UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Planning in the modern state : a new synthesis and a programme for theory Carley, Michael 1989

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata


831-UBC_1989 A1 C37.pdf [ 18.49MB ]
JSON: 831-1.0106750.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0106750-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0106750-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0106750-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0106750-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0106750-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0106750-source.json
Full Text

Full Text

P L A N N I N G IN T H E M O D E R N S T A T E : A new synthesis and a programme for theory B y M I C H A E L OOHN C A R L E Y B.Sc M I C H I G A N S T A T E U N I V E R S I T Y , 1969 M . S c L O N D O N S C H O O L O F E C O N O M I C S and P O L I T I C A L S C I E N C E , 1977 A T H E S I S S U B M I T T E D I N P A R T I A L F U L F I L M E N T O F T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S F O R T H E D E G R E E O F D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y in T H E F A C U L T Y O F G R A D U A T E S T U D I E S S c h o o l of C o m m u n i t y and R e g i o n a l P l a n n i n g We a c c e p t th is thesis as c o n f o r m i n g to the r e q u i r e d s tandard T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A F e b r u a r y 1989 c M I C H A E L 3 0 H N C A R L E Y 1989 P e r m i s s i o n h a s b e e n g r a n t e d t o t h e N a t i o n a l L i b r a r y o f C a n a d a t o m i c r o f i l m t h i s t h e s i s a n d t o l e n d o r s e l l c o p i e s o f t h e f i l m . T h e a u t h o r ( c o p y r i g h t o w n e r ) h a s r e s e r v e d o t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n r i g h t s , a n d n e i t h e r t h e t h e s i s n o r e x t e n s i v e e x t r a c t s f r o m i t may b e p r i n t e d o r o t h e r w i s e r e p r o d u c e d w i t h o u t h i s / h e r w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . L ' a u t o r i s a t i o n a fete a c c o r d e e a l a B i b l i o t h e q u e n a t i o n a l e d u C a n a d a d e m i c r o f i l m e r c e t t e t h e s e e t d e p r e t e r o u d e v e n d r e d e s e x e m p l a i r e s d u f i l m . L ' a u t e u r ( t i t u l a i r e d u d r o i t d ' a u t e u r ) s e r e s e r v e l e s a u t r e s d r o i t s d e p u b l i c a t i o n ; n i l a t h e s e n i d e l o n g s e x t r a i t s d e c e l l e - c i n e d o i v e n t e t r e i m p r i m e s o u a u t r e m e n t r e p r o d u i t s s a n s s o n a u t o r i s a t i o n e c r i t e . ISBN 0-315-50749-7 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department-4 f £ 0 * d & J ^ S f c - ^ * ^ The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date A B S T R A C T The notion that there is some crisis of public sector planning is common, and a literature review reveals this concern extends across the social sciences, and even to the conception and working of the modern welfare state. The dissertation links pol i t ical science and philosophy with organisation theory to explain the parameters and tensions governing planning by the state, and proposes an agenda for l iberal democratic planning theory for the 1990s. It is argued that these notions of crisis have a common basis in endemic tensions in the modern state which define the planning context. The instability of this context is heightened by increased turbulence in organizational relations at al l levels and in the world economic system, and by readjustments in pol i t ical values reflected in the election of conservative governments in many countries. The idea of crisis provides a useful beginning for analysing the problem of planning, an understanding of which requires a broad view of the socio-polit ical and epistemoiogical context in which planners operate. The concept of planning crisis is broken down into constituent parts from which, it is argued, a more profound view of the context of planning is rebuilt, and from which more appropriate responses to societal problems are l ikely to arise. By devising a formulation that generalizes expectable constraints across various planning situations, an original contribution is made towards a partial theory of the institutional and professional contexts of planning action. First , planning is defined as an instrumental expression of the role of the state in society which attempts to assert the preeminence of the future in the present, in terms of control over scarce resources and private property for some greater good 11 fostered by the state. Then the historical and philosophical basis for the role of the state is discussed in terms of factors which both underlie, and undermine, planning action: state power and individual freedom, social control for state stability, and the role of markets in terms of broader social objectives. The problem of planning is examined in terms of tensions between centre and periphery, economic objectives and political aspirations, opposing and confused trends to centralization and decentralization, and inter-organizational conflict and re-adjustment which seems an inevitable consequence of state intervention in society. In organisation theory, planning is seen as an attempt to manage change in turbulent environments characterised by uncertainty, inconsistent and ill-defined values, and an inability to predict the cumulative consequences of action. Analytic tools for understanding the planning dilemma are discussed, particularly conceptions of organizational learning, resources, networks, and capacity to innovate. The usefulness of static models for understanding dynamic planning situations is questioned. The discussion of the crisis of planning is concluded by turning to its epistemoiogical dimension, termed a crisis of rationality. This refers to the inability of social scientists to model complex social systems, and their seeming failure to devise theory useful to social action. The legacy of positivism and the concept of rationality in planning thought are examined. Three influential planning theories are analysed in terms of their contribution to an understanding of the crisis of planning and extent to which they can offer practical guidance. The conclusion relates the main themes to the current theoretical task, which is to build up a series of useful, partial, conceptions of the possibility for planning action 111 from a realistic understanding of its socio-political context. It is argued that the crisis of planning is rooted in the inevitable lack of consensus about the state's role, and the efficacy of intervention in the workings of the market in terms of human benefit and social justice. This lack of consensus is also set in a fundamental relationship to the crisis of rationality. First, it is argued that planning theorists have a responsibility to explore the practical implications of organizational options at the state-market conjuncture. Further, as any conception of the future is an interactive fusion of fact and value, theorists have a responsibility to develop ethical frameworks and principles, which may help combine the practical benefits of market mechanisms in terms of feedback with a conception of the transcending social responsibility of the state and the need to 'embed' ethical principles in political culture. Second, appropriate organizational responses to uncertainty are proposed, in particular action learning, inter-agency ventures, negotiation, cooperation, and risk taking. Third, the implications for planning theory of the boundaries of social scientific inquiry are examined, in light of endemic uncertainty, the drive to unified social theory which distances theoretical abstractions from reality, and the lure of academic structures and rewards which inhibit the required holistic and interdisciplinary approach. A policy model is proposed which reflects the centrality of values in the planning context, the non-revolutionary nature of planning action, and the position of planning knowledge as a lever on the distribution of societal power, requiring ethical norms. In an appendix, analytic elements derived from the work are used in a case study of urban decline and planning response in the UK. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS A B S T R A C T LIST OF FIGURES A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S 1. T H E P R O B L E M OF P L A N N I N G IN T H E M O D E R N S T A T E INT R O D U C T I O N T H E P R O B L E M OF P L A N N I N G T H E P R O B L E M OF P L A N N I N G T H E O R Y A P P R O A C H A N D OBJECTIVES P L A N N I N G IN T H E P O L I C Y P R O C E S S IS P L A N N I N G IN CRISIS? C O M P L E X I T Y A N D CRISIS IN T H E M O D E R N W O R L D C H A N G E IN T H E W O R L D E C O N O M I C SYSTEM P L A N N I N G A N D R E G I O N A L I S M U N D E R T H E NEW C O N S E R V A T I S M O U T L I N E OF T H E DISSERTATION 2. T H E R O L E OF T H E STATE IN SOCIETY I N T R O D U C T I O N T H E S T R U C T U R E OF STATES Definit ion of the State T H E STATE A N D INDIVIDUAL F R E E D O M The Early Conservative View of the State Industrialization and Early Liberalism Utopianism and Industrial Society Later Utopian Socialists Anarchism: No State Marxism and the Withered State The State in Neo-Marxist Theory SOCIAL D E M O C R A C Y A N D T H E D E V E L O P M E N T OF T H E W E L F A R E STATE Loca l Government in the Welfare State T H E RISE OF N E O - C O N S E R V A T I S M A N D T H E CRISIS OF P L A N N I N G C O N C L U S I O N T H E O R G A N I Z A T I O N OF T H E S T A T E F O R P L A N N I N G I N T R O D U C T I O N T H E C O N T R A D I C T I O N OF P U B L I C S E C T O R P L A N N I N G Exploring the Contradiction I N T E R - O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L RELATIONSHIPS IN P L A N N I N G T H E T R E N D T O C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N OF STATE POWER The Functions of the Welfare State Economic Development and Intervention Other Trends to Central izat ion T HE T R E N D T O D E C E N T R A L I Z A T ION Pol i t i ca l Decentralization Regional or Ethnic Nationalism Regional Income Disparity Functional Decentralization T H E C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N / D E C E N T R A L I Z A T I O N D E B A T E A N D T H E P L A N N I N G C O N T E X T C O N C L U S I O N P L A N N I N G IN T U R B U L E N T E N V I R O N M E N T S : A CRISIS OF C O M P L E X I T Y I N T R O D U C T I O N : T H E VIEW F R O M O R G A N I Z A T I O N T H E O R Y Conf l ic t in Turbulent Environments Organization and Environment: The Contribution of Systems Theory E N V I R O N M E N T A L U N C E R T A I N T Y A N D P L A N N I N G R E S O U R C E D E P E N D E N C E IN ORGANIZATIONS Inter-Organizational Networks Networks and Fields O R G A N I Z A T I O N S AS L E A R N I N G SYSTEMS Conf l ic t Management in Planning Organizations C O L L A B O R A T I O N A N D C O N F L I C T IN P L A N N I N G Limitations to Inter-agency Approaches » C O N C L U S I O N vi THE RATIONALITY DEBATE IN PLANNING INTRODUCTION HISTORICAL BASIS FOR RATIONALITY IN PLANNING RATIONALITY IN PLANNING THEORY Conceptions of Rationality in Public Administration Other Working Definitions of Rationality RATIONALITY IN THE POLICY PROCESS The Substantive-Procedural Distinction in Planning Theory CONCLUSION CRITICAL ORIENTATIONS IN PLANNING THEORY INTRODUCTION PARADIGMS AND PLANNING THEORIES THE NEW DECENTRALISTS Discussion of New Decentralist Theory THE NEO-MARXIST CRITIQUE OF PLANNING Corporatism in the Capitalist Welfare State Local Government in Recent Urban Theory Discussion of the Neo-Marxist Critique PLANNING THEORY DERIVED FROM CRITICAL THEORY A Focus on Communication Discussion of Planning Theory derived from Critical Theory CONCLUSION vii THE PROBLEMS OF PLANNING AND THEORY: A COMBINED AGENDA INTRODUCTION THE TASK FOR DEMOCRATIC PLANNING THEORY THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF PLANNING The Crisis of Planning and the Role of the State The Changing Relations of State to Market The Importance of Ethical Considerations to the Modern State Specific Forms of State Intervention The Cultural Dimension of Capitalist Markets THE ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION OF PLANNING Turbulence at the Level of the State: Central-Local Relations Turbulence at the Level of the Planning Organization The Action Learning Response to Turbulence State and Market Conjoined: Joint Venture Planning Organizations The Case for Strategic Monitoring THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF PLANNING Planning Theory and the Bounds of Social Science The Problem of Systemic Laws: The Human Ecology Route to Social Understanding The Action Research Approach Centrist Paradigm of Social Inquiry The Problem of Values: A Policy Orientation CONCLUSION REFERENCES APPENDIX: PRELIMINARY OUTLINE FOR ANALYSIS OF UK URBAN DECLINE AND POLICY RESPONSE: a planning metaproblem viii LIST O F F I G U R E S 1. Endemic Tensions in the Planning Context 2. Levels of Analysis in Planning Research 3. The Scope of Sub-national Government k. Potential Outcomes of a New Theoretical Agenda 5. The Mediation of Culture to Environment 6. Action Research: Tying Theory to Practice 7. Ethical Principles between Belief and Action 8. The Relationship of Political Culture to Market Op 9. Matrix Approaches to Planning Management 10. Information - Response Framework ix A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S I would l ike to express my appreciation to Professor Brahm Wiesman and to Professor B i l l Rees, both of the School of Community and Regional Planning (SCARP) at the University of British Columbia (UBC), for their many and challenging intel lectual contributions and for their patience in undertaking numerous readings of drafts of this dissertation. I would also l ike to thank Professor A l a n Art ib ise , Director of S C A R P ; Professor Henry High tower of S C A R P ; Professor Walter Hardwick of the Geography Department of U B C ; and Professor Keith Banting of the School of Public Administration at Queen's University, Kingston, for their helpful reviews of the draft document. During the course of its preparation, I was the beneficiary of a number of helpful discussions with Dr . Roger Morgan, Director of the European Centre for Pol i t i ca l Studies, London; with Professor Mart in Bulmer of the London School of Economics; and with Professor Ken Young, Director of the Institute for Loca l Government Studies at the University of Birmingham. I would also l ike to express my appreciation to the Social Science and Humanities Research Counci l , the K i l l a m Foundation, and the Cutler Foundation for their financial support, and more importantly, the honour of their fellowships during my doctoral studies. F inal ly , I would like to thank Lucy Parr and Clare Pattinson for their assistance in typing the manuscript, and Bonnie Schoenberger of S C A R P for her invaluable administrative assistance during the entire process. Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife and children for their considerable patience over a period of more than five years. M . Carley February 1989. x C H A P T E R 1. T H E P R O B L E M O F P L A N N I N G I N T H E M O D E R N S T A T E I N T R O D U C T I O N In this dissertation I propose that the notion that there is a crisis of planning is common, and that a further examination of the literature reveals this concern is not unique to planning but extends across the social sciences and beyond to the concept and working of modern states in a turbulent world economy. It also extends to the ideas of environmental, urban or human crisis, for example, those described by the recent World Commission on Environment and Development, known as the Brundtland Commission. A t the extreme, the human race now has the capacity to destroy itself, as a result of nuclear confl ic t or environmental degradation, or to cause death or suffering to thousands as at Chernobyl or Bhopal, and potentially to millions. In such circumstances notions of crisis are not surprizing, and however depressing, such notions of crisis provide a most useful beginning for analysing for the problem of planning in the modern state. In particular, I am conerned with the potential for the academic activity of 'planning theory' to make a practical contribution to our understanding of how these crises have arisen and how planning can help to ameliorate them. This dissertation then is about both the problems of planning in the public sector and the problem of planning theory, and the inter-relationship between the two. Before coming back to these problems, I w i l l briefly define planning. Most generally planning refers to any systematic consideration or action concerned with the quality of future l i fe . More specifically it is necessary to refer to the fundamental relationship of planning to poiictics. For al l planning in the public sector involves 1 some measure of guidance and control over individual action and private property where control is exercized or sanctioned by the state. The important word is control , for planning assumes an exercise of authority which almost always involves some measure of coercion, and in this the state is sovereign. A s Wildavsky (1975) says, there would be no need to plan if people were going to do spontaneously what a plan requires them to do or not do by its authority. Thus planning in the public sector relates back to the power of the state vis-a-vis its cit izens; and the influence of planning, or lack of i t , is a function of the role of the state in society. A l l planning therefore involves some tension between individual freedom and social control by the state, which is one of the oldest debating points in western pol i t ical philosophy. Such tension is characteristic of land use or environmental or town planning, but also of health or industrial planning or any other kind. Planning, most simply, is an ongoing managerial process embedded within the pol i t ical system, which both attempts and promotes systematic forward thinking and action. Now I return to the two problems addressed in this dissertation: the inter-related problem of planning, and the problem of planning theory. First the problem of planning, of which the notion of crisis is only a symptom. The problem has three dimensions. The first is the problem of ideological fashion, the second the problem of poli t ical values, and the third the problem of the growing complexity of our world. THE PROBLEM OF PLANNING The first , and most obvious problem, is that planning for the future has become ideologically unfashionable given the rise of conservative values and governments in many countries. The election of such conservative governments in the late 1970s and early 80s set the free market cat among the pigeons of state intervention. This 2 new pol i t ical agenda is questioning the relative roles of state and market in meeting societal objectives, and questioning the objectives of the state itself . Moves are being made to dismantle the welfare state, and reassert the primacy of the market. Some governments have emasculated regional planning, urban planning and, in Bri tain, even local government in a bid to promote overall economic growth. Related to this is that planning is now seen as a brake on the working of the 'free market', and is associated with bureaucracies and the inefficiencies of the welfare state. Planning has become a 'bad word', to be avoided. For example, in 1988 the head of the Royal Town Planning Institute in the U K was moved to write to the Minister of State for Transport to point out that a recent ministerial proposal for future transport policies never once mentioned planning except a derogatory remark about 'public bureaucrats'. The Minister's proposals for transport policy consisted mainly of trying to get the private sector to build to l l roads, this at a time when the traff ic problems of Southeast England are reaching crisis proportions and public transport is being run down or 'privatised'. A second related problem is that planners, for good reason, may assume that their tasks are technical and vocational rather than pol i t ica l . Planners 'plan' cit ies and subdivisions, new towns, transport systems, they 'manage' natural resources according to scientific expertise, vocationally received wisdom, and by the seat of their pants. But, as I have indicated in my definition, a l l planning in the public sector is by nature a poli t ical act ivi ty, poli t ical in subject, direction, methodology and particularly whether and how much to plan at a l l . The poli t ical nature of their work can put planners in a tense and unpleasant situation for which they may be unprepared or may find distasteful, and they can be used as a tool or a scapegoat in larger ideological struggles. To compound the issue, the very structure and existance of organisations in which planners work are not fixed constitutional entities but reflect dominant 3 poli t ical values and may be altered or eclipsed. Disappearing or emasculated planning agencies, like the Greater London Counci l or the Greater Vancouver Regional Distr ict , are examples of this institutional instability which can contribute to a sense of malaise or a notion of crisis . A third problem for planning is that the world is growing increasingly complex and inter-l inked, and departmentalized governments are ill-equipped to deal with serious problems which cut across agency and state boundaries. A rekindled debate on the appropriate role for the state contributes to an uncertain planning environment made more turbulent by the oi l crisis of 1973, the recession at the turn of the decade, and the inability of carefully planned projects to deliver positive results. States and their economies, now virtually inseparable in the public mind, seem very vulnerable to the vicissitudes of international market forces, which are themselves in rapid transition towards a more globalized, less place-oriented, system. The comfortable and growth-oriented certainties and consensus responses of the 1960s have a l l but disappeared. Some cities and regions, economically pre-eminent for decades, are suddenly in economic and social decline. In other locations mega-projects and resource-based development schemes have disappeared overnight as they have become unprofitable in global terms. In almost every country economic restraint has become a primary government function. The burdens of ailing economies are a new challenge to planners, who had previously helped to allocate growing public sector budgets, and channelled ever more development here and there on the spatial map. Suddenly ci t ies , regions and states need to engage in competition for l imited amounts of free floating capital and vie for inward investment by a combination of promotion and subsidies. Apparent gains in addressing economic, social and environmental problems are set back by recession, and in third world countries by debt crisis . In this changing context it has become more di f f icul t to select and implement appropriate objectives for state intervention. In this dissertation I have described this aspect of the planning problem as the attempt to manage change in turbulent environments. Such environments are characterized by uncertainty; inconsistent and il l-defined needs, preferences, and values; and an inherent inability to predict the cumulative consequences of action. In such turbulent environments inter-organizational act ivity itself among the agencies of society generate unpredictable ramifications as each agency attempts to internalize the benefits of their actions and to externalise the costs. I demonstrate that the emergence of a complex web of policy networks with the growth of modern states helps account for increasing turbulence. I argue turbulence presents a particular di f f icul ty in dealing with what I define as metaproblems, such as atmospheric pollution, watershed management, inner c i ty decline, deindustrialization in the developed world, explosive urban growth in the third world, the environmental consequences of very large projects such as dams, and the cumulative effects of smaller-scale resource-using activities like grazing and fuelwood col lect ion. Such problems are bigger than any one organization acting alone can resolve, and span not only functional departments but pol i t ical boundaries. The complexity of international and interregional linkages leads to yet more organizational turbulence. If the situation is that there is debate over the appropriate role of the state or market in intervening in a metaproblem, and/or tensions between centres and the peripheries, then the level of turbulence is heightened and planning becomes more di f f icul t . A profound problem for planners therefore is how to deal with the complexity and unforeseen effects of policy-making where policy-making activities interlock at 5 every level , and organizations confl ic t - or co-operate - in a world grown increasingly turbulent. These then are the three main dimensions of the planning problem, the situation is of course far more complex and two-thirds of the dissertation is an exercize in problem definition. Further elements of the problem are illustrated in figure 1. Many practising planners are instinctively aware of these problems, and although they would like time to reflect and ponder on the nature of the problems and the way forward, for planners are committed to societal betterment over personal gain, they are often too busy with the day-to-day demands of planning, administration and bureaucratic ' f ire-fighting' to reflect . THE PROBLEM OF PLANNING THEORY There is however a group of planners who have both the time and the inclination for reflection on the planning problem - the academic planning theorists. Indeed as they are paid by universities and thus in many cases the taxpayer, one could say almost a responsibility to address these problems. But I argue they have in many respects failed to do so, in spite of an outpouring of books and learned articles, and this failure I c a l l the problem of planning theory. It is common currency in our f ield that there is an enormous gap between theory and practice. This clearly reflects a failure of theorizing in so far as planning theorists ought to explicate the crisis in planning, and it is hard to imagine a role for them if that is not what they are attempting to do. Instead, for the planning profession another manifestation of crisis is the profound gap between practitioner and theoretician where each has l i t t le to say to the other, but both find themselves on the defensive. The practising planner suffers recurring policy and implementation failure, and as a result receives contempt from politicians 6 . Conflict of Values . Interdetermlnate Role cf the State . Individual Freedom vs. Social Control . Economic Incentive vs. Social Distribution . Centre vs. Periphery Tensions .. Political Consensus vs. Minority Control POLITICAL DIMENSION: THE PROBLEM OF ARGUABLE VALUES Organizational Turbulence international and Interregional Linkages and Dependencies Conflicting Centralizing vs. Decentralizing Trends Corporatlst Tendencies Compartmentalizatlon In Bureacracles PLANNING: METAPROBLEM SPACE OF ENDEMIC TENSION where ^ influences « CONTEXT RESPONSE ^ conditions^ THE CONJUNCTURE OF PRACTICE AND THEORY Problem of Uncertainty Difficulty of Social Prediction and Modelling Danger of Reductlonlsm Possibility of Rational Action Disciplinary Separation Relationship of Fact and Value Role of Theory vls-a-vis Practice ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION: OR THE ORGANIZATIONAL FACTS OF LIFE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSION: THE DIFFICULTY OF KNOWING AND DOING Figure 1 t Endemic Tensions in the Planning Context and the public alike. The theoretician works in an enclosed world where structure and reward are part of a self-reinforcing system, and where the output of the theoretical process is mostly of interest to other theorists and hardly anybody else. Some theorists in turn form into self-defensive theory or paradigm groups, highly c r i t i c a l of one another. A s an observer, writing in the UK's weekly newsletter Planning, says of theorists at a recent European conference called to discuss 'planning theory in practice' : The main papers ... serve simply to reinforce the stereotype image of the planning theorists' esoteric philosophical discussions largely unrelated to substance (Nadin, 1987, p.6). I am of course generalizing, but the situation is unproductive and this has been of primary concern to me in formulating this intellectual project. What then are the main dimensions problem of planning theory, that is, why is there the infamous chasm between theory and action, and why have we not learned more from theorists about the problem of planning? First , because particularly neo-Marxists, but to some measure Utopians, have taken the intellectual high ground in theorizing. In pursuing their ideological penchant the neo-Marxists have attributed too many of the problems of planning to what is ponderously called 'the decline of late capitalism'. A n d in spite of their obvious and sometimes exciting analytic c lar i ty , their logical if unstated commitment to revolutionary action diminishes to near nothing their contribution to practical thinking as opposed to historical analysis of the planning problem. In other words they score zero in the advice department for planners working in resiliant liberal democracies, and particularly in a decade when Communist states of the Eastern block and A s i a are themselves rewriting their socialist programmes in capitalist terms. 