UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

India and the Far East since 1947 Dhillon, Pritam Singh 1953

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I n d i a and the F a r East s i n c e 194-7. By P r i t a m Singh D h i l l o n A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF N MASTER OF ARTS i n the Departments of POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES. We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the st a n d a r d r e q u i r e d from candidates f o r the degree of MASTER OF Members of the Departments of THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1953. Abstract. As soon as India attained freedom i n 194-7, the funda-mental problem facing her was i n t e r n a l and not external. Naturally, the Indian leaders were concerned more about her domestic problems than foreign. The communal disturbances which immediately followed the p a r t i t i o n of the country, made i t d i f f i c u l t f or the Government to maintain law and order i n cer t a i n parts. Moreover, the economic s i t u a t i o n went from bad to worse a f t e r independence. Free India :had to tackle the tremendous problem of providing her vast population with the necesitles of l i f e , l i k e food, clothing and housing. The Government of India was f u l l y aware of these d i f f i c u l t i e s and the economic weakness of the country. I t was under these circumstances that the leaders of free India had to determine the objectives of India's foreign p o l i c y . The d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n at home and the d e s l r e b i l i t y of obtaining economic and technical assistance from abroad, made the pursuit of peace one of the great objectives of India's foreign p o l i c y . Other objectives were to work for the ending of colonialism and Imperialism throughout the world and the elimination of r a c i a l discrimination. In order to carry out these objectives successfully, the statesmen of India f e l t that they must give f u l l support to the United Nations and follow an . independent foreign policy. But India decided,to continue her h i s t o r i c a l connections with the Commonwealth of Nations because she owed common a l l e g i a n c e to a, p a r t i c u l a r way of l i f e ' and i d e a l of State and Government. With r e g a r d to her p o l i c i e s i n the Far E a s t , I n d i a developed f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h Communist China. She was one of the f i r s t c o u n t r i e s who r e c o g n i s e d the People's Republic o f China. Although these f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s were d i s t u r b e d i n 1950 over T i b e t , I n d i a continued to press f o r the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of Communist China i n the U.N. N e v e r t h e l e s s , she seems to be aware of the p r i n c i p a l p o n t e n t i a l t h r e a t of t h i s l a r g e neighbour to her s e c u r i t y . F o r t h i s reason, and o t h e r s , I n d i a wishes to see Japan ; :; a s t r o n g sovereign s t a t e i n A s i a . In the case of Korean problem, I n d i a supported the U.N. a c t i o n b r a n d i n g the North Koreans as a g g r e s s o r s , but she c o u l d not send any economic and m i l i t a r y support. However an ambulance and s u r g i c a l u n i t was sent to j o i n the U.N. f o r c e s . As soon as the United Nations f o r c e s pushed the aggressor back a c c r o s s the 3 8 t h P a r a l l e l , the i s s u e , a c c o r d i n g to Indian l e a d e r s , was no more an'issue of r e s i s t a n c e to a g g r e s s i o n . From t h i s time on I n d i a was r e l u c t a n t to support any such a c t i o n of U.N. which might p r o l o n g and extend the c o n f l i c t . At the same time she began to work f o r some k i n d of p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n of the Korean s i t u a t i o n . Although she could not succeed i n o b t a i n i n g her o b j e c t i v e completely, n e g o t i a t i o n s between the p a r t i e s i n d i s p u t e d i d b e g i n which b r i g h t e n e d the p r o s p e c t s f o r peace. P r e f a c e . Although few books and a r t i c l e s have been w r i t t e n on India's f o r e i g n p o l i c y w i t h i n r e c e n t years, t h i s f i e l d has not been l e f t a b s o l u t e l y unexplored. While some students of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s have defended I n d i a n p o l i c y , others more o f t e n , have a t t a c k e d i t . The l a t t e r group have done so because of I n d i a ' s constant e f f o r t s t o keep h e r s e l f f r e e from the two b l o c s engaged i n the C o l d War. However, the importance of new I n d i a i n world a f f a i r s has been r e f l e c t e d i n these w r i t i n g s . The w r i t e r chose the t o p i c " I n d i a and the F a r E a s t " f o r two reasons. F i r s t , i t i s In the F a r East t h a t the C o l d War has become "hot" with the North Koreans' i n v a s i o n of the R e p u b l i c of Korea i n 1950. I t i s f o r the f i r s t time i n h i s t o r y t h a t a c o l l e c t i v e measure, more than mere economic s a n c t i o n s , has been taken by an I n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n to stop a m i l i t a r y a g g r e s s i o n . Second, I n d i a ' s r o l e i n the U n i t e d Nations w i t h r e g a r d to F a r E a s t e r n problem has been v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t . I n d i a , more than any other s t a t e of the same s t a t u s , has made constant e f f o r t s t o seek a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n to end the Korean war. The w r i t e r has t r i e d , i n as d i s p a s s i o n a t e a manner as p o s s i b l e , to o u t l i n e India's approach to the problems of China, Korea and Japan. The e n t i r e e n t e r p r i s e has not been an easy one, as there i s ample documentary m a t e r i a l w r i t t e n on Ind i a i n U. N., but v e r y l i t t l e o r i g i n a l m a t e r i a l a v a i l a b l e on her r o l e i n the F a r E a s t . However, w i t h the a s s i s t a n c e of P r o f e s s o r F. H. Soward, the s u b j e c t has been ventured on and c a r r i e d to i t s prese n t e x t e n t . The w r i t e r taKes the o p p o r t u n i t y zo thank P r o f e s s o r Soward whose c o n s i d e r a t i o n and k i n d treatment, e s p e c i a l l y towards f o r e i g n s t u d e n t s , have l e f t a l a s t i n g i m p r e s s i o n upon the w r i t e r . U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. A p r i l , 1953-P r i t a m S. D h i l l o n . Contents. Chapter I. Fundamentals of I n d i a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y . Chapter I I . Chapter I I I . Chapter IV. Chapter V. Chapter VI. (a) To work f o r ending of C o l o n i a l i s m and i m p e r i a l i s m . (b) To promote r e g i o n a l c o - o p e r a t i o n between A s i a n c o u n t r i e s . (c) To work f o r s t a b i l i t y i n the f r e e c o u n t r i e s of A s i a . (d) To remain a member i n the Commonwealth. (e) To promote r a c i a l e q u a l i t y . ( f ) P u r s u i t of peace through n o n - a l i g n -ment wit h power b l o c s . (g) C o - o p e r a t i o n with the U. N. I n d i a n Opinion i n the U n i t e d Nations w i t h Regard to the F a r E a s t . (a) U. N. Temporary Commission on Korea. (b) I n d i a and ECAFE. (c) I n d i a ' s b i d f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of Communist China i n the U. N. D i s c o r d w i t h Communist China over T i b e t . R e l a t i o n s w i t h Japan. Approach to the Korean Problem. C o n c l u s i o n . Chapter I Fundamentals of Indian Foreign P o l i c y . The national movement for independence started i n 188?! with the foundation of the Indian National Congress. I t bore i t s f r u i t on August 15 th , 1947 when India became a Dominion within the B r i t i s h Commonwealth and l a t e r became' a Republic on January 2 6 t h , 1950. With independence came new responsib-i l i t i e s to the new Dominion. At the dawn of independence Pandit Nehru (who has been Prime Minister a s w e l l as Foreign Minister since 1947) gave the following message to the nation and the world: " I t i s a f a t e f u l movement for us i n India, for Asia and the world. A new star r i s e s - the star of freedom i n the East, a new hope comes into being, a v i s i o n long cherished'materialises But freedom brings r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and burdens and we have to face them i n the s p i r i t of a free and d i s c i p l i n e d people."2 1 Subhas Chandra Bose, The Indian Struggle  1920-1934, London Wishart & Co., 1935, p. 37 . 2 Government of India, Indian Information, 21:102, Sept. 1, 1947. 2 Free India found able leaders such as Pandit Nehru and his colleagues to handle her foreign p o l i c y . The world s i t u a t i o n was complex. The A l l i e d Powers, after winning the second world war, had begun to suspect each other. Western Powers were slowly coming together i n one group and the communist group was r a p i d l y making i t s e l f f e l t . The s i t u a t i o n i n the Middle-East and South-East Asia was de l i c a t e . The dependent people i n these areas were struggling for freedom, the Metropolitan Powers making every attempt to r e t a i n t h e i r hold on th e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . Such was the world s i t u a t i o n when the leaders of India took the reins of Indian foreign p o l i c y into t h e i r hands. They were new to world diplomacy, nevertheless they were to prove themselves worthy of playing a diplomatic game with the other nations of the world. What foreign p o l i c y India would follow was to be seen through practice. Nevertheless, Dr. Rajindra Prasad (present President of India) did not hesitate to outline the course which India would follow. He said; "We have no quarrel with other nations and countries and l e t us hope no one w i l l pick a quarrel with us. By history and t r a d i t i o n we are a peaceful people and India wants to be at 3 peace with the world "3 Immediately after the new Dominion came into existence, i t found i t s e l f i n the middle of i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t and confusion. P a r t i t i o n had worsened the food s i t u a t i o n which was already precarious at the outbreak of world war two. I t was r e a l i z e d that the remedy lay i n greater production and i n the acceleration of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y i n the country. The communal disturbances i n the Punjab i n July - August 194-7, had driven from Pakistan about f i v e m i l l i o n men, women and children who moved into India. The main problem before the Indian Government was how to feed, house and r e h a b i l i t a t e these refugees. Added to these d i f f i c u l t i e s was a dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir. These were the outstanding problems which did not allow Indian leaders to pay f u l l attention to the foreign p o l i c y of the country. This f a c t was f u l l y r e a l i z e d by the leaders. Pandit Nehru declared on December 4th, 1947, i n the constituent Assembly: "That has been the dominant feature of our p o l i t i c s during the past year and 3 Government of India, Indian Information 21:101, September 1, 1947. 4 undoubtedly that has affected our foreign p o l i c y i n the sense of our not giving enough time and energy to i t . "4 Indian foreign p o l i c y could not be a stable one unless the s i t u a t i o n at home was stable. The foreign p o l i c i e s and the domestic p o l i c i e s of a country are c l o s e l y r e l a t e d . I t may be safe to say that foreign p o l i c i e s are an extension of domestic p o l i c i e s i n the f i e l d of int e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . Most of the time, the foreign p o l i c y i s determined by economic p o l i c y . Pandit Nehru, i n his f i r s t foreign p o l i c y speech before the Constituent Assembly, stated that "ultimately, foreign p o l i c y i s the outcome of economic p o l i c y and u n t i l India has properly evolved her economic p o l i c y , her foreign p o l i c y w i l l be rather vague, rather inchoate and w i l l be groping .... I regret that we have not produced any constructive economic scheme or economic p o l i c y so f a r And when we do so, that w i l l govern our foreign p o l i c y , more than a l l the speeches i n t h i s house."5 4 Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence and After, (Delhi: Indian Government Publication D i v i s i o n , 1949), p. 200. ^ J. Nehru, Independence and After, p. 201. Indian foreign policy was in a formative stage i n 194-8. As the situation at home improved, India emerged with a definite foreign policy. The main fundamentals of Indian Foreign Policy can be summarized as follows: To work for ending of colonialism and imperialism. One of the main planks in India's foreign policy is to work for the ending of colonialism and imperialism. The antipathy to imperialism is deep rooted in the minds of Indian people. They inherited these feelings from their own struggle for freedom. It is quite natural for the colonial people who struggle to be free, to be sympathetic with their fellow brothers struggling for a similar cause. The above mentioned feelings of Indian peoples against imperialism are very old, older than free India. Pandit Nehru represented the Indian National Congress in the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities which was held at Brussels in February 1927.^ Here the Indian National Congress a f f i l i a t e d i t s e l f with the anti-imperialistic forces of the world — for the struggle which, according to Nehru, J. Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru an Autobiography* (London: John Lane the Bodley Head, 1936) p. 161. "was a common one against the thing that was imperialism"? 6 Not only did the Indian National Congress convey the a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t i c feelings of the Indian people at Brussels but i t also raised a voice against the use •, of Indian troops to subdue the neighbouring countries with whom they desired to l i v e peacefully. In the annual session of the Indian National Congress which was held at Madras i n 1927» the. following resolution was passed to that effect: "The Congress has noted with deep resentment that Indian troops have again been used by the B r i t i s h Government to further t h e i r i m p e r i a l i s t designs i n China and to hinder and prevent the people of China from gaining th e i r freedom. The congress demands that a l l Indian troops and police forces s t i l l i n China should be re c a l l e d immediately and that no Indian s h a l l go to China i n future as an agent of the B r i t i s h Govern-ment to f i g h t or to work against the Chinese people, who i n the opinion of the Congress, are the comrades of the Indian people i n th e i r j o i n t struggle against imperialism The Congress declared that the people of India have no quarrel 7 J . Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru art Autobiography, (London: John Lane the Bodley Head, 1936). p. 161. 7 with th e i r neighbours and desire to l i v e i n peace with them and assert th e i r r i g h t to determine whether or not they w i l l take part i n any war."° The people of India showed si m i l a r i n terest i n the freedom of A s i a t i c Nations i n 194-2. In August, 1942, the A l l Indian Congress Committee passed a resolu t i o n which stated that "the freedom of India must be the symbol of and prelude to the freedom of a l l A s i a t i c nations under foreign domination. Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, the Dutch Indies, Iran and Iraq must also a t t a i n their" complete freedom. I t must be c l e a r l y understood that such of these countries as are under Japanese control now, must not subsequently be placed under the rule or control of any other c o l o n i a l power.7 After gaining the independence of India the Indian leaders continued to have a sympathetic attitude towards the oppressed people of Asia. Nehru's words echoed i n the Constituent Assembly i n 1947 when he said "that we stand for the freedom ^ A. Appadorai, "India's Foreign P o l i c y " International A f f a i r s , 2 5 : 3 9 , January 1949,, P- 3<t-9 Statement published by the Government of  India on the Congress Party's r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for the  disturbances i n India 1942-1943, (London: H.M.S.O. 194-3), (p. 4 5 . ) 8 Asian countries and for the elimination of imper-i a l i s t i c c ontrol over them." 10 In the l i g h t of the above analysis India's r o l e i n the United Nations, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the United Nations Trusteeship Council, can be c l e a r l y seen. I t i s true that India could not help the other A s i a t i c Nations with food and other material because of her own poor economic s i t u a t i o n at home. Nevertheless she did not hesitate to express her verbal sympathies with no fear of any great power. Pandit Nehru explained t h i s f act i n the following way: "We have done precious l i t t l e i n the way of actual active help; we are not i n a p o s i t i o n to do that. But we have got sympathy towards them and we have expressed i t as public^as possible." H To promote regional cooperation between Asian countries. India wants to keep f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with the A s i a t i c Nations. This desire has been expressed time and again i n one form or another. An Asian Relations Conference, at the suggestion of the Burmese leader Aung San, was called by the Indian Council for world a f f a i r s (a n o n - p o l i t i c a l 1° J. Nehru, Independence and After, p. 201. 1 1 Indian Information, 22:411, A p r i l 15, 1948. 9 body established i n 1943 for the objective study of objective problems). The Conference was held i n the Old Fort at Delhi. I t was attended by 250 delegates from some 25 A s i a t i c countries. The purpose of the conference was "to bring together the leading men and women of Asia on a common platform to study problems of common concern to the peoples of th i s continent, to focus attention on s o c i a l , economic and c u l t u r a l problems of the dif f e r e n t countries of Asia, and to foster mutual contacts and understanding." ^ Although the conference was c u l t u r a l i n nature with no p o l i t i c a l motive behind i t yet the Moslem League of India alleged that the conference was "a t h i n l y disguised attempt on the part of Hindu Congress to boost i t s e l f p o l i t i c a l l y as the prospective leader of the As i a t i c people?" x3 India, at that time, was emerging into freedom and independence. She could be the centre 1 2 Keesings-Contemporary Archives Keynshan, (London), 6:8862, 1946-48. : 13 i b i d . 1946-1948, p. 8862. 10 of many forces at work i n Asia. Nevertheless the Indian leaders do not seem to be interested i n the leadership of the Asian people but rather i n th e i r friendship and cooperation. Nehru commented on t h i s i n his speech of June 1st, 194-8, at Ootacomund (Madras). He said: "People vaguely - t a l k of India's leadership i n Asia. I deprecate such t a l k . I want th i s problem to.be approached not i n terms of th i s country or that country being the leader and pushing and p u l l i n g others, but rather i n the s p i r i t of cooperation between a l l the countries of Asia, big or small." 14 More recently, while saying that India did not aspire to become leader i n Asia or elsewhere, Pandit Nehru declared, "We do not want to overawe any one but we do not want to be overawed by anyone either. We would not tolerate i t . " 1 ^ There became clear two main themes i n the speeches delivered i n the plenary session of the Asian Conference - the s o l i d a r i t y and the common consciousness- of the Asian peoples and the important 14- J. Nehru, 'Independence and After, p. 311* 1 ^ The Oversea Hindustan Times, A p r i l 17, 1952. 11 role they would play in the world. Pandit Nehru in his inaugural address, said that "the time had come for us, peoples of Asia, to meet together, to hold together and to advance together." He also made i t clear that the Asian people were not embarking at the conference on "some kind of a Pan-Asian movement" directed against their former oppressors. He continued, "In this atomic age Asia will have to function effectively in the maintenance of peace. Indeed, there can be no peace unless Asia plays her part." 16 The second Asian Conference was held at New Delhi from January 2 0 - 2 3 , 194-9. This conference was attended by the delegates or observers of countries of the Middle East, Far East and Australasia. This time i t was convened by the Government of India in connection with the situation in Indonesia. The conference was significant in the sense that Indian leaders took the initiative to give moral support to the Indonesian people against Dutch imperialism. The Indian Foreign Minister's words echoed once again through his presidential speech when he said that 16 J. Nehru, Independence and After, pp. 296-299. 12 "there can be and w i l l be, no surrender to aggression and no acceptance or reimposition of c o l o n i a l control." ^7 Such e f f o r t s on the part of the Indian people and t h e i r spokesmen show that they work f o r the re-emergence of Asia.' India has continued a f r i e n d l y and cooperative p o l i c y towards the Asian countries. She has been doing her best to win a seat for Red China i n the United Nations and to put an end to war i n Korea. In fact i t was India who formed a group of Asian countries i n the United Nations to f i g h t f or peace and to protect t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . In the early f o r t i e s - t h e students of world p o l i t i c s had canvassed for the working out of defence arrangements with neighbouring countries, p a r t i c u l a r l y with Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. Mr. K. M. Panikkar, (who l a t e r became the f i r s t ambassador to Communist China) i n his book advocated the establishment of a triume Commonwealth of India, Pakistan, and Burma with the f u l l cooperation of 18 Great B r i t a i n . 17 J . Nehru, Independence and After, p. 234. 1 8 K. M. Panikkar, The Future of South-East  Asia, (London: George A l l e n & Unwin Ltd,1943), pp. 40-53* 13 A simi l a r idea was advanced again i n 1948 by the Dewan of Jaipur, S i r V. T. Krishnamachari, i n his a r t i c l e "Regional Arrangement: The Indian Ocean Area." In t h i s a r t i c l e he suggested that a defence council should be established with India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Malaya as i t s members, but not without the cooperation of Great B r i t a i n and c e r t a i n l y such an arrangement should not be l i m i t e d to the common-wealth countries I t has not been made public how f a r the Indian leaders, responsible for shaping the foreign p o l i c y of India, shared Panikkar's ideas. Perhaps i t i s safe to say that the o f f i c i a l view stands for an independent foreign p o l i c y . So long as such a p o l i c y continues, the ideas summarized above would not f i n d favour i n o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s . Furthermore Nehru holds the opinion that Asia's problem i s not m i l i t a r y but economic. S t a b i l i t y i n the free countries of Asia; India i s interested to see peaceful and stable conditions i n a l l those countries of Asia which have attained t h e i r independence. Any !9 K; M. Panikkar,- Regionalism and Security* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 10-11. disturbance i n those countries could prove dangerous to India. The Government was p a r t i c u l a r l y con-cerned over the Karen r e v o l t which could disturb the whole s t a b i l i t y of the Burmese independent state and thus E f f e c t the economic relations between India and Burma. conference of the High Commis'sioners of the Common-wealth Countries, i n Delhi i n February 194-9 i n an attempt to mediate between the Karens and the Government of Burma. This plan was dropped to avoid giving any impression that the Commonwealth Govern-ments were i n t e r f e r i n g i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of Burma. However, the problem of aiding Burma was considered at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting i n A p r i l 194-9. I t was decided to form a Burma Aid Committee, composed of ambassadors to Rangoon, of B r i t a i n , Ceylon, India and Pakistan. I t was not u n t i l March 1950 that the Commonwealth Economic Aid Program for Burma was announced. An amount of 6 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 Pounds was to be contributed to the program. India was to contribute £1,000,000 as her share of the amount. 