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UBC Theses and Dissertations

The epistemological and metaphysical implications of dialectical materialism Edwards, James Henry 1952

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THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM by JAMES HENRY EDWARDS A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of PSYCHOLOGY and PHILOSOPHY We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the st a n d a r d r e q u i r e d from candidates f o r the degree of MASTER OF ARTS. Members of the Department of PSYCHOLOGY and PHILOSOPHY THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1952 ABSTRACT The E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l and M e t a p h y s i c a l I m p l i c a t i o n s of D i a l e c t i c a l M a t e r i a l i s m . The theory of d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m i s essen-t i a l l y the product of the j o i n t e f f o r t s of K a r l Marx and P r e d e r i c h E n g e l s . Such men as V. I . L e n i n , George Plekha-nov, J . D i e t z g e n , and J . B. S. Haldane have added v e r y l i t t l e e i t h e r i n terms of o r i g i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s or i n terms of r e f i n i n g and e l a b o r a t i n g the main t e n e t s of the theory. In t h i s r e s p e c t , V. I . Lenin's i n f l u e n c e on the theory i s n e g l i g i b l e ; what he has w r i t t e n i s p r i m a r i l y a c r i t i c i s m of the d e v i a t i o n i s t s and opposing s c h o o l s of thought, and a l s o a s u b s t a n t i a t i o n of the o r i g i n a l p o s t u l a t e s o f Marx and E n g e l s . The same may be s a i d of Plekhanov and Dietzgen with the e x c e p t i o n that they are c o n s i d e r e d , by Lenin and most of the Marxian " p u r i s t s " , as d e v i a t i o n i s t s owing to the m o d i f i c a t i o n s they attempted i n the epistemology. Such Marxians, as J . B. S. Haldane and many of the p r e s e n t day s o c i a l i s t s may a l s o be c l a s s i f i e d as d e v i a t i o n i s t s as they c o n s i d e r d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m more i n terms of technique r a t h e r than as a h i g h l y i n t e g r a t e d r e v o l u -t i o n a r y p h i l o s o p h i c schematism. In view of these d i v e r g e n c i e s of o p i n i o n , the w r i t e r has t r e a t e d d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m as p r i m a r i l y the theory f o r m u l a t e d by Marx and Engels and r e i t e r a t e d by L e n i n . The views of the Marxian d e v i a t i o n i s t s a r e , however, a l s o c o n s i d e r e d wherever they throw l i g h t on the aims and p o s t u l a t e s of the p h i l o s o p h y of ffiarx and E n g e l s . The schematism examined i s always g i v e n i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , the same t e s t , namely, does i t s u b s t a n t i a t e the over a l l c l a i m t h a t t h i s i s a dynamic, completely meaningful u n i v e r s e i n which man i s able t o a c t i v e l y i n f l u e n c e h i s environment, and i n which man i s , h i m s e l f , i n f l u e n c e d by the environment. The g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t , owing t o the Marxian concept of mind as a r e f l e c t o r and the r e j e c t i o n of any type of t e l e o l o g i c a l f a c t o r , the a c t i v e determinism enunciated i n t h i s p h i l o s o p h y i s not i m p l i c i t i n i t s b a s i c m e t a p h y s i c a l and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t e n e t s . In a d d i t i o n , owing t o the concepts of abrupt break, emergence of n o v e l t y , and the dynamic nature of terms and e n t i t i e s , i t i s not p o s s i b l e t o l o g i c a l l y deduce from a p l u r a l i t y of causes a s p e c i f i c e f f e c t , e.g., the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of the c o l l a p s e or negation of c a p i t a l i s m . In other words, the w r i t e r maintains t h a t there i s no sound b a s i s f o r the c l a i m t h a t c e r t a i n events must i n e v i t a b l y occur a t some f u t u r e time. i In s h o r t the t h e o r y i s an u n s u c c e s s f u l attempt t o p o s t u l a t e an a c t i v e d e t e r m i n i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y through merging two schools of thought, namely, m a t e r i a l i s m and i d e a l i s m . CONTENTS Page I n t r o d u c t i o n I P a r t 1. The H e r i t a g e of D i a l e c t i c a l M a t e r i a l i s m . 1. 1. Greek M a t e r i a l i s m . 1. 2. Modern M a t e r i a l i s m . 14. 3. Views on the Nature of Mind and Matter. 18. 4. The H e g e l i a n D i a l e c t i c . 24. P a r t I I . The E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l and M e t a p h y s i c a l I m p l i c a t i o n s of D i a l e c t i c a l M a t e r i a l i s m . 35. 1. The Subject-Object Concept. 35. 2. The Concept of Mind. 38. 3. The U n i t y of Opposites. 53. 4. The Negation of the Negation. 57. 5*. Q u a n t i t y - Q u a l i t y . 59. 6. The Theory of C a u s a l i t y . . 6 2 . I I I . C o n c l u s i o n . 70. I. I n t r o d u c t i o n K a r l H e i n r i c h Marx, born i n T r i e r i n 1818, came from a middle c l a s s Jewish f a m i l y . He was educated a t the u n i v e r s i t i e s of Bonn and B e r l i n where he came i n contact with the young Hegelians who r e p r e s e n t e d the most advanced s e c t i o n of German i n t e l l e c t u a l s a t t h a t time. Germany was at t h a t time j u s t emerging from a s t a t e of economic backwardness and p o l i t i c a l r e a c t i o n . The i n d u s t r i a l i s m and the democratic concepts . which had become p a r t of the every day l i f e of such c o u n t r i e s as B r i t a i n and Prance, were onl y beginning t o develop. Opportunity t o observe the German development a g a i n s t the background of the new democratic i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s , E n g l i s h i n d u s t r i a l i s m and E n g l i s h trade-unionism, as w e l l as French p o s t - r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i e s and s t r u g g l e s , was a v a i l a b l e f o r o b s e r v a t i o n and a n a l y s i s . Thus, i t was a g a i n s t a background of new p o l i t i c a l and economic i d e a s , as e x e m p l i f i e d i n the w r i t i n g s of the U t i l i t a r i a n s , and the e a r l y E n g l i s h and French s o c i a l i s t s , and a l s o the r a d i c a l i s m of the young H e g e l i a n s , t h a t Marx's youth was l i v e d . The i n f l u e n c e of these ideas p l u s the problems of the p e r i o d r e s u l t e d i n Marx becoming c r i t i c a l and d i s s a t i s f i e d with the I I . extreme I d e a l i s m of H e g e l i a n p h i l o s o p h y . He, t h e r e f o r e , began to search f o r a more p r a c t i c a l mode of e x p r e s s i o n of s o c i a l c r i t i c i s m than the I d e a l i s m of the young H e g e l i a n s . In 1843, Marx moved to P a r i s where he took over the e d i t o r s h i p of the "Deutsch-franzosische Jahrbucher". Only one i s s u e appeared but i t c o n t a i n e d a c l e a r statement of Marx's newly formed t h e o r y of h i s t o r y . The f o r m u l a t i o n and w r i t i n g of t h i s t h e o r y l e d to a d e t a i l e d study of p o l i t i c a l economy, and, i n a d d i t i o n , the p u b l i s h i n g of the Nationalflkonomic und P h i l o s o p h l e . L a t e r i n 1845, Marx moved t o B r u s s e l s where, with the c o l l a b o r a t i o n of P r e d e r i c h E n g e l s , he wrote Die Deutsche I d e o l o g i c . T h i s work was a c r i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n of German p h i l o s o p h y which f r e e d both Marx and Engels from H e g e l i a n I d e a l i s m and consequently was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the f o r m u l a t i o n of the theory of d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m . D i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , l i k e most t h e o r i e s , i s the r e s u l t of much t h a t has been handed down from other ages. In a sense, i t i s two concepts blended i n t o one, i . e . , the dynamic concept of r e a l i t y and the concept of determinism emanating from M a t e r i a l i s m . Both these con-cepts have been p a r t of p h i l o s o p h i c s p e c u l a t i o n , i n some form or other, f o r over two thousand y e a r s . T h e i r h i s t o r y may be t r a c e d to the Greek t h i n k e r s of the f i f t h century I l l . B.C., i n p a r t i c u l a r , H e r a c l i t u s and Democritus. In the seventeenth and e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s A.D. these two con-cepts o r t h e o r i e s were amended and e l a b o r a t e d u n t i l they developed as two opposing f o r c e s , namely, I d e a l i s m and Realism. The l a t e r h a l f of the e i g h t e e n t h century witnessed an attempted compromise of these two schools under the guidance of Immanual Kant. The n i n e t e e n t h century saw the r e v o l t from t h i s compromise i n the extreme I d e a l i s m of Hegel. Here, i n b r i e f , i s Hegel's m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r y i n which Marx found the instrument needed f o r the r e s u r r e c -t i o n of M a t e r i a l i s m . Hegel maintains t h a t the world i s i n a constant;, s t a t e of f l u x , and t h a t i t s p a t t e r n of change i s d i a l e c -t i c a l , i . e . , t h e s i s - a n t i t h e s i s - s y n t h e s i s . Subsequently, i f man i s to know r e a l i t y he must a l s o t h i n k i n terms of the d i a l e c t i c ; f o r i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s reason and r e a l i t y are i d e n t i c a l . Owing t o the dynamic nature of r e a l i t y , f i n i t e minds only grasp i t p a r t i a l l y . However, i f f i n i t e minds act c o n s i s t e n t l y with the " c o r r e c t " process of t h i n k i n g , namely, the d i a l e c t i c , then they w i l l r e a l i z e more and more of r e a l i t y which i s i n the A b s o l u t e , Idea, S p i r i t or Cod. Now, the c o r r e c t process of thought i s t h a t which i s c o n s i s t e n t with the d i a l e c t i c , f o r the u n i v e r s e i s by i t s very nature d i a l e c t i c a l . That i s , the u n i v e r s e IV. when c o n s i d e r e d i n terms of i t s p a r t s i s composed of o p p o s i t e s or c o n t r a d i c t o r i e s , which a c t and r e a c t upon one another, r e s u l t i n g i n a c o n c a t e n a t i o n of t h e s i s -a n t i t h e s i s - s y n t h e s i s . Each one of these t r i a d s , from the H e g e l i a n p o i n t of view, r e s u l t s i n a h i g h e r s y n t h e s i s , because they are a l l o r i e n t e d toward the r e a l i s a t i o n or s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n of the absolute Idea, S p i r i t , Mind or God, which i s the Whole. Thus, with the b a s i c assumption that the nature of the cosmos i s m i n d - l i k e , Hegel i s a b l e to formulate a t h e o r y t h a t a l l o w s f o r change, and y e t maintains an Absolute or Whole t h a t i s complete i n a l l r e s p e c t s w i t h i n i t s e l f . The s o c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s t heory w i l l appear quite a l i e n to a s o c i e t y educated i n terms of t w e n t i e t h century democracy. T h i s theory of d i a l e c t i c a l development l e d Hegel t o m a i n t a i n t h a t the State i s the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the supreme Idea or U n i v e r s a l i n the p a r t i c u l a r . Subsequently, i f one i s to l i v e a r a t i o n a l and e t h i c a l l i f e , h i s behaviour and a s p i r a t i o n s should be o r i e n t e d i n terms of the s t a t e . Marx, as we i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , found the r e a c t i o n a r y s o c i a l p h i l o s o p h y of Hegel inadequate i n view of the s o c i a l developments and problems t h a t eon-f r o n t e d the s o c i e t i e s of h i s e r a . He d i d , however, see i n the d i a l e c t i c method a medium which, when r e f i n e d , V. would be i n v a l u a b l e i n r e l a t i n g and .explaining the v a r i o u s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of r e a l i t y . To e l a b o r a t e , d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m a s s e r t s t h a t t h i s w o r l d i s composed of matter, the h i g h e s t form of which i s mind, and t h a t i t i s a world t h a t i s always i n a process of change. The change i s accounted f o r by the t h e o r y of o p p o s i t e s or c o n t r a d i c t i o n . Each u n i t , each m a n i f e s t a t i o n of nature c o n t a i n s w i t h i n i t the seeds of i t s own d e s t r u c t i o n . L o g i c a l l y s t a t e d , each t h e s i s or e n t i t y i m p l i e s or c o n t a i n s i t s a n t i t h e s i s or opposite which, owing to the dynamic nature of r e a l i t y , w i l l c o n t r a -d i c t or a c t on the t h e s i s or e n t i t y as i t i s at any p a r t i -c u l a r Instance i n time; and w i l l t h e r e f o r e , by u n i t i n g with i t s o p p o s i t e , l e a d t o a new t h e s i s o r h i g h e r s y n t h e s i s . Although w i t h i n the change process there i s a ' rhythm or u n i f o r m i t y of motion i t i s , i n a sense, on l y i n terms of d u r a t i o n b l o c k s , t h a t i s , a p o i n t i s reached where the change i s abrupt. For example, at what p o i n t does a c o l l e c t i o n of r o l l i n g stones become an avalanche, or a t what p o i n t i s a stream a r i v e r ? Engels e x p l a i n s t h i s type of change by h i s q u a n t i t y - q u a l i t y t h e o r y which i n essence maintains t h a t r e v o l u t i o n a r y or abrupt change i s p a r t of the nature of the u n i v e r s e . I t s s o c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s are c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e d i n Marx's w r i t i n g s on the h i s t o r y of man. As a matter of f a c t , no b e t t e r a p p l i c a t i o n <.J: VI. of d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m can be found than t h a t exempli-f i e d i n h i s economic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s t o r y . For example the dynamic concept i s c l e a r l y e n u n c i a t e d i n The Poverty  of P h i l o s o p h y : r " A l l t h a t e x i s t s , a l l t h a t l i v e s on l a n d and i n water, e x i s t s , l i v e s , o n l y by some movement. Thus the movement of h i s t o r y produces r e l a t i o n s . . . . " i S t a r t i n g from t h i s fundamental p o i n t , Marx con-s i d e r s the h i s t o r y of man i n terms of the d e r i v a t i v e s of the; u n d e r l y i n g substratum . namely, mind and m a t e r i a l t h i n g s . And, as mind i s c o n s i d e r e d t o r e f l e c t and a c t on t h a t which i s e x t e r i o r to i t s e l f , i t l o g i c a l l y f o l l o w s t h a t the m a t e r i a l t h i n g i s p r i o r to the i d e a t h a t man has of i t ; a l though, ide a s once formed can e x e r t a c o n s i d e r -able i n f l u e n c e i n changing the shape of t h i n g s and i n b r i n g i n g new t h i n g s i n t o e x i s t e n c e . Things and i d e a s i n t e r a c t , proceeds Marx, but never so as to upset the primacy of t h i n g s . The t h i n g i s always f i r s t , and i n order t h a t the i d e a may become a f o r c e i n molding and a f f e c t i n g t h i n g s , or more s p e c i f i -c a l l y h i s t o r y , the i d e a must be u t i l i z e d and thus become a t h i n g . For these " t h i n g s " , Marx m a i n t a i n s , are the agents of s o c i a l e v o l u t i o n . i . Marx, K a r l , The Poverty of P h i l o s o p h y , Chicago, Charles H. K e r r and Co. 1910, p. 116 V I I . In other words, the dynamics of h i s t o r y are t o be found i n the c o n d i t i o n s of man's m a t e r i a l e x i s t e n c e , i . e . , i n order f o r man to e x i s t there had to be present e i t h e r p r i o r t o h i s e x i s t e n c e o r a t the time of h i s f i r s t e x i s t -ence the m a t e r i a l n e c e s s i t i e s needed f o r h i s s u r v i v a l . Thus, the n e c e s s i t i e s imposed upon man by nature i n d i c a t e that the primary p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s of man were indepen-dent o f a l l forms of s o c i e t y . However, as the p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s of man con t i n u e d , new techniques were devised through the i n t e r a c t i o n of the then e x i s t i n g t h i n g s and the human mind. The new techniques i n p r o d u c t i o n and the new a r t i f a c t s designed t o implement these techniques were the r e s u l t s of the c a p i t a l i z a t i o n of man's i d e a s . These i d e a s , embodied i n m a t e r i a l forms, i n f l u e n c e d the h i s t o r y o f man as they i n t u r n became t h i n g s , and subsequently germinated f u r t h e r the i n t e r a c t i v e p r o c e s s . The economic o r g a n i s a t i o n brought about by t h i s p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y determines, through the i n t e r a c t i v e p r o c e s s , the e t h i c a l , the s o c i o l o g i c a l , the p o l i t i c a l , e t c e t e r a , i d e a s of man. The concepts and v a l u e s of each s o c i e t y emanate from the economic o r g a n i s a t i o n of that p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y , p l u s that which man has i n h e r i t e d , both i d e a s and m a t e r i a l t h i n g s , from past s o c i e t i e s . "In a c q u i r i n g new pr o d u c t i v e f o r c e s men change t h e i r mode of p r o d u c t i o n , t h e i r manner of g a i n i n g a l i v i n g , they change a l l t h e i r s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . The w i n d m i l l V I I I . g i v e s you s o c i e t y with the f e u d a l l o r d ; the s t e a m - m i l l s o c i e t y with the i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s t . " * i • Thus, Marx conceives of h i s t o r y as a c h a i n of connected developments, each phase of which must be of such a nature that i t can be developed out of i t s p r e -decessor; and subsequently men's powers i n i n f l u e n c i n g the course of h i s t o r y are l i m i t e d to a choice between a l t e r n a t i v e s which are p o s s i b l e i n the l i g h t of a g i v e n o b j e c t i v e s i t u a t i o n . T h i s Is not to deny the e x i s t e n c e of f r e e - w i l l , but r a t h e r t o s t a t e t h a t the f r e e - w i l l s of men form p a r t of the chain of c a u s a l i t y , and t h a t those w i l l s are l i m i t e d o n l y by the c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n which they have to operate. In the case of the great men who have appeared i n h i s t o r y , i t i s argued t h a t they counted because the ideas which they posed f i t t e d the c u l t u r a l and m a t e r i a l -i s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s and the o p p o r t u n i t i e s of t h e i r time. The ideas or t h e o r i e s which they p o s t u l a t e d were s t i l l , however, the r e s u l t of the i n t e r a c t i o n of the then e x i s t i n g o r g a n i s a t i o n s and p a t t e r n s of t h e i r s o c i e t y on t h e i r minds, and i n t u r n , of t h e i r minds on those o r g a n i z a t i o n s and c u l t u r a l p a t t e r n s . Consequently, a s s e r t s Marx, w i t h i n any s o c i e t y the p o l i t i c a l , l e g a l and e t h i c a l systems f o r m u l a t e d and i i . Marx, K a r l , The Poverty of P h i l o s o p h y , Chicago, Charles H. Kerr and Co. 1910, p. 119 IX. a c c e p t e d w i l l be t h o s e w h i c h a r i s e o u t o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e power and r e s o u r c e s o f p r o d u c t i o n . I t i s t h e mode o f p r o d u c t i o n w h i c h b a s i c a l l y d e t e r m i n e s t h e s e c o n c e p t s a n d a l s o t h e c l a s s s t r a t i f i c a t i o n o f s o c i e t y . I n s h o r t , t h e l a w s , p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and p r e c e p t s w h i c h e x i s t i n any s o c i e t y a r i s e o u t o f , a n d m o r e o v e r , s e r v e t o u p h o l d , t h e p a r t i c u l a r e c o n o m i c s y s t e m w h i c h e x i s t s a t t h a t moment. T h i s on t h e s u r f a c e w o u l d a p p e a r t o c o n t r a d i c t t h e b a s i c a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c c o m p l e x i s dynamic i n n a t u r e . F o r , i f t h a t mode o f p r o -d u c t i o n w h i c h i s i n e x i s t e n c e d e t e r m i n e s t h e i d e a s , t h e e t h i c s , e t c e t e r a o f t h e s o c i e t y , t h e n i t w o u l d seem t h a t , i n t e r m s o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f i n t e r a c t i o n , t h e s p e c i f i c s o c i e t y w o u l d t e n d t o p e r p e t u a t e i t s e l f , and hence a s t a t i c c o n c e p t w o u l d be t h e r e s u l t a n t . However, Marx d e n i e d t h i s s t a t i c c o n c e p t o f t h e s o c i o - c u l t u r a l c omplex on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e r e a s o n i n g e m p l o y e d a n d t h i s Marx c o n s i d e r e d t o be one o f t h e f a l l a c i e s o f t h e C l a s s i c a l S c h o o l i s t h a t o f f o r m a l l o g i c w h i c h u s e s s t a t i c c o n c e p t s w h i l e a t t e m p t i n g t o a n a l y s e a n d e x p l a i n a complex w h i c h i s dynamic by n a t u r e . The d i a l e c t i c , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , w o r k i n g ' i n terms o f " b e i n g " a n d "bec o m i n g " , o r i n terms o f a u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s , I s a b l e t o v i e w t h e s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c c o m p l e x as i t i s , namely, as " e x i s t i n g " a n d " n o t - e x i s t i n g " , o r " b e i n g " a n d " b e c o m i n g " . H e n c e , a l t h o u g h t h e mode o f p r o d u c t i o n e x i s t e n t a t any p a r t i c u l a r t i m e emanates t h e i d e a s , e t h i c s p r e c e p t s , e t c e t e r a o f t h a t a g e , i t i s i t s e l f i n a p r o c e s s o f " b e i n g a n d b e c o m i n g " , a n d t h e r e f o r e , i t changes t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between i t s e l f a n d i t s p a r t s and i t s e l f a n d th e i n d i v i d u a l s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n t h e c o m p l e x . Not o n l y t h a t , b u t , i n t h i s change p r o c e s s new t h i n g s a r e f o r e v e r coming i n t o b e i n g , a n d f i n d i n g , w i t h i n t h e complex t h i n g s t o w h i c h t h e y a r e o p p o s i t e s , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y a n t a g o n i s t i c . These t h i n g s e x e m p l i f y t h e m s e l v e s i n p a r -t i c u l a r s , s u c h a s , c a p i t a l - l a b o u r i n t e r m s o f e c o n o m i c s ; r u l e r - s u b j e c t i n terms o f p o l i t i c s ; a nd m a l e - f e m a l e i n terms o f m a t t e r ' o r p h y s i c s . " T h e r e i s a c o n t i n u a l movement o f g r o w t h i n t h e p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s o f d e s t r u c t i o n i n t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s o f f o r m a t i o n i n i d e a s ; t h e r e i s n o t h i n g immutable b u t t h e a b s t r a c t i o n o f t h e movement. 