AN EXAMINATION OF C. I. LEWIS' CONCEPTION OF VALUATION

by

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ABSTRACT

A descriptive and critical account of the theory of valuation presented by C.I. Lewis in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. Both the a priori and empirical basis for the theory are examined. The essential weakness of the theory lies in an inability to overcome some of the criticisms of the emotivists, especially in the concept of the ultimately valuable. Hence Lewis is unable, even, to present a view as plausible as the emotivists in that his theory of evaluation is, for all practical purposes, a tautology. In order to overcome this difficulty Lewis must hypostatize some non-empirical property or some imperative. However, Lewis has presented the most comprehensive and analytic defense of a naturalistic system since the appearance of Perry's Interest Theory. Many of the value concepts are analyzed showing the development and structure of Lewis' theory.
Contents.

Preface ........................................ page ii

Introduction ..................................... iii

I. The apprehension of value and expressive statements as distinguished from the predication of value and value judgements ......................... 1

II. The immediately valuable as the ultimate touchstone of value in all its modes ...................... 13

III. Contributory value and the transvaluation of value as authorized by the rational imperative ............... 23

IV. (A) Problems of method in Lewis' analysis: the distinction between science and philosophy; criteria of adequacy in meaning analysis ....................... 41

(B) Assessment of Lewis' analysis in terms of its alleged ability to set up an interpersonal objective critique of value; pertinence of the criticism offered by the "emotive theorists" ........ 51

Bibliography ...................................... 66
Preface.

I wish to thank Professors Savery and Maslow for the interest they have taken in my work and for valuable suggestions and criticisms pertaining to the form and content of this study.

D.J.K.
C.I. Lewis' theory of value, which will be analysed in this paper, is one of the most significant works on the subject to have appeared since R.B. Perry's by now classical General Theory of Value. Lewis writes as a naturalist. His views represent an attempt to deal with value as a natural (as opposed to a metaphysical) phenomenon and to provide a critique of valuation in terms of an empiricist epistemology. His outstanding predecessors in the field of value theory of William James, Mr. Santayana, R.B. Perry, and D.W. Prall, all of whom interpret value as a function of human interest and human satisfaction. The central thesis of this school of thought (in which the writing of John Dewey also play an important part) is that valuation is a form of empirical cognition. While James and Santayana did not express the matter in precisely these terms their emphasis upon the psychological and social aspects of the value situation inspired later writers to construe a quest for values as a careful descriptive analysis of the natural phenomenon of valuation.

Perry's analysis is the first in this movement to employ the method of descriptive analysis in an explicit manner. Perry regards the philosophic problem as that of determining the generic nature of value, i.e. of determining what characteristics are present in any situation
involving valuation. His inquiry therefore assumes the character of an empirical investigation of facts and it issues in a broad empirical generalization, to wit: "To be valuable is to be any object of any interest". In this connection Perry acknowledges the important contributions made to value theory by Alexis Meinong and Christian von Ehrenfels. The latter defines value as "...a relation between a subject and an object, which expresses the fact that the subject either actually desires the object, or would desire it in case he were not convinced of its existence." Meinong and von Ehrenfels carried on a debate concerning the nature of value, the former maintaining that value is to be defined in terms of feeling and the latter that it must be defined in terms of desire. Perry's concept of interest is designed to resolve this debate by defining both feeling and desire in terms of interest in certain of its "modes".

Perry's criticism of those who neglect the factor of interest is simply that their analysis of the value situation is factually incorrect. Whenever we find an instance of valuation we do in fact find an interest involved. His criticism of those who do acknowledge interest as a factor is mainly that they conceive the situation too narrowly - that they represent value as the qualified object of interest, or as the object of qualified interest. His own

view is that value is any object of any interest. And "interest" likewise is conceived in the most general sense. "It is to this all-pervasive characteristic of the motor-affective life, this state, act, attitude or disposition of favor or disfavor, to which we propose to give the name of 'interest'". To say of anything that it is the object of any interest is to say that it is valuable. This is the familiar 'naturalistic' definition of value. For Perry it was refined and elaborated by a careful psychological and a not-so-careful sociological study of the motor-affective life of man. Under the influence of such people as Prall Perry is inclined to favour a behaviouristic psychology - he works within the framework of an environment-organism conception of man and he does this with admirable consistency. Even his treatment of cognition falls within the conceptual framework of the stimulus-response psychology. The importance of the cognitive aspects of valuation was not fully recognized by Perry however. It is Lewis' recognition of the problems of cognition which enable him to advance a theory of valuation substantially more adequate than that of Perry.

The question of the cognitive import of valuations became increasingly acute in the years following the publication of the "General Theory of Value". In the first place the naturalisit definition of value itself was

* Perry, R.B., General Theory of Value, p. 115.
assailed and branded as a 'fallacy'. This criticism is due to G.E. Moore. To state the matter briefly, Moore had argued that no inference from fact to value was, in principle, valid. Facts are facts and values are values and unless a moral predicate is introduced into an analysis of fact no analysis of facts themselves can yield an ethical conclusion. To say that every value situation involves an all-pervasive aspect of the motor-affective life is interesting but not significant. All the psychology in the world cannot establish an ethical or value norm. Moore concludes that values are indefinable because unanalysable (as e.g. the colour red is unanalysable) and that the proposed naturalisitic definition of value is either fallacious or trivial. It amounts to saying either that (e.g.) goodness is pleasure, which is false, or that goodness is goodness, which is true but quite trivial. This line of criticism, with important modifications, was pursued by other analysts and particularly by logical positivists whose principal interest lay in the examination of cognitive meaning. The notion of cognitively meaningful was, by them, interpreted in terms of the criterion of verifiability. A statement cannot be said to be cognitively meaningful unless it is, in principle, capable of empirical verification.

Logical positivists proceeded to dissect traditional ethical and value theories with this criterion in mind and they found such theories to involve two principal ingredients.
These are: (a) statements about psychological facts and (b) pseudo-statements containing ethical or value terms i.e. sentences which could not, in principle, be verified. Perry would object to this analysis on the grounds that value statements are actually statements of fact since the value terms occurring in them may be defined in terms of descriptive predicates. This objection however defeats Perry's purpose since it fails to maintain any distinction between value theory and empirical psychology. To define all value concepts in terms of descriptive predicates is to reduce value theory to descriptive psychology and thus to deny that valuations carry any normative significance. And it is the claim that valuations carry normative as well as cognitive significance which characterizes value theory in general. Perry did not believe himself to be doing mere descriptive psychology in the General Theory of Value - he believed, on the contrary, that he was working out a conceptual system which would function as a critique of human conduct in the sense that it would provide for "true" valuations. He wished to represent valuations as empirical judgements without making them strictly synonymous with statements in descriptive psychology. The logical positivists held that this attempt could only issue in (a) the denial of normative standards or (b) the denial of the cognitive import of valuations. If valuations are verifiable or falsifiable they are not normative, and if they are normative they have no cognitive content, that
is, they are simply expressions of attitudes or articulations of ideals. Neither attitudes nor ideals are the sort of things which can be either true or false. According to the logical positivist an ethical statement is of the same order as a command or a cry of pain or a poetic expostulation.

It is this somewhat disquieting criticism that naturalists in ethics and value theory have had to contend with since about the time of publication of Perry's *General Theory of Value*. Some naturalists (such as e.g. S. Pepper) seem not to have realized the seriousness of the charges thus laid against them. C. I. Lewis however is continually aware of the objections he must meet from this quarter. He brings to the analysis of value not only an expert knowledge of traditional moral philosophy but also a thorough understanding of the newly developed techniques of logical analysis. He has grasped the implications of the logical positivist analysis of cognitive meaning and has attempted to establish a theory of value which will avoid these implications - not by ignoring them but by denying that they are such as the logical positivists claim them to be. Whether Lewis succeeds in this undertaking or not the importance of what he is trying to do must be recognized. His *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* represents the most comprehensive attempt to date to defend a naturalistic theory of value against both metaphysics and logical analysis.
Lewis' main object in his discussion of valuation is to show that value-judgements are cognitively significant. More specifically he is attempting to characterize valuations as a form of empirical cognition. In doing this he is putting them on the same level as the predictive hypotheses of the natural sciences. Valuations thus conceived are "...predictions of a goodness or badness which will be disclosed in experience under certain circumstances and on particular occasions..." Such predictions are legitimately subject to criticism - they may be true or false depending on whether what is predicted actually materializes.

The principal criticisms of this view are those offered by G.E. Moore and his followers who deny that valuations are empirical cognitions, and those offered by certain logical analysts who deny that valuations are cognitions of any sort. If either of these criticisms is sound Lewis' conception of valuation as a form of empirical cognition may well be a misconception. Moreover if the criticism offered by the "logical positivists" is sound both Lewis' and Moore's views may be misconceptions because Moore held that valuation was a form of cognition also viz. non-empirical cognition.

which are most relevant to the question concerning the
cognitive or non-cognitive nature of value-judgements.
Both Moore and Lewis hold that valuations are cognitions.
The more damaging criticism of Lewis' position is there­
fore that of the logical positivists (Ayer, Carnap and
others) who strip valuations of all cognitive significance
empirical or otherwise.

