-er, to transcend one another's transcendence or to incorporate that transcendence wit h i n ourselves. M. Warnock argues, therefore, that Sartre's account of concrete r e l a t i o n s with others makes ethics quite impossible: " I f e t h i c s . . . i s concerned with the f i t t i n g togeth-er of the i n t e r e s t s and choices of one person with those of another, there i s no way i n t o the subject at a l l i f our aim i s necessarily to dominate the other person and subordinate h i s freedom to our own." ^ 8 Ethics i s ruled out, Warnock concludes, because i t i s im-possible for c o n f l i c t ever to be overcome, since i t i s rooted i n Sartre's very description of being-for-others as such. In order to respond to t h i s c r i t i c i s m , i t i s f i r s t necessary to recognize that Sartre may not be presenting an exhaustive account 115 of human r e l a t i o n s . At the end of h i s discussion of concrete r e l a -tions with others, for example, Sartre observes i n a footnote that "These considerations do not exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of an e t h i c s of d e l i v e r y and s a l v a t i o n . But t h i s can be achieved only a f t e r a r a d i c a l conversion Which we cannot discuss here." ^ A s i m i l a r foot-note at the end of h i s treatment of bad f a i t h , together with Sartre' observations on ethics at the close of Being and Nothingness, strong l y suggest that Sartre acknowledges the p o s s i b i l i t y of p o s i t i v e hu-man r e l a t i o n s , but that he has confined h i s discussion i n Being and Nothingness to only negative concrete r e l a t i o n s . H. Barnes for one believes that "Sartre considered that what he had described r e f e r r e d only to conduct i n bad f a i t h and believed that good f a i t h and p o s i -t i v e human r e l a t i o n s are possible." ^ We should note at the outset, for example, that Sartre's use of the term ' c o n f l i c t ' does not simply r e f l e c t a single meaning, i . e . , overt h o s t i l i t y between i n d i v i d u a l s , but rather several mean-ings. As T.C. Anderson points out, Sartre f i r s t uses the term 'con-f l i c t ' when he i s describing the basic ontological separateness of i n d i v i d u a l s , or the fact that consciousnesses stand i n a r e l a t i o n of ' f r o n t a l opposition' or ' i n t e r n a l negation' to one another. ^ 1 Sartre also uses the term ' c o n f l i c t ' i n the context of h i s descrip-t i o n of the o r i g i n a l manner i n which one subject becomes aware of another subject, namely, by means of his own o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n by that Other. This o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of one subject by another i s character-ized by Sartre as ' a l i e n a t i o n ' and 'enslavement', and since t h i s mutual o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n i s the primal r e l a t i o n between subjects, Sar-tre asserts that c o n f l i c t i s the o r i g i n a l meaning of being-for-others. However, i t can be argued that neither our ontological sep-116 arateness nor our mutual o b R e c t i f i c a t i o n need necessarily imply c o n f l i c t i n the sense of actual h o s t i l i t y . Sartre also makes clear at the outset of h i s treatment of con-crete r e l a t i o n s that he i s dealing with human r e l a t i o n s within the context of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s attempt to be God. As we saw i n chapter two, Sartre maintains that "..the s e l f - a s - b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f i s what human r e a l i t y lacks and what makes i t s meaning." 1 + 2 The s e l f as a su b s t a n t i a l being would combine within i t s e l f the incompatible char-a c t e r i s t i c s of the i n - i t s e l f and the f o r - i t s e l f , v i z . the c o i n c i -dence with i t s e l f or f u l l p o s i t i v i t y of b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f , and the self-surpassing self-awareness which i s consciousness. The project to be God i s thus the project to be a s e l f - i d e n t i c a l plenitude of being who i s also self-conscious or self-aware, Moreover, while Sar-tre describes the f o r - i t s e l f as 'de trop' or r a d i c a l l y contingent, he characterizes God as 'the necessary foundation of h i m s e l f . What human r e a l i t y lacks and thus desires to be, therefore, i s a s e l f -i d e n t i c a l and necessary being, or God, and i n his discussion of concrete r e l a t i o n s Sartre i s considering human r e l a t i o n s p r e c i s e l y within the context of t h i s project to be God. As we have seen, Sartre holds that the Other's existence can motivate e i t h e r of two opposed attitu d e s : I attempt to o b j e c t i f y or else to assimilate the Other. As Anderson argues, i n both of these a t t i t u d e s the subjects involved may be construed as attempting to overcome t h e i r status as contingent, free beings and to achieve the state of a necessary being that would be i t s own foundation. ^ In the case of my attempt to o b j e c t i f y the Other ( i n d i f f e r e n c e , sadism), I endeavour to escape from my own object-ness or the con-tingent, t h i n g - l i k e status which the Other confers on me. Hate, of 11 7 course, takes t h i s a t t i t u d e to i t s extreme i n seeking the o b l i t e r -ation of others e n t i r e l y . In the case of my attempt to assimilate the Other (love, masochism), I want to i d e n t i f y myself with the Oth-er's freedom, which i s the foundation of my object-ness, i n order to become my own foundation. Moreover, i t i s not at a l l s u r p r i s i n g that Sartre deems a l l of these attempts f a i l u r e s : they are a l l r e-f l e c t i o n s or exemplifications of the project to be Goa, and t h i s project i t s e l f represents an impossible goal. I t may thus be argued that i t i s within the context of the God-project that our o n t o l o g i c a l separateness and our mutual o b j e c t i f i -cation give r i s e to c o n f l i c t In the sense of overt h o s t i l i t y between i n d i v i d u a l s . As Anderson puts i t , "The fact that subjects other than me o b j e c t i f y me i s a source of actual h o s t i l i t y because I want to be a being who i s the complete foundation of i t s being." ^ However, i f t h i s project to be God i s set aside, i t would appear that the door i s open for a p o s i t i v e account of concrete r e l a t i o n s . Indeed, when Sartre speaks of a 'ra d i c a l conversion' and an 'ethics of d e l i v -erance and s a l v a t i o n ' , he appears to be r e f e r r i n g to just such an eventuality; namely, that we can cease to value the God-project and, as noted i n chapter two, choose freedom i n i t s place as our primary value. This r e j e c t i o n of God as man's ultimate value can come about only when man sees and accepts the truth concerning the human con-d i t i o n , v i z . that human freedom alone Is the source of a l l values. Recall that Sartre's ethics of 'self-recovery' or authentic ex-istence i s centred around the r e f l e c t i v e consciousness as a moral consciousness, and has as i t s i d e a l the development of the morally autonomous i n d i v i d u a l . Such an i n d i v i d u a l i s i n a pos i t i o n to set 11 8 aside p r e - r e f l e c t i v e values, and s p e c i f i c a l l y the p r e - r e f l e c t i v e adoption of the God-project, i n favour of r e f l e c t i v e values, or values chosen i n l i g h t of a r e f l e c t i v e comprehension of human r e a l -i t y . The "attitude of s t r i c t consistency', a fundamental feature of i n d i v i d u a l a u t h e n t i c i t y , requires the choice of freedom as one's primary value: t h i s choice i s most consistent with the human condi-t i o n and the nature of value, since human freedom alone i s the source of a l l values. Thus, contrary to what Warnock suggests, Sartre's account of concrete r e l a t i o n s with others need not rule out p o s i t i v e i n t e r p e r -sonal r e l a t i o n s , nor indeed e t h i c s . I f we do set aside the project to be God, then we should be able to cease i n our attempts to assim-i l a t e the s u b j e c t i v i t i e s of others, because we w i l l no longer seek to be our own foundation. As Anderson observes, "We w i l l accept the fact that we are o n t o l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t beings. Our r e l a t i o n s , then, w i l l not involve e f f o r t s at a s s i m i l a t i o n or destruction of the Oth-er's s u b j e c t i v i t y with t h e i r ensuing c o n f l i c t , for neither of us w i l l t r y to eradicate, or become the foundation of, the o b j e c t i v i t y the Other confers on us." I f we cease to value the God-project, and choose freedom i n i t s place as our primary value, then i t would indeed seem possible for an 'ethics of deliverance and sal v a t i o n ' to emerge. Instead of c o n f l i c t rooted i n attempts at the o b R e c t i f i c a t i o n or a s s i m i l a t i o n of others, we might mutually support one another's freedom. As we have seen, Sartre does describe, a l b e i t b r i e f l y , what he considers to be man's moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to others: "I am obliged to w i l l the freedom of others at the same time as mine. I cannot make free-dom my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim." 1 + 6 More-119 over, i n Anti-Semite and Jew Sartre writes: Anti-Semitism i s a problem that a f f e c t s us a l l d i r e c t l y . . . i f we do not respect the person of the I s r a e l i t e , who w i l l respect us? I f we are conscious of these dangers...we s h a l l begin to understand that we must f i g h t for the Jew, no more and no l e s s than for ourselves. k7 Sartre argues, then, that i f we want our own freedom and v a l -ues to be respected, we must likewise respect the freedom and v a l -ues of others. The threat of oppression requires that we protect the freedom of a l l people equally: I f any person suffers persecu-t i o n , then I who am p r e c i s e l y h i s equal may also be oppressed. In other words, a l l people share a common human condition, no one's freedom Is i n t r i n s i c a l l y superior to that of anyone else, and hence, Sartre seems to say, I should choose to value everyone's freedom, and not j u s t my own. Indeed, on Sartre's account, i t would be inconsistent to rec-ognize that a l l freedoms have equal status, and then choose to value only my own: my freedom has no p r i v i l e g e d place; i n t r i n s i c a l l y , i t i s no more important than that of anyone else. Moreover, i t would be i n c o n s i s t e n t to apprehend the Other's free s u b j e c t i v i t y (which has been revealed to me through my own o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n ) , and then to t r e a t him as though he were only an object. The ethics of auth-e n t i c i t y requires that I observe the c r i t e r i o n of f i d e l i t y to the truth of the human condition, and thus that I treat the Other as the free subject that he i s , on a par with myself, and hence that I respect h i s freedom and values as much as I do my own. However, while i t may thus be argued that Sartre leaves room for a p o s i t i v e account of concrete r e l a t i o n s with others, i t cannot be denied that i n Being and Nothingness he provides no such account. Sartre states, for example, that I need the Other i n order to r e a l -120 i z e a l l of the structures of my being,^ 8 and that the presence of the Other i s the necessary condition of a l l thought which I might attempt to have concerning myself. ^ Both of these assertions clear l y suggest that the Other can play a p o s i t i v e r o l e for me. However, t h i s l i n e I s not pursued: Sartre discusses my shame before the Oth-er at great length, but then dismisses pride as merely being an ex-tension of fundamental shame. 5 0 instead of allowing for some p o s i -t i v e account of pride, say of the Other's role i n my forming a pos-i t i v e self-image, Sartre presents only a reductive account of pride. The same can unfortunately be said of h i s treatment of love. There i s no h i n t , for example, that we might be able to mutually support one another's freedom, that we might provide p o s i t i v e reinforcement of one another's projects and pursuits; rather, love i s simply r e -duced to a form of that o r i g i n a l c o n f l i c t which characterizes con-crete r e l a t i o n s as such as they are presented i n Being and Nothing-ness. We are therefore l e f t with l i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n of p r e c i s e l y what a p o s i t i v e account of pride or love might amount to, and indeed what form i n general our positve r e l a t i o n s with others might take, given Sartre's ontology. This i s also made clear i n Sartre's treatment of the 'We' i n Being and Nothingness. He notes f i r s t that "...the Us-object pre-c i p i t a t e s us i n t o the world; we experience i t i n shame as a commun-i t y a l i e n a t i o n . " 5 1 The 'Us' here refers to an experience of being objects i n common for some Other or Others. Sartre describes the experience of the Us-object i n terms of the appearance of a t h i r d person. I am engaged i n a c o n f l i c t with the Other, and 'The Third' comes on the scene and embraces both of us with h i s Look: " . . . I sud-denly experience the existence of an objective situation-form i n 121 the world of the Third i n which the Other and I s h a l l figure as equivalent structures i n s o l i d a r i t y with each other." 5 2 This s o l -i d a r i t y , however, i s interpreted by Sartre as a community a l i e n a -t i o n : i t corresponds to an experience of 'humiliation and impotence' with respect to a Third (e.g., the master, the feudal l o r d , the bourgeois, the c a p i t a l i s t ) , and thus hardly provides much hope for a p o s i t i v e account of r e l a t i o n s at the s o c i a l l e v e l , The s i t u a t i o n does not improve when Sartre considers the notion of a community of subjects or a 'We-subject': "...the fact that I am engaged with others i n a common rhythm i s e s p e c i a l l y l i k e l y to lead me to apprehend myself as engaged i n a We-subject." ^ The ex-perience of the We-subject thus arises i f we are working on a com-mon project, for example, or engrossed i n a shared a c t i v i t y . How-ever, Sartre i n s i s t s that such an experience of community i s para-s i t i c on the primal experience of the Other, and i s therefore only a secondary and subordinate experience. In other words, c o n f l i c t i s the o r i g i n a l meaning of being-for-others, and any experience of the We-subject i s only a 'psychological' experience which, as a purely subjective event, i s highly unstable and reveals nothing s i g -n i f i c a n t . Thus, on Sartre's account, while the experience of the Us-object r e f l e c t s 'a dimension of r e a l existence' and corresponds to a simple enrichment of his o r i g i n a l proof of being-for-others, the experience of the We-subject i s , on the contrary, "...a pure psych-o l o g i c a l , subjective event i n a single consciousness but does not appear on the foundation of a concrete ontological r e l a t i o n with others." 5 Z + We know that Sartre rejects the notion that Being-with i s an o n t o l o g i c a l structure of the f o r - i t s e l f , because he thinks 122 that i t i s incompatible with our fundamental on t o l o g i c a l separate-ness. Sartre thus contends that the experience of the 'We' i s only a symbol of 'the longed-for unity of transcendences', and he i n s i s t that " I t i s . . . i n no way a l a t e r a l , r e a l apprehension of s u b j e c t i v i -t i e s as such by a single s u b j e c t i v i t y ; the s u b j e c t i v i t i e s remain out of reach and r a d i c a l l y separated." ^5 0 n h i s a c c o u n t , therefore there can be no 'benign' meeting of s u b j e c t i v i t i e s ; a l l encounters with others are necessarily o b j e c t i f y i n g or, as Sartre puts i t , a l i e n a t i n g . The We-subject thus appears to suffer p r e c i s e l y the same fate as pride and love: Sartre's description confers on i t a secondary and d e r i v a t i v e status, and offers l i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n of how a p o s i -t i v e , constructive community might be r e a l i z e d . The Us-object alone r e f l e c t s a dimension of r e a l existence, and i t i s interpreted by Sartre as a community a l i e n a t i o n . The We-subject i s dismissed as a psychological experience, and with i t , i t would seem, any hope for a p o s i t i v e account of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . We are therefore l e f t with a number of questions. We know that Sartre's ethics of authentic existence requires that we choose freedom, our own and that of ev-eryone, as our fundamental value, but what does t h i s mean for our actual r e l a t i o n s with others? I f the project to be God i s indeed set aside, and we choose freedom i n i t s place as our primary value, precisely what form w i l l our r e l a t i o n s with others take, at the personal as w e l l as the group level? 123 Chapter S i x Some Problems with Relations with Others i n Heid-egger and Sartre In t h i s chapter, c e r t a i n d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the accounts of re-l a t i o n s with others presented by both Heidegger and Sartre w i l l be addressed. Heidegger's Mitsein w i l l be defended against Sartre's c r i t i c i s m s , and i t w i l l be argued that Being-with does provide an on t o l o g i c a l basis for s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , both at the l e v e l of inauth-e n t i c i t y and a u t h e n t i c i t y , i n a variety of modalities. However, i t w i l l also be argued that Heidegger's account of au t h e n t i c i t y remains e s s e n t i a l l y incomplete, because h i s treatment of Dasein's h i s t o r i -c a l l y f a i l s to provide c r i t e r i a by means of which authentic action may be distinguished from sheer a r b i t r a r i n e s s . Sartre's ethics of authentic existence w i l l prove h e l p f u l here, since the choice of freedom as our primary value provides d i r e c t i o n for our decision-making: a u t h e n t i c i t y requires action i n the world which has as i t s aim the enhancement of our concrete freedom. However, i t w i l l also be noted that Sartre s t i l l provides no account of how p o s i t i v e soc-i a l r e l a t i o n s are possible. I t w i l l be suggested that the c e n t r a l d i f f i c u l t y i n Sartre's account i s his i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of my o b j e c t i -f i c a t i o n by the Other with degradation, and that i f o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n i s instead construed n e u t r a l l y , an account of p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s with others, consistent with Sartre's ontology, i s indeed possible. 124 As we have seen, Heidegger, unlike Sartre, does provide an on t o l o g i c a l basis for p o s i t i v e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . On Heidegger's account, Dasein's being-in-the-world i s e s s e n t i a l l y a Mitsein or a Being-with: "The world of Dasein i s a with-world. Being-in i s Being-1 with Others." R e c a l l that Heidegger contends that others are as equiprimordially present to Dasein as equipment i s : indeed, i n our dealing with i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s the presence of others i s discov-ered at the same time because they are also implicated i n these pieces of equipment, as users or as makers. In other words, as soon as Dasein discovers the world, i t has already discovered others who co-exist with i t : as Being-in-the-world, our existence i s already a Being together with others, which i s to be understood as an open-ness to and a sharing i n one world. Sartre c r i t i c i z e s Heidegger's concept of Being-with for prim-a r i l y two reasons. F i r s t , he contends that Heidegger has wrongly passed from empirical examples of communal organizations, such as crews and teams, to a p o s i t i o n claiming that Dasein i s i n i t s Being a member of a community. Sartre asserts that such ' s o l i d a r i t y ' i s not an o n t o l o g i c a l structure of my being-in-the-world: my r e l a t i o n with the Other i s a f r o n t a l opposition and not an 'oblique i n t e r -dependence'. Second, Sartre argues that Heidegger's Mitsein implies an o n t o l o g i c a l 'monism', because i t f a i l s to preserve the o r i g i n a l negation that makes of the Other an other or a s u b j e c t i v i t y which i s not me. The primary f a c t , on Sartre's account, i s the p l u r a l i t y of consciousnesses, and t h i s p l u r a l i t y i s r e a l i z e d i n the form of a 'double, r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n of exclusion'. Moreover, t h i s very negation which makes the Other an other likewise constitutes him as non-essential: Being-with therefore cannot be an ontological 125 structure of the f o r - i t s e l f . S a rtre, as we have seen, contends i n Being and Nothingness that our r e l a t i o n s with others are c o n f l i c t - r i d d e n , meaning that o n t o l o g i c a l l y we are irremediably separated from one another, that our encounters with' one another are necessarily o b j e c t i f y i n g or a l -i e n a t i n g , and that as a consequence i n our concrete r e l a t i o n s we t r y to e i t h e r assimilate or eradicate one another's s u b j e c t i v i t y . As Sartre i n t e r p r e t s him, on the other hand, Heidegger's Mitsein implies that consciousnesses are o n t o l o g i c a l l y united with each oth-er, that we are able to meet on an equal footing such that we mut-u a l l y recognize one another's s u b j e c t i v i t y , and that we are thus able to j o i n t l y form p o s i t i v e communal organizations. Sartre i n s i s t s , on the contrary, that "...we s h a l l never place ourselves concretely on a plane of equality; that i s , on the plane where the recognition of the Other's freedom would involve the Other's recognition of our freedom." Moreover, as we have noted, Sartre dismisses the notion of a We-subject or a community of subjects as being merely a psych-o l o g i c a l experience, and contends instead that only the Us-object, which i n d i c a t e s a community a l i e n a t i o n , genuinely r e f l e c t s our being-for-others. Yet Heidegger's p o s i t i o n need not be interpreted as Sartre i n -terprets i t . I t should be noted, for example, that i n E x i s t e n t i a l -ism and Humanism Sartre l i s t s Heidegger among 'the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s ' and contends, "What they have i n common i s simply the fact that they think existence precedes essence or, i f you wish, that subjec-t i v i t y must be the s t a r t i n g point." 5 However, can Heidegger i n fact be associated with the thesis that ' s u b j e c t i v i t y must be the s t a r t i n g point'? I f s u b j e c t i v i t y i s taken to mean 'a negating con-126 sciousness', as Sartre maintains, then c l e a r l y Heidegger cannot be associated with t h i s t h e s i s , for Sartre himself c r i t i c i z e s Heid-egger p r e c i s e l y because he does not i n t e r p r e t Dasein i n t h i s way. In E x i s t e n t i a l i s m and Humanism, further, Sartre defines 'subjectiv-i t y ' by reference to Descartes: "At one's point of departure there can be only one t r u t h : I think, therefore I am. That i s the point where consciousness a r r i v e s at i t s own absolute t r u t h . 1 ^ Can Heid-egger be associated with t h i s thesis? I t would seem clea r that, again, he cannot be so associated, simply because Heidegger's Dasein i s intended as a primordial un-i t y that i s p r i o r to and the ground of any sort of d i s t i n c t i o n be-tween subject and object. As J.P. F e l l argues, " . . . t h i s o r i g i n a l unity i s an always already 'precedent community of nature'. I t i s a p r e l o g i c a l unity- the p r i o r ground and basis of any l o g i c o -analytico-regressive e f f o r t to factor t h i s unity into l o g i c a l r e l a -t a . " ^ While Sartre r e j e c t s Cartesian substance dualism, i n other words, h i s own d i s t i n c t i o n between the f o r - i t s e l f and the i n - i t s e l f s t i l l represents a s p l i t t i n g of the o r i g i n a l p r e - l o g i c a l unity to-wards which Heidegger's Dasein points. Sartre's theory of conscious ness i s committed to l o g i c : the fundamental r e l a t i o n of conscious-ness to any and a l l of i t s objects i s negation, and thus h i s onto-logy i s committed to a n t i t h e t i c a l modes of being. Heidegger argues instead that a primordial unity i s the ground of, and makes p o s s i b l any f a c t o r i n g of t h i s unity into l o g i c a l r e l a t a , or subjects that are not-objects and objects that are xlot-subjects. Heidegger's Da-sein cannot therefore be properly interpreted as a subject, not even as a non-substantial subject on the order of Sartre's f o r -i t s e l f . 