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Political strategy and tactics of communism; a study in total power Fic, Miroslav 1952

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POLITICAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF COMMUNISM A Study In Total Power - by -Mi ro slav Fic A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department o f Political Science and in the Department of Slavonic Studies We accept this thesis as confirming to the standard required from candidates for the degree of MASTER OF"ARTS Members of the Department^ of THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1 9 5 2 . " T h e c o n t r o l o f p o w e r w a s f i r s t a f a m i l y m a t t e r , t h e n a g r o u p p r o b l e m , t h e n a t r i b u n a l q u e s t i o n , t h e n a n a t i o n a l c o n c e r n , t h e n a c o n t i n e n t a l d a n g e r , u n t i l f i n a l l y , i n o u r d a y a n d g e n e r a t i o n , i t d e g e n e r a t e d i n t o a u n i v e r s a l c h a l l e n g e , t h e u l t i m a t e r e s o l u t i o n o f w h i c h m a y w e l l d e t e r m i n e t h e f o r m o f c i v i l i z a t i o n t o p r e v a i l d u r i n g t h e n e x t c h a p t e r i n t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e r a c e * .,, 0 " E . A ; W a l s h * " T o t a l P o w e r " , p . 80„ I N T R O D U C T I O N T h i s e s s a y i s a n a t t e m p t t o / a n a l y z e c o m m u n i s m i n t e r m s o f p o w e r o I t t r i e s t o d e s c r i b e t h e p o w e r m a c h i n e r y o f c o m -m u n i s m a n d t o f o r m u l a t e p r i n c i p l e s u p o n w h i c h i t o p e r a t e s . T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n i s u n d e r t a k e n i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e g r e a t p r o b l e m o f o u r d a y i s n o t t h e c o m m u n i s t i d e o l o g y , b u t r a t h e r t h e m a x i m s a n d I m p e r a t i v e s o f t o t a l p o w e r v h i c h i m p e l t h e c o m m u n i s t p o w e r m a c h i n e r y i n i t s b e h a v i o u r . T h i s p a p e r d e v e l o p e s a t h e s i s t h a t c o m m u n i s m i s a s y s t e m o f t o t a l p o w e r , t h a t i t i s a s y s t e m w h i c h r e j e c t s t h e p r i n c i p l e o f p o l i t i c a l e q u i l i b r i u m a n d o p e r a t e s a c e n t r a l l y - d i r e c t e d a n d a h i g h l y i n t e g r a t e d p y r a m i d o f s o c i a l f o r c e s * T h e r e f o r e i t 1 1 is not governed in Its behaviour by the free will of its leaders, but rather i s driven by an objective lau of tho necessity of total power, under which the leading communists are only executing its maxims and its imperatives e Its actions are motivated by the iron law of permanent expansion of power through the acquisition of new power areas within and outside its base. To expand within Its base, the communist power system makes use of permanently operating tensions generated by the Interaction of key sooial Institutions. Further, i t utilizes any momentary resentment against governmental and c i v i l author-ity and uses and converts every social organization within its reach Into instruments of expansion0 In short, the thesis of this paper is that tyranny must feed on conquest or die. The f i r s t part of this work is theoretical and is devoted to problems of power. It opens with an attempt to formulate the general concept of political power„ Later, i t attempts to describe the communist monopolistic concept of political power and its sources. Finally, i t attempts to formu-late the pattern of behaviour of the communist power system • Its strategy and its tactics. Because of the Immense scope of the subject-matter, the f i r s t part touches on only some of tho most Important problems and is inevitably sketchy. The second part of this study deals with the application I i i of the theory of total power* It discusses the origin of the communist system of total power; i.e., how i t was established by the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia in 1 9 1 7 . Further, i t describes the machinery of Soviet dictatorship by means of which the communist power system has consolidated and increased i t s strength* Finally, this second part deals with the methods of expansion - how the communist power system acquired nev; power areas and ad-vances of strength through the operation of Its agencies in various parts of the world. Attempting to be an objective analysis of the communist power system, this study i s descriptive rather than c r i t i c a l . Therefore, i t does not portray nor does i t evaluate the communist power system against the background of our own ethical standards* So far as the sources are concerned, this study relies oh the original works' of leading Soviet, as well as non-Soviet Marxian theoreticians, rather than, on secondary sources where these works are merely interpretedo The author wishes to express his appreciation to Bean H« F, Angus, Head of the Department of Political Science, Dr. J. 0, St, Clair «Sobell, Head of the Depart-ment of Slavonic Studies, Dp, w , J, Rose and Dra C. Bryner also of the Department of Slavonic Studies, for their kind attention extended to me during the period in which this thesis was written. Their interest in my post-graduate studies, as well as in my present under-taking, have afforded me much encouragement. To Dr. H0 E. Ronimolst, under whom this thesis was written, I wish to express my deep gratitude and indebted-ness for the valuable advice and guidance which he so generously offered and the pa, tient concern which he mani-fested on my behalf. To the staff of the University Library, I am greatly Indebted for their kind assistance at a l l times. tfiroslav Fic. University of British Columbia. April iSth, 1953o POLITICAL STRATEGY AMD TACTICS OF COMMUNISM A STUDY IN TOTAL POWER t mm i w M — a i anum i II mi 11 ni> W M i i m . u . i m u m Preface PART I . THE THEORY OF TOTAL POWER Chapter I . On P o l i t i c a l Power Chapter I I . The Communist Concept of Total Power Chapter I I I . Strategy and Tactics of Total Power PART I I . APPLICATION OF THEORY OF TOTAL POWER Chapter IV. The Seizure of Power Chapter V. The Preservation, Concentration and Increase of Seized Power Chapter VI« The Expansion of Power Beyond the Power Base. Conclusion CHAPTER I . POLITICAL POKER. (a) OH POMt GENERALLY • •33a© basic phenomenon on which the entire l i f e of social organization rests i s power. Every kind of social organization, no mattes? in what stage of development, has as its fundfMental problem the problem of power. Therefore, in our endeavour to understand the genesis, the growth and the expansion or decay of any social organization, and in oiir endeavour to understand its social functions., we have to go down to the very basis of i t s l i f e « we have to etucly its power problem. Powssr in a social organization appears to have various modes and fcrms. There i s political power, economic poorer, the power of church organisation, the power of religious and political beliefs, the power of parental authority, the power of trade unions and other professional organisations, the power of propaganda and a great variety of others. Because in a l l these forms of social power there seems to be present one common element « the element of will and conscious activity - we can define social power as the pro-duction of intended effects. 1 Laws of social dynamics can be understood only in categories of power, as the laws governing physical nature are only comprehensible in terms of energy. Although we possess considerable knowledge of physical laws, we know much less about the laws which direct the processes in living nature; and in our endeavour to find out and to define the substance of power in a social organization, we face a d i f f i -culty similar to that of defining the substance of energy in natural sciences. In this essay we shall be concerned only with one form of social power - with political power - and, to avoid misunderstanding, we endeavour to formulate what will be 1 Russell, Ber trend: Power - A New Social Analysis. W.W. Horthan & Co., Stew York 193*4, p„ ' See also Lord Davis: Force, E, Seen* London, 193k. and Bertrand DeJouvenel: Power"^lne fiatural History of Its  Oowth. Hutchinson & Oo'., London^ i9ijjbV " '" - 1 l l d d , Benjamin: The Science of Power. Methven & Co., London, 1920, pft 1860 " N understood as political power throughout tills essay0 (b) OH POLITICAL POWER Although political power is only one of the family of sooial forces which we meet in our dally lives, nevertheless, i t occupies a prominent position among them. This Is because political power i s an integrating social force which brings into interaction and fruitful cooperation the key social forces) facilitating thus their harmonious functioning In the areas in whioh i t operates0 Political power appears in three basic forms, each of which is characteristic for an Increasing degree of Its materialization. These forms are the force of attraction, the force of sooial cohesion and institutional loyalty and the foroe of social gravity. Because of the variety of appearances of political power, there exist two schools of thought treating and in* terpretlng political power from two different angles. There is a sohool of political theory which treats political power in i t s outward forms and manifestations - l.e» how i t appears in political institutions, laws and regulations. This school studies foremost the composition of political in-stitutions, the division and range of powers vested in these and their legalistic foundations. It i s studying political power as a *• h- -stabilized and materialized social force - as a force of sooial gravity? . hoi? political institutions^ through a set of laws j exercise social control over the. areas in vhich the? function e This school may be described as a school of political Institutional ism or as a school of ' legalistic approach* From i t s chief protagonists we name Hans Jelinek, Hans Kelson and Julian Towster. On the other hand., there is a school of political theory vftilch treats political power in terms of processes; in its dynamic manifestations. It studyies social-psycholo-gipal processes as a basis for genesis of social forces and also the methods by which these processes can be influenced and channeled. The main f i e l d of this school are the preb- . lems of mass psychology and the techniques of mass communi-cations. It also tries to answer the questions of genesis, growth and expansion of political systems such as nazism, fascism and communism, as well as to see the motive forces in a democratic process. The chief protagonists of this school* among many others, is Charles E. Llerrlam and the study group around Harold D. Laswell* Because both of these schools are treating political power only from one of i t s aspects, in this essay we endeavour to approach the problem of political power from both i t s aspeots, i a i t s unified concept.2 We try to see how the body politic functions in i t s dynamic capacities when i t gener-ates social forces in i t s environment and when i t integrates these into i t s e l f . We also try to understand how the body politic functions in i t s static capacities, how It utilizes social forces organized in itself to achieve and to maintain its internal stability and' to direct Its internal l i f e , (c) COHPOSlTIOir O F A POLITICAL P A R T Y Political power i s a product, a function of the body politic and before we can discuss this function, we have to describe the body politic itself - we have to establish its composition. In sooial organization there are political bodies of three magnitudes; there i s the political party, the national government, and fi n a l l y 9 the embryo of a supernatlonal p o l i t i -cal body in the Organization of the United Nations. Although they differ vastly in their magnitude and scope of authority, they s t i l l generate political power in its three fundamental 2 Hermann Heller defines political power as "the efforts to develop and utilize organized social powers"0 The  Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. Vol.-XII, p. 3 0 1 , Maclttlian, New York, 193&« Adolf A. Berle advances the so called nuclear Concept of Political Power: "A Political Force consists of centrally attractive idea surrounded by an organizational apparatus," Hatural Selection of Political Force. University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, Kansas, 1 9 5 0 . f o r m s . H o w e v e r , t h e m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t i n h a v i n g t h e i r m a i n o r g a n s u n e v e n l y d e v e l o p e d , t h e y p r o d u c e o n e o r t h e o t h e r f o r m o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i n p r e p o n d e r a n c e . S h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t y i s w e l l k n o w n f o r i t s a b i l i t y t o g e n e r a t e t h e f o r c e o f a t t r a c t i o n ; c o n s e q u e n t l y , i t h a s i t s m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s f u l l y d e v e l o p e d . T h e g o v e r n m e n t i s w e l l k n o w n f o r i t s a b i l i t y t o e x e r c i s e s o o i a l c o n t r o l o v e r t h e a r e a i n w h i c h i t o p e r a t e s , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y , i t d e v e l o p e d t h o s e p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h g e n e r a t e t h e f o r c e o f s o c i a l g r a v i t y . T h e same c a n b e s a i d o f t h e s u p e r - n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l b o d y , a l t h o u g h i t i s s t i l l i n i t s f o r m a t i v e s t a g e . I n t h i s c h a p t e r we s h a l l e x a m i n e t h e p o l i t i c a l b o d y o f t h e l o w e s t m a g n i t u d e - t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t y - a n d i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e we s h a l l t r y t o s e e i t s c o m p o s i t i o n . ^ T h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t y i s a p o w e r c o m p l e x c o m p o s e d o f n u m e r o u s , s o o i a l f o r c e s k e p t t o g e t h e r i n w o r k i n g h a r m o n y . T h e s e a r e a g g r e g a t e d i n t o t h r e e m a j o r o r g a n s o f t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , e a c h o f w h i c h p r o d u c e s o n e d i s t i n c t i v e f o r m p o l i t i c a l p o w e r . : T h e m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s g e n e r a t e p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i n t h e f o r m o f a t t r a c t i o n . P a r t y c o n g r e s s e s , c o n f e r e n c e s a n d 3 I n t h i s g e n e r a l c h a p t e r O n P o l i t i c a l P o w e r , t h e r e f e r -e n c e s m a d e t o t h e r e l a t i v e t o p i c s w i l l c o n c e r n o n l y t h e C o m -m u n i s t P a r t y o f USSR b e c a u s e o f t h e - f o l l o w i n g r e a s o n s : I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , i n t h i s w o r k a n a t t e m p t w i l l b e m a d e t o a n a l y z e t h e c o n c e p t o f p o w e r o f c o m m u n i s m ; a n d s e c o n d l y , b e s s M s e r t h * (Jef iaaui i ia t P a r t y , o f uBSR, a s a h i g h l y i n t e g r a t e d p o l i t i c a l b o d y , o f f e r s t h e m o s t s u i t a b l e i n t e r p r e t i v e m o d e l . *JP *» sessions produce the force of social cohesion and institu-tional loyalty* Finally, the party apparatus, laws and intra«party orders produce political power in the form of social gravity* The First Party Organs Mass Oommunieations -In the f i r s t place, there is the ideology, the pro-gram and the platform of the political party, which in a very broad sense represents the party's intellect, its social consciousness and ralson d'etre» It is a set of philosophic and theoretic postulates and beliefs which are focussed on the future, what should be done, supplemented with a set of practical guides, how this should be achieved, and -shat to do and idisre to start at present.^-k. For the Communist Parties a l l over the world the follow-ing can be considered as program, platform and ideology in their long range activities* Their, working resolutions, pro-grams and platforms adopted by the congresses for their dally activities ere > however, modified by domestic and present day conditions: Earl M E R E & Fred, Engels.: Manifesto of the Ctommunist Party, Selected Works_in Two Volumes. Foreign Languages Fubll« shing House, Moscow, i9£6, Vol pp. 13 - 61. Earl Mesne t Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Ibid*, pp* 332 - 3ljl. Earl M E P X : Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumula-tion, Chapter XXXIX of the First Volume of Capital. The Inter-national Publishers Co*, Hew York, 1939» Frederick Engels; Introduction to Dialectics of Nature, Sari Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works, Vol*-II, PP. 91 - 73. Frederick Engels: Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Ibid., pp. 66 - i f e . XContinued cn the following page) Secondly, there i s a very complex machinery of mass coimannications which i s the technical means facilitating the transmission and dissemination of the party's ideology and the party11 s program and enabling the party to reach and contact the outside world as well as i t s own membership* When the mass ecramunieatlens are directed towards the party's own membership, they serve as instruments through which leading elite builds the social consciousness within the general membership masses, and through which the party commands are transmitted from the leading bodies to the general membership mass. On the other hand, the party directs the apparatus of mass communications towards i t s own.environment to disseminate Its ideology, to stir up, to generate social forces and to (Continued} Frederick Bngelsx Ludwig Feuerbaeh and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Ibid,. pp, 32k * 3&U Vol, Lenin: Imperialism.'*ma Highest Stage of Capitalism, Hew Data edited b y B, Varga and L. I^endelsohja, pubiiahed by " International Publishers, Hew York, 19kD* . V 0Io Lenins Material.ism and Etaairo-Crltieism. Foreijga Languages Publishing House, Sfoscow', 19i$• J 0 V 0 Stalin: Dialectical and Historical JSateriallsm, in J". V, Stolin: Problems of J D e n l n i s m . Foreign Languages Publishing House, libscoW, 194.7. pp* 569 «* 595o "History of_the Oomm^igt Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks j a ' Oommfaslon of the central Committee of the7 C0P.S.Uo(B)., Canadian edition by Francis White Pub-lishers, Ltd,, Toronto 1939» was authorized by the Central Committee of the C,PeSttU0(B), Josef Stalin: "Economic Problems of Socialism i n the  U , S ^ S , R Q " International Publishers, Hew York, 1952, e Q cS attract these toiirards the party.^ Hence, the f i r s t organ of the political party gener-ates political power in the form of attraction The, Second Party Organs The Party Congresses. "" ' •' Conferences'and Sessions. The second organ of the political party is constituted by the congresses, conferences and sessions as well as the procedural rules governing these. They serve actually as carriers of the party's capacity, to transform political power from its form of attraction to the form of social cohesion and Institutional loyalty; their most significant feature is the time element. The congresses, conferences and sessions are not of a permanent nature, but are, convened oniy to organize social forces generated in the party's environment, to Integrate and absorb these into the party's internal organs.& £ For the theory of mass communications see two studies of H. Lasswell and his associates, offering the analysis of techniques of transmission as well as the quantitative analysis of the Ideas transmitted: Harold Lasswell: Language of Polities, G..W. Steward, Publisbsrs, Inc., Nel^ F f c T T ^ , anTliasswell H. & Blumenstook D.: World Revolutionary Propa-ganda., A,P. Knopf, New York, 1939. See also: Bartiett P, C s , Political Propaganda * and Inkeles, Alex: PublicmOpinion I n T S o r l o ' t ' ( M b n T ^ g ^ ^ to-Mass POPsuasion„ '^arva^o^nlver's'ifJT ?r e'a a >' C^amp'^l^oVT^b«, 6 An example of how the congresses and conferences operate can be found in Towster5s description of conferences and con-gresses in USSR; Towster: Political Power in USSR, Chapter VII, art. 2, entitled The Congress and' the' Conference of the Party, pp. ll*k -10 » Hence, the second party organ serves as a carrier of the party's capacity to produce the force of social cohesion and institutional loyalty. The Third Party Organs The Party Apparatusa Laws This third organ of the political party f a l l s into two main divisions?. In the f i r s t place, there is a skeleton of party organisations where political power appears in its most materialised^ concentrated and consequently most stable form* The party skeleton i s a tissue of power centers de-ployed horizontally over geographic regions and organized vertically into one integrated power system* Thus, the poli-tical party consists of the power centers of low order on i t s local levels, l«e. the local party organizations; and of the power centers of high order on i t s higher levels, i.e. of district, regional and nation-wide party organisations Secondly, this third organ of the party consists of intra-party laws, statutes and orders whioh are directing, balancing and harmonising the party's internal l i f e . These also include the punitive provisions and the devices through 7 For the description of the apparatus of the Communist Party of USSR see Tows ter Julians Political Power inthe USSR * 1917 - 19li?. Oxford University Pre^T^^'^or'k", I^1 } F ? ' Gh^SlWlS^Tvll and VIII, pp* 119 1 7 5 . which the party enforces decisions within its internal organs ,8 Hence, the third organ of the political party pro-duces political power in the form of social gravity. And finally, there is. the most important factor common to a l l three organs of the political party, the human element - the general membership. The human element with its class, sex and age stratification represents the social-biologic basis, a carrier of the party's social dynamics which determines; the vitality and mobility of the party as a social movement,? The human element within the party is broken down into three functional levels linked in hierarchial order: into the leading, elite which formulates policies and gives orders.> into the transmitting ca&?©s, and finally, into the general membership mass carrying out these policies and orders© rules 8 For the intra-party/of the Communist Party of USSR see th© new party rules adopted at the XIX Party Congress convened on October 5th, 1952, Published in For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy. Ho, 3k, August Z^T^^T^^^f^^ Official organ of the Cominform, 9 For the social, stratification of the membership of the Gommunlst Party of USSR see Towsters Political Power in ••USSR.. Chapter XIII, called th© Seelo-PolitieaT*Hiance 9 pp."^Tr~" On social stratification and its relation to the political power in general see Reinerd Sendix's* Social Stratifl cation and Political Power, a study published in The 'American ' PoHtical Science Review, Volo-XLYX, Ho, 2, June 1952, PP. 357 - 375, Hence,:'we conclude that the political party, as we know i t from its general appearance and activities i s actually the co-ordinated inter-action of three main organs of the political partyi and that the political power in its unified concept is a simultaneous manifestation of attraction, cohesion and social gravity, (d) THE POLITICAL PABTg AT WORK  Its External Activities. * The political party functions in its social environment and exercises an impact on the other social organisations as well. as on the unorganized masses. It transmits its ideology and program through a variety of mass communications^ such as party press, pamphlets, leaflets, by agitation and propaganda carried out by special departs® nts of the party and by the activities of it s individual members. The party mass communications are directed towards th® target social groups as well as towards the targat sections of the population in order to generate the power tensions between the party and that particular target in question. If the mas3 communications are beamed into mass®3 of Individuals not organized in other political parties, the effect they produce can be described as follows: * 13 *» T o e I n d i v i d u a l s r e a c t i n a p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n t o w a r d s t h e p a r t y v & e n t h e y w e r e a t t r a c t e d . T h e y r e a c t i n a n e g a t i v e d i r e c t i o n t o w a r d s t h e p a r t y w h e n t h e y h a v e b e e n a n t a g o n i s e d a n d r e p u l s e d . F i n a l l y , t h e y c a n . r e m a i n n e u t r a l . T h i s p r o c e s s o f b e a m i n g t h e m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t o w a r d s t h e u n o r g a n i s e d i n d i v i d u a l s b e a r s s t r o n g l y a r e s e m b l a n c e t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f m a g n e t i c f i e l d s i n p h y s i c s w h e r e t h e s m a l l i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c l e s o f m a t t e r a r e o r g a n i s e d i n p o s i t i v e , n e g a t i v e a n d n e u t r a l a t t i t u d e s , d e p e n d i n g , o f c o u r s e ; o n t h e s t r e n g t h o f t ine f i e l d a p p l i e d . Vi/hen t h e m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s b e a m t h e p a r t y ' s i d e o l o g y a n d p r o g r a m t o w a r d s t h e s o c i a l g r o u p s , a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y p o l i t i c a l g r o u p s , t h e p r o c e s s w h i c h f o l l o w s i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t m e n t i o n e d a b o v e . T h e g r o u p a s a w h o l e i s e i t h e r a t t r a c t e d , r e p u l s e d , o r f i n a l l y i t r e m a i n s n e u t r a l . W h e n h o w e v e r , t h e p r e s s u r e o f t h e m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s f r o m o u t s i d e i s s t r o n g e r t h a n t h e c e n t r i p e t a l f o r c e s h o l d i n g t h e t a r g e t g r o u p t o g e t h e r , a n e n t i r e l y n e w p r o c e s s t a k e s p l a c e . I t m a y b e d e s c r i b e d a s t h e d i s r u p t i o n a n d t h e d i s i n t e -g r a t i o n o f t h e s o c i a l g r o u p a n d h a s t h e s e f o l l o w i n g d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s . T h e f i r s t p a r t o f t h e m e m b e r s h i p o f t h e t a r g e t g r o u p i s b y t h e e f f e c t o f m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a t t r a c t e d a n d i t l e a v e s t h e o r i g i n a l g r o u p t o J o i n t h e a t t a c k i n g o n e . T h e - lit • second part of the membership of the target organisation also leaves the maternal group -this,: however, with the aim to join another sooial group i&ich would be more resistant. The third part of the member ship of the target organizatlon>be-cause of i t s strongest institutional loyalties, stays organized within the remaining torso of the maternal group. Finally, the fourth part of the membership is released in the course of this process of splitting, and i t emerges as some sort of emanation without any further political affiliations* The process of disrupting and splitting of a social group i s effected by a constant and long-lasting pressure of the mass communications on the target group and i s , therefore; of a slow and protracted character. It not only depletes the target organization in i t s numerical strength, but i t disturbs the internal equilibrium and th© power ratio within th© affected group and^therefore, i t transforms and entirely reconstructs the target group. 1 0 10 Though i t i s impossible to explain social phenomena by the categories of natural sciences, the resemblance of the principles involved i n the splitting of social groups and atoms i s so striking that i t deserves to be mentioned. The process of the splitting of social groups as a practical operation of great importance and far reaching consequences was for the f i r s t time described by Matyas Hakosl in a speech "The Way of Our People*s Democracy", delivered at the Academy orme jKHgarion SomrauMsTTar1 ty' on February 29th, 1952e Hakosi describes the slow and protracted process of splitting and chipping of the political parties of th© (Continued on the following page) - 15 She result of the processes of attraction ojf Indivi-duals and social groups as well as the result of the processes of splitting of social groups depend upon the Intensity of the applied f i e l d of mass ooaariunloations and better results are generally obtained j 1. Men the mass communications are directed towards the targets - individuals or sooial groups « which were singled out and isolated. 2. V2hen the mass communications transmit the ideas which appeal,; attract and meet interests, needs and beliefs of individuals and groups i n question. By way of summary we -can say, that social the. forces are generated by an Impact of/body politic on the un-organized masses, and the force of attraction hitherto gener-ated stirs up these masses and causes them to gravitate towards the body pol i t i c . On the other hand, we would say that the social forces are released when the body politic collides with other power complexes, when i t s Impact breaks the institutional loyalties and other centripetal forces holding the target group together, and when i t attracts part of i t s membership. Th© member ship (Continued) Communists' opponents through which tke Communists were gradu-ally pushed Into controlling the country. For tills process he coins the term "The Salami Tactics". The report was in f u l l published by the National Committee for Free Europe, Inc., New York City, May 1952, under the t i t l e "The Bolshevlgatlon •» 16 — o f t h e d i s r u p t e d g r o u p j o i n s t h e a t t a c k i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s n o t o n l y a s i n d i v i d u a l s , b u t i t b r i n g s w i t h i t s e l f q u i t e f r e q u e n t -l y a l s o t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l p a r t o f t h e a p p a r a t u s o f t h e o r g a n i -z a t i o n s t o w h i c h i t o n c e b e l o n g e d , , I t s I n t e r n a l A c t i v i t i e s * A c c o r d i n g t o o u r c o n c e p t o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r f o r m u l a t e d a t t h e o u t s e t o f t h i s p a p e r , t h e b o d y p o l i t i c f u n c t i o n s i n i t s s t a t i c c a p a c i t y w h e n i t m a i n t a i n s i t s i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y ) a n d v f r e n i t g e n e r a t e s t h e f o r c e o f s o c i a l g r a v i t y t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e l e a d i n g o r g a n s d i r e c t i t s i n t e r n a l l i f e . S p e a k i n g o f t h e c a p a c i t y t o m a i n t a i n i n t e r n a l c o n s o l i -d a t i o n a n d t o p r o d u c e t h e f o r c e o f s o c i a l g r a v i t y , we h a v e t o l o o k f o r t h e c a r r i e r o f t h i s c a p a c i t y . H e r e , we f i n d t h a t i t c o n s i s t s o f t h r e e m a j o r g r o u p s o f p o w e r . F i r s t l y , t h e r e i s t h e h u m a n e l e m e n t , t h e p a r t y e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r s e l e c t e d b y t h e p a r t y a s s e m b l i e s a n d e n d o w e d w i t h t h e e x e c u t i v e p o w e r s d e l e g a t e d t o t h e m . S e c o n d l y , t h e r e i s t h e s k e l e t o n o f p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s , w h i c h i n t h e i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h t h e p a r t y 8 s e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r s b r i n g t h e p a r t y t o i t s l i f e , t o i t s f u n c t i o n i n g . T h i r d l y , t h e r e a r e t h e l a w s d i r e c t i n g i n t r a - p a r t y l i f e , t h e r u l e s c o n c e r n i n g p a r t y , d i s c i p l i n e , t h e r u l e s e n f o r c i n g p a r t y d e c i s i o n s a n d , f i n a l l y , t h e p u n i t i v e p r o v i s i o n s . 1 7 A l l t h e s e a b o v e f o r c e s • • . w o r k ' - - h a n a o n i o u s l y a n d t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n p r o d u c e s a f o r c e o f s o c i a l g r a v i t y * W i t h i n t h e b o d y p o l i t i c , t h i s i s m a n i f e s t e d a s t h e I n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y w h i c h commands r e s p e c t , o b e d i e n c e a n d l o y a l t y o n t h e p a r t o f t h e m e m b e r s h i p * I n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d , t h e f o r c e o f s o c i a l g r a v i t y r e n d e r s t o t h e b o d y p o l i t i c a n a p p e a r a n c e o f a w e l l c o n s t i t u t e d a n d i n t e g r a t e d s o c i a l o r g a n i s m , a n d i t i s v m a n i f e s t e d b y t h e v i o l e n c e w i t h w h i c h t h e b o d y p o l i t i c c o l l i d e s w i t h o t h e r s o c i a l o r g a n i s m s a n d s t i l l m a i n t a i n s i t s m o n o l i t h i c c h a r a c t e r . A n o t h e r w e l l k n o w n m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h e f o r c e o f s o c i a l g r a v i t y i s t h a t i l l - d e f l h e d f o r c e o f a u t h o r i t y w h i c h i s g e n e r a t e d b y t h e b o d y p o l i t i c i n i t s e n -v i r o n m e n t w i t h o u t i t s d i r e c t a n d i n t e n t i o n a l e n g a g e m e n t j b y i t s v e r y e x i s t e n c e ) a n d a f f e c t i n g o t h e r s o c i a l o r g a n i s m s n o t i n d i r e c t c o n t a c t , b u t f r o m a d i s t a n c e . T h i s i s a c c o u n t e d f o r b y t h e f a c t , t h a t t h e b o d y p o l i t i c i n t h e a c t u a l p h y s i c a l m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d p o s s e s s e s a m a s s , a v e l o c i t y , a d i r e c t i o n o f i t s m o t i o n | a n d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i t n e c e s s a r i l y h a s i t s own g r a v i t a t i o n a l f i e l d i n w h i c h O r b i t t h i s f o r c e o f - s o c i a l , g r a v i t y i s e f f e c t i v e * . E h e s t a b i l i t y o f th© b o d y p o l i t i c a c h i e v e d by p r o p a g a -t i o n o f c e n t r i p e t a l f o r c e s i a n o t a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d © n t i t y j b u t i t s e r v e s a s a c a r r i e r o f t h e p a r t y ' s a b i l i t y t o d i s c h a r g e a n d to beam its ideology into the environment, to release and to generate there new social forces. Here again, the party applied the f i e l d of mass communications, i t again absorbs generated forces and produces again the force of social gravity; this: i s done by the processes already known to us. Hence, we may conclude with the observation that the body politic; in the same way as any other living organism actually lives on, absorbing and digesting the negative athropy* It absorbs the nfrgative athropy from i t s environment and transforms this within i t s organs into the energy *» into i t s v i t a l force - which in turn enables the body politic to release discharges into i t s environment and to cause athropy in i t s target organizations. (©) •• THB INTERMEDIATE STAGES BETWEEN POLITICAL DYNAMICS " — " — AriD ftfjaBMB:-'' — — It i s impossible to draw a simple dividing line between political dynamics and political statics and to define when the body politic functions in its dynamic and static capacities „ Political power observed from a dynamic aspect has the form of attraction and before i t is transformed within the body politic into the force of political statics, i 0 e o into the force of sooial gravity, i t has to undergo a transforma-tion which takes place in an intermediate stage 0 • 19 -F r o m t h e o u t s e t we h a v e t o d e f i n e t h o s e o r g a n s o f t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t y w h i c h a r e t h e c a r r i e r s o f t h e p a r t y ' s c a p a c i t y t o c a t c h a n d t o r a l l y s o c i a l f o r c e s w h i c h a r e o u t s i d e t h e p a r t y , w i t h i n i t s e n v i r o n m e n t * F u r t h e r , we h a v e t o e s t a b l i s h t h o s e o r g a n s w h i c h e n a b l e t h e p a r t y t o a b s o r b a n d t o d i g e s t a n i n f l u x o f t h i s n e w e n e r g y , a n d w h i c h w i l l s e c u r e t h a t t h e p a r t y i s n o t t h r o w n o u t o f b a l a n c e * P u r s u i n g t h i s o b j e c t i v e we s e e t h a t j i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , t h e r e i s t h e n e t w o r k o f p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s d e p l o y e d h o r i z o n -t a l l y a n d v e r t i c a l l y , p e n e t r a t i n g d e e p i n t o t h e p a r t y ' s s o o i a l e n v i r o n m e n t * T h i s n e t w o r k r e p r e s e n t s a d e n s e t i s s u e o f i n d i -v i d u a l p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s , w h i c h , b e i n g a c t u a l p h y s i c a l , p o w e r c e n t e r s , f u n c t i o n a s r a l l y i n g p o i n t s * T h e s e c o n d c a r r i e r , o f t h i s i n t e r m e d i a t e s t a g e c o n s i s t s o f t h e s t a t u t e s , o r d e r s a n d h a b i t s d i r e c t i n g t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f a p o w e r r e l a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l b l o c k s w i t h i n t h e p a r t y . M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t i n c l u d e s a i l t h o s e w r i t t e n a n d h a b i t u a l r u l e s s t i p u l a t i n g a n d d i r e c t i n g t h e . p e t r i f i c a t i o n o f p o w e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e p a r t y , a n d a l l t h o s e d e v i c e s t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e p a r t y a c q u i r e s a n d m a i n t a i n s i t s i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y * T h e s e a r e t h e r u l e s d i r e c t i n g t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f d i s c u s s i o n ; . d i r e c t i n g t h e v o t i n g a n d t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e d u r e s , t h e r u l e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e d e l e g a t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y a n d ^ f i n a l l y , t h e r u l e s s t i p u l a t i n g t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d f u n c t i o n i n g o f i n d i v i d u a l - 20 -p a r t y o r g a n s * i n s h o r t * t h i s c a r r i e r c o n s i s t s o f t h e r u l e s d i r e c t i n g t h e i h t r a - p a r t y p r o c e d u r e s , o f t h e s t a t u t e s f o r m u -l a t i n g t h e ini3?a-party s t r u c t u r e a n d o f t h e d e v i c e s t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e p a r t y a c h i e v e s a n d m a t e r i a l i s e s the e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e power r a t i o o f i n d i v i d u a l power b l o c k s * . I n t h e p r o c e s s r a l l y i n g , s e t t l i n g a n d a b s o r b i n g : s o o i a l f o r c e s , t h e p a r t y needs, h o w e v e r , t h e t h i r d a g e n t w h i c h . w o u l d e n a b l e t h e i n t e r - a c t i o n o f t h e t i s s u e o f p a r t y o r g a n i -z a t i o n s w i t h t h e r u l e s o f i n t r a - p a r t y p r o c e d u r e . A n d t h i s a g e n t c o n s i s t s o f t h e p a r t y c o n g r e s s e s , c o n f e r e n c e s a n d m e e t i n g s a n d o t h e r numerous a c t i v i t i e s p e r f o r m e d o n a l l p a r t y l e v e l s . Now. t h a t we h a v e d e s c r i b e d t h e c a r r i e r s o f t h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e b o d y p o l i t i c t o p r o d u c e t h e f o r c e o f s o c i a l c o h e s i o n , we c a n p r o c e e d t o d i s c u s s t h i s c a p a c i t y i t s e l f - how t h e s e t h r e e power g r o u p s f u n c t i o n i n t h e i r i n t e r - a c t i o n . A t t h e p a r t y c o n g r e s s e s , c o n f e r e n c e s and m e e t i n g s t h e i n d i v i d u a l s a n d t h e s o c i a l g r o u p s who were a t t r a c t e d t o t h e p a r t y meet w i t h t h e p a r t y ' s o l d m e m b e r s h i p , . a n d , b e i n g a n a l i e n e l e m e n t , t h e y h a v e t o be i d e o l o g i c a l l y u n i f o r m e d a n d l a t e r c h a n n e l l e d i n t o t h e p a r t y ' s i n t e r n a l o r g a n s * T h i s p r o c e s s o f u n i f i c a t i o n t a k e s p l a c e when t h e new membership a c c e p t s t h e p a r t y ' s p r o g r a m and when i t m u s t d i s c o n t i n u e i t s p r e s e n t l o y a l t i e s w h i c h c o u l d p o s s i b l y b i n d i t t o a n o t h e r p o l i t i c a l — 21 — formation,, In order to absorb the new membership, to strengthen the fetters between the newcomers and the party itself and to make this affiliation permanent, the new member-ship i s distributed into the intra-party organs and i t must accept commitments regarding i t s intra and outside party activities* Now, when the new membership is dissolved and absorbed, i t i s given the objective conditions for building the force of sooial cohesion and institutional loyalty. The new members are assigned to individual cells which become their maternal organisations. Here they meet regularly with the party's elite and are exposed to continuous influence of a l l those devices through which the party indoctrinates and devel-opes symbolism and fetiehism. These devices in the inter-action with the general membership masses produce and propa-gate centripetal forces vaSiich Imbue the party with the appear-ance of a social monolith. The party congresses, conferences and meetings, besides settling and channelling the turbulent social forces into the party's internal organs, act also in another way towards the transformation of political power from i t s dynamic to i t s static form* They formulate the party's policies and attitudes towards Its outside world and they materialize these attitudes in programs, resolutions and decisions 0 They further create and constitute the party's permanent bodies in which political power is manifested i n i t s most materialised form. These are the executive councils, various committees and sub-committees and other numerous organs of the party's apparatus. In order to enable the development of different attitudes to party problems and to facilitate the formation and aggregation of the party membership into various intra-party power groups, free discussion i s Introduced at a l l party congresses, con-ferences and meetings. Up to this point, up to the point of voting, when in the course of discussion the individual power blocs and formations were aggregated, the party assemblies act in their dynamic functions. When, however, the party assemblies approach the point of voting, no matter whether in policy-making or in electing the party executive organs, they enter into the region of political statics. Hence, the acts of voting; as well as the acts, of electing make the power relation of individual power blocks developed during the discussion permanent. The power relation is petrified and materialised in the programs, resolutions and amendments as well as in the power composition of elected executive bodies, where the power ratio achieved by voting and electing will be retained until the next congress. — 23 ** By my of conclusion we may say that; the acts of voting ana electing are the acts of transformation of poli-t i c a l power from its turbulent, oscillating and unstable form of attraction to its condensed^ materialized and stable form of social gravity* They render to political power those outside and well-known manifestations under which i t is generally apprehended* In this way the circle of power transition is com-pleted. The social forces generated by the force of attrac-tion are within the organs of the body politic transformed into the force of social cohesion, institutional loyalty, and finally, into the force of social gravity only to produce the force of attraction again. Power changes .its modes and manifestations, but never Its r e a l i t y , 1 1 11 For different approaches to the study of political power, see Field, Lowell G0: Hypothesis for a Theory of Political Power, Published in the American Political Science Review, Vol,-XLV, Ho, 3, September, 1^1, '^Tjm^J^T :—"~ An attempt to systematize the theory of political power is made by Franz L» Heumanh in Approaches to the Study of Political Power in the Political Science Quarterly, Vol,-LXV, Hoo 2, June 1950,"pp.' 161 - IBoT" A quantitative approach to the problems of political, power on an International level is made by Maurice A, Ash in An Analysis of Power, with Special Reference to International Polities, World Politics. Vol.