THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

by

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ABSTRACT

The Epistemological and Metaphysical Implications of Dialectical Materialism.

The theory of dialectical materialism is essentially the product of the joint efforts of Karl Marx and Frederich Engels. Such men as V. I. Lenin, George Plekhanov, J. Dietzgen, and J. B. S. Haldane have added very little either in terms of original contributions or in terms of refining and elaborating the main tenets of the theory. In this respect, V. I. Lenin's influence on the theory is negligible; what he has written is primarily a criticism of the deviationists and opposing schools of thought, and also a substantiation of the original postulates of Marx and Engels.

The same may be said of Plekhanov and Dietzgen with the exception that they are considered, by Lenin and most of the Marxian "purists", as deviationists owing to the modifications they attempted in the epistemology. Such Marxians as J. B. S. Haldane and many of the present day socialists may also be classified as deviationists as they consider dialectical materialism more in terms of technique rather than as a highly integrated revolutionary philosophic schematism.
In view of these divergencies of opinion, the writer has treated dialectical materialism as primarily the theory formulated by Marx and Engels and reiterated by Lenin. The views of the Marxian deviationists are, however, also considered wherever they throw light on the aims and postulates of the philosophy of Marx and Engels.

The schematism examined is always given in the final analysis, the same test, namely, does it substantiate the over all claim that this is a dynamic, completely meaningful universe in which man is able to actively influence his environment, and in which man is, himself, influenced by the environment.

The general conclusion is that, owing to the Marxian concept of mind as a reflector and the rejection of any type of teleological factor, the active determinism enunciated in this philosophy is not implicit in its basic metaphysical and epistemological tenets. In addition, owing to the concepts of abrupt break, emergence of novelty, and the dynamic nature of terms and entities, it is not possible to logically deduce from a plurality of causes a specific effect, e.g., the inevitability of the collapse or negation of capitalism. In other words, the writer maintains that there is no sound basis for the claim that certain events must inevitably occur at some future time.
In short the theory is an unsuccessful attempt to postulate an active deterministic philosophy through merging two schools of thought, namely, materialism and idealism.
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Introduction

Karl Heinrich Marx, born in Trier in 1818, came from a middle class Jewish family. He was educated at the universities of Bonn and Berlin where he came in contact with the young Hegelians who represented the most advanced section of German intellectuals at that time.

Germany was at that time just emerging from a state of economic backwardness and political reaction. The industrialism and the democratic concepts, which had become part of the everyday life of such countries as Britain and France, were only beginning to develop. Opportunity to observe the German development against the background of the new democratic industrial societies, English industrialism and English trade-unionism, as well as French post-revolutionary political theories and struggles, was available for observation and analysis.

Thus, it was against a background of new political and economic ideas, as exemplified in the writings of the Utilitarians, and the early English and French socialists, and also the radicalism of the young Hegelians, that Marx's youth was lived. The influence of these ideas plus the problems of the period resulted in Marx becoming critical and dissatisfied with the
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extreme Idealism of Hegelian philosophy. He, therefore, began to search for a more practical mode of expression of social criticism than the idealism of the young Hegelians.

In 1843, Marx moved to Paris where he took over the editorship of the "Deutsch-franzosische Jahrbucher". Only one issue appeared but it contained a clear statement of Marx's newly formed theory of history. The formulation and writing of this theory led to a detailed study of political economy, and, in addition, the publishing of the *Nationalökonomie und Philosophie*. Later in 1845, Marx moved to Brussels where, with the collaboration of Frederich Engels, he wrote *Die Deutsche Ideologie*. This work was a critical discussion of German philosophy which freed both Marx and Engels from Hegelian Idealism and consequently was instrumental in the formulation of the theory of dialectical materialism.

Dialectical materialism, like most theories, is the result of much that has been handed down from other ages. In a sense, it is two concepts blended into one, i.e., the dynamic concept of reality and the concept of determinism emanating from Materialism. Both these concepts have been part of philosophic speculation, in some form or other, for over two thousand years. Their history may be traced to the Greek thinkers of the fifth century.
B.C., in particular, Heraclitus and Democritus. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries A.D. these two concepts or theories were amended and elaborated until they developed as two opposing forces, namely, Idealism and Realism. The later half of the eighteenth century witnessed an attempted compromise of these two schools under the guidance of Immanuel Kant. The nineteenth century saw the revolt from this compromise in the extreme Idealism of Hegel. Here, in brief, is Hegel's metaphysical theory in which Marx found the instrument needed for the resurrection of Materialism.

Hegel maintains that the world is in a constant state of flux, and that its pattern of change is dialectical, i.e., thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Subsequently, if man is to know reality he must also think in terms of the dialectic; for in the final analysis reason and reality are identical. Owing to the dynamic nature of reality, finite minds only grasp it partially. However, if finite minds act consistently with the "correct" process of thinking, namely, the dialectic, then they will realize more and more of reality which is in the Absolute, Idea, Spirit or God.

Now, the correct process of thought is that which is consistent with the dialectic, for the universe is by its very nature dialectical. That is, the universe
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when considered in terms of its parts is composed of opposites or contradictories, which act and react upon one another, resulting in a concatenation of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Each one of these triads, from the Hegelian point of view, results in a higher synthesis, because they are all oriented toward the realisation or self-realisation of the absolute Idea, Spirit, Mind or God, which is the Whole. Thus, with the basic assumption that the nature of the cosmos is mind-like, Hegel is able to formulate a theory that allows for change, and yet maintains an Absolute or Whole that is complete in all respects within itself.

The social implication of this theory will appear quite alien to a society educated in terms of twentieth century democracy. This theory of dialectical development led Hegel to maintain that the State is the socio-political manifestation of the supreme Idea or Universal in the particular. Subsequently, if one is to live a rational and ethical life, his behaviour and aspirations should be oriented in terms of the state.

Marx, as we indicated earlier, found the reactionary social philosophy of Hegel inadequate in view of the social developments and problems that confronted the societies of his era. He did, however, see in the dialectic method a medium which, when refined,
would be invaluable in relating and explaining the various manifestations of reality.

To elaborate, dialectical materialism asserts that this world is composed of matter, the highest form of which is mind, and that it is a world that is always in a process of change. The change is accounted for by the theory of opposites or contradiction. Each unit, each manifestation of nature contains within it the seeds of its own destruction. Logically stated, each thesis or entity implies or contains its antithesis or opposite which, owing to the dynamic nature of reality, will contradict or act on the thesis or entity as it is at any particular instance in time; and will therefore, by uniting with its opposite, lead to a new thesis or higher synthesis.

Although within the change process there is a rhythm or uniformity of motion it is, in a sense, only in terms of duration blocks, that is, a point is reached where the change is abrupt. For example, at what point does a collection of rolling stones become an avalanche, or at what point is a stream a river? Engels explains this type of change by his quantity-quality theory which in essence maintains that revolutionary or abrupt change is part of the nature of the universe. Its social implications are clearly illustrated in Marx's writings on the history of man. As a matter of fact, no better application...
of dialectical materialism can be found than that exemplified in his economic interpretation of history. For example the dynamic concept is clearly enunciated in The Poverty of Philosophy:

"All that exists, all that lives on land and in water, exists, lives, only by some movement. Thus the movement of history produces relations. . . ."\textsuperscript{i}

Starting from this fundamental point, Marx considers the history of man in terms of the derivatives of the underlying substratum, namely, mind and material things. And, as mind is considered to reflect and act on that which is exterior to itself, it logically follows that the material thing is prior to the idea that man has of it; although, ideas once formed can exert a considerable influence in changing the shape of things and in bringing new things into existence.

Things and ideas interact, proceeds Marx, but never so as to upset the primacy of things. The thing is always first, and in order that the idea may become a force in molding and affecting things, or more specifically history, the idea must be utilized and thus become a thing. For these "things", Marx maintains, are the agents of social evolution.

\textsuperscript{i} Marx, Karl, \textit{The Poverty of Philosophy}, Chicago, Charles H. Kerr and Co. 1910, p. 116
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In other words, the dynamics of history are to be found in the conditions of man's material existence, i.e., in order for man to exist there had to be present either prior to his existence or at the time of his first existence the material necessities needed for his survival. Thus, the necessities imposed upon man by nature indicate that the primary productive activities of man were independent of all forms of society. However, as the productive activities of man continued, new techniques were devised through the interaction of the then existing things and the human mind. The new techniques in production and the new artifacts designed to implement these techniques were the results of the capitalization of man's ideas. These ideas, embodied in material forms, influenced the history of man as they in turn became things, and subsequently germinated further the interactive process.

The economic organisation brought about by this productive activity determines, through the interactive process, the ethical, the sociological, the political, et cetera, ideas of man. The concepts and values of each society emanate from the economic organisation of that particular society, plus that which man has inherited, both ideas and material things, from past societies.

"In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production, their manner of gaining a living, they change all their social relations. The windmill
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gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill society with the industrial capitalist."

Thus, Marx conceives of history as a chain of connected developments, each phase of which must be of such a nature that it can be developed out of its predecessor; and subsequently men's powers in influencing the course of history are limited to a choice between alternatives which are possible in the light of a given objective situation. This is not to deny the existence of free-will, but rather to state that the free-wills of men form part of the chain of causality, and that those wills are limited only by the conditions within which they have to operate. In the case of the great men who have appeared in history, it is argued that they counted because the ideas which they posed fitted the cultural and materialistic institutions and the opportunities of their time. The ideas or theories which they postulated were still, however, the result of the interaction of the then existing organisations and patterns of their society on their minds, and in turn, of their minds on those organizations and cultural patterns.

Consequently, asserts Marx, within any society the political, legal and ethical systems formulated and

accepted will be those which arise out of the development of the power and resources of production. It is the mode of production which basically determines these concepts and also the class stratification of society. In short, the laws, political institutions and precepts which exist in any society arise out of, and moreover, serve to uphold, the particular economic system which exists at that moment.