127 On Heidegger's account, as we saw i n chapter four, the basis for the r i s e of the d i s t i n c t i o n s between subject and object i s fac-t i c a l Dasein's f a l l i n g everyday understanding of i t s e l f as an e n t i -ty among other i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s . F e l l argues, for example, that "...the subject-object d i s t i n c t i o n i s an e x i s t e n t i e l l - o n t i c modifi-cation of the Dasein-world r e l a t i o n i n which a s e l e c t i v e and p a r t i a l ' d i s c l o s i n g ' ( t r u t h ) has l e f t 'dissimulated' the p r i o r oncological unity i n such a way that e n t i t i e s including Dasein i t s e l f are a r t i -culated, expressed i n language, and made present as simple present e n t i t i e s . " ^ The i n d i v i d u a l ' s fascination with h i s ontic present i s thus a f o r g e t t i n g of the primordial ontological unity which Heide-gger's Dasein represents. This p r i o r u n i f i e d ground i s forgettable p r e c i s e l y because i t i s 'no-thing': i t i s 'ontologically d i f f e r e n t ' from e n t i t i e s , and i s only subsequently revealed, on Heidegger's account, by means of the state-of-mind of Angst. Thus, while Sartre wants to i n s i s t that the 'primary f a c t ' i s the p l u r a l i t y of consciousnesses, Heidegger argues instead that Dasein i s the primordial unity which makes possible a p l u r a l i t y of subjects, and that Mitsein i s an e s s e n t i a l structure of Dasein which makes possible r e l a t i o n s between these subjects. However, Heid-egger's entire treatment of authentic existence makes clear that his ontology allows for an i r r e d u c i b l e p l u r a l i t y of d i s t i n c t i n d i v -iduals. He maintains throughout Being and Time that 'Dasein i s i n each case mine': Dasein renders possible a p l u r a l i t y of unique i n -dividuals. R e c a l l that to become authentic i s to become what one already i s , but with s p e c i f i c awareness of one's e s s e n t i a l struc-ture; and what one already i s i s a unique i n d i v i d u a l . One already i s t h i s i n d i v i d u a l , on Heidegger's account, but one i s , i n average 128 everydayness, submerged i n the 'they'. Resolute a n t i c i p a t i o n of death (occasioned by Angst) i s the necessary precondition for auth-e n t i c i t y , p r e c i s e l y because i t wrests me from the 'they' and i n -d i v i d u a l i z e s me down to myself, leaving me free for my own d i s t i n c -t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of existence. Being-with, for Heidegger, i s indeed an e s s e n t i a l structure of Dasein. As G. Steiner notes, "The ' I ' i s never alone i n i t s exper-ience of Dasein. When 'others' are met with, i t i s not the case that 'one's subject i s proximally present-at-hand'. We encounter others 'from out of the world' i n which 'concernfully circumspective Dasein 7 e s s e n t i a l l y dwells'." The meeting with others i s thus not a con-tingent, a n c i l l a r y a t t r i b u t e of Heidegger's Dasein. Rather, i t i s an e s s e n t i a l , i n t e g r a l element i n the r e c i p r o c a l r e a l i z a t i o n s of Dasein and of world. The world into which our Dasein i s thrown a l -ready has others i n i t : the world's 'worldhood' i s such that the existence of others i s absolutely e s s e n t i a l to i t s f a c t i c i t y , or to i t s 'being there' at a l l . Moreover, as we have seen, on Heidegger's account the determinant way i n which we come up against others i s 'at work' i n the world. Hence, Steiner observes that "Here there are genuine points of accord between Heidegger and the Marxist model of the p r i m a r i l y s o c i a l and c o l l a b o r a t i v e l y functional character of the process of human in d i v i d u a t i o n . " Further, Sartre i n t e r p r e t s Heidegger's Mitsein as though i t r e f l e c t s a fundamental s o l i d a r i t y between i n d i v i d u a l s . This i s not necessarily the case, however, since Dasein as such (and hence also Mitsein as such) i s a neutral structure. Being-with i s to be under-stood i n terms of an openness to and a sharing i n one world, and i t i s on the basis of t h i s common possession of one world that a 129 community can be constituted according to the various modalities of Being-with. These modalities i n fact range from love to hatred, on Heidegger's account, and from s o l i d a r i t y to i n d i f f e r e n c e . Thus for Heidegger Being-with does not imply that we l i v e i n a state of harmony with others, but rather only that man from the f i r s t mom-ent of h i s existence l i v e s as a c e r t a i n openness to the world or to that meaningful, value-laden complex i n which others are already implicated, and i t i s t h i s openness which renders possible the var-ious types of Being-with. In general, then, Mitsein merely discloses that others e x i s t with us, that our world i s a with-world, but i t says nothing about the q u a l i t y or character of our community with others. Moreover, we have seen that, as an e s s e n t i a l structure of Da-sein, Being-with characterizes both inauthentic and authentic ex-istence. In i t s inauthentic mode, Dasein assumes the character of 'being-lost i n the publicness of the they'. In order to take respon-s i b i l i t y for himself, the p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l must become an auth-entic s e l f : he must 'find h i m s e l f and take hold of himself 'in h i s own way', and so wrest himself from everydayness and the 'they'. Yet, as we have argued, t h i s does not imply an irremediable i s o l a -t i o n of Dasein from the world or from others. Dasein may be either Inauthentically or a u t h e n t i c a l l y disclosed to i t s e l f as regards i t s own Being, but i n neither case i s i t divorced from the world or from others. In f a c t , on Heidegger's account, authentic Being-one's-Self "...brings the S e l f r i g h t into i t s current concernful Being-along-side what i s ready-to-hand, and pushes i t into s o l i c i t o u s Being v/ith Others." ^ Thus, Heidegger's Mitsein does indeed provide an ontolog-i c a l basis for s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , both for inauthentic and authentic 130 existence, i n a v a r i e t y of modalities, both negative and p o s i t i v e . However, we w i l l consider l a t e r whether Heidegger's Being-with i s compatible with Sartre's theory of consciousness. At t h i s point, i t i s necessary to rais e those questions l e f t unanswered at the close of chapter four. There i t was decided that a u t h e n t i c i t y should be seen as a way of l i f e for man that re-f l e c t s genuine e x i s t e n t i a l - o n t o l o g i c a l understandings As an authen-t i c s e l f , man understands that he i s not a being among other i n t r a -worldly beings, but rather that he i s the 'ground' of such beings: there are beings only i n so far as beings come to pass through the three temporal ecstases which constitute Dasein or man's Being. As an authentic s e l f , man understands h i s temporal structure as one i n which the past, present and future are i n t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d , such that what i s now experienced ( i n the present) i s interpreted i n the l i g h t cast by a p r i o r (or past) future-oriented projection. F i n a l l y , as noted above, as an authentic s e l f , man's Being i s s t i l l Being-In-the-world, the world of Dasein i s a with-world; thus, as an authen-t i c s e l f , man i s neither divorced from the world nor i s o l a t e d from others, but rather continues to share a common world with others. However, while Heidegger c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e s authenticity i n Being and Time as an * e x i s t e n t i e l l modification of the they', r a -ther than something which 'float s above' f a l l i n g everydayness, he has thus f a r l e f t l a r g e l y unexplained prec i s e l y what i s involved i n such a modification. On the one hand, we can say that authenticity involves envisaging the actual i n i t s 'relation to the possible ( r a -ther than as simply a c t u a l ) , or placing the actual i n the context of Dasein's temporality. On the other hand, we know that when he exists i n a u t h e n t i c a l l y , man submits to 'the dictatorship of the 131 they', or subordinates himself to an established way of l i f e . Auth-entic existence demands instead that man choose himself and h i s own place: i f he i s to l i v e a u t h e n t i c a l l y , man must choose himself con-c r e t e l y , i n the world and with others. However, such choice does require guiding c r i t e r i a i f authentic action i s not to deteriorate into sheer a r b i t r a r i n e s s . How, then, i s authentic action possible? On what ba s i s , given Heidegger's ontology, may we choose our place i n the world and with others, and so l i v e authentically? Heidegger's treatment of Dasein's ' h i s t o r i c a l i t y ' attempts to answer these questions. H i s t o r i c a l i t y i s defined by Heidegger as a 'more concrete working out' of Dasein's temporality. 1 0 As noted e a r l i e r , resolute a n t i c i p a t i o n of death i s the necessary precondi-tion f o r authentic existence: i t wrenches Dasein from everydayness and the 'they', i t i n d i v i d u a l i z e s Dasein down to i t s e l f , and i t thus leaves Dasein free for i t s own authentic p o s s i b i l i t i e s of existence. Is the i n d i v i d u a l free, then, to choose a r b i t r a r i l y ? Can one choose anything whatever? Heidegger t e l l s us, on the contrary, that the p a r t i c u l a r Dasein draws i t s authentic p o s s i b i l i t i e s of existence from i t s own 1thrownness'. As thrown, f a c t i c a l Dasein i s submitted to a world of e n t i t i e s and e x i s t s with others, and for the most part i t i s l o s t i n the 'they': i t understands i t s e l f i n terms of those p o s s i b i l i t i e s which ' c i r c u l a t e ' i n the average, public way of i n -terpreting Dasein 'today'. An authentic understanding, however, does not somehow e x t r i c a t e the i n d i v i d u a l from these p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; r a -ther, " . . . i t i s i n terms of t h i s interpretation...that any p o s s i b i l -11 i t y one has chosen i s seized upon i n one's re s o l u t i o n * " I t i s i n t h i s sense, then, that authenticity i s not a 'novel state' but rather i s an e x i s t e n t i e l l modification of the 'they': 132 "The resoluteness i n which Dasein comes back to i t s e l f , discloses current f a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of authentic e x i s t i n g , and discloses them i n terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, 1 2 takes over." The authentic i n d i v i d u a l r e s o l u t e l y assumes h i s own thrownness: current p o s s i b i l i t i e s of authentic e x i s t i n g are d i s -closed In terms of t h i s heritage which he takes over, and the auth-entic i n d i v i d u a l thus hands down to himself the p o s s i b i l i t i e s which have come down to him. On t h i s account, the more au t h e n t i c a l l y the i n d i v i d u a l resolves, or the less ambiguously one understands one-s e l f , i n r e l a t i o n to death, i n terms of one's own d i s t i n c t i v e poss-i b i l i t y of authentic e x i s t i n g , the more unequivocally does the i n -divdual f i n d and choose t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . As Heidegger puts i t , "Once one has grasped the f i n i t u d e of one's existence, i t snatches one back from the endless m u l t i p l i c i t y of p o s s i b i l i t i e s which o f f e r themselves as closest to one- those of comfortableness, s h i r k i n g , and taking things l i g h t l y - and brings Dasein i n t o the s i m p l i c i t y of i t s fate." ^ In other words, the less ambiguously an i n d i v i d u a l understands himself i n r e l a t i o n to death, the l e s s does he merely accidentally choose the d i s t i n c t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y of h i s existence. The more an i n d i v i d u a l i s authentic, or the more resolute a n t i c i p a t i o n of death discloses his s p e c i f i c goal, the more i s he brought into his own fate. 'Fate' i s Heidegg-er's term for a d i s t i n c t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y which Dasein has i n h e r i t e d , and yet also chosen. Dasein must f i r s t choose authenticity: i t can choose to win i t s e l f or to lose i t s e l f " i n the 'they', but I t s spec-i f i c fate i s defined i n terms of i t s own thrownness, or that h e r i -tage which i t hands down to i t s e l f . Note though that ' f a t e f u l Dasein', l i k e a l l Dasein, i s essen-1 3 3 t i a l l y i n a world together with others: " . . . f a t e f u l Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, e x i s t s e s s e n t i a l l y i n Being-with Others, (and) i t s h i s t o r i c i z i n g i s a c o - h i s t o r i c i z i n g and i s determinative for i t as destiny." 1^ Destiny i s thus for Heidegger the h i s t o r i c i z i n g of a people, and the fate of the i n d i v i d u a l Dasein i s i n e x t r i c a b l y l i n k e d with the destiny of i t s h i s t o r i c a l community: "Our fates have already been guided i n advance, i n our Being with one another i n the same world and i n our resoluteness for d e f i n i t e p o s s i b i l i -1 5 t i e s . " v Hence, on Heidegger's account, i t i s Dasein's " f a t e f u l destiny' i n and with i t s own 'generation' which goes to make up the f u l l authentic h i s t o r i c i z i n g of Dasein. When man thus r e s o l u t e l y takes over his own thrownness, i n the world and with others, Heidegger c a l l s i t the 'r e p e t i t i o n ' of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of existence that have come down to Dasein: "Repeat-ing i s handing down e x p l i c i t l y , or going back into the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the Dasein that has-been-there." ^ In Heidegger's terms, the authentic r e p e t i t i o n of a p o s s i b i l i t y of existence that has been i s 'the p o s s i b i l i t y that Dasein may choose i t s hero'. This p o s s i b i l -i t y i s grounded e x i s t e n t i a l l y i n anticipatory resoluteness: " . . . f o r i t i s i n resoluteness that one f i r s t chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of l o y a l l y following i n the footsteps of 1 7 that which can be repeated." In other words, i t i s i n anticipatory resoluteness that f a c t i -cal Dasein f i r s t chooses to win i t s e l f , which then leaves i t free for i t s authentic p o s s i b i l i t i e s of existence. These are not 'free-f l o a t i n g ' , however; they are a function of Dasein's thrownness, i n the world and with others. My own 'fate' i s thus chosen, i n resolute anticipation, and i n h e r i t e d , by means of my destiny i n and with my 134 h i s t o r i c a l community. Indeed, the more profound the resoluteness, Heidegger appears to say, the more c l e a r l y w i l l my s p e c i f i c fate be distinguished from amongst the range of authentic p o s s i b i l i t i e s of existence i n my current s i t u a t i o n , enabling me to 'choose my hero'. Heidegger c a l l s authentic action ' r e p e t i t i o n ' , since i t com-prises choosing a hero from one's past or thrownness, who functions as an exemplar of a p a r t i c u l a r s t y l e of l i f e , and ' l o y a l l y follow-ing i n the footsteps of that which can be repeated'. However, r e p e t i t i o n should not be thought of as a mechanical reenactment of what has been, on Heidegger's account, but rather as a response which does not forsake the present and the future for the past: "The repeating of that which i s possible does not bring again something that i s 'past', nor does i t bind the 'Present' back •j Q to that which has already been outstripped." Instead, there ex-i s t s a r e l a t i o n s h i p of r e c i p r o c a l implication between the past and the future: the future i s the f u l f i l l m e n t of the having been; i t presupposes the past but, at the same time, t h i s past cannot mani-fest i t s e l f unless there i s a future. F i n a l l y , the present s i t u a -tion i s a 'product' of the future and the having been: i n authentic making-present, the i n d i v i d u a l ' s current s i t u a t i o n i s revealed by means of a future projection of his own d i s t i n c t i v e p o t e n t i a l i t y -for-Being, and i n the l i g h t of his own past as a member of a spec-i f i c h i s t o r i c a l community. Thus on Heidegger's account, f a c t i c a l Dasein hands down to i t -self i t s own past ( p r i o r projection) as the basis of i t s making-present of the future: my past i s both the p o s s i b i l i z i n g source and also the l i m i t i n g p a r t i c u l a r i t y of my present and future. As J.P. F e l l observes, authentic r e p e t i t i o n therefore means f i r s t l y "...that 135 the present act reaffirms and reappropriates i t s past as the very p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r present. ( I t ) also means that every present repeats the same e s s e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n ; every s i t u a t i o n w i l l always be an a c t u a l i z a t i o n of the selfsame e x i s t e n t i a l i a . " 1 9 In acting, I am indeed- reaffirming as co n s t i t u t i v e of me my community or the heritage of i n h e r i t e d meanings that are repeated i n present actions as the source and ground of these present actions* However, while we are thus subject to a common destiny, Heidegger does not envisage the present as a necessary consequence of the past. Rather, the past provides a s p e c i f i c range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s which may be actualized, as F e l l makes clear i n the following example taken from Heidegger's own l i f e : The German p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and economic past o f f e r s Heidegger the choice of affirming or r e j e c t i n g the National S o c i a l i s t program, given the fact that Heidegger owns up to his i n e v i t -able p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the making of history as an inherently h i s t o r i c a l being. The c a l l of con-science requires a decision on the basis of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s offered, and Heidegger chooses hi s 'hero'. 2 0 This example unfortunately i l l u s t r a t e s some of the ce n t r a l d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n Heidegger's account of authentic action. According to Heidegger, the e x i s t e n t i a l - o n t o l o g i c a l structure of our world does not change, and thus every present necessarily re-peats the same e s s e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n , defined by the e x i s t e n t i a l i a . However, every present i s also subject to i n d i v i d u a l and communal decision, since i t i s not a necessary r e s u l t of the past, but r a -ther the past always provides a f i e l d -of p o s s i b i l i t i e s for possible a c t u a l i z a t i o n . The past survives as the ground of future ^approp-ria t i o n s of i t , but the future meaning of the inhe r i t e d r e f e r e n t i a l t o t a l i t y that constitutes our world i s always modifiable by i n d i v -136 i d u a l and group decision. The problem, of course, concerns the d i r e c t i o n of t h i s modification, and the c r i t e r i a for choosing one's hero, or as F e l l puts i t , the fundamental danger i s that our world w i l l appear as " . . . a r b i t r a r i l y f i l l a b l e with anything whatsoever." 2 1 Mark B l i t z argues, for example, that Heidegger's use of the term 'community' i s unclear. On the one hand, there are r e l a t i v e l y narrow p o l i t i c a l communities, but on the other hand there are more universal r e l i g i o u s , s c i e n t i f i c and a r t i s t i c communities. Heidegger maintains that my p o s s i b i l i t i e s are presented i n terms of our com-munal destiny, but given the range of communities noted here, i t remains unclear which destiny i s supposed to guide my i n d i v i d u a l fate. As B l i t z observes, "The implied inclusiveness of 'destiny' at any time hides the e x c l u s i v i t y or contradictory nature of t r a d i -t i o n a l l y presented p o s s i b i l i t i e s at any time. This obfuscates both the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of- and the clash among- possible ways of l i f e 2 2 or guiding p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n general." I t seems evident that choices must be made from amongst a range of possible ways of l i f e , and Heidegger provides no c r i t e r i a i n terms of which the i n d i v i d u a l may make such decisions. As K. Harries sees i t , Heidegger does indeed recognize the need for an authority or measure which w i l l allow man to escape from a r b i t r a r i n e s s , and he sees such an authority i n the past. Authentic as opposed to a r b i t r a r y action i s r e p e t i t i o n , rooted i n the past, and Heidegger asserts that "...the sole authority which a free ex-2 3 i s t i n g can have...(is) the r e p e a t a b l e - p o s s i b i l i t i e s of existence." However, as we have seen, the inherited past i s not as such author-i t a t i v e : the i n d i v i d u a l must choose h i s hero. As Harries notes, then, "The past event becomes one which should be repeated only when 137 i t i s recognized to be worthy of repetition...There must be some-thing about the present i n d i v i d u a l and his s i t u a t i o n which allows him to recognize i n the precursor's stance the measure of h i s own."2if Heidegger himself does not elaborate: how pr e c i s e l y do we choose our hero? on what ground or grounds i s the decision made? Heidegger im-p l i e s i n Being and Time that the choice of a hero i s not a r b i t r a r y or u n j u s t i f i e d , but he provides no account of i t s i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , and hence h i s analysis of authenticity remains e s s e n t i a l l y incom-plete. A comparison between Heidegger's description of choosing a hero and Sartre's account of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s choice of a fundamental project might prove h e l p f u l at t h i s point. In Being and Nothingness Sartre proposes e x i s t e n t i a l psychoanalysis as a method by means of which the i n d i v i d u a l can become aware of his fundamental choice of himself i n the world: "...we w i l l discover the i n d i v i d u a l person i n 25 the i n i t i a l project which constitutes him." v O r i g i n a l l y , as we saw i n chapter two, man i s indeed the being whose project i s to be God, but Sartre maintains that t h i s project i s p a r t i c u l a r i z e d i n each case i n terms of the actual s i t u a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l . The orientation of e x i s t e n t i a l psychoanalysis i s thus empirical and i t s method i s comparative: "...by a comparison of the various emp-i r i c a l drives of the subject...we t r y to discover and disengage the 26 fundamental project v/hich i s common to them a l l . " Now, while Heidegger seems to say that resolute a n t i c i p a t i o n of death discloses my d i s t i n c t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y of existence to me, or reveals i t to me as my fate, Sartre on the contrary indicates that I choose my fundamental project. However, two d i s t i n c t kinds of 'choice' must here be distinguished. My o r i g i n a l choice of my-138 s e l f i n the world i s a non-thetic choice, and i t i s characterized by Sartre as absurd or u n j u s t i f i e d . 2 7 A l l of my I n d i v i d u a l ' l i v e d ' values derive t h e i r meaning from t h i s o r i g i n a l projection of myself which stands as my non-thetic choice of myself i n the world. Exis-t e n t i a l psychoanalysis, then, i s designed to enable the i n d i v i d u a l to become aware of t h i s non-thetic choice by e f f e c t i n g a t r a n s i t i o n from the u n r e f l e c t i v e plane of immediacy, or the plane of impure r e f l e c t i o n (bad f a i t h ) , to the l e v e l of pure r e f l e c t i o n , by means of which the 'true being of consciousness' i s recovered and known: "...the E r l e b n i s reflected-on i s posited i n i t s nature as lack, and ? R value i s disengaged as the out-of-reach meaning of what i s lacked." Note, then, that on Sartre's account my o r i g i n a l non-thetic choice of myself i n the world i s 'absurd'. Sartre's second kind of choice i s the notion of choice as voluntary d e l i b e r a t i o n . Voluntary d e l i b e r a t i o n i s a 'deception' at the l e v e l of non-thetic choice, because such choice i s 'prior to l o g i c ' and p r i n c i p l e s of decision-making. However, at the r e f l e c t i v e l e v e l , p a r t i c u l a r choices can be j u s t i f i e d by reference to the fundamental project and the framework of meanings i t provides. As P. Morris observes, "Voluntary d e l i b e r -ation can c e r t a i n l y take place within t h i s framework, since on t h i s 29 l e v e l a decision has been made about what w i l l count as a reason." Thus, on Sartre's account, by means of pure r e f l e c t i o n I am i n a position to evaluate my i n d i v i d u a l ' l i v e d ' values, to question them, modify them, a f f i r m or deny them. I t i s here, then, that the t r a n s i t i o n from i n a u t h e n t i c i t y to authenticity may be effected. While Sartre does contend that man i s the being whose fundamental project i s to be God, he also suggests that we need not value the God-project: we may r e f l e c t i v e l y appre-139 hend the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of the synthesis of the f o r - i t s e l f and the i n - i t s e l f , turn our back upon t h i s value, and choose freedom i n i t s place as our primary value. As we have seen, Sartre implies i n Being and Nothingness that the r e j e c t i o n of God as man's ultimate value can only come about-when man sees and accepts the truth concerning the human condition; namely, that human freedom alone i s the source of a l l value. Indeed, the'attitude of s t r i c t consistency', which i s a fundamental feature of Sartre's concept of au t h e n t i c i t y , r e-quires the choice of freedom as one's primary value: the choice of freedom i s most consistent with the nature of the human condition and the nature of value, since freedom i s entailed i n a l l values as t h e i r source, and hence the choice of any and a l l values e n t a i l s the p r i o r valuing of freedom. Thus, while Heidegger's description of choosing a hero f a i l s to d i s t i n g u i s h authentic action from a r b i t r a r i n e s s , because i t f a i l s to o f f e r us any c r i t e r i a which v/ould enable us to make a reasoned judgment, Sartre's account of freedom as our fundamental project does indeed provide us with d i r e c t i o n for our decision-making. I t i s true that the choice of freedom as my primary goal i s u n j u s t i f i e d i n an absolute sense: the fact that freedom i s the source of value simply precludes such j u s t i f i c a t i o n . However, while Heidegger's notion of choosing a hero remains e s s e n t i a l l y incomplete as i t stands, Sartre's treatment of freedom as our primary value i s re-vealed as a choice, as the choice, consistent with ontology. More-over, because freedom e x i s t s only i n r e l a t i o n to a s i t u a t i o n , v a l -uing freedom involves not only the r e f l e c t i v e apprehension of our condition, but also action i n the world which has as i t s aim the enhancement of our concrete freedom. 140 Sartre's ethics of authentic existence thus requires of man that he recognize h i s freedom, that he accept the fact that he i s the source of values and cannot abrogate t h i s fundamental responsi-b i l i t y , and that he s t r i v e to act accordingly. This means, then, that man should endeavour to modify his s i t u a t i o n i n the world so as to remove r e s t r i c t i o n s to h i s freedom of choice. Repressive soc-i a l or p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s or systems would thus be i n t o l e r a b l e , or as Sartre observes more s p e c i f i c a l l y , what counts i n each case i s 'the p a r t i c u l a r form of the obstacle to surmount, of the resistance to overcome': that i s what gives form to freedom i n each circumstance. Thus Sartre's account of freedom as our fundamental project does i n -deed render authentic, as opposed to a r b i t r a r y , action possible: authentic action i s action that takes freedom-enhancement as i t s goal. Moreover, Sartre wishes to maintain that i f I take freedom as my fundamental goal, I must take that of others to be equally my goal. We have presented a number of Sartre's reasons for holding this p o s i t i o n , but we have not yet considered h i s account of the interdependence of our freedoms. In E x i s t e n t i a l i s m and Humanism, Sartre explains: "...freedom as the d e f i n i t i o n of man does not de-pend upon others, but as soon as there i s engagement I am obliged to w i l l the freedom of others at the same time as mine." ^° In a concrete s i t u a t i o n , then, I cannot be free i f others who share t h i s s i t u a t i o n with me are not also free. Thus, i f I take freedom as my primary value, I must also take the freedom of others to be my goal: I must s t r i v e to increase the freedom of a l l , Sartre seems to say, i f I am to be able to maximize my own freedom, since my freedom i s in e x t r i c a b l y l i n k e d with theirs i n our shared s i t u a t i o n . 