POLITICAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF COMMUNISM

A Study In Total Power

- by -

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Political Science

and

in the Department of Slavonic Studies

We accept this thesis as conforming to the standard required from candidates for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS

Members of the Department of Slavonic Studies, Political Science

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

September, 1952.
"The control of power was first a family matter, then a group problem, then a tribunal question, then a national concern, then a continental danger, until finally, in our day and generation, it degenerated into a universal challenge, the ultimate resolution of which may well determine the form of civilization to prevail during the next chapter in the history of the race..."

E. A. Walsh: "Total Power", p. 80.

INTRODUCTION

This essay is an attempt to analyze communism in terms of power. It tries to describe the power machinery of communism and to formulate principles upon which it operates. This description is undertaken in the belief that the great problem of our day is not the communist ideology, but rather the maxims and imperatives of total power which impel the communist power machinery in its behaviour.

This paper develops a thesis that communism is a system of total power, that it is a system which rejects the principle of political equilibrium and operates a centrally-directed and a highly integrated pyramid of social forces. Therefore it
is not governed in its behaviour by the free will of its leaders, but rather is driven by an objective law of the necessity of total power, under which the leading communists are only executing its maxims and its imperatives. Its actions are motivated by the iron law of permanent expansion of power through the acquisition of new power areas within and outside its base.

To expand within its base, the communist power system makes use of permanently operating tensions generated by the interaction of key social institutions. Further, it utilizes any momentary resentment against governmental and civil authority and uses and converts every social organization within its reach into instruments of expansion.

In short, the thesis of this paper is that tyranny must feed on conquest or die.

The first part of this work is theoretical and is devoted to problems of power. It opens with an attempt to formulate the general concept of political power. Later, it attempts to describe the communist monopolistic concept of political power and its sources. Finally, it attempts to formulate the pattern of behaviour of the communist power system - its strategy and its tactics. Because of the immense scope of the subject-matter, the first part touches on only some of the most important problems and is inevitably sketchy.

The second part of this study deals with the application
of the theory of total power. It discusses the origin of the communist system of total power; i.e., how it was established by the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia in 1917. Further, it describes the machinery of Soviet dictatorship by means of which the communist power system has consolidated and increased its strength. Finally, this second part deals with the methods of expansion - how the communist power system acquired new power areas and advances of strength through the operation of its agencies in various parts of the world.

Attempting to be an objective analysis of the communist power system, this study is descriptive rather than critical. Therefore, it does not portray nor does it evaluate the communist power system against the background of our own ethical standards.

So far as the sources are concerned, this study relies on the original works of leading Soviet, as well as non-Soviet Marxian theoreticians, rather than on secondary sources where these works are merely interpreted.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author wishes to express his appreciation to Dean H. F. Angus, Head of the Department of Political Science, Dr. J. O. St. Clair-Sobell, Head of the Department of Slavonic Studies, Dr. W. J. Rose and Dr. C. Bryner also of the Department of Slavonic Studies, for their kind attention extended to me during the period in which this thesis was written. Their interest in my post-graduate studies, as well as in my present undertaking, have afforded me much encouragement.

To Dr. H. E. Ronimois, under whom this thesis was written, I wish to express my deep gratitude and indebtedness for the valuable advice and guidance which he so generously offered and the patient concern which he manifested on my behalf.

To the staff of the University Library, I am greatly indebted for their kind assistance at all times.

Miroslav Fic.

University of British Columbia.
April 15th, 1953.
POLITICAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF COMMUNISM

A STUDY IN TOTAL POWER

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CHAPTER I.

POLITICAL POWER.

(a) ON POWER GENERALLY

The basic phenomenon on which the entire life of social organization rests is power. Every kind of social organization, no matter in what stage of development, has as its fundamental problem the problem of power. Therefore, in our endeavour to understand the genesis, the growth and the expansion or decay of any social organization, and in our endeavour to understand its social functions, we have to go down to the very basis of its life - we have to study its power problem.

Power in a social organization appears to have various modes and forms. There is political power, economic power, the power of church organization, the power of religious
and political beliefs, the power of parental authority, the power of trade unions and other professional organizations, the power of propaganda and a great variety of others.

Because in all these forms of social power there seems to be present one common element - the element of will and conscious activity - we can define social power as the production of intended effects.¹

Laws of social dynamics can be understood only in categories of power, as the laws governing physical nature are only comprehensible in terms of energy. Although we possess considerable knowledge of physical laws, we know much less about the laws which direct the processes in living nature; and in our endeavour to find out and to define the substance of power in a social organization, we face a difficulty similar to that of defining the substance of energy in natural sciences.

In this essay we shall be concerned only with one form of social power - with political power - and, to avoid misunderstanding, we endeavour to formulate what will be


understood as political power throughout this essay.

(b) **ON POLITICAL POWER**

Although political power is only one of the family of social forces which we meet in our daily lives, nevertheless, it occupies a prominent position among them. This is because political power is an integrating social force which brings into interaction and fruitful cooperation the key social forces, facilitating thus their harmonious functioning in the areas in which it operates.

Political power appears in three basic forms, each of which is characteristic for an increasing degree of its materialization. These forms are the force of attraction, the force of social cohesion and institutional loyalty and the force of social gravity.

Because of the variety of appearances of political power, there exist two schools of thought treating and interpreting political power from two different angles.

There is a school of political theory which treats political power in its outward forms and manifestations - i.e., how it appears in political institutions, laws and regulations. This school studies foremost the composition of political institutions, the division and range of powers vested in these and their legalistic foundations. It is studying political power as a
stabilized and materialized social force - as a force of social gravity? How political institutions, through a set of laws, exercise social control over the areas in which they function. This school may be described as a school of political institutionalism or as a school of legalistic approach. From its chief protagonists we name Hans Jelinek, Hans Kelsen and Julian Toyster.

On the other hand, there is a school of political theory which treats political power in terms of processes, in its dynamic manifestations. It studies social-psychological processes as a basis for genesis of social forces and also the methods by which these processes can be influenced and channeled. The main field of this school are the problems of mass psychology and the techniques of mass communications. It also tries to answer the questions of genesis, growth and expansion of political systems such as nazism, fascism and communism, as well as to see the motive forces in a democratic process. The chief protagonists of this school, among many others, is Charles E. Merriam and the study group around Harold D. Lasswell.

Because both of these schools are treating political power only from one of its aspects, in this essay we endeavour to approach the problem of political power from both its
aspects, in its unified concept. We try to see how the body politic functions in its dynamic capacities when it generates social forces in its environment and when it integrates these into itself. We also try to understand how the body politic functions in its static capacities, how it utilizes social forces organized in itself to achieve and to maintain its internal stability and to direct its internal life.

(c) COMPOSITION OF A POLITICAL PARTY

Political power is a product, a function of the body politic and before we can discuss this function, we have to describe the body politic itself - we have to establish its composition.

In social organization there are political bodies of three magnitudes: there is the political party, the national government, and finally, the embryo of a supranational political body in the Organization of the United Nations. Although they differ vastly in their magnitude and scope of authority, they still generate political power in its three fundamental aspects.

2 Hermann Heller defines political power as "the efforts to develop and utilize organized social powers". The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol.-XII, p. 301, MacMillan, New York, 1936.

Adolf A. Berle advances the so called Nuclear Concept of Political Power: "A Political Force consists of centrally attractive idea surrounded by an organizational apparatus." Natural Selection of Political Force, University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, Kansas, 1950.
forms. However, the major difference is that in having their main organs unevenly developed, they produce one or the other form of political power in preponderance.

The political party is well known for its ability to generate the force of attraction; consequently, it has its mass communications fully developed. The government is well known for its ability to exercise social control over the area in which it operates, and consequently, it developed those political institutions which generate the force of social gravity. The same can be said of the super-national political body, although it is still in its formative stage.

In this chapter we shall examine the political body of the lowest magnitude - the political party - and in the first place we shall try to see its composition.3

The political party is a power complex composed of numerous social forces kept together in working harmony. These are aggregated into three major organs of the political party, each of which produces one distinctive form political power. The mass communications generate political power in the form of attraction. Party congresses, conferences and

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3 In this general chapter On Political Power, the references made to the relative topics will concern only the Communist Party of USSR because of the following reasons: In the first place, in this work an attempt will be made to analyze the concept of power of communism; and secondly, because the Communist Party of USSR, as a highly integrated political body, offers the most suitable interpretive model.
sessions produce the force of social cohesion and institutional loyalty. Finally, the party apparatus, laws and intra-party orders produce political power in the form of social gravity.

The First Party Organ: Mass Communications.

In the first place, there is the ideology, the program and the platform of the political party, which in a very broad sense represents the party's intellect, its social consciousness and raison d'être. It is a set of philosophic and theoretic postulates and beliefs which are focussed on the future, what should be done, supplemented with a set of practical guides, how this should be achieved, and what to do and where to start at present.¹

¹ For the Communist Parties all over the world the following can be considered as program, platform and ideology in their long range activities. Their working resolutions, programs and platforms adopted by the congresses for their daily activities are, however, modified by domestic and present day conditions:


Karl Marx: Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Ibid., pp. 332 - 341.


(Continued on the following page)
Secondly, there is a very complex machinery of mass communications which is the technical means facilitating the transmission and dissemination of the party's ideology and the party's program and enabling the party to reach and contact the outside world as well as its own membership.

When the mass communications are directed towards the party's own membership, they serve as instruments through which the leading elite builds the social consciousness within the general membership masses, and through which the party commands are transmitted from the leading bodies to the general membership mass.

On the other hand, the party directs the apparatus of mass communications towards its own environment to disseminate its ideology, to stir up, to generate social forces and to

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Frederick Engels: Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Ibid., pp. 324 - 364.


"History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)." Edited by a Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B). Canadian edition by Francis White Publishers, Ltd., Toronto 1939, was authorized by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B).

attract these towards the party. 5

Hence, the first organ of the political party generates political power in the form of attraction.

The Second Party Organ: The Party Congresses, Conferences and Sessions.

The second organ of the political party is constituted by the congresses, conferences and sessions as well as the procedural rules governing these. They serve actually as carriers of the party's capacity to transform political power from its form of attraction to the form of social cohesion and institutional loyalty; their most significant feature is the time element. The congresses, conferences and sessions are not of a permanent nature, but are convened only to organize social forces generated in the party's environment, to integrate and absorb these into the party's internal organs. 6


6 An example of how the congresses and conferences operate can be found in Towster's description of conferences and congresses in USSR: Towster: Political Power in USSR, Chapter VII, art. 2, entitled The Congress and the Conference of the Party, pp. 144 - 152.
Hence, the second party organ serves as a carrier of the party's capacity to produce the force of social cohesion and institutional loyalty.


This third organ of the political party falls into two main divisions. In the first place, there is a skeleton of party organizations where political power appears in its most materialized, concentrated and consequently most stable form. The party skeleton is a tissue of power centers deployed horizontally over geographic regions and organized vertically into one integrated power system. Thus, the political party consists of the power centers of low order on its local levels, i.e. the local party organizations; and of the power centers of high order on its higher levels, i.e. of district, regional and nation-wide party organizations.7

Secondly, this third organ of the party consists of intra-party laws, statutes and orders which are directing, balancing and harmonizing the party's internal life. These also include the punitive provisions and the devices through

which the party enforces decisions within its internal organs. 8

Hence, the third organ of the political party produces political power in the form of social gravity.

And finally, there is the most important factor common to all three organs of the political party, the human element - the general membership. The human element with its class, sex and age stratification represents the social-biologic basis, a carrier of the party's social dynamics which determines the vitality and mobility of the party as a social movement. 9

The human element within the party is broken down into three functional levels linked in hierarchial order: into the leading elite which formulates policies and gives orders, into the transmitting cadres, and finally, into the general membership mass carrying out these policies and orders.

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8 For the intra-party of the Communist Party of USSR see the new party rules adopted at the XIX Party Congress convened on October 5th, 1952. Published in For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy, No. 34, August 22, 1952, Bucharest, Official Organ of the Cominform.

9 For the social stratification of the membership of the Communist Party of USSR see Towster: Political Power in USSR, Chapter XIII, called the Socio-Political Balance, pp. 313 - 375.

Hence, we conclude that the political party, as we know it from its general appearance and activities is actually the co-ordinated inter-action of three main organs of the political party; and that the political power in its unified concept is a simultaneous manifestation of attraction, cohesion and social gravity.

(d) THE POLITICAL PARTY AT WORK

Its External Activities.

The political party functions in its social environment and exercises an impact on the other social organizations as well as on the unorganized masses. It transmits its ideology and program through a variety of mass communications, such as party press, pamphlets, leaflets, by agitation and propaganda carried out by special departments of the party and by the activities of its individual members.

The party mass communications are directed towards the target social groups as well as towards the target sections of the population in order to generate the power tensions between the party and that particular target in question.

If the mass communications are beamed into masses of individuals not organized in other political parties, the effect they produce can be described as follows:
The individuals react in a positive direction towards the party when they were attracted. They react in a negative direction towards the party when they have been antagonized and repulsed. Finally, they can remain neutral.

This process of beaming the mass communications towards the unorganized individuals bears strongly a resemblance to the application of magnetic fields in physics where the small individual particles of matter are organized in positive, negative and neutral attitudes, depending, of course, on the strength of the field applied.

When the mass communications beam the party's ideology and program towards the social groups, and particularly political groups, the process which follows is similar to that mentioned above. The group as a whole is either attracted, repulsed, or finally it remains neutral.

When however, the pressure of the mass communications from outside is stronger than the centripetal forces holding the target group together, an entirely new process takes place. It may be described as the disruption and the disintegration of the social group and has these following distinctive features.

The first part of the membership of the target group is by the effect of mass communications attracted and it leaves the original group to join the attacking one. The
second part of the membership of the target organization also leaves the maternal group—this, however, with the aim to join another social group which would be more resistant. The third part of the membership of the target organization, because of its strongest institutional loyalties, stays organized within the remaining torso of the maternal group. Finally, the fourth part of the membership is released in the course of this process of splitting, and it emerges as some sort of emanation without any further political affiliations.

The process of disrupting and splitting of a social group is effected by a constant and long-lasting pressure of the mass communications on the target group and is, therefore, of a slow and protracted character. It not only depletes the target organization in its numerical strength, but it disturbs the internal equilibrium and the power ratio within the affected group and, therefore, it transforms and entirely reconstructs the target group. 10

10 Though it is impossible to explain social phenomena by the categories of natural sciences, the resemblance of the principles involved in the splitting of social groups and atoms is so striking that it deserves to be mentioned.

The process of the splitting of social groups as a practical operation of great importance and far reaching consequences was for the first time described by Matyas Rakosi in a speech "The Way of Our People's Democracy", delivered at the Academy of the Hungarian Communist Party on February 29th, 1952. Rakosi describes the slow and protracted process of splitting and chipping of the political parties of the (Continued on the following page)
The result of the processes of attraction of individuals and social groups as well as the result of the processes of splitting of social groups depend upon the intensity of the applied field of mass communications and better results are generally obtained:

1. When the mass communications are directed towards the targets - individuals or social groups - which were singled out and isolated.

2. When the mass communications transmit the ideas which appeal, attract and meet interests, needs and beliefs of individuals and groups in question.

By way of summary we can say that social forces are generated by an impact of body politic on the unorganized masses, and the force of attraction hitherto generated stirs up these masses and causes them to gravitate towards the body politic.

On the other hand, we would say that the social forces are released when the body politic collides with other power complexes, when its impact breaks the institutional loyalties and other centripetal forces holding the target group together, and when it attracts part of its membership. The membership

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Communists' opponents through which the Communists were gradually pushed into controlling the country. For this process he coins the term "The Salami Tactics". The report was in full published by the National Committee for Free Europe, Inc., New York City, May 1952, under the title "The Bolshevisation Tactics in Hungary."
of the disrupted group joins the attacking organizations not only as individuals, but it brings with itself quite frequently also the proportional part of the apparatus of the organizations to which it once belonged.

**Its Internal Activities.**

According to our concept of political power formulated at the outset of this paper, the body politic functions in its static capacity when it maintains its internal stability, and when it generates the force of social gravity through which the leading organs direct its internal life.

Speaking of the capacity to maintain internal consolidation and to produce the force of social gravity, we have to look for the carrier of this capacity. Here, we find that it consists of three major groups of power.

Firstly, there is the human element, the party executive officers elected by the party assemblies and endowed with the executive powers delegated to them.

Secondly, there is the skeleton of party organizations, which in the interaction with the party's executive officers bring the party to its life, to its functioning.

Thirdly, there are the laws directing intra-party life, the rules concerning party discipline, the rules enforcing party decisions and, finally, the punitive provisions,
All these above forces work harmoniously and their interaction produces a force of social gravity. Within the body politic, this is manifested as the institutional authority which commands respect, obedience and loyalty on the part of the membership.

In relation to the outside world, the force of social gravity renders to the body politic an appearance of a well constituted and integrated social organism, and it is manifested by the violence with which the body politic collides with other social organisms and still maintains its monolithic character. Another well known manifestation of the force of social gravity is that ill-defined force of authority which is generated by the body politic in its environment without its direct and intentional engagement by its very existence, and affecting other social organisms not in direct contact, but from a distance. This is accounted for by the fact that the body politic in the actual physical meaning of the word possesses a mass, a velocity, a direction of its motion, and, therefore, that it necessarily has its own gravitational field in which orbit this force of social gravity is effective.

The stability of the body politic achieved by propagation of centripetal forces is not a self-contained entity, but it serves as a carrier of the party's ability to discharge and
to beam its ideology into the environment, to release and to generate there new social forces. Here again, the party applied the field of mass communications, it again absorbs generated forces and produces again the force of social gravity; this is done by the processes already known to us.

Hence, we may conclude with the observation that the body politic, in the same way as any other living organism actually lives on, absorbing and digesting the negative athropy. It absorbs the negative athropy from its environment and transforms this within its organs into the energy—into its vital force—which in turn enables the body politic to release discharges into its environment and to cause athropy in its target organizations.

(e) THE INTERMEDIATE STAGE BETWEEN POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND STATICS.

It is impossible to draw a simple dividing line between political dynamics and political statics and to define when the body politic functions in its dynamic and static capacities.

Political power observed from a dynamic aspect has the form of attraction and before it is transformed within the body politic into the force of political statics, i.e. into the force of social gravity, it has to undergo a transformation which takes place in an intermediate stage.
From the outset we have to define those organs of the political party which are the carriers of the party's capacity to catch and to rally social forces which are outside the party, within its environment. Further, we have to establish those organs which enable the party to absorb and to digest an influx of this new energy, and which will secure that the party is not thrown out of balance.

Pursuing this objective we see that, in the first place, there is the network of party organizations deployed horizontally and vertically, penetrating deep into the party's social environment. This network represents a dense tissue of individual party organizations, which, being actual physical power centers, function as rallying points.

The second carrier of this intermediate stage consists of the statutes, orders and habits directing the settlement of a power relation of individual blocks within the party. More specifically, it includes all those written and habitual rules stipulating and directing the petrification of power relations within the party, and all those devices through which the party acquires and maintains its internal stability. These are the rules directing the development of discussion, directing the voting and the electoral procedures, the rules concerning the delegation of authority and, finally, the rules stipulating the organization and functioning of individual
party organs. In short, this carrier consists of the rules directing the intra-party procedures, of the statutes formulating the intra-party structure and of the devices through which the party achieves and materializes the expression of the power ratio of individual power blocks.

In the process rallying, settling and absorbing social forces, the party needs, however, the third agent which would enable the inter-action of the tissue of party organizations with the rules of intra-party procedure. And this agent consists of the party congresses, conferences and meetings and other numerous activities performed on all party levels.

Now, that we have described the carriers of the capacity of the body politic to produce the force of social cohesion, we can proceed to discuss this capacity itself - how these three power groups function in their inter-action.

At the party congresses, conferences and meetings the individuals and the social groups who were attracted to the party meet with the party's old membership, and, being an alien element, they have to be ideologically uniformed and later channelled into the party's internal organs. This process of unification takes place when the new membership accepts the party's program and when it must discontinue its present loyalties which could possibly bind it to another political
formation. In order to absorb the new membership, to strengthen the fetters between the newcomers and the party itself and to make this affiliation permanent, the new membership is distributed into the intra-party organs and it must accept commitments regarding its intra and outside party activities.

Now, when the new membership is dissolved and absorbed, it is given the objective conditions for building the force of social cohesion and institutional loyalty. The new members are assigned to individual cells which become their maternal organizations. Here they meet regularly with the party's elite and are exposed to continuous influence of all those devices through which the party indoctrinates and develops symbolism and fetishism. These devices in the interaction with the general membership masses produce and propagate centripetal forces which imbue the party with the appearance of a social monolith.

The party congresses, conferences and meetings, besides settling and channelling the turbulent social forces into the party's internal organs, act also in another way towards the transformation of political power from its dynamic to its static form. They formulate the party's policies and attitudes towards its outside world and they materialize these attitudes in programs, resolutions and decisions. They further create
and constitute the party's permanent bodies in which political power is manifested in its most materialized form. These are the executive councils, various committees and sub-committees and other numerous organs of the party's apparatus. In order to enable the development of different attitudes to party problems and to facilitate the formation and aggregation of the party membership into various intra-party power groups, free discussion is introduced at all party congresses, conferences and meetings.

Up to this point, up to the point of voting, when in the course of discussion the individual power blocs and formations were aggregated, the party assemblies act in their dynamic functions. When, however, the party assemblies approach the point of voting, no matter whether in policy-making or in electing the party executive organs, they enter into the region of political statics.

Hence, the acts of voting as well as the acts of electing make the power relation of individual power blocks developed during the discussion permanent. The power relation is petrified and materialized in the programs, resolutions and amendments as well as in the power composition of elected executive bodies, where the power ratio achieved by voting and electing will be retained until the next congress.
By way of conclusion we may say that the acts of voting and electing are the acts of transformation of political power from its turbulent, oscillating and unstable form of attraction to its condensed, materialized and stable form of social gravity. They render to political power those outside and well-known manifestations under which it is generally apprehended.

In this way the circle of power transition is completed. The social forces generated by the force of attraction are within the organs of the body politic transformed into the force of social cohesion, institutional loyalty, and finally, into the force of social gravity only to produce the force of attraction again.

