AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE:
ITS INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to provide an explication and analysis of the existential concept of authentic existence, through an examination of Sartre, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber. It is primarily Sartre's treatment of authenticity, only implicit in his writings, which this thesis seeks both to make explicit and to defend. The positions of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber are each used to compare or contrast with key aspects of Sartre's concept of authentic existence, in order to establish the strengths and weaknesses of the Sartrean position.

Sartre's concept of individual authenticity rests upon an ethics designed to liberate the individual from living in 'bad faith' by means of a reflective comprehension of the nature of human reality. It is an ethics of self-recovery or authentic existence, having as its ideal the development of the morally autonomous individual who chooses to take freedom as his ultimate value.

Sartre also maintains that authenticity requires that we take the freedom of others, as well as our own, as our goal. At the same time, however, his discussion of relations with others in Being and Nothingness is a profoundly negative one, which contends that conflict is the original meaning of 'being-for-others'.

It will be argued that Sartre's theory of groups in Critique of Dialectical Reason provides an account of how positive social relations are indeed possible within the parameters of his ontology. The theory of groups thus renders intelligible that aspect of his concept of authentic existence which requires of us common action on behalf of the freedom of all.

Finally, Sartre's sociopolitical ideal, or that towards which
authentic action is ultimately directed, is identified as a 'direct democracy'. Such a community would be the concrete embodiment of a free society of disalienated individuals mutually choosing to promote each other's freedom.
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Preface

The purpose of this thesis is to offer an explication and analysis of the existential concept of authentic existence, through an examination of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Buber and particularly Sartre. The thesis offers an interpretation of Sartre's concept of authenticity, by way of a dialogue between Sartre and Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber, the basis for the dialogue being the concept of authenticity itself as it is developed in the writings of each philosopher. The portraits of authentic existence provided by Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber are each used to compare or contrast with key aspects of Sartre's concept of authenticity, in order to establish the strengths and weaknesses of the Sartrean position. First, with Nietzsche we will explore the notion of individual authenticity; then, with Heidegger we will focus on the problem of the nature of the relation between individual authenticity and relationships with others; and finally, with Buber we will examine an account of positive personal relations which will round out our interpretation of the Sartrean conception of authentic human existence.

It is primarily Sartre's treatment of authenticity, only implicit in his writings, which this thesis seeks both to make explicit and to defend: the authentic individual is the individual who acquires a reflective comprehension of the nature of human reality, and chooses freedom as his primary value. Also central to the thesis is an exploration of what appears to be an internal conflict in Sartre's thought: he maintains on the one hand that authenticity requires that we take the freedom of others, as well as our own, as our goal, yet on the other hand he claims in
Being and Nothingness that our concrete relationships with others are inevitably conflict-ridden.

This profoundly negative portrait of interpersonal relations has prompted many critics to argue that any concept of authentic existence derived from Sartre would necessarily be excessively individualistic, disallowing any positive social dimension to individual authenticity. This thesis contends on the contrary that Sartre's theory of groups in Critique of Dialectical Reason offers the resources for an account of how positive, constructive social relations are indeed possible within the parameters of Sartre's ontology. We thus render intelligible that aspect of his concept of authentic existence which requires of us action on behalf of the freedom of others.

The structure of the thesis requires a brief word of explanation. There are three sections, each section containing three chapters. The first section deals with Nietzsche and Sartre, the second with Heidegger and Sartre, and the third with Buber and Sartre. In each section, the first two chapters are primarily expository, addressing for example the basic concept of individual authenticity to be derived from Nietzsche and Sartre. The third chapter of each section contains critical analysis of the preceding two chapters, in the form of comparing and contrasting the positions of the two thinkers involved, as well as searching out the inherent weaknesses and strengths in each of their positions.

The thesis begins with Nietzsche, whose theory of value provides a substantive alternative to traditional values and modes of valuation, and constitutes a fundamental contribution to the notion
of authentic existence. It designates the creative activity of individuals as the sole source of value, and ultimately advocates the development of an 'experimental morality', understood in terms of the 'self-overcoming' of the individual, with self-perfection as its goal. Authentic existence is thus concerned with the creation and realization of ideals: these ideals are ways of life that are the product of autonomous ethical activity or value-creation.

Sartre's concept of individual authenticity, implicit in Being and Nothingness and also in his earlier works, rests upon an ethics designed to liberate the individual from living in 'bad faith' by means of a reflective comprehension of the nature of human reality. It is an ethics of self-recovery or authentic existence, having as its ideal the development of the morally autonomous individual who chooses to take freedom as his ultimate value.

A study of Heidegger begins our examination of the nature of the relation between individual authenticity and relationships with others. To become authentic, Heidegger argues, is to become 'what one already is': authenticity is a matter of being what one already is with explicit awareness of one's essential structure. Since man's Being (Dasein) is essentially a Being-with (Mitsein), authentic individual existence will necessarily involve 'solicitous' relations with others.

In contrast, Sartre's account of relations with others in Being and Nothingness is profoundly negative. The Other is another subjectivity who objectifies me and is thus the foundation of my object-ness or my 'being-in-itself'. Sartre interprets my objectification by the Other as an alienation of my own possibilities, and since this objectification is mutual, he contends that conflict is
the original meaning of 'being-for-others'. This renders questionable his exhortation that authenticity requires that we take the freedom of others, as well as our own, as our goal.

It will be argued, however, that Sartre's account of relations with others is not, and was not intended to be, an exhaustive one. It will be suggested, on the contrary, that Sartre's discussion takes place within the context of the individual's project to be a 'self-as-being-in-itself', or as Sartre also puts it, to be God. If this project to be God may be set aside, as Sartre's ethics of authentic existence suggests, then it can be argued that an account of positive, constructive relations with others might indeed be formulated within the parameters of his ontology.

It is Sartre's theory of groups in *Critique of Dialectical Reason* which provides an account of how positive social relations are possible, and thus renders intelligible that aspect of his concept of authentic existence which requires of us common action on behalf of the freedom of all. By historicizing conflict, by explaining it in terms of the contingent fact of scarcity, Sartre now acknowledges the possibility that cooperation may replace competitiveness in a future society of material abundance. Further, Sartre's concept of the mediating 'Third' provides a basis for practical union and common effort in the existing social world, or authentic action by 'common individuals' having as its aim the enhancement of their concrete freedom.

Sartre's portrait of authenticity will be broadened to encompass the dimension of personal relations by means of appealing to Buber's treatment of authentic existence as a fundamentally inter-personal process. Buber maintains that becoming authentic is 'be-
coming a whole' by standing in relationship with others. In my 'I-You' meetings with the Other, I am 'made present' by him in my wholeness and uniqueness, and my existence is 'confirmed'. Authenticity is thus for Buber an interpersonal process in which each requires the aid of the Other, or that mutual confirmation which only direct dialogical encounter provides.

Finally, Sartre's sociopolitical ideal, or that towards which authentic action is ultimately directed, is identified as a 'direct democracy'. True social reciprocity demands changes in those socioeconomic conditions that mediate this reciprocity. Sartre thus argues for debureaucratization, decentralization and democratization. He wants a classless society, with the division of labour abolished, or a direct democracy, where a spirit of genuine fraternity prevails.

It is my hope to have provided in this thesis a viable interpretation of the Sartrean conception of authentic human existence, an interpretation that effectively counters the common criticism that a Sartrean conception of authenticity cannot accommodate any dimension of positive, constructive relationships with others. Taking his work as a whole, Sartre's portrait of authentic human existence is not, in the end, excessively individualistic; instead, it ultimately has as its goal a 'true intersubjective community', which would be the concrete embodiment of a free society of disalienated individuals mutually choosing to promote each other's freedom.
Chapter One Nietzsche and Individual Authenticity

In order to explicate Nietzsche's contribution to the development of the concept of 'authentic existence', an examination of his treatment of value, and in particular his critique of Christian-moral values, is required. Nietzsche's position on the subject of value begins with a consideration of nihilism, an historical phenomenon for which he holds Christianity responsible. The Christian interpretation of existence designates a transcendent realm as the locus of value, and ultimately succeeds in making this world and human existence appear valueless by comparison. Nietzsche proceeds to argue that Christian morality is untenable, since the dualism of good and evil upon which it predicates its value-judgements is in fact a false hypothesis. His 'revaluation of values' does not stop here, however, for Nietzsche himself wants to maintain that there is a measure or standard of value by means of which value-determinations can legitimately be made. His theory of the 'will to power' provides value-judgments with an objective foundation, and allows him to condemn Christian morality as a mode of valuation borne of weakness and a 'contradiction of life'. While Nietzsche's appeal to the will to power as the 'essence of life' is considerably complicated by his own epistemological scepticism, as well as being questionable on independent grounds, his new theory of value does provide a substantive alternative to traditional values and modes of valuation, and constitutes a fundamental contribution to the
notion of 'authentic existence'. It designates the creative activity of individuals as the sole source of value, and ultimately advocates the development of an 'experimental morality', understood in terms of the 'self-overcoming' of the individual, with self-perfection as its goal.
The time has come when we have to pay for having been Christians for two thousand years: we are losing the center of gravity by virtue of which we lived; we are lost for awhile. 1

Nihilism, or the radical repudiation of the value of existence, is not, in Nietzsche's view, rooted in some profound insight into the actual nature of life, but rather in one particular interpretation of it; namely, the Christian interpretation. Christianity, as Nietzsche defines it, is 'Platonism for the people', and thus heir to what he identifies as the worst, most durable and most dangerous of all errors: Plato's invention of the pure spirit and the good as such. 2 We have measured the value of the world according to categories that refer to a purely fictitious world, or a 'true world' of being transcending what is characterized contrastingly as the 'apparent world' of becoming. Against this distinction, Nietzsche argues that the 'apparent world' is the only world, and that the 'true world' is an invention borne of false conclusions:

This world is apparent: consequently there is a true world; - this world is conditional: consequently there is an unconditioned world; - this world is full of contradiction: consequently there is a world free of contradiction; - this world is a world of becoming: consequently there is a world of being: - all false conclusions (blind trust in reason: if A exists, then the opposite concept B must also exist). 3

To invent fictions about a 'true world' has no meaning at all, on Nietzsche's account, unless an instinct of slander, distraction and suspicion against this world has gained the upper hand in us. It is thus of cardinal importance that we should abolish the concept of the 'true world' since it is the great devaluator of this world and, in Nietzsche's terms, 'our most dan-
gerous attempt to assassinate life'. His means of abolishing the 'true world' and related metaphysical concepts is by way of historical refutation: whereas in former times one sought to prove, for example, that there is no God, today one indicates how the belief that there is a God could arise and how this belief acquired its importance. According to Nietzsche, historical refutation is definitive, and he seeks in this way to provide a naturalistic account of the origin or psychology of metaphysical concepts.

'The real and the apparent world'- I have traced this antithesis back to value relations. We have projected the conditions of our preservation as predicates of being in general. Because we have to be stable in our beliefs if we are to prosper, we have made the 'real world' a world not of change and becoming, but one of being.

The 'real world' and 'being', therefore, have nothing to do with metaphysical truths: the inventive force that created these categories laboured in the service of our needs, "...namely, of our need for security, for quick understanding on the basis of signs and sounds, for means of abbreviation." The categories with which reason provides us, and in terms of which philosophers have been led to conceive of a 'true world' of 'being' are, in Nietzsche's language, 'conditions of life' for us. Logicizing, rationalizing and systematizing developed as expedients of life: we needed to facilitate observation and calculation of our environment if we were to survive. The postulation of a 'true world' thus answers to an internal requirement of the human intellect, or the demand of our reason for a world more conformable to its nature than is the world of experience: the philosopher "...invents a world of reason, where reason and the logi-
Nietzsche likewise explores a number of possible explanations of the origination and development of the belief in God. On the one hand, he suggests that the postulation of God was 'a mistake of man's', the result of "...an error in the interpretation of certain natural events, a failure of the intellect...", which is also reflected in a misinterpretation of the nature and significance of linguistic phenomena: "'Reason' in language... I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar." On the other hand, Nietzsche hypothesizes that the idea of God is a 'projection': "...one sets up one's own type as the measure of value in general; one projects it into things, behind things, behind the fate of things— as God..."; or, specifically with respect to Christianity, he holds that the concept of God is a 'construction' which contradicts life: "God— the formula for every slander against 'this world', for every lie about the 'beyond'."

With this latter observation, Nietzsche's naturalistic account of the origin of metaphysical concepts is virtually complete, since he has traced the philosophical attachment to the 'true world' to its root. If the 'true world' is an invention borne of false conclusions, then what is it that prompts these conclusions? Nietzsche maintains that suffering inspires such sentiments; "...fundamentally they are desires that such a world should exist; in the same way, to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians is here creative." Nietzsche
urges, moreover, that as soon as we recognize that the 'true world' is in fact fabricated from psychological needs, it becomes clear that we have 'absolutely no right to it'.

All the values by means of which we have tried so far to render the world estimable for ourselves and which then proved inapplicable and therefore devaluated the world— all these values are the results of certain perspectives of utility... and they have been falsely projected into the essence of things. What we find here is the hyperbolic naivete of man: positing himself as the meaning and measure of value of things. 14

Indeed, it is only an 'instinct of weakness' which conserves such beliefs as the belief in God, and thus Nietzsche maintains that his historical refutation of the 'being-hypothesis' together with the 'God-hypothesis' renders it unreasonable to understand the idea of a transcendent realm as anything other than a fiction. However, he also recognizes that so much "...was built upon this faith, propped up by it...", that its abandonment has consequences beyond "...the multitude's capacity for comprehension." 15 As Walter Kaufmann notes, while Nietzsche was keenly aware of the sense in which the conception of God diminishes the value of life and the world, he also felt that the death of God threatened existence with a complete loss of all significance: "To escape nihilism— which seems involved both in asserting the existence of God and thus robbing this world of ultimate significance, and also in denying God and thus robbing everything of meaning and value— this is Nietzsche's greatest and most persistent problem." 16

In Nietzsche's view, nihilism is in fact a transitional stage: we have measured the value of the world by means of categories that refer to a fictitious world, and "...the categories which we used to project some value into the world— we pull out
again; so the world looks valueless." 17 However, this recognition that we have 'no right' to a transcendent realm, Nietzsche maintains, provides 'the pathos that impels us to seek new values': "...the value feelings that hitherto have been squandered on the world of being are again set free." 18 The abandonment of belief in God is only the first step to be taken for those accustomed to thinking in terms of a theocentric interpretation of themselves, their lives, values and reality. Indeed, 'the whole of our European morality', on Nietzsche's account, rests upon the belief in God: "Christian morality is a command; its origin is transcendent; ...it has truth only if God is the truth—it stands and falls with faith in God." 19 Nietzsche maintains, then, that "God is dead; but... we still have to vanquish his shadow...", 20 and his task is thus to 'naturalize humanity' or to effect a revaluation of values: "In place of 'moral values', purely naturalistic values. Naturalization of morality." 21

The first aspect of Nietzsche's revaluation of values is a function of his belief that Christian ideals are ultimately untenable: Nietzsche 'wages war' against Christian-moral values, in order to expose "...how much hypocrisy, comfortableness, letting oneself go and letting oneself drop, how many lies lay hidden under the best honoured type of... contemporary morality, how much virtue was outlived." 22 The revaluation of values thus consists in, firstly, the painstaking examination of prevalent valuations, and specifically Christian-moral values, with a view to establishing that this morality actually rests upon the very things that it condemns as being immoral: "... all the means by which one has so far attempted to make mankind moral were through and through immoral." 23
Nietzsche maintains, for example, that his historical philosophy has determined that what are customarily regarded as opposite types of actions are not opposite at all: "Between good and evil actions there is no difference in type, at most, a difference in degree. Good actions are sublimated evil actions; evil actions are good actions become coarse and stupid." Nietzsche's illustrations of the dependence of 'good' actions upon 'evil' motivations are numerous: he shows that gratitude and magnanimity may be expressions of revenge; he holds that asceticism is the expression of vanity, and that virtue is desired by Christian saints for its brutal effects; he maintains that almost everything we call 'higher culture' is based upon cruelty and, metaphorically, that war is the father of all good things; and finally Nietzsche argues at length that moral judgments are a function of what he terms ressentiment:

Moral judgments and condemnations constitute the favorite revenge of the spiritually limited against those less limited—also a sort of compensation for having been ill-favored by nature—finally an opportunity for acquiring spirit and becoming refined—malice spiritualized.

Central to this theme of the dependence of 'good' actions on 'evil' motivations is Nietzsche's insistence upon the role of egoism, condemned by traditional morality, in many actions deemed 'good'. He argues, for example, that egoism is present in acts of goodwill, justice, self-sacrifice, pity, love and making others happy. Indeed, Nietzsche urges that, "If only those actions are moral which are performed for the sake of another and only for his sake, as one definition has it, then there are no moral actions." As John Wilcox notes, "Nietzsche thinks that the traditional assumptions incorporated into Christianity are
that the good is purely good and the evil is purely evil. His analysis has shown that these assumptions are false: the good and the evil are intertwined with one another, they are not 'opposites.' 38 It is Nietzsche's conclusion, therefore, that Christian morality is founded upon false assumptions, such as the assumption that good and evil are genuine contraries, and that as a result Christian morality is untenable: "Thus I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that is, I deny their premises." 39

However, this conclusion constitutes only one aspect of Nietzsche's revaluation; the second and more crucial aspect of his examination of morality concerns the problem of the value of traditional values: "What are our evaluations and moral tables really worth? What is the outcome of their rule? For whom? In relation to what? - Answer: for life." 40 Nietzsche's revaluation thus requires a standard or criterion in virtue of which the worth of moral tables may be judged, and he maintains that the real worth of traditional values is solely a matter of their value 'for life'. The notion of the value of something for life is explicated in terms of the extent to which 'it is life-preserving, life-enhancing': "But what is life? Here we need a new, more definite formulation of the concept 'life'. My formula for it is: life is will to power." 41

According to Nietzsche, life is will to power in various forms: "The world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined according to its 'intelligible character'- it would be 'will to power' and nothing else." 42 If life is will to power, then value can only be 'value for life', and can only be understood in terms of what life essentially involves: "What is the
objective measure of value? Solely the quantum of enhanced and organized power." The sole objective standard of value, then, recognizes only quanta of enhanced and organized power, and assesses them only in terms of the degree and manner of their enhancement and organization. The will to power, on Nietzsche's account, is precisely the disposition to such enhancement and organization, and is the condition of their possibility. The will to power is thus the ultimate basis of all value.

Nietzsche therefore takes life in this world to be the sole locus of value, and its preservation and enhancement to be decisive for determinations of value. His indictment of Christianity is a function of his conviction that it has made an ideal of those things that in fact contradict life: "...value judgments have been stood on their heads and the concepts of 'true' and 'false' are of necessity reversed: whatever is most harmful to life is called 'true'; whatever elevates it, enhances, affirms, justifies it, and makes it triumphant, is called 'false'." In Nietzsche's view, Christianity represents as 'something exalted' a 'petty, peaceful mediocrity' and an 'equilibrium of a soul that knows nothing of the mighty motivation of great accumulations of strength'. Furthermore, what the Christian does with 'all that his instinct opposes' is to subject it to a radical devaluation: "...he sullies and suspects the beautiful, the splendid, the rich, the proud, the self-reliant, the knowledgeable, the powerful- in summa, the whole of culture."  

One of the moral values championed by Christianity which Nietzsche considers to be a prime candidate for revaluation is 'selflessness': "...the whole morality of self-denial must be
questioned mercilessly and taken to court." 46 It is Nietzsche's contention that 'for all the value that the selfless may deserve', nonetheless a 'higher and more fundamental value for life might have to be ascribed to selfishness'. What he thus stands opposed to is the unqualified valuation of selflessness, since he holds that selfishness is too essential to life and too crucial to its development for its suppression to be desirable. As Richard Schacht observes, Nietzsche takes selflessness "...to be detrimental to the development of certain creative human powers and capacities, the potentiality for the strengthening and unfolding of which is shared by relatively few and is actualizable only if those happening to possess it are not induced to restrict themselves to actions agreeable to others generally." 47

Implicit in this latter observation is one of Nietzsche's basic contentions with respect to traditional values generally and Christian morality in particular: namely, that investigation of such valuations reveals that they are primarily responses to the needs of groups rather than individuals, and of those who constitute the general rule in human societies rather than the exceptions to it. Nietzsche designates the morality of a ruled group 'slave morality', and it is the interests of those who are ruled which are reflected in their moral valuations. The dispositions and actions which they value negatively are those associated with the 'power and dangerousness' of the ruling group, while "...those qualities are brought out and flooded with light which serve to ease existence for those who suffer." 48 Slave morality is thus essentially a morality of utility, grounded in the ressentiment of the weak against the strong and against existence.
...this is Judaeo-Christian morality pure and simple. So that it could say No to everything on earth that represents the ascending tendency of life, to that which has turned out well, to power, to beauty, to self-affirmation, the instinct of resentment, which had here become genius, had to invent another world from whose point of view this affirmation of life appeared as evil, as the reprehensible as such. 49

Christian morality thus constitutes a paradigm case of the species of valuations Nietzsche terms 'decadence-values'. Christianity 'has made an ideal of whatever contradicts the instinct of the strong life to preserve itself', 50 and thus subverts 'those instincts which aim at the preservation of life and the enhancement of its value'. It is important to recognize that for Nietzsche it is the will to power understood as 'the elevation and strengthening' of man which is the basic 'standard by which the value of moral valuations is to be determined'. 51 Thus, on Nietzsche's account, the 'Christian ideal' must be accorded a profoundly negative significance, because it involves the "...attempt to make the virtues through which happiness is possible for the lowliest into the standard ideal of all values." 52

However, Nietzsche's appeal to the will to power as the ultimate basis of all value and thus as the standard by means of which the value of valuations is to be determined raises serious difficulties, particularly in connection with his own considerable epistemological scepticism. On the one hand, Nietzsche wants to hold that 'the world defined and determined according to its intelligible character' is will to power, or that this constitutes a fundamental truth about the character of the world. On the other hand, Nietzsche declares repeatedly that 'there is no truth'. Clearly, with respect to 'metaphysical truths' of a transcendent
nature, Nietzsche wants to maintain that the 'true world' to which metaphysical propositions point does not exist: "The 'true world' and the 'apparent world'- that means: the mendaciously invented world and reality." 53 If there is no 'true world', then on Nietzsche's account there can be no metaphysical truths: "...there are no eternal facts, nor are there any absolute truths." 54

Nietzsche's scepticism, however, does not restrict itself to 'metaphysical truths' of a transcendent nature: "What are man's truths ultimately? Merely his irrefutable errors." 55 For Nietzsche 'man's truths' are the sorts of propositions which commonly pass as 'truths' in both ordinary discourse and specialized forms of discourse such as logic and science. It is his contention that perspective is 'the basic condition of all life' and that as a result 'delusion and error are conditions of human knowledge': "Owing to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of which we can become conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and generalization." 56 Nietzsche argues that concepts, including the so-called categories of the understanding, do not do justice to the empirical world, since they reduce what is individual to what is typical, and they equate the unequal. The contrast to the conceptual, or that which concepts simplify and falsify, is in Nietzsche's terms 'the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations.' 57

Nietzsche's perspectivism implies, then, that if truth is envisioned as a direct correspondence of thought and being, there is and can be nothing of the kind. His thinking here is Kantian,
in that he maintains that our experience is as it is for us largely in consequence of the way in which we constitute it. The axioms of logic, for example, are "...a means and measure for us to create reality, the concept 'reality', for ourselves..."\(^\text{58}\)

and thus on Nietzsche's view none of 'man's truths' can be considered to picture or model a reality which is as it is independently of our experience of it: "...facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations."\(^\text{59}\)

As Arthur Danto notes, it would appear to follow that, "We cannot speak of a true perspective, but only of the perspective that prevails. Because we cannot appeal to any fact independently of its relation to the perspective it is meant to support, we can do little more than to insist on our own perspective, and try, if we can, to impose it on other people."\(^\text{60}\)

Nevertheless, Nietzsche himself wants to claim that 'the world viewed from inside' is 'will to power, and nothing else'. His perspectivism implies that his own theory of the will to power must be an 'interpretation', as he is well aware: "Supposing that this also is only an interpretation- and you will be eager enough to make this objection?- well, so much the better."\(^\text{61}\)

The theory of the will to power must be an interpretation, for Nietzsche's perspectivism holds that, "There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective 'knowing'."\(^\text{62}\) However, it is frequently argued that Nietzsche's contention that there are no facts, but rather only interpretations, generates a self-referential paradox. If the thesis (P) that every view is an interpretation is true, in other words, then this would apply to (P) itself; and if (P) is indeed only an interpretation, then (P) may
be false, in which case not every view need be an interpretation after all.

However, as Alexander Nehemas observes, the conclusion that (P) is actually false does not follow from the fact that (P) is itself an interpretation. It is only reached by way of an invalid inference, by means of equating the fact that (P) is an interpretation and therefore possibly false with the fact that it is actually false. As Nehemas puts it, "This line of criticism presupposes that to consider a view an interpretation is to concede that it is false. It assumes that interpretation is a second-best mode of understanding and thus misunderstands perspectivism, which denies that there can be even in principle a mode of understanding that is better, more secure, or more accurate than interpretation." In acknowledging its own status as an interpretation, then, perspectivism concedes that no one is obliged to believe it, and on Nietzsche's account this is precisely how it differs from the dogmatic attitude which he so vehemently repudiates.

It is just this dogmatic spirit which, in Nietzsche's view, assumes that if a single interpretation is not good for everyone at all times, then no interpretation is good for anyone at any time. Nietzsche's perspectivism holds that no particular point of view is inherently superior to other points of view in the sense that it represents the world as it really is: "...as if a world would still remain over after one deducted the perspective." However, the fact that other points of view are possible does not by itself make them all equally legitimate. Perspectivism is not equivalent to relativism: it does not imply
that any interpretation is as good as any other. While Nietzsche's perspectivism does entail that his own theory of the will to power is an interpretation, in other words, it is also clear that for him some interpretations, like that of the will to power, are better than others.

If we cannot appeal to any fact independently of its relation to the perspective it is meant to support, however, then there must be some other means of ranking interpretations according to their adequacy. Nietzsche contrasts, for example, his own theory 'that in all events a will to power is operating' with the picture of 'the mechanistic senselessness of all events'; the latter, he asserts, is a function of "...the democratic idiosyncrasy which opposes everything that dominates or wants to dominate." Excessive cultural or historical biases and prejudices thus count against an interpretation of nature, and while there is no question of 'contemplation without interest', a kind of 'objectivity' is possible for us which, in Nietzsche's view, makes for better interpretations:

One has to be very light to drive one's will to knowledge into such a distance and, as it were, beyond one's time, to create for oneself eyes to survey millenia... One must have liberated oneself from many things that oppress, inhibit, hold down, and make heavy precisely us Europeans today. The human being of such a beyond who wants to behold the supreme measures of value of his time must first of all 'overcome' this time in himself. 66

Thus Nietzsche does in fact affirm that there are truths distinct from both 'metaphysical truths' and 'man's truths'. Nietzschean truths are necessarily perspectival, but they are superior to 'man's truths' insofar as they are informed by a greater
The theory of the will to power, on this account, provides a better interpretation of nature than do those modes of interpretation which reflect excessive anthropomorphisms. If so, as a value-standard it requires no further justification, and indeed it constitutes the only available 'objective' standard by means of which value-determinations can be made. As John Wilcox observes, "If (Nietzsche) is right, we all seek power, first and most fundamentally; and we all must—this is the nature of a living being. But if that is true, then, in a sense, the norm of power does not have to be justified; we are confronted with a fait accompli—in ourselves." 67 In sum, the will to power will necessarily constitute the ultimate basis of all value, and the norm of power will condemn valuations borne of weakness, while those that can be shown to express and enhance power will have the only vindication possible.

Nietzsche's new theory of value thus advocates the adoption of what he calls a 'Dionysian value-standard' for existence, or a value-standard deriving from the apprehension and affirmation of the fundamental character of existence as will to power. This value-standard is intended to reflect what goes on in the world, as it goes on independently of any 'tables of good' which the wants and needs of particular human beings might lead them to formulate. Moreover, it is intended to serve as a basis for value-judgments: "Dionysis is a judge! Have I been understood?" 68 Nietzsche's revaluation of values thus encompasses both a critique of traditional values and modes of valuation, and also the development of a substantive alternative to them. As Richard Schacht notes, "Nietzsche holds that the nature of life establishes
a standard for the evaluation of everything falling within its compass. The availability of this standard places evaluation on a footing that is as firm as that on which the comprehension of life and the world stands." Indeed, Nietzsche is convinced that this footing is sufficiently firm to rule out both nihilism and mere subjectivism in the theory of value.

Nietzsche contends, for example, that there is an 'order of rank' among men, and that 'what determines your rank is the quantum of power you are'. The quantum of power one is is not merely a matter of the magnitude of the 'passions and desires' present within one, but is also a function of 'having them under control' and thus their 'organization' and 'transfiguration' by reason, which is not 'an independent entity' but is rather 'a system of relations between various passions and desires.' In fact, Nietzsche characterizes his position along both naturalistic (quantitative) and artistic (qualitative) lines. He considers the passions to constitute the resources through which all qualitative enhancement of life alone is possible: "The greater and more terrible the passions are that an age, a people, an individual can permit themselves, because they are capable of employing them as means, the higher stands their culture." Indeed, Nietzsche asserts that 'there is nobody from whom I want beauty as much as from you who are powerful', and among his examples of 'higher men' he includes such artists as Goethe, Beethoven and Shakespeare.

It must be emphasized, then, that when Nietzsche speaks of a 'naturalization of morality' or a 'return to nature', he explicitly states that "...it is really not a going back but an ascent."
The last thing that he is proposing is a reversion to the level of the 'beast of prey', our transcendence of which is something for which he expresses gratitude to traditional morality. Nor does Nietzsche propose to revert to the once established but now eclipsed mode of valuation characteristic of the 'noble races'. 'Master morality', being a morality of abundance rather than want, is infinitely superior to 'slave morality', but it nevertheless reflects the character of one sort of group and is bound up with its relation to another type of group. What Nietzsche in fact advocates is the supersession of both master and slave moralities, of all basically social modes of valuation, in favour of value-creation rooted in the self-overcoming of the individual.

For Nietzsche, then, the will to power is an essentially transformative principle, and he explicated it in terms of his concept of the 'self-overcoming' of the individual. The process of becoming an individual, or 'giving style to one's character', stands in sharp contrast to what Nietzsche calls 'the moralist's madness' which seeks the extirpation of the passions, rather than their organization and transfiguration. The 'highest human being', in Nietzsche's view, would have "...the highest multiplicity of drives, in the relatively greatest strength that can be endured...", but they would be 'controlled' into a coherent whole. Indeed, Nietzsche asserts that so-called 'evil instincts' are 'expedient, species-preserving, and indispensable to as high a degree as the (so-called) good ones; their function is merely different'. The integration of all of his passions and desires into a harmony, on Nietzsche's account, accords the individual the highest degree of power, over himself and in his world.
It is Nietzsche's concept of value-creation defined in terms of the self-overcoming of individuals which constitutes his fundamental contribution to the notion of 'authentic existence'. When Nietzsche speaks of creating values, he means that 'there are altogether no moral facts': man has 'placed values in things' by coming to 'esteem' them. As Schacht notes, "It is he who creates in this sense... who 'creates man's goal and gives the earth its meaning and future'—not by fixing any particular values once and for all, but rather by generating esteem and so enriching and stimulating human life." According to Nietzsche, 'valuation itself' is the will to power; it is both an expression of it and a means whereby the power of those in question is in fact enhanced, for value-creation allows 'the rarest and best-constituted men' to attain 'the highest and most illustrious (of) human joys, in which existence celebrates its own transfiguration'. Indeed, it is the imbuing of life and the world with value in this fashion, through the creative activity of exceptional individuals, that on Nietzsche's account constitutes the highest of all forms of the will to power.

Clearly, then, Nietzsche repudiates all intellectualist conceptions of valuation as knowing, and insists instead that valuation must be understood as a volitional act. However, as we have noted, Nietzsche argues that intellectualism is not simply an error, but rather it is a symptom of 'weakness' on the part of human beings: it is a 'flight from reality' or 'mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary'; namely, 'distress of all kinds', 'waste, decay, elimination'—these are all necessary consequences of the growth of life. Intellectualism, with its inven-
tion of a 'true world' of being and 'the good as such', evidences an unwillingness or incapacity to face the truth about this world: "Error (faith in the ideal) is not blindness, error is cowardice."

Traditional morality will perish, on Nietzsche's account, only as the 'will to truth' gains self-consciousness, and we acquire both the courage to face 'the terrible aspects of reality', and the 'objectivity' which enables us to 'overcome' our time and 'behold the supreme measures of value of our time', not as metaphysical realities but as the products of our own creative activity.

It is this conception of individuals having the strength to 'live in the truth' and becoming, as a result, 'self-legislators' or autonomous ethical agents which constitutes Nietzsche's specific contribution to the notion of individual authenticity. A Nietzschean higher man is a 'free spirit' who has acquired a generalized awareness that all practices are interpretive and value-laden, and that his own mode of life is likewise a creation.

'Authentic existence' is thus concerned with the creation and realization of ideals: these ideals are ways of life that are the product of autonomous ethical activity or value-creation. They are the expression of individual power and preference, and make no claim to universal validity or acceptance, since Nietzsche's free spirits are aware that their own chosen modes of life are not the only ones that are possible, desirable or defensible. What Nietzsche's theory of value points toward, therefore, is an 'experimental morality' according to which one 'gives oneself a goal: "This is my way; where is yours?—thus I answered those who asked me 'the way'. For the way— that does not exist."
The symbol of the Übermensch represents Nietzsche's ideal: he maintains that there has never yet been an Übermensch, but there have been higher men or exceptional individuals, who constitute approximate realizations of this ideal. Our historical reality is characterized by nihilism, and this appears to preclude the possibility of a fully integrated, life-affirming individual. For example, Goethe is identified by Nietzsche as a higher man, but consider what Goethe wrote in 1824: "I will say nothing against the course of my existence. But at bottom it has been nothing but pain and burden, and I can affirm that during the whole of my 75 years, I have not had four weeks of genuine well-being. It is but the perpetual rolling of a rock that must be raised up again forever." Thus while Goethe might indeed constitute an example of a higher man, specifically an artist-free spirit, he does not and perhaps cannot exhibit the joyful affirmation of life which characterizes the attitude of Nietzsche's Übermensch.

It is clear, however, that Nietzsche's theory of value is far from unproblematic. He contends that the creation and realization of ideals by exceptional individuals constitutes the highest of all forms of the will to power, yet the meaning of 'power' is itself ambiguous, as is the method for determining what does and does not 'enhance' power. In fact, Nietzsche himself recognizes that 'the determination of the order of rank among values' is an unresolved problem, and he appeals to 'all the sciences' to address themselves to locating a solution. What remains questionable, however, is the theory of the will to power itself. As Walter Kaufmann notes, the will to power is, first and foremost, the key concept of a psychological hypothesis, in that Nietzsche con-
ceived of the will to power as a universal feature of the human constitution. The suggestion here, then, is that the theory of the will to power might be the one and only interpretation of human behaviour of which we are capable when we consider the empirical evidence at hand. When Nietzsche claims, moreover, that the will to power is not only the basic drive of man, but also the fundamental force operating in the universe, Kaufmann maintains that this extreme generalization is likewise offered in an empirical spirit: "...the constitution of the human mind might conceivably require it to interpret not only human behaviour but the entire cosmos in terms of the will to power." If Nietzsche based his theory on empirical data, however, then the most obvious objection to it would be that it appears to be empirically untrue that the human mind is so constituted.

While his theory of the will to power may thus be empirically false, Nietzsche's treatment of value does offer a substantive alternative to traditional intellectualist views of value, as well as to Christian morality specifically, by affirming that this world is the sole locus of value and by identifying the creative activity of individuals as the source of that value. However, Nietzsche has been criticized for proposing a new code of conduct that is, among other things, vague and unoriginal. For example, the character of Nietzsche's exceptional individual has been described by Danto as, "A sultry heart plus a cool head, minus the human-all-too-human... Here is an ancient, vaguely pagan ideal, the passions disciplined but not denied." The problem, then, is that the specific character of the higher man, what he is actually like and how precisely self-mastery or self-perfection is to be
achieved, remains unclear.

It must be emphasized, however, that it is not Nietzsche's intention to provide a new 'table of values' as such, or a positive code of conduct of his own, but rather to present a new conception of valuation as a human activity. Moreover, the project of self-perfection or of becoming an individual is not one which can be described specifically. As Nehemas observes, "A true individual is precisely one who is different from the rest of the world, and there is no formula, no set of rules, no code of conduct that can possibly capture in informative terms what it is to be like that." 90 There are, in other words, no general principles that we can follow in order to become unique; the very notion of an individual makes it impossible for Nietzsche to describe in any detailed way how one can become that.