Interest in the logical and epistemological aspects
of value theory has been growing steadily since value
theory itself began to be developed toward the end of the
nineteenth century. It was early recognized that valuation
is pointless so far as human conduct is concerned unless
there is some criterion in terms of which particular val­
uations may be denominated true or false, valid or invalid.
A philosophical rationalist such as Kant might insist on
the validity of a valuation - its strict logical derive­
ability from a supreme principle. Naturalists of Lewis'
persuasion however propose to set up a critique of value
the criterion of which is the truth or falsity of the
valuations in question. To allow that one valuation is as
good or as true as another is to fall into what Lewis
calls a Protagorean relativism. The statement "X is good"
is in Lewis' view of the same order as (say) "X is soluble
in water". The same kind of evidence which is used to
verify the latter may also be used to verify the former.
"Goodness", that is to say, is defined empirically and the
question whether X possesses such a quality is an empirical
question.

This is the principal thesis in Book III of Lewis' *Analysis of knowledge and valuation* and his whole conception of valuation stands or falls with it. The critic who can show that the categories of truth and falsity do not significantly apply to valuations will thereby invalidate the critique of value which Lewis proposes to establish. The issue is an extremely important one because a decision one way or the other vitally affects the methods and conclusions of all those sciences employing value concepts. The meaning of value statements in historical, anthropological, psychological, and sociological treatises is a question of some moment. And of course the significance of much ethical and esthetic theory may have to be called into question also. If Lewis' analysis is correct value statements in the social sciences, in moral philosophy, and in the field of esthetics have the same cognitive significance as the empirical hypotheses which comprise the non-value sciences. Valuations on this showing are "...not fundamentally different in what determines their truth or falsity, and what determines their validity or justification from other kinds of empirical knowledge." 2 On the other hand if the analysis offered by the logical positivists is correct all valuations occurring in scientific and philosophical literature must be

2. Lewis, C.I., Ibid., p. 356.
interpreted as emotive utterances having no cognitive significance whatever. Attribution of value to an object is, according to this view, either a disguised form of empirical hypothesis or an emotive or poetic expostulation.

Lewis begins his analysis of valuation by making an important distinction between "apprehensions of good or ill in experience" and "predictions of the possible realizations of these qualities in particular empirical contexts." The apprehension of good or ill is simply a direct finding of value-quality and if it is formulated in language the resultant expression does not predict anything but merely records what occurs in experience in the same manner as "protocol statements" record the occurrence of sense data when and as they occur. Lewis points out that such expressive statements may be true or false to the extent that they accurately or inaccurately record the content of immediate experience. What is expressed however is neither true nor false, i.e. an apprehension has not the forward looking character which all genuine valuations must have. Lewis concludes, therefore, that the mere apprehensions of value-quality are not judgements and not classifiable as knowledge. They are important nevertheless because without them valuations qua empirical cognition would have no meaning. If value-quality were not disclosed in immediate experience no ascription of

3. Lewis, C.I., Ibid., p. 356
value to objects would be meaningful in an empirical sense. It would be meaningless to predict the occurrence of value-quality in experience if it were logically impossible to verify the prediction by actually experiencing the value-quality predicted.

Having made this point Lewis goes on to discuss the two types of valuations which are judgements and which do represent a form of empirical cognition. The first of these is a terminating judgement, i.e., a prediction which may be conclusively verified provided a certain mode of action be adopted. Such judgements are of the "if...then" variety and are relatively simple in their intent. The judgement "If you live a dissolute life you will regret it before you die," may be conclusively verified by living a dissolute life and noting whether the predicted regret materializes. The second and more important type of judgement Lewis calls the "objective judgement". This consists in the ascription of value to things in general i.e. to objects, states of affairs, etc.; such judgements being non-terminating in the sense that they are not conclusively verifiable. They are similar to the judgements found in the natural sciences which ascribe non-value properties to things. And unlike terminating judgements they may be partially or indirectly verified without the experiencing of a value-quality itself. There may be ample grounds for believing a thing has value other than an immediate experience of the value
in question; just as there may be ample grounds for believing a thing is hot other than a direct (tactile) experience of its heat.

Thus far Lewis has described three forms of empirical statement the first of which is merely expressive and about which there can be no reasonable dispute concerning its truth or falsity. Lewis admits, and this point is crucial, that the finding of the subject is in this case final and incontrovertible. Such immediate apprehensions are subject to no critique - they constitute the ultimate criteria of value. The two other types of statement analysed are both forms of empirical hypothesis, the one terminating or conclusively verifiable, the other non-terminating. The question might be raised whether a terminating judgement is not actually a non-terminating judgement with a limit prescribed (arbitrarily) to the number and character of the tests of its truth or falsity. A decision one way or the other would not materially affect the soundness of Lewis' subsequent analysis however and the matter need not be discussed further.

The next point of importance to be made is that value concepts are definable only in terms of the expressions of direct value-apprehension in experience. This peculiarity seems to constitute the major difference between the ascription of value to objects ⁴ and the ascription of non-valued

⁴ The term 'objects' is used here for the sake of verbal economy. States of affairs, situations, etc., are also referred to where 'objects' alone is used.
value properties to objects. In scientific circles e.g. the concept of weight is rarely, if ever, defined in terms of the immediate uninterpreted experience of lifting an object - it is more often defined in terms of other abstract concepts such as mass or velocity, and the definition is usually expressed in terms of a mathematical equation. In the case of value concepts however it appears essential to maintain an intimate relation with the basic sensed value-qualities of immediate experience such that, in any dispute concerning objective value, reference may be made to the actual experience of value in connection with the object. As Lewis puts it "...the mode of feeling remains the head and front of the whole matter". This is in keeping with the fundamental tenets of naturalism in value theory and ethics viz. that value concepts and ethical principles ought to be directly related to and governed by, human interest and desire. Lewis does not deny that there may be indirect means for determining value but for him, as for most naturalists, the crucial test is the test of immediate experience.

In attempting to clarify the sense in which an attribution of value differs from an attribution of non-value properties Lewis undertakes an analysis of the modifiers "intrinsic" and "extrinsic". Consonant with his view that all value is ultimately relative to direct apprehensions

5. Lewis, C.I., op. cit., p.382
of value-quality he reserves use of the term "intrinsic" to characterize the value of experience itself. The value of a particular experience is intrinsic or self-verifying in the sense that a wholeness of such experiences is desired for its own sake. The value which does not attach directly to the experience of some subject is "extrinsic" - it is definable in terms of intrinsic value only, and its presence in an object is verified in the last analysis by determining whether the object in question actually does give rise to the sort of experience termed "valuable", "...nothing is good except relative to some possible felt goodness."\(^6\) This view consorts well with Lewis' conception of a sensible action. It is not for the sake of an object or state of affairs that action is initiated; rather "...some experience of goodness...represents the final aim of any sensible action."\(^7\) In the General Theory of Value Perry's analysis appears to suggest that it is the object of interest which is the ultimate aim of purposive behavior. Both Lewis and Pepper have called this into question of late insisting that nothing is significantly gained by the production of objects unless what is produced has some potentiality for contributing to the value-quality of experience.\(^8\) The potentiality of an object for giving rise

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to experienced value-quality is the object's value - a value moreover which is always extrinsic and only definable in terms of the intrinsic value to which it gives rise. Herein lies the radical difference between the objective character "value" and other objective non-value properties. To use Lewis' example, "roundness" is not ultimately definable in terms of a visual or tactile sensation of him who is defining. It is defined and identified in any particular instance by mathematical expressions and complicated measuring instruments respectively. "Goodness" however must ultimately be defined and identified with reference to the mode of feeling attending the experience of some subject who is confronted with the object. Whether an object actually possesses goodness or not must be decided by him who confronts the object in experience. And by a good object is meant simply "that which conduces to the realization of value-quality in experience."

There are some uses of the term "intrinsic" which suggest that some objects at least have intrinsic value. It is often said e.g. that a beautiful work of art is intrinsically valuable i.e. is valuable for its own sake. In Lewis' view however this is a misconception. If the work of art was not produced for the sake of giving rise to some valuable esthetic experience there would have been no point in producing it at all - unless of course the artist's aim was merely to satisfy a creative impulse; in which case
Lewis' analysis is still sound. For again it was for the sake of some immediately desirable experience that the thing was done. There are however certain objects which, while not possessing intrinsic value, do give rise to intrinsic value when confronted in experience. Such objects have what Lewis calls inherent extrinsic value. Inherent values attach to those things which contribute directly to intrinsic value (they are usually to be found in the realm of the esthetic). On the other hand instrumental extrinsic value attaches to those things which contribute to the realization, not of valuable experience, but of other things having inherent value.

This schematism of values is conceived in such a manner as to relate all modes of value to the intrinsic or self-verifying value of immediate experience actual or possible. The relation asserted is a logical one serving to define value concepts and to provide the schema necessary for the verification of particular valuations. The fact that values are so determined by "most people" is nothing to the point. Lewis is here concerned with an analysis of what is meant by the statement "X possesses value" and not at all with the quite different empirical question "How are values created biologically, socially etc.?" Lewis' method of analysis is, as he takes care to point out philosophical and a priori; and its correctness must be certified by critical reflection, not by empirical observation or experiment. A question arises, in connection
with this view, which must come up for consideration later viz. "What considerations are pertinent in appraising the type of analysis Lewis is here offering?" If empirical data may not be referred to it is not at once evident just what may be referred to. Stephen Pepper, in his analysis of purposive values, employs the method of descriptive definition—a definition of value being considered correct when an adequate description of value phenomena has been achieved. The description is empirically attested and there is therefore a criterion of correct definition viz. agreement of the definition with empirical fact. This method has one serious disadvantage however. Definitions based upon empirical generalizations can never attain the logical force necessary to warrant their being conceived as a priori because the empirical generalizations will be continually modified in the light of fresh experience. There will always remain a certain amount of doubt as to whether the description adequately represents the value situation. Lewis is aware of these difficulties and he avoids them by making a distinction between the apprehension of meanings and the cognition of empirical matters of fact. His solution is reminiscent of Hume's distinction between abstract reasoning and experimental reasoning.  