-Ill, Ho, 2, January 1951, pp. 218 ~ ZWo See also Miehels, Roberto: First Lectures in Political Sociology, University of Minnesotall,,,Pr'els,'s,'' ''Minneapolis,'' 'X9W> Merriam, Charles Edward: Political Power ~ Its Composition and Incidence. ViBiittlesey Sbuse','' Mew York", 193ij-o « 2l|. -(£) OH LIMITS' OP POLITICAL POWER There are two types of political parties, the democratic political parties and the totalitarian political parties, In democratic societies there exist several political parties which compete in open election to constitute the government and to take part in It by sharing power. Also, governments in democratic societies are limited. The powers which are vested in these are separated, checked and balanced to prevent their accumulation and monopolization and to elimin-ate the use of governmental executive powers outsi.de constitu-tional areas. In this restriction and limitation of political parties and the governments which they do constitute lies the fundamental difference between the governments of total and limited powers. Political parties of total powers organize social forces In order to establish ultimate and permanent control over them and to constitute a government of total powers well known for it s monopolistic and dictatorial character. Democratic political parties, on the other hand, organize social forces for limited purposes. They form a limited government confined in its activity by a set of con-stitutional laws and characterized by the distribution, sepa-ration and balance of powers. Before we treat communism as a political system which operates on. the principles of unlimited power, we shall C o 4 £ ? s u m m a r i z e t h e m a i n p o i n t s w h i c h , t a k e n t o g e t h e r , d r a w t h e d i v i d i n g l i n e b e t w e e n a d e m o c r a t i c a n d a t o t a l i t a r i a n p a r t y 0 D e m o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s h a v e b u t o n e s o c i a l f u n c t i o n : t o c o n s t i t u t e b y g e n e r a l , d i r e c t a n d s e c r e t e l e c t i o n s a g o v e r n m e n t w h i c h o p e r a t e s o h t h e c l a s s i c a l A r i s t o -t e l i a n c o n c e p t o f p o l i t i c a l e q u i l i b r i u m a n d o n M o n t e s q u i e u ' s c o n c e p t o f s e p a r a t i o n o f p o w e r s . D e m o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a r e l i m i t e d p o w e r c o m -p l e x e s s I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , t h e y a r e l i m i t e d i n t h e i r a i m s a n d p r o g r a m s ; t h e y w i l l s h a r e p o w e r i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t w i t h o t h e r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , a n d i f t h e y a r e i n t h e m a j o r i t y , t h e y w i l l r e s p e c t t h e r i g h t o f t h e m i n o r i t y , , I n t h e s e c o n d p l a c e , t h e y a r e l i m i t e d i n r e g a r d t o t h e a r e a s i n w h i c h t h e y o p e r a t e . D e m o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s l i m i t t h e m s e l v e s t o e l e c t o r a l r e g i o n s a s d e f i n e d b y t h e c o n -s t i t u t i o n , e l e c t o r a l r e g u l a t i o n s , e s t a b l i s h e d h a b i t s a n d c u s t o m s a n d t h e y m o b i l i z e t h e i r m e m b e r s h i p o n l y a t t h e t i m e o f e l e c t i o n s . T h i r d l y , d e m o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a r e l i m i t e d i n r e g a r d t o mo { h o d s e n d w a y s t h e y u s e i n t h e i r p o w e r s e e k i n g , , T h e y c o n s i d e r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f d e m o c r a t i c - e l e c t i o n s a s t h e m a i n w e a p o n t o a c h i e v e t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a m b i t i o n s a n d t h e y d o n o t u s e s t r i k e s , s t r e e t - f i g h t i n g a n d o t h e r f o r m s o f v i o l e n c e o Ehoy.do not organize intra-party organs of naked power to be able to intervene in the areas where the party Is weak at the polls. Democratic political parties further observe the time limits as set by the constitution and electoral lav/3 and they resign from power i f they lose the confidence of the popular vote. They do not use the entrusted governmental exe-cutive powers outside the frame-work of the constitution for the party's own purposes. Fnrthermore, democratic political parties are unevenly developed. Although they possess a l l the attributes of the political party as described in the f i r s t part of this paper, most of their organs are In a rather undeveloped form. They have usually fully developed the means of mass communications, but the party apparatus is maintained only on upper levels with very vague local power centers. Totalitarian political parties, on the other hand,, are political systems of total power. They set forth total pro-grams and total aims. They are not limited In their power seeking to electoral regions andjpursuing their objectives, they resort to total strategy. - 27 * CHAPTER II SHE, COMIUUIST FORM OF POLITICAL POtTER "All class smuggle Is a political struggle, because i t is finally a struggle for power » • . To strive to overthrow the bourgeoi-sie, and to destroy i t s State, means to carry on political warfare* To create working class apparatus -for the brid ling: and suppression of of the resisting bourgeoisie - what-ever such an apparatus maj- be, means to gain political power* A* OIJ TOTAL POblER G33HERALLY The communist political party differs fundamentally from democratic political parties because i t is a system of total power« It sets for tin total aims and consequently i t 1 The Theses and Statutes of the Communist International (as adopted at the Second World Congress, 1920, at Moscow}. Reprinted in Blueprint for World Conquest- Human Events, Washington - C & o a ^ V - - ^ ^ / " does not limit i t s e l f in i t s power-seeking to constitutional areas, and i t does not consider electoral proceedings as the main source Of i t s power 92 For the comimanists the free democratic society, with i t s numerous organizations, serves as a source of power. They conceive modern society as a network operating under constant tensions. They believe that in i t there exists an uninter-rupted interplay and interaction of a l l sooial organizations which in their mutual impact, exercising their social functions, generate various modes of social power; and finally, that a l l social organizations and the tensions they generate can be used as a source of power. The eammuiists utilize for their power purposes, i n tdie.first place* tensions which are generated by principal social organizations, such as government institutions, p o l i t i -cal parties, trade unions and civic groups. The power tensions generated by the principal sooial organizations are the most 2 For studies i n total power in the international f i e l d see George Schwarezenbergers Power Polities. Jonathan Cape, London* 19iil» Also Robert Stausz-Hupes g^opo^lltlcs-gtruggdle for Peace and Power. G.P. Putnam & Sons, few York-"IwtS'' 'and ais'' aEa " Balance of Tomorrow, G.P. Putnam & Sons, Slew York, Also see E&aunfi A'« Walsh j JPotal Power Double day & Co., Hew York, 19k&, H.W. Baldwins The Price of Power. Harper & Bros., Hew York, 1947, and B.LI..' ras'Jmrt 'The*'Pa'ytern of Imperialism. A Stody in the Theory of Power. Columbia University Press, lew York, l9lj.e. • • 29 -r e l i a b l e s o u r c e s o f p o w e r f o r t h e c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s , b e c a u s e a s p i l l a r s o f m o d e m i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y , t h e y a r e e v e r y w h e r e a n d t h e y o p e r a t e p e r m a n e n t l y * I n t h e i s e c o n d p l a c e , t h e c o m m u n i s t s u t i l i s e a n y m o m e n -t a r y t e n s i o n a n d m o v e m e n t w i t h i n t h e s o c i e t y w h i c h g e n e r a t e s r e s e n t m e n t a g a i n s t g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y a n d a g a i n s t t h e i r t a r g e t g r o u p s . F i n a l l y ; t h e c o m m u n i s t s u t i l i s e a s a s o u r c e o f p o w e r t h e f r e e m a s s b a s e , t h e b r o a d m a s s e s o f tiie p o p u l a t i o n n o t a f f i l i a t e d w i t h a n y p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n , S h e c o m m u n i s t c o n c e p t o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i s b a s e d o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t a l l s o o i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s m a y b e u s e d f o r p o l i t i c a l p u r p o s e s , i f p e n e t r a t e d b y o p e r a t o r s t o e n a b l e t h e c o m m u n i s t p a r t y t o m a n i p u l a t e t h e i r s o c i a l f u n c t i o n s , t o d i r e c t t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s i n t o d e s i r a b l e c h a n n e l s , a n d f i n a l l y , t o d i s t u r b t h e i r c o o p e r a t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n a n d t o s e t t h e m a g a i n s t e a c h o t h e r . F o r t h i s r e a s o n a l l s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s c o n -s t i t u t e t a r g e t s f o r c o m m u n i s t p e n e t r a t i o n , a n d t h e s t r a t e g i c v a l u e o f e a c h i n d i v i d u a l g r o u p d e t e r m i n e s t h e e f f o r t t h e c o m -m u n i s t s m a k e t o e s t a b l i s h c o n t r o l o v e r t h e l a t t e r . T h e c o m m u n i s t s , f o l l o w i n g t h i s c o n c e p t o f p o w e r , u t i l i s e t h e k e y s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s a n d t h e t e n s i o n s t h e y g e n e r a t e i n t h e m a n n e r d i s c u s s e d b e l o w . - 30 >» Bo SOURCES OF TOTAL POWER^  1. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AS A SOURCE OF-POWER (a) ELECTIONSs A striking example of how the communists utilise tensions In society is revealed by their attitude towards elections. They do not consider elections to be at a l l the source of their power> but they exploit It for mobilising the masses, for stirring up movements of resentment against governmental authority. "The election campaign must be carried on not only for the purpose of ob-taining a large number of seats in the Parliament, but for the revolutionary mobi-lisation, of the masses around, the slogans of the proletarian revolution.**. Cb) dOVERIMEHTAL INSTITUTIONS When the communists succeed, in elections, to obtain seats in constitutional assemblies, they do not take part in 3 In elaborating this chapter, Philip Selsnick's work T h e valuable assistance© k The Theses and Statutes of the Communist international (as adopted at th© Second World Congress, 1920, at Moscow). Reprinted In Blueprint for World Conquest. Human Events, Washington-Chicago,' 1946, p. 93, • 31 •' constructive legislative activities, but they work persistently to undermine the constitutional value of these institutions: "The Communist Party enters such in-stitutions (Parliaments) not for the purpose of organizational work, but in order to direct the masses to blow up the whole bourgeois machinery and the parliament its e l f from within i. . , • . • This work within the parliament, which consists chiefly in making revolutionary pro-paganda from the parliamentary platform , « • must be fully subordinated to the object and tasks of the mass struggle, "5 The parliamentary Immunity enjoyed by the communist members of legislative assemblies i s exploited to cover and protect their Illegal operations in which each member of parliament must be engaged. "A Cksmmunist representative, by decision of the Central Committee is bound to combine legal work with ill e g a l work. In the countries where the Communist delegate enjoys a certain inviolability, this must be utilized by way of rendering assistance to the illegal organizations and for propaganda of the party"o The communist members of Parliament do not work as legislators, but concentrate on promoting and sharpening political conflicts between political parties, with the aim of $ The Theses and Statutes of the Communist International (as adopted at the Second World Congress. 1920, at Moscow*) Reprinted in Blueprint for World Conquest, p. 92* - 32 -preventing any settlement which could bring about . stability and consolidation within the states "Each Communist representative must remember that he Is not a "legislator" who is bound to seek agreements with the other legislators, but an agitator of the party, detailod into the enemy's camp in order to carry out the order of the party there,, The Communist member i s not ansi?erable to the wide mass of his constituents, but to his own Communist party - whether legal or Illegal."' (c) MINISTERIAL AND OTHER EXECUTIVE POWERS When the communists are in control of seats in the cabinet and other executive governmental bodies, they use their vast executive powers for partisan decisions^ They buildup power nuclei in these agencies, and) finally, they engage, under their protection, in illegal operations. The communist control of the Ministry of Interior, Army, Agriculture, Industry and Public Communications is usually fatal to the government which entrusted these executi*-powers to the communistse (d) LOCAL AMP MUNICIPAL GOV13R11MENTS In order to utilize local and municipal governments, the Executive Committee of the Communist International in-structed communist parties to carry out the following activi-ties s 7 Ibid, p. 98 33 -I f t h o c o m m u n i s t s h a v e t h e m a j o r i t y i n t h e l o c a l , g o v e r n m e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e y m u s t s Ca) G a r r y o n a r e v o l u t i o n a r y o p p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t th© b o u r g e o i s c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y , ( b ) D o a l l f o r . t h e a i d o f t h e p o o r p o p u l a t i o n ( e c o n o m i c m e a s u r e s , e s t a b l i s h m e n t o r a t t e m p t t o e s t a b l i s h a n a r m e d w o r k e r s 1 m i l i t i a ) • ( c ) P o i n t o u t o n e v e r y o c c a s i o n t h e b a r r i e r w h i c h tli© b o u r g e o i s s t a t e p o w e r p u t s a g a i n s t r e a l l y g r e a t c h a n g e s 0 ( d ) , D e v e l o p o n t h i s b a s i s t h o s h a r p e s t r e v o l u -t i o n a r y p r o p a g a n d a w i t h o u t f e a r i n g a c o n -f l i c t w i t h t h e s t a t e a u t h o r i t i e s , ( e ) U n d e r c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s s u b s t i t u t e l o c a l W o r k e r s * C o u n c i l s f o r t h e m u n i c i p a l a d -m i n i s t r a t i o n , T h e w h o l e a c t i v i t y o f t h e C o m m u n i s t s i n t h e C o m m u n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e p m u s t b e a p a r t o f t h e g e n e r a l f i w o r k o f d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e c a p i t a l i s t s y s t e m , " 8 ( e ) P O L I T I C A L P A R T I E S P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s c a n b e u t i l i s e d o n l y i f t h e c o m -m u n i s t s a r e a b l e t o e s t a b l i s h d i r e c t a n d i m m e d i a t e c o n t a c t w i t h t h e i r m e m b e r s h i p f r o m b e l o w . P e r t h e p u r p o s e o f f a c i l i -t a t i n g a c c e s s t o t h o m e m b e r s h i p , o f o t h e r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , t h e c o m m u n i s t s e n g a g e i n b u i l d i n g t e m p o r a r y a l l i a n c e s a s w e l l a s u n i t e d f r o n t s o f a p e r m a n e n t n a t u r e 0 T h e y f o r m j o i n t p l a t f o r m s a n d j o i n t c o m m i t t e e s w h e r e t h e c o m m u n i s t s a r e c a r r y * i n g o n a g i t a t i o n a n d p r o p a g a n d a t o u n d e r m i n e t h e l o y a l t y o f 8 I b i d , p p , 92-93* fellow membership masses, and to dissociate these froia their maternal organ! sat ions 0 "The executive committee emphasizes that the application of the United Front tactics Is the duty of every Communist Party, that these tactics constitute a powerful means of exposing the opportunism of the reformist leaders and of disassociating the toiling masses from the leaders, and also of uniting the proletariat under the banner of th© Comintern, "9 In this respect, the Social Democratic and other socialist parties are the foremost targets of communist attacks. The reason being that the Socialists, by organizing th© working class,operate in the same social stratum as do. the communists, and that they are necessarily the Li? main competiters. Therefore, the communists do not consider poll* t l c a i parties of the extreme Right as the main obstacle in their road to power, but rather the strength of socialist parties is their main concern. have combined and shall continue to combine our readiness to march jointly with the Social Democratic Parties and organiza-tions to the struggle against fascism with an Irreconcilable struggle against Social Democracy as the ideology and practice of 9" I. Eomorf Years of Comintern,* quoted in August Tyler's The United Front, Rand School Press, New York, 1933. Reprinted in Philip Sefeilck's The Oj?ganizational Weapon, Th© Rand Corporation, M«toaw-Hiril"Book''"So",,In^rTTT^ewlrark. 19^2, p. 13So — 35 o j m p r o a d s e w i t h t h e B o u r g e o i s , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y a l s o a g a i n s t a n y p e n e t r a t i o n o f t h i s i d e o l o g y i n t o o u r ovaa r a n k s 0 T h e p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e w a g e d a g a i n s t s o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s i s a v e r y s e v e r e o n e , a n d r e c e n t l y , t h e c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s w e r e s u p p l i e d w i t h a p a m p h l e t f u r n i s h i n g a n i d e o l o -g i c a l p l a t f o r m a n d g u i d e f o r c o m b a t i n g th© S o c i a l D e m o c r a t s , T h u s , t h e b a t t l e i s f o u g h t f o r t h e m o n o p o l y o v e r t h e w o r k i n g c l a s s , v / i t h . t h e c o m m u n i s t s a i m i n g t o . p u s h o t h e r s o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s o u t o f t h i s r e g i o n ^ a n d t o d e s t r o y t h e m i n i s o l a t i o n , , 1 1 ( f ) TRADE U N I O N S T r a d e u n i o n s s e r v e a s a m a i n a n d d i r e c t s o u r c e o f p o w e r t o c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s , a n d t h e r e a r e t h r e e w a y s i n w h i c h t h e y a r e u t i l i z e d , . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , t r a d e u n i o n s s e r v e a s a s p e c i a l e n v i r o n m e n t w h i c h f a c i l i t a t e s t h e c o m m u n i s t s ' a c c e s s t o t h e w o r k i n g c l a s s * T h e m e m b e r s o f t h e c o m m u n i s t p a r t y m e e t i n t r a d e u n i o n s w i t h w o r k e r s b e l o n g i n g t o o t h e r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a n d a r e i n s t r u c t e d t o c a r r y o u t p r o p a g a n d a a n d a g i t a t i o n t o w e a k e n a n d t o b r e a k t h e l o y a l t y o f t h e i r f e l l o w t r a d e u n i o n -i s t s t o t h e i r p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p . S t r i k e s , d e m o n s t r a t i o n s * 10 G e o r g i D i a i t r o f f : T h e U n i t e d F r o n t . I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , New Y o r k , 193B, p . b i V mmi!mm\ ' 11 0, K u u s i n e n ? S h e R l f & t - W l n g S o c i a l D e m o c r a t s T o d a y , . F o r e i g n L a n g u a g e s Pub^shlag' House,'Mb'sebwV 19!J?0* ' "• ra s O <* meetings and other mass activities organized by.trade unions function as large united fronts from below, supplying a suitable environment for the establishment of access to the membership of other political parties. "Consequently, the Communists must strive to create as far as possible complete unity between the trade unions and the Com-munist Party, and to subordinate the unions to the leadership of the party » « 9 For this purpose, the Communists siould have Communist fractions in a l l the trade unions and factory committees and acquire by their means an in<» fluence over the labour movement and direct it,"12 and furthers "They must initiate the forming of the trade unions where these do not exist. "13 The second reason why the communists exercise the utmost effort to establish control over the trade unions is because of /their immense revolutionary potentiality and their striking power to paralyse vital centers of industrial society. The trade unions have not only fully developed their central organizations, but they are also extremely well organized on the local levels, and having factory committees in every individual enterprise, they penetrate deep into the economic l i f e of the countryo Thus, the trade unions are the main instrument of communist conquest0 12 Theses and Statutes of the Communist International, Blueprint for World Conquest. p 0 1060 3-3 Ibid., p. 103. « 3 7 -Tn© third way of utilisation of trade unions by the coaBHunist parties i s quite unique , TJnioisare not only envisaged as a main revolutionary force which will effect the seizure of political power, They are also considered to be the very instrument through which the communist party, after the conquest, establishes and sets into motion the machinery of dictatorship to retain i t s power, "The Ctamraunistsj converting the labour unions and the factory committees into the powerful weapons of the revolution, prepare these mass organisations for the great task which they will have after the establishment of the dictatorship of proletariat , for the task being an Instrument of the organization of economic l i f e on a Socialist basis, R 34 By way of conclusion we can say that the prime objective why the communists exercise fla© utmost effort to lies in control trade unions,/ their dense and well-integrated or-ganizational skeleton. The control of the organisational skeleton of trade unions facilitates in the f i r s t place an easy access to the working class mass base. Secondly, It serves as a revolutionary hammer for smashing political in-stitutions of their opponents in the process of seisure of power. And finally, the organizational skeleton of trade unions i s converted into the inslz?ument of dictatorship after the seisure of powere - 3 8 -2 0 PERIPHERAL ORCAHIZATIONS AS A SOURCE OF POWER ThQ civic organizations, such as cultural, artistic, church, .womens', youth and others, play a very important role in the communists' concept of power* They constitute the periphery of the communists' power pyramid and therefore are called peripheral or front organizations* There are three ways how these civic and nonpolitical organizations are utilized by the communist parties for their power purposes: I* They facilitate an access to the. middle class, Zo They are used by the communists to isolate and to destroy organizations of. their opponents, 3 o They are used as a non-conductive barrier which i s erected between the operation of seizure of power and the popular masses in order to prevent any spontaneous movement within the latter. The front organizations are of extreme strategic value for the communists because they facilitate an access to the middle class. The communists' effort to bring under their direct control the middle class of free societies has th© priority even over the effort to bring under their control the working class <> . The point i s , that the great majority of workers is organized in otbsr political parties, and that being indoctrinated, they are Ideologically more stable. This is the main factor why the communists' gains among the workers after World War II were not decisive. On the other hand, the middle class, being ideologically unstable and • 39 =° being not permanently affiliated with any political forma-tion, represents the ground where the communists in later years ware advancing most rapidly,, In addition to the fact that the middle class i s generally more accessible than the working class, another important factor directs communists* orientation towards the middle class. The latter occupies a leading position in vita l power centers of society and ie a leading elite In governmental, scientific and cultural in-stitutions, industrial enterprises and in the army. Thus, the revolutionary potentialities of communist parties do not depend on their numerical strength and o n the support.they receive from the working class, but rather o n the ability o f the communists to involve sympathetic or neutral strata of the population, functioning in key social positions, in their enterprises» And here the front organisations function as a connecting link through which the communist party reaches the decisive sectors of the population « the middle class and the intelligentsia. The front organizations, because of their non-polltieal and popular character, are further used by the eoramunlsts;. as sounding boards for communist propaganda, and as an instrument which the party engages in areas where i t can not act directly, under its own noiQ0 The front organizations are used for isolating, da.scr imiz atiisg . and against/attacking organizations and groups which are the pillars of communist resistance in free societies, and which are the main obstacles in the eOEBnunists' road to power« The front organisations play the most remarkable role in the communist operation of .seizure of power where they represent, after the trade unions, the second main revolu-tionary forceo The front organizations are designed to carry out the revolutionary Isolation and neutralisation of the broad masses of the population, with a view to preventing their spontaneous movement and grouping which could possibly result in the intervention of these popular masses into the communists' operation of seisure of power0 The front organisations are designed to be turned Into the hon-eonductiv© barrier which would separate the operation of seizure of power from popular masses, and which would secure that they, as in-calculable factors, would not enter into this political equation o The communists have worked out special tactics in order to penetrate into the front organizations, to establish i n these their power nuclei and to manipulate their functions,, In the. f i r s t place, the front organizations are gener-owing to ally more accessible / the fact that they are less sensitive to political power impllcations, that they have open membership and that they operate on non-political platformso The eom*> munists' successes in penetrating front organisations can be further accounted for through their explo-iting of liberal sentiments, political tolerance and the ideolo* gleal vulnerability of their membership» They exploit also general apathy, lack of Interest in leadership, and' finally, th® organizational looseness of their targets©10 &ma9 the front organizations as a source of power are virtually monopolized by the communist parties, because other political parties, having their organizational apparatus built for operating in constitutional areas, cannot x-each into these regionso We can conclude this paragraph with the observation, that the Institutional structure of society and social forces i t generates, serve as a source of power for the communist parties. The communists penetrate their target organizations and work within these to accelerate their functional activi-ties, to sharpen their, conflicts with the environment, and to Increase frictions within society in general. Th© communists retard and limit functional activities of their target organizations in order to neutralize these g to bring about their functional collapse, and to create a functional vacuum as a condition for their replacement by new groups fully controlled by the communists. In many instances, however, the prime and original, functions of social groups are of no strategic value to the communists, and therefore, the main .stress Is laid on the 10 See for example Dimitroff i "This obliges us to approach the different organisations in different ways,, taking in1;o consideration that infrequently the" Bulkof the membership does not know anything about the real political character of i t s leadership." The United Front. p« 1|.0. - k2 -utilization of their activities of secondary importance,, The coimmmists make use of their meeting places for their own illegal gatherings; they are used as recrutihg grounds „ or they utilise their organizational skeleton only as a medium to reach a certain stratum of the population and indi» viduals of special Importance for them, Thus, the comnmnlsts utilize both the internal as well as the external conflicts of social groups to establish power nuclei in these; to strangle them in performing their social functions, and to undermine their institutional value, The vital sectors of modem industrial society, such as government institutions, trade unions, cooperative societies, political parties and key civic institutions, i f penetrated by the eoxsmmists and'strangled in their social functions, have direct and immediate reflection on the state of society as a whole bringing It to its functional collapse, 3, THE FREE MASS BASE AS A SOURCE OF POWER The masses play an important role in the communist concept of political power. They are original material from which new social organisations are carved out in sectors of the population where the communists are unable to establish control over the groups presently in existence. The diffuse masses are articulated according to the strategic needs ivlth the advantage that the communists gain i n i t i a l control within - h3 -these newly formed groups. The art of directing and controlling the masses of unorganized population consists of the ability to articulate these into utanipulabl© units, to establish vdthin the sector In question a series of organizations which will serve as points of concentration, in the hope, that the diversity of their programmes and platforms will secure the attention of individuals with diversified opinions, no matter whether sympathetic, neutral, or hostile towards communism» Thus, manipulability is the principal quality of the masses and a criterion according to which they are Classified by the communists. The meaning of mass has not a constant value in the communists', concept of power, and i t varies ac-cording to the changes which take place in the forms of struggle at a given stage. nAt the beginning of the war, several thousand real revolutionary workers were suf-ficient to be called masses . . . When the revolution has been sufficiently prepared, the term "masses" acquires a different mean-ing. Then, several thousand workers can no longer be called masses . . . The term masses , then means the majority of a l l the exploited. R The term "mass" in the communist concept of power has 15 V.I. Lenin: In support of the Tactics of the 01 (July 21, 1921,) Selected Works, Vol.-10, International Publishers, Hew York, 1938, pp. 286 - 28?. Quoted in Philip Selzniok: The Organizational Weapon, p. 86. a l w a y s a r e l a t i v e m e a n i n g ) a n d i t a c t u a l l y e x p r e s s e s t h e s u b o r d i n a t e d r e l a t i o n o f a c e r t a i n l u m p o f p o p u l a t i o n t o a c e r t a i n s o o i a l g r o u p w h i c h f u n c t i o n s a s i t s l e a d i n g e l i t e . I n t h e c o m m u n i s t s • p o w e r s y s t e m t h e r e a r e t h r e e d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t s o f m a s s w h i o h f o l l o w i n s e q u e n c e . i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e ) t h e r e i s a p a r t y m a s s . T h e g e n e r a l m e m b e r s h i p o f t h e c o m m u n i s t p a r t y i s c o n s i d e r e d t o b e a m a s s a r t i c u l a t e d b y t h e l e a d i n g e l i t e a c c o r d i n g t o p a r t y n e e d s . S e c o n d l y , t h e r e i s a w o r k i n g c l a s s m a s s ^ e m b r a c i n g a l l w o r k e r s a n d f a r m e r s . H e r e th© c o m m u n i s t p a r t y a s a w h o l e f u n c t i o n s a s t h e l e a d i n g e l i t e a n d a r t i c u l a t e s t h i s w o r k i n g c l a s s m a d s b a s e . T h i r d l y , t h e r e i s a m a s s i n g e n e r a l , e m b r a c i n g a l l t h e p o p u l a t i o n . T h e l e a d i n g e l i t e h e r e i s r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e w o r k i n g c l a s s o r g a n i z a t i o n s , w h i c h u n d e r t h e c o m m u n i s t c o n t r o l , a r t i c u l a t e t h i s g e n e r a l m a s s b a s e i n t o s u i t a b l e f o r m a t i o n s . T o s u m u p , t h e c o m m u n i s t s * m a s s c o n c e p t c a n b e d e s c r i b e d a s a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e l e a d i n g e l i t e a n d t h o s e who a r e l e d w h i c h e n a b l e s t h e f o r m e r t o a r t i c u l a t e t h i s s u b o r d i n a t e d m a s s i n a s e r i e s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a n d t o m a n i p u l a t e t h e i r e x t e r n a l a n d i n t e r n a l a c t i v i t i e s . T h e n u m e r i c a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n l e a d i n g e l i t e a n d s u b o r d i n a t e d m a s s b a s e i s n o t o f p r i m e i m p o r t a n c e . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o m m u n i s t m a s s c o n c e p t , t h e a t t a c h e d c h a r t s h o w s a s e q u e n c e b y w h i c h e v e r w i d e r c i r c l e s o f APPEMJIX X THE CCMK0W2ST - .-POWER- SYSTEM Tm figurea indicate the application ©f involvement principle in Hisngarye Froa the Report of M. Hakoei to tte 2 M Gangg®B& of the Ccttssnatlst Ftoiy of lajsgsKyg 1951* CADRES AS A MASS WHOLE PARTY MEMBERS X? AS A MASS ] SHOES a i f f MIMBIESE2F AS SUITS TRADE XJBIQNS AS A MASS TRADE ENIGHS AS ELITE FRONT ORGANIZATIONS AS A MASS FB08T OBGAHIZATIOIS AS ELITE 9,205*000 I SERIES I I SERIES III SERIES I? SERIES SERIES POPULATION AS A WHOLE.' th© population are involved into the communist power vertex 0 This power structure is organised in hierarchial order, with the communist party at the apex^ resting on the broad base of the entire population. A l l organisations connected and linked with this power structure serve as channels through which party commands and party ideology ere transmitted from top to bottom, and as agencies through which those commands are executed. The marginal organisations, operating on the periphery of the communists' power structure, are of special importance. They function as capillaries penetrating deep into the free mass base, facilitating ah immediate contact of the communist party with neutral, but largely hostile?environment. The ability of the communist parties to appeal to neutral and hostile strata of the population lies in the gradual trans-mission of party commands from top to bottom of the power structure through a series of organisations functioning as transformers and diffusion stations, tfhen party commands and ideology ere transmitted, these stations gradually diffuse, cushion and transform them into more moderate language. And when they finally reach peripheral groups> and through these the general public; they appeal to liberal sentiments and political tolerance, being completely beyond the suspicion that they might have originated In the communist party. There is one more important aspect of mass as a source - 46 -of power to the communist parties. The general masses are a reservoir supplying the party's inner mechanism with an influx of new membership. The party purges itself continu-ously of elements who In the course of ihtra-party struggle and in carrying out party orders were slowed down by resistant medium. The Influx of newcomers supplies, the party with a stream of new and highly active members who refresh and the • vitalize i t s organs« The secret of/vigorous activity and the vitality of communist parties lies in the fact that the re-latively stable elite periodically cleans the cadres and the general membership mass of worn-out elements and refreshes Its lower party organizations and i t s cadres with highly active newcomers o C 0 SUMMARY OP 00MMDHZ3T SOURCES OP POWER The communists do not recognize traditional constitu-tional and electoral areas asfbedirect and only source of their power0 They conceive the whole of society as the f i e l d of their operations. They utilize as a direct source Of their power: 1, Reliable and permanently operating power tensions generated by Internal and ex-ternal conflicts of key social institutions„ 2, They utilize any momentary, motion of resent-ment against existing authority. 3, They utilize the free mass base. - itf -T h e c o m m u n i s t s e x p l o i t s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s e i t h e r i n t h e i r d y n a m i c ' c a p a c i t i e s , l » e « i n t h e i r c a p a c i t y t o s e t a n d t o s t i r u p t h e m a s s e s i n t o m o t i o n ; o r i n t h e i r s t a t i c c a p a -c i t i e s , e x p l o i t i n g t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l u e s , t h e i r s o c i a l g r a v i t y a n d t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s k e l e t o n s , • . I n t h e r e g i o n s w h e r e t h e c o m m u n i s t s c a n n o t r e a c h t h r o u g h t f c a m e d i a O f e x i s t i n g f r o n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s , t h e y c a r v e o u t s u i t a b l e p o w e r s t r u c t u r e s f r o m a m o r p h o u s m a s s e s . T h e s t r a t e g i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a n d t h e f o r m o f s t r u g g l e b e i n g t h e d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t o r s a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h e p a r t y m a s s , w o r k i n g c l a s s m a s s , o r g e n e r a l m a s s i s b r o k e n d o w n i n t o d e s i r a b l e f o r m a t i o n s , a n d l i n k e d t o t h e p o w e r p y r a m i d o f t h e c o m m u n i s t s . T h i s p l a n n e d a r t i c u l a t i o n o f d i f f u s e d . m a s s e s o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n i n t o m a n i p u l a b l e u n i t s h a s u n i q u e a n d f a r - r e a c h i n g c o n s e q u e n c e s s I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , i t t r a n s f o r m s a m o r p h o u s a n d l o o s e m a s s e s o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n i n t o m o b i l i z e d s o u r c e s o f s o c i a l p o w e r . S e c o n d l y , i t b e a r s w i t h i t s e l f a n a d v a n t a g e o f I n i t i a l c o n t r o l w i t h i n t h e s e n e w l y f o r m e d g r o u p s a n d - c o n s e q u e n t l y , s e c u r e s t h e m o n o p o l y o f p o w e r i n r e g i o n s w h e r e t h e s e w e r e f o r m e d , . t h e T h i r d l y , i t r e c o n s t r u c t s / s o c i a l e n v i r o n m e n t o f t a r g e t o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d l e a d s d i r e c t l y t o t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e i r g r o u p r e l a t i o n s , A r i n g o f c o m m u n i s t . « • • c o n t r o l l e d - 48 -g r o u p s e r e c t e d a r o u n d t h e t a r g e t o r g a n i z a t i o n s r e p l a c e s t h e i r n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t a n d f o r c e s t h e m i n t o c o n t r o l l e d a n d m a n i p u l a b l e I n t e r a c t i o n 0 H a v i n g b r i e f l y d e s c r i b e d t h e s o u r c e s o f t h e c o m m u n i s t p o w e r s y s t e m * I n t h e n e x t c h a p t e r we w i l l e n d e a v o u r t o d i s c u s s w a y s a n d m e a n s b y w h i c h i t a c h i e v e s i t s a i m s . We s h a l l d e a l w i t h I t s s t r a t e g y a n d t a c t i c s . - lj.9 « CHAPTER III ON POLITICAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS t(„ o o There i s , on the. whole, noth-. ing more important in l i f e than to find out exactly the point of view from which things must be regarded . and judged, and to keep to i t , for .we can only apprehend the mass of events. in their unity from one stand-point, and i t is only the keeping to one point of view that can save us from inconsistency ,• » o" 1 (a) ORIGINS OF TOTAL POKER CONCEPT The communist concept of political power is founded on the Clausewltz general philosophy of power, as. exposed in the f i r s t and in the eighth book of his i7eli«»known work On War, Clausewltz. in his treatise describes the organiza-tion and the functioning of total power In its most violent form, codifies the maxims of i t s behaviour, and formulates 1 Karl von Clausewltz: On War. Modern Library, New York, .19l|3, Book VIII, p. 597-Clausewltz' work was translated from German by 0 o J* Matthijs Jolles, Professor of tne Institute of iHlitary Studies at tho University of Chicago and published in unabridged form by the Modem Library 0 — ™ thus the theory of war,2 War is an instrument of politics and Clausewltz devotes a l l his extensive study to this advanced stage in which polities) in pursuing its objects,resort3 to violence B Th© communist concept of political power, on the other hand, formulates the maxims of behaviour of total power.in Its prewar stage, in the stage xvhen total power is s t i l l operating on a political level and slipp-ing into the province of violence and war only when It is inevitable. Thus, th© communist concept of power is a further elaboration of Clausewltz» concept of total power, i.e., from general to more specific, detailed and refined. The communist concept of political power^by subordinating war to politics ^ represents- the synthesis of both modes of power. The synthesis of power in its diluted and constructive form v/ith power in its most concentrated form, known by its sud-den discharges and pulsations of violence* It. is actually removing that ill-defined frontier between peaceful and violent politics, between peace and war and i t formulates a unified concept of social power. 2 Por the point that eomsiunist strategy is based on Clausewltz, see Byron Dexters Clausewltz and Soviet Strategy, in Fore.lffa Affairs, ?ol - 2 9 , No. 1, October, 1950, pp. kl - 55* Por a historical account of the development of mpdera concepts pf military'strategy, see Mead, Earle-E,s Makers'' of Modern Strateffl;. Princeton University P^ess, 19l|4V ' n « 52 ~ The fact that the coimounist philosophy of power Is derived from 'Claus'ewits has also direct bearing on the communist political strategy. The communist political strat-egy is derived from the maxims of military strategy of total pov;er as formulated by Clausewltz, which are, however, ela-borated and perfected for functioning on a political level* In the communist political strategy, war and violence, as the principal instruments of conquest, are obsolete. Victory is sought, speaking In Clausewltz8 terminology, through the strategic combination and operation of enemy for-ces without combat6 The whole point is to avoid the decisive battle and to meet a political adversary on a different power level where he cannot make use of the organization and the superiority of his forces. Thus the victory which is achieved on a political level decides everything) and military oper-ations are. unnecessary and are not resorted to at a l l . frhile Clausewitz formulates the strategy of conquest through war and does not deal with the problems of upholding the conquest (because -this belongs to the province of politics), the 'communists, on the other hand., elaborate the strategy of conquest and also the strategy of maintaining conquest, ©ad place them both on a political level. In this chapter, we shall endeavour to formulate some of the basic strategic principles upon vdiich the communist conquest^and also its preserva'ticn,operate? and we shall pro*» ject them on the background of Clauseivits theory of total power. — 5?£ •«* 0>) POLITICAL ACTION In the preceding chapters we have been discussing various modes of social power« We have established the power structure of the communist party and also the power composit-ion of the environment in which It operates* We have also discussed the inter changeability and trans formation of vari- , ous social powers. Now the problem arises as to how to clarify and systematize the ways by vhich these powers are utilized by tile communists. In other words, we will endeav-our to formulate the rules of conduct of politics, the guid-ance, the methods by which the communists arrange and organ-ize social powers into political actions in short, we will endeavour to formulate the political strategy and tactics of communism. ^  In the f i r s t place, we have to clarify vAiat the political action i s . The action in its general concept means any movement in the resistant medium* And consequent-ly, under political action we would understand any movement of communism (on national or global level) in its environment» 3 Viz Lenins "By. Party tactics, we mean the political conduct of the Party, or nature, tendency and methods of its political activity." V.I. Lenin s Two Tactics, of Sooial-Democracy in the Demo-cratic Revolution, Selected Works* Vol«-l, pp. 3k7* ~ 53 ~ Thus, political action has actually a dual characters one group of forces is seeking to disturb the present status  quo; and the other group endeavours to maintain i t by acting in its defence. Political action in itse l f is Of no value, but serves as a means to achieve the goal for vzhich i t xvas organised.^ Therefore, any action which serves to achieve the communists' aim jto destroy the old society, is acceptable for the commun-ists s "And we subordinate our communist morality; to this (class struggle) task. We says . Moral-ity is what serves to destroy the old exploiting society . • • « Communist morality' is the moral-ity which serves this purpose . . . Vie do not believe in eternal morality, and we expose a l l the fable about morality."4 The communists do not envisage the political action as a simple act, a simple discharge of a l l the engaged forces at the very same period of time and place. Political action appears to be composed of a series of independent operations, which only in their totality determine the final outcome of political action. This fact, that the political action is split in a series of minor operations, has in turn a direct bearing on the organisation of political action i t s e l f . Communist political action, just as the Clausei?its military action, is therefore a complex phenomenon, and k 7,1. Lenin? The Task of the Youth Leagues, Marx Engelga Marxism, Foreign Publishing House, rtoscowi 1947, passim, 463 .«- Uo5« - 5k -: is organized from strategic and.tactical aspects. The organization and conduct of individual partial operations of political action with subordinated power ele-ments belongs to the sphere of tactics: "Tactics deal with the forms of struggle and the forms of organizations of the prolet-ariat,; with their changes and combinations. During a given stage of the revolution tactics may change several times, depending on the flow or ebb, the rise or decline of the revolution. "5 On the other hand, the integration of these individual operations of political action by coordination, subordination ..and supra-ordlnation, with a view to reaching the object for which the action as a whole was organized, is strategy. "Strategy is the determination of the direction of the main blow of the proletariat at a given stage of the revolution, the elaborat-ion of a corresponding plan for the disposition of the revolutionary forces (the main and the secondary reserve), the fight to carry out this plan- through the given stage of the revolution."6 (c) STRATEGIC QBJiiCT Strategic object is a teleoiogical postulate which has to be reached by means of political action. Tho strategic object of political action lies within the frame of the strategic f i e l d and is achieved when deployed forces were acting upon each other and vfoen they reached expected stability in a new equilibrium. 5 J.V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, p. 71. 6 J.V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, p. 68 . - 55 -The strategic aim of coimaroiism is to establish a communist society on an international scale through world revolutions . "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends, can be attained only by the forcible over-throw of a l l existing social conditions. "7 According to this postulate the world revolution Is . the only means through which strategic aims should be reached . and, therefore, i t represents in our frame of consideration the political action. Political action of the magnitude of world revolution is a complex task and its realization Is envisaged through three main stages, each of which has its own distinctive strategic aim: "Our revolution already passed, through two stages, and after the October Revolution, i t has entered a third stage. Our strategy changed 'accordingly. FIRST STAGE: 1903 to February 1917* Object-ives to overthrow Tsar ism and completely v/lpe out the survivals of mediaevalism. The main force of the revolution: the proletariat. Immediate reserves: the peasantry. Direction of the main . blow: the isolation of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, which are striving to win over the peasantry, and liquidate" the revolution by compro-mising with: Tsarism. Flan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the working class with the peasantry « . . . SECOHD STATE g March. 1917 to October 1917* Objective: to overthrow imperialism in Russia and 7 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Manifesto of the Communist Party, Selected Works in Two Volumes. Vol.-1, p. 61. to withdraw from the imperialist war* The main force of the revolutions the proletariat* im-mediate reserves: the poor peasantry* The prol-etariat of neighbouring countries as probable re-serves i» The protracted war and the crisis of imperialism as the favourable factor* Direction of, the main blow: ' isolation of the petty-bourgeois democrats (Menshoviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries ) s who were striving to win over the toiling masses of the peasantry and to terminate the revolution by compromising with imperialism* Flan for the dis-position of forces: alliance of the proletariat with the poor peasantry* « • THIRD STAGS: Commenced after tho October Revolution* Objective: to consolidate the dictator-ship of: the proletariat in one country, using i t as a base for the overthrow of imperialism in a l l count-ries. The revolution is spreading beyond the con-fines of one country; the epoch of world revolution has commenced. The main forces of the revolution: the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, the revolutionary movement of the proletariat In a l l countries. Main reserves: the send-proletarian and small-peasant masses in the developed countries, the liberation movement In tho colonies and dependent countries« Direction of the main blow: isolation of the petty-bourgeois democrats, isolation of the parties of the Second International, which constitute the main support of the policy of compromise with Imperialism. Plan for the disposition of forces; alliance of the proletarian revolution with, the liber-ation movement in the colonies and the dependent . countries. Strategy deals with tho main forces of the revolution and their reserves* It changes with the passing of the revolution from one stage to another, but remains essentially unchanged throughout a given state."8 Also this last stage of world revolution with its strat-egic object. to "consolidate a dictatorship in one country and to use i t as a base for •-,an overthrow of governments In other countries," i s a tremendous task and is therefore further 8 JVV.