1 1 1 • N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e M a r x i a n c o n t e n t i o n i s n o t a f a t a l i s t i c one; i t does n o t a s s e r t t h a t men can t h i n k o n l y i n t e r m s d i c t a t e d by c u r r e n t e conomic c o n d i t i o n s , but r a t h e r , t h a t o u t o f men's t h o u g h t s t h o s e a l o n e w i l l i n f l u e n c e t h e c o u r s e o f human h i s t o r y t h a t a r e r e l e v a n t t o c o n t e m p o r a r y p r o b l e m s . T h a t i s , the t h o u g h t t h a t makes h i s t o r y i s n o t i s o l a t e d f r o m t h e m a t e r i a l a n d s u b -s t a n t i a l t h i n g s o f t h e w o r l d , b u t t h o u g h t a p p l y i n g i t s e l f t o t h e s e t h i n g s and a c t i n g ! upon t h e i r l a t e n t p o w e r s . i i i . Marx, K a r l , The P o v e r t y o f P h i l o s o p h y C h i c a g o , C h a r l e s H. K e r r and Co. 1910, p. 119. X I . To c o n t i n u e , t h e s e e n t i t i e s e x i s t i n g a n d com i n g i n t o e x i s t e n c e w i t h i n t h e s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c c o m p l e x f o r m t h e m s e l v e s , as shown a b o v e , i n t o c l a s s e s . These-c l a s s e s , Marx m a i n t a i n s , a r i s e o u t o f t h e mode o f p r o d u c -t i o n , a n d hence a r e c l a s s i f i e d i n t e r m s o f t h e eco n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n . I n t h e p e r i o d o f c a p i t a l i s m t h e c l a s s e s a r e , a t t h e p r e s e n t p o i n t o f d e v e l o p m e n t , t h r e e , n a mely, c a p i t a l i s t , p e t i t e b o u r g e o i s i e and p r o l e t a r i a t . However, as t h e c a p i t a l i s t i c mode o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n d e v e l o p s , t h e m i d d l e c l a s s , t h e p e t i t e b o u r g e o i s i e , w i l l d i s a p p e a r o r r a t h e r become immersed i n t h e p r o l e t a r i a n c l a s s . The c a p i t a l i s t i c R a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l complex w i l l t h e n be c l e a r l y d e f i n e d as c a p i t a l and l a b o u r , o r c a p i t a l i s t a n d p r o l e t a r i a t . T h i s i s c a p i t a l i s m i n it ' s f i n a l s t a g e o f d e v e l o p m e n t , where t h e i n h e r e n t a n t a g o n i s m e x i s t i n g between c a p i t a l and l a b o u r i s e p i t o m i s e d a n d i n w h i c h t h e t h e o r y o f t h e i n c l u s i o n o f t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y o r o p p o s i t e s i n any e n t i t y i s e x e m p l i f i e d . To r e c a p i t u l a t e , d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m i s th e t h e o r y t h a t t h i s i s , a dynamic m a t e r i a l i s t i c u n i v e r s e , i n w h i c h e v e n t s a r e d e t e r m i n e d by t h e e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h t h e y e x i s t , a n d a l s o by t h e i n h e r e n t n a t u r e o f t h e e v e n t s t h e m s e l v e s . T h a t i s , M a r x i s m m a i n t a i n s t h a t m a t e r i a l , s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s or e v e n t s c o n t a i n w i t h i n t h e m s e l v e s t h e i r own a n t i t h e s i s w h i c h a l o n e i s s u f f i c i e n t X I I . t o c a u s e a new e v e n t o r n e g a t e a p r e s e n t e v e n t . I n a d d i -t i o n t o t h e o p p o s i t e o r c o n t r a d i c t o r y c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n an e v e n t , t h e r e a r e e x t e r n a l o p p o s i t e s w h i c h a l s o q u a l i f y ' the n a t u r e o f an e v e n t . T h u s , on t h e b a s i s o f a dynamic u n i v e r s e I n w h i c h e v e n t s a r e d e t e r m i n e d by i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l o p p o s i t e s , M a r x i s m a s s e r t s t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f t h e n e g a t i o n o f any p a r t i c u l a r e v e n t o r e n t i t y , e . g . , t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f t h e c o l l a p s e o r n e g a t i o n o f c a p i t a l i s m . I n t h e s e c o n d p a r t o f t h i s work, t h e v e r y b a s i s , i . e . , t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l • b a s i s , of t h i s v i e w w i l l be e x a m i n e d . M o r e o v e r , the w r i t e r w i l l t r y t o show t h a t t h e t h e o r y o f i n e v i t a b i l i t y c a n n o t be u n i v e r s a l l y m a i n t a i n e d . I t has a l s o been shown i n t h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n t h a t M a r x i a n p h i l o s o p h y h o l d s t h a t m i n d i s a h i g h e r f o r m o f m a t t e r , r e f l e c t i n g t h a t w h i c h i s e x t e r n a l t o I t s e l f . Now, i f t h i s be t h e t r u e n a t u r e o f m i n d , a n d i f t h e t r u e n a t u r e o f a l l m a t t e r be d i a l e c t i c t h e n i n what s e n s e i s M a r x i s m o r d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m an a c t i v e r e v o l u t i o n a r y p h i l o s o p h y ? I t i s the w r i t e r ' s v i e w t h a t an a c t i v e d e t e r -m i n i s m , as e n u n c i a t e d by M a r x i a n w r i t e r s , c a n n o t be v a l i d l y h e l d i n t e r m s o f t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l a n d e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t e n e t s o f d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m . I n o r d e r t h a t t h i s may be s e e n q u i t e c l e a r l y , p a r t one o f t h i s work o u t l i n e s some o f t h e c a r d i n a l X I I I . p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s o f p a s t a g e s , and shows a l s o how d i f f e r e n t s c h o o l s o f t h o u g h t have t r i e d t o s o l v e t h e s e p r o b l e m s . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f past, p e r i o d s on d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m w i l l be s e e n an d t h r o u g h t h i s the i n h e r e n t d i f f i c u l t i e s o f t h e M a r x i a n p o s i t i o n w i l l , p e r h a p s , become a i l t h e more a p p a r e n t . The g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t owing t o t h e M a r x i a n c o n c e p t o f m i n d as a r e f l e c t o r , and t h e r e j e c t i o n o f any t y p e o f t e l e o l o g i e a l f a c t o r , t h e a c t i v e d e t e r m i n i s m e n u n c i a t e d i n t h i s p h i l o s o p h y i s n o t i m p l i c i t i n i t s b a s i c m e t a p h y s i c a l and y e p l s t e m o l o g i c a l t e n e t s . S e c o n d l y , t h e M a r x i a n p r i n c i p l e o f c a u s a l i t y , owing t o t h e t e n e t s o f a b r u p t b r e a k , emergence o f n o v e l t y , a n d t h e dynamic n a t u r e o f terms does n o t j u s t i f y t h e t h e o r y o f the i n t e r c o n n e c t e d n e s s o f e v e n t s . M o r e o v e r , t h i s p r i n c i p l e o f c a u s a l i t y does n o t s u b s t a n t i a t e the M a r x i a n t e n e t o f t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f p a r t i c u l a r e v e n t s , a g a i n owing t o t h e t e n e t s o f a b r u p t b r e a k a n d emergence o f  n o v e l t y . T h i r d l y , as t h e i n t e r c o n n e c t e d n e s s o f e v e n t s c a n n o t be l o g i c a l l y m a i n t a i n e d t h e r e i s no s o u n d b a s i s f o r t h e p o s t u l a t e o f a b s o l u t e o b j e c t i v e t r u t h . T h a t i s t o s a y , u n l e s s r e a l i t y c a n be v i e w e d as a s c h e m a t i c whole i n terms o f w h i c h p a r t i c u l a r e v e n t s a r e r e l a t e d t h e n t h e r e i s no s o u n d c r i t e r i o n f o r a s s e r t i n g the X I V . absolute t r u t h of p a r t i c u l a r events or f o r m a i n t a i n i n g that we approach ever c l o s e r to absolute o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . In s h o r t , the Marxian theory i s an u n s u c c e s s f u l attempt to produce a u n i v e r s a l and r e v o l u t i o n a r y p h i l o s o p h y by merging two schools of thought, namely m a t e r i a l i s m and i d e a l i s m . The attempt has been u n s u c c e s s f u l p r i m a r i l y because of the n e c e s s i t y , from the s o c i a l p o i n t of view, of producing a , d e t e r m i n i s t i c philosophy and yet an a c t i v e or p o s i t i v e p h i l o s o p h y . i Part I THE HERITAGE OP DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM I. Greek Materialism D i a l e c t i c a l materialism i s , l i k e most products of a culture, the result of the a c t i v i t i e s of a s p e c i f i c period coupled with the heritage of that period. As formulated by Marx and Engels, the theory i s i n many respects the by-product of the modifications and inno-vations that have been applied to the metaphysical and epistemological concepts of materialism and idealism. Throughout t h e i r h i s t o r y , materialism and idealism have appeared as both monistic and p l u r a l i s t i c concepts of r e a l i t y . In the materialism of the French Rationalists may be seen an epistemology comparable i n some respects to that of idealism. For example, Descartes' s t a r t i n g point, namely the ego, leads d i r e c t l y to the recognition of the ego-centric predicament of man i n attempting to postulate a completely objective philosophy. The recognition of such a problem or po s i t i o n , i n turn, i s the basic premise for a philosophy of idealism. On the other hand, the recognition that ideas are capable of v e r i f i c a t i o n by an appeal to a world e x i s t i n g independent of f i n i t e minds, and indeed stimulating f i n i t e 2. minds, became f o r the C a r t e s i a n s c h o o l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the conception of a d u a l i s t i c world of mind and matter. The complexity of attempting to r e c o n c i l e two u n l i k e s , such as mind and matter, showed c o n c l u s i v e l y , however, the i n -adequacy of French m a t e r i a l i s m from an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t a n d p o i n t . A3 shown above, the r e c o g n i t i o n of the e g o - c e n t r i c predicament of man i n attempting to p o s t u l a t e a u n i v e r s a l philosophy i s a c t u a l l y the b a s i s of i d e a l i s m ; both s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m . S u b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m , however, d i s -regards completely s o - c a l l e d concrete r e a l i t y and p o s t u l a t e s i n s t e a d a m o n i s t i c concept of the u n i v e r s e . In essence, s u b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m Is " . . . the d o c t r i n e that r e p r e s e n t s the s u b j e c t i t s e l f and i t s s t a t e s and judgments as the s i n g l e immediate datum of consciousness, and a l l e l s e , whether o b j e c t s i n an e x t e r n a l world or persons other than the i n d i -v i d u a l s u b j e c t whose s t a t e s are known to i t s e l f , as having a merely problematic e x i s t e n c e r e s t i n g upon analogy or other process of i n d i r e c t i n f e r e n c e . 1* However, such a s u b j e c t i v e monism seems q u i t e inadequate when the obvious m e t a p h y s i c a l problem i s p o s i t e d , namely, do a l l events emanate from minds ,or Mind? As a matter of f a c t , i n a l l f i e l d s of p h i l o s o p h i c endeavour such a s u b j e c t i v e p o s i t i o n seems t o l e a d t o an extreme r e l a t i v i s m h a r d l y j u s t i f i a b l e i n terms of l o g i c and e m p i r i c a l data. 1 " i d e a l i s m " , Encyclopedia" B r i t a n n i c a , (A New Survey of U n i v e r s a l Knowledge), Chicago, U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago, E n c y c l o p e d i a B r i t a n n i c a Inc., 1948, V o l . 12, p.66. O b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m , on the other hand, d i f f e r s from incomplete or s u b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m i n t h a t i t recog-n i s e s s o - c a l l e d "concrete r e a l i t y " , but at the same time recognises the e g o - c e n t r i c predicament of p h i l o s o p h y , i n g e n e r a l and epistemology, i n p a r t i c u l a r . M a t e r i a l i s m has a l s o appeared i n the forms of monism and p l u r a l i s m . The one c a r d i n a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e i n g between a m a t e r i a l i s t i c concept of a s i n g l e u n i v e r s a l substratum from which a l l p a r t i c u l a r s emanate, as a g a i n s t a m a t e r i a l i s t i c , y e t p l u r a l i s t i c , concept of two or more u n i v e r s a l s u b s t r a t a from which d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s of p a r t i c u l a r s emanate; or by the combining of such s u b s t r a t a d i f f e r e n t p a r t i c u l a r s come i n t o being. The e a r l y Greek p h i l o s o p h i e s exemplify these types o f m a t e r i a l i s m . The r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e . e g o - c e n t r i c predicament of man i n f o r m u l a t i n g a completely o b j e c t i v e p h i l o s o p h y was not common to the p r e - S o c r a t i c p e r i o d of Greek ph i l o s o p h y . The p r e - S o c r a t i c s were, i n other words, naive m a t e r i a l i s t s . T h e i r approach to t h e i r s u b j e c t was one t h a t e i t h e r d e l i b e r a t e l y i g n o r e d any epistemo-l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , or was based on the naive view t h a t by a n a l y s i n g and s y n t h e s i s i n g the laws of change and the nature of t h i n g s i t would be p o s s i b l e to a r r i v e at a u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d p h i l o s o p h y . Thus i t was t h a t i n the a n c i e n t M i l e s i a n s c h o o l such t h i n k e r s as T h a l e s , Anaximander and Anaximenes con-c e i v e d of r e a l i t y as a changing composite which m a n i f e s t e d i t s e l f through p a r t i c u l a r s t h a t emanated from a m a t e r i a l u n i v e r s a l substratum. Thales (585 B.C.), f o r example, c o n s i d e r e d the u n i v e r s a l substratum t o be water from which a l l t h i n g s tmanate. Another member of the M i l e s i a n s c h o o l , A n a x i -mander, c o n s i d e r e d t h i s to be f a l s e , but h i s approach was b a s i c a l l y the same as t h a t of T h a l e s . That i s , Anaximander maintained,that a l l t h i n g s emanate from a s i n g l e p r i m a l substance, but i t i s not water. No d e t a i l e d e x p l a n a t i o n what the p r i m a l substance may be appears to have been attempted by Anaximander. He does, however, d e f i n e i t as a n e u t r a l i n the cosmic s t r i f e which secondary substances Impose upon one another. The t h i r d important member of the M i l e s i a n s c h o o l , Anaximenes, i s b e l i e v e d t o have l i v e d before 494 B His theory of cosmology i s s i m i l a r i n approach to t h a t of both Thales and Anaximander. That i s , Anaximenes a l s o sought t o e x p l a i n r e a l i t y by use of a g e n e t i c con-cept, namely, a i r . As may be seen, he d i s a g r e e d with Both Thales and Anaximander as t o the nature of the b a s i c substance of the u n i v e r s e , but he d i d agree w i t h the g e n e r a l approach of these p h i l o s o p h e r s , namely, e n t i t i e s are d e r i v e d from a u n i v e r s a l substratum whose degrees of c o n c e n t r a t i o n r e s u l t i n the m u l t i p l i c i t y of a t t r i b u t e s t o be found i n p a r t i c u l a r e n t i t i e s and events. As Bertrand R u s s e l l has s t a t e d , "The fundamental substance. . . i s a i r . The s o u l i s a i r ; f i r e i s r a r e f i e d a i r ; when condensed, a i r becomes f i r s t water, then, i f f u r t h e r con-densed e a r t h , and f i n a l l y stone. T h i s theory has the m e r i t of making a l l the d i f f e r e n c e between d i f f e r e n t substances q u a n t i t a t i v e , depending e n t i r e l y upon the degree of conden-s a t i o n . " 2 The main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the m a t e r i a l i s m of a l l ages up to and i n c l u d i n g n i n e t e e n t h century d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m i s e v i d e n t In the monisms of these e a r l y Greek t h i n k e r s . F i r s t , an u n d e r l y i n g substratum i s p o s i t e d i n order t o e x p l a i n the m a n i f o l d e n t i t i e s e x i s t i n g at any p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t i n time. Secondly, a b a s i c d i s t i n c t i o n between mind and matter i s not admitted; on the c o n t r a r y a l l t h i n g s are c l a s s i f i e d i n terms of a g e n e t i c concept, e.g., a i r , water, e t c e t e r a . The reason f o r such an outlook has been c o n c i s e l y s t a t e d by H. J . Pos i n h i s a r t i c l e , "remarks on the M a t e r i a l i s m of the E i g h t e e n t h Century," "The m a t e r i a l i s t i c n a t u r a l i s t s of the p r e - S o c r a t i c p e r i o d saw no reason why matter should not comprise a l l r e a l i t y , i n c l u d i n g l i v i n g beings and, i n p a r t i -c u l a r , man. They i n c l i n e d the more r e a d i l y to t h i s view because they drew no sharp d i s t i n c t i o n between i n e r t and l i v i n g matter."^ 2 R u s s e l l , Bertrand, A H i s t o r y of Western P h i l o s o p h y , New York, Lemon and Schuster, p. 28. 