This on the surface would appear to contradict the basic assumption that the socio-political-economic complex is dynamic in nature. For, if that mode of production which is in existence determines the ideas, the ethics, et cetera of the society, then it would seem that, in terms of the principle of interaction, the specific society would tend to perpetuate itself, and hence a static concept would be the resultant.

However, Marx denied this static concept of the socio-cultural complex on the basis that the reasoning employed --- and this Marx considered to be one of the fallacies of the Classical School --- is that of formal logic which uses static concepts while attempting to analyse and explain a complex which is dynamic by nature. The dialectic, on the other hand, working in terms of "being" and "becoming", or in terms of a unity of opposites, is able to view the socio-political-economic complex as it is, namely, as "existing" and "not-existing", or "being"
and "becoming". Hence, although the mode of production existent at any particular time emanates the ideas, ethics, precepts, et cetera of that age, it is itself in a process of "being and becoming", and therefore, it changes the relationship between itself and its parts and itself and the individuals and institutions within the complex.

Not only that, but, in this change process new things are forever coming into being, and finding, within the complex, things to which they are opposites, and consequently antagonistic. These things exemplify themselves in particulars, such as, capital-labour in terms of economics; ruler-subject in terms of politics; and male-female in terms of matter or physics.

"There is a continual movement of growth in the productive forces of destruction in the social relations of formation in ideas; there is nothing immutable but the abstraction of the movement." iii.

Nevertheless, the Marxian contention is not a fatalistic one; it does not assert that men can think only in terms dictated by current economic conditions, but rather, that out of men's thoughts those alone will influence the course of human history that are relevant to contemporary problems. That is, the thought that makes history is not isolated from the material and substantial things of the world, but thought applying itself to these things and acting upon their latent powers.

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To continue, these entities existing and coming into existence within the socio-political-economic complex form themselves, as shown above, into classes. These classes, Marx maintains, arise out of the mode of production, and hence are classified in terms of the economic organization. In the period of capitalism the classes are, at the present point of development, three, namely, capitalist, petite bourgeoisie and proletariat. However, as the capitalistic mode of production and distribution develops, the middle class, the petite bourgeoisie, will disappear or rather become immersed in the proletarian class. The capitalistic national and international complex will then be clearly defined as capital and labour, or capitalist and proletariat. This is capitalism in its final stage of development, where the inherent antagonism existing between capital and labour is epitomised and in which the theory of the inclusion of the contradictory or opposites in any entity is exemplified.

To recapitulate, dialectical materialism is the theory that this is a dynamic materialistic universe, in which events are determined by the environment in which they exist, and also by the inherent nature of the events themselves. That is, Marxism maintains that material, social and political entities or events contain within themselves their own antithesis which alone is sufficient
to cause a new event or negate a present event. In addition to the opposite or contradictory contained within an event, there are external opposites which also qualify the nature of an event.

Thus, on the basis of a dynamic universe in which events are determined by internal and external opposites, Marxism asserts the inevitability of the negation of any particular event or entity, e.g., the inevitability of the collapse or negation of capitalism.

In the second part of this work, the very basis, i.e., the metaphysical basis, of this view will be examined. Moreover, the writer will try to show that the theory of inevitability cannot be universally maintained.

It has also been shown in this introduction that Marxian philosophy holds that mind is a higher form of matter, reflecting that which is external to itself. Now, if this be the true nature of mind, and if the true nature of all matter be dialectic then in what sense is Marxism or dialectical materialism an active revolutionary philosophy? It is the writer's view that an active determinism, as enunciated by Marxian writers, cannot be validly held in terms of the metaphysical and epistemological tenets of dialectical materialism.

In order that this may be seen quite clearly, part one of this work outlines some of the cardinal
philosophical problems of past ages, and shows also how different schools of thought have tried to solve these problems. In addition, the influence of the philosophies of past periods on dialectical materialism will be seen and through this the inherent difficulties of the Marxian position will, perhaps, become all the more apparent.

The general conclusion is that owing to the Marxian concept of mind as a reflector, and the rejection of any type of teleological factor, the active determinism enunciated in this philosophy is not implicit in its basic metaphysical and epistemological tenets.

Secondly, the Marxian principle of causality, owing to the tenets of abrupt break, emergence of novelty, and the dynamic nature of terms does not justify the theory of the interconnectedness of events. Moreover, this principle of causality does not substantiate the Marxian tenet of the inevitability of particular events, again owing to the tenets of abrupt break and emergence of novelty.

Thirdly, as the interconnectedness of events cannot be logically maintained there is no sound basis for the postulate of absolute objective truth. That is to say, unless reality can be viewed as a schematic whole in terms of which particular events are related then there is no sound criterion for asserting the
absolute truth of particular events or for maintaining that we approach ever closer to absolute objective reality.

In short, the Marxian theory is an unsuccessful attempt to produce a universal and revolutionary philosophy by merging two schools of thought, namely materialism and idealism. The attempt has been unsuccessful primarily because of the necessity, from the social point of view, of producing a deterministic philosophy and yet an active or positive philosophy.
Dialectical materialism is, like most products of a culture, the result of the activities of a specific period coupled with the heritage of that period. As formulated by Marx and Engels, the theory is in many respects the by-product of the modifications and innovations that have been applied to the metaphysical and epistemological concepts of materialism and idealism.

Throughout their history, materialism and idealism have appeared as both monistic and pluralistic concepts of reality. In the materialism of the French Rationalists may be seen an epistemology comparable in some respects to that of idealism. For example, Descartes' starting point, namely the ego, leads directly to the recognition of the ego-centric predicament of man in attempting to postulate a completely objective philosophy. The recognition of such a problem or position, in turn, is the basic premise for a philosophy of idealism.

On the other hand, the recognition that ideas are capable of verification by an appeal to a world existing independent of finite minds, and indeed stimulating finite
minds, became for the Cartesian school justification for
the conception of a dualistic world of mind and matter.
The complexity of attempting to reconcile two unlikes, such
as mind and matter, showed conclusively, however, the in-
adequacy of French materialism from an epistemological
standpoint.

As shown above, the recognition of the ego-centric
predicament of man in attempting to postulate a universal
philosophy is actually the basis of idealism; both subjective
and objective idealism. Subjective idealism, however, dis-
regards completely so-called concrete reality and postulates
instead a monistic concept of the universe. In essence,
subjective idealism is

"... the doctrine that represents the subject itself
and its states and judgments as the single immediate
datum of consciousness, and all else, whether objects
in an external world or persons other than the indi-
vidual subject whose states are known to itself, as
having a merely problematic existence resting upon
analogy or other process of indirect inference." ¹

However, such a subjective monism seems quite
inadequate when the obvious metaphysical problem is posited,
namely, do all events emanate from minds or Mind? As a
matter of fact, in all fields of philosophic endeavour
such a subjective position seems to lead to an extreme
relativism hardly justifiable in terms of logic and
empirical data.

¹ "Idealism", Encyclopedia Britannica, (A New Survey
of Universal Knowledge), Chicago, University of Chicago,
Objective idealism, on the other hand, differs from incomplete or subjective idealism in that it recognizes so-called "concrete reality", but at the same time recognizes the ego-centric predicament of philosophy, in general and epistemology, in particular.

Materialism has also appeared in the forms of monism and pluralism. The one cardinal distinction being between a materialistic concept of a single universal substratum from which all particulars emanate, as against a materialistic, yet pluralistic, concept of two or more universal substrata from which different classes of particulars emanate; or by the combining of such substrata different particulars come into being. The early Greek philosophies exemplify these types of materialism.

The recognition of the ego-centric predicament of man in formulating a completely objective philosophy was not common to the pre-Socratic period of Greek philosophy. The pre-Socratics were, in other words, naive materialists. Their approach to their subject was one that either deliberately ignored any epistemological implications, or was based on the naive view that by analysing and synthesising the laws of change and the nature of things it would be possible to arrive at a universally valid philosophy.
Thus it was that in the ancient Milesian school such thinkers as Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes conceived of reality as a changing composite which manifested itself through particulars that emanated from a material universal substratum.

Thales (585 B.C.), for example, considered the universal substratum to be water from which all things emanate. Another member of the Milesian school, Anaximander, considered this to be false, but his approach was basically the same as that of Thales. That is, Anaximander maintained that all things emanate from a single primal substance, but it is not water. No detailed explanation what the primal substance may be appears to have been attempted by Anaximander. He does, however, define it as a neutral in the cosmic strife which secondary substances impose upon one another.

The third important member of the Milesian school, Anaximenes, is believed to have lived before 494 B.C. His theory of cosmology is similar in approach to that of both Thales and Anaximander. That is, Anaximenes also sought to explain reality by use of a genetic concept, namely, air. As may be seen, he disagreed with both Thales and Anaximander as to the nature of the basic substance of the universe, but he did agree with the general approach of these philosophers, namely, entities are derived from a universal substratum whose degrees of
concentration result in the multiplicity of attributes to be found in particular entities and events. As Bertrand Russell has stated,

"The fundamental substance... is air. The soul is air; fire is rarefied air; when condensed, air becomes first water, then, if further condensed earth, and finally stone. This theory has the merit of making all the difference between different substances quantitative, depending entirely upon the degree of condensation."

The main characteristics of the materialism of all ages up to and including nineteenth century dialectical materialism is evident in the monisms of these early Greek thinkers. First, an underlying substratum is posited in order to explain the manifold entities existing at any particular point in time. Secondly, a basic distinction between mind and matter is not admitted; on the contrary all things are classified in terms of a genetic concept, e.g., air, water, et cetera. The reason for such an outlook has been concisely stated by H. J. Pos in his article, "Remarks on the Materialism of the Eighteenth Century,"

"The materialistic naturalists of the pre-Socratic period saw no reason why matter should not comprise all reality, including living beings and, in particular, man. They inclined the more readily to this view because they drew no sharp distinction between inert and living matter."

2 Russell, Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy, New York, Lemon and Schuster, p. 28.

Thirdly, as noted in the philosophy of Anaximander a quantitative account of the attributes of specific particulars is undertaken.

