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Date April 3, 1989
The notion that there is some crisis of public sector planning is common, and a literature review reveals this concern extends across the social sciences, and even to the conception and working of the modern welfare state. The dissertation links political science and philosophy with organisation theory to explain the parameters and tensions governing planning by the state, and proposes an agenda for liberal democratic planning theory for the 1990s. It is argued that these notions of crisis have a common basis in endemic tensions in the modern state which define the planning context. The instability of this context is heightened by increased turbulence in organizational relations at all levels and in the world economic system, and by readjustments in political values reflected in the election of conservative governments in many countries.

The idea of crisis provides a useful beginning for analysing the problem of planning, an understanding of which requires a broad view of the socio-political and epistemological context in which planners operate. The concept of planning crisis is broken down into constituent parts from which, it is argued, a more profound view of the context of planning is rebuilt, and from which more appropriate responses to societal problems are likely to arise. By devising a formulation that generalizes expectable constraints across various planning situations, an original contribution is made towards a partial theory of the institutional and professional contexts of planning action.

First, planning is defined as an instrumental expression of the role of the state in society which attempts to assert the preeminence of the future in the present, in terms of control over scarce resources and private property for some greater good.
fostered by the state. Then the historical and philosophical basis for the role of the state is discussed in terms of factors which both underlie, and undermine, planning action: state power and individual freedom, social control for state stability, and the role of markets in terms of broader social objectives. The problem of planning is examined in terms of tensions between centre and periphery, economic objectives and political aspirations, opposing and confused trends to centralization and decentralization, and inter-organizational conflict and re-adjustment which seems an inevitable consequence of state intervention in society.

In organisation theory, planning is seen as an attempt to manage change in turbulent environments characterised by uncertainty, inconsistent and ill-defined values, and an inability to predict the cumulative consequences of action. Analytic tools for understanding the planning dilemma are discussed, particularly conceptions of organizational learning, resources, networks, and capacity to innovate. The usefulness of static models for understanding dynamic planning situations is questioned.

The discussion of the crisis of planning is concluded by turning to its epistemological dimension, termed a crisis of rationality. This refers to the inability of social scientists to model complex social systems, and their seeming failure to devise theory useful to social action. The legacy of positivism and the concept of rationality in planning thought are examined. Three influential planning theories are analysed in terms of their contribution to an understanding of the crisis of planning and extent to which they can offer practical guidance.

The conclusion relates the main themes to the current theoretical task, which is to build up a series of useful, partial, conceptions of the possibility for planning action
from a realistic understanding of its socio-political context. It is argued that the crisis of planning is rooted in the inevitable lack of consensus about the state's role, and the efficacy of intervention in the workings of the market in terms of human benefit and social justice. This lack of consensus is also set in a fundamental relationship to the crisis of rationality.

First, it is argued that planning theorists have a responsibility to explore the practical implications of organizational options at the state-market conjuncture. Further, as any conception of the future is an interactive fusion of fact and value, theorists have a responsibility to develop ethical frameworks and principles, which may help combine the practical benefits of market mechanisms in terms of feedback with a conception of the transcending social responsibility of the state and the need to 'embed' ethical principles in political culture. Second, appropriate organizational responses to uncertainty are proposed, in particular action learning, inter-agency ventures, negotiation, cooperation, and risk taking.

Third, the implications for planning theory of the boundaries of social scientific inquiry are examined, in light of endemic uncertainty, the drive to unified social theory which distances theoretical abstractions from reality, and the lure of academic structures and rewards which inhibit the required holistic and interdisciplinary approach. A policy model is proposed which reflects the centrality of values in the planning context, the non-revolutionary nature of planning action, and the position of planning knowledge as a lever on the distribution of societal power, requiring ethical norms.

In an appendix, analytic elements derived from the work are used in a case study of urban decline and planning response in the UK.
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M. Carley
February 1989.
CHAPTER 1. THE PROBLEM OF PLANNING IN THE MODERN STATE

INTRODUCTION

In this dissertation I propose that the notion that there is a crisis of planning is common, and that a further examination of the literature reveals this concern is not unique to planning but extends across the social sciences and beyond to the concept and working of modern states in a turbulent world economy. It also extends to the ideas of environmental, urban or human crisis, for example, those described by the recent World Commission on Environment and Development, known as the Brundtland Commission. At the extreme, the human race now has the capacity to destroy itself, as a result of nuclear conflict or environmental degradation, or to cause death or suffering to thousands as at Chernobyl or Bhopal, and potentially to millions. In such circumstances notions of crisis are not surprising, and however depressing, such notions of crisis provide a most useful beginning for analysing for the problem of planning in the modern state. In particular, I am concerned with the potential for the academic activity of 'planning theory' to make a practical contribution to our understanding of how these crises have arisen and how planning can help to ameliorate them. This dissertation then is about both the problems of planning in the public sector and the problem of planning theory, and the inter-relationship between the two.

Before coming back to these problems, I will briefly define planning. Most generally planning refers to any systematic consideration or action concerned with the quality of future life. More specifically it is necessary to refer to the fundamental relationship of planning to politics. For all planning in the public sector involves
some measure of guidance and control over individual action and private property where control is exercised or sanctioned by the state. The important word is control, for planning assumes an exercise of authority which almost always involves some measure of coercion, and in this the state is sovereign. As Wildavsky (1975) says, there would be no need to plan if people were going to do spontaneously what a plan requires them to do or not do by its authority. Thus planning in the public sector relates back to the power of the state vis-a-vis its citizens; and the influence of planning, or lack of it, is a function of the role of the state in society. All planning therefore involves some tension between individual freedom and social control by the state, which is one of the oldest debating points in western political philosophy. Such tension is characteristic of land use or environmental or town planning, but also of health or industrial planning or any other kind. Planning, most simply, is an ongoing managerial process embedded within the political system, which both attempts and promotes systematic forward thinking and action.

Now I return to the two problems addressed in this dissertation: the inter-related problem of planning, and the problem of planning theory. First the problem of planning, of which the notion of crisis is only a symptom. The problem has three dimensions. The first is the problem of ideological fashion, the second the problem of political values, and the third the problem of the growing complexity of our world.

THE PROBLEM OF PLANNING

The first, and most obvious problem, is that planning for the future has become ideologically unfashionable given the rise of conservative values and governments in many countries. The election of such conservative governments in the late 1970s and early 80s set the free market cat among the pigeons of state intervention. This
new political agenda is questioning the relative roles of state and market in meeting societal objectives, and questioning the objectives of the state itself. Moves are being made to dismantle the welfare state, and reassert the primacy of the market. Some governments have emasculated regional planning, urban planning and, in Britain, even local government in a bid to promote overall economic growth. Related to this is that planning is now seen as a brake on the working of the 'free market', and is associated with bureaucracies and the inefficiencies of the welfare state. Planning has become a 'bad word', to be avoided. For example, in 1988 the head of the Royal Town Planning Institute in the UK was moved to write to the Minister of State for Transport to point out that a recent ministerial proposal for future transport policies never once mentioned planning except a derogatory remark about 'public bureaucrats'. The Minister's proposals for transport policy consisted mainly of trying to get the private sector to build toll roads, this at a time when the traffic problems of Southeast England are reaching crisis proportions and public transport is being run down or 'privatised'.

A second related problem is that planners, for good reason, may assume that their tasks are technical and vocational rather than political. Planners 'plan' cities and subdivisions, new towns, transport systems, they 'manage' natural resources according to scientific expertise, vocationally received wisdom, and by the seat of their pants. But, as I have indicated in my definition, all planning in the public sector is by nature a political activity, political in subject, direction, methodology and particularly whether and how much to plan at all. The political nature of their work can put planners in a tense and unpleasant situation for which they may be unprepared or may find distasteful, and they can be used as a tool or a scapegoat in larger ideological struggles. To compound the issue, the very structure and existence of organisations in which planners work are not fixed constitutional entities but reflect dominant
political values and may be altered or eclipsed. Disappearing or emasculated planning agencies, like the Greater London Council or the Greater Vancouver Regional District, are examples of this institutional instability which can contribute to a sense of malaise or a notion of crisis.

A third problem for planning is that the world is growing increasingly complex and inter-linked, and departmentalized governments are ill-equipped to deal with serious problems which cut across agency and state boundaries. A rekindled debate on the appropriate role for the state contributes to an uncertain planning environment made more turbulent by the oil crisis of 1973, the recession at the turn of the decade, and the inability of carefully planned projects to deliver positive results. States and their economies, now virtually inseparable in the public mind, seem very vulnerable to the vicissitudes of international market forces, which are themselves in rapid transition towards a more globalized, less place-oriented, system.

The comfortable and growth-oriented certainties and consensus responses of the 1960s have all but disappeared. Some cities and regions, economically pre-eminent for decades, are suddenly in economic and social decline. In other locations mega-projects and resource-based development schemes have disappeared overnight as they have become unprofitable in global terms. In almost every country economic restraint has become a primary government function. The burdens of ailing economies are a new challenge to planners, who had previously helped to allocate growing public sector budgets, and channelled ever more development here and there on the spatial map. Suddenly cities, regions and states need to engage in competition for limited amounts of free floating capital and vie for inward investment by a combination of promotion and subsidies. Apparent gains in addressing economic, social and environmental problems are set back by recession, and in third world
countries by debt crisis. In this changing context it has become more difficult to select and implement appropriate objectives for state intervention.

In this dissertation I have described this aspect of the planning problem as the attempt to manage change in turbulent environments. Such environments are characterized by uncertainty; inconsistent and ill-defined needs, preferences, and values; and an inherent inability to predict the cumulative consequences of action. In such turbulent environments inter-organizational activity itself among the agencies of society generate unpredictable ramifications as each agency attempts to internalize the benefits of their actions and to externalise the costs. I demonstrate that the emergence of a complex web of policy networks with the growth of modern states helps account for increasing turbulence. I argue turbulence presents a particular difficulty in dealing with what I define as metaproblems, such as atmospheric pollution, watershed management, inner city decline, deindustrialization in the developed world, explosive urban growth in the third world, the environmental consequences of very large projects such as dams, and the cumulative effects of smaller-scale resource-using activities like grazing and fuelwood collection. Such problems are bigger than any one organization acting alone can resolve, and span not only functional departments but political boundaries. The complexity of international and interregional linkages leads to yet more organizational turbulence. If the situation is that there is debate over the appropriate role of the state or market in intervening in a metaproblem, and/or tensions between centres and the peripheries, then the level of turbulence is heightened and planning becomes more difficult.

A profound problem for planners therefore is how to deal with the complexity and unforeseen effects of policy-making where policy-making activities interlock at
every level, and organizations conflict - or co-operate - in a world grown increasingly turbulent.

These then are the three main dimensions of the planning problem, the situation is of course far more complex and two-thirds of the dissertation is an exercise in problem definition. Further elements of the problem are illustrated in figure 1. Many practising planners are instinctively aware of these problems, and although they would like time to reflect and ponder on the nature of the problems and the way forward, for planners are committed to societal betterment over personal gain, they are often too busy with the day-to-day demands of planning, administration and bureaucratic 'fire-fighting' to reflect.

THE PROBLEM OF PLANNING THEORY

There is however a group of planners who have both the time and the inclination for reflection on the planning problem - the academic planning theorists. Indeed as they are paid by universities and thus in many cases the taxpayer, one could say almost a responsibility to address these problems. But I argue they have in many respects failed to do so, in spite of an outpouring of books and learned articles, and this failure I call the problem of planning theory. It is common currency in our field that there is an enormous gap between theory and practice. This clearly reflects a failure of theorizing in so far as planning theorists ought to explicate the crisis in planning, and it is hard to imagine a role for them if that is not what they are attempting to do. Instead, for the planning profession another manifestation of crisis is the profound gap between practitioner and theoretician where each has little to say to the other, but both find themselves on the defensive. The practising planner suffers recurring policy and implementation failure, and as a result receives contempt from politicians
Figure 1: Endemic Tensions in the Planning Context
and the public alike. The theoretician works in an enclosed world where structure and reward are part of a self-reinforcing system, and where the output of the theoretical process is mostly of interest to other theorists and hardly anybody else. Some theorists in turn form into self-defensive theory or paradigm groups, highly critical of one another. As an observer, writing in the UK's weekly newsletter Planning, says of theorists at a recent European conference called to discuss 'planning theory in practice':

The main papers ... serve simply to reinforce the stereotype image of the planning theorists' esoteric philosophical discussions largely unrelated to substance (Nadin, 1987, p.6).

I am of course generalizing, but the situation is unproductive and this has been of primary concern to me in formulating this intellectual project. What then are the main dimensions problem of planning theory, that is, why is there the infamous chasm between theory and action, and why have we not learned more from theorists about the problem of planning? First, because particularly neo-Marxists, but to some measure utopians, have taken the intellectual high ground in theorizing. In pursuing their ideological penchant the neo-Marxists have attributed too many of the problems of planning to what is ponderously called 'the decline of late capitalism'. And in spite of their obvious and sometimes exciting analytic clarity, their logical if unstated commitment to revolutionary action diminishes to near nothing their contribution to practical thinking as opposed to historical analysis of the planning problem. In other words they score zero in the advice department for planners working in resilient liberal democracies, and particularly in a decade when Communist states of the Eastern block and Asia are themselves rewriting their socialist programmes in capitalist terms.
Utopian theorists on the other hand, continue a valued tradition of exploration of the possibilities for human society, but unfortunately by too often ignoring what are labelled in figure 1. as 'the organizational facts of life'. Certainly what is missing in much planning theory is a recognition that the appropriate arrangements of the state and its sub-units for planning are not amenable to theoretical proposals for perfect systems, in which different tiers of government, or community agencies, relate to one another in a nested hierarchy, but are the results of messy compromises among political values and centralizing and decentralizing forces. Here planning theorists have in the main ignored the insights of organization theory.

Second, planning theory suffers from all the epistemological dilemmas that confront the social sciences generally, what I call in figure 1. the difficulty of knowing and doing: the constant failure of prediction and quantitative modelling, problems of forecasting, the natural tendency to reduce human complexity by reductionism, the lingering problem of positivism and reactions against it, a penchant for attempting the more glamorous unified theory as opposed to what Merton calls theories of the middle range, and many more. Planning theorists suffer these problems no worse than other social scientists, it's just that the problem is perhaps more obvious because planning has a strong vocational orientation which continually tests and finds wanting the strength of the bridge between theory and practice.

These two factors described above have combined to produce the problem of planning theory and my main goal in preparing this dissertation has been to ameliorate this problem by attempting to derive a viable, centrist and epistemologically supportable conceptual framework for future theoretical activity in planning. I term this a 'liberal democratic agenda' for planning theory. In putting this forward my intention is to contribute to a paradigm shift in planning theory back towards a more practical
and realistic approach designed to address the critical social, environmental, and organizational problems we face.

This work then is mainly addressed to planning theorists, and particularly European planning theorists, for that is the milieu in which I work. I hope it has wider applicability, but I do not presume to make that assumption. That said, I draw for my examples about 75% on British planning experience and about 25% on Canadian examples which reflects the amount of time in the last decade I have worked in the two countries.

In using the terms 'centrist' and especially 'liberal democratic' I obviously enter a minefield of political and semantic dispute. The work is centrist in that I am in fundamental disagreement with most but not all, of the neo-conservative political programme in so far as it abrogates state responsibility for the quality of the future, for easing the ravages of poverty and unemployment, for providing quality services like public transportation and environmental protection, and for encouraging essential social as well as economic objectives, and generally smoothing the rough edges of capitalism. I am in equal disagreement with the neo-Marxist schools of planning theory and social science, which have become an arcane and almost impenetrable religion of point and counterpoint, unrelated to matters of practical concern, for example to the metaproblems described above. The work is centrist in that I fall between these camps.

I use the term liberal democratic advisedly. 'Social democratic' might do as well, but somehow carries the taint of discredited and often inefficient 'cradle to grave' welfare bureaucracies. But the term liberal is problematic also. In the United States
politicians like Dukakis are accused of being 'liberal' as if it's just about the worst thing in the world after 'Communist'.

Liberalism there is taken as the philosophy of government intervention in the mold of Roosevelt. In Britain, on the other hand, liberalism is to some extent taken as freedom from government intervention in the workings of the market. In this view, derived lately from the economic liberalism of Hayek and Milton Friedman, successful societies are defined by the struggle of entrepreneurs against the constraints of the state and social convention arising from consensus. But both definitions of liberalism are conditioned by traditional left-right views on economic issues. Certainly liberalism as an ideology accepts that market forces can play a prominent role in the creation of wealth. There is a clear preference for competitive markets and the use of the price mechanism rather than state economic planning. Liberalism also recognises the need for state intervention to deal with externalities and monopolies, to provide public goods, and for income redistribution. But no definition of modern social liberalism is complete without reference to an essential concern for decentralized political pluralism, cooperation, and coordination in pursuit of social as well as economic development, and the maximum degree of individual liberty which is also consistent with a healthy political culture. Very recently, even some neo-Conservatives have become aware that maximum economic freedom, individualism and materialism do not necessarily lead to a mature and healthy society but rather towards private affluence and public squalor, and there have been attempts to redefine the elements of political culture in terms of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in the context of community. In the concluding chapter I return to a discussion of the importance of citizenship and political culture in society, and the contribution of planning to the realisation of these.
Finally I would like to conclude this introductory section by a brief description of my approach to the task. The bulk of the work involved a systematic breakdown of the two problems of planning into their constituent parts from which, I argue, a more profound view of what I call the context of planning can be rebuilt. Chapters two to five define the problem as a means of building up a body of evidence which describes the context of planning.

I then question the extent to which existing planning theories have been able to make a contribution to our understanding of the problems of planning, and whether they are able to speak to practising planners. In particular, I focus on theory groups which have begun something approaching a systematic critique of the role of planning in capitalist societies. However, I find that none quite come to grips with the problem of organizational turbulence, nor do their political assumptions make them wholly accessible to planners working in liberal democratic societies.

Having thus established an original conceptual framework for understanding the problems of planning I ask two questions:

First, what are the implications of this knowledge about the social context of planning for planning theory?

Second, given this, what are the appropriate tasks of planning theoreticians in the foreseeable future?

I return to these questions in the concluding chapter. My main purpose in writing this dissertation then has been to define in a broad and systematic fashion the problems of planning and to use this framework to propose a revised conception of planning.
theory, based on the context of planning rather than an ideological abstraction or utopian vision. To do this systematically required an examination of the political and organizational constraints which bound planning practice. In my view such extended (and recursive) problem definition is an important and creative task. Perhaps more importantly it can help shape a measure of political consensus required for social action, which I have argued is a primary task for planners. The requirement for coordinated action on serious metaproblems grows daily, as does the need for a higher regard for the future as represented by planning activities.

Also my objective is to attempt to make social science theory and knowledge more accessible. I have therefore attempted to construct a partial, interdisciplinary conceptual framework which can be a guide to observing and understanding the planning world. What I am attempting therefore is not a static conception but a prescription for an ongoing intellectual programme for planning theory.

Most importantly, my objective is to begin a process which relates planning theory to planning action. A key to so doing may be to recognise that theorizing is no more than a tool for action. Social science itself, which gives rise to theorizing, is a science of the artificial, - a science about the worlds that humans and human cultures have and are choosing to create (Bolman and Deal, 1984). As Caravajal (1983, p.237) asks 'are systems out there, or are they in the minds of systems planners?' In the same way, we are entitled to ask whether planning theories help us interpret reality and help us think about the crisis and context of planning. The criteria for judging the answer is that the way the world appears to us depends on our basic theory about the structure of the world. To inquire we must construct a theory of reality which will then guide us in the observations we make, which in turn will guide us in the
revision of our theory of reality and in turn can be a guide to actions and so on (Churchman, 1975).

The implications of this recursive approach to theorizing are threefold. First, it must be accepted that there are no immutable findings in the social sciences, because any findings become part of 'the rationalization of action' of those to whose conduct they refer. That is, social science 'facts' have no meaning outside a value orientation based on reason and free choice. As Levy (1981, p.19) puts it.

...consciousness is neither passive nor purely or irresponsibly active; rather it is reactive in the sense that it reacts creatively to the possibilities of the context. Only this formulation does justice to the way human beings respond creatively to the discovered problems of human existence.

Second, there is no one true theory, either in planning or any other discipline. Indeed to presume a unified social theory, explicitly or implicitly, borders on the megalomanical and is simply unacceptable on epistemological and moral grounds. Rather there may be several valid if partial perspectives on planning and the planning context, from several disciplines, and the conceptual tools which are helpful will vary according to the process under consideration (Boudon, 1986). It is to these perspectives and tools we turn to help practising planners build a basic theoretical and practical view of the planning context. Here I agree with Faludi (1982a) that planning paradigms can and should be combined. Understanding all the perspectives operating in the decision environment can lead to wiser policy making than sticking resolutely to the idea that only one perspective (one's own) can be valid. The empirical task of such analysis is to understand how theories interrelate, not to select between them (Zysman, 1983). Following from this a third point is that I propose that the term 'context of planning' somehow describes both practical reality and the theoretical reconstruction of that reality, and the relationship thereof.
It can be argued that a great strength of planning as field of intellectual inquiry is its multidisciplinary approach to questions of public policy. To maintain this strength planning must continually look outward to, and synthesize, intellectual understanding from other fields; as well as avoid the trap of using only inward-looking or self-referencing criteria as a means of evaluating planning theory. A multidisciplinary background, that is knowledge or experience of different disciplines, is fruitful ground for interdisciplinary analysis, which integrates disciplinary knowledge. A further level of analysis is transdisciplinary, which is able to transcend disciplinary boundaries with the aim of an holistic synthesis. Figure 2 outlines the levels of analysis:

![Figure 2: Levels of Analysis in Planning Research](image)

**PLANNING IN THE POLICY PROCESS**

Before beginning a systematic analysis of the context of planning it is useful to lay the groundwork for subsequent discussion by relating planning to the process of policy
development and implementation. Planmaking activities straddle almost the total range of human endeavour from personal and private action, through interpersonal relationships and group dynamics, to political processes (Yewlett, 1985). We all plan, at one time or another, and the activity, or better, the problematique of planning can be described as one of systematically considering a series of interrelated choices under conditions of uncertainty. That said, the focus of this dissertation is on a higher administrative level of planning, that of the senior planner, cum executive, who has some influence over the policy process and over the allocation of public (and sometimes private) resources in society. This administrative level is often replicated in one way or another at different spatial scales.

The choices available to the executive level planner are not static, they become outmoded almost as soon as they are made. For this reason at the beginning planning was described as both a management task and as the recurring intervention between problem context and administrative response. Planning is a systematic consideration of future problems and options within a never-ending public sector decision process in which short-term political and bureaucratic considerations tend to predominate.

Planning is, or should be, part of the process of decision, rather than a production line of plans. As Beer (1979, p.336-37) points out:

insofar as people have so often considered (and written about) planning as an activity in its own right - replete with a modus operandi that is conceived as separate from the business of managing, nonsensical rituals have evolved. And if planning means to engage in such rituals, then there is no escape for them. Thus managers and ministers become helplessly entangled in immensely high-variety estimations about performance in future epochs that have been arbitrarily selected, well-knowing that their effort will be wasted. They know this from experience. They have found that the attempt to plan consists mainly in rationalizing and updating plans that are being constantly falsified by unfolding history.
For private sector corporate planning this discussion would be sufficient in that it encompasses most elements of a definition of the generic activity of planning. But for the public sector the situation is more complex. Planners rarely define either the institutional context or the objectives of planning. These are a function of the political system, and planning is connected to power through the workings of politics in its broadest conception. A good definition of politics is provided by Held (1984, p.235):

> It is involved in all the relations, institutions and structures which are implicated in the activities of production and reproduction in the life of societies. It is expressed in all the activities of cooperation, negotiation and struggle over the use and distribution of resources which this entails. Politics creates and conditions all aspects of our lives and it is at the core of the development of problems in society and the collective modes of their resolution. Thus, politics is about power, about the forces which influence and reflect its distribution and use and about the effect of this on resource use and distribution; it is about the 'transformative capacity' of social agents, agencies and institutions.

All planning in the public sector relates back to the power of the state; and the influence of planning, or lack of it, is a function of the role of the state in society. This is as true of spatially-oriented or land use planning, as it is of public administration, policy analysis, or budgetary control over programmes. It is for this reason that Mann (1978, p.14) can say that the older distinctions between planning and other kinds of administrative decision-making have disappeared. Planning, with or without a socio-territorial focus, is grounded in a relationship to the political system by which both strategies and tactics for implementation are derived from a measure of consensus or coalition around political issues. This consensus results in policy.

Planning in this conception is closely related to the newer academic field of public policy studies, and there is little difference between the critical issues in planning
and in that field of political science. One recent attempt to distinguish planning from policy studies fell back on planning's concern for physical circumstances as a separate dimension of human life (Allison, 1986). This was in an effort to redress the decline 'in the morale of the town planning profession and its reputation, and to make sense of the complexity of modern life'. But the result seems a mistaken prescription for professional isolation for town planners, at a time when town planners are increasingly concerned with urban economic regeneration and its social consequences.

A simple definition which isolates planning from either policy or socio-economic circumstances is probably unhelpful. As Mann (1978, p.114) noted:

That planning programs are nominally concerned with urban and regional questions is little help; for they may actually be concerned with questions more at a national than local level, and there is nothing to keep the 'policy' field from moving into the local and urban sphere in response to opportunities.

He suggests that distinguishing policy analysis from planning can only be done by 'the most imaginative hair-splitting on matters of style'. Similarly Reade (1983) compares the 'thought-styles' of economic planners and town planners and finds them virtually identical. He concludes that 'planners seem to share a common style of thought, irrespective of what or where they plan'.

Planning practice bears this out insofar as local initiative, although important for many reasons which will be explored in subsequent chapters, cannot be divorced from either the broad policies concerned with economic or social change or from the workings of the international economic system. For example, the UK's Community Development Programmes in the 1970s clearly indicated that local planning initiative could not be isolated from national policy, or from international financial and industrial considerations. This is a fundamental insight which is unlikely to be
dislodged. Wallerstein (1974, 1980) makes a similar point in his analyses of the world economic system.

Both the role of the state in society, and the geographic and functional relationships between centres and peripheries, are taken as fundamental dimensions to the planning crisis and explored in subsequent chapters. In an earlier work (Carley, 1980) I discussed at length the field and definitions of policy studies and analysis. In summary, I would agree with Webber (1978, p.157):

"Under virtually all the social circumstances in which planners work, the acceptable way is necessarily the outcome of political processes. That is to say, there are no scientifically or technically correct answers, only politically appropriate ones ... I suspect the notion that there are right answers to be discovered or invented will be as difficult as any of our ideologic fixations to overcome. That fundamental doctrine has been so deeply woven into contemporary thoughtways as to have attained the status of a truism. It is nonetheless false.

In chapter two we find the origins of this false 'fundamental truism' that has dogged planning practice over much of its short history in a conception of progress developed first in the 18th century. In chapter five I examine the implications of this for planning practice and theory.

Of course having established that all planning is political, equally not all political activity or the activity of the agents of the state is planning. Quite the contrary. Once again planning is clearly concerned with the future. Here Paterson's (1972) analysis of the elements of the 'decision-complex', slightly revised, can help us understand the relationship of planning to politics to implementation in the policy process. Paterson's analysis, though originally of the firm, applies equally to the public sector organization. The decision-complex can be represented by:
If decision represents the political realm, planners are seldom politicians. Execution is the realm of policy implementation, the execution by administrators of decisions taken by politicians. Knowledge of execution should, but often doesn't, form part of the information gathered in information activities, which is synthesized by senior administrators for the benefit of politicians who take decisions. Planning activities, which promote systematic regard for the future, take place in information and synthesis areas but do not define those areas in which activities may not reflect a concern for the future but rather bureaucratic imperatives, desire for career promotion or other factors. The many motivations which define bureaucratic action are discussed in Carley (1980) and elsewhere. Paterson stresses that the decision complex is an open system since at any stage it will be subject to stimuli from outside the system. Also within the decision complex itself there will be extensive feedback systems. Finally, Paterson defines a 'decision-system' as a mass of such complexes reducible to one broad complex, the agency itself. The only drawback of transferring Paterson's conceptualization of the decision-complex to the public agency is that we must recognize that the outside stimuli, the political culture, is very strong and that there is no provision in this simplification for the electorate. That said, the important point here is that although all planning is political, it is not politics per se but is in a sense one source for the raw (information) and redefined (synthesis) material of the political process. Such material is used in what Habermas calls communication structures which not only transmit information, but
communicate political and moral meaning and reproduce and enhance the relations of power and production. The importance of planning's contribution to information and synthesis, and these to the policy process, surfaces again and again throughout this work.

IS PLANNING IN CRISIS?

Everywhere it seems planners feel under attack and the concept of planning is in retreat. It is virtually impossible to examine the literature of planning without finding reference to a crisis of or in planning, be it town and country, land use, economic, social, strategic, or even corporate planning. In The Planner it says that in the UK planning suffers from a 'withdrawal of political support' and is 'facing a crisis of credibility which has intellectual and ideological sources' (Blowers, 1986a). Becker (1985) calls it 'the crisis and restructuring of regional planning and theory'. Harris (1983, p. 5) argues that a long term crisis in planning became 'real and painful' with the onset of the world economic slump in the mid 1970s. He outlines the dimensions of the problem:

Actual planning becomes largely irrelevant to what happens, at best a detail in the public relations work of the government ... The problem is acute in most areas, whether the planning of countries, of companies, of sectors or localities. Some of the gravest symptoms of the ailment appear in the field of physical planning.

Deakin (1985, p. 295) looks back to a tarnished golden age when:

bliss (for some) was to be a planner in that second dawn, but to be a strategic planner was very heaven. Or so it should have been but it soon wasn't. The flaws in the planning structure were beginning to show up clearly - shortly to be followed by the physical cracks in the structures that had been put up.

But it isn't only physical planners who feel threatened. The decline of planning has been linked to the decline of regional policy and more generally to the decline of
interventionist government and the welfare state itself. In the UK regional planning has been eclipsed by what has been called a 'philosophical dark ages' (Cameron, 1985). Mrs. Thatcher has mounted a sustained constitutional attack on local government, and particularly local planning, in an attempt to destroy what are thought of as 'socialist' local governments. Right-wing magazines argue that 'it is the Town and Country Planning Act that is most in tune with Marx's ideas, removing as it does the freedom to use property as you wish' (Clarke, 1987). At the same time from the left, a Labour M.P. (E. Heffer) has no qualms in announcing that 'the crisis of capitalism is so deep that whatever is done by British or US governments, it cannot be overcome'. Even in more level-headed Canada it is reported that 'regional land use planning agencies have been under political attack ... efforts are underway to emasculate, if not eliminate, the agencies' (Robinson and Webster, 1985, p.30). Planning theory is attacked as well. 'Methodologies once held in esteem are now being challenged, even ridiculed' (Gluck, 1986, p.18). Canada's one national newspaper, The Globe and Mail, feels itself qualified to editorialize that 'planning lays tenuous claim to professional status, lacking a unique body of knowledge or theory at its core' (18/8/86). In general, planning is identified as a 'bad label', to be avoided by substituting a less emotive term (Hahn, 1987).

Nor is it only planning in the public sector that is appearing distinctly ill. In Long Range Planning, a journal for corporate planners in the private sector, a recent article is titled, 'Everywhere, Planners are in Pain' (Brown, 1983). The Harvard Business Review (Gray, 1986, p. 89) reports that 'it has become fashionable to attack formal strategic planning as a source of corporate America's competitive ills'. The medical analogy is hard to escape. The Planner (April, 1985) argues in an editorial that 'strategic planning must survive'. Lyddon (1985, p.26), Chief Planner of the
Scottish Development Department, proposes 'a recovery of the purpose and a confidence in the planning system and the role of the planner'.

COMPLEXITY AND CRISIS IN THE MODERN WORLD

But it is not planning alone that is in crisis. Rather the field is caught up in something larger, more dramatic. Some suggest it is a crisis of social science and that the era of purposive social science has lost its momentum (Ilchman and Uphoff, 1983). Others look beyond the confines of social science to what is called a crisis of governability in public sector processes and structures, where demands on government seem to exceed its capacity to meet them effectively. This has been called the overload crisis:

Overload refers to the increased expectations held of public administration, and indeed of political systems generally, in the post-1945 world. These expectations led to a big increase in the formal tasks and responsibilities of government, but of course it does not follow that these tasks have been adequately implemented. Clearly they have not (Self, 1986, p.330).

The meaning of the crisis of governability depends on political viewpoint. For the non-radical, it may be that public administrators and planners have failed to find practical means of fulfilling the many tasks of the welfare state in a turbulent milieu where changes in the world economic system have dramatic national and local implications. These cause demands on the welfare state to rise as resources have become more constrained. For planners it can mean attempting to grapple locally with serious socioeconomic, urban problems whose origins are international in scope. On the other hand, a conservative scholar has explained 'the crisis of democracy' in terms of the inability of the state to resist demands for preferential treatment by individual corporations and economic sectors thus diminishing market mechanisms (Huntington, 1981). The crisis may also reflect an endemic constitutional and
organizational tension between centre and periphery, or between central and sub-national governments, in what Ashford (1982) calls 'the classic problem of the state and government'.

For the radical, neo-Marxist or perhaps utopian theorist, the situation is more dramatic. This is not an organizational crisis which can be put right by government reform or planning thought, but only by a radical restructuring of the state itself. The problems run too deep, the crisis of planning is only symptomatic of the entire failure of the social democratic state in capitalism. This has been variously termed 'the political dilemma of technocracy' (Heydebrand, 1983), and 'the crisis of crisis management under late capitalism' (Offe, 1984). In the latter, the crisis is symptomatic of considerable alterations in the classic capitalist relations of production and the relation of capital to the state and its subunits and agencies.

Examination of the relations of the state to international finance capitalism has been undertaken in great detail by contemporary scholars using variations of neo-Marxist analysis. Where the state in its own interest must maintain the process of capital accumulation and yet at the same time expand its revenue base, the resultant contradiction results in 'fiscal crisis' (O'Conner, 1973, 1984). The state also needs to legitimate these activities to its electorate: pursuant difficulties may lead to 'legitimation crisis' (Habermas, 1976a). These crises suggest either the impending breakdown of capitalism, the diminishment of democracy in the interests of the survival of capitalism (MacPherson, 1977b), or the rise of a corporatist technocratic state (Heydebrand, 1983). Some argue that these crises may be endemic to the capitalist world economy of the late 20th century which is characterized by a global division of labour in a single world-scale marketplace (Wallerstein, 1974). Others argue that it is not so much a crisis of capitalism as one resulting from social
and technological changes stemming from advanced industrialism and therefore a crisis of modernity (Giddens, 1986).

The cries of crisis from political scholars within the liberal-democratic tradition have become almost as common as those within neo-Marxism. Boschken (1982) refers to 'a flood of works attesting to a crisis in politics and administration'. Ostrum (1973) assessed the crisis in terms of the task-oriented functions of government, Trist (1976) in terms of turbulence in the decision-making environment. Scott (1981) suggests that the crisis is one of institutional dependence which makes our lives subservient to deterministic systems of control, or an 'organizational imperative'. Beer (1979) argues that larger and more complex networks of interdependence cause the conditions for the continual trend of modern society towards greater centralization which eclipses freedom. Bureaucracy has become the instrumental means of making decisions. Boschken (1982 p. 247) sums up: 'most of these tendencies revolve around the trade-off of certain freedoms for more administrative control'. As Johnson (1979, p.246) puts it: 'The common dilemma: big government for efficiency's sake, small government for the sake of democratic values'. These arguments have both geographical and functional dimensions. The study of centre-periphery relations have become an important tool in understanding the post-war state, which can only be understood in the context of the world economic system.

CHANGE IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Although the notion of crisis may define in part the context of planning in the latter part of this century, it is clear that planners are hardly alone in facing 'crisis'. While the word may already seem overworked, the tensions under which planners must operate are certainly real, and I will argue, endemic in complex industrial states. As
we move towards a future which is commonly called post-industrial the situation may become more rather than less difficult. International economic turbulence, tension between developed and underdeveloped regions, and between levels of government, has been greatly exacerbated since the oil crisis of 1973 and by the recent recession which gave rise to new conditions of international trade. One result is that transnational corporations are now centralizing into what The Economist (15/2/85) calls global corporations, completely detached from concerns of nation states. A related result with considerable implications for planning has been the phenomenon of industrial shift. The latter serves as the structural ground upon which planners attempt to define their crisis.

Industrial shift describes a readjustment of productive activities at an international level, particularly the transfer of certain sectors, for example textiles, the car industry, electrical and electronic industries, ship-building etc. from the industrialized countries to certain developing countries (in Southeast Asia, South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, etc) based on shifts in comparative advantage (Madeuf and Michalet, 1981, pp. 356-367; Schydlowsky, 1984). This north-south shift is particularly pronounced in labour-intensive industries producing standardized goods. The main agents of the shift are the global or trans-national corporations (TNCs). For example, the European electronics giant Philips recently announced its first 'global company strategy' for the 1990s, by which it would transfer production from its European bases to Asia and Mexico. Philips' President announced that the company no longer saw itself as a European-based, but rather 'a global company' whose product development, production, and marketing strategy was linked to a 'single-world concept'.

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For the first time then the industrial production of advanced capitalist economies does not take place solely or even mainly in their own territory. Capital in the form of factories and whole branches of industry are shifted from place to place and entire regions, formerly prosperous, may suffer progressive de-industrialization and become the 'new peripheries' (The UK Midlands, the 'rust belt' in the USA). Devalued fixed capital in declining regions becomes a tax advantage in reinvestment strategies that take capital and jobs abroad (Walton, 1981), or to more inviting domestic regions like the US sunbelt or the southeast of England. Shifts in production are made easier by the globalization of access points to finance capital, the development of world-wide securities markets, and the availability of sophisticated computer-linked telecommunications facilities. The result are what Harvey (1978) calls 'switching crises' involving both geographic and sectoral shifts. Investment not only abandons regions but also moves into new product lines in which previous workers would have no special advantage were they able to migrate with capital (Walton, 1981, p.379).

However, this evolving world economic system is itself an entity with conflicting tendencies towards unity and disparity. The planned integration of the activities of TNCs at the world level leads towards generalized wage relationships, homogeneity of technology and production techniques, and standardization of products and patterns of consumption (Madeuf and Michalet, 1981, p.266). But equally the TNCs operate in a system of nation states where regulations and legislation, financial incentives, and political regimes give rise to policies to which TNCs may have to adjust. Pinder (1982, pp.44-46) describes an area of nation state policy which is an important manifestation of planning functions. This is regional, infrastructure, and economic development policies by which planners attempt to redress regional deprivation and underdevelopment engendered by industrial patterns in the international and national economies. But these types of policies are under the gun
from recent changes in political philosophy towards neo-conservatism (for example, Thatcherism) and subsequent changes in government practice: the decline of regional policy and the ascendancy of the notion that economic growth must be allowed to flourish in locations which are seen to optimal from a private point of view (Cameron, 1985). Grant and Healey (1985) argue that a major trend in national politics is towards reducing the scope and influence of planning at the local level. This is underpinned by moves towards managerial efficiency and privatisation, but also the growing centralization of government.

PLANNING AND REGIONALISM UNDER THE NEW CONSERVATISM

The advent of more conservative governments in the 1980s resulted in a de-emphasis of regional policy as a mode of state intervention in the economy. One result of industrial shift combined with this decline of regional policy has been an escalating and competitive syndrome of local promotion as cities great and small (and their planners), in the absence of any regional or national co-ordinative policies, vie for inward investment of any sort, with a combination of promotion, provision of industrial infrastructure, emphasis on the tractability of the local labour force, and financial subsidies and other incentives. Whether this leads to economic efficiency is anyone's guess (Hambleton, 1981; Stewart 1983). The main point is that the diminishment of regional policy, and therefore strategic planning on many fronts under the new conservatism, is really a reflection of a fundamental philosophic shift on the role of the state vis-a-vis both the economy as a whole, and its sub-national units. The decline of regional policy, the diminishment of a concern for territorial justice, and the ascendancy of a strong national perspective in economic policy are all facets in the continuing dialectical process by which national governments
redefine their relationships with the region, and the general relationship of the state to society.

But a move away from regionalism need not be a one-way trend. In France for example, a regional crisis was seen to last from about 1970 to 1982, when the incoming Socialist government instituted a new round of regional planning based on political devolution (Benko, 1987). Although such trends are very likely to be cyclical, it would however be a mistake to link regionalism as an ideological stance, *ipso facto* with left-wing views in politics, even if anti-regionalism now tends to be associated with conservative governments. The regional ideology has been espoused variously by groups from the extreme left to the extreme right and many points in-between, depending on other complex social and political factors. Recently, a new decentralism advocated by some planning theorists has been accused of appearing 'remarkably like the old conservatism' (Hebbert, 1982). The important point is that the dialectical relationships between national and sub-national units of government, or other aspects of centre and periphery important in planning, are in a continuing process of redefinition, which is related to but not necessarily contingent on, ideological perspective.

The fact that the organization of the state and political values are in no fixed relationship has important implications for those attempting to understand the place of planning in the national context. Too often planning theorists take moral justification for organizational proposals for undertaking planning from a particular ideological stance, without, it seems, much examination of the nature of the organizational phenomena they hope to alter or replace. This is not surprising, but often leads to a simplistic confusion between workings of complex social structures like nation states with the theorist's own ideological preferences. For example,
recently large public and housing bureaucracies in the UK have decentralized to local offices, for valid organizational reasons. Such decentralizations are more of a reaction to bureaucratic inflexibility than an ideological prescription, and therefore appeal to local governments on both the left and right of the political spectrum. This broad appeal is causing some consternation to theorists, particularly on the left, who feel compelled to fit these practical organizational responses to complexity into some simple left-right continuum which reflect mainly views on social justice and income redistribution. When something similar occurs in prescriptive planning theory, the result is usually well meaning proposals, reflecting a reasonable moral stance, but unfortunately devoid of an understanding of political or organizational reality, and therefore mildly and sometimes wildly impractical. Reflecting on this general failure to link political values to organizational knowledge can help us understand planning theory's own continuing crisis of 'knowledge into action' which is the poor relationship of planning theory to planning practice.

Certainly when value systems and/or tiers of administrative authority clash, it is very often on matters of planning (Ionescu, 1975). In the current clash of national and local units of government in the UK, 'planning was a casualty on the way' (Riddell, 1986). In organizational terms, Hinings et al. (1985, p. 45) suggest that policy and planning problems are magnified in any inter-organizational context because wide difference of opinion will have to be resolved, lines of authority and responsibility are not clear, and considerable resources need to be devoted to the planning task. In times when international economic turbulence combined with a shift to neo-Conservatism has resulted in pressure to roll back the welfare state, cut state expenditures and reduce government manpower, it is not surprising that planning becomes a casualty of inter-organizational conflict. The problem is made worse because highly complex problems often require agencies and departments to
cooperate in problem definition and policy response. But such cooperation is difficult and costs time and money. Also different departments are under pressure from different political constituencies and may not see immediate interests served by longer term or cooperative ventures. As often as not, the failure to cooperate results in counterproductive policies which serve to compound organizational turbulence and the difficulty of the planner's task. For example, for ten years central government in the UK has had inner city policies to counteract the urban decline caused by deindustrialization. But at the same time it is insisting that local planning authorities allow the kind of suburban shopping centres which have proved in North America to hasten the decline of city centre functions. Given that already very complex socioeconomic problems can be compounded by insufficient policy responses, it is not surprising that planners have described the context of planning in crisis terms.

Although it is commonplace to say that the world is growing increasingly complex, it is hard to imagine it getting simpler as an evolutionary trend. The crisis of planning, governability, overload, or perhaps of late capitalism and state capitalized socialism is partly a crisis of increased societal complexity and an inability for our rationally derived planning systems to cope. But there is also ample evidence that the organizational aspects of the crisis are not new, and may be as endemic as changing relations between the state and the factors of production. What is identified as a crisis in planning may be more a manifestation of the continuing transformation of modern, industrialized societies and their organizational arrangements. But the rate of change has increased since about 1973, and this has engendered notions of crisis. To understand the crisis it is necessary to look to the past in terms of western political philosophy since the Enlightenment, to consider current thought on the
relation of state and society, and to understand why the planning context can be described as turbulent.

OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

The outline of this dissertation and the argument presented is as follows. In this chapter I have proposed that the notion that there is a crisis of planning is common, and that a further examination of the literature reveals this concern is not unique to planning but extends across the social sciences, and even to the concept and working of the modern welfare state in a changing world economy. Without commenting on the extent to which cries of crisis ring true, it is argued that the notion of crisis provides a most useful beginning for analysing for the context of planning in the modern state. Chapters two to five address four key areas in the 'so-called' crisis of planning.

Chapter two examines the historical and philosophical basis for the role of the state in society and argues that in the writings of Locke, Hobbes, J. S. Mill and others are to be found the origins of present day views on the role of the state. Discussion of a series of insolvable tensions, which both underlie and sometimes undermine, planning action is initiated here with a consideration of state power, freedom, social control for state stability, and the role of markets in current neo-conservative thinking. Chapter two summarizes a number of fundamental political considerations which form the intellectual milieu in which planners think about why and what they do.

Chapter three goes on to examine the crisis of planning in the modern welfare state in terms of: an endemic tension between centre and periphery, conflict between economic objectives and political aspirations, opposing and confused trends to central
ization and decentralization, and an inter-organizational conflict and re-adjustment which is an inevitable consequence of state intervention in society. These factors both give rise to notions of crisis and form part of expectable constraints which will operate in the public sector planning situation.

Chapter four argues that much planning activity is an attempt to manage change in what organisation theorists describe as turbulent environments. These are characterized by uncertainty; inconsistent and ill-defined needs, preferences, and values; and an inherent inability to predict the cumulative consequences of action. It is argued that the planning dilemmas posed in chapters three and four are not entirely due to the inevitable decline of late capitalism but are also part and parcel of what is described as the problem of the modern state. In brief, this is how to deal with the complexity and unforeseen effects of policy-making where policy making activities interlock at every level, and organizations conflict - or co-operate - both politically and administratively in a world grown increasingly turbulent since 1973. In organization theory can be found some analytic tools for thinking about this planning dilemma. Particularly useful are notions of organization learning, resources, networks, and capacity to plan or innovate effectively. Organizational analysis calls into question the usefulness of static models for understanding the inter-organizational relationships which characterize many planning situations.

Chapter five concludes the discussion of the crisis of planning by turning to the epistemological dimension of the problem, often termed a crisis of rationality. Again it is useful to return briefly to the philosophical roots of our views about how we know the world. We find that the planning dilemma over the possibility of rational action is an issue for the social sciences generally. It is perhaps more acute in planning because its practical or vocational expression continually tests and finds
wanting the strength of the theory-action bridge. After a review of the historical basis for 'a social' science, the chapter examines the legacy of positivism in planning theory and practice, and the applicability of the concept of rationality to planning thought and policy analysis. In examining the problem of rationality I also turn to a problem which bedevils planning theory, which is the extent to which it is possible or useful to distinguish procedural from substantive planning modes. It is argued that outside of the confines of an artificial analytical construct of limited value, this distinction is both doomed to logical failure and carries political dangers.

Chapter six examines whether existing planning theories have been able to make a contribution to our understanding of the crisis of planning, and whether they are able to speak to practising planners. In particular, the focus is on three theoretical approaches, which by their overtly critical orientation have begun something approaching a systematic critique of the role of planning in western, capitalist societies. In particular it is argued that these approaches (new decentralists, neo-Marxists, and planning theory derived from critical theory) whatever their prescriptive failings, have made major contributions to our analytical understanding either in raising issues which have been on the whole ignored but are of practical significance (new decentralists), or in offering insights on the socio-historical context of planning (neo-Marxists), or in extending the arguments of theory to the point of practical advice to planners (critical theory). This chapter concludes with an examination of one area of theory which begins to address the context of planning action. Forester (1985, p.52) argues that if:

a formulation can be offered that generalizes expectable constraints across various planning situations, then we are half way to recognizing that the theory of rational action depends in part upon a theory of the institutional and structural contexts of action.
This dissertation attempts a formulation of those generalizable 'expectable constraints'.

In chapter seven I conclude the theoretical argument put forward in this dissertation by reassembling the main themes of the argument and relating these to the task for planning theory. This chapter proposes an agenda for liberal democratic planning theory in the 1990s, which attempts to build up a series of useful, if partial, conceptions of the possibility and direction for planning action from a systematic, and realistic, understanding of the socio-political context of planning. In particular this proposes that what is called the crisis of planning is rooted in the inevitable absence of consensus in societies about the role of the state in society, and about the efficacy of state intervention in the turbulent workings of the market in terms of totality of human benefit and for social justice; and that this lack of consensus, which waxes and wanes is in a fundamental relationship to what is called the crisis of rationality. That is the extent of the crisis of rationality is in part a function of the primacy of values and value conflict in planning problems. Value conflict results in part from an absence of consensus on the role of the state.

In putting this argument I first examine a number of arguments for state intervention in society, the relation of state to market, and the implication of these for planning. I argue that as public sector planning is an instrumental expression of the role of the state, and given the extreme unlikelihood of revolution, planning theorists have a responsibility to explore the practical implications of organizational options at the state-market conjuncture. Further, as planning holds a brief for the future vis-a-vis the present, and as the future is not a fact but an interactive fusion of fact and value, theorists have a responsibility to develop ethical frameworks and principles. These may help combine the practical benefits of the market in terms of feedback
with a conception of the transcending social responsibility of the state and the need to 'embed' ethical principles in political culture.

Second, the concluding chapter reviews the arguments about turbulence and proposes some appropriate organizational and individual responses to uncertainty. In particular the importance of action learning and uncompartmentalized organizational responses; inter-agency negotiation, cooperation, and risk taking; and the social distribution of planning knowledge based on ethical considerations are emphasized.

Third, I examine the implications for planning theory of the boundaries of social scientific inquiry, given the endemic uncertainty generated by turbulence. The appropriate responses are holistic and interdisciplinary. I stress that planning, because of its existing multidisciplinary and vocational orientation, is uniquely placed to join in evolving modes of social inquiry, particularly action research. A beginning is made by proposing a general policy model for planning which takes into account both the centrality of values in the planning context, the non-revolutionary nature of planning action, and the position of planning knowledge as a lever on the distribution of societal power, requiring ethical norms.

An appendix concludes the dissertation by using the policy model approach, and the key analytic elements derived from a study of the notion of the crisis of planning, in a brief introductory case study of urban decline and planning response in the UK.
CHAPTER 2. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN SOCIETY

INTRODUCTION

One of the main dimensions of the context of planning has to do with competing perspectives on the appropriate role of the state in society in terms of the balance between state intervention or control, one type of which is planning, and individual freedom. The rise of neo-Conservative thinking has particularly sharpened this debate, but the tension between aspirations for individual freedom set against the need for social control in service of a greater good has been of almost constant interest to political philosophers since the late 16th century. It is not possible to participate intelligently in the current debate without reference to the thread of political philosophy on this topic.

Lately planning, as an obvious manifestation of state intervention, has come in many ways to be identified with the rise and apparent fall of the western welfare state. The welfare state evolved mainly after World War II, its growth fuelled by a period of sustained economic expansion and relative political stability between 1945 and the mid-1970s. Now in many ways the welfare state is suffering a crisis brought on by economic recession and by changes in the direction of political thinking. There is widespread loss of confidence in the ability of states to promote economic well-being, full employment or to deliver efficient welfare services. There are tax-revolts on the right, and anti-bureaucratic movements of left and right, all of which have helped bring on the idea of the overload of government in the welfare state and thus a crisis of planning.
At another level however the nation state has never been more dominant as a mode of political and social organization. A broader perspective which takes into account the waning of colonialism, and rise of nation states covering virtually every land area and people of the globe, suggests that the age of the nation state, with its origins in 16th century Europe, may be near its apex. In particular, the administrative power of the state and its use of information as a resource or well-spring of power are important. For many reasons, if we are to better understand the context of planning, it is necessary to look back to some basic principles and events concerning the role of the state, the evolution of the welfare state, and the influence of political philosophy on views of the state. These threads are followed from the 16th century to the present day rise of neo-Conservative thinking, with its considerable implications for planning endeavours.

THE STRUCTURE OF STATES

To understand the institutional context and thus the potential for public sector planning it is helpful to first turn our attention to the question of commonalities among states, in terms of their inter-related role and organization. Any state structure, which includes arrangements of sub-units of government, reflects the perceived role of the state, derived historically and/or from perceptions of the dominant coalition of social groups, and the state's organization, which is the institutional arrangements for undertaking goal-seeking behaviour. There are of course many different state structures in the world today, reflecting historical and constitutional evolution, power groupings within societies, and geopolitical forces which impinge on domestic power relations. There are interesting studies which contrast the effects of differing institutional structures on decision making and planning (Ashford, 1982; Pollitt, 1984; Peters, 1985). For example Sundquist (1978) compares a number of European
countries with the United States to attempt to explain the relatively greater success of the European countries in planning for population movements. The explanatory factors are 1) different levels of bureaucratic capability; 2) different levels of bureaucratic discipline; 3) differences in the authority of party programmes; and 4) differences in the institutional environment of planning.

But however many different state structures exist, in all states public planning represents one form of the intervention of the state in society. Any consideration of public planning must therefore derive from an understanding of the role of the state. If we wish to analyse the objectives of existing planning systems or theories, or propose new ideas, then it will be helpful to briefly consider the evolution of important lines of thought about the state. Although the goals of state intervention are obviously diverse and multi-dimensional, there are certain basic parameters of the workings of states which relate to views on the appropriate role of the state. These pre-determine much of the potentiality of planning.

This thesis examines those parameters which planners and planning theorists work within, or against. It is folly to ignore them, especially in times of crisis for planning. As Hall (1983, p.43) notes 'the capacity of each state to formulate and implement innovative forms of policy ... is affected by the structural features of the state itself, of state-society relations, and of social institutions'. Hall suggests that the structures of power and rationality implicit in institutionalized sets of relations can have a 'profound impact' on the capacity of government to innovate. March and Olsen (1984) make a similar case that government is not only influenced by society, but that the institutions of government structure patterns of interaction in society.
The question might be raised as to what extent generalities are possible across different state systems. For example, the UK has a unitary system of government and Canada, like the United States and Australia, is a federation. However as Smith (1985, p.9-17) makes clear, the practical differences between state systems can be less than might be expected:

Federations as much as unitary states are confronted with the same classes of problem, whether it be in the delimitation of sub-national areas, the allocation of power including those to tax and consequent intergovernmental relationships, the creation of democratic and bureaucratic institutions, and the need to legitimise the State.

Nor are commonalities between states in terms of problems of intervention, or crises of planning, solely confined to western welfare states. On the contrary, problems of planning can be found in all industrial states with a high level of state intervention in the workings of complex economies. The commonality of a high level state intervention in society in both western market economies and centrally planned economies is described by Miles (1985, p.84-5):

In market economies the state is at some remove from the decision-making and planning activities of many major economic organizations, although the activities and goals of these enterprises is crucial in shaping state policies. In centrally planned economies the situation is somewhat different: while enterprise managers necessarily have some autonomy, long-term economic goals are determined internally within the state apparatus. This contrast is important, but should not be allowed to obscure the high level of involvement of most industrial states in their economies - even if they proclaim laissez-faire ideals. It is common for many economic sectors to be highly regulated, if not completely controlled, by the state even in market economies - this is particularly likely for strategic industries (e.g. banking), and major infrastructure (e.g. passenger transport), while other industries (e.g. military suppliers) may be effectively producing for state purposes. Often declining industries have been taken under state control in the West (thus shoring them up with public subsidies). New technology industries have recently been at the forefront of state intervention around the world.

So there is considerable evidence for the importance of the role of the state in terms of intervention in the economy, and in society generally, irrespective of ideological stance, and such intervention is a fact of life in the twentieth century.
There is also considerable evidence that there are generic problems of the organization of the modern state which are generalizable across ideological and geographic boundaries. It has been argued that governments based on central control may be 'likewise afflicted by the same policy diseases that incline all ambitious governments to fall apart from a combination of lack of co-ordination, implementation deficit and the creeping weight of incrementalism' (Gilliat, 1984, p.362). Equally, the same author suggests that centralized economies 'reveal the same lack of commitment and unwillingness to engage in organizational reform that characterize many government tolerated implementation gaps in the west'.

A similar point is that the Soviet Union is plagued with many of the same organizational and centre-periphery tensions, and inter-regional insensitivities, as countries in the West. This may be due to an 'internal colonialism' within the Soviet Union attributable to the hegemony of the industrialized cities and/or of the dominant, centralized political bureaucracy (Gouldner, 1976). Finally, Argyris (1978) argues that there are three primary causal factors which lead to a modern organizational crisis in both capitalist and non-capitalist worlds: (1) the nature of human beings as information processing systems, (2) the theories of action people hold about effective influence over others, and (3) the nature of organizational learning systems.

One conclusion is that some of the problems facing planning in capitalist states are not derived solely from the reproduction of the capitalist system, but reflect the nature of human social organization in the current socio-historical context. If this is the case then it seems useful to look to both the political role of the state in society, and to the organizational arrangements by which planning might be carried out in order to understand the context and therefore the potential of planning. The latter is
undertaken in chapter 3. In terms of the former, if we accept that the rationale for public planning is derived from the perceived role of the state, a key to understanding the context of planning may be to look to the development of ideas concerning the state, rather than to attempt to explain its role solely in terms of external factors such as the economy or cultural patterns (Meny, 1986). Certainly in any appraisal of decision making in public policy fields a common focus of inquiry is the appropriate role for government itself.