1 3 S e l l a r s , Roy Wood, and others ed., P h i l o s o p h y f o r  the Future, "Remarks on the M a t e r i a l i s m of the E i g h t e e n t h Century," New York, The Macmillan Co., 1949, p. 11. T h i r d l y , as noted i n the p h i l o s o p h y of Anaximander a q u a n t i t a t i v e account of the a t t r i b u t e s of s p e c i f i c p a r t i c u l a r s i s undertaken. Another monist, not of the M i l e s i a n s c h o o l , was Parmenides, who l i v e d around 450 B.C. S i m i l a r to the M i l e s i a n s , Parmenides regarded p a r t i c u l a r e n t i t i e s and events as the d e r i v a t i v e s of a p r i m a l u n i v e r s a l substratum. He d i f f e r s from the M i l e s i a n s , however, i n r e g a r d i n g the u n i v e r s e as e s s e n t i a l l y f i x e d or s t a t i c . T h i s concept seems t o have been a r r i v e d at by way of extreme r a t i o n a -l i s i n g and a complete d i s r e g a r d f o r observed phenomena. I t does, however, c o n t a i n the germ of the dilemma of m o n i s t i c m a t e r i a l i s m . That i s , i n p o s t u l a t i n g substance or matter as a fundamental u n i v e r s a l substratum must i t not be of n e c e s s i t y f i x e d or s t a t i c ? F o r , how indeed i s i t p o s s i b l e to use a g e n e t i c concept as an e x p l a n a t i o n of s p e c i f i c phenomena i f the concept i t s e l f i s a l s o becoming other than i t was? This i s the c a r d i n a l reason f o r Par-menides' s t a t i c concept of r e a l i t y which, although r e j e c t e d by succeeding p h i l o s o p h e r s , d i d i n f l u e n c e p r o f o u n d l y the concept of a u n i v e r s a l substratum. "What subsequent p h i l o s o p h y , down to q u i t e modern times, accepted from Parmenides, was not the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of a l l change, which was too v i o l e n t a paradox, but the i n d e s t r u c t i b i l i t y of substance. The word substance' d i d not accur i n h i s immediate s u c c e s s o r s , but the (Conception i s a l r e a d y present i n t h e i r s p e c u l a t i o n s . A substance was supposed to be the p e r s i s t a n t s u b j e c t of v a r y i n g p r e d i c a t e s . As such i t became and remained f o r more than two thousand years one of the fundamental concepts of p h i l o s o p h y , psychology, ph y s i c s and t h e o l o g y . " 4 Now, i n both the monisms of Parmenides and the M i l e s i a n s a s t a t i c concept of r e a l i t y i s p o s i t e d . Perhaps, i n the case of the M i l e s i a n t h i n k e r s , i t i s u n w i t t i n g l y p o s t u l a t e d , but, as seen, i n the t h i n k i n g of Parmenides i t i s c o n s i d e r e d a l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n drawn from the concept of a u n i v e r s a l substratum from which a l l p a r t i -c u l a r s emanate. J u s t p r i o r t o Parmenides' time, the opposite c o n c l u s i o n based upon a u n i v e r s a l substratum was p o s t u l a t e d by H e r a c l i t u s , namely, t h i s i s a dynamic u n i v e r s e . The H e r a c l i t e a n d o c t r i n e , however, w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d s e p a r a t e l y and i n . c o n n e c t i o n with the d i a l e c -t i c concept. In terms of the g e n e r a l p a t t e r n of thought i n Greek p h i l o s o p h y , the s h i f t was from a "one-substance" concept t o a "many-substance" concept and to a g e n e r a l b e l i e f t h a t u n i t s of matter are a l i v e and capable of q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s . The p h i l o s o p h i e s of Empedocles and Ananagoras exemplify t h i s t r e n d . 4 R u s s e l l , Bsrtrand, A H i s t o r y of Western Ph i l o s o p h y , New York, Simon and Schuster, p. 52. 8. For example, the p h i l o s o p h y of Empedocles i s a p l u r a l i s t i c m a t e r i a l i s m - a s y n t h e s i s of the monisms of h i s predecessors Thatles, Anaximander, Anaximenes and . H e r a c l i t u s . I t does, however, c o n t a i n one p r i n c i p l e t h a t i s e x c l u s i v e l y the b r a i n c h i l d of Empedocles, i . e . the p r i n c i p l e of Love and S t r i f e . Empedocles, l i v i n g about 440 B.C., regarded the cosmos as a composite of f o u r e v e r l a s t i n g elements or substances, namely, e a r t h , a i r , f i r e and water. These elements are u n i t e d and d i v i d e d i n d i f f e r e n t p r o p o r t i o n s by two other b a s i c elements, Love and S t r i f e . These concepts of Love and S t r i f e (or more s p e c i f i c a l l y a t t r a c -t i o n and r e p u l s i o n ) were used by Empedocles t o account f o r many of the events or m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of r e a l i t y . They are s i m i l a r i n some r e s p e c t s t o H e r a c l i t u s 1 theory of o pposites (to be d i s c u s s e d under "Creek D i a l e c t i c s " ) . These concepts, or as Empedocles c o n s i d e r s them, the elements of Love and S t r i f e were not regarded as a c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n of a l l phenomena; f o r he does admit t h a t some p a r t i c u l a r m a n i f e s t a t i o n s are chance e v e n t s . In other words, Empedocles b e l i e v e s t h a t events are the r e s u l t s of chance and n e c e s s i t y , and t h a t they are d e r i v e d from the d i f f e r e n t combinations or p r o p o r t i o n s of the basic elements or substances. A r o u n d t h e same p e r i o d , A n a x a g o r a s (500 B.C. t o 432 B.C.) was i n t r o d u c i n g p h i l o s o p h y t o the A t h e n i a n s . H i s p h i l o s o p h y , a l t h o u g h b a s i c a l l y m a t e r i a l i s t i c , t o o k t h e f o rm o f a d u a l i s m o f mind a n d m a t t e r . A n a x a g o r a s 1 c o n c e p t o f m i n d was, h o w e v e r , m e r e l y a f a c t o r t o a c c o u n t f o r l i v i n g o r g a n i s m s a n d t o d i f f e r e n -t i a t e them f r o m i n e r t b o d i e s . T h i s , as shown e a r l i e r , was t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r a new o r i e n t a t i o n and d i c h o t o m y o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t . T h a t i s t o s a y , t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a d u a l i s m o f m i n d a n d m a t t e r , a l t h o u g h t h e c o n c e p t o f m i n d was q u i t e a n i m i s t i c , must be c r e d i t e d . f i r s t t o A n a x a g o r a s , f o r "He d i f f e r e d f r o m h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s i n r e g a r d i n g m i n d (nous) as a s u b s t a n c e w h i c h e n t e r s i n t o t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f l i v i n g t h i n g s , a n d d i s t i n g u i s h e s them f r o m dead m a t t e r . " * The m a t e r i a l i s m of D e m o c r i t u s , p o s t u l a t e d a b o u t 420 B.C, i s an a t t e m p t t o m e d i a t e between monism an d p l u r a l i s m . G e n e r a l l y , D e m o c r i t u s i s c o n s i d e r e d as t h e f o u n d e r o f modern m a t e r i a l i s m b e c a u s e the d i s t i n c t i o n s he drew between p r i m a r y and s e c o n d a r y q u a l i t i e s a r e by i m p l i -c a t i o n a r e j e c t i o n o f any i d e a l i s t i c c o n c e p t o f knowledge and r e a l i t y . T h a t i s , ' t h r o u g h an a n a l y s i s o f p r i m a r y and s e c o n d a r y q u a l i t i e s , he a r r i v e d a t the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t s u c h q u a l i t i e s as s w e e t n e s s , b i t t e r n e s s , c o l o r , warmth and so f o r t h were m e r e l y o p i n i o n o r s e n s a t i o n , b r o u g h t a b o u t by s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a l t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l . 5 R u s s e l l , B e r t r a n d , A H i s t o r y o f Western, P h i l o s o p h y , New Y o r k , Simon a n d S c h u s t e r , p. 62. 10. Moreover, he maintained, that the causes of t h i n g s must be found i n those f o r c e s t h a t comprise nature; f o r these f o r c e s taken s i n g u l a r l y or i n the aggregate are the causes and the e f f e c t s of the m a n i f o l d aspects mani-f e s t e d i n the u n i v e r s e . The b a s i c or p r i m a l substance of these e n t i t i e s Democritus d e f i n e d as atoms, and the m u l t i p l i c i t y of the e n t i t i e s , both q u a n t i t a t i v e l y and q u a l i t a t i v e l y , he c o n s i d e r e d to be the r e s u l t of the a c t i o n and i n t e r a c t i o n of atoms. In a d d i t i o n , he con-c e i v e s of matter as being p r i m a r i l y i n d e s t r u c t i b l e , and a l s o as being c o n s t a n t l y mobile, i . e . , " . . . e v e r y t h i n g i s composed of atoms, which are p h y s i c a l l y , but not g e o m e t r i c a l l y , i n d i v i s i b l e ; . . . between the atoms there i s empty space.. . . atoms are i n d e s t r u c t i b l e ; . . . they .always have been, and always w i l l be i n m o t i o n . " 6 In s h o r t , i n the m a t e r i a l i s m of Democritus and h i s f o l l o w e r s most of the main tenets t h a t have been h e l d by m a t e r i a l i s t s o f a a l l ages are p o s t u l a t e d . F i r s t , an u n d e r l y i n g substratum i s p o s t u l a t e d as a 10-gical and m e t a p h y s i c a l n e c e s s i t y f o r the b a s i s of a theory of c a u s a l i t y . Secondly, a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between m a t e r i a l and mental phenomena i s e n u n c i a t e d , and more-over, mind i s d e f i n e d as a p a r t i c u l a r form of matter. In a word, no dualism i s t o l e r a t e d . T h i r d l y , i t i s fc> R u s s e l l , Bertrand, A H i s t o r y of Western Philosophy New York, Simon and Schuster, p. 65. 11. c o n s i d e r e d as probable, although perhaps not always p o s s i b l e , t h a t a c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n may be found f o r the m a n i f o l d events and e n t i t i e s t h a t comprise r e a l i t y . The essence of Democritus' atomism, s i m i l a r to a l l m a t e r i a l i s m , i s , In other words, determinism. The p r e - S o c r a t i c s were predominantly m a t e r i a l i s t i c n a t u r a l i s t s , who regarded r e a l i t y as an ever changing complex t h a t might be understood by e x p l a i n i n g i t s p a r t i -c u l a r m a n i f e s t a t i o n s i n terms of a g e n e t i c concept, such as, a i r , e a r t h , f i r e and water. That i s , the e a r l y Greek t h i n k e r s thought t h a t matter comprised a l l r e a l i t y i n -c l u d i n g man. "The m a t e r i a l i s t i c n a t u r a l i s t s of the p r e - S o c r a t i c p e r i o d saw no reason why matter should not comprise a l l r e a l i t y , i n c l u d i n g l i v i n g beings and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , man. They i n c l i n e d t h e more r e a d i l y to t h i s view because they drew no sharp d i s t i n c t i o n between i n e r t and l i v i n g matter."' A f t e r the c u l m i n a t i o n of Greek m a t e r i a l i s m i n the philosophy of Democritus a r e a c t i o n to what was con-s i d e r e d i t s p a n t h e i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the u n i v e r s e became apparent i n the d o c t r i n e s of Socrates and P l a t o , and A r i s t o t l e t o a l e s s e r ext;ent. S o c r a t e s , who d i e d i n 399 B.C., disapproved of a l l forms of m a t e r i a l i s m which were founded on a r e j e c t i o n of the r e a l i t y of concepts. He maintained t h a t r e a l i t y 7 S e l l a r s , Roy Wood, and o t h e r s , ed., P h i l o s o p h y  f o r the F u t u r e . "Remarks on the M a t e r i a l i s m of Ihe E i g h t e e n t h Century," New York, The MacMillan Company, 1949, p. 11. 12. or l i f e i s only e x p l i c a b l e as a system of ends. His approach, i n other words, was b a s i c a l l y one of pure r a t i o n a l i s m and i m p l i e s a r e c o g n i t i o n of the e g o - c e n t r i c predicament of p h i l o s o p h y i n g e n e r a l , and knowledge i n p a r t i c u l a r . P l a t o continues the S o c r a t i c o r i e n t a t i o n to p h i l o s o p h y , and d i s t i n g u i s h e s s h a r p l y between s o u l (mind) and body. P l a t o , f o r i n s t a n c e , sometimes thought of mind as an i n d e s t r u c t i b l e r a t i o n a l element t h a t e x i s t e d some-where before i t became a t t a c h e d to organisms. T h i s d i s -t i n c t i o n between mind and body i s the b a s i s of i d e a l i s m , which r e j e c t s a g e n e t i c approach to r e a l i t y and advocates i n s t e a d an approach by a n a l y t i c a p r i o r i methods. P l a t o ' s p u p i l , A r i s t o t l e , r e p r e s e n t s on one s i d e of h i s p h i l o s o p h y the common sense view, as w i t -nessed i n the g e n e t i c approach of the Greek m a t e r i a l i s t . In t h i s respect he i s i n r e v o l t a g a i n s t P l a t o n i c i d e a l i s m . On the other hand, he r e p r e s e n t s the attempt t o r e s t o r e Platonism, i n a more s a t i s f a c t o r y - form, e.g., "His account of the process of knowledge i n h i s l o g i c a l t r e a t i s e s e x h i b i t s the i d e a l i s t i c bent i n h i s p h i l o s o p h y . T h i s i s as f a r removed as p o s s i b l e e i t h e r from dualism or e m p i r i c i s m . The u n i v e r s a l Is the r e a l ; i t i s that which gives coherence and i n d i v i d u a l i t y to the p a r t i c u l a r . . . . " 8 8 " I d e a l i s m " , E n c y c l o p e d i a B r i t a n n i c a , (A New Survey of U n i v e r s a l Knowledge), Chicago, U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago, E n c y c l o p e d i a B r i t a n n i c a I n c . , 1948, v o l . 12, p. 66. The r e a l r e v o l t a g a i n s t P l a t o n i c s c e p t i c i s m and i d e a l i s m , however, was l e d by E p i c u r u s who b e l i e v e d i n t h e a b s o l u t e t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s o f s e n s a t i o n . He added n o t h i n g f u n d a m e n t a l l y new t o t h e d o c t r i n e s o f D e m o c r i t u s , b u t he a n d h i s s c h o o l d i d k e e p a l i v e G r e e k m a t e r i a l i s m a n d deny t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e s c e p t i c i s m o f P l a t o n i c i d e a l i s m . !'The E p i c u r e a n s were t h e most c o n s i s t e n t champions o f m a t e r i a l i s m i n a n t i q u i t y . T h ey were t h e most d e t e r m i n e d enemies o f t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l . T h ey b e s t k e p t a l i v e t h e c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a t r u e s c i e n c e o f n a t u r e . They d i d most t o k e e p a l i v e an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f t h e p r e - S o c r a t i c s . T h ey were t h e s u r e s t g u a r d i a n s o f th e v i e w t h a t man h a d made h i m s e l f by h i s c o n q u e s t o f n a t u r e , and t h a t h i s c i v i l i s a t i o n was t o be u n d e r s t o o d as a human e x p e r i m e n t . " 9 9 S e l l a r s , Roy Wood, a n d o t h e r s , e d . , P h i l o s o p h y f o r t h e F u t u r e , D e m o c r i t u s , P l a t o and E p i c u r u s , wew lorn.. The M a c m i l l a n Company,.1949, p. 11. 14. 11 Modern Materialism The Cartesian r a t i o n a l i s t s of the seventeenth century conceived of matter i n terms of extension, but not as an exclusive substratum; f o r t h e i r concept of r e a l i t y allowed f o r the existence of mind as a separate e n t i t y . The general implication of such a dualism became a l l too apparent from an epistemological standpoint, when a causal nexus between mind and matter was deemed necessary. Now, although Descartes was not an adherent of Democritus' theory of atoms, he did, nevertheless, incor-porate into his dualism many of the p r i n c i p l e s of the Greek m a t e r i a l i s t s , e.g., a p a r t i a l use of the genetic concept of materialism f o r explaining the o r i g i n of ce r t a i n kinds of p a r t i c u l a r s . His s t a r t i n g point, however, was essen-t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from that of Democritus, i . e . , Descartes started by doubting everything and subsequently recognising the existence of mind. Democritus, on the other hand, started with the acceptance of data received through the senses and then i n f e r s the o b j e c t i v i t y of t h i s data which stimulates the senses, and the s u b j e c t i v i t y of the senses' reaction to this data. This approach excludes the im p l i -cations of the recognition of the ego-centric predicament 15. of p o s t u l a t i n g a u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d p h i l o s o p h y , while the C a r t e s i a n concept of a d u a l i s t i c world i s by i m p l i c a t i o n a r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s problem. To e l a b o r a t e , D e s c a r t e s , by use of h i s "systematic doubt", was f o r c e d t o p o s t u l a t e mind as an e x c l u s i v e sub-stratum; then, while attempting to formulate a theory of knowledge, he was f o r c e d t o allow f o r the e x i s t e n c e of matter. He avoided, however, the s p i r i t u a l i s i n g of n a t u r a l o b j e c t s by c o n c e i v i n g of mind as an independent substance with c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s e x c e e d i n g l y d i f f e r e n t from those of matter. The l a t t e r , he d e f i n e d as extended substance, but mind or s p i r i t u a l substance, he maintained, completely l a c k e d e x t e n s i o n , and was c h a r a c t e r i s e d wholly by t h i n k i n g , which was a mode of f u n c t i o n i n g q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from the locomotion that c o n s t i t u t e s the s o l e a c t i v i t y of matter. Thus, the dichotomy between mind and matter was e x e m p l i f i e d i n the C a r t e s i a n dualism. The b i f u r c a t i o n t h e o r y , formulated by D e s c a r t e s , i n order t o bridge the gap between these two e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t elements proved, moreover, u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . b o t h from m e t a p h y s i c a l and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p o i n t s of view. M a t e r i a l o b j e c t s were c o n s i d e r e d by the French m a t e r i a l i s t s to have no element or f a c t o r of s e l f - a c t i o n s i m i l a r to t h a t which Descartes had a t t r i b u t e d t o organisms; r a t h e r they moved only as they were a c t e d upon. In o t h e r 16. words, the b a s i c assumption of p h y s i c a l science was t h a t a l l m a t e r i a l bodies were i n e r t and t h a t they moved onl y when they were a c t e d upon by some f o r c e e x t e r n a l to them-s e l v e s . In a d d i t i o n , a mathematical mechanical e x p l a n a t i o n of the a c t i o n of one body on another was g i v e n great promi-nence. The u n s a t i s f a c t o r y aspect of t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n was, however, t h a t i f an e x t e r n a l f o r c e was necessary f o r the movement of a body to take p l a c e e i t h e r an i n f i n i t e r e g r e s s i o n of causes or a f i r s t cause must be admitted or p o s t u l a t e d , which i s not of the nature of an i n e r t body, but which can a c t i v a t e an I n e r t body, thereby a l l o w i n g i t t o cause the a c t i o n of other i n e r t b o d i e s . Consequently, D e s c a r t e s , as a f i r s t cause or primary mover, p o s t u l a t e s the e x i s t e n c e of God or an Absolute whose e x i s t e n c e he endeavours to prove through the use of c o s m o l o g i c a l and o n t o l o g i c a l arguments. That i s , he maintains that the g e n e r a l cause of motion i s God, who c r e a t e d matter along w i t h motion and r e s t . Hence, wi t h the concept of an unchangeable A b s o l u t e , Descartes concludes t h a t the q u a n t i t y of motion i n the world i s a l s o unchanging. F u r t h e r , although God was the primary cause of a l l motion i n the world, there were secondary causes i n as much as bodies were a c t e d upon or moved by "bodies" e x t e r n a l t o themselves. Never-t h e l e s s , these secondary causes were a l s o i n t e r p e n e t r a t e d by the unchangeableness of God so t h a t they must a c t r e g u l a r l y and a c c o r d i n g to f i x e d laws. T h i s concept of u n c h a n g e a b l e n e s s as r e g a r d s t h e A b s o l u t e a n d i t s e f f e c t on s e c o n d a r y c a u s e s made f o r a c o n c e p t o f t h e u n i v e r s e w h i c h c o n s i d e r e d as a whole was s t a t i c . I n a d d i t i o n , i t l e d t o a m e c h a n i c a l - m a t h e m a t i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n s o f p a r t i c u l a r s a n d t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o one a n o t h e r . I n s h o r t , t h e manner o f d e v e l o p m e n t a n d t h e c o n c e p t s f r o m w h i c h m a t e r i a l i s m p r o g r e s s e d , up t o t h e e n d o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y e n d e d i n a t h e o r y o f t h e u n i v e r s e w h i c h was s t a t i c i f c o n s i d e r e d as a whole and n o t i n t e r m s o f i t s p a r t s . Marx-and, E n g e l s d i s a g r e e d a l m o s t e n t i r e l y w i t h t h e . p h i l o s o p h i e s o f t h e F r e n c h r a t i o n a l i s t s a n d m a t e r i a l i s t s i . e . , w i t h b o t h t h e d u a l i s t i c c o n c e p t a n d t h e m e c h a n i s t i c c o n c e p t o f n a t u r e . ,111 i Views on the Nature of Mind and Matter < Running almost p a r a l l e l with a, s t a t i c concept of r e a l i t y was the concept that the u n i v e r s e was not absolute i n every sense, but dynamic, i . e . , c o n s t a n t l y changing. For example, throughout the m e t a p h y s i c a l spec l a t i o n s of H e r a c l i t u s , P l a t o , A r i s t o t l e and o t h e r s , may be detected aspects of t h i s theory. That i s , from both an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l and m e t a p h y s i c a l p o i n t of view the p r i n c i p l e of d i a l e c t i c s was being developed, e.g., the A r i s t o t e l i a n concepts of p o t e n t i a l i t y and a c t u a l i t y . As f a r as the m e t a p h y s i c a l aspects of the d i a l e c t i c were concerned, i t seems t h a t the foremost exponent of them