Another monist, not of the Milesian school, was Parmenides, who lived around 450 B.C. Similar to the Milesians, Parmenides regarded particular entities and events as the derivatives of a primal universal substratum. He differs from the Milesians, however, in regarding the universe as essentially fixed or static. This concept seems to have been arrived at by way of extreme rationalising and a complete disregard for observed phenomena. It does, however, contain the germ of the dilemma of monistic materialism. That is, in postulating substance or matter as a fundamental universal substratum must it not be of necessity fixed or static? For, how indeed is it possible to use a genetic concept as an explanation of specific phenomena if the concept itself is also becoming other than it was? This is the cardinal reason for Parmenides' static concept of reality which, although rejected by succeeding philosophers, did influence profoundly the concept of a universal substratum.

"What subsequent philosophy, down to quite modern times, accepted from Parmenides, was not the impossibility of all change, which was too violent a paradox, but the indestructibility of substance. The word 'substance' did not occur in his immediate successors, but the conception is already present in their speculations.
A substance was supposed to be the persistent subject of varying predicates. As such it became and remained for more than two thousand years one of the fundamental concepts of philosophy, psychology, physics and theology.⁴

Now, in both the monisms of Parmenides and the Milesians a static concept of reality is posited. Perhaps, in the case of the Milesian thinkers, it is unwittingly postulated, but, as seen, in the thinking of Parmenides it is considered a logical conclusion drawn from the concept of a universal substratum from which all particulars emanate.

Just prior to Parmenides' time, the opposite conclusion based upon a universal substratum was postulated by Heraclitus, namely, this is a dynamic universe. The Heraclitean doctrine, however, will be considered separately and in connection with the dialectic concept.

In terms of the general pattern of thought in Greek philosophy, the shift was from a "one-substance" concept to a "many-substance" concept and to a general belief that units of matter are alive and capable of quantitative analysis. The philosophies of Empedocles and Ananagoras exemplify this trend.

For example, the philosophy of Empedocles is a pluralistic materialism - a synthesis of the monisms of his predecessors Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes and Heraclitus. It does, however, contain one principle that is exclusively the brain child of Empedocles, i.e. the principle of Love and Strife.

Empedocles, living about 440 B.C., regarded the cosmos as a composite of four everlasting elements or substances, namely, earth, air, fire and water. These elements are united and divided in different proportions by two other basic elements, Love and Strife. These concepts of Love and Strife (or more specifically attraction and repulsion) were used by Empedocles to account for many of the events or manifestations of reality. They are similar in some respects to Heraclitus' theory of opposites (to be discussed under "Greek Dialectics"). These concepts, or as Empedocles considers them, the elements of Love and Strife were not regarded as a causal explanation of all phenomena; for he does admit that some particular manifestations are chance events.

In other words, Empedocles believes that events are the results of chance and necessity, and that they are derived from the different combinations or proportions of the basic elements or substances.
Around the same period, Anaxagoras (500 B.C. to 432 B.C.) was introducing philosophy to the Athenians. His philosophy, although basically materialistic, took the form of a dualism of mind and matter.

Anaxagoras' concept of mind was, however, merely a factor to account for living organisms and to differentiate them from inert bodies. This, as shown earlier, was the starting point for a new orientation and dichotomy of philosophical thought. That is to say, the introduction of a dualism of mind and matter, although the concept of mind was quite animistic, must be credited first to Anaxagoras, for

"He differed from his predecessors in regarding mind (nous) as a substance which enters into the composition of living things, and distinguishes them from dead matter."^5

The materialism of Democritus, postulated about 420 B.C., is an attempt to mediate between monism and pluralism. Generally, Democritus is considered as the founder of modern materialism because the distinctions he drew between primary and secondary qualities are by implication a rejection of any idealistic concept of knowledge and reality. That is, through an analysis of primary and secondary qualities, he arrived at the conclusion that such qualities as sweetness, bitterness, color, warmth and so forth were merely opinion or sensation brought about by something external to the individual.

Moreover, he maintained, that the causes of things must be found in those forces that comprise nature; for these forces taken singularly or in the aggregate are the causes and the effects of the manifold aspects manifested in the universe. The basic or primal substance of these entities Democritus defined as atoms, and the multiplicity of the entities, both quantitatively and qualitatively, he considered to be the result of the action and interaction of atoms. In addition, he conceives of matter as being primarily indestructible, and also as being constantly mobile, i.e.,

"... everything is composed of atoms, which are physically, but not geometrically, indivisible; ... between the atoms there is empty space... . atoms are indestructible; ... they always have been, and always will be in motion."\(^6\)

In short, in the materialism of Democritus and his followers most of the main tenets that have been held by materialists of all ages are postulated. First, an underlying substratum is postulated as a logical and metaphysical necessity for the basis of a theory of causality. Secondly, a clear distinction between material and mental phenomena is enunciated, and moreover, mind is defined as a particular form of matter. In a word, no dualism is tolerated. Thirdly, it is

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considered as probable, although perhaps not always possible, that a causal explanation may be found for the manifold events and entities that comprise reality. The essence of Democritus' atomism, similar to all materialism, is, in other words, determinism.

The pre-Socratics were predominantly materialistic naturalists, who regarded reality as an ever changing complex that might be understood by explaining its particular manifestations in terms of a genetic concept, such as, air, earth, fire and water. That is, the early Greek thinkers thought that matter comprised all reality including man.

"The materialistic naturalists of the pre-Socratic period saw no reason why matter should not comprise all reality, including living beings and, in particular, man. They inclined the more readily to this view because they drew no sharp distinction between inert and living matter." 7

After the culmination of Greek materialism in the philosophy of Democritus a reaction to what was considered its pantheistic interpretation of the universe became apparent in the doctrines of Socrates and Plato, and Aristotle to a lesser extent.

Socrates, who died in 399 B.C., disapproved of all forms of materialism which were founded on a rejection of the reality of concepts. He maintained that reality

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or life is only explicable as a system of ends. His approach, in other words, was basically one of pure rationalism and implies a recognition of the ego-centric predicament of philosophy in general, and knowledge in particular.

Plato continues the Socratic orientation to philosophy, and distinguishes sharply between soul (mind) and body. Plato, for instance, sometimes thought of mind as an indestructible rational element that existed somewhere before it became attached to organisms. This distinction between mind and body is the basis of idealism, which rejects a genetic approach to reality and advocates instead an approach by analytic a priori methods.

Plato's pupil, Aristotle, represents on one side of his philosophy the common sense view, as witnessed in the genetic approach of the Greek materialist. In this respect he is in revolt against Platonic idealism. On the other hand, he represents the attempt to restore Platonism, in a more satisfactory form, e.g.,

"His account of the process of knowledge in his logical treatises exhibits the idealistic bent in his philosophy. This is as far removed as possible either from dualism or empiricism. The universal is the real; it is that which gives coherence and individuality to the particular . . . ."8

The real revolt against Platonic scepticism and idealism, however, was led by Epicurus who believed in the absolute trustworthiness of sensation. He added nothing fundamentally new to the doctrines of Democritus, but he and his school did keep alive Greek materialism and deny the validity of the scepticism of Platonic idealism.

"The Epicureans were the most consistent champions of materialism in antiquity. They were the most determined enemies of the supernatural. They best kept alive the conviction of the possibility of a true science of nature. They did most to keep alive an understanding of the achievement of the pre-Socratics. They were the surest guardians of the view that man had made himself by his conquest of nature, and that his civilisation was to be understood as a human experiment." 9

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Modern Materialism

The Cartesian rationalists of the seventeenth century conceived of matter in terms of extension, but not as an exclusive substratum; for their concept of reality allowed for the existence of mind as a separate entity. The general implication of such a dualism became all too apparent from an epistemological standpoint, when a causal nexus between mind and matter was deemed necessary.

Now, although Descartes was not an adherent of Democritus' theory of atoms, he did, nevertheless, incorporate into his dualism many of the principles of the Greek materialists, e.g., a partial use of the genetic concept of materialism for explaining the origin of certain kinds of particulars. His starting point, however, was essentially different from that of Democritus, i.e., Descartes started by doubting everything and subsequently recognising the existence of mind. Democritus, on the other hand, started with the acceptance of data received through the senses and then infers the objectivity of this data which stimulates the senses, and the subjectivity of the senses' reaction to this data. This approach excludes the implications of the recognition of the ego-centric predicament.
of postulating a universally valid philosophy, while the Cartesian concept of a dualistic world is by implication a recognition of this problem.

To elaborate, Descartes, by use of his "systematic doubt", was forced to postulate mind as an exclusive substratum; then, while attempting to formulate a theory of knowledge, he was forced to allow for the existence of matter. He avoided, however, the spiritualising of natural objects by conceiving of mind as an independent substance with characteristics exceedingly different from those of matter. The latter, he defined as extended substance, but mind or spiritual substance, he maintained, completely lacked extension, and was characterised wholly by thinking, which was a mode of functioning quite different from the locomotion that constitutes the sole activity of matter.

Thus, the dichotomy between mind and matter was exemplified in the Cartesian dualism. The bifurcation theory, formulated by Descartes, in order to bridge the gap between these two essentially different elements proved, moreover, unsatisfactory both from metaphysical and epistemological points of view.