Power changes its modes and manifestations, but never its reality.11

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11 For different approaches to the study of political power, see Field, Lowell G.: Hypothesis for a Theory of Political Power, Published in the American Political Science Review, Vol.-XLV, No. 3, September, 1951, pp. 715 - 723.


A quantitative approach to the problems of political power on an international level is made by Maurice A. Ash in An Analysis of Power, with Special Reference to International Politics, World Politics, Vol.-III, No. 2, January 1951, pp. 218 - 237.

See also Michels, Roberto: First Lectures in Political Sociology, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1949.

ON LIMITS OF POLITICAL POWER

There are two types of political parties, the democratic political parties and the totalitarian political parties.

In democratic societies there exist several political parties which compete in open election to constitute the government and to take part in it by sharing power. Also, governments in democratic societies are limited. The powers which are vested in these are separated, checked and balanced to prevent their accumulation and monopolization and to eliminate the use of governmental executive powers outside constitutional areas. In this restriction and limitation of political parties and the governments which they do constitute lies the fundamental difference between the governments of total and limited powers.

Political parties of total powers organize social forces in order to establish ultimate and permanent control over them and to constitute a government of total powers well known for its monopolistic and dictatorial character.

Democratic political parties, on the other hand, organize social forces for limited purposes. They form a limited government confined in its activity by a set of constitutional laws and characterized by the distribution, separation and balance of powers.

Before we treat communism as a political system which operates on the principles of unlimited power, we shall
summarize the main points which, taken together, draw the dividing line between a democratic and a totalitarian party.

Democratic political parties have but one social function: to constitute by general, direct and secret elections a government which operates on the classical Aristotelian concept of political equilibrium and on Montesquieu's concept of separation of powers.

Democratic political parties are limited power complexes:

In the first place, they are limited in their aims and programs; they will share power in the government with other political parties, and if they are in the majority, they will respect the right of the minority.

In the second place, they are limited in regard to the areas in which they operate. Democratic political parties limit themselves to electoral regions as defined by the constitution, electoral regulations, established habits and customs and they mobilize their membership only at the time of elections.

Thirdly, democratic political parties are limited in regard to methods and ways they use in their power seeking. They consider the institution of democratic elections as the main weapon to achieve their political ambitions and they do not use strikes, street-fighting and other forms of violence.
They do not organize intra-party organs of naked power to be able to intervene in the areas where the party is weak at the polls.

Democratic political parties further observe the time limits as set by the constitution and electoral laws and they resign from power if they lose the confidence of the popular vote. They do not use the entrusted governmental executive powers outside the framework of the constitution for the party's own purposes.

Furthermore, democratic political parties are unevenly developed. Although they possess all the attributes of the political party as described in the first part of this paper, most of their organs are in a rather undeveloped form. They have usually fully developed the means of mass communications, but the party apparatus is maintained only on upper levels with very vague local power centers.

Totalitarian political parties, on the other hand, are political systems of total power. They set forth total programs and total aims. They are not limited in their power seeking to electoral regions and pursuing their objectives, they resort to total strategy.
CHAPTER II

THE COMMUNIST FORM OF POLITICAL POWER

"All class struggle is a political struggle, because it is finally a struggle for power... To strive to overthrow the bourgeoisie, and to destroy its State, means to carry on political warfare. To create working class apparatus for the bridling and suppression of the resisting bourgeoisie - whatever such an apparatus may be, means to gain political power."

A. ON TOTAL POWER GENERALLY

The communist political party differs fundamentally from democratic political parties because it is a system of total power. It sets forth total aims and consequently it

does not limit itself in its power-seeking to constitutional areas, and it does not consider electoral proceedings as the main source of its power.  

For the communists the free democratic society, with its numerous organizations, serves as a source of power. They conceive modern society as a network operating under constant tensions. They believe that in it there exists an uninterrupted interplay and interaction of all social organizations which in their mutual impact, exercising their social functions, generate various modes of social power; and finally, that all social organizations and the tensions they generate can be used as a source of power.

The communists utilize for their power purposes, in the first place, tensions which are generated by principal social organizations, such as government institutions, political parties, trade unions and civic groups. The power tensions generated by the principal social organizations are the most

2 For studies in total power in the international field see George Schwarzenberger: Power Politics, Jonathan Cape, London, 1941.


reliable sources of power for the communist parties, because as pillars of modern industrial society, they are everywhere and they operate permanently.

In the second place, the communists utilize any momentary tension and movement within the society which generates resentment against governmental authority and against their target groups.

Finally, the communists utilize as a source of power the free mass base, the broad masses of the population not affiliated with any political organization.

The communist concept of political power is based on the assumption that all social organizations may be used for political purposes, if penetrated by operators to enable the communist party to manipulate their social functions, to direct their activities into desirable channels, and finally, to disturb their cooperative interaction and to set them against each other. For this reason all social organizations constitute targets for communist penetration, and the strategic value of each individual group determines the effort the communists make to establish control over the latter.

The communists, following this concept of power, utilize the key social organizations and the tensions they generate in the manner discussed below.
B. **SOURCES OF TOTAL POWER**

1. **SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AS A SOURCE OF POWER**

(a) **ELECTIONS**

A striking example of how the communists utilize tensions in society is revealed by their attitude towards elections. They do not consider elections to be at all the source of their power, but they exploit it for mobilizing the masses, for stirring up movements of resentment against governmental authority.

"The election campaign must be carried on not only for the purpose of obtaining a large number of seats in the Parliament, but for the revolutionary mobilization of the masses around the slogans of the proletarian revolution."^{4}

(b) **GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS**

When the communists succeed in elections to obtain seats in constitutional assemblies, they do not take part in

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constructive legislative activities, but they work persistently to undermine the constitutional value of these institutions:

"The Communist Party enters such institutions (Parliaments) not for the purpose of organizational work, but in order to direct the masses to blow up the whole bourgeois machinery and the parliament itself from within . . . . This work within the parliament, which consists chiefly in making revolutionary propaganda from the parliamentary platform . . . must be fully subordinated to the object and tasks of the mass struggle."5

The parliamentary immunity enjoyed by the communist members of legislative assemblies is exploited to cover and protect their illegal operations in which each member of parliament must be engaged.

"A Communist representative, by decision of the Central Committee is bound to combine legal work with illegal work. In the countries where the Communist delegate enjoys a certain inviolability, this must be utilized by way of rendering assistance to the illegal organizations and for propaganda of the party"6

The communist members of Parliament do not work as legislators, but concentrate on promoting and sharpening political conflicts between political parties, with the aim of

5 The Theses and Statutes of the Communist International (as adopted at the Second World Congress, 1920, at Moscow.) Reprinted in Blueprint for World Conquest, p. 92.
6 Ibid., p. 97
preventing any settlement which could bring about stability and consolidation within the state:

"Each Communist representative must remember that he is not a "legislator" who is bound to seek agreements with the other legislators, but an agitator of the party, detailed into the enemy's camp in order to carry out the order of the party there. The Communist member is not answerable to the wide mass of his constituents, but to his own Communist party - whether legal or illegal."?

(c) MINISTERIAL AND OTHER EXECUTIVE POWERS

When the communists are in control of seats in the cabinet and other executive governmental bodies, they use their vast executive powers for partisan decisions. They build up power nuclei in these agencies, and, finally, they engage, under their protection, in illegal operations.

The communist control of the Ministry of Interior, Army, Agriculture, Industry and Public Communications is usually fatal to the government which entrusted these executive powers to the communists.

(d) LOCAL AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS

In order to utilize local and municipal governments, the Executive Committee of the Communist International instructed communist parties to carry out the following activities:

7 Ibid, p. 98
If the communists have the majority in the local government institutions, they must:

(a) Carry on a revolutionary opposition against the bourgeois central authority.
(b) Do all for the aid of the poor population (economic measures, establishment or attempt to establish an armed workers' militia).
(c) Point out on every occasion the barrier which the bourgeois state power puts against really great changes.
(d) Develop on this basis the sharpest revolutionary propaganda without fearing a conflict with the state authorities.
(e) Under certain conditions substitute local Workers' Councils for the municipal administration.

The whole activity of the Communists in the communal administration, therefore, must be a part of the general work of destruction of the capitalist system.8

(e) POLITICAL PARTIES

Political parties can be utilized only if the communists are able to establish direct and immediate contact with their membership from below. For the purpose of facilitating access to the membership of other political parties, the communists engage in building temporary alliances as well as united fronts of a permanent nature. They form joint platforms and joint committees where the communists are carrying on agitation and propaganda to undermine the loyalty of

8 Ibid. pp. 92-93.
fellow membership masses, and to dissociate these from their
maternal organizations.

"The executive committee emphasizes that
the application of the United Front tactics
is the duty of every Communist Party, that
these tactics constitute a powerful means of
exposing the opportunism of the reformist
leaders and of disassociating the toiling
masses from the leaders, and also of uniting
the proletariat under the banner of the
Comintern." 9

In this respect, the Social Democratic and other
socialist parties are the foremost targets of communist
attacks. The reason being that the Socialists, by organizing
the working class, operate in the same social stratum as do
the communists, and that they are necessarily their main
competitors. Therefore, the communists do not consider poli-
tical parties of the extreme Right as the main obstacle in
their road to power, but rather the strength of socialist
parties is their main concern.

"We have combined and shall continue to
combine our readiness to march jointly with
the Social Democratic Parties and organiza-
tions to the struggle against fascism with
an irreconcilable struggle against Social
Democracy as the ideology and practice of

9 I. Komer: Ten Years of Comintern, quoted in August
Tyler's The United Front, Rand School Press, New York, 1933.
Reprinted in Philip Szeknich's The Organizational Weapon,
The Rand Corporation, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York,
1952, p. 135.
compromise with the Bourgeois, and consequently also against any penetration of this ideology into our own ranks.\textsuperscript{10}

The political struggle waged against socialist parties is a very severe one, and recently, the communist parties were supplied with a pamphlet furnishing an ideological platform and guide for combating the Social Democrats. Thus, the battle is fought for the monopoly over the working class, with the communists aiming to push other socialist parties out of this region, and to destroy them in isolation.\textsuperscript{11}

(f) \textbf{TRADE UNIONS}

Trade unions serve as a main and direct source of power to communist parties, and there are three ways in which they are utilized.

In the first place, trade unions serve as a special environment which facilitates the communists' access to the working class. The members of the communist party meet in trade unions with workers belonging to other political parties and are instructed to carry out propaganda and agitation to weaken and to break the loyalty of their fellow trade unionists to their political leadership. Strikes, demonstrations,


\textsuperscript{11} O. Kusinen: \textit{The Right-Wing Social Democrats Today}, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1950.
meetings and other mass activities organized by trade unions function as large united fronts from below, supplying a suitable environment for the establishment of access to the membership of other political parties.

"Consequently, the Communists must strive to create as far as possible complete unity between the trade unions and the Communist Party, and to subordinate the unions to the leadership of the party . . . For this purpose, the Communists should have Communist fractions in all the trade unions and factory committees and acquire by their means an influence over the labour movement and direct it."12

and further:

"They must initiate the forming of the trade unions where these do not exist."13

The second reason why the communists exercise the utmost effort to establish control over the trade unions is because of their immense revolutionary potentiality and their striking power to paralyze vital centers of industrial society. The trade unions have not only fully developed their central organizations, but they are also extremely well organized on the local levels, and having factory committees in every individual enterprise, they penetrate deep into the economic life of the country. Thus, the trade unions are the main instrument of communist conquest.

12 Theses and Statutes of the Communist International, Blueprint for World Conquest, p. 106.

13 Ibid., p. 103.
The third way of utilization of trade unions by the communist parties is quite unique. Unions are not only envisaged as a main revolutionary force which will effect the seizure of political power. They are also considered to be the very instrument through which the communist party, after the conquest, establishes and sets into motion the machinery of dictatorship to retain its power.

"The Communists, converting the labour unions and the factory committees into the powerful weapons of the revolution, prepare these mass organizations for the great task which they will have after the establishment of the dictatorship of proletariat, for the task being an instrument of the organization of economic life on a Socialist basis."

By way of conclusion we can say that the prime objective why the communists exercise the utmost effort to lies in control trade unions, their dense and well-integrated organizational skeleton. The control of the organizational skeleton of trade unions facilitates in the first place an easy access to the working class mass base. Secondly, it serves as a revolutionary hammer for smashing political institutions of their opponents in the process of seizure of power. And finally, the organizational skeleton of trade unions is converted into the instrument of dictatorship after the seizure of power.

14 Ibid., p. 110.
PERIPHERAL ORGANIZATIONS AS A SOURCE OF POWER

The civic organizations, such as cultural, artistic, church, women's, youth and others, play a very important role in the communists' concept of power. They constitute the periphery of the communists' power pyramid and therefore are called peripheral or front organizations.

There are three ways how these civic and nonpolitical organizations are utilized by the communist parties for their power purposes:

1. They facilitate an access to the middle class,
2. They are used by the communists to isolate and to destroy organizations of their opponents,
3. They are used as a non-conductive barrier which is erected between the operation of seizure of power and the popular masses in order to prevent any spontaneous movement within the latter.

The front organizations are of extreme strategic value for the communists because they facilitate an access to the middle class. The communists' effort to bring under their direct control the middle class of free societies has the priority even over the effort to bring under their control the working class. The point is, that the great majority of workers is organized in other political parties, and that being indoctrinated, they are ideologically more stable. This is the main factor why the communists' gains among the workers after World War II were not decisive. On the other hand, the middle class, being ideologically unstable and
being not permanently affiliated with any political formation, represents the ground where the communists in later years were advancing most rapidly. In addition to the fact that the middle class is generally more accessible than the working class, another important factor directs communists' orientation towards the middle class. The latter occupies a leading position in vital power centers of society and is a leading elite in governmental, scientific and cultural institutions, industrial enterprises and in the army.

Thus, the revolutionary potentialities of communist parties do not depend on their numerical strength and on the support they receive from the working class, but rather on the ability of the communists to involve sympathetic or neutral strata of the population, functioning in key social positions, in their enterprises. And here the front organizations function as a connecting link through which the communist party reaches the decisive sectors of the population - the middle class and the intelligentsia.

The front organizations, because of their non-political and popular character, are further used by the communists as sounding boards for communist propaganda, and as an instrument which the party engages in areas where it can not act directly, under its own name. The front organizations are used for isolating, discriminating and against/attacking organizations and groups which are the pillars of communist resistance in free societies, and which
are the main obstacles in the communists' road to power.

The front organizations play the most remarkable role in the communist operation of seizure of power where they represent, after the trade unions, the second main revolutionary force. The front organizations are designed to carry out the revolutionary isolation and neutralization of the broad masses of the population with a view to preventing their spontaneous movement and grouping which could possibly result in the intervention of these popular masses into the communists' operation of seizure of power. The front organizations are designed to be turned into the non-conductive barrier which would separate the operation of seizure of power from popular masses, and which would secure that they, as in-calcuable factors, would not enter into this political equation.

The communists have worked out special tactics in order to penetrate into the front organizations, to establish in these their power nuclei and to manipulate their functions.

In the first place, the front organizations are generally more accessible / the fact that they are less sensitive to political power implications, that they have open membership and that they operate on non-political platforms. The communists' successes in penetrating front organizations can be further accounted for through their exploiting of liberal sentiments, political tolerance and the ideological vulnerability of their membership. They exploit also
general apathy, lack of interest in leadership, and finally, the organizational looseness of their targets. Thus, the front organizations as a source of power are virtually monopolized by the communist parties, because other political parties, having their organizational apparatus built for operating in constitutional areas, cannot reach into these regions.

We can conclude this paragraph with the observation, that the institutional structure of society and social forces it generates, serve as a source of power for the communist parties. The communists penetrate their target organizations and work within these to accelerate their functional activities, to sharpen their conflicts with the environment, and to increase frictions within society in general.

The communists retard and limit functional activities of their target organizations in order to neutralize these, to bring about their functional collapse, and to create a functional vacuum as a condition for their replacement by new groups fully controlled by the communists.

In many instances, however, the prime and original functions of social groups are of no strategic value to the communists, and therefore, the main stress is laid on the

10 See for example Dimitroff: "This obliges us to approach the different organizations in different ways, taking into consideration that infrequently the bulk of the membership does not know anything about the real political character of its leadership." The United Front, p. 40.
utilization of their activities of secondary importance. The communists make use of their meeting places for their own illegal gatherings; they are used as recruiting grounds, or they utilize their organizational skeleton only as a medium to reach a certain stratum of the population and individuals of special importance for them.

Thus, the communists utilize both the internal as well as the external conflicts of social groups to establish power nuclei in these; to strangle them in performing their social functions, and to undermine their institutional value. The vital sectors of modern industrial society, such as government institutions, trade unions, cooperative societies, political parties and key civic institutions, if penetrated by the communists and strangled in their social functions, have direct and immediate reflection on the state of society as a whole bringing it to its functional collapse.

3. THE FREE MASS BASE AS A SOURCE OF POWER

The masses play an important role in the communist concept of political power. They are original material from which new social organizations are carved out in sectors of the population where the communists are unable to establish control over the groups presently in existence. The diffuse masses are articulated according to the strategic needs with the advantage that the communists gain initial control within
these newly formed groups.

The art of directing and controlling the masses of unorganized population consists of the ability to articulate these into manipulable units, to establish within the sector in question a series of organizations which will serve as points of concentration, in the hope, that the diversity of their programmes and platforms will secure the attention of individuals with diversified opinions, no matter whether sympathetic, neutral, or hostile towards communism.

Thus, manipulability is the principal quality of the masses and a criterion according to which they are classified by the communists. The meaning of mass has not a constant value in the communists' concept of power, and it varies according to the changes which take place in the forms of struggle at a given stage.

"At the beginning of the war, several thousand real revolutionary workers were sufficient to be called masses . . . When the revolution has been sufficiently prepared, the term "masses" acquires a different meaning. Then, several thousand workers can no longer be called masses . . . The term masses then means the majority of all the exploited."15

The term "mass" in the communist concept of power has

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always a relative meaning, and it actually expresses the subordinated relation of a certain lump of population to a certain social group which functions as its leading elite. In the communists' power system there are three different concepts of mass which follow in sequence.

In the first place, there is a party mass. The general membership of the communist party is considered to be a mass articulated by the leading elite according to party needs.

Secondly, there is a working class mass, embracing all workers and farmers. Here the communist party as a whole functions as the leading elite and articulates this working class mass base.

Thirdly, there is a mass in general, embracing all the population. The leading elite here is represented by the working class organizations, which under the communist control, articulate this general mass base into suitable formations.

To sum up, the communists' mass concept can be described as a relation between the leading elite and those who are led which enables the former to articulate this subordinated mass in a series of organizations, and to manipulate their external and internal activities. The numerical relation between leading elite and subordinated mass base is not of prime importance.

In order to understand the communist mass concept, the attached chart shows a sequence by which ever wider circles of
THE COMMUNIST POWER SYSTEM

The figures indicate the application of mass involvement principle in Hungary.

362,000
whole party membership as elite

1,730,000
trade unions as elite

2,531,000
front organizations as elite

9,205,000
population as a whole
the population are involved into the communist power vortex. This power structure is organized in hierarchial order, with the communist party at the apex, resting on the broad base of the entire population. All organizations connected and linked with this power structure serve as channels through which party commands and party ideology are transmitted from top to bottom, and as agencies through which those commands are executed.

The marginal organizations, operating on the periphery of the communists' power structure, are of special importance. They function as capillaries penetrating deep into the free mass base, facilitating an immediate contact of the communist party with neutral, but largely hostile, environment. The ability of the communist parties to appeal to neutral and hostile strata of the population lies in the gradual transmission of party commands from top to bottom of the power structure through a series of organizations functioning as transformers and diffusion stations. When party commands and ideology are transmitted, these stations gradually diffuse, cushion and transform them into more moderate language. And when they finally reach peripheral groups, and through these the general public, they appeal to liberal sentiments and political tolerance, being completely beyond the suspicion that they might have originated in the communist party.

There is one more important aspect of mass as a source
of power to the communist parties. The general masses are a reservoir supplying the party's inner mechanism with an influx of new membership. The party purges itself continuously of elements who in the course of intra-party struggle and in carrying out party orders were slowed down by resistant medium. The influx of newcomers supplies the party with a stream of new and highly active members who refresh and vitalize its organs. The secret of vigorous activity and the vitality of communist parties lies in the fact that the relatively stable elite periodically cleans the cadres and the general membership mass of worn-out elements and refreshes its lower party organizations and its cadres with highly active newcomers.

C. SUMMARY OF COMMunist SOURCES OF POWER

The communists do not recognize traditional constitutional and electoral areas as the direct and only source of their power. They conceive the whole of society as the field of their operations. They utilize as a direct source of their power:

1. Reliable and permanently operating power tensions generated by internal and external conflicts of key social institutions.
2. They utilize any momentary motion of resentment against existing authority.
3. They utilize the free mass base.
The communists exploit social institutions either in their dynamic capacities, i.e. in their capacity to set and to stir up the masses into motion; or in their static capacities, exploiting their institutional values, their social gravity and their organizational skeletons.

In the regions where the communists cannot reach through the media of existing front organizations, they carve out suitable power structures from amorphous masses. The strategic considerations and the form of struggle being the determining factors according to which the party mass, working class mass, or general mass is broken down into desirable formations, and linked to the power pyramid of the communists.

This planned articulation of diffused masses of the population into manipulable units has unique and far-reaching consequences:

1. It transforms amorphous and loose masses of the population into mobilized sources of social power.

2. It bears with itself an advantage of initial control within these newly formed groups and, consequently, secures the monopoly of power in regions where these were formed.

3. It reconstructs/social environment of target organizations and leads directly to the transformation of their group relations. A ring of communist-controlled
groups erected around the target organizations replaces their natural environment and forces them into controlled and manipulable interaction.

Having briefly described the sources of the communist power system, in the next chapter we will endeavour to discuss ways and means by which it achieves its aims. We shall deal with its strategy and tactics.
CHAPTER III

ON POLITICAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS

"... There is, on the whole, nothing more important in life than to find out exactly the point of view from which things must be regarded and judged, and to keep to it, for we can only apprehend the mass of events in their unity from one standpoint, and it is only the keeping to one point of view that can save us from inconsistency...."

(a) ORIGINS OF TOTAL POWER CONCEPT

The communist concept of political power is founded on the Clausewitz general philosophy of power, as exposed in the first and in the eighth book of his well-known work On War.