amongst the Greek p h i l o s o p h e r s was H e r a c l i t u s . He envisaged the world as a whole t h a t was f o r e v e r changing. Things were c o n s t a n t l y s h i f t i n g and becoming t h a t which they were not. The u n d e r l y i n g substratum which permeates a l l and which " j o i n s " t o -gether the multitude of p a r t i c u l a r s , which comprise the Whole was termed f i r e . S i m i l a r to, the m a t e r i a l i s t s , the d i a l e c t i c i a n s of t h i s p e r i o d were a l s o d e veloping a meta p h y s i c s which i m p l i e d or assumed the e x i s t e n c e of a sub-stance which made f o r a commonness between the v a r i o u s 19. bodies. In the case of H e r a c l i t u s , f i r e was the under-l y i n g substratum, because i t was a dynamic f o r c e always i n a process of change, never the same at any two i n s t a n c e s and yet having c o n t i n u i t y and cohesiveness. Consequently, i t was out of t h i s t heory of f l u x , or of ever changing and ever becoming t h a t the H e g e l i a n and Marxian concepts of a u n i t y of opposites was developed. That i s , every s i n g l e e n t i t y i n i t s continous change has w i t h i n i t s e l f an opposite which i n t u r n becomes a p a r t i c u l a r or s i n g l e t h i n g at some i n s t a n t i n time. In t h i s way, a c t i o n and r e a c t i o n take place i n s u c c e s s i v e s t a g e s , and moreover, are at a p a r t i c u l a r moment balanced i n t h e i r r e s u l t s . Thus the appearance of s i n g l e t h i n g s i s p o s s i b l e . A r i s t o t l e a l s o a p p l i e d the p r i n c i p l e of becoming i n h i s n o t i o n of matter. " . . . we conceive of matter as a c o r p o r e a l t h i n g d i s t r i b u t e d u n i v e r s a l l y , save where there i s vacuum, and of an e s s e n t i a l l y u n i form nature, although su b j e c t t o m o d i f i c a t i o n . " Here matter was r e l a t i v e ; as i t was matter only i n r e l a t i o n to that which was to r e s u l t from i t through i t being a c t u a l i z e d i n form. Thus, the p r i n c i p l e s of p o t e n t i a l i t y , whereby matter becomes a c t u a l i z e d through i t s m a n i f e s t a t i o n i n some form, was i n p r i n c i p l e s i m i l a r 10 Lange, P. A., " H i s t o r y of M a t e r i a l i s m " London, Trubuer and Company, 1879, pT 193. . t o the H e r a c l i t e a n d o c t r i n e of o p p o s i t e s , whereby, an e n t i t y comes i n t o being or changes because of i t s i n -herent opposite or because of o p p o s i t i o n ( e x t e r n a l ) i n the u n i v e r s a l substratum, f i r e . However, i n the A r i s t o -t e l i a n a p p l i c a t i o n of the d i a l e c t i c , there was no q u e s t i o n of a c o r p o r e a l substratum f o r a l l t h i n g s . For A r i s t o t l e regarded the form that r e a l i z e d i t s e l f i n the matter as the end or f i n a l cause i n which becoming f i n d s i t s com-p l e t e m a n i f e s t a t i o n . How, i t i s of no p a r t i c u l a r import, here, to p o i n t out the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h e r e n t i n t h i s t h e o r y but r a t h e r l e t the theory serve as an h i s t o r i c a l example of the merging of the d i a l e c t i c and m a t e r i a l i s t i c approaches. That i s , in. the A r i s t o t e l i a n concept of substance and matter there was apparent both the d i a l e c t i c concept of p r o g r e s s i o n , and a l s o the m a t e r i a l i s t i c emphasis on a concrete element t h a t may be determined through the p r i n c i p l e of c a u s a l i t y . To g e n e r a l i s e , i t has been shown t h a t i n the development of d i a l e c t i c a l thought there was i m p l i e d , i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y , a form of m a t e r i a l i s m i n t h a t a p h y s i c a l world was accounted f o r and was e x p l a i n e d to some degree i n terms of d i a l e c t i c s . F u r t h e r , i t has been shown that the d i a l e c t i c i a n s of the p r e - H e g e l i a n e r a d i d not c o n s i d e r the absolute as a f i x e d or s t a t i c concept. On the c o n t r a r y , they regarded the absolute as an ever changing being. On the other hand, the m a t e r i a l i s t s c h o o l of metaphysics p o s t u l a t e d an absolute t h a t was unchanging. Instead of ado p t i n g the d i a l e c t i c theory of dynamics, they p o s t u l a t e d a c a u s a l u n i v e r s e which was e x p l a i n a b l e i n terms of mechanical motion. In a d d i t i o n , t h i s determinism ( f o r such i s the essence of m a t e r i a l i s m ) as e x e m p l i f i e d i n the p h i l o s o p h y of D e s c a r t e s , c o n t a i n e d a dichotomy of mind and matter which even w i t h the concept of a Primary Mover and a theory of innate ideas d i d not qu i t e bridge the gap. For example, David Hume o b j e c t e d t o the C a r t e s i a n concept of mind and innate ideas on the grounds that there was no evidence t o support i t . Any i n d i v i d u a l mind, s t a t e d Hume, i s e x c l u s i v e l y the sum t o t a l o f the expe r i e n c e s t h a t f i l l the i n d i v i d u a l l i f e . That i s , each i n d i v i d u a l mind i s f o r Hume, " . . . a bundle or c o l l e c t i o n of d i f f e r e n t p e r c e p t i o n s , which succeed each other w i t h an i n c o n c e i v a b l e r a p i d i t y , and are i n a p e r p e t u a l f l u x and movement." 1 1 • Kant continues t h i s l i n e of thought, but c o n s i d e r s mind not as a bundle of experiences but r a t h e r as an organ-i z a t i o n of experiences made p o s s i b l e by an a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g p r i n c i p l e or agent of ^-Organization. The emphasis was upon 11 Cunningham, G. W., "Problems of Ph i l o s o p h y , " New York, Henry H o l t and Company, p. 256. the necessary e x i s t e n c e of some p r i n c i p l e of u n i t y among experience - a n e c e s s i t y which Hume denied. Moreover, the conc e p t i o n of t h i s p r i n c i p l e was as an a c t i v e o r g a n i z i n g agency as a g a i n s t the t r a d i t i o n a l P l a t o n i c - A r i s t o t e l e a n view of i t as a s t a t i c or changeless e n t i t y or t h i n g . The b a s i c t e n e t of the Kantian d o c t r i n e i s that mind cannot grasp or know the a c t u a l world, as such, but only a world of e x p e r i e n c e s . That i s , sense data are r e c e i v e d from the a c t u a l world by the organism and are then a c t e d upon or arranged i n a l o g i c a l p a t t e r n by the mind. F u r t h e r , as man "must" a c t i n accordance w i t h data arranged and r e l a t e d by the mind, f o r he can never get outside of experi e n c e , i t f o l l o w s that f o r a l l p r a c t i -c a l purposes the world i s m i n d - l i k e . T h i s i s the i d e a l i s t i c argument which a s s e r t s t h a t the world i s somewhat of the nature o r c h a r a c t e r of our mind. The emphasis of the Kanti a n theory does i n a sense f a l l upon the r e f u t a t i o n of complete r a t i o n a l i s m . That i s , Kant maintained t h a t knowledge must be and was r e s t r i c t e d t o the f i e l d of p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e , and that pure r a t i o n a l i z i n g of p o s s i b l e experience i s not j u s t i f i e d . That i s , i f reason goes beyond t h i s f i e l d i t w i l l be l i k e l y to argue a g a i n s t i t s e l f , and to pose pseudo problems or p r o p o s i t i o n s i n l i e u of the f a c t t h a t no frame of re f e r e n c e i s p o s s i b l e o u t s i d e e x p e r i e n c e . 23. In s h o r t , Kant maintained that a l l knowledge begins with e x p e r i e n c e , but i t i s not a l l d e r i v e d from e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s i s a l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n drawn from the very b a s i s of K a n t i a n epistemology. For example, p e r c e i v i n g and c o n c e i v i n g of any concept i m p l i e s s e l f , n o t - s e l f , and a r e l a t i o n s h i p i n f e r r e d by the mind from the nature of t h i s set of circumstances. T h i s b a s i c concept i s a l s o a p p l i e d i n the Kantian t h e o r y of c a u s a l i t y , i . e . , Kant r e j e c t s , i n essence, any attempt to formulate a m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r y of c a u s a l i t y . He i n s i s t s , i n s t e a d , t h a t f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes the s o - c a l l e d laws of nature are man-made, i . e . , cause i s the r e s u l t a n t of the r e l a t i o n s i n f e r r e d by man i n r e s p e c t to the v a r i o u s phenomena of h i s e x p e r i e n c e . 24. I T The H e g e l i a n D i a l e c t i c Hegelianism i s an attempt t o r e f u t e the a n t i -r a t i o n a l i s t i c d o c t r i n e s of Kant and h i s f o l l o w e r s , and a l s o to e l i m i n a t e the dichotomy of the C a r t e s i a n r a t i o n a l -i s t . I t i s a (monism, the essence of which i s a f u s i o n , both i n terms of approach and content, of metaphysics and epistemology. "The previous method of p h i l o s o p h y , s t a t e s Hegel, r e f e r r i n g t o the Kantian s c h o o l , has been to p r e f a c e metaphysics with an i n q u i r y i n t o the c o n d i t i o n s of knowledge i n the hope of f i n d i n g the a d d i t i o n s and s u b t r a c t i o n s made to and from i t s o b j e c t of knowledge, so t h a t by d i s c o u n t i n g these f a c t o r s we may get at the p r i m i t i v e t r u t h and s i g n i f i c a n c e of the object i t s e l f . T h i s g o a l i s f a l l a c i o u s f o r conceding t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e to c a r r y i t out, we a r r i v e at a stage where we have s u b t r a c t e d a l l knov?ledge from the p r i m i t i v e o b j e c t , and are back again where we s t a r t e d . " 1 2 T h i s approach and methodology was c o n s i s t e n t with Hegel's view t h a t l i f e i s an o r g a n i c u n i t y i n which a l l d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n and antagonism w i l l , i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , become s u b s e r v i e n t to one c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e 12 Myers, H. A. "The Spinoza-Hegel Paradox" I t h a c a , New York, C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1944, p. 24. 2 5 . which i s the very essence of p a r t i c u l a r d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n s and antagonisms, and which allows or brings about t h e i r acquiescence to h i g h e r p a r t i c u l a r s , or t o a f i n a l s t a t e . Hegel a r r i v e d a t t h i s p o s i t i o n by way of h i s d i a l e c t i c l o g i c which he c o n s i d e r e d to be the " t r u e " l o g i c as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t r a d i t i o n a l l o g i c which does not allow f o r the i n c l u s i o n of the c o n t r a d i c t o r y . For f o r m a l . l o g i c i s a b s t r a c t , d e a l i n g only with the r e l a t i o n -s h i p e x i s t i n g between terms. I t i s , indeed, s u b j e c t i v e t h i n k i n g and hence the b a s i s of the f a l l a c y c o n t a i n e d i n the divorce of epistemology and metaphysics. "True" l o g i c , that i s , d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c , deals with matter as w e l l as mind, o b j e c t as w e l l as s u b j e c t . The t r a d i t i o n a l f a l l a c y of both the r a t i o n a l i s t and a n t i - r a t i o n a l i s t , maintained Hegel, was to c o n s i d e r the b a s i c concepts or c a t e g o r i e s of thought as something a l i e n t o matter. That i s , as a product of mind imposed on matter and hence i n no way a b s o l u t e . T h i s i s f a l l a c i o u s , and the r e s u l t a n t of the misconceptions and of the tr u e nature o f human experience and subsequently of the true nature o f the c a t e g o r i e s . True c a t e g o r i e s , s t a t e s Hegel " . . . s p r i n g by inward n e c e s s i t y from the tru e nature of mind and from the tr u e ' n a t u r e of o b j e c t s . The whole world i s meaningful and to be meaningful i s to be l o g i c a l . The r a t i o n a l i s the a c t u a l , and r e a l i t y makes e v i d e n t i t s own c a t e g o r i e s and i t s own p r o c e s s . " ^ 13 Myers, H.A. "The Spinoza-Hegel_Paradox" I t h a c a , New York, C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1944, p..18. T h i s f u s i o n o f s u b j e c t a n d o b j e c t , as m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , i s t h e outcome o f H e g e l i a n d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c , i n g e n e r a l , a n d of t h e d i a l e c t i c a l t r i a d , i n p a r t i c u l a r . The d i a l e c t i c a l t r i a d c o n s i s t s o f t h r e e s t a g e s o r a s p e c t s t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e p e r c e i v i n g and c o g n i z i n g o f e n t i t i e s , w h i c h ar e c o n s i d e r e d as a c t u a l k n o w l e d g e , t a k e s p l a c e . The t r i a d i t s e l f i s the r e s u l t o f a c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f i d e n t i t y . T h a t i s , i n i d e n t i f y i n g an o b j e c t t h e r e e x i s t s a s e t o f a p r i o r i c i r c u m s t a n c e s , n a m e l y , o b j e c t and t h a t w h i c h i s n o t t h e o b j e c t . T h i s i s t h e o n l y manner i n w h i c h an e n t i t y becomes known. T h i s i s t h e t r a -d i t i o n a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t o f s e l f and n o t - s e l f . Where H e g e l d e p a r t s f r o m t r a d i t i o n i s I n h i s l e g i t i m a t e demand t h a t t h e . p o s t u l a t i o n o r p e r c e i v i n g of any c o n c e p t o r e n t i t y i m p l i e s t h a t w h i c h i s n o t t h e c o n c e p t o r e n t i t y . I t i s , i n o t h e r w o r d s , i m p o s s i b l e t o s e p a r a t e , f r o m th e p o i n t o f o b j e c t i v i t y , t h e e n t i t y and i t s o p p o s i t e , i . e . , t h e e n t i t y i s an e n t i t y e x c l u s i v e , i n a s e n s e , o f i t s o p p o s i t e : y e t , l o g i c a l l y , e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y and m e t a p h y s i -c a l l y i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m i t s o p p o s i t e . To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p o i n t , H e g e l p o s t u l a t e s t h e t e r m "A" a n d f i n d s t h a t i n so d o i n g he has a l s o p o s t u l a t e d t h a t w h i c h i s n o t "A". I n t e r m s o f l o g i c , "A" i m p l i e s "not-A" and c a n n o t be s e p a r a t e d f r o m "A"; c o n s e q u e n t l y "A" i n i t s a c t u a l o r o b j e c t i v e f o r m i s the r e s u l t a n t o f the a b s t r a c t "A" p o s t u l a t e d by t h e m i n d , p l u s i t s o p p o s i t e f rnot-A", w h i c h g i v e s i n t u r n c o n c r e t e o r o b j e c t i v e "A". Man c a n n o t , however, r e a l i z e t h i s 27. complete s y n t h e s i s or o b j e c t i v i t y because the "world p r o c e s s " has not yet completely r e a l i z e d i t s e l f . Hence h i s knowledge can be c o n s i d e r e d as not " t r u e " knowledge but r a t h e r c o r r e c t i n terms of the p a r t i a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the system t h a t he p e r c e i v e s . "The t r u t h i s the whole, however, i s merely the e s s e n t i a l nature r e a c h i n g i t s completeness through the process of i t s own development." ^ In s h o r t , owing t o the dynamics of the world process and to the f i n i t e n e s s of human minds, our knowledge i s only r e l a t i v e l y t r u e , t h a t i s to say, c o r r e c t i n terms of the p a r t i a l system comprehended. However, the world process ( d i a l e c t i c a l ) whereby each ne?* s y n t h e s i s Is con-s i d e r e d t o be a development toward a f i n a l s y n t h e s i s , r e a l i z e s i t s completeness i n the u l t i m a t e Idea. That i s , the s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n of the cosmos i s the end f o r which and to which the d i a l e c t i c a l world process i s o r i e n t a t e d . The r e a l i z a t i o n or m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the absolute Idea or S y n t h e s i s leads to the l i q u i d a t i o n of the d i a l e c t i c ; f o r no f i n a l s y n t h e s i s can be conceived wherein an a n t i t h e s i s would e x i s t whose v e r y being q u a l i f i e d or l i m i t e d the absolute or f i n a l s y n t h e s i s . Thus, the knowledge that man possesses at d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s of time cannot be c o n s i d e r e d as r e a l l y t r u e ; f o r the absolute c r i t e r i a , 14 llyersP, • H p A. "The Spinoza-Hegel Paradox',' I t h a c a , New York, C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1944, p. 20 28. i . e . , the "system" has not y e t reached m a t u r i t y . In a d d i t i o n , man's thought develops through d i f f e r e n t stages owing t o the nature of the thought p r o c e s s . These stages are the r e s u l t a n t s of the s u b j e c t -o b j e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t e x i s t s , f o r co n s c i o u s n e s s , i n p e r c e i v i n g and c o n c e i v i n g of any e n t i t y . "The t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f (and under t h i n g i s embraced even mind.and God) expresses, the o b j e c t when we leave out of s i g h t a l l that consciousness makes of i t , a l l i t s emotional a s p e c t s , and a l l s p e c i f i c thoughts of i t . . . what i s l e f t , - - u t t e r a b s t r a c t i o n , t o t a l emptiness, only d e s c r i b e d s t i l l as an 'other world' -- the negative of every image, f e e l i n g and d e f i n i t e thought . . . . " 1 5 The d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t u a l r e a l i t y and the, phenomena conceived by f i n i t e minds i s the r e s u l t of the a b s t r a c t i o n undertaken not by the senses but by c o n s c i o u s -ness. The ground f o r these phenomena i s i n the absolute i d e a , the goal toward which the r a t i o n a l , i . e . , d i a l e c t i c a l f a c t o r s of consciousness are ever s t r i v i n g . T h i s r e l a t i o n -s h i p between s u b j e c t and o b j e c t Hegel conceives of as a s e l f - i n t e g r a t i n g and s e I f - d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g whole. That i s , the r e l a t i o n s h i p takes the form of s e l f - i d e n t i t y , because any sense-data or appearance when p e r c e i v e d and cognized by the s u b j e c t c a l l s up the t o t a l system as a frame of r e f e r e n c e . I f t h i s be v a l i d , then sense data or p a r t i a l 15 Myers ,. „H.'CA. "The Spinoza-Hegel Paradox'] I t h a c a , New York, C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1944, p. 20 29. r e a l i t y i s p a r t of the same commonness as the frame of ref e r e n c e through which i t was i d e n t i f i e d , indeed how can i t be u n l i k e and s t i l l be d i g e s t e d or i d e n t i f i e d by the system, f o r , "A system i s that . . . which can f r e e l y d i g e s t i t s p a r t s and which i s a c t e d upon by n o t h i n g conceived of as o u t s i d e i t s e l f . . . . every step on the long road l e a d i n g up to the n o t i o n and to the absolute idea i s found to be u l t i m a t e l y a p a r t s e l f - i d e n t i c a l with the n o t i o n and the absolute i d e a . " i f e To e l a b o r a t e , s t a r t i n g with an immediate p r e s e n t a t i o n of sense data through sense organs, the mind c o n s i d e r s or conceives the data of i t s e l f , i . e . , as i s o l a t e d from other phenomena and as e x i s t i n g f o r i t s e l f . T h i s f i r s t stage i n the "knowledge-process" i s c a l l e d the t h e s i s . I t i s an a b s t r a c t i o n of the sense data or e n t i t y and t h e r e f o r e not the r e a l " t h i n g - i n - i t s e I f " ; . f o r i t i s not thought of i n r e l a t i o n t o other e n t i t i e s . I t i s what i t i s j I t i s b e i n g . However, i n c o n c e i v i n g of an e n t i t y i n meaningful terms, the pure a b s t r a c t i o n i s q u a l i f i e d c o n s i d e r a b l y , and the e n t i t y i s now con-c e i v e d i n terms of i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o . o t h e r e n t i t i e s , i . e . , i n terms of the " n o t - s e l f " . I t i s , i n other words, meaningful to consciousness o n l y when conceived as " s e l f " p l u s " n o t - s e l f " , i . e . , i t i s and i t i s not, i t i s "not-being". 16 Myers, H. A. "The Spinoza-Hege1 Paradox", I t h a c a , New York, C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1944 p. 25. 