141 T . C . Anderson objects here that i n some s i t u a t i o n s , i t could be the case that I can most e f f e c t i v e l y increase my own freedom by forcing others i n t o my service: "To compel others to serve me would not appear to be inconsistent with an admission of the interdepen-dency of our freedoms." 3 1 In order to defuse t h i s c r i t i c i s m , we must r e c a l l Sartre's account of the 'equality' of a l l freedoms. In chapter f i v e , we noted that a l l people share a common human condi-t i o n , no one's freedom i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y superior to that of anyone else, and hence, Sartre argues, I should choose to value everyone's freedom, and not just my own. Anderson i s correct when he says that to compel others to serve me i s not inconsistent with an admission of the interdependency of our freedoms; however, i t i s inconsistent with an admission of the equality of a l l freedoms. I t i s inc o n s i s -tent to recognize that a l l freedoms have equal status, and then choose to value only my own, since my freedom has no p r i v i l e g e d place: i n t r i n s i c a l l y , i t i s no more important than that of anyone else. Further, i t would be inconsistent, on Sartre's view, to appre-hend the Other's free s u b j e c t i v i t y (which has been revealed to me through my own o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n ) and then to treat him as though he were only an object. To compel others to serve me would thus be con-trary to the ethics of authenticity p_er se, which requires that I observe the c r i t e r i o n of consistency with the truth of the human condition, and hence that I treat the Other as the free subject that he I s , on a par with myself. Moreover,'Sartre maintains that our freedoms are interdependent i n a further sense: r e c a l l that I need 32 the Other i n order to r e a l i z e a l l the structures of my being, y and that the presence of the Other i s the necessary condition of a l l 142 thought which I would attempt to form concerning myself. 5 3 I f the Other i s indispensable to any knowledge I can have of myself, then i n terms of my freedom, i f others f a i l to recognize me as a free s u b j e c t i v i t y , I w i l l not r e f l e c t i v e l y recognize myself as a free s u b j e c t i v i t y . In t h i s sense, then, Sartre maintains that our free-doms are indeed i n e x t r i c a b l y interdependent. Simone de Beauvoir provides a further argument which serves to complement that of Sartre. De Beauvoir presupposes that man seeks meaning and j u s t i f i c a t i o n for h i s existence, and she argues that what follows i s a t o t a l interdependence between men, because "Man can f i n d a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of h i s existence only i n the existence of other men." De Beauvoir accepts Sartre's claim that man w i l l not know that he i s free unless others recognize him as being free. S i m i l a r l y , she argues, we want a l l men to value our existence, to find i t meaningful and j u s t i f i e d , so that we may likewise value i t . Since i t i s the Other's freedom that i s the source of h i s valuation of me, de Beauvoir concludes, I must value his freedom i f i t s v a l -uation of me i s to be s i g n i f i c a n t to me. Further, we want our l i v e s to be valued by those whose opinions we value, namely, our equals or peers, not our slaves, and hence, on de Beauvoir's account, I am also obliged to promote the freedom of others. However, Sartre has s t i l l provided no account of how p o s i t i v e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are possible at a l l , given his p o r t r a i t of con-f l i c t as the o r i g i n a l meaning of being-for-others. While Heidegger's Mitsein provides an o n t o l o g i c a l basis 'for both negative and posi-tive r e l a t i o n s with others, Sartre's treatment of being-for-others i s fleshed out only i n terms of negative, destructive concrete re-latio n s . R e c a l l from chapter f i v e that Sartre's use of the term 1 4 3 • c o n f l i c t ' r e f l e c t s three meanings: that we are o n t o l o g i c a l l y d i s -t i n c t beings; that our encounters with others are necessarily ob-j e c t i f y i n g or a l i e n a t i n g ; and f i n a l l y that we are, as a consequence of the foregoing, engaged i n h o s t i l e concrete r e l a t i o n s with others. I t was suggested, further, that i f we set aside the project to be God and choose freedom instead as our primary value, our actual so-c i a l r e l a t i o n s need not be h o s t i l e : neither our on t o l o g i c a l separ-ateness nor our mutual o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n need necessarily imply con-f l i c t i n the sense of overt h o s t i l i t y . I f the project to be God i s relinquished, i n other words, then perhaps the door i s open for a p o s i t i v e , constructive account of concrete r e l a t i o n s . Suppose that we do set aside the God-project: say that we cease i n our attempts to eliminate our o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n by others, and rather simply accept that o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n as a part of our human r e a l i t y . S i m i l a r l y , we w i l l be i n a posit i o n to cease i n our at-tempts to assimilate the s u b j e c t i v i t i e s of others, because we w i l l no longer seek to be our own foundation. However, there i s yet a fundamental d i f f i c u l t y here. A r e f l e c t i v e comprehension of the na-ture of human r e a l i t y can indeed r e s u l t i n the r e l i n q u i s h i n g of the project to be God, and i n our acceptance of our basic ontolog-i c a l separateness. S t i l l , since Sartre i n s i s t s that a l l of our en-counters with others are necessarily o b j e c t i f y i n g , and i n Being and Nothingness he appears to equate o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n with a l i e n a -t i o n , i t i s very d i f f i c u l t to see how or why we would 'simply ac-cept that o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n ' as a part-of our human r e a l i t y . I f the Other i n e v i t a b l y o b j e c t i f i e s me, and i f t h i s o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n amounts to an a l i e n a t i o n of my own p o s s i b i l i t i e s , as Sartre maintains, then i t would seem more l i k e l y that I would indeed attempt to eradicate rather than simply accept the o b j e c t i v i t y which the Other confers on me. C l e a r l y , what stands i n the way of a p o s i t i v e , constructive version of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s i s Sartre's treatment of our encounters with others as both necessarily o b j e c t i f y i n g and a l i e n a t i n g . Indeed, i t can be argued that Sartre's examples of my encounters with others i n Being and Nothingness are seriously misleading because of t h e i r excessively negative connotations. Consider, for instance, Sartre's description of my shame before the Other's Look when I am caught peering through a keyhole. This i s intended to i l l u s t r a t e my being-for-others as such, or my encounter with another subject by means of my o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n and alienation by that Other. However, as A. Danto observes, " . . . t h i s would be a true philosophical character-i z a t i o n , i f i t i s true at a l l , whatever act I were observed to per-form: helping a c h i l d , saving a drowning man, b a t t l i n g to save the c i t y - or, l a r g e l y neutral acts a l l , eating plums, reading Le Monde, 35 walking the dog." In other words, Sartre's philosophical characterization of my being-for-others takes on a misleadingly negative colo r a t i o n , due to the examples he uses to i l l u s t r a t e i t . M. Grene notes, s i m i l a r l y , that Sartre bases h i s analysis of human rela t i o n s on highly a r t i -f i c i a l examples, such as when he claims that my fundamental r e l a t i o n to the Other i s revealed i n the moment at which, s i t t i n g i n a park, I observe a stranger who may at any moment look at me. The Other i s thus revealed to me as a subject for whom I am an object, and as Grene observes, "An i n d i v i d u a l confronts another; but both are abstracted by the public nature of the place from the personal set-ting i n which each of them l i v e s his l i f e . So i t i s not the two as 145 l i v i n g human beings who face each other but the facsimiles of hum-anity who are, i n Heidegger's phrase, together i n the 'one' (the 'they')." 3 6 Thus, on the one hand, Sartre's examples of my o r i g i n a l encounter with the Other employ i n d i v i d u a l s who are i s o l a t e d stran-gers, rather than i n d i v i d u a l s who are involved i n some form of or-ganic human r e l a t i o n s h i p , such as members of a loving family. On the other hand, Sartre's choice of examples used to i l l u s t r a t e my o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n by the Other, such as my shameful behaviour looking through a keyhole, renders his account of my being-for-others as such u n j u s t i f i a b l y negative. Thus, whereas Heidegger states that his Mitsein i s a neutral structure, or that which makes possible diverse modalities, both negative and p o s i t i v e , of re l a t i o n s with others, Sartre's account of being-for-others i s representative of only negative, destructive concrete r e l a t i o n s , because our encounters with others are deemed necessarily o b j e c t i f y i n g , and o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n i s equated v/ith a l i e n -ation or degradation. As Anderson observes, "In one sense of the term, a l l knowledge of another subject o b j e c t i f i e s i t - where by ob-j e c t i f y we mean 'take as an object of knowledge'. But Sartre means much more than t h i s . For him, to ob j e c t i f y a subject i s to grasp him as a thing and not as a free subject transcending h i s f a c t i c i -ty." ^ There i s c l e a r l y an i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t i n Sartre's thought here. How can we meet the demand of the ethic of authenticity that one support the freedom of others, given Sartre's excessively nega-tive account of interpersonal r e l a t i o n s as necessarily i n v o l v i n g o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , a l i e n a t i o n or degradation? Does not the l a t t e r make the r e a l i z a t i o n of the former impossible? These questions w i l l be addressed at length i n the following chapters. At present we may 146 merely note that Sartre r e l i e s on h i s analysis of various exper-iences to make h i s case regarding interpersonal r e l a t i o n s , but since he generally chooses to explore only negative experiences, his conclusion appears to be begged from the outset. Indeed, given an analysis of more p o s i t i v e experiences between i n d i v i d u a l s , i t can be argued both that non-reifying encounters with others are possible, and that o b R e c t i f i c a t i o n i t s e l f should be construed i n a neutral manner, instead of being equated with a l i e n a t i o n or degrad-ation. However, a p a i r of questions remain: what sorts of r e l a t i o n s between persons w i l l Sartre's theory of consciousness tolerate? i s Heidegger's M i t s e i n compatible with Sartre's theory of conscious-ness? I t i s c l e a r Sartre rules out at least one thing, and that i s a merging of consciousnesses. Consider Sartre's description of Ro-quentin's encounter with the root of a chesnut tree i n Nausea: " I was the root of the chesnut tree. Or rather I was e n t i r e l y conscious of i t s existence. S t i l l detached from i t - since I was e n t i r e l y con-scious of i t - yet l o s t i n i t , nothing but i t . " ^ 8 Sartre thus main-tains that, contrary to what some forms of mysticism suggest, there can be no fusion of consciousness with the world, because such a fusion would s i g n i f y 'the s o l i d i f i c a t i o n of the f o r - i t s e l f i n the i n - i t s e l f , whereas the f o r - i t s e l f exists as the negation of the i n - i t s e l f . S i m i l a r l y , then, there can be no merging of conscious-nesses, and any account of r e l a t i o n s with others, i f i t i s to be consistent with Sartre's theory, must respect the o r i g i n a l negation that makes of the Other an other or a s u b j e c t i v i t y which i s not me. Heidegger himself does not speak i n terms of a theory of con-sciousness as negation, but his notion of Mitsein does not appear 147 to be incompatible with Sartre's theory, i n as much as i t does not imply a union of s u b j e c t i v i t i e s . Sartre i n s i s t s on the p l u r a l i t y of consciousnesses, and Heidegger likewise recognizes that Dasein i s i n each case e s s e n t i a l l y i t s own p o s s i b i l i t y . Indeed, i f Dasein i s interpreted as that which makes i n d i v i d u a l selves possible, and i f Mitsein i s in t e r p r e t e d as that which renders r e l a t i o n s between i n -dividuals p o s s i b l e , then c l e a r l y Heidegger's concept of Being-with need not imply that i n d i v i d u a l selves are i n some sense united with one another. On the contrary, i t can be argued that Heidegger's on-tology recognizes an i r r e d u c i b l e p l u r a l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s , who have the e s s e n t i a l capacity to stand i n r e l a t i o n to one another. Thus, i f Heidegger's Mi t s e i n i s construed as a neutral structure which makes possible a l l modalities of Being-with others, i t appears to be e n t i r e l y compatible with Sartre's theory of consciousness. Rather than presenting incompatible accounts of our r e l a t i o n s with others, i t would seem that Heidegger and Sartre are addressing di f f e r e n t l e v e l s of concern. Recall that Heidegger's Dasein repre-sents that primordial unity which precedes and makes possible any subsequent f a c t o r i n g of t h i s unity into l o g i c a l r e l a t a , such as Sartre's f o r - i t s e l f and i n - i t s e l f . Sartre's f o r - i t s e l f and i n -i t s e l f , i n other words, represent a s p l i t t i n g of the o r i g i n a l pre-l o g i c a l unity towards which Heidegger's Dasein points. One might thus conclude that the truth to which Heidegger refers i s p r i o r to the truth to which Sartre r e f e r s : the two are not incompatible, providing i t i s recognized that they tfccur at d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s , and that the former grounds the l a t t e r . For example, Heidegger's Mitsein i s an o n t o l o g i c a l structure which represents Dasein's e s s e n t i a l cap-acity to stand i n r e l a t i o n to others, while Sartre's treatment of 148 c o n f l i c t as being-for-others addresses my actual encounter with the Other at the f a c t u a l l e v e l . I t i s t h i s encounter which Sartre char-acterizes as fundamentally r e i f y i n g : my object-ness for the Other discloses h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y to me. I t i s worth noting here that Sar-tre himself c r i t i c i z e s Heidegger on his choice of examples i n Being and Time, and accuses him of wrongly moving from empirical instances of p o s i t i v e communal organizations, such as crews and teams, to the claim that Dasein i s i n i t s being a member of a supportive commun-i t y . However, i f we r e c a l l Sartre's own use of examples i n Being and Nothingness, then surely h i s p o s i t i o n i s vulnerable to p r e c i s e l y the same l i n e of c r i t i c i s m : Sartre's choice of examples, such as my shameful behaviour looking through a keyhole, renders h i s account of my being-for-others as such u n j u s t i f i a b l y negative. Moreover, we have noted that while Sartre f a i l s to provide any account of pos i -ti v e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , Heidegger's Mitsein i s i n fact a neutral structure which succeeds i n providing an ontological basis for d i -verse modalities of r e l a t i o n s with others. I t may thus be argued that Sartre's treatment of c o n f l i c t as the o r i g i n a l meaning of being-for-others actually represents one concrete modality of Heidegger's Mitsein, the other basic modality being p o s i t i v e , constructive r e l a t i o n s between i n d i v i d u a l s . This brings us back to our f i r s t question; namely, exactly what sorts of relations with others w i l l Sartre's theory of consciousness t o l e r -ate? We w i l l explore t h i s issue at length i n the chapters to follow, f i r s t by means of an examination of Sartre's theory of group r e l a -tions as i t i s presented i n the Critique of D i a l e c t i c a l Reason, and f i n a l l y by means of a comparison with the d i a l o g i c a l philosophy of Martin Buber. 149 Chapter Seven Sartre's Theory of Groups I t w i l l be argued i n t h i s chapter that Sartre's theory of groups i n C r i t i q u e of D i a l e c t i c a l Reason does provide an account of how p o s i t i v e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are p o s s i b l e , and thus renders i n t e l l -i g i b l e that aspect of h i s concept of authentic existence which r e -quires of us common ac t i o n on behalf of the freedom of a l l . By h i s -t o r i c i z i n g c o n f l i c t , by explaining i t i n terms of the contingent f a c t of s c a r c i t y , Sartre now acknowledges the p o s s i b i l i t y that co-operation may replace combativeness i n a future s o c i e t y of ma t e r i a l abundance. Further, h i s theory of groups also allows f o r cooperative act i o n i n the present: the Looking/Looked-at dyads of Being and Nothingness, composed of subjects o b j e c t i f y i n g or being o b j e c t i f i e d by other subjects, are replaced i n C r i t i q u e of D i a l e c t i c a l Reason by groups of i n d i v i d u a l s united by a shared s i t u a t i o n and common goals. S p e c i f i c a l l y , Sartre's concept of the mediating Third pro-vides a bas i s f o r p r a c t i c a l union and common e f f o r t i n the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l world, or authentic a c t i o n by 'common i n d i v i d u a l s ' having as i t s aim the enhancement of t h e i r concrete freedom. What h i s theory of groups l a c k s , as we s h a l l see, i s an ontology of r e l a t i o n s , and with i t s emphasis on common action for shared goals, i t f a i l s to accomodate the dimension of personal human r e l a t i o n s , or phenomena such as f r i e n d s h i p and love. 1 5 0 As we saw i n chapter f i v e , Sartre argues i n Being and Nothing-ness that c o n f l i c t i s the o r i g i n a l meaning of being-for-others. He analyses my being-for-others i n terms of the concept of the Other's Look: the Other i s another s u b j e c t i v i t y who o b j e c t i f i e s me and i s thus the foundation of my object-ness or my b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f . As we saw, Sartre maintains i n Being and Nothingness that the Other's ex-istence can motivate eith e r of two opposed a t t i t u d e s : I can attempt to destroy my object-ness for him by making an object out of him i n turn (hate, sadism), or else I can attempt to assimilate h i s subjec-t i v i t y so as to recover my own object-ness and thus become my own foundation (love, masochism). Both of these attempts Sartre i d e n t i -f i e s as f a i l u r e s , our concrete r e l a t i o n s with others thus being a c i r c l e i n which the f o r - i t s e l f i s i n d e f i n i t e l y tossed from one to the other of the two fundamental a t t i t u d e s . Indeed, Sartre i n s i s t s that "...we s h a l l never place ourselves concretely on a plane of equality; that i s , on the plane where the recognition of the Other's freedom would involve the Other's recognition of our freedom." 1 I t was suggested i n chapter f i v e , however, that Sartre's ac-count of r e l a t i o n s with others, as described above, i s not and was not intended to be an exhaustive one. Rather, Sartre's discussion takes place w i t h i n the context of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s project to be God. I f t h i s project to be God may be set aside, as Sartre's ethics of authentic existence suggests, then i t can be argued that an ac-count of p o s i t i v e , constructive r e l a t i o n s with others might indeed be formulated w i t h i n the parameters o-f Sartre's ontology. R e c a l l that i t i s w i t h i n the context of the project to be God that our on-t o l o g i c a l separateness and our mutual o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n give r i s e to c o n f l i c t i n the sense of overt h o s t i l i t y between i n d i v i d u a l s . I f 151 t h i s project i s set aside, and we accept the fact that we are on-t o l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t beings, then our concrete r e l a t i o n s need not involve e f f o r t s at the a s s i m i l a t i o n or destruction of the Other's s u b j e c t i v i t y with t h e i r ensuing c o n f l i c t , since neither of us w i l l any longer t r y to eradicate, or become the foundation of, the objec-t i v i t y which the Other confers on us. Yet as we saw i n chapters f i v e and s i x , a fundamental problem remains. Sartre's ethics advocates the choice of freedom as our p r i -mary value, and as we have noted, Sartre maintains i n E x i s t e n t i a l i s m and Humanism that I am obliged to w i l l the freedom of others at the same time as mine: "I cannot make freedom my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim." A l l people share a common human condi-t i o n , no one's freedom i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y superior to that of anyone els e , and hence i t would be inconsistent to choose to value only my own freedom. The ethics of authenticity requires that I observe the c r i t e r i o n of consistency with the truth of the human condition, and thus that I trea t the Other as the free subject that he i s , on a par with myself, and hence that I respect h i s freedom and values as much as I do my own. However, the fact remains that Sartre has thus far provided no account of how p o s i t i v e , constructive r e l a t i o n s with others are a c t u a l l y possible. We have been given only the Looking/ Looked-at dyad as the model for human r e l a t i o n s , subjects o b j e c t i -fying or being o b j e c t i f i e d by other subjects, where my o b j e c t i f i c a -tion by the Other i s equated with my degradation or the a l i e n a t i o n of my own p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I f the s o l i d a r i t y suggested above, with each of us acting for the freedom of a l l , i s to be rendered i n t e l l -i g i b l e , therefore, a new or s u b s t a n t i a l l y revised model of human rel a t i o n s i s required. Sartre offers such a model i n the Crit i q u e 152 of D i a l e c t i c a l Reason. R e c a l l , f i r s t , Sartre's treatment of the 'Us' and the 'We" i n Being and Nothingness: "...the Us-object p r e c i p i t a t e s us i n t o the world; we experience i t i n shame as a community a l i e n a t i o n . " ^ The 'Us* here r e f e r s to an experience of being objects i n common for some Other, and Sartre describes the experience of the Us-object i n terms of the appearance of a t h i r d party. I am engaged i n a c o n f l i c t with the Other, and 'the Third' comes on the scene and embraces both of us with h i s Look: " . . . I suddenly experience the existence of an objective situation-form i n the world of the Third i n which the Oth-er and I s h a l l figure as equivalent structures i n s o l i d a r i t y with each other." ^ This s o l i d a r i t y , however, i s interpreted by Sartre as a community a l i e n a t i o n : i t corresponds to an experience of hum-i l i a t i o n and impotence with respect to a Third (e.g., the master, feudal l o r d , bourgeois, c a p i t a l i s t ) , and thus hardly provides much hope for a p o s i t i v e account of r e l a t i o n s at the group l e v e l . The s i t u a t i o n does not improve when Sartre considers the notion of a community of subjects or a 'We-subject': "...the fact that I am engaged with others i n a common rhythm i s e s p e c i a l l y l i k e l y to lead me to apprehend myself as engaged i n a We-subject." y The ex-perience of the We-subject thus arises i f we are working on a com-mon project, for example, or engaged i n a shared a c t i v i t y . However, Sartre i n s i s t s that such an experience of community i s p a r a s i t i c on the primal experience of the Other, and i s therefore only a secon-dary and subordinate experience. In other words, c o n f l i c t i s the or-i g i n a l meaning of being-for-others, and any experience of the We-subject i s only a 'psychological' experience which, as a purely sub-jective event, i s highly unstable and reveals nothing s i g n i f i c a n t . 