This chapter takes an historical overview of the evolution of the state in society, and the development of the welfare state. Political philosophy, in addressing the problems and prospects of ordered human enterprise in nation states, is both explanatory and normative. That is, it addresses how a political society does or could work, and usually passes judgment on whether this is good or bad for mankind. This dual emphasis is reflected in a statement by Saint Simon (1964, p.56) that 'the progress of enlightenment reveals the anomalies of the old social order, and makes the need of a new organization felt'. Political philosophy encompasses analysis and value judgments on modern human organization, and as such provides key insights into an understanding of the planning crisis. However ignorant we may be of the antecedents to our political views, it is the case that political actions and ideologies, and planning theories of today, are directly and inextricably linked to our intellectual inheritance. In most cases these views have been formed and molded by various political philosophies developed since the Enlightenment.

The balance of this chapter examines the development of western political philosophy on the issue of the role of the state, and its capacity to promote social stability in the face of natural tendencies to instability caused by individualistic actions. This in turn will assist in a critique of a number of planning theories in a later chapter.
Definition of the State

Politics relates directly to the necessities of human life, and a political society, in Spragins (1976, p.2) words, is 'a framework of ordered relationships within which we are enabled to live together and satisfy our communal wants and needs. A political society, in short, is a meaningful human enterprise.' One problem is that there are no consistent, generic definitions which set out the relationship of state to nation to government. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the state as the 'body-politic', and 'political' as 'of or affecting the State or its government, of public affairs'. Politics is 'the science and art of government, political affairs, or life'. From this, the state can be construed to be administered by government, and politics taken as the activity of governing. But somewhat inconsistently the OED defines the state as 'an organized political community under one government', and a society as the 'organization of a civilized nation'.

Isuani (1980) reviews the use of these concepts in the social sciences and finds only a 'semantic labyrinth' of largely intuitive definitions. He synthesizes a workable definition from the literature of political theory: 1) the state as an association or community that coincides with society; 2) the state as a dimension of society, that embraces or opposes other societal dimensions, such as church, media, unions, private companies; and 3) the state as an apparatus for government, administration and/or coercion.

Such distinctions are evolutionary insofar as a separation of state from society, in popular as opposed to philosophical thought, may be recent. In the 18th and 19th century the notion of the state was closely related to contemporary national unification movements, the consolidation of territory, and anti-church movements.
Often the interests of state and nation or society were held up as identical and morally right.

In the late twentieth century the state, contaminated perhaps by an association with force and violence, is seldom taken as co-terminus with the concept of society, which implies cultural community. For this reason number 3 from above is generally now taken as a definition of the state. For example, North (1981, p.249) defines the state as 'an organization with a comparative advantage in violence, extending over a geographic area and whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax its constituents. The essence of property rights is the right to exclude, and an organization which has a comparative advantage in violence is in a position to specify and enforce property rights'. In otherwise peaceful Canada a clear example of the state's exercise of its comparative advantage in violence was the invocation of the War Measures Act in 1971 to enable troops to be used to counter the anti-state threat of the Front de la Liberation du Quebec. Although the presence of troops and tanks on the streets of Montreal was a shock to Canadians, it wouldn't be to the residents of Belfast, or the Basque country, or many other places. These may seem extreme examples of attempts to maintain a near monopoly of the state in force, but are also a logical extension of the need for power and control which enables planning. The difference is of degree. This control is in counterpoint to a long and important tradition of attention to individual freedom in western political thought.

THE STATE AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM

According to Adam Smith, Europe adopted feudalism after the decline of Rome as a response to political uncertainty and the constant danger of invasion and death by marauding armies. For five centuries, and long after the threat of invasion had
passed, powerful feudal landlords retained control over land, politics and local economies, and the spiritual order was dominated by the Catholic Church (Moss, 1979). By the twelfth century however, there was the gradual rise of mercantilism, the accumulation of capital, and the emergence of market economies. A secularization had begun in western Europe which was to lead to the Renaissance, and to the beginning of modern states.

The breaking down of the feudal order gave rise to the art of secular politics, no longer dominated by either religion or the norms of chivalry. The first important exponent of secular politics was Machiavelli, writing in the early sixteenth century. The society of which Machiavelli (1961) wrote, the city states of northern Italy, was very unstable. There were constant factional conflicts among armies, and tension between rich and poor, leading to political corruption and institutional decay (Sabine, 1950). Machiavelli had been a civil servant in Florence for a decade, when he was exiled by the return to power of the Medici. During the course of this exile he wrote The Prince and the Discourses, both of which argued for a politics devoid of theology and even morality. Machiavelli's stress on the importance of the stability of the secular state is a recurring theme, and still a major consideration in current political science. Machiavelli was also the first political philosopher to argue raison d'etat as an explanation and defence of political action, and only after him did the concept of the state become a central object of political philosophy.

A century after Machiavelli, England was confronted by instability and civil strife, both religious and between the landed aristocracy and the rising middle class. The result was civil war. This situation drove Hobbes (1977) in Leviathan to examine the failure of sovereign authority in England. This was brought on, he argued, by the subservience of the state to the church. The civil war represented a regression to the
natural condition of man outside of the bounds of civil society, which was characterized by war (Spragins, 1976). Here can be found an emphasis on a secular, stable state governed by a sovereign power as inevitably better than the anarchy of natural, individualistic, man. The actions of individuals created the state, and subsequent law and justice were created by the sovereign who secured the state, and was implicitly obeyed by the individual members. The motive for this, as Hobbes put it, 'is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby, that is to say, of getting out of the miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent to the natural passions of men...' (in Curtis, 1981a, p.339). The state, in this view, made possible the achievements of civilization, and the state was brought about by a social contract, which once entered into voluntarily by individuals, becomes a compulsory association wherein:

"every man should say to every man, "I authorize and give up my right to govern myself to this man, or this assembly of men, on this condition, that you give up thy right to him" ... and this done, the multitude so united in one person is called a Commonwealth (Hobbes, 1977, p.132)."

In this way a political power is created in the form of a strong secular state, pre-eminent in political and social life, and necessary because of the self-seeking nature of individuals' behaviour and patterns of interaction (Held, 1984). Hobbes recognizes and institutionalizes the state's right to regulate individual behaviour for the general good. Civilization is impossible without this regulation, and the option to do away with it is not available once the contract is made. In Hobbes' work can be found first, a systematic analysis of the relationship between individual freedom and state control; and second, a rationale for state intervention from a conception of a greater good to be had from regulation of individuals' behaviour.

John Locke's (1960) reaction to the English civil war was rather different. His Second Treatise was a reply to Hobbes in which he stressed the role of consent as the
basis of all political power, in the form of a voluntary rather than a compulsory contract between governor and governed. Men are free, equal and rational in nature, and need not submit to any arbitrary or absolute power. The instability of England was due to the exercise of arbitrary power by the monarchy, which engendered a natural rebellious reaction. The rulers of England, the embodiment of the state, had damaged their contractual relationship with the governed by taxing without consent, by creating armies, and by limiting the religious liberties of the citizenry (Spragins, 1976, p.34). Man had natural rights, including life, liberty, and property and these could not be transgressed by the state. A state of nature, which was a state of liberty rather than Hobbes' state of license, was preferable to bad government, and good government was created by a social contract to assist peaceful living and protect property. In this view the Stuart monarchy had become bad government and therefore deserved overthrow.

In Locke's work can be found a different theme from that of Hobbes or Machiavelli: government not as an imperative foil to a chaotic natural state but as a contract with the consent of the governed, to be dissolved or altered when it no longer served its purpose of safeguarding the right to life, liberty and property. This state was not only temporary but limited, and had to be prevented from transgressing natural rights by constitutional limits on the extent of its authority. Government was by consent and consent could be revoked by individuals in society and government could be changed. In Locke's view the creation of government is the burden individuals have to bear to secure their ends and while the state exists to safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens, it must generally be restricted in scope and constrained in practice to ensure individual freedom (Held, 1984, p41). Locke's views on the danger of arbitrary or absolute power on the part of the state were reinforced by his view, set out in Essay Concerning Human Understanding, that the acquisition of human
knowledge was constrained by the inherent limitations in the abilities of our senses to perceive the reality behind our images of reality. In the face of our limited knowledge, tolerance and a degree of scepticism about the ability of the state to govern were indicated (Locke, 1975).

In Hobbes and Locke then can be found two diverse reactions to civil instability, and two important themes in modern thinking on the state: conservatism and the beginning of liberalism. In Lockean ideas, which have considerable influence today, we find the origins of liberal thought which was taken to America, and which emphasized the right to liberty and the right of revolution against arbitrary authority. These ideas saw print in the writings of Tom Paine, amongst others. Locke himself insists on the right of revolution as the only effective test of citizenship, although for Locke such citizenship does not extend beyond the propertied class (MacPherson, 1977b). In any case here are the roots of the critical bourgeois revolutions to come in France and America, in support of liberalism, and against conservatism in the form of monarchy. With Locke begins the development of the main philosophical arguments for the liberal democratic state, and contemporary theorists such as Nozick continue the Lockean emphasis on individual private rights inviolable by the state. In Locke's prescient linking of fundamental human limitations in acquiring knowledge with constraints on the power of government (or any corporate body) to dictate or plan, can be found an important area of concern in current organization theory, discussed further in chapters four and seven.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, writing in the eighteenth century, provides a counterpoint to these evolving notions of liberal democracy. He contrasts the natural man, who is whole but concerned solely with himself, with the citizen, who understands his good to be identical to the common good. In Emile Rousseau attempts to reconcile man's
selfish nature with the demands of civil society. He emphasizes that the passion of selfishness is changed by the very experience of living in a stable society. Man is not virtuous in a state of nature, virtue only comes about in a society based on law, and the unselfish virtues can increase with time. In the *Social Contract* Rousseau (1927) argues that such civic virtue is insured by the development of a 'civil religion' inculcated by the sovereign. The dogma of the civil religion includes tolerance, sanctity of the social contract, and respect for law (West, 1979).

In particular Rousseau was unhappy with the existing ideas of social contract which implied or specified a direct transfer of sovereignty from individual to the state. Instead Rousseau proposed a system of self-government or direct democracy in which all citizens would be actively involved in the process of government, rather than simply engaging in periodic voting for a representative to take decisions. Here the idea of self-government is posited as an end in itself and a political order is proposed in which the affairs of the state are integrated into the affairs of ordinary citizens (Held, 1984).

The legitimate authority of the state in Rousseau's conception is based on 'the common good embodied in the 'general will'', which takes precedence over individual will. The general will cannot be developed by a divisive, selfish, class structured society, but only by a one-class society of working proprietors, and such a society was to be achieved by government action:

> It is therefore one of the most important functions of government to prevent extreme inequality of fortunes; not by taking away wealth ..., but by depriving all men of the right to accumulate it; not by building hospitals for the poor, but by securing citizens from becoming poor (Rousseau, 1927, p.267).

In the writings of Rousseau we find the origins of important ideas in modern political thinking, particularly in the areas of participation and equality. Rousseau has been
claimed as an antecedent by utopians for his emphasis on the small farmer and for his radical ideas on education (in *Emile*), and most importantly by Marxists for his emphasis on an egalitarian single class society. His call for direct political participation precurses an important theme in community development and planning theory which emphasizes the value of 'hands-on' or 'bottom-up' efforts by citizens to take control of their own lives. Chapter six examines one such planning theory. It is not surprising to find aspects of his philosophy in many places, for Rousseau went well beyond the visible manifestations of the state, to consider psychological and moral aspects of human endeavour and organization.

**The Early Conservative View of the State**

Within a decade, from 1789 to 1799, the ancient regime of French feudal society was swept aside as a result of a revolution marked by the liquidation of the ruling class, and wholesale confiscations of property. The revolution destroyed the established order in the form of the absolute monarchy with a feudal aristocracy and substituted first constitutional monarchy and then a democratic republic. Even more important were the changes in the social order resulting from the establishment of a consciously libertarian and ideological society which transformed property, family, law, religion and education. For the first time, the principle of a state as socially responsible for individual welfare was embodied in a constitution, which guaranteed all citizens the right to a livelihood. The newly established social order in France, however, was precarious and constantly challenged from within by dissent on three models: the moderate liberal, the radical democrat, and the socialist (Caute, 1966, p.35). This resulted in continuing upheaval. This unstable situation was criticized by conservatives in England, the most articulate of whom was Burke.
Burke found the revolution in France a terrifying prospect, which could only lead to continual crisis. In *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790) he contended that, by destroying the social bases of order, such as religion and social hierarchy, the French had discarded essential restraints on individualistic action. An oscillation between tyranny and anarchy would be the result (Spragins, 1976, p.36). Burke emphasized the importance of institutions - the state, the church, and private property - and tradition. He argued that the libertarians' insistence on individual liberty and natural rights was unrealistic, and that society must necessarily constrain mankind: society was created to deliver man from the destructive freedom of an unsocialized condition (Spragins, 1976, p.115). Moreover, this constraint could hardly be expected from a fully representative government, because constraint could only issue from a power outside the potentially unruly individuals.

In this suspicion of representative government Burke's conservatism was allied with the anti-democratic views of many moderate liberals. Not until the early twentieth century did the majority of conservatives and moderate liberals come to accept the principle of universal suffrage as the basis for establishing the governing body of the state. Thus for liberals as diverse as John Stuart Mill and de Tocqueville, the rule of the masses was bound to limit the advance of liberty and enlightenment (Caute, 1966, p.35). The evolution of liberalism to liberal democracy constitutes one of the most important themes of western political thought. The rest of this chapter will examine this theme, and also the important reactions against this liberal capitalist perspective, contributing as it does to the development of the welfare state, and our perceptions on the role of government.
Industrialization and Early Liberalism

It has been suggested that the three great revolutions of western Europe were: the age of enlightenment, the French revolution, and the industrial revolution (Schapiro, 1962). Early industrialization in England and Europe took place under the framework of the administrative system termed by Adam Smith as mercantilism. This involved extensive government regulation over capital and labour, including restrictions on imports, financial inducements to export, and special rights and trading privileges to certain individuals and companies, for example, to the Hudson's Bay Company or the East India Company (Rosenberg, 1979). Mercantilism was, to Smith, government designed to promote the interests of a few businessmen at the expense of the 'the public interest'. However this 'public interest' was only identified with the interests of the newly emerging bourgeoisie. For neither the French nor industrial revolutions had spread financial benefit or franchise to the working class, who were pouring into the great industrial cities from the countryside. The bourgeoisie was replacing the landed aristocracy as the ruling class, and it was this bourgeoisie who required of its thinkers a social and political philosophy which met its attitudes and values. This philosophy was liberalism.

The essential problem of liberalism was to develop a political system which would produce governments which would nurture a free market society and protect citizens from the natural tendency of governments to be rapacious. For the individual, freedom in the political and economic sphere was essential. In the economic sphere under capitalism, all were free to engage in business, and those who benefit themselves benefit the nation as a whole. The government was not to interfere in the workings of this natural economic system, in other words, laissez faire was the order of the day.
In the political sphere the problem of liberalism was the extent of the franchise—the issue of democracy. For citizens to be protected from rapacious governments, they must be able to 'question, check and control the policies of office holders, and confirm them in, or dismiss them from office' (Sherman, 1972, p.291). But given this, to what extent did the bourgeoisie wish to enfranchise the rest of society? Their inclination was not, at first, towards political or economic enfranchisement for the working class at all. Indeed the earliest liberals, from Locke to Burke, were anti-democratic (MacPherson, 1977b, p.20). Early liberal democracy did not begin until the rise of the utilitarian philosophy, in the early 19th century, with the work of Jeremy Bentham (1742-1832), and until then there were no clear arguments for local government.

The functions of utilitarian government then were limited to the maintenance of security and the promotion of a free market economy in which utilitarian principles could promote the greatest good for the most people. Adam Smith was the economic philosopher of utilitarianism, and his economic theory came to be called 'classical economics'. At the time Smith's economics were radical, insofar as they proposed limitations on sovereign power, and benefit to the common man, rather than solely to the mercantilist class. Smith emphasized the production of wealth and the abolition of special privilege. Beyond this, laissez faire would bring maximum utility to the most people. Smith was also the first to put forward the labour theory of value, later adopted by Marx.

The free market society had to ensure some method of representative and responsible government, if the citizens were to be protected from that government. The evolution in Bentham's own thinking mirrors the progress of democracy in liberalism (MacPherson, 1977b, p.25-35). In 1791 Bentham proposed a franchise excluding the
poor, the uneducated, and women. In 1809 he suggested all property holders paying tax. By 1817 he was for universal manhood franchise. Even here the transition is a grudging one, and MacPherson (1977b, p.10) suggests that 'the concept of liberal democracy became possible only when ... liberal theorists found reasons for believing that 'one man, one vote' would not be dangerous to property, or to the continuance of class-divided society'. Indeed MacPherson argues that what divides pre-liberal thinkers, like Rousseau, from true liberal democrats is not only democracy in terms of the vote, but the liberal democrats' implicit acceptance of the class divisions inherent in capitalism. This constitutes the 'pure' liberal democracy.

The transition from the pure liberal democracy of Bentham and his disciple James Mill, to one tempered by an ethical humanism is marked especially by the writings of John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century. However, we are now at the point in this discussion where political thought loses the remoteness of history, for a consideration of J.S. Mill leads us directly down the path to liberal capitalism and reformist liberal capitalism, or social democracy. It is with Mill that many current discussions of the relationship between the state and society begin. Before taking that up it is useful to turn to two other important themes in western political thought. These are both antithetical to liberal capitalism: socialism and anarchism. Socialism divides further into the 'scientific socialism' of Marx and the group of socialists he derisively called 'utopian'. The utopian socialists were not to have any lasting direct influence on either political development or social justice, but their indirect influence will be apparent in the tenets of later democratic socialism or what is called social democracy. Socialism, utopianism and to a certain extent anarchistic thought have had considerable influence on current planning theory.
Utopianism and Industrial Society

The term Utopian derives from Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516) which describes life in an ideal society. Utopian visions have exerted a strong fascination for planning theorists, concerned as they often are with the means and ends to a 'better' future life. There are two distinct elements in utopian visions which surface again and again in planning theory. Buber (1949, p.11) terms these schematic fiction and organic planning. Schematic fiction originates in abstract imagination which starts from a theory of nature of man and then deduces a social order that will employ man's capabilities and satisfy all his needs. The purpose of organic planning is to inaugurate, from an undogmatic understanding of contemporary man and his condition, a transformation in both, so as to overcome the contradictions of our social order. In the new order envisioned by the utopian socialists, independent, voluntary groups were to form communities and establish an economy based on the common use of the means of production, thus 'socializing' industry (Schapiro, 1962, p.21). The utopian socialists regarded the state, in its present forms, as ineffective and uncreative, and incapable of solving the economic problems posed by industrial capitalism.

A consideration of utopianism begins with Saint Simon who wrote around the turn of the nineteenth century. Like Rousseau, he is claimed directly or indirectly by diverse left political factions - socialist, anarchist, and Communist, and yet his doctrine is also described as sometimes indistinguishable from liberalism (Ionescu, 1976, p.46). In fact Saint Simon's concerns were less with a political state than with an industrial state: the organization of a post-revolutionary industrial society, its effective functioning, and its institutionalization. The new social order in France, Saint Simon maintained, was the result of changes wrought by science and technology, and the real conflict in society was no longer between ruler and democrat but between industrial participant and the idle (the nobles, clergy, military) (Schapiro, 1962, p.22-
The future nation was to be seen as a great industrial society run by a hierarchy of classes, based on their relative importance in the productive process, and imbued with a new spirit of religion. At the top were scientists, then technicians, engineers, bankers etc. Lowest were the labourers, who nevertheless would be assured of wages sufficient for a comfortable standard of living.

Private profit was rejected by Saint Simon as the prime motive of economic activity. Rather technological invention plus abundant production and increased productivity would be used to advance the welfare of society as a whole, with each person's share dependent on his contribution. In political terms, he called this the 'politics of abilities', where power was decentralized from small centrist nodes of power to the appropriate positions based on relative contributions to societal well-being. In macro terms this meant that nation states (in Europe) would disappear to be replaced by a European confederative association, which was the territorially appropriate size for industrial society (Ionescu, 1976, p.24-27). With the nation state, central governments would also disappear to be replaced by European deliberative and administrative organizations. Representative government would disappear naturally, to be replaced by direct administration which ensured a planned economy, full employment, high productivity, and wide-spread purchasing power. Saint Simon's technocratic vision of social justice was strange in some ways, and yet in other ways he presaged many important concerns of social democrats in a modern Europe, particularly with regard to the utility of supranational deliberative and administrative agencies. His interests in welfare at the societal level and in the appropriate spatial distribution of power are also of continuing interest.
Later Utopian Socialists

'Utopian socialist' was a term coined by Marx to identify a group of social philosophers whose attitude was unscientific according to the dialectic method, because they hoped to ameliorate the conditions of the working class by individual benevolence and small group enterprise (Rosenau, 1974, p.143). The epithet 'utopian' became the most derisive of terms in the fight of Marxism against non-Marxian socialism. The writers referred to by Marx however formed no common group, nor did they agree on analysis or solution. But they did share the view that capitalism and the industrial system, and often competition and private property, were wasteful methods of production, and socially inequitable and immoral in income distribution. The utopian socialists repudiated what Marx called 'the inexorable laws of political economy' which seems automatically to condemn the working class to poverty (Schapiro, 1962, p.21).

An important utopian socialist thinker of the same period as Saint Simon was Robert Owen, the owner of a large cotton mill in New Lanark, Scotland. Owen was also distressed at the miserable conditions of the labouring class, and proposed what has come to be called 'the economy of high wages' or the model of the contented worker (Schapiro, 1962, p.30). At New Lanark he raised wages, shortened the work day, abolished child labour, made the factories clean and sanitary, and built workers' housing. He was rewarded with great efficiency in his factories, and high profits. Owen was not satisfied with such organic planning however. He was also driven to schematic fiction in the form of ideal communities based on harmony and cooperation, rather than the evils of private profit and competition. These ideas found fruition in early model industrial villages, such as Saltair and Port Sunlight, which influenced in turn the arts and crafts movement and the garden cities movement and thus the whole direction of twentieth century land use planning.
Although Owen's 'Villages of Cooperation' in the U.K. and the U.S.A. failed, he was not without substantial influence in the passing of factory laws and in the promotion of trade unionism. Many early trade union leaders were Owenite socialists. A number of his followers established the cooperative movement, and his influence is apparent in the Fabian tradition and in some of the politics of the Labour party in the UK and the New Democratic Party in Canada.

The utopian socialists' movement itself virtually died out in the late 19th century, but Owen was especially influential in promoting individual social justice by government, without violent or revolutionary activities or social strife. In fact Owen, in response to the revolutionary events of 1848 of which he strongly disapproved, said 'it has always been my impression ... that it will be much easier to reform the world through governments, properly supported by the people, than by any other means' (Caute, 1966, p.37). Given this and other factors, it is not surprising that Marx decried the utopian socialists, and that their main legacy is in social democracy.

Anarchism: No State

Anarchism, in common with utopianism puts forward a critique of existing society, a scenario of a desirable future society, and a means of passing from one to the other. As to the question of the role of the state the anarchist's answer is simple - none whatsoever. The state in any form is inherently tyrannical and must be replaced by non-government inspired cooperation between free groups and individuals (Caute, 1966, p114). In its repudiation of the state, anarchist philosophy was a train of radical thought in sharp contrast to both liberalism and socialism.
Anarchist thought is derived from the ideology of the enlightenment and the thinking of Rousseau, in its view of man as good and reasonable by nature, and evil and irrational only when subject to the repression of a coercive authority (Schapiro, 1962, p.42-45). The advent of the state had destroyed the prior life of mankind, which was of freedom and equality, in conformity with nature. In anarchist thought the individual has complete liberty to do as he wishes, so long as his actions are not harmful to others. Any institutions which hamper this freedom must be destroyed, including state, church, property, and family. Of these the state is the most evil and most tyrannical - an instrument of repression in the interests of a dominant minority. The state has to be abolished, and replaced with a social order based on spontaneous cooperation between individuals and groups of individuals united into loose federations.

The precursor of anarchist ideology was William Godwin (1756-1836) who in An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, questioned the pattern of relationships between man and state posited by Enlightenment thinkers. The state, he argued, was a product of violence and coercion, while society was by nature free and good (Woodcock, 1962, pgs. 13-16). To establish this ideal society, the state must be abolished, along with those institutions such as property and marriage, which depended on its power.

The first conscious 'anarchist' was Proudhon (1809-1865), who denounced capitalism as an unjust, exploitive society and the state as the embodiment of evil (Woodcock, 1962, p.106-144). His ideal lay in a classless, libertarian society, where property was abolished and the 'reign of contract' would replace 'the reign of laws'. Contract would replace authority, and property would be replaced by 'possession' in which farm would belong to farmer, and goods produced to the worker. Although Proudhon wrote
'property is theft', he referred only to capitalist property, and was an individual anarchist who opposed collective ownership in capitalist or socialist form.

As an ideology, pure anarchism had little lasting political effect. Even in Spain, where it was strongest, the last anarchist holdouts found themselves increasingly pushed into alliances with Moscow-influenced communist groups, especially during the civil war. It is in anarcho-syndicalism's support for powerful labour unions that one finds the legacy of anarchism. In planning theory, radical decentralist proposals which reflect a profound mistrust of the nation state, have been influenced by anarchistic thought.

**Marxism and the Withered State**

The single most influential political theorist has been Marx (1818-1883) who distinguished himself from utopian socialists by propounding a 'scientific socialism'. After Saint Simon, Marx viewed politics as the 'science of production' which when properly organized would cause the state to wither away (Zeitlin, 1967, p.19). Marx was also influenced by the English classical economists, including Smith, Ricardo, and J.S.Mill. His ethical outlook was a kind of secular humanism, and his introduction to the disturbing effects of industrial capitalism was through Engel's *Condition of the Working Class in England*.

Marx developed a general political theory, based on Hegalian dialectic, but focussed on the historical inevitability of class conflict, resulting in the overthrow of capitalism and the creation of an eventual classless and stateless society. Marx (1968, p.327) believed this theory universally true for all times and places, because it was scientific. The collapse of capitalism was to be caused by both its inherent
inefficiency, and the apparent superiority of communism in organizing the 'factors of production'. The transition, however, would need to occur by revolution because of the entrenched powers of the ruling class. In addition to Marx's general historical theory, he also postulated a specific economic theory based on his development of Hume's labour theory of value into the theory of surplus value and the exploitation of labour. Upon this in turn is based his concept of class struggle (Rush and Althoff, 1971). Marx's theories, their defects, and his subsequent influence are well-known (Marx, 1968; Vigor, 1966; Sherman, 1972; Steigerwald, 1981). Here we focus solely on the role of the state.

According to Marx and Engels, the state emerges historically with private property in the means of production, and the solidification of classes. This social stratification undermines the natural solidarity of society, and so the state is required as a coercive force to hold in check the propertyless masses (Zeitlin, 1967, p.73-78). These may be slaves, serfs, or wage-earners under capitalism. In each case the state and its bureaucracy ensures the domination of the economically most powerful class.

The state functions through its complex bureaucratic and military organization, using its information network as a mechanism for surveillance, and undermining social movements that threaten the status quo (Held, 1984, p.54). The state, while powerful, is ultimately dependent upon the economically dominant class for its sanction. That class bases its domination on the control of private property which derives from alienated labour, in that the product of the worker's labour is appropriated by the capitalist and becomes a power independent of its producer. Marx (1982, p14) says:

The product of his labour is no longer his own. The greater this product is, therefore, the more he is diminished. The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, assumes an external existence, but that it exists independently, outside himself, and alien to him, and that it stands opposed to him as an autonomous power. The life which he
has given to the object sets itself against him as an alien and hostile force. (his emphasis)

Private property is both the product of alienated labour, and the means by which labour is alienated.

Marx and Engels (1968, p.37) writing together in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, trace the historical development of class domination from feudal nobility to mediaeval commune to independent urban republic to the great monarchies, and thence to the point where:

... the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of modern industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.

However, after proletarian revolution, class conflict and domination will be eliminated, and the state will lose its raison d'etre and disappear. As Engels (quoted in Lenin, 1982, p.54) puts it:

The proletariat seizes state power, and then transforms the means of production into state property. But in doing this, it puts an end to itself as the proletariat, it puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms, it puts an end also to the state as the state. Former society, moving in class antagonisms, had need of the state, that is, an organisation of the exploiting class at each period for the maintenance of its external conditions of production; therefore, in particular, for the forcible holding down of the exploited class in the conditions of oppression (slavery, bondage or serfdom, wage-labour) determined by the existing mode of production. The state was the official representative of society as a whole, its embodiment in a visible corporate body; but it was this only in so far as it was the state of that class which itself, in its epoch, represented society as a whole; in ancient times, the state of the slave-owning citizens; in the Middle Ages, of the feudal nobility; in our epoch, of the bourgeoisie. When ultimately it becomes really representative of society as a whole, it makes itself superfluous.

The withering away of the state would include the disappearance of its agents: the police, the judiciary, and the military and presumably planners as well. Then the perfect, classless, communist democracy would emerge. However, before this would
occur there would be a transitory step to socialism, which would involve a popular
democratic dictatorship of the proletariat during which class enemies may need to be
repressed. In some countries, the existing state bureaucracy would be smashed and a
new one erected; in other countries, like England, a parliamentary transition was
possible (Zeitlen, 1967, p.78). One thing is clear -Marx and Engels envisioned the
eventual disappearance of this proletarian state and with it any state that would be
distinguished from society in general. State and society merge, or the state is
'reabsorbed' into society. Marx wrote 'There will no longer be political power ...
since political power is precisely the official summary of the antagonism in civil
society' (in Caute, 1966, p.111). Engels (1968, p424) makes the point:

State interference becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then
dies out of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the administration
of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is not
abolished. It dies out. (his emphasis)

Of the followers of Marx, the most successful of the theorists has been Lenin (1870-
1924). Although Lenin leaned heavily on Marx and Engels in developing his own ideas,
'Marxism' and 'Leninism' are not synonymous. Lenin's focus was on the dictatorship of
the proletariat, and his interests were clearly derived from circumstances and
conditions specific to Russia (Medvedev, 1981, p.18). Lenin's main addition to Marx's
theory concerned the role of the small revolutionary party as the vanguard of the
proletariat and the makers of the revolution (Lenin, 1949; Vigor, 1966, p.131-145;
Curtis, 1981b, p.350). Lenin believed that the working class would not spontaneously
develop sufficient class consciousness for a revolution and the overthrow of
capitalism. This role was to be fulfilled by a nearly infallible party, as Lenin says
'Marxism teaches ... that only (the Communist party) is capable of united, training,
and organizing a vanguard of the proletariat and of the whole mass of the working
people' (in Vigor, p.133). Lenin did agree that the state would wither away, but that
would not take place for many years, until the proletariat was in the majority. Nor could this withering away of the state take place without violent revolution. Lenin is emphatic on this point and goes to great lengths in The State and Revolution to dispute the notions of 'anarchists and opportunists', German Social-Democrats, and 'social-chauvinists' who are accused of betraying Marx and Engel's teaching in suggesting that there may be other roads to socialist revolution. Lenin (1984, p.57) says:

The necessity of systematically fostering among the masses this and just this point of view about violent revolution lies at the root of the whole of Marx's and Engels' teaching. The replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution. The abolition of the proletarian state, i.e., of all states, is only possible through "withering away". (his emphasis)

The other important follower of Marx was Trotsky who criticized Lenin's authoritarian view of the party. Trotsky argued strongly for the concept of permanent international revolution, uninterrupted and universal. This became the basis for his later dispute with Stalin who took the position that revolution in one country was sufficient. In the influential The Revolution Betrayed (1936) Trotsky attributes the apparent failure of the Stalinist bureaucracy to the isolation of the Russian revolution and the poverty of Russia at the time of the revolution. This caused a struggle for goods and thus increased the power of the state in the form of its bureaucracy. This concern is shared by Trotsky's latter day heirs who predict that proletarian revolution in industrialized countries must result in a 'de-bureaucratization' of the state (Mandel, 1979, p.160).

Marxism is clear on the role of the state - it will eventually wither away into a classless, stateless society. The only disagreement with the anarchists on this is how, when, and by what process. Given Leninism and the subsequent Soviet experience, the concept of the stateless society doesn't change, but the reality of the virtually
permanent state bureaucracy and entrenchment of the so-called vanguard party seriously undermines Marx's scheme.

As to local government, Marxists have until recently tended to view the state as a unit that did not need to be differentiated between geographic levels (Smith, 1985, p.37). This has however changed. Recent neo-Marxist thought on local government is considered a little later, and the influence of Marx on some planning theory becomes apparent.

The State in Neo-Marxist Theory

Marx left no more than fragments of a theory of the state, and in the post war period neo-Marxists have increasingly turned their attention to the role of the state in society. Here I use the term neo-Marxism to distinguish what has been called 'orthodox Marxism' from the multiple and varying interpretations of Marxism which have flowered since the 1950s. Orthodox Marxism has been described as 'the Marxism of the parties', that is Marxist-Leninism of about 1880 to the death of Stalin (Wallerstein, 1986). Early neo-Marxist arguments were characterized by the Poulantzas (1968) -Miliband (1969) debate. Poulantzas (and later Harvey, 1973) put forward a structural explanation of the hegemony of the institutional arrangements between state and business, in which the state is viewed as an integrated element of capitalist social formation, and the role of the state is predetermined by the economic base. Miliband, on the other hand, conceptualized the state as instrumentally controlled by an elite bonded by direct and symbolic interaction. This view sought to describe the power and influence of the ruling class in the state structure.
Recently some neo-Marxists have argued that structural theories linking political problems solely to the economic crisis of capitalism is insufficient to explain the complex conditions of capitalism and the evolution of its institutional arrangements (Elster, 1980; Dear 1981; Jessop 1982). At the same time, the continuing critique of structural functionalism in the social sciences has made structural explanations less tenable. Instead theorists increasingly address the autonomy of the state, and the relationship between fiscal and legitimacy crisis and the character of political institutions in society (Pickvance, 1976). For example, Gottdiener (1985) suggests that:

Through the study of the urban crisis Marxian theory has itself been transformed, and the way has been cleared for the independent study of the role of the state in modern society from conventional as well as critical perspectives. Attempts to understand the dynamics of the urban crisis remain an important source of information on the relation between the state and civil society. It is abundantly clear, however, that this historical episode has been managed so far not with crisis but with surprising quiescence.

Similarly it has been recognised that the state is no longer simply an epiphenomenon of economic relations, if it ever was, and has a significant measure of autonomy with which to pursue its own interest rather than the interests of a ruling class or external interest group. Furthermore the instrumentalist approach has been criticized for failing to identify the logic whereby the elites or the ruling class themselves are constituent elements of a wider social order (Dear and Clark, 1981).

A new range of neo-Marxist theory now proposes an explicit theory of the state which considers the political and economic dimensions of the state, and has rejected the Poulantzas (and Miliband) lines of argument for regarding capitalist states only from a negative perspective, that is as basically serving to stabilize the capitalist enterprise without considering the capacity of the working class to influence the course and administration of state administration (Held, 1984 p.60). For example, Offe (1984)
conceptualizes the state both as a symbolic and autonomous system organized around electoral politics and as a substantive system involving expenditure on public goods, service and infrastructure. Social conflict and economic problems may lead to a legitimation crisis for the state, particularly when the state is under pressure to act as the representative of the interests of capital.

Clark and Dear (1984) criticize Poulantzas for his structuralist perspective which fails to consider historical changes in the mechanisms by which the state fulfills its objectives. Like Offe, their thesis is that the state derives equally from the political and economic imperatives of commodity production, and therefore must be analyzed as 'an institution in its own right' as well as one embedded in society. They focus on the 'state apparatus', which is the particular set of organizations and institutions through which state power is exercised, and they argue that state legitimacy is intimately connected with moral sentiments, which may be expressed in language, constitutional order, or actions (1985, p.275). Their view on the role of the state is indicative of the change in some neo-Marxist thinking:

Basically, we believe the state to be a social actor, capable of transformation and reproduction, and bound to the capitalist mode of production by only thin strands of democratic imperatives. The state could envelop class relations, and may restructure power relations. Hence, we remain uncomfortable with liberal or Marxist society-centered theories of the state (theories which reduce state actions to mere shadows of others' interests). The logic and actions of the state apparatus may be closely related to, and justified by, moral discourse, whether it is politically or economically inspired. And the state is in a powerful position to legitimize its own interpretation of social relations (Clark and Dear, 1985, p.276).

A related thread has been described as 'pluralist Marxism' insofar as 'the state' is no longer taken as a single, purposeful entity but rather comprises a plurality of institutions (McLennan, 1981; Jessop, 1982). This view enables neo-Marxists to accept the possibility of contradictions between branches of the state. An extension of this is the 'dual state' thesis which differentiates the roles of national and local
government and attempts to explain how these sometimes conflicting roles ultimately coalesce in support of the state (Saunders, 1982). But this puts the discussion in what Wallerstein (1986, p.1302) calls the 'third Marxian era' (after Marx, and then the utopian Marxism of Lenin and Stalin). This third era is characterized by 'a thousand Marxisms, the era of Marxism exploded. In this era not only is there no orthodoxy but it is also hard to say that any version is even dominant'. This makes a synopsis of current neo-Marxism at a general level problematic. Rather further discussion is held until chapter six which considers in some detail current neo-Marxist urban theory and corporatist theory. There it is noted that within planning theory, only the neo-Marxists can be credited with systematically addressing the nature of the links between the state and the growing arrangements for multinational commodity production. Their arguments, while ultimately flawed, provide a useful analytic framework for considering state and economic systems, which has had considerable influence in social science theorizing.

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WELFARE STATE

Unlike the utopians or Marxists, the utilitarians Bentham and James Mill had no vision of a future society because for them liberal 19th century capitalism was the correct model of society. All that was required was democratic government with periodic elections, a free market, and minimal state interference beyond ensuring the security of property. But as MacPherson (1977b, p.44) notes, two changes in the mid-19th century required new thinking. One was that the working class acquired new power and could be dangerous to property. The other was that the condition of the working class was so self-evidently bad that some liberals felt it was morally unjustifiable.
John Stuart Mill saw the liberal democratic state as a means to improve mankind, without having to change the nature of that state, in which democratic politics was a prime mechanism of moral self development (Held, 1984). Mill felt that the income inequality of capitalism was unjustifiable but that the fault lay, not with capitalism, but in its feudal origins. His hopes for a transformation of the relationship between capital and labour lay with producers' cooperatives. Mill and others inspired universal suffrage which, along with a series of incrementalist social reforms, greatly reduced class conflict in the industrialized countries. This kept Mill and his followers from having to confront the essential contradictions between capitalist relations of production and the democratic ideal of equal possibility for individual self-development. MacPherson (1977b, p.69) argues that the party system in liberal capitalist countries 'has been the means of reconciling universal equal franchise with the maintenance of an unequal society' by blurring class issues. Contributing to this is the fact that real incomes, and housing and environmental conditions, did improve dramatically in the late 19th century. Mill's enduring legacy is not in his economic analysis, but in his advocacy of ethical humanism by state action (and state education) within the capitalist system. In other words a reformist model of democracy, within the market system.

This model continues to be the focus of political philosophy in liberal democracies, with revisions and arguments about the role of participation and democracy. MacPherson (1977b, p.70-74) puts forward two elements in modern liberal-democratic theory: neo-idealist pluralism arising from the important work of Max Weber in the late 19th century, and social control of economic forces, which dates from the 1930s depression. In initiating the pluralist view of the workings of the state, Weber defines the modern state as characterized by the legitimate use of coercion within the territory of the nation and between nations, and by the existence of a
professional administrative organization which makes use of the state's monopoly of physical force to ensure compliance with its orders. The state therefore includes an institution of government, and in this view government and state are not identical. According to Weber the class nature of the state is quite distinct from the question of the necessity for a centralized bureaucratic administration, and it is misleading to confuse problems about the nature of administration with concern over the control of the state apparatus (Held, 1984, p.62). Centralized, professional administration may be inescapable in the modern state due to the complexity of the administrative task, and the power of the bureaucracy is best countered by strong political institutions like Parliament and the party system. In the absence of these representative political institutions, or in socialist states, the bureaucracy would elevate itself into a unitary state bureaucracy and replace the pluralist public and private bureaucracies, and checks and balances, of the liberal state.

Weber's analysis of the structure and the workings of bureaucracies gives an important insight into the nature of the modern state, and his views had a powerful influence on the development of pluralist theory or what has been called 'the liberal political science critique' of the relations among state, administration, and classes (Weaver et al., 1985). This is characterized by the view that power is distributed amongst a range of competing interest groups, and that these groups attempt to influence political decisions by exacting whatever leverage they may have over the workings of the system in a continuing process of bargaining and 'partisan mutual adjustment' (Dahl, 1978; Lindblom, 1968). In this way the democratic nature of the liberal state is insured by the workings of this system of value conflict and negotiation. There are a number of criticisms of these important arguments, particularly that they tend to ignore the context of international conditions. On this point, Held (1984) credits
Weber for his recognition of the importance of interconnections among nation states on the development of any one state.

Recent trends towards the social control of economic forces reflect a modern social democratic or revisionist socialist view of the state. This view argues that the economic evils of society are due primarily to the unregulated workings of the institutions of private property. Inequalities of wealth and opportunity should be removed, and industry organized to promote social ends, for example, by nationalization where necessary (Curtis, 1981b, p.349). The most influential group of social democrats has been the Fabian socialists, including the Webbs and George Bernard Shaw. They pursued economic democracy by what has latterly been called 'piece-meal social engineering' (Lewis and Melville, 1978). Although the Fabians never fully articulated a theory of the welfare state, their platform of 1918, Labour and the New Social Order, is indicative of their perception of the role of state:

1. Universal enforcement of minimum levels of social security.
2. Full employment, by public works if necessary.
3. Democratic control of industry, by nationalization where appropriate.
5. Redistribution of wealth by the provision of social services, education, and cultural activities.

Fabianism and social democracy provided a constructive and useful outlet for radical social ideas and advanced social reforms, without commitment to a revolutionary party or to a dogmatic ideology (Shapiro, 1962). Throughout the 20th century there has been a constant tension between the contradictions of capitalism and the ideals of social reform, and between overall stability and individual freedom. The pendulum swings left then right with the political order of the day.
Liberal capitalism has thus been transformed in the twentieth century into welfare capitalism in which the free utilization of capital is generally preserved and supported by the state, while the state ensures the loyalty of the population through the maintenance of individual mobility, and welfare measures which secure employment, stabilize income, and provide some housing, educational, and medical benefits. In welfare capitalism:

...the political system has to stabilize economic conditions, and the government is empowered to intervene in economic matters in order to eliminate any disfunctions and risks which threaten the stability of the system (Farganis, 1975, p.498).

Outside of the industrially developed countries however, liberal capitalism has not been displaced by the sophisticated state functions of welfare capitalism but exists in more basic and exploitive form.

In terms of political philosophy, MacPherson (1977a) argues that there has been little in the way of new liberal-democratic theory since J.S. Mill and that only the Marxists have attempted a refined theory of the state in the twentieth century. In putting this argument MacPherson first considers the most influential of contemporary non-Marxist normative theorists, Rawls and Nozick. There are substantial differences: Rawls (1971) would countenance a further extension of the welfare state in the distribution of 'primary goods' according to his theory of distributive justice. The state in this conception must implement two principles of justice: equal liberty for all, and only such inequality as improves the position of the worst-off in society. Nozick (1974), a radical libertarian, argues for a maximization of liberty in a 'minimal state'. But, MacPherson asserts, neither has felt it necessary to propose a theory of the state substantially different from that of Mill's, because 'they both endorse the fundamental relations of capitalist market society and its property institutions' and so 'they need not be concerned with any necessary or historical
relation of the state to society'. In modern political philosophy only the Marxists/neo-Marxists can be credited with addressing the nature of the important links between state and arrangements for multinational commodity production. However, the clarity of their position is severely dissipated by the division of neo-Marxism into numerous arcane factions.

Most modern non-Marxist theorists, including Rawls and Nozick, work in some way within the confines of a liberal democratic or pluralist theory of society and of the state. The democratic state in pluralist theory is:

an arrangement by which rational, well-intentioned citizens, who indeed had a wide variety of different interests but also a sense of a common interest or even general will, could and did adjust their differences in an active, rational, give and take of parties and interest groups and the free press (MacPherson, 1977a, p.228).

However MacPherson, although not a Marxist, argues that events in the twentieth century have outpaced non-Marxist political philosophy, in that the nature of pluralism in industrialized societies is shifting away from the pluralism of small scale labour and consumers' interest groups toward a domination by large scale, if plural, corporate interest groups and groups representing the state operated sector of the economy. In this corporate society powerful interest groups now represent the two most important sectors in the economy, the corporate oligopolistic sector and the corporate public sector. To this can be added the increasing number of sub-national, national and supranational organizations which seek to serve combined corporate-state interests. The corporatist perspective is examined again in a subsequent chapter.

MacPherson (1977a, p.234) identifies five areas of state activity in the modern welfare state, the first four of which virtually define categories of public sector planning:
(a) running the apparatus of the welfare state, thus absorbing burdens which might have to be met by capital, or if not met, might endanger public order;

(b) operating the monetary and fiscal management of the economy, which now appears to be the foremost visible activity of government;

(c) supporting infrastructure, e.g. in technical and higher education, urban transportation systems, urban and regional development schemes, public housing, energy plants, and direct and indirect state engagement in technological research and development in military and scientific fields;

(d) preventing or reducing the damaging side-effects of profit-making production activities, e.g. measures against pollution and destruction of natural resources. These, like the welfare-state measures are increasingly required in the interests of capital;

(e) operating the new apparatus of state-imposed marketing boards, price-support schemes, wage arbitration procedures, etc. designed to stabilize markets in commodities, labour and capital.

The development of the welfare state is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Local Government in the Welfare State

The views of John Stuart Mill on the role of the state remain a strong influence on modern thinking and emotion towards the idea of the liberal democratic state. However it is in the area of local government that Mill made his strongest mark and
most commentators on sub-national and local government first turn to Mill, for within his writings are the two primary justifications for local government, political participation and efficiency (Sharpe, 1969). In his Representative Government, Mill argued that local government provided an educative effect on local citizens, that it increased opportunity for political participation through elections, and allowed what Mill calls 'the lower grades' of society to act in a politically responsible manner and so develop public spirit. Mill (1931, p.347) believed that 'local administrative institutions are the chief instruments' of political education.

In Liberty Mill (1910) presents his argument for local government from a conception of the absolute priority of individual liberty. He understands liberty as the absence of restraint in relation to self-regarding actions of individuals, groups and local political authorities. Local self-government provides an important institutional buffer against abuse of power by greater society (Whalen, 1969, p.319). Just as the individual has a right to liberty in personal matters, there is a similar 'liberty in any number of individuals to regulate by mutual agreement such things as regard them jointly, and regard no persons but themselves' (Mill, 1958 p.157). Such a justification for local self-government parallel those of de Tocqueville (1946, p.57) who argued that 'a nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty'. de Tocqueville saw nationalism, industrialization and central bureaucracy as the greatest danger to liberalism (Whalen, 1969, p.322).

The other great value of local government argued by Mill was efficiency in the management and delivery of local services by virtue of responsiveness to local need. He stated that 'it is but a small portion of the public businesses of a country which can be well done or safely attempted by the central authorities' (quoted in Smith,
1969, p.333). Despite the fact that local government officials were likely to be less competent (i.e. of the 'lower orders') there would be a compensating advantage insofar as their authority depended on the will of the local public. They could be held accountable and this ensured a measure of efficiency in meeting local needs. This of course implied that functions of purely local interest could be distinguished from those of national interest, as Mill suggested. However 'local' here is not the neighborhood, as Mill had clear views on the need for larger and more comprehensive units of local government than existed at the time (Magnusson, 1979). For example, Mill (1931, p.368) believed that the whole of London should be governed by a single Municipal Council and not by neighborhood or presumably borough councils.

Mill's writing covers many issues which still concern us profoundly: local participation and democracy, efficiency and responsiveness, accountability, the distribution of functions or competences among levels of government, and the appropriate size of local units. Here too we find the essence of the Fabian belief in the contribution of local government and planning to social welfare. But this is not to imply that political philosophizing alone led to the actual devolution of state power and function. Such devolution went hand in hand with environmental concerns and the need for municipal services in water, sewage, transport, health and education - the public services of the 19th century which were the forerunner of municipal planning in the 20th century. Nevertheless, one doesn't need to look much further than Mill to capture nearly the full range of political issues on local government.

The rise of local government was also related to the growth of central government capacity and the development of general purpose central bureaucracies utilizing 'welfare-at-large' decisions on behalf of the national state (Boschken, 1982). As shall be seen in the next chapter, centralisation, or the promotion of vertical authority, as
a mode of intergovernmental relations, implies a strong centre and an active periphery or local government which serves as an agent of the centre. de Tocqueville (1946, p.292) had noticed this already in 19th century America: 'the idea of intermediate powers is weakened and obliterated ... the idea of omnipotence and sole authority of society rises to fill its place'. These central-local links were reinforced by the development of the welfare state, as local government becomes an important vehicle for implementation of national programmes in the social and educational sphere.

THE RISE OF NEO-CONSERVATISM AND THE CRISIS OF PLANNING

So far in this chapter it is suggested that conceptions of the proper role of the state in society are varied and complex, but that two broad, dissimilar political philosophies have unfolded since the Enlightenment. The first was the development of the notion of a liberal, democratic state. This conception developed from the work of Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, and Mill and others, and continues today with the work of Nozick on the right and Rawls on the left. The second was the development of Marxist political philosophy. Both traditions, although heterogenous and constantly in internal debate, have exerted a profound influence on twentieth century thinking and on the workings of nation states in the west and in the post-colonial third world.

The two most influential concepts in the development of the theory of the state have been the concept of the state as a structure of power, clearly distinguishable from society in general; and the endemic problem of reconciling the authority of the state to intervene in society by law, with the liberty of the individual. Most modern democratic theory:
has constantly sought to justify the sovereign power of the state while at the same time justifying limits upon that power. The history of this attempt since Machiavelli and Hobbes is the history of arguments to balance might and right, power and law, duties and rights. On the one hand, the state must have a monopoly of coercive power in order to provide a secure basis upon which trade, commerce and family life can prosper. On the other hand, by granting the state a regulatory and coercive capability, liberal political theorists were aware that they had accepted a force which could (and frequently did) deprive citizens of political and social freedoms (Held, 1984, p.71).

There is no answer to this question without recourse to value judgement - the relationship of state and society is one of the fundamental series of the irresolvable tensions which underlie planning practice. Recently the tension has been exacerbated by recession, turbulence and the apparent failure of the welfare state. The post-war consensus on the development of the welfare state, which lasted in America through Kennedy and Johnson's Great Society in the late 1960s, and in a more entrenched fashion in Canada and Europe in the 1970s, was based on a commitment by government to guarantee a minimum standard of living for the poor, a Keynesian macroeconomic role for the state in fiscal policy, and outside of the USA, a considerable measure of state intervention in industry.

This consensus of the 1950s and 1960s, based as it was on expanding economies, low inflation and full employment, had been broken by the recession, and by the 1970s there was discord and confusion about the appropriate role of the state and its relation to economic well-being. A new group of liberal democratic theorists, mainly called neo-conservatives, have taken this situation as an opportunity to mount a critique of the welfare state. Insofar as these neo-conservatives are attempting to swing the pendulum away from state intervention and back towards individualism and market mechanisms, it is not surprising that planning has become 'a casualty on the way'. In a nutshell the neo-conservative argument is that:

Social welfare derives from individual satisfaction. Most individuals, most of the time, understand their own preferences and how to choose in their own
interest. The state should allow individuals to advance their own welfare according to their own lights rather than enforcing on them some vision of the good life (Kleiman, 1987, p.244).

Neo-conservative liberalism derives philosophically from the thinking of Hayek and later Nozick and is based on the concept of inalienable rights which are outside the state. For Hayek, now finding favour after a long period of being dismissed as eccentric, planning and state intervention have long been the 'road to serfdom'. Hayek (1985, p.vii) writes:

In my lifetime I have witnessed a remarkable reverse in the attitude of young people to the conflicting appeals of socialism and liberalism. From my early days in the 1920s until very recently young people were strongly attracted to the 'left' in politics, philosophy and economics - from collectivist communism to socialist 'planning'. I think I know how they feel, since I was also for a time misled by socialism in my early days. The socialist argument continues despite its many defeats - on the impossibility of economic calculation under collectivism, the fallacious claims for the use of markets under socialism, the incompatibility of liberty and state direction of the economy, and many others. The argument is being won by the new liberals of the late 20th century. But many people still do not understand it. And most on the Left continue to resist it.

In particular the opportunity for a resurgence of neo-conservative thinking has been provided by problems of the welfare state, variously termed 'failure', 'overload crisis', or 'fiscal crisis'. Other authors however suggest the extent of the failure or crisis has been greatly exaggerated to suit the neo-conservative line (Johnson, 1986; Mishra, 1984).

Problems identified with the welfare state include the growing cost of welfare provision, coupled to the argument that this has been a drag on economic growth. In particular unemployment brought about by recession, changes in comparative advantage, and anti-inflationary fiscal policy have caused numbers of unemployed to rise, in some places dramatically so. A related concern is that, given the tendency to centralize services within the state, large bureaucracies have been created to
administer the welfare state. It is argued that these bureaucracies lack market discipline and accountability and are therefore inefficient. A related argument is that the administrative system of the welfare state simply doesn't work very well because of turbulence. In other words, government is unable to predict the unforeseen changes and unintended consequences of social policy interventions on individuals, families or institutions. Government failure inevitably parallels market failure because of a generic inability to predict the complex web of interactions brought about by large scale interventions (Mishra, 1984). However, the government with its intractable and unresponsive bureaucracies lacks the market's quick feedback mechanism and response and so wastes public funds in pursuing its aims.

Most arguments about the problems or merits of the welfare state reflect implicit value judgements, and are seldom based on coherent empirical arguments. What is clear is that 1) the role of government with regard to the economy and society is being redefined, 2) the international economic system is undergoing substantial structural adjustments, and 3) relations between levels of government and public and private institutions are being altered (Fox-Przeworski, 1986). The welfare state is mainly about redistribution of income and state intervention in the economy, and whatever the inconclusive empirical evidence, what is important is that there has been a substantial change in attitude towards it. This reflects a change in values and dominant ideology. The new ideology is less sympathetic to traditional notions of planning which appear to infringe on economic liberty, and a continually expanding welfare state is no longer viewed as a societal objective in any western country. This change in values is of a fundamental nature.

There are many variations and arguments within the neo-conservative position. These include the classic liberal philosophy of limited government of Hayek; the
Chicago school of neoclassical economics associated with Milton Friedman; public choice theory associated with Tullock and Buchanan; minimal state libertarianism of Nozick; and even strains of anarchist libertarianism (Kukathas, 1985, p60). However Hayek is probably most influential in terms of practical impact on thinking about the state tied to management of national economies and working of government. Since the publication of The Road to Serfdom in 1944, Hayek has been seen as a foe of 'planning' in its various guises, and is therefore worthy of attention.

Hayek puts forward the proposition that the impossibility of adequate information in an uncertain world provides a central argument for the market. In The Road to Serfdom Hayek argues that state planners, however well intentioned, are bound to lessen total welfare in society. This is because the socioeconomic world is marked by extreme complexity, and planners can never hope to understand it in its totality. When they try to form policy options based on what must be incomplete information, and lack of relevant facts, the result will be costly economically, freedom will be limited, and overall welfare will decline. Conversely the market, made up as it is of numerous small decision makers, doesn't pretend to have complete knowledge, and because it need only be concerned with market specific information it can engage in self-correction. The predisposition towards government overload in the welfare state underlines the benefits of the minimal state in which individuals, not collectivities, are the best judge of their own welfare.

However in Hayek's argument, tendencies towards anarchy also must be resisted by a framework for law and order which defends property rights. So the state cannot be extinguished: liberty and economic freedom require the state to guarantee the ability to enjoy property and to exercise consumer choice (Helm, 1986). Although property rights must be protected by law, the minimal principle of state interference extends
to taxation (except for law and order and defence of the sovereign state), which is the primary instrument for redistribution of income or wealth. Minimalness, that is liberty, in this conception is incompatible with income redistribution.

In general the neo-conservative view of the conjuncture of politics and economics represents a fusion of libertarian value judgements and an analysis of the instrumentality of the market. The market is taken as the best means for attaining libertarian, individualistic, or utilitarian objectives, and the role of the state in society needs to be severely curtailed.