30. T h i s concept of the e n t i t y as " s e l f " and " n o t - s e l f " o r, i n Heg e l i a n terms, t h e s i s and a n t i t h e s i s , i s a l s o a b s t r a c t f o r i t c o n s i d e r s only the r e l a t i o n of the t h i n g to another, i . e . , only i t s meaning f o r c o n s c i o u s -ness. I t i s not u n t i l the o b j e c t , t h e s i s and i t s a n t i -t h e s i s , i s con c e i v e d as a whole, i . e . , as a composite of t h e s i s and a n t i t h e s i s , and not as a r e l a t i o n s h i p or d i s t i n c t i o n of t h e s i s and a n t i t h e s i s , t h a t i t i s conceived and known as c o n c r e t e , r a t i o n a l r e a l i t y . Then, the mind or consciousness i s c o n s i d e r e d by Hegel t o t h i n k o r f u n c t i o n c o n c r e t e l y r a t h e r than a b s t r a c t l y . "Since we have set up t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n - b e t w e e n the o b j e c t per se and the o b j e c t f o r another, f o r consciousness i t behooves us t o c a r r y on the d i a l e c t i c to such a p o i n t t h a t being f o r s e l f (per se) and being f o r another w i l l p u l l t o g ether i n a f i n a l s y n t h e s i s t h a t w i l l c o n s t i -t u t e the absoluteness of knowledge and the t r u t h of concrete r e a l i t y . " ^ The b a s i s of the d i a l e c t i c a l t r i a d i s , then, the d i s t i n c t i o n between concrete a c t u a l i t y or concrete thought, and a b s t r a c t understanding or merely s u b j e c t i v e thought. Now, the above summary of Hegellanism has shown the main tene t s of d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c and t h e i r e xtensions i n the f o r m u l a t i o n of an " o b j e c t i v e " t h e o r y of knowledge. As no d i s t i n c t i o n i s allowed between metaphysics and 17 Myers, H. A. "The Spinoza-Hegel Paradox" I t h a c a , New York, C o r n e l l u n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1944, p. 25 31. epistemology, the d i a l e c t i c process must be c o n s i d e r e d as c o v e r i n g a l l s u b j e c t s i n c l u d e d i n any " a r t i f i c i a l " s e p a r a t i o n of metaphysics and epistemology, or t h a t might be undertaken f o r the sake of s i m p l i c i t y or emphasis. As was shown, the b a s i s of the d i a l e c t i c a l t r i a d Is the d i s t i n c t i o n between the formal " s u b j e c t i v e " c a t e g o r i e s of concrete a c t u a l i t y or thought, and a b s t r a c t understanding or merely s u b j e c t i v e thought. The c a t e g o r i e s , maintained Hegel, are i n t r o d u c e d to consciousness piecemeal and, t h e r e f o r e , " . . . are mutable and mutually c o n f u s i n g , and thus y i e l d t o mind on l y a piecemeal and i n s e c u r e a c t u a l i t y . " 18 In essence, Hegel's c r i t i c i s m of the s u b j e c t i v e concepts or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the c a t e g o r i e s i s t h a t they are not accounted f o r as a r i s i n g from the t r u e nature of t h i n g s , but r a t h e r as innate concepts of the mind which are imposed on sense duty. H. A. Myers i n h i s The Spinoza-Hegel Paradox dispenses with the misconceptions that have plagued H e g e l i a n epistemology thus: " . . . Hegel's, i s not the s u b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m which he a t t r i b u t e s t o Kant and o t h e r s . I t i s i n a sense, as much n a t u r a l i s m as i t i s i d e a l i s m , f o r the c a t e g o r i e s are not imposed by mind on something without but are always coming from w i t h i n and from without. " " 18 Myers, H.rA. "The Spinoza-Hegel Paradox',' Ithaca New'-!York::i C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1944, p. 29 19 I b i d p. 32. x Again, "His i d e a i s something t h a t transcends the e a r l i e r mind and matter, something which give s us a s i n g l e world t o work with , a world with c o n d i t i o n s of s e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and s e I f - i n t e g r a t i o n . " 2 0 Indeed, both of the above quotations appear as w e l l founded even i f the t r e a t i s e on the nature of c a t e g o r i e s i s f o r a moment r e j e c t e d ; f o r consciousness seems to be the b a s i s of the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l - m e t a p h y s i c a l H e g e l i a n concept. That the laws of l o g i c , epistemology and metaphysics are one, f o r Hegel, namely, the d i a l e c t i c , has been shown above; s u f f i c e i t t o say, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t consciousness i t s e l f i s c o n s i d e r e d t o have e v o l v e d out of nature by a process of g r a d u a l r i s e and development from the i n o r g a n i c , through the vegetable and animal forms, e t c e t e r a , u n t i l i t reaches the l e v e l of conscious thought. The e v o l u t i o n i t s e l f , i s , of course, e x p l a i n e d i n terms of a c a u s a l nexus, based e s s e n t i a l l y on the d i a l e c t i c t r i a d . That i s , e v o l u t i o n and change are one and the same t h i n g owing t o the c a u s a l continuum i m p l i c i t i n the d i a l e c t concept. In a d d i t i o n , change i s conceived as a d i v e r s i t y of q u a l i t i e s t h a t come and go. A q u a n t i t a t i v e change b r i n g s f o r t h a q u a l i t a t i v e change; thus, an o b j e c t cannot be and yet change. Hence, i n o r d e r f o r an ob j e c t 2 0 Myers , ;H. /-A.. "The Spinoza-Hegel Paradox", I t h a c a , New York, C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1944, p. 33, 33 to change , i t must be i n a s t a t e of becoming that which i t i s not, but w i l l be and w i l l not be. T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t a q u a n t i t a t i v e change i n the o b j e c t must l e a d t o a q u a l i t a t i v e change, whereby the o b j e c t becomes other than what i t was. That i s , i n t h i n k i n g of becoming we are a l s o i n v o l v e d i n the s t a t i c concept of being and t h i s r e q u i r e s that the beholder of an o b j e c t apply the s t a t i c p r i n c i p l e of i d e n t i t y , i . e . , of s i n g l e n e s s or u n i t y , as w e l l as d i f f e r e n c e and m u l t i p l i c i t y . But i n doing t h i s , s t a t e s P r o f e s s o r P u l l e r , " . . . we are t h i n k i n g of a u n i t or of the b a s i s of a l l q u a n t i t a t i v e measurements. In other words we pass from the category of q u a l i t y to t h a t of quantity.. But we f i n d at once t h a t the idea of q u a n t i t y g i v e s r i s e i n i t s t u r n to t h a t of q u a l i t y , s i n c e i t i s a p p l i c a b l e not o n l y to s p a t i a l magni-tudes but to degrees of i n t e n s i t y . But i n t e n s i t y and degree are meaningless t o q u a l i t y . Hence, the two concepts although a n t i t h e t i c a l , are s y n t h e s i s e d i n the concept of measure or of the amount of q u a n t i t y a t h i n g c o n t a i n s . . . . " ^1 ' I t i s through these c a t e g o r i e s and t h e i r l o g i c a l and m e t a p h y s i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p to one another t h a t another "proof" f o r the p o s t u l a t e t h a t the K a n t i a n dichotomy of noumena and phenomena i s f a l s e i s a r r i v e d a t . That i s , i f such c a t e g o r i e s are a c t u a l and o b j e c t i v e , as shovra c above, how can they p o s s i b l y e x i s t without something t h a t possesses these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . In a d d i t i o n , the 21 P u l l e r , B. A. G . , "A H i s t o r y of P h i l o s o p h y " . New York, Henry H o l t and Company, 1938, p. 314 above argument i s a l s o c o n s i d e r e d as a f u r t h e r proof of the o b j e c t i v i t y of the laws of thought and a c t u a l i t y namely, the d i a l e c t i c . As was s t a t e d e a r l i e r i n t h i s work, Hegel's e n t i r e p h ilosophy i s fundamentally the outcome of h i s d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c . H i s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l - m e t a p h y s i c a l concepts are the r e s u l t of a n a l y t i c a p r i o r i r e a s o n i n g . Ye t , owing to the technique of " c o n v e r s i t y " , e.g., q u a n t i t y - q u a l i t y concept, concept of becoming, e t c e t e r a , Hegel avoided the p i t f a l l s of r a t i o n a l i s m and pure em-p i r i c i s m . That i s , he r e j e c t e d the theory of Innate id e a s and a l s o the s t a t i c views of the e m p i r i c i s t of h i s time. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s from t h i s p o i n t of t echnique, and a l s o b a s i c s t a r t i n g p o i n t , that a s p l i t i n l e f t - w i n g H e gelianism developed. Marxism i s the major r e s u l t of t h a t s p l i t . 35. Part 11. The E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l and Me t a p h y s i c a l  I m p l i c a t i o n s of D i a l e c t i c a l M a t e r i a l i s m 1. • The Subject-Object Concept D i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m i s c o n s i d e r e d by i t s adherents t o be the outcome of a s c i e n t i f i c s y n t h e s i s and c o o r d i n a t i o n of the f i n d i n g s of man i n h i s many f i e l d s of endeavour. I t does, n e v e r t h e l e s s , owe most of i t s termino-logy and concepts to the p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s of Hegel. Indeed, much of the l i t e r a t u r e w r i t t e n to s u b s t a n t i a t e the tenets of d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m i s . i n d i c a t i v e of t h i s f a c t by the preponderance of c r i t i c i s m and d i s t i n c t i o n s that are undertaken by i t s authors i n or d e r t o substan-t i a t e the s u p e r i o r i t y of Marxism over Hegelianism. Hegel's s t a r t i n g p o i n t was, of course, d i f f e r e n t from that of Marx and E n g e l s ; f o r , as was noted i n the l a s t s e c t i o n , Hegel d e r i v e d h i s c a t e g o r i e s from h i s l o g i c and then proceeded to formulate an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l -m e t a p h y s i c a l theory. . S t a r t i n g with the acknowledgment of the ego-c e n t r i c predicament of man i n f o r m u l a t i n g an o b j e c t i v e p h i l o s o p h i c a l schematism, the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r an a n a l y s i s of l o g i c f i r s t seems q u i t e apparent. However, the i m p l i c a -t i o n of the Hegelian,approach d i d l e a d , i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , to an a b s o l u t i s m from which c o u l d be deduced s o c i a l and e t h i c a l concepts t h a t s u b s t a n t i a t e d a status-quo o u t l o o k . Moreover, and what i s more to the p o i n t i n t h i s c o n t e x t , the d i a l e c t i c a l t r i a d p o s t u l a t e d by Hegel i m p l i e d i n essence, a predetermined order of e v e n t s . T h i s , Marx and Engels maintained, was a r e s u l t of the f a l l a c y i n h e r e n t i n the methodology and s t a r t i n g p o i n t of Hegelianism. D i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m ' s s t a r t i n g p o i n t i s the opposite of Hegelianism, s t a t e d Marx: " i n d i r e c t c o n t r a s t t o German p h i l o s o p h y which descends from heaven t o e a r t h , here we ascend from e a r t h to heaven. That i s to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, c o n c e i v e , nor from men as n a r r a t e d , thought o f , imagined, conceived, i n order to a r r i v e at men i n the f l e s h . We s e t out from r e a l a c t i v e men, and on the b a s i s of t h e i r r e a l l i f e process we demonstrate the i d e o -l o g i c a l r e f l e x e s and echoes of t h i s l i f e - p r o c e s s . " 2 Now, i n denouncing the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the d i a l e c t i c t r i a d by way of the c a t e g o r i e s , Marx and Engels aimed a t the r e f u t a t i o n of predeterminism and the e s t a b -lishment of determinism. Subsequently, the c l a i m f o r the v a l i d i t y of determinism had to be fought not on merely 22 Marx, K. and E n g e l s , F. The German Ideology, London. The M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t L i b r a r y , Lawrence and Weshart, 1942, p. 14 37. l o g i c a l grounds but a l s o m e t a p h y s i c a l and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l grounds. . Hegel, as was shown, r e c o g n i s e d the o b j e c t i v i t y of the concept of the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f by way of t r e a t i n g metaphysics and epistemology as one f i e l d of a n a l y s i s and s p e c u l a t i o n . In so doing, he attempted not on l y t o e l i m i n a t e the i m p l i c a t i o n s of C a r t e s i a n dualism, but, i n a d d i t i o n , to negate the Kantian dualism of noumena and phenomena, with i t s emphasis on the r e l a t i v e n e s s of knowledge. In both these r e s p e c t s , i . e . , the " t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f " i s apprehended and t h a t an a b s o l u t i s m does e x i s t i n terms of t r u t h , Hegel's o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m and Marx's d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m are i n a c c o r d . I t i s , i n other words, the method of s u b s t a n t i a t i n g the concepts mind and matter t h a t caused the s p l i t between the Marxians and the H e g e l i a n s . That i s , both from a p o i n t of epistemology claimed the same; both b a s i c a l l y conceived of mind and matter i n terms of a monism that was s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same. The b a s i s of r e v o l t was that the i m p l i c a t i o n s of Hegelianism meant predeterminism. Marxism demanded and p o s t u l a t e d determinism, and i n terms of i t s "own" t e n e t s , attempted to negate Hegelianism. Marxism c e n t r e s around the establishment of three b a s i c concepts, namely, the " t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f " , "the knowledge p r o c e s s " and the "nature of c a u s a l i t y " . I I The Concept of Mind Here i s the f i r s t major p o i n t of departure from Hegelianism. I t i s a p o i n t based on the p r a c t i c a l every day s i g n i f i c a n c e of man's a c t i o n . I t i m p l i e s , indeed, an approach to phi l o s o p h y t h a t i s b a s i c a l l y t h a t of naive r e a l i s m . That i s , e s s e n t i a l l y , the Marxian approach i m p l i e s t h a t man i s as he i s seen by " h i m s e l f " . The problem of the degree of o b j e c t i v i t y of a n a l y s i s or s y n t h e s i s undertaken, when one of the terms under observa-t i o n i s alsotfthe observer, i s e i t h e r i g n o r e d or d i s c a r d e d f o r pragmatic reasons. Thus, the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r an a n a l y s i s of the p r i n c i p l e s of l o g i c and t h e i r c a t e g o r i e s of thought i s r e j e c t e d q u i t e openly by the d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t s of the n i n e t e e n t h and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s For example, Lenin i n h i s c r i t i c i s m of i d e a l i s m s t a t e s : " A l l knowledge comes from e x p e r i e n c e , from s e n s a t i o n , from p e r c e p t i o n . That i s t r u e . But the quest i o n a r i s e s , does o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y belong to p e r c e p t i o n ; i . e . , i s i t the source of pe r c e p t i o n ? I f you answer y e s , you are a m a t e r i a l i s t . . I f you answer no, you are i n c o n -s i s t a n t and w i l l i n e v i t a b l y a r r i v e at s u b j e c t i -vism or a g n o s t i c i s m , i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether you deny the k n o w a b i l i t y of the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f , or the o b j e c t i v i t y of time, gpace and c a u s a l i t y (with Kant) or whether you do not even permit the thought of a t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f (with Hume)." 2 3 The case t h a t L e n i n i s a d r o i t l y a r g u i n g here i s not one e x c l u s i v e l y a g a i n s t the epistemology of o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m , but a l s o f o r the r e c o g n i t i o n of a c t i v e determinism. However, the case f o r determinism r e s t s e s s e n t i a l l y on d e s t r o y i n g the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l -m e t a p h y s i c a l concept of the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f . Thus, i f matter can be e s t a b l i s h e d as the primary u n i v e r s a l s u b s t r a t a , whose nature or essence i s a manifested d i a l e c t i c , then mind can be conceived as a h i g h e r form of p a r t i c u l a r i z e d matter r e f l e c t i n g and m a n i f e s t i n g , r e a c t i n g t o and a c t i n g on, i t s m a t e r i a l i s t i c d i a l e c t i c environment. This i s i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n to the H e g e l i a n concept of a d i a l e c t i c a l process c o n t a i n i n g w i t h i n i t s e l f i t s own s y n t h e s i s . In the Marxian concept, the u n i v e r s a l , both mind and matter, i s p o s t u l a t e d as p r o g r e s s i n g through and i n a d i a l e c t i c a l p r o c e s s , but • not predetermined to the extent t h a t the d i a l e c t i c c o n t a i n s w i t h i n i t i t s own p a r t i c u l a r f i n a l s y n t h e s i s . A l l t h a t i s maintained i s t h a t every m a n i f e s t a t i o n w i l l be, because of i t s very n a t u r e , d i a l e c t i c a l . Hence, mind may r e a c t t o and a c t on i t s environment and thus 23 L e n i n , V. I. S e l e c t e d Works (The T h e o r e t i c a l P r i n c i p l e s of Marxism), New York, I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , Viol. 11, p. 190 m. be a determinant, but i t cannot act other than i n a d i a l e c t i c a l fashion. The Hegelian concept of mind and objective r e a l i t y i s s i m i l a r except i t maintains that i n order to achieve ultimate objective r e a l i t y mind must act according to the d i a l e c t i c laws and pattern of nature. "Man conquers nature by obeying her." ^4 Thus determinism i s the crux of the matter. In both theories a monism, behaving i n terms of the d i a l e c t i c t r i a d , i s enunciated. The theory of pre-determinism i s established by Hegel through his d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c , h is concept of a world process, and his concept of the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f . The Marxian monism, on the other hand, enunciates also a d i a l e c t i c a l t r i a d and a world process, but i t interprets the " t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f " i n an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t fashion to that of Hegelianism. Hegel, as was shown, conceived of phenomena and noumena as being united when complete o b j e c t i v i t y was attained by way of the d i a l e c t i c a l process. He maintained, therefore, that "The t h i n g - i n - i t s l e f . . . expresses the object when we leave out of sight a l l that consciousness makes of i t , a l l i t s emotional aspects, and a l l s p e c i f i c thoughts of i t . " ^5 24 P u l l e r , B. A. G., A History of Philosophy New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1938, p. 303 2 5 Myers, H. A. The Spinoza-Hegel Paradox , Ithaca, New York, Cornwall University Press, 1944, p. 20 41. The t h i n g - l n - i t s e l f may be e i t h e r a concrete or a b s t r a c t e n t i t y , but to be conceived or apprehended i n i t s complete o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y no connotations or r e l a t i o n s must be c a l l e d f o r t h and read i n t o i t by the s u b j e c t (mind). No a c t i v i t y whatsoever on the o b j e c t can be undertaken and s t i l l the complete r e a l i t y of the term ( t h i n g - i n -i t s e l f ) be maintained. For, i n p o i n t of f a c t , complete o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y c a l l s f o r the n e g a t i o n of a l l terms except one, namely, the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f I However, i n terms of a theory of knowledge a r e l a t i v e absolute c r i t e r i a i s p o s s i b l e owing to the H e g e l i a n concept of a f i n a l s y n t h e s i s . That i s , a r e l a t i v e a b s o l u t e , i n terms of knowledge or o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , i m p l i e s an a b s o l u t e ; thus Hegel conceives of h i s f i n a l s y n t h e s i s or Idea concept. Marxism r e j e c t s both the I d e a l i s t s ' and. M a t e r i a l i s t s ' concepts of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , namely, the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f . For example, Engels, w r i t i n g t o Conrad Schmidt.in 1891, s t a t e d the d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t ' s r e j e c t i o n of the H e g e l i a n concept of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y t h u s: "Hegel's d i a l e c t i c i s upside down because i t i s supposed t o be the 'self-development of thought' of which the d i a l e c t i c of f a c t s t h e r e o f i s only a r e f l e c t i o n , whereas r e a l l y the d i a l e c t i c i n our heads i s only the r e f l e c t i o n of the a c t u a l development which i s f u l f i l l e d i n the world of nature and of human h i s t o r y i n obedience t o d i a l e c t i c a l forms." 