INTERNATIONAL AND COMMONWEALTH ASPECTS OF THE
ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1911 - 1922

by

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ABSTRACT

The present international situation is characterized by the division of the World in two power blocs. The countries of the Western World have united themselves in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the first effective large scale example of regional collective security in world history. The spiritual foundation of NATO is the idea of the 'Atlantic Anglo-American community based on mutual friendship and cooperation between Great Britain and the United States. But it was by no means certain that these two great powers of the Anglo-Saxon race should cooperate in close association with each other in world politics. After World War I, the British Empire found its world supremacy - undisputed so far - challenged by the potential and increasing strength of the United States. Great Britain had then to make her decision whether she was to antagonize the United States or to become her cooperative partner in international politics.

The test-case was offered by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The global importance of this Alliance cannot be over-estimated. It was one of the strongest pillars of Britain's foreign policy, and contributed, to a substantial degree, to Japan's ascendancy in the Far East; it influenced decisively United States foreign policy immediately after 1919 - being to a large extent one of the deeper causes for the isolationist withdrawal of the United States from the system of international cooperation as established at the Paris Peace Conference -, and presented
Great Britain with the decision to choose definitely between Japan as Britain's ally in the Pacific and the realization of the Anglo-American Community.

**purpose**

It is the purpose of this thesis to point out these implications of the Alliance on international politics, particularly during the crucial years from 1919 to 1922. An elucidation of the problem from the British aspect is all the more important because it reflects the change in the constitutional development within the British Commonwealth after World War I. Finally, Britain's foreign policy towards Japan in that short period sheds significant light on the British attitude towards the political development in the Far East during the Manchurian Crisis in the beginning of the 1930's. It furnished the key for understanding the British appeasement and flirtation with Japan as it became evident by Sir John Simon's policy in 1932.
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CHAPTER I
"THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE AND THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE FAR EAST, 1914-1918"

The application of the term, 'World Politics' in its strict modern sense, of expressing the entanglement and inter-dependence of international affairs is only justified with the appearance of Japan and the United States in world affairs as powers of dominating influence on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. The rise of the Japanese Empire as a great power in the Far East which was primarily due to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, and the expansion of Japan's power during the First World War gave rise to political consequences which were of the highest importance in international politics. Primarily, there were two immediate results emanating from the ascendance of the Japanese power during this period. Firstly, there was the decline, if not the elimination of Great Britain as the traditional leading power with her predominant influence in Eastern Asia, particularly in China, political as well as economical; and secondly, the steadily growing increase of Japanese power aroused the antagonism of the United States which, having become the other world power in the Pacific, looked upon Japanese expansion in China and her potential expansion in
the Pacific as a serious menace to the basic principle of U. S. foreign policy, - the preservation of the Open-Door Policy in China, and as a direct threat to her own security. It is the scope of this chapter to point out these consequences of a political development which later on determined decisively the further course of British and American foreign policy in Eastern Asia. As far as Japan was concerned, the result was that at the end of the war, she had reached such a degree of power, political influence, and diplomatic prestige that she was entitled to appear at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 amongst those great powers which, by their preponderant influence, shaped the international post-war world through the decisions of the "Supreme Allied Council of the Big Four".

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902, provided, in the writer's opinion, one of the strongest pillars, if not the foundation of Great Britain's foreign policy in the following years. The reasons for the conclusion of the Alliance, as far as Great Britain was concerned, were in the main two-fold. The advance of Russia in Manchuria with the aim of absorbing Korea into the Russian sphere of influence, in other words, Russia's tremendous increase of power in the Far East, constituted a direct and serious challenge to the British position in the whole of Eastern Asia. The possible danger
however, of an alignment of Japan with Russia would have rendered Great Britain's position there "hopeless". Secondly, Great Britain after failing to arrive at an agreement with Russia, Germany and the United States, realized the indispensable necessity of overcoming her traditional policy of 'splendid isolation' the disadvantage of which she may well have already felt in the Venezuela Crisis, the Boer War, and the Fashoda Crisis. The Alliance from the British view was anti-Russian. It was regarded at that time as an instrument to check a further Russian expansion in the Extreme East. The success of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 had convinced Great Britain of the efficiency of Japan's military power and had therefore induced the British Government to continue the Alliance, in a modified form that enhanced its value. The balance of power in the Extreme East having been redressed by Russia's defeat, the British Government provided for the extension of the Alliance to India, whose security might possibly have been jeopardized if Russia concentrated her aspirations on Middle Asia after having been expelled from the Far East. But, however valuable the Alliance proved as the keystone of British foreign policy, Great Britain had to take into serious consideration the attitude of another great power with vital interests in the Far East, - the United States.

At first, the United States contemplated the Alliance favourably as a means which was serving the purpose of upholding the 'Open Door' doctrine and of safeguarding the territorial integrity of China as was stipulated by the treaty.\textsuperscript{1a} Spinks speaks of the United States as a 'secret partner' and 'unsigned member' of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance up to 1905\textsuperscript{2}.

This friendly attitude changed however, when Japan after 1905 embarked on an aggressive policy in China. It was in July of that year that President Theodore Roosevelt stated that the future history of America would be more determined by "the United States' position on the Pacific facing China than by her position on the Atlantic facing Europe."\textsuperscript{3} It was therefore only natural that U.S. Far Eastern policy became more active in counteracting Japan's policy in China.

The U.S. Secretary of War, Mr. Taft, addressed an indirect warning to Japan when he stated in October, 1907, at the American Association of Shanghai:

\begin{quote}
The American-Chinese trade is sufficiently great to require the government of the United States to take every legitimate means to protect it against diminution or injury by the political preference of any of its competitors. . . . It would have the right to protest against exclusion from Chinese trade by a departure from the policy of the open door. . . .
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{3} Th. Roosevelt in a letter to B. G. Wheeler, President of the University of California, June 17, 1905, quoted in Dennett, T., \textit{Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War}, New York, 1925, p. 5.

In addition to that, the immigration question between the United States and Japan assumed serious proportions and contributed in a considerable degree to straining the relations between both countries. In 1906 the famous San Francisco School Incident occurred because of the Japanese immigration. One year later in 1907, President Roosevelt issued a proclamation according to which Japanese immigrants provided with passports to Mexico, Canada or Hawaii, were denied entry into the United States. The tension reached its climax in 1907-08 when President Roosevelt, because of the war scare, ordered the despatch of the whole of the United States fleet into the Pacific. The British Government was most anxious to see the strained American-Japanese relations relaxed, and therefore approached the United States government with suggestions which led finally to the Root-Takahira Agreement of November 3rd, 1908, by which the United States and Japan re-affirmed their honest intention to maintain the existing 'status quo' in the Pacific and the principle of the open-door in China. Since that time, however, American-Japanese antagonism became a continuous factor of instability in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which

5. Chang op.cit.
the British Government had to take into due consideration in her relations with Japan. It faced Great Britain with the serious prospect of being involved in an American-Japanese War in which she had to take the side of Japan against the United States. In addition, there was an increasing body of opinion in the United States which looked with displeasure and uneasiness on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, a fact which was realized in Britain as well as in Japan. The potential danger of becoming embroiled with the United States because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, constituted a problem of great concern to the British Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. As early as 1906, Commander Bellairs raised the question in the British House of Commons "whether there is any provision in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty safeguarding His Majesty's Dominions from being involved in a war with the United States on behalf of Japan." At that time Sir Edward Grey was still in the position to allay such fears, saying that there was no indication that events were likely to lead to war. The American-Japanese tension, however, grew steadily, reaching a serious crisis in 1910 over the question of neutralization of the railway lines in South Manchuria as

9 cf. Ishii, op.cit. pp56-59

proposed by the U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. Knox. The anxiety of the British Government was obviously reflected in a despatch of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, in July 1911. This stated that

Canada was now on such good terms with the United States, and there was such a growing feeling of friendliness between the public opinion in this country and that of the other side of the Atlantic that it was clear that we could not undertake any obligation which would involve us in war with the United States.

This was the first time that Canada who was to play such an outstanding role in the history of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, was officially mentioned in this particular connection.

Accordingly, the British Government was highly pleased when she was approached in August and September, 1910, by the U.S. government with the suggestion of concluding a Treaty of General Arbitration for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The British Foreign Secretary immediately communicated with the Japanese Government, advancing suggestions which amounted to an adjustment of the Alliance to Anglo-American relations in the case of the renewal of the Alliance. The Japanese government responded positively and assented to the British


12 Ibid. No.405, p.503, and no.450, p.544, and no.463, p.559.

13 Ibid. and no.406, p.503.
- 8 -

proposal. Japan even took the initiative for suggesting a modification of the text of the Treaty in such a form that rendered the "casus foederis" of the Alliance inoperative against a power with whom Britain would conclude a treaty of arbitration. This proposal became a reality as Article IV inserted into the renewed Treaty of Alliance of 1911. The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1911 was the expression of the changed conditions in international affairs: The immediate Russian peril in the Far East had vanished, the American-Japanese tension was increasing more and more, and the view of the British Dominions, who had begun to play a more important role and had acquired the right to be consulted in matters of foreign policy in the Committee of Imperial Defence established in 1911, had to be taken into due consideration by the British government as far as her policy towards Japan was concerned. Before the Alliance was renewed the British Government therefore consulted the Dominion Prime Ministers on this question at the Imperial Conference in May 1911 and secured their unanimous approval. The British Dominions were on this occasion for the first time introduced into the "arcana imperii" in a matter of high politics, whereas the first two treaties of the Alliance in 1902 and 1905 had been concluded on the exclusive responsibility of the London Foreign Office.

14 The proposal was advanced by the Japanese Prime Minister Komura, cf. Ishii op. cit. Pp. 56ff.; cf. also Br. Doc. VIII, no. 407, pp. 504-505.

without any consultation or cooperation of the Dominions. In the Australian Parliament, in the Senate as well as in the House of Representatives, the opinion on the treaty-renewal was expressed by various speakers. Senator Millen maintained in September, 1911, that Australia was entitled to know how far she was committed. In the Australian House of Representatives, although warning was given that Australia "must not be lulled into any false security by the arrangement between Japan and the mother country", the treaty-renewal was welcomed. It was realistically argued that Japan should be the ally of the British Empire rather than a "possible assailant". These opinions reflected not only the Australian standpoint in the question of Anglo-Japanese relations, but were also indicative of the fact that the Dominions held their own views which were emanating from the peculiar and individual interest in this matter. But they had not yet arrived at that stage in their constitutional evolution which enabled them to insist vigorously on their own rights and interests or even to exert decisive influence on the course of foreign policy as determined exclusively by the Downing Street Cabinet.

17 Ibid., p. 389.
18 Ibid., p. 203.
Summarizing the matter of the treaty-renewal of 1911 one can say that two factors placed the British government in an uneasy position in her relations with Japan; the attitude of the United States of America and, in a somewhat lesser extent, interests of the self-governing Dominions. The United Kingdom Government had good reason to keep the new Anglo-Japanese agreement secret from the knowledge of Parliament, thus avoiding a large discussion, which gave rise to criticism in the British House of Commons.\footnote{Gr. Brit., Parl. Deb., 5th Sess., 1911, vol. 28, p. 1257.}

Owing to the combined effort of the British and Japanese negotiators, the insertion of the famous Article IV into the treaty-alliance was achieved. It read:

Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force."\footnote{Article I, V of the Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan, signed at London, July 13, 1911, quoted in Br. Doc. VIII, no. 436, pp 532-533.}

The purpose of this clause was to eliminate any danger for the British Empire of her being drawn into a possible armed conflict between Japan and the United States. The British Government was therefore anxious to communicate with the U. S. State Department, pointing out the object of the new
treaty and expressing the hope that the U. S. Government would "appreciate the desire that Great Britain and Japan have shown to remove any possible obstacle to progress of arbitration". The new provision together with the fact that Japan was no longer obliged to render armed assistance to Great Britain in the case of complications on the borders of India meant, without any doubt, a weakening of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, or generally speaking, a cooling-off of the diplomatic relations between the two Empires. Nevertheless, on both sides the desire for maintaining the Alliance as the keystone of Japanese and British diplomacy was very strong. Even a formerly declared opponent of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance like Prince Ito, was convinced in 1909 of the importance of retaining the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. He firmly believed in the efficiency and stability of the pact. The Japanese Government realistically recognized the urgent necessity for Great Britain to preserve amicable relations with the United States and so acquiesced in the British wishes because they wanted to use the Alliance as a further instrument for the consolidation of Japan's power in the Far East. The British motive for the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance derived


22 cf. Interview of the Brit. Ambassador to Tokyo, Mr. MacDonald, with Prince Ito, June 14, 1909, in Br. Doc. VIII, no. 565, pp. 466-468.
primarily from two considerations which were closely connected with each other. First, a continued alliance with Japan was regarded as a "guarantee against Japan's ill-will" which might have been easily aroused by the anti-Oriental immigration-laws in the British Dominions. An abrogation of the treaty alliance would have led to considerable frictions with Japan and might have constituted a permanent danger for the integrity of the British Empire. To avoid this was the supreme aim of British diplomacy at a time when Great Britain had to concentrate all her strength on Europe where the German naval policy constituted a serious menace. The prolongation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was therefore a precautionary measure on the part of the British Government for the protection of the British Dominions who were exposed to Japanese pressure. It was furthermore based on the assumption that the Japanese government feeling under a moral obligation, would refrain from embarking on a large-scale expansion southward by immigration into Australia and New Zealand, as well as to Canada, but would turn to Korea, Manchuria and the other regions in the neighborhood of Japan, as Sir Edward Grey hoped, expressing his view to

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the Japanese Ambassador to the Court of Saint James in May, 1911. This last consideration, serving as it did the vital interests of the "White Policy" of Australia and New Zealand and ensuring the security of these Dominions from a political and military Japanese expansion to the South apparently became a determining and influencing factor in Great Britain's Far Eastern policy. Since that time it has recurred in British diplomacy during the Siberian Expedition in 1918, 1919 and later on in the Manchurian Crisis of 1931.

The second reason for maintaining the Alliance was closely linked with the use of the Alliance as a means for safeguarding the Pacific Dominions against a possible attack by Japan herself. The centre of gravity, as far as British Foreign policy was concerned, had shifted to Europe since Germany had embarked upon a long-term naval-building policy the speed, extent and intensity of which immediately challenged British naval supremacy which British foreign policy always sought to maintain as its fundamental principle by keeping the so-called 'Two-Power Standard'. To meet the German danger Great Britain was compelled to concentrate all her naval power in the North Sea. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance enabled Great Britain to increase the effective strength of her navy in European waters by reducing the British naval forces in the Far East.

\[24\] Br.Doc.VIII, no. 427, p.525
\[25\] cf. Letter of Russian Ambassador to London on a conversation with Sir Arthur Nicolson, July 7, 1911, in Siebert, op.cit.p.33
The problem of Empire defence in the Pacific had been discussed at the Imperial Defence Conference in 1909, when it was decided to establish a powerful Pacific fleet consisting of three squadrons stationed in the Indian, Chinese and Australian waters. The China-station squadron was to be composed mainly of New Zealand units with the battle-cruiser 'New Zealand' as flagship, two cruisers of the 'Bristol Class', three destroyers, and two submarines. This decision, however, was not put into effect by the British Admiralty. The reason for dropping the plan was clearly stated in October, 1913, in a telegram from the British Foreign Secretary to the New Zealand government, saying that the general strategical disposition of naval strength, necessary in the interest of the Empire as a whole, had to be observed, and this "required available Bristols elsewhere." It was evident what was meant by this explanation. The British Admiralty, particularly Mr. Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty, gave priority to the British position in European waters where he felt the decisive battle would be fought, and in 1914 considered the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a sufficient instrument for securing the safety of Australia and New Zealand.


This policy, although it arose from a situation of emergency, was to prove short-sighted in the long run. It did not receive the full assent of Australia and New Zealand, as these Dominions recognized the danger involved in a lack of British naval strength in Far Eastern waters. The New Zealand Government sent the Minister of Defence, Colonel Allen to London in the beginning of 1913 to make inquiries concerning this question of naval defence. The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Massey, declared in 1913 in the New Zealand Parliament:

'It appears quite certain that we are on the eve of great changes in the Pacific. . . . The government are not thinking of the present, or even of the immediate future but of what may happen in years to come and the necessity of making preparation therefor.'

He assiduously urged a close cooperation of Canada, Australia and New Zealand for maintaining the absolute naval supremacy in the Pacific. There can be no doubt that his almost prophetical-sounding words alluded to the rising power of Japan. The political development in Eastern Asia during the World War was to demonstrate how accurate his predictions were. Similar opposition against the naval policy of the British Admiralty was voiced in the Australian Parliament.

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The Australian Minister of Defence, Senator Millen, insisted on the proposal pursuing the defence scheme of 1909 and refused that units of the Australian navy were to be sent to the North Sea. However, the British political and strategic conception of foreign policy at the eve of the World War which was based entirely on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance demanded concentration of all strength on Europe, thus leaving the protection of British interests in the Far East and in the Pacific to the Japanese ally. The withdrawal of considerable naval forces from that region proved disastrous for Great Britain and made her thoroughly dependent on the Alliance, that is to say, on the goodwill of Japan. Japanese diplomacy distinctly recognized the unique chance offered to her by the outbreak of the war in Europe. It seized this chance when the attention of the Western powers was distracted and their strength completely absorbed by the European conflict.

The outbreak of the First World War in Europe in August, 1914 confronted the British Government with a double problem: To secure by all means Japan's cooperation for the protection of British interests in Eastern Asia and in the Pacific, but at the same time to restrict possible political and military action on the part of Japan because of the

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30 Statement made by the Australian Minister of Defence, Senator Millen, in the Senate, on October 22, 1913, Commonwealth of Australia, Parl. Deb., Session 1913, vol. LXXI, p. 2297.
widespread trepidation in the British Dominions regarding Japan as well as because of the United States who looked upon every political step in the Far East as apt to increase Japan's power with suspicious eyes. The British dilemma is reflected by the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Grey, in his memoirs:

"...The prospect of unlimited Japanese action was repugnant to Australia and New Zealand. It was unthinkable that we should not have the most scrupulous care for the interests and feelings of British Dominions that were taking part in the war ready to make sacrifices. Equally important, the effect of Japanese action on public opinion in the United States might be disastrous; it might even make American sentiment definitely antagonistic to us. We had, therefore, to explain to Japan that her help would be welcome but that her action must be limited."31

The interests of the Dominions and the United States had to be taken into due consideration by the U. K. Cabinet.

On the other hand, some suspicion and doubt might have existed as to the Japanese attitude towards the war. At the beginning of the crisis it was uncertain what this attitude would be. By 1914 the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was no longer as efficient and as strong as it had been in 1902 or 1905; a considerable change had taken place in Anglo-Japanese relations which was characterized by a cooling-off of the intimacy between both countries since Japan had turned to

a policy of understanding with Russia over China and since Britain felt the full extent of Japanese trade rivalry in Eastern Asia. Anti-Japanese statements were voiced by some sections of the British press. The Britannic Review for instance, termed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance a 'mesalliance' by means of which Japan had usurped Korea and Manchuria and was threatening India and Australia. The paper expressed the fear that Japan in pursuing a policy of 'Asia to the Asiatics' would precipitate a general conflagration. In addition to that there were influential political groups in Japan advocating the replacement of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by an agreement with Germany which might possibly lead to the formation of a Eurasian continental power bloc of Germany, Russia and Japan, particularly after Japan's diplomacy had taken on a pro-Russian orientation through the Russo-Japanese treaties of 1907, 1910 and 1912. Suspicion and anxieties of such kind were expressed as early as 1911 in the British House of Commons. In 1914 at the outbreak of the war, it was chiefly in circles of the Japanese General Staff that the idea of an intervention on behalf of Germany was advanced, so that two different groups of influence in Tokyo contested

32 cf. Japan Post June 13, 1914, no.11, p.384

against each other. This did certainly not escape the serious attention of the British. The general suspicion and doubt regarding Japan's attitude immediately before the World War was increased by a semi-official leading article of the Japan Times on July 28, 1914, which said that Japan was "on the best possible terms with the three great powers, Austria, Germany and Russia," and that in case of war Tokyo would maintain "strict neutrality." Indeed, the Japanese Cabinet pursued a 'wait and see policy' on the eve of the World War in 1914 before it ultimately decided to take the side of Britain and to utilize the opportunity to embark upon a policy designed to lay the foundations for Japan's undisputed domination over Eastern Asia.

The task imposed upon British diplomacy in 1914 was, as pointed out, therefore immeasurably difficult. It had to ensure the efficacious aid and the goodwill of Japan in a region of the world where Britain, in the interest of wider political strategy, had to weaken her own strength; simultaneously, Britain had, with a minimum of available power, to prevent an excessive Japanese expansion in the Far East which jeopardized the British interests in China, if not the security of the Dominions.

The diplomatic correspondence between the Foreign Office and Tokyo preceding the outbreak of hostilities in the Far East reveals the desperate British efforts to impose restrictions of Japanese war actions. Whilst at first the British government took the view that the events in Europe would not invoke the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it considered it advisable on suggestion by Sir William Tyrrell to instruct the British Ambassador to Tokyo, Sir C. Green, to inform the Japanese government that "if hostilities spread to the Far East, and an attack on Hong-Kong or Waihawei were to take place" -- which was the only case, apart from an uprising in India, in which the "casus foederis" for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance could be applied -- Britain would rely on Japanese support.

What Great Britain wanted was a locally limited participation of Japan in the war such as the capture of German war- and armed-merchant ships in Far Eastern waters. Accordingly, the British government requested Tokyo in a memorandum of August 7, 1914, to provide such naval aid.

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37 Ibid., no. 534, p. 292
government had declared four days earlier that Great Britain could "count upon Japan at once coming to assistance of her ally with all her strength, if called to do so."\(^{40}\) This phraseology used has to be interpreted literally. It was much more than a matter of courtesy. The Japanese Foreign Minister Kato considered the British proposal as entirely unsatisfactory.\(^ {41}\) What Japan wanted as an official reason to join the war was nothing else but the elimination of Germany's influence in the Far East, or in other words, the surrender of Kioutchou. On the same day when the British request for limited action of the Japanese navy was conveyed to Tokyo, the German naval attaché, Captain Knorr, despatched a telegram to the 'Graf Spee'-squadron, saying that according to reliable information Japan intended to take Tsingtao.\(^ {42}\)

The British completely failed to postpone a Japanese declaration of war which implied the extension of military operations on the Chinese mainland and into the Pacific (the matter would have led to a Japanese occupation of the German island possessions in the South Sea). The British Government had to comply with the ambitions of an unyielding Japanese diplomacy which aimed at a long-term policy. The only measure

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\(^{40}\) Br. Doc., 1914, vol XI, no. 571, p.305
\(^{42}\) Marine Rundschau, 1921, pp.516-517
the British Government could take when faced with the 'fait accompli' of the Japanese ultimatum to Germany was to issue an official declaration to the press in which it was stated that the actions being taken by Great Britain and Japan were deemed to safeguard the aims of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, i.e., the integrity and independence of China; and it was announced that the "action of Japan will not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas... nor to any foreign territory except in German occupation on the continent of Eastern Asia." The purpose of this declaration was evident; it was designed to dispel anxieties on the part of the United States and the British Dominions. The British Government therefore conveyed this declaration expressly to the U. S. State Department with which she was in continuous contact over developments in the Far East.

The reason why Britain had addressed the request for military intervention to Japan at all, and why she finally had to yield to the persistent demands of the Japanese Cabinet lay in the extreme military weakness of Great Britain in Eastern Asia. The British naval forces of the China squadron consisted of two battle-cruisers, the 'Minotaur' and the 'Hampshire',

two light cruisers, the 'Yarmouth' and the 'Newcastle', and the old battleship 'Triumph' which had a slow speed. The units available from the Australian navy were the modern battle-cruiser 'Astralia', two new light cruisers, and the 'Sidney' and the 'Melbourne', two older cruisers, the 'Encounter' and 'Pioneer', and one torpedo-boat-destroyer. In addition to these forces there were three old cruisers of the New Zealand navy, two old French battle-cruisers, the 'Montcalm' and 'Dupleix', and two Russian light cruisers, the 'Shantung' and 'Askold'. This naval force, even when combined, was inadequate in strength, and not in any position to guarantee the protection of the British interests, possessions and sea-communications in the Far East and in the Pacific. Furthermore, they were unable to fulfill the tasks of British overseas strategy as assigned in the Committee of Imperial Defence by Admiral H. Jackson; for instance, the protection of British commerce and main communication-lines in the Pacific, the occupation of various German Pacific islands, particularly for the destruction of the cable stations on Yap, Nauru and Angaur could not be undertaken. The control of the Chinese waters was left to a so-called

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'Yellow Sea Patrol', consisting of the old 'Triumph',
the light-cruiser 'Yarmouth', five destroyers, and the
'Dupleix'. These forces were not sufficient to prevent the
German Far Eastern naval squadron of Admiral von Spee from
breaking through the Allied blockade. Not until Japan's
entry into the war was the British commander of the China
Station, Admiral Jerram, in the position to combine his
forces in Singapore for safeguarding the Indian Ocean from
any danger from the East. Thus for the first time the
dependence of Great Britain on Japan's military naval aid
became evident; in the new circumstances the official press
statement was ineffectual. This was clearly shown in a
telegram from the British Admiralty to the Japanese Admiralty
on November 5, 1914, when an extension of the Japanese naval
operations to the Pacific as far as the Californian and
Mexican coast was requested. It was also suggested that a
Japanese squadron should advance to Fiji to secure the safety
of Australia and New Zealand, whilst another squadron was
to advance southward so far as Sumatra and the Dutch East
Indies. These tasks were accepted by the Japanese Admir-
alty. The Japanese fleet took over also the protection of
the Canadian Pacific Coast where the naval forces, consist-
ing of two sloops, were inadequate for maintaining the

47 Telegram of the British Admiralty to the Japanese Ad-
miralty, Nov. 5, 1914, in Churchill, op cit. p. 468
security of the coast of British Columbia. The psychosis of fear from a naval bombardment by the Spee Squadron which broke out in Vancouver and Victoria, was not removed until Japanese warships anchored in Vancouver. The prediction made by the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Wilfred Laurier, in 1908 with reference to the 'Gentlemen's Agreement' that it would be possible that under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Canada "may see the fleet of Japan weighing anchor in the harbour of Vancouver for the protection of British interests." had proved correct.