Material objects were considered by the French materialists to have no element or factor of self-action similar to that which Descartes had attributed to organisms; rather they moved only as they were acted upon. In other
words, the basic assumption of physical science was that all material bodies were inert and that they moved only when they were acted upon by some force external to themselves. In addition, a mathematical mechanical explanation of the action of one body on another was given great prominence. The unsatisfactory aspect of this explanation was, however, that if an external force was necessary for the movement of a body to take place either an infinite regression of causes or a first cause must be admitted or postulated, which is not of the nature of an inert body, but which can activate an inert body, thereby allowing it to cause the action of other inert bodies. Consequently, Descartes, as a first cause or primary mover, postulates the existence of God or an Absolute whose existence he endeavours to prove through the use of cosmological and ontological arguments. That is, he maintains that the general cause of motion is God, who created matter along with motion and rest. Hence, with the concept of an unchangeable Absolute, Descartes concludes that the quantity of motion in the world is also unchanging. Further, although God was the primary cause of all motion in the world, there were secondary causes in as much as bodies were acted upon or moved by "bodies" external to themselves. Nevertheless, these secondary causes were also interpenetrated by the unchangeableness of God so that they must act regularly and according to fixed laws. This concept of
unchangeableness as regards the Absolute and its effect on secondary causes made for a concept of the universe which considered as a whole was static. In addition, it led to a mechanical-mathematical explanation of the actions of particulars and their relationship to one another. In short, the manner of development and the concepts from which materialism progressed, up to the end of the eighteenth century ended in a theory of the universe which was static if considered as a whole and not in terms of its parts.

Marx and Engels disagreed almost entirely with the philosophies of the French rationalists and materialists, i.e., with both the dualistic concept and the mechanistic concept of nature.
Views on the Nature of Mind and Matter

Running almost parallel with a static concept of reality was the concept that the universe was not absolute in every sense, but dynamic, i.e., constantly changing. For example, throughout the metaphysical speculations of Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle and others, may be detected aspects of this theory. That is, from both an epistemological and metaphysical point of view the principle of dialectics was being developed, e.g., the Aristotelian concepts of potentiality and actuality.

As far as the metaphysical aspects of the dialectic were concerned, it seems that the foremost exponent of them amongst the Greek philosophers was Heraclitus. He envisaged the world as a whole that was forever changing. Things were constantly shifting and becoming that which they were not. The underlying substratum which permeates all and which "joins" together the multitude of particulars, which comprise the Whole was termed fire. Similar to the materialists, the dialecticians of this period were also developing a metaphysics which implied or assumed the existence of a substance which made for a commonness between the various
bodies. In the case of Heraclitus, fire was the underlying substratum, because it was a dynamic force always in a process of change, never the same at any two instances and yet having continuity and cohesiveness. Consequently, it was out of this theory of flux, or of ever changing and ever becoming that the Hegelian and Marxian concepts of a unity of opposites was developed. That is, every single entity in its continuous change has within itself an opposite which in turn becomes a particular or single thing at some instant in time. In this way, action and reaction take place in successive stages, and moreover, are at a particular moment balanced in their results. Thus the appearance of single things is possible.

Aristotle also applied the principle of becoming in his notion of matter.

"... we conceive of matter as a corporeal thing distributed universally, save where there is vacuum, and of an essentially uniform nature, although subject to modification."

Here matter was relative; as it was matter only in relation to that which was to result from it through it being actualized in form. Thus, the principles of potentiality, whereby matter becomes actualized through its manifestation in some form, was in principle similar

to the Heraclitean doctrine of opposites, whereby, an entity comes into being or changes because of its inherent opposite or because of opposition (external) in the universal substratum, fire. However, in the Aristotelian application of the dialectic, there was no question of a corporeal substratum for all things. For Aristotle regarded the form that realized itself in the matter as the end or final cause in which becoming finds its complete manifestation.

Now, it is of no particular import, here, to point out the difficulties inherent in this theory but rather let the theory serve as an historical example of the merging of the dialectic and materialistic approaches. That is, in the Aristotelian concept of substance and matter there was apparent both the dialectic concept of progression, and also the materialistic emphasis on a concrete element that may be determined through the principle of causality.

To generalise, it has been shown that in the development of dialectical thought there was implied, implicitly or explicitly, a form of materialism in that a physical world was accounted for and was explained to some degree in terms of dialectics. Further, it has been shown that the dialecticians of the pre-Hegelian era did not consider the absolute as a fixed or static concept. On the contrary, they regarded the absolute as an ever changing being.
On the other hand, the materialist school of metaphysics postulated an absolute that was unchanging. Instead of adopting the dialectic theory of dynamics, they postulated a causal universe which was explainable in terms of mechanical motion.

In addition, this determinism (for such is the essence of materialism) as exemplified in the philosophy of Descartes, contained a dichotomy of mind and matter which even with the concept of a Primary Mover and a theory of innate ideas did not quite bridge the gap.

For example, David Hume objected to the Cartesian concept of mind and innate ideas on the grounds that there was no evidence to support it. Any individual mind, stated Hume, is exclusively the sum total of the experiences that fill the individual life. That is, each individual mind is for Hume,

"... a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." 11

Kant continues this line of thought, but considers mind not as a bundle of experiences but rather as an organization of experiences made possible by an actually existing principle or agent of organization. The emphasis was upon

the necessary existence of some principle of unity among experience - a necessity which Hume denied. Moreover, the conception of this principle was as an active organizing agency as against the traditional Platonic-Aristotelean view of it as a static or changeless entity or thing.

The basic tenet of the Kantian doctrine is that mind cannot grasp or know the actual world, as such, but only a world of experiences. That is, sense data are received from the actual world by the organism and are then acted upon or arranged in a logical pattern by the mind. Further, as man "must" act in accordance with data arranged and related by the mind, for he can never get outside of experience, it follows that for all practical purposes the world is mind-like. This is the idealistic argument which asserts that the world is somewhat of the nature or character of our mind. The emphasis of the Kantian theory does in a sense fall upon the refutation of complete rationalism. That is, Kant maintained that knowledge must be and was restricted to the field of possible experience, and that pure rationalizing of possible experience is not justified. That is, if reason goes beyond this field it will be likely to argue against itself, and to pose pseudo problems or propositions in lieu of the fact that no frame of reference is possible outside experience.
In short, Kant maintained that all knowledge begins with experience, but it is not all derived from experience. This is a logical conclusion drawn from the very basis of Kantian epistemology. For example, perceiving and conceiving of any concept implies self, not-self, and a relationship inferred by the mind from the nature of this set of circumstances.

This basic concept is also applied in the Kantian theory of causality, i.e., Kant rejects, in essence, any attempt to formulate a metaphysical theory of causality. He insists, instead, that for all practical purposes the so-called laws of nature are man-made, i.e., cause is the resultant of the relations inferred by man in respect to the various phenomena of his experience.
Hegelianism is an attempt to refute the anti-rationalistic doctrines of Kant and his followers, and also to eliminate the dichotomy of the Cartesian rationalist. It is a monism, the essence of which is a fusion, both in terms of approach and content, of metaphysics and epistemology.

"The previous method of philosophy, states Hegel, referring to the Kantian school, has been to preface metaphysics with an inquiry into the conditions of knowledge in the hope of finding the additions and subtractions made to and from its object of knowledge, so that by discounting these factors we may get at the primitive truth and significance of the object itself. This goal is fallacious for conceding that it is possible to carry it out, we arrive at a stage where we have subtracted all knowledge from the primitive object, and are back again where we started." 12

This approach and methodology was consistent with Hegel's view that life is an organic unity in which all diversification and antagonism will, in the final analysis, become subservient to one cardinal principle

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which is the very essence of particular diversifications and antagonisms, and which allows or brings about their acquiescence to higher particulars, or to a final state.

Hegel arrived at this position by way of his dialectic logic which he considered to be the "true" logic as distinguished from traditional logic which does not allow for the inclusion of the contradictory. For formal logic is abstract, dealing only with the relationship existing between terms. It is, indeed, subjective thinking and hence the basis of the fallacy contained in the divorce of epistemology and metaphysics. "True" logic, that is, dialectical logic, deals with matter as well as mind, object as well as subject.

The traditional fallacy of both the rationalist and anti-rationalist, maintained Hegel, was to consider the basic concepts or categories of thought as something alien to matter. That is, as a product of mind imposed on matter and hence in no way absolute. This is fallacious, and the resultant of the misconceptions and of the true nature of human experience and subsequently of the true nature of the categories. True categories, states Hegel

"... spring by inward necessity from the true nature of mind and from the true nature of objects. The whole world is meaningful and to be meaningful is to be logical. The rational is the actual, and reality makes evident its own categories and its own process." 13

This fusion of subject and object, as mentioned above, is the outcome of Hegelian dialectical logic, in general, and of the dialectical triad, in particular.

The dialectical triad consists of three stages or aspects through which the perceiving and cognizing of entities, which are considered as actual knowledge, takes place. The triad itself is the result of a careful analysis of the principle of identity. That is, in identifying an object there exists a set of a priori circumstances, namely, object and that which is not the object. This is the only manner in which an entity becomes known. This is the traditional epistemological concept of self and not-self. Where Hegel departs from tradition is in his legitimate demand that the postulation or perceiving of any concept or entity implies that which is not the concept or entity. It is, in other words, impossible to separate, from the point of objectivity, the entity and its opposite, i.e., the entity is an entity exclusive, in a sense, of its opposite: yet, logically, epistemologically and metaphysically inseparable from its opposite. To illustrate this point, Hegel postulates the term "A" and finds that in so doing he has also postulated that which is not "A". In terms of logic, "A" implies "not-A" and cannot be separated from "A"; consequently "A" in its actual or objective form is the resultant of the abstract "A" postulated by the mind, plus its opposite "not-A", which gives in turn concrete or objective "A". Man cannot, however, realize this
complete synthesis or objectivity because the "world process" has not yet completely realized itself. Hence his knowledge can be considered as not "true" knowledge but rather correct in terms of the partial manifestation of the system that he perceives.

"The truth is the whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own development." 14

In short, owing to the dynamics of the world process and to the finiteness of human minds, our knowledge is only relatively true, that is to say, correct in terms of the partial system comprehended. However, the world process (dialectical) whereby each new synthesis is considered to be a development toward a final synthesis, realizes its completeness in the ultimate Idea. That is, the self-realization of the cosmos is the end for which and to which the dialectical world process is orientated. The realization or manifestation of the absolute Idea or Synthesis leads to the liquidation of the dialectic; for no final synthesis can be conceived wherein an antithesis would exist whose very being qualified or limited the absolute or final synthesis. Thus, the knowledge that man possesses at different points of time cannot be considered as really true; for the absolute criteria,

i.e., the "system" has not yet reached maturity.