153 Thus, on S a r t r e ' s account, w h i l e the experience of the Us-object r e f l e c t s a 'dimension of r e a l e x i s t e n c e ' and corresponds to a simple enrichment of h i s o r i g i n a l proof of b e i n g - f o r - o t h e r s , the experience of the We-subject i s , on the c o n t r a r y , "...a pure p s y c h o l o g i c a l , s u b j e c t i v e event i n a s i n g l e consciousness; i t corresponds to an i n -ner m o d i f i c a t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r e of consciousness but does not ap-pear on the f o u n d a t i o n of a concrete o n t o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n w i t h o t h -e r s . " 6 In the C r i t i q u e , however, S a r t r e ' s p o s i t i o n i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e v i s e d . The c l a i m of Being and Nothingness, t h a t the b a s i c r e l a t i o n among human beings i s not the M i t s e i n but r a t h e r c o n f l i c t , i s con-t e x t u a l i z e d h i s t o r i c a l l y i n the C r i t i q u e . Basic i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a -t i o n s are now c h a r a c t e r i z e d by S a r t r e as p o s i t i v e or n e g a t i v e , co-o p e r a t i v e or combative, depending on 'previous circumstances and the m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s which determine the p r a c t i c a l f i e l d , ' I t i s s c a r c i t y which renders us competitors and which q u a l i f i e s human h i s -t o r y g e n e r a l l y as a s t r u g g l e f o r l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s . However, by h i s -t o r i c i z i n g c o n f l i c t i n t h i s manner, S a r t r e now acknowledges the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t c o o p e r a t i o n may r e p l a c e combativeness i n a f u t u r e s o c i e t y o f m a t e r i a l abundance. F u r t h e r , f o r those who are s c e p t i c a l about the p o s s i b i l i t y of e l i m i n a t i n g s c a r c i t y , S a r t r e ' s theory of groups i n the C r i t i q u e a l s o a l l o w s f o r cooperative a c t i o n i n the present: the Looking/Looked-at dyads composed of s u b j e c t s o b j e c t i -f y i n g or b e i n g o b j e c t i f i e d by other s u b j e c t s are r e p l a c e d by groups of i n d i v i d u a l s u n i t e d by a shared s i t u a t i o n and common g o a l s . Where-as i n Being and Nothingness the We-subject i s dismissed as a p u r e l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l phenomenon and the Us-object i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d as the product of an a l i e n a t i n g T h i r d , i n the C r i t i q u e S a r t r e i n t r o d u c e s 154 the concept of the mediating Third which, as we s h a l l see, provides a basis f o r p r a c t i c a l union and common e f f o r t i n the e x i s t i n g soc-i a l world. In order to appreciate Sartre's theory of groups, i t i s f i r s t necessary to e x p l i c a t e a number of the c e n t r a l theses and notions explored i n the C r i t i q u e . D i a l e c t i c a l reason i t s e l f , f o r S a r t r e , i s based on the r e c o g n i t i o n of contradictions and transcending synthe-ses. Unlike a n a l y t i c reason, which u t i l i s e s abstract concepts i n i t s a n a l y s i s of a 'detemporalized' r e a l i t y , d i a l e c t i c a l reason employs the 'notion' which Sartre characterizes as a synthetic e f f o r t to produce an i d e a which develops by 'contradictions and successive overcomings', and which i s thus 'homogeneous with the development of things'. D i a l e c t i c a l reason i s thus both a process of objects i n the world and the movement of our knowledge of them. As H. Barnes puts i t , " D i a l e c t i c a l Eeason i s a r e l a t i o n between Being and Knowing. I t i s the only appropriate approach by which human beings, who are-i n d i v i d u a l l y and c o l l e c t i v e l y - a perpetual process of self-making by means of t o t a l i z a t i o n , can hope to understand themselves and 7 t h e i r h i s t o r y and to plan f o r t h e i r future." D i a l e c t i c a l reason i s , fundamentally, the continuing process of ' t o t a l i z a t i o n ' , which Sartre characterizes as a p r a c t i c a l synthesiz-ing a c t i v i t y which transforms a m u l t i p l i c i t y of parts i n t o an emerg-ing -whole, which serves as the goal of the ongoing a c t i v i t y . The group i n the process of forming i s , Sartre says, the most simple form of t o t a l i z a t i o n ; l i k e the f o r - i t s e l f i n Being and Nothingness, the group ' i s not' but rather ' i t constantly t o t a l i z e s i t s e l f . T o t a l i z i n g praxis i n the C r i t i q u e thus takes the place of temporal-i z i n g consciousness i n Being and Nothingness. T o t a l i z a t i o n i s temp-155 9 r e a l i z a t i o n : i t advances i n a s p i r a l movement, with the past con-tinuously r e i n t e r p r e t e d i n the l i g h t of the future as an intended but unrealized t o t a l i t y . 'Praxis' i s purposive human a c t i v i t y i n i t s material environment: i t i s the unifying and reorganizing transcen-dence of e x i s t i n g circumstances toward the p r a c t i c a l f i e l d . 1 0 This transcendence i s d i a l e c t i c a l : i t i s simultaneously negation, conser-vation and s p i r a l i n g advance. Thus, the n i h i l a t i n g dynamic of con-sciousness from Being and Nothingness 'materializes' into organic praxis i n the C r i t i q u e , where the i n i t i a l negation i s lack, and need emerges as the corresponding negation of t h i s negation. However, since these negations occur within an ultimately t o t a l i z i n g context, thi s double negation constitutes a d i a l e c t i c a l a f f i r m a t i o n , Sartre argues, or a p r a c t i c a l , synthetic integration of the elements as parts. In the C r i t i q u e , Sartre maintains that by his praxis man un i -f i e s the material world around him and maintains t h i s unity, and matter, through the unity i t receives from man, serves to unite men i n i t i a l l y i n 'simple human r e l a t i o n s ' . Men, Sartre thus says, are 'mediated' by things to the same extent as things are 'mediated' by men. 1 1 The 'p r a c t i c o - i n e r t ' i s "...simply the a c t i v i t y of others 1 2 in so f a r as i t i s sustained and diverted by inorganic i n e r t i a . " In the case of p r a c t i c o - i n e r t mediation, then, i t i s never 'raw nature' but nature as modified by p r i o r praxis which i s the mediat-ing f a c t o r . The p r a c t i c o - i n e r t constitutes for Sartre 'fundamental s o c i a l i t y ' , or as T. Flynn puts i t , " A l l s o c i a l forms to the extent that they are s o c i a l have a basis i n the p r a c t i c o - i n e r t , that i s , i n the r e l a t i o n s among agents mediated by such 'worked matter' as nat-ural languages, r i t u a l s of exchange, or physical a r t i f a c t s . " 1 3 156 On Sartre's account, " . . . i t i s at the p r a c t i c o - i n e r t l e v e l that s o c i a l i t y i s produced i n men by things as a bond on m a t e r i a l i t y which transcends and a l t e r s simple human r e l a t i o n s . " 1 4 He terms the p r a c t i c o - i n e r t ensemble 'the c o l l e c t i v e ' , the thing which pro-duces i t he c a l l s 'the c o l l e c t i v e object', and the human r e l a t i o n s altered thereby he terms ' s e r i a l r e l a t i o n s ' . Sartre offers as an ex-ample a queue of people at a bus stop. In t h i s case, the c o l l e c t i v e object i s the bus, which sustains i n the people a ce r t a i n unity: they share a common purpose, namely, transportaion by t h i s bus. Yet Sartre maintains that t h i s commonality i s a c t u a l l y f a l s e , since s c a r c i t y of places on the bus renders each person i n the queue a r i v a l of every other. As I . Craib observes, s c a r c i t y eats away at basic s o c i a l i t y : "Scarcity defines a group of men i n terms of the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r co-existence and i t defines each member of the group as possibly an excess member; i t divides the group by de-fi n i n g each member as Other than the Others." 1^ Thus the bus queue i s for Sartre paradigmatic of s e r i a l r e l a -tions among i n d i v i d u a l s who are both united and separated by a c o l -l e c t i v e object: "A se r i e s i s a mode of being for i n d i v i d u a l s both i n r e l a t i o n to one another and i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i r common being, and t h i s mode of being transforms a l l t h e i r structures." 1 6 This transformation i n d i c a t e s , i n Sartre's view, that p r a c t i c o - i n e r t med-i a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s both the basic form of s o c i a l i t y and also the i n i t i a l source of personal and s o c i a l a l i e n a t i o n . For example, the very s e r i a l order of the bus queue i s the sign of the numerical equivalence of I t s members, and such 'otherness' or ' a l t e r i t y ' i s on Sartre's account the e s s e n t i a l feature of pr a c t i c o - i n e r t media-tion. The notion of a l t e r i t y includes among i t s aspects 'unity i n 157 e x t e r i o r i t y ' or the false commonality noted above, pseudoreciprocity among the members of the s e r i e s , t h e i r numerical equivalence and in t e r c h a n g e a b i l i t y , t h e i r separation and p a s s i v i t y i n the face of the c o l l e c t i v e object, and f i n a l l y t h e i r s o c i a l impotence. On Sar-tre's account, then, interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p s mediated by the p r a c t i c o - i n e r t are fundamentally a l i e n a t i n g : t h i s i s the moment of the ' a n t i - d i a l e c t i c ' , or the combination and a l i e n a t i o n of the free praxis of i n d i v i d u a l s by the 'passive action' of worked matter. Note that for Sartre there are three forms of praxis: i n d i v i d -u a l , c o n s t i t u t i n g p r a x i s , common praxis (of the constituted group), and s e r i a l p r axis* S e r i a l praxis grounds 'passive action', which i s i t s e l f non-originative: passive action i s , i n Sartre's view, a de-formation of praxis because of p r a c t i c o - i n e r t mediation. The basic motive for forming groups, then, i s to l i b e r a t e s e r i a l i z e d praxes from the a l i e n a t i n g mediation of the pr a c t i c o - i n e r t (supplanting i t , as we s h a l l see, by the mediation of the praxes themselves). Since Sartre equates s e r i a l i t y with unfreedom (passive a c t i o n ) , he contends that the appearance of the group can be considered 'the 1 7 sudden re s u r r e c t i o n of freedom', ' and he defines the group as f o l -lows: "...the group i s not a metaphysical r e a l i t y , but a d e f i n i t e 1 8 p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n of men to an objective and to each other." The group-in-fusion, on Sartre's account, arises through the spontaneity of i n d i v i d u a l praxes. I t i s formed on the basis of com-mon needs and common dangers, and i s defined by i t s common praxis. The f i r s t mediation involved i n the formation of the group i s ef-fected by the non-member: the series i s t o t a l i z e d as a group by an outside agent. Most often, Sartre says, i t i s a h o s t i l e agent, and he offers as an example the r i s i n g of the people of Paris against 158 the r o y a l troops on the occasion of the storming of the B a s t i l l e . 1 9 Given t h i s outside mediation, Sartre proceeds to describe the i n -t e r i o r transformation of structures which takes place through the a c t i v i t y of the members of the s e r i e s . Each member i s released from h i s s e r i a l i t y and becomes co-sovereign as the organizer of a common pr a x i s . Sartre c a l l s t h i s c o n s t i t u t i v e action the ' i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n of m u l t i p l i c i t y ' : each member acts as 'the Third*, able to t o t a l i z e the s e r i e s through h i s free praxis. The notion of 'the same' i s c e n t r a l to Sartre's account. As T.C. Anderson notes, "Although the members of a group are and r e -main d i s t i n c t i n d i v i d u a l s , they are not separate as i s o l a t e d atoms or as members of an i n e r t s e r i e s . They are u n i f i e d i n performing 20 common actions f o r common goals." Each member of the group thus perceives h i s fellow group members as undertaking actions that are the same as each other's and the same as his own. As Sartre puts i t , "Through the mediation of the group, he (my fellow member) i s n e i t h -er the Other nor i d e n t i c a l ( i d e n t i c a l with me): but he comes to the 21 group as I do; he i s the same as me." Since each i n d i v i d u a l i n the group i s the Third i n r e l a t i o n to a l l the others, each 'actual-i z e s ' the unity of the others, and i s also himself u n i f i e d i n t o the group by every other group member acting as the Third. The r e l a t i o n s h i p of quasi-transcendence/immanence i s thus the foundation of the group-in-fusion: as a Third I t o t a l i z e the group, and each Third t o t a l i z e s me into the group. I am a quasi-subject i n r e l a t i o n to those u n i f i e d , who are my quasi-object. The group unity a c t u a l i z e d by a given t h i r d party cannot include that t h i r d party: he i s quasi-transcendent i n r e l a t i o n to the group, and must be u n i f i e d i n t o i t or be made quasi-immanent by other t h i r d p a r t i e s . 1 5 9 These overlapping i n t e r n a l u n i f i c a t i o n s , on Sartre's account, con-s t i t u t e the very unity of the group: group members never constitute the s u b s t a n t i a l u n i t y or ont o l o g i c a l oneness of a 'hypreorganism•, but rather t h e i r u n i t y remains a p r a c t i c a l one of common pra x i s . The group, from the o n t o l o g i c a l standpoint, i s hence a revolving set of praxes, each r e c i p r o c a l l y related to the others by means of the praxis of anyone, treated as 'the same', i n a project that i s i n t e r i o r i z e d as 'ours', a single act with a p l u r a l subject. Note that what has emerged i s r e c i p r o c i t y mediated by pra x i s , and thus the group-in-fusion e x h i b i t s Sartre's fourfold condition f o r genuine reciprocity:' R e c i p r o c i t y i m p l i e s , f i r s t , that the Other i s a means to the extent that I myself am a means, that i s to say, that the Other i s the means of a transcendent end and not mx means; second, that I recognize the Other as praxis, that i s to say, as a developing t o t a l i z a t i o n , at the same time as in t e g r a t i n g him as an object Into my t o t a l i z i n g project; t h i r d , that I recognize h i s movement towards his own ends i n the same movement by which I project myself towards mine; and fourth, that I discover myself as an object and instrument of h i s ends through the same act which constitutes him an objective i n s t r u -ment of my ends. 22 What Sartre terms the 'pledged group' also exhibits t h i s four-fol d c o n d ition f o r r e c i p r o c i t y . R e c a l l that the group-in-fusion forms i n the face of an external threat perceived as common. The passing of that threat occasions the advent of a new danger: namely, the possible collapse of the group-in-fusion, with i t s hard-won freedom, back i n t o s e r i a l impotence. In order to avoid t h i s danger and to achieve a c e r t a i n s t a b i l i t y , Sartre maintains, the members of the group introduce the pledge as a form of 'self-imposed i n e r -t i a ' : "The group becomes the common objective i n everyone: i t s perm-anence must be secured." 2 3 Only by the pledge does each group mem-160 ber r e f l e c t i v e l y and d e l i b e r a t e l y give his free consent to the group r e l a t i o n s h i p , and only by the pledge does he agree to maintain h i s praxis as common, as the same i n each and a l l . Thus, i n contrast to the group-in-fusion, which arises through the p r e r e f l e c t i v e spontaneity of i n d i v i d u a l praxes, the advent of the pledge marks the group's stage of r e f l e c t i v e self-awareness. As Sartre puts i t , " I t i s through the pledge that the group posits i t -s e l f for i t s e l f . " 2 i f He also i n s i s t s that "The pledge i s not a sub-j e c t i v e or merely verbal determination: i t i s a r e a l modification of the group by my regulatory action." 2 ^ This r e a l modification i s described as the creation of a new e n t i t y , 'man as a common i n d i v i -dual': "...adopted i n e r t i a , function, power, r i g h t s and duties, structure, violence and f r a t e r n i t y - (the group member) actualizes 26 a l l these r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s as h i s new being, h i s s o c i a l i t y . " Following the creative act of the pledge, we are thus 'our own sons, our common cr e a t i o n ' , and i t i s t h i s creation which Sartre designates 27 'the o r i g i n of humanity'. On Sartre's account, however, the pledged group tends to deter-io r a t e i n t o the i n s t i t u t i o n . Recall that the group i s a constantly detotalized t o t a l i t y , or a constant movement towards a completed t o t a l i t y v i a the a c t i v i t y of i t s members as mediating Thirds. On Sartre's view, the i n a b i l i t y to achieve an ontological unity i s ex-perienced within the group as a permanent danger of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , which even the pledge cannot ultimately assuage. The desire i s to eliminate the moment of transcendence -in the member's r e l a t i o n s h i p to the group, and the long term response i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n , characterized by a reintroduction into interpersonal r e l a t i o n s of s e r i a l otherness, with i t s attendant s o c i a l impotence. Indeed, the 161 b i r t h of the i n s t i t u t i o n out of the group represents f o r Sartre 'the systematic self-domestication of man by man'28: "...there i s only one freedom for a l l the members of the ( i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d ) group: that of the sovereign." 2 9 This nonreciprocal sovereignity of the leader of the i n s t i t u t i o n i s what Sartre means by 'authority', and on h i s account i t goes hand i n hand with the c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d praxis into 'bureaucracy'. I t has been argued, on a number of grounds, that Sartre's ac-count of groups i n the Critique i s incompatible with h i s treatment of the f o r - i t s e l f i n Being and Nothingness. R e c a l l that i n Being and Nothingness Sartre i n s i s t s that i n d i v i d u a l consciousnesses s h a l l never place themselves on a plane of equality, 'on the plane where the recognition of the Other's freedom would involve the Other's recognition of our freedom'. Instead, r e l a t i o n s with others are ex-p l i c a t e d i n terms of c o n f l i c t , and the experience of the We-subject, as for example occasioned by p a r t i c i p a t i o n on a rowing team, i s d i s -missed as an unstable and i n s i g n i f i c a n t psychological event. Yet, as Flynn observes, t h i s account of the We-subject i s defective for several reasons: " . . . i t f a i l s to explain that mutuality of r e l a -tions that l a t e r a l awareness reveals. I t i s not s o l e l y my awareness of the others' rowing that constitutes our rhythm. I t i s also our mutual accomodation to a common goal, the shared desire for 'the team' to win, not to mention such s o c i a l facts as the regatta and i t s attendant r u l e s , functionaries, statuses, and rewards." 3 0 111 of these f a c t o r s , on other words, mediate c o l l e c t i v e i d e n t i t y and common action, but Sartre's treatment of the We-subject f a i l s to adequately address t h e i r r o l e . I t would appear, indeed, that no concatenation of i n d i v i d u a l s , 162 as Sartre describes them, could ever y i e l d a s o c i a l whole. As we have seen, i n Being and Nothingness the major source of s o c i a l co-hesion i s i d e n t i f i e d as the Look of the (alie n a t i n g ) Third. Sartre's discussion of the Us-object i s merely an extension of h i s treatment of my being-for-others, or the s e l f versus Other r e l a t i o n s h i p that obtains between any two i n d i v i d u a l consciousnesses. The so - c a l l e d unity of the Us-object i s purely e x t r i n s i c , imposed by the Look of the ( a l i e n a t i n g ) Third, and the only difference between the Other and t h i s would-be s o c i a l Third i s the p l u r a l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s which the l a t t e r o b j e c t i f i e s , a mere difference of degree. Thus, i t would seem that the ' s o c i a l space' which Sartre's theory posits i n Being and Nothingness i s not r e a l l y s o c i a l at a l l ; as Flynn notes, "Sartre has i n e f f e c t excluded co-operation i n the l i t e r a l sense of the term and hence the mutuality ( r e c i p r o c i t y ) r e q u i s i t e for properly s o c i a l 31 r e l a t i o n s . " y Yet i t must also be recognized that the c o l l e c t i v e dimension does receive some representation i n Being and Nothingness. As noted i n chapter two, many c r i t i c i s m s of Sartre's theory of value- espe-c i a l l y that i t implies for ethics a thoroughgoing subjectivism and r e l a t i v i s m - cannot u l t i m a t e l y be sustained because they f a i l to rec-ognize or appreciate h i s discussion of our ' s i t u a t i o n ' i n the world, the r o l e of others i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n of that s i t u a t i o n , and hence what he terms our 'objective encounter' with values i n the world. What Sartre c a l l s our s i t u a t i o n i s described as the common product of the contingency of the i n - i t s e l f and of freedom: i t i s the ' g i -ven' which human r e a l i t y has to be and which i t i l l u m i n a t e s by i t s project or i t s choice of i t s e l f i n the world, and i t includes my place (the place assigned to me by my b i r t h ) , my body, my past (a 163 backdrop and a point of view), my environment (the instrumental-things which surround me), and my fellowmen. In the case of my f e l -lowmen, moreover, Sartre e x p l i c i t l y observes that to l i v e i n a world with my fellowmen i s "...to f i n d myself engaged i n a world i n which instrumental-complexes can have a meaning which my free project has 3 2 not f i r s t given to them." ^ In sum, the world i s already provided with meaning, due to the c o l l e c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s of my fellowmen: i t i s t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s which anchor the values which I en-counter, values which have 'being', on Sartre's account, or are ' c r y s t a l l i z e d ' i n the s o c i a l world. Further, i n E x i s t e n t i a l i s m and Humanism the sense of p r a c t i c a l union, of common e f f o r t , as the model for s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s begins to take shape, when Sartre declares that I cannot make freedom my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim. Here again, the concepts of concrete freedom i n a c o l l e c t i v e s i t u a t i o n receive ex-p l i c i t , i f not f u l l y developed, expression. Indeed, i t has been ar-gued i n chapter three that, because freedom e x i s t s only i n r e l a t i o n to a shared s i t u a t i o n , Sartre's concept of authentic existence r e -quires of us action i n the world which has as i t s aim the enhance-ment of our concrete freedom. In Sartre's view, valuing freedom means that men should endeavour to modify t h e i r s i t u a t i o n i n the world so as to remove r e s t r i c t i o n s to t h e i r freedom of choice and to increase the range of choices available to them. Hence, Sartre c l e a r l y envisions h i s authentic i n d i v i d u a l s as having a p o s i t i v e s o c i a l r o l e to play, countering repressive p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s or systems, and supporting any p o l i c i e s or systems that maximize freedom of choice by enabling men to achieve t h e i r goals. Thus, while i t i s not u n t i l the Critique that these notions of 164 concrete freedom and common e f f o r t converge i n the concept of group pr a x i s , nevertheless both Being and Nothingness and E x i s t e n t i a l i s m and Humanism do a n t i c i p a t e t h i s development. The question remains, however, as to whether the group praxis of the C r i t i q u e i s compatible with Sartre's account of my c o n f l i c t -ridden r e l a t i o n s with others i n Being and Nothingness. In Being and Nothingness. Sartre s t i p u l a t e s that i n d i v i d u a l consciousnesses s h a l l never place themselves on a plane of equality, but i n the C r i t i q u e he claims that the group achieves just such an e q u a l i t y , a p o s i t i v e r e c i p r o c i t y of freedoms. These two claims need not be incompatible, however, i f i t i s acknowledged that our o n t o l o g i c a l separateness and our mutual o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , as described i n Being and Nothing-ness, need not imply c o n f l i c t i n the sense of overt h o s t i l i t y be-tween i n d i v i d u a l s . Indeed, Sartre explains i n the C r i t i q u e that i t i s the phenomenon of s c a r c i t y which renders us competitors and which has thus f a r q u a l i f i e d human h i s t o r y as a struggle for l i m i t e d re-sources. S i m i l a r l y , a l i e n a t i o n i s now defined as man's impotence i n the face of forces external to him: man's products (the embodiment of his work i n matter) escape h i s c o n t r o l and come to dominate him, and men thus become 'the product of t h e i r own product'. By h i s t o r -i c i z i n g c o n f l i c t , Sartre acknowledges i n the C r i t i q u e the p o s s i b i l -i t y that cooperation may replace combativeness i n a future society of material abundance, and h i s optimism about the possible eradica-t i o n of s c a r c i t y appears to be based on the fact that i n d i v i d u a l s joined cooperatively i n common action simply have more power than they do when i s o l a t e d -^: together, i n groups, they can most effec-t i v e l y combat t h e i r a l i e n a t i o n . I t i s thus the group which embodies Sartre's hope: i f I n d i v i d -165 uals j o i n together i n t o a common group pursuing the f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e i r common needs, s c a r c i t y might be abolished, and lik e w i s e the c o n f l i c t based upon s c a r c i t y . Even i f s c a r c i t y i s not abolished, i t i s the group, and s p e c i f i c a l l y the a c t i v i t y of i t s members as med-i a t i n g Thirds, which at l a s t provides an account of how, i n the pre-sent, a p o s i t i v e r e c i p r o c i t y of freedoms i s possible on the basis of Sartre's ontology. However, i t has also been argued, that the free i n d i v i d u a l described i n Being and Nothingness i s , i n e f f e c t , s a c r i -f i c e d to the group i n the C r i t i q u e . Certain c r i t i c s , among them Wal-ter Odajnyk, W i l f r i d Desan and Mary Warnock, maintain that Sartre simply abandons h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , and with i t the free i n d i v i d u a l , i n favour of Marxism. Yet t h i s p o s i t i o n f a i l s to acknowledge Sar-tre's own c r i t i q u e of Marxism, as a r t i c u l a t e d for example i n Search for a Method, where Sartre argues that 'Marxism stopped': "For years the Marxist i n t e l l e c t u a l believed that he served h i s party by v i o -l a t i n g experience, by overlooking embarrassing d e t a i l s , by grossly s i m p l i f y i n g the data, and above a l l , by conceptualizing the event before having studied i t . " y ^ Sartre contends i n Search for a Method that the task of e x i s t e n t i a l i s m i s to r e v i t a l i z e Marxism, and to remind us that, while i t i s true that men make h i s t o r y within de-termined conditions, nevertheless i t i s s t i l l men who make t h e i r h i s t o r y . As Barnes observes, Sartre believes that "(Marxism's) ec-onomic laws function l i k e laws of nature; human freedom i s ignored. Revolution comes about as the r e s u l t of impersonal forces rather than as the r e s u l t of the awakening of free men and women to the 55 fact of t h e i r a l i e n a t i o n and oppression." S t i l l , Warnock i n s i s t s that "...the i n d i v i d u a l of Being and Nothingness has been swallowed up i n the Group of the C r i t i q u e . . . " 166 or that the group i n i t s i n t e r n a l structure e n t a i l s the suppression of i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . Note, however, that i n one sense at l e a s t the i n d i v i d u a l i s not 'swallowed up' i n the group: as we have seen, group members never constitute the s u b s t a n t i a l unity of a 'hyper-organism'. On the contrary, Sartre's account c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s that t h e i r unity i s a p r a c t i c a l one of common praxis: each member i n the group acts as the Third i n r e l a t i o n to a l l the other members, each a c t u a l i z e s the unity of the others and i s himself u n i f i e d with them by every other group member acting as the Third. I t i s these over-lapping i n t e r n a l u n i f i c a t i o n s which constitute the unity of the group: there i s never an o n t o l o g i c a l oneness which 'swallows up' i n d i v i d u a l members. On the other hand, the group does impose c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s on the freedom of i t s members. Recall f i r s t that group members are u n i f i e d i n performing common actions for common goals: the Third does not see himself as other than and separate from those whose unity he a c t u a l i z e s ; rather, he perceives h i s fellow members' ac-tions as "the same' as h i s own. When each t h i r d party i n t e r i o r i z e s the m u l t i p l i c i t y , seeing a l l acts as the same as h i s , the r e s u l t i s that h i s personal freedom i s ' s y n t h e t i c a l l y enriched'. The fact that there are what Sartre c a l l s 'several myselves' (rather than several i s o l a t e d others) becomes an enrichment of our power, and hence of our freedom. ^ S t i l l , i t i s also the case that group members act as 'regulating Thirds': each i n d i v i d u a l cannot simply act as he pleases, since that would undermine "the power of the group as com-mon action. However, as Anderson observes, t h i s l i m i t a t i o n on my freedom need not be construed as a r e s t r i c t i o n per se: "My very pre-sence i n the group i s f r e e l y chosen by me; I choose to act i n union 167 with others for common goals. Also, because a l l of us within the group are the same, i n f r e e l y conforming my acts to t h e i r regula-t i o n I am i n e f f e c t conforming to myself." 