This brief description of the British position in the Far East at the outbreak of the World War has indicated that the diplomatic initiative had passed from the British Foreign Office to the Japanese Cabinet. The British press observed the development with some anxiety. The editor of the National Review commented in 1914 on the situation that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had proved "a great mistake for Great Britain's supremacy in the Far East." Great Britain, he complained, had simply surrendered her policy in the Far East to the Foreign Office in Tokyo, which he predicted

48 Lower, A.R.M., Canada and the Far East, 1940, New York, International Secretariat, F.P.R. 1940, P.9
49 quoted from Woodsworth, Ch.G., Canada and the Orient, Toronto, The Macmillan Comp. of Canada Ltd, 1941, pp 163 ff
marked the "beginning of the end of the British--and that means the European influence--in Eastern Asia." The British China Press expressed similar objections. The North China Herald stated in late August, 1914: "It is not clear how a Japanese ultimatum to Germany could be justified. Nothing compels Japan under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty to join the war." Neither British trade nor British interests were seriously endangered, the newspaper said. The North China Daily News with an uneasy feeling about Japan's future steps remarked in August 1914, that it would be very unwise of Japan to ignore the express desires of Great Britain, France and Russia. "Although these countries are preoccupied for the time being elsewhere, they will not remain so permanently." The Japanese government when she joined the war, made every effort to avoid any suspicion of her actions in Eastern Asia. In an official declaration she emphasized that the grounds which led Japan to the military measures, particularly against Kioutchou, were "none other than to maintain the common interests of Japan and Great Britain set out in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance." Japan, it was argued, harboured no expansionist or selfish designs but would "respect with the greatest care interests of third powers in Eastern Asia." The real objective of Japan,

50 Ostasiatischer Lloyd, August 28, 1914, no. 34, p. 194.  
52 ibid., p. 70  
53 Coll' ve, Diplom. Dec., Cmd. 7860, p. 532
however, was by no means that laid down in the Alliance with Great Britain, namely, the preservation of China's integrity. As early as January, 1913, the Japanese Foreign Minister Kato, then Ambassador to London, had expressed his view to Sir Edward Grey that Japan had a vital political interest in the Kwantung Peninsula and in the concessions of the South-Manchurian Railway. He intimated that Japan demanded a permanent occupation of the Peninsula and that she would act, if the 'psychological moment' occurred.\(^5\) There was no doubt in August, 1914, that this psychological moment had arrived. The Japanese Government fully understood the favourable situation presented by the complete absorption of the western powers by the European war which permitted Japan not only to realize her designs in South Manchuria but to achieve a radical solution of the Chinese problem; she aimed at the diplomatic, economic and military domination of China by Japan. The memorandum of the so-called 'Black Dragon Society' submitted to the Japanese government in August, 1914, revealed the true Japanese aspirations. It recognized quite well that preoccupation of the West mentioned in the North China Daily News of August 18, 1914, saying,

\(^5\) Takeuchi, op cit. p. 184
Now the opportunity for a solution of the Chinese question has arrived for Japan as it will never be offered for centuries. . . . After the European war the great powers will direct their attention to. . . China again. . . ."

With reference to Great Britain the memorandum stated:

Her strength will no longer be sufficient to oppose us. 55

The Japanese Government did not intend to fulfill the assurances regarding the surrender of Kioutchou to China. This can be seen from the announcement of Baron Kato in the 35th Diet in December, 1914, that Japan did not feel committed to a restoration of Tsingtao or to any limitations on the scope of her military operations. 56 Japan's adherence to the London Declaration of 1914 was strongly advocated in 1914 by the then Japanese Ambassador to Paris, Viscount Ishii, with the view of strengthening Japan's position at the Peace Conference. 57 This illustrated that Japan had more far-reaching designs than acknowledged by her Government in official attenuating notifications. Four days before Japan's declaration of war to Germany, the Japanese Minister to Peking, Hioki, was instructed to urge the Chinese President, Yuan Shi Kai, to enter into an exchange of views concerning

56 Takeuchi, op cit. p. 181
57 Ishii op cit. p. 96
Chinese-Japanese relations: The prelude to the famous 'Twenty-one Demands' had just begun. The events between January and May, 1915 resulting from the 'Twenty-One Demands' need not be recalled here in detail. The Demands not only purported the further consolidation of Japanese control over South Manchuria and a retention of the former German territorial and economic rights in Shantung, but also amounted in practice to the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over China as Group V of the Demands suggested. Considering the economic rights to be secured by the demands, particularly those contained in Group III concerning the Han-Yeh-Ping Company, one concludes that Japan wanted to assure herself the sources of raw material on the Asiatic mainland, primarily coal and iron which were indispensable for a large-scale policy of successful expansion. In the last analysis they amounted to the undisputed domination of Japan over Eastern Asia, or in other words, the elimination of the influence of the Western Powers from that region.

The official attitude of the British Government towards Japan's diplomatic offensive against China was significant because it showed the complete weakness of Great Britain in the Far East and how dependent she was on Japan's

\[58\] Takeuchi op cit. p. 184.
goodwill in that area. After the Japanese demands - except Group V which was kept strictly secret - first became known, the British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Primrose, announced in the House of Commons on March 11, 1914 that the British Government would raise no objection against any expansion of Japanese interests in China, provided that the British interests in the Yangtse area were not violated. He was referring primarily to railway concessions; for one month later the British Ambassador in Tokyo submitted a list to the Japanese government enumerating the railway concessions formerly acquired by Great Britain in Southern China. When they learned of Group V the British Government took a strong stand in opposing the demands by intimating in a note of May 4, 1915, that the public opinion in Great Britain would consider a disruption of the diplomatic relations between China and Japan as "disregarding the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance". An official memorandum by Sir Edward Grey to the Japanese Ambassador in London two days later reiterated the British apprehension that the independence and integrity of China were imperilled. Originally, this had been one of the main reasons which had brought the Alliance into being when China's integrity was threatened by Russia's

60 Ibid., vol. 71, p.414  
61 cf.MacNair, op cit. p. 188  
62 Lafargue, op cit. p. 74
expansion in the late 90's. The Japanese actions in 1915 (in contrast to Tokyo's assurances when Japan entered the war) reveal clearly how fundamental the difference of interpretation had become as far as the scope of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concerned, between Great Britain and Japan. Japan's policy in 1915 towards China constituted a direct violation of the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Nevertheless, the British Government, being always under the necessity not to alienate her Japanese ally because of the security of the whole British Empire, felt it expedient to advise the Chinese Government, who had applied to the British Government for consultation, to accept the Japanese demands as contained in the ultimatum of May 7, 1915. Simultaneously, she rejected a proposal of the U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, for joint diplomatic action in Tokyo with the view of exerting a restraining influence on the Japanese Cabinet. Thus, the United States saw themselves left alone in protesting against the violation of the "Open-Door" principle by Japan. This protest was made in a note sent by Mr. Bryan to Tokyo on May 11, 1915 which, by saying that the United States could "not recognize any agreement . . . impairing . . . the open-door policy." contained practically the essence of what became famous in 1932 as the "Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition."

65 U.S. For. Rel. 1915, p. 146
Although the Japanese Government was compelled by the attitude of Great Britain and the pressure of the U.S. to drop Group V of her demands in the Japanese ultimatum of May 7, it remains significant that the British Government yielded in a matter which seriously affected British interests in China. Japan's economic penetration of China including the British sphere of interest in the Yangtse valley, spoke in clear tones. Altogether it showed that Japan had not entered the war in fulfillment of her obligations under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in order to maintain peace in the Far East. Politically as well as economically, the interests of Great Britain and Japan conflicted. The attitude of the Foreign Office did not remain without criticism of the British press. Thus for instance, the former representative of the 'British and Chinese Corporation', Mr. F. P. O. Bland, published an article in the *Nineteenth Century* of November, 1915, in which he warned that the history of Korea and Manchuria as well as Japan's appearance in the Yangtse valley showed that any expansion of Japanese influence "must of necessity entail the gradual elimination of British interests." What then were the reasons for the British to yield instead of joining the Americans in exerting more effective pressure on Tokyo? One reason was that Britain was anxious to prevent any

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serious American-Japanese tension during the war which might have been increased if Great Britain backed the American actions against Japan in 1915. The other reason was reflected in a despatch of the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo to the Russian Foreign Minister, Sasanoff, on February 5, 1915, which read:

According to my opinion, Grey, as far as the future relations with Japan are concerned, never loses sight of the possibility that future difficulties may arise, not so much because of China but rather because of the British Dominions in the Pacific, Australia and Canada, concerning racial immigration restrictions. 67

This Russian view provides a key to the British interpretation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The primary object was not China but the safety of the British Dominions in the Pacific from a possible Japanese invasion, particularly during a period when all strength of the British Empire had to be concentrated on the war in Europe. The accept of the Alliance, as far as the British interest was concerned, had shifted since 1911 and 1913 more and more in this direction. The security of the Dominions, especially of Australia and New Zealand, was the real motive which impelled the British Government, and the Dominion governments after 1919, to continue the treaty-alliance with Japan rather than to estrange this rising big power and drive her into the

67 R.D. II, 7,1. no. 136, p.126
Only by taking this viewpoint into account can the British acquiescence in the measures of Japan's diplomacy during the World War be understood. It was a realistic attitude resulting from political necessity.

A further example of Japan's increasing prestige in the Far East was Japan's intervention in internal Chinese affairs when President Yuan-Shi-Kai attempted to reestablish the monarchy in China in late 1915. It was due to a joint démarche of the Japanese chargé d'affaire and of the British and Russian ministers at Peking on October 28, 1915, that the Chinese government was compelled to postpone the re-introduction of the monarchical system. The British Cabinet had instructed its representative at Peking to associate himself with the step taken by the Japanese government. It was significant that the minor Japanese chargé d'affaire acted as the leading speaker, in spite of the fact that the higher-ranking British and Russian diplomatic representatives were present - Sir John Jordan was even the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps in Peking - and that it was he who advised Peking in this direction. This leading diplomatic position had been traditionally occupied by the British Minister in China but had passed into Japanese hands following the outbreak of the war.

It was more than a mere question of diplomatic ceremony, as can be seen from the comment given by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Baron Ishii, on December 9, 1915, in the Japanese Parliament. He remarked:

When we gave China this advice Japan did only what was her duty to do in the interest of the general peace in the East. . . . The only motive for Japan was the desire to secure the common interests of China and of the Powers . . . . That meant that the Japanese diplomatic step was designed to emphasize Japan's role as mandatory in the Far East. The criticism of British newspapers in China frankly admitted the Japanese diplomatic victory. The National Review, for instance, interpreted the subordinate role of the British Minister as "full evidence for the complete recognition of the Japanese dictatorial aspirations on the part of those European powers which have interests in China." The Peking Daily News commented on the affair in January, 1915:

From the viewpoint of those powers who are interested in maintaining peace in China the joint démarche of the four powers on October 28, 1915, was a diplomatic mistake of primary importance . . . . The powers would be compelled someday to intervene in order to restore the order after revolutionary seditions. 'Powers', however, means in this case "Japan's."71

How thoroughly the situation in the Far East had changed becomes evident if the yielding British attitude in 1915

69 China Archiv. 1916, p. 73-74
70 China Archiv, 1917, p. 73
71 China Archiv, 1916, pp. 158
is compared with the strong protests of Great Britain when Japan tried to prevent China's national unity in 1911/12.

A similar diplomatic defeat for Great Britain, and another manifestation of Japan's predominant influence in Eastern Asia after the war broke out, occurred, when Great Britain made efforts in late 1915 to induce the Chinese government to join the war. The underlying idea was to create a counter balance against the growing influence of Japan in China when the Far Eastern problems were to be discussed at the forthcoming peace conference. China's resistance against the Japanese policy of expansion was to be increased by alloting her a voice at the peace conference. It was furthermore recognized that the Japanese military occupation of Kiaochou and of the railway line Tsingtao-Tsinan-fu had created a serious problem and aroused China's intense opposition. The problem would have to be solved by a 'modus vivendi' at that conference. The participation of China in the peace negotiations demanded that China join the war. When, therefore, on November 18, 1915, the British Minister in Peking, acting together with the French and Russian Ministers, approached the Chinese

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72 cf Chang. op cit. pp. 165-169
government with such a suggestion the Japanese government immediately raised strong objections. Again, the British government gave way instructing the British Ambassador in Tokyo on November 30, to communicate with the Japanese Foreign Minister "that the British government had no intention to enter into any political negotiations with China without having consulted Japan." 74

Japan objected to the British proposal not only because of her fear of being counteracted and of becoming isolated, but she wanted to give an unmistakable declaration that she alone was the determining great power in Eastern Asia and that no political action could be taken in that region of the world without the whole-hearted consent of Japan. This amounted more or less to enunciating an 'Asiatic Monroe Doctrine' the guardian of which was Japan by manifest destiny. The Japanese and Chinese press reflected this conception quite conspicuously. The immediate comment of the Japanese controlled newspaper, Jih-Jbh-Hsin-Wen-Pau in November, 1915, on the allied suggestions to China was:

The Asiatic Monroe Doctrine must become manifest. Because of this reason we must resist most energetically the plan advanced by Britain, France and Russia to draw China into the war . . . because of the Greater Asiatic idea. 75

74 China Archiv, 1916, pp. 20 and 30.
75 China Archiv, 1916, p. 27
The owner of the Osaka Hotchi Shimbun, Utschida, wrote in an article in 1916:

The English have now recognized Japan's superior position by promising to undertake nothing in China without consulting Japan.\textsuperscript{76}

In a similar way the comment of the Shanghai Chinese paper Hsinwen-pau of December 2, 1915, expressed

What Japan had aimed at during the last ten years, that is, the supremacy in the Far East, has now practically and officially been recognized by Great Britain.\textsuperscript{77}

International development in the late years of the World War was extremely favourable to Japan in Eastern Asia; in consequence Japan was soon in the position to achieve the internationally sanctioned implementation of her claims in the Far East.

When the United States felt compelled to enter the war in April, 1917, she wanted an understanding with Japan on Far Eastern problems, because she needed Japan's consent to China's participation in the war. Furthermore, the United States needed the goodwill of Japan because the submarine warfare necessitated a change in the naval programme of 1916. The building of battleships had to be stopped in order to allow for replacement by the building of two hundred and fifty destroyers.\textsuperscript{78} This was the reason for the

\textsuperscript{76} Peking Daily News, August 13-14, 1916.
\textsuperscript{77} China Archiv, 1916, p.31
\textsuperscript{78} Jensen, G. Seemacht Japan, Berlin 1943, pp.188-183
conclusion of the famous Lansing-Ishii Agreement signed on November 2, 1917, by which the United States conceded to Japan "special interests in China" based on propinquity. Whatever the interpretation of this agreement by the U. S. State Department might have been, there can be no doubt that Japan considered it as her Monroe Doctrine over Eastern Asia. Baron Ishii had already declared during the negotiations with the U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, in November, 1917, that "as the reason of the Monroe Doctrine exists so does the position of Japan with respect to China exist. . . .", because Japan's interests "in the whole of China" were greater than those of any other powers. Although the principle of the Open-Door and the integrity of China were again expressly affirmed by Japan in the agreement, it meant nothing but lip-service after Japan had shown what she understood by this phrase when she presented the Twenty-One Demands to China.

The conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was indeed a matter of far-reaching importance. The Russian Ambassador to Tokyo observed in a despatch to St. Petersburg that the powers were not to be allowed to undertake any

79 cf. U.S. For. Rel., 1917, pp.266-268
80 Ishii, op. cit. p. 117
political step in China without previously exchanging views with Japan. The Agreement was regarded by Japan as an instrument to eliminate thoroughly the Western influence from the whole of Asia. In 1916 it had already been suggested in the Japanese press that Japan should intervene in India in the case of a rebellion against the British rule. The Japanese journalist Kyosuki Schimatani in the newspaper, Hsin Nippon, advocated the creation of an Indian-Chinese-Japanese league directed against the Anglo-Saxons for the realization of the principle 'The Orient to the Orientals'. The clearest interpretation of the agreement came from a top-ranking official of the Japanese government who had been personally initiating the Japanese policy of expansion in China, namely the Japanese Minister to Peking, Hioki. In an article in the Japanese paper, Taiyo, he wrote in August, 1917:

To an ever-increasing extent the world concedes to us the role of a leader in the Far East. . . . Japan must be ready for action if circumstances demand so.

These examples testify to the growth of a nationalist-expansionist feeling in Japan based on ideological

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83 Japan Advertiser, Aug. 10, 1917.

84 Japan Advertiser, Aug. 17, 1917.
considerations. Here we see for the first time that Japan looked upon India as a potential field of her political activity, after India had become already the field of Japan's commercial activity.

The British reaction to the Lansing-Ishii Agreement which had been reported to the British government before being signed, was therefore all the more surprising. Mr. Balfour declared in the House of Commons that Great Britain welcomed the agreement because it unified two allies. That means the British government looked upon the American-Japanese understanding very favourably as a means safeguarding the solidarity of the allied war coalition. Any disintegration of this coalition, no matter whether caused by an American-Japanese embroilment or by a serious rupture in Anglo-Japanese relations, would have entailed a grave danger to the security of the British Empire.

What, however, was it that gave rise to British anxiety lest Japan might break away from the Allied cause? It was an open secret that since 1907 Japan had been

85 London Times, Nov. 7, 1917
pursuing a double policy. The cornerstone of her external policy remained, after her victory over Russia, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. At the same time however, Japan secured several understandings with Russia in 1907, 1910 and 1912. These agreements on the one side facilitated Japan's expansionist policy in China, insofar as they stipulated for a division of spheres of interest between Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia; without these party-secret agreements the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 which guaranteed China's administrative rights in those regions would have remained effective.\(^{87}\) Beyond that, however, the Russo-Japanese 'rapprochement' served the Japanese diplomacy as a means of replacing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, if required by circumstances, and of safeguarding Japan's interests against the Anglo-Saxon bloc.

The increasing estrangement between Great Britain and Japan, because of Japan's policy in China during 1915, which devaluated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the eyes of the Japanese government caused her to conclude the Russo-Japanese treaty of July 3, 1916,\(^ {88}\) the additional

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secret convention of which was of paramount importance. This secret convention contained the provision that "China should not fall under the political domination of any third power hostile to Russia or Japan" and provided for mutual military assistance for the defence of their vital interests in the Far East. Although, according to a statement made by Mr. Balfour in the Commons in January, 1918, the Russo-Japanese treaty had been confidentially communicated to the British government, Sir Edward Grey did not know the treaty terms in detail; and although the Japanese Foreign Minister, Count Motono in a statement to the press gave the assurance that the new treaty was not directed against any specific power but referred to other international agreements deemed as an instrument of securing the existing 'status quo' in the Far East, there can be no doubt as to the true scope of the secret alliance. It amounted to the replacement of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which had become outlived according to the opinion of larger sections in the political and public life in Japan. The third powers referred to in the secret convention, which were to be excluded from China, could only

89 Clyde, op.cit. p.413: and Chang op cit.p.181
92 China Archiv.1916, p.356
be Great Britain and the United States. Japan sought the reassurance of a Russian guarantee for consolidating what she had already gained and in the event of the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, to safeguard herself against a possible united Anglo-American front. This is the only interpretation of Count Motono's statement on the treaty.

The British press reacted to the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Treaty in different ways. Whilst newspapers as the Morning Post, the Daily Chronicle, the Daily Telegraph and the London and China Telegraph eulogized the Treaty—because they did not know of the secret convention—the Weekly Nation harboured suspicions of a secret clause, and the London Justice wrote that "Britain and France are simply compelled to save face". The paper warned that the result would be Moscow's and Tokyo's expanding political and commercial domination over China. The real danger threatening the British Empire by Japan's turning away from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance can be measured in its full extent only if we scrutinize the Japanese tendency to turn to the hostile camp, that is, to Germany.

93 China Archiv. 1916, pp 357 and 432-433.
The hesitating attitude of Tokyo at the outbreak of the war was due, at least partly, to influential circles amongst the General Staff who favoured a collaboration with Germany. In the course of the war this tendency increased more and more. As early as 1915 the Japanese press, bitterly resenting the British reluctance to give wholehearted support to Japan's Twenty-One Demands, began to agitate for a re-orientation of Japanese foreign policy towards Germany. The newspapers 'Sekai' and 'Yamato Shimbun' in particular pleaded for a German-Japanese alliance. The 'Sekai' in criticizing the British interference in the Twenty-one Demands said that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had lost its anti-Russian character and should be put aside unless Britain were willing to acknowledge Japan's supremacy in the East. The 'Yamato Shimbun' served as the mouth-piece of several pro-German orientated University professors who since 1915 had been publishing a series of articles under the heading "Japan to England". Especially significant was an article of the 'Yamato Shimbun' of November 7, 1915, which said that Tsingtao and the Sino-Japanese question showed how unilateral the

95 China Archiv, 1917, p.464

obligations imposed on Japan by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were. It was argued that if Japan and Germany had combined for a joint large-scale world policy "the Pacific Ocean, the South Sea, India, Persia, Egypt and South Africa would have risen under the auspices of the Japanese flag."\(^97\) Not only in the press but also in official political circles the idea of an alliance with Germany during the war found strong support. There was a pro-German group in the Genro\(^\text{98}\) and, as mentioned, amongst military circles, demanding in 1915 that Japan take the side of the Central Powers. The former Chief of the Political Division of the Japanese Foreign Office, Hayakawa, stated in the beginning of 1915 with reference to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance:

In order to reach her designs in China Japan has to strive for a 'rapprochement' towards Russia and Germany instead of maintaining the waste-paper agreement . . . .

This was the Japanese conception of a Russo-German-Japanese combination which would have rested upon the solid foundation of geographical conditions.

Although Russia was at war with the German Empire and looked with suspicious eyes upon a possible German-Japanese understanding after the European war - such a fear was expressed by the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo in

\(^97\)China Archiv, 1916, p. 82
\(^98\)Ishii op. cit. p. 112
\(^99\)R. D. II; 8,1, no. 57, p. 59
1915 - 100 the realization of this idea was not too remote in view of the possibility of arriving at a separate peace between Germany, Russia and Japan in March, 1916. How great the possibility of a German-Japanese alliance was to become may be illustrated by a memorandum from the Chief of the German General Staff, von Ludendorff, September 14, 1917, to the German Reichs-Chancellor, in which von Ludendorff expressed his opinion on the peace terms, saying:

The association of Belgium with Germany will have as a result that Holland, if she pursues her obvious interests will be attracted to us, especially if her colonial possessions are guaranteed by a Japan which is allied to us. . . . 102

In any case, the Japanese government must have counted upon the future formation of such a strong coalition. Only in this way it is possible to explain the statement of the Japanese Foreign Minister, Viscount Motono when he, on being asked by the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo in November, 1917, whether the Lansing-Ishii Agreement may not cause misunderstandings between Japan and the United States because of an ambiguous interpretation, answered:

in such a case Japan would have better means at her disposal for carrying into effect her interpretation rather than that of the United States. . . . 103

100 R.D. II: 7,2. no. 746, pp728
101 Chang, op cit.186
102 Quoted from Lloyd George, D, War Memoirs, London, Nicholson and Watson 1933-36 Vol.IV P.2075
103 Report of the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo, of Nov.1,1917, on a conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister Viscount Motono, quoted from Millard, op cit.p.169
After these considerations the British policy of acquiescence towards Japan becomes explicable. The creation of a potential 'Eurasian Continental Bloc' which consisted of two highly industrialized powers exploiting the vast riches of raw materials in the Russian Empire must have been a nightmare to British diplomacy. The British diplomatic documents reveal such concern up to and throughout the year 1919. The vital interests of the British Empire demanded that good Anglo-Japanese relations based on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, however obsolete it might have become with regard to China, be maintained. Instead of the anti-British agitation campaign of the Japanese press, the British press, notably in the Far East, sought therefore to save face and to emphasize the solidarity of cordial relations based upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The London and China Telegraph referred enthusiastically, in June, 1916, to a speech made by the Anglophil Japanese Foreign Minister, Baron Kato, in which he denied that temporary differences of opinion could lead to a dissolution of the Alliance, and

spoke of a "friendly competition" between Britain and Japan in China. The Japan Weekly Chronicle complaining in October, 1917, of the agitation launched by the Japanese newspapers, and endeavouring to remove any suspicion of friction between the two countries, made a sharp difference between the anti-British feeling of "irresponsible journalists" and the official attitude of the government. Meanwhile Japan was also enjoying a period of economic expansion.

The preoccupation of the European powers, primarily Great Britain, in the European war, provided Japan with a unique chance to replace these powers on the Far Eastern market, and to increase to a considerable degree her industrial capacity. According to American consular reports the number of new factories established during the war-years in Japan amounted to about fourteen thousand with a capital of four hundred-forty million yen. The Japanese cotton industry systematically penetrated the Chinese market where British trade, as a consequence of the war, was declining. Japanese cotton manufacture companies like the Mitsui-Mitsubichi-and Maigi-Companies established themselves in Shanghai and Tsingtao, so that the Japanese silk- and cotton-export-trade increased from two hundred and

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105 The London and China Telegraph, June 12, 1916
107 Handelsberichten, Amsterdam, July 3, 1919.
twenty million yen in 1916 to three hundred eighty-four million in 1917.

The second great market conquered by the Japanese export industry was India. As early as 1912, there was a significant competition in the India-coasting trade between the British-India Steamship Company and the 'Nippon Yusen Kaisha' the British and Japanese governmental authorities expressed the fear that the competition might prove detrimental to Anglo-Japanese friendship. There were questions in the House of Commons in 1914, which complained about the exclusion of British ships from the coasting trade between Indian ports by Japanese shipping companies which had overcome a shipping monopoly between Calcutta and Rangoon. According to official statistics, the loadings carried by Japanese shipping companies between India and other countries increased between 1912 and 1918 from an annual rate of thirty thousand tons to five hundred twenty-nine thousand tons. The war brought a complete change in the import-trade of India in favour of Japan. Whilst the Japanese total import

110 Japan Times, Nov.30, 1912.
to India in 1913-1914 amounted roughly to only £3,000,000, the total amount in 1918 was £22,404,000, that is an increase of 400 per-cent, or one fifth of the whole import of India, or, expressed in terms of percentage, the Japanese import to India rose from 2.5 percent to 19.8 percent, whilst the British import decreased from 62.8 percent to 45.5 percent. It was mainly the Lancashire cotton industry that suffered from the Japanese competition in India.

Similar increases of Japan's exports took place on the Australian market, where the Japanese exports in 1917 amounted to about $11,000,000 more than in 1912, and in Siam and Brazil. Parallel to the expansion of Japanese exports overseas there took place a considerable enlargement of Japan's shipbuilding industry which was subsidized during the war. The total tonnage of Japan's merchant navy rose from 1,152,575 tons in 1908 to 2,310,959 tons in 1918. Japan's great shipping lines, such as the 'Nippon Yusen Kaisha', the 'ToKyo Kisen Kaisha' and the 'Osaka Shosan Kaisha' dominated the Pacific Ocean in mercantile passenger shipping whilst the British merchant

113 Manchester Guardian, July 29, 1919.
114 Der Neue Orient, 1919, vol. II, p.231
115 Der Neue Orient, 1919, vol I, p.129
fleet had been suffering heavy losses from the war.

This sort summary of Japan's economic expansion, particularly the growth of her export trade, suffices to illustrate that here a power had grown up during the war which, because of her expanding industrial capacity, had entered into vigorous commercial competition with Great Britain, and which had undermined the so far undisputed trade supremacy of Great Britain in Eastern Asia and in the Pacific. In Australia which felt the Japanese commercial rivalry to its full extent, Senator Long warned the Senate in 1918 of the rapidity with which Japan's mercantile shipping had grown and that it now occupied a most prominent position in the Pacific. Senator MacDougall asked the government what measures they intended to take in order to compete with the further-increasing Japanese merchant navy.