In addition, man's thought develops through different stages owing to the nature of the thought process. These stages are the resultants of the subject-object relationship that exists, for consciousness, in perceiving and conceiving of any entity.

"The thing-in-itself (and under thing is embraced even mind and God) expresses the object when we leave out of sight all that consciousness makes of it, all its emotional aspects, and all specific thoughts of it . . . what is left, -- utter abstraction, total emptiness, only described still as an 'other world' -- the negative of every image, feeling and definite thought . . . ." 15

The distinction between actual reality and the phenomena conceived by finite minds is the result of the abstraction undertaken not by the senses but by consciousness. The ground for these phenomena is in the absolute idea, the goal toward which the rational, i.e., dialectical factors of consciousness are ever striving. This relationship between subject and object Hegel conceives of as a self-integrating and self-differentiating whole. That is, the relationship takes the form of self-identity, because any sense-data or appearance when perceived and cognized by the subject calls up the total system as a frame of reference. If this be valid, then sense data or partial

reality is part of the same commonness as the frame of reference through which it was identified, indeed how can it be unlike and still be digested or identified by the system, for,

"A system is that . . . which can freely digest its parts and which is acted upon by nothing conceived of as outside itself.

. . . every step on the long road leading up to the notion and to the absolute idea is found to be ultimately a part self-identical with the notion and the absolute idea." 16

To elaborate, starting with an immediate presentation of sense data through sense organs, the mind considers or conceives the data of itself, i.e., as isolated from other phenomena and as existing for itself. This first stage in the "knowledge-process" is called the thesis. It is an abstraction of the sense data or entity and therefore not the real "thing-in-itself"; for it is not thought of in relation to other entities. It is what it is! It is being. However, in conceiving of an entity in meaningful terms, the pure abstraction is qualified considerably, and the entity is now conceived in terms of its relationship to other entities, i.e., in terms of the "not-self". It is, in other words, meaningful to consciousness only when conceived as "self" plus "not-self", i.e., it is and it is not, it is "not-being".

This concept of the entity as "self" and "not-self" or, in Hegelian terms, thesis and antithesis, is also abstract for it considers only the relation of the thing to another, i.e., only its meaning for consciousness. It is not until the object, thesis and its antithesis, is conceived as a whole, i.e., as a composite of thesis and antithesis, and not as a relationship or distinction of thesis and antithesis, that it is conceived and known as concrete, rational reality. Then, the mind or consciousness is considered by Hegel to think or function concretely rather than abstractly.

"Since we have set up this distinction between the object per se and the object for another, for consciousness it behooves us to carry on the dialectic to such a point that being for self (per se) and being for another will pull together in a final synthesis that will constitute the absoluteness of knowledge and the truth of concrete reality." 17

The basis of the dialectical triad is, then, the distinction between concrete actuality or concrete thought, and abstract understanding or merely subjective thought.

Now, the above summary of Hegelianism has shown the main tenets of dialectical logic and their extensions in the formulation of an "objective" theory of knowledge. As no distinction is allowed between metaphysics and

epistemology, the dialectic process must be considered as covering all subjects included in any "artificial" separation of metaphysics and epistemology, or that might be undertaken for the sake of simplicity or emphasis.

As was shown, the basis of the dialectical triad is the distinction between the formal "subjective" categories of concrete actuality or thought, and abstract understanding or merely subjective thought. The categories, maintained Hegel, are introduced to consciousness piecemeal and, therefore,

"... are mutable and mutually confusing, and thus yield to mind only a piecemeal and insecure actuality." 18

In essence, Hegel's criticism of the subjective concepts or interpretation of the categories is that they are not accounted for as arising from the true nature of things, but rather as innate concepts of the mind which are imposed on sense duty.

H. A. Myers in his *The Spinoza-Hegel Paradox* dispenses with the misconceptions that have plagued Hegelian epistemology thus:

"... Hegel's is not the subjective idealism which he attributes to Kant and others. It is in a sense, as much naturalism as it is idealism, for the categories are not imposed by mind on something without but are always coming from within and from without." 19


19 Ibid p.
Again,

"His idea is something that transcends the earlier mind and matter, something which gives us a single world to work with, a world with conditions of self-differentiation and self-integration." 20

Indeed, both of the above quotations appear as well founded even if the treatise on the nature of categories is for a moment rejected; for consciousness seems to be the basis of the epistemological-metaphysical Hegelian concept.

That the laws of logic, epistemology and metaphysics are one, for Hegel, namely, the dialectic, has been shown above; suffice it to say, therefore, that consciousness itself is considered to have evolved out of nature by a process of gradual rise and development from the inorganic, through the vegetable and animal forms, et cetera, until it reaches the level of conscious thought. The evolution itself, is, of course, explained in terms of a causal nexus based essentially on the dialectic triad.

That is, evolution and change are one and the same thing owing to the causal continuum implicit in the dialect concept. In addition, change is conceived as a diversity of qualities that come and go. A quantitative change brings forth a qualitative change; thus, an object cannot be and yet change. Hence, in order for an object

to change, it must be in a state of becoming that which it is not, but will be and will not be. This implies that a quantitative change in the object must lead to a qualitative change, whereby the object becomes other than what it was. That is, in thinking of becoming we are also involved in the static concept of being and this requires that the beholder of an object apply the static principle of identity, i.e., of singleness or unity, as well as difference and multiplicity. But in doing this, states Professor Fuller,

"... we are thinking of a unit or of the basis of all quantitative measurements. In other words we pass from the category of quality to that of quantity. But we find at once that the idea of quantity gives rise in its turn to that of quality, since it is applicable not only to spatial magnitudes but to degrees of intensity. But intensity and degree are meaningless to quality. Hence, the two concepts although antithetical, are synthesised in the concept of measure or of the amount of quantity a thing contains..." 21

It is through these categories and their logical and metaphysical relationship to one another that another "proof" for the postulate that the Kantian dichotomy of noumena and phenomena is false is arrived at. That is, if such categories are actual and objective, as shown above, how can they possibly exist without something that possesses these characteristics. In addition, the

above argument is also considered as a further proof of the objectivity of the laws of thought and actuality namely, the dialectic.

As was stated earlier in this work, Hegel's entire philosophy is fundamentally the outcome of his dialectical logic. His epistemological-metaphysical concepts are the result of analytic a priori reasoning. Yet, owing to the technique of "conversity", e.g., quantity-quality concept, concept of becoming, et cetera, Hegel avoided the pitfalls of rationalism and pure empiricism. That is, he rejected the theory of innate ideas, and also the static views of the empiricist of his time. Nevertheless, it is from this point of technique, and also basic starting point, that a split in left-wing Hegelianism developed. Marxism is the major result of that split.
Part II.

The Epistemological and Metaphysical Implications of Dialectical Materialism

I.
The Subject-Object Concept

Dialectical materialism is considered by its adherents to be the outcome of a scientific synthesis and coordination of the findings of man in his many fields of endeavour. It does, nevertheless, owe most of its terminology and concepts to the philosophical doctrines of Hegel. Indeed, much of the literature written to substantiate the tenets of dialectical materialism is indicative of this fact by the preponderance of criticism and distinctions that are undertaken by its authors in order to substantiate the superiority of Marxism over Hegelianism.

Hegel's starting point was, of course, different from that of Marx and Engels; for, as was noted in the last section, Hegel derived his categories from his logic and then proceeded to formulate an epistemological-metaphysical theory.

Starting with the acknowledgment of the egocentric predicament of man in formulating an objective
philosophical schematism, the justification for an analysis of logic first seems quite apparent. However, the implication of the Hegelian approach did lead, in the final analysis, to an absolutism from which could be deduced social and ethical concepts that substantiated a status-quo outlook.

Moreover, and what is more to the point in this context, the dialectical triad postulated by Hegel implied in essence, a predetermined order of events. This, Marx and Engels maintained, was a result of the fallacy inherent in the methodology and starting point of Hegelianism.

Dialectical materialism's starting point is the opposite of Hegelianism, stated Marx:

"In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real active men, and on the basis of their real life process we demonstrate the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process."

Now, in denouncing the establishment of the dialectic triad by way of the categories, Marx and Engels aimed at the refutation of predeterminism and the establishment of determinism. Subsequently, the claim for the validity of determinism had to be fought not on merely

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logical grounds but also metaphysical and epistemological grounds.

Hegel, as was shown, recognised the objectivity of the concept of the thing-in-itself by way of treating metaphysics and epistemology as one field of analysis and speculation. In so doing, he attempted not only to eliminate the implications of Cartesian dualism, but, in addition, to negate the Kantian dualism of noumena and phenomena, with its emphasis on the relativeness of knowledge. In both these respects, i.e., the "thing-in-itself" is apprehended and that an absolutism does exist in terms of truth, Hegel's objective idealism and Marx's dialectical materialism are in accord. It is, in other words, the method of substantiating the concepts mind and matter that caused the split between the Marxians and the Hegelians. That is, both from a point of epistemology claimed the same; both basically conceived of mind and matter in terms of a monism that was substantially the same. The basis of revolt was that the implications of Hegelianism meant predeterminism. Marxism demanded and postulated determinism, and in terms of its "own" tenets, attempted to negate Hegelianism. Marxism centres around the establishment of three basic concepts, namely, the "thing-in-itself", "the knowledge process" and the "nature of causality".
The Concept of Mind

Here is the first major point of departure from Hegelianism. It is a point based on the practical everyday significance of man's action. It implies, indeed, an approach to philosophy that is basically that of naive realism. That is, essentially, the Marxian approach implies that man is as he is seen by "himself". The problem of the degree of objectivity of analysis or synthesis undertaken, when one of the terms under observation is also the observer, is either ignored or discarded for pragmatic reasons. Thus, the justification for an analysis of the principles of logic and their categories of thought is rejected quite openly by the dialectical materialists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

For example, Lenin in his criticism of idealism states:

"All knowledge comes from experience, from sensation, from perception. That is true. But the question arises, does objective reality belong to perception; i.e., is it the source of perception? If you answer yes, you are a materialist. If you answer no, you are inconsistent and will inevitably arrive at subjectivism or agnosticism, irrespective of whether you deny the knowability of the thing-in-itself,"
or the objectivity of time, space and causality (with Kant) or whether you do not even permit the thought of a thing-in-itself (with Hume)." 23

The case that Lenin is adroitly arguing here is not one exclusively against the epistemology of objective idealism, but also for the recognition of active determinism. However, the case for determinism rests essentially on destroying the epistemological-metaphysical concept of the thing-in-itself.