- Stalin: Problems of Leninism, pp. 69 - 70. - 57 ~ decoaposited into a series pi* actions varying in their -magnitudee The foorld Revolution is divided into operations to seize power in individual countries and these operations are further subdivided into a multitude of actions on a tactical, level* Although a l l these minor actions viewed from the total angle of VJorld Revolution are only the tactical operations, they s t i l l have, by reason of their complexity, their own strategy and tactics* Thus, we can speak of the strategy of the coup d'etat in February 19l|£ in Czechoslovakia, or of the strategy of revolutionary war in colonies, as well as of the; strategy of peace movement, without being confused that these oper-ations are self-contained entities and that they hold no bearing on the World Revolution* (d) THB PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM IS NEVER ACHIEVED , When the strategic object is reached, i t does not mean that the relation of forces, established* as the outcome of an action is absolute and permanent* In political action the victory does not mean the physical extermination of an opponent* As a matter of fact, a l l the opponent's forces which took part in action, remain within the strategic field, and may be again reorganized in order to commence a new action* Lasting and complete equilibrium in social organization, does not exist j the interplay of forces is a constant phenomenon of social l i f e 0 And; therefore, in that very moment when victory is achieved, there arises inevitably a new problem, namely) the problem of maintaining victory and staying in power. This maxim of total power was soon recognized by the Bolsheviks after the conquest of power in Russia in 1917, and the history of the U.S.S.R. from 1917 to the present day Is only an elaboration of techniques on how to preserve the conquest. A democratic society maintains i t s stability by periodic re-examination and re-adjustment of changing power relations by the institution of elections, Total power systems maintain their stability by the introduction of an elaborate apparatus of supressive organs controlling hot only the organizational structure of society, but also controlling the mass base. Therefore, the political systems of total power, one© set in operation, are driven with the inner necessity of principles upon which they operate towards the continuous expansion of power. And the monstrosity of communist die-t a tor ship lies precisely in the fact that the communistB, in order to make their victory lasting, have to control the interplay of forces from the very bottom to the ultimate top of social structure. «» 59 «=> (e) STRATEGIC FIELD iVhen the communists have established their strategic object they also clarify the theatre in which the political action will take place - they define the strategio f i e l d . Under the strategio f i e l d we understand the projection of political action into spacial-tezoporal categories. These localise the action into positive limits, stating vjhen, v/hepe, and with what forces involved the political action will take place* The strategic fie l d as a spaeial-temporal-energetie frame of political action is a total sum of social forces, which eit&B r originate within that particular theatre, or which will be brought there from the outside* A l l these forces are evaluated by the communist strat-egists as to whether they constitute the main forces of the revolution, or whether they are the direct or indirect re-serve* The main forces of the World Revolution are the communist parties and their reserves are classified by Stalin as follows: . .The reserves of the revolution can bet Direct: (a) the peasantry and In general the intermediate strata of the population within the country; (b) the proletariat of the neigh-bouring countries; (c) the revolutionary inove-raent in the colonies and dependent countries; (d) the gains and achievements of the dictator-ship of the proletariat - part of which the. pro-letariat may give up.temporarily, while retain-ing superiority of forces, in order to buy off a powerful enemy and gain, a respite: and « 60 Indirects (a) the eontra&lctions and conflicts among the honproletarian classes within the country, which can be utilised by the proletariat to weaken the enemy and to strengthen its own reserves; (b) contradictions, conflicts and wars (the imperialist war, for instance) among the bourgeois states hostile to the proletarian state, which can be utilised by the proletariat In its offensive or in.manobuvering in the event of a forced retreat*" 9 All. these three groups of forces i.e.; the main force and direct and indirect reserves j are further evaluated and scrutinised according to their magnitude,, power composition, relative proportion, relative position In time and space* They are further scru tlnised according to the direction of their motion, velocity, and according to the time factor of their internal developments "In determining its line of tactics, each Communist Party must take into account the con-crete internal and external situation, the cor-relation of class forces, the degree of stability and strength of the bourgeoisie, the degree of preparedness of the proletariat, the position taken up by the various intermediary strata In its country, etc« * * V 10 The ©valuation and scrutinisation of a i l forces which will take part in political action is of cardinal importance for communist strategists for the factjthat the communists base their calculations on utilisation of power tensions; on utilisation of dynamic forces of society and not on static numerical strength of communist partiesi* 9 J*V„ Stailns Problems of Leninism, p* 71 10 The Programme of th© Coraimmist International, as adopted by th© Sixth VZorld Congress in 1928 in Moscow. Reprinted in Blueprint of World Conquest, p. 238. - 61 « "That Is why In deciding the question of pro-letarian revolution statistical calculations of the percentage of the proletariat to the population in a given country lose the ex-ceptional importance so.eagerly attached to them by .the.pedants of the Second Internat-ional, ..- '.. • (f) STRATiJSIC ASPECTS jp'F POLITICAL ACTION The clarity pf the strategic field, i.e.* the evalu-ation of the communists' own forces and the forces, of their adversary, is the most significant feature In a l l policy-making statements of communist strategists. Especially Stalin's reports to Party Congresses and Conferencesjand a l l the Important documents of the Communist International speak, in very simple language in this respect. The. Irrefutable proof that the communists' political strategy is based on Clausewltz' strategical principles was provided by Stalin himself tshen> in his lecture at Svedrlow University in 192k, he adopted Clausewltz' four main strate-gical axioms and modified them for political action: These are the principle of • concentration, the principle of select-Ion of decisive moment, the principle of determined pursuit of strategic aim and finally the principle of retreat. They are)actually)the cornerstones of communist strategy and therefore we quote In f u l l : . 1 1 J.V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, p. 3 2 . " F I R S T : t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f t h e m a i n f o r c e s o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n a t t h e e n e m y * s m o a t v u l n e r a b l e s p o t a t t h e d e c i s i v e m o m e n t , w h e n t h e r e v o l u t i o n . h a s a l r e a d y b e c o m e r i p e , w h e n t h e o f -f e n s i v e i s g o i n g f u l l - s t e a m a h e a d , w h e n i n s u r r e c -t i o n i s k n o c k i n g a t t h e d o o r , a n d w h e n b r i n g i n g t h e r e s e r v e s u p t o t h e v a n g u a r d i s t h e d e c i s i v e c o n d i t i o n o f s u c c e s s « • . SECOlff) s t h e s e l e c t i o n o f t h e m o m e n t f o r t h e d e c i s i v e b l o w , o f t h e m o m e n t f o r s t a r t i n g t h e i n -s u r r e c t i o n , s o t i m e d a s t o c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e m o -m e n t T h e n t h e c r i s i s h a s r e a c h e d i t s c l i m a x s w h e n i t i s f u l l y a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e v a n g u a r d i s p r e p a r e d t o f i g h t t o t h e e n d , t h e r e s e r v e s a r e p r e p a r e d t o s u p p o r t t h e v a n g u a r d , a n d m a x i m u m c o n s t e r n a t i o n r e i g n s i n t h e r a n k s o f t h e e n e m y • • • T H I R D : u n d e v i a t i n g p u r s u i t o f t h e c o u r s e a d o p t e d * n o m a t t e r tihat d i f f i c u l t i e s a n d c o m p l i c a -t i o n s a r e e n c o u n t e r e d o n t h e r o a d t o w a r d t h e g o a l ; t h i s i s n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r t h a t t h e v a n g u a r d m a y n o t l o s e s i g h t o f t h e m a i n g o a l o f t h e s t r u g g l e a n d t h a t t h e m a s s e s m a y n o t s t r a y f r o m t h e r o a d w h i l e m a r c h i n g t o w a r d s t h a t g o a l a n d s t r i v i n g t o r a l l y a r o u n d t h e v a n g u a r d * F a i l u r e t o o b s e r v e tills c o n -d i t i o n l e a d s t o a g r a v e e r r o r , w e l l k n o w n t o s a i l o r s a s " l o s i n g t h e c o u r s e " • » • F O U R T H : m a n o e v e r i n g t h e r e s e r v e s w i t h a v i e w t o e f f e c t i n g a p r o p e r r e t r e a t w h e n t h e e n e m y i s s t r o n g , w h e n r e t r e a t i s I n e v i t a b l e , w h e n t o a c -c e p t b a t t l e f o r c e d u p o n u s b y t h e e n e m y i s o b v i -. o u s l y d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s , w h e n , w i t h . t h e . g i v e n a l i g n -m e n t o f f o r c e s , r e t r e a t b e c o m e s t h e o n l y w a y t o w a r d o f f a b l o w a g a i n s t t h e . v a n g u a r d a n d t o k e e p t h e r e s e r v e s i n t a c t * " * F r o m t h i s p a r a g r a p h we c a n d r a w t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e c o m m u n i s t s , b y c l a r i f y i n g t h e s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t a n d t h e s t r a -t e g i c f i e l d , a r e t r y i n g t o p u s h t h e e q u a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n I n t o t h e s t r i c t l a w o f n e c e s s i t y , w i t h t h e v i e w t o f r e e i n g i t a s m u c h a s p o s s i b l e f r o m t h e f a c t o r s w j t i c h a r e n o t c a l c u l a b l e 0 1 J . V . S t a l i n : P r o b l e m s o f L e n i n i s m * p a s s i m 0 72-73*7l|.o <° 63 •— Thus, fop example, the major communist concern in their operation of seizure of power is to eliminate the parti-cipation of popular masses in this process; to isolate these because their revolutionary potentiality and the direction of their motion are not calculable. Cg) THi3 TACTICAL ASPECTS OP POLITICAL ACTION Tactics means tb organize and to conduct individual minor.political operations vhich in their totality effect the gradual shift of gravity within the strategic field} which in the end brings victory. Looking at communist operations from the lower; tactical level, these operations appear to be only Individual political actions with hardly any mutual inter connection. Their tacti-: cal object is quite often diametrically opposed to the strat-egic object and i t Is really quite difficult to piece together the mosaic of individual tactical operations and to disclose the underlying strategio pattern. The real difficulty In Identifying the true intentions of communists lies in the fact that the tactical object Is very often taken for the strategic one. The tactical oper-ations, because they aim directly at their tactical objects, are very misleading in judging the communists strategic aim.. The strategic object is reached through a series of tactical operations^ being somehow concealed behind them. The communists^ in order to deceive their opponents, also resort to the indirect approach when their aims are achieved not be the shortest, open and direct ways, but by the application of the most complex and elaborate tacties. There i s , however, a reliable, guide to the ascertain-. Ing of the communists' true intentions. This i s to under-stand and to keep in mind the fundamental operational princi-ples Upon which the communist system, as a system of total power, acts. One must see behind every move of the communists, however innocent, peaceful, and even advantageous for their opponents as i t may appear to be, the operation of the iron law of continuous increase of power. Because as Clausewltz has already found out, the retreat) and even the suspension of action; for total power, systems means only the necessity to gather strength and to' await a more suitable moments . "A complete equilibrium of forces can never produce a suspension of action, for in such a suspension he who has the positive aim - that Is, the assailant - would necessarily retain the initiative . . . V7e see that the idea of an equilibrium cannot explain a suspension of hostilities * but a l l i t amounts to is the waiting for a more favourable moment. "2 2 Karl von Clausewltzs On War. Book 1, p. 11. See for this point-also an article of G. Kennan: published under the pseudonym "Z": The Sources of Soviet Conduct. Foreign Affairs.. July. 1947. And also NathanTEeTtes s The Operational Code of the  Politburo. McQraw-Hill Book Company", New York, 19&V >v'"9 ,*» 65 • Because the basic material of strategic and tactical operations is the same.(the' social powers of various foifms) the maxims governing political actions on a therefore, strategic level are/also applicable to political actions on a' tactical level. Tactical operation- is also a dual. It has i t s own direct tactical object and i t s own tactical field, in which the forces are acting. 'In the f i e l d of tactics too, Stalin follows his master, when he elaborates Clausewltzf tactical principles and'modifies them for political action: "Tactical leadership Is part of strategic leadership subordinated to the tasks and the requirements of the latter. The task of tacti-cal leadership is to master a l l forms-of stru-ggle and oranization of the proletariat and to ensure that they are used properly so as to •achieve with the given relation of forces, the maximum results necessary to prepare for stra-tegic success • • • : • • FIRST: To put in a forefront precisely those forms of struggle and organization which are best suited to the conditions prevailing during.the flow or ebb of the movement at a given moment . . . SECOND; To locate at any given moment that particular link in the chain of processes which, i f grasped, will enable us to hold the whole chain and to prepare the conditions for achieving strategic success. The point, here is to single out from a l l the problems confronting the Party that parti-cular immediate problem, the answer to ufaich constitutes the central point, and the solut-ion of which will ensure the successful solution of the other Immediate problems.3 3 J;V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, passim, 75-77» - 66 -(h) T11E RELATION' 13BTV.MBK POLITICAL STRATEGY AHD- TACTICS j Prom the general communist theory of total power. derived from Clauseivltz follows; that tactics is definitely subordinated to strategy. The magnitude of tactical power complexes being smaller and also the powers which are In-volved in tactical operations ore in their more rudimentary forms. Prom the quantitative and qualitative aspect, tactics is subordinated to .strategy. Prom the functional aspect the relation between strategy and tactics is that of a whole and of a part in an organic unit. Whereas in the mechanical unit the relation between the whole and.the part Is of a constant value, in the or-ganic, unit this relation is to a certain extent.flexible on account of the adjustability and ability of Individual parts to compensate; because bothjthe parts as well as the whole, do possess their own intellects. And this gives us a further Idea that there i s also another interdependence between strategy and tactics* When the tactical operation does not proceed according to the strategic plan, the strategic.intellect is given time to rearrange and to reorganize other tactical operations in order to achieve its aimj or finally to modify and adjust the strategic object i t s e l f . 67 This brings us to tho principle of retreat or sus-pension of operations, Which in terms of comaunist terminol-ogy were formulated in Lenin's/pamphlet Left Wing Comuiuhism: ;t "The revolutionary parties must complete their education. They have learned to attack. Now they have to realize that this knowledge must be supplemented with the knowledge how to retreat properly. They have to realize - and the revolutionary class is taught to realize i t by its own bitter experience - that victory is. impossible unless they haye learned both how to attack and how to retreat properly." 1 When,however, the tactical intellect is conscious of the fact that its own sacrifice.is out of proportion to the value of its own advantage, i t rejects the strategic intel-lect as supreme, authority. It might join directly the ad-versary forces; It might" fight against the. authority within the complex to which i t once belonged, or finally^ i t might remain neutral. An. example of this is Tito's revolt against Soviet authority as weil as the revolt of General Vlasov. 2 .1 , V.I. Lenin: Left-wing Communism, Selected Works. Vol.-II, pp. 576 - 577. 2. Por the background of the Tito-Stalin r i f t , see letters exchanged between the Communist Party of USSR and the Communist Party'of Yugoslavia in The Soviet Yugoslav  Dispute. Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1948. See also Jan Yindrich: Tito vs. Stalin. The Battle  of Marshals, .Ernest Mim, Ltd., London-, 1950. ;Also x\- M.S. Handler: .Communist Dogma and Yugoslav Practice, Foreign Affairs. Vol. - 3 0 , No. 3 , April 1952, pp. i|26 - i | 7 3 . <* 6 8 •«*» Strategy and tactics form the functional unity. Both are integral and complementary parts of the whole r of poli-tical action. Tactics without strategy are minor, individual and separated operations without a leading teleology.. On the other1 hand, strategy without tactics i s a general concept of political action without its practical realisation. ( 1 ) THS FORMS OF POLITICAL ACTIOH. The communists' concept of. power has also a direct bearing on the forms of political action. The communists' political system, being the system of total power, is necess-arily also a System of total strategy. In pursuing its ob-jects, i t does not limit itself only to conventional forms of political struggle, but It uses and developes such forms of struggle vhich are at the moment most advantageous. "In the f i r s t place, Marxism differs from a l l primitive forms of socialism by the fact that i t does not bind the movement to any one particular form of struggle . . . Marxism, therefore, positively does not reject'any form of struggle. Under no circum-stances does Marxism confine Itself to the forms of struggle that are possible and that . exist at the given moment only, recognising as It does, that new forms of struggle, unknown to the participants of the given period, in-evitably arise as the given sooial situation changes,"3 3 V.I. Lenin; Partisan Warfare, Marx Enftels Marxism p. 1 6 5 . * 69 -The variety and the magnitude of strategic and tactical objectives determines the form of political action, and the new forms of political struggle are developed when the tasks can be handled more efficiently. The pattern of communis to' conquest of power is elaborated to such a per-feoilonjthat the individual operations of the seizure of power follow in a Certain established sequence and therefore they can be easily described. There are two main categories of political actions in which the communist parties engage} and these can be again sub-divided into two groups. In the f i r s t place, there are the operations in the industrial countries of the West, consisting of the operat-ions leading to the conquest of power by the communists, and further of the operations aiming to preserve and to increase the seized power. Secondly, we have the operations in colonies and de-pendent countries. Those are again subdivided into operations aiming at the conquest of power and further into operations aiming to maintain the conquest. I. THE FORMS OF POLITICAL ACTIONS IN .INDUSTRIAL — CbWTMfls tiMffll Wtflg. " — In the following lines we shall describe the sequence of the main political actions leading to the seizure of power in industrial countries. They consist of actions directed againpt political parties end trade unions, ejp actions dipeet<?& * 70 -a g a i n s t c i v i c g r o u p s , a r i d f i n a l l y o f a c t i o n s o f t h e s e i s u r e o f p o w e r i t s e l f . ( a ) A c t i o n s C a r r i e d A g a i n s t P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s a n d  T r a d e U n i o n s ; : 1, E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a c c e s s t o t h e t a r g e t g r o u p , 2; U n i t e d a c t i o n f r o m b e l o w f o l l o w e d by. p e n e -t r a t l o n o f t h e , m e m b e r s h i p o f t h e t a r g e t g r o u p , 3. U n i t e d a c t i o n f r o m a b o v e ; , !{.. O r g a n i s a t i o n o f J o i n t c o m m i t t e e s a s d u a l p o w e r c e n t r e s , 5>. T h e s p l i t t i n g o f t h e t a r g e t g r o u p f r o m t h e b o t t o m a n d . t a k i n g o v e r t h e l e a d e r s h i p i n i t s l o c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s , 6 . T h e s p l i t t i n g o f t h e t a r g e t o r g a n i s a t i o n f r o m t h e t o p , o n i t s u p p e r l e v e l s , 7* T h e m e r g i n g w i t h t h e g e n e r a l m e m b e r s h i p o f t h e t a r g e t g r o u p , 8, A d o p t i o n a n d u s e o f t h e n e w l y a c q u i r e d o r -g a n i s a t i o n a l s k e l e t o n o f t h e t a r g e t g r o u p . <bj T h e S e q u e n c e o f A c t i o n s C a r r i e d O u t b y t h e  C o m m u n i s t P a r t i e s A g a i n s t t h e C i v i c G r o u p s : 1. E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a c c e s s t o t h e t a r g e t g r o u p , 2. U n i t e d a c t i o n f r o m b e l o w w i t h t h e g e n e r a l m e m b e r s h i p o f t h e t a r g e t g r o u p , 3* P e n e t r a t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l m e m b e r s h i p f r o m b e l o w a s w e l l a s p e n e t r a t i o n o f t h e c e n t r a l o r g a n s o f t h e t a r g e t g r o u p , 4 . E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o v e r t h e t a r g e t g r o u p b y c o - o r d i n a t i n g a c t i v i t i e s o f c o m m u n i s t s ' o p e r a t o r s w i t h i n i t s m e m b e r -s h i p a n d w i t h i n i t s c e n t r a l o r g a n s . ( c ) T h e A c t i o n s o f C o n q u e s t o f P o w e r . T h i s t h i r d g r o u p c o n s i s t s o f a l l c o m p l e x a c t i o n s o f t h e c o n q u e s t o f p o w e r i t s e l f . T h e y a r e a c t u a l l y t h r e e - c o u p s d » e t a t c a r r i e d o u t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o n t h e l e v e l o f g o v e r n m e n t a l i n -s t i t u t i o n s , o n t h e l e V e l o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a n d i n t h e s p h e r e o f i n d u s t r y . -71 * ( d ) T h e S e q u e n c e . o f P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n s W h i c h S e c u r e  t h e P r e s e r v a t i o n a n d i n c r e a s e o f s e i z e d P o w e r s . 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e m a c h i n e r y o f d i c t a t o r - , s h i p b y m o n o p o l i z a t i o n : o f a l l s o u r c e s o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r , 2* n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f i n d u s t r y a n d l a n d , a n d m o n o p o l i z a t i o n o f o t h e r s o u r c e s o f e c o n o m i c . p o w e r , 3. A p p l i c a t i o n o f s e l f - c r i t i c i s m a n d p e r i o d i c p u r g e s t o c l e a n t h e p a r t y a n d t h e s t a t e a p -p a r a t u s o f w o r n o u t e l e m e n t s , !}•• O r g a n i z a t i o n o f m a s s a c t i o n s t o k e e p t h e p a r t y * s m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e s t a t e o f p e r m a n e n t r e a d i n e s s a n d m o b i l i z a t i o n , 5. I n t r o d u c t i o n o f c e n t r a l i s m i n t o a l l g o v e r n -m e n t a l a g e n c i e s a n d t h e i r s u b - o r d i n a t i o n t o p a r t y c o m m a n d s , 6, I n t r o d u c t i o n o f s u p p r e s s i v e m e a s u r e s i n o r d e r t o e l i m i n a t e r e m n a n t s o f f o r m e r s o c i a l c l a s s e s . I I . T H B FORMS O F P O L I T I C A L A C T I O N S I N C O L O N I A L AND ~ — 1 Mwmaw wwrnm.—: ;— T h e f o r m s o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n s c a r r i e d o u t i n t h e c o l o n i e s a n d d e p e n d e n t c o u n t r i e s a r e n o t s o e l a b o r a t e d a n d d e l i c a t e a s t h e a c t i o n s i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s . T h e y c o n s i s t o f p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c m e a s u r e s c a r r i e d o u t s i m u l t a n e -o u s l y w i t h m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s , 1; T h e a c t i o n s l e a d i n g t o s e i z u r e o f p o w e r s ( a ) P o l i t i c a l e c o n o m i c m e a s u r e s : 1, E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t e r r i t o r i a l b a s e o f r e v o l u t i o n , . 2. O r g a n i z a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n w i t h i n t h e b a s e i n o r d e r t o s u p p l y t h e f r o n t , 3* O r g a n i z a t i o n o f a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n a s a m a i n f o r c e o f c o l o n i a l w a r , k» O r g a n i z a t i o n o f a n a r m y . 72 «* (b) Military operations s 1« Orthodox war with regular armies, .2... Guerilla warfare with irregular armies 9k 3 c Actions of sabotage and terror on the part of the c i v i l population. II o The actions leading towards the upholding of eonquest and towards i t s stabilisation: 1. Disarming of the military formations of an opponent and absorption of his armies. 2 0 Introduction of machinery of dictatorship by monopolising a l l sources of political power. 3» Organisation of economy by preservation and protection of rich peasantry and free enterprise in order to restore in the shortest possible time, the productive capacity of the country. 4o Organisation of the government of united front and utilisation of the creative abilities of the intelligentsia and of the middle class. 5<> Utilisation of nationalistic slogans to exploit nationalism of educated classes end to enlist their support. . The political actions applied by the communists In industrial countries are of a peaceful nature and generally do not resort to naked power. Oh the other hand, the Ij. For a military appraisal of guerrilla warfare, see: A study of F.O. tliksche: Secret Forces. The Technique of Underground Uoveaents, Faber & Faber Limited, London, See also Papagos Alexander, Field Marshall: Guerilla Warfare, Forei/sn Affairs. Vol.-30, Ho. 2, January, 1952. pp. 215 - 230« » 73 *» operations in colonies are violent and consist predominantly of military operations. This does not mean,however, that in industrial countries the communist parties do not organise the organs of naked power* As a matter of fact, the organ- . ization of workers* militia and other intra-party armed units, besides securing, the control Of the police arid of the army, are the very first; letters in the alphabet of communist strat-egy. The armed units are not used,however, as the.main forces of the conquest. Their actual function is to. be bn guard and to back the operation of conquest taking place on a political level. They have to intervene only i f the commonists' opponents resort to arms in their self-defence) and they have to prevent the possibility of intervention from outside. In colonies and dependent countries the main forms of communist actions are military Operations which are suspended and again renewed according to political expediency. (3) THE RELATION BETWEEN POLITICS AND WAR The inter changeability of political and military ac-tions in the communist's pattern of conquest of power) as ex-emplified in operations in colonies, is the core of communist political strategy, and confirms the well-known Clausewltz dictum, that .. war makes sense only in connection with de-finite political designs. That war is a political act, a continuation of political Intercourse by other means - an — 7ij. » instrument of politics. And regardless, of hot? strong the in-fluence and reflection of war on politics may be, It Is s t i l l subordinated to politics. "But.however powerfully (the war) i t may react on political designs in a particular case, s t i l l i t must always be regarded as only a modification of thorn? for the.political design is the object, while war Is the means, and the means can never be thought of apart from the object." 1 The communist strategy of conquest) in spite of the fact that i t operates with war and general violence;is essent-ia l l y p o l i t i c a l . It gives f u l l priority to the operations on a political level, y/ith the view to achieve Its aim 'peacefully'« This is not because of the dislike of bloodshed and general violence)but because of expediency. The thirst for undist-urbed and fresh power in conquered political institutions is the leading motive, and^therefore^the main stress is laic, on avoiding the application of naked power as the principle In-strument of conquest. The communists do not want to disrupt and smash the social institutions today in order to build them up tomorrow,, *&p waste their strength in building some-thing which was unnecessarily destroyed. Thus, the problem: of conquest of poxver is no longer a decisive factor in communist strategy, but i t goes hand In hcnd vith, is modified and actually depends on,the possibility of 1 Karl von Clausswitzs On Uar. Book 1 , p„ ^^^~™"^BMHMtt -**— * For use of armies as a main Instrument of revolutionary conquests, see Katherlne Chorloyj Armies and the Art of Revolution. Faber & Faber Ltd. London, 1 9 4 3 . ~ 75 ** staying In power after the conquest, The problem of making communist victories permanent determines the strategic con-siderations of how, by what means, and when, the operation of conquest will take place* The era of putsehlsm* of vio-lent strikes and.of coups d'etat in Individual branches of executive organs of state.authority, which were the main forms of communist operations in the twenties and especially in Germany, i s definitely over. 2 From the above discussion, we can draw the following as a clue to communist strategy:. The Naked power and general violence is used and  resorted to only when the decisions cannot be reached on the political level through political devices. In welding political and military operations into an organic whole the cc*mmunists finished the development of th? 2 The revolutionary activities of the German Communist Party, in the es?a of IVeimar Republic are described in very great detail by Ruth Fischer in Stalin and German Communism Harvard UMversity Press, Cambridge, 1940. The German .Communist Party was the strongest, best organized and the most militant Section of the Third International, and its--leaders were especially apt in organizing the revolutionary armed uprisings as well as in theorotical problems of cirdl vrar. Hons Neumann (alias A. Heuberger) wrote a pamphlet Per bewaffnete Aufstand, dealing with the principles of .i© armed uprising. And Hans Kippenberger (alias Alfred Lancer) wrote Der_l;eg zum Sieg; die iCunst des bewaffneten Aufstandes • (Trans, The way toVictory, the Art of Armed Uprising.j » 7 6 -theory of total power, put forward by Clausewltz 1 3 0 years ago* Clausewltz elaborated the theory of total power and the maxims of behaviour of total power as they appear In their most materialized and therefore. most violent form* He elucidates how the political power complexes engage their armies as instruments of politics in a violent collision, whore the decision i s sought through partial or total destru-ction of enemy forces. The communist1 theoreticians, on the other hand, e l -aborated the theory of total power and codified maxims of Its behaviour when It operates on a political level. They formulate the ways how the body politic releases discharges in order to disturb internal equilibrium within adversary forces without the direct and total engagement of the body pell-tic i t s e l f . Here) the decision is sought on a political level*, and because the main forces engaged arc the attraction, social cohesion and Institutional loyalties, tho whole process I s of a "peaceful nature "a. When, however, the decision cannot be achieved on a. political level and by political means, the communists immedi-ately apply violence. And when the issue is of international character, the result is war.-' The communist concept of war is different from ths wars the world has known. It not only pursues total aim3, " ° ° 3 See Whltte D,F.s Soviet Philosophy of War. Political  Science Quarterly. Vol.-II, 1 9 3 6 , pp. 3 2 1 - 3 5 3 . but i t also applies the total means^And as in the region of politics the communists do not limit themselves to the constitutional weapons 9 similarly In the region of war they db not confine themselves to orthodox warfare and orthodox weapons. To make a comparison,Hitler's total war was not. in the true sense of the word total, but limited. It war limited in aims - i t aimed at the redivision of the worlc. It was limited in sources, « Hitler did not command such vast f i f t h columns within the hinterland of the Allies as the communists do* And, finally> i t was limited in war tech-nique - the Germans did not develop and use guerrilla v/ar~ fare»£ The. war waged by the communists on a global scale would be a total war in Its real sense* It will have total aims, total sources, and It will be waged by total means« It would f u l f i l the prophetic vision of Clausewltz, that the war will reach i t s highest and absolute form when i t w i l l serve absolute and total politics* k See Kintner W.R.: The Front is Everywhere, University of Oklahoma Press, 1950* $ For total war of Hitler's pattern sees Farago LadiS l a v s The Axis Grand Strategy; Blueprint for the Total War, Fewar & Rineharfc, New Yorlc, l9i|5. "~ ~^®^ago Ladislavs German Psychological Warfare „ G*P« Putnam's Sons, Hew York7*19l^. Sargeaunt H*S. S West G.: Grand Strategy. Jonathan Cape, London 19^2* " • See also : Meerloo A.M. Major: Total War and Human Mind. Inter-national Universities Press, 19^5. Foertsch, Hermann: The Art of Modern Warfare, Oscar Priest, Hew York? 19ljO* "If war belongs to policy, i t will, naturally take oh Its character* If policy is grand and powerful, so also will be war, and this may be carried to the height at which ware attains its absolute form. » . «" 6 (k) THIS Tirar FACTOR IH POLITICAL .ACTION The key factor in political strategy of communism is that of time. The democratic political parties are limited in their political actions by the rules of electoral procedures and they mobilize their membership only at the time of elections* The communists, on the other hand, having the centre of their activities outside tho constitutional sphere, are hot bonid by electoral time schedules and have a free hand in select-ing the most suitable moment for their actions. Of speoiol significance in communist, political strategy are the two following aspects of time. Firstly, the communists are able to operate everywhere and-at any time, because>as the main source of their power.1; they utilize permanently operating social tensions. Secondly, in calculating their operations, the comraun-lets-not only consider fully-matured and developed social forces, but they take into consideration also th© latent social forces which will mature in the future| and the point is to establish the control of a l l these forces vihile they are young and more accessible: 6 Karl! von blaus'ewitz: 'dn'V.ar,' Book"" VI!t'i7','pT397T~'~, ~™~~* « 79 « "Hence ive must not base our orientation on the strata of society which are ho longer developing, even though they at present con-stitute the predominant force; but on those strata which are developing and have future before them> even though they at present do hot constitute the predominant force . "1 The mastering of the time factor also gives the communists the advantage of temporising retreat, a possibility of avoiding, postponing and delaying decisive battles to the time that will be most suitable for them. "To accept battle at a time when i t is obviously advantageous to the enemy and not to us is a crime; and anybody who i s unable to "tack, manoeuvre and compromise1' in order to avoid obviously disadvantageous battle Is absolutely worthless as political leader of the revolutionary class." 2 The communist strategists need plenty of time to In-troduce and to set In motion the principle of mass involve-ment which would give them willing and unwilling allies, whom they will need, either directly or indirectly, in their final bid for power. "Victory cannot be won by the vanguard alone. To throw vanguard alone into the de-cisive battle before, the whole class, before the broad masses have taken up a position either of direct, support of the vanguard, or at least benevolent neutrality, towards i t , and one in thieh they cannot possibly support. the enemy, would be not merely folly, but a crime."' • ' 1 J.V.s'tfoi'inrDTalectical and'HYsVd^ ^^  Selected frorks. Vol.-II, p. 63J4.0 ~^  V . I . Lehins Left-Wing CoHtfionisia, an Infantile Disorder. Selected Works. Vol a-II. p. 627 . *» 80 — To sum up, the time factor in communist strategy i s the key to political victory achieved through a strategic combination of adversary forces e She fact that the communists are not eonfined to any time schedules offers them the possi-b i l i t y of penetrating the principal target organisations, of establishing operational control over these, and finally, of selecting the most suitable moment for the final blow. (1) TEE PRIBSIPLB OF CONCENTRATION AM? DISPERSION The Clausewltz strategic axiom of maximal concentra«> tion of forces in time and space on decisive spots was further elaborated by the communists and supplemented by the axiom of maximal dispersion. The essence of the principle of maximal concentration and maximal dispersion lies in the conduct and in the organi-sation of political action In such a way, that the communists * opponents cannot make use of the organization and of the superi-ority of their forces. The decisive spots for democrats ere elections 3 t:i©3?e-fere, they concentrate their forces on electoral battles and into the classical political arena. For the communists, however, the decisive spots ars within the mass base and therefore they do not accept the battle within the electoral sphere as decisive. While tho* democrats concentrate only on the electoral actions, the - 81 communists j, simultaneously with a concentration in this arena, also attack the mass base and disperse and direct their acti-vities against principal target organizations.0 In this way the communists moot their political ad-versaries on an altogether different power level, where *«he democratic political parties have no access whatsoever. If the oommunists are defeated in elections i t does not mean^ fo:-? them that they were defeated in their own political sense. Operating on a different power level j in order to capture tho principal social organizations and the mass base, the commun« i s t S j i n the long run, appear to be the sure victors. Thus, the communists enjoy the monopoly in these power regions while their political opponents cannot reach and compete in those areas. In the realm of war, this principle of concentration and dispersion is manifested by the combination of orthodox war with guerrilla warfare a Ihereas orthodox war operates on tho Clause Wilis'1 principle of maximal concentration in time and space on ce-cisive points, partisan warfare operates on the comrninist; principle of maximal dispersion in time and space. The guerrilla warfare decomposits and splits th© 1at. tier in -a series of small—seal© engagements for whioh th© regvlar armies are not organized, trained and equipped, and vfoere "Mo regular armies cannot make us© of their numerical and materiel 82 « superiority. The regular armies) being organized and heavily equipped Tor grand scale battles)are,by guerrilla warfare^in the true sense of the word pinned down. Because they are not able to operate on the level for which they were destined, they are vulnerable to the threat of the disintegration of their morale and of their fighting spirit.^-There i s , however, one more aspect of partisan warfare which deserves to be mentioned. Partisan warfare is actually a semi-political and a seml-sallitary form of struggle)because simultaneously with the combat activities>it also establishes the nuclei of the future political administration. Partisan warfare, applied on a global scale;means that the communists;through the series of isolated and localised war conflicts in various parts of the world . pin down and chop up the armed forces of their opponents, draining gradually their strength and paralysing their ability to deal radical blows. Simultaneously with these military actions the commun-ists carry out operations for the conquest of world mass base, h For the definition of guerrilla warfare, see Mao Tsotungs "Guerrilla warfare is the integration of various kinds of struggle into one total concept* . ,. What is guerrilla warfare? It is the inevitable end hence the best form of struggle waged in backward, vast, colonial countries and over a long period of time by the people's armed forces to overcome their enemy and to create thoir oV/n base." Llab Tse-tung Ci Liu Shao-chi: Lessons of tho Chinese  Revolution. People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1950, pp.7-8. - 83 r w h i c h w i l l b e g r a d u a l l y t u r n e d a g a i n s t i t s r e s p e c t i v e g o v e r n -m e n t s . B o t h t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s , m i l i t a r y a s w e l l a s p o l i t i c a l ) a r e f i n a l l y b a c k e d b y t h e . u n t o u c h e d p o t e n t i a l o f t h e R e d A r m y r e a d y t o s t e p i n a t t h e . d e c i s i v e m o m e n t a n d i n a d e c i s i v e p l a c e , s h o u l d t h e c o m m u n i s t s o p p o n e n t s r e s o r t t o a r m s i n t h e i r s e l f - d e f e n c e . ( m ) T I I B V I C T O R Y I S S O U G H T T H R O U G H S T R A T E G I C T h e l a s t a n d t h e m o s t r e f i n e d p r i n c i p l e o f c o m m u n i s t s t r a t e g y i s t h a t c o m m u n i s t s • s e e k v i c t o r y t h r o u g h s t r a t e g i c c o m b i n a t i o n a n d m a n i p u l a t i o n o f a d v e r s a r y f o r c e s . p o w e r i s s e i z e d w i t h o u t e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e c l a s s i c a l m e a n s o f c o n q u e s t , i . e . , w i t h o u t t h e m e a n s o f . e l e c t i o n o r w i t h o u t , u s e o f f o r c e . S p e a k i n g i n m i l i t a r y t e r m s , t h e b a t t l e i s w o n w i t h o u t e n g a g e m e n t . ^ -T h e c o m m u n i s t s t r a t e g y t o w i n b y m a n i p u l a t i n g a d v e r s a r y f o r c e s i s d e r i v e d f r o m C l a u s e w l t z * p a r a m o u n t s t r a t e g i c p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e a c c e s s t o t h e e n e m y c o u n t r y l i e s v d t h l n t h e e n e m y > e o w n a r m y . . . ' T h e f o r c e s o f c o m m u n i s t s 1 a d v e r s a r i e s a r e - b y p e n e -t r a t i o n m a n i p u l a b l e t o s u c h a d e g r e e , t h a t w h e n t h e a d v e r s a r y o p e n s t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e m a i n b a t t l e , w h e t h e r i n s e l f - d e f e n c e o r I n a t t a c k , t h e p r o c e s s o f d i s i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h i n h i s f o r c e s I s s e t i m m e d i a t e l y i n t o m o t i o n w i t h t h e r e s u l t o f t o t a l I n t e r n a l c o l l a p s e . It is^ therefore,absolutely decisive for the self-defence of a democratic society that the communists be denied a l l access to tho vital social organizations;and that they bo isolated and paralyzed in their endeavours to capture the free mass base. Because,one© the communists succeed in establishing access, whether to trade unions, political parties or civic organizations, i t i s just a question of time when they will overpower, with thoir vitality and dynamics) the resistance of these target organizations. The penetration and establishment of latent communists power nuclei within adversary forces rearranges their internal composition long before they are'employed in the battle, When, finally, these forces are put together at a time of stress, (because only combination can they mean anything,) they simply do not match. They do not form a defensive or attacking pattern. They are paralyzed by their Internal frictions and they are completely transformed into the obedient tools of the communists. Thus, the control of individual power components on a tactical level gives the communists by its totality^ control over the strategic complex operation as a whole. This strategic principle, when the victory is achieved by operations within adversary forces and by stabbing in the back)is as old as power politics itself* It represents the ancient Trojan Horse strategy, improved, elaborated, and refined to an incredible perfection and elevated into the realm of politics. N» 35 — CHAPTER IV THE SEIZURE OP POWER "The basic question in the revolution is that of state power. Unless this question is understood, there can be no intelligent parti-cipation in the revolution, let alone guidance of the revolution." 1 (a) THE CONCEPT OP SEIZURE OF POWER In this chapter we shall discuss the strategy and tact-ics of the seizure of political power by the Bolsheviks in Russia in November (October) 1917, We shall be mainly concern-ed with the relation of individual power groups which brought about and carried through the Liberal-Democratic revolution (January, February, 1917), and with the tactics of the Bolshe-viks to out-manoeuvre their far stronger opponents. In other words, we shall discuss the Bolshevik tactics of utilizing the main revolutionary forces of the Russian Revolution for their own purposes, and the tactics they used to transform the Liber-al-Democratic Revolution into the Bolshevik one. The basis for our discussion is our thesis formulated in the foregoing chapters, that the successes of communist 1., ".V.I. Lenin: On Dual Power, Selected Works„ Vol. r i l , p.22. - 86 policy arc due to the following facts: That the communists analyse the power composition of every social collision; that they evaluate competing power groups according to their magnitude and according to their mutual position, and that afterwards, they formulate their policy. The thesis further implies that the successes of communist policy are due to .its ability to utilize perman-in ently operating tensions with/society, and, finally, that they are able to establish the operational control over huge social power complexes In the course of their movement. These tactics^ exemplified by the seizure of power in Russia in 1917, laid the foundation for a new technique of conquest of political power, leaving other concepts of seiz-ure of power obsolete. 2 2 The modern techniques of the seizure of power were sys-tematized by NIccolo Machiavelli, who in his "The Prince" de-scribed various ways and means through which the monarch can seize power and uphold his conquest. The Prince and the Discourses. The Modem Library, Hew York, 195>0. The chief landmarks iii the further development of tech-niques of seizure of power are the Eighteenth Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1799. the coup d'e'tat of Napoleon III in 1801, and finally the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Since 1917, the techniques of the seizure of power have developed in two directions. In the f i r s t place, the twenties and thirties,of t&is century witnessed the Fascist patterns of seizure of power, exemplified by the conquest of power by Mus-solini, Hitler and Franco. Oh the other hand, the forties and fi f t i e s of this century witnessed the seizure of power of Communistic patterns exemplified by the aeries of coups d'etat in -Middle and Eastern Europe and in Asia. For the analysis of the coup d'etat of Napoleon III In-1851, see one of the most brilliant works of Marx: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, K. Marx and F. Engles. Selected Works In Two Volumes, Foreign Languages,Publishing House, 'Moscow, 1^ 50, pp. 221 - 311o (b) THE CONDITIONS FOR THE SEIZURE OF EOWj-R IH RUSSIA. The factors which conditioned the seizure of p o l i t i -cal power by the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 can be divided into "external" and "internal'. 