CONCLUSION

There have been two revolutionary trends in the development of thinking on the role of the state: the bourgeois revolutions of the late 18th and early 19th centuries based on the ideas of the Enlightenment, and the socialist revolutions of the 20th century, based on Marxism. The Marxist-based revolutionary left in eastern Europe and China has orientated itself towards social welfare through state control, but at the expense of freedom, and with little chance of a withering away of the state which now takes the form of centralized bureaucracies run by an elite minority communist party. On the other hand, elements of the thinking of Rousseau, Saint Simon, utopian socialism, utilitarianism and social democracy have coalesced into the modern welfare states of western Europe and North America. These welfare states in turn have found it difficult to respond to world recession and demonstrated administrative inefficiencies which left them exposed to a neo-conservative critique in the 1980s.

However, some recent discussions questioning the continued existence of the welfare state tend to be simplistic, and the reality is different. First, while parts
of the welfare state, like parts of the economy, are in retrenchment, many of the functions associated with the provision of collective goods and with redistribution of income are unlikely to disappear. Some authors suggest that the welfare state is more politically durable than neo-conservatives might have anticipated. Although the public generally consider that state expenditure may be wasteful, they also appreciate a broad range of particular public services (Lane, 1986). The benefits of public consumption in public transport, infrastructure, education, health, recreation and other fields is apparent and while adjustments are being made in the public-private balance, a wholesale reduction of government has simply not occurred. The main exception is in the sale of nationalized industries, most, but not all of which, catered mainly to private consumption. The public, particularly outside the United States, have a conception of their standard of living which includes a wide range of public goods. Even the citizens of the USA, the bastion of free market liberalism, have long held that high quality education, urban public transportation, national and local parks and many other aspects of life lie within the province of the state. The efficiency of these services may be questioned but their objective is not, although a concern for value for money is leading to a reexamination of the mechanisms of delivering public goods. There is also a trend to disinvestment in lame duck industries, and to make nationalized industries more responsive by transferring them to the private sector.

More generally, just as many of the functions of the modern state are unlikely to disappear, the state itself serves important cultural functions in maintaining social solidarity. For example, the modern state is essential for maintaining an awareness in society of the:

transcendent obligations to those institutions that are larger than anything that could have been created by his own efforts. Here the state literally 'embodies' the whole cultural inheritance out of which the citizen's personal identity has
been fashioned. It must be surrounded by myth, ritual and ceremonies that are
adequate vehicles to express this sense of deep obligation (Rayner, 1985, p.263).

However in the United States, although patriotism rates very high as a social ideal,
extreme liberalism has created 'a society of maximal individual rights which have
broken down important community controls' (Glazer, 1987). As a result neo-
conservatives have had to promote individual virtue and family in their search for the
necessary mechanisms of transcendent obligation and social control.

Finally, to return to a more prosaic level, it appears that a measure of planning is
essential in both conservative and social democratic views, if only to protect
property rights and thus the broader conception of the standard of living from the
externalities of offending neighbours. Neo-conservative theorists like Hayek seldom
venture into a consideration of the problem of externalities or the need for the state
to exert environmental control, but the public is clearly concerned, and the degree to
which land use planning is acceptable is often related to the prevailing views of the
public, rather than their leaders or theorists on the role of the state. In the UK, the
Conservative government may express a desire for 'simplified planning zones', but in
fact are forced by their own constituents in the wealthy suburbs to defend 'the
greenbelt' from residential property developers. People may appreciate libert-
arianism in principle, but in practice, ad hoc pragmatism, family interests,
attachment to property, personal preferences, and social and environmental concerns
may all transcend simplified political notions. Conversely politicians commonly hide
value judgements on the balance between freedom and planning in simple rhetoric
about the efficiency of the market in promoting human freedom and welfare. But
any government's own position is seldom coherent or consistent. For example, as will
be discussed in chapter 3, the neo-conservatism of Mrs. Thatcher in the UK is less
characterized by a decline in the role of the state than by a relentless centralization of state functions, and a corresponding diminishment of local autonomy in the interest of liberalizing the economy and allowing the market a freer reign.

The recurrent problem for planners is that the question of the role of the state in society, the extent of its economic borders, and the appropriate balance of freedom and planning control has no right answer and never will. Empirical evidence is that the state will fail in some aspects of public provision just as the market will fail in some aspects of private provision (Helm, 1986). Empirical evidence can assist in policy formation on a pragmatic and incremental basis, but the only rationale for state intervention is by recourse to value judgement. The fact that the rationale for planning derived from the role of the state in society is a fundamental value judgement explains exactly the crisis of planning in terms of the state, and as I will argue subsequently, the crisis of planning in terms of rationality. The neo-conservative case, best represented by Hayek, rests primarily on libertarian value judgements, coupled to an argument on efficiency in economic and social production based on information processes and uncertainty in environmental turbulence (Helm, 1986). This is a substantive argument underpinned by an apparently instrumental argument. The social democratic case rests on moral views on redistributive justice and another set of instrumental views on the necessity of controlling market externalities and on state intervention in the promotion of collective efficiency and thus social and economic benefit. Recession, economic structural transformation, environmental turbulence, organizational incapacity and recent governmental rhetoric and policies may have contributed to notions of crisis within planning, but the fundamental nature of the value judgements concerning the role of the state results in a permanent tension about the value of planning. Instrumental arguments about the efficiency of the market or the relative inefficiency of the state bureaucracy cloak the fundamental and irresolvable nature of the debate.
However it is the case that the combined effect of the complexity of national and global corporate interests and the increased role of the state has altered the relation of the state to capital. This has resulted in a much greater politicization of the economy in modern states in which the relative health of the economy is the prime policy focus of the state. This in turn has resulted in a much greater politicization of the planning function, as planning objectives either relate to, or are subservient to, the service of the state to capital. The rise of intra-state organizational turbulence resulting from a proliferation of often competing state agencies attempting to fulfill their functions, is compounded by the growing influence of multinational and even global corporations and finance houses whose allegiances no longer relate to state objectives and whose operations may have a deleterious effect in national, regional or local terms.

Changes in economic circumstances, particularly resulting from the 1973 and 1980 recessions, and difficulties of the welfare state in overcoming turbulence and inefficiency in meeting its myriad objectives has helped promote the current neo-conservative interest in redefining and simplifying the relation of state to capital. This is known rather misleadingly as the 'free market' philosophy which harks back to the early days of neoclassical economics and a very different world in terms of volume of state activity and the degree of interplay between state and economy. Whatever the rhetoric and the reality of the extent of the current readjustments in the state-economy relationship, addressed in subsequent chapters, the 1980s have seen a dramatic resurgence of interest in political-philosophical thinking on the purpose and function of the state. Planners, as agents of the state, cannot remain immune to this interest. Insofar as 'planning' is often taken to hinder rather than hasten economic growth, and often involves contentious decision areas like the appropriate trade-off of pollution and economic activity, it is not surprising that
planners may feel that neo-conservative thinking is anti-planning. This politicization of planning, combined with epistemological concerns about the basis of rationality in planning, directly contribute to the crisis of planning.

A number of themes raised in this chapter are continued in subsequent chapters. What is important at this point in the argument is to stress that insofar as the justification for planning in the public sector derives from views on the appropriate role of the state in society, planners cannot think about or justify what they do without resource to the important debates in western political philosophy. Subsequent chapters return to the broad themes of this debate and propose a justification for public sector planning activities which goes beyond traditional arguments for public goods and control of externalities to suggest that planning is essential to the successful management of the turbulent organizational systems which characterize modern states. Leading up to that argument, in the next chapter I explore further the logic and growth of the welfare state, and the conflicting centralizing and decentralizing trends which comprise part of the crisis of governability and planning in the late welfare state. Chapter four examines the nature of organizational turbulence which I argue is the context of planning which engenders notions of crisis and which requires a planning response considerably different from the traditional application of analytic tools. Chapter five returns to the thought of Hobbes and Locke where we find early conceptions of the nature of social science which influence planning in terms of the crisis of rationality in the present day. In chapter six we find a continuation of the Marxian and utopian concepts in an examination of critical planning theories, and the crisis of planning as viewed by its theorists. Finally, chapter seven looks again at the role of state in society, and draws a number of conclusions relevant to planning theory and planning action in the modern democratic state.
INTRODUCTION

It is in the interplay between the two qualifications for local government put forward by J.S. Mill, democratic participation and efficiency, that fascinating issues on the role of the national state vis a vis its subunits come to our attention. For example, in the UK, an interest in efficiency and financial control on the part of central government has resulted in a downgrading of local democracy and the revoking of local planning functions in favour of more centralized control. In Canada, on the other hand, the 1987 'Meech Lake constitutional accord' caused public and media concern that central government may be ceding too much power and planning control to provincial governments, when what may be required is stronger national leadership to deal with trans-provincial issues, in areas such as economic management, pollution control, and management of energy and resources (see for example, Sunday Star, 1987).

In each case however can be found evidence that neither the role of the state nor its relationship to its sub-units is static, but rather in a state of flux which contributes to uncertainty, and which derives from changing views on the balance between democratic participation, efficiency, and the accepted role of the state. This also serves to underline the fundamental political nature of public sector planning.

THE CONTRADICTION OF PUBLIC SECTOR PLANNING

Any consideration of how to develop competence in public sector planning, whether regional or local, is quickly caught on the horns of an essential contradiction in industrial societies. This is the opposing tendencies to concentration of economic
power and centralization of decision-making compared to the tendency to devolution of power and decentralization of decision-making in the interests of preserving greater possibilities for democratic action. Economic development for example, proceeds on the whole from a power base that resides at the level of national government and multinational corporations. National politicians and administrators address a wide national public interest or constituency, and decisions economically effective at the national level may have equity implications which may seem unacceptable at the regional or local level. Conceptions of political and regional development, on the other hand, have a strong emotive and philosophical basis in devolution of power, local participation and planning, pluralism and regional equity, both financially and in terms of political control.

These bipolar tendencies to efficiency and equity have been termed 'the conflicting objectives of our time' (Coffey and Polese, 1984), and have been the subject of discussion at least since Mill. Attempts to overcome this dichotomy by planning at what Friend et al. (1974) call the 'intercorporate level of public policy-making' have generally failed. The situation is compounded by the fact that lately peripheral regions have been badly hit by recession and global restructuring, even while there has been a substantial political philosophic shift away from a concern for regional development by some central governments who themselves are centralizing government functions. Conversely it remains common knowledge that centralized programmes and decisions are often deficient in local knowledge and therefore poorly conceived and difficult to implement.

The arguments for and against concentration of power and centralization of government functions therefore have not only political but functional dimensions. Proponents of centralization argue that societal problems demand large scale,
planned intervention, co-ordinated nationally to properly conceptualise the problem and to overcome the tendency of parochial, organisational interests to take precedence over a system-wide interest in the common welfare. Arguments for decentralization, on the other hand, emphasize the increased flexibility, adaptiveness, innovation and local accountability in planning and service delivery in the usual public policy situation where goals are ambiguous, and environmental and technological conditions constantly changing. Aldrich (1979, p.66) notes that such is the appeal of many of the arguments from both sides that 'planners who on one occasion argue strongly for centralization find themselves on other occasions defending the benefits of decentralization' and that planning and social service delivery arrangements are often designed with these conflicting principles in mind. These built-in contradictions manifest themselves in numerous, and often disfunctional, ways when agencies at any level try to plan.

Both the interrelated political and functional aspects of this situation have resulted in a continuing series of crises in government decision-making at the inter-corporate level, as multiple decision centres oppose each other to the stage of creating administrative deadlocks (Ionescu, 1975). Equally sub-national planning or community development is often attempted in a vertical power vacuum and ultimately thwarted by the over-reaching effects of national policies and trans-national economic activitivies. Although lip service is paid to the importance of the inter-corporate dimension of policy-making and planning, it remains on the whole ignored. This is true not only in official reviews of government structure and activity, but in much of the academic literature as well. The economic literature assumes an objective criterion of efficiency, with attendant concentration of power, and if there is to be planning it is by measures of corporatism in society. The philosophical arguments for devolution and decentralization are ignored. Some of the literature in political
science and political economy, on the other hand, elevates the value of devolution to the level of an article of faith. But such proponents steer well clear of any reasoned consideration of the practicability of their proposals on the role of government intervention in economic and social life.

The exception is in the literature of centre-periphery relations which applies these geometric concepts to the study of political systems (Gottman, 1980). Centre-periphery analysis in the social sciences involves two assumptions, first that the centre is the locus of decision making, that is, power; and second that any centre and its peripheries belong to an encompassing sociopolitical system, of which they are differentiated but interdependent parts (Strassoldo, 1980, pp.38-39).

As with other attempts at systems analysis, it is easy to be critical of the centre-periphery metaphor, insofar as systems models are always somewhat confounded by the complexity and intersubjectivity of human existence. Strassoldo, for example, suggests that the centre-periphery analytical frame is more useful in describing political than economic systems, in part because centralization processes in political systems have grown steadily and reflect a relatively dominant mode of organization. The application of the metaphor to multinational economic systems, on the other hand, oversimplifies the complex, historical, technological, and unique geographic factors which explain how economic organizations adapt to their environment. The growth of the service or information economy, and the convergence of modern computing and telecommunications technologies probably further diminishes the application of centre-periphery analysis to economic systems. Of course, economic and political systems are far from mutually exclusive, and a political peripherization can reinforce economic disadvantage and be reinforced by it. Even in political systems, there is no guarantee that 'centres' in the usual sense are always dominant.
As described in terms of the considerably decentralized Canadian state a number of commentators feel that the centre has been overly weakened by recent constitutional readjustments to the point where it is insufficiently dominant in many areas of policy.

However, in spite of such reservations, the centre-periphery metaphor is a very helpful heuristic device for thinking about both the interrelated spatial and functional aspects of government in terms of power, managerial control, and the symbolic and real dimensions of democratic action. It is used here in that sense.

With the above exception, the contradiction between centralizing and decentralizing trends remains unaddressed in theoretical considerations of planning, even though it can be argued that this contradiction is an important part of the context of planning in advanced technological-industrial societies. I argue that this contradiction results in a dialectical and perhaps irreconcilable tension which is basic to the socio-political structure, and this tension circumscribes all centre-periphery relationships and thus most attempts at planning. Understanding this aspect of the context of planning and the nature of this contradiction is useful in at least three ways:

1) It aids in understanding of why central, sub-national and local relationships often move in and out of crisis.

2) It explains why many sub-national planning models (in the normative, ideological sense) proposed in planning theory seem divorced from the political reality most planners are familiar with.
3) It helps planners address the political tensions and functional interdependencies which characterize multi-level public policy making.

**Exploring the Contradiction**

It is easy to substantiate the tensions described above. Indeed many people concerned with public planning recognise that it constantly impinges on their activities. In western Europe, demands for territorial welfare, and notions of democracy combining ideological and territorial pluralism, constantly confront national bureaucratic and party structures. This trend to post-war regional construction and devolution is a general phenomenon in continental Europe, excepting perhaps the United Kingdom (Meny, 1986, p.39-42). In most cases this trend has resulted in the creation of a third tier of government above the municipality or department and below the central government. These regional governments, although not constituting federations, provide a substantial degree of decentralization of legislative power and administration. In France, Spain and Italy new systems of sub-national government have brought about the deliberate decentralization of policy making and planning from the centre to the region (Norton, 1985, p.40). Of the countries in western Europe only Britain is now deliberately centralizing power.

Additionally a tendency towards consensus and compromise is replacing unilateral decision-making by the central government and hierarchical subordination of sub-units, most recently in Spain and Portugal. However, in extreme cases where cooperation and inter-dependence have not worked dangerous conflicts have arisen, for example in the Basque country or in Northern Ireland.
Since the 1960s regionalist movements have taken their inspiration from many sources, varying in each country, but generally related to economic and cultural factors. Berentsen (1985) in a review of planning in Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR and Switzerland, concludes that differing interests within and between sectoral and regionally based institutions, and between federal and sub-national authorities, 'are so endemic that one might conclude they are not simply "problems" but conditions of large bureaucracies'. Other accounts of sub-national planning and regional development in Europe are available (Konukiewitz, 1986; Eskelinen, 1985; Pauley 1985; Jung, 1982).

In the UK, an incipient regionalist movement in Scotland and Wales declined after a proposal to secure constitutional devolution via regional parliaments failed in referendum. This UK crisis of the 1960s and 70s has given way to the crisis of the 1980s: a central government, driven by opposition to Labour dominated local authorities to a stance which includes curtailing traditional democratic rights, the abolition of a number of elected third-tier governments, and a severe dilution of regional and local planning. The situation is particularly striking in the Abolition of Metropolitan Counties Bill, which abolished the elected Greater London Council (GLC), in effect the only London-wide government, and six other metropolitan governments around the country on April 1, 1986. London is now probably the only major city in the world without a unified government structure. Instead London has 32 legally independent boroughs. This action is equivalent to getting rid of the government of the City of New York (as well as Mayor Koch and the New York-New Jersey Port Authority), leaving the five boroughs, with inter-borough planning and administration carried out by the federal government in Washington.
The functions of the Greater London Council and the six metropolitan governments, which included strategic planning, transport planning and administration, provision of fire services, co-ordination of toxic waste disposal and others have been transferred to delegated authorities, in effect administrative boards, appointed by and answerable only to central government Ministers. At a time when many other large cities around the world are appreciating the benefits of city-region wide strategic government, Mrs. Thatcher has abolished London's and either curtailed or transferred strategic planning functions to the central government bureaucracy. The Economist (19/11/84) suggested that this will cause London to 'be left with no single voice - except Whitehall's'. Labour's cries of 'democracy in danger' have even been echoed by some London Tories.

At the same time in the UK all remaining local authorities are subject to a programme of centralization of control over their finance and functions. This is the result of an attempt to hold down local public spending by changing the system of central government partial funding that now gives Whitehall the power to decide how much each local government ought to spend, and to cut the grants to overspenders. This has been combined with 'rate-capping' powers by which central government can now limit the amount of rates (i.e. local property taxes), which hitherto had been set solely by local government. There are also proposals to greatly "simplify" (i.e. reduce) local planning powers over development in what are called 'simplified planning zones'. The assumption is that the activities of local planners are obstructive and inimical to economic progress. In all these measures there is considerable potential for the curtailment of local planning functions and it is not surprising that planners in the UK believe they are facing a crisis. For example, Breheny and Hall (1984, p.96) argue that 'many pillars of the planning system of the mid-1970s have disappeared or have crumbled'.

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Mrs. Thatcher's government is pressing ahead with her centralization programme, in spite of considerable uproar. The Economist (19/11/84) suggests that the first four years of Mrs. Thatcher's Government had resulted in 'unprecedented conflict' between central and local government, and thus to implicit constitutional change. They assert that central government has 'blown a largish hole in local autonomy', and note that some scholars view the situation as a constitutional crisis which 'should raise fundamental questions about the role of local government in the changing state'. With regard to the centralization of planning functions, the planners have retorted that planning has been eclipsed by a 'philosophical dark ages' (Cameron, 1985) and that:

the central planning system provides no coherent link between the management of the economy and territorial or strategic tasks, no built-in constituency dimension ... In a word, the system is dictatorial; sooner or later it had to sponsor an attack on alternative centres of power at their financial and electoral roots (McConaghy, 1985, p.14).

Turning to Canada, while the situation is hardly so dramatic, we can also find evidence that the relationships between central and sub-national governments are in a state of tension and flux. The near constitutional crisis generated by the terrorist activities of the Front de la Liberation du Quebec and the imposition of the War Measures Act across Canada in 1970 has long subsided as, it appears, have aspirations for the independence of Quebec. But central-provincial relations continue to require whole bureaucracies and a battery of lawyers and accountants who engage in constant negotiation over the division of powers, financial arrangements, grants in aid, and control over offshore and northern natural resources. Such inter-corporate rivalries and regional issues are important factors in Canada's economic and political life. The Economist (15/2/86) suggests that Canadian politicians 'are too absorbed in arguments over the regional distribution of resources for other conflicts of interest
to take on any permanent national significance'. Within the province of British
Columbia, the provincial government recently embarked on a Thatcher-like exercise
of abolishing regional planning authorities and centralizing control in the provincial
bureaucracy, claiming that such regional agencies were obstructionist and strayed
beyond a narrow definition of land use planning (Robinson and Webster, 1985, p.23). In
the view of Dobell (1983, p.24) this centralization of power has resulted in 'large and
lasting' damage to 'processes of consultation, negotiation and conflict resolution in
the community'. Smith (1986, p.15) argues that this attack on regional and local
institutions 'has jeopardized effective policy making in the province'.

Perhaps the most interesting political situation in Canada involves the aspirations of
the residents of Canada's vast Northwest Territory (NWT) for greater political
autonomy, and control over their resource base, financial arrangements, and social
and land use planning. These aspirations are pitted against what Rees (1985) refers to
as central government's hegemony over northern affairs. This is particularly the case
in the areas of national defense, sovereignty, international relations, native peoples'
land claims, national energy policy, land use planning, and control over the revenue
potential of offshore oil and gas, mining, and other resource developments (Abele and
Dosman, 1981). For example, the region's oil and gas is exploited with financial
incentives from central government by three major multinationals, two of which are
American. This enormous exploration and production programme is subject to the
vicissitudes of the international oil market.

The Northwest Territory (NWT), covering 3.4 million square kilometers, constitutes
the largest sub-national political jurisdiction in the western world. However the NWT
has no provincial status and remains firmly a territory, indeed some would say a
colony, of the Canadian federal government. As Rees puts it 'the major levers of
political and economic power over these vast but sparsely populated areas are wielded from Ottawa'. The Canadian Catholic Conference of Bishops put it more bluntly: 'What we see emerging in the Canadian North are forms of exploitation which we often assume happen only in Third World countries'.

All the elements of the dialectical tension are present in the case of the NWT: central economic and political control versus regional political aspirations, clearly displayed national and multinational interests, a series of royal commission-like explorations of the constitutional issues, and a remote and inefficient centralized planning process faced with increasingly sophisticated regional political institutions vying for functional control, both for efficiency and as a matter of constitutional precedent. The issues are compounded and made even more interesting by the presence in the NWT of a slight majority of native peoples, who have only come into substantial contact with Western political and cultural ideas in last thirty years. They are resolved not to let the strengths of their non-western, northern native culture be submerged by the dominant white southern culture. Northern native dissention is not only over legal and political conflicts over land and resources, but over 'condescension in southern decision and opinion centres' and 'demands for more self-governing powers and stronger representative institutions' (Jull, 1985). Proposals to fulfill native political aspirations and planning objectives do not necessarily conform to western constitutional or democratic conceptions, but are based to an extent on the cultural and historical patterns of native life.

There are of course many other examples of this dialectical tension that could be cited in different countries ranging from benign discussion to near war. In social services planning in both Canada and the UK there are lively debates over questions of the decentralization of social policy functions (Tsalkis, 1985; Tomlinson, 1986).
In Australia disputes between central government and the state governments keep 'an army of lawyers in employment' (Rallings, 1987, p.28). More dramatically in Indonesia, the central government is (1) fighting a war in the former Portuguese colony of Timor against Fretelin rebels aspiring to independence, (2) is cautious about similar aspirations for independence by Sumatran fundamentalist Muslims, (3) is accused of over-centralizing economic development on the ruling island of Java, and (4) is attempting to deal with Javanese over-population and extend political control over the vast archipelago by planning the transmigration of hundreds of thousands of Javanese to other islands. No further examples seem necessary. The elements of the dialectical tension proposed are quite clear, as are their influence on planning.

INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN PLANNING

The inter-organizational context of public planning is defined by Rhodes (1985d, p.37) as 'that area of political activity concerned with the relations between central political institutions and sub-national political organizations and governmental bodies within the accepted boundaries of the state'. Here the conception of government is complex and is not limited to local or national government. The scope of sub-national government can be set out as:

![Diagram of Subnational Government](image)

**Figure 3: The Scope of Sub-national Government** (Rhodes, 1985d.)

Here territorial representation refers to the representation of territorial units at the centre and the activities of territorially based political organizations. Inter-
governmental relations are between central political institutions and all forms of governmental and quasi-governmental organisations beyond the centre. Central-local relations are the links between central departments and sub-national authorities, and inter-organisational relations encompass all further linkages. Finally, Ashford (1982) stresses that the sub-national system is not only made up of national and sub-national levels, it is also a political system and an administrative system. Here we will sometimes use the term local governments for sub-national governments.

The rest of this chapter examines the concomitant trends to centralization and decentralization in society, and sets out the implications of this for planning.

THE TREND TO CENTRALIZATION OF STATE POWER

The Functions of the Welfare State

The advent of the modern welfare state after World War Two served to reinforce the centralization of functions as the state assumed more responsibility for people's concerns and enjoyed tax sources which continued after the war had passed. Sub-national governments found that they were unable to muster a sufficient tax base to pay for the desired level of welfare programmes in health, education, income support and a broad range of related services, and turned to central government for funding, thus transferring power to the centre. In welfare funding and social service provision the demarcation between different levels of government became blurred. Central grants-in-aid were used to enlarge central influence more or less extra-constitutionally (Frenkel, 1986 pp.67-69).
The first phase of the development of the welfare state involved the provision of direct benefits to citizens in an attempt to equalize social conditions. This institutionalization of social rights is related to the development of civil and political rights, the origins of which are found in ideas initiated in 19th century political philosophy. This stage entailed substantial increases in state involvement in social security, education and health care, all of which had previously been undertaken mainly by local government. This state action, involving projects and services beyond the financial and technical means of local governments, dramatically increased the role of central government and the size of central bureaucracies, not only in relatively unitary states such as the UK, but in long established federations such as the United States, Canada and Australia (Bogdanor, 1986). In federal systems the jurisdiction of the federal government tended to increase relative to the states or provinces (Smith, 1985, p.80) as the national government assumed substantial financial responsibility for new services.

The advent of the welfare state raised expectations for territorial justice within the nation state, and central government was clearly the only level able to reallocate resources between sub-national units, based on need. This reallocation served to concentrate power at the centre, and indeed constitutes one of the major ethical arguments in favour of central power. As Bogdanor (1986, p.47) notes 'territorial justice is a fundamental aspiration in most modern democracies, and it can easily serve to re-concentrate at the centre powers which the constitution gives to the provinces'. The same case holds for other aspects of planning such as environmental protection, transportation, and some land use planning, for example in watershed systems; which cross-cut sub-national boundaries and therefore demand central arbitration, or control.
A second trend was that as central governments expanded their roles in a broad range of welfare state programmes, they came to rely on either local political structures or decentralized administrative structures to deliver services. The political system as a whole became increasingly dependent on the local provision of nationally determined policies (Ashford, 1982). At the same time the development of the welfare state implied that social service delivery should be standardized and routinized so as to minimize local variation. The responsibility placed on sub-national governments and organizations created an urge for rational and efficient administration that led to 'administrative strains' which had to be met (Kjellberg, 1985, p.225). The rise of the welfare state made inter-governmental relations more complex, politically and administratively.

Inter-organizational relationships also became more complex as the demand for and the delivery of welfare services and territorial justice gave rise to not only state welfare systems, but private welfare and insurance systems, and a large citizen-controlled 'voluntary sector' for welfare provision. The voluntary sector is on the whole decentralized, and locally-oriented and controlled.

State, voluntary and private sectors may co-operate or be in conflict. In Canada no fewer than three levels of government and voluntary organizations are involved in social services planning and delivery. A similar complexity can be found in Canadian watershed planning, for example, in the Mackenzie, Peace, and Athabasca system which spans three Canadian provinces and the Northwest Territories. Clearly the rise of the welfare state and increasing levels of organizational complexes made simple hierarchical or vertical models of central-sub-national relations meaningless (Ashford, 1982).
Economic Development and Intervention

From a systems perspective, government has to service the economic system as it is the ultimate source of the material resources upon which its political survival depends. Government must also monitor, control, and organize its utilization of these economic resources (Miles, 1985). Clearly then, central governments have an overriding interest in retaining responsibility for economic policy, macro-economic strategy, and demand management. After the first world war, and especially during the great economic depression, central governments started to build up their 'monopoly' on economic intervention, planning and economic monitoring (Frenkel, 1986). This position was consolidated during the second world war, and after the war most states assumed responsibility for economic stability through Keynesian management of the macro economy. Stability was taken to mean low unemployment, stable prices, and a positive balance of payments.

This government intervention coincides with a concentration of economic power in the hands of multi-plant oligopolistic, transnational corporations and conglomerates. The state of the economy became both a national and a supra-national issue (Loughlin and Young, 1985). National and provincial governments have managed the economy on behalf of increasingly oligopolistic corporations, often by providing the infrastructure upon which industrial production is dependent, access to natural resources, financial and tax incentives, and export credit guarantees; in addition to overall monetary fiscal and trade policy.

Economic management has sub-national effects as well. The main one is a more articulated regional development and labour market policy, which involves local authorities in a broad range of public programmes, and a closer interlocking of
activities between centre and periphery in the form of integrated development agreements between levels of government (Kjellberg, 1985). These further complicate the web of inter-governmental relations.

Conservative governments have recently sought to decrease welfare budgets and subject more aspects of society to market mechanisms. This follows social market economy doctrines pioneered by Hayek and Friedman. While Keynesian intervention has now given way to a measure of monetarist intervention, central governments, whatever their professed philosophies on laissez faire, are unlikely to diminish their hold over economic planning. In Britain for example, attempts to impose this minimal state has only served to reinforce centralist trends. Rhodes (1985d, p.41) notes that the attempt to impose minimalist views on sub-national governments 'has provided the clearest assertion yet of the centre's belief in its right to govern.' Eversley (1975) maintains that so long as major and essentially national decisions on economic development rest with central governments, these decisions will pre-determine all lesser decisions related to regional economic development and thus pre-empt much of decision-making power of sub-national levels of government and their agencies. The incentives for, and timing and location of, oil and gas developments in Scotland and in Canada's north dramatically illustrate this point, as does the recent Channel Tunnel decision in England.

Other Trends to Centralization

The centralizing tendencies of the welfare state and its economic intervention were complemented by other centralizing factors. These included increased population mobility, a drift from the country to the city as agriculture became more mechanized, and a movement from city to city with changing labour market
conditions. These contributed to a decline in orientation to place and a rise of orientation to similar interest groups in society (Webber, 1964; Sharpe, 1979). A second factor is what Smith (1985) has called 'cultural nationalization', brought about by improved transportation and development of the communications networks and radio and television. The recent penetration of television to the Canadian north by satellite transmission is an example. Sharpe (1979, p.12) adds that 'where an emergent national media system also carries advertising, centralization and metropolitanization was further enhanced' by the promotion of world-wide mass consumption. Smith (1985, p.81) notes that cultural nationalization is 'a powerful socially homogenizing force that undermines parochial sentiment and interest in the uniqueness of regional cultures'. Modern politics reflect the tension between such forces and attempts of cultural movements and organisations to preserve local culture, especially language. Attempts to preserve the cultural identities of native groups in Canada is a clear case. Here, as in Wales, regional media in native languages are used to counteract the homogenizing forces of transnational media.

Thirdly, governmental growth has been accompanied by the professionalization of the state and the growth of bureaucracies which themselves have capacity for self-sustaining growth (Smith, 1985, p.82). Professional knowledge transcends political divisions, and professional judgements in such diverse fields as public health, public works and environmental planning may take precedent over territorial concerns (Tarrow et al., 1978).

Fourthly, financial control is an acid test of the balance of power between central and peripheral units of government. The potential for conflict is clear:

On the one hand, it is impossible to have meaningful local or member-unit political autonomy without corresponding financial resources. On the other hand, many advocates of an energetic economic policy claim that central steering of sub-national expenditure policies is inevitable (Frenkel, 1986, p.82)
It may be that either constitutional, or ad hoc, devolution of power is virtually meaningless without corresponding financial resources. For example, Hinings (1985, p.44) argues that apparently co-operative policy planning arrangements in the UK between central and local governments in fact constitute the use of central government financial power to bring local spending priorities under central direction. In Canada's Northwest Territory control over resource royalties and yearly allocations of block grants to the territorial government are the keystone of central government control.

Finally, there may be a paradoxical centralizing force in the notion of regional development initiatives designed to use infrastructure to adapt the regional economy to meet changing perceptions of locational efficiency, to improve regional transportation and communications links, and to counter urban decline. Meny (1986) argues that the challenge to the state posed by the demand for regional development is often of ultimate benefit to the centre, and that organizationally the rhetoric of regional independence conveys an underlying centralist logic. This is because, in devolving certain powers or procedures to the region, regional development policy inevitably strengthens central government by instituting new financial and administrative instruments. There is a tendency for central government politicians and bureaucrats to retain ultimate financial or legal control over regional development programmes. Meny also notes that, particularly in the case of France and Italy, concessions made to the regional idea have forced the state into a more political, complex, and less authoritarian, relationship with its regions, which has democratized the decision process. However, these concessions ultimately strengthen the central state by preserving its role vis-a-vis sub-national governments.
THE TREND TO DECENTRALIZATION

There is general agreement that decentralization is the transference of legislative, judicial or administrative authority for functions from a higher level of government (or organization) to a lower level (Smith, 1969; Ashford, 1982; Kitchen and McMillan, 1984). Decentralization involves the delegation of power to lower levels in a territorial hierarchy, whether the hierarchy is one of governments or offices within a large scale organization (Smith, 1985). Decentralization requires the creation of political and administrative institutions to administer the functions. Deconcentration, on the other hand, denotes the delegation of a power to act from a superior to a subordinate without transfer of authority.

The notion of decentralization covers a wide range of concepts. For example:

It can be defined as the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of central government ministries or agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or non-governmental private or voluntary organizations (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986, p.5).

Within this conception of decentralization, based on a considerable number of country studies, Rondinelli and Nellis (p. 6-10) suggest four sub-categories. First, devolution is the creation or strengthening financially or legally, of sub-national units of government, whose activities are substantially outside the direct control of the central government. Second, deconcentration is the handing over of some administrative authority or responsibility to lower levels within central government ministries and agencies - a shifting of workload from centrally located officials to staff or offices outside the centre. Third, delegation involves the transfer of managerial responsibility for specifically defined functions to organizations outside
the regular bureaucratic structure. However, ultimate responsibility remains with
the sovereign authority. Fourth, through privatization, some governments have
divested themselves of responsibility for functions either by transferring them to
voluntary organizations or by allowing them to be performed by private enterprises.

Political Decentralization

The political form of decentralization is generally either a federation or a
regionalised administrative system, or some combination. The initial impetus for
establishing either may be political crisis, de-colonisation and/or liberation, and
subsequent constitutional and political bargaining. In any case, whenever sub-
national units of government have been established it generally means that
government recognises that it cannot function purely on the basis of national
majorities. Instead two 'political logics' come into play - 'one the classic democratic
logic of one man - one vote, the other the logic of cooperation between entities
differently constituted' (Frognier, 1982, p.203). The recognition of the two logics is
institutionalized by either an organization designed to facilitate central-provincial
bargaining or through the representation of provincial units at the centre to secure
the resolution of territorial conflict. However the creation of a sub-national level of
government creates a new locus of political power:

Elected provincial assemblies will claim that they are best able to represent
public opinion in the areas under their jurisdiction, and their electorates may
well support this claim. The assemblies will enjoy a degree of legitimacy
arising from popular election, and those who have elected them are likely to
resent intervention by the centre, whatever formal powers central government
enjoys. Under a federal system or a system of devolution, therefore, the
provincial legislature may come to be the principal authority with respect to
the domestic affairs of the province. Even if constitutional theory dictates
that ultimate legislative power remains with central government, the political
facts may well indicate that power has been nearly irrevocably transferred
(Bogdanor, 1986, p.44).
Outside of the 'classic' pre-war federations (Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the USA) political regionalism is a recent phenomena based on deeply-held convictions that decentralization is synonymous with democratic participation, and that regional under-development runs counter to notions of territorial justice in welfare states. The origins of federalism are in the ideas of Jeffersonian democracy, while the origins of political regionalism are in Utopian, anarchistic, and anarcho-syndicalist ideologies. There is no doubt that political regionalism, and subsequently derived notions of functional decentralization, are a prime factor in shaping perceptions of the role of the state and in the organization of the state for planning purposes in the post-war period.

Political regionalism as an ideology has usually been based on a number of factors related to democracy and underdevelopment (Meny, 1986, p.6-11). First, in some European countries the identification of devolution with greater democracy was the result of a reaction against dictatorial regimes associated with a high degree of bureaucratic centralization and the abolition of local autonomy. The Nazis in Germany and the Fascists in Spain and Italy are obvious cases. A similar anti-fascistic thread in the British local government and regional planning movements of the 1930s has been noted (Young, 1983). Second, forms of political participation were found wanting and regional or extra-municipal representation was desired. The demands for more suitable forms of representation took many guises from neighbourhood committees to regional parliaments.

Regional or Ethnic Nationalism

A second force towards decentralization has been what is variously termed regional or ethnic nationalism (Sharpe, 1979) or ethno-nationalism (Conner, 1973). Here the
notion of cultural and especially language and/or religious heritage was increasingly seen as a fundamental democratic freedom which could not be denied by the liberal state. Cultural and ethnic minorities therefore demanded a larger degree of self-government and an enhanced share of national resources (Johnson, 1979). This is the case for the Inuit in Canada's north, the Welsh Nationalists, Corsicans and others. In its most extreme forms outright separation may be demanded, for example, by Tamils in Sri Lanka. Although in many cases interest in traditional language diminished during the process of the integration of regional economies into the national and trans-national economic system (for example in Scotland), the cultural demands of intellectuals subsequently helped support those people who felt increasingly alienated by their integration into an impersonal national or global society. The claims of ethnic groups, for example in the Basque country or in Canada's north, find natural allies in intellectuals who favour increased democracy in over-centralized states. Furthermore, the mere act of asserting cultural independence can contribute to renewed self-respect by a regional minority.

Regional Income Disparity

After regional ideology, another impetus for decentralization is income disparity and control over resources. This results in what has been described as the mobilization of the periphery for its own development (Meny, 1986), and may be a direct reaction to the integration of regional economies into the national and international economic system. The process by which the peripheral regions became the ultimate victims of apparent economic progress is summarized by Weaver (1984, p.2):

For the first time, perhaps, productive activity was definitively removed from the home environment; most vestiges of family economic organization and domestic production relations were suppressed for many decades. Both the small-scale territorial community and the biological family were alienated from the production process, and people in ever-increasing numbers were pushed off
the land to become urban factory workers. This freed the countryside as well for organization along factory lines. The metropolis boomed, becoming itself an extended factory - surrounded by the squalor of working-class housing. The countryside was first reduced to a position of political and economic subservience, and then, in much of the industrial West, it was all but obliterated as a social environment.

This conception of uneven development holds that the benefits of industrialization has not spread evenly, and that the dominant region exploits and discriminates against the less developed regions. Residents of those regions became alienated from the national state (Sharpe, 1979).

This reaction against exploitation of the periphery by the centre generated territorial frameworks of analysis argued by intellectuals (Urwin, 1980), which combined nicely with regional protest movements designed to obtain better economic conditions for the periphery. The combination was fueled by notions of territorial justice, and social and economic changes, and gave rise to a kind of 'technocratic regionalism' based on the logic of the spatial arrangement of economic functions. In many cases this is what we have come to call 'regional planning'. Weaver (1984) has traced its history succinctly from the early work of the Tennessee Valley Authority to the present day. Regional planning has been all but emasculated in the UK by conservative interest in the overall national economy, while in Canada it survives in a weak fashion (Robinson and Webster, 1985). In France however it is still strong as witnessed by the intense efforts of the French central government in the Pas-de-Nord where the Channel Tunnel will surface in 1993. The decentralized organizational manifestations of technocratic regionalism are regional development departments or agencies, development grants, controls over industrial location, and other planning endeavours.
Technocratic regionalism has so far been only partially successful, and its degree of success has proved difficult to measure in face of exogenous forces, particularly recession and global shifts in comparative advantage. At different times it has served as a springboard for new regionalist critiques ranging from right to left in the political spectrum. Where conservative governments hold sway regionalism is clearly out of favour. In any event, although technocratic regionalism originates in what might be thought of as decentralist sentiments, the effects are clearly centralizing as the resources and administrative arrangements are almost always centrally controlled.

Functional Decentralization

There is an additional spur to decentralization stemming from a functional perspective that the remoteness of central government from the regions and its clients means communication is poor, design and implementation of programmes is deficient, and resources are squandered by information overload, bureaucratic ineptitude, 'buckpassing' and political patronage. A whole literature on service decentralization and implementation has arisen. Peeters (1987) for example, argues that decentralization may be the solution to overcoming government overload, which he attributes to the rise of the nation state. Decentralists argue that needs assessment and service delivery can be more efficient and effective by localizing the administrative structure. Closely linked is the demand for more responsiveness and access through participation; for example, to counteract bureaucratic dominance and to ensure the citizen is involved in education, social welfare services, or the planning process as much as in traditional political arrangements such as voting (Johnson, 1979).
However there is a reverse side to this decentralist force insofar as it is held that local government efficiency will be increased by the demarcation of larger boundaries. Urban services, such as strategic planning, housing, water, sewage disposal and transportation are thought to need large-scale organization (Smith, 1985, p.67). Metropolitan governments like Metro Toronto and the late Greater London Council are examples, regional transportation authorities are another. In the UK, and in a number of European countries, this argument has been used to consolidate units of government thus greatly reducing the number of sub-national units. Such consolidation was often seen as a necessary complement to decentralization.

Finally, decentralist tendencies may also be a direct reaction to the socio-economic forces producing homogeneity, concentration, and centralization of government functions. They may reflect the deep-seated need for political participation and the realization of democratic values (Hechter, 1977; Sharpe, 1979). That is, decentralization may be an instinctive reaction against centralizing government, prompted by its remoteness from the activities of everyday life. This phenomenon is noted in the US and Canada by Magnusson (1979) and in the Federal Republic of Germany by Johnson (1979). If this is the case then the symbolic potency of both the centralizing and decentralizing trends in influencing the planning context is clear.

THE CENTRALIZATION/DECENTRALIZATION DEBATE AND THE PLANNING CONTEXT

Planning theory takes little account of the forces of centralization and only slightly more of decentralization. Clavel (1983, p.32) notes 'most of what has been written about planning takes account of neither centrality nor local capacity. In effect, the literature assumes this polyarchy case: centrally linked institutions are balanced by
strong local politics and administration, and competing interest groups agree on the rules'. But if we accept Ashford's (1982) dictum that the degree of centralization is a classic problem of state and government, then understanding the economic, political, ideological and interorganizational relations between centre and periphery is fundamental to understanding the context of planning in the public sector. Planning agencies stand in some relation to wider political and economic forces, and most are in constant tension between the organizational demands made on them and the institutional arrangements which govern their ability to act.

While the relative degree of decentralization among levels of government is often governed by judicial arrangements and/or legislation there is often scope for altering arrangements. On the one side decentralization can provide choice, differentiation, and local responsiveness to meet needs. Decentralization of some town planning functions to neighbourhood offices is a common theme in the last decade, for example, in Brussels, Rotterdam, Paris and Toronto (Norton, 1983). Citizens may feel more in control in petitioning for small adjustments in policy than with large, rigid, sometimes distant centralized bureaucracies (Peterson, 1979). However the arguments for centralization may be compelling as well, because territorial justice or income redistribution within a state may depend on the existence of a national arbitrator, or in other cases because functions like metropolitan transport or town planning are best undertaken by a regional authority.

Decentralization is perhaps too often thought of as an absolute good in its own right, or presented as a romantic ideal (Fesler, 1965; Fuerst, 1986). This ignores the not uncommon situation where decentralized authority is used to support a community's existing power structure. In this case decentralized power may reinforce existing patterns of wealth distribution, dominant political alignments, and in some developing
countries hereditary arrangements as well. The degree of decentralization that is accepted may depend on an arrangement made among dominant coalitions which transcend regional boundaries. The assumption that the more 'local' something is, the more democratic it must be, is not verifiable by research into local government (Dearlove, 1978; Cochrane, 1985). Many economic and environmental problems often go beyond the territorial boundaries of the region and even the nation, such as acid rain, and action at the national or international level can be essential.

The appropriate degree of decentralization in any situation must be at that point where major areas both of functional responsibility and political participation are maximised - some hypothetical equilibrium described by the subsidiarity principle, first put forward by Kohr (1957). Norton (1985) interprets the subsidiarity principle such that tasks should be undertaken at lower rather than higher levels in society and the higher level should support the lower one to ensure that it has sufficient means to undertake the required tasks. From this it follows that functional responsibility for stabilization and promotion of economic activity, and redistribution of income, should reside with central (and provincial) governments. Conversely the provision of public goods and services can best be done by local governments, especially where the costs and benefits are confined locally. However, not all activities are neatly compartmentalized, and there are often cases where benefits are national or regional but many environmental costs are borne locally. Oil and gas developments in Canada's Arctic, and transport infrastructure projects like the Channel Tunnel, are examples. Here there are bound to be disagreements over the most appropriate level of government to adjudicate and plan. As Mawhood (1983 p.9) notes 'there is no such thing as a deductive theory of political decentralization, working downwards from first principles to a logical prescription...'. It may be therefore that the question of the appropriate degree of decentralization of power cannot be answered in an
objective, logical fashion. If that is the case the only basis for resolving issues is
continuing negotiation among competing jurisdictions within the conventions of the
political framework.

This being the case, it is not surprizing that what appears to be a crisis of planning
and governability is to an extent endemic. Indeed it is in the order of a fact of life,
and in many cases the quality of the relationships between central and sub-national
planning agencies may be critical to successful design and implementation of policies.
However, the centralization debate can also become confused where decentralization
is assumed to be solely a function of a centralized authority. In reality, of course,
oncentralized and voluntary processes are independent of the state and may well
provide for the satisfaction of local interests (Boschken, 1982). Problems of
integrating levels of government activity are common to all but the simplest city
states, and even the explicit constitutional arrangements in federated states have not
saved them from addressing these issues. What remains under-appreciated is that all
socioeconomic systems are products of compromises and partisan mutual adjustment
between centralizing and decentralizing forces, and endemic tension is built into such
arrangements because of the irresolvable nature of these arguments (Aldrich, 1978).
The essence of this contradiction therefore is that the planning context is
unamenable to any rational proposals on systematic planning theories for perfect
systems in which different tiers of government, and regional and national entities,
relate as autonomous and independent entities.

The notion that the contradiction between centralizing and decentralizing forces is
resolvable in the longer term is entirely at odds with the notion of either federalism
or regionalism as 'an open-ended contract' (Holmes and Sharman, 1977, p.185) in
which the balance of power shifts along with economic and social conditions. As
Bogdanor (1986 p.63) notes:
There will, inevitably, be conflict and tension between different layers of government, but the task of creative statesmanship must be not only to ensure that such conflict does not threaten the very basis of the state; but also to turn conflict into creative channels so that federal or regionalist states can achieve their aims of diffusing power and ensuring for the territorial groups in the state effective representation. How this is to be achieved is a task for the politician and not for the jurist; it is a matter of practice rather than theory.

This point is echoed by Frenkel (1986, p.67): 'Interdependence of competences is a result of the complexity of modern life. It cannot be spirited away by some clever constitutional formula', or it might be added, by some clever planning theory. Finally, the case is reinforced by the fact that, except for the highest level of generality, there is no unitary public interest and theoretical proposals for planning systems which assume such unity of interests will no doubt face difficulty in implementation. The public interest is often indistinguishable from the interests of dominant social groups.

Finally, centralization and decentralization may not be polar opposites but mutually dependent processes. A trend towards participation and decentralization may be a source of legitimacy for the state, and legitimation tactics can redefine some policies of the state. For example, the Canadian federal government has attempted to maintain its appearance of legitimacy and influence public relations in 'land claims negotiations' with Northern native people, by providing funds for native groups and by increasing their opportunity for political participation. This funding has been used by native groups to harass other branches of the same central government in the courts. The process serves not only to incrementally nudge the government position on land claims and thus redefine policy, but enhances the legitimacy of both native groups and central government, at the expense of the territorial and municipal governments in the region.
CONCLUSION

Trends to centralization are associated with the rise of the welfare state, increasing central responsibility for programme funding and redistribution of resources on a territorial basis, as a result of cultural homogenization, and by extension of administrative control. Trends to decentralization are either political responses to ideological regionalism, the need to maintain ethnic identity, and the promotion of regional economic development; or functional responses to government overload and bureaucratic unresponsiveness. But the distinctions are not hard and fast, and apparently decentralist procedures like regional planning and economic development programmes can be centralizing forces.

The main conclusion to be drawn is that system complexity and fluidity is inevitable, and that the degree of complexity has risen considerably in the welfare state, reinforced by a more explicit role for government in managing the economy and by an unstable environment. To substantiate the latter, one only need look at changes in the price of a barrel of oil since 1973 and then reflect on the impact of these changes on national economies, debt ratios, air and sea transport systems, and the value of numerous currencies. The natural reaction to this system complexity has been to match it in government by a rise in the number of interdependent specialists and technocrats. Beer (1978, p.9) argues that:

more important than any shifts of power or functions between levels of government has been the emergence of new areas of mutual influence among levels of government. Within the field of inter-governmental relations a new and powerful system of representation has arisen.

Any organization faces not only environmental complexity but is invariably dependent on other organizations in that environment, each of whom are pursuing unrelated objectives. Such interdependence of organization and environment is
compounded by political, economic, cultural and psychological changes at the sub-
national level. Such interdependence is a major factor which has caused government
problems to increase dramatically, and which has fostered a perceived decline in
government performance. This decline is manifested by concern over poor
management, deficiencies in service coordination, poor quality of service, and
inability to establish a conception of the public good which commands confidence
(Loughlin, 1985a). Kirby (1985) argues that the problem is exacerbated by a rise in
pluralism and a changing value system which decreases willingness to co-operate with
government in any form.

Possible implications for planning of this situation are set out by Boschken (1982,
p.248) in a study of land use conflict:

> The handling of conflict among groups and the decision outcome occur through
> multiple access to government, and solutions emerge from politicizing
> alternative values, goals and needs. Instead of unity several measures of
> betterment form the basis of adequate policy.

This of course is what often happens, and harkens back to Lindblom's (1968)
conception of partisan mutual adjustment. But the case for centralized control in
income redistribution, economic management, and environmental protection is clear
as well. As will be argued in chapter six, there appears to be no future in radically
decentralized systems. Here we arrive at the argument that the management of
complexity by planners is a process rather a product, a journey which can be done
poorly or well, but where each arrival is a point of departure. Planners who are not
technocrats or narrow specialists must work toward a synthesis of knowledge and
promote a common problem conception on a series of pressing issues. They must
relish the rough and tumble of inter-organizational negotiation and accept the
indeterminate nature of their calling. Cooperation rather than sub-ordination of
subunits is a reasonable objective. The situation was excellently summarized by
Whalen (1960), writing in the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, twenty-six years ago:

The law of life is the law of change, social activities breed and transform social and political arrangements ... The achieving of an acceptable balance between change and order involves a continuing tension between institutional effectiveness - interpreted as operational efficiency in relation to a matrix of communal skills, resources, demands and goals - and group images of institutional legitimacy. Given the complex, changing, independent, and potentially unstable conditions common to most democratic states, and given the public measures required to secure social stability in such an environment the condition of local self-government may be described as a crisis of effectiveness (my emphasis).

Soedgatmoko makes a complementary point:

Complexity cannot be managed, intellectually or practically, through increased control. We have to learn to understand and manage complex systems while respecting the autonomy of the processes and the elements within these systems (quoted in Kirby, 1985).

At this point the term crisis of planning does not seem like quite the right set of words for a situation which is unlikely to go away, whatever planners do. Indeed as I am recommending that planners must relish the challenge, crisis seems the wrong word for describing what is more like an endemic tension, a yin and yang for planning. This suggests that Webber's (1978) conception of planning as a 'cognitive style, not a substantive field' is accurate. The problem doesn't go away as one moves from one type to another of planning for land use, or transport, or social services, or energy, or in resource management. This is both the planning task and planning context: problem analysis and communicative action in a turbulent environment, described in part by simultaneous but conflicting trends towards political and administration centralization and decentralization. These forces are important descriptors of the context of planning and can result in shifting organizational arrangements of the state, a fact which may be counterintuitive to an abiding conception of the organization of the state as fixed by unvarying constitutional arrangements. The
instability of the context of planning, which is endemic political turbulence, may engender notions of crisis, at least in a planning style dependent on a firm base from which to project and plan the future. However the fluidity of the situation will be much less threatening and even exciting to planners who understand that political, organizational and professional interactions in the planning process very often contribute more to social betterment than products or plans *per se*.

Chapters two and three described how the context of planning is in part defined by conflicting views on the role of the state in society, and in part by the trends to organizational arrangements of its political and administrative responsibilities and functions. Chapter four further defines the context of planning in terms of the uncertainty inherent in turbulent organizational environments.
INTRODUCTION: THE VIEW FROM ORGANIZATION THEORY

Planners are often called upon to address very complex and seemingly intractable problems. These have been referred to as 'metaproblems' (Chevalier, 1967) or 'messes' (Ackoff, 1974). Metaproblems are 'many sided clusters of problems with inter-related symptoms that are beyond the capabilities of one or a few existing organizational units to address themselves' (Van de Ven, 1980). Metaproblems are not amenable to either simple cause and effect analysis or to simple one dimensional policy responses. Such problems are usually bigger than any one organization acting alone can resolve, and are often not the primary responsibility of any one body. It is common for governments to excuse inactivity in a metaproblem area by the fact that it spans functional departments and political jurisdictions. Examples of metaproblems include deindustrialization and urban decline in the developed world, urban growth in the third world, desertification and other ecological challenges, pollution control, acid rain and the environmental consequences of large projects like the Aswan Dam. The 'wickedness' (Rittel and Webber, 1973) of these metaproblems has been heightened by the increased pace of change since the 1973 oil crisis, ending a period of relative stability and resulting in increasing turbulence. Metaproblems both exist in, and are the result of, turbulent environments.

The context or crisis of planning from the perspective of organization theory is embodied in this concept of turbulent environments, first postulated by Emery and Trist in 1965. Change in a turbulent environment is rapid and complex. Systems of
interrelated problems are exacerbated by the independent actions of many unrelated administrative units in the organizational environment. These organizations act in uncoordinated and dissonant ways to meet their individual objectives within this environment, often externalizing as many of the costs and internalizing as many of the benefits of their actions as they can (Ramirez, 1983). At the same time the number and complexity of international and interregional linkages and dependencies has never been greater and these lead to further uncertainty and a loss of local control (Pearman, 1985). This has been aptly called 'the loss of the stable state' (Schon, 1971).

A turbulent environment is characterized by (1) uncertainty; (2) inconsistent and ill-defined needs, preferences and values; (3) unclear understanding of the means or consequences of collective action; and (4) fluid participation in which multiple partisan participants vary in the amount of resources they invest in complex problems (Cohen et al., 1972). It is commonly argued that the ability of organizations to plan in the face of turbulence is greatly constrained, and that the turbulent environment of organizations is largely made up of the activities of other organizations.

Organization theory recognizes the linkage between multi-faceted, complex problems and the limited capability of organizations to address those problems in a complex inter-organizational environment. Trist (1983) argues that the response to 'a mess' has to be inter- and multi-organizational. This requires the cultivation of domain-based inter-organizational competence, where a domain is defined as a set of individuals, groups or organizations joined by a common interest or problem. Trist argues that the cultivation of this kind of competence should constitute a major societal project in western societies. Such societies are weak in inter-organizational capabilities even though the higher level of interdependence present in the
contemporary environment renders traditional bureaucratic and planning models dysfunctional. Trist calls for advances in institution building at the level of inter-organizational domains, which are functional social systems occupying a position in social space between society as a whole and the single organization. Such domains actualize themselves in concrete settings to reduce and regulate turbulence. For example, in Canada the regular interprovincial meetings among premiers and senior ministers constitutes the framework of an inter-organizational domain. In the UK the recently disbanded Greater London Council was clearly a domain based institution which coordinated London-wide interests. Other domain-based organizations are now arising to combat economic decline in older industrial regions.

Conflict in Turbulent Environments

Other organizational theorists echo Trist in arguing that such a domain level focus, cutting across traditional organizational boundaries, is essential for dealing with complex problems in turbulent environments (McCann, 1983; Gray, 1985). In these situations 'conflict between organizations is an inevitable growth of functional interdependence and the scarcity of resources' (Assael, 1969, p.573). For some organizational theorists such conflict can have a beneficial influence on organizational effectiveness, and cannot be reduced or eliminated, but managed (Rahim, 1985. That such conflict among organizations is inevitable would be no news to most politicians. In the organizational environment concerned with regional development in Canada's Northwest Territory, for example, the following areas of inter-jurisdictional and inter-agency conflict are apparent:

- between Federal Government departments, for example, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the Department of Environment;
between Federal and Territorial governments;

- between Territorial and Municipal governments;
- between Native organizations and all levels of government;
- between environmental groups and government agencies; and
- between private industry and environmental and nature groups.

In fact the list could be longer, for there is also intra-departmental conflict in at least two levels of government, and a strong measure of centre-periphery tension between Ottawa, which is 2000 miles from the region, and Yellowknife, Inuvik and other regional administrative centres.