Thus, it can be seen that whilst the Western Powers were almost completely absorbed in the war in Europe, Japan utilized this opportunity for launching a large-scale political, territorial and economic expansion in the Far East. This expansion together with the tremendous increase of her industrial capacity and of her diplomatic prestige resulted in the fact that, whilst Japan had entered

118 Ibid., vol. LXXXV, p.6177
the war as a leading power in Eastern Asia, she came out of the war-period as a world power. As such, she appeared in 1919 at the Peace Conference in Paris. The rise of Japan's power was accompanied by the decline of Great Britain's influence in the Far East. Although the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had become more and more obsolete as the common bond of British-Japanese friendship, and a certain antagonism had arisen between Japan and Great Britain, Japan was an indispensable ally during the war upon whom Great Britain was dependent. The British Government was therefore determined to cooperate further with the Japanese ally and to maintain the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Japanese statesman Baron Ishii commented upon the value of the third alliance for Britain:

With so many British possessions in the Orient--Australia, India, Singapore, Hong Kong--Japan's friendship was absolutely essential to Britain.\(^{119}\)

The British motive which was to determine from now on Great Britain's policy towards Japan was to use

\(^{119}\) Ishii, op cit. p. 60
the Alliance as a means for preventing a Japanese expansion southward to the British Dominions and for exerting a certain controlling and restraining influence on Japan's expansionist policy. For this purpose Great Britain had to be prepared to make concessions to Japan in China, Manchuria and Mongolia, where the Japanese expansion could possibly be diverted in order to protect the Dominions in the south and to preserve the integrity of the British Empire.

Thus, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance underwent a remarkable change. Whereas the Alliance of 1902 had been directed against Russia, in 1905 against Russia and Germany, and after 1911 primarily against Germany, paradoxically, it served the British government from 1914 until its expiration in 1922 as a precautionary measure against Japan herself.
CHAPTER II
BRITISH AND JAPANESE DIPLOMACY AT THE PEACE
CONFERENCE OF PARIS, 1919

Owing to her considerably enlarged power, influence and diplomatic prestige, Japan was admitted to the Conference as a Principal Power, ranking equally with Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States; she could thus exert her influence in the major councils, executives and committees like the Supreme Council of the Big Four and the Council of Ten. The Japanese delegation, headed by the former Prime Minister and member of the Genro, Prince Saionji, was faced with the task of securing juridically by means of diplomacy what had been gained during the war by means of force. The Japanese government might have recalled the demarche of Shimonoseki in 1895, when, being isolated, Japan was deprived of the fruits of her victory over China by the joint intervention of three European Great Powers. To prevent a repetition of such events was the first aim of Japan's diplomacy in 1919. Japan had under all circumstances to avoid being placed in a position of diplomatic isolation, and being opposed by a united anti-Japanese front at the peace negotiations. A revival of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided the means of preventing such isolation. The Japanese government had, as has been seen, been playing with the idea of replacing
the Alliance thoroughly with the British Empire by a formal military alliance with Russia ever since the Russo-Japanese "rapprochement" had taken place through a series of public and secret treaties; but the collapse of the Tsarist Empire in 1918 put an end to these plans and induced the Japanese government as well as Japanese public opinion to think more favourably with the Alliance with Great Britain.

On the occasion of the departure of the Japanese Peace Conference-delegation in 1919, the Tokyo newspaper "Nitschi Nitschi Shimbun" wrote:

Japan's diplomacy, after having defended the claims on Shantung, the German Pacific Islands and the supremacy in Eastern Asia, will be based on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Under these aspects Japan's peace terms will be formulated.¹

Furthermore, by the conclusion of the secret agreements of February, 1917 with Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy,(the details of which will be mentioned later in this Chapter)Japan had secured an effective instrument which provided the legal basis for Japan's demands at the Peace Conference. Both the alliance with Great Britain and the secret agreements enabled Viscount Motono, the Japanese Foreign Minister, to state in the Japanese

¹ Der Neue Orient, 1919, I. p.28
Diet in June, 1917 that his Government had no anxieties regarding the support of the Allied Powers at the Peace Conference and had taken adequate measures to secure Japanese rights and interests. Although Viscount Motono in his statement did not take into account the probable attitude of the United States, he was perfectly right in his prediction.

In the session of the Council of Ten on January 27, 1919, the chief Japanese delegate, Baron Makino, presented his demand for the unconditional cession of the former German rights in Shantung and of all former German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. In making the first claim Japan was seeking to realize the ambition to which she had aspired in the Twenty-one Demands in 1915, and in the supplementary agreement in 1918. It was designed to give Japan a dominating position in Northern China and to strengthen her economy. The second demand originated from strategic considerations. In a memorandum published in the London and China Telegraph he emphasized:

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We claim the right to occupy these islands ... A national sense of dignity inspires the whole people of Japan to the conviction that any other disposal of them would be a reflection upon us, and the handing over of the supervision of these islands would be a just recognition of the services we rendered in maintaining the commerce of the Pacific assisting our Allies in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. We contend, and shall continue to contend that Japan should control the islands north of the equator...

The Japanese demand concerning Shantung necessarily aroused the strongest opposition from the Chinese delegation at the Conference, who sought to vindicate by all means China's right to have Chinese sovereignty over Shantung restored directly without negotiation with Japan. The Chinese opposed Japan because the latter insisted on carrying out the provisions of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915 with regard to Shantung according to which China had agreed to assent to any subsequent settlement disposing of the German rights in Shantung. This created the first complication in the Eastern Asiatic question at Paris. The United States, although she was apparently concerned in this matter, found her interest ignored; her irritation over the Shantung

4 The London and China Telegraph, February 10, 1919

question had important world repercussions and may explain much of her future foreign policy. The key, however, for an understanding of the importance of this problem lies in the policy of Britain at Paris.

British foreign policy toward Japan during the World War had been a policy of acquiescence, the consequences of which became evident at Paris. British diplomacy at the Conference was not free in the choice of the course to be taken but was bound to a very considerable degree by the obligations resulting from agreements which the British Government had incurred towards Japan during the War.

In addition, the British Government in taking their decisions had to take into due consideration the specific interests of the British Dominions, which were going to play more and more an independent role in international politics, and the attitude of the United States.

The obligations towards her Japanese ally imposed upon Great Britain were the provisions of the secret agreement concluded by exchange of notes between the British Ambassador to Tokyo, Sir C. Green, and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Viscount Motono, on February 16, 1917, which stipulated that
His Britannic Majesty's Government accede... to request of the Japanese Government for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference...  

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out why the British government had incurred this obligation of far-reaching consequences in the Council of the Big Three on April 22, 1919. According to the British Prime Minister, it was the result of the emergency-situation in which Great Britain found herself in 1917, when naval units for the anti-submarine warfare were urgently needed in the Mediterranean. Therefore, he stated, Japanese naval aid was indispensable. It was granted by Japan in return for the agreement. This argument, however, although it shows the temporary military dependence of Great Britain in the Far East on the co-operation of Japanese naval power, does not reveal the deeper reasons for the British concession to Japan. As the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, stated in the hearing before the United States Senate Commission on Foreign Relations, an understanding, at least regarding the disposal...


of the islands in the Pacific, was reached between Sir Edward Grey and Baron Ishii, then Japanese Ambassador to Paris, as early as 1915. It was then arranged that the equator was to be the demarcation line between the British and Japanese conquered islands in the Pacific. On the Shantung question, there was no formal agreement except the promise on the part of Japan to return Kiaotchou to China after the war. This revelation made by Mr. Lansing shows that the British concession in regard to the Pacific islands was made at a time when, on the one hand, the Anglo-Japanese relations had become strained because of the twenty-one demands of Japan to China, and, on the other hand, the British Cabinet was negotiating with Tokyo for the accession of Japan to the famous London Declaration of September 4, 1914, under the terms of which the signatory powers pledged themselves not to conclude a separate peace during the hostilities. It will be recalled that in 1915 there was a violent anti-British press campaign in Japan with several suggestions for a re-orientation of Japanese foreign policy towards a German-Japanese "rapprochement", and that, indeed, this possibility was not too remote in 1914 after secret and informal contacts had taken place between German and Japanese diplomatic representatives in Stockholm, which aimed

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8 Mr. Lansing referred to an interview with Baron Ishii during the American-Japanese negotiations on September 6, 1917. cf., Report of the Hearing on the Treaty of Peace before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August 8, 1919, quoted in Millard, op.cit., p.66 ff.
at reaching a separate peace between Germany and the Eastern Powers, Japan and Russia. The British government had therefore been extremely anxious to secure Japan's adherence to the London Declaration to prevent Japan's breaking away from the Allied Powers in general, and from Great Britain in particular. That a defection and even a possible alliance of Japan with Germany against the Allies was feared in Great Britain was openly expressed by the Tokyo correspondent of the "London Times" to Baron Ishii. The reluctance towards Japanese accession to the London Declaration in Genro circles, particularly on the part of Prince Yamagata and Prince Inouye and the criticism launched in the Japanese Diet on the accomplished accession of Japan demonstrated that the anxieties on the part of the British were not unjustified. Thus the British concession had to be made at that time as a price to assure Japan's adherence to the binding London Declaration.

Significant light was shed on the British-Japanese secret agreements of February, 1917 by a secret telegram of the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo of February 8, 1917—that is, six days after the conclusion of the secret agreement. This telegram was published in the leading Moscow newspaper, Izvestia, on December 14, 1917. Referring to the

11Ishii, op. cit., p.101
expediency of granting Japan the promises requested, the Russian diplomat expressed the opinion that "the total relationship between England and Japan during recent months entitles one to the conclusion that Japanese ambitions will meet with no objections on the part of the London Cabinet." The truth of this statement becomes evident in the light of the Japanese answer to the British note of February 6th. The Japanese reply of February 21, 1917 termed the secret agreement a "fresh proof of the close ties that unite the two Allied powers." That means, the British Government had concluded the secret agreement of 1917 with Japan because she was anxious to induce the Japanese Government to remain in the war on the side of the Allies.

A further motive was to revive the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a possibly effective instrument for British post-war diplomacy. The secret diplomacy which the British Government had pursued during the war through a series of agreements necessarily clashed with President Wilson's ideas of replacing the balance of power-system by a universal system of international co-operation in which the old-fashioned secret diplomacy would be replaced by an "open diplomacy", i.e., by open discussion in the League of Nations.

12 Secret telegram of the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo, Krupensky, No. 40, February 8, 1917, pub. by Isvestia, December 14, 1917, quoted from China Archiv. 1918, pp. 59-60.

Questions in the British House of Commons in March, 1918 reflected some uneasiness about the secret treaties concluded by Great Britain since the outbreak of the war, and Prime Minister Mr. Lloyd George may have had similar feelings; for, in a speech at the London Trade Union Congress, January 5, 1918, accepting Wilson's principles, he denied all imperialistic war aims of the Allies as embodied in the secret agreements. Mr. Lloyd George carefully omitted to mention the secret treaty with Japan.

The U. S. Government did not have full and detailed information about this treaty prior to President Wilson's arrival at the Paris Peace Conference early in 1919. President Wilson was, therefore, all the more surprised when he learned of the existence of such a treaty in the Supreme Allied Council. How bitter the feeling of President Wilson was is revealed by his sarcastic remark that he was entitled to ask whether Great Britain and Japan had any right to dispose of the islands in the Pacific. The British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, however, took a firm stand with

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President Wilson, saying that the attitude of the British Government was based on an irrevocable obligation as contained in the Treaty of 1917. He took the same attitude towards the Chinese demand presented by the Chinese chief delegate, Dr. Willington Koo, who wanted the German rights in Shantung directly restored to China. Mr. Lloyd George argued that the Japanese actions in the Far East during the war had also protected China, and that Great Britain was morally obliged to Japan, without whose help the German threat in Eastern Asia could not have been eliminated. The same view was shared by Mr. Arthur Balfour as he pointed out in a despatch to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon. It was remarkable that the British Prime Minister never questioned the legal validity of the Sino-Japanese Treaties of 1915 and 1918, which, as the "Twenty-one Demands," were imposed upon China under Japanese diplomatic pressure. On the contrary, Mr. Lloyd George doubted whether these treaties constituted a suppression of China, and recommended to the Chinese delegate not to consider the agreements as a "scrap of paper." Speaking in terms of International Law,


this meant that the British Government fully recognized, if not sanctioned, the measures taken by the Japanese Government during the war in China. It was the formal recognition of the newly created 'status quo' in the Far East on the part of the British Government, that is to say, of Japan's dominating position in Eastern Asia.

When compared with the attitude of the U. S. Government at that time, which had expressly announced the policy of "non-recognition" in the case of the 'fait accompli' created by Japan, the fundamental difference between British and U. S. Far Eastern policy becomes evident. Great Britain with her vital commercial interests in China, realistically adjusted her policy there to the altered political situation whenever it was necessitated by circumstances. This traditional adaptibility remained a constant feature of British diplomacy from 1915, through the 1920's, when it was illustrated by British willingness to surrender extraterritorial rights in 1926, and by the recognition of the Nanking Government in 1928 down to 1949 when the British Government announced the 'de jure'-recognition of Red China. In contrast, the U. S. policy in the Far East remained persistently inflexible in the restrictive interpretation of the open-door from the time of its enunciation in 1899, and tried
to meet any serious infringement upon this principle by continuously practising a policy of "non-recognition", as is illustrated by the U. S. attitude towards the Twenty-one Demands in 1915, towards the Shantung question in 1919, and during the Manchurian Conflict in 1932.

The basic attitudes of Great Britain and the United States thus collided at the Paris Peace Conference on the Shantung question. The British Government was determined to accept the Japanese dominating influence over certain regions in China as a 'fait accompli' and, by doing this, to secure Japan's co-operation for a policy based upon the thesis of "spheres of influence". Accordingly, the U. S. President faced a joint diplomatic front of Great Britain and Japan, when he proposed at the Conference the abolition of all spheres of influence in China. Mr. Lloyd George impetuously rejected the American proposal, since he was unwilling to allow other nations to share in the financial and economic development of the Yangtse Valley.

The British Government, however, took a resolute and dissenting standpoint when the Japanese delegation put forward their demands for racial equality, particularly when they urged the insertion of a clause in the Covenant

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22 Secret Protocol of the Council of Four, April 21, 1919

of the League, which was to guarantee equal and just treatment to all members of the League. The British delegate, Lord Cecil, declared in February 1919 that this question would imply "extraordinarily serious problems for the British Empire" and advocated a postponement of the discussion of this matter. When the Japanese delegate, Baron Mako, in April 1919 tabled a second proposal at the Conference, which was an amendment to the Preamble of the Covenant, Lord Cecil again expressed his regret not to be in the position to vote for the Japanese amendment, because, as he said, he feared "interference in the domestic affairs of states members of the League".

The British delegate, Mr. Miller, in commenting on the Japanese amendment, explained why the British delegation objected to the proposal of their Japanese Ally. "The words ... could only mean that they were a sort of curtain behind which was the question of White Australia and of immigration of Eastern Peoples into countries which regarded the possibility of such immigration as impossible to discuss." These countries referred to were unquestionably the British Dominions, whose views in questions of international politics had to be carefully observed by the Imperial Government.

25 Ibid. p.178.
27 Miller, Ibid. p.461, quoted by LaFargue, op.cit.p.209.
The standpoint of the British Dominions at the Conference considerably influenced the decisions of the British Government, especially the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, in their policy toward Japan.

To understand fully the Dominions' influence at Paris, and what is of far more importance, on the further course of British-Japanese relations, it appears necessary to review succinctly the constitutional evolution of the Dominions up to that time, and the implications thereof germane to Anglo-Japanese relations. As will be recalled, the British Dominions acquired in 1911 the "right" of consultation on matters of foreign policy in the Imperial Defence Committee. The Dominion Governments utilized this "right" for the first time when the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was at stake in 1911. The Dominions, however, were only given a consultative voice. The conduct of foreign affairs still remained the exclusive preserve of the British Foreign Office in London; and although at the outbreak of the war Sir Edward Grey's attitude towards Japan's participation in the war was influenced by his fear of repercussion on the Dominions, the latter played no major part in the considerations of the British Cabinet so far as Anglo-Japanese relations during the war period were concerned. Australia was not even informed by the British Government about the Japanese actions against China

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18a It was granted by courtesy, not by law.
in 1915. Nor was the Australian Government consulted prior to the conclusion of the secret British-Japanese agreement of 1917, although the allocation of the Pacific islands, which was stipulated, was a matter of primary concern to Australia. The Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes, was confronted with a 'fait accompli' so that he—according to the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Bonar Law—"acquiesced in that which was already done." This aroused severe criticism in the Australian Senate and in the House of Representatives later in 1919 when the Peace Treaty was under discussion.

A closer co-operation between the governments of the United Kingdom and the Dominions began when the Prime Ministers of the Dominions had a direct influence on British foreign policy through their participation in the Imperial War Cabinet in early 1917; and although this body was mainly concerned with the conduct of affairs immediately connected with the war, the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, commented: "With the constitution of that Cabinet a new era has dawned and a new page of history has been written." 

30 cf. Statement by Mr. Hughes, Sept. 19, 1919, Ibid., p. 12608.
31 Ibid., Vol. LXXVIII, p. 10203-4.
The decisive change in the juridical position of the British Dominions occurred in 1917, when by Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference the Dominions were granted an "adequate voice in foreign policy". However ambiguous this formulation was from the juridical point of view, it constituted the legitimate basis for the participation of the Dominions in the Paris Peace Conference. It was particularly due to the influence of Sir Robert Borden and of General Smuts that the Dominions obtained the right of separate representation and separate signature at this conference, thus for the first time taking part in determining post-war politics of the British Empire. Besides the separate representation, the Dominion representatives formed part of the British Empire Delegation which placed them in a "peculiarly effective position", to use Sir Robert Borden's phraseology. No action was taken by the prominent heads of the British Delegation, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, that had not been submitted to the Dominion representatives who had "exactly the same voice in determining British policy as any member of the British Cabinet". The concession made by the Imperial Cabinet was due to the fact that the Dominions had rendered valuable

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contributions to the final victory of the Allies and, after having suffered comparatively heavy casualties during the war, had a moral right not only to be consulted but also to exercise a certain active influence on British foreign policy. This was all the more the case as there were items on the agenda of the Conference which were of vital importance to the Dominions, such as, for instance, the question of Japanese racial equality with its grave eventual consequences on the immigration policies of the Dominions, and the territorial settlement of the question of the former German Pacific islands which concerned the Governments of Australia and New Zealand from the strategic point of view.

The Australian Prime Minister appeared to be the dominant figure at Paris in dealing with these questions. On all important problems affecting Australia he was in close contact with the Japanese delegates, Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda. The question of oriental immigration, chiefly from Japan and China, had long been a matter of primary concern for the Australian as well as the New Zealand Governments. In 1901 the Australian Government had enacted the "Immigration Restriction Act" under which all immigrants who were unable to meet the requirements of a language test were refused entry into Australia.

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36 Clyde, P.H. Op. Cit. p. 474
The same kind of immigration law was introduced in New Zealand in 1908. The purpose of this law was to safeguard what had already become well-known as the "White Policy" upon which Australia's foreign policy was basically founded. Any impairment of the sovereign rights of the Dominions to control the oriental immigration was looked upon by Australia and New Zealand with critical eyes. Their anxiety in this respect, like that of Canada, originated not so much from a feeling of racial discrimination but rather from the governments' efforts to prevent serious economic disturbances which might have resulted in lowering the white men's standard of living. However, because of the existing intimate relations between Great Britain and Japan as a result of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Imperial Government in London had the greatest interest in avoiding any possible friction with her Japanese ally which might possibly result from the anti-Japanese immigration laws of the Dominions. The London Government assiduously urged the Dominions to postpone any discriminatory legislation against Japanese immigration on behalf of the greater imperial interests.

With the increase of Dominion autonomy expressed in Resolution IX, the Australian Government was in a position to take a firmer stand in securing her interests. Prime

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Minister Hughes vigorously opposed the Japanese proposals for racial equality. In a press statement of March 27, 1919 he emphasized:

we cannot agree to the insertion of any words in the Covenant or in the Treaty of Peace that would impair or even question our sovereign rights in regard to any and every aspect of this question. I cannot regard the proposed amendment as an effort to establish a principle under which ultimately some nations would find their international policy as to immigration and nationalization challenged by the League at the instigation of one of its members. 38

Mr. Hughes threatened that Australia "would not sign the Covenant if it contained any such amendment." 39 He even went so far as to announce that he would start an anti-Japanese agitation in Australia if the Japanese demands were conceded. This resolute stand on the part of the Australian Prime Minister caused the British Delegation to take the same line of opposition against the Japanese, although they did so reluctantly as Lord Cecil admitted. 40

Mr. Hughes' attitude, which rejected even any modification in the wording of the Japanese amendment, 41 (and which was not entirely approved by Sir Robert Borden, Mr. Massey and General Smuts) 42 may be considered as the first practical

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38 Canadian Annual Review, 1919, p. 254.
39 The Morning Post, March 29, 1919.
application of exercising an "adequate voice in foreign policy". The Australian-Japanese dispute on the question of racial equality was finally settled by the mediation of the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden. ⁴³

In summing up the Australian standpoint at the Paris Conference, as far as her relations with Japan were concerned, it can be stated that Prime Minister Hughes made it clear to the Japanese Delegation that he was very anxious for the maintenance of friendship and alliance with Japan, but only on condition of the undisputed preservation of the Australian right to decide "who shall enter and who shall not". ⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the Prime Minister of Australia must have felt some uneasiness about the outspoken affront towards Japan implied in his rejection of the Japanese demands. For strategic reasons Australia simply could not afford to incur the enmity of the growing Japanese power. In an interview with the Japanese press at the Paris Conference, Mr. Hughes intimated that it was not Australia who was responsible for the rejection of the Japanese Amendment. ⁴⁵ The consequence was that the attacks of the world press were mainly directed


against President Wilson, although according to a secret dispatch to the U. S. Ambassador to Tōkyō, Mr. Morris, the American Delegation would have possibly accepted the Japanese Amendment. On the whole, it cannot be said that the British rejection of the Japanese proposal for racial equality affected the comparatively intimate Anglo-Japanese relations seriously. For the demands were deemed by the Japanese Delegation to have some value; if they were rejected Japan might secure compensation elsewhere. Baron Makino, when speaking of his Amendment-proposals on April 28, 1919, declared he would not press it. In a conversation with Mr. Arthur Balfour, Baron Makino associated the racial question with that of Shantung, intimating that a grave situation would be created if Japan experienced a rebuff on both questions. This intention seems to have been well recognized on the British side. The Tokyo correspondent of the "Morning Post" reported in March, 1919 from the Japanese capital that official government circles wanted Japan to receive a free hand in Eastern Asia as compensation for her renunciation of any demands for unlimited immigration into the English-speaking countries. As the report made by Mr. Balfour on his talk with Baron Makino on April 28, 1919 in the Council of Four reveals, Sir Arthur Balfour

49 The Morning Post April 23, 1919.
was fully aware that if Japan received the rights she wanted in Shantung the Japanese delegates would not any longer insist unduly on their demands for racial equality. This was a further reason for Britain to support Japan wholeheartedly in the Shantung question. Here again the basic pattern adopted by British diplomacy in regard to her policy towards Japan becomes clear; the British Government was prepared to make considerable concessions to Japan in China for the sake of the security of the Dominions, being urged not a little by the Dominions themselves. This influence was still more evident in another question of vital concern to Australia and New Zealand, namely the future status of the Pacific islands south of the equator.

As early as 1917 the representatives of the British Dominions pointed out very clearly in the sessions of the Imperial War Cabinet their intention not to surrender the conquered former German colonies. It was agreed then that this should be the course to be pursued by the British Delegation at the Peace Conference. This policy, of course,

conflicted with President Wilson's view of the mandatory system. The U. S. President severely criticized the idea of annexation advocated by Mr. Lloyd George on behalf of the Dominions, saying that on this point the powers were at the parting of the ways. It was, however, obvious from the very beginning of the discussions that Australia and New Zealand would not accept the American standpoint as far as the Pacific islands were concerned. On January 28, 1919, the same day that Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson clashed in the Council of Ten, the "Sydney Daily Telegraph" published a statement by the Acting Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Watt, which read:

It is probable that at the Conference of the Allied Powers an attempt will be made to internationalize or neutralize these and other countries that formerly belonged to Germany ... I am cabling today to the Prime Minister in Paris, strongly setting out our objections to any form of international government.

The "Sydney Sun" of February 8, 1919 declared:

The Ladrone, Marshall and Caroline groups involve our strategic and national safety in the Pacific and are inevitably linked with Australia's future greatness and expansion. ...

The Australian attitude in this respect was substantially determined by the Japanese expansion into the Pacific during the war. Australia was the more insistent on her rights as


54 Ibid. p.12424.
the Anglo-Japanese intimacy expressed by Mr. Lloyd George's unqualified support of Japan's demands in Shantung and the Pacific met with some suspicion in that Dominion. The "Sydney Daily Telegraph" remarked, for instance, that Mr. Lloyd George was anxious to "appease Japan and accede to her demands in the Pacific." Since the problem was so important for Australia, Mr. Hughes vigorously urged the annexation of the islands, arguing in the Council of Ten that a New Guinea dominated by another strong power meant the domination of the whole of Australia. In an interview with the Paris newspaper "Le Matin" on February 2, 1919 he stated:

The question of these islands means life or death to Australia...it is our national roof. We want the roof safe as a whole and not open to the fancies of passers-by or aggression of marauders...

A similar stand was taken by the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr. Massey, in regard to Samoa, which he pleaded should be controlled exclusively by New Zealand. The Prime Ministers of both Pacific Dominions were supported by Sir Robert Borden, who admitted that Australia and New Zealand were

in a peculiar position because they had immediately felt the rise of the new Japanese Empire.

The British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, saw the Dominions acting as a united front on this question. He was thus placed between the United States and the Dominions. This was the first indication that the Imperial Cabinet was no longer free in its decisions concerning British policy in the Pacific. Only with the greatest difficulty did Mr. Lloyd George succeed in persuading the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, at a special conference of the British Empire Delegation, to accept the mandate system under a modified form of a compromise, according to which the reservation was made that the Pacific islands were to be administered according to the laws of the mandatory powers being integral parts thereof. It was due only to this compromising policy of Mr. Lloyd George that President Wilson's whole idea of the mandate system was salvaged. The result was, however, that neither President Wilson nor the Australian Prime Minister were satisfied with this solution. Mr. Hughes declared bitterly that the acceptance of this formula was the 'maximum concession' which the Dominions were willing to grant. Nor was the British Government pleased by

61 Ibid. P. 223.
Mr. Hughes' insistence. The London "Westminster Gazette" commented upon his attitude at the Conference:

If individual delegates are allowed to do as Mr. Hughes has done, all national questions will be made battlegrounds in the newspapers whenever delegates are dissatisfied with Conference's votes. This is an impossible state of affairs; and Conference itself will be broken up unless it maintains some discipline over its members. Nothing is more deplorable than the bad example of the Australian Prime Minister . . . .

This statement, however true the reference to the possibility of a breaking up of the Conference might have been hardly seems justified in the light of the new stage in the constitutional evolution of the Dominions developing out of the Imperial War Conference of 1917 and Resolution IX.