The most that can be hoped for in the way of a positive characterization of Nietzschean 'authentic existence' is a number of less than specific guidelines, as when Nietzsche describes his free spirits as those who have gained 'objectivity' by distancing themselves from and hence 'overcoming' the conventions of their own time. Further, Nietzschean higher men are said to possess 'the highest multiplicity of drives in the relatively greatest strength that can be endured', but they control and organize them in order to create and realize their own ideals. Nietzsche does offer us concrete examples of self-legislators, such as Goethe, Beethoven and Shakespeare, but it is clear that the greatest example of the nature of individual authenticity is provided by Nietzsche himself. First, he overcame the prejudices of his time: he lived "...with one foot beyond life...", 91 and as a
result he became capable of making those shifts of perspective which constitute objectivity: "...the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our... 'objectivity' be." 92 Second, Nietzsche was, in his own words, one who "...exploits bad accidents to his advantage... collects from everything he sees, hears, lives through, his sum..."; 93 and was "...strong enough to turn even what is most questionable and dangerous to my advantage and thus to become stronger." 94 Despite numerous personal difficulties, including a variety of debilitating physical ailments, Nietzsche therefore was able to conclude nevertheless: "How could I fail to be grateful to my whole life?", 95 for it was the utilization of all aspects of his experience which on his own account provided him with the strength necessary not only to live 'in the truth' and to produce a unique body of work, but also ultimately to affirm life, even including its 'terrible aspects': "My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely to bear what is necessary, still less to conceal it... but love it." 96
Chapter Two  Sartre's Concept of Authentic Individual Existence

My purpose in this chapter is to elucidate Sartre's concept of individual authenticity. In order to achieve this end, a brief presentation of his ontology is required, as well as a more lengthy discussion of his theory of value as it is put forward in *Being and Nothingness*. Nothing possesses intrinsic value, on Sartre's account, but instead values are created by means of our free choices. The most prevalent criticisms of Sartre's position will be addressed, such as the contention that his ontology implies for ethics a thoroughgoing subjectivism and relativism. It will be argued, however, that these criticisms of Sartre's theory of value cannot ultimately be sustained, because they fail to recognize or appreciate his discussion of our situation in the world, the role of others in the constitution of that situation, and hence what he terms our 'objective encounter' with values in the world. Sartre's doctrine of freedom will be examined in this connection, together with his explication of the nature of 'bad faith'. It will be suggested that implicit in *Being and Nothingness* is an ethics designed to liberate the individual from living in bad faith by means of a reflective comprehension of the nature of human reality. It is an ethics of self-recovery or authentic existence, having as its ideal the development of the morally autonomous individual who chooses to take freedom as his ultimate value.

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Consciousness, according to Sartre, has two fundamental characteristics. First, it is intentional: "All consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something. This means that there is no consciousness which is not a positing of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, that consciousness has no 'content'." Second, it is self-conscious: "In other words, every positional (thetic) consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional (non-thetic) consciousness of itself." Non-positional self-consciousness is, for Sartre, an immediate, non-cognitive relation of the self to itself. Reflection, on the other hand, is a secondary act in which the reflecting consciousness posits the consciousness reflected on as its object. It is Sartre's contention that non-thetic self-consciousness makes reflection possible, or that "...there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito." Unlike consciousness, which is described as a 'lack of being' or a 'nothingness', Sartre characterizes being-in-itself as 'solid' or a 'coincidence with itself' which is 'full positivity'. Sartre argues that being-for-itself (consciousness, human reality) can establish itself only in terms of and against being-in-itself (non-conscious being, the given); specifically, the for-itself exists as the negation or 'nihilation' of the in-itself. In order to be non-thetic self-consciousness, consciousness must be a thetic consciousness of something, of an object; but it is impossible to construct the notion of an object if we do not have originally a negative relation designating the object as that which is not consciousness. Sartre thus contends that negation is the a priori foundation of all experience: "...what makes all experience
possible is an \textit{a priori} upsurge of the object for the subject— or since the upsurge is the original fact of the for-itself, an original upsurge of the for-itself as presence to the object which it is not." \footnote{4}

On Sartre's account, then, the for-itself determines itself by means of what it is not, and this nihilation of being is an 'internal negation' which reveals the in-itself while determining the being or defining the intra-structure of the for-itself: "For example... the revelation of the spatiality of being is one with the non-positional apprehension by the for-itself as unextended." \footnote{5}

To say that the for-itself determines its being by means of a being which it is not is to say, in Sartre's terminology, that the for-itself is the foundation of itself as a lack of being. Indeed, on Sartre's account human reality, which is itself a lack, is that by which lack appears in the world: "...in the human world, the incomplete being which is released to intuition as lacking is constituted in its being by the lacked— that is, by what is not. It is the full moon which confers on the crescent moon its being as crescent; what-is-not determines what-is." \footnote{6}

Sartre contends that the existence of desire as a human fact is sufficient to prove that human reality is a lack. Desire is a lack of being: "...the self-as-being-in-itself is what human reality lacks and what makes its meaning." \footnote{7} Sartre maintains that, in its primitive relation to itself, human reality is not what it is. The relation denied in this definition of the for-itself is a relation between the for-itself and itself in the mode of identity. Thus, what the for-itself lacks is the self as a substantial being, or itself as being-in-itself. As Sartre puts it, the cogito
is haunted by being, and this constitutes the origin of transcendence: "Human reality is a perpetual surpassing toward a coincidence with itself which is never given."⁸ The perpetually absent being which haunts the for-itself is, on Sartre's account, the impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself.

Sartre argues in *Being and Nothingness* that the self can exist only as a 'lack of totality', whereas this perpetually absent being would be the self as a substantial being. It would combine within itself, in other words, the incompatible characteristics of the in-itself and the for-itself, viz. the coincidence with itself or full positivity of being-in-itself, and the self-surpassing self-awareness which is consciousness. It is just this impossible synthesis which, when hypostatized as a transcendence beyond the world, takes on the name of God; that is, God conceived of as a self-identical plenitude of being who is also self-conscious or self-aware. Moreover, while Sartre characterizes the in-itself and the for-itself as 'de trop' or radically contingent, he describes God as a necessary being or 'the necessary foundation of himself'.⁹ In Sartre's view, then, what human reality lacks and hence desires to be is just such a self-identical and necessary being, and he contends that this desire to be God implies that the being of human reality is suffering: "(Human reality) rises in being as perpetually haunted by a totality which it is without being able to be it, precisely because it could not attain the in-itself without losing itself as for-itself. Human reality is therefore an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state."¹⁰

Value, on Sartre's account, is 'the lacked', and value therefore makes a 'dyad' with human reality, which is a lack. Indeed,
human reality in the broad sense includes both the for-itself and value. The impossible synthesis of the for-itself and in-itself, or God, is the supreme value: "The supreme value toward which consciousness at every instant surpasses itself by its very being is the absolute being of the self with its characteristics of identity, of purity, of permanence, etc., and as its own foundation." Value is 'beyond being', but Sartre wants to maintain that nonetheless it possesses being in the sense that it is this absent being which haunts the for-itself: "It is that toward which a being surpasses its being; every value-oriented act is a wrenching away from its own being toward _______."  

Concretely, each particular for-itself lacks a certain particular reality: "What is given as the peculiar lack of each for-itself and what is strictly defined as lacking to precisely this for-itself and no other is the possibility of the for-itself. The possible rises on the ground of the nihilation of the for-itself." My possibility, my project is my choice of myself in the world, and the for-itself cannot appear without being 'haunted by value', or the 'risen ideal' of coincidence with self: each particular for-itself lacks that certain particular reality "...which if the for-itself were synthetically assimilated with it, would transform the for-itself into itself." All of my individual values, in Sartre's view, derive their meaning from this original projection of myself which stands as my choice of mode of being in the world. It is thus I who sustains values in being: nothing makes values exist, Sartre contends, unless it is that freedom which at the same time makes me myself exist.

Specifically, then, Sartre wishes to maintain that value haunts
the for-itself-as-freedom: "(Value) does not deliver itself to a contemplative intuition which would apprehend it as being value... On the contrary, it can be revealed only to an active freedom which makes it exist as value by the sole fact of recognizing it as such." Values, in other words, do not enjoy an independent existence. They depend for their existence on my freedom, and Sartre concludes that "...my freedom is the unique foundation of value and... nothing, absolutely nothing justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or that particular scale of values." As the being by whom values exist, therefore, I am 'without justification and without excuse', and in this sense there is what Sartre calls a 'total contingency of being-for-value'.

This constitutes Sartre's initial treatment of value in Being and Nothingness, considered in relation to his description of the ontological structure of being-for-itself. He cautions at this juncture, however, that 'in fact I am engaged in a world of values': in the world of the immediate, values "...are sown on my path as thousands of little real demands." At this point in his descriptive ontology, Sartre cannot discuss this 'objective encounter' with values in the world, because he has not yet elucidated the nature of being-for-others. Nevertheless, it is against Sartre's initial and essentially incomplete analysis of value that many of his critics direct their attacks. The most prevalent of these criticisms will be presented here, but it will be argued that these objections to Sartre's discussion of value, and specifically to any ethical implications of this discussion, cannot be sustained if his treatment of being-for-others, as well as his implicit account of authentic existence, are taken into consideration.
Richard Bernstein maintains, for example, that if man inevitably seeks to become God, then no ethical theory can possess any significance. If all of man's actions are directed to attaining the synthesis of the in-itself and the for-itself, and this goal is impossible as Sartre indeed asserts, then there is no import to morality. Sartre holds that the desire to be God implies that human reality is 'by nature an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state': all of our efforts are doomed to failure, and hence all of our actions are rendered equivalent. On Bernstein's account, therefore, "We should have the courage to admit that the consequence of Sartre's analysis of human reality is not only despair, but nihilism in the coldly technical sense. There never is nor can be any basic reason or justification for one value, end, choice, or action rather than another."  

Bernstein continues his attack by noting that Sartre maintains that it is 'I who sustains values in being': nothing makes values exist unless it is that freedom which makes me myself exist. It is individual freedom alone, then, that is the source of all values. There are no objective norms, and Bernstein holds that this radically subjectivist position undercuts the possibility of any genuine ethical theory. If, as Sartre states, my freedom is the unique foundation of values, and if 'absolutely nothing justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or that particular scale of values', then the result for ethics is a thoroughgoing relativism. As Bernstein puts it, "...if we hold fast to Sartre's ontological analysis, we can never justify any criteria, we can never ultimately say that one thing is more valuable than
Similar objections are raised by Risieri Frondizi, but he pushes his points considerably further than does Bernstein. Sartre, in Frondizi's view, altogether rejects the notion of objective values or moral norms, and he instead bases moral norms and values solely on subjective choice. On Frondizi's account, "Sartre gives the impression that values come to us out of the blue. In contrast to Scheler's and Hartmann's interpretations, which consider values as essences that exist up there in the ether like some kind of Platonic 'Ideas', Sartre jumps to the other extreme and contends that we can make anything valuable by the mere fact that we freely choose it." Frondizi concludes, then, that on Sartre's account we are denied the possibility of making a mistake: if the mere fact of my choosing it makes a thing valuable, then the very notions of 'right' and 'wrong' are destroyed.

On Sartre's subjectivist position, Frondizi asserts, one simply invents one's own values without any guidance or criteria. To say that the individual freely chooses in moral matters, in other words, is to say "...that he can decide arbitrarily, that his free choice is the only foundation of morality and he can ignore facts and circumstances that bear upon moral decisions." If it is indeed sheer choice and not its content that counts, then all possibilities are rendered equivalent and we end up with what Frondizi terms an 'ethics of indifference': anything will do as well as anything else. Frondizi maintains, moreover, that this ethics of indifference is a direct consequence of Sartre's notion of human freedom, which in his view acknowledges no limits to freedom but rather asserts that it is absolute and unconditioned.
These criticisms of Sartre's position will be addressed in two stages: first, from the point of view of the individual living in bad faith (which is our usual pre-reflective state, on Sartre's view), and second, from the perspective of the individual who has made the transition from bad faith to an authentic form of existence. It is true that for Sartre nothing possesses intrinsic value; nothing is 'objectively valuable' in that sense. However, does this imply that 'values come to us out of the blue', the products of an 'absolute and unconditioned' freedom, as Frondizi claims? Does it imply that 'there never is nor can be any basic reason or justification for one value, end, choice, or action rather than another', as Bernstein asserts? In order to defend Sartre against criticisms such as these, an examination of his doctrine of freedom is required.

In a bare ontological sense, we are absolutely free: we are not free to cease being free, or as Sartre states we are condemned to be free, because the being of human reality is freedom. Sartre does indeed assert that our freedom encounters no limits, but he means by this that the 'coefficient of adversity' in things cannot be used as an argument against our freedom, because it is by us, i.e. by the preliminary positing of an end, that this coefficient of adversity arises. As Sartre puts it, "...although brute things can from the start limit our freedom of action, it is our freedom itself which must first constitute the framework, the technique, and the ends in relation to which they will manifest themselves as limits." 22 It is therefore our freedom which constitutes the limits which it will subsequently encounter, and hence from an ontological standpoint 'no limits to my freedom can be found ex-
cept freedom itself'.

This does not imply, however, that our freedom is in fact 'unconditioned'. Empirically, we can be free only in relation to a 'state of things' and in spite of this state of things. Freedom is originally a relation to the given: "...this given is nothing other than the in-itself nihilated by the for-itself which has to be it." 23 What Sartre calls our 'situation', then, is the common product of the contingency of the in-itself and of freedom. The paradox of freedom, on Sartre's account, is that there is freedom only in a situation, and there is a situation only through freedom: "Human-reality everywhere encounters resistance and obstacles which it has not created, but these resistances and obstacles have meaning only in and through the free choice which human-reality is." 24

The given which human reality has to be and which it illuminates by its project or its choice of itself in the world includes: my place (the place which is assigned to me by my birth), my body, my past (a backdrop and a point of view), my environment (the instrumental-things which surround me), and my fellowman. In the case of each of these aspects of our situation, Sartre makes the point that man encounters obstacles only within the field of his freedom: there are no obstacles in an absolute sense, but rather obstacles reveal their coefficient of adversity across freely invented and freely acquired techniques. However, Sartre also insists that these techniques are not necessarily or simply mine: to live in a world with my fellowman is "...to find myself engaged in a world in which instrumental-complexes can have a meaning which my free project has not first given to them." 25 In other words,
the world is already provided with meaning, indeed I have meaning which I have not given to myself: there exist collectively defined meanings, an 'innumerable host of meanings', which are independent of my choice.

On Sartre's account (and recall that we are discussing the case of the individual living in bad faith, or our usual pre-reflective state), our being is immediately in situation: "...that is, it arises in enterprises and knows itself first in so far as it is reflected in those enterprises. We discover ourselves then in a world peopled with demands, in the heart of projects 'in the course of realization'." 26 The bourgeoisie, for example, call themselves 'respectable citizens', but they do not become respectable as a result of contemplating moral values. On the contrary, from the moment of their arising in the world they are thrown into a pattern of behaviour the meaning of which is respectability. As Sartre puts it, "...respectability acquires a being; it is not put into question. Values are sown on my path as thousands of little real demands, like the signs which order us to keep off the grass." 27

It is clear, then, that Sartre's treatment of value need not deteriorate into the radically subjectivist position described by Frondizi: his account fails to recognize or appreciate Sartre's discussion of our situation, and the role of others in the constitution of that situation. Sartre indeed holds that nothing is intrinsically valuable, viz. nothing is 'objectively valuable' in that sense, since all values depend for their existence on freedom or the constitutive activity of consciousness. The freedom in question, however, is not necessarily or simply my freedom. I am
engaged in a world which is already meaningful, due to the collective activities of my fellowmen. It is their collective activities which anchor the objective values which I encounter: values which have 'being', on Sartre's account, or are 'crystallized' in the social world.

It is true that Sartre's discussion of the ontological structure of the for-itself considers the for-itself in isolation, and hence he articulates his conclusions in forms such as 'It is I who sustains values in being'. The for-itself so considered, however, is an abstraction, as Sartre himself readily acknowledges. In fact, the for-itself can exist only in a situation, and in any situation there will be collectively defined values, due to the presence and activities of others. Hence, contrary to what Frondizi suggests, values do not 'come to us out of the blue'. We cannot 'decide arbitrarily' what we will or will not value, and we cannot 'ignore facts and circumstances'. On the contrary, Sartre maintains that we are inevitably faced with a social world, a world of collective meanings and valuations. As Sartre puts it, it is a world 'peopled with demands' which exist independently of my choice.

This, in itself, does not undermine Bernstein's objection that, given Sartre's ontology, 'there never is nor can be any basic reason or justification for one value, end, choice, or action rather than another'. In order to defuse this criticism, we must consider Sartre's analysis of bad faith and the transition from living in bad faith to an authentic form of existence. Sartre maintains that we are, in fact, free to modify the valuations which are 'crystallized' in the social world, we are free to affirm or deny them, but we conceal this fundamental freedom of choice from
ourselves: we live in 'bad faith'. Firstly, since value and the for-itself can arise only in what Sartre calls the 'consubstantial unity of a dyad', value is not originally posited by the for-itself. Value is not the object of a thesis, and hence it is not known at this stage but rather it is lived as 'the concrete meaning of that lack which makes my present being': "Value is merely given with the non-thetic translucency of the for-itself, which makes itself be as the consciousness of being." Secondly, our being is immediately in situation: at each instant we are thrust into the world and engaged there. The consciousness of man in action, on Sartre's account, is a non-reflective consciousness: it is consciousness of those structures of exigency in the world which are collectively defined valuations. It is not, however, a reflective consciousness of my relation to those structures, viz. their dependence on the constitutive activity of consciousness, and hence my freedom to modify them.

What is concealed, then, is my own original relation to values; that they derive their meaning for me in relation to an original projection of myself which stands as my choice of myself in the world. This is why, on Sartre's account, 'everyday morality' is devoid of ethical anguish: everyday morality does not recognize the essential 'ideality of values', or the fact that they depend upon freedom. Anguish, on the other hand, is the reflective apprehension of freedom by itself, and it appears at the moment that I disengage myself from the world in which I had been engaged: "In each instant of reflection anguish is born as a structure of the reflecting consciousness in so far as the latter considers consciousness as an object of reflection." Through reflection,
then, I am in a position to recognize that values depend for their existence on the activity of consciousness, and that consequently they can be put into question and modified.

However, it is one of Sartre's central theses in Being and Nothingness that 'everything takes place as if our essential and immediate behaviour with respect to anguish is flight'. Psychological determinism, in Sartre's view, is a reflective defense against anguish: "It attempts to fill the void which encircles us, to re-establish the links between the past and present, between present and future. It provides us with a nature productive of our acts, and these very acts it makes transcendent." Flight before anguish can take the form of 'distraction' in relation to the future; specifically, it is an attempt at distraction directed at the possibilities opposed to my possibility: "I force myself to see them as endowed with a transcendent, purely logical being, in short, as things." They are thus no longer threatening, since they surround my possibility as merely conceivable eventualities. Flight before anguish, on Sartre's account, also attempts to disarm the past of its threat. What I attempt to flee here is my very transcendence, in so far as it sustains and surpasses my essence: I assert that I am my essence in the mode of being of the in-itself. Freedom then becomes one of the properties of this opaque being, and is thus disarmed; my being is no longer free qua being, but rather, "My self becomes the origin of its acts as the other is of his, by virtue of having a personality already constituted."

It is such processes of distraction before anguish, or such patterns of flight in the face of our fundamental freedom, that
Sartre terms instances of 'bad faith'. Bad faith is an immediate and permanent threat to every project of the human being: "...consciousness conceals in its being a permanent risk of bad faith." The risk of bad faith is permanent, on Sartre's account, because of the ontological structure of the for-itself. Human reality is a lack: it is haunted by being. As we have seen, Sartre maintains that it is the desire for an impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself, the desire to be God, which characterizes human reality. Bernstein contends, however, that if man does indeed seek this impossible goal, then all of our efforts are doomed to failure, and hence all of our actions are rendered equivalent. As a result, in his view, no ethical theory can possess any significance if Sartre's ontology is taken seriously. It will be argued, however, that implicit in Being and Nothingness, and also in Sartre's earlier works, is an ethics designed to liberate the individual from living in bad faith (if not from its permanent threat), via a reflective comprehension of his condition. It is an ethics of 'self-recovery' or 'authentic existence', centred around the pure reflective consciousness as a moral consciousness and having as its ideal the development of the morally autonomous individual.

In The Transcendence of the Ego, for example, Sartre distinguishes reflective consciousness from unreflective consciousness, in that the latter is positional consciousness of an object other than itself, together with non-thetic self-consciousness, whereas the former is positional consciousness of itself, viz. of another act of consciousness, together with non-thetic self-consciousness. On the unreflective level, objects appear as though they have
"...the qualities of repulsive, attractive, delightful, useful, etc., and as if these qualities were forces having a certain power over us." On the reflective level, as Thomas Busch observes, two possibilities present themselves: "A reflection (impure) can occur that grasps consciousness in such a way as to prolong this state of the power of objects over us. A reflection (pure), which is phenomenological, can occur that grasps the true being of consciousness." 

In the case of impure reflection, Sartre maintains that consciousness "...imprisons itself in the world in order to flee from itself; consciousnesses are given as emanating from states and states as produced by the ego." It is impure reflection together with its patterns of flight which, in Being and Nothingness, Sartre calls 'bad faith'. In the case of pure reflection, on the contrary, the 'true being of consciousness' (which was aware of itself only non-thetically) is recovered and known, with the results that objects no longer appear to have power over us, since their relation to and dependence upon consciousness is apprehended, and the ego itself is recognized as being a product of the constitutive activity of consciousness. In pure reflection, therefore, consciousness comprehends both its fundamental freedom and, correlative, its absolute responsibility for itself, and it is this comprehension which in Sartre's view renders ethics (as distinct from 'everyday morality') possible.

However, as we have noted, the very structure of the for-itself implies that impure reflection and bad faith are permanent risks. Sartre proposes existential psychoanalysis as a method by means of which the individual can become aware of his choice of
himself in the world: "...we will discover the individual person in the initial project which constitutes him." While man is indeed the being whose project is to become God, Sartre maintains that this project is particularized in each case in terms of the situation of the individual. As Sartre puts it, "While the meaning of the desire is ultimately the project of being God, the desire is never constituted by this meaning; on the contrary, it always represents a particular discovery of its ends." The orientation of existential psychoanalysis is thus empirical and its method is comparative: "...by a comparison of the various empirical drives of the subject... we try to discover and disengage the fundamental project which is common to them all."

Two distinct kinds of 'choice' must here be distinguished. My original choice of myself in the world is a non-thetic choice, which is characterized by Sartre as absurd or unjustified. All of my individual 'lived' values derive their meaning from this original projection of myself which stands as my non-thetic choice of myself in the world. Existential psychoanalysis, then, is designed to enable the individual to become aware of this non-thetic choice by effecting a transition from the unreflective plane of immediacy, or the plane of impure reflection, to the level of pure reflection. As Sartre notes, furthermore, "...reflective consciousness in fact accomplishes two things by the same stroke; the Erlebnis reflected-on is posited in its nature as lack, and value is disengaged as the out-of-reach meaning of what is lacked."

Pure reflection, then, can properly be called a moral consciousness, because it cannot arise without at the same time disclosing my valuations and their status as choices. At this juncture,
moreover, Sartre's second kind of 'choice' comes into play, or the notion of choice as voluntary deliberation. Voluntary deliberation is a 'deception' at the level of non-theetic choice, because such choice is 'prior to logic' and principles of decision-making. At the reflective level, however, particular choices can be justified by reference to the fundamental project and the framework of meanings it provides. As Phyllis Morris observes, "Voluntary deliberation can certainly take place within this framework, since on this level a decision has been made about what will count as a reason." By means of pure reflection, then, I am in a position to evaluate my individual 'lived' values, to question them, modify them, affirm or deny them.

According to Bernstein, however, if man is the being whose project is to be God, then all of his efforts are doomed to failure, and hence all of his actions are rendered equivalent. As Frondizi puts it, similarly, the only ethical theory implicit in Sartre's ontology is an ethics of indifference: any choice, any value will do as well as any other, for we are always in bad faith. This line of argumentation is, however, quite fallacious. Firstly, while Sartre does maintain that the structure of human reality implies that bad faith is a permanent threat, it does not follow that we are always in bad faith. Indeed, the object of existential psychoanalysis is precisely to liberate the individual from living in bad faith by means of a reflective comprehension of his condition. Through the methods of existential psychoanalysis and pure reflection, then, bad faith becomes a matter of degree and a function of lucidity. Secondly, while Sartre does contend that man is the being whose project is to be God, he also
suggests that we need not value the God-project: we may reflectively apprehend the impossibility of the synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself, and choose to 'turn our back upon this value'.

Indeed, the suggestion implicit in *Being and Nothingness* is that we can cease to value the God-project, and choose freedom in its place as our primary value. In the final section of *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre implies that the rejection of God as man's ultimate value can come about only when man sees and accepts the truth concerning the human condition; namely, that freedom alone is the source of all values. In other words, pre-reflective values, and specifically the pre-reflective adoption of the God-project, may be set aside in favour of reflective values, or values chosen in light of a reflective apprehension of human reality as the source of all values. It is not clear, however, why this reflective apprehension entails the choice of freedom over everything else as one's primary value. Indeed, if nothing has any intrinsic value, as Sartre insists throughout, then there would appear to be no compelling reason to prefer freedom as one's primary value over any number of other possibilities, such as pleasure or power.

However, Sartre argues in *Existentialism and Humanism* that "...once a man has seen that values depend upon himself, in that state of forsakenness he can will only one thing, and that is freedom as the foundation of all values." The 'attitude of strict consistency', a fundamental feature of individual authenticity, requires the choice of freedom as one's primary value. The choice of freedom is most consistent with the human condition and the
nature of value, since human freedom alone is the source of all value. As Thomas Anderson observes, "...since freedom is ontologically entailed in all values as their source, the choice of any and all values logically entails the prior valuing of freedom." In sum, in the choice of anything as a value, such as pleasure or power, there is logically entailed the more fundamental choice of freedom as a value; otherwise that choice of anything else as a value would itself be repudiated, for if a man does not value his freedom, he cannot consistently value any value it creates.

Sartre's ethics of authentic existence is thus far from an 'ethics of indifference': it is the ontological structure of human reality which provides the basic reason or justification for the choice of freedom as one's primary value. The strengths and weaknesses of this position will be explored and discussed at length in the chapters to come, but at present we should note that the ethics of authenticity is centred around the pure reflective consciousness as a moral consciousness, having as its ideal the development of the morally autonomous individual. We need not as individuals reflectively affirm as valuable any pre-reflective or lived values which we find in the world as given. Most importantly, we can cease to value the God-project and, following a reflective apprehension of the nature of human reality, value our freedom in its place. In other words, instead of valuing the 'Self as a substantial being', we can choose to value that freedom which, on Sartre's account, "...is characterized by a constantly renewed obligation to remake the Self which designates the free being." Authentic existence is just this ongoing process of remaking the 'Self which designates the free being', or as Francis
Jeanson puts it, living with 'the rent in consciousness': "This involves maintaining a perpetually invented and perpetually un­stable equilibrium between action that calls for a coherent en­gagement and reflection that calls for an explicit distancing or ratification of the rent, which usually lies latent in one's pre­sence to self." 48

In other words, because freedom exists only in relation to a situation, valuing freedom involves not only the reflective com­prehension of our condition, but also action in the world which has as its goal the enhancement of our existing freedom. As we have seen, Sartre contends that we should take freedom as our primary value because it is the source of value: specifically, it is man's freedom of choice which is the source of value, since it is by means of his choices that he creates all of his values. Valuing freedom therefore means, in Sartre's view, that man should endeavour to modify his situation in the world so as to remove restrictions to his freedom of choice, and to increase the range of choices available to him. As Anderson observes, "Freedom of choice is in reality inseparable from freedom to attain goals; thus to value the former demands valuing the latter and conse­quently valuing the modification of the situation so as to broad­en the attainable goals." 49

Hence, in Sartre's words, individual authenticity "...con­sists in having a true and lucid consciousness of the situation, (and) in assuming the responsibilities and risks that it in­volves." 50 Sartre's ethics of authentic existence thus requires of man that he acknowledge his freedom, that he accept the fact that he is the source of values and cannot abrogate this basic
responsibility, and that he strive to act accordingly. This means, then, that any repressive social and political policies or systems would be unacceptable, while any policies or systems that maximize freedom of choice by enabling man to achieve his goals would be supported. In sum, the authentic individual is the individual who recognizes that freedom is the source of values, chooses that freedom as his ultimate value, and accepts that this choice carries with it a responsibility requiring of him action on behalf of freedom in the existing social-political world.
Certain problems with the portraits of individual authenticity presented by both Nietzsche and Sartre will be examined in this chapter. For example, it has been suggested that Nietzsche's new theory of value actually provides justification for 'the unlimited use of power by the higher human being'. Nietzsche's theory of the will to power, on this account, is nothing more than a device for justifying all forms of domination of the weak by the strong. On the other hand, Sartre's portrayal of the autonomous ethical agent who chooses freedom as his primary value has been criticized for a number of reasons, not the least of which being that it is actually unintelligible. These and other difficulties will be considered, with particular attention being paid to the question of how to reconcile these portraits of individual authenticity with any kind of social existence: Nietzsche's higher men appear to stand wholly outside the social nexus, while Sartre's contention that conflict is the 'original meaning of being-for-others' renders questionable any positive interpretation of the notion of a moral community.

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It has been argued that Nietzsche's new theory of value in fact provides justification for what might be termed an 'immoralist use of power'. Ofelia Schutte maintains that Nietzsche's revaluation of values involves two contradictory goals: the eradication of previous values, and the reversal of previous values. In the case of the first of these goals, Schutte notes that Nietzsche negates the moralistic position which relies upon the dualism of good and evil to warrant all of its value-judgments. This negation does not constitute grounds for calling Nietzsche an 'immoralist', since the individual who transcends this dualism is only an immoralist 'in the eyes of one still trapped in the dualistic moral perspective'. However, Schutte maintains that Nietzsche's second and contradictory goal does imply that he is an immoralist; on this account, Nietzsche himself continues to be a dualist, but reverses the value of his opponent's ideals: "The position attacked by Nietzsche is that of the 'moralist', namely, the slave or democrat who claims that all persons have moral dignity regardless of sex, class, or race. Nietzsche here defends the immoralist master or aristocrat who denies the slave's values." Schutte concludes, then, that Nietzsche's theory of the will to power and his Dionysian value-standard ultimately turn into devices for justifying 'all forms of domination', or 'the unlimited use of power by the higher human being'.

Schutte insists, therefore, that Nietzsche's portrait of authentic individual existence is highly questionable. In Nietzsche's view, individual authenticity is concerned with the creation and realization of ideals or comprehensive styles of life that express a preference that is not justifiable by any standard
except itself. The danger here, as Schutte sees it, is that instead of social morality determining what ideals are to be admissible, the ideals of a controlling elite will take precedence over the demands of the social moral code. Nietzsche himself relates the Übermensch to the artistic free spirit and declares that all creation involves destruction, but as Schutte sees it, to defend destruction as a necessary part of life is to justify violence in all of its forms: "...the will-to-power idea turns into a device for justifying all forms of domination, just as the Übermensch symbol turns into a preliminary justification for the creation of a solipsistic monster." Schutte concludes, then, that Nietzsche's notion of the overcoming of morality by the higher man is ultimately nothing more than an instrument of manipulation by which the most powerful human beings may mold the rest of humanity into conformity with their goals.

As we have seen, Nietzsche does take the position that there is an 'order of rank' among men, and that 'what determines your rank is the quantum of power you are'. However, what Schutte's discussion neglects to take into account is that the 'quantum of power one is' is not simply a function of the magnitude of the forces and drives present within one, but is also a function of 'having them under control', and thus their 'organization' and 'transfiguration'. In fact, as we have noted, Nietzsche characterizes his position on the matter of value along both naturalistic or quantitative and artistic or qualitative lines: he considers the 'passions' to constitute the resources through which all qualitative enhancement of life alone is possible. Indeed, far from advocating an immoral use of power, Nietzsche asserts that "What
I fight against: that an exceptional type should make war on the rule." On the contrary, Nietzsche holds "...there is nobody from whom I want beauty as much as from you who are powerful: let your kindness be your final self-conquest."  

What Schutte's analysis thus fails to recognize is that for Nietzsche the will to power is an essentially transformative principle, explicated in terms of his concept of the 'self-overcoming' of the individual. In fact, Schutte considers that Nietzschean higher men and the Ubermensch represent conflicting ideals: "The Ubermensch stands for will to power as creativity. The higher man stands for will to power as power." The inadequacy of this interpretation becomes apparent when Nietzsche's examples of higher men are examined: while they include the likes of Caesar and Napoleon, they are predominantly philosophers and artists, and it is difficult to see how one would identify Goethe, Beethoven or Shakespeare as being an example of the will to power as power, rather than as creativity. It would seem clear, on the contrary, that these individuals constitute approximate realizations of Nietzsche's fully integrated, life-affirming Ubermensch.

Without doubt, Nietzsche asserts that so-called 'evil instincts' are 'expedient, species-preserving, and indispensable to as high a degree as the (so-called) good ones; their function is merely different'. However, when Nietzsche speaks of a 'naturalization of morality' or a 'return to nature', he explicitly states that "...it is not really a going back but an ascent." In fact, as we have seen, Nietzsche does not advocate a return to the once established mode of valuation characteristic of the 'noble races', yet this is just what Schutte contends when she says that for
Nietzsche's higher men "...the will to power is narrowed down to the exercise of domination on the part of the 'strong' to suppress the 'weak'.” 10 Instead of such a 'going back', Nietzsche proposes an 'ascent': he advocates the transcendence of all fundamentally social modes of valuation, both master and slave moralities, in favour of value-creation rooted in the self-overcoming of the individual.

Nietzsche does indeed maintain that higher men 'overcome' traditional morality: by reflecting upon the origin and nature of morality, these individuals arrive at the conclusion that it has no absolute power to command them. However, this realization does not necessitate the subordination of the weak to the strong, nor does Nietzsche advocate such subordination. On the contrary, his free spirits have a generalized awareness that all points of view, including their own, are interpretations. Their own mode of life is their own creation, but it is not the only mode that is possible or desirable: "This is my way; where is yours?—thus I answered those who asked me 'the way'. For the way— that does not exist." 11 Nietzschean authentic existence is concerned with the creation and realization of unique styles of life, but in terms of their content, these lifestyles make no claim to universal validity or acceptance. On Nietzsche's account, his higher men do not seek to impose their own perspectives on others; instead, he suggests that they will maintain "My judgment is my judgment: no one else is easily entitled to it." 12 Indeed, this is precisely how such exceptional individuals differ from dogmatists of all persuasions, who attempt to mask their interpretations and to present them as views that are binding on everyone.
Here we must recall Nietzsche's perspectivism ("facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations"), and its specific application to the subject of morality: "My chief proposition: there are no moral phenomena, there is only a moral interpretation of phenomena." In the case of the Christian-moral perspective, as we have seen, Nietzsche argues that moral judgments are a function of ressentiment, or 'the favorite revenge of the spiritually limited against those less limited'. According to Nietzsche, Christianity 'has made an ideal of whatever contradicts the instinct of the strong life to preserve itself': it embodies the "...attempt to make the virtues through which happiness is possible for the lowliest into the standard ideal of all values." However, Nietzsche insists that the Christian-moral interpretation of phenomena is not a view that is binding on everyone: 'the ideas of the herd should rule in the herd', but for exceptional individuals Nietzsche proposes an 'experimental morality' defined in terms of self-overcoming and self-realization.

Still, it must be acknowledged that certain fundamental difficulties remain. What Nietzsche's theory of value points toward is an experimental morality according to which one 'gives oneself a goal'. The conception of self-overcoming and self-realization is an ethical ideal for Nietzsche - at this level, there is a claim to general validity, but it is directed at a formal conception only, and not to any particular type of realization of it. The problem is that, as critics point out, no explicit restrictions are placed on what type of life can fulfill this form. Thus, while Nietzsche does not advocate the subordination of the weak to the strong, and while his theory does not nec-
essarily imply any such subordination, neither does it rule it out. Schutte's 'solipsistic monster' remains a possibility, and indeed it is difficult to see how one might reconcile Nietzsche's portrait of individual authenticity with any sort of positive social existence.

For example, what is the nature of the relation between higher men with their unique modes of life, and the rest of society with its common or shared values? Walter Kaufmann sees 'the leitmotif of Nietzsche's life and thought' as 'the anti-political individual who seeks self-perfection far from the modern world'. Clearly, Nietzsche is an intransigent individualist, and he says of higher men that '...solitude is a virtue for us, as a sublime bent and urge for cleanliness which guesses how all contact between man and man- 'in society'- involves inevitable uncleanness. All community makes men- somehow, somewhere, sometime 'common'.' In fact, Nietzsche maintains that 'the herd is a means, no more!', while exceptional individuals constitute the justification of life: a 'full, rich, great, whole human being' is said to 'justify the existence of whole millenia'.