Clausewitz, in his treatise, describes the organization and the functioning of total power in its most violent form, codifies the maxims of its behaviour, and formulates

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Clausewitz' work was translated from German by O. J. Matthijs Jolles, Professor of the Institute of Military Studies at the University of Chicago and published in unabridged form by the Modern Library.
thus the theory of war.\textsuperscript{2}

War is an instrument of politics and Clausewitz devotes all his extensive study to this advanced stage in which politics, in pursuing its objects, resorts to violence.

The communist concept of political power, on the other hand, formulates the maxims of behaviour of total power in its prewar stage, in the stage when total power is still operating on a political level and slipping into the province of violence and war only when it is inevitable.

Thus, the communist concept of power is a further elaboration of Clausewitz' concept of total power, i.e., from general to more specific, detailed and refined. The communist concept of political power, by subordinating war to politics, represents the synthesis of both modes of power. The synthesis of power in its diluted and constructive form with power in its most concentrated form, known by its sudden discharges and pulsations of violence. It is actually removing that ill-defined frontier between peaceful and violent politics, between peace and war and it formulates a unified concept of social power.

\textsuperscript{2} For the point that communist strategy is based on Clausewitz, see Byron Dexter: Clausewitz and Soviet Strategy, in \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol. 29, No. 1, October, 1950, pp. 41 - 55.

The fact that the communist philosophy of power is derived from Clausewitz has also direct bearing on the communist political strategy. The communist political strategy is derived from the maxims of military strategy of total power as formulated by Clausewitz, which are, however, elaborated and perfected for functioning on a political level.

In the communist political strategy, war and violence, as the principal instruments of conquest, are obsolete. Victory is sought, speaking in Clausewitz's terminology, through the strategic combination and operation of enemy forces without combat. The whole point is to avoid the decisive battle and to meet a political adversary on a different power level where he cannot make use of the organization and the superiority of his forces. Thus the victory which is achieved on a political level decides everything, and military operations are unnecessary and are not resorted to at all.

While Clausewitz formulates the strategy of conquest through war and does not deal with the problems of upholding the conquest (because this belongs to the province of politics), the communists, on the other hand, elaborate the strategy of conquest and also the strategy of maintaining conquest, and place them both on a political level.

In this chapter, we shall endeavour to formulate some of the basic strategic principles upon which the communist conquest, and also its preservation, operate; and we shall project them on the background of Clausewitz's theory of total power.
(b) **POLITICAL ACTION**

In the preceding chapters we have been discussing various modes of social power. We have established the power structure of the communist party and also the power composition of the environment in which it operates. We have also discussed the interchangeability and transformation of various social powers. Now the problem arises as to how to clarify and systematize the ways by which these powers are utilized by the communists. In other words, we will endeavour to formulate the rules of conduct of politics, the guidance, the methods by which the communists arrange and organize social powers into political action; in short, we will endeavour to formulate the political strategy and tactics of communism.³

In the first place, we have to clarify what the political action is. The action in its general concept means any movement in the resistant medium. And consequently, under political action we would understand any movement of communism (on national or global level) in its environment.

³ Viz Lenin: "By Party tactics, we mean the political conduct of the Party, or nature, tendency and methods of its political activity."
Thus, political action has actually a dual character: one group of forces is seeking to disturb the present status quo, and the other group endeavours to maintain it by acting in its defence.

Political action in itself is of no value, but serves as a means to achieve the goal for which it was organized. Therefore, any action which serves to achieve the communists' aim, to destroy the old society, is acceptable for the communists:

"And we subordinate our communist morality to this (class struggle) task. We say: Morality is what serves to destroy the old exploiting society... Communist morality is the morality which serves this purpose...

We do not believe in eternal morality, and we expose all the fable about morality."4

The communists do not envisage the political action as a simple act, a simple discharge of all the engaged forces at the very same period of time and place. Political action appears to be composed of a series of independent operations, which only in their totality determine the final outcome of political action. This fact, that the political action is split in a series of minor operations, has in turn a direct bearing on the organization of political action itself.

Communist political action, just as the Clausewitz military action, is therefore a complex phenomenon, and

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is organized from strategic and tactical aspects.

The organization and conduct of individual partial operations of political action with subordinated power elements belongs to the sphere of tactics:

"Tactics deal with the forms of struggle and the forms of organizations of the proletariat, with their changes and combinations. During a given stage of the revolution tactics may change several times, depending on the flow or ebb, the rise or decline of the revolution."\(^5\)

On the other hand, the integration of these individual operations of political action by coordination, subordination and supra-ordination, with a view to reaching the object for which the action as a whole was organized, is strategy.

"Strategy is the determination of the direction of the main blow of the proletariat at a given stage of the revolution, the elaboration of a corresponding plan for the disposition of the revolutionary forces (the main and the secondary reserve), the fight to carry out this plan through the given stage of the revolution."\(^6\)

(c) STRATEGIC OBJECT

Strategic object is a teleological postulate which has to be reached by means of political action.

The strategic object of political action lies within the frame of the strategic field and is achieved when deployed forces were acting upon each other and when they reached expected stability in a new equilibrium.

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5 J.V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, p. 71.
6 J.V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, p. 68.
The strategic aim of communism is to establish a communist society on an international scale through world revolution:

"The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions."  

According to this postulate the world revolution is the only means through which strategic aims should be reached and, therefore, it represents in our frame of consideration the political action.

Political action of the magnitude of world revolution is a complex task and its realization is envisaged through three main stages, each of which has its own distinctive strategic aim:

"Our revolution already passed through two stages, and after the October Revolution, it has entered a third stage. Our strategy changed accordingly.

FIRST STAGE: 1903 to February 1917. Objective: to overthrow Tsarism and completely wipe out the survivals of mediaevalism. The main force of the revolution: the proletariat. Immediate reserves: the peasantry. Direction of the main blow: the isolation of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, which are striving to win over the peasantry and liquidate the revolution by compromising with Tsarism. Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the working class with the peasantry . . .

SECOND STAGE: March 1917 to October 1917. Objective: to overthrow imperialism in Russia and

7 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Manifesto of the Communist Party, Selected Works in Two Volumes, Vol.-1, p. 61.
to withdraw from the imperialist war. The main force of the revolution: the proletariat. Immediate reserves: the poor peasantry. The proletariat of neighbouring countries as probable reserves. The protracted war and the crisis of imperialism as the favourable factor. Direction of the main blow: isolation of the petty-bourgeois democrats (Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), who were striving to win over the toiling masses of the peasantry and to terminate the revolution by compromising with imperialism. Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the proletariat with the poor peasantry.

THIRD STAGE: Commenced after the October Revolution. Objective: to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries. The revolution is spreading beyond the confines of one country; the epoch of world revolution has commenced. The main forces of the revolution: the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in all countries. Main reserves: the semi-proletarian and small-peasant masses in the developed countries, the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries. Direction of the main blow: isolation of the petty-bourgeois democrats, isolation of the parties of the Second International, which constitute the main support of the policy of compromise with imperialism. Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the proletarian revolution with the liberation movement in the colonies and the dependent countries.

Strategy deals with the main forces of the revolution and their reserves. It changes with the passing of the revolution from one stage to another, but remains essentially unchanged throughout a given state. 8

Also this last stage of world revolution with its strategic object to "consolidate a dictatorship in one country and to use it as a base for an overthrow of governments in other countries," is a tremendous task and is therefore further

8 J.V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, pp. 69 - 70.
decomposed into a series of actions varying in their magnitude. The World Revolution is divided into operations to seize power in individual countries and these operations are further subdivided into a multitude of actions on a tactical level.

Although all these minor actions viewed from the total angle of World Revolution are only the tactical operations, they still have, by reason of their complexity, their own strategy and tactics.

Thus, we can speak of the strategy of the coup d'état in February 1938 in Czechoslovakia, or of the strategy of revolutionary war in colonies, as well as of the strategy of peace movement, without being confused that these operations are self-contained entities and that they hold no bearing on the World Revolution.

(d) THE PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM IS NEVER ACHIEVED

When the strategic object is reached, it does not mean that the relation of forces, established as the outcome of an action is absolute and permanent. In political action the victory does not mean the physical extermination of an opponent. As a matter of fact, all the opponent's forces which took part in action remain within the strategic field, and may be again reorganized in order to commence a new action.
Lasting and complete equilibrium in social organization does not exist; the interplay of forces is a constant phenomenon of social life.

And, therefore, in that very moment when victory is achieved, there arises inevitably a new problem, namely, the problem of maintaining victory and staying in power.

This maxim of total power was soon recognized by the Bolsheviks after the conquest of power in Russia in 1917, and the history of the U.S.S.R. from 1917 to the present day is only an elaboration of techniques on how to preserve the conquest.

A democratic society maintains its stability by periodic re-examination and re-adjustment of changing power relations by the institution of election.

Total power systems maintain their stability by the introduction of an elaborate apparatus of supressive organs controlling not only the organizational structure of society, but also controlling the mass base.

Therefore, the political systems of total power, once set in operation, are driven with the inner necessity of principles upon which they operate towards the continuous expansion of power. And the monstrosity of communist dictatorship lies precisely in the fact that the communists, in order to make their victory lasting, have to control the interplay of forces from the very bottom to the ultimate top of social structure.
When the communists have established their strategic object they also clarify the theatre in which the political action will take place - they define the strategic field.

Under the strategic field we understand the projection of political action into spacial-temporal categories. These localize the action into positive limits, stating when, where, and with what forces involved the political action will take place.

The strategic field as a spacial-temporal-energetic frame of political action is a total sum of social forces, which either originate within that particular theatre, or which will be brought there from the outside.

All these forces are evaluated by the communist strategists as to whether they constitute the main forces of the revolution, or whether they are the direct or indirect reserve. The main forces of the World Revolution are the communist parties and their reserves are classified by Stalin as follows:

".. The reserves of the revolution can be:
Direct: (a) the peasantry and in general the intermediate strata of the population within the country; (b) the proletariat of the neighbouring countries; (c) the revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries; (d) the gains and achievements of the dictatorship of the proletariat - part of which the proletariat may give up temporarily, while retaining superiority of forces, in order to buy off a powerful enemy and gain a respite; and
Indirect: (a) the contradictions and conflicts among the nonproletarian classes within the country, which can be utilized by the proletariat to weaken the enemy and to strengthen its own reserves; (b) contradictions, conflicts and wars (the imperialist war, for instance) among the bourgeois states hostile to the proletarian state, which can be utilized by the proletariat in its offensive or in maneuvering in the event of a forced retreat.*

All these three groups of forces i.e., the main force and direct and indirect reserves, are further evaluated and scrutinized according to their magnitude, power composition, relative proportion, relative position in time and space. They are further scrutinized according to the direction of their motion, velocity, and according to the time factor of their internal development:

"In determining its line of tactics, each Communist Party must take into account the concrete internal and external situation, the correlation of class forces, the degree of stability and strength of the bourgeoisie, the degree of preparedness of the proletariat, the position taken up by the various intermediary strata in its country, etc." 10

The evaluation and scrutinization of all forces which will take part in political action is of cardinal importance for communist strategists for the fact that the communists base their calculations on utilization of power tensions; on utilization of dynamic forces of society and not on static numerical strength of communist parties.

9 J.V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, p. 71

10 The Programme of the Communist International, as adopted by the Sixth World Congress in 1928 in Moscow. Reprinted in Blueprint of World Conquest, p. 238.
"That is why in deciding the question of proletarian revolution statistical calculations of the percentage of the proletariat to the population in a given country lose the exceptional importance so eagerly attached to them by the pedants of the Second International."

(f) **STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF POLITICAL ACTION**

The clarity of the strategic field, i.e., the evaluation of the communists' own forces and the forces of their adversary, is the most significant feature in all policy-making statements of communist strategists. Especially Stalin's reports to Party Congresses and Conferences, and all the important documents of the Communist International speak in very simple language in this respect.

The irrefutable proof that the communists political strategy is based on Clausewitz' strategical principles was provided by Stalin himself when, in his lecture at Svedrlov University in 1924, he adopted Clausewitz' four main strategical axioms and modified them for political action: These are the principle of concentration, the principle of selection of decisive moment, the principle of determined pursuit of strategic aim and finally the principle of retreat. They are, actually, the cornerstones of communist strategy and therefore we quote in full:

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11 J.V. Stalin: *Problems of Leninism*, p. 32.
"FIRST: the concentration of the main forces of the revolution at the enemy's most vulnerable spot at the decisive moment, when the revolution has already become ripe, when the offensive is going full-steam ahead, when insurrection is knocking at the door, and when bringing the reserves up to the vanguard is the decisive condition of success . . .

SECOND: the selection of the moment for the decisive blow, of the moment for starting the insurrection, so timed as to coincide with the moment when the crisis has reached its climax, when it is fully apparent that the vanguard is prepared to fight to the end, the reserves are prepared to support the vanguard, and maximum consternation reigns in the ranks of the enemy . . .

THIRD: undeviating pursuit of the course adopted, no matter what difficulties and complications are encountered on the road toward the goal; this is necessary in order that the vanguard may not lose sight of the main goal of the struggle and that the masses may not stray from the road while marching towards that goal and striving to rally around the vanguard. Failure to observe this condition leads to a grave error, well known to sailors as "losing the course" . . .

FOURTH: maneuvering the reserves with a view to effecting a proper retreat when the enemy is strong, when retreat is inevitable, when to accept battle forced upon us by the enemy is obviously disadvantageous, when, with the given alignment of forces, retreat becomes the only way to ward off a blow against the vanguard and to keep the reserves intact."

From this paragraph we can draw the conclusion that the communists, by clarifying the strategic object and the strategic field, are trying to push the equation of political action into the strict law of necessity, with the view to freeing it as much as possible from the factors which are not calculable.

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1 J.V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, passim. 72-73-74.
Thus, for example, the major communist concern in their operation of seizure of power is to eliminate the participation of popular masses in this process; to isolate these because their revolutionary potentiality and the direction of their motion are not calculable.

(g) **THE TACTICAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL ACTION**

Tactics means to organize and to conduct individual minor political operations which in their totality effect the gradual shift of gravity within the strategic field, which in the end brings victory.

Looking at communist operations from the lower, tactical level, these operations appear to be only individual political actions with hardly any mutual interconnection. Their tactical object is quite often diametrically opposed to the strategic object and it is really quite difficult to piece together the mosaic of individual tactical operations and to disclose the underlying strategic pattern.

The real difficulty in identifying the true intentions of communists lies in the fact that the tactical object is very often taken for the strategic one. The tactical operations, because they aim directly at their tactical objects, are very misleading in judging the communists strategic aim. The strategic object is reached through a series of tactical operations, being somehow concealed behind them.
The communists, in order to deceive their opponents, also resort to the indirect approach when their aims are achieved not be the shortest, open and direct ways, but by the application of the most complex and elaborate tactics.

There is, however, a reliable guide to the ascertaining of the communists' true intentions. This is to understand and to keep in mind the fundamental operational principles upon which the communist system, as a system of total power, acts.

One must see behind every move of the communists, however innocent, peaceful, and even advantageous for their opponents as it may appear to be, the operation of the iron law of continuous increase of power. Because as Clausewitz has already found out, the retreat and even the suspension of action, for total power systems means only the necessity to gather strength and to await a more suitable moment:

"A complete equilibrium of forces can never produce a suspension of action, for in such a suspension he who has the positive aim - that is, the assailant - would necessarily retain the initiative . . ."

We see that the idea of an equilibrium cannot explain a suspension of hostilities, but all it amounts to is the waiting for a more favourable moment."2

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2 Karl von Clausewitz: On War, Book 1, p. 11.
See for this point also an article of G. Kennan: published under the pseudonym "Z": The Sources of Soviet Conduct, Foreign Affairs, July, 1947.
Because the basic material of strategic and tactical operations is the same (the social powers of various forms) the maxims governing political actions on a strategic level are also applicable to political actions on a tactical level. Tactical operation is also a dual. It has its own direct tactical object and its own tactical field in which the forces are acting. In the field of tactics too, Stalin follows his master, when he elaborates Clausewitz' tactical principles and modifies them for political action:

"Tactical leadership is part of strategic leadership subordinated to the tasks and the requirements of the latter. The task of tactical leadership is to master all forms of struggle and organization of the proletariat and to ensure that they are used properly so as to achieve with the given relation of forces, the maximum results necessary to prepare for strategic success . . .

FIRST: To put in a forefront precisely those forms of struggle and organization which are best suited to the conditions prevailing during the flow or ebb of the movement at a given moment . . .

SECOND: To locate at any given moment that particular link in the chain of processes which, if grasped, will enable us to hold the whole chain and to prepare the conditions for achieving strategic success.

The point here is to single out from all the problems confronting the Party that particular immediate problem, the answer to which constitutes the central point, and the solution of which will ensure the successful solution of the other immediate problems.3

3 J.V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, passim, 75-77.
From the general communist theory of total power, derived from Clausewitz follows, that tactics is definitely subordinated to strategy. The magnitude of tactical power complexes being smaller and also the powers which are involved in tactical operations are in their more rudimentary forms.

From the quantitative and qualitative aspect, tactics is subordinated to strategy. From the functional aspect the relation between strategy and tactics is that of a whole and of a part in an organic unit.

Whereas in the mechanical unit the relation between the whole and the part is of a constant value, in the organic unit this relation is to a certain extent flexible on account of the adjustability and ability of individual parts to compensate; because both, the parts as well as the whole, do possess their own intellects.

And this gives us a further idea that there is also another interdependence between strategy and tactics. When the tactical operation does not proceed according to the strategic plan, the strategic intellect is given time to rearrange and to reorganize other tactical operations in order to achieve its aim; or finally to modify and adjust the strategic object itself.
This brings us to the principle of retreat or suspension of operations, which in terms of communist terminology were formulated in Lenin's pamphlet Left Wing Communism:

"The revolutionary parties must complete their education. They have learned to attack. Now they have to realize that this knowledge must be supplemented with the knowledge how to retreat properly. They have to realize - and the revolutionary class is taught to realize it by its own bitter experience - that victory is impossible unless they have learned both how to attack and how to retreat properly."

When, however, the tactical intellect is conscious of the fact that its own sacrifice is out of proportion to the value of its own advantage, it rejects the strategic intellect as supreme authority. It might join directly the adversary forces; it might fight against the authority within the complex to which it once belonged, or finally, it might remain neutral. An example of this is Tito's revolt against Soviet authority as well as the revolt of General Vlasov.1


2. For the background of the Tito-Stalin rift, see letters exchanged between the Communist Party of USSR and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in The Soviet Yugoslav Dispute, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1948.


Strategy and tactics form the functional unity. Both are integral and complementary parts of the whole - of political action. Tactics without strategy are minor, individual and separated operations without a leading teleology. On the other hand, strategy without tactics is a general concept of political action without its practical realization.

(1) **THE FORMS OF POLITICAL ACTION.**

The communists' concept of power has also a direct bearing on the forms of political action. The communists' political system, being the system of total power, is necessarily also a system of total strategy. In pursuing its objects, it does not limit itself only to conventional forms of political struggle, but it uses and develops such forms of struggle which are at the moment most advantageous.

"In the first place, Marxism differs from all primitive forms of socialism by the fact that it does not bind the movement to any one particular form of struggle . . . Marxism, therefore, positively does not reject any form of struggle. Under no circumstances does Marxism confine itself to the forms of struggle that are possible and that exist at the given moment only, recognizing as it does, that new forms of struggle, unknown to the participants of the given period, inevitably arise as the given social situation changes."

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The variety and the magnitude of strategic and tactical objectives determines the form of political action, and the new forms of political struggle are developed when the tasks can be handled more efficiently. The pattern of communists' conquest of power is elaborated to such a perfection, that the individual operations of the seizure of power follow in a certain established sequence and therefore they can be easily described.

There are two main categories of political actions in which the communist parties engage, and these can be again subdivided into two groups.

In the first place, there are the operations in the industrial countries of the West, consisting of the operations leading to the conquest of power by the communists, and further of the operations aiming to preserve and to increase the seized power.

Secondly, we have the operations in colonies and dependent countries. These are again subdivided into operations aiming at the conquest of power and further into operations aiming to maintain the conquest.

I. **THE FORMS OF POLITICAL ACTIONS IN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES OF THE WEST.**

In the following lines we shall describe the sequence of the main political actions leading to the seizure of power in industrial countries. They consist of actions directed against political parties and trade unions, of actions directed
against civic groups, and finally of actions of the seizure of power itself.

(a) **Actions Carried Against Political Parties and Trade Unions:**

1. Establishment of access to the target group,
2. United action from below followed by penetration of the membership of the target group,
3. United action from above,
4. Organization of joint committees as dual power centres,
5. The splitting of the target group from the bottom and taking over the leadership in its local organizations,
6. The splitting of the target organization from the top, on its upper levels,
7. The merging with the general membership of the target group,
8. Adoption and use of the newly acquired organizational skeleton of the target group.

(b) **The Sequence of Actions Carried Out by the Communist Parties Against the Civic Groups:**

1. Establishment of access to the target group,
2. United action from below with the general membership of the target group,
3. Penetration of the general membership from below as well as penetration of the central organs of the target group,
4. Establishment of operational control over the target group by co-ordinating activities of communists' operators within its membership and within its central organs.

(c) **The Actions of Conquest of Power.**

This third group consists of all complex actions of the conquest of power itself. They are actually three coups d'état carried out simultaneously on the level of governmental institutions, on the level of political parties and in the sphere of industry.
The Sequence of Political Actions Which Secure the Preservation and Increase of Seized Power:

1. Introduction of the machinery of dictatorship by monopolization of all sources of political power,
2. Nationalization of industry and land, and monopolization of other sources of economic power,
3. Application of self-criticism and periodic purges to clean the party and the state apparatus of worn out elements,
4. Organization of mass actions to keep the party's membership in the state of permanent readiness and mobilization,
5. Introduction of centralism into all governmental agencies and their sub-ordination to party commands,
6. Introduction of suppressive measures in order to eliminate remnants of former social classes.

II. THE FORMS OF POLITICAL ACTIONS IN COLONIAL AND DEPENDENT COUNTRIES.

The forms of political actions carried out in the colonies and dependent countries are not so elaborated and delicate as the actions in the industrial countries. They consist of political-economic measures carried out simultaneously with military operations.