3 8 However, i t must be recognized that i n the case of the pledged group, as opposed to the group-in-fusion, more t e l l i n g l i m i t a t i o n s are placed upon the freedom of i t s i n d i v i d u a l members. For example, i n order to make the group more stable, i t s members r e f l e c t i v e l y focus t h e i r a t t e n t i o n on i t , and i n so doing they make each other objects, rather than merely 'quasi-objects' as i n the group-in-fusion. As a r e s u l t , there i s more 'otherness' between myself and my fellow group members, yet Sartre also i n s i s t s that "...we do not relapse i n t o s e r i a l i t y , since, for each t h i r d party, t h i s Other-Being i s the same Other-Being as for h i s neighbour." 3 9 However, unlike i n the case of the group-in-fusion, where we so i d e n t i f y with one another that the regulations to me from a t h i r d party are per-ceived as regulations to me from 'myself, i n the pledged group with i t s increased 'otherness', to the extent that the t h i r d party as Other-Being l i m i t s my freedom, t h i s l i m i t a t i o n constitutes a genuine r e s t r i c t i o n . I t can no longer be perceived, Sartre says, as a regu-l a t i o n to me from 'myself. Further, the l i m i t a t i o n s and r e s t r i c t i o n s placed on the freedom of the members of the pledged group are evident i n Sartre's notions of o b l i g a t i o n and t e r r o r . R e c a l l that the pledge occasions the crea-t i o n of 'man as a common i n d i v i d u a l ' , h i s new being or s o c i a l i t y constituted by 'adopted i n e r t i a , function, power, r i g h t s and duties, structure, violence and f r a t e r n i t y ' . Sartre maintains that formal obligations to other group members arise only when a pledge has been given to them. Through his pledge, the i n d i v i d u a l gives h i s fellow 168 group members the r i g h t to d i s c i p l i n e and even to l i q u i d a t e him i f he f a i l s to remain a member of the group: "To swear i s to say, as a common i n d i v i d u a l : you must k i l l me i f I secede. And t h i s demand has no other aim than to i n s t a l l Terror w i t h i n myself as a free de-fence against the fear of the enemy (at the same time reassuring me about the t h i r d party who w i l l be confirmed by the same Terror)." However, i t i s also fundamental to note that t h i s t e r r o r des-cribed by Sartre i s a ' free defence 1: my very presence i n the pled-ged group i s f r e e l y chosen by me, as I choose to act together with others i n order to a t t a i n common goals. I t i s for t h i s reason that membership i n the pledged group can be i d e n t i f i e d as being an embod-iment of Sartre's concept of authentic existence. As we have seen, Sartre's e t h i c s of authentic existence comprises two basic aspects. F i r s t , there i s the r e f l e c t i v e comprehension of the nature of human r e a l i t y , which has as i t s r e s u l t the choice of freedom as one's p r i -mary value. Second, since freedom e x i s t s only i n r e l a t i o n to a c o l -l e c t i v e s i t u a t i o n , valuing freedom involves action i n the world which has as i t s aim the enhancement of our concrete freedom. Sim-i l a r l y , then, the advent of the pledge marks the group's stage of r e f l e c t i v e self-awareness: i t i s through the pledge that the group posi t s i t s e l f f or i t s e l f . Moreover, the pledge occasions the ' o r i g i n of humanity', i n which men are related as brothers, and hence the pledged group represents "...the v i c t o r y of man as common freedom over s e r i a l i t y . " ^ 1 Thus, the pledged group, with i t s r e f l e c t i v e self-awareness and the enriched power~ of i t s members, constitutes for Sartre the most e f f e c t i v e means for the r e a l i z a t i o n of his eth-i c a l i d e a l of human l i b e r a t i o n and f u l f i l l m e n t . Sartre's theory of groups has also been c r i t i c i z e d , however, on 169 the grounds that, while the group may i n fact be supportive of hu-man freedom i n i t s i n i t i a l stages, nevertheless i t s d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n t o ' i n e r t 1 i n s t i t u t i o n s which suppress i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y i s pre-sented as i n e v i t a b l e . For example, K. Hartmann maintains that for Sartre true s o c i a l freedom i s a v a i l a b l e only i n the group-in-fusion, where everything i s f l u i d , non-oppressive, and yet p l u r a l . On t h i s view, Sartre maintains the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of a free and yet s t r u c t u r -ed ensemble, but Hartmann argues on the contrary that "There i s no excuse, i n Sartre or i n Marx, for ignoring s o c i a l organizations of redress, e.g. organized welfare, trade unions as countervailing f o r -ces of c a p i t a l , and u l t i m a t e l y , the state as a uni v e r s a l agent cap-able of adjusting the e v i l e f f ects of ensembles which, l e f t alone on t h e i r c a t e g o r i a l l e v e l of p a r t i c u l a r i t y , may prove to be increas-i n g l y determined by adverse co n s t r a i n t s . " ^ 2 Indeed, c r i t i c s contend both that Sartre sees s o c i a l structures as necessarily a l i e n a t i n g , and also that he sees the progressive d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the group as an i n e v i t a b l e occurrence. I t must be acknowledged that i n some sections of the C r i t i q u e Sartre does appear to portray the det e r i o r a t i o n of the group as i n -e v i t a b l e : "..groups have a s e r i a l destiny even i n the moment of t h e i r p r a c t i c a l t o t a l i z a t i o n . " ^ I f we were to r e s t r i c t ourselves to remarks such as t h i s , we might indeed conclude that the ultimate f a i l u r e of the group i s as i n e v i t a b l e as the f r u s t r a t i o n of attempts at p o s i t i v e i n d i v i d u a l human r e l a t i o n s appears to be i n Being and Nothingness. However, as Barnes observes, " . . . j u s t as the l a t t e r were analyzed i n the context of bad f a i t h and a mistaken pursuit of the missing God, so we must note that the Critique presupposes a mil i e u of s c a r c i t y which i t i s the aim of Marxism to overcome." kk 170 S c a r c i t y i s a contingent f a c t , and i t i s a contingent fact which might be defeated; thus, the f a i l u r e of the group, or i t s d e t e r i o r -ation i n t o i n e r t organizations, i s non-necessary. R e c a l l also Sartre's c r i t i q u e of Marxism; namely, that i t s ec-onomic laws function l i k e laws of nature, and human freedom i s i g -nored. On Sartre's own account, men do make h i s t o r y within determin-ed conditions, but nevertheless i t i s s t i l l free men who make t h e i r h i s t o r y . I t i s also true, however, that when I f r e e l y act on the world, the r e s u l t of my action i n e v i t a b l y assumes a l i f e of i t s own to some extent. As Sartre puts i t , necessity i s "...the destiny i n e x t e r i o r i t y of freedom." ^ y For example, because men f r e e l y decide to cut down trees, one i n e v i t a b l e consequence w i l l be the erosion of the s o i l . On the other hand, a d i f f e r e n t decision would r e s u l t i n a quite d i f f e r e n t outcome. Thus, Anderson suggests that the nec-e s s i t y proposed by Sartre i s hypothetical i n nature ( i f I decide to do A, B w i l l i n e v i t a b l y occur): "To apply t h i s to the analysis of the group, we could say that i f the group took as i t s primary goal from the beginning the freedom of each of i t s members, then i t s de-t e r i o r a t i o n i n t o a bureaucracy and ser i e s need not take place." ^ I t i s also not the case that Sartre views s o c i a l structures i n wholly negative terms. He speaks p o s i t i v e l y , for example, of the creation of 'man as a common i n d i v i d u a l ' : following the creative act of the pledge, we are 'our own sons, our common creation', and i t i s t h i s creation which Sartre describes as 'the o r i g i n of human-i t y ' , which marks the advent of p o s i t i v e r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s of f r a t e r n i t y among group members. On the other hand, Sartre's emphasis on the r o l e of te r r o r i n the formation of s o c i a l wholes i s obviously negative. Could men, on his account, j o i n together i n s o c i a l wholes 171 i n a s p i r i t of love and cooperation? Anderson suggests that, i n f a c t , "Sartre s t i l l views men as so i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , so separate, so f e a r f u l of the loss of t h e i r personal freedom that they cannot continue to cooperate and unite with each other over a long period of time. That i s why the threat of violence i s necessary." ^ S i m i l a r l y , M. Grene contends that Sartre s t i l l has 'a thorough-l y molecular conception of the i n d i v i d u a l 1 , and that even h i s p h i l -osophy of praxis as described i n the C r i t i q u e f a i l s to overcome 'his i n i t i a l s o l i p s i s m ' . ^ However, while there i s some tr u t h to Ander-son's observation i n r e l a t i o n to e x i s t i n g h i s t o r i c a l conditions, i t must also be recognized that on Sartre's view the elimination of s c a r c i t y might involve as w e l l the elimination of t e r r o r as an i n -strument of s o c i a l cohesion. R e c a l l that Sartre defined t e r r o r i n terms of 'a free defence against the fear of the enemy', and presum-ably with the elimination of s c a r c i t y , group members would no longer be acting i n response to external threats of t h i s nature. Further, Grene's contention f a i l s to acknowledge that Sartre's agents i n the C r i t i q u e are presented, not as i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s , but rather as i n d i v i d u a l s - i n - r e l a t i o n , whether these r e l a t i o n s be negative (ser-i a l ) or p o s i t i v e ( r e c i p r o c a l ) i n character. The c e n t r a l d i f f i c u l t y with Sartre's account appears to be instead that the status of these r e l a t i o n s , and consequently of the groups which are constituted by them, remains unclear. Sartre seems to think that he has only two options: either a group i s a 'hyperorganism' or an ontological unity, or else i t i s 'purely p r a c t i c a l ' or the detotalized product of assorted praxes. C l e a r l y , he cannot accept the former description; u n i t i e s of t h i s sort are out of the question for him, and so he opts for the l a t t e r 172 d e s c r i p t i o n , with problematic r e s u l t s . Consider h i s various charac-t e r i z a t i o n s of human r e l a t i o n s , the ' s t u f f out of which groups are composed. F i r s t , there are 'simple human r e l a t i o n s ' , which Sartre characterizes as r e l a t i o n s among agents mediated by such 'worked matter' as na t u r a l languages, r i t u a l s of exchange, or phy s i c a l a r t -i f a c t s . S c a r c i t y a l t e r s simple human r e l a t i o n s : i t renders us com-p e t i t o r s or r i v a l s for l i m i t e d material resources, and i t marks the advent of s e r i a l r e l a t i o n s , also c a l l e d f a l s e r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s . Genuine r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s , Sartre says, arise with the appearance of the group, formed on the basis of common needs and shared dangers and defined by i t s common praxis. Praxis mediation thus replaces p r a c t i c o - i n e r t mediation (exacerbated by s c a r c i t y ) ; p o s i t i v e r e c i p -r o c a l r e l a t i o n s appear i n place of negative r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s . I t would seem, then, that on Sartre's account r e c i p r o c i t y i s created, e i t h e r v i a s c a r c i t y or else v i a praxis. However, he also states that ' r e c i p r o c i t y i s a permanent structure' ^ y: 'r e c i p r o c i t y i s l i v e d by everyone as diffu s e objective p o s s i b i l i t y ' , u n t i l i t 5 0 i s 'actualized, or rather unmasked'. y As Anderson observes with respect to the formation of the group, Sartre's p o s i t i o n i s d i f f i -c u l t to define: "What exactly ' a c t u a l i z a t i o n ' means i s unclear. Does the t h i r d party simply make manifest a unity already present or does 51 he provide t h i s unity?" S i m i l a r l y , i n the case of the 'creation' of man as a common i n d i v i d u a l , Sartre says that the group member 'actualizes a l l these r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s ' (adopted i n e r t i a , func-t i o n , power, r i g h t s and duties, structure, violence and f r a t e r n i t y ) as 'his new being, h i s s o c i a l i t y ' . The exact ontological status of these r e l a t i o n s , and hence also of group unity (as po s i t i v e r e c i -p r o c i t y ) , remains obscure. Though Sartre c l e a r l y holds that the 173 group never becomes a hyperorganism but rather remains a unity of actions, at the same time he claims that group praxis i s not merely a c o l l e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l praxes, but something more- a 'synthetic enrichment' of i n d i v i d u a l praxes. I f we assume that r e c i p r o c i t y i s indeed a permanent structure, then we might say that p o s i t i v e r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s constitute a synthetic enrichment of t h i s basic structure, while negative r e c i -p rocal r e l a t i o n s constitute a det e r i o r a t i o n of i t ( s c a r c i t y 'eats away' at r e c i p r o c i t y ) . I f we allow that r e c i p r o c i t y i s an onto l o g i -c a l structure of the i n d i v i d u a l , then i t appears to be i n d i s t i n g -uishable from Heidegger's Mitsein (Dasein or human Being i s a Mit-sein or a Being-wittO, able to take negative or p o s i t i v e form, de-pending upon p r a c t i c o - i n e r t or praxis mediation, r e s p e c t i v e l y . As argued i n chapter s i x , t h i s does not imply an ont o l o g i c a l monism: Heidegger's ontology recognizes an i r r e d u c i b l e p l u r a l i t y of i n d i v i -duals, but he also i n s i s t s upon the pr i m a r i l y s o c i a l and collabora-t i v e l y f u n c t i o n a l nature of the process of human i n d i v i d u a t i o n . Sim-i l a r l y , i n the C r i t i q u e Sartre argues that agents-in-relation are the ultimate constituents of s o c i a l r e a l i t y , but he f a i l s to examine the nature of the r e l a t i o n s that constitute the r e a l i t y of s o c i a l wholes. Thus, as Flynn observes, Sartre i s l e d to posit an 'erron-eous contrast of the on t o l o g i c a l and the p r a c t i c a l ' , either the group i s an o n t o l o g i c a l hyperorganism or else i t i s a detotalized t o t a l i t y of p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s : "What Sartre's theory lacks most 52 b a s i c a l l y i s an ontology of relations'." This lack notwithstanding, Sartre's theory of groups i n the Cri t i q u e does provide an account of how po s i t i v e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are possible, and thus renders i n t e l l i g i b l e that aspect of h i s con-174 cept of authentic existence which requires of us common action on behalf of the freedom of a l l . By h i s t o r i c i z i n g c o n f l i c t , by explain-in g i t i n terms of the contingent fact of s c a r c i t y , Sartre now ac-knowledges the p o s s i b i l i t y that cooperation may replace c o n f l i c t i n a future society of material abundance. Further, h i s theory of groups also allows for cooperative action i n the present; the Look-ing/Looked-at dyads of Being and Nothingness, composed of subjects o b j e c t i f y i n g or being o b j e c t i f i e d by other subjects, are replaced i n the C r i t i q u e by groups of i n d i v i d u a l s united by a shared s i t u a -t i o n and common goals. S p e c i f i c a l l y , Sartre's concept of the medi-ating Third provides a basis for p r a c t i c a l union and common e f f o r t i n the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l world, or authentic action by 'common i n d i v -i d u a l s ' having as i t s aim the enhancement of t h e i r concrete freedom. However, Sartre's theory also e x h i b i t s one fundamental lack, which we s h a l l pursue with help from the philosophy of Martin Buber i n the following chapters; namely, i t f a i l s to accomodate the dim-ension of personal human r e l a t i o n s . R e c a l l that Sartre holds that, following the creative act of the pledge, we are 'our own sons, our common cr e a t i o n ' . He goes on to suggest that r e l a t i o n s such as friendship and love are simply further free s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of the basic f r a t e r n i t y e x i s t i n g among those who take the same pledge. How-ever, the unity of the members of a group i s a p r a c t i c a l one of ac-t i o n ; i t occurs i n so fa r as they act together for a common goal. Thus, friends or lovers sharing i n one another's company, having no other goal than simple enjoyment or pleasure, do not appear to constitute what Sartre would c a l l a group. Yet i f personal r e l a -tions cannot be reduced to common action, how w i l l Sartre account for them? Note that Sartre allows i n the Critique that "...trans-175 l u c i d human r e l a t i o n s do e x i s t . . . ; I mean immediate r e c i p r o c i -53 t i e s . . . " , y y but i n our current alienated state , such immediacy i s rare and ephemeral. In chapter nine we s h a l l examine t h i s notion of immediate r e c i p r o c i t i e s , together with Buber's philosophy of dialogue, i n an attempt to accomodate the dimension of personal r e -l a t i o n s i n Sartre's s o c i a l theory, and i n order to complete h i s account of authentic human existence. F i r s t , however, an e x p l i c a -t i o n of Buber's d i a l o g i c a l philosophy i s required, together with h i s view of au t h e n t i c i t y as an e s s e n t i a l l y interpersonal process. 176 Chapter Eight Buber's D i a l o g i c a l Approach to Authenticity On Buber's account, we are to understand authentic human ex-istence i n terms of h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the two basic word p a i r s I - I t and I-You, which each e s t a b l i s h a d i s t i n c t i v e mode of existence. I - I t i s the basic word of separation, or experience and use: per-c e i v i n g , f e e l i n g , wanting and thinking are a l l designated by Buber as ' p a r t i a l actions' of man characterized by the structure of the subject-object r e l a t i o n . On the other hand, I-You i s the basic word of r e l a t i o n , i n which the undivided s e l f meets the undivided Other, and such encounters are i n turn characterized by exclusiveness, mu-t u a l i t y and immediacy. While Buber i n s i s t s that there are not two types of men, he maintains that there are two poles of humanity, the one inauthentic (or dominated by the I - I t , and hence separate-ness and mutual e x p l o i t a t i o n ) , and the other authentic ( i n which the I-You interpenetrates the I - I t , allowing for the development of 'genuine persons' standing i n a l i v i n g , r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n to one another). Buber maintains that becoming authentic i s 'becoming a whole* by standing i n r e l a t i o n s h i p with others. L i f e i s fundamentally i n -tersubjective: i n d i v i d u a l being i s a being-with. Becoming a whole or a coherent unity organized around and i n terms of one's d i s t i n c -t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y or 'fate' i s a process which requires the p a r t i -c i p a t i o n of the Other. On Buber's account, the s e l f and the Other are d i a l e c t i c a l l y related: the mature development of one's s e l f -unity at the r e f l e c t i v e l e v e l and the f u l l manifestation of the 'otherness* of the Other constitute the two movements of the d i a l e c -t i c a l process of becoming a whole. In my I-You meetings with the 177 Other, I am 'made present' by the Other i n my wholeness and unique-ness, and my existence i s 'confirmed'. Likewise, when I choose to enter i n t o r e l a t i o n with the Other, I assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for h i s self-development as w e l l as my own. Indeed, Buber•s conception of i n d i v i d u a l being as a being-with serves to ground an interpersonal ethic which rules out the e x p l o i t -ation of others by the i n d i v i d u a l . The absolute p r i n c i p l e of t h i s e t h i c s of authentic existence i s derived from the I-You r e l a t i o n i t s e l f ; namely, the i n t e g r i t y of the s e l f and the Other, which must be established and preserved i n every s i t u a t i o n . Authenticating one's own humanity i s thus an e s s e n t i a l l y interpersonal process for Buber, i n which each i s obliged to respect the di g n i t y of the Other, and i n which each requires the aid of the Other, or that mutual con-firmation which only genuine I-You meeting provides. 178 Buber's I and Thou begins: "The world i s twofold for man i n accordance with h i s twofold a t t i t u d e . The attitude of man i s two-f o l d i n accordance with the two basic words he can speak." 1 These basic words, which Buber proceeds to explore at length, are the word pa i r s 'I-You' and ' I - I t ' . He contends that the ' I ' of man i s also twofold, for the ' I ' of the word pair I-You i s d i f f e r e n t from the • I ' of the word p a i r I - I t . Basic words est a b l i s h a mode of existence, or as Buber puts i t , they are 'spoken with one's being'. He i n i t i a l l y d i s tinguishes I-You and I - I t as follows: "The basic word I-You can only be spoken with one's whole being. The basic word I - I t can never p be spoken with one's whole being." Buber designates the ' I t ' world and the 'You' world as the world of experience and the world of r e l a t i o n , r e s p e c t i v e l y . The world of experience i s characterized by a c t i v i t i e s 'that have some-thing for t h e i r object': "I perceive something. I f e e l something. I imagine something. I want something. I sense something. I think something." ^ These are a l l p a r t i a l a c t i v i t i e s of man, d i s t i n c t from one another and characterized by the structure of the subject-object r e l a t i o n . On the other hand, Buber holds that 'whoever says You does not have something for h i s object': "But he stands i n r e l a t i o n . " ^ When 'You' i s spoken, one meets the incomparable: the undivided s e l f meets the undivided Other. The world of r e l a t i o n , on Buber's account, a r i s e s i n three spheres: l i f e with nature, where the r e l a -t i o n 'vibrates i n the dark and remains below language'; l i f e with men, where the r e l a t i o n ' i s manifest~and enters language'; and f i n -a l l y , l i f e with 'forms of the s p i r i t ' , where 'we hear no You and yet f e e l addressed; we answer- creating, thinking, acting.' Buber provides the following example. When I contemplate a tree, 1 7 9 I can assume a v a r i e t y of attitudes towards i t : I can accept i t as a p i c t u r e , 'a r i g i d p i l l a r i n a flood of l i g h t ' ; I can assign i t to a species and observe i t as an instance; I can 'overcome i t s un-iqueness and form so rigorously' that I recognize i t only as an ex-pression of a law of physics or chemistry; or I can even 'dissolve i t i n t o a number, into a pure r e l a t i o n between numbers, and ete r n a l -i z e i t ' . In a l l of these a t t i t u d e s , the tree i s an I t for me, a sensory or i n t e l l e c t u a l object structured i n terms of i t s r e l a t i o n to a subject, but Buber maintains that another fundamentally d i f f -erent o r i e n t a t i o n i s possible: "But i t can also happen, i f w i l l and grace are joined, that as I contemplate the tree I am drawn into a r e l a t i o n , and the tree ceases to be an I t . The power of exclusive-7 ness has seized me." We w i l l explore the nature of the I-You r e l a t i o n thoroughly as we proceed. At t h i s point, however, Buber merely indicates that i n the I-You r e l a t i o n , which i s characterized by 'r e c i p r o c i t y ' rather than 'experience and use', what I encounter i s the 'tree i t s e l f . I meet with an undivided Other: "Whatever belongs to the tree i s included: i t s form and i t s mechanics, i t s color and i t s chemistry, i t s conversation with the elements and i t s conversation with the Q s t a r s - a l l t h i s i n i t s e n t i r e t y . " S i m i l a r l y , Buber states that the human being to whom I say You i s a unity, an undivided t o t a l i t y ; one must ' p u l l and tear' to turn a unity into a m u l t i p l i c i t y : "...so i t i s with the human being to whom I say You. I can abstract from him the color of his h a i r or the color of h i s speech or the color of h i s graciousness; I have to do this again and again; but immed-Q l a t e l y he i s no longer You." In the case of our l i f e with the forms of the s p i r i t , Buber 180 maintains that t h i s i s the eternal o r i g i n of a r t ; namely, "...a human being confronts a form that wants to become a work of a r t through him. Not a figment of h i s soul but something that appears to the soul and demands the soul's creative power." 