But it would be mistaken to take such situations as one of constant and evenly spread conflict among competing agencies. The situation is even more complex in that there is a constant shift of organizational alliances amongst all groups. For example, native organizations may find it in their interest to align themselves with central government against the aspirations for provincehood of the Government of the Northwest Territory. A federal department with a mandate over environmental conservation (Department of Environment) may fall naturally into an alliance with the similar territorial Department of Renewable Resources against federal and territorial agencies aligned with private industry to promote industrial development. These kinds of situational alliances are constantly shifting as agencies continually make progress towards, or review, objectives. All this takes place against a background of shifting world prices for the regions' commodities (oil, gas, gold, furs, etc); the long term constitutional struggle over the region's future; and the democratic aspirations of the majority of native people for independent political entities within the Canadian federation.
Political scientists have reviewed the situation in the Northwest Territories in all its fascinating detail (Dacks, 1981), and similar reviews of inter-organizational conflict in other countries are available. For the purpose of reviewing the contribution of organization theory to planning practice several observations are important. First, conflict is clearly inevitable and therefore worth understanding if agencies are to plan in these kinds of turbulent environments. Second, while simple organizational models are useful in helping to consider these kinds of complex situations, they should not be allowed to obscure the rich complexity and real nature of the human systems they purport to describe. These human systems represent a tremendous diversity of cultural patterns, values and aspirations. Any model should ultimately be in service to the aspirations of the people living and working within the inter-organizational domain. Third, it is clear that planning agencies will not be passive actors responding mechanically to the will of executive and legislative superiors, but will actively, if indirectly, seek to enhance their autonomy and their degree of organizational control (Bozeman and Straussman, 1983).

Organization and Environment: The Contribution of Systems Theory

The challenge of managing change, or planning in turbulent environments, has received considerable attention in organization theory. Inter-organizational relations are a more specific case of these organization-environment relations. Minnery (1985) argues that the workings of planning organizations match the four main criteria which distinguish inter-organizational theory from intra-organizational theory. These criteria are:

a) conflict between organizations is accepted as given, not something to be overcome to preserve an institutional structure;
b) interactions occur under conditions of unstructured authority;
c) communications channels are poorly defined; and
d) there is lack of agreement on joint goals (Minnery, 1985; Negandhi, 1975).

Minnery confines these arguments to 'urban' planning organizations; however they are easily extended to inter-organizational planning tasks at all levels from local to supra-national.

The distinction between an organization and its environment has recently been described as 'one of the most powerful and pervasive metaphors in the language of organization theory' (Robins, 1985, p.335). This distinction first arose in the early 1960s as theorists began to examine economic and societal forces external to organizations, rather than focus solely on their internal dynamics. In part this was due to influential considerations in systems theory thinking which marked an important paradigmatic shift in many of the social sciences. Systems thinking contributed two basic concepts to organization theory: the organizational choice - environment distinction, and the concept of feedback.

Systems theory views an organization as an open system differentiated from its environment by some sort of boundary (von Bertalanffy, 1968). An open system tends towards a state of dynamic equilibrium with its environment through a continuous exchange of materials, data and energy. Both system and environment can affect the exchange process, giving rise to important interactive effects. Of equal importance to interactive effects is the characterization of open systems by equifinality, that is, the same outcomes can be achieved in multiple ways, with different resources and various methods or means (Hrebiñiak and Joyce, 1985). Therefore even if the environment of an open system is highly deterministic in terms of control over ends
or outcomes, organizational choice will still be possible. Choice, it is argued, can be separated from environmental determination in a logical way, as a necessary defining characteristic of the organization as an open system. This distinction is useful in a consideration of environmental uncertainty, a point to which we will return shortly.

A basic tenet of the systems view is that systems are processes striving towards survival, which can be conceptualized in terms of inputs, throughputs, outputs and feedback. Units within an organization are subsystems with their own systemic characteristics. Boundary transactions are critical organizational activities, both internally between subsystems, and externally via the environment. For example, Aldrich (1979) uses the concepts of open systems theory to attempt an integration between the idea of an organization as a consciously boundary-maintaining system and the fact of inter-organizational conflict. Boundaries can be expanded to draw in more resources or participants, or constricted to strengthen the requirements of participation. The concept of feedback, which is critical to the systems view, describes the process whereby information concerning the system is fed back as input into it, leading to alteration of the behaviour of the system. Feedback is a critical concept for organizational learning. This is a second point to which we will return.

There is no shortage of criticism of the systems model, and Caravajal (1983) identifies a number of strands. First, the systems movement is seen as the embodiment of the techno-managerial extreme; and of dubious philosophical providence, based on weakness in Hegalian thought and false assumptions of the objectivity of human observers and the possibility of social systems modelling (Lilienfeld, 1978; Phillips, 1976). Such models are seen to avoid the dynamics and complexities of social system change and so to place a high value on the status quo.
As an attempt at a systemic conceptualization of organizational reality, systems theory is easy to criticize on any number of points. However, as Caravajal (1983, p.232) notes:

"frequently criticism is made in an implicit form as in the proposal of a research program that is antithetical to a given systems frame. Without confronting theses and antithesis it is almost impossible to recognize the criticism implied by the antithesis."

In other words if we accept that the pursuit of understanding is aided by intelligent dialogue then the systems frame has encouraged dialogue over a dramatic range of concepts throughout the social and natural sciences. Caravajal identifies some of the concepts: complexity; emergent social processes; culture, language and myths in organizations; autonomy; systems pathology; system crisis; and planning and turbulence. Clearly systems thinking is not a 'paradigm fad' but has deeply influenced organization theory and the social sciences generally.

For the purposes of explicating the context of inter-organizational planning five important concepts from organization and systems theory are important. These are roughly divided between three explanatory frames and two normative frames, the former use organizational behaviour to describe planning organizations; the latter suggest ways in which planning organizations can learn to cope with turbulence and uncertainty. The concepts in turn are:
Explanatory frames

1. The sources of environmental uncertainty
2. Resource dependance
3. Inter-organizational networks and fields

Normative frames

4. Organizational learning
5. Conflict management and organizational capacity.

ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY AND PLANNING

A dominant perspective that has emerged in organization theory centres around a questioning of the extent to which organizations are able to 'manage' environmental uncertainty to their advantage. Insights from cybernetics have been linked to a metaphor of ecology which shifted theoretical attention away from a preoccupation with individual organizations towards an appreciation of organizations relationships to one another and to their surroundings. This consideration of the ecology of inter-organizational relationships can help us understand the way in which organizations are influenced by actions and events over which they have no control (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Morgan, 1982). These are the contexts in which organizations plan:

The turbulent field defies prediction since the problems it generates are so multifaceted, and the result of so many independent decisions and lines of action that preclude analysis in terms of simple cause-effect relationships (Morgan, 1982, p.528).

In this kind of situation the traditional rational planning model is of little use, since the environment is an interactive, dynamic phenomenon which cannot be 'controlled'
by unilateral action. Rather planning organizations must be prepared to continually adapt and learn as information (feedback) from the environment becomes available.

Questioning the degree to which organizations can either affect or respond to their environments has resulted in a more accurate definition of the concept of environment (McKelvey, 1982; Robins, 1985). This definition distinguishes between the things an organization can affect and those outside its influence, and the environment consists of those elements which are beyond organizational control. Each organization will have a definite impact on the environment, but it will be impossible to predict that impact precisely because all other organizations will be acting at the same time.

Although organizations may influence what is called their environmental 'niche', their larger context of planning will always include a full range of phenomena which are important but which cannot be controlled. This gives a dramatic and rather profound twist to the notion of uncertainty:

Environmental uncertainty has roots that lie deeper than the problems of collecting and evaluating information, directing organizational activity, or any of the other features traditionally discussed in the analysis of strategic planning and control. An uncertain environment exists precisely because the consequence of organizational activity are not realized until after the activity has taken place (Robins, 1985, p.336).

Uncertainty therefore is not simply a lack of adequate information relevant to a problem or planning task; there is not a body of information which if acquired would unlock solutions or dissolve uncertainty. Nor is dealing with uncertainty simply a matter of organizational restructuring or revised management direction. An uncertain environment exists because the impact of organizational activity cannot be predicted in a way which allows those activities to be altered to control environmental effects. The environment therefore is by nature uncertain and while
this uncertainty can be managed it can never be resolved. This goes some way to explain the crisis of planning, for the nature of the public policy system clearly precludes the exercise of instrumental rationality in more than a limited fashion. And yet planning tends towards the rational choice model unless consciously steered in a direction more in line with a model of communicative action.

Uncertainty also arises because at the level of the individual unpredictable organizational interaction constantly alters the shared symbolic representations of reality or the cultural norms by which individuals deal with their environment. Robins (1985, p.339-40) argues that this multi-level uncertainty is a classic problem of social order and integration in modern societies and that this has been close to the 'heart of social and economic theory since the Enlightenment'. The implicit and intractable problem of uncertainty has led Miles (1975) to speak of the 'poverty of prediction' in public policy making. More specifically, Carley (1986a and b) sees this as a fundamental flaw in the mechanistic application of technology and environmental assessments to situations which are mainly defined by their value complexity.

Of course a perspective on the intractability of uncertainty should not be taken to imply that action is impossible, or that we exist only in an environmentally determined situation. Indeed to postulate either the possibilities of complete organizational adaptation, say through techno-managerial control, or to postulate a complete inability to manage uncertainty, is to resort to extreme views and neither is useful. As Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985, p.336) argue, to 'classify change as either organizationally or environmentally determined is misleading and diverts research inquiry away from the critical interactive nature of organization-environment relationships in the adaption process'. Clearly there is an infinitely variable range
between maximum organizational control and total environmental determinism which is situationally determined and constantly shifting. More important is the need to develop an interactive view in which a reciprocal relationship between planning organizations and their environment forms the basis for action.

RESOURCE DEPENDENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS

Resource dependence theory puts forward an organization-environment link in which organizations must interact with other organizations which control the resources required for organizational survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Five propositions describe the resource dependence framework (Rhodes, 1981, p.4):

(a) Any organisation is dependent upon other organisations for resources.

(b) In order to achieve their goals, organisations have to exchange resources.

(c) Although decision-making within the organisation is constrained by other organisations, the dominant coalition retains some discretion. The appreciative system of the dominant coalition influences which relationships are seen as a problem and which resources will be sought.

(d) The dominant coalition employs strategies within known rules of the game to regulate the process of exchange.

(e) Variations in the degree of discretion are a product of the goals and the relative power of interacting organisations.
Resource dependence theory argues that organisations experience success or failure in policy areas according to their control and efficient exploitation of resources like money, information and law (MacCaffrey, 1983, p.56). Interorganizational relations in modern states are 'a complex system of dependencies' (Rhodes, 1979) in which interdependence conditions the actions of all levels of government. Power and dependence, or positive results in conflict and strategic bargaining, rest on access to five major types of resource: finance, political access and support, information and expertise, authority, and administrative relationships. Of these Smith (1985, p.95) argues, information and expertise are the political resources which can strengthen the power of organisations even where they are subordinated in jurisdiction or administrative relationships. Conversely a shortage of information and expertise can undermine formally delegated powers. Similarly, authority or jurisdiction can be seen as a resource sought by organizations seeking to control their environments. This is often accomplished by seeking legislative mandate or bureaucratic directive from a supraordinate authority (Aldrich, 1978).

The resource dependence model has been used in various analyses of party politics (Gyford, 1986), and of central-local relations in the UK (Rhodes, 1981). However, a list of dependences is not much use in preparing a mental inter-organizational balance sheet. Rather the usefulness of the dependency concept is in considering the relationships of relative dependence in inter-organizational networks. For example Hinings et al. (1985, p.42), in an examination of multi-organizational planning systems, notes:

The requirements of information produce dependencies, initially of the centre on the locality. The move to a simpler information and evaluation process pushes the balance of dependence towards the centre. If a financial allocation is part of the planning process, then a resource dependency is apparent.
There is little point in toting up the balance sheet of dependences because the dependency, although part of the structure of the inter-organizational relationship, is not an issue until something goes wrong, until an inter-organizational tension becomes apparent.

The dependency model is useful as a tool of analysis rather than a complete frame for analysing inter-organizational relationships. Young (1983b) takes the dependency perspective to task for reducing organizational purposes to dependency management, and suggests that such models are only of partial use in understanding the actions of government agencies. Following Randall (1973) Young argues that it is useful to conceive of 'policy spaces' or 'domains' into which an organization will wish to expand to protect its main policy interests from encroachment by competing organizations, emasculation by senior authorities, or to extend their sphere of influence. Young argues that an organizational goal is the consensual expansion of policy space or domain, where the domain includes a view on a preferred future state of the operating environment of the organization. Young is correct that the acquisition of resources is not generally an organizational goal but a means of goal attainment, which must include a preferred future state toward which an organization works or plans. Conversely, a public sector organization which elevates resource acquisition itself to a goal would find it increasingly hard to motivate its employees or to justify its existence to the larger voting public in terms of productivity. However, the concept of resource dependency needn't be elevated to the status of a system model. Its main contribution is in describing and analysing the range of resources beyond the financial and the constitutional which a policy or planning organization will make use of in pursuit of its goals. The resources in turn are the means by which consensual expansion of policy space takes place.
For example, in the UK the Manpower Services Commission has continually eroded the control of the Department of Education and Science over vocational training, and now higher education, by making use of political access to acquire constitutional and financial resources. Here is a clear incursion by an agency into new but related policy domains. Similarly local municipal authorities in the UK are alarmed at the possibility of the transference of planning functions over declining inner city areas to development agencies set up by the central government. For example, the London Dockland Development Corporation promotes and controls economic development, new construction, and all planning and land use in an area of London spanning six boroughs. In Canada's Northwest Territories, one important goal (Young's 'preferred future state') of the territorial government is for a large measure of political independence in provincehood. It is slowly moving towards this goal by poaching resources in the form of political access and support, control over information flows and expertise, and administrative hegemony over local functions at the expense of the central government. The central government in turn maintains its control over its historical resource mix of authority, jurisdiction and finance. Clearly in these cases the mix of resources is as important as level of resources. The latter example also substantiates the notion of a constantly shifting mix of organizational autonomy and environmental determinism in a turbulent political environment.

**Inter-organizational Networks**

A consideration of resource dependence leads directly to the concept of the inter-organizational networks for the exchange of resources. DiMaggio (1983, p.145) proposes that the more centralized the resources upon which organizations in a field depend are, the greater the degree of interaction in that field. The expansion of the modern welfare state has clearly centralized resource dependencies in a number of organizational fields.
This process has been called 'structuration', which is a process enacted continually in the course of interactions among organizations in a field (Giddens, 1981; DiMaggio, 1983). A structuration process includes five components:

(1) an increase in the level of interaction among organizations in a field;
(2) an increase in the load of information on organizations in a field;
(3) the emergence of a structure of domination;
(4) the emergence of a pattern of coalition; and
(5) the development, at the cultural level, of an ideology of the field.

For example, in the field of social service provision in the UK, central government agencies, local government agencies, private sector organizations and voluntary bodies are now much more closely linked by a complex web of information flows and interests, partly encouraged by the tremendous centralizing force of the giant central Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS). In one area of social policy, demographic trends and increasing longevity have resulted in a much greater number of elderly people requiring residential accommodation. Such accommodation is provided by local government, voluntary bodies, and in private sector accommodation, all dependent in some measure on central funding from DHSS. DHSS tends to dominate the policy area by its pervasive influence, and this has led to the formation of other coalitions, particularly the Association of Directors of Social Services, whose members are senior civil servants in local authorities.

Planning difficulties tend to be magnified when complex problems are the responsibility or interest of an inter-organizational field such as that described above. Such planning systems operate within complex sets of relationships and may have to combine wide differences of opinion and subsequent conflict. Confronting
such problems successfully often requires either clear hierarchical responsibility or
the provision of a special interagency planning systems, which have been termed
'policy planning systems' (Hinings et al. 1985, p.45). Without such a planning system
it is possible that no one will accept responsibility for the policy problem. Conversely
if such planning systems do operate in the sense of producing the necessary
information, policies and programmes, a great deal of work will be generated. If
governments are under pressure to reduce expenditure and manpower, this will
conflict with the resource needs generated by a policy planning process.

Networks and Fields

In the absence of clear hierarchical responsibility in a social problem area an issue or
policy network will form. Networks are unbounded, non-hierarchical, social systems
which constitute the basic social form that permits an inter-organizational domain to
develop as a system of organizational ecology (Trist, 1983, p.279). Where
relationships among organizations are as yet undeveloped to the point of a network,
the organizational system has been termed an organizational field (DiMaggio, 1983).
In the area of social service provision for example the inter-organizational field
consists of the population of social service organizations, and the linkages among
organizations and agencies, central and local. In addition to formal linkages and
informal contacts, important linkage functions may be provided by specialist journals;
in the UK for example, The Health and Social Services Journal.

An increasing degree of structuration marks the transition from a field to network,
and the extent to which a field constitutes a network of interaction is an empirical
question. A central focus in any consideration of a field or network is the degree to
which organizations are loosely or tightly 'coupled'. Aldrich (1978, p.53) defines
coupling in terms of the strength of vertical or horizontal ties between organizations, the generality or specificity of policy guidelines, the number of direct or indirect ties among organizations, and whether relations are voluntary or mandated. The degree of coupling also depends in part on the degree of hierarchical control exercised by a central authority, and on the mix of centralization and decentralization on the different dimensions of coupling. Following a review of networks within social service delivery systems, Aldrich (1979, 1978, p.68) summarizes the position:

Advocates assert that a loosely coupled structure is most appropriate under conditions of environmental change where decisions must be taken rapidly and where a high degree of responsiveness to citizen demands is desired. Advocates of centralization attack these arguments on the grounds that a decentralized system caters to local interests at the expense of societal interests and is more costly to administer because of duplication of administrative overhead across many semi-autonomous organizations.

The concept of networks related to policy making in government has been refined by a definition of policy networks, which are a complex of organizations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other complexes by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies. This definition is elaborated by Rhodes (1985a, p.14-15) who argues that networks have 'structures of dependencies' which vary along five key dimensions:

(i) Constellation of Interests - the interests of participants in a network vary by service/economic function, territory, client-group and common expertise.

(ii) Membership - membership differs in terms of the balance between public and private sector; and between political-administrative elites, professions, and clients.
(iii) Vertical Interdependence - intra-network relationships vary in their degree of interdependence, especially of central on sub-national actors for the implementation of policies.

(iv) Horizontal Interdependence - relationships between the networks vary in their degree of horizontal articulation: that is, in the extent to which a network is insulated from, or in conflict with, other networks.

(v) The Distribution of Resources - actors control different types and amounts of resources and such variations in the distribution of resources affect the patterns of vertical and horizontal interdependence.

This definition is used to distinguish between policy and territorial communities on one hand, and issue, professional, inter-governmental, producer networks on the other. Policy communities are networks based on the major functional interests in and of government (e.g. health, energy, education) and are characterised by stability of relationships, continuity of restricted memberships, shared service delivery responsibilities and insulation from other networks (Rhodes, 1985a, p.15). Territorial communities, on the other hand, share geographic interests. In Canada for example, the 'maritimes' (the eastern-most three provinces) share a constellation of interests and a degree of inter-dependence in their relations with non-Maritime Canada.

Other networks as characterized by Rhodes are considerably less integrated than communities. The least integrated is the issue network, which has a large number of participants and a limited degree of interdependence. An example is the network of people concerned with the issues surrounding nuclear power generation. Cross-cutting this will be professionalized networks, for example, nuclear engineers who
will attempt to influence resource allocation. Where they have operational control in sub-central agencies, their views may coalesce towards a national (or even international) ideological system. A national professional association may periodically formalize professional opinion and disseminate professional practice. Professional influence is exercised in lobbying and in institutionalized policy networks.

Inter-governmental networks are based on the representative organizations of sub-national governments. They have limited vertical interdependence because they have no unified service delivery responsibilities but extensive horizontal contacts across an extensive constellation of interests. In Canada, the regular meetings of provincial premiers constitutes the focus of a large intergovernmental network. In England, the Association of Metropolitan Authorities constitutes another.

Finally, producer networks are concerned with economic functions, and the relationship between the private and public sector. Here private industry, through trade associations and links with government, may have a major influence on policy. For example, private industry has had a major influence on nuclear policy in the U.K. In both cross-cutting producer and professional networks there has been particularly strong links between the public and private sectors with strong flows of influence, often from the private to the public sector (Rhodes, 1985a, p.17). The concentration of nuclear engineers in regulatory bodies like the UK Atomic Energy Authority, who work closely with nuclear power plant manufacturers, results in a distortion of the engineers' conception of the public interests in nuclear power (Dunleavy, 1982, p.197).

If we accept the proposition put earlier that inter-organizational activity itself generates unpredictable ramifications or policy impacts, then the emergence of a
complex web of policy networks with the growth of the welfare state helps account for the notion of increasing environmental turbulence. It also suggests why it is insufficient for planners to be issue-oriented. It may not be enough to understand and argue the merits of nuclear power, or hydroelectric generation, or land claims by native Canadians. Rather, what Vickers (1968) called a 'policy appreciation' may require an integrated perspective on an issue and the cross-cutting policy networks which provide the dynamic dimension to policy issues. Here we find evidence that making substantive (nuclear power) versus procedural (policy networking) distinctions may be unhelpful. An issue such as the need for, and the mode of, power generation, cannot be abstracted from the dynamic and turbulent organizational network through which the issue is constructed. This is obvious to community activists but less so to planning theorists.

There is also a strong centre-periphery dimension to the growth of policy networks in the modern state. Rhodes (1985b, p.39) argues:

The emergence of policy networks with the growth of the welfare state could be interpreted as the triumph of functional over territorial politics. Thus, channels of communication between centre and locality were not based on territorial representation but on professional-bureaucratic contacts within policy networks. The politics of service provision of a centrally dispensed territorial justice rivalled the politics of place; uniform standards challenged local variety.

But as noted in the previous chapter, the emergence of functional political coalitions and policy networks may also generate a counter tendency towards regional devolution. This is particularly the case with decentralist political movements in western Europe, some of which have gone as far as to resort to organized violence. The functional dimension, on the other hand, is reinforced by the professional, creating tension between the drive for central control and the needs for local service delivery. If issues are 'constructed' by the very existence of interorganizational
turbulence, then it is probably beyond the power of a single planning agency to 'deconstruct' or defuse an issue, although there may be political expectations that this is possible. But it is only inter-organizational activity itself, which requires resources such as mandate, staff time, budget etc., that can unravel policy problems which have interrelated, and inseparable substantive and interorganizational dimensions. The above formulation of the inter-relationship of issue and network offers a significant explanation of the endemic nature of the crisis in planning, which is bound to be a generic phenomenon in the modern state.

ORGANIZATIONS AS LEARNING SYSTEMS

It was noted earlier that systems theory, particularly in the area of systems feedback has been linked with a metaphor of ecology to shift attention away from the study of individual organizations towards an appreciation of their field of relationships, that is, their environment. As we have seen, this focus helps us understand the genesis of uncertainty, and how organizations cannot help but be influenced by the activities of other organizations in their network. For this reason, organizations need to be aware of the changes which occur in their environment and to learn or adapt their behaviour to accommodate this flow of information. Such organizational learning is not mechanistic, as the cybernetic analogy would first suggest, but must involve an organization in what has been called 'enculturated change'.

The conception of organizations as learning systems is a valuable contribution of current organization theory. For example, Argyris and Schon (1978) build on cybernetic insights to propose a 'theory of action' which describes a process of human learning in which knowledge is continually tested and reconstructed. Morgan (1982) argues that the application of these cybernetic insights has resulted in a major
epistemological reorientation in organization theory by which the epistemology of
goal-oriented rationality (the rational planning model) is superceded by an ethic
which stresses the need to facilitate the creative interplay and development of
contextual relationships, or 'action learning'. In action learning the primary task of
organizational managers is to create an organizational capacity for learning. In this
case learning becomes a pre-eminent organizational function and planning,
management and supportive research become secondary functions to the learning
process.

Action learning becomes the means by which organizations can deal with rapid and
complex change which causes process outcomes and organizational objectives to be
mismatched. This mismatch is termed 'error' by Argyris and Schon (1978) who
describe learning as the process of finding and correcting error. Turbulent change
can be seen as systems of problems, or errors, which need to be dealt with through
learning. Such action learning is a multi-layered process, which usually requires
enculturated change in organizations. Such change is seldom easy, for reasons
addressed shortly. But the rewards are tangible in terms of organizational
maintenance and flexibility in turbulence, and in terms of personal development and
learning. Here the method of inquiry shapes the content of the knowledge obtained,
and action learning broadens the range of dimensions and responses in problem
analysis which can be tapped by what Schon (1983) has called the 'reflective
practitioner'. The general benefits of action learning are summarized by Ramirez

Action learning strategies enable us to deal with systems of problems without
having to solve them, and to do so in a continuous, adaptive and nonsynoptic
manner which meets the rapidity, complexity and uncertainty of turbulence.
During the 1970s these insights were integrated into organization theory thereby allowing theorists to sidestep the vexacious and endemic argument over rationality, bounded rationality and meta-rationality and focus on the process by which policy analysts and planners engage in social learning. Dunn's (1971) _Economic and Social Development: A Process of Social Learning_ is identified by Weaver et al. (1985) as a primary source. In the same year Schōn's _Beyond the Stable State_ argued that the rational model was inappropriate in a turbulent environment, and that new learning systems were required. Subsequently attention was drawn to the interpersonal context of practice and the behavioural worlds of planners (or theories of action) which influence and are influenced by their activities and their ways of knowing (Argyris and Schōn, 1974; Schōn, 1982).

**Conflict Management in Planning Organizations**

Planning organizations which do not engage in the enculturated change necessary for learning and capacity building can remain immured in what Argyris (1982) calls culturally programmed strategies which emphasize continuity, consistency, and stability in order to maintain the status quo. However, when such an organization experiences turbulence it faces an array of internal and external disorders and is unable to deal effectively by its accustomed learning and acting patterns (Gemmill and Smith, 1985, p.761). Traditionally, planning authorities have not been structured for learning, adaptation and change, but rather to carry out a predetermined range of tasks. Sections and departments are not geared up for change, but for those tasks.

The conflict engendered in organizations by environmental turbulence may involve an up-rooting of the context the organizational members use to understand and define their organization and themselves. An organization may find itself in crisis but may
also be presented with the opportunity to redefine organizational norms and identity, and to reassess an ineffective structure. This view is echoed by Godet (1986) who finds in system crisis both a threat and an opportunity for beneficial change. Gemmill and Smith (1985) argue that it is at this point when there is a major thrust towards disorder within a system that genuine learning and transition can occur. A key to organizational survival is the ability of its members to experiment together and make firm commitment to the process of change (Argyris, 1980).

In summary current organization theory suggests that a) conflict is inevitable in issue networks and b) that conflict presents opportunities for positive action. These are important ideas for managers and planners who constantly find themselves confronted with what seems to be one sub-system crisis after another. Indeed for senior government bureaucrats such conflict and inter- and intra-organizational bargaining is a way of life, and recommendations that conflict can be resolved or minimized in some ideal system, while superficially attractive, seldom ring true. Organizational conflict cannot be eliminated, but it can be managed.

Organizational responses to environmental turbulence and technological change may be structural or behavioural. The former attempts to improve organizational effectiveness by changing an organization's roles, mandate, legal obligations, communications systems, reward system and other structural characteristics. For example, the Hampshire County Council in England recently merged its planning and survey/engineering departments in an attempt to promote efficiency. Other local government departments in the UK are currently decentralizing their operations to area offices. On a larger scale central government in the UK uses its legislative control over levels of local authorities to carry out periodic, reorganizations of the legal responsibilities and jurisdiction of lesser authorities. The abolition of the only
strategic planning authority for London, described in a previous chapter, is an extreme example. Although these structural responses to turbulence are important, but are seldom sufficient. The seemingly endless reorganizations of local government in the UK probably supports this assertion.

A second approach to intervention in conflict is behavioural: improving organizational effectiveness by changing members' culture, attitudes, values, norms, etc. This is enculturated change (Young, 1983b; Rahim, 1985) involving participants in a cycle of discovery-invention-production and evaluation of knowledge. Self-directed learning motivates action and a redesign of patterns of interaction. Here change at the level of the organization presumes individual learning and communication in a way which allows an organization's members to re-examine their set of norms, values and perceptions to produce different behaviours. This approach involves a conscious effort to resolve what Comfort (1985, p105) calls a tension between thought and action, and which in planning practice is paralleled by tension between theory and practice. The promotion of organizational effectiveness requires adaptation to environmental pressure and to the possibilities and limitations inherent in the members of the organization (Hinings, 1981). For strategic managers the primary task is the creation of 'organizational capacity' for learning.

The concept of capacity is discussed by Young (1983b). He notes that it is neither resources in terms of legal or functional ability or funds, nor is it directly equated with effectiveness. Rather it falls in between. Adequate resources are a necessary condition of capacity, which is a necessary condition of organizational effectiveness. Put simply, a legal obligation to undertake land use planning is not a guarantee of effectiveness in so doing, but if there is no legal competency (or funds) the chances of useful planning are probably nil. A lack of staff or an 'advisory' role will often
result in lack of effectiveness in planning. But capacity goes further. It defines an intervening strategy which focuses on organizational skills and tools and the dissemination of good practice. The capacity-building approach involves the development of a set of concepts and guidelines for self-sustained skill development.

Because policy environments are not static, it is more appropriate to nurture a process of good planning practice, rather than attempt to dictate the actual terms of that practice. For example, such management practice may concentrate on promoting inter-departmental coordination via information flow in a monitoring system. Another possibility might be to promote skills for undertaking 'educative' and non-threatening evaluations of planning programmes. Both are more likely to result in true organisational growth than proposals for overly complex statistical or evaluation systems which will wither from bureaucratic inaction, or lack of resources or political will. It has recently been demonstrated by survey that the concept of organisational learning is not simply a vague 'good idea', but that successful public sector planning organisations possess a visible range of characteristics which, when taken together define organisational capacity (Young, 1983b; Mills and Young, 1986).

The constituent elements of a high capacity organization can be characterized as:

a) analytic capability - to formulate a view of the key problems facing the organization;

b) goal capability - to have clear objectives in the sense of preferred future states of the operating environment;

c) innovation capability - to devise appropriate strategies in non-traditional forms for the achievement of these futures;
d) **corporate capability** - to take an overall view of the resource and action requirements of the situation with regard to the total package of services;

e) **functional capability** - to develop and implement specific programmes within a corporate framework;

f) **monitoring capability** - to monitor changing conditions in the operating environment and the effects of interventions with a view to assessing their impact and further reviewing policies; and

g) **connective capability** - to devise connective relations with other bodies whose operations are relevant to the achievement or frustration of environmental goals.

High capacity is self-reinforcing. Mills and Young (1986) note how high capacity urban planning authorities in the UK receive enhanced status, power and resources, while those perceived as having low capacity may be passed over in resource allocation, except where their inner city problems are of such magnitude as to make this politically unwise. However Young warns that presumed capacity should not be mistaken for actual capacity. Nor is capacity an abstraction, it can only be considered with regard to an identifiable area of operation, say, land use or transport planning, environmental protection, provision of social services to elderly people, or other planning tasks.

Capacity can be developed as part of the management process. Planners may be, but are not necessarily, managers. However, they are likely to be active participants in a management process in so far as they are concerned with strategic issues and
overviews of complex social, environmental and/or land use problems. When that is the case planners may take the role of participating researchers, as described by Castellano (1986 p.24).

Participatory researchers frequently act as catalysts to stimulate awareness of common interests, to introduce communication techniques that facilitate analysis and to provide information on organizational strategies employed in similar circumstances elsewhere.

In concluding this examination of the contribution of organization theory to planning the remainder of this chapter looks at the emergence of new organizational strategies for planning.

COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT IN PLANNING

Increasingly, organizations that plan are forced by environmental turbulence and problem complexity into a range of temporary alliances, formal or informal, with other organizations in their environment. The capacity to do so productively is described as 'connective', or as collaborative problem solving. Circumstances which warrant collaboration include dramatic changes in levels of environmental turbulence, the existence of complex problems which are bigger than any organization can solve acting alone, and limited traditional adversarial means for addressing problems (Gray, 1985).

During sub-system crisis the need for collaboration often increases. For example such problems as regional development, declining industrial base, inner city poverty, disposal of toxic waste, or acid rain afflict multiple sectors of society and fall under multiple planning jurisdictions. Therefore action, information, and resource transfer among a number of organizations are required. Collaboration is a necessary approach in such planning situations, which are not uncommon. In such cases, collaboration
offers an alternative to single agency planning and/or existing decision processes. Young (1983, p8) finds evidence for this phenomena in British local government. 'In seeking to realise preferred future states - and to avoid dreaded states - of the operating environment, the local authority engages with other agencies.' Similar evidence for inter-organizational alliances in the UK are found by Hinings et al. (1985) in what they called policy planning systems. Such systems have as a common element attempts to regularize and plan a network of relationships between government agencies at different levels, for example, land use planning or transport planning.

In every case inter-organizational planning systems require at some time either clear hierarchical responsibility or the provision of a special inter-agency unit. The evidence for the working of clear hierarchical responsibility, even when formalized, is often lacking. For example, Friend et al. (1974) in their insightful study of local planning in Britain, found evidence that ostensibly hierarchical relationships between government institutions dissolve under the pressures of policy implementation. In these cases networking skills and negotiated mutual adjustment becomes more useful than formal planning processes (Rhodes, 1980).

Nor are the actors involved in these types of planning problems confined to members of various inter-governmental organizations. For example the stakeholders in any consideration of nuclear waste-dumping include managers of the nuclear industry, its employees, and their families, future generations exposed to risk, and taxpayers who may be responsible for clean-up or compensation. Collaboration may be the only viable response to complex interdependencies (Gray, 1985).
The evidence that inter-organizational collaboration is a clear feature of planning in turbulent environments is not difficult to substantiate from practice, and conforms to hypothesized responses to turbulence in early organization theory (Emery and Trist, 1965). Following that early work, Trist (1977, 1983) suggests that such planning increasingly will be undertaken by 'referent' organizations operating in inter-organizational domains. Such a referent organization often appears out of an uncentred issue network. The emergence of a referent organization allows purposive action to be undertaken. The possible functions of referent organizations are given by Trist (1983, p.275):

a) Regulation: of present relationships and activities; establishing ground rules and maintaining base values

b) Appreciation: of emergent trends and issues; developing a shared image of a desirable future

c) Infrastructure support: resources, information sharing, special projects, etc.

In addition, a referent organization may have two further functions: mobilization of resources, and the development of a network of external relations for interactive planning. The life span of a referent organization is by its nature discontinuous.

An example of referent organizations are the emergent and voluntary bodies that are attempting to offset economic decline in various cities in North America and the UK. Trist gives an example of the organization called Sudbury 2001 in Ontario, which has taken a lead role in attempting to arrest the economic decline of a city with an eroding industrial base. In the USA, joint ventures between city governments and private developers have reinvigorated downtown areas in such places as Boston, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, and many others, and this has become a primary mode of urban planning and development. In the UK central government has set up the London
Dockland Development Corporation (LDDC) and the Merseyside Development Corporation to plan and encourage investment in former dock areas now derelict due to the advent of containers and different patterns of trans-shipment. These have proved so successful in central government's eyes that they have designated a further five such urban development corporations, and are establishing similar Housing Action Trusts to appropriate public housing management and ownership away from British local authorities. But agencies at all levels are recognizing that cooperation in pursuit of urban planning objectives is more likely to succeed than unilateral action. For example, London's Labour-controlled Newham Council announced a programme of cooperation with the LDDC, thus ending seven years of resistance to joint working. The result for Newham is to be 1500 homes for sale or rent to local residents, and a minimum of £10m investment by LDDC and the private sector into community projects.

Many more UK local authorities are now reassessing their position on cooperation with agencies in the private and non-profit sectors. Legislation, tangible self-interest, and new attitudes may combine to make such joint ventures a prime mode of urban policy implementation in the 1990s.

The population ecology perspective on organization posits a similar organizational type, which Aldrich (1978, 1979) calls linking-pin organizations. In loosely coupled inter-organizational networks they may play a key role in integrating the system. Unlike a referent organization they may be ad hoc and without formal status. Three functions of linking-pin organizations are identified as important: (1) they serve as communication channels between organizations; (2) they provide general services that link third parties to one another by transferring resources, information or clients; and (3) if they are dominant or high status organizations they may use the dependence of
other organizations on themselves to actively direct network activities (1978, p.63). Linking-pin organizations may manipulate authority in inter-organizational systems, and may help prevent the isolation of smaller organizations.

For these and other planning organizations, bargaining is a central mode of political action, and organizational dynamics involves a dialectical relation between positional power and authority derived from possession of resources and their use in bargaining interactions (Barrett and Hill, 1986). For example in northern England the Lancashire County Council has recently expanded its constitutional role to take an important linking-pin function with regard to job creation and renovation of derelict industrial areas alongside the Leeds and Liverpool Canal. In so doing it has, for the first time, linked its industrial development agencies, a borough council, six district councils, and the British Waterways Board in an application for £80 million in European Common Market regional development funding. The county council expects the ad hoc initiative to last well into the 1990s, and the funding would not have been made available without the council taking on the linking pin function.

Other task-oriented planning bodies in the UK are set up as consultative committees. For example, the Channel Tunnel Consultative Committee represents central departments, local governments, project proponents, and British Rail - sixteen organisations in all.

**Limitations to Inter-Agency Approaches**

Clearly referent planning organizations may be an important organizational form for tackling complex problem areas in planning. But there are limitations to this form of inter-organizational activity. First, the limitations outlined on organizational
learning apply equally to inter-organizational collaboration. Referent organizations which are a threat to existing agencies may be undermined, unless they are mandated by a stronger central authority. The latter is the case for the London Dockland Development Corporation, which operates from a resource base of strong central authority and finances, much to the chagrin of the planning agencies of surrounding local authorities. Where power is not mandated, existing local authorities or dominant organizations which share a common paradigm, can ensure that new organizations do not radically challenge existing ones. For example, Aldrich (1978) notes that model cities organizations in the USA in the 1960s made little progress in changing patterns of interaction among existing social service organizations which shared a common paradigm on the individualistic, rather than social, roots of poverty. In a similar case, the late 1970s Inner Cities Programme in the UK, intended to 'bend' the main urban programmes of various central departments toward a common conception and response to urban decay, had little luck in changing either existing organizational arrangements or problem conception.

The other side of the coin is the fact that mandated inter-agency planning organizations, in the UK at least, can be seen to assist in the erosion of local democratic control where centrally appointed urban development corporations assume planning control over (albeit mostly derelict) land and deal directly with private capital, using central funds for financial leverage and presumed planning gain. Thus the trend to multi-agency joint ventures may be a result of local initiative or central policy initiatives designed to lever-in private finance to urban renewal and to bypass what are taken as politically obstructivist local authorities. Although the inspiration for such British programmes as Urban Development Corporations and the proposed Housing Action Trusts clearly comes from American success at urban revival in places like Boston and Baltimore, the centralisation of functions and control which
marks some British programmes runs directly counter to the American mode of policy implementation, which is based on a regeneration of local leadership in collaboration with local commercial enterprise. Some UK joint ventures in turn begin as a local tactical response to the centralisation of planning and financial control as represented by Urban Development Corporations.

Another point is that much of the urban policy literature has focussed on inner city problems and on the ideological assumptions of urban policy initiatives. Less attention has been paid to policy implementation. However the making of urban policy and its implementation may be indistinguishable in practice. Outside of routine administrative tasks, successful policies very often depend on multi-agency implementation and incremental revision of the policy direction, i.e. organisational co-operation and learning. Solesbury (1986), writing from the perspective of the UK's Department of Environment, notes that although inner cities policies have for ten years been predicated on inter-agency joint ventures, these are the hardest forms of policy to implement. They face two basic operational constraints, first the diversity of agency interests within the urban area and second, the need for some convergence of values that binds agencies and individuals to a common purpose.

The success of policies therefore depends on the interlocking performance of a number of agencies, each of whom would normally have a particular way of working and would attempt to internalise system benefits and externalise costs. In other words, not co-operate. However in multi-agency working negotiation towards mutual benefit becomes a paramount organisational skill. Where policies fail at the implementation stage, it is often the result of what has been called 'multi-organizational sub-optimisation' (Hood, 1976).
What is obvious is that inter-organizational co-operation must serve the needs of the cooperating participants, as for example it appears to do in the case of Lancashire County Council and the eight cooperating authorities, who have secured 80 million pounds of European Community regional development funding. Where the underlying self-interest base of organizational behaviour is ignored, exorations or assumptions that inter-organizational co-operation will occur are naive. Leach (1980) finds such naivety in the UK Department of Environment in circulars of advice to local planning agencies. These contain vague assertions about the need for 'constructive relationships between authorities which will help them achieve their planning objectives'. He suggests that such glib advice might be based on a genuine lack of awareness of the realities of inter-organizational behaviour.

As simple partnerships between two planning agencies give way to complex, multi-agency arrangements organizational and managerial skills in terms of joint working may be critical to project success, often as important as the scope of the initiative itself. The extent of the development of these localised management skills, entrepreneurial abilities and modes of joint working is therefore a critical but largely unaddressed aspect of planning.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that the context of modern planning is environmental turbulence, and that turbulence is characterised by uncertainty about the nature of complex problems and the consequences of collective action, by inconsistent and ill-defined preferences and values, and complex networks of participants with a varying interest in problem resolution. A mistaken belief in a 'stable state', in which planning can buffer against change and uncertainty, gives rise to institutional dysfunctions and
planning organizations need to recognise that some problems in the organizational environment are caused by organizations themselves attempting to fulfill individual objectives, while maximizing their own benefits and externalizing as many costs as possible. For example, Rahmin (1981) notes that a positive consequence of the introduction of high-energy agriculture in India is increased food production, but along with this has come increased income disparity through the negation of the government's simultaneous attempts at land reform.

Clearly positive benefits in one sphere of action can result in negative consequences in a different sphere, often at a later date and involving completely different government departments. Equally actions which benefit one part of society can place costs elsewhere.

Organizational turbulence presents a particular difficulty in dealing with metaproblems such as acid rain, pollution control, watershed management, inner city decline, deindustrialization, and the environmental consequences of very large projects such as dams. Such problems are bigger than any one organization acting alone can resolve, and span functional departments and political boundaries. The complexity of international and interregional linkages leads to yet more organizational turbulence and loss of local control. If the situation is such that there is debate over the appropriate role of the state in intervening in a metaproblem, and/or inter-governmental or departmental tensions between centre and the periphery, then the level of turbulence is heightened.

The existence of turbulence for planning organizations means that the planning context is often characterized by sometimes bitter organizational conflict over seemingly intractable problems. The rational model of planning, which stresses the
generation of options for problem resolution based on forecasts of future environments, plus a policy intervention, often proves inappropriate to the challenge of turbulence. Organization theory suggests that more appropriate responses to turbulence and metaproblems can be both structural and oriented to development of organizational skills and learning.

The main structural response is to attempt to reduce and regulate turbulence by fostering domain (i.e. topic)-based inter-organizational competence by development of what have been called referent organizations or policy planning systems. These are important because heavily departmentalized governments are ill-equipped to deal with an increasing number of issues which cut across departmental boundaries. Referent organizations may be formally constituted or represent informal networks of inter-organizational collaboration promoting by 'networking' the development of a common problem conception and organizational integration out of an unfocussed issue network. Collaboration is not only between government departments but between public and private sector, and voluntary organizations, and lateral relationships are as important as hierarchical ones. Whether formal or not, referent planning organizations foster communication, information exchange, and new organizational linkages. An appendix to this dissertation further describes the use of referent planning organizations to tackle the UK's metaproblem of urban decline.

Structural responses to turbulence may be insufficient without attention to a number of responses based on organizational learning. First, if the proposition is correct that that inter-organizational activity itself generates unpredictable ramifications or impacts, then the emergence of a complex web of policy networks with the growth of the welfare state helps account for increasing turbulence. One necessary response is a 'policy appreciation' of problems which integrates a focus on issues (say, water
pollution) with knowledge about the policy network and cross-cutting institutional actions and responses which provide the dynamic dimension to the issue. The degree of instability and fluidity in the planning context generated by interaction between any issue and its organizational environment may help to explain why planners feel a sense that policy planning systems move in and out of crisis. Further instability may come from a lack of available refuge in the rational planning model, addressed in the next chapter.

A second, non-structural response is to view crisis as an opportunity for beneficial organizational change and learning. This is called enculturated change in which management leads in a re-examination of norms, values and perceptions. For example, existing commonly held values may stress and even reward a lack of inter-departmental communication, and this may be buttressed by professional canons which pay lip service but actually discourage interdisciplinary working on problems. Similarly the efficient carrying-out of ineffective tasks may be sanctioned by years and even decades of bureaucratic habit. The nature of turbulent systems suggests that such values must be challenged in organizations hoping to plan effectively, but in a non-threatening and constructive manner. Attempts at enculturated change are mindful of the bureaucratic as well as the political reality of public sector planning. This view is reinforced in a proposed policy model for planning in chapter seven.

Third, there are a number of constituent elements of high capacity planning organizations and the development of such capacity is a result of focus on personal and organizational skills and the dissemination of good practice. One area of particular interest to planners is control of information flows about the turbulent, or uncertain, environment. It was noted that uncertainty is not simply a lack of adequate factual information relevant to a problem or planning task. Nor is dealing
with uncertainty a matter of organizational restructuring or revised management direction. An uncertain environment exists because the impact of organizational activity cannot be predicted in a way which allows those activities to be altered to control environmental effects. Uncertainty arises not only because of unpredictable organizational interaction, but also because at the level of the individual this interaction constantly alters the shared symbolic representations of reality or the cultural norms by which individuals deal with their environment.

Uncertainty cannot be resolved in any final way, but it can be managed by attention to feedback from environment to planning organizations. Resource dependency theory tells us that positive results in planning is often predicated on the development of political influence arising out of access to information and expertise. This insight is no more than the dictum 'knowledge is power', but no less worthy of attention. Here it is worth noting that knowledge is more than facts, but represents the conjunction of fact and value which is at the heart of the planning context. Information in this conception is not just a stream of facts but represents a knowledge of relevant fact and values in the society. For agencies which plan it is particularly important to note that information and expertise are the political resources which can strengthen the power of organisations even where they are subordinated in jurisdiction or administrative relationships. Conversely a shortage of information and expertise can undermine formally delegated powers.

The development of strategic monitoring capacity may be one key to managing uncertainty insofar as planners in turbulent environments no longer solve problems (if they ever did) as much as they assist in a learning process which relies on flows of information about the internal and external environment.
Monitoring is feedback, and systems theory argues that feedback is essential for system viability. Common sense tells us the same, but although monitoring is another area where we pay lip service, it is very often the case that policy planning systems proceed on a basis of woefully inadequate knowledge about the recent past and the likely consequences of action. Valid information can assist in developing a necessary measure of consensus on problem definition, and may foster a commitment to action. In chapter six recent thinking by planning theorists on communicative action is explored. Chapter seven takes up the question of the role of knowledge in planning.

In summary, planning organizations need to recognise that planning involves a political struggle for influence in the broad context of differing ideologies concerning the structure and organization of society. Such a view doesn't imply that every response need proceed from a base of radical analysis or extreme views of the relations between economy and society. However an appreciation of problem complexity and the nature of turbulence is essential. Planners should be influential in promoting communication and information flows, and in participating in and fostering new inter-organizational alliances. An appropriate response to turbulence may be to promote organizational learning and the characteristics of high capacity, such as monitoring.

Underpinning all organizational learning should be a process of personal learning, based on an exploration of the value basis from which planners work. This is a contentious area for planning theorists and is in part what this dissertation has set out to do. The problem of knowledge for planners has come to be called the rationality crisis which is addressed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5. THE RATIONALITY DEBATE IN PLANNING

INTRODUCTION

Much of post-war planning theory has been engaged in an exercise to define, qualify or refute the notion that planning is rational. The epistemological foundations of the rationality debate are to be found in the legacy and attraction of positivism in the social sciences. This approach to social knowledge led to a belief in the ability of social scientists to establish simplified, reductionist models of human behaviour, and to use these to predict the consequences of alternative interventions in social phenomena. Planning theorists find in this positivist legacy dangers of gross oversimplification of social reality at best, and at worst the possibility of technocratic and amoral domination of political decision making processes. Many practising planners, on the other hand, have sidestepped the debate and have evolved a working definition of rationality which focuses on the systematic organization of information and policy options. This working view of what is 'rational' is very different from the notion of a rationality crisis which concerns theorists.

In short, the current rationality crisis is a legacy of Enlightenment thought which postulated that social analogues to evolving physical laws about nature were possible in the form of laws governing human society. These were to be based on empirical observation of the irreducible elements of human behaviour. These views were part of the broader 18th century 'rationalist' movement in which the power of reason over faith and superstition was to lead to social progress. The embodiment of rationalism in social inquiry was positivism, in what was to be a 'social' science. At the heart of the current debate are questions about the extent to which social phenomena are
amenable to quasi-scientific study, and the political and epistemological implications of different methods of social inquiry.

The rationality debate has ranged far and wide, some of it seemingly designed to allow academic theorists to engage in esoteric semantics, or to attack other planning theorists of opposing political views with the dreaded epithet of 'positivist'. On the other hand, the best aspects of the debate reflect a real concern about how we evaluate our own knowledge base and about the potential for social science influence on the direction of society. Certainly when it became apparent that the positivist approach to social inquiry had grave limitations, some sort of crisis for planning was in the cards. The question which will be raised here and addressed again in the concluding chapter is: if prediction is difficult in a turbulent environment, human life too complex to model accurately, and rationality no more than common sense, what is planning's apparent contribution to the shaping of the future?

HISTORICAL BASIS FOR RATIONALITY IN PLANNING

In the seventeenth century the arrival of the Scientific Revolution, which presaged the Enlightenment, was most dramatically marked by the work of Newton. In *Principia*, Newton set out his synthesis of the two opposing trends in existing scientific method: the empirical, inductive approach of Bacon and the rational, deductive method of Descartes. Moving beyond Bacon in systematic experimentation, and beyond Descartes in mathematical analysis, Newton developed the scientific method upon which modern natural science is based (Capra, 1982, p.50). The rapid spread in Europe of the Newtonian view of the universe and a belief in the rational approach to human problems, heralded the 'Age of Enlightenment'. For thinkers of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, rational thought could improve on
religious faith, superstition, ancient custom, local tradition and instinct; and faith in science could lead to social progress.

The development of western thinking in political philosophy during this period also gave rise to a literature concerned with methodological issues in the study of social life, and these issues continue to engage planning theorists and social scientists to this day. In particular this was stimulated 'by the prospect of finding in social processes the analogues of Newton's laws of physical processes' (Brown, 1984, p.71). Hobbes, influenced by Galileo, set out in *Leviathan* to build a 'civil science' made up of clear principles and closely reasoned deductions based on postulates derived from observations about human nature (Held, 1984, p.33). Based on the idea that all knowledge was based on sensory perception, he set out to study first the nature of the individual human being, and then to apply the principles of human nature to economic and political problems, guided by the belief that there were laws governing human society similar to those governing the physical universe. In so doing, Locke laid the foundations for the discipline of economics. This natural science approach to knowledge also impressed the eighteenth century utilitarians Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. They argued that the existing concepts of social contract and natural rights were misleading and that it was more productive to use observation to uncover the basic, definable elements of actual human behaviour (Held, 1984, p.42).

At about the same time two contextual factors served to reinforce the scientific approach. First, the French Revolution demonstrated that societal institutions, hitherto invested with a degree of permanence and inevitability, were transmutable. This meant that new structures were possible and their nature could be derived from scientific analysis - logical, empirical and quantified (Wallerstein, 1986). Second, large scale production associated with the industrial era and the rise of capitalism
was predicated on the use of rational calculation concerning the nature and geographical spread of markets.

The fundamental propositions of the rationalist tradition stemming from the Enlightenment are set out by Besten (1982, quoted in Tietz):

First, that human nature is essentially the same at all times and places. Second, that universal human goals, true ends and effective means, are discoverable in principle. Third, that methods akin to Newtonian science may be discovered and applied in morals, politics, economics, and human behaviour, toward the elimination of social ills. Fourth, that a single coherent structure of knowledge embracing fact and value is, in principle, possible.

Rationalism was a belief in the power of reason as a major influence on the direction of human behaviour.

Other philosophers, particularly August Comte, worked to fuse the notion of rationalism with the methodology of the natural sciences and to extend this to the fledgling social sciences. For Comte the existing bodies of philosophic and scientific knowledge of his time were insufficient for the social tasks engendered by the French revolution. The existing sciences had to be systematized, and then extended into a new science of man and society. In *Cours de philosophie positive* Comte argued that the true philosophic spirit would henceforth address positively reality with a certainty and precision previously unknown in intellectual life. In Comte's scheme of positive philosophy the sciences formed a hierarchy of decreasing generality and increasing complexity beginning with mathematics, then physics, chemistry and biology, and then moving into the science of human conduct: sociology. As with natural phenomena, it was argued that social phenomena are subject to general laws, which will become apparent through scientific study. Benton (1977, p.28-29) suggests the search for such general laws is at the heart of the positivist conception of both natural and social life, and 'the implication is clear: an extension of scientific thought
to social phenomena will generate systematic knowledge of society to which all must assent'. The study of man was to become a science, free from the inaccuracy of speculative philosophy, and free to discover the predictive natural laws. Human thinking, for Comte, has passed through the theological and metaphysical stages of development, to arrive at the final positive stage, reflecting the inevitable scientific-industrial future.

Without delving deeply into the history of sociological thought it can be suggested that the legacy of Comte's positivistic philosophy comes down to us through Durkheim's reworking of sociological method into a 'science of society' resembling the natural sciences in approach and forms of explanation, and through the Vienna Circle of logical positivist philosophers and logicians. The philosophical underpinnings of positivistic sociology and philosophy are described by Giddens (1977, p.29):

...reality consists in sense-impressions; an aversion to metaphysics, the latter being condemned as sophistry or illusion; the representation of philosophy as a method of analysis, clearly separable from, yet at the same time parasitic upon, the findings of science; the duality of fact and value - the thesis that empirical knowledge is logically discrepant from the pursuit of moral aims or the implementation of ethical standards; and the notion of the 'unity of science': the idea that the natural and social sciences share a common logical and perhaps even methodological foundation.

The legacy of positivism is substantial and continues to the present day. However an anti-scientific movement of sorts did arise in the late 19th century among English romantic poets and authors, beginning with Coleridge, which in turn had an influence on the arts and crafts movement and the garden cities movement, and thus on early planning theory. In particular this was a concern about the reductionism inherent in positivism. This concern was to give rise to the body of planning thought associated with Geddes, Howard and later Mumford which sought to be integrative rather than reductionist.
However in general the notion of a positivistic social science gained currency, particularly after the second world war, based on the success of the 'science of economics' in the Keynesian post-war reconstruction. Other social disciplines, such as sociology and psychology, attempted to emulate economics and emerge as sciences, thus producing well-tested theories which could be used to intervene and control social phenomena in the welfare state (Mishra 1984, p.13). The attraction of the positivist approach lay in its apparent advantages in fostering manipulation in the social environment:

The discovery of laws governing natural events reveals causal connections that allow the subjection of such events to human manipulation. Scientific knowledge here stands in instrumental relation to technology; the disclosed predictability of the world is the connecting link between theory and practice (Giddens, 1977, p.25).

In planning one result was 'rational, comprehensive planning' which originated in transportation studies for major US metropolitan areas such as Detroit and Chicago, and eventually lead to metropolitan plan-making processes characterized by massive data collection, mathematical modelling, demand forecasting, and quantitative evaluation of options (Batey and Breheny, 1982, p.20). The result of this well-intentioned social engineering was urban freeways, destruction of working class neighbourhoods by comprehensive urban renewal schemes and construction in its place of Corbusier-inspired high-rise public housing. Some of the most interesting current thinking in planning theory is a reaction to the social mistakes of that period, used as a springboard for considering the nature of social knowledge and its relation to action in planning.

The results of the general development of positivist influences in the social sciences is described by Simey (1968, p.52):
The total effect was that theory lost contact with empirical studies; the whole problem of values remained unsolved, especially so far as its practical manifestation in policy formation was concerned, no secure links were forged between philosophy, particularly moral and political, and sociology. This was disastrous.

No further explication of the history of social science is necessary for our purpose (for insightful reviews see Simey, 1968; Giddens, 1977; Benton, 1977; Levy, 1981). Suffice it to say that positivism is a recent if declining paradigm in many disciplines including political science and regional planning.

RATIONALITY IN PLANNING THEORY

Planning theorists set themselves a three-fold task. First, to advance broad options for the future direction of society, and particularly state-society relations using knowledge of political philosophy, epistemology and other disciplines. Second, to construct models of existing political and planning processes from which generalities can be made and planning action suggested. Third, to undertake research and draw lessons on current planning issues. These are interrelated tasks of an increasing degree of specificity, and of increasing direct relevance to the day-to-day activities of planning practitioners. Although utopian vision is an important function of planning theory, it is probably further from the interest of planners than the more specific functions, and a real challenge for theory is to link vision at the first level with practical suggestions for action at the second and third levels. However, because the theorists' and the practitioners' tasks are considerably different, they have adopted differing definitions of rationality and differing concerns over the limitations and even dangers of so-called rational action. The fact that the concept of rationality seems to mean different things to planning theorists, who are academics, and planning practitioners may explain in part the gap between theory and practice. The following sections look at conceptions of rationality in planning theory,
in terms of the somewhat more practically infused definitions of public administration, and in terms used by non-academic planners and managers.