Thus, if matter can be established as the primary universal substrata, whose nature or essence is a manifested dialectic, then mind can be conceived as a higher form of particularized matter reflecting and manifesting, reacting to and acting on, its materialistic dialectic environment. This is in contradistinction to the Hegelian concept of a dialectical process containing within itself its own synthesis. In the Marxian concept, the universal, both mind and matter, is postulated as progressing through and in a dialectical process, but not predetermined to the extent that the dialectic contains within it its own particular final synthesis. All that is maintained is that every manifestation will be, because of its very nature, dialectical. Hence, mind may react to and act on its environment and thus

be a determinant, but it cannot act other than in a dialectical fashion.

The Hegelian concept of mind and objective reality is similar except it maintains that in order to achieve ultimate objective reality mind must act according to the dialectic laws and pattern of nature.

"Man conquers nature by obeying her." 24

Thus determinism is the crux of the matter.

In both theories a monism, behaving in terms of the dialectic triad, is enunciated. The theory of pre-determinism is established by Hegel through his dialectical logic, his concept of a world process, and his concept of the thing-in-itself. The Marxian monism, on the other hand, enunciates also a dialectical triad and a world process, but it interprets the "thing-in-itself" in an entirely different fashion to that of Hegelianism.

Hegel, as was shown, conceived of phenomena and noumena as being united when complete objectivity was attained by way of the dialectical process. He maintained, therefore, that

"The thing-in-itslef . . . expresses the object when we leave out of sight all that consciousness makes of it, all its emotional aspects, and all specific thoughts of it." 25

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The thing-in-itself may be either a concrete or abstract entity, but to be conceived or apprehended in its complete objective reality no connotations or relations must be called forth and read into it by the subject (mind). No activity whatsoever on the object can be undertaken and still the complete reality of the term (thing-in-itself) be maintained. For, in point of fact, complete objective reality calls for the negation of all terms except one, namely, the thing-in-itself! However, in terms of a theory of knowledge a relative absolute criteria is possible owing to the Hegelian concept of a final synthesis. That is, a relative absolute, in terms of knowledge or objective reality, implies an absolute; thus Hegel conceives of his final synthesis or Idea concept.

Marxism rejects both the Idealists' and Materialists' concepts of objective reality, namely, the thing-in-itself. For example, Engels, writing to Conrad Schmidt in 1891, stated the dialectical materialist's rejection of the Hegelian concept of objective reality thus:

"Hegel's dialectic is upside down because it is supposed to be the 'self-development of thought' of which the dialectic of facts thereof is only a reflection, whereas really the dialectic in our heads is only the reflection of the actual development which is fulfilled in the world of nature and of human history in obedience to dialectical forms." 26

This, of course, hits again at the pre-deterministic aspect of the tenets of Hegel's philosophy. The "self-development of thought" is quite in keeping with determinism. It is the fusion of subject and object in Hegelian epistemology-metaphysic, whereby the dialectic is conceived as realising itself, so that any diversification between subject and object is regarded as a deviation away from objective reality.

On the other hand, the dichotomy of the French materialist, i.e., between subject and object, was also rejected on the grounds of the anti-organic and pro-mechanistic characteristics. Marx, in his thesis on Feuerbach, points out the deficiencies from the view of dialectical materialism of both these schools:

"The chief defect of all materialism up to now (including Feuerbach's) is that the object reality, what we apprehend through our senses, is understood only in the form of the object or contemplation; but not as sensuous human activity as practice: not subjectively. Hence in opposition to materialism the active side was developed abstractly -- by idealism -- which of course does not know real sensuous activity as such." 27

In other words, the dynamic aspect of objective reality was accepted by the Marxists but the "motivation" of the dialectic was rejected.

"My own dialectical method is not only fundamentally different from the Hegelian dialectical method, but is its direct opposite. For Hegel, the thought process (which he actually transforms into an independent subject, giving to it the name of 'idea') is the demiurge of the real; and for him the real is only the outward manifestation of the idea. In my view on the other hand, the ideal is nothing other than the material, when it has been transposed and translated inside the human head." 28

On the other hand, Feuerbach's declaration as to the nature of the relationship between subject and object was accepted by Marx and Engels and made the basis, with certain modifications, of their theory of development.

"... the true relation between thought and being may be expressed as follows; being is the subject and thought the predicate, thought is conditioned by being, not being by thought. Being is conditioned by itself, has its basis in itself." 29

The main point of difference was, once again, one of emphasising the deterministic aspect of life.

George Plekhanov, the Russian Marxian, in his Fundamental Problems of Marxism states that what was at issue for Marx:

"... was not the undeniable fact that sensation precedes thought but the fact that Man is led to thought mainly by the sensations which he experiences in the course of his own action on the outer world." 30

28 Plekhanov, G. V., Essays in the History of Materialism, London, John Lane, The Bodley Head Ltd., 1934, p. 194


30 Ibid, p. 12
This interpretation, however, Lenin disagreed with, and rightly so when the implications are realized for they lead either back to determinism or to the relative concepts of Empiricism. This, of course, runs counter to the revolutionary nature of nineteenth and twentieth century Marxism. The essence of the concept of reality, and hence of the thing-in-itself is this, states Lenin, quoting from Albert Levy's *Feuerbach's Philosophy and his Influence on German Literature.*

"... Marx expresses regret that materialism had left it to idealism to appreciate the importance of the active forces i.e., human practice which according to Marx, must be wrested from idealism in order to integrate them into the materialist system. But it will of course be necessary to give these active forces the real and sensible character which idealism cannot grant them. Marx's idea, then, is the following: just as to our ideas there correspond real objects outside us, so to our phenomenal activity of these corresponds a real activity of things. In this sense humanity partakes of the absolute, not only through theoretical knowledge but also through practical activity: thus all human activity requires a dignity, a nobility, that permits it to advance hand in hand with theory. Revolutionary activity henceforth acquires a metaphysical significance..."31

In other words dialectical materialism, similar to objective idealism, attempts to fuse metaphysical and epistemological concepts. The ideas and images which the mind apprehends are considered to be

the resultants of the reflection, action and interaction, of that which is external to the mind. Objective reality is realized in this manner, and the "artificial" divorce of mental activity from that which is commonly considered concrete activity is avoided. Objective reality is conceived then as that which is consistent with the tenets of dialectical materialism as exemplified in matter, and its higher particular, mind.

From a metaphysical point of view, the acting and reacting of subject and object on one another appears basically sound, consequently, the underlying thesis of a deterministic universe may momentarily be granted. However, from a point of epistemology, the concept of mind as a higher form of matter which acts on and reacts to sense data seems highly inconsistent with the dialectical materialist's concept of active determinism. That is, the interacting of terms on one another is from the point of determinism, both empirically and metaphysically sound, but determinism, in the Marxian sense, relies implicitly on a uniqueness in one of the terms, namely, mind; otherwise all that is really being postulated is Hegelian predeterminism; at least as far as the destiny of man is concerned. Pure predeterminism is, of course, alien to the spirit and letter of Marxism. Hence, the Marxists postulate a concept of mind that they believe will allow for the revolutionary or active aspects of their determinism, and also for the metaphysical tenets of dialectical materialism.
Engels in his Anti-Duhring, conceives of mind in functional terms:

"... thought and consciousness ... are products of the human brain and that man himself is a product of Nature, which has been developed in and along with its environment; whence it is self-evident that the products of the human brain, being in the last analysis also products of Nature are in correspondence with it." 32

J. B. S. Haldane develops this concept further and qualifies it in a manner that might substantiate the dialectical materialistic theory of determinism.

"The mind is a part of nature, and in particular it modifies the rest of nature, as well as being modified by it. Just because the mind is a part of nature, the processes which go on in it can be and are like the processes which go on in other parts of nature, and they do actually mirror, although more or less incompletely." 33

To elaborate, there are among the dialectical materialists two schools of thought as to the nature of knowledge and of mind. The first school contains the adherents of the original doctrines of Marx and Engels. The second school, those who accept the basic tenets of dialectical materialism, but conceive of knowledge and mind in a fashion more in keeping with the epistemology of objective idealism.


That is, the first group, the purists, accept the concept that mind is a higher form of matter reflecting that which is external to itself. In addition, they maintain that the "thing-in-itself" is known or apprehended by the active nature of the beholder or subject. This, of course, is an attempt, similar to Hegel's, to fuse metaphysics and epistemology, but the approach is actually from a metaphysical point. For example, Marx in his thesis on Feuerbach emphasises the active and sensuous nature of both subject and object.

"Certainly Feuerbach has a great advantage over the 'pure' materialists in that he realizes how man too is an 'object of the senses'. But apart from the fact that he only conceives him as a 'sensuous object', not as a 'sensuous activity', because he still remains in the realm of theory and conceives of men not in their given social connection, not under their existing condition of life, which have made them what they are, he never arrives at the abstraction 'man' and gets no further than recognising 'the true', 'individual corporeal man' emotionally, i.e., he knows no other 'human relationship'." 34

Marx's criticism was, in terms of dialectical materialism, quite justified from a metaphysical point of view, but it was not the essence of his argument. He was quite aware that Feuerbach also regarded reality and man, i.e., self and not-self, as dynamic. Feuerbach recognized the interaction of these two dynamic terms, but what he did not develop was the interrelationship of these terms.