1. The actions leading to seizure of power:

(a) Political economic measures:

1. Establishment of territorial base of revolution,
2. Organization of production within the base in order to supply the front,
3. Organization of agrarian revolution as a main force of colonial war,
4. Organization of an army,
(b) Military operations:

1. Orthodox war with regular armies,
2. Guerilla warfare with irregular armies,
3. Actions of sabotage and terror on the part of the civil population.

II. The actions leading towards the upholding of conquest and towards its stabilization:

1. Disarming of the military formations of an opponent and absorption of his armies.
2. Introduction of machinery of dictatorship by monopolizing all sources of political power.
3. Organization of economy by preservation and protection of rich peasantry and free enterprise in order to restore in the shortest possible time, the productive capacity of the country.
4. Organization of the government of united front and utilization of the creative abilities of the intelligentsia and of the middle class.
5. Utilization of nationalistic slogans to exploit nationalism of educated classes and to enlist their support.

The political actions applied by the communists in industrial countries are of a peaceful nature and generally do not resort to naked power. On the other hand, the

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operations in colonies are violent and consist predominantly of military operations. This does not mean, however, that in industrial countries the communist parties do not organize the organs of naked power. As a matter of fact, the organization of workers' militia and other intra-party armed units, besides securing the control of the police and of the army, are the very first letters in the alphabet of communist strategy. The armed units are not used, however, as the main forces of the conquest. Their actual function is to be on guard and to back the operation of conquest taking place on a political level. They have to intervene only if the communists' opponents resort to arms in their self-defence, and they have to prevent the possibility of intervention from outside.

In colonies and dependent countries the main forms of communist actions are military operations which are suspended and again renewed according to political expediency.

(3) THE RELATION BETWEEN POLITICS AND WAR

The interchangeability of political and military actions in the communist's pattern of conquest of power, as exemplified in operations in colonies, is the core of communist political strategy, and confirms the well-known Clausewitz dictum, that war makes sense only in connection with definite political designs. That war is a political act, a continuation of political intercourse by other means - an
instrument of politics. And regardless of how strong the influence and reflection of war on politics may be, it is still subordinated to politics.

"But however powerfully (the war) it may react on political designs in a particular case, still it must always be regarded as only a modification of them; for the political design is the object, while war is the means, and the means can never be thought of apart from the object." 1

The communist strategy of conquest, in spite of the fact that it operates with war and general violence, is essentially political. It gives full priority to the operations on a political level, with the view to achieve its aim 'peacefully'. This is not because of the dislike of bloodshed and general violence, but because of expediency. The thirst for undisturbed and fresh power in conquered political institutions is the leading motive, and therefore, the main stress is laid on avoiding the application of naked power as the principle instrument of conquest. The communists do not want to disrupt and smash the social institutions today in order to build them up tomorrow, to waste their strength in building something which was unnecessarily destroyed.

Thus, the problem of conquest of power is no longer a decisive factor in communist strategy, but it goes hand in hand with, is modified and actually depends on, the possibility of

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1. Karl von Clausewitz: On War, Book 1, p. 16.

* For use of armies as a main instrument of revolutionary conquests, see Katherine Chorley: Armies and the Art of Revolution. Faber & Faber Ltd. London, 1943.
staying in power after the conquest. The problem of making communist victories permanent determines the strategic considerations of how, by what means, and when, the operation of conquest will take place. The era of putschism, of violent strikes and of coups d'état in individual branches of executive organs of state authority, which were the main forms of communist operations in the twenties and especially in Germany, is definitely over.  

From the above discussion, we can draw the following as a clue to communist strategy:

The Naked power and general violence is used and resorted to only when the decisions cannot be reached on the political level through political devices.

In welding political and military operations into an organic whole the communists finished the development of the

2 The revolutionary activities of the German Communist Party in the era of Weimar Republic are described in very great detail by Ruth Fischer in Stalin and German Communism. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1948. The German Communist Party was the strongest, best organized and the most militant Section of the Third International, and its leaders were especially apt in organizing the revolutionary armed uprisings as well as in theoretical problems of civil war. Hans Neumann (alias A. Neuberger) wrote a pamphlet Der bewaffnete Aufstand, dealing with the principles of an armed uprising. And Hans Kippenberger (alias Alfred Langer) wrote Der Weg zum Sieg: die Kunst des bewaffneten Aufstandes. (Trans. The Way to Victory, the Art of Armed Uprising.)
theory of total power, put forward by Clausewitz 130 years ago.

Clausewitz elaborated the theory of total power and the maxims of behaviour of total power as they appear in their most materialized and therefore most violent form. He elucidates how the political power complexes engage their armies as instruments of politics in a violent collision, where the decision is sought through partial or total destruction of enemy forces.

The communist theoreticians, on the other hand, elaborated the theory of total power and codified maxims of its behaviour when it operates on a political level. They formulate the ways how the body politic releases discharges in order to disturb internal equilibrium within adversary forces without the direct and total engagement of the body politic itself. Here, the decision is sought on a political level, and because the main forces engaged are the attraction, social cohesion and institutional loyalties, the whole process is of a "peaceful nature".

When, however, the decision cannot be achieved on a political level and by political means, the communists immediately apply violence. And when the issue is of international character, the result is war.³

The communist concept of war is different from the wars the world has known. It not only pursues total aims,

but it also applies the total means. And as in the region of politics the communists do not limit themselves to the constitutional weapons, similarly in the region of war they do not confine themselves to orthodox warfare and orthodox weapons. To make a comparison, Hitler's total war was not in the true sense of the word total, but limited. It was limited in aims - it aimed at the redivision of the world. It was limited in sources - Hitler did not command such vast fifth columns within the hinterland of the Allies as the communists do. And, finally, it was limited in war technique - the Germans did not develop and use guerrilla warfare.

The war waged by the communists on a global scale would be a total war in its real sense. It will have total aims, total sources, and it will be waged by total means. It would fulfill the prophetic vision of Clausewitz, that the war will reach its highest and absolute form when it will serve absolute and total politics.


5 For total war of Hitler's pattern see:
See also:
"If war belongs to policy, it will naturally take on its character. If policy is grand and powerful, so also will be war, and this may be carried to the height at which war attains its absolute form."^6

(k) **THE TIME FACTOR IN POLITICAL ACTION**

The key factor in political strategy of communism is that of time.

The democratic political parties are limited in their political actions by the rules of electoral procedures and they mobilize their membership only at the time of elections. The communists, on the other hand, having the centre of their activities outside the constitutional sphere, are not bound by electoral time schedules and have a free hand in selecting the most suitable moment for their actions.

Of special significance in communist political strategy are the two following aspects of time.

Firstly, the communists are able to operate everywhere and at any time, because as the main source of their power they utilize permanently operating social tensions.

Secondly, in calculating their operations, the communists not only consider fully-matured and developed social forces, but they take into consideration also the latent social forces which will mature in the future; and the point is to establish the control of all these forces while they are young and more accessible:

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^6 Karl von Clausewitz: On War, Book VIII, p. 597.
"Hence we must not base our orientation on the strata of society which are no longer developing, even though they at present constitute the predominant force, but on those strata which are developing and have future before them, even though they at present do not constitute the predominant force."1

The mastering of the time factor also gives the communists the advantage of temporizing retreat, a possibility of avoiding, postponing and delaying decisive battles to the time that will be most suitable for them.

"To accept battle at a time when it is obviously advantageous to the enemy and not to us is a crime; and anybody who is unable to "tack, manoeuvre and compromise" in order to avoid obviously disadvantageous battle is absolutely worthless as political leader of the revolutionary class."2

The communist strategists need plenty of time to introduce and to set in motion the principle of mass involvement which would give them willing and unwilling allies, whom they will need, either directly or indirectly, in their final bid for power.

"Victory cannot be won by the vanguard alone. To throw vanguard alone into the decisive battle before the whole class, before the broad masses have taken up a position either of direct support of the vanguard, or at least benevolent neutrality towards it, and one in which they cannot possibly support the enemy, would be not merely folly, but a crime."3

To sum up, the time factor in communist strategy is the key to political victory achieved through a strategic combination of adversary forces. The fact that the communists are not confined to any time schedules offers them the possibility of penetrating the principal target organizations, of establishing operational control over these, and finally, of selecting the most suitable moment for the final blow.

(1) **THE PRINCIPLE OF CONCENTRATION AND DISPERSION**

The Clausewitz strategic axiom of maximal concentration of forces in time and space on decisive spots was further elaborated by the communists and supplemented by the axiom of maximal dispersion.

The essence of the principle of maximal concentration and maximal dispersion lies in the conduct and in the organization of political action in such a way, that the communists' opponents cannot make use of the organization and of the superiority of their forces.

The decisive spots for democrats are elections; therefore, they concentrate their forces on electoral battles and into the classical political arena.

For the communists, however, the decisive spots are within the mass base and therefore they do not accept the battle within the electoral sphere as decisive. While the democrats concentrate only on the electoral actions, the
communists, simultaneously with a concentration in this arena, also attack the mass base and disperse and direct their activities against principal target organizations.

In this way the communists meet their political adversaries on an altogether different power level, where the democratic political parties have no access whatsoever. If the communists are defeated in elections it does not mean for them that they were defeated in their own political sense. Operating on a different power level, in order to capture the principal social organizations and the mass base, the communists, in the long run, appear to be the sure victors. Thus, the communists enjoy the monopoly in these power regions while their political opponents cannot reach and compete in these areas.

In the realm of war, this principle of concentration and dispersion is manifested by the combination of orthodox war with guerrilla warfare.

Whereas orthodox war operates on the Clausewitz' principle of maximal concentration in time and space on decisive points, partisan warfare operates on the communist principle of maximal dispersion in time and space.

The guerrilla warfare decomposes and splits the battle in a series of small-scale engagements for which the regular armies are not organized, trained and equipped, and where the regular armies cannot make use of their numerical and material
superiority. The regular armies, being organized and heavily equipped for grand scale battles, are, by guerrilla warfare, in the true sense of the word pinned down. Because they are not able to operate on the level for which they were destined, they are vulnerable to the threat of the disintegration of their morale and of their fighting spirit.

There is, however, one more aspect of partisan warfare which deserves to be mentioned. Partisan warfare is actually a semi-political and a semi-military form of struggle, because simultaneously with the combat activities, it also establishes the nuclei of the future political administration.

Partisan warfare, applied on a global scale, means that the communists, through the series of isolated and localized war conflicts in various parts of the world, pin down and chop up the armed forces of their opponents, draining gradually their strength and paralyzing their ability to deal radical blows.

Simultaneously with these military actions the communists carry out operations for the conquest of world mass base.

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4. For the definition of guerrilla warfare, see Mao Tsetung: "Guerrilla warfare is the integration of various kinds of struggle into one total concept. . . .

What is guerrilla warfare? It is the inevitable and hence the best form of struggle waged in backward, vast, colonial countries and over a long period of time by the people's armed forces to overcome their enemy and to create their own base."

which will be gradually turned against its respective governments. Both these operations, military as well as political, are finally backed by the untouched potential of the Red Army ready to step in at the decisive moment and in a decisive place, should the communists' opponents resort to arms in their self-defence.

The last and the most refined principle of communist strategy is that communists seek victory through strategic combination and manipulation of adversary forces. Power is seized without employment of the classical means of conquest, i.e., without the means of election or without use of force. Speaking in military terms, the battle is won without engagement.

The communist strategy to win by manipulating adversary forces is derived from Clausewitz' paramount strategic principle that the access to the enemy country lies within the enemy's own army.

The forces of communists' adversaries are, by penetration, manipulable to such a degree, that when the adversary opens the operation of the main battle, whether in self-defence or in attack, the process of disintegration within his forces is set immediately into motion with the result of total internal collapse.
It is, therefore, absolutely decisive for the self-defence of a democratic society that the communists be denied all access to the vital social organizations and that they be isolated and paralyzed in their endeavours to capture the free mass base. Because, once the communists succeed in establishing access, whether to trade unions, political parties or civic organizations, it is just a question of time when they will overpower, with their vitality and dynamics, the resistance of these target organizations.

The penetration and establishment of latent communists power nuclei within adversary forces rearranges their internal composition long before they are employed in the battle. When, finally, these forces are put together at a time of stress, (because only combination can they mean anything) they simply do not match. They do not form a defensive or attacking pattern. They are paralyzed by their internal frictions and they are completely transformed into the obedient tools of the communists. Thus, the control of individual power components on a tactical level gives the communists by its totality, control over the strategic complex operation as a whole.

This strategic principle, when the victory is achieved by operations within adversary forces and by stabbing in the back, is as old as power politics itself. It represents the ancient Trojan Horse strategy, improved, elaborated, and refined to an incredible perfection and elevated into the realm of politics.
CHAPTER IV

THE SEIZURE OF POWER

"The basic question in the revolution is that of state power. Unless this question is understood, there can be no intelligent participation in the revolution, let alone guidance of the revolution." 1

(a) THE CONCEPT OF SEIZURE OF POWER

In this chapter we shall discuss the strategy and tactics of the seizure of political power by the Bolsheviks in Russia in November (October) 1917. We shall be mainly concerned with the relation of individual power groups which brought about and carried through the Liberal-Democratic revolution (January, February, 1917), and with the tactics of the Bolsheviks to out-maneuver their far stronger opponents. In other words, we shall discuss the Bolshevik tactics of utilizing the main revolutionary forces of the Russian Revolution for their own purposes, and the tactics they used to transform the Liberal-Democratic Revolution into the Bolshevik one.

The basis for our discussion is our thesis formulated in the foregoing chapters, that the successes of communist

policy are due to the following facts:

That the communists analyse the power composition of every social collision; that they evaluate competing power groups according to their magnitude and according to their mutual position, and that afterwards they formulate their policy. The thesis further implies that the successes of communist policy are due to its ability to utilize permanently operating tensions with society, and, finally, that they are able to establish the operational control over huge social power complexes in the course of their movement.

These tactics, exemplified by the seizure of power in Russia in 1917, laid the foundation for a new technique of conquest of political power, leaving other concepts of seizure of power obsolete.  

2 The modern techniques of the seizure of power were systematized by Niccolo Machiavelli, who in his "The Prince" described various ways and means through which the monarch can seize power and uphold his conquest. The Prince and the Discourses, The Modern Library, New York, 1950.

The chief landmarks in the further development of techniques of seizure of power are the Eighteenth Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1799, the coup d'etat of Napoleon III in 1851, and finally the Bolshevist Revolution in 1917. Since 1917, the techniques of the seizure of power have developed in two directions. In the first place, the twenties and thirties of this century witnessed the Fascist patterns of seizure of power, exemplified by the conquest of power by Mussolini, Hitler and Franco. On the other hand, the forties and fifties of this century witnessed the seizure of power of Communistic patterns exemplified by the series of coups d'etat in Middle and Eastern Europe and in Asia. For the analysis of the coup d'etat of Napoleon III in 1851, see one of the most brilliant works of Marx: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, K. Marx and F. Engles, Selected Works in Two Volumes, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1950, pp. 221 - 311.
(b) **THE CONDITIONS FOR THE SEIZURE OF POWER IN RUSSIA, 1917**

The factors which conditioned the seizure of political power by the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 can be divided into "external" and "internal." 3

(1) **The External Conditions:** The Tsarist Army practically collapsed under the heavy pressure of the joint forces of the Central Powers at the beginning of the third year of the war. (January 1917). The backwardness of the country was patently manifested by the speed with which the Russian Armies disintegrated. The lack of supplies, communications and leadership, and above all the autocratic regime of the Monarchy caused great masses of soldiers to lose their loyalty to the existing regime, and to become sensitive to any movement which promised better and more democratic leadership. This was the classic situation which demanded new leadership and gave to the latent revolutionary forces in Russia a perfect opportunity to become active. In short, it was this impact from outside which, in the first place, brought Russia, in January 1917, to the verge of revolution.

(2) **The Internal Conditions:** The internal situation in Russia at the beginning of 1917 can be best described by showing the attitude of the three main power groups towards the existing revolutionary situation:

In the first place, there were the forces of the Monarchy, of feudal landlords, and of the bureaucratic and military castes, which were definitely on the side of counter-revolution.

Secondly, there were extremely active groups of Liberal-Democratic Revolutionaries; the Octobrists and the Cadets, who attracted the broadest stratum of Russian Society, namely, the middle class and the peasantry. This was the main force of the Russian revolution.

Thirdly, there were the Russian Social Democrats whose party was split into the Menshevik and the revolutionary Bolshevik fraction, and who organized the numerically weak working class.

Lenin, commenting after the revolution on the conditions which enabled the Bolsheviks to take power, specified them as follows:

"1. The possibility of linking up the Soviet Revolution with the ending (as a consequence of this revolution) of the Imperialist war, which had exhausted the workers and peasants to an incredible degree.

2. The possibility of taking advantage for a certain time of the mortal conflict between the two world-powerful groups of imperialist robbers, who were unable to unite against the Soviet enemy;

3. The possibility of enduring a comparatively lengthy civil war partly owing to the enormous size of the country and to the poor means of communication;"
4. The existence of such a profound bourgeois-democratic revolutionary movement among the peasantry, that the party of the proletariat was able to take over the revolutionary demands of the peasant party (the Socialist-Revolutionary Party) the majority of the members of which were definitely hostile to Bolshevism, and to realize them at once.

The conflict of these three main forces, the forces of the Monarchy, the Liberal-Democratic revolutionary forces, and the Social Democrats, was a long and protracted process, and culminated in February 1917. The Liberal-Democratic and Socialist Revolutionaries forced the Monarchy to abdicate and established a Liberal-Democratic Provisional Government. This seizure of power was a quick and bloodless process because all the revolutionary forces were united by one common aim, as Lenin commented:

"that the revolution succeeded so quickly . . . is due to the fact that as a result of an extremely unique historic situation, absolutely dissimilar movements, absolutely heterogeneous class interests, absolutely contrary political and social tendencies, have merged, and merged in a strikingly 'harmonious' manner."

(c) THE DUAL POWER CENTRES - THE CRUX OF THE SEIZURE OF POWER

This peculiar combination of diverse forces which

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brought about the Democratic-Liberal Revolution and established a new Provisional Government, had however, one significant feature which was not quite well understood by the Democrats. This was the existence of dual power. 6

The Social Revolutionaries and other Democrats, according to the classical concept of political power, laid their main stress on the establishment of central organs of state authority; that is, on the establishment of a parliament, cabinet and other central organs of governmental authority.

The Socialists, on the other hand, operating and controlling the comparatively broad basis of the working class, concentrated on the establishment of local and municipal Revolutionary Governments, on the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers. In other words, the Socialists organized the local power centres.

Lenin was quick to grasp the significance of this fact and drew the conclusion that there were in Russia two rival forms of Government. One, he saw, controlled the central organs of state authority and the other controlled the local power centres.

See also: V.I. Lenin: The Task of the Proletariat in our Revolution, Selected Works, Vol.-II, pp. 25 - 49.
"The main peculiarity of our revolution, a peculiarity that urgently demands thoughtful attention, is the dual power which was established in the very first day after the triumph of the revolution. This dual power is manifested in the existence of two governments: one is the main, the real, actual government of the bourgeoisie . . . which controls all the organs of power; the other is supplementary and parallel government, a 'supervisory' government in the shape of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies which possesses no organs of state power."

Thus, the new Provisional Government was actually a Coalition Government of the Social Revolutionaries (Agrarian Party) and the Social Democrats. The former controlled the central organs of the revolutionary government, the latter the revolutionary mass base. Such was the power situation in Russia before the Bolsheviks launched upon the second stage of the Russian Revolution.

The theoretical basis for this protracted revolution consisted in the formula that the Russian Revolution did not end with the establishment of a Provisional Government, and that the establishment of this Government meant only the end of the first, the transitional stage of the revolution.

While the Liberal-Democratic forces had fulfilled their historical mission by sweeping away the monarchy, the Bolsheviks, following Marx's formula, perceived that -

"... while the democratic petty bourgeoisie wishes to bring the revolution to a conclusion as quickly as possible ..., it is to our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent ..." 8

and prepared themselves for their own independent operation.

Under these conditions Lenin maintained that the institution of "Dual Power" is not a permanent, but a transitional feature in the development of the revolution, and that one of these two powers must finally be eliminated:

"The dual power expresses but a transitional phase in the development of the revolution, in which it has gone further than the ordinary bourgeoisie-democratic revolution, but has not yet reached a 'pure' dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry ... Two powers cannot exist in one stage. One of them is bound to be eliminated." 9

The last sentence of the above quotation is very significant for the further development of Russian revolution because it expresses its central problem.

Lenin realized that this peculiar situation, where the central organs of the revolutionary government were controlled by one power group and its local organizations by an opposing force, cannot last long. He was correct in the assumption that the central government, as one of its first tasks, will move against its local power centres to bring them to obedience and subordination. He saw, however, an

equal opportunity for the local government to move against the central authority and to bid for power. And this idea is the turning axis of Russian Revolution.

Lenin realized that the Soviets, being the lower-level power centres were actually organizing the revolutionary mass base, and that he who controls the revolutionary mass base controls the revolution as a whole. He concluded that by seizing the power within the Soviets, there was a possibility for the Bolsheviks to awaken a new powerful revolutionary wave, which, if turned against the central authority, would carry the revolution into its second stage.

(d) THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE SEIZURE OF POWER

After this, the Bolsheviks realized that the key to their success were the local power centres, the Soviets, which in the meantime became genuine mass organizations. And as a first step it was necessary to isolate this mass base from the influence and control of the Provisional Government.

This isolation was carried out by the propaganda of discrediting the Provisional Government in its endeavour to redivide the land and to introduce the land reform.\(^1\) In other


See also J.V. Stalin: The Slogan of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Poor Peasantry in the Period of Preparation for October, Problems of Leninism, pp. 189 - 197.

words, the prime task was to isolate the revolutionary mass base by cutting it off from its leadership, and to monopolize it.

Simultaneously with this operation of isolating the Soviets, the Bolsheviks were carrying out activities within the Soviets in order to conquer in these the power. Their main attack attempted to split the participating parties in fractions, to separate their revolutionary elements from moderate elements and to amalgamate all these radicals into one revolutionary force under Communist control.

As Lenin pointed out:

"New and different tasks now face us: to effect a split between the proletarian elements ... and the small-proprietor or petty bourgeois elements ..."

The split of the majority parties within the Soviets was facilitated by skilfully employed slogans appealing to their radical fraction separating these from their leadership:

"Disintegration set in among the compromising parties. Under the pressure of the revolutionary peasants, the Left Wing formed within the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, known as the "Left" Socialist-Revolutionaries, who expressed their disapproval of the policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie.

