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An examination of C.I. Lewis' conception of valuation King, David Joseph 1952

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AN EXAMINATION OF C. I. LEWIS* CONCEPTION OF VALUATION by DAVID JOSEPH KING ' A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the standard required from candidates f o r the degree of MASTER OF ARTS. Members of the Department of PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1952. ABSTRACT A d e s c r i p t i v e and c r i t i c a l account of the theory of v a l u ation presented by C.I. Lewis i n An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. Both the a p r i o r i and empirical basis for the theory are examined. The e s s e n t i a l weakness of the theory l i e s i n an i n a b i l i t y to overcome some of the c r i t i c i s m s o f the emotivists, e s p e c i a l l y i n the concept of the u l t i m a t e l y valuable. Hence Lewis i n unable, even, to present a view as p l a u s i b l e as the emotivists i n that h i s theory of evaluation i s , f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, a tautology. In order to overcome t h i s d i f f i c u l t y Lewis must hypostatize some non-empirical property or some imperative. However, Lewis has presented the most comprehensive and a n a l y t i c defense of a n a t u r a l i s t i c system since the appearance of Perry's Interest Theory. Many of the value concepts are analyzed showing the development and structure of Lewis' theory. i C o ntents. P r e f a c e page i i I n t r o d u c t i o n i i i I . The apprehension of value and e x p r e s s i v e statements as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the p r e d i c a t i o n o f value and value judgements 1 I I . The immediately v a l u a b l e as the u l t i m a t e touchstone of value i n a l l I t s modes 13 I I I . C o n t r i b u t o r y value and the t r a n s -v a l u a t i o n of value as a u t h o r i z e d by the r a t i o n a l i m p e r a t i v e 23 IV. (A) Problems o f method i n Lewis' a n a l y s i s : the d i s t i n c t i o n between s c i e n c e and p h i l o s o p h y ; c r i t e r i a of adequacy i n meaning a n a l y s i s .41 (B) Assessment of Lewis' a n a l y s i s i n terms of i t s a l l e g e d a b i l i t y t o s e t up an i n t e r p e r s o n a l o b j e c t i v e c r i t i q u e of value; p e r t i n e n c e of the c r i t i c i s m o f f e r e d by the "emotive t h e o r i s t s " £1 B i b l i o g r a p h y 66 i i P r e f a c e . I wish to thank P r o f e s s o r s Savery and Maslow f o r the i n t e r e s t they have taken i n my work and f o r v a l u a b l e suggestions and c r i t i c i s m s p e r t a i n i n g t o the form and content of t h i s study. D.J.K i i i I n t r o d u c t i o n C.I. Lewis' theory of value , which w i l l be ana l y s e d i n t h i s paper, i s one of the most s i g n i f i c a n t works on the s u b j e c t t o have appeared s i n c e R.B. P e r r y ' s by now c l a s s i c a l General Theory of V a l u e . Lewis w r i t e s as a n a t u r a l i s t . H i s views r e p r e s e n t an attempt t o d e a l w i t h v a l u e as a n a t u r a l (as opposed t o a metaphysical) pheno-r menon and to pro v i d e a c r i t i q u e of v a l u a t i o n i n terms of an e m p i r i c i s t epistemology. H i s o u t s t a n d i n g predecessors i n the f i e l d o f value theory of W i l l i a m James, Mr. Santa-yana, R.B. P e r r y , and D.W. P r a l l , a l l of whom i n t e r p r e t value as a f u n c t i o n o f human i n t e r e s t and human s a t i s f a c -t i o n . The c e n t r a l t h e s i s of t h i s s c h o o l o f thought ( i n which the w r i t i n g o f John Dewey a l s o p l a y an important part) i s t h a t v a l u a t i o n i s a form of e m p i r i c a l c o g n i t i o n . While James and Santayana d i d not express the matter i n p r e c i s e l y these terms t h e i r emphasis upon the p s y c h o l o g i -c a l and s o c i a l aspects of the value s i t u a t i o n i n s p i r e d l a t e r w r i t e r s t o construe a quest f o r values as a c a r e f u l d e s c r i p t i v e a n a l y s i s of the n a t u r a l phenomenon of v a l u a -t i o n . P e r r y ' s a n a l y s i s i s the f i r s t i n t h i s movement t o em-p l o y the method of d e s c r i p t i v e a n a l y s i s i n an e x p l i c i t manner. P e r r y regards the p h i l o s o p h i c problem as t h a t of determining the g e n e r i c nature of v a l u e , i . e . of d e t e r -mining what c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are present i n any s i t u a t i o n i v i n v o l v i n g v a l u a t i o n . H i s i n q u i r y t h e r e f o r e assumes the c h a r a c t e r of an e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n of f a c t s and i t i s s u e s i n a broad e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , to w i t : "To be v a l u a b l e i s to be any o b j e c t of any i n t e r e s t " . In t h i s c o n n e c t i o n P e r r y acknowledges the important c o n t r i b u t i o n s made t o value t h e o r y by A l e x i s Meinong and C h r i s t i a n von E h r e n f e l s . The l a t t e r d e f i n e s value as "...a r e l a t i o n be-tween a s u b j e c t and an o b j e c t , which expresses the f a c t t h a t the s u b j e c t e i t h e r a c t u a l l y d e s i r e s the o b j e c t , or would d e s i r e i t i n case he were not convinced of i t s e x i -s tence." $ Meinong and von E h r e n f e l s c a r r i e d on a debate concerning the nature of v a l u e , the former m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t value i s t o be d e f i n e d i n terms of f e e l i n g and the l a t t e r t h a t i t must be d e f i n e d i n terms of d e s i r e . P e r r y ' s concept of i n t e r e s t i s designed t o r e s o l v e t h i s debate by d e f i n i n g both f e e l i n g and d e s i r e i n terms of i n t e r e s t i n c e r t a i n of i t s "modes". Pe r r y ' s c r i t i c i s m of those who n e g l e c t the f a c t o r of i n t e r e s t i s simply t h a t t h e i r a n a l y s i s of the value s i t u a -t i o n i s f a c t u a l l y i n c o r r e c t . Whenever we f i n d an i n s t a n c e of v a l u a t i o n we do i n f a c t f i n d an i n t e r e s t i n v o l v e d . H i s c r i t i c i s m of those who do acknowledge i n t e r e s t as a f a c t o r i s mainly that they conceive the s i t u a t i o n too narrowly -t h a t they r e p r e s e n t value as the q u a l i f i e d o b j e c t of i n -t e r e s t , or as the o b j e c t of q u a l i f i e d i n t e r e s t . H i s own # E h r e n f e l s , C h r i s t i a n v., System der W e r t t h e o r i e , 1897, v o l . 1, p. 65. V view i s that v a l u e i s any o b j e c t of any i n t e r e s t . And " i n t e r e s t " l i k e w i s e i s conceived i n the most g e n e r a l sense. " I t i s to t h i s a l l - p e r v a s i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the m o t o r - a f f e c t i v e l i f e , t h i s s t a t e , a c t , a t t i t u d e or  d i s p o s i t i o n of f a v o r or d i s f a v o r , to which we propose to g i v e the name of ' i n t e r e s t ' " . To say o f a n y t h i n g t h a t i t i s the o b j e c t of any i n t e r e s t i s t o say t h a t i t i s v a l u a b l e . T h i s i s the f a m i l i a r ' n a t u r a l i s t i c ' d e f i n i t i o n of v a l u e . F o r P e r r y i t was r e f i n e d and e l a b o r a t e d by a c a r e f u l p s y c h o l o g i c a l and a n o t - s o - c a r e f u l s o c i o l o g i c a l study o f the m o t o r - a f f e c t i v e l i f e o f man. Under the i n -f l u e n c e of such people as P r a l l P e r r y i s i n c l i n e d t o f a v o u r a b e h a v i o u r i s t i c psychology - he works w i t h i n the framework o f an environment-organism c o n c e p t i o n of man and he does t h i s w i t h admirable c o n s i s t e n c y . Even h i s treatment of c o g n i t i o n f a l l s w i t h i n the c o n c e p t u a l frame-work of the stimulus-response,psychology. The importance of the c o g n i t i v e aspects of v a l u a t i o n was'not f u l l y r e -cognized by P e r r y however. I t i s Lewis' r e c o g n i t i o n of the problems of c o g n i t i o n which enable him t o advance a theory of v a l u a t i o n s u b s t a n t i a l l y more adequate than t h a t of P e r r y . The q u e s t i o n of the c o g n i t i v e import of v a l u a t i o n s became i n c r e a s i n g l y acute i n the years f o l l o w i n g the pub-l i c a t i o n of the "General Theory of Value1.' In the f i r s t p l a c e the n a t u r a l i s i t d e f i n i t i o n of value i t s e l f was # P e r r y , R.B., G e n e r a l Theory of Value, p. 115 v i a s s a i l e d and branded as a ' f a l l a c y ' . T h i s c r i t i c i s m i s due to G.E. Moore. To s t a t e the matter b r i e f l y , Moore had argued that no i n f e r e n c e from f a c t t o value was, i n p r i n c i p l e , v a l i d . F a c t s are f a c t s and values are values and u n l e s s a moral p r e d i c a t e i s i n t r o d u c e d i n t o an a n a l -y s i s of f a c t no a n a l y s i s of f a c t s themselves can y i e l d an e t h i c a l c o n c l u s i o n . To say t h a t every v a l u e s i t u a t i o n i n v o l v e s an a l l - p e r v a s i v e aspect of the m o t o r - a f f e c t i v e l i f e i s i n t e r e s t i n g but not s i g n i f i c a n t . A l l the p s y c h o l -ogy i n the world cannot e s t a b l i s h an e t h i c a l or value norm. Moore concludes t h a t v a l u e s are i n d e f i n a b l e because unanalysable (as e.g. the c o l o u r red i s unanalysable) and t h a t the proposed n a t u r a l i s t i c d e f i n i t i o n of value i s e i t h e r f a l l a c i o u s or t r i v i a l . I t amounts to s a y i n g e i t h e r t h a t (e.g.) goodness i s p l e a s u r e , which i s f a l s e , or t h a t goodness i s goodness, which i s t r u e but q u i t e t r i v i a l . T h i s l i n e o f c r i t i c i s m , w i t h important m o d i f i c a t i o n s , was pursued by other a n a l y s t s and p a r t i c u l a r l y by l o g i c a l pos-i t i v i s t s whose p r i n c i p a l i n t e r e s t l a y i n the examination of c o g n i t i v e meaning. The n o t i o n of cognotive meaning was, by them, i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms of the c r i t e r i o n of v e r i f i a -v i l i t y . A statement cannot be s a i d to be c o g n i t i v e l y mean-i n g f u l u n l e s s i t i s , i n p r i n c i p l e , capable of e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n . L o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s proceeded to d i s s e c t t r a d i t i o n a l e t h i c a l and value t h e o r i e s w i t h t h i s c r i t e r i o n i n mind and they found such t h e o r i e s to i n v o l v e two p r i n c i p a l i n g r e d i e n t s . v i i These are; (a) statements about p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t s and (b) pseudo-statements c o n t a i n i n g e t h i c a l or value terms i . e . sentences which could not, i n p r i n c i p l e , be v e r i f i e d . P e r r y would o b j e c t to t h i s a n a l y s i s on the grounds t h a t value statements are a c t u a l l y statements of f a c t s i n c e the value terms o c c u r i n g i n them may be d e f i n e d i n terms of d e s c r i p t i v e p r e d i c a t e s . T h i s o b j e c t i o n however d e f e a t s P e r r y ' s purpose s i n c e i t f a i l s to m a i n tain any d i s t i n c t i o n between va l u e theory and e m p i r i c a l psychology. To d e f i n e a l l value concepts i n terms of d e s c r i p t i v e p r e d i c a t e s i s to reduce value theory to d e s c r i p t i v e psychology and thus to deny t h a t v a l u a t i o n s c a r r y any normative s i g n i f i c a n c e . And i t i s the c l a i m t h a t v a l u a t i o n s c a r r y normative as  w e l l as c o g n i t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e which c h a r a c t e r i z e s v a l u e theory i n g e n e r a l . P e r r y d i d not b e l i e v e h i m s e l f t o be doing mere d e s c r i p t i v e psychology i n the General Theory  of V a l u e - he b e l i e v e d , on the c o n t r a r y , t h a t he was work-i n g out a c o n c e p t u a l system which would f u n c t i o n as a c r i t i q u e o f human conduct i n the sense t h a t i t would p r o -v i d e f o r " t r u e " v a l u a t i o n s . He, wished to r e p r e s e n t v a l u a -t i o n s as e m p i r i c a l judgements without making them s t r i c t l y synonymous w i t h statements i n d e s c r i p t i v e psychology. The l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s h e l d t h a t t h i s attempt could only i s s u e i n (a) the d e n i a l of normative standards or (b) the d e n i a l of the c o g n i t i v e import of v a l u a t i o n s . I f v a l u a t i o n s are v e r i f i a b l e or f a l s i f i a b l e they are not normative, and i f they are normative they have no c o g n i t i v e content, t h a t v i i i i s , they a re simply expressions of a t t i t u d e s or a r t i c u -l a t i o n s o f i d e a l s . N e i t h e r a t t i t u d e s nor i d e a l s are the s o r t o f th i n g s which can be e i t h e r t r u e or f a l s e . Ac-c o r d i n g t o the l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t an e t h i c a l statement i s of the same order as a command or a c r y of p a i n or a p o e t i c e x p o s t u l a t i o n . I t i s t h i s somewhat d i s q u i e t i n g c r i t i c i s m t h a t n a t u r -a l i s t s i n e t h i c s and value theory have had to contend w i t h s i n c e about the time o f p u b l i c a t i o n of P e r r y ' s G e n e r a l  Theory of Val u e . Some n a t u r a l i s t s (such as e.g. S. Pepper) seem not to have r e a l i z e d the s e r i o u s n e s s of the charges thus l a i d a g a i n s t them. C. I . Lewis however.is c o n t i n u -a l l y aware of the o b j e c t i o n s he must meet from t h i s q u a r t e r . He bri n g s t o the a n a l y s i s o f value not only an expert know-ledge of t r a d i t i o n a l moral p h i l o s o p h y but a l s o a thorough understanding o f the newly developed techniques of l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s . He.has grasped the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t a n a l y s i s of c o g n i t i v e meaning and has attempted to e s t a b l i s h a theory of value which w i l l a v o i d these im-p l i c a t i o n s - not by i g n o r i n g them but by denying t h a t they are such as the l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s c l a i m them to be. Whether Lewis succeeds i n t h i s u n d e r t a k i n g or not the im-portance of what he i s t r y i n g t o do must be r e c o g n i z e d . H i s A n a l y s i s of Knowledge and V a l u a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s the most com-prehensive attempt to date to defend a n a t u r a l i s t i c theory of value a g a i n s t both metaphysics and l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s . I . I Lewis' main object i n his discussion of valuation i s to show that value-judgements are cog n i t i v e l y s i g n i f i c a n t . More s p e c i f i c a l l y he i s attempting to characterize valua-tions as a form, of empirical cognition. In doing t h i s he i s putting them on the same l e v e l as the pr e d i c t i v e hypo-theses of the natural sciences. Valuations thus conceived are "...predictions of a goodness or badness which w i l l be disclosed i n experience under certain circumstances and on p a r t i c u l a r occasions..." 1 Such predictions are l e g i t i -mately subject to c r i t i c i s m - they may be true or f a l s e depending on whether what i s predicted a c t u a l l y material-i z e s . The p r i n c i p a l c r i t i c i s m s of t h i s view are those offered by G.E. Moore and his followers who deny that valuations are empirical cognitions, and those offered by c e r t a i n l o g i c a l analysts who deny that valuations are cognitions of any sort . I f either of these c r i t i c i s m s i s sound Lewis' conception of valuation as a form of empirical cognition may well be a misconception. Moreoever i f the c r i t i c i s m offered by the " l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s " i s sound both Lewis' and Moore's views may be misconceptions because Moore held that valuation was a form of cognition also v i z . non-empirical cognition. In the discussion which follows em-phasis w i l l be placed upon those aspects of Lewis' theory I. Lewis, C.I., An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. Open Court, LaSalle, I l l i n o i s , 1946, p. 35b. 2. which are most r e l e v a n t t o the q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the c o g n i t i v e or n o n - c o g n i t i v e nature of value-judgements. Both Moore and Lewis hol d t h a t v a l u a t i o n s are c o g n i t i o n s . The more damaging c r i t i c i s m of Lewis' p o s i t i o n i s t h e r e -f o r e t h a t of the l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s (Ayer, Carnap and others) who s t r i p v a l u a t i o n s of a l l c o g n i t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e e m p i r i c a l or o t h erwise. I n t e r e s t i n the l o g i c a l and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l aspects of value theory has been growing s t e a d i l y s i n c e value theory i t s e l f began t o be developed toward the end o f the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . I t was e a r l y r e c o g n i z e d t h a t v a l u a t i o n i s p o i n t l e s s so f a r as human conduct i s concerned u n l e s s there i s some c r i t e r i o n i n terms of which p a r t i c u l a r v a l -u a t i o n s may be denominated t r u e or f a l s e , v a l i d or i n v a l i d . A p h i l o s o p h i c a l r a t i o n a l i s t such as Kant might i n s i s t on the v a l i d i t y of a v a l u a t i o n - i t s s t r i c t l o g i c a l d e r i v e -a b i l i t y from a supreme p r i n c i p l e . N a t u r a l i s t s of Lewis' p e r s u a s i o n however propose to set up a c r i t i q u e of value the c r i t e r i o n of which i s the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of the v a l u a t i o n s i n q u e s t i o n . To a l l o w t h a t one v a l u a t i o n i s as good or as t r u e as another i s t o f a l l i n t o what Lewis c a l l s a Protagorean r e l a t i v i s m . The statement "X i s good", i s i n Lewis' view of the same order as (say) "X i s s o l u b l e i n water". The same kind of evidence which i s used to v e r i f y the l a t t e r may a l s o be used t o v e r i f y the former. "Goodness", t h a t i s t o say, i s d e f i n e d e m p i r i c a l l y and the q u e s t i o n whether X possesses such a q u a l i t y i s an e m p i r i c a l 3 q u e s t i o n . T h i s i s the p r i n c i p a l t h e s i s i n Book I I I of Lewis* A n a l y s i s of knowledge and v a l u a t i o n and h i s whole con-c e p t i o n of v a l u a t i o n stands or f a l l s w i t h i t . The c r i t i c who can show t h a t the c a t e g o r i e s of t r u t h and f a l s i t y do not s i g n i f i c a n t l y a p p l y t o v a l u a t i o n s w i l l thereby i n v a l -i d a t e the c r i t i q u e of value which Lewis proposes t o esta b -l i s h . The i s s u e i s an extremely important one because a d e c i s i o n one way or t h e oth e r v i t a l l y a f f e c t s the meth-ods and c o n c l u s i o n s o f a l l those s c i e n c e s employing value concepts. The meaning of value statements i n h i s t o r i c a l , a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l , p s y c h o l o g i c a l , and s o c i o l o g i c a l t r e a t -i s e s i s a q u e s t i o n of some moment. And of course the s i g -n i f i c a n c e of much e t h i c a l and e s t h e t i c theory may have t o be c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n a l s o . I f Lewis' a n a l y s i s i s c o r -r e c t value statements i n the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , i n moral phi l o s o p h y , and i n the f i e l d of e s t h e t i c s have the same c o g n i t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e as the e m p i r i c a l hypotheses which comprise the non-value s c i e n c e s . V a l u a t i o n s on t h i s show-i n g are "...not fundamentally d i f f e r e n t i n what determines t h e i r t r u t h or f a l s i t y , and what determines t h e i r v a l i d -i t y or j u s t i f i c a t i o n from o t h e r kinds of e m p i r i c a l know-p led g e . " On the other hand i f the a n a l y s i s o f f e r e d by the l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s i s c o r r e c t a l l v a l u a t i o n s oecur-i n g i n s c i e n t i f i c and p h i l o s o p h i c a l l i t e r a t u r e must be 2. Lewis, C.I., I b i d . , p. 356. 