India and the Far East since 1947.

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Abstract.

As soon as India attained freedom in 1947, the fundamental problem facing her was internal and not external. Naturally, the Indian leaders were concerned more about her domestic problems than foreign. The communal disturbances which immediately followed the partition of the country, made it difficult for the Government to maintain law and order in certain parts. Moreover, the economic situation went from bad to worse after independence. Free India had to tackle the tremendous problem of providing her vast population with the necessities of life, like food, clothing and housing. The Government of India was fully aware of these difficulties and the economic weakness of the country.

It was under these circumstances that the leaders of free India had to determine the objectives of India's foreign policy. The difficult situation at home and the desirability of obtaining economic and technical assistance from abroad, made the pursuit of peace one of the great objectives of India's foreign policy. Other objectives were to work for the ending of colonialism and imperialism throughout the world and the elimination of racial discrimination. In order to carry out these objectives successfully, the statesmen of India felt that they must give full support to the United Nations and follow an independent foreign policy. But India decided to continue her historical connections with the Commonwealth of
Nations because she owed common allegiance to a particular way of life and ideal of State and Government.

With regard to her policies in the Far East, India developed friendly relations with Communist China. She was one of the first countries who recognised the People's Republic of China. Although these friendly relations were disturbed in 1950 over Tibet, India continued to press for the representation of Communist China in the U.N. Nevertheless, she seems to be aware of the principal potential threat of this large neighbour to her security. For this reason, and others, India wishes to see Japan a strong sovereign state in Asia.

In the case of Korean problem, India supported the U.N. action branding the North Koreans as aggressors, but she could not send any economic and military support. However an ambulance and surgical unit was sent to join the U.N. forces. As soon as the United Nations forces pushed the aggressor back across the 38th Parallel, the issue, according to Indian leaders, was no more an issue of resistance to aggression. From this time on India was reluctant to support any such action of U.N. which might prolong and extend the conflict. At the same time she began to work for some kind of peaceful solution of the Korean situation. Although she could not succeed in obtaining her objective completely, negotiations between the parties in dispute did begin which brightened the prospects for peace.
Preface.

Although few books and articles have been written on India's foreign policy within recent years, this field has not been left absolutely unexplored. While some students of international affairs have defended Indian policy, others more often, have attacked it. The latter group have done so because of India's constant efforts to keep herself free from the two blocs engaged in the Cold War. However, the importance of new India in world affairs has been reflected in these writings.

The writer chose the topic "India and the Far East" for two reasons. First, it is in the Far East that the Cold War has become "hot" with the North Koreans' invasion of the Republic of Korea in 1950. It is for the first time in history that a collective measure, more than mere economic sanctions, has been taken by an International organization to stop a military aggression. Second, India's role in the United Nations with regard to Far Eastern problem has been very significant. India, more than any other state of the same status, has made constant efforts to seek a peaceful solution to end the Korean war. The writer has tried, in as dispassionate a manner as possible, to outline India's approach to the problems of China, Korea and Japan. The entire
enterprise has not been an easy one, as there is ample documentary material written on India in U. N., but very little original material available on her role in the Far East. However, with the assistance of Professor F. H. Soward, the subject has been ventured on and carried to its present extent.

The writer takes the opportunity to thank Professor Soward whose consideration and kind treatment, especially towards foreign students, have left a lasting impression upon the writer.

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Chapter I

Fundamentals of Indian Foreign Policy.

The national movement for independence started in 1885\textsuperscript{1} with the foundation of the Indian National Congress. It bore its fruit on August 15th, 1947 when India became a Dominion within the British Commonwealth and later became a Republic on January 26th, 1950. With independence came new responsibilities to the new Dominion. At the dawn of independence Pandit Nehru (who has been Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister since 1947) gave the following message to the nation and the world:

"It is a fateful movement for us in India, for Asia and the world. A new star rises - the star of freedom in the East, a new hope comes into being, a vision long cherished materialises ....... But freedom brings responsibilities and burdens and we have to face them in the spirit of a free and disciplined people."\textsuperscript{2}


Free India found able leaders such as Pandit Nehru and his colleagues to handle her foreign policy. The world situation was complex. The Allied Powers, after winning the second world war, had begun to suspect each other. Western Powers were slowly coming together in one group and the communist group was rapidly making itself felt. The situation in the Middle-East and South-East Asia was delicate. The dependent people in these areas were struggling for freedom, the Metropolitan Powers making every attempt to retain their hold on their territories. Such was the world situation when the leaders of India took the reins of Indian foreign policy into their hands. They were new to world diplomacy, nevertheless they were to prove themselves worthy of playing a diplomatic game with the other nations of the world.

What foreign policy India would follow was to be seen through practice. Nevertheless, Dr. Rajindra Prasad (present President of India) did not hesitate to outline the course which India would follow. He said; "We have no quarrel with other nations and countries and let us hope no one will pick a quarrel with us. By history and tradition we are a peaceful people and India wants to be at
peace with the world...."³

Immediately after the new Dominion came into existence, it found itself in the middle of internal conflict and confusion. Partition had worsened the food situation which was already precarious at the outbreak of world war two. It was realized that the remedy lay in greater production and in the acceleration of industrial activity in the country. The communal disturbances in the Punjab in July - August 1947, had driven from Pakistan about five million men, women and children who moved into India. The main problem before the Indian Government was how to feed, house and rehabilitate these refugees. Added to these difficulties was a dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir. These were the outstanding problems which did not allow Indian leaders to pay full attention to the foreign policy of the country.

This fact was fully realized by the leaders. Pandit Nehru declared on December 4th, 1947, in the constituent Assembly: "That has been the dominant feature of our politics during the past year and

undoubtedly that has affected our foreign policy in the sense of our not giving enough time and energy to it."4

Indian foreign policy could not be a stable one unless the situation at home was stable. The foreign policies and the domestic policies of a country are closely related. It may be safe to say that foreign policies are an extension of domestic policies in the field of international affairs. Most of the time, the foreign policy is determined by economic policy. Pandit Nehru, in his first foreign policy speech before the Constituent Assembly, stated that "ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy and until India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate and will be groping .... I regret that we have not produced any constructive economic scheme or economic policy so far .... And when we do so, that will govern our foreign policy, more than all the speeches in this house."5


5 J. Nehru, Independence and After, p. 201.
Indian foreign policy was in a formative stage in 1948. As the situation at home improved, India emerged with a definite foreign policy. The main fundamentals of Indian Foreign Policy can be summarized as follows:

To work for ending of colonialism and imperialism.

One of the main planks in India's foreign policy is to work for the ending of colonialism and imperialism. The antipathy to imperialism is deep rooted in the minds of Indian people. They inherited these feelings from their own struggle for freedom. It is quite natural for the colonial people who struggle to be free, to be sympathetic with their fellow brothers struggling for a similar cause. The above mentioned feelings of Indian peoples against imperialism are very old, older than free India.

Pandit Nehru represented the Indian National Congress in the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities which was held at Brussels in February 1927.\(^6\) Here the Indian National Congress affiliated itself with the anti-imperialistic forces of the world -- for the struggle which, according to Nehru,

"was a common one against the thing that was imperialism"\(^7\)

Not only did the Indian National Congress convey the anti-imperialistic feelings of the Indian people at Brussels but it also raised a voice against the use of Indian troops to subdue the neighbouring countries with whom they desired to live peacefully. In the annual session of the Indian National Congress which was held at Madras in 1927, the following resolution was passed to that effect:

"The Congress has noted with deep resentment that Indian troops have again been used by the British Government to further their imperialist designs in China and to hinder and prevent the people of China from gaining their freedom. The congress demands that all Indian troops and police forces still in China should be recalled immediately and that no Indian shall go to China in future as an agent of the British Government to fight or to work against the Chinese people, who in the opinion of the Congress, are the comrades of the Indian people in their joint struggle against imperialism..........

The Congress declared that the people of India have no quarrel

with their neighbours and desire to live in peace with them and assert their right to determine whether or not they will take part in any war."\(^8\)

The people of India showed similar interest in the freedom of Asiatic Nations in 1942. In August, 1942, the All Indian Congress Committee passed a resolution which stated that "the freedom of India must be the symbol of and prelude to the freedom of all Asiatic nations under foreign domination. Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, the Dutch Indies, Iran and Iraq must also attain their complete freedom. It must be clearly understood that such of these countries as are under Japanese control now, must not subsequently be placed under the rule or control of any other colonial power."\(^9\)

After gaining the independence of India the Indian leaders continued to have a sympathetic attitude towards the oppressed people of Asia. Nehru's words echoed in the Constituent Assembly in 1947 when he said "that we stand for the freedom

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\(^8\) A. Appadorai, "India's Foreign Policy" *International Affairs*, 25:39, January 1949, p. 39.

Asian countries and for the elimination of imper­
ialistic control over them." 10

In the light of the above analysis India's role in the United Nations, particularly in the United Nations Trusteeship Council, can be clearly seen. It is true that India could not help the other Asiatic Nations with food and other material because of her own poor economic situation at home. Nevertheless she did not hesitate to express her verbal sympathies with no fear of any great power. Pandit Nehru explained this fact in the following way: "We have done precious little in the way of actual active help; we are not in a position to do that. But we have got sympathy towards them and we have expressed it as public as possible." 11

To promote regional cooperation between Asian countries. India wants to keep friendly relations with the Asiatic Nations. This desire has been expressed time and again in one form or another. An Asian Relations Conference, at the suggestion of the Burmese leader Aung San, was called by the Indian Council for world affairs (a non-political

10 J. Nehru, Independence and After, p. 201.
body established in 1943 for the objective study of objective problems). The Conference was held in the Old Fort at Delhi. It was attended by 250 delegates from some 25 Asiatic countries. The purpose of the conference was "to bring together the leading men and women of Asia on a common platform to study problems of common concern to the peoples of this continent, to focus attention on social, economic and cultural problems of the different countries of Asia, and to foster mutual contacts and understanding." 12

Although the conference was cultural in nature with no political motive behind it yet the Moslem League of India alleged that the conference was "a thinly disguised attempt on the part of Hindu Congress to boost itself politically as the prospective leader of the Asiatic people?" 13

India, at that time, was emerging into freedom and independence. She could be the centre

13 Ibid. 1946-1948, p. 8862.
of many forces at work in Asia. Nevertheless the Indian leaders do not seem to be interested in the leadership of the Asian people but rather in their friendship and cooperation. Nehru commented on this in his speech of June 1st, 1948, at Ootacomund (Madras). He said: "People vaguely talk of India's leadership in Asia. I deprecate such talk. I want this problem to be approached not in terms of this country or that country being the leader and pushing and pulling others, but rather in the spirit of cooperation between all the countries of Asia, big or small." 14 More recently, while saying that India did not aspire to become leader in Asia or elsewhere, Pandit Nehru declared, "We do not want to overawe any one but we do not want to be overawed by anyone either. We would not tolerate it." 15

There became clear two main themes in the speeches delivered in the plenary session of the Asian Conference - the solidarity and the common consciousness of the Asian peoples and the important

14 J. Nehru, Independence and After, p. 311.
15 The Oversea Hindustan Times, April 17, 1952.
role they would play in the world. Pandit Nehru in his inaugural address, said that "the time had come for us, peoples of Asia, to meet together, to hold together and to advance together." He also made it clear that the Asian people were not embarking at the conference on "some kind of a Pan-Asian movement" directed against their former oppressors. He continued, "In this atomic age Asia will have to function effectively in the maintenance of peace. Indeed, there can be no peace unless Asia plays her part." 

The second Asian Conference was held at New Delhi from January 20-23, 1949. This conference was attended by the delegates or observers of countries of the Middle East, Far East and Australasia. This time it was convened by the Government of India in connection with the situation in Indonesia. The conference was significant in the sense that Indian leaders took the initiative to give moral support to the Indonesian people against Dutch imperialism. The Indian Foreign Minister's words echoed once again through his presidential speech when he said that

16 J. Nehru, Independence and After, pp. 296-299.
"there can be and will be, no surrender to aggression and no acceptance or reimposition of colonial control." 17

Such efforts on the part of the Indian people and their spokesmen show that they work for the re-emergence of Asia. India has continued a friendly and cooperative policy towards the Asian countries. She has been doing her best to win a seat for Red China in the United Nations and to put an end to war in Korea. In fact it was India who formed a group of Asian countries in the United Nations to fight for peace and to protect their interests.

In the early forties the students of world politics had canvassed for the working out of defence arrangements with neighbouring countries, particularly with Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. Mr. K. M. Panikkar, (who later became the first ambassador to Communist China) in his book advocated the establishment of a triume Commonwealth of India, Pakistan, and Burma with the full cooperation of Great Britain. 18


A similar idea was advanced again in 1948 by the Dewan of Jaipur, Sir V. T. Krishnamachari, in his article "Regional Arrangement: The Indian Ocean Area." In this article he suggested that a defence council should be established with India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Malaya as its members, but not without the cooperation of Great Britain and certainly such an arrangement should not be limited to the commonwealth countries.\(^{19}\)

It has not been made public how far the Indian leaders, responsible for shaping the foreign policy of India, shared Panikkar's ideas. Perhaps it is safe to say that the official view stands for an independent foreign policy. So long as such a policy continues, the ideas summarized above would not find favour in official circles. Furthermore Nehru holds the opinion that Asia's problem is not military but economic.

**Stability in the free countries of Asia;**

India is interested to see peaceful and stable conditions in all those countries of Asia which have attained their independence. Any

disturbance in those countries could prove dangerous to India. The Government was particularly concerned over the Karen revolt which could disturb the whole stability of the Burmese independent state and thus affect the economic relations between India and Burma.

The Indian Government proposed an informal conference of the High Commissioners of the Commonwealth Countries, in Delhi in February 1949 in an attempt to mediate between the Karens and the Government of Burma. This plan was dropped to avoid giving any impression that the Commonwealth Governments were interfering in the internal affairs of Burma. However, the problem of aiding Burma was considered at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in April 1949. It was decided to form a Burma Aid Committee, composed of ambassadors to Rangoon, of Britain, Ceylon, India and Pakistan. It was not until March 1950 that the Commonwealth Economic Aid Program for Burma was announced. An amount of 6,000,000 Pounds was to be contributed to the program. India was to contribute £1,000,000 as her share of the amount. This shows with

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what sincerity India wants to maintain stability in the free countries of Asia.