Among the Mensheviks, too, there appeared a group of "Lefts", the so called "Internationalists" who gravitated towards the Bolsheviks.

2 V.I. Lenin: Letters on Tactics, Marx, Engles Marxism, p. 335.
As for the Anarchists, a group whose influence was insignificant to start with, they now definitely disintegrated into minute groups. 

From the strategic point of view, one event played a decisive role in the splitting of the parties of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. This was General Kornilov's attempt to suppress the Soviets, which were slipping more and more under the control of the Bolsheviks, and which, by attacking the Provisional Government, were generally disseminating unrest when the Provisional Government needed peace and time to settle down.

The move/General Kornilov against the Soviets was utilized by the Bolsheviks for the organization of a grand scale "united action from below" in their defence. This united action brought together all revolutionary elements which were split away from the other two parties participating in the Soviets, and enabled the Bolsheviks, in the course of this defence action, to establish operational leadership over this huge mass movement.

The Kornilov affair convinced the Bolsheviks that the Soviets possessed tremendous latent revolutionary forces which could be turned into new revolutionary waves by which the Communists could be catapulted to the position of the supreme power.  


The Bolsheviks, having isolated the Provisional Government, and having monopolized the revolutionary mass base, were now in a position to make a final bid for power. They issued a slogan demanding the complete transfer of state power to the Soviets and then started military operations to effect this transfer. In this way, the Russian Revolution entered its second stage, the stage of bloody and protracted civil war of which the history is well known.5

(e) SUMMARY

To sum up, the Bolshevik's strategy of seizure of power in 1917 in Russia was based primarily on utilizing the

A Letter to the Members of the Central Committee, Ibid. pp. 138 - 140.
For different approaches and interpretations of events which took place in Russia and called Russian Revolution and also Bolshevik Revolution, see:
J.V. Stalin: The October Revolution and the Tactics of Russian Communists, Problems of Leninism, pp. 94 - 123.
potential of the revolutionary pressure which had accumulated in the last century of Russian history, and which exploded in Liberal-Democratic Revolution. This fact was admitted frankly by Lenin:

"... A bourgeois revolution is in the highest degree advantageous to the proletariat. The more complete, determined and consistent the bourgeois revolution, the more assured will be the proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie for Socialism. Such a conclusion will appear new or strange or paradoxical only to those who are ignorant of the rudiments of scientific socialism. And from this conclusion, among other things, follows the thesis that, in a certain sense, a bourgeois revolution is more advantageous to the proletariat than to the bourgeoisie."

The Russian Democratic Revolutionary movement reached tremendous proportions thanks to the fact that the late abolition of serfdom, as well as the late extension of franchise, did not release and diminish the revolutionary pressure. Thus, the profoundness of the Russian Democratic Revolution was shown by the fact that, apart from the middle class fighting for its political rights, the second main revolutionary force was represented by the peasantry, fighting for complete abolition of serfdom.

The Bolshevik strategy of seizure of power was based on utilizing both these revolutionary forces in succession.

When the first revolutionary force, the middle class, fulfilled

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its mission by smashing the monarchy and tried to settle down, the Bolsheviks linked themselves with the second revolutionary force, with the peasantry, which grew and matured in the process of revolution.

The best exposition of this strategy of protracted revolution was given by Lenin himself, when he described the utilization of the dynamics of fully matured democratic revolutionary forces in the first stage of the revolution, and of the huge reservoir of latent revolutionary forces of the unarticulated agrarian masses in the second stage of the revolution:

"The course taken by the revolution has confirmed the correctness of our reasoning:

FIRST, with the 'whole' of the peasantry against the monarchy, against the landlords, against the mediaeval regime (and to that extent, the revolution remains bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic).

THEN, with the poorest peasantry, with all the exploited, against capitalism, including the rural rich, the kulaks, the profiteers, and to that extent, the revolution becomes a Socialist one."?

Having placed themselves in control of the revolution

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By the "whole of the peasantry" Lenin refers to the main force of Russian Democratic Revolution, to the peasant party of Social Revolutionaries.
from below, the Bolsheviks applied the principle of mass involvement and transformed the Soviets into instruments of Bolshevik revolution, as well as into the agencies of Bolshevik state power.

The initial control over the new revolutionary mass base, consisting of the lower strata of the peasantry, of the revolutionary proletariat and of the masses of soldiers involved in the Bolshevik enterprise by the slogan to end the war, was not only the clue to Bolsheviks' victory in revolution. The control of this mass base put the Bolsheviks into the advantageous position of being able to articulate these peasant masses and to form all those military, political and economic institutions which became the instruments of dictatorship and which secured permanence to their conquest.

8 For the development of the army mass base which was the main instrument of Bolsheviks in winning the civil war, see:

In charge of the organization of revolutionary Red Army was Leon Trotsky. For his personal account see The History of Russian Revolution, Vol.-I, pp. 125 - 167.
CHAPTER V

THE PRESERVATION, CONCENTRATION, AND INCREASE OF SEIZED POWER

"... The Dictatorship of the Proletarian is the rule unrestricted by law and based on force... "\(^1\)

(a) THE CONCEPT OF DICTATORSHIP

When the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in 1917, they were well aware of the fact that:

"The fundamental question of revolution is the question of power... The seizure of power is only the beginning... Therefore, the whole point is to retain power, to consolidate it, to make it invincible... "\(^2\)

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1. J.V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, p. 43.
The Bolsheviks realized that when they had seized power, they were at the very beginning of the difficult task of building "Communist Society". They knew there would be plenty of difficulties, but none of them realized what monstrous machinery of oppression they would have to build in order to retain power.

Marx had spoken only vaguely of the necessity to introduce a dictatorship once the proletariat took over.

"Between Capitalism and Communist Society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transformation period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat."³

This general concept of dictatorship of Marx was never further elaborated either by himself or by Engels, it and constitutes, along with the hypotheses "of the withering away of the state", the two weakest points in all the Marxian theories.

This weakness was especially apparent when Kautsky and Lenin were fiercely arguing the "real meaning and

content" of Marx's vague term "dictatorship of the proletariat", and when Kautsky concluded that:

"Marx hat es leider unterlassen naher auszuführen, wie er sich diese Diktatur vorstellt."

Only a few weeks before the Bolsheviks seized power Lenin started to work on the pamphlet "The State and Revolution", in which he endeavoured further to elaborate this vague concept of dictatorship of the proletariat, and also what will happen after the dictatorship was introduced;

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4 The main ideas of Marx and Engels, after their deaths, were developed in two directions: 1. Into the democratic or evolutionary Marxism represented by Kautsky, Adler, Bernstein and others, and called Social Democratism. 2. Into revolutionary Marxism or Communism with Lenin as its theorist. For democratic and evolutionary interpretation of Marx, see:
Karl Kautsky: The Dictatorship of the Proletariat,
For revolutionary interpretations see:
V.I. Lenin: What is to be Done? Selected Works, Vol.-I, pp. 147 - 269.
V.I. Lenin: Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, Ibid., pp. 343 - 435.
All these works were written by Lenin before the Bolshevik Revolution and can be considered as revolutionary interpretation of Marxism. The studies written during the revolution and after departed so fundamentally from Marx that they constitute a distinctive theoretical school formulating the philosophy and practice of total power - Leninism.

5 Trans. "Marx unfortunately omitted to explain more clearly how he envisaged this dictatorship."
Karl Kautsky: Bolshevik Revolution, quoted in the manuscript of Macek, Dr. Josef: From Marx to Stalin, p.52
e.g. the process by which the state will wither away. He held that the dictatorship of the proletariat meant the smashing of the state machine, and that "accounting and control" were the main requirements for the setting up and correct functioning of the first phase of a communist society which will immediately follow. He visualized that all citizens become employers and workers of a single national state syndicate. He thought that "after the overthrow of the capitalists, it would be possible to proceed immediately, overnight, to supersede them in the control of production and distribution, in the work of keeping the accounts of labour and production by the armed workers, by the whole of the armed population." He further fully accepted the Engels view of the withering away of the state that:

"When most of the functions of the state are reduced to the accounting and control by the workers themselves, it will cease to be a 'political' state and public functions will lose their political character and be transformed into simple administrative functions."  

From the above Lenin concluded that when the people


have learned to administer production, to keep accounts and to exercise control, very soon the "necessity of observing the simple, fundamental rules of human intercourse would become a habit."8

How different, however, was the reality!

By smashing the state machine according to the classical hypothesis mentioned above, the Bolshevists did consequently do away with the old political set up.

But what they did not realize, however, was the fact that by smashing the state apparatus they loosened all the bonds which hold modern society together. In destroying political institutions they unleashed a chain reaction loosening all the main centripetal forces—political, economic and moral, with the result of total institutional and functional decimation of Russian society.

Under these conditions, "things did not take their natural creative course of orderliness" toward the establishment of the first phase of Communist society as Lenin predicted and expected, but proceeded in the opposite directions, in the direction of destruction and chaos.

This is why Lenin's work "The State and Revolution", until then considered the latest and the most authoritative interpretation of Marx, was obsolete overnight. Lenin had learned his first lesson of total power.

At the beginning of the Bolshevik revolution the Bolsheviks did not know that by breaking away from the coalition government they had embarked upon the field of total power, which never before had been explored, so that

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9 This pamphlet was written by Lenin in August & September, 1917. When however, Lenin came to the seventh chapter, he was, as he says, 'interrupted' by a political crisis, the October Revolution. He states further that it is more pleasant and useful to go through the 'experience of the revolution' than to write about it.

How true that was and what did he learn from it! The elaborate concept and blueprint for the ideal workers' state envisaged in The State and Revolution fell to pieces under the revolutionary experience. And instead of finishing this pamphlet, he wrote The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, (between October and November 1918,) and later (April - May 1920) Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder, two new pamphlets in which he abandons all his former ideas concerning the organization and form of the proletarian state, and where he formulates a new concept of dictatorship based on total power.

For the State and Revolution, see: Selected Works, Vol.-II, pp. 141 - 239. For Left Wing Communism, see Ibid., p. 571 - 641.

For the Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, see Ibid., Vol.-II, pp. 359 - 434.

For further elaboration of the theories on the state and on the problem of 'withering away of the state' see J.V. Stalin: Some Questions of Theory, Problems of Leninism, pp. 631 - 642. Report On the Work of the Central Committee to the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U (B) delivered March 10, 1939.

no formulae and prescriptions could be followed. They did not realize that an iron logic, the objective law of total power, drove them towards the destruction and decimation of all social institutions. However, it did not take long before the Bolsheviks discovered that the basic operational law of their new political system was the continuous increase of power. It was Lenin who for the first time in his pamphlet "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder" did away with all vague and impractical ideas concerning dictatorship, and taught by experience, formulated its real meaning and concept:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is a persistant struggle, bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative - against the forces and traditions of the old society."

This is the so-called Leninist concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat which differs, however, fundamentally from that of Marx. According to Marx, at the moment the proletariat seizes power the dictatorship is introduced, the class struggle ceases to exist; the dictatorship is of a static nature. According to Lenin, on the other hand, the class struggle, after the seizure of power, continues and is actually exercised by the dictatorship. The Leninist

concept of the dictatorship is dynamic.

This dynamic concept of dictatorship has been of fundamental importance for the further development of the Soviet regime. It represents the basic operational law of the Soviet system from which all other formulae concerning the behaviour of total power after the conquest, in the period of its consolidation, are derived.

(b) THE BUILDING OF DICTATORSHIP

In coping with the situation to retain their power, the Bolsheviks possessed two important weapons.

In the first place, in the Leninist concept of the dictatorship, they had a new theory of power. In the second place, they enjoyed hegemony over the broad and practically unarticulated mass base, which would serve as rough material in carving out new social institutions.

Productive material forces, such as plants, factories, mines and land, in contrast to social institutions, remained practically intact after the revolutionary explosion. They were capable of functioning at any time if the organized human element could set them in motion. And precisely this - to organize the human element into institutions suitable to this end, and to build up a new institutional structure, was the prime tasks of the Bolsheviks immediately after the seizure. It was necessary to erect and to construct new
social institutions in a way which would enable the party, as a central controlling body, to direct every phase of life of the new Soviet society.

This tremendous task started and proceeded successfully because the Bolsheviks applied again the principle of mass involvement. The party used those organizations which stood closest by as the first instruments to penetrate into the diffuse mass, to articulate it, and to form their own auxiliary and subordinated agencies.

When the ring of new organizations in this field had been erected, the party turned these agencies into the instruments of further penetration. The new field of diffuse mass was further articulated, and a series of new institutions sprang up in regions even far remote from the party's immediate activities.

This process, however difficult, progressed rapidly so that Lenin in his pamphlet "Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder", written between April and May, 1920, was able to say:

"... On the whole, we have a formally non-Communist, flexible and relatively wide and very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means of which the Party is closely linked up with the class and with the masses, and by means of which, under the leadership of the Party, the dictatorship of the class is exercised."II

And further, because all social institutions created by the application of the principle of mass involvement are linked to the Communist party, Lenin observed that:

"Not a single important political or organizational question is decided by any state institution in our republic without the guiding instructions of the General Committee of the Party . . . ." 12

Stalin, while giving a lecture on "Foundations of Leninism" at Sverdlov University in April, 1924, also explained that the successes of Bolsheviks were due to the fact that the Party was able to transform any organization into its auxiliary body, into the instrument of dictatorship:

". . . the Party . . . is . . . the only organization capable of centralizing the leadership . . . . . . . . . thus, transforming each and every nonparty organization of the working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the Party with the class." 13

(c) THE STRUCTURE OF DICTATORSHIP

A more consistent and more detailed description of dictatorship, its mechanism and its functioning, was given, however, later in 1926 by Stalin in his pamphlet "On the

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13 J.V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, p. 139 and also p. 87.
Problems of Leninism”. In this work Stalin further developed some of the fundamental features of Leninist concept of total power as exemplified by Lenin in "Left-Wing Communism”.

According to Stalin, dictatorship is exercised through a system of organizations which function as transmission belts and levers connecting the party with all vital sectors of Soviet society. The core of Stalin’s article, because of its importance, clarity and frankness deserves to be quoted at length:

"The levers or the transmission belts are those very mass organizations of the proletariat without whose aid the dictatorship cannot be realized . . .

What are these organizations?

First, there are the Worker’s trade unions with their central and local ramifications in the shape of a whole series of industrial, cultural, educational and other organizations. These unite the workers of all trades. They are not Party organizations . . .

Secondly, there are the Soviets and their numerous central and local ramifications in the shape of administrative, business, military, cultural and other state organizations, plus the innumerable voluntary mass associations of the working people, which group themselves around these organizations and connect them with the population. The Soviets are mass organizations of all working people of town and country. They are not Party organizations . . .

Thirdly, there are the co-operative societies of all kinds, with all their ramifications. These are mass organizations of the working people, non-Party organizations, which unite the working people primarily as consumers, but also in the course of time as producers (agricultural cooperation). They facilitate contact between the
vanguard of the proletariat and the masses of the peasantry and provide the possibility of drawing the latter into channels of Socialist construction.

Fourthly, there is the Young Communist League. This is a mass organization of young workers and peasants; it is not a Party organization, but is associated with the Party.

Lastly, there is the Party of the proletariat. Its strength lies in the fact that it draws into its ranks all the best elements of the proletariat from all the mass organizations. Its function is to combine the work of all the mass organizations of the proletariat without exception and to direct their activities.

To sum up: the trade unions, as the mass organization of the proletariat, linking the Party with the class primarily in the sphere of production;

The Soviets as the mass organizations of the working people, linking the Party with the latter primarily in the sphere of the state;

The co-operative societies, as mass organizations mainly of the peasantry, linking the Party with the peasant masses, primarily in economic field, in enlisting the peasantry for the work of Socialist construction;

The Young Communist League, as the mass organization of young workers and peasants, whose mission is to help the vanguard of the proletariat in the Socialist education of the new generation and training young reserves.

And finally the Party, as the main directing force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat whose mission is to lead all these mass organizations.

... such, in general, is the picture of the "mechanism" of the dictatorship, the picture of the "system of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

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Since the seizure of power the Bolsheviks had only one main problem - to develop a government which would enable them to predict and to detect every possible movement within the masses to counteract it. It was Stalin again, when reporting to the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR in 1923, who outlined this Bolshevik ideal:

"In our Soviet country, we must evolve a system of government that will permit us with certainty to anticipate all changes, to perceive everything that is going on among the peasants, the nationals, the non-Russian nations, and the Russians; the system of supreme organs must possess a number of barometers which will anticipate every change, register and forestall . . . all possible storms and ill-fortune. That is the Soviet system of government."  

By 1926, the Bolsheviks had not merely built up a government corresponding to the ideal of 1923; but they had erected a monstrous machine of oppression which, giving them an advantage of absolute control over society, on the one hand, brought a new problem - the danger of functional standstill and vacuum on the other.

In this chapter we have been discussing the unorthodox, i.e., the political instruments of dictatorship. We have been primarily concerned with the instruments of dictatorship as applied on the political level; in other words, how the

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2 J.V. Stalin; Marxismum a Narodnostni a Koloniálni Otázka. (Marxism, National and Colonial Question, Nakladatelství 'Svoboda' v Praze, 1945, p. 105.
system of total power converts the principal functional organizations into its tools.

Under orthodox instruments of dictatorship we understand all party and state organs of naked power, such as the police, army, workers' militia, party "Storm Troops", and finally the Central Control Commission which directs all of them. In spite of the fact that we lack a comprehensive study of Soviet 'organ of suppression' as Stalin calls them, the fragmentary information which we have in regard to the application of naked power in the USSR clearly indicates its fantastic dimensions, monstrosity and efficiency.³

³ See, for example, the 'Corrective Labour Codes', a set of rules which turns every Soviet citizen into a virtual slave and prisoner of the Soviet economic machinery. Published as an Appendix to the pamphlet The Slave Labour in Russia, the case presented by the American Federation of Labour to the United Nations, The American Federation of Labour, 1949.

According to this paper, there are over ten million people held in various kinds of concentration camps and 'the slave labour has become an expanding organic feature of Soviet economy'. The paper concludes that the slave labour, with its huge system of political police, has become the very foundation of the political power of the Stalin Regime, p. 19.


See also the numerous testimonials and personal accounts of people who were successful in escaping from concentration camps, corrective labour camps and prisons of all kinds, printed in Slave Labor in Russia, Part III, Affidavits by Former Inmates of Soviet Concentration Camps, pp. 37 - 84. American Federation of Labor, 1949.
THE FUNCTIONING OF DICTATORSHIP

1. FUNCTIONAL DYNAMICS

The principle of mass involvement applied by the Bolsheviks in articulating the mass base and in forming suitable organizations for the exercise of dictatorship, gave the Bolsheviks enormous power of control over the life of the Soviet people. The functional spontaneity, the free action and interaction of social organizations, were eliminated and sacrificed for the control of their functions and their associative processes.

"The entire course of development of Soviet society has been the process of overcoming spontaneity and of the triumph of conscious, planned leadership."¹

By imposing total control over the institutional structure and by eliminating spontaneity of social intercourse, the Bolsheviks inevitably created a functional vacuum within the Soviet society. The actual danger of this functional vacuum lies in the fact that it creates a climate killing all initiative, pioneering, invention, endurance and interest in the individual and in groups, which are the motive force of horizontal and vertical mobility of free societies.

¹ F. V. Konstantinov: The Role of Socialist Consciousness in the Development of Soviet Society, Foreign Publishing House, Moscow, 1950, p. 44.
By the imposition of total control, the life of Soviet society was choked and was slowly approaching a state of internal equilibrium—a state of atrophy. This was, however, a red light for the Bolsheviks; and the Party, in order to bring society to revival, had to stir up and activate individuals as well as social groups.

In the first year of dictatorship Lenin introduced the NEP. He moderated the pressure and control put on the middle class, free enterprise, merchants and on farmers.  

In later years, however, when under the rule of Stalin the middle class enterprisers, merchants and farmers were, by crusades, eliminated, and when the Soviet Society was finally

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2 NEP means New Economic Policy started by Lenin in 1921: "War Communism had been an attempt to take the fortresses of capitalistic elements in the town and in the country by assault, by a frontal attack. In this offensive the Party had gone too far ahead and ran the risk of being cut off from its base. Now, Lenin proposed to retreat for a while to the base, to change from an assault of the fortress to the slow method of siege, so as to gather strength and resume the offensive." See History of Communist Party of USSR, p. 257.

3 For the policies relative to the elimination of social classes, see:

J.V. Stalin: The Policy to Eliminate the Kulaks as a Class, Ibid., pp. 322-325.
J.V. Stalin: Dizzy with Success, Ibid., pp. 326-331.
J.V. Stalin: Reply to Collective Farm Comrades, Ibid., pp. 332-349.
J.V. Stalin: Speech Delivered at the First All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock Workers, Ibid., pp. 440-453.

See also: History of the Communist Party of USSR, Chapters X and XI, pp. 280-330.
uniformed and colourless, the Party had to resort to artificial devices which would stir up society and which would activate its life. Of the most important devices which were introduced we might name the Stakhanovite Movement, the Socialist Competition, the Creative Patriotism, and finally the device of Criticism and Self-Criticism.

The Stakhanovite Movement is directed at industrial production. Socialist Competition is applied in every industrial enterprise and also on farms. Creative patriotism is a movement to revive the activities of the Soviet intelligentsia, of government employees and the work of the leading Soviet elite in general.4

Of special significance, however, is the device of criticism and self-criticism because of its universal applicability. Criticism and self-criticism may be described as a whip sweeping everywhere from industrial and agricultural production to the party and state apparatus, and intervening in the fields of esthetics, literature, art, music and

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4 For a Stakhanovite movement and its origins, see J.V. Stalin: Speech at the First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites, Problems of Leninism, pp. 526 - 539.
philosophy.

Criticism and self-criticism as an instrument for the creation of individual and group tensions is of supreme value to the Bolsheviks. As Zhdanov explained, it is actually the main "motive force" behind the development of Soviet society:

"In our Soviet society, where antagonistic classes have been eliminated, the struggle between the old and the new, and consequently the development from the lower to the higher, proceeds not in the form of struggle between antagonistic classes and of cataclysms, as is the case under capitalism, but in the form of criticism and self-criticism, which is the real motive force of our development, a powerful instrument in the hands of the Party. This is incontestably a new form of movement, a new type of development, a new dialectical law." 5

In sum, the functional dynamics, the intra-group and inter-group tensions within Soviet society are motivated by artificially introduced and cultivated devices; they are planned in their disposition, directed in the course of their process, and therefore constitute a mighty weapon in the hands of the party. The Soviet dictatorship, thus, is a system of incredible perfection.