The exceptional individual, according to Nietzsche, is '...something quite new which creates new things, something absolute; all his acts are entirely his own.' Moreover, he is not to be appraised according to how useful he is to other men: 'The value of a man does not reside in his utility; for it would continue to exist even if there were no one to whom he could be of any use.' In other words, while Nietzschean individuals do not seek to tyrannize the herd, neither do they seek to liberate it. Nietzsche is not a social revolutionary: 'the ideas of the herd
should rule in the herd', and the continued existence of the rule is the precondition for the value of the exception. Thus, while Nietzsche does fight against the notion 'that an exceptional type should make war on the rule', it is also clear that his higher men are under no obligation to play any positive social role with respect to 'the average man'.

Indeed, Nietzsche rarely chooses to view social conventions as such in a positive light; generally, he characterizes any search after such stability as a failure of independence and courage, a symptom of mediocrity, or as a defection from the rigours of singularity. However, in addressing the heroic individual as though he could stand wholly outside the social nexus, Nietzsche appears oblivious to some of the most significant contributions to social theory of his time. As J.P. Stern observes, for example, "Early sociologists, among them Marx and Durkheim, but also Max Weber, have shown at length that the individual self, even as a self, is already implicated in a system of social and moral conventions; that it is nothing ('the merest vapourings of Idealism', Marx calls it) without having some relationship to this system." If the social nexus is in fact the main condition of individual life, then Nietzsche's portrait of authenticity owes us some account of the nature of the relation between his self-legislators and their social environment.

The nature of the relationship between exceptional individuals is also problematic. For example, Nietzsche at times presents a picture of 'the savage egoisms that have turned, almost exploded, against one another... and can no longer derive any limit, restraint, or consideration from their previous morality'. This
'dangerous and uncanny point' has now been reached: "...the 'individual' appears, obliged to give himself laws and to develop his own arts and wiles for self-preservation, self-enhancement, self-redemption." 26 Conflict between Nietzsche's self-legislators would appear to be inevitable, each seeking to enhance or maximize his own power. As John T. Wilcox notes, "Even if we grant that each of us aims at power, and so takes power as the good, what this means is that each takes his own power as the good, and often at the expense of the power of others." 27

Moreover, Nietzsche sees 'the genius of the race overflowing from all cornucopias of good and bad': 28 the pursuit of individual authenticity or the process of self-realization offers no guarantee of the character or quality of the individual or self that is thus being confirmed. Nietzsche's 'principle of authenticity' as an ethical ideal is stated on a number of occasions: "What does your conscience say? - 'You shall become the person you are.'" 29 Similarly, the subtitle of Ecce Homo is 'How one becomes what one is'. J.P. Stern notes, then, "Nietzsche is saying that the only absolute imperative a man should obey is that of his inward potential: whatever it is given to a man to become, that should indicate the direction, and be the goal, of his intense striving, his will." 30 Nietzsche describes the process of self-discovery in some detail in an early essay:

Let the youthful soul look back on life with the question: what have you truly loved up to now, what has drawn your soul aloft, what has mastered it and at the same time blessed it? Set up these revered objects before you and perhaps their nature and their sequence will give you a law, the fundamental law of your own true self. Compare these objects one with another, see how one completes, expands, surpasses, transfigures another,
how they constitute a stepladder upon which you have clambered up to yourself as you are now; for your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you usually take yourself to be. 31

This description of self-discovery (which is remarkably similar to Sartre's exegesis of existential psychoanalysis and the discovery of one's fundamental project, as discussed in chapter two) suggests that authenticity for Nietzsche is the 'deliberate coincidence of what a man is with what he can become': it is a validation of the self by means of the process of self-realization through 'hardness against oneself', or self-overcoming. However, while Nietzsche does state that 'your true nature lies... immeasurably high above... that which you usually take yourself to be' (your conventional and therefore inauthentic self), as Stern sees it, it would appear to be equally possible that 'your true nature' might lie immeasurably below 'that which you usually take yourself to be', and that social conventions mercifully prevent its realization. The principle of authenticity as an ethical ideal thus not only provides no guarantee of the character of the self that is being validated; on Stern's account, "...it sets up the quality of 'commitment', its intensity and earnestness, as the dominant moral quality and the criterion of good and evil." 32

Stern's points are well taken, with one qualification. The quality of commitment to one's self-realization is not for Nietzsche the criterion of good and evil (or good and bad, as he would prefer to put it). His new theory of value advocates instead the adoption of a 'Dionysian value-standard' for existence, or a value-standard deriving from the apprehension and affirmation of the fundamental character of existence as will to power.
tum of 'enhanced and organized' power is the sole objective measure of value. For Nietzsche, as we have seen, the will to power is an essentially transformative principle, and he explicates it in terms of his concept of the self-overcoming of the individual. To 'become what one is', then, is to become an individual, as distinct from a member of the herd, by means of 'giving style' to one's own unique character.

We know that for Nietzsche the idea of the ego as a metaphysically abiding subject is dismissed as a fiction. In The Will to Power, on the other hand, the idea of 'the subject as multiplicity' constantly emerges: "The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general." Becoming an individual, then, will involve examining one's various aspects or 'selves'; and it will amount to an ongoing, unending process of integrating these character traits, habits and patterns of action with one another. Self-criticism will play an integral part in this process, and thus self-realization will require, as Nietzsche puts it, the courage for an attack upon one's convictions. Becoming an individual is hence a perpetual movement towards integration and wholeness, where every decision made or change effected contains an implicit or explicit appraisal of values. Indeed, as we have seen, value-creation is defined by Nietzsche in terms of this process of self-overcoming. 'Valuation itself' is the will to power: it is the imbuing of life and the world with value, through the creative activity of exceptional individuals, that constitutes the highest of all forms of the will to power. Thus, as has been
argued, authentic existence is in Nietzsche's view fundamentally concerned with the creation and realization of ideals or unique styles of life.

We have already noted some basic difficulties with this account: the meaning of 'power' is ambiguous, as is the method for determining what does and does not enhance power. These problems are tied to the also unresolved difficulty of the determination of an order of rank among values. We can now add that, given these problems, value-creation by exceptional individuals does become a potentially arbitrary activity, as Stern observes. Indeed, given no clear account of what does and does not enhance power, given no order of rank among values, what is to distinguish good from bad creative activity? (Recall that a stand beyond the morality of good and evil is not a stand beyond good and bad.) Moreover, among these self-legislators, who as Nietzsche puts it 'can no longer derive any limit, restraint, or consideration from their previous morality', the risk of self-deception is surely extremely high. What is to distinguish, then, the fanaticism which goes with self-deception from Nietzsche's own description of the 'hardness against oneself' which goes hand in hand with self-legislation? Finally, as we noted earlier, the fundamental difficulty of potential conflicts between wills to power, each of us taking his own power as the good, remains almost wholly unresolved.

Nietzsche does indicate that, "Refraining mutually from injury, violence, and exploitation and placing one's will on a par with that of someone else- this may become, in a certain rough sense, good manners among individuals if the appropriate conditions are present." \(^{34}\) The appropriate conditions are identified
by Nietzsche as 'similarity in strength and value-standards', and 'belonging together in one body'. However, if this principle is extended and accepted as the fundamental principle of society, it immediately proves to be what, in Nietzsche's view, it really is: "...a will to the denial of life, a principle of disintegration and decay." 35

Given this conclusion, can Nietzsche's 'experimental morality' properly be called a 'morality' at all? P. Foot notes that the word 'morality' is derived from mos with its plural mores, and in its present usage it has not lost this connection with the mores, or the rules of behaviour, of a society. She thus argues that Nietzsche is after all an immoralist: "He keeps some of his sharpest vituperation for those who try to impose social rules and a code of behaviour which shall be uniform throughout the community." 36 However, a distinction can be made between a social morality and an individualistic ethics: recall, for example, Sartre's distinction between everyday morality as a social phenomenon, and the ethics of authentic individual existence. Similarly, Nietzsche's individualistic ethics requires of the higher man that he recognize that social morality has no absolute authority to command him, and that he embrace the principle of authenticity instead. Nietzsche's goal is the Ubermensch, or the fully integrated, life affirming individual, and the route to the Ubermensch is the authentically existing higher man, who is not bound by, and indeed must in some sense be protected from, the decadent, egalitarian values of the societal herd.

We have thus come full circle. Nietzsche himself does not intend or advocate an immoral use of power; his self-legislating in-
dividuals do not seek to dominate the herd: 'an exceptional type should not make war on the rule'. However, neither is the exceptional type obliged to attempt to liberate others from the herd: 'the ideas of the herd should rule in the herd'. What, then, is the nature of the relation between self-legislators and average men, between unique lifestyles and social conventions? Nietzsche's individuals cannot stand wholly outside the social nexus: their value-creation must in some sense take place in terms of or in relation to this nexus. Indeed, any viable view of authentic existence must address the question of the nature of the relations between individuals and their social environment: in the case of Nietzsche's portrait of individual authenticity, however, no such account is provided.

Sartre, on the other hand, manages to avoid some of Nietzsche's difficulties by means of his concept of our 'situation' in the world. As we have seen, my situation includes my place, my body, my past, my environment and also my fellowmen. On Sartre's account, we are immediately in a situation: we find ourselves in an already meaningful or value-laden world, due to the collective activities of our fellowmen. It is their collective activities which anchor the meanings or values which I encounter: values or meanings which have 'being' or are 'crystallized' in the social world. Like Nietzsche, Sartre wants us to transcend the habit of 'everyday morality' and to become autonomous ethical agents, but for Sartre there is no question of the 'individual self' standing wholly outside the social nexus: the for-itself can exist only in a situation. 37 Sartre's concern is rather that we acquire a reflective comprehension of our condition: in pure reflection, consciousness comprehends
its fundamental freedom and, correlatively, its absolute respon-
sibility for itself. It is this comprehension which, in Sartre's
view, renders ethics (as distinct from everyday morality) possible:
those structures of exigency in the world which are collectively
defined values are dependent upon the constitutive activity of
consciousness. They are our products, and we must assume respon-
sibility for them and recognize that we are free to modify them.

It is Sartre's contention, moreover, that authentic individ-
duals will modify these collective valuations, not arbitrarily but
rather in a manner consistent with their apprehension of the nature
of human reality as the source of all values. Unlike Nietzschean
higher men, who act to maximize their own power through the cre-
tion of unique ideals or styles of life, Sartre's authentic individ-
duals choose freedom as their ultimate value. Since freedom exists
only in relation to a situation, valuing freedom involves not only
the reflective comprehension of the human condition (and so affirm-
ing our ontological freedom), but also action in the world which
has as its aim the enhancement of our concrete freedom (or valuing
our actual freedom of choice). In Sartre's view, valuing freedom
means that man should endeavour to modify his situation in the
world so as to remove restrictions to his freedom of choice, and
to increase the range of choices available to him. Freedom of
choice is inseparable from freedom to attain goals: valuing the
former also requires valuing the latter, and hence valuing the mod-
ification of the concrete situation in order to broaden attainable
goals. In other words, Sartre clearly envisions his autonomous
ethical agents as having a positive social role to play, countering
repressive political and social policies or systems, and supporting
any policies or systems that maximize freedom of choice by enabling man to achieve his goals.

Indeed, Sartre maintains in Being and Nothingness that our shared techniques and collective activities imply that "...there is a truth concerning man and not only concerning individuals who cannot be compared." There is a 'truth concerning man' for any given historical period: its characteristic social and political structures constitute the situation in terms of which the individual subsequently defines himself. It is on the ground of this truth concerning man, moreover, that the freedom of choice of the morally autonomous individual is exercised. Collectively defined social and political structures are evaluated and modified, not only or simply in terms of the specific goals of the individual, but rather with a view toward the fulfillment of shared or intersubjectively defined needs and desires. For Sartre, in other words, the individual is inextricably linked with his fellowmen by means of their shared situation, and the attainment of a reflective apprehension of this condition carries with it the obligation to enhance the concrete freedom existing in the shared situation. The suggestion, then, is that since we do share a common social-political situation, none of us will enjoy real freedom, concrete freedom of action, unless all of us do.

Thus, while Nietzsche maintains that the notion of the 'equality of men' is an 'error', Sartre instead chooses to emphasize that, while we are all unique individuals, we do nevertheless share a common condition, and the reflective apprehension of the nature of that condition provides good grounds for choosing to take freedom as one's primary value. The 'attitude if strict con-
sistency' requires the choice of freedom as one's primary value: the choice of freedom is most consistent with the human condition and the nature of value, since human freedom alone is the source of all value. As we have seen, in the choice of anything as a value there is logically entailed the more fundamental choice of freedom as a value; otherwise that choice of anything else as a value would itself be repudiated, for if man does not value his freedom, he cannot consistently value any value it creates.

This line of argument has been criticized on a number of grounds; for example, Richard Bernstein correctly points out that it depends upon a prior decision to value logical consistency. On Sartre's account, however, logical consistency has no intrinsic value; man is under no obligation to be consistent, and thus he is under no obligation to choose freedom as his fundamental value. However, Sartre maintains that it is up to man to provide his life with meaning, or to satisfy his desire for a justified existence. He can do so by refusing to value the God-project with its impossible goal, and choosing instead to value goals that are attainable, goals that are consistent with reality. It is true that the fact that we desire meaning and justification for our existence does not logically entail that we must value this desired meaning and justification. As T.C. Anderson notes, however, to allow that no logically compelling reasons can be advanced for valuing a meaningful and justified existence does not mean that no reasons at all can be given: "Man's deep longing for justification and the fact that a meaningful life (unlike the project to be God) is attainable are certainly reasons that support the valuing of such a life." Still, it must be acknowledged that the choice of
freedom as one's primary value cannot be justified in any absolute sense: the fact that man is the source of values simply precludes such justification.

Sartre's position has also been criticized on the ground that the assertion that freedom should be man's primary value is actually unintelligible. Here, for example, is what Sartre says about valuation, or the positing of an 'ideal state of affairs' by the individual in relation to the situation in which he is presently immersed: "This means that he will have had to give himself room, to withdraw in relation to it, and will have to have effected a double nihilation: on the one hand, he must posit an ideal state of affairs as a pure present nothingness; on the other hand, he must posit the actual situation as nothingness in relation to this state of affairs." Sartre maintains that value is that which is to be 'made real', but the difficulty, as critics see it, is that his ontology stipulates that man is already free, which renders senseless the contention that man should value freedom, or make freedom real.

However, this particular objection reflects a basic misunderstanding of Sartre's position, which considers freedom in two distinct contexts. First, there is a consideration of our ontological freedom as such, or the constitutive structure of the for-itself. We are indeed 'already free', in this sense, but we may or may not choose to value our fundamental freedom. We may flee from our autonomy and the responsibility it carries with it by means of bad faith, or we may accept it and value it as our fundamental project. Now Sartre asks: what does it mean to value freedom? what is involved in valuing freedom? It is not, he argues, simply a matter
of affirming the fact that we are free beings and responsible for ourselves. Here we must move to Sartre's consideration of 'real freedom': although he has discussed freedom as the ontological structure of human reality per se, he acknowledges that freedom so considered is in fact an abstraction. 42 Freedom exists only as situated freedom. The question thus becomes 'what is involved in valuing situated freedom?'. Sartre maintains that situated freedom is concrete freedom of choice, freedom to attain goals. Valuing the former requires also valuing the latter and hence, he argues, valuing the modification of the social-political situation in order to broaden attainable goals.

Moreover, in Existentialism and Humanism Sartre presents what he takes to be man's ethical responsibility to others: "I am obliged to will the freedom of others at the same time as mine. I cannot make freedom my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim." 43 For example, Sartre maintains that whatever an individual chooses, he deems it a value for all men: "I am thus responsible for myself and for all men, and I am creating a certain image of man as I would have him be. In fashioning myself I fashion man." 44 Thus, if I choose freedom as my primary value, I am actually affirming freedom as the ultimate value for all men, or urging that all men should become free.

Sartre's argument does require qualification, in as much as it is clearly not the case that 'whatever an individual chooses, he deems it a value for all men'. We are all unique individuals, with particular projects and goals, and it is rather when my choice is based upon the nature of our common condition that I am choosing 'for all men' and not simply for myself alone. As we have noted,
Sartre holds that the basis for my choice of freedom is a truth about the universal human condition; namely, that human freedom is the source of all values. Thus, on Sartre's account, when I choose freedom as my primary value, I am actually asserting that, given our common condition, everyone should likewise choose freedom as his fundamental value.

Given our common ontological condition, and also our shared historical situation, then, it is Sartre's contention that choosing freedom as our primary value requires action in the social world which has as its goal the maximization of our concrete freedom. As Simone de Beauvoir puts it, "I must then try to create for men situations in which they could accompany and surpass my transcendence... I ask for health, knowledge, well-being, leisure for men so that their freedom is not consumed in fighting illness, ignorance, misery." 45 Similarly, Sartre insists that, given a reflective apprehension of the nature of the human condition, including the recognition that freedom exists only in relation to a shared situation, men should endeavour to jointly modify their situation in the world so as to remove restrictions to their freedom of choice and likewise to broaden their attainable goals. On Sartre's account, therefore, individual authenticity requires social commitment.

A difficulty remains, however, and it is a considerable one for Sartre: he has not yet adequately demonstrated that 'I cannot make freedom my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim'. It would seem, on the contrary, that I can choose to make my own freedom my primary value, and in so doing affirm that everyone else should do likewise, without at the same time choosing their freedom.
as a value for me. Recall that a similar problem faces Nietzsche: even if we allow that each of us aims at power, and so takes power as the good, what this means is that each takes his own power as the good. Just as there is nothing in Nietzsche's account of individual authenticity which adequately addresses the question of conflicts between wills to power, so too is there thus far nothing in Sartre's account which demonstrates that I must choose, not just my own freedom, but equally the freedom of others, as my goal. Indeed, as Anderson observes, even the criterion of consistency is of no help here: "All that consistency demands is that I choose my own freedom as my primary goal, since it is only an individual's personal freedom that is the source of his values." 46

Moreover, Sartre's exhortation to make the freedom of others one's own goal becomes increasingly problematic if his treatment of my 'being-for-others' in *Being and Nothingness* is taken into consideration. There Sartre asserts that, "Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others." 47 The Other, on this account, is another subjectivity who objectifies me, and this objectification constitutes 'the solidification and alienation of my own possibilities'. In this sense, Sartre maintains, we can consider ourselves 'slaves' in so far as we appear to the Other: "I am a slave to the degree that my being is dependent at the center of a freedom which is not mine and which is the very condition of my being." 48 The Other's freedom, then, is the condition of my object-ness, and this me-as-object is described by Sartre as 'a degraded consciousness': "My original fall is the existence of the Other." 49

According to Sartre, my concrete relations with the Other are
wholly governed by my attitudes with respect to the object which I am for the Other. The Other's existence can motivate either of two opposed attitudes: I can turn back upon the Other so as to make an object out of him in turn, since the Other's object-ness destroys my object-ness for him, or I can seek to possess the Other as freedom. Indeed, in so far as the Other as freedom is the foundation of my object-ness, my being-in-itself, if I could recover that freedom and identify myself with it, I would then be my own foundation. As Sartre puts it, "To transcend the Other's transcendence, or, on the contrary, to incorporate that transcendence within me without removing from it its character as transcendence—such are the two primitive attitudes which I assume confronting the Other." Further, since everything which may be said of me in my relations with the Other applies to him as well, Sartre maintains that conflict is the fundamental meaning of being-for-others: we each attempt to either eradicate or assimilate one another's subjectivity, in order to avoid our own alienating objectification.

Thus, on Sartre's account relations with others form a circle of futility. I attempt either to assimilate or eradicate the Other's freedom: each attempt is the 'death' of the other, the failure of one motivates the adoption of the other. As Sartre puts it, "...there is no dialectic for my relations toward the Other but rather a circle..."; the for-itself is "...indefinitely tossed from one to the other of the two fundamental attitudes." Since these relations are reciprocal, while I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to
enslave me. Hence, Sartre concludes that our concrete relations are inevitably conflict-ridden: "...we shall never place ourselves concretely on a plane of equality; that is, on the plane where the recognition of the Other's freedom would involve the Other's recognition of our freedom."  

Given this portrait of relations with others, what are we to conclude about the social dimension of Sartre's description of individual authenticity? Under the circumstances, does Sartre's treatment of our ethical responsibility to others even make sense? Critics such as Mary Warnock argue, for example, "If ethics... is concerned with the fitting together of the interests and choices of one person with those of another, there is no way into the subject at all if our aim is necessarily to dominate the other person and subordinate his freedom to our own."  

As we have seen, Sartre commands us to will the freedom of others at the same time as our own: 'I cannot make freedom my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim'. However, if all human relations are necessarily relations of conflict, or attempts to assimilate or eradicate the Other's freedom, then Sartre's account of our ethical responsibility to others appears to be unintelligible.

Indeed, it is difficult to see at this juncture precisely how to reconcile the notion of individual authenticity with a social existence. Nietzsche's authentic individuals appear to stand wholly outside the social nexus: while it is not the case that his higher men necessarily seek to dominate the herd, neither are they portrayed as having any real connection with society or as having any positive social role to play. On the other hand, Sartre's autonomous ethical agents are firmly situated in the social
world, and their common human condition provides them with a basis for shared goals. Indeed, unlike Nietzschean higher men, who act to maximize their own power through the creation of unique ideals or styles of life, Sartre's authentic individuals together choose freedom as their ultimate value and seek to remove restrictions to their freedom of choice and to increase the range of choices available to them. However, while Sartre thus clearly envisions his autonomous ethical agents as having a positive social role to play, his treatment of my conflict-ridden relations with others renders questionable his exhortation to make the freedom of others my own goal. Clearly, a more profound consideration of the relationship between the individual and his social environment, and thus the social dimension of individual authenticity, is required. We will turn now to the philosophy of Heidegger in order to begin our examination of the nature of the relation between individual authenticity and relationships with others.
In this chapter, Heidegger's concept of authentic existence as it is presented in Being and Time will be examined, with specific attention to the relation between individual authenticicty and relationships with others. In order to appreciate Heidegger's discussion of authenticity, a pair of terminological distinctions must be noted at the outset. The distinction between 'ontological' and 'ontic' is derived from the distinction between Being and beings. Beings are intraworldly entities, and investigations concerning them, or descriptions of what as a matter of fact is the case, are 'ontic' studies. The Being of a being, on the other hand, is its fundamental structure, or that which makes this being what it is, and is the focus of 'ontological' inquiry. Ontological inquiry seeks to uncover the essential structures of the ontic; in an ontological study of a being, one attempts to exhibit the essential structures which make this particular type of being possible. In the case of man, Heidegger designates ontic investigations by the term 'existentiell', while ontological inquiry concerning man's Being (Dasein) he refers to as 'existential'.

It is Heidegger's contention that the 'Being-in-the-world' which essentially characterizes Dasein is a structure that can assume two different fundamental modalities, one 'authentic' and the other 'inauthentic'. We will examine both of these modalities, with a view to understanding the relation between them and the manner in which, on Heidegger's account, authenticity may be wrested from inauthenticity. His discussion of 'anxiety' and 'Being-towards-death' will be central here, as will his explication of
temporality as the meaning of authentic Dasein's Being-in-the-world.

To become authentic, Heidegger argues, is to become 'what one already is': authenticity is a matter of being what one already is with explicit awareness of one's essential structure. However, Heidegger's account of authentic existence has been criticized on a number of grounds, many of which concern the nature of the relationship between the individual seeking authenticity and his social environment. It is generally supposed, for example, that Heidegger's portrait of authenticity is so exclusively individualistic that it rules out positive, constructive relations with others. It will be argued, however, that most of these criticisms rest upon a misidentification of Dasein and man, and that when correctly understood, Heidegger's account of Dasein and his treatment of authenticity provide an ontological basis for positive social relations.

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Heidegger's purpose in *Being and Time* is to inquire into the meaning of Being, or what it is for a being to Be, or for a thing to exist. He maintains that we do not have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'Being'; indeed, the question of the meaning of Being has today been forgotten: "On the basis of the Greeks' initial contributions towards an Interpretation of Being, a dogma has been developed which not only declares the question of the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect." It is said that 'Being' is the most universal and the emptiest of concepts, that it resists every attempt at definition, and that in any case it does not require any definition, since everyone uses it constantly and already understands what he means by it. Heidegger, on the contrary, insists that we do not have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'Being', that if 'Being' is the most universal concept, this means not that it is the one which is clearest but rather that it is the darkest of all, that the indefinability of Being is a function of the fact that it cannot be conceived as an entity, that this indefinability does not eliminate the question of its meaning, and that it is therefore necessary to raise again the question of the meaning of Being.

In order to uncover what it is for a being to Be, or what it is for a thing to exist, Heidegger seeks to investigate via a particular kind of being. There is one being, and only one, which provides a starting point for the question about the meaning of Being: man is the being that can question itself about its own Being. What is it for man to Be? What makes man what he is? What essential structures make this particular type of being possible? Heidegger
maintains that it is only by means of an analysis of man's essential structures, man's Being or Dasein, that we can acquire an understanding of the meaning of Being: "...to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity- the inquirer- transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about- namely, Being." In this sense, an examination of man's Being, or Dasein, constitutes a necessary condition for a genuine ontology.

Heidegger calls the mode of Being proper to man Existenz or 'standing out toward', because it is the distinctive characteristic of man that he must 'come out' of himself in order to realize himself. As Heidegger explains it, "It is not the case that man 'is' and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-Being towards the 'world'... Dasein is never 'proximally' an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a 'relationship' towards the world. Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is." In other words, man is essentially an intentional and self-transcending being, or as Heidegger puts it, man's Being is Being-in-the-world.

Heidegger's phenomenological method of inquiry requires that in our analysis of man's Being we approach man in his everyday, common character in the world, rather than from any ideal image of man. Our everyday existence is characterized by our concernful dealings with intraworldly entities or 'equipment', and an examination of this 'average everydayness' is intended to bring to light that which underlies man's ordinary behaviour; namely, the essential
structures or existentialia of Dasein. These structural determinations of man are to be clearly distinguished from the basic determinations of entities other than man, which Heidegger calls 'categorial determinations'. The distinctive character of man lies in the fact that, unlike all other entities which merely are, for the entity man "...in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it." Man not only is, but he 'has to be', or as Heidegger puts it, his Being is a task imposed upon him.

The fundamental structures of this Being are identified by Heidegger through a consideration of the Da of Dasein, the 'there' or Dasein's 'openness': "In understanding and state-of-mind, we shall see the two constitutive ways of being the 'there'; and these are equiprimordial." Heidegger proceeds to add that state-of-mind and understanding are "...characterized equiprimordially by discourse." Understanding, state-of-mind and discourse thus comprise the existentialia of Dasein, and while they form an 'unbreakable unity' they can on Heidegger's account be analysed independently in order to arrive at a full and complete characterization of the nature of man's Being. What follows is a preliminary description of the fundamental structures of Dasein.

What Heidegger indicates ontologically by the term 'state-of-mind' is ontically or concretely identified as our mood. Mood discloses "...the 'thrownness' of this entity into its 'there'; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the 'there'. The expression 'thrownness' is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over." In mood, then, man is aware of his Being, of the fact that he is, without having freely chosen it. His Being appears to him as a Being-thrown among things.
Having a mood is thus not an 'inner condition': Dasein is essentially Being-in-the-world, and mood discloses man's facticity or his situation among other entities within the world. Moreover, Heidegger maintains that in mood man not only becomes conscious of the fact that he is, but also of the fact that he 'has to be', or that his Being has to be realized by himself as a task.

The second existentiale of Dasein's openness, understanding, indicates that Dasein is primarily Being-possible: "As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities." Primordial understanding discloses 'existentiality' or Dasein's power to be or to realize itself. In his Being, man is not determined once and for all. His Being is distinguished from that of things precisely in that it can always be further realized. In so far as Dasein always is its possibilities, it is constantly also already more than it is now. In so far as man always transcends himself, in so far as he is 'with' his possibilities, he exists. Understanding is thus what Heidegger calls a 'project'. In its primordial understanding, Dasein projects itself to an ultimate 'for-the-sake-of-which' or purpose, but at the same time it projects itself to a certain 'significance' or a particular worldly structure. Thus, primordial understanding as the constitutive disclosure of Dasein's power to be also brings to light the world as a referential totality.

Of Dasein's third existentiale, Heidegger maintains that, "Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility." The way in which discourse gets expressed is language, and discoursing or talking is the way in which we articulate 'significantly' the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world. In other words, the function of
speech is not to make known 'externally' what is 'inside' us. On the contrary, we are always already 'out there' in the world and articulate what we experience there: "In discourse the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world (an intelligibility which goes with a state-of-mind) is articulated according to significations; and discourse is this articulation." 9

As state-of-mind discloses Dasein's facticity, and understanding its existentiality, Heidegger maintains that discourse discloses Dasein's 'fallenness'. In order to appreciate Heidegger's discussion of fallenness, however, it is first necessary to recognize that on his account Dasein's Being-in-the-world is essentially a Mitsein or a 'Being-with': "The world of Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is Being-with Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with." 10 Heidegger maintains, then, that others are as equiprimordially present to Dasein as equipment is: in our dealings with intraworldly entities the presence of others is discovered at the same time because they are also involved in these pieces of equipment, as users or as makers. As soon as Dasein discovers the world, in other words, it has already discovered others who co-exist with it: as Being-in-the-world, our existence is already a Being together with others.

On Heidegger's account, Being-with is not to be understood in terms of spatial proximity but rather in terms of an openness to and a sharing in one world. It is on the basis of this common possession of one world that a community can be constituted according to the different modalities of Being-with, which range from love to hatred and from solidarity to indifference. Thus for Heidegger 'Being-with' does not imply that we live in a state of harmony with
others, but rather only that man from the first moment of his ex­
istence lives as a certain openness in which others are already
enclosed, and it is this openness which renders possible the var­
ious types of Being-with. Similarly, Heidegger characterizes Da­
sein's dealings with others by the term 'solicitude' (Fursorge),
but solicitude is to be understood only as that which makes possible
all of the particular modalities of our behaviour toward one anoth­
er. Thus hate is a form of solicitude, as is indifference. In gen­
eral, then, Being-with merely discloses that others exist with us,
that our world is a with-world, but it says nothing about the qual­
ity or character of our community with others.

Dasein's 'fallenness', on Heidegger's account, is likewise to
be construed in a neutral manner: "This term does not express any
negative evaluation, but is used to signify that Dasein is proxi­
mally and for the most part alongside the 'world' of its concern." 11
Heidegger maintains, then, that we must not take the fallenness of
Dasein as a 'fall' from a purer and higher 'primal state'. Dasein
has fallen into the world, which itself belongs to its Being: "Fall­
ing is a definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself." 12
Indeed, this is the kind of Being which is closest to Dasein and
in which Dasein maintains itself for the most part.

Our fallenness includes two fundamental aspects. First, man
understands his own Being in terms of that of intraworldly beings,
and thus conceives of himself as a substance possessing certain
qualities. Second, the world which is present here is the world of
everyone or of the 'they': "We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves
as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and
art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great
mass' as they shrink back; we find shocking what they find shocking."

The 'they', on Heidegger's account, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness, in which Dasein is fascinated by the world and absorbed in Being-with-one-another.

It is Heidegger's contention that the Being-in-the-world which essentially characterizes Dasein is a structure that can assume two different fundamental modalities, one authentic and the other inauthentic. In its inauthentic mode, the particular Dasein submits to the 'dictatorship of the they': the three existentialia (understanding, state-of-mind and discourse) here manifest themselves as curiosity, ambiguity and idle talk. For example, curiosity "...concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a Being towards it) but just in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty." Similarly, the lack of genuine understanding manifests itself in our everydayness as ambiguity and idle talk, or 'groundless' communication. In its inauthentic mode, then, Heidegger maintains that the particular Dasein assumes the character of 'Being-lost in the publicness of the they'.

The Self of everyday Dasein is thus the they-Self, which Heidegger distinguishes from the authentic Self or "...the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. As they-Self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the 'they', and must first find itself." The 'they' cultivates averageness as the norm of everything, but also the particular Dasein is disburdened by the 'they': "...because the 'they' presents every judgment and decision as its own, it deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability." In order to assume responsibility for itself, therefore, the particular Da-
sein must become an authentic Self: it must 'find itself' and take
hold of itself 'in its own way', or as Heidegger puts it, "... be-
cause Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it
can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also
lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so." 17

In order to understand precisely what is meant by authentic
Being an analysis of 'care' (Sorge) is first required. Heidegger
defines 'care' as "Being-ahead-of-oneself -- in-Being-already-in...
-- as Being-alongside." 18 This means that care constitutes the un-
ity of the structural determinations of Dasein, or the existentialia.
The fact that Dasein is essentially a power to be implies that it
is always 'ahead of itself' in its projection of possibilities.
However, Dasein can realize its possibilities only because it is
thrown or 'already in' the world. Moreover, Dasein always discovers
itself 'alongside' the world, or absorbed in its dealings with in-
traworldly entities. Care is thus the necessary consequence of ex-
istentiality, facticity and fallenness.

According to Heidegger, it is the phenomenon of 'anxiety' or
Angst which throws light on the unity of Dasein's structural deter-
minations: "... anxiousness as a state-of-mind is a way of Being-in-
the-world; that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Be-
ing-in-the-world; that which we have anxiety about is our potential-
ity-for-Being-in-the-world." 20 In anxiety, we feel 'uncanny': an-
xiety brings us back from our absorption in the 'world'. Everyday
familiarity collapses, and anxiety thus deprives us of the possibi-
ility of understanding ourselves in terms of the 'world' of intra-
worldly entities and the way things have been publicly interpreted
by the 'they'. Anxiety individualizes us for our 'ownmost Being-
in-the-world'; it makes manifest in Dasein "...its Being-free-for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself." Thus on Heidegger's account, anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for the authenticity of its Being.

Moreover, Heidegger maintains that anxiety discloses Dasein's 'thrownness into death': "Anxiety in the face of death is anxiety 'in the face of' that potentiality-for-Being which is one's ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped." Death is defined by Heidegger as the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Anxiety in the face of death so understood must not be confused with fear in the face of one's demise: rather, as a basic state-of-mind of Dasein, it amounts to the disclosure of the fact that Dasein exists as 'thrown Being towards its end'. Our everyday understanding of death suggests, on the contrary, that it is merely a 'well-known event occurring within the world': "'Dying' is levelled off to an occurrence which reaches Dasein, to be sure, but belongs to nobody in particular." There is, then, a 'constant tranquillization' about death, or an evasion which conceals: the 'they' does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death. Our everyday falling evasion in the face of death is thus an inauthentic Being-towards-death.

Authentic Being-towards-death, on the other hand, does not "... evade its ownmost non-relational possibility, or cover up this possibility by thus fleeing from it, or give a new explanation for it to accord with the common sense of the 'they'." In other words, death must be genuinely understood as the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein. Heidegger's terminology for such Being towards this possibility is 'anticipation': "Anticipation turns out to be
the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-Being -- that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence." 25 Death is thus Dasein's 'ownmost' possibility, and Being towards this possibility discloses to Dasein its 'ownmost' potentiality-for-Being, in which its very Being is an issue: "Here it can become manifest to Dasein that in this distinctive possibility of its own self, it has been wrenched away from the 'they'." 26 Death thus lays claim to one's own Dasein as an individual Dasein: the non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein 'down to itself'. On Heidegger's account, therefore, a genuine understanding of death reveals to Dasein its 'lostness in the they-Self', and brings it face to face with the possibility of Being itself, or of authentic existence.

In terms of Dasein's existentialia, then, Angst is the state-of-mind which allows an individual to be immediately affected by his own mortality, opening up or uncovering the possibility of authentic existence. Heidegger maintains further that conscience is the discourse which belongs to the authentic mode of self-disclosedness. Heidegger's concept of conscience is ontological, rather than theological. For example, he asserts that the religious interpretation of conscience as the voice of God warning us against sinning is only one particular (existentiell) way of interpreting the universal (existential) phenomenon of being summoned away from our usual way of doing things. What Heidegger calls the 'silent call of conscience' is described as the highest form of communication: our very Being summons itself to function in its most appropriate way.