To remain a member in the Commonwealth:

Indian people had fought for the full independence of India since 1930. They were determined to have no ties whatsoever with Great Britain after obtaining their freedom. But as soon as independence was gained circumstances persuaded them to decide to remain a member of the Commonwealth. This historic decision was reached in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in April, 1949. India's Prime Minister declared that the Republic of India would be glad to continue her membership of the Commonwealth. Why did India decide to remain a member of the Commonwealth when her leaders had advocated until 1947 a complete break with Great Britain? First of all, India remained in the Commonwealth because it became a new type of Association. She was to remain a sovereign independent republic with "the King as the symbol of the free association of independent member nations, and as such, the head of the Commonwealth." 22 Nehru had stressed again and again that it was his desire to

22 Canada, House of Commons Debates, April 27, 1949, p. 2655 (unrevised)
keep India an independent force in international affairs. Since the Commonwealth relation involves consultation but not commitments, it permits frank discussion leading to better balanced judgments and does not limit action.

The second important factor to keep India in the Commonwealth, is her economic and defence weakness. India must import capital to build up her economic strength. She is weak in defence, particularly in her sea and air power. Britain's naval and air power can be helpful in case of danger. Moreover Indian leaders are afraid of isolation. Pandit Nehru put it before the Constituent Assembly on May 16, 1949; "Commonwealth does not come in the way of our co-operation and friendship with other countries, ultimately we shall have to decide, and ultimately the decision will depend on our own strength. If we dissociate ourselves completely from the Commonwealth, then for the moment we are completely isolated." 23.

The communist uprisings in the South East States of Asia are a constant danger to the new Republic.

The Indian Government's vigorous actions against communists at home, can certainly keep the internal situation peaceful, but that cannot dispel the outside danger.

Lastly, India has little to lose by remaining a member of the Commonwealth. On the other hand she gains a lot from other member nations which are well advanced in the field of science and industry. She is making use of the scientific, technological, professional and academical experiences of other member nations. In view of the above mentioned advantages to India, the present leadership would not discontinue her membership in the Commonwealth. This fact was made clear on May 16, 1949, by Pandit Nehru in his speech to the Constituent Assembly in moving a resolution endorsing the Commonwealth decision. He said; "In the world today where there are so many disruptive forces at work, where we are often on the verge of war, I think it is not a safe thing to encourage the breaking up any associations that one has."24

There were some socialist members in the

Constituent Assembly who objected to Nehru's policy to continue as a member of the Commonwealth. Their main objection was that some of the older Dominions, particularly South Africa followed the policy of racial discrimination. Nehru's answer to those members was that India would continue her struggle against racial discrimination in various parts of the world.

To promote racial equality:

The Indian leader's attitude towards racial problems has been very obvious. The treatment of East Indians in South Africa became one of the major issues before the United Nations. From that time on no racial discrimination became one of the ideological objectives of India's foreign policy. The doctrine of racial superiority, in the eyes of Indian leaders, seems to be a menace to the peace of the world.

Referring to the second of the two policies to which India is committed, Pandit Nehru said; "Our second belief is that the world must recognise that there must be no racial discrimination. Any policy based on racial discrimination obviously gives rise to conflict, and in the present condition of the world, people do not put up with that sort of thing.\textsuperscript{25}\" 

\textsuperscript{25} M. Venkatarangaiya, "Indo-American Political Relations", \textit{Aspects of India's Foreign Relations}, (New Delhi, 1949), p. 10.
The same reason sets Pandit Nehru against Australia's White Policy. During his tour of the United States in 1949, Nehru expressed himself fully on this issue. In one of his speeches he mentioned three causes of war: Political subjection, social inequality and economic inequality.26

Pursuit of peace through non-alignment with power blocs:

One of the main objectives of India's foreign policy is the pursuit of peace through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue. Within the United Nations and outside of it, India has refrained from linking herself with one bloc or other. Sometimes Pandit Nehru has been looked upon as pro-Russian by the western world.27 At one time he was inclined towards communism in the late thirties. He writes in his autobiography that he "turned inevitably with good will towards communism, for, whatever its faults it was at least not hypocritical and not imperialistic."28

26 V. P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, p.7.


Those were Nehru's feelings when Congress Party was fighting for independence and he was in a British jail. Now, being Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister of India he has new responsibilities and a new outlook. Moreover one must not forget that he was educated at Harrow and Cambridge and that English culture has had a permanent influence on him. There is some truth in a British statesman's statement that "Nehru is an Englishman inside of him; therefore, he will never break with us."\(^29\) His policies at home have shown that he has no love for the communists. He does not approve wholeheartedly of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Talking to pressmen Nehru said that the Soviet Union "more and more" is following "a nationalist expansionist policy rather than the old style concept of communism."\(^30\)

In spite of the fact that India has a democratic parliamentary Government and that her economic and social systems are derived from the West, the vast majority of Indian people are still suspicious of the West because of 200 years of British rule in India. Although Nehru does not show bitterness against

\(^{29}\) The New Statesman and Nation, Jan. 1950.

the West, it does not mean that the Indian people feel the same way. They are plain people and it will take considerable time to heal their wounds. Pandit Nehru mentioning this fact to J. J. Singh (President of Indian League of America) in 1949, said; "I am not a dictator .... India is a democracy .... I must carry my people with me."  

Article 51 of the Constitution of India forms the statutory basis for India, to seek peace and security. The article 51 reads as follows:

"The state shall endeavour to:

(a) promote international peace and security.
(b) maintain just and honourable relations between nations,
(c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another; and,
(d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration."  

"Peace and Security" in the world that is split into two power blocs, could in the Indian leader's view only be obtained through friendship with all the nations of the world. This can only be done if India rises above group considerations and bloc-alignments.

India does not seem to be interested in preparing for another war. Perhaps no peace-loving state would do that. She likes to keep herself aloof from international conflicts. One reason is that India is too weak to have any effect one way or the other. Nehru put it this way; "We should either be strong enough to produce some effect or we should not interfere at all. I am not anxious to put my finger into every international pie." However India has been trying to view the international disputes without fear or prejudice or passion; she has tried to appraise them without parti-pris and striven for a settlement by conciliation and agreement. She tried to seek solutions in the cases of Palestine, Korea and in the problems of atomic control. Such a critical and dispassionate approach can only be continued if she does not align with any power bloc.

This position may have its drawbacks but it could be the only positive policy for the interests of world peace. To join one bloc or another may mean to accept ready-made policies and programs evolved in one capital or another. India seems to be too

conscious of her responsibilities to participate in any arrangement that might induce a sense of dependence or compromise her freedom of action. In Nehru's words, "alignment means that you do what you think is not right but others think it is right for you to do it". Moreover, India's spokesman seems to hold the idea that the forces driving to war could be checked by the most persistent and patient efforts. This seems to be the main basis for the present Indian foreign policy. It is in this spirit that India is working in the United Nations, to bring together the divergent points of view and to seek to heal the breach which has been created by the Korean war.

The middle of the road foreign policy of Pandit Nehru was endorsed by the Congress Party Working Committee in a resolution presented to the all-India convention of the Congress Party on October 17, 1952. This resolution reads as follows:

"This congress approves of the policy pursued by the Government of India in seeking friendly relations with all countries and in avoiding any entanglement in military or other attainments that

tend to divide the world into rival groups and thus endanger world peace."

Thus keeping her foreign policy independent and neutral, India has been seeking economic and other help, without any strings attached, from the West and the East. This is being done through the Colombo Plan and the Indo-U.S. Technical Cooperation Agreement. (In June 1951, U. S. granted $190,000,000 to buy food and grain.) China (100,000 tons of rice in May 1952) and the Soviet Union (100,000 tons of wheat in June 1951) have helped the Indian people with food. India has been conscious of the intentions of the helpers. Pandit Nehru, touring the United States in 1949, made it clear again and again that India would welcome U. S. aid and cooperation only on terms "which are to their mutual benefit" and that "we do not seek any material advantage in exchange for any part of our hard won freedom."36

It is further of interest to note the comments of some of the popular Indian English newspapers on Nehru's visit to the United States. The Indian News Chronicle of October, 1959, wrote as follows:


36 The High Commissioner for India in Canada, "The Indian Information, October 19, 1949."
"If there is need for anything, it is for caution on India's part. She must be on her guard to ensure she is not made a participant in the cold war that rages so furiously - producing a frantic arms race and exclusive military alliances - and she is not made to give up her policy of neutrality."

The Tribune of October 12, 1949, emphasized the fact that the Prime Minister's visit to the U. S. A. would not bring any change in the policy of non-alignment with power blocs. It further made the remark that:

"there are several problems of common interest to the United States and India which call for the cooperation and understanding of both sides .... American statesmen have realized their mistake and are seeking to give new orientation to their policies in Asia. The Prime Minister's visit should help them see the situation in Asia in its proper perspective." 37

Pandit Nehru's foreign policy brings some criticism and opposition at home. The late Sardar Patel, Home Minister, wanted a more definite alignment with the Anglo-American bloc. After his death Purshottandas Tandon became the leader of the right wing of the Congress Party. He was elected president of the party in 1950 in spite of Nehru's opposition. Although Nehru succeeded in defeating

37 The High Commissioner for India in Canada, The Indian Information, October 19, 1949.
him a year later, opposition to Nehru's policies remained in the parliament. Tandon favours a grand alliance with the western democracies instead of Nehru's determined neutralism in the current world conflict. Referring to this group the Prime Minister on March 28, 1951, declared in the Indian Parliament that "one can understand the alignment of a country in times of war, but completely fail to understand why this war tendency should be imported in peace time."  

So long as Pandit Nehru is the creator, organizer and executor of the foreign policy of India, he will support the present pattern, but when and if the rightists gain control of the congress party policy, it will be easy to anticipate which way the wind will blow.  

Outside the Congress Party there is a handful of orthodox religious persons who denounce the present Government's neutrality. To name some of them - Shyma Presad Mukerjee of the Hindu Mahansabha (religious organization) and Dr. Taraknath Das. He left India for American in 1905 and lived there until after the independence of India. At present he is professor at Columbia University,

U. S. A.). He holds the opinion that India won her freedom due to Japan's victories in the South East Asian countries during World War Two. He further believes that the policy of neutrality would be helpful to Russia and harmful to India.\footnote{39}

There is another small but well organized section of the Indian people which demands that India should ally herself with the Soviet Union bloc. This section consists of communists and their sympathizers. Immediately after the independence of India in 1947, the party gave all its support to Nehru's Government.\footnote{40} But it was not very long until it was discovered in January 1948, that the party was on the wrong track. This was done at the Calcutta Party Congress. The Congress was attended by delegates from other Asiatic countries and from the Communist International.\footnote{41} The former general secretary, P. C. Joshi, of the Indian Communist Party was dismissed. The Congress passed the

\footnote{39}{\textit{The Amarita Bazar Patria} (Calcutta), September 24, 1952.}
\footnote{40}{\textit{The New York Times}, May 31, 1950. Also, June 2, 1950 (editorial)}
\footnote{41}{\textit{The Manchester Guardian Weekly} (London), January 24, 1952.}
resolution that the Communist Party of India had to take the path of the Chinese comrades. After that the party became ultra-revolutionary.*

The result of this policy was that the Provincial Governments took severe measures to ban the party and arrest the well-known communists. The central Government issued a white paper on September 29, 1949 on communist activities. This document contains charges against the Indian Communist Party. It states that the communists of India have preached and planned violence on a wide scale and are still practising it in defiance of ethics and decency and in complete disregard of the value of social life and institutions. The Government, further, expressed its determination "to control lawlessness with all the resources at their disposal, and are confident that they will continue to receive the whole hearted and active support of all sections of the population." 42 In February, 1950, it was felt that stronger steps than the mere issuing of a white paper should be taken. The Government passed emergency legislation introduced by the late Sardar Patel, Home Minister. This bill was passed with a view to prohibiting persons

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42 The Hindustan Times, (Delhi), Sept. 30, 1949.

* A brief history of the Communist Party was given by M. R. Masani in, "The Communist Party in India", Pacific Affairs, March, 1951.
from acting "in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, the security of Indian Union or of an Indian state." 43

In spite of the fact that the Indian Government took such strong steps to suppress the communist at home, this did not affect the foreign policy of India one way or the other. This action, as the Prime Minister put it, was "a purely domestic affair and does not reflect India's stand in one power bloc or expressed our position towards another." 44 However, this statement would not dispel the fact that India would not stand with the western world in the case of world-wide aggression.

So far as the foreign policy of India is concerned, the Indian Communist Party's stand is that India should withdraw from the British Commonwealth and join the "peace camp led by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China". This demand was made by the party in the election manifesto issued on September 25, 1951. 45 Besides

43 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (London), April 1-8, 1950.
this the party is propagandizing for peace through the Peace Congress of India. All this does not deter the present Indian leaders from following the independent policy which is considered to be the best one under the present circumstances however, there is hope that some events in the near future might effect Indian opinion in one way which may prove to be a western one.

India being a democracy of the western type, may join the western states in case of danger to democracy anywhere in the world. India may not have her neutral policy then. Her present policy may last as long as there is a cold war, but there are very few chances for a country like India to stand aside when there is a 'hot' war. A well known American student of International Affairs, wrote in 1948 "An India dominated by landlords, moneylenders, Princes, and industrialists would, if it could, support the American Colossus against the Kremlin." 46 Pandit Nehru explained what India's position would be in case of the democracies being in danger. He declared before the Constituent

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Assembly in 1948, that "we stand in this country for democracy, we stand for an Independent Sovereign India. Now obviously, anything that is opposed to the democratic concept - the real, essentially democratic concept, which includes not only political but economic democracy - we ought to oppose."47

A similar statement was made before the United States Congress in 1949. Nehru said; "where freedom is menaced or justice threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral. 48

What does all this mean? What kind of aggression did Nehru have in mind? Obviously he was talking about the communist aggression. Nehru's Statement is quoted by D. Chamanlal in a pamphlet - "The Nehru Doctrine", as follows: "The idea of social justice as embodied in communism attracts many people. But the methods and the ideology of the Communist Parties have been greatly disliked and have come into conflict with democratic nationalism. Although world communism sometimes appears in the guise of a liberating movement, as an expansionist movement,

it is considered a danger to peace and freedom." 49

Naturally the democratic countries are interested to keep India on their side in the world struggle. They seem to realize the tremendous importance of India and her leader, J. Nehru, not only in Asia but in the world. On August 29, 1950, the New York Times wrote:

"The struggle for Asia conceivably could be won or lost in the mind of one man - Jawaharlal Nehru ... Whatever one may think of his opinions - and most of us have been rather unhappy about some of these opinions - no one can deny that he is the most influential non-communist voice in Asia. He is the counter-weight on the democratic side to Mao TseTung. To have Pandit Nehru as an ally in the struggle for Asiatic support is worth many divisions; to have him as an opponent or even a critic would jeopardise the position of Western democracy through Asia." 50

Nehru's policy to seek peace and friendship and freedom throughout the world required full cooperation with the United Nations. Nehru and other leaders had given repeated expressions of

49 Dewan Chamanlal, _The Nehru Doctrine_, (Bombay: Thacker's Press), p. 21

India's loyalty to the Charter of the United Nations. It was this faith in the Charter of the United Nations that made them bring the case of the South African Indians before the General Assembly. Once again the Kashmir issue was brought before the Security Council with the same spirit. India gave her unstinted support to the United Nations because she believed and still believes that world troubles can be solved through this international organization. It was in this light that India played an important role in lessening the gap between the two powerful groups.