2 1 This shows with PO -Vidya Prakash Dutt, India's Foreign P o l i c y with Special References to Asia and the P a c i f i c , (New The Indian Government proposed an informal what s i n c e r i t y India wants to maintain s t a b i l i t y i n the free countries of Asia. To remain a member i n the Commonwealth: Indian people had fought for the f u l l independence of India since 1930. They were deter-mined to have no t i e s whatsoever with Great B r i t a i n a f t e r obtaining t h e i r freedom. But as soon as independence was gained circumstances persuaded them to decide to remain a member of the Commonwealth. This h i s t o r i c decision was reached i n the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference i n A p r i l , 1949. India's Prime Minister declared that the Republic of India would be glad to continue her membership of the Commonwealth. Why did India decide to remain a member of the Commonwealth when her leaders .had advocated u n t i l 1947 a complete break with Great B r i t a i n ? F i r s t of a l l , India remained i n the Commonwealth because i t became a new type of Assoc-i a t i o n . She was to remain a sovereign independent republic with "the King as the symbol of the free association of independent member nations, and as such, the head of the Commonwealth." 22-* Nehru had stressed again and again that i t was his desire to Canada, House of Commons Debates, A p r i l 2 7 , 1949 f p. 2655 (unrevised) 16 keep India an independent force i n international a f f a i r s . Since the Commonwealth r e l a t i o n involves consultation but not commitments, i t permits frank discussion leading to better balanced judgments and does not l i m i t action. The second important factor to keep India i n the Commonwealth, i s her economic and defence weakness. India must import c a p i t a l to b u i l d up her economic strength. She i s weak i n defence, part-i c u l a r l y i n her sea and a i r power. B r i t a i n ' s naval and a i r power can be h e l p f u l i n case of danger. Moreover Indian leaders are a f r a i d of i s o l a t i o n . Pandit Nehru put i t before the Constituent Assembly on May 16, 1949; "Commonwealth does not come i n the way of our co-operation and friendship with other countries, ultimately we s h a l l have to decide, and ultimately the decision w i l l depend on our own strength. I f we dissociate ourselves completely from the Commonwealth, then for the moment we are completely i s o l a t e d . " The communist uprisings i n the South East States of Asia are a constant danger to the new Republic. 23 j . Nehru, Independence and After, p. 279. 17 The Indian Government's vigorous actions against communists at home, can certainly keep the internal situation peaceful, but that cannot dispel the outside danger. Lastly, India has l i t t l e to lose by remaining a member of the. Commonwealth. On the other hand she gains a lot from other member nations which are well advanced in the f i e l d of science and industry. She is making use of the sc i e n t i f i c , technological, professional and academical experiences of other member nations. In view of the above mentioned advantages to India, the present leadership would not discontinue her membership i n the Commonwealth. This fact was made clear on May 16, 194-9, by Pandit Nehru i n his speech to the Constituent Assembly in moving a resolution endorsing the Commonwealth decision. He said; "In the world today where there are so many disruptive forces at work, where we are often on the verge of war, I think i t is not a safe thing to encourage the breaking up any associations that one has." 2 4 There were some socialist members i n the J. Nehru, Independence and After, p. 275. 18 Constituent Assembly who objected to Nehruts p o l i c y to continue as a member of the Commonwealth. Their main objection was that some of the older Dominions, p a r t i c u l a r l y South Afri c a followed the p o l i c y of r a c i a l discrimination. Nehru's answer to those members was that India would continue her struggle against r a c i a l d iscrimination i n various parts of the world. To promote r a c i a l equality; The Indian leader's attitude towards r a c i a l problems has been very obvious. The treatment of East Indians i n South Afri c a became one of the major issues before the United Nations. From that time on no r a c i a l discrimination became one of the i d e o l o g i c a l objectives of India's foreign p o l i c y . The doctrine of r a c i a l s u p e r i o r i t y , i n the eyes of Indian leaders, seems to be a menace to the peace of the world. Referring to the second of the two p o l i c i e s to which India i s committed, Pandit Nehru said; "Our second b e l i e f i s that the world must recognise that there must be no r a c i a l discrimination. Any p o l i c y based on r a c i a l discrimination obviously gives r i s e to c o n f l i c t , and i n the present condition of the world, people do not put up with that sort of thing. 25" 2 5 M. Venkatarangaiya, "Indo-American P o l i t i c a l Relations", Aspects of India's Foreign Relations, (New Delhi, 1949), p. 10. 19 The same reason sets'Pandit Nehru against Australia's White P o l i c y . During his tour of the United States i n 194-9, Nehru expressed himself f u l l y on t h i s issue. In one of his speeches he mentioned three causes of war: P o l i t i c a l subjection, s o c i a l Of. i n e q u a l i t y and economic inequality. D Pursuit of peace through non-alignment with power blocs; One of the main objectives of India's foreign p o l i c y i s the pursuit of peace through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue. Within the United Nations and outside of i t , India has refrained from l i n k i n g herself with one bloc or other. Sometimes Pandit Nehru has been looked upon as pro-Russian by the western world. 2? At one time he was i n c l i n e d towards communism i n the l a t e t h i r t i e s . He writes i n his autobiography that he "turned i n e v i t a b l y with good w i l l towards communism, f o r , whatever i t s f a u l t s i t was at least not h y p o c r i t i c a l . and not i m p e r i a l i s t i c . " 2 8 26 v. P. Dutt, India's Foreign P o l i c y , p.7. 27 R. K. Karanjia, "The Foreign P o l i c y of Free India," The New Statesman and Nation, January 3, 1948, p.6. 2 8 J. Nehru, An Autobiography, (London: John Lane, 1936), p. 163. 20 Those were Nehru's feelings when Congress Party was f i g h t i n g for independence and he was i n a B r i t i s h j a i l . Now, being Prime Minister as w e l l as Foreign Minister of India he has new r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and a new outlook. Moreover"one must not forget that he was educated at Harrow and Cambridge and that English culture has had a permanent influence on him. There i s some tr u t h i n a B r i t i s h statesman's state-ment that "Nehru i s an Englishman inside of him; therefore, he w i l l never break with us." 2^ His p o l i c i e s at home have shown that he has no love f or the communists. He does not approve wholeheartedly of the foreign p o l i c y of the Soviet Union. Talking to pressmen Nehru said that the Soviet Union "more and more" i s following "a n a t i o n a l i s t expansionist p o l i c y rather than the old s t y l e concept of communism."' In spite of the fact that India has a democratic parliamentary Government and that her economic and s o c i a l systems are derived from the West, the vast majority of Indian people are s t i l l suspicious of the West because of 200 years of B r i t i s h rule i n India. Although Nehru does not show bitterness against 29 The New Statesman and Nation. Jan. 1950. 3 0 The New York Times, A p r i l 2 5 t h , 1950. 21 the West, i t does not mean that the Indian people f e e l the same way. They are p l a i n people and i t w i l l take considerable time to heal t h e i r wounds. Pandit Nehru mentioning t h i s f act to J. J. Singh (President of Indian League of America) i n 194-9, said; " I am not a dictator India i s a democracy I must carry my people with me."31 A r t i c l e 51 of the Constitution of India forms the statutory basis f o r India, to seek peace and security. The a r t i c l e 51 reads as follows: "The state s h a l l endeavour to: (a) promote in t e r n a t i o n a l peace and security. (b) maintain just and honourable re l a t i o n s between nations, (c) foster respect for in t e r n a t i o n a l law and treaty obligations i n the dealings of organized peoples with one another; and, (d) encourage settlement of int e r n a t i o n a l disputes by arbitration." 3 2 "Peace and Security" i n the world that i s s p l i t into two power blocs, could i n the Indian leader's view only be obtained through friendship with a l l the nations of the world. This can only be done i f India rises-above group considerations and bloc-alignments. 31 The New York Times, July 8th, 1950. 3 2 The Constitution of India, p. 21 . 22 India does-not seem to be interested i n preparing f o r another war. Perhaps no peace-loving state would do that. She l i k e s to keep herself aloof from i n t e r -national c o n f l i c t s . One reason i s that India i s too weak to have any effect one way or the other. Nehru put i t t h i s way; "We should either be strong enough to produce some effect or we should not interfere at a l l . I am not anxious to put my finger into every i n t e r -national pie. " 3 3 However India has been trying to view the in t e r n a t i o n a l disputes without fear or prejudice or'passion; she has t r i e d to appraise them without p a r t i - p r i s and s t r i v e n for a settlement by c o n c i l i a t i o n and agreement. She t r i e d to seek solutions i n the cases of Palestine, Korea and i n the problems of atomic control. Such a c r i t i c a l and dispassionate approach can only be continued i f she does not a l i g n with any power bloc. This p o s i t i o n may have i t s drawbacks but i t could be the only p o s i t i v e p o l i c y for the interests of world peace. To j o i n one bloc or another may mean to accept ready-made p o l i c i e s and programs evolved i n one c a p i t a l or another. India seems to be too 33 j . Nehru, Independence and After, p. 215. conscious of her r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to p a r t i c i p a t e in'any arrangement that might induce a sense of dependence or compromise her freedom of action. In Nehru's words, "alignment means that you do what you think i s not r i g h t but others think i t i s r i g h t for you to do i t " . 3 4 Moreover, India's spokesman seems to hold the idea that the forces driving to war could be checked by the most persistent and patient e f f o r t s . This seems to be the main basis for the present Indian foreign p o l i c y . I t i s i n t h i s s p i r i t that India i s working i n the United Nations, to bring together the divergent points of view and to seek to heal the breach which has been created by the Korean war. The middle of the road foreign p o l i c y of Pandit Nehru was endorsed by the Congress Party Working Committee i n a resolution presented to the a l l - I n d i a convention of the Congress Party on October 17, 1952. This r e s o l u t i o n reads as follows: "This congress approves of the p o l i c y pursued by the Government of India i n seeking f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with a l l countries and i n avoiding any entangle-ment i n m i l i t a r y or other attainces that 34 The New York Times, Mar. -29, 1952. 24 tend to divide the world into r i v a l groups and thus endanger world peace."35 Thus keeping her foreign p o l i c y independent and neutral, India has been seeking economic and other help, without any strings attached, from the West and the East. This i s being done through the Colombo Plan and the Indo-U.S. Technical Cooperation Agreement. (In June 1951? U. S. granted $190,000,000 to buy food and grain.) China (100,000 tons of r i c e i n May 1952) and the Soviet Union (100,000 tons of wheat i n June 1 9 5 D have helped the Indian people with food. India has been conscious of the intentions of the helpers. Pandit Nehru, touring the United States i n 1949, made i t clear again and again that India would welcome U. S. ai d and cooperation only on terms "which are to t h e i r mutual benefit" and that "we do not seek any material advantage i n exchange fo r any part of our hard won freedom."3^ I t i s further of int e r e s t to note the comments of some of the popular Indian English news-papers on Nehru's v i s i t to the United States. The  Indian News Chronicle of October, 1959, wrote as follows: 55 The New York Times, Oct. 16, 1952. 36 The High Commissioner for India i n Canada, "The Indian Information, October 19, 1949. 25 "If there is need for anything, i t is for caution on India's part. She must be on her guard to ensure she is not made a > participant in the cold war that rages so furiously - producing a frantic arms race and exclusive military alliances -and she is not made to give up her policy of neutrality." The Tribune of October 12, 194-9, emphasized the fact that the Prime Minister's v i s i t to the U. S. A. would not bring any change in the policy of non-alignment with power blocs. It further made the remark that: "there are several problems of common interest to the United States and India which c a l l for the cooperation and under-standing of both sides .... American statesmen have realized their mistake and are seeking to give new orientation to their policies in Asia. The Prime Minister's v i s i t should help them see the situation in Asia in its proper perspective." 37 Pandit Nehru's foreign policy brings some criticism and opposition at home. The late Sardar Patel, Home Minister, wanted a more definite alignment with the Anglo-American bloc. After his death Purshottandas Tandon became the leader of the right wing of the Congress Party. He was elected president of the party in 1950 in spite of Nehru's opposition. Although Nehru succeeded in defeating D f The High Commissioner for India in Canada, The Indian Information. October 19, 194-9. 26 him a year l a t e r , opposition to Nehru's p o l i c i e s remained i n the parliament. Tandon favours a grand a l l i a n c e with the western democracies in; stead of -Nehru's determined neutralism i n the current world c o n f l i c t . Referring to t h i s group the Prime Minister on March 28, 1951> declared i n the Indian Parliament that "one can understand the alignment of a country i n times of war, but completely f a i l to understand why t h i s war tendency should be imported i n peace time'.'38 So long as Pandit Nehru i s the creator, organizer and executor of the foreign p o l i c y of India, he w i l l support the present pattern, but when and i f the r i g h t i s t s gain control of the congress party p o l i c y , i t w i l l be easy to anticipate which way the wind w i l l blow. Outside the Congress Party there i s a handful of orthodox r e l i g i o u s persons who denounce the present Government's n e u t r a l i t y . To name some of them - Shyma Presad Mukerjee of the Hindu Mahansabha ( r e l i g i o u s organization) and Dr. Taraknath Das. He l e f t India for American i n 1905 and l i v e d there u n t i l a f t e r the independence of India. At present he i s professor at Columbia University, 3°" The New York Times, March 29, 1951. U. S. A.). He holds the opinion that India won her freedom due to Japan's v i c t o r i e s i n the South East Asian countries during World War Two. He further believes that the p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y would be h e l p f u l to Russia and harmful to I n d i a . ^ There i s another small but w e l l organized section of the Indian people which demands that India should a l l y herself with the Soviet Union bloc, This section consists of communists and t h e i r sympathizers. Immediately a f t e r the independence of India i n 1947, the party gave a l l i t s support 40 to Nehru's Government. But i t was not very long u n t i l i t was discovered i n January 1948, that the party was on the wrong track. This was done at the Calcutta Party Congress. The Congress was attended by delegates from other A s i a t i c countries and from 41 the Communist International. The former general secretary, P. C. Joshi, of the Indian Communist Party was dismissed. The Congress passed the The Amarita Bazar Patrica (Calcutta), September 24, 1952. 4 0 The New York Times. May 31, 1950. also, June 2, 1950 ( e d i t o r i a l ) 41 The Manchester Guardian Weekly (London) January 24, 1952. 28 r e s o l u t i o n that the Communist Party of India had to take the path of the Chinese comrades. After that the party became ultra-revolutionary.* The r e s u l t of this p o l i c y was that the Pro-v i n c i a l Governments took severe measures to ban the party and arrest the wellknown communists. The central Govern-ment issued a white paper on September 29, 194-9 on communist a c t i v i t i e s . This document contains charges against the Indian Communist Party. I t states that the communists of India have preached and planned violence on a wide scale and are s t i l l p r a c t i s i n g i t i n defiance of ethics arid decency and i n complete disregard of the value of s o c i a l l i f e and I n s t i t u t i o n s . The Government, further, expressed i t s determination "to control law-lessness with a l l the resources at t h e i r disposal, and are confident that they w i l l continue 1to receive the whole hearted and active support of a l l sections of the pop-ulati o n . " 4-2 j n February, 1950? i t was f e l t that stronger steps than the mere issuing of a white paper should be taken. The Government passed emergency l e g i s l a t i o n introduced by, the late Sardar Patel, Home Minister. This b i l l was passed with a view to p r o h i b i t i n g persons 4 2 The Hindustan Times, (Delhi), Sept. 3 0 , 1949. * A b r i e f h i s t o r y of the Communist Party was given by M. R. Masani i n , "The Communist Party i n India", P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , March, 1951. 29 from acting " i n a manner p r e j u d i c i a l to the defence of India, the rela t i o n s of India with foreign powers, the security of Indian Union or of an Indian state." 4 3 In spite of the f a c t that the Indian Govern-ment took such strong steps to suppress the communist at home, th i s did not a f f e c t the foreign p o l i c y of India one way or. the other. This action, as the Prime Minister put i t , was " a purely domestic a f f a i r and does not r e f l e c t India's stand i n one power bloc or expressed our p o s i t i o n towards another." 4 4 However, t h i s statement would not d i s p e l the f a c t that India would not stand with the western world i n the case of world-wide aggression. So f a r as the foreign p o l i c y of India i s concerned, the Indian Communist Party's stand i s that India should withdraw from the B r i t i s h Commonwealth and j o i n the "peace camp led by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China". This demand was made by the party i n the e l e c t i o n manifesto issued on September 25 , 1 9 5 1 .^ Besides 4 3 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (London), A p r i l 1-8, 1950. 4 4 I b i d , June 26f30, 1948. 4 ^ New York Times, Sept. 29, 1951. t h i s the party i s propagandizing, for peace..through the Peace Congress of India. A l l this does not deter the present Indian leaders from following the independent p o l i c y which i s considered to he the best one under the present circumstances however, there i s hope that some events i n the near future might effect Indian opinion i n one way which may prove to be a western one. India being a democracy of the western type, may j o i n the western states i n case of danger to democracy anywhere i n the world. India may not have her neutral p o l i c y then. Her present p o l i c y may l a s t as long as there i s a cold war, but there are very few chances for a country l i k e India to stand aside when there i s a 'hot' war. A w e l l known American student of International A f f a i r s , wrote i n 194-8 "An India dominated by landlords, moneylenders, Princes, and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s would, i f i t could, support the American Colossus against the Kremlin." Pandit Nehru explained what India's p o s i t i o n would be i n case of the democracies being i n danger. He declared before the Constituent 4-6 F. L. Schuman, International P o l i t i c s , (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1948), p. 568. 31 Assembly i n 194-8, that "we stand in this country for democracy, we stand for an Independent Sovereign India. Now obviously, anything that is opposed to the democratic concept - the real, essentially democractic concept, which includes not only p o l i t i c a l but economic democracy - we ought to oppose."4'7 A similar statement was made before the United States Congress in 1949. Nehru said; "where freedom is menaced or justice threatened, or where aggression 48 takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral. What does a l l this mean? What kind of aggression did Nehru have in mind? Obviously he was talking about the communist aggression. Nehru's Statement is quoted by D. Chamanlal in a pamphlet - "The Nehru Doctrine", as follows: "The idea of social justice as embodied i n communism attracts many people. But the methods and the ideology of the Communist Parties have been greatly disliked and have come into conflict with democratic nationalism. Although world communism sometimes appears in the guise of a liberating movement, as an expansionist movement, 47 J. Nehru, Independence and After, p. 217. 4 8 New York Times, July 8, 1950. -32 i t i s considered a danger to peace and freedom." ^ Naturally the democratic countries are interested to keep India on t h e i r side i n the world struggle. They seem to r e a l i z e the tremendous importance of India and her leader, J. Nehru, not only i n Asia but i n the world. On August 29, 1950, the New York Times wrote: "The struggle f or Asia conceivably could be won or l o s t i n the mind of one man - Jawarhar L a i Nehru ... Whatever one may think of his opinions -.and most of us have been rather unhappy about some of these opinions - no one can deny that he i s the most i n f u e n t i a l non-communist "voice i n Asia. He i s the counter-weight on the democratic side to Mao TseTung. To have Pandit Nehru as an a l l y i n the struggle f o r A s i a t i c support i s worth many d i v i s i o n s ; to have him as an opponent or even a c r i t i c would jeopardise the p o s i t i o n of Western democracy through Asia." 50 Nehru's p o l i c y to seek peace and f r i e n d -o ship and freedom throughout the world required f u l l cooperation with the United Nations. Nehru and other leaders had given repeated expressions of 4 9 Dewan Chamanlal, The Nehru Doctrine, (Bombay: Thacker's Press), p. 21 5° The New York Times, August 29, 1950. India's l o y a l t y to the Charter of the United Nations. I t was t h i s f a i t h i n the Charter of the United Nations that made them bring the case of the South African Indians before the General Assembly. Once again the Kashimir issue was brought before the Security Council with the same s p i r i t . India gave her unstinted support to the United Nations because she believed and s t i l l believes that world troubles can be solved through t h i s i n ternational organization. I t was i n t h i s l i g h t that India played an important r o l e i n lessening the gap between the two powerful groups. Although the Indian delegation to the United Nations, i s working hard to restore peace i n Korea yet the Indian leaders seem to see that 51 "a change has come over the U. N. 0.", y part-i c u l a r l y i n connection with the Tunisian problem. They believe that the United Nations should tackle t h i s problem with the same s p i r i t that i t once did that of Libya. The following chapters w i l l discuss t h i s aspect of India's Foreign P o l i c y more thoroughly. 51 Dewan Chamanlal, The Nehru Doctrine, (Bombay: Thacker's Press), p. 10. 