In conclusion, it can be seen that British diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference was affected in three ways. The war heritage of the secret Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1917 obliged Great Britain to render her support to Japanese diplomacy at the Conference. The United States' policy at Paris fundamentally conflicted with Japan's interests in the Shantung question. The British Pacific Dominions successfully insisted for the first time on pressing their special interests. Nevertheless, Great Britain remained to a certain

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degree master of the situation. As a matter of political prudence and expediency, the British Government had decided to make concessions to Japan in the Far East, and by maintaining intimate friendship with Japan on the basis of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to serve the interests of Imperial security. The Shantung dispute was indicative of the growing antagonism between the two world powers in the Pacific, Japan and the United States. Great Britain, however, decided at the Paris Conference in favour of her former Japanese ally. The Paris Conference proved that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was still an effective instrument in international politics. It is no exaggeration to maintain that it was this Alliance which caused the defeat of U. S. diplomacy in the Far Eastern question of 1919, and this led ultimately to the rejection of the Versailles Peace Treaty by the U. S. Senate. Since the United States had necessarily to consider Japan's diplomatic victory as a serious menace to the Hay Doctrine of the Open Door Policy in China, which was the traditional basis for any American policy in the Far East, and as an undermining of the diplomatic prestige and influence of the United States Government, the significance of the Paris Conference lay in the fact that it turned out as a triumph of the joint British-Japanese diplomacy over the United States.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had thus become in American eyes a problem of primary concern. To the United States Government the settlement of the Far Eastern question in 1919 was merely a temporary settlement. It was no final solution. Thus, the origin of the Washington Conference, to which the whole Pacific issue culminating in the problem of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to be transferred two years later, lay in Paris.
It has been shown how strong was the intimacy of Anglo-Japanese co-operation at the Paris Peace Conference, which to such a considerable degree influenced the treatment of the Far Eastern question at the Conference. In this chapter it is proposed to examine Anglo-Japanese relations after the Peace Conference until the Imperial Conference in June, 1921. Significant light was shed by the Siberian Intervention on the Far Eastern political problems Great Britain had to face in the years to come.

Originally, the main reason for starting the so-called Siberian Intervention necessitated by the collapse of the Tsarist Empire in 1917, had been merely military-strategic. It was the general fear that Germany would possibly expand her military and political influence in the East beyond the Urals to Siberia and to the coast of the Pacific.¹ This meant not only the seizure of vast

natural resources by the German armies, but might have had also far-reaching political repercussions on Japan's diplomacy. The British Government intended to re-establish a new effective front in the East against Germany. She hoped, furthermore that Japan by participating in the intervention would be committed more deeply in the struggle against the Central Powers and thus, perhaps, might be distracted from her ambitions in China. Therefore, at the end of 1917 and in the beginning of 1918 London took the initiative for the intervention, proposing in Paris, Rome and Washington that Japan should act as a mandatory of the Allies in the task of resisting the German advance to the East. The Japanese Government for their part watching the situation in Eastern Siberia with careful attention as a welcome opportunity to extend Japan's influence in that region, was not disinclined towards the prospect of an armed intervention.

At the outbreak of the Russian Revolution the Japanese Foreign Minister, Viscount Motono, declared that he could not remain indifferent in case of disturbances in Siberia. It was, however, clear from the very beginning

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4 Ibid. Vol.III, No. 613
5 Ibid.
to the Japanese Government that they would not extend Japanese military operations "as far west as possible", beyond Irkutsk, as was proposed by the British; but Japan was particularly interested in concentrating her actions on the Eastern Siberian littoral, i.e., the Maritime Province, with the view of gaining control over that region and consolidating Japanese influence in Northern Manchuria as well as in Outer Mongolia. Such aims were hinted at in various Japanese newspapers. The "Kokusho" demanded in February 1918 the right for Japan to control the administration of the Siberian Railways, and of the Eastern Chinese Railway, whilst a high ranking official in the Japanese Foreign Office, Dr. Terao, in the periodical "Nihon oyobi Nihonju" even went so far as to suggest the cession of Amur Province to Japan. Representatives of Japanese economic circles emphasized the necessity of securing these regions as a convenient market for industrial projects and as a source of raw materials.

The British Government from the very beginning of the intervention had to overcome the suspicion of the United States towards Japanese actions in Eastern Siberia. Only with the utmost reluctance did President Wilson give his

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6 cf. L'Europe Nouvelle 1920, No. 27, pp. 1074.

7 Ibid. 1919, No. 17, p. 786.
consent to the British proposals for armed intervention.\(^8\)

The attitude of the American Government, to whom the idea of further expansion of Japanese power was repugnant, and the continuous efforts of the British Government to secure the effective co-operation of the United States were indicative of the changed situation in the Far East after the First World War; they reflected the growing American-Japanese antagonism and revealed the decline of British power in the Far East, both factors being results of the World War. The Balfour Memorandum of March 16, 1918 to the U. S. Government declared with reference to the Siberian Intervention that

\[\text{no steps could usefully be taken to carry out this policy which had not the active support of the United States. Without that support it would be useless to approach the Japanese Government. }\] \(^9\)

This meant that Great Britain in her policy in the Far East had to take into account the attitude of the United States more than ever before, whether it was a question of securing the U. S. approval for certain actions or of checking Japanese expansionist policy in Eastern Asia. The need for close Anglo-American co-operation with regard to China and Siberia was clearly expressed in a dispatch of the British diplomatic representative in Tokyo, Mr. Alston, to the Foreign Secretary,

\[\begin{align*}
\text{8} & \text{ Doc.Br.For.Pol.1919, Vol.III No.613} \\
\text{9} & \text{Lloyd George, D.War Memoirs London,Nicholson & Watson,1933-36 Vol. VI, p.3175-77.}
\end{align*}\]
Lord Curzon, on October 27, 1919:

Should the Japanese harbour designs ascribed to (them?) ... retention of U.S. troops in Siberia would be best to check available ( . . ? . . ) but nothing can effectually control 'peaceful' penetration of China by Japan except a decision by other members of League of Nations, in which we and U.S.A. would have to take lead, upon a definite policy of rehabilitation of China which (Japan?) would have to accept. . . . 10

As a result of British initiative the so-called "Inter-Allied Railway Board" was established in February, 1919 for supervising the administration of all Siberian railways including the Eastern Chinese Railway. In this body the United States exerted the predominant influence and control, and the American director-general, Mr. G. F. Stevens, was vested with plenipotentiary powers. 11 The purpose was to give the United States a stronger voice as a check against Japan in Eastern Siberia. The British need for American collaboration became apparent when the U. S. Government, on account of American-Japanese controversies over the administration of railways, threatened to withdraw completely from the Intervention.


11 Ibid. No. 256.
The British Government repeatedly expressed their great concern about this. A memorandum from the Foreign Office of December 1919 said: "On our side we have been urging the Americans to take no step in this direction which would play directly into the hands of the Japanese by leaving them in sole control."

To sum up, the Siberian Intervention was an example of the dual position in which British diplomacy found itself; on the one hand, Great Britain had favoured, if not induced, her Japanese ally to take action in Eastern Siberia mainly for strategic reasons, whilst on the other hand the British Government, fully recognizing that the policy pursued by Japan in Siberia involved the continued occupation of North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia and the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, was anxious to secure the co-operation of the United States as the only power capable of checking Japan's expansion in the Far East. For the first time since the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Great Britain secretly collaborated with the United States against her ally in the east. A careful examination of

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13 Ibid. No. 613
14 Ibid. No. 440, Appendix 3; No. 613.
British diplomacy during the Siberian Intervention discloses still another determining feature of British Far Eastern policy at that time. However watchful Great Britain was towards the Japanese aspirations in Eastern Siberia, Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, and however strongly she encouraged the United States to counteract Japanese policy, at the same time the British Government was inclined to look not unfavourably upon an involvement of Japan in those regions of North-Eastern Asia; at least Britain appeared to give her silent consent to Japan's expansion there. The reason for this apparently inconsistent and schizoid diplomacy on the part of Great Britain is connected with the security of the British Dominions in the Pacific and India, as we shall see. To understand this diplomacy it is important to appreciate the trend in Japanese foreign policy immediately after the war had come to an end.

The geographical position of Japan as an island power on the coast of Eastern Asia offered Japan the alternative of either pursuing a continental policy directed towards the Asiatic mainland or of orientating herself overseas which meant pursuing an oceanic maritime policy. During the second part of the war the military Cabinet under General Terauchi, who was in office from 1916 until September 1918, had primarily concentrated on a continental policy. The Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1916, serving as a measure of reassurance against an eventual conflict with the Anglo-Saxon powers and as the instrument for a common domination over China
by Japan and Russia, was to be the basis of this policy. One of the motives which may have induced the Terauchi Cabinet in 1917 to take action in Siberia, in addition to the territorial and economic expansion in North-Eastern Asia was the fight against spreading Bolshevism. Japan needed a strong monarchical government in Russia as a counterbalance against the Anglo-Saxon powers. The Sino-Japanese Treaties of military alliance concluded in March and May, 1918 gave Japan control over the Chinese army and naval forces and served as a further instrument against Russian Bolshevism. This turning away from a deliberate oceanic-economic expansion was reflected in a new programme of army expenditures in the spring of 1918 which was adopted by the Japanese Diet. The programme inaugurated by General Tanaka, a declared opponent of Bolshevism, provided for the reinforcement of the Japanese Army from twenty-one to fifty divisions at the price of reductions in naval expenditures. The liberal circles of Japanese economy, however, mainly represented by the Seiyukai Party, were opposed to the continental policy as pursued by General Terauchi. This led to the resignation of the Terauchi Cabinet in September 1918 and to its replacement by the Seiyukai Party government.

headed by Prime Minister Hara. The new Japanese statesman was determined to resume a policy of economic expansion not only on the Asiatic mainland but also through an expansion of Japanese export economy overseas. It was, however, evident that such a policy could not remain confined to the economic sphere. Political aims were inevitably in the background. This was all the more true in an era in which economic and political factors, being extremely interdependent, could hardly be separated from each other. Thus, the new oceanic policy of Japan found concrete political expression in the so-called 8:8 naval building programme approved by Parliament in the winter session of 1918-19.\textsuperscript{18} According to this programme, which had already been demanded in 1910 by the Minister of the Navy, Baron Saito, two naval squadrons, each consisting of eight battleships, were finally to be established. At the outset the Diet approved the immediate construction of two battleships, two battle cruisers, and eight cruisers, as well as several destroyers and submarines. A far more extensive naval programme was launched in the winter of 1919-20, when Admiral Kato proposed to the Cabinet a naval plan which provided for the construction of four battle cruisers, twelve cruisers, and twenty-four light cruisers, sixty-four

\footnote{Jensen, \textit{Op. Cit.} p.201}
destroyers, and seventy-four submarines. In a special session in July 1920 the tremendous naval scheme for the building of four battleships, four battle cruisers, twelve cruisers, thirty-two destroyers, twenty-eight submarines, five gunboats, and eighteen special ships, at a cost of seven hundred million yen, i.e., ¥68,000,000, was approved by the Japanese Parliament. The scale of Japanese naval armaments can be assessed from the statistical figures for the annual Japanese Naval expenditures from 1916 to 1921.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amt. in Yen</th>
<th>% of Total Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1916-17</td>
<td>99,900,000</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-18</td>
<td>119,880,000</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-19</td>
<td>166,500,000</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-20</td>
<td>249,547,000</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-21</td>
<td>372,627,000</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In English currency, this was an increase of naval expenditures from £15,000,000 to nearly £56,000,000 within five years.

What did this mean? The Hara Cabinet being under the influence of the Japanese Naval circles had embarked upon a large-scale naval policy which was an integral part of Japan's policy of oceanic expansion. There can be no other conclusion but that this huge naval power suited the oceanic

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20 Quoted from Jensen, Op. Cit. p. 217
21 Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1921-22, pp. 49-50.
conception of the responsible statesmen in the Japanese Cabinet. It was deemed to serve as an effective instrument for enforcing the new course of policy if required. There could be no doubt as to the direction of Japan's oceanic policy. As early as 1904-05, during the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese General Kodama had worked out a memorandum in which he alluded to the Japanese conquest of Indo-China.  

During the years of the World War, Japanese businessmen had intensified their trade relations with the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies by increasing their capital investments and the number of Japanese factories and trading estates. The occupation of the former German Pacific islands north of the equator in 1914 can be considered as the prelude to an oceanic expansion of Japanese power and influence to the South. In 1916 the Japanese journalist and former Member of Parliament, Takekoshi, published an article entitled "The First Step of our New Naval Policy", in which he remarked:

Japan must always aim at expansion. ... as all peoples did toward the South, and not toward the North. We must not continue our expansion in the North beyond Manchuria's boundaries, but must direct our eyes toward the South. ... we cannot be proud of possessing some islands in the South Seas until we have Java and Sumatra. ...  

In Japan propaganda started to acquaint the Japanese people

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22 Franke, O. Die Grossmaechte in Ostasien, 1894-1914 Hamburg, 1923, p. 293.
24 China Archiv. Berlin. 1916, p. 176
with the importance of the economic problems in Indo-China, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Straits Settlements. The establishment of a Japanese society for "penetration of the South Seas", presided over by Count Akimosa Yoshikana, was to serve this purpose.25

This southward expansion of Japan raised another problem: the emigration of the Japanese surplus population into the white British Dominions of Australia and New Zealand. This was naturally a problem of immediate and vital concern to the Governments of Great Britain and the Dominions. It determined the basic attitudes of these governments in their policy toward Japan in general and the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in particular. Great Britain fully appreciated the danger to the security of the British Empire. As early as August, 1916 the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson submitted an official memorandum to the British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, in which he set out the potential peace terms. In this memorandum Sir William observed:

German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and the Saloman Islands... are now in the hands of the Australian Government, who have the further enducement to keep what they have got that these islands form a valuable buffer between the mainland and possible Japanese encroachment...26


This remarkable statement carries all the more weight because it originated from competent military circles. Allusions to a southward move of Japanese emigration also appeared in the British press. In April, 1919 the "Morning Post" said that the masses of Japanese labourers would prefer to emigrate into the "warmer and richer territories of the Pacific Ocean" instead of settling in China, Korea and Siberia. The "Japan Advertiser" in January, 1920 expressed concern about Japan's "expansion of territories and the hegemony of the Asiatic races against the whites".

The rise of Japanese sea power in the Far East particularly worried the British Government because, as has already been said, the naval strength of Great Britain in Far Eastern waters was extraordinarily weak during the war. In August, 1919 the British Admiralty, therefore, sent Admiral Jellicoe to New Zealand to survey the naval situation in the Far East and in the South Seas. In his report, Admiral Jellicoe clearly pointed out that it was absolutely necessary to reinforce the British naval forces in those waters:

...the presence of strong naval forces in Far Eastern waters is necessary to ensure the safety of the sea communications from the outset, and to act as a deterrent to other forms of attack, should the condition render them possible as might be the case...

27 Morning Post. April 23, 1919

28 Japan Advertiser. January 1, 1920
Admiral Jellicoe called the serious attention of the Admiralty to the "growing naval strength of nations outside European waters," which necessitated a "reconsideration of the strategical distribution of British naval forces." Admiral Jellicoe was directly referring to Japan in his report. The growing Japanese sea power considered together with the trend of Japanese emigration towards the South, or as Admiral Jellicoe put it, "other forms of attack", constituted a direct challenge to the security of the British Dominions of Australia and New Zealand, which could not remain unanswered. Accordingly, Admiral Jellicoe recommended the increase of the British Far Eastern Fleet to two squadrons, each consisting of eight battleships. He furthermore suggested that Singapore should be developed as a strong modern naval base. This suggestion was adopted by the British Government two years later, after the Dominions had given their whole-hearted consent.


naval base and as the strategic centre of British naval defence in the East, rather than Sydney or Melbourne, owing to the necessity of protecting the access to the Indian Ocean. This was disclosed in later years by the First Sea Lord, Mr. Amery. In view of the Japanese press comments during the war regarding Japan's Pan-Asiatic aspirations towards India as well as the penetration of the Indian market by Japan, the British suspicions do not seem unjustified.

In the light of the foregoing British diplomacy toward Japan, as it appeared during the Siberian Intervention, becomes clear. Although "it was not part of British policy to risk any permanent establishment of Japan in Siberia", as Mr. Lloyd George expressed it in his Memoirs, the British Government, being fully aware that Japan, because of her population problem had to expand, earnestly considered the question of whether or not an "engagement" of Japan on the Asiatic mainland was expedient in the interests of the British Dominions of Australia and of New Zealand. This question was discussed at an Anglo-French Conference held at number 10 Downing Street on

December 13, 1919. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, pointed out that Japan required an outlet "as the Japanese were debarred from going to America and certain British possessions." In his opinion, Siberia offered an "immense field for immigration." Mr. Lloyd George associated himself with this view. The whole problem was set out in an important official memorandum from the Foreign Office in December, 1919, which read in part:

The question is, are we going to draw a tight circle around her (Japan's) activities, or are we going to allow her latitude for ostensibly legitimate operations outside her appointed sphere? It may be said that she must expand somewhere. If so, is there any great objection to her expansion taking place in the wide undeveloped territories which lie at her door, Manchuria, Mongolia, Sakhalin, and Eastern Siberia? At any rate, we have at all costs to prevent such expansions from being affected in patent opposition to us. . .

This basic attitude appeared to become the determinant in the future policy of the British Government as well as of the Australian and New Zealand Governments towards Japan. It was generally felt in Great Britain that Japan's expansion on the Asiatic mainland was a necessary evil to divert

Japanese immigration and political aspirations from the British Dominions in the South. For instance, the "Observer" remarked in 1921:

It cannot be denied that just as the security of the economic life of California, Canada or Australia compels them to exclude the competition of Asiatic immigrants, even so, the security of the economic life of Japan compels her, either to seek new outlets for her surplus population overseas, or to endeavour to secure such a position of economic advantage in comparatively undeveloped regions of the Asiatic mainland, as shall enable her to maintain and increase her industries and thereby feed the people at home . . . 36

The British Government by no means misinterpreted the two political aims of Japan; nor was she under any delusion regarding Japan's Pan-Asiatic intentions. 37 She looked upon the Japanese encroachments on China with some uneasiness, because she felt that the British trade position in China would decline more and more owing to the impairment of the Open Door Doctrine by the Japanese. But for the sake of the security of the British Dominions - which in the last analysis affected the integrity of the whole British Empire - and because it was essential to present oriental immigration, the British Government had to make sacrifices in respect of the British position in China. The Japanese newspaper,

36 "The Observer" June 16, 1921.

"Nippon-oyobi-Nipponjin", alluding to Japan's Pan-Asiatic programme, had intimated as early as 1916, "the greater the consideration paid by Japan to India the more should be the British concessions to Japan as regards China."

There was another fear prevalent in British Government circles which determined to a certain extent British Far Eastern policy, not only at the time of the Siberian Intervention but also thereafter. It played a role in the considerations of the Cabinet as to the expediency of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. With reference to the Japanese aspirations towards the Chinese Eastern Railway, Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, the British Minister at Peking, Mr. Jordan, declared in a dispatch of October 8, 1919: "Japanese influence will always be found on side of whatever party most likely to lend itself the attainment of those ends." 39
38 Although this statement referred primarily to local Russo-Japanese co-operation against China, (that is, Japanese assistance to the Russian General Sem'nov) it must be interpreted under the broader aspects of Russo-Japanese relations. This is more clearly expressed in the Foreign Office Memorandum of December, 1919 which has been previously mentioned. Warning was given there that the Japanese should

not be compelled to seek the attainment of their political ambitions "by a combination which would mean the most formidable menace we have yet to face." No doubt this combination would have been an alliance between Japan, Russia and Germany. The British diplomatic documents of 1919 reveal that the Foreign Office and several British diplomatic representatives in the Far East were deeply concerned about the existing possibility of such an alliance. In Europe, the British Minister in Berne, Lord Acton, reported to London certain rumours about talks going on between Russian, Japanese and German politicians who were discussing the prospects of mutual co-operation. From the Far East the British High Commissioner at Omsk and the British Ambassador to Tokyo wired that "the idea of Japanese-Russian-German alliance no doubt exists," and that in Eastern Siberia it was "growing stronger amongst public." The same fears were shared by the U. S. State Department. One of the primary motives which had led President Wilson to yield to the Japanese demands at the

41 Ibid. No. 280, App. 1
42 Ibid.No. 280.
43 Ibid.No. 323.
44 Ibid.No. 467.
Paris Peace Conference had been his fear that the withdrawal of Japan might possibly have resulted in an Eastern alliance between Japan, Russia and Germany. The U. S. authorities in Siberia were convinced that the aim of the joint policy of the Japanese and General Semenov was the creation of an independent state comprising Siberia and Mongolia, which could play an important role in the formation of an eventual German-Russo-Japanese coalition.  

What conclusions can be drawn from the preceding considerations? Great Britain could not pursue a policy in the Far East which was deliberately directed against Japan; but she had to attempt to arrive at a diplomatic understanding with Japan. Furthermore, to prevent an expansion of Japanese power and influence to the South, and at the same time to avoid the danger of a pro-German and a pro-Russian orientation of Japan, Great Britain was forced to make concessions to Japan on the Asiatic mainland. In practice this policy of appeasement and understanding necessitated the maintenance and continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. An abrogation of the Alliance would have meant that Japan, who was inclined to a prolongation of the treaty, would make efforts to substitute the Eurasian

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continental alliance for the alliance with Great Britain. In addition to that, Great Britain had to face the fact that her traditional naval supremacy for the first time in her history was disputed by a threatening preponderance of the navy of the U. S. A.

An additional factor influencing the British standpoint in this question was the British position in India. The security of British rule in India after the war could be jeopardized from two sides. Already during the war period Japan, under the influence of growing pan-Asianic ideas, had directed her attention to seditious British Indians, and there can be no doubt that the revolutionary anti-British movement in India which strove for India's independence was affected by the pan-Asianic idea. In 1920 the Japanese were in a position to give a warning to the Canadian missionaries in Korea that if they gave "assistance, material or immaterial to either the independence movement in Korea or to the anti-Japanese movement, the Buddhists in Japan would be able to find a legal reason for giving anti-British assistance to those behind the non-co-operation movement in India. Furthermore, the expansion of Japanese exports, primarily of cotton textiles and bazaar goods, to India, which were already high during the war, increased until 1922 to the total of

This economic penetration of India by Japan provided, of course, a possibility of gaining influence in that country. The number of Japanese trade agents established all over India increased rapidly. In other words, it became expedient for the British Government to assure herself the goodwill of Japan and to ensure that she refrained from any pan-Asiatic propaganda and from encouraging the revolutionary forces in India. In the second place, the internal security of India was threatened to a special degree after 1918 by subversive activities of Soviet Russian agents, who collaborated with the anti-British elements in India. According to a "Times" message of January 2, 1919, the Soviet inspired "League for the Liberation of the East", established on Moscow's initiative, had declared that Persia and Afghanistan were the channels through which the revolutionary propaganda would penetrate into India. A report of the Moscow newspaper "Isvestja" of May 6, 1919 said that the leader of the Indian revolutionary movement and member of the Indian National Congress, Professor Barakatullah, had expressed India's sympathy with the Russian struggle against capitalism because the seditious Indians identified capitalism with the British Raj. These examples may illustrate the British concern about the situation in India after 1918. Undoubtedly English anxiety to prevent a domestic uprising played an important

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49 Cf. Report of the British Trade Commissioner in India, Mr. Ainscough, on British-Indian Trade 1921/22. The Board of Trade Journal, Nov. 9, 1922.
50 The Board of Trade Journal, August 7, 1919.
51 Der Neue Orient. 1919, Vol. II, pp. 212
52 Ibid. Vol. I, p. 181
role in the British considerations about the renewal of
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Although, according to a
statement of the Undersecretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Cecil Harmsworth, the terms of the Anglo-
Japanese Treaty did not provide for Japanese military aid
in the case of internal disturbances in India.\textsuperscript{53} the
Alliance might serve as a valuable instrument for strength-
ening the British position in the eyes of the Indians and
of other Asiatic nationalities under British administration.
Statements on the part of the Japanese confirmed this
assumption. For instance, the Japanese Ambassador to
London, Baron Hayashi, declared to the press in the beginning
of 1921:

\ldots the basic idea of the Alliance is to protect
by common action the territorial rights and special
interests of Japan and Great Britain in Eastern
Asia and India. \ldots \textsuperscript{54}

The same view was supported by the Tokyo newspaper "Nitchi
Nitchi"\textsuperscript{55}. This reference to India made by the Japanese
Ambassador in London was reinforced by another remark of
Baron Hayashi, in which he declared the Alliance to be the
only safeguarding bulwark against spreading Bolshevist power.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{53} Gr.Brit.,Parl.Debates,Sess.5, 1921, Vol.146,p.18
\textsuperscript{54} The Japan Advertiser. Feb.16, 1921
\textsuperscript{55} The Japan Advertiser, Jan. 11, 1921
\textsuperscript{56} Ost-Asiatische Rundschau, July 1, 1920
These then were the motives which played an important role in determining the course of Great Britain's policy towards Japan after 1919 and which affected the development of Anglo-Japanese relations after the Paris Conference. As far as Japan was concerned, she wanted to maintain the Alliance after 1919, for several reasons. The trade competition between Japan and Great Britain, which was the result of the enormous rise of Japan's economy and industry during the war, had been continuously increasing since the war. The Japanese cotton goods and silk spinning industry in particular had entered into competition with the Lancashire industry by increasing exports of Japanese goods to English markets. Realizing that the young Japanese economy would not be able in the long run to compete successfully with Great Britain, Japan made earnest efforts after the war to reach a trade understanding. This induced Japan to think favourably of the existing Alliance. In July, 1919 the Director of the Japan Silk Weaving and Spinning Company, Ltd. (Nippon Kimuori Kabushiki Kaisha), Mr. Kanji Morimura, went to Great Britain for trade talks. As he declared, his task was to make enquiries about how a new Anglo-Japanese Alliance could be achieved in the commercial field.\footnote{The Journal of Commerce. July 15, 1919.} But of more importance for Japan was the political
aspect of the Alliance, even if it could never be invoked in the case of serious Japanese-American tension, or in a war between those countries. This was expressed by official representatives of the Japanese Government. The former Japanese Foreign Minister, Count Kato, eulogizing the renewal, remarked in the "Jiji Shimpo" that even if the Alliance were nothing else than a "mutual declaration" this would be better than nothing. The Japanese press unanimously expressed a strong desire for a prolongation of the treaty. The Kokumin stressed in an article in 1921 headed "A Spiritual Alliance":

The object of the Alliance consists of the spiritual affiliation of the two countries. ... While the fundamental spirit of Japan and Great Britain continues to be united with each other there can be no hitch to the relations of the two countries.

Similar favourable utterances were voiced by the Tokyo Nitchi Nitchi and the Asahi Shimbun press. Above all, Japan needed the Alliance with Great Britain to prevent the risk of diplomatic isolation. A continuation of the treaty would enhance Japan's international prestige.

59 The Japan Advertiser. Jan. 9, 1921.
Moreover, Japan expected, if the Alliance were continued, that Britain, although she would never come to Japan's aid in case of a military conflict with the United States, would give moral and diplomatic support to Japanese policy in China, or at least acquiesce in Japan's measures in China.