8 Utopian theorists on the other hand, continue a valued tradition of exploration of the possibilities for human society, but unfortunately by too often ignoring what are labelled in figure i . as 'the organizational facts of l i fe ' . Certainly what is missing in much planning theory is a recognition that the appropriate arrangements of the state and its sub-units for planning are not amenable to theoretical proposals for perfect systems, in which different tiers of government, or community agencies, relate to one another in a nested hierarchy, but are the results of messy compromises among pol i t ical values and centralizing and decentralizing forces. Here planning theorists have in the main ignored the insights of organization theory. Second, planning theory suffers from a l l the epistemoiogical dilemmas that confront the social sciences generally, what I c a l l in figure 1. the di f f icul ty of knowing and doing: the constant failure of prediction and quantitative modelling, problems of forecasting, the natural tendency to reduce human complexity by reductionism, the lingering problem of positivism and reactions against i t , a penchant for attempting the more glamourous unified theory as opposed to what Merton calls theories of the middle range, and many more. Planning theorists suffer these problems no worse than other social scientists, it's just that the problem is perhaps more obvious because planning has a strong vocational orientation which continually tests and finds wanting the strength of the bridge between theory and practice. These two factors described above have combined to produce the problem of planning theory and my main goal in preparing this dissertation has been to ameliorate this problem by attempting to derive a viable, centrist and epistemoigically supportable conceptual framework for future theoretical act ivity in planning. I term this a 'liberal democratic agenda' for planning theory. In putting this forward my intention is to contribute to a paradigm shift in planning theory back towards a more practical 9 and realistic approach designed to address the c r i t i c a l social, environmental, and organizational problems we face. This work then is mainly addressed to planning theorists, and particularly European planning theorists, for that is the milieu in which I work. I hope it has wider applicability, but I do not presume to make that assumption. That said, I draw for my examples about 75% on British planning experience and about 25% on Canadian examples which reflects the amount of time in the last decade I have worked in the two countries. In using the terms 'centrist' and especially ' l iberal democratic' I obviously enter a minefield of pol i t ical and semantic dispute. The work is centrist in that I am in fundamental disagreement with most but not a l l , of the neo-conservative pol i t ica l programme in so far as it abrogates state responsibility for the quality of the future, for easing the ravages of poverty and unemployment, for providing quality services like public transportation and environmental protection, and for encouraging essential social as well as economic objectives, and generally smoothing the rough edges of capitalism. I am in equal disagreement with the neo-Marxist schools of planning theory and social science, which have become an arcane and almost impenetrable religion of point and counterpoint, unrelated to matters of pract ical concern, for example to the metaproblems described above. The work is centrist in that I f a l l between these camps. I use the term liberal democratic advisedly. 'Social democratic' might do as wel l , but somehow carries the taint of discredited and often inefficient 'cradle to grave' welfare bureaucracies. But the term liberal is problematic also. In the United States 10 politicians like Dukakis are accused of being ' l iberal ' as if it's just about the worst thing in the world after 'Communist'. Liberalism there is taken as the philosophy of government intervention in the mold of Roosevelt. In Bri tain, on the other hand, liberalism is to some extent taken as freedom from government intervention in the workings of the market. In this view, derived lately from the economic liberalism of Hayek and Mil ton Friedman, successful societies are defined by the struggle of entrepreneurs against the constraints of the state and social convention arising from consensus. But both definitions of liberalism are conditioned by traditional left-r ight views on economic issues. Certainly liberalism as an ideology accepts that market forces can play a prominent role in the creation of wealth. There is a clear preference for competit ive markets and the use of the price mechanism rather than state economic planning. Liberalism also recognises the need for state intervention to deal with externalities and monopolies, to provide public goods, and for income redistribution. But no definition of modern social liberalism is complete without reference to an essential concern for decentralized pol i t ical pluralism, cooperation, and coordination in pursuit of social as wel l as economic development, and the maximum degree of individual liberty which is also consistent with a healthy poli t ical culture. Very recently, even some neo-Conservatives have become aware that maximum economic freedom, individualism and materialism do not necessarily lead to a mature and healthy society but rather towards private affluence and public squalor, and there have been attempts to redefine the elements of poli t ical culture in terms of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in the context of community. In the concluding chapter I return to a discussion of the importance of citizenship and poli t ical culture in society, and the contribution of planning to the realisation of these. 11 APPROACH AND O B 3 E C T IVES Finally I would l ike to conclude this introductory section by a brief description of my approach to the task. The bulk of the work involved a systematic breakdown of the two problems of planning into their constituent parts from which, I argue, a more profound view of what I ca l l the context of planning can be rebuilt. Chapters two to five define the problem as a means of building up a body of evidence which describes the context of planning. I then question the extent to which existing planning theories have been able to make a contribution to our understanding of the problems of planning, and whether they are able to speak to practising planners. In particular, I focus on theory groups which have begun something approaching a systematic critique of the role of planning in capitalist societies. However, I find that none quite come to grips with the problem of organizational turbulence, nor do their pol i t ical assumptions make them wholly accessible to planners working in l iberal democratic societies. Having thus established an original conceptual framework for understanding the problems of planning I ask two questions: First , what are the implications of this knowledge about the social context of planning for planning theory? Second, given this, what are the appropriate tasks of planning theoreticians in the foreseeable future? I return to these questions in the concluding chapter. My main purpose in writing this dissertation then has been to define in a broad and systematic fashion the problems of planning and to use this framework to propose a revised conception of planning 12 theory, based on the context of planning rather than an ideological abstraction or Utopian vision. To do this systematically required an examination of the pol i t ica l and organizational constraints which bound planning practice. In my view such extended (and recursive) problem definition is an important and creative task. Perhaps more importantly it can help shape a measure of pol i t ical consensus required for social action, which I have argued is a primary task for planners. The requirement for coordinated action on serious metaproblems grows daily, as does the need for a higher regard for the future as represented by planning activit ies. Also my objective is to attempt to make social science theory and knowledge more accessible. I have therefore attempted to construct a partial , interdisciplinary conceptual framework which can be a guide to observing and understanding the planning world. What I am attempting therefore is not a static conception but a prescription for an ongoing intellectual programme for planning theory. Most importantly, my objective is to begin a process which relates planning theory to planning action. A key to so doing may be to recognise that theorizing is no more than a tool for action. Social science itself, which gives rise to theorizing, is a science of the ar t i f i c ia l , - a science about the worlds that humans and human cultures have and are choosing to create (Bolman and Deal, 1984). A s Caravajal (1983, p.237) asks 'are systems out there, or are they in the minds of systems planners?' In the same way, we are entitled to ask whether planning theories help us interpret reality and help us think about the crisis and context of planning. The cr i ter ia for judging the answer is that the way the world appears to us depends on our basic theory about the structure of the world. To inquire we must construct a theory of reality which w i l l then guide us in the observations we make, which in turn w i l l guide us in the 13 revision of our theory of reality and in turn can be a guide to actions and so (Churchman, 1975). The implications of this recursive approach to theorizing are threefold. First , it must be accepted that there are no immutable findings in the social sciences, because any findings become part of 'the rationalization of action' of those to whose conduct they refer. That is, social science 'facts' have no meaning outside a value orientation based on reason and free choice. A s Levy (1981, p.19) puts i t . ...consciousness is neither passive nor purely or irresponsibly active; rather i t is reactive in the sense that it reacts creatively to the possibilities of the context. Only this formulation does justice to the way human beings respond creatively to the discovered problems of human existence. Second, there is no one true theory, either in planning or any other discipline. Indeed to presume a unified social theory, explicit ly or implic i t ly , borders on the megolomanical and is simply unacceptable on epistemological and moral grounds. Rather there may be several valid if partial perspectives on planning and the planning context, from several disciplines, and the conceptual tools which are helpful w i l l vary according to the process under consideration (Boudon, 1986). It is to these perspectives and tools we turn to help practising planners build a basic theoretical and practical view of the planning context. Here I agree with Faludi (1982a) that planning paradigms can and should be combined. Understanding al l the perspectives operating in the decision environment can lead to wiser policy making than sticking resolutely to the idea that only one perspective (one's own) can be val id. The empirical task of such analysis is to understand how theories interrelate, not to select between them (Zysman, 1983). Following from this a third point is that I propose that the term 'context of planning' somehow describes both practical reality and the theoretical reconstruction of that reality, and the relationship thereof. 14 It can be argued that a great strength of planning as field of intellectual inquiry is its multidisciplinary approach to questions of public policy. To maintain this strength planning must continually look outward to, and synthesize, intellectual understanding from other fields; as wel l as avoid the trap of using only inward-looking or self-referencing cr i ter ia as a means of evaluating planning theory. A multidisciplinary background, that is knowledge or experience of different disciplines, Is f rui t ful ground for interdisciplinary analysis, which integrates disciplinary knowledge. A further level of analysis is transdisciplinary, which is able to transcend disciplinary boundaries with the aim of an holistic synthesis. Figure 2 outlines the levels of analysis: T R A N S D I S C I P L I N A R Y L E V E L I N T E R D I S C I P L I N A R Y L E V E L M U L T I D I S C I P L I N A R Y L E V E L DISCIPLINARY L E V E L Figure 2 : Levels of Analysis in Planning Research PLANNING IN THE POLICY PROCESS Before beginning a systematic analysis of the context of planning it is useful to lay the groundwork for subsequent discussion by relating planning to the process of policy 15 development and implementation. Planmaking activities straddle almost the total range of human endeavour from personal and private action, through interpersonal relationships and group dynamics, to poli t ical processes (Yewiett , 1985). We a l l plan, at one time or another, and the act ivi ty , or better, the problematique of planning can be described as one of systematically considering a series of interrelated choices under conditions of uncertainty. That said, the focus of this dissertation is on a higher administrative level of planning, that of the senior planner, cum executive, who has some influence over the policy process and over the allocation of public (and sometimes private) resources in society. This administrative level is often replicated in one way or another at different spatial scales. The choices available to the executive level planner are not static, they become outmoded almost as soon as they are made. For this reason at the beginning planning was described as both a management task and as the recurring intervention between problem context and administrative response. Planning is a systematic consideration of future problems and options within a never-ending public sector decision process in which short-term poli t ical and bureacratic considerations tend to predominate. Planning is, or should be, part of the process of decision, rather than a production line of plans. A s Beer (1979, p.336-37) points out: insofar as people have so often considered (and written about) planning as an activity in its own right - replete with a modus operandi that is conceived as separate from the business of managing, nonsensical rituals have evolved. A n d if planning means to engage in such rituals, then there is no escape for them. Thus managers and ministers become helplessly entangled in immensely high-variety estimations about performance in future epochs that have been arbitrarily selected, well-knowing that their effort wi l l be wasted. They know this from experience. They have found that the attempt to plan consists mainly in rationalizing and updating plans that are being constantly falsified by unfolding history. 16 For private sector corporate planning this discussion would be sufficient in that i t encompasses most elements of a definition of the generic activity of planning. But for the public sector the situation is more complex. Planners rarely define either the institutional context or the objectives of planning. These are a function of the pol i t ical system, and planning is connected to power through the workings of politics in its broadest conception. A good definition of politics is provided by Held (1984, p.235): It is involved in a l l the relations, institutions and structures which are implicated in the activities of production and reproduction in the l i fe of societies. It is expressed in a l l the activities of cooperation, negotiation and struggle over the use and distribution of resources which this entails. Pol i t ics creates and conditions a l l aspects of our lives and it is at the core of the development of problems in society and the collect ive modes of their resolution. Thus, politics is about power, about the forces which influence and reflect its distribution and use and about the effect of this on resource use and distribution; it is about the 'transformative capacity' of social agents, agencies and institutions. A l l planning in the public sector relates back to the power of the state; and the influence of planning, or lack of i t , is a function of the role of the state in society. This is as true of spatially-oriented or land use planning, as it is of public administration, policy analysis, or budgetary control over programmes. It is for this reason that Mann (1978, p.14) can say that the older distinctions between planning and other kinds of administrative decision-making have disappeared. Planning, with or without a socio-territorial focus, is grounded in a relationship to the pol i t ical system by which both strategies and tactics for implementation are derived from a measure of consensus or coalition around polit ical issues. This consensus results in policy. Planning in this conception is closely related to the newer academic f ield of public policy studies, and there is l i t t le difference between the cr i t i ca l issues in planning 17 and in that field of pol i t ical science. One recent attempt to distinguish planning from policy studies f e l l back on planning's concern for physical circumstances as a separate dimension of human l i fe (Allison, 1986). This was in an effort to redress the decline 'in the morale of the town planning profession and its reputation, and to make sense of the complexity of modern l i fe ' . But the result seems a mistaken prescription for professional isolation for town planners, at a time when town planners are increasingly concerned with urban economic regeneration and its social consequences. A simple definition which isolates planning from either policy or socio-economic circumstances is probably unhelpful. A s Mann (1978, p. 114) noted: That planning programs are nominally concerned with urban and regional questions is l i t t le help; for they may actually be concerned with questions more at a national than local level , and there is nothing to keep the 'policy' f ield from moving into the local and urban sphere in response to opportunities. He suggests that distinguishing policy analysis from planning can only be done by 'the most imaginative hair-splitt ing on matters of style'. Similarly Reade (1983) compares the 'thought-styles' of economic planners and town planners and finds them virtually identical . He concludes that 'planners seem to share a common style of thought, irrespective of what or where they plan'. Planning practice bears this out insofar as local init iative, although important for many reasons which w i l l be explored in subsequent chapters, cannot be divorced from either the broad policies concerned with economic or social change or from the workings of the international economic system. For example, the UK's Community Development Programmes in the 1970s clearly indicated that local planning initiative could not be isolated from national policy, or from international financial and industrial considerations. This is a fundamental insight which is unlikely to be 18 dislodged. Wallerstein (1974, 1980) makes a similar point in his analyses of the world economic system. Both the role of the state in society, and the geographic and functional relationships between centres and peripheries, are taken as fundamental dimensions to the planning crisis and explored in subsequent chapters. In an earlier work (Carley, 1980) I discussed at length the field and definitions of policy studies and analysis. In summary, I would agree with Webber (1978, p. 157): Under virtually a l l the social circumstances in which planners work, the acceptable way is necessarily the outcome of pol i t ical processes. That is to say, there are no scientif ically or technically correct answers, only poli t ical ly appropriate ones ... I suspect the notion that there are right answers to be discovered or invented w i l l be as dif f icult as any of our ideologic fixations to overcome. That fundamental doctrine has been so deeply woven into contemporary thoughtways as to have attained the status of a truism. It is nonetheless false. In chapter two we find the origins of this false 'fundamental truism' that has dogged planning practice over much of its short history in a conception of progress developed first in the 18th century. In chapter five I examine the implications of this for planning practice and theory. Of course having established that a l l planning is pol i t ical , equally not a i l pol i t ical activity or the activity of the agents of the state is planning. Quite the contrary. Once again planning is clearly concerned with the future. Here Paterson's (1972) analysis of the elements of the 'decision-complex', slightly revised, can help us understand the relationship of planning to politics to implementation in the policy process. Paterson's analysis, though originally of the f i r m , applies equally to the public sector organization. The decision-complex can be represented by: 19 —5 SYNTHESIS/ DECISION i— C O N C L U S I O N —9 I N F O R M A T I O N E X E C U T I O N (N.B. st imuli from outside the open system)—>• If decision represents the pol i t ical realm, planners are seldom politicians. Execution is the realm of policy implementation, the execution by administrators of decisions taken by politicians. Knowledge of execution should, but often doesn't, form part of the information gathered in information activities, which is synthesized by senior administrators for the benefit of politicians who take decisions. Planning activities, which promote systematic regard for the future, take place in information and synthesis areas but do not define those areas in which activities may not reflect a concern for the future but rather bureaucratic imperatives, desire for career promotion or other factors. The many motivations which define bureaucratic action are discussed in Carley (1980) and elsewhere. Paterson stresses that the decision complex is an open system since at any stage i t wi l l be subject to st imuli from outside the system. Also within the decision complex itself there w i l l be extensive feedback systems. Finally, Paterson defines a 'decision-system' as a mass of such complexes reducible to one broad complex, the agency itself. The only drawback of transferring Paterson's conceptualization of the decision-complex to the public agency is that we must recognize that the outside st imuli , the pol i t ical culture, is very strong and that there is no provision in this simplification for the electorate. That said, the important point here is that although al l planning is pol i t ical , i t is not politics per se but is in a sense one source for the faw (information) and redefined (synthesis) material of the poli t ical process. Such material is used in what Habermas calls communication structures which not only transmit information, but 20 communicate pol i t ical and moral meaning and reproduce and enhance the relations of power and production. The importance of planning's contribution to information and synthesis, and these to the policy process, surfaces again and again throughout this work. IS PLANNING IN CRISIS? Everywhere i t seems planners feel under attack and the concept of planning is in retreat. It is virtually impossible to examine the literature of planning without finding reference to a crisis of or in planning, be it town and country, land use, economic, social , strategic, or even corporate planning. In The Planner it says that in the U K planning suffers from a 'withdrawal of pol i t ical support' and is 'facing a crisis of credibility which has intellectual and ideological sources' (Blowers, 1986a). Becker -(1985) calls i t 'the crisis and restructuring of regional planning and theory'. Harris (1983, p. 5) argues that a long term crisis in planning became 'real and painful' with the onset of the world economic slump in the mid 1970s. He outlines the dimensions of the problem: Actua l planning becomes largely irrelevant to what happens, at best a detail in the public relations work of the government ... The problem is acute in most areas, whether the planning of countries, of companies, of sectors or localit ies. Some of the gravest symptoms of the ailment appear in the field of physical planning. Deakin (1985, p. 295) looks back to a tarnished golden age when: bliss (for some) was to be a planner in that second dawn, but to be a strategic planner was very heaven. Or so it should have been but it soon wasn't. The flaws in the planning structure were beginning to show up clearly - shortly to be followed by the physical cracks in the structures that had been put up. But it isn't only physical planners who feel threatened. The decline of planning has been linked to the decline of regional policy and more generally to the decline of 21 interventionist government and the welfare state itself. In the U K regional planning has been eclipsed by what has been called a 'philosophical dark ages' (Cameron, 1985). Mrs. Thatcher has mounted a sustained constitutional attack on local government, and particularly local planning, in an attempt to destroy what are thought of as 'socialist' local governments. Right-wing magazines argue that ' i t is the Town and Country Planning A c t that is most in tune with Marx's ideas, removing as it does the freedom to use property as you wish' (Clarke, 1987). A t the same time from the left , a Labour M . P . (E. Heffer) has no qualms in announcing that 'the crisis of capitalism is so deep that whatever is done by British or US governments, it cannot be overcome'. Even in more level-headed Canada it is reported that 'regional land use planning agencies have been under pol i t ical attack ... efforts are underway to emasculate, if not eliminate, the agencies' (Robinson and Webster, 1985, p.30). Planning theory is attacked as wel l . 