34-Chapter I I Indian Opinion i n the United Nations with regard to the Far East. India had become one of the o r i g i n a l members of the United Nations at the time of i t s formation i n 194-5. Although India, at that time, was s t i l l under the B r i t i s h r u l e , the Indian delegation to the San Francisco Conference consisted of very able Indians. There were representatives of the Hindus, the Muslims and the Princely States. S i r Ramaswami Mudaliar was Hindu, S i r Firoze Khan Noon was Muslim and S i r V. T. Krishnamachari represented the States. The curious £hing about t h i s delegation was that i t s composition was based on r e l i g i o n and i t was responsible to the B r i t i s h Government of India, not the people of India. ( A l l the national leaders were i n j a i l ) . I t was not u n t i l after the independence of India i n August 194-7 that the f l a g of the new Dominion, (India became a republic i n January 1950)? flew at the United Nations headquarters and the Indian delegation appeared at Lake Success under the leadership of Mrs. Vdjaya Lakhshami Pandit, then Indian Ambassador to the U. S. S. R. This was not the f i r s t time that India had become a member of an International Organization. The Indian representatives were present at the Peace Treaty of 1919 and India had been admitted as an o r i g i n a l member State of the League of Nations. Her p o s i t i o n was unique, as she was the only member of the League which was non-self-governing. This continued to be so i n spite of the fa c t that the Covenant of the League did not permit any non-s e l f -governing community to become a member state. Subsequently India participated i n a l l the meetings of the League Assembly. Besides t h i s she also attended annual sessions of the Inter-national Labour Office and other international conferences. However, India's representatives were appointed under di f f e r e n t conditions. That was why they were always part of the B r i t i s h delegation and not, as i n the case of Dominions, an e n t i r e l y separate delegation. Although the po s i t i o n of the Indian representatives i n the United Nations before 194-7 was d i f f e r e n t , they could not be called the true representatives of the Indian people. As a matter of fact India had no r i g h t to be at San Francisco. The United Nations, as A r t i c l e 2 of the Charter states, " i s based on the Sovereign equality of a l l members."^ India i n 194-5,- could not be regarded as standing on a footing of sovereign equality with other nations. Indeed, Mr. Molotov i n his f i r s t speech before the San Francisco Conference made an oblique reference to India's status. "Let us hope," he said "that the voice of an independent India w i l l be heard i n t h i s h a l l before long." ^ 3 Nevertheless India continued to be represented i n the United Nations and the Indian Leaders, a f t e r independence, gladly accepted her membership. F i r s t of a l l the Indian spokesmen saw that the United Nations membership would not i n t e r -fere with Indian independence. Secondly they f e l t that some sort of in t e r n a t i o n a l organization was necessary to maintain peace and order i n the world. The United Nations could be a suitable platform for the nations of the world to bring t h e i r grievances The United Nations Charter,- p. 51 K.P.S. Menon, "India and the United Nations" Indian Information. New Delhi, November 15, 194-8, p. 4-41. 37 for s o l u t i o n . More recently Shree (which means Mister i n Hindustani) Nehru described the reasons fo r t h i s i n the Indian Parliament as follows: "Our association with the United Nations does not take away (anything) from our independence. We associated ourselves with the United Nations because we f e l t that some such world organization was e s s e n t i a l . The League of Nations had f a i l e d . Here was another attempt under wider and perhaps better auspices and we joined i t ' . And, I think that the Charter of the United Nations i s s t i l l a very f i n e and noble document." 54 What p o l i c y India would follow i n the United Nations was made clear by Mrs. Pandit, Chairman of the Indian delegation, i n her f i r s t speech i n the General Assembly. She declared that "we i n India, for our part, are aware of no compulsion to i d e n t i f y ourselves wholly, or to associate ourselves systematically, with either or any of the d i f f e r e n t groups. On the contrary, we consider i t should be narrowed down." She further declared that the Indian delegation would "vote s o l e l y i n the l i g h t of i t s judgment of the : merits of the case i n question." She continued, 54 Indian Embassy for the United States, Prime Minister oh Foreign P o l i c y , reply to Debate i n parliament, June 27, 1952 38 "We stand for peace, and w i l l devote our resources and energy toward the abolition^pf a l l the causes which lead to war." "55 India and the United Nations Commissions on Korea. One of the problems, concerning the Far East, was that of the independence of Korea, (other problems were China and Japan) This problem was brought before the General Assembly by the United States on September 17, 194-7. After the defeat of Japan, Korea had been occupied by the United States and the U. S. S. R. The United States had occupied the area south of the Thirty-eighth Parallel and the U. S. S. R. had occupied the region north of i t . The occupying powers had agreed, at the Moscow Conference in December 194-5? to set up a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. The Conference established a Joint Commission of occupying powers for the formation of the Government in Korea. Negotiations, to form the Joint Commission of the representatives of the United States and the U. S. S. R., began on March 20, 1946' between the two nations in question, failed and the United States, thereafter, 55 The United Nations, The second session  of the General Assembly, Vol. 1, p. 137» submitted the problem to the United Nations. The U. S. S. R. argued that the, Korean Problem did not f a l l within the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the United Nations. However, i t proposed that the General Assembly should ask the United States and the U. S. S. R. to with-draw t h e i r occupying forces from Korea at the beginning of 1948. The question of forming the government should be l e f t to the Korean People. On the other hand the United States proposed that the national Government as wel l as the national security forces should be formed before the withdrawal of the troops. The main objective of the United States proposal was to establish a government machinery to which the Powers should be transferred before the withdrawal of the foreign forces. That meant the formation of a single government representing the Korean People. I t was further proposed that a United Nations Temporary Commission should be formed to supervise the implication of the resolution (U. S.). India disagreed with both the Proposals of the U. S. S. R., and the United States. Regarding the U. S. S. R.'s Proposal for the immediate with-drawal of the occupying forces, India's stand was that such an arrangement would lead to confusion, because there was no Government to take over the administration of the country. On the other hand she did not l i k e the U. S. reso l u t i o n either. However India agreed to the formation of the United 56 Nations Temporary Commission for Korea. Con-sequently, India proposed her own formula as a compromise between the two other proposals. That formula was as follows: F i r s t , that the general elections should be held on a national basis under the supervision of the United Nations Temporary Commission. Secondly, a l l adults should have the r i g h t to vote by secret b a l l o t without any p o l i t i c a l discrimination. Thirdly, a national Government should be formed immediately after the e l e c t i o n . Fourth, the national Government should form i t s own security forces and dissolve a l l other m i l i t a r y and semi-m i l i t a r y formations. Lastly, a time l i m i t should be 57 f i x e d f or the withdrawal of occupation troops. The r e s u l t of the Indian Proposal was that the United States revised her resolution. The revised resolution included the Indian suggestion 5& The United Nations, F i r s t Committee, P o l i t i c a l and Security Questions 16 Sept - 1 9 Nov 194-7, p.285 $j The United Nations, F i r s t Committee 1 9 4 7 , p. 285 . that the e l e c t i o n might be held on a national, not a zonal, basis. Consequently the Temporary Commission would be free to decide how the e l e c t i o n should be supervised. Another Indian proposal that the e l e c t i o n should be held on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret b a l l o t , was included i n the r e s o l u t i o n . Paragraph 4(a) of the United States resolution, added a phrase " and dissolve a l l m i l i t a r y or semi-military formations not included 58 therein " • This was exactly the phraseology suggested by the Indian representative. The amendment submitted by the Indian delegation was adopted by the General Assembly and India supported the United States r e s o l u t i o n which was accepted by the General Assembly, af t e r r e j e c t i n g the U. S. S. R. -Proposal. The Assembly also accepted the U. S. Proposal for forming the United Nations Temporary Commission to supervise the implication of the resolution. The Commission was to be composed of A u s t r a l i a , Canada, China, El-Salvador, France, India, The P h i l i p p i n e s , Syria and the Ukrainian S. S. R. The Assembly recommended The United Nations Document A/C 1/218/Rev.l that the election be held not latter than March 3 1 , 194-8. The Commission was authorized to consult with the Assembly's Interim Committee on the application of i t s recommendations. Although the Soviet Union bloc voted against the revised resolution of the United States and i t was accepted by the majority of the democratic States, yet the Indian delegation did not withdraw its support from the resolution. India s t i l l thought that the resolution was a good f i e l d for compromise for the United States and the U. S. S. R. That was the correct step and she accepted - taking part in the Temporary Commission. Mr. K. P. S. Menon represented India in the Commission, which started to work immediately after its formation. Mr. Menon was elected to act as Chairman of the Commission. Thus making him Chairman rendered this position d i f f i c u l t , because he had to work both as representative of India and Chairman of the Commission. However he managed to perform both functions ably. The Commission's work was limited in the area south of the 38° Parallel. This was due to the refusal.- by the U. S. S. R.'s military commander to l e t the Commission cross north of that l i n e . In such a s i t u a t i o n the Commission found i t d i f f i c u l t to continue i t s work and decided to consult the Interim Committee of the General Assembly. Before the Temporary Commission took the matter to the Interim Committee for advice, most of the members of the Commission were divided on whether there should be any e l e c t i o n i n South Korea or not. Some members had expressed serious doubts, i n view of the s i t u a t i o n , regarding i t s r i g h t to implement the General Assembly's decision i n South Korea alone. The Indian representative expressed the view that a government established on the basis of elections held i n South Korea could not be described as a national government i n the sense of the General Assembly' resolution. The representative of India further argued that i f a government were set up i n South Korea, the U. S. troops would always be needed to support i t . ^ 9 Like the Indian represent-ative, the representatives of Canada, E l Salvador and Australia held the same view.6° ^ The United Nations O f f i c i a l Records of  Third Session of the General Assembly. Park 1, p. 979. 6 0 Ibid, p. 947. 44 T h u s o u t o f n i n e members o f t h e T e m p o r a r y C o m m i s s i o n , f o u r w e r e i n f a v o u r o f g o i n g a h e a d a n d h o l d i n g t h e e l e c t i o n i n S o u t h K o r e a a n d t h e r e m a i n i n g f o u r were i n o p p o s i t i o n w i t h one a b s t a i n i n g ( U k r a i n i a n S . S . R . ) who n e v e r c o o p e r a t e d w i t h t h e C o m m i s s i o n . T h e I n d i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e e v e n ?;ent s o f a r a s t o a s k t h e C o m m i s s i o n t o d e c l a r e i t s i n a b i l i t y t o c a r r y o u t i t s m i s s i o n a n d t o r e t u r n i t s m a n d a t e t o t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y . B u t t h i s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f t h e I n d i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e was r e j e c t e d u n a n i m o u s l y , ^-l"' a n d t h e w h o l e p r o b l e m was t a k e n t o t h e I n t e r i m C o m m i t t e e f o r a d v i c e . H o w e v e r I n d i a e x p r e s s e d h e r a t t i t u d e e v e n b e f o r e t h e I n t e r i m C o m m i t t e e i n F e b r u a r y 1948, M r . M e n o n , m a k i n g a s t a t e m e n t d e c l a r e d t h a t " m o s t o f t h e members o f t h e T e m p o r a r y C o m m i s s i o n h a d e x p r e s s e d t c o n c e r n t h a t t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a s e p a r a t e s o v e r e i g n g o v e r n m e n t i n S o u t h K o r e a u n d e r t h e p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n s w o u l d n o t f a c i l i t a t e t h e t w i n o b j e c t i v e s l a i d down i n t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e A s s e m b l y , n a m e l y , t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e f o r t h e p e o p l e o f K o r e a a n d t h e w i t h d r a w l o f t h e o c c u p y i n g f o r c e s . S u c h a g o v e r n m e n t , i n a n y c a s e , c o u l d n o t be i n a p o s i t i o n t o t a k e o v e r t h e f u n c t i o n s o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t ^ T h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , R e p o r t o f t h e I n t e r i m  C o m m i t t e e o f t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y (5th J a n u a r y -5th Augus t 1948), p . 19. 45 from the m i l i t a r y commands and c i v i l i a n authorities of North Korea and South Korea." In spite of the fac t that the represent-atives of India brought f o r t h the above mentioned consequences i f the e l e c t i o n were held i n South Korea, the Interim Committee asked the Commission to hold the e l e c t i o n i n South Korea. The ef f o r t s of Mr. Menon, to see both South and North Korea united and independent under the National Korean Government, f a i l e d . This earnest desire of India, ( l i k e that of some other states) was not f u l f i l l e d , p a r t l y because of the non-cooperative attitude of the Soviet Union authorities i n North Korea and p a r t l y because of the decision of the-Interim Committee which was not appreciated by India. Perhaps .that was the reason that the Indian representative (the representative of Canada was not present either) was not present at the meeting of the United Nations -Temporary Commission on Korea which was held on February 28, 194-8, at S e o u l . ^ I t was at this meeting that the decision was taken to implement the Interim ^ 2 The United Nations, Report of the Interim  Committee of the General Assembly (5th January -(5th August 1948), p. 19. : 6 % The Department of State, Korea 1945 to 1948 Washington D.C., 1948), p. 13. 46 Committee's resolution of February 26th, 1948, by issuing a public statement that the Commission would observe°A"eleetion i n South Korea, not later than May 10, 1948. Nevertheless, India continued to be a member of the Commission. Finally the efforts of Temporary Commission found reward in the shape of the formation of the Republic of South Korea, under President Singman Rhee. The question of Korea came up again before the General Assembly in December 1948. The United States urged the approval of the new South Korean Government and the establishment of: .a new United Nations Commission which should lend i t s good offices' to bring about the unification of the two zones. India held the opinion that the approval of the South Korean Government would make the division of the country permanent, which would be disastrous for the future of Korea. She further argued that i t would jeopardize peace and st a b i l i t y in the Far East. For those reasons India hesitated to vote in favour of the United States resolution for the approval of the South Korean Republic. Some other delegates explained the fact that the Assembly's approval of the South Korean Government would not stand in the way of the achievement of Korean unity. Moreover i t 47 was pointed out to the Indian delegation that India took part i n the U. N. Temporary Commission on Korea, so she could not reasonably vote against the r e s o l u t i o n . Under t h i s . persuasion; India voted for the United States resolution, r e l u c t a n t l y nevertheless. 4^ She also accepted her membership i n the United Nations Commission on Korea. However, India never recognized the South Korean Government. She refrained, from doing so not to perpetuate the d i v i s i o n of Korea. India and ECAFE In addition to her membership i n the Temporary Commission of the United Nations and the United Nations Commission on Korea, India was represented on the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. The countries of Asia are agrarian. The majority of the people have the source of t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d i n a g r i c u l t u r e : Asian agriculture i s backward. Its organization and methods are p r i m i t i v e . Moreover the land tenure systems and s o c i a l customs are not economical. The density of population i s another factor added to the poverty and dangerously 6^ V. P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, p. 24. Embassy of India, Washington, D. C , Prime Minister on Foreign P o l i c y Reply to Debate i n  Parliament, p. 11. 48 low standards of l i v i n g . To make some progress toward r a i s i n g the standards of l i v i n g by i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g the Asian countries, i t was f e l t necessary to have Planned Programmes for the U t i l i z a t i o n of the resources through cooperation between the countries concerned. I t was with t h i s context that the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East was set up i n 1947. By the end of 1948, A u s t r a l i a , Burma, China, France, India, The Netherlands, New Zealand, The P h i l i p p i n e s , Siam, the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom and the United States were i t s f u l l members. Besides these members there were associate members such as B r i t i s h Borneo, Cambodio,. Ceylon, Hong Kong, The Republic of Indonesia, Laos, Malaya and Nepal. India took a keen interest from the beginning • i n the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). The reason for India's interest i n the ECAFE was that she believed that the economic w e l l -being of the people of India came f i r s t and foremost. The other Asian countries, l i k e India, are i n the same economic conditions. So India seemed to be interested i n s e e i n g - a l l the countries of Asia developing t h e i r economic resources and create a better balance between industry and a g r i c u l t u r e . Addressing the members of the ECAFE at i t s t h i r d session at Ootacamund, Madras 49 (India) on June 1, 1948. Prime Minister Nehru explained i t as follows: "From the Asian point of view, i t has become essentially a matter of extreme urgency to deal with those problems .^economic/. From the world point of view i t is equally urgent really, because unless these problems are dealt with in Asia, they affect other parts of the world." Suggesting how this problem could be solved, he added, " The whole of this Asian region is f u l l of vast resources, human and material, and the question before us is how to yoke them together and produce results. It is not that we are lacking in men or material. We have both. In order to yoke them together the easiest way is to have certain assistance in capital equipment and experienced technical personnel from those countries which may have a surplus of i t . " 66 In the earlier session of the ECAFE the Indian representative had suggested similar measures. Those suggestions remained the basis for approaching the question of the economic organization of Asia. In the f i r s t session of'the ECAFE the representative of India laid down the following Proposals: 66 J. Nehru, Independence and After, p. 306-309. 50 "That the S e c r e t a r i a t be d i r e c t e d , t o i n s t i t u t e e n q u i r i e s i n t o the f o l l o w i n g s u b j e c t s i n r e s p e c t of each c o u n t r y w i t h i n the g e o g r a p h i c a l scope of the Commission: (1) Probable requirement during the next twelve months of food, seed, c l o t h i n g , raw m a t e r i a l , p l a n t , i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r e equipment, b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l and other e s s e n t i a l goods; (2) Measures necessary to ensure t h a t the above requirements are met: (a) from domestic sources, e.g., by improvement of i n t e r n a l t r a n s p o r t f a c i l i t i e s , d i s t r i b u t i o n methods, e t c . ; (b) from w i t h i n the r e g i o n , e.g., by p r o v i s i o n of f a c i l i t i e s f o r more extended i n t e r - r e g i o n a l trade, improvement i n e x t e r n a l t r a n s p o r t f a c i l i t i e s , e t c . ; and .(c) from a l l other r e s o u r c e s , e.g., by develop-ment of e x t e r n a l t r a d e g e n e r a l l y , a d o p t i o n of measures necessary f o r f i n a n c i n g imports, improvement i n e x t e r n a l t r a n s p o r t f a c i l i t i e s , e t c . ; ( 3 ) Measures necessary to f a c i l i t a t e t r a i n i n g of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and t e c h n i c a l p e r s o n n e l i n the economic f i e l d and the o b t a i n i n g of competent technicians: from o u t s i d e by c o u n t r i e s i n need." Very l i t t l e progress c o u l d have been made by the ECAFE during a p e r i o d of one year. T h i s was p o i n t e d out by the I n d i a n delegate i n the second s e s s i o n of the ECAFE which was h e l d i n Baguio, The V . P. Dutt, I n d i a ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 27-28. . P h i l i p p i n e s , i n November and December 1947. The Indian delegate c r i t i c i z e d the methods which had been i n s u f f i c i e n t to replace the worn out machinery i n India where i n d u s t r i a l production had f a l l e n back. Because of t h i s f a c t , the delegate asserted "India was prevented from making her contribution to the economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of Asia and the Far East." However, commenting on the Interim Report and Recommendations on i n d u s t r i a l development by the working Party, Dr. S. P. Mukerjee, Indian delegate, said that "India offered unconditional cooperation to her fellow members within the region subject to the l i m i t a t i o n s from which she herself suffered." He further emphasized the fact that the f i r s t and most important problem of those countries was "to r e q ^ r e to the pre-war l e v e l of production the land under c u l t i v a t i o n i n those surplus areas which had now become defunct area." Similar suggestions were made by Mr. C. C. Dasai who headed the Indian delegation to the fourth session of the ECAFEv.which was held at Lapstone, N.S.W., Au s t r a l i a . His suggestions were accepted by a Q V. P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy., p. 26. the Commission. India's stand i n the ECAFE has been for • more concrete actions rather than mere drafting plans and meetings. There are some metropolitan countries whose r o l e , i t seems, has been to l i m i t the a c t i v i t i e s of the Commission to research and i n v e s t i g a t i o n only. Indian spokesmen seem to hold the opinion that actions should follow immediately after the research and investigations. India advocated the same p o l i c y i n the other various committees such as the Committee on Food and Agriculture, the Committee on Trade and Finance, the Committee on Flood Control and the Drafting Committee of the Committee on Trade Promotion. One r e s u l t of such a p o l i c y of India was that the ECAFE adopted a reso l u t i o n i n i t s f i f t h session for a grant to the East Punjab I r r i g a t i o n I n s t i t u t e , Amritsai", India. This was done to under-6.9 take a j o i n t study on the s i l t problem. " Similar measures were taken i n other countries of Asia. For instance, the Bureau of Flood Control of the; ECAFE assisted Thailand's I r r i g a t i o n Department to United Nations B u l l e t i n , 8:180, February, 1950. build the f i r s t hydraulic model and to train young people for such work. India's Bid for Representation of Communist China  in the U. N. Another problem which faced'the Indian spokesmen in 194-9, was China - the great neighbour of India. The relations between the two countries have been very friendly and have never been ruined by war or serious conflict for about 2,000 years. Even when India was under British rule, the people of India continued to express their sympathy with in the Chinese' cause. After the independence, India continued to have friendly relations with China even after the Chinese Communist revolution in 1949. A very significant development took place in the Far East in the year of 1949. China went * through-the Communist revolution after a bitter c i v i l war. It ended in 1949 with the Communists victories on the mainland. After driving out the Nationalist Government to Formosa, the Communists set up, in cooperation with other anti-kuomintang l i b e r a l elements, the Central People's Government of People's Republic of China in October 1949. Immediately after.its formation the Communists began to seek the new 5 4 , Government's recognition and to establ i s h diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with the other countries. India observed the domestic s i t u a t i o n of China very keenly. The Government of India f e l t that i t was not t h e i r duty to support one group or another nor to t e l l the people of China what was ri g h t or what was wrong for them. As long as the Nationalist Government ruled over China the Indian Government recognized i t , but as soon as the Communists got control over the mainland of China and established t h e i r Government, the Indian Government was faced with a dual s i t u a t i o n as to whether i t should continue to recognize Chiang's Government at Formosa or whether i t should recognize the new Government. F i n a l l y , after considering the s i t u a t i o n thoroughly and a f t e r consulting the other Commonwealth 70 Governments, the Government of India decided to accept the r e a l i t y of the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n China and accorded recognition to the Communist Government on December 30,. 