Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

International and Commonwealth aspects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1911-1922 Stipke, Ulrich Heinz 1953

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1953_A8 S8 I7.pdf [ 11.63MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0106406.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0106406-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0106406-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0106406-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0106406-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0106406-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0106406-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0106406-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0106406.ris

Full Text

INTERNATIONAL AND COMMONWEALTH ASPECTS OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1911 - 1922 by ULRIGH HEINZ. STIPKE A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS In the Department of INTERNATIONAL STUDIES We accept this thesis as conforming to the standard required from candidates for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS. Members of the Department of THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, VANCOUVER, CANADA Apr i l , 1953. ABSTRACT The present i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n i s characterized by the d i v i s i o n of the World i n two power blocs. The countries of the Western World have united themselves i n the North A t l a n t i c Treaty Organization as the f i r s t e f f e c t i v e large scale example of regional c o l l e c t i v e security i n world history. The s p i r i t u a l foundation of NATO i s the idea of the ''Atlantic Anglo-American community based on mutual friendship and co-operation between Great B r i t a i n and the United States. But i t was by no means certain that these two great powers of the Anglo-Saxon race should cooperate i n close association with each other i n world politics. After World War I , the B r i t i s h Empire found i t s world supremacy - undisputed so f a r - challeng-ed by the p o t e n t i a l and increasing strength of the United States. Great B r i t a i n had then to make her decision whether she was to antagonize the United States or to become her cooperative partner i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . The test-case was offered by the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . The global importance of t h i s A l l i a n c e cannot be over-estimated. I t was one of the strongest p i l l a r s of B r i t a i n ' s foreign p o l i c y , and contributed, to a substantial degree, to Japan's ascendancy i n the Far East; i t influenced d e c i s i v e l y United States foreign p o l i c y immediately a f t e r 1919 - being to a large extent one of the deeper causes for the i s o l a t i o n i s t withdrawal of the United States from the system of international cooperation as established at the Paris Peace Conference -, and presented Qreat B r i t a i n with the decision to choose definitely-between Japan as B r i t a i n ' s a l l y i n the P a c i f i c and the r e a l i z a t i o n of the Anglo-American Community. purpose I t i s thePS'd.'^-j- of t h i s thesis to point out these implications of the A l l i a n c e on inte r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , p a r t i c u l a r l y during the c r u c i a l years from 1919 to 1922. An elucidation of the problem from the B r i t i s h aspect i s a l l the more important because i t r e f l e c t s the change i n the con s t i t u t i o n a l development within the B r i t i s h Commonwealth aft e r World War I. F i n a l l y , B r i t a i n ' s foreign p o l i c y towards Japan i n that short period sheds s i g n i f i c a n t l i g h t on the B r i t i s h attitude towards the p o l i t i c a l development i n the Far East during the Manchurian C r i s i s i n the beginning of the 1930's. I t •f.&rnri«'&e£tie key f o r understanding the B r i t i s h appeasement and f l i r t a t i o n with Japan as i t became evident by S i r John Simon's p o l i c y i n 1932. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This thesis was written during my exchange-scholarship year 1952/53, sponsored by the International Students Service of the University of British Columbia. I am indebted to Dean H. F. Angus, Professor G.Davies, Professor Ping-ti Ho and Professor F. H. Soward, who encouraged my work and inspired me with useful suggestions. Especially I wish to thank Professor G. Davies who supervised the thesis and corrected my English, and Professor F. H. Soward who made accessible to me the "Unpublished Borden Papers" from the Dominion Archives of Canada. Finally, I should l i k e to express my grateful apprecia-tion to the International Students Service of the University of British Columbia for having made available to me, one year's scholarship-and for the financial assistance granted to my thesis work. T A B L E OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the P o l i t i c a l Development in the Far East, 1914-18. . . 1 II British and Japanese Diplomacy at the Peace Conference of Paris, 1919. . . . . . 55 III Anglo-Japanese Relations from 1919 to the Imperial Conference of 1921 . . . . 84 IT The Dominions, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the^Imperial Conference" of 1921 . :l 132 V The Washington Conference of 1921-22 and the Solution of the Pacific Problem . . 185 Bibliography 216 CHAPTER I "THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE AND THE POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT IN THE FAR EAST,1914-1918" The ap p l i c a t i o n of the term, •World P o l i t i e s ' i n i t s s t r i c t modern sense, of expressing the entanglement and inter-dependence of international a f f a i r s i s only j u s t i f i e d with the appearance of Japan and the United States i n world a f f a i r s as powers of dominating influence on both sides of the P a c i f i c Ocean. The r i s e of the Japanese Empire as a great power i n the Far East which was primarily due to the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e of 1902, and the expansion of Japan's po?/er during the F i r s t World War gave r i s e to po l -i t i c a l consequences which were of the highest importance i n in t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . P rimarily, there were two immediate r e s u l t s emanating from the ascendance of the Japanese power during t h i s period. F i r s t l y , there was the decline, i f not the elimination of Great B r i t a i n as the t r a d i t i o n a l leading power with her predominant influence in Eastern A s i a , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n China, p o l i t i c a l as well as economical; and secondly, the steadily growing increase of Japanese power aroused the antagonism of the United States which, having become the other world power i n the P a c i f i c , looked upon Japanese expansion i n China and her pot e n t i a l expansion i n the P a c i f i c as a serious menace to the basic p r i n c i p l e of U. S. foreign p o l i c y , - the preservation of the Open-Door P o l i c y i n China, and as a d i r e c t threat to her own security. I t i s the scope of t h i s chapter to point out these consequences of a p o l i t i c a l development which l a t e r on determined de-c i s i v e l y the further course of B r i t i s h and American foreign p o l i c y i n Eastern Asia. As f a r as Japan was concerned, the r e s u l t was that at the end of the war, she had reached such a degree of power, p o l i t l c a L i n f l u e n c e , and diplomatic prestige .that she was e n t i t l e d to appear at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 amongst those great powers which, by their prepond-erant influence, shaped the international post-war world through the decisions of the "Supreme A l l i e d Council of the Big Four". The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , concluded i n 1902, p r o -videdyone of the strongest p i l l a r s , i f not the foundation of Great B r i t a i n ' s foreign p o l i c y i n the following years. The reasons for the conclusion of the A l l i a n c e , as f a r as Great B r i t a i n was concerned, were i n the main two-fold. The advance of Russia i n Manchuria with the aim of absorbing Korea into the Russian sphere of influence^ i n other 7?ords, Russia's tremendous increase of power i n the Far East ( con-st i t u t e d a d i r e c t and serious challenge to the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n the whole of Eastern Asia. The possible danger - 3 -however, of an alj-gnment of Japan with Russia would have rendered Great B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n there ^hopeless" 1. Secondly, Great B r i t a i n a f t e r f a i l i n g to arrive at an agreement with Russia, Germany and the United States, realized the i n d i s -pensable necessity of overcoming her t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of •splendid i s o l a t i o n ' the disadvantage of which she may well have already f e l t i n the Venezuela C r i s i s , the Boer War, and the Fashoda C r i s i s . The A l l i a n c e from the B r i t i s h view was anti-Russian. I t was regarded at that time as an instrument to check a further Russian expansion i n the Extreme East. The success of Japan i n the Russo-Japanese War i n 1905 had convinced Great B r i t a i n of the e f f i c i e n c y of Japan fs m i l i t a r y power and had therefore induced the B r i t i s h Government to continue the A l l i a n c e , i n a modified form that enhanced i t s value. The balance of power i n the Extreme East having been redressed by Russia's defeat, the B r i t i s h Government provided f o r the extension of the A l l i a n c e to India, whose security might possibly have been jeopardized i f Russia concentrated her aspirations on Middle Asia a f t e r having been expelled from the Far East^>ut r however valuable t h e A l l i a n c e proved as the keystone of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y , Great B r i t a i n had to take into serious consideration the attitude of another great power with v i t a l i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East, - the United States. '"^Langer, W.L. The Diplomancy of Imperialism, 1890-1902.New York }London, A. A. Knopp , 1935, Vol. II. p. 783. - 4 -At f i r s t , the United States contemplated the A l l i a n c e favourably as a means which was serving the purpose of up-holding the 'Open Door' doctrine and of safe-guarding the i a t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of China as was stipulated by the treaty. Spinks speaks of the United States as a 'secret partner' and: g •unsigned member' of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e up to 1905 . This f r i e n d l y attitude changed however, when Japan after 1905 embarked oh an aggressive p o l i c y i n China. I t was i n July of that year that President Theodore R oosevelt stated that the future h i s t o r y of America would be more determined by "the United States'position on the P a c i f i c facing China than by her p o s i t i o n on the A t l a n t i c facing Europe." I t was therefore only natural that U. S. Far Eastern p o l i c y became more active i n counteracting Japan Ts p o l i c y i n China. The U. S. Secretary of War, Mr. Taft, addressed an i n d i r e c t warning to Japan when he stated in October, 1907, at the American Association of Shanghai: " The American-Chinese trade i s s u f f i c i e n t l y great to require the government of the United States to take every legitimate means to protect i t against dimin-uation or injury by the p o l i t i c a l preference of any of i t s competitors. . . . I t would have the right to protest against exclusion from Chinese trade by a departure from the p o l i c y of the open door. . . . c f . I s h i l , V i s c . K . .Diplomatic Commentaries.transit.by W.R.Langdon^ Baltimore /&he John Hopkins Press,1936, p.80. 2Spinks,C.N. ,"the 'Eermination of the Anglo-JapQ^Pse A l l i a n c e " , P a c i f i c H i s t o r i c a l Review.Vol.VJ. .plEffiS?) p.522 3Th.Roosevelt i n a l e t t e r to B.G.Wheeler,President of the Uni-v e r s i t y of California,June 17,1905,quoted i n Dennett,T., Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War.New York ,1925 ,p.3. 4 the Statement by secretary of "far,Mr. Taft on Oct.8,1907, i n North China Herald,0ct.11,1907.quoted from Chang.ChF.The Anglo-Japanese Alliance,Baltimore,The John Hopkins Press ,1931, pp.247 f f . - 5 -In addition to that, the immigration question between the United States and Japan assumed serious proportions and con-tributed i n a considerable degree to s t r a i n i n g the r e l a t i o n s between both countries. In 1906 the famous San Francisco School Incident occurred because of the Japanese immigration. One year l a t e r i n 1907, President Roosevelt issued a proclam-ation according to which Japanese immigrants provided with passports to Mexico, Canada or Hawaii, were denied entry into the United States. The tension reached i t s climax i n 1907-08 when President Roosevelt, because of the war scare, ordered the despatch of the whole of the United States f l e e t into the P a c i f i c . The B r i t i s h Government was most anxious to see the strained American-Japanese r e l a t i o n s relaxed^and therefore 7 approached the United States government with suggestions which led f i n a l l y to the Root-Takahira Agreement of November 3rd, States ^ 1908, by which the Upi "fed/ana Japan re-affirmed t h e i r honest inte n t i o n to maintain the existing 'status quo* i n the P a c i f i c and the p r i n c i p l e of the open-door i n China. 8 Since that time, however, American-Japanese antagonism became a continuous factor of i n s t a b i l i t y i n the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e which 5-'Chang op. c i t . .Ibid. ppfti^S. Bailey, Th,A., Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American  C r i s i s , Stanford Univ. C a l i f . , Stand.Univ.Press,1934.p.211 f f . 7 cf. Franhke,0. Die Grossmaechte i n Ostasien ,1894.-1914, Hamburg 1923.pp.300-302 cf. Root-Takahira Agreement of Nov.3,1908, by exchange of notes. Text of. Kawakami,K.K., Japan's P a c i f i c P o l i c y , New York,1922, pp.48-49. _ 6 -the B r i t i s h Government had to take into due consideration i n her r e l a t i o n s with Japan. I t faced Great B r i t a i n with the serious prospect of being involved i n an American-Japanese War i n which she had to take the side of Japan against the United States. Un addition, there was an increasing body of opinion i n the United States which looked with displeasure and uneasiness on the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , a fac t which 9 was r e a l i z e d i n B r i t a i n as well as i n Japan. The po t e n t i a l danger of becoming embroiled with the United States because of the AngloSJapanese A l l i a n c e , constituted a problem of great concern to the B r i t i s h Dominions of Canada, A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand. As early as 1906, Commander B e l l a i r s raised the question In the B r i t i s h House of Commons '^whether there i s any provision i n the Anglo-Jap anese Treaty safeguarding His Majesty's Dominions from being involved i n a war with the United States on behalf of Japan." 1 0 At that time S i r Edward Grey was s t i l l i n the p o s i t i o n to a l l a y such fears, saying that there was no i n d i c a t i o n that events were l i k e l y to lead to war. The American-Japanese tension, however, grew st e a d i l y , reaching a serious c r i s i s i n 1910 over the question of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of the railway l i n e s i n South Manchuria as 9 cf. I s h i i , op.cit. pp56-59 10 Great Britain,The Parliamentary Debates,House of Commons 4th Series,London,.H.M.St.0. (Hereafter referred to as Gr.Brit.,Pari.DebJ 4th Ser.1906 ,vol.163, p.864,quoted from Chang, op. c i t . pp 149-150. - 7 -proposed by the U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. Knox. The anxiety of the B r i t i s h Government was obviously r e f l e c t e d In a despatch of the Foreign Secretary, S i r Edward Grey, i n July 1911. This stated that Canada was now on such good terms with the United States, and there was such a growing f e e l i n g of f r i e n d l i n e s s between the public opinion i n t h i s country and that of the other side of the A t l a n t i c that i t was clear that we could not undertake any obli g a t i o n which would involve us i n war with the United States 1 1 This was the f i r s t time that Canada who was to play such an outstanding role i n the h i s t o r y of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , was o f f i c i a l l y mentioned i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r connection. Accordingly, the B r i t i s h Government was highly pleased when she was approached i n August and September, 1910, by the U.S. government with the suggestion of concluding a Treaty of General A r b i t r a t i o n for the peaceful settlement of d i s p u t e s . 1 2 The B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary immediately communicated with the Japanese^Government, advancing suggestions which amounted to an adjustment of the Al l i a n c e to Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s i n the case of the renewal of the A l l i a n c e . 1 3 The Japanese government responded p o s i t i v e l y and assented to the B r i t i s h ^ B r i t i s h Documents on the Origin^of the War,1898-1914,ed. Goocn ,ti..F.- Temper l e y ,honaon, ti.M. at. O f f i c e ,1925 f f Yol VIII (Hereafter referred to as Br.Doc.VIII). ' ' Br.Doc.VIII, no.431, p.529. 12 Ibid. Mo.405, p.503, and no.450,p.544, and no.463,p.559. 13 Ibid.and no.406,p.503. - 8 -proposal. Japan even took the i n i t i a t i v e for suggesting a modification of the text of the Treaty i n such a form that rendered the "casus foederis" of the A l l i a n c e inoperative against a power with whom B r i t a i n would conclude a treaty 14 of a r b i t r a t i o n . This proposal became a r e a l i t y as A r t i c l e IV inserted into the renewed; Treaty of A l l i a n c e of 1911. The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n 1911 was the ex-pression of the changed conditions i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s : The immediate Russian p e r i l i n the Far East had vanished, the American-Japanese tension was increasing more and more, and the view of the B r i t i s h Dominions, who had begun to play a more Important role and had acquired the right to be consulted i n matters of foreign p o l i c y i n the Committee of Imperial Defence established i n 1911, had to be taken into due consideration by the B r i t i s h government as f a r as her p o l i c y towards Japan was concerned. Before the A l l i a n c e was renewed the B r i t i s h Government therefore consulted the Dominion Prime Ministers on t h i s question at the Imperial Conference i n May 1911 and 15 secured t h e i r unanimous approval. The B r i t i s h Dominions were on t h i s occasion for the f i r s t time introduced i n t o the "arcana im p e r i i " i n a matter of high p o l i t i c s , whereas the f i r s t two t r e a t i e s of the A l l i a n c e i n 1902 and 1905 had been concluded on the exclusive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the London Foreign Office ^ The proposal was advanced by the Japanese Prime Minister Komura,cf.Ishil op.©it Pp.56ff.; cf.also Br.Doc. VIII, no. 407,pp 504-505. ~ 15 of. Statement by the Secretary of State f o r the, Colonies,Mr. Harcourt, i n the B r i t i s h House of Commons,July 19,1911, Gr ^ - : 2 S ' J . U S . 8 - r " TO1- » ' »" * Br. Doc. without any cohsultation or cooperation of the Dominions. In the Australian Parliament, i n the Senate as well as i n the House of Representatives, the opinion on the treaty-renewal was expressed by various speakers. Senator M i l l e n maintained i n September, 1911, that A u s t r a l i a was e n t i t l e d 16 to know how far she was committed. In the Australian House of Representatives, although warning was given that A u s t r a l i a "must not be l u l l e d i n t o any f a l s e security by the arrangement between Japan and the mother country", 17 the treaty-renewal was welcomed. I t was r e a l i s t i c a l l y argued that Japan should be the a l l y of the B r i t i s h Empire 18 rather than a "possible assailant". These opinions r e f l e c t e d not only the A u s t r a l i a n standpoint i n the question of Anglo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , but ware also i n d i c a t i v e of the fact that the Dominions held t h e i r own views which were emanating from the peculiar and i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t i n t h i s matter. But they had not yet arrived at that stage i n t h e i r constit-utional evolution which enabled them to i n s i s t vigorously on t h e i r own r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s or even to exert decisive influence on the course of foreign p o l i c y as determined ex-c l u s i v e l y by the Downing Street Cabinet. 16 Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , P a r i . Deb., Sess. 1911, vol, LX, p. 61. 1 7 i b i d . , p. 389. 1 8 l b i d . , p. 203. - 10 -Summarizing the matter of the treaty-renewal of 1911 one can say that two factors placed the B r i t i s h government i n an uneasy p o s i t i o n i n her r e l a t i o n s with Japan; the at-titude of the United States of America and, i n a somewhat le s s e r extent, in t e r e s t s of the self-governing Dominions. The United Kingdom Government had good reason to keep the new Anglo-Japanese agreement secret from the knowledge of Parliament, thus avoiding a large discussion, which gave r i s e to c r i t i c i s m i n the B r i t i s h House of Commons.1^ Owing to the combined e f f o r t of the B r i t i s h and Japanese negotiators, the i n s e r t i o n of the famous* A r t i c l e IV into, the t r e a t y - a l l i a n c e was achieved. I t read: Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general a r b i t r a t i o n wLth a t h i r d power, i t i s agreed that nothihg i n t h i s Agreement s h a l l e n t a i l upon such Contracting Party an o b l i g a t i o n to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of a r b i t r a t i o n i s i n force." 20 The purpose of t h i s clause was to eliminate any danger f o r the B r i t i s h Empire of her being drawn into; a possible armed c o n f l i c t between Japan and the United States. The B r i t i s h Government was therefore anxious to communicate with the U. S. State Department, pointing out the object of the new l Q Gr. B r i t . , P a r i . Deb. , 5th Sess. , 1911, v o l . 28, p. 1257. 20 A r t i c l e IJT of the Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan, signed at London, July 13,, 1911, quoted i n Br. Doc. VIII, no. 436, pp 532-533. - 11 -treaty and expressinggthe hope that the U. S. Government would "appreciate the desire that Great B r i t a i n and Japan have shown to remove any possible obstacle to progress of a r b i -21 t r a t i o n " . The new provision together with the fact that Japan was no longer obliged to render armed assistance to Great B r i t a i n i n the case of complications on the borders of India meant, without any doubt, a weakening of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , or generally speaking, a coollng-off of the diplomatic r e l a t i o n s between the two Empires. Never-theless, on both sides the desire for maintaining the A l l i a n c e as the keystone of Japanese and B r i t i s h diplomacy was very strong. Even a formerly declared opponent of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e l i k e Prince I t o , was convinced i n 1909 of the importance of retaining the Anglo-Japanese 22 A l l i a n c e . He firm l y believed i n the e f f i c i e n c y and stab-i l i t y of the pact. T he Japanese Government r e a l i s t i c a l l y recognized the urgent necessity f o r Great B r i t a i n to pre-serve amicable relatilons with the United States and so acquiesced i n the B r i t i s h wishes because they wanted to use the A l l i a n c e as a further instrument for the consolidation of Japan's power i n the Far East. The B r i t i s h motive for the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e derived 21 of.Despatches of the Brit.Foreign Secretary,Sir Edward Grey, to the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Washington,Mr.Bryce,July 12,1911, Br. Doc. ¥111, no. 433 and 434, pp. 530-531. cf.Interview of the Brit.Ambassador to Tokyo,Mr.MacDonald, with Prince Ito,June 14,1909,in Br.Doc.VIII,no.365,pp 466-468. - 12: -pri m a r i l y from two considerations which were closely con-nected with each other. F i r s t , a continued a l l i a n c e with Japan was regarded as a"guarantee against Japan's i l l - w i l l " which might have been e a s i l y aroused by the an t i - O r i e n t a l 23 immigration-laws i n the B r i t i s h Dominions. An abrogation of the treaty a l l i a n c e would have led to considerable f r i c t i o n s with Japan and might have constituted a permanent danger f o r the i n t e g r i t y of the B r i t i s h Empire. To avoid t h i s was the supreme aim of B r i t i s h diplomacy at a time when Great B r i t a i n had to concentrate a l l her strength on Europe where the German naval p o l i c y constituted a serious menace. The prolongation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was therefore a precautionary measure on the part of the B r i t i s h Government for the protection of the B r i t i s h Dominions who were exposed to Japanese pressure. I t was furthermore based on the assumption that the Japanese government f e e l i n g under a moral ob l i g a t i o n , would r e f r a i n from embarking on a large-scale expansion southward by immigration into A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand, as well as to Canada, but would turn to Korea, Manchuria and the other regions i n the neighborhood of Japan, as S i r Edward Grey hoped.expressing h i s view to 7 2 3 C f . L e t t e r of the Russian Ambassador to London, July 7,1911 on h i s conversation with the Under-Secretary of State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , S i r Arthur NIcolson, i n Siebert ,B, •Entente Diplomacy and the World, London,New York,The KnicicerDocicer press, l y a l , p. 32. - 13 -the Japanese Ambassador to the Court of Saint James i n May, 1911.24 This l a s t consideration, serving as i t did the v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of the "White P o l i c y " of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand and ensuring the security of these Dominions from a p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y Japanese expansion to the South apparently became a determining and influencing factor i n Great B r i t a i n ' s Far Eastern p o l i c y . Since that time i t has recurred i n British.diplomacy during the Siberian Expedition i n 1918, 1919 and l a t e r on i n the Manchurian C r i s i s of 1931. The second reason f o r maintaining the A l l i a n c e was c l o s e l y linked with, the use of the A l l i a n c e as a means for safeguarding the P a c i f i c Dominions against a possible attack by Japan herself. The centre of gravity, as f a r as B r i t i s h Foreign p o l i c y was concerned, had shifted to Europe since Germany had embarked upon a long-term naval-building p o l i c y the speed, extent and i n t e n s i t y of which iipnedlately challeng-ed B r i t i s h naval supremacy which B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y always sought to maintain as i t s fundamental p r i n c i p l e by keeping the so-called 'Two-Power Standard'. Tbemeet the German danger Great B r i t a i n was compelled to concentrate a l l her naval power i n the North Sea. The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e enabled Great B r i t a i n to increase the e f f e c t i v e strength of her navy i n European waters by reducing the B r i t i s h naval forces i n the Far E a s t . 2 5 2 4Br.Doc.VIII, no. 427,p.525 2 5 c f . L e t t e r of Russian Ambassador to London on a conversa-t i o n with S i r Arthur Nicolson,July 7,1911,in Siebert,op.cit.p.33 - 14 -The problem of Empire defence i n the P a c i f i c had been discussed at the Imperial Defence Conference i n 1909, when i t was decided to e s t a b l i s h a powerful P a c i f i c f l e e t consisting of three squadrons stationed in the Indian, Chinese and Australian waters. The China-station- squadron was to be composed mainly of New Zealand^units with the b a t t l e - c r u i s e r !New Zealand' as f l a g s h i p , two cruisers of the ' B r i s t o l Class', three destroyers, and two submarines. This decision, however, was not put into e f f e c t by the B r i t i s h Admiralty. The reason for dropping the plan was c l e a r l y stated i n October, 1913, i n a telegram from the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary to the New Zealand government, saying that the general s t r a t e g i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n of naval strength, necessary in the interest of the Empire as a whole, had to be observed, and this "required available B r i s t o l s elsewhere." I t was evident what was meant by this explana-ti o n . The B r i t i s h Admiralty, p a r t i c u l a r l y Mr. C h u r c h i l l as F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, gave p r i o r i t y to the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n in European waters where he f e l t the decisive b a t t l e would be fought, and i n 1914 considered the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e as a s u f f i c i e n t instrument for securing the safety 27 of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand. 2 6 c f . Report on Naval Defence P o l i c y l a i d before the New Zealand House of Representatives, October 28,1913, New Zea-land,Parl. Deb.,3rd Sess., 1913,vol.166, p. 329. 2 7cf.Statement made by Mr.Churchill i n the B r i t i s h House of Commons,March 17,1914,Gr.Br.,Pari.,Deb., 5th Ser.,1914, vol.59,p.1931 f f . - 15 -This p o l i c y , although i t arose from a s i t u a t i o n of emer-gency, was to prove short-sighted i n the long run. I t did not receive the f u l l assent of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand }as these Dominions recognized the danger involved i n a lack of B r i t i s h naval strength i n Far Eastern waters. The New Zealand Government sent the Minister of Defence, Colonel A l l e n to London i n the beginning of 1913 to make 'inquiries concerning t h i s question of naval defence. The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Massey, declared i n 1913 In the New Zealand Parliament: I t appears quite certain that we are on the eve of great changes i n the P a c i f i c . . . . The government are not thinking of the present, or even of the immediate future but of what may happen i n years to come and the necessity of making preparation therefor. 8 He assiduously urged a close cooperation of Canada , A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand f o r maintaining the absolute naval supremacy i n the P a c i f i c . There can be no doubt that his almost prophetical-sounding words alluded to the r i s i n g power of Japan. T-he p o l i t i c a l development i n Eastern Asia during the World War was to demonstrate how accurate h i s predictions were. Similar opposition against the naval p o l i c y of the 29 B r i t i s h Admiralty was voiced i n the Australian Parliament. • cf. Statement by Mr. Massey on Naval Defence P o l i c y i n the New Zealand House of Representatives, Oct.28,1913, New Zealand,Parl. Deb., 3rd Sess.1913, vol.166, pp.329 and 331. 29Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , P a r i . Deb. ,Sess.1914, vol.LXXTI ,pp.S? 277. The Au s t r a l i a n Minister of Defence ? ^ ? < 3 B . l l e n , i n s i s t e d on the proposal pursuing the defence scheme of 1909 and refused that units of the Australian navy were to be sent to the North Sea. However, the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l and strategic conception of foreign p o l i c y at the eve of the World War which was based e n t i r e l y on the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e demanded concentra-t i o n of a l l strength on Europe, thus leaving the protection of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East and i n the P a c i f i c to the Japanese a l l y . The withdrawal of considerable naval forces from that region proved disastrous for Great B r i t a i n and made her thoroughly dependent on the A l l i a n c e , that i s to say,on the goodwill of Japan. Japanese diplomacy d i s -t i n c t l y recognized the unique chance offered to her by the outbreak of the war i n Europe. I t seized t h i s chance when the attention of the Western powers was distracted and t h e i r strength cxampletely absorbed by the.: European c o n f l i c t . The outbreak of the F i r s t World War i n Europe i n August, 1914 confronted the B r i t i s h Government with a double problem: To secure by a l l means Japan's cooperation f o r the protection of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n Eastern Asia and i n the P a c i f i c , but at the same time to r e s t r i c t possible p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y action on the part of Japan because of the Statement made by the Aust r a l i a n Minister of Defence, Senator M i l l e n , i n the Senate,on October 22, 1913, Common-Wealth of A u s t r a l i a , P a r i . Deb., Session.1913, vol, LXXI, p. 2297. - 17 -widespread trepidation i n the B r i t i s h Dominions regarding 1 Japan as well as because of the United States who looked upon every p o l i t i c a l step i n the Far East «§r apt to increase Japan's power with suspicious eyes. The B r i t i s h dilemma i s r e f l e c t e d by the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, Viscount Grey, i n h i s memoirs: . . .The prospect of unlimited Japanese action was repugnant to A u s t r a l i a and. New Zealand . . . .It was unthinkable that we should not have the most scrup-ulous care f o r the i n t e r e s t s and f e e l i n g s of B r i t i s h Dominions that were taking part i n the war ready to make s a c r i f i c e s . .. Equally important, the e f f e c t of Japanese action on public opinion i n the United States might be disastrous; i t might even make American .sentiment d e f i n i t e l y antagonistic to us. . . We had, therefore, to explain to Japan that her help would be welcome but that her action must be l i m i t e d . " 3 The i n t e r e s t s of the Dominions and the United States had to be taken into due consideration by the U. K. Cabinet. On the other hand, some suspicion and doubt might have existed as to the Japanese attitude towards the war. • At the beginning of the c r i s i s i t was uncertain what this attitude would be. By 1914 the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was no longer as e f f i c i e n t and as strong as i t had been i n 1902 or 1905; a considerable change had taken place In Anglo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s which was characterized by a cooling-off of the intimacy between both countries since Japan had turned to 31 ... i Grey, S i r Edwand , Twenjsx^ive Tears , _ 1892-1916. London, Hodder and Stoughton,Lmtd.iy25, Vol.il,"pp 1U3-104 - 2-8 -a p o l i c y sofa understanding with Russia over China* and since B r i t a i n f e l t the f u l l extent of Japanese trade r i v a l r y i n Eastern Asia. Anti-Japanese statements were voiced by some sections of the B r i t i s h press. The B r i t -annic Review for instance, termed the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e a 'mesalliance' by means of which Japan had usurped Korea and Manchuria and was threatening India and A u s t r a l i a . The paper expressed the fear that Japan i n pursuing a p o l i c y of 'Asia to the A s i a t i c s * would p r e c i p i -32 tate a general conflagration. In addition to that there were i n f l u e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l groups i n Japan advocating the replacement of the AngloWapanese A l l i a n c e by an agreement. with Germany which might possibly lead to the formation of a Eurasian continental power bloc of Germany, Russia and Japan, p a r t i c u l a r l y after Japan's diplomacy had taken on a pro-Russian o r i e n t a t i o n through the Russo-Japanese t r e a t i e s of 1907, 1910 and 1912. Suspicion and anxieties of such kind were expressed as early as 1911 i n the B r i t i s h House of 33 Commons. In 1914 at the outbfeak of the war, i t was c h i e f l y i n c i r c l e s of the Japanese General Staff that the idea of an intervention on behalf of Germany was advanced, so that two d i f f e r e n t groups of influence i n Tokyo contested 32 cf. Japan Post June 13, 1914, no.11, p.384 33 of. Gr. B r i t . , Pari.Deb.5th Sess.1911,Vol.22,p.2529. - 19 -against each other. This did c e r t a i n l y not escape the 34 serious attention of the B r i t i s h . The general suspicion and doubt regarding Japan's attitude immediately before the World War was increased by a s e m i - o f f i c i a l leading a r t i c l e of the Japan Times on July 28, 1914, ishich said that Japan was "on the best possible terms with the three great powers, Au s t r i a , Germany and Russia," and that i n case of war Tokyo 35 would maintain '.'strict n e u t r a l i t y . " Indeed, the Japanese Cabinet pursued a 'wait and see p o l i c y ' on the eve of the World War i n 1914 before i t ultimately decided to take the side of B r i t a i n and to u t i l i z e the opportunity to embark, upon a p o l i c y designed to lay the foundations f o r Japan's undisputed domination over Eastern Asia. The task imposed upon B r i t i s h diplomacy i n 1914 was, as pointed out, therefore immeasurably d i f f i c u l t . I t had to ensure the e f f i c a c i o u s aid and the goodwill of Japan i n a region of the world where B r i t a i n , i n the i n t e r e s t of wider p o l i t i c a l strategy, had to weaken her own strength; simultaneously, B r i t a i n had ,with a minimum of available power, to prevent an excessive Japanese expansion i n the Far East which jeopardized the B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n China, i f not the security of the Dominions. 3 4cf.Steed,W. / ' B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n the P a c i f i c " The Nineteenth  Century and After",vol.CXI (Apr.1932), pp 397-3¥8 3 5cf.Despatch of theAustro-Hungarian diplomatic representative at Tokyo,Freiherr von Mueller,to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister,Count Berchtold ,July 28.1914.Collected Diplomatic  Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War(Pjlife^el'll} No. 10,1915) London ,H.M. Stationery u r n c e , n a m son ana sons,print. ersjl915. Cmd?860.('Hereafter referred to as Collect.Diplom. Doc* Cmd. 7860?)Austro-Hungarian Red-book, no.36,p.515 - 20 -The diplomatic correspondence between the Foreign O f f i c e and Tokyo preceding the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s r i n the Far East reveals the desperate B r i t i s h e f f o r t s to Impose r e s t r i c t i o n s of Japanese war actions. Whilst at f i r s t the B r i t i s h government took the view that the events 36 i n Europe would not invoke the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , i t considered i t advisable on suggestion by S i r William 37 T y r r e l l to i n s t r u c t the B r i t i s h Ambassador to Tokyo, S i r C. Green, to inform the Japanese government that " i f h o s t i l i t i e s spread to the Far East, and an attack on Hong -• Kong or Waihawei were to take place 1 1 — which was the only case, apart from an uprisin g i n India, i n which the "casus foederis" for the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e could be 38 applied -- B r i t a i n would r e l y on Japanese support. What Great B r i t a i n wanted was a l o c a l l y limited p a r t i c i p a -t i o n of Japan i n the war such as the capture of German war-and armed-merchant ships i n Far Eastern waters. Accordingly, the B r i t i s h government requested Tokyo i n a memorandum of August 7, 1914, to provide such naval aid. * The Japanese Br. Doc. 1914, v o l . X I, no. 436, p.256. 3 7 I b i d . , no. 534, p. 292 3 8 B r . Doc. 1914, Vol. XI, no. 549, p. 298 3 9 c f . T a k e u c h i , T. ,War and Diplomacy jn the_Japanese Empire, New York, Doubleday uoran and Comp. ,inc.1935,p.16Q. - 21 -government had. declared four days e a r l i e r that Great B r i t a i n could "count upon Japan at once coming to assistance of her 40 a l l y with a l l her strength, i f c a l l e d to do so." This phraseology used has to be interpreted l i t e r a l l y . I t was much more than a matter of courtesy. The Japanese Foreign Minister Kato considered the B r i t i s h proposal as e n t i r e l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . 4 1 What Japan wanted as an o f f i c i a l reason to j o i n the war was nothing else but the elimination of Germany's influence i n the Far East, or i n other words, the surrender of Kioutchou. On the same day when the B r i t i s h request for limited action of the Japanese navy was conveyed to Tokyo, the German naval attache, Captain Knorr, despatched a telegram to the 'Graf Spee'-squadron, saying that according 42 to r e l i a b l e information Japan intended to take Tsingtao. The B r i t i s h completely f a i l e d to postpone a Japanese declar-ation of war which implied the extension of m i l i t a r y opera-tions on the Chinese mainland and into the Pacific-{the matter would have led to a Japanese occupation of the German Island possessions i n the: South Sea). The B r i t i s h Government had to comply with the. ambitions of an unyielding Japanese diplomacy which aimed at a long-term p o l i c y . The only measure 4 0 B r . Doc., 1914, vol XI, no. 571, p.305 4 1 L a Fargue, T.E.,China and the World War, Stanford Univ. Calif..Stanford Univ.Press 1937,p.12 4 S M a r i n e Rundschau, 1921, pp.516-517 - 22 -the B r i t i s h Government could take when faced with the ' f a i t accompli' of the Japanese ultimatum to Germany was to issue an o f f i c i a l declaration to the press i n which i t was stated that the actions being taken by Great B r i t a i n and Japan were deemed to safeguard the aims of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , i.e.,the i n t e g r i t y and independence of China; and i t was announced that the "action of Japan w i l l not extend to the P a c i f i c Ocean beyond the China Seas. . . nor to any foreign t e r r i t o r y except i n German occupation on 43 the continent of Eastern Asia." The purpose of t h i s declaration was evident; i t was designed to dispel anxieties on the part of the United States and the B r i t i s h Dominions. The B r i t i s h Government therefore conveyed t h i s declaration expressly to the U. S. State Department with which" she was 44 i n continuous contact over developments i n the Par East. The reason why B r i t a i n had addressed the request for m i l i t a r y intervention to Japan at a l l , and why she f i n a l l y had to y i e l d to the persistent demands of the Japanese Cabinet lay i n the extreme m i l i t a r y weakness of Great B r i t a i n i n Eastern Asia. The B r i t i s h naval forces of the China squadron con-si s t e d of two b a t t l e - c r u i s e r s , the 'Minotaur' and the "Hampshire*, _ Statement of the B r i t i s h Press Bureau,of August 17,1914, published by the 'London Times' on August 18,1914,cited i n MacNair,H.F.' ,Modern Par Eastern International Relations, Toronto ,New York, London 1950, pp 177-178. 