Marx, in short, was interested in showing that the dialectical process, which is manifest in the material substratum, inheres both in mind and objective reality (the distinction is merely for exposition), and as the two act and react on one another, mind expresses one aspect of the interaction, namely, the effect on itself of this interaction. This, however, hardly seems to allow for a deterministic influence of man on nature other than as a component of nature. How, indeed, can a correspondence theory of knowledge be accepted by a materialist who rejects any teleological characteristic being inherent within the human organism? Yet this concept of mind as a mirror of nature, was also accepted by Engels:

"Thought and consciousness... are products of the human brain and... man himself is a product of Nature, which has been developed in and along with its environment; whence, it is self-evident that the products of the human brain, being in the last analysis also products of Nature, do not contradict the rest of Nature but are in correspondence with it." 35

The implications of Engels' theory of knowledge are quite apparent. If the brain reflects that which is external to itself, and if those reflections are the products of both mind and nature, then the deterministic aspect of Marxism is really nothing other than the inevitability of man and nature behaving in a manner

35 (Italics are mine.)
dictated by the dialectical nature of the universe, and, in terms of particulars, by the qualification that two terms self and not-self impose on one another a priori. The dynamic nature of the thought process is merely the resultant of the antithesis existing within the two terms. However, to speak of terms, state the Marxists, is really, in the final analysis fallacious; what exists is one term with a contradictory implicit within it, causing it to change and become other than what it was. This, indeed, is the fusion of subject and object. Yet, Engels description of the thought process seems to suggest a concept of mind rather different to that of a mere reflector.

"... thought consists just as much in the analysis of objects of consciousness into their elements as in the synthesis of related elements into a unity. Without analysis, no synthesis. Secondly, without committing blunders thought can only bring together into a unity those elements of consciousness in which or in whose real prototypes this unity already exists." 36

If thought consists of analysing and synthesising sense data into intelligible wholes, then in exactly what manner is this process realised? The concept of mind postulated by both Marx and Engels does not allow for anything of the nature of innate idea or categories. That is, a nominalist interpretation of the thought process is implied whereby universals for the classifying

of sense data are realized through a synthesis of particulars containing similar characteristics. This, however, involves a concept that does not seem to be obtained by empirical technique alone, namely, that of being related. Professor Pap has shown the paradox of the resemblance theory thus:

"If a and b are related in a certain way, and b and c are related in a certain way, it may indeed be doubted whether they are related in quite the same way. But how could it be doubted that they are both related? But being related is a universal, even though an extremely empty or abstract one."  

In other words, the universal being related cannot be accounted for by a synthesis of similarities existing among entities; for, these similarities when considered individually are really not similarities until the category or universal of being related is applied. For example, what characteristic have A and B in common unless they are classified in terms of an alphabetic schematism? A taken exclusively in its own right as an entity is completely dissimilar to the entity B.

However, this dilemma might be avoided by maintaining that a causal continuum exists between all entities, whereby it is possible for the mind, as

37 Pap, A., Elements of Analytic Philosophy New York, the Macmillan Company, 1949, p. 79
reflector of nature, to express the inherent similarities and relationships existing amongst entities, i.e., in nature. The concept of being related could then be accepted as arising out of the internality of the relationships existing in nature.

But, the ramifications of this view are also idealistic. That is, if a theory of internal relations is accepted, whereby the terms of any composite influence the relationship and the relationship in turn influences the terms, then any form of final analysis would be impossible. For each entity would be a composite of other smaller entities, and their relationships, and thus could never be completely divorced in order that a final analysis could be asserted, i.e., the knowability of the thing-in-itself would be virtually impossible, and consequently the basis of the Marxian epistemological concept would be negated for:

"... the 'objective truth' of thinking means nothing else than the existence of objects (i.e., 'things-in-themselves') truly reflected by thinking." 38

In short, the acceptance of the doctrine of internal relation would eliminate the possibility of any ultimate term in the knowledge process, and indeed in the social realm; also the absolute objectivity that

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is implied would be completely negated owing to sub-
mergence of the "thing-in-itself". The question to
consider then is whether or not the basis of dialectical
materialism, i.e., the dialectical triad, as expressed by
the unity of opposites, implies a theory of internal relations.
Now, the cardinal tenet of dialectical materialism, through which the manifestation of particulars in a dynamic materialistic universe are accounted for, is the concept of the unity of opposites. That is, each entity has an internal and external opposite through the influence of which it becomes other than what it was, and in addition is what it is. This apparent contradiction is the very nature of matter and of motion itself. George Plekhanov points out that it is not merely the nature of entities but also the pattern of motion that is dialectical, i.e., behaves in accordance with the law of contradiction.

"Trendelenburg declared that the law of contradiction is applicable not to motion, but only to the objects created thereby. That is sound. But motion does not merely create objects. That is why the logic of movement (the 'logic of contradiction') never forfeits its right over the objects created by motion".39

The entities themselves, as stated above, contain within them their own opposite which in time will result in the negation of the original entity and

the manifestation of a new entity containing, of course, within it, its own opposite. Considered from the point of the internal nature of any particular entity, the relationship between the entity, i.e., the thesis and its inherent opposites, i.e., the antithesis is undoubtedly a case of internal relations. In addition, when the relationship between entities is analyzed, it too tacitly asserts a doctrine of internal relations. For, if entities are to act on one another, i.e., if they are to behave in terms of dynamic opposites and negate one another then they must either be compelled by their own nature and by that of motion itself, or an extemporaneous cause must be postulated to unite the opposites. This, however, would lead, in terms of the organic concept of Marxism to the postulating of a first cause; a prime mover.

However, as Engels pointed out in his Anti-Dühring, the postulating of dynamic particulars, even of a dynamic universe, is not philosophically organic unless the explanation of the dynamism is implicit within the concept of a universe in a constant state of flux, i.e., in a state of becoming. If it is not, then the dilemma of not being able to account for change becomes quite apparent.

"If the world had ever been in a state in which no change whatever was taking place, how could it pass from this state to a changing state? The absolutely unchanging,
especially when it has been in this state from eternity, cannot possibly get out of such a state by itself and pass over into a state of motion and change. A joint impulse must therefore have come in from outside, from outside the universe and an impulse which set it in motion." 40

In short, the underlying substrata is conceived of as being both materialistic and dialectically dynamic, i.e.,

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be." 41

The unity of opposites is then a theory of causality founded exclusively on internal relations. It implies, moreover, an inevitability in the manifestations of the universe, i.e., not only are entities, the result of a dialectically dynamic universe, but they are by definition the necessary results in a given motion or through a given matter.

"Every singular is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of singulars (things, phenomena, processes) etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the appearance and the essence . . . . " 42


41 Ibid, p. 68

Considered from the point of view of the action and interaction between entities, the concept of the unity of opposites suffices as the basis of a causal theory. However, it is not sufficient to explain the causal connection in the dynamism of a single entity, or to show how it is possible for the causal continuum to progress after external opposite entities have synthesised.
IV

The Negation of the Negation

As was shown, each thesis (entity) contains an antithesis which negates the thesis and leads to a synthesis, and eventually a new thesis. Consequently, if the manifestations were always in a definite progression the theory of the opposites might suffice, but, as is often the case, the manifestations may be repetitious. For example, Engels takes as an illustration the life process of a grain of barley; from the moment it germinates it ceases to exist,

"... it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain... it grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of the negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley." 43

In other words, the concept of the negation of the negation is the causal nexus whereby the new synthesis, and the antithesis, both internally and externally are explained in terms of their own nature, i.e.,

"Each class of things . . . has its appropriate form of being negated in such a way that it gives rise to a development and it is just the same with each class of conceptions and ideas."  

or in other words,

"Long ago Spinoza said: Omnis Determinatio en negatio - every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation . . . the kind of negation is here determined in the first place by the general and secondly particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also in turn sublate the negation . . . so construct the first negation that the second remains or becomes possible."  

The negation of the negation differs from the unity of opposites in that the latter only accounts for immediate causes within a given synthesis, while the former accounts for the mediate causes of the old and new synthesis. It is thus distinct from the unity of opposites in explaining the unique or novel which is, after all, the metaphysical outcome of the production of new antitheses or negations.


45 Ibid.,
The new negations (or new syntheses when manifest) achieve expression both gradually and abruptly, and it is as a causal tenet for explaining abrupt changes that the postulate of quantity-quality is applied. That is, if things are always in a state of becoming then they are not really ever realised. They are merely in a dynamic process of gradualism. However, this is not the case; for entities do exist as such, and at the same time are in a process of becoming other than what they are and were. As far as the individual is concerned, the change may be considered gradual, but from a point of Marxian dialectic the inter-connectedness and complexity of any event implies a negation of a negation. Thus, the emergence of novelty is manifested at every moment in time. In short, actual gradualness cannot be postulated as valid when a causal continuum of any duration is examined. Hegel has stated the case against gradualism and it is accepted by the Russian Marxist, George Plekhanov:

"To explain the appearance or disappearance of a given phenomenon by gradualness of the transformation is absurdly tautological, for it implies that we consider as having
appeared or disappeared that which is actually in course of appearing or disappearing." 46

Engels, states Professor Haldane, and Marx also, accepted this reasoning and applied it in their social and scientific doctrines.

"Here, as in natural science is verified the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel in his 'logic' that merely quantitative changes beyond a certain point pass into qualitative differences." 47

and again,

"... it is worth while pointing out that laws holding right through one state of society may become meaningless in another. Social change may be discontinuous as in the case of water to steam at atmospheric pressure, or continuous, as in the case of the passage from water to steam at pressure higher than the critical pressure." 48

Abrupt change, then may be accounted for through an increase or decrease in the quantitative aspect of any entity, or on the other hand, through an increase or decrease, in terms of density, of the qualitative aspect of any entity. Theoretically, of course, it follows that abrupt changes are always part of the natural order, and consequently gradualness is not. This, however, is a contradiction because change, indeed movement itself, is a contradiction.