3 (1) The External Conditions; The Tsarist Army practically collapsed under the heavy pressure of the joint forces of the Central lowers at the beginning of the third year of the war, (January 1917)• The backwardness of the country was patently manifested by the speed with which the Russian Armies disinte-grated. The lack of supplies, communications and leadership, a l l and above/the autocratic regime of the Monarchy caused great masses of soldiers to lose their loyalty to the existing regime, and to become sensitive to any movement which promised better and more democratic leadership. This was the classic situat-ion which demanded hew leadership and gave. to the latent re-volutionary forces in Russia a perfect opportunity to become active. In short, i t was this impact from outside which,in the f i r s t place, brought Russia,' in January 1917, to the verge of revolution, ( 2 ) The Internal Conditions: The internal situation in Russia at the beginning of 1917 can be best described by show-ing the' attitude of the three main power groups towards the existing revolutionary situation: 3 See V,I, Lenin: Letters from Afar; First Letter. The First Stage of. the First Revolution, Selected Works. Vol,-l, PP. 735 - 7 4 2 . ~ 86 «-In the f i r s t place, there were the forces of the Monarchy, of feudal landlords, and of the bureaucratic and military castes, which were definitely on the side of counter-' revolution. Secondly, there were extremely active groups of Liberal-Democratic Revolutionaries; the Octobrists and the Cadets, who attracted the broadest stratum of Russian Society, namely, the middle class and the peasantry. This was the main force of the Russian revolution. Thirdly, there were the Russian. Social Democrats whose party was split into the Menshevik and the revolutionary Bolshevik fraction, and who organized the numerically weak working class. Lenin, commenting after the revolution on the condit-ions which enabled the Bolsheviks to take power; specifled them as follows: " 1 . The pbssibilty of linking up the Soviet Revolution with the ending (as a consequence of this revolution) of the Imperialist war, which had exhausted the workers and peasants to an in-credible degree. 2 , The possibility of taking advantage for a certain time of the mortal confL let between the two world-powerful groups of imperialist robbersj who were unable to unite against the Soviet enemy; 3. The possibility of enduring a comparat** ively lengthy .civil war partly owing to the enor-mous size of the country and to the poor means of communication; « 89 « 4<> The existence of such a profound bourgeois -democratic revolutionary movement among the peasantry, that the party of the proletariat was able to take over the revol-utionary demands of the peasant party (the Socialist-Revolutionary Party) the majority of the members, of which were definitely host-i l e to. Bolshevism, and to realize them at once* «k . The conflict of these three main forces, the forces of the Monarchy, the Liberal-Democratic revolutionary forces, and the Social Democrats> was a long and protracted process, » » and culminated in February 1917* The Liberal-Democratic and Socialist Revolutionaries forced the Monarchy to abdicate and established a Liberal**Democratic Provisional Govern ment . This seizure of power was a quick, and bloodless process be-cause a l l the revolutionary forces were united by one common aim, as Lenin commented t "that the revolution succeeded so quickly • . » is due to the fact that as a result of an extremely unique historic situation, absol- utely dissimilar movements, absolutely heterog- enous class interests, absolutely contrary pol-i t i c a l and social tendencies, have merged, and merged in a strikingly 'harmonious' manner."> (c) THE DUAL POWER CENTRES - THE CRUX OF TUB SEIZURE OF POWER This peculiar combination Of diverse forces which k. V.Io Lenin: Left-wing Communism, An Infantile Disorderv  Selected Works. Vol.-II, pp . .60l j . - 6 0 5 * 5 . V.Ip Lenin; Letters from Afar, Selected Works. VOI.TI, p, 73o* •*» 90 •» brought about the Democratic-Liberal Revolution and est-ablished a hew Provisional Government, had however, one significant feature which was not quite well understood by the Democrats. This was the existence of dual power.6 The Social Revolutionaries and other Democrats, according to the classical concept of political power, laid their main stress on the establishment of central organs, of state authority; that i s , on the establishment of a parlia-ment, cabinet and other central organs of governmental authority. The Socialists) oh the other hand, operating and con-trolling the comparatively broad basis Of the working class, concentrated on the establishment of local and municipal Revolutionary Governments, on the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers. In other words, the Socialists organized the local , power centres. Lenin was quick to grasp the significance of this fact and drew the conclusion that there were in Russia two rival . forms of Government. One, he saw, controlled the central organs of state authority and the other controlled the local power centres. 6 See V.I. Lenin: A Dual Power, Selected Works, Vol,-II, pp. 22 - : 22j... See also: V.I, Lenin: The Task of the Proletariat in our Revolution, Selected Works. Vol.-II, pp. 25? - lj.9. See the well-known April Thesi s of Lenin analysing that particular stage of revolution*and instructing and mobilizing the Bolsheviks: The Task of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution, Selected Works. Vol^-il , pp. 1? - 31• "The main peculiarity of our revolution, a peculiarity that urgently demands thoughtful attention, is the dual power vhich was estab-lished in idle very f i r s t day after the triumph of the revolution. This dual power is mani-fested In the existence of two governments: one Is the main, the real, actual government of the-bourgeoise . . . which controls a l l the organs of powers, the other is supplementary and para-l l e l government, a 8 super vis ory' government In the shape of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies which possesses no organs of state power,"7 Thus, the new Provisional Government was actually a Coalition Government of the Social Revolutionaries (Agrarian Party) and the Social Democrats, The former controlled the central organs of the revolutionary government, the latter the revolutionary mass base. Such was the power situation in Russia before the Bolsheviks launched upon the second stage of the Russian Revolution. The theoretical basis for this protracted revolution consisted in the formula that the Russian Revolution did not end with the establishment of a Provisional Government, and that the establishment of this Government meant, only the end of the f i r s t , the transitional stage of the revolution. 'chile the Liberal-Democratic forces had f u l f i l l e d their historical mission by sweeping away the monarchy, the Bolsheviks, following Marx's formula^perceived that -7 V.I. Lenin: On Dual Power, Selected Y,orks. Vol.-II, p. ?7. CM 92 •>• "o o o while the democratic petty bourgeoisie wishes to bring the revolution to a conclusion as quickly as possible . , , i t is to our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent « * • • »o • and prepared themselves for their own independent operation, . Under these conditions Lenin maintained that the in-stitution of "Dual Power" is not a permanent, but a transit-ional feature in the development of the revolution, and that one of these two powers must finally be eliminated: "The dual power expresses but a transit- ional phase, in the development of the revolut-ion s in which i t has gone further than the. ordinary bourgeoise-democratio revolution, but has not vet reached a •pure1 dictatorship of tlie proletariat and peasantry • * « • Two powers cannot exist in. one stage. One of them i s bound to be eliminated. "9 The last sentence of the above quotation is very sig-nificant for the further development of Russian revolution because i t expresses i t s central problem. Lenin realized that this peculiar situation^ where the central Organs of. the revolutionary government were con-trolled by one power group; and its local organisations by an opposing force, cannot last long. He was correct in the as-sumption that the central government, as one of it s f i r s t tasks, wili move against i t s local power centres to bring them to obedience and subordination. He saw, however, an 8 Sari Marx: Address to the Communist League, K. Marx ' and F, Engles: Selected Works. Vol.-I, p. 102, 9 V.I, Lenin: The Task of the Proletariat in Our Revolution,, Selected Works^ Vol.-II, p, 28, ess 3^ 0 equal opportunity for th© local government to move against the central authority and to bid for power. And this Idea Is the turning axis of Russian Revolution. Lenin realized, that the Soviets, being the lower-level power centres were actually organizing the revolutionary mass base; and that he who controls the revolutionary mass base con-trols the revolution as a whole. He concluded that by seiz-ing the power within the Soviets, there v/as a possibility for the Bolsheviks to awaken a new powerful revolutionary wave, which,if turned against the central authority, would carry the revolution Into its second stage. (d) THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OP THB SEIZURE OF POWER After this, the Bolsheviks realized that the key to their success wer® the local power centres, the Soviets, which in the meantime became genuine mass organizations. And as a f i r s t step it. was necessary to isolate this mass base from the influence and control of the Provisional Government. This Isolation was carried out by the propaganda of discrediting the Provisional Government In its endeavour to red!vide the land and to introduce the land reform.1 In other 1 See ¥»Io Lenin: On Slogans, Selected Works. Vol.-11. PP. 6 7 - 7 3 . See also J. V. Stalin: The Slogan of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Poor Peasantry in the Period of Preparation for October, Problems of Leninism, pp. 189 - 197 «> And J.V. Stalin: The PartysfThree ^fundamental Slogans on the Peasant Problem, Problems of Leninism, pp.. 178 188. - 9k •» words, the prime task was to isolate the revolutionary mass base by cutting i t off from its leadership, and to monopolise i t * Simultaneously with this.operation of isolating the Soviets, the Bolsheviks were carrying out activities within the Soviets in order to conquer In these, the power*, Their main attack attempted to split the participating parties in fractions, to separate their revolutionary elements from moderate elements and to amalgamate a l l these radicals into one revolutionary force under Communist control* As Lenin pointed out: '• "Hew and different tasks now face Us: to effect a split between the proletarian elements s o e and the small-proprietor or petty bourge- ois elements . "•" The split of the majority parties within the Soviets was facilitated by skilfully employed slogans appealing to their radical fraction separating these from their leadership; "Disintegration set in among the compro-mising parties, under the pressure of the re-volutionary peasants, the Left Wing formed with-in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, known as the "Loft" Socialist-Revolutionaries, who- ex-pressed their disapproval of the policy of com-promise with the bourgeoisie... Among the Mensheviks, too, there appeared a group of "Lefts", the so called "International-ists" who gravitated towards the Bolsheviks. 2 V.I. Lenin: Letters on Tactics, Marx, Engles, Marxism. P* 335o As for the Anarchists,, a group whose influence was insignificant to start with, they now definitely disintegrated into minute groups . , ."3 Prom the strategic point of view, one event played a decisive role In the splitting of the parties of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. This was General Kornilov's attempt to suppress the Soviets, which were slipping more and more under the control of the Bolsheviks, and which ^by attack-ing the Provisional Government j were generally disseminating unrest when the Provisional Government needed peace and time to settle down0 of The move/General Kornllov against the Soviets was utilized by the Bolsheviks for the organization of a grand scale "united action from below" in their defence. This united action brought together a l l revolutionary elements which were split away from the other two parties participating in the Soviets*and enabled the Bolsheviks )in the course of this defence action^to establish operational leadership over this huge mass movement. The Komilov affair convinced the Bolsheviks that the Soviets possessed tremendous latent revolutionary forces which could be turned Into new revolutionary waves by which the Communists could be catapulted to the position of the supreme power 3 History of the Communist Party_of the Soviet Union. Edited by a Commission of the Central Committee of 'the C,P,S»U, (B), Francis White, Publishers, Toronto, 1939, p*. 2 0 3 « k Por this point, sees History of the Communist Party of  the Soviet Union, p. 2 0 2 . « 9 96 «"> Th© Bolsheviks, having Isolated the Provisional Govern-ment, and having monopolized the revolutionary mass base, were now In a position to make a final bid for power. They issued a slogan demanding the complete transfer of state power to the Soviets and then started military operations to effect this "transfero In this way, the Russian Revolution entered its second stage s the stage of bloody and protracted c i v i l v/ar of which the history is well known.£ (©) SUGARY To sum up,, he Bolshevik's strategy of seizure of power in 1917 In Russia was based primarily on utilizing the 5 See three documents drafted by Lenin which started the Bolshevik's Military operations of protracted revolutions Resolution on the Armed Uprising, Selected Works* Vol.-II, Po 135. A Letter to the Members of the Bolshevik Party, Ibid, pp. 136 - 138. — A Letter to the Members of the Central Committee, Ibid, pp. 138 - lijjO. — " " For different approaches and interpretations of events which took place in Russia and called Russian Revolution and also Bolshevik Revolution, sees The History of the C i v i l War in the U.S.S^ R,. Foreign Languages Mblishlrg House, Moscow, l^ljT* • History of tfcv O'oimaunist Party of the Soviet Union. CfoapteTl^ r ^ r a n d T I T l , pp. loO 1 Ultf. J.V. Stalin: The October Revolution and the Tactics of Russian Communists^ Problems of Leninism, pp. 94 - 123. Leon Trotsky: The""51!s^ ory of"^He Russian Revolution. Vol.-I, lis,and III, Victor Gollancz Ltd';, London, 1932. W. H8 Chamber lint The Russian Revolution 1917-1921. Vol.-i:;and T£, Pacinian c W , Saer lfj&«. ^""^ Barnes Mavor: The Russian Revolution. G. Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1928. Lancelot Lawton: The Russian Revolution 1?17-1926. MacMillan Co., London, l ' ^ ? ' . ' ~ 97 potential of the revolutionary pressure which had accumulated in the last century of Russian history, and which exploded in Liberal-Democratic Revolution» This fact was admitted frankly by Lenin s ", . . A bourgeois revolution is in tho highest degree advantageous to the pro-letariat , The more complete, determined and consistent the bourgeois revolution, the more assured will be the proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie for Socialism* Such a conclusion will appear new or strange or paradoxical only to those who are ignorant of tho rudiments of scientific socialism. And from this conclusion, among other things, follows the thesis that, in a certain sense, a bourgeois revolution is more advantageous , to the proletariat than to the bourgeoisie. w o The Russian Democratic Revolutionary movement reached tremendous proportions thanks to the fact that the late abol-ition of serfdom, as well as the late extension of franchise, did not release and diminish the revolutionary pressure. Thus, the profoundness of the Russian Democratic Revolution was shorn by the fact that, apart from the middle class fighting for its political rights, the second main revolutionary force was re-presented by the peasantry, fighting for complete abolition of serfdom. The Bolshevik strategy, of seizure, of power was based on utilizing bp th these revolutionary forces in succession. Ihen the f i r s t revolutionary force, the middle class, f u l f i l l e d 6 V.I 0 Lenins Two Tactics of Social Democracy in a Democratic Revolution, Selected Works. Vol.-I, p. 368, « 98 i t s mission by smashing the monarchy and tried to settle down, the Bolsheviks linked themselves with the second revolutionary force,with the peasantry, which grew and matured in the pro-7 cess of revolution,, The best e;r?o3itlon of this strategy of protracted revolution was gijen by Lenin himself, when he described the utilisation of the dynamics of fully matured democratic revol-utionary forces in the f i r s t stage of the revolution t and of the hug© reservoir of latent revolutionary forees of the un-articulated agrarian masses in the second stage of the revolutions "The course taken by the revolution has confirmed the correctness of our reasonings FIRST, with the 'whole« of the peasan-try against the monarchy, against the land-lords, against the mediaeval regime (and to that extent, the revolution remains bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic)• TEEN, with the poorest peasantry, with a l l the exploited, against capitalism, includ-ing the rural rich, the kulaks, the profiteers, and to that extent, the revolution becomes a Socialist one,"7 Having placed themselves in control of the revolution 7 V«I« Lenins The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, Selected Works. Vol«-II. p„ ip.Jj.e By the "wJab'ie" of "ihe peasantry" Lenin refers to the main force of Russian Democratic Revolution, to the peasant party of Social Revolutionarieso - 99 froin below, the Bolsheviks applied the principle of mass involvement snd transformed the Soviets into Instruments of Bolshevik revolution, as -well as into the agencies of Bolshevik state power* The i n i t i a l control over the new revolutionary, mass base,consisting of the lower strata of the peasantry, of the revolutionary proletariat and of the masses of soldiers in-volved in the BolB?w/ik enterprise by the slogan to end the war j° was not only the clue to Bolsheviks* victory in revolut-ion* The control v this mass base put. the Bolsheviks Into the advantageous position of being able to articulate these peasant masses and to form a l l those military, political and economic institutions which became the Instruments of dictator-ship, and which secured permanence to their conquest* 8 For the development of the army mass, base which was the main instrument of Bolsheviks in winning the c i v i l war, see: V*I. Lenin: Questions to the Delegates of the First Army Congress on Demobilization, Selected Works, Vol.-II, pp* 254 266* V*I. Lenins Thesis on the Question of Immediate Conclus-ion of Separate and Annexationist Peace, Ibid, pp. 269 - 274« V*I* Lenin: The Socialist Fatherlana" is' in Danger, Ibid. pp. 275 - 276. V,I. Lenin: Report on War and Peace, Ibid. pp. 291 • • 307. ~ ™ In charge of the organization of revolutionary Red Army was Leon Trotsky. For his personal account see The History  of Russian Revolution. Vol«-I, pp. 125 - 167. « 1 0 0 m> CHAPTER V THE PRESERVATION. CONCENTRATION. AMP  INOREASE OP SEIZED POIER '„ . . Tho Dictatorship of the Proletarian i s the rule un-restricted toy law and based on force » . • Ca) THEJOTCEPT OP DICTATORSHIP Mien the Bolsheviks seised power in Russia in 1917, they were well aware of tiae fact that: v "The fundamental question of revolution is the question of power • . , The seizure of power is only the beginning « . » There-fore, the whole point i s to retain power, to consolidate i t , to make It invincible . . . " 2 1 2 - 101 -The Bolsheviks realised that when they had seized power, they were at the very beginning of the d i f f i -cult task of building "Communist Society"* They knew there would be plenty of difficulties., but none of them realized what monstrous machinery of oppression they would have to build in order to retain power, Marx had spoken only vaguely of the necessity to introduce a dictatorship once the proletariat took over* "Between Capitalism and Communist Society lies the period of the revolut-ionary transformation of the one into the other* There corresponds to this also a political transformation period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. "3 This general concept of dictatorship of Marx was never further elaborated either by himself or by Engels, i t and/constitutes, along with the hypotheses "of the withering awav of the state "j the two weakest points In a l l the Marxian theories* This weakness was especially apparent when Kautsky and Lenin were fiercely arguing the "real meaning and 3 Karl Marx quoted by V.I* Lenin in The State and Revolution, Selected Works. Vol.-II, p# 199« « 102 » content"4 of Marx's vague term "dictatorship of the pro«-letariat", and when Kautsky concluded that* "Marx hat es leider unterlassen naher auszufuhren., wie er sich diese Diktatur vorstellt."? Only a few weeks before the Bolsheviks seized power Lenin started to work on the pamphlet "The. State and  Revolution"i in which he endeavoured further to elaborate this vague concept of dictatorship of the proletariat, and also what will happen after the dictatorship was introduced; If The main ideas of Marx and.Engels, after their deaths, were developed in two directions; 1« Into the democratic or evolutionary Marxism represented by Kautsky, Adler, Bernstein and others, and called Social Democratism. 2. Into revolut-ionary Marxism or Communism with Lenin as its theorist. For democratic and evolutionary interpretation of Marx, see; Karl Kautsky: The Dictatorship of the Proletariat.. The national Labour Press, London, 19l9« and Karl kautsky: The Social Revolution. Charles H, Kerr & Co,, Chicago, 1902. For revolutionary interpretations see; V,I, Lenin; What is to be Done? Selected Works, Vol,-I, pp, llj.7 - 269. V,I, Lenin: . One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, Ibid., pp. 270 - 342. V,I. Lenin: Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, Ibid.. pp. 343 •» 435>« A l l these works were written by Lenin before the Bolshe-vik Revolution and can be considered as revolutionary inter-pretation of Marxism, The studies written during the revol-ution and after departed so fundamentally, from Marx that they constitute a distinctive theoretical school, formulating the philosophy and practice of total power - Leninism, 5 Trans, "Marx unfortunately omitted to explain more clearly how he envisaged this dictatorship," Karl Kautsky: Bolshevik Revolution, quoted in the manuscript of Macek, Dr, Josef; From Marx to Stalin. p , 5 2 « 103 ~> © 0 g o the process by vhich the state will vrither away. He held that the dictatorship of the proletariat meant •Hie smashing of the state machine, and that "accounting as?.d control" were the main requirements for the setting up and correct functioning of the f i r s t phase of a communist society which vd.ll immediately follow. He vis-ualized that a l l citizens become employers and workers of a single national state syndicate0 He thought that "after the overthrow of the capitalists, i t would be possible to proceed immediately, overnight, to supersede them in the control of production and distribution, In the work of keeping the accounts of labour and production by the armed workers, by the whole of the armed population." 6 He further fully accepted the Engels view of the wither-ing away of the state that: "VShen most of the functions of the state are reduced to the accounting and control by the workers themselves, i t wi l l cease to be a 'political 1 state and public functions will lose their political char-acter and be transformed into simple ad-ministrative functions,"? From the above Lenin concluded that when the people 6 Y.I. Lenin: The State and Revolution, Selected Works Vol.-II, p. 210. " ~ " " 7 Engels quoted by Lenin in The State and Revolution, Selected Works, Vol,-II, p. 210, have learned to administer production, to keep accounts and to exercise control, very soon the "necessity of observing the simple, fundamental rules of human inter-course would become a habit."^ How different, however, was the reality $ By smashing the state machine according to the classical hypothesis mentioned above, the Bolshe-viks did consequently do away with the old political set up0 But what they did not realize, however, was the fact that by smashing the state apparatus they loosened a l l the bonds which hold modem society together. In destroying political Institutions they unleashed a chain reaction loosening a l l the main centripetal forces «• political, economic and moral, with the result of total institutional and functional decimation of Russian society. Under these conditions, "things did not take their natural creative course of orderliness" toward the establishment of the f i r s t phase of Communist society as Lenin predicted and expected, but proceeded in the opposite directions, in the direction of destruction and chaos. 8 V.I. Lenins The State and Revolution, Selected Works. Vol.-II, p. 211. 9 « S » 105 «i>. This i s why Lenin's work "The State and Revolution".9 until then considered the latest and the most authoritative interpretation of Marx, was obsolete overnight. Lenin had learned his f i r s t lesson of total power. At the beginning of the Bolshevik revolution the Bolsheviks did not know that by breaking away from the coalition government they had embarked upon the f i e l d of total power, which never before had been explored, so that 9 This pamphlet was .written by Lenin in August & Sept-ember, 191?. When however, Lenin came to the seventh chapter, he was, as he says, (interrupted' by a political crisis, the October Revolution. He states further that i t i s more pleasant and useful to go through the * experience of the revolution* than to write about It. How true that was and what did he learn from its The elaborate concept and blueprint for the Ideal workers* state envisaged in The State and Revolution f e l l to pieces under th© revolutionary experienceAna" ''instead of finishing this pamphlet, he wrote The Proletarian Revol-utlon and the Renegade Kautsky. (between October and Nov-ember 19T«,J and later (April -May 1920) Left Wing Commun-ism., An Infantile Disorder, two new pamphlets' inlmich -he " abandons a l l his former Ideas concerning the organisation and form of the proletarian state, and where he formulates a new concept of dictatorship based on total power. For the State and Revolution, see: Selected Works. Vol.-II, pp. 1^1 - 2 3 9 . For Left Wing Communism, see Ibid., p. 571 - 61*1* For the Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, see Ibid. Vol.-II, pp. 359 - k3k» For further elaboration of the theories on the state and on the problem of 'withering aivay of the state* see J.V. Stalin: Some Questions of Theory, Problems of  Leninism, pp. 6 3 1 - 6 l j 2 9 Report On the Work of the Central" Cbimaittee to the Eighteenth Congress of th© C.P.S.TJ (B) delivered March 10, 1939. Also A.Y. Vyshinski: The Teaching of Lenin and Stalin on Proletarian Revolution and' the State. publTshed by Soviet Hews, London, 19t|B0 . « 106 -n o f o r m u l a e a n d p r e s c r i p t i o n s c o u l d b e f o l l o w e d . T h e y d i d n o t r e a l i z e t h a t a n I r o n l o g i c , t h e o b j e c t i v e l a w o f t o t a l power> d r o v e t h e m t o w a r d s t h e d e s t r u c t i o n a n d d e c i m a t i o n o f a l l s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . H o w e v e r , i t d i d n o t t a k e l o n g b e -f o r e t h e B o l s h e v i k s d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e b a s i c o p e r a t i o n a l l a w o f t h e i r n e w p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m s / a s t h e c o n t i n u o u s i n c r e a s e o f p o w e r . I t was L e n i n w h o f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n h i s p a m -p h l e t " L e f t - W l r i g C o m m u n i s m , a n I n f a n t i l e D i s o r d e r " d i d a w a y w i t h a l l v a g u e a n d i m p r a c t i c a l i d e a s c o n c e r n i n g d i c t a t o r s h i p , a n d t a u g h t . b y e x p e r i e n c e , f o r m u l a t e d i t s r e a l m e a n i n g a n d c o n c e p t : " T h e d i c t a t o r s h i p o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t i s a p e r s i s t a n t s t r u g g l e , b l o o d y a n d . b l o o d l e s s , v i o l e n t a n d p e a c e f u l , m i l i t a r y a n d e c o n o m i c , e d u c a t i o n a l a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e - a g a i n s t t h e f o r c e s a n d t r a d i t i o n s o f t h e o l d s o c i e t y , , "10 T h i s i s t h e s o - c a l l e d L e n i n i s t c o n c e p t o f t h e d i c t a t o r -s h i p o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t w h i c h d i f f e r s , h o w e v e r , f u n d a m e n t a l l y f r o m t h a t o f Marx . A c c o r d i n g t o M a r x , a t t h e moment t h e p r o l e t a r i a t s e i z e s p o w e r a n d t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p i s i n t r o -d u c e d , t h e c l a s s s t r u g g l e c e a s e s t o e x i s t : t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p i s o f a s t a t i c n a t u r e . A c c o r d i n g t o L e n i n ( o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e c l a s s s t r u g g l e ; a f t e r t h e s e i z u r e o f p o w e r ^ c o n t i n u e s a n d i s a c t u a l l y e x e r c i s e d by t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p s T h e L e n i n i s t 10 V . I . L e n i n : L e f t - w i n g C o m m u n i s m , A n I n f a n t i l e D i s o r d e r , S e l e c t e d W o r k s . V o l ^ - I I , p 0 $ 8 9 . » 107 ^ concept of the dictatorship is dynamic?, This dynamic concept of dictatorship has been of fundamental importance for the further development of the Soviet regimeo It represents the basic operational law of the Soviet system from which a l l other formulae concerning the behaviour of total power after the conquest, in the period of i t s consolidation, are derived,, (b) THB BUILDING OP DICTATORSHIP In coping with the situation to retain their power, the Bolsheviks possessed two Important weapons. In the f i r s t place, in the Leninist concept of the dictatorship ^  they had a new theory of power. In the second place j they enjoyed hegemony over the broad and practically unarticiliated mass basey which would serve as rough material in carving out new social institutions. Productive material forces, such as plants, factories, mines and land, in contrast to social institutions, remained practically Intact after the revolutionary explosion. They were capable of functioning at any time i f the organized human element could set them in motion. And precisely this -to organize the human element into institutions suitable to this end^and to build up a new institutional structure, was the prime tasks of the Bolsheviks Immediately after the seizure. It was necessary to or ect and to construct new « 108 -social irfi titutions in a way which would enable the party, as a central controlling body, to direct every phase of l i f e of the new Soviet society. This tremendous task started and proceeded successfully because the Bolsheviks applied again the principle of mass involvement. The party used those organizations which stood closest by as the f i r s t instruments to penetrate into the diffuse mass, to articulate i t , and to form their own auxil-iary and subordinated agencies, When the ring of new organizations in this f i e l d had been erected, the party turned these agencies into the in-struments of further penetration,, The new fie l d of diffuse mass was further articulated, and a series of new Institutions sprang up in regions even far remote from the party's immed-iate activities. This process, however difficult, progressed rapidly so that Lenin in his pamphlet "Left-Wing Communism,, An  Infantile Pisoa'der", written between April and May, 1920, was able to say? 11, , , On the whole, we have a formally non-Communist, £L exible and relatively wide and very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means of which the Party is closely linked up with.the class and with the masses, and by means of which, under the leadership of the Party, the dictatorship of the class is exercised, "J-A 11 V,I, Lenins Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder, Selected Works. Vol,-II, p. 5 9 2 , « 109 And further, because a l l social institutions created by the application of the principle of mass involvement are linked to the Communist party, Lenin observed that: "Not a single important political or organisational question i s decided by any state institution in our republic without the guiding instructions of the General Committee of the Party . . *" 1 2 Stalin, while giving a lecture on "Foundations of Leninism" at Sverdlov University in April, 192k, also ex-the plained that the successes of/bolsheviks were due to the fact that the Party was able to transform any organization into its auxiliary body, into the instrument of dictatorship; " e » » the Party « » » i s « . „ the only organization capable of Centralizing the leadership • • ' • • • ' 0 * * o - thus, transforming each and every nonparty or-ganization of the T s o r k i n g class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt link-ing the Party with the class« n l 3 (c) THE STRUCTURE OF DICTATORSHIP A more consistent and more detailed description of dictatorship, its mechanism and its functioning^was given, however, later in 1926 by Stalin in his pamphlet "On the 12 V01« Lenin: Left-wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder, M6J&SLAJmh • o l . * n . p. 592. 13 J»VB Stalin: Problems of Leninism. p« 139 and also P* 87, "~" « 110 <*> P r o b l e m s o f L e n i n i s m " , I n t h i s work S t a l i n f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d some o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l f e a t u r e s o f L e n i n i s t c o n c e p t o f t o t a l power as e x e m p l i f i e d b y L e n i n i n " L e f t - W i n g Communism", A c c o r d i n g t o S t a l i n , d i c t a t o r s h i p i s e x e r c i s e d t h r o u g h a s y s t e m o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s w h i c h f u n c t i o n as t r a n s m i s s i o n b e l t s a n d l e v e r s c o n n e c t i n g t h e p a r t y w i t h a l l v i t a l s e c t o r s o f S o v i e t s o c i e t y . The c o r e o f S t a l i n ' s a r t i c l e , b e c a u s e o f i t s i m p o r t a n c e , c l a r i t y a n d f r a n k n e s s d e s e r v e s t o b e q u o t e d a t l e n g t h s "The l e v e r s o r t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n b e l t s a r e t h o s e v e r y mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f the p r o l e t a r i a t w i t h o u t whose a i d t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p c a n n o t be. r e a l i z e d , , , What a r e t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s ? F i r s t , t h e r e a r e t h e W o r k e r ' s t r a d e u n i o n s w i t h t h e i r c e n t r a l a n d l o c a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s i n t h e shape o f a whole s e r i e s o f i n d u s t r i a l , c u l t u r a l , e d u c a t i o n a l a n d o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s * T h e s e u n i t e t h e w o r k e r s o f a l l t r a d e s . They a r e n o t P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s , • , S e c o n d l y , t h e r e a r e t h e S o v i e t s a n d t h e i r numerous c e n t r a l a n d l o c a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s i n t h e shape o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , b u s i n e s s , m i l i t a r y , c u l t u r a l a n d o t h e r s t a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , p l u s t h e i n n u m e r a b l e v o l u n t a r y mass a s s o c i a t i o n s o f t h e w o r k i n g p e o p l e , w h i c h group t h e m s e l v e s a r o u n d t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d c o n n e c t them w i t h t h e p o p u l a t i o n . The S o v i e t s a r e mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f a l l w o r k i n g p e o p l e o f town and c o u n t r y . They a r e n o t P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s « ,. , T h i r d l y , , t h e r e a r e t h e . c o - o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t -i e s o f a l l k i n d s , w i t h a l l t h e i r r a m i f i c a t i o n s . These a r e mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f t h e t o r k i n g p e o p l e , n o n - P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s , w h i c h u n i t e t h e w o r k i n g p e o p l e p r i m a r i l y a s c o n s u m e r s , b u t . a l s o I n t h e c o u r s e o f t i m e a s p r o d u c e r s ( a g r i c u l t u r a l c o o p e r -a t i o n ) . They f a c i l i t a t e c o n t a c t between t h e 4 « 1 1 1 « vanguard of the proletariat and the masses of the peasantry and provide the possibility of drawing the latter into channels of Socialist construction, • Fourthly, there is the Young Communist League, This is a mass organisation of young workers and peasants; i t is not a Party or-ganisation, but is associated with the Party , , « Lastly, there is the Party of the pro-letariat« » 6 Its strength lies in the fact that i t draws into Its ranks a l l the best ele-ments of the proletariat from a l l the mass or-ganizations. Its function is to combine the work of a l l the mass organisations of the pro-letariat without exception and to direct their activities 0 o o To sum up: the trade unions, as the mass organisation of the proletariat, linking the Party with the class primarily in the sphere of production; The Soviets as the mass organisations of the working people j linking the Party with the latter primarily in the sphere of the state; The co-operative societies, as mass organi-sations mainly of the peasantry, linking the Party with the peasant masses., primarily in econ-omic f i e l d , in enlisting the peasantry for the work of Socialist construction; The Young Communist League, as the mass organization of young workers and peasants, whose mission is to help the vanguard of the proletariat in the Socialist education of the new generation and training young reserves. And finally the Party, as the main direct-ing force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat whose mission is to lead a l l these mass organisations , , , o , , such, in general, is the picture of the "mechanism" of the. dictatorship, the picture of the "system of the dictatorship of the pro-letariat, *1 1 JcVo Stalin: Problems of Leninism. Passim. 137»138rl39,, * 112 — V Since the seisure of power the Bolsheviks had only one main problem • to develop a government which would enable them to predict and to detect every possible movement within the and masses /co counteract i t . It was Stalin again, when reporting to the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR i n 1923, who outlined this Bolshevik ideal: "In our Soviet country, we must evolve a system of government that w i l l permit us with certainty to anticipate a l l changes, to perceive everything that i s going on among the peasants, the nationals, the non-Russian ne,tions, and the Russians; the system of supreme organs must possess a number of baro-meters which w i l l anticipate every change., register and f o r e s t a l l „ a « a l l possible storms and 111-fortune„ That i s the Soviet system of government,"2 By 1926, the Bolsheviks had not merely b u i l t up a government corresponding to the ideal of 1923; but they had erected a monstrous machine of oppression which , giving them an advantage of absolute control ovei* Society^ on the oae hand, brought a now problem - the danger of functional stand-s t i l l and vacuum on the other, in this chapter we have been discussing the unorthodox, i,e, the p o l i t i c a l instruments of dictatorship. We have been primarily concerned with the instruments of dictatorship as applied on the p o l i t i c a l l e v e l ; i n other words, how the 2 J.V, Stalin; Marxiamum a Harqdnostni a Kolonialni Otaj&a, (Marxism, National' ^ ^'V'6t6W.^m'^B£€^6n'p'v'"""" laHaHatelstvi "Svoboda8 v Prase, 1945, P« 105* 113 «* system of total power converts the principal functional organizations into its tools„ Under orthodox instruments of dictatorship we understan i a l l party and state organs of naked povrer, such as the police, 'army, workers' militia, party "Storm Troops", and finally the Central Control Commission which directs a l l of them. In spite of the fact that we lack a comprehensive study of Soviet *organ i of suppression* as Stalin calls them, the fragmentary inform-atlon which we have in regard to the application of naked power in the USSR clearly indicates its fantastic dimensions, monstrosity and efficiency,-* 3 See, for example,, the 9Corrective Labour Codes», a set of rules which turns every Soviet citizen into a virtual slave and prisoner of the Soviet economic machinery. Published as an Appendix to the pamphlet The Slave Labour in Russia, the case presented by the American Federation or Labour to the United Nations, Th© Amer loan Federation of Labour, 1 9 4 9 « According to this paper, there are over, ten million people held in various kinds of concentration camps and "the slave labour has become an expanding organic feature of Soviet economy8. The paper concludes that the slave labour, with its huge system of political police, has become the very foundation of the political power of the Stalin Regime, p« 19. Or see: Document on Terror, a Soolo-Psychological form-ulation of the theory of terror and of its application, A shocking document of outstanding value for sociologists and psychologists. Published as a special feature in The News from Behind the Iron Curtain, Vol.-I, No. 3* March, IWd, pp. 44 - 57. Edited by the National Committee for Free Europe, New. York, See also the numerous testimonials and personal accounts of people who were successful i n escaping from concentration camps, corrective labour camps and prisons of a l l kinds, printed in Slave Labor i n Russia. Part III, Affidavits by Former Inmates of Soviet Concentration Camps, pp. 37 84* American Federation of Labor, 1949o xaij, (ci) TEE FUNCTIONING- OF DICTATORSHIP,  l o FUNCTIONAL DYNAMICS The principle of mass involvement applied by the Bolsheviks in articulating the mass base and jh forming suit-able organisations for the exercise of dictatorship, gave the Bolsheviks enormous power of control over the l i f e of the . Soviet people* The functional spontaneity, the free action and interaction of social organisationsjwere eliminated and sacrificed for the control.of their functions and their associ-ative processes» "The entire course of development of Soviet society has been the process of over-coming spontaneity and of the triumph of conscious 9 planned leadership, M l By imposing total control over the institutional structure and by eliminating spontaneity of social intercourse, the Bolsheviks Inevitably created a functional vacuum within the Soviet society. The actual danger of this functional vacuum lies in the fact that i t creates a climate killing a l l initiative, pioneering, invention, endurance and interest in the individual and In groups, which are the motive force of horizontal and vertical mobility of free societies. 1 F* f* Kohstantinov, The Role, of Soeiallst'jConsciousness in the Development of Soyle^""'s"olBl'etivV:"'foreign''PubXish^nK." ' M 3.3.5 C 3 . By th© Imposition of total control, the l i f e of Soviet society was choked and was slowly approaching a state of inter-nal equilibrium « a state of atrophy, This was, however, a red light for the Bolsheviks $ arid the Party, in order to bring socioty to revival, had to stir up and activate individuals as well as social groups. In the f i r s t year of dictatorship Lenin introduced the HBP, He moderated the pressure and control put on the middle class, free enterprise, merchants and on farmers,2 In later years, however, when under the rule of Stalin the middle class enterprisers, merchants and farmers were,by crusades j eliminated, 3 ana When th© Soviet Society was finally 2 STEP means New Economic Policy started by Lenin In 1921s "Wear Communism had been an attempt to take the fortresses of capitalistic elements in the town and in the country by as« sault, by a frcntal attack a In this offensive the Party had gone too far ahead and ran the risk of being cut off from its base, Slow, Lenin proposed to retreat for a while to the base, to change from an assault of the fortress to the slow method of. siege, so as to gather strength and resume the offensive, See History of Communist Party of USSR, p. 2 5 7 . 3 For the policies relative to the elimination of social class-as sees J,¥, Stalin: Problems of Agrarian Policy in USSR, Problems of Leninism, pp, 3 0 1 « 3 2 1 . """^  1 irJV',' Stal'in's" The Policy to Eliminate the Kiilaka as a Class, Ibid, pp, 3 2 2 « 3 2 5 . J . V . S't'alins Disay with Success, Ibid, pp. 326 3 3 1 . J.V, Stalin: Reply to Collective Farm Commarades, Ibid,, pp. 3 3 2 « 3 4 9 . Stalin: Work in Rural Districts, Ibid, pp. 4 2 7 4 3 9 . ™ ~ J,V, Stalin: Speech Delivered at the First All^Unioh Congress of Collective Farm Shock Workers, Ibid,, pp. IJ4O «• 4 5 3 . See also: History of the Communist Party of uSSR» Chapters X and XI, pp. 2o0 •* 330, « 116 <» u n i f o r m e d a n d c o l o u r l e s s 5 t h e P a r t y h a d t o r e s o r t t o a r t i -f i c i a l d e v i c e s w h i c h w o u l d s t i r u p s o c i e t y a n d w h i c h w o u l d , a c t i v a t e i t s l i f e * O f t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t d e v i c e s w h i c h w e r e i n t r o d u c e d w e m i g h t n a m e - H i e S t a b h a n o v i t e M o v e - m e n t , t h e S o c i a l i s t C o m p e t i t i o n , t h e C r e a t i v e P a t r i o t i s m . , a n d f i n a l l y t h e d e v i c e o f C r i t i c i s m a n d S e l f - C r i t i c i s m . T h e S t a k h a n o v i t e M o v e m e n t i s d i r e c t e d a t i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n . S o c i a l i s t C o m p e t i t i o n i s a p p l i e d i n . e v e r y i n -d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e a n d a l s o o n f a r m s . C r e a t i v e p a t r i o t i s m i s a m o v e m e n t t o r e v i v e t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e S o v i e t I n t e l l i -g e n t s i a , o f g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y e e s a n d t h e w o r k o f t h e l e a d i n g S o v i e t e l i t e i n g e n e r a l . 4 O f s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , h o w e v e r 9 i s t h e d e v i c e o f c r i t i c i s m a n d s e l f - c r i t i c i s m b e c a u s e o f i t s u n i v e r s a l a p p l i -c a b i l i t y * C r i t i c i s m a n d s e l f - c r i t i c i s m m a y b e d e s c r i b e d a s a w h i p s w e e p i n g e v e r y w h e r e f r o m i n d u s t r i a l a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n t o t h e p a r t y a n d s t a t e a p p a r a t u s , a n d i n t e r v e n i n g i n t h e f i e l d s o f e s t h e t i c s , l i t e r a t u r e , a r t , m u s i c a n d k F o r a S t a k h a n o v i t e m o v e m e n t a n d i t s o r i g i n s , s e e J . V . S t a l i n : S p e e c h a t t h e F i r s t A l l - U n i o n C o n f e r e n c e o f S t a k n a n o v l t e a , P r o b l e m s o f L e n i n i s m , p p . 526 - 539. F o r a c r i t i c a l a p p r a i s a l o f S o c i a l i s t c o m p e t i t i o n , s e e t h e w o r k o f I s a a c D e u t s e h e r : S o c i a l i s t C o m p e t i t i o n , F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , V o l . - 3 0 , M b . 3 , A p r i l , 1952* p p . 