In general, planning theory is about 'planned social change' (Bolan, 1974) and is normative, that is it prescribes certain actions or value sets over others. Beyond this, the situation is not simple. One means of determining what planning theory has been about is to look back over time and establish a typology of approaches to planning theory. Useful typologies are Weaver et al. (1985), Friedman and Hudson (1974), and Hudson (1979). What is apparent from these typologies is that much of current planning theory is a reaction against, or an attempt to constructively reformulate, a rational planning model which has its origins in positivist/functionalist social science. In all of these reactions however there is a common commitment to some kind of planning theory - there has been no retreat to an empiricist and atheoretical stance. This commitment is based on a perception that planning theory should be a bridge over what Bolan (1980) calls the 'chasm between knowledge and action', that is that theories about planning should be of value to the practising planner. Although much of post-war planning theory has been an attempt to define, qualify or refute the notion that planning is rational, planning as a theoretical discipline or a way of practice is imbued with rational overtones, indeed the term 'irrational planning' has an incongruous ring.

Some planning theorists have recently attempted to come to grips with the concept of rationality in planning (in Breheny and Hooper, 1985). However the task is made difficult by the 'confusions and contradictions in the way the notion of reason is used in practice and philosophical discourse' (Darke, 1985, p.15). Numerous definitions of rationality in planning theory are reviewed by Reade (1985) who suggests that probably the most objected-to use of the term rational refers to the idea that
planners' recommendations are to be taken as objectively valid, and therefore unquestionable in political or other terms. In this view rationality is equated with an instrumental, means-end efficiency and often with the quantitative reporting of behavioural patterns. In the theoretical literature this is a common conception of rationality. Rational planning modes which derived from this positivist approach to knowledge emphasized value-free objectivity and were seen as 'pragmatic, instrumentalist, and unreflective' (Breheny and Hooper, 1985); overly concerned with means rather than ends, and with a tendency to:

- depoliticize politics into technical judgements;
- to emphasize facts over values;
- to create abstractions rather than to emphasize concrete material issues;
- to perpetuate the status quo; and so on (Yewlett, 1985, p.217).

Positivist, or 'calculating' approaches to planning might lead to 'embarrassing (not to say repugnant) results' (Forester, 1985), presumably like bulldozed inner city neighbourhoods.

An emphasis on instrumentality and quantification links closely with the overall positivist approach in the social sciences in which an assumption of rationality in terms of means-end congruence is fundamental to any explanation or prediction of human behaviour. In this approach large samples of humans, which social scientists have empirically observed and wish to generalize about, must be assumed to be acting rationally in terms of means-end congruence. The only other alternative is that observations are of random behaviour and no explanation or prediction is possible. Equally rationality must be assumed if social scientists are to statistically substantiate what are at first instance abstractions or generalizations.

There are two levels of concern. First, abstractions will be a simplified reality, and
no quantitative models are able to encapsulate the multi-dimensionality of human existence. Reductive attempts at modelling invariably lead to criticism:

Evermore abstract conceptualisations of the planning environment have paralleled the quest for rationality in planning. Empirical methods such as simulation, optimisation, and multivariate statistical modelling all represent very considerable simplications of, and abstractions from, the normal reality most of us would agree upon. Our discontinuous, nonlinear, stochastic, uncertain, and ill-defined world is stretched, shortened, trimmed, compressed, and molded until it fits into the procrustean bed of the analytical methods at hand (Goldberg, 1985, p.125).

Problems of quantitative modelling have been discussed at length and are familiar to most social scientists (Carley, 1981; Encel et al., 1975). The main objection is not that tools like statistical modelling are not useful, but that they are misused or overvalued, in that their simplification of reality is conveniently taken for reality itself. Although such tools can have important heuristic value when they contribute additional dimensions to an understanding of complex problems, they are not surrogates for reality nor can they be comprehensive, and so they are not in themselves a guide to action. But they are often taken to be sufficient for action, for example, the use of cost-benefit analysis in assessing development projects.

A second concern is when heuristic techniques purport to be politically neutral or 'value-free'. But all such techniques are value-laden in themselves in that they reflect the priorities of dominant societal groups and can exclude consideration of the values of other highly concerned groups. They can also undervalue social, environmental, spiritual and other intangible dimensions of policy problems. They can be predicated on simplistic methodological assumptions, for example, the choice of a discount rate in cost-benefit analysis, which cannot withstand either methodological or political scrutiny and which themselves represent value judgements.
Third, planning theorists working at the level of discourse on preferred societal options, and state-society and production relations, have a more profound concern about the legacy of positivism and rationalism. This is that decision processes masquerading as value-free, or technical, modes of policy making are invariably ideological and can represent a form of technocratic domination which precludes moral discourse and value conflict. The most reasoned and thorough critique along these lines is to be found in the diverse literature of humanist philosophy, for example, in the social philosophy of critical theory, developed by the Frankfurt School since the 1930s, and especially in the recent critical theory of Habermas. As Giddens (1977, p.65) says: 'the imposition of strict limits upon moral reason in positivistic philosophies is something which two generations of Frankfurt philosophers from Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, to Habermas, have been concerned to criticize'. This has been a central, and instructive, preoccupation of critical theory, only recently taken on by planning theorists, and a theme to which we return in the next chapter.

Conceptions of Rationality in Public Administration

A second conception of rationality is derived from economic thought but modified extensively in the literature of public administration. This began as an hypothetical abstraction about human behaviour and evolved to a more practical description of human decision processes. In its beginnings in the abstraction of economic theory to be rational meant to select from a group of alternative courses of action that course of action which maximises output for a given input, or minimises input for a given output. Secondly, in systems analysis, decision theory, or game theory, to be rational is to select a course of action, from a group of possible courses of action, which has a given set of predicted consequences in terms of some welfare function which, in turn,
ranks each set of consequences in order of preference. This second application of rationality has also been applied to a conception of 'planning' in so far as planning 'is that activity that concerns itself with proposals for the future, with the evaluation of alternative proposals, and with the methods by which those proposals may be achieved' (Simon, 1957, p.423) and is considered 'a process for rationally determining the framework of future decisions' (Smith, 1976, p.24). In all of these definitions rationality refers to consistent, value-maximising choice given certain constraints.

In public administration theory this approach has been modified to take into account the common situation where people do not relentlessly seek an optimum choice of an array of choices, but settle for what seems to be a 'good enough' or a satisfactory choice (Elster, 1986). This concept of 'satisficing' behaviour or bounded rationality was first postulated by Simon (1957) and formed the basis for three decades of public choice theory.

Such satisficing is rational because it follows rational procedures, but it is a limited rationality. Many authors accept the notion of limited rationality under a variety of terms. Rawls (1971, p.418) calls it 'deliberative rationality' which is:

an activity like any other, and the extent to which one should engage in it is subject to rational decision. The formal rule is that we should deliberate up to the point where the likely benefits from improving our plan are just worth the time and effort of reflection. Once we take the costs of deliberation into account, it is unreasonable to worry about finding the best plan, the one we would choose had we complete information. It is perfectly rational to follow a satisfactory plan when the prospective returns from further calculation and additional knowledge outweigh the trouble.

Deliberative rationality is, of course, as applicable to the day-to-day decisions of individuals as it is to the policy making or planning process, and other authors more or less concur with Rawls. Self (1974, p.193) suggests that 'planning can be described as rational, in some not infrequent circumstances'. Etzioni (1967) and later Gershuny...
(1978) propose 'mixed scanning models' of planning with rationality as an unachievable ideal, but worth striving for.

**Other Working Definitions of Rationality**

Other working definitions of rationality are less focussed than the above. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word rational as 'exercising one's reason in a proper manner, having sound judgement; sensible, sane'. Levine et al. (1975, p.89) point out that for some people rationality:

- means achievement of goals, some associate it with individuals maximising satisfaction, others conceive of it as a decision making process without regard to how successful a person is in achieving goals, and still others consider rationality to be broadly synonymous with intelligent and purposeful behaviour.

Similarly, Peters and Waterman (1982) in their influential management text *In Search of Excellence* describe the definition of rationality used by 'the experienced, feet on the ground, operating manager' (p.36) as 'sensible, logical, reasonable, a conclusion drawn from a correct statement of the problem' (p.31). This is probably very close to the definition of rationality used by most practising planners, which comes from what Schon (1987) calls 'knowing-in-action'. This is based on practitioners observing what they themselves do, constructing a description of it, and using that description to help re-think what they are doing. A practitioner's conception of rationality is mostly about systematically organizing information relevant to planning problems.

That rationality can be taken to mean no more (or less) than what is intelligent behaviour may help to explain its continuing attraction to practising planners, many of whom hope to do nothing more than to inject some common sense or reliable information into the political decision process, fraught as it is with self-serving arguments. To paraphrase Schattschneider (in Forester, 1985) rationality may be no
more than the mobilization of bias towards intelligent discourse which includes the possibility of disagreement, consensus and the negotiated outcomes common in politics. If planning theorists do themselves a disservice it is in imputing an inappropriate definition of rationality onto a planning practice, and then debating it into the ground. There is little evidence that practising planners have acted in an instrumental or procedural mode since the 1960s (although other technicians may do so) and textbooks used in urban planning schools since that time have made it clear that planning is politics, that is, planning is about the distribution of power and resources in society (e.g. Altshuler, 1965; Gans, 1968). It may be more helpful therefore to consider the role of this kind of 'common sense' rationality in the policy process.

RATIONALITY IN THE POLICY PROCESS

In a consideration of the notion of rationality in the policy process, I have argued that this policy process is a form of social debate and is orientated to the survival of the institutions of political life (Carley, 1980). The policy process can be called 'reality at work', in which rational modes of planning (e.g. problem definition, problem assessment, consideration of options, implementation, and evaluation) are likely to be the least influential of four aspects of the political situation. The others are value conflict, the workings of bureaucracies, and external forces in the turbulent environment.

External forces need no great description. These may range from change in technological capabilities, in government directives, or the inflation rate, a steep rise or fall in oil prices, shifts in comparative advantage around the globe, natural disasters, or any other. These are one form of turbulence, obvious in retrospect, but
extremely difficult to anticipate in the rational model, and often with implications so
dramatic that all efforts at even flexible planning are difficult.

Politics and value-conflict are the key elements in the policy process, and involve the
promotion of values related to a multiplicity of goals and objectives. This is the
natural human result of a diversity of value judgements in society on the means to
(and ends of) alternative patterns of resource allocation. This is politics and the tools
of value-conflict include at best negotiation, bargaining, argument and partisan
mutual adjustment, and at worst, terrorism and war.

The last important element in the policy process is the bureaucratic or
administrative. This includes routinised activities which are employed for the
purposes of simplifying the decision environment and avoiding conflict. Because
government at any level is multi-functional, the bureaucratic element involves tasks
and objectives like co-ordination of organizational sub-units, maintenance or
acquisition of new resources or power, career promotion, or adaptation to the
external environment (Goldstein et al., 1978). The continuing capacity of theorists to
ignore the bureaucratic reality of life is a matter of concern.

Within the policy system, then, government is most directly concerned with the
values that are incorporated into policies, just as private industry is formally more
directly concerned with profit and productivity. Government makes policy decisions
which call for an understanding of the political context and a selection of social,
economic, or environmental objectives.

My arguments have been criticized in turn as part of the ongoing discourse about
rationality in planning theory (in Darke, 1985), mainly for proposing a definition of
rationality somehow particular to physical or environmental planning. While I disagree with this it is not worthwhile to enter further into the definition of rationality debate here, which has recently has been continued at great length (Breheny and Hooper, 1985; Faludi, 1985), except to return briefly to one particular aspect of this debate. This is the distinction of substantive versus procedural theory, that is what we do (as planners) and how we do it. Drawing such a distinction separates ends from means, which may be an attractive option when we wish to speak in abstractions, but which raises grave political concerns.

The Substantive-Procedure Distinction in Planning Theory

Some theorists trace the origin of the distinction to Weber (Darke, 1985), others to Mannheim (Friedmann, 1973) or even to Banfield (Reade, 1985). Faludi (1973, p.172) attributes it to Mannheim's reading of Weber, and has attempted in the past to substantiate the distinction in the face of a barrage of criticism. However, Faludi recently (1985) argued that the whole debate should be 'transcended' by a more holistic view of environmental planning. This is sensible in that the distinction itself is only possible to substantiate as an artificial construct, and while it may have been helpful as a point of reference in debate, it has outlived its usefulness.

It is possible to present a simple argument why attempts to distinguish substantive from procedural modes of planning are doomed to logical failure, and should raise political alarm in many quarters. The extent to which one could make such a distinction, as an artificial construct, depends entirely on the degree of consensus in society over the role of the state, and therefore planning as an instrument of state control. In an hypothetical case of perfect, unchanging political consensus about societal objectives and the role of the state it is indeed possible to draw a
procedural-substantive distinction, and thus propose that planners 'work procedurally'. But given such hypothetical and improbable consensus it is hard to fathom why anyone would want to distinguish between what planners do and how they do it. However, in the absence of perfect consensus the rationale for making the distinction declines. Where there are substantial political disagreements, that is value conflicts, to carry on with the pretence of the distinction could be positively dangerous where social and moral choices are converted into a technical mode which conceals underlying value judgements requiring political debate. For example, in planning for rail public transport there may be a sufficient consensus that there should be such transport to focus almost entirely on track positioning or train design. However if the topic is changed to the possible construction of nuclear power stations or hydroelectric dams, technical or procedural planning in the absence of consensus can clearly be taken as a political act designed to further one value stance while precluding others. In the absence of clear consensus, or some democratic procedures like issue-by-issue voting, planners can have no mandate to work in a procedural mode. The generally political nature of planning, the existence of environmental turbulence, and the absence of direct political mandate for planners suggests that further debate about the usefulness of the procedural-substantive distinction may be pointless.

CONCLUSION

One thing which is clear is that means-orientated planning activities cannot be realistically divorced from social goals or societal values, and that almost all goals will be contentious. Indeed as this dissertation has sought to demonstrate, the national socio-political context in which planning is carried out probably explains more in the way of how and what planners do than any other factor, and planning
problems usually involve contentious trade-offs among an array of costs and benefits. A new highway brings increased mobility and environmental disturbance just as a new factory brings jobs and pollution to a community. One challenge for planning is to assess the distribution of costs and benefits and to assist towards negotiated concensus where possible, rather than domination. A rational mode of planning can be helpful only insofar as it is defined as the systematic and useful display of an array of information about a contentious and complex policy area.

As to the broader rationality debate, Carnell (1986) suggests that assuming that behaviour is rational or irrational is a false dichotomy, but rather that behaviour in an uncertain world will be based upon situational reasoning, and that to be rational means 'to attempt to be efficacious and judicious' in a context of uncertainty, vested interest, and ignorance of the overall import of decisions. Weick (1979) suggests that 'rationality is best understood in the eye of the beholder'. In any event the rationality debate in planning theory clearly needs to be bounded, and following the thorough examination in Breheny and Hooper (1985) perhaps consideration of the concept should be confined to questions of public choice at the conjuncture of philosophy, economics and game theory. The energy released in the planning theory field might be redirected to the conjuncture of academic theory and planning practice, still underaddressed.

A main objective for theory should be to fuse a critical function with a practical orientation. More useful than semantic debates about rationality may be attention to the epistemological underpinnings in social science and the extent of the legacy of positivism in the social sciences.
Probably the greatest failing of positivistic philosophy generally, and positivistic social science, has been the attempt to separate fact from value, by the argument that the basis of scientific knowledge can be separated from ethical considerations. This gave rise to the mistaken notion that 'social' science could be value-free, or neutral and objective, and that facts are apolitical and therefore not implicitly prescriptive, but only descriptive. But the social reality of man is distinguished from other social, animal societies by the fact that human existence is political, and politics is a function of the creativity of man's response to the world (Levy, 1981). Values therefore are deeply influential in the work of planners and their influence on the policy-making process is normative rather than technical, in that their analysis may both consider others' values, and be a statement of their own.

A related problem is that the mathematical orientation of modern social science, which is useful in itself, can reinforced a tendency towards reductionism in which critical elements of a policy problem are quantified at the expense of important, and often paramount, qualitative information. A similar situation occurs when a complex political situation, representing a variety of conflicting human goals and value-stances, is reduced into a manageable but overly simplistic model. The model in turn is usually based more on the researchers' own value judgements in the form of 'assumptions' than on any approximation of reality. These reductionist models are often misleading to politicians and the public who, on the one hand, are impressed by the mathematical concreteness of the model, and yet tend to have a much more holistic view of human society than the social scientist.

This raises the issue of the esoteric knowledge claimed by social scientists, and especially technology assessors, which is often wrapped up in technical jargon. But as Schutz points out (in Levy, 1981, p.46) the interpretive constructs of the social
sciences are constructs of the second degree, that is, they are attempts to make sense of a reality that already possesses a sense structure for those who inhabit it. Therefore

...'expertise' in the world of social relations is not incidental to social life, but is the very medium of its orderliness. The necessary intersubjectivity of the social world makes it 'our world' in a way that has no parallel in the relation of human beings to nature ... (Giddens, 1977, p.27).

The dangers of missing this argument are twofold. One is that social science may tell us what is obvious or commonsense, sometimes reissued and mystified by technical jargon. Second, as we have argued, there are no immutable findings in social science, because the findings themselves become part of 'the rationalization of action' of those to whose conduct they refer. That is, social science 'facts' have no meaning outside of one or another value orientation based on reason and free choice.

This reactive relationship between human knowledge and human action suggests a profound responsibility on the part of planners for, by musing over the substance of the future, they play some part in establishing the boundaries which make manageable diverse policy considerations which serve to define that future. This is especially important in periods of fundamental social change, for example, during the current trend to deindustrialization in 'rust belt' cities. It is also important for planning, as an interdisciplinary field of inquiry, to reflect on arguments which go to the heart of the presuppositions brought to the planning task. However while it is important to help planners of theoretical or practical persuasion to confront their political values, it is less helpful for paradigmatic warriors in planning theory to rashly impune positivistic tendencies to those academic colleagues or practitioners whose political values may differ.
Finally the main challenge for planning theorists is to develop a series of partial social action theories which can fuse explanations of the sociohistorical context with a constructive critique of existing theory and practice in a language understandable to the practitioner. In addition, the planning theorist in particular among social scientists, has an obligation to synthethize existing insights from a variety of academic disciplines. This responsibility of the theorist to the practitioner may be undervalued in planning but the rationale is clear: without reference to planning practice, planning theory is pointless. Further, as unified social theory is impossible, a recurrent cycle of synthesis and critique is essential to understanding. The next chapter examines a number of recent planning theories which relate to the arguments of this dissertation. One criterion by which they will be examined will be their ultimate relevance to planning practice.
INTRODUCTION

Unfortunately nobody seems prepared to disagree with Batty's (1985) contention that 'there is now an enormous gap between planning theory and planning practice'; least of all planning theorists. This clearly reflects a failure of theorizing in so far as there is or should be a link between theory and practice, or knowledge and action. Planning theorists ought to explicate the crisis in planning, and it is hard to imagine a role for them if that is not what they are attempting to do. This chapter turns to planning theory to determine whether it can help us understand the crisis in planning, and whether advances have been made on the knowledge-action link which can help practising planners understand the context and complexities of their situation.

PARADIGMS AND PLANNING THEORIES

In Kuhn's (1970) conceptualization of paradigm development and decay, each paradigm consists of a theoretical orientation, a set of beliefs and values, and a group of set problem solutions and assumptions. These paradigms tend to pass through stages of growth and acceptance, and eventually decline and rejection, as basic assumptions are questioned based on new knowledge. Planning theory has been divided into such paradigms by various authors (Friedmann and Hudson, 1974, Weaver et al., 1985). Implicit in this process is the idea of critique or being critical of prior paradigms, and therefore 'criticalness' is by nature overtly, or sometimes implicitly, expressed in the development of new paradigmatic orientations in planning. In other words it is hard to find a planning theory set which is not 'critical' of that which has
gone before and this is clearly part of the learning process. However, our orientation here is somewhat different, and more specific. We will examine three schools of thought on planning which by definition, have a critical orientation to existing practice in terms of planners as agents of the state. These schools of thought are loosely known as new decentralization, neo-Marxism, and that stemming from the Frankfurt school of critical theory.

This chapter focuses on these theory groups for two reasons. First, their proponents have undertaken a basic critique of planning in western, capitalist states, and in particular they have considered the role of the state. Second, these theory groups, whatever flaws in their ultimate argument, have made major contributions to understanding elements of the crisis of planning, either in raising issues which have been on the whole ignored but are of practical significance (new decentralists), or in offering insights on the socio-historical context of planning which engenders notions of crisis (neo-Marxists), or in extending the arguments of theory to advance practical advice to planners (critical theory).

The first theory group examined, commonly called the new decentralists, might also be called the utopian regionalists. This theory group begins from a learning theorist perspective but goes on to address questions of the structural organization of the state and its economic development process as a means of overcoming the crisis of planning. They tie their conception of planning to an understanding of the world economy, and propose a 'bottom-up' as opposed to a 'top-down' style of planning. Alone among the theorists they address head-on issues in the centralization-decentralization debate. As is the case for most utopian visions they ultimately fail to offer a comprehensive guide to action, but they raise important questions along the way.
The second theory group are the Marxist, neo-Marxists or urban theorists. They argue that most planning theory reflects bourgeois attention to the safe abstraction of planning procedures, as opposed to the political reality of substance (Camhis, 1978). For most neo-Marxists, planning theory cannot be divorced from a view of the role of the state (Edwards et al., 1975). Bourgeois planning theory exists to facilitate the continuation of the dominant social relations in the control of the means of production. Put more simply, 'bourgeois theory emphasizes form in favour of content because this is one way to cover up the latter' (Camhis, 1978, p.56). Neo-Marxist analysis, it is argued, moves away from the abstract towards the concrete, i.e. it explains phenomena by relating them to the wider political context in which they take place. For the neo-Marxist theorist, planning is politics, and planning problems reflect class struggle. Planning activities in a capitalist economy absorb criticism of the political structure, while maintaining its essential order (Edwards, 1977b). Although unable to advance a theory of social action short of revolution, the neo-Marxists force us to confront our own political views. In so doing they suggest the dangers of corporatism, and reinforce the argument that the crisis of planning in the modern state reflects an endemic tension between real and symbolic aspirations for democracy and control and the reality of state organization and multinational commodity production.

The third theory group attempts to discern the most appropriate linkage between theory and practice by examining the relationship between the use of knowledge and social arrangements, and by proposing a theory of societal guidance that relates the forces of social change to the communication of knowledge. Perhaps the most coherent body of thought in this vein is from the Frankfurt school of critical theory, based on the writings of Habermas. Critical theory argues that what a planner does is 'communicative action' or attention-shaping rather than narrow instrumental
problem-solving (Forester, 1980). The planner is therefore a moral agent. Habermas himself attempts to develop a theory of social practice which overcomes the limitations of the positivist basis of social science. Habermas argues that the development of knowledge in society is related to the socio-historical context in which it occurs and that 'distortion' occurs not only in interpersonal communication but at the political and economic level as a means for maintaining the power of the state and other corporate bodies. Planners are therefore given a task in attempting to reduce or eliminate distortion. The view ties in closely with the arguments advanced in chapter four on the fundamental importance of information, strategic monitoring, and feedback in the planning process. Forester (1982a, 1985) is seen to have extended aspects of Habermas' work on communication in a way which makes it possible to postulate practical action in a planning context.

THE NEW DECENTRALISTS

Of all the theory groups in planning the new decentralists address the issues in the centralization versus decentralization debate most directly. Hebbert (1982) suggests that 'the terms for this debate in the 1980s have been set by the emergence of a strong decentralist school whose leading exponent is John Friedmann'. The new decentralism addresses questions of the structural organization of the development process as a means of overcoming the crisis of planning. It is underpinned by Friedmann's (1973) earlier work which postulates a theory of transactive planning where knowledge is joined to action through personal transactions, and where theory itself is transformed by effective learning. This 'learning society' is to be organized through decentralized control of the means of production and distribution and the development of a cellular socio-economic organization which maximises personal interaction and dialogue and promotes capacity for independent community action.
In this way, Friedmann argues that what he calls the crisis of knowing (being right) and the crisis of valuing (doing good) can be overcome.

Friedmann applied his thinking about societal learning to problems of regional development, particularly in South America where he had worked. In *Territory and Function* Friedmann and Weaver (1979) explore the dichotomy between functional and territorial integration of the space economy as a prelude to arguing for an economically decentralized, territorial basis for sustained development. Functional and territorial forces are seen as mutually contradictory forces within national economies, and this distinction is basic to the entire proposal of the new decentralists. Friedmann (1982, p.249) sees the distinction as the embodiment of a generic concern for the organisation and use of territorial power.

When this thinking is applied to the development problems of rural areas in Asia and Africa, the decentralized territorial approach results in what Friedmann calls 'agropolitan development'. Subsequently the arguments are generalised. Friedmann's (1985, p.156) objective is 'an argument from political theory' and 'a fuller rationale for a decentered system of societal guidance' based on 'a dramatic devolution of power'. Here societal guidance is defined as a process of decision-making involving both state and private sector at the level of territorially organized social formations.

Friedmann argues that function has superceded territory as a mode of economic organization and that this has resulted in a global development crisis, where ways of thinking and modes of action are predicated on assumptions as to the inevitability of the functional organization of the space economy. The solution suggested is decentralized regional integration based on regional or territorial governments with the highest possible degree of economic sovereignty.
Functional integration of the space economy is based on abstract, rational, and economically oriented human interaction, as opposed to small-scale, local or regional patterns of integration. The latter take place in concrete, spatially delimited territorial space, while the former takes place in abstract or functional space. Functional space is bridged by high technology communication, and involves large-scale impersonal human interaction. Functional integration in production, transport and technology is epitomized by vertically-integrated multinational corporations and in international banking activities. These activities take place in space that can be bridged by functional processes, and often have considerable autonomy from broader social norms. In many cases the power of functionally organized institutions is supranational. The assumption of functional integration as a development mode implies that smaller-scale communities (localities, regions, or even nation states) can only develop through the intermediary of more highly developed communities or countries, and then only by accepting the larger unit's definition of development.

The dramatic costs of functional integration are suggested by Friedmann (1982 p.249): apparent gains in production balanced against devastation of nature, ruthless destruction of old ways of life, exploitation of labour, inequality between rich and poor, and regional disparity. Even where regional planning based on centralized resource allocation is attempted, it is bound to fail because the effective balance of power between political communities at the periphery and at the centre of the nation state are not touched. As noted in chapter three, this is one of the fundamental tensions of the decentralization debate.

Territorial integration, on the other hand, is the new decentralists' preferred development mode. Friedmann and Weaver argue that growth should be based on integrated resource mobilization within a defined region, and not on criteria dictated
by world market forces. Territorial integration refers to 'those ties of history and sentiment that bind the members of a geographically bounded community to one another. Territorial communities are communities informed by a deep attachment to their territorial base' (Friedmann and Weaver, 1979, p.29). Territorial ties are created by face-to-face relationships in small settlements, and territorial systems develop in the periphery rather than in the core or growth centres.

The basic objective of the territorial or new decentralist approach is the development of a region's natural resources and human skills, for the benefit of the residents of that region. Policies are therefore oriented towards basic needs services, rural development, labour-intensive activities, and appropriate technology. In this way development would be sustained by the territorial hinterland and its population, rather than by uncontrollable trickle-down from above. Considerable decentralized power would rest with regional government to carry out economic and social development policies and to counter the destabilising and other ill effects of functionally integrated institutions. Such powers would include protectionism, import substitution, and a regional focus for transport and communications.

Where functional integration is the dominant mode of development, Friedmann (1982) argues that planning is 'from above' by the state, and meant to further the state's interests in maintaining its own legitimacy and serving the hegemonic interests of capital. Where territorial integration is the dominant mode, planning is 'from below' and is organized on territorial lines. The boundaries of territories are those of natural 'political communities', which are defined by Friedmann (1985, p.158) as 'political parties, social movements, and other groups of citizens mobilized for a political purpose, to the extent that they are independent of the state' (his emphasis). Here political community is explicitly defined as a territorial form of organization
which exists to the extent that it is free from state interference and manipulation by capital.

A move away from functional organization will be precipitated by crisis and breakdown in the world economy and a subsequent reconstruction along the territorial lines proposed. Friedmann and Weaver find evidence that this has begun in the ethnic nationalist movements: the Basques, the Corsicans, the Scottish Nationalists, the Quebecous and others. These ethnic nationalist pressures in the west are expected to coincide with an enthusiasm for agropolitan development in the third world, where the disparity between centre and periphery is to give rise to this enthusiasm. These moves towards agropolitan development and regional ethnic nationalism are taken as evidence by Friedmann (1982, p.249) that 'we are beginning to see what may be the emergence of a post-statist system of political economy', that is where the role of the nation state is on the wane in favour of territorially based planning and governing organizations.

Discussion of New Decentralist Theory

There are several limitations to Friedmann's analysis, although its emphasis on development from below and on basic needs strategies is useful. First, the policy will be difficult to implement in regions or countries which have a high degree of external economic interaction, for example, those with small internal markets or dependent on high value saleable resources like copper, bauxite, coffee, etc. Also transport systems in most countries are physically oriented towards core areas or major cities, sometimes entirely, and this reinforces the centre at the expense of the periphery.
Second, while the peripheries of many countries are irrelevant to the needs of international capitalism and are therefore grossly under-developed economically and socially, there is no evidence that the situation can be redressed without some measure of central government action. Indeed curtailing the ability to exercise national economic and industrial policy may reduce the overall efficiency of the system, which may or may not be acceptable to the regions. To ignore this is to fall into what Hebbert (1982) calls the common fallacy of regionalist ideology.

Third, any increase in regional power diminishes the ability of central governments to shift resources or redistribute income. Indeed to pursue a measure of social justice which, it can be argued, should be a fundamental rationale for the state requires central redistribution. Considerable and costly inefficiencies in the use of resources may result from a lack of central direction. There will be limited opportunity to redistribute income from rich regions to poor regions. In Canada for example, the degree of devolution of control over natural resources puts the Province of Alberta at an advantage over the Maritime's provinces in terms of royalties paid into the provincial treasuries, whenever the price of a barrel of oil is high. In the Canadian system these resource royalties are not redistributed by the central government, although other opportunities for redistribution exist.

Fourth, there is a structural problem with the territorial approach in so far as integrated private institutional power may be more controllable by the nation state, represented in international agencies, than by localities. Certainly there is clear evidence that along with the international economy, the international state system has a powerful effect on the character of domestic events (Gourevitch 1978).
In a recent paper Friedmann (1985, p.162) attempts to deal with these criticisms by moving from a proposal for 'selective regional closure' to one of 'functional interdependence in system guidance', as a way of addressing what he calls the interdependency of life spaces of the international system. However his proposals for what he calls multi-centred, multi-level systems of societal guidance are vague. As suggested in chapter three, most constitutional scholars now agree that that the allocation of functions among levels of government is a process strongly influenced by situation, and is fraught with political contention among competing groups in societies. This is reflected in endemic tension among political units which is unlikely ever to be finally resolved. Given this, to propose a wholesale reorganization of existing arrangements may be impractical in the extreme. Friedmann (1985, p.163) nevertheless assumes that what he himself calls 'admittedly difficult conditions' will be met, at which time he suggests we will have a new 'critical problem of coordination' where 'most proposals for decentralization fall apart'. Friedmann's subsequent proposals for co-ordinating systems are vague and hardly inspire confidence that his proposals for decentralization will not also fall apart. It is hard to see how arguments for multi-level guidance system could present a viable alternative to the state and supranational bodies as already exist. An appropriate hierarchy of functions is bound to require a constitutional entity at about the level of the nation state.

Fifth, there is no evidence that regional political independence can foster a locally-generated economic transformation. Even if it did, there is no further guarantee that the principle beneficiaries of decentralization wouldn't be established local elites. Although Friedmann (1985, p.160) argues that the state is always 'aligned with the dominant class in society and will use its powers to safeguard the basic interests of this class', he doesn't explain how the same situation won't be replicated when power
is devolved from the nation-state to what must clearly be a territorial state-like entity, whether it is called a province, a municipality or even a political community with geographic boundaries. Friedmann seems to ignore the likelihood that power relations will be replicated in the the regional entities.

Finally, in all of these points the new decentralists' utopian fantasies betray themselves. As Deakin (1985 p.291) puts it:

Utopias ... exist in fact only in the imagination of the believer. Attempts to cross the gulf that separates the imagined ideal from the actual reality characteristically leads to sharp attacks of disillusionment. In this respect modern Utopias resemble their fictional forerunner, the flying island of Laputa in Gulliver's Travels.

Events have so far refuted the earlier regionalist ideas of Geddes and Mumford, now further developed by the new decentralists. Their ideas remain powerful, but the organized region has yet to prove a more potent force than the functional and class mobilizations of this century, nor is it likely to (Clavel, 1987). The new decentralists represent a type of planning theory which Batty (1985) suggests is more concerned with changing the world than attempting to understand it. In so doing they are in danger of encouraging reductionist thinking and obscuring the importance and complexity of political arrangements, state structures at specific historical moments, and the building up of governing coalitions, group interests, and efforts to form alliances among them. While community-generated development, and attention to basic needs, are important, there is little in the way of a guide to practical action in the new decentralists' programme.

The utopian vision forces Friedmann (1985) to take some odd stances, even when he attempts to refute his critics. To suggest as he does, that we are somewhere near the emergence of a post-statist system is absurd, unless he means that the evolution
of global corporations is diminishing the control of the nation states. If this is so, how is the new decentralism to counter this powerful grasp? The question remains unanswered, except insofar as Friedmann (1982, p.250) proposes:

...a politicized process of planning in which territorial and class interests will have a far greater role than in the past. In its most radical form this might involve, as it did in Mao Ze Dong's China, the adoption of 'mass line' politics grounded in the idea that planners must learn from the people and be led by them even as they lead, and the people's improvement in new forms of territorial organization, such as communes.

Here it is not hard to see why the practising planner finds theory remote from day to day practice. While one may sympathise with the generalization of planners learning from 'the people', one is hard pressed to suggest a society where the people constitute anything but divergent value factions which coalesce and split apart on numerous issues which cross-cut territorial, and sometimes class dimensions. As pointed out in chapter 3, there is no single explanation or model for the rise of regional ethnic nationalist movements. They may spring from right or left, and from economic, territorial, language, religious, or other cultural aspirations. It is therefore difficult to see how the new decentralist model could conceivably postulate a cross-class, territorial consensus.

These factors limit the value of the new decentralists' approach to the practising planner. Friedmann's concerns about the relative powerlessness of the peripheral regions and about the importance of 'bottoms-up' development are valid, but his proposals for newly decentralized anti-state systems are unacceptable and unrealistic. However he has served to raise an important issue. The centralization-decentralization dilemma is a critical consideration for planning practice; and one that, outside of Friedmann, is too often ignored in the planning literature. I have argued that this dilemma is an important component of the 'planning crisis' and gives rise to endemic tensions which serve in part to define the planning context.
THE NEO-MARXIST CRITIQUE OF PLANNING

Marxist theory is an important if flawed attempt to apply critical analysis to organized societal action. Its two main components are first, a normative critique of individualistic market capitalism; and second a theory of the historical transformation of society. The neo-Marxist critique of the 1960s and later derives substantially from original Marxist thought, and revives, a century after Marx, the notion of capitalism as an oppressive system of economic and social organization, and a system fraught with crisis.

The crisis of capitalism has been defined at three levels: world (core-periphery, north-south), national (regional secession, regional inequality) and urban (neighbourhood struggles). Marxist analysis has a common conception of social class, an explanation of conflict based on class, and the analysis of class in terms of contradiction and exploitation within the capitalist system (Camhis, 1979). The neo-Marxists assume, with Marx, that capitalist society reduces human capacities to a commodity, which even when it gains its exchange value in a competitive market, receives less than its value added to the product, thus increasing the mass of capital and the domination of labour by capital (MacPherson, 1977a). The important elements of the neo-Marxist critique for planners are identified by Weaver et al. (1985) as: a) the social control function of the capitalist state, b) planning theory as a form of ideology, and c) the existence of a general global crisis.

The revival of Marxism in the social sciences generally, and in planning theory in particular, stems from the failure of earlier paradigms of positive social change, like advocacy planning, and from the apparent failure of market liberalism and welfare capitalism to deal with basic societal problems of poverty and discontent. These are
seen by neo-Marxists as structural and endemic in advanced capitalist societies. Such factors as unequal income distribution, poor housing, regional income disparity, and exploitation of peripheral regions and less developed nations were not lessened by two decades of unparallellled economic growth, nor by the development of the modern welfare state. The development of neo-Marxist planning theory has also been linked to 'the events of 1968', and to the failure of planning theory (Camhis, 1979, p.119).

With the growth of Keynesian economics and social democracy the role of the state in society had increased dramatically. The neo-Marxists argued that the state could not, and would not, act to resolve the undesirable features of capitalism because the state is controlled by the capitalist class, which uses this control to maintain its hegemony over society (Panitch, 1977). Two means are used: legitimation of the state's role to ensure its survival for the benefit of the capitalist class, and when necessary, state aid in the accumulation of capital for private interests by the protection of private property, transfer payments and the provision of infrastructure (Beauregard, 1978, p.239-244).

These important roles for the state give rise to an expanded neo-Marxist theory of the state in capitalist society. The planner is seen as an agent of an oppressive state, who assists the capitalist class in managing the state for their long-term interests. Government or corporate planners, and even well-intentioned advocate planners, are co-opted by their lack of authority and their ability to act is constrained by the dominant class (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1979, p.386). Castells (1977) argues that planning in a capitalist society cannot be an instrument of social change, but only one of domination, integration and regulation of the contradictions of capitalism. Planning serves to make an unpleasant situation, capitalism, 'bearable'
(Camhis, 1979). In this conception non-Marxist planning theories are ideological components of capitalist relations.

The current neo-Marxist orientation in urban sociology and planning theory is directly critical of the arrangement of the relations of production in society, of the role of the state, and of the role of the planner in reproducing these relations. Although Marx terms the state the 'executive committee of the bourgeoisie' he was less concerned with its role in capitalism and envisioned a 'withering away' under communism. Neo-Marxism is more directly concerned with the role of the capitalist state and its relative autonomy. For example Mandel (1975) analyses the decline of late capitalism in terms of the crisis of the state, where market saturation means an increasing dependency on third world markets, and increasing maldistribution of income. O'Connor (1973) looks more closely at the 'fiscal' crisis of multinational capitalism caused by attempts by the state to serve both accumulation and legitimation functions, in reproducing and maintaining the relations of production. This is achieved by increasing transfer payments to multinational corporations and by the provision of infrastructure. In this argument the government takes on two functions: to promote capital accumulation and profitability in the private sector and to maintain a measure of social harmony and avoid disturbances to the social order.

Of particular importance to western liberal democracies is the contradiction between the progressive socialization of production and the continued private control of profits and investments (Heydebrand, 1983). Beauregard (1978) characterizes state support for the accumulation function as: arbitration among capitalists, easing market imperfections, regulating where necessary, absorbing externalities, and managing uncertainty, for example, in the form of export credit guarantees.
Legitimation is promoted by distribution of public goods and social services, and redistribution of income. Harvey (1973) expresses the legitimation function more dramatically: repression, co-optation, and/or integration of critics into the capitalist system.

The state's attempts to administer economic and social subsystems can become extraordinarily expensive, and this accounts for the chronic fiscal crisis of the welfare state. This in turn leads to ineffectiveness and illegitimacy. Offe (1984) extends O'Connor's arguments by suggesting that a continuous rise in the costs of 'social overheads' such as health and transport systems, result in permanent fiscal deficits which in turn can impinge on the profitability of the capitalist sector. Under conditions of welfare state capitalism, state expenditures may persistently outrun state revenues, services will be cut, and the crisis will perpetuate itself. In this situation the effectiveness of welfare state policies depends increasingly upon informal and publicly inaccessible negotiations between state planners and the elites of powerful social interest groups (Offe, 1984; Keane, 1984).

Germane to planning is Castells' (1978) and Harvey's (1973) conceptualization of the crisis of the capitalist state as most apparent in cities. Castells forecasts an increasing tension between the legitimation and accumulation functions in a constrained western economy, especially over the consumption of collective urban goods (infrastructure, housing, etc.). This is marked by the rise of urban social movements that are wider than the proletariat, focussing on issues like the environment, provisions of public transport, etc. Harvey makes a similiar case where crisis is related to struggle over the proceeds (striving for social justice) or the circuits of capital used in production of the built environment, especially land and property development in the cities. Harvey (1974, p.239) attempts to demonstrate
that the controlling influence over the urbanization process is the power of finance
capital and that 'many aspects of community conflict in an urban society are to be
interpreted as a manifestation of class struggle around the realization of class-
monopoly'. Policies emanating from a single hierarchical structure of finance and
government institutions maintain the existing class structure and facilitate capitalist
accumulation (Harvey, 1974, p.249; Camhis, 1979, p.120).

Related to this is Heydebrand's (1983, p.102-4) definition of the technocratic
corporatism which arises due to the increasing intervention of government in the
affairs of the economy and society, triggered by recurrent business cycles and
reinforced by the endemic crisis of capitalism. This technocratic corporatism is
manifest in state-corporate interlocking structures of the mixed economy, and a
blurring of the public and private-sector divide in organizational terms. Technocratic
strategies of administrative planning result in interagency networks of regional,
national, and international proportions, which link organizations to each other and to
governments. Such societal corporatism is seen as an inevitable development of the
advanced capitalist state (Schmitter, 1979). The mediation opportunities thus made
available to the state become an important element in crisis management strategies

Corporatism in the Capitalist Welfare State

In chapter four I argued that part of the crisis of the modern state is a generic and
universal phenomenon attributable to organizational turbulence which spans
geographic space and economic systems. However there is another perspective,
ultimately flawed, but which offers considerable insight into the working of
organizational systems. Heydebrand (1983) and others (Schmitter, 1979; Offe, 1984)
argue that the state of permanent crisis, or environmental turbulence, is not a
generic, trans-historical phenomenon but a characteristic of specific historical
systems or social formations, and is therefore capable of being resolved by political
intervention. This view postulates that the elements of systems maintenance in
modern planning organizations provide clear evidence of the technocratic, corporatist
nature of late capitalism. For example Heydebrand (1983, p.101) looks at the
application of systems theory, with its attempts to monitor and control
environmental turbulence, as crisis management through internalization, where:

planning and managing the future means that the turbulent environment, indeed
even the crises themselves are to be anticipated and incorporated into the system ... (this) facilitates the possibility of ideologically concealing the crisis character of the system.

In this view, important preconditions for the success of technocratic strategies for
systems maintenance and control are the rationalization of organizational budgeting
policy, the enlargement and sophistication of the intelligence function, rapid
information and data processing, and long term planning. The method of systemwide
planning relies on information about the dynamics of the system's environment, based
on forecasting and social indicators. The purpose of planning is taken as a continual
re revitalization of the system, or 'the planning of change' by gradual incorporation of
the turbulent environment into the system. Technocratic strategy is a system of
societal guidance 'without wanting to appear as such' (Heydebrand, 1983, p.101-102).

The rise of corporatism, and increased intervention of the state in the economy and
society, is linked to the emergence of the welfare state, and the rise of transnational
corporations. All are reinforced by the endemic crisis of advanced capitalist
economies. Societal corporatism, or the centralization of organized interest groups,
is the inevitable result (Schmitter, 1979). The mediation facilities thus made
available to the state are used to support the state-corporate complex (Lehmbruch,
The strategy of corporatism attempts to alleviate the fiscal and planning problems of the welfare state by instituting state-supervised and informal modes of bargaining between representatives of key interest groups of capital and labour so as to develop consensus among power elites (Keane, 1984, p.27).

The emergence of a state corporate complex is marked first, by an increasing convergence and interdependence of the public and private sector so that it is difficult to distinguish public and private interests. Second, what Heydebrand (1983, p.103) calls 'technocratic strategies of administrative planning' are responsible for the rise of regional, national and international networks which establish systems of communication and control for private organizations and agencies of government.

The rise of such interagency and transnational networks (such as the Trilateral Commission) has in turn inspired unprecedented growth in inter-organizational analysis itself, which responds to growing demands for inter-organizational coordination, integration and management. Heydebrand (1983, p.103) argues:

These vertical and horizontal inter-organizational networks emerging within the state-corporate complex suggest not only the matrix-like image of the corporate state but also the actual development of neo-corporatist tendencies in advanced capitalist societies. In fact, placing the burgeoning field of inter-organizational analysis within the context of technocratic and neo-corporatist strategies may provide the badly needed theoretical framework for such an analysis.

In this formulation, the definition of technocratic corporatism is extended from a linkage between interest group representation and the political structure to the conception of a neo-corporatist organization of society. The ultimate state of neo-corporatist organization will come about 'when all effective power has passed from representative bodies to corporate-government planning agencies' (Wolf, 1977, p.338).
What is the evidence for the rise of technocratic neo-corporatism? Heydebrand (1983, p.105-110) outlines several points that may be familiar to the reader. First is the rise of inter-organizational networks for planning and managing turbulent environments. Second is the emergence of social indicator and forecasting systems to provide the feedback required for system maintenance. Third is 'de bureaucratization', which takes the form of dismantling various elements of bureaucracy or integrating these elements into a larger, systematic control structure: what is called 'simultaneous centralization and decentralization'. This may be accompanied by 'de hierarchization' in which functional decentralization leads to the diffusion of authority among sub-units, the establishment of task forces and ad hoc project teams, and the design of 'matrix organizations' which permit the simultaneous operation of vertical and lateral channels of information and authority (Scott, 1981). These are particularly evident in innovative industries such as electronics and aerospace. Debureaucratization also leads to the concept of a loose coupling of activities, which is derived from systems theory, and in which the capacity of a sub-system in the face of turbulence is enhanced if the ripple effect of the disturbance is localized by weak linkages. Similar evidence of debureaucratization and technocratic corporatism is to be found in the development of client participation in decision-making at the expense of bureaucratic direction.

As a critique at the level of both of organization and planning theory as well as societal development, these propositions are worth examining, especially for their insight into modern organizational relations, their concern with the dangers of technocratic control, and as a warning of the possible emergence of technocratic-corporatist strategies. These may extend the combined power of corporations and the state in an authoritarian direction if environmental complexity or uncertainty is found to be irreducible. Here the anti-corporatist view echoes Habermas' (1973)
warning that the acceptance of technocratic strategies of control serves to weaken the moral fabric of the institutional framework of society.

As is obvious from the evidence for the rise of the corporatist state, the neo-Marxist organization theorist shares a state of the art explanatory frame with other non-Marxist organization and systems theorists in terms of describing the working of the modern capitalist state. This framework is particularly insightful in explaining the rise of inter-organizational networks and ad hoc, problem oriented planning agencies. The obvious and crucial difference between the two approaches is that the neo-Marxist view takes the rise of inter-organizational networks and all responses to environmental turbulence as clear evidence of the emergence of technocratic strategies of administration. In such strategies there is a fusion, rather than separation of, administration and control. In this situation power is seen to ebb from representative bodies like Parliaments to new simultaneously decentralized and centralizing 'technocratic control structures'. These structures are based on an underlying symbolic code rooted in concepts of systems guidance, and conceived as a medium of communication for the organizational system as a whole.

If this analysis is correct, it would indeed be a matter of profound concern to people committed to the maintenance of representative democracy, with all its too apparent flaws, and to planners concerned with practical social problems such as income redistribution, housing, land use, maintenance of the bio-physical environment etc. However, as with the neo-Marxist view in planning theory, the proposition is elegant but the evidence is stretched to the breaking point by a near religious conviction that all human activity in the productive, administrative or political sphere of a capitalist system is intended to prop up a system which is not worth propping up. One is forced to return to the proposition that neo-Marxist analysis is a reductionist view of
politics and institutions where all evidence which can be remotely construed as positive system maintenance is taken as proof of the evil machinations of capitalism. Conversely a lack of revolutionary intent is (ipso facto) evidence of the rightness of the neo-Marxist view. So for example, Heydebrand (1983, p.106) finds that:

innovation, flexibility and informalism are being rewarded instead of being punished, provided they operate within and on behalf of the overall system.

Given the rise of inter-organizational networks, there is little evidence as yet of an 'eclipse of bureaucracy' or of the substantial transfer of power from representative bodies to planning authorities. This distortion of evidence suggests that the corporatist analysis is insufficient as a theory of the state, in so far as there is no western, capitalist state which conforms to the postulates of the theory (Rhodes, 1985a). As Jordan (1981, p.113) comments on the UK:

the nature of British politics has certainly changed, but not towards anything which could be identified with any rigorous definition of the corporate state ...

It is this fundamental insufficiency which, Rhodes argues, engenders continual attempts to redefine the corporate theory, and gives rise to 'adjectival proliferation' - neo-corporatism, liberal corporatism, bargaining corporatism; all of which Jordan (1981, p.102) suggests are no more than pluralism in different guises. Heydebrand himself lends credence to this when he suggests that:

it is more appropriate to talk about technocratic strategies than about a technocratic system of control since the latter conception implies too high a degree of integration and logically excludes contradictoriness as a basis for organization.

But the dialectic of the argument is nevertheless illuminating, and a conceptualization of corporatism in whatever guise raises salutary warnings to the non-extremist planner. First, to refute the argument that there is an explicit corporatist strategy to ally the state with other corporatist bodies in a kind of conspiracy in aid
of capitalism is not to deny the validity of any analysis of the effect and power of
corporatist forces in societies. For example an analysis of property and housing
ownership in the UK finds that 1500 million pounds sterling of property is owned by
the little known 'Church Commissioners', a corporatist force to be reckoned with.
Second, corporatism reminds us that tendencies towards technocracy, or the replace­
ment of moral values with values derived from technical imperatives, are a constant
danger. Third, the corporatist view reinforces the idea that neither the process of
planning by the state, nor the purpose of planning, can be divorced from one another.
In other words, there is no substantive-procedural distinction in reality. The purpose
and process of planning, and its environmental context, must be considered as
multiple dimensions of a unified problem set. In this view a consideration of
process/purpose best takes place in a learning or action research context where the
planner's activities are part of a learning task concerning the nature of the state-
industrial system.

Local Government in Recent Urban Theory

Just as an analysis of corporatist forces can aid an understanding of the working of
economic systems, so an analysis of the role of sub-national units of government
within the state can be instructive in thinking about the role of planning in the state.
O'Conner (1973) analyses regionalism as an extension of state intervention in support
of private capital, with the state as project developer, consumer of private services,
or an underwriter of financial investment. The state provides infrastructure, schools
and welfare services for a mobile labour force employed by the private sector.
Regional development agencies in particular are seen to offer support for private
business activity. Harvey (1973) conceives of any sub-national units of government as
embedded in an hierarchical structure of internal relations which is continually in the
process of being structured. The inevitable evolution and dictates for survival of the late capitalist state serves to define the rules of the game by which the relationships evolve. No subunits of the system (e.g. regional or local planning agencies) can be understood without reference to the broad system of capitalism. Other authors concur, for example Dearlove (1979, p.244) analyses the reorganization of British local government as a 'problem of local government as an aspect of an overall problem of the public sector in a capitalist economy', and as 'a facet of the general problem which requires the capitalist state to fulfill the two basic and often mutually contradictory functions of accumulation and legitimization' (p.256). Cockburn (1977, p.51-52) argues that while the central state contributes primarily to capitalist production, the local state contributes mainly to capitalist reproduction. However, authors whose main focus of inquiry has been the role of the central state have seldom come to grips with the complexity and local variation in the arrangements of sub-national governments, and their linkages to other sectors of the economy and society.

The failure of more structuralist approaches to explain the variation in the form and functions of the local state is examined by a number of authors. The Cawson and Saunders (1983) dual state model, for example, attempts to fuse a corporatist style of analysis with a detailed examination of central-local relations between government and the economy. They argue that government activities at the two levels legitimate the state and support capital accumulation through links with two different economic sectors. The central state links with national and multinational corporations and associated bodies, and the local government with smaller, more competitive, local firms and labour markets (Cawson and Saunders, 1983). But as with corporatism generally, empirical evidence for such a corporatist framework is thin and conflicting, and what does exist suggests that power relations in modern societies are
far more complex and changing than can be rationally modelled (Villadsen, 1986). Although it would be convenient to begin to build a theory of the welfare state from a specific division of central and local functions, even in one state, reality confounds the attempt because of:

the inappropriateness and, in many cases, the sheer impossibility, of dividing public sector functions into direct horizontal levels. The increasing complexity of modern policies, the ever more precise definition of target groups to which services are directed, and the need to enlist the cooperation of an increasingly varied network of public and quasi-public bodies in order to ensure effective implementation, not to mention the ever insistent pressure for centralization in order to promote universalistic egalitarianism, or even more to cut local expenditure, all points to the need for flexibility in the institutional arrangements for service delivery and, above all, for not allocating exclusive responsibility to one horizontal level, particularly the local (Sharpe, 1984 p.42).

The question of whether the local state should necessarily be considered a smaller-scale spatial analogue of the central state is also raised by Dear and Clark (1981). They suggest that neither liberal nor past Marxist models provide an adequate basis for analysis of the hierarchical arrangements of the state. Rather they see the local state as fulfilling a legitimating function in the service of the wider social organization:

we assert that the existence of a local state is predicated upon the need for long-term crisis avoidance at the local level. It is only via the local state system that social and ideological control of a spatially extensive and heterogeneous jurisdiction becomes possible. In this manner, local needs are anticipated and answered, and central state legitimacy ensured. Although the existence of a local state is functional for capitalism, it is also in keeping with the principles of local self-determination in democracy. A highly potent ideological and functional alliance thus buttresses the local state system (Dear and Clark, 1981, p.1280; my emphasis).

Here Dear and Clark present an argument similar to the one put in this dissertation, that is, the crisis of planning in the modern state often reflects an endemic tension between real and symbolic aspirations for local democracy and control and the reality of the state organization and multi-national commodity production. Clark and Dear (1985, p.274) go on to suggest that current analysis over-emphasizes the actions of
the local state at the expense of an understanding of its constitutional incapacity vis-
a-vis higher levels of government. They argue that the liberal rhetoric of local autonomy is sustained by the legal apparatus or by higher tiers of the state that constrain it. This dissonance, they argue, is an important aspect of the legitimacy crisis of the state. However the fundamental difference between my view and theirs is that I argue that this dissonance is likely to occur in all industrialized economic systems and is not peculiar to capitalism.

Discussion of the Neo-Marxist Critique

The foregoing is a simplified synopsis of the neo-Marxist critique of planning, which sheds considerable light on the workings of the capitalist system. As MacPherson (1977a p.231-232) notes the neo-Marxists repair a great defect of twentieth-century liberal theory, 'which accepted bourgeois society but did not examine the implications of that acceptance'. These theorists raise important questions about the necessary and changing relation of the state to capitalist society.

The neo-Marxist critique, however, suffers from a number of failings. First and most simply it tends to be reductionist in that in the interests of supporting its ideological stance of class conflict it conveniently emphasizes the limited rationality of positive knowledge. McDougall (1982, p.262) notes that the neo-Marxist task is essentially ideological for they are charged not only with interpreting reality in terms of fixed categories of analysis which cannot be refuted, but with ignoring aspects of reality which may lead to a refutation of their fixed analytical categories. This dogmatic rationality in neo-Marxism has the same epistemological origins in scientific method and materialism as the neo-positivist stance in the social sciences. Camhis (1979, p.11) says 'Marxist method is not something particular to Marxism, but it is the
method of science in general, and science can only be materialist'. This may have its origins in what Camhis calls the 'uncritical positivism' of Hegal (p.105). We will return to this in a subsequent section, when considering Habermas' attempts to move the frontiers of neo-Marxist analysis beyond its objectivist/positivist stance.

Second, the materialist basis of neo-Marxism analysis can be limiting. Gourevitch (1978) calls this the 'economic reductionist view of politics and institutions'. According to it the economy is the origin of all social and political change, material conditions provide substructure and relationships upon which class and politics rest (Clavel, 1983, p.43). But this ignores too many other dimensions of human existence: political, cultural, spiritual, organizational, and personal; all of which contribute to what should be an holistic perspective on human nature. MacPherson (1977, p.243) suggests that neo-Marxist theorists have been unable to come to grips with the possible relation of the capitalist society and state to essential human needs and capacities.

Equally it seems that materialist analysis is as likely to lead towards an economically motivated technocracy as is late capitalism. It is not surprizing therefore to find rationality as a philosophy of science used to sustain order by bureaucrats in the Soviet Union (Camhis, 1979, p.91). In the absence of any state based on neo-Marxist principles it is quite reasonable to turn to states based on Marxian principles for some guidance as to the outcomes of such forms of societal guidance. The recent nuclear power plant accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl demonstrate the danger of technology which is allowed to gain ascendance at the expense of other values. When Castells (1977) argues that urban planning in a capitalist society cannot be an instrument of social change, but only one of domination, integration, and regulation of the contradictions, it is not difficult to substitute the terms 'technocratic', 'state socialist' or even 'neo-Marxist' for capitalist.
Third, attempts to revise Marxism to accommodate the workings of present-day capitalist societies and the institutional dimensions of power have resulted in a greatly increased emphasis on the role of the state. One of the contentious issues in neo-Marxist thought is the relative degree of autonomy of the state from the dominant economic interests, even while it is pursuing its legitimation and accumulation functions. Panitch (1977) contents that there are variations in the extent to which the state acts on behalf of the dominant class. If this is the case, and the state has a significant measure of autonomy, the possibility therefore exists that it may transform itself over time without violent revolution, even as capitalist countries have so done since the industrial revolution (Heilbroner, 1976, p.31). Braybrooke (1981) for example, argues that such autonomy increases the prospects for a self-transformation to socialism, and some Euro-communists would no doubt agree. Some neo-Marxist analysis has tended to obscure this possibility by insisting on a deterministic relationship between state and dominant economic interests.