Finally, Heidegger maintains that it is the recognition and acceptance of oneself as finite temporal openness which is the un-
derstanding which constitutes authentic disclosedness. Heidegger argues that it is resolute anticipation of death which makes Dasein authentically futural: "By the term 'futural', we do not here have in view a 'now' which has not yet become actual and which sometime will be for the first time. We have in view the coming in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself." 27 By anticipating death, Dasein receives its Being precisely as its own, so that it genuinely comes to Be itself. In other words, resolute anticipation of death discloses the distinctive possibility of one's existence, one's specific goal, as opposed to 'the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one'. Further, Heidegger contends that this means that anticipation not only makes Dasein authentically futural, but also that it makes it possible for Dasein to take over its own thrownness: "The authentic coming-towards-oneself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the same time a coming-back to one's ownmost Self, which has been thrown into its individualization." 28 Dasein thus takes over resolutely that entity which it already is: "In anticipating, Dasein brings itself again forth into its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. If Being-as-having-been is authentic, we call it 'repetition'." 29

Heidegger thus maintains that genuine self-understanding is possible because we can exist in such a way which unifies our past, present and future. Resolute anticipation of death is the 'self-gathering' by means of which an individual's future becomes intelligible in terms of his past, and his past likewise becomes intelligible in terms of his future. For the authentic individual, then, the future is the completion or fulfillment of the past; it pre-
supposes the past but, on the other hand, this past cannot manifest itself unless there is a future. Thus on Heidegger's account there exists a relationship of reciprocal implication between past and future. Further, in authentic 'making present', Dasein's current situation is revealed by means of a future projection of its own potentiality-for-Being, and in the light of its own past or thrownness. As Heidegger puts it, "In resoluteness, the Present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one's closest concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been." The present situation is thus a 'product' of the future and the 'having been', and what is meant by 'temporality' as such is precisely the unity of this structured whole, or the future which makes present in the process of having been.

Heidegger maintains, therefore, that temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care. As we have seen, Dasein's totality of Being as care means: ahead-of-itself-already-Being-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). It is now clear that "...the 'ahead of itself' is grounded in the future. In the 'Being already-in...' the character of 'having been' is made known. 'Being-alongside...' becomes possible in making present." Thus temporality makes possible the unity of existentiality, facticity and fallenness, and in this way it constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care. Dasein's temporal structure is therefore a 'circular' unity in which a seemingly separate past, present and future in fact inter-penetrate each other: what we experience now (in the present) is interpreted in the light cast by a prior (past) future-oriented projection.
Heidegger thus argues that, contrary to what traditional conceptions of selfhood suggest, Dasein exists as finite temporal openness. More fundamental than the ego-subject with its worldly objects, for example, is the temporality which makes possible the experience of both subject and object. As Heidegger puts it, Dasein exists as the temporal 'clearing' in which beings, including the ego-subject, can be manifest. Indeed, just as for Kant an object can be experienced and known only if it is organized according to the categories of the human understanding, for Heidegger a being can manifest itself only within the temporal 'horizons' opened up in Dasein's transcendence. Without these temporal horizons, there would be neither subjects nor objects, since there would be no disclosedness or clearing ('world') in which subjects and objects could be manifest. To be a Self, Heidegger maintains, is precisely to be this temporal openness in which beings can be revealed.

To become authentic, then, is to become 'what one is', or to recognise Dasein as Dasein. Man for the most part remains concealed from himself in his own reality, and sees himself instead as a being among other intraworldly beings. Becoming authentic means 'owning up' to one's own true nature or Being, which one already is. As owning up to what one already is, authenticity is a matter of Being what one already is with explicit awareness of one's own true Being: namely, Dasein is its own existentialia, those constitutive ways of Being that together exhibit its Existenz, or the way in which Dasein has to Be as 'thrown possibility'. Dasein has to Be as temporal care: it is temporality which makes possible the unity of the existentialia and thus reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care.
It is resolute anticipation of death which makes factual Dasein authentically futural by wresting Dasein from the 'they' and leaving it free for its own potentiality-for-Being. In authentic having been, the particular Dasein resolutely assumes its thrownness or that entity which it already is by means of the 'repetition' of its own potentiality-for-Being. Finally, in authentic making present, factual Dasein's present situation is revealed by means of a future projection of its own potentiality-for-Being, and in the light of its own past or thrownness. As an authentic Self, man understands his temporal structure as one in which the past, present and future are internally related, such that what we experience now is interpreted by means of a prior future-oriented projection. As an authentic Self, therefore, man understands that he is not a being among other intraworldly beings, but rather that he is the 'ground' of such beings: there are beings only in so far as beings come to pass through the introplay of the three temporal 'ecstases' which constitute man's Being, or Dasein.

Heidegger's portrait of authentic existence has been criticized on a number of grounds, many of which concern the nature of the relationship between the individual seeking authenticity and his social environment. M. Grene poses the following questions: "What happens to the individual's relationships to others when he resolves to be, not a mass of conventions, but himself? In other words, what does Heidegger do with the question of our existing-together-with-others outside the conventional and unauthentic level of existence?" 32 As Grene sees it, Heidegger's Dasein is lost in the 'they' and in the distracting demands of the everyday, until this lostness and distraction is substituted by the genuine resolve of
the isolated but liberated individual. When the individual resolves to be himself and wrests himself from social conventions, on Grene's account, his relationships to others are for all intents and purposes severed: "My freedom is mine, and the awareness of it bears no intruders, for it is 'freedom to death'; and from my loneliness in face of death no one can save me; nor can I, if I would, save or even pity another." 33

Grene allows that Heidegger maintains that 'togetherness' or Mitsein is essential to the very nature of the individual Dasein. However, she insists that it is only on the level of the inauthentic that 'togetherness' is actually essential: "...for it is just a fraudulent togetherness, a sense of belonging with nothing genuine to belong to, that constitutes the 'one' (the 'they') in and by which, on the unauthentic level, each of us lives." 34 On the other hand, with his resolute emergence into authenticity, Heidegger's individual learns to subordinate the concerns of everyday, both the things and the people involved in this inauthentic mode of existence: "Now he is liberated from the many by binding himself to a true one, that is, to his own solitary projection of himself into the future, a future shaped by the fearful realization of his mortal destiny." 35 The authentic individual therefore stands alone, on Grene's account, isolated but liberated.

Indeed, Grene argues that there is at the authentic level of existence no meaningful equivalent of Fursorge or my solicitous dealings with others. At the inauthentic level, I am indeed concerned with others: "...here, of course, neither I nor the others emerge as genuine individuals but only as pseudo-centers in a pattern whose whole meaning is the distraction of the individual from
his true nature." 36 It might be supposed, then, that with the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity my concern for others might be transformed from fraudulent distraction to a positive form of solicitude. However, according to Grene, this is far from being the case: "I care for others in a genuine, rather than a conventional, sense, according to Heidegger, in so far as I refer my care for them essentially and completely to my own free projection of myself. This is, in other words, the contrary morality to Kant's: the free man is he who treats other people always as means, never as ends." 37 Grene concludes, then, that there is in fact no positive form of solicitude in Heidegger's account of individual authenticity.

Martin Buber is likewise highly critical of Heidegger's portrait of authentic existence. Buber maintains that Heidegger "...isolates from the wholeness of life the realm in which man is related to himself, since he absolutizes the temporally conditioned situation of the radically solitary man, and wants to derive the essence of human existence from the experience of a nightmare." 38 Buber argues that Heidegger's authentic individual turns away from an essential relation to other men, and that there remains for him only "...the sublime illusion of detached thought that he is a self-contained self; as man he is lost." 39 Indeed, Buber holds that the authentic individual is not the man who genuinely lives with man, but rather the man who can no longer really live with others, or the individual who knows a genuine life only in communication with himself.

Buber acknowledges that all of this seems to be contradicted by Heidegger's contention that man's Being is by nature in the world
and together with other men. Still, Buber argues that in point of fact a relation to others is not essential for the authentic individual: "For the relation of solicitude which is all (Heidegger) considers cannot as such be an essential relation, since it does not set a man's life in direct relation with the life of another, but only one man's solicitous help in relation with another man's lack and need of it." On Buber's account, essential relations are 'direct, whole relations' between man and man, which have a fundamental part in building up the 'substance of life'.

Buber's point here is that in a relation such as Heidegger's solicitude, an individual remains fundamentally within himself: "...the barriers of his own being are not thereby breached; he makes his assistance, not his self, accessible to the other; nor does he expect any real mutuality...he 'is concerned with the other', but he is not anxious for the other to be concerned with him." Buber characterizes an essential relation as one in which the barriers of individual being are in fact breached and a new phenomenon appears which can appear only in this way, namely, one life open to another: "...the other becomes present...in the depths of one's substance, so that one experiences the mystery of the other being in the mystery of one's own." On Buber's account, then, Heidegger's authentic individual knows nothing of an essential relation between men, or one in which men actually participate in one another's lives. On the contrary, in Heidegger's view existence is completed in self-being, and Heidegger's self is a 'closed system'.

Following Buber's criticisms of Heidegger's presentation of authentic existence, R. Weber maintains that Heidegger's implicit moral theory can be charged with the 'error' of 'ethical egoism':
"The only form of ethics implicit in the major portion of Heidegger's ontology...can best be described as ethical egoism...which is incompatible with Heidegger's claim of Dasein as irreducibly co-Dasein." Only in the concept of 'solicitude', on Weber's account, does Heidegger suggest modes of human behaviour that seem directly related to an interpersonal ethic. Solicitude has both positive and negative modes. Heidegger characterizes the negative modes of solicitude as, for example, 'passing one another by' or 'not mattering to one another'. Such indifference to others is representative of the deficient forms of solicitude generally, and seeing no basis here for an interpersonal ethic, Weber proceeds to Heidegger's discussion of the positive modes of solicitude.

The first of these Heidegger calls 'leaping in': "This kind of solicitude takes over for the Other that with which he is to concern himself. The Other is thus thrown out of his own position; he steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can either take it over as something finished and at his disposal, or disburden himself of it completely." In this kind of solicitude the Other tends to become one who is dominated and dependent, unable to assume his own potentiality-for-Being, and thus Weber dismisses it also as a possible basis for an interhuman ethic.

The second positive form of solicitude Heidegger calls 'leaping ahead', "...which does not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead of him in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his 'care' but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time." This kind of solicitude, on Heidegger's account, helps the Other to become 'transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it'. However, here Weber
argues that Heidegger has already stipulated that the basic insight that I myself must grasp through care is that I am a being-toward-death: "Being-toward-death, Heidegger emphatically asserts, isolates each man irremediably from all others, an isolation that cannot in principle be overcome, and one that is 'primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude'." If being-toward-death is so fundamentally non-relational, and if authentic anticipatory resoluteness for death constitutes man's central existential task, then, Weber contends, it is not possible for anyone to 'leap ahead' of another. Heidegger's account of Dasein is so exclusively individualistic that it precludes the possibility of positive constructive solicitude, and in so doing precludes the possibility of an interpersonal ethic.

In addition to the charge of ethical egoism, Weber maintains that Heidegger's concept of authenticity implies 'ethical permissiveness': "...inherent in Heidegger's ontology is a potentially pernicious ethical permissiveness. For only the solitary individual who has chosen his aloneness can dwell in the truth." Weber states that Heidegger refuses to suggest what the 'laws and rules' for man's communal life ought to be. Instead, he holds that to be authentically resolute is in itself the highest human good: "...Heidegger equates the very attitude of resoluteness with action, and moreover with authentic, i.e. right action, (and) any expectation that the resolute individual ought in addition to manifest active ethical commitments, interactions, or relationships with others is clearly misplaced." Thus Weber maintains that Heidegger seems to say that so long as one is resolved, anything is permitted: Heidegger's concept of resoluteness contains no apparent safeguards
against licensing the individual to follow whatever the voice of conscience might dictate.

In order to defend Heidegger against the foregoing criticisms, it is first necessary to reiterate that Dasein is not man, but rather Dasein is man's Being. It should be acknowledged, however, that Heidegger himself frequently employs misleading locutions in Being and Time, locutions which tend to promote the misidentification of Dasein and man. For example, in his discussion of authenticity, Heidegger speaks of 'the particular Dasein' being deprived of its answerability by the 'they', and that if it is to assume responsibility for itself, 'the particular Dasein' must become an authentic Self. However, it is the particular man who is deprived of his answerability, and who must assume responsibility for himself. Man is a being, a subject who can be answerable and responsible. At times Heidegger does make a distinction between Dasein and 'factual Dasein' ('the individual Dasein', 'the particular Dasein'), where the latter refers to the being, man. Dasein itself, however, is not a being, but is rather the process by which a 'clearing' is made so that beings (subjects and objects) may make an appearance. As J.P. Fell notes, "Heidegger's Dasein is intended as an original or primordial unity that is prior to and ground of the distinction between subject and object." 49

Dasein may thus be understood as that which renders individuals (as well as objects) possible. However, to say that 'Dasein is in each case mine', or that man's Being is such that he exists 'for the sake of himself', does not imply either a solipsistic isolation or an egoistic exaltation of the individual. Thus when Weber, for example, characterizes Heidegger's 'implicit moral theory'
as 'ethical egoism', she clearly misunderstands Heidegger's account of Dasein. As he plainly states, "The proposition 'Dasein exists for the sake of itself' contains no reference to the egoistic and selfish ends of a blind self-love in factual Dasein. Consequently it cannot be 'refuted' by pointing out that many men sacrifice themselves for others and, generally, that men do not exist for themselves alone but in society." 50 Indeed, Heidegger states clearly that the proposition 'Dasein exists for the sake of itself' implies neither a solipsistic isolation of Dasein, as Buber suggests, nor an egoistic exaltation of Dasein, as Weber contends. On the contrary, to say that Dasein exists for the sake of itself is "...the condition of possibility for the fact that man can relate to others either egoistically or altruistically." 51

Similarly, it is not the case that Heidegger's account of Being-towards-death implies that the individual Dasein's relations to the world and to others are irrevocably severed, as both Grene and Weber contend. It is true that Heidegger maintains that with death, Dasein stands before itself in its 'ownmost potentiality-for-Being': "When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone." 52 Heidegger states that the ownmost potentiality is indeed non-relational, but by this he means that Dasein alone can take over its own Being: death lays claim to an individual Dasein. The non-relational character, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein 'down to itself'. In other words, as we have seen, Heidegger maintains that anticipation of death is the possibility of authentic existence.

However, Heidegger also stresses that our relations to the world (concern) and to others (solicitude) are not thereby perman-
ently severed: "But if concern and solicitude fail us, this does not signify at all that these ways of Dasein have been cut off from its authentically Being-its-Self. As structures essential to Dasein's constitution, these have a share in conditioning the possibility of any existence whatsoever." 53 Thus, while the process of becoming an authentic Self requires that the particular Dasein wrest itself from everydayness and the 'they', it does not imply an irremediable isolation of Dasein. Indeed, Heidegger asserts on the contrary that "Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concernful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being rather than upon the possibility of the they-self." 54

It is important to recognize here that authenticity and inauthenticity are not, so to speak, mutually exclusive. As Heidegger puts it, "Authentically Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it is rather an existentiell modification of the 'they' - of the 'they' as an essential existentiale." 55 Heidegger maintains, then, that authentic existence is not something which 'floats above' falling everydayness, because falling everydayness is inevitable and constitutes Dasein's usual 'base state'. On the contrary Heidegger contends that authentic existence is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon.

To become authentic, in other words, is to become 'what one is' or to recognize Dasein as Dasein. Becoming authentic means 'owning up' to man's own true nature or Being, which one already is. As J.P. Fell observes, "As owning up to what one already is, 'authenticity' cannot be a shift to a new or novel state of being.
It can only be a matter of being what one already is with explicit awareness. It is a self-awareness, awareness of one's own real or true being." 56 Indeed, Heidegger asserts that "The meaning of Da-sein's Being is not something free-floating which is other than and 'outside of' itself, but is the self-understanding Da-sein itself." 57 Thus the individual Da-sein is either authentically or inauthentically disclosed to itself as regards its Being, but in neither case is it divorced from the world or from others. Heidegger sums his position up as follows:

Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one's-Self, does not detach Da-sein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating 'I'. And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others. 58

Thus, Heidegger does indeed provide an ontological basis for social relations. Da-sein's Being-in-the-world is essentially a Being-with Others, regardless of whether our Being is grasped authentically or inauthentically. In either case, Being-with is to be understood in terms of an openness to and a sharing in one world. Heidegger's Da-sein is thus not, as Buber holds, a 'closed system'. Nor does Heidegger's account of Da-sein render positive constructive solicitude impossible, as Weber argues. On the contrary, the world of Da-sein is a with-world, and it is precisely on the basis of this common possession of one world that a community can be constituted according to the different modalities of Being-with, which as we have noted range from love to hatred and from solidarity to indifference.

In other words, our solicitous dealings with others are made
possible in all of their modalities by means of the constitutive structure of Dasein itself. Positive constructive solictitude or 'leaping ahead' enables the particular Dasein to help the Other to seize his own Being. Unlike 'leaping in', which encourages domination and dependency, 'leaping ahead' leaves the Other free for his own Being. Buber appears to believe that such a relation cannot be an essential one, because the 'barriers of individual being' are not breached. This characterization plainly reveals Buber's lack of appreciation of the radical nature of Heidegger's Dasein, as opposed to traditional conceptions of selfhood. As we have seen, Heidegger argues that Dasein is not an ego-subject: there are no 'barriers of individual being' to be breached. Dasein exists as that finite temporal openness which makes possible the appearance of both subjects and objects. In fact, Heidegger's account of Dasein as a Mitsein lays the foundation for all possible interpersonal relations but, as Caputo notes, Heidegger insists that "...while the 'I' can love the other...it cannot love for him. The 'I' cannot take away the other's care, that is, his selfhood." 59 Indeed, Heidegger's account of Dasein insists that 'Dasein is in each case mine', but this does not isolate factual Dasein from the Other; on the contrary, it renders their mutual self-commitment possible.

Weber has also argued, however, that Heidegger's account of authentic existence issues in 'ethical permissiveness': Heidegger refuses to suggest what the 'laws and rules' for man's communal life ought to be; provided one is resolved, he seems to say, anything is permitted. Here, Weber once again misunderstands Heidegger's ontology: she is seeking a set of ontic directives governing relations between men, while Heidegger on the other hand is prim-
arily concerned with the relations between *Dasein* and Being. As Caputo observes, "It is absurd to think that Being itself in some way issues determinate directives, for Being is not a being - God, e.g., or some human legislator. Beyond any determinate ethic, Heidegger questions into an 'ought' that inheres in Being itself, in virtue of which all determinate obligations are rendered possible." Caputo refers to what Heidegger calls 'original ethics' in his "Letter on Humanism", and original ethics is there identified as 'thinking committed to Being' and to the relation between *Dasein* and Being. Such thinking does not, on Heidegger's account, provide any ontic directives.

Indeed, thinking committed to Being and to the relation between *Dasein* and Being issues not in a set of 'laws and rules' but rather, as we have seen, in authentic existence. As an authentic Self, man understands that he is not a being among other intraworldly beings, but rather that he is the 'ground' of such beings: there are beings only in so far as beings come to pass through the three temporal ecstases which constitute *Dasein* or man's Being. As an authentic Self, man understands his temporal structure as one in which the past, present and future are internally related, such that what is experienced now (in the present) is interpreted in the light cast by a prior (past) future-oriented projection. Finally, as an authentic Self, man's Being is still Being-in-the-world, and the world of *Dasein* is a with-world; thus, as an authentic Self, man is neither divorced from the world nor isolated from others, but rather continues to share a common world with others.

It might be argued, however, that Heidegger's account of authentic existence is fundamentally incomplete as it stands. Heidegger
clearly identifies authenticity as an 'existeniell modification of the they', but he thus far leaves unexplained precisely what is involved in such a modification. While Being and Time is indeed concerned primarily with the existential-ontological level, nevertheless since authenticity is defined by Heidegger as an existentiell modification, some further account of the nature of this modification is required if the description of authentic existence is to be rendered satisfactory. Fell suggests, for example, that authenticity means "...a form of self-coincidence or coherence in which a human being's particular existentiell actions are brought into explicit accord with one's own real existential structure, which is the very possibility of those particular actions." It would appear, then, that to be appreciated fully 'authenticity' must be considered more concretely as a mode of human existence which reflects genuine existential-ontological understanding.

Notice, for example, that Heidegger himself allows, "Is there not, however, a definite ontical way of taking authentic existence, a factical ideal of Dasein, underlying our ontological Interpretation of Dasein's existence? That is so indeed." Karsten Harries suggests, then, that the purity of fundamental ontology is an illusion: "(Heidegger's) choice of terms communicates the ideal underlying his ontological investigations: Being and Time calls its readers to authenticity, to that honest acceptance of man's own being which Heidegger terms 'resolve'." Heidegger calls us to a form of life, but man cannot exist as pure form. If he is to live authentically, man must choose himself concretely, in the world and with others. As Harries puts it, resolve becomes genuine only when it is expressed in particular resolute actions: "Only in particular
decisions does man genuinely seize himself and thus become authen-
tic." When he exists inauthentically, man submits to the 'dicta-
torship of the they', or subordinates himself to an established way of life. Authentic existence, on the contrary, demands that man choose himself and his own place, and such choice requires criteria if authentic action is not to deteriorate into sheer arbi-
trariness. Heidegger's analysis of authentic existence thus remains incomplete until it has shown precisely how authentic action is possible, or on what basis we choose our place in the world and with others, and so live authentically. This discussion will be con-
tinued in chapter six, where we will consider Heidegger's treatment of Dasein's 'historicality', which he explicates as 'a more con-
crete working out of Dasein's temporality'. First, however, we will turn to an examination of Sartre's analysis of 'being-for-others', in order to compare and contrast his view with that of Heidegger on the subject of individual authenticity and relationships with others.
Chapter Five  Sartre's Concept of Being-for-Others

In this chapter, Sartre's treatment of 'being-for-others' will be examined. We will begin by considering Sartre's criticism of Heidegger's concept of 'Being-with' or Mitsein: Sartre argues that Being-with is not an ontological structure of the for-itself. Instead, an internal negation is the constitutive structure of being-for-others: the Other is another subjectivity who is not me. Sartre analyses my being-for-others in terms of the concept of the Other's Look: the Other is another subjectivity who objectifies me and is thus the foundation of my object-ness or my being-in-itself. As we shall see, Sartre interprets my objectification by the Other as an alienation of my own possibilities, and since this objectification is mutual, he contends that conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others.

On Sartre's account, the Other's existence can motivate either of two opposed attitudes: I can attempt to destroy my object-ness for him by making an object out of him in turn, or else I can attempt to assimilate his subjectivity so as to recover my own object-ness and thus become my own foundation. Both of these attempts Sartre identifies as failures, and his profoundly negative description of our concrete relations with others has prompted numerous criticisms. His position can be defended, however, if it is acknowledged that his account of relations with others is not, and was not intended to be, an exhaustive one. It will be suggested, on the contrary, that Sartre's discussion takes place within the context of the individual's project to be a self-as-being-in-itself, to be the foundation of himself, or as Sartre puts it, to
be God. If this project to be God may be set aside, as Sartre's ethics of authentic existence suggests, then it can be argued that an account of positive, constructive relations with others might indeed be formulated within the parameters of Sartre's ontology.

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In his treatment of being-for-others, Sartre is critical of Heidegger's concept of Mitsein or Being-with. Sartre characterizes Heidegger's position as follows: the relation between 'human realities' is a relation of being, and this relation causes 'human realities' to depend on one another in their essential being. Being-with is an essential structure or an existential of Dasein, in other words, and the relation between Daseins is a relation of being or an internal relation. There are, however, two possible sorts of internal relation. First, there is internal negation, or "...a negation which posits the original distinction between the Other and myself as being such that it determines me by means of the Other and determines the Other by means of me." Second, there is what might be termed internal community: "It expresses rather a sort of ontological solidarity for the exploitation of this world." Heidegger, Sartre maintains, believes that my relation with the Other is not a frontal opposition, as internal negation suggests, but rather an oblique interdependence: Dasein is in its being a member of a community.

Sartre notes, for example, that the experiential image which best symbolizes Heidegger's position is that of a crew: "The original relation of the Other and my consciousness is not the you and me; it is the we." Experientially or ontically there are indeed crews, teams and a variety of other forms of communal organization. However, Sartre argues that Heidegger is not justified in passing from such empirical examples of Being-with to a position claiming co-existence as the ontological structure of my being-in-the-world. Communal being, on Sartre's account, is not the primary relation between Dasein and the Other: Heidegger's position fails
to preserve the original negation that makes of the Other an other.

Sartre's fundamental presupposition in his treatment of others does preserve this original negation: "...others are the Other, that is the self which is not myself. Therefore we grasp here a negation as the constitutive structure of the being-of-others." 5 This constituting negation is an internal relation, which means a synthetic, active connection of the two terms, each one of which constitutes itself by denying that it is the other. If we suppress this original negation, as Heidegger does, then in Sartre's view we are going to fall into a monism, and he insists that "...the primary fact is the plurality of consciousnesses, and this plurality is realized in the form of a double, reciprocal relation of exclusion." 6 The Other is the one who excludes me by being himself, and the one I exclude by being myself. Moreover, the negation which makes the Other an other constitutes him as non-essential 7: Being-with is not an ontological or essential structure of the for-itself. On the contrary, Sartre contends that "Human-reality remains alone because the Other's existence has the nature of a contingent and irreducible fact." 8 (The adequacy of Sartre's interpretation of Heidegger will be pursued in chapter six. At present we will continue with Sartre's own position.)

Sartre notes that it is in the reality of everyday life that the Other appears to me: "I am in a public park. Not far away there is a lawn and along the edge of that lawn there are benches. A man passes by those benches. I see this man; I apprehend him as an object and at the same time as a man." 9 To apprehend him as a man, on Sartre's account, is to apprehend him as a distinct centre
of reference for the objects in my universe, for instead of a grouping toward me of these objects, there is now an orientation which flees from me. As Sartre puts it, "...the appearance among the objects of my universe of an element of disintegration in that universe is what I mean by the appearance of a man in my universe." 10

The Other is indeed still an object for me, but he is an object 'which has stolen the world' from me. Everything still exists for me, yet everything is traversed by an invisible flight and fixed in the direction of this new object. The appearance of the Other in the world thus corresponds to a decentralization of the world which undermines the centralization which I am simultaneously effecting: "...it appears that the world has a kind of drain hole in the middle of its being and that it is perpetually flowing off through this hole." 11 However, none of this enables us to leave the level on which the Other is an object: Sartre maintains that since the Other-as-object is defined in connection with the world as that object which, as another centre of reference, sees what I see, then my fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent possibility of being seen by the Other.

The relation which Sartre calls 'being-seen-by-another' represents the original relation of myself to the Other: "It is in and through the revelation of my being-as-object for the Other that I must be able to apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject. For just as the Other is a probable object for me-as-subject, so I can discover myself in the process of becoming a probable object for only a certain subject." 12 Thus the fundamental relation by which the Other is discovered is not object-ness, on Sartre's account;
on the contrary, in the fundamental relation between my consciousness and the Other's, the Other is revealed to me as a subject for whom I am an object. I cannot be an object for an object, but rather only for another subject, and thus Sartre concludes that 'being-seen-by-another' represents an irreducible fact which cannot be deduced either from the essence of the Other-as-object, or from my being-as-subject. Indeed, the concept of the Other-as-object has meaning only as a result of the conversion and degradation of this original relation.

The Other is thus originally the subject who is revealed to me in 'that flight of myself toward objectivation': the Other is in principle the one who looks at me. In order to explicate what being seen means for me, Sartre provides the example of an individual looking through a keyhole. He is alone and on the level of a non-thetic self-consciousness: "My attitude...has no 'outside'; it is a pure process of relating the instrument (the keyhole) to the end to be attained (the spectacle to be seen), a pure mode of losing myself in the world." 13 In other words, I am my acts, I am a pure consciousness of things: I am not a positional consciousness of myself, and hence there is no 'self' to inhabit my consciousness.

However, with the appearance of the Other my situation is radically altered: "...I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at me! What does this mean? It means that I am suddenly affected in my being and that essential modifications appear in my structure-modifications which I can apprehend and fix conceptually by means of the reflective cogito." 14 When we considered the for-itself in isolation, Sartre notes, we were able to maintain that the unreflective consciousness cannot be inhabited by a 'self' or 'ego'.
Instead, the 'self' was given in the form of an object only for the reflective consciousness. However, here the 'ego' comes to inhabit the unreflective consciousness, due to the Look of the Other: "...the person is presented to consciousness in so far as the person is an object for the Other." 15 With the Look of the Other, Sartre contends, I am suddenly conscious of myself as escaping myself and as having my foundation outside myself, in the Other.

Nevertheless, Sartre maintains, I am that 'ego': "I do not reject it as a strange image, but it is present to me as a self which I am without knowing it; for I discover it in shame and, in other instances, in pride." 16 Shame, for example, is shame of my 'self', or my recognition of the fact that I am indeed that object which the Other is looking at and judging: I am ashamed of what I am. In its primary structure shame is shame before somebody: the Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the Other. Thus, Sartre argues, the Other has not only revealed to me what I have been, but he has established me in a new type of being, i.e. as an object with an 'outside' or 'nature', which can support new qualifications.

In other words, the Other by his very presence, by the pure upsurge of his being, is responsible for the fact that I have this 'outside' or 'nature', although that very nature 'escapes me', since it is an attribute of the object which I am for the Other. Further, Sartre states that "My original fall is the existence of the Other." 17 The Other's Look constitutes the solidification and alienation of my own possibilities: "...I still am my possibilities in the mode of non-thetic consciousness (of) these possibilities. But at the same time the Look alienates them from me." 18 Indeed,
the Other as a Look is my transcendence transcended: with the Other's Look I become a spatio-temporal object in the world, and my possibilities are surpassed and organized into a world by the Other.

Sartre thus maintains that being-seen initially constitutes me as a defenseless being for a freedom which is not my freedom. To be looked at is to apprehend oneself as the object of the appraisals and, in particular, of the value judgments of the Other. A judgment is the transcendental act of a free being, and Sartre asserts that in this sense we can consider ourselves as 'slaves' in so far as we appear to the Other: "I am a slave to the degree that my being is dependent at the centre of a freedom which is not mine and which is the very condition of my being." 19 Indeed, in so far as I am the object of values which come to qualify me without my being able to act on this qualification, in so far as this object-ness and these evaluations escape me, I am a 'slave'.

In general, Sartre maintains that the Other is the necessary condition of my objectivity; the Other is the being through whom I gain my object-ness: "If I am able to conceive of even one of my properties in the objective mode, then the Other is already given." 20 The Other is given as a pure subject, another freedom, but the Other-as-subject can in no way be known nor even conceived as such. On the contrary, it is only through experiencing myself as an unrevealed object-ness, Sartre contends, that I experience the inapprehensible subjectivity of the Other: "That subject's presence...is the necessary condition of all thought which I would attempt to form concerning myself." 21 Hence, on Sartre's account, I need the Other in order to fully realize all of the structures
of my being.

However, being-for-others is not an ontological structure of the for-itself: "...the Other) appears as a being who arises in an original relation of being with me and whose indubitability and factual necessity are those of my own consciousness." Being-for-others is a constant fact of my concrete human reality, and Sartre maintains that I grasp it with its factual necessity in every thought which I form concerning myself: the Other is present to me everywhere as the one through whom I become an object. However, Sartre insists that the existence of the Other is only a factual necessity and not an ontological structure of being-for-itself: "It would perhaps not be impossible to conceive of a For-itself which would be wholly free from all For-others and which would exist without even suspecting the possibility of being an object." According to Sartre, my concrete relations with the Other are wholly governed by my attitudes with respect to the object which I am for the Other. The Other's existence can motivate either of two opposed attitudes: I can turn back upon the Other so as to make an object out of him in turn, since the Other's object-ness destroys my object-ness for him, or I can seek to possess the Other as freedom. Indeed, in so far as the Other as freedom is the foundation of my object-ness, my being-in-itself, if I could recover that freedom and identify myself with it, I would then be my own foundation. As Sartre puts it, "To transcend the Other's transcendence, or, on the contrary, to incorporate that transcendence within me without removing from it its character as transcendence - such are the two primitive attitudes which I assume confronting the Other." It is fundamental to recognize, moreover, that everything
which may be said of me in my relations with the Other applies to him as well: we each attempt to either objectify or assimilate one another, and Sartre thus maintains that conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others.

Sartre considers first the conduct in which the for-itself tries to assimilate the Other's freedom. Love, he contends, is the desire to be loved, and this desire to be loved manifests itself as follows: "...I want the Other to found my being as a privileged object by maintaining himself as pure subjectivity confronting me." The Other's freedom is the foundation of my object-ness, and in love I want to possess his freedom as freedom, to identify myself with it, and so to recover my own object-ness. If love could succeed, I would thus be the foundation of my being-in-itself: I would be secure within the Other's consciousness, and my existence would no longer feel 'de trop' but rather justified. Sartre argues, however, that this is an unrealizable ideal: "...for the assimilation of the for-itself and the Other in a single transcendence would necessarily involve the disappearance of the characteristic of otherness in the Other." The for-itself cannot assimilate the Other's freedom, because the internal negation which makes of the Other an other simply precludes any such union of subjectivities.

Love is thus a failure, and I am thrown back on my own responsibilities and on my own power to be: "The lovers remain each one for himself in a total subjectivity; nothing comes to relieve them of their duty to make themselves exist each one for himself; nothing comes to relieve their contingency nor to save them from facticity." It is easy to see why Sartre feels that a love which seeks to escape from the burden of personal responsibility slips
so readily into masochism: I will attempt to cause myself to be absorbed by the Other and to lose myself in his subjectivity in order to eliminate my own. However, Sartre observes, the masochistic project of becoming only an object is likewise doomed to failure; the masochist is an object for the Other, and this objectivity is in principle inapprehensible for him: "The more he tries to taste his objectivity, the more he will be submerged by the consciousness of his subjectivity—hence his anguish." 28

The failure of the first attitude toward the Other can be the occasion for my assuming the second: I may turn back upon the Other so as to make an object out of him, since the Other's object-ness destroys my object-ness for him. Sartre notes that I may begin by adopting an attitude of indifference to others: "I practice then a sort of factual solipsism; others are those forms which pass by in the street." 29 However, this attitude is vulnerable to the Look of the Other, which at any moment might undermine my 'blindness' towards him. I might instead attempt to get hold of the Other's free subjectivity through his objectivity-for-me: sexual desire attempts to ensnare the Other's consciousness in his body and thus to possess an embodied subjectivity. However, Sartre argues that desire will also necessarily fail in its project: "...pleasure is the death and the failure of desire. It is the death of desire because it is not only its fulfillment but its limit and end." 30

As love may lead to masochism, moreover, so one may fall from sexual desire to sadism: the sadist wants to incarnate the Other through violence, or to ensnare the Other in his flesh by means of pain. Once again, however, it is the Other's Look which causes the meaning and goal of sadism to collapse: "The sadist discovers that
it was that freedom which he wished to enslave, and at the same
time he realizes the futility of his efforts." 31 The sadist can
never possess the Other's freedom as freedom, and at this point,
Sartre observes, the only recourse is to hate the Other. Hate is
described as a wish for the death of the Other, a wish which is ex­
plained by the fact that I want to rediscover a freedom without
factual limits: "...that is, to get rid of (my) own inapprehensible
being-as-object-for-the-Other and to abolish (my) dimension of
alienation." 32 Yet here too Sartre contends that this project is
futile, for even if all others were eliminated, the memory of the
Other's Look would remain with me: my being-for-others, by slipping
into the past, would become an irremediable dimension of myself.

It is clear, then, that on Sartre's account relations with
others form a circle of futility. He remarks about hate, for exam­
ple, "After the failure of this attempt nothing remains for the for­
itself except to re-enter the circle and allow itself to be indef­
initely tossed from one to the other of the two fundamental atti­
tudes." 33 I attempt either to assimilate or eradicate the Other's
freedom: each attempt is the death of the other, the failure of one
motivates the adoption of the other. Moreover, these relations are
reciprocal: "While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the
Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek
to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me." 34 Thus, Sar­
tre concludes that conflict is indeed the fundamental meaning of
being-for-others: "...we shall never place ourselves concretely on
a plane of equality; that is, on the plane where the recognition of
the Other's freedom would involve the Other's recognition of our
freedom." 35
It is not surprising that Sartre's treatment of relations with others has been widely criticized, primarily on the grounds that it appears to be an entirely negative portrait of our concrete relations. M. Grene argues, for example, that Sartre's discussion of love is unacceptable: both his definition of love as the desire to be loved, as well as the arguments following from this definition making of love a battle of subjectivities, she finds inadequate and one-sided. Sartre's definition of love, on this account, is quite arbitrary; Grene points to other definitions, such as that of Aristophanes as he is depicted in Plato's Symposium: "What the lover of Aristophanes' story wants is not just to be loved but to be made whole again, to become wholly himself in union with the Other from whom an unnatural cleavage has divided him." 36

The idea here is that we are not, on Grene's account, dealing with two subjectivities attempting to transcend one another's transcendence: "...the transcendence of the lover here neither transcends nor is transcended by another but becomes aware of itself, i.e., becomes itself, through the participation of the very freedom of another in his freedom." 37 This participation is mutual or reciprocal, as Grene sees it: the two subjectivities share in and complete one another's freedom, rather than threaten one another with objectification and alienation. In sum, love can be construed as a mutual or reciprocal enrichment, in and through which two subjectivities 'become wholly themselves in union with one another'.