376 - 390. F o r a t h e o r e t i c a l e x p o s i t i o n o f c r i t i c i s m a n d s e l f -c r i t i c i s m a n d i t s r o l e i n a c t i v a t i n g S o v i e t s o c i e t y s e e s A . A « , Z h d a n o v : . C r i t i c i s m a n d S e l f - C r i t i c i s m - T h e S p e c i a l F o r m o f S t r u g g l e " " B e t w e e n t g e * * o l ^ ' " a n T " ^ t e ^ e w , T F r o m h i s ' s p e e c h " G ^ i i v w e o T ' a V ' a c o n f e r e n c e o f S o v i e t P h i l o s o -p h i c a l W o r k e r s , 19k79 e n t i t l e d O n P h i l o s o p h y . R e p r i n t e d I n A . A . Z h d a n o v s O n L i t e r a t u r e . flu'sib a n d P h i l o s o p h y . L a w r e n c e & W i s h a r T T B d T p S o n ^ — —. X17 ** philosophy. Criticism and .self•criticism as an Instriiment for the creation of individual and group tensions is of supreme value to the Bolsheviks, As Zhdanov explained, i t is actu-ally the main "motive force" behind the development of Soviet society: "In our Soviet society, where antagonistic classes have been eliminated, the struggle be-tween the old and the new, and consequently the development from the lower to the higher, pro-ceeds, not in the form of struggle between anta-gonistic classes and of cataclysms, as is the case under capitalism, but in the form of c r i t i c -ism and self-criticism, which i s the real motive force of our development, a powerful instrument in the hands of the Party* This i s incontestably a new form of movement, _,a new type of development, anew dialectical law."5 In sum, the functional dynamics, the intra-group and inter-group tensions within Soviet society are motivated by a r t i f i c i a l l y Introduced and cultivated devices; they are planned in their disposition j directed in the course of their process, and therefore constitute a mighty weapon in the hands of the party. The Soviet dictatorship, thus, is a system of incredible perfection. It is difficult tov people living In free societies to realize that human beings can live in a virtual cage where any seemingly free action and response to this action is $ A«A. Zhdanov: On philosophy, (A speech at a Conference of Soviet Philosophical. Workers, 19J.7* published in On Literature,, Music and Philosophy, p. 107.)' """" <m • 13.8 «• p l a n n e d a n d c o n t r o l l e d f r o m o n e c e n t r a l p o i n t 0  2, T H E I N S T I T U T I O N A L D Y N A M I C S S o v i e t S o c i e t y i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v e r y u n s t a b l e a n d i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e u n d e r g o i n g a c o n s t a n t c h a n g e , ' T h e c e n t r a l o r g a n s o f t h e p a r t y c a n f o r m , d i s s o l v e , a n d t r a n s f o r m a n y i n -s t i t u t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r n e e d s . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e h a s b e e n c h a n g e d s e v e r a l t i m e s , t h e p r e s e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n i s t h e t h i r d o n e , a n d t h e c o m m i s s a r i a t s w e r e c h a n g e d i n t o t h e m i n i s t r i e s ,7 I n t h e e c o n o m i c s p h e r e c o n s t a n t c h a n g e s a r e m a n i f e s t e d b y i n t r o d u c i n g n e w t a r g e t s i n t o e c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g a n d b y s e t t i n g u p n e w I n s t i t u t i o n s t o c o n t r o l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e s e 6 T h e a p p l i c a t i o n a n d f u n c t i o n i n g o f a l l t h e s e d e v i c e s a n d m e t h o d s o f r e v i v i n g a n d c o n t r o l l i n g m a k e l i f e f o r m o s t o f -Hie p e o p l e u n d e r t h e s y s t e m o f d i c t a t o r s h i p v i r t u a l l y u n b e a r a b l e . S e e a c c o u n t o f V i c t o r K r a v c h e n k o s I C h o o s e F r e e d o m . C h a r l e s S c r i b n e r & S o n s s H e w Y o r k , 1946 . 7 F o r C h a n g e s a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f g o v e r n m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e s o e : J , T o w s t e r : P o l i t i c a l P o w e r i n t h e U S S R . C h a p t e r I I , P a r t 1, 2, & 3, C h a p t e r I I I , P a r t 2 Ss 3; f o r t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e S o v i e t C o n s t i t u t i o n , F o r t h e e v o l u t i o n o f t h e F e d e r a l U n i o n s e e C h a p t e r V , P a r t 2, F o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e S o v i e t s t r u c t u r e a s a g e n c i e s o f p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , s e e C h a p t e r X & X I . F o r a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e J u d i c i a l S y s t e m , s e e C h a p t e r X I I F o r a c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f S o v i e t e c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g a n d a d e s c r i p t i o n o f S o v i e t e c o n o m i c m a c h i n e r y s e e : H 0 E , R o n l m o i s j S o v i e t P l a n n i n g & E c o n o m i c T h e o r y . C o m p l e t e d a t t h e L o n d o n S c h o o l o f E c o n o m i c s ' a n d ' p u b l i s h e d i n p a m p h l e t f o r m b y t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1 9 5 0 . S e e a l s o : H , E 0 . R o n i m o i s s T h e S o v i e t E c o n o m i c M a c h i n e A s t u d y p u b l i s h e d i n J p a m p h l e t f o r m b y t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1 9 S U ~ 119 * new targetso Of the latest changes in the economic set-up of USSR i t is worth mentioning the introduction of targets of state reserve and the changes which have taken place in the accounting system.^ Civic organizations also rise and disappear according to the party needs . We witness today the emergence of sever-al patriotic organizations, agencies of peace movement and c i v i l defence clubs. On the other hand; the anti-church and ahti-rellgious organizations have overnight disappeared* To systematize the motive forces behind the instit-utional dynamics of Soviet society, we can summarize as follows: The main factor is the party, with i t s omnipotence to create new organizations, to counterbalance the natural atrophy of Soviet institutions which have to function in an a r t i f i c i a l environment. A second factor of institutional instability is that the institutions are not given time enough to settle doxvn, to stabilize and to develop institutional gravity through tradition. As a third factor we may consider the abruptness with which changes in social-political equilibrium take 8 For a study in the Soviet accounting system: H.Eo Ronimois: The Cost-Prof it-Cutput Relationship in a Soviet Industrial Firm. Published in pamphlet form by the UnlverslSy of. British Columbia, 1951* « 120-m place in Russia, The Soviet, society does not develop grad-ually; a l l changes are sudden, abrupt and shocking. As a fourth factor explaining why Soviet institutions are undergoing constant change and adjustment we can con-sider the errors and miscalculations of the party,9 Finally, as a f i f t h factor, we must consider the magnitude of Soviet "society, its resources and territory, and the magnitude of the changes carried through by the Bolshevik revolution. A l l these factors taken together explain why Soviet Society is in a permanent state of transition, 1 0 3» Tins VERTICAL DYNAMICS By vertical dynamics we understand the general move-ment in an upward direction, from masses towards the top lovel perty organisations, ' The leading party eiite touches the environment 9 The chaotic state of Soviet economy is due to the fact that economic problems are approached from a political and administrative, rather than an economic angle. It is also due to the fact that the party orthodoxy denies "functioning of t r i v i a l economic principles" (as 'capitalistic invention') in Soviet economy. See again Ronimois 2 The Soviet Economic  Machine and The. Theoretical Analysis of Soviet Economic Planning, Published in pamphlet form by the University of British Columbia, 1951. 10 See J, Towsters Political Power in USSR, Chapter XIV, Part I, The Dynamics of Constitutional Order, pp, 375 ~ 377* — 223. «• indirectly, through media, which;in executing the party commands in direct contact with the environment > have to overcome frictions; their energies are consumed and generally they are worn out. This is precisely the reason why the lower party or-ganizations particularly have a tremendous fluctuation of their membership j and why they must be continuously supplied with new and fresh forces dragged from the masses, after the worn out elements; have been purged0 The leading elite, on the other hand.is comparatively stable .while the cadres are more fluctuating on account of their being the f i r s t link In carrying out party policy© The friction which the party meets in executing i t s policy has a bearing on the party organisation. The party apparatus is built to. enable fresh forces from the mass base to be sucked into the party lower organizations» to utilize their vitality and to put these in turn to work on the most difficult sectors. The best elements from the mass base move upwards through a series of thresholds, such as the Soviets, the trade unions, party probationary stage, and finally through party membership and cadres to the party elite. The yardstick used to judge the value of a person for party purposes is his ability to carry oul? ruthlessly par£y orders and his ability to get the maximum out of h£.s eubprjr dinates. — 122 — The purges o f the party and state organisations, of economic planning bodies as well as of industrial lnanage-inent boards, are not at a l l accidental phenomena ih Soviet society. On the contrary, they constitute the basic operat-ional law of a government of total power. This government y to retain its power •> has to purge Itself continuously Of worn-tout elements; and has to secure the Influx of fresh ! . p forces into i t s executive apparatus. it* HORIZONTAL DYNAMICS By horizontal dynamics we. under stand a l l those numer-ous activities of party, government and mass organisations, which keep their membership permanently mobilized and ready to execute party commands. The horizontal dynamics, because of the great number of organisations involved, reach tre-mendous proportions. Their meetings, conferences, etc* are called "active"| and its preparation is the chief organisat-ional task of the party. 2 For the purge as a political device and i t s appraisal sees. V.I* Lenins Purging the Party. Selected Works. Vol,-II pp. 7k$ - 7h&0 See also: Purges In the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Research and Publication Service of The National Committee for a Free Europe, New York, 1952, This study, besides giving a summary of the purges in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, gives .also a brief description of various methods applied, starting with preliminary screening of an individual and resulting in periodic mass purges. ri 123 •* " T i r e l e s s i s o r k v / i t h t h e A c t i v e l e a d s t o i n c r e a s e d P a r t y a c t i v i t y , h e l p s t o s e c u r e t h e s p e e d y , c a r r y i n g o u t o f d i r e c t i v e s o f t h e l e a d -i n g o r g a n s a n d h e l p s t o a o t i v i a e a l l C o i m n u n i s t s . Com r a d e S t a l i n t e a c h e s t h a t ' a f t e r t h e c o r r e c t p o l i t i c a l l i n e h a s b e e n l a i d d o w n , o r -g a n i z a t i o n a l s o r b d e c i d e s e v e r y t h i n g , i n c l u d i n g t h e f a t e o f t h e p o l i t i c a l l i n e i t s e l f , i t s s u c c e s s o r f a i l u r e a * ©* I t i s n e c e s s a r y t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e a c t i v e b e c o m e s a b o l d a n d r e s o l u t e t r a n s m i t t e r o f t h e i d e a s o f t h e P a r t y . " 1 T h e m a i n a c t i v i t i e s o f s o o i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s w h i o h k e e p t h e e n t i r e S o v i e t s o c i e t y I n t h e s t a t e o f p e r m a n e n t r e a d i n e s s c a n b e s u m m a r i z e d a s f o l l o w s : (1) R e g u l a r m e e t i n g s , c o n f e r e n c e s , a n d c o n g r e s s e s j o f a l l o r g a n i z a t i o n s o n a l l l e v e l s . ( 2 ) P u b l i o r e f e r e n d a , p l e b i s c i t e s , e l e c t i o n s a n d n o m i n a t i o n s . (3) O c c a s i o n a l m e e t i n g s m c e l e b r a t i o n s , c o m m e m o r -a t i o n s . (Ij.) P a r t y a n d n o n - P a r t y a c t i v e s , b e n e v o l e n t b r i g a d e s , c i v i l d e f e n c e e x e r c i s e s , e t c . (S>) M a s s m e e t i n g s o f v a r i o u s k i n d s ( p e a c e d r i v e s , p a t r i o t i c d r i v e s , e t c . ) A l l t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s p e r f o r m e d b y n u m e r o u s p a r t y a n d n o n - p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s o n a l l l e v e l s a r e t h e r e a l m o t i v e f o r c e s b e h i n d t h e v e r t i c a l d y n a m i c s o f S o v i e t s o c i e t y . A l l o f t h e m e x e c u t e t h e p a r t y commands a n d t h e w h o l e i n s t i t u t i o n -a l s t r u c t u r e ^ i n t h e r o a l s e n s e o f t h e w o r d , v i b r a t e s u n d e r p a r t y i m p a c t . 1 P r o m a n a r t i c l e T r a i n a n d E d u c a t e P a r t y A c t i v e , p u b l i s h e d l u F o r a L a s t i n g P e a c e , f o r a P e o p l e ' s D e m o c r a c y . N o . 2 9 . J u l y 2o, 1 9 5 U ! — — ; — " — • — - 124 -C H A P T E R V I T H E E X P A N S I O N OP POWER BEYOND T H E POWER B A S E l o T H E G E N E R A L P R O P O S I T I O N " B e i n g t h e l a n d o f t h e D i c t a t o r s h i p o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t 0 . « t h e U . S . S . R . i n e v i t a b l y b e c o m e s t h e b a s e o f t h e w o r l d m o v e m e n t o f a l l o p p r e s s e d c l a s s e s , t h e c e n t r e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n , t h e g r e a t e s t f a c t o r i n t h e w o r l d h i s t o r y . . . s h e i s t h e - i n t e r n a t i o n a l d r i v i n g f o r c e o f p r o -l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n t h a t i m p e l s t h e p r o l e t a r i a t o f a l l . c o u n t r i e s t o s e i z e p o w e r • . ' » • * ( a ) U . S . S . R . A S A B A S E O F E X P A N S I O N T h e f u n d a m e n t a l o p e r a t i o n a l l a w o f t h e C o m m u n i s t c o n -c e p t o f p o w e r i s a p e r m a n e n t d r i v e f o r a c q u i s i t i o n o f h e w p o w e r a r e a s r e a l i z e d b y m o v e m e n t i n t w o d i r e c t i o n s . . F i r s t , t h e e x p a n s i o n o f p o w e r w i t h i n t h e b a s e , a n d s e c o n d l y , t h e e x -p a n s i o n o f p o w e r b e y o n d t h e b a s e . 1 " T h e P r o g r a m m e o f C o m m u n i s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l a s a d o p t e d b y t h e S i x t h W o r l d C o n g r e s s , 1928". R e p r i n t e d i n B l u e p r i n t f o r  W o r l d C o n q u e s t . p „ 220. ( T h e S i g n i f i c a n c e o f U . S . S . R , a n d h e r W o r l d R e v o l u t i o n a r y D u t i e s . ) • 1 2 5 -T h e i n c r e a s e o f i n t e r n a l p o w e r i s r e a l i z e d b y t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f , n e w p o w e r a r e a s w i t h i n t h e b a s e i t s e l f , t h r o u g h t h e e x p a n s i o n i n t o t h e d e p t h o f t h e b a s e . T h e h u m a n e l e m e n t i s o r g a n i z e d i n s u i t a b l e f o r m a t i o n s t o e n a b l e b e t t e r e x p l o i t -a t i o n o f n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s * H e r e p o l i t i c a l p o w e r , i n l i n k i n g t h e s u p e r s t r u c t u r e o f s o c i e t y ( t h e p a r t y I t h e t r a d e u n i o n s , a n d t h e p r o d u c t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n s ) w i t h i t s m a t e r i a l b a s e ( n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s , f a c t o r i e s a n d l a n d ) , r e s t s o n e c o n o m i c p o w e r i n a c o m b i n a t i o n o f w h i c h t h e d i v i d i n g l i n e i s d i f f i c u l t t o d r a w * T h e e x p a n s i o n o f p o w e r b e y o n d t h e b a s e i s e f f e c t e d b y C o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e p o w e r b a s e a n d o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n t h e s u p e r s t r u c t u r e o f s u r r o u n d i n g s t a t e s * I n s h o r t * t h e f i r s t o p e r a t i o n a l l a w o f a c o n c e p t o f t o t a l p o w e r i s t h e e x p a n s i o n o f p o w e r w i t h i n t h e b a s e * T h i s we h a v e b e e n d i s c u s s i n g i n t h e f o r e g o i n g c h a p t e r . T h e s e c o n d o p e r a t i o n a l l a w o f a c o n c e p t o f t o t a l p o w e r I s t h e e x p a n s i o n o f p o w e r b e y o n d t h e b a s e s a n d t h i s w i l l b e d i s c u s s e d b e l o w . T h e t r u i s m , e x p r e s s e d a b o v e > w a s p u t i n t o M a r x i a n t e r m -i n o l o g y b y S t a l i n t " T h e v i c t o r y o f s o c i a l i s m i n o n e c o u n t r y I s n o t a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t t a s k . T h e r e v o l u t i o n w h i c h h a s b e e n v i c t o r i o u s i n o n e c o u n t r y m u s t n o t : r e g a r d i t s e l f a s a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t e n t i t y , Ibut a s a n a i d , : a m e a n s f o r h a s t e n i n g t h e v i c -t o r y o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t i n a l l c o u n t r i e s . " 3 3 J . V f t S t a l i n t P r o b l e m s o f L e n i n i s m , p . 120 126 -Stalin, however, did not leave this general proposi-tion unelaborated. H e went further explaining that the re-volution in other countries must be supported and assisted .even by arras* but only when the power of the base has been sufficiently consolidated: nZn what should this assistance be ex-pressed? It should be expressed, f i r s t , in the victorious country achieving the utmost pos-sible in one country for the development, support, and awakening of the revolution in a l l countries. -Second, i t should be expressed In that 'the victorious proletariat' of one country • . would stand up against the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to i t s cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states. n4 Thus, when the Soviet power was consolidated and in-creased, the U.S.S.R«,as a base of world revolution,faced the problem of awakening revolutions in other countries, and organized the Communist International to this end.£ The Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. held in March, 1913, laid the foundation for the U. Lenin quoted by Stalin: Problems of Leninism, p. 122. See also y.I 0 Lenin: The United States of Europe Slogan, Selected Works. Vol.-I, p. 619, $ For the Soviet Union as a base of World Revolution see World_Revolution and the U.S. S.R./the MacMillan Co,, Hew York, 1933* by Miehaei T. Florinsky. « 127 -establishment of the Third International and a year later, in March, 1919, the Third International convened libs First • Congress in Moscow,? (b) THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL AS AU Ptt3TRUMENT OF EXPANSION The Communist International, as envisaged by i t s founders, is an instrument designed to carry out the world revolution. "The Communist international i s the concentrated will of the world revolutionary proletariat. Its mission is to organize the working class of the whole world for the over-throw of the capitalist.order and the estab-lishment of Communism*™1 Beoause the alms Of communism are global, the Inter-national Communist movement established i t s agencies, the communist parties, in every country of the world* 2 That the 7 See V, I o Lenin j The Third International and its Place in History, Seleoted Works. Vol,-II, pp. 471 - 477o 1 The Thesis and Statutes of the Communist International as adopted at the Second World Congress, July 17 to August 7, 1920 .at Moscow, Reprinted In Blueprint for World  Conquest, p, 218, 2 The Communist Parties in Europe actually originated by the splitting up of Social Democratic Parties into their revolutionary and moderate wings. For this process of splitting and "winning over? of revolutionary elements see the work of Ruth Fischer - Stalin and German Communism. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 191^80 Also vide supra Ch,- I,j p,-l4o - 128 -C o m m u n i s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t h e b i g g e s t a n d m o s t p o w e r f u l i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i s c l e a r f r o m t h e r e p o r t p u b -l i s h e d a t t h e C o m m u n i s t C o n f e r e n c e i n L o n d o n , o f J a n u a r y 23rd, 19 l*7» w h i c h i s i n c l u d e d i n A p p e n d i x N o . I I . i n . T h e C o m m u n i s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l , / i t s s t r i c t d i s c i p l i n e a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n , r e s e m b l e s t h e m e d i e v a l e c c l e s i a s t i c a l O r d e r a n d h e n c e , t h e C o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s h a v e t o a d o p t a n d s u b m i t t o t h e c a n o n s o f t h e w e l l k n o w n ' T w e n t y - O n e C o n d i t i o n s ' .3 . T h e C o m m u n i s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s a h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d I n t e r n a t i o n a l b o d y a n d d e m a n d s a b s o l u t e s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f I n t e r e s t s o f i n d i v i d u a l c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s t o t h e s t r a t e g i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t ... T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d R u l e s o f t h e C o m m u n i s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l , a s a d o p t e d b y t h e S i x t h W o r l d C o n g r e s s i n 1928, s p e a k i n g v e r y c l e a r l a n g u a g e i n t h i s r e g a r d a n d f o r m i n g t h e b a s i s f o r i t s o r -g a n i z a t i o n a n d i t s d i s c i p l i n e . 4 T h e s e r u l e s g i v e t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e e n o r m o u s p o w e r s t o I n t e r f e r e i n t h e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f i n d i v i d u a l c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s , t o d i r e c t t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y ) t h r o u g h t h e s e p a r t i e s > t o i n t e r f e r e i n t h e i n t e r n a l l i f e o f i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s . 3 S e e C o n d i t i o n s o f A d m i s s i o n t o t h e C o m m u n i s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l , r e p r i n t e d i n B l u e p r i n t f o r W o r l d C o n q u e s t p p . 64-73, I b i d , p p . 2^ 7 <- 258. 4 S e e C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d R u l e s o f t h e C o m m u n i s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l , r e p r i n t e d i n B l u e p r i n t f o r W o r l d C o n q u e s t . P a r t k* P P . 247 -- 129 Ce) WORLD POWER TENSIONS AS THE SOURCES OF EXPANSION The strategy of World Revolution i s based on- the analysis of the world situation in it s power implications. Communist strategists scrutinize existing power tensions in different parts of the world and calculate the possibility of their utilisation. In their considerations they depart from the theory of <Gaeven Development of Capitalism"«, According to this theory, there exists in the world a variety of social systems which are going through different stages of their development. They have one or another dominating mode of production and a corresponding class character; therefore they are of definite p o t 7 e r composition and they represent distinct power patterns, Jh taking this variety of power patterns into consid-eration when planning the World Revolution, the Communist strategists realize that the proletariat will get to power in different regions of tho world by different ways and also not at the same times "These circumstances make i t historically inevitable that the proletariat will come to power by a variety of ways and degree of rapid-ity , c ,"1 1 The Programme of the Communist International adopted by Sixth World Congress 1928 in Moscow, Reprinted in Blueprint  for World Conquest» pp, 208 - 209. - 130 -Consequently, the communists divide the world into regions according to the dominant mode of production of the states, which these regions constitute. They analyse the internal power composition of individual states to discover, the sources of their main power tensions; they also analyse their external.reletions, interactions and conflicts, in uther words, the sources of World Revolution l i e i n the internal and external conflicts of these regions and their respective states * and i t i s the task of strategy and tactics to utilise them in this respect, "The moro powerful enemy can be conquered only by exerting tine utmost effort, and by necessarily, thoroughly, carefully, attentively and sk i l l f u l l y taking advantage of every, even the smallest)«rift» among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various count-ries 5 and also by taking advantage of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacil-lating, unstable, unreliable and conditional," 2 In planning World Revolution, the communist strategists divide the world in these spheres.: 1, Regions with highly developed industrial product-ion, with diversified social stratification and highly devel-oped institutional structure, 2, Regions where the dominant mode of production is agriculture, with few sooial classes and with less developed institutional structure. 2 V.I 0 Lenin: Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder, Selected Works, VoI*-II, pp, 609«-610o - 131 -3 . Colonies, dependent and other countries with feudal and caste systems. These three main groups of countries jconsltuting three different power patterns^ divide the world into three distinctive theatres of World Revolution, each having i t s own specific strategy and tactics.3 In this way World Revolution i s resolved into indi-vidual revolutionary processes which are taking place within individual states of respective regions, and the strategy of World Revolution Is Only their co-ordination and integration. The strategio object, - Communist dictatorship on a world Seal©) will be achieved only as a final outcome of these pro-cesses. "The International Proletarian Revolution represents a combination of processes which vary in time and character; purely proletarian re-volutions; revolutions of a bourgeois - democratic type, which grow into proletarian revolutions; Wars of national liberation; colonial revolutions. The World Dictatorship of the proletariat comes only as the. final result of the revolutionary processes."4 3 This proposition of three distinctive patterns of re-volution was actually later on developed only into two pat-terns, and therefore the pattern of seisure of power in in-dustrial countries with certain modifications applies also to the countries with agrarian production. k The Programme of the Communist International as adopted by the Sixth World Congress in 1928 in Moscow. Reprinted in Blueprint for World Conquest, p. 208. - 132 The perplexity of communist actions In the inter-national f i e l d can be understood only i f viewed from the total angle; only then can we disclose the underlying pat-tern of World Revolution described above. Only then we can piece together seemingly unconnected Individual Communist actions and see that they f i t into a pattern of conspiracy of global dimensions*5 $ See the document of. the Committee on Foreign Affairs The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism. House Oocu-ment Ho, OT, 8 0 t h congress, 2nd session, united States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1948• 1 3 3 * CHAPTER VI 2. THE PATTERN OP COMMUNIST EXPANSION IH THE  PEOPLE9S DEMOCRACIES . (a) THE CONDITION OP THB SEIZURE OF POWER The World Revolution in the regions with highly developed industrial production scored considerable successes when the countries of Middle and Eastern Europe, in the short span of three or four years {19kk~19kB) * were brought under the Soviet yoke* The World Revolution-, in acquiring Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Poland^was con-siderably strengthened and i t s base expanded.1 The establishment of communist control in the above countries is a recent and exemplary confirmation of the main thesis of this essay; that the Communist strategy is primarily based on the utilisation of permanently operating power 1 See Moscow's European Satellites.The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Philadelphia, 1 9 5 0 * - 1 3 4 -tensionsjon the ability of the communists to link them-selves with any social movement, and to transform and use i t as a source of their power, ' In the particular case of the countries of Eastern and Middle Europe the communists linked themselves as early as the beginning of the Second World War with the underground national-liberation movements, with power tensions of coloss-al magnitude. The resistance movement in occupied countries of Middle and Eastern Europe was composed of democratic p o l i t i -cal parties of different orientations, and of nonpartisan patriots. The pressure of long years of Nazi occupation re-sulted in the unification of a l l the diverse and mutually antagonistic forces and thus supplied the fundamental pre-requisite for Communist independent operations* Huge all-national underground united fronts were formed. While the resistance movement, as the united front, had as i t s prime object to fight the invader , the Commun-ist strategic aim was to establish control over various sections of the united front; to prepare themselves for their own independent operations which were planned to start simul-taneously with the end of the Second World War, Although the Communist International was formally i dissolved to appease the democratic Allies of the U 0 S 0 SoHo, the plans for World Revolution went f u l l speed ahead and - 135 -the principal Communist Parties of Europe directed their membership with detailed instructions. For example, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the midst of the war. in July. 1943, mobilized i t s membership and issued detailed instructions from which we quote: "We publish these Instructions on the eve of the end of this war* They are addressed to our experienced comrades who are receiving them In the moment rapidly approaching the hour of our open battle. This battle will be won only by those who know exactly their aims and means, and who know how to predict and utilize further development of the war for the victory of the Czech working class...,», The longer the war lasts, . occupied Europe becomes mere Bolshevist, the middle class becomes more proletarian, and. consequently, the general conditions for the establishment of Soviet Socialist Republics in Europe are growing more rapidly. These republics will be established even in the . ease that the revolutionary armies of the USSR1 will he tfoorowffily exhausted by long  and heavy battles against Nazism. ""^  When this war conflict will culminate on its main battle fields, simultaneously with i t also the world.political conflict will reach its peak... We are fighting against Nazism, but we are leading our battle as the battle of our own class as well. We are fighting the battle , 2 The Communist International was dissolved on May 22nd, 1943. Announcement of this, move was made through the publi-cation of a resolution of its Executive Committee. For its text, see The Dissolution of the Comintern, The Strategy and  Tactics of World Communism. House Document No. 619, oOth Congress, 2 n d session, United States Government Printing Office, Washington; 1948, PP» 165 - 168. ' - '136 -against Nazism,in a way whioh would leave us strong enough for the moment of revolution against the dictatorship of the bourgeolse The instruction issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia contains further di-rections for the seizure of power in conjunction with the end of the Second World War. It stresses the paramount im-portance of capturing and controlling the patriotic mass base, of establishing the United Front from below, and of isolating and neutralizing organizations and elements hostile to communism. The most revealing is the concluding part of the instructions where the communists openly declare that there is only one possible outcome of this war; the establishment of Soviet Republic in Czechoslovakia and i t s annexation to the U.S.S.R., even at the cost of extermination and deport-ation of the opposing population. • "The establishment of Czech Soviet Republic and i t s annexation to the U.S.S.R. is the main object of our revolution and the found-ation of our new State • • ..This is.our com-plete programme, and everything that departs from i t or that is against i t must be defeated and removed by the revolution .... 3 'llristrukce vydane Ustrednim Vybqrem Komunlsticke Stranv Ces koslov'enskd v Praze v Servenci 19U.3". Trans. Instruction's issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechslovakia, Prague July, 19^3o The document is . i n possession of Pr. Vladimir Krajina, former M.P. of Czechoslovak Parliament and the Secretary General of the Socialist Party, and is quoted in f u l l in his MS; The Communists in Practice. - 137 * • o o I t i s e n t i r e l y i r r e l e v a n t whether we s h a l l have t o deport one hundred, two h u n -dred or e i g h t hundred thousand people a f t e r the war i n t o f o r c e d . l a b o u r camps beyond the f r o n t i e r s o f our nety s t a t e . Everyone who w i l l n o t be able to prove t h a t he took an a c t i v e p a r t i n our (understand Communist).., r e v o l u t i o n a r y b a t t l e , w i l l have to go t h e r e , no matter who he may be . .» «"4 . The Communist P a r t y o f Czechoslovakia was not the o n l y one which i s s u e d the i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r i t s membership« Several s t u d i e s p u b l i s h e d s i n c e the end o f the war d i s c l o s e the same u n d e r l y i n g p a t t e r n behind the a c t i v i t i e s o f the communist p a r t i e s , v i z . the i n t e n s i v e p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the s e i z u r e o f power i n conjunction w i t h the end o f the Second World War. & The communists penetrated a l l important o r g a n i z a t i o n s and s e c t i o n s o f the r e s i s t a n c e movement and formed there the communist c e l l s as l a t e n t power c e n t r e s . The war and the ex-tremely d i f f i c u l t c o n d i t i o n s under the occupation f u r n i s h e d a favourable c l i m a t e t o tills end. They deployed t h e i r operators i n t o , p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , ' t r a d e unions and other l e a d -i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f the r e s i s t a n c e movement w i t h the hope 4 I b i d . p . 15. 5 F o r the a c t i v i t i e s o f French Communist P a r t y see A . R o s s i : A Communist P a r t y In A c t i o n . Y a l e u n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , Hew Haven, The War o f Yugoslav Communists c a r r i e d against the German army as w e l l as against democratic Yugoslav p a t r i o t s i s d e -s c r i b e d by Stephen C l i s s o l d ; Whirlwind; "rhe orescent P r e s s , •London, 1949. • T ~ * T •. F o r the a c t i v i t i e s o f Communists o f Czechoslovakia see: The Strategy o f Communist P e n e t r a t i o n : Czechoslovakia 1944 -1948, World P o l i t i e s . V o l . I I » H o . 3, A p r i l 1950, p p . 345-372. - 1 3 8 t h a t t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s ) a t t h e e n d o f t h e w a r } w o u l d e m e r g e a s a b a c k b o n e o f n e w p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s o f t h e l i b e r a t e d c o u n t r i e s . T o a c q u i r e a c c e s s t o t h e i r t a r g e t g r o u p s , t h e c o m m u n i s t s p r o v o k e d a n d i n i t i a t e d t h e i n t e r - g r o u p t e n s i o n s ' a n d ) t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e o f t h e s e , t h e y l i n k e d t h e m s e l v e s w i t h t h i s o r t h e o t h e r g r o u p . I n o r d e r t o p e n e t r a t e i n t o t h e t a r g e t g r o u p a f t e r a c c e s s h a d b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d , t h e c o m m u n i s t s i n i t i a t e d a n d e n -c o u r a g e d i n t r a - g r o u p c o n f l i c t s . T h e y s p l i t t h e g r o u p i n t o a n t a g o n i s t i c f a c t i o n s , a n d b y s u p p o r t i n g a n d l i n k i n g t h e m s e l v e s w i t h w i n n i n g f a c t i o n s , t h e y l a t e r e m e r g e d i n t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e g r o u p o T h e m o s t s h a m e f u l a c t i v i t i e s o f I & t r o p e a n c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s d u r i n g t h e w a r y e a r s w e r e t h e d e n u n c i a t i o n s • T h e c o m m u n i s t s > t o r e m o v e t h e i r p r e s e n t a n d a l s o p o s s i b l e f u t u r e f o e s , > d e n o u n c e d * t h e i r o p p o n e n t s t o e n e m y a u t h o r i t i e s . T h e c o m m u n i s t s a l s o p r o v o k e d o r i n i t i a t e d a r m e d u p -r i s i n g s a g a i n s t t h e o c c u p a n t s o n l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f e x p o s i n g t h e i r f e l l o w f i g h t e r s t o t h e s u p e r i o r s t r e n g t h p f G e r m a n a r m i e s . T h i s e x p o s u r e w a s c a l c u l a t e d t o e x t e r m i n a t e a n d t o l i q u i d a t e t h e d e m o c r a t i c u n d e r g r o u n d g r o u p s . The* d e c i m a t i o n o f t h e P o l i s h ' d e m o c r a t i c u n d e r g r o u n d m o v e m e n t b y G e r m a n a r m i e s i n t h e W a r s s w u p r i s i n g o f 1 9 4 4 i s & n o t o r i o u s e x a m p l e 6 S e e S t a n i s l a v M i k o l a l e z v k t T h e K a n e o f P o l a n d . P a t t e r n  o f S o v i e t A g r e s s i o n . M c G r a w - H i l l k > o k d e w M , " 1946, " C h a p t e r Vi, p p . o o - 90. S e e a l s o W , A n d e r s L t . G e n , t A n A r m y i n E x i l e . M a c M i l l a n ^ C o . L o n d o n , 1949. - 1 3 9 -A l l o p e r a t i o n s m e n t i o n e d a b o v e w e r e c a r r i e d o u t w i t h t h e v i e w t o s e c u r i n g o p e r a t i o n a l C o n t r o l o v e r t h e b r o a d p o p u l a r p a t r i o t i c m o v e m e n t s w h i c h w e r e b o u n d t o e m e r g e a f t e r t h e w a r a s t h e m a i n o r g a n i s i n g f o r c e s o f t h e l i b e r a t e d s t a t e s . C o m i n g b a c k t o t h e o o m m u n i s t c o n q u e s t o f p o w e r i n t h e c o u n t r i e s o f M i d d l e a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e , we h a v e t o c o n -s i d e r t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e R e d A r m y I n t h o s e c o u n t r i e s a s a s e c o n d d e c i s i v e f a c t o r o f e a s y c o m m u n i s t v i c t o r y , t h e o p e r -a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o f t h e m a s s b a s e b e i n g t h e f i r s t O n e . T h e R e d A r m y f u n c t i o n e d a s a p r o t e c t i n g w i n g w h i l e t h e c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s w e r e b u s y t r a n s f o r m i n g t h e n a t i o n a l w a r o f l i b e r a t i o n i n t o t h e . g e n e r a l s o c i a l u p h e a v a l w h i c h } t h e y p l a n n e d w o u l d e n d i n t h e P r o l e t a r i a n R e v o l u t i o n a n d t h e c o m -m u n i s t c o n q u e s t o f p o w e r . T h e c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s ) o n t h e i r r o a d t o p o w e r j w e r e p r o t e c t e d a n d b a c k e d b y t h e m i g h t o f t h e R e d A r m y w h i c h i n t e r v e n e d o n l y w h e n t h e c o m m u n i s t s e n c o u n t e r e d u n b r e a k a b l e r e s i s t a n c e . " T h e c o m i n g o f t h e S o v i e t A r m y m a d e p o s s i b l e t h e g r o w i n g o f t h e N a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e i n t o t h e n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n w a r o o o T h e w o r k i n g c l a s s w h i c h l e d t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e o c c u p i e r s n o w g a i n e d e x t e n s i v e p o s -s i b i l i t i e s o f s e i s i n g p o l i t i c a l p o w e r a n d c a r r y -i n g o u t t h e b r o a d s t r u g g l e f o r t h e a b o l i t i o n o f . t h e r u l e o f c a p i t a l i s t a n d l a n d o w n e r s « 0 * T h e w o r k i n g m a s s e s , t h e w o r k i n g c l a s s a n d i t s p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s h a d a c l a s s a l l y i n t h e S o v i e t A r m y 0 « « a n a l l y w h o b y h i s v e r y p r e s e n c e r e n d e r e d p o w e r l e s s t h e camp o f t h e r e a c t i o n a n d m a d e i t i n c a p a b l e o f d e a l i n g b y f o r c e o f a r m s w i t h t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o v e r n -m e n t O O P o P o The socialist revolution in the People's Democracies was based in Its source on the aid and power of the Soviet Union and i t s : Army* "7 A third factor whioh played a decisive role i n the communist conquest of power in the People's Democracies was that th© communist parties) step by step with the advance of the Red Army^  moved ahead with a ready-made skeleton ap-paratus of new State power0 They established local and central revolutionary governments and i n those secured for themselves i n i t i a l control. The organization and installation of the Lublin Government in Poland i s an example» The fourth major factor leading to the communist victory, in middle Europe was the institution of a National Front and the system of government of the National Front. This latter was based on the coalition of political parties as they emerged from the Underground at the end of the war. These governments did not rest on popular consent, but were formed by.Inter-party agreements when the communists were always given the key posts in the cabinets. They always controlled the Ministry of Internal Police to use i t s authority for liquidation of their political op-ponents and to be able to exercise general terror against the 7 Hilary Mine: People's Democracy in Eastern Europe. A Selection of Articles and Speeches entitled On People»s  Democracy in Eastern Europe and China. Published by the communist Party, London, April, 1951* p. 6» whole population. They also demanded control of the Industrial and agricultural departmentsi Controlling these two ministries, the communists were able to provoke practically at any time revolutionary waves which could sweep away their political partners 6 By loosening or tightening the land reform, the communists were able to stir up the agrarian masses. On the other hand, controlling the nationalized industry, the communists had command of the working class and were able to form armed workers' militia, and to control the trade unions The communists also controlled the Ministry; of Inform-ation and used its apparatus of mass communication, such as radio, press, theatres and cinemas. They were also anxious to control the Ministry of Education to acquire access to the intelligentsia. Being in control of the above key positions in the state and using and exploiting governmental authority with which they were entrusted, the communists were able to prepare individual sectors of the population separately for a final Showdown o In addition to the control of the most important 8 For the land reform and the nationalization of industry as tactical instruments of Communism, see Matyas Rakosis The Ways of Our Peopl e's Democracy. pp» 13 and 2 1 , - li|2 > b r a n c h e s o f t h e s t a t e a u t h o r i t y f r o m a b o v e , t h e c o m m u n i s t s a l s o c o n t r o l l e d t h e m a s s b a s e t h r o u g h t h e I n s t i t u t i o n o f a n a t i o n a l f r o n t . T h e n a t i o n a l f r o n t o r g a n i z e d a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a s w e l l a s t h e g e n u i n e m a s s o r g a n i z a t i o n s , s u c h a s t r a d e u n i o n s , p a t r i o t i c ) women a n d y o u t h O r g a n i z a t i o n s , a n d i t s a g e n c i e s w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d o n n a t i o n a l , r e g i o n a l , d i s t r i c t e n d l o c a l l e v e l s . I n a l l t h e s e a g e n c i e s t h e c o m m u n i s t s w e r e f a i r l y w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d , b e c a u s e a l r e a d y d u r i n g t h e w a r t h e y h a d p e n e t r a t e d i n t o a l l m e m b e r s h i p o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f u n i t e d f r o n t a n d f o r m e d w i t h i n t h e s e t h e i r c e l l s . I n p r e p a r i n g t h e s e i z u r e o f p o w e r , t h e m a i n a t t a c k o f t h e c o m m u n i s t s w a s d i r e c t e d o n t h e t r a d e u n i o n s . I n th© " p e a c e f u l d e v e l o p m e n t of- r e v o l u t i o n " t h e t r a d e u n i o n s s e r v e a s e n v i r o n m e n t w h e r e t h e c o m m u n i s t s ) b y t h e i r p e r s o n a l a g i t -a t i o n ^ u n d e r m i n e t h e l o y a l t y o f t h e i r f e l l o w t r a d e u n i o n i s t s t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p . When h o w e v e r , t h e c o m m u n i s t s d e c i d e t o m o v e i n a f i n a l b i d f o r p o w e r , t h e t r a d e u n i o n s a r e . t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a d i r e c t i n s t r u m e n t o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n - i n t o t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y h a m m e r - r a i s i n g thef r e -v o l u t i o n a r y d e m a n d s a n d s m a s h i n g t h e p a r t i e s o f t h e c o m m u n i s t s ' o p p o n e n t s , ( b ) T H E S E I Z U R E OP POWER T h e s i t u a t i o n a s o u t l i n e d b r i e f l y a b o v e w a s t h e p o w e r p o s i t i o n w i t h i n c o u n t r i e s o f M i d d l e a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e s h o r t l y after the end of the war; and i t was the starting point for the long and protracted process of the gradual shifting of political gravity within these countries to the l e f t , with the gradual "taking over" by the communists. The main features of this process can be described as follows; The communists,to decimate political parties of the Right)Used the trade unions to put forward new and progressive revolutionary demands which they knew would not be accepted. In this operation they enlisted the support of the parties of the Centre and of the Left, VJhen the parties of the Right were paralysed by this common effort, the communists initiated the reconstruction of the composition of the government as well as of the national front? and claiming ^ together with Social Democrats,more than 00$ of the majority in a l l governmental bodies and in a l l agencies of the united front, the centre of political.gravity within the country shifted to the Left. After a short period of time had allowed things to settle down, and having a firm grip on the spoils of the "first partition", the communists were ready to move again, this time against the Centre. By placing Social Democrats Into prominent positions in the government and by promises of joint rule, the communists were able to secure the support of the Social Democratic, Party, and then, together with them, • lilii -they introduced new revolutionary demands not acceptable to moderate and democratic parties of the Centre, simultaneously with the process of destruction of the Centre, the communists, however, opened operations against the Social Democrats themselves, They undermined and split their parties from the top as well as from the bottom. They instructed the communist operators hidden within their general membership to carry out> with the help of Left Wing: Sooial Democrats, internal revolutions,to dispose of the present leadership and to install a new one carefully selected by the communists* Head Quarters, and to propose the merger of the Social Democratic Party with the Communist Party a Concurrently with the decimation of political parties and with the reshaping of the government and national front the communists mobilized workers* armed militia, seized con-trol in factories, mines and other Industrial enterprises and kept the police and the army ready to intervene i f necessary. The gradual and smooth conquest of power which followed is of a unique character, because only i n a few except i on &r end minor cases, did the communists use naked power and violence. And this is how** In different ways and with varying degrees of rapidity^the People's Democratic Governments in Middle and Eastern Europe were established,3-1 -145 -( c o n t , ) S t s n i s l a v M i k o l a j c z y k : T h e R a p e O f P o l a n d . P a t t e r n o f S o v i e t A g r e s s i o n . M c G r a w - H i l l B o o k C o , , H e w Y o r k , 1948* A « ~ B l i s s L a n e : I S a w P o l a n d B e t r a y e d , t h e B o b b s -M e r r i l l C o . ; " ; N e w Y o r k , 1948* P — B r o n i s l a v K u s n i e r z : S t a l i n a n d t h e P o l e s . H o l l i s & C a r t e r , L o n d o n , 1949* . F o r c o n q u e s t of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a s e e s H u b e r t R i p k a : C z e c h o s l o v a k i a E n s l a v e d : t h e S t o r y o f t h e C o m m u n i s t s  COUP d ' e t a t . G o l l a n s ^ L o n d o n . 