1 0 Again, Buber speaks i n terms of the exclusiveness of such a confrontation, and of the f a c t that such creative acts are actions performed with one's whole being (as opposed to the p a r t i a l a c t i v i t i e s of the I - I t ) . The form that confronts me I cannot experience or describe; instead, I can only a c t u a l i z e i t . The form i s 'what i s present*: "Tested for i t s o b j e c t i v i t y , the form i s not 'there' at a l l ; but what can equal 11 i t s presence?" F i n a l l y , the r e l a t i o n i s mutual: the form acts on me as I act on i t . As Buber puts i t , I lead the form across and i n t o the world of I t . Thus f a r , then, Buber has indicated several c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the You r e l a t i o n which d i s t i n g u i s h i t from the subject-object mode of experiencing and conceptualizing. F i r s t , the undivided s e l f meets the undivided Other: a fusing of a l l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s takes place, or the growing together into a unity of a l l o b j e c t i f i a b l e elements, and thus the I-You meeting i s a l i v e d r e l a t i o n of whole to whole. On Buber's account, t h i s 'seeing the whole' i s a knowing of unique-ness, and hence an exclusive kind of knowing. Exclusiveness i s the necessary prerequisite for saying You, but exclusiveness i t s e l f pre-supposes the coming together of two factors which also characterize the You r e l a t i o n ; namely, the coming together of w i l l and grace. As Buber puts i t , "The concentration.and fusion into a whole being can never be accomplished by me, can never be accomplished without 1 2 me. I require a You to become; becoming I, I say You." The You, then, encounters me by grace, but I enter into a d i r e c t 1 81 r e l a t i o n to i t ; thus the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s passive and active at once. Buber also contends that the r e l a t i o n to the You i s 1unmediated': "Nothing conceptual intervenes between I and You, no p r i o r knowledge and no imagination...No purpose intervenes between I and You, no greed and no a n t i c i p a t i o n . " 1^ The immediacy of the You r e l a t i o n i s what Buber also re f e r s to as 'presentness', and he contends that only as the You becomes present does 'presence' come into being: "Presence i s not what i s evanescent and passes but what confronts us, waiting and enduring." 1^ In contrast, to dwell i n the I - I t , or i n o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , i s to reduce the present to the past: the unique-ness we meet i s considered only i n terms of what i t has i n common with others we have encountered. The Other thus becomes, i n the I - I t , an object of organized experience, and future a n t i c i p a t i o n reduces the Other to an object of use, which i s the c o r o l l a r y of the organization of experience. Thus on Buber's account, the I of the basic word I - I t has only a past and no present: "...insofar as a human being makes do with the 1 5 things that he experiences and uses, he l i v e s i n the past." ^ He al s o , i n Buber's view, l i v e s without the mutuality or r e c i p r o c i t y which characterizes the You r e l a t i o n . W i l l and grace provide the necessary preconditions for meeting, and what follows from i t i s a mutuality of e f f e c t s : my You acts on me as I act on i t . As Buber puts i t , "Inscrutably involved, we l i v e i n the currents of universal r e c i p r o c i t y . " 1 6 As for the nature of the r e l a t i o n between the realms of You and I t , Buber maintains that i t i s 'the sublime melancholy of our l o t ' that every You must become an I t i n our world: "Every You i n the world i s doomed by i t s nature to become a thing or at least to 1 82 enter i n t o thinghood again and again." 1 7 On the other hand, every thing i n the world can appear to some I as i t s You: 'the I t i s the c h r y s a l i s , the You the b u t t e r f l y ' . Buber also traces what he takes to be the h i s t o r i c a l development from You to I t . In the beginning i s the r e l a t i o n : the language of pri m i t i v e peoples, t h e i r sentence-words, generally designate the wholeness of r e l a t i o n s . In the or-i g i n a l wholeness of r e l a t i o n s , "...persons are s t i l l embedded l i k e r e l i e f s without achieving the f u l l y rounded independence of nouns 1 8 or pronouns." The drive for preservation and knowledge, however, brings with i t the emergence of a separated I. 'I see the tree' i s now pronounced i n such a way, Buber says, that " . . . i t no longer re-la t e s a r e l a t i o n between a human I and a tree You but the perception of the tree object by the human consciousness, (and) i t has erected the c r u c i a l b a r r i e r between subject and object." 1 9 The basic word I - I t , or the word of separation, has thus been spoken. Buber maintains that t h i s h i s t o r i c a l development from You to I t i s p a r a l l e l e d i n the development of a c h i l d : "Every developing human c h i l d r e s t s , l i k e a l l developing beings, i n the womb of the great mother; the undifferentiated, not yet formed primal world. 20 From t h i s i t detaches i t s e l f to enter a personal l i f e . " Once a-gain Buber in d i c a t e s that 'in the beginning i s the r e l a t i o n ' : "...as the category of being, as readiness, as a form that reaches out to be f i l l e d , as a model of the soul; the a p r i o r i of r e l a t i o n ; the innate You." 2 1 The longing for r e l a t i o n i s primary, on t h i s account, and the genesis of the thing i s a la t e product that develops out of the s p l i t of the primal encounters, as does the genesis of the I . Man becomes an I, i n other words, through a You: what confronts us as our You va r i e s , but through these changes the I-consciousness 183 (the consciousness of the constant partner) c r y s t a l l i z e s . Now the basic word I - I t can be a r t i c u l a t e d : the I i s a detached subject that experiences and uses objects which are now over against i t . Buber maintains that the h i s t o r y of the i n d i v i d u a l and that of the human race both s i g n i f y a progressive increase of the I t -world. As noted e a r l i e r , the basic r e l a t i o n of man to the It-world includes experience ('which constitutes the world ever again'), and use ('which leads i t toward i t s multifarious purpose'; namely, the preservation, a l l e v i a t i o n and equipment of human l i f e ) . However, i t i s Buber's contention that the improvement of the capacity for ex-perience and use generally involves a decrease i n man's power to enter i n t o r e l a t i o n . This has s i g n i f i c a n t repurcussions for the i n -d i v i d u a l and for h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p s with h i s fellowmen: "Standing under the basic word of separation which keeps apart I and I t , he has divided h i s l i f e with h i s fellowmen into two neatly defined d i s -22 t r i c t s : i n s t i t u t i o n s and fee l i n g s . I t - d i s t r i c t and I - d i s t r i c t . " Neither, Buber says, knows the world of r e l a t i o n , and hence neither knows the true human being, nor a true community. Instead, we are confronted by 'egos', on the one hand, and an It-world, on the other Thus, when a culture i s no longer centred i n a l i v i n g and con-t i n u a l l y renewed r e l a t i o n a l process, on Buber's account, i t 'freezes into the It-world'. Further, the I of the I - I t i s d i f f e r e n t from that of the I-You. The I of I - I t appears as an ego and becomes con-scious of i t s e l f as being 'this way and not that', as a subject (of experience and use). The I of I-You appears as a person and becomes conscious of i t s e l f as s u b j e c t i v i t y (without any ' o f clause). As Buber puts i t , "Egos appear by setti n g themselves apart from other egos. Persons appear by entering into r e l a t i o n with other persons." 184 Whoever s t a n d s i n r e l a t i o n ' p a r t i c i p a t e s ' i n an a c t u a l i t y ; t h a t i s , ' i n a b e i n g t h a t i s n e i t h e r m e r e l y a p a r t o f him n o r m e r e l y o u t s i d e o f h i m ' . Bu b e r m a i n t a i n s t h a t a l l a c t u a l i t y i s an a c t i v i t y i n w h i c h I p a r t i c i p a t e w i t h o u t b e i n g a b l e t o a p p r o p r i a t e i t . The I i s made a c t u a l t h r o u g h i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a c t u a l i t y , o r t h r o u g h s t a n d i n g i n r e l a t i o n : " I n s u b j e c t i v i t y t h e s p i r i t u a l s u b s t a n c e o f t h e p e r s o n m a t u r e s . The p e r s o n becomes c o n s c i o u s o f h i m s e l f as p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n b e i n g , as b e i n g - w i t h , and t h u s as a b e i n g . " 2 Z + The more p e r f e c t t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s , Buber h o l d s , t h e more a c t u a l , t h e more ' a u t h -e n t i c ' , t h e I becomes. On B u b e r ' s a c c o u n t , t h e n , we a r e t o u n d e r s t a n d a u t h e n t i c human e x i s t e n c e i n terms o f the d i s t i n c t i o n between t he I t - w o r l d and the Y o u - w o r l d , and between t h e I as ego and the I as p e r s o n . As B u b e r p u t s i t , "There a r e n o t two k i n d s o f human b e i n g s , b u t t h e r e a r e 2 5 two p o l e s o f h u m a n i t y . " ^ No human b e i n g i s pure p e r s o n , and none i s p u r e ego; none i s e n t i r e l y a c t u a l , and none i s e n t i r e l y l a c k i n g i n a c t u a l i t y . Each l i v e s i n a t w o f o l d I . However, i t i s B u b e r ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e more a human b e i n g , t h e more h u m a n i t y i s domin-a t e d by t h e ego, t h e more does t he I ' f a l l p r e y t o i n a c t u a l i t y * : " I n s u c h ages t h e p e r s o n i n the human b e i n g and i n humanity comes 2 6 to l e a d a s u b t e r r a n e a n , h i d d e n , as i t were i n v a l i d e x i s t e n c e . " A u t h e n t i c human e x i s t e n c e r e q u i r e s , t h e n , t h a t one 'proceed toward the w o r l d o f t h e You', and r e s u r r e c t one's power t o r e l a t e . S i n c e man has an a - p r i o r i r e l a t i o n t o the O t h e r , i n b o r n i n the v e r y s t r u c -t u r e o f h i s n a t u r e ( r e c a l l t h e ' i n n a t e Y o u ' ) , a u t h e n t i c i t y n e c e s s -a r i l y i n v o l v e s t h e r e s u r g e n c e o f t r u e community, i n which i n d i v i -d u a l s s t a n d i n a ' l i v i n g r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p ' t o one a n o t h e r , and t o what Buber terms a ' s i n g l e l i v i n g c e n t r e ' . 185 This s i n g l e l i v i n g centre i s a man whose l i f e has been 'inform-ed by the s p i r i t ' : a holy man or a s p i r i t u a l leader. The r e l i g i o u s dimension of Buber's thought i s evident throughout I and Thou, and i s s p e c i f i c a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d i n the f i n a l section of the book. Buber believes that "Extended, the l i n e s of r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n t e r s e c t i n the e t ernal You. Every single You i s a glimpse of that. Through ev-ery s i n g l e You the basic word addresses the eternal You." 2 7 The human being who has become whole, on Buber's account, i s able to venture f o r t h toward 'the supreme meeting' with God. What has to be given up f i r s t i s 'the false drive for s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n ' which im-pels man to f l e e from the unpredictable world of r e l a t i o n i nto the r e l i a b l e world of things. However, the I as such i s not given up, as most mystics suppose; indeed, i t i s fundamental to Buber's thought that "...the I i s indispensable for any r e l a t i o n s h i p , i n c l u d i n g the p Q highest, which always presupposes an I and You." Before more cl o s e l y examining Buber's I-You, I - I t d i s t i n c t i o n , as w e l l as h i s conception of authentic human existence, c e r t a i n c r i -ticisms of h i s p o s i t i o n should be addressed. W. Kaufmann makes his point s u c c i n c t l y : "The crux of my c r i t i c i s m i s simple. I t i s not true that a genuine r e l a t i o n s h i p to another human being can be ach-ieved only i n b r i e f encounters from which we must always relapse into states i n which the other human being becomes for us mereiy an object of experience and use." 2 9 I t i s Kaufmann's opinion that I and Thou reveals a deep malaise i n the author: he surmises that Buber was permanently damaged by his mother's abandonment of him when he was a small c h i l d . As Kaufmann puts i t , "I believe he des-cribed h i s own experience f a i t h f u l l y , assuming f a l s e l y that i t s l i m -i t a t i o n s were part of the human condition. In other words, h i s ba-186 s i c dichotomy cannot be accepted as i t stands, and h i s personality and l i f e help to account for what i s wrong with i t . " ^° Kaufmann i n s i s t s , then, that i t i s not 'the sublime melancholy of our l o t ' that every You must become an I t i n our world. Kaufmann i d e n t i f i e s the I-You with f e e l i n g and the I - I t with reason, ^ a n d contends that we cannot avoid thinking about the You that confronts us. On the contrary, he says, those who refuse to do t h i s l i v e i n i l l u s i o n s and c u l t i v a t e a r e l a t i o n s h i p to an i d o l instead of t r u l y confronting a You: "The more others mean to me, the more needful i t i s for me also to think about them, sometimes i n an e f f o r t to understand better how they f e e l and think. Such thoughts are not a f a l l from grace, a relapse into i n a u t h e n t i c i t y , or a betrayal to be 32 atoned for m another more ecstatic encounter." ^ On Kaufmann's account, then, Buber tended to mistake intense emotion for revela-t i o n , and did not r e a l i z e how much r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n i s required i f we r e a l l y want to encounter a You, rather than an i l l u s i o n . I t i s Kaufmann's contention, moreover, that Buber's p o s i t i o n evidences a 'Manichaean denigration of the I - I t ' , together with an 'unduly romantic, i f not e c s t a t i c , notion of the I-You'. ^ The I -I t i s represented as a 'deplorable a t t i t u d e ' ; reason i s associated with the I - I t and denigrated, Kaufmann maintains, while the I-You, or 'intense emotion' masquerading as r e v e l a t i o n , i s exalted. With-out r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , however, there i s no genuine I-You r e l a -t i o n s h i p , but only 'self-indulgence, self-absorption, self-deception, a romantic dream'. Kaufmann concludes, therefore, "By relegating a l l r e f l e c t i o n and examination to the I - I t (Buber) provided a p h i l -osophical j u s t i f i c a t i o n for excessive s u b j e c t i v i t y , i l l u s i o n s , s e l f -deception, and murkiness. He f a i l e d to see how much reason and the 1 8 ? courage for an attack on one's i n t u i t i o n s are needed for the discov-ery of the mind." This reference to Nietzsche (who championed the notion of the courage f o r an attack on one's convictions) provides an apt s t a r t -i n g point f o r an examination of Kaufmann's c r i t i c i s m s . Nietzsche i s notorious for h i s hyperbolic mode of expression, but Kaufmann i s nevertheless always quick to defend him, on the grounds that Nietz-sche f e l t obliged to overstate h i s case i n order to ensure that hi s point was heard by, oftentimes, unreceptive ears. Kaufmann does not extend the same consideration to Buber. However, i t i s clea r that i n I and Thou Buber's chief purpose i s to point toward some-thing that he believed was fundamental to human l i f e , but at the same time r a r e l y noticed e x p l i c i t l y - the I-You - and indeed he does resort to hyperbole i n his descriptions i n order to achieve t h i s end. Yet i t i s also c l e a r , both i n I and Thou as w e l l as i n subse-quent works, that Buber does not intend h i s I - I t , I-You d i s t i n c t i o n to be an eithe r / o r dichotomy: either inauthentic l i v i n g i n the I - I t or, unmixed and unmixable, authentic dwelling i n the I-You. As Buber puts i t , there are not two kinds of human beings, but there are two poles of humanity; no human being i s pure person, and none i s pure ego- each l i v e s i n a twofold I. The I - I t i s not, for Buber, a 'de-plorable a t t i t u d e ' , as Kaufmann maintains; on the contrary, Buber states c l e a r l y that the t r a n s i t i o n from You to I t i s also man's greatness : "For thus knowledge, thus works, thus image and example come in t o being among the l i v i n g . " 3-5 What Buber deplores i s instead the dominance of the I - I t over the I-You; i t i s t h i s which he be-li e v e s constitutes an inauthentic form of l i f e and which he main-tains characterizes our modern world, and i t i s t h i s which he speaks out against, a l b e i t rather dramatically. I t i s fundamental to recognize, further, that the I - I t , I-You d i s t i n c t i o n i s not, as Kaufmann suggests, a d i s t i n c t i o n denigrating objective reason, on the one hand, and e x a l t i n g subjective f e e l i n g , on the other. The I-You, the realm of r e l a t i o n , i s not the realm of subjective f e e l i n g . In the I-You r e l a t i o n the undivided s e l f meets meets the undivided Other: according to Buber, t h i s r e l a t i o n c o n s t i -tutes the a c t u a l i z e d realm of the 'Between'. The Between actualized i n r e l a t i o n i s i n fact the c e n t r a l notion of Buber's thought: "On the f a r side of the subjective, on t h i s side of the objective, on the narrow ridge, where I and Thou meet, there i s the realm of 'be-36 tween'." y The notion of the Between points to the self-transcendent character of the act whereby one relates to the You, as w e l l as to the ultimate i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y , or the r e a l 'otherness', of the You. Relation i s not psychological, on Buber's account, but rather onto-l o g i c a l , or a r e l a t i o n of the s e l f to the being of the Other. There i s also no question of a 'mystical absorption' i n which the s e l f and the Other merge into a unity: r e l a t i o n , as Buber puts i t , r e-quires both an I and a You. Buber's concept of the Between i s c l o s e l y related to h i s notion of 'presence', which he defines as the o r i g i n a l bond between subject and object, always there as the ground of the mutuality involved. As R. Wood observes, "Presence i s the mutual givenness of subject and object, the primary togetherness which antedates t h e i r separa-t i o n through r e f l e c t i o n . This i s why.Buber sees children and primi-37 t i v e s as c l e a r instances of the l i f e of r e l a t i o n . " Children and p r i m i t i v e s have not l o s t the capacity to 'sense the depth hidden within the simple presence of things', to see each new event as some-189 thing which i s , despite a l l resemblance to what has gone before, unique and unexpected. Indeed, Buber believes that ' a l l r e a l l i v i n g i s meeting': subject-object or I - I t knowledge i s nothing other than the s o c i a l l y o b j e c t i v i z e d and elaborated product of the meeting which takes place between man and h i s You, whether that 'You' be nature, other men, or forms of the s p i r i t . However, both I-You meet-ing and I - I t knowledge are necessary for human existence: Buber i s not advocating a return to the state of children and p r i m i t i v e s , but as we s h a l l see a movement from the dominance of the I - I t , and hence inauthentic l i v i n g for i n d i v i d u a l s and c o l l e c t i v e s , toward the harmonious interpenetration of I-You and I - I t , or a u t h e n t i c i t y , and thus the establishment of 'genuine persons and genuine commun-i t i e s '. In order to appreciate Buber's treatment of authentic existence, several of h i s key concepts must be elaborated. In I and Thou, as we have seen, Buber provides both a phenomenological description of man's twofold a t t i t u d e , as w e l l as an ontology which points to the realm of the Between as that which binds subject and object to-gether i n an i d e n t i t y - i n - d i f f e r e n c e . In "Distance and Relation", Buber i d e n t i f i e s the two 'basic movements' of man from which the twofold p r i n c i p l e of human l i f e i s derived; namely, 'the primal s e t t i n g at a distance' and 'entering into r e l a t i o n ' : "That the f i r s t movement i s the presupposition of the other i s p l a i n from the fact that one can enter i n t o r e l a t i o n only with being which has been set at a distance, more p r e c i s e l y , has become an independent o p p o s i t e . " 3 8 I t i s only for man, Buber contends, that an independent opposite e x i s t s . Only through the act of s e t t i n g at a distance does man have a 'world as such', and Buber c a l l s the act of entering into r e l a t i o n 1 9 0 with the world 'synthesizing apperception' or the apperception of a being as a whole and as a unity. S i m i l a r l y , i n h i s l i f e with other men, i t i s the fact that man sets man at a distance and makes him independent that enables him to enter i n t o r e l a t i o n , as an i n d i v i d u a l s e l f , with others l i k e him-s e l f . However, as Buber notes, "Man can set at a distance without coming i n t o r e a l r e l a t i o n with what has been set at a distance." ^ When man f a i l s to enter into r e l a t i o n , the distance i n question 'thickens and s o l i d i f i e s ' ; instead of making room for r e l a t i o n , i n other words, i t obstructs i t . I t i s t h i s f a i l u r e to enter i n t o re-l a t i o n which corresponds to the I - I t , and thus, on Buber's account, distance i s the presupposition for both the I-You (which can be equated with entering into r e l a t i o n ) and the I - I t . In sum, distance i s given to man as man, yet from the ontological standpoint i t i s pre-personal: from out of an o r i g i n a l i d e n t i t y - i n - d i f f e r e n c e comes the primal s e t t i n g at a distance, preceding the I-You and I - I t which together make up personal existence. Buber describes the I-You r e l a t i o n with other men at some length i n h i s l a t e r works. In "Elements of the Interhuman", for example, Buber i n s i s t s that only as a partner i n d i r e c t d i a l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n can man be perceived, not as an object, but as an 'existing whole-ness'. As M. Friedman observes, "To become aware of a man means to perceive h i s wholeness as a person defined by s p i r i t : to perceive the dynamic centre which stamps on a l l h i s utterances, actions, and attitudes the tangible sign of oneness." ^° On Buber's account, such an awareness i s possible only when the Other becomes present for me. This notion of making the Other present i s explicated by Buber i n terms of the concepts of 'inclusion' and 'experiencing the 191 other s i d e ' . In Between Man and Man, 'inc l u s i o n ' i s defined as 'the extension of one's own concreteness': I t s elements are, f i r s t , a r e l a t i o n , of no matter what kind, between two persons, second, an event experienced by them i n common, i n which at l e a s t one of them a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i -pates, and, t h i r d , the fact that t h i s one person, without f o r f e i t i n g anything of the f e l t r e a l i t y of h i s a c t i v i t y , at the same time l i v e s through the common event from the stand-point of the Other. 41 Buber provides as an example a s i t u a t i o n i n which one man i s s t r i k i n g another: "Then l e t us assume that the s t r i k e r suddenly r e -ceives i n h i s soul the blow which he s t r i k e s : the same blow; that he receives i t as the other who remains s t i l l . For the space of a moment he experiences the s i t u a t i o n from the other side." ^ 2 Exper-iencing the other side, then, makes the Other present as an e x i s t i n g unity: i t i s not, Buber i n s i s t s , a form of empathy but rather 'a bold swinging' i n t o the l i f e of the Other which demands 'the most intensive s t i r r i n g of one's being'.^ J 'Empathy1, on t h i s account, means to transpose oneself 'over there': "Thus i t means the exclusion of one's own concreteness, the extinguishing of the actual s i t u a t i o n of l i f e , the absorption i n pure aestheticism of the r e a l i t y i n which one p a r t i c i p a t e s . " ^ Inclusion i s purported to be preci s e l y the opposite of t h i s : making the Other present by means of experiencing the other side enables one to l i v e through a shared event from the perspective of the Other, to thus perceive him as a You i n a l l h i s wholeness and uniqueness, without lo s i n g anything of one's own r e a l -i t y . There are a number of d i f f i c u l t i e s , however, with Buber's ex-amples of I-You r e l a t i o n s . In "What i s Man?", Buber provides as an instance of such a r e l a t i o n s h i p the glances of two strangers i n an 192 a i r - r a i d s h e l t e r which 'suddenly meet for a second i n astonishing and unrelated mutuality': "...when the A l l Clear sounds i t i s f o r -gotten; and yet i t did happen, i n a realm which existed only for that moment." ^ S i m i l a r l y , Buber holds that i n a darkened opera-house there can be established between two of the audience, who do not know one another and who are l i s t e n i n g with the same i n t e n s i t y to the music of Mozart: "...a r e l a t i o n which i s scarcely perceptible and yet i s one of elemental dialogue, and which has long vanished when the l i g h t s blaze up again." ^  On Buber's account, then, these examples of momentary exchanges between strangers constitute bona fide instances of I-You r e l a t i o n s . P. Wheelwright poses the following pointed questions: "May not such an appearance of dialogue be i l l u s o r y ? Can a glance between strangers, i f unconfirmed by other evidences, be a s a t i s f a c t o r y i n -d i c a t i o n that mutuality of response i s r e a l l y present?"