1949.^ India did not stop here, but went one step further to ask the Commonwealth countries ' V.P. Dutt, India's Foreign P o l i c y , pp. 14-15 71 I b i d , p. 15-55 to do likewise. At the Colombo Conference, Shiree Nehru made a f o r c e f u l plea to the Commonwealth Ministers f o r the recognition of Communist China. He explained that the Chinese people should not be is o l a t e d from the non-Communist world, but should be encouraged to have re l a t i o n s with other parts of the world.' 7 2 Recognition, however, did not mean that India would approve the Communist p o l i c i e s . The B r i t i s h Government recognized the new Chinese Government also, but i t i s s t i l l combating the Communists i n Malaya. S i m i l a r l y , India takes s t r i c t measures to put down the Communists at home. Thus, the recognition of Red China by India and other non-communist countries means that they recognize the fact that Chinese Communists have support of the vast majority of Chinese people. Shiree Nehru declared i n Parliament that " i t - was not a question of approving or disapproving the changes that had taken place, i t was a question of recognizing the major event i n history and appreciating and dealing with i t . " Referring to the Communist Government i n China, he said that "the new Government was a stable Government and that there i s no force l i k e l y to supplant i t or to push i t away. India therefore, recognized ? 2 Business Week. Feb. 11, 1950? also TIME, 55; "1^17, January 23, 1950. 56 the new Government and suggested exchange of ambass-adors." 73 There was another factor which should be noted here. The People's Republic of China was not wholly composed of Communists. There were other a n t i -Koomintang l i b e r a l elements i n i t which supported the new government. Speaking of Chinese Communism, The Times of London wrote as follows on June 28 and 29 of 1950: " I t i s because i t i s a Chinese movement, seeking to reform conditions i n China, that i t has gained such wide support. Few of i t s followers are r e a l l y interested i n foreign nations or t h e i r f ate. The mass support of a l l classes which the regime now enjoys i s not given to t h e o r e t i c a l Communism but to the p r a c t i c a l programme of reform and reconstruction which the party i s now carrying out. The administration, confined i n the executive posts to the Party members, i s implacably honest; the army i s admirably d i s c i p l i n e d ; there i s no nepotism; e f f i c i e n c y and drive have replaced slo t h and indifference. I n t e l l e c t u a l s and experts, non-Communists i n th e i r own views, have been asked to work for the regime i n order to reconstruct China, and f i n d a congenial atmosphere i n which the expert i s appreciated and his advice accepted. 73' v . P/Dutt, India's Foreign P o l i c y , p . 16. 74 The Times, London, June 18, 19, 1950. The Indian spokesmen seemed to have full y -r e a l i z e d the fa c t that the new Chinese Government represented the Chinese people. Defending his own res o l u t i o n for the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, S i r Bengal N. Rau declared; "According to our information so far as the new Government of China i s concerned, that government i s a national c o a l i t i o n representing a l l sections of the nation, including some members of the Kuomintang, pledged to work a common programme of democratic advance. "75 Shiree Nehru's p o l i c y of suppressing the Communists at home and seeking friendship with Communist China was described, by many Americans, as inconsistent. When Mrs. Pandit, then Ambassador to the United States, mentioned t h i s attitude of the Americans i n parliament, Shiree Nehru interrupted: " I am not prepared to be a n t i - t h i s or anti-that, I may be soft to some, hard to others at times, but I d i s l i k e being pushed about or b u l l i e d . . . some on the Anglo-American side c a l l me a Communist, while some of the other side c a l l me an i m p e r i a l i s t . . . people ask me: "Are you th i s or are you that?" But I say: 75 The United Nations, O f f i c i a l Records  of the General Assembly,1950* p. 9. 58 .This i s where I intend to be. Nowhere e l s e 1 . " 76 The Chinese Communists did not delay t h e i r bid f o r recognition from the United Nations. On January 8, 1950? a telegram sent by the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China was received by the Security Council. On January 10, 1950? the representative of the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution i n which he proposed that the representative of the Na t i o n a l i s t Government of China should be expelled from the Security Council and the representative of the People's Republic of China should be recognized the r e a l representative of the Chinese and take a seat i n The Security Council. By t h i s time India had been elected one of the non-permanent members of the Security Council. India voted f o r the resol u t i o n which was rejected by s i x votes to three.77 Seeing t h i s r e s u l t the representative of the Soviet Union declared that his delegation would not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the work of the Security Council u n t i l the representative of the Koumintang group should be removed from the Council. Although t h i s was considered unfortunate, India con-76 Time, February, 1950. 77 Security C o u n c i l t O f f i c i a l Records, 4 6 l  meeting, January 15, 1950. p. 9 . 59 tinued to advocate the admittance of the represent-ative of Communist China to the United Nations, Before the Korean War broke out, India's b e l i e f was that the admission of Red China to the United Nations was essential from the point of view of Asia and the world. After the outbreak of the Korean War, India saw i t necessary that New China should be ad-mitted to the U. N. and the U. S. S. R.'should return to the Security Council because i t was "of basic importance both i n terms of r e a l i t y and i n order to have a peaceful solution," 78 i n the Far East. This p o l i c y of India, outside the United Nations, was winning support. The B r i t i s h Press seemed to have become sympathetic toward India's p o l i c y i n regard to Communist China. The London Times of September, 1950, wrote: "India's voice must be heard and heard with respect, as an authentic voice of Asian democracy." 79 When India introduced a resolution for the admission of Communist China i n the f i f t h session of the General Assembly, Great B r i t a i n and other non-Communist countries backed India. 7 8 The New York Times, October 17, 1950. 79 j . Alvarez Del Vayo, "Preview of the U. N. Assembly", The Nation, September 23, 1950. Thus before the f i f t h session of the General Assembly was held i n 1950, the Indian dele-gation was well prepared to make a bid for the recognition of Communist China. A draft resolution was presented by S i r B. Rau, the head of the Indian delegation. The reso l u t i o n read as follows: "The General Assembly, "Noting that the Republic of China i s a member of the United Nations and of various organs thereof, "Considering that the obligations of a Member under the Charter of the United Nations cannot be carried out except by a government which, with a reasonable expectancy of permanence, ac t u a l l y exercises control over the t e r r i t o r y of that Member and commands the obedience of i t s people, "Recognizing that the Central Government of the People's Republic of China i s the only such government functioning i n the public of China as now constituted, "Decides that the aforesaid Central Government through i t s head, or i t s minister for Foreign A f f a i r s or accredited representatives, as the case may be, s h a l l be e n t i t l e d to represent the Republic of China i n the General Assembly and "Recommends that the organs of the United Nations adopt s i m i l a r resolutions." °° United Nations, O f f i c i a l Records of the  General Assembly, F i f t h Session, 1 9 5 0 , P. 2 . 6 1 The draft r e s o l u t i o n was defeated by a large majority. 16 countries voted for while 33 voted against i t and 10 abstained from voting. Nevertheless, i f one looks at that voting from the population point of view of those countries which voted for the resol u t i o n , i t could be considered m o r a l l y C a r r i e d . Keeping China, whose v a l i d i t y was i n issue, out of the picture, the t o t a l population of the countries that voted for i t was about 809 m i l l i o n and the t o t a l population of the countries that voted against the res o l u t i o n was about 412 m i l l i o n . Anyhow the"Indian delegation was not disappointed by th i s defeat. The most s i g n i f i c a n t f a ct about this action i n the General Assembly was that the leadership was i n the hands of India. India stood f i r m and consistent without caring for any "softening" process. The diplomatic pressure which i s often used at Lake Success to silence or delay a delegate who wishes to ra i s e some awkward issue, could not happen i n the case of India. I t i s also important to notice that the support India r a l l i e d on the Chinese issue might not be disposed of very e a s i l y . > Great B r i t a i n had i t s own view point about what should be the p o l i c y of the western powers i n Asia and voted f or the Indian draft resolution. The 62 action of the three Scandinavian countries was noteworthy since t h e i r S o c i a l i s t Governments are anti-Communist. The other small countries may have been influenced, even those that abstained. Whatever popularity India got by bringing the Chinese issue before the General Assembly, i t was mostly due to one able personality, S i r B. Rau who was the head of the Indian delegation i n th i s part-i c u l a r session of the General Assembly. S i r B. Rau argued that the new Government of China was a stable one. Secondly, as he pointed out,"£Which i s always true^ according to the general p r i n c i p l e s of International Law, that government ought to be recognized which has control over the vast t e r r i t o r y of a country and has support of the majority of the people. This he had made clear i n the draft r e s o l u t i o n which stated "a government which, with a reasonable expectancy of permanence, a c t u a l l y exercises control over the majority of that Member and commands the obedience of i t s people." The t h i r d argument 'he brought forward was that a state has obligations to the United Nations. More so when i t i s a permanent member of the. Security Council. How can those obligations be f u l f i l l e d i f Republic of China had no control over the t e r r i t o r y and the Chinese people? 63 In such a s i t u a t i o n only the People's Republic of China could discharge China's duties and obligations under the Charter. India's interest i n confront Athe General Assembly with the Chinese issue was based on her f r i e n d l y a t t i t u d e towards Communist China. Due to her geograph-i c a l . s i t u a t i o n she cannot afford to have a h o s t i l e power next to her. Because of the same reason, India's statesmen would probably be reluctant to see any war i n the Far East i n which China i s involved. The spokesmen of India r e a l i z e d t h i s fact long ago, and did not leave any stone unturned to win the friendship of the Communist Government. S i r B. Rau once declared i n the United Nations General Assembly, "we wish to do everything possible to promote f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s that now p r e v a i l between us, because we f e e l that a free and independent China marching with India w i l l be the most e f f e c t i v e s t a b i l i z i n g factor i n Asia." Shree Nehru was categorical on t h i s point. In his opinion the absence of Communist China from the United Nations l e f t a nation of 450,000,000 people, a permanent member of the Security Council, without genuine representation. This also exposed Asia to the constant danger of conf lagration.•:••-I-8 l' J. Alvares Del Vayo, "The Vote on China", The Nation, Sept. 3 0 , 1 9 5 0 . 64 Chapter I I I Discord with Communist China over Tibet. 1950 was the year during which the relations 8 2 between New Delhi and Peking were disturbed. The disturbance was created by the Chinese Communists' move to consolidate and safeguard control over t h e i r national t e r r i t o r y by " l i b e r a t i n g " Tibet. Despite the fact that India was not wholeheartedly i n favour of China's attitude toward Tibet, she clung to the b e l i e f that the admittance of the Peking Government to the United Nations was the best hope for peace i n the Far East. Some l i g h t may be shed on Tibet which had been a point of f r i c t i o n i n relations between India and China. The f r i c t i o n had been due to the over-lapping of the interests of the two countries i n Tibet. For centuries China enjoyed suzerainty over Tibet and the Manchu dynasty was able to establish a mild rule there in.the eighteenth century. Perhaps t h i s See Chapter I I for further r e l a t i o n s between India and China. 65 step was taken by the Manchu emperors because of the fear that B r i t a i n would detach Tibet as a colony. This fear was established by the expedition of Colonel F. E. Younghusband i n 1904. That expedition resulted i n imposing a treaty on the Lhasa ( c a p i t a l of Tibet) a u t h o r i t i e s . This treaty opened up trade between Tibet and India. The main motive behind this expedition seemed to be the desire of B r i t a i n to s t a b i l i z e the north east f r o n t i e r of India, to f a c i l i t a t e trade and to counteract Russian expansionism. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907? recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and stipulated that neither Russia nor B r i t a i n should i n t e r f e r e i n the i n t e r n a l administration of Tibet or seek concessions there. The ManchuS" then decided to impose a strong regime i n Lhasa and dispatched a m i l i t a r y expedition which reached Lhasa i n February 1910. The Dalai Lama (secular head of the state) f l e d to Darjeeling, India. But the Chinese revolution enabled Tibet to break the t i e s binding her to China and the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa. In 1917 the Tibetans repulsed another Chinese attack. The Simla (India!) Conference was held i n 1914 to consider the British-Chinese r e l a t i o n s over Tibet. The Conference was attended by B r i t a i n , China and Tibet. B r i t a i n was ready to recognize Chinese suzerainty over autonomous Tibet, but China never r a t i f i e d the Simla Convention so the Tibetan Government, as stated in its note to the U. N., maintained that China had thereby renounced "the benefits that would have occurred to her" under the 1914- Con-vention and in consequence, that Tibet possessed f u l l p o l i t i c a l independence 'de jure'. 8 3 In 1933? China sent her armies once again to control Tibet. This time China occupied territory east of the Yangstse. Since then no settlement was reached between Tibet and China and the upper Yangstse remained the frontier between them. Meanwhile bitter quarrels arose between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. The latter fled to China in 1920. The Panchen Lama was the religious head whereas the Dalai Lama was secular head of that semi-autonomous state. The powerful thirteenth Dalai Lama died in 1933 and the 16 year old incumbent succeeded in 194-0. In the meantime the Banchen Lama died in China in 1938. The d i f f i c u l t y arose over the selection of a successor. In addition to the 16 year old boy, another candidate was put forward in former Tibetan 83 United Nations, Document A/154-9. 67 t e r r i t o r y of C h i n g h a i which has been converted i n t o a Chinese p r o v i n c e v e r y r e c e n t l y . Known as the Kumbum Lama i n s t a l l e d by h i s suppbrt e r s , was r e c o g n i z e d by the Red Chinese l e a d e r s as the temporal r u l e r of T i b e t . The Peking Government claimed i n 1950 t h a t T i b e t was an i n t e g r a l p a r t of China and d e c l a r e d t h a t they would " l i b e r a t e " i t . The T i b e t a n a u t h o r i t i e s were d i s t u r b e d by t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n of the Chinese Communists and asked f o r help from the western c o u n t r i e s i n case of a t t a c k by Communist China.$ 4 Meanwhile the Ky-bmintang m i s s i o n i n Lhasa was n o t i f i e d by the D a l a i Lama to l e a v e the country. T h i s was done to a v o i d the e n t r y of the Chinese Red Army i n t o the t e r r i t o r y . The I n d i a n Government, t o keep i t s e l f informed i n such a s i t u a t i o n , asked i t s P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Sikkim to v i s i t Lhasa and to make a r e p o r t on the r e v o l t ( r e p o r t e d by N a t i o n a l i s t r e s o u r c e s i n Canton) i n Lhasa a g a i n s t the Chinese N a t i o n a l i s t Government. The New China News Agency charged t h a t "the B r i t i s h and American i m p e r i a l i s t s and P a n d i t Nehru were now p l o t t i n g a coup i n Lhasa f o r the annexation of T i b e t . " °^ The a t t i t u d e of I n d i a toward the c l a i m made 8 4 The New York Times, F e b r u a r y 1, 1950. ^ V. P. Dutt, I n d i a F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 17. by the Chinese Communists over T i b e t , was that T i b e t , being autonomous under nominal s u z e r a i n t y of China, should have the r i g h t to decide her own f u t u r e . F u r t h e r -more the I n d i a n Spokesmen d e c l a r e d t h a t they would defend T i b e t a n autonomy by d i p l o m a t i c means o n l y . The stand taken by the I n d i a n Leaders was a v e r y m i l d one. N a t u r a l l y such a statement t h a t I n d i a . would defend T i b e t by p e a c e f u l means, c o u l d not have been a s t r o n g warning to the Chinese Communists. In the p a s t , the B r i t i s h Government had.very a b l y defended the autonomy of T i b e t which was necessary from the I n d i a n s e c u r i t y p o i n t of view. But the present l e a d e r -s h i p of I n d i a s t a r t e d a poor d i p l o m a t i c game from the v e r y beginning, and i t was d o u b t f u l (as i t was proved l a t e r on) whether the p e a c e f u l I n d i a n P o l i c y would succeed. I n d i a needed as much s e c u r i t y i n 1950 (even more) as she d i d under the B r i t i s h r u l e . In a d d i t i o n to the s e c u r i t y problem, I n d i a had c u l t u r a l and commercial r e l a t i o n s w i t h T i b e t . The Government of I n d i a had i t s agent i n Lhasa and trade agencies a t Gyantse and Yatung and post and t e l e g r a p h o f f i c e s a t the t r a d e r o u t e up to Gyantse over f o r t y y e ars. 8 ? 8 ^ The New York Times, February 16, 1950. 8 ? I n d i a n I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e s (Ottawa), F e b r u a r y 15» 1951. 69 The news of the advance of the Chinese Red Army into Tibet on October 25, 1950, came as a surprise to the Indian Government, esp e c i a l l y at a time when the Tibetan delegation, at the insistence of India, was on i t s way to Peking f or negotiations. The Indian Government sent a note to China the following day. In that note the Indian Government expressed i t s deep regret that the Chinese Government should have decided to seek a solution of the problem of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with Tibet, by force. "In the present context of world events", the note added, "invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and i n the considered judgment of the Government of India, not i n the interest of China or peace." 8 8 The Chinese reply of October 29 stated that the viewpoint of the Government of India had been "affected by foreign influence h o s t i l e to China In Tibet." The note further added that "the problem of Tibet i s a domestic problem of the People's Republic of China and no foreign interference s h a l l be t o l e r a t e d . " 8 9 The Government of India repudiated t h i s suggestion of the Chinese Government and t r i e d to make i t clear that India's foreign p o l i c y had been 88 "World Documents", Current History, December, 1950, p. 359. 8 9 I b i d , p. 359 70 e n t i r e l y independent and directed s o l e l y toward a peaceful settlement of international disputes and avoidance of anything calculated to increase the present deplorable tensions i n the world. India also expressed the anxiety and the desire that the Indian establishments, "which are to the mutual interests of India and Tibet and do not detract i n any way from suzerainty over Tibet," ^0 should continue. These f r i e n d l y gestures, on the part of the Government of India, did not stop the Red Army of Communist China from advancing to Lhasa. I t was reported on November 5? 1950 that the pro-communist Tibetans seized control of the Government of Lhasa and the 16 year old Dalai Lama f l e d . Meanwhile the Indian Press became unfavourable towards. Communist China. I t cautioned the Indian people that Tibet's status as a buffer state between the spheres of three great Oriental powers - the Soviet Union, China and India - might s w i f t l y disappear i f her present autonomy under nominal Chinese suzerainty were allowed to be swallowed by Communist power. The Times  of India wrote: "World Documents", Current History, December 1950, pp. 360-361 . 71 "A Communist Tibet transforms the problem of India's adjustment of her rel a t i o n s with i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism into a matter of extreme urgency ... Tibet's natural outlet to the outer /jclemocr a tic/world through India and the s trategic p o s i t i o n of Nepal are aspects of the new s i t u a t i o n to which New Delhi w i l l undoubtedly pay close attention." 91 The Indian as w e l l as the foreign Press speculated on the "reexamination" of India's entire p o l i c y i n regard to Communist China as a r e s u l t of the Peking Government's s t i f f r e j e c t i o n of India's•expressed concern over the Tibetan development. The Hindu, Madras, wrote: "Imposition of a Communist regime over Tibet by force w i l l materially effect India's attitude toward Communist China and c a l l f o r a rethinking of our foreign p o l i c y i n general." 