4. i n t e r p r e t e d as emotive u t t e r a n c e s h a v i n g no c o g n i t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e whatever. A t t r i b u t i o n of value t o an o b j e c t i s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s view, e i t h e r a d i s g u i s e d form of e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s or an emotive or p o e t i c e x p o s t u l a t i o n . Lewis b e ^ i n ^ s h i s a n a l y s i s of v a l u a t i o n by making an important d i s t i n c t i o n between "apprehensions of good o r i l l i n e x p e rience" and " p r e d i c t i o n s of the p o s s i b l e r e a l -i z a t i o n s of these q u a l i t i e s i n p a r t i c u l a r e m p i r i c a l con-t e x t s . " ^ The apprehension of good or i l l i s simply a d i r -e c t f i n d i n g of v a l u e - q u a l i t y and i f i t i s formulated i n language the r e s u l t a n t e x p r e s s i o n does not p r e d i c t any-t h i n g but merely r e c o r d s what occurs i n experience i n the same manner as " p r o t o c o l statements" r e c o r d the occurence of sense data when and as they occur. Lewis p o i n t s out t h a t such e x p r e s s i v e statements may be t r u e or f a l s e to the extent t h a t they a c c u r a t e l y or i n a c c u r a t e l y r e c o r d the content of immediate ex p e r i e n c e . What i s expressed however i s n e i t h e r t r u e nor f a l s e , i . e . an apprehension has not the forward l o o k i n g c h a r a c t e r which a l l genuine v a l u a t i o n s must have. Lewis concludes, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the mere apprehensions of v a l u e - q u a l i t y are not judgements and not c l a s s i f i a b l e as knowledge. They are important n e v e r t h e l e s s because without them v a l u a t i o n s qua e m p i r i -c a l c o g n i t i o n would have no meaning. I f v a l u e - q u a l i t y were not d i s c l o s e d i n immediate experience no a s c r i p t i o n of 3. Lewis, C.I., I b i d . , p. 356 • s. value to -objects would be meaningful i n an e m p i r i c a l sense. I t would be meaningless t o p r e d i c t the occurence of v a l u e - q u a l i t y i n experience i f i t were l o g i c a l l y im-p o s s i b l e t o v e r i f y the p r e d i c t i o n by a c t u a l l y e x p e r i e n c -i n g the v a l u e - q u a l i t y p r e d i c t e d . H aving made t h i s p o i n t Lewis goes on to d i s c u s s the two types of v a l u a t i o n s which are judgements and which do rep r e s e n t a form of e m p i r i c a l c o g n i t i o n . The f i r s t of these i s a t e r m i n a t i n g judgement, i . e . , a p r e d i c t i o n which may be c o n c l u s i v e l y v e r i f i e d p r o v i d e d a c e r t a i n mode o f a c t i o n be adopted. Such judgements are of the " i f . . . t h e n " v a r i e t y and are r e l a t i v e l y simple i n t h e i r i n t e n t . The judgement " I f you l i v e a d i s s o l u t e l i f e you w i l l r e g r e t i t before you d i e , " may be c o n c l u s i v e l y v e r -i f i e d by l i v i n g a d i s s o l u t e l i f e and n o t i n g whether the p r e d i c t e d r e g r e t m a t e r i a l i z e s . The second and more im-por t a n t type o f judgement Lewis c a l l s the " o b j e c t i v e judgement". T h i s c o n s i s t s i n the a s c r i p t i o n of va l u e t o thin g s i n g e n e r a l i . e . to o b j e c t s , s t a t e s of a f f a i r s , e t c . ; such judgements being n o n - t e r m i n a t i n g i n the sense t h a t they a re not c o n c l u s i v e l y v e r i f i a b l e . They are sim-i l a r to the judgements found i n the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s which a s c r i b e non-value p r o p e r t i e s to t h i n g s . And u n l i k e t e r m i n a t i n g judgements they may be p a r t i a l l y or i n d i r e c t -l y v e r i f i e d without "fehe e x p e r i e n c i n g o f a v a l u e - q u a l i t y i t s e l f . There may be ample grounds f o r b e l i e v i n g a t h i n g has value other than an immediate experience o f the value 6, i n q u e s t i o n ; j u s t as there may be ample grounds f o r b e l i e v i n g a t h i n g i s hot other than a d i r e c t ( t a c t i l e ) experience of i t s heat. Thus f a r Lewis has d e s c r i b e d t h r e e forms of e m p i r i c a l statement the f i r s t o f which i s merely e x p r e s s i v e and about which t h e r e can be no reasonable d i s p u t e c o n c e r n i n g i t s t r u t h or f a l s i t y . Lewis admits, and t h i s p o i n t i s c r u c i a l , that the f i n d i n g of the s u b j e c t i s i n t h i s case f i n a l and i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e . Such immediate apprehensions are s u b j e c t t o no c r i t i q u e - they c o n s t i t u t e the u l t i m a t e c r i t e r i a o f v a l u e . The two other types of statement a n a l -ysed are both forms of e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s , the one term-i n a t i n g or c o n c l u s i v e l y v e r i f i a b l e , the o t h e r non-termi-n a t i n g . The q u e s t i o n might be r a i s e d whether a t e r m i n a t -i n g judgement i s not a c t u a l l y a n o n - t e r m i n a t i n g judge-ment w i t h a l i m i t p r e s c r i b e d ( a r b i t r a r i l y ) to the number and c h a r a c t e r of the t e s t s o f i t s t r u t h or f a l s i t y . A d e c i s i o n one way or the o t h e r would not m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t the soundness of Lewis' subsequent a n a l y s i s however and the matter need not be d i s c u s s e d f u r t h e r . The next p o i n t of importance to be made i s t h a t v a l u e concepts are d e f i n a b l e o n l y i n terms of t h e expressions of d i r e c t value-apprehension i n e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s p e c u l i a r -i t y seems to c o n s t i t u t e the major d i f f e r e n c e between the 4 a s c r i p t i o n of value to o b j e c t s and the a s c r i p t i o n of non-4. The. term 'objects* i s used here f o r the sake of v e r b a l economy. S t a t e s of a f f a i r s , s i t u a t i o n s , e t c . , are a l s o r e f e r r e d t o where ' o b j e c t s ' alone i s used. value p r o p e r t i e s to o b j e c t s . In s c i e n t i f i c c i r c l e s e.g. the concept of weight i s r a r e l y , i f ever, d e f i n e d i n terras of the immediate u n i n t e r p r e t e d experience of l i f t -i n g an o b j e c t - i t i s more o f t e n d e f i n e d i n terms of other a b s t r a c t concepts such as mass or v e l o c i t y , and the d e f i n -i t i o n i s u s u a l l y expressed i n terms of a mathematical equation. In the case of value concepts however i t appears e s s e n t i a l to m a i n t a i n an i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n w i t h the b a s i c sensed v a l u e - q u a l i t i e s of immediate experience such t h a t , i n any d i s p u t e concerning o b j e c t i v e v a l u e , r e f e r e n c e may be made to the a c t u a l experience of value i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the o b j e c t . As Lewis puts i t "...the mode of f e e l i n g 3 remains the head and f r o n t of the whole matter". T h i s i s i n keeping w i t h the fundamental ten e t s of n a t u r a l i s m i n value theory and e t h i c s v i z . t h a t value concepts and e t h i -c a l p r i n c i p l e s ought t o be d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o and govern-ed by, human i n t e r e s t and d e s i r e . Lewis does not deny t h a t there may be i n d i r e c t means f o r d e t e r m i n i n g value but f o r him, as f o r most n a t u r a l i s t s , the c r u c i a l t e s t i s the t e s t o f immediate e x p e r i e n c e . In attempting t o c l a r i f y the sense i n which an a t t r i -b u t i o n of value d i f f e r s from an a t t r i b u t i o n of non-value p r o p e r t i e s Lewis undertakes an a n a l y s i s of the m o d i f i e r s " i n t r i n s i c " and " e x t r i n s i c " . Consonant w i t h h i s view t h a t a l l v a lue i s u l t i m a t e l y r e l a t i v e to d i r e c t apprehensions 5. Lewis, C.I., op. c i t . , p.382 8. of value-quality he reserves use of the term ^intrinsic1® to characterize the value of experience i t s e l f . The value of a p a r t i c u l a r experience i s i n t r i n s i c or s e l f - v e r i f y i n g i n the sense that a wholeness of such experiences i s desired fo r i t s own sake. The value which does not attach d i r e c t l y to the experience of some subject i s " e x t r i n s i c " - i t i s definable i n terms of i n t r i n s i c 'value only, and i t s pre-sense i n an object i s v e r i f i e d i n the l a s t analysis by de-termining whether the object i n question a c t u a l l y does give r i s e to the sort of experience termed "valuable", "...nothing i s good except r e l a t i v e to some possible f e l t goodness."^ This view consorts well with Lewis' concep-t i o n of a sensible action. It i s not for the sake of an object or state of a f f a i r s that action i s i n i t i a t e d ; rather "...some experience of goodness...represents the f i n a l aim 7 of any sensible action." In the General Theory of Value Perry's analysis appears to suggest that i t i s the object of i n t e r e s t whioh i s the ultimate aim of purposive behav-i o r . Both Lewis and Pepper have ca l l e d this into question of l a t e i n s i s t i n g that nothing i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y gained by the production of objects unless what i s produced has some p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r contributing to the value-quality of 8 experience. The p o t e n t i a l i t y of an object f o r giving r i s e 6. Lewis, C.I., Ibid., p. 383• 7. Lewis, G.I., Ibid., p. 383. 8. Pepper, S.C.,=A digest of purposive values. University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1947, p. 24. 9 to experienced v a l u e - q u a l i t y i s the o b j e c t ' s value - a value moreover which i s always e x t r i n s i c and onl y d e f i n -a b l e i n terms of the i n t r i n s i c value t o which i t give s r i s e . H e r e i n l i e s the r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e Ibetween t h e ob-j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r " v a l u e " and other o b j e c t i v e non-value p r o p e r t i e s . To use Lewis' example, "roundness" i s not u l t i m a t e l y d e f i n a b l e i n terms of a v i s u a l or t a c t i l e sen-s a t i o n of him who i s d e f i n i n g . I t i s d e f i n e d and i d e n t i -f i e d i n any p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e by mathematical express -s i o n s and complicated measuring instruments r e s p e c t i v e l y . "Goodness" however must u l t i m a t e l y be d e f i n e d and i d e n t i -f i e d with r e f e r e n c e t o the mode of f e e l i n g a t t e n d i n g the experience o f some s u b j e c t who i s confronted w i t h the ob-j e c t . Whether an o b j e c t a c t u a l l y possesses goodness o r not must be decided by him who c o n f r o n t s the o b j e c t i n exper i e n c e . And by a good o b j e c t i s meant simply " t h a t which conduces t o the r e a l i z a t i o n of v a l u e - q u a l i t y i n expe r i e n c e . " There a r e some uses of the term " i n t r i n s i c " which sug-gest t h a t some o b j e c t s a t l e a s t have i n t r i n s i c v a l u e . I t i s o f t e n s a i d e.g. t h a t a b e a u t i f u l work of a r t i s i n t r i n s i -c a l l y v a l u a b l e i . e . i s v a l u a b l e f o r i t s own sake. In Lewis' view however t h i s i s a mi s c o n c e p t i o n . I f the work of a r t was not produced f o r the sake of g i v i n g r i s e to some v a l u -a b l e e s t h e t i c experience there would have been no p o i n t i n producing i t a t a l l - u n l e s s of course the a r t i s t ' s aim was merely t o s a t i s f y a c r e a t i v e impulse; i n which case 10. Lewis' a n a l y s i s i s s t i l l sound. For a g a i n i t was f o r the sake of some immediately d e s i r a b l e experience t h a t the t h i n g was done. There are however c e r t a i n o b j e c t s which, w h i l e not p o s s e s s i n g i n t r i n s i c v a l u e , do g i v e r i s e t o i n -t r i n s i c v alue when con f r o n t e d i n experience. Such o b j e c t s have what Lewis c a l l s i n h e r e n t e x t r i n s i c v a l u e . Inherent values a t t a c h t o those t h i n g s which c o n t r i b u t e d i r e c t l y to i n t r i n s i c value (they a re u s u a l l y t o be found i n the realm of the e s t h e t i c ) . On the other hand i n s t r u m e n t a l e x t r i n s i c value attaches to,.those t h i n g s which c o n t r i -bute t o the r e a l i z a t i o n , not o f v a l u a b l e experience, but of o t h e r t h i n g s having i n h e r e n t v a l u e . T h i s schematism of values i s conceived i n such a man-ner as to r e l a t e a l l modes of value to the i n t r i n s i c or self-.•verify i n g value of immediate experience a c t u a l or p o s s i b l e . The r e l a t i o n a s s e r t e d i s a l o g i c a l one s e r v i n g to d e f i n e value concepts and t o p r o v i d e the schema nec-essary f o r the v e r i f i c a t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r v a l u a t i o n s . The f a c t t h a t values are so determined by "most people" i s nothing t o the p o i n t . Lewis i s here concerned w i t h an ana-l y s i s o f what i s meant by the statement "X possesses v a l u e " and not a t a l l w i t h the q u i t e d i f f e r e n t e m p i r i c a l ques-t i o n "How are values c r e a t e d b i o l o g i c a l l y , s o c i a l l y e t c . ? " Lewis' method of a n a l y s i s i s , as he takes care to p o i n t out p h i l o s o p h i c a l and a p r i o r i ; and i t s c o r r e c t n e s s must be c e r t i f i e d by c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n , not by e m p i r i c a l obser-v a t i o n o r experiment. A q u e s t i o n a r i s e s , i n connec t i o n 11 w i t h t h i s view, which must come up f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n l a t e r v i z . "What c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are p e r t i n e n t i n a p p r a i s i n g the type of a n a l y s i s Lewis i s here o f f e r i n g ? " I f e m p i r i c a l data may not be r e f e r r e d to i t i s not a t once ev i d e n t j u s t what may be r e f e r r e d t o . Stephen Pepper, i n h i s a n a l y s i s of p u r p o s i v e v a l u e s , employs the method of d e s c r i p t i v e 9 d e f i n i t i o n - a d e f i n i t i o n of value being c o n s i d e r e d c o r -r e c t when an adequate d e s c r i p t i o n of value phenomena has been ac h i e v e d . The d e s c r i p t i o n i s e m p i r i c a l l y a t t e s t e d and t h e r e i s t h e r e f o r e a c r i t e r i o n of c o r r e c t d e f i n i t i o n v i z . agreement of the d e f i n i t i o n w i t h e m p i r i c a l f a c t . T h i s method has one s e r i o u s disadvantage however. D e f i n i -t i o n s based upon e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s can never a t t a i n the l o g i c a l f o r c e necessary t o warrant t h e i r being con-c e i v e d as a p r i o r i because the e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s w i l l be c o n t i n u a l l y m o d i f i e d i n the l i g h t of f r e s h exper-i e n c e . There w i l l always remain a c e r t a i n amount of doubt as to whether the d e s c r i p t i o n adequately r e p r e s e n t s the value s i t u a t i o n . Lewis i s aware of these d i f f i c u l t i e s and he avoids them by making a d i s t i n c t i o n between the appre-hension o f meanings and the c o g n i t i o n of e m p i r i c a l matters of f a c t . H i s s o l u t i o n i s r e m i n i s c e n t of Hume's d i s t i n c t i o n 10 between a b s t r a c t r e a s o n i n g and experimental r e a s o n i n g . 9. Pepper, S.G., I b i d . , p. 77. 10. Hume i s u s u a l l y c r e d i t e d w i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h i s view i n i t s modern form but a c t u a l l y i t i s t o be found i n the works of e a r l i e r " e m p i r i c i s t s " . The d o c t r i n e o f a b s t r a c t ideas ( y i e l d i n g c e r t a i n knowledge), and prob-a b l e knowledge, was a c e n t r a l theme i n Locke's Essay  Concerning Human Understanding. 