10. Hume is usually credited with the introduction of this view in its modern form but actually it is to be found in the works of earlier "empiricists". The doctrine of abstract ideas (yielding certain knowledge), and probable knowledge, was a central theme in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
The sense in which the apprehension of meanings is knowledge will turn out to be one of the most troublesome questions which Lewis has to deal with. For unless certain definitions (which are seen somehow to be true because of what they mean) are accepted it is questionable whether Lewis can maintain his principal thesis. Unless e.g. his definition of generic value in terms of a mode of feeling be accepted his conception of extrinsic value need not be accepted either. Lewis' entire thesis in fact rests upon the soundness of certain initial definitions and he himself admits that unless the meanings of these be sufficient to convince one of their truth little else can be done to argue their correctness. The definition of value, that is, is independent completely of empirical matters of fact. Empirical data affect the truth and falsity of a valuation, but the kind of truth attaching to a definition of value is not so affected. The sense in which a definition embodies a cognition of sorts is, then, the central problem in the analysis of value statements. Agreement must be reached on this question before any appraisal of valuation qua empirical cognition is possible. Consequently Lewis proceeds to examine the nature of value as intrinsic; since all values are to be defined in terms of a self-verifying value-quality disclosed in experience. It will also be necessary to clarify the logical character of the expressive statements employed to record the occurrence of intrinsic value.
II

Instrumental and inherent extrinsic value exist by courtesy of intrinsic value. It is meaningless in Lewis' view to speak of the "value" of a thing unless implicit or explicit reference is made to a quality of experience actual or possible. That for the sake of which all else is valued is the intrinsically desirable experience of some subject. Moreover the ultimate touchstone of value in any of its modes is the immediate experience of delight, satisfaction, or some other similar feeling on the part of some subject. Thus all extrinsic value is relative to a certain aspect of experience loosely termed "what is desirable" or "what is prized" in the given content of experience itself. It is because of the relativity of extrinsic value that valuations may be represented as a form of empirical cognition. Mistaken beliefs might easily be entertained concerning the potentiality of objects for contributing to an immediately valuable experience; and such beliefs or valuations concern a character of things which is objective and as independent of personal desire or aversion as any other objective property of things. It is quite permissible, on this showing, to speak of the value of a thing as an objective property which the thing would possess even if it never came within the ambit of anyone's experience. If the statement "X is good" be
construed as referring to such objective properties in the sense intended "X is good" is indeed an empirical hypothesis - a hypothesis moreover which may be afforded a high degree of probability without any reference being made to the actual experience of any subject. A fund of past experience will be sufficient to substantiate the truth of the hypothesis - a knowledge of psychology being perhaps most pertinent in this connection.

The logical status of expressive statements however is not so clear-cut. Lewis attacks the problem by first concentrating his attention upon the immediately valuable "as a mode of the phenomenal as such". As a rough approximation he suggests that "Value-disvalue is that mode or aspect of the given or the contemplated to which desire and aversion are addressed; and that by apprehension of which the inclination to action is normally elicited". Further "The immediately good is what you like and what you want in the way of experience; the immediately bad is what you dislike and do not want." The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value must not be lost sight of in this connection. An object may be desired or prized but such desiring or prizing of objects is not always indicative of intrinsic value. It is the reaction to objects which possesses or may possess intrinsic value. "What you like and what you want in the way of experience" is the intrinsically

11. Lewis, C.I., op. cit., p. 403
valuable. Value in the intrinsic sense is a kind of datum findable in experience. Value in objects is not so much a datum as an empirically inferred fact about which one may be mistaken. No mistake however is possible in the case of intrinsic value because no judgement is involved and therefore no belief which stands in need of verification. Just as the data of sense (upon which are based scientific hypotheses) possess a reality as experienced, so do the data of feeling possess a reality as experienced. And it is upon these data of feeling and desire that valuations are properly based. They constitute the sole evidence of actual value in objects in case the indirect verification of a valuation be called into question. The data which are termed "intrinsic values" are ingredient in the given content of experience, therefore, and are indubitable in the same sense that other empirical data are indubitable. They possess what Lewis calls "an absolute factuality" and their formulation constitutes a kind of truth. The use of the term "truth" in this connection is unfortunate however because no resort to verification is implied. As Lewis states elsewhere "The factuality of the presentation content is neither verifiable nor falsifiable" - it is an epistemological ultimate. 13

The formulation of an apprehension of value-quality is a value-predication. But is differs from the ascription of

value to objects in an important sense. An apprehension of value-quality is simply the direct and uninterpreted prizing of some element of experience. The prizing is ultimately indicative of value in any particular case. Moreover the prizing is what defines value (in an ostensive manner). He who has never desired, prized, or found satisfaction in anything with which he is confronted in experience cannot be informed in any other manner what is meant by "value". In other words the value concepts one employs must be ostensively defined, i.e. defined by one's actually experiencing the mode of feeling which the term "value" designates. Here is where Lewis runs into extreme difficulty. The attempt to characterize immediate value by means of mere "dictionary" definitions leads one to a frustrating impasse. The aspect of experience in question has, from time to time, been identified with a great number of "natural" properties such as pleasure, contentment, satisfaction, delight, etc. but some critic or other has always found grounds for attacking the definition as being too comprehensive or too narrow, too materialistic or too idealistic, too generous or too austere. Lewis himself takes the transcendentalists to task for defining the good in terms of something other than "our natural desires". Hence his recommendation that the meaning of the immediately valuable be established by actually experiencing what is intended by the use of the expression. Certain discursive devices may be helpful - such as indicating that
"value" refers to roughly the same property as "desirability" refers to; the valuable is the desired or the desirable. When the objection is made that the desired is often disvalued one can only urge that in this case one desire has overruled another. If this fails to convince little else can be done except to urge that one scrutinize more carefully one's use of value terms. Further argument is likely to issue in what Stevenson has called a "persuasive definition". The question must be raised later as to whether Lewis, in formulating his conception of the final good, is not employing this artifice. What is important to notice here is that the formulations of direct value-apprehension are a species of definition of value itself. The formulation in question is a value-prediction of the order "X is good" but a prediction which cannot be verified because an analysis of its meaning, only, certifies its truth.

An important question to be discussed in connection with the immediately valuable concerns the distinction between value-quality and non-value-quality. If no distinction along these lines is possible it is difficult to see just what distinctive meaning might be given to valuations in general. This is a besetting weakness of any theory of value which purports to be naturalistic. Analysts

of Moore's persuasion have pointed out that value-predications must refer to qualities of a different order from non-value qualities, else value judgements would be nothing more than ill-expressed empirical hypotheses; i.e. they would be value-predications in grammatical form only. Where Moore's analysis falls down of course is in his insistence that value-predications assert a synthetic and necessary relation between empirical entities and supposititious non-empirical entities. Lewis proposes to avoid this metaphysical approach by insisting that all meaningful formulations of the immediately valuable refer to qualities which are ingredient in an actual or possible experience and which, by that token, are empirically definable. If, apart from the natural properties of an object, there is another property called "value" which is directly disclosed when and as the object is experienced, no empirical definition of this property is meaningful according to Lewis because no such non-empirical property is recognized in his epistemology. But although he denies the existence of such a property in objects he does seem to affirm its existence in the content of immediate experience. "Value" as applied to objects has the same meaning as "a potentiality for contributing to the realization of value-quality in experience". Such a potentiality has strictly the same logical status as a potentiality for contributing to (say) confusion or amazement in experience. Its significance for value theory lies in the fact that it
contributes, not to confusion or amazement, but to a particular quality termed value-quality. Any potentiality or an object which thus contributes to value-quality is a value of it. Its existence in objects is a matter for scientific inquiry. Intrinsic value, on the other hand, is not a potentiality for contributing to anything - it is, as Lewis puts it, an "empirical datum". It seems fairly obvious however that not all data of immediate experience are value-qualities and it is the task of characterizing the dichotomy between value-quality and non-value-quality which presents the greatest difficulty in this connection. Both qualities are empirical in the broad sense of the term but one (value-quality) distinguishes itself where rational or sensible action is concerned and where, consequently, evaluations of events, objects, and conduct is concerned. In attempting to account for this normative force of value data Lewis is reaching the crucial point of his analysis.