'Methodologies once held in esteem are now being challenged, even ridiculed' (Gluck, 1986, p. 18). Canada's one national newspaper, The Globe and M a i l , feels itself qualified to editorialize that 'planning lays tenuous c laim to professional status, lacking a unique body of knowledge or theory at its core' (18/8/86). In general, planning is identified as a 'bad label', to be avoided by substituting a less emotive term (Hahn, 1987). Nor is it only planning in the public sector that is appearing distinctly i l l . In Long Range Planning, a journal for corporate planners in the private sector, a recent article is t i t led, 'Everywhere, Planners are in Pain' (Brown, 1983). The Harvard Business Review (Gray, 1986, p. 89) reports that 'it has become fashionable to attack formal strategic planning as a source of corporate America's competitive i l ls ' . The medical analogy is hard to escape. The Planner (Apri l , 1985) argues in an editorial that 'strategic planning must survive'. Lyddon (1985, p.26), Chief Planner of the 22 Scottish Development Department, proposes 'a recovery of the purpose and a confidence in the planning system and the role of the planner'. COMPLEXITY AND CRISIS IN THE MODERN WORLD But it is not planning alone that is in crisis. Rather the f ield is caught up in something larger, more dramatic. Some suggest it is a crisis of social science and that the era of purposive social science has lost its momentum (Ilchman and Uphoff, 1983). Others look beyond the confines of social science to what is called a crisis of governability in public sector processes and structures, where demands on government seem to exceed its capacity to meet them effect ively. This has been called the overload crisis: Overload refers to the increased expecations held of public administration, and indeed of poli t ical systems generally, in the post-1945 world. These expectations led to a big increase in the formal tasks and responsibilities of government, but of course i t does not fol low that these tasks have been adequately implemented. Clearly they have not (Self, 1986, p.330). The meaning of the crisis of governability depends on poli t ical viewpoint. For the non-radical, it may be that public administrators and planners have failed to find practical means of fulf i l l ing the many tasks of the welfare state in a turbulent milieu where changes in the world economic system have dramatic national and local implications. These cause demands on the welfare state to rise as resources have become more constrained. For planners it can mean attempting to grapple locally with serious socioeconomic, urban problems whose origins are international in scope. On the other hand, a conservative scholar has explained 'the crisis of democracy' in terms of the inability of the state to resist demands for preferential treatment by individual corporations and economic sectors thus diminishing market mechanisms (Huntington, 1981). The crisis may also reflect an endemic constitutional and 23 organizational tension between centre and periphery, or between central and sub-national governments, in what Ashford (1982) calls 'the classic problem of the state and government'. For the radical, neo-Marxist or perhaps Utopian theorist, the situation is more dramatic. This is not an organizational crisis which can be put right by government reform or planning thought, but only by a radical restructuring of the state itself. The problems run too deep, the crisis of planning is only symptomatic of the entire failure of the social democratic state in capital ism. This has been variously termed 'the pol i t ical dilemma of technocracy' (Heydebrand, 1983), and 'the crisis of crisis management under late capitalism' (Offe, 1984). In the latter, the crisis is symptomatic of considerable alterations in the classic capitalist relations of production and the relation of capital to the state and its subunits and agencies. Examination of the relations of the state to international finance capitalism has been undertaken in great detail by contemporary scholars using variations of neo-Marxist analysis. Where the state in its own interest must maintain the process of capital accumulation and yet at the same time expand its revenue base, the resultant contradiction results in ' f iscal crisis' (O'Conner, 1973, 1984). The state also needs to legitimate these activities to its electorate: pursuant diff iculties may lead to 'legitimation crisis' (Habermas, 1976a). These crises suggest either the impending breakdown of captial ism, the diminishment of democracy in the interests of the survival of capitalism (MacPherson, 1977b), or the rise of a corporatist techno-managerial state (Heydebrand, 1983). Some argue that these crises may be endemic to the capitalist world economy of the late 20th century which is characterized by a global division of labour in a single world-scale marketplace (Wallerstein, 1974). Others argue that it is not so much a crisis of capitalism as one resulting from social 24 and technological changes stemming from advanced industrialism and therefore a crisis of modernity (Giddens, 1986). The cries of crisis from pol i t ical scholars within the liberal-democratic tradition have become almost as common as those within neo-Marxism. Boschken (1982) refers to 'a flood of works attesting to a crisis in politics and administration'. Ostrum (1973) assessed the crisis in terms of the task-oriented functions of government, Tr is t (1976) in terms of turbulence in the decision-making environment. Scott (1981) suggests that the crisis is one of institutional dependence which makes our lives subservient to deterministic systems of control , or an 'organizational imperative'. Beer (1979) argues that larger and more complex networks of interdependence cause the conditions for the continual trend of modern society towards greater centralization which eclipses freedom. Bureaucracy has become the instrumental means of making decisions. Boschken (1982 p. 247) sums up: 'most of these tendencies revolve around the trade-off of certain freedoms for more administrative control ' . A s Johnson (1979, p.246) puts i t : The common dilemma: big government for efficiency's sake, small government for the sake of democratic values'. These arguments have both geographical and functional dimensions. The study of centre-periphery relations have become an important tool in understanding the post-war state, which can only be understood in the context of the world economic system. CHANGE IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM Although the notion of crisis may define in part the context of planning in the latter part of this century, it is clear that planners are hardly alone in facing 'crisis'. While the word may already seem overworked, the tensions under which planners must operate are certainly real, and I w i l l argue, endemic in complex industrial states. A s 25 we move towards a future which is commonly called post-industrial the situation may become more rather than less di f f icul t . International economic turbulence, tension between developed and underdeveloped regions, and between levels of government, has been greatly exacerbated since the oi l crisis of 1973 and by the recent recession which gave rise to new conditions of international trade. One result is that transnational corporations are now central izing into what The Economist (15/2/85) calls global corporations, completely detached from concerns of nation states. A related result with considerable implications for planning has been the phenomenon of industrial shift. The latter serves as the structural ground upon which planners attempt to define their crisis. Industrial shift describes a readjustment of productive activities at an international level, particularly the transfer of certain sectors, for example textiles, the car industry, electrical and electronic industries, ship-building etc. from the industrialized countries to certain developing countries (in Southeast A s i a , South Korea, Braz i l , Mexico, Argentina, etc) based on shifts in comparative advantage (Madeuf and Michalet, 1981, pp. 356-367; Schydlowsky, 1984). This north-south shift is particularly pronounced in labour-intensive industries producing standardized goods. The main agents of the shift are the global or trans-national corporations (TNCs). For example, the European electronics giant Philips recently announced its first 'global company strategy' for the 1990s, by which i t would transfer production from its European bases to As ia and Mexico. Philips' President announced that the company no longer saw itself as a European-based, but rather 'a global company' whose product development, production, and marketing strategy was linked to a 'single-world concept'. 26 For the first time then the industrial production of advanced capitalist economies does not take place solely or even mainly in their own territory. Capi ta l in the form of factories and whole branches of industry are shifted from place to place and entire regions, formerly prosperous, may suffer progressive de-industrialization and become the 'new peripheries' (The U K Midlands, the 'rust belt' in the USA). Devalued fixed capital in declining regions becomes a tax advantage in reinvestment strategies that take capital and jobs abroad (Walton, 1981), or to more inviting domestic regions like the US sunbelt or the southeast of England. Shifts in production are made easier by the globalization of access points to finance capital , the development of world-wide securities markets, and the availability of sophisticated computer-linked tele-communications faci l i t ies . The result are what Harvey (1978) calls 'switching crises' involving both geographic and sectoral shifts. Investment not only abandons regions but also moves into new product lines in which previous workers would have no special advantage were they able to migrate with capital (Walton, 1981, p.379). However, this evolving world economic system is itself an entity with confl ict ing tendencies towards unity and disparity. The planned integration of the activities of T N C s at the world level leads towards generalized wage relationships, homogeneity of technology and production techniques, and standardization of products and patterns of consumption (Madeuf and Michalet, 1981, p.266). But equally the T N C s operate in a system of nation states where regulations and legislation, financial incentives, and polit ical regimes give rise to policies to which T N C s may have to adjust. Pinder (1982, pp.44-46) describes an area of nation state policy which is an important manifestation of planning functions. This is regional, infrastructure, and economic development policies by which planners attempt to redress regional deprivation and underdevelopment engendered by industrial patterns in the international and national economies. But these types of policies are under the gun 27 from recent changes in poli t ical philosophy towards neo-conservatism (for example, Thatcherism) and subsequent changes in government practice: the decline of regional policy and the ascendancy of the notion that economic growth must be allowed to flourish in locations which are seen to optimal from a private point of view (Cameron, 1985). Grant and Healey (1985) argue that a major trend in national politics is towards reducing the scope and influence of planning at the local level . This is underpinned by moves towards managerial eff iciency and privatisation, but also the growing centralization of government. PLANNING AND REGIONALISM UNDER THE NEW CONSERVATISM The advent of more conservative governments in the 1980s resulted in a de-emphasis of regional policy as a mode of state intervention in the economy. One result of industrial shift combined with this decline of regional policy has been an escalating and competitive syndrome of local promotion as cit ies great and small (and their planners), in the absence of any regional or national co-ordinative policies, vie for inward investment of any sort, with a combination of promotion, provision of industrial infrastructure, emphasis on the tractability of the local labour force, and financial subsidies and other incentives. Whether this leads to economic efficiency is anyone's guess (Hambleton, 1981; Stewart 1983). The main point is that the diminishment of regional policy, and therefore strategic planning on many fronts under the new conservatism, is really a reflection of a fundamental philosophic shift on the role of the state vis-a-vis both the economy as a whole, and its sub-national units. The decline of regional policy, the diminishment of a concern for terri torial justice, and the ascendancy of a strong national perspective in economic policy are al l facets in the continuing dialectical process by which national governments 28 redefine their relationships with the region, and the general relationship of the state to society. But a move away from regionalism need not be a one-way trend. In France for example, a regional crisis was seen to last from about 1970 to 1982, when the incoming Socialist government instituted a new round of regional planning based on poli t ical devolution (Benko, 1987). Although such trends are very likely to be cyc l i ca l , it would however be a mistake to link regionalism as an ideological stance, ipso facto with left-wing views in politics, even if anti-regionalism now tends to be associated with conservative governments. The regional ideology has been espoused variously by groups from the extreme left to the extreme right and many points in -between, depending on other complex social and poli t ical factors. Recently, a new decentralism advocated by some planning theorists has been accused of appearing 'remarkably like the old conservatism' (Hebbert, 1982). The important point is that the dialectical relationships between national and sub-national units of government, or other aspects of centre and periphery important in planning, are in a continuing process of redefinement, which is related to but not necessarily contingent on, ideological perspective. The fact that the organization of the state and polit ical values are in no fixed relationship has important implications for those attempting to understand the place of planning in the national context. Too often planning theorists take moral justification for organizational proposals for undertaking planning from a particular ideological stance, without, it seems, much examination of the nature of the organizational phenomena they hope to alter or replace. This is not surprizing, but often leads to a simplistic confusion between workings of complex social structures i like nation states with the theorist's own ideological preferences. For example, 29 recently large public and housing bureaucracies in the U K have decentralized to local offices, for valid organizational reasons. Such decentralizations are more of a reaction to bureaucratic inflexibi l i ty than an ideological prescription, and therefore appeal to local governments on both the left and right of the pol i t ical spectrum. This broad appeal is causing some consternation to theorists, particularly on the left , who feel compelled to f i t these practical organizational responses to complexity into some simple left-right continuum which reflect mainly views on social justice and income redistribution. When something similar occurs in prescriptive planning theory, the result is usually well meaning proposals, reflecting a reasonable moral stance, but unfortunately devoid of an understanding of pol i t ical or organizational reality, and therefore mildly and sometimes wildly impract ical . Reflecting on this general failure to link poli t ical values to organizational knowledge can help us understand planning theory's own continuing crisis of 'knowledge into action' which is the poor relationship of planning theory to planning practice. Certainly when value systems and/or tiers of administrative authority clash, it is very often on matters of planning (Ionescu, 1975). In the current clash of national and local units of government in the U K , 'planning was a casualty on the way' (Riddell , 1986). In organizational terms, Hinings et a l . (1985, p. 45) suggest that policy and planning problems are magnified in any inter-organizational context because wide difference of opinion w i l l have to be resolved, lines of authority and responsibility are not clear, and considerable resources need to be devoted to the planning task. In times when international economic turbulence combined with a shift to neo-Conservatism has resulted in pressure to rol l back the welfare state, cut state expenditures and reduce government manpower, it is not surprising that planning becomes a casualty of inter-organizational confl ict . The problem is made worse because highly complex problems often require agencies and departments to 30 cooperate in problem definition and policy response. But such cooperation is di f f icul t and costs time and money. Also different departments are under pressure from different pol i t ical constituencies and may not see immediate interests served by longer term or cooperative ventures. A s often as not, the failure to cooperate results in counterproductive policies which serve to compound organizational turbulence and the diff iculty of the planner's task. For example, for ten years central government in the U K has had inner c i ty policies to counteract the urban decline caused by deindustrialization. But at the same time it is insisting that local planning authorities allow the kind of suburban shopping centres which have proved in North A m e r i c a to hasten the decline of c i ty centre functions. Given that already very complex socioeconomic problems can be compounded by insufficient policy responses, it is not surprizing that planners have described the context of planning in crisis terms. Although it is commonplace to say that the world is growing increasingly complex, it is hard to imagine it getting simpler as an evolutionary trend. The crisis of planning, governability, overload, or perhaps of late capitalism and state capitalized socialism is partly a crisis of increased societal complexity and an inability for our rationally derived planning systems to cope. But there is also ample evidence that the organizational aspects of the crisis are not new, and may be as endemic as changing relations between the state and the factors of production. What is identified as a crisis in planning may be more a manifestation of the continuing transformation of modern, industrialized societies and their organizational arrangements. But the rate of change has increased since about 1973, and this has engendered notions of crisis. To understand the crisis it is necessary to look to the past in terms of western polit ical philosophy since the Enlightenment, to consider current thought on the | 31 relation of state and society, and to understand why the planning context can be described as turbulent. O U T L I N E O F T H E DISSERTATION The outline of this dissertation and the argument presented is as follows. In this chapter I have proposed that the notion that there is a crisis of planning is common, and that a further examination of the literature reveals this concern is not unique to planning but extends across the social sciences, and even to the concept and working of the modern welfare state in a changing world economy. Without commenting on the extent to which cries of crisis ring true, it is argued that the notion of crisis provides a most useful beginning for analysing for the context of planning in the modern state. Chapters two to five address four key areas in the 'so-called' crisis of planning. Chapter two examines the historical and philosophical basis for the role of the state in society and argues that in the writings of Locke, Hobbes, 3. S. M i l l and others are to be found the origins of present day views on the role of the state. Discussion of a series of insolvable tensions, which both underlie and sometimes undermine, planning action is initiated here with a consideration of state power, freedom, social control for state stability, and the role of markets in current neo-conservative thinking. Chapter two summarizes a number of fundamental poli t ical considerations which form the intellectual milieu in which planners think about why and what they do. Chapter three goes on to examine the crisis of planning in the modern welfare state in terms of: an endemic tension between centre and periphery, confl ict between economic objectives and polit ical aspirations, opposing and confused trends to central 32 ization and decentralization, and an inter-organizational confl ic t and re-adjustment which is an inevitable consequence of state intervention in society. These factors both give rise to notions of crisis and form part of expectable constraints which w i l l operate in the public sector planning situation. Chapter four argues that much planning activity is an attempt to manage change in what organisation theorists describe as turbulent environments. These are characterized by uncertainty; inconsistent and ill-defined needs, preferences, and values; and an inherent inability to predict the cumulative consequences of action. It is argued that the planning dilemmas posed in chapters three and four are not entirely due to the inevitable decline of late capitalism but are also part and parcel of what is described as the problem of the modern state. In brief, this is how to deal with the complexity and unforeseen effects of policy-making where policy making activit ies interlock at every level, and organizations confl ict - or co-operate - both polit ical ly and administratively in a world grown increasingly turbulent since 1973. In organization theory can be found some analytic tools for thinking about this planning dilemma. Particularly useful are notions of organization learning, resources, networks, and capacity to plan or innovate effectively. Organizational analysis calls into question the usefulness of static models for understanding the inter-organizational relationships which characterize many planning situations. Chapter five concludes the discussion of the crisis of planning by turning to the epistemoiogical dimension of the problem, often termed a crisis of rationality. Again it is useful to return briefly to the philosophical roots of our views about how we know the world. We find that the planning dilemma over the possibility of rational action is an issue for the social sciences generally. It is perhaps more acute in planning because its practical or vocational expression continually tests and finds 33 wanting the strength of the theory-action bridge. A f t e r a review of the historical basis for 'a social' science, the chapter examines the legacy of positivism in planning theory and practice, and the applicability of the concept of rationality to planning thought and policy analysis. In examining the problem of rationality I also turn to a problem which bedevils planning theory, which is the extent to which it is possible or useful to distinguish procedural from substantive planning modes. It is argued that outside of the confines of an ar t i f i c ia l analytical construct of l imited value, this distinction is both doomed to logical failure and carries pol i t ical dangers. Chapter six examines whether existing planning theories have been able to make a contribution to our understanding of the crisis of planning, and whether they are able to speak to practising planners. In particular, the focus is on three theoretical approaches, which by their overtly c r i t i c a l orientation have begun something approaching a systematic critique of the role of planning in western, capitalist societies. In particular it is argued that these approaches (new decentralists, neo-Marxists, and planning theory derived from c r i t i c a l theory) whatever their prescriptive failings, have made major contributions to our analytical understanding either in raising issues which have been on the whole ignored but are of practical significance (new decentralists), or in offering insights on the socio-historical context of planning (neo-Marxists), or in extending the arguments of theory to the point of practical advice to planners (cri t ical theory). This chapter concludes with an examination of one area of theory which begins to address the context of planning action. Forester (1985, p.52) argues that if : a formulation can be offered that generalizes expectable constraints across various planning situations, then we are half way to recognizing that the theory of rational action depends in part upon a theory of the institutional and structural contexts of action. 