12. The sense i n which the apprehension of meanings i s know-ledge w i l l t urn out to be one of the most troublesome questions which Lewis has to d e a l w i t h . For u n l e s s c e r t a i n d e f i n i t i o n s (which are seen somehow t o be t r u e because of what they mean) are accepted i t i s q u e s t i o n a b l e whether Lewis can m a i n t a i n h i s p r i n c i p a l t h e s i s . Unless e.g. h i s d e f i n i t i o n of g e n e r i c value i n terms of a mode of f e e l i n g be accepted h i s co n c e p t i o n o f e x t r i n s i c value need not be accepted e i t h e r . Lewis' e n t i r e t h e s i s i n f a c t r e s t s upon the soundness of c e r t a i n i n i t i a l d e f i n i t i o n s and he him-s e l f admits t h a t u n l e s s the meanings of these be s u f f i c -i e n t t o convince one of t h e i r t r u t h l i t t l e e l s e can be done to argue t h e i r c o r r e c t n e s s . ,The d e f i n i t i o n of va l u e , t h a t i s , i s independent completely of e m p i r i c a l matters of f a c t . E m p i r i c a l data a f f e c t the t r u t h and f a l s i t y of a v a l u a t i o n , but the k i n d o f t r u t h a t t a c h i n g t o a d e f i -n i t i o n of value i s not so a f f e c t e d . The sense i n which a d e f i n i t i o n embodies a c o g n i t i o n o f s o r t s i s , then, the c e n t r a l problem i n the a n a l y s i s o f value statements. Agree-ment must be reached on t h i s q u e s t i o n before any a p p r a i -s a l o f v a l u a t i o n qua e m p i r i c a l c o g n i t i o n i s p o s s i b l e . Consequently Lewis proceeds to examine the nature of value as i n t r i n s i c ; s i n c e a l l v a l u e s are to be de f i n e d i n terms of a s e l f - v e r i f y i n g v a l u e - q u a l i t y d i s c l o s e d i n e x p e r i e n c e . I t w i l l a l s o be necessary t o c l a r i f y the l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r of the e x p r e s s i v e statements employed to r e c o r d the occur-ence of I n t r i n s i c v a l u e . 13. Instrumental and in h e r e n t e x t r i n s i c v a l u e e x i s t by-co u r t e s y o f i n t r i n s i c v a l u e . I t " i s meaningless i n Lewis 1 view to speak o f the " v a l u e " of a t h i n g u n l e s s i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e i s made to a q u a l i t y of experience a c t u a l or p o s s i b l e . That f o r the sake of which a l l e l s e i s valued i s the i n t r i n s i c a l l y d e s i r a b l e experience of some s u b j e c t . Moreover the u l t i m a t e touchstone of value i n any o f i t s modes i s the immediate experience of de-l i g h t , s a t i s f a c t i o n , or some other s i m i l a r f e e l i n g on the p a r t of some s u b j e c t . Thus a l l e x t r i n s i c value i s r e l a t i v e t o a c e r t a i n aspect of experience l o o s e l y termed "what i s d e s i r a b l e " or "what i s p r i z e d " i n the g i v e n content of experience i t s e l f . I t i s because of the r e l a t i v i t y of e x t r i n s i c value t h a t v a l u a t i o n s may be rep r e s e n t e d as a form of e m p i r i c a l c o g n i t i o n . Mistaken b e l i e f s might e a s i l y be e n t e r t a i n e d c o n c e r n i n g the p o t e n t i a l i t y of o b j e c t s f o r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o an immediately v a l u a b l e experience; and such b e l i e f s or v a l u a t i o n s concern a c h a r a c t e r o f th i n g s which i s o b j e c t i v e and as independent of p e r s o n a l d e s i r e or a v e r s i o n as any other o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t y of t h i n g s . I t i s q u i t e p e r m i s s a b l e , on t h i s showing, t o speak of the value of -a t h i n g as an o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t y which the t h i n g would possess even i f i t never came w i t h i n the ambit of anyone's e x p e r i e n c e . I f the statement "X i s good" be 3-4. construed as r e f e r r i n g to such o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s i n the sense intended "X i s good" i s indeed an e m p i r i c a l hypoth-e s i s - a hy p o t h e s i s moreover which may be a f f o r d e d a h i g h degree of p r o b a b i l i t y without any r e f e r e n c e being made to the a c t u a l experience o f any s u b j e c t . A fund o f past exper-i e n c e w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t to s u b s t a n t i a t e the t r u t h o f the hypothesis - a knowledge of psychology being perhaps most o p e r t i n e n t i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n . The l o g i c a l s t a t u s of e x p r e s s i v e statements however i s not so c l e a r - c u t . Lewis a t t a c k s the problem by f i r s t con-c e n t r a t i n g h i s a t t e n t i o n upon the immediately v a l u a b l e "as a mode of the phenomenal as such". As a rough approximation he suggests that " V a l u e - d i s v a l u e i s that mode or aspect of the given o r the contemplated to which d e s i r e and a v e r s i o n are addressed; and t h a t by apprehension of which the i n c l i n -a t i o n t o a c t i o n i s norm a l l y e l i c i t e d " . 1 1 F u r t h e r "The immediately good i s what you l i k e and what you want i n the way of experience; the immediately ba<3 i s what you d i s l i k e I P and do not want." The d i s t i n c t i o n between i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c v a l u e must not be l o s t s i g h t of i n t h i s con-n e c t i o n . An o b j e c t may be d e s i r e d or p r i z e d but such des-i r i n g or p r i z i n g of o b j e c t s Is not always i n d i c a t i v e of i n t r i n s i c v a l u e . I t i s the r e a c t i o n t o o b j e c t s which poss-esses o r may possess i n t r i n s i c v a l u e . "What you l i k e and what you want i n the way of e x p e r i e n c e " i s the i n t r i n s i c a l l y 11. Lewis, C.I., op. c i t . , p. 403 12. Lewis, C.I., I b i d . , p. 404. 15. v a l u a b l e . Value i n the i n t r i n s i c sense i s a ki n d o f datum f i n d a b l e i n exp e r i e n c e . Value i n o b j e c t s i s not so much a datum as an e m p i r i c a l l y i n f e r r e d f a c t about which one may be mistaken. No mistake however i s p o s s i b l e i n the case of i n t r i n s i c value because no judgement i s i n v o l v e d and t h e r e -f o r e no b e l i e f which stands i n need of v e r i f i c a t i o n . J u s t as the data of sense (upon which are based s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses) possess a r e a l i t y as experienced, so do the data of f e e l i n g possess a r e a l i t y as experienced. And i t i s upon these data of f e e l i n g and d e s i r e that v a l u a t i o n s are p r o p e r l y based. They c o n s t i t u t e the s o l e evidence of a c t u a l value i n o b j e c t s i n case the i n d i r e c t v e r i f i c a t i o n of a v a l u a t i o n be c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n . The data which a r e termed " i n t r i n s i c v a l u e s " are i n g r e d i e n t i n the g i v e n con-t e n t o f experience, t h e r e f o r e , and are i n d u b i t a b l e i n the same sense t h a t other e m p i r i c a l data are i n d u b i t a b l e . They possess what Lewis c a l l s "an a b s o l u t e f a c t u a l i t y " and t h e i r f o r m u l a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a kind of t r u t h . The use of t h e term " t r u t h " i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n i s u n f o r t u n a t e however be-cause no r e s o r t t o v e r i f i c a t i o n i s . i m p l i e d . As Lewis spates elsewhere "The f a c t u a l i t y of the p r e s e n t a t i o n content i s n e i t h e r v e r i f i a b l e nor f a l s i f i a b l e " - i t i s an epistemo-13 l o g i c a l u l t i m a t e . The f o r m u l a t i o n o f an apprehension o f v a l u e - q u a l i t y i s a v a l u e - p r e d i c a t i o n . But i s d i f f e r s from the a s c r i p t i o n of 13. Lewis, C.I.., I b i d . , p. 40?. 16. value to o b j e c t s i n an important sense. An apprehension of v a l u e - q u a l i t y i s simply the d i r e c t and u n i n t e r p r e t e d p r i z i n g of some element o f e x p e r i e n c e . The p r i z i n g i s u l t -i m a t e l y i n d i c a t i v e of value i n any p a r t i c u l a r case. More-over the p r i z i n g i s what d e f i n e s value ( i n an o s t e n s i v e manner). He who has never d e s i r e d , p r i z e d , or .found s a t i -s f a c t i o n , i n anything w i t h which he i s confronted i n exper-ience cannot be informed i n any other manner what i s meant by " v a l u e " . In o t h e r words the v a l u e concepts one employs must be o s t e n s i v e l y d e f i n e d , i . e . d e f i n e d by one's a c t u a l l y e x p e r i e n c i n g the mode of f e e l i n g which the term " v a l u e " d e s i g n a t e s . Here i s where Lewis runs i n t o extreme d i f f i -c u l t y . The attempt to c h a r a c t e r i z e immediate value by means of mere " d i c t i o n a r y " d e f i n i t i o n s l e a d s one to a f r u s t r a -t i n g impasse. The aspect of experience i n q u e s t i o n has, from time to time, been i d e n t i f i e d w i t h a g r e a t number of " n a t u r a l " p r o p e r t i e s such as p l e a s u r e , contentment, s a t i s -f a c t i o n , d e l i g h t , e t c . but some c r i t i c or o t h e r has always found grounds f o r a t t a c k i n g the d e f i n i t i o n as being too comprehensive or too narrow, too m a t e r i a l i s t i c or too i d e a l i s t i c , too generous or too a u s t e r e . Lewis h i m s e l f takes the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s t s t o t a s k f o r d e f i n i n g the good i n terms of something other than "our n a t u r a l d e s i r e s " . Hence h i s recommendation t h a t the meaning of the immedia-t e l y v a l u a b l e be e s t a b l i s h e d by a c t u a l l y e x p e r i e n c i n g what i s intended by the use o f the e x p r e s s i o n . C e r t a i n d i s c u r -s i v e d e v i c e s may be h e l p f u l - such as i n d i c a t i n g t h a t 17. " v a l u e " r e f e r s t o r o u g h l y the same p r o p e r t y as " d e s i r -a b i l i t y " r e f e r s t o ; the v a l u a b l e i s the d e s i r e d or the d e s i r a b l e . When the, o b j e c t i o n i s made that the d e s i r e d i s o f t e n d i s v a l u e d one can only urge t h a t i n t h i s case one d e s i r e has o v e r r u l e d another. I f t h i s f a i l s t o con-v i n c e l i t t l e e l s e can be done except to urge t h a t one s c r u -t i n i z e more c a r e f u l l y one's use of value terms. F u r t h e r argument i s l i k e l y t o i s s u e i n what Stevenson has c a l l e d a " p e r s u a s i v e d e f i n i t i o n " . 1 4 The q u e s t i o n must be r a i s e d l a t e r as t o whether Lewis, i n f o r m u l a t i n g h i s c o n c e p t i o n of the f i n a l good, i s not employing t h i s a r t i f i c e . What i s important to n o t i c e here i s t h a t the f o r m u l a t i o n s of d i r -e c t value-apprehension are a s p e c i e s of d e f i n i t i o n of value a. i t s e l f . The f o r m u l a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n i s a v a l u e - p r e d i c t i o n a. of the order "X i s good" but a p r e d i c t i o n which cannot be v e r i f i e d because an a n a l y s i s of i t s meaning, only, c e r t i f i e s i t s t r u t h . An important q u e s t i o n t o be d i s c u s s e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the immediately v a l u a b l e concerns the d i s t i n c t i o n between v a l u e - q u a l i t y and n o n - v a l u e - q u a l i t y . I f no d i s -t i n c t i o n a l o n g these l i n e s i s p o s s i b l e i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see j u s t what d i s t i n c t i v e meaning might be g i v e n t o valuQ-a t i o n s i n g e n e r a l . T h i s i s a b e s e t t i n g weakness of any theory o f value which purports to be n a t u r a l i s t i c . A n a l y s t s 14. Stevenson, C.I., E t h i c s and Language, Y a l e Univ., 1945, chap. 14. 18. of Moore's persuasion.have p o i n t e d out t h a t v a l u e - p r e d i -c a t i o n s must r e f e r to q u a l i t i e s of a d i f f e r e n t order from non-value q u a l i t i e s , e l s e v a l u e judgements would be noth-i n g more than i l l - e x p r e s s e d e m p i r i c a l hypotheses; i . e . they would be v a i u e - p r e d i c a t i o n s i n grammatical form o n l y . Where Moore's a n a l y s i s f a l l s down of course i s i n h i s i n -s i s t e n c e t h a t v a l u e - p r e d i c a t i o n s a s s e r t a s y n t h e t i c and necessary r e l a t i o n between e m p i r i c a l e n t i t i e s and suppos-i t i t i o u s n o n - e m p i r i c a l e n t i t i e s . Lewis proposes to a v o i d t h i s m e t a p h y s i c a l approach by i n s i s t i n g that a l l meaning-f u l f o r m u l a t i o n s of the immediately v a l u a b l e r e f e r t o q u a l i t i e s which a r e i n g r e d i e n t i n an a c t u a l or p o s s i b l e experience and which, by t h a t token, are e m p i r i c a l l y de-f i n a b l e . I f , apart from the n a t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s of an ob-j e c t , t here i s another p r o p e r t y c a l l e d " v a l u e " which i s d i r e c t l y d i s c l o s e d when and as the o b j e c t i s experienced, no e m p i r i c a l d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s p r o p e r t y i s meaningful a c c o r d i n g to Lewis because no such n o n - e m p i r i c a l p r o p e r t y i s r e c o g n i z e d i n h i s epistemology. But a l t h o u g h he denies the e x i s t e n c e of such a p r o p e r t y i n o b j e c t s he does seem to a f f i r m i t s e x i s t e n c e i n the content of immediate e x p e r i e n c e . "Value" as a p p l i e d to o b j e c t s has the same meaning as "a p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o the r e a l i z a t i o n o f v a l u e -q u a l i t y i n experience". Such a p o t e n t i a l i t y has s t r i c t l y the same l o g i c a l s t a t u s as a p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r c o n t r i b u t e i n g t o {say) c o n f u s i o n or amazement i n experience. I t s s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r value theory l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t i t 1 9 . c o n t r i b u t e s , not to c o n f u s i o n or amazement, but to a p a r t -i c u l a r q u a l i t y termed v a l u e - q u a l i t y . Any p o t e n t i a l i t y or an o b j e c t which thus c o n t r i b u t e s to v a l u e - q u a l i t y i s a value of i t . I t s e x i s t e n c e i n o b j e c t s i s a matter f o r s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y . I n t r i n s i c v a l u e , on the other hand, i s not a p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o a n y t h i n g - i t i s , as Lewis puts i t , an " e m p i r i c a l datum". I t seems f a i r l y obvious however t h a t not a l l data of immediate experience are v a l u e - q u a l i t i e s and i t i s the t a s k of c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the dichotomy between v a l u e - q u a l i t y and n o n - v a l u e - q u a l i t y which presents the g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t y i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n . Both q u a l i t i e s are e m p i r i c a l i n the broad sense of the term but one ( v a l u e - q u a l i t y ) d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s e l f where r a t i o n a l or s e n s i b l e a c t i o n i s concerned and where, con-sequently, e v a l u a t i o n s of events, o b j e c t s , and conduct i s concerned. In attempting to account f o r t h i s normative f o r c e of value data Lewis i s r e a c h i n g the c r u c i a l p o i n t of h i s a n a l y s i s . I n t r i n s i c value - a datum of experience designated by an e x p r e s s i v e statement - must be sought i n the immediate content of experience, and more s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t h a t con-ten t of i t t o which d i r e c t p r i z i n g and d i s p r i z i n g i s add-r e s s e d . The k i n d of q u a l i t y i n q u e s t i o n i s that which s t i -mulates a tendency to d e s i r e an element o f the content o f experience f o r i t s own sake and not f o r any u l t e r i o r pur-pose. Such a q u a l i t y a t t a c h e s t o the phenomenally presen-20. ted and l a r g e l y u n i n t e r p r e t e d i n experience, i . e . to what i s immediately present to consciousness. I t does not a t t -ach t o o b j e c t s because o b j e c t s are e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n s t r -u c t s - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s p l a c e d upon immediate e x p e r i e n c e . I n t r i n s i c value i s crea t e d and d i s c l o s e d i n experience by the mode of f e e l i n g a t t e n d i n g one's contemplation of- the phenomenal content of experience as such. A t t e n t i o n must t h e r e f o r e be focussed upon the common human tendency t o d e s i r e , take d e l i g h t i n , and f i n d s a t i s f a c t i o n i n , what i s immediately present to c o n s c i o u s n e s s . "One's momentary l i k i n g or d i s l i k i n g i s c o n c l u s i v e l y i n d i c a t i v e of a pre -sent value°-f i n d i n g . . . I f what i s presented i s immedi-a t e l y p r i z e d , i . e . i f the p r e s e n t a t i o n as such i s accom-panied by a f e e l i n g o f d e l i g h t or s a t i s f a c t i o n then the experience i n q u e s t i o n possesses i n t r i n s i c v a l u e . Lewis i s not too c a r e f u l t o decide whether the value attaches to what i s presented or t o one's emotional r e a c t i o n to what i s p r e s ented. From s c a t t e r e d r e f e r e n c e s however i t must be concluded t h a t he a t t r i b u t e s i n t r i n s i c v alue t o one's f e e l -ings - t o one's experience o f the content o f experience, as i t were. In t h i s case the content i t s e l f need not be con-s i d e r e d as p o s s e s s i n g value at a l l , u n l e s s i t be i n h e r e n t e x t r i n s i c v a l u e . But perhaps i t would be more c o r r e c t t o say that both the p r e s e n t a t i o n content and the f e e l i n g s i t gi v e s r i s e to a r e i n t r i n s i c a l l y v a l u a b l e . The whole prob-lem of the r e c o g n i t i o n of the immediately v a l u a b l e i s , as Lewis admits, a b a f f l i n g one. An o v e r - p r e c i s e demarcation 15. Lewis, C.I., I b i d . , p. 404. 