Also most neo-Marxist critique ignores organizational factors and the nature of large institutions which, whether in market capitalist or state bureaucratic societies, may have characteristics which transcend class conflict. Problems of pollution in Lake Erie and Lake Baikal may illustrate more institutional similarities than differences. Equally the workings of the international state system tends to be ignored in such analyses (Gourevitch, 1978).

Fourth, while the analytical and critical utility of neo-Marxist analysis is accepted, its positive theory (or ideology) can be criticized as simplistic or naive. The limitations of neo-Marxist planning theory may be symptomatic of normative inadequacies in Marx's analysis itself. These in turn are reflected in a tendency of so-called 'communist countries' towards bureaucratic authoritarianism, in the absence
of any detailed plan for a transition to pure communism from the dictatorship of the proletariat. Equally, proletarian revolution may be a fantasy in advanced capitalist societies. Nor is there any historical evidence that a transformed, post-revolutionary, society would be preferable in any way to the welfare state in late capitalism. This is especially true given that existing communist and/or Marxist-Leninist states are marked by tendencies mirrored in the authoritarian dictatorships of the right (e.g., Chile): suppression of civil liberties, the elimination of representative institutions, and bureaucracies which serve to support a privileged elite.

Finally, and most important for our purposes, it is difficult for neo-Marxist analysts to translate radical knowledge into radical action, other than revolution. Indeed, it is common for neo-Marxists not to have any conceivable policy short of the destruction of the capitalist system or the promotion of regressive policies that heighten contradiction as a prelude to revolution (Walton, 1981). If we accept that the concept of planning theory should represent a bridge between knowledge and action then neo-Marxism, while a valuable critique of the dynamics of capitalism, is not a positive theory of planning applicable to our current social crisis. This is not surprising, given the tension between the concepts of urban or economic planning, and the radical action of violent revolution. Good planners are not likely candidates for revolutionary action, and this is probably as true of academic neo-Marxists as of advocate planners or liberal political scientists. Revolutionary conditions are antithetic to at least the temporary stability necessary for planned social change. Further, the second part of Marx's legacy - a theory of historical transformation - proves dated and not readily applicable to the advanced industrialized welfare state. It does not therefore provide the neo-Marxist proponent with a ready prescription for action.
This leaves the neo-Marxist planning theorist, invariably intellectual rather than proletarian, in a difficult situation. The logical conclusion of the dilemma between planning thought and action is to give up planning thought and devote one's self wholeheartedly to revolutionary action. For a variety of reasons, few do. A more likely response is for the neo-Marxist to engage in some less socially disruptive political activity until the time is ripe for revolution (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1979). Unfortunately for the purist, these activities come perilously close to those social reformist activities which they claim buttress the liberal capitalist state, for example those of the revisionists of Europe's social democratic parties (Braybrooke, 1981, p.32). It is therefore not surprising that there is considerable tension between neo-Marxism as normative critique as opposed to a guide to political action. Neo-Marxism concentrates on domination, without addressing its opposite - liberation (Freire, 1970, p.93). It is small wonder that the analysis of such radical planning theorists suffers from a conceptual gap between knowledge and action, and they have in fact great difficulty in communicating with the vast majority of practising, as opposed to academic, planners.

PLANNING THEORY DERIVED FROM CRITICAL THEORY

One of the potentially most productive influences on planning theory comes from critical theory of the Frankfurt school, which was developed from work at the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research from the 1920s to the present. Its earlier influential thinkers include Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, who led a move from a Marxist critique of political economy to a more general critique of instrumental rationality. This in part was due to a growing scepticism about the possibility of anything remotely like the proletarian revolutions envisioned by Marx (Bernstein, 1985). This scepticism was rooted in the defeat of the German working class by
Nazism, and the degeneration of Soviet socialism into Stalinism. Instead reason was to be assigned the emancipatory task which Marx had assigned to the proletariat (Lubasz, 1986).

Habermas (1970, 1971, 1974, 1979, 1985), perhaps the best known current critical theorist also begins with a Marxist orientation but spreads the net of criticism more broadly in an attempt to fuse action, knowledge, ethics and politics into a new understanding of social and cultural modernity. Habermas' 'intellectual project' is to put aside arbitrariness in social theorizing and to attempt to derive universal normative standards which can be used to develop 'a theory of the pathology of modernity from the viewpoint of the realization ... of reason in history' (Habermas, 1981, p.7). These 'universal pragmatics', derived from a concrete understanding of the historical situation of modern society, result from what Habermas (1985, p.211) calls a dedifferentiation of 'forms of knowledge behind whose categorical distinctions we can no longer retreat in good conscience'.

Habermas begins in what is called 'the spirit of Marx' to overcome domination and repression by demonstrating the errors in the Marxist legacy, and showing why Marx's analysis of nineteenth century capitalist societies is no longer adequate to explain twentieth century industrial societies (Bernstein, 1985, p.7-8). He analyses the political crisis engendered by the accumulation and especially legitimation crises of an advanced, oligopolistic capitalism, with a growing 'demoted middle class'. However, Habermas rejects both the utopian fantasy and the common systemic pessimism of Marxism. Rather he proposes grounds for social hope based on what he calls communicative reason (Bernstein, 1985, p.24; Habermas, 1982, p.221). In so doing he parts company with many neo-Marxists, who have described his work as a 'McLuhan type of bourgeois apologetics' and an 'idealist aberration which seeks to
reduce all problems to that of problems concerning the language of communication, thereby diverting us away from the historical analysis of class struggle, imperialism, and capitalist forces of production! (Frankel, 1974, p.38). Habermas however is not demeaning Marx's contribution to historical analysis. Rather his purpose is to subject Marxism to an epistemological analysis that 'might be a help in avoiding the dogmatist self-understanding of Marxist traditions, especially the Soviet type of Marxism' (Habermas, 1974, p.49). Habermas rejects the notion that economic crisis will result in the straightforward demise of capitalism, but without rejecting the possibilities for ongoing legitimation crises caused by systematic limits in the resources which 'crisis managers' can call on in support of the 'planning capacity' of the state apparatus (Habermas, 1974, p.51-53).

Habermas, in formulating his theory of communicative action, first focuses on the objectivist/positivist basis of contemporary societies. He finds rooted in positivism the alienation engendered by the ascendancy of instrumental rationality over the substantive in every aspect of life. The 'scientism' bleeds our institutional frameworks of their capacity to make ethical judgements, and can lead to a repressive, alienating technocracy. Habermas (1974) attempts to eliminate what are seen as objectivistic and scientistic elements in Marx's understanding of historical materialism.

The problem is that the distinctive character of socio-political relations renders a quasi-natural science approach to societal analysis inappropriate as a complete form of social inquiry. Rather, Habermas argues, it is useful to conceive of societies as social systems in which the institutional framework represents the norms and values which made up the socio-cultural life of the society. These norms and values provide the moral beliefs and legitimation for orientating man's interactions within the
society. Within this larger framework are sub-systems of purposive-rational action within which behaviour is rightly governed by scientific knowledge. In modern societies, the danger is that an acceptance of an amoral and positivistic philosophy causes the rational sub-system to gain ascendency, thereby weakening the moral fabric of the institutional framework of society (Habermas, 1971; Farganis, 1975).

In such societies, political power is legitimated, not by reference to ethical value but by science and technology as ideology, or by reference to solely economic gain, and moral guides to social action are lost. This is the case when technology is assessed in terms of technologically-orientated standards and criteria, rather than as an exercise in socio-political and moral philosophy. It is an attempt to overcome this dilemma which gives rise to concepts such as science courts, or standing parliamentary committees on science and ethics; or, in another field, to the concept of human development - rather than gross national product - as a measure of social progress. In every case, it is an attempt to make our understanding of what are genuinely socio-political situations more holistic and more reflective of the multi-dimensional nature of human character (Carley, 1986a). Here Habermas identifies what we have argued is a problem of all modern societies, not just modern capitalist societies, that is, what Ignatieff (1986) calls the crisis of modernity, and Giddens (1986) of industrialism, not capitalism.

The problem therefore with scientific, or empirical-analytic, knowledge is not that it is an incorrect form of inquiry, as Marcuse (1969) would argue, but rather that it is only one type of knowledge and cannot be taken as the model for all legitimate knowledge. Rather Habermas' purpose is to fuse together both the philosophical and scientific-empirical dimensions of analysis (Bernstein, 1985, p.22). He does this by mediating between the sociological concepts of system and life-world. The former
describes society as a complex system, and at its extreme diminishes the role of individuals to that of components of system structure. The other view emphasizes the creative role of social actors in constructing and negotiating the social meanings of their world. At the extreme all conception of system structure and organization are lost. Either extreme carries with it the dangers of 'logocentrism' which Habermas (1985, p.197) defines as 'neglecting the complexity of reason effectively operating in the life-world, and restricting reason to its cognitive-instrumental dimension'. Logocentrism can occur when systems interactions are determined by an institutional setting which is not freely accessible to the consciousness of the actors (Habermas, 1974, p.48).

A synthesis of system and life-world perspectives is required. Bernstein (1985, p.22) summarizes Habermas' task:

> We cannot understand the character of the life-world unless we understand the social systems that shape it, and we cannot understand social systems unless we see how they arise out of activities of social agents. The synthesis of system and life-world orientations is integrated with Habermas's delineation of different forms of rationality and rationalization: systems rationality is a type of purposive-rational rationality, life-world rationality is communicative rationality.

In his theory of communicative action, Habermas explores the symbolic realm of human interaction. He argues that the domination and exploitation embodied in the reproduction of social relations by distorted communication leads us, via disabling discourse, towards totalitarianism in advanced industrialized societies (Habermas, 1979). Planning, in this analysis, is a process of communication which may be subject to systematic distortion by established power groups and interest groups in society. Planning is analysed by examining communication structures with a view to 'enabling' discourse which leads towards the expression of legitimate power and communicative action based on mutual understanding. These communication structures postulated by
Habermas not only transmit information but they are also the relations of power and production; they communicate political and moral meaning. Human communication is the universal competence which enables universal pragmatics to be developed, and all more restricted domains of intellectual and scientific endeavour can contribute to the development of these pragmatics.

Universal pragmatics are identified by Habermas (1974, p.3) as: comprehensibility, sincerity, or truthfulness, legitimacy and truth. What is most important about these norms is that they can be violated not only at the interpersonal level but also at the level of socio-political and economic structure. Those in power may pay lip service to universal pragmatics while maintaining a system of distorted communication designed to consolidate their power base. Even politicians and bureaucrats with the best of intentions may find their role demands this of them. The planners' task is to attempt to elevate the quality of the political debate through the application of these norms for ethical dialogue.

The key to such communicative action is to move from a monological perspective, which in chapter one I called monotheoretical, towards dialogue. The theory of communicative action is therefore grounded in language in general, and in communication in particular. The nature of communicative action is summarized by Bernstein (1985, p.18):

Communicative action is intrinsically dialogical. The starting point for an analysis of the pragmatics of speech is the situation of a speaker and a hearer who are oriented to mutual reciprocal understanding; a speaker and a hearer who have the capacity to take an affirmative or negative stance when a validity claim is challenged.

Habermas' purpose is to promote communicative rationality, the highest form of rationality in the life-world, which is the arena of common social activity. This is in
balance with the legitimate if lesser needs for system rationalization. Habermas recognizes the importance of the systems view but also emphasizes that the purposive rationality, or goal-directed behaviour, which governs the managerial and administrative activities of the political and economic system is ultimately subservient to the universal pragmatic of dialogue, or life world rationality. Rationality at this level presumes communication or dialogue to the point of understanding.

In Habermas' examination of communication structures he analyses the means by which the structure of the state, and planners as its agents, seeks to: 1) legitimate and perpetuate itself while extending its power; 2) exclude systematically from decision-making processes affecting their lives particular groups defined along economic, racial, or sexual lines; 3) promote the political and moral illusion that science and technology, through professionals and experts, can solve political problems. This results in a restriction of public political argument, participation, and mobilization on a broad range of policy options and alternatives which appear to be incompatible with the existing patterns of ownership, wealth, and power (Forester, 1980, p.277).

Habermas tries to move the frontiers of Marxist criticism forward on more than the economic front, towards an understanding of legitimated power through discourse, ethical institutions, a political-scientific dialogue, and the repoliticisation of the public at large. In doing so, Habermas criticizes contemporary Marxism for slighting the importance of communication and discourse, for being epistemologically rigid in elevating class consciousness to an objective function, and for being unable to bridge the 'chasm' between knowledge and action without either slipping into social reformism or doing away with the very stability which makes any planning possible. Habermas, for his own criticisms, is accused of being 'anti-Marxist' (Farganis, 1975).
Habermas comes close to putting together a constructive theory of society and thus planning in society. Unfortunately for the practitioner he is extremely abstruse and long-winded, and his theory-action bridge, is only presented at a conceptual level. However, a few planning theorists appear to have built on aspects of the work of Habermas. Bolan (1980) identifies and attempts to bridge the chasm between knowledge and action. Knowledge, he argues, is derived from action, the knowledge we develop and the ways we develop it are a product of our interests and activities. The pre-action state of mind is future oriented, and grounded in intentions, goals or aims (p.261). Bolan examines 'the professional episode' in terms of the

conscious relationship of the self as one human entity to other human entities, where the relationship is mediated, or constructed, through the use of symbols created for the purpose of giving meaning and form to the relationship ... at the core of interaction is communication ... Language is the embodiment of our symbolization of the world and, thus, the vehicle by which we give it meaning (p.265).

In the final anlysis, Bolan (p.259) argues, the professional is not a problem solver but a moral agent. The professional episode is distinguished from academic theorizing because the practitioner (a) must synthesize a range of knowledge and personal experience and assume the risks and commitments of action, and (b) he encounters the world as a totality, undivided into typologies, paradigms, and without qualifying assumptions (p.271-72). The latter is what Habermas calls dedifferentiation.

Other theorists examine the relationship between planning practice and communication. Susskind (1978) observes that planning practice takes different forms, and useful knowledge is of different kinds. Christensen (1985) analyses types of planning problems along dimensions of goal agreement and known or unknown means towards goal achievement and relates this four part matrix to planning styles.
A Focus on Communication

Probably the most useful extension of Habermas' communication theory for planners is that of Forester (1980, 1982 a,b,c, 1984, 1985). Forester, like his mentor, proceeds by synthesis and development. He is not afraid to link abstruse theory to suggestions for planning practice. By an infusion of the practical aspects of critical theory Forester lends new credence to planning theory by his systematic exploration of communication. It is not so much that it hasn't been said before, more that it has never been said quite so systematically to planners, in planning language, in planning journals.

Forester appears to be able to build on the useful dimensions of critical theory without necessarily accepting what Churchman (1977) would call the entire 'paradigm fad' at one go. For the practising planner concerned with the theory-action bridge, this puts Forester in an advantageous position vis-a-vis utopian or neo-Marxist theorists. Forester, like Habermas, is overtly critical of some aspects of the Marxian/structuralist approach. He argues (1982b) that their argument is 'tragic': pure in intention, but frustrating in practice in that they systematically fail to address possibilities for positive work in planning. Their overly deterministic view of history is designed to support the thesis that planners and administrators must legitimate the capitalist state and that they cannot work to restructure or democratize political power (1982a, p.67). But the statement that 'planning is political' need not be the end of the discussion; Forester argues that instead it should be a 'fruitful beginning' (1980, p.282).

Forester makes a conscious effort to link the philosophical and ethical stance of critical theory with the practical organizational and budgetary analysis of the policy
analyst. Both profess a concern for social and political learning and share a fundamental interest in the practical aspects of current political orientations. (See for example Habermas' (1985) discussions of American neo-conservatism or German political alliances). Forester (1980) sets out his objectives in linking Habermas' critical communication theory to planning practice: (1) to clarify how planning practice works as communicative action; (2) to demonstrate how planning action and broader political-economic forces work to foster or thwart a democratic planning process, and (3) to suggest how planning theory can be concretely empirical and immediately normative, thus offering as Forester put it, 'pragmatic strategy and political vision'.

Drawing directly on Habermas (1979) Forester first postulates a distinction between policy-shaped patterns of interaction, and policy-produced learning processes. The latter refers to the learning which comes from useful technical-scientific and legal-political discourse. Habermas, unlike Marcuse and others, doesn't argue that techno-scientific communication need be distorting when kept in proper perspective, but rather that it must never be elevated to the status of a moral guide to action.

Habermas' universal pragmatics have been adopted as the norms of planning communication by Forester (1982a). The problems of pragmatic communication have a special importance in planning because planners often have little formal power or authority, and thus the effectiveness of their communication becomes all important. Also planners may unwittingly serve special, private, or class interests which seek to systematically distort communication. Such distortions are likely in planning if planners are removed from a democratic planning process which encourages political debate, criticizes problem definition, and proposes policy. This echoes Carley's (1980) arguments that the main role of policy analysts is to promote informed debate.
and to assist in forming a common conception of policy problems. Forester suggests that the planners responsibility, or a strategy of response, to systematic distortions should be the careful political organization of attention and action which corrects or seeks to eliminate these distortions (1980, p.280). In addition, the role of the planner as policy analyst is to teach us about the collective, public, and social consequences of alternative policy interactions. Such interactions include the management or reproduction of citizens' knowledge or ignorance; consent or deference, informed or not; and trust and relations of co-operation (Forester, 1982a, p.154-155). This is the analysis of communicative action. Planners who understand how the relations of power structure the planning process can empower citizen and community action and work to foster a genuinely democratic planning process.

In place of the Marxist argument Forester (1982b, p.69) suggests a progressive attitude in which information is taken as a source of power because it enables citizen participation, and calls attention to the structural, organizational, and political barriers that may unnecessarily distort the information that citizens use to shape their own actions. Political action in this view is dependent on information as political communication, and the structural determinents of misinformation. Such misinformation from distortions of communication is not an accidental problem, but a structural and institutional problem which is rooted in, and an inevitable part, of the political system. Systematic distortions of social action may be social-psychological or ideological, that is political or economic, occurring at the interpersonal or societal level. These distortions can be countered by a critical social theory linked to an account of power relations to provide politically guided practice. This is similar to Habermas' (1974, p.53) earlier call for 'radical reformism' which he defines as 'an attempt to use the institutions of present day capitalism in order to challenge and to test the basic or kernel institutions of this system'.
Planners, Forester (1982b, 1985) argues, must learn to distinguish the necessary boundedness of rational action from the unnecessary. Necessary bounds may be socially or biologically inevitable, for example, distribution of skills among a population. Other bounds on rational action are unnecessary and may be social or political artifacts or matters of convention which can be altered by an act of political will. For example, the length of the working week is alterable and may help determine who gets to exercise their skills in a job and who is out of work. The planner's task is to constructively focus on the unnecessary boundedness of rational action to promote communicative action. Such action is vulnerable to miscomprehension of issues by distraction or jargon, to a false neutrality on the part of planning staff, to false claims on legitimacy in acting in the 'public interest', and to misrepresentation of the facts on feasible alternatives.

Four practical but always threatened conditions of well-informed policy appraisal or project review are suggested by Forester (1982c, p.70): (1) accurate, believable information, (2) sources who may be trusted, (3) the consent of properly informed citizens who may be affected by projects close at hand, and (4) attention to clearly formulated issues. Project review may also be threatened by inequitable agenda-setting, which results from project review agendas which are politically structured in advance as a result of inequalities of power, wealth and control of capital. This is often the case for large infrastructure projects and bedevils attempts at rational policy analysis, like cost-benefit analysis or environmental assessment (Carley, 1980). If the deck is stacked, not only is information which meets the universal pragmatic norms difficult to come by; but the terms of reference under which the planner works, and the criteria by which decisions are made, may well be predetermined. The role of the planner is to regularly anticipate these biases and thus work to counter the agenda setting that systematically threatens project appraisal. This can be done
by (1) empirical research which questions policy-structured interactions, and (2) philosophical or cognitive inquiries into the workings of learning systems. Critical theory, Forester (1982a) argues, provides planners with a framework for the analysis of policy-produced outcomes and interactions, and a means of thinking about the structural learning mechanisms through which communicative action occurs.

Discussion of Planning Theory derived from Critical Theory

The proposition that planners may work to reduce communicative distortion and foster communicative action is hardly new to the working planner. As Forester (1982b, 1985) readily admits, the existing repertoire of planners' possible responses is already vast, and selection of appropriate strategies depends on the situation at hand. Rather the contribution of this theoretical approach to the understanding of the crisis in planning is twofold.

Firstly, Forester draws on Habermas to offer a useful conceptual framework to the practising planner. This sets out a communicative model of planning action which enables planners to begin to understand the context of planning. Forester derives a learning mechanism which not only helps us understand the potential and limitations for promoting communicative action, but enables planners to examine their role in such interactions. In other words, one can act out a role, as Bolan would put it, as a moral agent; while at the same time continually engaging in a critique of that role vis-a-vis political or social structures and by discourse. This in fact is a definition of consciousness, political or social.

Secondly, Forester eschews the cynicism of current neo-Marxists, what Bernstein (1985) calls the 'totalizing critique which seduces us into despair and defeatism'.
Rather Forester puts forward a model of a progressive planner who attempts to understand the socio-political structure in which he works, and to anticipate and redress distortions in communication.

Forester clearly parts company with the neo-Marxists in his suggestion that there may be some necessary boundedness to rational action. For example, Kemp (1982) argues that Forester misunderstands that for Habermas all distorted communications are unnecessary, and that all distortions in communications serve to disguise existing power relations in society. Forester's (1980) arguments about the need for planners to understand systemic distortion in the context of a larger political economy are insufficient to save him from suggestions that his analysis may be biased towards an individual as opposed to a societal level of analysis, and his prescriptions for action may therefore be 'too easy' (Kemp, 1982, p.66). But these arguments are circular in that the neo-Marxists in turn ignore the psychology of the individual and the family, and the attractiveness of market mechanisms in serving the economic dimension of human interaction. They elevate a single model of societal guidance to the status of the ultimate truth. Such arguments relate more to attempts by some neo-Marxists to appropriate Habermas back into their paradigm, even while others are dismissive of what they term his bourgeois apologetics.

More important is to go to the nub of the problem of planning theory itself, which is how one answers the question: is it possible to critique the role of the planner as an agent of the advanced capitalist state and still offer a model of positive action outside of revolution? There is no one answer, except by recourse to deeply-held values about the nature of human interaction, society, and social change. The academic neo-Marxists have the luxury of engaging in critique without engaging in action. Forester on the other hand attempts to fuse critique with a model for action.
and does so in a relatively sophisticated but practical fashion. In this sense Forester is not proposing a new paradigm at all, but continues in the policy analytic tradition, which has always attempted to be useful, and which has often pointed out that an understanding of political context and institutional structure is an essential prerequisite for useful policy analysis (Wildavsky 1979; Carley, 1980).

CONCLUSION

Despite the crisis in planning and the chasm between theory and practice, it is possible to uncover in planning theory a range of knowledge which may be of considerable help to the planner who wishes to understand the context of planning practice. From Habermas, Offe and Heydebrand and other philosophers and sociologists stemming from the neo-Marxist tradition, we are alerted to the dangers of technocratic structures in advanced industrial societies which will seek to eclipse political discourse, to submerge moral guides to social action, and transfer the power of representative bodies to technocratic agencies. Such danger is readily apparent in consideration of problems of planning and participation for large projects and the introduction of new technology (Carley, 1986a). Similarly, we have been alerted to the nature of advanced industrial society, with turbulent environments, and complex inter-organizational networks which are indicative of such societies. At the same time we can concur with Giddens (1981) that ascribing such change to the advancement of capitalism may be a necessary but hardly sufficient precondition for understanding the context of planning.

Although I have taken exception to Friedmann's conclusions on what is possible or useful in terms of decentralized regional administrative structures, his opening up of the decentralization debate has brought forward many important arguments on this
critical but under-appreciated element in the planning context. Friedmann is correct in his attention to the feedback loops by which social learning takes place, in his emphasis on the importance of basic needs in development, and on the need for 'bottom-up' modes of planning and participation.

The neo-Marxist attention to the political economy of planning provides considerable critical insight, and encourages non-Marxist policy analysts and planners to pay attention to the overwhelmingly political and bureaucratic nature of decision-making, and to the necessary and changing relationship of the state to the economic structure of capitalist society. Clark and Dear, in particular, have demonstrated the endemic tension between local political aspiration and the structure of the state which contributes to the legitimacy crisis of planning as state intervention. However this endemic tension is a characteristic of advanced industrial societies, and not just those organized along capitalist lines. Planners needn't necessarily subscribe to the pessimistic, or conspiracy, view of the working of capitalist societies. Much of the analytic perception of neo-Marxism is obscured by its relentless drive to demonstrate that capitalism is a conspiracy and by a misunderstanding of the general practicality, adaptability, and attractiveness of capitalist modes for human interaction, in spite of their many glaring defects. Finally, in Forester's drawing-out of Habermas on the importance of discourse and communicative action, one finds a practical start for articulating pragmatic norms for undistorted communication, and actively considering the socio-political context of planning endeavours.

It is appropriate in any consideration of the context of planning to eschew the elegance of a single highly unified theoretical formulation, model, or world view. Rather it is more productive to mix and match from theory groups according to criteria of system critique, non-revolutionary change, social progress, an
understanding of the socio-political context of planning action, and the promotion of communicative dialogue. This allows for a moderately optimistic view of the potential for planning action.

Finally it is obvious that planning theory is derivative of ideological bias, and is never value neutral. This is an additional reason why unified planning theory is impossible, and also demonstrates that what planning theory is about is politics. Perhaps the only general conclusion on planning theory is that it is always value-laden, and therefore must be ethical.
CHAPTER 7: THE PROBLEMS OF PLANNING AND THEORY: A COMBINED AGENDA

INTRODUCTION

I have argued that what is called a crisis in planning is symptomatic of larger forces and trends at work in modern societies, and that the notion of crisis has provided a useful beginning for analysing for the context of planning in the modern state. I outlined a systematic breakdown of both the problem of planning and the problem of planning theory into their constituent parts from which, I hope, a more profound view of the context of planning was rebuilt.

The context of planning was described in terms of a number of interrelated dimensions: political, organizational and epistemological. The multiplicity and interrelatedness of these dimensions are taken to both contribute to, and confuse, discussion of the crisis of planning; for at any one time we have been talking about such factors as a loss of confidence in the welfare state, the possibility or impossibility of rationality and control, the nature of prediction and uncertainty, or what seems like an endemic tension between one or more centres of government or production and a number of peripheral regions or organizations. Also the notion that planning may be in crisis is engendered by the tension between competing views of the role and function of particular states and arrangements of particular socio-economic systems, a transnational dimension which reflects the globalization of the world economy, and a transnational and transhistoric dimension which reflects a fundamental but uncertain relationship between organizations and their environment. The notion that planning was somehow in crisis proved therefore to be most complex
and required a substantial interdisciplinary scan to disentangle the constituent elements of the context of planning.

THE TASK FOR DEMOCRATIC PLANNING THEORY

In the first chapter, I proposed what I called a new 'liberal democratic' agenda for planning theory, by which I suggested planning theory could become more practical. Here I turn to that task.

It is well established that if planning theorists have a constant problem it is that they are weak on practical advice for the planner. Earlier I noted that this has been described aptly as 'the gap between theory and practice, and the resulting chasm between knowledge and action' (Bolan, 1980). This lack of an instrumental linkage between theory and practice came to be one of the major issues of the 1980s for planning theorists, and remains on the whole, unresolved. Here positivists would have an apparent advantage:

The discovery of laws governing natural events reveals causal connections that allow the subjection of such events to human manipulation. Scientific knowledge here stands in instrumental relation to technology; the disclosed predictability of the world is the connecting link between theory and practice (Giddens, 1977, p.25).

But, as I argued, it is a mistake to extend this reasoning to social science, for predictability in human affairs is not independent of human knowledge of the social world. Social reality is complex and multidimensional and we are directly involved in its construction. The diversity of human existence continually undermines attempts of social scientists to formulate social laws. The interactive nature of social reality precludes its capture in quantitative models, and forecasts are invariably set awry by discontinuous events. This doesn't mean that social systems don't respond to
attempts to change them, but given turbulence we can seldom quite predict or control the nature of the change. Complex social systems are best understood by recourse to holistic, interdisciplinary conceptions and managed by a process of organizational learning which accepts that knowledge and uncertainty, and success and failure in policy initiatives, are inescapable elements of social reality, part of which will always be unknowable. In this conception, the purpose of both planning theory and planning action is to further understanding of the intersubjective social reality in which planning takes place, and which planners in part constitute. This is the context of planning.

Some social theorists have attempted to bridge the knowledge-action gap. Habermas in particular has attempted to develop a theory of social practice which transcends the dichotomy between content-orientated and process-orientated approaches to theory because that distinction can reinforce the positivist base of social science. Habermas argues that the development of knowledge in society is related to the social decision-making context in which it occurs. A focus on the social decision-making context, and the process by which society moves towards a measure of consensus on its goals, suggests a number of ways forward in relating planning theory to planning practice.

I have discussed this context at length here in terms of competing political philosophies, organizational turbulence, and diverse kinds of knowledge couched in theories of planning. There is evidence to suggest that these political, organizational and epistemological threads can be productively drawn together, indeed must be to go forward on the theory-action front, and in this conclusion I use each of the constituent elements of the context of planning to suggest directions for theory based on conceptions from a number of disciplinary approaches and paradigms.
In particular I propose the following objectives for planning theory and action:

1. the encouragement of new forms of social consensus as a precursor to social action,

2. more widespread and equalitarian empowerment of citizens and communities in the political process,

3. more informed planning and policy decisions,

4. innovative approaches to serious social and environmental problems, and

5. closer ties between theory and practice to foster the above.

During the course of this chapter I will suggest ways that progress might be made towards these simple but worthy objectives and the likely contribution of theory to practice to these objectives. I will also argue that practice must inform theory, and that through action learning strategies theory and practice can enter into a more productive, symbiotic relationship. The objectives themselves derive not entirely from my own predilections for a better world (although these no doubt enter into it) but I hope from the reasoned and relatively dispassionate analysis of the context of planning of the previous six chapters, as summarized in figure 4. Given organizational turbulence, the interactive nature of man-environment relations, and the intersubjectivity of human intention and social action, I have argued that a key task for planning theory and practice is recursive problem definition. Put simply we have no choice as political beings but to continually redefine the challenges that face us, our failures as social groups and societies, and the issues which must be faced by
MAIN CHALLENGES TO UNDERSTANDING

Relationship of Freedom to Social Control

Understanding Global Linkages

The Nature of Democratic Values

Political Basis of Institutional Structure

Metaprobems

Turbulence

Legacy of Positivism

FURTHER CHALLENGES TO UNDERSTANDING

Relation of Planning to Role of State

Participation/Power Debates: Peripherisation Bottoms up - Top down Centralisation

Need for Higher Order Goals Pluralism Social Action

The Problem of Uncertainty

Sectoral, Agency and Professional Compartmentalisation

Failure of Prediction

Disciplinary Separation Reductionism Mono-Theorising Separation Theory and Practice

NECESSARY DEVELOPMENTS IN PLANNING THEORY: THE NEW AGENDA

New Theories of Citizenship and Social Responsibility

Conceptualization of Costs/Benefits of Capitalism as Social/Cultural/Economic System

Development of Theory/Practice of Communicative Action, Equity Considerations in Planning

Organizational Development for Planning Merger Innovation Joint Ventures Multi-Agency, Sector Responses

New Strategic Feedback/Monitoring Systems

Innovations in Public Administration Matrix Management Risk and Failure Action Learning/Research Strategies

POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

New Forms of Productive Social Consensus

More Informed Planning Decisions

More Widespread Empowerment of Citizen and Community in the Political Process

Useful Bridges Between Theory and Practice

Constructive Approaches to Metaprobems

Figure 4: Potential Outcomes of a New Theoretical Agenda
the political system. From, and only from, some measure of consensus over problem
definition can come problem resolution; if we don't agree what the problem is we are
unlikely to resolve it. Indeed the real stuff of political debate is always first arguing
about whether there is a problem (for example, in the 1970s asking 'is acid rain a
problem?' and then asking what to do about the problem we now agree exists). In
setting out, or 'redefining' what I see as the problems of planning and planning theory,
in the previous six chapters, I hope I have made some contribution to problem
resolution by furthering consensus on problem definition. But now, having assumed
that the reader is in some measure of agreement, I take the next step which is to ask
what do we do, and where do we get if we do? The result of what I propose in this
chapter are the objectives set out in points one to five above, taken from figure 4.

The objective of empowerment (objective 2) is a similar and logical extension of
Habermas' and Forester's intention in analysing communication structures with a view
to 'enabling' discourse. This, as we have seen, leads towards the expression of
legitimate power and communicative action based on mutual understanding. These
communication structures not only transmit information but they are also the
relations of power and production; they communicate political and moral meaning.
Communicative action is dialogical, based on mutual reciprocal understanding, on
what our problems are and in which direction a solution may lie. Communicative
action leads towards, not away from, consensus. Its political and moral content is
based not on technological imperative or the profit motive alone, but on a measure of
consensus on moral values (i.e. what's right and wrong), developed through dialogue
and discourse. If Bolan (1980) is right, and he is, that the planner is not a problem
solver but a moral agent who helps us think about right and wrong, then clearly
planning theory itself needs to address both issues of right and wrong (moral value)
and the means by which we determine rightness and wrongness, that frameworks which assist debate about the ethical choices in issues and options.

As we redefine our problems, as we become continually aware of the social limitations of capitalism and the ways the byproducts of capitalism, industrial processes, population growth, and human initiative generate new metaproblems. New forms of social consensus become critically important, perhaps to our very survival. New forms of consensus (objective 2) derive in part from societal-level dialogue fostered by communicative action and information flows generated by new institutional arrangements for strategic monitoring. At their most productive they result in realignment away from outdated political views (e.g. old left-right splits) towards new issue orientated based on both problem redefinition, for example, on the 'greenhouse effect', or on new or obvious directions for social progress. For example, the British Labour Party is now bringing itself around to accepting the advantages of market capitalism based on a re-conceptualization of the costs and benefits of the capitalist system. A practical manifestation of this is found in the number of British Labour local governments who have accepted that the only way to tackle the metaproblem of deindustrialization - urban decline - is by entering into new joint venture of 'partnership' alliances with business, something almost unheard of just a few years ago. This development also results in an increase in local empowerment as communities feel more in charge of their destinies and less victims of global economic linkages. At the same time however, as we have seen, one of the hall marks of Thatcherism has been a relentless centralization of functions at the expense of local government, so the process is not a one way street.

More informed planning decisions (objective 3) may stem from a broader measure of consensus as more parties and empowered social groups enter into political dialogue,
thus producing more robust solutions less sensitive to unanticipated developments and subsequent objections. New monitoring systems (defined in a very broad, strategic sense as social system feedback) will also contribute to informed decisions. But informed decisions and more widespread empowerment may also be hindered at any time by obfuscation on the part of governments which find it easier and more empowering for themselves to keep an electorate uninformed on the issues of the day. In that case only a strong social consensus in favour of freedom of information can redress the situation by forcing the government's hand.

More informed decisions, and better implementation of those decisions, will be had by the development of organizational capacity through new formal and informal alliances among agencies and sectors (health, transport, environment, etc.), which in turn are a benefit of communicative action. Such developments are reinforced by a trend away from looking for "break-through" innovations to metaproblems and toward 'merger innovation' as represented by joint venture arrangements. Equally, innovative solutions, implementation and learning will stem from new behavioural responses in public administration and planning management, particularly action learning strategies which fuse theory and practice in an iterative process of exploration and generation of knowledge. Finally new consensus among professionals is required to address issues which cross functional and jurisdictional boundaries.

All these points can coalesce towards more constructive approaches to metaproblems (objective 4), which by their very complexity and dynamic nature require an holistic, inter-disciplinary approach from both theoreticians and practitioners; what I have called the human ecological approach. This has an uncanny resemblance to Bolan’s (1980) definition of the characteristics of the professional episode in planning: a synthesis of a range of knowledge and experience, and the taking of the world as a
totality, undivided into typologies, paradigms, and without qualifying assumptions.
Both Bolan's conception of the professional episode and the human ecological
approach are rooted in a link to reality which in social theory has become partially
obscured by some centuries of more narrow Cartesian-based, disciplinary inquiries.
In a nutshell, the human ecologist says 'let us not miss the forest for the trees', and 'if
we are to understand the forester we must also understand his relationship to the
forest'.

From its origins in the 1930s, human ecology's focus on the links between
environment and culture have been profitably expanded in the 1970s to include
organizational ecology. This is no more than the culture of organized social groups,
not tribal or familial, but functional and political. Human ecology's original focus on
the relationship between environment and culture also reminds us how important it is
to nurture social responsibility into political culture, for it is culture which not only
predetermines in part our world view (usually nature-dominating in capitalist
societies) but which also mediates between individual action and the environment.
The bare bones of this relationship is set out in figure 5:

![Diagram](image)

Figure 5: The Mediation of Culture to Environment
It is the mediation of culture which distinguishes the human relationship with the environment from that of the animals. An ability to engage in conscious thought gives a relative independence from the environment and allows societies to change both themselves and the environment around them. In modern societies the relationship between the environment and the society is always in what Oliver (1988) calls 'a fragile dynamic equilibrium', ie, a condition of turbulence, to which he attributes an increasing number of ecological disasters brought on by 'ecocide': robbing the land to produce food and fuel, thus causing desertification and flooding. He argues the responsibility lies with market mechanisms, what I will call later the culture of capitalism. It is certainly likely that a transition from traditional patterns of resource harvesting towards capitalist culture may be one factor in 'ecocide': atmospheric change or 'the greenhouse effect' may be the most dramatic example yet. No modern society has yet to resist tendencies to ecocide - but the effect of these is exacerbated in poor, overpopulated countries unable to use economic power or technology to restore the fragile dynamic equilibrium. What is most important is that if modern political culture contains the seeds of its own destruction it is also the only hope for resisting ecocide and managing turbulence. The changes required will therefore need to be cultural (in values and ethical principles) before they can be technical. It is to the learning systems and institutions of culture we need to turn.

I return to the human ecological perspective later but it is worth noting that it is one of four ways I will identify for bringing theory and practice into a closer and more productive relationship (objective 5). The others are to foster more centrist political assumptions in theorizing, to encourage a 'policy orientation' to theory which is mindful of the iterative information synthesis - decision - implementation routine of policy systems, and perhaps most importantly to engage in action learning and
research as a means of institutional and behavioural innovation and as a means for theorizing.

Action learning is specifically concerned with integration: theory with practice and research with action (and vice-versa). Its underlying assumptions are that integration is preferable to separation, and that there is an emergent quality to the integration of theory with practice - they are worth more integrated in terms of knowledge and insight than the sum of the two apart. Action learning is not therefore a-theoretical or anti-theoretical but theory grounded in practical experience, and experience directed by theoretical reflection. It may be less rigorous in a positivistic sense, because it explicitly recognises and attempts to mitigate the limitations of social inquiry, but it is also more integrative and comprehensive. Action learning:

addresses 'head-on' social inquiry's fundamental problems - the relation between theory and practice, between the general and the particular, between common-sense and academic expertise, between mundane action and critical reflection, and hence - ultimately - between ideology and understanding (Winter, 1987 p viii).

There is academic debate over the extent to which action learning strategies can be linked to Habermas' propositions on the emancipatory effect of dialogical reasoning (Brown et al., 1982; Carr and Kemmis, 1986). There is not the space here to enter the debate, except to note that its very existence probably contributes to the kind of dialogue intended by Habermas to emancipate.

Action learning strategies address three objectives:

1. The unification of theory and practice through 'action-research';
2. Informed and effective decision-making through structural readjustment in organizations and the changing of organizational culture towards learning; and

3. Professional development.

Action learning has three dimensions relating to these objectives. First, there is a research dimension. Action research proposes specific procedures for tying theory to practice (figure 6).

Figure 6: Action Research - Tying Theory to Practice

In action research, the researcher and the practitioner become jointly involved in the interactive cut and thrust of the planning process, in continually redefining the
problem as new knowledge becomes available, and in then revising the research methodology (something anathema to the positivistic researcher) in response to new requirements for action. In short, the researcher becomes intimate with what Bolan (1980) calls 'the risks and commitments of action'. The main methodological limitation is that the research cannot be replicated, it no longer fits into the quasi-randomized control trial mode of the natural sciences. However, the benefits often outweigh the costs in the social sciences. But the researcher does not forego the responsibility to be thorough and systematic.

Second, there is an organizational dimension to action learning, by which institutions benefit from the knowledge that results from creating a milieu which encourages learning and discourages retreats from the learning process. Management-lead strategies and rewards are necessary to change organizational culture; organizations in the public sector have generally been structured and managed to discourage learning because it may mean admitting that past policies and procedures are failures. Later I discuss entrepreneurship, failure and risk-taking in the public organization.

Finally, a third dimension is professional development - which by definition encompasses both practical work and relevant theoretical knowledge. If this is a fair definition of professionalism it suggests that joining theory and practice in planning is vital, particularly at a time when both planning and planners are under attack as running counter to free market ideology. The fusion of theory and practice must therefore be an important element on the theoretical agenda for the coming decade, and action learning/research strategies may be useful. It is not so much that it is not done already by good theorists and practitioners working together, but that action learning itself presents challenges as well as further potential and these challenges
need to be systematically explored to allow full potential to be realized. In particular, action research implies closer and more productive links between academia and planning practice, and mechanisms must be established to encourage this development.

These then are the main points to be discussed in proposing a theoretical agenda. The overall criteria by which I assess my programme for planning theory are simple, and derive from basic objectives of educational strategies designed to promote human reason, capability and knowledge (Feuerstein, 1987). In this conception the:

- The reasonable planner listens, observes, questions, considers the available evidence, makes a judgement which he or she is ready to justify, modify in the light of new ideas, and act upon, combining clear thinking with fair-mindedness;

- The capable planner 'knows how' across major areas of experience, including the aesthetic and social;

- The knowledgeable planner knows about ideas and is motivated to explore them beyond their utilitarian value, finding pleasure and fulfilment in the process.

Finally there is a caveat I wish to make. I am not proposing a unified theory of planning or the state. During the course of this chapter I will further explain why any attempt to do so would probably be unproductive. For example, in discussing the role of the state I will make reference to the question of externalities to the production process. Many useful books have been written about this specific topic (e.g. Mishan,
1971; Peskin and Seskin, 1975), but my purpose is not to recapitulate those arguments. In the entire dissertation the raising of appropriate issues is taken as a fundamental task.

In the next three sections of this chapter I discuss each of the issue areas summarized in figure 4, in terms of the political and organizational dimension of the problem of planning, and an epistemological dimension, which is the problem of planning theory.

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF PLANNING

This section explores the political dimension of the problem of planning. There are four basic points raised:

1. The crisis of planning and planning theory derives in part from lack of consensus over the appropriate role of the state in the society and the market economy. Planning theory has a responsibility to explore in an explicit and practical fashion the benefits and disadvantages of different types of state intervention in the form of planning.

2. An appreciation of the utilitarian benefits of market capitalism cannot be divorced from a systematic consideration of the ethical and moral dilemmas and choices which derive from the working of the capitalist system. This is a legitimate and important area for further inquiry.

3. Further exploration is required on the relationship between market operation at the level of the individual and the firm, with the level of political culture which derives from and influences the state and the society, and how these in turn are
influenced by the world-wide 'culture' of capitalism and the operation of the world market economy.

4. Developing innovative responses to metaproblems requires political consensus as a mode of social action. Consensus both derives from and contributes to the development of political culture.

The Crisis of Planning and the Role of the State

The mandate for public sector planning as an instrument of the state derives entirely from a fluctuating consensus about the role of the state in society, and the differential influence of planners from country to country and from time to time can be explained by this. Planning however is not coterminus with general state intervention but is a unique activity which places particular emphasis on the quality of the future related to present policy options. Planners need to be sensitive to the political nature of their calling, and to the likelihood and benefit of continuing debate about their mandate to act. To participate in the debate planners themselves will need to develop some explicit views of the role of the state in society, and an opinion of the likely costs and benefits of different options at the conjuncture of the market and the state. Planning theory can and should be of assistance in this task. However the considerable variations from state to state in political culture and priorities in the public sector suggest that search for a general theory of state intervention may be pointless. Instead a realistic analysis of existing arrangements can be derived from exploration of ethical considerations at the state-market conjuncture.

Chapter two summarized a number of fundamental political considerations which form the intellectual milieu in which planners think about why and what they do. It
was argued that the idea of planning action could not be divorced from a consideration of state power, freedom and state stability. In particular it was necessary to address the tension or trade-off between social control and guidance, of which planning is a form, and the desire for individual freedom; a subset of this addresses the relationship of the state to the market. One of the more obvious conclusions is that planning is a political process, in that it is mainly concerned with issues which are only decided by recourse to value judgement. The context of planning is therefore the broader environment of the public policy process. The interrelationship of government and society influences the capability of governments to plan effectively.

These arguments are most important for planners, for planners are not politicians, and what should be a lively argument about the relative merits of freedom and planning often turns into an opportunity for planners to be made the scapegoat in a zero sum game where productive efficiency, fair distribution of income, environmental control and minimum state interference are taken as competing objectives of the state. A recurrent problem for planners is that the question of the role of the state in society, and the extent of its economic boundaries, has no correct answer and never will. Empirical evidence shows that the state will fail in some aspects of public provision just as the market will fail in some aspects of private provision (Helm, 1986). Such evidence can assist in policy formation on a pragmatic and incremental basis, but the only rationale for state intervention is by recourse to value judgement. Planners may not be politicians, but the rationale for what they do and thus how they do it will always be a matter of public debate. Given that planners have no direct mandate from voters, the rationale for acting in an instrumental mode in pluralist states is by nature problematic. The fact that the rationale for planning derived from the role of the state in society is a fundamental value judgement
explains the crisis of planning in terms of the state, and as I will argue, also the crisis of planning in terms of rationality.

Here I suggest that:

a) what has been called the crisis of planning is rooted in the general lack of consensus on the role of the state in society, and on the effectiveness of state intervention in the market in terms of the totality of human benefit or social justice; and second,

b) that this lack of consensus, which waxes and wanes, has a fundamental relationship to the crisis of rationality; to the extent that the crisis of rationality is a function of the indeterminate nature of political values in social science, of which the lack of consensus on the role of the state is one example.

Put simply, where there is disagreement on what planners should do, it is not possible to agree on how to do it. At one level this is commonsense, yet much of the deliberation on the relationship of theory to practice in planning seems to be unreflective on this truth. The view here is that what is now called the crisis of planning, and the crisis of the state, reflects a measure of disenchantment with the welfare state which has resulted in part from increased levels of turbulence in the international environment. This has combined with the effects of stagnant national economies in the 1970s and 80s, and the obvious inefficiencies of corporate aspects of the welfare state. The resulting decline in consensus about the proper role of the state in society, and the rise of neo-conservatism, has been called 'crisis' by some planners.
The Changing Relations of State to Market

Particularly since 1945 the combined effect of the rising complexity of national and global corporate interests and the increased role of the state has altered the classic relations of production, and the relation of the state to capital. This has resulted in a much greater politicization of the economy in modern states, in which the relative health of the economy is one of the prime policy foci of the state.

Economic problems are of profound concern to the state, whether at national and local level, if only because both re-election in a democratic system, or social control in both democratic and non-democratic systems, are made more difficult by declining economic circumstances. Local, regional and provincial governments too are increasingly driven into economic promotion by changing circumstances - this has become a major planning task of the 1980s. This in turn has resulted in an increasing politicization of the planning function, as planning objectives either relate to, or are subservient to, the service of the state to capital. The task of the state in economic management is made more difficult by the rise of intra-state organizational turbulence resulting from a proliferation of often competing state agencies attempting to internalize the benefits and externalize the costs of organizational activity, and by the growing influence of multinational and global corporations and finance houses. Their allegiances no longer relate to politically-derived economic objectives and their operations may have a deleterious effect in national, regional or local economic terms.

Insofar as the planner is an instrument of state power, changing objectives of the state in terms of economic management, as dictated by the government in power, have become an overwhelming factor in defining the context of planning. This
politicization of planning, combined with valid questioning of the basis of rationality in planning, directly contribute to the crisis of planning. However, this crisis and thus context of planning is not derived solely from the reproduction of the capitalist system within welfare states, but is also the result of an interaction between the constitutional and cultural systems of individual nation states and the reality of multinational commodity production in a turbulent world. Many of the arguments put forward here apply in capitalist and non-capitalist states.

The thesis began by noting that recent political developments, such as Thatcherism and Reaganomics, have raised the profile of issues at the state-market conjuncture. However value-loaded discussions about the morality, efficacy or even continued existence of the welfare state have tended to be simplistic, and the reality is different. First, while parts of the welfare state, like parts of the economy, are in retrenchment, many of the functions associated with the provision of collective goods, mediation, and with redistribution of income are unlikely to disappear. In this sense the welfare state may prove more politically durable and attractive than neo-conservatives might anticipate. Conversely however a market economy responds to environmental turbulence with a rapidity impossible in either a command economy or by government generally because its profit-oriented objectives are clear, simple, and unhindered by conflicting claims on its attention, and because it need only be concerned with market specific information and can therefore engage in rapid self-correction. The penalty for failing to self-correct is consumers voting with their feet. Increased environmental complexity reinforces the advantages of the market, which although far from perfect, has this critical feature of self-correction.

Arguments about market versus state from the left or right of the social scientific spectrum have tended to be too simple in their basic if unstated ideological
assumptions, and therefore unhelpful. Neither a minimum state with a truly free
market nor a maximum state with centralized planning are a possibility or even
attractive in a theoretical sense. Reference to current political developments
substantiates this point. For example, the efforts of the current Soviet leadership to
introduce a measure of capitalist incentive to combat the endemic inefficiency of the
state-managed enterprise system is evidence that the debate has shifted to a more
centrist point in the eastern bloc. Whether modifications at the margin of the state
centralized industrial system will be sufficient to counteract the serious structural
problems of the USSR is an open question. Clearly, central planning was more
efficient in attaining early Soviet industrialization than in managing a complex late
industrial economy. Now, to retain its legitimacy, the Communist party in the USSR
(and in eastern bloc countries generally) refer less to Marxism-Leninism and more to
the need to foster economic growth. In doing so, the USSR is required to compete
with advanced technologies and marketing methods of capitalist society in the global
economic system (Hall, 1987, pp 99-100). For example, the USSR has recently asked
a number of British advertising and marketing consultancies to assist their agencies
in the design and marketing of goods to an acceptable capitalist standard.

Similarly in China it has now been found necessary to introduce 'market forces' at the
current stage of 'socialist' development. For example, the Chinese government
recently announced that housing and land use are to be 'privatized'. Housing is to
revert to private ownership, and developable land is to be let on 50 year leases to the
highest bidder, which may include foreign development corporations. This move to
private, and larger, landholdings cannot but erode the theory of state ownership. All
this is a far cry from the ideological purity of the past, and such changes are
occurring in many socialist countries from Poland (private business, cooperative
housing) to Mozambique (private business) to Burma ('free' black market) to
Czechoslovakia (production facilities for multinational corporations). Nor should we assume that such changes will be confined to the economic sector. The recent announcement in Hungary that rival political parties are to be legalized for the first time since 1948 may be only the first indication of dramatic changes towards pluralism in the Eastern block.

On the other side of the coin many elements of government intervention in the western capitalist states are either indispensable to the working of societies or just plain attractive to electorates. Examples include regional planning in France, greenbelt protection in England, and the safeguarding of Canada's successful nationalized health system. Many more examples of continuing state action could be cited, but not all will be continued. For example, the short term solution of shoring-up of some inefficient state-owned industries, often for the purpose of maintaining the jobs of an urban electorate, is ending in a number of countries.

The main point is that the demarcation between state and market is undergoing a radical rethink in countries all over the world, in the east and west, and in developing countries. One result is that simplistic conceptions of capitalism, socialism and social democracy are no longer possible, if they ever were. A replacement language of political systems has yet to be defined. Unless planning theorists are prepared to eschew simplistic models, which may accord with their ideological penchant but not with reality, they risk a further widening of the gap between theory and practice.

The general dialogue over the relation of state to market has at least two important implications for planning. First, it underlines the need for the development of dialogue and debate about ethical principles, which can assist and guide moral choices having to do with the appropriate role of state and markets (and voluntary
organizations) in the society. These deliberations must attempt some fusion of the utilitarian benefits of market economics with a sense of transcending social responsibility. Second, it raises questions about the role of political culture vis-a-vis the state, and the contribution of political consensus to social action. Third, it emphasizes the importance of the relation of strategic information to power in terms of non-violent social change in the state.

The Importance of Ethical Considerations to the Modern State

The following model (figure 7) sets out the place of ethical considerations in a relationship between beliefs and action. Here political culture both contributes to our world view (belief system, values) and mediates as a mechanism for feedback between our environment and our belief system. The importance of culture is often underestimated, probably because we are too immersed in it to view it with detachment, however we define it: western culture, political culture, or as I will also suggest, capitalist culture. Nonetheless it is the fundamental medium within which all else unfolds. This is not to argue that our beliefs and ethical principles are functionally dependent on our cultural definition, that is, can be exhaustively derived from a study of our non-ethical interests such as family or economy. Rather our beliefs are relative to our culture, the influence is very great but not overwhelming. Other factors, such as ideas from other cultures, are also possible influences. Importantly for the social theorist, studies of our own culture are not only possible but intellectually profitable. Gadamer (1975) for example, points out that the development of consciousness of the conditioning effect of our own culture opens up the possibility of dialogue about alternative views. Such dialogue is essential to the process of deriving appropriate ethical principles which can guide specific moral choices about right and wrong, good and bad; or most commonly in policy choices,
good, not-so-good, not-good-at-all, or good now but bad later. Ethical debate and
dialogue therefore gives rise to what Habermas calls moral guides to social action,
which have become eclipsed in a process of legitimating political power by reference
to apparent economic and technological imperatives. Now that many politicians,
Mrs. Thatcher included, have become 'green', it will be interesting to see the extent
ethical debate, at least over environmental issues, will take their place on an agenda
dominated by economic considerations.

Figure 7: Ethical Principles between Belief and Action

There is not the room here to delineate the range of possible ethical principles about
which planning need be concerned. These include justice, non-maleficence,
autonomy, participation, egalitarianism, sustainability and responsibility. I refer
again to egalitarianism (equal rights for all) in terms of political empowerment of
citizens disadvantaged in their influence in the political process and in their access to
information which is a lever on power. I also refer to sustainability which is an
approach to progress which meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The focus is on overall human,
not just economic, progress and on a type of growth which respects limits to
environmental resources. The concept of sustainability is important because it forces us to consider the carrying capacity of ecosystems in terms of present and future generations. I also use the term social responsibility, which is the taking of responsibility for the foreseen and unforeseen consequences of our actions. The importance of these principles arises in subsequent discussion.

A clear task for planning theory must be to reflect on the appropriate balance between market forces based on individualistic action, and the social responsibilities of the state and the wider political culture. The notion of political culture is important because social ideas have no value outside of a framework of shared basic assumptions of societal groups. For example, my good idea about resolving an environmental problem is not worth much unless I can convince a lot of people, unless pressure can be put on government to legislate, or unless I can change somehow (say, with the help of the media) values with respect to the problem. Consensus is the key to action in democratic societies and such consensus, given the right conditions, can generate political power and social change. To the extent that planners manipulate information which can lead to, or away from, consensus, and can redistribute that information to the less powerful, they have a responsibility which can be guided by reference to moral discourse and knowledge of the power structure in society. Societal consensus deriving from ethical considerations can contribute to social development at the level of individual and at the level of political culture if that consensus is well-informed. As noted in chapter 2, the modern state may take as an important task the development of political culture, but political culture exists quite apart from the state. Both levels of individual action and political culture are highly enjoined, but can be considered separately.
Modern capitalist and increasingly state socialist societies work on at least two levels (figure 8). The first is the level of the individual and the firm in which, in economic terms, market arrangements tend to work best because of their rapid use of information, straightforward objectives, and efficient transformation of resources into products and services. Activities at this level are important to material well-being, efficient, and basically irrepressible; indeed it requires the full power of the state to repress market transaction, which spring up as 'black markets' when forbidden. However market transactions do not reflect ethical considerations but usually only profit-maximizing or utilitarian considerations. Because of this mainly materialistic focus, and lack of mechanisms for conceptualizing and dealing with problems at the societal level, reliance on market mechanisms is not sufficient to define a healthy society. Some specific reasons for this are set out in the next few pages.