It has been already seen that a continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in the interests of the British Empire, particularly as far as the security of Australia, New Zealand and India was concerned. Therefore, according to a dispatch of the Chinese Minister in London and to press reports, the British Government as early as 1920 took steps to negotiate with Tokyo for an eventual renewal of the Alliance. Both governments recognized, however, that the treaty terms of this Alliance were not quite compatible with the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article XX of the Covenant stipulated:

The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings "inter se" which are inconsistent with the terms thereof and solemnly undertake that they will hereafter not enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case any member of the League shall before becoming a member of the League have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

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As to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it was notably Article II of the Treaty, providing for immediate mutual military assistance, which was inconsistent with Articles X, XIII and XIV of the Covenant as they contained the principle of arbitration and intermediation by international bodies in case of conflicts. Consequently, the British Foreign Minister, Lord Curzon, on behalf of Great Britain, and the Japanese Ambassador to London, Count Chinda, on behalf of Japan, addressed a joint declaration from Spa on July 8, 1920 to the Council of the League which read:

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan have come to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of July 13, 1911 now existing between the two countries, though in harmony with spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is not entirely consistent with the letter of that Covenant, which both governments earnestly desire to respect. They accordingly have the honour, jointly to inform the League that they recognize the principle that if the said agreement be continued after July, 1921, it must be in a form which is not inconsistent with that Covenant. 63

This joint notification was to become of juridical and political importance as it gave rise to the question of whether it constituted a formal denunciation of the treaty.

The competent law officers of the Crown held the opinion that a denunciation of the Treaty was unquestionably implied and intended. Politically it sheds a significant light on the attitude of the British Government that the Lord Chancellor reversed this interpretation of the

notification at the Imperial Conference in 1921. The British Government obviously handled the question of the renewal or abrogation of the Alliance with the greatest caution and care, because it was an extremely delicate matter in view of Great Britain's relationships with Japan, China and the U.S.A. When asked in the House of Commons on what date the treaty would have to be denounced, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Harmsworth, denied being in the position to answer the question.\textsuperscript{64} In the light of the problems created for the British Empire by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance this approach is understandable.

What were the implications of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on Anglo-American relations? As will have been observed, the danger that the British Empire might be drawn into an American-Japanese war in which it had to support Japan, increased in proportion to the growing American-Japanese tension since 1905. This had already necessitated a revision of the terms of the treaty in 1911, when Article IV of the renewed and modified treaty was inserted, making the "casus foederis" inapplicable in case Great Britain should conclude a general treaty of arbitration with the United States. The Anglo-American arbitration treaty concluded in 1911 did not receive the approval of ratification by the two-thirds majority of the U.S. Senate.

\textsuperscript{64} Gr.Britain,Parls,Deb.5thSeries,1921,Vol.141,p.21
as required by American constitutional law. Instead of the arbitration treaty the British and U. S. Governments therefore negotiated in September, 1914 the Bryan-Spring-Rice Peace Commission Treaty, which, although not technically a treaty of general arbitration, was considered by the British Government as such within the meaning of Article IV of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This interpretation was officially communicated to the Japanese Government by Great Britain; but the British public was not informed about it until December 31, 1920. The British Government was compelled to make a public announcement because of the growing feeling of uneasiness in the U.S.A. about the possible implications of the alliance in case of an armed conflict between America and Japan.

Government and press in Great Britain were anxious to remove all fear in the U.S.A. with regard to the Alliance. Lord Northcliffe issued a statement in December, 1920 which said:

Some of our American friends seem anxious or suspicious about the supposed obligations of Great Britain to join Japan in case Japan goes to war against the U.S.A., under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. These suspicions seem to me to be unfounded... there is no possibility of any combination of England and Japan against the U.S.A. ...

Lord Northcliffe emphasized that the realities of the British Empire made it "impossible to unite Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa against America on behalf of the Japanese." The "Times" in its leading articles

65 The London Times, Dec. 1920

66 The Japan Advertiser, Jan. 1, 1921
associated itself with that opinion.\(^67\) The Japanese Government on their part did all it could to appease the U.S.A. by issuing official statements through her diplomatic representatives in London and Washington. It did so in full recognition of the fact that the British Empire could never be induced by treaty obligations to fight against the U.S.A. with whom she was bound by the bonds of common blood, ancestry and history. Accordingly, the Japanese Ambassador to London, Baron Hayashi, declared in the beginning of 1921:

> It was . . . never in the mind of the Japanese Government to fight the U.S.A. at all, and . . . in the most improbable eventuality of such a war . . . Japan would not expect England to come to her help . . . I can assure you with all the emphasis at my command that the Alliance will never stand in the way of the good understanding and friendly relations between Great Britain and the U.S.A. . . .\(^68\)

The same assurance was given by the Japanese Ambassador to Washington, Baron Shidehara, who, arguing that Article IV of the Treaty had deliberately been inserted to remove any possibility of war between the U.S.A. and Great Britain, denied most emphatically "that the Alliance was ever designed or remotely intended as an instrument of hostility or even of defence against the U.S.A."\(^69\)

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\(^68\) The Japan Advertiser, February 16, 1921
\(^69\) The Journal of Commerce, New York, July 5, 1921.
However honest these statements were, they did not suffice to remove the inexorable opposition of the United States to the Alliance. It was finally this opposition which forced Great Britain to terminate the Alliance.

The view of the United States (which had emerged from the war as the other world power in the Pacific) had to be taken into consideration by Great Britain to a far larger extent than before the war because Britain had become dependent upon the financial capacity of the United States. The British Government had to recognize the changed position of power in the Pacific which was no longer determined by Great Britain alone, but by a 'Pacific Triangle' consisting of Great Britain, Japan and the United States. For the British Government the rise of the United States as a world power meant that sooner or later she had to make her decision between the United States and her former ally, Japan. In the British House of Commons, Commander Bellairs expressed the ambivalent position by calling Japan "an ally by diplomatic means and the United States an ally by nature." Great Britain found herself in a dilemma of alliances; she was facing the difficult task of bringing into harmony two

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alignments which were incompatible with each other, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Anglo-American co-operation. This dilemma became apparent as early as 1917, when Mr. Balfour put forward the proposal for a multi-lateral six power naval agreement between Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Japan and the United States. 71 In his Memorandum of June 22, 1917 to the Imperial War Cabinet, Mr. Balfour pointed out that he definitely would prefer a bi-lateral defence alliance between Great Britain and the U.S.A., but "the objection to it arises out of our existing treaty with Japan." 72 He feared the implications of an Anglo-American alliance on Anglo-Japanese relations. According to Mr. Balfour, an Anglo-American defence pact would have been regarded as "the beginning of the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance." This explains Mr. Balfour's attempt to "associate Japan from the beginning with the new arrangement." 73 Mr. Balfour was under the misapprehension that the United States would accept the obligations of a formal alliance and would join a combination to which the growing Japanese power was a part. 74 Nevertheless his

71 Dugdale, OppCit. p.209
72 Ibid. P.210
73 Ibid. P.210
74 Ibid. P.210.
attitude shows that the British Government did recognize that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance constituted a real problem in the changed situation in the Pacific. In the ultimate analysis the traditional Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had rendered valuable service to Great Britain for almost twenty years and which was still one of the strongest pillars of British foreign policy, stood against the idea of Anglo-American co-operation. This idea had grown stronger since the World War on both sides of the Atlantic. In England the "London Times" advocated in 1918 an Anglo-American Alliance, or at least a strengthening of the bonds between Great Britain and the U.S.A., upon which friendship the future prosperity of the world would depend. In the United States President Harding emphasized in a letter to the Chairman of the Sulgrave Institute, Mr. J. A. Stewart, early in 1921, the paramount importance of the "unity of English-speaking peoples" in world affairs. There was a widespread feeling in the United Kingdom that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should not be renewed before the views of the U.S. Government were heard. Questions raised in the House of Commons by several M.P's expressed serious anxieties as to the effect of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on Anglo-American relations.

75 The London Times, December 11, 1918.
76 Ibid. January 19, 1921.
Commander Bellairs asked in June, 1921:

... whether it has been officially intimated to the U.S.A., by means of a diplomatic note, that in no circumstances can Japan receive support... in the case of war between Japan and the U.S.A. 78

He hinted that the British Government should immediately communicate with the U.S. Government regarding the plans for a renewal of the Alliance. 79 This had not yet been done, for a press communique issued by the U.S. State Department denied the alleged reception of official assurance and information regarding the possible treaty terms. 80

Lieut.-Col. Sir F. Hall (M.P.) asked similar questions about the application of the treaty to a conflict between Japan and the U.S.A. 81 The answers given by the Government representatives in the Commons were mostly dilatory and evasive. The additional Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kellaway, referring to Article IV of the Alliance, assured the House:

Our relations with Japan are so arranged as not to involve us in the possibility of conflict with the U.S.A. 82

He, as well as the Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Chamberlain, believed it to be unnecessary to make an official communication to the U.S.A. 83

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79 Ibid. P. 1983.
80 The London Times, June 23, 1921.
82 Ibid. P. 1574
83 Ibid. P. 1574 and P. 1791
These answers revealed two important things. Firstly, the British Government believed it could appease the U.S. Government by referring only to the application of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in case of war. In so doing they misunderstood the essential motives behind the U.S. opposition to the Alliance. Secondly, being fully aware of the diplomatic expediency to renew the treaty, but at the same time realizing the necessity of taking into serious consideration the attitude of the U.S.A., the British Government proceeded with extreme caution, wishing to keep the door open for a compromise solution. Therefore, the Foreign Office informed the U.S. Ambassador to London in April, 1920 that the question of the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance remained "undecided". There can be no doubt that the British Government was strongly inclined to renew the Alliance. Various facts in British-Japanese relations after 1919 support this assumption.

Anglo-Japanese co-operation in the League of Nations' Assembly was looked upon by U.S. observers with critical eyes. The British representatives in Geneva obviously supported the Japanese standpoint when China, in 1920, tried to place her demands for a revision of the Shantung controversy on the Agenda. The British delegates intimated to the Chinese that it was inadvisable to raise the question, and they made it unmistakably clear that

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if China persisted in her demands, Great Britain would support Japan in accordance with the obligations incurred under the terms of the secret Shantung agreement of 1917, and of the Versailles Peace Treaty. American suspicion even went so far as to assume that a secret tripartite agreement between Great Britain, Japan and France had been concluded at Paris with regard to pursuing a future policy of mutual understanding in the whole of Eastern Asia.

The Japanese Government for their part, being in a position to use the issue of racial equality to exert pressure on Great Britain, offered the British Government the diplomatic 'quid pro quo' by dropping such demands in the League Assembly.

Another example of the British appeasement policy towards Japan which has to be considered in connection with the issue of the Alliance was the attitude of Great Britain in negotiating the 'Consortium Agreement' early in 1920. The British Government protested the Japanese demand for insertion of the express reservation in the agreement that South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia be exempted from the scope of the 'Consortium', because Japan claimed "special rights and interests" there in accordance with the Lansing-Ishii Agreement. But the U.K. Government, in

its note of March 19th, 1920, was prepared "to subscribe to a written assurance to the effect that the Japanese Government need have no reason to apprehend that the Consortium would direct any activities affecting the security of the economic life and national defence of Japan." This formula was ultimately accepted by the Japanese cabinet. It is clear from the comment of the "Observer" upon this agreement:

To expect the Japanese to abandon the position thus created with all that it means to the economic life of the nation, is to ignore the basic realities of the situation.

that the attitude adopted by the British cabinet amounted in the final analysis to an acquiescence in Japan's policy on the Asiatic mainland, a policy based on "special rights and interests", that is to say, the Japanese interpretation of the Lansing Ishii Agreement. The same London newspaper went on:

Under these circumstances it is reasonable. That a full and frank discussion of the renewal of the Alliance starting with reciprocal recognition of accomplished facts should lead to a clear definition of Japan's position in Manchuria and Mongolia.

Three days later the "Observer" again referring to Great

90 The Observer, June 16, 1921
91 Ibid.
Britain's and Japan's position in China remarked:

It is today more than ever desirable that Great Britain and Japan should renew their alliance. 92

These statements of the "Observer" reflected exactly the view of the British Government who always approached the situation in China with a realistic outlook. Great Britain had to accept a sort of Japanese supremacy over certain areas in China as a 'fait accompli'. She realized that this was one of the repercussions of the world war on the political 'status quo' in the Far East. To prevent as far as possible direct Japanese encroachments upon the British commercial position in China she was forced to base her policy towards Japan on mutual understanding. This could best be done by a renewal of the Alliance.

In the second place the British Government had always in mind the Imperial security of the British Dominions. The British apprehension of a Japan turning to the South was a motive for Great Britain's yielding as exemplified in the case of the 'Consortium Agreement'.

The power which was immediately affected by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the Far East was China. Being without an effective and centralized government since the decline of the Manchu-dynasty, and therefore in no position to resist European economic penetration and Japan's aggressive, expansionist policy, she had been the victim

92 The June 19, 1921. Observer
in the Far Eastern diplomacy of these powers. During the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance China had suffered considerable impairments to her territorial and administrative integrity. The Japanese penetration of South Manchuria, the occupation of the Liaotung peninsula, the annexation of Korea, the Twenty-one Demands of 1915 and the Shantung issue were, the Chinese felt, examples which were the result of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Alliance, the Treaty terms of which referred directly to China, was therefore thought by her to be most prejudicial to Chinese interests. In particular a renewal of the Treaty was interpreted by China as a British endorsement of Japan's policy of encroachments since 1915. As soon as the intention of Great Britain and Japan to renew the Alliance became apparent, the Chinese Government formally protested in 1920 against being mentioned in the Treaty without being asked previously for her consent. In a statement to the press on June 6, 1920 the Chinese Foreign Minister emphasized:

Chinese opinion is not unnaturally distrustful of any renewal of the agreement...a contract regarding her affairs between other members of the League of Nations cannot be entered into without her previous consent...94

94 Manchester Guardian, June 6, 1920.
In addition to the official protests of the Chinese Government there were protest messages from Chinese public opinion, particularly from various financial, commercial, and banking circles. In a memorandum submitted by these organizations to the British Minister to Peking, Sir. B. Alston, in July 1920, reference was made to the secret Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1917 which was alleged to be one of the consequences of the Alliance upon China. Warning was given that the renewal of that Alliance would "cause Great Britain to share the distrust of the Chinese people so widely and deeply entertained towards Japan". The same view was expressed by the well-known leader of the democratic movement of China, Dr. Sun Yat Sen, in an interview with the North "China Herald". In various messages, amongst them a telegram from the President of the Shanghai People's Convention, Mr. Yu Yoh Tesze, the attention of the British was drawn to the possible effects of a renewal of the Treaty on English trade in China. Similar Chinese telegrams were dispatched to Melbourne, Paris, Rome, Ottawa and especially to Washington where the Chinese asked that strong pressure be brought to bear on Great Britain.

95 id., Sept. 10, 1920, Manchester Guardian.
96 Chang, op. cit., p. 213-14.
97 The London Times, July 9, 1921 and New York Evening Post June 14, 1921.
98 New York Evening Post, June 14, 1921
In the official reply of the Foreign Office the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, gave pacating assurances to the Chinese that the Imperial Cabinet in London would take into due account the Chinese standpoint. It was true that the Chinese objections against the renewal of the Treaty were widely shared in British circles. The leading British newspapers in the Far East, the "Japan Chronicle" and the "Peking Tientsin Times", reflecting the opinion of British residents in these regions, echoed strong dissatisfaction and were also opposed to the prospect of a continued alliance because of the prejudicial effects on British trade in China.

Numerous questions in the British House of Commons during the Spring and summer of 1921 expressed in the same way grave apprehensions as to the possible reactions of China. Mr. Kenyon (M.P.) inquired whether the opinions of the British commercial circles in the Far East had been ascertained by the Government. Sir W. de Frece (M.P.) intimated the possibility of organized boycott of British imports of the Lancashire cotton trade by the Chinese and Mr. T. Wilson (M.P.) asked whether the Government would take steps "to prevent anything that will prejudice our trade relations with China being embodied in our treaty with Japan."

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99 The London Times, July 9, 1921
100 Millard, op.cit. pp.452-469 Appendix
102 Ibid. p.52
103 Ibid. p.406
Indeed, the economic penetration of China by Japan, which ran parallel to political and military action had seriously affected British trade in China, if not caused the decline of Britain's previously supreme commercial position there. This was especially true as far as British export of cotton goods was concerned. According to information given by the Secretary for the Sino-British trade association, Mr. L. E. Haynes, Japanese cotton exports to China in 1921 totalled 70,208 piculs, whilst during the same period the British cotton yard export amounted to 13,371 piculs.¹⁰⁴

The following figures may illustrate the decline of British export of cotton piece goods to China.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Japan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>11,705,426</td>
<td>5,716,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>5,784,026</td>
<td>7,035,458</td>
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</tbody>
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Roughly speaking these figures show that in 1913 the British cotton export to China was about twice as high as that of Japan, whilst in 1921 the reverse was true. In view of these economic aspects, the critical voices in the Commons and in the British Far Eastern press seemed to be justified. Great Britain's principal interests in the Far East were predominantly economic and commercial in character. A preservation or even consolidation of these interests was to a substantial extent dependent on Great Britain's cooperation with China.

¹⁰⁴ Manchester Guardian, Commercial, August 24, 1922
¹⁰⁵ Ibid. Sept. 7, 1922
The British China expert, Mr. L. Simpson termed this cooperation as a 'sine qua non'. No less justification was contained in those questions in Parliament which expressed apprehension of the political repercussions of the Anglo-Japanese alignment on British policy in China. Mr. Kenyon, for instance, asked whether the British Government would be able under the alliance "publicly to dissociate itself from aspects of Japanese action which do not recommend themselves to opinion in this country". 107

To sum up the problem of Anglo-Chinese relationship with particular reference to Anglo-Japanese relations, the British Government had earnestly to consider whether joint Anglo-Japanese cooperation with regard to Britain's policy in China was preferable to securing the good will of China. The alliance between Great Britain and Japan was incompatible with Anglo-Chinese friendship. A careful examination of the evasive answers given by the Government in the Commons during April and June 1921 leads to the assumption that the British Cabinet wanted to leave the final decision on the renewal of the Alliance "in suspenso". 108

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106 Simpson, L. op.cit. p.110
108 Ibid. Vol. 141, pp. 370 and 674
       Vol. 143 pp. 52, 112-12, 1337, 1393
At this stage of developments an event which occurred in May 1921 must be considered of as great importance in relation to the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This was the state visit of the Japanese Crown Prince, Hirohito, to London. Although the British as well as the Japanese Press remarked that no political meaning should be attached to the visit, it was apparent from various circumstances that political intentions were implied. It was no accident that the high visit of a member of the Imperial Family who was accompanied by such prominent persons as the former Japanese ambassador to the Court of St. James, Count Chinda, Admiral Oguri and Lieutenant-General Nara coincided with the fact that the renewal of the Alliance was under consideration. A tour abroad of the Crown-Prince of Japan was unprecedented and marked a complete break with the tradition of thousands of years. This elicited the most acrimonious opposition of the conservative Genro and led to the resignation of Prince Yamagata and Matsukata. It was the first time in Japan's history that the heir to the Imperial throne had left his country. This could only be interpreted as a political mission to be carried out by the personal representative of the Japanese Emperor. The official speeches delivered at the State's Banquet at Buckingham Palace on May 5th, 1921 illustrated the political significance behind this visit.

Koelnische Zeitung, June 25, 1921
King George V, emphasized the importance of "friendly co-operation" between Great Britain and Japan, and the Japanese Crown-Prince eulogized the "invariable friendship" between both nations. He hoped that the "happy relations existing between our two allied countries" would continue.\textsuperscript{110} The comments of the British press on this event unanimously expressed a pro-Japanese feeling. "The Morning Post" pointed out that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had proved a great asset in maintaining peace in the Far East and recommended its renewal in the present year.\textsuperscript{111} The "Daily Telegraph" emphasized the peaceful character of the Alliance which refuted the fears of the U.S.A. The paper particularly praised the interpretation of the Alliance given by the Australian Prime Minister, namely the protection of Australia. The "Daily Chronicle", also stressing the advantage of the Alliance, said that it had never been directed against the U.S.A.\textsuperscript{112} The Japanese newspaper "ASahi Shimbun" clearly stated: "the Alliance, renewed and undergoing changes and amendments, will continue to be the guiding principle in politics and the guarantee of the peace in the Far East."\textsuperscript{114} It was remarkable how two days after the official reception at Buckingham Palace the British Government reacted on

\textsuperscript{110}London Times, May 10, 1921
\textsuperscript{111}Morning Post, May 9, 1921
\textsuperscript{112}The Daily Telegraph, May 7, 1921
\textsuperscript{113}The Daily Chronicle, May 9, 1921
\textsuperscript{114}Quoted in the London Times, May 12, 1921
questions put forward in the Commons. The Leader of the House, Mr. Chamberlain, refused to give precise answers to all questions by remarking: "I can make no further statement." He announced that the problem would be transferred for discussion to the forthcoming Imperial Conference. Another example that shows how anxious the British Cabinet was to avoid having the matter drawn into the public eye, was the suggestion advanced by Colonel Wedgwood (M.P.) in the Commons that an opportunity be provided for parliamentary discussion of the subjects to be tabled on the agenda of the Imperial Conference. The evasive answer of the British Prime Minister, that he would be willing to discuss the matter "if there be a general desire in the House", amounted to a flat rejection of the proposal, particularly the numerous questions put in the House with regard to China and the Alliance had already indicated a general desire for such discussion. Indeed, prior to the Imperial Conference no general discussion took place in the British House of Commons, a procedure that was entirely different from that adopted by the Australian and Canadian Governments. The Dominion Parliaments were given the opportunity of discussion just as the Dominion Prime Minister of Australia and Canada made statements in each case expressing the Governments' views.

To sum up, what conclusions can be drawn from the

116 Ibid. Vol. 142, pp. 567-68
picture of Anglo-Japanese relationship from 1919 till June 1921? The motives which influenced the British Cabinet in its considerations of a renewal or non renewal of the Alliance have been discussed and the pros and cons underlying this question examined. The objections to a renewal did carry, no doubt, considerable weight; the complete surrender of British policy in China to Japan's will which made the British Government unable to dissociate itself from Japanese actions that were prejudicial to British interests; the probable danger of an estrangement of China which would have had serious effects on British trade in China, and last, but not least, the violent antagonism of the U. S. A. which might result in most serious repercussions on Anglo-American relations. In spite of all that, the Imperial Government seemed to be strongly inclined in the early summer of 1921 to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, primarily for reasons of Imperial security. She hoped that a continued Alliance would serve as an instrument by which a controlling and restraining influence on Japanese foreign policy could be exercised. Considered under these aspects the Alliance had become a kind of necessary evil to Great Britain.

The approaching date of the expiration of the Alliance in July 1921 required that an immediate decision
be taken by the British Cabinet. This was, however, only possible after full consultation with the Prime Ministers of the Dominion Governments, because the issue at stake was a matter that affected the whole of the British Empire. This leads to the consideration of the "Imperial Conference" held in June and July 1921 in London, and of its implications for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
CHAPTER IV

THE DOMINIONS, THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE AND THE "IMPERIAL CONFERENCE" OF 1921

As long as the British Government in London exclusively determined the course of the foreign policy of the British Empire as one legal entity, the British Dominions had little direct influence on British foreign policy towards Japan. As a result, however, of the Dominions' contribution to the war efforts, and in consequence of Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference in 1917, by which the Dominions were granted an "adequate voice in foreign policy", a fundamental change took place in the international structure of the British Empire. This meant that the Imperial Cabinet had to take into due consideration the specific interests of the Dominions towards the Pacific problem as constituted by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This problem vitally affected the Dominions of Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The "Imperial Conference" of 1921¹ was convened on the initiative of the Australian Prime Minister, 

¹Officially called: "Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, The Dominions and India." cf. Conference of Prime Minister and Representatives of the United Kingdom, The Dominions and India (June, July, August, 1921) Summary of Proceedings and Documents presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, Cmd. 1474, London, H.M. St. O. 1921, (Thereafter referred to as Cmd. 1474.)
Mr. Hughes, who urged in October 1920 in a telegram to the British Prime Minister, that a joint policy of Great Britain and the Dominions with the regard to the Pacific should be laid down at such a conference. The result was that in December 1920 Mr. Lloyd George informed the House of Commons that a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the British Empire was to be held in June 1921. He announced that action concerning the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be taken only after full consultation with the Dominion Governments. This assurance to the Dominions was reiterated by the Leader of the House, Mr. Chamberlain, in May and June 1921, when he stated that the United Kingdom Cabinet would take no decision before having requested the "advice" of the Dominions. The attitude of the United Kingdom Government as expressed by Mr. Chamberlain has to be noted, because it provided the British interpretation of what an "adequate voice in foreign policy" meant. Although Mr. Lloyd George, declared in his opening speech at the "Imperial Conference" in June 1921 that the Dominions had achieved "full national status" and stood "beside the United Kingdom as equal partners", the British interpretation of an "adequate voice", as conferred upon the Dominions by the Imperial War Conference in 1917, was that the Dominion Governments were to exert an advisory influence on the United

3 Cf. The London Times, Dec. 24, 1920
5 Cmd. 1474 p. 14
Kingdom Cabinet before it took the final decision in a matter of foreign policy. Whilst this was also the interpretation by the Australian Prime Minister, the Canadian conception expressed by the attitude of the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Arthur Meighen, differed greatly from the British and Australian view. The Pacific problem or more accurately, the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as it was tabled on the agenda of the "Imperial Conference", presented a test-case in which, for the first time, the practical application of Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917 was to be experienced. Like a mirror this question of high politics reflected the degree of autonomy the Dominions had acquired after the war.

To understand the Australian and New Zealand standpoint in the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it is expedient to recall the determining factors of Australia's and New Zealand's foreign policy. Firstly, owing to their geographical position in the vastness of the Pacific Ocean the security of the Dominions was dependent upon Empire communications, and, on the protection of the British Royal Navy. Secondly, the supreme and fundamental principle of Australia's and New Zealand's policy was the absolute maintenance of what is called "White Policy". It was the constant determination of these Dominions situated on the very edge of Asia and immediately exposed to the oriental immigration from China and Japan, to build
up - according to the New Zealand Minister of Education, Mr. Parr, "a great European race in Australia and New Zealand". The third factor of decisive influence was that Australia and New Zealand were directly exposed to the threat of the rising Japanese naval power and to the danger of a Japanese expansion to the South. Finally it may be mentioned that Australia had a vital interest in maintaining good trade relations with Japan because Australia's wool export industry was dependent on the Japanese market. This factor was to play an even more important role in Australian policy in the 1930s. All these factors had reactions on the attitude of both Dominions towards the possible renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

As will be recalled, Japan's foreign policy after 1918 in connection with her large scale naval programme and her expansion into the Pacific Ocean by the occupation of the former German South Sea Islands indicated the tendency of a Japanese expansion to the South. This danger was clearly recognized in both chambers of the Australian Parliament. Senator Needham declared in the late summer of 1919 that "because the Marshall and Caroline Islands are to be the property of Japan, our White Australia Policy is not safe.


7 Cf. King Hall St., op. cit. p. 667
in Japan I see a menace to Australia... we have to watch Japan...

"The leader of the Federal Country Party, Dr. Earle Page, pointing out the rise of Japan, her Pan-Asiatic programme and her trend southwards, anxiously intimated that serious future conflicts may rise "possibly from the exclusion of aliens from these territories, from this continent or from our treatment of their coloured people...