21. of the realm of i n t r i n s i c v alue would i n e v i t a b l y do v i o l -ence t o the extremely complex s t r u c t u r e of a c t u a l exper-i e n c e . For the purposes of t h e o r e t i c a l c l a r i t y some such demarcation must be attempted. But i d e a l l y the a s p e c t of experience i n question i s best i d e n t i f i e d and d e l i m i t e d by c a r e f u l i n t r o s p e c t i v e a n a l y s i s . Lewis s t a t e s i t thus: "We can only r e l y upon the i m p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t what i s so g e n e r a l l y e x h i b i t e d i n the experience of everyone, and i s so u n i v e r s a l l y of i n t e r e s t and hence so commonly remarked, could f a i l t o be c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d by r e f e r e n c e to the m u l t i p l i c i t y . o f occasions on which a l l of us use a d j e c t i v e s of p r i z i n g and d i s p r i z i n g . " Lewis w i l l not be g r o s s l y m i s i n t e r p r e t e d i f h i s view be summed up as f o l l o w s . That f o r the sake of which a l l e l s e i s judged or found v a l u a b l e i s the experience a c t u a l or p o s s i b l e of some s u b j e c t . T h i s experience (a complex a f f e c t i o n of the su b j e c t which i n c l u d e s many i n g r e d i e n t s such as f e e l i n g s of p l e a s u r e , s e c u r i t y , e s t h e t i c d e l i g h t , etc.) i s found to be v a l u a b l e when and as i t o c c u r s . * What i s i n d i c a t i v e of i n t r i n s i c v a l u e i s the f a c t t h a t the content of exper-ience i n whole or i n p a r t i s p r i z e d by some s u b j e c t not as a means to an y t h i n g f u r t h e r but as an end i n i t s e l f . T h i s q u a l i t y o f experience i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y s a t i s f y i n g and c o n s t i t u t e s a c r i t e r i o n i n terms o f which proposed ends of a c t i o n and means t o such ends may be c r i t i c i z e d . "X i s 16. Lewis, C.I., I b i d . , p. 404. 22. good", then, i n i t s e x p r e s s i v e sense means "some s u b j e c t p r i z e s X" where X stands f o r some element of the experience of the s u b j e c t i n que s t i o n . Where X stands f o r an o b j e c t "X i s good" i s e i t h e r an e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s p r e d i c a t i n g e x t r i n s i c value o f something or i t i s an e l l i p t i c a l exp-r e s s i o n of the f a c t t h a t some s u b j e c t p r i z e s the e x p e r i -ence to which X g i v e s r i s e . V a l u e - f i n d i n g s formulated by ex p r e s s i v e statements have an "absolute f a c t u a l i t y " which cannot be g a i n s a i d . But t h i s does not imply t h a t they can-not be c r i t i c i z e d . Lewis i s aware of the l a t e n t r e l a t i v i s m i n a con c e p t i o n of v a l u a t i o n which does not pr o v i d e f o r a r a t i o n a l c r i t i q u e of v a l u a t i o n s which might appear to be h o p e l e s s l y c o n t r a r y . I t i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y p l a u s i b l e t h a t two i n d i v i d u a l s who are as much a l i k e p h y s i c a l l y and psy-c h o l o g i c a l l y as "normally" i s the case may d e l i v e r them-s e l v e s of c o n t r a r y v a l u a t i o n s o f the e x p r e s s i v e s o r t . What i s perhaps more d i s q u i e t i n g i s the f a c t t h a t many i n d i v i d -17 u a l s do d i f f e r on these m a t t e r s . ' And where a r e s o r t t o the r e l e v a n t e m p i r i c a l f a c t s i s l o g i c a l l y p r o h i b i t e d i t i s a l l the more impe r a t i v e t h a t a procedure be s p e c i f i e d which w i l l f a c i l i t a t e the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f d i v e r s e v a l u a -t i o n s . I f . the q u e s t i o n concerns e x t r i n s i c value i t i s pro-p e r l y s u b j e c t to c o n s i d e r a t i o n by those who are s u f f i c i e n t -l y w e l l t r a i n e d t o make sound e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s i n 17. Recent and c u r r e n t a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l r e s e a r c h has amassed a g r e a t volume of i n t e r e s t i n g and cogent f a c t s r e l a t i n g to the q u e s t i o n of e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i s m . The student o f e t h i c s and s o c i a l p h i l o s o p h y n e g l e c t s these f a c t s a t h i s p e r i l . 23. the f i e l d i n v o l v e d . I f the que s t i o n concerns i n t r i n s i c value however the procedure i s not so o b v i o u s l y apparent. I I I . Although Lewis has been i n s i s t i n g on the f a c t t h a t present v a l u e - f i n d i n g s are s u b j e c t t o no c r i t i q u e he now proposes to i n t r o d u c e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which w i l l make such a c r i t i q u e p o s s i b l e . The most important such c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s the f a c t t h a t the immediacies of experience are i n g r e -d i e n t -in a temporal whole which i t s e l f i s found i n t r i n -s i c a l l y good. A r a t i o n a l concern f o r the f u t u r e and f o r what may be r e a l i z e d i n the way of v a l u a b l e experience i n the f u t u r e d i c t a t e s t h a t momentary s a t i s f a c t i o n s be j u d -ged a c c o r d i n g as they c o n t r i b u t e t o a l i f e which i s good on the whole. In t h i s sense immediate goods have an i n t -r i n s i c v alue (which i s an i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e datum of exp-eri e n c e ) and an i n s t r u m e n t a l or c o n t r i b u t o r y value which i s not d i s c l o s e d but must be judged and the judgement v e r -i f i e d . Thus a d i s t i n c t i o n i s here made between the v a l u e of a moment of experience as' i t occurs and i s apprehended and the v a l u e of having had such e x p e r i e n c e . Lewis i s q u i t e emphatic i n s t a t i n g t h a t i t i s normally more impor-t a n t to judge a p a r t i c u l a r experience i n terms of what i s c o n t r i b u t e s t o the whole than t o accept as f i n a l i t s mom-24. entary valuation. Indeed the r u l i n g imperative i n a l l valuation i s the p r e s c r i p t i o n "Judge a l l experiences i n terms of t h e i r r e l a t i o n to a l i f e which i s good on the whole." The absolute and i n v i o l a t e character of p a r t i c -u l a r i n t r i n s i c values i s thus attenuated by the i n t r o d -uction of a norm the v a l i d i t y of which i s , according to Lewis, self-evident. Just as the i n t r i n s i c value-quality of p a r t i c u l a r experiences i s a brute datum so i s t h i s supreme norm a datum. Lewis denies that i t i s a psycho-l o g i c a l datum; perhaps because he wishes to avoid the objection that psychological data carry only descriptive 18 and not normative s i g n i f i c a n c e . C r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n , he contends, w i l l reveal that i f t h i s norm be repudiated a l l norms must be repudiated and a l l pretension to s i g -n ificance i n thought and action be abandoned. The u l t -imate purpose which defines the r a t i o n a l and the s i g n i -f i c a n t i n valuation, discourse, and conduct i s the r e a l -i z a t i o n of the good l i f e . One i s properly compelled to be consistent i n one's thinking because inconsistency i s i n e f f e c t u a l as a means to r e a l i z i n g the good l i f e . S i m i l a r -l y with valuation and conduct. Except they are governed 18. Lewis sets up a s t r i c t dichotomy between philosophy and science; philosophy being concerned with prim-a r i l y with "meanings" and science primarily with "truths". See below p. 46 f f . 25. by some s p e c i f i c and s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g purpose they are p o i n t l e s s . Knowledge p r o p e r l y conceived i s f o r the sake of a c t i o n , ; a c t i o n i s f o r the sake of achievement; and what i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y achieved i s determined by v a l u a t i o n . The knowing-doing-valuing complex i s , i n any s e n s i b l e or r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l , informed by the only i d e a l which recommends i t s e l f as good without any q u a l i f i c a t i o n , v i z . the concern w i t h , and i n t e n t i o n to r e a l i z e , the good l i f e . Two questions must be r a i s e d i n c o n n e c t i o n with t h i s more complicated c o n c e p t i o n . The f i r s t concerns the sound ness of the a l l e g a t i o n t h a t no more u l t i m a t e purpose i s c o n c e i v e a b l e than the r e a l i z a t i o n of the good l i f e . Second l y the meaning of the concept "the good l i f e " must be e x p l i c a t e d and the i m p l i c a t i o n s p e r t i n e n t t o the l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n at hand e l i c i t e d . The f i r s t q u e s t i o n i s more fundamental and i s b e t t e r postponed. The second may be d e a l t w i t h a t once. With the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the r a t i o n a l i m p e r a t i v e en-j o i n i n g one to have concern f o r , and c o n s c i o u s l y s t r i v e to r e a l i z e , a l i f e found good i n the l i v i n g o f i t L e w i s 1 whole conception of i n t r i n s i c v alue takes on a d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t . In one sense present v a l u e - f i n d i n g s are u l t i m a t e and u n c r i t i c i z e a b l e . But i n a more important sense i t i s not only p o s s i b l e but a l s o i m p e r a t i v e t h a t such p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e - f i n d i n g s be " t r a n s v a l u a t e d " . S i n c e a r a t i o n a l ev-a l u a t i o n of experience l o o k s to the c r i t e r i o n of a v a l u a b l 26. whole p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e - f i n d i n g s may not be taken as a b s o l u t e l y f i n a l . One experience q u a l i f i e d ano-t h e r , and the v a l u e - q u a l i t i e s of p a r t i c u l a r experiences q u a l i f y one another a l s o . A number o f experiences when taken t o g e t h e r d i s c l o s e a value which i s not a mere sum of the p a r t i c u l a r values but a super-added q u a l i t y a t t a -c h i n g to the temporal s y n t h e s i s of a s t r e t c h of experience. In order t h a t such an " o v e r - a r c h i n g " value be apprehended i t i s necessary t h a t an a c t of the i m a g i n a t i o n be emplo-yed which envisages the whole as a complex s t r u c t u r e or G e s t a l t 1 ^ the elements o f which are found to be l e s s v a l -uable taken s i n g l y than taken as c o n t r i b u t i n g t o the whole. The c o n t r i b u t o r y value of an element of experience i s thus of g r e a t e r importance normally than i t s momentary value -i n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t i t s momentary value i s i n t r i n s i c w h i l e i t s c o n t r i b u t o r y value i s o f t e n only i n s t r u m e n t a l . There i s o f course no c l e a r - c u t s e p a r a t i o n of experiences i n t o those which possess only i n s t r u m e n t a l or c o n t r i b u t o r y value and those which possess only i n t r i n s i c v a l u e . Many experiences are v a l u a b l e i n both senses. A l a t e r e x p e r i -ence may q u a l i f y the value of, or be q u a l i f i e d i n r e s p e c t of i t s value, by an e a r l i e r one and v i c e - v e r s a . 1 9 . Lewis c i t e s m u s i c a l and l i t e r a r y works as examples of t h i n g s which possess t h i s "value s t r u c t u r e " . Any whole of experience however w i l l be seen t o exemplify the same c h a r a c t e r to a g r e a t e r or l e s s e r e x t e n t . 27. The f i n a l word i n the e v a l u a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r exper-i e n c e i s never r e a l l y s a i d because i t i s always capable of being q u a l i f i e d by f r e s h experience and i t s value-? q u a l i t y r e i n t e r p r e t e d a c c o r d i n g l y . But i n s p i t e o f t h i s i n s i s t e n c e upon the s i g n i f i c a n t t r a n s v a l u a t i o n o f values Lewis wishes t o avoid a c o n f u s i o n t h a t may a r i s e concern-i n g the c r i t e r i o n o f t r a n s v a l u a t i o n . T h i s c r i t e r i o n i s the r e l a t i o n of each moment o f experience t o the whole of experience and not i t s r e l a t i o n t o any non-experienceable i d e a l . The l i f e found good i n the l i v i n g o f i t i s the u l t -imate c r i t e r i o n of v a l u e . The complexity of t h i s c o n c e p t i o n i s at once apparent. There i s no value save t h a t d i s c l o s e d i n the immediacies of e x p e r i e n c e . But the immediacies o f experience are i n -g r e d i e n t i n a temporal G e s t a l t and are i n f u s e d w i t h a r a t -i o n a l concern f o r t h e f u t u r e and what may be r e a l i z e d as a r e s u l t o f d e l i b e r a t e and f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g a c t i o n . Immediate experience and a c o g n i t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p l a c e d upon i t s i g n a l i z e what may be r e a l i z e d . And e v a l u a t i o n of the mul^... t i p i i c i t y of p o s s i b l e ends of a c t i o n d i c t a t e s what i s sen-t s i b l y r e a l i z e d o r a t l e a s t s i g n i f i c a n t l y sought a f t e r i n exper i e n c e . E v a l u a t i o n o f ends and means i s t h e r e f o r e a c o n t i n u i n g s e l f - c o n s c i o u s e n t e r p r i s e of human l i v i n g which acknowledges the i n t r i n s i c value of each moment but i s ever s e n s i t i v e t o the p e c u l i a r i n t e r r e l a t e d n e s s o f a l l such moments and t h e i r v a l u e s . Lewis' concept of a whole of 28. experience, i t w i l l be seen, functions i n much the same manner i n his theory of value as does the " p r i n c i p l e of 20 inclusiveness" i n Perry's theory. For the h i s t o r i c a l record i t i s also i n t e r e s t i n g to note the extent to which both Lewis and Perry were'influenced by William James. 21 Perry quotes James as follows: "That act must be the best act, accordingly, which makes for the best whole i n the sense of awakening the l e a s t sum of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s . " And according to Lewis " . . . ( l i f e ) should be envisaged as a whole and no part of i t omitted from our concern." The l i f e which i s good on the whole i s constituted good by i t s being a complex configuration of p a r t i c u l a r i n t r i n s i c a l l y desirable experiences. Thus the ultimate or f i n a l good, while i t i s not definable except i n terms of immediately apprehended goods, does not represent a mere sum or c o l l e c t i o n of such goods. I t i s t h i s circum-stance which complicates the epistemological determination of value i n any p a r t i c u l a r case. There i s required, apart from d i r e c t value-findings and comparatively unambiguous empirical hypotheses, an imaginative and synthetic envis-agement of a whole of experience. And t h i s envisagement 20. Perry, R.B., General Theory of Value. Harvard Univ. Press, 1950, p. 645 21. Perry, R.B., Ibid., p. 645. The passage quoted i s from James' W i l l to Believe, p. 205 22. Lewis, C.I., op. c i t . , p. 495 1 29, i n v o l v e s complex judgements which r e l a t e i n a s i n g l e " i n t u i t i o n " past experience and i t s v a l u e - q u a l i t y and a n t i c i p a t e d f u t u r e experience and i t s probable v a l u e -q u a l i t y . A whole of experience i s never a t any moment experienced d i r e c t l y as a d i s c r e t e a c t u a l i t y - i t must be conceived or c o n s t r u c t e d on a b a s i s of past experience and the fund of knowledge a l r e a d y confirmed In e x p e r i e n c e . In t h i s sense the envisagement of a whole o f experience i n v o l v e d i m p l i c a t i o n s which may be s u b j e c t e d to the t e s t o f d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t e m p i r i c a l c o n f i r m a t i o n . I t i n v o l v e s hypotheses concerning the content o f past e x p e r i e n c e , I t s v a l u e - q u a l i t y , and i t s e m p i r i c a l l y determinable cause-e f f e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h f u t u r e e x p e r i e n c e . I t i n v o l v e s hypotheses which p r e d i c t s p e c i f i c events and which r e l a t e these events to c e r t a i n a n t i c i p a t e d e x p e r i e n c e s . And most i m p o r t a n t l y i t i n v o l v e s a r e c o g n i t i o n of the o r g a n i c nature of the whole such t h a t an apprehension of u l t i m a t e value w i l l be seen to depend upon an adequate grasp of what i s on the whole or i n the l o n g run s a t i s f y i n g . A premature and a b s o l u t i s t i c e v a l u a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s or experience i s , on t h i s showing, p e r v e r s e and i r r a t i o n a l because there i s no a p r i o r i i n d i c a t i o n - t h a t , , i : an adequate envisagement of a whole of l i f e has i n any i n s t a n c e been ac h i e v e d . The r e v e l a t i o n s of f r e s h e x p e r i -ence w i l l i n e v i t a b l y a f f e c t the cumulative value of any s t r e t c h of experience a l r e a d y e v a l u a t e d . Moreover f r e s h 30. evidence may a f f e c t the p r e v i o u s l y conceived i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n o f past experience and thereby a f f e c t the values i n v o l v e d . I f a l i m i t i s p r e s c r i b e d to the otherwise i n - ~ d e f i n i t e degree i n which an e v a l u a t i o n of a whole of l i f e may be s u b s t a n t i a t e d , such a l i m i t can o n l y be j u s t i f i e d p r a g m a t i c a l l y . There are no l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which are p e r t i n e n t i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n - normally i t i s the p r e s s u r e of b i o l o g i c a l , p s y c h o l o g i c a l and s o c i o l o i c a l f o r c e s which d e f i n e s the a r b i t r a r y l i m i t to be p l a c e d upon a s i g n i f i c a n t quest f o r v a l u e s . But t h e o r e t i c a l l y t h i s quest i s a never-ending one the f i n d i n g s of which may be a f f o r d e d a g r e a t e r o r l e s s e r degree of p r o b a b i l i t y o n l y . Perhaps Lewis would contend t h a t j u s t as I t i s a r a t i o n a l i m p e r a t i v e which e n j o i n s one t o evaluate a whole of exper-i e n c e so i s i t a l s o a r a t i o n a l i mperative which checks any tendency to become abnormally concerned w i t h such an e v a l u a t i o n . An abnormal p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h questions con-c e r n i n g o v e r - a r c h i n g values may e a s i l y p r e j u d i c e the r e a l -i z a t i o n o f a c t u a l value i n e x p e r i e n c e . I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n one's "common sense 1' must be c o n s u l t e d and d e l i b e r a t e ac-t i o n i n i t i a t e d i n s p i t e o f the f a c t t h a t many o f the en-s u i n g consequences of a c t i o n are not f o r e s e e n . One jumps from the p a t h of an on-coming express t r a i n and one's d e c i s i o n so to a c t i s s e n s i b l y taken - i n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t o n l y one consequence of one's a c t i o n i s c o n s i d -ered, v i z . t h a t one's l i f e w i l l be momentarily out of . 