Sartre would reject this account for a number of reasons. First, his account of love is not described in terms of the attempt to transcend one another's transcendence. Quite the opposite: it is the attempt to assimilate the Other's transcendence, to identify
myself with the freedom of the Other, which is the foundation of my object-ness. It is this assimilation which Sartre argues will inevitably fail: a union of consciousnesses, on his account, is simply impossible, and it is just such a union which Grene appears to be proposing in her analysis of love. Her talk of union with one another, and participation in the very freedom of another, must, in Sartre's view, be regarded as metaphorical exaggeration. There can be no merging of subjectivities, since as Sartre points out, any such identification is precluded in principle by that internal negation which makes of the Other a distinct subjectivity. If Grene wishes to dispute this, then she must challenge Sartre's theory of consciousness, and not simply his definition of love.

However, Sartre's view of being-for-others has also been criticized on the grounds that it renders ethics impossible. Sartre does insist that conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others: we each attempt to either objectify or assimilate one another, to transcend one another's transcendence or to incorporate that transcendence within ourselves. M. Warnock argues, therefore, that Sartre's account of concrete relations with others makes ethics quite impossible: "If ethics...is concerned with the fitting together of the interests and choices of one person with those of another, there is no way into the subject at all if our aim is necessarily to dominate the other person and subordinate his freedom to our own." Ethic is ruled out, Warnock concludes, because it is impossible for conflict ever to be overcome, since it is rooted in Sartre's very description of being-for-others as such.

In order to respond to this criticism, it is first necessary to recognize that Sartre may not be presenting an exhaustive account
of human relations. At the end of his discussion of concrete relations with others, for example, Sartre observes in a footnote that 'These considerations do not exclude the possibility of an ethics of delivery and salvation. But this can be achieved only after a radical conversion which we cannot discuss here.' A similar footnote at the end of his treatment of bad faith, together with Sartre's observations on ethics at the close of Being and Nothingness, strongly suggest that Sartre acknowledges the possibility of positive human relations, but that he has confined his discussion in Being and Nothingness to only negative concrete relations. H. Barnes for one believes that "Sartre considered that what he had described referred only to conduct in bad faith and believed that good faith and positive human relations are possible." 

We should note at the outset, for example, that Sartre's use of the term 'conflict' does not simply reflect a single meaning, i.e., overt hostility between individuals, but rather several meanings. As T.C. Anderson points out, Sartre first uses the term 'conflict' when he is describing the basic ontological separateness of individuals, or the fact that consciousnesses stand in a relation of 'frontal opposition' or 'internal negation' to one another. Sartre also uses the term 'conflict' in the context of his description of the original manner in which one subject becomes aware of another subject, namely, by means of his own objectification by that Other. This objectification of one subject by another is characterized by Sartre as 'alienation' and 'enslavement', and since this mutual objectification is the primal relation between subjects, Sartre asserts that conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others. However, it can be argued that neither our ontological sep-
arateness nor our mutual objectification need necessarily imply conflict in the sense of actual hostility.

Sartre also makes clear at the outset of his treatment of concrete relations that he is dealing with human relations within the context of an individual's attempt to be God. As we saw in chapter two, Sartre maintains that "..the self-as-being-in-itself is what human reality lacks and what makes its meaning." \(^{42}\) The self as a substantial being would combine within itself the incompatible characteristics of the in-itself and the for-itself, viz. the coincidence with itself or full positivity of being-in-itself, and the self-surpassing self-awareness which is consciousness. The project to be God is thus the project to be a self-identical plenitude of being who is also self-conscious or self-aware. Moreover, while Sartre describes the for-itself as 'de trop' or radically contingent, he characterizes God as 'the necessary foundation of himself'. What human reality lacks and thus desires to be, therefore, is a self-identical and necessary being, or God, and in his discussion of concrete relations Sartre is considering human relations precisely within the context of this project to be God.

As we have seen, Sartre holds that the Other's existence can motivate either of two opposed attitudes: I attempt to objectify or else to assimilate the Other. As Anderson argues, in both of these attitudes the subjects involved may be construed as attempting to overcome their status as contingent, free beings and to achieve the state of a necessary being that would be its own foundation. \(^{43}\) In the case of my attempt to objectify the Other (indifference, sadism), I endeavour to escape from my own object-ness or the contingent, thing-like status which the Other confers on me. Hate, of
course, takes this attitude to its extreme in seeking the obliteration of others entirely. In the case of my attempt to assimilate the Other (love, masochism), I want to identify myself with the Other's freedom, which is the foundation of my object-ness, in order to become my own foundation. Moreover, it is not at all surprising that Sartre deems all of these attempts failures: they are all reflections or exemplifications of the project to be God, and this project itself represents an impossible goal.

It may thus be argued that it is within the context of the God-project that our ontological separateness and our mutual objectification give rise to conflict in the sense of overt hostility between individuals. As Anderson puts it, "The fact that subjects other than me objectify me is a source of actual hostility because I want to be a being who is the complete foundation of its being." However, if this project to be God is set aside, it would appear that the door is open for a positive account of concrete relations. Indeed, when Sartre speaks of a 'radical conversion' and an 'ethics of deliverance and salvation', he appears to be referring to just such an eventuality; namely, that we can cease to value the God-project and, as noted in chapter two, choose freedom in its place as our primary value.

This rejection of God as man's ultimate value can come about only when man sees and accepts the truth concerning the human condition, viz. that human freedom alone is the source of all values. Recall that Sartre's ethics of 'self-recovery' or authentic existence is centred around the reflective consciousness as a moral consciousness, and has as its ideal the development of the morally autonomous individual. Such an individual is in a position to set
aside pre-reflective values, and specifically the pre-reflective adoption of the God-project, in favour of reflective values, or values chosen in light of a reflective comprehension of human reality. The 'attitude of strict consistency', a fundamental feature of individual authenticity, requires the choice of freedom as one's primary value: this choice is most consistent with the human condition and the nature of value, since human freedom alone is the source of all values.

Thus, contrary to what Warnock suggests, Sartre's account of concrete relations with others need not rule out positive interpersonal relations, nor indeed ethics. If we do set aside the project to be God, then we should be able to cease in our attempts to assimilate the subjectivities of others, because we will no longer seek to be our own foundation. As Anderson observes, "We will accept the fact that we are ontologically distinct beings. Our relations, then, will not involve efforts at assimilation or destruction of the Other's subjectivity with their ensuing conflict, for neither of us will try to eradicate, or become the foundation of, the objectivity the Other confers on us." 45

If we cease to value the God-project, and choose freedom in its place as our primary value, then it would indeed seem possible for an 'ethics of deliverance and salvation' to emerge. Instead of conflict rooted in attempts at the objectification or assimilation of others, we might mutually support one another's freedom. As we have seen, Sartre does describe, albeit briefly, what he considers to be man's moral responsibility to others: "I am obliged to will the freedom of others at the same time as mine. I cannot make freedom my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim." 46 More-
over, in *Anti-Semite and Jew* Sartre writes:

Anti-Semitism is a problem that affects us all directly...if we do not respect the person of the Israelite, who will respect us? If we are conscious of these dangers...we shall begin to understand that we must fight for the Jew, no more and no less than for ourselves. 47

Sartre argues, then, that if we want our own freedom and values to be respected, we must likewise respect the freedom and values of others. The threat of oppression requires that we protect the freedom of all people equally: if any person suffers persecution, then I who am precisely his equal may also be oppressed. In other words, all people share a common human condition, no one's freedom is intrinsically superior to that of anyone else, and hence, Sartre seems to say, I should choose to value everyone's freedom, and not just my own.

Indeed, on Sartre's account, it would be inconsistent to recognize that all freedoms have equal status, and then choose to value only my own: my freedom has no privileged place; intrinsically, it is no more important than that of anyone else. Moreover, it would be inconsistent to apprehend the Other's free subjectivity (which has been revealed to me through my own objectification), and then to treat him as though he were only an object. The ethics of authenticity requires that I observe the criterion of fidelity to the truth of the human condition, and thus that I treat the Other as the free subject that he is, on a par with myself, and hence that I respect his freedom and values as much as I do my own.

However, while it may thus be argued that Sartre leaves room for a positive account of concrete relations with others, it cannot be denied that in *Being and Nothingness* he provides no such account. Sartre states, for example, that I need the Other in order to real-
ize all of the structures of my being,\(^{48}\) and that the presence of
the Other is the necessary condition of all thought which I might
attempt to have concerning myself.\(^ {49}\) Both of these assertions clearly suggest that the Other can play a positive role for me. However,
this line is not pursued: Sartre discusses my shame before the Other at great length, but then dismisses pride as merely being an ex-
tension of fundamental shame.\(^ {50}\) Instead of allowing for some positive account of pride, say of the Other's role in my forming a positive self-image, Sartre presents only a reductive account of pride. The same can unfortunately be said of his treatment of love. There is no hint, for example, that we might be able to mutually support one another's freedom, that we might provide positive reinforcement of one another's projects and pursuits; rather, love is simply re-
duced to a form of that original conflict which characterizes concrete relations as such as they are presented in Being and Nothing-
ness. We are therefore left with little indication of precisely what a positive account of pride or love might amount to, and indeed what form in general our positive relations with others might take, given Sartre's ontology.

This is also made clear in Sartre's treatment of the 'We' in Being and Nothingness. He notes first that "...the Us-object pre-
cipitates us into the world; we experience it in shame as a commun-
ity alienation."\(^ {51}\) The 'Us' here refers to an experience of being objects in common for some Other or Others. Sartre describes the experience of the Us-object in terms of the appearance of a third person. I am engaged in a conflict with the Other, and 'The Third' comes on the scene and embraces both of us with his Look: "...I sud-
denly experience the existence of an objective situation-form in
the world of the Third in which the Other and I shall figure as equivalent structures in solidarity with each other." 52 This solidarity, however, is interpreted by Sartre as a community alienation: it corresponds to an experience of 'humiliation and impotence' with respect to a Third (e.g., the master, the feudal lord, the bourgeois, the capitalist), and thus hardly provides much hope for a positive account of relations at the social level.

The situation does not improve when Sartre considers the notion of a community of subjects or a 'We-subject': "...the fact that I am engaged with others in a common rhythm is especially likely to lead me to apprehend myself as engaged in a We-subject." 53 The experience of the We-subject thus arises if we are working on a common project, for example, or engrossed in a shared activity. However, Sartre insists that such an experience of community is parasitic on the primal experience of the Other, and is therefore only a secondary and subordinate experience. In other words, conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others, and any experience of the We-subject is only a 'psychological' experience which, as a purely subjective event, is highly unstable and reveals nothing significant.

Thus, on Sartre's account, while the experience of the Us-object reflects 'a dimension of real existence' and corresponds to a simple enrichment of his original proof of being-for-others, the experience of the We-subject is, on the contrary, "...a pure psychological, subjective event in a single consciousness but does not appear on the foundation of a concrete ontological relation with others." 54 We know that Sartre rejects the notion that Being-with is an ontological structure of the for-itself, because he thinks
that it is incompatible with our fundamental ontological separateness. Sartre thus contends that the experience of the 'We' is only a symbol of 'the longed-for unity of transcendences', and he insists that "It is...in no way a lateral, real apprehension of subjectivities as such by a single subjectivity; the subjectivities remain out of reach and radically separated." On his account, therefore, there can be no 'benign' meeting of subjectivities; all encounters with others are necessarily objectifying or, as Sartre puts it, alienating.

The We-subject thus appears to suffer precisely the same fate as pride and love: Sartre's description confers on it a secondary and derivative status, and offers little indication of how a positive, constructive community might be realized. The Us-object alone reflects a dimension of real existence, and it is interpreted by Sartre as a community alienation. The We-subject is dismissed as a psychological experience, and with it, it would seem, any hope for a positive account of social relations. We are therefore left with a number of questions. We know that Sartre's ethics of authentic existence requires that we choose freedom, our own and that of everyone, as our fundamental value, but what does this mean for our actual relations with others? If the project to be God is indeed set aside, and we choose freedom in its place as our primary value, precisely what form will our relations with others take, at the personal as well as the group level?
Chapter Six  Some Problems with Relations with Others in Heidegger and Sartre

In this chapter, certain difficulties in the accounts of relations with others presented by both Heidegger and Sartre will be addressed. Heidegger's *Mitsein* will be defended against Sartre's criticisms, and it will be argued that Being-with does provide an ontological basis for social relations, both at the level of inauthenticity and authenticity, in a variety of modalities. However, it will also be argued that Heidegger's account of authenticity remains essentially incomplete, because his treatment of *Dasein*'s historicity fails to provide criteria by means of which authentic action may be distinguished from sheer arbitrariness. Sartre's ethics of authentic existence will prove helpful here, since the choice of freedom as our primary value provides direction for our decision-making: authenticity requires action in the world which has as its aim the enhancement of our concrete freedom. However, it will also be noted that Sartre still provides no account of how positive social relations are possible. It will be suggested that the central difficulty in Sartre's account is his identification of my objectification by the Other with degradation, and that if objectification is instead construed neutrally, an account of positive relations with others, consistent with Sartre's ontology, is indeed possible.

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As we have seen, Heidegger, unlike Sartre, does provide an ontological basis for positive social relations. On Heidegger's account, Dasein's being-in-the-world is essentially a Mitsein or a Being-with: "The world of Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is Being-with Others." \(^1\) Recall that Heidegger contends that others are as equiprimordially present to Dasein as equipment is: indeed, in our dealing with intraworldly entities the presence of others is discovered at the same time because they are also implicated in these pieces of equipment, as users or as makers. In other words, as soon as Dasein discovers the world, it has already discovered others who co-exist with it: as Being-in-the-world, our existence is already a Being together with others, which is to be understood as an openness to and a sharing in one world.

Sartre criticizes Heidegger's concept of Being-with for primarily two reasons. First, he contends that Heidegger has wrongly passed from empirical examples of communal organizations, such as crews and teams, to a position claiming that Dasein is in its Being a member of a community. Sartre asserts that such 'solidarity' is not an ontological structure of my being-in-the-world: my relation with the Other is a frontal opposition and not an 'oblique interdependence'. Second, Sartre argues that Heidegger's Mitsein implies an ontological 'monism', because it fails to preserve the original negation that makes of the Other an other or a subjectivity which is not me. The primary fact, on Sartre's account, is the plurality of consciousnesses, and this plurality is realized in the form of a 'double, reciprocal relation of exclusion'. Moreover, this very negation which makes the Other an other likewise constitutes him as non-essential: Being-with therefore cannot be an ontological
Sartre, as we have seen, contends in *Being and Nothingness* that our relations with others are conflict-ridden, meaning that ontologically we are irremediably separated from one another, that our encounters with one another are necessarily objectifying or alienating, and that as a consequence in our concrete relations we try to either assimilate or eradicate one another's subjectivity. As Sartre interprets him, on the other hand, Heidegger's *Mitsein* implies that consciousnesses are ontologically united with each other, that we are able to meet on an equal footing such that we mutually recognize one another's subjectivity, and that we are thus able to jointly form positive communal organizations. Sartre insists, on the contrary, that "...we shall never place ourselves concretely on a plane of equality; that is, on the plane where the recognition of the Other's freedom would involve the Other's recognition of our freedom."² Moreover, as we have noted, Sartre dismisses the notion of a We-subject or a community of subjects as being merely a psychological experience, and contends instead that only the Us-object, which indicates a community alienation, genuinely reflects our being-for-others.

Yet Heidegger's position need not be interpreted as Sartre interprets it. It should be noted, for example, that in *Existentialism and Humanism* Sartre lists Heidegger among 'the existentialists' and contends, "What they have in common is simply the fact that they think existence precedes essence or, if you wish, that subjectivity must be the starting point."³ However, can Heidegger in fact be associated with the thesis that 'subjectivity must be the starting point'? If subjectivity is taken to mean 'a negating con-
sciousness', as Sartre maintains, then clearly Heidegger cannot be associated with this thesis, for Sartre himself criticizes Heidegger precisely because he does not interpret Dasein in this way. In *Existentialism and Humanism*, further, Sartre defines 'subjectivity' by reference to Descartes: "At one's point of departure there can be only one truth: I think, therefore I am. That is the point where consciousness arrives at its own absolute truth." Can Heidegger be associated with this thesis?

It would seem clear that, again, he cannot be so associated, simply because Heidegger's Dasein is intended as a primordial unity that is prior to and the ground of any sort of distinction between subject and object. As J.P. Fell argues, "...this original unity is an always already 'precedent community of nature'. It is a prelogical unity- the prior ground and basis of any logico-analytico-regressive effort to factor this unity into logical relata." While Sartre rejects Cartesian substance dualism, in other words, his own distinction between the for-itself and the in-itself still represents a splitting of the original pre-logical unity towards which Heidegger's Dasein points. Sartre's theory of consciousness is committed to logic: the fundamental relation of consciousness to any and all of its objects is negation, and thus his ontology is committed to antithetical modes of being. Heidegger argues instead that a primordial unity is the ground of, and makes possible, any factoring of this unity into logical relata, or subjects that are not-objects and objects that are not-subjects. Heidegger's Dasein cannot therefore be properly interpreted as a subject, not even as a non-substantial subject on the order of Sartre's for-itself.
On Heidegger's account, as we saw in chapter four, the basis for the rise of the distinctions between subject and object is factual Dasein's falling everyday understanding of itself as an entity among other intraworldly entities. Fell argues, for example, that "...the subject-object distinction is an existentiell-ontic modification of the Dasein-world relation in which a selective and partial 'disclosing' (truth) has left 'dissimulated' the prior ontological unity in such a way that entities including Dasein itself are articulated, expressed in language, and made present as simple present entities." 6 The individual's fascination with his ontic present is thus a forgetting of the primordial ontological unity which Heidegger's Dasein represents. This prior unified ground is forgettable precisely because it is 'no-thing': it is 'ontologically different' from entities, and is only subsequently revealed, on Heidegger's account, by means of the state-of-mind of Angst.

Thus, while Sartre wants to insist that the 'primary fact' is the plurality of consciousnesses, Heidegger argues instead that Dasein is the primordial unity which makes possible a plurality of subjects, and that Mitsein is an essential structure of Dasein which makes possible relations between these subjects. However, Heidegger's entire treatment of authentic existence makes clear that his ontology allows for an irreducible plurality of distinct individuals. He maintains throughout Being and Time that 'Dasein is in each case mine': Dasein renders possible a plurality of unique individuals. Recall that to become authentic is to become what one already is, but with specific awareness of one's essential structure; and what one already is is a unique individual. One already is this individual, on Heidegger's account, but one is, in average
everydayness, submerged in the 'they'. Resolute anticipation of death (occasioned by *Angst*) is the necessary precondition for authenticity, precisely because it wrests me from the 'they' and individualizes me down to myself, leaving me free for my own distinctive possibilities of existence.

Being-with, for Heidegger, is indeed an essential structure of *Dasein*. As G. Steiner notes, "The 'I' is never alone in its experience of *Dasein*. When 'others' are met with, it is not the case that 'one's subject is proximally present-at-hand'. We encounter others 'from out of the world' in which 'concernfully circumspective *Dasein* essentially dwells'." The meeting with others is thus not a contingent, ancillary attribute of Heidegger's *Dasein*. Rather, it is an essential, integral element in the reciprocal realizations of *Dasein* and of world. The world into which our *Dasein* is thrown already has others in it: the world's 'worldhood' is such that the existence of others is absolutely essential to its facticity, or to its 'being there' at all. Moreover, as we have seen, on Heidegger's account the determinant way in which we come up against others is 'at work' in the world. Hence, Steiner observes that "Here there are genuine points of accord between Heidegger and the Marxist model of the primarily social and collaboratively functional character of the process of human individuation."

Further, Sartre interprets Heidegger's *Mitsein* as though it reflects a fundamental solidarity between individuals. This is not necessarily the case, however, since *Dasein* as such (and hence also *Mitsein* as such) is a neutral structure. Being-with is to be understood in terms of an openness to and a sharing in one world, and it is on the basis of this common possession of one world that a
community can be constituted according to the various modalities of Being-with. These modalities in fact range from love to hatred, on Heidegger's account, and from solidarity to indifference. Thus for Heidegger Being-with does not imply that we live in a state of harmony with others; but rather only that man from the first moment of his existence lives as a certain openness to the world or to that meaningful, value-laden complex in which others are already implicated, and it is this openness which renders possible the various types of Being-with. In general, then, Mitsein merely discloses that others exist with us, that our world is a with-world, but it says nothing about the quality or character of our community with others.

Moreover, we have seen that, as an essential structure of Dasein, Being-with characterizes both inauthentic and authentic existence. In its inauthentic mode, Dasein assumes the character of 'being-lost in the publicness of the they'. In order to take responsibility for himself, the particular individual must become an authentic self: he must 'find himself' and take hold of himself 'in his own way', and so wrest himself from everydayness and the 'they'. Yet, as we have argued, this does not imply an irremediable isolation of Dasein from the world or from others. Dasein may be either inauthentically or authentically disclosed to itself as regards its own Being, but in neither case is it divorced from the world or from others. In fact, on Heidegger's account, authentic Being-one's-Self

"...brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-along-side what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others." 9 Thus, Heidegger's Mitsein does indeed provide an ontological basis for social relations, both for inauthentic and authentic
existence, in a variety of modalities, both negative and positive. However, we will consider later whether Heidegger's Being-with is compatible with Sartre's theory of consciousness.

At this point, it is necessary to raise those questions left unanswered at the close of chapter four. There it was decided that authenticity should be seen as a way of life for man that reflects genuine existential-ontological understanding. As an authentic self, man understands that he is not a being among other intra-worldly beings, but rather that he is the 'ground' of such beings: there are beings only in so far as beings come to pass through the three temporal ecstases which constitute Dasein or man's Being. As an authentic self, man understands his temporal structure as one in which the past, present and future are internally related, such that what is now experienced (in the present) is interpreted in the light cast by a prior (or past) future-oriented projection. Finally, as noted above, as an authentic self, man's Being is still Being-in-the-world, the world of Dasein is a with-world; thus, as an authentic self, man is neither divorced from the world nor isolated from others, but rather continues to share a common world with others.

However, while Heidegger clearly identifies authenticity in Being and Time as an 'existentiell modification of the they', rather than something which 'floats above' falling everydayness, he has thus far left largely unexplained precisely what is involved in such a modification. On the one hand, we can say that authenticity involves envisaging the actual in its relation to the possible (rather than as simply actual), or placing the actual in the context of Dasein's temporality. On the other hand, we know that when he exists inauthentically, man submits to 'the dictatorship of the
they', or subordinates himself to an established way of life. Authentic existence demands instead that man choose himself and his own place: if he is to live authentically, man must choose himself concretely, in the world and with others. However, such choice does require guiding criteria if authentic action is not to deteriorate into sheer arbitrariness. How, then, is authentic action possible? On what basis, given Heidegger's ontology, may we choose our place in the world and with others, and so live authentically?

Heidegger's treatment of Dasein's 'historicality' attempts to answer these questions. Historicality is defined by Heidegger as a 'more concrete working out' of Dasein's temporality. As noted earlier, resolute anticipation of death is the necessary precondition for authentic existence: it wrenches Dasein from everydayness and the 'they', it individualizes Dasein down to itself, and it thus leaves Dasein free for its own authentic possibilities of existence.

Is the individual free, then, to choose arbitrarily? Can one choose anything whatever? Heidegger tells us, on the contrary, that the particular Dasein draws its authentic possibilities of existence from its own 'thrownness'. As thrown, factual Dasein is submitted to a world of entities and exists with others, and for the most part it is lost in the 'they': it understands itself in terms of those possibilities which 'circulate' in the average, public way of interpreting Dasein 'today'. An authentic understanding, however, does not somehow extricate the individual from these possibilities; rather, "...it is in terms of this interpretation...that any possibility one has chosen is seized upon in one's resolution." 11

It is in this sense, then, that authenticity is not a 'novel state' but rather is an existentiell modification of the 'they':
"The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over." The authentic individual resolutely assumes his own thrownness: current possibilities of authentic existing are disclosed in terms of this heritage which he takes over, and the authentic individual thus hands down to himself the possibilities which have come down to him. On this account, the more authentically the individual resolves, or the less ambiguously one understands oneself, in relation to death, in terms of one's own distinctive possibility of authentic existing, the more unequivocally does the individual find and choose this possibility.

As Heidegger puts it, "Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one—those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly—and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate." In other words, the less ambiguously an individual understands himself in relation to death, the less does he merely accidentally choose the distinctive possibility of his existence. The more an individual is authentic, or the more resolute anticipation of death discloses his specific goal, the more is he brought into his own fate. 'Fate' is Heidegger's term for a distinctive possibility which Dasein has inherited, and yet also chosen. Dasein must first choose authenticity: it can choose to win itself or to lose itself in the 'they', but its specific fate is defined in terms of its own thrownness, or that heritage which it hands down to itself.

Note though that 'fateful Dasein', like all Dasein, is essen-
ially in a world together with others: "...fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, (and) its historicizing is a co-historicizing and is determinative for it as destiny." 14 Destiny is thus for Heidegger the historicizing of a people, and the fate of the individual Dasein is inextricably linked with the destiny of its historical community: "Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities." 15 Hence, on Heidegger's account, it is Dasein's 'fateful destiny' in and with its own 'generation' which goes to make up the full authentic historicizing of Dasein.

When man thus resolutely takes over his own thrownness, in the world and with others, Heidegger calls it the 'repetition' of the possibilities of existence that have come down to Dasein: "Repeating is handing down explicitly, or going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there." 16 In Heidegger's terms, the authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been is 'the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero'. This possibility is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness: "...for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated." 17

In other words, it is in anticipatory resoluteness that facti-
cal Dasein first chooses to win itself, which then leaves it free for its authentic possibilities of existence. These are not 'free-floating', however; they are a function of Dasein's thrownness, in the world and with others. My own 'fate' is thus chosen, in resolute anticipation, and inherited, by means of my destiny in and with my
historical community. Indeed, the more profound the resoluteness, Heidegger appears to say, the more clearly will my specific fate be distinguished from amongst the range of authentic possibilities of existence in my current situation, enabling me to 'choose my hero'. Heidegger calls authentic action 'repetition', since it comprises choosing a hero from one's past or thrownness, who functions as an exemplar of a particular style of life, and 'loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated'.

However, repetition should not be thought of as a mechanical reenactment of what has been, on Heidegger's account, but rather as a response which does not forsake the present and the future for the past: "The repeating of that which is possible does not bring again something that is 'past', nor does it bind the 'Present' back to that which has already been outstripped." Instead, there exists a relationship of reciprocal implication between the past and the future: the future is the fulfillment of the having been; it presupposes the past but, at the same time, this past cannot manifest itself unless there is a future. Finally, the present situation is a 'product' of the future and the having been: in authentic making-present, the individual's current situation is revealed by means of a future projection of his own distinctive potentiality-for-Being, and in the light of his own past as a member of a specific historical community.

Thus on Heidegger's account, factical Dasein hands down to itself its own past (prior projection) as the basis of its making-present of the future: my past is both the possibilizing source and also the limiting particularity of my present and future. As J.P. Fell observes, authentic repetition therefore means firstly "...that
the present act reaffirms and reappropriates its past as the very possibility of this particular present. (It) also means that every present repeats the same essential situation; every situation will always be an actualization of the selfsame existentialia."

In acting, I am indeed reaffirming as constitutive of me my community or the heritage of inherited meanings that are repeated in present actions as the source and ground of these present actions. However, while we are thus subject to a common destiny, Heidegger does not envisage the present as a necessary consequence of the past. Rather, the past provides a specific range of possibilities which may be actualized, as Fell makes clear in the following example taken from Heidegger's own life:

The German political, social and economic past offers Heidegger the choice of affirming or rejecting the National Socialist program, given the fact that Heidegger owns up to his inevitable participation in the making of history as an inherently historical being. The call of conscience requires a decision on the basis of the possibilities offered, and Heidegger chooses his 'hero'.

This example unfortunately illustrates some of the central difficulties involved in Heidegger's account of authentic action. According to Heidegger, the existential-ontological structure of our world does not change, and thus every present necessarily repeats the same essential situation, defined by the existentialia. However, every present is also subject to individual and communal decision, since it is not a necessary result of the past, but rather the past always provides a field of possibilities for possible actualization. The past survives as the ground of future reappropriations of it, but the future meaning of the inherited referential totality that constitutes our world is always modifiable by indiv-
idual and group decision. The problem, of course, concerns the
direction of this modification, and the criteria for choosing one's
hero, or as Fell puts it, the fundamental danger is that our world
will appear as "...arbitrarily fillable with anything whatsoever." 21

Mark Blitz argues, for example, that Heidegger's use of the
term 'community' is unclear. On the one hand, there are relatively
narrow political communities, but on the other hand there are more
universal religious, scientific and artistic communities. Heidegger
maintains that my possibilities are presented in terms of our com­
munal destiny, but given the range of communities noted here, it
remains unclear which destiny is supposed to guide my individual
fate. As Blitz observes, "The implied inclusiveness of 'destiny'
at any time hides the exclusivity or contradictory nature of tradi­tionally presented possibilities at any time. This obfuscates both
the attractiveness of- and the clash among- possible ways of life
or guiding possibilities in general." 22 It seems evident that
choices must be made from amongst a range of possible ways of life,
and Heidegger provides no criteria in terms of which the individual
may make such decisions.

As K. Harries sees it, Heidegger does indeed recognize the
need for an authority or measure which will allow man to escape from
arbitrariness, and he sees such an authority in the past. Authentic
as opposed to arbitrary action is repetition, rooted in the past,
and Heidegger asserts that "...the sole authority which a free ex­
isting can have...(is) the repeatable possibilities of existence." 23
However, as we have seen, the inherited past is not as such author­
itative: the individual must choose his hero. As Harries notes,
then, "The past event becomes one which should be repeated only when
it is recognized to be worthy of repetition... There must be something about the present individual and his situation which allows him to recognize in the precursor's stance the measure of his own."²⁴

Heidegger himself does not elaborate: how precisely do we choose our hero? on what ground or grounds is the decision made? Heidegger implies in Being and Time that the choice of a hero is not arbitrary or unjustified, but he provides no account of its intelligibility, and hence his analysis of authenticity remains essentially incomplete.

A comparison between Heidegger's description of choosing a hero and Sartre's account of the individual's choice of a fundamental project might prove helpful at this point. In Being and Nothingness Sartre proposes existential psychoanalysis as a method by means of which the individual can become aware of his fundamental choice of himself in the world: "...we will discover the individual person in the initial project which constitutes him."²⁵ Originally, as we saw in chapter two, man is indeed the being whose project is to be God, but Sartre maintains that this project is particularized in each case in terms of the actual situation of the individual. The orientation of existential psychoanalysis is thus empirical and its method is comparative: "...by a comparison of the various empirical drives of the subject...we try to discover and disengage the fundamental project which is common to them all."²⁶

Now, while Heidegger seems to say that resolute anticipation of death discloses my distinctive possibility of existence to me, or reveals it to me as my fate, Sartre on the contrary indicates that I choose my fundamental project. However, two distinct kinds of 'choice' must here be distinguished. My original choice of my-
self in the world is a non-thetic choice, and it is characterized by Sartre as absurd or unjustified. All of my individual 'lived' values derive their meaning from this original projection of myself which stands as my non-thetic choice of myself in the world. Existential psychoanalysis, then, is designed to enable the individual to become aware of this non-thetic choice by effecting a transition from the unreflective plane of immediacy, or the plane of impure reflection (bad faith), to the level of pure reflection, by means of which the 'true being of consciousness' is recovered and known: "...the Erlebnis reflected-on is posited in its nature as lack, and value is disengaged as the out-of-reach meaning of what is lacked." Note, then, that on Sartre's account my original non-thetic choice of myself in the world is 'absurd'. Sartre's second kind of choice is the notion of choice as voluntary deliberation. Voluntary deliberation is a 'deception' at the level of non-thetic choice, because such choice is 'prior to logic' and principles of decision-making. However, at the reflective level, particular choices can be justified by reference to the fundamental project and the framework of meanings it provides. As P. Morris observes, "Voluntary deliberation can certainly take place within this framework, since on this level a decision has been made about what will count as a reason." Thus, on Sartre's account, by means of pure reflection I am in a position to evaluate my individual 'lived' values, to question them, modify them, affirm or deny them.

It is here, then, that the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity may be effected. While Sartre does contend that man is the being whose fundamental project is to be God, he also suggests that we need not value the God-project: we may reflectively appre-
hend the impossibility of the synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself, turn our back upon this value, and choose freedom in its place as our primary value. As we have seen, Sartre implies in Being and Nothingness that the rejection of God as man's ultimate value can only come about when man sees and accepts the truth concerning the human condition; namely, that human freedom alone is the source of all value. Indeed, the 'attitude of strict consistency', which is a fundamental feature of Sartre's concept of authenticity, requires the choice of freedom as one's primary value: the choice of freedom is most consistent with the nature of the human condition and the nature of value, since freedom is entailed in all values as their source, and hence the choice of any and all values entails the prior valuing of freedom.

Thus, while Heidegger's description of choosing a hero fails to distinguish authentic action from arbitrariness, because it fails to offer us any criteria which would enable us to make a reasoned judgment, Sartre's account of freedom as our fundamental project does indeed provide us with direction for our decision-making. It is true that the choice of freedom as my primary goal is unjustified in an absolute sense: the fact that freedom is the source of value simply precludes such justification. However, while Heidegger's notion of choosing a hero remains essentially incomplete as it stands, Sartre's treatment of freedom as our primary value is revealed as a choice, as the choice, consistent with ontology. Moreover, because freedom exists only in relation to a situation, valuing freedom involves not only the reflective apprehension of our condition, but also action in the world which has as its aim the enhancement of our concrete freedom.
Sartre's ethics of authentic existence thus requires of man that he recognize his freedom, that he accept the fact that he is the source of values and cannot abrogate this fundamental responsibility, and that he strive to act accordingly. This means, then, that man should endeavour to modify his situation in the world so as to remove restrictions to his freedom of choice. Repressive social or political policies or systems would thus be intolerable, or as Sartre observes more specifically, what counts in each case is 'the particular form of the obstacle to surmount, of the resistance to overcome': that is what gives form to freedom in each circumstance. Thus Sartre's account of freedom as our fundamental project does indeed render authentic, as opposed to arbitrary, action possible: authentic action is action that takes freedom-enhancement as its goal.

Moreover, Sartre wishes to maintain that if I take freedom as my fundamental goal, I must take that of others to be equally my goal. We have presented a number of Sartre's reasons for holding this position, but we have not yet considered his account of the interdependence of our freedoms. In *Existentialism and Humanism*, Sartre explains: "...freedom as the definition of man does not depend upon others, but as soon as there is engagement I am obliged to will the freedom of others at the same time as mine." In a concrete situation, then, I cannot be free if others who share this situation with me are not also free. Thus, if I take freedom as my primary value, I must also take the freedom of others to be my goal: I must strive to increase the freedom of all, Sartre seems to say, if I am to be able to maximize my own freedom, since my freedom is inextricably linked with theirs in our shared situation.
T.C. Anderson objects here that in some situations, it could be the case that I can most effectively increase my own freedom by forcing others into my service: "To compel others to serve me would not appear to be inconsistent with an admission of the interdependency of our freedoms." In order to defuse this criticism, we must recall Sartre's account of the 'equality' of all freedoms. In chapter five, we noted that all people share a common human condition, no one's freedom is intrinsically superior to that of anyone else, and hence, Sartre argues, I should choose to value everyone's freedom, and not just my own. Anderson is correct when he says that to compel others to serve me is not inconsistent with an admission of the interdependency of our freedoms; however, it is inconsistent with an admission of the equality of all freedoms. It is inconsistent to recognize that all freedoms have equal status, and then choose to value only my own, since my freedom has no privileged place: intrinsically, it is no more important than that of anyone else.

Further, it would be inconsistent, on Sartre's view, to apprehend the Other's free subjectivity (which has been revealed to me through my own objectification) and then to treat him as though he were only an object. To compel others to serve me would thus be contrary to the ethics of authenticity per se, which requires that I observe the criterion of consistency with the truth of the human condition, and hence that I treat the Other as the free subject that he is, on a par with myself. Moreover, Sartre maintains that our freedoms are interdependent in a further sense: recall that I need the Other in order to realize all the structures of my being, and that the presence of the Other is the necessary condition of all
thought which I would attempt to form concerning myself. If the Other is indispensable to any knowledge I can have of myself, then in terms of my freedom, if others fail to recognize me as a free subjectivity, I will not reflectively recognize myself as a free subjectivity. In this sense, then, Sartre maintains that our freedoms are indeed inextricably interdependent.