Intrinsic value - a datum of experience designated by an expressive statement - must be sought in the immediate content of experience, and more specifically in that content of it to which direct prizing and disprizing is addressed. The kind of quality in question is that which stimulates a tendency to desire an element of the content of experience for its own sake and not for any ulterior purpose. Such a quality attaches to the phenomenally presen-
ted and largely uninterpreted in experience, i.e. to what is immediately present to consciousness. It does not attach to objects because objects are epistemological constructs - interpretations placed upon immediate experience. Intrinsic value is created and disclosed in experience by the mode of feeling attending one's contemplation of the phenomenal content of experience as such. Attention must therefore be focussed upon the common human tendency to desire, take delight in, and find satisfaction in, what is immediately present to consciousness. "One's momentary liking or disliking is conclusively indicative of a present value-finding..."\(^{15}\) If what is presented is immediately prized, i.e. if the presentation as such is accompanied by a feeling of delight or satisfaction then the experience in question possesses intrinsic value. Lewis is not too careful to decide whether the value attaches to what is presented or to one's emotional reaction to what is presented. From scattered references however it must be concluded that he attributes intrinsic value to one's feelings - to one's experience of the content of experience, as it were. In this case the content itself need not be considered as possessing value at all, unless it be inherent extrinsic value. But perhaps it would be more correct to say that both the presentation content and the feelings it gives rise to are intrinsically valuable. The whole problem of the recognition of the immediately valuable is, as Lewis admits, a baffling one. An over-precise demarcation

\(^{15}\) Lewis, C.I., Ibid., p. 404.
of the realm of intrinsic value would inevitably do violence to the extremely complex structure of actual experience. For the purposes of theoretical clarity some such demarcation must be attempted. But ideally the aspect of experience in question is best identified and delimited by careful introspective analysis. Lewis states it thus: "We can only rely upon the improbability that what is so generally exhibited in the experience of everyone, and is so universally of interest and hence so commonly remarked, could fail to be correctly identified by reference to the multiplicity of occasions on which all of us use adjectives of prizing and disprizing."\textsuperscript{16} Lewis will not be grossly misinterpreted if his view be summed up as follows.

That for the sake of which all else is judged or found valuable is the experience actual or possible of some subject. This experience (a complex affection of the subject which includes many ingredients such as feelings of pleasure, security, esthetic delight, etc.) is found to be valuable when and as it occurs. What is indicative of intrinsic value is the fact that the content of experience in whole or in part is prized by some subject not as a means to anything further but as an end in itself. This quality of experience is intrinsically satisfying and constitutes a criterion in terms of which proposed ends of action and means to such ends may be criticized. "X is

\textsuperscript{16} Lewis, C.I., Ibid., p. 404.
good", then, in its expressive sense means "some subject
prizes X" where X stands for some element of the experience
of the subject in question. Where X stands for an object
"X is good" is either an empirical hypothesis predicating
extrinsic value of something or it is an elliptical exp-
ression of the fact that some subject prizes the experi-
ence to which X gives rise. Value-findings formulated by
expressive statements have an "absolute factuality" which
cannot be gainsaid. But this does not imply that they can-
not be criticized. Lewis is aware of the latent relativism
in a conception of valuation which does not provide for a
rational critique of valuations which might appear to be
hopelessly contrary. It is theoretically plausible that
two individuals who are as much alike physically and psy-
chologically as "normally" is the case may deliver them-
selves of contrary valuations of the expressive sort. What
is perhaps more disquieting is the fact that many individ-
uals do differ on these matters.¹⁷ And where a resort to
the relevant empirical facts is logically prohibited it is
all the more imperative that a procedure be specified
which will facilitate the reconciliation of diverse valua-
tions. If the question concerns extrinsic value it is pro-
perly subject to consideration by those who are sufficient-
ly well trained to make sound empirical generalizations in

¹⁷. Recent and current anthropological research has amassed
a great volume of interesting and cogent facts relating to
the question of ethical relativism. The student of ethics
and social philosophy neglects these facts at his peril.
the field involved. If the question concerns intrinsic value however the procedure is not so obviously apparent.

III.

Although Lewis has been insisting on the fact that present value-findings are subject to no critique he now proposes to introduce considerations which will make such a critique possible. The most important such consideration is the fact that the immediacies of experience are ingredient in a temporal whole which itself is found intrinsically good. A rational concern for the future and for what may be realized in the way of valuable experience in the future dictates that momentary satisfactions be judged according as they contribute to a life which is good on the whole. In this sense immediate goods have an intrinsic value (which is an incontrovertible datum of experience) and an instrumental or contributory value which is not disclosed but must be judged and the judgement verified. Thus a distinction is here made between the value of a moment of experience as it occurs and is apprehended and the value of having had such experience. Lewis is quite emphatic in stating that it is normally more important to judge a particular experience in terms of what is contributes to the whole than to accept as final its mom-
entary valuation. Indeed the ruling imperative in all valuation is the prescription "Judge all experiences in terms of their relation to a life which is good on the whole." The absolute and inviolate character of particular intrinsic values is thus attenuated by the introduction of a norm the validity of which is, according to Lewis, self-evident. Just as the intrinsic value-quality of particular experiences is a brute datum so is this supreme norm a datum. Lewis denies that it is a psychological datum; perhaps because he wishes to avoid the objection that psychological data carry only descriptive and not normative significance. Critical reflection, he contends, will reveal that if this norm be repudiated all norms must be repudiated and all pretension to significance in thought and action be abandoned. The ultimate purpose which defines the rational and the significant in valuation, discourse, and conduct is the realization of the good life. One is properly compelled to be consistent in one's thinking because inconsistency is in effectual as a means to realizing the good life. Similarly with valuation and conduct. Except they are governed

18. Lewis sets up a strict dichotomy between philosophy and science; philosophy being concerned with primarily with "meanings" and science primarily with "truths". See below p. 46 ff.
by some specific and self-justifying purpose they are pointless. Knowledge properly conceived is for the sake of action; action is for the sake of achievement; and what is significantly achieved is determined by valuation. The knowing-doing-valuing complex is, in any sensible or rational individual, informed by the only ideal which recommends itself as good without any qualification, viz. the concern with, and intention to realize, the good life.

Two questions must be raised in connection with this more complicated conception. The first concerns the soundness of the allegation that no more ultimate purpose is conceivable than the realization of the good life. Secondly the meaning of the concept "the good life" must be explicated and the implications pertinent to the logical question at hand elicited. The first question is more fundamental and is better postponed. The second may be dealt with at once.

With the introduction of the rational imperative enjoining one to have concern for, and consciously strive to realize, a life found good in the living of it Lewis' whole conception of intrinsic value takes on a different aspect. In one sense present value-findings are ultimate and uncriticizeable. But in a more important sense it is not only possible but also imperative that such particular value-findings be "transvaluated". Since a rational evaluation of experience looks to the criterion of a valuable
whole particular value-findings may not be taken as absolutely final. One experience qualified another, and the value-qualities of particular experiences qualify one another also. A number of experiences when taken together disclose a value which is not a mere sum of the particular values but a super-added quality attaching to the temporal synthesis of a stretch of experience. In order that such an "over-arching" value be apprehended it is necessary that an act of the imagination be employed which envisages the whole as a complex structure or Gestalt the elements of which are found to be less valuable taken singly than taken as contributing to the whole. The contributory value of an element of experience is thus of greater importance normally than its momentary value - in spite of the fact that its momentary value is intrinsic while its contributory value is often only instrumental. There is of course no clear-cut separation of experiences into those which possess only instrumental or contributory value and those which possess only intrinsic value. Many experiences are valuable in both senses. A later experience may qualify the value of, or be qualified in respect of its value, by an earlier one and vice-versa.

19. Lewis cites musical and literary works as examples of things which possess this "value structure". Any whole of experience however will be seen to exemplify the same character to a greater or lesser extent.
The final word in the evaluation of a particular experience is never really said because it is always capable of being qualified by fresh experience and its value-quality reinterpreted accordingly. But in spite of this insistence upon the significant transvaluation of values Lewis wishes to avoid a confusion that may arise concerning the criterion of transvaluation. This criterion is the relation of each moment of experience to the whole of experience and not its relation to any non-experienceable ideal. The life found good in the living of it is the ultimate criterion of value.

The complexity of this conception is at once apparent. There is no value save that disclosed in the immediacies of experience. But the immediacies of experience are ingredient in a temporal Gestalt and are infused with a rational concern for the future and what may be realized as a result of deliberate and forward-looking action. Immediate experience and a cognitive interpretation placed upon it signalize what may be realized. And evaluation of the multiplicity of possible ends of action dictates what is sensibly realized or at least significantly sought after in experience. Evaluation of ends and means is therefore a continuing self-conscious enterprise of human living which acknowledges the intrinsic value of each moment but is ever sensitive to the peculiar interrelatedness of all such moments and their values. Lewis' concept of a whole of
experience, it will be seen, functions in much the same manner in his theory of value as does the "principle of inclusiveness" in Perry's theory. For the historical record it is also interesting to note the extent to which both Lewis and Perry were influenced by William James. Perry quotes James as follows:

"That act must be the best act, accordingly, which makes for the best whole in the sense of awakening the least sum of dissatisfactions."

And according to Lewis "...(life) should be envisaged as a whole and no part of it omitted from our concern."22

The life which is good on the whole is constituted good by its being a complex configuration of particular intrinsically desirable experiences. Thus the ultimate or final good, while it is not definable except in terms of immediately apprehended goods, does not represent a mere sum or collection of such goods. It is this circumstance which complicates the epistemological determination of value in any particular case. There is required, apart from direct value-findings and comparatively unambiguous empirical hypotheses, an imaginative and synthetic envisagement of a whole of experience. And this envisagement

21. Perry, R.B., Ibid., p. 645. The passage quoted is from James' Will to Believe, p. 205
22. Lewis, C.I., op. cit., p. 495
involves complex judgements which relate in a single "intuition" past experience and its value-quality and anticipated future experience and its probable value-quality. A whole of experience is never at any moment experienced directly as a discrete actuality - it must be conceived or constructed on a basis of past experience and the fund of knowledge already confirmed in experience. In this sense the envisagement of a whole of experience involved implications which may be subjected to the test of direct or indirect empirical confirmation. It involves hypotheses concerning the content of past experience, its value-quality, and its empirically determinable cause-effect relationship with future experience. It involves hypotheses which predict specific events and which relate these events to certain anticipated experiences. And most importantly it involves a recognition of the organic nature of the whole such that an apprehension of ultimate value will be seen to depend upon an adequate grasp of what is on the whole or in the long run satisfying.