^ 7 Indeed, as examples of I-You r e l a t i o n s , these f l e e t i n g encounters leave much to be desired: they may w e l l be nothing more than i l l u s i o n s . On t h i s point, Kaufmann's c r i t i c i s m s are w e l l taken: there i s no guarantee that genuine I-You re l a t i o n s h i p s e x i s t here; they could i n fact be examples of 'self-indulgence, self-absorption, self-deception, ro-mantic dreams'. G. Marcel makes a h e l p f u l suggestion when he says that, rather than being exemplified i n the meetings of strangers, genuine I-You r e l a t i o n s are manifested when the persons involved share some sort of h i s t o r y or community. As Marcel puts i t , the stranger seated beside me i n the t r a i n to whom I say nothing does not belong to my hi s t o r y : "But a minute event might be enough to give b i r t h to t h i s community, for example, an unexpected stop of the t r a i n which threatens to have for both of us e x i s t e n t i a l con-193 sequences. This could s u f f i c e for an opening i n the sort of b a r r i e r which separates us, i n short, for us to make contact." Z f 8 Marcel's suggestion i s a c t u a l l y compatible with much of the l a t e r Buber, where f l e e t i n g I-You encounters are s t i l l p ossible, but c e r t a i n l y not paradigmatic of mature d i a l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In order to understand the nature of these mature d i a l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n -ships, and hence Buber's p o r t r a i t of authentic existence, i t i s nec-essary to r e c a l l that on Buber's account our time i s characterized by the progressive decline of dialogue, and that our world i s there-fore, by and large, an I t world. However, even given these condi-t i o n s , Buber contends that an i n d i v i d u a l today s t i l l unexpectedly finds himself confronted by an hour which has 'a s p e c i a l and even an e s p e c i a l l y questionable connection with h i s personal future'. There are e s s e n t i a l l y two possible reactions to such an hour. The i n d i v i d u a l i n question can once again submerge himself i n events and 'surrender anew' to the I t world, or he can 'renounce the beaten track': "...draw forth forgotten primal forces from t h e i r hiding-places, and make the decision that answers the s i t u a t i o n . " ^ One can deny choice or af f i r m choice, Buber says, one can f a i l to enter i n t o r e l a t i o n and abdicate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , or one can 'participate i n becoming, i n the fa c t u a l decision that w i l l be made about the make-up of the next hour.' Choosing to enter into r e l a t i o n , with one's world and with one's fellowmen, means for Buber choosing a form of existence which i s fundamentally authentic. Buber makes-a d i s t i n c t i o n between the caus-a l necessity of the I t world, and 'true necessity' or fate, which i s encountered only by the i n d i v i d u a l who actualizes freedom. The free human being, the human being who affirms choice and who chooses to 194 enter i n t o r e l a t i o n , •encounters fate as the counter-image of h i s freedom': " I t i s not h i s l i m i t but h i s completion; freedom and fate embrace each other to form meaning." 5 0 I t i s Buber's contention that whoever proceeds toward the world of You, 'concentrating h i s whole being, with h i s power to re l a t e resurrected, beholds h i s free-dom'. Fate, on t h i s account, does not lead the i n d i v i d u a l - i t 'waits fo r him': "He must proceed toward i t without knowing where i t waits for him. He must go forth with h i s whole being." ^ 1 The notion of 'becoming a whole' i s central to Buber's concep-t i o n of authentic existence. Becoming a whole i s a process which cannot, u l t i m a t e l y , be accomplished i n i s o l a t i o n but rather, on Bu-ber's account, requires that one enter into r e l a t i o n with others. As P. Wheelwright observes, "By nature each person i s a single be-i n g , f i n d i n g himself i n company with other single beings; to be s i n -gle i s not to be i s o l a t e d , however, and by vocation each one of us i s to f i n d and r e a l i z e h i s proper focus by entering into r e l a t i o n -ship with others." ^ 2 Finding and r e a l i z i n g one's proper focus i s indeed what Buber means by a c t u a l i z i n g one's fate, and that t h i s process requires r e l a t i o n with others i s a function of the 'innate You'. To be i s to be r e l a t e d , on Buber's view, since man has an p r i o r i r e l a t i o n to the Other, inborn i n the very structure of h i s nature. His being i s a being-toward, or being out there with the Other. One's s e l f - u n i t y o r i g i n a l l y i s a function of r e l a t i o n to an Other. R e c a l l that for man alone, on.Buber's view, there i s 'an oth-erness which i s constituted as otherness'. The basic otherness of the world of experience i s the r e s u l t of a process of distancing on man's part, but the process i s 'primordial' or p r e - r e f l e c t i v e . As 195 Wheelwright notes, "The process of distancing i s epistemologically a p r i o r i , i n the Kantian sense that i t i s the basis of our possess-ing any conception of an independent world and, correspondingly, any conception of o u r s e l f . " 5 3 However, Buber maintains that otherness i s not f u l l y manifest u n t i l the separated I and the world of I t have emerged as independent opposites. Mature d i a l o g i c a l encounter r e -quires that otherness be f u l l y manifest: the You-saying of the c h i l d and the p r i m i t i v e are s t i l l immature, on t h i s view, because t h e i r I-saying i s s t i l l immature. As we s h a l l see, the mature development of one's s e l f - u n i t y at the r e f l e c t i v e l e v e l and the f u l l manifesta-t i o n of the otherness of other men constitute the two movements of the d i a l e c t i c a l process of becoming a whole. A l l awareness, on Buber's account, i s manifestation of other-ness, and simultaneous with that manifestation there emerges the sense of selfhood i n terms of which otherness i s s p e c i f i a b l e . As R. Wood puts i t , "There i s no sp e c i f i a b l e I without the Other i n vi r t u e of v/hich the I i s s p e c i f i a b l e ; but likewise there i s no manifest Other without the I i n vi r t u e of which the Other i s man-i f e s t . " 3 / + The s e l f and the Other are thus d i a l e c t i c a l l y r e l a t e d , and maturation i s a bip o l a r process i n which the You i s enriched, at le a s t p o t e n t i a l l y , through o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , and the I i s enriched through a r e f l e c t i v e development of s u b j e c t i v i t y which does not lose touch with i t s relatedness. Contrary to Kaufmann's suggestion that Buber denigrates the I - I t , and hence o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , Buber i n fact sees o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n as having an indispensable part to play, not only i n the development of the world of experience, but also i n de-veloping the I-You r e l a t i o n i t s e l f . On t h i s account, the purpose of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n i s the enlargement of the I being encountered, so 196 as to provoke a more profound meeting. O b R e c t i f i c a t i o n , on i t s own, does not constitute an adequate manifestation of otherness. The Other appears as the Other-for-me, as an object for my experience or use. However, the r e v e l a t i o n of otherness i s , on Buber's view, capable of development. As Wood notes, "The term of that r e v e l a t i o n i s the manifestation of the Other wholly as other, apart from speculative or pragmatic conquest,, Revelation of the O t h e r - i n - t o t a l i t y presupposes and grounds, i n a simultaneous mutual act, s e l f h o o d - i n - t o t a l i t y . " ^5 j n s u m j i f otherness i s not f u l l y manifest then neither i s selfhood, and what i s required for both i s a mature I-You r e l a t i o n s h i p i n which the undivided s e l f meets with the undivided Other. Authentic existence, on Buber's account, comprises just t h i s d i a l e c t i c a l process of becoming a whole by standing i n r e l a t i o n s h i p with others. Men become mature selves i n r e l a t i o n with other such selves; as Friedman puts i t , "The inmost growth of the s e l f i s not induced by man's r e l a t i o n to himself but by the confirmation i n which one man knows himself to be 'made present' i n h i s uniqueness by the other." Authentic existence, for Buber, i s completing d i s -tance by r e l a t i o n , and r e l a t i o n here means genuine dialogue and mu-t u a l confirmation. I t i s only as a d i a l o g i c a l partner, Buber main-t a i n s , that man can be made present, or perceived i n h i s wholeness and uniqueness. Making the Other present means perceiving him as a unity or t o t a l i t y defined by h i s own p a r t i c u l a r f a t e , and i t i s by means of t h i s act of making present that one d i a l o g i c a l partner con-firms the other. In our l i f e with other men, as we have seen, i t i s the fact that man sets man at a distance and makes him independent that en-19? ables him to enter into r e l a t i o n , as an i n d i v i d u a l s e l f , with others l i k e himself. I t i s through t h i s 'interhuman' r e l a t i o n alone, Buber says, that men f i n a l l y become manifest selves by confirming one an-other. Moreover, as Friedman observes, "Confirmation does not mean that I take h i s appearance at t h i s moment as being the person I want to confirm. I must take the other person i n h i s dynamic existence, i n h i s s p e c i f i c p o t e n t i a l i t y . " 5 7 Confirming the Other as he i s now i s thus only a f i r s t step: i n the present l i e s the seed of what he can become, and i t i s t h i s p o t e n t i a l i t y , t h i s sense of his unique d i r e c t i o n as a person, that I most seek to confirm. Authentic e x i s -tence i s thus for Buber an ongoing process between i n d i v i d u a l s : i t i s a d i a l e c t i c of I t and You, of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n which can enlarge and develop the I, and meeting which serves to synthesize the ob-je c t i v e elements of the I into a d i s t i n c t i v e unity through confirm-atio n by the Other. I t should be noted here that Buber does not deny that, as oth-ers o b j e c t i f y me, I also o b j e c t i f y myself; nor does he deny that I am able to gather myself into a unity and embrace my d i s t i n c t i v e fate i n s o l i t a r y r e f l e c t i o n . Indeed, Buber allows that withdrawal i s 'always required to achieve any act of r e l a t i o n ' , and that 'the u n i f i c a t i o n of the soul' can be achieved i n so l i t u d e . v However, he also i n s i s t s that withdrawal and s o l i t a r y r e f l e c t i o n are prepar-atory only: mature s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n requires confirmation by the Other, because i t i s only an other who can f u l l y make me present, or see me as a d i s t i n c t i v e whole. I cannot do t h i s for myself: we must, on Buber's view, help one another. Thus, to the question 'What have I to do?', he answers: 'You s h a l l not withhold y o u r s e l f : "You, imprisoned i n the s h e l l s i n which society, state, church, school, 198 economy, public opinion, and your own pride have stuck you, i n d i r e c t one among i n d i r e c t ones, break through your s h e l l s , become d i r e c t ; man, have contact with men!" ^9 Buber i n s i s t s that each man needs help, and that we must awaken i n the Other the need of help and i n ourselves the capacity to help. The goal, on t h i s account, i s to 'make the crowd no longer a crowd': to d e l i v e r man from i t , and to 'shape the shapeless' i n t o a genuine community. In order for a true community to come into being, on Buber's account, i n d i v i d u a l s "...have to stand i n a l i v i n g , r e c i p r o c a l r e l a -tionship to a sin g l e l i v i n g centre, and they have to stand i n a l i v -i n g , r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p to one another." ^ Buber r e l a t e s t h i s notion of a l i v i n g centre to the zaddik or holy man of the Hasidic community, whose l i f e has been 'informed by the s p i r i t ' . Given t h i s l i v i n g centre, the establishment of a genuine community requires mutuality, or l i v i n g r e c i p r o c i t y between i n d i v i d u a l s , and s o l i d a r i t y , or a l i v i n g 'answering fo r ' or r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for one another. I t i s through membership i n a genuine community, or what Buber terms the ' e s s e n t i a l We', that man escapes 'the crowd': man escapes the crowd not through i s o l a t i o n but instead through mutuality and s o l i -d a r i t y . As Buber puts i t , "By We I mean a community of several indepen-dent persons, who have reached a s e l f and s e l f - r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the community r e s t i n g on the basis of t h i s s e l f and s e l f - r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and being made possible by them." ^ 1 R e c a l l Buber's claim that the You-saying of the c h i l d and the pri m i t i v e are immature because t h e i r I-saying i s immature: mature You-saying i s only possible a f t e r the separated I and the world of I t have emerged. S i m i l a r l y , Buber d i s -tinguishes immature from mature We-saying*. the former precedes the 199 development of true i n d i v i d u a l i t y , and the l a t t e r occurs when inde-pendent i n d i v i d u a l s f r e e l y come together i n l i v i n g r e c i p r o c a l r e l a -t i o n . Authentic community involves t h i s mutuality of r e l a t i o n , as w e l l as s o l i d a r i t y or r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : 'pledging a s e l f i n response and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' . We are responsible for and must respond to the concrete r e a l i t y which confronts us, and Buber maintains that i n our time, the d e t e r i o r a t i o n of a l l t r a d i t i o n a l bonds has made t h e i r legitimacy questionable: Only i n the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l bonds, i n the spinning w h i r l of freedom, does personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y arise which i n the end can no longer lean with i t s burden of decision on any church or society or culture but i s lonely i n the face of Present Being. 63 As Buber puts i t , at the opposite pole of being compelled by destiny or nature or men there does not stand being free of destiny or nature or men, but being free to 'commune and covenant with them' To do t h i s , one must f i r s t have become independent ( r e l a t i o n pre-supposes distance), but on Buber's account t h i s freedom i s 'a foot-bridge, not a dwelling-place': "Let us r e a l i z e the true meaning of being free of a bond: i t means that a quite personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y takes the place of one shared with many generations. L i f e l i v e d i n freedom i s personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or i t i s a pathetic farce." 6 Z f Buber maintains that the power which alone can give a content to empty freedom and a d i r e c t i o n to 'swaying, spinning' freedom i s pre-c i s e l y 'the i n s t i n c t for communion, which teaches us the saying of You' and which points ultimately to the eternal You: "When a l l ' d i r -ections' f a i l there arises i n the darkness over the abyss the one true d i r e c t i o n of man, towards the creative S p i r i t , towards the Spir i t of God." 6 5 On Buber's view, therefore, i f man becomes authentic, i f the 200 i n d i v i d u a l becomes what only he can and should become, i t i s through responding with his whole being to the address of the unique s i t u a -t i o n which confronts him, through becoming a whole and f i n d i n g h i s true personal d i r e c t i o n , which i s u l t i m a t e l y the d i r e c t i o n to God. Thus the good, for-Buber, i s not a objective state of a f f a i r s or a subjective f e e l i n g , but rather i t i s a type of r e l a t i o n s h i p ; namely, the dialogue between man and God which has as i t s product authentic human existence. Indeed, on t h i s view, as Friedman notes, "The very meaning of 'good' i s derived from our r e l a t i o n to God and h i s demand that we make r e a l our created existence by becoming human, becoming r e a l . " ^ Thus the basis of Buber's ethics i s h i s r e l i g i o n : the source of the 'ought' i s ulti m a t e l y the command and w i l l of God, which i s given expression by means of r e v e l a t i o n , or my meeting with the eternal You. We w i l l address ce r t a i n d i f f i c u l t i e s with t h i s ac-count i n chapter nine. However, the r e l i g i o u s dimension of Buber's thought aside, h i s conception of i n d i v i d u a l being as a being-with, or h i s account of the 'innate You', serves to ground an interpersonal ethic which rules out the e x p l o i t a t i o n of others by the i n d i v i d u a l . As J.W. Murphy puts i t , "Every actor has an ontological r e l a t i o n s h i p to the Other which demands that the Other be confirmed i n every person's acts. This does not mean that every act must be sanctioned by the Other, but that every act must be planned with reference to the on t o l o g i c a l respect that the Other deserves." L i f e for Buber i s fundamentally i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e : every act occurs i n s i t u and presupposes the pre-sence of the Other. Every act, i f i t i s to be moral, must respect the boundary and l i m i t established between the s e l f and the Other: actions that are not confirmed by the Other, or which v i o l a t e h i s 201 own a b i l i t y to act, are ruled out as i l l e g i t i m a t e . The choice be-tween a u t h e n t i c i t y and i n a u t h e n t i c i t y , for Buber, i s thus u l t i m a t e l y a choice between moving one's actions and attitudes i n the d i r e c t i o n of r e l a t i o n s h i p and r e c i p r o c i t y (I-You), or i n the d i r e c t i o n of sep-arateness and mutual e x p l o i t a t i o n ( I - I t ) . Buber's conception of authentic existence i n fact espouses a species of s i t u a t i o n e t h i c s , but i t i s not an ethics without an ab-solute p r i n c i p l e . The p r i n c i p l e , derived from the I-You r e l a t i o n i t s e l f , i s the i n t e g r i t y of both the s e l f and the Other, which must be established and preserved i n every s i t u a t i o n . The good, r e c a l l , i s not for Buber an objective state of a f f a i r s or a subjective f e e l -i n g , but a type of r e l a t i o n s h i p ; bypassing the r e l i g i o u s dimension, l e t us say the d i r e c t d i a l o g i c a l encounter between man and man. Bu-ber maintains that most of the t r a d i t i o n a l moral values are implied i n the I-You r e l a t i o n , such as that one must not k i l l , l i e or s t e a l , and that one must honor one's parents, and so on. However, he also believes that i t must be decided anew i n each concrete context what these p r e s c r i p t i o n s a c t u a l l y involve: I have never doubted the absolute v a l i d i t y of the command 'Honor thy father and thy mother', but he who says to me that one, i n f a c t , knows always and under a l l c i r -cumstances, what 'to honor' means and what i t does not, of him I say that he does not know what he i s t a l k i n g about. 68 What i s e s s e n t i a l , always, for Buber i s a respect for the i n -t e g r i t y of the Other, and the confirmation which grows out of one's d i r e c t r e l a t i o n with t h i s Other. 'Making the Other present', per-ceiving h i s wholeness and uniqueness, and 'experiencing the other side', so that one may help and not hinder him i n the f u l f i l l m e n t of h i s own p o t e n t i a l i t y , determines the moral q u a l i t y of one's ac-202 tions and a t t i t u d e s . Authenticating one's own humanity i s thus, for Buber, as e s s e n t i a l l y interhuman process, i n which each i s ob l i g e d to respect the dignity of the Other, and i n which each r e -quires the help of the Other, or that mutual confirmation which only d i r e c t d i a l o g i c a l encounter provides. We may now proceed to compare Buber's p o s i t i o n with that of Sartre, i n an attempt to broaden and deepen Sartre's account of authentic existence, by means of appealing to Buber's p o r t r a i t of au t h e n t i c i t y as a funda mentally interpersonal process. 203 Chapter Nine Sartre and Authentic Human Existence In t h i s chapter, Sartre's account of authentic existence w i l l be further fleshed out by means of appealing to Buber*s I-You, I - I t d i s t i n c t i o n . Buber' describes for us a non-objectifying meeting, not a merging, of d i s t i n c t s u b j e c t i v i t i e s , and he also provides f o r us an account both of p o s i t i v e , constructive and negative, destructive o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of one s u b j e c t i v i t y by another. I t w i l l be argued that Buber's descriptions are e n t i r e l y consistent with Sartre's theory of consciousness as i t i s presented i n Being and Nothingness, and that they are likewise compatible with the praxis philosophy of the C r i t i q u e of D i a l e c t i c a l Reason. Sartre's theory of groups does provide an account of how p o s i t i v e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are possible and hence renders i n t e l l i g i b l e that aspect of his concept of auth-e n t i c i t y which requires of us action on behalf of the freedom of a l l . Hov/ever, p o s i t i v e personal r e l a t i o n s such as love and f r i e n d -ship cannot be reduced to common or group action, and an account of such r e l a t i o n s w i l l be presented which w i l l f i l l t h i s gap l e f t i n Sartre's treatment of au t h e n t i c i t y . F i n a l l y , h i s ethics of authentic human existence, which requires that we should act to promote the freedom of a l l people, w i l l be examined, together with h i s socio-p o l i t i c a l i d e a l of d i r e c t democracy, or a true i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v e com-munity where a s p i r i t of f r a t e r n i t y p r e v a i l s . 204 I t has been argued i n chapter seven that Sartre's concept of authentic existence s t i l l lacks an account of the dimension of pos-i t i v e personal r e l a t i o n s . In Being and Nothingness, negative person-a l r e l a t i o n s , within the context of bad f a i t h and the God-project, were described. In the C r i t i q u e , group r e l a t i o n s within the h i s t o r -i c a l context of material s c a r c i t y were discussed, both negative ( p r a c t i c o - i n e r t mediation) and pos i t i v e (praxis mediation). We w i l l now turn to Buber i n an attempt to f i l l the gap l e f t i n Sartre's theory of human r e l a t i o n s . As we saw i n chapter eight, Buber main-tains that we are to understand authentic human existence i n terms of h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the two basic word pairs I - I t and I-You, which each e s t a b l i s h a d i s t i n c t i v e mode of existence. R e c a l l that I - I t i s the basic word of separation, or experience and use: per-c e i v i n g , f e e l i n g , wanting and thinking are a l l described by Buber as ' p a r t i a l a c t i v i t i e s ' of man characterized by the structure of the subject-object r e l a t i o n . I-You, on the other hand, Is the basic word of r e l a t i o n , i n which the undivided s e l f meets the undivided Other, and such encounters are i n turn characterized by exclusive-ness, presentness or immediacy, and r e c i p r o c i t y or mutuality. While Buber i n s i s t s that there are not two types of men, he maintains that there are two poles of humanity, the one inauthentic (or dominated by the I - I t , and hence separateness and mutual e x p l o i t a t i o n ) , and the other authentic ( i n which the I-You interpenetrates the I - I t , allowing for the development of 'genuine persons', standing i n a l i v i n g , r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n to one another). For our purposes, the c r u c i a l aspect of Buber's account i s that becoming authentic i s 'becoming a whole' by standing i n r e l a t i o n s h i p with others. L i f e i s fundamentally i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e : i n d i v i d u a l being 2 0 5 i s a being-with. Becoming a whole or a coherent unity organized around and i n terms of one's d i s t i n c t i v e p o t e n t i a l i t y or 'fate', i s a process which requires the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Other. On Bu-ber 's account, the s e l f and the Other are d i a l e c t i c a l l y r e l a t e d : the mature development of one's s e l f - u n i t y at the r e f l e c t i v e l e v e l and the f u l l manifestation of the 'otherness' of the Other c o n s t i -tute the two movements of the d i a l e c t i c a l process of becoming a whole. In my I-You meetings with the Other, I am 'made present' by the Other i n my wholeness and uniqueness, and my existence i s 'con-firmed'. Likewise, when I choose to enter into r e l a t i o n with the Other, I assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for h i s self-development as well as my own. Authenticating one's own humanity i s thus an e s s e n t i a l l y interhuman process for Buber, i n which each i s obliged to respect the d i g n i t y of the Other, and i n which each requires the aid of the Other, or that mutual confirmation which only genuine I-You meeting provides. What must be recognized, i n r e l a t i o n to Sartre's account, i s that Buber's treatment of authentic existence describes for us a non-objectifying meeting, not a merging, of d i s t i n c t s u b j e c t i v i t i e s , and i t also provides for us an account of both p o s i t i v e , construc-t i v e and negative, destructive o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of one s u b j e c t i v i t y by another. In the I-You r e l a t i o n , f i r s t l y , the undivided s e l f meets the undivided Other: there i s no question of a 'mystical absorption' i n which the s e l f and the Other merge into a unity, since r e l a t i o n , as Buber puts i t , requires both an 1 and a You. Secondly, the dimen-sion of the I - I t possesses both negative and po s i t i v e modes and functions. When the I t dominates the You, when o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n dom-inates r e l a t i o n , the r e s u l t i s indeed negative: an inauthentic form 206 of existence characterized by separateness and mutual e x p l o i t a t i o n i n an It-world. However, o b R e c t i f i c a t i o n also possesses a p o s i t i v e function: i t has an indispensable part to play, Buber argues, not only i n the development of the world of experience, but also i n de-veloping the I-You-relation i t s e l f . In the case of the development of the world of experience, re-c a l l that Buber says that the t r a n s i t i o n from You to I t i n our world i s also man's greatness: "For thus knowledge, thus works, thus image and example come into being among the l i v i n g . " 1 In the case of de-veloping the I-You r e l a t i o n i t s e l f , moreover, Buber argues that the purpose of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n i s the enlargement of the I being encoun-tered, so as to provoke a more profound meeting. R e c a l l that on Bu-ber's view, mature d i a l o g i c a l encounter requires that 'otherness' be f u l l y manifest: the You-saying of the c h i l d and the pr i m i t i v e are s t i l l immature, on t h i s view, because t h e i r 1-saying i s s t i l l immature. As we saw i n chapter eight, the mature development of one's s e l f - u n i t y at the r e f l e c t i v e l e v e l and the f u l l manifestation of the otherness of other men constitute the two movements of the d i a l e c t i -c a l process of becoming a whole, or becoming authentic: maturation i s a b i p o l a r process i n which the You i s enriched through o b j e c t i f i -c ation and the I i s enriched through a r e f l e c t i v e development of s u b j e c t i v i t y which does not lose touch with i t s relatedness. Auth-entic existence thus means for Buber that the I-You of r e l a t i o n i n -terpenetrates the I - I t of ob R e c t i f i c a t i o n , allowing for the mature development of 'genuine persons', standing i n a l i v i n g , r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n to one another. However, there i s a problem with Buber's account which has not yet been addressed. Choosing to enter into r e l a t i o n , with one's world 207 and with one's fellowmen, means choosing a form of existence which i s fundamentally authentic. The free human being, the human being who affirms choice and who chooses to enter into r e l a t i o n , on Buber's view, 'encounters fate as the counter-image of his freedom': "He must proceed toward i t without knowing where i t waits for him. He must go f o r t h with h i s whole being." 