4 4Papers Relating_bo_the Foreign Relations of the United States, U.S.Govt. Printing—OTfTce Washington 1924 IT. (diiereai'ter Yet&VT-ed to as U.S.For.Rel.il914,Supplem.p.l27. - 23 -fc#K two l i g h t c r u i s e r s , the 'Yarmouth' and the 'Newcastle*, and the old battleship 'Triumph* which had a slow speed. The units available from the Australian navy were the modern ba t t l e - c r u i s e r ' A s t r a l i a * , two new l i g h t c ruisers, -a&a the 'Sidney' and the 'Melbourne', two older c r u i s e r s , the •Encounter' and 'Pioneer', and one torpedo-boat-destroyer. In addition to these forces there were three old cruisers of the New Zealand navy, two old French b a t t l e - c r u i s e r s , the 'Montcalm' and 'Dupleix', and two Russian l i g h t c r u i s e r s , the 45 'Shantung' and 'Askold'. This naval force, even when combined, was inadequate i n strength, and not i n any p o s i t i o n to guarantee the protection of the B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , poss-essions and sea-communi cations i n the Far East and. i n the P a c i f i c . Furthermore, they were unable to f u l f i l l the tasks of B r i t i s h overseas strategy as assigned i n the Committee of Imperial Defence by Admiral H. Jackson; for instance, the protection of B r i t i s h commerce and main communication-lines i n the P a c i f i c , the occupation of various German P a c i f i c i s l a n d s , p a r t i c u l a r l y for the destruction of the dable stations 46 on Yap, Nauru and Angaur could not be undertaken. The control of the Chinese waters was l e f t to a so-called 4 5 C h u r c h i l l , W, The 'World C r i s i s , New York, C.Scribner's Sons. 1923. pp 313-314, and Marine Rundscau, 1921, p. 516 4 6 c f . Marine Rundschau , 1921, pp. 522-523 - 24 -•Yellow Sea P a t r o l ' , consisting of the old 'Triumph', the l i g h t - c r u i s e r 'Yarmouth', f i v e destroyers, and the 'Dupleix'. These forces were not s u f f i c i e n t to prevent the German Far Eastern naval squadron of Admiral von Spee from breaking through the A l l i e d blockade. Not u n t i l Japan»s entry into the war was the B r i t i s h commander of the China Station, Admiral Jerram, i n the position to combine h i s forces i n Singapore for safeguarding the Indian Ocean from any danger from the East. Thus for the f i r s t time the dependence of Great B r i t a i n on Japan's m i l i t a r y naval aid became evident; i n the new circumstances the o f f i c i a l press statement was i n e f f e c t u a l . This was c l e a r l y shown i n a telegram from the B r i t i s h Admiralty to the Japanese Admiralty on November 5, 1914, when an extension of the Japanese naval operations to the P a c i f i c as f a r as the C a l i f o r n i a n and Mexican coast was requested. I t was also suggested that a Japanese squadron should advance to F i j i to secure the safety of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand, whilst another squadron was to advance southward so f a r as Sumatra and the Dutch East 47 Indies. These tasks were accepted by the Japanese Admir-a l t y . The Japanese f l e e t took over also the protection of the Canadian P a c i f i c Coast where the naval forces, consist-ing of two sloops, were inadequate for maintaining the 47 Telegram of the B r i t i s h Admiralty to the Japanese Ad-mir a l t y , Nov.5, 1914, i n C h u r c h i l l , op c i t . p.468 - 25 -security of the coast of B r i t i s h Columbia. The psyhhos&s of fear from a naval bombardment by the Spee Squadron which broke out i n Vancouver and V i c t o r i a , was not removed u n t i l 48 Japanese warships anchored i n Vancouver. The predic t i o n made by the Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r , S i r Wilfred Laurier, i n 1908 with reference to the 'Gentlemen's Agreement' that i t would be possible that under the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e Canada "may see the f l e e t of Japan weighing anchor i n the harbour of Vancouver for the protection of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , had proved correct. This b r i e f description of the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n the Far East at the outbreak of the World War has indicated that the diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e had passed from the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e to the Japanese Cabinet. The B r i t i s h press observed the development with some anxiety. The editor of the National Review commented i n 1914 on the sit u a t i o n that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e had proved "a great mistake f o r Great B r i t a i n ' s supremacy i n the Far East.? Great B r i t a i n , he complained, had simply surrendered her p o l i c y i n the Far East to the Foreign O f f i c e i n Tokyo, which he predicted 4 8Lower, A.R.M., Canada and the Far East,1940.,New York, International S e c r e t a r i a t , ?.P.R. 1940. P.9 4 9quoted from Woodsworth, Ch.G.,Canada and the Orient,Toronto The Macmillan. Comp.of Canada Ltd, 1941, pp 163 f f - 26 -marked the "beginning of the end of the B r i t i s h — a n d that 50 means the European influenoe--in Eastern Asia." The B r i t i s h China Press expressed s i m i l a r objections. The North China Herald stated i n l a t e August, 1914: " I t i s not clear how a Japanese ultimatum to Germany could be j u s t i f i e d . Nothing compels Japan under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty to jo i n the war." Neither B r i t i s h trade nor B r i t i s h 51 i n t e r e s t s were seriously endangered, the newspaper said. The North China Daily News with an uneasy f e e l i n g about Japan's future steps remarked i n August 1914, that i t would be very unwise of Japan to ignore the express desires of Great B r i t a i n , France and Russia. "Although these countries are preoccupied for the time being elsewhere , they w i l l not 52 remain so permanently." The Japanese government when she joined the war, made every e f f o r t to avoid any suspicion. . of her actions i n Eastern Asia. In an o f f i c i a l declaration she emphasized that the grounds which l e d Japan to the m i l i t a r y measures, p a r t i c u l a r l y against Kioutchou, were "none other than to maintain the common in t e r e s t s of Japan and Great B r i t a i n set out i n the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . " Japan, i t was argued, harboured no expansionist or s e l f i s h designs but would"respect with the greatest care in t e r e s t s of t h i r d 53 powers i n Eastern Asia." The real objective of Japan, 5 0 0 s t a s i a t i s c h e r Lloyd.August 28,1914, no. 34, p.194. 5 1 c f . C h i n a Arehiv.Berlin, 1917, p.63 5 2 i b i d . , p. 70 5 3Coll've*Diplom. Dec., Cmd. 7860, p.532 - 8 7 -however, was by no means that l a i d down i n the A l l i a n c e with Great B r i t a i n , namely, the preservation of China's i n t e g r i t y . As early as January, 1913, the Japanese Foreign M i n i s t e r Kato, then Ambassador to London, had expressed h i s view to S i r Edward Grey that Japan had a v i t a l p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t i n the Kwantung Peninsula and i n the concessions of the South-Manchurian Railway. He intimated that Japan de-manded a permanent occupation of the Peninsula and that she 54 would act, i f the 'psychological moment' occurred. There was no doubt i n August, 1914, that t h i s physchological moment had arrived. The Japanese Government f u l l y understood the favourable s i t u a t i o n presented by the complete absorption of the western powers by the European war which permitted Japan not only to r e a l i z e her designs i n South Manchuria but to achieve a r a d i c a l solution of the Chinese problem; she aimed at the diplomatic, ecohomic and m i l i t a r y domination of China by Japan. The memorandum of the so-called 'Black Dragon Society' submitted to the Japanese government i n f r August, 1914, revealed .the true Japanese aspirations. I t recognized quite well that preoccupation of the West mention-ed i n the North China Daily News of August 18, 1914, saying, Takeuchi, op c i t . p. 184 - 88 -Now the opportunity f o r a solution of the Chinese question has arrived for Japan as i t w i l l never be offered for centuries. . . .After the European war the great powers w i l l d i r e c t t h e i r attention to. . . China again. . . . " With reference to Great B r i t a i n the memorandum stated: Her strength w i l l no longer be s u f f i c i e n t to oppose u s . 5 5 The Japanese Government did not intend to f u l f i l the as-surances regarding the surrender of Kioutchou to China. This can be seen from the announcement of Baron Kato i n the 35th Diet i n December, 1914, that Japan did not f e e l committed to a.restoration of Tsingtao or to any l i m i t a t i o n s on the scope of her m i l i t a r y operations.^ 6 Japan's adherence to the London Declaration of 1914 was strongly advocated i n 1914 by the then Japanese Ambassador to P a r i s , Viscount I s h i i , with the view of strengthening Japan's p o s i t i o n at 57 the Peace Conference. This i l l u s t r a t e d that Japan had more far-reaching designs than acknowledged by herGovernment i n o f f i c i a l attenuating n o t i f i c a t i o n s . Four days before Japan's declaration of war to Germany, the Japanese Minister to Peking, Hioki , was instructed to urge the Chinese P r e s i -dent, Yuan Shi K a i , to enter into an exchange of views coneerniig 5 Pernor and urn of the Black Dragon Society, of. Der_Ne.ue__0_r_ie,nt, Monalsschrift fuer das p o l i t l s c h e ,Wirschaf t l i c h e und gerstige Leben jjimgesamten Osten, B e r l i n , 1919, v o l . I, pp#. 232-235. 5 6 T a k e u c h i , op c i t . p. 181 5 7 I s h i i op c i t . p. 96 - 29 -58 Chinese-Japanese re l a t i o n s : The prelude to the famous 'Twenty-one Demands'had just begun. The events between January and May, 1915 r e s u l t i n g from the 'Twenty-One Demands' need not be re c a l l e d here i n d e t a i l . The Demands not only purported the further consolidation of Japanese control over South Manchuria and a retention of the former German t e r r i t o r i a l and economic r i g h t s i n Shantung, but also amounted i n practice to the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over China as Group ¥ of the Demands suggested. Considering the economic r i g h t s to be secured by the demands, p a r t i c u l a r l y those contained i n Group I I I concerning the Han-Yeh-Ping Company, one concludes that Japan wanted to assure he r s e l f the sources of raw material on the A s i a t i c mainland, p r i m a r i l y coal and i r o n which were indispensable f o r a large-scale p o l i c y of successful expansion. . In the l a s t analysis they amounted to the undisputed domination of Japan over Eastern Asia, or i n other words, the elimination of the influence of the Western Powers from that region. The o f f i c i a l attitude of the B r i t i s h Government towards Japan's diplomatic offensive against China was s i g n i f i c a n t because i t showed the complete weakness of Great B r i t a i n i n the Far East and how dependent she was on Japan's Takeuchi op c i t . p. 184. - 30 -goodwill i n that area. After the Japanese demands - except Group V which was kept s t r i c t l y secret - f i r s t became known, the B r i t i s h Under-Secretary for Foreign A f f a i r s , Mr. Primrose, announced i n the H ouse of Commons oh March 11, 1914 that the B r i t i s h Government would raise no objection against any expansion of Japanese i n t e r e s t s i n China, provided that the 59 B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n the Yangtse area were not viol a t e d . He was r e f e r r i n g p r imarily to railway concessions; for one month l a t e r the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Tokyo submitted a l i s t to the Japanese government enumerating the railway concess-60 ions formerly acquired by Great B r i t a i n i n Southern China. When they learned of Group V the B r i t i s h Government took a strong stand i n opposing the demands by intimating i n a note of May 4, 1915, that the public opinion i n Great B r i t a i n would consider a disruption of the diplomatic re l a t i o n s between China and Japan as "disregarding the s p i r i t of the Anglo-Jap-61 anese A l l i a n c e " . An o f f i c i a l memorandum by S i r Edward Grey to the Japanese Ambassador i n London two days l a t e r r e i t e r a t e d the B r i t i s h apprehension that the independence and 62 i n t e g r i t y of China were imperilled. O r i g i n a l l y , t h i s had been one of the main reasons which had brought the A l l i a n c e into being when China's i n t e g r i t y was threatened by Russia's ^ r B r i t . ,Parl. Deb., 5th ser. , 1915, v o l . 70, p.1722. 6 0 J i b i d . , v o l . 71, p.414 6 1cf.MacNair, op c i t . p. 188 6 2LaFargue, op c i t . p. 74 - 31 -expansion i n the l a t e 90's. The Japanese actions i n 1915 (in contrast to Tokyo's assurances when Japan entered the war) reveal c l e a r l y how fundamental the difference of i n t e r -pretation had become as f a r as the scope of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was concerned, between Great B r i t a i n and Japan. Japan's p o l i c y i n 1915 towards China constituted a d i r e c t v i o l a t i o n of the terms of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . Nevertheless, the B r i t i s h Government, being always under the necessity not to alienate her Japanese a l l y because of the security of the whole B r i t i s h Empire, f e l t i t expedient to advise the Chinese Government, who had applied to the B r i t i s h Government for consultation, to accept the Japanese demands 6 3 as contained i n the ultimatum of May 7, 1915. Simultaneously, she rejected a proposal of the U. S. Secretary of State,Mr. Bryan, for joint diplomatic action i n Tokyo with the view of 64 exerting a r e s t r a i n i n g influence on the Japanese Cabinet. Thus, the United States saw themselves l e f t alone i n protest-ing against the v i o l a t i o n of the"Open-B 7oor"principle by Japan. This protest was made i n a note sent by Mr. Bryan to Tokyo on May 11, 1915 which^by saying that the United States could "not recognize any agreement. . . impairing . . . the open-65 door p o l i c y . . . contained p r a c t i c a l l y the essence of what »» became famous i n 1932 as the Stimson Doctrine ofnon-n recognition." 6 5U. S. For. Rel., 1915, pp. 144-145. 6 4 Die Internationalen Beziehungen i n Zeltajte'r des Imperial!sSSff Documente »u.s den Archiven der Zaristishen and Provisionschen RegieKung, B e r l i n , 1934-1936, Vol I I , {[Hereafter referred to as R.D.) 65 U.S. For Rel. 1915, p. 146 - 32 -Although the Japanese Government was compelled by the attitude of Great B r i t a i n and the pressure of the U.S. to drop Group V of her demands i n the Japanese ultimatum of May 7, i t remains s i g n i f i c a n t that the B r i t i s h Government yielded i n a matter which seriously affected B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n China. Japan's economic penetration of China including the B r i t i s h sphere of in t e r e s t i n the Yangtse v a l l e y , spoke in clear tones. Altogether i t showed that Japan had not entered the war i n f u l f i l l m e n t of her obligations under the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n order to maintain peace i n the Far East. P o l i t i c a l l y as well as economically, the i n t e r e s t s of Great B r i t a i n and Japan c o n f l i c t e d . The attitude of the Foreign O f f i c e did not remain without c r i t i c i s m of the B r i t i s h press. Thus for instance, the former representative of the ' B r i t i s h and Chinese Corporation', Mr. 3?. P. 0. Bland, published an a r t i c l e i n the Nineteenth Century of November, 1915, i n which he warned that the history of Korea and Manchuria as well as Japan's appearance i n the Yangtse v a l l e y showed that any expansion of Japanese influence "must of necessity e n t a i l the gradual elimination of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . " What then were the reasons f o r the B r i t i s h to y i e l d instead of joining the Americans i n exerting more e f f e c t i v e pressure on Tokyo? One reason was that B r i t a i n was anxious to prevent: any __ _ . _ _ Bland, 3T.P.0. "Japanese Pjolicy i n China", Nineteenth Century, Vol. LXXVIII (Nov.1915) P. 1203. - 33 -serious American-Japanese tension during the war which might have been increased i f Great B r i t a i n backed the American actions against Japan i n 1915. The other reason was r e f l e c t e d i n a despatch of the Russian Ambassador i n Tokyo to the Russian Foreign M i n i s t e r , Sasanoff, on February 5, 1915, which read: According to my opinion, Grey, as f a r as the future r e l a t i o n s with Japan are concerned, never loses sight of the p o s s i b i l i t y that future d i f f i c u l t i e s may a r i s e , not so much because of China but rather because of the B r i t i s h Dominions In the P a c i f i c , A u s t r a l i a and Canada, concerning r a c i a l immigra-t i o n r e s t r i c t i o n s . 6 7 This Russian view provides a key to the B r i t i s h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e : The primary object was not China but the safety of the B r i t i s h Dominions i n the P a c i f i c from a possible Japanese invasion, p a r t i c u l a r -l y during a period when a l l strength of the B r i t i s h Empire had to be concentrated on the war i n Europe. The accent of the A l l i a n c e , as f a r as the B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t was concerned, had s h i f t e d since 1911 and 1913 more and more i n this d i r e c t i o n . The security of the Dominions, e s p e c i a l l y of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand, was the r e a l motive which impelled the B r i t i s h Government, and the Dominion governments a f t e r 1919, to continue the t r e a t y - a l l i a n c e with Japan rather than to estrange t h i s r i s i n g big power and drive her into the 67 R.D. I I , 7,1. no. 136, p.126 - 34 -h o s t i l e campp Only by taking t h i s viewpoint into account can the B r i t i s h acquiescence i n the measures of Japan's diplomacy during the World War be understood. I t was a r e a l i s t i c a ttitude r e s u l t i n g from p o l i t i c a l necessity. A further example of Japan's increasing prestige i n the Far East was Japan's intervention i n i n t e r n a l Chinese a f f a i r s when President Yuan-Shi-Kai attempted to rees t a b l i s h the monarchy i n China i n la t e 1915. I t was due to a j o i n t demarche of the Japanese charge d ' a f f a i r e and of the B r i t i s h and Russian ministers at Peking on October 38, 1915, that the Chinese government was compelled to postpone the re-introduction of the monarchical system. The B r i t i s h Cabinet had instructed i t s representative at Peking to associate himself with the step taken by the 68 Japanese government. I t was s i g n i f i c a n t that the minor t Japanese charge d'affaire acted as the leading speaker, i n spite of the fact that the higher-ranking B r i t i s h and Russian diplomatic representatives were present - S i r John Jordan was even the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps i n Peking -and that i t was he who advised Peking i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . This leading diplomatic p o s i t i o n had been t r a d i t i o n a l l y occupied by the B r i t i s h Minister i n China but had passed into Japanese hands following the outbreak of the war. 68 cf. Statement by S i r Edward Grey i n answering a question i n the House of Commons, Nov. 9, 1915, Gr. Br.,Pari.Deb., 5th Ser. , 1915, v o l . 75, p.984 - 35 fe-l t was more than a mere question of diplomatic ceremony, as can be seen from the comment given by the Japanese Foreign M i n i s t e r , Baron I s h i i , on December 9, 1915, i n the Japanese Parliament. He remarked When we gave China t h i s advice Japan did only what was her duty to do i n the i n t e r e s t of the general peace i n the East. . . The only motive for Japan was &*.desire to secure the common int e r e s t s of China and of the Powers . . . ; That meant that the Japanese diplomatic step was designed to emphasize Japan's ro l e as mandatory i n the Par East. The c r i t i c i s m of B r i t i s h newspapers i n China frankly admitted the Japanese diplomatic victory. The National Review, for instance, interpreted the subordinate role of the B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r as " f u l l evidence for the complete recognition of the Japanese d i c t a t o r i a l aspirations on the part of those 70 European powers which have in t e r e s t s i n China." The Peking Daily News commented on the a f f a i r i n January, 1915: From the viewpoint of those powers who are interested i n maintaining peace i n China the jo i n t demarche of the four powers on October 28, 1915, was a diplomat-i c mistake of primary importance . . . .The powers would be compelled someday to intervene i n order to restore the order a f t e r revolutionary seditions. •Powers'., however, means i n t h i s case "Japan's" 7! How thoroughly the s i t u a t i o n i n the Far East had changed becomes evident i f the y i e l d i n g B r i t i s h attitude i n 1915 D y C h i n a Archiv. 1916, p.73-74 7 0 C h i n a Archiv, 1917, p.73 71 China Archiv, 1916, ppl58 - 36 -i s compared with the strong protests of Great B r i t a i n when Japan t r i e d to prevent China's national unity i n 72 1911/12 A s i m i l a r diplomatic defeat for Great B r i t a i n , and another manifestation of Japan's predominant influence i n Eastern Asia a f t e r the war broke out, occurred,when Great B r i t a i n made e f f o r t s i n l a t e 1915 to induce the Chinese government to j o i n the war. The underlying idea was to create a counter balance against the growing influence of Japan i n China when the Far Eastern problems were to be discussed at the forthcoming peace conference. China's resistence against the Japanese p o l i c y of expansion was to be increased by a l l o t i n g her a voice at the peace con-ference. I t was furthermore recognized that the Japanese m i l i t a r y occupation of Kiaotchou and of the railway l i n e Tsingtao-Tsinan-fu had created a serious problem and aroused China's intense opposition. The problem would have to be 73 solved by a 'modus vivendi'at that conference. The p a r t i c i p a t i o n of China i n the peace negotiations demanded ed > that China j o i n the war. When, therefore, on November 18, 1915, the B r i t i s h Minister i n Peking ^ c t i n g together with the French and Russian Ministers ^ approached the Chinese 7 2 c f Chang, op c i t . pp. 165-169 73 of. Japan Weekly Chronicle, Sept.21, 1916. - 37 -government with such a suggestion the Japanese government immediately raised strong objections. Again, the B r i t i s h government gave way i n s t r u c t i n g the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Tokyo on November 30, to communicate with the Japanese Foreign Minister "that the B r i t i s h government had no inte n t i o n to enter into any p o l i t i c a l negotiations with 74 China without having consulted Japan." Japan objected to the B r i t i s h proposal not only because of her fear of being counteracted and of becoming i s o l a t e d , but she wanted to give an unmistakable declaration that she alone was the determining great power i n Eastern Asia and that no p o l i t i c a l action could be taken i n that region of the world without the whole-hearted consent of Japan. This amounted more or l e s s to enunciating an • A s i a t i c Monroe Doctrine' the guardian of which was Japan by manifest destiny. The Japanese and Chinese press r e f l e c t e d t h i s conception quite conspicuously. The immediate comment of the Japanese controlled newspaper, Jih-Jbh-Hsin-Wen-Pau i n November, 1915, on the a l l i e d suggestions to China wa_s: The A s i a t i c Monroe Doctrine must become manifest. Because of t h i s reason we must r e s i s t most ener-g e t i c a l l y the plan advanced by Britain,France and Russia to draw China into the war . . . because of the Greater A s i a t i c Idea. '*China Archiv, 1916, pp. SO and 30. 7 5 C h i n a Archiv, 1916, p. 27 - 38 -The owner of the Osaka Hotchi Shimbun, Utschida, wrote i n an a r t i c l e i n 1916; The English have now recogized Japan's superior p o s i t i o n by promising to undertake nothing i n China without consulting Japan. 7 5 In a s i m i l a r way the comment of the Shanghai Chinese paper Hsinwen-pau of December £, 1915, expressed What Japan had aimed at during the l a s t ten years, that i s , the supremacy i n the Far East, has now p r a c t i c a l l y and o f f i c i a l l y been re-cognized by Great B r i t a i n . 7 7 International development i n the la t e years of the World War was extremely favourable to Japah i n Eastern Asia; i n consequence Japan was so^on i n the p o s i t i o n to achieve the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y sanctioned implementation of her claims i n the Far East. When the United States f e l t compelled to enter the A • war i n Ap"ri.l'-2r;;.", 1917, she wanted an understanding with Japan on Far Eastern problems, because she needed Japan's consent to China's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war. Furthermore, States the Unified A. neeued the goodwill of Japan because the sub-marine warfare necessitated a change i n the naval programme of 1916. The bui l d i n g of battleships had to be stopped i n order to allow for replacement by the building of two hundred 78 and f i f t y destroyers. This was the reason f o r the _ Peking Daily News, August 13-14, 1916. 7 7 C h i n a Archiv, 1916, p.31 78 Jensen, G. Seemacht Japan, B e r l i n 1943, pp.188-183 - 39 -conclusion of the famous Lansing-Ishii Agreement signed on November 2, 1917, by which the United States conceded to 79 Japan "spe c i a l i n t e r e s t s i n China" based on propinquity* Whatever the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s agreement by the U. S. State Department might have been, there can be no doubt that Japan considered i t as her Monroe Doctrine over Eastern Asia. Baron I s h i i had already declared during the negotia-tions with the U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, i n November, 1917, that "as the reason of the Monroe Doctrine exists so does the p o s i t i o n of Japan with respect to China 80 e x i s t . . . .",because Japan's in t e r e s t s " i n the whole of China'' were greater than those of any other powers. Although the p r i n c i p l e of the Open-Door and the i n t e g r i t y of China were again expressly affirmed by Japan i n the agreement, i t meant nothing but l i p - s e r v i c e after Japan had shown what she understood by t h i s phrase when she presented the Twenty-One Demands to China. The conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was indeed a matter of far-reaching importance. The Russian Ambassador to Tokyo observed i n a despatch to St.Petersburg that the powers were not to be allowed to undertake any cf. U.S. For.Rel., 1917, pp.266-268 I s h i i , op.cit. p. 117 , - 40 -p o l i t i c a l step i n China without previously exchanging p i views with Japan. The Agreement was regarded by Japan as an instrument to eliminate thoroughly the Western influence from the whole of Asia. In 1916 i t had already been suggested i n the Japanese press that Japan should intervene i n India i n the case of a r e b e l l i o n against the B r i t i s h r u l e . 8 2 The Japanese j o u r n a l i s t Kyosuki Schimatani i n the newspaper, Hsin Nippon, advocated the creation of an Indian-Chinese-Japanese league directed against the Anglo-Saxons for the r e a l i z a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e •The Orient 83 to the Orientals' . The clearest i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the agreement came from a top-ranking o f f i c i a l of the Japanese government who had been personally i n i t i a t i n g the Japanese p o l i c y of expansion i n China, namely the Japanese Minister to Peking, Hioki. In an a r t i c l e i n the Japanese paper, Taiyo, he wrote i n August, 1917 To an ever-increasing extent the world concedes to us the role of a leader i n the Far East. . . . Japan must be ready for action i f circumstances demand so. 4 These examples t e s t i f y to the growth of a n a t i o n a l i s t ! c -expansionist f e e l i n g i n Japan based on i d e e l o g i c a l cf.Secret telegram of the Russian Ambassador i n Tokyo to St.Petersburg,Oct.22,1917,quoted from Millard,Th.F. C o n f l i c t of P o l i c i e s i n Asia. London, George A l l e n & Unwin Ltd.1924,p.l68 8 2 c f . Peking Daily News, Aug.14, 1916 8 3 J a p a n Advertiser, Aug.10, 1917. ^ Japan Advertiser, Aug. 17, 1917. - 41 -considerations. Here we see for the f i r s t time that Japan looked upon India as a p o t e n t i a l f i e l d of her p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , a f t e r India had become already^ the f i e l d of Japan's commercial a c t i v i t y . The B r i t i s h reaction to the Lansing-Ishli Agreement which had been reported to the B r i t i s h government before 85 being signed, was therefore a l l the more surprising. Mr. Balfour declared i n the House of Commons that Great B r i t a i n welcomed the agreement because i t u n i f i e d two a l l i e s . That means the B r i t i s h government looked upon the American-Japanese understanding very favourably as a means safeguarding the s o l i d a r i t y of the a l l i e d war c o a l i t i o n . Any di s i n t e g r a t i o n of t h i s c o a l i t i o n , no matter whether caused by an American-Japanese embroilment or by a serious rupture i n Anglo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , would have entailed a grave danger to the security of the B r i t i s h Empire. What, however, was i t that gave r i s e to B r i t i s h anxiety l e s t Japan might break away from the A l l i e d cause? I t was an open secret that since 1907 Japan had been London Times, Nov.7, 1917 86 cf.Statement by Mr. Balfour i n House of Commons, Nov.12, 1917, Gr. B r i t . , P a r i . Deb.,1917,vol.99,pp 1160ff. - 42 -pursuing a double p o l i c y . The c o r n e r stone of her ex-ternal p o l i c y remained ( a f t e r h e r v i c t o r y over R u s s i a , the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . At the same time however, Japan secured several understandings with Russia i n 1907, 1910 and 1912. These agreements on the one side f a c i l i t a t e d Japan's expansionist p o l i c y i n China, insofar as they stipulated f o r a d i v i s i o n of spheres of inter e s t between Russia and Japan i n Manchuria and Mongolia; without these parlJy--sepret agreements the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 which guaranteed China's administrative r i g h t s i n those regions 87 would have remained e f f e c t i v e . Beyond that, however, the Russo- Japanese'rapprochement' served the Japanese diplomacy as a means of replacing the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , i f required by circumstances, and of safeguard-ing Japan's i n t e r e s t s against the Anglo-Saxon bloc. The increasing estrangement, between Great B r i t a i n and Japan, because of Japan's p o l i c y i n China during 1915, which devaluated the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e In the eyes of the Japanese government caused her to conclude the 88 Russo-Japanese treaty of July 3,-1916, the additional 8 7 Clyde, P.H. The Far East, New York 2 Prentice-Hall,Inc. 1952, p.334. 88 B r i t i s h and Foreign State Papers,1916,vol, CX,London, H.M.St.O. , pp.yi&j — - 43 -secret convention of which was of paramount importance. This secret convention contained the p r o v i s i o n that "China should not f a l l under the p o l i t i c a l domination of any t h i r d "89 power h o s t i l e to Russia or Japan and provided for mutual m i l i t a r y assistance for the defence of their- v i t a l i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East. Although, according to a statement made by Mr. Balfour i n the Commons i n January, 1918, the Russo-Japanese treaty had been c o n f i d e n t i a l l y communicated to the B r i t i s h government, S i r Edward Grey did not know the treaty terms i n d e t a i l : and although the Japanese Foreign Minister , Count Motono i n a statement to the press gave the assurance that the new treaty was not directed against any s p e c i f i c power but referred to other i n t e r -national agreements deemed as an instrument of securing the e x i s t i n g 'status quo* i n the Far E a s t , 9 2 there can be no doubt as to the true scope of the secret a l l i a n c e . I t amounted to the replacement of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e which had become outlived according to the opinion of larger sections i n the p o l i t i c a l and public l i f e i n Japan. The t h i r d powers referred to i n the secret con-v e n t i o n which were to be excluded from China^could only 89 Clyde, op.cit. P.413: and Chang op cit.p.181 cf. Gr. B r i t . , Earl.Deb.,5th Sess., 1918,vq1.101,pp.641ff. 91 According to a statement by S i r Edward Grey at the Con-ference of Ministers at Boulogne ,0c1.19,1916, China Archiv, 1917, p.38. 9 2 C h i n a Archiv.1916, p.356 - 44 -be Great B r i t a i n and the United States. Japan sought the reassurance of a Russian guarantee for consolidating what she had already gained a^nd, i n the event of the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , to safeguard h e r s e l f against a possible united AngIo- wAmerican front. This i s the only i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Count Motono's statement on the treaty. The B r i t i s h press reacted to the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Treaty i n d i f f e r e n t ways. Whilst newspapers as the Morning Post, the Daily Chronicle, the Dally Telegraph and the London and China Telegraph eulogized the T r e a t y — because they did not know of the secret convention— the Weekly Nation harboured suspicions of a secret clause 9 3 and the London Justice wrote that " B r i t a i n and France are simply compelled to save face". The paper warned that the r e s u l t would tee Moscow's and Tokyo's expanding p o l i t i c a l 94 and commercial domination over China. The r e a l danger threatening the B r i t i s h Empire by Japan's turning away from the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e cam be measured i n i t s f u l l extent only i f we s c r u t i n i z e the Japanese tendency to turn to the h o s t i l e camp, that i s , to Germany. 9 3 G h i n a Archiv. 1916, pp 357' and 432.-433. 94 China Archiv, 1916, p.433. - 45 -The h e s i t a t i n g attitude of Tokyo at the outbreak of the war was due, at least p a r t l y ( t o i n f l u e n t i a l c i r c l e s amongst the General Staff who favoured a collaboration with Germany. In the course of the war t h i s tendency increased more and more. As early as 1915 the Japanese press, b i t t e r l y resenting the B r i t i s h reluctance to give whole-hearted support to Japan's Twenty-One Demands, began to agitate for a re-orientation of Japanese foreign p o l i c y towards Germany. The newspapers (Sekai' and 'Yamato Shimbun' i n p a r t i c u l a r pleaded for a German-Japanese •95 a l l i a n c e . The 'Sekai' i n c r i t i c i z i n g the B r i t i s h i n t e r -ference i n the Twenty-one Demands said that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e had l o s t i t s anti-Russian character and should be put aside unless B r i t a i n were w i l l i n g to acknow-96 ledge Japan's supremacy i n the East. The 'Yamato  Shimbun' served as the mouth-piece of several pro-German orientated University professors who since 1915 had been publishing a series of a r t i c l e s under the heading "Japan to England". E s p e c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t was an a r t i c l e of the 'Yamato Shimbun'of November 7, 1915 ;which said that Tsingtao and the Sino-Japanese question showed how u n i l a t e r i a l the 95 China Archiv, 1917, p.464 9 6 0 s t a s i a t i s c h e r Lloyd, A p r i l 16, 1915, no.14, p.367. - 46 -obligations imposed on Japan by the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e were. I t was argued that i f Japan and Gemany had combined for a j o i n t large-scale world p o l i c y "the 1 P a c i f i c Ocean, the South Sea, India, P e r s i a , Egypt and South A f r i c a would have risen under the auspices of the 97 Japanese f l a g . " Not only In the press but also i n o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s the idea of an a l l i a n c e with Germany during the war found strong support. There was a pro-German group i n the Genro 9 8 and, as mentioned, amongst m i l i t a r y c i r c l e s , demanding i n 1915 that Japan \ ' • • •• take the side of the" Central Powers. The former Chief of the P o l i t i c a l D i v i s i o n of the Japanese Foreign O f f i c e , Hayakawa^stated i n the beginning of 1915 with reference to the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e : In order to reach her designs i n China Japan has to s t r i v e f o r a * rapprochement 1 towards Russia and Germany instead ofgrnaintaining the waste-paper agreement: . . . . This was the Japanese conception of a Russo-German-Japanese combination which would have rested upon the s o l i d foundation of geographical conditions. Although Russia was at war with the German Empire and looked with suspicious eyes upon a possible German-Japanese understanding a f t e r the European war - such a fear was expressed by the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo i n ; 9 7 C h i n a Archiv, 1916, p.82 9 8 I s h i i op.olt. p. 112 9 9R. D. I I ; 8,1.no.57, f,59 4 7 -19,15 - 1 0 0 t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of t h i s idea was not too remote i n view of the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r r i v i n g at a separate peace 101 between Germany, Russia and Japan i n March, 1916. How great the p o s s i b i l i t y of a German-Japanese a l l i a n c e was to become may be i l l u s t r a t e d by a memorandum from the Chief of the German General Staff,, von Ludendorff, September 14, 1917, to the German Reichs-Chancellor, i n which von Ludendorff expressed, h i s opinion on the peace termss, saying The association of Belgium' with Germany w i l l have as a res u l t that Holland, i f she pursues her obvious i n t e r -ests willl be attracted to us, e s p e c i a l l y i f her colon-i a l possessions" are guaranteed by a Japan which i s a l l i e d to us . . . . 0 2 In any case, the Japanese government must have counted upon the future formation of such a strong c o a l i t i o n . Only i n t h i s way i t i s possible to explain the statement of the Japanese Foreign M i n i s t e r , Viscount Motono when he, on being asked by the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo i n November, 1917, whether the Lansing-Ishii Agreement may not cause misunderstandings between Japan"and the United States because of an ambiguous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , answered: i n such a case Japan would have better means at her disposal f o r carrying into e f f e c t her i n t e r p r e t a t i o n rather than that of the United States. . . . 1 0 3 loo ' " " •" <-, - • • ' ! : ~ ~~~ R.D. I I ; 7,2. no. 74.6, pp728 1 0 1Chang ,1.0^. c i t . 186 102 •• ~ Quoted from Lloyd George,D,War Memoirs,London.Nicholson and Watson 1923-36 Vol.IV P.2075 103 •• ' . • Report of the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo>of Nov.1,1917, on a conversation with the Japanese Foreign M i n i s t e r Viscount Motono, quoted from M i l l a r d , op cit.p.169 - 48 -After these considerations the B r i t i s h p o l i c y of acquiescence towards Japan becomes explicable. The creation of a p o t e n t i a l 'Eurasian Continental Bloc' which consisted of two highly i n d u s t r i a l i z e d powers e x p l o i t i n g the vast riches of raw materials i n the Russian Empire must have been a nightmare to B r i t i s h diplomacy. The B r i t i s h diplomatic documents reveal such concern up to ' . 104 and throughout the year 1919. The v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of the B r i t i s h Empire demanded that good Anglo-Japanese re l a t i o n s based on the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , however obsolete i t might have become with regard to China, be maintained. InsJas&S of the a n t i - B r i t i s h a g i t a t i o n campaign of the Japanese press, the B r i t i s h press, notably i n the Far East, sought therefore to save face and to emphasize the s o l i d a r i t y of c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s based upon the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . The London and China Telegraph referred e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y , I n June, 1916, to a speech made by the Anglophil Japanese Foreign M i n i s t e r , Baron Kato, i n which ha denied that temporary differences of opinion could lead to a di s s o l u t i o n of the A l l i a n c e , and cf. for instance. Documents on B r i t i s h Foreign Policy,1919 -1959 ,ed. E.L..Woodward-R.Butler , F i r s t Senfes 1919 ..London, H.M.,St.O. 194^/Doc.Brit.For.Pol. ,1919).vol III,No.280, no.552, no. 615. ^p/Hereafter referred to as - 49 -spoke of a * f r i e n d l y competition" between B r i t a i n and 105 Japan i n China. The Japan Weekly Chronicle complaining i n October, 1917, of the a g i t a t i o n launched by the Japanese newspapers, and endeavouring to remove any suspioion of f r i c t i o n between the two countries, made a sharp difference between the a n t i - B r i t i s h f e e l i n g of "irresponsible journal-1 n fi i s t s " and the o f f i c i a l attitude o f : t h e government. Meanwhile Japan was also enjoying a period of economic expansion. The preoccupation of the European powers, primarily Great B r i t a i n , i n the European war, provided Japan with a unique chance to replace these powers on the Far Eastern market, and to increase to a considerable degree her indust-r i a l capacity. According to American consular reports the number of new f a c t o r i e s established during the war-years i n Japan amounted to about fourteen thousand with a c a p i t a l of four hundred-forty m i l l i o n y e n . 1 0 7 The Japanese cotton industry systematically penetrated the Chinese market where B r i t i s h trade, as a. consequence of the war, was de-c l i n i n g . Japanese cotton manufacture companies l i k e the Mitsui-Mitsubichi-an& Kfaigi.-Gompand.es established themselves 108 i n Shaaghai and Tsingtao, so that the Japanese s i l k -and cotton-exp.ort-trade increased from two hundred and The London and China Telegraph, June 12, 1916 1 0 6 J a p a n Weekly Chronicle, Oct. 11,1917. 107 Handelsberichten, Amsterdam, July 3, 1919. 1 0 8Indiaman, London, Feb. 11, 1916. - 50 -twenty m i l l i o n yen i n 1916 to three hundred eighty-four 109 m i l l i o n i n 1917. The second great market conquered by the Japanese export industry was India. As early as 1912, there was a s i g n i f i c a n t competition i n the India^coasting trade between the B r i t i s h - I n d i a Steamship Company and the 'Nippon Yusen Kaishsf the B r i t i s h and Japanese governmental au t h o r i t i e s expressed the fear that the competition might prove detrimental to Anglo-Japanese f r i e n d s h i p . 1 1 0 There were questions i n the House of Commons i n 1914, which complained about the ex-clusion of B r i t i s h ships from the coasting trade between Indian ports by Japanese shipping companies which had over^ come a shipping monopoly between Calcutta and Rangoon. 1 1 1 According to o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s , the loadings carried by Japanese shippihg companies between India and other countries increased between 1912 and 1918 from an annual rate of t h i r t y 132 thousand tons to f i v e hundred twenty-nine thousand tons. The war brought a complete change In the import-trade of India i n favour of Japan. Whilst the Japanese t o t a l import _ Per Neue Orient, 1919, v o l . I , p.113. 110 Japan Times, Nov.30, 1912. l i : L G r . B r i t . ,Parl.Deb. ,5th Ser. ,1914,vol.63,p.904; 112 Per Neue Orient, 1919, v o l . I I , p. 191. - 51 -to'India i n 1913-1914 amounted roughly to only $3,000,000, the t o t a l amount i n 1918 was ^22,404,000, that i s an increase 113 400 per-cent, or one f i f t h of the whole import of India, or, expressed i n terms of percentage, the Japanese import to India rose from 2.5 percent to 19.8 percent, whilst the B r i t i s h import decreased from 62.8 percent to 45.5 114 percent. I t was mainly the Lancashire cotton industry that suffered from the Japanese competition i n India. Similar increases of Japan's exports took place on the Australian i*wrket, where the Japanese exports i n 115 1917 amounted to about $11,000,000 more than i n 1912, and i n Siam and B r a z i l ^ P a r a l l e l 5? the expansion of Japanese exports overseas there took place a considerable enlargement of Japan's shipbuilding industry wb. i c h was subsidized during the war. The t o t a l tonnage of Japan's merchant navy rose from 1,152,575 tons i n 1908 to 2,310,959 116 tons i n 1918. Japan's great shipping l i n e s , such as the 'Nippon Yusen Kaisha' , the "Tojicyo Kisen Kaisha' and the 'Osaka Shosan Kaisha' dominated the P a c i f i c Ocean i n mercantile passenger shipping whilst the B r i t i s h merchant 1 1 SManehester Guardian, July 29, 1919. 114 Per Neue Orient. 