A premature and absolutistic evaluation of particular things or experience is, on this showing, perverse and irrational because there is no a priori indication that an adequate envisagement of a whole of life has in any instance been achieved. The revelations of fresh experience will inevitably affect the cumulative value of any stretch of experience already evaluated. Moreover fresh
evidence may affect the previously conceived interpretation of past experience and thereby affect the values involved. If a limit is prescribed to the otherwise indefinite degree in which an evaluation of a whole of life may be substantiated, such a limit can only be justified pragmatically. There are no logical considerations which are pertinent in this connection — normally it is the pressure of biological, psychological and sociological forces which defines the arbitrary limit to be placed upon a significant quest for values. But theoretically this quest is a never-ending one the findings of which may be afforded a greater or lesser degree of probability only. Perhaps Lewis would contend that just as it is a rational imperative which enjoins one to evaluate a whole of experience so is it also a rational imperative which checks any tendency to become abnormally concerned with such an evaluation. An abnormal preoccupation with questions concerning over-arching values may easily prejudice the realization of actual value in experience. In this connection one's "common sense" must be consulted and deliberate action initiated in spite of the fact that many of the ensuing consequences of action are not foreseen. One jumps from the path of an on-coming express train and one's decision so to act is sensibly taken — in spite of the fact that only one consequence of one's action is considered, viz. that one's life will be momentarily out of
danger. Thus in actual practice the business of evaluation is seldom the calm and calculating discernment of ultimate values which ensures the highest level of rationality in one's deliberate or willed action. This is perhaps as it should be because to act is often more rational than to surrender the goods of action on the pretext that these goods are not completely foreseeable. No rule of course can be formulated which will strike a nice balance between action and evaluation in every case, but the ensuing consequences will usually indicate that the emphasis has been properly or improperly placed. Here again, even a decision to take action is a species of empirical hypothesis verifiable in future experience.

Following the development of Lewis' thought the question of value in objects must now be considered. In spite of the complexity of the valuing situation it is still possible to keep separate the various modes of value-predication and the meanings of the statements which embody them. The attribution of value to objects is the commonest type of value-predication. And such predication in all its modes represents a form of empirical cognition the ultimate basis of which is some actual experience of intrinsic value. In its broadest and least specific sense "X is good" (where X stands for an object) signifies that X has an empirically determinable relation to the value experience of some subject. When value is predicated of
an object this much at least is meant and a great deal more may be intended as well.

The value of an object consists in its potentiality for giving rise to certain experiences. In an important sense all properties of objects are potentialities for giving rise to certain experiences. This formulation of the matter is simply an explication of the meaning of "empirical cognition". The redness of an object is a potentiality which the object possesses for stimulating one's visual apparatus such that when the object is observed the distinctive color datum occurs in one's experience. Similarly with the so-called objective (primary) qualities, shape, motion, weight, etc. Except these properties reveal themselves in some possible experience no empirical definition of them would be meaningful - they could not be represented as real properties of the object in question. Even the property of having a specific atomic weight (for example), is a potentiality of something for giving rise to certain experiences in the laboratory which alone attest the empirical reality of the property. Thus the property "value" which a thing possesses is just as much a property of the thing as the property compressibility is of air or as weight is of mercury. If a certain volume of mercury be placed on a scale then the indicator needle will be deflected a certain distance. Therefore a certain volume of mercury has a certain weight.
What is meant by the property weight, and whether an object possesses it or not, is determined by the procedure specified in the subjunctive conditional "if...then" statement. In the case of value properties the procedure is essentially the same, except that in any actual determination of value reference must be made to an experience of intrinsic value. It would not e.g. be necessary or perhaps even meaningful to refer to an experience of "intrinsic weight", in order to confirm the existence of weight in an object. But by the relativity of value is meant just this necessary relation of value in objects to value as apprehended in experience. Here one of the traditional epistemological puzzles in connection with value suggests itself. If the nature of objective value cannot be understood except in terms of a reference to subjective experience what considerations are pertinent to an evaluation of experience itself? In terms of what criterion may significant experience be identified in case the actual value of an object be disagreed upon by two individuals who do not disagree about the pertinent empirical facts? Some discussion of these difficulties is included in Lewis' treatment of the immediately valuable. But the problems involved are thrown into sharper focus in the present discussion.

Lewis maintains that the relativity of value does not turn upon the relation of an object to the experience of
particular persons. It depends rather "... upon the circumstances under which the satisfaction to which an object may conduces would be realized in experience." He thus makes a distinction between the relativity of value and the relativity of values. Value in objects in its generic sense is indeed relative to experience - but this does not necessarily mean that contrary value-predications are hopelessly irreconcilable. It is important that the conditions under which an evaluation is made be taken into account; and these conditions include the psychological make-up of the evaluator, his cultural background, and in short, all of the pertinent circumstances which account for his having made an evaluation at all. Once these are understood the sense in which value is predicated of the object will be understood. In this connection the various modes in which value is attributed to objects call for clarification.

The attribution of value qua bare potentiality leaves a great many questions unanswered because of the various interpretations which may legitimately be placed upon it. When certain qualifications are introduced concerning conditions to be realized before an object will be correctly judged valuable attributions of simple potentiality become attributions of value-in-fact. To say that water is good is to state a simple potentiality of water viz. that it is of such a character that it may in some

23. Lewis, C.I., Ibid., p. 512
sense contribute to value-quality in experience. To say that water has a health-giving value is to delimit the sense in which water is good and to state that under certain specific conditions water has a certain specific value. This is an attribution of value-in-fact. Most value predications are of this order, although in grammatical form they may appear to be absolute or unqualified. The uncritical use of value statements by most pay people fits this description. And many apparently contradictory predications of value turn out, under analysis, to be slipshod expressions of values which are quite compatible when their full meanings are explicated. Until such a full explication is achieved no significant appraisal of value statements is possible. It is in this sense that many questions in both value theory and ethics are verbal ones and their answers dependent upon philosophical analysis rather than on empirical observation. It is in this sense also that the empirical meaningfulness of a value statement is dependent on the logical possibility of its being verified. It will be seen, in this connection, that an attribution of bare potentiality (an unqualified assertion of the form "X is good") is little better than meaningless. Its method of verification and therefore its meaning depend upon the introduction of qualifications specifying precisely under what conditions the object will give rise to value-experience. This is almost tantamount to saying
that no attribution of value to objects is empirically meaningful unless it is an attribution of value-in-fact. The implications of this view will be considered later. 24

Of particular importance in value theory are predications of value-in-fact in the mode of relativity to persons. A familiar criticism of naturalistic theories of value has it that any determination of value which depends upon a reference to personal feelings and attitudes is bound to lead to a species of relativism which renders all valuations arbitrary. Lewis is aware of this difficulty and is expressly concerned to avoid such a "Protagorean relativism".

There is a sense in which an object may have objective value and yet be value-less to a particular person at a particular time and in particular circumstances. A sieve has no value to a man who is bailing out a leaky boat, but his present disvaluing of the sieve is no indication of its objective or on-the-whole value. The object has objective value but at the same time "has no value" as judged by the man in the boat. Thus it is perfectly correct to say that "X has value" (in one sense) and that "it is not the case that X has value" (in quite a different sense). The object has properties which make it

24. Lewis endorses the 'verifiability criterion of empirical meaningfulness' - but credit is due to Peirce for first having formulated this conception(usually referred to as the Pragmatist theory of meaning). See below p. 56.
valuable whatever circumstances may prevent its being actually valued in certain contexts. Not only 'environmental' circumstances are involved; the value of an object is not apprehended by some persons because of an organic or psychological incapacity on their parts so to apprehend it. Thus a person with tone deafness may not value an objectively valuable piece of music; but his disvaluing would be cognitively significant only with explicit reference to his incapacity.

A different problem however is involved in the fact that sometimes an object will be valued by a person when it does not genuinely possess objective value. Willful murder e.g. is generally conceded not to have objective value, i.e. it is an event which has no potentiality for contributing to the valuable experience of anyone. But occasionally a person appears who does value the event - either as a means to some further valuable event, or as possessing an inherent albeit perverse value in itself. Lewis attempts to resolve this paradox by suggesting that the objective value of an object is usually conceived in terms of its comparative value. Thus another casuistic principle has been introduced. An object may have more potentiality for creating disvalue in experience than value and on this basis be termed objectively disvaluable. But it may possess some potentialities for good and thus be termed valuable in an absolute (thought somewhat trivial)
sense. An important point has here been clarified. To say that an object has no objective value is not to say that it possesses no potentiality whatever for contributing to value-experience but rather that its potentialities for disvalue far outweigh its potentialities for value. It is quite conceivable, therefore, that some value may be attributed to an object which has no objective value in the sense that, comparatively speaking, its value is insignificant in the scheme of things.