92 Foreign P o l i c y B u l l e t i n , New York, stated: "Whatever the motives that inspired the Chinese Communists, there can be no doubt that t h i s step w i l l further the expansion of int e r n a t i o n a l communism and may w e l l delay Peiping's admission to the U. N., p a r t i c u l a r l y because of possible changes i n India's foreign p o l i c y . " 93 yA- Quoted i n The New York Times of October 28, 1950. 92 Quoted i n The New York Times of November 5, 1950. 93 Foreign P o l i c y B u l l e t i n , New York, November 10, 1950. 72 In the United States some Republican party-spokesmen were c r i t i c i s i n g India for not sending troops to Korea and for not taking a firmer stand against the Chinese Communist invasion of Tibet. Senator William F. Knowland, a Republican of C a l i f o r n i a warned, at a news conference (at Manila) on November 25, 1950, that India herself was i n danger of invasion, and added, "some of those nations which did not help /In the Korean War_7 may f i n d themselves victims of aggression. I have p a r t i c u l a r reference to India. " 9 4 But no major change occurred i n the foreign p o l i c y of India. New Delhi declared that i t s p o l i c y toward Communists would not be affected by the Tibetan problem. That meant, that India would continue to advocate for Communist China's admission to the United Nations. However, Indian leaders were "rather worried" 95 about the whole thing. In opening the winter session of the Parliament on November 14, 1950, President Rajindra Prasad said: "India i s not only a neighbour of Tibet but has had close c u l t u r a l and other t i e s with her for ages past. India must nec-e s s a r i l y concern herself with what- happens 94 The New York Times, November 26, 1950. 95 U. S. News and World Report, November 3 , 1950. i n Tibet and hope that the autonomy of t h i s peaceful country w i l l be preserved." 96 What the President mentioned " c u l t u r a l and other t i e s " , was not the only thing that India should have concerned herself with, there was something more than that which was disturbing the mind of the leadership of India. Tibet i s the back door of India. Almost a l l contacts of Tibet with the outside world had been through India. Tibet i n the Chinese Comm«nists hands can e a s i l y become a base for supporting the Indian Communists i f they revolt against the present Government of India. As a matter of fact there had been increasing a c t i v i t y i n the past i n Assam state, which adjoins Tibet, by the Revolutionary Communist party of India (a small revolutionary branch of the main Indian Communist Party). With India under Communist control the Communists would f i n d i t easy to " l i b e r a t e " the rest of the Asians from under the " i m p e r i a l i s t s " . The l a t e Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhai P a t e l may have had the' above-mentioned considerations i n mind when he asked the people of India to be ready to meet any aggression along the northern f r o n t i e r . In the same speech he declared; 96 Quoted i n The New York Times, November 15, 1950. 74 "Communist China's invasion of Tibet might be s u f f i c i e n t , i n view of i n t e r n a t i o n a l tension, to s t a r t a new world war" and urged that "his countrymen should not run away from danger but meet i t l i k e brave men." 97 Meanwhile Tibet appealed as follows to the United Nations on November 7, 1950, for Protection: "We, Ministers, with the approval of His Highnessthe Dalai Lama entrust the pro-blem of Tibet i n this emergency to the ultimate decision of the United Nations, hoping that the conscience of the world would not allow the disruption of our state by methods reminiscent of the jungle." The appeal described the b r i e f r e l a t i o n s between Tibet and China i n the Past. Referring to the Chinese invasion the appeal said, "This unwarranted act of aggression has not only disturbed the peace of Tibet, i t i s i n complete disregard of . a solemn assurance given by the Chinese to the Government of India; i t has created a grave s i t u a t i o n i n Tibet and may eventually deprive Tibet of her long cherished independence." Denouncing the invasion as the "greatest v i o l a t i o n of the weak by the strong," the message appealed "to the"nations of the world to intercede i n our behalf and r e s t r a i n Chinese aggression." The New York Times, November 10, 1950 75 The views of the people could be ascertained, i f needed, by other c i v i l i z e d methods or, i t could be redressed through an International Court. Conquest " w i l l only enlarge the area of conflict and increase the threat to the independence and s t a b i l i t y of other Asian countries." 98 The United Nations General Assembly's General Committee took up the Tibetan question on November 24, at the request of E l Salvador. The E l Salvador delegations asked that "invasion of Tibet by Foreign forces" be included in the current agenda of the General Assembly. He also submitted a draft resoltuion to "condemn this act of unprovoked aggression against Tibet", and to appoint a committee to study appropriate measures to be taken by the Assembly and to submit it s report to the Assembly's current Session." Australia, India and Great Britain opposed the proposed resolution of E l Salvador on the grounds that the matter could be settled by peaceful means. Mr. Kenneth Younger, of the United Kingdom emphasized the point that "there was s t i l l hope that the existing d i f f i c u l t i e s could be settled amicably by agreement 9 8 United Nations, Document A/1549. " United Nations, Records of meetings of  General Committee from Sept. 21 to December 5. P. 17. 76 between the parties concerned." Speaking for India, the Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawangar said that "the Indian Government was ce r t a i n that the Tibetan question could s t i l l be s e t t l e d by peaceful means and that such a settlement would safeguard the autonomy which Tibet had enjoyed for several decades while maintaining i t s h i s t o r i c a l association with China." 1^ 0 The other countries agreed with Great B r i t a i n and India and the matter was postponed unanimously. Meanwhile the s i t u a t i o n i n Tibet continued to be the same as before. However i t was reported i n March 1951 that the representatives of the Dalai Lama were proceeding to Peking for settlement of the Tibetan Problem. In the meantime India was busy tightening her northern border along Tibet. At the Press Conference i n New Delhi on March 13, Prime Minister Nehru said that trade between India and Tibet had been affected to some extent because of the trouble i n Tibet, but he hoped that trade would continue. He expressed the fear that "new order" coming into power i n Tibet might i n t e r f e r e with i t . "When i t comes, we have to see about i t " , he assured the people of India. In regard to the stationing of Indian detachments at Yantsu, the x u u United Nations, Records of meetings of  General Committee from Sept. 21 to December 5, P. 19. 77 Prime Minister said; "obviously we can be there only with the good w i l l of the people concerned. We are not there i n occupation of any foreign t e r r i t o r y but only i n order to give protection to our trade routes with the consent of the government concerned. If the government concerned made adequate arrangements for the protection of trade routes instead, our protection of the routes does not a r i s e . 101 According to the Moscow Press "the Chinese People's Liberation Army" was i n Gyangtse before the Peking agreement was signed on May 17, 1 9 5 1 . 1 , 1 0 2 On May 17, 1951, Peking radio announced that "peaceful l i b e r a t i o n " of Tibet had been achieved. A 17 point agreement was signed by both p a r t i e s . By t h i s agreement Lhasa accepted the suzerainty of Communist China. Thus the f i v e starred Red Flag of the Chinese People's Republic was planted on the "roof of the world" from where India and Pakistan could be watched. India accepted the new status of 10"} Tibet, "coupled with i n t e r n a l autonomy." J Thus went another Asian state to Communism. This had been foreshadowed for months. Once the Chinese armies began moving i n Lhasa i n October 1950, Government of India, Information Service, March, 1951. 1 0 2 New Times, Moscow, November 26, 1952. 103 The New York Times, June 12, 1951. i t was clear that the Tibetans would not be able to defend themselves. Those mountain people were strong and brave but they were not well-trained and equipped with modern weapons for f i g h t i n g . Moreover the pr i m i t i v e Government was not the kind which would encourage and ins p i r e the p l a i n people to r e s i s t the enemy. The only other hope was a determined opposition from India. During the B r i t i s h r u l e , Tibet was nursed as a buffer state between India, Russia and China. But the Indian Government with Shree Nehru at i t s head, did not look upon Chinese Communism with fear and d i s l i k e . Shree Nehru made i t clear that he would i n s i s t on maintenance of the so-called McMahan Line, f i x i n g India's northwest boundary with Tibet. (Red Chinese maps had been showing the f r o n t i e r at the f o o t h i l l s on the mountains on the Indian s i d e ) . Otherwise, except for some mild protests, New Delhi did not do anything. The r e s u l t was - Tibet behind the A s i a t i c Iron Curtain. The loss of Tibet to Communism, could be considered a defeat for the democratic world. Its chief danger i s that i t brought the Communists r i g h t down on India's border. I t i s quite possible that the Chinese Communists decide to use Tibet as an a i r f i e l d i n case of I n d i a ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the world wide c r i s e s . T i b e t has i t s shortcomings, such as l a c k of g a s o l i n e and road d i f f i c u l t i e s . Never-t h e l e s s these are not such t h a t they cannot be s o l v e d i n t h i s atomic age. Moreover T i b e t can be used as a l a i r f o r espionage and s u b v e r s i o n a g a i n s t I n d i a , Kashmir and Nepal. L a s t but not l e a s t , Communist T i b e t has a p s y c h o l o g i c a l e f f e c t of c o n s i d e r a b l e importance on the I n d i a n masses. F o r a l l these reasons western a n x i e t y over what has happened to T i b e t i s j u s t i f i e d . 80 Chapter IV Relations with Japan As soon as the Second World War ended i n 1945, Japan was occupied by the A l l i e d powers. The Moscow Conference of the Big Foreign Ministers i n December, 1945 set up a Far Eastern Commission (supplanting the Far East Advisory Commission), composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, A u s t r a l i a , France, Holland, Canada, Great B r i t a i n , New Zealand, India and the P h i l i p p i n e s . The functions of the Commission were, described as follows: 1. To formulate the p o l i c i e s , p r i n c i p l e s and standards i n conformity with which the f u l f i l m e n t by Japan of i t s obliga-tions under the terms of surrender may be accomplished; 2. To receive, on the request of any member, any d i r e c t i v e issued to the Supreme Commander f o r the A l l i e d Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving p o l i c y decisions within the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Commission; 3 . To consider such other matters as may be assigned to i t by agreement among the p a r t i c i p a t i n g governments reached i n accordance with the voting procedure £p£ the Commission/ 1°4 1 0 4" Poel i u Dai, "The Far Eastern Commission' and i t s recent development", American Journal of  International Law, 1948, p. 149. 81 At the same conference an Allied Council for Japan was established in Tokyo in which were included the representatives of China, U. S. A., U. S. S. R.,anda representatives for U. K., Australia,-New Zealand and India. Its purpose was to lay down the policies which the Japanese were to follow in f u l f i l l i n g the Terms of Surrender which they had signed. The policy decisions of the Commission were to be passed to the United States Government which was respon-sible for preparing directives- in accordance with these decisions and for transmitting the directives to General Mac-Arthur, the Supreme Commander. The Supreme Commander was the executive authority responsible for the implementation of Far Eastern Commission policy decisions. The Commission's meetings were not open to the public or the Press. Nevertheless, The Secretary General issued two reports (the f i r s t on July 17, 194-7 and the second in December 194-8) which covered the work of the Commission from February 26, 194-6 to December 194-8. The great bulk of the work of the Commission was done in seven committees. The seven committeeJ_s' work was limited to dealing with reparations economic and financial affairs, constitutional and legal reform, strengthening of democratic tendencies, 82 war c r i m i n a l s , a l i e n s i n Japan and disarmament of Japan. 1 0 ^ I n d i a had entered the war a g a i n s t Japan as a B r i t i s h Commonwealth country. There had been a con-s i d e r a b l e resentment at t h a t time, p a r t i c u l a r l y from the I n d i a n N a t i o n a l Congress P a r t y , t h a t the people of I n d i a had not been c o n s u l t e d b e f o r e the d e c l a r a t i o n of war was made. However, I n d i a made a v a l u a b l e con-t r i b u t i o n i n manpower and m a t e r i a l to support the A l l i e d Powers. In d i a n troops had fought i n A f r i c a and Burma. P r o b a b l y t h a t was the reason why I n d i a was r e p r e s e n t e d i n the F a r E a s t e r n Commission and the A l l i e d C o u n c i l f o r Japan. In d i a ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s took a f u l l share i n the work of the F a r E a s t e r n Commission and the A l l i e d C o u n c i l . They d i d so because Ind i a was deeply concerned w i t h the s i t u a t i o n i n the F a r E a s t , p a r t i c u l a r l y , she r e a l i z e d the importance of a p e a c e f u l and democratic Japan. Both the F.E.C. and the A l l i e d C o u n c i l succeeded i n accomplishing the t a s k a s s i g n e d to i t . 105 Department of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , - Ottawa, E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , November 194-8, p. 5» 1 0 6 V. P. Dutt, I n d i a ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 25 . 83 The parliamentary type of government was introduced and elections were held twice i n Japan. With the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty on A p r i l 28, 1952 and the restoration of f u l l sovereignty to Japan, both the A l l i e d Council i n Tokyo and the Far Eastern Commission i n Washington ceased to e x i s t . India started to advocate an early peace treaty with Japan as soon as the s i t u a t i o n i n Japan was described as suitable (General MacArthur's state-ments i n 194-9 that Japan was ready for f u l l independ-ence). India was i n favour of putting as few r e s t r i c t i o n s on Japan as possible i n the peace treaty. At a press conference at India House, London, on November 12, 1949, Shree Nehru answered the questions about how soon a peace treaty would be signed with Japan, as follows: "The sooner i t comes, the better."107 He also emphasized the fact that i t would not be wise to block Japan. However, she should not be allowed to become a m i l i t a r y threat to world peace. The Commonwealth Conference on foreign a f f a i r s which took place i n Colombo (Ceylon) i n January 1950, 1 0 7 v. P. Dutt, India's Foreign P o l i c y , p. 24. 84 also considered the issue of a peace treaty with Japan. This meeting of foreign ministers of the Commonwealth countries was the f i r s t one of th i s kind that had been held. Of course Commonwealth discussions on foreign a f f a i r s had taken place i n the Imperial Conferences, but t h i s was the f i r s t time that a Commonwealth meeting was held which was composed mainly of foreign ministers of the Commonwealth countries and which dealt exclusively with questions of foreign a f f a i r s . I t i s also of great significance to note that i t was the f i r s t time that a conference of Commonwealth ministers was held on the t e r r i t o r y of an Asian member. The reason for that could be found i n the important s i t u a t i o n which was and i s s t i l l taking place i n the Asian countries. During the conference, Prime Minister Nehru made a strong plea f o r a speedy peace treaty with Japan which would allow her to reconstruct her economy and to re b u i l d her p o l i t i c a l self-determination. Shree Nehru, with the agreement of Pakistan and Ceylon, declared that i t was impossible to "keep 8 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 people under m i l i t a r y occupation for ever." Talking about the terms of the treaty he warned of the danger of "driving the Japanese into the arms of Russia." 1 0 8 New York Times, January 12, 1950. 8 5 The r e s u l t was that a l l the representatives of the Commonwealth countries were i n f u l l agreement for a speedy treaty with Japan. I t was decided that the High.Commissioners i n London of the countries repre-sented at Colombo, should meet to discuss the treaty. The Indian Government's attitude towards Japan was further explained by Mr. K. K. Chettur, chief of the Indian Mission to Japan. In a statement to the Press i n Tokyo on March' 13, 1950, he said; "India believes i n getting Japan on i t s feet. I t i s to the interest of us a l l i n Asia to see that Japan again p l e n t i f u l l y supplies t h i s part of the world with goods she manufactured before the war. The Japanese are the only people i n Asia who can do i t . We do not fear Japanese economic aggression. Dumping and other such practices can e a s i l y be countered by countries individually.!' 1 1 0 With those f r i e n d l y verbal expressions, p r a c t i c a l steps were also taken by the Indian Government to create a f r i e n d l y atmosphere with Japan. India agreed to be a party i n the trade agreement between the 1 0 9 Canada, House of Commons Debates, February 22, 1950, pp. 129-135 Cunrevised) 1 1 0 V. P.r Dutt, India's Foreign P o l i c y , p. 25 . 86 the Commonwealth countries and Japan. The trade agreement was signed between representatives of S.C.A.P., (The Supreme Commander, A l l i e d Powers) acting on behalf of occupied Japan and f i v e B r i t i s h Commonwealth countries - A u s t r a l i a , India, New Zealand, South Africa and the U. K., and Colonies (except Hong Kong) on November 8, 1948. This agreement provided for trade exchange to a minimum value of £55,000,000 between the Commonwealth countries and Japan during the year July 1, 1948 -June 3 0 , 1949. According to the agreement the following goods were to be exchanged; cotton t e x t i l e s , i n d u s t r i a l machinery and parts, raw s i l k , r o l l i n g stock, caustic soda and other chemicals, rayon, wool, s i l k manufactures, paper and paper products, and bunker coal. The s t e r l i n g area participants would furnish a wide range of raw materials and other goods and services to an approximate value of £23,000,000 including raw wool, i r o n ore, s a l t , raw cotton, cereal, petroleum, rubber, t i n , jute, o i l -seeds, wool waste, coal, hides and skins, manganese, gums and r a i s i n s and shipping. 1 1 1 Of $94 ,000,000 exported to Japan from the s t e r l i n g area countries, India's share was $ 1 7 , 0 2 5 , 0 0 0 . 1946 Indian Information Services, December 11, 87 Of import from Japan, t o t a l i n g $111,000,000, $28,260,000 was expected to go to India. This meant that the balance of trade was unfavourable to India by $11,245,000 which was covered i n the next agreement signed i n 1949. * This agreement between the Commonwealth countries and Japan was the f i r s t of i t s kind. Never before had such a large and representative part of the s t e r l i n g area, including f i v e Dominions, combined for the purpose of together forming one of the two parties to a trade agreement. A new Trade Agreement was signed by the same Commonwealth countries i n November, 1949 for one more year. I t was announced i n New Delhi i n November 1949 that Indian imports from Japan i n 1949-50 would amount to $23,000,000 including $10,000,000 worth of c a p i t a l goods, such as e l e c t r i c a l machinery,, power plants, telephone cables as wel l as copper, zinc, s t e e l , and some a r t i f i c i a l s i l k yarn. India, on the other hand, would export to Japan iron-ore, p i g - i r o n , mica, manganese ore, hides and skins. I t was also agreed upon that Indian trade export would not only balance her imports but would also cover a gap l e f t over i n Japan's favour from Indo^Japanese trade during ' 88 112 194-8-1949. Similar trade agreements were-signed i n the.coming years between India and Japan. Not only did these trade agreements play an important rol e i n creating good relations between India and Japan, they also proved hel p f u l to reconstruct the economy of both countries. India's need has been to i n d u s t r i a l i s e herself as f a s t as she can. Japan, on the other hand, was and s t i l l i s , i n need of raw material to put l i f e into her war-broken-, economy. Having l o s t Korea and Manchuria after the second World War, the Japanese started to seek raw material and markets i n the South East Asian countries. A Japanese delegation with Mr. H. Watanbe as i t s leader, went to India. I t s mission was to explore the p o s s i b i l i t y of importing more iron-ore from India and i t toured various i r o n mines there. According to Mr. Watanbe, Japan required about 5*500,000 tons of iron ore annually. He expressed the desire that India and Goa (a Portuguese t e r r i t o r y i n India) should j o i n t l y export at least a m i l l i o n tons of ore a year to J a p a n . D e s p i t e the Japanese e f f o r t to increase Japan's foreign trade, i t continued to decline i n 1951 and 1952. However, Japan's H 2 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, December 10-17, 1949, p. 10400. ' I 1 3 Indian League of America, India To-day, June, 1951. 89 export to India increased during this period. Of course Japan's exports to India and other South East Asian countries are at the expense of B r i t i s h markets i n that region. Japan has already replaced B r i t a i n as the leading supplier of t e x t i l e s to Pakistan, and i s also t r y i n g to secure f i r s t place i n the supply of machinery. I t w i l l not be very long before Japan replaces B r i t a i n as the leading supplier, of manufactured goods to India. I t has been noted before that India was advocat-ing an early peace treaty v/ith Japan. However, when the United States was drafting the treaty India did not l i k e the clauses- of i t and refused to be party i n signing the treaty at San Francisco i n September, 1951. To under-stand why India did not sign the Peace Treaty, one has to go a l i t t l e back to see the history of the relations of the A l l i e d Powers over Japan. In July, 1947, the United States suggested that the members of the Far East Commission (representing the States which had been at war with Japan) confer on a Peace treaty. The Soviet Union proposed instead that the Council of Foreign Ministers (made up of the United States, B r i t a i n , France and Russia) draft the treaty. The United States with the support of Great B r i t a i n and France, 90 rejected the Soviet counter proposal. 1 1 4" The rapid deterioration of Russo-American relations aroused suspicions i n Washington and Moscow that each power intended to use Japan to i t s own advantage. This mistrust proved to be a stronger barrier to agreement than perhaps differences over the mechanics of negoti-a t i o n were. This stalemate l e f t the United States i n control of Japan because most of the occupation troops were American and the Supreme Commander of the Occupation was also American, General Douglas MacArthur. The Soviet Union raised the question of Peace for Japan i n the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers i n June, 194-9, i n P a r i s . This proposal was ignored by the United States, B r i t a i n and France. But when the Chinese Communists established t h e i r authority over a l l of the mainland of China, Washington's attitude towards Japan changed to a desire to have some sort of treaty or "mechanism... which permits the Japanese greater freedom - complete freedom i f p o s s i b l e " . 1 1 ^ However, serious negotiations of a Japanese separate peace treaty did not begin u n t i l the Spring of 1951, when Mr. Dulles v i s i t e d Japan, the 114 "U. S. makes Headway on Japanese Peace Treaty", Foreign P o l i c y B u l l e t i n , June 2 2 , 1951. 