It is difficult for people living in free societies to realize that human beings can live in a virtual cage where any seemingly free action and response to this action is

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2. THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS

Soviet Society is institutionally very unstable and its institutions are undergoing a constant change. The central organs of the party can form, dissolve, and transform any institution according to their needs.

For example, the governmental structure has been changed several times, the present constitution is the third one, and the commissariats were changed into the ministries.

In the economic sphere constant changes are manifested by introducing new targets into economic planning and by setting up new institutions to control fulfilment of these

6 The application and functioning of all these devices and methods of reviving and controlling make life for most of the people under the system of dictatorship virtually unbearable. See account of Victor Kravchenko: I Choose Freedom, Charles Scribner & Sons, New York, 1946.

7 For changes and development of governmental structure see: J. Towster: Political Power in the USSR, Chapter II, Part 1, 2, & 3; Chapter III, Part 2 & 3; for the interpretation and application of the Soviet Constitution. For the evolution of the Federal Union see Chapter V, Part 2.

For the development of the Soviet structure as agencies of public administration, see Chapter X & XI.

For a description of the Judicial System, see Chapter XII. For a critical analysis of Soviet economic planning and a description of Soviet economic machinery see:


See also: H.E. Ronimois: The Soviet Economic Machine A study published in pamphlet form by the University of British Columbia, 1951.
new targets. Of the latest changes in the economic set-up of USSR it is worth mentioning the introduction of targets of state reserve and the changes which have taken place in the accounting system. 8

Civic organizations also rise and disappear according to the party needs. We witness today the emergence of several patriotic organizations, agencies of peace movement and civil defence clubs. On the other hand, the anti-church and anti-religious organizations have overnight disappeared.

To systematize the motive forces behind the institutional dynamics of Soviet society, we can summarize as follows:

The main factor is the party, with its omnipotence to create new organizations, to counterbalance the natural atrophy of Soviet institutions which have to function in an artificial environment.

A second factor of institutional instability is that the institutions are not given time enough to settle down, to stabilize and to develop institutional gravity through tradition.

As a third factor we may consider the abruptness with which changes in social-political equilibrium take

8 For a study in the Soviet accounting system: H. E. Ronimois: The Cost-Profit-Output Relationship in a Soviet Industrial Firm. Published in pamphlet form by the University of British Columbia, 1951.
place in Russia. The Soviet society does not develop gradually; all changes are sudden, abrupt and shocking.

As a fourth factor explaining why Soviet institutions are undergoing constant change and adjustment we can consider the errors and miscalculations of the party. 9

Finally, as a fifth factor, we must consider the magnitude of Soviet society, its resources and territory, and the magnitude of the changes carried through by the Bolshevik revolution.

All these factors taken together explain why Soviet society is in a permanent state of transition. 10

3. THE VERTICAL DYNAMICS

By vertical dynamics we understand the general movement in an upward direction, from masses towards the top level party organizations.

The leading party elite touches the environment

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9 The chaotic state of Soviet economy is due to the fact that economic problems are approached from a political and administrative, rather than an economic angle. It is also due to the fact that the party orthodoxy denies "functioning of trivial economic principles" (as 'capitalistic invention') in Soviet economy. See again Ronimois: The Soviet Economic Machine and The Theoretical Analysis of Soviet Economic Planning, Published in pamphlet form by the University of British Columbia, 1951.

indirectly, through media, which, in executing the party commands in direct contact with the environment, have to overcome frictions; their energies are consumed and generally they are worn out.

This is precisely the reason why the lower party organizations particularly have a tremendous fluctuation of their membership, and why they must be continuously supplied with new and fresh forces dragged from the masses, after the worn out elements have been purged.

The leading elite, on the other hand, is comparatively stable, while the cadres are more fluctuating on account of their being the first link in carrying out party policy.

The friction which the party meets in executing its policy has a bearing on the party organization. The party apparatus is built to enable fresh forces from the mass base to be sucked into the party lower organizations, to utilize their vitality and to put these in turn to work on the most difficult sectors.

The best elements from the mass base move upwards through a series of thresholds, such as the Soviets, the trade unions, party probationary stage, and finally through party membership and cadres to the party elite.

The yardstick used to judge the value of a person for party purposes is his ability to carry out ruthlessly party orders and his ability to get the maximum out of his subordinates.
The purges of the party and state organisations, of economic planning bodies as well as of industrial management boards, are not at all accidental phenomena in Soviet society. On the contrary, they constitute the basic operational law of a government of total power. This government, to retain its power, has to purge itself continuously of worn-out elements, and has to secure the influx of fresh forces into its executive apparatus.  

4. HORIZONTAL DYNAMICS

By horizontal dynamics we understand all those numerous activities of party, government and mass organizations, which keep their membership permanently mobilized and ready to execute party commands. The horizontal dynamics, because of the great number of organizations involved, reach tremendous proportions. Their meetings, conferences, etc. are called "active", and its preparation is the chief organizational task of the party.

2 For the purge as a political device and its appraisal see: V.I. Lenin: Purging the Party, Selected Works, Vol.-II pp. 745 - 746.

See also: Purges in the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Research and Publication Service of The National Committee for a Free Europe, New York, 1952. This study, besides giving a summary of the purges in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, gives also a brief description of various methods applied, starting with preliminary screening of an individual and resulting in periodic mass purges.
"Tireless work with the active leads to increased Party activity, helps to secure the speedy carrying out of directives of the leading organs and helps to activate all Communists. Comrade Stalin teaches that 'after the correct political line has been laid down, organizational work decides everything, including the fate of the political line itself, its success or failure.'

It is necessary to ensure that the active becomes a bold and resolute transmitter of the ideas of the Party."

The main activities of social organizations which keep the entire Soviet society in the state of permanent readiness can be summarized as follows:

(1) Regular meetings, conferences, and congresses, of all organizations on all levels.

(2) Public referenda, plebiscites, elections and nominations.

(3) Occasional meetings, celebrations, commemorations.

(4) Party and non-Party actives, benevolent brigades, civil defence exercises, etc.

(5) Mass meetings of various kinds (peace drives, patriotic drives, etc.)

All these activities performed by numerous party and non-party organizations on all levels are the real motive forces behind the vertical dynamics of Soviet society. All of them execute the party commands and the whole institutional structure, in the real sense of the word, vibrates under party impact.

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1. From an article Train and Educate Party Active, published in For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy, No. 29, July 20, 1951.
CHAPTER VI

THE EXPANSION OF POWER BEYOND THE POWER BASE

1. THE GENERAL PROPOSITION

"Being the land of the Dictatorship of the proletariat . . . the U.S.S.R. inevitably becomes the base of the world movement of all oppressed classes, the centre of international revolution, the greatest factor in the world history . . . she is the international driving force of proletarian revolution that impels the proletariat of all countries to seize power . . . "1

(a) U.S.S.R. AS A BASE OF EXPANSION

The fundamental operational law of the Communist concept of power is a permanent drive for acquisition of new power areas realized by movement in two directions. First, the expansion of power within the base, and secondly, the expansion of power beyond the base.

1 "The Programme of Communist International as adopted by the Sixth World Congress, 1928". Reprinted in Blueprint for World Conquest, p. 220. (The Significance of U.S.S.R. and her World Revolutionary Duties.)
The increase of internal power is realized by the acquisition of new power areas within the base itself, through the expansion into the depth of the base. The human element is organized in suitable formations to enable better exploitation of natural resources. Here political power, in linking the superstructure of society (the party, the trade unions, and the productive organizations) with its material base (natural resources, factories and land), rests on economic power in a combination of which the dividing line is difficult to draw.

The expansion of power beyond the base is effected by Communist parties established by the power base and operating within the superstructure of surrounding states.

In short, the first operational law of a concept of total power is the expansion of power within the base. This we have been discussing in the foregoing chapter. The second operational law of a concept of total power is the expansion of power beyond the base; and this will be discussed below.

The truism, expressed above, was put into Marxian terminology by Stalin:

"The victory of socialism in one country is not a self-sufficient task. The revolution which has been victorious in one country must not regard itself as a self-sufficient entity, but as an aid, a means for hastening the victory of the proletariat in all countries."^3

^3 J.V. Stalin: *Problems of Leninism*, p. 120
Stalin, however, did not leave this general proposition unelaborated. He went further explaining that the revolution in other countries must be supported and assisted even by arms; but only when the power of the base has been sufficiently consolidated:

"In what should this assistance be expressed? It should be expressed, first, in the victorious country achieving the utmost possible in one country for the development, support, and awakening of the revolution in all countries. Second, it should be expressed in that 'the victorious proletariat' of one country . . . would stand up against the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states."

Thus, when the Soviet power was consolidated and increased, the U.S.S.R., as a base of world revolution, faced the problem of awakening revolutions in other countries, and it organized the Communist International to this end.

The Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. held in March, 1918, laid the foundation for the

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establishment of the Third International and a year later, in March, 1919, the Third International convened its First Congress in Moscow.7

(b) **THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL AS AN INSTRUMENT OF EXPANSION**

The Communist International, as envisaged by its founders, is an instrument designed to carry out the world revolution.

"The Communist International is the concentrated will of the world revolutionary proletariat. Its mission is to organize the working class of the whole world for the overthrow of the capitalist order and the establishment of Communism."1

Because the aims of communism are global, the International Communist movement established its agencies, the communist parties, in every country of the world.2 That the


1 The Thesis and Statutes of the Communist International as adopted at the Second World Congress, July 17 to August 7, 1920 at Moscow. Reprinted in *Blueprint for World Conquest*, p. 218.

2 The Communist Parties in Europe actually originated by the splitting up of Social Democratic Parties into their revolutionary and moderate wings. For this process of splitting and 'winning over' of revolutionary elements see the work of Ruth Fischer - *Stalin and German Communism*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1948. Also vide supra Ch.- I. p.-14.
Communist International is the biggest and most powerful international organization is clear from the report published at the Communist Conference in London, of January 23rd, 1917, which is included in Appendix No. II.

The Communist International, its strict discipline and organization, resembles the medieval ecclesiastical Order and hence, the communist parties have to adopt and submit to the canons of the well known 'Twenty-One Conditions'.

The Communist International is a highly centralized international body and demands absolute subordination of interests of individual communist parties to the strategic considerations of the International Communist movement. The Constitution and Rules of the Communist International, as adopted by the Sixth World Congress in 1928, speaking very clear language in this regard and forming the basis for its organization and its discipline. These rules give the Central Committee enormous powers to interfere in the internal affairs of individual communist parties, to direct their activities, and consequently, through these parties, to interfere in the internal life of individual states.


WORLD POWER TENSIONS AS THE SOURCES OF EXPANSION

The strategy of World Revolution is based on the analysis of the world situation in its power implications. Communist strategists scrutinize existing power tensions in different parts of the world and calculate the possibility of their utilization.

In their considerations they depart from the theory of *Uneven Development of Capitalism*. According to this theory, there exists in the world a variety of social systems which are going through different stages of their development. They have one or another dominating mode of production and a corresponding class character; therefore they are of definite power composition and they represent distinct power patterns.

In taking this variety of power patterns into consideration when planning the World Revolution, the Communist strategists realize that the proletariat will get to power in different regions of the world by different ways and also not at the same time:

"These circumstances make it historically inevitable that the proletariat will come to power by a variety of ways and degree of rapidity . . ."1

1 The Programme of the Communist International adopted by Sixth World Congress 1928 in Moscow, Reprinted in *Blueprint for World Conquest*, pp. 208 - 209.
Consequently, the communists divide the world into regions according to the dominant mode of production of the states which these regions constitute. They analyse the internal power composition of individual states to discover the sources of their main power tensions; they also analyze their external relations, interactions and conflicts.

In other words, the sources of World Revolution lie in the internal and external conflicts of these regions and their respective states; and it is the task of strategy and tactics to utilize them in this respect:

"The more powerful enemy can be conquered only by exerting the utmost effort, and by necessarily, thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skillfully taking advantage of every, even the smallest 'rift' among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries; and also by taking advantage of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional."

In planning World Revolution, the communist strategists divide the world in these spheres:

1. Regions with highly developed industrial production, with diversified social stratification and highly developed institutional structure.

2. Regions where the dominant mode of production is agriculture, with few social classes and with less developed institutional structure.

3. Colonies, dependent and other countries with feudal and caste systems.

These three main groups of countries, constituting three different power patterns, divide the world into three distinctive theatres of World Revolution, each having its own specific strategy and tactics.\(^3\)

In this way World Revolution is resolved into individual revolutionary processes which are taking place within individual states of respective regions, and the strategy of World Revolution is only their co-ordination and integration. The strategic object, - Communist dictatorship on a world scale, will be achieved only as a final outcome of these processes.

"The International Proletarian Revolution represents a combination of processes which vary in time and character; purely proletarian revolutions; revolutions of a bourgeois - democratic type, which grow into proletarian revolutions; wars of national liberation; colonial revolutions. The World Dictatorship of the proletariat comes only as the final result of the revolutionary processes."\(^4\)

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\(^3\) This proposition of three distinctive patterns of revolution was actually later on developed only into two patterns, and therefore the pattern of seizure of power in industrial countries with certain modifications applies also to the countries with agrarian production.

\(^4\) The Programme of the Communist International as adopted by the Sixth World Congress in 1928 in Moscow. Reprinted in *Blueprint for World Conquest*, p. 203.
The perplexity of communist actions in the international field can be understood only if viewed from the total angle; only then can we disclose the underlying pattern of World Revolution described above. Only then we can piece together seemingly unconnected individual Communist actions and see that they fit into a pattern of conspiracy of global dimensions.5

2. THE PATTERN OF COMMUNIST EXPANSION IN THE
PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES

(a) THE CONDITION OF THE SEIZURE OF POWER

The World Revolution in the regions with highly
developed industrial production scored considerable successes
when the countries of Middle and Eastern Europe, in the short
span of three or four years (1944-1948), were brought under
the Soviet yoke. The World Revolution, in acquiring Albania,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Poland, was con­
siderably strengthened and its base expanded.¹

The establishment of communist control in the above
countries is a recent and exemplary confirmation of the main
thesis of this essay; that the communist strategy is primarily
based on the utilisation of permanently operating power

¹ See Moscow's European Satellites, The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science
tensions on the ability of the communists to link themselves with any social movement, and to transform and use it as a source of their power.

In the particular case of the countries of Eastern and Middle Europe the communists linked themselves as early as the beginning of the Second World War with the underground national-liberation movements, with power tensions of colossal magnitude.

The resistance movement in occupied countries of Middle and Eastern Europe was composed of democratic political parties of different orientations, and of nonpartisan patriots. The pressure of long years of Nazi occupation resulted in the unification of all the diverse and mutually antagonistic forces and thus supplied the fundamental prerequisite for communist independent operations. Huge all-national underground united fronts were formed.

While the resistance movement, as the united front, had as its prime object to fight the invader, the Communist strategic aim was to establish control over various sections of the united front; to prepare themselves for their own independent operations which were planned to start simultaneously with the end of the Second World War.

Although the Communist International was formally dissolved to appease the democratic Allies of the U.S.S.R., the plans for World Revolution went full speed ahead and
the principal Communist Parties of Europe directed their membership with detailed instructions.  

For example, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the midst of the war, in July, 1943, mobilized its membership and issued detailed instructions from which we quote:

"We publish these instructions on the eve of the end of this war. They are addressed to our experienced comrades who are receiving them in the moment rapidly approaching the hour of our open battle. This battle will be won only by those who know exactly their aims and means, and who know how to predict and utilize further development of the war for the victory of the Czech working class.......

The longer the war lasts, occupied Europe becomes mere Bolshevist, the middle class becomes more proletarian, and consequently, the general conditions for the establishment of Soviet Socialist Republics in Europe are growing more rapidly. These republics will be established even in the case that the revolutionary armies of the USSR will be thoroughly exhausted by long and heavy battles against Nazism.

When this war conflict will culminate on its main battle fields, simultaneously with it also the world political conflict will reach its peak...

We are fighting against Nazism, but we are leading our battle as the battle of our own class as well. We are fighting the battle...

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2 The Communist International was dissolved on May 22nd, 1943. Announcement of this move was made through the publication of a resolution of its Executive Committee. For its text see The Dissolution of the Comintern, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, House Document No. 619, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1948, pp. 165 - 168.
against Nazism in a way which would leave us strong enough for the moment of revolution against the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie."3

The instruction issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia contains further directions for the seizure of power in conjunction with the end of the Second World War. It stresses the paramount importance of capturing and controlling the patriotic mass base, of establishing the United Front from below, and of isolating and neutralizing organizations and elements hostile to communism. The most revealing is the concluding part of the instructions where the communists openly declare that there is only one possible outcome of this war; the establishment of Soviet Republic in Czechoslovakia and its annexation to the U.S.S.R., even at the cost of extermination and deportation of the opposing population.

"The establishment of Czech Soviet Republic and its annexation to the U.S.S.R., is the main object of our revolution and the foundation of our new State . . . This is our complete programme, and everything that departs from it or that is against it must be defeated and removed by the revolution . . .

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It is entirely irrelevant whether we shall have to deport one hundred, two hundred or eight hundred thousand people after the war into forced labour camps beyond the frontiers of our new state. Everyone who will not be able to prove that he took an active part in our (understand Communist) revolutionary battle, will have to go there, no matter who he may be.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was not the only one which issued the instructions for its membership. Several studies published since the end of the war disclose the same underlying pattern behind the activities of the communist parties, viz. the intensive preparation for the seizure of power in conjunction with the end of the Second World War.

The communists penetrated all important organizations and sections of the resistance movement and formed there the communist cells as latent power centres. The war and the extremely difficult conditions under the occupation furnished a favourable climate to this end. They deployed their operators into political parties, trade unions and other leading organizations of the resistance movement with the hope

4. Ibid. p. 15.


The War of Yugoslav Communists carried against the German army as well as against democratic Yugoslav patriots is described by Stephen Clissold: Whirlwind. The Crescent Press, London, 1949.

that these organizations, at the end of the war, would emerge as a backbone of new political institutions of the liberated countries.

To acquire access to their target groups, the communists provoked and initiated the inter-group tensions; and, taking advantage of these, they linked themselves with this or the other group.

In order to penetrate into the target group after access had been established, the communists initiated and encouraged intra-group conflicts. They split the group into antagonistic factions, and by supporting and linking themselves with winning factions, they later emerged in the leadership of the group.

The most shameful activities of European communist parties during the war years were the denunciations. The communists, to remove their present and also possible future foes, denounced their opponents to enemy authorities.

The communists also provoked or initiated armed uprisings against the occupants only for the purpose of exposing their fellow fighters to the superior strength of German armies. This exposure was calculated to exterminate and to liquidate the democratic underground groups. The decimation of the Polish democratic underground movement by German armies in the Warsaw uprising of 1944 is a notorious example.6

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All operations mentioned above were carried out with the view to securing operational control over the broad popular patriotic movements which were bound to emerge after the war as the main organizing forces of the liberated states.

Coming back to the communist conquest of power in the countries of Middle and Eastern Europe, we have to consider the presence of the Red Army in those countries as a second decisive factor of easy communist victory, the operational control of the mass base being the first one.

The Red Army functioned as a protecting wing while the communist parties were busy transforming the national war of liberation into the general social upheaval which they planned would end in the Proletarian Revolution and the communist conquest of power. The communist parties, on their road to power, were protected and backed by the might of the Red Army which intervened only when the communists encountered unbreakable resistance.

"The coming of the Soviet Army made possible the growing of the National liberation struggle into the national liberation war... The working class which led the struggle against the occupiers now gained extensive possibilities of seizing political power and carrying out the broad struggle for the abolition of the rule of capitalist and land owners...

The working masses, the working class and its political organizations had a class ally in the Soviet Army... an ally who by his very presence rendered powerless the camp of the reaction and made it incapable of dealing by force of arms with the revolutionary government..."
The socialist revolution in the People's Democracies was based in its source on the aid and power of the Soviet Union and its Army. 

A third factor which played a decisive role in the communist conquest of power in the People's Democracies was that the communist parties, step by step with the advance of the Red Army, moved ahead with a ready-made skeleton apparatus of new state power. They established local and central revolutionary governments and in these secured for themselves initial control. The organization and installation of the Lublin Government in Poland is an example.

The fourth major factor leading to the communist victory in middle Europe was the institution of a National Front and the system of government of the National Front. This latter was based on the coalition of political parties as they emerged from the underground at the end of the war.

These governments did not rest on popular consent, but were formed by inter-party agreements when the communists were always given the key posts in the cabinets.

They always controlled the Ministry of Internal Police to use its authority for liquidation of their political opponents and to be able to exercise general terror against the...

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whole population.

They also demanded control of the industrial and agricultural departments. Controlling these two ministries, the communists were able to provoke practically at any time revolutionary waves which could sweep away their political partners. By loosening or tightening the land reform, the communists were able to stir up the agrarian masses. On the other hand, controlling the nationalized industry, the communists had command of the working class and were able to form armed workers' militia, and to control the trade unions.8

The communists also controlled the Ministry of Information and used its apparatus of mass communication, such as radio, press, theatres and cinemas. They were also anxious to control the Ministry of Education to acquire access to the intelligentsia.

Being in control of the above key positions in the state and using and exploiting governmental authority with which they were entrusted, the communists were able to prepare individual sectors of the population separately for a final showdown.

In addition to the control of the most important

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8 For the land reform and the nationalization of industry as tactical instruments of Communism, see Matyas Rakosi: The Ways of Our People's Democracy, pp. 13 and 21.
branches of the state authority from above, the communists also controlled the mass base through the institution of a national front. The national front organized all political parties as well as the genuine mass organizations, such as trade unions, patriotic women and youth organizations, and its agencies were established on national, regional, district and local levels. In all these agencies the communists were fairly well established, because already during the war they had penetrated into all membership organizations of united front and formed within these their cells.