34 This dissertation attempts a formulation of those generalizabie 'expectable constraints'. In chapter seven I conclude the theoretical argument put forward in this dissertation by reassembling the main themes of the argument and relating these to the task for planning theory. This chapter proposes an agenda for l iberal democratic planning theory in the 1990s, which attempts to build up a series of useful, if part ial , conceptions of the possibility and direction for planning action from a systematic, and realistic, understanding of the socio-polit ical context of planning. In particular this proposes that what is called the crisis of planning is rooted in the inevitable absence of consensus in societies about the role of the state in society, and about the efficacy of state intervention in the turbulent workings of the market in terms of totality of human benefit and for social justice; and that this lack of consensus, which waxes and wanes is in a fundamental relationship to what is called the crisis of rationality. That is the extent of the crisis of rationality is in part a function of the primacy of values and value confl ict in planning problems. Value confl ict results in part from an absence of consensus on the role of the state. In putting this argument I first examine a number of arguments for state intervention in society, the relation of state to market, and the implication of these for planning. I argue that as public sector planning is an instrumental expression of the role of the state, and given the extreme unlikelihood of revolution, planning theorists have a responsibility to explore the practical implications of organizational options at the state-market conjuncture. Further, as planning holds a brief for the future vis-a-vis the present, and as the future is not a fact but an interactive fusion of fact and value, theorists have a responsibility to develop ethical frameworks and principles. These may help combine the practical benefits of the market in terms of feedback 35 with a conception of the transcending social responsibility of the state and to 'embed' ethical principles in pol i t ical culture. Second, the concluding chapter reviews the arguments about turbulence and proposes some appropriate organizational and individual responses to uncertainty. In particular the importance of action learning and uncompartmentalized organizational responses; inter-agency negotiation, cooperation, and risk taking; and the social distribution of planning knowledge based on ethical considerations are emphasized. Third , I examine the implications for planning theory of the boundaries of social scientific inquiry, given the endemic uncertainty generated by turbulence. The appropriate responses are holistic and interdisciplinary. I stress that planning, because of its existing multidisciplinary and vocational orientation, is uniquely placed to join in evolving modes of social inquiry, particularly action research. A beginning is made by proposing a general policy model for planning which takes into account both the centrality of values in the planning context, the non-revolutionary nature of planning action, and the position of planning knowledge as a lever on the distribution of societal power, requiring ethical norms. A n appendix concludes the dissertation by using the policy model approach, and the key analytic elements derived from a study of the notion of the crisis of planning, in a brief introductory case study of urban decline and planning response in the U K . 36 CHAPTER 2. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN SOCIETY INTRODUCTION One of the main dimensions of the context of planning has to do with competing perspectives on the appropriate role of the state in society in terms of the balance between state intervention or control, one type of which is planning, and individual freedom. The rise of neo-Conservative thinking has particularly sharpened this debate, but the tension between aspirations for individual freedom set against the need for social control in service of a greater good has been of almost constant interest to poli t ical philosophers since the late 16th century. It is not possible to participate intelligently in the current debate without reference to the thread of pol i t ical philosophy on this topic. Lately planning, as an obvious manifestation of state intervention, has come in many ways to be identified with the rise and apparent fa l l of the western welfare state. The welfare state evolved mainly after World War II, its growth fuelled by a period of sustained economic expansion and relative poli t ical stability between 1945 and the mid-1970s. Now in many ways the welfare state is suffering a crisis brought on by economic recession and by changes in the direction of polit ical thinking. There is widespread loss of confidence in the ability of states to promote economic w e l l -being, ful l employment or to deliver efficient welfare services. There are tax-revolts on the right, and anti-bureaucratic movements of left and right, al l of which have helped bring on the idea of the overload of government in the welfare state and thus a crisis of planning. 37 A t another level however the nation state has never been more dominant as a mode of pol i t ical and social organization. A broader perspective which takes into account the waning of colonialism, and rise of nation states covering virtually every land area and people of the globe, suggests that the age of the nation state, with its origins in 16th century Europe, may be near its apex. In particular, the administrative power of the state and its use of information as a resource or well-spring of power are important. For many reasons, if we are to better understand the context of planning, it is necessary to look back to some basic principles and events concerning the role of the state, the evolution of the welfare state, and the influence of poli t ical philosophy on views of the state. These threads are followed from the 16th century to the present day rise of neo-Conservative thinking, with its considerable implications for planning endeavours. T H E S T R U C T U R E O F S T A T E S To understand the institutional context and thus the potential for public sector planning it is helpful to first turn our attention to the question of commonalities among states, in terms of their inter-related role and organization. Any state structure, which includes arrangements of sub-units of government, reflects the perceived role of the state, derived historically and/or from perceptions of the dominant coalition of social groups, and the state's organization, which is the ins t i -tutional arrangements for undertaking goal-seeking behaviour. There are of course many different state structures in the world today, reflecting historical and constitutional evolution, power groupings within societies, and geopolitical forces which impinge on domestic power relations. There are interesting studies which contrast the effects of differing institutional structures on decision making and planning (Ashford, 1982; Pol l i t t , 1984; Peters, 1985). For example Sundquist (1978) compares a number of European 38 countries with the United States to attempt to explain the relatively greater success of the European countries in planning for population movements. The explanatory factors are 1) different levels of bureaucratic capability; 2) different levels of bureaucratic discipline; 3) differences in the authority of party programmes; and 4) differences in the institutional environment of planning. But however many different state structures exist, in a l l states public planning represents one form of the intervention of the state in society. Any consideration of public planning must therefore derive from an understanding of the role of the state. If we wish to analyse the objectives of existing planning systems or theories, or propose new ideas, then it w i l l be helpful to briefly consider the evolution of important lines of thought about the state. Although the goals of state intervention are obviously diverse and multi-dimensional, there are certain basic parameters of the workings of states which relate to views on the appropriate role of the state. These pre-determine much of the potentiality of planning. This thesis examines those parameters which planners and planning theorists work within, or against. It is folly to ignore them, especially in times of crisis for planning. As Hall (1983, p.43) notes 'the capacity of each state to formulate and implement innovative forms of policy ... is affected by the structural features of the state itself, of state-society relations, and of social institutions'. Hal l suggests that the structures of power and rationality implicit in institutionalized sets of relations can have a 'profound impact' on the capacity of government to innovate. March and Olsen (1984) make a similar case that government is not only influenced by society, but that the institutions of government structure patterns of interaction in society. 39 The question might be raised as to what extent generalities are possible across different state systems. For example, the U K has a unitary system of government and Canada, like the United States and Austral ia , is a federation. However as Smith (1985, p.9-17) makes clear, the practical differences between state systems can be less than might be expected: Federations as much as unitary states are confronted with the same classes of problem, whether it be in the delimitation of sub-national areas, the allocation of power including those to tax and consequent intergovernmental relationships, the creation of democratic and bureaucratic institutions, and the need to legitimise the State. Nor are commonalities between states in terms of problems of intervention, or crises of planning, solely confined to western welfare states. On the contrary, problems of planning can be found in al l industrial states with a high level of state intervention in the workings of complex economies. The commonality of a high level state intervention in society in both western market economies and centrally planned economies is described by Miles (1985, p.84-5): In market economies the state is at some remove from the decision-making and planning activities of many major economic organizations, although the activities and goals of these enterprises is crucial in shaping state policies. In centrally planned economies the situation is somewhat different: while enterprise managers necessarily have some autonomy, long-term economic goals are determined internally within the state apparatus. This contrast is important, but should not be allowed to obscure the high level of involvement of most industrial states in their economies - even if they proclaim laissez-faire ideals. It is common for many economic sectors to be highly regulated, if not completely controlled, by the state even in market economies - this is particularly likely for strategic industries (e.g. banking), and major infrastructure (e.g. passenger transport), while other industries (e.g. military suppliers) may be effectively producing for state purposes. Often declining industries have been taken under state control in the West (thus shoring them up with public subsidies). New technology industries have recently been at the forefront of state intervention around the world. So there is considerable evidence for the importance of the role of the state in terms of intervention in the economy, and in society generally, irrespective of ideological stance, and such intervention is a fact of l i fe in the twentieth century. 40 There is also considerable evidence that there are generic problems of the organization of the modern state which are generalizable across ideological and geographic boundaries. It has been argued that governments based on central control may be 'likewise aff l ic ted by the same policy diseases that incline a l l ambitious governments to fa l l apart from a combination of lack of co-ordination, implementation deficit and the creeping weight of incrementalism' (Gil l iat , 1984, p.362). Equally, the same author suggests that centralized economies 'reveal the same lack of commitment and unwillingness to engage in organizational reform that characterize many government tolerated implementation gaps in the west'. A similar point is that the Soviet Union is plagued with many of the same organizational and centre-periphery tensions, and inter-regional insensitivities, as countries in the West. This may be due to an 'internal colonialism' within the Soviet Union attributable to the hegemony of the industrialized cities and/or of the dominant, centralized pol i t ical bureaucracy (Gouldner, 1976). Final ly, Argyris (1978) argues that there are three primary causal factors which lead to a modern organizational crisis in both capitalist and non-capitalist worlds: (1) the nature of human beings as information processing systems, (2) the theories of action people hold about effective influence over others, and (3) the nature of organizational learning systems. One conclusion is that some of the problems facing planning in capitalist states are not derived solely from the reproduction of the capitalist system, but reflect the nature of human social organization in the current socio-historical context. If this is the case then it seems useful to look to both the polit ical role of the state in society, and to the organizational arrangements by which planning might be carried out in order to understand the context and therefore the potential of planning. The latter is 41 undertaken in chapter 3. In terms of the former, if we accept that the rationale for public planning is derived from the perceived role of the state, a key to understanding the context of planning may be to look to the development of ideas concerning the state, rather than to attempt to explain its role solely in terms of external factors such as the economy or cultural patterns (Meny, 1986). Certainly in any appraisal of decision making in public policy fields a common focus of inquiry is the appropriate role for government itself . This chapter takes an historical overview of the evolution of the state in society, and the development of the welfare state. Pol i t i ca l philosophy, in addressing the problems and prospects of ordered human enterprise in nation states, is both explanatory and normative. That is, it addresses how a poli t ical society does or could work, and usually passes judgment on whether this is good or bad for mankind. This dual emphasis is reflected in a statement by Saint Simon (1964, p.56) that 'the progress of enlightenment reveals the anomalies of the old social order, and makes the need of a new organization felt ' . Pol i t ica l philosophy encompasses analysis and value judgments on modern human organization, and as such provides key insights into an understanding of the planning crisis. However ignorant we may be of the antecedents to our pol i t ical views, i t is the case that polit ical actions and ideologies, and planning theories of today, are directly and inextricably linked to our intellectual inheritance. In most cases these views have been formed and molded by various polit ical philosophies developed since the Enlightenment. The balance of this chapter examines the development of western polit ical philosophy on the issue of the role of the state, and its capacity to promote social stability in the face of natural tendencies to instability caused by individualistic actions. This in turn wi l l assist in a critique of a number of planning theories in a later chapter. 42 Definition of the State Politics relates directly to the necessities of human l i fe , and a polit ical society, in Spragins (1976, p.2) words, is 'a framework of ordered relationships within which we are enabled to live together and satisfy our communal wants and needs. A poli t ical society, in short, is a meaningful human enterprise.' One problem is that there are no consistent, generic definitions which set out the relationship of state to nation to government. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the state as the 'body-politic' , and 'polit ical ' as 'of or affecting the State or its government, of public affairs' . Politics is 'the science and art of government, pol i t ical affairs, or l i fe ' . From this, the state can be construed to be administered by government, and politics taken as the activity of governing. But somewhat inconsistently the O E D defines the state as 'an organized poli t ical community under one government', and a society as the 'organization of a c ivi l ized nation'. Isuani (1980) reviews the use of these concepts in the social sciences and finds only a 'semantic labyrinth 1 of largely intuitive definitions. He synthesizes a workable definition from the literature of poli t ical theory: 1) the state as an association or community that coincides with society; 2) the state as a dimension of society, that embraces or opposes other societal dimensions, such as church, media, unions, private companies; and 3) the state as an apparatus for government, administration and/or coercion. Such distinctions are evolutionary insofar as a separation of state from society, in popular as opposed to philosophical thought, may be recent. In the 18th and 19th century the notion of the state was closely related to contemporary national unification movements, the consolidation of territory, and anti-church movements. 43 Often the interests of state and nation or society were held up as identical and morally right. In the late twentieth century the state, contaminated perhaps by an association with force and violence, is seldom taken as co-terminus with the concept of society, which implies cultural community. For this reason number 3 from above is generally now taken as a definition of the state. For example, North (1981, p.249) defines the state as 'an organization with a comparative advantage in violence, extending over a geographic area and whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax its constituents. The essence of property rights is the right to exclude, and an organization which has a comparative advantage in violence is in a position to specify and enforce property rights'. In otherwise peaceful Canada a clear example of the state's exercize of its comparative advantage in violence was the invocation of the War Measures Act in 1971 to enable troops to be used to counter the anti-state threat of the Front de la Liberation du Quebec. Although the presence of troops and tanks on the streets of Montreal was a shock to Canadians, it wouldn't be to the residents of Belfast, or the Basque country, or many other places. These may seem extreme examples of attempts to maintain a near monopoloy of the state in force, but are also a logical extension of the need for power and control which enables planning. The difference is of degree. This control is in counterpoint to a long and important tradition of attention to individual freedom in western polit ical thought. THE STATE AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM According to Adam Smith, Europe adopted feudalism after the decline of Rome as a response to polit ical uncertainty and the constant danger of invasion and death by marauding armies. For five centuries, and long after the threat of invasion had 44 passed, powerful feudal landlords retained control over land, politics and local economies, and the spiritual order was dominated by the Catholic Church (Moss, 1979). By the twelfth century however, there was the gradual rise of mercantil ism, the accumulation of capital , and the emergence of market economies. A secularization had begun in western Europe which was to lead to the Rennaissance, and to the beginning of modern states. The breaking down of the feudal order gave rise to the art of secular polit ics, no longer dominated by either religion or the norms of chivalry. The first important exponent of secular politics was Machiavel l i , writing in the early sixteenth century. The society of which Machiavelli (1961) wrote, the city states of northern Italy, was very unstable. There were constant factional conflicts among armies, and tension between rich and poor, leading to poli t ical corruption and institutional decay (Sabine, 1950). Machiavelli had been a c iv i l servant in Florence for a decade, when he was exiled by the return to power of the Medic i . During the course of this exile he wrote The Prince and the Discourses, both of which argued for a politics devoid of theology and even morality. Machiavelli 's stress on the importance of the stability of the secular state is a recurring theme, and st i l l a major consideration in current poli t ical science. Machiavelli was also the first poli t ical philosopher to argue raison d'etat as an explanation and defence of polit ical action, and only after him did the concept of the state become a central object of polit ical philosophy. A century after Machiavell i , England was confronted by instability and c iv i l strife, both religious and between the landed aristocracy and the rising middle class. The result was c iv i l war. This situation drove Hobbes (1977) in Leviathan to examine the failure of sovereign authority in England. This was brought on, he argued, by the subservience of the state to the church. The c iv i l war represented a regression to the 45 natural condition of man outside of the bounds of c iv i l society, which was characterized by war (Spragins, 1976). Here can be found an emphasis on a secular, stable state governed by a sovereign power as inevitably better than the anarchy of natural, individualistic, man. The actions of individuals created the state, and subsequent law and justice were created by the sovereign who secured the state, and was implic i t ly obeyed by the individual members. The motive for this, as Hobbes put i t , 'is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented l i fe thereby, that is to say, of getting out of the miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent to the natural passions of men... ' (in Curt is , 1981a, p.339). The state, in this view, made possible the achievements of c ivi l izat ion, and the state was brought about by a social contract, which once entered into voluntarily by individuals, becomes a compulsory association wherein: every man should say to every man, "I authorize and give up my right to govern myself to this man, or this assembly of men, on this condition, that you give up thy right to him" ... and this done, the multitude so united in one person is called a Commonwealth (Hobbes, 1977, p.132). In this way a polit ical power is created in the form of a strong secular state, pre-eminent in polit ical and social l i f e , and necessary because of the self-seeking nature of individuals' behaviour and patterns of interaction (Held, 1984). Hobbes recognizes and institutionalizes the state's right to regulate individual behaviour for the general good. Civi l izat ion is impossible without this regulation, and the option to do away with it is not available once the contract is made. In Hobbes' work can be found first , a systematic analysis of the relationship between individual freedom and state control; and second, a rationale for state intervention from a conception of a greater good to be had from regulation of individuals' behaviour. John Locke's (1960) reaction to the English c iv i l war was rather different. His Second Treatise was a reply to Hobbes in which he stressed the role of consent as the 46 basis of al l poli t ical power, in the form of a voluntary rather than a compulsory contract between governor and governed. Men are free, equal and rational in nature, and need not submit to any arbitrary or absolute power. The instability of England was due to the exercise of arbitrary power by the monarchy, which engendered a natural rebellious reaction. The rulers of England, the embodiment of the state, had damaged their contractual relationship with the governed by taxing without consent, by creating armies, and by l imit ing the religious liberties of the cit izenry (Spragins, 1976, p.34). Man had natural rights, including l i fe , l iberty, and property and these could not be transgressed by the state. A state of nature, which was a state of liberty rather than Hobbes' state of license, was preferable to bad government, and good government was created by a social contract to assist peaceful living and protect property. In this view the Stuart monarchy had become bad government and therefore deserved overthrow. In Locke's work can be found a different theme from that of Hobbes or Machiavel l i : government not as an imperative fo i l to a chaotic natural state but as a contract with the consent of the governed, to be dissolved or altered when it no longer served its purpose of safeguarding the right to l i fe , liberty and property. This state was not only temporary but l imited, and had to be prevented from transgressing natural rights by constitutional limits on the extent of its authority. Government was by consent and consent could be revoked by individuals in society and government could be changed. In Locke's view the creation of government is the burden individuals have to bear to secure their ends and while the state exists to safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens, it must generally be restricted in scope and constrained in practice to ensure individual freedom (Held, 1984, p41). Locke's views on the danger of arbitrary or absolute power on the part of the state were reinforced by his view, set out in Essay Concerning Human Understanding, that the acquisition of human 47 knowledge was constrained by the inherent limitations in the abilities of our senses to perceive the reality behind our images of reality. In the face of our l imited knowledge, tolerance and a degree of scepticism about the ability of the state to govern were indicated (Locke, 1975). In Hobbes and Locke then can be found two diverse reactions to c i v i l instability, and two important themes in modern thinking on the state: conservatism and the beginning of l iberalism. In Lockean ideas, which have considerable influence today, we find the origins of l iberal thought which was taken to Amer ica , and which emphasized the right to liberty and the right of revolution againt arbitrary authority. These ideas saw print in the writings of Tom Paine, amongst others. Locke himself insists on the right of revolution as the only effective test of citizenship, although for Locke such citizenship does not extend beyond the propertied class (MacPherson, 1977b). In any case here are the roots of the cr i t i ca l bourgeois revolutions to come in France and America , in support of l iberalism, and against conservatism in the form of monarchy. With Locke begins the development of the main philosophical arguments for the l iberal democratic state, and contemporary theorists such as Nozick continue the Lockean emphasis on individual private rights inviolable by the state. In Locke's prescient linking of fundamental human limitations in acquiring knowledge with constraints on the power of government (or any corporate body) to dictate or plan, can be found an important area of concern in current organization theory, discussed further in chapters four and seven. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, writing in the eighteenth century, provides a counterpoint to these evolving notions of liberal democracy. He contrasts the natural man, who is whole but concerned solely with himself, with the c i t izen, who understands his good to be identical to the common good. In Emile Rousseau attempts to reconcile man's 48 selfish nature with the demands of c i v i l society. He emphasizes that the passion of selfishness is changed by the very experience of living in a stable society. Man is not virtuous in a state of nature, virtue only comes about in a society based on law, and the unselfish virtues can increase with t ime. In the Social Contract Rousseau (1927) argues that such c ivic virtue is insured by the development of a ' c iv i l religion' inculcated by the sovereign. The dogma of the c i v i l religion includes tolerance, sanctity of the social contract, and respect for law (West, 1979). In particular Rousseau was unhappy with the existing ideas of social contract which implied or specified a direct transfer of sovereignty from individual to the state. Instead Rousseau proposed a system of self-government or direct democracy in which al l citizens would be actively involved in the process of government, rather than simply engaging in periodic voting for a representative to take decisions. Here the idea of self-government is posited as an end in itself and a polit ical order is proposed in which the affairs of the state are integrated into the affairs of ordinary citizens (Held, 1984). The legitimate authority of the state in Rousseau's conception is based on 'the common good embodied in the 'general w i l l ' ' , which takes precedence over individual w i l l . The general wi l l cannot be developed by a divisive, selfish, class structured society, but only by a one-class society of working proprietors, and such a society was to be achieved by government action: It is therefore one of the most important functions of government to prevent extreme inequality of fortunes; not by taking away wealth but by depriving al l men of the right to accumulate i t ; not by building hospitals for the poor, but by securing citizens from becoming poor (Rousseau, 1927, p.267). In the writings of Rousseau we find the origins of important ideas in modern polit ical thinking, particularly in the areas of participation and equality. Rousseau has been 49 claimed as an antecedent by Utopians for his emphasis on the small farmer and for his radical ideas on education (in Emile), and most importantly by Marxists for his emphasis on an egalitarian single class society. His cal l for direct polit ical participation precurses an important theme in community development and planning theory which emphasizes the value of 'hands-on' or 'bottom-up' efforts by citizens to take control of their own lives. Chapter six examines one such planning theory. It is not surprising to find aspects of his philosophy in many places, for Rousseau went well beyond the visible manifestations of the state, to consider psychological and moral aspects of human endeavour and organization. The Early Conservative View of the State Within a decade, from 1789 to 1799, the ancient regime of French feudal society was swept aside as a result of a revolution marked by the liquidation of the ruling class, and wholesale confiscations of property. The revolution destroyed the established order in the form of the absolute monarchy with a feudal aristocracy and substituted first constitutional monarchy and then a democratic republic. Even more important were the changes in the social order resulting from the establishment of a consciously libertarian and ideological society which transformed property, family, law, religion and education. For the first t ime, the principle of a state as socially responsible for individual welfare was embodied in a constitution, which guaranteed all citizens the right to a livelihood. The newly established social order in France, however, was precarious and constantly challenged from within by dissent on three models: the moderate l iberal , the radical democrat, and the socialist (Caute, 1966, p.35). This resulted in continuing upheaval. This unstable situation was cr i t ic ized by conservatives in England, the most articulate of whom was Burke. 50 Burke found the revolution in France a terrifying prospect, which could only lead to continual crisis. In Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) he contended that, by destroying the social bases of order, such as religion and social hierarchy, the French had discarded essential restraints on individualistic action. An oscillation between tyranny and anarchy would be the result (Spragins, 1976, p.36). Burke emphasized the importance of institutions - the state, the church, and private property - and tradition. He argued that the libertarians' insistance on individual liberty and natural rights was unrealistic, and that society must necessarily constrain mankind: society was created to delivery man from the destructive freedom of an unsocialized condition (Spragins, 1976, p. 115). Moreover, this constraint could hardly be expected from a fully representative government, because constraint could only issue from a power outside the potentially unruly individuals. In this suspicion of representative government Burke's conservatism was allied with the anti-democratic views of many moderate liberals. Not until the early twentieth century did the majority of conservatives and moderate liberals come to accept the principle of universal suffrage as the basis for establishing the governing body of the state. Thus for liberals as diverse as John Stuart M i l l and de Tocqueville, the rule of the masses was bound to l imit the advance of liberty and enlightenment (Caute, 1966, p.35). The evolution of liberalism to liberal democracy constitutes one of the most important themes of western polit ical thought. The rest of this chapter wi l l examine this theme, and also the important reactions against this liberal capitalist perspective, contributing as it does to the development of the welfare state, and our perceptions on the role of government. 51 Industrialization and Early Liberalism It has been suggested that the three great revolutions of western Europe were: the age of enlightenment, the French revolution, and the industrial revolution (Schapiro, 1962). Early industrialization in England and Europe took place under the framework of the administrative system termed by Adam Smith as mercantil ism. This involved extensive government regulation over capital and labour, including restrictions on imports, financial inducements to export, and special rights and trading privileges to certain individuals and companies, for example, to the Hudson's Bay Company or the East India Company (Rosenberg, 1979). Mercantilism was, to Smith, government designed to promote the interests of a few businessmen at the expense of the 'the public interest'. However this 'public interest' was only identified with the interests of the newly emerging bourgeoisie. For neither the French nor industrial revolutions had spread financial benefit or franchise to the working class, who were pouring into the great industrial cities from the countryside. The bourgeoisie was replacing the landed aristocracy as the ruling class, and it was this bourgeousie who required of its thinkers a social and polit ical philosophy which met its attitudes and values. This philosophy was liberalism. The essential problem of liberalism was to develop a polit ical system which would produce governments which would nurture a free market society and protect citizens from the natural tendency of governments to be rapacious. For the individual, freedom in the poli t ical and economic sphere was essential. In the economic sphere under capitalism, a l l were free to engage in business, and those who benefit themselves benefit the nation as a whole. The government was not to interfere in the workings of this natural economic system, in other words, laissez faire was the order of the day. 52 In the polit ical sphere the problem of liberalism was the extent of the franchise -the issue of democracy. For citizens to be protected from rapacious governments, they must be able to 'question, check and control the policies of office holders, and confirm them i n , or dismiss them from office ' (Sherman, 1972, p.291). But given this, to what extent did the bourgeoisie wish to enfranchise the rest of society? Their inclination was not, at f i rst , towards poli t ical or economic enfranchisement for the working class at a l l . Indeed the earliest liberals, from Locke to Burke, were ant i -democratic (MacPherson, 1977b, p.20). Early liberal democracy did not begin until the rise of the utilitarian philosophy, in the early 19th century, with the work of Jeremy Bentham (1742-1832), and until then there were no clear arguments for local government. The functions of uti l i tarian government then were l imited to the maintenance of security and the promotion of a free market economy in which uti l i tarian principles could promote the greatest good for the most people. Adam Smith was the economic philosopher of uti l i tarianism, and his economic theory came to be called 'classical economies'. A t the time' Smith's economics were radical , insofar as they proposed limitations on sovereign power, and benefit to the common man, rather than solely to the mercantilist class. Smith emphasized the production of wealth and the abolition of special privilege. Beyond this, laissez faire would bring maximum uti l i ty to the most people. Smith was also the first to put forward the labour theory of value, later adopted by Marx. The free market society had to ensure some method of representative and responsible government, if the citizens were to be protected from that government. The evolution in Bentham's own thinking mirrors the progress of democracy in liberalism (MacPherson, 1977b, p.25-35). In 1791 Bentham proposed a franchise excluding the 53 poor, the uneducated, and women. In 1809 he suggested all property holders paying tax. By 1817 he was for universal manhood franchise. Even here the transition is a grudging one, and MacPherson (1977b, p.10) suggests that 'the concept of l iberal democracy became possible only when .. . l iberal theorists found reasons for believing that 'one man, one vote' would not be dangerous to property, or to the continuance of class-divided society'. Indeed MacPherson argues that what divides pre-liberal thinkers, like Rousseau, from true liberal democrats is not only democracy in terms of the vote, but the liberal democrats' implici t acceptance of the class divisions inherent in capitalism. This constitutes the 'pure' l iberal democracy. The transition from the pure liberal democracy of Bentham and his disciple James M i l l , to one tempered by an ethical humanism is marked especially by the writings of John Stuart M i l l in the nineteenth century. However, we are now at the point in this discussion where polit ical thought loses the remoteness of history, for a consideration of J.S. M i l l leads us directly down the path to liberal capitalism and reformist l iberal capitalism, or social democracy. It is with M i l l that many current discussions of the relationship between the state and society begin. Before taking that up it is useful to turn to two other important themes in western polit ical thought. These are both antithetical to liberal capitalism: socialism and anarchism. Socialism divides further into the 'scientific socialism' of Marx and the group of socialists he derisively called 'utopian'. The Utopian socialists were not to have any lasting direct influence on either polit ical development or social justice, but their indirect influence wi l l be apparent in the tenets of later democratic socialism or what is called social democracy. Socialism, utopianism and to a certain extent anarchistic thought have had considerable influence on current planning theory. 54 Utopianism and Industrial Society The term Utopian derives from Sir Thomas More's Utopia (1516) which describes l i fe in an ideal society. Utopian visions have exerted a strong fascination for planning theorists, concerned as they often are with th means and ends to a 'better' future l i fe . There are two distinct elements in Utopian visions which surface again and again in planning theory. Buber (1949, p.11) terms these schematic f ict ion and organic planning. Schematic fiction originates in abstract imagination which starts from a theory of nature of man and then deduces a social order that wi l l employ man's capabilities and satisfy a l l his needs. The purpose of organic planning is to inaugurate, from an undogmatic understanding of contemporary man and his condition, a transformation in both, so as to overcome the contradictions of our social order. In the new order envisioned by the Utopian socialists, independent, voluntary groups were to form communities and establish an economy based on the common use of the means of production, thus 'socializing' industry (Schapiro, 1962, p.21). The Utopian socialists regarded the state, in its present forms, as ineffective and uncreative, and incapable of solving the economic problems posed by industrial capitalism. A consideration of utopianism begins with Saint Simon who wrote around the turn of the nineteenth century. Like Rousseau, he is claimed directly or indirectly by diverse left poli t ical factions - socialist, anarchist, and Communist, and yet his doctrine is also described as sometimes indistinguishable from liberalism (Ionescu, 1976, p.46). In fact Saint Simon's concerns were less with a polit ical state than with an industrial state: the organization of a post-revolutionary industrial society, its effective functioning, and its institutionalization. The new social order in France, Saint Simon maintained, was the result of changes wrought by science and technology, and the real conflict in society was no longer between ruler and democrat but between industrial participant and the idle (the nobles, clergy, military) (Schapiro, 1962, p.22-55 24). The future nation was to be seen as a great industrial society run by a hierarchy of classes, based on their relative importance in the productive process, and imbued with a new spirit of religion. A t the top were scientists, then technicians, engineers, bankers etc. Lowest were the labourers, who nevertheless would be assured of wages sufficient for a comfortable standard of l iving. Private profit was rejected by Saint Simon as the prime motive of economic act iv i ty . Rather technological invention plus abundant production and increased productivity would be used to advance the welfare of society as a whole, with each person's share dependent on his contribution. In polit ical terms, he called this the 'politics of abilities', where power was decentralized from small centrist nodes of power to the appropriate positions based on relative contributions to societal well-being. In macro terms this meant that nation states (in Europe) would disappear to be replaced by a European confederative association, which was the territorial ly appropriate size for industrial society (Ionescu, 1976, p.24-27). With the nation state, central governments would also disappear to be replaced by European deliberative and administrative organizations. Representative government would disappear naturally, to be replaced by direct administration which ensured a planned economy, ful l employment, high productivity, and wide-spread purchasing power. Saint Simon's technocratic vision of social justice was strange in some ways, and yet in other ways he presaged many important concerns of social democrats in a modern Europe, particularly with regard to the uti l i ty of supranational deliberative and administrative agencies. His interests in welfare at the societal level and in the appropriate spatial distribution of power are also of continuing interest. 56 Later Utopian Socialists 'Utopian socialist' was a term coined by Marx to identify a group of social philosophers whose attitude was unscientific according to the dialectic method, because they hoped to ameliorate the conditions of the working class by individual benevolence and small group enterprise (Rosenau, 1974, p. 143). The epithet 'utopian' became the most derisive of terms in the fight of Marxism against non-Marxian socialism. The writers referred to by Marx however formed no common group, nor did they agree on analysis or solution. But they did share the view that capitalism and the industrial system, and often competition and private property, were wasteful methods of production, and socially inequitable and immoral in income distribution. The Utopian socialists repudiated what Marx called 'the inexorable laws of pol i t ical economy' which seems automatically to condemn the working class to poverty (Schapiro, 1962, p.21). An important Utopian socialist thinker of the same period as Saint Simon was Robert Owen, the owner of a large cotton mi l l in New Lanark, Scotland. Owen was also distressed at the miserable conditions of the labouring class, and proposed what has come to be called 'the economy of high wages' or the model of the contented worker (Schapiro, 1962, p.30). A t New Lanark he raised wages, shortened the work day, abolished child labour, made the factories clean and sanitary, and built workers' housing. He was rewarded with great efficiency in his factories, and high profits. Owen was not satisfied with such organic planning however. He was also driven to schematic f ict ion in the form of ideal communities based on harmony and co-operation, rather than the evils of private profit and competition. These ideas found fruition in early model industrial villages, such as Saltair and Port Sunlight, which influenced in turn the arts and crafts movement and the garden cities movement and thus the whole direction of twentieth century land use planning. 57 Although Owen's 'Villages of Cooperation' in the U . K . and the U . S . A . fai led, he was not without substantial influence in the passing of factory laws and in the promotion of trade unionism. Many early trade union leaders were Owenite socialists. A number of his followers established the cooperative movement, and his influence is apparent in the Fabian tradition and in some of the politics of the Labour party in the U K and the New Democratic Party in Canada. The Utopian socialists' movement itself virtually died out in the late 19th century, but Owen was especially influential in promoting individual social justice by government, without violent or revolutionary activities or social strife. In fact Owen, in response to the revolutionary events of 1848 of which he strongly disapproved, said 'it has always been my impression ... that it wi l l be much easier to reform the world through governments, properly supported by the people, than by any other means' (Caute, 1966, p.37). Given this and other factors, i t is not surprising that Marx decried the Utopian socialists, and that their main legacy is in social democracy. Anarchism: No State Anarchism, in common with utopianism puts forward a critique of existing society, a scenario of a desirable future society, and a means of passing from one to the other. As to the question of the role of the state the anarchist's answer is simple - none whatsoever. The state in any form is inherently tyrannical and must be replaced by non-government inspired cooperation between free groups and individuals (Caute, 1966, p i 14). In its repudiation of the state, anarchist philosophy was a train of radical thought in sharp contrast to both liberalism and socialism. 