2 6 26 Marx, K. and E n g e l s , F., K a r l Marx and F r i e d r i c h  Engels Correspondence 1846-1895, London, Lawrence and Wishart L t d . 1936, p. 495 T h i s , of course, h i t s again at the p r e -d e t e r m i n i s t i c aspect of the t e n e t s of Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y . The "self-development of thought" i s q u i t e i n keeping with determinism. I t i s the f u s i o n of s u b j e c t and o b j e c t i n H e g e l i a n epistemology-metaphysic, whereby the d i a l e c t i c i s conceived as r e a l i s i n g i t s e l f , so t h a t any d i v e r s i f i -c a t i o n between s u b j e c t and o b j e c t i s regarded as a d e v i a -t i o n away from o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . On the other hand, the dichotomy of the French m a t e r i a l i s t , i . e . , between s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , was a l s o r e j e c t e d on the grounds of the a n t i - o r g a n i c and pro-mechanistic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Marx, i n h i s t h e s i s on Feuerbach, p o i n t s out the d e f i c i e n c i e s from the view of d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m of both these s c h o o l s : "The c h i e f d e f e c t of a l l m a t e r i a l i s m up to now ( i n c l u d i n g Feuerbach's) i s t h a t the o b j e c t r e a l i t y , what we apprehend through our senses, Is understood only i n the form of the o b j e c t or contemplation; but not as sensuous human a c t i v i t y as p r a c t i c e ; not s u b j e c t i v e l y . Hence i n o p p o s i -t i o n to m a t e r i a l i s m the a c t i v e s i d e was developed a b s t r a c t l y -- by i d e a l i s m -- which of course does not know r e a l sensuous a c t i v i t y as such." 2 7 In other words, the dynamic aspect of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y was accepted by the M a r x i s t s but the " m o t i v a t i o n " of the d i a l e c t i c was r e j e c t e d . 27 Marx, K. and E n g e l s , F. The German Ideology The M a r x i s t s - L e n i n i s t L i b r a r y , London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1942, p. 197. 43. "My own d i a l e c t i c a l method i s n o t o n l y f u n d a -m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e H e g e l i a n d i a l e c t i c a l method, b u t i s i t s d i r e c t o p p o s i t e . F o r H e g e l , t h e t h o u g h t p r o c e s s ( w h i c h he a c t u a l l y t r a n s f o r m s i n t o an i n d e p e n d e n t s u b j e c t , g i v i n g t o i t t h e name o f ' i d e a ' ) i s the demiurge o f t h e r e a l : a n d f o r h i m t h e r e a l i s o n l y t h e o u t w a r d m a n i -f e s t a t i o n o f t h e i d e a . I n my v i e w on t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e i d e a l i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e m a t e r i a l , when i t has been t r a n s p o s e d and t r a n s l a t e d i n s i d e the human h e a d . " 2 8 On t h e o t h e r h a n d , F e u e r b a c h ' s d e c l a r a t i o n as t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s u b j e c t a n d o b j e c t was a c c e p t e d by Marx a n d E n g e l s a n d made th e b a s i s , w i t h c e r t a i n m o d i f i c a t i o n s , o f t h e i r t h e o r y o f d e v e l o p m e n t . " . . . the t r u e r e l a t i o n between t h o u g h t a n d b e i n g may be e x p r e s s e d as f o l l o w s : b e i n g i s the s u b j e c t a n d t h o u g h t t h e p r e d i c a t e , t h o u g h t i s c o n d i t i o n e d by b e i n g , n o t b e i n g by t h o u g h t . B e i n g i s c o n d i t i o n e d by i t s e l f , h a s i t s b a s i s i n i t s e l f . " ^ The m a i n p o i n t o f d i f f e r e n c e was, once a g a i n , one o f e m p h a s i s i n g the d e t e r m i n i s t i c a s p e c t o f l i f e . George P l e k h a n o v , t h e R u s s i a n M a r x i a n , i n h i s F u n d a m e n t a l P r o b l e m s o f Ma r x i s m s t a t e s t h a t what was a t i s s u e f o r Marx: " . . . was n o t t h e u n d e n i a b l e f a c t t h a t s e n s a t i o n p r e c e d e s t h o u g h t b u t t h e f a c t t h a t Man i s l e d t o t h o u g h t m a i n l y by t h e s e n s a t i o n s w h i c h he e x p e r i e n c e s i n the c o u r s e o f h i s own a c t i o n on t h e o u t e r w o r l d . " 30 28 P l e k h a n o v , G. V.., E s s a y s i n t h e H i s t o r y o f M a t e r i a l i s m , London, J o h n L a n e , The B o d l e y Head L t d . , 1934, p. 194 29 P l e k h a n o v , G. V., F u n d a m e n t a l P r o b l e m s o f M a r x i s m , e d . by D. Ryazanov, New Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1929, p. 7 30 I b i d , p. 12 T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , however, Len i n d i s a g r e e d w i t h , and r i g h t l y so when the i m p l i c a t i o n s are r e a l i z e d f o r they l e a d e i t h e r back to predeterminism or to the r e l a t i v e concepts of Emp i r i c i s m . T h i s , of course, runs counter to the r e v o l u t i o n a r y nature of n i n e t e e n t h and twenti e t h century Marxism. The essence of the concept of r e a l i t y , and hence of the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f i s t h i s , s t a t e s L e n i n , quoting from A l b e r t Levy's Feuerbach's  Philosophy and h i s In f l u e n c e on German L i t e r a t u r e . " . . . Marx expresses r e g r e t t h a t m a t e r i a l i s m had l e f t i t to i d e a l i s m to a p p r e c i a t e the importance of the a c t i v e f o r c e s i . e . , human p r a c t i c e which a c c o r d i n g t o Marx, must be wrested from i d e a l i s m i n order to i n t e g r a t e them i n t o the m a t e r i a l i s t system. But i t w i l l of course be necessary to give these a c t i v e f o r c e s the r e a l and s e n s i b l e c h a r a c t e r which i d e a l i s m cannot grant them. Marx's i d e a , then, i s the f o l l o w i n g : j u s t as to our ideas there correspond r e a l o b j e c t s outside us, so to our phenomenal a c t i v i t y of these corresponds a r e a l a c t i v i t y of t h i n g s . In t h i s sense humanity partakes of the a b s o l u t e , not only through t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge but a l s o through p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y : thus a l l human a c t i v i t y r e q u i r e s a d i g n i t y , a n o b i l i t y , t h a t permits i t t o advance hand i n hand with theory. R e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i v i t y h e n c e f o r t h a c q u i r e s a metaphysical s i g n i f i c a n c e . . . . " 3 1 In other words d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , s i m i l a r t o o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m , attempts t o fuse meta-p h y s i c a l and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l concepts. The idea s and images which the mind apprehends are c o n s i d e r e d to be 31 Lenin, V . I . , S e l e c t e d Works (The T h e o r e t i c a l P r i n c i p l e s of Marxism),-- I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s . New York, V o l . 11, p. 169. t h e r e s u l t a n t s o f t h e r e f l e c t i o n , a c t i o n a n d i n t e r a c t i o n , o f t h a t w h i c h i s e x t e r n a l t o t h e mind. O b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y -i s r e a l i z e d i n t h i s manner, and t h e " a r t i f i c i a l " d i v o r c e o f m e n t a l a c t i v i t y f r o m t h a t w h i c h i s commonly c o n s i d e r e d c o n c r e t e a c t i v i t y i s a v o i d e d . O b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y i s c o n -c e i v e d t h e n as t h a t w h i c h i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t e n e t s o f d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m as e x e m p l i f i e d i n m a t t e r , and i t s h i g h e r p a r t i c u l a r , m i n d . Prom a m e t a p h y s i c a l p o i n t o f v i e w , t h e a c t i n g a n d r e a c t i n g o f s u b j e c t a n d o b j e c t on one a n o t h e r a p p e a r s b a s i c a l l y s o u n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e u n d e r l y i n g t h e s i s o f a d e t e r m i n i s t i c u n i v e r s e may m o m e n t a r i l y be g r a n t e d . However, f r o m a p o i n t o f e p i s t e m o l o g y , t h e c o n c e p t o f m i n d as a h i g h e r f o r m o f m a t t e r which a c t s on a n d r e a c t s t o s e n s e d a t a seems h i g h l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e d i a l e c t i -c a l m a t e r i a l i s t ' s c o n c e p t o f a c t i v e d e t e r m i n i s m . T h a t i s , th e i n t e r a c t i n g o f terms on one a n o t h e r i s f r o m the p o i n t o f d e t e r m i n i s m , both';..-, e m p i r i c a l l y :and ; m e t a p h y s i c a l l y s o u n d , b u t d e t e r m i n i s m , i n t h e M a r x i a n s e n s e , r e l i e s i m p l i c i t l y on a u n i q u e n e s s i n one o f t h e t e r m s , n a m e l y , mind: o t h e r -w i s e a l l t h a t i s r e a l l y b e i n g p o s t u l a t e d I s H e g e l i a n p r e d e t e r m i n i s m ; a t l e a s t as f a r as t h e d e s t i n y o f man i s c o n c e r n e d . Pure p r e d e t e r m i n i s m i s , o f c o u r s e , a l i e n t o t h e s p i r i t a n d l e t t e r o f M a r x i s m . Hence, t h e M a r x i s t s p o s t u l a t e a c o n c e p t o f m i n d t h a t t h e y b e l i e v e w i l l a l l o w f o r t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y o r a c t i v e a s p e c t s o f t h e i r d e t e r m i n i s m , a n d a l s o f o r t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l t e n e t s o f d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m . 46. - E n g e l s i n h i s A n t i - D u h r i n g , c o n c e i v e s o f m i n d i n f u n c t i o n a l t e r m s : " . . . t h o u g h t a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s . . . a r e p r o d u c t s o f the human b r a i n a n d t h a t man h i m s e l f i s a p r o d u c t o f N a t u r e , w h i c h h a s been d e v e l o p e d i n a n d a l o n g w i t h i t s e n -v i r o n m e n t ; whence i t i s s e l f - e v i d e n t t h a t t h e p r o d u c t s o f t h e human b r a i n , b e i n g i n the l a s t a n a l y s i s a l s o p r o d u c t s o f N a t u r e a r e i n c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h i t . " 32 J . B. S. H a l d a n e d e v e l o p s t h i s c o n c e p t f u r t h e r and q u a l i f i e s i t i n a manner t h a t m i g h t s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t i c t h e o r y o f d e t e r m i n i s m . "The m i n d i s a p a r t o f n a t u r e , and i n p a r t i c u l a r i t m o d i f i e s the r e s t of n a t u r e , as w e l l as b e i n g m o d i f i e d by i t . J u s t b e c a u s e the m i n d I s a p a r t o f n a t u r e , t h e p r o c e s s e s w h i c h go on i n i t c a n be a n d a r e l i k e the p r o c e s s e s w h i c h go on i n o t h e r p a r t s o f n a t u r e , a n d t h e y do a c t u a l l y m i r r o r , a l t h o u g h more o r l e s s i n c o m p l e t e l y . " 33 To e l a b o r a t e , t h e r e a r e among t h e d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t s two s c h o o l s o f t h o u g h t as t o t h e n a t u r e o f knowledge an d o f m i n d . The f i r s t s c h o o l c o n t a i n s t h e a d h e r e n t s o f t h e o r i g i n a l d o c t r i n e s of Marx an d E n g e l s . The s e c o n d s c h o o l , t h o s e who a c c e p t the b a s i c t e n e t s o f d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , but c o n c e i v e o f knowledge and m i n d i n a f a s h i o n more i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e e p i s t e m o l o g y o f o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m . 32 E n g e l s , P., H e r r Eugen D u h r i n g ' s R e v o l u t i o n i n  S c i e n c e , New Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1939, p . 43. 33 H a l d a n e , J . B. S., The M a r x i s t s P h i l o s o p h y a n d t h e  S c i e n c e s , New Y o r k , Random House, I n c . 1939, p. 160". 47. T h a t i s , t h e f i r s t 'group, t h e p u r i s t s , a c c e p t t h e c o n c e p t t h a t m i n d i s a h i g h e r f o r m o f m a t t e r r e f l e c t i n g t h a t w h i c h i s e x t e r n a l t o i t s e l f . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e y m a i n -t a i n t h a t t h e " t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f " i s known o r a p p r e h e n d e d by t h e a c t i v e n a t u r e o f t h e b e h o l d e r o r s u b j e c t . T h i s , o f c o u r s e , i s an a t t e m p t , s i m i l a r t o H e g e l ' s , t o f u s e meta-p h y s i c s and e p i s t e m o l o g y , but t h e a p p r o a c h i s a c t u a l l y f r o m a m e t a p h y s i c a l p o i n t . F o r e x a m p l e , Marx i n h i s t h e s i s on F e u e r b a c h e m p h a s i s e s th e a c t i v e a n d s e n s u o u s n a t u r e o f b o t h s u b j e c t and o b j e c t . " C e r t a i n l y F e u e r b a c h has a g r e a t a d v a n t a g e o v e r t h e ' p u r e ' m a t e r i a l i s t s i n t h a t he r e a l i z e s how man t o o i s an ' o b j e c t o f the s e n s e s ' . Igut a p a r t f r o m the f a c t t h a t he o n l y c o n c e i v e s h i m as a ' s e n s u o u s o b j e c t ' , n o t as a 'sensuous a c t i v i t y ' , b e c a u s e he s t i l l r e m a i n s i n t h e r e a l m o f t h e o r y and c o n c e i v e s o f men n o t i n t h e i r g i v e n s o c i a l c o n n e c t i o n , n o t u n d e r t h e i r ; e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n o f l i f e , w h i c h have made them what t h e y a r e , he n e v e r a r r i v e s a t t h e a b s t r a c t i o n 'man' and g e t s no f u r t h e r t h a n r e c o g n i s i n g 'the t r u e ' , ' i n d i v i d u a l c o r p o r e a l man' e m o t i o n a l l y , i . e . , he knows no o t h e r 'human r e l a t i o n s h i p ' . " 34 Marx's c r i t i c i s m was, i n terms o f d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , q u i t e j u s t i f i e d f r o m a m e t a p h y s i c a l p o i n t o f v i e w , but i t was n o t t h e e s s e n c e o f h i s argument. He was q u i t e aware t h a t F e u e r b a c h a l s o r e g a r d e d r e a l i t y and man, i . e . , s e l f a n d n o t - s e l f , as d ynamic. F e u e r b a c h r e c o g n i z e d t h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f t h e s e two dynamic t e r m s , b u t what he d i d n o t d e v e l o p was t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e s e t e r m s . 34 Marx, K. and E n g e l s , F., The German I d e o l o g y The M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t L i b r a r y , London, Lawrence and W i s h a r t , 1942. p. 37. 48. Marx, i n s h o r t , was i n t e r e s t e d i n s h o w i n g t h a t t h e d i a l e c t i c a l p r o c e s s , w h i c h i s m a n i f e s t i n the m a t e r i a l s u b s t r a t u m , i n h e r e s b o t h i n mi n d and o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y ( t h e d i s t i n c t i o n i s m e r e l y f o r e x p o s i t i o n ) , and as t h e two a c t and r e a c t on one a n o t h e r , m i n d e x p r e s s e s one a s p e c t o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n , n a mely, the e f f e c t on i t s e l f o f t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n . T h i s , however, h a r d l y seems t o a l l o w f o r a d e t e r m i n i s t i c i n f l u e n c e o f man on n a t u r e o t h e r t h a n as a component o f n a t u r e . How, i n d e e d , c a n a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t h e o r y o f knowledge be a c c e p t e d by a m a t e r i a l i s t who r e j e c t s any t e l e o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c b e i n g i n h e r e n t w i t h i n t h e human o r g a n i s m ? Y e t t h i s c o n c e p t o f mi n d as a m i r r o r o f n a t u r e , was a l s o a c c e p t e d by E n g e l s : "Thought and c o n s c i o u s n e s s . . . a r e p r o d u c t s o f t h e human b r a i n and . ... man h i m s e l f i s a p r o d u c t o f N a t u r e , w h i c h has been d e v e l o p e d i n °- "j a n d a l o n g w i t h i t s e n v i r o n m e n t ; whence, i t i s s e l f - e v i d e n t t h a t t h e p r o d u c t s o f t h e human  b r a i n , b e i n g i n t h e l a s t a n a l y s i s a l s o procTucts  o f N a t u r e , do n o t c o n t r a d i c t the r e s t o f N a t u r e but a r e i n c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h i t . " $5 The i m p l i c a t i o n s o f E n g e l s ' t h e o r y o f knowledge a r e q u i t e a p p a r e n t . I f t h e b r a i n r e f l e c t s t h a t w h i c h i s e x t e r n a l t o i t s e l f , a n d i f t h o s e r e f l e c t i o n s a r e t h e p r o d u c t s o f b o t h m i n d and n a t u r e , t h e n t h e d e t e r m i n i s t i c a s p e c t o f M a r x i s m i s r e a l l y n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f man and n a t u r e b e h a v i n g i n a r m a n n e r 35 ( I t a l i c s a r e mine.) E n g e l s , P., H e r r Eugen D u h r i n g ' s R e v o l u t i o n ' i n  S c i e n c e , New Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h i n g , 1939, p. 43. 49. d i c t a t e d by the d i a l e c t i c a l nature of the u n i v e r s e , and, i n terras of p a r t i c u l a r s , by the q u a l i f i c a t i o n that two terms s e l f and n o t - s e l f impose on one another a p r i o r i . The dynamic nature of the thought process i s merely the r e s u l t a n t of the a n t i t h e s i s e x i s t i n g w i t h i n the two terms. However, to speak of.terms, s t a t e the M a r x i s t s , i s r e a l l y , i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s ^ f a l l a c i o u s ; what e x i s t s i s one term with a c o n t r a d i c t o r y i m p l i c i t w i t h i n i t , causing i t to change and become other than what i t was. T h i s , indeed, i s the f u s i o n of s u b j e c t and o b j e c t . Y e t , Engels d e s c r i p - -t i o n of the thought process seems to suggest a concept of mind r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t to that of a mere r e f l e c t o r . " . . . thought c o n s i s t s j u s t as much i n the a n a l y s i s of o b j e c t s of consciousness i n t o t h e i r elements as i n the s y n t h e s i s of r e l a t e d elements i n t o a u n i t y . Without a n a l y s i s , no s y n t h e s i s . Secondly, without committing blunders . thought can only b r i n g together i n t o a u n i t y those elements of consciousness i n which or i n whose r e a l prototypes t h i s u n i t y a l r e a d y e x i s t s . " 3 6 I f thought c o n s i s t s of a n a l y s i n g and s y n t h e s i s -i n g sense data i n t o i n t e l l i g i b l e wholes, then i n e x a c t l y what manner i s t h i s process r e a l i s e d ? The concept of mind p o s t u l a t e d by both Marx and Engels does not allow f o r anything of the nature of innate i d e a or c a t e g o r i e s . That i s , a n o m i n a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the thought process i s i m p l i e d whereby u n i v e r s a l s f o r the c l a s s i f y i n g 36 Ehge' 1 s j ;. Fv9. Herr Bugen Duhring's Revolution i n  Science", New York, I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h i n g , 1939, p. 49 5 0 . o f s e n s e d a t a a r e r e a l i z e d t h r o u g h a s y n t h e s i s o f p a r t i c u l a r s c o n t a i n i n g s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . T h i s , h owever, i n v o l v e s a c o n c e p t t h a t does n o t seem t o be o b t a i n e d by e m p i r i c a l t e c h n i q u e a l o n e , namely, t h a t o f b e i n g r e l a t e d . P r o f e s s o r Pap has shown the p a r a d o x o f t h e r e s e m b l a n c e t h e o r y t h u s : > " i f a and b a r e r e l a t e d i n a c e r t a i n way, and b a n d c a r e r e l a t e d i n a c e r t a i n way, i t may i n d e e d be d o u b t e d whether t h e y a r e r e l a t e d i n q u i t e t h e same way. But how c o u l d i t be d o u b t e d t h a t t h e y a r e b o t h r e l a t e d ? But b e i n g r e l a t e d i s a u n i v e r s a l , e v e n t h o u g h an e x t r e m e l y empty o r a b s t r a c t one." ^ " I n o t h e r w o r d s , the u n i v e r s a l b e i n g r e l a t e d c a n n o t be a c c o u n t e d f o r by a s y n t h e i s o f s i m i l a r i t i e s e x i s t i n g among e n t i t i e s ; f o r , t h e s e s i m i l a r i t i e s when c o n s i d e r e d i n d i v i d u a l l y ' a r e r e a l l y n o t s i m i l a r i t i e s u n t i l t h e c a t e g o r y o r u n i v e r s a l o f b e i n g r e l a t e d i s a p p l i e d . F o r e x a m p l e , what c h a r a c t e r i s t i c have A a n d B i n common u n l e s s t h e y a r e c l a s s i f i e d i n t e r m s o f an a l p h a b e t i c s c h e m a t i s m ? A t a k e n e x c l u s i v e l y i n i t s own r i g h t as an e n t i t y i s c o m p l e t e l y d i s s i m i l a r t o t h e e n t i t y . B . However, t h i s dilemma m i g h t be a v o i d e d by m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t a c a u s a l c o n t i n u u m e x i s t s between a l l e n t i t i e s , whereby i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r t h e m ind, as 37 Pap, A., E l e m e n t s o f A n a l y t i c P h i l o s o p h y New Y o r k , t h e M a c m i l l a n Company, 1949, p . 