3 1 . danger. Thus i n a c t u a l p r a c t i c e the business o f e v a l u a t i o n i s seldom the calm and c a l c u l a t i n g discernment of u l t i m a t e values which ensures the h i g h e s t l e v e l o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n one's d e l i b e r a t e or w i l l e d a c t i o n . T h i s i s perhaps as i t should be because t o a c t i s o f t e n more r a t i o n a l than to surrender the goods of a c t i o n on the p r e t e x t t h a t these goods a r e not completely f o r e s e e a b l e . No r u l e of course can be formulated which w i l l s t r i k e a n i c e balance between a c t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n i n every case, but the ensuing con-sequences w i l l u s u a l l y i n d i c a t e that the emphasis has been p r o p e r l y or improperly p l a c e d . Here again, even a d e c i s i o n to take a c t i o n i s a s p e c i e s of e m p i r i c a l hypo-t h e s i s v e r i f i a b l e i n f u t u r e experience. F o l l o w i n g the development of Lewis' thought the. ques-t i o n o f value i n o b j e c t s must now be c o n s i d e r e d . In s p i t e of the complexity of the v a l u i n g s i t u a t i o n i t i s s t i l l p o s s i b l e t o keep separate the v a r i o u s modes of v a l u e -p r e d i c a t i o n and the meanings of the statements which em-body them. The a t t r i b u t i o n of value to o b j e c t s i s the commonest type of v a l u e - p r e d i c a t i o n . And such p r e d i c a t i o n i n a l l i t s modes r e p r e s e n t s a form of e m p i r i c a l c o g n i t i o n the u l t i m a t e b a s i s of which i s some a c t u a l experience of i n t r i n s i c v a l u e . In i t s broadest and l e a s t s p e c i f i c sense "X i s good" (where X stands f o r an object) s i g n i f i e s t h a t X has an e m p i r i c a l l y determinable r e l a t i o n t o the value experience o f some s u b j e c t . When val u e i s p r e d i c a t e d of 32. an o b j e c t t h i s much at l e a s t i s meant and a g r e a t d e a l more may be intended as w e l l . The value of an o b j e c t c o n s i s t s i n i t s p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r g i v i n g r i s e t o c e r t a i n e x p e r i e n c e s . In an important sense a l l p r o p e r t i e s of o b j e c t s are p o t e n t i a l i t i e s f o r g i v i n g r i s e t o c e r t a i n e x p e r i e n c e s . T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n of the matter i s simply an e x p l i c a t i o n of the meaning of " e m p i r i c a l c o g n i t i o n " . The .redness of an o b j e c t i s a p o t e n t i a l i t y which the o b j e c t possesses f o r s t i m u l a t i n g one's v i s u a l apparatus such t h a t when the o b j e c t i s ob-served the d i s t i n c t i v e c o l o r datum occurs i n one's exper-i e n c e . S i m i l a r l y with the s o - c a l l e d o b j e c t i v e (primary) q u a l i t i e s , shape, motion, weight, e t c . , Except these p r o p e r t i e s r e v e a l themselves i n some p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e no e m p i r i c a l d e f i n i t i o n of them would be meaningful -they could not be r e presented as r e a l p r o p e r t i e s of the o b j e c t i n q u e s t i o n . Even the p r o p e r t y of h a ving a s p e c i f i c atomic weight ( f o r example), i s a p o t e n t i a l i t y of some-t h i n g f o r g i v i n g r i s e t o c e r t a i n experiences i n the l a b -o r a t o r y which alone a t t e s t the e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y o f the p r o p e r t y . Thus the p r o p e r t y " v a l u e " which a t h i n g p o s s e s s -es i s j u s t as much a p r o p e r t y of the t h i n g as the prop-e r t y c o m p r e s s i b i l i t y i s of a i r or as weight i s of mercury. I f a c e r t a i n volume of mercury be p l a c e d on a s c a l e then the i n d i c a t o r needle w i l l be d e f l e c t e d a c e r t a i n d i s t a n c e . T h e r e f o r e a c e r t a i n volume of mercury has a c e r t a i n weight. 33. What i s meant by the p r o p e r t y weight, and whether an o b j e c t possesses i t or not, i s determined by the procedure spec-i f i e d i n t h e s u b j u n c t i v e c o n d i t i o n a l " i f . . i t h e n " s t a t e -ment. In the case o f value p r o p e r t i e s the procedure i s ess-e n t i a l l y the same, except t h a t i n any a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of value r e f e r e n c e must be made to an experience of i n t r i -n s i c v a l u e . I t would not e.g. be necessary o r perhaps even meaningful to r e f e r t o an experience of " i n t r i n s i c weight", i n order t o c o n f i r m the e x i s t e n c e o f weight i n an o b j e c t . But by the r e l a t i v i t y of value i s meant j u s t t h i s necessary r e l a t i o n of value i n o b j e c t s t o v a l u e as apprehended i n e x p e r i e n c e . Here one o f the t r a d i t i o n a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p u z z l e s i n c o n n e c t i o n with v a l u e suggests i t s e l f . I f the nature o f o b j e c t i v e value cannot be under-stood except i n terms of a r e f e r e n c e t o s u b j e c t i v e exper-i e n c e what c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are p e r t i n e n t t o an e v a l u a t i o n of experience i t s e l f ? In terms of what c r i t e r i o n may s i g -i n i f i c a n t experience be i d e n t i f i e d i n case the a c t u a l v a l -ue of an obj e c t be d i s a g r e e d upon by two i n d i v i d u a l s who  do not di s a g r e e about the p e r t i n e n t e m p i r i c a l f a c t s ? Some d i s c u s s i o n o f these d i f f i c u l t i e s i s i n c l u d e d i n L e w i s 1 treatment o f the immediately v a l u a b l e . But the problems i n v o l v e d are thrown i n t o sharper focus i n the presen t d i s -c u s s i o n . Lewis maintains t h a t the r e l a t i v i t y of value does not t u r n upon the r e l a t i o n of an o b j e c t to the experience of 34. p a r t i c u l a r persons. I t depends r a t h e r "... upon the c i r -cumstances under which the s a t i s f a c t i o n t o which an ob-23 j e c t may conduce would be r e a l i z e d i n e x p e r i e n c e . " ^ He thus makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between the r e l a t i v i t y o f value and the r e l a t i v i t y o f v a l u e s . Value i n o b j e c t s i n i t s g e n e r i c sense i s indeed r e l a t i v e t o experience - but t h i s does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean that c o n t r a r y v a l u e - p r e d i c a t i o n s are h o p e l e s s l y i r r e c o n c i l a b l e . I t i s important t h a t the c o n d i t i o n s under which an e v a l u a t i o n i s made be taken i n t o account; and these c o n d i t i o n s i n c l u d e the p s y c h o l o g i c a l make-up of the e v a l u a t o r , h i s c u l t u r a l background, and i n s h o r t , a l l o f the p e r t i n e n t circumstances which account f o r h i s having made an e v a l u a t i o n at a l l . Once these a re understood the sense i n which value i s p r e d i c a t e d o f the o b j e c t w i l l be. understood. In t h i s connection the v a r i o u s modes i n which value i s a t t r i b u t e d to o b j e c t s c a l l f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n . The a t t r i b u t i o n of value qua bare p o t e n t i a l i t y l e a v e s a great many quest i o n s unanswered because of the v a r i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which may l e g i t i m a t e l y be p l a c e d upon i t . When c e r t a i n q u a l i f i c a t i o n s are i n t r o d u c e d concerning c o n d i t i o n s t o be r e a l i z e d before an o b j e c t w i l l be c o r -r e c t l y judged v a l u a b l e a t t r i b u t i o n s o f simple p o t e n t i a -l i t y become a t t r i b u t i o n s of v a l u e - i n - f a c t . To say t h a t water i s good i s t o s t a t e a simple p o t e n t i a l i t y o f water v i z . t h a t i t i s of such a c h a r a c t e r t h a t i t may i n some 23. Lewis, C.I., I b i d . , p. 512 35. sense c o n t r i b u t e t o v a l u e - q u a l i t y i n expe r i e n c e . To say t h a t water has a h e a l t h - g i v i n g value i s t o d e l i m i t the sense i n which water i s good and to s t a t e that under c e r -t a i n s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s water has a c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c v a l u e . T h i s i s an a t t r i b u t i o n of v a l u e - i n - f a c t . Most value p r e d i c a t i o n s are o f t h i s order, although i n grammatical form they may appear t o be a b s o l u t e or u n q u a l i f i e d . The u n c r i t i c a l use of value statements by most pay people f i t s t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n . And many a p p a r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y pred-i c a t i o n s of value t u r n out, under a n a l y s i s , t o be s l i p -shod expressions of values which are q u i t e compatible when t h e i r f u l l meanings are e x p l i c a t e d . U n t i l such a f u l l e x p l i c a t i o n i s cahieved no s i g n i f i c a n t a p p r a i s a l o f value statements i s p o s s i b l e . I t i s i n t h i s sense t h a t many questions i n both v a l u e theory and e t h i c s are v e r b a l ones and t h e i r answers dependent upon p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s r a t h e r than on e m p i r i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n . I t i s i n t h i s sense a l s o that the e m p i r i c a l meaningfulness of a value s t a t e -ment i s dependent on the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s being v e r i f i e d . I t w i l l be seen, i n t h i s connection, t h a t an a t t r i b u t i o n of bare p o t e n t i a l i t y (an u n q u a l i f i e d a s s e r t i o n of the form "X i s good") i s l i t t l e b e t t e r than meaningless. I t s method of v e r i f i c a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e i t s meaning de-pend upon the i n t r o d u c t i o n of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s s p e c i f y i n g p r e c i s e l y under what c o n d i t i o n s the o b j e c t w i l l g i v e r i s e to v a l u e - e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s i s almost tantamount t o s a y i n g 36. t h a t no a t t r i b u t i o n of value to o b j e c t s i s e m p i r i c a l l y meaningful u n l e s s i t i s an a t t r i b u t i o n o f v a l u e - i n - f a c t . The i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s view w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d l a t e r . Of p a r t i c u l a r importance i n value theory are p r e d i -c a t i o n s o f v a l u e - i n - f a c t i n the mode of r e l a t i v i t y t o persons. A f a m i l i a r c r i t i c i s m of n a t u r a l i s t i c t h e o r i e s of value has i t t h a t any d e t e r m i n a t i o n of value which depends upon a r e f e r e n c e to p e r s o n a l f e e l i n g s and a t t i t u d e s i s bound t o le a d to a s p e c i e s of r e l a t i v i s m which renders a l l v a l u a t i o n s a r b i t r a r y . Lewis i s aware of t h i s d i f f i c u l t y and i s e x p r e s s l y concerned to a v o i d such a "Protagorean r e l a t i v i s m " . There i s a sense i n which an o b j e c t may have o b j e c t -i v e value and y e t be v a l u e - l e s s : i t o a p a r t i c u l a r person at a p a r t i c u l a r time and i n p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A s i e v e has no value t o a man who i s b a i l i n g out a l e a k y boat, but h i s present d i s v a l u i n g o f the s i e v e i s no i n d i c a t i o n of i t s o b j e c t i v e or on-the-whole v a l u e . The o b j e c t has o b j e c t i v e value but at the same time "has no v a l u e " as judged by the man i n the boat. Thus i t i s p e r f e c t l y c o r -r e c t t o say t h a t "X has jtm v a l u e " ( i n one sense) and that " i t i s not the case t h a t X has v a l u e " ( i n q u i t e a d i f f -erent sense). The o b j e c t has p r o p e r t i e s which make i t 24. Lewis endorses the * v e r i f i a b i l i t y c r i t e r i o n of e m p i r i -c a l meaningfulness' - but c r e d i t i s due t o P e i r c e f o r f i r s t h a v i n g formulated t h i s c o n c e p t i o n ( u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d t o as the Pragmatist theory of meaning)• See below p. 56. v a l u a b l e whatever circumstances may prevent i t s being a c t u a l l y valued i n c e r t a i n c o n t e x t s . Not only ' e n v i r o n -mental' circumstances are i n v o l v e d ; the value of an o b j e c t i s not apprehended by some persons because of an o r g a n i c or p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n c a p a c i t y on t h e i r p a r t s so t o apprehend i t . Thus a person w i t h tone deafness may not value an ob-j e c t i v e l y v a l u a b l e p i e c e o f music; but h i s d i s v a l u i n g would be c o g n i t i v e l y s i g n i f i c a n t only w i t h . e x p l i c i t r e f e r -ence t o h i s i n c a p a c i t y . A d i f f e r e n t problem however i s i n v o l v e d i n the f a c t t h a t sometimes an o b j e c t w i l l be valued by a person when i t does not gen u i n e l y possess o b j e c t i v e v a l u e . W i l l f u l murder e.g. i s g e n e r a l l y conceded not to have o b j e c t i v e v a l u e , i . e . i t i s an event which has no p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o the v a l u a b l e experience of anyone. But o c c a s i o n a l l y a person appears who does value the event -e i t h e r as a means to some f u r t h e r v a l u a b l e event, or as p o s s e s s i n g an i n h e r e n t a l b e i t p e r v e r s e value i n i t s e l f . Lewis attempts t o r e s o l v e t h i s paradox by s u g g e s t i n g t h a t the o b j e c t i v e value of an o b j e c t i s u s u a l l y conceived i n terms o f i t s comparative v a l u e . Thus another c a s u i s t i c p r i n c i p l e has been i n t r o d u c e d . An o b j e c t may have more p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r c r e a t i n g d i s v a l u e i n experience than value and on t h i s b a s i s be termed o b j e c t i v e l y d i s v a l u a b l e . But i t may possess some p o t e n t i a l i t i e s f o r good and thus be termed v a l u a b l e i n an a b s o l u t e (thought somewhat t r i v i a l ) 38. sense. An Important p o i n t has here been c l a r i f i e d . To say tha t an o b j e c t has no o b j e c t i v e value i s not to say t h a t i t possesses no p o t e n t i a l i t y whatever f o r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o valu e - e x p e r i e n c e but r a t h e r t h a t i t s p o t e n t i a l i t i e s f o r d i s v a l u e f a r outweigh i t s p o t e n t i a l i t i e s f o r v a l u e . I t i s q u i t e c o n c e i v e a b l e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t some va l u e may be a t t r i b u t e d to an o b j e c t which has no o b j e c t i v e value i n the sense t h a t , comparatively speaking, i t s v a l u e i s i n -s i g n i f i c a n t i n the scheme of t h i n g s . V alue may of course be a t t r i b u t e d t o an o b j e c t poss-e s s i n g no o b j e c t i v e value because the a t t r i b u t o r i s or g -a n i c a l l y abnormal and g i v e n t o e x p e r i e n c i n g s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the presence of o b j e c t s which normal persons d i s v a l u e . The murderer may be a s a d i s t . The problem then a r i s e s of s p e c i f y i n g c r i t e r i a which d e l i m i t the c l a s s o f normal persons. These c r i t e r i a , as a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s and others take c a r e t o p o i n t out, are c u l t u r a l l y d e f i n e d , and t h i s i m p l i e s t h a t the a c t u a l value o f o b j e c t s w i l l i n any i n s -tance be r e l a t i v e to a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e , Lewis i s s t i l l c o r r e c t i n i n s i s t i n g however that the v a l u e - e x p e r i e n c e an o b j e c t may g i v e r i s e t o i s not a f f e c t e d by the value i t does a c t u a l l y g i v e r i s e t o . To use h i s example, g o l d may 25. A most p e n e t r a t i n g , though e a s i l y r ead, account of t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f human s o c i e t y i s given i n Ruth B e n e d i c t ' s w e l l known P a t t e r n s of C u l t u r e . C l a s s i c a l e x p r e s s i o n of the view i s to be found i n the w r i t i n g s of Westermarck and other a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s . C f . a l s o Durkheim, E., Elementary Forms of  the R e l i g i o u s L i f e . 