1919, v o l . I I , p.231 1 1 5 D e r Neue Orient, 1919, v o l I, p.129 116 Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual,New York,Macmillan, 1921/22, p.280. - 52 -f l e e t had. been suffering heavy losses from the war. This s W t summary of Japan's economic expansion, p a r t i c u l a r l y the growth of her export trade, s u f f i c e s to i l l u s t r a t e that here a power had grown up during the war which, because of her expanding i n d u s t r i a l capacity^had entered into vigorous commercial competition with Great B r i t a i n , and which had undermined the so f a r undisputed trade supremacy of Great B r i t a i n ' i n Eastern Asia and i n the P a c i f i c . In A u s t r a l i a which f e l t the Japanese com-mercial r i v a l r y to i t s f u l l extent, Senator Long warned the Senate i n 1918 of the r a p i d i t y with which Japan's mercantile shipping had grown and that i t now occupied a 117 most prominent p o s i t i o n i n the P a c i f i c . Senator what. MacDougall asked the government ^&fee*f measures i h e j ^ intended to take i n order to compete with the further-increasing Japanese merchant navy. ^ ® Thusjit can be seen that whilst the Western Powers were almost completely absorbed i n the war i n Europe, Japan u t i l i z e d t h i s opportunity f o r launching a large-scale p o l i t i c a l , t e r r i t o r i a l and economic expansion i n the Far East. This expansion together with the tremendous increase of her i n d u s t r i a l capacity and of her diplomatic prestige resulted i n the fact that,whilst Japan had entered 117 Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , P a r i . Deb. ,1917-1918, v o l . LXXXIV, pp3410; 1 1 8 i b i d . , v o l . LXXXV, p.6177 - 53 -the war as a leading power i n Eastern Asia, she came out of the war-period as a world power. As such, she appeared i n 1919 at the Peace Conference i n Pa r i s . The r i s e of Japan's power was accompanied by the decline of Great B r i t a i n ' s influence i n the Far East. Although the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e had become more and more obsolete as the common bond of British-Japanese f r i e n d -ship , and a cert a i n antagonism had ar i s e n between Japan and Great B r i t a i n , Japan was an indispensable a l l y during the war upon whom Great B r i t a i n was dependent. The B r i t -i s h Government was therefore determined to cooperate further with the Japanese a l l y and! to maintain the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . The Japanese statesman Baron I s h i i commented upon the value of the t h i r d a l l i a n c e f o r B r i t a i n : With so many B r i t i s h possessions i n the Orieht--A u s t r a l i a , India, Singapore, Hong Kong— Japan's friendship was absolutely e s s e n t i a l to B r i t a i n . The B r i t i s h motive which was to determine from now on Great B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y towards Japan was to use 119 I s h i i , o p c i t . p. 6G - 5 4 -the A l l i a n c e as a means for preventing a Japanese expansion southward to the B r i t i s h Dominions and f o r exerting a c e r t a i n c o n t r o l l i n g and r e s t r a i n i n g i n -fluence on Japan's expansionist policy. For t h i s pur-pose Great B r i t a i n had to be prepared to make concess-ions to Japan i n China, Manchuria and Mongolia, where the Japanese expansion could possibly be diverted i n order to protect the Dominions i n the south and to preserve the i n t e g r i t y of the B r i t i s h Empire. Thus^the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e underwent a remarkable change. Whereas the A l l i a n c e of 1902 had been directed against Russia, i n 1905 against Russia and Germany, and a f t e r 1911 pr i m a r i l y against Germany, para-do x i c a l l y , i t served the B r i t i s h government from 1914 u n t i l i t s expiration i n 1922 as a precautionary measure against Japan herself. - 55 -CHAPTER II BRITISH AND JAPANESE DIPLOMACY AT THE PEACE  CONFERENCE OF PARIS, 1919 Owing to her considerably enlarged power, influence and diplomatic prestige, Japan was admitted to the Conference a^js a P r i n c i p a l Power, ranking equally with Great B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y and the United States; she could thus exert her influence i n the major councils, executives and com-mittees l i k e the Supreme Council of the Big Four and the Council of Ten. The Japanese delegation, headed by the former Prime Minister and member of the Genro, Prince S a i o n j i , was faced with the task of securing j u r i d i c a l l y by means of diplomacy what had been gained during the war by means of force. The Japanese government might have re-c a l l e d the demarche of Shimonoseki i n 1895, when, being i s o l a t e d , 'Japan was deprived of the f r u i t s of her v i c t o r y over China by the j o i n t intervention of three European Great Powers. To prevent a r e p e t i t i o n of such events was the f i r s t aim of Japan's diplomacy i n 1919. Japan had under a l l circumstances to avoid being placed i n a p o s i t i o n of diplomatic i s o l a t i o n , and being opposed by a united anti-Japanese front at the peace negotiations. A r e v i v a l of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e provided the means of preventing such i s o l a t i o n . The Japanese government had, as has been seen, been playing with the idea of replacing - 56 -the A l l i a n c e ft^wq#&# with the B r i t i s h Empire by a formal m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e with Russia ever since the Russo-Japanese ^rapprochement" had taken place through a series of public and secret treaties? but the collapse of the T s a r i s t Empire i n 1918. put an end to these plans and induced the Japanese government as well as Japanese Peace Conference-delegation i n 1919, the Tokyo newspaper, "Nitschi N i t s c h i Shimbun" wrote: Japan's diplomacy, a f t e r having defended the claims on Shantung, the German P a c i f i c Islands and the supremacy i n Eastern Asia, w i l l be based on the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . Under these aspects Japan's peace terms w i l l be formulated.^ Furthermore, by the conclusion of the secret agreements of February, 1917 with Great B r i t a i n , France, Russia and I t a l y , ( t h e d e t a i l s of which w i l l be mentioned l a t e r i n t h i s Chapter)Japan had secured an e f f e c t i v e instrument which provided the l e g a l basis for Japan's demands at the Peace Conference. Both the a l l i a n c e with Great B r i t a i n and the secret agreements enabled Viscount Motono, the Japanese Foreign Minister,to state i n the Japanese public opinion to think with Great B r i t a i n . On the occasion of the departure of the Japanese Der Neue Orient, 1919, I. p.28 - 57 -Diet i n June, 1917 that h i s Government had no anxieties regarding the support of the A l l i e d Powers at the Peace Conference and had taken adequate measures to secure 2 Japanese rights and in t e r e s t s . Although Viscount Motono i n h i s statement did not take into account the probable attitude of the United States, he was p e r f e c t l y r i g h t i n h i s pre d i c t i o n . In the session of the Council of Ten on January 27, 1919, the chief Japanese delegate, Baron Makino, presented h i s demand for the unconditional cession of the former German r i g h t s i n Shantung and of a l l former German islands 3 i n the P a c i f i c north of the equator. In making the f i r s t claim Japan was seeking to r e a l i z e the ambition to which she had aspired i n the Twenty-one Demands i n 1915, and i n the supplementary agreement i n 1918. I t was designed to give Japan a dominating p o s i t i o n i n Niprthem China and to strengthen her economy. The second demand originated from str a t e g i c considerations. In a memorandum published i n the London and China Telegraph he emphasized: 2 Takeuchi, T. War and Diplomacy i n the Japanese Empire.New York,Doubleday Doran & Comp.inc. 1935., p.219 3 Secret protocol of the Council of Ten,January 27,1919 Baker, R.St. Woodrow Wilson (Memoirs and DocumentsjLelpzig,1925, Vol. II p.174 ' - 58 -We claim the right to occupy these islands . . . A national sense of dignity i n s p i r e s the -whole people of Japan to the conviction that any other disposal of them would he a r e f l e c t i o n upon us, and the handing over of the supervision of these islands would be a just recognition of the services we rendered In maintaining the commerce of the P a c i f i c a s s i s t i n g our A l l i e s i n the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. We contend, and s h a l l continue to contend that Japan should control the islands north of the equator.. . . 4 The Japanese demand concerning Shantung necess-a r i l y aroused the strongest opposition from the Chinese delegation at the Conference, who sought to vindicate by a l l means China's right to have Chinese sovereignty over Shantung restored d i r e c t l y without negotiation with Japan. The Chinese opposed Japan because the l a t t e r i n s i s t e d on carrying out the provisions of the Sino-5 Japanese Treaty of 1915 with regard to Shantung - ac-cording to which China had agreed to assent to any subse-quent settlement disposing of the German righ t s i n Shantung. This created the f i r s t complication i n the Eastern A s i a t i c question at P a r i s . The United States, a l -though she was vff>tkifrly concerned i n t h i s matter, found her i n t e r e s t ignored; her i r r i t a t i o n over the Shantung The London and China Telegraph, February 10, 1919 5 cf. Report of the testimony of Professor E.T.Williams,chief adviser on Far Eastern A f f a i r s to the United States Commiss-ion at Paris,before the Senate Commission on Foreign Relations Aug. 22, 1919, i n M i l l a r d , Th.F., C o n f l i c t of P o l i c i e s i n  Asia. London,George A l l e n & Unwin,Ltd. 1924. - 59 -question had important world repercussions and may ex-p l a i n much of her future foreign p o l i c y . The key, however, for an understanding of the importance of t h i s problem l i e s i n the p o l i c y of B r i t a i n at Pa r i s . B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y toward Japan during the; World War had been a p o l i c y of acquiescence, the conse-quences of which became evident at P a r i s . B r i t i s h diplomacy at the Conference was not free i n the choice of the course to be taken but was bound to a very considerable degree by the obligations goemLt-yagxl^BB^^ which the B r i t i s h Government had incurred towards Japan during the War. In addition, the B r i t i s h Government i n taking t h e i r decisions had to take into due consideration the s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t s of the B r i t i s h Dominions, which were going to play more and more an independent role i n in t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s ^ a n d the attitude of the United States. The obligations towards her Japanese a l l y imposed upon Great B r i t a i n were the provisions of the secret agree-ment concluded by exchange of notes between the B r i t i s h Ambassador to Tokyo, S i r C. Green, and the Japanese Foreign Mi n i s t e r , Yiscount Motono, on February 16, 1917, which stipulated that - 60 -His Britannic Majesty's Government accede . . . to request of the Japanese Government for an assurance that they w i l l support Japan's claims i n regard to the disposal of Germany's ri g h t s i n Shantung and possessions i n the islands north of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference . . . . Mr. Lloyd George pointed out why the B r i t i s h govern-ment had incurred t h i s obligation of far-reaching consequences i n the Council of the Big Three on A p r i l 22, 1919. According to the B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r , i t was the r e s u l t of the emergeney-situation i n which Great B r i t a i n found h e r s e l f i n 1917, when naval units for the anti-submarine warfare were urgently needed i n the Mediterranean. Therefore, he stated, Japanese naval aid was indispensable. I t was "7 granted by Japan i n return f o r the agreement. This argument, however, although i t shows the temporary m i l i t a r y dependence of Great B r i t a i n i n the Far East on the co-opera-t i o n of Japanese naval power, does not reveal the deeper reasons for the B r i t i s h concession to Japan. As the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, staified i n the hearing before the United States Senate Commission on Foreign Relations, an understanding, at l e a s t regarding the disposal ^MacMurray,J.V.A.,Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning  China, 1894 - 1919.Washington,1925, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Vol I I , p.1168. Secret Report of the Council of Four, May 11, 1919, Baker Q.PPcit.Vol.1. p.58. - 61 -of the Islands i n the P a c i f i c , was reached between S i r Edward Grey ahd Baron I s h i i , then Japanese Ambassador to P a r i s , as early as 1915. I t was1 then arranged that the equator was to be the demarcation^line between the B r i t i s h 8 and Japanese conquered islands i n the P a c i f i c . On the Shantung question, there was no formal agreement except the promise oh the part of Japan to return Kiaotchou to China a f t e r the war. This revelation made by Mr. Lansing shows that the B r i t i s h concession i n regard to the P a c i f i c islands was made at a time when, on the one hand; the Anglo-Japanese relations had become strained because of the twenty-one demands of Japan to China, and, on the other hand, the B r i t i s h Cabinet was negotiating with Tokyo f o r the accession of Japan to the famous London Declaration of September 4, 1914)under the terms of which the signatory powers pledged themselves not to conclude a separate peace during the h o s t i l -i t i e s . I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d that i n 1915 there was a violent a n t i - B r i t i s h press campaign i n Japan with several suggestions f o r a re-orientatlon of Japanese foreign p o l i c y towards a German-Japanese "rapprochement"^ and that, indeed, t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y was not too remote i n 1914 a f t e r secret and informal contacts had taken place between German and Jap-anese diplomatic representatives i n Stockholm, which aimed 8 Mr. Lansing referred to an interview with Baron I s h i i during the American-Japanese negotiations on September 6, 1917. cf,Report of the Hearing on the Treaty of Peace before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August 8, 1919,quoted i n M i l l a r d , op.cit. , p.66 f f . - 62 -at reaching a separate peace between Germany and the Eastern Powers, Japan and Russia. The B r i t i s h government had there-fore been extremely anxious to secure Japan's adherence' to the London Declaration to prevent Japan's breaking away from the A l l i e d Powers i n general, and from Great B r i t a i n i n p a r t i c u l a r . That a defection and even a possible a l -lia n c e of Japan with Germany against the A l l i e s was feared i n Great B r i t a i n was openly expressed by the Tokyo corres-pondent of the "London Times1" to Baron I s h i i . 9 The reluctance towards Japanese accession to the London Declaration i n Genro c i r c l e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y on the part of Prince Yamagata 10 and Prince Inouye and the c r i t i c i s m launched In the Japanese Diet on the accomplished accession of Japan^demonstrated that the anxieties on the part of the B r i t i s h were not un-j u s t i f i e d . Thus the B r i t i s h concession had to be made at that time as a price to assure Japan's adherence to the binding London Declaration. S i g n i f i c a n t l i g h t was shed on the British-Japanese secret agreements of February, 1917 by a secret telegram of the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo of February 8, 1917 -that i s , six days a f t e r the conclusion of the secret agree-ment. This telegram was published i n the leading Moscow newspaper,I§vestia, on December 14, 1917. Referring to the 9 I s h i i , Viscount K., Diplomatic Commentaries,Baltimore, the John Hopkins Press, 1936. p.103. 1 0Takeuohi, T. Op.cit. , p.196 i ; L I s h i i , op. c i t . , p. 101 - 63 -expediency of granting Japan the promises requested, the Russian diplomat expressed the opinion that "the t o t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between England and Japan during recent months e n t i t l e s one to the conclusion that Japanese ambitions w i l l meet with no objections on the part of the London Cabinet. The truth of t h i s statement becomes evident i n the l i g h t of the Japanese answer to the B r i t i s h note of February 6th. The Japanese reply of February 21, 1917 termed the secret agreement a "fresh proof of the close t i e s that unite the 13 two A l l i e d powers." That means, the B r i t i s h Government had concluded the secret agreement of 1917 with Japan because she was anxious to induce the Japanese Government to remain i n the war on the side of the A l l i e s . A further motive was to revive the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e as a possibly e f f e c t i v e instrument f o r B r i t i s h post-war diplomacy. The secret diplomacy which the B r i t i s h Government had pursued during the war through a seriea of agreements necessarily clashed with President Wilson's ideas of replacing the balance of power-system by a uni-versal system of international co-operation i n which the old-fashioned secret diplomacy would be replaced by an "open diplomacy", i . e . , by open discussion i n the League of Nations. 12 Secret.telegram of the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo, Krupensky, No.40, February 8, 1917, pub.by Isvestia,December 14, 1917, quoted from China Archiv.1918, pp.59-60. 13 MacMurray, op c i t . , Vol I I , p. 1167 f f . - 64 -Questions i n the B r i t i s h House of Commons i n March, 1918 r e f l e c t e d some uneasiness about the secret t r e a t i e s concluded by Great B r i t a i n since the outbreak of the war, 1 4 and Prime Minister Mr. Lloyd George may have had si m i l a r feelings? f o r , i n a speech at the London Trade Union Congress, January 5, 1918,accepting Wilson's p r i n c i p l e s , he denied a l l i m p e r i a l i s t i c war aims of the A l l i e s as em-bodied i n the secret agreements. Mr. Lloyd George c a r e f u l l y 15 omitted to mention the secret treaty with Japan. The U. S. Government did not have f u l l and detailed information about th i s treaty p r i o r to President Wilson's 16 a r r i v a l at the P a r i s Peace Conference early i n 1919. President Wilson was, therefore, a l l the more $£jp#^3ce&'when he learned of the existence of such a treaty i n the Supreme A l l i e d Council. How b i t t e r the f e e l i n g of President Wilson was i s revealed by h i s sarcastic remark that he was e n t i t l e d to ask whether Great B r i t a i n and Japan had any r i g h t to dispose of the islands i n the P a c i f i c . 1 7 The B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r , Mr. Lloyd George, however, took a firm stand with 1 4G*. B r i t . , Pari.Debates, 5th Series, 1918, Yol.103,p.1690 1 5Baker. 0p^ C i t . Vol. I, pp.43-44 Cf.President Wilson's answer to Senator Borah's question, O f f i c i a l Report of the Conference between Pres.Wilson and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at the White House, August 19,1919, cited i n M i l l a r d , Op.Cit. , P.65 17 Secret Protocol of the Council of Four,April 22,1919, Baker Op.Cit.Yol I I , p.189. - 65 -President Wilson-^saying that the attitude of the B r i t i s h Government was based on an irrevocable o b l i g a t i o n as contain-18 ed In the Treaty of 1917. He took the same attitude towards the Chinese demand presented by the Chinese chief delegate, Dr. Willington Koo, who wanted the German righ t s i n Shantung d i r e c t l y restored to China. Mr. Lloyd George argued that the Japanese actions i n the Far East during the war had also protected China, and that Great B r i t a i n was morally obliged to Japan^without whose help the German 19 threat i n Eastern Asia could not have been eliminated. The same view was shared by ^ i i - Arthur Balfour as he pointed out i n a despatch to the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, Lord 20 Curzon. I t was remarkable that the B r i t i s h Prime Minister never questioned the l e g a l v a l i d i t y of the Sino-Japanese Treaties of 1915 and 1918, which ,as the Twenty-one Demand s, were imposed upon China under Japanese diplomatic pressure. On the. contrary, Mr. Lloyd George doubted whether these t r e a t i e s constituted a suppression of China, and recommended to the Chinese delegate not to consider the agreements as a "scrap of paper". 2 1 Speaking i n terms of Interna 1£ onal Law, l 8 S e c r e t Protocol of the Council of Four, A p r i l 22,1919, Baker Op.City Vol IT, p.188 l 9 S e c r e t Protocol of the Council of Four,April 22,1919, Baker, Op.Cit.Vol. I I , p. 194. 2 0 D i s p a t e h from S i r Arthur Balfour to Lord Curzon,May 8, 1919, quo ted i n Dugdale, B.E.C. Arthur James Balfour (1906-1930). London,Hut'chtns6h.& Co.Ltd. , 1936, p.332. Secret Protocol of the Council of Four,Apr.22,1919,Baker Op.Cit.Vol.II, p.193. - 6 6 -t h i s meant that the B r i t i s h Government f u l l y recognized, if not sanctioned, the measures taken by the Japanese Government during the war i n China. I t was the formal recognition of the newly created 'status quo' i n the Far East on the part of the B r i t i s h Government, that i s to say, of Japan's dom-inati n g p o s i t i o n i n Eastern Assia. When compared with the attitude of the U. S. Govern-ment at that time, which had expressly announced the p o l i c y of "non-recognition'' i n the case of the ' f a i t accompli' created by Hiapah, the fundamental difference between B r i t i s h and U. S. Far Eastern p o l i c y becomes evident. Great B r i t a i n with her v i t a l commercial i n t e r e s t s i n China, r e a l i s t i c a l l y adjusted her p o l i c y there to the altered p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n whenever i t was necessitated by circumstances. This t r a d i t i o n -a l a d a p t i b i l i t y remained a constant feature of B r i t i s h diplomacy from 1915, through the 1920's, when i t was i l l u s -trated by B r i t i s h willingness to surrender e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s i n 1926, and by the "recognition of the Nanking Govern-ment i n 1928 down to 1949 when the B r i t i s h Government an-nounced the 'de jure'-recognition of Red China. In contrast, the U. S. p o l i c y i n the Far East remained p e r s i s t e n t l y i n f l e x i b l e i n the r e s t r i c t i v e i nterpretation of the open-door from the time of i t s enunciation i n 1899 , and t r i e d - 67 -to meet any serious infringement upon t h i s p r i n c i p l e by continuously p r a c t i s i n g a p o l i c y of "non-recognition", as i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the U. S. attitude towards the Twenty-one Demands i n 1915,towards the Shantung question i n 1919, and during the Manchurian C o n f l i c t i n 1932. The basic attitudes of Great B r i t a i n and the United States thus c o l l i d e d at the P a r i s Peace Conference on the Shantung question. The B r i t i s h Government was determined to accept the Japanese dominating influence over cer t a i n regions i n China as a ' f a i t accompli' and, by doing t h i s , to secure Japan's co-operation f o r a p o l i c y based upon the thesis of "spheres of influence". Accordingly, the U. S. President faced a j o i n t diplomatic front of Great B r i t a i n and Japan, when he proposed at the Conference the a b o l i t i o n 22 of a l l spheres of influence i n China. Mr. Lloyd George impetuously rejected the American proposal, since he was unwilling to allow other nations to share i n the f i n a n c i a l 23 and economic development of the Yangtse Valley. The B r i t i s h Government, however, took a resolute and dissenting standpoint when the Japanese delegation put forward t h e i r demands f o r r a c i a l equality, p a r t i c u l a r l y when they urged the i n s e r t i o n of a clause i n the Covenant 22 Secret Protocol of the Council of Four,April 21,1919 Baker, Op.Cit. Vol I I . p.186-7. Baker, QpyCit.Vol.11, ppl97 - 68 -of the League, which was to guarantee equal and just 24 treatment to a l l members of the League. The B r i t i s h delegate, Lord C e c i l , declared i n February 1919 that t h i s question would imply "e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y serious problems f o r the B r i t i s h Empire" and advocated a postponement of 25 the discussion of t h i s matter. When the Japanese delegate, Baron Maj0.no, i n A p r i l , 1919 tabled a second proposal at the Conference, which was an amendment to the Preamble of the Covenant, Lord C e c i l again expressed h i s regret not to be i n the p o s i t i o n to vote for the Japanese amendment, because, as he said, he feared "interference 26 i n the domestic a f f a i r s of states members of the League". The j^L&^f^aelegate, Mr. M i l l e r , i n commenting on the Japanese amendment, explained why the B r i t i s h delegation objected to the proposal of their Japanese A l l y . "The words .. could only mean that they were a sort of curtain behind which was the question of White A u s t r a l i a and of immigratioh of Eastern Peoples into countries which regarded the poss-27 i b i l i t y of such immigration as impossible to discuss." These countries referred to were unquestionably the B r i t i s h Dominions, whose views i n questions of int e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s had to be c a r e f u l l y observed by the Imperial Government. 24lbid. Vol.1, p.177-8. 2 5 I b i d . p.178. 26 M i l l e r , D.H. Drafting the Covenant. Vol.11, p.389,quoted by LaFargue, OpoCit. p.209. 27 M i l l e r , Ibid, p.461, quoted by LaFargue, op.cit.p.209. - 69 -The standpoint of the B r i t i s h Dominions at the Conference considerably influenced the decisions of the B r i t i s h Govern-ment, e s p e c i a l l y the Prime Mi n i s t e r , Mr. Lloyd George, i n t h e i r p o l i c y toward Japan. P a r i s , and what i s of f a r more importance, on the further course of British-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , i t appears necessary to review s u c c i n c t l y the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l evolution of the Dominions up to that time, and the implications thereof germane to Anglo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . As w i l l be r e c a l l e d , the B r i t i s h Dominions acquired i n 1911 the "right" of con-s u l t a t i o n on matters of foreign p o l i c y i n the Imperial Defence Committee. The Dominion Governments u t i l i z e d t h i s " r i g h t " f o r the f i r s t time when the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was at stake i n 1911. The Dominions, however, were only given a consultative voice. The conduct of foreign a f f a i r s s t i l l remained the exclusive preserve of the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e i n London; and although at the outbreak of the war S i r Edward Grey's attitude towards Japan's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war was influenced by h i s fear of repercussion on the Dominions, the l a t t e r played no major part i n the considerations of the B r i t i s h Cabinet so f a r as Anglo-Japanese relations during the war period were concerned. A u s t r a l i a was not even informed by the B r i t i s h Government about the Japanese actions against China To understand f u l l y the Dominions' influence at - 70 -28b i n 1915. Nor was the Australian Government consulted p r i o r to the conclusion of the secret British-Japanese agreement of 1917, although the a l l o c a t i o n of the P a c i f i c islands ;which was stipulated, was a matter of primary 29 concern to A u s t r a l i a . The Australian Prime Mi n i s t e r , Mr. Hughes, was confronted with a ' f a i t accompli' so that he-according to the B r i t i s h Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Bonar Law - "acquiesced i n that which was 30 already done." This aroused severe c r i t i c i s m i n the Australian Senate and i n the House of Representatives l a t e r 31 i n 1919 when the Peace Treaty was under discussion. A closer co-operation between the governments of the United Kingdom and the Dominions began when the Prime Mini s t e r s of the Dominions had a d i r e c t influence on B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y through t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Imperial War Cabinet i n early 1917; and although t h i s body was mainly concerned with the conduct of a f f a i r s immediately connected with the war, the Canadian Prime Minister, S i r Robert Borden, commented: "With the constitution of that Cabinet a new era has dawned and a new page of his t o r y has 32 been, written." Commonwealth of Australia,Parliamentary Debates,Ses.1914-17, Vol.LXXVIII, p.5564. 2 9Ibid.Ses.l919, Vol.LXXXIX, p.12611. 3 0 c f . Statement by Mr. Hughes, Sept.19,1919,Ibid.p.12608. 3 1 I b i d . VolLKXXvTII, p.10203-4. 32 Borden, S i r Robert The War and the Future.London.Hbddqr-.an-g. Stoughton, 1917, p.145. - 71 -The decisive change i n the j u r i d i c a l p o s i t i o n of the B r i t i s h Dominions occurred i n 1917, when by Resolution IJf of the Imperial War Conference the Dominions were granted an "adequate voice i n foreign p o l i c y " . However ambiguous t h i s formulation was from the j u r i d i c a l point of view, i t constituted the legitimate basis for the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Dominions i n the P a r i s Peace Conference. I t was p a r t i c u l a r l y due to the influence of S i r Robert Borden and of General Smuts that the Dominions obtained the right of separate representation and separate signature at this conference, thus for the f i r s t time taking part i n determining post-war p o l i t i c s of the B r i t i s h Empire. Besides the separate representation, the Dominion representatives formed part of the B r i t i s h Empire Delegation which placed them i n a "peculiarly e f f e c t i v e p o s i t i o n " , to use S i r Robert Borden's phraseology. No action was taken by the prominent heads of the B r i t i s h Delegation, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, that had not been submitted to the Dominion representatives who had "exactly the same voice i n determining B r i t i s h p o l i c y as any member of the B r i t i s h 33 Cabinet". The concession made by the Imperial Cabinet was due to the fact that the Dominions had rendered valuable Statement by Mr. Lloyd George i n the B r i t i s h Hous e of Commons, August 18, 1921, Great Brit.Pari.Debates, 5th Series, 1921, Vol. 136, p.1699. - 72 -contributions to tbe f i n a l v i c t o r y of the A l l i e s and, a f t e r having suffered comparatively heavy casualties during 34 the war, had a moral right not only to be consulted but also to exercise a c e r t a i n active influence on B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y . This was a l l the more the case as there were items on the agenda of the Conference which were of v i t a l import-ance to the Dominions, such as, for instance, the question of Japanese r a c i a l equality with i t s grave eventual con-sequences on the immigration p o l i c i e s of the Dominions, and the t e r r i t o r i a l settlement of the question of the former German P a c i f i c islands which concerned the Governments of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand from the st r a t e g i c point of view. The Australian Prime Minister appeared to be the dominant figure at P a r i s i n dealing with these questions. On a l l important problems a f f e c t i n g A u s t r a l i a he was i n close contact with the Japanese delegates, Baron Makino 35 and Viscount Chinda. The question of o r i e n t a l immigration, c h i e f l y from Japan and China, had long been a matter of primary concern for the Australian as well as the New Zealand Governments. In 1901 the Australian Government had enacted the "Immigration R e s t r i c t i o n Act" under ythiek a l l immigrants who were unable to meet the requirements 36 of a language test were refused entry into A u s t r a l i a . 34. C f . B r i t i s h Empire Army Casualties,1914-19,"Diary and Index of the War" (Times),in King-Hall,S/. ,0ur Own Times, 1913-1938 London,NJefQlson'lind Watson Ltd. ,1938, p.245. 35Cf.Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Debates,Ses.1919,Vol. LXXXIX, p.12609. 3 6Clyde,P.H. Op.Cit.p.474 - 73 -The same kind of immigration law was introduced i n New Zealand i n 1908. The purpose of t h i s law was to safeguard what had already become well-known as the "White fttea l c P o l i c y " upon which Aust r a l i a ' s foreign p o l i c y was b a s i c a l l y founded. Any impairment of the sovereign rights of the Dominions to control the o r i e n t a l immigration was looked upon by A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand with c r i t i c a l eyes. Their anxiety i n t h i s respect, l i k e that of Canada, o r i g i n -ated not so much from a f e e l i n g of r a c i a l discrimination but rather from the governments' e f f o r t s to prevent serious economic disturbances might have resulted i n lowering the white men's standard of l i v i n g . 3 7 However, because of the exis t i n g intimate r e l a t i o n s between Great B r i t a i n and Japan as a res u l t of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , the Imperial Government i n London had the greatest i n t e r e s t i n avoiding any possible f r i c t i o n with her Japanese a l l y which might possibly r e s u l t from the anti-Japanese immigration laws of the Dominions. The London Government assiduously urged the Dominions to postpone any discriminatory l e g i s l a t i o n against Japanese immigration on behalf of the greater imperial i n t e r e s t s . With the increase of Dominion autonomy expressed i n Resolution IX, the Australian Government was i n a p o s i t i o n to take a firmer stand i n securing her int e r e s t s . Prime '-''Cf.Impsrial Conference 1923, Appendices to the Summary of Proceedings,presented to parliament by Command of His Majesty 1923.Cmd 1988, London H.M.St.0.1923, p.68 - 74 -Mi n i s t e r Hughes vigorously opposed the Japanese proposals f o r r a c i a l equality. In a press statement of March 27, 1919 he emphasized: we cannot agree to the i n s e r t i o n of any words i n the Covenant or i n the Treaty of Peace that would, impair or' even question our sovereign rig h t s In regard to any and every aspect of th i s question. I cannot bytregard ttoe proposed amendment as an e f f o r t to • es t a b l i s h a p r i n c i p l e under which ultimately some nations would f i n d t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c y as to immigration and Ra t i o n a l i z a t i o n challenged by the League at the i n s t i g a t i o n of one of i t s members.?8. Mr. Hughes threatened that A u s t r a l i a "would not sign the 39 Covenant i f i t contained any such amendment." He even went so f a r as to announce that he would sta r t an a n t i -Japanese a g i t a t i o n i n A u s t r a l i a i f the Japanese demands were conceded. This resolute stand on the part of the Australian Prime Minister caused the B r i t i s h Delegation to take the same l i n e of opposition against the Japanese, 40 although they did so r e l u c t a n t l y as Lord C e c i l admitted. Mr. Hughes* a t t i t u d e , which rejected even any modification y 41 i n the wording of the Eapanese amendment, (and which was not e n t i r e l y approved by S i r Robert Borden, Mr. Massey and 42 General Smuts) may be considered as the f i r s t p r a c t i c a l 3 8Canadian Annual Review,1919, p.254. 3 9The Morning Post,March 29, 1919. 4 0Baker. Op.Cit.Vo.I, p.180. 41 , Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , Par.Debates,Ses.l919 Vol.LXXXIX p.12175. 4 2 S t e e d , K.W.Through the T h i r t y Years .LondongN.Y.1924, Vol.11, p.323. - 75 -application of exercising an "adequate voice i n foreign p o l i c y " . The Australian-Japanese dispute on the quesCon of r a c i a l equality was f i n a l l y s e t t l e d by the mediation of the Canadian Prime Minister, S i r Robert Borden. In summing up the Australian standpoint at the P a r i s Conference, as f a r as her r e l a t i o n s with Japan were concern-ed, i t can be stated that Prime Minister Hughes made i t clear to the Japanese Delegation that he was very anxious for the maintenance of friendship and a l l i a n c e with Japan, but only on condition of the undisputed preservation of the Australian right to decide "who s h a l l enter and who s h a l l n o t " 4 4 Nevertheless, the Prime Minister of A u s t r a l i a must have f e l t some uneasiness about the outspoken affront towards Japan implied i n h i s r e j e c t i o n of the Japanese demands. For strategic reasons A u s t r a l i a simply could not afford to incur the enmity of the growing Japanese power. In an interview with the Japanese press at the Paris Conference, Mr. Hughes intimated that i t was not A u s t r a l i a who was responsible for 45 the rejection of the Japanese Amendment. The consequence was that the attacks of the world press were mainly directed 4.^ Borden,H.(ed.) Robert Laird Borden, His Memoirs, Toronto,The Mac-1938, Vol.11, pp 926-28. Millan. Co.of Canada 44 Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Debates,Sess.1917-19,Vol. LXXXTX, p.12176. 4 5 M i l l e r , D.H. My Diary a)ff the Peace Conference of P a r i s , New York, 1924,Vol.1,April 17,1919.,pp.257-8. - 76 -against President Wilson, although according to a secret dispatch to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo, Mr. Morris, the American Delegation would have possibly accepted the Japan-4-fi ese Amendment. On the whole, i t cannot be said that the B r i t i s h r e j e c t i o n of the Japanese proposal f o r r a c i a l equality affected the comparatively intimate Anglo-Japanese re l a t i o n s seriously. For the demands were deemed by the Japanese Delegation to have some value; i f they were re-jected Japan might secure compensation elsewhere. Baron Makino , when speaking of his Amendment-proposals' on A p r i l 47 28, 1919, declared he would not press i t . In a conversa-t i o n with 'M.r. Arthur Balfour, Baron Makino associated the r a c i a l question with that of Shantung, intimating that a grave s i t u a t i o n would be created i f Japan experienced a 48 rebuff on both questions. This in t e n t i o n seems to have been well recognized on the B r i t i s h side. The Tokyo correspondent of the "Morning Post" reported i n March, 1919 from the Japanese c a p i t a l that o f f i c i a l government c i r c l e s wanted Japan to receive a free hand i n Eastern Asia as compensation for her renunciation of any demands for unlimited immigra-49 t i o n into the English-speaking countries. As the report made by Mr. Balfour on h i s ta l k with Baron Makino on A p r i l 28, 1919 In the Council of Four reveals, S i r Arthur Balfour D.H. My Diary <stf the Peace Conference of P a r i s New York, 1924, Vol.I, A p r i l 17,1919., pp 257-8. M i l l a r d , Op.Cit. p.74. 4 8 M i l l e r , Op. C i t . Vol.XIX, p.196-7. 49 The Morning Post A p r i l 23,1919. was f u l l y aware that i f Japan received the rights she wanted i n Shantung the Japanese delegates would not any 50 longer i n s i s t unduly on their demands fo r r a c i a l equality. . This was a further reason for B r i t a i n to support Japan wholeheartedly i n the Shantung question. Here again the hasic pattern adopted by B r i t i s h diplomacy i n regard to her p o l i c y towards Japan becomes clear; the B r i t i s h Government was prepared to make considerable concessions to Japan i n China f o r the sake of the security of the Dominions, being urged not a l i t t l e by the Dominions themselves.. This influence was s t i l l more evident i n another questiion of v i t a l concern to A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand, namely the future status of the p a c i f i c islands south of the equator. As early as 1917 the representatives of the B r i t i s h Dominions pointed out very c l e a r l y i n the sessions of the Imperial War Cabinet t h e i r intention not to surrender the conquered former German colonies. I t was agreed then that t h i s should be the course to be pursued by the B r i t i s h Dele-51 gation at the Peace Conference. This p o l i c y , of course, 5 0 M i l l e r , Op.Cit. Vol.XIX, Pp.196-7. Lloyd George. War Memoirs.Berlin.1954. Vol.11, p.382. - 78 -c o n f l i c t e d with President Wilson's view of the mandatory system. The U. S. President severely c r i t i c i z e d the idea of annexation advocated by Hr. Lloyd G eorge on behalf of the Dominions, saying that on t h i s point the powers were 52 at the parting of the ways. I t was, however, obvious from the very beginning of the discussions that A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand would not accept the American standpoint as f a r as the P a c i f i c islands were concerned. On January 28, 1919, the same day that Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson clashed i n the Council of Ten, the "Sydney Daily Telegraph" published a statement by the Acting Prime Minister of A u s t r a l i a , Mr. Watt, which read: I t i s probable that at the Conference of the A l l i e d Powers an attempt w i l l be made to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e or neutralize these and other countries that former-l y belonged to Germany . . . I am cabling today to the Prime Minister i n P a r i s , strongly s;etH.ng out our objections to any form of i n t e r n a t i o n a l govern-ment. b 3 The "Sydney Sun" of February 8, 1919 declared: The Ladrone, Marshall and Caroline groups involve our strategic and national safety i n the P a c i f i c and are i n e v i t a b l y linked with A u s t r a l i a ' s future greatness and expansion. . . .54 The Australian attitude i n t h i s respect was s u b s t a n t i a l l y determined by the Japanese expansion into the P a c i f i c during the war. A u s t r a l i a was the more i n s i s t e n t on her r i g h t s as 0 ^ S e c r e t Protocol of the Council of Ten,January 28,1919,in Baker, OppQit. Yol.I . pp219. °°Cf. Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , P a r i . Debates ,1919 ,Vol.. LXXXVIII, p.12427. 54 Ibid, p.12424. - 79 -the Anglo-Japanese intimacy expressed by Mr. Lloyd George's unqualified support of Japan's demands i n Shantung and the •Pacific met with some suspicion i n that Dominion. The "Sydney Daily Telegraph" remarked, f o r instance, that Mr. Lloyd George was anxious to "appease Japan and accede to her demands i n the Pacific."55 since the problem was so important f o r A u s t r a l i a , Mr. Hughes vigorously urged the annexation of the islands, arguing i n the Council of Ten that a New Guinea dominated by another strong power meant 56 the domination of the whole of A u s t r a l i a . In an interview with the P a r i s newspaper "Le Matin" on February 2, 1919 he stated: The question of these islands means l i f e or death, to A u s t r a l i a . . . i t i s our national roof. We ' want the roof safe as a whole and not open to the fancies of passers-by or agression of marauders..57 A s i m i l a r stand was taken by the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr. Massey, i n regard to Samoa, which he pleaded should be 58 controlled exclusively by New Zealand. The Prime Ministers of both P a c i f i c Dominions were supported by S i r Robert Borden, who admitted that A u s t r a l i a and. New Zealand were Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Deb.,Ses.1919.Vol.LXXXvTII p.12423. } 5 6Baker, Op.Cit.Vol.1, p.209-10. 5 7 Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Deb.,Ses.1919,Vol. LXXXVIII, p.12423 58 Mr.Massey i n the Council of Ten,Jan.24,1919,Baker Op.Cit. Vol.I,p.210 - 80 -i n a peculiar p o s i t i o n because they had immediately f e l t 59 the r i s e of the new Japanese Empire. fee B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r , Mr. Lloyd George, saw the Dominions acting as a united front on t h i s question. He was thus placed between the United States and the Dominions. This was the f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n that the Imperial Cabinet was no longer free i n i t s decisions concerning B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n the P a c i f i c . Only with the greatest d i f f i c u l t y did Mr. Lloyd George succeed i n persuading the Prime Ministers of Au s t r a l i a and New Zealand, at a special conference of the B r i t i s h Empire Delegation, to accept the mandate system under a modified form of a compromise , according to which the re-servation was made that the P a c i f i c islands were to be administered according to the laws of the mandatory powers 60 being i n t e g r a l parts thereof. I t was due only to thi s compromising p o l i c y of Mr. Lloyd George that President Wilson's whole idea of the mandate system was salvaged. The re s u l t was, however, that neither President Wilson nor the Australian Prime Minister were s a t i s f i e d with this Solutlen. Mr. Hughes declared b i t t e r l y that the acceptance of t h i s formula was the 'maximum concession' which the Dominions were 61 w i l l i n g to grant. Nor was the B r i t i s h Government pleasedby 59 Jbi4.