Simone de Beauvoir provides a further argument which serves to complement that of Sartre. De Beauvoir presupposes that man seeks meaning and justification for his existence, and she argues that what follows is a total interdependence between men, because "Man can find a justification of his existence only in the existence of other men." De Beauvoir accepts Sartre's claim that man will not know that he is free unless others recognize him as being free. Similarly, she argues, we want all men to value our existence, to find it meaningful and justified, so that we may likewise value it. Since it is the Other's freedom that is the source of his valuation of me, de Beauvoir concludes, I must value his freedom if its valuation of me is to be significant to me. Further, we want our lives to be valued by those whose opinions we value, namely, our equals or peers, not our slaves, and hence, on de Beauvoir's account, I am also obliged to promote the freedom of others.

However, Sartre has still provided no account of how positive social relations are possible at all, given his portrait of conflict as the original meaning of being-for-others. While Heidegger's Mitsein provides an ontological basis for both negative and positive relations with others, Sartre's treatment of being-for-others is fleshed out only in terms of negative, destructive concrete relations. Recall from chapter five that Sartre's use of the term
'conflict' reflects three meanings: that we are ontologically distinct beings; that our encounters with others are necessarily objectifying or alienating; and finally that we are, as a consequence of the foregoing, engaged in hostile concrete relations with others. It was suggested, further, that if we set aside the project to be God and choose freedom instead as our primary value, our actual social relations need not be hostile: neither our ontological separateness nor our mutual objectification need necessarily imply conflict in the sense of overt hostility. If the project to be God is relinquished, in other words, then perhaps the door is open for a positive, constructive account of concrete relations.

Suppose that we do set aside the God-project: say that we cease in our attempts to eliminate our objectification by others, and rather simply accept that objectification as a part of our human reality. Similarly, we will be in a position to cease in our attempts to assimilate the subjectivities of others, because we will no longer seek to be our own foundation. However, there is yet a fundamental difficulty here. A reflective comprehension of the nature of human reality can indeed result in the relinquishing of the project to be God, and in our acceptance of our basic ontological separateness. Still, since Sartre insists that all of our encounters with others are necessarily objectifying, and in Being and Nothingness he appears to equate objectification with alienation, it is very difficult to see how or why we would 'simply accept that objectification' as a part of our human reality. If the Other inevitably objecifies me, and if this objectification amounts to an alienation of my own possibilities, as Sartre maintains, then it would seem more likely that I would indeed attempt to eradicate
rather than simply accept the objectivity which the Other confers on me.

Clearly, what stands in the way of a positive, constructive version of social relations is Sartre's treatment of our encounters with others as both necessarily objectifying and alienating. Indeed, it can be argued that Sartre's examples of my encounters with others in *Being and Nothingness* are seriously misleading because of their excessively negative connotations. Consider, for instance, Sartre's description of my shame before the Other's Look when I am caught peering through a keyhole. This is intended to illustrate my being-for-others as such, or my encounter with another subject by means of my objectification and alienation by that Other. However, as A. Danto observes, "...this would be a true philosophical characterization, if it is true at all, whatever act I were observed to perform: helping a child, saving a drowning man, battling to save the city— or, largely neutral acts all, eating plums, reading *Le Monde*, walking the dog." 35

In other words, Sartre's philosophical characterization of my being-for-others takes on a misleadingly negative coloration, due to the examples he uses to illustrate it. M. Grene notes, similarly, that Sartre bases his analysis of human relations on highly artificial examples, such as when he claims that my fundamental relation to the Other is revealed in the moment at which, sitting in a park, I observe a stranger who may at any moment look at me. The Other is thus revealed to me as a subject for whom I am an object, and as Grene observes, "An individual confronts another; but both are abstracted by the public nature of the place from the personal setting in which each of them lives his life. So it is not the two as
living human beings who face each other but the facsimiles of humanity who are, in Heidegger's phrase, together in the 'one' (the 'they'). Thus, on the one hand, Sartre's examples of my original encounter with the Other employ individuals who are isolated strangers, rather than individuals who are involved in some form of organic human relationship, such as members of a loving family. On the other hand, Sartre's choice of examples used to illustrate my objectification by the Other, such as my shameful behaviour looking through a keyhole, renders his account of my being-for-others as such unjustifiably negative.

Thus, whereas Heidegger states that his Mitsein is a neutral structure, or that which makes possible diverse modalities, both negative and positive, of relations with others, Sartre's account of being-for-others is representative of only negative, destructive concrete relations, because our encounters with others are deemed necessarily objectifying, and objectification is equated with alienation or degradation. As Anderson observes, "In one sense of the term, all knowledge of another subject objectifies it- where by objectify we mean 'take as an object of knowledge'. But Sartre means much more than this. For him, to objectify a subject is to grasp him as a thing and not as a free subject transcending his facticity." There is clearly an internal conflict in Sartre's thought here. How can we meet the demand of the ethic of authenticity that one support the freedom of others, given Sartre's excessively negative account of interpersonal relations as necessarily involving objectification, alienation or degradation? Does not the latter make the realization of the former impossible? These questions will be addressed at length in the following chapters. At present we may
merely note that Sartre relies on his analysis of various experiences to make his case regarding interpersonal relations, but since he generally chooses to explore only negative experiences, his conclusion appears to be begged from the outset. Indeed, given an analysis of more positive experiences between individuals, it can be argued both that non-reifying encounters with others are possible, and that objectification itself should be construed in a neutral manner, instead of being equated with alienation or degradation.

However, a pair of questions remain: what sorts of relations between persons will Sartre's theory of consciousness tolerate? is Heidegger's *Mitsein* compatible with Sartre's theory of consciousness? It is clear Sartre rules out at least one thing, and that is a merging of consciousnesses. Consider Sartre's description of Roquentin's encounter with the root of a chesnut tree in *Nausea*: "I was the root of the chesnut tree. Or rather I was entirely conscious of its existence. Still detached from it—since I was entirely conscious of it—yet lost in it, nothing but it." 

Sartre thus maintains that, contrary to what some forms of mysticism suggest, there can be no fusion of consciousness with the world, because such a fusion would signify 'the solidification of the for-itself in the in-itself', whereas the for-itself exists as the negation of the in-itself. Similarly, then, there can be no merging of consciousnesses, and any account of relations with others, if it is to be consistent with Sartre's theory, must respect the original negation that makes of the Other an other or a subjectivity which is not me.

Heidegger himself does not speak in terms of a theory of consciousness as negation, but his notion of *Mitsein* does not appear
to be incompatible with Sartre's theory, in as much as it does not imply a union of subjectivities. Sartre insists on the plurality of consciousnesses, and Heidegger likewise recognizes that Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility. Indeed, if Dasein is interpreted as that which makes individual selves possible, and if Mitsein is interpreted as that which renders relations between individuals possible, then clearly Heidegger's concept of Being-with need not imply that individual selves are in some sense united with one another. On the contrary, it can be argued that Heidegger's ontology recognizes an irreducible plurality of individuals, who have the essential capacity to stand in relation to one another. Thus, if Heidegger's Mitsein is construed as a neutral structure which makes possible all modalities of Being-with others, it appears to be entirely compatible with Sartre's theory of consciousness.

Rather than presenting incompatible accounts of our relations with others, it would seem that Heidegger and Sartre are addressing different levels of concern. Recall that Heidegger's Dasein represents that primordial unity which precedes and makes possible any subsequent factoring of this unity into logical relata, such as Sartre's for-itself and in-itself. Sartre's for-itself and in-itself, in other words, represent a splitting of the original pre-logical unity towards which Heidegger's Dasein points. One might thus conclude that the truth to which Heidegger refers is prior to the truth to which Sartre refers: the two are not incompatible, providing it is recognized that they occur at different levels, and that the former grounds the latter. For example, Heidegger's Mitsein is an ontological structure which represents Dasein's essential capacity to stand in relation to others, while Sartre's treatment of
conflict as being-for-others addresses my actual encounter with the Other at the **factual** level. It is this encounter which Sartre characterizes as fundamentally reifying: my object-ness for the Other discloses his subjectivity to me. It is worth noting here that Sartre himself criticizes Heidegger on his choice of examples in *Being and Time*, and accuses him of wrongly moving from empirical instances of positive communal organizations, such as crews and teams, to the claim that Dasein is in its being a member of a supportive community. However, if we recall Sartre's own use of examples in *Being and Nothingness*, then surely his position is vulnerable to precisely the same line of criticism: Sartre's choice of examples, such as my shameful behaviour looking through a keyhole, renders his account of my being-for-others as such unjustifiably negative. Moreover, we have noted that while Sartre fails to provide any account of positive social relations, Heidegger's *Mitsein* is in fact a neutral structure which succeeds in providing an ontological basis for diverse modalities of relations with others.

It may thus be argued that Sartre's treatment of conflict as the original meaning of being-for-others actually represents one concrete modality of Heidegger's *Mitsein*, the other basic modality being positive, constructive relations between individuals. This brings us back to our first question; namely, exactly what sorts of relations with others will Sartre's theory of consciousness tolerate? We will explore this issue at length in the chapters to follow, first by means of an examination of Sartre's theory of group relations as it is presented in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, and finally by means of a comparison with the dialogical philosophy of Martin Buber.
Chapter Seven  Sartre's Theory of Groups

It will be argued in this chapter that Sartre's theory of groups in *Critique of Dialectical Reason* does provide an account of how positive social relations are possible, and thus renders intelligible that aspect of his concept of authentic existence which requires of us common action on behalf of the freedom of all. By historicizing conflict, by explaining it in terms of the contingent fact of scarcity, Sartre now acknowledges the possibility that cooperation may replace combativeness in a future society of material abundance. Further, his theory of groups also allows for cooperative action in the present: the Looking/Looked-at dyads of *Being and Nothingness*, composed of subjects objectifying or being objectified by other subjects, are replaced in *Critique of Dialectical Reason* by groups of individuals united by a shared situation and common goals. Specifically, Sartre's concept of the mediating Third provides a basis for practical union and common effort in the existing social world, or authentic action by 'common individuals' having as its aim the enhancement of their concrete freedom. What his theory of groups lacks, as we shall see, is an ontology of relations, and with its emphasis on common action for shared goals, it fails to accommodate the dimension of personal human relations, or phenomena such as friendship and love.

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As we saw in chapter five, Sartre argues in *Being and Nothingness* that conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others. He analyses my being-for-others in terms of the concept of the Other's Look: the Other is another subjectivity who objectifies me and is thus the foundation of my object-ness or my being-in-itself. As we saw, Sartre maintains in *Being and Nothingness* that the Other's existence can motivate either of two opposed attitudes: I can attempt to destroy my object-ness for him by making an object out of him in turn (hate, sadism), or else I can attempt to assimilate his subjectivity so as to recover my own object-ness and thus become my own foundation (love, masochism). Both of these attempts Sartre identifies as failures, our concrete relations with others thus being a circle in which the for-itself is indefinitely tossed from one to the other of the two fundamental attitudes. Indeed, Sartre insists that "...we shall never place ourselves concretely on a plane of equality; that is, on the plane where the recognition of the Other's freedom would involve the Other's recognition of our freedom." 1

It was suggested in chapter five, however, that Sartre's account of relations with others, as described above, is not and was not intended to be an exhaustive one. Rather, Sartre's discussion takes place within the context of the individual's project to be God. If this project to be God may be set aside, as Sartre's ethics of authentic existence suggests, then it can be argued that an account of positive, constructive relations with others might indeed be formulated within the parameters of Sartre's ontology. Recall that it is within the context of the project to be God that our ontological separateness and our mutual objectification give rise to conflict in the sense of overt hostility between individuals. If
this project is set aside, and we accept the fact that we are ontologically distinct beings, then our concrete relations need not involve efforts at the assimilation or destruction of the Other's subjectivity with their ensuing conflict, since neither of us will any longer try to eradicate, or become the foundation of, the objectivity which the Other confers on us.

Yet as we saw in chapters five and six, a fundamental problem remains. Sartre's ethics advocates the choice of freedom as our primary value, and as we have noted, Sartre maintains in Existentialism and Humanism that I am obliged to will the freedom of others at the same time as mine: "I cannot make freedom my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim." All people share a common human condition, no one's freedom is intrinsically superior to that of anyone else, and hence it would be inconsistent to choose to value only my own freedom. The ethics of authenticity requires that I observe the criterion of consistency with the truth of the human condition, and thus that I treat the Other as the free subject that he is, on a par with myself, and hence that I respect his freedom and values as much as I do my own. However, the fact remains that Sartre has thus far provided no account of how positive, constructive relations with others are actually possible. We have been given only the Looking/Looked-at dyad as the model for human relations, subjects objectifying or being objectified by other subjects, where my objectification by the Other is equated with my degradation or the alienation of my own possibilities. If the solidarity suggested above, with each of us acting for the freedom of all, is to be rendered intelligible, therefore, a new or substantially revised model of human relations is required. Sartre offers such a model in the Critique
Recall, first, Sartre's treatment of the 'Us' and the 'We' in *Being and Nothingness*: "...the Us-object precipitates us into the world; we experience it in shame as a community alienation." The 'Us' here refers to an experience of being objects in common for some Other, and Sartre describes the experience of the Us-object in terms of the appearance of a third party. I am engaged in a conflict with the Other, and 'the Third' comes on the scene and embraces both of us with his Look: "...I suddenly experience the existence of an objective situation-form in the world of the Third in which the Other and I shall figure as equivalent structures in solidarity with each other." This solidarity, however, is interpreted by Sartre as a community alienation: it corresponds to an experience of humiliation and impotence with respect to a Third (e.g., the master, feudal lord, bourgeois, capitalist), and thus hardly provides much hope for a positive account of relations at the group level.

The situation does not improve when Sartre considers the notion of a community of subjects or a 'We-subject': "...the fact that I am engaged with others in a common rhythm is especially likely to lead me to apprehend myself as engaged in a We-subject." The experience of the We-subject thus arises if we are working on a common project, for example, or engaged in a shared activity. However, Sartre insists that such an experience of community is parasitic on the primal experience of the Other, and is therefore only a secondary and subordinate experience. In other words, conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others, and any experience of the We-subject is only a 'psychological' experience which, as a purely subjective event, is highly unstable and reveals nothing significant.
Thus, on Sartre's account, while the experience of the Us-object reflects a 'dimension of real existence' and corresponds to a simple enrichment of his original proof of being-for-others, the experience of the We-subject is, on the contrary, "...a pure psychological, subjective event in a single consciousness; it corresponds to an inner modification of the structure of consciousness but does not appear on the foundation of a concrete ontological relation with others." 6

In the Critique, however, Sartre's position is substantially revised. The claim of Being and Nothingness, that the basic relation among human beings is not the Mitsein but rather conflict, is contextualized historically in the Critique. Basic interpersonal relations are now characterized by Sartre as positive or negative, cooperative or combative, depending on 'previous circumstances and the material conditions which determine the practical field.' It is scarcity which renders us competitors and which qualifies human history generally as a struggle for limited resources. However, by historicizing conflict in this manner, Sartre now acknowledges the possibility that cooperation may replace combativeness in a future society of material abundance. Further, for those who are sceptical about the possibility of eliminating scarcity, Sartre's theory of groups in the Critique also allows for cooperative action in the present: the Looking/Looked-at dyads composed of subjects objectifying or being objectified by other subjects are replaced by groups of individuals united by a shared situation and common goals. Whereas in Being and Nothingness the We-subject is dismissed as a purely psychological phenomenon and the Us-object is characterized as the product of an alienating Third, in the Critique Sartre introduces
the concept of the mediating Third which, as we shall see, provides a basis for practical union and common effort in the existing social world.

In order to appreciate Sartre's theory of groups, it is first necessary to explicate a number of the central theses and notions explored in the Critique. Dialectical reason itself, for Sartre, is based on the recognition of contradictions and transcending syntheses. Unlike analytic reason, which utilises abstract concepts in its analysis of a 'detemporalized' reality, dialectical reason employs the 'notion' which Sartre characterizes as a synthetic effort to produce an idea which develops by 'contradictions and successive overcomings', and which is thus 'homogeneous with the development of things'. Dialectical reason is thus both a process of objects in the world and the movement of our knowledge of them. As H. Barnes puts it, "Dialectical Reason is a relation between Being and Knowing. It is the only appropriate approach by which human beings, who are individually and collectively- a perpetual process of self-making by means of totalization, can hope to understand themselves and their history and to plan for their future." 7

Dialectical reason is, fundamentally, the continuing process of 'totalization', which Sartre characterizes as a practical synthesizing activity which transforms a multiplicity of parts into an emerging whole, which serves as the goal of the ongoing activity. The group in the process of forming is, Sartre says, the most simple form of totalization; like the for-itself in Being and Nothingness, the group 'is not' but rather 'it constantly totalizes itself'. 8 Totalizing praxis in the Critique thus takes the place of temporalizing consciousness in Being and Nothingness. Totalization is temp-
oralization: it advances in a spiral movement, with the past continuously reinterpreted in the light of the future as an intended but unrealized totality. 'Praxis' is purposive human activity in its material environment: it is the unifying and reorganizing transcendence of existing circumstances toward the practical field. This transcendence is dialectical: it is simultaneously negation, conservation and spiraling advance. Thus, the nihilating dynamic of consciousness from *Being and Nothingness* 'materializes' into organic praxis in the *Critique*, where the initial negation is lack, and need emerges as the corresponding negation of this negation. However, since these negations occur within an ultimately totalizing context, this double negation constitutes a dialectical affirmation, Sartre argues, or a practical, synthetic integration of the elements as parts.

In the *Critique*, Sartre maintains that by his praxis man unifies the material world around him and maintains this unity, and matter, through the unity it receives from man, serves to unite men initially in 'simple human relations'. Men, Sartre thus says, are 'mediated' by things to the same extent as things are 'mediated' by men. The 'practico-inert' is "...simply the activity of others in so far as it is sustained and diverted by inorganic inertia." In the case of practico-inert mediation, then, it is never 'raw nature' but nature as modified by prior praxis which is the mediating factor. The practico-inert constitutes for Sartre 'fundamental sociality', or as T. Flynn puts it, "All social forms to the extent that they are social have a basis in the practico-inert, that is, in the relations among agents mediated by such 'worked matter' as natural languages, rituals of exchange, or physical artifacts."
On Sartre's account, "...it is at the practico-inert level that sociality is produced in men by things as a bond on materiality which transcends and alters simple human relations." He terms the practico-inert ensemble 'the collective', the thing which produces it he calls 'the collective object', and the human relations altered thereby he terms 'serial relations'. Sartre offers as an example a queue of people at a bus stop. In this case, the collective object is the bus, which sustains in the people a certain unity: they share a common purpose, namely, transportation by this bus. Yet Sartre maintains that this commonality is actually false, since scarcity of places on the bus renders each person in the queue a rival of every other. As I. Craib observes, scarcity eats away at basic sociality: "Scarcity defines a group of men in terms of the impossibility of their co-existence and it defines each member of the group as possibly an excess member; it divides the group by defining each member as Other than the Others." 

Thus the bus queue is for Sartre paradigmatic of serial relations among individuals who are both united and separated by a collective object: "A series is a mode of being for individuals both in relation to one another and in relation to their common being, and this mode of being transforms all their structures." This transformation indicates, in Sartre's view, that practico-inert mediation constitutes both the basic form of sociality and also the initial source of personal and social alienation. For example, the very serial order of the bus queue is the sign of the numerical equivalence of its members, and such 'otherness' or 'alterity' is on Sartre's account the essential feature of practico-inert mediation. The notion of alterity includes among its aspects 'unity in
exteriority' or the false commonality noted above, pseudoreciprocit
among the members of the series, their numerical equivalence and intercchangeability, their separation and passivity in the face of the collective object, and finally their social impotence. On Sar
tre's account, then, interpersonal relationships mediated by the practico-inert are fundamentally alienating: this is the moment of the 'anti-dialectic', or the combination and alienation of the free praxis of individuals by the 'passive action' of worked matter.

Note that for Sartre there are three forms of praxis: individu
al, constituting praxis, common praxis (of the constituted group), and serial praxis. Serial praxis grounds 'passive action', which is itself non-originative: passive action is, in Sartre's view, a de
formation of praxis because of practico-inert mediation. The basic motive for forming groups, then, is to liberate serialized praxes from the alienating mediation of the practico-inert (supplanting it, as we shall see, by the mediation of the praxes themselves). Since Sartre equates seriality with unfreedom (passive action), he contends that the appearance of the group can be considered 'the sudden resurrection of freedom', and he defines the group as follows: "...the group is not a metaphysical reality, but a definite practical relation of men to an objective and to each other." The group-in-union, on Sartre's account, arises through the spontaneity of individual praxes. It is formed on the basis of common needs and common dangers, and is defined by its common praxis. The first mediation involved in the formation of the group is ef
fected by the non-member: the series is totalized as a group by an outside agent. Most often, Sartre says, it is a hostile agent, and he offers as an example the rising of the people of Paris against
the royal troops on the occasion of the storming of the Bastille. Given this outside mediation, Sartre proceeds to describe the interior transformation of structures which takes place through the activity of the members of the series. Each member is released from his seriality and becomes co-sovereign as the organizer of a common praxis. Sartre calls this constitutive action the 'interiorization of multiplicity': each member acts as 'the Third', able to totalize the series through his free praxis.

The notion of 'the same' is central to Sartre's account. As T.C. Anderson notes, "Although the members of a group are and remain distinct individuals, they are not separate as isolated atoms or as members of an inert series. They are unified in performing common actions for common goals." Each member of the group thus perceives his fellow group members as undertaking actions that are the same as each other's and the same as his own. As Sartre puts it, "Through the mediation of the group, he (my fellow member) is neither the Other nor identical (identical with me): but he comes to the group as I do; he is the same as me." Since each individual in the group is the Third in relation to all the others, each 'actualizes' the unity of the others, and is also himself unified into the group by every other group member acting as the Third.

The relationship of quasi-transcendence/immanence is thus the foundation of the group-in-fusion: as a Third I totalize the group, and each Third totalizes me into the group. I am a quasi-subject in relation to those unified, who are my quasi-object. The group unity actualized by a given third party cannot include that third party: he is quasi-transcendent in relation to the group, and must be unified into it or be made quasi-immanent by other third parties.
These overlapping internal unifications, on Sartre's account, constitute the very unity of the group: group members never constitute the substantial unity or ontological oneness of a 'hyperorganism', but rather their unity remains a practical one of common praxis. The group, from the ontological standpoint, is hence a revolving set of praxes, each reciprocally related to the others by means of the praxis of anyone, treated as 'the same', in a project that is interiorized as 'ours', a single act with a plural subject. Note that what has emerged is reciprocity mediated by praxis, and thus the group-in-fusion exhibits Sartre's fourfold condition for genuine reciprocity:

Reciprocity implies, first, that the Other is a means to the extent that I myself am a means, that is to say, that the Other is the means of a transcendent end and not my means; second, that I recognize the Other as praxis, that is to say, as a developing totalization, at the same time as integrating him as an object into my totalizing project; third, that I recognize his movement towards his own ends in the same movement by which I project myself towards mine; and fourth, that I discover myself as an object and instrument of his ends through the same act which constitutes him an objective instrument of my ends. 22

What Sartre terms the 'pledged group' also exhibits this fourfold condition for reciprocity. Recall that the group-in-fusion forms in the face of an external threat perceived as common. The passing of that threat occasions the advent of a new danger: namely, the possible collapse of the group-in-fusion, with its hard-won freedom, back into serial impotence. In order to avoid this danger and to achieve a certain stability, Sartre maintains, the members of the group introduce the pledge as a form of 'self-imposed inertia': "The group becomes the common objective in everyone: its permanence must be secured." 23 Only by the pledge does each group mem-
ber reflectively and deliberately give his free consent to the group relationship, and only by the pledge does he agree to maintain his praxis as common, as the same in each and all.

Thus, in contrast to the group-in-fusion, which arises through the prereflective spontaneity of individual praxes, the advent of the pledge marks the group's stage of reflective self-awareness. As Sartre puts it, "It is through the pledge that the group posits itself for itself." He also insists that "The pledge is not a subjective or merely verbal determination: it is a real modification of the group by my regulatory action." This real modification is described as the creation of a new entity, 'man as a common individual': "...adopted inertia, function, power, rights and duties, structure, violence and fraternity- (the group member) actualizes all these reciprocal relations as his new being, his sociality." Following the creative act of the pledge, we are thus 'our own sons, our common creation', and it is this creation which Sartre designates 'the origin of humanity'.

On Sartre's account, however, the pledged group tends to deteriorate into the institution. Recall that the group is a constantly detotalized totality, or a constant movement towards a completed totality via the activity of its members as mediating Thirds. On Sartre's view, the inability to achieve an ontological unity is experienced within the group as a permanent danger of disintegration, which even the pledge cannot ultimately assuage. The desire is to eliminate the moment of transcendence-in the member's relationship to the group, and the long term response is institutionalization, characterized by a reintroduction into interpersonal relations of serial otherness, with its attendant social impotence. Indeed, the
birth of the institution out of the group represents for Sartre 'the systematic self-domestication of man by man'\textsuperscript{28}: "...there is only one freedom for all the members of the (institutionalized) group: that of the sovereign." \textsuperscript{29} This nonreciprocal sovereignty of the leader of the institution is what Sartre means by 'authority', and on his account it goes hand in hand with the crystallization of institutionalized praxis into 'bureaucracy'.

It has been argued, on a number of grounds, that Sartre's account of groups in the Critique is incompatible with his treatment of the for-itself in Being and Nothingness. Recall that in Being and Nothingness Sartre insists that individual consciousnesses shall never place themselves on a plane of equality, 'on the plane where the recognition of the Other's freedom would involve the Other's recognition of our freedom'. Instead, relations with others are explicated in terms of conflict, and the experience of the We-subject, as for example occasioned by participation on a rowing team, is dismissed as an unstable and insignificant psychological event. Yet, as Flynn observes, this account of the We-subject is defective for several reasons: "...it fails to explain that mutuality of relations that lateral awareness reveals. It is not solely my awareness of the others' rowing that constitutes our rhythm. It is also our mutual accommodation to a common goal, the shared desire for 'the team' to win, not to mention such social facts as the regatta and its attendant rules, functionaries, statuses, and rewards." \textsuperscript{30} All of these factors, on other words, mediate collective identity and common action, but Sartre's treatment of the We-subject fails to adequately address their role.

It would appear, indeed, that no concatenation of individuals,
as Sartre describes them, could ever yield a social whole. As we have seen, in *Being and Nothingness* the major source of social cohesion is identified as the Look of the (alienating) Third. Sartre's discussion of the Us-object is merely an extension of his treatment of my being-for-others, or the self versus Other relationship that obtains between any two individual consciousnesses. The so-called unity of the Us-object is purely extrinsic, imposed by the Look of the (alienating) Third, and the only difference between the Other and this would-be social Third is the plurality of individuals which the latter objectifies, a mere difference of degree. Thus, it would seem that the 'social space' which Sartre's theory posits in *Being and Nothingness* is not really social at all; as Flynn notes, "Sartre has in effect excluded co-operation in the literal sense of the term and hence the mutuality (reciprocity) requisite for properly social relations." 31

Yet it must also be recognized that the collective dimension does receive some representation in *Being and Nothingness*. As noted in chapter two, many criticisms of Sartre's theory of value—especially that it implies for ethics a thoroughgoing subjectivism and relativism—cannot ultimately be sustained because they fail to recognize or appreciate his discussion of our 'situation' in the world, the role of others in the constitution of that situation, and hence what he terms our 'objective encounter' with values in the world. What Sartre calls our situation is described as the common product of the contingency of the in-itself and of freedom: it is the 'given' which human reality has to be and which it illuminates by its project or its choice of itself in the world, and it includes my place (the place assigned to me by my birth), my body, my past (a
backdrop and a point of view), my environment (the instrumental-

things which surround me), and my fellowmen. In the case of my fel-

lowmen, moreover, Sartre explicitly observes that to live in a world

with my fellowmen is "...to find myself engaged in a world in which

instrumental-complexes can have a meaning which my free project has

not first given to them." 32 In sum, the world is already provided

with meaning, due to the collective activities of my fellowmen: it

is their collective activities which anchor the values which I en-

counter, values which have 'being', on Sartre's account, or are

'crystallized' in the social world.

Further, in Existentialism and Humanism the sense of practical

union, of common effort, as the model for social relations begins

to take shape, when Sartre declares that I cannot make freedom my

aim unless I make that of others equally my aim. Here again, the

concepts of concrete freedom in a collective situation receive ex-

plicit, if not fully developed, expression. Indeed, it has been ar-

gued in chapter three that, because freedom exists only in relation

to a shared situation, Sartre's concept of authentic existence re-

quires of us action in the world which has as its aim the enhance-

ment of our concrete freedom. In Sartre's view, valuing freedom

means that men should endeavour to modify their situation in the

world so as to remove restrictions to their freedom of choice and

to increase the range of choices available to them. Hence, Sartre

clearly envisions his authentic individuals as having a positive

social role to play, countering repressive political and social

policies or systems, and supporting any policies or systems that

maximize freedom of choice by enabling men to achieve their goals.

Thus, while it is not until the Critique that these notions of
concrete freedom and common effort converge in the concept of group praxis, nevertheless both Being and Nothingness and Existentialism and Humanism do anticipate this development.

The question remains, however, as to whether the group praxis of the Critique is compatible with Sartre's account of my conflict-ridden relations with others in Being and Nothingness. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre stipulates that individual consciousnesses shall never place themselves on a plane of equality, but in the Critique he claims that the group achieves just such an equality, a positive reciprocity of freedoms. These two claims need not be incompatible, however, if it is acknowledged that our ontological separateness and our mutual objectification, as described in Being and Nothingness, need not imply conflict in the sense of overt hostility between individuals. Indeed, Sartre explains in the Critique that it is the phenomenon of scarcity which renders us competitors and which has thus far qualified human history as a struggle for limited resources. Similarly, alienation is now defined as man's impotence in the face of forces external to him: man's products (the embodiment of his work in matter) escape his control and come to dominate him, and men thus become 'the product of their own product'. By historicizing conflict, Sartre acknowledges in the Critique the possibility that cooperation may replace combativeness in a future society of material abundance, and his optimism about the possible eradication of scarcity appears to be based on the fact that individuals joined cooperatively in common action simply have more power than they do when isolated: together, in groups, they can most effectively combat their alienation.

It is thus the group which embodies Sartre's hope: if individ-
uals join together into a common group pursuing the fulfillment of their common needs, scarcity might be abolished, and likewise the conflict based upon scarcity. Even if scarcity is not abolished, it is the group, and specifically the activity of its members as mediating Thirds, which at last provides an account of how, in the present, a positive reciprocity of freedoms is possible on the basis of Sartre's ontology. However, it has also been argued that the free individual described in *Being and Nothingness* is, in effect, sacrificed to the group in the *Critique*. Certain critics, among them Walter Odajnyk, Wilfrid Desan and Mary Warnock, maintain that Sartre simply abandons his existentialism, and with it the free individual, in favour of Marxism. Yet this position fails to acknowledge Sartre's own critique of Marxism, as articulated for example in *Search for a Method*, where Sartre argues that 'Marxism stopped': "For years the Marxist intellectual believed that he served his party by violating experience, by overlooking embarrassing details, by grossly simplifying the data, and above all, by conceptualizing the event before having studied it." Sartre contends in *Search for a Method* that the task of existentialism is to revitalize Marxism, and to remind us that, while it is true that men make history within determined conditions, nevertheless it is still men who make their history. As Barnes observes, Sartre believes that "(Marxism's) economic laws function like laws of nature; human freedom is ignored. Revolution comes about as the result of impersonal forces rather than as the result of the awakening of free men and women to the fact of their alienation and oppression." Still, Warnock insists that "...the individual of *Being and Nothingness* has been swallowed up in the Group of the *Critique*..."
or that the group in its internal structure entails the suppression of individual liberty. Note, however, that in one sense at least the individual is not 'swallowed up' in the group: as we have seen, group members never constitute the substantial unity of a 'hyperorganism'. On the contrary, Sartre's account clearly indicates that their unity is a practical one of common praxis: each member in the group acts as the Third in relation to all the other members, each actualizes the unity of the others and is himself unified with them by every other group member acting as the Third. It is these overlapping internal unifications which constitute the unity of the group: there is never an ontological oneness which 'swallows up' individual members.

On the other hand, the group does impose certain limitations on the freedom of its members. Recall first that group members are unified in performing common actions for common goals: the Third does not see himself as other than and separate from those whose unity he actualizes; rather, he perceives his fellow members' actions as 'the same' as his own. When each third party interiorizes the multiplicity, seeing all acts as the same as his, the result is that his personal freedom is 'synthetically enriched'. The fact that there are what Sartre calls 'several myselves' (rather than several isolated others) becomes an enrichment of our power, and hence of our freedom. Still, it is also the case that group members act as 'regulating Thirds': each individual cannot simply act as he pleases, since that would undermine the power of the group as common action. However, as Anderson observes, this limitation on my freedom need not be construed as a restriction per se: "My very presence in the group is freely chosen by me; I choose to act in union
with others for common goals. Also, because all of us within the group are the same, in freely conforming my acts to their regulation I am in effect conforming to myself."

However, it must be recognized that in the case of the pledged group, as opposed to the group-in-fusion, more telling limitations are placed upon the freedom of its individual members. For example, in order to make the group more stable, its members reflectively focus their attention on it, and in so doing they make each other objects, rather than merely 'quasi-objects' as in the group-in-fusion. As a result, there is more 'otherness' between myself and my fellow group members, yet Sartre also insists that "...we do not relapse into seriality, since, for each third party, this Other-Being is the same Other-Being as for his neighbour." However, unlike in the case of the group-in-fusion, where we so identify with one another that the regulations to me from a third party are perceived as regulations to me from 'myself', in the pledged group with its increased 'otherness', to the extent that the third party as Other-Being limits my freedom, this limitation constitutes a genuine restriction. It can no longer be perceived, Sartre says, as a regulation to me from 'myself'.

Further, the limitations and restrictions placed on the freedom of the members of the pledged group are evident in Sartre's notions of obligation and terror. Recall that the pledge occasions the creation of 'man as a common individual', his new being or sociality constituted by 'adopted inertia, function, power, rights and duties, structure, violence and fraternity'. Sartre maintains that formal obligations to other group members arise only when a pledge has been given to them. Through his pledge, the individual gives his fellow
group members the right to discipline and even to liquidate him if he fails to remain a member of the group: "To swear is to say, as a common individual: you must kill me if I secede. And this demand has no other aim than to install Terror within myself as a free defence against the fear of the enemy (at the same time reassuring me about the third party who will be confirmed by the same Terror)."

However, it is also fundamental to note that this terror described by Sartre is a 'free defence': my very presence in the pledged group is freely chosen by me, as I choose to act together with others in order to attain common goals. It is for this reason that membership in the pledged group can be identified as being an embodiment of Sartre's concept of authentic existence. As we have seen, Sartre's ethics of authentic existence comprises two basic aspects. First, there is the reflective comprehension of the nature of human reality, which has as its result the choice of freedom as one's primary value. Second, since freedom exists only in relation to a collective situation, valuing freedom involves action in the world which has as its aim the enhancement of our concrete freedom. Similarly, then, the advent of the pledge marks the group's stage of reflective self-awareness: it is through the pledge that the group posits itself for itself. Moreover, the pledge occasions the 'origin of humanity', in which men are related as brothers, and hence the pledged group represents "...the victory of man as common freedom over seriality." Thus, the pledged group, with its reflective self-awareness and the enriched power of its members, constitutes for Sartre the most effective means for the realization of his ethical ideal of human liberation and fulfillment.

Sartre's theory of groups has also been criticized, however, on
the grounds that, while the group may in fact be supportive of human freedom in its initial stages, nevertheless its deterioration into 'inert' institutions which suppress individual liberty is presented as inevitable. For example, K. Hartmann maintains that for Sartre true social freedom is available only in the group-in-fusion, where everything is fluid, non-oppressive, and yet plural. On this view, Sartre maintains the impossibility of a free and yet structured ensemble, but Hartmann argues on the contrary that "There is no excuse, in Sartre or in Marx, for ignoring social organizations of redress, e.g. organized welfare, trade unions as countervailing forces of capital, and ultimately, the state as a universal agent capable of adjusting the evil effects of ensembles which, left alone on their categorial level of particularity, may prove to be increasingly determined by adverse constraints." Indeed, critics contend both that Sartre sees social structures as necessarily alienating, and also that he sees the progressive deterioration of the group as an inevitable occurrence.

It must be acknowledged that in some sections of the Critique Sartre does appear to portray the deterioration of the group as inevitable: "...groups have a serial destiny even in the moment of their practical totalization." If we were to restrict ourselves to remarks such as this, we might indeed conclude that the ultimate failure of the group is as inevitable as the frustration of attempts at positive individual human relations appears to be in Being and Nothingness. However, as Barnes observes, "...just as the latter were analyzed in the context of bad faith and a mistaken pursuit of the missing God, so we must note that the Critique presupposes a milieu of scarcity which it is the aim of Marxism to overcome."
Scarcity is a contingent fact, and it is a contingent fact which might be defeated; thus, the failure of the group, or its deterioration into inert organizations, is non-necessary.