Value may of course be attributed to an object possessing no objective value because the attributor is organically abnormal and given to experiencing satisfaction in the presence of objects which normal persons disvalue. The murderer may be a sadist. The problem then arises of specifying criteria which delimit the class of normal persons. These criteria, as anthropologists and others take care to point out, are culturally defined, and this implies that the actual value of objects will in any instance be relative to a particular culture. Lewis is still correct in insisting however that the value-experience an object may give rise to is not affected by the value it does actually give rise to. To use his example, gold may

25. A most penetrating, though easily read, account of this characteristic of human society is given in Ruth Benedict's well known Patterns of Culture. Classical expression of the view is to be found in the writings of Westermarck and other anthropologists. Cf. also Durkheim, E., Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.
be of no value to a primitive Indian tribe but this fact does not alter the quite different fact that gold as such possesses properties capable of giving rise to the experience of genuine value on the part of someone. And what is at any particular time actually valued is perhaps of less importance for value theory than what is capable of commanding approbation on the whole or in the long run. The fact that a person actually values an object is only a very slight indication of the full potentialities of the object for giving rise to similar or different satisfactions on the part of others. In case there is an organic peculiarity affecting the person's experience the fact that he values it may be totally non-indicative of its actual value. Such an apprehension of value would be subjective and would not be a reliable basis for predicting the accrual of further value-quality. In fact this very nearly sums up Lewis' definition of subjectivity. Whatever apprehension of value reveals itself as an erroneous indication of future possible value-experience or of value-experiences on the part of others is by that token subjective. Thus there are two main considerations which affect the classification of values into "subjective" and "objective". Before it can be said to possess objective value an object must be shown to be a continuing source of satisfaction to the individual who values it and it must be a source of on-the-whole or comparative satisfaction to oth-
ers. In this sense the objectivity of value is precisely of the same character as the objectivity of any other property of objects. The objective value of an object consists in the empirically attested relation between it and the experience, actual or possible, of persons. The relation asserted has the same status as a relation (say) between litmus paper and acids. It is an exceedingly complex relation of course, due to the exceedingly complex character of the human organism and its social environment. But it is a relation the nature of which may be determined by empirical methods and expressed in terms of empirical hypothesis. Truths about values are thus afforded a measure of probability only and are properly subject to continuing confirmation and modification just as are the truths of physics and chemistry. Indeed it should be apparent by now that the truths about values hang together with truths about other empirical entities. The laws of astronomy, in spite of their remoteness from the laws of human psychology, may be relevant in some respects to an empirical determination of value. The fact that the sun produces radiations of a certain character and with a certain uniformity is a fact that may have to be considered in any assessment of the value of objects whose relation to human experience is a more proximate one. Nevertheless it must be recognized that value theory must look more and more to the social
sciences for support and corroboration. The increasing preoccupation with empirical methods in psychology, anthropology, sociology, history and cognate disciplines bears out the contention that traditional a prioristic approaches are inept. The only a priorism which Lewis endorses is that which characterizes the determination of meanings. The validity of these is certified by 'critical reflection' only, no empirical confirmation of them being possible. What is required in the determination of meanings is that one apprehend adequately what one intends by the use of certain expressions. It is Lewis' belief that once value-expressions are explicated in this manner the question of objective value is seen to be an empirical question the only significant resolution of which is a probability judgement based ultimately upon empirical data.

IV.
(A) The problems germane to the determination of value in objects are legion; and it is here suggested that not all of these problems are empirically resoluble. The ascription of bare potentiality to an object, as was noted above, is of little practical importance. It is the mere form of a judgement rather than a judgement
itself. Lewis is forced to admit that "...hardly any valuation envisages a potentiality so bare as to be free of all implicit limitations."26 In order to be empirically meaningful a valuation must involve certain limitations prescribing in what sense the object in question has value. Any valuation which did not involve these limitations could not be verified because one would not have the slightest notion as to how to proceed with the verification. When this procedure of verification is not specified the problem of value-determination loses its meaning. And it follows from this that no categorical attribution of value is empirically meaningful. Theoretically the meaning of a valuation involves an understanding of the precise method of its verification.

In view of these considerations it is difficult to see just what Lewis means by an object's having impersonal value. All value is relative to persons because it is only persons who have the type of experience termed intrinsically good. But in assessing the social value of an object Lewis suggests that all the value properties of the object must be taken into account and the value-in-general of the object determined with respect to any and all persons who may experience it. Now a perfectly obvious device may be employed to ensure that such a valuation be rendered unambiguous viz., the precise num-

26. Lewis, C.I., Ibid., p. 540
ber of persons referred to may be specified and the totality of conditions affecting their experience of the object be described. The valuation would then become an attribution of value-in-fact in the mode of relativity to persons. If this is what Lewis means by the impersonal value of a thing the theoretical problem is soluble. But there are passages which imply that no such specific reference is intended, and that it is meaningful to attribute value to things with reference to people generally or to "all people". 27 What is more to be wondered at is that Lewis proposes to give the experiences of all people equal weight in this connection. This recommendation is hardly compatible with the view expressed earlier, viz. that perverse and irrational modes of feeling must be disregarded or at least discounted. What appears to be at issue here is a definition of the "natural man" and of "normality" as applied to the direct apprehension of value-quality in experience. And if "normal" is to be defined by a statistical average nothing is proved about value except (as Lewis admits) what is relative to a majority. Moreover it will be remembered that the more significant of direct value-findings are not those focussed upon the specious present but those addressed to a complex imaginative envisagement of a whole of life. Clearly, not all

27. Lewis, C.I., Ibid., p. 545.
persons have the same discernment and power of imagination necessary to achieve such an envisagement. It would be quite inconsistent to place as much emphasis upon the experience of a dullard as upon that of an artistic genius. Lewis is faced, here, with a curious paradox. Presumably impersonal value is one of the more important types of value because it is indicative of what is most likely to conduce to the satisfaction of most persons in the long run. In view of the extremely complex nature of valuation the presence of impersonal value in a thing out to be determined by persons endowed with the highest degree of spiritual discernment and having an understanding of a great volume of empirically attested fact of a quite technical nature. Ideally one would consult the experience of an Aristotle or a Goethe. And yet Lewis denies that the experience of one person should count for more than that of another.

Within the scope of the present treatment such problems as these cannot begin to be discussed with any thoroughness. It will perhaps serve some useful purpose however to indicate what the crucial difficulties are in Lewis' views and to suggest what considerations are pertinent to their solution. In particular the relevance of certain criticisms offered by those who en-
dorse the emotive theory of value will be considered.

Most of the questions arising from the conception of valuation qua empirical cognition are, paradoxically, not empirical questions; rather they concern the means of clarification to be employed in unfolding the meaning of valuations. Where an actual determination of value is concerned it is perhaps more important to clear away vagueness and ambiguity in meanings than to busy oneself with observations and empirical generalizations the relevance of which is not apparent. Plainly speaking it is pointless to attempt the empirical verification of a statement the empirical meaning of which is unknown. In the natural sciences such meanings are largely implicit or assumed in the initial stages of inquiry, an explic¬ation of them being undertaken after positive results have been obtained. A pre-analytic grasp of meanings is in every case necessary however because it is the meaning of a hypothesis which must be referred to if its method of verification is to be understood. It will be seen that Lewis' discussion of valuation is almost entirely devoted to the task of making value statements

28. Classical examples of the explication of pre-analytic meanings are Hume's analysis of efficient causation and Berkeley's analysis of material substance. Consider also Einstein's analysis of the concept of simultaneity.
meaningful in an explicit sense. In Lewis' view the philosophic examination of any scientific discipline or common sense belief consists in such an explication of implicit or unconsciously employed meanings. In connection with his analysis of esthetic value he makes the following observations. "...the nature of esthetic value is a question to be answered by analysis and a priori, and constitutes a topic for philosophical investigation." And further "The definitive explication of what is meant by attributing esthetic value operates as the basic criterion of those phenomena which are pertinent to the determination of any specific law, and thus represents the basis from which, either explicitly or implicitly, investigations of the positive science of esthetics must proceed." The analysis of meaning is therefore the peculiarly philosophic part of value theory. "But the positive laws of the science of esthetics are a question which must be left to those who possess sufficiently wide acquaintance with esthetic phenomena and are sufficiently expert to be capable of arriving at trustworthy empirical generalizations in this field."29 Thus a strict dichotomy is set up between science and philosophy such that while scientific inquiry presupposes philosophic analysis of some sort, and would not

29. Lewis, C.I., op. cit., p. 468-469,
be significant inquiry unless it did, philosophic analysis need not await the findings of science but may proceed a priori to explicate the meanings of any concepts whatever. More importantly the soundness of philosophic analysis does not depend (as Perry's analysis of value might suggest) upon the truth or falsity of any scientific theory and is not affected favorably or unfavorably by any empirical observations. An apprehension of meaning is accomplished by means of critical reflection; and in connection with values critical reflection reveals, for Lewis, that "... in our mouths 'value' means 'value to humans'" and 'value to humans', as the foregoing survey of Lewis views should reveal, means 'what is ultimately satisfactory in the way of human experience'.