--F ra3rl Baker .Op. c i t . Vol. I , p.21St 6 0 S e c r e t Protocol of the Council of Ten.Jan.30,1919, i n Baker, Opp C i t . Vol. I , pp S21-2. 6 1 I b i d . P. 223. - 81 -Mr. Hughes* Insistence. The ®ffltii-WQ& London "Westminster Gazette" commented upon h i s attitude at the Conference: I f i n d i v i d u a l delegates are allowed to do as Mr. Hughes has done , a l l national questions w i l l he made battlegrounds i n the newspapers whenever delegates are d i s s a t i s f i e d with Conference's votes. This i s an impossible state of a f f a i r s ; and Confer-ence i t s e l f w i l l be broken up unless i t maintains some d i s c i p l i n e over i t s members. Nothing i s more deplorable than the bad example of the Australian Prime Minster . . . . 63 This statement, however true the reference to the p o s s i b i l -i t y of a breaking up of the Conference might have been hardly seems j u s t i f i e d i n the l i g h t of the new stage In the co n s t i t u t i o n a l evolution of the Dominions developing out of the Imperial War Conference of 1917 and Resolution IX. In conclusion, i t can be seen that B r i t i s h diplomacy at the P a r i s Peace Conference was affected i n three ways. The war heritage of the secret Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1917 obliged Great B r i t a i n to render her support to Japanese diplomacy at the Conference. The United States* p o l i c y at P a r i s fundamentally c o n f l i c t e d with Japan's i n t e r e s t s i n the Shantung question. The B r i t i s h P a c i f i c Dominions success-f u l l y i n s i s t e d f o r the f i r s t time on pressing t h e i r special i n t e r e s t s . Nevertheless, Great B r i t a i n remained to a certain 62 Sydney Daily Telegraph. Jan. 28, 1919, cited i n Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , P a r i . Debates, Ses. 1919, Vol. LXXXVIII p.12423 Cited Ibid. Vol. LXXXIX, p.12436. t - 82 -degree master of the s i t u a t i o n . As a matter of p o l i t i c a l prwdence and expediency, the B r i t i s h Government had decided to make concessions to Japan i n the Far East, and by main-taining intimate friendship with Japan on the basis of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e to serve the i n t e r e s t s of Imperial security. The Shantung dispute was i n d i c a t i v e of the grow-ing antagonism between the two world powers i n the P a c i f i c , Japan and the United States. Great B r i t a i n , however, decided at the Paris'Conference i n fewfouj of her So-raw Japanese a l l y . The P a r i s Conference proved that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was s t i l l an e f f e c t i v e instrument i n international p o l i t i c s . I t isVno exaggeration to maintain that i t was t h i s A l l i a n c e which caused the defeat of U. S. diplomacy i n the Far Eastern question of 1919, and t h i s led ultimately to the r e j e c t i o n of the V e r s a i l l e s Peace Treaty by the U. S. Senate. Since the United States had necessarily to consider Japan's diplo-matic v i c t o r y as a serious menace to the Hay Doctrine of the Open Door P o l i c y i n China, which was the t r a d i t i o n a l basis for any American p o l i c y i n the Far East, and as an undermining of the diplomatic prestige and influence of the United States Government, the significance of the P a r i s Conference lay i n the fact that i t turned out as a triumph of the j o i n t British-Japanese diplomacy over the United States. - 83 -The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e had thus become i n American eyes a problem of primary concern. To the United States Government the settlement of the Far Eastern question i n 1919 was merely a temporary settlement. I t was no f i n a l solution. Thus, the o r i g i n of the Washington Conference ,to which the whole P a c i f i c issue culminating i n the problem of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was to be transferred two years l a t e r , l a y i n Pa r i s . - 84 -CHAPTER II I ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS FROM 1919  TO THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF 1921],. I t has been shown how strong was the intimacy of Anglo-Japanese co-operation at the P a r i s Peace Conference, which to such a considerable degree influenced the treat-ment of the Far Eastern question at the Conference. In t h i s chapter i t i s proposed to examine Anglo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s a f t e r the Peace Conference u n t i l the Imperial Conference i n June, 192.1. S i g n i f i c a n t l i g h t was shed by the Siberian Intervention on the Far Eastern p o l i t i c a l problems Great B r i t a i n had to face i n the years to come. O r i g i n a l l y , the main reason for s t a r t i n g the so-c a l l e d Siberian Intervention necessitated by the collapse of the T s a r i s t Empire i n 1917, had been merely m i l i t a r y -s t r a t e g i c . I t was the general fear that Germany would possibly expand her m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l influence i n the East beyond the Urals to S i b e r i a and to the coast of the P a c i f i c . 1 This meant not only the seizure of vast Cf.Lloyd George,D.,¥ar Memoirs,transl.Berlin,1934.Vol.Ill pp. 458 ,468 ,470. Documents on B r i t i s h Foreign Policy,1919-1959, ed.E.L.Wood-ward-R.Butler ,1st series lyiy.London,H.M.St.U.1949. U&ere-af t e r referred to as Doc.Br.For.Pol. 1919 KVd.Ta. w©.fe^ > a«Jl W . - 85 -natural resources by the German armies, but might have had also far-reaching p o l i t i c a l repercussions on Japan's diplomacy. The B r i t i s h Government intended to re-establish 2 a new e f f e c t i v e front i n the East against Germany. She hoped, furthermore that Japan by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the i n t e r -vention would be committed more deeply i n the struggle against the Central Powers and thus, perhaps, might be 3 distracted from her ambitions i n China. Therefore, at the end of 1917 and i n the beginning of 1918 London took the i n i t i a t i v e f o r the intervention, proposing i n P a r i s , Rome and Washington that Japan should act as a mandatory of the A l l i e s i n the task of r e s i s t i n g the German advance 4 to the East.. The Japanese Government f o r t h e i r part watching the s i t u a t i o n i n Eastern S i b e r i a with careful at-tention as a welcome opportunity to extend Japan's influence i n that region, wgs not d i s i n c l i n e d towards the prospect of an armed intervention. At the outbreak of the Russian Revolution the Jap-anese Foreign Minister, Viscount Motono, declared that he could not remain i n d i f f e r e n t i n case of disturbances i n 5 S i b e r i a . I t was, however, clear from the very beginning 2Doc.Br.For.Pol.1919, Vol.Ill,No.223,App.I;No.233 App.I,No.256 3Ibid.No. 613, and V o l . I I , No.59. 4 I b i d . V o l . I I I , No.613 5 I b i d . - 86 -to the Japanese Government that they would not extend Japanese m i l i t a r y operations "as f a r west as possible", beyond Jrkutsk, as was proposed by the B r i t i s h ; but Japan was p a r t i c u l a r l y interested i n concentrating her actions on the Eastern Siberian l i t t o r a l , i . e . , the Maritime Pro-vince, with the view of gaining control over that region and consolidating Japanese influence i n Northern Manchuria as well as i n Outer Mongolia. Such aims were hinted at i n various Japanese newspapers. The "Kokusho" demanded in February 1918 the right for Japan to control the admini-s t r a t i o n of the Siberian Railways, and of the Eastern Chinese Railway,whilst a high ranking o f f i c i a l i n the Jap-anese Foreign O f f i c e , Dr. Terao, i n the p e r i o d i c a l "Ninon oy-obi Nihonju" even went so f a r as to suggest the cession of Amur Province to Japan. Representatives of Japanese economic c i r c l e s emphasized the necessity of securing these regions as a convenient market f o r i n d u s t r i a l projects 7 and as a source of raw materials. The B r i t i s h Government from the very beginning of the intervention had to overcome the suspicion of the United States towards Japanese actions i n Eastern S i b e r i a . Only with the utmost reluctance did President Wilson give h i s cf. L'Europe Nouvelle 1920, No.27, pp.1074. Ibid. 1919, No. 17, p.786. - 87 -g consent to the B r i t i s h proposals for armed intervention. The attitude of the American Government,to whom the idea of further expansion of Japanese power was repugnant,and the continuous e f f o r t s of the BEitishSSolternment to secure the e f f e c t i v e co-operation of the United States were i n -dic a t i v e of the changed s i t u a t i o n i n the Far East a f t e r the F i r s t World War; they r e f l e c t e d the growing American-Japanese antagonism and revealed the decline of B r i t i s h power i n the Far East, both f a c t o r s being r e s u l t s of the World War. The Balfour Memorandum of March 16, 1918 to the U. S. Government declared with reference to the Siberian Intervention that no steps could u s e f u l l y be taken to carry out t h i s p o l i c y which had not the active support of the United States. Without that support i t would be useless to approach the Japanese Government. . . : This meant that Great B r i t a i n i n her p o l i c y i n the Far East had to take into account the attitude of the United States more than ever before, whether i t was a question of securing the U. S. approval for certain actions or of checking Japan-ese expansionist p o l i c y i n Eastern Asia. The need f o r close Anglo-American co-operation with regard to China and S i b e r i a was c l e a r l y expressed i n a dispatch of the B r i t i s h diplomatic representative i n Tokyo, Mr. Alston, to the Foreign Secretary, 8Doc.Br.For.Pol.1919 , V o l . I l l No.613 9 Lloyd George, D.War Memoirs London,Nicholson & Watson,1933-36 Vol. VI, p.3175-77. - 88 -Lord Cur.zon, on October 27, 1919: Should the Japanese harbour designs ascribed to ( t h e m ? ) . retention of U.S. troops i n S i b e r i a would be best to check available (. . ?. .) but nothing can e f f e c t u a l l y control 'peaceful' penetration of China by Japan except a decision by other members of League of Nations, i n which we and U.S.A. would have to take lead, upon a d e f i n i t e p o l i c y of re-h a b i l i t a t i o n of. China which (Japan?) would have to accept. . . . 1 0 As a re s u l t of B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e the so-called " I n t e r - A l l i e d Railway Board" was established i n February, 1919 for supervising the administration of a l l Siberian railways including the Eastern Chinese Railway. In t h i s body the United States exerted the predominant influence and control, and the American director-general, Mr. G. F. Stevens, was vested with plenipotentiary powers.^ The purpose was to give the United States a stronger voice as a check against Japan i n Eastern Siberia. The B r i t i s h need for American collaboration became apparent when the U. S. Government, on account of American-Japanese controversies over the administration of railways, threatened to withdraw completely from the Intervention. 1 0Doc.Br.For.Pol.1919, V o l . I l l , No.498 i : L I b l d . No. 256. - 89 -The B r i t i s h Government repeatedly expressed t h e i r great concern about t h i s . A memorandum from the Foreign Office of December 1919 said: >tfe on our side have been urging the Americans to take no step i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n which would play d i r e c t l y into the hands of the Japanese by 13 leaving them i n sole control." To sum up, the Siberian Intervention was an example of the dual p o s i t i o n i n which B r i t i s h diplomacy found i t s e l f ; on the one hand, Great B r i t a i n had favoured, i f not induced, her Japanese a l l y to take action i n Eastern S i b e r i a mainly f o r strategic reasons, whilst on the other hand the B r i t i s h Government, f u l l y recognizing that the p o l i c y pursued by Japan i n S i b e r i a involved the continued occupation of North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia and %b the control of the Chin... Eastern Railway, 1 4,as anxious to secure the CO-operation of the United States as the only power capable of checking Japan's expansion i n the Far East. For the f i r s t time since the existence of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e Great B r i t a i n secretly collaborated with the United States against her a l l y i n the east. A careful examination of Doc.Brit.For.Pol.1919, Vol.Ill,No.451.Appendix 3;No.466 13 Ibid. No.613 14 Ibid.No.440, Appendix 3; No.613. - 90 -B r i t i s h diplomacy during the Siberian Intervention discloses s t i l l another determining feature of B r i t i s h Far Eastern p o l i c y at that time. However watchful Great B r i t a i n was towards the Japanese aspirations i n Eastern S i b e r i a , Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, and however strongly she encouraged the United States to counteract Japanese p o l i c y , at the same time the B r i t i s h Government was i n c l i n e d to look not unfavourably upon an involvement of Japan i n those regions of ftorth-Sastern Asia; at least B r i t a i n appeared to give her s i l e n t consent to Japan's expansion there. The reason for thi s apparently inconsistent and schizoid diplomacy on the part of Great B r i t a i n i s connect-ed with the security of the B r i t i s h Dominions i n the P a c i f i c and India, as we s h a l l see. To understand this diplomacy i t i s important to appreciate the trend i n Japanese foreign p o l i c y immediately aft e r the war had come to an end. The geographical p o s i t i o n of Japan as an island power on the coast of Eastern Asia offered Japan the alternative of either pursuing a continental p o l i c y dl rected towards the A s i a t i c mainland or of orientating h e r s e l f overseas whioh meant pursuing an oceanic maritime p o l i c y . During; the second part of the war the m i l i t a r y Cabinet under General Terauchl, who was i n o f f i c e from 1916 u n t i l September 1918, had primar-i l y concentrated on a continental p o l i c y . The Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1916, serving as a measure of reassurance against an eventual c o n f l i c t with the AngloOSaxon powers and as the instrument for a common domination over China - 91 -by Japan and Russia, was to be the basis of t h i s p o l i c y . One of the motives which may ha ve induced the Terauohi Cabinet i n 1917 to take action i n Siberia?" i n addition to the t e r r i t o r i a l and economic expansion i n North-Eastern Asia was the f i g h t against spreading Bolshevism. Japan needed a strong monarchical government i n Russia as a counter-balance against the Anglo-Saxon powers. The Sino-Japanese Treaties of m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e concluded i n March and May, 1918 gave Japan control over the Chinese army and naval forces and served as a further instrument against Russian Bolshevism. This turning away from a deliberate oceanic-economic expansion was r e f l e c t e d i n a new programme of army expenditures i n the spring of 1918 which was adopted by the Japanese Diet. The programme inaugurated by General 15 Tanaka, a declared opponent of Bolshevism, provided f o r the reinforcement of the Japanese Army from twenty-one to f i f t y d i v i s i o n s at the p r i c e of reductions i n naval expend-i t u r e s . 1 6 The l i b e r a l c i r c l e s of Japanese economy, however, mainly represented by the Seiyukai Party, were opposed to the continental p o l i c y as pursued by General Terauchi. This led to the resignation of the Terauchi Cabinet i n September 17 1918 and to i t s replacement by the Seiyukai Party government 1 5 c f . Doc.Brit.For.Pol.1919 , V o l . I l l , No.572. 1 6 J e n s e n , G. Seemacht Japan. B e r l i n , 1943, ppl95 1 7 C l y d e , P.H. The Far East. New York,Prentice-Hall Inc.1952 P. 489 - 92 -headed by Prime Minister Hara. The new Japanese states-man was determined to resume a p o l i c y of economic expansion not only on the A s i a t i c mainland but also through an expansion of Japanese export economy overseas. I t was, however, evident that such a p o l i c y could not remain confined to the economic sphere. P o l i t i c a l aims were i n e v i t -ably i n the background. This was a l l the more true i n an era i n which economic and p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s , being extremely interdependent, could hardly be separated from each other. Thus, the new oceanic p o l i c y of Japan found concrete p o l i t i c a l expression i n the so-called 8:8 naval b u i l d i n g programme approved by Parliament i n the winter session of 18 1918-19. According to t h i s programme, which had already been demanded i n 1910 by the Minister of the Navy, Baron Saito, two naval squadrons, each consisting of eight b a t t l e -ships, were f i n a l l y to be established. At the outset the Diet approved the immediate construction of two battleships, two b a t t l e cruisers, and eight c r u i s e r s , as well as several destroyers and submarines. A f a r more extensive naval programme was launched i n the winter of 1919-20, when Admiral Kato proposed to the Cabinet a naval plan which provided f o r the construction of four b a t t l e c r u i s e r s , twelve c r u i s e r s , and twenty-four l i g h t c r u i s e r s , s i x t y - f o u r Jensen, Op. C i t . p.201 - 93 -19 destroyers, and seventy-four submarines. In a spe c i a l session i n July 1920 the tremendous naval scheme f o r the building of four battleships, four b a t t l e c r u i s e r s , twelve c r u i s e r s , thirty-two destroyers, twenty-eight submarines, f i v e gunboats, and eighteen special ships, at a cost of seven hundred m i l l i o n yen, i . e . , ^ 68,000,000, was approved by the Japanese Parliament. The scale of Japanese naval armaments can be assessed from the s t a t i s t i c a l figures f o r 20 the annual Japanese Naval expenditures from 1916 to 1921. Year Amt.in Yen $ of Total Budget 1916- 17 99,900,000 14.8$ 1917- 18 119,880,000 14.8$ 1918- 19 166,500,000 14.8$ 1919- 20 249,547,000 23,6$ 1920- 21 372,627,000 29.5$ In English currency, t h i s was an increase of naval expenditures from ^15 ,000 ,000 to nearly ,^ 56 ,000 ,000 within f i v e y e a r s . 2 1 What did t h i s mean? The Hara Cabinet being under the influence of the Japanese Naval c i r c l e s had embarked upon a large-scale naval p o l i c y which was an in t e g r a l part of Japan's p o l i c y of oceanic expansion. There can be no other conclusion but that this huge naval power suited the oceanic 1 9Bywater.H.C.Sea Power i n the Pacific.London,Constable & Co.Ltd.1934, Vol II,p.151 f f . 20 Quoted from Jensen * Op. C i t . p.217 Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual,1921-22, pp.49650. - 94 -conception of the responsible statesmen i n the Japanese Cabinet. I t was deemed to serve as an e f f e c t i v e i n s t r u -ment for enforcing the new course of p o l i c y i f required. There could be no doubt as to the d i r e c t i o n of Japan's oceanic p o l i c y . As early as 1904-05, during the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese General Kodama had worked out a memorandum i n which he alluded to the Japanese conquest 22 of Indo-China. During the years of the World War, Japanese businessmen had i n t e n s i f i e d their trade r e l a t i o n s with the P h i l i p p i n e s and the Netherlands East Indies by increasing their c a p i t a l investments and the number of 23 Japanese f a c t o r i e s and trading estates. The occupation of the former German P a c i f i c islands north of the equator i n 1914 can be considered as the prelude to an oceanic expansion of Japanese power and influence to the South. In 1916 the Japanese j o u r n a l i s t and former Member of Parliament, Takekoshi, published an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "The F i r s t Step of our New Naval P o l i c y " , i n which he remarked: Japan must always aim at expansion. . . as a l l peoples did toward the South, and not toward the North. We must not continue our expansion i n the North beyond Manchuria's boundaries, but must d i r e c t our eyes toward the South . . . we cannot be proud of possession some Islands i n the ?South Seas u n t i l we have Java and Sumatra. . . . In Japan propaganda started to acquaint the Japanese people 2 2 F r s n e k e , Q.Die Grossmaechte i n Ost.rasien,1894-1914 Ham-burg, 1923, p.293. 2 3Jensen. Op. C i t . p.181 24. China Archiv. B e r l i n . 1916, p.176 with the importance of the economic problems i n Indo-china, the P h i l i p p i n e s , the Netherlands East Indies, and the S t r a i t s Settlements. The establishment of a Japanese society for "penetration of the South Seas", presided 2 over by Count Akimosa Yoshikana, was to serve t h i s purpose. This southward expansion of Japan raised another problem: the emigration of the Japanese surplus population into the white B r i t i s h Dominions of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand. This was na t u r a l l y a problem of immediate and v i t a l concern to the Governments of Great B r i t a i n and the Dominions. I t determined the basic attitudes of these governments i n t h e i r p o l i c y toward Japan i n general and the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n p a r t i c u l a r . Great B r i t a i n f u l l y appreciated the danger to the security of the B r i t i s h Empire. As early as August, 1916 the Chief of the Imperial General Staff , S i r William Robertson submitted an o f f i c i a l memorandum to the B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r , Mr. Lloyd George, i n which he set out the po t e n t i a l peace terms. In t h i s memorandum SirWilliam observed: German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and the Salomon Islands. . . are now In the hands of the Australian Government, who have the further enducement to keep what they have got that these islands form a valuable buffer between the mainland and possible Japanese encroachment. . . .26 2 5 D e r Neue Orient. 1919. Vol. I, p.196 26 Cited i n Lloyd George, D. War Memoirs London,Nicholson and Watson,1933-36. .761.11 p.840 - 96 -This remarkable statement c a r r i e s a l l the more weight because i t originated, from competent m i l i t a r y c i r c l e s . A l l u s i o n s to a southward move of Japanese emigration also appeared i n the B r i t i s h press. In A p r i l , 1919 the "Morning Post" said that the masses of Japanese labourers would prefer to emigrate into the "warmer and r i c h e r t e r r i t o r i e s of the P a c i f i c Ocean" instead of s e t t l i n g i n China, Korea 27 and S i b e r i a . The "JapanaAdvertiser" i n January, 1920 expressed concern about Japan's "expansion of t e r r i t o r i e s 28 and the hegemony of the A s i a t i c races against the whites". § The r i s e of Japanese sea power i n the Far East p a r t i c u l a r l y worried the B r i t i s h Government because, as has already been said, the naval strength of Great B r i t a i n i n Far Eastern waters was ex t r a o r d i n a r i l y weak during the war. In August, 1919 the B r i t i s h Admiralty, therefore, sent Admiral J e l l i c o e to New Zealand to survey the naval s i t u a t i o n i n the Far East and i n the South Seas. In h i s report, Admiral J e l l i c o e c l e a r l y pointed out that i t was absolutely necessary to reinforce the B r i t i s h naval forces i n those waters : . . .the presence of strong naval forces i n Far Eastern waters i s necessary to ensure the safety of the sea communications from the outset, and to act as a deterrent to other forms of attack, should the condition render them possible as might be the case.. . 2 7Moming Post. A p r i l 23, 1919 28 Japan Advertiser. January 1, 1920 Admiral J e l l i c o e c a l l e d the serious attention of the Admiralty to the "growing naval strength of nations^ outside European waters," which necessitated a "recon-sideration of the s t r a t e g i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of B r i t i s h 29 naval forces." Admiral J e l l i c o e was d i r e c t l y r e f e r r i n g to Japan i n h i s report. The growing Japanese sea power considered together with the trend of Japanese emigration towards the South, or as Admiral J e l l i c o e put i t , "other forms of attack", constituted a dir e c t challenge to the security of the B r i t i s h Dominions of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand, which could not remain unanswered. Accordingly, Admiral J e l l i c o e recommended the increase of the B r i t i s h Far Eastern Fleet to two squadrons, each consisting of eight battleships. He furthermore suggested that Singapore should be developedlas a strong modern naval base. This This suggestion was adopted by the B r i t i s h Government two years l a t e r , a f t e r the Dominions had given t h e i r whole-30 hearted consent. Singapore was deliberately chosen as a 2^cf.Naval Mission to the Dominion of New Zealand.Report of Admiral Viscount Jellicoe,August-October,1919,in:Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand, Wellington,1919. A-4, Vol.I,Chapter I,pp 12-13. 3 0 G r . B r i t . ,Pari. Deb. 5th Ses. ,1923 ,Vol. 165 ,P. 249 ,and Vol.163 pp.1229-13. - 98 -naval base and. as the strategic centre of B r i t i s h naval defence i n the East, rather than Sydney or Melbourne,owing to the necessity of protecting the access to the Indian Ocean. This was disclosed i n l a t e r years by the F i r s t Sea Lord, Mr. Amery. x In view of the Japanese press comments during the war regarding Japan's Pan-Asiatic aspirations towards India as well as the penetration of the Indian market by Japan, the B r i t i s h suspiciona^do not seem u n j u s t i f i e d . In the l i g h t of the foregoing B r i t i s h diplomacy toward Japan, as i t appeared during the Siberian Inter-vention, becomes clear. Although H i t was not part of B r i t i s h p o l i c y to r i s k any permanent establishment of Japan i n S i b e r i a " , as Mr. Lloyd George expressed i t i n 22 h i s Memoirs , the B r i t i s h Government, being f u l l y aware that Japan, because of her population problem had to expand, earnestly considered the question of whether or not an "engagement" of Japan on the A s i a t i c mainland was expedient i n the i n t e r e s t s of the B r i t i s h Dominions of A u s t r a l i a and of New Zealand. This question was discussed at an Anglo-French Conference held at number 10 Downing Street on Grt.Brit.Pari.Deb.5th Ses. B»>d.l924, Yol. 176,p.2304. 32 Lloyd George, D. War Memoirs. London,1933-36.Yol.VI,p.3174. - 99 -December 13, 1919. The B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, pointed out that Japan required an outlet "as the Japanese were debarred from going to America and c e r t a i n B r i t i s h possessions." In his opinion, S i b e r i a offered an 33 "immense f i e l d for immigration." Mr. Lloyd George 34 associated himself.with t h i s view. The whole problem was set out i n an important o f f i c i a l memorandum from the Foreign O f f i c e i n December, 1919, which read i n part: The question i s , are we going to draw a tight c i r c l e around her (^Japan's ) a c t i v i t i e s , or are we going to allow her l a t i t u d e f o r ostensibly legitimate operations outside her appointed sphere? I t may be said that she must expand somewhere. I f so, i s there any great objection to her expansion taking place In the wide undeveloped t e r r i t o r i e s which.lie at her door, Manchuria, Mongolia,Sakhalin, and Eastern Siberia? At any rate, we have at a l l costs to prevent such expansions from being affected i n patent opposition to us. . . 3 5 This basic attitude appeared to become the determinant i n the future p o l i c y of the B r i t i s h Government as wel.l as of the Australian and New Zealand Governments towards Japan. I t was generally f e l t i n Great B r i t a i n that Japan's expansion on the A s i a t i c mainland was a necessary e v i l to divert 3 3 D o c . B r i t.For.Pol.1919,Vol.II,No.59. 3 4Doc ,Br.For.Pol.1919.Vol.II, No.59 3 5 I b i d . V o l . I l l , No.613 - 100 -Japanese Immigration and p o l i t i c a l aspirations from the B r i t i s h Dominions i n the South. For instance, the "Observer" remarked i n 1921: I t cannot be denied that just as the security of the economic l i f e of C a l i f o r n i a , Canada or A u s t r a l i a compels them to exclude the competition of A s i a t i c immigrants, even so, the security of the economic l i f e of Japan compels her, either to seek new out-l e t s for her surplus population overseas, or to endeavour to secure such a po s i t i o n of economic advantage i n comparatively undeveloped regions of the A s i a t i c mainland,as s h a l l enable her to maintain and increase her industries and thereby feed the people at home . . . The B r i t i s h Government by no means misinterpreted the two p o l i t i c a l aims of Japan; nor was she under any delusion 57 regarding Japan's Pan-Asiatic intentions. She looked upon the Japanese encroachments on China with some uneasiness, because she f e l t that the B r i t i s h trade p o s i t i o n i n China would decline more and more owing to the impairment of the Open Door Doctrine by the Japanese. But for the sake of the security of the B r i t i s h Dominions - which i n the l a s t analysis affected the i n t e g r i t y of the whole B r i t i s h Empire - and because i t was e s s e n t i a l to present o r i e n t a l immigration, the B r i t i s h Government had to make s a c r i f i c e s i n respect of the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n China. The Japanese newspaper, "The Observer" June 16, 1921. 3 7Doc.Br.For.Pol.l919, V o l . I l l , No.613, and Letter of the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Tokyo, S i r Charles E l i o t , to Mr.Balfour Nov.10, 1921, c i t e d i n Dugdale, Op.Cit. pp.322-5. - 101 -"Nippon-oyobi-Nipponjin", alluding to Japan's Pan-Asiatic programme, had intimated as early as 1916, "the greater the consideration paid by Japan to India the more should be "38 the B r i t i s h concessions to Japan as regards China. There was another fear prevalent i n B r i t i s h Government c i r c l e s which determined to a certa i n extent B r i t i s h Far Eastern p o l i c y , not only at the time of the Siberian Inter-vention but also thereafter. I t played a r o l e i n the considerations of the Cabinet as to the expediency of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . With reference to the Japanese aspirations towards the Chinese Eastern Railway, Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, the B r i t i s h M inister at Peking, Mr. Jordan, declared i n a dispatch of October 8,1919: "Japanese influence w i l l always be found on side of whatever party most l i k e l y to lend i t s e l f the attainment of those ends. 3© . . Although t h i s statement referred primarily to l o c a l Russo-Japanese co-operation against China,(that i s , Japanese assistance to the Russian General Semfinov)it must be i n t e r -preted under the broader aspects of Russo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . This i s more c l e a r l y expressed i n the Foreign O f f i c e Memorandum of December, 1919 which has been previously mentioned. Warning was given there that the Japanese should Quoted from Chang.Op.cit. ppl55. Doc.Brit.For.Pol. 1919, V o l . I l l , No.440,App.3 - 102 -not be compelled to seek the attainment of their p o l i t i c a l ambitions "by a combination which would mean the most 40 formidable menace we have yet to face." No doubt t h i s combination would have been an a l l i a n c e between Japan, Russia and Germany. The B r i t i s h diplomatic documents of 1919 reveal that the Foreign O f f i c e and several B r i t i s h diplomatic representatives i n the Far East were deeply concerned about the exi s t i n g p o s s i b i l i t y of such an a l l i a n c e . In Europe, the B r i t i s h Minister i n Berne, Lord Acton, reported to London certain rumours about talks going on between Russian, Japanese and German p o l i t i c i a n s who were discussing the prospects of mutual co-operation. 41 From the Far East the B r i t i s h High Commissioner at Omsk and the B r i t i s h Ambassador to Tokyo wired that "the idea of 42 Japanese-Russian-German a l l i a n c e no doubt e x i s t s , " and that i n Eastern S i b e r i a i t was "growing stronger amongst 43 pu b l i c . " The same fears were shared by the U. S. State 44 Department. One of the primary motives which had led President Wilson to y i e l d to the Japanese demands at the 4°Dob.Br.For.Pol.1919, V o l . I l l No.613 41 Ibid. No. 280, App.l 4 2Ibid.No. 280. 4 3Ibid.No. 323. 4 4Ibid.No. 467. -103-Pa r i s Peace Conference had been his fear that the with-drawal of Japan might possibly have resulted i n an Eastern 45 a l l i a n c e between Japan, Russia and Germany. The U. S. au t h o r i t i e s i n S i b e r i a were convinced that the aim of the jo i n t p o l i c y of the Japanese and General Semenov was the creation of an independent state comprising S i b e r i a and Mongolia, which could play an important role i n the forma-46 ti o n of an eventual German-Russo-Japanese c o a l i t i o n . What conclusions can be drawn from the preceding considerations? Great B r i t a i n could not pursue a p o l i c y i n the Par East which was de l i b e r a t e l y directed against Japan; but she had to attempt to a r r i v e at a diplomatic understanding with Japan. Furthermore, to prevent an expansion of Japanese power and influence to the South, and at the same time to avoid the danger of a pro-German and a pro-Russian orien t a t i o n of Japan, Great B r i t a i n was forced to make concessions to Japan on the A s i a t i c mainland. In practice t h i s p o l i c y of appeasement and understanding necessitated the maintenance and continuation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . An abrogation of the A l l i a n c e would have meant that Japan, who was i n c l i n e d to a prolongation of the treaty, would make e f f o r t s to substitute the Eurasian Baker,Op.Cit. Vol.11, pp.195-6, 201-2. 4 6 Doc.Br.For.Pol.1919 , V o l . I l l , No.613 -•104 -continental a l l i a n c e for the a l l i a n c e with Great B r i t a i n . In addition to that, Great B r i t a i n had to face the f a c t that her t r a d i t i o n a l naval supremacy f o r the f i r s t time i n her his t o r y was disputed hy a threatening preponder-ance of the navy of the U. S. A. An-additional f a c t o r influencing the B r i t i s h standpoint i n t h i s question was the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n India. The security of B r i t i s h rule i n India af t e r the war could be jeopardized from two sides. Already during the war period Japan, under the influence of growing pan-,Asiatic ideas, had directed her attention cto seditious 47 B r i t i s h Indians, and there can be no doubt that the re-volutionary a n t i - B r i t i s h movement i n India which strove f o r India's independence was affected by the pan-Asiatic idea. In 1920 the Japanese were i n a p o s i t i o n to give a warning to the Canadian missionaries i n Korea that i f they gave "assistance, material or immaterial to either the i n -dependence movement i n Korea or to the anti-Japanese move-ment, the Buddhists i n Japan would be able to f i n d a le g a l reason for giving a n t i - B r i t i s h assistance to those behind 48 the non-co-operation movement i n India. Furthermore, the expansion of Japanese exports, primarily of cotton t e x t i l e s and bazaar goods, to India, which were already high during the war, increased u n t i l 1922 to the t o t a l of 4 7Doc.Br.For.Pol.1919,Vol.Ill, No.619 48 Japan Advertiser, December 3,1920, cited i n Chang,Op.Cit.p.IS - 105 -/49 26.5 m i l l i o n . .-./This economic penetration of India by-Japan provided, of course, a p o s s i b i l i t y of gaining influence i n that country. The number of Japanese trade agents 50 established a l l over India increased rapidly. In other words, i t became expedient for the B r i t i s h Government to assure h e r s e l f the goodwill of Japan and to ensure that she refrained from any pan-Asiatic propaganda and from encouraging the revolutionary forces i n India. In the second place, the i n t e r n a l security of India was threaten-ed to a special degree a f t e r 1918 by subversive a c t i v i t i e s of Soviet Russian agents, who collaborated with the a n t i -B r i t i s h elements i n India. According to a "Times" message of January 2, 1919, the Soviet inspired "League for the L i b e r a t i o n of the East", established on Moscow's i n i t i a t i v e , had declared that Persia and Afghanistan were the channels through which the revolutionary propaganda would penetrate 51 into India. A report of the Moscow newspaper "Isv e s t i a " of May 6, 1919 said that the leader of the Indian revolution-ary movement and member of the Indian National Congress, Professor Barakatullah, had expressed India's sympathy with the Russian struggle against capitalism because the seditious 52 Indians i d e n t i f i e d capitalism with the B r i t i s h Raj. These examples may i l l u s t r a t e the B r i t i s h concern about the s i t u a t i o n i n India a f t e r 1918. Undoubtedly English anxiety to prevent a domestic uprising played an important 4-Q Cf.Report of the B r i t i s h Trade Commissioner i n India,Mr. Ainscough, on British-Indian Trade 1921/22.The Board of Trade Journal,Nov.9,1922. 5 0 T h e Board of Trade Journal, August 7, 1919. 5 1 D e r Neuye Orient. 1919,Vol.II, pp212 5 2Ibid.Vol.I,p.!81 - 106 -rol e i n the B r i t i s h considerations about the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . Although, according to a statement of the Under-Secretary of State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , Mr. C e c i l Harmsworth, the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty did not provide for Japanese m i l i t a r y aid 53 i n the case of in t e r n a l disturbances i n India. the Al l i a n c e might serve as a valuable instrument f o r strength-ening the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n the eyes of the Indians and of other A s i a t i c n a t i o n a l i t i e s under B r i t i s h administration. Statements on the part of the Japanese confirmed t h i s assumption. For instance, the Japanese Ambassador to London, Baron Hayashi, declared to the press i n the beginning of 1921: . . . the basic idea of the A l l i a n c e i s to protect by common action the t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s and special i n t e r e s t s of Japan and Great B r i t a i n i n Eastern Asia and India . . . 54 The same view was supported by the Tokyo newspaper "Nitchi 55 N i t c h i " . This reference to India made by the Japanese Ambassador i n London was reinforced by another remark of Baron Hayashi , i n which he declared the A l l i a n c e to be the only safeguarding bulwark against spreading Bolshevist power. 5 6 53 Gr.Brit.,Pari.Debates,Sess.5, 1921, Vol.146,p.18 54 The Japan Advertiser. Feb.16, 1921 55 The Japan Advertiser, Jan. 11, 1921 56 Ost—Asiatische Rundschau, July 1, 1920 - 107 -These then were the motives which played an important r o l e i n determining the course of Great B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y towards Japan a f t e r 1919 and which affected the development of Anglo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s a f t e r the Paris Conference. As fa r as Japan was concerned, she wanted to maintain the Al l i a n c e a f t e r 1919, for several reasons. The trade competition, between Japan and Great B r i t a i n , which was the re s u l t of the enormous r i s e of Japan's economy and industry during the war, had been continuously increasing since the wary The Japanese cotton goods and s i l k spinning industry i n p a r t i c u l a r had entered into competition with the Lancashire industry by increasing exports of Japanese goods to English markets. Realizing that the young Japanese economy would not be able i n the long run to compete successfully with Great B r i t a i n , Japan made earnest e f f o r t s a f t e r the war to reach a trade understanding. This induced Japan to think favourably of the exi s t i n g A l l i a n c e . In July, 1919 the Director of the Japan S i l k Weaving and Spinning Com-pany, Ltd. (Nippon Kimuori Kabushiki Kaisha), Mr. Kanji Morimura, went to Great B r i t a i n for trade talks. As he declared, h i s task was to make enquiries about how a new Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e could be achieved i n the commercial f i e l d . 5 7 But of more importance f o r Japan was the p o l i t i c a l The Journal of Commerce. July 15, 1919. - 108 -aspect of the A l l i a n c e , even i f i t could never be invoked i n the case of serious Japanese-American tension^ or i n a war between those countries. This was expressed by o f f i c i a l representatives of the Japanese Government. The former Japanese Foreign M i n i s t e r , Count Kato, eulo-g i z i n g the renewal, remarked i n the " J i j i Shimpo" that even i f the A l l i a n c e were nothing else than a "mutual 58 declaration" t h i s would be better than nothing. The Japanese press unanimously expressed a strong desire for a prolongation of the treaty. The Kokumin stressed i n an a r t i c l e i n 1921 headed "A S p r i t u a l A l l i a n c e " : The object of the A l l i a n c e consists of the s p i r i t u a l a f f i l i a t i o n of the two countries. . . . While the fundamental s p i r i t of Japan and great B r i t a i n continues to be united with each other there can be no h i t c h to the re-l a t i o n s of the two countries. 59 Similar favourable utterances were voiced by the Tokyo N i t c h i N i t c h i and the Asahi Shimbun p r e s s . 6 0 Above a l l , Japan needed the A l l i a n c e with Great B r i t a i n to prevent the r i s k of diplomatic i s o l a t i o n . A continuation of the treaty would enhance Japan's international prestige. 58 Le Temps. 2fan.l0,1920 59 The Japan Advertiser. Jan.9, 1921. 6 QIbid.Jan.11, 1921; and the London "Times", June 8, 1920. - 109 -Moreover, Japan expected, i f the A l l i a n c e were continued, that B r i t a i n , although she would never come to Japan's aid i n case of a m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t with the United States, would give moral and diplomatic support to Japanese p o l i c y i n China, or at lea s t acquiesce i n Japan's measures i n China. I t has been already seen that a continuation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was i n the inte r e s t s of the B r i t i s h Empire, p a r t i c u l a r l y as f a r as the s e c u r i t y of Australia-,Mew Zealand and India was concerned. Therefore, according to a dispatch of the Chinese Minister i n London and to press reports, the B r i t i s h Government as early as 1920 took steps to negotiate with Tokyo for an eventual 61 renewal of the A l l i a n c e . Both governments recognized, however, that the treaty terms of t h i s A l l i a n c e were not quite compatible with the Covenant of the League of Nations. A r t i c l e XX of the Covenant stipulated: The Members of the League severally agree that t h i s Covenant i s adcepted as abrogating a l l ob-l i g a t i o n s or understandings " i n t e r se" which are inconsistent with the terms thereof and solemnly undertake that they w i l l hereafter not enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case any member of the League s h a l l before becoming a member of the League have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of t h i s Covenant, i t s h a l l be the duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure i t s release from such obligations. 62 U.S.For.Rel.1920,Vol.IT,p.679,and the London Journal, Jan.31,1920. 6 2Covenant of the League of Nations,1919,Article XX, quoted i n Duggan,St.P., The League of Nations. Boston, The A t l a n t i c Monthly/1919. App.p.335. Press, - 110 -As to the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , i t was notably A r t i c l e II of the Treaty, providing for immediate mutual m i l i t a r y assistance, which was inconsistent with A r t i c l e s X, XIII and XIV of the Covenant as they contained the p r i n c i p l e of a r b i t r a t i o n and Intermediation by international bodies i n case of c o n f l i c t s . Consequently, the B r i t i s h Foreign M i n i s t e r , Lord Curzon, on behalf of Great B r i t a i n , and the Japanese Ambassador to London, Count Chinda , on behalf of Japan, addressed a j o i n t declaration from Spa on July 8, 1920 to the Council of the League which read: The Governments of Great B r i t a i n and Japan have come to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of July 13, 1911 now existing between the two countries, though i n harmony with s p i r i t of the Covenant of the League of Nations, i s not e n t i r e l y consistent with the l e t t e r of that Covenant, which both governments earnestly desire to respect. They accordingly have the honour, j o i n t l y to Inform the League that they recognize the p r i n c i p l e that i f the said agreement be con-tinued a f t e r July, 1921, i t must be i n a form which i s not inconsistent with that Covenant. 