1 9 5 Q . O t t o F r i e d m a n , T h e B r e a k of C z e c h D e m o c r a c y . V , G o l l -a n c z , L p n d o n p 1950, J o s e f J o s t e n : O h M y C o u n t r y . L a t l m o r e H o u s e L t d , , L o n d o n , 1949* „ I v o D u c h a c e k : T h e F e b r u a r y C o u p I n C z e c h o s l o v a k i a W o r l d P o l i t i c s . V e l . - I I , No. 4, J u l y , 1950, p p . 511 - 532. F o r t h e C o m m u n i s t v i c t o r y I n H u n g a r y s e e : P e r e n e N a g y s T h e S t r u g g l e B e h i n d t h e I r o n C u r t a i n . T h e M a c M i l l a n l o . . , N e w YorkTlW. — ; S t e p h e n D . K e r t e s z : T h e M e t h o d s o f C o m m u n i s t C o n q u e s t : H u n g a r y 1944 - 1947. W o r l d P o l i t i c s . V o l . - I I I , N o , 1, O c t o b e r , 1950, p p , 20 '-' '54. F o r t h e C o m m u n i s t s * o w n e x p o s i t i o n o f t h e i r r o a d t o p o w e r s e e M a t y a s R a k o s i ; T h e Way o f O u r - P e o p l e ' s D e m o c r a c y . P u b l i s h e d b y : t h e N a t i o n a l C o m m i t t e e f o r F r e e E u r o p e , " i n c . , New Y o r k , 19^ 2, H o w t h e C o m m u n i s t s c o n q u e r e d R u m a n i a s e e : B a r r y B r a n n e r i T h e S o v i e t C o n q u e s t O f R u m a n i a , F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . V o l . - 3 0 , N o . 3, A p r i l , 1952, p p . 466 - 4 8 7 . - ~~-F o r t h e C o m m u n i s t a t t a c k o n P o s t W a r E u r o p e s e e a l s o : D a v i d J , D a l l l n : R u s s i a a n d P o s t W a r E u r o p e . Y a l e u n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , N e w H a v e n , 1945« J a n C i e c h a n o w s k l s D e f e a t i n V i c t o r y . D o u g l e d a y & C o , New Y o r k , 1947* C o n s t a n t i n F o t i t e h : T h e War We L o s t . T h e V i k i n g P r e s s New Y o r k , 1948. P a u l W i n t e r t o n : I n q u e s t o n A n A l l y . T h e C r e s c e n t P r e s s , L o n d o n , 1948, F o r t h e m e t h o d s o f S o v i e t i z a t l o n o f B a l t i c c o u n t r i e s w h i c h w e r e c o n q u e r e d b y U S S R u n d e r t h e S t a l i n - H i t l e r p a c t o f 1939, s e e H e r m a n n R a j a m a a : T h e M o u l d i n g o f S o v i e t  C i t i z e n s . B o r e a s P u b l i s h i n g C o . L t d . , L o n d o n , l 9 4 o , a n d E n d e l K a r e l a : T e c h n i q u e O f E c o n o m i o S o v i e t i z a t l O n s . B o r e a s P u b l i s h i n g C o 'i L t d , , L o n d o n , 19147, S e e a l s o A , K a e l a s * Human R i g h t s a n d G e n o c i d e i n t h e  B a l t i c S t a t e s . E s t o n i a n I n f o r m a t i o n C e n t r e , S t o c k h o l m , • lli.6 -Co) ESTABLISHMENT OP THE MACHINERY OP DICTATORSHIP T h e s y s t e m o f t h e P e o p l e ' s D e m o c r a t i c D i c t a t o r s h i p h a s s e v e r a l i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e s m a n i f e s t i n g t h e p e r f e c t i o n o f t h e c o m m u n i s t s * t e c h n i q u e s o f s e i z u r e o f p o w e r a n d a l s o t h e p e r f e c t i o n o f m e a n s f o r i t s p r e s e r v a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e n e w t e c h n i q u e s * o f u t i l i z a t i o n o f p o w e r t e n s i o n s , t h e c o m m u n i s t s h a v e a l s o d e v e l o p e d n e w m e t h o d s o f t r a n s f o r m i n g g e n u i n e p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s o f t h e i r o p p o n e n t s , i n t o t h e i n s t r u m e n t s o f t h e i r d i c t a t o r s h i p . H i l a r y M i n e , M e m b e r o f t h e P o l i t i c a l B u r e a u o f t h e P o l i s h W o r k e r ' s P a r t y i n h i s a r t i c l e " O n P e o p l e ' s D e m o c r a c y I n E a s t e r n E u r o p e " , f o r m u l a t e d t h e t h e o r e t i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s o f t h e P e o p l e ' s d e m o c r a t i c D i c t a t o r s h i p , t h e r e l e v a n t p a r t o f w h i c h i s q u o t e d h e r e i n f u l l : " A l t h o u g h t h e r e i s c o m p l e t e f u n d a m e n t a l h a r m o n y i n t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e m e c h a n i s m o f t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t , b a s e d o n t h e l e a d i n g r o l e o f t h e p a r t y . . > s . . . c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c n a t u r e d o e s e x i s t , h o w e v e r , a t t h e p r e s e n t s t a g e o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t . o f P e o p l e ' s D e m o c r a t i c f o r m . T h i s s p e c i f i c n a t -u r e l i e s i n t h e e x i s t e n c e o f n o t o n l y o n e s i n g l e p a r t y , t h e . p a r t y o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t , b u t a l s o o f o t h e r p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d p a r t i e s , x h i c h f u n c t i o n m a i n l y i n t h e f i e l d o f t h e p e a s a n t a n d p e t t y b o u r g e o i s s t r a t a . I t m u s t , h o w e v e r , b e s t a t e d d i s t i n c t l y t h a t t h e s e p a r t i e s d p n o t p o s s e s s a n y m o r e t h e . c h a r a c t e r o f p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t -i n g t h e i n t e r e s t o f " a n t a g o n i s t i c c l a s s e s w h o s e I n t e r e s t s a r e h o s t i l e a n d c a n n o t b e r e c o n c i l e d " 0 ( S t a l i n ) « o .some of these parties were the more or less wavering allies of the Communist and Workers"' Parties vihlle some of them held op-enly hostile positions in relation to them. However, in the process of the great class battles which took place in the People's Democracies . . . these parties changed their class nature. In this period a thorough revision of their ideology, a thorough cleansing of their leadership and apparatus took place. At present these parties recognize the general political line worked out by the Communist and Workers'* Part-ies . . . as binding for them, and corres-ponding to the Interest of the social strata among which they function. These parties de-velop their practical activity along this line. These parties recognize also ;both In theory and in practice, the leading role of the Communist and Workers Parties. • • • In the present stage of development of the People's Democracies, these parties are f u l f i l l i n g in reality the function of special ally formations, a special bridge for the lead-ing detachment of the working class to a part of. the working masses, especially to.the pea-sants. Hence, toe entrance of the representat-ives of these parties into the government does not in any case endow the governments in the People's Democracies with the character of the coalition governments in the bourgeois meaning of the word, does not deprive them of coherence and compactness, does not infringe in principle their unity of actions, and does not undermine the stability and durability of the people's . power."* This is precisely why the existence of parliaments, political parties, elections and of other constitutional usages in People's Democracies, obscures and confuses the 1 Hilary Mines On People's Democracy, passim. 16-1?. •» 3lj£ «» actual state of affairs, leaving an observer with an im-pression that the People's Democracies are the governments of limited, checked and balanced powers in the Western sense. WPo Bierut, another leading Polish Communist, put i t correctly; "The People's Democracy is not a synthesis or stabilised form of co-existence of two different systems, but is a form of pushing out and gradual elimination of capitalist elements, * The devices applied by the communist parties in the People's,Democracies to exercise control over the institutional structure as well as over the mass base are of the same nature as in the u\S.S,R0, with, however, special adjustments to more civilised and developed conditions. ' The communist parties are articulating their membership masses into the ten-man groups according to the places of their occupation. Every ten-man party group again rallies around its e l f a definite number of non-party members, engages them in carrying out party commands and in the f u l f i l l i n g of production targets as set by the party. The ten-man groups are actually.the lowest level of the communist party power structure. They link the party with the non-party masses, and in relation to the latter they function as the leading elite: 2 From the Speech of the unification Congress of the Polish Workers' and Socialist Parties, December 1946, Reprelnted in On People's Democracy, p. i& "By means of these lower links (the Party Groups) the Party leadership estab-lished close and direct contact with each member of the organization* Each individ-ual Party member is within the fiel d of vision of the Party group organizer. The group organizer involves the membership in the Party activity and in social work, for fulfilment and over fulfilment of production assignments. Be sees to i t that the members of his group take part in the Party study since constant educational work strengthens discipline and deepens the consciousness of the members of the group. The organizer and the member of the group oonduct systematic agitational, educational and organizational work among the non-Party masses and, in this way, exert a steady influence over them too "tr* O • » . The dynamicsof societies:In People's Democracies is also directed by the party and reaches tremendous proportions. For example, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at.the end of 1951 decided to hold five thousand community meetings in the countryside which would be devoted to the international and internal political situation. By the end of April of 1952, the communist party reported that i t was able to organize eight thousand community meetings in various parts of the country in which a substantial part of the polulation took part, 4 3 From Experience of the Work of Party Groups in Hungarian Working People's Party. Published For a Lasting Peace, for a  People' s Democracy „ Organ of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties. No. 21, May 23rd, 1952. if. . A. Novotny, member of the Political Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia In his article Turn to the Masses published in Official Organ ef Comlnfom. No.*!?. April 25th; 1952. • 1 5 0 • P u r g e s a r e a l s o p e r m a n e n t ; i n s t i t u t i o n s I n P e o p l e ' s D e m o c r a c i e s . T h e y h e l p t h e p a r t y t o d o a w a y w i t h / i n f l e x i b l e a n d u n d e s i r a b l e e l e m e n t s w h i c h c a n n o t f o l l o w t h e s h a r p t u r n s o f t h e p a r t y p o l i t i c a l l i n e , a n d t o p r e p a r e t h e s o i l f o r " p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c c o n s o l i d a t i o n " 2 " T h e m e e t i n g ( C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e o f t h e C0P0 o f B u l g a r i a h e l d i n A p r i l 1951) d e c i d e d t o p u r g e t h e l o w e r P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t h e r u r a l l o c a l i t i e s » « « D u r i n g 1951 o v e r 1,600 c o m m i s s i o n s w o r k e d u n d e r t h e d i r e c t l e a d e r s h i p o f r e g i o n a l a n d d i s t r i c t P a r t y C o m m i t t e e v e r i -f y i n g t h e C o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e P a r t y o r g a n i s a t -i o n s O f t . T h e p o l i t i c a l a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h -• e n i n g o f t h e l o w e r P a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t h e r u r a l a r e a s ; a s a r e s u l t o f t h e p u r g e , h a s . c r e a t -e d c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ^ e c o n o m i c , a n d p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f a g r i c u l t u r e * " 5 T o c o n c l u d e , t h e P e o p l e ' s D e m o c r a t i c G o v e r n m e n t s a r e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m s o f u n l i m i t e d ) t o t a l p o w e r . T h e y a r e b a s e d . o n t h e e x p e r i e n c e s o f t h e U , S * S * B « a n d } b e i n g a d j u s t e d a n d a d a p t e d f o r t h e s p e c i f i c s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t i n g i n M i d d l e . a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e , t h e y m a n i f e s t a f a r r e a c h i n g f l e x i b i l i t y a n d d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e M a r x i a n o r t h o d o x y i n m e e t i n g t h e the • • d e m a n d s o f / t o t a l p o w e r c o n c e p t . R e g a r d l e s s o f h o w d i f f e r e n t l y t h e i r o r g a n s a r e g r o u p e d i n v a r i o u s c o u n t r i e s a n d w h a t e v e r d i f f e r e n t n a m e s t h e y m i g h t h a v e , t h e y s t i l l d i s c l o s e t h e u n i v e r s a l n a t u r e o f t o t a l p o w e r « 'l» I ' " » ' I, I M M I I ( I I I I I H III I II l>l M I I I U . H I H MMII^II I III. ' .1 • I. M 5 R e s u l t o f t h e p u r g e i n r u r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y ' o f B u l g a r i a , P u b l i s h e d i n t h e O f f i c i a l  O r g a n o f C o m i n f o r m N o . 19, M a y 9th, 1952, - 101 The People's Democratic Government represents the machinery of dictatorship on the Soviet pattern^ with an important difference, that the party touches it s environ-ment not only through a series of mass organisations, but uses also the organisational apparatus of former political parties. The People's Democratic Government also maintains the skeletons of former political parties for another purpose. They provide that misleading and quite often misunderstood screen of democratic institutions behind which the communists oan freely operate without the risk of being detected and having their system labelled as totalitarian. (d) THB MAIN FEATURES OF THE MODERN SEIZURE OP POWER The techniques of the. conquest of political power in the People's Democracies is the latest word in the development of political strategy of communism and have the following main features: The conquest of political power i s not realised through sudden explosive and violent revolution, but is achieved 6 For the theory of People's Democratic Government see Rosa Ruth Amende: The Soviet Theory of People's Democracy. World Politics. Vol.-l, No. k* July 1949, PP* 489 - 5l0„ Adam B. ulam: The Cominform and the People's Democracies, World Politics. Vol. I l l , No. 2, January 1951 PP. 200 « 217. 0, utls: Generalissimo. Stalin and the Art of Government Foreign Affairs. Vol.-30. NO. 2, January 1952, pp. 197 - 211+.. V 1 5 2 « through & series of small-scale revolutions or coups d'etat which simultaneously take place within political parties* government institutions and economic organisations* This ls^ a long and protracted process whereby^ in chipping off the parties of the right* the centre of political gravity within the country is gradually shifted to the l e f t : and where, in the course of this process, a l l political parties as well as a l l governmental institutions undergo gradual transformation and Internal reconstruction* This gradual transformation does not smash the social institutions as the revolution of the early Bolshevik pattern did* It only paralyses the target Institutions In their functions and preserves and leaves their organisational struct-ures intact* ready to be taken over and used by the Communists* The revolution of the People's Democratic pattern* because i t takes place within the higher level power centres) eliminates the participation of the masses in this revolution-ary process* The masses are isolated and neutralized by actual non-conductive barriers which are placed between thorn and the operations of seizure of power* These non-conductive barriers are built from communist** controlled front organisations, and their function lis to pre-vent, any possibility of a spontaneous movement within the masses* The dimension, direction and dynamic of the spontan-eous movement of the masses is not .calculable* and i f allowed to enter into the political equation operative In the upper ™ lf?3 ™ levels, i t would necessarily b© the big unknown which could give the process, of seisure quite a different direction, The revolution no longer f ollows the old Marxian prescription that It must have the form "of forcible over-throw" o It is rather a slow and well planned transformation of which most of the population is not at a l l aware0 Sa© revolution is not conducted to smash institutions, but 1',. aims at thoir preservation. It no longer manifests its e l f by the heroic, spontaneous movement of the masses. It is a highly skilled manipulation carried out quietly within a few upper level power centres and completely excludes the masses „ Thus, the revolution aa the People's nemocratle pattern constitutes an altogether new concept of political conquest, which, i f not grasped or i f misunderstood, could be fatal to a l l Western civilisation. 1 1 Por different patterns of revolutions sees James Burnhams The, Managerial Revolution; The John Day Co., Hew York, 19l*l.f ' Ethan Col tons Four Patterns of Revolution«, Association Press, New York, 1935. Slgffiund Heuman: Permanent Revolution. Harper & Brotbera, London 19l|2. Leon Trotsky: Permanent Revolution. Gupta Rahman a Gupta, Calcutta, 194TT For the classic old-Marxian concept of the revolution where the main instrument Is violence, see J. Kennan's study published under the pseudonym Historicus: Stalin Cn Revolution, Foreign, Affairs. January 1949. I - 152j. «• CHAPTER VI-TEE PATTERN OP EXPANSION IN FREE: DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES (a) THB QENERAL PROPOSITION The operations of the GomrHunist International move-ment in other countries with highly developed industrial eetw nomiea are oarried but by local communist parties, the sections of the Communist Internationale The communist parties operating in democratic countries are agencies of a foreign power alien and hostile to the government of the country in which they operate, and recognising, as their only authority the Executive Committee of the Communist Inter-national in Moscow.1 The communist parties i n democratic countries do not seek power by established constitutional process, i,e. 1 For this point see the publication of the Committee on Un-American Activities, entitled The Communist Party of the United States as an Agent of Foreign Power,, House^ReportMo* 209* United' States Qovernment Printing office, Washington 19&7. - 1 5 5 directly, in elections,, They confine themselves to the strategy of indirect approach; they attack the whole instit-utional structure of society In order to strangle individual institutions In their functions, and In this way bring about a functional collapse of society as a whole* Thus, the com-munists create an atmosphere of instability and chaos and Under these conditions, being a highly organised and disci-plined c i v i l army, they strike for power* They are well pre-pared because they organise two independent networks as their agencies; the one which operates openly and legally, and the other which operates in the .underground illegally: "The general state of things in the whole of Europe and America makes necessary an obli-gatory formation of illegal Communist organis-ations along with those existing legally, £he exe-- outlve committee shall be bound to see that this shall be carried out everywhere*"2 (b) . THE TACTICS OP THE UNITED FRONT, The rich and highly articulated institutional struc-ture of the democratic countries) generating in its function-ing constantly operating power tensions) is a target of communist attacks* 2 Paragraph 12 cf Thesis and Statutes of the Communist International as adopted at the Second World Congress 1920 Moscow. Reprinted Blueprint for World Conquest* p* 39* «• 1^ 6 — In the f i r s t place, the comjainiists attack the trade unions o The communists link themselves with the trade unions because these belong to the category of the most revolutionary social organisations* They are highly organised, they have a vast network of power centres on a l l levels and)because of their class character) they are more accessible t ttThe ftmdamental principle of a l l organ!-, sational work of the Communist Party and indi-vidual Communists must be the creation of Com-munist nuclei everywhere whs re they find pro-letarians and semi-proletarians - although in small numbers» In every Soviet of Workers1 De-puties, i n every trade and industrial union, co-operative association, factory, tenant's union, in every government institution, everywhere, even though there may be only three people sympathis-ing with Communism, a Communist nuclei must be Immediately organized,, It Is only the power of organisation, of the Communists that enables the advanced guard of the working class to be the leader of the whole class c Communist nuclei working in organisation adhering to no political party organisations in general, must be subjected to the party organisation in general, whether the party itself i s working legally or illegally at the given moment* Communist nuclei of a l l kinds must be subordinated one to another in strictly hierarchical order and system*"! When the communists have established power nuclei in trade unions of different orientations they have acquired the f i r s t link in th© chain of organisations leading them to the mass base* And to secure for themselves the second link 1 Paragraph 18 of Theses and Statutes of Communist International* Ibid* P* $k° - 1 5 7 -and to extend their influence 5 the communists now direct their activities, against other working class organizations! and also those vhich do not belong to any political party* "The most important task of the genuine Communist Party is to preserve constantly the closest contact with the widest masses of the workers* For that purpose the Communists must carry on activity also within suoh organizations which are non-partisan, but which comprise large proletarian groups * . *" 2 The communists establish with these organizations of the working class fighting alliances called United Fronts, They form joint committees and joint organizations which function as dual power centres*3 The access to a l l these organizations as a condition for the establishment of the United Front i s supplied by the tactical operation called the United Action* The communist strategists direct individual members of the communist party as well as whole groups of the com-munists to assist the individual target organizations in their struggle* to unite with their general membership from 2 Theses and Statutes of Communist international, Ibid* p. 1 0 3 . 3 The theory of United Front tactics as well as its appli-cation was formulated by Qeorgl Dimifcroff* Secretary General k of Communist International In his report delivered to the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International held i n August 1935 in Moscow. This report with his other articles and speeches Is reprinted in Georgi Dimitroff The United Front, International Publishers, Hew York* 193o« «» 1 0 8 — below in common action, to get known to the others and to acquire their confidence« This operation of acquisition of access to the target organization!because It takes place in the process of common, united action and within the general membership, i s called the tactics of united aetion from below, and is actually the opening key to successful penetration of communist. targets Ihen this united action from below reaches i t s ex-pected objective* i*o* when the membership of the target or-ganization i s influenced enough to demand the change of its leadership of the choice of all i e s , the communist strategists commence to operate within the upper levels of the target groupo She communist party seeks an opportunity to offer its assistance to the target organization as a whole5 to join i t on a l l levels and to help i t in i t s struggle* And to f a c i -litate this common fight the comsiunist party offers -the formu-1 at Ion of a common program - platform as well as the 4v For the strategy of access to the Social Democratic Parties, see .Oeorgi Dimitroff instructions to the Communist • Parties: -; "Thus, in countries having Social Democratic governments,, the Communists, by utilizing suitable individual demands taken from the platform of the Social '"3ge^ bral;£e '^artieX^j^gg^gi" and from the, election promises'of the SoclaX"WiiScratic 'mjn£~ iters P. 'Sffie startiffi ppS^f"^r"'ac^'ieving' .loint^action"wiW "" the~so6^^^ and organizations, "can "afterwards more easily develop a campaign for an estabTishment of a united front on the basis of other mass demands in the struggle against the capitalist offensive, against fascism and the threat of warv* (Italics supplied*) G* Dimitroff. The United Front. p p 0 0 8 - ' 5>9* -159 -organisation of joint executive agencies. This operation, tho formulation of common program and the establishment of joint agencies for carrying out this program since i t takes place on the upper levelsj within the central organ of the target group >is called the tactics  of the united front from above. ' . • . The offer of the communists to form joint agencies is usually accepted, either because of the severity of the strug-gle and the target organisation needs an ally, or because of the pressure from below initiated by the influence of the communists operating within the general membership of the tar-get group. The tactics of united action from below and the tactics of united action from above are complementary) and because they are applicable on every level and against every social organ-isation, they are the cornerstone of a l l communist operations in free democratic countries 0 The united action from below is quite often based on the principle of the conditioned reflex and on the utilisation of this triv i a l sociological phenomenon. The communists antici-pate that every social organisation under certain conditions and under certain stimuli follows a definite and established pattern of behaviour $ that It responds in a definite way* Realising this and taking i t as the basis for their operations the communists supply and introduce adequate stimuli. They - 160 -provoke incidents and bring about situations which involve the target organization Only for the purpose of acquiring easy access, and to assist the target group in united action which follows* When access from below i s established, united action from above immediately follows and is com-pleted by the organization of joint executive bodies function-ing as the dual power centres^ 5> Another example of how the oommunists utilize the condit-ioned reflex is given by the following incident which happened In 19lj-2: "Prom 19^2 oh» a mighty struggle raged between the Poles and Ukrainians in the Polish-Ukrainian border regions* Its reverberations have not died out to this day* This fight was started and conducted ac-cording to the rules of enlightened terror, on the initiative of the competent Bolshevist organs. These Bolshevist elements decided to strike the three op-ponents, the Germans, the Polos, and the Ukrainians, in a single aotxon and with a single stroke. This is indicated by. tho aim of* the action, which was as followsj a* to bring the German hinterland to a status of 'Balkanization1, b, to expose the elements with nationalist leanings on both the Polish and the Ukrainian sides, c* to prevent any attempt at Polish-Ukrainian co-operation, d, to weaken Poland's position in the international f i e l d (in case the Polish government should demand the ro-institution of the eastern border as of 1939)* The means with which this action was carried out may be regarded as classic* Two fighting groups were formed, Polish and Ukrainian* Both groups were numerically weak and consisted of only a few people, who, however, were distinguished by special abilities. The two groups started the action simultaneously but . independently i n the sectors assigned to them (in V/olhynla), The Polish group attacked the Ukrainians; the Ukrainians the Poles* « « The actions were (continued on the following page) • 161 ~ When' the tactics of the "United action from below and above i s applied against several organizations and p o l i t i c a l parties simultaneously, i t results i n the form-ation of huge joint executive committees? and because these link.together several organizations i n a common front, operating oh the agreed programatic platform, they are called the united Front. And because,in this i n i t i a l stage ? the joint committees link together parties and organizations of the working class, more accessible for their class char-acter, the communist strategists c a l l this formation The united Proletarian Front. (continued) carried out ruthlessly and at short inter-vals, always i n the name of the loudly proclaimed nat-ional interests, either Polish or Ukrainian* Both Poles and Ukrainians are distinguished by the relative speed with which they oan be aroused. For this reason the mass reaction occurred very quickly* In a short time the true avengers and defenders of the national interests appeared on both sides, and they continued the actions t i r e l e s s l y and enthusiastically, along the lines determined i n the beginning by the tv/o operational groups* Then, the two groups were suddenly diverted to other f i e l d s , and f i n a l l y completely withdrawn, because i t had quickly become evident that they were no longer needed* The machine of enlightened terror was already operating automatically * * » A l l those affected by the action believe that i t was of the nature of a spontaneous movement, and dif-ferences of opinion exist only concerning who was to blame* For file Poles blame the Ukrainians and the Ukrainians the Poles* But both sides, and also the outside world, are mistaken,tt Quoted from The Document on Terror reprinted i n IJews from Behind the Iron curtain, vol.-I. Ho, 3, March 1952, • • M i n i i u . m i . I I I J J U I I i n i l J i m ammamm-*<i i i . m i l ' • * • — » 3 pp* 49-50* •> 162 — The operation of united action from below and from above is a clear manifestation of the communist strategy of indirect approach in its very rudimentary formn The communists move and make a final bid for power on the upper institution-al levels only when the loyalty of the general membership of their targets i s broken and when the operational control over the membership masses from below is established,, This fact i s of fundamental importance and constitutes the iron law of communist strategy 0 "United front from the bottom - nearly always; united from the top - fairl y fre-quently and with all.the necessary guarantees as to the tactics of mobilisation that would facilitate the revolutionizing of tho masses; united front from the top alone - never 0"° The establishment of the United Proletarian Front i s a great success for the communists,, The communist party? operating beyond the constitutional frame} finds in the system of the united front i t s natural environmentt and in i t gradu-ally transforms the participating organizations into its prime source of power0 The communist party exorcises a slow but steady influence' and pressure Upon the general membership of participating parties as well as upon their leadership, and the United Proletarian Front is finally changed into the tool 6 Zinoviev quoted by Solznick P„ s The Organizational  Weapon* p 0 136a - 1 6 3 -of cowamlBt policy s It is the second link in the chain of organizations' connecting the communist party with the mass base* the f i r s t link being the trade unions. While in the meantime the participating parties and organizations of the United Proletarian Front are carrying out the o f f i c i a l program as their main activity, the com-munist party, on the other hand, sets aside alms for which the united front was originally organized and considers the united front only as an environment for i t s own independent operations} "Wo must strive to establish'-the widest united')front.with the aid of joint action by workers organizations of different trends . • « We must tirelessly prepare the working class for rapid change in the form and methods  of struggle, when there i s a change in'the situ-ation. As the movement grows and the unity of the working class strengthens, we must go further and prepare then transition frofo the defensive to  the offensive against Capital, steering toward'' the organization of the mass political strike. . . Oommunists. of course cannot and must" not for a moment abandon their own independent work of communist education, organization ana mofciii-zation of the masses. "7 When the oommunists succeed in forming the United Proletarian Front comprising the organizations of the working class, such as socialist parties, trade unions and other workers * organizations, they concentrate on building up an extended and broader united front, on forming a system of a 7 Georgi Dimitroff: The United Front, pp© 3 6 - 3 7 . • 1 6 4 -u n i t e d f r o n t w h i o h w o u l d e m b r a c e ) b e s i d e s t h e w o r k i n g c l a s s / a l s o a w i d e c r o s s - s e c t i o n o r t h e p o p u l a t i o n * The m a i n d e v i c e a p p l i e d i n t h i s o p e r a t i o n i s a g a i n the p r i n c i p l e o f m a s s i n v o l v e m e n t , a n d the same p r o c e s s t a k e s p l a c e a s i n b u i l d i n g t h e p r o l e t a r i a n u n i t e d f r o n t , h o w e v e r , o n a w i d e r s c a l e . T h e u n i t e d f r o n t w h i c h i s a c h i e v e d i s c a l l e d t h e P e o p l e ' s U n i t e d F r o n t , b e c a u s e i t c o m p r i s e s the n o n - p r o l e t a r i a n p o p u l a r e l e m e n t s a n d i t l i n k s the c i v i c , s c i e n t i f i c , c u l t u r a l a n d c h u r c h o r g a n i z a t i o n t o the c o m m u n i s t -c o n t r o l l e d p o w e r p y r a m i d . T h u s , t h e f o u n d a t i o n i n b u i l d i n g t h e p e o p l e ' s f r o n t , t h e t h i r d l i n k c o n n e c t i n g t h e p a r t y w i t h t h e m a s s b a s e , i s t h e s e c o n d l i n k , t h e p r o l e t a r i a n u n i t e d f r o n t , a l r e a d y f u l l y u n d e r t h e o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o f t h e c o m m u n i s t p a r t y . I n t h i s r e -s p e c t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s o f t h e C o m i n t e r n e x p r e s s e d b y i t s S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l , G o o r g ! D l m l t r o f f a r e v e r y d e f i n i t e : " F i r s t t h e U n i t e d P r o l e t a r i a n f r o n t - t h e n t h e U n i t e d P e o p l e ' s f r o n t " 8 a n d f u r t h e r : " T h e j o i n t a c t i o n o f t h e o r g a n i s e d w o r k e r s i s t h e b e g i n n i n g , t h e f o u n d a t i o n * "9 T h e p r i m e o b j e c t o f t h e u n i t e d f r o n t t a c t i c s i s t o 8 G e o r g i D i m i t r o f f : T h e U n i t e d F r o n t , p . 9 2 . 9 I b i d . p. 3 8 • 165 « Involve and gradually to bring "under the communists1 control progressively larger circles of the' population, and to extend the influence Of the communist party into idealogically far removed strata of the population, which otherwise, i.e., directly^would not be accessible* The tactics of united front based on the principle of mass involvement actually stratifies the whole population of the country into the ser-ies of elites and masses) into the chain of command, connecting the communist party with the mass base in the following sequence t First series.; communist party as an elite - trade unions as a corresponding mass base* Second series s trade unions as an elite - other working class organizations, the Proletarian united Front, as a cor-responding mass base* Third series; the Proletarian united Front as an elite - the united People's Front as a corresponding mass base* Fourth series; the united People's Front as an elite -the population as a whole as a corresponding mass base* The devices serving as starting points for the develop-ment of united front tactics are numerous. In the thirties the main slogan was "the struggle against fascism". At pre-sent, the latest and the most successful united fronts are built around peace slogans* The organization of the World Wide united Front around peace slogans was initiated by the so-called - 266 « "Stockholm Appeal", released in March 19th, 1950, when the World Communist movement was1 able to collect In the course of nine months of 1950 over four hundred million (400,000,000) signatures. This was the f i r s t stage in the building of the world-wide united front. Its distinctive strategic aim was to achieve the preliminary articulation of the world mass base by setting up a number of peace committees in every country of the world. The Second World Peace Congress held in Wars ay/, Novem-ber 16th to 22nd, 1950, correctly evaluated the significance of this f i r s t step: " T h e S e c o n d W o r l d P e a c e C o n g r e s s Was a b r i l l i a n t d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f t h e e x c e l l e n t o r -g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d p e a c e m o v e m e n t . S u f -f i c e i t t o p o i n t o u t , f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t t h e r e h o w e x i s t n a t i o n a l p e a c e c o m m i t t e e s a n d c o u n -c i l s i n 75 c o u n t r i e s , t h a t m o r e t h a n 150,000 p e a c e c o m m i t t e e s f u n c t i o n i n t h e t o w n s a n d c o u n t r y s i d e s , a t t h e f a c t o r i e s a n d O f f i c e s i n a l m o s t a l l c o u n t r i e s . " 1 0 W h e n t h e w o r l d m a s s b a s e w a s p r e l i m i n a r i l y a r t i c u l a t e d b y t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f p e a c e m o v e m e n t c o m m i t t e e s , t h e p r o -c e s s O f b u i l d i n g o f t h e w o r l d u n i t e d f r o n t e n t e r e d i n t o i t s S e c o n d p h a s e • T h e p e a c e c o m m i t t e e s ) b e i n g o f a p r o v i s i o n a l 10 I n t h e o f f i c i a l o r g a n o f t h e C o m l h f o r m F o r a . L a s t i n g  P e a c e , f o r a P e o p l e ' s D e m o c r a c y : M i l i t a n t P r o g r a m m e o f t h e W o r l d P e a c e S t r u g g l e . N o . 47, N o v e m b e r 2 i | t h , 1950. • 167-nature, are transformed into permanent institutions. They have to extend their sooial composition to acquire a mass character. . In other words, the peace committees! originally organized ad hoc with the aim of collecting signatures, are be transformed into genuine mass organizations, into the nuclei of dual power,, with the communists' i n i t i a l control. The efficiency of this transformation was manifested by the fact that The Appeal for the Pact of Peace.1 issued at the Peace Congress in Berlin on February 5th, 1951, was in the short spaceof seven months distributed around the world and signed by the fantastic figure of 562 million people. 1 1 That a quarter of the population of the earth f e l l into the communist trap is explainable only by the fact that the communists are masters in concealing their real aims. For the consumption of the general public of free countries they pre-tend to be the champions of peace, and accordingly, they fed i t with appropriate propaganda. On the other hand, for the con-sumption of their cadres and operators they issue clear in-structions setting the strategic line. The peace committees 11 See an article in For a Lasting Peace, for a People's  Democracy. No. 1|4, November 2, 1951: "The communique issued by the Secretariat of the World Peace Councils on October 9 th, 1951 says, that one-fourth of the population of the world signed the World Peace Councils Appeal for a pact of peace among the five Great Powers. The communique says that to date 562,083,363 signatures have been obtained izi the course of the campaign 0 . » 168 -in free countries have to link the communist parties with the free mass base and to bring under communists1 control otherwise loyal Citizens^ they are the. starting points in th® development of a united action: ''The struggle for peace - the cardinal task of the Communist Parties - links in the closest possible way the Communist Parties . . with the masses and Will make i t possible to ensure the realization of the united action of the working class and bn this basis, the attainment of national unity on the part of a l l democratic forces for the purpose of rallying of the broad masses of the people in the struggle against U.S. - British imperial* ism and domestic reaction. "12 The organization of the world united front around peace slogans i s , at the present time, the foremost task of the Communist .International, and its o f f i c i a l paper brings continuously detailed instructions and directives as to how to build a peace movement with the main stress on securing a broad mass base; For example: "The work of extending the composition of local committees nov; under way in many countries, by electing new members.- repre-sentatives of various parties, organizations associations, by including in the committee workers and employees, local clergy, owners of. small enterprises, will undoubtedly help 12 In For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy; Strengthen Prestige and Influence of Communists Among Masses Ho. 34, August 24th, 1951. -169 to strengthen the peace committees and extend their mass base, "13 The really great revolutionary potential of the latent forces of the united fronts is f u l l y understood and correctly evaluated by individual communist parties „ The united fronts In free countries are envisaged as the instruments for the overthrow of existing governments under: the. peace slogans, and they are planned and constructed with the view to being later converted from the instruments of the revolution into . the instruments of dictatorship after the conquest of power 0 The strategy of the peace movement, the strategy of conquest under the peace slogans> is the very foundation of the communists1 plans for world conquest, and its uni-versality i s manifested by the fact that even the small com-munist parties, such.as that of Guatemala(recognise in the struggle for peace the direct road to seizure of power: . "We must work to make the struggle for peace the basic Issue for a l l other democratic and progressive forces, since the fight for peace ensures .united action by the working people and is the foundation upon which the unity of a l l democratic forces for successful struggle, for revolutionary alms, is based."14 13 Por Pact of Peace, in For a Lasting Peace for a  People's Democracy. No. lit, April 0, 1951. 1 4 For Lasting Peace for People's Democracy. Report from the Meeting of the Central Committee of the CP of Guatemala No. i t , April 19£2. - 170 « The united fronts in various parts of the world are also built upon the exploitation of political^economic and-racial power tensions* They are organized around the slogans appealing to national unity, anti-American and anti-British feeling"and around the slogans of nationalization of industry and land reform* The most effective devices in building the national front3 are* however, the slogans of a universal nature which appeal to everybody, everywhere, and which con-sist of the combination of appeals for the defence of peace with the appeals to defend political freedoms and c i v i l liberties. Both these devices are two distinctive tactics, each facilitating access to a different stratum of the population in sequence* This was remarkably clearly defined by Palmiro Tbgliatti: "There i s a strategy of a struggle for freedom and a strategy of struggle for peace, and we understand this precisely because we are Communists* The strategy of struggle for freedom is that we, defending the principles of democracy, come into contact with and can act in co-operation with the broad masses of the people who do not belong to the working class.. • • The strategy of the struggle for peace is a s t i l l broader strategy because while defending the peace we come Into contact with and can act in co-operation both with individuals and groups of people s t i l l further removed from us from the point of view of social status and outlook * , ."15 15 From the Report of Palmiro Togliattl to Meeting of Central Committee of Communist Party of Italy, June 21at, 1952. Reprinted In For a Lasting Peace, for a People's  Democracy. Ho. 27, July i{.th, 1952. -.171 -The process of building the Proletarian United Fronts and)on their basis,the People's United Fronts,Is progressing with varying rapidity. For example i n Italy and France, where the communists are already i n control of extensive mass bases, the main stress i s put on the development of mass action Here the communists are i n i t i a t i n g strikes, demonstrations and other actions i n which they can engage their c i v i l armies on a mass scale i n -order to keep their organizations ready for action,to keep their membership permanently mobilized and to season i t i n battle. These mass actions serve > however> another important purpose. Because they are organized i n various places and according to different time schedules, they function as i n -dicators showing to the communist e l i t e the ripeness of the general revolutionary situation within individual parts of the country. They indicate the degree to which the communists' mass actions are able to set i n motion, to Involve and to organize other masses into the revolutionary wave on which 16 For the a c t i v i t i e s of the communists i n Western Europe see Mario Einaudi: Communism i n Western Europe, Ithaca Press, 1951, and also his a r t i c l e i n Yale Review entitled Coi-m-amlsm i n Western Europe; Its Strength and vulnerability, Vol* 4jl,--pp. Z3k '- 236, (1952)* For the organization and acti v i t i e s of the French Communists see: Charles A* Micaud: Organization and Leader-ship of the French Communist Party, World P o l i t i c s , Vol,-IV, Ho* 3 , A p r i l 1952,-.pp. 319 - 355* "•' Also Dorothy Pickles: The Communist Problem i n France, International A f f a i r s . Vol. XXVIII, Ho* 2, April 1952* pp. 102 - 179. - 1 7 2 -crest the communists would be catapulted to power t "These remarkable actions testify to th$ effectiveness of the policy of unity pursued by the Communist Parties. This i s a valuable lesson which shows that the Communist Parties - organizers of united action by the masses - are capable of establishing close contacts with the masses, and are capable of preparing them for decisive battle«"17 While in Prance* Italy, and other European countries the communists were able to establish contol over the broad masses, the process of building up united fronts in the Countries of the Hcrth and South American continents is in its preliminary stage. Here the main battle is s t i l l fought for the establishment of control over various individual groups and organizations which must serve as building blocks in erecting the united front. The main stress is laid on the acquisition of access, to create conditions Ibr penetration of strategically import-ant target organizations* in the areas where the encountered resistance is discouraging the emphasis i s laid on the form-ation of completely new suitable organizations in which the coascmxnists will command the i n i t i a l control* In other words, the battle is s t i l l fought for access to the institutional structure of American society*. The documents published by 1 7 Struggle of Working People'. For Lasting Peace for a  People's Democracy. Ho* 1 3 , March 3 0 t h , " i ^ l . w 173 "* the United States Congress since the end of the Second World War concerning communist activ i t i e s i n the U.S.A. furnish irrefutable proof to this end 0 According to these documents the following are the prime target Organizations of communist subversive activltes; the trade unions, farmers' groups, minority groups 9 alien and national groups. v To penetrate Into the cultural sphere, Into the upper layers of American Society, the communists have organized th© "National Council of Arts, Science and Professions B" The communists spread the wide network of their direct and indirect agents into the American radio, press, and motion picture in« dustry i n order to mould public opinion and to neutralize and keep American citizens as far away as possible from the realm of v i t a l p o l i t i c a l issues. To penetrate Into the population of Slavic descent the communists have organized the American, Slav Congress. Besides conducting operations to establish control over the institutional: structure the communists are also engaged i n espionage i n Government Agencies. Scientific I n s t i t u t i o n as well as i n v i t a l Defence areas. 