58 Anarchist thought is derived from the ideology of the enlightenment and the thinking of Rousseau, in its view of man as good and reasonable by nature, and evil and irrational only when subject to the repression of a coercive authority (Schapiro, 1962, p.42-45). The advent of the state had destroyed the prior l ife of mankind, which was of freedom and equality, in conformity with nature. In anarchist thought the individual has complete liberty to do as he wishes, so long as his actions are not harmful to others. Any institutions which hamper this freedom must be destroyed, including state, church, property, and family . Of these the state is the most evil and most tyrannical - an instrument of repression in the interests of a dominent minority. The state has to be abolished, and replaced with a social order based on spontaneous cooperation between Individuals and groups of individuals united into loose federations. The precursor of anarchist ideology was William Godwin (1756-1836) who in An Enquiry Concerning Pol i t ica l Justice, questioned the pattern of relationships between man and state posited by Enlightenment thinkers. The state, he argued, was a product of violence and coercion, while society was by nature free and good (Woodcock, 1962, pgs. 13-16). To establish this ideal society, the state must be abolished, along with those institutions such as property and marriage, which depended on its power. The first conscious 'anarchist' was Proudhon (1809-1865), who denounced capitalism as an unjust, exploitive society and the state as the embodiment of evil (Woodcock, 1962, p.106-144). His ideal lay in a classless, libertarian society, where property was abolished and the 'reign of contract' would replace "the 'reign of laws'. Contract would replace authority, and property would be replaced by 'possession' in which farm would belong to farmer, and goods produced to the worker. Although Proudhon wrote 59 'property is theft', he referred only to capitalist property, and was an individual anarchist who opposed collective ownership in capitalist or socialist form. As an ideology, pure anarchism had l i t t le lasting polit ical effect . Even in Spain, where it was strongest, the last anarchist holdouts found themselves increasingly pushed into alliances with Moscow-influenced communist groups, especially during the c i v i l war. It is in anarcho-syndicalism's support for powerful labour unions that one finds the legacy of anarchism. In planning theory, radical decentralist proposals which reflect a profound mistrust of the nation state, have been influenced by anarchistic thought. Marxism and the Withered State The single most influential polit ical theorist has been Marx (1818-1883) who distinguished himself from Utopian socialists by propounding a 'scientific socialism'. After Saint Simon, Marx viewed politics as the 'science of production' which when properly organized would cause the state to wither away (Zeitl in, 1967, p. 19). Marx was also influenced by the English classical economists, including Smith, Richardo, and J . S . M i l l . His ethical outlook was a kind of secular humanism, and his introduction to the disturbing effects of industrial capitalism was through Engel's Condition of the Working Class in England. Marx developed a general poli t ical theory, based on Hegalian dialectic, but focussed on the historical inevitablity of class confl ict , resulting in the overthrow of capitalism and the creation of an eventual classless and stateless society. Marx (1968, p.327) believed this theory universally true for al l times and places, because it was scientif ic . The collapse of capitalism was to be caused by both its inherent 60 inefficiency, and the apparent superiority of communism in organizing the 'factors of production'. The transition, however, would need to occur by revolution because of the entrenched powers of the ruling class. In addition to Marx's general historical theory, he also postulated a specific economic theory based on his development of Hume's labour theory of value into the theory of surplus value and the exploitation of labour. Upon this in turn is based his concept of class struggle (Rush and Al thof f , 1971). Marx's theories, their defects, and his subsequent influence are well-known (Marx, 1968: Vigor, 1966; Sherman, 1972; Steigerwald, 1981). Here we focus solely on the role of the state. According to Marx and Engels, the state emerges historically with private property in the means of production, and the solidification of classes. This social stratif ication undermines the natural solidarity of society, and so the state is required as a coercive force to hold in check the propertyless masses (Zeitl in, 1967, p.73-78). These may be slaves, serfs, or wage-earners under capitalism. In each case the state and its bureaucracy ensures the domination of the economically most powerful class. The state functions through its complex bureaucratic and military organization, using its information network as a mechanism for surveillance, and undermining social movements that threaten the status quo (Held, 1984, p.54). The state, while powerful, is ultimately dependent upon the economically dominant class for its sanction. That class bases its domination on the control of private property which derives from alientated labour, in that the product of the worker's labour is appropriated by the capitalist and becomes a power independent of its producer. Marx (1982, pl4) says: The product of his labour is no longer his own. The greater this product is, therefore, the more he is diminished. The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, assumes an external existence, but that it exists independently, outside himself, and alien to him, and that it stands opposed to him as an autonomous power. The l i fe which he 61 has given to the object sets itself against him as an alien and hostile force, (his emphasis) Private property is both the product of alienated labour, and the means by which labour is alienated. Marx and Engels (1968, p.37) writing together in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, trace the historical development of class domination from feudal nobility to mediaeval commune to independent urban republic to the great monarchies, and thence to the point where: ... the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of modern industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive poli t ical sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. However, after proletarian revolution, class conflict and domination wi l l be eliminated, and the state wi l l lose its raison d'etre and disappear. As Engels (quoted in Lenin, 1982, p.54) puts i t : The proletariat seizes state power, and then transforms the means of production into state property. But in doing this, it puts an end to itself as the proletariat, it puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms, it puts an end also to the state as the state. Former society, moving in class antagonisms, had need of the state, that is, an organisation of the exploiting class at each period for the maintenance of its external conditions of production; therefore, in particular, for the forcible holding down of the exploited class in the conditions of oppression (slavery, bondage or serfdom, wage-labour) determined by the existing mode of production. The state was the of f ic ia l representative of society as a whole, its embodiment in a visible corporate body; but it was this only in so far as it was the state of that class which itself, in its epoch, represented society as a whole: in ancient times, the state of the slave-owning citizens; in the Middle Ages, of the feudal nobility; in our epoch, of the bourgeousie. When ultimately it becomes really representative of society as a whole, it makes itself superfluous. The withering away of the state would include the disappearance of its agents: the police, the judiciary, and the military and presumably planners as wel l . Then the perfect, classless, communist democracy would emerge. However, before this would 62 occur there would be a transitory step to socialism, which would involve a popular democratic dictatorship of the proletariat during which class enemies may need to be repressed. In some countries, the existing state bureaucracy would be smashed and a new one erected; in other countries, like England, a parliamentary transition was possible (Zeitlen, 1967, p.78). One thing is clear -Marx and Engels envisioned the eventual disappearance of this proletarian state and with it any state that would be distinguished from society in general. State and society merge, or the state is 'reabsorbed' into society. Marx wrote 'There wi l l no longer be poli t ical power ... since polit ical power is precisely the of f ic ia l summary of the antagonism in c i v i l society' (in Caute, 1966, p.111). Engels (1968, p424) makes the point: State interference becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then dies out of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is not abolished. It dies out, (his emphasis) Of the followers of Marx, the most successful of the theorists has been Lenin (1870-1924). Although Lenin leaned heavily on Marx and Engels in developing his own ideas, 'Marxism' and 'Leninism' are not synonymous. Lenin's focus was on the dictatorship of the proletariat, and his interests were clearly derived from circumstances and conditions specific to Russia (Medvedev, 1981, p.18). Lenin's main addition to Marx's theory concerned the role of the small revolutionary party as the vanguard of the proletariat and the makers of the revolution (Lenin, 1949; Vigor, 1966, p.131-145; Curtis , 1981b, p.350). Lenin believed that the working class would not spontaneously develop sufficient class consciousness for a revolution and the overthrow of capitalism. This role was to be fulf i l led by a nearly infallible party, as Lenin says 'Marxism teaches ... that only (the Communist party) is capable of united, training, and organizing a vanguard of the proletariat and of the whole mass of the working people' (in Vigor, p.133). Lenin did agree that the state would wither away, but that 63 would not take place for many years, until the proletariat was in the majority. Nor could this withering away of the state take place without violent revolution. Lenin is emphatic on this point and goes to great lengths in The State and Revolution to dispute the notions of 'anarchists and opportunists', German Social-Democrats, and 'social-chauvinists' who are accused of betraying Marx and Engel's teaching in suggesting that there may be other roads to socialist revolution. Lenin (1984, p.57) says: The necessity of systematically fostering among the masses this and just this point of view about violent revolution lies at the root of the whole of Marx's and Engels' teaching. The replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution. The abolition of the proletarian state, i .e. , of al l states, is only possible through "withering away", (his emphasis) The other important follower of Marx was Trotsky who cr i t ic ized Lenin's authoritarian view of the party. Trotsky argued strongly for the concept of permanent international revolution, uninterrupted and universal. This became the basis for his later dispute with Stalin who took the position that revolution in one country was sufficient. In the influential The Revolution Betrayed (1936) Trotsky attributes the apparent failure of the Stalinist bureaucracy to the isolation of the Russian revolution and the poverty of Russia at the time of the revolution. This caused a struggle for goods and thus increased the power of the state in the form of its bureaucracy. This concern is shared by Trotsky's latter day heirs who predict that proletarian revolution in industrialized countries must result in a 'de-bureaucrat-ization' of the state (Mandel, 1979, p.160). Marxism is clear on the role of the state - it wi l l eventually wither away into a classless, stateless society. The only disagreement with the anarchists on this is how, when, and by what process. Given Leninism and the subsequent Soviet experience, the concept of the stateless society doesn't change, but the reality of the virtually 64 permanent state bureaucracy and entrenchment of the so-called vanguard party seriously undermines Marx's scheme. As to local government, Marxists have until recently tended to view the state as a unit that did not need to be differentiated between geographic levels (Smith, 1985, p.37). This has however changed. Recent neo-Marxist thought on local government is considered a l i t t le later, and the influence of Marx on some planning theory becomes apparent. The State in Neo-Marxist Theory Marx left no more than fragments of a theory of the state, and in the post war period neo-Marxists have increasingly turned their attention to the role of the state in society. Here I use the term neo-Marxism to distinguish what has been called 'orthodox Marxism 1 from the multiple and varying interpretations of Marxism which have flowered since the 1950s. Orthodox Marxism has been described as 'the Marxism of the parties', that is Marxist-Leninism of about 1880 to the death of Stalin (Wallerstein, 1986). Early neo-Marxist arguments were characterized by the Poulantzas (1968) -Miliband (1969) debate. Poulantzas (and later Harvey, 1973) put forward a structural explanation of the hegemony of the institutional arrangements between state and business, in which the state is viewed as an integrated element of capitalist social formation, and the role of the state is predetermined by the economic base. Miliband, on the other hand, conceptualized the state as instrumentally controlled by an elite bonded by direct and symbolic interaction. This view sought to describe the power and influence of the ruling class in the state structure. 65 Recently some neo-Marxists have argued that structural theories linking poli t ical problems solely to the economic crisis of capitalism is insufficient to explain the complex conditions of capitalism and the evolution of its institutional arrangements (Elster, 1980; Dear 1981; Jessop 1982). At the same t ime, the continuing critique of structural functionalism in the social sciences has made structural explanations less tenable. Instead theorists increasingly address the autonomy of the state, and the relationship between fiscal and legitimacy crisis and the character of poli t ical institutions in society (Pickvance, 1976). For example, Gottdiener (1985) suggests that: Through the study of the urban crisis Marxian theory has itself been transformed, and the way has been cleared for the independent study of the role of the state in modern society from conventional as well as c r i t i ca l perspectives. Attempts to understand the dynamics of the urban crisis remain an important source of information on the relation between the state and c i v i l society. It is abundantly clear, however, that this historical episode has been managed so far not with crisis but with surprising quiescence. Similarly it has been recognised that the state is no longer simply an epiphenomenon of economic relations, if it ever was, and has a significant measure of autonomy with which to pursue its own interest rather than the interests of a ruling class or external interest group. Furthermore the instrumentalist approach has been cr i t ic ized for fail ing to identify the logic whereby the elites or the ruling class themselves are constituent elements of a wider social order (Dear and Clark, 1981). A new range of neo-Marxist theory now proposes an explicit theory of the state which considers the polit ical and economic dimensions of the state, and has rejected the Poulantzas (and Miliband) lines of argument for regarding capitalist states only from a negative perspective, that is as basically serving to stabilize the capitalist enterprize without considering the capacity of the working class to influence the course and administration of state administration (Held, 1984 p.60). For example, Offe (1984) 66 conceptualizes the state both as a symbolic and autonomous system organized around electoral politics and as a substantive system involving expenditure on public goods, service and infrastructure. Social confl ict and economic problems may lead to a legitimation crisis for the state, particularly when the state is under pressure to act as the representative of the interests of capital . Clark and Dear (1984) cr i t i c ize Poulantzas for his structuralist perspective which fails to consider historical changes in the mechanisms by which the state fulf i l ls its objectives. Like Offe , their thesis is that the state derives equally from the poli t ical and economic imperatives of commodity production, and therefore must be analyzed as 'an institution in its own right' as well as one embedded in society. They focus on the 'state apparatus', which is the particular set of organizations and institutions through which state power is exercized, and they argue that state legitimacy is intimately connected with moral sentiments, which may be expressed in language, constitutional order, or actions (1985, p.275). Their view on the role of the state is indicative of the change in some neo-Marxist thinking: Basically, we believe the state to be a social actor, capable of transformation and reproduction, and bound to the capitalist mode of production by only thin strands of democratic imperatives. The state could envelop class relations, and may restructure power relations. Hence, we remain uncomfortable with liberal or Marxist society-centered theories of the state (theories which reduce state actions to mere shadows of others' interests). The logic and actions of the state apparatus may be closely related to, and justifed by, moral discourse, whether it is polit ically or economically inspired. And the state is in a powerful position to legitimize its own interpretation of social relations (Clark and Dear, 1985, p.276). A related thread has been described as 'pluralist Marxism' insofar as 'the state' is no longer taken as a single, purposeful entity but rather comprises a plurality of institutions (McLennan, 1981; Jessop, 1982). This view enables neo-Marxists to accept the possibility of contradictions between branches of the state. An extension of this is the 'dual state' thesis which differentiates the roles of national and local 67 government and attempts to explain how these sometimes conflicting roles ultimately coalesce in support of the state (Saunders, 1982). But this puts the discussion in what Wallerstein (1986, p.1302) calls the 'third Marxian era' (after Marx, and then the Utopian Marxism of Lenin and Stalin). This third era is characterized by 'a thousand Marxisms, the era of Marxism exploded. In this era not only is there no orthodoxy but it is also hard to say that any version is even dominant'. This makes a synopsis of current neo-Marxism at a general level problematic. Rather further discussion is held until chapter six which considers in some detail current neo-Marxist urban theory and corporatist theory. There it is noted that within planning theory, only the neo-Marxists can be credited with systematically addressing the nature of the links between the state and the growing arrangements for multinational commodity production. Their arguments, while ultimately flawed, provide a useful analytic framework for considering state and economic systems, which has had considerable influence in social science theorizing. SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WELFARE STATE Unlike the Utopians or Marxists, the utilitarians Bentham and James M i l l had no vision of a future society because for them liberal 19th century capitalism was the correct model of society. A l l that was required was democratic government with periodic elections, a free market, and minimal state interference beyond ensuring the security of property. But as MacPherson (1977b, p.44) notes, two changes in the mid-19th century required new thinking. One was that the working class acquired new power and could be dangerous to property. The other was that the condition of the working class was so self-evidently bad that some liberals felt it was morally unjustifiable. 68 John Stuart M i l l saw the liberal democratic state as a means to improve mankind, without having to change the nature of that state, in which democratic politics was a prime mechanism of moral self development (Held, 1984). M i l l felt that the income inequality of capitalism was unjustifiable but that the fault lay, not with capital ism, but in its feudal origins. His hopes for a transformation of the relationship between capital and labour lay with producers' cooperatives. M i l l and others inspired universal suffrage which, along with a series of incrementalist social reforms, greatly reduced class conflict in the industrialized countries. This kept M i l l and his followers from having to confront the essential contradictions between capitalist relations of production and the democratic ideal of equal possibility for individual self-development. MacPherson (1977b, p.69) argues that the party system in liberal capitalist countries 'has been the means of reconciling universal equal franchise with the maintenance of an unequal society' by blurring class issues. Contributing to this is the fact that real incomes, and housing and environmental conditions, did improve dramatically in the late 19th century. Mill 's enduring legacy is not in his economic analysis, but in his advocacy of ethical humanism by state action (and state education) within the capitalist system. In other words a reformist model of democracy, within the market system. This model continues to be the focus of polit ical philosophy in liberal democracies, with revisions and arguments about the role of participation and democracy. MacPherson (1977b, p.70-74) puts forward two elements in modern liberal-democratic theory: neo-idealist pluralism arising from the important work of Max Weber in the late 19th century, and social control of economic forces, which dates from the 1930s depression. In initiating the pluralist view of the workings of the state, Weber defines the modern state as characterized by the legitimate use of coercion within the territory of the nation and between nations, and by the existence of a 69 professional administrative organization which makes use of the state's monopoly of physical force to ensure compliance with its orders. The state therefore includes an institution of government, and in this view government and state are not identical . According to Weber the class nature of the state is quite distinct from the question of the necessity for a centralized bureaucratic administration, and it is misleading to confuse problems about the nature of administration with concern over the control of the state apparatus (Held, 1984, p.62). Central ized, professional administration may be inescapable in the modern state due to the complexity of the administrative task, and the power of the bureaucracy is best countered by strong polit ical institutions like Parliament and the party system. In the absence of these representative pol i t ical institutions, or in socialist states, the bureaucracy would elevate itself into a unitary state bureaucracy and replace the pluralist public and private bureaucracies, and checks and balances, of the liberal state. Weber's analysis of the structure and the workings of bureaucracies gives an important insight into the nature of the modern state, and his views had a powerful influence on the development of pluralist theory or what has been called 'the liberal polit ical science critique' of the relations among state, administration, and classes (Weaver et a l . , 1985). This is characterized by the view that power is distributed amongst a range of competing interest groups, and that these groups attempt to influence poli t ical decisions by exacting whatever leverage they may have over the workings of the system in a continuing process of bargaining and 'partisan mutual adjust-ment'(Dahl, 1978; Lindblom, 1968). In this way the democratic nature of the liberal state is insured by the workings of this system of value conflict and negotiation. There are a number of criticisms of these important arguments, particularly that they tend to ignore the context of international conditions. On this point, Held (1984) credits 70 Weber for his recognition of the importance of interconnections among nation states on the development of any one state. Recent trends towards the social control of economic forces reflect a modern social democratic or revisionist socialist view of the state. This view argues that the economic evils of society are due primarily to the unregulated workings of the institutions of private property. Inequalities of wealth and opportunity should be removed, and industry organized to promote social ends, for example, by nationalization where necessary (Curtis, 1981b, p.349). The most influential group of social democrats has been the Fabian socialists, including the Webbs and George Bernard Shaw. They pursued economic democracy by what has latterly been called 'piece-meal social engineering 1 (Lewis and Melvi l le , 1978). Although the Fabians never fully articulated a theory of the welfare state, their platform of 1918, Labour and the New Social Order, is indiciative of their perception of the role of state: 1. Universal enforcement of minimum levels of social security. 2. Ful l employment, by public works if necessary. 3. . Democratic control of industry, by nationalization where appropriate. 4. Progressive taxation. 