6 3 This j o i n t n o t i f i c a t i o n was to become of j u r i d i c a l and p o l i t i c a l importance as i t gave r i s e to the question of whether i t constituted a formal denunciation of the treaty. The competent law o f f i c e r s of the Crown held the opinion that a denunciation of the Treaty was unquestionably im-p l i e d and intended. P o l i t i c a l l y i t sheds a s i g n i f i c a n t l i g h t on the attitude of the B r i t i s h Government that the Lord Chancellor reversed t h i s interpretation of the B r i t i s h and Foreign State Papers, 1920, Vol.CXIII,p.370. - I l l -n o t i f i c a t i o n at the Imperial Conference i n 1921. The B r i t i s h Government obviously handled the question of the renewal or abrogation of the A l l i a n c e with the greatest caution and care, because i t was an extremely delicate matter i n view of"Great B r i t a i n ' s relationships with Japan, China and the U.S.A. When asked i n the House of Commons on what date the treaty would have to be denounced , the Under-Secretary f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , Mr. Harmsworth, denied 64 being i n the p o s i t i o n to answer the question. In the l i g h t of the problems created for the B r i t i s h Empire by the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e t h i s approach i s understandable. What were the implications of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e on Anglo-American relations? As w i l l have been observed, the danger that the B r i t i s h Empire might be drawn into an American-Japanese war i n which i t had to support Japan, increased i n proportion to the growing American-Japanese tension since 1905. This had- already necessitated a r e v i s i o n of the terms of the treaty i n 1911, when A r t i c l e IV of the renewed and modified treaty was.:, inserted, making the "casus foederis" inapplicable i n case Great B r i t a i n should conclude a general treaty of ar-b i t r a t i o n wL th the United States. The Anglo-American a r b i -t r a t i o n treaty concluded i n 1911 did not receive the approval of r a t i f i c a t i o n by the two-thirds majority of the U.S. Senate 64 Gr,f?Britgin ,P,arls ,D<§&£ e5tbrSeri.es p921 ,Vol. 141 ,p. 21 - .112 -as required by American c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law. Instead of the a r b i t r a t i o n treaty the B r i t i s h and U. S. Governments therefore negotiated i n September, 1914 the Bryan-Spring-Rice Peace Commission Treaty, which, although not techni-c a l l y a treaty of general a r b i t r a t i o n , was considered by the B r i t i s h Government as such within the meaning of A r t i c l e IV of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . This i n t e r -pretation w a s ' o f f i c i a l l y communicated to the Japanese Government by Great B r i t a i n ; but the B r i t i s h p u b l i c was 65 not informed about i t u n t i l December 31, 19SO. The B r i t i s h Government was compelled to make a public announce-ment because of the growing f e e l i n g of uneasiness i n the U.S.A. about the possible implications of the a l l i a n c e i n case of an armed c o n f l i c t betv/een America and Japan. Government and press i n Great B r i t a i n were anxious to remove a l l fear i n the U.S.A. with regard to the A l l i a n c e . Lord N o r t h c l i f f e issued a statement i n December, 1920 which said: Some of our American:, friends seem anxious or suspicious about the supposed obligations of Great B r i t a i n to j o i n Japan i n case Japan goes to war against the U.S.A., under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . These suspicions seem to me to be unfounded . . . there i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of any combination of England and Japan against the U.S.A. . . . Lord N o r t h c l i f f e emphasized that the r e a l i t i e s of the B r i t i s h Empire made i t "impossible to unite B r i t a i n , Canada, Australia New Zealand and South A f r i c a against America on behalf of 66 the Japanese." The"Times" i n i t s leading a r t i c l e s 65 The London Times, Dec. 1920 The Japan Advertiser, J a n . l , 1921 - 113 -associated i t s e l f with that opinion. The Japanese Govern-ment on t h e i r part did a l l i t could to appease the U.S.A by i s s u i n g o f f i c i a l statements through her diplomatic re-presentatives i n London and Washington. I t did so i n f u l l recognition of the fact that the B r i t i s h Empire could never be-induced by treaty obligations to f i g h t against the U.S.A. with whom she was bound by the bonds of common blood, ancestry and his t o r y . Accordingly, the Japanese Ambassador to London, Baron Hauashi, declared i n the beginning of 1921: I t was . . . never i n the mind of the Japanese Government to f i g h t the U.S.A. at a l l , and . . . i n the most improbable eventuality of such a war T r - Japan would not expect England to come to her help . . . I can assure you with a l l the emphasis at my command that the A l l i a n c e w i l l never stand i n the way of the good understanding and f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between Great B r i t a i n and the U.S.A. . . .68 The same assurance was given by the Japanese Ambassador to Washington, Baron Shidehara, who, arguing that A r t i c l e IV of the Treaty had deliberately been inserted to remove any p o s s i b i l i t y of war between the U.S.A. and Great B r i t a i n , denied most emphatically "that ..the A l l i a n c e was ever designed or remotely intended as an instrument of h o s t i l i t y or even ' 69 of defence against' the U.S.A." 67 The London Times, December 30, 1920. The Japan Advertiser, February 16, 1921 69 The Journal of Commerce, New York, July 5, 1921. - 114 -However honest these statements were , they did not s u f f i i c e to remove the inexorable opposition of the United States to the A l l i a n c e . I t was f i n a l l y this opposition which forced Great B r i t a i n to terminate the A l l i a n c e . The view of the United States (which had emerged from the war as the other world power i n the P a c i f i c ) had to be taken into consideration by Great B r i t a i n to a f a r larger extent than before the war because B r i t a i n de3?e-^efl4^~u^Qja--4^ the United States. The B r i t i s h Government had to recognize the changed po s i t i o n of power i n the P a c i f i c which was no longer determined by Great B r i t a i n alone, but by a • P a c i f i c Triangle* consisting of Great B r i t a i n , Japan and the United States. For the B r i t i s h Government the r i s e of the United States as a world power meant that sooner or l a t e r she had to make her decision between the United States and her former a l l y , Japan. In the B r i t i s h House of Commons, Commander B e l l a i r s expressed the ambivalent p o s i t i o n by c a l l i n g Japan "an a l l y by diplo-matic means and the United States an a l l y by n a t u r e . " ^ Great B r i t a i n found herself i n a dilemma of a l l i a n c e s ; she was facing the d i f f i c u l t task of bringing into harmony two Gr.Brit.,Pari.Debates ,5th Series,1980,Vol.126,p.2334. - 115 -alignments which were incompatible with each other, the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e and Anglo-American co-operation. This dilemma became apparent as early as 1917, when Mr. Balfour put forward the proposal f o r a m u l t i - l a t e r a l s i x power naval agreement between Great B r i t a i n , France, I t a l y , 71 Russia, Japan and the United States. In hi s Memorandum of June 22, 1917 to the Imperial War Cabinet, Mr. Balfour pointed out that he d e f i n i t e l y would prefer a b i - l a t e r a l defence a l l i a n c e between Great B r i t a i n and the U.S.A., but "the objection to i t arises out of our ex i s t i n g treaty 72 with Japan." He feared the implications of an Anglo-American a l l i a n c e on Anglo-Japanese re l a t i o n s . According to Mr. Balfour, an Anglo-American defence pact would have been regarded as "the beginning of the end of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . " This explains Mr. Balfour's attempt to "associate Japan from the beginning with the new ar-73 rangement'.' Mr. Balfour was under the misapprehension that the United States would accept the obligations of a formal a l l i a n c e and would j o i n a combination to which the 74 i & . i f l n n r f i s f l n n w f t T w a s a T>PIT*T. growing Japanese power was a part. Nevertheless h i s 7 1Dugdale, QppCit. p.209 7 2 I b l d . P.210 7 5 I b i d . P.210 7 4 I b i d . P.210. - 116 -attitude shows that the B r i t i s h Government did recognize that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e constituted a real problem i n the changed s i t u a t i o n i n the P a c i f i c . In the ultimate analysis the t r a d i t i o n a l Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , which had rendered valuable service to Great B r i t a i n f o r almost twenty years and which was s t i l l one of the strongest p i l l a r s of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y , stood against the idea of Anglo-American co-operation. This idea had grown stronger since the World War on both sides of the A t l a n t i c . In England the"London Times"advocated i n 1918 an# Anglo-American A l l i a n c e , or at least a strengthening of the bonds between Great B r i t a i n and the U.S.A., upon which friendship the 75 future prosperity of the world would depend. In the United States President Harding emphasized i n a l e t t e r to the Chairman of the Sulgrave I n s t i t u t e , Mr. J. A.Stewart, early i n 1921, the paramount importance of the "unity pf of English-speaking peoples" i n world a f f a i r s . There was a widespread f e e l i n g i n the United Kingdom that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e should not be renewed before the 77 views of the U.S. Government were heard. Questions raised i n the House of Commons by several M.P's expressed serious anxieties as to the effect of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e on Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s . _ The London Times ,December 11,1918. 7 6 I b i d . January 19,1921. 77 Gr.Brit. ,Parl.Debates.5th Series,1921,Tol.143,p.1883 - 117 -Commander B e l l a i r s asked i n June, 1921: . . . whether i t has been o f f i c i a l l y Intimated to. the U.S.A., by means of a diplomatic note, that i n no circumstances can Japan receive support. . . i n the case of war between Japan and the U.S.A.. .78 He hinted that the B r i t i s h Government should imm§diately communicate with the U.S. Government regarding the plans 79 for a renewal of the A l l i a n c e . This had not yet been done, for a press communique issued by the U.S.State Department denied the alleged reception of o f f i c i a l assur-80 ance and information regarding the possible treaty terms. Lieut.-Col. S i r F. H a l l (M.P. ). as&ed sim i l a r questions about the application of the treaty to a c o n f l i c t between 81 Japan and the U.S.A. The answers given by the Government representatives i n the Commons were mostly d i l a t o r y and evasive. The add i t i o n a l Under-Secretary of State for Foreign A f f a i r s , Mr. Kellaway, r e f e r r i n g to A r t i c l e IV of the A l l i a n c e , assured the House: Our relations with Japan are so arranged as not to involve us i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n f l i c t with the U.S.A. 82 He, as well as the Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Chamberlain, believed i t to be unnecessary to make an o f f i c i a l communi-83 cation to the U.S.A. 7 a G r i B r i t . P a r i . D e b . ,5th Ser. ,1921 ,*Vol.143, p.1791. 7 9 I b i d . P.1983. 80 The London Times,June 23,1921. 8 1Gr.Brit.Pari.Debates.5th Series.Vol.138 ,P.1574. 8 2 L b i d . P.1574 R3 Ibid. P.1574 and P.1791 - 118 -These answers- revealed two important things. F i r s t l y , the B r i t i s h Government believed i t could appease the U.S. Government by r e f e r r i n g only to the application of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n case of war. In so doing they misunder-stood the essential motives behind the U.S. opposition to the A l l i a n c e . Secondly, being f u l l y aware of the diplomatic expediency to renew the treaty, but at the same time r e a l i z i n g the necessity of taking into serious consideration the attitude of the U.S.A., the B r i t i s h Government proceeded with extreme caution, wishing to keep the door open for a compromise solution. Therefore, the Foreign O f f i c e inform-ed the U.S.Ambassador to London i n A p r i l , 1920 that the question of the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e 84 remained "undecided". There can be no doubt that the B r i t i s h Government was strongly i n c l i n e d to renew the Al l i a n c e . Various f a c t s i n British-Japanese r e l a t i o n s a f t e r 1919 support t h i s assumption. Anglo-Japanese co-operation i n the League of Nations^ Assembly was looked upon by U.S.observers with c r i t i c a l eyes. The B r i t i s h representatives i n Geneva obviously supported the Japanese standpoint when China, i n 1920,tried to place her demands for a r e v i s i o n of the Shantung controversy on the Agenda. The B r i t i s h delegates intimated to the Chinese that i t was inadvisable to raise the question, and they i&ade i t unmistakably clear that 84 U.S. For.Rel*1920,Vol.II, p.680. - 119 -i f China persisted i n her demands, Great B r i t a i n would support Japan i n accordance with the obligations incurred under the terms of the secret Shantung agreement of 1917, 85 and of the V e r s a i l l e s Peace Treaty. American suspicion even went so f a r as to assume that a secret t r i p a r t i t e agreement between Great B r i t a i n , Japan and France had been concluded at P a r i s with regard to pursuing a future p o l i c y of mutual understanding i n the whole of Eastern Asia. The Japanese Government for th e i r part, being i n a p o s i t i o n to use the issue of r a c i a l equality to exert pressure on Great B r i t a i n , offered the B r i t i s h Government the diplomatic 'quid pro quo' by dropping such demands i n the League 87 Assembly. Another example of the B r i t i s h appeasement p o l i c y towards Japan which has to be considered i n connection with the issue of the A l l i a n c e was the attitude of Great B r i t a i n i n negotiating the 'Consortium Agreement' early i n 1920. The B r i t i s h Government protested the Japanese demand for i n s e r t i o n of the express reservation i n the agreement that South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia be exempted from the scope of the 'Consortium',because Japan claimed "s p e c i a l r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s " there i n accordance with 88 the Lansing-Ishii Agreement. But the U.3C.Government. i n 8 5 C o n f i d e n t i a l Memorandum ."of Mr. Th. F.Millard .Jan. 1921 .en-1 t i t l e d *The League of NaT ions!*, i n M i l l a r d .,0fc CI t. pp. 155-4. 86 Confidential Memorandum of Mr. M i l l a r d for the Chinese Peace Conference Delegation at Paris,May 8,1919,Millard, Op.Cit. p.100 f f . 87 Confidential Memorandum of Mr. M i l l a r d ,Geneva,Nov.18,1920, i n M i l l a r d Op.Cit. pp.177-8. 8 8Toynbee,A.J.Survey of International Affairs,1920-23 (pp.445 gfcgftClnstit.Qf. Interntl.Affairs,London,H.Milford O.U.P. 192"D~A - 120 -i t s note of March 19th, 1920, was prepared "to subscribe to a written assurance to the eff e c t that the Japanese Government need have no reason to apprehend that the Consortium would dire c t any a c t i v i t i e s a f f e c t i n g the security of the economic l i f e and national defence of 89 Japan." . This formula was ultimately accepted by the Japanese cabinet. I t i s clear from the comment of the "Observer" upon t h i s agreement: To expect the Japanese to abandon the po s i t i o n thus created with a l l that i t means to the economic l i f e of the nation, i s to ignore the basic r e a l i t i e s of the situation,90 that the attitude adopted by the B r i t i s h cabinet amounted i n the f i n a l analysis to an acquiescence i n Japan's p o l i c y on the A s i a t i c mainland, a p o l i c y based on "spec i a l rights and i n t e r e s t s " , that i s to say, the Japanese interpreta-tion of the Lansing I s h i i Agreement. The same London Newspaper went on: Under these circumstances i t i s reasonable. . .ifchat a f u l l and frank discussion of the renewal of the Al l i a n c e s t a r t i n g with reciprocal recognition of accomplished facts should lead to a clear d e f i n i t i o n of Japan's p o s i t i o n i n Manchuria and Mongolia. . . 9 1 Three days l a t e r the "Observer" again r e f e r r i n g to Great 8 9Note of the B r i t i s h Government of March 19,1920, ci t e d i n Kawakami op.Git. pp 157-58. 9 0The Observer, June 16, 1921 Ibid. - 121 -B r i t a i n ' s and Japan's p o s i t i o n i n China remarked: i t i s today more than ever desirable that Great B r i t a i n and Japan should renew t h e i r a l l i a n c e . 92 These statements of the "Observer" r e f l e c t e d exactly the view of the B r i t i s h Government who always approached the s i t u a t i o n i n China with a r e a l i s t i c outlook. Great B r i t a i n had to accept a sort of Japanese supremacy over certain areas i n China as a ' f a i t accompli'. She r e a l i z e d that t h i s was one of the repercussions of the world war on the p o l i t i c a l •status quo' i n the Far East. To prevent as f a r as possible d i r e c t Japanese encroachments upon the B r i t i s h commercial p o s i t i o n i n China she was forced to base her p o l i c y towards Japan on mutual understanding. This could best be done by a renewal of the A l l i a n c e . In the second place the B r i t i s h Government had always i n mind the Imperial security of the B r i t i s h Dominions. The B r i t i s h apprehension of a Japan turning to the South was a motive f o r Great B r i t a i n ' s y i e l d i n g as exemplified i n the case of the 'Consortium Agreement*. The power which was immediately affected by the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n the Far East was China. Being without an e f f e c t i v e and centralized government s i m e the decline of the Manchu.dynasty, and therefore i n no p o s i t i o n to r e s i s t European economic penetration and Japan's aggressive, expansionist p o l i c y , she had been the victim 92 Theo>Jjine 19 , 1921. Observer" - 122 -i n the Par Eastern diplomacy of these powers. During the existence of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e China had suffer-ed considerable impairments to her t e r r i t o r i a l and admin-i s t r a t i v e i n t e g r i t y . The Japanese penetration of South Manchuria, the occupation of the Liaotung peninsula, the annexation of Korea, the Twenty-one D emands of 1915 and the Shantung issue were,the Chinese f e l t , examples which were the r e s u l t of the AnglogJapanese A l l i a n c e . The A l l i a n c e , the Treaty terms of which referred d i r e c t l y to China, was therefore thought by her to be most pre-j u d i c i a l to Chinese i n t e r e s t s . In p a r t i c u l a r a renewal of the Treaty was interpreted by China as a B r i t i s h endorse-ment of Japan's p o l i c y of encroachments since 1915. As soon as the intention of Great B r i t a i n and Japan to renew the A l l i a n c e became apparent, the Chinese Government formally protested i n 1920 against being mentioned i n the Treaty 93 without being asked previously for her consent. In a statement to the press on June 6, 1920 the Chinese Foreign Minister emphasized: Chinese opinion i s not unnaturally d i s t r u s t f u l of any renewal of the agreement . . .a contract re-garding her a f f a i r s between other members of the Lea_gue of Nations cannot be entered into without her previous consent...94 93 U.S.For.Rel.l920,Vol.II, p.685. 94 Manchester Guardian,June 6, 1920. - 123 -In addition to the o f f i c i a l protests of the Chinese Govern-ment there were protest messages from Chinese public opinion, p a r t i c u l a r l y from various f i n a n c i a l , commercial, and banking c i r c l e s . In a memorandum submitted by these organizations to the B r i t i s h Minister to Peking, S i r . B. Alston, i n July 1920,reference was made to the secret Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1917 which was alleged to be one of the consequences of the A l l i a n c e upon China. Warning was given that the renewal of that A l l i a n c e would "cause Great B r i t a i n to share the d i s t r u s t of the Chinese people 95 so widely and deeply entertained towards Japan". The same view was expressed by the well-known leader of the democratic movement of China, Dr. Sun Yat Sen, i n an i n t e r -Q & view with the North "China Herald" . In various messages, amongst them a telegram from the President of the Shanghai People's Convention, Mr. Yu Yoh Tesze, the attention of the B r i t i s h was drawn to the possible e f f e c t s of a renewal 97 of the Treaty on English trade i n China. Similar Chinese telegrams were dispatched to Melbourne, P a r i s , Rome, Ottawa and e s p e c i a l l y to Washington where the Chinese asked that 98 strong pressure fe^e brought to bear on Great B r i t a i n . 9 5 t v,Id.Sept. 10,1920.Manchester Guardian , 9 6Chang,op.cit.po 213-14. 9 7The London Times,July 9,1921 and New York Evening Post June 14, 1921. 98 New York Evening Post, June 14,1921 - 124 -In the o f f i c i a l reply of the Foreign O f f i c e the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, gave pleating assurances to the Chinese that the Imperial Cabinet i n London would take into 99 due account the Chinese standpoint. I t was true that the Chinese objections against the renewal of the Treaty were widely shared i n B r i t i s h c i r c l e s . The leading B r i t i s h news-papers i n the Far East, tSe "Japan Chronicle" and the "Peking T i e n t s i n Times"^reflecting the opinion of B r i t i s h residents i n these regions, echoed strong d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and were also opposed to the prospect of a continued a l l i a n c e be-cause of the p r e j u d i c i a l e f f ects on B r i t i s h trade: i n C h i n a . 1 0 0 Numerous questions i n the B r i t i s h House of Commons during the Spring and summer of 1921 expressed"the same way grave apprehensions as to the possible reactions of China. Mr. Kenyon (M.P.) inquired whether the opinions of the B f i t i s h commercial c i r c l e s i n the Far East had been ascertained by the Government. S i r W. de Frece (M.P.) intimated the p o s s i b i l i t y of organized boycott of B r i t i s h imports of the 102 Lancashire cotton trade by the Chinese and Mr. T. Wilson (M.P.) asked whether the Government would take steps "to prevent anything that w i l l prejudice our trade r e l a i i ons " 103 with China being embodied i n our treaty with Japan.  9 9 T h e London Times, July 9,1921 1 0 0 M i l l a r d , op.cit. pp.452-469 Appendix 101 Gr.Brit.,Parl.Deb.5th Ser.1921,Vol.143,p.13193 102 I b i d . p. 52 1 0 3 I b i d . p.406 - 125 -Indeed, the economic penetration of China by Japan, which ran p a r a l l e l to p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y action had seriously affected B r i t i s h trade i n China, i f not caused the decline of B r i t a i n ' s previously supreme commercial p o s i t i o n there. This was e s p e c i a l l y true as f a r as B r i t i s h export of cotton goods was concerned. According to information given by the Secretary f o r the S i n o - B r i t i s h trade association, Mr. L. E. Haynes, Japanese cotton exports to China i n 1921 t o t a l l e d 70,208 p i c u l s , whilst during the same period the a 104 B r i t i s h cotton yarjr export amounted to 13,371 p i c u l s . The following figures may i l l u s t r a t e the decline of B r i t i s h 105 export of cotton piece goods to China. 1915 1920 1921 Great B r i t a i n 11,705,426 5,784,026 3,489,093 pieces Japan 5,716,594 7,035,458 5,815,955 * Roughly speaking these figures show that i n 1913 the B r i t i s h cotton export to China was about twice as high as that of Japan whilst i n 1921 the reverse was true. In view of these economic aspects, the c r i t i c a l voices i n the Commons and i n the B r i t i s h Far Eastern press seemed to be j u s t i f i e d . Great B r i t a i n ' s p r i n c i p a l i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East were predomin-antly economic and commercial i n character. A preservation or even consolidation of these interests was to a substantial extent dependent on Great B r i t a i n ' s cooperation with China. 104. Manchester Guardian, Commercial,August 24,1922 1 0 5 Ibid . Sept.7, 1922 - 126 -The B r i t i s h China expert, Mr. L. Simpson termed th i s co-106 operation as a 'sine qua non*. No less j u s t i f i c a t i o n was contained i n those questions i n Parliament which ex-pressed apprehension of the p o l i t i c a l repercussions of the. Anglo-Japanese alignment on B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n China, Mr. Kenyon, for instance, asked whether the B r i t i s h Government would be able under the a l l i a n c e " p u b l i c l y to dissociate i t s e l f from aspects of Japanese action which do not recomm-107 end themselves to opinion i n t h i s country". To sum up the problem of Anglo-Chinese relationship with p a r t i c u l a r reference to Anglo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , the B r i t i s h Government had earnestly to consider whether joint Anglo-Japanese cooperation with regard to B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y i n China was preferable to securing the good w i l l of China. The a l l i a n c e between Great B r i t a i n and Japan was incompatible with Anglo-Chinese friendship. A careful examination of the evasive answers given by the Government i n the Commons during A p r i l and June 1931 leads to the assumption that the B r i t i s h Cabinet wanted to leave the f i n a l decision on the 108 renewal of the A l l i a n c e " i n suspenso" ^-Simpsdm, L. op. c i t . p. 110 107 Great Brit.Pari.Deb.5th,ser.1921,Vol.144 p.664 1 0 8 I b i d . Vol.141,pp.370 and 674 Vol.143 pp.52,112-12, 1337,1393 - 127 -At t h i s stage of developments an event whieh occurred i n May 1921 must be considered of as great im-portance i n r e l a t i o n to the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . This was the state v i s i t of the Japanese Crown Prince, H i r o h i t o , to London. Although the B r i t i s h as well as the Japanese Press remarked that no p o l i t i c a l meaning should be attached to the v i s i t , i t was apparent from various circumstances that p o l i t i c a l intentions were implied. I t was no accident that the high v i s i t of a member of the Imperial Family who was accompanied by such prominent persons as the former Japanese ambassador to the Court of S t . James, Count Chinda, Admiral Oguri and Lieutenant-General Nara coincided with the fact that the renewal of the A l l i a n c e was under consideration. A tour abroad of the Crown-Prince of Japan was unprecedented and marked a complete break with the t r a d i t i o n of thousands of years. This e l i c i t e d the most acrimonious opposition of the conservative Genro and led to the resignation of Prince 109 Yamagata and Matsukata. I t was the f i r s t time i n Japan's history that the h e i r to the Imperial throne had l e f t h i s country. This could only be interpreted as a p o l i t i c a l mission to be carried out by the personal representative of the Japanese Emperor. The o f f i c i a l speeches delivered at the State's Banquet at Buckingham Palace on May 5th,1921 i l l u s t r a t e d the p o l i t i c a l s i gnificance behind t h i s v i s i t . Koelnische Zeitung, June 25, 1921 - 128 -King George V, emphasized the importance of " f r i e n d l y co-operation" between Great B r i t a i n and Japan, and the Japanese Crown-Prince eulogized the "invariable friendship" between both nations. He hoped that the "happy relations e x i s t i n g between our two a l l i e d countries" would continue.110 The comments of the B r i t i s h press on t h i s event unanimously expressed a pro-Japanese f e e l i n g . "The Morning Post" pointed out that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e had proved a great asset' i n maintaining peace i n the Far East and recomm-ended i t s renewal i n the present y e a r . 1 1 1 The "Dally Telegraph" emphasized the peaceful character of the A l l i a n c e which refuted the fears of the U.S.A. The paper p a r t i c u l a r l y praised the inte r p r e t a t i o n of the A l l i a n c e given by the 112 Australian Prime M i n i s t e r , namely the protection of A u s t r a l i a . The "Daily Chronicle',' also stressing the advantage of the A l l i a n c e , said that i t had never been directed against the 113 U.S.A. The Japanese newspaper "ASahi Shimbun" c l e a r l y stated: .'.'the A l l i a n c e , renewed and undergoing changes and amendments, w i l l continue to be the guiding p r i n c i p l e i n 114 p o l i t i c s and the guarantee of the peace i n the Far East." I t was remarkable how two days a f t e r the o f f i c i a l receXption at Buckingham Palace the B r i t i s h Government reacted on 1 1 0London Times,May 10,1921 l i : LMorning Post, May 9 , 1921 112 The Daily Telegraph May 7, 1921 113 The Daily Chronicle, May 9, 1921 4 Quoted i n the London Times, May 12, 1921 - 129 -questions put forward i n the Commons. The Leader of the House, Mr. Chamberlain, refused to give precise answers to a l l questions by remarking: "I can make no further statement.'' He announced that the problem would be trans-ferred for discussion to the forthcoming Imperial Conference. 1 1 Another example that shows how anxious the B r i t i s h Cabinet was to avoid having the matter drawn into the public eye, was the suggestion advanced by Colonel Wedgwood (M.P.) In the Commons that an opportunity be provided for parliamentary discussion of the subjects to be tabled on the agenda of the Imperial Conference. The evasive answer of the B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r , that he would be w i l l i n g to discuss the matter " i f there be a general desire i n the House", amounted to a f l a t r e j e c t i o n of the proposal, p a r t i c u l a r l y the numerous questions put i n the House wi th regard to China and the Al l i a n c e had already indicated a general desire for such 116 discussion. Indeed, p r i o r to the Imperial Conference no general discussion took place i n the B r i t i s h House o f Commons, a procedure that was e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from that adopted by the Australian and Canadian Governments. The Dominion Parliaments were given the opportunity of di scussion just as the Dominion Prime Minister of A u s t r a l i a and Canada made statements i n each case expressing the G o v e r n m e n t s " " views. To sum up , what conclusions can be drawn from the _ Great Brit.,Pari.Deb.5th Ser.1921,Vol.141,pp.1864-65 116 Ibid. Vol.142,pp.567-68 - 130 -picture of Anglo-Japanese rela t i o n s h i p from 1919 t i l l June 1921? The motives which influenced the B r i t i s h Cabinet i n i t s considerations of a renewal or non renewal of the A l l i a n c e have been discussed and the pros and cons underlying this question examined. The objections to a renewal did carry, no doubt, •-; considerable weight; the complete surrender of B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n China to Japan's w i l l which made the B r i t i s h Government unable to dissociate i t s e l f from Japanese actions that were p r e j u d i c i a l to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s ; the probable danger of an estrangement of China which would have had serious e f f e c t s on B r i t i s h trade i n China, and l a s t , but not l e a s t , the violent anta-gonism, of the U. S. A. which might r e s u l t i n most serious repercussions on Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s . In spite of a l l that, the Imperial Government seemed to be strongly ' i n c l i n e d i n the early summer of 1921 to renew the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , primarily f o r reasons of Imperial security. She hoped that a continued A l l i a n c e would serve as an instrument by which a c o n t r o l l i n g and restraining influence on Japanese foreign p o l i c y could be exercised. Considered under these aspects the A l l i a n c e had become a kind of necessary e v i l to Great B r i t a i n . The approaching date of the expiration of the A l l i a n c e i n July 1921 required that an immediate decision - 131 -be taken by the B r i t i s h Cabinet. This was, however, only possible a f t e r f u l l consultation with the Prime Ministers • of the Dominion Governments, because the issue at stake was a matter that affected, the whole of the B r i t i s h Empire. This leads to the consideration of the"imperial Conference" held i n June and July 1921 i n London, and of i t s implications the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . - 132 8 CHAPTER IY THE DOMINIONS, THE ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE AND THE "IMPERIAL CONFERENCE*' OF 1921 As long as the B r i t i s h Government i n London ex-cl u s i v e l y determined the course of the foreign p o l i c y of the B r i t i s h Empire as one l e g a l e n t i t y , the B r i t i s h Dom-inions had l i t t l e d irect influence on B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y towards Japan. As a r e s u l t , however, of the Dominions* contribution to the war e f f o r t s , and in consequence of Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference i n 1917J by which the Dominions were granted an "adequate voice in foreign p o l i c y " ) a fundamental change took place i n the inte r n a t i o n a l structure of the B r i t i s h Empire. This meant that the Im-p e r i a l Cabinet had to take into due consideration the s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t s of the Dominions towards the P a c i f i c problem as constituted by the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . This, problem v i t a l l y affected the Dominions of A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand and Canada. The"lmperlal Conference"of 1 9 2 1 1 was convened on the i n i t i a t i v e of the Australian Prime Minister, "'"Officially c a l l e d : "Conf erence of Prime Ministers and Repre-sentatives of the United Kingdom, The Dominions and India."cf. Conference of Prime Minister and Representatives of the United  Kingdom,I'ne Dominions and India ( June ,July ,August ,ival)summary of Proceedings and Documents presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.Cmd.1474,London,H.M.St.0.1921,(THereafter re-ferred to as Cmd.1474.) - 133 -Mr. Hughes, who urged In October 1920 i n a telegram to the B r i t i s h Prime Minister, that a joint p o l i c y of Great B r i t a i n and the Dominions with the regard to the P a c i f i c 2 should be l a i d down at such a conference. The r e s u l t was that i n December 1920 Mr. Lloyd George informed the House of Commons that a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the B r i t i s h Empire was to be^ield i n June 1921. He announced that action concerning the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e would be taken only a f t e r f u l l consultation 3 with the Dominion Governments. This assurance to the Dominions was reiterated by the Leader of the House, Mr. Chamberlain, i n May and June 1921, when he stated that the United Kingdom Cabinet would take no decision before having 4 requested the '•advice'' of the Dominions. The attitude of the United Kingdom Government as expressed by Mr. Chamber-l a i n has to be noted, because i t provided the B r i t i s h "inter-pretation of what an "adequate voice i n foreign p o l i c y " meant. Although Mr. Lloyd George, declared i n h i s opening speech at the*Imperial Conference* i n June 1921 that the Dominions had achieved " f u l l national Status" and stood "beside the United Kingdom as equal partners" , the B r i t i s h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of an "adequate voice", as conferred upon the Dominions by the Imperial War Conference i n 1917, was that the Dominion Gov-ernments were to exert an advlsary influence on the United ^Commonwealth of Australia,Parl.Deb.,1920/21,Vol.XCV,p.7719 Cf. The London Times, Dec.24,1920 4Gr.Brit.,Pari.Deb.,5th Ser.1921,Vol.142,p.844 and p.1681 5 Cmd.1474 p.14 - 134 -Kingdom Cabinet before i t took the f i n a l decision i n a matter of foreign p o l i c y . Whilst t h i s was also the i n t e r -pretation by the Australian Prime M i n i s t e r , the Canadian conception expressed by the attitude of the Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r , Arthur Meighen, d i f f e r e d greatly from the B r i t i s h and Australian view. The P a c i f i c problem or more accurately, the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , as i t was tabled on the agenda of the Imperial Conference'*, presented a test-case i n which, f o r the f i r s t time, the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917 Was to be experienced. Like a mirror t h i s question of high p o l i t i c s r e f l e c t e d the degree of autonomy the Dominions had acquired a f t e r the war. To understand the Australian and New Zealand stand-point i n the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , i t i s expedient to r e c a l l the determining factors of A u s t r a l i a ' s and New Zealand's foreign p o l i c y . F i r s t l y , owing to t h e i r geographical p o s i t i o n i n the vastness of the P a c i f i c Ocean the security of the Dominions was dependent upon Empire communications, and, on the protection of the B r i t i s h Royal Navy. Secondly, the supreme and fundamental p r i n c i p l e of Aus t r a l i a ' s and New Zealand's p o l i c y was the absolute maintenance of what i s c a l l e d "White '-e^^p-Policy". I t was the constant determination of these Dominions situated on the very edge of Asia and immediately exposed to the o r i e n t a l immigration from China and Japan, to build - 135 -up - according to the New Zealand Minister of Education,-Mr. Parr,-"a great European race i n A u s t r a l i a and New 6 Zealand". The t h i r d factor of decisive influence was that A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand were d i r e c t l y exposed to the threat of the r i s i n g Japanese naval power and to the danger of a Japanese expansion to the South. Pinal l y i t may be mentioned that A u s t r a l i a had a v i t a l i n t e r e s t i n maintaining good trade r e l a t i o n s with Japan because Australia's wool export industry 7 was dependent on the Japanese market. This factor was to play an even more important role i n Australian p o l i c y In the 1930s. A l l these factors had reactions on the attitude of both Dom-inions towards the possible renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e As w i l l be r e c a l l e d , Japan's foreign p o l i c y a f t e r 1918 In connection with her large scale naval programme and her expansion into the P a c i f i c Ocean by the occupation of the former German South Sea Islands indicated the tendency of a Japanese expansion to the South. This danger was c l e a r l y recognized i n both chambers of the Australian Parliament. Senator Needham declared i n the l a t e summer of 1919 that "because the Marshall and Caroline Islands are to be the property of Japan, our White A u s t r a l i a P o l i c y i s not safe. . . 6 New Zealand,Pari.Deb.4th Sess.1922,Vol.196,p.497,Cf.also Mr.Massey's statement at the occasion of the 2nd reading of the New Zealand Immigration R e s t r i c t i o n B i l l 1920,quoted i n Dewey, A.G., The Dominions and Diplomacy, London,Longmans, Green and Comp. 1929, Vol.11, p.65. Cf.King H a l l St., op.cit. p.667 - 136 -i n Japan I see a menace to A u s t r a l i a . . . we have to g watch Japan. . . " The leader of the Federal Country-Party, Dr. Earle Page, pointing out the r i s e of Japan, her 9 Pan-Asiatic programme and her trend southwards, anxiously intimated that serious future c o n f l i c t s may r i s e "possibly from the exclusion of al i e n s from these t e r r i t o r i e s , from t h i s continent or from our treatment of their coloured lo people. . ." The only e f f e c t i v e means of protection against the Japanese p e r i l was by a strong Imperial navy i n the P a c i f i c as had been repeatedly demanded by Aus t r a l i a and New Zealand statesmen i n the pre-war years. But, as haw been seen, the B r i t i s h naval p o s i t i o n i n those waters had decreased i n strength since the World War. The plan for strong united Imperial f l e e t i n the P a c i f i c had been e n t i r e l y abandoned. Future naval p o l i c y was, according to a statement from the B r i t i s h Admiralty, based on "the develop-ment of Dominion Navies" under the command of the i r own o f f i c e r s , and "each separate Navy being the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of i t s own Government". At the Imperial Conference of 1921 a resolution was passed that each Dominion Earli-ament Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a Parl.Deb.1919 Vol.LXXXIX pp.12655 & 11337 9 Ibid. 1920/21, Vol. XCI, p.362 10 Ibid. 1921, Vol.XGVII, ppll697 11 Cf.Memorandum Supplemental to the Explanatory Statement of the Navy Estimates, 1921/22, by Lord Lee,March 12 ,1921, cited i n Brassey, op.cit. 1921/22 p.107 - 137 -alone should decide on methods and expense of naval co-12 operation. This meant that A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand had, to a considerable extent, to bear the sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r naval defence, including, the high f i n a n c i a l burden of naval expenditures. As Great B r i t a i n was deeply indebted to the U. S . f i n a n c i a l l y the Dominions could not expect any economic and f i n a n c i a l aid from the United Kingdom Government •, In a naval race of the great powers i n the P a c i f i c , the p o s i t i o n of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand would thus have become disastrous. For these reasons A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand welcomed a strong U. S. Navy as a counter-balance against the rapidly growing Japanese f l e e t . But the withdrawal of U. S. p o l i c y into i s o l a t i o n a f t e r 1919 and the tendency of the United States to desist from any entangling a l l i a n c e s eliminated the prospect of a close p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y cooperation between the P a c i f i c Dominions and the U. S . R.Australia and New Zealand were therefore under the necessity to safeguard theLr security by an understanding with Japan h e r s e l f which meant con-tinuation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . The Australian Prime M i n i s t e r , Mr. Hughes, r e a l i s t i c a l l y recognized Aus t r a l i a ' s s i t u a t i o n by stating i n the Australian House Cmd. 1474, p.6 - 138 -of Representatives i n A p r i l 1921: i f we cannot secure a s a t i s f a c t o r y treaty then i t i s obvious that any adequate scheme of naval defence w i l l involve us i n much greater expenditures, and at ahtime when our resources are strained to the utmost. . . 13. The same r e a l i s t i c argument was advanced by Dr.Earle Page who advocated a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e as 14 a substitute for the P a c i f i c f l e e t . A u s t r a l i a ' s and New Zealand's security was possibly menaced by Japan. In the absence of any other means, however, r e a l security could be only gained by a contin-uation of the A l l i a n c e with Japan, although both Dominions because of the r a c i a l immigration question were extremely reluctant to become too dependent on Japan. I t ?ras f u l l y appreciated i n A u s t r a l i a that the A l l i a n c e had i t s d i s -advantages and that Japan was by no means a f r i e n d l y a l l y "by nature", to use Commander B e l l a i r ' s phraseology, but rather a perilous a l l y "by necessity". A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand thus v a c i l l a t e d between " S c y l l a and Charybdis" , between the fear from a p o t e n t i a l Japanese aggression and the need f o r Japan's good w i l l . This explains Mr.Hughes' 13Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , Pari.Deb.1920/21 Vol.XCIV p.7269. 