Although the Indian delegation to the United Nations is working hard to restore peace in Korea yet the Indian leaders seem to see that "a change has come over the U. N. 0.", particularly in connection with the Tunisian problem. They believe that the United Nations should tackle this problem with the same spirit that it once did that of Libya. The following chapters will discuss this aspect of India's Foreign Policy more thoroughly.

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Chapter II

Indian Opinion in the United Nations with regard to the Far East.

India had become one of the original members of the United Nations at the time of its formation in 1945. Although India, at that time, was still under the British rule, the Indian delegation to the San Francisco Conference consisted of very able Indians. There were representatives of the Hindus, the Muslims and the Princely States. Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar was Hindu, Sir Firoze Khan Noon was Muslim and Sir V. T. Krishnamachari represented the States. The curious thing about this delegation was that its composition was based on religion and it was responsible to the British Government of India, not the people of India. (All the national leaders were in jail). It was not until after the independence of India in August 1947 that the flag of the new Dominion, (India became a republic in January 1950), flew at the United Nations headquarters and the Indian delegation appeared at Lake Success under the leadership of Mrs. Vijaya Lakhshami Pandit, then
This was not the first time that India had become a member of an International Organization. The Indian representatives were present at the Peace Treaty of 1919 and India had been admitted as an original member State of the League of Nations. Her position was unique, as she was the only member of the League which was non-self-governing. This continued to be so in spite of the fact that the Covenant of the League did not permit any non-self-governing community to become a member state.

Subsequently India participated in all the meetings of the League Assembly. Besides this she also attended annual sessions of the International Labour Office and other international conferences. However, India's representatives were appointed under different conditions. That was why they were always part of the British delegation and not, as in the case of Dominions, an entirely separate delegation. Although the position of the Indian representatives in the United Nations before 1947 was different, they could not be called the true representatives of the Indian people. As a
matter of fact India had no right to be at San Francisco. The United Nations, as Article 2 of the Charter states, "is based on the Sovereign equality of all members."\(^52\) India in 1945, could not be regarded as standing on a footing of sovereign equality with other nations. Indeed, Mr. Molotov in his first speech before the San Francisco Conference made an oblique reference to India's status. "Let us hope," he said "that the voice of an independent India will be heard in this hall before long."\(^53\) Nevertheless India continued to be represented in the United Nations and the Indian Leaders, after independence, gladly accepted her membership.

First of all the Indian spokesmen saw that the United Nations membership would not interfere with Indian independence. Secondly they felt that some sort of international organization was necessary to maintain peace and order in the world. The United Nations could be a suitable platform for the nations of the world to bring their grievances

\(^52\) The United Nations Charter; p.

for solution. More recently Shree (which means Mister in Hindustani) Nehru described the reasons for this in the Indian Parliament as follows:

"Our association with the United Nations does not take away (anything) from our independence. We associated ourselves with the United Nations because we felt that some such world organization was essential. The League of Nations had failed. Here was another attempt under wider and perhaps better auspices and we joined it. And, I think that the Charter of the United Nations is still a very fine and noble document."

What policy India would follow in the United Nations was made clear by Mrs. Pandit, Chairman of the Indian delegation, in her first speech in the General Assembly. She declared that

"we in India, for our part, are aware of no compulsion to identify ourselves wholly, or to associate ourselves systematically, with either or any of the different groups. On the contrary, we consider it should be narrowed down."

She further declared that the Indian delegation would

"vote solely in the light of its judgment of the merits of the case in question."

She continued,

54 Indian Embassy for the United States, Prime Minister on Foreign Policy, reply to Debate in Parliament, June 27, 1952.
"We stand for peace, and will devote our resources and energy toward the abolition of all the causes which lead to war." 55

India and the United Nations Commissions on Korea.

One of the problems, concerning the Far East, was that of the independence of Korea. (other problems were China and Japan) This problem was brought before the General Assembly by the United States on September 17, 1947. After the defeat of Japan, Korea had been occupied by the United States and the U. S. S. R. The United States had occupied the area south of the Thirty-eighth Parallel and the U. S. S. R. had occupied the region north of it. The occupying powers had agreed, at the Moscow Conference in December 1945, to set up a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. The Conference established a Joint Commission of occupying powers for the formation of the Government in Korea. Negotiations, to form the Joint Commission of the representatives of the United States and the U. S. S. R., began on March 20, 1946 between the two nations in question, failed and the United States, thereafter,

submitted the problem to the United Nations. The U. S. S. R. argued that the Korean Problem did not fall within the jurisdiction of the United Nations. However, it proposed that the General Assembly should ask the United States and the U. S. S. R. to withdraw their occupying forces from Korea at the beginning of 1948. The question of forming the government should be left to the Korean People.

On the other hand the United States proposed that the national Government as well as the national security forces should be formed before the withdrawal of the troops. The main objective of the United States' proposal was to establish a government machinery to which the Powers should be transferred before the withdrawal of the foreign forces. That meant the formation of a single government representing the Korean People. It was further proposed that a United Nations Temporary Commission should be formed to supervise the implication of the resolution (U. S.).

India disagreed with both the Proposals of the U. S. S. R., and the United States. Regarding the U. S. S. R.'s Proposal for the immediate withdrawal of the occupying forces, India's stand was
that such an arrangement would lead to confusion, because there was no Government to take over the administration of the country. On the other hand she did not like the U. S. resolution either. However India agreed to the formation of the United Nations Temporary Commission for Korea. Consequently, India proposed her own formula as a compromise between the two other proposals. That formula was as follows: First, that the general elections should be held on a national basis under the supervision of the United Nations Temporary Commission. Secondly, all adults should have the right to vote by secret ballot without any political discrimination. Thirdly, a national Government should be formed immediately after the election. Fourth, the national Government should form its own security forces and dissolve all other military and semi-military formations. Lastly, a time limit should be fixed for the withdrawal of occupation troops.

The result of the Indian Proposal was that the United States revised her resolution. The revised resolution included the Indian suggestion

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that the election might be held on a national, not a zonal, basis. Consequently the Temporary Commission would be free to decide how the election should be supervised. Another Indian proposal that the election should be held on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot, was included in the resolution. Paragraph 4(a) of the United States resolution, added a phrase "..... and dissolve all military or semi-military formations not included therein....." This was exactly the phraseology suggested by the Indian representative.

The amendment submitted by the Indian delegation was adopted by the General Assembly and India supported the United States resolution which was accepted by the General Assembly, after rejecting the U. S. S. R. Proposal. The Assembly also accepted the U. S. Proposal for forming the United Nations Temporary Commission to supervise the implication of the resolution. The Commission was to be composed of Australia, Canada, China, El-Salvador, France, India, The Philippines, Syria and the Ukrainian S. S. R. The Assembly recommended

58 The United Nations Document A/C 1/218/Rev.1
that the election be held not latter than March 31, 1948. The Commission was authorized to consult with the Assembly's Interim Committee on the application of its recommendations.

Although the Soviet Union bloc voted against the revised resolution of the United States and it was accepted by the majority of the democratic States, yet the Indian delegation did not withdraw its support from the resolution. India still thought that the resolution was a good field for compromise for the United States and the U. S. S. R. That was the correct step and she accepted - taking part in the Temporary Commission.

Mr. K. P. S. Menon represented India in the Commission, which started to work immediately after its formation. Mr. Menon was elected to act as Chairman of the Commission. Thus making him Chairman rendered this position difficult, because he had to work both as representative of India and Chairman of the Commission. However he managed to perform both functions ably.

The Commission's work was limited in the area south of the 38° Parallel. This was due to the refusal by the U. S. S. R.'s military commander
to let the Commission cross north of that line.

In such a situation the Commission found it difficult to continue its work and decided to consult the Interim Committee of the General Assembly.

Before the Temporary Commission took the matter to the Interim Committee for advice, most of the members of the Commission were divided on whether there should be any election in South Korea or not. Some members had expressed serious doubts, in view of the situation, regarding its right to implement the General Assembly's decision in South Korea alone. The Indian representative expressed the view that a government established on the basis of elections held in South Korea could not be described as a national government in the sense of the General Assembly's resolution. The representative of India further argued that if a government were set up in South Korea, the U. S. troops would always be needed to support it.\textsuperscript{59} Like the Indian representative, the representatives of Canada, El Salvador and Australia held the same view.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{59} The United Nations Official Records of Third Session of the General Assembly, Park 1, p. 979.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, p. 947.
Thus out of nine members of the Temporary Commission, four were in favour of going ahead and holding the election in South Korea and the remaining four were in opposition with one abstaining (Ukrainian S. S. R.) who never cooperated with the Commission. The Indian representative even went so far as to ask the Commission to declare its inability to carry out its mission and to return its mandate to the General Assembly. But this recommendation of the Indian representative was rejected unanimously, and the whole problem was taken to the Interim Committee for advice. However India expressed her attitude even before the Interim Committee in February 1948, Mr. Menon, making a statement declared that "most of the members of the Temporary Commission had expressed concern that the formation of a separate sovereign government in South Korea under the present conditions would not facilitate the twin objectives laid down in the resolution of the Assembly, namely, the attainment of national independence for the people of Korea and the withdrawal of the occupying forces. Such a government, in any case, could not be in a position to take over the functions of the government

from the military commands and civilian authorities of North Korea and South Korea." 62

In spite of the fact that the representatives of India brought forth the above mentioned consequences if the election were held in South Korea, the Interim Committee asked the Commission to hold the election in South Korea. The efforts of Mr. Menon, to see both South and North Korea united and independent under the National Korean Government, failed. This earnest desire of India, (like that of some other states) was not fulfilled, partly because of the non-cooperative attitude of the Soviet Union authorities in North Korea and partly because of the decision of the Interim Committee which was not appreciated by India. Perhaps that was the reason that the Indian representative (the representative of Canada was not present either) was not present at the meeting of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea which was held on February 28, 1948, at Seoul. 63 It was at this meeting that the decision was taken to implement the Interim


Committee's resolution of February 26th, 1948, by issuing a public statement that the Commission would observe an election in South Korea, not later than May 10, 1948. Nevertheless, India continued to be a member of the Commission. Finally the efforts of Temporary Commission found reward in the shape of the formation of the Republic of South Korea, under President Singman Rhee.

The question of Korea came up again before the General Assembly in December 1948. The United States urged the approval of the new South Korean Government and the establishment of a new United Nations Commission which should lend its good offices to bring about the unification of the two zones. India held the opinion that the approval of the South Korean Government would make the division of the country permanent, which would be disastrous for the future of Korea. She further argued that it would jeopardize peace and stability in the Far East. For those reasons India hesitated to vote in favour of the United States resolution for the approval of the South Korean Republic. Some other delegates explained the fact that the Assembly's approval of the South Korean Government would not stand in the way of the achievement of Korean unity. Moreover it
was pointed out to the Indian delegation that India took part in the U. N. Temporary Commission on Korea, so she could not reasonably vote against the resolution. Under this persuasion, India voted for the United States resolution, reluctantly nevertheless. 64 She also accepted her membership in the United Nations Commission on Korea. However, India never recognized the South Korean Government. She refrained from doing so not to perpetuate the division of Korea. 65

India and ECAFE

In addition to her membership in the Temporary Commission of the United Nations and the United Nations Commission on Korea, India was represented on the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. The countries of Asia are agrarian. The majority of the people have the source of their livelihood in agriculture. Asian agriculture is backward. Its organization and methods are primitive. Moreover the land tenure systems and social customs are not economical. The density of population is another factor added to the poverty and dangerously

64 V. P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, p. 24.

65 Embassy of India, Washington, D. C., Prime Minister on Foreign Policy Reply to Debate in Parliament, p. 11.
low standards of living. To make some progress toward raising the standards of living by industrializing the Asian countries, it was felt necessary to have Planned Programmes for the Utilization of the resources through cooperation between the countries concerned. It was with this context that the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East was set up in 1947. By the end of 1948, Australia, Burma, China, France, India, The Netherlands, New Zealand, The Philippines, Siam, the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom and the United States were its full members. Besides these members there were associate members such as British Borneo, Cambodio, Ceylon, Hong Kong, The Republic of Indonesia, Laos, Malaya and Nepal.

India took a keen interest from the beginning in the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). The reason for India's interest in the ECAFE was that she believed that the economic well-being of the people of India came first and foremost. The other Asian countries, like India, are in the same economic conditions. So India seemed to be interested in seeing all the countries of Asia developing their economic resources and create a better balance between industry and agriculture. Addressing the members of the ECAFE at its third session at Ootacamund, Madras
(India) on June 1, 1948. Prime Minister Nehru explained it as follows:

"From the Asian point of view, it has become essentially a matter of extreme urgency to deal with those problems economic. From the world point of view it is equally urgent really, because unless these problems are dealt with in Asia, they affect other parts of the world."

Suggesting how this problem could be solved, he added,

"..... The whole of this Asian region is full of vast resources, human and material, and the question before us is how to yoke them together and produce results. It is not that we are lacking in men or material. We have both. In order to yoke them together the easiest way is to have certain assistance in capital equipment and experienced technical personnel from those countries which may have a surplus of it." 66

In the earlier session of the ECAFE the Indian representative had suggested similar measures. Those suggestions remained the basis for approaching the question of the economic organization of Asia. In the first session of the ECAFE the representative of India laid down the following Proposals:

"That the Secretariat be directed to institute enquiries into the following subjects in respect of each country within the geographical scope of the Commission:

(1) Probable requirement during the next twelve months of food, seed, clothing, raw material, plant, industrial and agriculture equipment, building material and other essential goods;

(2) Measures necessary to ensure that the above requirements are met: (a) from domestic sources, e.g., by improvement of internal transport facilities, distribution methods, etc.; (b) from within the region, e.g., by provision of facilities for more extended inter-regional trade, improvement in external transport facilities, etc.; and (c) from all other resources, e.g., by development of external trade generally, adoption of measures necessary for financing imports, improvement in external transport facilities, etc.;

(3) Measures necessary to facilitate training of administrative and technical personnel in the economic field and the obtaining of competent technicians from outside by countries in need."