Recall also Sartre's critique of Marxism; namely, that its economic laws function like laws of nature, and human freedom is ignored. On Sartre's own account, men do make history within determined conditions, but nevertheless it is still free men who make their history. It is also true, however, that when I freely act on the world, the result of my action inevitably assumes a life of its own to some extent. As Sartre puts it, necessity is "...the destiny in exteriority of freedom." 

For example, because men freely decide to cut down trees, one inevitable consequence will be the erosion of the soil. On the other hand, a different decision would result in a quite different outcome. Thus, Anderson suggests that the necessity proposed by Sartre is hypothetical in nature (if I decide to do A, B will inevitably occur): "To apply this to the analysis of the group, we could say that if the group took as its primary goal from the beginning the freedom of each of its members, then its deterioration into a bureaucracy and series need not take place."

It is also not the case that Sartre views social structures in wholly negative terms. He speaks positively, for example, of the creation of 'man as a common individual': following the creative act of the pledge, we are 'our own sons, our common creation', and it is this creation which Sartre describes as 'the origin of humanity', which marks the advent of positive reciprocal relations of fraternity among group members. On the other hand, Sartre's emphasis on the role of terror in the formation of social wholes is obviously negative. Could men, on his account, join together in social wholes...
in a spirit of love and cooperation? Anderson suggests that, in fact, "Sartre still views men as so individualistic, so separate, so fearful of the loss of their personal freedom that they cannot continue to cooperate and unite with each other over a long period of time. That is why the threat of violence is necessary." 47

Similarly, M. Grene contends that Sartre still has 'a thoroughly molecular conception of the individual', and that even his philosophy of praxis as described in the Critique fails to overcome 'his initial solipsism'. 48 However, while there is some truth to Anderson's observation in relation to existing historical conditions, it must also be recognized that on Sartre's view the elimination of scarcity might involve as well the elimination of terror as an instrument of social cohesion. Recall that Sartre defined terror in terms of 'a free defence against the fear of the enemy', and presumably with the elimination of scarcity, group members would no longer be acting in response to external threats of this nature. Further, Grene's contention fails to acknowledge that Sartre's agents in the Critique are presented, not as isolated individuals, but rather as individuals-in-relation, whether these relations be negative (serial) or positive (reciprocal) in character. The central difficulty with Sartre's account appears to be instead that the status of these relations, and consequently of the groups which are constituted by them, remains unclear.

Sartre seems to think that he has only two options: either a group is a 'hyperorganism' or an ontological unity, or else it is 'purely practical' or the detotalized product of assorted praxes. Clearly, he cannot accept the former description; unities of this sort are out of the question for him, and so he opts for the latter
description, with problematic results. Consider his various characterizations of human relations, the 'stuff' out of which groups are composed. First, there are 'simple human relations', which Sartre characterizes as relations among agents mediated by such 'worked matter' as natural languages, rituals of exchange, or physical artifacts. Scarcity alters simple human relations: it renders us competitors or rivals for limited material resources, and it marks the advent of serial relations, also called false reciprocal relations. Genuine reciprocal relations, Sartre says, arise with the appearance of the group, formed on the basis of common needs and shared dangers and defined by its common praxis. Praxis mediation thus replaces practico-inert mediation (exacerbated by scarcity); positive reciprocal relations appear in place of negative reciprocal relations.

It would seem, then, that on Sartre's account reciprocity is created, either via scarcity or else via praxis. However, he also states that 'reciprocity is a permanent structure' 49: 'reciprocity is lived by everyone as diffuse objective possibility', until it is 'actualized, or rather unmasked'. 50 As Anderson observes with respect to the formation of the group, Sartre's position is difficult to define: "What exactly 'actualization' means is unclear. Does the third party simply make manifest a unity already present or does he provide this unity?" 51 Similarly, in the case of the 'creation' of man as a common individual, Sartre says that the group member 'actualizes all these reciprocal relations' (adopted inertia, function, power, rights and duties, structure, violence and fraternity) as 'his new being, his sociality'. The exact ontological status of these relations, and hence also of group unity (as positive reciprocity), remains obscure. Though Sartre clearly holds that the
group never becomes a hyperorganism but rather remains a unity of actions, at the same time he claims that group praxis is not merely a collection of individual praxes, but something more - a 'synthetic enrichment' of individual praxes.

If we assume that reciprocity is indeed a permanent structure, then we might say that positive reciprocal relations constitute a synthetic enrichment of this basic structure, while negative reciprocal relations constitute a deterioration of it (scarcity 'eats away' at reciprocity). If we allow that reciprocity is an ontological structure of the individual, then it appears to be indistinguishable from Heidegger's Mitsein (Dasein or human Being is a Mitsein or a Being-with), able to take negative or positive form, depending upon practico-inert or praxis mediation, respectively. As argued in chapter six, this does not imply an ontological monism: Heidegger's ontology recognizes an irreducible plurality of individuals, but he also insists upon the primarily social and collaboratively functional nature of the process of human individuation. Similarly, in the Critique Sartre argues that agents-in-relation are the ultimate constituents of social reality, but he fails to examine the nature of the relations that constitute the reality of social wholes. Thus, as Flynn observes, Sartre is led to posit an 'erroneous contrast of the ontological and the practical', either the group is an ontological hyperorganism or else it is a detotalized totality of practical relations: "What Sartre's theory lacks most basically is an ontology of relations." 52

This lack notwithstanding, Sartre's theory of groups in the Critique does provide an account of how positive social relations are possible, and thus renders intelligible that aspect of his con-
cept of authentic existence which requires of us common action on behalf of the freedom of all. By historicizing conflict, by explaining it in terms of the contingent fact of scarcity, Sartre now acknowledges the possibility that cooperation may replace conflict in a future society of material abundance. Further, his theory of groups also allows for cooperative action in the present: the Looking/looked-at dyads of Being and Nothingness, composed of subjects objectifying or being objectified by other subjects, are replaced in the Critique by groups of individuals united by a shared situation and common goals. Specifically, Sartre's concept of the mediating Third provides a basis for practical union and common effort in the existing social world, or authentic action by 'common individuals' having as its aim the enhancement of their concrete freedom.

However, Sartre's theory also exhibits one fundamental lack, which we shall pursue with help from the philosophy of Martin Buber in the following chapters; namely, it fails to accommodate the dimension of personal human relations. Recall that Sartre holds that, following the creative act of the pledge, we are 'our own sons, our common creation'. He goes on to suggest that relations such as friendship and love are simply further free specifications of the basic fraternity existing among those who take the same pledge. However, the unity of the members of a group is a practical one of action; it occurs in so far as they act together for a common goal. Thus, friends or lovers sharing in one another's company, having no other goal than simple enjoyment or pleasure, do not appear to constitute what Sartre would call a group. Yet if personal relations cannot be reduced to common action, how will Sartre account for them? Note that Sartre allows in the Critique that "...trans-
lucid human relations do exist...; I mean immediate reciprocities...", 53 but in our current alienated state, such immediacy is rare and ephemeral. In chapter nine we shall examine this notion of immediate reciprocities, together with Buber's philosophy of dialogue, in an attempt to accommodate the dimension of personal relations in Sartre's social theory, and in order to complete his account of authentic human existence. First, however, an explication of Buber's dialogical philosophy is required, together with his view of authenticity as an essentially interpersonal process.
Chapter Eight  Buber's Dialogical Approach to Authenticity

On Buber's account, we are to understand authentic human existence in terms of his distinction between the two basic word pairs I-It and I-You, which each establish a distinctive mode of existence. I-It is the basic word of separation, or experience and use: perceiving, feeling, wanting and thinking are all designated by Buber as 'partial actions' of man characterized by the structure of the subject-object relation. On the other hand, I-You is the basic word of relation, in which the undivided self meets the undivided Other, and such encounters are in turn characterized by exclusiveness, mutuality and immediacy. While Buber insists that there are not two types of men, he maintains that there are two poles of humanity, the one inauthentic (or dominated by the I-It, and hence separateness and mutual exploitation), and the other authentic (in which the I-You interpenetrates the I-It, allowing for the development of 'genuine persons' standing in a living, reciprocal relation to one another).

Buber maintains that becoming authentic is 'becoming a whole' by standing in relationship with others. Life is fundamentally intersubjective: individual being is a being-with. Becoming a whole or a coherent unity organized around and in terms of one's distinctive possibility or 'fate' is a process which requires the participation of the Other. On Buber's account, the self and the Other are dialectically related: the mature development of one's self-unity at the reflective level and the full manifestation of the 'otherness' of the Other constitute the two movements of the dialectical process of becoming a whole. In my I-You meetings with the
Other, I am 'made present' by the Other in my wholeness and uniqueness, and my existence is 'confirmed'. Likewise, when I choose to enter into relation with the Other, I assume responsibility for his self-development as well as my own.

Indeed, Buber's conception of individual being as a being-with serves to ground an interpersonal ethic which rules out the exploitation of others by the individual. The absolute principle of this ethics of authentic existence is derived from the I-You relation itself; namely, the integrity of the self and the Other, which must be established and preserved in every situation. Authenticating one's own humanity is thus an essentially interpersonal process for Buber, in which each is obliged to respect the dignity of the Other, and in which each requires the aid of the Other, or that mutual confirmation which only genuine I-You meeting provides.

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Buber's *I and Thou* begins: "The world is twofold for man in accordance with his twofold attitude. The attitude of man is twofold in accordance with the two basic words he can speak." These basic words, which Buber proceeds to explore at length, are the word pairs 'I-You' and 'I-It'. He contends that the 'I' of man is also twofold, for the 'I' of the word pair I-You is different from the 'I' of the word pair I-It. Basic words establish a mode of existence, or as Buber puts it, they are 'spoken with one's being'. He initially distinguishes I-You and I-It as follows: "The basic word I-You can only be spoken with one's whole being. The basic word I-It can never be spoken with one's whole being."

Buber designates the 'It' world and the 'You' world as the world of experience and the world of relation, respectively. The world of experience is characterized by activities 'that have something for their object': "I perceive something. I feel something. I imagine something. I want something. I sense something. I think something." These are all partial activities of man, distinct from one another and characterized by the structure of the subject-object relation. On the other hand, Buber holds that 'whoever says You does not have something for his object': "But he stands in relation." When 'You' is spoken, one meets the incomparable: the undivided self meets the undivided Other. The world of relation, on Buber's account, arises in three spheres: life with nature, where the relation 'vibrates in the dark and remains below language'; life with men, where the relation 'is manifest and enters language'; and finally, life with 'forms of the spirit', where 'we hear no You and yet feel addressed; we answer- creating, thinking, acting.'

Buber provides the following example. When I contemplate a tree,
I can assume a variety of attitudes towards it: I can accept it as a picture, 'a rigid pillar in a flood of light'; I can assign it to a species and observe it as an instance; I can 'overcome its uniqueness and form so rigorously' that I recognize it only as an expression of a law of physics or chemistry; or I can even 'dissolve it into a number, into a pure relation between numbers, and eternallyize it'. In all of these attitudes, the tree is an It for me, a sensory or intellectual object structured in terms of its relation to a subject, but Buber maintains that another fundamentally different orientation is possible: "But it can also happen, if will and grace are joined, that as I contemplate the tree I am drawn into a relation, and the tree ceases to be an It. The power of exclusiveness has seized me." 7

We will explore the nature of the I-You relation thoroughly as we proceed. At this point, however, Buber merely indicates that in the I-You relation, which is characterized by 'reciprocity' rather than 'experience and use', what I encounter is the 'tree itself'. I meet with an undivided Other: "Whatever belongs to the tree is included: its form and its mechanics, its color and its chemistry, its conversation with the elements and its conversation with the stars— all this in its entirety." 8 Similarly, Buber states that the human being to whom I say You is a unity, an undivided totality; one must 'pull and tear' to turn a unity into a multiplicity: "...so it is with the human being to whom I say You. I can abstract from him the color of his hair or the color of his speech or the color of his graciousness; I have to do this again and again; but immediately he is no longer You." 9

In the case of our life with the forms of the spirit, Buber
maintains that this is the eternal origin of art; namely, "...a human being confronts a form that wants to become a work of art through him. Not a figment of his soul but something that appears to the soul and demands the soul's creative power." Again, Buber speaks in terms of the exclusiveness of such a confrontation, and of the fact that such creative acts are actions performed with one's whole being (as opposed to the partial activities of the I-It). The form that confronts me I cannot experience or describe; instead, I can only actualize it. The form is 'what is present': "Tested for its objectivity, the form is not 'there' at all; but what can equal its presence?" Finally, the relation is mutual: the form acts on me as I act on it. As Buber puts it, I lead the form across and into the world of It.

Thus far, then, Buber has indicated several characteristics of the You relation which distinguish it from the subject-object mode of experiencing and conceptualizing. First, the undivided self meets the undivided Other: a fusing of all characteristics takes place, or the growing together into a unity of all objectifiable elements, and thus the I-You meeting is a lived relation of whole to whole. On Buber's account, this 'seeing the whole' is a knowing of uniqueness, and hence an exclusive kind of knowing. Exclusiveness is the necessary prerequisite for saying You, but exclusiveness itself presupposes the coming together of two factors which also characterize the You relation; namely, the coming together of will and grace. As Buber puts it, "The concentration and fusion into a whole being can never be accomplished by me, can never be accomplished without me. I require a You to become; becoming I, I say You."  

The You, then, encounters me by grace, but I enter into a direct
relation to it; thus the relationship is passive and active at once. Buber also contends that the relation to the You is 'unmediated': "Nothing conceptual intervenes between I and You, no prior knowledge and no imagination...No purpose intervenes between I and You, no greed and no anticipation." The immediacy of the You relation is what Buber also refers to as 'presentness', and he contends that only as the You becomes present does 'presence' come into being: "Presence is not what is evanescent and passes but what confronts us, waiting and enduring." In contrast, to dwell in the I-It, or in objectification, is to reduce the present to the past: the uniqueness we meet is considered only in terms of what it has in common with others we have encountered.

The Other thus becomes, in the I-It, an object of organized experience, and future anticipation reduces the Other to an object of use, which is the corollary of the organization of experience. Thus on Buber's account, the I of the basic word I-It has only a past and no present: "...insofar as a human being makes do with the things that he experiences and uses, he lives in the past." He also, in Buber's view, lives without the mutuality or reciprocity which characterizes the You relation. Will and grace provide the necessary preconditions for meeting, and what follows from it is a mutuality of effects: my You acts on me as I act on it. As Buber puts it, "Inscrutably involved, we live in the currents of universal reciprocity." 16

As for the nature of the relation between the realms of You and It, Buber maintains that it is 'the sublime melancholy of our lot' that every You must become an It in our world: "Every You in the world is doomed by its nature to become a thing or at least to
enter into thinghood again and again." 17 On the other hand, every thing in the world can appear to some I as its You: 'the It is the chrysalis, the You the butterfly'. Buber also traces what he takes to be the historical development from You to It. In the beginning is the relation: the language of primitive peoples, their sentence-words, generally designate the wholeness of relations. In the original wholeness of relations, "...persons are still embedded like reliefs without achieving the fully rounded independence of nouns or pronouns." 18 The drive for preservation and knowledge, however, brings with it the emergence of a separated I. 'I see the tree' is now pronounced in such a way, Buber says, that "...it no longer relates a relation between a human I and a tree You but the perception of the tree object by the human consciousness, (and) it has erected the crucial barrier between subject and object." 19 The basic word I-It, or the word of separation, has thus been spoken.

Buber maintains that this historical development from You to It is paralleled in the development of a child: "Every developing human child rests, like all developing beings, in the womb of the great mother; the undifferentiated, not yet formed primal world. From this it detaches itself to enter a personal life." 20 Once again Buber indicates that 'in the beginning is the relation': "...as the category of being, as readiness, as a form that reaches out to be filled, as a model of the soul; the a priori of relation; the innate You." 21 The longing for relation is primary, on this account, and the genesis of the thing is a late product that develops out of the split of the primal encounters, as does the genesis of the I. Man becomes an I, in other words, through a You: what confronts us as our You varies, but through these changes the I-consciousness
(the consciousness of the constant partner) crystallizes. Now the basic word I-It can be articulated: the I is a detached subject that experiences and uses objects which are now over against it.

Buber maintains that the history of the individual and that of the human race both signify a progressive increase of the It-world. As noted earlier, the basic relation of man to the It-world includes experience ('which constitutes the world ever again'), and use ('which leads it toward its multifarious purpose'; namely, the preservation, alleviation and equipment of human life). However, it is Buber's contention that the improvement of the capacity for experience and use generally involves a decrease in man's power to enter into relation. This has significant repercussions for the individual and for his relationships with his fellowmen: "Standing under the basic word of separation which keeps apart I and It, he has divided his life with his fellowmen into two neatly defined districts: institutions and feelings. It-district and I-district." 22 Neither, Buber says, knows the world of relation, and hence neither knows the true human being, nor a true community. Instead, we are confronted by 'egos', on the one hand, and an It-world, on the other.

Thus, when a culture is no longer centred in a living and continually renewed relational process, on Buber's account, it 'freezes into the It-world'. Further, the I of the I-It is different from that of the I-You. The I of I-It appears as an ego and becomes conscious of itself as being 'this way and not that', as a subject (of experience and use). The I of I-You appears as a person and becomes conscious of itself as subjectivity (without any 'of' clause). As Buber puts it, "Egos appear by setting themselves apart from other egos. Persons appear by entering into relation with other persons." 23
Whoever stands in relation 'participates' in an actuality; that is, 'in a being that is neither merely a part of him nor merely outside of him'. Buber maintains that all actuality is an activity in which I participate without being able to appropriate it. The I is made actual through its participation in actuality, or through standing in relation: "In subjectivity the spiritual substance of the person matures. The person becomes conscious of himself as participating in being, as being-with, and thus as a being."\(^24\) The more perfect the participation is, Buber holds, the more actual, the more 'authentic', the I becomes.

On Buber's account, then, we are to understand authentic human existence in terms of the distinction between the It-world and the You-world, and between the I as ego and the I as person. As Buber puts it, "There are not two kinds of human beings, but there are two poles of humanity."\(^25\) No human being is pure person, and none is pure ego; none is entirely actual, and none is entirely lacking in actuality. Each lives in a twofold I. However, it is Buber's contention that the more a human being, the more humanity is dominated by the ego, the more does the I 'fall prey to inactuality': "In such ages the person in the human being and in humanity comes to lead a subterranean, hidden, as it were invalid existence."\(^26\) Authentic human existence requires, then, that one 'proceed toward the world of the You', and resurrect one's power to relate. Since man has an a priori relation to the Other, inborn in the very structure of his nature (recall the 'innate You'), authenticity necessarily involves the resurgence of true community, in which individuals stand in a 'living reciprocal relationship' to one another, and to what Buber terms a 'single living centre'.
This single living centre is a man whose life has been 'informed by the spirit': a holy man or a spiritual leader. The religious dimension of Buber's thought is evident throughout *I and Thou*, and is specifically articulated in the final section of the book. Buber believes that "Extended, the lines of relationships intersect in the eternal You. Every single You is a glimpse of that. Through every single You the basic word addresses the eternal You." 27 The human being who has become whole, on Buber's account, is able to venture forth toward 'the supreme meeting' with God. What has to be given up first is 'the false drive for self-affirmation' which impels man to flee from the unpredictable world of relation into the reliable world of things. However, the I as such is not given up, as most mystics suppose; indeed, it is fundamental to Buber's thought that "...the I is indispensable for any relationship, including the highest, which always presupposes an I and You." 28

Before more closely examining Buber's I-You, I-It distinction, as well as his conception of authentic human existence, certain criticisms of his position should be addressed. W. Kaufmann makes his point succinctly: "The crux of my criticism is simple. It is not true that a genuine relationship to another human being can be achieved only in brief encounters from which we must always relapse into states in which the other human being becomes for us merely an object of experience and use." 29 It is Kaufmann's opinion that *I and Thou* reveals a deep malaise in the author: he surmises that Buber was permanently damaged by his mother's abandonment of him when he was a small child. As Kaufmann puts it, "I believe he described his own experience faithfully, assuming falsely that its limitations were part of the human condition. In other words, his ba-
sic dichotomy cannot be accepted as it stands, and his personality and life help to account for what is wrong with it." 30

Kaufmann insists, then, that it is not 'the sublime melancholy of our lot' that every You must become an It in our world. Kaufmann identifies the I-You with feeling and the I-It with reason, and contends that we cannot avoid thinking about the You that confronts us. On the contrary, he says, those who refuse to do this live in illusions and cultivate a relationship to an idol instead of truly confronting a You: "The more others mean to me, the more needful it is for me also to think about them, sometimes in an effort to understand better how they feel and think. Such thoughts are not a fall from grace, a relapse into inauthenticity, or a betrayal to be atoned for in another more ecstatic encounter." 32 On Kaufmann's account, then, Buber tended to mistake intense emotion for revelation, and did not realize how much rational reflection is required if we really want to encounter a You, rather than an illusion.

It is Kaufmann's contention, moreover, that Buber's position evidences a 'Manichaean denigration of the I-It', together with an 'unduly romantic, if not ecstatic, notion of the I-You'. 33 The I-It is represented as a 'deplorable attitude'; reason is associated with the I-It and denigrated, Kaufmann maintains, while the I-You, or 'intense emotion' masquerading as revelation, is exalted. Without rational reflection, however, there is no genuine I-You relationship, but only 'self-indulgence, self-absorption, self-deception, a romantic dream'. Kaufmann concludes, therefore, "By relegating all reflection and examination to the I-It (Buber) provided a philosophico-justification for excessive subjectivity, illusions, self-deception, and murkiness. He failed to see how much reason and the
courage for an attack on one’s intuitions are needed for the discovery of the mind." 34

This reference to Nietzsche (who championed the notion of the courage for an attack on one’s convictions) provides an apt starting point for an examination of Kaufmann's criticisms. Nietzsche is notorious for his hyperbolic mode of expression, but Kaufmann is nevertheless always quick to defend him, on the grounds that Nietzsche felt obliged to overstate his case in order to ensure that his point was heard by, oftentimes, unreceptive ears. Kaufmann does not extend the same consideration to Buber. However, it is clear that in I and Thou Buber's chief purpose is to point toward something that he believed was fundamental to human life, but at the same time rarely noticed explicitly - the I-You - and indeed he does resort to hyperbole in his descriptions in order to achieve this end. Yet it is also clear, both in I and Thou as well as in subsequent works, that Buber does not intend his I-It, I-You distinction to be an either/or dichotomy: either inauthentic living in the I-It or, unmixed and unmixable, authentic dwelling in the I-You. As Buber puts it, there are not two kinds of human beings, but there are two poles of humanity; no human being is pure person, and none is pure ego- each lives in a twofold I. The I-It is not, for Buber, a 'deplorable attitude', as Kaufmann maintains; on the contrary, Buber states clearly that the transition from You to It is also man's greatness: "For thus knowledge, thus works, thus image and example come into being among the living." 35 What Buber deplores is instead the dominance of the I-It over the I-You; it is this which he believes constitutes an inauthentic form of life and which he maintains characterizes our modern world, and it is this which he speaks
out against, albeit rather dramatically.

It is fundamental to recognize, further, that the I-It, I-You distinction is not, as Kaufmann suggests, a distinction denigrating objective reason, on the one hand, and exalting subjective feeling, on the other. The I-You, the realm of relation, is not the realm of subjective feeling. In the I-You relation the undivided self meets meets the undivided Other: according to Buber, this relation constitutes the actualized realm of the 'Between'. The Between actualized in relation is in fact the central notion of Buber's thought: "On the far side of the subjective, on this side of the objective, on the narrow ridge, where I and Thou meet, there is the realm of 'between'." 36 The notion of the Between points to the self-transcendent character of the act whereby one relates to the You, as well as to the ultimate inaccessibility, or the real 'otherness', of the You. Relation is not psychological, on Buber's account, but rather ontological, or a relation of the self to the being of the Other. There is also no question of a 'mystical absorption' in which the self and the Other merge into a unity: relation, as Buber puts it, requires both an I and a You.

Buber's concept of the Between is closely related to his notion of 'presence', which he defines as the original bond between subject and object, always there as the ground of the mutuality involved. As R. Wood observes, "Presence is the mutual givenness of subject and object, the primary togetherness which antedates their separation through reflection. This is why Buber sees children and primitives as clear instances of the life of relation." 37 Children and primitives have not lost the capacity to 'sense the depth hidden within the simple presence of things', to see each new event as some-
thing which is, despite all resemblance to what has gone before, unique and unexpected. Indeed, Buber believes that 'all real living is meeting': subject-object or I-It knowledge is nothing other than the socially objectivized and elaborated product of the meeting which takes place between man and his You, whether that 'You' be nature, other men, or forms of the spirit. However, both I-You meeting and I-It knowledge are necessary for human existence: Buber is not advocating a return to the state of children and primitives, but as we shall see a movement from the dominance of the I-It, and hence inauthentic living for individuals and collectives, toward the harmonious interpenetration of I-You and I-It, or authenticity, and thus the establishment of 'genuine persons and genuine communities'.

In order to appreciate Buber's treatment of authentic existence, several of his key concepts must be elaborated. In I and Thou, as we have seen, Buber provides both a phenomenological description of man's twofold attitude, as well as an ontology which points to the realm of the Between as that which binds subject and object together in an identity-in-difference. In "Distance and Relation", Buber identifies the two 'basic movements' of man from which the twofold principle of human life is derived; namely, 'the primal setting at a distance' and 'entering into relation': "That the first movement is the presupposition of the other is plain from the fact that one can enter into relation only with being which has been set at a distance, more precisely, has become an independent opposite." It is only for man, Buber contends, that an independent opposite exists. Only through the act of setting at a distance does man have a 'world as such', and Buber calls the act of entering into relation
with the world 'synthesizing apperception' or the apperception of a being as a whole and as a unity.

Similarly, in his life with other men, it is the fact that man sets man at a distance and makes him independent that enables him to enter into relation, as an individual self, with others like himself. However, as Buber notes, "Man can set at a distance without coming into real relation with what has been set at a distance." When man fails to enter into relation, the distance in question 'thickens and solidifies'; instead of making room for relation, in other words, it obstructs it. It is this failure to enter into relation which corresponds to the I-It, and thus, on Buber's account, distance is the presupposition for both the I-You (which can be equated with entering into relation) and the I-It. In sum, distance is given to man as man, yet from the ontological standpoint it is pre-personal: from out of an original identity-in-difference comes the primal setting at a distance, preceding the I-You and I-It which together make up personal existence.

Buber describes the I-You relation with other men at some length in his later works. In "Elements of the Interhuman", for example, Buber insists that only as a partner in direct dialogical relation can man be perceived, not as an object, but as an 'existing wholeness'. As M. Friedman observes, "To become aware of a man means to perceive his wholeness as a person defined by spirit: to perceive the dynamic centre which stamps on all his utterances, actions, and attitudes the tangible sign of oneness." On Buber's account, such an awareness is possible only when the Other becomes present for me. This notion of making the Other present is explicated by Buber in terms of the concepts of 'inclusion' and 'experiencing the
other side'. In *Between Man and Man*, 'inclusion' is defined as 'the
text extension of one's own concreteness':

Its elements are, first, a relation, of no
matter what kind, between two persons, second,
an event experienced by them in common, in
which at least one of them actively partici­
pates, and, third, the fact that this one
person, without forfeiting anything of the
felt reality of his activity, at the same time
lives through the common event from the stand­
point of the Other. 41

Buber provides as an example a situation in which one man is
striking another: "Then let us assume that the striker suddenly re­
ceives in his soul the blow which he strikes: the same blow; that
he receives it as the other who remains still. For the space of a
moment he experiences the situation from the other side." 42 Experi­
encing the other side, then, makes the Other present as an existing
unity: it is not, Buber insists, a form of empathy but rather 'a
bold swinging' into the life of the Other which demands 'the most
intensive stirring of one's being'. 43 'Empathy', on this account,
means to transpose oneself 'over there': "Thus it means the exclusion
of one's own concreteness, the extinguishing of the actual situation
of life, the absorption in pure aestheticism of the reality in which
one participates." 44 Inclusion is purported to be precisely the
opposite of this: making the Other present by means of experiencing
the other side enables one to live through a shared event from the
perspective of the Other, to thus perceive him as a You in all his
wholeness and uniqueness, without losing anything of one's own real­
ity.

There are a number of difficulties, however, with Buber's ex­
amples of I-You relations. In "What is Man?", Buber provides as an
instance of such a relationship the glances of two strangers in an
air-raid shelter which 'suddenly meet for a second in astonishing and unrelated mutuality': "...when the All Clear sounds it is forgotten; and yet it did happen, in a realm which existed only for that moment." 45 Similarly, Buber holds that in a darkened opera-house there can be established between two of the audience, who do not know one another and who are listening with the same intensity to the music of Mozart: "...a relation which is scarcely perceptible and yet is one of elemental dialogue, and which has long vanished when the lights blaze up again." 46 On Buber's account, then, these examples of momentary exchanges between strangers constitute bona fide instances of I-You relations.

P. Wheelwright poses the following pointed questions: "May not such an appearance of dialogue be illusory? Can a glance between strangers, if unconfirmed by other evidences, be a satisfactory indication that mutuality of response is really present?" 47 Indeed, as examples of I-You relations, these fleeting encounters leave much to be desired: they may well be nothing more than illusions. On this point, Kaufmann's criticisms are well taken: there is no guarantee that genuine I-You relationships exist here; they could in fact be examples of 'self-indulgence, self-absorption, self-deception, romantic dreams'. G. Marcel makes a helpful suggestion when he says that, rather than being exemplified in the meetings of strangers, genuine I-You relations are manifested when the persons involved share some sort of history or community. As Marcel puts it, the stranger seated beside me in the train to whom I say nothing does not belong to my history: "But a minute event might be enough to give birth to this community, for example, an unexpected stop of the train which threatens to have for both of us existential con-
sequences. This could suffice for an opening in the sort of barrier which separates us, in short, for us to make contact." 48

Marcel's suggestion is actually compatible with much of the later Buber, where fleeting I-You encounters are still possible, but certainly not paradigmatic of mature dialogical relationships. In order to understand the nature of these mature dialogical relationships, and hence Buber's portrait of authentic existence, it is necessary to recall that on Buber's account our time is characterized by the progressive decline of dialogue, and that our world is therefore, by and large, an It world. However, even given these conditions, Buber contends that an individual today still unexpectedly finds himself confronted by an hour which has 'a special and even an especially questionable connection with his personal future'. There are essentially two possible reactions to such an hour. The individual in question can once again submerge himself in events and 'surrender anew' to the It world, or he can 'renounce the beaten track': "...draw forth forgotten primal forces from their hiding-places, and make the decision that answers the situation." 49 One can deny choice or affirm choice, Buber says, one can fail to enter into relation and abdicate responsibility, or one can 'participate in becoming, in the factual decision that will be made about the make-up of the next hour.'

Choosing to enter into relation, with one's world and with one's fellowmen, means for Buber choosing a form of existence which is fundamentally authentic. Buber makes a distinction between the causal necessity of the It world, and 'true necessity' or fate, which is encountered only by the individual who actualizes freedom. The free human being, the human being who affirms choice and who chooses to
enter into relation, 'encounters fate as the counter-image of his freedom': "It is not his limit but his completion; freedom and fate embrace each other to form meaning." 50 It is Buber's contention that whoever proceeds toward the world of You, 'concentrating his whole being, with his power to relate resurrected, beholds his freedom'. Fate, on this account, does not lead the individual— it 'waits for him': "He must proceed toward it without knowing where it waits for him. He must go forth with his whole being." 51

The notion of 'becoming a whole' is central to Buber's conception of authentic existence. Becoming a whole is a process which cannot, ultimately, be accomplished in isolation but rather, on Buber's account, requires that one enter into relation with others. As P. Wheelwright observes, "By nature each person is a single being, finding himself in company with other single beings; to be single is not to be isolated, however, and by vocation each one of us is to find and realize his proper focus by entering into relationship with others." 52 Finding and realizing one's proper focus is indeed what Buber means by actualizing one's fate, and that this process requires relation with others is a function of the 'innate You'. To be is to be related, on Buber's view, since man has an a priori relation to the Other, inborn in the very structure of his nature. His being is a being-toward, or being out there with the Other.

One's self-unity originally is a function of relation to an Other. Recall that for man alone, on Buber's view, there is 'an otherness which is constituted as otherness'. The basic otherness of the world of experience is the result of a process of distancing on man's part, but the process is 'primordial' or pre-reflective. As
Wheelwright notes, "The process of distancing is epistemologically a priori, in the Kantian sense that it is the basis of our possessing any conception of an independent world and, correspondingly, any conception of ourself." However, Buber maintains that otherness is not fully manifest until the separated I and the world of It have emerged as independent opposites. Mature dialogical encounter requires that otherness be fully manifest: the You-saying of the child and the primitive are still immature, on this view, because their I-saying is still immature. As we shall see, the mature development of one's self-unity at the reflective level and the full manifestation of the otherness of other men constitute the two movements of the dialectical process of becoming a whole.

All awareness, on Buber's account, is manifestation of otherness, and simultaneous with that manifestation there emerges the sense of selfhood in terms of which otherness is specifiable. As R. Wood puts it, "There is no specifiable I without the Other in virtue of which the I is specifiable; but likewise there is no manifest Other without the I in virtue of which the Other is manifest." The self and the Other are thus dialectically related, and maturation is a bipolar process in which the You is enriched, at least potentially, through objectification, and the I is enriched through a reflective development of subjectivity which does not lose touch with its relatedness. Contrary to Kaufmann's suggestion that Buber denigrates the I-It, and hence objectification, Buber in fact sees objectification as having an indispensable part to play, not only in the development of the world of experience, but also in developing the I-You relation itself. On this account, the purpose of objectification is the enlargement of the I being encountered, so
as to provoke a more profound meeting.

Objectification, on its own, does not constitute an adequate manifestation of otherness. The Other appears as the Other-for-me, as an object for my experience or use. However, the revelation of otherness is, on Buber's view, capable of development. As Wood notes, "The term of that revelation is the manifestation of the Other wholly as other, apart from speculative or pragmatic conquest. Revelation of the Other-in-totality presupposes and grounds, in a simultaneous mutual act, selfhood-in-totality." In sum, if otherness is not fully manifest then neither is selfhood, and what is required for both is a mature I-You relationship in which the undivided self meets with the undivided Other.

Authentic existence, on Buber's account, comprises just this dialectical process of becoming a whole by standing in relationship with others. Men become mature selves in relation with other such selves; as Friedman puts it, "The inmost growth of the self is not induced by man's relation to himself but by the confirmation in which one man knows himself to be 'made present' in his uniqueness by the other." Authentic existence, for Buber, is completing distance by relation, and relation here means genuine dialogue and mutual confirmation. It is only as a dialogical partner, Buber maintains, that man can be made present, or perceived in his wholeness and uniqueness. Making the Other present means perceiving him as a unity or totality defined by his own particular fate, and it is by means of this act of making present that one dialogical partner confirms the other.

In our life with other men, as we have seen, it is the fact that man sets man at a distance and makes him independent that en-
ables him to enter into relation, as an individual self, with others like himself. It is through this 'interhuman' relation alone, Buber says, that men finally become manifest selves by confirming one another. Moreover, as Friedman observes, "Confirmation does not mean that I take his appearance at this moment as being the person I want to confirm. I must take the other person in his dynamic existence, in his specific potentiality." Confirming the Other as he is now is thus only a first step: in the present lies the seed of what he can become, and it is this potentiality, this sense of his unique direction as a person, that I most seek to confirm. Authentic existence is thus for Buber an ongoing process between individuals: it is a dialectic of It and You, of objectification which can enlarge and develop the I, and meeting which serves to synthesize the objective elements of the I into a distinctive unity through confirmation by the Other.

It should be noted here that Buber does not deny that, as others objectify me, I also objectify myself; nor does he deny that I am able to gather myself into a unity and embrace my distinctive fate in solitary reflection. Indeed, Buber allows that withdrawal is 'always required to achieve any act of relation', and that 'the unification of the soul' can be achieved in solitude. However, he also insists that withdrawal and solitary reflection are preparatory only: mature self-realization requires confirmation by the Other, because it is only an other who can fully make me present, or see me as a distinctive whole. I cannot do this for myself: we must, on Buber's view, help one another. Thus, to the question 'What have I to do?', he answers: 'You shall not withhold yourself': "You, imprisoned in the shells in which society, state, church, school,
Buber insists that each man needs help, and that we must awaken in the Other the need of help and in ourselves the capacity to help. The goal, on this account, is to 'make the crowd no longer a crowd': to deliver man from it, and to 'shape the shapeless' into a genuine community.

In order for a true community to come into being, on Buber's account, individuals "...have to stand in a living, reciprocal relationship to a single living centre, and they have to stand in a living, reciprocal relationship to one another." Buber relates this notion of a living centre to the zaddik or holy man of the Hasidic community, whose life has been 'informed by the spirit'. Given this living centre, the establishment of a genuine community requires mutuality, or living reciprocity between individuals, and solidarity, or a living 'answering for' or responsibility for one another. It is through membership in a genuine community, or what Buber terms the 'essential We', that man escapes 'the crowd': man escapes the crowd not through isolation but instead through mutuality and solidarity.