1 4 I b i d . pp.7398/99 15 Cf. ,for example, Ibid. Vol. XCYI pp.9382/84. - 139 -view that the Treaty "means everything to us". He frankly admitted, i n the House of Representatives on A p r i l 4, 1921: No man can deny that i s a thing more precious than rubies that we -should have an a l l i a n c e with the greatest power i n the East. . .If we are asked are we i n favour of a renewal of that Treaty. . . we are. 16 Many Australians did not f e e l that the .-maintenance of a White A u s t r a l i a P o l i c y would necessarily be impaired by a renewal of the Treaty. On the contrary, even the leader of the opposition i n the Australian Parliament, Mr. Tudor, expressed the opinion that a renewal of the a l l i a n c e would 17 serve the preservation of White A u s t r a l i a P o l i c y . Other members of the House who supported a Treaty renewal did so on condition that the renewal would not impair the p r i n c i p l e 18 of White A u s t r a l i a . The opposition against the renewal and the r e a l d i f f i c u l t y arose out of the attitude of the United States. There was unanimity of opinion i n both the Australian House of Representatives and the Senate that no renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e could take place 19 at the p r i c e of antagonizing and estranging the U.S.A. Senator Barkhap, a declared opponent of the A l l i a n c e stated i n the Australian Senate i n June 1921: 1Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , Pari.Deb.1920/21 Vol.XCIV p.7267-17 i b i d , pp.7389 ,7391,7392 1 8 i b i d . pp.7268,7390,7407 1 9 i b i d . Vol.XCV pp.7646 ,7650 ,7652 ,7657 - 140 -America i s as much a daughter nation of the United Kingdom as i s A u s t r a l i a ; . . . i t i s a most dangerous thing for us to renew the A l l i a n c e with Japah . . . I r e a l l y believe that i t would be f a t a l before many decades to the continued existence of the B r i t i s h Empire i f we were to renew the Al l i a n c e with Japan or a c t i v e l y operate i t i n defiance of the opinion . of the people of the U. S. A. . . .20 Numerous statements indicated that sentiment i n favour of drawing closer the bonds between the great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race was rather prevalent i n Au s t r a l i a . The dilemma which was one not only f o r A u s t r a l i a but f o r the whole of the B r i t i s h Empire was very c l e a r l y recognized by Mr. Hughes, when he said: "Our i n t e r e s t , our safety l i e s i n a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e Treaty. Yet 21 that Treaty i s anathema to the Americans." Mr. Hughes, however, believed i n bringing about an easy solution by suggesting a modification of the terms of the A l l i a n c e to make i t acceptable to Great B r i t a i n , the U.S.A., Japan and A u s t r a l i a . He was of the opinion that A u s t r a l i a should play the role of an intermediator i n s e t t l i n g the American-Japanese differences and i n fin d i n g a "modus vivendi" 22 as f a r as the Treaty renewal was concerned. This opinion was to prove wrong. The severe c r i t i c i s m of the Labour •SO^ommonweaIth^^ A u s ^ i a .Pari. Deb. 1920/21 ~ 21 Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , Pari.Deb.1920/21 Yol.XCIY pp.7267/68 22 Ibid, pp.7268 - 141 -Opposition, notably of the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Ryan, resulted from the fear of antagonizing the U. S.R. and from a certa i n tendency to accentuate the Dominion's autonomy i n foreign p o l i c y . The j u d i c i a l dispute between the Australian Prime Minister and the Deputy Leader of the Opposition over the extent to which A u s t r a l i a would be bound by the A l l i a n c e T r e a t y , i f i t were renewed by the United Kingdom Government without A u s t r a l i a ' s approval of the r a t i f i c a t i o n , disclosed that the Australian Prime Minister was not i n c l i n e d to an in t e r p r e t a t i o n of Resolution IX of 1917 which gave i t more than an advisory character. Requesting f u l l authority from the Dominion Parliament f o r his p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the forthcoming"imperial Conference i n London, Mr. Hughes deliberately made a d i s t i n c t i o n between decisions on the issue of naval expenditures which were i n any case subject to the approval by the Australian Parliament.jand the matter of the Treaty renewal. Whereas i n the f i r s t case Mr. Hughes gave the assurance that A u s t r a l i a would not be committed at the Conference to any expenditure 23 without Parliamentary approval he evaded ''•faffing the same assurance with regard to the subject of foreign p o l i c y . When being asked by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Tudor, to give a precise statement also with regard to the A l l i a n c e 23 Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Deb.1920/21, Vol.XCIV p.7269 and Vol.XCVII'p.11630 - 142 -Treaty Mr. Hughes made i t unmistakably clear: the only thing I asked t h i s Parliament for authority to do, without further reference to Parliament }is to renew the Anglo-Japanese Treaty i n some form acceptable to Great B r i t a i n , to Japan, to A u s t r a l i a , • and i f possible to the U.S.A., provided that no renewal s h a l l impair the p r i n c i p l e of White A u s t r a l i a . I s h a l l not subscribe to anything that might do that. and should bring the Treaty here were i t attempted. 2 4 When th i s statement i s considered i n conjunction with another one which read: The question of the renewal of the Treaty . . . i s . . . a matter upon which our voice ought to be heard. . .we have been i n v i t e d to express  our opinion 25 Mr. Hughes' conception of Dominion autonomy, and p a r t i c u l a r -l y h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of what was meant by an "adequate voice i n foreign p o l i c y " becomes obvious. He looked upon the wording of Resolution IX not as f a c i l i t a t i n g a departure from a united Empire p o l i c y directed by the Imperial Government i n London, but as conferring upon the Dominion Governments the right to express t h e i r views on foreign p o l i c y , which p o l i c y - i n the f i n a l analysis -remained In the scope of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and function of the United Kingdom Government. Mr. Hughes believed that 24 Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , Pari.Deb.1920/21 -Hwrd-. Vol. XCIV, p. 7390 25 I b i d . Vol. XCV, p.7719 - 143 -the Australian Parliament could only refuse to r a t i f y the Treaty en-ly i f Australia's "sacred p r i n c i p l e " of w . ...... Policy" • "Whi t el^ s'±fca-lliai*«y' "was s a c r i f i c e d , but t h i s was a subject of domestic and i n t e r n a l rather than of foreign p o l i c y . When the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Ryan, moved that the Aus t r a l i a n Prime Minister at the forthcoming Imperial Conference should not be empowered to commit A u s t r a l i a to any agreement or understanding except on the condition "that the same s h a l l be subject to the 2fi approval and r a t i f i c a t i o n of the people of A u s t r a l i a " , and when he urged that^referendum be held on the question 27 of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty } he met with the strongest dissent from the Australian Prime Minister. Mr. Hughes emphatically denied that the Australian Government possessed f i n a l treaty-making power which rested exclusively with the United Kingdom Government. According to him the AngloSJapanese Treaty was, j u r i d i c a l l y speaking, one concluded between the United Kingdom Government 28 and the Japanese Government. Refuting the Opposition's 26 Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Deb.1921/21 Vol.XCV, p.7635 27 Ibid. p.7631. 28 Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a Pari.Deb.1920/21,Vol.XCV,p.7719 - 144 -view that the Dominion had the f u l l sovereignty to make the j u r i d i c a l v a l i d i t y of a p o l i t i c a l treaty dependent on the r a t i f i c a t i o n by the Dominion Parliament, Mr. Hughes even went so f a r as to say that A u s t r a l i a was e n t i r e l y subject to the l e g i s l a t i o n enacted by the B r i t i s h House 29 of Parliament. Hereby the Australian Prime Mi n i s t e r r professed without reservation his b e l i e f that the Dominion Government was f u l l y bound by the Colonial Laws V a l i d i t y Act of 1865. Mr. Hughes,rwas undoubtedly right) since the Colonial Laws V a l i d i t y Act was s t i l l e f f e c t i v e and was not repealed u n t i l 1931 under the terms of the Statute of West-minster. The Australian Prime Minister smmmarized therefore h i s standpoint by stating c l e a r l y : I f our people do not approve that w i l l not a l t e r matters by one thousandth part of an inch. . . i f t h i s Parliament. . . rej e c t s the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, then l e t i t do so. . . The Treaty w i l l be i n force. . . i t w i l l make no difference. . . 0 This "fidus Achates" - attitude towards the impe r i a l Cabinet was shared wholeheartedly by New Zealand. The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Massey, advocated i n the New Zealand Parliament i n March 1921 the establishment of an Imperial 29 Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a ,Pari .Deb. 1920/21 Vol.XCV. Ibid. p.7719 and Vol.XCVII, p.11642 30 . • Commonwealth of Au s t r a l i a Pari.Deb.1920/21,Vol.XCV p.772/22. Consequently Mr. Ryan's Proposal was rejected by a vote of 41;23 - 145 -Executive headed by. the B r i t i s h Prime Minster, an ex-ecutive which was to be concerned with carrying out a 31 centralized foreign p o l i c y of the B r i t i s h Empire. The general f e e l i n g i n New Zealand was one of unqualified l o y a l t y towards Great B r i t a i n and the cause of the Empire; i t was strongly opposed to any new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Dominion Status a f t e r 1919 which might claim complete independence of the Dominions. Just before Mr. Massey l e f t f o r the "imperial Conference" an "Open Letter from the Wellington Round Table Group to the Parliament of New Zealand" was tabled i n the New Zealand Parliament. In t h i s l e t t e r anxiety was expressed that the unity of the Empire was threatened by c e n t r i f u g a l tendencies i n Dominion p o l i t i c s . 3 2 In accord-ance wJLth t h i s f e e l i n g Mr. Massey proclaimed at the*Imperial Conference unreserved l o y a l t y to the Empire. I t i s evident what stood behind t h i s Australian and New Zealand attitude. I t was the b e l i e f of both the Australian 31 Cf.The Round Table 1920/21 P.968. Ibid, pp.974-75 3 3 Cmd. 1474, p.27 - 146 -and the New Zealand Government that the B r i t i s h Empire was one i n d i v i s i b l e entity with one united foreign p o l i c y . This idea culminated i n Mr. Hughes' statement made i n the Australian House of Representatives on A p r i l 22, 1921 with reference to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty Alliance:. "^-\ ... Our l i a b i l i t y i n regard to wars i n which B r i t a i n i s involved arises not out of any t r e a t i e s but out of our r e l a t i o n s to B r i t a i n and to the Empire generally. Whei. B r i t a i n goes to war then, ipso facto, we are at war also . . . .34 P r e c i s e l y the same view was expressed by the Prime Minister of New Zealand at the Imperial Conference of 1921. The reason, however, why A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand firm l y adhered to the p r i n c i p l e of Imperial unity, i f not c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , originated, as previously pointed out, from t h e i r insular p o s i t i o n i n the P a c i f i c Ocean on the borders of Eastern Asia. A u s t r a l i a ' s and New Zealand's self-preservation depended e n t i r e l y upon the .existence of the B r i t i s h Empire. In the e f f i c i e n c y of t h i s Empire and of Imperial Defence rested the security of Australia's and New Zealand's independence as Dominions. This b r i e f review of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issue provides an understanding of the close association of both Dominion Governments with the B r i t i s h view on the question of renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . I t was i n d i r e c t 34 , Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , Pari.Deb. 1920/21 Vol.XCV p.7718 35 Cmd. 1474 p.27 - 147 -contrast to the Canadian attitude. At the Imperial Conference i n London which began on July 20, 1921, the Prime Ministers of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand put forward th e i r views on the issues. In h i s open-ing speech Mr. Hughes called the case for the renewal "very strong. . . i f not. . . overwhelming" 3 6 He emphasized that to A u s t r a l i a the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e had a "special s i g n i f i c a n c e " . .The Australian main argument f o r favouring a renewal was the same as that ascribed to; the B r i t i s h Govern-ment i n her p o l i c y towards Japan since 1919, namely that a continuation of the Al l i a n c e offered the p o s s i b i l i t y to exercise a greater influence on Japan's p o l i c y and to impose r e s t r a i n t s on her. But he r e a l i z e d that because of the op-po s i t i o n of the United States of America the Treaty could not be renewed i n i t s o r i g i n a l form. The Australian Prime Minister l a i d i t down as a "sine qua non" that any renewed treaty with Japan had to exclude any p o s s i b i l i t y of war with 37 the United States i n order to be sa t i s f a c t o r y to A u s t r a l i a . Cmd. 1474, pp.19-20 37 Ibid. - 148 -Mr. Hughes saw, therefore, the i d e a l solution i n a broadening of the b i l a t e r a l Treaty A l l i a n c e into a t r i -p a r t i t e a l l i a n c e between Great B r i t a i n , the United States and Japan. On the second day of the Conference he proposed a special conference of these three powers at which i t should be discussed how the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e could be sup-38 planted by a t r i p a r t i t e treaty. In case, however, that such an agreement should f a i l he strongly urged the contin-uation of the b i l a t e r a l pact aft e r the views of the United States of America had been ascertained. Under no circumstances was the Australian Prime Minister i n c l i n e d to renounce the a l l i a n c e with Japan. On the same day Mr. Hughes suggested a disarmament conference of Great B r i t a i n , United States of America, Japan and France to stop "naval construction and 39 naval expenditure." Both proposals were t y p i c a l of the Australian standpoint. A u s t r a l i a ' s security required thait the powers composing the ' P a c i f i c Triangle' , that i s to say, Japan, the United States of America and the B r i t i s h Empire, cooperatedwith each other instead of antagonizing each other. The former Australian Minister of Defence, Senator E. D. 38 Commonwealth of Australia,Parl.Deb.1920/21,Vol.XCVTI pp.11636-37 39 I b i d . - 149 -M i l l e n , therefore advocated an understanding between Great B r i t a i n , Japan and the United States of America as the "Ideal" 40 of A u s t r a l i a . A naval race i n the P a c i f i c which would undoubtedly have resulted from a serious disruption i n the ' P a c i f i c Triangle', whether caused either by the abrogation. of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e or the deep d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n of the United States of America would have imposed upon A u s t r a l i a i n t o l e r a b l e expenditures. For the same reasons as A u s t r a l i a , Mr. Massey supported wholeheartedly the renew-41 a l of the A l l i a n c e . As Mr. Massey had already declared In May 1921 i n V i c t o r i a , B. C. ". . .we have much to gain and hothing to lose by a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty." 42 He supported Mr. Hughes' suggestion for an a l l i a n c e with the United States of America f u l l y recognizing that 43 future world peace lay i n close Anglo-American relations. The suggested solution by the Prime Ministers of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand were based on misinterpretation of United States p o l i c y . No Dominion was i n a better p o s i t i o n to understand the United States of America than Canada. Her 40 Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , Pari.Deb.1920/21 1*41.Vol.XCVI, P.9390. 4 1Cmd. 1474, pp. 30,31. 42 Canadian Annual Review, 1921 p.97 43 Cmd. 1474, p.30. - 150 -attitude towards the A l l i a n c e must therefore now be dis-cussed. From the very beginning the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e constituted a matter of serious concern p a r t i c u l a r l y for Canada f o r two main reasons - the immigration problem and Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s . As far as Japanese immigration into B r i t i s h Columbia was concerned the P r o v i n c i a l Govern-ment and the l o c a l population had been strongly opposed 44 to the o r i e n t a l i n f l u x since the early eighteen-nineties. The P r o v i n c i a l Government as well as the Federal Government were i n complete accord that the p r i n c i p l e of "White -^ WPIa-' p o l i c y " as i t was advocated by A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand, 45 should be maintained by Canada. This task however, was greatly complicated by the existence of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . Whilst Canada t r i e d to deal with the immigration question by anti-Japanese immigration acts passed i n the B. C. Le g i s l a t u r e , the B r i t i s h Government was anxious to maintain c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s between the Empire and Japan, and to avoid any f r i c t i o n s with lapan which might res u l t from Canada's attitude. Such measures might have seriously affected, i f not jeopardized the foundation of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y , the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . Thus, v i t a l Canadian i n t e r e s t s were i n contradiction to B r i t i s h Empire •4'4 Woodsworth, Ch.G. Canada and the Orient, Toronto, The Macmillan Company of Canada Ximited,1941, pp.49 f f . 45 Speech by S i r Robert Borden i n Vancouver,Sept.24,1907 quoted i n Borden, R.L. The Question of Oriental Immigration, Speeches 1907 and 1908, p$3,ff, - 151 -po l i c y . Canada's Federal Government i n disallowing a n t i -immigration acts of the B, C. Legislature under the terms of the B.N. A. Act.46 was compelled to make s a c r i f i c e s on behalf of Great B r i t a i n and for the sake of a united Empire p o l i c y . Consequently, strong opposition was aroused amonst the population of B r i t i s h Columbia, i n the Canadian 47 Parliament, as well as i n Government c i r c l e s . In 1908, for Instance, when Mr. Lem&ix's Gentlemen's Agreement was debated in. the'Canadian House of Commons, the French Canadian N a t i o n a l i s t , Mr. Armand. Lavergne, stated: I t seems to me that we have been s a c r i f i c i n g Canadian i n t e r e s t s for the Imperial p o l i c y of Great B r i t a i n , for the sake of an a l l y of Great B r i t a i n , which a l l y may appear i n the future as a most dangerous enemy.^8 S i r Robert Borden i n attacking the L a u r i e r ^ ^ ^ o f n o n t h i s question urged i n a speech(delivered i n Vancouver i n 1907, that Canada must be accorded perfect and. unimpaired freedom of action as f a r as the o r i e n t a l immigration problem was 49 concerned. In the House of Commons he emphasized i n 1908: Canada ought not to enter into any treaty engagement which would prevent the necessary and e f f e c t i v e con-t r o l of immigration. Oriental immigration i s a question of v i t a l importance not only to B.C. but to the whole of the Dominion. 0 4 6B.N.A.Act of 1867, sec.132. 47 Woodsworth,0p.cit.passim,particularly pp.55-62,72-87 and Lower,A.R.M. Canada and the Far East-1940.International Secretariat,I.P.R.,New York 1940 pp.68-70 48 quoted from Woodsworth op.cit. p.90 I 50, 4 9Borden, op.cit. pp.3 f f . 'Ibid, p.30 - 152 -These examples may be s u f f i c i e n t to point out the d i f f i c u l t y with T/hich the Canadian Government was confronted: v i t a l domestic i n t e r e s t s c o n f l i c t e d with Empire p o l i c y as directed from London. At that time, however, Canada's l e g a l p o s i t i o n i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and international law had not yet advanced to the stage which would have enabled the Dominion to i n s i s t on i t s own r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s . I t had to comply with the dominating course of foreign p o l i c y as pursued by the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e . That was Canada's contribution to Empire po l i c y ; B r i t i s h Columbia had, i n a c e r t a i n sense, to pay the p r i c e for Imperial security. V i t a l Canadian int e r e s t s were strongly concerned but not taken into account by the B r i t i s h Government. I t was obviously & B r i t i s h foreign P o l i c y rather than >ar s p e c i f i c Canadian foreign p o l i c y executed i n Ottawa. Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917, however, marked the beginning of a new era i n the con-s t i t u t i o n a l evolution of the B r i t i s h Dominions, as pointed out already. Canada took the lead i n the new evolution. The issue of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e proved the occasion when Canada for the f i r s t time practised an i n d i v i d u a l and s p e c i f i c Canadian foreign p o l i c y . Before analysing the o f f i c i a l attitude of the Canadian Cabinet and of Prime Minister Meighen i n p a r t i c u l a r , the general f e e l i n g - 153 -of Canadian public opinion has to be elucidated b r i e f l y . The overwhelming majority of the Canadian press strongly opposed any renewal of the Treaty with Japan. The "Toronto Globe" f o r instance drew attention as early as January, 1920 to the fact that the r i s e of Japanese power i n the Far East and the Japanese immigration on the P a c i f i c coast of the North American Continent had led to serious f r i c t i o n between the United States and Japan, and that Canada, i n the case of a c o n f l i c t , would stand side by 51 side with the United States instead of aiding Japan. With reference to o r i e n t a l immigration, the newspaper declared i n 192:1 that Canada and the United States ?rould object to any treaty which "would enable Japanese s e t t l e r s to increase t h e i r already important holdings of f e r t i l e land i n C a l i f o r n i a , Oregon, Washington and B r i t i s h Columbia. The: same opposition v/as voiced by such other leading news-papers as the "Winnipeg Free Press", and the "Ottawa Journal The best comment which summarizes the problem Canada was faced with, came from the "Toronto Star" which stated on _ Cf."Japan Advertiser" Jan.1,1920 52 Quoted from the "London Times" October 28,19 21. 5^ Brebner ,J.B. ,Canada , the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e and the Washington Conference.Political Science Quarterly Vol.L, 1935, pp.49-50 - 154 -May 21: Canada should oppose the renewal of that Treaty and her supreme i n t e r e s t i n the matter should be recognized and deferred to . . . , ^ Prime Minister Meighen, being f u l l y aware that Canadian i n t e r e s t and Empire unity were at stake, took the i n i t i a t i v e i n seeking a sat i s f a c t o r y solution. Conservative i n h i s p o l i t i c a l outlook he had always professed h i s l o y a l t y to the B r i t i s h Crown and adhered to the p r i n c i p l e of B r i t i s h 55 leadership i n -Foreign p o l i c y . As Prime Minister of Canada he f u l l y r e a l i z e d , however, that Canadian p o l i c y , because of Canada's p o s i t i o n on the North American Continent, was subject to i t s own r u l e s , that i t faced a dual pos i t i o n ; i t looked not only towards Great B r i t a i n and the B r i t i s h Empire, but also towards the great neighbour, the United States ; Allegiance to i t s ' common Sovereign and our membership i n the Empire are fundamental; but geographical s i t u a t i o n , our s o c i a l p o s i t i o n our economic h e r i -tage and development r a i s e problems which are not i d e n t i c a l with those which confront the motherland or any other Dominion. 56 Whereas the Australian Prime M i n i s t e r , Mr. Hughes, interpreted Resolution IS as meaning that A u s t r a l i a ' s "voice ought to be heard" the Canadian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was absolutely d i f f e r e n t Quoted from the Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs,1921 p.102 (hereafter referred to as Canad.An.Rev.) , A.Meighen .Oversea Addresses June-July 1921 ,Toronto^x: The Musson Book Co.Ltd.1921, pp.21,23,29/31,and Brebner, op.cit . pp49. 56 Meighen,op cit.pp37(statement Sir.Arthur Meighen's at the Dominion Day Dinner i n London July 1,1921) - 1 5 5 -going f a r beyond th i s r e s t r i c t i v e interpretation. The Cana-dian Prime Minister at th££ "Imperial Conference" of .1921 p e r s i s t e n t l y held the opinion that the Canadian voice should p r e v a i l i n proportion to the i n t e n s i t y with which a problem 5 7 a ofriforeign p o l i c y affected Canadian int e r e s t s . As one of the leading statesmen, Mr. Arthur Meighen was the f i r s t to r e a l i z e the imminent importance of the fact that as a r e s u l t of World War I the centre of gravity i n world p o l i t i c s > 5 7 b had s h i f t e d from Europe to the P a c i f i c , where Canada, sharing with the United States of America the dominating p o s i t i o n on the Eastern side of the Ocean, had a v i t a l i n t e r e s t . Thus as early as February 1?21, Mr. Meighen communicated through the Department of External A f f a i r s with the B r i t i s h Government. Expressing the view that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e should not be renewed as a b i l a t e r a l pact, he suggested that the Canadian Government should approach the TP. S. Government i n order to ascertain the p o s s i b i l i t y of a P a c i f i c conference with the B r i t i s h Empire, the United 5 8 States, Japan and China. This proposal appeared to him to be the best opportunity to'iarrive at a solution s a t i s -factory to a l l the nations whose inte r e s t s were involved. In other words, i t was to reconcile the diverging interests of the members within the B r i t i s h Commonwealth and par t i c u -l a r l y to s a t i s f y at the same time the United States of America. 5 7 a Mr. Meighen was considerably influenced by the Legal Adviser to the Canadian Department of External A f f a i r s , Mfl.L.C.Christie, who served on the s e c r e t a r i a l s t a f f of the Conference. Mr. C h r i s t i e had played an eminent role i n drafting Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917^-Brebner. OP. c i t . p . 5 0 . 5 7 bMeighen, OP. c i t . p. 2 5 , 5 8 XJanad. jgy+Rer, 1921 pp 1 0 2 - 1 0 5 , and B^ebner. op. c i t. pp. 55 f f a. ' • .. _ . - 156 -• Prime Mini ster .Meighen, practised a p o l i c y of utmost caution and reserve. On March 21, he announced i n the Commons that i n July'a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth-would he held and that for t h i s purpose his Government would be prepared to f a c i l i t a t e a preceding discussion i n the Canadian Parliament. But he refused to •' make any commitment i n that respect i n advance of the « . »59 Imperial Conference The Parliamentary Debate, which dealt with the question of the A l l i a n c e took place on A p r i l 27th. Again the Canadian Prime Minister reacted rather c a r e f u l l y , saying that any o f f i c i a l expression of opinion at the present moment before the*Imperial Conference" had opened would prove de-trimental to a successful solution. There were, however, two things which he most emphatically pointed out, one p o l i t i c a l , the other j u r i d i c a l . The question of the renewal of the A l l i a n c e was of paramount importance to Canada and Canadian interest,and arose i n a "very high degree" out of the i n t e r e s t of the United States i n t h i s question , because Canada, as a part of the B r i t i s h Empire, stood between Great B r i t a i n and the United States. Therefore, the question 59 Canada,Parilament,House of Commons.Official Report of Debates Ottawa, King's. Printer,1921 (Hereafter referred to as Canada, Pari.Deb.) Vol. 146,p<.564. 60 I b i d . p.2629. 61 Canada ,Parl.Deb. 1921,Vol. 146,p.2659 - 157 -concerned Canada more than the other Dominions. There could be no- o b l i g a t i o n f o r Canada emanating from the A l l i a n c e Treaty i f renewed, without the approval of the Canadian Parliament. fM;:» Arthur Meighen was, however, not i n c l i n e d to accept the proposal of Mr. Lapointe, M.P. for Quebec East, who-'recommended the i n s e r t i o n of a sp e c i a l clause i n the treaty I f renewed, which expressly secured t h i s right f o r the Canadian Parliament. Arthur Meighen agreed i n p r i n c i p l e but he made the reservation that the question of Canada's obligations and eommi/tmemts might be quite 62 d i f f e r e n t i n case of war. This showed that the already i n t r i c a t e and precarious p o l i t i c a l question was further complicated by the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and j u r i d i c a l aspects. At the "imperial Conference" i n June 1921 ^ r , Arthur Meighen presented, Canada's case. Whilst the Australian and Mew Zealand Prime Ministers i n their opening speeches eulogized the value of the A l l i a n c e and advocated i t s re-newal , stating that Canada was "not disposed to give the same attention" t° the B r i t i s h view at any rate, intimated that he might express more detailed dissenting - 63 opinion i n the further course of discussion. He did so 62 Canada. Pari.Deb.1921 ifri-d. V o l . 148 ,p, 2640 63 Cmd.1474, p.16. - 158 -on June 29th a f t e r Lord Curzon had,'announced the B r i t i s h desire f o r a treaty-renewal. 6 4 ^ f r . A r t h u r Meighen then launched a massive attack against the intentions of B r i t a i n , .Australia and N ew Zealand. He urged that the reason f o r the continuation of the treaty had disappeared a f t e r Russian and German influence had been eliminated from the Far East. He emphasized that the b i l a t e r a l pact with Japan'was i n -compatible with the terms of the League of Nations, and pointed out that the A l l i a n c e fostered Japanese expansion i n China and constituted a d i r e c t challenge to the United 65 States. Of a l l these points the l a s t concerning the United States of America was the strongest and paramount one. He stressed-the importance of a r r i v i n g at an i n t e r -national cooperation which would include the United States of America. 6 6 At the same time he exerted a certain amount of diplomatic pressure on the United Kingdom Government by c i r c u l a t i n g ^ c o n f i d e n t i a l memorandum i n which he o f f i c i a l l y declared that i f the A l l i a n c e should be renewed Canada would not consider h e r s e l f bound by the" treaty without the formal approval by the Canadian Parliament of the r a t i f i e a t i o n . & 6 4Brebner op.cit p.51 65 Ibid.p.55. 66."Canadian Gazette" July 7,1921 i n Can.Ann.Rev.1921 p.104. 67 Simp son,B.L."An Indiscreet Chronicle from the P a c i f i c by Putnam Weale (pseu.)New York,Dod4Mead & Comp. 1922, p.108, and The Round Table 1920/21. p.112 - 159 -As the only expedient solution,he re i t e r a t e d the proposal he had made i n February 1921, i n which he urged the c a l l i n g of a conference to deal with P a c i f i c . a f f a i r s . 6 8 He wished to convince B r i t a i n and A u s t r a l i a of the v i t a l necessity to hold such a conference because i t was the only means of gaining the cooperation of the United States with the B r i t i s h Empire i n world p o l i t i c s . This aroused strong opposition from the Australian Prime Minster who objected to the idea 69 of terminating the a l l i a n c e with Japan. Canada's attitude was of great importance because It revealed the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of Canadian foreign p o l i c y . What were the underlying motives f o r Tdii Arthur Meighen's v i o l e n t opposition towards the Anglo-Japanese Alliance? As pointed out previously the A l l i a n c e hand! capped the Ottawa Government i n exercising an e f f e c t i v e control oyer-Japanese immigration into Canada. Indeed, t h i s a n t i -Japanese f e e l i n g i n B r i t i s h Columbia was a factor the Canadian Government i n Ottawa had to. take into account. CO Brebner op.ci t . p.49 and Canad.Ann,Rev.1921 p.104 69 Carter,G.Mi The B r i t i s h Commonwealth and International  Security, Toronto , The Ryerson Press 1947, p.44 - 160 -In a debate In the Canadian House of Commons A p r i l 26, 1921 % v i representative- from Vancouver, Mr. Stevens, urged the Government to reserve i n any renewed treaty with Japan the absolute right to control o r i e n t a l im-70 migration. He drew the Government's attention to a test-case which occurred somewhat e a r l i e r i n B r i t i s h Columbia, when the Supreme Court and the Privy Council disallowed a P r o v i n c i a l Law enacted by the B. C. Legis-lature which dealt with employment of o r i e n t a l s . The Court's decision-was based on the; argument that the act passed constituted a v i o l a t i o n of the s p i r i t of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. During the Imperial Conference i n London the P r o v i n c i a l Government, of B r i t i s h Columbia despatched a telegram to Prime Minister Meighen, uB^ng him to oppose any renewal of the A l l i a n c e unless Canada was given the r i g h t to r e s t r i c t Japanese immigration. This showed that there was some pressure on the Government emanating from the immigration problem i n B r i t i s h Columbia; but i t showed also that B r i t i s h Columbia did not raise objections to 70 ' Canada Pari.Deb.1921, Vol.148 P.2595 71 Canad.Ann.Rev.1921 p.100 - 161 -the Treaty-renewal on p r i n c i p l e , i f the r i g h t s of the P r o v i n c i a l Government were reserved. On the contrary, newspapers i n B. C. were i n favour of maintaining the a l l i a n c e 7 2 . Thus i t appears that the o r i e n t a l problem was a factor i n f l u e n c i n g - ^ ^ Arthur Meighen*s a t t i t u d e , but i t was not the dominating one. I t waB^not i l l - w i l l against Japan or the intention to sever the close r e l a t i o n s with Japan by which lf£?^Arthur Meighen was led i n h i s p o l i c y as he emphasized i n a speech held i n Toronto i n September 1921 .. His objection to the course of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y originated from the f a c t that the contin-uation of, the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e jeopardized B r i t i s h -American as well as Canadian-American r e l a t i o n s . I t can be stated that a basic axiom of Canadian foreign p o l i c y i s the maintenance of good and f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between Canada and the United States of America. This fundamental p r i n c i p l e i n Canadian external r e l a t i o n s i s derived not only from a common f e e l i n g between both nations but also from Canada's geographical propinquity to the United States. S i r Robert Borden was the f i r s t to emphasize very emphatically i n 1917 the idea of Anglo-American cooperation; he regarded united action between the 72 Cf. f o r example, the Vancouver Daily Province,June 22nd, 1921; and Angus, H.F. "Canada and Naval Rivalry i n the P a c i f i c " , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , Vol. VIII (June 1935J,p.l78^ 73 Canad.Ann.Rev.1921 p.101. - 162 -' B r i t i s h Empire and the United States of Ameri ca i n world 74 p o l i t i e s as the best guarantee for safeguarding peace. As early as 1918 S i r Robert Borden made i t clear i n the Imperial War Cabinet that, i f the B r i t i s h Empire cooperated with any power against the United States, "that p o l i c y 75 could not reckon on the approval or the support of Canada. to promote good r e l a t i o n s between the B r i t i s h Commonwealth and the United States of America, was the underlying idea of those Canadian p o l i t i c i a n s who i n 1920 advocated special 76 diplomatic representation for Canada i n Washington Such good r e l a t i o n s between Canada and the United States were seriously imperilled by the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . Any continued b i l a t e r a l a l l i a n c e between Great B r i t a i n and Japan^however modified and hedged with clauses which excluded the p o s s i b i l i t y of war with the United States, was incompatible with the idea of Anglo-American cooperation. Moreover, i n the event of war between United States and Japan, China was supposed to intervene against her r i v a l i n the Far East. Thus the 'casus foederis' would have presented i t s e l f to Great B r i t a i n who would have been involved automatically i n a 74 Lloyd George, D. War Memoirs, (Transl.) B e r l i n 1934, Vol.11, p.385. 75 Brebner, |.B. The North A t l a n t i c Triangle, Toronto,The Ryerson Press, 1945, P.281. 7 6Canada.Pari.Deb.1920, Vol.143,p.2444. - 163 -c o n f l i c t with the United States of America. This dilemma had been c l e a r l y pointed out i n May 1921 by Bertram Lenox Simpson, Chief foreign advisor of the President of the Chinese Republic, i n a memorandum to the Canadian Prime Minister. "Sooner or l a t e r " he argued,"the Treaty" would i n e f f e c t bring B r i t a i n and the United States into c o l l i s i o n with one another, f i r s t on Chinese, s o i l and then, by natural process, 77 everywhere on the P a c i f i c " . Mr. Simpson considered i t as self-evident that as a natural consequence of the renewal of the A l l i a n c e a Sino-American rapprochement would take place i n form of a j o i n t m i l i t a r y defence scheme under which 78 China offered naval bases on her coast to the United States. The same apprehensions over such an a l l i a n c e and over the possible danger of an armed c o n f l i c t between China and the United States on the one hand and Japan and B f i t a i n on the other hand were expressed i n the Australian Senate and the 79 B r i t i s h House of Commons. Even i f there were no danger of war there remained Memorandum "China and the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e " May 4,1921, Simpson op.cit.pp 53-58. 78. I b i d . p . 5 7 . 7Q cf.Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Deb.1920/21 Vol.XGVI,p.9383, and Gr.Brit.,Pari.Deb.5th Ser.1921,Vol.144,p.2006. - 164 -the strong opposition of the United States Government and the wide-spread public i l l - w i l l i n the United States against the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . Accordingly, Canadian opposition towards the renewal of the A l l i a n c e was manifest. In the Canadian House of Commons' Debate of A p r i l 27th,1921, the leader of the Unionist L i b e r a l Party, Mr. Rowel1, reflected-the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the House.- He urged that the Canadian Government should not ignore the acrimonious f e e l i n g against t h i s treaty i n the United States. "In the i n t e r e s t of good r e l a t i o n s between the B r i t i s h Empire and the United States of America," he expressed the conviction that the treaty should not be 80 renewed. The mouthpiece of the I s o l a t i o n i s t French-Canadian opposition, Mr. Deslaurier,(a Member from Montreal) advocated the conclusion of a defensive a l l i a n c e witli^United States as foundation of any future Canadian p o l i c y . He went even so f a r as to think of t h i s proposed a l l i a n c e as a measure of protection against Japanese aggression which might, turn a neutral Canada i n t o a new Belgium. This question of pre-serving n e u t r a l i t y i n case of war between Japan and the United States leads to a consideration of the j u r i d i c a l aspects. Was Canada j u r i d i c a l l y e n t i t l e d to proclaim neutral-i t y quite apart from the p o l i t i c a l question whether she was i n the p o s i t i o n to maintain n e u t r a l i t y ? 80 Canada Pari.Deb. 1921, Vol.148,p.2657 81 Ibid, pp 2676-77. - 165 -The "Toronto Globe" urgently demanding the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance commented in January 1921 that in the case of h o s t i l i t i e s between Japan and the United States "the Britannic peoples throughout the world would preserve 82 absolute neutrality" . The newspaper expressed i t s opinion that Canada, treaty or no treaty, would feel under no ob-ligation to render assistance to Japan against the United States. No doubt, these words echoed exactly the feeling of Canadian public opinion and indicated the general trend in Canada towards greater autonomy and against centralized Imperial control; but the opinion as expressed by "The Globe" did not onform with the legal position of the Canadian Domin-ion at that time. An o f f i c i a l statement of the Canadian Government appeared on February 4, 1920, which alluded to the case of an armed conflict between Canada and a foreign power, saying Canada owes allegiance to the same sovereign as Great Britain and so long as she continues to do so she would be a party i n the interest and dis-entitled to vote. If she disclaimed her interest and claimed the right to vote, she would thereby proclaim her independence. 8 3 The same view was shared by Sir Robert Borden when he stated in the Commons Debate of April 27, 1921, that eaeh Dominion must take i t s reasonable part in the common defence or withdraw and become an independent s t a t e . 8 4 8 2The Round Table 1920-21, p.395 British Year Book of International Law 1922-23.London,H.Milford O.U.P. 1923, p.38. 84 ^Canada Pari.Deb.1921, Vol.148,p.2629. - 16* . This showed the discrepancy between the j u d i c i a l p o s i t i o n and the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n which Canada found he r s e l f placed. Suppose war broke out between Japan and the United States, then Canada's security c a t e g o r i c a l l y demanded at lea s t maintaining a benevolent n e u t r a l i t y towards the United States. Diplomatic unity of the Empire, however, required Canada to associate her actions with those of Great B r i t a i n . Thus, the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e became a symbol of what 85 Putnam Weale c a l l e d "the Break-up of the B r i t i s h Empire" Should Canada resort to a solution which might pro-duce a new 1776? Several statements made by outstanding p o l i t i c i a n s , which r e f l e c t e d the strong f e e l i n g f o r nation-alism and the desire f o r absolute independence showed that the issue of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e might possibly 86 push Canada to the very edge of separation. Summarizing the main problems which faced the Meighen-Government i t can be said that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e constituted a serious threat to Canada's security. I t en-dangered the v i t a l p r i n c i p l e s of Canadian foreign p o l i c y because i t jeopardized good Anglo-American and Canadian-American r e l a t i o n s . I t involved the danger of disturbing the unity of the B r i t i s h Empire. I t was the merit of the Canadian Prime Minister that he r e a l i z e d very d i s t i n c t l y 8 5Simpson, Op >Cit. p.60 86 cf. Canad.Ann.Rev.1921, p.170 - 167 -that the hour f o r decision for the B r i t i s h Empire had come, that the B r i t i s h Empire had to choose between Japan and the United States as partner f o r future cooperation i n world p o l i t i c s . S i r Arthur Meighen, i n h i s capacity of Canada's Prime M i n i s t e r , could n a t u r a l l y pursue no other course of p o l i c y thaii that which served the special i n t e r e s t s of h i s country, that i s to say, to prevent under a l l circumstances a renewal of the A l l i a n c e . Simultaneously, however, by i n s i s t i n g on the idea of close AngloQ^meriean cooperation and by acting as intermediator between B r i t a i n and the United States he served the int e r e s t s of the unity of the whole Empire. S i r Arthur's p o l i t i c a l conception was embodied i n h i s message to the London Times of July 4, 1921 i n which he said that the "peace and welfare of the world i n the future depended upon the maintenance of a s p i r i t of understanding and cooperation between the two great English-speaking Commonwealths." He expressed h i s conviction that Canada should act as interpreter and intermediary between the members of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth and " t h e i r friends and kinsmen of the great Republic to the South." 