Whether the term "valuable" or the term "satisfactory" is applied to a certain content of experience is not, according to Lewis, a mere terminological question. If it were, value theory would lose its significance completely. What is involved, rather, is a search for a criterion which will certify the correct application of the value term to contents of experience to which non-value terms also correctly apply. But if valuation is always a matter of empirical cognition the semantic reference of value terms must in every case be specifiable. The cognitive meaning of valuations will thus de-

pend upon what is designated by value terms, and the 
distinctive cognitive meaning of valuations will depend 
upon whether the value terms involved designate some-
thing different from what non-value terms designate. If 
e.g. the term "valuable" designates a content of experi-
ence which is also correctly designated by the term 
"desirable" the decision as to which term to employ 
would be a terminological one. And it might appear that 
in this sense Lewis' analysis amounts to just such a 
terminological decision. Such a conclusion however is 
only partly warranted. As a rough approximation Lewis 
did suggest that the valuable and the desirable are 
one and the same. But his entire subsequent analysis is 
designed to qualify this rudimentary definition. In his 
view every correct application of the term "desirable" 
does not necessarily warrant application of the term 
"valuable". Perhaps the only unqualifiedly correct app-
lication of the term "valuable" is to something called 
"a whole of experience". Therefore the fact that some 
element of experience is correctly classifiable as "des-
irable" does not necessarily imply that it is correctly 
classifiable as "valuable". What does warrant the appli-
cation of "valuable" in the final analysis is a rational 
imperative, viz. "Judge all experiences in terms of their 
relation to a whole of experience which is satisfying as 
such!" It will be remembered that Lewis introduced this
imperative to facilitate a transvaluation of values and to set up a critique which would avoid the latent relativism in naturalistic theories. Without this norm no norms at all would have any significance. But with the recognition of this norm the meanings of valuations will become immediately apparent. Whether the application of a value term is in any instance warranted is a question, then, to be answered by him who has an adequate grasp of what is meant by "a whole of experience satisfying as such" and who is sufficiently informed of the contributory nature of the experience to be judged. If the desirability of an experience implied its value without qualification there would be no grounds for making a distinction between rational and perverse evaluations and no basis upon which to erect a critique of value unless a purely arbitrary one. These considerations all seem to point to the conclusion that, for Lewis, the full significance of any valuation is not apprehended except with definite reference to a particular rational imperative. To value an experience is not merely to prize it or to desire it; rather it is to prize and desire significantly or relative to an ultimate purpose.

If Lewis is to be criticized for defining value concepts in terms of descriptive predicates the critic will have to recognize that "valuable" and desirable" are

31. Their generic meaning, that is.
not flatly synonymous in Lewis' view unless what is found desirable is a whole of experience as such. But with reference to such a whole of experience Lewis does use the terms "desirable" and "valuable" interchangeably. The fact that a whole of experience is intrinsically desirable constitutes it good. Lewis' position on this matter is quite unambiguous. When he asserts that valuation is a matter of empirical cognition only he is obviously taking for granted the recognition of a valid imperative. And his imperative asserts that value and satisfaction are identical where a synthetic view of a whole of life is achieved.

It would be incorrect, then, to say that Lewis equates the valuable and the satisfying in the manner that some hedonists equate pleasure and the good. His is a much more catholic and a much more sophisticated conception than that of Bentham, for example. If Lewis is aware of nothing else he is certainly aware of the complexity of his subject and of the dangers of over-simplification. He purposely avoids the use of concepts borrowed from the 'precise' sciences because these can only do violence to the ineffable character of many aspects of actual experience. And in contra-distinction to many "behavioristic" approaches he is typically concerned with experience as experienced rather than as interpreted in biological terms. Both of these approaches deal with
aspects of the same complex phenomenon but Lewis' is perhaps the more penetrating and fruitful. He is getting at the problem from within as it were. In spite of the felicity of Lewis' method however certain logical difficulties remain in his analysis. It must be admitted that he considers the valuable and the desirable to be synonymous in some of their meanings at least. It has been the purpose of this survey to disclose what these meanings are; and it remains now to consider some of the pertinent objections to valuations so conceived.

(B) The commonest criticism of a naturalistic theory of value has it that value concepts are not definable in terms of, and therefore not strictly synonymous with, descriptive non-value concepts. The classical expression of this view was formulated by Professor G. E. Moore in his *Principia Ethica*. According to Moore no ethical predicate is synonymous with any descriptive predicate. "Goodness" is not synonymous with "pleasure" because it is always possible to point to instances of the correct application of "pleasure" which do not admit of the correct application of the concept "good". Even though an

32. Pepper, in his *Digest of Purposive Values*, adopts the biological or behavioristic approach thus construing valuation in terms of overt behavior rather than in terms of the immediacies of experience. Perry's method is similar to Pepper's though perhaps not quite so dependent upon biological concepts.
experience is found pleasant it is always significant to inquire as to whether it is good as well as pleasant. Moore based his criticism on the contention that one property cannot be identified with another and that, therefore, the concepts "goodness" and "pleasure" cannot be synonymous. If such an identification of properties be attempted what results is a self-contradictory statement asserting that "goodness is not goodness", i.e. that it is pleasure. As Professor W. Frankena has pointed out however Moore's rejection of an analysis of ethical concepts involves the rejection of all analysis of the same order. On this showing all analytic statements would have to be rejected as meaningless because self-contradictory. Recent analysts have avoided this unsatisfactory conclusion by insisting that an analytic statement does not assert the identity of two properties at all but simply functions as an implicit indication of the synonymity of two terms. This would resolve the difficulty posed by Moore by representing analytic statements as refering to the meanings of terms and not to


34. A good discussion of this question is to be found in Pap, A., Elements of Analytic Philosophy, MacMillan, N.Y. 1949, p. 29 ff.
the properties of objects. This is in fact the interpretation of analytic statements which Lewis himself endorses. But even this conception of synonymity does not avoid the objection that one of the two terms in a simple analysis (A is B, or A means B) is cognitively superfluous and that the analysis really amounts to nothing more than a terminological decision. The question now becomes "Are the meanings of the terms 'goodness' and 'pleasure' identical?" According to Lewis one's intention in using the term "good" constitutes its meaning. And this meaning fully explicated is the same as the meaning of "desirable" where the descriptive term designates a whole of experience found satisfactory as such. But if one's intention is the same in the use of "good" as it is in the use of "desirable" (as it must be if the analysis is to be certified correct) then there is only one meaning, not two; and an analysis of value in terms of desire can only result in a nominal definition.

This "paradox of analysis" is not peculiar to value theory but cuts across any philosophic inquiry which involves the definition of concepts. The paradox has not been satisfactorily resolved to date although numerous solutions have been offered. Lewis has this to say about

35. The paradox runs as follows: "If an analysis is correct it is trivial, and if it is not trivial it must be incorrect."
it. "...(definitions) may be explications of one inten­sion by another and more familiar or more lucid meaning; and thus delimit the essential nature of what is named and is in question. Only if they have this...character can they contribute to the clarification of a serious matter such as the nature of value." 36 Lewis adheres closely to this manner of explication throughout his analysis. In defining "value" he uses the terms "desirable", "prizing", "satisfying", and the like to mention the meaning or intension of the term "valuable". As was noted above, this is a species of ostensive definition. Lewis is attempting to point to and identify the charac­ter of experience which the term "value" commonly designates. It is this character of experience which is the meaning intended by the use of the term, and it is this character of experience which functions as a criterion of the correct application of value terms. But in what sense the explication of a value concept is a cognitive enterprise is difficult to determine. Lewis believes an explication to be certified correct by critical reflec­tion. This manner of accounting for it however suggests that meanings are first-person constructions certifiable a priori in the first person only - since it is general­ly conceded that one person cannot introspect into the thought processes of another person. If, on the other

hand, the correctness of one's critical reflections is to be substantiated by referring to other persons' critical reflections the substantiation must proceed by way of inference and empirical generalization - a curious way to certify the a priority of anything. 37

It has to be admitted (as Lewis himself admits) that any philosophic explication of a concept requires some pre-analytic grasp of its meaning, else one would not even know what concept it was that was being analysed. It might even be argued that one would have to possess a complete grasp of pre-analytic meaning before any analysis of it could be formulated. In this sense an analysis would be certified correct if, and only if, it made more clear and familiar what is already known in a

37. Many of the fundamental difficulties of "meaning analysis" are to be found discussed in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding; particularly in Book III (Of Words). The problem, even in its present form, is not peculiar to contemporary formulations. Locke encounters the same problem as Lewis does in attempting to specify the sense in which an apprehension of meaning may be false. Concerning a definition of such things as goodness and justice Locke says "(these ideas) cannot but be adequate. An idea thus made, and laid up for a pattern, must necessarily be adequate (i.e. valid) being referred to nothing else but itself nor made by any other original but the good liking and will of him that first made the combination." Construction of concepts in the first-person are therefore always correct. But Locke goes on to discuss a sense in which they may be incorrect. Suppose, he says, that someone has constructed an idea of justice. Then "Another coming after, and in conversation learning from him the word justice, different from what the first author applied to it, and has in mind when he uses it....on this account our ideas (of justice etc.) are liable
muddled and confused way. There is a danger however, especially in the treatment of value and ethical concepts, that these will involve sentimental connotations and their explication be accompanied by an over-tone of meaning which is emotive and not cognitive. By critical reflection one may become aware that one's intension in using the term "good" is such-and-such. But in communicating this meaning to others there is always a tendency for one to insist that others ought to mean by "good" what one means oneself. It is because of this circumstance, among others, that the definition "The good is the desirable" (for example) has been construed by Stevenson and other analysts as a persuasive definition and the view taken that ethical concepts have no cognitive meaning.