In preparing the seizure of power, the main attack of the communists was directed on the trade unions. In the "peaceful development of revolution" the trade unions serve as environment where the communists, by their personal agitation, undermine the loyalty of their fellow trade unionists to their respective political leadership. When however, the communists decide to move in a final bid for power, the trade unions are transformed into a direct instrument of the revolution - into the revolutionary hammer - raising the revolutionary demands and smashing the parties of the communists' opponents.

(b) **THE SEIZURE OF POWER**

The situation as outlined briefly above was the power position within countries of Middle and Eastern Europe shortly
after the end of the war; and it was the starting point for
the long and protracted process of the gradual shifting of
political gravity within these countries to the left, with
the gradual "taking over" by the communists.

The main features of this process can be described as
follows:

The communists, to decimate political parties of the
Right, used the trade unions to put forward new and progressive
revolutionary demands which they knew would not be accepted.
In this operation they enlisted the support of the parties
of the Centre and of the Left.

When the parties of the Right were paralyzed by this
common effort, the communists initiated the reconstruction of
the composition of the government as well as of the national
front; and claiming, together with Social Democrats, more than
50% of the majority in all governmental bodies and in all
agencies of the united front, the centre of political gravity
within the country shifted to the Left.

After a short period of time had allowed things to
settle down, and having a firm grip on the spoils of the
"first partition", the communists were ready to move again,
this time against the Centre. By placing Social Democrats
into prominent positions in the government and by promises
of joint rule, the communists were able to secure the support
of the Social Democratic Party, and then, together with them,
they introduced new revolutionary demands not acceptable to moderate and democratic parties of the Centre.

Simultaneously with the process of destruction of the Centre, the communists, however, opened operations against the Social Democrats themselves. They undermined and split their parties from the top as well as from the bottom. They instructed the communist operators hidden within their general membership to carry out, with the help of Left Wing Social Democrats, internal revolutions, to dispose of the present leadership and to install a new one carefully selected by the communists' Head Quarters, and to propose the merger of the Social Democratic Party with the Communist Party.

Concurrently with the decimation of political parties and with the reshaping of the government and national front the communists mobilized workers' armed militia, seized control in factories, mines and other industrial enterprises and kept the police and the army ready to intervene if necessary.

The gradual and smooth conquest of power which followed is of a unique character, because only in a few exceptional and minor cases did the communists use naked power and violence.

And this is how, in different ways and with varying degrees of rapidity, the People's Democratic Governments in Middle and Eastern Europe were established.1

1 For the Communist conquest of Poland see: (cont.)
A. Bliss Lane: I Saw Poland Betrayed, the Bobbs-Merrill Co., New York, 1948.
For conquest of Czechoslovakia see: Hubert Ripka: Czechoslovakia Enslaved, the Story of the Communists Coup d'etat, Gollancz, London, 1950.
For the Communist victory in Hungary see:
For the Communists' own exposition of their road to power see Matyas Rakosi: The Way of Our People's Democracy, Published by the National Committee for Free Europe, Inc., New York, 1952.
For the Communist attack on Post War Europe see also:
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MACHINERY OF DICTATORSHIP

The system of the People's Democratic Dictatorship has several important features manifesting the perfection of the communists' techniques of seizure of power and also the perfection of means for its preservation. In addition to the new techniques of utilization of power tensions, the communists have also developed new methods of transforming genuine political organizations, the political parties of their opponents, into the instruments of their dictatorship. Hilary Minc, Member of the Political Bureau of the Polish Worker's Party in his article "On People's Democracy in Eastern Europe", formulated the theoretical foundations of the People's Democratic Dictatorship, the relevant part of which is quoted here in full:

"Although there is complete fundamental harmony in the functioning of the mechanism of the dictatorship of the proletariat, based on the leading role of the party, a certain specific nature does exist, however, at the present stage of the development of People's Democratic form. This specific nature lies in the existence of not only one single party, the party of the proletariat, but also of other political organizations and parties, which function mainly in the field of the peasant and petty bourgeois strata.

It must, however, be stated distinctly that these parties do not possess any more the character of political organizations representing the interest of "antagonistic classes whose interests are hostile and cannot be reconciled". (Stalin)
some of these parties were the more or less wavering allies of the Communist and Workers' Parties while some of them held openly hostile positions in relation to them.

However, in the process of the great class battles which took place in the People's Democracies . . . these parties changed their class nature. In this period a thorough revision of their ideology, a thorough cleansing of their leadership and apparatus took place. At present these parties recognize the general political line worked out by the Communist and Workers' Parties . . . as binding for them, and corresponding to the interest of the social strata among which they function. These parties develop their practical activity along this line. These parties recognize also, both in theory and in practice, the leading role of the Communist and Workers Parties.

In the present stage of development of the People's Democracies, these parties are fulfilling in reality the function of special ally formations, a special bridge for the leading detachment of the working class to a part of the working masses, especially to the peasants. Hence, the entrance of the representatives of these parties into the government does not in any case endow the governments in the People's Democracies with the character of the coalition governments in the bourgeois meaning of the word, does not deprive them of coherence and compactness, does not infringe in principle their unity of actions, and does not undermine the stability and durability of the people's power."

This is precisely why the existence of parliaments, political parties, elections and of other constitutional usages in People's Democracies obscures and confuses the

1 Hilary Minc: On People's Democracy, passim. 16-17.
actual state of affairs, leaving an observer with an impression that the People's Democracies are the governments of limited, checked and balanced powers in the Western sense. Mr. Bierut, another leading Polish Communist, put it correctly:

"The People's Democracy is not a synthesis or stabilized form of co-existence of two different systems, but is a form of pushing out and gradual elimination of capitalist elements..."

The devices applied by the communist parties in the People's Democracies to exercise control over the institutional structure as well as over the mass base are of the same nature as in the U.S.S.R., with, however, special adjustments to more civilized and developed conditions.

The communist parties are articulating their membership masses into the ten-man groups according to the places of their occupation. Every ten-man party group again rallies around itself a definite number of non-party members, engages them in carrying out party commands and in the fulfilling of production targets as set by the party. The ten-man groups are actually the lowest level of the communist party power structure. They link the party with the non-party masses, and in relation to the latter they function as the leading elite:

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2 From the Speech of the Unification Congress of the Polish Workers' and Socialist Parties, December 1946, Reprinted in On People's Democracy, p. 41.
"By means of these lower links (the Party Groups) the Party leadership established close and direct contact with each member of the organization. Each individual Party member is within the field of vision of the Party group organizer. The group organizer involves the membership in the Party activity and in social work, for fulfilment and over fulfilment of production assignments. He sees to it that the members of his group take part in the Party study since constant educational work strengthens discipline and deepens the consciousness of the members of the group. The organizer and the member of the group conduct systematic agitational, educational and organizational work among the non-Party masses and, in this way, exert a steady influence over them too . . . ."\(^3\)

The dynamics of societies in People's Democracies is also directed by the party and reaches tremendous proportions. For example, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at the end of 1951 decided to hold five thousand community meetings in the countryside which would be devoted to the international and internal political situation. By the end of April of 1952, the communist party reported that it was able to organize eight thousand community meetings in various parts of the country in which a substantial part of the population took part.\(^4\)

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\(^4\) A. Novotny, member of the Political Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in his article Turn to the Masses published in Official Organ of Cominform, No. 17, April 25th, 1952.
Purges are also permanent institutions in People's Democracies. They help the party to do away with inflexible and undesirable elements which cannot follow the sharp turns of the party political line, and to prepare the soil for "political and economic consolidation":

"The meeting (Central Committee of the C.P. of Bulgaria held in April 1951) decided to purge the lower Party organizations in the rural localities . . . During 1951 over 1,600 commissions worked under the direct leadership of regional and district Party Committee verifying the composition of the Party organizations . . .

The political and organizational strengthening of the lower Party organizations in the rural areas, as a result of the purge, has created conditions for the organizational, economic and political consolidation of agriculture."

To conclude, the People's Democratic Governments are political systems of unlimited total power. They are based on the experiences of the U.S.S.R. and being adjusted and adapted for the specific social conditions existing in Middle and Eastern Europe, they manifest a far reaching flexibility and departure from the Marxian orthodoxy in meeting the demands of total power concept. Regardless of how differently their organs are grouped in various countries and whatever different names they might have, they still disclose the universal nature of total power.

5 Result of the purge in rural organizations of the Communist Party of Bulgaria. Published in the Official Organ of Cominform No. 12, May 9th, 1952.
The People's Democratic Government represents the machinery of dictatorship on the Soviet pattern with an important difference, that the party touches its environment not only through a series of mass organisations, but uses also the organizational apparatus of former political parties. The People's Democratic Government also maintains the skeletons of former political parties for another purpose. They provide that misleading and quite often misunderstood screen of democratic institutions behind which the communists can freely operate without the risk of being detected and having their system labelled as totalitarian.

(d) **THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE MODERN SEIZURE OF POWER**

The techniques of the conquest of political power in the People's Democracies is the latest word in the development of political strategy of communism and have the following main features:

The conquest of political power is not realized through sudden explosive and violent revolution, but is achieved

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through a series of small-scale revolutions or coups d'état which simultaneously take place within political parties, government institutions and economic organizations. This is, a long and protracted process whereby in chipping off the parties of the right, the centre of political gravity within the country is gradually shifted to the left; and where, in the course of this process, all political parties as well as all governmental institutions undergo gradual transformation and internal reconstruction.

This gradual transformation does not smash the social institutions as the revolution of the early Bolshevik pattern did. It only paralyses the target institutions in their functions and preserves and leaves their organizational structures intact, ready to be taken over and used by the Communists.

The revolution of the People's Democratic pattern, because it takes place within the higher level power centres, eliminates the participation of the masses in this revolutionary process. The masses are isolated and neutralized by actual non-conductive barriers which are placed between them and the operations of seizure of power.

These non-conductive barriers are built from communist-controlled front organizations, and their function is to prevent any possibility of a spontaneous movement within the masses. The dimension, direction and dynamic of the spontaneous movement of the masses is not calculable, and if allowed to enter into the political equation operative in the upper
levels, it would necessarily be the big unknown which could give the process of seizure quite a different direction.

The revolution no longer follows the old Marxian prescription that it must have the form "of forcible overthrow". It is rather a slow and well planned transformation of which most of the population is not at all aware. The revolution is not conducted to smash institutions, but it aims at their preservation. It no longer manifests itself by the heroic, spontaneous movement of the masses. It is a highly skilled manipulation carried out quietly within a few upper level power centres and completely excludes the masses.

Thus, the revolution on the People's democratic pattern constitutes an altogether new concept of political conquest, which, if not grasped or if misunderstood, could be fatal to all Western civilization.¹

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¹ For different patterns of revolutions see:

For the classic old-Marxian concept of the revolution where the main instrument is violence, see J. Kenman's study published under the pseudonym Historicus: Stalin On Revolution, Foreign Affairs, January 1949.
CHAPTER VI

THE PATTERN OF EXPANSION IN FREE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES

(a) THE GENERAL PROPOSITION

The operations of the Communist International movement in other countries with highly developed industrial economies are carried out by local communist parties, the sections of the Communist International. The communist parties operating in democratic countries are agencies of a foreign power alien and hostile to the government of the country in which they operate, and recognizing as their only authority the Executive Committee of the Communist International in Moscow.¹

directly, in elections. They confine themselves to the strategy of indirect approach; they attack the whole institutional structure of society in order to strangle individual institutions in their functions, and in this way bring about a functional collapse of society as a whole. Thus, the communists create an atmosphere of instability and chaos and under these conditions, being a highly organized and disciplined civil army, they strike for power. They are well prepared because they organize two independent networks as their agencies: the one which operates openly and legally, and the other which operates in the underground illegally:

"The general state of things in the whole of Europe and America makes necessary an obligatory formation of illegal Communist organizations along with those existing legally. The executive committee shall be bound to see that this shall be carried out everywhere."2

(b) THE TACTICS OF THE UNITED FRONT

The rich and highly articulated institutional structure of the democratic countries, generating in its functioning constantly operating power tensions, is a target of communist attacks.

In the first place, the communists attack the trade unions. The communists link themselves with the trade unions because these belong to the category of the most revolutionary social organizations. They are highly organized, they have a vast network of power centres on all levels and, because of their class character, they are more accessible:

"The fundamental principle of all organizational work of the Communist Party and individual Communists must be the creation of Communist nuclei everywhere where they find proletarians and semi-proletarians — although in small numbers. In every Soviet of Workers' Deputies, in every trade and industrial union, cooperative association, factory, tenant's union, in every government institution, everywhere, even though there may be only three people sympathizing with Communism, a Communist nuclei must be immediately organized. It is only the power of organization of the Communists that enables the advanced guard of the working class to be the leader of the whole class. Communist nuclei working in organization adhering to no political party organizations in general, must be subjected to the party organization in general, whether the party itself is working legally or illegally at the given moment. Communist nuclei of all kinds must be subordinated one to another in strictly hierarchical order and system."

When the communists have established power nuclei in trade unions of different orientations they have acquired the first link in the chain of organizations leading them to the mass base. And to secure for themselves the second link

1 Paragraph 18 of Theses and Statutes of Communist International. Ibid. P. 84.
and to extend their influence, the communists now direct their activities against other working class organizations, and also those which do not belong to any political party.

"The most important task of the genuine Communist Party is to preserve constantly the closest contact with the widest masses of the workers. For that purpose the Communists must carry on activity also within such organizations which are non-partisan, but which comprise large proletarian groups . . ."2

The communists establish with these organizations of the working class fighting alliances called United Fronts. They form joint committees and joint organizations which function as dual power centres.3

The access to all these organizations as a condition for the establishment of the United Front is supplied by the tactical operation called the United Action.

The communist strategists direct individual members of the communist party as well as whole groups of the communists to assist the individual target organizations in their struggle, to unite with their general membership from

2 Theses and Statutes of Communist International, Ibid. p. 103.
3 The theory of United Front tactics as well as its application was formulated by Georgi Dimitroff, Secretary General of Communist International in his report delivered to the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International held in August 1935 in Moscow. This report with his other articles and speeches is reprinted in Georgi Dimitroff The United Front, International Publishers, New York, 1938.
below in common action, to get known to the others and to acquire their confidence.

This operation of acquisition of access to the target organization, because it takes place in the process of common, united action and within the general membership, is called the tactics of united action from below, and is actually the opening key to successful penetration of communist targets.¹

When this united action from below reaches its expected objective, i.e. when the membership of the target organization is influenced enough to demand the change of its leadership of the choice of allies, the communist strategists commence to operate within the upper levels of the target group. The communist party seeks an opportunity to offer its assistance to the target organization as a whole; to join it on all levels and to help it in its struggle. And to facilitate this common fight the communist party offers the formulation of a common program — platform as well as the

¹ For the strategy of access to the Social Democratic Parties, see Georgi Dimitroff instructions to the Communist Parties:

"Thus, in countries having Social Democratic governments, the Communists, by utilizing suitable individual demands taken from the platform of the Social Democratic Parties themselves and from the election promises of the Social Democratic ministers as the starting point for achieving joint action with the Social Democratic Parties and organizations, can afterwards more easily develop a campaign for an establishment of a united front on the basis of other mass demands in the struggle against the capitalist offensive, against fascism and the threat of war." (Italics supplied.) G. Dimitroff: The United Front, pp. 58 - 59.
organization of joint executive agencies.

This operation, the formulation of common program and the establishment of joint agencies for carrying out this program since it takes place on the upper levels within the central organ of the target group, is called the tactics of the united front from above.

The offer of the communists to form joint agencies is usually accepted, either because of the severity of the struggle and the target organization needs an ally, or because of the pressure from below initiated by the influence of the communists operating within the general membership of the target group.

The tactics of united action from below and the tactics of united action from above are complementary, and because they are applicable on every level and against every social organization, they are the cornerstone of all communist operations in free democratic countries.

The united action from below is quite often based on the principle of the conditioned reflex and on the utilization of this trivial sociological phenomenon. The communists anticipate that every social organization under certain conditions and under certain stimuli follows a definite and established pattern of behaviour; that it responds in a definite way. Realizing this and taking it as the basis for their operations the communists supply and introduce adequate stimuli. They
provoke incidents and bring about situations which involve the target organization only for the purpose of acquiring easy access, and to assist the target group in united action which follows. When access from below is established, united action from above immediately follows and is completed by the organization of joint executive bodies functioning as the dual power centres.5

5 Another example of how the communists utilize the conditioned reflex is given by the following incident which happened in 1942:

"From 1942 on, a mighty struggle raged between the Poles and Ukrainians in the Polish-Ukrainian border regions. Its reverberations have not died out to this day. This fight was started and conducted according to the rules of enlightened terror, on the initiative of the competent Bolshevist organs. These Bolshevist elements decided to strike the three opponents, the Germans, the Poles, and the Ukrainians, in a single action and with a single stroke. This is indicated by the aim of the action, which was as follows:

a. to bring the German hinterland to a status of 'Balkanization';
b. to expose the elements with nationalist leanings on both the Polish and the Ukrainian sides,
c. to prevent any attempt at Polish-Ukrainian co-operation,
d. to weaken Poland's position in the international field (in case the Polish government should demand the re-institution of the eastern border as of 1939).

The means with which this action was carried out may be regarded as classic. Two fighting groups were formed, Polish and Ukrainian. Both groups were numerically weak and consisted of only a few people, who, however, were distinguished by special abilities. The two groups started the action simultaneously but independently in the sectors assigned to them (in Wolynia). The Polish group attacked the Ukrainians; the Ukrainians the Poles... The actions were (continued on the following page)
When the tactics of the united action from below and above is applied against several organizations and political parties simultaneously, it results in the formation of huge joint executive committees; and because these link together several organizations in a common front, operating on the agreed programatic platform, they are called the United Front. And because, in this initial stage, the joint committees link together parties and organizations of the working class, more accessible for their class character, the communist strategists call this formation The United Proletarian Front.

(continued) carried out ruthlessly and at short intervals, always in the name of the loudly proclaimed national interests, either Polish or Ukrainian.

Both Poles and Ukrainians are distinguished by the relative speed with which they can be aroused. For this reason the mass reaction occurred very quickly. In a short time the true avengers and defenders of the national interests appeared on both sides, and they continued the actions tirelessly and enthusiastically, along the lines determined in the beginning by the two operational groups.

Then the two groups were suddenly diverted to other fields, and finally completely withdrawn, because it had quickly become evident that they were no longer needed. The machine of enlightened terror was already operating automatically . . .

All those affected by the action believe that it was of the nature of a spontaneous movement, and differences of opinion exist only concerning who was to blame. For the Poles blame the Ukrainians and the Ukrainians the Poles. But both sides, and also the outside world, are mistaken."

The operation of united action from below and from above is a clear manifestation of the communist strategy of indirect approach in its very rudimentary form. The communists move and make a final bid for power on the upper institutional levels only when the loyalty of the general membership of their targets is broken and when the operational control over the membership masses from below is established.

This fact is of fundamental importance and constitutes the iron law of communist strategy.

"United front from the bottom - nearly always; united from the top - fairly frequently and with all the necessary guarantees as to the tactics of mobilization that would facilitate the revolutionizing of the masses; united front from the top alone - never."

The establishment of the United Proletarian Front is a great success for the communists. The communist party, operating beyond the constitutional frame, finds in the system of the united front its natural environment, and in it gradually transforms the participating organizations into its prime source of power. The communist party exercises a slow but steady influence and pressure upon the general membership of participating parties as well as upon their leadership, and the United Proletarian Front is finally changed into the tool

of communist policy, it is the second link in the chain of organizations connecting the communist party with the mass base, the first link being the trade unions.

While in the meantime the participating parties and organizations of the United Proletarian Front are carrying out the official program as their main activity, the communist party, on the other hand, sets aside aims for which the united front was originally organized and considers the united front only as an environment for its own independent operations:

'We must strive to establish the widest united front with the aid of joint action by workers organizations of different trends . . .

We must tirelessly prepare the working class for rapid change in the form and methods of struggle, when there is a change in the situation. As the movement grows and the unity of the working class strengthens, we must go further and prepare then transition from the defensive to the offensive against capital, steering toward the organization of the mass political strike . . .

Communists of course cannot and must not for a moment abandon their own independent work of communist education, organization and mobilization of the masses.'

When the communists succeed in forming the United Proletarian Front comprising the organizations of the working class, such as socialist parties, trade unions and other workers' organizations, they concentrate on building up an extended and broader united front, on forming a system of a

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7 Georgi Dimitroff: The United Front, pp. 36 - 37.
united front which would embrace besides the working class, also a wide cross-section of the population.

The main device applied in this operation is again the principle of mass involvement, and the same process takes place as in building the proletarian united front, however, on a wider scale. The united front which is achieved is called the People's United Front, because it comprises the non-proletarian popular elements and it links the civic, scientific, cultural and church organization to the communist-controlled power pyramid.

Thus, the foundation in building the people's front, the third link connecting the party with the mass base, is the second link, the proletarian united front, already fully under the operational control of the communist party. In this respect the instructions of the Comintern expressed by its Secretary-General, Georgi Dimitroff are very definite:

"First the United Proletarian front - then the United People's front" 8

and further:

"The joint action of the organized workers is the beginning, the foundation." 9

The prime object of the united front tactics is to

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8 Georgi Dimitroff: The United Front, p. 92.
9 Ibid. p. 38
involve and gradually to bring under the communists' control progressively larger circles of the population, and to extend the influence of the communist party into ideologically far removed strata of the population, which otherwise, i.e., directly, would not be accessible. The tactics of united front based on the principle of mass involvement actually stratifies the whole population of the country into the series of elites and masses, into the chain of command, connecting the communist party with the mass base in the following sequence:

**First series**: communist party as an elite - trade unions as a corresponding mass base.

**Second series**: trade unions as an elite - other working class organizations, the Proletarian United Front, as a corresponding mass base.

**Third series**: the Proletarian United Front as an elite - the United People's Front as a corresponding mass base.

**Fourth series**: the United People's Front as an elite - the population as a whole as a corresponding mass base.

The devices serving as starting points for the development of united front tactics are numerous. In the thirties the main slogan was "the struggle against fascism". At present, the latest and the most successful united fronts are built around peace slogans.

The organization of the **World Wide United Front** around peace slogans was initiated by the so-called
"Stockholm Appeal", released in March 19th, 1950, when the World Communist movement was able to collect in the course of nine months of 1950 over four hundred million (4,000,000,000) signatures.

This was the first stage in the building of the worldwide united front. Its distinctive strategic aim was to achieve the preliminary articulation of the world mass base by setting up a number of peace committees in every country of the world.