1 1 5 The Department of the State B u l l e t i n , January 2 3 , 1950. p. 117. 9 1 P h i l i p p i n e s , Australia and New Zealand, B r i t a i n and France. The Korean war divided the former anti-Japanese a l l i e s into two h o s t i l e camps and thus prevented the negotiations of a r e a l treaty of peace. But at the same time i t quickened the United States interest i n the r e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of Japan, by some arrangements which would not only please the Japanese, but also serve the purpose of the United States i n pursuing her p o l i c i e s i n the Far East. The attitude of.Great B r i t a i n was favourable •'to. the separate treaty of peace with Japan. She was anxious, however, that the United States should take the i n i t i a t i v e . " 1 " ^ Great B r i t a i n , l i k e India, also expressed the opinion that .the Chinese Communist Government should be.permitted to sign the treaty. The United States preferred to have the Na t i o n a l i s t Government of China, i n e x i l e on Formosa, sign the treaty. This issue was se t t l e d by Mr. Dulles and the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary,. Herbert Morrison, i n June, 1951. But India stood fi r m . However, Shree Nehru made i t clear that there was no harm i n negotiating b i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s with Japan, provided such a b i l a t e r a l approach would not come i n the way of other countries having t r e a t i e s with an independent Japan. At the same time the Indian Government proposed Great B r i t a i n , House of Commons Debate, June 26, 1950, pp. 2056-2066. 92 three amendments to the treaty. Those amendments were: (1) In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the isl a n d of Formosa be given to China i n future. (2) The clause r e l a t i n g to the stationing of foreign troops (that i s , the United States troops) i n Japan be s t r i c k e n out. (3) The Ryuku and Bonin Islands be returned to Japan. 1 1' 7 India seemed to hold the opinion that removing Formosa from Japanese sovereignty without making provision for i t s future administration would mean the continuation of the is l a n d as a major Asian problem. So the Indian spokesmen wanted to be sure that the treaty should make i t clear that the sovereignty of Formosa would rest with China, i n accordance with the pr i n c i p l e s of the Yalta Agreement. As for the stationing of foreign troops i n Japan, India believed that the c r i t i c i s m would arise that the United States occupation of Japan was being continued under a new guise. However, she did not object to any defense arrangement between Japan and the United States. The incorporation of such an arrangement i n a peace treaty was considered an improper infringement upon the sover-ergnty of Japan. 1 1 7 Government of India ^ Information Services, September 15, 1951. 93 Replying to India's note of August 23, 1951 which contained these proposals, the United States expressed surprise at some of India's arguments and rejected them p o l i t e l y . Prime Minister Nehru, on August 27, 1951, explained to a cheering Indian Parliament that his government rejected the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty because "none of the major suggestions put forward by India was accepted" by the United States. He also asserted that India "has decided that immediately after Japan attains independent status the Government of India w i l l make a declaration terminating the state of war ... and that l a t e r a simple b i l a t e r a l treaty w i l l be neg o t i a t e d . " 1 ^ Not only the Indian Parliament and the Indian National Congress Party supported Nehru's boycott of the San Francisco Conference but the Indian S o c i a l i s t s and other r a d i c a l parties supported him also. The Politburo of the Communist Party of India while i t welcomed Nehru's res o l u t i o n not to sign the United States draft f or peace, condemned his decision not to have India represented at the Japanese Peace Conference.H9 Of course the Indian Communists wanted to see India aligning with Gromyko i n denouncing the proposed treaty. But Shree Nehru was 1 1 8 The New York Times, August 28, 1951. 1 1 9 I b i d , September 4 , 1951. 94 u n w i l l i n g to comfort Ru s s i a by j o i n i n g Gromyko i n con-demning the t r e a t y . However, India's r e b u f f to the U n i t e d S t a t e s gave the communist world f r e s h ammunition f o r propaganda a g a i n s t the democratic world. The Chinese Communists People's China wrote: "The U. S. i s v a i n l y attempting t o s p l i t A s i a on t h i s v i t a l i s s u e ^Japanese Peace T r e a t y / . China stands f o r the i n t e r e s t s of a l l A s i a a g a i n s t t h i s d r a f t t r e a t y f o r war and the e n s l a v e -ment of A s i a . She stands f o r the r e a l peace as proposed by the S o v i e t Union t h a t w i l l b r i n g p r o s p e r i t y and mutual f r i e n d s h i p to a l l A s i a . " 1 2 0 New Times (a weekly j o u r n a l p u b l i s h e d i n Moscow) wrote on September 12, 1951: " I n d i a r e f u s e d to send a d e l e g a t i o n to San F r a n c i s c o , d e c l a r i n g t h a t the Anglo-American d r a f t i s unacceptable. P u b l i c o p i n i o n in" I n d i a , as i n other c o u n t r i e s , i s r e a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n p r e s e r v i n g peace i n the F a r E a s t and i s s e r i o u s l y alarmed by the American m i l i t a r y adventures which are t h r e a t e n i n g to engulf the whole of A s i a In war." 1 2 1 I f the K r e m l i n used I n d i a ' s b o y c o t t of the San F r a n c i s c o Conference f o r propaganda a g a i n s t Western Powers, the American Press c r i t i c i z e d P a n d i t Nehru's stand s t r o n g l y . The American c r i t i c s f a i l e d t o see t h a t I n d i a ' s r e j e c t i o n of the Peace T r e a t y was not a u t o m a t i c a l l y People's China, Peking, September 1951? p. 7» 1 2 1 New Times, Moscow, September 12, 1951. 95 an Indian gesture of friendship to the Soviets. The  New York Times commented on Nehru's att i t u d e ; "Instead of seizing the leadership of Asia for i t s good, Nehru turned aside from the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , proclaiming India's disinterestedness...." The paper c a l l e d India's objections to the treaty as "misguided reasons for staying away from San Francisco," and complained that Nehru's statesmanship i s not i n s p i r i n g people and nations to do things but only to leave them undone. How the mighty have f a l l e n ! " 1 2 2 The Japanese Peace Treaty came o f f i c i a l l y into force on A p r i l 28, 1952 on which date, as required under A r t i c l e 23 of the Treaty, instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n had been deposited i n Washington by the U. S. and Japanese Governments and by a majority of 13 other countries s p e c i f i e d i n the treaty. India, although not a signatory to the San Francisco Treaty terminated the state of war with Japan on the same day. I t was also announced by the Government of India on A p r i l 28 that India would propose to conclude a separate peace treaty with Japan soon. In the meantime the head of .the Indian mission i n Tokyo (Mr. K. K. Chattur) would act under the status of Ambassador and the representative of Japan would have The New York Times, August 28, 1951. 96 s i m i l a r status i n New D e l h i . 1 2 3 The conclusion of the separate Peace Treaty was not delayed very long. I t was signed on June 9 > 1952 i n Tokyo by Foreign Minister Katsuo Okazaki and Indian Ambassador K. K. Chattur. The document o f f i c i a l l y ended World War I I h o s t i l i t i e s between the two nations and l e f t the Soviet Union as the only major belligerent s t i l l l e g a l l y at war with Japan. The preamble of the Indo-Japanese Treaty pro-vided that both nations would seek "maintenance of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and security i n conformity with the p r i n c i p l e s of the Charter of the United Nations." The two countries agreed to the "Most Favoured Nations" treatment with respect to a i r - t r a f f i c rights and p r i v -ileges - that they would grant to each country the rights and p r i v i l e g e s accorded to a l l other nations. India stated that she would "return or restore, i n th e i r present form, a l l property, tangible or intangible, and rights and interests of Japan or i t s nationals" within India at the time war started and now under control of the Indian Government. Japan agreed to return s i m i l a r property, rights and interests i n Japan of India and i t s nationals" which were within Japan, at anytime between the 7 t h The Oversea Hindustan Times, May 8 , 1 9 5 2 . 97 December, 1941 and the 2nd September, 1945, unless the owner has f r e e l y disposed thereof without duress or fraud." India would "waive a l l claims of India and Indian nationals a r i s i n g out of action taken by Japan and i t s nationals i n the course of the prosecution of the war as also claims of India a r i s i n g from the f a c t that i t p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the occupation of Japan." t The treaty came into force on August 26, 1952 when the Indian Government r a t i f i e d i t . The conclusion of the Indo-Japanese treaty i s s i g n i f i c a n t from the point of view that i t could develop a future balance of power i n Asia to neutralize possible Chinese Communist expansion. A strong, independent Japan can serve as a check on pres-sure from Peking against the countries of South East Asia. As Chinese i n t e r e s t grew i n South East Asia, i t came nearer to threatening India's interests i n this area. The main interests of.India i n this area are to keep South East Asian countries free,- stable buffers against Communist penetration i n the Far East, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . International M i l i t a r y Tribunal For the Far East. The Tribunal to t r y the Major War Criminals i n the Far East was established by a Special Proclamation of Keesing's Contemporary Archives, July 19-26, 1952,. p. 12353. 98 General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers which was signed on January 19, 1946. The Pro-clamation l a i d down the task of the Tribunal as follows: "There shall be established an International Military Tribunal for the Far East for the t r i a l of those persons charged individually, or as members of organizations, or both capacities, with offences which include crimes against peace." 1 2 5 The Tribunal was to consist of not less than six members and not more than eleven, appointed by the Supreme Commander from the names submitted by the Signatories of The Instrument of Surrender, India and Philippines. The President of the Tribunal was to be appointed by the Supreme Commander who consequently appointed Sir William Webb of Australia. The other countries represented on the Tribunal were; Canada, China, Great Britain, The Netherlands, The Soviet Union, The United States, 'France, India and The Philippine Islands. India was represented by f tJustice Rabha Binod Pal. The Tribunal began hearings on May 3 , 1946 and delivered its f i n a l verdict against 28 accused Japanese war criminals in November 1948. During the two years t r i a l of these accused, the Tribunal admitted 4,336 exhibits and 779 depositions in evidence and heard 419 1 2 5 The United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and  Development of Laws of War. (London: H.M.S.O.; 1948), p. 460. ~ 99 witnesses t e s t i f y i n C o u r t . 1 2 ^ In the f i n a l v e r d i c t , 17 were given l i f e imprisonment and 7 were to be hanged. Justice R. B. P a l of India desagreed e n t i r e l y with the' other judges of the Tribunal. (The Judges of Netherlands and France dissented partly.) He gave his opinion i n a 240,000 word thesis i n which he blamed Australia for contributing to Japan's psychological preparation for war by blocking the League of Nations 127 discussion of the r a c i a l question. Moreover he said that a l l the criminals should have been acquitted and pleaded that the world needs "generous magnanimity and understanding charity." 128 Although this dissenting opinion of the Indian judge did not affect the f i n a l decision of the Court, " i t weakened the strength of the indictment greatly".^ 2 9 Moreover, i t may have drawn some sympathy from those Japanese who worshipped Tojo and Co., as t h e i r heroes. 1 2 ^ "International M i l i t a r y Tribunal For the Far East," International Organization,1949, Vol. I l l , p. 184. 1 2 7 I b i d , p. 186. 1 2 8 Vancouver Sun, November 12, 1948. 1 29 Newsweek, November 22, 1948, p. 3 6 . 100 Question of Japanese War Prisoners i n the U. N. In the United Nations this question of Japanese war prisoners was brought up before the General Assembly by A u s t r a l i a , The United Kingdom and The United States. These three nations, i n a j o i n t communication asked the General Assembly that i t consider the " f a i l u r e of the U. S. S. R. to repatriate or otherwise account for prisoners of war detained In Soviet t e r r i t o r y " . 1 ^ 0 Demands for r e p a t r i a t i o n of remaining war prisoners had been pressed repeatedly by the western powers. Under the terms of the four Powers agreement the l a s t of the war prisoners were to have been sent home before January 1, 194-9. In the middle of 1950, exchanges with the Soviet Government over the r e p a t r i a t i o n question had grown increasingly b i t t e r . According to Western estimates, 400 ,000 German prisoners and between 300,000 and 400 ,000 Japanese prisoners had not been accounted for by Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s . In January, 1950, the Soviet member of the A l l i e d Council for Japan walked out of a session i n Tokyo when the Council i n s i s t e d on continuing i t s investigation into the whereabouts of Japanese prisoners. Moscow, on • the other hand contended that the r e p a t r i a t i o n programs ! 3 0 United Nations, Agenda Item, 67 . 101 had been completed. The U. S. S. R. objected to the Assembly's handling of this question since i t contended that A r t i c l e 107 of the Charter excluded t h i s matter from the duties of the United Nations. The f u l l debate over t h i s issue took place i n the Third Committee of the General Assembly. The j o i n t r e s o l u t i o n of A u s t r a l i a , The United Kingdom and the United States demanded that the Secretary General should e s t a b l i s h an 'ad hoc' Commission composed of three q u a l i f i e d and impartial persons. The representative of India, Mrs. Menon, agreed with the Western powers f n t h e i r demand for the repat-r i a t i o n of Japanese and German prisoners from the Soviet Union. However, she did not accept the figures of prisoners of war submitted by these countries. She also expressed her doubt about the entry of the proposed Commission into Soviet t e r r i t o r y for i n v e s t i g a t i o n . " ^ l Nevertheless, the representative of India and the representative of Iraq j o i n t l y proposed the following amendment to the draft r e s o l u t i o n by three countries. The Secretary General "requests the International Red Cross to estab l i s h a Commission composed of q u a l i f i e d i m p a r t i a l observers with a view to s e t t l i n g amicably 1 3 1 United Nations, Third Committee 1950 p. 4 3 8 . 102 the problem of p r i s o n e r s of war...." ^32 when t h i s amendment was brought to the a t t e n t i o n of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Red Cross, i t r e p l i e d t h a t i t could o n l y a c t i f a l l Governments agreed to the Assembly r e s o l u t i o n . However, the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of I n d i a and I r a q i n s i s t e d upon i n c o r p o r a t i o n of t h e i r amendment which was r e j e c t e d by the Committee. Seeing t h i s the I n d i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a b s t a i n e d from v o t i n g . The reason t h a t the I n d i a n delegate d i d not vote f o r the r e s o l u t i o n seemed to be that s i n c e the Red Cross.-which c o u l d o n l y guarantee a humanitarian approach, would not appoint the observers to i n v e s t i g a t e the problem, the e n t i r e matter would remain i n the realm of p o l i t i c s . I t would not accomplish anything except i n c r e a s e the t e n s i o n between the two groups. Anyhow, the r e s o l u t i o n was passed i n the T h i r d Committee as w e l l as i n the G e n e r a l Assembly. I t remained to be seen whether i t would be a b l e to accomplish i t s work or not. X 1 3 2 U n i t e d Nations, Agenda Item 67, p. 14-. 1Q3 Chapter V Approach t o the Korean Problem. "The i s s u e now i s whether an a g g r e s s i v e e x p e d i t i o n i n order t o remove the borders w i l l produce a world c o n f l a g r a t i o n or not. I f i t i s l i k e l y t o produce a c o n f l a g r a t i o n what i s the duty of I n d i a i n t h a t case? T h i s i s the approach which I would l i k e t o make. I f Ind i a stands f o r a s t a t e s -manly a c t i o n i n the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l and f u r t h e r c o n s e r v a t i o n and s t r e n g t h -ening of the a u t h o r i t y of U. N. without unduly attempting t o s t r a n g l e the s o v e r e i g n t y of i n d i v i d u a l n a t i o n s t h a t compose i t , then we can see the l o g i c behind Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru's p o l i c y and the a c t i o n s taken t h e r e a f t e r . Are we to support and st r e n g t h e n the U. N. or not? I have no doubt i n my mind t h a t t h e r e i s no hope f o r any n a t i o n i n Asia unless we s t r e n g t h e n the f o r c e s t h a t stand f o r peace." 133 Unfortunate Korea, s e t by geography i n a s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n among China, Japan and R u s s i a , had been a bone of c o n t e n t i o n among these c o u n t r i e s from 1890 to 1910. The " R i s i n g Sun" changed her p o s i t i o n i n 1910 by annexing her. Japan used Korea as a base t o support her f o r c e s i n Manchuria i n 1931 and a g a i n s t China i n 1937. Meanwhile a l l the e f f o r t s of the Korean people f o r independence were suppressed by Japanese !33 Mr. C. R a j a g o p a l a s h e r i , former Governor-General of I n d i a , on Ind i a ' s p o l i c y towards Korea. Quoted by C. Kondapi i n " I n d i a n Opinion of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organization,November, 1951? p .717-104 imperialism for the maintenance of "peace" in the Far East. During World War Two, Korean independence was discussed by the. Allied leaders at the Cairo Conference in November 194-3. Independence was promised and later at Yalta, in February 194-5 where the principle of trustee-ship was discussed. After the war, the United States and the U.S.S.R. could not reach any agreement on the Korean problem. In this stalemate the United Nations succeeded in August 194-8, through i t s commission, in forming the Republic of Korea in the area South of the 38th P a r a l l e l . ^ This government under Syngman Rhee as President, was recog-nized by the United Nations. A Democratic People's Republic was formed in the north, in September 194-8, with Kim Ilsung, Korean Communist, as Premier. This government was recognized by the U.S.S.R. Thus Korea was divided into two regimes, each claiming jurisdiction over the whole territory. However, the United Nations continued to attempt to reunite north and south Korea under a single government. For this purpose the United Nations Commission on Korea had been set up in 194-8. The Commission sought without success to effect a unification by diplomatic means. Meanwhile the relations between north and south 134- j p o r f u n account of Korean issue see Chapter IL 105 Korea had deteriorated. According to the cablegram of June 26, 1950, of the United Nations Commission to the Secretary General the s i t u a t i o n was going from bad to worse. The cablegram stated; "for the past two years the North Korean regime has by v i o l e n t l y abusive pro-paganda, threatening gestures along the 38th P a r a l l e l and by encouraging and supporting subversive a c t i v i t i e s i n the t e r r i t o r y of the Republic of Korea, pursued t a c t i c s designed to weaken and destroy the Government of the Republic of Korea..." 135 Thus, the r i s i n g antagonism between the Korean regimes, each supported by an opposing great Power, l e f t l i t t l e hope for progress tovrards unity through negotiations. Thus the dynamic s i t u a t i o n was created which exploded with the attack of North Koreans on the Republic on June 25, 1950. An emergency meeting of the Security Council was 1^6 c a l l e d on June 25, 1950, at the United States request. J On the same day, the Security Council received, through the Secretary General, a cable from the Commission i n Korea confirming reports of the attack. The Secretary General, addressing the Security Council, declared that the attack on the Korean Republic was "a v i o l a t i o n of the 1 3 5 United Nations, Document, S/1505/Rev. 1. 136 United Nations, Document, S / 1 4 9 5 . 106 p r i n c i p l e s of the Charter" and "a threat to i n t e r -national peace." ^37 The Security Council acted quickly i n the absence of the Soviet Union whose representative, i f present, probably would have delayed the progress. The Council adopted the United States r e s o l u t i o n by a vole of 9 to 0 with Yugoslavia abstaining. The Security Council declared that a breach of the peace existed and c a l l e d f o r a cease-fire and withdrawal of northern troops. It also c a l l e d upon United Nations members to r e f r a i n from a s s i s t i n g the invading forces. The representative of India voted f o r the res o l u t i o n . The second basic r e s o l u t i o n was passed by the Security Council on June 27. The Soviet Union was again absent. This r e s o l u t i o n c a l l e d upon member states to furn i s h assistance, including armed forces, to repel the attack and restore peace. The resolution was passed by a vote of 7 to 1 with Yugoslavia opposed. India and Egypt abstained from voting because of lack of instructions from t h e i r respective governments. On June 29, however, a cablegram was received by the General Secretary from Prime Minister Nehru i n which he had stated that "the Government of India has given the most ca r e f u l consideration to this ^37 Security Council, O f f i c i a l records, June 25, 1950. r e s o l u t i o n of the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l i n the context of the events i n Korea and a l s o of the g e n e r a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y of the Government of I n d i a . I t i s opposed to any attempt t o s e t t l e I n t e r -n a t i o n a l disputes by r e s o r t to a g g r e s s i o n ... t h e r e f o r e ... accepts the second o r e s o l u t i o n of the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . " 1 3 ° Before sending t h i s cablegram the Prime M i n i s t e r had c o n s u l t e d h i s Ca b i n e t . I t i s q u i t e understandable why the I n d i a n Government was so much concerned. I n d i a , next t o China, was nea r e s t to the scene of c o n f l i c t an'd the Government had to weigh w i t h s p e c i a l care, the con-sequences of any such a c t i o n . The a c t i o n taken by the Government, was approved unanimously by the I n d i a n P a r l i a m e n t . 1 ^ Although In d i a supported both the r e s o l u t i o n s of June 2 5 and 2 7 , she c o u l d not f u r n i s h much m a t e r i a l help t o the Un i t e d Nations f o r c e s i n Korea. The reason f o r t h i s was t h a t the I n d i a n economy was not stro n g enough to bear any e x t r a burden. As f a r as m i l i t a r y support was concerned, I n d i a , a c c o r d i n g to her l e a d e r s , c o u l d not a f f o r d t o share such a burden because of t h e , d i s p u t e with P a k i s t a n over Kashmir. S i r B. N. Rau put i t t h i s way: "The t r u t h i s t h a t the whole s t r u c t u r e and o r g a n i z a t i o n 1 3 8 U n i t e d Nations, Document, 5 / 1 5 2 0 . 1 3 9 . G e n e r a l Assembly, O f f i c i a l Records, F i f t h  S e s s i o n , 1 9 5 0 . p. 1 3 3 . 