Very little progress could have been made by the ECAFE during a period of one year. This was pointed out by the Indian delegate in the second session of the ECAFE which was held in Baguio, The

67 V. P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, p. 27-28.
Philippines, in November and December 1947. The Indian delegate criticized the methods which had been insufficient to replace the worn out machinery in India where industrial production had fallen back. Because of this fact, the delegate asserted "India was prevented from making her contribution to the economic rehabilitation of Asia and the Far East."

However, commenting on the Interim Report and Recommendations on industrial development by the working Party, Dr. S. P. Mukerjee, Indian delegate, said that "India offered unconditional cooperation to her fellow members within the region subject to the limitations from which she herself suffered."

He further emphasized the fact that the first and most important problem of those countries was "to restore to the pre-war level of production the land under cultivation in those surplus areas which had now become defunct area." 68

Similar suggestions were made by Mr. C. C. Dasai who headed the Indian delegation to the fourth session of the ECAFE which was held at Lapstone, N.S.W., Australia. His suggestions were accepted by

68 V. P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, p. 28.
India's stand in the ECAFE has been for more concrete actions rather than mere drafting plans and meetings. There are some metropolitan countries whose role, it seems, has been to limit the activities of the Commission to research and investigation only. Indian spokesmen seem to hold the opinion that actions should follow immediately after the research and investigations. India advocated the same policy in the other various committees such as the Committee on Food and Agriculture, the Committee on Trade and Finance, the Committee on Flood Control and the Drafting Committee of the Committee on Trade Promotion.

One result of such a policy of India was that the ECAFE adopted a resolution in its fifth session for a grant to the East Punjab Irrigation Institute, Amritsar, India. This was done to undertake a joint study on the silt problem. Similar measures were taken in other countries of Asia. For instance, the Bureau of Flood Control of the ECAFE assisted Thailand's Irrigation Department to

build the first hydraulic model and to train young people for such work.

India's Bid for Representation of Communist China in the U. N.

Another problem which faced the Indian spokesmen in 1949, was China - the great neighbour of India. The relations between the two countries have been very friendly and have never been ruined by war or serious conflict for about 2,000 years. Even when India was under British rule, the people of India continued to express their sympathy with in the Chinese' cause. After the independence, India continued to have friendly relations with China even after the Chinese Communist revolution in 1949.

A very significant development took place in the Far East in the year of 1949. China went through the Communist revolution after a bitter civil war. It ended in 1949 with the Communists victories on the mainland. After driving out the Nationalist Government to Formosa, the Communists set up, in cooperation with other anti-kuomintang liberal elements, the Central People's Government of People's Republic of China in October 1949. Immediately after its formation the Communists began to seek the new
Government's recognition and to establish diplomatic relations with the other countries.

India observed the domestic situation of China very keenly. The Government of India felt that it was not their duty to support one group or another nor to tell the people of China what was right or what was wrong for them. As long as the Nationalist Government ruled over China the Indian Government recognized it, but as soon as the Communists got control over the mainland of China and established their Government, the Indian Government was faced with a dual situation as to whether it should continue to recognize Chiang's Government at Formosa or whether it should recognize the new Government.

Finally, after considering the situation thoroughly and after consulting the other Commonwealth Governments, the Government of India decided to accept the reality of the political situation in China and accorded recognition to the Communist Government on December 30, 1949. India did not stop here, but went one step further to ask the Commonwealth countries

71 Ibid, p. 15.
to do likewise. At the Colombo Conference, Shiree Nehru made a forceful plea to the Commonwealth Ministers for the recognition of Communist China. He explained that the Chinese people should not be isolated from the non-Communist world, but should be encouraged to have relations with other parts of the world.\footnote{Business Week, Feb. 11, 1950, also TIME, 55: 16-17, January 23, 1950.}

Recognition, however, did not mean that India would approve the Communist policies. The British Government recognized the new Chinese Government also, but it is still combating the Communists in Malaya. Similarly, India takes strict measures to put down the Communists at home. Thus, the recognition of Red China by India and other non-communist countries means that they recognize the fact that Chinese Communists have support of the vast majority of Chinese people. Shiree Nehru declared in Parliament that "it was not a question of approving or disapproving the changes that had taken place, it was a question of recognizing the major event in history and appreciating and dealing with it." Referring to the Communist Government in China, he said that "the new Government was a stable Government and that there is no force likely to supplant it or to push it away. India therefore, recognized
the new Government and suggested exchange of ambassadors." 73

There was another factor which should be noted here. The People's Republic of China was not wholly composed of Communists. There were other anti-Koomintang liberal elements in it which supported the new government. Speaking of Chinese Communism, The Times of London wrote as follows on June 28 and 29 of 1950:

"It is because it is a Chinese movement, seeking to reform conditions in China, that it has gained such wide support. Few of its followers are really interested in foreign nations or their fate. The mass support of all classes which the regime now enjoys is not given to theoretical Communism but to the practical programme of reform and reconstruction which the party is now carrying out.

The administration, confined in the executive posts to the Party members, is implacably honest; the army is admirably disciplined; there is no nepotism; efficiency and drive have replaced sloth and indifference. Intellectuals and experts, non-Communists in their own views, have been asked to work for the regime in order to reconstruct China, and find a congenial atmosphere in which the expert is appreciated and his advice accepted." 74

73 V. P. 'Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, p. 16.

74 The Times, London, June 18, 19, 1950.
The Indian spokesmen seemed to have fully realized the fact that the new Chinese Government represented the Chinese people. Defending his own resolution for the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, Sir Bengal N. Rau declared; "According to our information so far as the new Government of China is concerned, that government is a national coalition representing all sections of the nation, including some members of the Kuomintang, pledged to work a common programme of democratic advance."

Shirlee Nehru's policy of suppressing the Communists at home and seeking friendship with Communist China was described, by many Americans, as inconsistent. When Mrs. Pandit, then Ambassador to the United States, mentioned this attitude of the Americans in parliament, Shirlee Nehru interrupted: "I am not prepared to be anti-this or anti-that, I may be soft to some, hard to others at times, but I dislike being pushed about or bullied... some on the Anglo-American side call me a Communist, while some of the other side call me an imperialist... people ask me: "Are you this or are you that?" But I say:

The Chinese Communists did not delay their bid for recognition from the United Nations. On January 8, 1950, a telegram sent by the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China was received by the Security Council. On January 10, 1950, the representative of the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution in which he proposed that the representative of the Nationalist Government of China should be expelled from the Security Council and the representative of the People's Republic of China should be recognized the real representative of the Chinese and take a seat in the Security Council. By this time India had been elected one of the non-permanent members of the Security Council. India voted for the resolution which was rejected by six votes to three. 77 Seeing this result the representative of the Soviet Union declared that his delegation would not participate in the work of the Security Council until the representative of the Kuomintang group should be removed from the Council. Although this was considered unfortunate, India con-

76 Time, February, 1950.

continued to advocate the admittance of the representative of Communist China to the United Nations,
Before the Korean War broke out, India's belief was that the admission of Red China to the United Nations was essential from the point of view of Asia and the world. After the outbreak of the Korean War, India saw it necessary that New China should be admitted to the U. N. and the U. S. S. R. should return to the Security Council because it was "of basic importance both in terms of reality and in order to have a peaceful solution," 78 in the Far East.
This policy of India, outside the United Nations, was winning support. The British Press seemed to have become sympathetic toward India's policy in regard to Communist China. The London Times of September, 1950, wrote: "India's voice must be heard and heard with respect, as an authentic voice of Asian democracy." 79
When India introduced a resolution for the admission of Communist China in the fifth session of the General Assembly, Great Britain and other non-Communist countries backed India.

Thus before the fifth session of the General Assembly was held in 1950, the Indian delegation was well prepared to make a bid for the recognition of Communist China. A draft resolution was presented by Sir B. Rau, the head of the Indian delegation.

The resolution read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Noting that the Republic of China is a member of the United Nations and of various organs thereof,
"Considering that the obligations of a Member under the Charter of the United Nations cannot be carried out except by a government which, with a reasonable expectancy of permanence, actually exercises control over the territory of that Member and commands the obedience of its people,
"Recognizing that the Central Government of the People's Republic of China is the only such government functioning in the public of China as now constituted,
"Decides that the aforesaid Central Government through its head, or its minister for Foreign Affairs or accredited representatives, as the case may be, shall be entitled to represent the Republic of China in the General Assembly and
"Recommends that the organs of the United Nations adopt similar resolutions." 80

The draft resolution was defeated by a large majority. 16 countries voted for while 33 voted against it and 10 abstained from voting. Nevertheless, if one looks at that voting from the population point of view of those countries which voted for the resolution, it could be considered morally carried. Keeping China, whose validity was in issue, out of the picture, the total population of the countries that voted for it was about 809 million and the total population of the countries that voted against the resolution was about 412 million. Anyhow the Indian delegation was not disappointed by this defeat.

The most significant fact about this action in the General Assembly was that the leadership was in the hands of India. India stood firm and consistent without caring for any "softening" process. The diplomatic pressure which is often used at Lake Success to silence or delay a delegate who wishes to raise some awkward issue, could not happen in the case of India. It is also important to notice that the support India rallied on the Chinese issue might not be disposed of very easily.

Great Britain had its own viewpoint about what should be the policy of the western powers in Asia and voted for the Indian draft resolution. The
action of the three Scandinavian countries was noteworthy since their Socialist Governments are anti-Communist. The other small countries may have been influenced, even those that abstained.

Whatever popularity India got by bringing the Chinese issue before the General Assembly, it was mostly due to one able personality, Sir B. Rau who was the head of the Indian delegation in this particular session of the General Assembly. Sir B. Rau argued that the new Government of China was a stable one. Secondly, as he pointed out, "which is always true according to the general principles of International Law, that government ought to be recognized which has control over the vast territory of a country and has support of the majority of the people. This he had made clear in the draft resolution which stated "a government which, with a reasonable expectancy of permanence, actually exercises control over the majority of that Member and commands the obedience of its people." The third argument he brought forward was that a state has obligations to the United Nations. More so when it is a permanent member of the Security Council. How can those obligations be fulfilled if Republic of China had no control over the territory and the Chinese people?
In such a situation only the People's Republic of China could discharge China's duties and obligations under the Charter.

India's interest in confronting the General Assembly with the Chinese issue was based on her friendly attitude towards Communist China. Due to her geographical situation she cannot afford to have a hostile power next to her. Because of the same reason, India's statesmen would probably be reluctant to see any war in the Far East in which China is involved.

The spokesmen of India realized this fact long ago, and did not leave any stone unturned to win the friendship of the Communist Government. Sir B. Rau once declared in the United Nations General Assembly, "we wish to do everything possible to promote friendly relations that now prevail between us, because we feel that a free and independent China marching with India will be the most effective stabilizing factor in Asia."

Shree Nehru was categorical on this point. In his opinion the absence of Communist China from the United Nations left a nation of 450,000,000 people, a permanent member of the Security Council, without genuine representation. This also exposed Asia to the constant danger of conflagration.81

Chapter III

Discord with Communist China over Tibet.

1950 was the year during which the relations between New Delhi and Peking were disturbed.\(^{82}\) The disturbance was created by the Chinese Communists' move to consolidate and safeguard control over their national territory by "liberating" Tibet. Despite the fact that India was not wholeheartedly in favour of China's attitude toward Tibet, she clung to the belief that the admittance of the Peking Government to the United Nations was the best hope for peace in the Far East.

Some light may be shed on Tibet which had been a point of friction in relations between India and China. The friction had been due to the overlapping of the interests of the two countries in Tibet. For centuries China enjoyed suzerainty over Tibet and the Manchu dynasty was able to establish a mild rule there in the eighteenth century. Perhaps this

\(^{82}\) See Chapter II for further relations between India and China.
step was taken by the Manchu emperors because of the fear that Britain would detach Tibet as a colony. This fear was established by the expedition of Colonel F. E. Younghusband in 1904. That expedition resulted in imposing a treaty on the Lhasa (capital of Tibet) authorities. This treaty opened up trade between Tibet and India. The main motive behind this expedition seemed to be the desire of Britain to stabilize the north east frontier of India, to facilitate trade and to counteract Russian expansionism.

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and stipulated that neither Russia nor Britain should interfere in the internal administration of Tibet or seek concessions there. The Manchus then decided to impose a strong regime in Lhasa and dispatched a military expedition which reached Lhasa in February 1910. The Dalai Lama (secular head of the state) fled to Darjeeling, India. But the Chinese revolution enabled Tibet to break the ties binding her to China and the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa. In 1917 the Tibetans repulsed another Chinese attack. The Simla (India) Conference was held in 1914 to consider the British-Chinese relations over Tibet. The Conference was attended by Britain, China and Tibet. Britain was ready to
recognize Chinese suzerainty over autonomous Tibet, but China never ratified the Simla Convention so the Tibetan Government, as stated in its note to the U. N., maintained that China had thereby renounced "the benefits that would have occurred to her" under the 1914 Convention and in consequence, that Tibet possessed full political independence 'de jure'. 83

In 1933, China sent her armies once again to control Tibet. This time China occupied territory east of the Yangtse. Since then no settlement was reached between Tibet and China and the upper Yangtse remained the frontier between them.

Meanwhile bitter quarrels arose between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. The latter fled to China in 1920. The Panchen Lama was the religious head whereas the Dalai Lama was secular head of that semi-autonomous state. The powerful thirteenth Dalai Lama died in 1933 and the 16 year old incumbent succeeded in 1940. In the meantime the Panchen Lama died in China in 1938. The difficulty arose over the selection of a successor. In addition to the 16 year old boy, another candidate was put forward in former Tibetan

territory of Chinghai which has been converted into a Chinese province very recently. Known as the Kumbum Lama installed by his supporters, was recognized by the Red Chinese leaders as the temporal ruler of Tibet.