1^ The actual dimensions of communist penetration into the fabric of American society i s 1 8 Por the communist penetration of a l l above institutions see the Documents of United States Government i n Bibliography. For the operation of Soviet. Vtoimic espionage ring i n Canada, USA and England see Igor Gouzenko: This Was My  Choice. J«M« Dent & Sons Ltd., Toronto, 19i| .8. 174 -revealed by the number of organizations which were found to be controlled by communists, and of which a l i s t was pub-lished in the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" by the Committee on Un-American Activities, Hay 14th, 1951. The simple fact that the communists in the United States and in Canada are s t i l l fighting for access, and that at present they are hot developing any mass actions on a nation-wide scale, is the main reason why the real danger of communism in these countries i s generally underestimated,^ The struggle for the institutional structure of demo-cratic countries is a long and protracted process and the com-munist strategists* to win necessary tlme^ abandoned Marxian orthodoxy and formulated "The Theory of Peaceful Co-existence  of Capitalist and Socialist Systems,"20 They put aside a l l immediate revolutionary aims in their desire to take part in the democratic process. They want to co-operate with free 19 For the communist policy of acquisition of access in Canada .see Tim Buck: Canada: The Communist Viewpoint. Pro-gress Books, Toronto 19^0. See also: Tim Buck: 30 Years - 1922-1952, The Story  of- the. Communist Movement in Canada, Progress Books. Toronto,, m&o ~ ~ ~ For the current political line of American and Canadian Communists see their theoretical organs Political Affairs. published monthly by New Century Publishers, inc.',''^ ew'York,• and National Affairs, published monthly by the National Committee of the Labor-Progressive Party of Canada, Toronto. 20 For its o f f i c i a l Soviet version, see Se Titarenko: The Peaceful Co-Existence of the Capitalist and Socialist  Systems, soviet News. TEffltnTT$&* ' - 175 -countries in international relations, and they also want to co-operate in domestic affairs and to enter government, cult-ural, civic and scientific organizations. The real motive behind this new theory is an attempt to break through the isolation In which the communists f e l l in advocating openly their revolutionary programs, and further to acquire access to the institutional structure of free societies. The theory consists of quotations from Lenin's and Stalin*a works written when both recognized the necessity of co-exist-ence of Democratic and Communist Societies for a certain period of time) while the communists were not strong enough to deal the final blow. It consists of quotations selected and deli-berately taken out of their context stressing only th© possi-b i l i t y and the necessity for co-existence, leaving out, however, completely those parts referring to the co-existence as the necessary condition for the gathering of strength,^1» 21 The original quotations exerpted for the Peaceful Co- Existence theory are of the following nature s "We cannot forget the saying of Lenin to the effect, that a great deal In the matter of our construction depends on whether we Succeed In delaying war with the capitalist count-ries, which i s inevitable but which may be delayed either until proletarian revolution ripens in Europe, or until the colonial revolutions come fully to a head, Or-finally, until the capit-alists fight among themselves over division over colonies. Therefore the malntainence of peaceful relations with Capital-i s t countries is an obligatory task for us. The basis of our relations with capitalist countries con-sists in admitting the co-existence' of two opposed systems.11 Prom the Stenographic Record of the XV Congress of the Communist Party of USSR, p, 47, (Russian ed,} Reprinted in Stalin Oh Revolution by Hlstoricus, Foreign Affairs. January 1949, p. 35. - 1?6 -( c ) T H E O P E R A T I O N OP M A S S A C T I O N When t h e c o m m u n i s t s s u c c e e d i n e s t a b l i s h i n g c o n t e » o l o v e r s t r a t e g i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t o r g a n i s a t i o n s , a n d t h e n these are w e l d e d t o g e t h e r i n t o a u n i t e d f r o n t , t h e y e m b a r k o n t h e o p e r -a t i o n o f m a s s a c t i o n . T h e c o m m u n i s t s e n g a g e t h e i r o r g a n i -s a t i o n i n v a r i o u s k i n d s o f s t r u g g l e ; f r o m l o c a l i n c i d e n t s t o n a t i o n - w i d e e n g a g e m e n t s e v e r g r o w i n g I n p r o p o r t i o n a n d I n t e n s i t y w i t h t h e v i e w t o b r i n g t h e c o u n t r y t o the v e r g e o f r e v o l u t i o n . " T h e m a s s s t r u g g l e m e a n s a w h o l e s y s t e m o f d e v e l o p i n g a c t i v i t i e s g r o w i n g e v e r m o r e a c u t e i n f o r m a n d l o g i c a l l y l e a d i n g t o a n u p -r i s i n g a g a i n s t t h e c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e . " 1 T h e m a s s a c t i o n s o r g a n i s e d b y t h e c o m m u n i s t s a l s o i n v o l v e t h e n o n - p a r t y g r o u p s a n d a c t u a l l y b r i n g t o g e t h e r t h e c o m m u n i s t s w i t h o t h e r m e m b e r s o f t h e w o r k i n g c l a s s a n d w i t h p o l i t i c a l l y u n a f f i l i a t e d m a s s e s . T h e y a l w a y s s t a r t a s a c t i o n s o r g a n i s e d l o c a l l y w h i c h l a t e r d e v e l o p i n t o d i s t r i c t , r e g i o n a l a n d n a t i o n a l e v e n t s . " T h e c h i e f s t r e s s i n a l l t h i s m u s t b e l a i d o n d e v e l o p i n g m a s s a c t i o n l o c a l l y , t o b e c a r r i e d o u t b y l o c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s t h r o u g h l o c a l a g r e e m e n t s « 0 o 1 T h e s e s a n d S t a t u t e s o f C o m m u n i s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l , R e p r i n t e d I n B l u e p r i n t f o r W o r l d C o n g r e s s . p » 9 1 . - 177 -These forms may include for instances co-ordinated joint action of th© workers to be agreed upon from case to case on definite occasions, on individual demands" or on the basis of a common platform, co-ordinated actions i n Individual enterprises or by the whole industry's co-ordinated actions on a local, regional.' national or international scales co-ordinated actions for the organiz-ation of the economic, struggle of the workers, carrying out mass political action for the organization of Joint self-defense against fascist attacks; co-ordinated action in rend-ering aid to political prisoners and their  families', in the f i e l d of struggle against sooial reactions joint actions in the de-fenae of the interest of the youth and women. in the f i e l d of co-operative movement,  cultural activities. sports. etc. In the course of united action the communists esta-blish access to individuals and groups which revolve around the strong self-imposed leadership supplied by the communist organizations. Thus are the huge c i v i l armies fonsed in the heat of revolutionary battles nA political army is not like a military army, a military command begins the war with an array ready to' hand; whereas the Party has to create i t s army in the course of the strug-gle it s e l f , in the course of the class con-f l i c t . ^ The mass actions are motivated and carried upon the slogans gradually developing the revolutionary situation, involving wider and wider circles of the population In the the communist enterprise.. 2 Georgi Dimitroff 5 united Front, p. 37, 3 J. V, Stalin: Problems of Leninism, p. 110. <. 178 "VJhen the revolutionary situation is developing the Party advances certain trans-itional slogans and partial demands corres-ponding to the concrete situations but these demands and slogans must be bent to the re-volutionary aims of the capturing power and of overthrowing bourgeois capitalist society."4 . W h e n t h e m a s s a c t i o n ' , i s w e l l u n d e r w a y a n d w h e n i t r e a c h e s e x p e c t e d d i m e n s i o n s , t h e o l d r e c i p e f o r m a k i n g r e v o l -u t i o n s ^ i s s u e d b y t h e S i x t h C o n g r e s s o f t h e C o m m u n i s t I n t e r -n a t i o n a l i n 1928, p r e s c r i b e d t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g c o u r s e s h o u l d b e t a k e n : ^When t h e . r e v o l u t i o n a r y t i d e i s r i s i n g • . • t h e P a r t y o f t h e P r o l e t a r i a t i s c o n -f r o n t e d w i t h t h e t a s k o f l e a d i n g Jbhe m a s s e s t o a d i r e c t a t t a c k u p o n t h e b o u r g e o i s S t a t e * T h i s i s d o n e b y c a r r y i n g o n p r o p a g a n d a i n f a v o u r o f i n c r e a s i n g t h e r a d i c a l t r a n s i t i o n a l s l o g a n s ( f o r S o v i e t s , w o r k e r s c o n t r o l o f i n -d u s t r y , f o r p e a s a n t c o m m i t t e e s , f o r t h e s e i z -u r e s o f t h e b i g l a n d e d p r o p e r t i e s , f o r d i s -a r m i n g t h e b o u r g e o i s i e a n d a r m i n g t h e p r o l e t a r -i a t , e t c * ) a n d b y o r g a n i z i n g m a s s a c t i o n , u p o n w h i c h a l l b r a n c h e s o f P a r t y a g i t a t i o n a n d p r o -p a g a n d a > I n c l u d i n g P a r l i a m e n t a r y a c t i v i t y ; m u s t b e c o n c e n t r a t e d * T h i s m a s s a c t i o n I n c l u d e s : a c o m b i n a t i o n o f s t r i k e s a n d d e m o n s t r a t i o n s ; a c o m b i n a t i o n o f s t r i k e s a n d a r m e d d e m o n s t r a t i o n s ; a n d f i n a l l y , t h e g e n e r a l s t r i k e c o n j o i n t l y w i t h t h e a r m e d , i n s u r r e c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e p o w e r o f t h e b o u r g e o i s • T h e la&Bi? f o r m o f s t r u g g l e , w h i c h i s t h e s u p r e m e f o r m * m u s t b e c o n d u c t e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e r u l e s o f w a r ; © »' * »-rt5 jj. T h e P r o g r a m m e o f t h e C o m m u n i s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l * R e p r i n t e d i n B l u e p r i n t f o r W o r l d C o n q u e s t s p . 239* £ lOCo c i t * - 179 The above concept of seizure of power with the direct employment of arms as the principal instruments of the con-quest is today obsolete, and In reality quite a different process takes i t s place. The revolution envisaged by the Comintern in 1928 was supposed to be a process with a grand-scale mass involvement which will destroy the "Capitalist State Machine" and which wil l shako the society to its very foundations . The revolution was supposed to be carried out by revolutionaries and heros fighting in the front line and leading the masses into battle* The communists' seizure of power today, however, is a piece of work planned and carried.out. by social engineers from behind their working desks without the mass involvement and explosive effects. (d) THE SEIZURE OF POlilER The main features of the modern conquest of political power likely to be employed by the communists in democratic countries can be briefly summarized as follows: In the f i r s t place, the communists need to gain voting strength to place themselves in the government through elections, and to secure for themselves the key positions in the Ministry of Interior, Industry and Agriculture and the Army, - 180 -I n t h e s e c o n d p l a c e , t h e communists e x e r c i s e a n i m -mense e f f o r t t o e s t a b l i s h o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o v e r t h o s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s w h i c h w i l l c a r r y o u t t h e m a i n r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i v i t i e s ; w h i o h i n p u t t i n g f o r w a r d r e v o l u t i o n a r y demands w i l l c r e a t e t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y wave a n d p r e s s u r e f r o m b e l o w . T h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e t h e t r a d e u n i o n s * I n t h e t h i r d p l a c e , t h e communists a i m t o e s t a b l i s h c o n t r o l o v e r t h o s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s v h i c h w i l l be u s e d a s i n -s t r u m e n t s o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y n e u t r a l i z a t i o n * T h e s e a r e t h e p e r i p h e r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s w h i c h w i l l f o r m t h e n o n - c o n d u c t i v e b a r r i e r s e r e c t e d between t h e p o p u l a r masses a n d the p r o c e s s o f s e i z u r e o f power* The a c t u a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o c e s s i s n o t of a v i o l e n t n a t u r e b u t c o n s i s t s o f a s e r i e s o f s i m u l t a n e o u s coups d ' e t a t t a k i n g p l a c e On t h r e e l e v e l s * The comiHunist-eontrolled t r a d e u n i o n s p u t f o r w a r d r e v o l u t i o n a r y demands a n d c r e a t e g o v e r n m e n t a l c r i s e s , w h i l e a t t h e same t i m e t h e communist p a r t y u n d e r m i n e s t h e s t r e n g t h o f o t h e r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s b y o p e r a t i o n s c a r r i e d o u t w i t h i n t h e i r membership f r o m b e l o w * S i m u l t a n e o u s l y t h e communists s t r i k e f r o m above a n d I n f l i c t a s p l i t w i t h i n t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e p a r t i e s o f t h e i r o p p o n e n t s * W i t h t h e p a r t i s i p a r a l y z e d f r o m t h e t o p t h e communists r e o r g a n i z e p a r l i a m e n t a n d the. c a b i n e t * W i t h t h e p a r t i e s p a r a l y z e d f r o m b e l o w t h e communists d i s s o c i a t e t h e i r 1 8 1 -l e f t wings and absorb them into the communist party, They also amalgamate certain local front organizations in one governing body and endow this body with the authority to represent local popular governments, The trade unions in the meantime seize industry and establish the workers' man-agement committees. While a l l these operations are supported by the power of the police and the army, the peripheral or-ganizations, with their attitude of neutrality;keep the pop-ular masses isolated and neutralized. Thus, the three coups d'etat which are taking place concurrently on the level of government institution, on the level of political parties and in the sphere of industry are carried out without mass parti-cipation and without destructive effects of revolutionary upheavals. This kind of revolution represents the possibility^? is$n*» trolling extremely complex social processes known until today for their explosiveness and unpredictability of direction. The main political forces loosened by the revol-utions of the old type acted as a starting point to unleash a chain reaction releasing other social forces which devast-ated completely the society. Today, the communist strate-gists are able to slow down the revolutionary process and to confine i t to controllable channels, to prevent its spreading by erecting a non-conductive barrier between the actual process of the seizure of power and the masses, and •* 182 *» consequently9 to eliminate this incalculable factor which xvould otherwise enter* into the process c From the strategic point of view the revolution of this new type represents a synthesis of the principles of maximal concentration with principles of maximal dis-persion* It i s a unique combination of maximal consen- . taxation of forces effecting the revolutionary pressure and tho seizure of power with the maximal dispersion of forces effecting the revolutionary Isolation of opposing forces* The revolution of this new type Is effected by the expansion of communist controlled power structure In two diametrically opposed directions* One direction is that of revolutionary pressure carried out by the trade unions and aiming at the upper levels of tsrget organizations. The other direction is t h i i o of a revolutionary vacuum s isolation and neutralization Carried out by peripheral organizations and aiming at the loose mass base* Both these movements work simultaneously and they are two pistons of the modern revolutionary, machine 1 An example of co-ordination of revolutionary p r e s s u r e with revolutionary vacuum is represented by the Communist strategy of the coup d'etat in Prague in February 19i|B* See The^pup d'etat in Prague, Supplement to the report of the Committee on Foreign' Affairs 'The Strategy ar.C TaeJ;ies of World Oemmuhism, United States Government Printing Office, wsshl%^bn i9lj.8o p* 11* -'183 -CHAPTER VI 4* THE PATTERN OP EXPANSION IN COLONIES AND DEPENDENT COUNTRIES "Leninism,, , recognizes the latent revolutionary capabilities of the national liberation movements of the oppressed countries and «, 0 e « that i t is possible to use these for the purpose of overthrowing the common enemy <• • « • . • Hence the necessity for the pro-letariat to support - resolutely and actively to support - the national liberation movement of the oppressed and dependent people • « n* (a) THE GENERAL PROPOSITION The communists consider the liberation movements in colonies and dependent countries to be an Integral part of the World Revolution, and according to Stalin, the colonial revolutions actually are the main reserve of the proletarian 1 J, V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, pp. 61 *» 62, - 1 6 4 « resolutions taking place in the industrial countries of the West.2 The communist parties in colonies and in mother coun-tries co-operate closely 5.n a ciear cut pattern. While the communists attack in the colonies, the Communist party of the motherland works to prevent and paralyze possible intervention of the motherland in colonial affairs. While,on the other hand;, the communists intensify their activities in the mother coun-try, the communists in the colonies isolate the mother country from supplies by paralysing arid sabotaging production, trans-portation j and by stirring up open revolts,3 2 To foster the revolution in colonies the Third Interna-tional had established* in 1926) in Moscow, the University of the Nations of the East called Sun Yat Sen University, train revolutionary cadres. Today practically a l l the Key communists in Asia are graduates of this school, 3 The Communist International actually prescribes the f o l -lowing conduct as the duty for the Communist Party of the motherland as well for the Communist Party of the colony. For the Communist Party of the motherland s "The Communist Parties in the imperialist countries must render systematic aid to the colonial revolutionary liberation movement and to the movement of oppressed nationalities gen-erally. The duty of rendering active Support to these move-ments rests primarily upon, the workers in the Countries upon which the oppressed nations are economically, financially or politically dependent," The Communist Parties in colonial and semi-colonial countries must on the other hand' . '• .carry on a bold and consistent struggle against foreign imperialism and Unfailingly conduct propaganda in favour of friendship and unity with the proletariat in the imperialist countries." The Programme of the Coasnunist' International, reprinted in Blueprint for World Conquest, pp. 237 - 238, •SB •» This mutual interdependence of the proletarian revolu-tions in the west with the revolutions in the colonies was put Into a formula by Lenln> and further elaborated by Stalin in "Problems of Leninism." . "Lenin has proved • » . that the national problem can be solved only in coh-. nection with and on the basis, of the. prole-tarian revolution, and that the road to vic-tory of the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movements Of the colonies and dependent countries against imperialism. The national problem IS a part of the general 1 problem of the proletarian revolution '. .. *" 4 Lehin. in the early twenties had recognised the latent revolutionary forces of the national-liberation movements, but i t took years for his .disciples to find out the working formula .for the.,colonial revolution,and to utilize i t s forces as ve-hicles of World Revolution.^ It actually emerged^as late as 1927; as a result of a bitter struggle between Stalin, Trotsky, ZlnoViev, Kamenev . 4 J, V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, p. 61 - 5 For a certain period of time the Communist strategists were considering for the.conquest of Asia, -the type of peasant and nationalistic revolution which placed General Mustapha Kemal Pasha of Turkey into power; and to put this pattern of revolution into operation, the -Comintern convened a Congress of Oriental Nations in Baku on September 1920. This pattern of combined peasant and nationalistic revolution did not operates because at that time the devices for the establishment of Communists' control over popular movements were s t i l l in their formative and test-tube stage. <* 186 '« and Radek over tine strategy of the Communist; International, i n colonies) and particularly over the tactics of the Communist Party of China.^ The result of this conflict xvas a clarification of the proposition that the colonial revolu-tion is motivated by two major forces. In the f i r s t place, at present, the main force is a fully-developed national revolution carried out by an advanced educated and economically powerful patriotic class. As the second major, force there!s a latent > though potentially far stronger; agrarian movement, until now shape-less, without definite class character) without effective orani zation to carry out the agrarian revolution. The conclusion was obvious. The Chinese communists were ordered to sever their relations ; with the nationalist government, until now the official, line of . the Comintern, and to turn their eyes to the rising star of agrarian revolution. Since then the centre of gravity of the! operations shifted from co-operation with the National Front 6 For Stalin-Trotsky duel see I. Deutscher: Stalin « . A Political Biographychap. VIII, pp. 2 9 5 - 343, Oxford University Press, 1949. For Trotsky's point of view concerning the strategy of Communist International In China see Leon Trotskys Stalin Hollis & Carter Ltd., London, 1947. °" For Stalin's point of view see Stalin on China. People*s Publishing House Ltd., Bombay 1951, a collection of five writings and speeches of Stalin from the period from November 1926 to August 1927. : See also On China from Marxism and the National and Colonial Question. Lawrence &" iVishart. London. et 1 8 7 to nursing and developing agrarian revolution* There is hardly another example in the history or revolutions where the main revolutionary force i s methodically developed and nursed from Its mere cradle into the revolutionary force involving hundreds of millions of people over the span of three decades* When the development of agrarian revolution became the number one task of Chinese communists, the peasantry of China was a completely unorganized, dispersed and amorphous mass - an ideal material for articulation* And the f i r s t device which was injected Into this diffuse agrarian ms.su} in order to articulate it>were the slogans of confiscation of land: "But in order that this agrarian revolu-tion should take shape, i t must have its gen-eral slogan. This slogan is the confiscation of the landlord land* . * I think that in the near future the en-tire peasantry will pass over to the slogans of the confiscation of land. In this.lies the strength of Chinese revolution* " 7 Hence, Lenin's original formula>which based the colo-nial revolution oh the utilisation of the national-liber atlon-al movements and on the. exploitation of nationalism >was sup-plemented by the formula of agrarian revolution. The National Revolution Is led by the intelligentsia 7 Stalin on China. People's Publishing House Ltd*, Bombay, 1951, p* 43"» :i|4»V - 188 -a n d b y t h e m i d d l e c l a s s , a n d i t s p r o g r a m d o e s n o t appeal t o t h e p e a s a n t m a s s e s 0 O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e a g r a r i a n r e v o l u -t i o n r e s t s o n the b r o a d m a s s e s o f p e a s a n t r y a n d i s l e d b y the c o m m u n i s t s • A n d i t i s o n l y a q u e s t i o n o f t i m e when the c o m -m u n i s t s , b e i n g i n c o n t r o l o f a b r o a d a n d f a r more p o t e n t i a l m a s s b a s e , ; a r e a l s o a b l e t o t a k e o v e r t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h e n a t i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n , , T h e c r i s i s o f 1926-27 a l s o c l a r i f i e d t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e " t a k i n g o v e r " o f t h e n a t i o n a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n i o n o t a c h i e v e d p e a c e f u l l y , b u t b y a n armed strug-g l e i n a p r o t r a c t e d c i v i l w a r » T h e s t r a t e g y o f t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f China in its a s c e n t t o p o w e r e x e r c i s e d a t r e m e n d o u s i m p a c t o n other com-m u n i s t p a r t i e s i n t h e c o l o n i a l , s e m i - c o l o n i a l and dependent c o u n t r i e s o I t h a s l a i d t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r . t h e new strategy o f c o l o n i a l r e v o l u t i o n , w h i c h i n t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t the s p e c i f i c d o m e s t i c c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e c o u n t r y i n question^ has a u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y 0 T h e p r o p o s i t i o n ; t h a t the c o l o n i a l r e v o l u t i o n starts a s a n a g r a r i a n m o v e m e n t w h i c h l a t e r e s t a b l i s h e s c o n t r o l by a n a r m e d s t r u g g l e o v e r t h e n a t i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n , w a s a c c e p t e d as a w o r k i n g f o r m u l a b y a l l A s i a t i c C o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s in their s t r u g g l e f o r p o w e r « T h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s m e t f o r t h e f i r s t time o n the o c c a s i o n o f t h e R e g i o n a l M e e t i n g o f t h e W o r l d F e d e r a t i o n of D e m o c r a t i c Y o u t h i n C a l c u t t a , I n d i a , i n F e b r u a r y , 19481 and - 189 -f o r t h e s e c o n d t i m e i n P e k i n g * C h i n a , 1949, o n t h e o c c a -s i o n o f a C o n g r e s s o f T r a d e U n i o n s o f A s i a n a n d A u s t r a l -a s i a n c o u n t r i e s o I n P e k i n g , o n e h u n d r e d a n d t w e l v e d e l e g a t e s f r o m t h e f o l l o w i n g c o u n t r i e s w e r e p r e s e n t : B u r m a , C e y l o n , C h i n a , N o r t h K o r e a , S o u t h K o r e a , I n d i a , I n d o n e s i a , I r a n , M a l a y a , M o n g o l i a , t h e P h i l l l p i n e s , S l a m , t h e U S S R a n d V i e t -n a m . ^ T h e m a i n p o i n t s o n t h e a g e n d a w e r e n o t t h e p r o b l e m s c o n c e r n i n g t h e T r a d e U n i o n s , b u t t h e p r o g r a m a n d p l a n f o r c o -o r d i n a t e d c o n q u e s t o f a l l A s i a * T h e y a c c e p t e d t h e s t r a t e g y o f t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t s a s a s t a n d a r d ; a n d l a i d t h e f o u n d a -t i o n f o r c o - o p e r a t i o n a n d e x c h a n g e o f e x p e r i e n c e s - f o r a c o n s p i r a c y o f c o l o s s a l d i m e n s i o n s * ( b ) T H E P A T T E R N O P T H E C H I N E S E R E V O L U T I O N A R Y WAR B e c a u s e t h e C h i n e s e p a t t e r n o f c o l o n i a l r e v o l u t i o n 1 s e t a n e x a m p l e f o r o t h e r A s i a t i c C o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s , we s h a l l 8 T h e m o s t I m p o r t a n t d o c u m e n t s f r o m t h i s c o n f e r e n c e , t h e O p e n i n g S p e e c h b y L i u S h a o - C h i a n d t h e M a n i f e s t o t o A l l t h e  w o r k i n g P e o p l e o f t h e • A s i a n a n d A u s t r a l a s i a n C o u n t r i e s , w e r e p u b l i s h e d i n W o r k i n g g l a s s i n t h e s t r u g g l e f o r N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a t i o n . P e o p l e ' s - P u b l i s h i n g H o u s e / L t d * , B o m b a y 1950* 1 S e e M a o T s e - t u n g t T h e S t r a t e g i c P r o b l e m s o f C h i n a ' s  R e v o l u t i o n a r y W a r . w r i t t e n i n 1936 a n d p u b l i s h e d b y P e o p l e ' s P u b l i s h i n g H o u s e L t d * , B o m b a y , 1952* P o r c o m m e n t s o n t h e s a m e s e e 1 A M a r x i s t M i l i t a r y L i n e * N o t e s o n r e r e a d i n g T h e S t r a t e g i c P r o b l e m s o f C h i n a ' s R e v o l u t i o n a r y W a r , P e o p l e ' s  C h i n a . V o l . - I I , N o , 5, S e p t e m b e r 1, 19#>* "~~ -« 190 • briefly summarize the most important features of the strategy of the Chinese Communists5 from their co-operation with the nationalists in the United Front in 1921, to their final bid for power in 1946*. The Chinese revolutionary war can be divided into five main stages: (i) THB FIRST STAGS - GATHERING STRENGTH When, in 1920, the Communist Party of China was estab-lished, i t linked itself with the national revolution, at that time the main revolutionary force in China « The participation of the communists in the united front with the nationalists was of decisive importance to the communist party because the communists were able to develop their party into a mass or-ganization. In the f i r s t place, by splitting up and organiz-ing the Left intellectuals from within the luiomintang, the communist party acquired important cadres* and secondly, by organizing the rank and f i l e of the nationalists, the com-munists were able to extend the party mass base.. Another advantage the communists gained by linking themselves with the Knomintang was that they, in taking part in the Kuomintang & s military campaigns ? were able to extend the base of their own operations and. to establish com" munist cells over the. vast Chinese territories. As Stalin pointed out; 191 « " T h e Gorwsml&t P a r t y e n t e r e d i n t o a b l o c w i t h t h e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e i n . C a n t o n i n t h e , f i r s t s t a g e o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n i n o r d e r t o e x t e n d t h e t e r r i t o r y o f t h e . r e v o l u t i o n , f o r m i t s e l f i n t o a m a s s P a r t y , c r e a t e f o r i t s e l f o p p o r t u n i t y o f o p e n l y o r -g a n i s i n g t h e p r o l e t a r i a t a n d t o d e a r f o r I t s e l f t h e p a t h t o w a r d s : t h e p e a s a n t r y • " * A l t h o u g h t h e c o m m u n i s t s w e r e i n c o m m a n d o f l a r g e a r m i e s , t h e y d i d n o t t h i n k o f u s i n g t h e m i n a n o p e n s t r u g g l e f o r p o w e r s The P a r t y h a d c o n s i d e r a b l e r e v o l u t i o n a r y a r m e d f o r c e s u n d e r i t s c o n t r o l b u t w a s n o t a b l e t o m a k e t h e m o s t , e f f e c t i v e u s e o f t h e m . A l l t h e s e w e r e t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e l a c k o f e x p e r i e n c e , o f t h e l a c k o f a p r o f o u n d r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n s i g h t a n d o f t h e l a c k o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n u n i t i n g M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t t h e o r y ^ w i t h t h e p r a c t i c e o f t h e C h i n e s e r e v o l u -t i o n , ^ . T h e p o l i t i c a l l i n e o f t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f C h i n a s e t u p b y t h e C o m i n t e r n p r e s c r i b e d t h a t t h e m a i n t a s k o f C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t s , i n o r d e r t o g a i n s t r e n g t h , w a s t o t a k e p a r t i n t h e N a t i o n a l F r o n t a n d i n t h e r e c o n d u c t i n d e p e n d e n t p o l i t i c a l a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l w o r k : 1 S t a l i n i n h i s a r t i c l e C o m m e n t s o n C u r r e n t A f f a i r s „ in C h i n a , p u b l i s h e d I n P r a v d a , J u l y Z t i t h , i9Z7, i n w h i c h E e ~ d e f e n d s t h e p o l i c y o f t h e C o m i n t e r n a g a i n s t c r i t i c i s m o f t h e b l o c o f T r o t s k y - Z i n o v i e v - R a d e k . R e p r i n t e d i n S t a l i n o n  C h i n a , po 65. 2 M a o T s e - t u n g a n d L i u S h a o - e h i : L e s s o n s o f t h e C h i n e s e R e v o l u t i o n . P e o p l e s P u b l i s h i n g H o u s e t ^ d » , ' B o m b a y , i 9 £ ? T ^ " " ~ £ o 9 » - 192 -"A tmited front can have revolutionary significance only i f and when i t does not hinder the Communist Party from conducting its independent political and organizational work, only i f i t does not prevent i t from organizing the proletariat into on independ-ent political force, rousing the peasantry against the landlords, openly organizing a revolution of xrorkers and peasants and thus preparing the conditions necessary for the hegemony of the proletariat. "3 ( i i ) THE SECOND STAGS * THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THB —JSB nmsimmhm BASB The second stage of the Chinese Revolution was marked by ten years of c i v i l war and by the end of the co-operation of the communists with the nationalists. The cojumunlsts, in 1927, split the Kuomlntang and with i t s l e f t wing established an independent Kuomlntang in the Province of Wuhan, It was co:ttposed of the communists, of the l e f t i s t bourgeoisie and l e f t i s t Intelligentsia ; and represented in relation to the Kuomlntang i n Canton a ri v a l revolutionary government. The communist strategists in Moscow realized that in the Kuomlntang in Wuhan they possessed a revolutionary centre completely under their control, with highly developed upper level organizations,lacking, however, an adequate mass base. And this i s precisely why the Chinese Communists were ordered 3 Stalin defending the Policy of Comintern in China before a Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (B), August 1st, 1927. Reprinted in Stalin oh China, p. 86, — .193 ** to turn their activities towards the Chinese peasants, t o develop agrarian revolution and to supply the top-heavy united front of the Kuomlntang in Wuhan with an adequate mass base. For the point that the united front o f the Kuomlntang in Wuhan was used only as a means to facilitate access to the agrarian masses, see Stalin. "The Communist Party entered into a bloc with the petty-bourgeois i n t e l l i -gentsia of the Kuomlntang in Wuhan in the second stage of the revolution, in order to multiply it s forces t extend the organ-ization of the proletariat, weah away the broad masses of the peasantry from the Kuomlntang leadership and create the con-ditions for the hegemony of the proletar-i a t . * 1 The Chinese Communists were confronted with this new approach on November 30th, 1926, when Stalin, speaking in the Chinese Commission of the Executive Committee of the Communist international "On the Perspectives of the Revolution in China", outlined the policy on how to develop the agrarian revolution. "What are the paths and ways through, which the Chinese revolutionaries should pass in order to rouse the muXti<°miilion peasantry of China to revolutions* I think that In the present conditions we can speak of only three paths: The f i r s t path i s the path of formation of peasant committees and the penetration of Chinese revolutionaries in them in order to influence the peasantry. • a 1 Reprinted in Stalin on China, p. 65. 194 *• The second path is the path of in-fluencing the peasantry through the apparatus of now people's revolutionary power , » o There is no doubt that this power and the apparatus of this power must engage in satis-fying the most urgent demands of the peasantry i f i t really wishes to advance the revolution. The task of the communists and of the revolu-tionaries in general in China consists in pene-trating into the apparatus of this now power, bringing this, apparatus nearer to the masses of peasants and-helping the peasant masses to satisfy their most urgent demands through this apparatus, either by confiscating the landowner's land, or by reducing taxes and rents - depending on the eircumstanoes. The third path is the path of influencing the peasantry through the revolutionary army , • , The revolutionary army is the force which is the f i r s t to! penetrate into the new provinces, which is the f i r s t to go right into the thick of the peasantry and above a l l through whom the peasantry Judges the new power, its good or bad qualities , '. , For this reason the communists and the Chinese revolutionaries in general must take a l l possible measures to neutralize the anti-peasant elements in the army, retain the revolutionary spirit in the army and direct things in such a way that ths army helps the peasants and souses them for the revolution, , , t t 2 The development of the agrarian revolution, according to the above formula ,went hand in hand with the growth of the communist army. The revolutionized peasants expropriated the land) under the protection of the armyg and the army, on the other hand, grew through an influx of peasant recruits. The most important feature of this period was that the communists were entirely in control of large territories in 2 Reprinted in Stalin on Chinah passim0 pp. 11 - 13« which they had setup a Soviet system with very radical measures of collectivized agriculture. They have also increased their army from 10,000 men in 1928 to 62,000 in 1930, and consolidated their power to such a degree that in 1939 they were able to hold the First Congress of Soviets, which adopted the Soviet Constitution for China* -The Nationalist Government at that time was busy with military operations In the Northern Provinces > and i t was not until 1930 that Chiang Kai-shek was in a position to undertake an offensive against the communist base in Kiangsi Province* From 1930 to 1934 the Nationalists organized altogether six offensives to uproot the centre of communist power in China; The communists, faoing total destruction, finally decided to move out and, In November 1 9 3 4 * they started their well-known "Long Iter oh" to the remote and secure area of Shensi Province in the North-Blest, which they reached in 1935>o On their march they . united individual and isolated islands of com-munists scattered .throughout China to compensate for the losses they had suffered through the Nationalist attacks, and through starvation while on the march* In the new province they immediately introduced a Soviet political administration and extended also their influence to surrounding provinces* It was during this period* when the Chinese eomraunists were fighting for their existence against far superior Nationalists,,that they realized that the armed struggle -t h e a r m e d a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n - w a s t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e f o r m o f s t r a g g l e i n c o l o n i e s a n d d e p e n d e n t c o u n t r i e s a g a i n s t s u p e r i o r a d v e r s a r i e s « T h u s , t h e C h i n e s e R e v o l u t i o n i n i t s s e c o n d s t a g e a c q u i r e d t h r o u g h a n a r m e d s t r u g g l e i t s p e r m a n e n t a n d l a r g e t e r r i t o r i a l b a s e c a p a b l e o f s u p p l y i n g t h e c o m m u n i s t a r m i e s w i t h m e n a n d m a t e r i a l f o r t h e i r f u r t h e r e x p a n s i o n 0 ( i i i ) T H E T H I R D S T A G S - T H E E X P A N S I O N O P T H E R E V O L U T I O N A R Y • • 1 BASE1 " — • " T h e C h i n e s e R e v o l u t i o n e n t e r e d i n i t s t h i r d s t a g e w h e n , i n 1937; a n a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e c o m m u n i s t s a n d t h e n a t i o n a l i s t s w a s s i g n e d t o f o r m t h e U n i t e d F r o n t a g a i n s t J a p a n e s e a g g r e s s i o n w h i c h w a s t a k i n g p l a c e i n t h e n o r t h e r n p r o v i n c e s . T h e c o m m u n i s t s w e r e r e c o g n i z e d a s a n i n d e p e n d e n t f o r c e " a n d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i r a r m i e s w e r e put o n t h e s a m e l e v e l w i t h t h e N a t i o n a l i s t a r m i e s o f f e r e d t h e m . u n i q u e o p p o r t u n i t i e s . T h e c o m m u n i s t s ^ u n d e r t h e p r e t e x t o f f i g h t i n g t h e J a p a n e s e ; o c c u p i e d t h e b o r d e r s t a t e s b e t w e e n M a n c h u r i a a n d C h i n a p r o p e r > a n d e s t a b l i s h e d S o v i e t P o w e r i n t h e P r o v i n c e s o f S h e n s l , H o p e ! a n d C h a h a r , T h e c o - o p e r a t i o n o f t h e c o m m u n i s t s w i t h t h e N a t i o n a l i s t s i n t h e u n i t e d f r o n t f o l l o w e d t h e w e l l - k n o w n p a t t e r n o f a l l u n i t e d f r o n t s e n t e r e d i n t o a n d m a i n t a i n e d b y c o m m u n i s t s : t o a c q u i r e a s u i t a b l e e n v i r o n m e n t v h i c h i s u s e d a s a s o u r c e . o f p o w e r , M a o T s e - t u n g I s q u i t e c a n d i d a b o u t . t h i s : - 1 9 7 -"An important part of the political line of the Chinese Communist Party is to unite with*as well as to struggle against, the bour-geoisie. An important part of the Party-build-ing of-the Chinese Communist Party i s its de-velopment and tempering through unity with; as well as struggle against; the bourgeoisie. Here unity means the united fronts struggle means; during the time of unity, "peace-ful " and "bloodless" ideological and organiza-tional struggle, which will be transformed into an armed struggle when the proletariat is forced to break with the bourgeoisie. If the party does not know how to unite at a certain period with the bourgeoisie, i t will not be able to advance, and the revolution will not develop. If the Party does not knot? how to carry on a resolute, stem, peaceful struggle against the bourgeoisie in time of unity, It will disinte-grate ideologically, politically and organiza-tionally, and the revolution will end in failure; and i f the Party, when forced to break with the bourgeoisie does hot carry on.the resolute, stern, armed struggle against the latter, i t will also disintegrate and the revolution will fall... A l l this has been borne out by the history of the past 18 years."! 1 Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ehi: Lessons of the Chinese  Revolution, pp. 6 - 7 . ' Because the strategy of Chinese Communist Party was based on "co-operation and unity" with, as well as "struggle against" the Nationalists, i t s policy followed an extremely zig-zag line. The leading party strategists changed the party line so many times and in such sharp turns, that the great majority of the membership could not grasp. the situation^ and change from democrats and reformists into radical revolutionaries and vice versa. For this reason the Chinese Communist Party was never a monolith. To cope with this situation and to' secure the most "advantageous and correct party line In a given situation") the Chinese Coramunist Party developed the theory of intra-party struggle and the rules of it s conduct. The party purges i t s membership from right opportunism when i t operates on the revolutionary program. On the other hand) the party purges i t s membership from l e f t radicalism when i t co-operates in national front. See Liu Shao-chi: On Inner-Party Struggle. Foreign Languages Press, Peking.. China, 1950. (Continued on the following page) « 198 -The eoimfiunists played off the Japanese and nation-alists against each other, subjecting the latter to heavy losses while building up their own strength» The co-operation of the communists with the nation-alists in the united front was decisive to the communist suocess and fatal to that of the nationalists, when the com-munists were able to grasp the slogans of nationalism, until now the domain, of Chiang Kai-shek, and incorporate them into their own programs In grasping and exploiting the slogans of nationalism and patriotism, the communists were able to break through the isolation In tahich they were placed by breaking away from the f i r s t United Front of the Kuomlntang in Canton in 1927„ They linked themselves with the nationalistic forces and>by a slow process of penetration;they gradually imposed their control and their hegemony over the Nationalist Revolution* The single fact that the communists were able to operate on the nationalist and patriotic platform facilitated an access to those strata of middle class and intelligentsia which the communists were not able to reach while operating on the platform of agrarian revolution only, and which strata were (Conto) See also Liu Shao-ohis How to be a Good Communist. Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 1952* Series of lectures deli-vered by Liu Shao-chi in July* 1939 at the Institute of Marx-Leninism in Yenan introducing an intensive study of Marx-Leninism and "self-cultivation" as the only remedy for ideolo-gical instability and disorientation of membership* • 199 -the exclusive domain and the main support of Chiang Kai-shek, By means of skilful operations with nationalistic and patriotic slogans, the communists secured for themselves an excellent opportunity to conceal their real revolutionary aims} and an opportunity to carry out Infiltration on the upper levels of China a e sooiety. They were able to penetrate and to form their nuolei in key organizations of the middle class and to prepare these for the communist-controlled united front. Here lies the tragedy of the Chinese Nationalist Revolution. Denied access to the masses of peasantry be-cause of the communist hegemony over agrarian revolution, and being gradually deprived of hegemony over the Nationalist Revolution, the Chiang Kai-shek forces lost ground and were pushed aside onto the periphery of the revolution,, This was the situation in 1 9 4 O : the communists enjoyed hegemony over the agrarian revolution; they were gradually establishing hegemony oyer the nationalist revolution and they had at their disposal a colossal army. And i t was exactly under these conditions that Mao' Tse-tuhg wrote his masterpiece "The New Democracy"-, elaborating on the theory of the united front government with special reference to Chinese conditions. 