The only effective means of protection against the Japanese peril was by a strong Imperial navy in the Pacific as had been repeatedly demanded by Australia and New Zealand statesmen in the pre-war years. But, as has been seen, the British naval position in those waters had decreased in strength since the World War. The plan for a strong united Imperial fleet in the Pacific had been entirely abandoned. Future naval policy was, according to a statement from the British Admiralty, based on "the development of Dominion Navies" under the command of their own officers, and "each separate Navy being the responsibility of its own Government". At the Imperial Conference of 1921 a resolution was passed that each Dominion Parliament

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9 Ibid. 1920/21, Vol. XCI, p. 362
10 Ibid. 1921, Vol. XCVII, pp. 11697
alone should decide on methods and expense of naval cooperation. This meant that Australia and New Zealand had, to a considerable extent, to bear the sole responsibility for their naval defence, including, the high financial burden of naval expenditures. As Great Britain was deeply indebted to the U. S. financially the Dominions could not expect any economic and financial aid from the United Kingdom Government. In a naval race of the great powers in the Pacific, the position of Australia and New Zealand would thus have become disastrous. For these reasons Australia and New Zealand welcomed a strong U. S. Navy as a counterbalance against the rapidly growing Japanese fleet. But the withdrawal of U. S. policy into isolation after 1919 and the tendency of the United States to desist from any entangling alliances eliminated the prospect of a close political and military cooperation between the Pacific Dominions and the U. S. R. Australia and New Zealand were therefore under the necessity to safeguard their security by an understanding with Japan herself, which meant a continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes, realistically recognized Australia's situation by stating in the Australian House Cmd. 1474, p. 6.
of Representatives in April 1921:

if we cannot secure a satisfactory treaty
then it is obvious that any adequate scheme
of naval defence will involve us in much greater
expenditures, and at a time when our resources
are strained to the utmost. . . 13.

The same realistic argument was advanced by Dr. Earle Page
who advocated a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as
a substitute for the Pacific fleet. 14

Australia's and New Zealand's security was possibly
menaced by Japan. In the absence of any other means,
however, real security could be only gained by a continu-
uation of the Alliance with Japan, although both Dominions
because of the racial immigration question were extremely
reluctant to become too dependent on Japan. It was fully
appreciated in Australia that the Alliance had its dis-
advantages 15 and that Japan was by no means a friendly
ally "by nature", to use Commander Bellair's phraseology,
but rather a perilous ally "by necessity". Australia and
New Zealand thus vacillated between "Scylla and Charybdis",
between the fear from a potential Japanese aggression and
the need for Japan's good will. This explains Mr. Hughes'

14 Ibid. pp. 7398/99
15 Cf., for example, ibid. Vol. XCVI pp. 9382/84.
view that the Treaty "means everything to us". He frankly
admitted in the House of Representatives on April 4, 1921:

No man can deny that is a thing more precious than
rubies that we should have an alliance with the
greatest power in the East. . . If we are asked
are we in favour of a renewal of that Treaty. . .
we are. 16

Many Australians did not feel that the maintenance of a
White Australia Policy would necessarily be impaired by a
renewal of the Treaty. On the contrary, even the leader
of the opposition in the Australian Parliament, Mr. Tudor,
expressed the opinion that a renewal of the alliance would
serve the preservation of White Australia Policy. 17 Other
members of the House who supported a Treaty renewal did so
on condition that the renewal would not impair the principle
of White Australia. 18 The opposition against the renewal
and the real difficulty arose out of the attitude of the
United States. There was unanimity of opinion in both the
Australian House of Representatives and the Senate that no
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance could take place
at the price of antagonizing and estranging the U.S.A. 19

Senator Barkhap, a declared opponent of the Alliance stated
in the Australian Senate in June 1921:

17 ibid. pp. 7389, 7391, 7392
18 ibid. pp. 7268, 7390, 7407
19 ibid. Vol. XCV pp. 7646, 7650, 7652, 7657
America is as much a daughter nation of the United Kingdom as is Australia; . . . it is a most dangerous thing for us to renew the Alliance with Japan . . . I really believe that it would be fatal before many decades to the continued existence of the British Empire if we were to renew the Alliance with Japan or actively operate it in defiance of the opinion of the people of the U. S. A. . . .

Numerous statements indicated that sentiment in favour of drawing closer the bonds between the great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race was rather prevalent in Australia. The dilemma which was one not only for Australia but for the whole of the British Empire was very clearly recognized by Mr. Hughes, when he said: "Our interest, our safety lies in a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty. Yet that Treaty is anathema to the Americans." Mr. Hughes, however, believed in bringing about an easy solution by suggesting a modification of the terms of the Alliance to make it acceptable to Great Britain, the U.S.A., Japan and Australia. He was of the opinion that Australia should play the role of an intermediary in settling the American-Japanese differences and in finding a "modus vivendi" as far as the Treaty renewal was concerned. This opinion was to prove wrong. The severe criticism of the Labour

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20 Commonwealth of Australia, Parl. Deb. 1920/21
Ibid. Vol. XCVI, p. 9583

21 Commonwealth of Australia, Parl. Deb. 1920/21 Vol. XCIV
pp. 7267/68

22 Ibid. pp. 7268
Opposition, notably of the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Ryan, resulted from the fear of antagonizing the U.S.R. and from a certain tendency to accentuate the Dominion's autonomy in foreign policy. The judicial dispute between the Australian Prime Minister and the Deputy Leader of the Opposition over the extent to which Australia would be bound by the Alliance Treaty, if it were renewed by the United Kingdom Government without Australia's approval of the ratification, disclosed that the Australian Prime Minister was not inclined to an interpretation of Resolution IX of 1917 which gave it more than an advisory character. Requesting full authority from the Dominion Parliament for his participation in the forthcoming "Imperial Conference" in London, Mr. Hughes deliberately made a distinction between decisions on the issue of naval expenditures, which were in any case subject to the approval by the Australian Parliament, and the matter of the Treaty renewal. Whereas in the first case Mr. Hughes gave the assurance that Australia would not be committed at the Conference to any expenditure without Parliamentary approval, he evaded making the same assurance with regard to the subject of foreign policy. When being asked by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Tudor, to give a precise statement also with regard to the Alliance

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Treaty Mr. Hughes made it unmistakably clear:

the only thing I asked this Parliament for authority to do, without further reference to Parliament, is to renew the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in some form acceptable to Great Britain, to Japan, to Australia, and if possible to the U.S.A., provided that no renewal shall impair the principle of White Australia. I shall not subscribe to anything that might do that and should bring the Treaty here were it attempted.

When this statement is considered in conjunction with another one which read:

The question of the renewal of the Treaty . . . is . . . a matter upon which our voice ought to be heard. . . we have been invited to express our opinion.

Mr. Hughes' conception of Dominion autonomy, and particularly his interpretation of what was meant by an "adequate voice in foreign policy" becomes obvious. He looked upon the wording of Resolution IX not as facilitating a departure from a united Empire policy directed by the Imperial Government in London, but as conferring upon the Dominion Governments the right to express their views on foreign policy, which policy - in the final analysis - remained in the scope of responsibility and function of the United Kingdom Government. Mr. Hughes believed that

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24 Commonwealth of Australia, Parl. Deb. 1920/21
   Ibid. Vol. XCV, p. 7719

25 Ibid. Vol. XCV, p. 7719
the Australian Parliament could only refuse to ratify the Treaty only if Australia's "sacred principle" of "White Australia" was sacrificed, but this was a subject of domestic and internal rather than of foreign policy.

When the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Ryan, moved that the Australian Prime Minister at the forthcoming "Imperial Conference" should not be empowered to commit Australia to any agreement or understanding except on the condition "that the same shall be subject to the approval and ratification of the people of Australia", and when he urged that a referendum be held on the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, he met with the strongest dissent from the Australian Prime Minister. Mr. Hughes emphatically denied that the Australian Government possessed final treaty-making power which rested exclusively with the United Kingdom Government. According to him the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was, juridically speaking, one concluded between the United Kingdom Government and the Japanese Government. Refuting the Opposition's

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27 Ibid. p. 7631.
view that the Dominion had the full sovereignty to make the juridical validity of a political treaty dependent on the ratification by the Dominion Parliament, Mr. Hughes even went so far as to say that Australia was entirely subject to the legislation enacted by the British House of Parliament. 29 Hereby the Australian Prime Minister professed without reservation his belief that the Dominion Government was fully bound by the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865. Mr. Hughes, was undoubtedly right, since the Colonial Laws Validity Act was still effective and was not repealed until 1931 under the terms of the Statute of Westminster. The Australian Prime Minister summarized therefore his standpoint by stating clearly:

If our people do not approve that will not alter matters by one thousandth part of an inch... if this Parliament... rejects the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, then let it do so... The Treaty will be in force... it will make no difference... 30

This "fidus Achates" - attitude towards the Imperial Cabinet was shared wholeheartedly by New Zealand. The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Massey, advocated in the New Zealand Parliament in March 1921 the establishment of an Imperial


30 Commonwealth of Australia, Parl. Deb. 1920/21, Vol. XCV p. 772/22. Consequently Mr. Ryan's Proposal was rejected by a vote of 41;23
Executive headed by the British Prime Minister, an executive which was to be concerned with carrying out a centralized foreign policy of the British Empire.\footnote{Cf. The Round Table 1920/21 P.968.} The general feeling in New Zealand was one of unqualified loyalty towards Great Britain and the cause of the Empire; it was strongly opposed to any new interpretation of Dominion Status after 1919 which might claim complete independence of the Dominions. Just before Mr. Massey left for the "Imperial Conference" an "Open Letter from the Wellington Round Table Group to the Parliament of New Zealand" was tabled in the New Zealand Parliament. In this letter anxiety was expressed that the unity of the Empire was threatened by centrifugal tendencies in Dominion politics.\footnote{Ibid. pp.974-75} In accordance with this feeling Mr. Massey proclaimed at the "Imperial Conference" unreserved loyalty to the Empire.\footnote{Cmd. 1474, p.27}

It is evident what stood behind this Australian and New Zealand attitude. It was the belief of both the Australian

and the New Zealand Government that the British Empire was one indivisible entity with one united foreign policy. This idea culminated in Mr. Hughes' statement made in the Australian House of Representatives on April 22, 1921 with reference to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty Alliance:

... Our liability in regard to wars in which Britain is involved arises not out of any treaties but out of our relations to Britain and to the Empire generally. When Britain goes to war then, ipso facto, we are at war also . . . .34

Precisely the same view was expressed by the Prime Minister of New Zealand at the "Imperial Conference" of 1921.35 The reason, however, why Australia and New Zealand firmly adhered to the principle of Imperial unity, if not centralization, originated, as previously pointed out, from their insular position in the Pacific Ocean on the borders of Eastern Asia. Australia's and New Zealand's self-preservation depended entirely upon the existence of the British Empire. In the efficiency of this Empire and of Imperial Defence rested the security of Australia's and New Zealand's independence as Dominions. This brief review of the constitutional issue provides an understanding of the close association of both Dominion Governments with the British view on the question of renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It was in direct

35 Cmd. 1474 p.27
contrast to the Canadian attitude.

At the "Imperial Conference" in London which began on July 20, 1921, the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand put forward their views on the issues. In his opening speech Mr. Hughes called the case for the renewal "very strong. . . if not. . . overwhelming" He emphasized that to Australia the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had a "special significance". The Australian main argument for favouring a renewal was the same as that ascribed to the British Government in her policy towards Japan since 1919, namely that a continuation of the Alliance offered the possibility to exercise a greater influence on Japan's policy and to impose restraints on her. But he realized that because of the opposition of the United States of America the Treaty could not be renewed in its original form. The Australian Prime Minister laid it down as a "sine qua non" that any renewed treaty with Japan had to exclude any possibility of war with the United States in order to be satisfactory to Australia.  

36 Cmd. 1474, pp.19-20

37 Ibid.
Mr. Hughes saw, therefore, the ideal solution in a broadening of the bilateral Treaty Alliance into a tripartite alliance between Great Britain, the United States and Japan.

On the second day of the Conference he proposed a special conference of these three powers at which it should be discussed how the Anglo-Japanese Alliance could be supplanted by a tripartite treaty. In case, however, that such an agreement should fail he strongly urged the continuation of the bilateral pact after the views of the United States of America had been ascertained. Under no circumstances was the Australian Prime Minister inclined to renounce the alliance with Japan. On the same day Mr. Hughes suggested a disarmament conference of Great Britain, United States of America, Japan and France to stop "naval construction and naval expenditure." Both proposals were typical of the Australian standpoint. Australia's security required that the powers composing the 'Pacific Triangle', that is to say, Japan, the United States of America and the British Empire, cooperated with each other instead of antagonizing each other.

The former Australian Minister of Defence, Senator E. D.

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39 Ibid.
Millen, therefore advocated an understanding between Great Britain, Japan and the United States of America as the "Ideal" of Australia.\(^40\) A naval race in the Pacific which would undoubtedly have resulted from a serious disruption in the 'Pacific Triangle', whether caused either by the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance or the deep dissatisfaction of the United States of America would have imposed upon Australia intolerable expenditures. For the same reasons as Australia, Mr. Massey supported wholeheartedly the renewal of the Alliance.\(^41\) As Mr. Massey had already declared in May 1921 in Victoria, B. C. "...we have much to gain and nothing to lose by a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty."\(^42\) He supported Mr. Hughes' suggestion for an alliance with the United States of America fully recognizing that future world peace lay in close Anglo-American relations.\(^43\) The suggested solution by the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand were based on misinterpretation of United States policy. No Dominion was in a better position to understand the United States of America than Canada. Her

\(^{40}\) Commonwealth of Australia, Parl. Deb. 1920/21
\(^{41}\) Ibid. Vol. XCVI, p. 9390.
\(^{42}\) Cmd. 1474, pp. 30, 31.
\(^{43}\) Canadian Annual Review, 1921 p. 97
attitude towards the Alliance must therefore now be discussed.

From the very beginning the Anglo-Japanese Alliance constituted a matter of serious concern particularly for Canada for two main reasons - the immigration problem and Anglo-American relations. As far as Japanese immigration into British Columbia was concerned the Provincial Government and the local population had been strongly opposed to the oriental influx since the early eighteen-nineties. The Provincial Government as well as the Federal Government were in complete accord that the principle of "White policy" as it was advocated by Australia and New Zealand, should be maintained by Canada. This task however, was greatly complicated by the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Whilst Canada tried to deal with the immigration question by anti-Japanese immigration acts passed in the B. C. Legislature, the British Government was anxious to maintain cordial relations between the Empire and Japan, and to avoid any frictions with Japan which might result from Canada's attitude. Such measures might have seriously affected, if not jeopardized the foundation of British foreign policy, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Thus, vital Canadian interests were in contradiction to British Empire

policy. Canada's Federal Government in disallowing anti-immigration acts of the B.C. Legislature under the terms of the B.N.A. Act.46 was compelled to make sacrifices on behalf of Great Britain and for the sake of a united Empire policy. Consequently, strong opposition was aroused amongst the population of British Columbia, in the Canadian Parliament, as well as in Government circles. In 1908, for instance, when Mr. Lemiux's Gentlemen's Agreement was debated in the Canadian House of Commons, the French Canadian Nationalist, Mr. Armand Lavergne, stated:

It seems to me that we have been sacrificing Canadian interests for the Imperial policy of Great Britain, for the sake of an ally of Great Britain, which ally may appear in the future as a most dangerous enemy.48

Sir Robert Borden in attacking the Laurier Government on this question urged in a speech delivered in Vancouver in 1907, that Canada must be accorded perfect and unimpaired freedom of action as far as the oriental immigration problem was concerned. In the House of Commons he emphasized in 1908:

Canada ought not to enter into any treaty engagement which would prevent the necessary and effective control of immigration. Oriental immigration is a question of vital importance not only to B.C. but to the whole of the Dominion.49

46 B.N.A. Act of 1867, sec.132.
48 quoted from Woodsworth op.cit. p.90
49 Borden, op.cit. pp.3 ff.
50 Ibid. p.30
These examples may be sufficient to point out the difficulty with which the Canadian Government was confronted: vital domestic interests conflicted with Empire policy as directed from London. At that time, however, Canada's legal position in constitutional and international law had not yet advanced to the stage which would have enabled the Dominion to insist on its own rights and interests. It had to comply with the dominating course of foreign policy as pursued by the British Foreign Office. That was Canada's contribution to Empire policy; British Columbia had, in a certain sense, to pay the price for Imperial security. Vital Canadian interests were strongly concerned but not taken into account by the British Government. It was obviously British foreign policy rather than a specific Canadian foreign policy executed in Ottawa. Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917, however, marked the beginning of a new era in the constitutional evolution of the British Dominions, as pointed out already. Canada took the lead in the new evolution. The issue of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance proved the occasion when Canada for the first time practised an individual and specific Canadian foreign policy. Before analysing the official attitude of the Canadian Cabinet and of Prime Minister Meighen in particular, the general feeling
of Canadian public opinion has to be elucidated briefly.

The overwhelming majority of the Canadian press strongly opposed any renewal of the Treaty with Japan. The "Toronto Globe" for instance drew attention as early as January, 1920 to the fact that the rise of Japanese power in the Far East and the Japanese immigration on the Pacific coast of the North American Continent had led to serious friction between the United States and Japan, and that Canada, in the case of a conflict, would stand side by side with the United States instead of aiding Japan. 51

With reference to oriental immigration, the newspaper declared in 1921 that Canada and the United States would object to any treaty which "would enable Japanese settlers to increase their already important holdings of fertile land in California, Oregon, Washington and British Columbia. 52

The same opposition was voiced by such other leading newspapers as the "Winnipeg Free Press", and the "Ottawa Journal" 53

The best comment which summarizes the problem Canada was faced with, came from the "Toronto Star" which stated on

51 Cf. "Japan Advertiser" Jan. 1, 1920
52 Quoted from the "London Times" October 28, 1921.
May 21:

Canada should oppose the renewal of that Treaty and her supreme interest in the matter should be recognized and deferred to. . . . 54

Prime Minister Meighen, being fully aware that Canadian interest and Empire unity were at stake, took the initiative in seeking a satisfactory solution. Conservative in his political outlook he had always professed his loyalty to the British Crown and adhered to the principle of British leadership in foreign policy. 55 As Prime Minister of Canada he fully realized, however, that Canadian policy, because of Canada's position on the North American Continent, was subject to its own rules, that it faced a dual position; it looked not only towards Great Britain and the British Empire, but also towards the great neighbour, the United States:

Allegiance to its common Sovereign and our membership in the Empire are fundamental; but geographical situation, our social position, our economic heritage and development raise problems which are not identical with those which confront the motherland or any other Dominion. 56

Whereas the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes, interpreted Resolution IX as meaning that Australia's "voice ought to be heard" the Canadian interpretation was absolutely different.

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54 Quoted from the Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1921 p.102 (hereafter referred to as Canad.An.Rev.)
55 Sir A. Meighen, Oversea Addresses June-July 1921, Toronto. The Musson Book Co., Ltd. 1921, pp. 21, 23, 29/31, and Brebner, op.cit. pp. 49.
going far beyond this restrictive interpretation. The Canadian Prime Minister at the "Imperial Conference" of 1921 persistently held the opinion that the Canadian voice should prevail in proportion to the intensity with which a problem of foreign policy affected Canadian interests. As one of the leading statesmen, Mr. Arthur Meighen was the first to realize the eminent importance of the fact that as a result of World War I the centre of gravity in world politics had shifted from Europe to the Pacific, where Canada, sharing with the United States of America the dominating position on the Eastern side of the Ocean, had a vital interest. Thus as early as February 1921, Mr. Meighen communicated through the Department of External Affairs with the British Government. Expressing the view that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should not be renewed as a bilateral pact, he suggested that the Canadian Government should approach the U. S. Government in order to ascertain the possibility of a Pacific conference with the British Empire, the United States, Japan, and China. This proposal appeared to him to be the best opportunity to arrive at a solution satisfactory to all the nations whose interests were involved. In other words, it was to reconcile the diverging interests of the members within the British Commonwealth and particularly to satisfy at the same time the United States of America.

57a Mr. Meighen was considerably influenced by the Legal Adviser to the Canadian Department of External Affairs, Mr. I. C. Christie, who served on the secretarial staff of the Conference. Mr. Christie had played an eminent role in drafting Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference of 1917. [Brebner, op. cit. p. 50.

57b Meighen, op. cit. p. 25

58 Canad. Rev. 1921 pp 102-103, and Brebner, op. cit. pp. 53 ff
Prime Minister Meighen practised a policy of utmost caution and reserve. On March 21, he announced in the Commons that in July a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth would be held and that for this purpose his Government would be prepared to facilitate a preceding discussion in the Canadian Parliament. But he refused to make any commitment in that respect in advance of the "Imperial Conference".

The Parliamentary Debate which dealt with the question of the Alliance took place on April 27th. Again the Canadian Prime Minister reacted rather carefully, saying that any official expression of opinion at the present moment before the "Imperial Conference" had opened would prove detrimental to a successful solution. There were, however, two things which he most emphatically pointed out, one political, the other juridical. The question of the renewal of the Alliance was of paramount importance to Canada and Canadian interest, and arose in a "very high degree" out of the interest of the United States in this question, because Canada, as a part of the British Empire, stood between Great Britain and the United States. Therefore, the question

60 Ibid. p. 2639.
61 Canada, Parl. Deb. 1921, Vol. 146, p. 2639
concerned Canada more than the other Dominions. There could be no obligation for Canada emanating from the Alliance Treaty if renewed, without the approval of the Canadian Parliament. Mr. Arthur Meighen was, however, not inclined to accept the proposal of Mr. Lapointe, M.P. for Quebec East, who recommended the insertion of a special clause in the treaty if renewed, which expressly secured this right for the Canadian Parliament. Mr. Arthur Meighen agreed in principle but he made the reservation that the question of Canada's obligations and commitments might be quite different in case of war. This showed that the already intricate and precarious political question was further complicated by the constitutional and juridical aspects.

At the "Imperial Conference" in June 1921 Mr. Arthur Meighen presented Canada's case. Whilst the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers in their opening speeches eulogized the value of the Alliance and advocated its renewal, Mr. Meighen, stating that Canada was "not disposed to give the same attention" to the British view at any rate, intimated that he might express more detailed dissenting opinion in the further course of discussion. He did so

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63 Cmd. 1474, p. 16.
on June 29th after Lord Curzon had announced the British desire for a treaty-renewal. Mr. Arthur Meighen then launched a massive attack against the intentions of Britain, Australia and New Zealand. He urged that the reason for the continuation of the treaty had disappeared after Russian and German influence had been eliminated from the Far East. He emphasized that the bilateral pact with Japan was incompatible with the terms of the League of Nations, and pointed out that the Alliance fostered Japanese expansion in China and constituted a direct challenge to the United States. Of all these points the last concerning the United States of America was the strongest and paramount one. He stressed the importance of arriving at an international cooperation which would include the United States of America. At the same time he exerted a certain amount of diplomatic pressure on the United Kingdom Government by circulating a confidential memorandum in which he officially declared that if the Alliance should be renewed Canada would not consider herself bound by the treaty without the formal approval by the Canadian Parliament of the ratification.

64 Brebner *op.cit* p.51
67 Simpson,B.L. "An Indiscreet Chronicle from the Pacific by Putnam Weale (pseu.)New York,Dodd,Mead & Comp. 1922, p.108, and The Round Table 1920/21, p.112
As the only expedient solution, he reiterated the proposal he had made in February 1921, in which he urged the calling of a conference to deal with Pacific affairs. He wished to convince Britain and Australia of the vital necessity to hold such a conference because it was the only means of gaining the cooperation of the United States with the British Empire in world politics. This aroused strong opposition from the Australian Prime Minister who objected to the idea of terminating the alliance with Japan.

Canada's attitude was of great importance because it revealed the fundamental principles of Canadian foreign policy. What were the underlying motives for Mr. Arthur Meighen's violent opposition towards the Anglo-Japanese Alliance?

As pointed out previously the Alliance handicapped the Ottawa Government in exercising an effective control over Japanese immigration into Canada. Indeed, this anti-Japanese feeling in British Columbia was a factor the Canadian Government in Ottawa had to take into account.

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In a debate in the Canadian House of Commons April 26, 1921 a representative from Vancouver, Mr. Stevens, urged the Government to reserve in any renewed treaty with Japan the absolute right to control oriental immigration. He drew the Government's attention to a test-case which occurred somewhat earlier in British Columbia, when the Supreme Court and the Privy Council disallowed a Provincial Law enacted by the B. C. Legislature which dealt with employment of orientals. The Court's decision was based on the argument that the act passed constituted a violation of the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. During the Imperial Conference in London the Provincial Government of British Columbia despatched a telegram to Prime Minister Meighen urging him to oppose any renewal of the Alliance unless Canada was given the right to restrict Japanese immigration. This showed that there was some pressure on the Government emanating from the immigration problem in British Columbia; but it showed also that British Columbia did not raise objections to

70 Canada Parl. Deb. 1921, Vol. 148 P. 2595
71 Canad. Ann. Rev. 1921 p. 100
the Treaty-renewal on principle, if the rights of the Provincial Government were reserved. On the contrary, newspapers in B. C. were in favour of maintaining the alliance. Thus it appears that the oriental problem was a factor influencing Mr. Arthur Meighen's attitude, but it was not the dominating one. It was not ill-will against Japan or the intention to sever the close relations with Japan by which Mr. Arthur Meighen was led in his policy as he emphasized in a speech held in Toronto in September 1921. His objection to the course of British foreign policy originated from the fact that the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance jeopardized British-American as well as Canadian-American relations.

It can be stated that a basic axiom of Canadian foreign policy is the maintenance of good and friendly relations between Canada and the United States of America. This fundamental principle in Canadian external relations is derived not only from a common feeling between both nations but also from Canada's geographical propinquity to the United States. Sir Robert Borden was the first to emphasize very emphatically in 1917 the idea of Anglo-American cooperation; he regarded united action between the

72 Cf. for example, the Vancouver Daily Province, June 22nd, 1921; and Angus, H.F. "Canada and Naval Rivalry in the Pacific", Pacific Affairs, Vol. VIII (June 1935), p. 178.
British Empire and the United States of America in world politics as the best guarantee for safeguarding peace. 74 As early as 1918 Sir Robert Borden made it clear in the Imperial War Cabinet that, if the British Empire cooperated with any power against the United States, "that policy could not reckon on the approval or the support of Canada. to promote good relations between the British Commonwealth and the United States of America, was the underlying idea of those Canadian politicians who in 1920 advocated special diplomatic representation for Canada in Washington 76. Such good relations between Canada and the United States were seriously imperilled by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Any continued bilateral alliance between Great Britain and Japan, however modified and hedged with clauses which excluded the possibility of war with the United States, was incompatible with the idea of Anglo-American cooperation. Moreover, in the event of war between United States and Japan, China was supposed to intervene against her rival in the Far East. Thus the 'casus foederis' would have presented itself to Great Britain who would have been involved automatically in a

conflict with the United States of America. This dilemma had been clearly pointed out in May 1921 by Bertram Lenox Simpson, Chief foreign advisor of the President of the Chinese Republic, in a memorandum to the Canadian Prime Minister. "Sooner or later" he argued, "the Treaty" would in effect bring Britain and the United States into collision with one another, first on Chinese soil and then, by natural process, everywhere on the Pacific". Mr. Simpson considered it as self-evident that as a natural consequence of the renewal of the Alliance a Sino-American rapprochement would take place in form of a joint military defence scheme under which China offered naval bases on her coast to the United States.

The same apprehensions over such an alliance and over the possible danger of an armed conflict between China and the United States on the one hand and Japan and Britain on the other hand were expressed in the Australian Senate and the British House of Commons.