The Peking Government claimed in 1950 that Tibet was an integral part of China and declared that they would "liberate" it. The Tibetan authorities were disturbed by this declaration of the Chinese Communists and asked for help from the western countries in case of attack by Communist China. Meanwhile the Kuomintang mission in Lhasa was notified by the Dalai Lama to leave the country. This was done to avoid the entry of the Chinese Red Army into the territory. The Indian Government, to keep itself informed in such a situation, asked its Political Officer in Sikkim to visit Lhasa and to make a report on the revolt (reported by Nationalist resources in Canton) in Lhasa against the Chinese Nationalist Government. The New China News Agency charged that "the British and American imperialists and Pandit Nehru were now plotting a coup in Lhasa for the annexation of Tibet." 85

The attitude of India toward the claim made

85 V. P. Dutt, India Foreign Policy, p. 17.
by the Chinese Communists over Tibet, was that Tibet, being autonomous under nominal suzerainty of China, should have the right to decide her own future. Furthermore the Indian Spokesmen declared that they would defend Tibetan autonomy by diplomatic means only. 86

The stand taken by the Indian Leaders was a very mild one. Naturally such a statement that India would defend Tibet by peaceful means, could not have been a strong warning to the Chinese Communists. In the past, the British Government had very ably defended the autonomy of Tibet which was necessary from the Indian security point of view. But the present leadership of India started a poor diplomatic game from the very beginning, and it was doubtful (as it was proved later on) whether the peaceful Indian Policy would succeed. India needed as much security in 1950 (even more) as she did under the British rule. In addition to the security problem, India had cultural and commercial relations with Tibet. The Government of India had its agent in Lhasa and trade agencies at Gyantse and Yatung and post and telegraph offices at the trade route up to Gyantse over forty years. 87

87 Indian Information Services (Ottawa), February 15, 1951.
The news of the advance of the Chinese Red Army into Tibet on October 25, 1950, came as a surprise to the Indian Government, especially at a time when the Tibetan delegation, at the insistence of India, was on its way to Peking for negotiations. The Indian Government sent a note to China the following day. In that note the Indian Government expressed its deep regret that the Chinese Government should have decided to seek a solution of the problem of their relations with Tibet, by force. "In the present context of world events", the note added, "invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgment of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace." 88 The Chinese reply of October 29 stated that the viewpoint of the Government of India had been "affected by foreign influence hostile to China in Tibet." The note further added that "the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of the People's Republic of China and no foreign interference shall be tolerated." 89

The Government of India repudiated this suggestion of the Chinese Government and tried to make it clear that India's foreign policy had been

89 Ibid, p. 359
entirely independent and directed solely toward a peaceful settlement of international disputes and avoidance of anything calculated to increase the present deplorable tensions in the world. India also expressed the anxiety and the desire that the Indian establishments, "which are to the mutual interests of India and Tibet and do not detract in any way from suzerainty over Tibet," should continue.

These friendly gestures, on the part of the Government of India, did not stop the Red Army of Communist China from advancing to Lhasa. It was reported on November 5, 1950 that the pro-communist Tibetans seized control of the Government of Lhasa and the 16 year old Dalai Lama fled.

Meanwhile the Indian Press became unfavourable towards Communist China. It cautioned the Indian people that Tibet's status as a buffer state between the spheres of three great Oriental powers - the Soviet Union, China and India - might swiftly disappear if her present autonomy under nominal Chinese suzerainty were allowed to be swallowed by Communist power. The Times of India wrote:

"A Communist Tibet transforms the problem of India's adjustment of her relations with international communism into a matter of extreme urgency ... Tibet's natural outlet to the outer democratic world through India and the strategic position of Nepal are aspects of the new situation to which New Delhi will undoubtedly pay close attention." 91

The Indian as well as the foreign Press speculated on the "reexamination" of India's entire policy in regard to Communist China as a result of the Peking Government's stiff rejection of India's expressed concern over the Tibetan development. The Hindu, Madras, wrote:

"Imposition of a Communist regime over Tibet by force will materially affect India's attitude toward Communist China and call for a rethinking of our foreign policy in general." 92

Foreign Policy Bulletin, New York, stated:

"Whatever the motives that inspired the Chinese Communists, there can be no doubt that this step will further the expansion of international communism and may well delay Peiping's admission to the U. N., particularly because of possible changes in India's foreign policy." 93

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In the United States some Republican party spokesmen were criticising India for not sending troops to Korea and for not taking a firmer stand against the Chinese Communist invasion of Tibet. Senator William F. Knowland, a Republican of California warned, at a news conference (at Manila) on November 25, 1950, that India herself was in danger of invasion, and added, "some of those nations which did not help In the Korean War may find themselves victims of aggression. I have particular reference to India." 94

But no major change occurred in the foreign policy of India. New Delhi declared that its policy toward Communists would not be affected by the Tibetan problem. That meant, that India would continue to advocate for Communist China's admission to the United Nations. However, Indian leaders were "rather worried" 95 about the whole thing. In opening the winter session of the Parliament on November 14, 1950, President Rajindra Prasad said:

"India is not only a neighbour of Tibet but has had close cultural and other ties with her for ages past. India must necessarily concern herself with what happens

in Tibet and hope that the autonomy of this peaceful country will be preserved." 96

What the President mentioned "cultural and other ties", was not the only thing that India should have concerned herself with, there was something more than that which was disturbing the mind of the leadership of India. Tibet is the back door of India. Almost all contacts of Tibet with the outside world had been through India. Tibet in the Chinese Communists hands can easily become a base for supporting the Indian Communists if they revolt against the present Government of India. As a matter of fact there had been increasing activity in the past in Assam state, which adjoins Tibet, by the Revolutionary Communist party of India (a small revolutionary branch of the main Indian Communist Party). With India under Communist control the Communists would find it easy to "liberate" the rest of the Asians from under the "imperialists". The late Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhai Patel may have had the above-mentioned considerations in mind when he asked the people of India to be ready to meet any aggression along the northern frontier. In the same speech he declared;

"Communist China's invasion of Tibet might be sufficient, in view of international tension, to start a new world war" and urged that "his countrymen should not run away from danger but meet it like brave men." 97

Meanwhile Tibet appealed as follows to the United Nations on November 7, 1950, for Protection:

"We, Ministers, with the approval of His Highness the Dalai Lama entrust the problem of Tibet in this emergency to the ultimate decision of the United Nations, hoping that the conscience of the world would not allow the disruption of our state by methods reminiscent of the jungle."

The appeal described the brief relations between Tibet and China in the Past. Referring to the Chinese invasion the appeal said,

"This unwarranted act of aggression has not only disturbed the peace of Tibet, it is in complete disregard of a solemn assurance given by the Chinese to the Government of India; it has created a grave situation in Tibet and may eventually deprive Tibet of her long cherished independence."

Denouncing the invasion as the "greatest violation of the weak by the strong," the message appealed "to the nations of the world to intercede in our behalf and restrain Chinese aggression."

The views of the people could be ascertained, if needed, by other civilized methods or, it could be redressed through an International Court. Conquest "will only enlarge the area of conflict and increase the threat to the independence and stability of other Asian countries." 98

The United Nations General Assembly's General Committee took up the Tibetan question on November 24, at the request of El Salvador. The El Salvador delegations asked that "invasion of Tibet by Foreign forces" be included in the current agenda of the General Assembly. He also submitted a draft resolution to "condemn this act of unprovoked aggression against Tibet", and to appoint a committee to study appropriate measures to be taken by the Assembly and to submit its report to the Assembly's current Session.99

Australia, India and Great Britain opposed the proposed resolution of El Salvador on the grounds that the matter could be settled by peaceful means. Mr. Kenneth Younger, of the United Kingdom emphasized the point that "there was still hope that the existing difficulties could be settled amicably by agreement

99 United Nations, Records of meetings of General Committee from Sept. 21 to December 5, p. 17.
between the parties concerned." Speaking for India, the Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawangar said that "the Indian Government was certain that the Tibetan question could still be settled by peaceful means and that such a settlement would safeguard the autonomy which Tibet had enjoyed for several decades while maintaining its historical association with China." 100 The other countries agreed with Great Britain and India and the matter was postponed unanimously.

Meanwhile the situation in Tibet continued to be the same as before. However it was reported in March 1951 that the representatives of the Dalai Lama were proceeding to Peking for settlement of the Tibetan Problem. In the meantime India was busy tightening her northern border along Tibet. At the Press Conference in New Delhi on March 13, Prime Minister Nehru said that trade between India and Tibet had been affected to some extent because of the trouble in Tibet, but he hoped that trade would continue. He expressed the fear that "new order" coming into power in Tibet might interfere with it. "When it comes, we have to see about it", he assured the people of India. In regard to the stationing of Indian detachments at Yantsu, the

100 United Nations, Records of meetings of General Committee from Sept. 21 to December 5, p. 19.
Prime Minister said;

"obviously we can be there only with the good will of the people concerned. We are not there in occupation of any foreign territory but only in order to give protection to our trade routes with the consent of the government concerned. If the government concerned made adequate arrangements for the protection of trade routes instead, our protection of the routes does not arise." 101 According to the Moscow Press "the Chinese People's Liberation Army" was in Gyangtse before the Peking agreement was signed on May 17, 1951." 102

On May 17, 1951, Peking radio announced that "peaceful liberation" of Tibet had been achieved. A 17 point agreement was signed by both parties. By this agreement Lhasa accepted the suzerainty of Communist China. Thus the five starred Red Flag of the Chinese People's Republic was planted on the "roof of the world" from where India and Pakistan could be watched. India accepted the new status of Tibet, "coupled with internal autonomy." 103

Thus went another Asian state to Communism. This had been foreshadowed for months. Once the Chinese armies began moving in Lhasa in October 1950,

102 New Times, Moscow, November 26, 1952.
it was clear that the Tibetans would not be able to defend themselves. Those mountain people were strong and brave but they were not well-trained and equipped with modern weapons for fighting. Moreover the primitive Government was not the kind which would encourage and inspire the plain people to resist the enemy.

The only other hope was a determined opposition from India. During the British rule, Tibet was nursed as a buffer state between India, Russia and China. But the Indian Government with Shree Nehru at its head, did not look upon Chinese Communism with fear and dislike. Shree Nehru made it clear that he would insist on maintenance of the so-called McMahan Line, fixing India's northwest boundary with Tibet. (Red Chinese maps had been showing the frontier at the foothills on the mountains on the Indian side). Otherwise, except for some mild protests, New Delhi did not do anything. The result was - Tibet behind the Asiatic Iron Curtain.

The loss of Tibet to Communism, could be considered a defeat for the democratic world. Its chief danger is that it brought the Communists right down on India's border. It is quite possible that the Chinese Communists decide to use Tibet as an
airfield in case of India's participation in the world wide crises. Tibet has its shortcomings, such as lack of gasoline and road difficulties. Nevertheless these are not such that they cannot be solved in this atomic age. Moreover Tibet can be used as a lair for espionage and subversion against India, Kashmir and Nepal. Last but not least, Communist Tibet has a psychological effect of considerable importance on the Indian masses. For all these reasons western anxiety over what has happened to Tibet is justified.
Chapter IV

Relations with Japan

As soon as the Second World War ended in 1945, Japan was occupied by the Allied powers. The Moscow Conference of the Big Foreign Ministers in December, 1945 set up a Far Eastern Commission (supplanting the Far East Advisory Commission), composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Australia, France, Holland, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, India and the Philippines. The functions of the Commission were described as follows:

1. To formulate the policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfilment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender may be accomplished;

2. To receive, on the request of any member, any directive issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission;

3. To consider such other matters as may be assigned to it by agreement among the participating governments reached in accordance with the voting procedure of the Commission.

At the same conference an Allied Council for Japan was established in Tokyo in which were included the representatives of China, U. S. A., U. S. S. R., and a representative for U. K., Australia, New Zealand and India. Its purpose was to lay down the policies which the Japanese were to follow in fulfilling the Terms of Surrender which they had signed. The policy decisions of the Commission were to be passed to the United States Government which was responsible for preparing directives in accordance with these decisions and for transmitting the directives to General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander. The Supreme Commander was the executive authority responsible for the implementation of Far Eastern Commission policy decisions.

The Commission's meetings were not open to the public or the Press. Nevertheless, The Secretary General issued two reports (the first on July 17, 1947 and the second in December 1948) which covered the work of the Commission from February 26, 1946 to December 1948. The great bulk of the work of the Commission was done in seven committees. The seven committees' work was limited to dealing with reparations, economic and financial affairs, constitutional and legal reform, strengthening of democratic tendencies,
war criminals, aliens in Japan and disarmament of Japan. 105

India had entered the war against Japan as a British Commonwealth country. There had been a considerable resentment at that time, particularly from the Indian National Congress Party, that the people of India had not been consulted before the declaration of war was made. However, India made a valuable contribution in manpower and material to support the Allied Powers. Indian troops had fought in Africa and Burma. Probably that was the reason why India was represented in the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan. India's representatives took a full share in the work of the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council. They did so because India was deeply concerned with the situation in the Far East, particularly, she realized the importance of a peaceful and democratic Japan. 106

Both the F.E.C. and the Allied Council succeeded in accomplishing the task assigned to it.

105 Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, External Affairs, November 1948, p. 5.
106 V. P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, p. 25.
The parliamentary type of government was introduced and elections were held twice in Japan. With the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty on April 28, 1952 and the restoration of full sovereignty to Japan, both the Allied Council in Tokyo and the Far Eastern Commission in Washington ceased to exist.

India started to advocate an early peace treaty with Japan as soon as the situation in Japan was described as suitable (General MacArthur's statements in 1949 that Japan was ready for full independence). India was in favour of putting as few restrictions on Japan as possible in the peace treaty. At a press conference at India House, London, on November 12, 1949, Shree Nehru answered the questions about how soon a peace treaty would be signed with Japan, as follows: "The sooner it comes, the better." He also emphasized the fact that it would not be wise to block Japan. However, she should not be allowed to become a military threat to world peace.

The Commonwealth Conference on foreign affairs which took place in Colombo (Ceylon) in January 1950,

107 V. P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, p. 24.
also considered the issue of a peace treaty with Japan. This meeting of foreign ministers of the Commonwealth countries was the first one of this kind that had been held. Of course Commonwealth discussions on foreign affairs had taken place in the Imperial Conferences, but this was the first time that a Commonwealth meeting was held which was composed mainly of foreign ministers of the Commonwealth countries and which dealt exclusively with questions of foreign affairs. It is also of great significance to note that it was the first time that a conference of Commonwealth ministers was held on the territory of an Asian member. The reason for that could be found in the important situation which was and is still taking place in the Asian countries.

During the conference, Prime Minister Nehru made a strong plea for a speedy peace treaty with Japan which would allow her to reconstruct her economy and to rebuild her political self-determination. Shree Nehru, with the agreement of Pakistan and Ceylon, declared that it was impossible to "keep 80,000,000 people under military occupation for ever." Talking about the terms of the treaty he warned of the danger of "driving the Japanese into the arms of Russia." 108

The result was that all the representatives of the Commonwealth countries were in full agreement for a speedy treaty with Japan. It was decided that the High Commissioners in London of the countries represented at Colombo, should meet to discuss the treaty.

The Indian Government's attitude towards Japan was further explained by Mr. K. K. Chettur, chief of the Indian Mission to Japan. In a statement to the Press in Tokyo on March 13, 1950, he said;

"India believes in getting Japan on its feet. It is to the interest of us all in Asia to see that Japan again plentifully supplies this part of the world with goods she manufactured before the war. The Japanese are the only people in Asia who can do it. We do not fear Japanese economic aggression. Dumping and other such practices can easily be countered by countries individually."