39. be of no value t o a p r i m i t i v e I n d i a n t r i b e but t h i s f a c t does not a l t e r the q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f a c t t h a t g o l d as such possesses p r o p e r t i e s capable of g i v i n g r i s e t o the e x p e r i -ence of genuine value on the p a r t o f someone. And what i s at any p a r t i c u l a r time a c t u a l l y valued i s perhaps of l e s s importance f o r value theory than what i s capable of com-manding approbation on the whole or i n the l o n g run. The f a c t t h a t a person a c t u a l l y values an o b j e c t i s only a very s l i g h t i n d i c a t i o n of the f u l l p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of the o b j e c t f o r g i v i n g r i s e to s i m i l a r or d i f f e r e n t s a t i s f a c -t i o n s on the p a r t of o t h e r s . In case t h e r e i s an o r g a n i c p e c u l i a r i t y a f f e c t i n g the person's experience the f a c t t h a t he values i t may be t o t a l l y n o n - i n d i c a t i v e of i t s a c t u a l v a l u e . Such an apprehension o f value would be sub-j e c t i v e and would not be a r e l i a b l e b a s i s f o r p r e d i c t i n g the a c c r u a l of f u r t h e r v a l u e - q u a l i t y . In f a c t t h i s very n e a r l y sums up Lewis' d e f i n i t i o n of s u b j e c t i v i t y . Whatever apprehension of value r e v e a l s i t s e l f as an erroneous i n d -i c a t i o n o f f u t u r e p o s s i b l e v a l u e - e x p e r i e n c e or of v a l u e -experiences on the p a r t o f o t h e r s i s by t h a t token s u b j e c -t i v e . Thus t h e r e are two main c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which a f f e c t the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of values i n t o " s u b j e c t i v e " and "objec-t i v e " . Before i t can be s a i d t o possess o b j e c t i v e value an o b j e c t must be shown to be a c o n t i n u i n g source of s a t -i s f a c t i o n -to the i n d i v i d u a l who v a l u e s i t and i t must be a source of on-the-whole or comparative s a t i s f a c t i o n t o o t h -40. e r s . In t h i s sense the o b j e c t i v i t y of value i s pre -c i s e l y of t h e same c h a r a c t e r as the o b j e c t i v i t y of any other p r o p e r t y of o b j e c t s . The o b j e c t i v e v a l u e of an o b j e c t c o n s i s t s i n the e m p i r i c a l l y a t t e s t e d r e l a t i o n between i t and the experience, a c t u a l o r p o s s i b l e , of persons. The r e l a t i o n a s s e r t e d has the same s t a t u s as a r e l a t i o n (say) between l i t m u s paper and a c i d s . I t i s an e x c e e d i n g l y complex r e l a t i o n of course, due t o the excee d i n g l y complex c h a r a c t e r o f the human organism and i t s s o c i a l environment. But i t i s a r e l a t i o n the nature of which may be determined by e m p i r i c a l methods and ex-pressed i n terms of e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s . Truths about values are thus a f f o r d e d a measure of p r o b a b i l i t y o n l y and are p r o p e r l y s u b j e c t t o c o n t i n u i n g c o n f i r m a t i o n and m o d i f i c a t i o n j u s t as are the t r u t h s of p h y s i c s and chem-i s t r y . Indeed i t should be apparent by now t h a t the t r u t h s about values hang together w i t h t r u t h s about other e m p i r i c a l e n t i t i e s . The laws of astronomy, i n s p i t e of t h e i r remoteness from the laws of human psychology, may be r e l e v a n t i n some r e s p e c t s t o en e m p i r i c a l determina-t i o n o f v a l u e . The f a c t t h a t the sun produces r a d i a t i o n s of a c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r and w i t h a c e r t a i n u n i f o r m i t y i s a f a c t t h a t may have to be c o n s i d e r e d in:any assessment of the value o f o b j e c t s whose r e l a t i o n t o human experience i s a more proximate one. N e v e r t h e l e s s i t mUit be r e c o g n i z e d t h a t value theory must loo k more and more to the s o c i a l 41. s c i e n c e s f o r support and c o r r o b o r a t i o n . The i n c r e a s i n g p r e o c c u p a t i o n with e m p i r i c a l methods i n psychology, an-thropology, s o c i o l o g y , h i s t o r y and cognate d i s c i p l i n e s bears out the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l a p r i o r i s t i o approaches are i n e p t • The o n l y a p r i o r i s m which Lewis endorses i s that which c h a r a c t e r i z e s the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of meanings. The v a l i d i t y of these i s c e r t i f i e d by ' c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n " o n l y , no e m p i r i c a l c o n f i r m a t i o n of them being p o s s i b l e . What i s r e q u i r e d i n the determin-a t i o n of meanings i s t h a t one apprehend adequately what one intends by the use of c e r t a i n e x p r e s s i o n s . I t i s Lewis' b e l i e f t h a t once v a l u e - e x p r e s s i o n s a r e e x p l i c a t e d i n t h i s manner the question of o b j e c t i v e value i s seen to be an e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n the o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e s o l u -t i o n o f which i s a p r o b a b i l i t y judgement based u l t i m a t e l y upon e m p i r i c a l d a t a . I V . (A) The problems germane to the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of value i n o b j e c t s are l e g i o n ; and i t i s here suggested t h a t not a l l o f these problems are e m p i r i c a l l y r e s o l u b l e . The as-c r i p t i o n of bare p o t e n t i a l i t y to an o b j e c t , as was noted above, i s of l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l importance. I t i s the mere form o f a judgement r a t h e r than a judgement 42. i t s e l f . Lewis i s f o r c e d to admit t h a t " . . . h a r d l y any v a l u a t i o n envisages a p o t e n t i a l i t y so bare as to be f r e e 26 of a l l i m p l i c i t l i m i t a t i o n s . " I n order t o be e m p i r i -c a l l y meaningful a v a l u a t i o n must i n v o l v e c e r t a i n l i m i -t a t i o n s p r e s c r i b i n g i n what sense the o b j e c t i n q u e s t i o n has v a l u e . Any v a l u a t i o n which d i d not i n v o l v e these l i m i t a t i o n s could not be v e r i f i e d because one would not have the s l i g h t e s t n o t i o n as t o how to proceed w i t h the v e r i f i c a t i o n . When t h i s procedure of v e r i f i c a t i o n i s not s p e c i f i e d the problem of v a l u e - d e t e r m i n a t i o n l o s e s i t s meaning. And i t f o l l o w s from t h i s that no c a t e g o r -i c a l ' a t t r i b u t i o n of value i s e m p i r i c a l l y meaningful. T h e o r e t i c a l l y the meaning of a v a l u a t i o n i n v o l v e s an understanding of the p r e c i s e method of i t s v e r i f i c a t i o n . I n view o f these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see j u s t what Lewis means by an o b j e c t ' s having imper-s o n a l v a l u e . A l l value i s r e l a t i v e t o persons because i t i s o n l y persons who have the type of experience termed i n t r i n s i c a l l y good. But i n a s s e s s i n g the s o c i a l value of an o b j e c t Lewis suggests t h a t a l l the value .properties of the o b j e c t must be taken i n t o account and the v a l u e -i n - g e n e r a l of t h e o b j e c t determined w i t h r e s p e c t t o any and a l l persons who may experience i t . Now a p e r f e c t l y obvious d e v i c e may be employed to ensure that such a v a l u a t i o n be rendered unambiguous v i z . , the p r e c i s e num-26. Lewis, C.I., I b i d . , p. 540 43. ber of persons r e f e r r e d to may be s p e c i f i e d and the - t o t a l i t y of c o n d i t i o n s a f f e c t i n g t h e i r e xperience of the o b j e c t be d e s c r i b e d . The v a l u a t i o n would then become an a t r i b u t i o n of v a l u e - i n - f a c t i n the mode of r e l a t i v i t y to persons. I f t h i s i s what Lewis means by the imper-s o n a l value of a t h i n g the t h e o r e t i c a l problem i s s o l -u b l e . But there are passages which imply t h a t no such s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e i s intended, and t h a t i t i s meaning-f u l to a t t r i b u t e value to t h i n g s w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o peo-v 27 p i e g e n e r a l l y or t o " a l l p e ople". What i s more t o be wondered at i s t h a t Lewis proposes t o give the e x p e r i -ences of a l l people equal weight In t h i s c o n n e c t i o n . T h i s recommendation i s h a r d l y compatible w i t h the view expressed e a r l i e r , v i z . that perverse and i r r a t i o n a l modes of f e e l i n g must be d i s r e g a r d e d or a t l e a s t d i s -counted. What appears to be a t i s s u e here i s a d e f i n i -t i o n of the " n a t u r a l man" and of " n o r m a l i t y " as a p p l i e d to the d i r e c t apprehension of v a l u e - q u a l i t y i n e x p e r i -ence. And i f "normal" i s to be d e f i n e d by a s t a t i s t i -c a l average n o t h i n g i s proved about value except (as Lewis admits) what i s r e l a t i v e to a m a j o r i t y . Moreover i t w i l l be remembered t h a t the more s i g n i f i c a n t of d i r -e c t v a l u e - f i n d i n g s are not those focussed upon the spe-c i o u s present but those addressed to a complex imagina-t i v e envisagement of a whole of l i f e . C l e a r l y , not a l l 27. Lewis, C.I., I b i d . , p. 545 44. persons have the same discernment and power o f imagin-a t i o n necessary to achieve such an'-envisagement. I t would be q u i t e i n c o n s i s t e n t to p l a c e as much emphasis upon the experience of a d u l l a r d as upon that of an a r t i s t i c genius. Lewis i s faced, here, w i t h a c u r i o u s paradox. Presumably impersonal value i s one of the more important types of value because i t i s i n d i c a t i v e of what i s most l i k e l y t o conduce t o the s a t i s f a c t i o n of most persons i n the l o n g run. I n view of the extremely complex nature of v a l u a t i o n the presence of impersonal v a l u e i n a t h i n g out to be determined by persons en-dowed w i t h the h i g h e s t degree of s p i r i t u a l discernment and having an understanding of a g r e a t volume of empir-i c a l l y a t t e s t e d f a c t of a q u i t e t e c h n i c a l n a t u r e . Ide-a l l y one would c o n s u l t the experience of an A r i s t o t l e or a Goethe. And yet Lewis denies t h a t the experience of one person should count f o r more than t h a t of ano-t h e r . W i t h i n t h e scope of the present treatment such p r o -blems as these cannot begin t o be d i s c u s s e d with any thoroughness. I t . w i l l perhaps serye some u s e f u l pur-pose however to i n d i c a t e what the c r u c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s are i n Lewis' views and t o suggest what c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are p e r t i n e n t to t h e i r s o l u t i o n . In p a r t i c u l a r the r e l -evance of c e r t a i n c r i t i c i s m s o f f e r e d by those who en-45. dorse the emotive theory of value w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d . Most of the q u e s t i o n s a r i s i n g from the c o n c e p t i o n of v a l u a t i o n qua e m p i r i c a l c o g n i t i o n a r e , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , not e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n s ; r a t h e r they concern the means of c l a r i f i c a t i o n t o be employed i n u n f o l d i n g the meaning of v a l u a t i o n s . Where an a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of value i s concerned i t i s perhaps more important t o c l e a r away vagueness and ambiguity i n meanings than to busy o n e s e l f w i t h o b s e r v a t i o n s and e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s the r e l -evance o f which i s not apparent. P l a i n l y speaking i t i s p o i n t l e s s t o attempt the e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n o f a statement the e m p i r i c a l meaning of which i s unknown. In the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s such meanings are l a r g e l y i m p l i c i t or assumed i n the i n i t i a l stages of i n q u i r y , an e x p l i c -a t i o n o f them being undertaken a f t e r p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s have been ob t a i n e d . A p r e - a n a l y t i c grasp o f meanings i s i n every case necessary however because i t i s the mean-i n g o f a h y p o t h e s i s which must be r e f e r r e d t o i f i t s 28 method of v e r i f i c a t i o n i s t o be understood. I t w i l l be seen t h a t Lewis' d i s c u s s i o n o f v a l u a t i o n i s almost en-t i r e l y devoted t o the task of making value statements 28. C l a s s i c a l examples of the e x p l i c a t i o n of p r e - a n a l -ytic" meanings are Hume's a n a l y s i s o f e f f i c i e n t c a u s a t i o n and B e r k e l e y ' s a n a l y s i s of m a t e r i a l substance. C o n s i d e r a l s o E i n s t e i n ' s a n a l y s i s of the concept of s i m u l t a n e i t y . 46. meaningful i n an e x p l i c i t sense. In Lewis' view the p h i l o s o p h i c examination of any s c i e n t i f i c d i s c i p l i n e or common sense b e l i e f c o n s i s t s i n such an e x p l i c a t i o n of i m p l i c i t or u n c o n s c i o u s l y employed meanings. In con-n e c t i o n w i t h h i s a n a l y s i s of e s t h e t i c value he makes the f o l l o w i n g o b s e r v a t i o n s , "...the nature of e s t h e t i c value i s a q u e s t i o n t o be answered by a n a l y s i s and a p r i o r i , and c o n s t i t u t e s a t o p i c f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n -v e s t i g a t i o n . " And f u r t h e r "The d e f i n i t i v e e x p l i c a t i o n of what i s meant by a t t r i b u t i n g e s t h e t i c value operates as the b a s i c c r i t e r i o n of those phenomena which a r e p e r t i n e n t t o the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of any s p e c i f i c law, and thus r e p r e s e n t s the b a s i s from which, e i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y , i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of the p o s i t i v e s c i e n c e of e s t h e t i c s must proceed." The a n a l y s i s of meaning i s t h e r e f o r e the p e c u l i a r l y p h i l o s o p h i c p a r t of value t h e o r y . "But the p o s i t i v e laws of the s c i e n c e of e s t h e t i c s are a q u e s t i o n which must be l e f t to those who possess s u f -f i c i e n t l y wide acquaintance with e s t h e t i c phenomena and are s u f f i c i e n t l y expert to be capable of a r r i v i n g at 29 t r u s t w o r t h y e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s i n t h i s f i e l d . " Thus a s t r i c t dichotomy i s set up between s c i e n c e and p h i losophy such t h a t w h i l e s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y presup-poses p h i l o s o p h i c a n a l y s i s of some s o r t , and would not 29. Lewis, C.I., op. c i t . , p. 468-469, 47. be s i g n i f i c a n t i n q u i r y u n l e s s i t d i d , p h i l o s o p h i c a n a l -y s i s need not await the f i n d i n g s of s c i e n c e but may pro-ceed a p r i o r i to e x p l i c a t e the meanings o f any concepts whatever. More i m p o r t a n t l y the soundness of p h i l o s o p h i c a n a l y s i s does not depend (as P e r r y ' s a n a l y s i s of value might suggest) upon the t r u t h or f a l s i t y o f any s c i e n t i -f i c theory and i s n o t a f f e c t e d f a v o r a b l y or u n f a v o r a b l y by any e m p i r i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n s . An apprehension of mean-i n g i s accomplished by means of c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n ; a n d i n c o n n e c t i o n with values c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n r e v e a l s , f o r Lewis, t h a t " . . . i n our mouths 'value' means 'value 30 to humans'" and 'value to humans', as the f o r e g o i n g survey of Lewis views should r e v e a l , means 'what i s u l t i m a t e l y s a t i s f a c t o r y i n the way of human ex p e r i e n c e ' . Whether the term " v a l u a b l e " or the term " s a t i s f a c t -ory" i s a p p l i e d to a c e r t a i n content of experience i s not, a c c o r d i n g t o Lewis, a mere t e r m i n o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n . I f i t were, value theory would l o s e i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e completely. What i s i n v o l v e d , r a t h e r , i s a search f o r a c r i t e r i o n which w i l l c e r t i f y the c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n of the value term t o contents of experience t o which non-value terms a l s o c o r r e c t l y a p p l y . But i f v a l u a t i o n i s always a matter o f e m p i r i c a l c o g n i t i o n the semantic .reference of value terms must i n every case be s p e c i f i -a b l e . The c o g n i t i v e meaning o f v a l u a t i o n s w i l l thus de-30. Lewis, G.I., I b i d . , p. 532 48. pend upon what i s designated by value terms, and the d i s t i n c t i v e c o g n i t i v e meaning o f v a l u a t i o n s w i l l depend upon whether the value terms i n v o l v e d designate some-t h i n g d i f f e r e n t from what non-value terms d e s i g n a t e . I f e.g. the term " v a l u a b l e " d e s i g n a t e s a content of exper-ience which i s a l s o c o r r e c t l y designated by the term, " d e s i r a b l e " the d e c i s i o n as to which term to employ would be a t e r m i n o l o g i c a l one, And i t might appear t h a t i n t h i s sense Lewis' a n a l y s i s amounts to j u s t such a t e r m i n o l o g i c a l d e c i s i o n . Such a c o n c l u s i o n however i s only p a r t l y warranted. As a rough approximation Lewis d i d suggest t h a t the v a l u a b l e and the d e s i r a b l e are one and the same. But h i s e n t i r e subsequent a n a l y s i s i s designed to q u a l i f y t h i s rudimentary d e f i n i t i o n . In h i s view every c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n of the term " d e s i r a b l e " does not . n e c e s s a r i l y warrant a p p l i c a t i o n o f the term " v a l u a b l e " . Perhaps the only u n q u a l i f i e d l y c o r r e c t app-l i c a t i o n of the term " v a l u a b l e " i s to something c a l l e d "a whole of e x p e r i e n c e " . T h e r e f o r e the f a c t t h a t some element o f experience i s c o r r e c t l y c l a s s i f i a b l e as rades^ i r a b l e " does not n e c e s s a r i l y imply t h a t i t i s c o r r e c t l y c l a s s i f i a b l e as " v a l u a b l e " . What does warrant the a p p l i -c a t i o n of " v a l u a b l e " i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s i s a r a t i o n a l i m p e r a t i v e , v i z . "Judge a l l experiences i n terms of t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o a whole of experience which i s s a t i s f y i n g as s u c h l " I t w i l l be remembered t h a t Lewis i n t r o d u c e d t h i s 4 9 . i m p e r a t i v e to f a c i l i t a t e a t r a n s v a l u a t i o n of values and to set up a c r i t i q u e which would a v o i d the l a t e n t r e l a t i v i s m i n n a t u r a l i s t i c t h e o r i e s . Without t h i s norm no norms at a l l would have any s i g n i f i c a n c e . But w i t h the r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h i s norm the meanings of v a l u a t i o n s 31 w i l l become immediately apparent. Whether the a p p l i c -a t i o n o f a v a l u e term i s i n any i n s t a n c e warranted i s a q u e s t i o n , then, t o be answered by him who has an adequ-ate grasp of what i s meant by "a whole o f e x p e r i e n c e s a t i s f y i n g as such" and who i s s u f f i c i e n t l y informed of the c o n t r i b u t o r y nature of the experience t o be judged. I f the d e s i r a b i l i t y of an experience i m p l i e d i t s value without q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h e r e would be no grounds f o r ma--k i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n between r a t i o n a l and p erverse e v a l u -a t i o n s and no b a s i s upon which t o e r e c t a c r i t i q u e of v a l u e u n l e s s a p u r e l y a r b i t r a r y one. These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a l l seem to p o i n t to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , f o r Lewis, the f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f any v a l u a t i o n i s not apprehended except w i t h d e f i n i t e r e f e r e n c e to a p a r t i c u l a r r a t i o n a l i m p e r a t i v e . To value an experience i s not merely to p r i z e i t or t o d e s i r e i t ; r a t h e r i t i s to p r i z e and des-i r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y or r e l a t i v e to an u l t i m a t e purpose. I f Lewis i s to be c r i t i c i z e d f o r d e f i n i n g value con-cepts i n terms of d e s c r i p t i v e p r e d i c a t e s the c r i t i c w i l l have to r e c o g n i z e t h a t " v a l u a b l e " and d e s i r a b l e " are 31. T h e i r g e n e r i c meaning, t h a t i s . 