108 of our armed f o r c e s are designed f o r home defence, and our i n t e r n a l needs at p r e s e n t are such t h a t we cannot a f f o r d to send any of these f o r c e s to remote areas out of I n d i a . " 1 4 0 But t h a t d i d not seem to be the o n l y reason. S h i r e e .Nehru gave the f o l l o w i n g reason to the I n d i a n P a r l i a m e n t ; " I n d i a c o u l d have sent a token f o r c e t o Korea but d i d not do so because other matters were connected w i t h Korea and such a gesture might embarrass I n d i a and other p a r t i e s i n the case of f u r t h e r development i n a p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n . " 141 T h i s l a t t e r reason g i v e n by the Prime M i n i s t e r seems to have more t r u t h than the former one. N e v e r t h e l e s s , I n d i a o f f e r e d an ambulance and a s u r g i c a l u n i t f o r Korea. India's moral support was i n v a l u a b l e a t t h a t time, i n view of the f a c t t h a t I n d i a had been p u r s u i n g an independent l i n e i n world p o l i t i c s and c o u l d h a r d l y be accused of a c t i n g under any k i n d of p r e s s u r e from gr e a t powers. The second phase of the c o n f l i c t emerged w i t h the d e c i s i o n of the S o v i e t delegate to r e t u r n to the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l and to assume the p r e s i d e n c y f o r the month of August. The S o v i e t d e l e g a t e condemned the 1 4 0 S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , O f f i c i a l Records, J u l y 28, 1950. 1 4 1 Times of I n d i a , August 7, 1950. 109 J u n e r e s o l u t i o n s o f t h e C o u n c i l a n d c h a r g e d t h a t t h e R e p u b l i c o f K o r e a c o m m i t t e d t h e f i r s t a g g r e s s i o n i n K o r e a . He f u r t h e r d e c l a r e d , a l t h o u g h somewhat c o n t r a -d i c t o r i l y , t h a t t h e K o r e a n a f f a i r was a c i v i l w a r . He a l l e g e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was i n t e r e s t e d i n m a k i n g K o r e a a n A m e r i c a n c o l o n y a n d a m i l i t a r y b a s e . R e t u r n i n g t h e c h a r g e s t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m w a r n e d t h a t " . . . t h e d a r k f o r c e s o f c o m m u n i s t i m p e r i a l i s m a r e now c l e a r l y c o n c e n t r a t i n g f o r t h e k i l l . " 14-2 T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d e l e g a t e d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n was u s i n g " b i g l i e t a c t i c s " . T h e r e s u l t o f s u c h a n u n p l e a s a n t d i s c u s s i o n was t h a t t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l c o u l d n o t t a k e a n y s u b s t a n t i a l a c t i o n i n K o r e a i n t h e month o f A u g u s t . H o w e v e r , i t p l a c e d on i t s a g e n d a two c h a r g e s f r o m P e k i n g w h i c h f o r e s h a d o w e d f u t u r e d i f f i c u l t i e s . T h e f i r s t c h a r g e was t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d p l a c e d i t s s e v e n t h f l e e t a r o u n d F o r m o s a a n d t h e s .econd c h a r g e was t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r c e s e n g a g e d i n K o r e a h a d m a c h i n e - g u n n e d a n d bombed t h e t e r r i t o r y o f C h i n a . I n S e p t e m b e r , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t r o d u c e d a r e s o l u t i o n f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a C o m m i s s i o n t o i n v e s t i g a t e C o m m u n i s t C h i n a ' s c h a r g e s . S h e a l s o s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e C o m m i s s i o n s h o u l d be c o m p o s e d o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f I n d i a a n d S w e d e n . T h e r e a s o n t h a t t h e s e two c o u n t r i e s w e r e m e n t i o n e d was t h a t t h e y m a i n t a i n e d 1 4 2 S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , O f f i c i a l R e c o r d s , A u g u s t 1950, N o . 28 . p . 9 . 110 d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s at Peking. The r e s o l u t i o n was vetoed by the S o v i e t Union. However, the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l decided to i n v i t e the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Government of Red China to take p a r t i n the d i s c u s s i o n on the matter. Mr. Wu Hsiuchuan, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of Communist China, took h i s seat i n the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l on November 28, 1950. A f t e r a long speech, Wu introduced a r e s o l u t i o n in which he.charged that the United States had committed ah aggression a g a i n s t the Chinese people by "... occupation of Taiwan /Formosa/ by the armed fo r c e s of the Government of the United States of America...." He demanded "the complete withdrawal by the Government of the United States 143 of America of i t s f o r c e s of armed aggression from Taiwan. The r e s o l u t i o n was r e j e c t e d . The Indian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the v o t i n g because of l a c k of i n s t r u c t i o n s from h i s Government. The s i t u a t i o n i n Korea i n e a r l y September 1950, continued to be unfavourable to the United Nations. The Republic of Korea forces and United Nations troops were s t i l l r e t r e a t i n g i n South Korea. I t was not c l e a r whether or not the United Nations forces would hold the Pusan beachhead. In view of such a gloomy s i t u a t i o n , the United States introduced a r e s o l u t i o n asking the C o u n c i l 1 4 3 S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , O f f i c i a l Records, December 3 0 , 1950. I l l to condemn the North Koreans for continuing the aggression, but the Soviet Union vetoed this resolution on September 6, 1950 and countered with a proposal for an immediate cease f i r e and withdrawal of foreign troops. This proposal was rejected by the other members of the Security Council. In the meantime, the situation in Korea improved as the United Nations forces made a landing at Inchon in mid-September and drove the aggressors across the 3 8 t h Parallel. On October 1, 1950, General MacArthur called upon the North Koreans to surrender. One of the aspects of Indian Policy towards the Korean situation was that North Korea had committed aggression. Thus India supported the Security Council resolutions. From that time on India's spokesmen were interested in seeing some kind of peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict. Such a policy had been outlined by the Prime Minister, in the course of the debate in the Indian Parliament. "Our policy is f i r s t , of course, that aggression has taken place by North Korea over South Korea. That is a wrong act, that has to be condemned, that has to be resisted. Secondly, that so far as possible the war should not be spread beyond Korea. And thirdly that we should explore means of ending this war. The future of Korea must be decided entirely 112 by the Koreans themselves." 1 4 4 Immediately a f t e r the outbreak of war i n Korea, India again began to advocate the admission of Communist China to the United Nations 1 4!? and the return of the Soviet Union to the Security C o u n c i l * 1 4 ^ It was necessary, as India saw i t , f o r peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. As soon as the Soviet Union returned to the Security Council i n August 1950, the Indian delegate introduced a proposal that the Council should appoint a committee consisting of i t s non-permanent members to study a l l draft resolutions (The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. had already presented t h e i r draft resolutions) and proposals. After examining them the committee should submit i t s 1 4 7 recommendations for peaceful settlement to the Council. ' The Indian delegate suggested a committee of non-permanent members because they could not be accused of any expan-s i o n i s t ambitions. These suggestions were not given /in. s u f f i c i e n t support by the other members, and Sir,Rau did 1 4 4 Quoted by S i r B.N. Rau i n Plenary meetings of the General Assembly, 1950, p. 133* 1 4 5 Nehru's appeal of July 13, 1950 to s e t t l e Korean problem by admitting Communist China to U.N. was rejected by the United States. The Department of State  Bullete-n, July 31 , 1950. 1 4 ^ On July 13, Nehru's personal message to S t a l i n suggesting that the U.S.S.R. should return to the Security Council. Keesing's Contemporary Archives,July 15-22, 1950. p. 1084-7. ^ 147.Security Council, O f f i c i a l Records,No.29, August 14, 1950. 113 not p r e s e n t the d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n . .Had these p r o p o s a l s been adopted, the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l would have avoided acrimony and saved time. Some u s e f u l r e s u l t s a l s o c o u l d have been ob t a i n e d . S i n c e nothing was accomplished i n the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l and a p o l i t i c a l stalemate p r e v a i l e d , i t was c l e a r t h a t o n l y the General Assembly c o u l d o f f e r some c o n s t r u c t i v e a c t i o n . Under A r t i c l e 12 of the Charter, the General Assembly can make recommendations on the b a s i s of l o n g -term p o l i t i c a l s e ttlement, although i t cannot do so when a matter i s being considered "by the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . I t was q u i t e e v i d e n t t h a t the C o u n c i l was blocked, so the " U n i t i n g f o r Peace" r e s o l u t i o n was presented i n the G e n e r a l Assembly by the Western powers. T h i s r e s o l u t i o n was adopted by the Assembly on November 3? 1950. Under the p r o v i s i o n of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n , the General Assembly can take a c t i o n s ,on the non-procedural matters which were under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l b e f o r e . Although I n d i a had supported the U. N. stand i n Korea, f o r some reasons she d i d not support t h i s r e s o l u t i o n and a b s t a i n e d on the f i n a l vote on i t . In October 1950, the U n i t e d Nations f o r c e s stand-i n g on the 38th P a r a l l e l were w a i t i n g f o r a s i g n a l t o t o cross i t . T h i s s i g n a l came on October 7th w i t h the 114 adoption of the resolution sponsored by 9 Powers, Austr a l i a , B r a z i l , Cuba, The Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, The Philippines and the United Kingdom. This r e s o l u t i o n stated that "(a) a l l appropriate steps be taken to. ensure conditions of s t a b i l i t y throughout Korea." "(b) that a l l constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a un i f i e d , independent and democratic government i n the Sovereign State of Korea." "(c) That a l l sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be in v i t e d to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations i n the res t o r a t i o n of peace, i n the holding of elections and i n the establishment of u n i f i e d government...." The debate which took place on this r e s o l u t i o n was p o l i t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . I t r e c a l l e d a d i v i s i o n of opinion among the non-Soviet states. Although the majority of the states was prepared to agree to solve the Korean problem i n l i n e with the terms of the resolution, India and other states opposed i t and showed the i r desire f o r peaceful settlement at this time. United Nations, Document No. A/C1/558. 115 The delegate of I n d i a argued t h a t i f recommend-a t i o n s (a) and (b) were adopted by the General Assembly, i t might prolong North Korea's r e s i s t a n c e and even extend the area of c o n f l i c t . He proposed, a t the same time, t h a t the General Assembly should^ c a l l upon the North Korean f o r c e s to cease h o s t i l i t i e s , by a s p e c i f i c date. I f they d i d so, the U n i t e d Nations c o u l d go on to implement i t s o b j e c t i v e s , namely, the c r e a t i o n of an independent and u n i t e d Korea by means of f r e e e l e c t i o n s and the economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the country. But i f the North Koreans d i d not comply with the c a l l "we c o u l d review the s i t u a t i o n and decide upon some other c o urse." 1 49 What I n d i a d e s i r e d a t t h i s time was t h a t b e f o r e the U n i t e d Nations f o r c e s c r o s s e d the P a r a l l e l , the North Koreans be g i v e n a chance to t h i n k a f r e s h about peace a t the time of t h e i r adverse m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n . But the G e n e r a l Assembly d i d not pay any a t t e n t i o n to the I n d i a n P r o p o s a l s .-^O I n d i a , then, a b s t a i n e d from v o t i n g on the U n i t e d Nations, P l e n a r y Meetings of the  G e n e r a l Assembly, 1950. p. 231. 15° Speaking a t Toronto on A p r i l 24 and 25, 1951, S i r Benegal Rau gave the f o l l o w i n g reason f o r the d e f e a t of the I n d i a n p r o p o s a l ; "... the d e f e a t of t h i s motion... was the r e s u l t of a c r u c i a l m i s c a l c u l a t i o n . . . Many more d e l e g a t i o n s would have supported the p r o p o s a l had they not been under the impression t h a t the t h r e a t of Chinese i n t e r v e n t i o n was mere b l u f f and t h a t the u n i f i c a t i o n of the whole of Korea by m i l i t a r y a c t i o n was i n near prospect." S i r Benegal Rau, I n d i a and the F a r East, Burwash Memorial L e c t u r e s , A p r i l 24 and 25, 1951. (Toronto: V i c t o r i a U n i v e r s i t y , 1 9 5 D . 116 nine power r e s o l u t i o n which was adopted by a b i g m a j o r i t y . Shiree Nehru t o l d a press conference on October 18, "we f e l t t h a t the time had come f o r an e f f o r t to be made f o r a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n ... to cross the 38th P a r a l l e l without making such an e f f o r t ... appeared to us to be wrong and to i n v o l v e grave r i s k s of a c o n f l i c t on a much wider s c a l e . " 151 The Prime M i n i s t e r kept h i m s e l f informed about the i n t e n t i o n s of the Chinese Communists through Sardar K. M. Panikkar, Ambassador of In d i a i n Peking. Mr. Panikkar informed the Prime M i n i s t e r that the Chinese Communist Government would take d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n i f the U n i t e d Nations f o r c e s passed the P a r a l l e l . T h i s warning was r e l a y e d immediately to the S t a t e Department i n W a s h i n g t o n . 1 ^ T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n was ignored by Washington. Instead some American papers c a l l e d Panikkar a "Red sympathizer" and c r i t i c i s e d S h i r e e Nehru and the I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n a t the U n i t e d Nations . 1 5 3 i t should be mentioned t h a t Panikkar i n f a c t i s more c o n s e r v a t i v e than Nehru h i m s e l f . Most of h i s ca r e e r was spent i n the s e r v i c e of Maharajas. He worked f o r the Maharaja of Kashmir, was S e c r e t a r y to Maharaja P a t i a l a and became 151 Quoted i n E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , A p r i l 1951, p.122. 1 5 2 V i n c e n t Sheean, "The Case f o r I n d i a , " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , October 1951, pp. 81-82. 153 U. S. News"and World Report, January 26 and F e b r u a r y 6, 1951. New York Times, October 23, 1950. 117 s u c c e s s i v e l y , F o r e i g n and P o l i t i c a l M i n i s t e r , Education, H e a l t h M i n i s t e r and Prime M i n i s t e r of Bikamer S t a t e . Although he j o i n e d the Gandhi movement one time, he, u n l i k e Nehru or other n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s , spent no time i n j a i l . The 3 8 t h P a r a l l e l was c r o s s e d and S h i r e e Nehru had no t h i n g to say except t h a t "the m i l i t a r y mind has taken over." A f t e r the c r o s s i n g , the Chinese Communists r e p e a t e d l y p r o t e s t e d to the U n i t e d Nations t h a t the American f o r c e s were i n v a d i n g the t e r r i t o r i a l a i r of China and demanded t h e i r withdrawal. But the United Nations f o r c e s drove towards the Manchurian and the U.S.S.R. borders i n order to c l e a r the P e n i n s u l a of h o s t i l i t i e s . 1 5 5 By l a t e November, U n i t e d S t a t e s Marines succeeded i n . e s t a b l i s h i n g a f o o t h o l d a t one p l a c e on the Manchurian border. The " v o l u n t e e r s " of Communist China came i n t o a c t i o n on November 2, 1951 and the U n i t e d Nations f o r c e s were d r i v e n .into wholesale r e t r e a t . General MacArthur d e c l a r e d t h a t "a wholly new war s i t u a t i o n p r e v a i l e d w i t h enemy f o r c e s of 200,000 men i n c l u d i n g a 154 Sheean, "The Case f o r I n d i a , " F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s , October, 1951, p. 8 2 . 155 New York Times, May 26, 1951. Testimony of G e n e r a l J . Lawtpn C o l l i n s b e f o r e Senate Armed S e r v i c e s and F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committees. 118 major segment of China Communist armies." 1^ 6-T h i s new s i t u a t i o n i n Korea caused wide spread pessimism i n many q u a r t e r s . General MacArthur's hand l i n g of m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s produced c r i t i c i s m , not o n l y i n Europe and A s i a , but d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n were a l s o q u i t e apparent i n Washington. Some of the members of the Un i t e d Nations f e a r e d t h a t Chinese i n t e r v e n t i o n would mean d i s a s t r o u s e x t e n s i o n of the c o n f l i c t . T h i s f e a r was i n t e n s i f i e d by the d e c l a r a t i o n of P r e s i d e n t Truman t h a t the Un i t e d S t a t e s would use the Atomic Bomb, which l e d to the hast y v i s i t of Mr. A t t l e e , then Prime M i n i s t e r of the Un i t e d Kingdom, to Washington. The members of the I n d i a n P a r l i a m e n t and the In d i a n Press unanimously c r i t i c i s e d Truman's d e c l a r a t i o n . ^ 5 7 At Lake Success, Canada and the A s i a n S t a t e s became a c t i v e i n attempting to s e t t l e the Korean problem by p e a c e f u l means. Mr. L e s t e r B. Pearson, Canadian M i n i s t e r f o r E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , came out i n favour of broad peace n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the Chinese Communists. On the same day, on December 5, 1950, U n i t e d Nations r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h i r t e e n c o u n t r i e s gathered a t S i r 3 0 New York Times. November 29, 1950. 157 New York Times, December 3» 1950. 119 B . N . R a u ' s F i f t h Avenue a p a r t m e n t t o view the s i t u a t i o n . T h i s was t h e f i r s t t i m e t h a t I n d i a assumed the l e a d e r s h i p of A s i a n and m i d d l e e a s t e r n s t a t e s i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s w h i c h was t o o c c u r many t imes i n f u t u r e . These t h i r t e e n n a t i o n s under t h e s p o n s o r s h i p of R a u , i s s u e d a n a p p e a l t o Communist C h i n a and N o r t h Korea t o i s s u e a n immediate s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e i r f o r c e s would n o t c r o s s t h e 3 8 t h P a r a l l e l . These t h i r t e e n n a t i o n s - A f g h a n i s t a n , Burma, E g y p t , I n d i a , I n d o n e s i a , I r a n , I r a q , L e b a n o n , P a k i s t a n , The P h i l i p p i n e s , S a u d i A r a b i a , S y r i a and Yemen - f u r t h e r a p p e a l e d t h a t " s u c h a d e c l a r a t i o n w i l l g i v e t i m e f o r . c o n s i d e r i n g what f u r t h e r s t e p s a r e n e c e s s a r y t o r e s o l v e t h e c o n f l i c t i n t h e F a r E a s t and thus h e l p t o a v e r t t h e danger of a n o t h e r w o r l d w a r . " S i x days l a t e r , t h e I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n i n t r o d u c e d a r e s o l u t i o n , on b e h a l f of the same t h i r t e e n c o u n t r i e s , f o r a c e a s e - f i r e . S i r B . N. Rau a l s o s u g g e s t e d t h a t the P r e s i d e n t of t h e G e n e r a l Assembly s h o u l d a p p o i n t a Committee of t h r e e p e r s o n s , t o d e t e r m i n e the b a s i s on w h i c h a s a t i s f a c t o r y c e a s e - f i r e i n Korea c o u l d be a r r a n g e d , T h i s r e s o l u t i o n was p a s s e d by t h e F i r s t Committee o f the G e n e r a l Assembly and t h e P r e s i d e n t named M r . L . B . P e a r s o n (Canada) and S i r B . N . Rau ( I n d i a ) t o t h i s C o m m i t t e e . The t h i r d member was the P r e s i d e n t h i m s e l f . 158 New Y o r k T i m e s , December 6, 1950. 120 I t should be noted, t h a t i n January 1951 the Commonwealth Prime M i n i s t e r s were d i s c u s s i n g the F a r 1^9 E a s t e r n A f f a i r s i n London. J During t h i s p e r i o d they were i n constant touch w i t h t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a t Lake Success, among whom were S i r Senegal Rau and Mr. Pearson of the U. N. Truce Committee. On January 11th, I t was r e p o r t e d t h a t the Prime M i n i s t e r s had reached s u b s t a n t i a l agreement which was probably r e f l e c t e d i n the Truce Committee's P l a n . 1 ^ 0 T h i s Truce Committee presented i t s peace P l a n to the F i r s t Committee on January 11, 1951. The P l a n c a l l e d f o r a c e a s e - f i r e , a withdrawal of f o r e i g n troops and a f o u r Power's t a l k on Formosa and other Far E a s t e r n problems. T h i s was approved by the F i r s t Committee and i t was decided t h a t Communist China should be informed about i t . But the U.S.S.R. d e l e g a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i z e d the whole p l a n a s ^ ' h a r d l y c o n s t i t u t e d a b a s i s f o r the p e a c e f u l settlement of any q u e s t i o n . " l 6 l <pne People's Government of China r e j e c t i n g the c e a s e - f i r e p l a n , charged \ 1 5 9 p. H. Soward, "The Korean C r i s i s and the Commonwealth", P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , J u n e , 1951? p. 126. 160 s i r Gladwyn Jebb, the U n i t e d Kingdom's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n the U.N., remarked l a t e r t h a t "the p e a c e f u l e f f o r t s of the nine Commonwealth Prime M i n i s t e r s " were r e j e c t e d by Communist China. U.N. F i r s t Committee  F i f t h S e s s i o n , January i o , 1951? V o l . I I , p . 502. 161 U n i t e d Nations, F i r s t Committee, January 11, 1951. p. 4-80. 121 t h a t a c e a s e - f i r e b e f o r e the opening of n e g o t i a t i o n s , was designed o n l y t o o b t a i n a " b r e a t h i n g space f o r the U. S. troops" and co u l d " o n l y be advantageous to the maintenance and e x i s t e n c e of American a g g r e s s i o n . " At the same time i t put forward a c o u n t e r - p r o p o s a l t h a t seven powers - The People's R e p u b l i c of China, The U.S.S.R. the U n i t e d S t a t e s , the United Kingdom, France, I n d i a and Egypt - should hold a conference i n China t o s o l v e the problems of Formosa and of the F a r E a s t . 1 ^ 2 The U n i t e d S t a t e s took t h i s r e p l y of the Chinese Communists as a r e j e c t i o n of the c e a s e - f i r e p l a n and her d e l e g a t i o n i n the U n i t e d Nations i n t r o d u c e d a r e s o l u t i o n branding them as a g g r e s s o r s . I n d i a , as w e l l as many other c o u n t r i e s , i n c l u d i n g B r i t a i n and Canada, became f e a r f u l of the consequences of t r e a t i n g the Chinese r e p l y as a r e j e c t i o n . These c o u n t r i e s i n s i s t e d upon seeking a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the Chinese r e p l y . In f a c t , the I n d i a n Ambassador i n Peking was working on t h i s and conveyed Peking's a t t i t u d e t o the In d i a n d e l e g a t i o n who forwarded i t to the members of the F i r s t Committee. Indi a and some other members f e l t t h a t progress was made towards a c e a s e - f i r e . The United S t a t e s , never-t h e l e s s , b e l i e v e d t h a t l i t t l e had been accomplished and U n i t e d Nations, Document no. A/C.1/653• 122 chose t h i s moment to make no c o n c e s s i o n s . The A s i a n -Arab group came forward w i t h an a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s a l t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the seven governments mentioned by Peking, meet and " a f t e r a l l obscure p o i n t s - i f there were any - had been c l a r i f i e d , would frame a d e f i n i t e •• programme of steps to be taken f o r t h e i r f u t u r e d e l i b e r -a t i o n s . " 163 T h i s p r o p o s a l was r e j e c t e d by the F i r s t Committee. I n the same evening the United S t a t e s r e s o l u t i o n , branding the Chinese Communists as aggressors was passed by a vote of 4 4 - 7> with 7 a b s t e n t i o n s . Those who voted a g a i n s t the U. S. r e s o l u t i o n were the S o v i e t b l o c , Burma and I n d i a . The a b s t a i n e r s were Afgha n i s t a n , Egypt, Indonesia, P a k i s t a n , Sweden, S y r i a , Yemen and Y u g o s l a v i a . The General Assembly adopted the r e s o l u t i o n by the same vote on February 1, 1951. The U n i t e d S t a t e s obtained i t s way, but a t what p r i c e ? D e s p i t e the s i z e of the vote i n favour of the r e s o l u t i o n , many c o u n t r i e s b e l i e v e d t h a t the a c t i o n was unwise a t t h a t time and I n d i a warned that i t abandoned, f o r the time being, a l l hopes f o r a p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t . Speaking i n the I n d i a n Parliament, Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru d e c l a r e d : "As we expected, the p a s s i n g of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n has, f o r the time being a t l e a s t , put an end to any attempts l 6 3 F i r s t Committee, January 25, 1951? p. 54-4. 