With those friendly verbal expressions, practical steps were also taken by the Indian Government to create a friendly atmosphere with Japan. India agreed to be a party in the trade agreement between the


110 V. P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, p. 25.
the Commonwealth countries and Japan. The trade agreement was signed between representatives of S.C.A.P., (The Supreme Commander, Allied Powers) acting on behalf of occupied Japan and five British Commonwealth countries - Australia, India, New Zealand, South Africa and the U. K., and Colonies (except Hong Kong) on November 8, 1948. This agreement provided for trade exchange to a minimum value of £55,000,000 between the Commonwealth countries and Japan during the year July 1, 1948 - June 30, 1949.

According to the agreement the following goods were to be exchanged; cotton textiles, industrial machinery and parts, raw silk, rolling stock, caustic soda and other chemicals, rayon, wool, silk manufactures, paper and paper products, and bunker coal. The sterling area participants would furnish a wide range of raw materials and other goods and services to an approximate value of £23,000,000 including raw wool, iron ore, salt, raw cotton, cereal, petroleum, rubber, tin, jute, oil-seeds, wool waste, coal, hides and skins, manganese, gums and raisins and shipping. 111

Of $94,000,000 exported to Japan from the sterling area countries, India's share was $17,025,000. 111 Indian Information Services, December 11, 1948.
Of import from Japan, totaling $111,000,000, $28,260,000 was expected to go to India. This meant that the balance of trade was unfavourable to India by $11,245,000 which was covered in the next agreement signed in 1949.

This agreement between the Commonwealth countries and Japan was the first of its kind. Never before had such a large and representative part of the sterling area, including five Dominions, combined for the purpose of together forming one of the two parties to a trade agreement.

A new Trade Agreement was signed by the same Commonwealth countries in November, 1949 for one more year. It was announced in New Delhi in November 1949 that Indian imports from Japan in 1949-50 would amount to $23,000,000 including $10,000,000 worth of capital goods such as electrical machinery, power plants, telephone cables as well as copper, zinc, steel, and some artificial silk yarn. India, on the other hand, would export to Japan iron-ore, pig-iron, mica, manganese ore, hides and skins. It was also agreed upon that Indian trade export would not only balance her imports but would also cover a gap left over in Japan's favour from Indo-Japanese trade during
1948-1949. Similar trade agreements were signed in the coming years between India and Japan.

Not only did these trade agreements play an important role in creating good relations between India and Japan, they also proved helpful to reconstruct the economy of both countries. India's need has been to industrialise herself as fast as she can. Japan, on the other hand, was and still is, in need of raw material to put life into her war-broken economy. Having lost Korea and Manchuria after the second World War, the Japanese started to seek raw material and markets in the South East Asian countries. A Japanese delegation with Mr. H. Watanbe as its leader, went to India. Its mission was to explore the possibility of importing more iron-ore from India and it toured various iron mines there. According to Mr. Watanbe, Japan required about 5,500,000 tons of iron ore annually. He expressed the desire that India and Goa (a Portuguese territory in India) should jointly export at least a million tons of ore a year to Japan. Despite the Japanese effort to increase Japan's foreign trade, it continued to decline in 1951 and 1952. However, Japan's

112 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, December 10-17, 1949, p. 10400.
113 Indian League of America, India To-day, June, 1951.
export to India increased during this period. Of course Japan's exports to India and other South East Asian countries are at the expense of British markets in that region. Japan has already replaced Britain as the leading supplier of textiles to Pakistan, and is also trying to secure first place in the supply of machinery. It will not be very long before Japan replaces Britain as the leading supplier of manufactured goods to India.

It has been noted before that India was advocating an early peace treaty with Japan. However, when the United States was drafting the treaty India did not like the clauses of it and refused to be party in signing the treaty at San Francisco in September, 1951. To understand why India did not sign the Peace Treaty, one has to go a little back to see the history of the relations of the Allied Powers over Japan.

In July, 1947, the United States suggested that the members of the Far East Commission (representing the States which had been at war with Japan) confer on a Peace treaty. The Soviet Union proposed instead that the Council of Foreign Ministers (made up of the United States, Britain, France and Russia) draft the treaty. The United States with the support of Great Britain and France,
rejected the Soviet counter proposal. 114 The rapid deterioration of Russo-American relations aroused suspicions in Washington and Moscow that each power intended to use Japan to its own advantage. This mistrust proved to be a stronger barrier to agreement than perhaps differences over the mechanics of negotiation were.

This stalemate left the United States in control of Japan because most of the occupation troops were American and the Supreme Commander of the Occupation was also American, General Douglas MacArthur. The Soviet Union raised the question of Peace for Japan in the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in June, 1949, in Paris. This proposal was ignored by the United States, Britain and France. But when the Chinese Communists established their authority over all of the mainland of China, Washington's attitude towards Japan changed to a desire to have some sort of treaty or "mechanism... which permits the Japanese greater freedom - complete freedom if possible". 115 However, serious negotiations of a Japanese separate peace treaty did not begin until the Spring of 1951, when Mr. Dulles visited Japan, the

Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, Britain and France. The Korean war divided the former anti-Japanese allies into two hostile camps and thus prevented the negotiations of a real treaty of peace. But at the same time it quickened the United States interest in the remilitarization of Japan, by some arrangements which would not only please the Japanese, but also serve the purpose of the United States in pursuing her policies in the Far East.

The attitude of Great Britain was favourable to the separate treaty of peace with Japan. She was anxious, however, that the United States should take the initiative. Great Britain, like India, also expressed the opinion that the Chinese Communist Government should be permitted to sign the treaty. The United States preferred to have the Nationalist Government of China, in exile on Formosa, sign the treaty. This issue was settled by Mr. Dulles and the British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, in June, 1951. But India stood firm. However, Shree Nehru made it clear that there was no harm in negotiating bilateral treaties with Japan, provided such a bilateral approach would not come in the way of other countries having treaties with an independent Japan. At the same time the Indian Government proposed

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three amendments to the treaty. Those amendments were:

1. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the island of Formosa be given to China in future. (2) The clause relating to the stationing of foreign troops (that is, the United States troops) in Japan be stricken out.

(3) The Ryuku and Bonin Islands be returned to Japan.¹¹⁷

India seemed to hold the opinion that removing Formosa from Japanese sovereignty without making provision for its future administration would mean the continuation of the island as a major Asian problem. So the Indian spokesmen wanted to be sure that the treaty should make it clear that the sovereignty of Formosa would rest with China, in accordance with the principles of the Yalta Agreement.

As for the stationing of foreign troops in Japan, India believed that the criticism would arise that the United States occupation of Japan was being continued under a new guise. However, she did not object to any defense arrangement between Japan and the United States. The incorporation of such an arrangement in a peace treaty was considered an improper infringement upon the sovereignty of Japan.

¹¹⁷ Government of India, Information Services, September 15, 1951.
Replying to India's note of August 23, 1951 which contained these proposals, the United States expressed surprise at some of India's arguments and rejected them politely. Prime Minister Nehru, on August 27, 1951, explained to a cheering Indian Parliament that his government rejected the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty because "none of the major suggestions put forward by India was accepted" by the United States. He also asserted that India "has decided that immediately after Japan attains independent status the Government of India will make a declaration terminating the state of war ... and that later a simple bilateral treaty will be negotiated."\textsuperscript{118}

Not only the Indian Parliament and the Indian National Congress Party supported Nehru's boycott of the San Francisco Conference but the Indian Socialists and other radical parties supported him also. The Politburo of the Communist Party of India while it welcomed Nehru's resolution not to sign the United States draft for peace, condemned his decision not to have India represented at the Japanese Peace Conference.\textsuperscript{119} Of course the Indian Communists wanted to see India aligning with Gromyko in denouncing the proposed treaty. But Shree Nehru was

\textsuperscript{118} The New York Times, August 28, 1951.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid, September 4, 1951.
unwilling to comfort Russia by joining Gromyko in condemning the treaty. However, India's rebuff to the United States gave the communist world fresh ammunition for propaganda against the democratic world. The Chinese Communists People's China wrote: "The U. S. is vainly attempting to split Asia on this vital issue [Japanese Peace Treaty]. China stands for the interests of all Asia against this draft treaty for war and the enslavement of Asia. She stands for the real peace as proposed by the Soviet Union that will bring prosperity and mutual friendship to all Asia."  

New Times (a weekly journal published in Moscow) wrote on September 12, 1951:

"India refused to send a delegation to San Francisco, declaring that the Anglo-American draft is unacceptable. Public opinion in India, as in other countries, is really interested in preserving peace in the Far East and is seriously alarmed by the American military adventures which are threatening to engulf the whole of Asia in war."  

If the Kremlin used India's boycott of the San Francisco Conference for propaganda against Western Powers, the American Press criticized Pandit Nehru's stand strongly. The American critics failed to see that India's rejection of the Peace Treaty was not automatically

120 People's China, Peking, September 1951, p. 7.
121 New Times, Moscow, September 12, 1951.
an Indian gesture of friendship to the Soviets. The New York Times commented on Nehru's attitude; "Instead of seizing the leadership of Asia for its good, Nehru turned aside from the responsibilities, proclaiming India's disinterestedness...." The paper called India's objections to the treaty as "misguided reasons for staying away from San Francisco," and complained that Nehru's statesmanship is not inspiring people and nations to do things but only to leave them undone. How the mighty have fallen!" 122

The Japanese Peace Treaty came officially into force on April 28, 1952 on which date, as required under Article 23 of the Treaty, instruments of ratification had been deposited in Washington by the U.S. and Japanese Governments and by a majority of 13 other countries specified in the treaty. India, although not a signatory to the San Francisco Treaty terminated the state of war with Japan on the same day. It was also announced by the Government of India on April 28 that India would propose to conclude a separate peace treaty with Japan soon. In the meantime the head of the Indian mission in Tokyo (Mr. K. K. Chattur) would act under the status of Ambassador and the representative of Japan would have

similar status in New Delhi. 123

The conclusion of the separate Peace Treaty was not delayed very long. It was signed on June 9, 1952 in Tokyo by Foreign Minister Katsuo Okazaki and Indian Ambassador K. K. Chattur. The document officially ended World War II hostilities between the two nations and left the Soviet Union as the only major belligerent still legally at war with Japan.

The preamble of the Indo-Japanese Treaty provided that both nations would seek "maintenance of international peace and security in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations." The two countries agreed to the "Most Favoured Nations" treatment with respect to air-traffic rights and privileges - that they would grant to each country the rights and privileges accorded to all other nations. India stated that she would "return or restore, in their present form, all property, tangible or intangible, and rights and interests of Japan or its nationals" within India at the time war started and now under control of the Indian Government. Japan agreed to return similar property, rights and interests in Japan of India and its nationals" which were within Japan, at anytime between the 7th

123 The Oversea Hindustan Times, May 8, 1952.
December, 1941 and the 2nd September, 1945, unless the owner has freely disposed thereof without duress or fraud."

India would "waive all claims of India and Indian nationals arising out of action taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war as also claims of India arising from the fact that it participated in the occupation of Japan." 124

The treaty came into force on August 26, 1952 when the Indian Government ratified it. The conclusion of the Indo-Japanese treaty is significant from the point of view that it could develop a future balance of power in Asia to neutralize possible Chinese Communist expansion. A strong, independent Japan can serve as a check on pressure from Peking against the countries of South East Asia. As Chinese interest grew in South East Asia, it came nearer to threatening India's interests in this area. The main interests of India in this area are to keep South East Asian countries free, stable buffers against Communist penetration in the Far East, particularly in this direction.

**International Military Tribunal For the Far East.**

The Tribunal to try the Major War Criminals in the Far East was established by a Special Proclamation of

General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers which was signed on January 19, 1946. The Proclamation laid down the task of the Tribunal as follows:

"There shall be established an International Military Tribunal for the Far East for the trial of those persons charged individually, or as members of organizations, or both capacities, with offences which include crimes against peace." 125

The Tribunal was to consist of not less than six members and not more than eleven, appointed by the Supreme Commander from the names submitted by the Signatories of The Instrument of Surrender, India and Philippines. The President of the Tribunal was to be appointed by the Supreme Commander who consequently appointed Sir William Webb of Australia. The other countries represented on the Tribunal were: Canada, China, Great Britain, The Netherlands, The Soviet Union, The United States, France, India and The Philippine Islands. India was represented by Justice Rabha Binod Pal.

The Tribunal began hearings on May 3, 1946 and delivered its final verdict against 28 accused Japanese war criminals in November 1948. During the two years trial of these accused, the Tribunal admitted 4,336 exhibits and 779 depositions in evidence and heard 419

witnesses testify in Court. In the final verdict, 17 were given life imprisonment and 7 were to be hanged.

Justice R. B. Pal of India disagreed entirely with the other judges of the Tribunal. (The Judges of Netherlands and France dissented partly.) He gave his opinion in a 240,000 word thesis in which he blamed Australia for contributing to Japan's psychological preparation for war by blocking the League of Nations discussion of the racial question. Moreover he said that all the criminals should have been acquitted and pleaded that the world needs "generous magnanimity and understanding charity." Although this dissenting opinion of the Indian judge did not affect the final decision of the Court, "it weakened the strength of the indictment greatly". Moreover, it may have drawn some sympathy from those Japanese who worshipped Tojo and Co., as their heroes.

128 Vancouver Sun, November 12, 1948.
129 Newsweek, November 22, 1948, p. 36.
Question of Japanese War Prisoners in the U. N.

In the United Nations this question of Japanese war prisoners was brought up before the General Assembly by Australia, The United Kingdom and The United States. These three nations, in a joint communication asked the General Assembly that it consider the "failure of the U. S. S. R. to repatriate or otherwise account for prisoners of war detained in Soviet territory". 130

Demands for repatriation of remaining war prisoners had been pressed repeatedly by the western powers. Under the terms of the four Powers agreement the last of the war prisoners were to have been sent home before January 1, 1949. In the middle of 1950, exchanges with the Soviet Government over the repatriation question had grown increasingly bitter. According to Western estimates, 400,000 German prisoners and between 300,000 and 400,000 Japanese prisoners had not been accounted for by Soviet authorities.

In January, 1950, the Soviet member of the Allied Council for Japan walked out of a session in Tokyo when the Council insisted on continuing its investigation into the whereabouts of Japanese prisoners. Moscow, on the other hand contended that the repatriation programs

130 United Nations, Agenda Item, 67.
had been completed. The U. S. S. R. objected to the Assembly's handling of this question since it contended that Article 107 of the Charter excluded this matter from the duties of the United Nations.