Even if there were no danger of war there remained

78 Ibid., p. 57.
the strong opposition of the United States Government and the wide-spread public ill-will in the United States against the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Accordingly, Canadian opposition towards the renewal of the Alliance was manifest. In the Canadian House of Commons' Debate of April 27th, 1921, the leader of the Unionist Liberal Party, Mr. Rowell, reflected the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the House. He urged that the Canadian Government should not ignore the acrimonious feeling against this treaty in the United States. "In the interest of good relations between the British Empire and the United States of America," he expressed the conviction that the treaty should not be renewed. The mouthpiece of the Isolationist French-Canadian opposition, Mr. Deslaurier, (a Member from Montreal) advocated the conclusion of a defensive alliance with United States as foundation of any future Canadian policy. He went even so far as to think of this proposed alliance as a measure of protection against Japanese aggression which might turn a neutral Canada into a new Belgium. This question of preserving neutrality in case of war between Japan and the United States leads to a consideration of the juridical aspects. Was Canada juridically entitled to proclaim neutrality quite apart from the political question whether she was in the position to maintain neutrality?

80 Canada Parl. Deb. 1921, Vol. 148, p. 2657
81 Ibid. pp 2676-77.
The "Toronto Globe" urgently demanding the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance commented in January 1921 that in the case of hostilities between Japan and the United States "the Britannic peoples throughout the world would preserve absolute neutrality". The newspaper expressed its opinion that Canada, treaty or no treaty, would feel under no obligation to render assistance to Japan against the United States. No doubt, these words echoed exactly the feeling of Canadian public opinion and indicated the general trend in Canada towards greater autonomy and against centralized Imperial control; but the opinion as expressed by "The Globe" did not conform with the legal position of the Canadian Dominion at that time. An official statement of the Canadian Government appeared on February 4, 1920, which alluded to the case of an armed conflict between Canada and a foreign power, saying

Canada owes allegiance to the same sovereign as Great Britain and so long as she continues to do so she would be a party in the interest and disentitled to vote. If she disclaimed her interest and claimed the right to vote, she would thereby proclaim her independence.

The same view was shared by Sir Robert Borden when he stated in the Commons Debate of April 27, 1921, that each Dominion must take its reasonable part in the common defence or withdraw and become an independent state.

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82 The Round Table 1920-21, p.395
This showed the discrepancy between the judicial position and the political situation in which Canada found herself placed. Suppose war broke out between Japan and the United States, then Canada's security categorically demanded at least maintaining a benevolent neutrality towards the United States. Diplomatic unity of the Empire, however, required Canada to associate her actions with those of Great Britain. Thus, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance became a symbol of what Putnam Weale called "the Break-up of the British Empire."\(^{85}\)

Should Canada resort to a solution which might produce a new 1776? Several statements made by outstanding politicians, which reflected the strong feeling for nationalism and the desire for absolute independence showed that the issue of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance might possibly push Canada to the very edge of separation.\(^{86}\)

Summarizing the main problems which faced the Meighen-Government it can be said that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance constituted a serious threat to Canada's security. It endangered the vital principles of Canadian foreign policy because it jeopardized good Anglo-American and Canadian-American relations. It involved the danger of disturbing the unity of the British Empire. It was the merit of the Canadian Prime Minister that he realized very distinctly

\(^{85}\) Simpson, Op. Cit. p. 60

that the hour for decision for the British Empire had come, that the British Empire had to choose between Japan and the United States as partner for future cooperation in world politics. Sir Arthur Meighen, in his capacity of Canada's Prime Minister, could naturally pursue no other course of policy than that which served the special interests of his country, that is to say, to prevent under all circumstances a renewal of the Alliance. Simultaneously, however, by insisting on the idea of close Anglo-American cooperation and by acting as intermediator between Britain and the United States he served the interests of the unity of the whole Empire. Sir Arthur's political conception was embodied in his message to the London Times of July 4, 1921 in which he said that the "peace and welfare of the world in the future depended upon the maintenance of a spirit of understanding and cooperation between the two great English-speaking Commonwealths." He expressed his conviction that Canada should act as interpreter and intermediary between the members of the British Commonwealth and "their friends and kinsmen of the great Republic to the South." 87

The question arises whether Prime Minister Meighen, in interpreting more or less the American standpoint in the whole affair did anything but execute United States policy.

87 Quoted from Canad. Ann. Review, 1921, p. 131
There were several statements which appeared to suggest this at that time. Mr. Lloyd George was reported to have accused Mr. Meighen at the Imperial Conference of 1921 of being the mouth-piece of Washington, the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Hughes, made the same charge. In fact, such a view was even voiced by the United States press. For instance, the "Philadelphia Ledger" said that Mr. Meighen represented the United States' viewpoint rather than that of Canada. This superficial identification, however, which tends to depreciate the Canadian Government to a mere executive agency of the United States Government hardly seems justified. The attitude of the Canadian press and of the Ontario Legislature which opposed the anti-British agitation campaign in the American Hearst newspapers, demonstrated that Canadian public opinion was not exclusively pro-American but had its own views. Moreover, at that time no direct diplomatic channels existed between Washington and Ottawa, through which the U.S. State Department could have officially conveyed its opinion to the Canadian Government. In their deliberations on policy to be pursued, the Canadian Government were led primarily by Canada's own vital interests

89 Brebner, J.B. Canada, the Anglo-Jap Alliance and the Washington Conference, Political Science Quarterly Vol.L,1935,pp56
91 Can.Ann.Rev.1921, p.130
as necessitated by Canada's geographical position on the North American Continent and by her dual position between two world powers; Canada's security, which was dependent upon the protection of the British Navy in the Atlantic and the United States naval power in the Pacific, demanded that British and American foreign policy be in complete agreement with each other, or, as Lord Baldwin termed it, that the British Foreign Office "secures the acquiescence" of the State Department. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, if continued, imperilled the harmony between the Empire and the United States. In addition, Canada had to take into consideration that in case of war between Japan and the United States, which was likely to be precipitated by the Alliance, Canadian territory would be involved. Thus it was quite natural that Mr. Arthur Meighen's foreign policy, like any other Canadian external policy, would wish to avoid antagonizing United States policy or even American public opinion. This, however, did not imply that Mr. Meighen merely executed the policy of the State Department in Washington. His policy served the real interests of Canada. It was the individuality of a specific Canadian policy: "Canadianism rooted in North Americanism" as Brebner termed it.

93 Brebner, Opp.Cit., p. 56
This was the first time in the history of the British Empire that a Dominion like Canada had practised a specific individual foreign policy of her own, as distinct from a united Empire policy directed by the British Foreign Office. Mr. Arthur Meighen's policy finally convinced the British Government that British Empire policy toward Japan, (that is in the Pacific and in the Far East) must coincide with U. S. policy. This basic principle of Canadian external policy was vigorously maintained unchanged during the following period. When rumours alluding to the revival of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance occurred in 1934, the "Winnipeg Free Press", emphasized that Canada's attitude of 1921 was a final one, and stated that:

any prospect of an agreement which would draw Great Britain into Japan's orbit at the expense of the U.S.A., with the consequent effect on British-American relations, would be repugnant to Canada and find nothing but opposition in the Dominion. 94

The success of Mr. Meighen's policy can therefore be described as a diplomatic victory which contributed largely to increasing Canada's political prestige and influence in international affairs, and was a prelude to a further consolidation of Canada's legal position. The constitutional issue raised by the Japanese Alliance,—the conflict between centralization and autonomy—was solved by Mr. Meighen's

94 The Winnipeg Free Press, December 3, 1934, quoted by A.R.M. Lower OppCit. p.35
compromising policy of securing the unity of the Empire plus the autonomy of Canada.  

Meanwhile, the British Cabinet was under urgent pressure of time because the treaty was due to expire on July 13, 1921, in two weeks' time from the beginning of the Imperial Conference. The British Government therefore officially addressed a request to the Japanese Government for an extension of the treaty for three months in order to gain time to consider the matter. An immediate decision had to be taken. The British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, presented his views at the beginning of the Conference. He pointed out that the Alliance had proved a most valuable factor in British foreign policy, and reiterated that Japan had "special interests" in the Far East.  With regard to the United States he left no doubt that the "cardinal principle" of British Foreign policy was close and friendly cooperation with the United States. But Mr. Lloyd George put forward one argument in strong support of returning the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In view of the increasing tension between Japan and the United States, which involved

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95 Cf. Mr. Meighen's speech in June 1921, as guest of the Benchers of Gray's Inn: "We have a sense of independence and a sense of unity, and these do not clash; they are in harmony." quoted from Can. Ann. Rev. 1921, pp. 220.


97 Cmd. 1474 p. 13.
the real danger of war — a racial war because of the immigration question —, an abrogation of the Alliance would not only have increased the tension and accelerated the outbreak of an armed conflict, but would also have resulted in serious repercussions on the British Empire. A cancellation of the treaty would be considered by Japan, and furthermore by India and the other Asiatic dependencies of the Empire, as a sign that Great Britain endorsed a racial division of the Pacific Area. Mr. Lloyd George expressed himself thus:

No greater calamity could overtake the world than any further accentuation of the world's division upon the lines of race. Our foreign policy can never arrange itself. . . upon the differences of race and civilization between East and West. It would be fatal to the Empire. . . It would divide the British Empire against itself. . . .

Owing to the structure of the British Empire, the Imperial Government had to play the role of mediator between East and West. The expression of this policy was in terms of friendship with Japan. Speaking in terms of power politics, it meant that the supreme aim of British Pacific policy had to be the prevention of a war between Japan and the United States, and the preservation of a certain balance of power in the Pacific. Accordingly, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, presented a detailed analysis of British foreign policy to the Conference in which he favoured strongly a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.  

98 Cmd.1474.P.13
99 Brebner, OppCit. p.51
It was at this stage of the Conference that the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Arthur Meighen, started his attack on the intention of the British, Australian and New Zealand Governments. The dilemma for Great Britain was evident; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance offered to her the pernicious prospect of disunity if not dismemberment of the Empire, and antagonism or open hostility of the United States. A constitutional authority such as Prof. A. B. Keith suggested in a letter to "The Times" that the difficulty with regard to the Dominions might be overcome by inserting a clause in the treaty stipulating that the terms of the new treaty should not be applicable to the Dominions without the acceptance of the Dominion Parliaments.\(^{100}\) Prof. Keith thus followed the precedent of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee with France of June 28, 1919, and anticipated Article IX of the Treaty of Locarno. It will be understood, however, from the foregoing that this suggestion offered no real solution. Prime Minister Lloyd George chose another way. On July 1, 1921 he surprised the Imperial Conference with the announcement that he accepted the Canadian proposal for the Pacific Conference.\(^{101}\) The aim was to arrive at a reasonable understanding by joint discussions with the United States, Japan and China. Consequently, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, communicated with the Japanese and United States Ambassadors and with the Chinese Minister, approaching them with the idea of a

\(^{100}\) cf. The London Times, July 6, 1921.

\(^{101}\) Woodsworth, Op. Cit. P. 176
conference on the Problems of the Pacific and the Far East. This by no means implied a cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by Great Britain. The Imperial Cabinet was determined rather, to keep the door open for a special solution. Whereas, prior to the Imperial Conference, the British notification of July 1920 to the League regarding the treaty with Japan had been generally considered as constituting a denunciation of the Alliance, particularly by the Law Officers of the Crown, as the request for a three months' extension demonstrated, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, expressed the reverse legal view at the Conference. He argued that a decision was not immediately urgent since the Treaty Alliance, not having been formally denounced, would automatically continue in force. By adopting this dilatory juridical procedure, the British Government gained time for the readjustment of its policy. Almost simultaneously, the British and Japanese Governments notified the League of Nations that in case of a situation which rendered the Alliance inconsistent with the procedure prescribed by the Covenant, the latter was to prevail. The purpose of this notification was obvious. It was to confirm the British intention to keep the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in force, but in a form compatible with the League Covenant.

103 Ibid., p. 916
104 cf. Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, Aug. 21, 1921, p. 64, quoted in Chang op. cit. p. 193
In the meantime, the British Prime Minister was pressed in the House of Commons by questions about the renewal of the Alliance. Mr. Lloyd George then answered that he would issue a statement which would depend upon "whether replies are received from the United States, Japan and China." But he was cautious enough to avoid a definite answer to Lt.-Com. Kenworthy's question whether the House would be given the opportunity of discussing the issue. The reply expected by the Cabinet from the United States Government arrived at London on July 10, 1921. This reply took the form of an invitation from the United States President, Mr. Harding, for a conference on limitation of armaments and on the problems of the Pacific and the Far East to be held in Washington. The United States step was unanimously praised by Great Britain and the Dominions. The Australian Prime Minister, in a message to the "London Times", utilized this occasion for restating:

The ideal at which the Conference should aim as the first step to peace was the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in such a form as would be acceptable to Great Britain, America, Japan and ourselves.

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106 Ibid. p. 622
107 Ibid. p. 914
108 Ibid. p. 917, and the London Times, July 9, 1921
109 The London Times July 12, 1921
In his official statement of July 11, 1921 in the House of Commons Prime Minister, Lloyd George, enunciated the course of foreign policy which was to be pursued by the Imperial Government:

In the U.S.A. we see today, as we have always seen the people closest to our own aims and ideals with whom it is for us, not merely a desire and an interest, but a deeply rooted instinct to consult and to cooperate. . . The first principle of our policy is "friendly cooperation with the U.S.A." . .

Simultaneously Mr. Lloyd George declared "we also desire. . . to maintain our close friendship and cooperation with Japan. . ."

These statements reveal the attempt of the British Government to reconcile by an ambivalent policy both the Japanese Alliance and the fundamental principle of British policy, Anglo-American cooperation. The British Government recognized that it had to meet the desires of the United States by joint and direct discussions, but Mr. Lloyd George believed that he could find the solution in a merging of the Alliance into a tripartite treaty between Great Britain, Japan and the United States. In this the British and the Australian views completely coincided. Great Britain wanted, like Australia, an allied or, at least, cooperating Pacific triangle.

Ibid. Vol.146, pp.704-6
During the whole period following the Imperial Conference up to the opening of the Washington Conference in November 1921 the British Government showed utmost reluctance towards a formal and complete abrogation of the Alliance. On August 18, 1921, Mr. Lloyd George stated clearly in the Commons:

The Alliance is an existing alliance. . . I do not believe there is any country in the world whether it likes the Japanese alliance or does not like it, that would think any better of the British Empire if we broke off the Alliance - not one.  

There were also voices in the House which emphatically protested against a disruption with the Japanese ally. Mr. Lloyd George eagerly sought to avoid an open parliamentary debate as his answers to questions in the Commons showed. He argued a debate "would be inopportune in the present stage of negotiations" The Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Chamberlain, replied to an enquiry from Earl Winterton, whether the issue of the Alliance would be touched in the next debate on the forthcoming Washington Conference, that he would "deprecate as contrary to the public interest" any discussion of that subject." Indeed, this subject was not mentioned in the Commons' debate referred to, except in a statement by Colonel Burn that, if an alliance between England, America

113 Ibid.Vol.146,pp.1725-26 and Vol.147,p.2140
115 The London Times Nov. 3, 1921
and Japan would be concluded, the Pacific problem would disappear. How firmly the British Government still supported Japan in the Far East can be seen from Mr. Chamberlain's statement in October 1921 on the question whether Great Britain was still - in spite of the changed circumstances - bound by the secret Anglo-Japanese agreement regarding Shantung. His answer was that His Majesty's Government considered the Shantung question as settled by the decisions of the Peace-treaty of Versailles. Immediately prior to the Conference, the British Cabinet was then divided about the attitude to be adopted at Washington towards Japan and the United States. Great Britain was facing the alternative whether she should yield completely to the United States demand for the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance or whether she should try to keep the balance of power between Japan and the United States in the Pacific by pursuing a middle road course of neutrality. The last possibility implied the retention of the Alliance. Mr. Lloyd George and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, were very strongly inclined to the second possibility which seemed to offer the greater degree of Empire security in the Pacific.

It was no accident that — Arthur Balfour was

117 Ibid. Vol. 147, pp. 641 ff.
appointed chief of the British Empire Delegation to Washington. He had been the moving spirit behind the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. Nobody recognized the importance of that Alliance better than he. The Alliance had been the pivot of British Foreign policy in Asia for almost twenty years. In spite of the changes in the international situation Mr. Arthur Balfour still firmly believed in the value of the Alliance for the British Empire.\textsuperscript{119} He therefore showed the utmost disinclination to abrogate the treaty. The Japanese Government on their part was also strongly in favour of the continuation of the Alliance, if necessary as a tripartite agreement including the United States, although Japan preferred that the bilateral treaty continue.\textsuperscript{120}

The proposal of His Majesty’s Ambassador to Tokyo to the Japanese Government for joint British-Japanese preliminary discussions on the presumable agenda of the Washington Conference\textsuperscript{121} gave further evidence that Great Britain on the eve of the Washington Conference still maintained the view that notwithstanding the unimpaired principle of Anglo-American friendship the equilibrium in the Pacific could be preserved only by Anglo-Japanese cooperation.

\textsuperscript{119} Dugdale \textit{op.cit.} p.319
\textsuperscript{120} cf.Letter of the British Ambassador to Tokyo, Sir Charles Eliot, of Nov.10,1921 to Sir.A.Balfour quoted in Dugdale \textit{op.cit.} p.328.
\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Ibid.}
It should be briefly noted here that the position taken by the British Government was not shared by the "London Times". The policy of the "Times" as determined by Lord Northcliffe and Mr. Wickham Steed, exerted a certain influence on the course of events in this matter, which should not be underestimated. It was undoubtedly true that in July 1921 the "Times" - Mr. Steed being in personal contact with Mr. Lloyd George and the U. S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Mr. Harvey, considerably facilitated the possibility of convening a conference on Pacific questions. 122 In a leading article of July 9, 1921, the "Times" declared that any continued alliance with Japan, however modified, would form an "insuperable obstacle" to Anglo-American cooperation. 123 Furthermore, the article called attention to the fact that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would prevent an agreement for the limitation of naval armaments. As a solution the "Times" also advanced the proposal of a larger agreement by a triangular exchange of notes to which the United States should be a party. 124 With regard to China the "Times" advocated close cooperation between Great Britain and the United States who had "identical interests" there against any Japanese attempt of domination and exploitation. 125 During the summer of 1921 Lord Northcliffe and Mr. Steed undertook an extensive journey to the United States and Canada. They

123 The London Times, July 9, 1921
124 Ibid.
125 The Times, Oct. 18, 1921
toured in particular the Pacific coastal area of North America, including visits to Vancouver, Victoria, Seattle and San Francisco. Their object was to study the situation on the spot, especially in British Columbia, and to determine the press policy to be pursued by the "Times" at the forthcoming Washington Conference. On this journey Mr. Steed had several contacts with Canadian publicists, American naval officers, with the Canadian Prime Minister, the Governor General, Lord Byng, and the Japanese Ambassador to Washington, Mr. Shidehara. The practical result of these contacts was a memorandum summarizing the political problems created by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This memorandum was submitted to the members of the British Empire delegation and to British naval officers and may have exercised influence on the British Delegation.

After the Washington Conference had opened, the "Times", arguing that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance prevented the realization of Anglo-American cooperation, persistently advocated the abrogation of the Treaty. The "Times"' leading article of November 23, 1921, pointed out that the decision taken by the statesmen of the British Empire at the Imperial Conference could not be put into effect until the Alliance was denounced. "The Anglo-Japanese Treaty stands in the way. It must be cleared out of the way, and the sooner. . . ."  

126 Steed, W. op. cit. pp 369-70
better for Anglo-American understanding."\(^{127}\)

Thus it can be seen that at the Imperial Conference in 1921 the disunity of opinion amongst the members of the British Empire with regard to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had become obvious. Whilst the standpoint of Australia and New Zealand was derived from their insular geographical position in the Pacific - because these Dominions, according to the words of the New Zealand Minister of the Interior, Mr. Downie Stewart, felt "the full danger of foreign aggression and their entire dependence on Imperial defence"\(^{128}\) - Canada's attitude resulted from her continental position on the North American continent. The political implication was that Canadian security could rely on the Monroe Doctrine, but was basically dependent upon good relations between Great Britain and the United States. These fundamental differences of geographical conditions account for the diverging opinions of the Australian and the Canadian Prime Minister with regard to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Mr. Hughes' utterances: "I do not mistake the voice of a noisy, anti-British faction in America for the sentiment of that great Republic"\(^{129}\) and "I lay it down as an axiom that we must not be embroiled in war with America"\(^{130}\)

\(^{127}\)The London Times, Nov. 23, 1921
\(^{128}\)New Zealand, Parl. Deb. 4th Sess. 1922, Vol. 196, p. 503
\(^{129}\)Commonwealth of Australia, Parl. Deb. 1920-21 Vol. XCVII
\(^{130}\)Ibid. Vol. XCV, p. 7718
reveal that he misinterpreted the intrinsic and fundamental aims of United States foreign policy. It was not a question of war against the United States which perturbed the U. S. Government, but it was simply the basic demand of the United States that Great Britain's Far Eastern and Pacific Policy had to coincide entirely with that of the United States. In the final analysis this amounted to Great Britain's former predominating position in the Pacific being supplanted by the United States. The Canadian Government, on the other hand, did realize the problem which jeopardized Anglo-American relations. The importance of Mr. Arthur Meighen's policy at the Imperial Conference lay in the fact that he, by vigorously insisting on Canada's rights, took the initiative for the calling of the Washington Conference which was to become the turning-point in British Far Eastern policy. The Canadian Government thus contributed to paving the way for the achievement of the unique phenomenon of the Anglo-American community. The Canadian policy at the Conference was indeed nothing else than the implementation of the special role that Canada is destined to play in world politics, because of her geographical position, of her ancestry and history. Canada acted as the intermediary and interpreter of the Great branches of the English speaking race; she was the bridge over the Atlantic between Great Britain and the United States. However, there is good reason to believe that the
role of the Canadian Prime Minister at the "Imperial Conference" should not be overestimated and overemphasized. Mr. Meighen did not dominate the Imperial Conference because the British position there was very strong. It would be inaccurate to say that he forcibly deflected British foreign policy completely, but rather that he induced the British Cabinet to abandon the idea of a bilateral treaty with Japan and to enter into direct discussions with the U. S. Government. By achieving this he accelerated a historical development culminating in the integration of Anglo-American partnership. The British Government for their part were convinced that the Alliance had to be transformed. It realized that Anglo-American friendship and cooperation had to be the axiom of British foreign policy. Great Britain acknowledged furthermore that it was merely a question of time before she had to drop her policy of playing her both ways, and to associate her Pacific policy with that of the United States of America.
CHAPTER V.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921-22
AND THE SOLUTION OF THE PACIFIC PROBLEM

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 ended with a diplomatic defeat of United States foreign policy. Ultimately the deep American dissatisfaction over the Shantung problem was one of the principal reasons for the rejection of the Versailles Peace Treaty by the United States Senate. On the very day that the unfortunate decision concerning Shantung was made at Paris, the chief Far East-expert of the United States delegation to the Conference commented upon it: "It may bring war in Asia." The United States had already been appalled by the secret diplomacy of Great Britain in European questions, as for instance in the case of Trieste; but she would not long tolerate the enforced settlement over Shantung which immediately concerned the United States. For in the case of China the United States Government had assumed responsibilities. China had entered the war in 1917 after having been induced to do so by the United States. The United States had at least a moral responsibility for the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity and political autonomy. Moreover, the Treaty of 1858 with China imposed the obligation upon

\[1\text{Cf. Millard, Op. Cit. p. 84}\]
the United States to use her good offices in case China should receive unjust treatment. This alone sufficed to illustrate that the injury inflicted upon China by the Shantung decision discredited United States policy and diplomatic prestige. The conclusion which the United States Government had to draw from the results of the Paris Conference, where she had been thwarted by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, was that Japan's diplomatic position in the Far East was strengthened by the Alliance. The United States feared that Great Britain would give moral and possible material support to Japan in case of an American-Japanese war, and that the United States would remain isolated in Eastern Asia. On the whole Great Britain was compelled by the Alliance to endorse tacitly Japan's political and military actions which were prejudicial to vital American interests and constituted a direct challenge to the basic principle of United States policy in Asia, the Open-Door Doctrine. Thus, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was directly responsible for the fundamental schism between the two Anglo-Saxon world powers in global policy.

The supreme aim of United States foreign policy after the disastrous blow at Paris had therefore to be to prevent by all means a resuscitation or renewal of the
Alliance after its expiration in July, 1921. In a confidential memorandum "Aspects of the Problem of the Pacific and the Eastern Question as they Relate to the U.S.A." issued in July, 1920 by the unofficial adviser of the Chinese Government Conference Delegation, Mr. Millard, it was clearly pointed out that a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would "require the American Government either to abandon its Far Eastern policy, to submit it to the dictation of Japan and Great Britain, or to develop its naval and military programme on a basis of equalling the combined powers of Great Britain and Japan." Mr. Millard suggested in his remarkable memorandum that "Great Britain should be made to choose definitely between Japan and America and the Far East." These intimations reflect the attitude of the American Government toward the Pacific problem. Only in this context is it possible to understand fully the exasperated and tenacious opposition of the United States to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the importance of the Washington Conference which was the United States' counter attack against the results of the joint British-Japanese diplomacy at Paris.

As early as October, 1919 the U. S. State Department became concerned because of various rumours that the British Government had entered into negotiations with Japan concerning

a renewal of the Alliance. A dispatch from the Acting U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Philipps, to the U. S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Mr. Davis, instructed the Ambassador to inquire whether the British Government intended "to broaden or to restrict the recognition of Japan's special interests in Eastern Asia . . ."4 This instruction revealed the decisive motive for the American opposition to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The prospect of an American-Japanese war and the uncertain position of Great Britain in such an eventuality perturbed the American Government since the Anglo-American Treaty of General Arbitration of 1911, which, combined with Article IV of the Alliance, was to eliminate any possibility of an armed conflict between Great Britain and the United States, had never been ratified by the American Senate.5 The Bryan-Spring-Rice Peace Commission Treaty of September 19146 was no adequate substitute. Although Sir Edward Grey on his own initiative informed the Japanese Ambassador, Baron Inouye, that His Majesty's Government did consider the Treaty as equivalent to a general arbitration treaty, official British notification to this effect was not given to the U. S. Government.7 It was, however, not the question of war which caused uneasiness in the American Government so much as the fact that Great Britain was bound by the

5Br.Doc.VIII,No.514,p.604.
Alliance to support the Japanese interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement regarding the recognition of Japan's "special interests" in Eastern Asia. The result would have been that on the one hand the Japanese military party might be encouraged in their further aspirations. On the other hand Great Britain was handicapped in supporting American diplomacy wholeheartedly in the Far East by taking joint diplomatic action designed to prevent Japanese encroachment in China, so in such circumstances the United States Government "might find itself virtually alone" as had been the case in 1915, and in the Yap dispute.

The Japanese occupation of the former German Islands in the North Pacific was regarded by the American Government with the utmost uneasiness. President Wilson's insistence on administering the former German Pacific islands under the mandatory system, if they could not be neutralized, arose from strategic rather than idealistic considerations; it was part of the American fear that these islands, if fortified as naval bases, would form a menace to the American lines of communication from Hawaii to the Philippines. The dispute over the important cable station of Yap, in which the United States claimed the cable from Yap to Guam, showed how strongly the British were tied to their Japanese ally.