79 r e f l e c t o r o f n a t u r e , t o e x p r e s s t h e i n h e r e n t s i m i l a r i t i e s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s e x i s t i n g amonst e n t i t i e s , i . e . , i n n a t u r e . The c o n c e p t o f b e i n g r e l a t e d c o u l d t h e n be a c c e p t e d as a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e i n t e r n a l i t y o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s e x i s t i n g i n n a t u r e . But, t h e r a m i f i c a t i o n s o f t h i s view a r e a l s o i d e a l i s t i c . T h a t i s , i f a t h e o r y o f i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s i s a c c e p t e d , whereby the t e r m s o f any c o m p o s i t e i n f l u e n c e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p and the r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t u r n i n f l u e n c e s ' t h e t e r m s , t h e n any f o r m o f f i n a l a n a l y s i s w o u l d be im -p o s s i b l e . F o r e a c h e n t i t y w o u l d be a c o m p o s i t e o f o t h e r s m a l l e r e n t i t i e s , and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and t h u s c o u l d n e v e r be c o m p l e t e l y d i v o r c e d i n o r d e r t h a t a f i n a l a n a l y s i s c o u l d be a s s e r t e d , i . e . , t h e k n o w a b i l i t y o f t h e t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f w o u l d be v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y the b a s i s o f t h e M a r x i a n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t would, be n e g a t e d f o r : " . . . t h e ' o b j e c t i v e t r u t h ' o f t h i n k i n g means n o t h i n g e l s e t h a n t h e e x i s t e n c e o f o b j e c t s CiTeT, ' t h i n g s - i n - t h e ' m s e l v e s ' ) t r u l y r e f l e c t e d by t h i n k i n g . " 3 8 I n s h o r t , t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e d o c t r i n e o f i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n w o u l d e l i m i n a t e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f any u l t i m a t e t e r m i n t h e knowledge p r o c e s s , and i n d e e d i n the s o c i a l realm,: a l s o the a b s o l u t e o b j e c t i v i t y t h a t 38 L e n i n , V. T. S e l e c t e d Works,, (The T h e o r e t i c a l P r i n c i p l e s of M a r x i s m ) , New Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1935, p. 168 52. i s i m p l i e d w o u l d be c o m p l e t e l y n e g a t e d o w i n g t o s u b - , mergence of the " t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f " . The q u e s t i o n t o c o n s i d e r t h e n i s w h e t h e r o r n o t the b a s i s o f d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , i . e . , the d i a l e c t i c a l t r i a d , as e x p r e s s e d by the u n i t y of o p p o s i t e s , i m p l i e s a t h e o r y o f i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s The U n i t y o f O p p o s i t e s Now, t h e c a r d i n a l t e n e t o f d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f p a r t i -c u l a r s i n a dynamic m a t e r i a l i s t i c u n i v e r s e a r e a c c o u n t e d f o r , i s t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e u n i t y of o p p o s i t e s . T h a t i s , e a c h e n t i t y has an i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l o p p o s i t e t h r o u g h t h e i n f l u e n c e o f w h i c h i t becomes o t h e r t h a n what i t was, a n d i n a d d i t i o n i s what i t i s . T h i s a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f m a t t e r a n d o f m o t i o n i t s e l f . George P l e k h a n o v p o i n t s o u t t h a t i t i s n o t m e r e l y t h e n a t u r e o f e n t i t i e s but a l s o the p a t t e r n o f m o t i o n t h a t i s d i a l e c t i c a l , i . e . , behaves i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e law o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n . " T r e n d e l e n b u r g d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e law o f c o n t r a -d i c t i o n i s a p p l i c a b l e n o t t o m o t i o n , but o n l y t o t h e o b j e c t s c r e a t e d t h e r e b y . T h a t i s s o u n d . But m o t i o n does n o t m e r e l y c r e a t e o b j e c t s . T h a t i s why t h e l o g i c o f movement ( t h e ' l o g i c o f c o n t r a -d i c t i o n ' ) n e v e r f o r f e i t s i t s r i g h t o v e r th e o b j e c t s , c r e a t e d by m o t i o n " . 3 9 The e n t i t i e s t h e m s e l v e s , as s t a t e d g b o v e , c o n t a i n w i t h i n them t h e i r own o p p o s i t e w h i c h i n t i m e w i l l r e s u l t i n t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e o r i g i n a l e n t i t y a n d 39 P l e k h a n o v , G., F u n d a m e n t a l P r o b l e m s o f M a r x i s m , e d . D. Ryazonov, New Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1929, p. 116 t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f a new e n t i t y c o n t a i n i n g , o f c o u r s e , w i t h i n i t , i t s own o p p o s i t e . C o n s i d e r e d f r o m t h e p o i n t o f t h e i n t e r n a l n a t u r e o f any p a r t i c u l a r e n t i t y , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the e n t i t y , i . e . , t h e t h e s i s and i t s i n h e r e n t o p p o s i t e s , i . e . , t h e a n t i t h e s i s i s u n -d o u b t e d l y a c a s e o f i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n , when t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between e n t i t i e s i s a n a l y z e d , i t t o o t a c i t l y a s s e r t s a d o c t r i n e o f i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s . F o r , i f e n t i t i e s a r e t o a c t on one a n o t h e r , i . e . , i f t h e y a r e t o behave i n terras o f dynamic o p p o s i t e s a n d n e g a t e one a n o t h e r t h e n t h e y must e i t h e r be c o m p e l l e d b y . t h e i r own n a t u r e and by t h a t o f m o t i o n i t s e l f , o r an e x t e m p o r a n e o u s cause must be p o s t u l a t e d t o u n i t e t h e o p p o s i t e s . T h i s , h o w e v e r , w o u l d l e a d , i n terms o f t h e o r g a n i c c o n c e p t o f M a r x i s m t o the p o s t u l a t i n g o f a f i r s t c a u s e ; a p r i m e mover. However, as E n g e l s p o i n t e d o u t i n h i s A n t i - j D u h r i n g , t h e p o s t u l a t i n g o f dynamic p a r t i c u l a r s , e v e n o f a dynamic u n i v e r s e , i s n o t p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y o r g a n i c u n l e s s t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e dynamism i s i m p l i c i t w i t h i n t h e c o n c e p t o f a u n i v e r s e i n a. c o n s t a n t s t a t e o f f l u x , i . e . , i n a s t a t e o f b e c o m i n g . I f i t i s n o t , t h e n the dilemma o f n o t b e i n g a b l e t o a c c o u n t f o r change becomes q u i t e a p p a r e n t . " I f t h e w o r l d h a d e v e r been i n a s t a t e i n w h i c h no change w h a t e v e r was t a k i n g p l a c e , how c o u l d i t p a s s f r o m t h i s s t a t e t o a c h a n g i n g s t a t e ? The a b s o l u t e l y u n c h a n g i n g , e s p e c i a l l y when . i t has been i n t h i s s t a t e f r o m e t e r n i t y , c a n n o t p o s s i b l y g e t o u t o f s u c h a s t a t e by i t s e l f a n d p a s s o v e r i n t o a s t a t e o f m o t i o n a n d change. A j o i n t i m p u l s e must t h e r e f o r e have come i n f r o m o u t s i d e , f r o m o u t s i d e t h e u n i v e r s e and an i m p u l s e w h i c h s e t i t i n m o t i o n . " 40 I n s h o r t , t h e u n d e r l y i n g s u b s t r a t a i s c o n c e i v e d o f as b e i n g b o t h m a t e r i a l i s t i c and d i a l e c t i c a l l y d y n a m i c , i . e " M o t i o n i s t h e mode o f e x i s t e n c e o f m a t t e r . N e ver anywhere has t h e r e been m a t t e r w i t h o u t m o t i o n , n o r can t h e r e b e." 41 The u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s i s t h e n a t h e o r y o f c a u s a l i t y f o u n d e d e x c l u s i v e l y on i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s . I t i m p l i e s , m o r e o v e r , an i n e v i t a b i l i t y i n t h e m a n i f e s t a -t i o n s o f t h e u n i v e r s e , i . e . , n o t o n l y a r e e n t i t i e s , t h e r e s u l t o f a d i a l e c t i c a l l y dynamic u n i v e r s e , b u t t h e y a r e by d e f i n i t i o n t h e n e c e s s a r y r e s u l t s i n a g i v e n m o t i o n o r t h r o u g h a g i v e n m a t t e r . " E v e r y s i n g u l a r I s c o n n e c t e d by t h o u s a n d s o f t r a n s i t i o n s w i t h o t h e r k i n d s o f s i n g u l a r s ( t h i n g s , phenomena, p r o c e s s e s ) e t c . Here a l r e a d y we have t h e e l e m e n t s , t h e germs , the c o n c e p t s o f n e c e s s i t y , o f o b j e c t i v e c o n n e c t i o n i n n a t u r e , e t c . Here a l r e a d y we have the c o n t i n g e n t and t h e n e c e s s a r y , t h e a p p e a r a n c e and t h e e s s e n c e . . . . " 4 2 40 E n g e l s , P. H e r r Eugen D u h r i n g ' s R e v o l u t i o n i n S c i e n c e , New York, I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1939, p. BI 41 I b i d , p. 68 42 L e n i n , V. I . , S e l e c t e d Works (The T h e o r e t i c a l P r i n c i p l e s o f Marxism) I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , New Y o r k , V o l . 11 p. 169 56. C o n s i d e r e d f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h e a c t i o n a n d i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n e n t i t i e s , t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s s u f f i c e s as t h e b a s i s o f a c a u s a l t h e o r y . H o w e v e r , i t i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o e x p l a i n t h e c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n i n t he d y n a m i s m o f a s i n g l e e n t i t y , o r t o show how i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r t h e c a u s a l c o n t i n u u m t o p r o g r e s s a f t e r e x t e r n a l o p p o s i t e e n t i t i e s h a v e s y n t h e s i s e d . 57. I V The N e g a t i o n of the N e g a t i o n As was shown, e a c h t h e s i s ( e n t i t y ) c o n t a i n s an a n t i t h e s i s w h i c h n e g a t e s t h e t h e s i s and l e a d s t o a s y n t h e s i s , a n d e v e n t u a l l y a new t h e s i s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , i f t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n s were a l w a y s i n a d e f i n i t e p r o -g r e s s i o n - t h e t h e o r y o f t h e o p p o s i t e s m i g h t s u f f i c e , b u t , as i s o f t e n t h e c a s e , t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n s may be r e p e t i t i o u s . F o r e x a m p l e , E n g e l s t a k e s as an i l l u s t r a t i o n t h e l i f e p r o c e s s o f a g r a i n o f b a r l e y ; f r o m t h e moment i t g e r m i n a t e s i t c e a s e s t o e x i s t , ". . . i t i s - n e g a t e d , a n d i n i t s p l a c e a p p e a r s t h e p l a n t w h i c h has a r i s e n f r o m i t , t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e g r a i n . . . i t g r ows, f l o w e r s , i s f e r t i l i s e d and f i n a l l y once more p r o d u c e s g r a i n s o f b a r l e y , and as soon as t h e s e have r i p e n e d t h e s t a l k d i e s , i s i n i t s t u r n n e g a t e d . As a r e s u l t o f t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e n e g a t i o n we have once a g a i n t h e o r i g i n a l g r a i n o f b a r l e y . " 4 3 I n o t h e r words, t h e c o n c e p t of t h e n e g a t i o n  o f t h e n e g a t i o n i s t h e c a u s a l nexus whereby t h e new s y n t h e s i s , and t h e a n t i t h e s i s , b o t h i n t e r n a l l y a n d e x t e r n a l l y a r e e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s o f t h e i r - o w n n a t u r e , i . e . , 43 E n g e l s , F., H e r r E u g e n , D u h r i n g ' s R e v o l u t i o n i n  S c i e n c e , New Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1939, p. 149 "Each c l a s s o f t h i n g s . . . has i t s a p p r o p r i a t e f o r m o f b e i n g n e g a t e d i n s u c h a way t h a t i t g i v e s r i s e ' t o a d e v e l o p m e n t and i t i s j u s t t h e same w i t h e a c h c l a s s o f c o n c e p t i o n s and i d e a s . , , 44 o r i n o t h e r w o r d s , "Long ago S p i n o z a s a i d : Omnis D e t e r m i n a t i o  es n e g a t i o - e v e r y l i m i t a t i o n o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s a t t h e same t i m e a n e g a t i o n . . . t h e k i n d o f n e g a t i o n i s h e r e d e t e r m i n e d i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e by t h e g e n e r a l a n d s e c o n d l y p a r t i c u l a r n a t u r e of the p r o c e s s . I must n o t o n l y n e g a t e , b u t a l s o i n t u r n s u b l a t e t h e n e g a t i o n . . . so c o n s t r u c t t h e f i r s t n e g a t i o n t h a t t h e s e c o n d r e m a i n s o r becomes p o s s i b l e . • • The n e g a t i o n o f the n e g a t i o n d i f f e r s f r o m t h e u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s i n t h a t t h e l a t t e r o n l y a c c o u n t s f o r immediate c a u s e s w i t h i n a g i v e n ' s y n t h e s i s , w h i l e t h e f o r m e r a c c o u n t s f o r t h e m e d i a t e c a u s e s o f t h e o l d a n d new s y n t h e s i s . I t i s t h u s d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s i n e x p l a i n i n g the u n i q u e o r n o v e l w h i c h i s , a f t e r a l l , t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l outcome o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f new a n t i t h e s e s o r n e g a t i o n s . 44 E n g e l s , P., H e r r Eugen D u h r i n g ' s R e v o l u t i o n i n  S c i e n c e , New Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1939, p. 45 Ibid., 59. V Q u a n t i t y - Q u a l i t y The new n e g a t i o n s ( o r new s y n t h e s e s when m a n i f e s t ) a c h i e v e e x p r e s s i o n b o t h g r a d u a l l y a n d a b r u p t l y , and i t i s as a c a u s a l t e n e t f o r e x p l a i n i n g a b r u p t c h a n g es t h a t t h e p o s t u l a t e o f q u a n t i t y - q u a l i t y i s a p p l i e d . T h a t i s , i f t h i n g s a r e a l w a y s i n a s t a t e o f b e c o m i n g t h e n t h e y a r e n o t r e a l l y e v e r r e a l i s e d . They a r e m e r e l y i n a dynamic p r o c e s s o f g r a d u a l i s m . However, t h i s i s n o t t h e c a s e ; f o r e n t i t i e s do e x i s t as s u c h , and a t t h e same t i m e a r e i n a p r o c e s s o f becoming o t h e r t h a n what t h e y a r e and were. As f a r as t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s c o n c e r n e d , t h e change may be c o n s i d e r e d g r a d u a l , but f r o m a p o i n t o f M a r x i a n d i a l e c t i c t h e i n t e r - c o n n e c t e d n e s s and c o m p l e x i t y o f any e v e n t i m p l i e s a n e g a t i o n o f a n e g a t i o n . T h u s , t h e emergence o f n o v e l t y i s m a n i f e s t e d a t e v e r y moment i n t i m e . I n s h o r t , a c t u a l g r a d u a l n e s s c a n n o t be p o s t u l a t e d as v a l i d when a c a u s a l c o n t i n u u m o f any d u r a t i o n i s e x a m i n e d . H e g e l has s t a t e d the c a s e a g a i n s t g r a d u a l i s m and i t i s a c c e p t e d by t h e R u s s i a n M a r x i s t , George P l e k h a n o v : "To e x p l a i n t h e a p p e a r a n c e o r d i s a p p e a r a n c e o f a g i v e n phenomenon by g r a d u a l n e s s o f t h e . t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i s a b s u r d l y t a u t o l o g i c a l , f o r i t i m p l i e s t h a t we c o n s i d e r as h a v i n g 60. a p p e a r e d o r d i s a p p e a r e d t h a t w h i c h i s a c t u a l l y i n c o u r s e o f a p p e a r i n g o r d i s a p p e a r i n g . " 4 6 E n g e l s , s t a t e s P r o f e s s o r H a l d a n e , and Marx a l s o , a c c e p t e d t h i s r e a s o n i n g and a p p l i e d i t i n t h e i r s o c i a l and s c i e n t i f i c d o c t r i n e s . " H e r e , as i n n a t u r a l s c i e n c e i s v e r i f i e d t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f the law d i s c o v e r e d by H e g e l i n h i s ' l o g i c ' t h a t m e r e l y q u a n t i t a t i v e changes b e y o n d a c e r t a i n p o i n t p a s s i n t o q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s . " 4 7 a n d a g a i n , ". . . I t i s w o r t h w h i l e p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t laws h o l d i n g r i g h t t h r o u g h one s t a t e o f s o c i e t y may become m e a n i n g l e s s i n a n o t h e r . S o c i a l change may be d i s c o n t i n u o u s as i n t h e case o f w a t e r t o steam a t a t m o s p h e r i c p r e s s u r e , o r c o n t i n u o u s , as i n t h e ca s e o f the p a s s a g e f r o m w a t e r t o steam a t p r e s s u r e h i g h e r t h a n t h e c r i t i c a l p r e s s u r e . " 4 ^ A b r u p t c h a n g e , t h e n may be a c c o u n t e d f o r t h r o u g h an i n c r e a s e o r d e c r e a s e i n t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e a s p e c t o f any e n t i t y , o r on t h e o t h e r hand, t h r o u g h an i n c r e a s e o r d e c r e a s e , i n terms o f d e n s i t y , o f t h e q u a l i t a t i v e a s p e c t o f any e n t i t y . T h e o r e t i c a l l y , o f c o u r s e , i t f o l l o w s t h a t a b r u p t changes a r e a l w a y s p a r t o f t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y g r a d u a l n e s s i s n o t . T h i s , h owever, i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e c a u s e c h a n g e , i n d e e d movement i t s e l f , i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . 46 P l e k h a n o v G., F u n d a m e n t a l P r o b l e m s o f Marxism e d . D. Ryazanov, New Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1929, p.105 47 H a l d a n e , J . B. S., The M a r x i s t P h i l o s o p h y and t h e  S c i e n c e s , New Y o r k , Random House, I n c . 1939, p. 27 48 I b i d p. 28 "The movement o f m a t t e r u n d e r l i e s a l l phenomena o f n a t u r e . But what i s movement? I t i s an o b v i o u s c o n t r a d i c t i o n . S h o u l d anyone a s k you w h e t h e r a body i n m o t i o n i s a t a p a r t i c u l a r s p o t a t a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e , y o u w i l l be u n a b l e . . . t o answer i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h Ueberweg's r u l e , t h a t i s t o s a y i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e f o r m u l a 'Yes i s Y e s , a n d No i s No'. A body i n . m o t i o n i s a t a g i v e n p o i n t , a n d a t t h e same t i m e i t i s n o t t h e r e . We c a n o n l y c o n s i d e r i t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e f o r m u l a , 'Yes i s no, a n d no i s y e s ' . T h i s m o v i n g body t h u s p r e s e n t s i t s e l f as an i r r e f u t a b l e argument i n f a v o u r o f the ' l o g i c o f c o n t r a -d i c t i o n ' , and one who i s u n w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t t h i s l o g i c w i l l be f o r c e d t o p r o c l a i m , w i t h Zeno, t h a t m o t i o n i s m e r e l y an i l l u s i o n o f the s e n s e s . " 4 9 49 P l e k h a n o v , G., F u n d a m e n t a l P r o b l e m s o f M a r x i s m , e d . D. Ryazanov, New Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s 1929. p . 