The full debate over this issue took place in the Third Committee of the General Assembly. The joint resolution of Australia, The United Kingdom and the United States demanded that the Secretary General should establish an 'ad hoc' Commission composed of three qualified and impartial persons.

The representative of India, Mrs. Menon, agreed with the Western powers in their demand for the repatriation of Japanese and German prisoners from the Soviet Union. However, she did not accept the figures of prisoners of war submitted by these countries. She also expressed her doubt about the entry of the proposed Commission into Soviet territory for investigation. Nevertheless, the representative of India and the representative of Iraq jointly proposed the following amendment to the draft resolution by three countries. The Secretary General "requests the International Red Cross to establish a Commission composed of qualified impartial observers with a view to settling amicably

the problem of prisoners of war...." 132 When this amendment was brought to the attention of the International Red Cross, it replied that it could only act if all Governments agreed to the Assembly resolution. However, the representatives of India and Iraq insisted upon incorporation of their amendment which was rejected by the Committee. Seeing this the Indian representative abstained from voting.

The reason that the Indian delegate did not vote for the resolution seemed to be that since the Red Cross, which could only guarantee a humanitarian approach, would not appoint the observers to investigate the problem, the entire matter would remain in the realm of politics. It would not accomplish anything except increase the tension between the two groups. Anyhow, the resolution was passed in the Third Committee as well as in the General Assembly. It remained to be seen whether it would be able to accomplish its work or not.

Chapter V

Approach to the Korean Problem.

"The issue now is whether an aggressive expedition in order to remove the borders will produce a world conflagration or not. If it is likely to produce a conflagration what is the duty of India in that case? This is the approach which I would like to make. If India stands for a statesmanly action in the Security Council and further conservation and strengthening of the authority of U. N. without unduly attempting to strangle the sovereignty of individual nations that compose it, then we can see the logic behind Prime Minister Nehru's policy and the actions taken thereafter. Are we to support and strengthen the U. N. or not? I have no doubt in my mind that there is no hope for any nation in Asia unless we strengthen the forces that stand for peace." 133

Unfortunate Korea, set by geography in a strategic position among China, Japan and Russia, had been a bone of contention among these countries from 1890 to 1910. The "Rising Sun" changed her position in 1910 by annexing her. Japan used Korea as a base to support her forces in Manchuria in 1931 and against China in 1937. Meanwhile all the efforts of the Korean people for independence were suppressed by Japanese

133 Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, former Governor-General of India, on India's policy towards Korea. Quoted by C. Kondapi in "Indian Opinion of the United Nations" International Organization, November, 1951, p.717.
imperialism for the maintenance of "peace" in the Far East. During World War Two, Korean independence was discussed by the Allied leaders at the Cairo Conference in November 1943. Independence was promised and later at Yalta, in February 1945 where the principle of trusteeship was discussed.

After the war, the United States and the U.S.S.R. could not reach any agreement on the Korean problem. In this stalemate the United Nations succeeded in August 1948, through its commission, in forming the Republic of Korea in the area South of the 38th Parallel.\textsuperscript{134} This government under Syngman Rhee as President, was recognized by the United Nations. A Democratic People's Republic was formed in the north, in September 1948, with Kim Ilsung, Korean Communist, as Premier. This government was recognized by the U.S.S.R. Thus Korea was divided into two regimes, each claiming jurisdiction over the whole territory. However, the United Nations continued to attempt to reunite north and south Korea under a single government. For this purpose the United Nations Commission on Korea had been set up in 1948. The Commission sought without success to effect a unification by diplomatic means.

Meanwhile the relations between north and south

\textsuperscript{134} For full account of Korean issue see Chapter II.
Korea had deteriorated. According to the cablegram of June 26, 1950, of the United Nations Commission to the Secretary General the situation was going from bad to worse. The cablegram stated: "for the past two years the North Korean regime has by violently abusive propaganda, threatening gestures along the 38th Parallel and by encouraging and supporting subversive activities in the territory of the Republic of Korea, pursued tactics designed to weaken and destroy the Government of the Republic of Korea..." 135 Thus, the rising antagonism between the Korean regimes, each supported by an opposing great Power, left little hope for progress towards unity through negotiations. Thus the dynamic situation was created which exploded with the attack of North Koreans on the Republic on June 25, 1950.

An emergency meeting of the Security Council was called on June 25, 1950, at the United States request. 136 On the same day, the Security Council received, through the Secretary General, a cable from the Commission in Korea confirming reports of the attack. The Secretary General, addressing the Security Council, declared that the attack on the Korean Republic was "a violation of the

principles of the Charter" and "a threat to international peace." 137

The Security Council acted quickly in the absence of the Soviet Union whose representative, if present, probably would have delayed the progress. The Council adopted the United States resolution by a vote of 9 to 0 with Yugoslavia abstaining. The Security Council declared that a breach of the peace existed and called for a cease-fire and withdrawal of northern troops. It also called upon United Nations members to refrain from assisting the invading forces. The representative of India voted for the resolution.

The second basic resolution was passed by the Security Council on June 27. The Soviet Union was again absent. This resolution called upon member states to furnish assistance, including armed forces, to repel the attack and restore peace. The resolution was passed by a vote of 7 to 1 with Yugoslavia opposed. India and Egypt abstained from voting because of lack of instructions from their respective governments. On June 29, however, a cablegram was received by the General Secretary from Prime Minister Nehru in which he had stated that

"the Government of India has given the most careful consideration to this

resolution of the Security Council in the context of the events in Korea and also of the general foreign policy of the Government of India. It is opposed to any attempt to settle international disputes by resort to aggression ... therefore ... accepts the second resolution of the Security Council." 138

Before sending this cablegram the Prime Minister had consulted his Cabinet. It is quite understandable why the Indian Government was so much concerned. India, next to China, was nearest to the scene of conflict and the Government had to weigh with special care, the consequences of any such action. The action taken by the Government, was approved unanimously by the Indian Parliament.139

Although India supported both the resolutions of June 25 and 27, she could not furnish much material help to the United Nations forces in Korea. The reason for this was that the Indian economy was not strong enough to bear any extra burden. As far as military support was concerned, India, according to her leaders, could not afford to share such a burden because of the dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. Sir B. N. Rau put it this way: "The truth is that the whole structure and organization

of our armed forces are designed for home defence, and our internal needs at present are such that we cannot afford to send any of these forces to remote areas out of India." 140 But that did not seem to be the only reason. Shiree Nehru gave the following reason to the Indian Parliament; "India could have sent a token force to Korea but did not do so because other matters were connected with Korea and such a gesture might embarrass India and other parties in the case of further development in a particular direction." 141 This latter reason given by the Prime Minister seems to have more truth than the former one. Nevertheless, India offered an ambulance and a surgical unit for Korea. India's moral support was invaluable at that time, in view of the fact that India had been pursuing an independent line in world politics and could hardly be accused of acting under any kind of pressure from great powers.

The second phase of the conflict emerged with the decision of the Soviet delegate to return to the Security Council and to assume the presidency for the month of August. The Soviet delegate condemned the


141 Times of India, August 7, 1950.
June resolutions of the Council and charged that the Republic of Korea committed the first aggression in Korea. He further declared, although somewhat contradictorily, that the Korean affair was a civil war. He alleged that the United States was interested in making Korea an American colony and a military base.

Returning the charges the United Kingdom warned that "... the dark forces of communist imperialism are now clearly concentrating for the kill." 142 The United States delegate declared that the Soviet Union was using "big lie tactics". The result of such an unpleasant discussion was that the Security Council could not take any substantial action in Korea in the month of August. However, it placed on its agenda two charges from Peking which foreshadowed future difficulties. The first charge was that the United States had placed its seventh fleet around Formosa and the second charge was that the United States forces engaged in Korea had machine-gunned and bombed the territory of China. In September, the United States introduced a resolution for establishing a Commission to investigate Communist China's charges. She also suggested that the Commission should be composed of the representatives of India and Sweden. The reason that these two countries were mentioned was that they maintained

diplomatic representatives at Peking. The resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. However, the Security Council decided to invite the representative of the Government of Red China to take part in the discussion on the matter.

Mr. Wu Hsiuchuan, representative of Communist China, took his seat in the Security Council on November 28, 1950. After a long speech, Wu introduced a resolution in which he charged that the United States had committed an aggression against the Chinese people by "... occupation of Taiwan /Formosa/ by the armed forces of the Government of the United States of America...." He demanded "the complete withdrawal by the Government of the United States of America of its forces of armed aggression from Taiwan." The resolution was rejected. The Indian representative did not participate in the voting because of lack of instructions from his Government.

The situation in Korea in early September 1950, continued to be unfavourable to the United Nations. The Republic of Korea forces and United Nations troops were still retreating in South Korea. It was not clear whether or not the United Nations forces would hold the Pusan beachhead. In view of such a gloomy situation, the United States introduced a resolution asking the Council

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to condemn the North Koreans for continuing the aggression, but the Soviet Union vetoed this resolution on September 6, 1950 and countered with a proposal for an immediate cease fire and withdrawal of foreign troops. This proposal was rejected by the other members of the Security Council. In the meantime, the situation in Korea improved as the United Nations forces made a landing at Inchon in mid-September and drove the aggressors across the 38th Parallel. On October 1, 1950, General MacArthur called upon the North Koreans to surrender.

One of the aspects of Indian Policy towards the Korean situation was that North Korea had committed aggression. Thus India supported the Security Council resolutions. From that time on India's spokesmen were interested in seeing some kind of peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict. Such a policy had been outlined by the Prime Minister, in the course of the debate in the Indian Parliament.

"Our policy is first, of course, that aggression has taken place by North Korea over South Korea. That is a wrong act, that has to be condemned, that has to be resisted. Secondly, that so far as possible the war should not be spread beyond Korea. And thirdly that we should explore means of ending this war. The future of Korea must be decided entirely
by the Koreans themselves." 144

Immediately after the outbreak of war in Korea, India again began to advocate the admission of Communist China to the United Nations145 and the return of the Soviet Union to the Security Council.146 It was necessary, as India saw it, for peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. As soon as the Soviet Union returned to the Security Council in August 1950, the Indian delegate introduced a proposal that the Council should appoint a committee consisting of its non-permanent members to study all draft resolutions (The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. had already presented their draft resolutions) and proposals. After examining them the committee should submit its recommendations for peaceful settlement to the Council.147 The Indian delegate suggested a committee of non-permanent members because they could not be accused of any expansionist ambitions. These suggestions were not given sufficient support by the other members, and Sir, Rau did

144 Quoted by Sir B.N. Rau in Plenary meetings of the General Assembly, 1950, p. 133.

145 Nehru's appeal of July 13, 1950 to settle Korean problem by admitting Communist China to U.N. was rejected by the United States. The Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1950.


not present the draft resolution. Had these proposals been adopted, the Security Council would have avoided acrimony and saved time. Some useful results also could have been obtained. Since nothing was accomplished in the Security Council and a political stalemate prevailed, it was clear that only the General Assembly could offer some constructive action.

Under Article 12 of the Charter, the General Assembly can make recommendations on the basis of long-term political settlement, although it cannot do so when a matter is being considered by the Security Council. It was quite evident that the Council was blocked, so the "Uniting for Peace" resolution was presented in the General Assembly by the Western powers. This resolution was adopted by the Assembly on November 3, 1950. Under the provision of this resolution, the General Assembly can take actions on the non-procedural matters which were under the jurisdiction of the Security Council before. Although India had supported the U. N. stand in Korea, for some reasons she did not support this resolution and abstained on the final vote on it.

In October 1950, the United Nations forces standing on the 38th Parallel were waiting for a signal to cross it. This signal came on October 7th with the
adoption of the resolution sponsored by 9 Powers, Australia, Brazil, Cuba, The Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, The Philippines and the United Kingdom. This resolution stated that "(a) all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea."
"(b) that all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the Sovereign State of Korea."
"(c) That all sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of unified government..." 148

The debate which took place on this resolution was politically significant. It recalled a division of opinion among the non-Soviet states. Although the majority of the states was prepared to agree to solve the Korean problem in line with the terms of the resolution, India and other states opposed it and showed their desire for peaceful settlement at this time.

The delegate of India argued that if recommendations (a) and (b) were adopted by the General Assembly, it might prolong North Korea's resistance and even extend the area of conflict. He proposed, at the same time, that the General Assembly should call upon the North Korean forces to cease hostilities, by a specific date. If they did so, the United Nations could go on to implement its objectives, namely, the creation of an independent and united Korea by means of free elections and the economic rehabilitation of the country. But if the North Koreans did not comply with the call "we could review the situation and decide upon some other course."  

What India desired at this time was that before the United Nations forces crossed the Parallel, the North Koreans be given a chance to think afresh about peace at the time of their adverse military situation. But the General Assembly did not pay any attention to the Indian Proposals. India, then, abstained from voting on the


150 Speaking at Toronto on April 24 and 25, 1951, Sir Benegal Rau gave the following reason for the defeat of the Indian proposal; "... the defeat of this motion... was the result of a crucial miscalculation... Many more delegations would have supported the proposal had they not been under the impression that the threat of Chinese intervention was mere bluff and that the unification of the whole of Korea by military action was in near prospect." Sir Benegal Rau, India and the Far East, Burwash Memorial Lectures, April 24 and 25, 1951. (Toronto: Victoria University, 1951).
nine power resolution which was adopted by a big majority. Shiree Nehru told a press conference on October 18,

"we felt that the time had come for an effort to be made for a peaceful solution ... to cross the 38th Parallel without making such an effort ... appeared to us to be wrong and to involve grave risks of a conflict on a much wider scale." 151

The Prime Minister kept himself informed about the intentions of the Chinese Communists through Sardar K. M. Panikkar, Ambassador of India in Peking. Mr. Panikkar informed the Prime Minister that the Chinese Communist Government would take defensive action if the United Nations forces passed the Parallel. This warning was relayed immediately to the State Department in Washington. 152 This information was ignored by Washington. Instead some American papers called Panikkar a "Red sympathizer" and criticised Shiree Nehru and the Indian delegation at the United Nations. 153 It should be mentioned that Panikkar in fact is more conservative than Nehru himself. Most of his career was spent in the service of Maharajas. He worked for the Maharaja of Kashmir, was Secretary to Maharaja Patiala and became

151 Quoted in External Affairs, April 1951, p.122.
152 Vincent Sheean, "The Case for India," Foreign Affairs, October 1951, pp. 81-82.
successively, Foreign and Political Minister, Education, Health Minister and Prime Minister of Bikamer State. Although he joined the Gandhi movement one time, he, unlike Nehru or other national leaders, spent no time in jail.