47 Haldane, J. B. S., The Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences, New York, Random House, Inc. 1939, p. 27

48 Ibid p. 28
"The movement of matter underlies all phenomena of nature. But what is movement? It is an obvious contradiction. Should anyone ask you whether a body in motion is at a particular spot at a particular time, you will be unable . . . to answer in accordance with Ueberweg's rule, that is to say in accordance with the formula 'Yes is Yes, and No is No'. A body in motion is at a given point, and at the same time it is not there. We can only consider it in accordance with the formula, 'Yes is no, and no is yes'. This moving body thus presents itself as an irrefutable argument in favour of the 'logic of contradiction', and one who is unwilling to accept this logic will be forced to proclaim, with Zeno, that motion is merely an illusion of the senses." 49

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49 Plekhanov, G., Fundamental Problems of Marxism, ed. D. Ryazanov, New York, International Publishers 1929. p. 113
VI

The Theory of Causality

As was outlined in the last section, the theory of causality postulated by the formulators of dialectical materialism contain three major tenets, namely, the unity of opposites, the negation of the negation and quantity-quality. These three tenets, based upon the premise that this is a dynamic universe, are, in effect, merely different aspects of one concept of causality, namely, that particular manifestations, and the universal manifestation of motion, are exemplifications of the contradictory nature of reality.

Consequently, Marxians are continually pointing out that formal logic is inadequate to explain the manifestations of nature, and that the entire epistemological problem centres around the fact that conceptions or perceptions of anything involve the conception or perception of its opposite. In other words, there is implicit in any entity, either abstract or concrete, an opposite. But surely, from a point of semantics and logic it is possible to state that A is only A, and its contradictory
not-A is not-A, i.e., they are both individual entities. The only reason that "A" implies "not-A" is because of the relationship established in the process of identifying A as A, i.e., perception or conception immediately involves a subject-object or self-not-self relationship.

Epistemologically, if the adherents of Marxism maintained that a unity of opposites was forthcoming in the perception or conception of any entity owing to the circumstances of the act of identity, namely, the a priori self-not-self relationship, then their view would be not only orthodox, but, in addition, would be tantamount to recognising the validity of the Kantian "thing-in-itself". This, of course, Marxians refuse to recognise, and hence their epistemological concept of a unity of opposites is based on the concept of mind as a reflector of a reality whose nature is essentially one of contradiction. For example, states Engels,

"Motion itself is a contradiction; even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body at one and the same moment of time being in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continuous assertion and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is."

This, of course, is merely a restatement of Zeno's famous paradox and may subsequently be answered.

in a similar fashion; namely, a body in motion is not at a certain point at a certain time owing to the fact that it is in motion; rather it passes through or by a certain point. In short, the illustration that Engels gives to substantiate dialectical logic is extremely misleading, in as much as he uses terms that negate his basic idea of motion as flux or becoming or activity. Thus, there is really no reason for speaking of an object as being and not-being because it is always in a state of becoming; for what is suggested is that as perceived at a certain point in time -- the object had certain attributes which by the very principle of the negation of the negation were necessary in order that it might develop or pass into its next phase.

However, to maintain from the other extreme that there is never a point in time when an object is either A or not-A is also falacious; for this again can be explained by the principle of indeterminacy, i.e., no definite classification under the existing circumstances is possible owing to the lack of either sufficient or necessary conditions to activate the continuum positively.

"In any concrete continuum, whether temporal or non-temporal, there is a middle ground between any two contiguous opposite qualities A and -A, i.e., a certain stretch S of the continuum where it is not true that everything
is either A or -A. Thus the law of included middle, which states that S is always either A or -A is restricted. 51

However, the sufficient and necessary conditions to activate a causal continuum positively, may be either subjective or objective, i.e., owing to the lack of empirical data, caused by either a deficiency of skill or necessary instruments, the observer is unable to ascertain the cause of a specific effect. Consequently, the effect could be considered as not realised. On the other hand, all elements or factors necessary to produce a specific effect may be known, such as in a chemical experiment, and owing to limitations in time the effect may not be realized and hence what did exist could not be considered either the original elements or the desired effect.

Briefly, the concept of the unity of opposites plus the concept of mind as a reflector of nature is not sufficient to explain how percepts and concepts are arrived at unless an a priori relationship of subject and object, self and not-self is granted. The admission of this, however, immediately involves the Marxians in a theory, or in theories, that would have to allow for the recognition of the Kantian ding an sich, or owing to the necessity of a frame of reference some a priori categories would have to be granted. The only reason for not granting

a subject-object relationship appears to be the insistence on the realization of absolute objective truth. Absolute objective truth is of course considered as realizable through use of the dialectical materialists' theory of causality, which although inadequate as an explanation of the epistemological tenets of dialectical materialism, may be valid as a metaphysical theory.

In terms of the unity of opposites and the negation of the negation, dialectical materialism is a contiguous theory of causality. For, by the definitions of the causal concepts, namely, the unity of opposites and the negation of the negation, each event is a synthesis of a priori thesis-antithesis relationship. The prior thesis may be considered as the sufficient condition necessary for the activity of the antithesis as the necessary condition to realise its function, namely, the primary cause of the synthesis or new entity. The designating or classifying of sufficient and necessary conditions is, however, in most cases, logically arbitrary.

Nevertheless, ontologically speaking, the Marxian tenet of the negation of the negation implies that each cause is determined by a prior cause, i.e., each antithesis within every entity is determined by a prior antithesis or negation. From a point of practical application, it is logically impossible to state which
is the major cause of a specific event as both thesis and antithesis are determinants of the proceeding synthesis or event. On these grounds alone, the theory of inevitability of certain events is questionable merely from the point of distinguishing the sufficient and necessary conditions needed for the realization of the "hypothetical synthesis". The causal judgments in terms of future events are, however, referred to the universal concept, or, for the dialectical materialists, to the law of causality.

That is to say, the above analysis is considered correct as far as any specific entity is involved, but the inevitability of events are considered owing to the universal causal law of dialectical materialism to be valid. For example,

"It is just the same with cause and effect; they are conceptions which only have validity in their application to a particular case as such, but when we consider the particular case in its general connection with the world as a whole they merge and dissolve in the conception of universal action and interaction, in which causes and effects are constantly changing places, and what is now or here an effect becomes there or then a cause . . . ." 52

In other words, the theory is contiguous in terms of a specific content, i.e., the causal relation is not internal in the sense that it is implicit in the

nature of its terms. However, in terms of its metaphysical postulates, the theory enunciates the interconnectedness of events. This interconnectedness of events, in terms of the above, could only be justified on pragmatic grounds, i.e., by an appeal to statistics and mathematical probability in terms of the number of times similar events and causes are forthcoming under particular conditions. This technique for arriving at metaphysical postulates is, however, unsound because

"... only entire classes of cases could count as negative evidence against them, but not a single case." 53

whereas a universal must be applicable in terms of all its particulars. Subsequently, a universal causal continuum cannot be granted unless the quantity-quality concept can explain abrupt change. This concept does explain abrupt changes by way of enunciating that decreases or increases in quantitative or qualitative factors do lead, at a certain period of activity, to an entity exclusively different from that which existed before. However, this in itself, when the subjectivity of time is considered, hardly leads to the postulating of an abrupt break. If abrupt is to suggest a time period then the entire concept is of no real significance owing to the subjective or relative nature of time.

The concept of abrupt change, however, is always linked with the emergence of novelty, and is subsequently used to imply a break in a causal continuum. In what other sense, indeed, could the word novelty be used without becoming as subjective or relative as time?

In short, if the Marxians are suggesting a change similar to: \(-\text{ab} -- \text{bc} -- \text{cd}\) then \(\text{e}\), then the interconnectedness of events cannot be explained in terms of a contiguous theory of causality. For, there is not implied in any of the preceding steps or events the factor "e", or even assuming that by some means of the unity of opposites and the negation of the negation "e" is the product or resultant, there is still no manner by which analytically this could be predicted or determined.

In short, a causal theory based on internal relation, such as,

"A relation is internal if it follows from the nature of its terms alone that it either holds or does not hold between them."\(^5^4\)

is not sufficient to substantiate the doctrine of interconnectedness owing to the break in the causal continuum, i.e., two terms are needed to form a relationship. The tenet of abrupt break and the emergence of novelty can distinguish only one term, namely, the effect or entity.

CONCLUSION

The theory of dialectical materialism is considered by its advocates as a practical theory by which man may act in a positive fashion on his environment. The nature of reality, including man himself, is explained in terms of the dialectical concepts of Hegel.

The major implication of the Hegelian theory, namely, predeterminism is, however, rejected on the basis that the subject is not merely "sensuous" but also "active" and consequently influences its environment. However, when the implications of the concept of mind, as a reflector of the dialectical manifestations of reality and as being completely non-teleological, are considered, the theory is in many respects just as predeterministic as the Marxians maintain Hegelianism is. In other words, the only influence that man has upon his environment is as a factor of the environment which, as such, qualifies it to a limited degree. This, however, is a completely passive activity and hardly in keeping with the aims of dialectical materialism.

Secondly, the theory as a causal explanation of the universe does not account for all manifestations owing to the tenet of abrupt break and the emergence of
novelty. Yet in spite of this, Marxists maintain that all events are interconnected. Indeed, from this point of view such statements as the following appear as pure dogma:

"... the limits of approximation of our knowledge to the objective, absolute truth are historically conditional, but the existence of such truth is unconditional, and the fact that we are approaching nearer to it is also unconditional." 55

In short, dialectical materialism as a philosophical doctrine is not a highly integrated schematism but a group of loosely connected concepts. Consequently, the absolutistic claims of the "pure Marxians" appear entirely unwarranted.

If, on the other hand, Marxism is considered as "not complete, not a system, and only in second place theoretical . . . because it is alive and growing, and above all because it lays no claim to finality." 56 it does, in essence, lose all import as a revolutionary philosophical doctrine.


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III


PERIODICALS.