5. Redistribution of wealth by the provision of social services, education, and cultural activit ies. Fabianism and social democracy provided a constructive and useful outlet for radical social ideas and advanced social reforms, without commitment to a revolutionary party or to a dogmatic ideology (Shapiro, 1962). Throughout the 20th century there has been a constant tension between the contradictions of capitalism and the ideals of social reform, and between overall stability and individual freedom. The pendulum swings left then right with the polit ical order of the day. 71 Liberal capitalism has thus been transformed in the twentieth century into welfare capitalism in which the free util ization of capital is generally preserved and supported by the state, while the state ensures the loyalty of the population through the maintenance of individual mobility, and welfare measures which secure employment, stabilize income, and provide some housing, educational, and medical benefits. In welfare capital ism: ...the poli t ical system has to stabilize economic conditions, and the government is empowered to intervene in economic matters in order to eliminate any disfunctions and risks which threaten the stability of the system (Farganis, 1975, p.498). Outside of the industrially developed countries however, l iberal capitalism has not been displaced by the sophisticated state functions of welfare capitalism but exists in more basic and exploitive form. In terms of polit ical philosophy, MacPherson (1977a) argues that there has been l i t t le in the way of new liberal-democratic theory since J.S. M i l l and that only the Marxists have attempted a refined theory of the state in the twentieth century. In putting this argument MacPherson first considers the most influential of contemporary non-Marxist normative theorists, Rawls and Nozick. There are substantial di f fer-ences: Rawls (1971) would countenance a further extension of the welfare state in the distribution of 'primary goods' according to his theory of distributive justice. The state in this conception must implement two principles of justice:equal liberty for a l l , and only such inequality as improves the position of the worst-off in society. Nozick (1974), a radical libertarian, argues for a maximization of liberty in a 'minimal state'. But, MacPherson asserts, neither has. felt it necessary to propose a theory of the state substantially different from that of Mil l ' s , because 'they both endorse the fundamental relations of capitalist market society and its property institutions' and so 'they need not be concerned with any necessary or historical 72 relation of the state to society'. In modern polit ical philosophy only the Marxists/neo-Marxists can be credited with addressing the nature of the important links between state and arrangements for multinational commodity production. However, the clarity of their position is severely dissipated by the division of neo-Marxism into numerous arcane factions. Most modern non-Marxist theorists, including Rawls and Nozick, work in some way within the confines of a l iberal democratic or pluralist theory of society and of the state. The democratic state in pluralist theory is: an arrangement by which rational, well-intentioned citizens, who indeed had a wide variety of different interests but also a sense of a common interest or even general w i l l , could and did adjust their differences in an active, rational, give and take of parties and interest groups and the free press (MacPherson, 1977a, p.228). However MacPherson, although not a Marxist, argues that events in the twentieth century have outpaced non-Marxist polit ical philosophy, in that the nature of pluralism in industrialized societies is shifting away from the pluralism of small scale labour and consumers' interest groups toward a domination by large scale, if plural, corporate interest groups and groups representing the state operated sector of the economy. In this corporate society powerful interest groups now represent the two most important sectors in the economy, the corporate oligopolistic sector and the corporate public sector. To this can be added the increasing number of sub-national, national and supranational organizations which seek to serve combined corporate-state interests. The corporatist perspective is examined again in a subsequent chapter. MacPherson (1977a, p.234) identifies five areas of state activity in the modern welfare state, the first four of which virtually define categories of public sector planning: 73 (a) running the apparatus of the welfare state, thus absorbing burdens which might have to be met by capital , or if not met, might endanger public order; (b) operating the monetary and fiscal management of the economy, which now appears to be the foremost visible activity of government; (c) supporting infrastructure, e.g. in technical and higher education, urban transportation systems, urban and regional development schemes, public housing, energy plants, and direct and indirect state engagement in technological research and development in military and scientif ic fields; (d) preventing or reducing the damaging side-effects of profit-making production activit ies, e.g. measures against pollution and destruction of natural resources. These, like the welfare-state measures are increasingly required in the interests of capital ; (e) operating the new apparatus of state-imposed marketing boards, price-support schemes, wage arbitration procedures, etc. designed to stabilize markets in commodities, labour and capital . The development of the welfare state is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Local Government in the Welfare State The views of John Stuart M i l l on the role of the state remain a strong influence on modern thinking and emotion towards the idea of the liberal democratic state. However it is in the area of local government that M i l l made his strongest mark and 74 most commentators on sub-national and local government first turn to M i l l , for within his writings are the two primary justifications for local government, pol i t ical participation and efficiency (Sharpe, 1969). In his Representative Government, M i l l argued that local government provided an educative effect on local citizens, that i t increased opportunity for poli t ical participation through elections, and allowed what M i l l calls 'the lower grades' of society to act in a polit ically responsible manner and so develop public spirit . M i l l (1931, p.347) believed that 'local administrative institutions are the chief instruments' of poli t ical education. In Liberty M i l l (1910) presents his argument for local government from a conception of the absolute priority of individual l iberty. He understands liberty as the absence of restraint in relation to self-regarding actions of individuals, groups and local poli t ical authorities. Local self-government provides an important institutional buffer against abuse of power by greater society (Whalen, 1969, p.319). Just as the individual has a right to liberty in personal matters, there is a similar 'liberty in any number of individuals to regulate by mutual agreement such things as regard them jointly, and regard no persons but themselves' (Mi l l , 1958 p. 157). Such a justification for local self-government parallel those of de Tocqueville (1946, p.57) who argued that 'a nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty', de Tocqueville saw nationalism, industrialization and central bureaucracy as the greatest danger to liberalism (Whalen, 1969, p.322). The other great value of local government argued by Mi l l was efficiency in the management and delivery of local services by virtue "of responsiveness to local need. He stated that 'it is but a small portion of the public businesses of a country which can be well done or safely attempted by the central authorities' (quoted in Smith, 75 1969, p.333). Despite the fact that local government officials were likely to be less competent (i.e. of the 'lower orders') there would be a compensating advantage insofar as their authority depended on the wi l l of the local public. They could be held accountable and this ensured a measure of eff iciency in meeting local needs. This of course implied that functions of purely local interest could be distinguished from those of national interest, as M i l l suggested. However ' local' here is not the neighborhood, as M i l l had clear views on the need for larger and more comprehensive units of local government than existed at the time (Magnusson, 1979). For example, M i l l (1931, p.368) believed that the whole of London should be governed by a single Municipal Council and not by neighborhood or presumably borough councils. Mill 's writing covers many issues which st i l l concern us profoundly: local participation and democracy, efficiency and responsiveness, accountability, the distribution of functions or competences among levels of government, and the appropriate size of local units. Here too we find the essence of the Fabian belief in the contribution of local government and planning to social welfare. But this is not to imply that polit ical philosphizing alone led to the actual devolution of state power and function. Such devolution went hand in hand with environmental concerns and the need for municipal services in water, sewage, transport, health and education -the public services of the 19th century which were the forerunner of municipal planning in the 20th century. Nevertheless, one doesn't need to look much further than M i l l to capture nearly the ful l range of polit ical issues on local government. The rise of local government was also related to the growth of central government capacity and the development of general purpose central bureaucracies util izing 'welfare-at-large' decisions on behalf of the national state (Boschken, 1982). As shall be seen in the next chapter, centralisation, or the promotion of vertical authority, as 76 a mode of intergovernmental relations, implies a strong centre and an active periphery or local government which serves as an agent of the centre, de Tocqueville (1946, p.292) had noticed this already in 19th century America : 'the idea of intermediate powers is weakened and obliterated ... the idea of omnipotence and sole authority of society rises to f i l l its place'. These central-local links were reinforced by the development of the welfare state, as local government becomes an important vehicle for implementation of national programmes in the social and educational sphere. THE RISE OF NEO-CONSERVATISM AND THE CRISIS OF PLANNING So far in this chapter it is suggested that conceptions of the proper role of the state in society are varied and complex, but that two broad, dissimilar political philosophies have unfolded since the Enlightenment. The first was the development of the notion of a l iberal, democratic state. This conception developed from the work of Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, and M i l l and others, and continues today with the work of Nozick on the right and Rawls on the left . The second was the development of Marxist polit ical philosophy. Both traditions, although heterogenous and constantly in internal debate, have exerted a profound influence on twentieth century thinking and on the workings of nation states in the west and in the post-colonial third world. The two most influential concepts in the development of the theory of the state have been the concept of the state as a structure of power, clearly distinguishable from society in general; and the endemic problem of reconciling the authority of the state to intervene in society by law, with the liberty of the individual. Most modern democratic theory: 77 has constantly sought to justify the sovereign power of the state while at the same time justifying limits upon that power. The history of this attempt since Machiavell i and Hobbes is the history of arguments to balance might and right, power and law, duties and rights. On the one hand, the state must have a monopoly of coercive power in order to provide a secure basis upon which trade, commerce and family l ife can prosper. On the other hand, by granting the state a regulatory and coercive capability, liberal poli t ical theorists were aware that they had accepted a force which could (and frequently did) deprive citizens of pol i t ical and social freedoms (Held, 1984, p.71). There is no answer to this question without recourse to value judgement - the relationship of state and society is one of the fundamental series of the irresolvable tensions which underlie planning practice. Recently the tension has been exacerbated by recession, turbulence and the apparent failure of the welfare state. The post-war consensus on the development of the welfare state, which lasted in America through Kennedy and Johnson's Great Society in the late 1960s, and in a more entrenched fashion in Canada and Europe in the 1970s, was based on a commitment by government to guarantee a minimum standard of living for the poor, a Keynesian macroeconomic role for the state in f iscal policy, and outside of the USA, a considerable measure of state intervention in industry. This consensus of the 1950s and 1960s, based as i t was on expanding economies, low inflation and ful l employment, had been broken by the recession, and by the 1970s there was discord and confusion about the appropriate role of the state and its relation to economic well-being. A new group of liberal democratic theorists, mainly called neo-conservatives, have taken this situation as an opportunity to mount a critique of the welfare state. Insofar as these neo-conservatives are attempting to swing the pendulum away from state intervention and back towards individualism and market mechanisms, it is not surprizing that planning has become 'a casualty on the way'. In a nutshell the neo-conservative argument is that: Social welfare derives from individual satisfaction. Most individuals, most of the time, understand their own preferences and how to choose in their own 78 interest. The state should allow individuals to advance their own welfare according to their own lights rather than enforcing on them some vision of the good l i fe (Kleiman, 1987, p.244). Neo-conservative liberalism derives philosophically from the thinking of Hayek and later Nozick and is based on the concept of inalienable rights which are outside the state. For Hayek, now finding favour after a long period of being dismissed as eccentric, planning and state intervention have long been the 'road to serfdom'. Hayek (1985, p.vii) writes: In my l i fet ime I have witnessed a remarkable reverse in the attitude of young people to the conflicting appeals of socialism and liberalism. From my early days in the 1920s until very recently young people were strongly attracted to the 'left' in polit ics, philosophy and economics - from collectivist communism to socialist 'planning'. I think I know how they feel , since I was also for a time misled by socialism in my early days. The socialist argument continues despite its many defeats - on the impossiblity of economic calculation under col lect ivism, the fallacious claims for the use of markets under socialism, the incompatibility of liberty and state direction of the economy, and many others. The argument is being won by the new liberals of the late 20th century. But many people st i l l do not understand i t . And most on the Lef t continue to resist i t . In particular the opportunity for a resurgence of neo-conservative thinking has been provided by problems of the welfare state, variously termed 'failure', 'overload crisis', or ' f iscal crisis' . Other authors however suggest the extent of the failure or crisis has been greatly exaggerated to suit the neo-conservative line (Johnson, 1986; Mishra, 1984). Problems identified with the welfare state include the growing cost of welfare provision, coupled to the argument that this has been a drag on economic growth. In particular unemployment brought about by recession, changes in comparative advantage, and anti-inflationary fiscal policy have caused numbers of unemployed to rise, in some places dramatically so. A related concern is that, given the tendency to centralize services within the state, large bureaucracies have been created to 79 administer the welfare state. It is argued that these bureaucracies lack market discipline and accountability and are therefore ineff icient . A related argument is that the adminstrative system of the welfare state simply doesn't work very well because of turbulence. In other words, government is unable to predict the unforeseen changes and unintended consequences of social policy interventions on individuals, families or institutions. Government failure inevitably parallels market failure because of a generic inability to predict the complex web of interactions brought about by large scale interventions (Mishra, 1984). However, the government with its intractable and unresponsive bureaucracies lacks the market's quick feedback mechanism and response and so wastes public funds in pursuing its aims. Most arguments about the problems or merits of the welfare state reflect implici t value judgements, and are seldom based on coherent empirical arguents. What is clear is that 1) the role of government with regard to the economy and society is being redefined, 2) the international economic system is undergoing substantial structural adjustments, and 3) relations between levels of government and public and private institutions are being altered (Fox-Przeworski, 1986). The welfare state is mainly about redistribution of income and state intervention in the economy, and whatever the inconclusive empirical evidence, what is important is that there has been a substantial change in attitude towards i t . This reflects a change in values and dominant ideology. The new ideology is less sympathetic to traditional notions of planning which appear to infringe on economic l iberty, and a continually expanding welfare state is no longer viewed as a societal objective in any western country. This change in values is of a fundamental nature. There are many variations and arguments within the neo-conservative position. These include the classic liberal philosophy of limited government of Hayek; the 80 Chicago school of neoclassical economics associated with Milton Friedman; public choice theory associated with Tullock and Buchanan; minimal state libertarianism of Nozick; and even strains of anarchist libertarianism (Kukathas, 1985, p60). However Hayek is probably most influential in terms of practical impact on thinking about the state tied to management of national economies and working of government. Since the publication of The Road to Surfdom in 1944, Hayek has been seen as a foe of 'planning' in its various guises, and is therefore worthy of attention. Hayek puts forward the proposition that the impossibility of adequate information in an uncertain world provides a central argument for the market. In The Road to Serfdom Hayek argues that state planners, however well intentioned, are bound to lessen total welfare in society. This is because the socioeconomic world is marked by extreme complexity, and planners can never hope to understand it in its total i ty. When they try to form policy options based on what must be incomplete information, and lack of relevant facts, the result wi l l be costly economically, freedom wi l l be l imited, and overall welfare wi l l decline. Conversely the market, made up as it is of numerous small decision makers, doesn't pretend to have complete knowledge, and because it need only be concerned with market specific information it can engage in self-correction. The predisposition towards government overload in the welfare state underlines the benefits of the minimal state in which individuals, not collectivit ies, are the best judge of their own welfare. However in Hayek's argument, tendencies towards anarchy also must be resisted by a framework for law and order which defends property rights. So the state cannot be extinguished: liberty and economic freedom require the state to guarantee the ability to enjoy property and to exercise consumer choice (Helm, 1986). Although property rights must be protected by law, the minimal principle of state interference extends 81 to taxation (except for law and order and defence of the sovereign state), which is the primary instrument for redistribution of income or wealth. Minimalness, that is l iberty, in this conception is incompatible with income redistribution. In general the neo-conservative view of the conjucture of politics and economics represents a fusion of libertarian value judgements and an analysis of the instru-mentality of the market. The market is taken as the best means for attaining libertarian, individualistic, or utilitarian objectives, and the role of the state in society needs to be severely curtailed. C O N C L U S I O N There have been two revolutionary trends in the development of thinking on the role of the state: the bourgeois revolutions of the late 18th and early 19th centuries based on the ideas of the Enlightenment, and the socialist revolutions of the 20th century, based on Marxism. The Marxist-based revolutionary left in eastern Europe and China has orientated itself towards social welfare through state control, but at the expense of freedom, and with l i t t le chance of a withering away of the state which now takes the form of centralized bureaucracies run by an elite minority communist party. On the other hand, elements of the thinking of Rousseau, Saint Simon, Utopian socialism, utilitarianism and social democracy have coalesced into the modern welfare states of western Europe and North America . These welfare states in turn have found it diff icult to respond to world recession and demonstrated administrative inefficiencies which left them exposed to a neo-conservative critique in the 1980s. However, some recent discussions questioning the continued existence of the welfare state tend to be simplistic, and the reality is different. First , while parts 82 of the welfare state, like parts of the economy, are in retrenchment, many of the functions associated with the provision of collective goods and with redistribution of income are unlikely to disappear. Some authors suggest that the welfare state is more polit ically durable than neo-conservatives might have anticipated. Although the public generally consider that state expenditure may be wasteful, they also appreciate a broad range of particular public services (Lane, 1986). The benefits of public consumption in public transport, infrastructure, education, health, recreation and other fields is apparent and while adjustments are being made in the public-private balance, a wholesale reduction of government has simply not occurred. The main exception is in the sale of nationalized industries, most, but not al l of which, catered mainly to private consumption. The public, particularly outside the United States, have a conception of their standard of living which includes a wide range of public goods. Even the citizens of the U S A , the bastion of free market l iberalism, have long held that high quality education, urban public transportation, national and local parks and many other aspects of l i fe lie within the province of the state. The efficiency of these services may be questioned but their obj ective is not, although a concern for value for money is leading to a reexamination of the mechanisms of delivering public goods. There is also a trend to disinvestment in lame duck industries, and to make nationalized industries more responsive by transferring them to the private sector. More generally, just as many of the functions of the modern state are unlikely to disappear, the state itself serves important cultural functions in maintaining social solidarity. For example, the modern state is essential for maintaining an awareness in society of the : transcendent obligations to those institutions that are larger than anything that could have been created by his own efforts. Here the state l iterally 'embodies' the whole cultural inheritance out of which the citizen's personal identity has 83 been fashioned. It must be surrounded by myth, ritual and ceremonies that are adequate vehicles to express this sense of deep obligation (Rayner, 1985, p.263). However in the United States, although patriotism rates very high as a social ideal, extreme liberalism has created 'a society of maximal individual rights which have broken down important community controls' (Glazer, 1987). As a result neo-conservatives have had to promote individual virtue and family in their search for the necessary mechanisms of transcendent obligation and social control . Final ly, to return to a more prosaic level , it appears that a measure of planning is essential in both conservative and social democratic views, if only to protect property rights and thus the broader conception of the standard of living from the externalities of offending neighbours. Neo-conservative theorists like Hayek seldom venture into a consideration of the problem of externalities or the need for the state to exert environmental control, but the public is clearly concerned, and the degree to which land use planning is acceptable is often related to the prevailing views of the public, rather than their leaders or theorists on the role of the state. In the U K , the Conservative government may express a desire for 'simplified planning zones', but in fact are forced by their own constituents in the wealthy suburbs to defend 'the greenbelt' from residential property developers. People may appreciate l ibert-arianism in principle, but in practice, ad hoc pragmatism, family interests, attachment to property, personal preferences, and social and environmental concerns may all transcend simplified political notions. Conversely politicians commonly hide value judgements on the balance between freedom and planning in simple rhetoric about the efficiency of the market in promoting human freedom and welfare. But any government's own position is seldom coherent or consistant. For example, as wi l l be discussed in chapter 3, the neo-conservatism of Mrs. Thatcher in the UK is less 84 characterized by a decline in the role of the state than by a relentless centralization of state functions, and a corresponding diminishment of local autonomy in the interest of l iberalizing the economy and allowing the market a freer reign. The recurrent problem for planners is that the question of the role of the state in society, the extent of its economic borders, and the appropriate balance of freedom and planning control has no right answer and never w i l l . Empirical evidence is that the state wi l l f a i l in some aspects of public provision just as the market wi l l fa i l in some aspects of private provision (Helm, 1986). Empirical evidence can assist in policy formation on a pragmatic and incremental basis, but the only rationale for state intervention is by recourse to value judgement. The fact that the rationale for planning derived from the role of the state in society is a fundamental value judgement explains exactly the crisis of planning in terms of the state, and as I w i l l argue subsequently, the crisis of planning in terms of rationality. The neo-conservative case, best represented by Hayek, rests primarily on libertarian value judgements, coupled to an argument on efficiency in economic and social production based on information processes and uncertainty in environmental turbulence (Helm, 1986). This is a substantive argument underpinned by an apparently instrumental argument. The social democratic case rests on moral views on redistributive justice and another set of instrumental views on the necessity of controlling market externalities and on state intervention in the promotion of collective efficiency and thus social and economic benefit. Recession, economic structural transformation, environmental turbulence, organizational incapacity and recent governmental rhetoric and policies may have contributed to notions of crisis within planning, but the fundamental nature of the value judgements concerning the role of the state results in a permanent tension about the value of planning. Instrumental arguments about the efficiency of the market or the relative inefficiency of the state bureaucracy cloak the fundamental and irresolvable nature of the debate. 