50. not f l a t l y synonymous i n Lewis' view u n l e s s what i s found d e s i r a b l e i s a whole of experience as such. But w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o such a whole of experience Lewis does use the terms " d e s i r a b l e " and " v a l u a b l e " i n t e r c h a n g a b l y . The f a c t t h a t a whole of e x p e r i e n c e i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y d e s i r a b l e c o n s t i t u t e s i t good. Lewis' p o s i t i o n on t h i s matter i s q u i t e unambiguous. When he a s s e r t s that v a l u -a t i o n i s a matter of e m p i r i c a l c o g n i t i o n only he i s ob-v i o u s l y t a k i n g f o r granted the r e c o g n i t i o n of a v a l i d i m p e r a t i v e . And h i s i m p e r a t i v e a s s e r t s that value and s a t i s f a c t i o n are i d e n t i c a l where a s y n t h e t i c view of a whole o f l i f e i s a c h i e v e d . ' I t would be i n c o r r e c t , then, to say that Lewis eq-uates the v a l u a b l e and the s a t i s f y i n g i n the manner t h a t some h e d o n i s t s equate p l e a s u r e and the good. H i s i s a much more c a t h o l i c and a much more s o p h i s t i c a t e d con-c e p t i o n than that of Bentham, f o r example. I f Lewis i s aware of n o t h i n g e l s e he i s c e r t a i n l y . a w a r e of the com-p l e x i t y of h i s s u b j e c t and of the dangers of over-simp-l i f i c a t i o n . He purposely avoids the use of concepts bor-rowed from the ' p r e c i s e " s c i e n c e s because these can ojjly do v i o l e n c e to the i n e f f a b l e c h a r a c t e r of many aspects of a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e . And i n c o n t r a - d i s t i n c t i o n to many " b e h a v i o r i s t i c " approaches he i s t y p i c a l l y concerned w i t h experience as. experienced r a t h e r than as i n t e r p r e t e d i n 32 b i o l o g i c a l terms. Both of these approaches d e a l w i t h 51. aspects o f the same complex phenomenon but L e w i s ' i s perhaps the more p e n e t r a t i n g and f r u i t f u l . He I s g e t t i n g a t the problem from w i t h i n as i t were. In s p i t e of the f e l i c i t y of Lewis' method browever c e r t a i n l o g i c a l d i f -f i c u l t i e s remain i n h i s a n a l y s i s . I t must be admitted t h a t he c o n s i d e r s the v a l u a b l e and the d e s i r a b l e to be synonymous i n some of t h e i r meanings at l e a s t . I t has been the purpose o f t h i s survey t o d i s c l o s e what these meanings are; and i t remains now t o c o n s i d e r some of the p e r t i n e n t o b j e c t i o n s to v a l u a t i o n s so conceiv e d . (B)_The commonest c r i t i c i s m o f a n a t u r a l i s t i c theory of value has i t t h a t value concepts are not d e f i n a b l e i n terms of, and t h e r e f o r e not s t r i c t l y synonymous w i t h , d e s c r i p t i v e non-value concepts. The c l a s s i c a l e x p r e s s i o n of t h i s view was formulated bjmProfessor G. E . Moore i n h i s P r i n c i p i a E t h i c a . A c c o r d i n g t o Moore no e t h i c a l p r e -i c a t e i s synonymous w i t h any d e s c r i p t i v e p r e d i c a t e . "Goodness" Is not synonymous w i t h " p l e a s u r e " because i t i s always p o s s i b l e to p o i n t t o i n s t a n c e s of the c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n of " p l e a s u r e " which do not admit of the c o r -r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n of the concept "good". Even though an 32. Pepper, i n h i s D i g e s t of Purposive V a l u e s , adoptsf the b i o l o g i c a l or b e h a v i o r i s t i c approach thus c o n s t r u i n g v a l u a t i o n i n terms of o v e r t behavior r a t h e r than i n terms of the immediacies of e x p e r i e n c e . P e r r y ' s method i s sim-i l a r to Peeper's though perhaps not q u i t e so dependent upon b i o l o g i c a l concepts. 52. experience i s found p l e a s a n t i t i s always s i g n i f i c a n t to i n q u i r e as to whether i t i s good as w e l l as p l e a s a n t . Moore based h i s c r i t i c i s m on the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t one pro-p e r t y cannot be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h another and t h a t , t h e r e -f o r e , the concepts "goodness" and " p l e a s u r e " cannot be synonymous. I f such an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f p r o p e r t i e s be attempted what r e s u l t s i s a s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y statement a s s e r t i n g t h a t "goodness i s not goodness", i . e . that i t i s p l e a s u r e . • As P r o f e s s o r W. Frankena has p o i n t e d out however Moore's r e j e c t i o n o f an a n a l y s i s of e t h i c a l concepts i n v o l v e s the r e j e c t i o n of a l l a n a l y s i s of the same ord e r . On t h i s showing a l l a n a l y t i c statements would have t o be r e j e c t e d as meaningless because s e l f -c o n t r a d i c t o r y . Recent a n a l y s t s have avoided t h i s unsat-i s f a c t o r y c o n c l u s i o n by i n s i s t i n g that an a n a l y t i c s t a -tement does not a s s e r t the i d e n t i t y of two p r o p e r t i e s a t a l l but simply f u n c t i o n s as an i m p l i c i t i n d i c a t i o n of 34 the synonymity of two t e r m s T h i s would r e s o l v e the d i f f i c u l t y posed by Moore by r e p r e s e n t i n g a n a l y t i c s t a -tements as r e f e r i n g to the meanings of terms and not t o f 33. Frankena, W., "The N a t u r a l i s t i c F a l l a c y " , Mind, 1939. 34. A good d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s q u e s t i o n i s to be found i n Pap, A., Elements of A n a l y t i c . P h i l o s o p h y . MaoMillan, N.Y. 1949, p. 29 f f . . 53* the p r o p e r t i e s of o b j e c t s . T h i s i s i n f a c t the i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n of a n a l y t i c statements which Lewis h i m s e l f en-d o r s e s . But even t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f synonymity does not a v o i d the o b j e c t i o n t h a t one of the two terms i n a simple a n a l y s i s (A i s B, or A means B) i s c o g n i t i v e l y s u p e r f l u -ous and that the a n a l y s i s r e a l l y amounts to n o t h i n g more than a t e r m i n o l o g i c a l d e c i s i o n . The q u e s t i o n now becomes "Are the meanings o f the terms 'goodness' and ' p l e a s u r e ' i d e n t i c a l ? " A c c o r d i n g to Lewis one's i n t e n t i o n i n u s i n g the term "good" c o n s t i t u t e s i t s meaning. And t h i s mean-i n g f u l l y e x p l i c a t e d i s the same as the meaning of " d e s i r a b l e " where the d e s c r i p t i v e term designates a whole of e x p e r i e n c e found s a t i s f a c t o r y as such. But i f one's i n t e n t i o n i s the same i n the use of "good" as i t i s i n the use of " d e s i r a b l e " (as i t must be i f the ana-l y s i s i s t o be c e r t i f i e d c o r r e c t ) then t h e r e i s o n l y one meaning, not two; and an a n a l y s i s of value i n terms of d e s i r e can only r e s u l t i n a nominal d e f i n i t i o n . 35 T h i s "paradox of a n a l y s i s " i s not p e c u l i a r t o v a l -ue theory but cuts across any p h i l o s o p h i c i n q u i r y which i n v o l v e s the d e f i n i t i o n o f concepts. The paradox has not been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y r e s o l v e d to date although numerous s o l u t i o n s have been o f f e r e d . Lewis has t h i s t o say about 35. The paradox runs as f o l l o w s : ''If an a n a l y s i s i s c o r -r e c t i t i s t r i v i a l , and i f i t i s not t r i v i a l i t must be i n c o r r e c t . " 5 V i t . " . . . ( d e f i n i t i o n s ) may be e x p l i c a t i o n s o f one i n t e n -s i o n by another and more f a m i l i a r or more l u c i d meaning; and thus d e l i m i t the e s s e n t i a l nature of what i s named and i s i n q u e s t i o n . Only i f they have t h i s . . . c h a r a c t e r can they c o n t r i b u t e t o the c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f a s e r i o u s matter such as the nature o f v a l u e . " Lewis adheres c l o s e l y to t h i s manner o f e x p l i c a t i o n throughout h i s a n a l y s i s . In d e f i n i n g " v a l u e " he uses the terms " d e s i r -a b l e " , " p r i z i n g " , " s a t i s f y i n g " , and the l i k e t o mention the meaning or i n t e n s i o n o f the term " v a l u a b l e " . As was noted above, t h i s i s a species of o s t e n s i v e d e f i n i t i o n . Lewis i s attempting t o p o i n t t o and i d e n t i f y the c h a r a c -t e r of experience which the term " v a l u e " commonly d e s i g -n a t e s . I t i s t h i s c h a r a c t e r of experience which i s the meaning intended by the use of the term, and i t i s t h i s c h a r a c t e r of experience which f u n c t i o n s as a c r i t e r i o n o f the c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n o f value terms. But i n what sense the e x p l i c a t i o n o f a value concept i s a c o g n i t i v e e n t e r p r i s e i s d i f f i c u l t t o determine. Lewis b e l i e v e s an e x p l i c a t i o n t o be c e r t i f i e d c o r r e c t by c r i t i c a l r e f l e c -t i o n . T h i s manner of a c c o u n t i n g f o r i t however suggests that meanings are f i r s t - p e r s o n c o n s t r u c t i o n s c e r t i f i a b l e a p r i o r i i n the f i r s t person only - s i n c e i t i s g e n e r a l -l y conceded t h a t one person cannot i n t r o s p e c t i n t o the. thought processes o f another person. I f , on the other 36. Lewis, C.I., op. c i t . , p. 379• 55. hand, the c o r r e c t n e s s o f one's c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n s i s t o be s u b s t a n t i a t e d by r e f e r r i n g t o o t h e r persons' c r i t -i c a l r e f l e c t i o n s the s u b s t a n t i a t i o n must proceed by way of i n f e r e n c e and e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n - a c u r i o u s way 37 to c e r t i f y the a p r i o r i t y o f a n y t h i n g . I t has to be admitted (as Lewis h i m s e l f admits) t h a t any p h i l o s o p h i c e x p l i c a t i o n of a concept r e q u i r e s some p r e - a n a l y t i c grasp of i t s meaning, e l s e one would not even know what concept i t was that was being a n a l y s e d . I t might even be argued t h a t one would have t o possess a complete grasp of p r e - a n a l y t i c meaning before any ana-l y s i s of i t could be formulated. In t h i s sense an a n a l -y s i s would be c e r t i f i e d c o r r e c t i f , and only i f , i t made more c l e a r and f a m i l i a r what i s a l r e a d y known i n a 37. Many o f the fundamental d i f f i c u l t i e s of "meaning a n a l y s i s " are t o be found d i s c u s s e d i n Locke's Essay  Concerning Human Understanding; p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Book I I I (Of Words). The problem, even i n i t s present form, i s not p e c u l i a r t o contemporary f o r m u l a t i o n s . Locke encoun-t e r s the same problem as Lewis does i n attempting to spe-c i f y the sense i n which an apprehension of meaning may be f a l s e . Concerning a d e f i n i t i o n of such t h i n g s as goodness and j u s t i c e Locke says "(these i d e a s ) c a n n o t but be ade-quate. An i d e a thus made, and l a i d up f o r a p a t t e r n , must n e c e s s a r i l y be adequate ( i . e . v a l i d ) being r e f e r r e d t o n o t h i n g e l s e but i t s e l f nor made by any other o r i g i n a l but the good l i k i n g and w i l l o f him t h a t f i r s t made the combination." C o n s t r u c t i o n of concepts i n the f i r s t -person are t h e r e f o r e always c o r r e c t . But Locke goes on to d i s c u s s a sense i n which they may be i n c o r r e c t . Sup-pose, he says, t h a t someone has c o n s t r u c t e d an i d e a of j u s t i c e . Then "Another coming a f t e r , and i n c o n v e r s a t i o n l e a r n i n g from him the word j u s t i c e , d i f f e r e n t from what the f i r s t author a p p l i e d t o i t , and has i n mind when he uses i t . . . . o n t h i s account our ideas (of j u s t i c e etc.) are l i a b l e 56. muddled and confused way. There i s a danger however, esp-e c i a l l y i n the treatment of value and e t h i c a l concepts, t h a t these w i l l i n v o l v e s e n t i m e n t a l c o n n o t a t i o n s and t h e i r e x p l i c a t i o n be accompanied by an over-tone o f meaning which i s emotive and not c o g n i t i v e . By c r i t i c a l r e f l e c -t i o n one may become aware that one's i n t e n s i o n i n using-the term "good" i s such-and-such. But i n communicating t h i s meaning t o others t h e r e i s always a tendency f o r one t o i n s i s t t h a t others ought to mean by "good" what one means o n e s e l f . I t i s because of t h i s circumstance, among o t h e r s , that the d e f i n i t i o n "The good i s the des-i r a b l e " ( f o r example) has been construed by Stevenson and other a n a l y s t s as a p e r s u a s i v e d e f i n i t i o n and the view taken that e t h i c a l concepts have no c o g n i t i v e mean-i n g . The use of language to evi n c e f e e l i n g s and a t t i t u d e s and to a f f e c t the f e e l i n g s and a t t i t u d e s o f o t h e r s i s one which has been unduly n e g l e c t e d i n n a t u r a l i s t i c (and m e t a p h y s i c a l ) e t h i c s and value t h e o r y . As a r e c e n t a n a l -y s t puts i t "There i s l i t t l e doubt but t h a t much of t r a -d i t i o n a l e t h i c s with i t s m e t a p h y s i c a l t a l k about ' a b s o l -u t e v a l u e s ' , which, l i k e mathematical o b j e c t s (numbers) ,,,to be f a u l t y . " (Book I I , chapter 31, #304). The que-s t i o n now of course i s "Whose idea of j u s t i c e i s t o be taken as the c r i t e r i o n of adequacy i n the assessment of an a n a l y s i s ? " Contemporary a n a l y s t s tend t o f a v o r Locke's answer v i z . t h a t "common usage" i s the a r b i t e r . are capable o f apprehension by the i n t e l l e c t o nly, has nurtured i t s e l f on a p e r s i s t e n t d i s r e g a r d of the expres-38 s i v e and m o t i v a t i v e f u n c t i o n s of e t h i c a l language." I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t , w h i l e Lewis does not ign o r e t h i s f u n c t i o n of language, he does attempt to d i s c o u n t i t as much as p o s s i b l e . Even i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f the immedia-t e l y v a l u a b l e he n e g l e c t s to c o n s i d e r f u l l y the i m p l i c a -t i o n s o f the f a c t t h a t the f o r m u l a t i o n s of d i r e c t v a l u e -f i n d i n g s are e x p r e s s i v e statements and not e m p i r i c a l hyp-otheses. In order to a v o i d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s m Lewis must j u s t -i f y the view t h a t v a l u e - q u a l i t y i s an e m p i r i c a l l y r e a l datum of e x p e r i e n c e . That i s , i f value judgements.are t o have c o g n i t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e t h e r e must be some q u a l i t y r e c o g n i z e a b l e i n experience which i s c o r r e c t l y d e s i g -nated by the term " v a l u e " . In d e f i n i n g t h i s q u a l i t y however Lewis f i n d s i t necessary to i d e n t i f y i t i n some  sense with other q u a l i t i e s of ex p e r i e n c e . Once the def-i n i t i o n of va l u e i n terms of d e s c r i p t i v e p r e d i c a t e s i s accomplished the business of de t e r m i n i n g v a l u e s i s pro-p e r l y undertaken by the " s o c i a l engineer". The d i s c o n -c e r t i n g t h i n g however i s that a l l the value terms occ-u r i n g i n a n a t u r a l i s t i c theory must be r e p l a c e d by non-value ( d e s c r i p t i v e ) terms before the c o g n i t i v e import o f 38. Pap., l o c . c i t . , p. 34. 