As Buber puts it, "By We I mean a community of several independent persons, who have reached a self and self-responsibility, the community resting on the basis of this self and self-responsibility, and being made possible by them." Recall Buber's claim that the You-saying of the child and the primitive are immature because their I-saying is immature: mature You-saying is only possible after the separated I and the world of It have emerged. Similarly, Buber distinguishes immature from mature We-saying: the former precedes the
development of true individuality, and the latter occurs when inde­
dependent individuals freely come together in living reciprocal rela­
tion. Authentic community involves this mutuality of relation, as
well as solidarity or responsibility: 'pledging a self in response
and responsibility'. 62 We are responsible for and must respond to
the concrete reality which confronts us, and Buber maintains that
in our time, the deterioration of all traditional bonds has made
their legitimacy questionable:

Only in the disintegration of traditional bonds,
in the spinning whirl of freedom, does personal
responsibility arise which in the end can no
longer lean with its burden of decision on any
church or society or culture but is lonely in
the face of Present Being. 63

As Buber puts it, at the opposite pole of being compelled by
destiny or nature or men there does not stand being free of destiny
or nature or men, but being free to 'commune and covenant with them'.
To do this, one must first have become independent (relation pre-
supposes distance), but on Buber's account this freedom is 'a foot-
bridge, not a dwelling-place': "Let us realize the true meaning of
being free of a bond: it means that a quite personal responsibility
takes the place of one shared with many generations. Life lived in
freedom is personal responsibility or it is a pathetic farce." 64
Buber maintains that the power which alone can give a content to
empty freedom and a direction to 'swaying, spinning' freedom is pre-
cisely 'the instinct for communion, which teaches us the saying of
You' and which points ultimately to the eternal You: "When all 'dir-
ections' fail there arises in the darkness over the abyss the one
true direction of man, towards the creative Spirit, towards the Spir-
it of God." 65

On Buber's view, therefore, if man becomes authentic, if the
individual becomes what only he can and should become, it is through responding with his whole being to the address of the unique situation which confronts him, through becoming a whole and finding his true personal direction, which is ultimately the direction to God. Thus the good, for Buber, is not a objective state of affairs or a subjective feeling, but rather it is a type of relationship; namely, the dialogue between man and God which has as its product authentic human existence. Indeed, on this view, as Friedman notes, "The very meaning of 'good' is derived from our relation to God and his demand that we make real our created existence by becoming human, becoming real." 66 Thus the basis of Buber's ethics is his religion: the source of the 'ought' is ultimately the command and will of God, which is given expression by means of revelation, or my meeting with the eternal You. We will address certain difficulties with this account in chapter nine.

However, the religious dimension of Buber's thought aside, his conception of individual being as a being-with, or his account of the 'innate You', serves to ground an interpersonal ethic which rules out the exploitation of others by the individual. As J.W. Murphy puts it, "Every actor has an ontological relationship to the Other which demands that the Other be confirmed in every person's acts. This does not mean that every act must be sanctioned by the Other, but that every act must be planned with reference to the ontological respect that the Other deserves." 67 Life for Buber is fundamentally intersubjective: every act occurs in situ and presupposes the presence of the Other. Every act, if it is to be moral, must respect the boundary and limit established between the self and the Other: actions that are not confirmed by the Other, or which violate his
own ability to act, are ruled out as illegitimate. The choice between authenticity and inauthenticity, for Buber, is thus ultimately a choice between moving one's actions and attitudes in the direction of relationship and reciprocity (I-You), or in the direction of separateness and mutual exploitation (I-It).

Buber's conception of authentic existence in fact espouses a species of situation ethics, but it is not an ethics without an absolute principle. The principle, derived from the I-You relation itself, is the integrity of both the self and the Other, which must be established and preserved in every situation. The good, recall, is not for Buber an objective state of affairs or a subjective feeling, but a type of relationship; bypassing the religious dimension, let us say the direct dialogical encounter between man and man. Buber maintains that most of the traditional moral values are implied in the I-You relation, such as that one must not kill, lie or steal, and that one must honor one's parents, and so on. However, he also believes that it must be decided anew in each concrete context what these prescriptions actually involve:

I have never doubted the absolute validity of the command 'Honor thy father and thy mother', but he who says to me that one, in fact, knows always and under all circumstances, what 'to honor' means and what it does not, of him I say that he does not know what he is talking about. 68

What is essential, always, for Buber is a respect for the integrity of the Other, and the confirmation which grows out of one's direct relation with this Other. 'Making the Other present', perceiving his wholeness and uniqueness, and 'experiencing the other side', so that one may help and not hinder him in the fulfillment of his own potentiality, determines the moral quality of one's ac-
tions and attitudes. Authenticating one's own humanity is thus, for Buber, as essentially interhuman process, in which each is obliged to respect the dignity of the Other, and in which each requires the help of the Other, or that mutual confirmation which only direct dialogical encounter provides. We may now proceed to compare Buber's position with that of Sartre, in an attempt to broaden and deepen Sartre's account of authentic existence, by means of appealing to Buber's portrait of authenticity as a fundamentally interpersonal process.
In this chapter, Sartre's account of authentic existence will be further fleshed out by means of appealing to Buber's I-You, I-It distinction. Buber describes for us a non-objectifying meeting, not a merging, of distinct subjectivities, and he also provides for us an account both of positive, constructive and negative, destructive objectification of one subjectivity by another. It will be argued that Buber's descriptions are entirely consistent with Sartre's theory of consciousness as it is presented in *Being and Nothingness*, and that they are likewise compatible with the *praxis* philosophy of the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. Sartre's theory of groups does provide an account of how positive social relations are possible and hence renders intelligible that aspect of his concept of authenticity which requires of us action on behalf of the freedom of all. However, positive personal relations such as love and friendship cannot be reduced to common or group action, and an account of such relations will be presented which will fill this gap left in Sartre's treatment of authenticity. Finally, his ethics of authentic human existence, which requires that we should act to promote the freedom of all people, will be examined, together with his socio-political ideal of direct democracy, or a true inter-subjective community where a spirit of fraternity prevails.

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It has been argued in chapter seven that Sartre's concept of authentic existence still lacks an account of the dimension of positive personal relations. In *Being and Nothingness*, negative personal relations, within the context of bad faith and the God-project, were described. In the *Critique*, group relations within the historical context of material scarcity were discussed, both negative (practico-inert mediation) and positive (*praxis* mediation). We will now turn to Buber in an attempt to fill the gap left in Sartre's theory of human relations. As we saw in chapter eight, Buber maintains that we are to understand authentic human existence in terms of his distinction between the two basic word pairs I-It and I-You, which each establish a distinctive mode of existence. Recall that I-It is the basic word of separation, or experience and use: perceiving, feeling, wanting and thinking are all described by Buber as 'partial activities' of man characterized by the structure of the subject-object relation. I-You, on the other hand, is the basic word of relation, in which the undivided self meets the undivided Other, and such encounters are in turn characterized by exclusiveness, presentness or immediacy, and reciprocity or mutuality. While Buber insists that there are not two types of men, he maintains that there are two poles of humanity, the one inauthentic (or dominated by the I-It, and hence separateness and mutual exploitation), and the other authentic (in which the I-You interpenetrates the I-It, allowing for the development of 'genuine persons', standing in a living, reciprocal relation to one another).

For our purposes, the crucial aspect of Buber's account is that becoming authentic is 'becoming a whole' by standing in relationship with others. Life is fundamentally intersubjective: individual being
is a being-with. Becoming a whole or a coherent unity organized around and in terms of one's distinctive potentiality or 'fate', is a process which requires the participation of the Other. On Buber's account, the self and the Other are dialectically related: the mature development of one's self-unity at the reflective level and the full manifestation of the 'otherness' of the Other constitute the two movements of the dialectical process of becoming a whole. In my I-You meetings with the Other, I am 'made present' by the Other in my wholeness and uniqueness, and my existence is 'confirmed'. Likewise, when I choose to enter into relation with the Other, I assume responsibility for his self-development as well as my own. Authenticating one's own humanity is thus an essentially interhuman process for Buber, in which each is obliged to respect the dignity of the Other, and in which each requires the aid of the Other, or that mutual confirmation which only genuine I-You meeting provides.

What must be recognized, in relation to Sartre's account, is that Buber's treatment of authentic existence describes for us a non-objectifying meeting, not a merging, of distinct subjectivities, and it also provides for us an account of both positive, constructive and negative, destructive objectification of one subjectivity by another. In the I-You relation, firstly, the undivided self meets the undivided Other: there is no question of a 'mystical absorption' in which the self and the Other merge into a unity, since relation, as Buber puts it, requires both an I and a You. Secondly, the dimension of the I-It possesses both negative and positive modes and functions. When the It dominates the You, when objectification dominates relation, the result is indeed negative: an inauthentic form
of existence characterized by separateness and mutual exploitation in an It-world. However, objectification also possesses a positive function: it has an indispensable part to play, Buber argues, not only in the development of the world of experience, but also in developing the I-You relation itself.

In the case of the development of the world of experience, recall that Buber says that the transition from You to It in our world is also man's greatness: "For thus knowledge, thus works, thus image and example come into being among the living." In the case of developing the I-You relation itself, moreover, Buber argues that the purpose of objectification is the enlargement of the I being encountered, so as to provoke a more profound meeting. Recall that on Buber's view, mature dialogical encounter requires that 'otherness' be fully manifest: the You-saying of the child and the primitive are still immature, on this view, because their I-saying is still immature. As we saw in chapter eight, the mature development of one's self-unity at the reflective level and the full manifestation of the otherness of other men constitute the two movements of the dialectical process of becoming a whole, or becoming authentic: maturation is a bipolar process in which the You is enriched through objectification and the I is enriched through a reflective development of subjectivity which does not lose touch with its relatedness. Authentic existence thus means for Buber that the I-You of relation interpenetrates the I-It of objectification, allowing for the mature development of 'genuine persons', standing in a living, reciprocal relation to one another.

However, there is a problem with Buber's account which has not yet been addressed. Choosing to enter into relation, with one's world
and with one's fellowmen, means choosing a form of existence which is fundamentally authentic. The free human being, the human being who affirms choice and who chooses to enter into relation, on Buber's view, 'encounters fate as the counter-image of his freedom': "He must proceed toward it without knowing where it waits for him. He must go forth with his whole being." On Buber's view, if man becomes authentic, if the individual becomes what only he can and should become, it is through responding with his whole being to the address of the unique situation which confronts him, through becoming a whole and finding his true personal direction, which is ultimately the direction to God. Thus, as we have seen, the good for Buber is a type of relationship; namely, the dialogue between man and God which has as its product authentic human existence. The basis of Buber's ethics of authenticity is thus his religion: the source of the 'ought' is ultimately the command and will of God, which is given expression by means of revelation, or my meeting with the eternal You.

It is Buber's conception of revelation which presents the problem for his treatment of authenticity. Of revelation, Buber says: "The powerful revelations invoked by the religions are essentially the same as the quiet one that occurs everywhere and at all times." One hears the claim of the situation at hand, and one answers it 'out of the depths of one's own being'. On Buber's account, this response comes from the 'conscience'; not 'the routine conscience', 'the play-on-the-surface conscience', but "...the unknown conscience in the ground of being, which needs to be discovered ever anew." As M. Friedman notes, "Conscience is the voice which calls one to fulfill the personal intention of being for which he was created. It
is the individual's awareness of what he 'really' is, of what in
his unique and nonrepeatable existence he is intended to be." ^ On
Buber's view, then, when conscience is not stifled, it is able to
compare what one is with what one is called to become, and it there­
by distinguishes and decides between right and wrong. As Buber puts
it, "We find the ethical in its purity only there where the human
person confronts himself with his own potentiality and distinguishes
and decides in this confrontation without asking anything other than
what is right and what is wrong in this his own situation." 6

On Buber's account, then, it is only through revelation or in
genuine encounter with God that we discover what is right and what
is wrong. As M. Fox observes, however, there are fundamental diffi­
culties with this position, chief among them being the everpresent
risk of being mistaken: "If we admit that individuals can be mistaken
when they believe they have been addressed by God, must we not have
some reliable criterion for distinguishing between the false and
the true address? But what criterion can there be? So long as man
judges revelation by his inner light, is not every claim to revela­
tion equally valid?" 7 Coupled with this difficulty is the fact that
revelation itself apparently does not provide us with a set of ethi­
cal rules or guidelines. In I and Thou Buber states, for example,
"No prescription can lead us to the encounter (with God), and none
leads from it." 8 What comes out of revelation is not a set of rules
or guidelines, but rather the reformation of the human spirit:
through revelation man apprehends that demands are made of him to
become what he can be, but on Fox's view it is only the individual
himself who can decide what specifically is asked of him and exactly
how he is to respond. Thus we are left once again with the problem
of the possibility of error, as well as these related questions: "What shall we do with the man who chooses in a way in opposition to the norms of society? Shall we condemn him as evil? But we cannot for he may be acting in accordance with what he is convinced is the voice of God." 9

On the subject of ethical guidelines, Buber responds that there are, on his view, universally valid moral rules: as we saw in chapter eight, most of the traditional moral values are in fact implied in the I-You relation itself, such as that one must not kill, lie, steal, that one must honor one's parents, and so on. Buber's point is rather that in each concrete context it has to be decided anew, for example, what genuine honoring of one's parents actually involves: "I have never doubted the absolute validity of the command 'Honor thy father and thy mother', but he who says to me that one, in fact, knows always and under all circumstances, what 'to honor' means and what it does not, of him I say that he does not know what he is talking about." 10 However, the essential thing about even the Ten Commandments is not the objective norms per se, but rather the meeting with God out of which they originally emerged, and Buber maintains that morality must be grounded ever again in such dialogical encounters between man and God.

This brings us to the central difficulty noted by Fox; namely, the problem of establishing the genuineness of these dialogical encounters themselves. On Buber's account, conscience calls one to fulfill the personal intention of being for which he was created, and it is conscience which compares what one is now with what one is called to become, and thereby distinguishes between the right course of action and the wrong course of action in the present situation.
Here, Buber allows that the certainty produced by conscience is only a 'personal certainty': conscience is human and can be mistaken. Indeed, Buber believes that ours is an age in which 'false absolutes pierce through the level of the ethical' and demand 'the sacrifice of personal integrity in order that equality may come, that freedom may come, or that the Kingdom may come'. Buber concludes, then, that we must guard against the confusion of the relative with the Absolute: "Both, the human faith not less than the human conscience, can err and err ever again. And knowing about this erring, both- conscience not less than faith- must place themselves in the hands of grace."

Clearly, this response is less than satisfactory, particularly for the nonbeliever. For Buber, the 'ultimate mysteries of creation' are beyond logic, and hence beyond proof. However, as an alternative and as a means of bypassing the difficulties inherent in the notion of religious revelation, it can be argued that an ethics consistent with Buber's conception of authentic human existence need not include reference to the religious dimension of his thought. Buber's account of authenticity stipulates that man must 'become a whole', become a unity by means of entering into relation with the You and embracing his 'fate'. Embracing one's fate is interpreted by Buber as actualizing a God-given potentiality, but it could be interpreted, for example, along Sartrean lines, as becoming reflectively aware of one's (pre-reflectively chosen) fundamental project, by means of existential psychoanalysis. Recall that, on this view, the individual person is 'discovered in the initial project which constitutes him': by a comparison of the various empirical drives of the subject, we try to discover and disengage the fundamental project which is common to them all. Becoming reflectively aware of this pre-reflectively
chosen project enables one to evaluate it and, as we have seen, make
the transition from inauthenticity (the pre-reflective choice of a
variation of the God-project) to authenticity (the reflective choice
of freedom as one's primary value).

Further, while Fox suggests that Buber faces the problem of a
potential clash between the individual 'becoming a whole', on the
one hand, and societal norms protecting the rights of others, on the
other, in fact Buber's conception of individual being as a being-
with serves to ground an interpersonal ethic which rules out the ex-
ploration of others by the individual. As we saw in chapter eight,
every agent has an ontological relationship to the Other which de-
mands that the Other be confirmed in all of his acts. Every act, if
it is to be moral, must respect the boundary and limit established
between the self and the Other: the integrity of both the self and
the Other must be established and preserved in every situation. 'Mak-
ing the Other present', perceiving his wholeness and uniqueness, and
'experiencing the other side', so that one may help him and not hin-
der him in his projects and pursuits, determines the moral quality
of one's actions and attitudes. What is essential, always, for Buber
is a respect for the integrity of the Other, and the confirmation
which grows out of one's direct relation with this Other. The choice
of authenticity over inauthenticity is thus on Buber's account ul-
timately the choice of moving one's actions and attitudes in the
direction of relationship and reciprocity (I-You), and away from
separateness and mutual exploitation.(I-It).

The religious dimension of his thought aside, then, Buber suc-
ceeds in filling a gap in Sartre's treatment of authentic human ex-
istence in the area of positive personal relations. It will be ar-
gued that both Buber's description of non-objectifying meetings of subjectivities, as well as his description of positive, constructive objectification of one subjectivity by another, are entirely compatible with Sartre's theory of consciousness. As we have seen, consciousness, according to Sartre, has two fundamental characteristics. First, it is intentional: all consciousness is consciousness of something. Second, it is self-conscious: every positional or thetic consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional or non-theic consciousness of itself. Non-positional self-consciousness is, Sartre says, an immediate non-cognitive relation of the self to itself. Reflection, on the other hand, is a secondary act in which the reflecting consciousness posits the consciousness reflected on as its object. It is Sartre's contention that non-theic self-consciousness makes reflection possible, or that there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito. 13

As P. Kenevan observes, this means that for Sartre consciousness is "...not only a positional intention of objects other than consciousness, but also, simultaneously, an attending arrow, an attention to the self as it intends objects." 14 It is fundamental to recognize, however, that non-theic self-consciousness and positional consciousness of objects constitute a unity. They are not distinct entities, the former being self-directed and the latter being world-directed; as a result, the pre-reflective cogito is as much world-related as is the reflective cogito. What Sartre means by non-theic self-consciousness is, in large part, the non-theic 'residue' involved in all positional consciousness of objects, or world-directed 'subsidiary awareness'. There is always a non-theic foundation at
the root of even the most clearly positional consciousness of an object, and Sartre endeavours to explain this 'tacit ground of all knowledge' via his treatment of the temporal structure of consciousness:

...temporally we are not dealing with successive moments without mutual connection on the pre-reflective level. For example: I perceive you and I am conscious of perceiving you, but I am conscious of perceiving you as the one whom I have already perceived a moment ago and whom I will perceive in the following moment. It cannot be doubted that you do not appear without this connection. The moments of consciousness wherein I am conscious of you do not appear without connection with the consciousness that I have had earlier or later shall have. 15

Sartre's central thesis concerning temporality, or 'the intra-structure of the for-itself', is that temporality is an organized structure. As Sartre puts it, "The three so-called 'elements' of time, past, present, and future, should not be considered as a collection of 'givens' for us to sum up- for example, as an infinite series of 'nows' in which some are not yet and others are no longer- but rather as the structured moments of an original synthesis." 16 Hence, on his account, all positional consciousness of objects does indeed require non-thetic self-consciousness, for as P. Morris notes, "To see object x as object x is in part to re-cognize it; that is, to see it in comparison with past experiences of this and similar objects. In addition, to see object x as object x is in part to expect it to figure in future perceptions and experiences in certain predictable ways, and to view it as connected with some future end." 17

Every positional consciousness of an object, then, necessarily involves this temporal dispersion of present intention, past retentions and future pretentions that constitutes for Sartre the pre-reflective cogito.
Sartre's theory of consciousness thus recognizes both non-thetic awareness as well as positional consciousness of objects, and while he usually speaks of non-thetic awareness as a self-awareness, it is actually as much world-related as is positional consciousness, viz. it is world-directed 'subsidiary awareness', the non-thetic 'residues' or 'tacit ground' involved in all positional consciousness of objects. Given these two levels of awareness, it is clear that, on the basis of Sartre's theory of consciousness, encounters with other subjects could take either of two (interrelated) fundamental forms: first, a non-reifying meeting, but not a merging, of distinct subjectivities; and second, objectifying relations between individuals. In the case of the second of these two forms, moreover, it can be argued that objectification may either be negative and destructive, or else serve a positive function, as Buber explains, in the maturation and enrichment of the self, as well as being a source of reinforcement and support for the projects and pursuits of the individual.

In *Being and Nothingness*, as we have seen, concrete relations with others are explained in terms of Looking/Looked-at dyads, or subjects objectifying or being objectified by other subjects. The phenomena of pride and love, moreover, are given reductive accounts: pride is dismissed as an extension of fundamental shame, and love is reduced to a form of that original conflict which characterizes concrete relations as such as they are presented in *Being and Nothingness*. However, we must keep in mind that Sartre is describing human relations within the context of bad faith and the God-project, and we should also recall that even in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre says that I need the Other in order to realize all of the structures of
my being, \textsuperscript{18} and that the presence of the Other is the necessary condition of all thought which I might have concerning myself. \textsuperscript{19} Both of these assertions clearly suggest that the Other can play a positive role for me: in the case of pride, for example, the Other could assist in my forming a positive self-image, while in the case of love, we might be able to mutually support one another’s freedom, and to provide positive reinforcement of one another’s projects.

It is Buber, however, who serves to fill out Sartre’s account of positive personal relations: his entire discussion of becoming a whole by standing in relationship with others brings out what Sartre only hints at when he says that I need the Other in order to realize all of the structures of my being. As Buber explains, the self and the Other are dialectically related, each requires the aid of the Other in becoming a whole (becoming authentic): maturation is a bipolar process in which the You is enlarged and enriched through objectification, and the I is enlarged and enriched through a reflective development of subjectivity which does not lose touch with its relatedness. There remains, then, the question of Buber’s I-You relation itself, or the notion of a meeting of subjectivities. It has already been suggested that Sartre’s account of non-thetic awareness, as world-directed and hence Other-directed, makes possible such non-reifying encounters between distinct subjects. Indeed, H. Barnes argues that there is a sort of Look which calls into question ‘the whole existential status of the Look as that which bestows object-ness’; the Look-as-exchange ‘... is not a union of subjects but a mutual affirmation of respect for the Other as subject. It resembles Sartre’s enterprise of love but lacks the attempt to assimilate the Other’s freedom.’ \textsuperscript{20}
Barnes uses this conception of the Look-as-exchange in order to construct a positive view of love which is consistent with Sartre's theory of consciousness. In the Look-as-exchange, there is a simultaneous recognition by both of us that the Other is a free subject and that he recognizes me as a free subject. Further, Barnes says, I take from and of him, and he (since we are speaking of an exchange) takes from and of me: "There is nothing mystic or mysterious here. The Other, through words, gestures, actions reveals to me new possibilities, new dimensions of the world. All of this I take in from my own point of view, to be sure. But the point of view is modified by that of which it is a point of view." Barnes fleshes out her account further by means of her notion of another sort of Look, the Looking-together-at-the-world, which is exemplified in the making of a life together, for example, in marriage. Here, two subjects will share common projects, thus enlarging and enriching their lives, and while no common I-subject appears, Barnes contends that "...there has come into being something more than two already existing I-subjects. This is the 'We'."

Sartre has chosen to discuss this 'We' only in terms of group relations, and not as it arises between two people who are in love or who share a close friendship. In other words, the 'We' to which Barnes refers has as its background the remembrance of the Look-as-exchange or what Buber terms the I-You relation, and it is precisely this dimension of the 'You' which Sartre has failed to acknowledge. On Barnes' account, the You can derive from either a reflective or a pre-reflective consciousness. In the pre-reflective case, my interest in the Other is such that, in so far as is possible, I suppress all concern with my own future project: "The 'I' is present
only as an active agent engaged in helping the Other further his own chosen projects." On the reflective level, in its purest form, the only content of the You is precisely the positing of the relation between the I and the You: "It is as though this 'You' conveyed these two things: first, that an I-subject is at the moment making itself nothing except an awareness of the Other and an awareness of that awareness; second, that the I-subject seeks to transcend the Other as object and asserts both the existence and absolute value of the Other as 'I-subject'." As Barnes puts it, this is not an assertion about, but rather a recognition of; it is given and received without intermediary.

If this account of positive personal relations is indeed consistent with Sartre's theory of consciousness, how does it relate to his praxis philosophy in the Critique? It must be noted first that the theory of consciousness in Being and Nothingness remains fundamentally intact in the Critique, but that it is given a different form, with certain corresponding modifications. For example, praxis inherits the intentionality and self-transparency (called 'comprehension') of consciousness, but it is specifically defined as purposive human activity in its material environment. Praxis, like consciousness, is ontologically free, for it is the unifying and reorganizing transcendence of existing circumstances toward the practical field. However, as T.R. Flynn observes, "...Sartre has come to realize that this transcendence is dialectical; that is, that it is simultaneously negation, conservation, and spiraling advance. In other words, it is totalizing." 25

Recall that the nihilating dynamic of consciousness in Being and Nothingness is worked out chiefly through the ways in which human
reality 'is what it is not and is not what it is'; but this 'dialec-
tic of dyads' is without synthesis. In the Critique, totalizing prax-
is takes the place of temporalizing consciousness: the initial nega-
tion is lack, and need emerges as the corresponding negation of this
negation. However, since these negations occur within an ultimately
totalizing context, this double negation constitutes a dialectical
affirmation, Sartre argues in the Critique, or a practical, synthetic
integration of the elements as parts. As we saw in chapter seven,
the group in the process of forming is the most simple form of tot-
alization; the group 'is not', Sartre says, but rather 'it constant-
ly totalizes itself'.

These modifications notwithstanding, it is clear that the theory
of consciousness is unchanged in its essentials in the Critique:
praxis takes over the intentionality of consciousness, and comprehen-
sion or 'the translucency of praxis to itself' 27 plays the same
'foundational' role in Sartre's praxis philosophy that the pre-re-
lectic cogito played in Being and Nothingness. Thus, the account
of positive personal relations which we have provided, based upon
Buber's I-It, I-You distinction and consistent with Sartre's theory
of consciousness, should likewise be compatible with his praxis
philosophy. For example, Buber's contention with respect to the di-
mension of I-It that objectification of one subject by another may
be either negative and reifying or else serve a positive and enrich-
ing function, is carried over at the group level in the Critique
in the descriptions of serial relations between persons and recipro-
cal relations between group members, respectively. Indeed, as we
have seen, the fundamental motive for forming groups is to liberate
serialized praxes from the alienating mediation of the practico-
inert, supplanting it by the mediation of the praxes themselves: each group member acts as the mediating Third, able to totalize the series through his free praxis. Moreover, as Sartre makes clear, in the case of reciprocal relations there is no question of mutual reification as there is in the case of serial relations: I am only a quasi-subject in relation to those unified, who are likewise only my quasi-object, since each member of the group perceives his fellow members as undertaking actions and pursuing goals that are the same as each other's and the same as his own.

On the other hand, the dimension of Buber's I-You, or what Sartre terms 'immediate reciprocities' or 'translucid human relations', receives little attention in the Critique, where it is merely suggested that, in our current alienated state, such immediacy is rare and ephemeral. Indeed, in the Critique authenticity is defined solely in terms of social action, with personal relations being omitted entirely from the discussion. As we saw in chapter seven, Sartre's theory of groups does provide an account of how positive social relations are possible, and hence renders intelligible that aspect of his concept of authentic existence which requires of us common action on behalf of the freedom of all. Groups of individuals are united by a shared situation and common goals: specifically, Sartre's concept of the mediating Third provides a basis for practical union and common effort in the existing social world, or authentic action by 'common individuals' having as its aim the enhancement of their concrete freedom. Moreover, by historicizing conflict between individuals, by explaining it in terms of the contingent fact of scarcity, Sartre acknowledges the possibility that cooperation may replace combativeness in a future society of material abundance. Indeed, Sartre's
sociopolitical ideal, or that towards which authentic action is directed, is precisely a "...true intersubjective community in which the only real relations will be those between men." 29

In a world dominated by scarcity, alienation and oppression, on Sartre's account, authenticity clearly requires of us common action on behalf of the freedom of all. True social reciprocity demands changes in those socioeconomic conditions that mediate this reciprocity. Sartre thus argues for 'debureaucratization, decentralization and democratization', and calls upon the sovereign group or class in a given society to relinquish its monopoly on that society. 30 He wants a classless society, with the division of labour abolished; a true socialist society will be one in which "...powers will be exercised by all equally, where there will be no more representatives of powers but where there will be free men who will decide matters of which each could be considered the author." 31 What Sartre wants, therefore, is a 'direct democracy', or one in which all people participate in self-governance. As T.C. Anderson observes, "A direct democracy, as Sartre views it, would be the concrete embodiment of a free society of free individuals mutually choosing to promote each other's freedom." 32

With this future goal in mind, Sartre's ethics of authentic existence stipulates that, in relation to existing conditions, we should act to promote the freedom of all, removing restrictions to freedom of choice and increasing positively the range of choices available. Indeed, Sartre states that socialism is 'freedom choosing itself as a goal', and as Anderson notes, "If we put this in terms of morality, we could say in general that conduct which promotes freedom for all is morally good, that which impedes it is morally
evil." It is thus the overall orientation of an individual's or a society's conduct and its consequences that are of central ethical significance, as opposed to the character of particular acts or classes of acts. In Sartre's terms, it is the fundamental project that is of paramount importance, and actions which realize this primary value must be viewed, not in isolation, but rather in their total orientation. Indeed, the same acts in one context might be highly moral because they promote the freedom of all, while in another context the exact opposite might obtain.

In other words, Sartre does not subscribe to the view that there are any acts or classes of acts that are always and everywhere morally good or morally evil. However, his position is not correctly described as an extreme individualism that makes no place for general rules within the structure of the moral life. F.A. Olafson suggests, for example, that Sartre's view of the relationship of particular choices to general rules may be summarized as follows: "It is that an individual can accept a moral rule or policy only by acting in accordance with it, and that the particular choices or actions by which such rules are effectively accepted are themselves logically prior to, and independent of, the rule itself." A general rule, such as to tell the truth rather than to lie, cannot by itself tell us what to do in any individual case: for that, a decision has to be made that this principle is to take precedence over other considerations that might lead us to act otherwise; and this decision is logically prior to, and independent of, the rule itself. The whole question of the acceptance of any general moral rule is thus always 'reopenable'.

Moral rules, then, are seen by Sartre as emerging from a pro-
gressive resolution of individual cases, and as gradually increasing in stability and reliability, but also as never wholly immune from review and revision. Sartre does not set forth specific moral rules to guide conduct, but nevertheless he has condemned acts such as torture, the killing of innocent people, lying, cowardice, betrayal and apathy (all of which either frustrate or fail to support freedom), and he has approved such phenomena as courage, fidelity, justice, commitment, honesty, love and esteem (in the name of freedom for all). The real difficulty, as Sartre sees it, is not in supplying norms of behaviour, but in making specific moral judgments in concrete situations: is this particular rebellion, this particular government policy, good or bad? One is always obliged to promote the freedom of all, or at least 'the salvation of the greater number', but it is oftentimes difficult to judge which course of action will best serve this overall goal. Indeed, Sartre seems to assert that even when freedom itself is the guiding principle of action, contradictory alternatives may arise which can only be resolved by choice. As A.C. Danto puts it, "There may just be, on the deepest level there is, blatantly irreconcilable and equally urgent demands with only the possibility of a hopeless choice and no way out." 35

Further, while Sartre himself chooses to define authenticity solely in terms of political group action, it should be recognized that in fact, on the basis of his own account, other choices are both possible and justifiable. As we have seen, the 'attitude of strict consistency', a fundamental feature of authenticity, requires the choice of freedom as one's primary value: the choice of freedom is most consistent with the human condition and the nature of value, since human freedom alone is the source of all value. Moreover, since
freedom exists only in relation to a shared situation, valuing freedom involves not only the reflective comprehension of our condition, but also action in the world which has as its goal the enrichment of our concrete freedom. What is at issue, however, is precisely the form of this 'action in the world': Sartre himself opts for political group action, and seems to imply that this choice of his own version of Marxism is the only justifiable choice in a world dominated by material scarcity, alienation and oppression.

Yet surely other choices are both possible and justifiable: one can act in the name of freedom in many ways, as individuals as well as in groups, through art and education, for example, and not simply by means of strictly political action. Sartre agreed with this observation at one time, as a brief perusal of his views on the role of literature will testify. Originally, Sartre saw literature as a means of 'salvation': in *Nausea*, what Roquentin proposes is a personal salvation for the writer by means of his art, construed as a creative objectification of himself. Later, in *What is Literature?*, Sartre argued that the writer must commit himself, and confront the concrete problems of his time: he must write to promote human freedom, or work in order to achieve human rather than merely personal salvation. As an artist, the writer is now conceived by Sartre as one who challenges our fundamental presuppositions: he makes us aware of these presuppositions, opens up new possibilities for us, and hence gives us the ability to use our own freedom in order to improve the existing world. However, ultimately Sartre moved from this view of literature as a form of action in the name of freedom to a position which generally disdains all activity which is not 'immediately involved' in the economic and social liberation of man.
Sartre thus finally maintains that we must engage in political group action in order to promote the freedom of all men, or at least the salvation of the greater number, but there are two basic problems with this position. First, the quality of human life, as well as the quantity of lives saved, must be considered. As Barnes observes, "It is imperative to provide bread and freedom for all. But unless we whose lives have been preserved and liberated find them worth living, we have an empty goal to offer those we hope to rescue." Second, Sartre's position constitutes a repudiation of the very freedom which he wants to promote: the choice of purely political action is not the only choice possible or justifiable, and if Sartre seeks to impose this choice upon others, then the freedom which he wants to save will be destroyed in the very process of liberation.

Buber, for example, allows for diverse forms of authentic action. He does not discount political group action, by any means; in Between Man and Man, Buber provides his own account of the 'We': "The special character of the We is shown in the essential relation existing, or arising temporarily, between its members...For example, in revolutionary groups we find a We most readily among those whose members make it their labour among the people to waken and teach quietly and slowly." However, recall also that on Buber's account the 'world of relation' arises in three basic spheres: life with nature, where the relation 'vibrates in the dark and remains below language'; life with men, where the relation 'is manifest and enters language'; and life with 'forms of the spirit', where 'we hear no You and yet feel addressed; we answer- creating, thinking, acting'. Buber provides examples of persons who exemplify these diverse forms.
of authentic existence, or various forms of life steeped in relations of reciprocity: Goethe, who embodied relation to nature, and Socrates, who exemplified the life of interpersonal dialogical relation. In the case of life with forms of the spirit, finally, Buber maintains that this is, among other things, the 'eternal origin of art': the life of the artist is a paradigm of the life of relation, and the work of art is a testament to this reciprocity for others.

All that Buber insists upon, in his treatment of authentic human existence, is the principle (derived from the I-You relation itself) of the integrity of both the self and the Other, which must be established and preserved in every situation. Provided this principle is observed, authentic action can assume diverse forms. Similarly, all that Sartre should insist upon is that we act in the name of freedom for all, which likewise carries with it the notion of respect for the integrity of both the self and the Other. As we have seen, on Sartre's account all people share a common human condition, no one's freedom is intrinsically superior to that of anyone else, and hence I should choose to value everyone's freedom, and not just my own. It would be inconsistent to recognize that all freedoms have equal status, and then choose to value only my own. Moreover, it would be inconsistent to apprehend the Other's free subjectivity, and then to treat him only as an object. The ethics of authenticity requires that I observe the criterion of fidelity to the truth of the human condition, and thus that I treat the Other as the free subject that he is, on a par with myself, and hence that I respect his freedom and values as much as I do my own.

However, if this ethical ideal is to serve as a regulating principle for our relations with others, if we are to act to promote the
freedom of all, then we must also acknowledge that Sartre's account of authentic existence should allow for diverse forms of such authentic action, both for individuals and at the group level. Instead of restricting his discussion to political group action, and mediated reciprocities grounded in this common action, Sartre's account should be expanded in order to accommodate both various forms of activity by individuals, such as the work of the artist, as well as immediate reciprocities or personal human relations. Recall that Sartre says that 'translucid human relations do exist...; I mean immediate reciprocities', but in our current alienated state, such immediacy is rare and ephemeral. Nevertheless, personal relations (love, friendship) cannot be reduced to common action, and Sartre's portrait of authentic existence should include reference to this dimension of immediate reciprocal relations, as well as to mediated reciprocal relations of a practical nature. Indeed, Sartre's portrait of authenticity should have as its ideal a true inter-subjective community, where a spirit of genuine fraternity prevails, and where a multifaceted human existence is promoted and enjoyed by fully disalienated individuals.
Chapter One

4 Ibid., p.314.
7 Ibid., p.277.
8 Ibid., p.322.
11 Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, p.121.
14 Ibid., p.13.
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