2 On Buber's view, i f man be-comes authentic, i f the i n d i v i d u a l becomes what only he can and should become, i t i s through responding with his whole being to the address of the unique s i t u a t i o n which confronts him, through becoming a whole and f i n d i n g h i s true personal d i r e c t i o n , which i s u l t i m a t e l y the d i r e c t i o n to God. Thus, as we have seen, the good for Buber i s a type of r e l a t i o n s h i p ; namely, the dialogue between man and God which has as i t s product authentic human existence. The basis of Bu-ber 's eth i c s of au t h e n t i c i t y i s thus h i s r e l i g i o n : the source of the 'ought' i s u l t i m a t e l y the command and w i l l of God, which i s given expression by means of r e v e l a t i o n , or my meeting with the eternal You. I t i s Buber's conception of reve l a t i o n which presents the prob-lem for h i s treatment of authen t i c i t y . Of r e v e l a t i o n , Buber says: "The powerful revelations invoked by the r e l i g i o n s are e s s e n t i a l l y the same as the quiet one that occurs everywhere and at a l l times." 3 One hears the claim of the s i t u a t i o n at hand, and one answers i t 'out of the depths of one's own being'. On Buber's account, t h i s re-sponse comes from the 'conscience'; not 'the routine conscience', 'the play-on-the-surface conscience'., but "...the unknown conscience i n the ground of being, which needs to be discovered ever anew.',Zf As M. Friedman notes, "Conscience i s the voice which c a l l s one to f u l f i l l the personal i n t e n t i o n of being for which he was created. I t 208 i s the i n d i v i d u a l ' s awareness of what he ' r e a l l y ' i s , of what i n h i s unique and nonrepeatable existence he i s intended to be." ^ On Buber's view, then, when conscience i s not s t i f l e d , i t i s able to compare what one i s with what one i s c a l l e d to become, and i t there-by distinguishes and decides between r i g h t and wrong. As Buber puts i t , "We f i n d the e t h i c a l i n i t s p u r i t y only there where the human person confronts himself with his own p o t e n t i a l i t y and distinguishes and decides i n t h i s confrontation without asking anything other than what i s r i g h t and what i s wrong i n t h i s h i s own s i t u a t i o n . " 6 On Buber's account, then, i t i s only through r e v e l a t i o n or i n genuine encounter with God that we discover what i s r i g h t and what i s wrong. As M. Fox observes, however, there are fundamental d i f f i -c u l t i e s with t h i s p o s i t i o n , chief among them being the everpresent r i s k of being mistaken: " I f we admit that i n d i v i d u a l s can be mistaken when they believe they have been addressed by God, must we not have some r e l i a b l e c r i t e r i o n for dis t i n g u i s h i n g between the false and the true address? But what c r i t e r i o n can there be? So long as man judges r e v e l a t i o n by h i s inner l i g h t , i s not every claim to revela-t i o n equally v a l i d ? " 7 Coupled with t h i s d i f f i c u l t y i s the fact that r e v e l a t i o n i t s e l f apparently does not provide us with a set of e t h i -c a l rules or guidelines. In I and Thou Buber states, for example, "No p r e s c r i p t i o n can lead us to the encounter (with God), and none leads from i t . " 8 What comes out of revel a t i o n i s not a set of rules or guidelines, but rather the reformation of the human s p i r i t : through r e v e l a t i o n man apprehends that demands are made of him to become what he can be, but on Fox's view i t i s only the i n d i v i d u a l himself who can decide what s p e c i f i c a l l y i s asked of him and exactly how he i s to respond. Thus we are l e f t once again with the problem 2 0 9 of the p o s s i b i l i t y of error, as w e l l as these related questions: "What s h a l l we do with the man who chooses i n a way i n opposition to the norms of society? S h a l l we condemn him as e v i l ? But we cannot for he may be acting i n accordance with what he i s convinced i s the voice of God." 9 On the subject of e t h i c a l guidelines, Buber responds that there are, on h i s view, u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d moral r u l e s : as we saw i n chap-ter eight, most of the t r a d i t i o n a l moral values are i n fact implied i n the I-You r e l a t i o n i t s e l f , such as that one must not k i l l , l i e , s t e a l , that one must honor one's parents, and so on. Buber's point i s rather that i n each concrete context i t has to be decided anew, for example, what genuine honoring of one's parents a c t u a l l y involves "I have never doubted the absolute v a l i d i t y of the command 'Honor thy father and thy mother', but he who says to me that one, i n f a c t , knows always and under a l l circumstances, what 'to honor' means and what i t does not, of him I say that he does not know what he i s t a l k -1 o ing about." However, the e s s e n t i a l thing about even the Ten Com-mandments i s not the objective norms per se, but rather the meeting with God out of which they o r i g i n a l l y emerged, and Buber maintains that morality must be grounded ever again i n such d i a l o g i c a l encoun-ters between man and God. This brings us to the c e n t r a l d i f f i c u l t y noted by Fox; namely, the problem of establishing the genuineness of these d i a l o g i c a l en-counters themselves. On Buber's account, conscience c a l l s one to f u l f i l l the personal i n t e n t i o n of being for which he was created, and i t i s conscience which compares what one i s now with what one i s c a l l e d to become, and thereby distinguishes between the r i g h t course of action and the wrong course of action i n the present s i t u a t i o n . 210 Here, Buber allows that the cert a i n t y produced by conscience i s only a 'personal c e r t a i n t y ' : conscience i s human and can be mistaken. 1 1 Indeed, Buber believes that ours i s an age i n which 'false absolutes pierce through the l e v e l of the e t h i c a l ' and demand 'the s a c r i f i c e of personal i n t e g r i t y i n order that equality may come, that freedom may come, or that the Kingdom may come'. Buber concludes, then, that we must guard against the confusion of the r e l a t i v e with the Absolute "Both, the human f a i t h not less than the human conscience, can err and e r r ever again. And knowing about t h i s e r r i n g , both- conscience 1 2 not l e s s than f a i t h - must place themselves i n the hands of grace." C l e a r l y , t h i s response i s less than s a t i s f a c t o r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y for the nonbeliever. For Buber, the 'ultimate mysteries of creation' are beyond l o g i c , and hence beyond proof. However, as an a l t e r n a t i v e and as a means of bypassing the d i f f i c u l t i e s Inherent i n the notion of r e l i g i o u s r e v e l a t i o n , i t can be argued that an ethics consistent with Buber's conception of authentic human existence need not i n -clude reference to the r e l i g i o u s dimension of his thought. Buber's account of au t h e n t i c i t y s t i p u l a t e s that man must 'become a whole', become a unity by means of entering i n t o r e l a t i o n with the You and embracing h i s 'fate'. Embracing one's fate i s interpreted by Buber as a c t u a l i z i n g a God-given p o t e n t i a l i t y , but i t could be interpreted, for example, along Sartrean l i n e s , as becoming r e f l e c t i v e l y aware of one's ( p r e - r e f l e c t i v e l y chosen) fundamental project, by means of e x i s t e n t i a l psychoanalysis. R e c a l l that, on t h i s view, the i n d i v i d u a l person i s 'discovered i n the i n i t i a l ' p r o j e c t which constitutes him': by a comparison of the various empirical drives of the subject, we t r y to discover and disengage the fundamental project which i s common to them a l l . Becoming r e f l e c t i v e l y aware of t h i s p r e - r e f l e c t l v e l y 21 1 chosen project enables one to evaluate i t and, as we have seen, make the t r a n s i t i o n from i n a u t h e n t i c i t y (the p r e - r e f l e c t i v e choice of a v a r i a t i o n of the God-project) to authenticity (the r e f l e c t i v e choice of freedom as one's primary value). Further, while Fox suggests that Buber faces the problem of a p o t e n t i a l clash between the i n d i v i d u a l 'becoming a whole', on the one hand, and s o c i e t a l norms protecting the r i g h t s of others, on the other, i n fact Buber's conception of i n d i v i d u a l being as a being-with serves to ground an interpersonal ethic which rules out the ex-p l o i t a t i o n of others by the i n d i v i d u a l . As we saw i n chapter eight, every agent has an onto l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p to the Other which de-mands that the Other be confirmed i n a l l of his acts. Every act, i f i t i s to be moral, must respect the boundary and l i m i t established between the s e l f and the Other: the i n t e g r i t y of both the s e l f and the Other must be established and preserved i n every s i t u a t i o n . 'Mak-ing the Other present', perceiving his wholeness and uniqueness, and 'experiencing the other side', so that one may help him and not hin-der him i n h i s projects and pursuits, determines the moral q u a l i t y of one's actions and at t i t u d e s . What i s e s s e n t i a l , always, for Buber i s a respect for the i n t e g r i t y of the Other, and the confirmation which grows out of one's d i r e c t r e l a t i o n with t h i s Other. The choice of a u t h e n t i c i t y over i n a u t h e n t i c i t y i s thus on Buber's account u l -timately the choice of moving one's actions and attitudes i n the d i r e c t i o n of r e l a t i o n s h i p and r e c i p r o c i t y (I-You), and away from separateness and mutual exploitation.. ( I - I t ) . The r e l i g i o u s dimension of his thought aside, then, Buber suc-ceeds i n f i l l i n g a gap i n Sartre's treatment of authentic human ex-istence i n the area of positive personal r e l a t i o n s . I t w i l l be ar-21 2 gued that both Buber's description of non-ob.iectifying meetings of s u b j e c t i v i t i e s , as wel l as his description of p o s i t i v e , constructive o b R e c t i f i c a t i o n of one s u b j e c t i v i t y by another, are e n t i r e l y compat-i b l e with Sartre's theory of consciousness. As we have seen, cons-ciousness, according to Sartre, has two fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . F i r s t , i t i s i n t e n t i o n a l : a l l consciousness i s consciousness of something. Second, i t i s self-conscious: every p o s i t i o n a l or t h e t i c consciousness of an object i s at the same time a non-positional or non-thetic consciousness of i t s e l f . Non-positional self-conscious-ness i s , Sartre says, an immediate non-cognitive r e l a t i o n of the s e l f to i t s e l f . R e f l e c t i o n , on the other hand, i s a secondary act i n which the r e f l e c t i n g consciousness posits the consciousness re-f l e c t e d on as i t s object. I t i s Sartre's contention that non-thetic self-consciousness makes r e f l e c t i o n possible, or that there Is a p r e - r e f l e c t i v e cogito which i s the condition of the Cartesian cog-i t o . ''3 As P. Kenevan observes, t h i s means that for Sartre consciousness i s "...not only a p o s i t i o n a l i n t e n t i o n of objects other than cons-ciousness, but also, simultaneously, an attending arrow, an attention to the s e l f as i t intends objects." 4 I t i s fundamental to recog-nize, however, that non-thetic self-consciousness and p o s i t i o n a l consciousness of objects constitute a unity. They are not d i s t i n c t e n t i t i e s , the former being s e l f - d i r e c t e d and the l a t t e r being world-directed; as a r e s u l t , the p r e - r e f l e c t i v e cogito i s as much world-r e l a t e d as i s the r e f l e c t i v e c o g i t o 6 What Sartre means by non-thetic self-consciousness i s , i n large part, the non-thetic 'residue' i n -volved i n a l l p o s i t i o n a l consciousness of objects, or world-directed 'subsidiary awareness'. There i s always a non-thetic foundation at 213 the root of even the most c l e a r l y p o s i t i o n a l consciousness of an object, and Sartre endeavours to explain t h i s ' t a c i t ground of a l l knowledge' v i a h i s treatment of the temporal structure of conscious-ness : ...temporally we are not dealing with successive moments without mutual connection on the pre-re f l e c t i v e l e v e l . For example: I perceive you and I am conscious of perceiving you, but I am conscious of perceiving you as the one whom I have already perceived a moment ago and whom I w i l l perceive i n the following moment. I t cannot be doubted that you do not appear without t h i s connection. The moments of consciousness wherein I am conscious of you do not appear without con-nection with the consciousness that I have had e a r l i e r or l a t e r s h a l l have. 15 Sartre's c e n t r a l thesis concerning temporality, or 'the i n t r a -structure of the f o r - i t s e l f , i s that temporality i s an organized s t r u c t u r e . As Sartre puts i t , "The three so-called 'elements' of time, past, present, and future, should not be considered as a c o l -l e c t i o n of 'givens' for us to sum up- for example, as an i n f i n i t e s e r i e s of 'nows' i n which some are not yet and others are no longer-but rather as the structured moments of an o r i g i n a l synthesis." D Hence, on h i s account, a l l p o s i t i o n a l consciousness of objects does indeed require non-thetic self-consciousness, for as P. Morris notes, "To see object x as object x i s i n part to re-cognize i t ; that i s , to see i t i n comparison with past experiences of t h i s and s i m i l a r objects. In addition, to see object x as object x i s i n part to ex-pect i t to figure i n future perceptions and experiences i n c e r t a i n 1 predictable ways, and to view i t as connected with some future end." Every p o s i t i o n a l consciousness of an object, then, necessarily i n -volves t h i s temporal dispersion of present i n t e n t i o n , past retentions and future pretentions that constitutes for Sartre the p r e - r e f l e c t i v e cogito. 214 Sartre's theory of consciousness thus recognizes both non-theti awareness as w e l l as p o s i t i o n a l consciousness of objects, and whil e he usu a l l y speaks of non-thetic awareness as a self-awareness, i t i s a c t u a l l y as much world-related as i s p o s i t i o n a l consciousness, v i z . i t i s world-directed 'subsidiary awareness', the non-thetic ' r e s i -dues' or ' t a c i t ground' involved i n a l l p o s i t i o n a l consciousness of objects. Given these two l e v e l s of awareness, i t i s c l e a r that, on the basis of Sartre's theory of consciousness, encounters with other subjects could take either of two ( i n t e r r e l a t e d ) fundamental forms: f i r s t , a non-reifying meeting, but not a merging, of d i s t i n c t sub-j e c t i v i t i e s ; and second, o b j e c t i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s between i n d i v i d u a l s . In the case of the second of these two forms, moreover, i t can be argued that o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n may either be negative and destructive, or else serve a p o s i t i v e function, as Buber explains, i n the matur-ation and enrichment of the s e l f , as wel l as being a source of re-inforcement and support for the projects and pursuits of the i n d i -v i d u a l . In Being and Nothingness, as we have seen, concrete r e l a t i o n s with others are explained i n terms of Looking/Looked-at dyads, or subjects o b j e c t i f y i n g or being o b j e c t i f i e d by other subjects. The phenomena of pride and love, moreover, are given reductive accounts: pride i s dismissed as an extension of fundamental shame, and love i s reduced to a form of that o r i g i n a l c o n f l i c t which characterizes con-crete r e l a t i o n s as such as they are presented i n Being and Nothing-ness. However, we must keep i n mind that Sartre i s describing human r e l a t i o n s within the context of bad f a i t h and the God-project, and we should also r e c a l l that even i n Being and Nothingness Sartre says that I need the Other i n order to r e a l i z e a l l of the structures of 2 1 5 1 8 my being, and that the presence of the Other i s the necessary condition of a l l thought which I might have concerning myself. 1 9 Both of these assertions c l e a r l y suggest that the Other can play a p o s i t i v e r o l e for me: i n the case of pride, for example, the Other could a s s i s t i n my forming a p o s i t i v e self-image, while i n the case of love, we might be able to mutually support one another's freedom, and to provide p o s i t i v e reinforcement of one another's projects. I t i s Buber, however, who serves to f i l l out Sartre's account of p o s i t i v e personal r e l a t i o n s : h i s entire discussion of becoming a whole by standing i n r e l a t i o n s h i p with others brings out what Sartre only h i n t s at when he says that I need the Other i n order to r e a l i z e a l l of the structures of my being. As Buber explains, the s e l f and the Other are d i a l e c t i c a l l y r e l a t e d , each requires the aid of the Other i n becoming a whole (becoming authentic): maturation i s a b i -polar process i n which the You i s enlarged and enriched through ob-j e c t i f i c a t i o n , and the I i s enlarged and enriched through a r e f l e c -t i v e development of s u b j e c t i v i t y which does not lose touch with i t s relatedness. There remains, then, the question of Buber's I-You re-l a t i o n i t s e l f , or the notion of a meeting of s u b j e c t i v i t i e s . I t has already been suggested that Sartre's account of non-thetic aware-ness, as world-directed and hence Other-directed, makes possible such non-reifying encounters between d i s t i n c t subjects. Indeed, H. Barnes argues that there i s a sort of Look which c a l l s i n to ques-t i o n 'the whole e x i s t e n t i a l status of the Look as that which bestows object-ness'; the Look-as-exchange "... . . i s not a union of subjects but a mutual affirmation of respect for the Other as subject. I t resembles Sartre's enterprise of love but lacks the attempt to ass-2 0 i m i l a t e the Other's freedom." 216 Barnes uses t h i s conception of the Look-as-exchange i n order to construct a p o s i t i v e view of love which i s consistent with Sar-tre's theory of consciousness. In the Look-as-exchange, there i s a simultaneous recognition by both of us that the Other i s a free sub-ject and that he recognizes me as a free subject. Further, Barnes says, I take from and of him, and he (since we are speaking of an exchange) takes from and of me: "There Is nothing mystic or myster-ious here. The Other, through words, gestures, actions reveals to me new p o s s i b i l i t i e s , new dimensions of the world. A l l of t h i s I take i n from my own point of view, to be sure. But the point of view i s ? 1 modified by that of which i t i s a point of view." Barnes fleshes out her account further by means of her notion of another sort of Look, the Looking-together-at-the-world, which i s exemplified i n the making of a l i f e together, for example, i n marriage. Here, two sub-jects w i l l share common projects, thus enlarging and enriching t h e i r l i v e s , and while no common I-subject appears, Barnes contends that "...there has come into being something more than two already e x i s t -ing I-subjects. This i s the 'We'." 2 2 Sartre has chosen to discuss t h i s 'We' only i n terms of group r e l a t i o n s , and not as i t arises between two people who are i n love or who share a close friendship. In other words, the rWe' to which Barnes r e f e r s has as i t s background the remembrance of the Look-as-exchange or what Buber terms the I-You r e l a t i o n , and i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s dimension of the 'You' which Sartre has f a i l e d to acknowledge. On Barnes' account, the You can derive from either a r e f l e c t i v e or a p r e - r e f l e c t l v e consciousness. In the p r e - r e f l e c t i v e case, my i n -terest i n the Other i s such that, i n so far as i s possible, I supp-ress a l l concern with my own future project: "The ' I ' Is present 2 1 7 only as an active agent engaged i n helping the Other further h i s own chosen projects." 2 3 On the r e f l e c t i v e l e v e l , i n i t s purest form, the only content of the You i s p r e c i s e l y the p o s i t i n g of the r e l a -t i o n between the I and the You: " I t i s as though t h i s 'You1 conveyed these two things: f i r s t , that an I-subject i s at the moment making i t s e l f nothing except an awareness of the Other and an awareness of that awareness; second, that the I-subject seeks to transcend the Other as object and asserts both the existence and absolute value of the Other as 'I-subject'." 2 / +As Barnes puts i t , t h i s i s not an assertion about, but rather a recognition p_f; i t i s given and rece i v -ed without intermediary. I f t h i s account of p o s i t i v e personal r e l a t i o n s i s indeed con-s i s t e n t with Sartre's theory of consciousness, how does i t r e l a t e to his praxis philosophy i n the Critique? I t must be noted f i r s t that the theory of consciousness i n Being and Nothingness remains funda-mentally i n t a c t i n the C r i t i q u e , but that i t i s given a d i f f e r e n t form, with c e r t a i n corresponding modifications. For example, praxis i n h e r i t s the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y and self-transparency ( c a l l e d 'compre-hension') of consciousness, but i t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y defined as pur-posive human a c t i v i t y i n i t s material environment. Praxis, l i k e con-sciousness, i s o n t o l o g i c a l l y free, for i t i s the unifying and reor-ganizing transcendence of e x i s t i n g circumstances toward the p r a c t i -c a l f i e l d . 2 3 However, as T.R. Flynn observes, "...Sartre has come to r e a l i z e that t h i s transcendence i s d i a l e c t i c a l ; that i s , that i t i s simultaneously negation, conservation, and s p i r a l i n g advance. In 2 6 other words, i t i s t o t a l i z i n g . " R e c a l l that the n i h i l a t i n g dynamic of consciousness i n Being and Nothingness i s worked out c h i e f l y through the ways i n which human 21 8 r e a l i t y ' i s what i t i s not and i s not what i t i s ' ; but t h i s ' d i a l e c -t i c of dyads* i s without synthesis. In the C r i t i q u e , t o t a l i z i n g prax-i s takes the place of temporalizing consciousness: the i n i t i a l nega-t i o n i s l a c k , and need emerges as the corresponding negation of t h i s negation. However,, since these negations occur within an u l t i m a t e l y t o t a l i z i n g context, t h i s double negation c o n s t i t u t e s a d i a l e c t i c a l a f f i r m a t i o n , Sartre argues i n the C r i t i q u e , or a p r a c t i c a l , synthetic i n t e g r a t i o n of the elements as p a r t s . As we saw i n chapter seven, the group i n the process of forming i s the most simple form of t o t -a l i z a t i o n ; the group ' i s not', Sartre says, but rather ' i t constant-l y t o t a l i z e s i t s e l f . These modifications notwithstanding, i t i s c l e a r that the theory of consciousness i s unchanged i n i t s e s s e n t i a l s i n the C r i t i q u e : praxis takes over the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y of consciousness, and comprehen-27 sion or 'the translucency of praxis to i t s e l f ' plays the same 'foundational' r o l e i n Sartre's praxis philosophy that the pre-re-f l e c t i v e cogito played i n Being and Nothingness. Thus, the account of p o s i t i v e personal r e l a t i o n s which we have provided, based upon Buber's I - I t , I-You d i s t i n c t i o n and consistent with Sartre's theory of consciousness, should likewise be compatible with his praxis philosophy. For example, Buber's contention with respect to the d i -mension of I - I t that o b R e c t i f i c a t i o n of one subject by another may be e i t h e r negative and r e i f y i n g or else serve a p o s i t i v e and enrich-i n g f u n c t i o n , i s c a r r i e d over at the group l e v e l i n the C r i t i q u e i n the d e s c r i p t i o n s of s e r i a l r e l a t i o n s between persons and r e c i p r o -c a l r e l a t i o n s between group members, r e s p e c t i v e l y . Indeed, as we have seen, the fundamental motive for forming groups i s to l i b e r a t e s e r i a l i z e d praxes from the a l i e n a t i n g mediation of the p r a c t i c