58. the whole i s apparent. I f "value" does d e s i g n a t e an em-p i r i c a l l y r e a l q u a l i t y why should i t be necessary to em-p l o y d e s c r i p t i v e non-value terms i n i t s stead? In every case these non-value terms must be employed i f c o g n i t i v e 39 sense i s to be made of the statements i n q u e s t i o n . What more, i f an y t h i n g , does a v a l u a t i o n a s s e r t t h a t i s not a s s e r t e d by the e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s i n t o which i t must be converted before being capable o f v e r i f i c a t i o n ? I f Lewis i s t o be s t r i c t l y i n t e r p r e t e d h i s answer would be t h a t t h e r e i s no d i f f e r e n c e i n what i s a s s e r t e d . "Va-l u a t i o n i s always a matter o f e m p i r i c a l c o g n i t i o n " . I f a v a l u a t i o n i s not p r e c i s e l y e q u i v a l e n t t o some e m p i r i -c a l h y p o thesis I t i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , not a genuine v a l -u a t i o n . But i f t h i s i s the case what s i g n i f i c a n c e has a v a l u a t i o n which an e q u i v a l e n t a s s e r t i o n ( i n psychology e. has not? I t w i l l not do to argue t h a t v a l u a t i o n s r e f e r to a s pects o f experience,"by apprehension of which the i n c l i n a t i o n t o a c t i o n i s normally e l i c i t e d " . P s y c h o l o -g i s t s are j u s t as much concerned w i t h these aspects of experience as a r e value t h e o r i s t s . No matter what asp-ects of experience v a l u a t i o n s r e f e r t o t h e i r c o g n i t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e w i l l not the r e b y be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from that o f p u r e l y d e s c r i p t i v e statements. And i t i s the 39. T h i s i s s t r i c t l y i m p l i e d i n Lewis' c o n c e p t i o n of value i n o b j e c t s . An a t t r i b u t i o n o f value without any q u a l i f i c a t i o n s would be qu i t e meaningless i n h i s view. See above p. 36, 59. c o g n i t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f v a l u a t i o n s w h i c h i s h e r e i n q u e s t i o n . The dilemma p o s e d by n a t u r a l i s t s , v i z . t h a t v a l u a -t i o n s a r e e i t h e r d i s g u i s e d e m p i r i c a l s t a t e m e n t s o r sem-a n t i c a l l y a b s u r d m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a t e m e n t s , may be r e s o l v e d a c c o r d i n g t o c e r t a i n c o n t e m p o r a r y a n a l y s t s by e x p l a i n -i n g t h e i r m e anings i n t e r m s o f t h e e x p r e s s i v e and m o t i -v a t i v e . f u n c t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e . ^ I n t h e i r v i e w t h e o c c u -r e n c e o f v a l u e t e r m s i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l , and s c i e n t i f i c l i t e r a t u r e and i n e v e r y - d a y s p e e c h s e r v e s t o b e t r a y t h e p e c u l i a r i n t e r e s t t a k e n i n t h e s u b j e c t d e a l t with-. A v a l -u a t i o n s u c h as "The u l t i m a t e good i s . t h e l i f e f o u n d good i n t h e l i v i n g o f i t " w o u l d t h u s be c o n s t r u e d as a n emo-t i v e u t t e r a n c e t h e t r u t h o r f a l s i t y o f w h i c h i t w o u l d be l o g i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e . The s t a t e m e n t : : : a s s e r t s n o t h i n g but s i m p l y e v i n c e s t h e s e n t i m e n t s o f t h e s p e a k e r and s e r v e s t o " . . . s t i m u l a t e f e e l i n g s and v o l i t i o n a l t e n -41 d e n c i e s on t h e p a r t o f t h e h e a r e r . " The a p p a r e n t l a c k o f s y n o n y m i t y between a v a l u a t i o n and a n " e q u i v a l e n t " e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s i s t h u s a c c o u n t e d f o r by r e v e a l i n g 40. T h i s a p p r o a c h had i t s i n c e p t i o n i n t h e w r i t i n g s o f . O.K. Ogden and I.A. R i c h a r d s , C f . P r i n c i p l e s o f L i t e r a r y  C r i t i c i s m and The M e a n i n g o f M e a n i n g . B o t h w orks d e a l w i t h t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between c o g n i t i v e and e m o t i v e mean-i n g . 4 1 . C a r n a p , R., The L o g i c a l S y n t a x o f L a n g u a g e , t r a n s . Ameth.e Smeaton, New Y o r k , H a r c o u r t B r a c e & Co*, 1937, P. 217 60. the emotive meaning attaching to valuations i n general. The normative s i g n i f i c a n c e of valuations i s to be under-stood i n terms of t h e i r emotive meaning also. Lewis sug-gests that value-disvalue i s distinguished from, non-value by the normative significance of the former where r a t i o -nal or sensibly taken action i s concerned. According to the emotive theory " r a t i o n a l " and Ssensibly taken" are merely epithets employed to d i s c r e d i t modes of conduct etc. which the speaker does not approve and to recomm-end those he does approve. On t h i s showing Lewis' i n s i s t -ence upon the s e l f - v e r i f y i n g v a l i d i t y of the r a t i o n a l imperative amounts to a recommendation, somewhat horta-tory i n character, concerning what attitudes h i s readers ought to entertain toward c e r t a i n things. The case would be d i f f e r e n t i f Lewis believed the r a t i o n a l imperative to be hypothetical i n character. I t would then be understood to assert " I f you would lead a s a t i s f y i n g l i f e you must evaluate a l l elements of exper-ience i n terms of t h e i r r e l a t i o n to such a l i f e . " Then on the assumption that his readers wish to lead such a l i f e and are prepared to make this the c r i t e r i o n of s i g -n i f icance where deliberate action and evaluation are con-cerned, Lewis' analysis of valuation has indeed the s i g -nificance of a c r i t i q u e of r a t i o n a l conduct and correct evaluation - a c r i t i q u e , moreoever, which has more than merely emotive meaning. Once a characterization of the 61. i d e a l l i f e i s agreed.upon and i t i s understood that r a t -i o n a l conduct i s a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s r e a l i z a t i o n of the good l i f e v a l u a t i o n s w i l l be c o r r e c t l y c l a s s i f i a b l e as empir-i c a l hypotheses and s u b j e c t to r a t i o n a l d i s p u t e . I f t h i s i s Lewis' c o n c e p t i o n of the r a t i o n a l i m p e r a t i v e he has s u c c e s s f u l l y avoided much damaging c r i t i c i s m . On the o t h -er hand i f he i n s i s t s t h a t t h e r e i s only one such imper-a t i v e or i d e a l which recommends i t s e l f to humans he i s e i t h e r f o r m u l a t i n g an e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s based upon a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l data ( i n which case he would be mistaken) or he i s i n d u l g i n g i n a s p e c i e s o f moral e x h o r t a t i o n ( i n which case h i s views c o u l d h a r d l y be s a i d t o be c o r r e c t or i n c o r r e c t 0 they would be b e t t e r c h a r a c t e r i z e d as ad.-m i r a b l e or repugnant). A c t u a l l y Lewis wavers between these two p o s i t i o n s , r e f e r r i n g a t times to what "most average people" c o n s i d e r as good without q u a l i f i c a t i o n , and s u g g e s t i n g at o t h e r times t h a t a s t a t i s t i c a l average i s of no s i g n i f i c a n c e . I t i s i n t h i s sense that Lewis' co n c e p t i o n of v a l u a t i o n depends upon c e r t a i n assump-t i o n s or p o s t u l a t e s p r e s c r i b i n g i d e a l ends of a c t i o n and 42 d e f i n i n g r a t i o n a l modes of conduct and f e e l i n g s I t i s 42. A " r a t i o n a l i d e a l " i s a c t u a l l y a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n terms. R a t i o n a l i t y i s d e f i n e d i n terms of an i d e a l ; the i d e a l i t s e l f , being the u l t i m a t e c r i t e r i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y i s b e t t e r r e f e r r -ed to as a n o n - r a t i o n a l p o s t u l a t e . 6 2 . not the case (as Lewis would appear to suggest) that a repudiation of the imperative "Have concern for the f u t -ure and s t r i v e to r e a l i z e the good l i f e " e n t a i l s a repu-di a t i o n of a l l norms and a l l s i g n i f i c a n c e of thought and action. The f a c t i s that imperatives may be speeified at w i l l and the significance of thought and action may be defined i n terms of ideals quite remote from the good ( i . e . satisfying) l i f e . These ideals may not recommend themselves to a majority of people or even to anyone at a l l - but i f they be endorsed significance of thought and action would be s p e c i f i a b l e and definable i n terms of them. Once the imperative i s specified the business of e x p l i c a t i n g the e t h i c a l or value system becomes what Ayer has termed, rather uncharitably, "an exercise i n symbolic l o g i c . " What Lewis believes to be a repudiation of a l l v a l i d norms on the part of those who endorse the emotive theory i s a c t u a l l y a penetrating analysis of what is,meant by a normative statement. I f i t i s to be maintained that the categories of truth and f a l s i t y apply to norms the method of establishing such truth must be s p e c i f i a b l e without converting the norm into an empirical hypothesis. -The truth of the norm "The f i n a l good i s a s a t i s f y i n g whole of experience" i s not established, according to Lewis, 43. Ayer, A.J., Language Truth and Logic, Gallancz, London, 1947, chapter 6. 63. by the f a c t t h a t "most people" p r i z e a s a t i s f y i n g l i f e . I n f a c t i f t r u t h or f a l s i t y i s t o be a t t r i b u t e d to such a statement at a l l i t must be a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t sense of " t r u t h " from t h a t a t t r i b u t e d to e m p i r i c a l hypotheses. What i s e m p i r i c a l l y presented cannot a f f e c t a t r u e d e f i -n i t i o n or a n a l y s i s of " v a l u e " and a s t a t i s t i c a l survey of "common usage" i s l i k e w i s e of no a v a i l . I f c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n must be r e l i e d upon i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see what i n t e r p e r s o n a l c r i t e r i a may be c o n s u l t e d i n case two i n d i v i d u a l s d i f f e r on what i s a " t r u e " d e f i n i t i o n . T h i s appears to be the p o i n t at which Lewis' concep-t i o n i s most v u l n e r a b l e to a t t a c k and h i s c r i t i c s have r i g h t on t h e i r side* i f t h e i r c r i t i c i s m i s aimed at h i s attempt to formulate a d e f i n i t i o n of the u l t i m a t e l y v a l -u a b l e . They are c o r r e c t a l s o i n p o i n t i n g out t h a t the occurence of a value term i n an. e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s does not add to or s u b t r a c t from the c o g n i t i v e import of the statement but i s simply i n d i c a t i v e of t h e speakers f e e l -ings and a t t i t u d e s . As such, a v a l u a t i o n does not even ex-press a f e e l i n g i n the sense t h a t i t says a n y t h i n g about the speakers emotional s t a t e s . I t a s s e r t s n o t h i n g about a s u b j e c t matter because the value terms o c c u r i n g i n i t have no semantic or c o g n i t i v e meaning. A value statement merely b e t r a y s , i n a somewhat o b l i q u e manner, what a t t i -tudes and f e e l i n g s the speaker e n t e r t a i n s toward whatever i s designated by the d e s c r i p t i v e terms i n v o l v e d . 64. T h i s c r i t i c i s m i s based l a r g e l y on semantic a n a l -y s i s . The p o s i t i o n i s taken t h a t value terms are cog-n i t i v e l y redundant i f they are s t r i c t l y synonymous w i t h d e s c r i p t i v e terms. I f they are not synonymous wit h des-c r i p t i v e terms the burden of proof i s upon those who em-p l o y them to s p e c i f y unambiguously what they d e s i g n a t e . And i t cannot t r u t h f u l l y be s a i d t h a t Lewis i s a b l e to do t h i s w i t h i n the framework of h i s a n a l y s i s without i n -t r o d u c i n g some s u p p o s i t i t i o u s n o n - e m p i r i c a l e n t i t y . Moore, co n f r o n t e d by the same d i f f i c u l t y , employed t h i s very a r t i f i c e ; but c a r e f u l . a n a l y s i s has s i n c e shown t h a t nothing i s t o be gained by p o s i t i n g a non-observable c h a r a c t e r o f t h i n g s merely to s a t i s f y the requirement t h a t a l l s u b s t a n t i v e s i n a language must have a r e f e r e n t . The p e r t i n e n c e of t h i s a t t a c k upon n a t u r a l i s t i c con-c e p t i o n s of value i s attenuated somewhat by the f a c t t h a t some n a t u r a l i s t s ( S c h l i c k i s one) r e c o g n i z e the nec-e s s i t y of making c e r t a i n assumptions c o n c e r n i n g what i s g e n e r a l l y conceded to be an u l t i m a t e or u n q u a l i f i e d i d e a l or purpose.' I t i s d i f f i c u l t to say j u s t what assumptions IS Lew-is^prepared to make. T h i s much however seems t o be q u i t e c l e a r . He must e i t h e r base h i s c o n c e p t i o n of value on a p o s t u l a t e d i m p e r a t i v e , or s p e c i f y i n what sense t h i s i m p e r a t i v e may be s a i d t o be e i t h e r t r u e or f a l s e . A c t -u a l l y he does n e i t h e r of these t h i n g s but simply a s s e r t s t h a t the r a t i o n a l i mperative i s a datum, of e x p e r i e n c e . 65. Now t h i s a s s e r t i o n i s e i t h e r an e x p r e s s i v e s t a t e m e n t r e -v e a l i n g what L e w i s h i m s e l f f i n d s t o be u l t i m a t e i n t h e way o f i d e a l s i n h i s own e x p e r i e n c e ; o r i t i s an e m p i r i -c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n a s s e r t i n g t h a t a l l p e o p l e e n d o r s e a c e r t a i n i d e a l . I f i t i s s i m p l y an e x p r e s s i o n o f L e w i s ' own i d e a l s ( t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e ) t h i s h a r d l y w a r r a n t s i t s b e i n g ( e l e v a t e d t o the s t a t u s o f a u n i v e r s a l i m p e r a -t i v e . I f i t i s a c o n j e c t u r e c o n c e r n i n g o t h e r p e o p l e s ' i d e a l s ( t h e s e c o n d a l t e r n a t i v e ) i t i s s i m p l y f a l s e . On the whole t h e d e s c r i p t i v e p h a s e o f L e w i s ' a n a l y -s i s o f v a l u e phenomena i s the c l e a r e s t and most p e n e t r -a t i n g t o h a v e a p p e a r e d s i n c e P e r r y ' s G e n e r a l T h e o r y o f  V a l u e , and i t i m p r o v e s on P e r r y ' s a n a l y s i s i n many impo-r t a n t r e s p e c t s . I n p a r t i c u l a r L e w i s ' emphasis upon t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l c o n t e x t of. v a l u a t i o n i s a d e c i d e d a d v a n c e upon s u p e r f i c i a l b e h a v i o r i s t i c a n a l y s i s . B u t i t must be r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e p r e c i s e c o g n i t i v e i m p o r t o f v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s i s n o t s e t t l e d beyond d i s p u t e i n t h e A n a l y s i s o f Knowledge and V a l u a t i o n . I t i s h e r e s u g g e s t e d t h a t L e w i s ' c o n c e p t i o n of v a l u a t i o n c a n o n l y be s a v e d a t t h e e xpense o f a d m i t t i n g t h a t v a l u a t i o n i s s o m e t h i n g more t h a n e m p i r i c a l c o g n i t i o n . The " s o m e t h i n g more" o f c o u r s e i s t h e l o g i c a l l y u n a v o i d a b l e r e f e r e n c e t o a p o s t u l a t e d i d e a l . 66. Bibliography. The following works are a l l relevant to the subject of value analysis, but those marked with an asterisk are p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant to the subject of meaning analysis as applied to value theory. 1. Ayer, A.J., Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, N.Y., MacMillans, 1940. ...^Language Truth and Logic, London, V i c t o r Gallancz, 1936. 2. Benedict, R.^Patterns of Culture. 3. Bentham, J., P r i n c i p l e s of Morals and L e g i s l a t i o n , 1823 4. Berkeley, G..Principles of Human Knowledge, 1710. 3. Bosanquet, B., The P r i n c i p l e of I n d i v i d u a l i t y and  Value. 1912. 6. Bougie, C , L*Evolution des Valeurs, 1922. 7. Carnap, R., The Logical Syntax of Language, trans, by Amethe Smeaton, N.Y., Harcourt Brace & Co., 1937. ... The Unity of Science, trans. by Max Black London, Kegan Paul, 1934. 8. D a s h i e l l , J.F., The Philosophical Status of Values, 1913. 9. Durkheim, E., Elementary Forms of the Religious L i f e , trans, by J.W. Swain, 1915. 10. Ehrenfels, Ch. v S y s t e m der Werttheorie. 1897. 11. Frankena, W.,i "The N a t u r a l i s t i c F a l l a c y " , Mind, 1939 12. Hume, D., Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748 13. James, W., P r i n c i p l e s of Psychology, 1 8 9 0 . 14. Kaplan, A.,* "Are moral Judgements Assertions?", Philosophical Review, 1942. 67. 15. K r e i b i g , J . C , Psychologische Grundlegung eines  Systems der Werttheorie. 1902. 16. Locke, J.,»An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 17'. Lewis, C . L . f A n A n a l y s i s of Knowledge and V a l u a t i o n , The Open Court Pub. Co., La S a l l e , I l l i n o i s , 1946. 18. Meinong, A..#Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie, ...Untersuchungen der Werttheorie, 1894. 19. M i l l , J.S., U t i l i t a r i a n i s m , 1863 20. Moore, G.E.,•Ethics, Oxford Univ. P r e s s , 1913. # P r i n c i p i a E t h i c a . Cam. Un. Press, I903 21. Munsterberg, H., E t e r n a l Values, 1909. 22. N i e t z s c h e , E., Genealogy of Morals, t r a n s , by V/. A. 23. Ogden, C.K., and Richards, I.A.,* The Meaning of  Meaning. 24. Pap, A.,» Elements of A n a l y t i c Philosophy. N.Y., MacMillans, 1949. 25. P e r r y , R.B.,» General Theory of Value, Harvard Univ., 1926. 26. P r a l l , D.W., "A Study i n the Theory of Value", Univ. of C a l i f . Pub. i n P h i l . , V o l . I l l , no. 2, 1921. 27. Pepper, S.,*A Digest of Purposive Values, Univ. of C a l i f . Press, 1947. 28. Richards, I.A.,* P r i n c i p l e s of L i t e r a r y C r i t i c i s m , London, 1925. 29. R u s s e l l , B., An I n q u i r y i n t o Meaning and Truth, N.Y., W.W. Norton & Co., 1940. 30. S c h l i c k , M., $ Problems of E t h i c s , t r a n s , by D. Rynin, N.Y., P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1939. 31. Stevenson, C.L.,* "The Emotive Meaning of E t h i c a l . Terms", Mind. 1937. . . . ^ E t h i c s and Language, Yal e Univ., 1945. 68. 3 2 . Urban, W.M., V a l u a t i o n . 1909. 33. Weinberg, J . , An Examination of L o g i c a l P o s i t i v i s m . N.Y., Hareourt Brace, 1 9 3 b . 34. Westermarck, E . , * O r i g i n and Development of Moral Ideas. 1 9 0 b . 35. Wick, W.A., Metaphysics and the New L o g i c . Univ. of Chicago,Press, 1942. 36. W i t t g e n s t e i n , L.-, # T r a c t a t u s L o g i c o - p h i l o s o p h i c u s , London, Kegan P a u l , 1 9 2 2 . 

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