The use of language to evince feelings and attitudes and to affect the feelings and attitudes of others is one which has been unduly neglected in naturalistic (and metaphysical) ethics and value theory. As a recent analyst puts it "There is little doubt but that much of traditional ethics with its metaphysical talk about 'absolute values', which, like mathematical objects (numbers)

"to be faulty." (Book II, chapter 31, #304). The question now of course is "Whose idea of justice is to be taken as the criterion of adequacy in the assessment of an analysis?" Contemporary analysts tend to favor Locke's answer viz. that "common usage" is the arbiter.
are capable of apprehension by the intellect only, has nurtured itself on a persistent disregard of the expressive and motivative functions of ethical language."

It is significant that, while Lewis does not ignore this function of language, he does attempt to discount it as much as possible. Even in his discussion of the immediately valuable he neglects to consider fully the implications of the fact that the formulations of direct value-findings are expressive statements and not empirical hypotheses.

In order to avoid transcendentalism Lewis must justify the view that value-quality is an empirically real datum of experience. That is, if value judgements are to have cognitive significance there must be some quality recognizable in experience which is correctly designated by the term "value". In defining this quality however Lewis finds it necessary to identify it in some sense with other qualities of experience. Once the definition of value in terms of descriptive predicates is accomplished the business of determining values is properly undertaken by the "social engineer". The disconcerting thing however is that all the value terms occurring in a naturalistic theory must be replaced by non-value (descriptive) terms before the cognitive import of

38. Pap., loc. cit., p. 34.
the whole is apparent. If "value" does designate an empirically real quality why should it be necessary to employ descriptive non-value terms in its stead? In every case these non-value terms must be employed if cognitive sense is to be made of the statements in question. \(^{39}\)

What more, if anything, does a valuation assert that is not asserted by the empirical hypothesis into which it must be converted before being capable of verification? If Lewis is to be strictly interpreted his answer would be that there is no difference in what is asserted. "Valuation is always a matter of empirical cognition". If a valuation is not precisely equivalent to some empirical hypothesis it is, by definition, not a genuine valuation. But if this is the case what significance has a valuation which an equivalent assertion (in psychology e.g.) has not? It will not do to argue that valuations refer to aspects of experience,"by apprehension of which the inclination to action is normally elicited". Psychologists are just as much concerned with these aspects of experience as are value theorists. No matter what aspects of experience valuations refer to their cognitive significance will not thereby be distinguished from that of purely descriptive statements. And it is the

\(^{39}\) This is strictly implied in Lewis' conception of value in objects. An attribution of value without any qualifications would be quite meaningless in his view. See above p. 36.
cognitive significance of valuations which is here in question.

The dilemma posed by naturalists, viz. that valuations are either disguised empirical statements or semantically absurd metaphysical statements, may be resolved according to certain contemporary analysts by explaining their meanings in terms of the expressive and motivational functions of language. In their view the occurrence of value terms in philosophical and scientific literature and in every-day speech serves to betray the peculiar interest taken in the subject dealt with. A valuation such as "The ultimate good is the life found good in the living of it" would thus be construed as an emotive utterance the truth or falsity of which it would be logically impossible to determine. The statement asserts nothing but simply evinces the sentiments of the speaker and serves to "...stimulate feelings and volitional tendencies on the part of the hearer." The apparent lack of synonymity between a valuation and an "equivalent" empirical hypothesis is thus accounted for by revealing

40. This approach had its inception in the writings of C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, Cf. Principles of Literary Criticism and The Meaning of Meaning. Both works deal with the distinction between cognitive and emotive meaning.

the emotive meaning attaching to valuations in general. The normative significance of valuations is to be understood in terms of their emotive meaning also. Lewis suggests that value-disvalue is distinguished from non-value by the normative significance of the former where rational or sensibly taken action is concerned. According to the emotive theory "rational" and "sensibly taken" are merely epithets employed to discredit modes of conduct etc. which the speaker does not approve and to recommend those he does approve. On this showing Lewis' insistence upon the self-verifying validity of the rational imperative amounts to a recommendation, somewhat hortatory in character, concerning what attitudes his readers ought to entertain toward certain things.

The case would be different if Lewis believed the rational imperative to be hypothetical in character. It would then be understood to assert "If you would lead a satisfying life you must evaluate all elements of experience in terms of their relation to such a life." Then on the assumption that his readers wish to lead such a life and are prepared to make this the criterion of significance where deliberate action and evaluation are concerned, Lewis' analysis of valuation has indeed the significance of a critique of rational conduct and correct evaluation - a critique, moreover, which has more than merely emotive meaning. Once a characterization of the
ideal life is agreed upon and it is understood that rational conduct is a self-conscious realization of the good life valuations will be correctly classifiable as empirical hypotheses and subject to rational dispute. If this is Lewis' conception of the rational imperative he has successfully avoided much damaging criticism. On the other hand if he insists that there is only one such imperative or ideal which recommends itself to humans he is either formulating an empirical hypothesis based upon anthropological data (in which case he would be mistaken) or he is indulging in a species of moral exhortation (in which case his views could hardly be said to be correct or incorrect they would be better characterized as admirable or repugnant). Actually Lewis wavers between these two positions, referring at times to what "most average people" consider as good without qualification, and suggesting at other times that a statistical average is of no significance. It is in this sense that Lewis' conception of valuation depends upon certain assumptions or postulates prescribing ideal ends of action and defining rational modes of conduct and feeling. It is

42. A "rational ideal" is actually a contradiction in terms. Rationality is defined in terms of an ideal; the ideal itself, being the ultimate criterion of rationality is better referred to as a non-rational postulate.
not the case (as Lewis would appear to suggest) that a repudiation of the imperative "Have concern for the future and strive to realize the good life" entails a repudiation of all norms and all significance of thought and action. The fact is that imperatives may be specified at will and the significance of thought and action may be defined in terms of ideals quite remote from the good (i.e. satisfying) life. These ideals may not recommend themselves to a majority of people or even to anyone at all — but if they be endorsed significance of thought and action would be specifiable and definable in terms of them. Once the imperative is specified the business of explicating the ethical or value system becomes what Ayer has termed, rather uncharitably, "an exercise in symbolic logic." 43

What Lewis believes to be a repudiation of all valid norms on the part of those who endorse the emotive theory is actually a penetrating analysis of what is meant by a normative statement. If it is to be maintained that the categories of truth and falsity apply to norms the method of establishing such truth must be specifiable without converting the norm into an empirical hypothesis. The truth of the norm "The final good is a satisfying whole of experience" is not established, according to Lewis,

by the fact that "most people" prize a satisfying life. In fact if truth or falsity is to be attributed to such a statement at all it must be a radically different sense of "truth" from that attributed to empirical hypotheses. What is empirically presented cannot affect a true definition or analysis of "value" and a statistical survey of "common usage" is likewise of no avail. If critical reflection must be relied upon it is difficult to see what interpersonal criteria may be consulted in case two individuals differ on what is a "true" definition.

This appears to be the point at which Lewis' conception is most vulnerable to attack and his critics have right on their side if their criticism is aimed at his attempt to formulate a definition of the ultimately valuable. They are correct also in pointing out that the occurrence of a value term in an empirical hypothesis does not add to or subtract from the cognitive import of the statement but is simply indicative of the speakers feelings and attitudes. As such, a valuation does not even express a feeling in the sense that it says anything about the speakers emotional states. It asserts nothing about a subject matter because the value terms occurring in it have no semantic or cognitive meaning. A value statement merely betrays, in a somewhat oblique manner, what attitudes and feelings the speaker entertains toward whatever is designated by the descriptive terms involved.
This criticism is based largely on semantic analysis. The position is taken that value terms are cognitively redundant if they are strictly synonymous with descriptive terms. If they are not synonymous with descriptive terms the burden of proof is upon those who employ them to specify unambiguously what they designate. And it cannot truthfully be said that Lewis is able to do this within the framework of his analysis without introducing some supposititious non-empirical entity. Moore, confronted by the same difficulty, employed this very artifice; but careful analysis has since shown that nothing is to be gained by positing a non-observable character of things merely to satisfy the requirement that all substantives in a language must have a referent.

The pertinence of this attack upon naturalistic conceptions of value is attenuated somewhat by the fact that some naturalists (Schlick is one) recognize the necessity of making certain assumptions concerning what is generally conceded to be an ultimate or unqualified ideal or purpose. It is difficult to say just what assumptions Lewis is prepared to make. This much however seems to be quite clear. He must either base his conception of value on a postulated imperative, or specify in what sense this imperative may be said to be either true or false. Actually he does neither of these things but simply asserts that the rational imperative is a datum of experience.
Now this assertion is either an expressive statement revealing what Lewis himself finds to be ultimate in the way of ideals in his own experience; or it is an empirical generalization asserting that all people endorse a certain ideal. If it is simply an expression of Lewis' own ideals (the first alternative) this hardly warrants its being elevated to the status of a universal imperative. If it is a conjecture concerning other peoples' ideals (the second alternative) it is simply false.

On the whole the descriptive phase of Lewis' analysis of value phenomena is the clearest and most penetrating to have appeared since Perry's *General Theory of Value*, and it improves on Perry's analysis in many important respects. In particular Lewis' emphasis upon the experiential context of valuation is a decided advance upon superficial behavioristic analysis. But it must be recognized that the precise cognitive import of value judgements is not settled beyond dispute in the *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*. It is here suggested that Lewis' conception of valuation can only be saved at the expense of admitting that valuation is something more than empirical cognition. The "something more" of course is the logically unavoidable reference to a postulated ideal.
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