In answering American protests to a unilateral disposal of Yap and referring to United States intimations that an unsatisfactory settlement would have serious effects upon American public opinion, the British Ambassador to Washington stated in April, 1921 that His Majesty's Government "had no alternative, and that no matter what the consequence, they must abide with the agreement with Japan. . . ."¹⁰

Incidents such as these convinced the United States that in spite of all assurances to the contrary, the Alliance must be considered "as an alliance between Great Britain and Japan against the United States".¹¹

Accordingly, American public opinion as reflected by the press categorically demanded the complete abrogation of the Treaty Alliance.¹² The Hearst press particularly voiced strong anti-British feelings. The Anti-British Senator Reed of Missouri even charged Great Britain with having inserted a "secret clause directed against the United States"¹³ and with "plotting in the dark for her own aggrandizement".¹⁴

¹²Cf.for instance, The New York Times, June 24,1921 and July 5,1921
¹³Cf.The London Times, January 4, 1921.
¹⁴Ibid. January 3,1921
In several confidential memoranda the United States encouraged Chinese representatives at the League of Nations in Geneva to object openly and forcibly to the existing Alliance, calling the attention of the Chinese delegates to the prejudicial character of that Alliance in its application to China. It was even suggested in July 1920 that plans should be worked out by the State, War and Navy Departments for a potential joint military cooperation of America with China, Korea and Eastern Siberia in case of an armed conflict in the Far East.

As a further means of influencing British-Japanese relations indirectly, the United States attempted to exert diplomatic pressure on Great Britain in the Irish question, which was acute at that time. The American Secretary of State frankly intimated to the British Ambassador in Washington that a British indication of good will to support United States' Far Eastern policy would prevent Congress from adopting anti-British resolutions in favour of the Irish Republic. It was also recommended to the American Government that in view of Canada's strategical position and of Canadian sentiment the latent danger of Canadian separation from the Empire in case of war between the United States and Japan.

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States on the one hand and Japan and Great Britain on the other hand, should be utilized as a factor of United States diplomacy. The suggestion was advanced, therefore, that American assent to the establishment of a separate Canadian diplomatic representation at Washington should be withheld, the implication being that the British Government should not be relieved of the danger of losing Canada as an integral part of the British Empire. The establishment of a Canadian Legation at Washington could possibly have been construed as an alteration of the international status of Canada which might have exempted the Dominion from the scope of the Anglo-American dispute at that time.\(^\text{18}\)

To exert direct pressure on the British Government the U. S. Government capitalised on two factors of paramount importance. The first of these was the general feeling in the two Anglo-Saxon countries of America and Great Britain, towards the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on the one hand and the idea of Anglo-American friendship on the other. Accordingly, the American Ambassador to the Court of St. James was instructed in 1919 to ascertain the general feeling of the British people on this subject. In official representations to the British Foreign Office, expressing opposition to the renewal of the


\(^{19}\) U.S. For. Rel. 1920 Vol. II, p. 679
Alliance, the U. S. State Department always emphatically drew British attention to the disastrous effects upon American public opinion. The aim of this tactic, which was a 'novum' in the history of modern diplomacy, was to demonstrate to Great Britain that the ideal of Anglo-American cooperation was simply impossible as long as Britain maintained the Alliance with Japan. It was an appeal to the sentiment of the English people, to the deep-rooted conscience of common descent and ancestry. Here no territorial issues were at stake, no boundary disputes, no fishing rights, no spheres of influence, problems which had characterized so far disputes in British-American relations, but imponderables which carried far heavier weight: the fundamental idea of the Anglo-Saxon community, the physical centre of which lies in the Atlantic, but the solidity of which was tested in the Pacific.

The second factor applied by the American Government was American naval policy. The emergence of the United States as a world power found concrete expression in the tremendous naval building programme which had been inaugurated and approved by Congress in August, 1916 as the "first far-reaching constructive programme in the history of the Republic." According to this plan a powerful navy was to be completed within seven years, consisting of ten battleships, six battle

21 Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1920-21,p.42.
cruisers, ten cruisers, fifty destroyers, and sixty-eight submarines; and it was planned to increase the total amount of capital ships to fifty ships until 1925. In his speech on February 3, 1916, President Wilson had announced that the United States was determined to construct a navy which was to be superior to the capacity of all the navies of the world. The diplomatic defeat of America at the Paris Conference and her isolationist withdrawal from European affairs only served to encourage the United States Government to implement this naval programme. The existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the British intention to continue this treaty convinced the United States Navy Department that it had to face the naval preponderance of the combined British and Japanese fleets which could be balanced only by the creation of an adequate American naval force. At the third anniversary of the naval armaments programme on August 31, 1919, the Secretary of the U.S. Navy, Mr. Joseph Daniel, announced at a speech at Charleston (West Virginia):

We are not only completing this great plan, but are building enormous stocks and other needed shore facilities elsewhere, and are constructing eighteen dreadnoughts... which, in effective fighting power will give our navy world primacy... The navy of the United States should ultimately be equal to that of the most powerful maintained by any other nation in the world...24

22Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual,1920-21, and Jensen, Op.Cit.p.182


24Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual,1920-21 pp43.
The same view was expressed by the United States President, Mr. Harding, in December, 1921 at Norfolk (Virginia):

... I believe in partial but not permanent disarmament and I foresee the time when this will be realized, but until that time arrives, I want a Navy for America's defense that is equal to the aspirations of this country....

There can be no doubt that the United States was determined to counteract the menace constituted to her by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by a deliberate large scale naval competition with Great Britain and Japan. President Harding's statement can be interpreted only as meaning that the United States would not consent to a naval disarmament or to a suspension of naval construction until the supreme aim of American post-war foreign policy was reached, namely the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

The reactions on Great Britain produced by the United States naval policy were significant. World War I which resulted in the annihilation of Germany's sea power had left Great Britain in the position of undisputed naval supremacy. Whereas immediately after the war Liberal circles concentrating around the "Manchester Guardian" and including General Smuts and Lord Robert Cecil, advocated

25 Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1921-22, p. 31
a limitation of naval armaments, Conservative groups, represented by the British Admiralty, the "Morning Post" and prominent persons like Lord Curzon and Winston Churchill, tenaciously upheld the supreme and traditional principle of naval superiority. The competent naval experts of the British Admiralty unanimously agreed that no challenge to British naval supremacy could be tolerated. Still, in 1921 Rear Admiral Sir Roger Keyes pointed out most emphatically at a speech at Sheffield that Great Britain was not disposed to surrender her sea power supremacy "not even to a kinsmen who is a good and tried friend." It was, however, obvious that owing to the dislocation of Britain's post-war economy in the long run she was either going to be outbuilt by American competition or go bankrupt. This was frankly admitted by Lieutenant Commander Kenworthy as early as 1921. Fully appreciating economic necessities, the British Admiralty in March 1921 realistically arrived at the historic decision to abandon the traditional "Two Power Standard" of the British Navy, for the maintenance of which Great Britain had lastly fought the war against Germany. The basis of the new naval policy was the preservation of the "One Power Standard". This meant that the British

27 Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1921-22 p.3.
Royal Navy should not be inferior in strength to that of any other power. The Navy Estimates of 1921-22 as introduced by the First Sea Lord, Lord Lee of Fairhamp, amounted to £91,186,369, whereas the total for naval expenditures in the preceding year was £105,283,281—a drastic reduction of about £14,000,000. In March, 1921 the First Lord of the Admiralty declared in the Commons that he strongly desired an agreement with America on the naval question of the basis of parity in naval strength. On July 5, 1921 the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, officially proposed to the U. S. Ambassador to London that a conference should be held

\[\text{to consider all essential matters bearing on Far East and Pacific Ocean with a view to arriving at a common understanding designed to assure settlement by peaceful means, the elimination of naval warfare. etc., etc.} \]

Considering the fact that it was for the first time in the history of the British Empire that Great Britain contented herself with naval parity with another sea power and sacrificed a fundamental principle upon which her world policy had been based, the conclusion which has to be drawn from this decision can only be that Britain had determined to yield to the United States rather than to struggle in rivalry with her in world politics.

Lord Curzon's message showed that the leading British statesmen clearly recognized that the question of

\[\text{Brassey's Naval & Shipping Annual, 1921-22 p. 405} \]


\[\text{U. S. For. Rel. 1921 Vol. I, p. 19.} \]
Anglo-American naval competition and that of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were intimately related. The official text of the U. S. invitation issued by President Harding for convening such a conference also left no doubt about the fact that the issue of the limitation of naval armaments had "close relation to Pacific and Far Eastern problems." As pointed out, however, the Imperial Government was still hoping to maintain the Alliance with Japan in a modified form. Britain, therefore, made the attempt to separate the issues of naval disarmament and of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in order to avoid a conference at which the discontinuation of the Alliance would be made "sine qua non" on the part of the Americans for an Anglo-American naval agreement. Consequently, the British Government proposed to the American Government that a preliminary conference was to be held in London which was to deal with the Pacific and Far Eastern problem before the conference on naval disarmament started at Washington. This suggestion had been one of the decisions reached at the Imperial Conference. It was indicative of the attitude of Australia and New Zealand, who favoured a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, that the Australian Prime Minister vigorously insisted on holding the Pacific conference first,

33 Cmd.1974, P.5
at which Australia and New Zealand should be represented. When answering President Harding's invitation, the Japanese Government agreed in principle to the idea of a conference but made the reservation that questions of "sole concern to certain particular powers . . . should be scrupulously avoided". Furthermore, they responded positively to the British suggestions of a preliminary conference in London. It was clear from that that Britain wanted to utilize the proposed London discussions to arrive at an agreement with Japan in advance of the naval disarmament conference at Washington.

The U. S. State Department recognized the diplomatic move on the part of the United Kingdom Government, and therefore rejected their proposal by arguing that a conference in London would not be regarded favourably in America, "in the light of relations between Japan and Great Britain." The American diplomatic standpoint is perhaps illustrated most clearly by two newspaper messages, the correspondents of both papers being in close contact with the "New York

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36 Cmd. 1474, p. 5.
Herald”. The Italian newspaper, "Corriere della Sera" wrote on October 28, 1921:

La più importante delle condizioni, che gli Stati Uniti imperano come preliminare necessario per la limitazione dei propri armamenti... sarà l'abrogazione dell'alleanza anglo-giapponese che è considerata come indirettamente rivolta contro l'America e che si ritiene abbia effetto perturbatore nell'Estremo Oriente. 38

In the same vein the French paper, "Le Temps" stated on November 9, 1921:

Les États-Unis s'opposeront a toute tentative qui aurait pour objet l'examen de la limitation de l'armement avant qu'ait été réglées les questions extrêmes orientales... 39

Indeed, this has to be pointed out most emphatically; the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the price demanded by the U. S. Government for stopping the expensive naval construction programme of 1916 which, if carried out, would have proved in the long run disastrous for Great Britain's economy, naval strength and position as a world power. The U. S. Government would never have agreed to a limitation of naval armament such as was embodied in the proposals of the U. S. Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, if the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance confronted the United States with the prospect of dealing with the combined fleets of two strong naval powers. 40

38 Corriere della Sera, October 28, 1921
39 Le Temps, November 9, 1921.
The British Government was facing tremendous problems. On the one hand, Great Britain saw her position in the Far East imperilled by the rise of Japan. For the sake of her commercial interests in China and the security of her Empire it was expedient to keep on good terms with Japan by means of the Alliance. On the other hand, she ran the risk of incurring the permanent antagonism of the United States which would have resulted in an exasperated naval rivalry between the two Anglo-Saxon powers, and, in the ultimate analysis, in the failure of the idea of the Anglo-American community. Particularly with regard to the latter aspect, there could be no doubt where British public opinion stood. During the summer of 1921 the general feeling of the English people grew stronger against the Alliance. The "London Times", conveying the American feeling towards the Alliance to the people of England commented in July, 1921:

Any renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, even if the United States were expressly excluded from the scope of its operation, might render impossible that close cooperation between the nations of the English-speaking world which President Harding and his administration are eager to promote.

It was clear that the British Empire Delegation, headed by Mr. A. J. Balfour, had to take into account the strong sentiment of the Anglo-Saxon people on both sides of the Atlantic when they went to Washington to seek the solution.

42 The London Times, July 11, 1921
It is not the scope of this thesis to give a detailed analysis of the events of the Washington Conference of 1921-22. This has already been done in other works. But due consideration should be given to the fairness with which the British Empire Delegation handled the dual Anglo-Japanese and Anglo-American problem at its final stage, as well as to the eminent influence and share of Canada, through her delegate Sir Robert Borden, in bringing about a solution. The latter's contribution is revealed by the Unpublished Borden Papers. Even prior to the Washington Conference the Canadian delegate, anxious to prevent a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, contacted and had several conversations with important persons concerned with the Conference such as, for instance, the U.S. Delegates Mr. Root and Senator Lodge, the U.S. Secretaries of State, War and Navy Departments, First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Lee of Fareham, and the Australian and New Zealand Delegates, Senator Pearce and Sir John Salmond, and the editor of the London Times, Mr. Steed. In doing this Sir Robert Borden, as the representative of Canada, assumed the task of an intermediator not only between Great Britain and the United States, but also between the members of the British Commonwealth themselves. Thus he impressed upon

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the American Delegate, Mr. Root, that a satisfactory solution must be found which would help to placate the apprehensions of Australia and New Zealand.\(^{45}\) The idea of Sir Robert Borden, which was fully shared by the Canadian Government, was to achieve under all circumstances an understanding between the British Empire and the United States which would secure close cooperation between the two Anglo-Saxon powers. Sir Robert realized that a formal alliance with America was not obtainable from the U. S. Government.\(^{46}\) In a letter to the head of the Empire Delegation (Mr. Arthur Balfour, he expressed his view, saying:

The scope of any treaty or agreement. . . must be limited for the present; . . . if we cannot have the United States enter the League of Nations, we should spare no effort to bring it into cooperation with us.\(^{47}\)

Such cooperation applied to the Pacific was to give Australia and New Zealand a certain guarantee after the Alliance with Japan was abandoned. The Canadian policy at the Conference deliberately aimed at a replacement of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by close Anglo-American cooperation. After having secured the approval of his suggestion by Mr. Root, who believed that "an arrangement as to the security in the Pacific could be established which would be much more valuable to Australia than any safeguard afforded by the Japanese Treaty."\(^{48}\)

\(^{45}\) Diary of Sir Robert Borden, Nov. 9, 1921, p. 6

\(^{46}\) Ibid.


\(^{48}\) Sir Robert Borden Diary, November 9, 1921, p. 6
Sir Robert Borden was in a position to influence the Australian and New Zealand delegates by conveying this assurance to them. Thus, by removing Australia's and New Zealand's fears, Canada through this intermediary policy contributed considerably to the achievement of the final solution of the Pacific problem. In the same way as the Canadian delegate influenced the representatives of the Australian and New Zealand Governments, he urged the British and American Governments, represented by Mr. A. Balfour and Secretary of State Mr. C. E. Hughes, to reach a general agreement of close cooperation. On the assumption that the best possible way for securing the association of the United States would be a multi-lateral agreement (to which the United States adhered) for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, Sir Robert proposed the conclusion of a treaty by which the signatories would oblige themselves "to investigation and report by a Permanent International Tribunal" before the powers concerned "would commence hostilities." The idea involved in the Canadian proposal was, in a nutshell, the continuation or rather resumption of the traditional policy of settling disputes by general arbitration which has been characteristic in Anglo-American

relationship. Furthermore, since the Covenant of the League and the Permanent Court of International Justice were not recognized by the United States, Canada attempted to induce America to associate herself as far as possible by cooperating with the League of Nations. In his determination to secure United States cooperation in international affairs under all circumstances and at any price, Sir Robert Borden even went so far as to ignore Arthur Balfour's lukewarmness towards the Canadian proposal, which, as the Chief British Delegate realized, would duplicate the existing machinery of the League. Sir Robert's argument being that they should not "even shrink from duplication of machinery, if such duplication would be of effective aid in that great purpose."\(^5\)

Sir Robert's proposal was finally realized to a large extent in the Quadruple-Pacific Pact which terminated and replaced the bi-lateral Anglo-Japanese Alliance. At the Conference Arthur Balfour made a last attempt to salvage the essentials of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by suggesting a tripartite alliance between Great Britain.

\(^5\) Cf. Sir Robert Borden Diary, Nov. 17, 1921, p. 91

\(^5\) Cf. Private and Secret Letter of Mr. Arthur Balfour to Sir Robert Borden Nov. 29, 1921, from the Unpublished Borden Papers.

\(^5\) Cf. Letter of Sir Robert Borden to Mr. A. Balfour, Dec. 3, 1921, Ibid.
Japan and the United States. Among the British journalists attending the Conference, the representative of the "Morning Post" pleaded strongly for the preservation of the Alliance.

But in view of the strong opposition of the U. S. Government and of the American press to such a solution as it suited exclusively British, Australian and Japanese interests, Mr. Arthur Balfour, without making further attempts, acquiesced in the proposal advanced by the U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. Hughes.

The Four Power Treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan of December 13, 1921, by which the signatory powers pledged themselves to respect mutually their "insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific Ocean," to refer any international dispute "arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy" to a joint conference "for consideration and adjustment", and in case that the rights of the contracting parties "are threatened by the aggressive action of any other power", to consult each other for effective measures "to be taken jointly or separately," was indeed, according to a statement of the U. S. Foreign Relations Committee, no formal alliance, and contained "no commitments to armed force." 58

53 cf. Letter of Mr. A. Balfour to His Majesty's Ambass.to Tokyo, Sir Chas. Elliot, in Dugdale, Op.Cit., pp. 328-9
54 cf. Sir Robt. Borden Diary, Nov. 9, 1921, p. 7
56 cf. Ichihashi, Op. Cit. p. 120
57 cf. Cmd. 2037.
But it can be considered as the first treaty in the history of international relations which embodies the principle of non-universal, regional "collective security". In the final analysis the Canadian alternative for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was thus carried through. In a letter to the newly elected Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. MacKenzie King, Sir Robert Borden declared that the Four Power Pacific Treaty was "entirely in line" with Sir Arthur Meighen's suggestions at the preceding "Imperial Conference."  

There is, indeed, good reason to believe that Sir Robert had proposed at the Imperial Conference that in a Pacific treaty countries with important Pacific interests should be included, especially the United States. Moreover, Sir Robert Borden's ideas of bringing the United States into international co-operation by an agreement for peaceful settlement of disputes found expression in that Treaty. Consequently, Sir Robert's comment on the Pacific Treaty as reflected in a letter to the Canadian Prime Minister Meighen read:

The vital feature is that it provides a definite method whereby, if relations become strained, the issues involved may be adjusted through a joint conference between all the parties to the agreement. That is to say; it substitutes the conference method for other methods of resolving international disputes. . .


60 Most Secret Letter of Sir Robert Borden to Prime Minister Arthur Meighen December 8, 1921, Ibid.
Being thoroughly convinced that the Conference would not only decide on the future of Anglo-American relations in the Pacific and in the Far East, but that it also presented a test case for the relationship between Great Britain and America 'in toto', Sir Robert Borden made constant efforts to bring about a harmonious British-American understanding over naval disarmament which should eliminate any apprehension or cause of friction on either side of the Atlantic. One could go so far as to say that whereas a pro-American solution of the problem of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was designed to appease the United States in the Pacific, the acquiescence in the American proposals for the limitation of naval armaments on the part of Great Britain was to satisfy America in the Atlantic. After the announcement of the famous proposals for a ten years' naval holiday had been put forward by the U. S. Secretary of State, Sir Robert Borden urged the leader of the British Empire Delegation most emphatically to "accept the proposal in spirit and principle" without making any reservation. How strongly Sir Robert impressed Arthur Balfour can be seen from the fact that the latter used almost precisely the same wording in his cable to the British Prime Minister, recommending the acceptance of the American proposal as far as capital ships were concerned. An agreement on the naval question, however, was jeopardized by the constant

61 Sir Robert Borden, Diary, November 14, 1921 p.16
objections of the naval experts amongst the British Dele-
gation. They tenaciously held the view that the American
suggestion for a naval holiday should be rejected or at
least paralyzed as far as possible. Admiral Chatfield
even intimated his readiness to fight against the U. S.
navy. In a draft telegram to Mr. Lloyd George, the naval
experts led by Lord Lee urged the British Government to
"oppose the construction by the United States and Japan
of any cruisers or destroyers during the ten years' period."
Mr. Lloyd George generally shared Sir Robert Borden's view
as far as the naval holiday was concerned, but the Borden
Papers reveal that at the same time the British Government
imposed restrictions on Mr. Arthur Balfour which handicapped
his freedom of action at the Conference. Thus, Sir Robert
faced at times the difficult situation that all the members
of the Empire Delegation were inclined to adhere to the
opinion of the naval experts. An agreement was finally reached
on this question; however, due to the incessant efforts of

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63 Sir Robert Borden Diary, December 9, 1921, pp. 73-5
64 Ibid.
65 Sir Robert Borden Diary, P. 20
66 cf. Letter of Sir Robert to the Acting Can. Prime Minister, Sir
James Longhead, Nov. 16, 1921 from the Unpublished Borden Papers.
67 Sir Robert Borden Diary, Nov. 25, 1921, p. 42.
68 Ibid. Dec. 9, 1921, p. 73
the Canadian Delegate to avert the rejection of the American naval offer, Sir Robert realistically argued that the financial and material resources of America capacitated her "to outstrip the British Empire in any competition in naval armaments. 69

In the discussions of the limitations of naval armaments the reality of Anglo-American cooperation became obvious in that Great Britain took a firm stand for the first time against her former Japanese ally, when the Japanese Delegate, Admiral Kato, demanded an increase of the Japanese ratio of capital ships from 60% to 70%. 70 The London Times, in speaking of the "unanimous view of Great Britain and the United States", gave the best expression of the changed political situation by stating:

If the Japanese by their proposal wished to test the strength of this view, they will certainly be confronted by an impressive demonstration of its weight and power. 71

Owing to the mediatising Canadian influence and to the British willingness to gain the friendship instead of the enmity of the United States, full agreement was thus reached on the Pacific and Far Eastern problems and on the issue of limitation of naval armament. The immediate result was the Four Power Pacific Pact, which supplanted the former Anglo-Japanese

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Alliance, and the Naval Treaty for the limitation of naval armament which sanctioned the principle of naval equality between Great Britain and the United States and granted Japan the third place as sea power. In both cases Japan could do nothing but comply with political realities. She did so without resentment.

In this thesis the development of Anglo-Japanese relations since 1911 up to the Washington Conference has been portrayed in the special light of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This Alliance had formed the strongest pillar of the structure of British world policy since 1902, despite the changes which the Treaty underwent in its political scope and character. These changes, reflecting the dynamic character of international politics, were due to three factors; the tremendous rise of Japan as an expanding world power in the Far East, the parallel ascendancy of the United States on the eastern coast of the Pacific Ocean, and the constitutional evolution of the Dominions within the British commonwealth in which Canada took the lead. The expanding power and influence of Japan in Eastern Asia appeared to make a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance a matter of expediency. From the British view the Alliance was in the first place designed to safeguard British commercial interests in China and to serve the interests of the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand. Both aims could best be achieved by securing the goodwill of Japan and by exerting a restraining and controlling influence on Japanese policy rather than by estranging Japan and making her an enemy. In the second place
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Britain felt, might serve as an instrument for maintaining the balance of power in the Pacific which was seriously disturbed by the steadily increasing tension between Japan and the United States. The ideal solution for the security of British, Australian and New Zealand's interests would have been a tripartite alliance between Great Britain, Japan and the United States, that is, the establishment of a Pacific Triangle in which the three powers cooperated with each other. Such a solution, however, would have meant United States acquiescence and recognition of Japan's "special interests" in the Far East, or in other words, the sacrifice of the essentials of the "Open-Door Doctrine" upon which United States Far Eastern policy was based.

Any continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was directly detrimental to one of the foundations of U. S. foreign policy and to the self interest of America herself. This explains the acrimonious opposition of the United States to the renewal of the Alliance. Great Britain had to make her final decision - a decision which was to become of far reaching importance in the development of international relations. Either Japan or the United States had to be chosen as the future partner in world politics. The U. S. Ambassador in London, Mr. Harvey, emphasized the historical nature of the decision in a speech in London on October 31, 1921, when he said:
The bonds of friendship and forbearance which now hold us closely together... are bound to be strengthened or relaxed by what happens to Washington. If we cannot act in unison now there is slight reason to assume that we ever can... 72

At the Washington Conference Great Britain made her decision in favour of the United States, her "ally by nature" in preference to her former "ally by diplomacy". The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was formally superseded by the Four Power Pacific Treaty which practically meant the abandonment of Japan as Great Britain's ally.

The analysis of British Far Eastern policy and of the American motives behind their inflexible resistance to a renewal of the Alliance make it abundantly clear why the United States appealed to Great Britain to ensure that her policy in the Far East coincided with that of the United States. This, indeed, was the result emanating from the Washington Conference, or more accurately, from the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In the years to follow Great Britain pursued the line of action taken by the U. S. Government in the Far East, in the case of the Manchurian Conflict of 1931-32 hesitatingly, but from the China Incident of 1937 till the outbreak of World War II in Eastern Asia, in complete accord with the United States. Mr. Churchill declared in... 73

72 Quoted from the London Times, November 1, 1921
his Mansion House speech, on November 10, 1941:

...The United States are doing their utmost to find ways of preserving peace in the Pacific. ...it is my duty to say, that, should the United States become involved in war with Japan, the British declaration will follow within the hour. ...74

Moreover, Great Britain's renunciation of a Far Eastern policy deviating from the American line had decisive bearing on the British position in the whole of the Pacific. The former British supremacy in the Pacific was supplanted by the dominant position of the United States after the last British attempt to preserve a balance of power by the establishment of a Pacific Triangle had failed. One year after Washington the First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty, Mr. Amery, declared in the Commons with reference to the British position in the Pacific: "... we are helpless and reliant on the goodwill of a friendly and lately allied power. ..."75

But whilst Great Britain lost on the one hand the "Pacific Triangle", she gained on the other hand what was to become the "North Atlantic Triangle". Herein lies the political quintessence of the problem of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Washington Conference was something more than British and American diplomatic cooperation; the decision brought nearer the realization of the idea of the community of

74 Hubbard, op.cit. page 66.
English-speaking nations based upon common tradition and heritage. Thus it marked the beginning of a new epoch in Anglo-American relations.

In conclusion, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, with Great Britain's supremacy in the Pacific had to be sacrificed on the altar of the idea of the Trans-Atlantic Anglo-Saxon community. Although the physical centre of gravity of the Anglo-American community was, is, and will remain the North Atlantic, nevertheless the intimate association of this community originated in the Pacific.

The significance, however, of the problem of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as dealt with in this thesis lies in the fact that it is immediately associated with present world history. Great historical events never happen spontaneously or incidentally; but according to the law of historical continuity they are the product and the result of the long-lasting process of a development which passes beneath the surface of events. Thus, the historic decision of the British Government at the Washington Conference, brought about by Canada, laying, as it did, the foundation for Anglo-American partnership must be considered as an important milestone in a development which led ultimately to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of 1949, which is the political implementation and the spiritual incarnation of the idea of Anglo-American cooperation.
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