8 7 The question a r i s e s whether Prime Minister Meighen, i n i n t e r p r e t i n g more or less the American standpoint i n the whole a f f a i r did anything but execute United States p o l i c y . Quoted from Canad.Ann.Review, 1921, p.131 - 168 -There were several statements which appeared, to suggest t h i s at that time. Mr. Lloyd George was reported to have accused Mr. Meighen at the Imperial Conference of 1921 of 88 being the mouth-piece of Washington^ the Australian Prime 89 Min i s t e r , Mr. Hughes, made the same charge. In f a c t , such a view was even voiced by the United States press. For instance, the "Philadelphia Ledger" said that Mr. Meighen represented the United States'*viewpoint rather than that of Canada. 9 0 This s u p e r f i c i a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , however, which tends to depreciate the Canadian Government to a mere executive agency of the United S t ates Government hardly seems j u s t i f i e d . The attitude of the Canadian press and of the Ontario Legislature which opposed the a n t i - B r i t i s h a g i t a t i o n campaign i n the American Hearst newspapers, de-monstrated that Canadian public opinion was not exclusively pro-American but had i t s own views. 9 1Moreover, at that time no dire c t diplomatic channels existed between Y/ashington and Ottawa, through which the U. S. State Department could have o f f i c i a l l y conveyed i t s opinion to the Canadian Government. In t h e i r deliberations on p o l i c y to be pursued, the Canadian Government were le d primarily by Canada's own v i t a l i n t e r e s t s op Simpson, Op.Cit.p.110 8 9Brebner, J. B.Canada., the Anglo^Jap.Alliance and theWashington ton Conference, P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly Vol.L ,1935,pp56 Cf.Statement of the U.S.Correspondent of Philadelpha Ledger, Mr.C.lvAckerman:a i n the Can.Ann.Rev. 1921,p. 101. 91 Can.Ann,Rev. 1921, p.130 - 169 -as necessitated by Canada's geographical p o s i t i o n on the North American Continent and by her dual p o s i t i o n between two world powers;Canada*s security, which was dependent upon the protection of the B r i t i s h Navy i n the A t l a n t i c and the United States naval power i n the P a c i f i c , demanded that B r i t i s h and American foreign p o l i c y be i n complete agreement with each other, or,, as Lord Baldwin termed i t , that the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e "secures the acquiescence" 92 * of the State Department. The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , i f continued, imperilled the harmony between the Empire and the United States. In addition, Canada had to take into consideration that i n case of war between Japan and the United States, which was l i k e l y to be pr e c i p i t a t e d by the A l l i a n c e , Canadian t e r r i t o r y would be involved. Thus i t was quite natural that - ^ r . Arthur Meighen's foreign p o l i c y w»'sV\ -to avoid l i k e any other Canadian external p o l i c y , ttfould •®jja#©£yan-tagonizf^United States p o l i c y or even American public opinion. This, however, did not imply that Mr. Meighen merely executed the p o l i c y of the State Department i n Washington. His p o l i c y served the r e a l i n t e r e s t s of Canada. I t was the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of a s p e c i f i c Canadian p o l i c y : "Canadianism rooted i n North 93 Americanism" as Brebner termed i t . Strange.W.Canada, the P a c i f i c and War. Toronto: Thos.Nelson & Sons, Ltd. 1937, p.35. 9 3 Brebner, QppCit.p.56 - 170 -This was the f i r s t time i n the hist o r y of the .British Empire that a Dominion l i k e Canada had practised a s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l foreign p o l i c y of her own, as d i s t i n c t from a united Empire po l i c y directed by the B r i t i s h Foreign Off i c e . Uls,Arthur Meighen*s p o l i c y f i n a l l y convinced the B r i t i s h Government that B r i t i s h Empire p o l i c y toward Japan, (that i s i n the P a c i f i c and i n the Far East) must coincide with U. S. p o l i c y . This basic p r i n c i p l e of Canadian ex-ternal p o l i c y was vigorously maintained unchanged during the following period. When rumours a l l u d i n g to the r e v i v a l of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e occurred i n 1934, the "Winnipeg Free Press", emphasized that Canada's attitude of 1921 was a f i n a l one, and stated that any prospect of an agreement which would draw Great B r i t a i n into Japan's o r b i t at the expense of the U.SJR., with the consequent e f f e c t on British-American r e l a t i o n s , would be repugnant to Canada and f i n d nothing but opposition i n the Dominion. 9 4 The success of Mr. Meighen's p o l i c y can therefore be de-scribed as a diplomatic victory which contributed l a r g e l y to increasing Canada's p o l i t i c a l prestige and influence i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , and was a prelude to a further consolidation of Canada's le g a l p o s i t i o n . The co n s t i t u t i o n a l issue raised by the Japanese A l l i a n c e , - the c o n f l i c t between ce n t r a l i z a t i o n and autonomy - was solved by Mr. Meighen's The Winnipeg Free Press, December 3, 1934, quoted by A.R.M.Lower '@pyCit. p.35 - 171 -compromising p o l i c y of securing the unity of the Empire 95 plus the autonomy of Canada. Meanwhile, the B r i t i s h Cabinet was under urgent pressure of time because the treaty was due; to expire on July 13, 1921, i n two weeks' time from the beginning of the Imperial Conference. The B r i t i s h Government therefore o f f i c i a l l y addressed a request to the Japanese Government for an extension of the treaty f o r three months i n order to gain time to consider the matter. An immediate decision had to be taken. The B r i t i s h Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, presented h i s views at the beginning of the Conference. He pointed out that the A l l i a n c e had proved a most valuable f a c t o r i n B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y , and rei t e r a t e d that Japan 97 had "sp e c i a l i n t e r e s t s " i n the Far East. With regard to the United States he l e f t no doubt that the "cardinal p r i n c i p l e " of B r i t i s h Foreign p o l i c y was close and f r i e n d l y cooperation with the United States. But Mr. Lloyd George put forward one argument i n strong support of returning the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . In view of the increasing tension between Japan and the United States, which involved Cf.Mr.Meighen's speech in June 1921, as guest of the Benchers of Gray's Inn:"We have a sense of independence and a sence of unity, and these do not clash; they are i n harmony." quoted from Can.Ann.Rev.1921, pp220. 9Commonwealth of Au s t r a l i a Pari.Debates. 1921, Vol.XCvTI ,p. 11635. 97 Cmd.1474 p.13. - 178 -the r e a l danger of war - a r a c i a l war because of the im-migration question - ;an abrogation of the A l l i a n c e would not only have increased the tension and a c c e l e r a t e d the outbreak of an armed c o n f l i c t , but would also have resulted i n serious repercussions on the B r i t i s h Empire. A cancellation of the treaty would be considered by Japan, and furthermore by India and the other A s i a t i c dependencies of the Empire, as a sign that Great B r i t a i n endorsed a r a c i a l d i v i s i o n of the P a c i f i c Area. Mr. Lloyd George expressed himself thus: No greater calamity could overtake the world'than any further accentuation of the world's d i v i s i o n upon the l i n e s of race. Our foreign p o l i c y can never arrange i t s e l f . . •. upon the differences of race and c i v i l i z a t i o n between East and l e s t . I t would be f a t a l to the Empire. . . I t would o g divide the B r i t i s h Empire against i t s e l f . . . / Owing to the structure of the B r i t i s h Empire, the Imperial Government had to play the role of r'jfceimediator between East and West. The expression of t h i s p o l i c y was i n terms of friendship with Japan. Speaking i n terms of power p o l i t i c s , i t meant that the supreme aim of B r i t i s h P a c i f i c p o l i c y had to ge the prevention of a war between Japan and the United States, and the preservation of a. certain balance of power i n the P a c i f i c . Accordingly, the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, presented a detailed analysis of Br i t i s h foreign p o l i c y to the Conference i n which he favoured strongly a re-99 newal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . 98 Cmd.l474.P.13 99 Brebner, OppCit. p.51 - 173 -I t was at t h i s stage of the Conference that the Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r , .ri:Jfr.Arthur Meighen, started his attack on the intention of the B r i t i s h , Australian and New Zealand Governments. The dilemma for Great B r i t a i n was evident; the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e offered to her the pernicious prospect of disunity i f not dismemberment of the Empire, and antagonism or open h o s t i l i t y of the United States. A c o n s t i t u t i o n a l authority such as Prof. A. B. Keith suggested i n a l e t t e r to "The Times" that the d i f f i c u l t y with regard to the Dominions might be overcome by i n s e r t i n g a clause i n the treaty s t i p u l a t i n g that the terms of the new treaty should not be applicable to the Dominions without the acceptance of the Dominion P a r l i a m e n t s . 1 0 0 Prof. Keith thus followed the precedent of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee with France of June 28, 1919, and a n t i c i -pated A r t i c l e IX of the Treaty of Locarno. I t w i l l be understood, however, from the foregoing that t h i s suggestion offered no r e a l solution. Prime Minister Lloyd George chose another way. On July 1, 1921 he surprised the Imperial Conference with the announcement that he accepted the Canadian proposal for the P a c i f i c Conference. 1 0 1 The aim was to ar-r i v e at a reasonable understanding by j o i n t discussions with the United States, Japan and China. Consequently, the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, communicated with the Japanese and United States Ambassadors and with the Chinese M i n i s t e r , approaching them with the idea of a 100 cf.The London Times, July 6, 1921. 101 Woodsworth, Op.Cit.P.176 - 174 -102 conference on the Problems of the P a c i f i c and the Far East. This by no means implied a cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e by Great B r i t a i n . The Imperial Cabinet was determined rather, to keep the door open for a spe c i a l solution. Whereas, p r i o r to the Imperial conference^the B r i t i s h n o t i f i c a t i o n of July 1920 to the Leaguejregarding the treaty with Japan had been generally considered as constituting a denunciation of the A l l i a n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y by the Law O f f i c e r s of the Crown, as the request for a three months* extension demon-' stated, the Lord Chancellor;,' Lord Birkenhead, expressed the reverse l e g a l view at the Conference. He argued that a de-c i s i o n was not immediately urgent since the t r e a t y A l l i a n c e , not having been formally denounced, would automatically 103 continue i n force. By adopting t h i s d i l a t o r y j u r i d i c a l procedure, the B r i t i s h Government gained time f o r the re-adjustment of i t s p o l i c y . Almost simultaneously, the B r i t i s h and Japanese,Governments n o t i f i e d the League of Nations that i n case of a s i t u a t i o n which rendered the A l l i a n c e i n -consistent with the procedure prescribed by the Covenant, the l a t t e r was to p r e v a i l . 1 0 4 The purpose of t h i s n o t i f i c a t i o n was obvious. I t was to confirm the B r i t i s h intention to keep the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n force, but i n a form compatible with the League Covenant. 1 0 2 c f . G r . B r i t . , P a r l . D e b . 5 t h Ser.1921,Vol.144,p.917. 1 0 3 I b i d r . p . 9 1 6 104 cf.Monthly Summary of the League of Nations,Aug.21,1921, p.64, quoted i n Chang op.cit.p.193 - 175 -In the meantime,, the B r i t i s h Prime Mi n i s t e r was pressed i n the House of Commons by questions about the renew-a l of the A l l i a n c e . Mr. Lloyd George then answered that he would issue a statement which would depend upon ''whether r e p l i e s are received from the United States, Japan and 1G5 China." But he was cautious enough to avoid a d e f i n i t e answer to Lt.-Com. Kenworthy's question whether the House would be given the opportunity of discussing the i s s u e . 1 0 6 The reply expected by the Cabinet from the United States 107 Government arrived at London on July 10, 1921. This reply took the form of an i n v i t a t i o n from the United States President, Mr. Harding, f o r a conference on l i m i t a t i o n o f armamentsand on the problems of the P a c i f i c and the Far East to be held i n Washington. The United States step was 108 unanimously praised by Great B r i t a i n and the Dominions. The Australian Prime M i n i s t e r , i n a message to the "London Times", u t i l i z e d t h i s occasion f o r restating: The i d e a l at which the Conference should aim as the f i r s t step to peace was the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty i n such a form as would be acceptable to Great B r i t a i n , America, Japan and o u r s e l v e s . 1 0 9 1 0 5Gr.£rit. ,Pari.Deb.5th Ser. 1921,Vol. 144,p.621. 106 Ibid . P.622 1 0 Y I b i d . P.914 3 109 108 Ibid. P.917,and the London Times, July 9,1921 The London Times July 12, 1921 - 176 -In h i s o f f i c i a l statement of July 11, 1921 i n the House of Commons Prime Minister, Lloyd George, enunciated the course of foreign p o l i c y which was to be pursued by the Imperial Government: In the U.S.A. we see today, as we have always seen the people closest to our own aims and i d e a l s with whom i t i s for us, not merely a desire and an i n t e r e s t , but a deeply rooted i n s t i n c t to consult and to cooperate. . . The f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of our p o l i c y i s " f r i e n d l y cooperation with the U.S.A." . . Simultaneously Mr. Lloyd George declared "we also desire. . . to maintain our close friendship and cooperation with 110 Japan. . , These statements reveal the attempt of the B r i t i s h Govern-ment to reconcile by an ambivalent p o l i c y both the Japanese A l l i a n c e and the fundamental p r i n c i p l e of B r i t i s h p o l i c y , Anglo-American cooperation. The B r i t i s h Government recognized that i t had to meet the desires of the United States by j o i n t and d i r e c t discussions, but Mr. Lloyd George believed that he could f i n d the solution i n a merging of the A l l i a n c e into a t r i p a r t i t e treaty between Great B r i t a i n , Japan and the United S t a t e s . 1 1 1 . In t h i s the B r i t i s h and the Australian views completely coincided. Great B r i t a i n wanted, l i k e A u s t r a l i a , an a l l i e d or, at l e a s t , cooperating P a c i f i c t r i a n g l e . 1 1 0 G r t . B r i t . P a r i . D e b . 5 t h Ser.1921 ,Vol.144,pp.915-16. l i : L I b i d . Vol.146,pp. 704-6 - 177 -During the whole period following the Imperial Conference up to the opening of the Washington Conference i n November 1921 the B r i t i s h Government showed utmost reluctance towards a formal and complete abrogation of the A l l i a n c e . On August 18, 1921, Mr. Lloyd George stated c l e a r l y i n the Commons: The A l l i a n c e i s an ex i s t i n g a l l i a n c e . . , I do not believe there i s any country i n the world whether i t l i k e s the Japanese a l l i a n c e or does not l i k e i t , that would think any better of the B r i t i s h Empire i f we broke o f f the A l l i a n c e -n6t one. 1 2 There were also Voices i n the House which emphatically pro-tested against a disruption with the Japanese a l l y . 1 1 3 Mr. Lloyd George eagerly sought to avoid an open parliamentary Rebate as h i s answers to questions i n the Commons showed. He argued a debate "would be inopportune i n the present stage 114 of negotiations" The Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Chamberlain, r e p l i e d to an enquiry from E a r l Winterton, whether the issue of the A l l i a n c e would be touched i n the next debate on the forthcoming Washington Conference, that he would "deprecate as contrary to the public i n t e r e s t " any discussion 115 of that subject." Indeed, t h i s subject was not mentioned i n the Commons' debate referred to, except i n a statement by Colonel Burn that, i f an a l l i a n c e between England, America _ _ Gr.Brit.Parl.Deb.5th Ser.1921 Vol.146,pp.1704-6 1 1 3Ibid.Vol.l46,pp.1725-26 and Vol.147,p.2140 114 Ib i d . Vol.144 pp.1459-60. l i e ; The London Times Nov. 3, 1921 - 178 -and Japan would be concluded, the P a c i f i c problem would 116 disappear. How fir m l y the B r i t i s h Government s t i l l supported Japan i n the Far East can be seen from Mr. Cham-berlain's statement i n October 1921 on the question whelher Great B r i t a i n was s t i l l - i n spite of the changed circum-stances - bound by the secret Anglo-Japanese agreement regarding Shantung. His answer was that His Majesty's Government considered the Shantung question as s e t t l e d 117 by the decisions of the Peace-treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . p r i o r v•• ^ i s i ^ ^ l m m e d i a t 6 1 ^ % ^ the. Conference, the B r i t i s h Cabinet was then divided about the attitude to be adopted at Washington towards Japan and the United States. Great B r i t a i n was facing the al t e r n a t i v e whether she should y i e l d completely to the United States demand for the abro-gation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e or whether she should try to keep the balance of power between Japan and the United States i n the P a c i f i c by pursuing a middle road course of n e u t r a l i t y . The l a s t p o s s i b i l i t y implied the reiition of the A l l i a n c e . Mr. Lloyd George and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, were very strongly i n c l i n e d to the second poss-i b i l i t y which seemed to o f f e r the greater degree of Empire 1 1 ft security i n the P a c i f i c . Mr, I t was no accident that $fcJ*"Arthur Balfour was IT6 Great Brit.Pari.Deb.5th Ser.1921, Vol.147,p.2120 117 Ibid . Vol.147, pp.641 f f . 118 cf.Steed W, B r i t i s h P o l i c y i n the P a c i f i c , The 19th Century Vol.CH ( A p r i l 1932) p.399 - 179 -appointed chief of the B r i t i s h Empire Delegation to Washington. He had been the moving s p i r i t b«Vuw<lthe Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n 1902. Nobody recognized the importance of that B l l i a n c e better than he. The SLliance had been the pivot of B r i t i s h Foreign p o l i c y i n Asia for almost twenty years. In spite of the changes i n the international s i t u a t i o n Arthur Balfour s t i l l f i r m l y believed i n the value of the a l l i a n c e for the B r i t i s h E mpire. 1 1 9 He there-fore showed the utmost d i s i n c l i n a t i o n , to abrogate the treaty. The Japanese Government on t h e i r part was also strongly i n favour of the continuation of the B l l i a n c e , i f necessary as a t r i p a r t i t e agreement including the United States, although 120 Japan preferred that the b i l a t e r a l treaty continue. The proposal of His Majesty's Ambassador to Tokyo to the Japanese Government for j o i n t British-Japanese preliminary discussions on the presumable agenda of the Washington 121 Conference gave further evidence that Great B r i t a i n on the eve of the Washington Conference s t i l l maintained the view that notwithstanding the unimpaired p r i n c i p l e of Anglo-American friendship the equilibrium i n the P a c i f i c could be preserved only by Anglo-Japanese cooperation. 119 Dugdale op.cit. p.319 1 2 0 c f . L e t t e r of the B r i t i s h Ambassador to Tokyo,Sir Charles E l i o t , of Nov.10,1921 to Sir.A.Balfour quoted i n Dugdale op.cit. p.328. 121 I b i d . - 180 -I t should, be b r i e f l y noted here that the p o s i t i o n taken by the B r i t i s h Government was not shared by the "London Times". The p o l i c y of the vTimes"as determined by Lord N o r t h c l i f f e and Mr. Wickham Steed, exerted.a cert a i n influence oh the course of events i n t h i s matter/which should not be underestimated. I t was undoubtedly true that i n July 1921 the MTimes- Mr. Steed being i n personal contact with Mr. Lloyd George and the U. S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Mr. Harvey,considerably f a c i l i t a t e d the p o s s i b i l i t y 122 of convening a conference on P a c i f i c questions. In a leading a r t i c l e of July 9, 1921, the"Times"declared that any continued a l l i a n c e with Japan, however modified, would form an "insuperable obstacle" to Anglo-American cooperation . Furthermore, the a r t i c l e c a l l e d attention to the f a c t that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e would prevent an agreement f o r the l i m i t a t i o n of naval armaments. As a solution the "Times" also advanced the proposal of a larger agreement by a triangular exchange of notes to which the United States 124 should be a party. With regard to China the "Times" advo-cated close cooperation between Great B r i t a i n and the United States who had " i d e n t i c a l i n t e r e s t s ^ there against any 125 Japanese attempt of domination and exploitation. During the summer of 1921 Lord N o r t h c l i f f e and Mr. Steed undertook an extensive journey to the United States and Canada.They cf .Steed ,H.W. .Through 11,3 Th i r t y Years, London ,William Heinemann Ltd. 1925, Vol.11, p.362. 123 The London Times July 9, 1921 1 2 4 i b i d . 12§ The Times, Oct.18,1921 - 181 -toured i n p a r t i c u l a r the P a c i f i c coastal area of North America^including v i s i t s to Vancouver, V i c t o r i a , Seattle and San Francisco. Their object was to study the s i t u a t i o n on the spot, e s p e c i a l l y i n B r i t i s h Columbia, and to deter-mine the press p o l i c y to be pursued by the "Times" at the forthcoming Washington Conference. On t h i s journey Mr. Steed had several contacts with Canadian p u b l i c i s t s ^ American naval o f f i c e r s , with the Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r , the Governor General, Lord Byng, and the Japanese Ambassador 126 to Washington, Mr. Shidehara. The p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t of these contacts was a memorandum summarizing the p o l i t i c a l problems created by the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . This memor-andum wa.s submitted to the members of the B r i t i s h Empire delegation and to B r i t i s h naval o f f i c e r s and may have exer-cised influence on the B r i t i s h Delegation. After the Washington Conference had opened, the "Times", arguing that the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e prevented the r e a l i z a t i o n of Anglo-American cooperation, p e r s i s t e n t l y advocated the abrogation of the Treaty. The "Times"' leading a r t i c l e of November 23, 1921, pointed out that the decision taken by the statesmen of the B r i t i s h Empire at the Imperial Conference could not be put into e f f e c t u n t i l the A l l i a n c e was denounced."The Anglo-Japanese Treaty stands i n the way. I t must be cleared out of the way, and the sooner. . .the _ _ Steed, W. op.cit. pp 369-70 - 182 -127 better f o r Anglo-American understanding." Thus i t can be seen that at the Imperial Confer-ence i n 1921 the disunity of opinion amongst the members of the B r i t i s h Empire with regard to the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e had become obvious. Whilst the standpoint of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand was derived from their i n s u l a r geographical p o s i t i o n i n the P a c i f i c - because these Dominions, according to the words of the New Zealand Minister of the I n t e r i o r , Mr. Downie Stewart, f e l t "the f u l l danger'of foreign aggression and t h e i r entire de-1 p Q pendence on Imperial defence" . - Canada's attitude resulted from her continental p o s i t i o n on the North American continent. The p o l i t i c a l implication was that Canadian se-c u r i t y could r e l y on the Monroe Doctrine,but was basic££ly dependent upon good r e l a t i o n s between Great B r i t a i n and the United States. I'hese fundamental differences of geographical conditions account for the diverging opinions of the Australian and the Canadian Prime Minister with regard to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.Mr/Hughes' utterances:"I do not mistake the voice of a noisy, a n t i - B r i t i s h f a c t i o n i n America f o r the 129 sentiment of that great Republic" and "I lay i t down as an 130 axiom that, we must not be embroiled i n war with America" The London Times,Nov.23,1921 1 2 8New Zealand, Parl.Deb.4th Sess.1922, Vol.196 ,p.503 129 Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Deb.1920-21 Vol.XCVIT 1 3 0 I b i d . Vol.XCV, p.7718 - 183 -reveal that he misinterpreted the i n t r i n s i c and fundamental aims of United States foreign p o l i c y . I t was not a question of war against the United States which perturbed the U. S. Government, but i t was simply the basic demand of the United States that Great B r i t a i n ' s Far Eastern and P a c i f i c P o l i c y had to coincide e n t i r e l y with that of the United States. I n the f i n a l analysis t h i s amounted to Great B r i t a i n ' s former predominating p o s i t i o n i n the P a c i f i c being supplanted by the United States. The Canadian Government, on the other hand, did r e a l i z e the problem which jeopardized Anglo-Aijeer-ican r e l a t i o n s . The importance of fM.r. Arthur Meighen's p o l i c y at the Imperial Conference lay i n the fact that he, by vigorously i n s i s t i n g on Canada's r i g h t s , took the i n i t i a t i v e f o r the c a l l i n g of the Washington Conference which was to become the turning-point i n B r i t i s h Far Eastern poli c y . The Canadian Government thus contributed to paving the way for the achievement of the unique phenomenon of the Anglo-American community. The Canadian p o l i c y at the Conference was indeed nothing else than the implementation of the s p e c i a l role that Canada i s destined to play i n world p o l i t i c s , because of her geographical p o s i t i o n , of her ancestry and history. Canada acted as the intermediator and interpreter of the Ijrreat branches of the English speaking race; she was the bridge over the A t l a n t i c between Great B r i t a i n and the United States. However, there i s good reason to believe that the - 184 -II " role of the Canadian Prime Minister at the Imperial Conference should not he overestimated and overemphasized. Mfi'r Me\±%hah did not dominate the Imperial Conference because the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n there was very strong. I t would be inaccurate to say that he f o r c i b l y deflected B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y completely, but rather that he induced the B r i t i s h Cabinet to abandon the idea of a b i l a t e r a l treaty with Japan and to enter into d i r e c t discussions with the U. S. Government. By achieving t h i s he accelerated a h i s t o r i c a l development culminating i n the integration of Anglo-American partnership. The B r i t i s h Government fo r their part were convinced that the A l l i a n c e had to be transformed. I t r e a l i z e d that Anglo-American friendship and cooperation had to be the axiom of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y . Great B r i t a i n acknowledged furthermore that i t was merely a question of time before she had to drop her p o l i c y of playing her both ways, and to associate her P a c i f i c p o l i c y with that of the United States of America. - 185 -CHAPTER V. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921-22  AND THE SOLUTION Off THE PACIFIC PROBLEM - \« V^\e ao+Vio-ri-opinion — The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 ended with a &#s#ee diplomatic defeat of United States feee4gn p o l i c y . Ultimately the deep, American d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n over the Shantung problem was one of the p r i n c i p a l reasons for the r e j e c t i o n of the V e r s a i l l e s Peace Treaty by the United States Senate. On the very day that the unfortunate decision concerning Shantung was made at P a r i s , the chief Far East-expert of the United States delegation to the Conference commented upon i t : ..'.'It may bring war i n A s i a . " 1 The United States had already been appalled by the secret diplomacy of Great B r i t a i n i n European questions, as f o r instance i n the case of Trieste^ but she would not long tolerate the enforced settlement ov er Shantung which immediately concerned the United States. For i n the case of China the United States Government had assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . China had entered the war i n 1917 a f t e r having been induced to do so by the United States. The United States had at least a moral re-s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the preservation of China's t e r r i t o r i a l and administrative i n t e g r i t y and p o l i t i c a l autonomy. Moreover, the Treaty of 1858 with China imposed the o b l i g a t i o n upon Cf . M i l l a r d , Op.Cit. p.84 - 186 -the United States to use her good o f f i c e s i n case China should receive unjust treatment. This alone s u f f i c e d to i l l u s t r a t e that the i n j u r y i n f l i c t e d upon China by the Shantung decision d i s c r e d i t e d United States p o l i c y and d i -plomatic prestige. The conclusion which the United States Government had to draw from the r e s u l t s of the P a r i s Con-ference , where she had been thwarted by the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , was that Japan's diplomatic p o s i t i o n i n the Far East was strengthened by the A l l i a n c e . The United States feared that Great B r i t a i n would give moral and possible material support to Japan i n case of an American-Japanese war, and that the United States would remain i s o l a t e d i n Eastern Asia. On the whole Great B r i t a i n was compelled by the A l l i a n c e to endorse t a c i t l y Japan's p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y actions which were p r e j u d i c i a l to v i t a l American i n t e r e s t s and constituted a d i r e c t challenge to the basic p r i n c i p l e of United States p o l i c y i n A s i a , the Open-Door Doctrine. Thus, the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was d i r e c t l y responsible f o r the fundamental schism between the two Anglo-Saxon world powers i n global p o l i c y . The supreme aim of United States foreign p o l i c y a f t e r the disastrous blow at P a r i s had therefore to be to prevent by a l l means a r e s u s c i t a t i o n or renewal of the - 187 -Al l i a n c e a f t e r i t s expiration i n July, 1921. In a confid-e n t i a l memorandum "Aspects of the Problem of the P a c i f i c and the Eastern Question as they Relate to the U.S.A." u n o f f i c i a l 1 issued i n July, 1920 by the J&ttffflTfc adviser of the omki&BQ •^v^rhmewtP-•j ^ ^I^I^xMh^is&^mk, Mr. M i l l a r d , i t was c l e a r l y pointed out that a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e would "require the American Government ei t h e r to abandon i t s Far Eastern p o l i c y , to submit i t to the d i c t a t i o n of Japan and Great B r i t a i n , or to develop i t s naval and m i l i t a r y programme on a basis of equalling the combined powers of Great B r i t a i n and Japan." Mr. M i l l a r d suggested i n h i s remarkable memorandum that "Great B r i t a i n should be made to choose d e f i n i t e l y between Japan and America and the Far East."3 These intimations reflect*, the attitude of the American Govern-ment toward the' P a c i f i c problem. Only i n t h i s context i s i t possible to understand f u l l y the exasperated and tenacious opposition of the United States to the Anglo-Japanese A l -l i a n c e , and the importance of the Washington Conference which was the United States 5counter attack against the re s u l t s of the jo i n t British-Japanese diplomacy at Pa r i s . As early as October, 1919 the U. S. State Department became concerned because of various rumours that the B r i t i s h Government had entered into negotiations with Japan concerning i M i l l a r d , 'Op.Cit. p.196 3 M i l l a r d , Op.Cit. p.198 - 188 -a renewal of the A l l i a n c e . A dispatch from the Acting U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. P h i l i p p s , to the U. S. Ambassador to the Court of St.James, Mr. Davis, instructed the Ambassador to inquire whether the B r i t i s h Government intended "to broaden or to r e s t r i c t the recognition of Japan's special i n t e r e s t s i n Eastern Asia . . ." 4 This i n s t r u c t i o n revealed the decisive motive f o r the American opposition to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . The prospect of an American-Japanese war and the uncertain p o s i t i o n of Great B r i t a i n i n such an eventuality perturbed the American Government since the Anglo-American Treaty of General Ar-b i t r a t i o n of 1911, which, combined with A r t i c l e IV of the A l l i a n c e , was to eliminate any p o s s i b i l i t y of an armed c o n f l i c t between Great Brit a i n and the United States, had 5 never been r a t i f i e d by the American Senate. The Bryan-ts Spring-Rice Peace Commission Treaty of September 1914 was no adequate substitute. Although S i r Edward Grey on hi s own i n i t i a t i v e informed the Japanese Ambassador, Baron Inouye, that His Majesty's Government did consider the Treaty as equivalent to a general a r b i t r a t i o n treaty, o f f i c i a l B r i t i s h n o t i f i c a t i o n to t h i s e f f e c t was not given 7 to the U. S. Government. I t was, however, not the question of war which caused uneasiness i n the American Government so much as the fact that Great B r i t a i n was bound by the 4U.S.F6r.Rel.1920,Vol,II, p.679 5Br.Doc.VIII,No.514,p.604. 6 I b i d . p.631 and 648, and U.S.For.Re1.1914,pp.304-7. 7cf.Statement of the Additional Undersecretary of State f o r For-eign Affairs,Mr.Kellaway,in. the Commons ,Gr.Brit.Pari.Debet.5th Ser & ' 1921,vol.138,p.1574 - 189 -A l l i a n c e to support the Japanese inte r p r e t a t i o n of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement regarding the recognition of Japan's "spec i a l i n t e r e s t s " i n Eastern Asia. The r e s u l t would have been that on the one hand the Japanese m i l i t a r y party might be encouraged i n th e i r further aspirations. On the other hand Great B r i t a i n was handicapped i n supporting American diplomacy wholeheartedly i n the Far East by taking j o i n t diplomatic action designed to prevent Japanese encroachment i n China, so*h£n such circumstances the United States Govern-menf'might f i n d i t s e l f v i r t u a l l y alone as had been the case i n 1915, and i n the Yap dispute. The Japanese occupation of the former German Islands i n the North P a c i f i c was regarded by the American Government with the utmost uneasiness. President Wilson's insistence on administering the former German P a c i f i c islands under the mandatory system, i f they could not be neutralized, arose from strategic rather than i d e a l i s t i c considerations; i t was part of the American fear that these i s l a n d s , i f f o r t i f i e d as naval bases, would form a menace to the American l i n e s 9 of communication from Hawaii to the P h i l i p p i n e s . The dispute over the important cable station of Yap, i n which the United States claimed the cable from Yap to Guam, showed how strongly the B r i t i s h were t i e d to t h e i r Japanese a l l y . 8U.S.For.Rel.l921,Vol.II, pp.314-5. Q Cf.Pres.Wilson's conversation with Mr. D.H.Miller immediately a f t e r the session of the Council of Ten ,Jan.30,1919,in M i l l e r Op.Cit. Vol.1, p.100 - 190 -In answering American protests to a u n i l a t e r a l disposal of Yap and r e f e r r i n g to United States intimations that an unsatisfactory settlement would have serious e f f e c t s upon American public opinion, the B r i t i s h Ambassador to Washington stated i n A p r i l , 1921 that His Majesty's Government "had no a l t e r n a t i v e , and that no matter what the consequence, they must abide with the agreement with Japan. . . "}° Incidents such as these convinced the United States that i n spite of a l l assurances to the contrary, the A l l i a n c e must be considered "as an a l l i a n c e between Great B r i t a i n and Japan against the United States". 1 1 Accordingly, American public opinion as r e f l e c t e d by the press c a t e g o r i c a l l y demanded the complete abrogation of 12 the Treaty B l l i a n c e . The Hearst press p a r t i c u l a r l y voiced strong a n t i - B r i t i s h f e e l i n g s . The A n t i - B r i t i s h Senator Reed of Missouri even charged Great B r i t a i n with having inserted 13 a "secret clause directed against the United States" 14 and with " p l o t t i n g i n the dark for her own aggrandizement". 1 0U.S.For.Rel.1921, Vol.11, p.286. 1 1Borden, Sir.Robt., Diary of the Washington Disarmament Confer- ence p.6. The Unpublished Borden Papers. F i l e 00611,Wash. Conference 1921-22. Microfilmed i n 1952 by the Public Archives of Canada. 1 2 C f . f o r instance, The New York Times,June 24,1921 and July 5,1921 13 Cf.The London Times,January 4, 1921. 1 4 I b i d . January 3,1921 - 191 -In several confidential.memoranda the United States encouraged Chinese representatives at the League of Nations i n Geneva to object openly and f o r c i b l y to the ex i s t i n g A l l i a n c e , c a l l i n g the attention of the Chinese delegates to the p r e j u d i c i a l character of that A l l i a n c e i n i t s application 15 to China. I t was even suggested i n July 1920 that plans should be worked out by the State, War and Navy Departments f o r a p o t e n t i a l j o i n t m i l i t a r y cooperation of America with China, Korea and Eastern S i b e r i a i n case of an armed c o n f l i c t 16 i n the Far East. As a further means of influencing British-Japan ese re l a t i o n s i n d i r e c t l y , the United States attempted to exert diplomatic pressure on Great B r i t a i n i n the I r i s h question, which was acute at that time. The American Secretary of State frankly intimated to the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Wash-ington that a B r i t i s h i n d i c a t i o n of good w i l l to support United States' Far Eastern p o l i c y would prevent Congress from adopting a n t i - B r i t i s h resolutions i n favour of the 1 7 I r i s h Republic. I t was also recommended to the American Government that i n view of Canada's s t r a t e g i c a l p o s i t i o n and of Canadian sentiment the latent danger of Canadian separation from the Empire i n case of war between the United Cf. Confidential Memorandum of Mr.Millard of Aug.1920 "China and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance",Mlllard,0p.Cit.pp.185 f f , and Confidential Memorandum of October 1920 "China and the League of Nations Meeting??, Ibid, p.144 Memorandum of Mr. M i l l a r d , J u l y 1920 "Aspects of the Problem of the P a c i f i c and the Eastern Question as they Relate to the U.S.A. " ,0p.Cit.p.l98 1 7U.S.For.Rel.1921,Vol.II, pp 315-16. - 192 -States on the one hand and Japan and Great B r i t a i n on the other hand, should be u t i l i z e d as a factor of United States diplomacy. The suggestion was advanced, therefore, that American assent to the establishment of a separate Canadian diplomatic representation at Washington should be withheld, the implication being that the B r i t i s h Government should not be relieved of the danger of losing Canada as an i n t e g r a l part of the B r i t i s h Empire. The establishment of a Canadian Legation at Washington could possibly have been construed as an a l t e r a t i o n of the international status of Canada which might have exempted the Dominion from the scope of the Anglo-18 American dispute at that time. To exert direct pressure on the B r i t i s h Government the U. S. Government c a p i t a l i s e d on two factors of paramount importance. The f i r s t of these was the general f e e l i n g i n the two Anglo-Saxon countries of America and Great B r i t a i n , towards the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e on the one hand and the idea of Anglo-American friendship on the other. Accordingly, the American Ambassador to the Court of St.James was instructed i n 1919 to ascertain the general f e e l i n g of the B r i t i s h people 19 on t h i s subject. In o f f i c i a l representations to the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e , expressing opposition to the renewal of the 18 Cf .Memorandum by Mr. M i l l a r d , J u l y 1920 "Aspects of the Problem of the P a c i f i c . . . " M i l l a r d , Op.Cit.p.200 19 U.S.For.Rel.1920 Vol.11, p.679 - 193 -A l l i a n c e , the U. S. State Department always emphatically drew B r i t i s h attention to the disastrous e f f e c t s upon American 20 public opinion. The aim of t h i s t a c t i c , which was a 'novum' i n the his t o r y of modern diplomacy, was to demonstrate to Great B r i t a i n that the ideal of Anglo-American cooperation was simply impossible as long as B r i t a i n maintained the A l l i a n c e with Japan. I t was an appeal to the sentiment of the English people, to the deep-rooted conscience of common descent and ancestry. Here no t e r r i t o r i a l issues were at stake,, no boundary disputes, no f i s h i n g r i g h t s , no spheres of influence, problems which had characterized so f a r disputes In B r i t i s h -American relations - but imponderables which carried f a r heavier weight: the fundamental idea of the Anglo-Saxon community, the physical centre of which l i e s i n the A t l a n t i c , but the s o l i d i t y of which was tested i n the P a c i f i c . The second fac t o r applied by the American Government was American naval p o l i c y . The emergence of the United States as a world power found concrete expression i n the tremendous naval building programme which had been inaugurated and ap-proved by Congress i n August, 1916 as the " f i r s t far-reaching 21 constructive programme i n the h i s t o r y of the Republic." According to t h i s plan a powerful navy was to be completed within seven years, consisting of ten battleships, six battle 20 ' ' Cf. U.S.For.Rel.1921 Vol.11, p.286; and Ibid.pp.314^15. 21 Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1920-21,p.42. - 194 -c r u i s e r s , ten c r u i s e r s , f i f t y destroyers, and sixty-eight submarines; and i t was planned to increase the t o t a l amount 22 of c a p i t a l ships to f i f t y ships u n t i l 1925. In h i s speech on February 3, 1916, President Wilson had announced that the United States was determined to construct a navy which was to be superior to the capacity of a l l the navies of the world. The diplomatic doreat of America at the Paris Con-ference^and her i s o l a t i o n i s t withdrawal from European a f f a i r s only served' to encourage the United States Government to implement th i s naval programme. The existence of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e and the B r i t i s h intention to continue t h i s treaty convinced the United States Navy Department that i t had to face the naval preponderance of the combined B r i t i s h and Japanese f l e e t s which could be balanced only by the creation of an adequate American naval force. At the t h i r d anniversary of the naval armaments programme on August 31, 1919, the Secretary -of the U.S.Navy, Mr. Joseph Daniel, announced at a speech at Charleston (West V i r g i n i a ) : We are not only completing t h i s great plan, but are building enormous stocks and other needed shore f a c i l i t i e s elsewhere, and are constructing eighteen dreadnoughts. . . which, i n e f f e c t i v e f i g h t i n g power w i l l give our navy world primacy. . .The navy of the United States should ultimately be equal to that of the most powerful maintained by any other nation i n the world. . . . 