85 However it is the case that the combined effect of the complexity of national and global corporate interests and the increased role of the state has altered the relation of the state to capital . This has resulted in a much greater polit icization of the economy in modern states in which the relative health of the economy is the prime policy focus of the state. This in turn has resulted in a much greater polit icization of the planning function, as planning objectives either relate to, or are subservient to, the service of the state to capital . The rise of intra-state organizational turbulence resulting from a proliferation of often competing state agencies attempting to f u l f i l l their functions, is compounded by the growing influence of multinational and even global corporations and finance houses whose allegiances no longer relate to state objectives and whose operations may have a deleterious effect in national, regional or local terms. Changes in economic circumstances, particularly resulting from the 1973 and 1980 recessions, and difficulties of the welfare state in overcoming turbulence and inefficiency in meeting its myriad objectives has helped promote the current neo-conservative interest in redefining and simplifying the relation of state to capital . This is known rather misleadingly as the 'free market' philosophy which harks back to the early days of neoclassical economics and a very different world in terms of volume of state activity and the degree of interplay between state and economy. Whatever the rhetoric and the reality of the extent of the current readjustments in the state-economy relationship, addressed in subsequent chapters, the 1980s have seen a dramatic resurgence of interest in political-philosophical thinking on the purpose and function of the state. Planners, as agents of the state, cannot remain immune to this interest. Insofar as 'planning' is often taken to hinder rather than hasten economic growth, and often involves contentious decision areas like the appropriate trade-off of pollution and economic activity, it is not surprizing that 86 planners may feel that neo-conservative thinking is anti-planning. This polit icization of planning, combined with epistemological concerns about the basis of rationality in planning, directly contribute to the crisis of planning. A number of themes raised in this chapter are continued in subsequent chapters. What is important at this point in the argument is to stess that insofar as the justification for planning in the public sector derives from views on the appropriate role of the state in society, planners cannot think about or justify what they do without resource to the important debates in western poli t ical philosophy. Subsequent chapters return to the broad themes of this debate and propose a justification for public sector planning activities which goes beyond traditional arguments for public goods and control of externalities to suggest that planning is essential to the successful management of the turbulent organizational systems which characterize modern states. Leading up to that argument, in the next chapter I explore further the logic and growth of the welfare state, and the conflicting centralizing and decentralizing trends which comprise part of the crisis of governability and planning in the late welfare state. Chapter four examines the nature of organizational turbulence which I argue is the context of planning which engenders notions of crisis and which requires a planning response considerably different from the traditional application of analytic tools. Chapter five returns to the thought of Hobbes and Locke where we find early conceptions of the nature of social science which influence planning in terms of the crisis of rationality in the present day. In chapter six we find a continuation of the Marxian and Utopian concepts in an examination of cr i t ical planning theories, and the crisis of planning as viewed by its theorists. Finally, chapter seven looks again at the role of state in society, and draws a number of conclusions relevant to planning theory and planning action in the modern democratic state. 87 CHAPTER 3: THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE FOR PLANNING INTRODUCTION It is in the interplay between the two qualifications for local government put forward by J.S. M i l l , democratic participation and eff iciency, that fascinating issues on the role of the national state vis a vis its subunits come to our attention. For example, in the U K , an interest in efficiency and financial control on the part of central government has resulted in a downgrading of local democracy and the revoking of local planning functions in favour of more centralized control. In Canada, on the other hand, the 1987 'Meech Lake constitutional accord' caused public and media concern that central government may be ceding too much power and planning control to provincial governments, when what may be required is stronger national leadership to deal with trans-provincial issues, in areas such as economic management, pollution control, and management of energy and resources (see for example, Sunday Star, 1987). In each case however can be found evidence that neither the role of the state nor its relationship to it sub-units is static, but rather in a state of flux which contributes to uncertainty, and which derives from changing views on the balance between democratic participation, eff iciency, and the accepted role of the state. This also serves to underline the fundamental polit ical nature of public sector planning. THE CONTRADICTION OF PUBLIC SECTOR PLANNING Any consideration of how to develop competence in public sector planning, whether regional or local , is quickly caught on the horns of an essential contradiction in industrial societies. This is the opposing tendencies to concentration of economic 88 power and centralization of decision-making compared to the tendency to devolution of power and decentralization of decision-making in the interests of preserving greater possibilities for democratic action. Economic development for example, proceeds on the whole from a power base that resides at the level of national government and multinational corporations. National politicians and administrators address a wide national public interest or constituency, and decisions economically effective at the national level may have equity implications which may seem unacceptable at the regional or local level . Conceptions of polit ical and regional development, on the other hand, have a strong emotive and philosophical basis in devolution of power, local participation and planning, pluralism and regional equity, both financially and in terms of poli t ical control. These bipolar tendencies to eff iciency and equity have been termed 'the conflicting objectives of our time' (Coffey and Polese, 1984), and have been the subject of discussion at least since M i l l . Attempts to overcome this dichotomy by planning at what Friend et a l . (1974) cal l the 'intercorporate level of public policy-making' have generally fai led. The situation is compounded by the fact that lately peripheral regions have been badly hit by recession and global restructuring, even while there has been a substantial poli t ical philosophic shift away from a concern for regional development by some central governments who themselves are centralizing government functions. Conversely it remains common knowledge that centralized programmes and decisions are often deficient in local knowledge and therefore poorly conceived and diff icult to implement. The arguments for and against concentration of power and centralization of government functions therefore have not only polit ical but functional dimensions. Proponents of centralization argue that societal problems demand large scale, 89 planned intervention, co-ordinated nationally to properly conceptualise the problem and to overcome the tendency of parochial, organisational interests to take precedence over a system-wide interest in the common welfare. Arguments for decentralization, on the other hand, emphasize the increased f lexibi l i ty , adaptiveness, innovation and local accountability in planning and service delivery in the usual public policy situation where goals are ambiguous, and environmental and technological conditions constantly changing. Aldr ich (1979, p.66) notes that such is the appeal of many of the arguments from both sides that 'planners who on one occasion argue strongly for centralization find themselves on other occasions defending the benefits of decentralization' and that planning and social service delivery arrangements are often designed with these conflicting principles in mind. These built- in contradictions manifest themselves in numerous, and often disfunctional, ways when agencies at any level try to plan. Both the interrelated poli t ical and functional aspects of this situation have resulted in a continuing series of crises in government decision-making at the inter-corporate level, as multiple decision centres oppose each other to the stage of creating administrative deadlocks (Ionescu, 1975). Equally sub-national planning or community development is often attempted in a vertical power vacuum and ultimately thwarted by the over-reaching effects of national policies and trans-national economic actit ivies. Although lip service is paid to the importance of the inter-corporate dimension of policy-making and planning, it remains on the whole ignored. This is true not only in of f ic ia l reviews of government structure and act ivity, but in much of the academic literature as wel l . The economic literature assumes an objective criterion of eff iciency, with attendant concentration of power, and if there is to be planning it is by measures of corporatism in society. The philosophical arguments for devolution and decentralization are ignored. Some of the literature in polit ical 90 science and poli t ical economy, on the other hand, elevates the value of devolution to the level of an article of fa i th . But such proponents steer well clear of any reasoned consideration of the practicability of their proposals on the role of government intervention in economic and social l i f e . The exception is in the literature of centre-periphery relations which applies these geometric concepts to the study of polit ical systems (Gottman, 1980). Centre-periphery analysis in the social sciences involves two assumptions, first that the centre is the locus of decision making, that is, power; and second that any centre and its peripheries belong to an encompassing sociopolitical system, of which they are differentiated but interdependent parts (Strassoldo, 1980, pp.38-39). As with other attempts at systems analysis, i t is easy to be cr i t i ca l of the centre-periphery metaphor, insofar as systems models are always somewhat confounded by the complexity and intersubjectivity of human existence. Strassoldo, for example, suggests that the centre-periphery analytical frame is more useful in describing polit ical than economic systems, in part because centralization processes in polit ical systems have grown steadily and reflect a relatively dominant mode of organization. The application of the metaphor to multinational economic systems, on the other hand, oversimplifies the complex, historical , technological, and unique geographic factors which explain how economic organizations adapt to their environment. The growth of the service or information economy, and the convergence of modern computing and telecommunications technologies probably further diminishes the application of centre-periphery analysis to economic systems. Of course, economic and political systems are far from mutually exclusive, and a political peripherization can reinforce economic disadvantage and be reinforced by i t . Even in polit ical systems, there is no guarantee that 'centres' in the usual sense are always dominant. 91 As described in terms of the considerably decentralized Canadian state a number of commentators feel that the centre has been overly weakened by recent constitutional readjustments to the point where it is insufficiently dominant in many areas of policy. However, in spite of such reservations, the centre-periphery metaphor is a very helpful heuristic device for thinking about both the interrelated spatial and functional aspects of government in terms of power, managerial control , and the symbolic and real dimensions of democratic action. It is used here in that sense. With the above exception, the contradiction between centralizing and decentralizing trends remains unaddressed in theoretical considerations of planning, even though i t can be argued that this contradiction is an important part of the context of planning in advanced technological-industrial societies. I argue that this contradiction results in a dialectical and perhaps irreconcilable tension which is basic to the socio-political structure, and this tension circumscribes a l l centre-periphery relationships and thus most attempts at planning. Understanding this aspect of the context of planning and the nature of this contradiction is useful in at least three ways: 1) It aids in understanding of why central, sub-national and local relationships often move in and out of crisis. 2) It explains why many sub-national planning models (in the normative, ideological sense) proposed in planning theory seem divorced from the poli t ical reality most planners are familiar with. 92 3) It helps planners address the polit ical tensions and functional interdependencies which characterize mult i - level public policy making. Exploring the Contradiction It is easy to substantiate the tensions described above. Indeed many people concerned with public planning recognise that it constantly impinges on their act ivit ies . In western Europe, demands for territorial welfare, and notions of democracy combining ideological and terri torial pluralism, constantly confront national bureaucratic and party structures. This trend to post-war regional construction and devolution is a general phenomenon in continental Europe, excepting perhaps the United Kingdom (Meny, 1986, p.39-42). In most cases this trend has resulted in the creation of a third tier of government above the municipality or department and below the central government. These regional governments, although not constituting federations, provide a substantial degree of decentralization of legislative power and administration. In France, Spain and Italy new systems of sub-national government have brought about the deliberate decentralization of policy making and planning from the centre to the region (Norton, 1985, pAO). Of the countries in western Europe only Britain is now deliberately centralizing power. Additionally a tendency towards consensus and compromise is replacing unilateral decision-making by the central government and hierarchical subordination of sub-units, most recently in Spain and Portugal. However, in extreme cases where cooperation and inter-dependence have not worked dangerous conflicts have arisen, for example in the Basque country or in Northern Ireland. 93 Since the 1960s regionalist movements have taken their inspiration from many sources, varying in each country, but generally related to economic and cultural factors. Berentsen (1985) in a review of planning in Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, the G D R and Switzerland, concludes that differing interests within and between sectoral and regionally based institutions, and between federal and sub-national authorities, 'are so endemic that one might conclude they are not simply "problems" but conditions of large bureaucracies'. Other accounts of sub-national planning and regional development in Europe are available (Konukiewitz, 1986; Eskelinen, 1985: Pauley 1985; Jung, 1982). In the U K , an incipient regionalist movement in Scotland and Wales declined after a proposal to secure constitutional devolution via regional parliaments failed in referendum. This UK crisis of the 1960s and 70s has given way to the crisis of the 1980s: a central government, driven by opposition to Labour dominated local authorities to a stance which includes curtailing traditional democratic rights, the abolition of a number of elected third-tier governments, and a severe dilution of regional and local planning. The situation is particularly striking in the Abolition of Metropolitan Counties B i l l , which abolished the elected Greater London Council (GLC), in effect the only London-wide government, and six other metropolitan governments around the country on Apr i l 1, 1986. London is now probably the only major city in the world without a unified government structure. Instead London has 32 legally independent boroughs. This action is equivalent to getting rid of the government of the C i t y of New York (as well as Mayor Koch and the New Y o r k - N e w Jersey Port Authority), leaving the five boroughs, with inter-borough planning and administration carried out by the federal government in Washington. 94 The functions of the Greater London Council and the six metropolitan governments, which included strategic planning, transport planning and administration, provision of f ire services, co-ordination of toxic waste disposal and others have been transferred to delegated authorities, in effect administrative boards, appointed by and answerable only to central government Ministers. A t a time when many other large cities around the world are appreciating the benefits of city-region wide strategic government, Mrs. Thatcher has abolished London's and either curtailed or transferred strategic planning functions to the central government bureaucracy. The Economist (19/11/84) suggested that this wi l l cause London to 'be left with no single voice -except Whitehall's'. Labour's cries of 'democracy in danger' have even been echoed by some London Tories. A t the same time in the U K all remaining local authorities are subject to a programme of centralization of control over their finance and functions. This is the result of an attempt to hold down local public spending by changing the system of central government partial funding that now gives Whitehall the power to decide how much each local government ought to spend, and to cut the grants to overspenders. This has been combined with 'rate-capping' powers by which central government can now l imit the amount of rates (i.e. local property taxes), which hitherto had been set solely by local government. There are also proposals to greatly "s implify" (i.e. reduce) local planning powers over development in what are called 'simplified planning zones'. The assumption is that the activities of local planners are obstructive and inimical to economic progress. In all these measures there is considerable potential for the curtailment of local planning functions and it is not surprising that planners in the UK believe they are facing a crisis. For example, Breheny and Hall (1984, p.96) argue that 'many pillars of the planning system of the mid-1970s have disappeared or have crumbled 1. 95 Mrs. Thatcher's government is pressing ahead with her centralization programme, in spite of considerable uproar. The Economist (19/11/84) suggests that the first four years of Mrs. Thatcher's Government had resulted in 'unprecedented confl ict ' between central and local government, and thus to implicit constitutional change. They assert that central government has 'blown a largish hole in local autonomy', and note that some scholars view the situation as a constitutional crisis which 'should raise fundamental questions about the role of local government in the changing state'. With regard to the centralization of planning functions, the planners have retorted that planning has been eclipsed by a 'philosophical dark ages' (Cameron, 1985) and that: the central planning system provides no coherent link between the management of the economy and terri torial or strategic tasks, no built-in constituency dimension ... In a word, the system is dictatorial ; sooner or later it had to sponsor an attack on alternative centres of power at their financial and electoral roots (McConaghy, 1985, p.14). Turning to Canada, while the situation is hardly so dramatic, we can also find evidence that the relationships between central and sub-national governments are in a state of tension and flux. The near constitutional crisis generated by the terrorist activities of the Front de la Liberation du Quebec and the imposition of the War Measures Act across Canada in 1970 has long subsided as, it appears, have aspirations for the independence of Quebec. But central-provincial relations continue to require whole bureaucracies and a battery of lawyers and accountants who engage in constant negotiation over the division of powers, financial arrangements, grants in aid, and control over offshore and northern natural resources. Such inter-corporate rivalries and regional issues are important factors in Canada's economic and polit ical l i fe . The Economist (15/2/86) suggests that Canadian politicians 'are too absorbed in arguments over the regional distribution of resources for other conflicts of interest 96 to take on any permanent national significance'. Within the province of British Columbia, the provincial government recently embarked on a Thatcher-like exercise of abolishing regional planning authorities and centralizing control in the provincial bureaucracy, claiming that such regional agencies were obstructionist and strayed beyond a narrow definition of land use planning (Robinson and Webster, 1985, p.23). In the view of Dobell (1983, p.24) this centralization of power has resulted in 'large and lasting' damage to 'processes of consultation, negotiation and confl ict resolution in the community 1 . Smith (1986, p. 15) argues that this attack on regional and local institutions 'has jeopardized effective policy making in the province'. Perhaps the most interesting poli t ical situation in Canada involves the aspirations of the residents of Canada's vast Northwest Territory (NWT) for greater political autonomy, and control over their resource base, financial arrangements, and social and land use planning. These aspirations are pitted against what Rees (1985) refers to as central government's hegemony over northern affairs . This is particularly the case in the areas of national defense, sovereignty, international relations, native peoples' land claims, national energy policy, land use planning, and control over the revenue potential of offshore oil and gas, mining, and other resource developments (Abele and Dosman, 1981). For example, the region's oi l and gas is exploited with financial incentives from central government by three major multinationals, two of which are American. This enormous exploration and production programme is subject to the vicissitudes of the international oil market. The Northwest Territory (NWT), covering 3.4 million square kilometers, constitutes the largest sub-national polit ical jurisdiction in the western world. However the NWT has no provincial status and remains f irmly a territory, indeed some would say a colony, of the Canadian federal government. As Rees puts it 'the major levers of 97 polit ical and economic power over these vast but sparsely populated areas are wielded from Ottawa'. The Canadian Catholic Conference of Bishops put i t more bluntly: 'What we see emerging in the Canadian North are forms of exploitation which we often assume happen only in Third World countries'. A l l the elements of the dialectical tension are present in the case of the NWT: central economic and pol i t ical control versus regional poli t ical aspirations, clearly displayed national and multinational interests, a series of royal commision-like explorations of the constitutional issues, and a remote and inefficient centralized planning process faced with increasingly sophisticated regional polit ical institutions vying for functional control, both for efficiency and as a matter of constitutional precedent. The issues are compounded and made even more interesting by the presence in the NWT of a slight majority of native peoples, who have only come into substantial contact with Western polit ical and cultural ideas in last thirty years. They are resolved not to let the strengths of their non-western, northern native culture be submerged by the dominant white southern culture. Northern native dissention is not only over legal and poli t ical conflicts over land and resources, but over 'condescension in southern decision and opinion centres' and 'demands for more self-governing powers and stronger representative institutions' (Jull, 1985), Proposals to fu l f i l l native polit ical aspirations and planning objectives do not necessarily conform to western constitutional or democratic conceptions, but are based to an extent on the cultural and historical patterns of native l i fe . There are of course many other examples of this dialectical tension that could be cited in different countries ranging from benign discussion to near war. In social services planning in both Canada and the UK there are lively debates over questions of the decentralization of social policy functions (Tsalikis, 1985; Tomlinson, 1986). 98 In Australia disputes between central government and the state governments keep 'an army of lawyers in employment' (Railings, 1987, p.28). More dramatically in Indonesia, the central government is (1) fighting a war in the former Portuguese colony of Timor against Fretel in rebels aspiring to independence, (2) is cautious about similar aspirations for independence by Sumatran fundamentalist Muslims, (3) is accused of over-centralizing economic development on the ruling island of Java, and (4) is attempting to deal with Javanese over-population and extend polit ical control over the vast archipelago by planning the transmigration of hundreds of thousands of Javanese to other islands. No further examples seem necessary. The elements of the dialectical tension proposed are quite clear, as are their influence on planning. I N T E R - O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L RELATIONSHIPS IN P L A N N I N G The inter-organizational context of public planning is defined by Rhodes (1985d, p.37) as 'that area of poli t ical act ivi ty concerned with the relations between cen