113 VI The T h e o r y o f C a u s a l i t y , As was o u t l i n e d i n t h e l a s t s e c t i o n , t h e t h e o r y o f c a u s a l i t y p o s t u l a t e d by the f o r m u l a t o r s o f d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m c o n t a i n t h r e e m a j o r t e n e t s , namely, t h e u n i t y  o f o p p o s i t e s , t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e n e g a t i o n a n d q u a n t i t y - q u a l i t y . T hese t h r e e t e n e t s , b a s e d upon t h e p r e m i s e t h a t t h i s i s a dynamic u n i v e r s e , a r e , i n e f f e e t , m e r e l y d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s o f one c o n c e p t o f c a u s a l i t y , namely, t h a t p a r t i c u -l a r m a n i f e s t a t i o n s , and t h e u n i v e r s a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f m o t i o n , a r e e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n s of t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y . C o n s e q u e n t l y , M a r x i a n s a r e c o n t i n u a l l y p o i n t i n g out t h a t f o r m a l l o g i c i s i n a d e q u a t e t o e x p l a i n t h e m a n i -f e s t a t i o n s o f n a t u r e , a n d t h a t t h e e n t i r e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m c e n t r e s a r o u n d t h e f a c t t h a t c o n c e p t i o n s o r p e r -c e p t i o n s o f a n y t h i n g i n v o l v e t h e c o n c e p t i o n o r p e r c e p t i o n o f i t s o p p o s i t e . I n o t h e r words, t h e r e I s i m p l i c i t i n any e n t i t y , e i t h e r a b s t r a c t o r c o n c r e t e , an o p p o s i t e . But s u r e l y , f r o m a p o i n t o f s e m a n t i c s and l o g i c i t i s p o s s i b l e t o s t a t e t h a t A i s o n l y A, a n d i t s c o n t r a d i c t o r y 63. n o t - A i s n o t - A , i . e . , t h e y a r e b o t h i n d i v i d u a l e n t i t i e s . The o n l y r e a s o n t h a t "A" i m p l i e s " n o t - A " i s b e c a u s e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e p r o c e s s o f i d e n t i f y i n g A as A, i . e . , p e r c e p t i o n o r c o n c e p t i o n i m m e d i a t e l y i n -v o l v e s a s u b j e c t - o b j e c t o r s e l f - n o t - s e l f r e l a t i o n s h i p E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y , i f t h e a d h e r e n t s o f M a r x i s m m a i n t a i n e d t h a t a u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s was f o r t h c o m i n g i n the p e r c e p t i o n o r c o n c e p t i o n o f any e n t i t y owing t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f the a c t o f i d e n t i t y , n a m e l y , t h e a p r i o r i s e l f - n o t - s e l f r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e n t h e i r v i e w w o u l d be n o t o n l y o r t h o d o x , b u t , i n a d d i t i o n , w o u l d be t a n t a m o u n t t o r e c o g n i s i n g t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e K a n t i a n " t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f " ' , T h i s , o f c o u r s e , M a r x i a n s r e f u s e t o r e c o g n i s e , and h e n c e t h e i r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t o f a u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s i s b a s e d on t h e c o n c e p t o f mind as a r e f l e c t o r o f a r e a l i t y whose n a t u r e Is' e s s e n t i a l l y one o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n . F o r example, s t a t e s E n g e l s , " M o t i o n i t s e l f i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n ; e v e n s i m p l e m e c h a n i c a l change o f p l a c e c a n o n l y come a b o u t t h r o u g h a "body a t one and t h e same moment o f time b e i n g i n one p l a c e a n d i n a n o t h e r p l a c e , b e i n g i n one a n d the same p l a c e a n d a l s o n o t i n I i t . . And t h e c o n t i n u o u s a s s e r t i o n and s i m u l t a n e o u s s o l u t i o n o f t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s p r e c i s e l y what m o t i o n i s . " T h i s , of c o u r s e , I s m e r e l y a r e s t a t e m e n t o f Zeno's famous p a r a d o x a n d may s u b s e q u e n t l y be a n s w e r e d 50 E n g e l s , F., H e r r Eugen D u h r i n g ' s R e v o l u t i o n i n S c i e n c e , New Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1939, p.132 6 4 . i n a s i m i l a r f a s h i o n : namely, a body i n motion i s not a t a c e r t a i n p o i n t a t a c e r t a i n time owing t o the f a c t t h a t i t i s i n m o t i o n ; r a t h e r i t passes through or by a c e r t a i n p o i n t . I n s h o r t , the i l l u s t r a t i o n t h a t Engels g ives to s u b s t a n t i a t e d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c i s extremely m i s l e a d i n g , i n as much as he uses terms t h a t negate h i s b a s i c i d e a of motion as f l u x or becoming or a c t i v i t y . Thus, there i s r e a l l y no reason f o r speaking of an object as b e i n g and n o t - b e i n g because i t i s always i n a s t a t e of becoming; f o r what i s suggested i s t h a t as p e r -c e i v e d at a c e r t a i n p o i n t i n time the object had c e r t a i n a t t r i b u t e s which by the v e r y p r i n c i p l e of the n e g a t i o n of the n e g a t i o n were necessary i n order t h a t i t might develop or pass i n t o i t s next phase. However, t o m a i n t a i n from the other extreme t h a t there i s never a p o i n t i n time when an object i s e i t h e r A or not-A i s a l s o f a l a c i o u s ; f o r t h i s a g a i n can be e x p l a i n e d by the p r i n c i p l e of i n d e t e r m i n a c y , i . e . , no d e f i n i t e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n under the e x i s t i n g c i r c u m -stances i s p o s s i b l e owing to the l a c k of e i t h e r s u f f i c i e n t or necessary c o n d i t i o n s to a c t i v a t e the continuum p o s i t i v e l y . " i n any concrete continuum, whether temporal or n o n - t e m p o r a l , there i s a middle ground between any two contiguous opposi te q u a l i t i e s A and -A, i . e . , a c e r t a i n s t r e t c h S of the continuum where i t i s not t rue t h a t e v e r y t h i n g 65. i s e i t h e r A o r -A. Thus t h e law o f i n c l u d e d m i d d l e , w h i c h s t a t e s t h a t S i s a l w a y s e i t h e r A o r -A i s r e s t r i c t e d . " °x However, t h e s u f f i c i e n t and n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s t o a c t i v a t e a c a u s a l c o n t i n u u m p o s i t i v e l y , may be e i t h e r s u b j e c t i v e o r o b j e c t i v e , i . e . , owing t o the l a c k o f em-p i r i c a l d a t a , c a u s e d by e i t h e r a d e f i c i e n c y o f s k i l l o r n e c e s s a r y i n s t r u m e n t s , t h e o b s e r v e r i s u n a b l e t o a s c e r t a i n , t h e c a u s e o f a s p e c i f i c e f f e c t . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e e f f e c t c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d as n o t r e a l i s e d . Gn t h e o t h e r h a n d , a l l e l e m e n t s o r f a c t o r s n e c e s s a r y t o prod u c e a s p e c i f i c ' e f f e c t may be known, s u c h as i n a c h e m i c a l e x p e r i m e n t , and owing t o l i m i t a t i o n s i n time t h e e f f e c t may n o t be r e a l i z e d a n d hence what d i d e x i s t c o u l d n o t be c o n s i d e r e d e i t h e r t h e o r i g i n a l e l e m e n t s o r t h e d e s i r e d e f f e c t . B r i e f l y , t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e u n i t y of o p p o s i t e s p l u s t h e c o n c e p t o f mind as a r e f l e c t o r o f n a t u r e i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o e x p l a i n how p e r c e p t s and c o n c e p t s a r e a r r i v e d a t u n l e s s an a p r i o r i r e l a t i o n s h i p o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , . s e l f a n d n o t - s e l f i s g r a n t e d / The a d m i s s i o n o f t h i s , h owever, i m m e d i a t e l y i n v o l v e s t h e M a r x i a n s i n a t h e o r y , o r i n t h e o r i e s . t h a t w o u l d have t o a l l o w f o r t h e r e c o g -n i t i o n o f t h e K a n t i a n d i n g an s i c h , o r owing t o the. n e c e s s i t y o f a frame o f r e f e r e n c e some a p r i o r i c a t e g o r i e s w o u l d have t o be g r a n t e d . The o n l y r e a s o n f o r n o t g r a n t i n g 51 M c G i l l , V. J . and P a r r y , W. T., "The U n i t y o f  O p p o s i t e s " , S c i e n c e and S o c i e t y , New Y o r k , 1948, V o l . X I I , p. 428 a s u b j e c t - o b j e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p a p p e a r s t o be t h e i n s i s t e n c e on t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a b s o l u t e o b j e c t i v e t r u t h . A b s o l u t e o b j e c t i v e t r u t h i s o f c o u r s e c o n s i d e r e d as r e a l i z a b l e t h r o u g h use o f t h e d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t s ' t h e o r y o f c a u s a l i t y , w h i c h a l t h o u g h i n a d e q u a t e as an e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t e n e t s o f d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , may be v a l i d as a m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r y . I n terms o f t h e u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s and t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e n e g a t i o n , d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m i s a c o n t i g u o u s t h e o r y o f c a u s a l i t y . F o r , by t h e d e f i n i t i o n s o f t h e c a u s a l c o n c e p t s , n a m e l y , the u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s and t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e n e g a t i o n , e a c h e v e n t i s a s y n -t h e s i s o f a p r i o r i t h e s i s r - a n t i t h e s i s r e l a t i o n s h i p . The p r i o r t h e s i s may be c o n s i d e r e d as t h e s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i -t i o n n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e a c t i v i t y o f the a n t i t h e s i s as t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n t o r e a l i s e i t s f u n c t i o n , n a mely, t h e p r i m a r y c a u s e o f t h e s y n t h e s i s o r new e n t i t y . The d e s i g -n a t i n g o r c l a s s i f y i n g o f s u f f i c i e n t a n d n e c e s s a r y c o n d i -t i o n s i s , however, i n most c a s e s , l o g i c a l l y a r b i t r a r y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , o n t o l o g i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , t h e M a r x i a n t e n e t o f t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e n e g a t i o n i m p l i e s t h a t e a c h c a u s e i s d e t e r m i n e d by a p r i o r c a u s e , i . e . , e a c h a n t i t h e s i s w i t h i n e v e r y e n t i t y i s d e t e r m i n e d by a p r i o r a n t i t h e s i s or n e g a t i o n . From a p o i n t o f p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n , i t i s l o g i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o s t a t e w h i c h 67 i s the major cause of a s p e c i f i c event as both t h e s i s and a n t i t h e s i s are determinants of the proceeding s y n t h e s i s or event. On these grounds alone, the theory of i n e v i t a -b i l i t y of c e r t a i n events i s questionable merely from the p o i n t of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the s u f f i c i e n t and necessary c o n d i t i o n s needed f o r the r e a l i z a t i o n of the " h y p o t h e t i c a l s y n t h e s i s " . The c a u s a l judgments i n terms of f u t u r e events a r e , however, r e f e r r e d t o the u n i v e r s a l concept, o r , f o r the d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t s , to the law of c a u s a l i t y . That i s t o say. the above a n a l y s i s i s c o n s i d e r e d c o r r e c t as f a r as any s p e c i f i c e n t i t y i s i n v o l v e d , but the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of events are considered, owing t o the u n i v e r s a l c a u s a l law of d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m to be v a l i d . F or example, • " I t i s j u s t the same with cause a n d , e f f e c t ; they are conceptions which only have v a l i d i t y i n t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n to a p a r t i c u l a r case as such, but when we c o n s i d e r the p a r t i c u l a r case i n i t s g e n e r a l connection with the world as a whole they merge and d i s s o l v e i n the conception of u n i v e r s a l a c t i o n and i n t e r a c t i o n , i n which causes and e f f e c t s are c o n s t a n t l y changing p l a c e s , and what i s now or here an e f f e c t becomes there or then a cause . . . . " 52 In other words, the theory i s contiguous i n terms of a s p e c i f i c c ontent, i . e . , the c a u s a l r e l a t i o n i s not i n t e r n a l i n the sense that i t i s i m p l i c i t i n the 52 En g e l s , F. Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution i n Sci e n c e , New York, I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1939, p. 29 6 8 . n a t u r e o f i t s . t e r m s . However, i n t e r m s o f i t s meta-p h y s i c a l p o s t u l a t e s , the t h e o r y e n u n c i a t e s t h e i n t e r -c o n n e c t e d n e s s o f e v e n t s . T h i s i n t e r c o n n e c t e d n e s s o f e v e n t s , i n t e r m s o f t h e a bove, c o u l d o n l y be j u s t i f i e d on p r a g m a t i c g r o u n d s , i . e . , by an a p p e a l t o s t a t i s t i c s a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o b a b i l i t y i n t e r m s o f t h e number o f t i m e s s i m i l a r e v e n t s and c a u s e s a r e f o r t h c o m i n g u n d e r p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s t e c h n i q u e f o r a r r i v i n g a t m e t a p h y s i c a l p o s t u l a t e s i s , however, u n s o u n d b e c a u s e ". .. . o n l y e n t i r e c l a s s e s o f c a s e s c o u l d c o u n t as n e g a t i v e e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t them, but n o t a s i n g l e case.". 53 whereas a u n i v e r s a l must be a p p l i c a b l e i n t e r m s o f a l l i t s p a r t i c u l a r s . S u b s e q u e n t l y , a u n i v e r s a l c a u s a l c o n -t i n u u m c a n n o t be g r a n t e d u n l e s s t h e q u a n t i t y - q u a l i t y c o n c e p t c a n e x p l a i n a b r u p t c h a n g e . T h i s c o n c e p t does e x p l a i n a b r u p t c h a n ges by way o f e n u n c i a t i n g t h a t d e c r e a s e s o r i n c r e a s e s i n q u a n t i t a t i v e o r q u a l i t a t i v e f a c t o r s d o . l e a d , a t a c e r t a i n p e r i o d o f a c t i v i t y , t o an e n t i t y e x c l u s i v e l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t w h i c h e x i s t e d b e f o r e . However, t h i s i n i t s e l f , when t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f t i m e i s c o n s i d e r e d , h a r d l y l e a d s t o the p o s t u l a t i n g o f an a b r u p t b r e a k . I f a b r u p t i s t o s u g g e s t a t i m e p e r i o d t h e n t h e e n t i r e c o n c e p t i s o f no r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o w i n g t o t h e s u b j e c t i v e o r r e l a t i v e n a t u r e o f t i m e . 53 Pap, A., E l e m e n t s o f A n a l y t i c P h i l o s o p h y , New Y o r k , The M a c m i l l a n Company, 1949, p. 227 69. The c o n c e p t o f a b r u p t change, however, i s a l w a y s l i n k e d w i t h t h e emergence o f n o v e l t y , a n d i s s u b s e q u e n t l y u s e d t o i m p l y a b r e a k i n a c a u s a l c o n t i n u u m . I n what o t h e r s e n s e , i n d e e d , c o u l d t h e word n o v e l t y be u s e d w i t h o u t becoming as s u b j e c t i v e o r r e l a t i v e as t i m e ? I n s h o r t , I f t h e M a r x i a n s a r e s u g g e s t i n g a change s i m i l a r t o : - ab -- be - - c d t h e n e, t h e n t h e i n t e r -c o n n e c t e d n e s s o f e v e n t s c a n n o t be e x p l a i n e d i n t erms o f a c o n t i g u o u s t h e o r y of c a u s a l i t y . F o r , t h e r e i s n o t i m p l i e d i n any o f t h e p r e c e d i n g s t e p s o r e v e n t s t h e f a c t o r " e " , o r e v e n a s s u m i n g t h a t by some means o f t h e u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s a n d t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e n e g a t i o n " e " i s t h e p r o d u c t o r r e s u l t a n t , t h e r e i s s t i l l no manner by w h i c h a n a l y t i c a l l y t h i s c o u l d be p r e d i c t e d o r d e t e r m i n e d . I n s h o r t , a c a u s a l t h e o r y b a s e d on i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n , s u c h a s , "A r e l a t i o n i s i n t e r n a l i f i t f o l l o w s f r o m t h e n a t u r e o f i t s terms a l o n e t h a t i t e i t h e r h o l d s o r does n o t ' h o l d between them." ^4 i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e d o c t r i n e o f i n t e r -c o n n e c t e d n e s s owing t o t h e b r e a k i n t h e c a u s a l c o n t i n u u m , i . e . , two terms a r e n e e d e d t o f o r m a r e l a t i o n s h i p . The t e n e t o f a b r u p t b r e a k a n d t h e emergence o f n o v e l t y c a n d i s t i n g u i s h o n l y one t e r m , n a m e l y , th e e f f e c t o r e n t i t y . 54 Bap;: .Ap, E l e m e n t s o f A n a l y t i c P h i l o s o p h y , New Y o r k , The M a c m i l l a n Company, 1949, p. 20?'. 7 0 . CONCLUSION The t h e o r y o f d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m i s c o n -s i d e r e d by i t s a d v o c a t e s as a p r a c t i c a l t h e o r y by w h i c h man may a c t , i n a p o s i t i v e f a s h i o n on h i s e n v i r o n m e n t . The n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y , i n c l u d i n g man h i m s e l f , i s e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f t h e d i a l e c t i c a l c o n c e p t s o f H e g e l . The m a j o r i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h e H e g e l i a n t h e o r y , n a m e l y , p r e d e t e r m i n i s m i s , however, r e j e c t e d on the b a s i s . t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i s n o t m e r e l y " s e n s u o u s " b ut a l s o " a c t i v e " a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y i n f l u e n c e s i t s e n v i r o n m e n t . However, when t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the c o n c e p t of m i n d , as a r e f l e c t o r o f t h e d i a l e c t i c a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f r e a l i t y a n d as b e i n g c o m p l e t e l y n o n - t e l e o l o g i c a l , a r e c o n s i d e r e d , t h e t h e o r y i s i n many r e s p e c t s j u s t as p r e d e t e r m i n i s t i c as t h e M a r x i a n s m a i n t a i n H e g e l i a n i s m i s . I n o t h e r w o rds, t h e o n l y i n f l u e n c e t h a t man has upon h i s e n v i r o n m e n t i s as a f a c t o r o f t h e e n v i r o n m e n t w h i c h , as s u c h , q u a l i f i e s i t t o a l i m i t e d d e g r e e . T h i s , however, i s a c o m p l e t e l y p a s s i v e a c t i v i t y and h a r d l y i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e aims o f d i a l e c t i c a l , m a t e r i a l i s m . S e c o n d l y , t h e t h e o r y as a c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f the u n i v e r s e does n o t a c c o u n t f o r a l l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o wing t o the t e n e t o f a b r u p t b r e a k and the emergence o f n o v e l t y . Y e t i n s p i t e o f t h i s , M a r x i s t s m a i n t a i n t h a t a l l e v e n t s a r e i n t e r c o n n e c t e d . I n d e e d , f r o m t h i s p o i n t o f v i e w such s t a t e m e n t s as t h e f o l l o w i n g a p p e a r as p u r e dogma : " . . . the l i m i t s o f a p p r o x i m a t i o n o f o u r knowledge t o t h e o b j e c t i v e , a b s o l u t e t r u t h a r e h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n d i t i o n a l , but t h e e x i s t e n c e o f such t r u t h i s u n c o n d i t i o n a l , a n d the f a c t t h a t we a r e a p p r o a c h i n g n e a r e r t o i t i s a l s o u n c o n d i t i o n a l . " 55 I n s h o r t , d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m as a p h i l o -s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e i s n o t a h i g h l y i n t e g r a t e d s c h e m a t i s m but a g r o u p o f l o o s e l y c o n n e c t e d c o n c e p t s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the a b s o l u t i s t i c c l a i m s o f t h e "pure M a r x i a n s " a p p e a r e n t i r e l y . u n w a r r a n t e d . I f , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , M a r x i s m i s c o n s i d e r e d as "not c o m p l e t e , n o t a s y s t e m , an d o n l y i n s e c o n d p l a c e t h e o r e t i c a l . . . b ecause i t i s a l i v e a n d g r o w i n g , a n d above, a l l b e c a u s e i t l a y s no c l a i m t o f i n a l i t y . 56 i t d o e s , i n e s s e n c e , l o s e a l l i m p o r t as a r e v o l u t i o n a r y p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e . 55 L e n i n , V. T., S e l e c t e d Works (The T h e o r e t i c a l P r i n c i p l e s o f M a r x i s m ) , New T o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1955, p. 198. 56 H a l d a n e , J . B. S., The M a r x i s t s P h i l o s o p h y , New Y o r k , Random House I n c . 1939, p. 8. 1 BIBLIOGRAPHY ( T h i s i s a p a r t i a l b i b l i o g r a p h y o f the s u b j e c t , , r e p r e s e n t i n g books a n d a r t i c l e s c o n s u l t e d by the w r i t e r . ) BOOKS. Bake.we 11, C h a r l e s M . , S o u r c e Book i n A n c i e n t P h i l o s o p h y , C h a r l e s S c r i b n e r ' s Sons, New Y o r k , 1907. Bowne, B. P., M e t a p h y s i c s a S t u d y i n F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s , L ondon, Sampson Low, M a r s t o n , S e a r l e a n d R i v i n g t o n . , I8"82. 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