2 4 __ Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual,1920-21, and Jensen, Op.Cit.p.182 23 Cf.Baker,Op.Cit.Vol.I. , ppSO.7-8 24 Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual,1920-21 pp43. - 195 -The same view was expressed by the United States President, Mr. Harding, i n December, 1921 at Norfolk ( V i r g i n i a ) : . . . I believe i n p a r t i a l but not permanent d i s -armament and I foresee the time when t h i s w i l l be r e a l i z e d , but u n t i l that time a r r i v e s , I want a Navy f o r America's defense that i s equal to the aspirations of this country.. . 25 There can be no doubt that the United States was determined to counteract the menace constituted to her by the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e by a deliberate large scale naval compe-t i t i o n with Great B r i t a i n and Japan. President Harding's statement can be interpreted only as meaning that the United States would not consent to a naval disarmament or to a suspension of naval construction u n t i l the supreme aim of American post-war foreign p o l i c y was reached, namely the abrogation of the...Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . The reactions on Great B r i t a i n produced by the United States naval p o l i c y were s i g n i f i c a n t . World War I which resulted i n the a n n i h i l a t i o n of Germany's sea power had l e f t Great B r i t a i n i n the p o s i t i o n of undisputed naval supremacy. ?fhereas immediately a f t e r the war L i b e r a l c i r c l e s concentrating around the "Manchester Guardian" and including General Smuts and Lord Robert C e c i l , advocated Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual,1921-22, p.31 - 196 -a l i m i t a t i o n of naval armaments, Gonservative groups, repre-sented by the B r i t i s h Admiralty, the "Morning Post" and prominent persons l i k e Lord Curzon and Winston C h u r c h i l l , tenaciously upheld the supreme and t r a d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e o f f 26 naval superiority. The competent naval experts of the B r i t i s h Admiralty unanimously agreed that no challenge to B r i t i s h naval supremacy could tie tolerated. S t i l l , i n 1921 Rear*? Admiral S i r Roger Keyes pointed out most emphatically at a speech at S h e f f i e l d that Great B r i t a i n was not disposed to surrender her sea power supremacy "not even to a kinsman 27 who i s a good and t r i e d f r i e n d . " I t was, however, obvious that owing to the d i s l o c a t i o n of B r i t a i n ' s post-war economy i n the long run she was either going, to-be -outbuilt by American competition or go bankrupt. This was "frankly ad-28 mitted by Lieutenant Commander Kenworthy as early as 1921. F u l l y appreciating economic n e c e s s i t i e s , the B r i t i s h Admiralty i n March 1921 r e a l i s t i c a l l y arrived at the h i s t o r i c decision to abandon the t r a d i t i o n a l "Two Power Standard" of the B r i t i s h Navy, for the maintenance of which Great B r i t a i n had l a s t l y fought the war against Germany. The basis of the new naval p o l i c y was the preservation of the "One Power Standard". This meant that the B r i t i s h 26 Baker, Op.Cit. Vol.1, p.306. 27 Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1921-22 p.3. 28 Grt.Brit.Pari.Deb. 5th Ser.1920,Vol.126,p.2346. - 197- -Royal Navy should not be i n f e r i o r i n strength to that o f any other power. The Navy Estimates of 1921-22 as i n t r o -duced by the F i r s t Sea Lord, Lord Lee of FarBham, amounted tol.91, 186,369, whereas the t o t a l for naval expenditures i n the prededing year was £ 105,283,281 - a dra s t i c reduction 29 of aboutj 000,000. In March, 1921 the F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty declared i n the Commons that he strongly desired an agreement with America on the naval question 30 of the basis of p a r i t y i n naval strength. On July 5, 1921 the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, o f f i c i a l l y proposed to the U. S. Ambassador to London that a conference should be held to consider a l l e s s e n t i a l matters bearing on Far East and P a c i f i c Ocean with a view to a r r i v i n g at a common understanding designed to assure settlement by peaceful means, the elimination of naval warfare. . . etc., f ^ e . 31 Considering the fac t that i t was for the f i r s t time i n the history of the B r i t i s h Empire that Great B r i t a i n contented herself with naval p a r i t y with another sea power and s a c r i -f i c e d a fundamental p r i n c i p l e upon which her world p o l i c y had been based, the conclusion which has to be drawn from t h i s decision can only be that B r i t a i n had determined to y i e l d to the United States rather than to struggle i n r i v a l r y with her i n world p o l i t i c s . Lord Curzon's message showed that the leading B r i t i s h statesmen c l e a r l y recognized that the question of CO Brassey's Naval & Shipping Annual,1921-22 p.405 30 Cf .Dugd'ale ,Op. C i t . p. 315. 3 1U.S.For.Rel.1921 Vol.1, p.19. - 198 -Anglo-American naval competition and that of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e were intimately related. The o f f i c i a l text of the U. S. i n v i t a t i o n issued by Presid-ent Harding for convening such a conference also l e f t no doubt about the fact that the issue of the l i m i t a t i o n of naval armaments had ''close r e l a t i o n to P a c i f i c and Far « 3 2 Eastern problems. As pointed out, however, the Imperial Government was s t i l l hoping to maintain the Al l i a n c e with Japan i n a modified form. B r i t a i n , therefore, made the attempt to separate the issues of naval disarmament and of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n order to avoid a conference at which the discontinuation of the A l l i a n c e would be made "sine qua non" on the part of the Americans for an Aiigo-American naval agreement. Consequently, the B r i t i s h Government proposed to the American Government that a pre-liminary conference was to be held i n London which was to . deal with the P a c i f i c and Far Eastern problem before the 33 conference on naval disarmament started at Washington. This suggestion had been one of the decisions reached at the Imperial Conference. I t was i n d i c a t i v e of the attitude of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand, who favoured a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , that the Au s t r a l i a n Prime Minister vigorously i n s i s t e d on holding the P a c i f i c conference f i r s t , _____ __________________________________ U.S.For.Eel.1921 Vol.1, P.24 33 Cmd.1974, P.5 - 199 -at which A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand should be represented.34 When answering President Harding's i n v i t a t i o n , the Japanese Government agreed i n p r i n c i p l e to the idea of a conference but made the reservation that questions of "sole concern to certain p a r t i c u l a r powers . > j.. should be scrupulously 35 avoided". Furthermore, theyzresponded p o s i t i v e l y to the 36 B r i t i s h suggestions of a preliminary conference i n London. I t was clear from that that B r i t a i n wanted to u t i l i z e the proposed London discussions to ar r i v e at an agreement with Japan i n advance of the naval disarmament conference at Washington. The U. S. State Department recognized the diplomatic move on the part of the United Kingdom Government, and therefore rejected t h e i r proposal by arguing that a confer-ence i n London would not be regarded favourably i n America, " i n the l i g h t of rel a t i o n s between Japan and Great Britain."° The American diplomatic standpoint i s perhaps i l l u s t r a t e d most c l e a r l y by two newspaper messages, the correspondents of both papers being i n close contact with the "New York __ Cf.Commonwealth of Australia,Pari.Deb. ,Ses.1921,Vol.XCVII,p.11639. 3 5Chang, Op.Cit. p.196 3 6Cmd. 1474, p.5. 37 U.S.For.Rel.1921, Vol.1, pp 28-9. - 200 -Herald". The I t a l i a n newspaper, "Gorriere d e l l a Sera" wrote on October 28, 1921: La p i u importante d e l l e condizione,chi g l i S t a t i U n i t i imperanno come preliminare necessario per l a l imitazione dei propri armament!. . . sara^l'abrogazione d e l l ' a l l i a n z a anglo-giapponese che U. considerata come indirettamente r i v o l t a contro 1'America e che s i r i t i e n e abbia e f f e t t o perturbatore n e l l ' Estremo Orients. 38 In the same vein the French paper, "Le Temps'1 stated on November 9, 1921: Les Etats-Unis s'opposeront a touts tentative qui aurait pour objet l'examen de l a l i m i t a t i o n dey armaments avant qu'ait ete reglees l e s questions extremes orientales. . . 3 9 Indeed, t h i s has to be pointed out most emphatically; the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was the p r i c e demanded by the U. S. Government fo r stopping the expensive naval construction programme of 1916 which, i f ca r r i e d out, would have proved i n the long run disastrous for Great B r i t a i n ' s economy, naval strength and p o s i t i o n as a world power. The U. S..Government would never have agreed to a l i m i t a t i o n of naval armament such as was embodied i n the proposals of the U. S. Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, i f the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e confronted the United States with the prospect of dealing with the 40 combined f l e e t s of two strong naval powers. Gorriere d e l l a Sera, October 28, 1921 39 Le Temps, November 9, 1921. 40 cf.Statement of Senator Lodge i n the 67th U.S.Congress,in Ic h i h a s h i , The Washington Conference and A f t e r , Stanford C a l i f . , Stanford University Press, 1928, p.127. - 201 -The B r i t i s h Government was facing tremendous problems. On the one hand, Great B r i t a i n saw her po s i t i o n i n the Far East impe r i l l e d by the r i s e of Japan. For the sake of her commercial i n t e r e s t s i n China and the security of her Empire i t was expedient to keep on good terms with Japan by means of the A l l i a n c e . On the other hand, she ran the r i s k of incurring the permanent antagonism of the United States which would have resulted i n an exasperated naval r i v a l r y between the two Anglo-Saxon powers, and, i n the ultimate a n a l y s i s , i n the f a i l u r e of the idea of the Anglo-American community. P a r t i c u l a r l y with regard to the l a t t e r aspect, there could be no doubt where B r i t i s h public opinion stood. During the summer of 1921 the general f e e l i n g of the 41 English people grew stronger against the A l l i a n c e , The "London Times'; conveying the American f e e l i n g towards the Al l i a n c e to the people of England commented i n July, 1921: Any renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , even i f the United States were expressly excluded from the scope of i t s operation, might render impossible that close cooperation between the nations of the English-speaking world which President. Harding and h i s administration are eager to promote. 42 I t was clear that the B r i t i s h Empire Delegation, headed by $£r. A. J. Balfour, had to take Into account the strong s e n t i -ment of the Anglo-Saxon people ofi both sides of the Atlantic, when they went to Washington to seek the solution. 4 1U.S.For.Rel.1921, Vol.1, p.20. 4 2 T h e London Times, July 11, 1921 - 302 -I t i s not the scope of th i s thesis to give a detailed analysis of the events of the Washington Conference of 1921-43 22. This has already been done i n other works. But due consideration should be given to the fairness with which the B r i t i s h Empire Delegation handled the dual Anglo-Japanese and Anglo-American problem at i t s f i n a l stage, as well as to the eminent influence and share of Canada ,through her delegate S i r Robert Borden, i n bringing about a solution. The l e t t e r ' s contribution i s revealed by the Unpublished Borden Papers. Even p r i o r to the Washington Conference the Canadian delegate, anxious to prevent a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , contacted,and had several con-versatlonswith.important persons concerned with the Con-ference such as, f o r instance, the U. S. Delegates Mr. Root and Senator Lodge, the U. S. Secretaries of State, War and Navy Departments,First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Lee of Fareham, and the A u s t r a l i a n and New Zealand Delegates, Senator Pearce and S i r John Salmond, and the 44 editor of the London Times, Mr. Steed. In doing t h i s S i r Robert Borden, as the representative of Canada, assumed the task of an intermediator not only between Great B r i t a i n and the United States, but also between the members of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth themselves. Thus he impressed upon 43 Cf.for instance.Iohihashi,0p.Cit. ,and Buell.R.L..The  Washington Conference, New York: D.Appleton & Co. 1922. 44 Diary of S i r Robert Borden, pp.2,4,6. - 203 -the American Delegate, Mr. Root, that a s a t i s f a c t o r y solution must be found which would help to placate the apprehensions 4 5 of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand . The idea of S i r Robert Borden, which was f u l l y shared by the Canadian Government, was to achieve under a l l circumstances an understanding between the B r i t i s h Empire and the United States which would secure close cooperation between the two Anglo-Saxon powers. S i r Robert r e a l i z e d that a formal a l l i a n c e with America was not 46 obtainable from the U. S. Government. In a l e t t e r to the head of the Empire Delegation rUr»Arthur Balfour, he expressed h i s view, saying: The scope of any treaty or agreement. . . must be l i m i t e d f o r the present; . . . i f we cannot have the United States enter the League of Nations, we should spare no e f f o r t to bring i t into coopera-t i o n with us. 47 Such cooperation applied to the P a c i f i c was to give A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand a certain guarantee a f t e r the A l l i a n c e with Japan was abandoned. The Canadian p o l i c y at the Conference de l i b e r a t e l y aimed at a replacement of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e by close Anglo-American cooperation! After having secured the-approval of h i s suggestion by Mr. Root, who believed that "an arrangement as to the security i n the P a c i f i c could be established which would be much more valuable to A u s t r a l i a than any safeguard afforded by the Japanese Treaty^" 48 45 1 "~~ Diary of S i r Robert Borden, Nov. 9, 1921, p.6 46 Ibid. 47 cf.Letter of S i r Robert Borden to S i r A.Balfour,Nov.26,1921, from the Unpublished Borden Papers,Washington Conference. 48e' S i r Robert Borden Diary, November 9, 1921 p.6 - 804 -S i r Robert Borden was i n a p o s i t i o n to influence the Austral-ian and New Zealand delegates by conveying t h i s assurance to them. Thus, by removing Aus t r a l i a ' s and New Zealand's fears, Canada through th i s intermediary p o l i c y contributed considerably to the achievment of the f i n a l solution of the P a c i f i c problem. In the same way as the Canadian delegate influenced the representatives of the Australian and New Zealand Governments, he urged the B r i t i s h and American Governments, represented by I f f f r . A . Balfour and Secretary of State Mr. C^. E. Hughes, to reach a general agreement of close cooperation. On the assumption that the best possible way f o r securing the association of the United States would be a m u l t i - l a t e r a l agreement(to which the United States adhered) f o r the peaceful settlement of international disputes, S i r Robert ^rojBsed the conclusion of a treaty by which the signatories would oblige themselves "to i n v e s t i -gation and report by a permanent International Tribunal" /, 49 before the powers concerned "would commence h o s t i l i t i e s . . . The idea involved i n the Canadian proposal was, i n a nu t s h e l l , the continuation or rather resumption of the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of s e t t l i n g disputes by general ar-b i t r a t i o n which has bash c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n Anglo-American 49 Cf.Letter of S i r Robert Borden to the Acting Prime Minister of Canada, Nov.14,1921, from the Unpublished Borden Papers, and Secret Letter of S i r Robert to f i r . Arthur Balfour,Nov.2 6 , 1921, Ibid. - 2G5 -rel a t i o n s h i p . Furthermore, since the Covenant of the League and the Permanent Court of International Justice were not recognized by the United States, Canada attempted to induce America to associate herself as f a r as possible 50 by cooperating with the League of Nations. In h i s de-termination to secure United States cooperation i n i n t e r -n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s under a l l circumstances and at any p r i c e , S i r Robert Borden even went so f a r as to ignore o¥l?»Arthur Balfour's lukewarmness towards the Canadian proposal, which, as the Chief B r i t i s h Delegate r e a l i z e d , would duplicate the 51 e x i s t i n g machinery of the League, S i r Robert's argument being that they should not "even shrink from duplication of machinery, i f such duplication would be of e f f e c t i v e aid i n that great purpose." 5 2 S i r Robert's proposal was f i n a l l y r e a l i z e d to a large extent i n the Quadruple^Pacific Pact which terminated and replaced the b i - l a t e r a l Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . At the Conference $L.r» Arthur Balfour made a l a s t attempt to salvage the essentials of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e by suggesting a t r i p a r t i t e a l l i a n c e between Great B r i t a i n , 5 0 C f . S i r Robert Borden Diary,Nov.17,1921,p.91 5 1 c f . Private and Secret L e t t e r of iflr. Arthur Balfour to to S i r Robert Borden Nov.29,1921,from the Unpublished Borden Papers. 5 2 C f . L e t t e r of S i r Robert Borden to $ltr, A.Balfour , Dec. 3, 1921, Ibid. - 206 -53 Japan and the United States. Among the B r i t i s h j o u r n a l i s t s attending-the Conference, the representative of the "Morning ' 54 Post" pleaded strongly f o r the preservation of the A l l i a n c e . 55 But i n view of the strong opposition of the U. S. Government and of the. American press(86)to such a solution as i t suited Sxeluslvely B r i t i s h , A u s t r a l i a n and Japanese i n t e r e s t s , 5jf r. Arthur Balfour, without making further attempts, acquies-ced i n the. proposal advanced by the U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. Hughes. The Four POwer Treaty between the United States, the B r i t i s h Empire, France and Japan of December 13, 1921, by whioh the signatory powers pledged themselves to respect mutually t h e i r " i n s u l a r possessions and i n s u l a r dominions i n the P a c i f i c Ocean," to r e f e r any international dispute " a r i s i n g out of any P a c i f i c question and involving t h e i r said r i g h t s which i s not s a t i s f a c t o r i l y s e t t l e d by diplomacy" to a j o i n t conference " f o r consideration and adjustment", and i n case that the rig h t s of the contracting p a r t i e s "are threatened by the aggressive action of any other power", to consult each other f o r e f f e c t i v e measures "to be taken 57 j o i n t l y or separately," was indeed, according to a state-ment of the U. S. Foreign Relations Committee, no formal 58 a l l i a n c e , and contained "no committments to armed force." 53 cf.Letter of $&r.A.Balfour to His Majesty's Ambass.to Tokyo,Sir Chas.Eliot,in Dugdale t0p.Cit.pp.328-9 54 c f . S i r Robt.Borden Diary,Nov.9,1921,p.7 55 cf. U.S.For.Rel.l921,vol.II ,p.315 ,and Ibid.1922,Vol.I ,pp.7ff Ichihashi,Op.Cit.p.120 5 6The "New York Sun" and "Evening Post" had rejected such proposals already i n Aug.1921,cf.the London Times,Aug.20,1921. 5 7Cf.Cmd.2037. 5 8The London Times,March 25,1922 - 207 -But i t can be considered as the f i r s t treaty i n the history of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s which embodies the p r i n c i p l e of non-universal, regional " c o l l e c t i v e security". In the f i n a l analysis the Canadian alternative for the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was thus carried through. In a l e t t e r to the newly elected Canadian Prime Minister,Mr. MacKenzie King, S i r Robert Borden declared that the Four Power P a c i f i c Treaty was " e n t i r e l y i n l i n e " with S i r Arthur Meighen's suggestions at the preceding*Imperial Conference" There i s , indeed, good reason to believe that M ^ j ^ l ^ f F had proposed at the Imperial Conference that i n a P a c i f i c treaty countries with important P a c i f i c i n t e r e s t s should be included, es p e c i a l l y the United States. Morever., S i r Robert Borden's ideas of bringing the United States into international co-operation by an agreement for peaceful settlement of disputes found expression i n that Treaty. Consequently, S i r Robert's comment on the P a c i f i c Treaty as re f l e c t e d i n a l e t t e r to-foe Canadian Prime Minister Meighen read: The v i t a l feature i s that, i t provides a d e f i n i t e method whereby, i f r e l a t i o n s become strained, the issues involved may be adjusted through a joint conference between a l l the parties to the' agree-ment. That i s to sayl; i t substitutes the confer-ence method for other methods of resolving i n t e r -national disputes. . . b 0 Secret l e t t e r of S i r Robert Borden to Prime Minister Mac-Kenzie King, January 31, 1922, from the Unpublished • Bord'en Papers. . fin Most Secret Letter of S i r Robert Borden to Prime Minister Arthur Meighen December 8, 1921, Ibid. - 308 -Being thoroughly convinced that the Conference would not only decide on the future of Anglo-American re l a t i o n s i n the P a c i f i c and i n the Far East, but that i t also presented a test case for the re l a t i o n s h i p between Great B r i t a i n and America ' i n toto' , S i r Robert Borden made constant e f f o r t s to bring about a harmonious British-American understanding over naval disarmament^which should eliminate any apprehension or cause of f r i c t i o n on either side of the A t l a n t i c . One could go so f a r as to say that whereas a pro-American solution of the problem of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was designed to appease the United States i n the P a c i f i c , the acquiescence i n the American proposals for the l i m i t a t i o n of naval arma-ments on the part of Great B r i t a i n was to s a t i s f y America i n the A t l a n t i c . After the announcement of the famous proposals for a ten years' naval holiday had been put forward by the U. S. Secretary of State, S i r Robert Borden urged the leader of the B r i t i s h Empire Delegation most emphatically to "accept 61 the proposal.in s p i r i t and p r i n c i p l e " without making any reservation. How strongly S i r Robert impressed j ^ r Arthur Balfour can be seen from the fact that the l a t t e r used almost p r e c i s e l y the same wording i n h i s cable to the B r i t i s h Prime Minister .recommending the acceptance of the American 7 6£ proposal as f a r as c a p i t a l ships were concerned. An agreement on the naval question, however, was jeopardized by the constant 61 S i r Robert Borden,Diary, November 14, 1921 p.16 62 Cf. Dugdale. Op.Cit.p.521 - 209 -objections of the naval experts amongst'the B r i t i s h Dele-gation. They tenaciously held the view that the American suggestion for a naval holiday should be rejected or at 63 le a s t paralyzed as far as possible. Admiral Chatfield even intimated h i s readiness to f i g h t against the U. S. 64 navy. In a draft telegram to Mr.Lloyd George, the naval experts led by Lord Lee urged the B r i t i s h Government to "oppose the construction by the United States and Japan. of any cruisers or destroyers during the ten years' period. Mr. Lloyd George generally shared S i r Robert Borden's view 66 as f a r as the naval holiday was concerned, but the Borden Papers reveal that at the same time the B r i t i s h Government imposed r e s t r i c t i o n s on fey Arthur Balfour which haniicapped 67 h i s freedom of action at the Conference. ThuSjSir Robert faced at times the d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n that a l l the members of the Empire Delegation were i n c l i n e d to adhere to the 68 opinion of the naval experts. An agreement was f i n a l l y reachgd on t h i s que°stionj however, due to the incessant e f f o r t s of 63 S i r Robert Borden Diary,December 9, 1921, pp.73-5 6 4I_bid S i r Robert Borden Diary,P.20 6 6 c f . L e t t e r of S i r Robert to the Acting Can.Prime M i n i s t e r , S i r James Longhead, Nov.16,1921 from the Unpublished Borden Papers. 6 7 S i r Robert Borden Diary,Nov.25,1921,p.42. 68 Ibid.Dec.9 ,1921, p.73 - 210 -the Canadian Delegate to avert the r e j e c t i o n of the American naval o f f e r , S i r Robert r e a l i s t i c a l l y argued that the finan-c i a l and material resources of America capacitated her "to outstrip the B r i t i s h Empire i n any competition i n naval armaments.69 In the discussions of the l i m i t a t i o n s of naval armaments the r e a l i t y - o f Anglo-Am-erican cooperation became obvious i n that Great B r i t a i n took a firm stand for the f i r s t time against her former Japanese a l l y , when the Japanese Delegate, Admiral Kato, demanded an increase of the Japanese r a t i o of c a p i t a l ships from 60% to 70%. The London Times, i n speaking of the "unanimous view of Great B r i t a i n and the United States", gave the best expression of the changed p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n by stating: I f the Japanese by t h e i r proposal wished to test the strength of t h i s view, they w i l l c e r t a i n l y be confronted by an impressive ;demonstration of i t s weight and power. 71 Owing to the Jfleto0^e4ia-M_tg Canadian influence and to the B r i t i s h willingness to gain the friendship instead of the enmity of the United States, full.agreement was thus reached on the P a c i f i c and Far Eastern problems and on the Issue of l i m i t a t i o n of naval armament. The immediate res u l t was the Four Power P a c i f i c Pact, which supplanted the former Anglo-Japanese ^ 9Secret l e t t e r of S i r Robert Borden to S i r Arthur Balfour, Nov.26,1921, from the Unpublished Borden Papers. 70 Cf.Admiral Kato's statement to the press, Nov.17 ,1921,in the London Times, Nov.21, 1921. 71 cf.Leading a r t i c l e of the London Times, Dec.2, 1921. - 211 -A l l i a n c e , and the Naval Treaty for the l i m i t a t i o n of naval armament which sanctioned the p r i n c i p l e of naval equality between Great B r i t a i n and the United States and granted Japan the third-place as sea power. In both cases Japan could do nothing but comply with p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s . she did so without resentment. In t h i s thesis the development of Anglo-Japanese re-l a t i o n s since 1911 up to the Washington Conference has been portrayed i n the special l i g h t of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . This A l l i a n c e had formed the strongest p i l l a r of the structure of B r i t i s h world p o l i c y since 1902, despite the changes which the Treaty underwent i n i t s p o l i t i c a l scope and character. These changes, r e f l e c t i n g the dynamic character of international p o l i t i c s , were due to three factors; the tremendous r i s e of Japan as an expanding world power i n the Far East, the p a r a l l e l ascendency of the United States on the eastern coast of the P a c i f i c Ocean, and the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l evolution of the Dominions within the B r i t i s h commonwealth i n which Canada took the lead. The expanding power and influence of Japan i n Eastern Asia appeared to make a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e a matter of expediency. From the B r i t i s h view the A l l i a n c e was i n the f i r s t place designed to safeguard B r i t i s h commercial i n t e r e s t s i n China and to serve the interests of the Dominions of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand. Both aims could best be achieved by securing the goodwill of Japan and by exerting a r e s t r a i n i n g and c o n t r o l l i n g influence oft Japanese p o l i c y rather than by estranging Japan and making her an anemy. In the second place - 212 -the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , B r i t a i n f e l t , might serve as an instrument for maintaining the balance of power i n the P a c i f i c which was seriously disturbed by the steadily increasing tension between Japan and the United States. The i d e a l solution for the security of B r i t i s h , Australian and New Zealand's i n t e r e s t s would have been a t r i p a r t i t e a l l i a n c e between Great B r i t a i n , Japan and the United States, that i s , the establishment of a P a c i f i c Triangle i n which the three powers cooperated with each other. Such a solution, however, would have meant United States acquiescence and recognition of Japan's "special i n t e r e s t s " i n the Far East, or i n other words, the s a c r i f i c e of the essentials of the"Open-Door Doctrine" upon which United States Far Eastern p o l i c y was based. Any continuation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was d i r e c t l y detrimental to one of the foundations of U. S. foreign p o l i c y and to the s e l f i n t e r e s t of America J i B r s e l f . This explains the acrimonious apposition of the United States to the renewal of the A l l i a n c e . Great B r i t a i n had to. make her f i n a l decision -a decision which was to become of f a r reaching importance i n the development of international r e l a t i o n s . E i t h e r Japan or the United States had to be chosen as the future partner^in world p o l i t i c s . The U. S. Ambassador i n London, Mr. Harvey, empha-dized the h i s t o r i c a l nature of the decision i n a speech i n London,on October 31 1921,when he said: - 313 - • '* The bonds of friendship and forbearance which now hold us clos e l y together . . . are hound to he strengthened or relaxed by what happens to Washing-ton. I f we cannot act i n unison now there i s s l i g h t reason to assume that we ever can. . . 72 At the Washington-Conference Great B r i t a i n made her decision i n favour of the United' States, her ''ally by nature" i n preference to her former " a l l y by diplomacy". The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was formally superseded by the Four Power P a c i f i c Treaty which p r a c t i c a l l y meant the abandonment of Japan as Great B r i t a i n ' s a l l y . The analysis of B r i t i s h Far Eastern p o l i c y and of the American motives behind t h e i r i n f l e x i b l e resistance to a renewal of the A l l i a n c e make i t abundantly clear why the United States appealed to Great B r i t a i n to ensure that her p o l i c y i n the Far East coincided with that of the United States. This,indeed, was the resu l t emanating from the Washington Conference, or more accurately, from the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . In the years to follow Great B r i t a i n pursued the l i n e of action taken by the U. S. Govern-ment i n the Far East, i n the case of the Mahchurian C o n f l i c t of 1931-32 h e s i t a t i n g l y , but from the China Incident of 1937 t i l l the outbreak of World War I I i n Eastern As i a , i n complete 73 ~ accord w>ith the United States. Mr. C h a r c h i l l declared i n 72 Q&dted from the London Times, November 1, 1921 73 cf. Hubbard, G.E. B r i t i s h Far Eastern Pol i c y . I.P.R.Inquiry Series, I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c Relations, New York, 1943.pp.41,45 ,46 - 214 -h i s Mansion House speech,on November 10, 1941: . . .The United States are doing th e i r utmost to f i n d ways of preserving peace i n the P a c i f i c . . . i t i s my duty to say, that, should the United States beoome involved i n war with Japan, the B r i t i s h declaration w i l l follow within the hour.. .74 Moreover, Great B r i t a i n ' s renunciation of a Far Eastern p o l i c y deviating from the American l i n e had decisive bearing on the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n the whole of the P a c i f i c . The former B r i t i s h supremacy i n the P a c i f i c was supplanted by the dominant p o s i t i o n of the United States after the l a s t B r i t i s h attempt to preserve *a balance of power by the es-tablishment' of a P a c i f i c Triangle had f a i l e d . One year a f t e r Washington the F i r s t Sea Lord of the B r i t i s h Admiralty, "jj r... Amery, declared i n the Commons with reference to the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n the P a c i f i c : ". . .we are helpless and r e l i a n t on the goodwill of a f r i e n d l y and l a t e l y a l l i e d power. . .75 But whilst Great B r i t a i n l o s t on the one hand the " P a c i f i c  Triangle ,she gained on the other hand what was to become the "North^Atlantic Triangle". Herein l i e s the p o l i t i c a l quintessence of the problem of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . The Washington Conference was something more than B r i t i s h and American diplomatic cooperation ; the decision brought nearer the r e a l i z a t i o n of the idea of the community of 74 Hubbard, op.oit.page 66. 75 Gr.Brit.Pari.Deb.5th Se*.1923,Vol.163,pp.1267-8. - 215 -English-speaking nations based upon common t r a d i t i o n and heritage. Thus i t marked the beginning of a new epoch i n Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s . In conclusion,the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , with Great B r i t a i n ' s supremacy i n the P a c i f i c had to be sacrificed on the a l t a r of the idea of the Trans-Atlantic Anglo-Saxon community. Although the ph y s i c a l centre of gravity of the Anglo-American community was, i s , and w i l l remain the North A t l a n t i c , nevertheless the intimate association of t h i s community originated i n the P a c i f i c . The s i g n i f i c a n c e , however, of the problem of the Anglo-Japahese A l l i a n c e as dealt with i n t h i s thesis l i e s i n the fact that i t i s immediately associated with present world history. Great h i s t o r i c a l events never happen spontaneously or Incident-ally; tout according to the law of h i s t o r i c a l continuity they are the product and the r e s u l t of the long-lasting process of a development which passes beneath the surface of events.Thus, the h i s t o r i c decision of the B r i t i s h Government at the Washing-ton Conference, brought about by Canada,laying, as i t d i d , the foundation f o r Anglo-American partnership must be considered as an important milestone i n a development which led ultimately to the formation of the North A t l a n t i c Treaty Organization of 1949, which i s the p o l i t i c a l implementation and the s p i r i t u a l incarnation of the idea of Anglo-American cooperation. - 816 -B I B L I O G R A P H Y A. PRIMARY SOURCES OF INFORMATION I. O f f i c i a l and Government Publications 1. British Documents on the Origin of the War, 1898-1914. ed. G.P.Gooeh-H.W.Temperley, London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1926 f f . Vol. VIII and XI. 8. British and Foreign State Papers, London, H.M.St.Office, 1920 f f . Vol. CX (1916) and Vol.XCIII (1920). 3. Canada.Parliament.House of Commons.Official Report  of Debates. Ottawa King's Printer. 1920,Vol.143; 1921, Vol. 146 and 148; 1922, Vol.151. 4. Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak  of the European War,(Mlscell No. 10) 1915, London, ~~ H.M.St.Office, Harrison and Sons printers, 1915,Cmd.7860. 5. Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates. Sess.1911, VolJX; Sess. 1913, Vol.LXX1; Sess,1914/17 Vol.LXXIII and LXXVIII; Sess.1917/18,Vol.LXXXIV and LXXXV,Sess.1919, Vol.LXXXVIII and LXXXIX,Sess.1920/21, Vol.XCI, XCIV, XCV, XCVI, XCVII. 6. Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom and the Dominions and India.(June,July, August,1921) Summary of Proceedings and Documents Pre-sented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty,Cmd.1474. London, H.M.St.Office,1921. -7. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. ed.E.L.Woodward - R.Butler, 1st Series, 1919. London, H.M.St.Office, 1949, Vol.11 and III. 8. Great Britain, The Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons London, H.M.St.Office.5th Ser.1911,Vol.22 and 28,1914, Vol.59 and 63; 1915, Vol.70,71 and 75; 1917, Vol.99;1918, Vol.101 and 103; 1920, Vol.126; 1921,Vol.136, 138,141,142,143,144,146 and 147; 1923,Vol.163 and 165; 1924, Vol.176. 9. Imperial Conference 1923.Appendix to the Summary of  Proceedings. Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. 1923. Cmd.1988. London,H.M.St.Office 1923. 10. Die Internatlonalen Bezlehungen im Zeitalter des Imperial!smus Dokumente aus den Archiven der Zaristischen und Provisori-schen Regierung. Berlin, 1934-36, Vol.11. 11. Naval Mission to the Dominion of New Zealand. Report of Admiral Viscount J e l l i c o e . August-October 1919. Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives of New Zealand. 1919. Wellington 1919. A-4 Vol.1. 12;. New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Sess.1913, Vol.166; 4th Sess.1922, Vol.196. 13. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the. United States. U.S.Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , Washington 1924 f f . 1914, Supplem; 1915; 1917;1920, Vol.11; 1921, Vol.1 and I I ; 1922, Vol.1. 14. Treaty Series No. 6 (1924) Treaty between the B r i t i s h Empire, France, Japan and the ': United States,,Relating to t h e i r Insular possessions and  Insular Dominions i n the P a c i f i c Ocean, and Accompanying  Declaration. Washington, December 13th,1921. Presented by the Secretary of State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. Cmd.2037, London, H.ffl. St.0.1924. • I I . Memoirs, D i a r i e s . Speeches, etc. 1. Borden, S i r Robert, Diary of the Washington Disarmament  Conference. The Unpublished Borden Papers. F i l e OC 611. Washington Conference 1921/22. Microfilmed i n 1952 by.the Public Archives of Canada. 2. Borden, S i r Robert, Robert L a i r d Borden, His Memoirs, ed.by ":r Henry Borden, Toronto. The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd. 1938, Vol.11. 3. Borden, S i r Robert, The Question of Ori e n t a l Immigration. Speeches i n part delivered i n 1907 and 1908. 4. The B r i t i s h Year Book of International Law. 1922/85.London H.Milford.Oxford University Press 1923. 5. Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual 1920/21 and 1921/22, New York, Maomillan. 1921 f f . 6. C h u r c h i l l , W. The World C r i s i s . New York, C. Scribnerls Sons. 1923. • 7. Dugdale, B.E.C., Arthur James Balfour. 1906/1930. London, Hutchinson and Co.Ltd. 1936. 8. Grey, S i r Edward, Twenty-five Years 1892-1916 London, Hodder and Stoughten, Ltd.1925, Vol.II. - 218 -9. I s h i i , Vise. K. , Diplomatic Coramen.taries, (t ran s i . by W. R. Langdon), Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1936. 10. Lloyd George, D. t i War Memoirs, London, Nicholson and Watson, 1933-36, Vol.11, IV, and VI. 11. Lloyd, George, D. , War Memoirs, (transl.), Berlin,1934. 12. MacMurray, I. V. A., Treaties and Agreements with and  Concerning China, 1894-1919. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1929, Vol.11. 13. Meighen, Arthur, Oversea Addresses. ( June -July 1921). Toronto^ The Musson Book Company, Ltd. 1921. 14. Millard, Th. F. , Conflict of Policies in Asia. London, George Allen and Unwill, Ltd. 1924. 15. M i l l e r , D. H., My Diary at the Peace Conference of Paris. New York 1924. Vol. I and XIX. 16. Siebert, B. V., Entente Diplomacy and the World. ed. Schreiner, A. B., New York, London. The Knicker-bocker Press, 1921. III. Newspapers 1. The Board of Trade Journal 1919, 1922. 2. Corriere della Sera, 1921. 3. The Daily Chroniclei 1921. 4. The Vancouver Daily Province 1921 5. The Daily Telegraph 1921. 6. Handelsberichten, Amersterdam, 1919. 7. Indiaman, London, 1916. 8. Japan Advertiser 1917, 1920, 1921. 9. Japan Post 1914. 10. Japan Times 1912. 11. Japan Weekly Chronicle 1916, 1917. - 219 -The Journal of Commerce, New York, 1919, 1921. Koelnische Zeitung 1921. The London and China Telegraph 1916, 1919. The London Journal 1929. The London Times 1917, 1918, 1920, 1921, 1922. The Manchester Guardian 1919, 1920. The Manchester Guardian Commercial 1922. The Morning Post 1919, 1921. The New York Evening Post 1921. The New York Times 1921. The Observer 1921. The Peking Daily News 1916. Le Temps 1920, 1921. B. SECONDARY SOURCES OP INFORMATION I. Books 1. Bailey, Th. A. , Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American C r i s i s , Stanford, California,, Stanford University Press 1934. 2. Borden, Sir Robert, The War and the Future, London, Hodder and Stoughten, 1917. 3. Brebner, J . B., The North Atlantic Triangle, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1945. 4. Buell, R. L., The Washington Conference, New York, D. Appleton and Comp. 1922. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 1 7 • 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. - 220 - • 5. Bywater, H. C. , Sea Power i n t h e P a c i f i c , London, Constable and Comp., Ltd. 1934. 6. Carter, G. , The B r i t i s h Commonwealth,and International  Security, Toronto, TheRyerson Press, 1947. 7. Chang, Ch. F., The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1931. 8. Clyde, P.H. , The Far East, New York , Prentice , H a l l , Inc. 1952. 9. Dennet, T., Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, New York 1925. 10. Dewey, A. G., The Dominions and Diplomacy London,New York,Toronto,Longmans,Green and Comp.1929.Vol.11 11. Duggan, St.P., The League of Nations Boston, The A t l a n t i c Monthly Press, 1919. 12. Francke, 0., Die Grossmaechte i n Ostasien,1894-1914.Hamburg 192£ 13. Hubbard,.G. E. , B r i t i s h Far Eastern P o l i c y New York, International Secretariat,I.P.R.,1943. 14. Ichihashi, Y. , The Washington Conference and After Stanford, C a l i f . , Stanford University Press, 1928. 15. Jensen, G., Seemacht Japan, B e r l i n , 1943. 16. Kawakami, K.K., Japan's P a c i f i c P o l i c y New York 1922. 17. King-Hall, S*., Our Own Times, 1913-1938. London, Nicholson and Watson Ltd. 1938. 18. La Fargue, T. E., China and the World War Stanford, C a l i f . , Stanford Univ. Press, 1937. 19. Langer, W.L., The Diplomacy of Imperialism. 1890-1902., New York, London, A.A.KnojJf, 1935. Vol.11. 20. Lower, A.R.M., Canada and the Far East - 1940 New York, International Secretariat, I.P.R.1940. - 221 -21. MacNair, H. F., Modern Far Eastern Internation Relations Toronto, New York, London, 1950. 22. Simpson, B.L., An Indiscreet Chronicle from the P a c i f i c by Putnam Weale (pseu.) New York, Dodd, Mead and Comp.1922. 23. Steed, H. W. , Through i.. , . ^ T h i r t y Years, London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1925, Vol.II. 24. Strange, W. , Canada,. The P a c i f i c and War. Toronto, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. 1937. 25. Takeuchi, T., War and Diplomacy i n the Japanese Empire, New York, Doubleday, Doran and Comp.Inc. 1935. 26. Toynbee, A. J . , Survey of International Affairs,1920/23 B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e of International A f f a i r s , London, H. M i l f o r d , Oxford, Unversity Press 1925. 27. Woodsworth, Ch. G., Canada and the Orient, Toronto, The Macmillan Comp. of Canada Ltd. 1941. I I . P e r i o d i c a l s , Special A r t i c l e s , etc. a) Special A r t i c l e s 1. Angus, H. F. , Canada and Naval Rivalry i n the P a c i f i c , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s . V o l . VIII (June 1935) pp 176-184. 2. < Bland, I.P.O., Japanese P o l i c y i n China, the Nineteenth Century and After,Vol. LXZVTII (November 1915) pp 1198-1212. 3. Brebner, J.B., Canada, The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e and the Washington Conference, P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly, Vol. L (March 1935.) pp. 45/56L -4. Spinks, C.N. , The Termination of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , P a c i f i c H i s t o r i c a l Review, Vol. VI, (1_37) pp.321-340. 5. Steed, W., B r i t i s h P o l i c y i n the P a c i f i c ; The Nineteenth  Century and A f t e r , Vol.CXI, ( A p r i l 1932) pp 369-409. - £22 -b) P e r i o d i c a l s 1. The Canadian Annual Review of Public A f f a i r s 1919. 1921. 2. China Archiv. B e r l i n 1916, 1917, 1918. 3. E.',iEurop.a£Nbuye.leIl_19, 1920 4. Marine Rundschau 1921. 5. Der Neue Orient, B e r l i n 1919 6. Ostasiatische Rundschau 1920 7. Ostasiatischer Lloyd 1914, 1915 8. The Round Table 1920/21. 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0106406/manifest

Comment

Related Items