More generally however, activities at this level are necessary but insufficient because the very act of efficient market competition precludes co-operation in deriving and attaining higher order goals, in defining and addressing metaproblems, and in promoting human as opposed to economic development. Some of these higher order goals e.g. (to promote industrial development, R & D, or higher education) can be important in attaining level one efficiency, other goals nurture quality of life in important, but non-economic and non-materialist areas such as environmental quality. Higher order goals cannot be derived from considerations of economic efficiency but only by recourse to philosophical inquiry and ethical debate. Such goals, because of their often dramatic import on quality of life, can only be derived from ethical dialogue, because they reflect fundamental value judgments. At the extremes, the alternatives to ethical dialogue at the level of political culture are totalitarianism on the part of demagogues or ruling elites on the one hand, and the
blind injustices and inhumanity of unrestrained capitalism on the other. Experience suggests both are real possibilities to be avoided at all costs.

It is important to note that the development of political culture can be nurtured by the state but it need not be a function solely of the state. In many societies political culture itself reflects a measure of societal consensus which can be traced to long-standing cultural traditions quite apart from the state. Other paramount social organizations, the church, the media, the educational system, or the tribe for example, can be agents of the development of this cultural consensus. Conversely the state can take an active or lead role. There is of course no guarantee that consensus is socially progressive, for example societies may be, and often are, consensually racist. Again dialogue with reference to ethical considerations is essential, whatever the agency for social change.

For planners and theorists considering the role of the state it is important to understand the role of consensus. In participating in any public policy debate, a planning objective should be to assist the development of a sufficient degree of societal consensus for political or policy action. Consensus, that is a sharing of perceptions by a broad political constituency, greatly increases the chances of beneficial policy results and implementation. The ease with which this happens reflects the degree to which an issue is agreed by a broad political constituency. Agreement on a range of issues over time, say on environmental management, land use, or even on the role of the state in society, both gives rise to, and can stem from, consensus. At best, this reflects a transcendent societal view which is clearly above the individualism of the market, but complementary to it, reflecting as it ultimately must some measure of societal as opposed to individual good, and a marriage between market economics and social responsibility.
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*Level of the firm and the economic individual*

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Figure 8: The Relationship of Political Culture to Market Operation
Thinking and acting at the level of society in terms of state and interstate relations, guided by a consensus on ethical principles of sustainability and responsibility, may be the only way to tackle most metaproblems. The recent debate about the greenhouse effect is a case in point. No laws, regulations, or incentives exist to deal with such meta-externalities and it is only by recourse to some measure of socio-ecological consensus that we may have any expectation of progress or control.

Societal consensus on social responsibility as a reasonable mode of state action is a necessary complement to market mechanisms and one which leads to improved quality of life. In particular a degree of consensus on the parameters of government policy, which transcends party politics, can increase the capacity of the state/market alliance to respond to economic turbulence in the world economic system. Where that is lacking, for example in the UK in the 1970s, social and economic progress can be stilted by dramatic policy reversals when governments change. What is clear is that previous conceptions of state-market interaction, stemming from traditional left-right divisions or party platforms, are no longer valid. But political ideas and policy options continue to cluster around the old left-right divisions; partly because political parties themselves lag behind readjustments, and partly because any blurring of the demarcations between parties causes difficulties in terms of voter identification.

The tasks and responsibilities of the planner in policy debates are very often to provide information which contributes to the debate by helping to shape the political agenda, and by assisting participants towards a common problem conception which may well transcend party political boundaries and suggests the possibility of political reconciliation and social consensus over any issue. Again a consideration of the ethical implication of the choices open to us can help or force parties to readjust
political platforms to recognise new realities. It is not that political differences in any way disappear, only that the boundaries of the debate need to be continually shifted to take into account new knowledge and the implications of existing polices.

Where an appropriate mix of public goods is at issue, the planner is also involved in suggesting the costs and benefits of various options as they accrue to different social groups, and the demands and preferences of those social groups. Principles of distributive justice are important here and a fruitful approach is unlikely to assume categorically that market-based economic development and social redistribution are mutually incompatible.

This raises the third point about planning options at the state-market conjuncture. The role of information is critical to ethical dialogue and moral choice, and what planners do perhaps more than anything is devise, manipulate and redistribute information in the face of uncertainty. The manipulation of information can influence the outcome of political debate. Planners may not be politicians, but to the extent that they systematically explore policy options, and where information about those options is an increment of political power, they obviously have a moral responsibility with regard to the distribution of that information. Liberal democratic planning theorists, in returning centrist values to the forefront of the theoretical stage, need to address bluntly the moral dimensions and implications of the role of knowledge in political decisions. I return to question of information in a subsequent section.

**Specific Forms of State Intervention**

The case for the market side of the market-state equation was outlined previously. Capitalism, represented by market economies with private ownership of industry, is
dominant in world economic production because it makes use of strategic market information to respond to environmental turbulence in an efficient (if not always effective) manner, and with a rapidity and precision which is beyond the organizational capacity of a command economy. The market economy is far from perfect, but better than any alternative feedback system in the face of turbulence. The result is a necessary but not sufficient quality of life in advanced western democracies.

However the market, for all its economic virtues, is insufficient in a number of obvious respects which give rise to the need for state intervention and planning. At the simplest level, even Hayek (1960) recognises the necessity for a 'rule of law' and the need to police externalities, both necessary for the efficient working of the market. Externalities, such as land degradation or environmental pollution, arise where the complete and long-term costs of an individual or firm's actions are not reflected in market price calculations. For example, in the competitive situation at the level of the firm, no individual producer is likely to invest in pollution control equipment without some carrot or stick. Consideration of externalities is an important aspect of the planning function of the state. The development of national regulations on environmental impact assessment in North America, Australia and now Europe is a case in point. Other methods of state control of pollution include monitoring, land use zoning and financial incentives.

Related to the rule of the law is the necessity for the state to act as the ultimate arbitrator between different but perhaps equally valid demands on the limited resources of the society. Land itself, for example, is a finite resource, and political debate between farmers, industrialists, and conservationists over land use is a common problem to which planners are very often expected to make major
contributions towards the process of mediation. Resolution of such debates comes only from consensus or rule of law, and the process of mediation is an essential function of the state. Such mediation is necessary not only among competing private interests, but among agencies of the state as well. For example, in the case of the privately funded and operated Channel Tunnel development in the UK, 16 agencies representing central government departments, local government, and quasi-governmental agencies have some measure of jurisdiction or direct interest. In this case only a central agency like Cabinet, a law court, or the Department of Environment could be expected to convene and mediate among those agencies and the private sector to a peaceful and fruitful end.

Third, the state has an unassailable role in the development of social infrastructure and in the delivery of those public goods which the market cannot provide with efficiency or without the guidance of the state, and where the 'free rider' problem presents competitive pricing. Either the state must provide infrastructure, or the state must provide regulatory agencies to oversee the workings of private provision in a non-market, and often monopoly, situation. Defence, transport, electric power, telecommunications, education and other infrastructure are the classic examples, but state investment in R & D and science infrastructure are newly emerging examples. For example, as countries increasingly develop service economies from the convergence of computing and information technology (IT) new kinds of state-provided or coordinated infrastructure may be necessary. Such IT industries are skill intensive and develop most quickly in countries with an advanced technological base, adaptive educational system and productive R & D structure. Investment in scientific and educational infrastructure, and in the enhancement of skill levels and mobility in the workforce, may therefore be critical to economic development. New examples of public-private sector partnerships in the provision of infrastructure with
development capital are also relevant to this argument, for example, the U.K.'s urban development corporations discussed in chapter 4 and again in the appendix.

Infrastructure is not therefore confined to physical provision. The need for strategic guidance, industrial policy, or other forms of planning may also be complementary to market provision. For example, interdisciplinary and interfirm collaboration may be essential to react to rapid changes in IT products and markets in sufficient time to generate economic benefit in the face of international competition. Strategic guidance by government may be necessary, but this requires acceptance that government must take a longer term view and has a pragmatic role to play in shaping the conditions for best market operation. For example, Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry successfully encourages otherwise competing firms to take a broad view of national economic interests. The need for such strategic vision is replicated on many levels in turbulent societies.

A past problem has been that industrial intervention in many states has focussed mainly on subsidizing declining industries engaged in uncompetitive production, rather than intervention to create the conditions for enhancing comparative advantage in stable or growth industries. This situation is changing rapidly, but has given industrial strategy a bad name. The potential of any state/market system to respond to industrial policy is related to a) the government's institutional capacity to implement policy, b) the political power residing in different groups in business and labour, c) political values of strong social groups, and d) the marketplace problems of industry (Zysman, 1983, p.300). Differing propensities of governments to engage in industrial strategy, and national markets to respond, once again will belie attempts at uniform or grand theories of state-market interaction. Nor is there anything in this argument to imply that the state must be involved in any particular type of
infrastructure development. For example, the private sector is now funding some infrastructure projects which only a few years ago would be solely within the boundaries of state provision. The Channel Tunnel is one example, others include municipal transport systems funded by enhanced property values, road building, and new airports. The only clear rule is that previous patterns of provision may no longer be valid, but the state invariably has a responsibility to provide strategic guidance and a framework for investment.

Finally the state has an obvious if contentious role in income redistribution, territorially and between social groups. This is an accepted function, to a greater or lesser degree, in developed western economies, but is always the subject of intense political debate. The issue represents perhaps the most critical social problem for many less developed, capitalist countries. In countries where even basic needs are unmet, gross distortations in income distribution are exacerbated by turbulence in the market of the world capitalist system in the form of changing export prices for basic commodities. Income maldistribution can only be rectified by action of the state at the level of central government, buttressed by self-help social development projects at regional and local levels. Determining and encouraging an appropriate and efficacious balance between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' development is an important challenge to the state in this regard, insofar as the state very often needs to encourage a political framework in which bottom-up development can succeed. Nor is uneven distribution of societal benefit confined to money income. It is very often the case that environmental pollution is borne locally or by disadvantaged groups in societies, and the state has a responsibility to mitigate or compensate for this uneven distribution which reinforces existing systems of inequities.
None of these arguments for the control of externalities, mediation, for the provision of infrastructure and public goods, or for income redistribution, are unusual in any reasoned consideration of the relationship of the state to the market. Rhetoric against state activity in the workings of the market often considerably exceeds any actual diminishment of these kinds of state functions. On the other hand, although they are clearly critical to quality of life in any civilized state, the degree to which externalities are controlled, public goods provided, or income redistributed, is profoundly political and constitutes much of the current public policy debate to which planning theory must contribute.

The Cultural Dimension of Capitalist Markets

Because levels of individual action and political culture are highly conjoined, one challenge for planning theory is to devise appropriate and realistic frameworks for exploring the relationship of state to market where the market is defined in a true, broad sense which reflects the influence of a number of centuries of capitalism on political culture. Earlier, changes in economic thinking in the USSR, China, and elsewhere were compared to changes in thinking on state and market in the western welfare states. One point is that simple two dimensional bifurcations, state vs. market, private vs. public, or east vs. west are arbitrary, untrue, and insufficient to capture the multidimensional reality of national states and/or cultures operating within a turbulent, overwhelmingly capitalist, world economic system. Partly any conceptualization must at least refer to the tandem argument about capitalism's rapid utilization of market intelligence as response to turbulence, and to the need for social control/civil morality in pursuit of greater social objectives (e.g. a 'clean' environment) unattainable in laissez-faire economic systems. At another level though, a problem in analysing economic behaviour is in rectifying rational, capitalist
behaviour at the level of the individual with aggregated market behaviours. The latter may result not only in economic betterment for some, but also in exploitation or externalities which are dysbenefits to individuals, groups or countries. These can give rise to political conflict. In a sense the challenge is to devise a conceptualization which encompasses the activities of the individual market trader and the workings of interacting global corporations. Most theorizing fails to make this linkage of levels.

A market in this conception can be defined instrumentally as an area or a mechanism for buying and selling, in which individual activities are connected by conditions of supply and demand as expressed by price. But the study of markets cannot be divorced from the study of politics. On the one hand, the institutional organization of markets influences political debate about the purposes of state intervention, and on the other, political values directly influence the workings of markets:

Though traditionally viewed as different means of coordinating activities, political command and market prices in fact melt together in the actual workings of the advanced economies. In each case, it is important to determine the character of the mix. Market positions are a source of political power and government choices shape the operations of the market (Zysman, 1983, p.310).

Unfortunately, in economic theory, assumptions are often made about 'pure' market conditions at the level of the firm which ignore the effects of organized, oligopolical economic behaviour by multinational corporations. This insufficiency can cause theory to divert from reality to such an extent that theory, although elegant, is unhelpful. Conversely however, corporatist or conspiracy theories which assume malevolent intent (as opposed to endemic dysfunctional side effects) in the working of the capitalist economic system very often ignore the fact that capitalism itself derives from a fundamental human drive to join together in self-interested market
arrangements to transact 'business'. This can be at the level of bartering a cowskin for some rice, or at the level of complex global industrial transactions.

At a most basic level one only need to think of the vibrancy and excitement of food and household goods markets the world over, and of the intensity of human production and interaction which those represent. In China at the time of the 'four modernizations' in 1980, for example, one could sense the latent energy which existed within the Chinese culture to establish markets in both the physical and functional sense. This was revealed in the numerous little street markets which sprang up, selling a few onions or a twist of paper containing soap powder. Such tangible marketplaces may be at the simple and more obvious level of the capitalist spectrum, but no less capitalist than General Motors for all that. Unfortunately for social scientists with a penchant to explain the world in simple models, the combined economic and psychological attraction of capitalism, and its ability to satisfy at least one level of human needs with relative efficiency, is a complex phenomena.

Of course capitalism has many obvious and painful flaws, particularly well documented in the literature of development theory (e.g. Stohr and Taylor, 1981). There are at least three major problems. First, the externalities of individualistic economic behaviour can be disruptive and even dangerous to human existence at the aggregate level. This has been discussed. Second, as stated, capitalism does not by nature result in equitable income distribution and in fact, where it is distorted by corporatist and class factors, can result in a highly regressive income structure. This is because at one level capitalism represents productive self-interest, but the dividing-line between self-interest and conscious or unconscious selfishness is thin indeed. At worst, where basic needs are unsatisfied by market operation, or where industrialization and integration into the world economy results in disruption of
adequate subsistence patterns of living, grave suffering and death can result. Technical economic adjustments, or 'trickle-down' theories, have simply proved not to work. Some income redistribution derived from ethical and social considerations is therefore essential to civilized capitalist societies.

Third, the main cultural tendency in capitalist behaviour is commoditization, that is the subsuming of all relevant dimensions of human existence to the dictates and efficiency of market transactions to bring them within the scope of the monetary system. First and foremost, labour itself becomes a commodity, as do land, resources, and the natural environment as required. But even the very mechanisms of cultural transmission can be reduced to commodities. So for example, vibrant cultural forms can be reduced to bastardized versions devoid of life, just as 'MacDonaldization' can spread its beguiling grip on the production and marketing aspects of food systems worldwide. It is not only that important human diversity is foreclosed, but that the physical and spiritual consequences of commoditization can be profound. As for example, when the world's dwindling tropical forests, and their indigenous inhabitants, are destructively replaced by cattle-grazing operations set up to meet a growing demand for beef. But these are more complex areas of philosophical inquiry than space permits here, for it is not only multinational capitalists or wealthy tourists, but many people obviously oppressed by capitalism who paradoxically find great allure in the commodities and lifestyles associated with it. Even those purists who decry the obvious sad points of the commoditization process, or presume to make judgments on its relevance for less fortunate members of the human race, often find it difficult indeed to detach themselves from a world economic and cultural system which forms the dominant paradigm in which we live our lives.
One important task for planning theory is to conceptualize both the costs and benefits of capitalism as a sociocultural system within the same analytic framework. This is of course a classic problem of liberalism, but one insufficiently addressed in recent decades. A fundamental question is of course whether we are irreconcilably trapped by our own cultural conditioning or whether it is possible to reasonably critique this dominant paradigm from within, that is without assuming revolutionary intent against capitalism as a precursor to systematic analysis. I suggest that the problem can be fruitfully addressed, and that the development of a consciousness of the conditioning effect of capitalist culture, and how that can be altered towards a more ecological perspective, is an important theoretical task. This is clearly a problem with ideological and moral rather than simply methodological dimensions.

The main point is to recognize that capitalism has not evolved solely as a mode of mechanistic economic transaction, but also as the dominant cultural paradigm of the last two centuries. Within this capitalist paradigm, we are probably in transition from an industrial to a post-industrial subparadigm. It is also possible to conjecture that the state socialism of the twentieth century is mainly a function of the industrial subparadigm rather than a completely separate road to development. Nor is the possibility precluded of the replacement of capitalism by a subsequent paradigm at a future time. But however much we may conjecture about the role of capitalism in human development, and however much one may identify the flaws in capitalism, it is hard to deny that the workings of markets are a fundamental means of human interaction. At least on this level the logic of capitalism is inescapable.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION OF PLANNING

This section explores the organizational dimension of planning, and particularly responses to the condition of turbulence. These are the main points:
1. At the level of the state, all socio-economic systems, whether capitalist or not, are products of compromises and adjustments between centralizing and decentralizing forces. For each state, any possible compromise produces X amount of efficiency and Y amount of democracy in a given context, not however in an inverse relationship. Although a generic theory of the state is unattainable, empirical studies should contribute to understanding of how, and at what level, planning is carried out most effectively.

2. At the level of the organization, agencies which plan well find that crisis and turbulence present opportunities for positive structural and behavioural action. The most potent response may be an action learning strategy which bridges between professional experiential knowledge and action. It does this by re-orienting organizational culture, structure and rewards towards reflective learning as a counterpoint to action.

3. Turbulence and metaprobblems may be constructively managed by joint ventures between government planning organizations and agencies in the private and voluntary sectors.

4. The development of strategic monitoring systems is important to all organizational innovations.

5. Although both joint ventures and monitoring information systems are likely to increase the efficiency of planning, they are not by nature democratic. The extent to which they empower and inform will depend wholly on the political assumptions which underpin their organization and funding.
What is called the crisis of planning can be explained in part in terms of an endemic tension between centre and periphery in the modern state and world economy, conflict between economic objectives and political aspirations, opposing trends to centralization and decentralization, and the inter-organizational conflict which seems an inevitable consequence of state intervention in society. These factors give rise to notions of crisis and form part of expectable constraints which will operate in public sector planning. I have argued that centre-periphery relations, in both a functional and territorial sense, is a fundamental theme in the context of planning and significant for an understanding of the evolution of modern political developments.

The main structural response to 'peripheralization' caused by centralization of power and function within one state is decentralization. In chapter three it was noted that trends to centralization have been associated with: the rise of the welfare state, increasing central responsibility for funding programmes and redistributing resources on a territorial basis, cultural homogenization, and extension of administrative and budgetary control. Trends to decentralization reflect political responses to ideological regionalism, the need to maintain ethnic identity, and the promotion of regional economic development; or functional responses to government overload and bureaucratic unresponsiveness. But the distinctions are not hard and fast, and apparently decentralist procedures like regional planning and economic development programmes can reinforce the authority of the central state. The centralization debate can also become confused where decentralization is assumed to be solely a function of a centralized authority. Many noncentralized and voluntary processes are independent of the state and can efficiently serve local interests. Equally
corporatism may operate at the local level, as well as at national or international levels.

The functional and geographical differentiation of the state results in government planning systems in which the capacity to address complex metaproblems is disaggregated into an often uncoordinated group of organizations with limited mandates and resources. Metaproblems are often not the primary responsibility of any one body, and it is common for governments to excuse inactivity in a metaproblem area by the fact that it spans functional departments and political jurisdictions. Any consideration of the context of planning must carefully consider the relationship between the state and its sub-national agencies of planning, because the crisis of planning is caused in part by organizational uncoordination, reinforced by tension between valid aspirations for local democracy and control the reality of state organization and multinational commodity production.

It is important to note however that lack of coordination is not ipso facto to be associated with decentralized systems. While they may be uncoordinated, overly centralized systems can be equally uncoordinated because they are unable to monitor and react to new developments in the field. Coordination is usually more an inter-organizational challenge rather than an intra-organizational one, and it is therefore to innovative coordination mechanisms, like joint ventures, to which one must turn.

The range of response can be mapped out on the following axes:

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+-----------------+-----------------+
|                | COORDINATED     |
| Coordinating    |     DECENTRALIZED |
| Centralized     |                |
| Decentralized   |                |
| Uncoordinated   |                |
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Coordination is an important factor in structural responses to turbulence. As I will argue in the next section, coordination is the first step to integrated responses to metaprobblems.

With the exception of the work of Friedmann, planning theory seldom seems to take account of the forces of centralization and only slightly more account of decentralization. But because determining the appropriate degree of centralization is a recurring challenge to government, then understanding the economic, political, and interorganizational relations between centre and periphery is fundamental to understanding the context of planning. Planning agencies stand in some relation to wider political and economic forces, and these influence ability to plan. Most planning agencies are in constant tension between the organizational demands made on them and the institutional arrangements which govern their ability to act. It is in the mediation between these two forces that planners have the opportunity to be creative, for the question of the appropriate degree of decentralization of power cannot be answered in an objective, logical fashion. The only basis for resolving what are at heart political issues is negotiating among competing jurisdictions within the conventions of the political framework.

This being the case, it is not surprising that we find the crisis of planning and governability is not an aberration but in the order of a fact of life. But even an apparent dichotomy between centralization and its opposite oversimplifies. As Beer (1975, p428) says 'the polarity between centralization and decentralization - one masquerading as oppression and the other as freedom is a modern myth'. Planning in the post-welfare state is more complex, more interactive and alive with possibility for re-alliances and political or administrative coalitions based on issues, which may transcend or conform to territorial boundaries, than the simple dichotomy would have
it. In many cases the quality of the relationships between central and sub-national planning agencies may be critical to successful design and implementation of policies. As I have argued, all socio-economic systems, whether capitalist or not, are products of compromises and adjustments between centralizing and decentralizing forces. Endemic tension is built into these systems because the appropriate arrangements of the state and its sub-units are not amenable to theoretical proposals for perfect systems, in which different tiers of government, and regional and national entities, relate to one another in a nested hierarchy.

Rather the appropriate arrangement of state and subunits reflects a balance of knowledge and value judgments. The knowledge is an understanding of the efficiency and effectiveness of different arrangements for delivery of the services of the state, which may be welfare services, strategic economic guidance, land use planning, or any other; and the value judgments reflect the views of individuals and social groups on the appropriate mix between local democracy and central state power. However, as values, the power base, and knowledge of conditions change, so the institutional arrangements of the state can change, sometimes rather slowly, as in the relationship of the provinces to the central government in Canada; sometimes virtually overnight, as in the case of the demise of the Greater London Council. The main point is that the institutional context of planning reflects value judgments to a far greater extent than many planners might envisage, and is more fluid than generally conceived. These changing institutional arrangements certainly contribute to organisational turbulence, and perhaps to a sense of insecurity on the part of practising planners.

Although central-local conflict is always possible, it is inevitable nor necessarily dysfunctional to democratic processes. Whether it occurs and is harmful depends very much on local political culture, and particularly on the extent to which
consensus extends to the value and process of central-local relations. For example, in the United States local democracy and control is jealously guarded and constitutionally enshrined, in Canada it is the subject of protracted and costly constitutional wrangles and delicate inter-governmental negotiations, while in the UK changes in central-local structural relations are usually rather undemocratically dictated by central government. This reinforces the point that there are no hard and fast rules either from democratic principles, or from questions of efficiency in service delivery, for either the appropriate level for state functions or for the process by which institutional change is effected, except on a case-by-case basis. This also reinforces the view that planning theory derived from a generic theory of the state, which attempts to generalize about all states within a phase or position in the world capitalist system, is unlikely to prove useful in the current situation. More appropriate is to marry empirical studies on the operation of specific state organizational structures in terms of task performance, with theoretical views on the appropriate measure of democratic accountability and control. The necessity for pursuing these in combination is reflected by the fact that economic efficiency in government cannot be reasonably evaluated without reference to the effectiveness of specific government services in meeting broader social objectives.

In summary, these structural contradictions on the relationship of the state and its subunits results in shifting organizational arrangements of the state. This is counterintuitive to the usual idea of a fixed state, and can further contribute to insecurity and notions of crisis. If the context of planning management is accepted as endemic political turbulence, then an appropriate focus of planning is to emphasize the importance of the process as much as the product of planning action.
Turbulence at the Level of the Planning Organization

Turbulence clearly describes the fundamental context of planning in the modern state, in that organizations which plan are increasingly vulnerable to national and international forces over which they have little or no control, and are faced with metaproblems which cut across functional and territorial boundaries. The turbulent context defies simple cause-effect analysis because these problems reflect a multiplicity of inter-relating actors, organizations and events. Each planning organization will have some impact on its environment, but it will be impossible to predict that impact precisely because all other organizations will be acting at the same time. In this situation endemic uncertainty is inescapable.

The tension between the uncertainty generated by multiple individual actions and a desire for a stable state has been a common theme in political philosophy since the Enlightenment. Uncertainty is not simply a lack of adequate information relevant to a problem or planning task. Nor is dealing with uncertainty simply a matter of organizational restructuring or revised management direction. An uncertain environment exists because the impact of organizational activity cannot be predicted in a way which allows those activities to be altered to control environmental effects. Uncertainty also arises because unpredictable organizational interaction constantly alters the shared perceptions and cultural norms which help individuals deal with their environment.

Chapter four suggested that much planning activity is an attempt to manage change in such turbulent environments which are characterized by inconsistent and ill-defined needs, preferences and values; and the inherent inability to predict the cumulative consequences of action. The situation is compounded in the case of
metaproblems. I argued therefore that planning dilemmas are not entirely due to the decline of late capitalism but also reflect our bemusement in the face of turbulence. One problem I identified with the influential neo-Marxist stream in planning theory is that it steadfastly confuses the generic forces of modernization and turbulence with features specific to the capitalist mode of socioeconomic organization.

In brief, the problem for planning organizations is how to deal with the complexity and unforeseen effects of events and policy-making where the policy-making activities themselves interlock at every level. From organization theory I identified some useful analytic tools for thinking about this dilemma, particularly notions of organizational resources, organizational networks and fields, and organizational learning to develop capacity to plan or innovate effectively. Organizational analysis calls into question the usefulness of static models for understanding the inter-organizational relationships which characterize many planning situations.

If inter-organizational activity itself generates unpredictable impacts, then the emergence of a complex web of policy networks with the growth of the welfare state has helped us account for the notion of increasing turbulence. It also suggests why it is insufficient for planners to focus on contentious issues without also paying attention to the process of policy making. Rather, policy appreciations require an integrated perspective on an issue and the cross-cutting policy networks which provide the dynamic dimension to issues. Here is evidence that making substantive (planning issue) versus procedural (planning process) distinctions may be unhelpful and that one cannot be divorced from the other.

Planning difficulties tend to be magnified when complex problems are the focus of an inter-organizational field, or what has been called a policy planning system (Hinings
et al., 1985). Such planning systems operate within complex sets of relationships and may have to combine wide differences of opinion. Confronting such problems successfully often requires either clear almost military hierarchical responsibility or the provision of special intergovernmental or interagency planning arrangements. Without such political commitment to interagency arrangements it is possible that no one agency will accept responsibility for a metaproblem. Conversely if such planning systems do operate in of producing the necessary information, policies and programmes, a great deal of work will be required. When government departments are under pressure to reduce expenditure and manpower, this will conflict with the resource needs generated by a policy planning process. Planners may therefore face increasing difficulty as the result of cuts in resources, which cause yet greater uncertainty in managing the environment. Planning theory has not been of much assistance to planners buffeted by the winds of organizational turbulence. There is little evidence of any fruitful cross-fertilization between organization and planning theory, beyond the dismissal of such concerns as 'managerialism' by theorists (e.g. Moore and Booth, 1986) whose interests are mainly the ideological implications of policy, obvious though these might be to many active planners.

Traditionally, planning authorities have not been structured for adaptation and change based on learning, but rather to carry out a predetermined range of technical or professional tasks. However, the conflict engendered in organizations by turbulence may involve an up-rooting of the context the organization's members use to understand and define their organization and themselves, and this has contributed to feelings of crisis, as new tasks require new responses. An organization which finds itself in crisis may therefore be presented with the opportunity to redefine organizational norms and identity, and to reassess an ineffective structure.
Organization theory suggests that while conflict and crisis may be inevitable they also present opportunities for positive action.

Organizational responses to turbulence, it was suggested, may be structural or behavioural. Structural reorganization attempts to improve organizational effectiveness by changing roles, mandate, legal obligations, communications systems, reward system and other structural characteristics. Local governments in many countries are decentralizing their operations to area-based offices. Sometimes an interdepartmental steering group or policy secretariat can encourage information flow, policy and implementation coordination, and other appropriate responses to turbulence. But not all organizational responses are appropriate. For example, central government in the UK uses its legislative control over local authorities to carry out periodic reorganizations of the legal responsibilities and jurisdiction of the lesser authorities. The abolition of the only strategic planning authority for London, described earlier, is an example. But such reduction of local authority and the concentration of planning functions in central government bureaucracies runs counter to evolving notions of productive organizational responses to turbulence. Therefore, although structural responses to turbulence may (or may not) be useful, they are seldom sufficient. The seemingly endless reorganizations of local government in the UK probably supports the assertion that organizational reforms need to be supplemented by both new inter-organizational alliances, and by new behavioural approaches within planning organizations.

Behavioural approaches to turbulence involve organizations and members in self-directed, participative action learning strategies. These enable organizations to address turbulence and deal with interrelated problems, but without an assumption that problems will necessarily be solved in a once and for all manner. Rather the
development of skills in responding to turbulence is the objective. The main responses to turbulence discussed in this section are: action learning, matrix management, decentralization, joint ventures, and the development of information/monitoring systems.

The Action Learning Response to Turbulence

One way to enhance the process and the product of planning is to engage the action learning strategies referred to earlier. Action learning aims to combine past experience, organizational intelligence, and future goals in a mode of action-oriented management which is intended to produce valid information, informed choice, and most importantly, a commitment to action based on consensual knowledge (Comfort, 1985). Such strategies have evolved mainly in the context of professional rather than academic interest, and in such professions (management, education, public/social administration) where scientific expertise is weak. Such people-oriented professions 'make up' for a lack of scientific underpinning by turning to the unique experience of professional practice, which is treasure-trove of experiential knowledge. Of course professionals (including planners) have always learned-by-doing; the action learning perspective extends the advantages of that approach to the organization and links practice to theory to action in a more direct way which might be described as 'doing-by-learning'.

It is of course common for professionals to feel hindered by bureaucratic restraints. Action learning at the level of the organization brings the bureaucratic structure and reward system more in line with the advantage to be gained by interjecting a reflective or learning component into the practice-action equation:
'Action research' in turn, recognizing both the problematic nature of knowledge in the social sciences, and the benefits of a theorizing component to action, focuses on the knowledge needs of the process and the practical means or methodology of action learning. I return to the specifics of action research in the final section of this chapter. Here I focus on the implications for the organization of engaging an action learning strategy:

a) joint motivation by management and a measure of consensus among staff and other participants as to the original conception of the problem, and the need for further learning;

b) a reframing of organizational objectives and bureaucratic structures towards learning, that is the iterative acquisition and action based on new knowledge;

c) recognition that the interactive nature of organization, context and problem requires that the development and management of adequate information systems must become a primary organizational task;

d) that the new information flows will require continuing reformulation of both problem definition and the organization's responses;
that this process of problem-response adjustment will challenge bureaucratic rigidities and hierarchical patterns of authority and may require that organizational patterns built up around static problem conceptions be modified to reward flexible approaches and to decentralize authority.

The best organizational responses to turbulence combine structural and behavioural changes, and use them to reinforce one another. In particular what are called 'matrix' management approaches attempt to mediate between the traditional bureaucratic structure and more organic and responsive management styles like action learning. The term 'matrix' itself derives from the networking, as opposed to hierarchical, communication structures which characterize this organizational style. The differences between the two approaches are set out in figure 9.

For many metaproblems action learning is a necessary but inefficient response. A further task is coordination, sometimes best achieved through formal arrangements, or joint ventures.

Figure 9: Matrix Approaches to Planning Management, (after Maruyama, 1976; Banner, 1987)
Earlier I proposed that inter-organizational collaboration will be a clear feature of planning in the turbulent environments of the 1990s. This runs counter to most existing practice where government departments and agencies are compartmentalized along functional and discipline lines, which results in poor communication and an inability to cope with turbulence. The mode of collaboration was described as joint ventures between government planning organizations and/or organizations in the private and voluntary sectors. Here I look more closely at joint ventures for planning.

Joint ventures work at two levels:

Level 1: policy/implementational cooperation and information-sharing
Level 2: level one activities plus mutual financial risk-taking.

Successful joint ventures in planning will probably involve:

1. Motivation toward joint working based on knowledge of the organizational requirements, benefits and costs of joint venture activity;

2. Changes in attitudes towards a more reasonable understanding as to the nature of public bureaucracy, the profit and risk orientation of the private sector, and the social objectives of non-profit organizations;

3. Changes in organizational structure away from formal, hierarchical bureaucratic structures toward smaller-scale, interlocking, and interactive working arrangements such as the matrix approach.
The importance of 'support systems' of information and advice to the participants in joint ventures, and need to foster changes in attitudes towards 'imagination, flexibility, and innovation', has been identified in terms of the UK's metaproblem of inner city decline (Solesbury, 1986). Such joint public-private sector ventures in urban development in many countries now extend to joint policy making and implementation. But attitudes reflect the local socio-cultural situation. For example, successful joint ventures in urban renewal in the USA are predicated on strong entrepreneurial attitudes and a strong sense of the power of local government and private sector initiative. Conversely in the UK:

there are often long delays in vetting proposals and there is a reluctance on the part of officials to be seen to be involved in making recommendations that might result in somebody making a profit, albeit that the local situation could be transformed as a result (Cowie, 1986).

Local planning officials in the UK in particular may feel caught between conflicting central government demands for minimizing government intervention, ie direct control, while developing a strategic planning role. Planning organizations find they need encouragement and advice on how to develop the networking skills useful in joint ventures. But perhaps most of all, individual planners may require intellectual support in coming to grips with the new and evolving ways of working. For example, Solesbury (1986) argues that the tendency of the UK government has been to pursue urban renewal objectives without regard for the development of professional and management capabilities. If this continues to be the case, while a dramatic range of urban renewal policies are implemented, the risk is replicating urban problems in new ways.

A few researchers have identified the importance of organisational capacity and professional skill in urban planning. Solesbury (1986, p.389) ties the concept of organisational capacity to joint ventures:
Operationally the need is to strengthen the capacities of business, government and not-for-profit agencies and bind them more effectively to joint action that serves their separate interests.

Young (1986) has argued that organisational capacity represented by management skills is self-reinforcing, and that successful organisations attract funding. A survey of economic development initiatives by UK local governments, led mainly by planners, leads to the following:

A blunt conclusion is that local authorities' own internal structures, processes and procedures serve to impede rather than to aid the realization of their economic development aspirations. And as more authorities move away from traditional concerns with industrial land and property development towards a closer relationship with enterprises - whether profit-making or otherwise - this incapacity is likely to be the more keenly felt (Mills and Young, 1986, p.141).

However a focus on structures cannot be separated from the crucial importance of capacity in terms of management skills:

the weakest leg on which local economic policy stands is the limited professional capacity of the local authority officers themselves. Acceptance of the local authority presence in this field surely implies an acceptance of the responsibility to help them to develop their capacity to perform it by training, education, and a widening of recruitment (Young, 1986, p.450).

This suggests that attention to organizational responses to turbulence should not be divorced from an interest in the professional capabilities of its members. Structural responses need to be integrated with behavioural responses: responding to crisis by providing the opportunity for self-directed changes in culture, attitudes, values and norms. This enculturated change presumes individual learning and communication in a way which allows an organization's members to re-examine their values and perceptions to produce different behaviours (Comfort, 1985). Adaptive behaviour of this kind in the public sector parallels exactly the societal function of entrepreneurship in the private sector which Etzioni (1987, p.176) describes as
'adaptive reality testing'. This is designed to change obsolescent societal patterns of relations, organizations, or modes of production to render them more compatible with a changed environment. Entrepreneurship in the public sector can be directed towards fulfilling what is called the public service or consumer orientation of government. The public service orientation is characterized by

- a readiness to look for opportunities rather than be overwhelmed by problems;
- concern for innovation;
- flexibility in implementation;
- a readiness to take risks;
- a looking outward for resources and alliances;
- the relaxation of traditional control procedures; and
- the creation of new organizational forms (Stewart, 1986)

Entrepreneurial approaches increasingly require governmental organizations to search for new and creative ways to spread financial risk once it is accepted, and to use public investment as seed money to encourage private investment, for example in urban renewal. The hope is that appropriately 'geared' public investment will result in private investment of a greater magnitude.

The rise of formal and informal joint ventures may gradually erode the compartmentalization and bureaucratic inertia which acts as if entrepreneurship had no place in public service bureaucracies. However, private entrepreneurship is characterized not only by success but by failure. Some degree of failure is an inevitable and natural result of adaptive experimentation and any policies which involve risk-taking. But there is little willingness in the public sector to admit to the possibility of failure, although in reality problems in policy implementation, misguided or unintended policy consequences, and uncoordinated and disjointed policy
initiatives are common. Politicians are worried about lost votes at the ever-near next election, and administrative arrangements seldom reward initiative and often positively encourage bureaucratic timidity. This is doubly unfortunate insofar as admission of failure and subsequent learning and adaptation are essential responses to turbulence and metaproblems. Since the existence of turbulence means aspects of the future are unknowable, and since risk-taking may well require experimentation, the importance of monitoring of policy implementation as a primary management/planning task cannot be overemphasized. Both the possibility and the consequences of policy failure are minimized if strategic monitoring of problems and policy responses are institutionalized within public sector organizations. This is one way in which the public sector can begin to replicate the responsiveness of private firms to market needs, and is a practical component of a public service orientation.

True organisational and individual learning also involves raising fundamental questions about existing framing of policy problems, existing responses (if any) and existing modes of bureaucratic operation. Raising such fundamental questions can be a difficult and potentially unrewarding process, certainly from within the bureaucracy. Clearly individual adaptive behaviour must be predicated on an institutional framework which encourages such behaviour at the level of the public sector organization.

The Case for Strategic Monitoring

The traditional rational planning model assumes a static equation between problems and planning responses. This sets the planning task as the search for elements which solve the equation, for example, in the way in which urban freeways solved traffic problems, or massive high-rise public housing estates solved housing problems.
Professional skills, in this view, consist mainly of building on a knowledge base of past practice in planning which, although useful, is a rather mechanistic conception.

However, even without resorting to an ideologically extreme position, it is clear that dynamic problems and the notion that organizational learning is possible does away with both static problem conceptions, and once and for all 'right' answers to planning problems. Instead, as I proposed, difficult metaprocesses require constant redefinition and readjustment of responses as new knowledge becomes available. Institutionally this requires that the development of information systems for strategic monitoring becomes a primary planning function, and that the institutional patterns and rigidities reflecting static problem conceptions be modified to encourage a steady flow of relevant information. Monitoring is therefore no more than the recurring feedback of relevant information to the planning process. As uncertainty increases, more feedback may be needed - but may not seem to be available. However, an organization can increase its capacity to process information by developing inter-organizational relations, by direct contacts, liaison roles, project teams and increased contact in an issue network. This is the substance of communicative action.

From what we have learned about the resource dependence of organizations we know that information and expertise are the political resources which can strengthen the power of organizations even where they are subordinated in jurisdiction or administrative relationships. Conversely a shortage of information and expertise can undermine formally delegated powers. These activities, which are usually essential to the development of monitoring systems, suggests to us that 'monitoring' in this conception is as much a political/institutional task as a technical/statistical one. Experience confirms this is the case (Carley, 1986a).
Every organization, including government, will use its stock and flows of information as a resource. Hinings et al. (1985) argue that in policy planning systems a major task is to structure the flow of information between organizations in any network through consensual agreement on procedures which attempt to dictate what information is to be collected, how it is to be processed, who is to deal with it, and to whom it is to be transmitted. These are key specifications in the manipulation of information as a resource, and planners are often in a position to exert influence on some or all of them. For example, Carley (1986b) notes that in monitoring regional development initiatives, especially where uncertainty is caused by large projects like an oil field development or a major infrastructure investment like the Channel Tunnel, a key to any planning at all lies in the flow of information about an environment which is impossible to predict. Conversely, it is when monitoring is not undertaken that we are often surprised when project or policy impacts are greatly different from those intended, and may on balance be negative. In the absence of monitoring we have lost all opportunities for learning and incremental redirection of project or policy. The quality and usefulness of monitored information lies in the political specification of the monitoring system: who monitors, who pays for monitoring, who interprets the information, and by what means is information acted upon to promote societal benefits or to minimise adverse consequences at national, regional or local levels, or to particular social groups.

The resource dependency perspective alerts planners to the importance of information as a resource, which will be used and manipulated for organizational benefit. Information may be 'leaked by subversives', and will certainly be denied to key participants when convenient. For this reason gaining access to information is not only a primary task of organizations which plan, but also of less powerful constituencies like community or environmental groups, who are often offered
information which is too little or too late. Moreover, information may embarrass, and ambiguity is often preferred where political bargains may need to be hammered out. Elsewhere I have detailed the numerous ways in which seemingly rational information is manipulated or distorted in a policy or planning process where value conflict and bureaucratic maintenance predominate (Carley 1980, 1981). The main point here is that information is a critical component of any planning/learning process and the presentation and/or manipulation of information is much of what a planner does. Information is never neutral, but rather:

information is a resource which in practice is manipulated by competitors within organisations; and in the case of the state, information is an instrument which can be manipulated to maintain domination over policies, to deny influence to external competition for influence over policies and to reduce 'recalcitrance' in the external political environment (Minogue, 1983, p.74).

Here we can restate the point made earlier that information generated by a monitoring system can be used to empower the disadvantaged in society or those directly affected by developments, or it can be used to further empower the entrenched power structure. The ethical principle of distributive justice must be brought into play. Planning information is therefore important at a number of levels. For example, a Canadian citizens' group, in considering a massive government-private sector resource development with regional and national implications, argues:

We are concerned about the lack of effort on the part of both the developer and the government to ensure that the people affected have a clear understanding of the nature and long-term consequences of the proposed development (Council of Yukon Indians, 1981).

This suggests that a primary audience for planning information should be the public at large, and community organisations and social development groups. Information flows should be designed and published so as to enable all citizens of a region to better understand the social, economic and cultural changes occurring in their
locality, and the numerous policies and initiatives related to those changes. Information can militate against the dangers of national and local corporatism and may encourage participation in the democratic process. The community is not a passive audience, but may take or encourage social action based on information.

A second audience for planning information is strategic policy makers and other planners who need to be alerted to particular issues requiring policy attention. They may use the information to set an agenda for initiating inter-agency contacts to foster coordination, often between or among competing programmes or objectives, whether at a departmental or strategic inter-departmental level. Planning information can help aid understanding of a broad range of issue areas which are interconnected, and which require a sensitivity to the 'inter-relatedness' of decisions. While sophisticated social modelling in a quantitative mode is impossible, it is part of the art of planning analysis to group the interconnected causes and effects of decision and action in various policy spheres. The operational aspects of such strategic policy making is anticipatory or proactive planning, which attempts to anticipate future issues and structure goals and objectives accordingly. This is the opposite of the more common ad hoc planning, or 'firefighting', which deals with issues only when they become critical problems.

Of course a flow of valid information from a monitoring system is a necessary but not sufficient condition for full and informed choice. Knowledge alone about complex policy problems is no guarantee of social progress without action. But action without knowledge may well compound already complex problems. Attention to feedback mechanisms is essential. Establishing high quality, and democratic, feedback mechanisms, or monitoring procedures in a broad sense, can be a progressive political act.
Information, I am arguing, is much more than a neutral commodity, but rather an integral part of sociocultural and political systems which reflect values and attitudes. Information and response are in an inseparable, complex and dynamic relationship (figure 10). This is important at two levels. First, the drive to create sophisticated, interlocking monitoring and communications networks is a natural response to turbulence and uncertainty in the organizational environment, but it also creates a dependence. As the stock market crash of 1987 demonstrates, turbulence can be increased as well as decreased when technologically sophisticated information networks interact with human attitudes and wilfulness. As our capability to manage complex information flows increases, so does our vulnerability to both technical breakdown, and more importantly, to politically or economically motivated abuse of the knowledge system. There can be no assumption that the development or operation of a strategic monitoring programme can be a technical excercise. This is important because not only is the information generated by monitoring value-laden; but both the institutional structure which is set up to monitor, and the political structure which makes use of the information, are expressions of political values and power relationships. It is for this reason that consideration of the political/institutional structure of any monitoring programme is as important as the substantive topics to be monitored. Value conflicts can exist in all aspects of a monitoring arrangement.

The choice of action modes when values conflict is either collaboration based on consensus, or continued conflict, and information plays an intensely political role in the negotiations that might lead to consensus. That information is political means that it can be one more lever used to the advantage of the existing power structure, whether between centre and periphery, first and third world, or among competing societal groups. The cliche that 'information is power' is an apt expression of its role.
in the political structuring of societies. It is also a warning to planners about their responsibilities to foster communicative frameworks which increase rather than decrease democratic participation in the decision making process, which recognise a multiplicity of appropriate social perspectives, and which foster understanding and informed choice. The discharge of such responsibilities is facilitated by reference back to ethical choices. Here moral dialogue can assist in understanding the considerable measure of responsibility which control over information entails. Equally the development of planning skills in philosophical and moral dialogue per se may make planners' future tasks easier if no less challenging.

**Figure 10: Information - Response Framework**
However the dissemination of knowledge, and its use in building coalitions based on common problem and value consensus, is but one important influence in policy decisions. It cannot be assumed that new organizational responses to turbulence such as monitoring agencies or joint ventures in planning and implementation are ipso facto more democratic by virtue of being innovative. Tensions between social control and freedom are likely to be a constant thread in planning. Joint venture planning organizations, such as urban development corporations, may eclipse or may reinforce local democracy depending on how they are constituted, and by whom. Once again the lesson is that the institutional structure of planning agencies, their freedom, constraints and resources, are more matters of political choice than simply questions of organizational efficiency. Monitoring arrangements in Canada, for example, have been known to be legally constituted and funded in such a way as to preclude their having any substantial influence, thus effectively cutting local citizens out of the political process (Carley, 1984). Each case needs to be considered on its own political and organizational merits.

In summary, the context of planning in the modern state is characterized by turbulent environments whose causal texture is richly joined in terms of the interaction between and among human organizations and the natural environment. High levels of complexity and interdependence mean that uncertainty is the norm rather than the exception. The most positive response to this situation is the rebuilding of social institutions in a way which will enable them and their members to respond to uncertainty in a rapid and unthreatened manner. To do so requires organizational learning and attention to the quality of societal information flows. The value basis of institutional structures in society need to be constantly reexamined. It also requires the restructuring of bureaucracies to allow networking, non-hierarchical lateral linkages, risk-taking, entrepreneurship and the possibility of failure. The possibility
of policy failure because of a natural inability to predict the consequences of action reinforces the need for monitoring systems focussed on policy implementation. In a turbulent environment there are no final solutions to social problems but rather a continuing series of appropriate responses. For planners, professional rewards must be found in the appropriate nature of responses rather than in the elegance of a model or a solution.

The uncertainty generated by turbulence, and the nature of spatial and functional centre-periphery relations, suggests that successful planning in the future may be the result of inter-agency collaboration in the face of metaproblems. Old styles of protective territoriality of planning functions may be inappropriate. A new set of communicative and synthesizing skills may be necessary to realize the benefits of multilevel, inter-agency planning. Underpinning all organizational learning should be a process of personal learning based on an exploration of the value basis from which planners work. This is a contentious area, at least for academic planning theorists with the time and inclination to reexamine the basis of their knowledge about the world. The problem of knowledge for planners is also germane to the question of the stature of planning as a social science.

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF PLANNING

In this section I turn from problems of planning to problems of planning theory. The main points all relate to the improvement of the relationship of theory to practice and vice-versa:

1. The Cartesian world view, the lingering influence of positivism, the lure of sophisticated quantitative modelling in the social sciences, and the disciplinary
organization of universities have all conspired to produce a narrow, compartmentalized knowledge base which is unable to deal with metaproblem complexity, and the unpredictability and intersubjectivity of social outcomes. A human ecological perspective can begin to rectify this situation.

2. Action research is a practical means of grounding theory-in-action and action-in-theory. Planning theorists and practitioners may both find benefit in its approach but further understanding of its processes and methodologies is required.

3. There are serious deficiencies in neo-Marxist, neo-Conservative and welfare bureaucratic approaches to theories of planning and the state. What is required is a theoretical approach underpinned by 'centrist' values. Centrist, not in a party-political sense, but in the sense that choosing between market or state is no longer the issue, if it ever was. Rather a task for planning theory is to find the right ethical and efficient balance among the many possibilities for state-market interaction, and to continually and systematically explore new policy options and institutional vehicles for social action.

4. Probably the greatest failing of positivistic social science has been the attempt to separate fact from value, which gave rise to the mistaken notion that 'social' science could be neutral and objective, and that facts are apolitical and therefore not implicitly prescriptive. But the social reality of man is political. This is a critical issue for planning, which holds a brief for the future, for in my view of the future there are no facts, only values. One way to work toward the convergence of fact and value is what I call a policy orientation for planning theory.
Planning Theory and the Bounds of Social Science

The question of whether existing planning theories have been able to make a contribution to our understanding of the crisis of planning, and whether they are able to speak to practising planners, was examined in the previous chapter. In particular, the focus was on three theoretical attempts which have begun something approaching a systematic critique of the role of planning in western capitalist societies. It was argued that these three theoretical orientations, whatever their prescriptive failings, have made contributions to our analytical understanding either in raising issues which have been on the whole ignored but are of practical significance (new decentralists), or in offering insights on the socio-historical context of planning (neo-Marxists), or in extending the arguments of theory to the point of practical advice to planners (critical theory). None however quite come to grips with the problem of organizational turbulence, nor do their explicit, or sometimes implicit, political assumptions make them wholly accessible to practising planners working at the state-market conjuncture in resilient liberal or social democratic societies.

In chapter five I argued that a great challenge to planning theorists was to link elements of utopian or moral vision with more practical explanatory models of socio-political process, and make practical suggestions for action on current planning issues. What is required of theorists is a series of social action theories which fuse explanations of the sociohistorical context with a constructive critique of existing theory and practice in a political language understandable to the practitioner. In addition the planning theorist, in particular among social scientists, has an obligation to transcend the attraction of mono-theorizing and to synthesize existing insights from a variety of academic disciplines. This responsibility of the theorist to the practitioner may be undervalued in planning but I argued that the rationale is clear:
without reference to planning practice, planning theory is pointless. If the concept of turbulence in a world system and its implications are accepted, then a primary step for planning theorists must be to ask in what areas can social science or planning theory can offer practical guidance, and what are the parameters which bound or constrain social theorizing and how these might be lessened?

In relating theory to practice, and vice-versa, there are two fundamental but interrelated challenges. The first, given planning's brief for the future, is to question whether predictions derived from formulations of social laws by social science are possible, and if not, how to conduct theoretical inquiries. I suggest the answers should be sought within a human ecology perspective and by attempting action research strategies. The second is to question the appropriate modes for planning action given that social reality is political, rather than objective, insofar as the basis of social knowledge cannot be separated from ethical values. I suggest a way forward for theory can be found in a more centrist approach to theory and in a policy orientation to theory. I consider each in turn.

The Problem of Systemic Laws: The Human Ecology Route to Social Understanding

The latter-day intellectual and administrative response to turbulence has been characterized by a) extreme specialization in the development of academic knowledge and b) compartmentalization of the public service into a plethora of poorly relating agencies, whose actions are as likely to lead to increased, as to decreased, turbulence. The problem is that specialization and compartmentalization, which may be necessary for systematic advancement of knowledge and for administrative control respectively, are insufficient as a response to turbulence. A second, higher
level of activity, called variously strategic planning or metapolicy-making is required. As turbulence increases, planners increasingly need to find themselves working at this level of activity. There is little however in the theoretical literature which addresses the problems of social action at this level of planning.

In a world described in part by the condition of turbulence, it is unrealistic to look for precise social laws which describe human organization and interaction. If social phenomena are both diverse and constantly changing, not least because human and organizational action is itself a causal antecedent, the influence of any social law may be counteracted in an unpredictable fashion by the influence of any other social law (Riley, 1986). Therefore, theories about the future behaviour of complex social systems will be as much normative or value-laden as explanatory beyond the level of the individual actor in the system. The parameters of systemic behaviour may be tentatively described, but poorly predicted. James Coleman (1986), in an insightful examination of the possibility of a theory of action in the social sciences, suggests that Parsonian-influenced, rationalistic social inquiry continues to this day a tradition stemming back to Hobbes, Locke, and J S Mill. This is to ground social inquiry in a theory of individual action where individuals are seen as purposeful and goal directed, guided by self-interest or values, and by the rewards and constraints of the social environment. In addressing macrosocial phenomena, such as political and economic systems, the functioning of societies could thus be explained in terms of purposive individual actions which linked the individual directly to society. In an optimistic view the individuals shaped the social system, and in the pessemistic view individuals were merely products of their environment. Both approaches ignore the fundamentally social nature of human life, and both, grounded in individual action and reinforced by social survey methodology, ignore the existence of turbulence and the
emergent, interactive, and intersubjective nature of human activity at the level of the larger community.

It is reasonable to ask why there has been little progress in revising the rationalistic approach to theories of social action. One reason is the specialization of knowledge and the continuing reinforcement of this by the discipline and reward structure in academic institutions. As described in chapter 5 this stems back to the intellectual roots of the Enlightenment and a drive to a reductionist view of what was perceived as a science-based, technological society. In a search for the respectability which the scientific method accorded to the natural sciences, the social sciences have tended to reinforce this reductionist tendency by an ahistorical, empirical methodological approach. For example, the development of statistical analysis in the social sciences in recent decades has caused a false shift in emphasis away from organisations and communities to individuals, who can be readily sampled:

On two grounds then the empirical research that became the dominant mode in sociology came to be of limited usefulness for social theory. First, it was lacking a theory of action, replacing 'action' with 'behaviour' and eliminating any recourse to purpose or intention in its causal explanations; second, it focused on explaining the behaviour of individuals per se, seldom moving up to the level of a community or other social systems (Coleman, 1986, p.131).

The result was:

extraordinarily elaborated methods for analysis of the behaviour of a set of independent entities (most often individuals,) with little development of methods for characterizing systemic action resulting from the interdependent actions of members of the system (Coleman, 1986, p.131).

As methodology became more sophisticated in statistical terms, social scientists became less able to see the forest of social reality for the trees of academic interest. Therefore a central theoretical task in future must be to consider the means by which purposive action of system actors and organizations combine to produce a social
outcome in system-level behaviour, and how the actions both shape and are shaped by constraints that result from the behaviour of the system itself. Here analytic tools are useful, for example the resource dependency concepts explored earlier, but philosophical and political discourse is a must. This holds as much for the natural as the social sciences because where scientific knowledge and values conjoin, for example, over the appropriate tolerance of present and future ecosystems for pollution, all action must be by recourse to value judgments.

Nowhere is this argument intended to denigrate the importance of rigorous inquiry in the natural or social sciences. Rather the main points are firstly, that the natural science approach doesn't logically extend to social inquiry. Secondly, that social prediction is a matter of values and vision, and qualitative or soft information is therefore an essential complement to information which can be readily quantified. Thirdly, that rigorous inquiry can only be interpreted in terms of higher order, value laden discourse. But because organizations and individual actions are highly conjoined in turbulent environments social theory must take into account the basic unpredictability of social outcomes and the role of value consensus and/or political and economic power in shaping social outcome.

If social prediction cannot be scientific, or even quasi-scientific, but consists mainly of philosophical discourse, then neo-positivist methodologies are of little use to the planning theorist. Further, if there is one lesson from a consideration of the planning context, it is that highly interactive systemic level outcomes can only be considered in an holistic, interdisciplinary framework which recognises that the environment, social structure, social groups, economic functions and cultural values must all be considered together at some point in an analysis of planning problems. Consideration
of any one factor in isolation will seldom be sufficient where 'messy problems' require a systemic view.

There is increasing recognition that an holistic, interdisciplinary perspective is essential, for all its difficulties, and in the face of a lack of a professional reward structure. An interdisciplinary perspective has an emergent quality: the whole is often more than the sum of the parts, particularly where interdisciplinary teams can address policy problems. Conversely, as I have argued, it is common for social scientists working from the perspective of a single discipline to tend to be reductionist in that they may mistake their necessary abstractions from reality for reality itself. Santos (1986) argues that one of the most potent causes of the crisis of the social sciences is their insularity, shortsightedness, and neglect of comprehensive, systemic studies. Capra (1983) describes the need for an holistic or ecological perspective:

We live today in a globally interconnected world, in which biological, psychological, social and environmental phenomena are all interdependent. To describe this world appropriately we need an ecological perspective which the Cartesian world view does not offer.

In attempting to come to grips with development planning problems, Braillard (1986, p.630) argues that 'only a transdisciplinary approach going beyond traditional disciplinary frameworks and opening the way to a paradigm of complexity can do justice to the multi-dimensional nature of development'.