The 38th Parallel was crossed and Shiree Nehru had nothing to say except that "the military mind has taken over." 154 After the crossing, the Chinese Communists repeatedly protested to the United Nations that the American forces were invading the territorial air of China and demanded their withdrawal. But the United Nations forces drove towards the Manchurian and the U.S.S.R. borders in order to clear the Peninsula of hostilities.155 By late November, United States Marines succeeded in establishing a foothold at one place on the Manchurian border. The "volunteers" of Communist China came into action on November 2, 1951 and the United Nations forces were driven into wholesale retreat. General MacArthur declared that "a wholly new war situation prevailed with enemy forces of 200,000 men including a

154 V. Sheean, "The Case for India," Foreign Affairs, October, 1951, p. 82.

This new situation in Korea caused widespread pessimism in many quarters. General MacArthur's handling of military affairs produced criticism, not only in Europe and Asia, but differences of opinion were also quite apparent in Washington. Some of the members of the United Nations feared that Chinese intervention would mean disastrous extension of the conflict. This fear was intensified by the declaration of President Truman that the United States would use the Atomic Bomb, which led to the hasty visit of Mr. Attlee, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, to Washington. The members of the Indian Parliament and the Indian Press unanimously criticised Truman's declaration.\textsuperscript{157}

At Lake Success, Canada and the Asian States became active in attempting to settle the Korean problem by peaceful means. Mr. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Minister for External Affairs, came out in favour of broad peace negotiations with the Chinese Communists. On the same day, on December 5, 1950, United Nations representatives of thirteen countries gathered at Sir


B. N. Rau's Fifth Avenue apartment to view the situation. This was the first time that India assumed the leadership of Asian and middle eastern states in the United Nations which was to occur many times in future. These thirteen nations under the sponsorship of Rau, issued an appeal to Communist China and North Korea to issue an immediate statement that their forces would not cross the 38th Parallel. These thirteen nations - Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, The Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen - further appealed that "such a declaration will give time for considering what further steps are necessary to resolve the conflict in the Far East and thus help to avert the danger of another world war." 158

Six days later, the Indian delegation introduced a resolution, on behalf of the same thirteen countries, for a cease-fire. Sir B. N. Rau also suggested that the President of the General Assembly should appoint a Committee of three persons, to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea could be arranged. This resolution was passed by the First Committee of the General Assembly and the President named Mr. L. B. Pearson (Canada) and Sir B. N. Rau (India) to this Committee. The third member was the President himself.

It should be noted, that in January 1951 the Commonwealth Prime Ministers were discussing the Far Eastern Affairs in London.¹⁵⁹ During this period they were in constant touch with their representatives at Lake Success, among whom were Sir Benegal Rau and Mr. Pearson of the U. N. Truce Committee. On January 11th, it was reported that the Prime Ministers had reached substantial agreement which was probably reflected in the Truce Committee's Plan.¹⁶⁰

This Truce Committee presented its peace Plan to the First Committee on January 11, 1951. The Plan called for a cease-fire, a withdrawal of foreign troops and a four Power's talk on Formosa and other Far Eastern problems. This was approved by the First Committee and it was decided that Communist China should be informed about it. But the U.S.S.R. delegation characterized the whole plan as "hardly constituted a basis for the peaceful settlement of any question."¹⁶¹ The People's Government of China rejecting the cease-fire plan, charged


¹⁶⁰ Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the United Kingdom's representative in the U.N., remarked later that "the peaceful efforts of the nine Commonwealth Prime Ministers" were rejected by Communist China. U.N. First Committee Fifth Session, January 16, 1951, Vol. II, p. 502.

that a cease-fire before the opening of negotiations, was designed only to obtain a "breathing space for the U. S. troops" and could "only be advantageous to the maintenance and existence of American aggression." At the same time it put forward a counter-proposal that seven powers - The People's Republic of China, The U.S.S.R. the United States, the United Kingdom, France, India and Egypt - should hold a conference in China to solve the problems of Formosa and of the Far East.\textsuperscript{162}

The United States took this reply of the Chinese Communists as a rejection of the cease-fire plan and her delegation in the United Nations introduced a resolution branding them as aggressors. India, as well as many other countries, including Britain and Canada, became fearful of the consequences of treating the Chinese reply as a rejection. These countries insisted upon seeking a clarification of the Chinese reply. In fact, the Indian Ambassador in Peking was working on this and conveyed Peking's attitude to the Indian delegation who forwarded it to the members of the First Committee.

India and some other members felt that progress was made towards a cease-fire. The United States, nevertheless, believed that little had been accomplished and

chose this moment to make no concessions. The Asian-Arab group came forward with an alternative proposal that representatives of the seven governments mentioned by Peking, meet and "after all obscure points - if there were any - had been clarified, would frame a definite programme of steps to be taken for their future deliberations." This proposal was rejected by the First Committee. In the same evening the United States resolution, branding the Chinese Communists as aggressors was passed by a vote of 44 - 7, with 7 abstentions. Those who voted against the U. S. resolution were the Soviet bloc, Burma and India. The abstainers were Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sweden, Syria, Yemen and Yugoslavia. The General Assembly adopted the resolution by the same vote on February 1, 1951. The United States obtained its way, but at what price? Despite the size of the vote in favour of the resolution, many countries believed that the action was unwise at that time and India warned that it abandoned, for the time being, all hopes for a peaceful settlement. Speaking in the Indian Parliament, Prime Minister Nehru declared:

"As we expected, the passing of this resolution has, for the time being at least, put an end to any attempts

163 First Committee, January 25, 1951, p. 544.
at negotiation or settlement. We hope still that it may be possible for events to take a better turn in future, but I must confess that at the moment, that hope has grown very dim."

Of course, the United States felt resentful towards those countries who voted against her resolution. India, more than any other country, was looked upon with great disfavour. Perhaps "India's great crime in American eyes" was that she stood firm to the end. The American Congress punished the starving people of India by delaying an issue of wheat to them for months. But even that episode could not bring any change in India's independent approach to the Korean problem.

For the time being all India's hopes for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem were dampened. Mr. Rau refused to work on the Good Office Committee. So did Mr. Pearson of Canada. As had been warned by the Indian delegation, all efforts (from February 1st to May 15th, 1951) made by the Good Offices Committee to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Korean war, proved futile, due to the unfavourable Chinese attitude.

164 "India's Foreign Policy, A Summary of Recent Statement by the Prime Minister of India", External Affairs, April, 1951, p. 122.

165 V. Sheean, "The Case for India", Foreign Affairs, October, 1951.
However, India's hopes for peaceful negotiations brightened after the removal of General MacArthur by President Truman in April 1951. One of the Indian spokesmen remarked that the United Nations would now be able to "pursue its Korean peace with greater singleness of purpose." *

While these developments were taking place, the General Assembly on May 8, 1951, voted for the imposition of an arms embargo upon Communist China and North Korea. The resolution which had been introduced by the United States, requested all governments to impose an embargo on the shipments of "arms, ammunition, implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation material of strategic value and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war." 166 India did not support this measure because of her belief that it would have little effect in further reducing supplies for China, but would, on the contrary put further obstacles in the way of a peaceful solution. However, this did not affect the efforts of the United Nations in seeking a peaceful solution.

The first sign of another move for peace came from the U. N. side on June 1st when the General

166 U. N. First Committee, May 17, 1951, p. 632.

* New York Times, April, 1951.
Secretary (at Ottawa) proposed to the North Koreans a cease-fire along the 38th Parallel. This suggestion was accepted by the Soviet Union on June 23. World opinion grasped this occasion and high-level diplomatic talks began in Washington, London and Moscow. These were followed by exchanges in the field after General Ridgeway on June 29, offered to discuss a cease-fire with the Communist Commanders. The truce talks opened on July 10 at Kaesong (the truce party moved to Panmunjon in October 1951).

While fighting continued all along the front line, these protected parleys with their charges and interruptions continued for a year and a half. Although most of the conflicting issues were settled, the stalemate occurred on the prisoners of war issue. The North Koreans and the Chinese Communists insisted that all their soldiers, captured by the United Nations forces should be returned; on the other hand the United Nations explained that there must not be a forced repatriation of the prisoners of war.

India took the initiative in breaking the stalemate in November 1952. The Indian delegation to the U. N. submitted a compromise proposal for solving the prisoner-of-war issue in Korea. This resolution was drafted by the Indian delegation after consulting the
Peking authorities. According to the resolution, a Repatriation Commission which was to consist of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, or similar four states nominated by both sides, plus an umpire appointed by the Commission or the United Nations, would handle the prisoners of war. Those prisoners who were not disposed of within 90 days would be referred to the Political Conference to be called under the terms of a draft truce.

The United States as well as the Soviet Union opposed the resolution in its original form. The U. S. mainly objected to the reference of the prisoners to the Political Conference if the Repatriation Commission failed to dispose of them. However, the support of the U. S. was assured when India revised her resolution. The revised resolution would give the U. N. authority to decide on prisoners of war if the Political Conference failed to solve the problem within 30 days. On the Soviet side, the main objection was that the Indian resolution did not contain a clause for a cease-fire. Consequently the Soviet delegation accused, unfairly, that "the representative of India did not wish to act in the interest of the Asian people".167 The Chinese Communists likewise rejected the Indian truce.

plan charging that it was "camouflage" to prevent the "complete repatriation of prisoners." Nevertheless, the revised resolution was passed by the General Assembly by 53 to 5 with one (China) abstention. Since the plan was rejected, both by the Soviet Union and Communist China, it did not stand any chance of expediting an armistice. The significant thing about the vote was that the Asian and Arab countries, following the example of India, voted with the western powers.

It is hard to predict what India might do but in view of her past record it is safe to say that she will continue to make attempts to solve the Korean problem.

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Chapter VI

Conclusion

In her so-called Far Eastern Policy, India has followed certain positive objectives: although she has given firm support to the United Nations and its Charter she has not always agreed with its policies in the Far East.

Her leaders have been eager to support the oppressed people's of Asia. This policy has been illustrated by the calling of the first Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi in April 1947 and again in January 1949. In the latter conference the cause of the Indonesian Republic's stand against the Netherlands government was fully discussed. The purpose of these conferences was not to form any kind of Asian bloc in world politics, but merely to promote friendship between all the Asian states and to give moral support to the cause of those Asian peoples who were engaged in a war of liberation. At the same time India has never lost faith in the United Nations and she has supported the Asian cause through this world organization.

In the case of China, India regarded the objectives of Communist China's foreign policy as being very
much the same as were those pursued by the Kuomintang. The "liberation" of Tibet by the Chinese Communists has been considered an act of consolidation of their territory which historically belongs to China. Manchuria and Formosa also fall into this category. In view of China's security, her spokesmen, want to see Korea and Indo-China freed from foreign influence. Consequently such a policy of Communist China is considered by the Indians as being defensive, not offensive. One may agree or disagree with this policy and its methods of execution, its aspects are old - older than the Communist regime. It is the old policy of China, which has been inherited by the new regime from its predecessors.

Although, India has been following a friendly policy towards Communist China, she is also aware that her large neighbour is the principal potential threat to her security. While professing affection for their fellow Asians in the north, the Indian statesmen are acutely conscious of Red China's much larger army and her easy access to India through Burma. Probably for these reasons India regards China, Japan, Burma and Nepal as her most important diplomatic posts abroad, with Peking ranking first. It is for the same reasons that the statesmen in New Delhi wish to remain on the best possible terms with the government at Peking.
The second way to confine China's interest in expansion, if there is any, is to make Japan a strong and democratic nation. India's refusal to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty was the expression of a desire to see a strong counter-balance to Red China created. From the very beginning India's position has been to see a sovereign state in Asia. The San Francisco document left Japan's real sovereignty doubtful in the minds of many Asians. It tended, in their opinion, to weaken rather than strengthen Japan's potential position as a leader among the democratic forces in the East. However, in the light of past friendly relations between India and China, it may be said that there is probability of continuation of such relations in the near future.

So far as the Korean situation is concerned, India supported the U. N. action branding the North Koreans as the aggressors, but she could only afford to send an ambulance and a surgical unit to join the U. N. forces in Korea. However, her moral support which was invaluable at that time, was assured so long as resistance to aggression was the main issue. But as soon as the United Nations' forces crossed the 38th Parallel, the issue of resistance to aggression, according to India, was no longer existent. What she wanted to see, that is, the end of the Korean war along the 38th Parallel, was
appreciated by the United Nations one year later after much loss and destruction. Thus the responsibility of prolonging and extending the conflict lay on the shoulders of the United Nations and India had no part in it.

India fully accepted the principle of collective security but being an Asian state, she could not agree with all the United Nations methods of enforcing it in Korea. The Indian representatives in the United Nations had given warnings about the consequences of the United Nations forces moving to the Manchurian border. Consequently, India could not support the United States resolution for branding the Chinese Communists as the aggressors. In fact, she opposed it on legal grounds as well as on the ground that it would prolong hostilities, extend the area of conflict and negate the proposals to negotiate peace. India was not the only country to see this. Many other countries including other states of Asia and earlier, of Europe also saw it. So as later events show India's predictions turned out to be right.

The Indians were equally determined to have peace in Korea. From the beginning they saw the necessity of the presence of the Soviet Union and Communist China at the peace table to end the Korean war. On this account Pandit Nehru made his personal appeals to Stalin and Acheson. Although he did not succeed, he did not
tire of making further attempts to bring the antagonistic parties together. Despite the serious disagreement with the United Nations policy, the Indian delegation in the United Nations gathered the support of 12 Asian and Middle East Asian countries behind it to continue its efforts for peace. India was in a very good position for this as she was friendly with both sides and was diplomatically represented in Peking by an Ambassador. The latter kept the Indian delegation at Lake Success informed about the Chinese reaction to any major event. Moreover, because of friendly relations between India and China, India's interpretation of Chinese foreign policy made it possible to bring the opposition parties together.

Unfortunately, every attempt of India in seeking a peaceful settlement was blocked either by the Western Powers or by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it left its deep impression on both sides. The latest attempt of the Indian delegation in U. N. in 1952 to settle the issue of repatriation of prisoners-of-war was a genuine approach to the problem: although it was turned down by the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communists, it may be hoped that a similar formula will be employed to settle that issue.

In short, India's approach to the Far East problems has been a constructive one. India has been
trying to see reality throughout. In regard to her attitude towards Communist China and Japan, India has been bitterly criticised by the United States. The Soviet Union has taken an equal share in condemning some of the aspects of India's policy. In spite of this, India has been able to continue to pursue an independent policy in seeking a solution of the Far Eastern problems by peaceful means. In view of the circumstances which have arisen since 1947, her foreign policy in that region is justified.
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