123 a t n e g o t i a t i o n or s e t t l e m e n t . We hope s t i l l t h a t i t may be p o s s i b l e f o r events to take a b e t t e r t u r n i n f u t u r e , but I must confess t h a t a t the moment, th a t hope has grown v e r y dim." 1 6 4 Of course, the U n i t e d S t a t e s f e l t r e s e n t f u l towards those c o u n t r i e s who voted a g a i n s t her r e s o l u t i o n . I n d i a , more than any other country, was looked upon with great d i s f a v o u r . Perhaps " I n d i a ' s great crime i n American eyes" 165 was t h a t she stood f i r m to the end. The American Congress punished the s t a r v i n g people of I n d i a by d e l a y i n g an i s s u e of wheat to them f o r months. But even t h a t episode c o u l d not b r i n g any change i n I n d i a ' s independent approach to the Korean problem. For the time being a l l I n d i a ' s hopes f o r a p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t of the Korean problem were dampened. Mr. Rau r e f u s e d to work on the Good O f f i c e Committee. So d i d Mr. Pearson of Canada. As had been warned by the I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n , a l l e f f o r t s (from February 1st to May 15th , 1 9 5 D 'made b y the Good O f f i c e s Committee to b r i n g about a p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t of the Korean war, proved f u t i l e , due to the unfavourable Chinese a t t i t u d e . 164 " I n d i a ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y , A Summary of Recent Statement by the Prime M i n i s t e r of I n d i a " , E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , A p r i l , 1951? P- 122. 1 6 5 v. Sheean, "The Case f o r I n d i a " , F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s , October, 1951. 124 However, Ind i a ' s hopes f o r p e a c e f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s b r i g h t e n e d a f t e r the removal of General MacArthur by P r e s i d e n t Truman i n A p r i l 1951. One of 'the Indian spokesmen remarked t h a t the U n i t e d Nations would now be ab l e to "pursue i t s Korean peace with g r e a t e r s i n g l e n e s s of purpose." * While these developments were t a k i n g p l a c e , the General Assembly on May 8, 1951, voted f o r the i m p o s i t i o n of an arms embargo upon Communist China and North Korea. The r e s o l u t i o n which had been i n t r o d u c e d by the Un i t e d S t a t e s , requested a l l governments t o impose an embargo on the shipments of "arms, ammunition, implements of war, atomic energy m a t e r i a l s , petroleum, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n m a t e r i a l of s t r a t e g i c v alue and items u s e f u l i n the p r o d u c t i o n of arms, ammunition and implements of war." 166 I n d i a d i d not support t h i s measure because of her' b e l i e f t h a t i t would have l i t t l e e f f e c t i n f u r t h e r r e d u c i n g s u p p l i e s f o r China, but would, on the c o n t r a r y put f u r t h e r o b s t a c l e s i n the way of a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n . However, t h i s d i d not a f f e c t the e f f o r t s of the Un i t e d Nations i n seeking a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n . . The f i r s t s i g n of another move f o r peace came from the U. N. .side on June 1st when the General ^ U. N. F i r s t Committee, May l y , ±951, p. 632. A New York Times, A p r i l , 1951. 125 S e c r e t a r y (at Ottawa) proposed to the North Koreans a c e a s e - f i r e along the 38th P a r a l l e l . T h i s s u g g e s t i o n was accepted by the S o v i e t Union on June 23. World o p i n i o n grasped t h i s o c c a s i o n and h i g h - l e v e l d i p l o m a t i c t a l k s began i n Washington, London and Moscow. These were f o l l o w e d by exchanges i n the f i e l d a f t e r General Ridgeway on June 29., o f f e r e d to d i s c u s s a c e a s e - f i r e w i t h the Communist Commanders. The t r u c e t a l k s opened on J u l y 10 a t Kaesong (the t r u c e p a r t y moved to Panmunjon i n October 1951).' While f i g h t i n g c ontinued a l l along the f r o n t l i n e , these p r o t e c t e d p a r l e y s w i t h t h e i r charges and i n t e r r u p t i o n s continued f o r a year and a h a l f . Although most of the c o n f l i c t i n g i s s u e s were s e t t l e d , the stalemate o c c u r r e d on the p r i s o n e r s of war i s s u e . The North Koreans and the Chinese Communists i n s i s t e d t h a t a l l t h e i r s o l d i e r s , captured by the U n i t e d Nations f o r c e s should be returned; on the other hand the U n i t e d Nations e x p l a i n e d that there must not be a f o r c e d r e p a t r i a t i o n of the p r i s o n e r s of war. I n d i a took the i n i t i a t i v e m breaking the s t a l e -make i n November 1952. The I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n to the U. N. submitted a compromise p r o p o s a l f o r s o l v i n g the p r i s o n e r - o f - w a r i s s u e i n Korea. T h i s r e s o l u t i o n was d r a f t e d by the I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n a f t e r c o n s u l t i n g the 126 Peking a u t h o r i t i e s . According to the r e s o l u t i o n , a R e p a t r i a t i o n Commission which was to c o n s i s t of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , Poland, Sweden and S w i t z e r l a n d , or s i m i l a r f o u r s t a t e s nominated by both s i d e s , p l u s -an. umpire appointed by the Commission or the U n i t e d Nations, would handle the p r i s o n e r s of war. Those p r i s o n e r s who were not disposed of w i t h i n 90 days would be r e f e r r e d to the P o l i t i c a l Conference to be c a l l e d under the terms of a d r a f t t r u c e . The U n i t e d S t a t e s as w e l l as the S o v i e t Union opposed the r e s o l u t i o n i n i t s o r i g i n a l form. The U. S. mainly o b j e c t e d to the r e f e r e n c e of the p r i s o n e r s to the P o l i t i c a l Conference i f the R e p a t r i a t i o n Commission f a i l e d to dispose of them. However, the support of the U. S. was assured when Ind i a r e v i s e d her r e s o l u t i o n . The r e v i s e d r e s o l u t i o n would g i v e the U. N. a u t h o r i t y to decide on p r i s o n e r s of war i f the P o l i t i c a l Conference f a i l e d t o s o l v e the problem w i t h i n 30 days. On the S o v i e t s i d e , the main o b j e c t i o n was t h a t the I n d i a n r e s o l u t i o n d i d not c o n t a i n a c l a u s e f o r a c e a s e - f i r e . Consequently the S o v i e t d e l e g a t i o n accused, u n f a i r l y , t h a t "the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of I n d i a d i d not wish to a c t i n the i n t e r e s t of the A s i a n people". 1 6 7 The '.' Chinese Communists l i k e w i s e r e j e c t e d the I n d i a n t r u c e 1 6 7 U. N., F i r s t Committee, December 1, 1952, p. 178. . 1 2 7 p l a n charging t h a t i t was "camouflage" to prevent the "complete r e p a t r i a t i o n of p r i s o n e r s . " 168 N e v e r t h e l e s s , the r e v i s e d r e s o l u t i o n was passed by the General Assembly by 53 to 5 w i t h one (China) a b s t e n t i o n . S i n c e the p l a n was r e j e c t e d , both by the S o v i e t Union and Communist China, i t d i d not stand any chance of e x p e d i t i n g an a r m i s t i c e . The s i g n i f i c a n t t h i n g about the vote was t h a t the A s i a n and Arab c o u n t r i e s , f o l l o w i n g the example of I n d i a , voted w i t h the western powers. I t i s hard to p r e d i c t what India might do but i n view of her past r e c o r d i t i s s a f e to say t h a t she w i l l c o ntinue to make attempts to s o l v e the Korean problem. New York Times, November 2 9 , 1 9 5 2 . 128 Chapter VI Conclusion In her so-called Far Eastern Policy, India has followed c e r t a i n p o s i t i v e objectives: although she has given firm support to the United Nations and i t s Charter she has not always agreed with i t s p o l i c i e s i n the Far East. Her leaders have been eager to support the oppressed peopleJLs of Asia. This policy has been i l l u s t r a t e d by the c a l l i n g of the f i r s t Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi i n A p r i l 194-7 and again i n January 1949. In the l a t t e r conference the cause of the Indonesian Republic's stand against the Netherlands government was f u l l y discussed. The purpose of these conferences was not to form any kind of Asian bloc i n world p o l i t i c s , but merely to promote friendship between a l l the Asian states and to give moral support to the cause of those Asian peoples who were engaged i n a war of l i b e r a t i o n . At the same time India has never l o s t f a i t h i n the United Nations and she has supported the Asian cause through this world organization. In the case of China, India regarded the object-ives of Communist China's foreig n p o l i c y as being very 129 much the same as were those pursued by the Kuomantang. The " l i b e r a t i o n " of T i b e t by the Chinese Communists has been c o n s i d e r e d an a c t of c o n s o l i d a t i o n of t h e i r t e r r i t o r y which h i s t o r i c a l l y belongs to China. Manchuria and Formosa a l s o f a l l i n t o t h i s category. In view of China's s e c u r i t y , her spokesmen, want to see Korea and Indo-c h i n a f r e e d from f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e . Consequently such a p o l i c y of Communist China i s considered by the Indians as being d e f e n s i v e , not o f f e n s i v e . One may agree or d i s a g r e e w i t h t h i s p o l i c y and i t s methods of execution, i t s aspects are o l d - o l d e r than the Communist regime. I t i s the o l d p o l i c y of China, which has been i n h e r i t e d by the new regime from i t s p r e d e c e s s o r s . Although, I n d i a has been f o l l o w i n g a f r i e n d l y p o l i c y towards Communist China, she i s a l s o aware t h a t her l a r g e neighbour i s the p r i n c i p a l p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t t o her s e c u r i t y . While p r o f e s s i n g a f f e c t i o n f o r t h e i r f e l l o w Asians i n the n o r t h , the I n d i a n statesmen are a c u t e l y conscious of Red China's much l a r g e r army and her easy access to In d i a through Burma. Probably f o r these reasons I n d i a regards China, Japan,. Burma and Nepal as her most important d i p l o m a t i c posts abroad, w i t h Peking r a n k i n g f i r s t . I t i s f o r . t h e same reasons t h a t the statesmen i n New D e l h i wish to remain on the • be s t p o s s i b l e terms w i t h the government a t Peking. 130 The second way to c o n f i n e China's i n t e r e s t i n expansion, i f there i s any, i s to make Japan a s t r o n g and democratic n a t i o n . I n d i a ' s r e f u s a l to s i g n the San F r a n c i s c o Peace T r e a t y was the e x p r e s s i o n of a d e s i r e to see a s t r o n g counter-balance to Red China c r e a t e d . From the v e r y beginning India's p o s i t i o n has been to see a s o v e r e i g n s t a t e i n A s i a . The San F r a n c i s c o document l e f t Japan's r e a l s o v e r e i g n t y d o u b t f u l i n the minds of many Asi a n s . I t tended, i n t h e i r o p i n i o n , to weaken r a t h e r than s t r e n g t h e n Japan's p o t e n t i a l p o s i t i o n as a l e a d e r among the democratic f o r c e s i n the E a s t . However, i n the l i g h t of past f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between In d i a and China, i t may be s a i d t h a t there i s p r o b a b i l i t y of con-t i n u a t i o n of such r e l a t i o n s i n the near f u t u r e . So f a r as the Korean s i t u a t i o n i s concerned, I n d i a supported the U. N. a c t i o n branding the North Koreans as the aggressors, but she c o u l d o n l y a f f o r d to send an ambulance and a s u r g i c a l u n i t to j o i n the U. N. f o r c e s i n Korea. However, her moral support which was i n v a l u a b l e ,at t h a t time, was assured so long as r e s i s t a n c e to a g g r e s s i o n was the main i s s u e . But as soon as the U n i t e d Nations' f o r c e s c r o s s e d the 38th P a r a l l e l , the i s s u e of r e s i s t a n c e to a g g r e s s i o n , a c c o r d i n g to I n d i a , was no longer e x i s t e n t . What she wanted to see, t h a t i s , the end of the Korean war along the 38th P a r a l l e l was 131 a p p r e c i a t e d by the U n i t e d Nations one year l a t e r a f t e r much l o s s and d e s t r u c t i o n . Thus the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of p r o l o n g i n g and extending the c o n f l i c t l a y on the shoulders of the U n i t e d Nations and I n d i a had no p a r t i n i t . I n d i a f u l l y accepted the p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y but being an As i a n s t a t e , she c o u l d not agree w i t h a l l the U n i t e d Nations methods of e n f o r c i n g i t i n Korea. The I n d i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n the U n i t e d Nations had g i v e n warnings about the consequences of the U n i t e d Nations f o r c e s moving to the Manchurian border. Conseq-u e n t l y , I n d i a c o u l d not support the United S t a t e s r e s o l u t i o n f o r branding the Chinese Communists as the a g g r e s s o r s . In f a c t , she opposed i t on l e g a l grounds as w e l l as on the ground' t h a t i t would prolong h o s t i l i t i e s , extend the area of c o n f l i c t and negate the proposals t o n e g o t i a t e peace. In d i a was not the only country to see t h i s . " Many other c o u n t r i e s i n c l u d i n g other s t a t e s of Asia and e a r l i e r , of Europe a l s o saw i t . So as l a t e r events show India's p r e d i c t i o n s turned out to be r i g h t . The Indians were e q u a l l y determined to have peace i n Korea. From the beginning they saw the n e c e s s i t y of the presence of the S o v i e t Union and Communist China a t the peace t a b l e to end the Korean war. On t h i s account P a n d i t Nehru made h i s p e r s o n a l appeals to S t a l i n and Acheson. Although he d i d not succeed, he d i d not 132 t i r e of making f u r t h e r attempts t o b r i n g the a n t a g o n i s t i c p a r t i e s t o g e t h e r . Despite the s e r i o u s disagreement w i t h the U n i t e d Nations p o l i c y , the I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n i n the Un i t e d Nations gathered the support of 12 A s i a n and Middle East A s i a n c o u n t r i e s behind i t to continue i t s e f f o r t s f o r peace. I n d i a was i n a very good p o s i t i o n f o r t h i s as she was f r i e n d l y w i t h both s i d e s and was d i p -l o m a t i c a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d i n Peking by an Ambassador. The l a t t e r kept the I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n a t Lake Success informed about the Chinese r e a c t i o n t o any major event. Moreover, because of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between India and China, I n d i a ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Chinese f o r e i g n p o l i c y made i t p o s s i b l e to b r i n g the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s t o g e t h e r . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , every attempt of Ind i a i n seeking a p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t was bl o c k e d e i t h e r by the Western Powers or by the S o v i e t Union. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t l e f t i t s deep imp r e s s i o n on both s i d e s . The l a t e s t attempt of the I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n i n U. N. i n 1952 to s e t t l e the i s s u e of r e p a t r i a t i o n of p r i s o n e r s - o f - w a r was a genuine approach to the problem: alt h o u g h i t was turned down by the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communists, i t may be hoped t h a t a s i m i l a r formula w i l l be employed to s e t t l e t h a t i s s u e . In s h o r t , I n d i a ' s approach t o the F a r E a s t problems has been a c o n s t r u c t i v e one. Ind i a has been 133 t r y i n g t o see r e a l i t y throughout. I n regard to her a t t i t u d e towards Communist China and Japan, In d i a has been b i t t e r l y c r i t i c i s e d by the U n i t e d S t a t e s . The S o v i e t Union has taken an equal share i n condemning some of the aspects of I n d i a ' s p o l i c y . In s p i t e of t h i s , India has been a b l e to continue to pursue an independent p o l i c y i n seeking a s o l u t i o n of the F a r E a s t e r n problems by p e a c e f u l means. In view of the circumstances which have a r i s e n s i n c e 194-7? her f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t h a t r e g i o n i s j u s t i f i e d . Bibliography". 134 Documents: Canada, House of Commons, Debates, April 27, 1949, and February 22, 1950. Great Britain, House of Commons, Debates, June 26, 1950. History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Laws of War, United Nations War Crime Mission (London: H.M.S.O. 1948). 592 pp. Tr i a l of Japanese War Criminals, Department of State (Washington D.C.: 1946). 104 pp. United Nations, Agenda Item, 67 . United Nations, Documents Nos. A/Cl/653; A/Cl/558; ACl/218/Rev. 1; A/154; S/1505/Rev.1; S/1495; 5/1520. United Nations, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meeting, Third Session, 1948; Fourth Session, 1949; F i f t h Session, 1950; Sixth Session, 1951 and Seventh Session, 1952. United Nations, F i r s t Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, in 1950, 1951, 1952. United Nations, Records of Meetings of General Committee, From September 21 to December 5, 1950. United Nations, Records of Meetings of Third Committee, 1950. Security Council, O f f i c i a l Records, January 15, 1950; June 25 , 1950; August 1950; November 1950. Statement published by the Government of India on The Congress Party's responsibilities  for the disturbances in India 1942-1943 (London : H.M.S.O., 1943. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations. 135 The C o n s t i t u t i o n of I n d i a , Government of I n d i a , (New D e l h i : 1950). •United Nations, Report of, the I n t e r i m Committee of the General Assembly, 5 t h January to 5 t h August, 1 9 4 8 . Books: The I n d i a n S t r u g g l e , 1 9 2 0 - 1 9 3 4 , Bose S.C. (London: Wishart and Company L t d . , 1935)> 353 pp. I n d i a , the Western Democracies and China, C a r t e r , C. Edward (Winnipeg: 1 9 4 9 7 . 11 pp. Korea, Department of S t a t e , (Washington D.C., 1 9 4 8 ) . 50 pp. I n d i a ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y w i t h S p e c i a l References to Asia and the P a c i f i c , Dutt, P. Vidya, (New D e l h i : I n d i a n C o u n c i l of World A f f a i r s , 1950). 4 5 pp. Aspects of I n d i a ' s F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , I n d i a n C o u n c i l of World A f f a i r s (New D e l h i : 1 9 4 9 ) . 48 pp. The Commonwealth i n A s i a , Jenning, Ivor (Oxford: The Clarendon P r e s s , 1 9 5 D , 124 pp. I n d i a i n World A f f a i r s August 1947 - January 1 9 5 0 , '' Karunakaran,: K.P. ( C a l c u t t a : Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1952), 407 PP« F r e e I n d i a i n A s i a , L e v i , Werner (Mi n n e a p o l i s : U n i v e r s i t y of Minnesota," 1952) 160 pp. Jawahar L a i Nehru an Autobiography, Nehru, J . (London: John Lane the Bodley Head, 1 9 3 6 ) . 618 pp. Independence and A f t e r , Nehru, J . ( D e l h i : I n d i a n Government P u b l i c a t i o n , 1 9 4 9 ) , 403 pp. R e g i o n a l i s m and. S e c u r i t y , Panikkar, K. M. (/Bombay: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 4 8 ) , 173 p p . The Future of South East A s i a , Panikkar, K. M. (London: George A l l e n Unwin L t d . , 1 9 4 3 ) , 124 pp. 136 I n d i a and the F a r East, Rau, B. N. (Toronto: V i c t o r i a U n i v e r s i t y , 1 9 5 D , 31 pp. The Changing Commonwealth, Sowar^ F. H. (ed.) (Toronto: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1950), 268 pp. I n d i a i n the New E r a . Wallbank, T. Walter (New York: S c o t t , Foresman & Co., 1 9 5 D , 204 pp. P e r i o d i c a l A r t i c l e s : Anonymous, " I n d i a ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y , A Summary of Recent Statement by the Prime M i n i s t e r of I n d i a " , E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , Ottawa, A p r i l , 1951. - "China and the U. N.," Commonwealth, October 6, 1950. "U. N. Nears D e c i s i o n on China." F o r e i g n  P o l i c y B u l l e t i n , Sept. 29, 1950. -. " I n v a s i o n of T i b e t B r i n g s Chinese - I n d i a n D i s c o r d , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y B u l l e t i n , November 10, 1950. - " W i l l U. N. Members F o l l o w U. S. on China," F o r e i g n P o l i c y B u l l e t i n , January 26, 1951. ~ - "U. S. Makes Headway on Japanese Peace T r e a t y , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y B u l l e t i n , June 22, 1951. - "Mystery Man i n China... Panikkar, I n d i a ' s Ambassador t o Peiping,"- U. S. 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H., "Admission of Indian States to the United Nations," American Journal  of International Law. Vol. 43, 1949. Mansergh Nicholas, "The Commonwealth In Asia," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s . March, 1950. Masani, M. R., "The Communist Party i n India," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s . March, 1951. Menon, K. P. S., "India and the United Nations," Indian Information, November 15, 1948., Nhan Van Nguyen, "The Asian Reaction to Korea," Asian Horizon. Winter, 1950-51. Sheean, Vincent, "The Case f o r India," Foreign A f f a i r s , October, 1951. Soward, H. F., "The Korean Crises and the Commonwealth" P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , June, 1951. "The Commonwealth Countries and World A f f a i r s . " International A f f a i r s , Vol. XXVII, 1951. Magazines and Newspapers: Amrita Bazar Pat r i c a , Calcutta, September 24, 1952. External A f f a i r s , Ottawa, November, 1948. Hindustan Times, Delhi, September 30, 1949. Indian Information Service, (Published by Government of India), Sept. 1, 1947; A p r i l 15, 1948; Dec. 11, 1948; Oct. 19, 1949; Feb. 15, Mar. 1 and Sept. 15 of 1951. India Today, (Published monthly by India League of America, New York) July, 1951. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, London, Oct. 4-11, 1947; June 26-30, 1948; Dec. 10-17, 1949; A p r i l 1-8 and July 15-22, 1950; July 19-26, 1952. 139 New York Times, Jan. 12, Feb. 10, and 16, Apr. 25, May 31 , June 2, July 8, Oct. 17, 23, 28, Nov. 5, 10, 15, 26, Dec. 3 , 6, 1950; March 29, Apr. 13, May 26, June 29, and 12, Aug. 28, Sept. 4, Oct. 17, 1951; Oct. 16, Nov. 29, Dec. 1, 1952. New Times, Moscow, Sept. 12, 1951; Nov. 26, 1952. Oversea Hindustan Times, New Delhi, A p r i l 17, 1952 and May 8, 1952. People's China, Peking, Sept. 1951. Times of India, August 7, 1950. Time, Jan. 23, 1950. The Times, London, June 13, 18, 1950. U. N. B u l l e t i n , Feb. 1950. Vancouver Sun, Nov. 12, 1948. 

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