2 2 For Mao Tee-Tung's The New Democracy, see the document of Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Strategy and Tactics of  World Communism. House Document No. 154 - Part 3 , oistHJongress, 1st Session, Supplement III, Communism in China. Appendix B, pp» 67 - 90o united States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1949. « 200 « "The Hew Democracy" is the most important piece of communist theory written outside the U.S.S.R.) because i t formulates the principles of the communist strategy of the United Front Government* The main thesis of this work is based on the proposi-tion that the complex revolutionary processes can be divided into individual actions of controllable magnitude; that the final bid for power is made when the monopoly of power is secured on the political level and) therefore> i t does not re-quire employment of naked power. And finally, that the economic organisations of hostile classes oould be utilized in their original form in .the communist's system of dictator-ship as levers and transmission belts under the condition that the hostile classes are deprived of their political leadership 0 The theory could not have originated anywhere else but In China because the other .Communist parties were not given an opportunity of long years of experimenting with united fronts. "The Hew Democracy". being written i n 19^0, served as a theoretical and practical guide to the communist parties of Europe in their struggle to establish broad patriotic united fronts under communist hegemony during the Second World War. • 201 -(Iv) THE FOURTH STAGE - THE CONQUEST OF POWER BY. MILITARY . • — , — S M » — :—•—- R " Th© ccfflraunlat revolution entered into i t s fourth stage when the Chinese communis ts, pursuing the conquest of power, opened on June 20th, 19lt&)a frontal military attack on the Nationalists, This operation was launched upon be-cause the communists were in possession of sufficient mi l i -tary forces to bring about a quick decision by military means, when victory was politically well prepared;and when further dwelling on political operations was be Ineffective and dangerous. There was, however, one circumstance which could have brought about a change in the military and political situation to the disadvantage of the communists5 this was the possibility of interference from outside in support of the Nationalists, And here we are confronted with the most remarkable feature of the communist conquest of power in China; namely, with the operation of isolation - of neutralization - which was carried out the communists in the United States in order to secure for the Chinese communists a free hand in dealing' with the Nationalists, William Z, Foster, speaking to the National Committee of the Communist Party of tiie United States>urged the mobilization of American public opinion in order to prevent possible intervention of the United States in China 'e c i v i l war: eb 202 « "On the international scale, the key task* as emphasized in Comrade Dennis's re-port is to stop American intervention in China o o « The war in China is the key to a l l problems of the international front and i t is here, above a l l else, where we have to deal the hardest blow to reaction « * 0 On the question of China, T&ieh l a Our key concentration, as Comrade Dennis pointed out, we want to hold 500 meetings a l l over Idie country to mobilise a l l the forces of the people that we can reach to put a stop to the intervention in China* ?3 The tactics of neutralization carried out in the United States by the American Communist Party reached tre-mendous proportions, because the communists were able to utilise the influence of their direct and indirect operators, who had been deployed and planted already during the war into Idle higher governmental agencies, policy planning bodies; within the army, and within many public and scientific In-stitutions* The decisive role in influencing the United States policy makers was exercised by the communist controlled Institute of Pacific Relations* The top executives of this institute submitted reports and analyses to the China desk in the State Department-advising on policies favourable to the U*S«S*R*, and generally to the communist movement in Asia 0 3 Published in Dally Worker on December 2nd, 1945« Re-printed In the House Document Ho* 154 - ?art 3* The Strategy  and Tactics of World Communism„ Supplement III, Communism In China,, P» " - 203 -Tho most revealing facts of this situation were furnished by the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate* which)after two years of investigations>publish-ed a report on the Institute of Pacific Relations A Espe-cially Instructive are the parts of the document dealing with the effects of the Institute on the American, publlo opinion; and with the effects of the Institute upon the United States foreign policy* £ (v) THB FIFTH STAGE - THE CONSOLIDATION OF SEIZED PQEBR As the beginning of the f i f t h stage of the Chinese Revolutionary War we can consider the period nfren the Chinese communists defeated the Nationalists armies and established the People4s Government of China on October 1st* 1949* 1 This period has a l l the characteristic features of. the behaviour of a total power government, which after the conquest of power has to develop a system of dictatorship i n order to 4 See Institute of Pacific Rel ations. Hearings before the Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws* Committee on the Judiciary* United States Senate. 82nd Congress* 1st Session Parts 1,2,3,4»5 96,7,7A. United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1952. ; 5 For this point see Institute of Pacific Relations. Report Ho;* 205°, Committee on the Judiciary, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1952, pp* 63 * 222. 1 For the founding conference see Program of the Chinese  People's Political Conference. 29. Septemoer ivkv. new China Hews Agency, London, 19£>0. » 20l|. -m a i n t a i n i t s p o w e r e A n d , a l t h o u g h t h i s p e r i o d c o r r e s p o n d s f u n c t i o n a l l y t o t h e p e r i o d a f t e r 1917 i n R u s s i a , t h e r e a r e h o w e v e r , f u n d a m e n t a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e m e t h o d s o f e s t a b l i s h -i n g d i c t a t o r s h i p . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e > t h e C h i n e s e c o m m u n i s t s e n t e r e d t h i s p e r i o d n o t o n l y v / i t h f u l l c o n t r o l o f t h e b r o a d m a s s b a s e f r o m b e l o w , b u t i n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s t h e y w e r e a l s o i n c o n t r o l o f a r e a d y - m a d e u n i t e d f r o n t , c o m p r i s i n g t h e b r o a d c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f t h e m i d d l e c l a s s ) e n a b l i n g a n i m m e d i a t e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a n e w s o - c a l l e d P e o p l e ' s G o v e r n m e n t . T h e s e c o n d d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e R u s s i a n s i t u a t i o n was t h a t t h e d y n a m i c s o f t h e C h i n e s e a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n w a s s o f t -p e d a l l e d w i t h t h e a p p r o a c h i n g c o m m u n i s t v i c t o r y . F u r t h e r , t h e p r o c e s s t o u t i l i s e a n d e x p l o i t t h e s k i l l o f t h e m i d d l e c l a s s s t a r t e d i n R u s s i a i n 1926, I n C h i n a 4 h o w -e v e r , t h i s p r o c e s s t o o k p l a c e i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e c o m m u n i s t s ' v i c t o r y . O f s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e a r e t h e s t e p s t a k e n b y t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t G o v e r n m e n t i n o r d e r t o c h e c k t h e l o o s e f o r c e s o f a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n , t o e l i m i n a t e t h e i r d e s t r u c t i v e e f f e c t s o n t h e e c o n o m y o f t h e c o u n t r y ; a n d t o r e s t o r e a g r a r i a n p r o d u c t i o n . T h i s e x p l a i n s why t h e C h i n e s e c o m m u n i s t s a d o p t e d a p o l i c y n o t o f d e s t r o y i n g , b u t o f n e u t r a l i s a t i o n a n d p r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h e r i c h p e a s a n t r y : " B y d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n b e t w e e n , s t a g e s we m e a n t h a t in a r e a s w h i c h t h e P e o p l e ' s L i b e r a t i o n A r m y h a s j u s t o c c u p i e d , t h e t a c t i c s ; o f n e u t r a l i s i n g t h e r i c h p e a s a n t s a n d s m a l l a n d m i d d l e l a n d -l o r d s s h o u l d b e s e t f o r t h a n d c a r r i e d o u t , r e d u c i n g t h e s p h e r e t o b e s t r u c k t o o n l y e l i m i n a t i n g t h e K u o m l n t a n g • a r e a c t i o n a r y a r m e d f o r c e s , h i t t i n g a t b i g f e u d a l t y r a n -n i c a l e l e m e n t s - c o n c e n t r a t i n g a l l s t r e n g t h f o r f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h i s t a s k a s t h e f i r s t s t a g e i n t h e w o r k i n n e w a r e a s . 2 T h u s , t h e a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n i n C h i n a , w h e n i t h a d S e r v e d i t s p u r p o s e , w a s d e a l t t h e f i n a l b l o w b y t h e same m a n who w a s b y i t s d y n a m i c s o a r r i e d t o p o w e r . M a o T s e - t u n g v e r y s O o n l e a r n e d t h a t t h e s o u r c e o f p o w e r o f h i s p a r t y nO l o n g e r r e s t e d w i t h t h e p o o r p e a s a n t s who w e r e n o t a b l e t o o r g a n i s e p r o d u c t i o n , b u t w i t h t h e e x p e r i e n c e d , i n t e l l i g e n t a n d e f f i c i e n t m i d d l e c l a s s a n d r i c h p e a s a n t r y . I n d e l i v e r i n g a. r e p o r t t o T h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e o f t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f C h i n a o n J u n e l £ t h , 1950, h e e x p r e s s e d t h i s c l e a r l y : " T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e s h o u l d b e a c h a n g e I n o u r p o l i c y t o w a r d r i c h p e a s a n t s , a c h a n g e f r o m t h e p o l i c y o f r e q u i s i t i o n i n g t h e s u r p l u s l a n d a n d t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e r i c h p e a s a n t s t o o n e o f p r e s e r v i n g a r i c h - p e a s a n t e c o n o m y , i n o r d e r t o h e l p t h e e a r l y r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n i n t h e r u r a l a r e a s . " 3 2 M a o T s e - t u n g : A d d r e s s t o t h e C o n f e r e n c e o f C o m m u n i s t C a d r e s o f S h a n s i a n d S u i y a n , A p r i l . 1, 19M* a s r e p r o d u c e d I n T h e P r e s e n t S i t u a t i o n a n d O u r T a s k s ( i n C h i n e s e ) , H o n g K O n g , 1949. R e p r i n t e d C h i n e s e A g r a r i a n R e f o r m a n d B o l s h e v i k L a n d P o l i c y b y Y a - l u n C h o u , i n P a c i f i c A f f a i r s . V o l . - X X V N o . 1, M a r c h 195*2, p p . 30 r . 31. 3 R e p o r t o f Mao T s e - t u n g t o t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e o f t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f C h i n a , P e k i n g , J u n e 5 t h , 1950, A m e r i c a n C o n s u l a t e G e n e r a l , H o n g K o n g , S u p p l e m e n t N o . 3, J u n e 2 8 t h , 1950. R e p r i n t e d i n C h i n e s e . A g r a r i a n R e f o r m a n d B o l s h e v i k L a n d P o l i c y . I b i d , p . 33. - 2 0 6 -According t o tho new political line, the poor peasant, the original wheel of the Chinese Revolution, is no longer allowed to expropriate the land and.the property of his landlord, but i t is his sacred duty to preserve his pro-perty and to protect i t against those "Left-deviatienists" who are not flexible enough to adjust themselves to current party line. It is also his sacred duty to remain in the pre-sent feudal relation of a landless peasant worker, from which bondage the communists promised to liberate him0 The Chinese communists soon realized that the unchecked dynamics of agrarian revolution is the main challenge to the consolidation of their power and proclaimed everything which goes against the preservation of feudalism and rich peasant economy as being counter-revolutionary. The policy of preserving the rich-peasant economy is nbt of a temporary nature, but is the long«terra policy which will be carried through the .whole period of the New Democracy) and this will take a somewhat lengthy time - possibly several decades, "The policy adopted by us of preserving a rich-peasant economy is , , ,. not temporary, but a long—term policy. That is to say, a rich-peasant economy will be preserved in the whole stage of the New Democracy,"4 The similar policy of "preserving" is applied in the 4 Liu Shao-ohi: On Problems Concerning Agrarian Reform, A report to the Second Session of the National Committee of idle People's Political Consultative Conference in June, 1 9 5 0 Ibid, p. 34-« 2 0 ? -sphere of industry* Also' here, the intelligence, s k i l l and abilities of the middle class are utilized as a source of, communist power in the period of consolidation of their dictatorship: "At the present stage the national bour-geoisie is very important • , „ In order to offset the pressure of th© imperialists and to advance the backward economy one step for-ward, China must make use of every Urban and rural capitalist enterprise which can benefit the national economy and i s not detrimental to the people's standard of living* China must Unite with the national bourgeoisie in the common struggle* Our present policy is to restrict capitalism, but not destroy It*"5 Thus, the policy of "preservation" constitutes another important feature of the strategy of the Chinese Revolutionary War, which, together w££h the f i r s t one, namely) with the com-munists' ability to awaken, deyolop and monopolize agrarian revolution, represents a .classic example of functional u t i l i -zation of social stratification 0 The communists, in til© f i r s t place, utilize the great revolutionary potentialities of unorganized agrarian masses for the conquest of power* Secondly, after the conquest, the communists utilize the pro-ductive potentialities of the middle class in the country as 5 Prom an article published in For A Lasting Peace For A  People's Democracy* of • Jul? 19, 1949, commemorating the.2tith Anniversary of the Communist Party of China* For tills point see also Mao Tse-tung; People's Democratic Pictatorship> Lawrence & Wishard Ltd,, London, 1950, co 208 <*> well as In industry to Increase and to maintain their power« (c) THE VIET-HAM PATTERN OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR (a) GENERAL PROPOSITION The revolutionary experiences which finally led the Chinese Communists to power serve as a school of apprentice-ship for the other communist parties of Asia in shaping their strategy of conquest,, The merits of the Chinese Oommunists are recognised as a standard, and they are fully utilised by the Communist International in directing the activities of it s agencies In various parts of Asia 0 The most remarkable proof to this end is supplied by the Manifesto and Platform of the Viet-Ham Lao Dong Party.3-The Platform,recently adopted, outlines in a very comprehensive blueprint the strategy o f revolutionary war applicable in a l l colonial countrieso The strategy of revolutionary war as exemplified in the Manifesto not only utilises the experiences of the Chinese communists, but with an amasing logic and sensitivity to 1 The Manifesto and Platform of the Viet-Ham Lao Dong Party, supplement to People's China. Vol,-III, Ho. 9, May 1, 1951 o The Manifesto ana fche Platform were adopted at the Founding Congress of the Communist Party of Viet-Ham in February 195U « 209 -power implications i t develops and formulates the new maxims of revolutionary war0 Because this document is of immense importance for the understanding of the processes taking place in a l l parts of Asia, we endeavour to interpret and summarise briefly i t s most; important features* (b) THE STAGES OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR The colonial revolution is a form of the revolutionary war and i s oarried out by armed struggle in three stages: (a) The defensive stage with the main strategic objects being to secure and protect the territorial base of the revolution* (b) In the second stage the communists are fighting vis-a-vis with oiie opposing forces for the balance of power) using the occupied territory as a base for their expansion* Every territorial gain must be immediately consolidated with the base* Fart of the man power is utilised in the production of supplies for the fronts and the rest serves in the army. The main feature of this stage is guerrilla warfare. Cc) The third stage i s carried out predominantly with military operations attacking the opponent's armies on a l l fronts and is conducted under the rules of orthodox war com-bined with the guerrilla warfare* Because these three stages of colonial revolution are « 210 -o f u n p r e d i c t a b l e d u r a t i o n , , th© p r o t r a c t e d c h a r a c t e r o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r , u n t i l r e c e n t l y u n d e r e s t i m a t e d b y t h e s t r a t e g i s t o f c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s , i s i t s m o s t i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e 0 T h e t i m e f a c t o r ; i n c o n t r a s t t o o r t h o d o x w a r f a r e ; h a s a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t v a l u e i n t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r . T h e O r t h o d o x w a r s t a r t s w i t h r e a d y m a d e a r m i e s a n d t h e t i m e f a c t o r i s c o n s i d e r e d o n l y i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e i r m o b i l i t y a n d t o t h e i r s t a m i n a i n a c t i o n 0 T h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , s t a r t s w i t h o u t p r o f e s s i o n a l a r m i e s a n d t h e t i m e f a c t o r i s c o n s i d e r e d i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a r m i e s , i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e b u i l d i n g u p o f t h e t e r r i t o r i a l b a s e o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n . T h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r , i t s e x t e n t , p r o g r e s s a n d p o t e n t i a l i t i e s c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d a n d e v a l u a t e d c o r r e c t l y u n l e s s t h e t i m e e l e m e n t i s c o n s i d e r e d t h e k e y f a c t o r i n i t s s t r a t e g y . ( o ) T H B FORMS O F T H E R E V O L U T I O N A R Y WAR T h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r c o n s i s t s o f a c o m b i n a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c m e a s u r e s w i t h p u r e l y m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s , w h e r e t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s d e t e r m i n e . t h e s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e o f m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s , a n d w h e r e t h e l a t t e r a r e a l w a y s s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h e f o r m e r . T h u s , t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r t h o r o u g h l y c o n f i r m s t h o o l d a n d f a m o u s C l a u s w i t z t r u i s m t h a t a r m i e s a r e i n s t r u m e n t s o f p o l i t i c s a n d t h a t w a r i s o n l y t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f p o l i t i c s b y o t h e r m e a n s . « 211 -Th© m e a s u r e s c o n s t i t u t i n g p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c o p e r a t i o n s o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r c o u l d b e d e s c r i b e d a s f o l l o w s ? ( a ) E x p r o p r i a t i o n a n d r e - d i v i s i o n o f l a n d , ( b ) I n t r o d u c t i o n o f a n e w p o l i t i c a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n v / i t h t h e u n i t e d F r o n t a s i t s m a i n f e a t u r e , ( c ) O r g a n i s a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n t o s e c u r e s u p p l i e s f o r t h e f r o n t s , ( d ) E n l a r g i n g o f t h e a r m y b y a n i n f l u x o f r e v o l u t i o n -i z e d p e a s a n t s . T h e m i l i t a r y m e a s u r e s o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r c o n s i s t o f : ( a ) M i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s o f o r t h o d o x w a r f a r e w i t h r e g u l a r a r m i e s , ( b ) T h e o p e r a t i o n s , o f g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e i n t h e r e a r o f t h e c o m m u n i s t s ' o p p o n e n t s w i t h i r r e g u l a r a r m i e s , ( e ) A c t s o f m i l i t a r y a n d e c o n o m i c s a b o t a g e . T h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y war> w h e r e b o t h t h e a b o v e g r o u p s o f o p e r a t i o n s a r e i n t e r w o v e n > i s a v e r y c o m p l e x p h e n o m e n o n w i t h q u i t e u n i q u e f e a t u r e s . F r o m t h e m i l i t a r y p o i n t o f v i e w t h e s t r a t e g y o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r p r e s e n t s a p r o b l e m w h i c h , c a n b e s u c c e s s f u l l y t a c k l e d o n l y i f c e r t a i n a x i o m s o f o r t h o d o x m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y a r e m o d i f i e d a n d a d j u s t e d t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t w a r i s j u s t a n I n s t r u m e n t o f p o l i t i c s . A p a r t f r o m t h e n e c e s s i t y t o r e - e v a l u a t e t h e t i m e f a c t o r I n t h e s t r a t e g y o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r , t h e r e i s a l s o t h e n e c -e s s i t y t o r e - e v a l u a t e t h e p r i n c i p l e o f m a x i m a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n t i n e a n d S p a c e , t h a t i r o n l a w o f o r t h o d o x m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y . T h e c o m m u n i s t , s t r a t e g y o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y w a r a p p l i e s t h e p r i n c i p l e o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e o f d i s p e r s i o n , s p l i t t i n g t h e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s i n t o a s e r i e s o f I n d i v i d u a l I s o l a t e d c o m b a t s i n w h i c h t h e i r a d v e r s a r y i s n o t — 212 — able to make use of the material superiority and concentra-tion of his regular armies. Also from the political point of view the revolutionary war,, outlined by the platform of the Viet-Nam Communist Party, has its unique features. The revolutionary war of the Viet-nam pattern does not sti r the peasant masses so deeply as the revolution In China did,' and i t does not carry out the agrarian revolution on a scale which would paralyze the economy of the country. The agrarian revolution no longer expropriates the land and the property of the middle class and landlords. In-stead; its fore©8 are channeled into agrarian reforms of which the main task is to reduce land rent and interest on leased land and to mobilize the peasantry for the armed struggle. 2 The colonial revolution of the Viet-Nam pattern; in order to maintain production on a high level; leaves-the country-side with its feudal productive relations intact. Xt i s carried out solely on a nationalistic platform in order to appeal to.the more developed and advanced strata of modern Asiatic society. The main stress is laid on the preservation of landlords and a national bourgeoisie and on their participation in national fronts. • In this respect the Manifesto is most revealing: 2 Manifesto;, Paragraph 6, Carrying Out Agrarian Reform. P. 7. •*» i£13 a "Th© motive forces of the Viefc-lam revolution at present are the people com-prising primarily the workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, followed by the patriotic and progressive personages and landlords. The basic mass of the people consists of the workers, peasants and intellectual worl-cers (Intel-lectual workers belong to various strata of the people, mostly to the petty bourgeoisie). The leading class in the Viet-Nam revolution is the working Class."3 The communist strategists recognise that the success or failure of the colonial revolution no longer depends on the revolutionary spirit of the peasantry, but on the ability of the Communist Parties of Asia to utilise the productive organizations of the bourgeoisie. Thus, the main battle in the countries of Asia, just as the battle in the industrial countries of the West)is waged for the subjugation of the middle class, in which struggle the ideological instability and the inability of the middle class to unite is the main ally of the communists. The middle class of colonial countries Is divided by the communists into antagonistic factions to be>with the help the Of peasantry, deprived of i t s political leadership. It is not destroyed, but only paralyzed, in order to be able to perform its economic functions under communist, control. It i s not at a l l accidental that the Communist Party of Viet-Ham Is the f i r s t of the colonial countries to have formulated a clear-cut strategy of colonial war. Viet-Nam, because of its key geographical position and i t s highest among production of rice / a l l colonial countries, is considered by the Moscow strategists to be the natural base for the expansion of a revolutionary war into the whole of Asia. This pattern of conquest of South-East Asia, using Indo-china as a base of its operations, was already once success-fully realized - in the Second World War by Japan* If the communist strategists In Moscow were in control of Viet-Nam and were backed in their operations by the armies of Mao Tse-tung, the door to Malaya and Indonesia i n the South, to the Philllpines in the East and to Thailand and Burma in the West, would be wide open. • ' Hence, we can conclude with a certain degree of cer-tainty, that the awakening and the development of the revolu-tionary wars of the Viet-Nam pattern in a l l Asiatic countries, and their integration into, one colossal revolutionary process to set ablaze this soft spot of the earth, is likely to be the program of Moscow in this region for the next few years Jt-.1111 I » ^ I M — M B — — • — « • — M — M i l 1 ll •!—«—»«—»«•—»—*——i I U I I . 1 a 1 it For this point see Crisis of the Colonial System. Nation- al Liberation Struggle or the People or East Asia. Reports presented in 1949 to the Pacific institute of the Academy of Sciences, USSR. People's Publishing House, Ltd. Bombay, 1951* See also E. L. Katzenbach:. Indo-China: A Military-Political Appreciation, World Politics, Vol.-IV, Ho, 2, (Continued on the following page) <=> 2 1 5 * January 19$29 pp. 186 • 218. And J. Soustelle : Indo-China and Korea: One Front, Foreign Affairs. Vol.-29, No. 1 , October 1 9 5 0 , pp. $6 - 66. J.K. Fairbank: The Problem of Revolutionary Asia, Foreign Affairs. Vol . -29. No. 1, October 1 9 5 0 , pp. 1 0 1 -1 1 3 . M.H. Roy: Democracy and Nationalism in Asia. Pacific Affairs, Vol.-XXV, No„ 2 , June 1 9 5 2 , pp. li|X) - IIJJS. "" Hu" shin: China in Stalin's Grand Strategy, Foreign  Affairs. Vol.-29, No* 1, October 1 9 5 0 , pp. 1 1 - 4'0o - 216 -CONCLUSION « In this final section ran attempt will be made to formulate some conclusions as they follow from Fart I and Part II of tills essay. Communism represents a system of total power because It sets its e l f total alms, operates upon total sources and resorts to total strategy in pursuit of its objectives. Once the communists reject tho principle of political equili-brium and set the machinery o:? dictatorship in operation they embark on the f i e l d of total power from which there is no return, She machinery of total power has to r o l l ahead or die© The objective lav/ of the necessity of total power is a continuous drive for an increase of power and a continuous expansion of the power struct*ire by the acquisition of new power areas within and outside i t s base. • 21? -The ©mansion of the cosmmXat power system within its base i s carried out by its static capacities — by the force of social gravity 0 The machinery of dictatorship con-quers the new power areas within the population by exploiting the social-biologic processes of certain social classes. Further, by tho acquisition of new.power areas within i t s material base i t also increases i t s monopoly of power in the realm of economics» It exploits natural resources and organizes the human element into suitable formations for tiais exploitation. This process of expansion within the the material base reinforces/political power of communist dictator-ship ivlth economic power and integrates i t by a high exponent. The base of the communist power system i s the U.S.S.R. and the Peoples* Democracies, It functions in a static capa-city^ increasing the strength of the communist power system by the acquisition of new power areas from within i t s popu-lation and natural resources. On the other hand, the expansion of the communist power system outside its base i s realised by its dynamic capacities, and i s carried out by the functioning of the communist parties in free democratic countries. These penetrate Into the depth of free societies, generate and release there sooial forces and Integrate them Into the communist power system. Their ultimate aim is to seize power, to establish communist dictator-ship and to enlarge the base of the communist power system. How, finally, we can formulate some conclusions con-cerning the possibility of checking the expansion of the communist power machinery 0 In countries where communists have been able to establish the machinery of dictatorship, under the present conditions* there does not seem to be any possibility of checking the increase of communist power* In free societies>where the communist parties operate in dynamic capacities and where the time factor i s the key element in their strategy, there i s only one way to check ex-pansion of communisms an absolute denial of access for the communists to the Institutional structure of democratic society and their complete isolation* Any partial containment of communism, no matter whether on a national or an International scalef also any partial solution based on the co-existence, or on the division of spheres of influence do not constitute any solution whatso-ever* These measures work inevitably towards the strengthen-ing of the communist power system* Actually, the whole problem boils down to the point where the free world must counter and meet communism on the same power level as communism i s ap-proaching the free world* The free world has to be ready to wage an atomic war in self-defence to-morrow, as well as to be able to withstand, the protracted cold war for ten or fifteen years* depending upon what the communist strategists consider - 219 -t o b e m o r e a d v a n t a g e o u s t o t h e m . A s f a r a s t h e p r e s e n t , a n d a s f a r a s d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e i m m e d i a t e f u t u r e i n d i c a t e , t h e c o m m u n i s t s t r a t e g i s t s h a v e d e c i d e d u p o n a p r o t r a c t e d c o l d w a r f o r w h i c h t h e i r a d v e r s a r i e s a r e r a t h e r p o o r l y e q u i p p e d . S h o u l d t h i s b e t h e c a s e , t h e f r e e w o r l d f a c e s t w o p r o b l e m s , t h e m a s t e r i n g o f w h i c h w i l l d e c i d e i t s f a t e 0 I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , t h e f r e e w o r l d h a s t o d e a l r a d i -c a l l y w i t h t h e c o l o s s a l c o m m u n i s t f i f t h c o l u m n b e f o r e t h e s e p a r a l y z e t h e s p i n a l c o r d o f d e m o c r a t i c s o o i e t i e s - t h e i r i n -s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s - a n d b e f o r e t h e y u n d e r m i n e t h e w i l l t o r e s i s t t h e c o m m u n i s t a g g r e s s i o n . S e c o n d l y , t h e f r e e w o r l d h a s t o d e v e l o p n e w t e c h n i q u e s o f g r a n d s c a l e m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t o b e a b l e t o I n c r e a s e r e -s e n t m e n t , t o a w a k e n l a t e n t d e m o c r a t i c f o r c e s i n t h e c o u n t r i e s d o m i n a t e d b y t h e c o m m u n i s t s a n d t o p r o v i d e a n o b j e c t i v e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r t h e i r s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n b y a c t i v e s u p p o r t . T h u s , t h e t i m e e l e m e n t , b e i n g t h e k e y f a c t o r i n t h e c o m m u n i s t s t r a t e g y o f p r o t r a c t e d c o l d . w a r b e c o m e s i n e v i t a b l y t h e k e y f a c t o r i n t h e s t r a t e g y o f t h e f r e e w o r l d i n i t s s e l f -d e f e n c e . u n l e s s tixls I s u n d e r s t o o d , t h e r e c a n b e n o r e a l i s t i c a p p r o a c h t o t h e p r o b l e m o f w o r l d c o m m u n i s m . APPENDIX NO. II HOW THE COMMUNISTS ESTIMATE THEIR STRENGTH (Published in New York Times, March 1 6 t h , 1 9 4 7 , Page E5.) At a recent Communist conference in London, a chart show-ing "The Advance of Communism" was displayed, giving the Communists' own estimate of their strength. The total world membership claimed was 1 8 , 5 9 2 , 3 0 0 . According to the chart, "All parties in this l i s t base themselves on the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin,; and Stalin." This i s the listing that appeared on the chart: COUNTRY PARTY MEMBERS M. P^S AMERICA Argentina Brazil Canada Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Ecuador Haiti Martinique Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Puerto Rico United States Uruguay Santo Domingo Venezuela Communist Communist 3 0 , 0 0 0 1 3 0 , 0 0 0 2 3 , 0 0 0 5 0 , 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 2 0 , 0 0 0 1 5 2 , 0 0 0 17 Lab* -Progre ssives Communist Dem. Socialist Vanguardia Pop. Popular Soc. Communist Popular Soc. Communist Communist 2 0 2 6 1 2 1 2 Partido Socialista Partido del Pueblo 8 . 0 0 0 3 5 , 0 0 0 1 , 2 0 0 7 4 , 0 0 0 1 5 , 0 0 0 2 , 0 0 0 2 0 , 0 0 0 5 0 0 Communist Communist Communist Communist Communist 5 5 Pop0 Socialist Communist 2 COUNTRY PARTY MEMBERS M. P.'s ASIA Burma Ceylon China Cyprus India Indonesia Japan Korea Lebanon Malaya Palestine Philippines Siam Syria Communist Communist Communist Akel Communist Communist Communist Communist Communist Communist Communist Communist Communist Communist 4,000 2,000,000 4,000 53,700 6,000 50,000 15,000 10,000 1,400 8,000 AUSTRALASIA Australia New Zealand EUROPE USSR Albania Austria Belgium Britain Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Denmark Finland France Germany (Sov.) Germany (West.) Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland (N.) Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Communist 25,000 1 Communist ' 2,000 Communist 6,000,000 Communist - -Communist 150,000 4 Communist 100,000 23 Communist 43,000 2 Workers' Party 450,000 278 Communist 1,000,000 115 Communist 60,000 18 Communist 28,000 41 Communist 1,300,000 -Soc. Unity 1,576,300 -Communist 350,000 mm Communist 400,000 -Communist 650.000 .70 United Socialist 1,000 10 Communist 500 -Communist 2,200,000 108 Communist 5,000 Communist 50,000 15 Communist 33,000 11 Workers' Party 600,000 -Communist mm mm COUNTRY PARTY MEMBERS Rumania Slovakia Spain Sweden Switzerland Communist 500,000 Communist 250,000 Communist *» Communist 46,000 Parti du Travail 21,000 AFRICA Algeria Eritrea Morocco S 0 Africa Tunisia Communist Communist Communist Communist Communist 200 BIBLIOGRAPHY I BIBLIOGRAPHY PART 1 BOOKS ANDERS W. : BALDWIN N. W. BARTLETT F, C. BELOFF Max : "An Army in Exile". MacMillan Co,, London, 1949. "The Price of Power". Harper & Brothers, New York, 1947. "Po l i t i c a l Propaganda". The University-Press, 1940 o "The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1929 ~ 41". Two Volumes. 'Oxford 'University"'Press 1947. BERLE Adolf A. : BLISS Lane A. : "Blueprint for World Conquest as Outlined by the Communist Inter-n a t i o n a l ^ Chamberlin W. H. ed.'" Human Events, Washington, i94o\ "Natural Selection of P o l i t i c a l Force". University of Kansas Press, 1950. "I Saw Poland Betrayed". The Bobbs-Msrrill Co., New York, 1950. BUCK Tim "Canada: The.Communists Viewpoint". Progress Publishing Co., Toronto, 1 9 4 8 . "Thirty Years - 1922 - 1952: The Stpr_y_of  the Communist Movement in Canada^. Progress Books8 Toronto, 1 9 5 2 , 21 •BUKIIARIN Nikolai : BURWHAK James : CARR Hallett E. : CHAKB3PXHJ V/. H. : CHORLEY Katherine: CIECHANOWSKI Jan : CLISSOD Stephen : COLTON Ethan : DALLIN David J. : DAVIS Lord :. D.eJ0UV3NEL Bertrand : QEHTSeiHfiR. I * : "Historical Materialism: A System of  Soclology". International Publishers, RewHForkV 1933 . "The Managerial Revolution". The John Day Co., New York, 1941. "German- Soviet Relations Between the  "Two World tfars.. 1919 - 1939". J. Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1951* "The Soviet Impact On the Western World". MacMillan Co., London, 1946. "The Russian Revolution 1917 - 1921", Vol. I and II. The Kacliillan Co., New York, 1935. "The Russian Enigma". Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1943-"Armies and the Art of Revolution", Faber & faber Ltd., London, 1943. "Defeat in Victory". Doubleday & Co., New York, 1947* "Whirlwind". The Crescent Press, London, 1949. "Four Patterns of Revolution". Association Press, New York, 1935. "The Rise of Russia in Asia". Yale University Press, New Haven, 1949-"Soviet Russia and Far East". Yale University Press, New Haven, 1948• "Russia and Postwar Europe". Yale tJniversity Press, New Haven, 1945. "Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy 1939 - 1942". Yale University Press. New Haven, 1947. "Force". E. Benn, London, 1934-"Power - The National History of Its Growth". Hutchinson fe Co.. London. 1946*• "Stalin - A Political Biography" Oxford University Press, 1949• DIMITR07F O'corgi : "The UnltajU£rpnt". International Publishing Co., New York, 1933. DUTT Palmsr : "The Two Internationals" G. A l l e n & TJnwin, London, 1920. "The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences". MacMillan, New York, 1930. EINAUDI Mario : "Communism in.Western Europe". Ithaca . Press, 1951-ELLIOT W. Y. : "The Pragmatic Revolution i n P o l i t i c s ». The MacMillan Co., New York, 1928, FARAGO Ladislav : "The Axis Grand Strategy": Blueprint f o r the Total War". Farrar fc Rinehart. New York, 1942. "German Psychological Warfare",, G. P. Putnam's Sons, NewTork, 1942. FISCHER Louis : "The Soviets i n World A f f a i r s " . V o l . I and I I , Princeton University Press 1951. "Dawn of Victory". Duell, Sloan & Pearce, New York, 1942. FISCHER Rurth : " S t a l i n and German Communism". Harvard University Press, "Cambridge 1948. FLORINSKY Michael T. : "World Revolution and the USSR*" The MacMillan Co., New York, 1933. FOERTSCH Hermann : "The Art of Modern Warfare". Oscar P i e s t , New York, 1940. ~ FOTITCH Constantin: "The War We Lost". The Viking Press, New York, 1948T FRIEDMAN Otto : "The Break of Czech Democracy". V . Gollancs London, 1950. G0UZENK0 Igor : "This Was My Choice". J . M . Dent ft Sons Ltd. Toronto, 1948. "History of the C i v i l War i n the USSR.". Goreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947-"History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union". Edited by the Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B)., Francis V/hite Publishers, Ltd., Toronto, 1939. L i d d e l l : "Thoughts On War". Faber & Faber Ltd*,. London,; 1934. III RULES Alex JOSTEII Josef "Public Opinion i;i_Soviet„,Union:,,.. Study i n Mass Persuafriqn^% Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1950. "Oh My Country". Latimore House Ltd., London, 1949 • "Karl Marx and Frederick Engels". Selected V/orks i n Two Volumes, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hoscow, 1949. KAELAS A, KAUTSKY Karl KEY V. 0. : KIDD Benjamin : KINTNER W. R. : KOIBI Hans : KORBEL Josef : KRAVCHENKO V i c t o r KUSNIERZ B. : LASSWELL Harold LASSlflSLL H. & BLUM3MST0CK D. LAWTON Lanceton LEITES Nathan : "Human Rights and' Genocide i n the B a l t i c  States". Estonian Information Centre, Stockholm, 1948. "The Dictatorship of the P r o l e t a r i a t " , the National Labour Press, London, 1919. "The S o c i a l Revolution". Cheles H. Kerr 2c.Co., Chicago, 19027 " P o l i t i c s . Parties and Pressure .Groups", Thomas Y. Crawell Co., New York, 1950. "The Science of Power". Methven & Co.. London, 1920. "The Front i s Everywhere". University of Oklahoma Press, 1950. "Nationalism i n the Soviet Union", G. Routledge & Sons Ltd., London, 1933-"Tito's Communism". The University of Denver Press, 1951* "I Chose Freedom". Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, .1946. " S t a l i n and the Poles". H o l l i s & Carter, London,. 1949« "Language of P o l i t i c s " . G. W. Steward, Publishing 'Inc.7""NewYork, 1949. "World Revolutionary Propaganda". A. P. Knopf, New York, 1939. "The Russian Revolution 1917 - 26", MacKillan Co., London, 1927. "The Operational Code of the Politburo", McGraw - H i l l Book Co., New York, 1951« 1 L E I JIN V. I . : MACHIAVELLI N. : MARX- Karl. : MAVOR • Jamas : KEAD E, Earle : I-IEAD Margaret : MEERLOO A. K , : MERRIAII Charles E. KICHELS' Roberto : KIKOLAJCZYK 3, : I10L0T0V V. M. r J..O0RE B. : NAGY Ferenc : J^-IAN gignund- : "Selected Works", V o l . Land I I , Foreign Languages Publishing House, Koscot*, 1947 "Katerialism and S m p i r o c r i t i c i s n " ? Fbrei''gh"''Langua,ge3 Publishing House, Moscow, 1947. "Marx. Engels Marxism". Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947 • "The Prince and the Discourses". The Kodera Library, New York, 1950, " C a p i t a l " , The International Publishers Co., New York, 1939. "The Russian Revolution". G. A l l e n & Unwin Ltd*, London, 1928. "Makers of Modern Strategy". Pi'inceton University Press, 1944* "The Soviet Attitudes Toward. Authority McGraw-Hill Book Co,, New York, 1951* "Total War and Human Kind". International U n i v e r s i t i e s Press, 19.45-" P o l i t i c a l Power"t I t s Composition and  and I n c i d e n c e W h i t t l e s e y House, Nevr York, 1934. " F i r s t Lecture i n P o l i t i c a l Sociology",, University of Miasesota Press, Ilinneapoli; 1949. "The Rape of, Poland. Pattern of Soviet  Aggression".' McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1948-"Problems of Foreign Policy". Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1949. "Soviet P o l i t i c s - the Dilemna of Power", Harvard University Press, 1950. "The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain", The Ma'cllill'an Co., . New' York, 1 9 4 ^ "Permanent Revolution", Harper Brothers, •London, 1942. VI OSTROGORSKI RUSSELL Bertrand : SARGEAUNT II. A. & * WEST G. : SCHWARZENBERGER G. : SELZI1ICK Philip : SOIITAG R. J. & BEDDIE J. S. : STALIN J. V, : STETTINIUS E. Jr. : STRAUSZ-HUPE R„ : TARACOUZIO T. A. : TROTSKY Leon : "Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties". Vol. I and II, McMillan & Co., London, 1902. "Power. A Social Analysis". 17. 17. Norton & Co., New York, 1938. "Authority and the Individual". Simon & Shuster, New York, 1949. "Grand Strategy", Jonathan Capo, London, "Power Politics" r Jonathan Cape, London, 1 9 a . "The Organizational Weapon: A St u d " of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics". I'cGrai:-H i l l 3ook Co., New York, 1952. "Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939 - Uln. Didior, New York, 19451 "Problems of Leninism", (elevent edition) Foreign Lan^ages' Publishing House, Moscow, 1947. "Marxims a Ilarodni a Kolonialni Otazka", Nakladatelstvi Svoboda, Praha, 1945-~ (Trans: Marxism and National and C o l o n i a l Question)-"Roosevelt and Russians. The Yalta Conference", "Doubleday &' Co.™'' New York, 1949. "The Balance of Tomorrow". G, P« Putnam's Sons, New York, 1945-"Oeopolitlca-Stragt&e for Peace and_ Power", G, P. Put-ham»s Sons, New York, 1942. "War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy''. The McMillan Co., New York, 1940. "The History of the Russian Revolution",• 1.ol. I, II, III, Victor Gollancz, London, "The Revolution .Betrayed". Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1945* "The First Five Years of the Communist  International'V Vol* I. Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1945. V A I TOWSTIS*' Julian : VARGA E. & MENDELSOHN L« : VON CLAUSEWITZ Karl : VYSHIIJSKY A. Y. : WALSH Edmund A, : WILLOW E. K. : ;\fINTi!RT01.r Paul : YNDRICH Jan : "P o l i t i c a l Power in the_USSR 1917 - 1947". Oxford University 'fress^^evr York, 194°« "New Data for Lenin's Imperialism". International Publishers Co. New York, 1940, "On War". The Modern Library, New York, 1943. "Principles of War". The Military Service Publishing CoB, Harrisburg Pennsylvania, 1942. T?The Teachings of Lenin,.jtnd_Stalln on  Proletarian Revolution and the State", Soviet News, London. 1949• "~ "Total Power". Doubleday ft Co., Kew York, 194 *^: "The Pattern of Imperialism: A Study,in  thet Theory of Power" Columbia University Press, New York, 1948. "Incuest On An Ally". The Crescent Press, London, 1948. "Tito vs Stalin: The .Battle of the  Marshals" f Ernest Benn Ltri.j London, 1950•> t PART II. DOCUMENTS "The Agrarian Reform Law of themiPeople's Republic of  China". Adopted by the Central People's"Government Council on June 2Sth, 1950. Published by People's Publishing House Ltd., Bombay, 1950. "Bolshevization Tactics in Hungary". Speech of Matyas Rakosi "The Way of Our People's Democracy", delivered on February 2nd, 1952, at the Academy of the Hungarian Worker's Party. Reprinted by the National Committee for a Free Europe Inc., New York, 1952. "Canadian Independence and People's Democracy", Program adopted by the National Committee of* the'Labour-Pro gressive Party of Canada, February 1952, Published by the Labour-Progressive Party of Canada, Toronto, 1952. "The Common Program and Other Documents of the First  Plenary Session of the Chinese "People's P o l i t i c a l Consultative  Conf'"erence"'™' Adopted' on September 29thT"T9&97" i n Peking. Published"by Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1950. "The Communique. On the Conference of Information Bureau of^ommunist Parties. •NovemberT^r9'49ff«'''''^^^sned 0 7 the "Communist Party, London, 1949.' "Constitution and. Rules of the Communist International". Reprinted i n "Blueprint for World Conquest", published by Human Events, Washington, 1946, pp. 246 - 25S. IX "The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Task of the Fourth International" Program and Statutes as adopted by the Founding Conference 193©4. Pioneer Publishers } New York, 1946. "Document On Terror". Appendix to "News Behind the Iron Curtain". VoTTl. No. 3P March 1952. Published by the National Conmitteafor Free Europe Inc., New York. Documents of the United States Government: The Documents are organized as to follow respective references on pages Hearings Regarding Communist Infiltration of Labour Unions. Part I and III Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, 1st Session, August 9, 10 and 11, 1949. Published by the United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1949. Communist Efforts to Infiltrate Farm Groups. Printed in Annual Report of the Committee on Un-American Activities for the year 1951• Published by the same committee February 17, 1952. p. 6-7. Hearings Regarding Communist Inf i l t r a t i o n of Minority Groups*Part 1, 2, 3* Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities, 8lst Congress, 1st Session, July 13, 14, and 18, 1949. Published by the United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1949. Communist Activities Among Aliens and,National Groups. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Committee on the Judicary, United States Senate, 8lst Congress, 1st Session, Part 1, 2, 3. k Published by the United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1949, 1950. Communist Tactics Among Veteran Groups. Printed in the Annual Report of the Committee on Un-American Activities, for the year 1951. Published by the same Committee on February 17th, 1952. p. 7. Report on the Slav Congress and Associated Organizations, prepared and released by %he Committee onK'lJn»-Ame'ricari' '* Activities, United States House of'Representatives, Washington June 26th, 1949-^SXiSSL of, the, Scientific Miand.Cultural, Conference, for World... .feaa.e_ Arranged by""the^  National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, held in New, York on March 25. 2"o"7 an"3T27-. 1949. Prepared and released by "theCorimitt e e on Un-American Activities, United States House of Repre-sentatives, Washington, April 19th, 1949* The Role of the Communist Press in the Communist Conspiracy. Hearings"before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, Second Session, January 9, 10, 15, 16 and 17, 1952. Published by the United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1952« The Communist Infiltr a t i o n of Hollywood Motion Picture  Industry. Printadf in the Annual Report of the Committee on Tin-American Activities for the year 1951. Published by the same committee on February 17th, 1952. Interim Report on Hearings Regarding, Communist Espionage  in^th^^nXted f~States Government. "Sommittee on U^n-American Act i v i t i e s , House of Representatives, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, August 28th, 1948. Published by the United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1948. Soviet, Espionage Within the United States, Government. 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