Unfortunately there is much lip service but little reward in academic or government circles for interdisciplinary analysis, and intelligent generalists often need some security of tenure before they can start generalizing. Academic journals in particular are unresponsive to holistic approaches outside of policy studies, futures
research, and planning. This reflects the nature of the higher educational process by which academic disciplines socialize their members into particular paradigmatic views which can be almost insurmountable barriers to communication. Social scientists of different disciplines suffer from problems in communication and that between social and natural scientists is more difficult still. Language, jargon, different methodological approaches, and different world views all serve to keep disciplines apart. Attempts at multidisciplinary teamwork or true interdisciplinary analysis can be extremely challenging, and a positive reward structure is often necessary. In Holland, for example, the national government offers financial inducement to universities to establish inter-departmental policy units focussed on areas or topics of interest, for example, on technology assessment or flood plain management. But Holland is the exception rather than the rule, and most efforts at interdisciplinary planning face an uphill struggle in securing mandate, resources, in operating, and in acceptance of findings.

Government departments also very often adopt a narrow sectoral and programme approach to policy problems which precludes interdisciplinary and interagency perspectives (Kuklinksi, 1987). Attempts to counter this natural inclination in the Canadian federal government bureaucracy have been described as 'like pulling against gravity', and doubt has been expressed about whether even the Canadian Prime Minister himself could alter current bureaucratic arrangements (Savoie, 1984). Practically all government bureaucracies share this problem - in part because there are many tangible inducements to do so and little reward for operating in any other way.

However planning, perhaps because it is not a traditional discipline but rather a more vocationally-oriented 'school' within the social sciences, possesses the rudiments of
an holistic perspective. Its outlook is already multi-disciplinary, to its great advantage, and this facilitates transition to true interdisciplinary analysis. The intake of the average graduate level planning class will commonly consist of geographers, economists, biologists, ecologists, political scientists, and other disciplines. This puts planning, along with schools of public policy, in a unique position to evolve methods of social enquiry which overcome or transcend existing doctrines and rigidities in the social sciences.

The Action Research Approach

In the previous section, action-learning strategies were discussed. Here I turn to the action research sub-model which is specifically intended to account for the limitations of positivist approaches to social knowledge; to mediate between theory and practice, to enhance both; to link the research process to the needs of action; and to use reflective social experience to make theory more practical. According to Winter (1987, p.1) the interesting thing about action research is that:

it claims to reject both of the institutional traditions which propose grounds for its activities: action-research rejects the tradition of scientific research, by invoking as a central principle the need for practical effectiveness at the level of mundane activity; and it rejects the tradition of mundane practice, by invoking as a central principle the scrutiny of practical judgements by means of research.

The argument for action research is that the limitations imposed on social inquiry by the positivist approach are so severe that the results of the research process are of little or no value to practical decision making, and that the resultant theory is so divorced from reality as to be suspect, however analytically logical. In particular, traditional methods of social inquiry:
a) require that the primary objective of research remain unaltered during the
research process;

b) that there is precise and measurable control over dependent variables and that
intervening variables can be controlled or excluded from the research
framework; and

c) that the researcher remain neutral and dispassionate throughout the process.

The action research perspective on the other hand, argues that b) is impossible in a
dynamic policy situation characterized by turbulence, and that a) and c) greatly
reduce the value of the research approach to real life concerns. All three ensure that
qualitative and complex aspects of problems will be ignored or undervalued. For
these reasons positivistic approaches are unrealistic, cumbersome, unresponsive and
unable to bridge institutional barriers to understanding. The action research
perspective:

1. makes use of the social context of research to increase its own effects;

2. redefines the research process towards rapid iterative cycle of problem-
discovery-reflection-response-problem redefinition;

3. replaces the neutral scientific observer with a multi-disciplinary team of
practitioner/theorists, all working as facilitators in a process of mutual self-
education;
4. recognizes that the methods of social inquiry influence the content of knowledge obtained; and

5. argues that pluralistic evaluation replace static models of social processes, this is characterized by concern for:
   - institutional functioning
   - monitoring of project implementation
   - the subjective views of major constituent groups
   - methodological 'triangulation' by which a variety of data sources are brought to bear.

6. builds theory or generalization from the above elements, which in turn is constantly tested against both experience and the results of current action.

Action research therefore differs substantially from research or action alone (Midwinter, 1972). From research, in its avoidance of the static, controlled and contrived model and its emphasis on a fluid, on-going approach which generates conclusions at the most appropriate time. It differs from action alone in the constant feeding back of evaluation resulting in crucial shifts in the direction of action. Action research is about collaboration and dialogue:

Action-research is a collaborative endeavour in which groups of practitioners work together to understand better their own practice, to increase their awareness of the effects of their practice, and of their control over the situation in which they work. (Brown et al., 1982, p.4)

Brown et al. add that practitioners benefit greatly from the assistance of 'facilitators' from outside the immediate situation being studied - an important role for the academic planning theorist who wishes to ground theory in action.
In Chapter 1. I noted how planning's vocational orientation (i.e. to practice) continually tested and found wanting its theoretical contributions on the criteria that theory should speak to practice. Action research can help overcome that problem. The author, for example, has found it effective in situations as diverse as health planning in the UK and in studying and promoting the influence of environmental concerns in third world development. I would suggest that its applicability could be widespread and that it could assist in the integration of theory and practice. It does require that practitioners make space for theorists/researchers in their planning agencies, and that theorists take a practical interest in the challenges of planning action.

**Centrist Paradigm of Social Inquiry**

Recently some scholars are becoming aware of the fundamental insufficiencies of current approaches. The neo-Marxist Wallerstein (1986) for example proposes no less than a 'third era of social science', which is to move us beyond the first two eras of philosophical social science and scientific social science. New approaches are marked by attention and interpretation of social and political interactions in process, always looking for something *practically* better based on a critique of existing social reality. New approaches cannot rely on the acquired wisdom of the recent scientific era of social science:

> No doubt there is wisdom there, but we have to tear it into very small bits in order to reassemble it in forms that are usable. Not to do so is simply to fall further into the monumental culs-de-sac in which, as of the 1960s, both orthodox Marxism and scientific social science found themselves (Wallerstein, 1986, p.1306).

Wallerstein summarizes the task as he sees it:
The task before us is precisely to place the activities of the intelligentsia (i.e. social science) and the activities of political organizations in a framework in which, in tension and tandem with each other, they illuminate the historical choices rather than presume to make them ... The political task is to reconstruct a strategy of change that in fact will work ... The intellectual's task is to create a methodology that will seize the unseizable process ... in which contradiction is intrinsic (p.1307-8).

But neo-Marxism itself, in its hundreds of guises, falls into an outdated category of methods of social inquiry. It 'remains largely negative, a demolition job which cannot put anything better in place of capitalism' (Mishra, 1984, p.97). Neo-Marxist social science steadfastly refuses to come to grips with the resilience of the capitalist economic system, 'capable of undergoing major internal modifications without promoting the sort of revolutionary cataclysm which Marx anticipated' (Giddens, 1981, p.286). It comes as no surprise that advanced neo-Marxist thinkers such as Habermas and perhaps Wallerstein, in attempting to push forward Marxist analysis by taking account of the nature of the modern world, become increasingly non-Marxist.

Social scientists are also beginning to find that other existing approaches to social inquiry, based on either neo-conservative or welfare state assumptions, are as insufficient as the current neo-Marxist view as a way forward in societal analysis. The neo-conservative view, for example, attempts to separate politics from economics by ignoring that state intervention across a broad range of activities is now intrinsic to the workings of capitalism and to the promotion of quality of life in civilized societies. Although the chances of a reappearance of laissez-faire are nil, neo-conservatives are wont to cloak value-laden views on social justice and redistribution behind technical arguments for market efficiency.

Finally the pragmatic, Fabian-inspired welfare bureaucratic view has suffered from failing to propose partial theories of the state from which to analyse the reality of
the welfare state as a social structure, and from which to argue the case for social benefit from a mixed capitalist economy. Their weakness was compounded by a refusal to recognise until recently the obvious social dysfunctions caused by entrenched corporatist aspects of the welfare state. These became particularly apparent in the inability of the welfare bureaucracy and nationalized industries to respond appropriately to organizational turbulence in the form of recession. In the UK for example, it was a Labour rather than Conservative government which accommodated recession by going cap in hand to the IMF. The result was a predictable but swingeing round of public expenditure cuts of the sort very often imposed on developing countries. Subsequently Labour was virtually thrown out of office as a result of the rebellion of corporatist trade unions against pay restraint, in what was euphemistically known as the 'winter of discontent'. Similarly in 1987 the 'self-managed' Yugoslavian economy, long an inspiration to planning theorists, was in the same dire straits, its government in the queue on the steps of the IMF. Capitalists and communists vie for position in the queue, an effect of organizational turbulence in interlinked national-international economies. Such turbulence has not been captured by simplistic social scientific models based on simple assumptions. In this sense social theorizing has often been out of sync with the more complex social reality.

Given the apparent deficiencies of existing neo-Marxist, neo-Conservative, and welfare bureaucratic views of the state, the implication of a new approach to social science for planning must be, as a first step, a theoretically-substantiated and politically more centrist position merging a pragmatism borne out of an understanding of the context of planning with a recognition of the political basis of all planning activity. The position is centrist not in a party-political sense, but in the sense that choosing between market or state is no longer the issue, if it ever was.
Rather a task for planning theory is to find the right ethical and efficient balance among the many possibilities for state-market interaction, and to continually and systematically explore new policy options and institutional vehicles for social action. This view recognizes the intrinsic abilities of markets to satisfy a range of human needs and wants by combining information and reward structure. Conversely it is also important that in the provision of genuine public goods and in societal mediation it is usually only the state, as the now paramount social institution in complex societies, which provides the means for reconciling and mediating among value groups. And only the state can provide the strategic guidance necessary to supplement market provision with the public goods and redistributive functions which are indicative of mature societies not satisfied with what has been called 'private wealth and public squalor'. The opposite of that condition arises when markets work within a larger ethical framework of civic morality based on measure of societal consensus over the appropriate balance of individual freedom and social responsibility. The state can and should nurture such civic morality.

Also if planners are to appreciate the context of planning as holistic and interdisciplinary they will need to take into account the nature of the world economic system, described by a universalization of production and value, marketing, finance and resource exploitation. As Santos (1986, p.658) says: 'globalization is a phenomenon to be reckoned with. Today, anything which is not globalized must be defined in terms of globalization'. Public sector planners may need to learn about the developing expertise in global strategic planning used by their quietly influential counterparts in multinational corporations (for example see Leontiades, 1986; Taylor, 1986).
Finally, whatever the rhetoric of right or left, the evidence is that when confronted with severe or messy societal problems, covering a broad range of sub-problems, the appropriate organizational response is likely to be a measure of public-private and voluntary sector co-operation rather than unilateral action. In an appendix I illustrate this case in the discussion of urban decline and policy response in the UK. For planning theorists an important task is to use interdisciplinary analysis as a basis to argue the costs and benefits of different options in the state-market synthesis.

The Problem of Values: A Policy Orientation

Implicit in these arguments has been the assumption that an objective for planning theory is to fuse a critical function with a practical orientation. Semantic debates about rationality should give way to attention to the epistemological underpinnings in social science and the legacy of positivism in planning and the social sciences, discussed in chapter five. As I argued there, probably the greatest failing of positivistic social science has been the attempt to separate fact from value, by the argument that the basis of scientific knowledge can be separated from ethical values. This gave rise to the mistaken notion that 'social' science could be value-free, or neutral and objective, and that facts are apolitical and therefore not implicitly prescriptive. But the social reality of man is distinguished from other social, animal societies by the fact that human existence is political, and politics is a function of man's response to the world (Levy, 1981). This is a critical issue for planning, which holds a brief for the future, for in my view of the future there are no facts, only values. And these values are rooted in our past experience of social reality, which carries with it, implicitly, political and evaluative convictions. Values therefore are deeply influential in the work of planners and other policy analysts. Their influence on the policy-making process is normative rather than technical, in that their analysis
may both consider others' values, and be a statement of their own. Nor are values simply another order of social facts, but have been described as the 'forces which lie behind the creation of events' (Simey 1968, p.154).

It is at the conjunction of fact and value that planning theorists work, and one important task is the shaping, using, and redistribution of planning knowledge. The Oxford English Dictionary defines knowledge as the fusion of experience, information and theoretical and practical understanding. Neither fact in the absence of values nor values in the absence of facts can be construed as true knowledge. One way to work toward the convergence of fact and value, or true knowledge, is to think about the essential elements of what I call a policy orientation for planning theory. Here I use the term 'policy' to denote action based on knowledge; this derives from the OED's definition of policy as 'prudent conduct, sagacity in a general plan of action'. It could equally be called 'practical theory'.

In epistemological terms the policy orientation is directed towards critical issue in planning, that is, instrumental or empirical analysis may be useful but has no life of its own outside of the context of value judgments by political actors backed up by a capacity to influence the course of events. The potential policy impacts uncovered, and the scenarios proposed, in planning studies are not self-evident truths but rather statements of some pre-action potential, neither morally elitist nor superior to other such statements. For example, Horowitz (1978) argues that 'policy science is a contradiction in terms ... social science can never take for granted the things which make for political sovereignty'. The term 'policy' is used to reflect more accurately the relative and reflexive nature of the activity of planning which occurs at the conjuncture of fact and value. Gregg (1976, p.2) suggests why this is the case:
Policy systems are human artifacts that are grounded in language and modified by large numbers of discrete choices by persons and collectivities. They are open systems. As policy projections move into the future, the probability increases that transformations will be governed by factors which cannot be predicted... As a result a large proportion of the conjectures that policy scholars use to array alternatives will be based on conceptualizations and inferential reasoning unsupported by rigorous data and models.

Within a policy system, government should be directly concerned with question of values incorporated into policies, just as industry is more directly concerned with profit and productivity. Government especially makes policy decisions which call for an understanding of the broad political options and the impacts of policies on present and future social groups, and a selection of social or economic objectives. The policy process is a form of social debate concerned in part with the survival of the institutions of political life. As Wildavsky (1979, p. 16) puts it '...policy analysis must be prescriptive; arguments about correct policy, which deal in the future, cannot help but be wilful and therefore political'. Because the policy process (which encompasses the elements of information, synthesis, decision, and execution) is no less than extended social debate, the development of elements of communicative action, and of strategic feedback/monitoring systems are both important areas for fruitful theory/practice developments. The hoped-for outcome of this debating process is informed decisions and further empowerment in the democratic process.

A policy orientation should therefore encompass an understanding of the process of policy formation with its essential, and often paramount, emphasis on political value judgments, value manipulation, social debate and dissent and in particular, moves toward value consensus and bureaucratic maintenance. One part of the policy process involves an iterative cycle by which policy development is informed by planning activities. In turn the contingencies of policy-making serve to reestablish some of the parameters of planning. This is important, because as Carter (1981,
p.172) says, 'it is in the process of development and application that one discovers what are the really significant unanswered questions' (my emphasis). It is in iterative problem reformulation rather than problem resolution that exists the seed of a potential consensus which generates progression social action. A planner's primary task is to assist in social problem definition, which in itself is a political activity which conjoins fact and values.

This is not to imply however that the contribution of planning to the policy formation process is always substantial. The effects may range from major to nil. Planning activities may help to solve some problems but the real tasks of the planner in the policy process are: 1) identifying and defining socio-economic and environmental problems as a step towards putting them on the political agenda, 2) mobilizing government action or the action of community groups, 3) confronting societal dilemmas and trade-offs and helping to build a measure of societal consensus, 4) helping to develop practical tools, such as monitoring capacity, to respond to turbulence, and 5) shaping and redistributing the knowledge base both to government and those societal groups disadvantaged in their possession of information and their ability to use it.

If planning is as much oriented towards 'problem setting' as problem solving, it is bound to be a very disorderly process as different interest groups make use of research and analysis to further their views. Rival groups bid for influence and the planner participates, not by 'solving' the problem, but by helping to define the real nature of the issue, and by helping individuals and groups towards a common conception of the problem, if not the apparent solution (Rein and White, 1977, p.132-3). In this conception, policy choices are enlightened but not resolved by the activity of planning.
However, acceptance of a policy orientation may not be an easy task for planners. First and on a personal level, planners, like other human beings, have their own reference groups, reward structures, and professional canons. The disorderliness of societal agenda setting, and the differences between perceptions of planning analysis and politics, set up tensions not easily resolved. The 'relativeness' of planning, with its many methodologically unsupportable assumptions about the future, may cause the planner to look longingly at the tidiness of the positivistic model, even when the very failures of positivism have brought the benefits of social science into disrepute. At times the results of half a professional lifetime of planning analysis may be conveniently ignored or manipulated for politically expedient reasons. Also many policy scholars have one foot in policy research and the other in their particular academic discipline such as geography or biology, and legitimation in one area may produce negative response in the other. Moreover in client-centred planning there can be a constant tension between clients' political objectives and the planners' professional values.

At another level the planner is not a politician, and yet planners are asked regularly to propose and evaluate programmes in transport, housing, urban renewal, resource development etc. which have dramatic social impact, but without there being the necessary public debate about the issues. When this situation occurs there is a transfer of responsibility from politicians to planners which may put the planner in an untenable moral position. Unfortunately there are no ready answers to such dilemmas. Good planners are marked by their ability to deal with the relative and reflective nature of their calling, and with the ambiguous situations in which they find themselves. Conversely, persons keen on working in a deterministic manner in a highly structured environment make poor planners. Working in a relative and ambiguous environment, however, doesn't mean that the planner is in ignorance of the
forces at work in that environment, nor of its institutional arrangements which have been the focus of this dissertation.

A policy orientation then is a perspective on the locus of the planning activity in the wider world, which is represented by a framework of diverse concepts: norms, values, assumptions, etc. It is something which could be aspired to, an ideal of sorts. I refer to the argument that good policy scholarship constantly attempts to make what Jenkins (1978) calls a 'linkage of levels' between practical experience and social theorizing. This has been lacking in much planning theory. This is what I have argued here: that the planner be explicitly aware of the inescapable context of the activity. This dissertation has put forward one view of that context as a means of encouraging that each conceptual area, and the whole flow of concept and activity, should be of moral and intellectual concern.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have recommended a theoretical programme which:

a) recognises that the institutional structure and context of planning organizations reflects dominant, but alterable, political values;

b) seeks to develop practical organizational options at the state-market conjuncture which fuse the advantages of market intelligence systems with an ethical notion of social responsibility by which the individual and the wider community relate to one another, and which is nurtured by the state and other societal institutions;
c) recognises the societal advantages of building coalitions towards political consensus as a mode of social action;

d) overcomes governmental, intergovernmental and sectorial compartmentalization and tension by the promotion of intra- and inter-agency communicative action, joint working, and risk-taking;

e) meets turbulence by combining appropriate structural and behavioural responses such as action learning and research, matrix management, entrepreneurship, and by organizational adaptation which elevates learning to a primary organizational function;

f) recognises the necessity of strategic monitoring as a planning task, the political nature of planning information, and the planner's responsibility to redistribute information in the policy process according to principles of distributional equity based on ethical formulations.

g) overcomes the problems of disciplinary specialization by a human, ecological perspective in theory;

h) accepts that insofar as planning is about the future it always involves the fusion of fact and value, what I call knowledge.

In coming to these conclusions I have argued that what has been called the crisis of planning reflects a series of endemic tensions over the role of the state in society, the relationship of centre to periphery, the appropriate degree of centralization or decentralization of planning functions, and the appropriate planning response in an
environment bound to be characterized by the uncertainty generated from turbulence. A closer examination reveals that although the current round of neo-conservative rhetoric against planning proves convenient to their political objectives in rearranging the public-private balance of the welfare state, the value of the planning function as a strategic window on the possibility of the future remains. Planners knowledgeable about the options for the intervention of the state in society, and the likely costs and benefits of different arrangements, may argue more confidently the benefits of the planning approach to public sector problems. It has also been argued here that an holistic analysis of the basis for arguing a crisis of planning has provided a conceptual framework for sensitizing the planner to the context of public sector planning, and which is both necessary and helpful in relating theory to practice. In a subsequent appendix a case study of a planning metaproblem is analysed by the framework proposed and, I would argue, demonstrates its theoretical and practical value.

While the dissertation has not attempted to propose this as a unified social theory, indeed argued such was impossible, it is possible to conceive that the same analytic approach would be useful in understanding other planning problems. For example, a case study of resource development in Canada's Beaufort region made early use of the rudiments of a similar analytic framework (Carley, 1984b). Equally an examination of the problems associated with basic needs programmes in less developed countries might also make use of such a framework. Finally, as the discussion of the social scientific and policy-related issues associated with urban decline and deprivation will illustrate, planners who don't wish to make recourse to extremist or apocalyptic prescriptions on the role of the state will need to complement the spatially oriented focus of land use planning with a policy oriented mode of thinking and action, characterized by the primacy of values and by an
interdisciplinary approach to planning. Here an emphasis on traditional planning skills is supplemented by attention to communication skills in all forms, and to the increasing importance of inter-agency policy coordination and risk-taking joint ventures. In this conception knowledge may be a valuable and scarce commodity, and its possession may affect the distribution of power. The planner has an obvious moral obligation in this regard.

Although moves in this direction have been going on for some time, there remains powerful resistance. Planners' professional organizations in Canada and the UK are loath to admit to a broader, non-land use focus for planning, perhaps for fear of losing control over the education of planners, or of planners being further relegated into the rather second-class professional status in which they are habitually typecast. In the UK for example, the Royal Town Planning Institute is still arguing, after 25 continuous years of debate, about whether it can admit a category of 'associate members' which, while not 'formally trained in town planning, constitutes a qualified experienced group of practitioners which de facto contributes to knowledge, understanding and capability in the field of town planning' (Planning, 27/11/87). Here it might be that a less defensive approach is more profitable. In any event planners will continue to move into a broad range of related fields as long as they see the necessity and interest of doing so. This is in no way to denigrate the traditional planning functions which centre around development control and land use planning, but only to argue that the profession could be considered far broader than that one area of expertise. Certainly the range of activities which come under the rubric 'engineering' might be indicative of how many types of planning there must be. At a time when the rational model of planning expertise leading to 'correct' solutions is negated, when the need for interdisciplinary approaches is ever more apparent; and when town planners themselves are engaged in economic promotion, social services
development, natural resource management and a host of other functions, it is very difficult to substantiate a narrow definition of the field.

A second area of resistance to a broad of the definition of planning may come in universities, where planning departments may feel under threat for their lack of a traditional discipline structure, particularly at times of financial retrenchment. They may feel out of sync with the compartmentalized intellectual arrangements and reward structures of the university generally. In the best universities these threats will not be felt and planning departments, like schools of public policy, are rightfully seen as practical, policy-oriented, and knowledge-synthesizing branches of the more general intellectual programme. Academic planning departments will hopefully find that in the long run they are best to emphasize their practical policy-oriented and interdisciplinary strengths rather try to become more narrowly focussed as a defensive reaction.

Finally, the general purpose of this dissertation has been to state the argument that value-free planning is an impossibility, and that this conclusion should now be self-evident. The analysis of fact and the appraisal of value in planning problems must be simultaneous and explicit. Economic growth is not to be confused with moral progress, and facts take on significance from what should be a framework of ethical considerations. Planning activities can make early and useful contribution to problem definition, subsequent value consensus, and thus to the functioning of political institutions.

A policy orientation has been suggested to encourage an understanding of the centrality of values and their function within the socio-cultural planning context which they in part define. This understanding should be integral to the conceptual
framework of the planner who clarifies values in relation to facts and thus assists in the production of genuine new knowledge, which can influence the social reality we all share; and so influence human opportunity and direction in a positive manner.

THE END
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APPENDIX

USE OF THE CONCEPTS FOR PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
OF A PLANNING METAPROBLEM: U.K. urban decline and policy response

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation has explored a number of key concepts which derived from a systematic examination of the possibility of a crisis of planning. In this appendix some of these analytic concepts are grounded in a discussion of a contemporary planning problem: industrial dereliction and urban decline in the UK.

The extent of current political concern about this problem has been expressed by Britain's Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd:

Each generation brings a major social challenge and to my mind solving the problems of the inner cities is the challenge for late twentieth century Britain.

Most of the analytic concepts proposed in the previous discussion surfaces in some way in this urban planning problem, these are summarized in the conclusion of this chapter. First, in introducing the problem, I hope to demonstrate the extent to which in any consideration of what may appear to be an urban and spatial problem the planner must act as a policy analyst rather than as a spatial technician, particularly in understanding the international economic context of the problem, and the intellectual currents and political values which underlie both problem perception, and policy and organizational responses.
Cities are elements of societal systems: urban problems and prospects are inextricably linked with broad social, economic and demographic movements. Urban policy making and planning activities, as all other, are the product of the continuous interaction of intellectual process and institutional change. Banting (1979) argues that intellectual processes and research can contribute to conceptual shifts which may be the major agents of policy innovation in subsequent decades. Institutional change, on the other hand, is the result of some mix of party government, group conflict, administrative attitude, and public preference.

Three paradigms appear to have been paramount in urban policy and planning in the UK since the 1950s: environmental determinism, the culture of poverty thesis, and structural analysis. The intellectual origins of environmental determinism are well documented in the apparently diverse Garden Cities movement in planning, in the Victorian social reform movement, and in the modernist movement in architecture (Ravetz, 1980; Donnison, 1980; Esher, 1981). Its basic premise was that control and manipulation of the physical environment had a direct and determinate effect on social behaviour. In the words of Broady (1968) it implied a one way process in which the physical environment is the independent, and human behaviour the dependant variable.

The policy implications of environmental determinism have been dramatic: widespread urban renewal and slum clearance, massive public housing projects and council estates, urban motorways and the general cleaning-up of the messy bits of urban mixed land use in an attempt to approximate the tidiness of single use zoning. The criticisms of environmental determinism are legion, both as a normative
paradigm, and for the destruction of local communities and the urban fabric (Goodman, 1971; Aidous, 1975; Esher, 1981; Coleman, 1985).

The culture of poverty (or cycle of deprivation) thesis had its intellectual origins in the social area analysis of Park and Burgess (1925, 1952) and the Chicago school of sociologists, extended by the work of Shevky and Bell (1955). The basic premise of the culture of poverty thesis is that physical, economic and social handicaps reinforce one another to ensure life-cycle and inter-generational multiple deprivation on the part of the urban poor, who are spatially concentrated and can be identified as so. There is an implicit assumption that the origins of poverty can be found in the inadequacy of individuals and families who lived in deprived environments. Later the work of Oscar Lewis (1966) was the impetus for extensive policy efforts based on this thesis, and in the 1960s, as Donnison (1980) puts it, 'social policy goes spatial'. In the U.K. this began with the Local Government Act (1966) which provided additional staff in local authorities with high concentrations of ethnic minorities. Other similar policy efforts included the Educational Priority Neighbourhoods, General Improvement Areas, Housing Action Areas and Community Development Projects, all of which involved the identification of 'deprived' urban neighbourhoods suitable for fiscal intervention, advice giving, and advocacy planning. Wholehearted adherence to the notion of a culture of poverty has waned in the face of considerable practical criticism (Rutter and Madge, 1976; Carley, 1981; Brown and Madge, 1982; Higgens et al., 1983;). However its policy influence remains in the U.K., especially in some aspects of the Inner Area Partnerships and in the so-called 'bending of main departmental programmes' towards the inner cities.

Structural analysis is the current orthodoxy. Efforts to break the cycle of deprivation and to focus on urban deprivation at the neighbourhood level
demonstrated that such attempts promised poor results in the face of existing international and national demographic and economic trends and arrangements. In Coventry, for example, the Community Development Team found themselves becoming increasingly aware of the extent to which the fortunes of their local priority area were influenced by forces outside local control. This community, the home of Chrysler UK (now Citroen-Taibot), was far more influenced by decisions taken in Detroit, London and Paris than any made locally. No local positive discrimination programme could counteract the effect of Chrysler's fortunes in the international auto market. The final report of the Coventry CDP, entitled 'Gilding the Ghetto', expressed clearly the structuralists' opinion of locally based positive discrimination programmes.

Other factors which influenced the efficacy of local programmes included migration of population and employment opportunities to the suburban periphery and to 'sunbelt' cities, deindustrialization of older manufacturing centres, the rise of service industries and the new technologies, transfer of comparative advantage regionally and internationally; and in terms of poverty, dramatic unemployment and mismatch between the skills of inner city residents and those require in new types of employment (Hall and Hay, 1980). The basic policy objective has been towards the maintenance of high levels of aggregate economic performance in the face of international and national restructuring of the industrial and service economies. Urban programs based on this line of reasoning include diverse attempts at employment and retraining schemes for inner city residents, and provision of land, infrastructure, financial and other incentives for prospective employers. These efforts are bolstered by central government funds available for local spending, for example, from the Inner City Partnerships. Intellectually part of the origins of the structuralist analysis is from neo-Marxist analysts considered in the main body of this.
dissertation (Harvey, 1973; Pickvance, 1976; Castells, 1977), but many of the perspectives provided by this analysis equally suit conservative ideology and the new right's orientation to urban poverty and decline (Hicks, 1982; Ledebur, 1982).

A BRIEF REVIEW OF SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON URBAN DECLINE

The recent literature on economic restructuring and urban decline is substantial, but inconclusive. The main points raised with regard to these issues are reviewed here only briefly.

Some connection among industrial restructuring, unemployment and urban decline is generally agreed (Blackaby, 1979; Berthoud and Brown, 1981), but beyond that opinions differ. Certainly one of the main causes of being in poverty is insufficient income, which in turn is caused by unemployment and underemployment. The numbers of the unemployed in the U.K. has risen dramatically, to about 13% of the labour force in 1986. This is related to a process of urban change described by Young and Mason (1983, p.219) as investment 'relocating to urban fringe or non-fringe locations on a dynamic and cumulative tide of urban deindustrialization'.

There is increasing evidence that the problems of long-term unemployment and underemployment may not resolve themselves with the ending of the recent recession. In the short term, recent rises in per unit labour productivity in many of the OECD countries suggest that many of the unemployed may not necessarily be rehired even as economies expand. In the current relatively small economic expansion companies' order books are filling, more goods are being produced and inventories built up, without any consequential demand for new workers. These productivity gains, while important for economic reasons, do not suggest any
reduction in unemployment, at least in the short-term. In the medium-term, increased profits will be used for technological upgrading in the form of microprocessor applications, robots and flexible manufacturing systems. Further unemployment could well result. There is little agreement on whether new technology will eventually result in an increase or in a decrease in the number of jobs.

There is of course considerable evidence that poverty associated with long-term unemployment and deindustrialization is of substantial magnitude in declining industrial cities and regions, compared with suburban and rural areas. Deindustrialization here is defined as the cumulative decline in the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the economy, whether measured in terms of investment, employment, output, or exports (Martin, 1982). Changes wrought by deindustrialization occur internationally (steel production transfers to Korea), inter-regionally (a new 'sun-belt' in southern England at the expense of the industrial north), and at the inter-urban level (green field sites for single-level manufacturing in industrial parks on the urban periphery). A number of urban analysts agree that urban deindustrialization, although directly related to national economic decline, is clearly magnified in regions or local areas where there is a historical concentration of manufacturing employment, relative to the national pattern (Brownrigg, 1983; Ross et al., 1980, Elias and Keogh, 1982). Other researchers suggest that the degree to which the problem can be anticipated spatially is a function of an area's i) industrial structure, ii) urban infrastructure, and iii) size of manufacturing plant (Fothergill and Gudgin, 1982). There is certainly evidence that, whatever the causative factors involved, older cities have borne the brunt of the financial and human costs of economic restructuring (Young and Mason, 1983).
As to the actual causes of urban decline, and therefore declining employment availability, the evidence is confusing. Bradbury et al. (1982) identify no less than 37 theories of urban decline, and there is not the space here to attempt to interrelate these arguments. Briefly, research on unemployment tends to focus on either supply or demand, that is in the provision of employment opportunity, or on the characteristics of the labour force, and on the mismatch between the two. In the first case, factors considered included changes in industrial structure and locational advantage (Gripaios, 1977a and b; Fagg, 1980; Danson et al., 1980; Nicholson et al., 1981; Wellbelove et al., 1981; Fothergill and Gudgin, 1982); the role of multinational corporations and capital (Manners et al. 1980; Ross et al., 1981, Brownrigg, 1983); of local planning (Bull, 1979; Mills and Young, 1986); and of labour markets (Button, 1978; Cheshire, 1979; Evans, 1980; Mason, 1980). A number of authors have attempted to bring this diversity of information together (Jones, 1979; Eversley and Evans, 1980; Lawless, 1981; Young and Mason, 1983; Higgins et al., 1983).

ISSUES GOVERNING PLANNING RESPONSES TO URBAN DECLINE

There are at least four important issues which are critical to a planning response to urban decline. First, the broad process of deindustrialization, however defined, is clearly linked with a dramatic growth in urban unemployment in the U.K. At issue however is whether policies designed to counter this situation are feasible at all, or are only as Young and Mason (1983) ponder, symbolic activities running counter to the dynamic and cumulative tide of deindustrialization. The policy implications of the question are substantial. The arguments are basically for policies to promote urban economic regeneration in distressed regions, on the one hand, or for an emphasis on the health of the national economy as a prime policy orientation on the other. The latter implies little (or even no) regard for the geographic distribution of negative
effects, beyond the usual income supplements provided as matter of general social policy. The gradual policy shift from a spatial concern for unemployment and regional development to a national economic recovery orientation has recently been characterized by a political commentator as the transition from the welfare state to the Business Society (Young, 1984). The Business Society doesn't 'have policies to attack unemployment, but policies to encourage business, which may or may not increase jobs'. The Business Society is marked, it is argued, 'by the uncontested dethronement of the caring principle', that is, the welfare state. At the extreme, arguments against the welfare state suggests that the provision of social benefits themselves may debilitate national economic recovery, although there is scant evidence put forward to support such a contention. In any event, arguments on the future of the welfare state are dramatic and at their root, intensely political.

Second, there is evidence that employment goals, particularly the provision of jobs, are not necessarily realized by policies designed to promote economic recovery via production efficiency, plant rationalization, modernization of equipment and geographical relocation. As has been suggested, the central government's economic objectives, oriented to modern capital intensive and high technology industries, may in fact be incompatible with policy objectives to increase employment, as increasingly espoused by local government. Whether from confusion over this, or more likely for reasons of political and administrative convenience, there is a marked reluctance to face this issue in discussion or in attempts to rationalize policy.

Third, attempts to develop a coordinated approach to urban policymaking, especially the Inner Cities Programme, have run afoul of interdepartmental rivalry (Higgins et al., 1983) and the inertia of traditional administrative practice (Stewart and Underwood, 1983). Hambleton (1981) argues this is because a coordinated policy
effort violates long-held principles of: geographic uniformity in the distribution of urban resources, functional (or departmental) service management, and hierarchical control over policy setting and expenditure. The uncoordinated approach to policy, that is generating turbulence rather than reducing it, may be unequitable, inefficient, but politically acceptable. This raises a challenging question about appropriate organizational responses conducive to planning.

Finally, the most important issue remains unresolved: the extent to which the problems of unemployment and poverty are spatial, that is whether it is 'place poverty' or 'people poverty' (Smith, 1979). This debate over whether poverty is a problem of cities, or only in cities by happenstance or circumstance, has raged since the implementation of policies based on the culture of poverty thesis. There is a further debate on whether employment decline reflects an inner city effect or merely a disproportionate concentration of nationally declining industries (Danson et al., 1980; Kirby, 1981). Certainly it is accepted that inner cities have concentrations of unemployment, and conversely, that there are places which do not have the problem in any great magnitude. These latter towns and cities have the characteristics of regional service centres, new towns, or industrial suburbs (Donnison and Soto, 1980; Young and Mills, 1982). Beyond that, unemployment is a problem both in and of cities, and the mix is probably unknowable. The debate over the wider implications of the question is intensely political, however, especially when arguments are being made for urban-oriented policies (Gans, 1982), or against any locational bias in policies designed to aid national economies (Ledebur, 1982). Figure 8 summarizes the dimensions of the main conflicting approaches to urban decline. This tends towards simplification to the extent that actual 'packages of policies' involve a mix-and-match between the two streams, depending on historical circumstances, conviction, and political expediency. Nevertheless, the simplification is instructive because it
suggests the interrelated political, value-laden and economic considerations which underlie what at first glance appear to be spatial, or city problems. It also suggests the extent to which policies may work in conjunction or in opposition to one another. Urban policy in the UK has been characterized by its 'multi-organizational sub-optimization' based on conflicting policy initiatives by uncoordinated organizations (Hogwood, 1987).

The following table summarizes these critical policy arguments:

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<tr>
<th>NON-SPATIAL POLICY</th>
<th>SPATIAL OR URBAN ORIENTED POLICY</th>
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**Basic assumptions**

* Economic focus on distressed regions or cities.
* Jobs to people
* Urban economies must be assisted and encouraged to adapt to changing economic circumstances

**Value orientations**

* Welfare state
* The role of older cities is of great historical and social significance to the national ethos.
* Importance of attachment to family and community social networks
* Concern for the unemployed
* Urban values, the deconcentration of people and firms promotes urban sprawl.

**Political considerations**

* Concentration of the less well-off in urban constituencies, block voting towards the left.
* Shrinking political groupings (i.e., the trade unions)

* Economic focus on the health of the national economy.
* People to jobs
* Greater exposure to international pressures and industrial restructuring processes essential for future socio-economic well-being of people and of the country as a whole.
* Free market orientation, i.e. the inevitability of decline requires painful adjustment to new realities.
* Long predominant role of industrial cities shifting to favour suburban peripheral locations.
* This accords with the majority of peoples' preference for lower density, automobile oriented living.
* Mobility of workers is essential
* Unemployment is an inevitable consequence of economic restructuring.

* Increasing power of the suburban, middle class, vote.
SPATIAL OR URBAN ORIEN TED POLICIES

Efficiency considerations
* Extensive human resources are squandered in poverty and unemployment
* The cities still offer the most efficient locations, and the sophisticated infrastructure, necessary for the advanced service economy.
* Mobility subsidies for the poor have to be inefficiently high for the benefits to exceed costs for the poor themselves.
* New forms of urban renewal and urban redevelopment are appropriate.

NON-SPATIAL POLICIES

* Channelling investment to declining areas is inefficient in terms of the national economy, and in terms of public expenditure on job creation.
* Low density peripheral locations are now most cost efficient, and required for international competitiveness.
* The economic premises of spatial policy are destroyed by the effects of cumulative deindustrialization. The evidence is in the unemployment rates and labour force participation rates. Inner cities are now inefficient in terms of many industrial activities.
* People are inefficiently rooted by place-specific subsidies.

Theoretical considerations
* The urban area provides a realistic frame of reference for defining a spatial concentration of either levels of economic opportunity or environmental circumstance. Most credible therefore is a modified concept of space in which areal analysis plays a continuing role, subordinate to social structural analysis.
* The ecological fallacy (extending areal correlations to individuals) is also an epistemological fallacy which separates spatial from social relations, and has elevated these to an absurd and irrelevant level of analysis.

Conclusions
* The sheer magnitude of inner city problems means they cannot be ignored. National economic policies have substantial spatial ramifications.
* Spatially oriented policies are neither efficient nor effective but at best ameliorative. In the extreme they may hinder national economic recovery.
SUMMARY OF POLICY INITIATIVES TOWARDS URBAN PROBLEMS

In spite of, or perhaps because of, a lack of agreement on overall objectives of urban policy there are considerable policy and/or programme initiatives directed towards urban decline, originating in both central and local governments, and operating at national, regional and local levels. In terms of the (often implicit) objectives of policy at the central government level, the policy orientation has obviously shifted under the current Conservative administration from that of its Labour predecessor. The current orientation is strongly toward national economic recovery and the creation of wealth, private sector initiatives, reduced state intervention, and diminishing public expenditure, particularly by local authorities (Lawless, 1981a; Stewart and Underwood, 1983). The policy shift towards national economic recovery and away from differential regional industrial policy and locally applied social policy is a gradual one however. The central government is still very active in a variety of specifically urban-oriented policy efforts, outlined below.

Part of the reason for this is that the influence of theoretical arguments is usually diffuse. Tidy arguments are useful for debate in the abstract, but the reality is more complex and current theory of urban restructuring is no more than one of a range of important influences, which include a number of bureaucratic and political factors. Policy is often the result of compromise, and voluntary exchange by partisan groups, that is, partisan mutual adjustment. Thus even within the Conservative Party will be found important differences of opinion as to the appropriate policy response to urban decline. Furthermore, where urban decline is visible and obvious, central government must be seen to be doing something 'urban' whatever a general belief in the efficacy of spatially oriented policies. Equally where something looks plausible, or is seen to work, or is championed by a powerful Minister, then that may result in policy,
whatever the flavour of the general rhetoric. As can be seen shortly, the Urban Development Corporation provides the ideal vehicle for government to be seen to be doing something spatial, without transfer of functions or resources to local government. There is the added benefit that at some levels this policy initiative seems to work.

However the responses are far from being confined to central government. Various changes in the central government's policy orientation, combined with increasing inner city unemployment rates, have also encouraged town planning departments of many local authorities in the U.K. to make a rather dramatic shift from a strictly land use planning orientation to one of systematic socioeconomic planning which combines attempts at economic regeneration with a concern for reducing unemployment. This attempt has been termed no less than the social reconstruction of local communities (Middleton, 1983). Nor is it only planning departments changing focus. Individual planners are moving into new fields of local government activity. Mills and Young (1986) find that almost half of the newly emerging profession of economic development officers (EDOs) in U.K. local authorities had previously worked as planners, and were members of the Royal Town Planning Institute. The Mills and Young survey shows that the majority of EDOs had a background in the 'built environment', that is their education was in planning, architecture or urban design. This demonstrates the expansion of traditional planning functions in local government into the new related field of socioeconomic development.

The following summarizes policy initiatives by government, at all levels, directed towards urban decline:
a) Regional industrial policy and selective assistance - of the Department of Industry (and the EEC Regional Development Fund), which is basically the provision of various locational incentives to firms, locating in regions identified by changing definitions as development areas or special development areas. This is not an urban policy in any spatial sense, and it is possibly anti-urban in orientation (Lawless, 1981b).

b) Inner City Partnerships and Programmes - designed to associate intergovernmental (central-local) and interdepartmental initiatives to link agencies, stimulate innovation, redirect main programmes, and funnel resources to cities most in need (Hambleton, 1981).

c) Other main departmental programmes including those of the Departments of Employment, Environment, the Home Office, and the Manpower Services Commission.

d) Local authority initiatives in economic development and employment creation through statutory activities, as independent actors, and as agents for delivery of national programmes. Many diverse activities directed towards job creation detailed elsewhere (OECD, 1983).

e) Urban renewal initiatives - mainly by central government initiation and including Enterprise Zones, Urban Development Corporations, and Industrial Improvement Areas.

f) Public/Private/Voluntary joint venture activities - as an extension of e) - these have been called 'third sector' developments and include harnessing private
finance for municipal development, development of infrastructure, and particular in housing and urban renewal, as discussed in the main body of this dissertation.

THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION - NEW AGENCY
RESPONSE TO PLANNING TURBULENCE

The political emphasis of the central government's urban programme in the UK has gradually reflected a shift in priorities away from a) in the above first towards b) and now to e) and f). The previous Labour government's focus on regional development initiatives has shifted under the current Tory administration towards a concern for national economic regeneration in combination with more spatially focused urban interventions which assign highest priority to derelict land reclamation and creation of employment opportunities in the most deprived and/or derelict of inner city areas. One particular initiative, recently expanded, has been the designation of urban development corporations (UDCs). These not only focus on the problem of urban decline but also represent a substantial alteration in the organizational and planning response to the problem and have considerable effect on the ways planners work.

INITIATION OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS

The Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980 empowered the Secretary of State to make orders designating urban development areas and setting up urban development corporations to secure the regeneration of these areas. Such orders require approval by both Houses of Parliament before they come into force. The board of a UDC is appointed by the Secretary of State and it is financed by grant-in-aid from the Government. Under the 1980 Act, a UDC has general powers to acquire,
hold, manage, reclaim, and dispose of land, to carry out building and other operations,
to provide services, and to support the provision of roads and other infrastructure.
The Secretary of State may also confer on a UDC, either in all or in part of its area,
planning and housing powers.

In 1980 the government established the first two UDCs, one in the docklands of
London called the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), the other in
Liverpool and called the Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC). Both areas
were formerly active docklands, now containing major concentrations of derelict or
disused former industrial land, and each having a tremendously eroded employment
base as the result of changes in the location of transshipment points in the U.K. The
LDDC has control over 55 miles of shoreline, much consisting in 1980 of vacant
warehouses, but also with a substantial local population mainly living in public sector
housing. The MDC controls about 12 miles of shoreline, with little residential use but
like LDDC a number of existing small businesses. The new UDCs were to be state
corporations, developed from the model of the British new towns corporation, widely
perceived as successful urban innovation agencies. The UDCs were to have
substantial funding and planning powers designated to promote private sector
confidences by extensive public sector investment in infrastructure and land
reclamation. In addition the UDCs have a range of discretionary powers to bring
buildings and land into effective use, to encourage development of existing and new
industry and commerce, to create an attractive environment and to develop or
encourage social facilities and housing.

Since its inception the net expenditure of MDC has been £128m. Among its notable
achievements have been the 1984 International Garden Festival and the
refurbishment of the Albert Dock complex, bringing back into use 1,267,000 sq ft in a
previously derelict building considered to be of national historic importance. Net expenditure by the London Docklands DC has been £275m, which has so far resulted in the commitment of £1.2 billion of private investment, the reclamation of over 870 acres of derelict land, and the building of 4,000 houses and flats, with nearly 4,000 more under construction.

There is general agreement from a number of commentators that LDDC in particular has been successful with hundreds of new or transferred business locating in docklands (Davia, 1986; Fazey, 1986). But the LDDC has also benefited from its proximity to the business centre of the City of London, and the generally healthy economic climate and attractiveness of London. For the MDC success is coming more slowly, but the Albert Dock refurbishment is considered very impressive in terms of architectural regeneration. However not many jobs have been created.

In spite of the measure of success of the existing UDCs, there is reasonable debate about whether this success has been achieved at the expense of local democracy, and whether this success is the result as much of levels of public expenditure in excess of those available to local planning agencies as of new approaches. Whatever the merits of these, success by LDDC in particular is clearly visible and the government has recently designated five more UDCs.

The first of the newly designated UDCs is in Trafford Park in Manchester, which was once the largest and most modern industrial estate in Europe. It has lost much of its manufacturing industry in the post-war period and now approximately 800 of its 2,000 acres are disused. The Government will also be considering the inclusion of other land within the overall urban development area. The second is in Teesside, where the closure of chemical, steel and shipbuilding works has left the largest continuous area
of de-industrialised land in Europe along the banks of the Tees stretching from Langbrough through Middlesbrough to Stockton. Some 3,500 acres of derelict land are involved. The third is in the Black Country, where there are more than 7,000 acres of derelict or disused land within the four boroughs of Dudley, Sandwell, Walsall and Wolverhampton. The fourth is in Tyne and Wear, on a number of major sites along both the river Tyne and the river Wear. Many sites were previously used for shipbuilding. These sites fall within the boroughs of North Tyneside, South Tyneside, Newcastle and Gateshead on the Tyne and Sunderland on the River Wear.

It is expected each UDC could spend between £100m and £160m over six or seven years. The bulk of expenditure will go on the reclamation of derelict or disused land, and the provision of access roads and other infrastructure, to pave the way for subsequent development by the private sector for industry or housing. The first new UDC in Trafford Park will be in operation in late 1987, and the others in 1988.

The public-private sector hybrid development model is proving most attractive as an organizational vehicle for tackling urban decline. The government could well extend it elsewhere in the likely event the Conservatives are reelected for a third term. Also, although not on quite the same scale, other similar private-public partnerships are springing up to undertake redevelopment, for example in Manchester at Salford Quays along the Ship Canal, in Lancashire along the Leeds Liverpool Canal, in Birmingham, Bristol and elsewhere. In yet other places public-private partnerships tackle more specific urban problems, for example, the renovation of decrepit public sector housing estates in Glasgow and Liverpool. The basis of most partnership schemes is that the local government, in return for making assets - land or existing properties - available, secures a major say in the composition of the development. This can mean the right to stipulate the type and price range of the properties to be
built and to nominate purchasers from its waiting list. The local government will very often receive a share of profits either in the form of a new facility, such as a community health centre, or cash.

Clearly the hybrid development model is one which is assuming increasing importance as a mode of urban planning in the U.K. In the final section of this appendix I examine the phenomenon of the urban development corporation in terms of the analytic concepts we have distilled from an examination of the apparent crisis of planning.

APPLYING ANALYTIC CONCEPTS TO THE EMERGENCE OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS

In each paragraph below a key concept is discussed with reference to the urban decline problem and the UDC policy response:

Metaproblem

In chapter 4 a metaproblem was defined as a many sided cluster of problems not amenable to simple cause and effect analysis or one-dimensional policy response, and often beyond the capability of an existing organizational unit to address. The urban decline problem consists of many inter-related subproblems. For example, international changes in comparative advantage and technical developments like containerized shipping result in a decline of London's docklands. In Merseyside the decline of the docks is also heavily influenced by a reorientation of Britain's shipping from the western ports serving the decreasingly important Commonwealth, like Liverpool, to the eastern ports serving the European Economic Community. Both, as
inner city areas, are influenced by changes in values, housing patterns and transport systems which reinforce trends to suburbanization. Unemployed dockworkers have sets of skills unrelated to the needs of rising service sector industries, and by their relative poverty and reliance on state-provided housing are at a locational disadvantage in the job market. Abandonment of physical plant not only results in urban dereliction but reduces the local tax or rate structure and thus the financial capability of local authorities to respond to urban problems. Infrastructure runs down, and the relative unattractiveness of the area on all fronts is reinforced. The discussion of policy issues in the previous section suggests that analysts are unable to agree on cause and effect relationships or even on the nature and actual definition of the urban decline metaproblem.

Turbulence

London's docklands spans six local government units and in over a decade they were unable to generate any combined initiative to address the metaproblem. In particular the area 'had lain dormant for decades while the various local authorities involved argued about what to do and who should be responsible for what' (Pauley, 1986). But central government's initiative also suffered similar problems. As noted the Inner City Partnerships were characterized by the inability of central departments, particularly Environment and Employment, to work together. Some suggest they worked at cross-purposes, a guaranteed recipe for turbulence.

Centre-Periphery

If in London the problem was mainly about the shift of the docks to the new container port at Tilbury, Liverpool suffered from a series of problems created by decisions
taken by non-resident U.K. and foreign multinational companies about their many branch plant operations in the area. No amount of planning could counteract the effect of decisions taken in London, New York and elsewhere. Liverpool, like its near neighbour Manchester, had gone from being one of the most important cities in the Commonwealth to being part of the 'new periphery' in a reorganized world industrial pattern, in which Britain not only lost its historic position at the centre of an imperial empire, but reoriented itself away from the Commonwealth and towards the EEC.

Role of the State

In spite of Mrs. Thatcher's personal beliefs, and the neo-conservative line on the over-riding advantage of the markets, clearly the markets could do no more for the docklands then the local authorities. Not at least without a new organizational responses coupled with substantial 'pump-priming' of private investment by massive public sector investment. As Michael Heseltine, former Secretary of State for Environment in Mrs. Thatcher's cabinet and initiator of the Merseyside Development Corporation, puts it:

Instead of kidding ourselves that the government is leaving it all to the market place we ought to put the nature and quality of government intervention at the very top of the political agenda ... British industry depends crucially on having government as a partner (1987).

When it comes to urban renewal the Conservative government knows that public-private partnerships, with a strong measure of state intervention and transfer of financial resources is essential in addressing metaproblems.
Centralization and Decentralization of Planning Functions

In chapter three it was argued that there is often concurrent centralization and decentralization of government functions, and that neither is necessarily related to a loss or gain in local democracy. In chapter six it was argued that the crisis of planning in the modern state often reflected an endemic tension between aspirations for local democracy and control and the reality of an appropriate level response to the results of the multi-national commodity production system and the workings of the national state. This situation is clearly contentious in the case of UDCs. For example, commenting on the now Secretary of State for the Environment's creation of a new round of UDCs one commentator suggests:

It can hardly be doubted that Nicholas Ridley will be keen to devolve the fullest range of functions to his new creations. Conversely, the local authority side can be guaranteed to fight tooth and nail over the loss of planning control (Johnston, 1986).

The UDCs were set up to override local authority planning powers, to draw together development land from a number of local government areas, and to reduce local authority indecision and inaction. Although there was much talk of conferring with local authorities and the local community, a central government with a history of implicit centralization would have few qualms about loss of local representation in the planning process stemming from the establishment of what were primarily executive agencies with substantial powers to act, and to override opposition of other public agencies and private interests. The UDC area local authorities, on the other hand, are not only local but almost entirely Labour, so their criticism of UDCs is two-pronged, and it is not surprising that a Labour spokesperson can dismiss the UDCs as 'undemocratic and centralist'. At the same time as the central government was decentralizing planning functions from the Department of Environment to UDCs,
it was also autocratically usurping local planning powers into the UDC thus centralizing the planning function at a new level of quasi-government. Certainly the evidence from the LDDC was that after six years of its existence the relationship between LDDC and the existing authorities was 'painful and uneasy' with no improvement 'despite several years of co-existence' (Shaw, 1986).

Resource Dependency

The Royal Town Planning Institute (1985) itself argued: 'many town planners remain to be convinced that it would not have been more effective to make the resources available to local authorities'. But as noted in chapter three the Thatcher government sees itself as involved in a virtual crusade to bring under control what it sees as a rampant and ill-directed overexpenditure by local authorities, particularly Labour-controlled local authorities. The possibility of the control over additional urban funding passing directly to local authorities from this conservative central government was therefore a near impossibility, whatever the RTPI's views. The Planning Coordinator for the LDDC argued that the UDCs were probably the best chance that depressed areas had for levering money out of central government (Shaw, 1986). The local authorities in this case are resource dependent.

Of course the situation might change with a new government. The Labour spokesperson on the environment has said that a re-elected Labour government would make local authorities the most prominent agency of urban renewal, including turning control of UDCs over the local authority control. The Social Democratic Party/Liberal alliance, on the other hand, is stressing the need for regional planning agencies on the European model, something new for Britain and directly counter to the Conservatives' anti-regionalist policies.
Organizational Capacity

Other local authorities, not designated for UDC status, are taking a tactical line in an attempt to avoid erosion of their own planning and development control powers. The result is that a number of multi-agency, joint ventures involving local authority, business, and non-profit organisations have also come into being. At the broadest level are urban renewal trusts, which involve a wide range of initiatives to improve housing conditions and employment opportunities. Examples are found in Londonderry, Glasgow, and Birmingham and more are intended. Such trusts are based partly on the recognition that if local authorities are to retain a measure of control over the urban renewal process they must adopt a pro-active and pro-business stance. In Birmingham for example, the local authority, assisted by central grants, is committed to providing infrastructure and it is accepted the private sector will only participate if it can see profits are to be made. Birmingham City Council has established its own urban development agency to redevelop the run-down Aston/Nechells district of about 2000 acres near the M6 motorway. The agency will be controlled by a top tier holding company in which the City Council will have majority shareholding status but which will also include representatives from the industrial, commercial and financial sectors. As in the UDCs the public sector will provide investment in infrastructure in an attempt to encourage private investment. A subsidiary private company, with local government minority representation, will foster land development with a majority of shares held by construction companies. Of course the degree of public sector investment, in the order of £900 million over ten years, is beyond the purse of the City Council acting alone, and they are looking elsewhere for money. They have received funds from the EEC’s European Regional Development Fund, who have quite a strict application procedure, and are also looking to central government for funds through the Inner City Initiative. They might
well get this too, because unlike some of the more left-wing Labour city governments, Birmingham 'has a track record of delivering economic initiatives regardless of party' (Smith, 1986). Birmingham clearly feels that it has both initiative and organizational capacity in terms of staff and expertise to delivery urban renewal efficiently via inter-organizational alliances. In chapter four, it was argued that high levels of organizational capacity is often self-reinforcing, in terms of acquiring additional resources, and the Birmingham example is a case in point.

Organizational Learning

In response to the establishment of the second round of UDCs the Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA, 1986) welcomed the decision and noted the economic achievement of UDCs. However the TCPA also warned that such agencies should work to the land use plans already laid down by elected local authorities and must be 'seen to be accountable to the community through elected politicians'. Unlike the unresolved and rather confrontational experiences of the LDDC and MDC, there is evidence that the new round of UDCs are already engaged in organizational learning. For example, in the initial setting-up negotiations of the Trafford Park and Black Country UDCs 'agency agreements' are being explored. These constitute a formal working arrangement by which local planning authorities continue to handle the bulk of development control work in the UDC areas; leaving the UDC to pursue strategic objectives in urban renewal. The purpose of these agreements would be to redress what the Manchester City Council saw as its 'greatest loss' suffered as a result of UDC designation, the control over day-to-day planning matters. Similarly the chairman of the Black Country UDC argues that 'it is very important that we have the right relationship with the local authorities in the task ahead'. Here may be a good example of individual planning officials engaging in communicative action, and
planning agencies in organizational learning. While it won't redress the continuing tension between LDDC/MDC and their local authorities, in which too much bad blood has been spilt, it bodes well for the inter-agency success of the newer round of UDCs.