The Second World Peace Congress held in Warsaw, November 16th to 22nd, 1950, correctly evaluated the significance of this first step:

"The Second World Peace Congress was a brilliant demonstration of the excellent organization of the world peace movement. Suffice it to point out, for example, that there now exist national peace committees and councils in 75 countries, that more than 150,000 peace committees function in the towns and countrysides, at the factories and offices in almost all countries."

When the world mass base was preliminarily articulated by the establishment of peace movement committees, the process of building of the world united front entered into its second phase. The peace committees, being of a provisional

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nature, are transformed into permanent institutions. They have to extend their social composition to acquire a mass character. In other words, the peace committees, originally organized *ad hoc* with the aim of collecting signatures, are to be transformed into genuine mass organizations, into the nuclei of dual power, with the communists' initial control.

The efficiency of this transformation was manifested by the fact that *The Appeal for the Pact of Peace*, issued at the Peace Congress in Berlin on February 5th, 1951, was in the short space of seven months distributed around the world and signed by the fantastic figure of 562 million people.\(^1\)

That a quarter of the population of the earth fell into the communist trap is explainable only by the fact that the communists are masters in concealing their real aims. For the consumption of the general public of free countries they pretend to be the champions of peace, and accordingly, they fed it with appropriate propaganda. On the other hand, for the consumption of their cadres and operators they issue clear instructions setting the strategic line. The peace committees

\(^{11}\) See an article in *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, No. 44, November 2, 1951:

"The communique issued by the Secretariat of the World Peace Councils on October 9th, 1951 says, that one-fourth of the population of the world signed the World Peace Councils Appeal for a pact of peace among the five Great Powers.

The communique says that to date 562,083,363 signatures have been obtained in the course of the campaign . . . ."
in free countries have to link the communist parties with the free mass base and to bring under communists' control otherwise loyal citizens; they are the starting points in the development of a united action:

"The struggle for peace - the cardinal task of the Communist Parties - links in the closest possible way the Communist Parties with the masses and will make it possible to ensure the realization of the united action of the working class and on this basis, the attainment of national unity on the part of all democratic forces for the purpose of rallying of the broad masses of the people in the struggle against U.S. - British imperialism and domestic reaction."12

The organization of the world united front around peace slogans is, at the present time, the foremost task of the Communist International, and its official paper brings continuously detailed instructions and directives as to how to build a peace movement with the main stress on securing a broad mass base. For example:

"The work of extending the composition of local committees now under way in many countries, by electing new members - representatives of various parties, organizations, associations, by including in the committee workers and employees, local clergy, owners of small enterprises, will undoubtedly help

12 In For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy: Strengthen Prestige and Influence of Communists Among Masses No. 34, August 24th, 1951.
to strengthen the peace committees and extend their mass base."\(^{13}\)

The really great revolutionary potential of the latent forces of the united fronts is fully understood and correctly evaluated by individual communist parties. The united fronts in free countries are envisaged as the instruments for the overthrow of existing governments under the peace slogans, and they are planned and constructed with the view to being later converted from the instruments of the revolution into the instruments of dictatorship after the conquest of power. The strategy of the peace movement, the strategy of conquest under the peace slogans, is the very foundation of the communists' plans for world conquest, and its universality is manifested by the fact that even the small communist parties, such as that of Guatemala, recognize in the struggle for peace the direct road to seizure of power:

"We must work to make the struggle for peace the basic issue for all other democratic and progressive forces, since the fight for peace ensures united action by the working people and is the foundation upon which the unity of all democratic forces for successful struggle, for revolutionary aims, is based."\(^{14}\)

\(^{13}\) For Pact of Peace, in For a Lasting Peace for a People's Democracy, No. 14, April 6, 1951.

\(^{14}\) For Lasting Peace for People's Democracy, Report from the Meeting of the Central Committee of the CP of Guatemala No. 14, April 1952.
The united fronts in various parts of the world are also built upon the exploitation of political, economic and racial power tensions. They are organized around the slogans appealing to national unity, anti-American and anti-British feeling and around the slogans of nationalization of industry and land reform. The most effective devices in building the national fronts are, however, the slogans of a universal nature which appeal to everybody, everywhere, and which consist of the combination of appeals for the defence of peace with the appeals to defend political freedoms and civil liberties.

Both these devices are two distinctive tactics, each facilitating access to a different stratum of the population in sequence. This was remarkably clearly defined by Palmiro Togliatti:

"There is a strategy of a struggle for freedom and a strategy of struggle for peace, and we understand this precisely because we are Communists. The strategy of struggle for freedom is that we, defending the principles of democracy, come into contact with and can act in co-operation with the broad masses of the people who do not belong to the working class... The strategy of the struggle for peace is a still broader strategy because while defending the peace we come into contact with and can act in co-operation both with individuals and groups of people still further removed from us from the point of view of social status and outlook..."15

The process of building the Proletarian United Fronts and, on their basis, the People's United Fronts, is progressing with varying rapidity. For example in Italy and France, where the communists are already in control of extensive mass bases, the main stress is put on the development of mass action. Here the communists are initiating strikes, demonstrations and other actions in which they can engage their civil armies on a mass scale in order to keep their organizations ready for action, to keep their membership permanently mobilized and to season it in battle.

These mass actions serve however another important purpose. Because they are organized in various places and according to different time schedules, they function as indicators showing to the communist elite the ripeness of the general revolutionary situation within individual parts of the country. They indicate the degree to which the communists' mass actions are able to set in motion, to involve and to organize other masses into the revolutionary wave on which

16 For the activities of the communists in Western Europe see Mario Einaudi: Communism in Western Europe, Ithaca Press, 1951, and also his article in Yale Review entitled Communism in Western Europe: Its Strength and Vulnerability, Vol. -IV, pp. 234 - 236, (1952).


crested the communists would be catapulted to power:

"These remarkable actions testify to the effectiveness of the policy of unity pursued by the Communist Parties. This is a valuable lesson which shows that the Communist Parties - organizers of united action by the masses - are capable of establishing close contacts with the masses, and are capable of preparing them for decisive battle."

While in France, Italy, and other European countries the communists were able to establish control over the broad masses, the process of building up united fronts in the countries of the North and South American continents is in its preliminary stage. Here the main battle is still fought for the establishment of control over various individual groups and organizations which must serve as building blocks in erecting the united front.

The main stress is laid on the acquisition of access, to create conditions for penetration of strategically important target organizations. In the areas where the encountered resistance is discouraging the emphasis is laid on the formation of completely new suitable organizations in which the communists will command the initial control. In other words, the battle is still fought for access to the institutional structure of American society. The documents published by

the United States Congress since the end of the Second World War concerning communist activities in the U.S.A. furnish irrefutable proof to this end.

According to these documents the following are the prime target organizations of communist subversive activities: the trade unions, farmers' groups, minority groups, alien and national groups.

To penetrate into the cultural sphere, into the upper layers of American Society, the communists have organized the "National Council of Arts, Science and Professions." The communists spread the wide network of their direct and indirect agents into the American radio, press, and motion picture industry in order to mould public opinion and to neutralize and keep American citizens as far away as possible from the realm of vital political issues.

To penetrate into the population of Slavic descent the communists have organized the American Slav Congress.

Besides conducting operations to establish control over the institutional structure the communists are also engaged in espionage in Government Agencies, Scientific Institutions as well as in vital Defence areas.\(^\text{18}\) The actual dimensions of communist penetration into the fabric of American society is

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\(^{18}\) For the communist penetration of all above institutions see the Documents of United States Government in Bibliography. For the operation of Soviet atomic espionage ring in Canada, USA and England see Igor Gouzenko; This Was My Choice, J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., Toronto, 1948.
revealed by the number of organizations which were found to be controlled by communists, and of which a list was published in the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" by the Committee on Un-American Activities, May 11th, 1951.

The simple fact that the communists in the United States and in Canada are still fighting for access, and that at present they are not developing any mass actions on a nation-wide scale, is the main reason why the real danger of communism in these countries is generally underestimated. 19

The struggle for the institutional structure of democratic countries is a long and protracted process and the communist strategists, to win necessary time, abandoned Marxian orthodoxy and formulated "The Theory of Peaceful Co-existence of Capitalist and Socialist Systems." 20 They put aside all immediate revolutionary aims in their desire to take part in the democratic process. They want to co-operate with free

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19 For the communist policy of acquisition of access in Canada see Tim Buck: Canada: The Communist Viewpoint, Progress Books, Toronto 1948.


countries in international relations, and they also want to co-operate in domestic affairs and to enter government, cultural, civic and scientific organizations.

The real motive behind this new theory is an attempt to break through the isolation in which the communists fell in advocating openly their revolutionary programs, and further to acquire access to the institutional structure of free societies.

The theory consists of quotations from Lenin's and Stalin's works written when both recognized the necessity of co-existence of Democratic and Communist Societies for a certain period of time; while the communists were not strong enough to deal the final blow. It consists of quotations selected and deliberately taken out of their context stressing only the possibility and the necessity for co-existence, leaving out, however, completely those parts referring to the co-existence as the necessary condition for the gathering of strength.21

21. The original quotations excerpted for the Peaceful Co-Existence theory are of the following nature:

"We cannot forget the saying of Lenin to the effect, that a great deal in the matter of our construction depends on whether we succeed in delaying war with the capitalist countries, which is inevitable but which may be delayed either until proletarian revolution ripens in Europe, or until the colonial revolutions come fully to a head, or finally, until the capitalists fight among themselves over division over colonies. Therefore the maintainence of peaceful relations with capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us.

The basis of our relations with capitalist countries consists in admitting the co-existence of two opposed systems."

When the communists succeed in establishing control over strategically important organizations, and when these are welded together into a united front, they embark on the operation of mass action. The communists engage their organization in various kinds of struggle; from local incidents to nation-wide engagements ever growing in proportion and intensity with the view to bring the country to the verge of revolution.

"The mass struggle means a whole system of developing activities growing ever more acute in form and logically leading to an uprising against the capitalist state."\(^1\)

The mass actions organized by the communists also involve the non-party groups and actually bring together the communists with other members of the working class and with politically unaffiliated masses. They always start as actions organized locally which later develop into district, regional and national events.

"The chief stress in all this must be laid on developing mass action locally, to be carried out by local organizations through local agreements . . . .

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These forms may include for instance: co-ordinated joint action of the workers to be agreed upon from case to case on definite occasions, on individual demands or on the basis of a common platform, co-ordinated actions in individual enterprises or by the whole industry's co-ordinated actions on a local, regional, national or international scale; co-ordinated actions for the organization of the economic struggle of the workers, carrying out mass political action for the organization of joint self-defense against fascist attacks; co-ordinated action in rendering aid to political prisoners and their families, in the field of struggle against social reaction; joint actions in the defense of the interest of the youth and women, in the field of co-operative movement, cultural activities, sports, etc."

In the course of united action the communists establish access to individuals and groups which revolve around the strong self-imposed leadership supplied by the communist organizations. Thus are the huge civil armies formed in the heat of revolutionary battle:

"A political army is not like a military army, a military command begins the war with an army ready to hand; whereas the Party has to create its army in the course of the struggle itself, in the course of the class conflict."3

The mass actions are motivated and carried upon the slogans gradually developing the revolutionary situation, involving wider and wider circles of the population in the communist enterprise.

3 J. V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, p. 110.
"When the revolutionary situation is developing the Party advances certain transitional slogans and partial demands corresponding to the concrete situation; but these demands and slogans must be bent to the revolutionary aims of the capturing power and of overthrowing bourgeois capitalist society."4

When the mass action is well under way and when it reaches expected dimensions, the old recipe for making revolutions, issued by the Sixth Congress of the Communist International in 1928, prescribed that the following course should be taken:

"When the revolutionary tide is rising . . . the Party of the Proletariat is confronted with the task of leading the masses to a direct attack upon the bourgeois State. This is done by carrying on propaganda in favour of increasing the radical transitional slogans (for Soviets, workers control of industry, for peasant committees, for the seizures of the big landed properties, for disarming the bourgeoisie and arming the proletariat, etc.) and by organizing mass action, upon which all branches of Party agitation and propaganda, including Parliamentary activity, must be concentrated. This mass action includes: a combination of strikes and demonstrations; a combination of strikes and armed demonstrations; and finally, the general strike conjointly with the armed insurrection against the state power of the bourgeois. The latter form of struggle, which is the supreme form, must be conducted according to the rules of war: . . . ."5

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4 The Programme of the Communist International. Reprinted in Blueprint for World Conquest, p. 239.

5 loc. cit.
The above concept of seizure of power with the direct employment of arms as the principal instruments of the conquest is today obsolete, and in reality quite a different process takes its place. The revolution envisaged by the Comintern in 1928 was supposed to be a process with a grand-scale mass involvement which will destroy the "Capitalist State Machine" and which will shake the society to its very foundations. The revolution was supposed to be carried out by revolutionaries and heroes fighting in the front line and leading the masses into battle.

The communists' seizure of power today, however, is a piece of work planned and carried out by social engineers from behind their working desks without the mass involvement and explosive effects.

(a) **THE SEIZURE OF POWER**

The main features of the modern conquest of political power likely to be employed by the communists in democratic countries can be briefly summarized as follows:

In the first place, the communists need to gain voting strength to place themselves in the government through elections, and to secure for themselves the key positions in the Ministry of Interior, Industry and Agriculture and the Army.
In the second place, the communists exercise an immense effort to establish operational control over those organizations which will carry out the main revolutionary activities; which in putting forward revolutionary demands will create the revolutionary wave and pressure from below. These organizations are the trade unions.

In the third place, the communists aim to establish control over those organizations which will be used as instruments of revolutionary neutralization. These are the peripheral organizations which will form the non-conductive barriers erected between the popular masses and the process of seizure of power.

The actual revolutionary process is not of a violent nature but consists of a series of simultaneous coups d'état taking place on three levels.

The communist-controlled trade unions put forward revolutionary demands and create governmental crises, while at the same time the communist party undermines the strength of other political parties by operations carried out within their membership from below.

Simultaneously the communists strike from above and inflict a split within the leadership of the parties of their opponents. With the parties paralyzed from the top the communists reorganize parliament and the cabinet. With the parties paralyzed from below the communists dissociate their
left wings and absorb them into the communist party. They also amalgamate certain local front organizations in one governing body and endow this body with the authority to represent local popular governments. The trade unions in the meantime seize industry and establish the workers' management committees. While all these operations are supported by the power of the police and the army, the peripheral organizations, with their attitude of neutrality, keep the popular masses isolated and neutralized. Thus, the three coups d'état which are taking place concurrently on the level of government institution, on the level of political parties and in the sphere of industry are carried out without mass participation and without destructive effects of revolutionary upheavals.

This kind of revolution represents the possibility of controlling extremely complex social processes known until today for their explosiveness and unpredictability of direction. The main political forces loosened by the revolutions of the old type acted as a starting point to unleash a chain reaction releasing other social forces which devastated completely the society. Today, the communist strategists are able to slow down the revolutionary process and to confine it to controllable channels, to prevent its spreading by erecting a non-conductive barrier between the actual process of the seizure of power and the masses, and
consequently, to eliminate this incalculable factor which would otherwise enter into the process.

From the strategic point of view the revolution of this new type represents a synthesis of the principles of maximal concentration with principles of maximal dispersion. It is a unique combination of maximal concentration of forces effecting the revolutionary pressure and the seizure of power with the maximal dispersion of forces effecting the revolutionary isolation of opposing forces.

The revolution of this new type is effected by the expansion of communist controlled power structure in two diametrically opposed directions. One direction is that of revolutionary pressure carried out by the trade unions and aiming at the upper levels of target organizations. The other direction is that of a revolutionary vacuum, isolation and neutralization carried out by peripheral organizations and aiming at the loose mass base. Both these movements work simultaneously and they are two pistons of the modern revolutionary machine.¹

¹ An example of co-ordination of revolutionary pressure with revolutionary vacuum is represented by the Communist strategy of the coup d'état in Prague in February 1948. See The Coup d'etat in Prague, Supplement to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1948, p. 11.
CHAPTER VI

4. THE PATTERN OF EXPANSION IN COLONIES AND DEPENDENT COUNTRIES

"Leninism... recognizes the latent revolutionary capabilities of the national liberation movements of the oppressed countries and... that it is possible to use these for the purpose of overthrowing the common enemy... Hence the necessity for the proletariat to support — resolutely and actively to support — the national liberation movement of the oppressed and dependent people...."

(a) THE GENERAL PROPOSITION

The communists consider the liberation movements in colonies and dependent countries to be an integral part of the World Revolution, and according to Stalin, the colonial revolutions actually are the main reserve of the proletarian

1 J. V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, pp. 61 - 62.
The communist parties in colonies and in mother countries co-operate closely in a clear cut pattern. While the communists attack in the colonies, the communist party of the motherland works to prevent and paralyze possible intervention of the motherland in colonial affairs. While, on the other hand, the communists intensify their activities in the mother country, the communists in the colonies isolate the mother country from supplies by paralysing and sabotaging production, transportation, and by stirring up open revolts.

2 To foster the revolution in colonies the Third International had established in 1926 in Moscow, the University of the Nations of the East called Sun Yat Sen University, train revolutionary cadres. Today practically all the key communists in Asia are graduates of this school.

3 The Communist International actually prescribes the following conduct as the duty for the Communist Party of the motherland as well for the Communist Party of the colony. For the Communist Party of the motherland:

"The Communist Parties in the imperialist countries must render systematic aid to the colonial revolutionary liberation movement and to the movement of oppressed nationalities generally. The duty of rendering active support to these movements rests primarily upon the workers in the countries upon which the oppressed nations are economically, financially or politically dependent."

The Communist Parties in colonial and semi-colonial countries must on the other hand:

"... carry on a bold and consistent struggle against foreign imperialism and unfailingly conduct propaganda in favour of friendship and unity with the proletariat in the imperialist countries."

This mutual interdependence of the proletarian revolutions in the West with the revolutions in the colonies was put into a formula by Lenin, and further elaborated by Stalin in "Problems of Leninism."

"Lenin has proved . . . that the national problem can be solved only in connection with and on the basis of the proletarian revolution, and that the road to victory of the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movements of the colonies and dependent countries against imperialism. The national problem is a part of the general problem of the proletarian revolution . . . . "4

Lenin in the early twenties had recognized the latent revolutionary forces of the national-liberation movements, but it took years for his disciples to find out the working formula for the colonial revolution, and to utilize its forces as vehicles of World Revolution.5

It actually emerged as late as 1927, as a result of a bitter struggle between Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev

4 J. V. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, p. 61

5 For a certain period of time the Communist strategists were considering for the conquest of Asia, the type of peasant and nationalistic revolution which placed General Mustapha Kemal Pasha of Turkey into power; and to put this pattern of revolution into operation, the Comintern convened a Congress of Oriental Nations in Baku on September 1920. This pattern of combined peasant and nationalistic revolution did not operate, because at that time the devices for the establishment of Communists' control over popular movements were still in their formative and test-tube stage.
and Radek over the strategy of the Communist International in colonies, and particularly over the tactics of the Communist Party of China. The result of this conflict was a clarification of the proposition that the colonial revolution is motivated by two major forces.

In the first place, at present, the main force is a fully-developed national revolution carried out by an advanced educated and economically powerful patriotic class.

As the second major force there is a latent, though potentially far stronger, agrarian movement, until now shapeless, without definite class character, without effective organization to carry out the agrarian revolution.

The conclusion was obvious. The Chinese communists were ordered to sever their relations with the nationalist government, until now the official line of the comintern, and to turn their eyes to the rising star of agrarian revolution. Since then the centre of gravity of their operations shifted from co-operation with the National Front.

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For Stalin's point of view see Stalin on China, People's Publishing House Ltd., Bombay 1951, a collection of five writings and speeches of Stalin from the period from November 1926 to August 1927.
See also On China from Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, Lawrence & Wishart, London.
to nursing and developing agrarian revolution. There is hardly another example in the history of revolutions where the main revolutionary force is methodically developed and nursed from its mere cradle into the revolutionary force involving hundreds of millions of people over the span of three decades.

When the development of agrarian revolution became the number one task of Chinese communists, the peasantry of China was a completely unorganized, dispersed and amorphous mass - an ideal material for articulation. And the first device which was injected into this diffuse agrarian mass, in order to articulate it, were the slogans of confiscation of land:

"But in order that this agrarian revolution should take shape, it must have its general slogan. This slogan is the confiscation of the landlord land... I think that in the near future the entire peasantry will pass over to the slogans of the confiscation of land. In this lies the strength of Chinese revolution." 7

Hence, Lenin's original formula, which based the colonial revolution on the utilization of the national-liberation movements and on the exploitation of nationalism, was supplemented by the formula of agrarian revolution.

The National Revolution is led by the intelligentsia

7 Stalin on China, People's Publishing House Ltd., Bombay, 1951, p. 43 - 44.
and by the middle class, and its program does not appeal to the peasant masses. On the other hand, the agrarian revolution rests on the broad masses of peasantry and is led by the communists. And it is only a question of time when the communists, being in control of a broad and far more potential mass base, are also able to take over the leadership of the national revolution. The crisis of 1926–27 also clarified the proposition that the "taking over" of the nationalist revolution is not achieved peacefully, but by an armed struggle in a protracted civil war.

The strategy of the Communist Party of China in its ascent to power exercised a tremendous impact on other communist parties in the colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries. It has laid the foundation for the new strategy of colonial revolution, which in taking into account the specific domestic conditions of the country in question, has a universal applicability.

The proposition, that the colonial revolution starts as an agrarian movement which later establishes control by an armed struggle over the national revolution, was accepted as a working formula by all Asiatic Communist parties in their struggle for power.

Their representatives met for the first time on the occasion of the Regional Meeting of the World Federation of Democratic Youth in Calcutta, India, in February, 1948; and
for the second time in Peking, China, 1949, on the occasion of a Congress of Trade Unions of Asian and Australasian countries. In Peking, one hundred and twelve delegates from the following countries were present: Burma, Ceylon, China, North Korea, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaya, Mongolia, the Philippines, Siam, the USSR and Viet-Nam. The main points on the agenda were not the problems concerning the Trade Unions, but the program and plan for coordinated conquest of all Asia. They accepted the strategy of the Chinese Communists as a standard, and laid the foundation for co-operation and exchange of experiences — for a conspiracy of colossal dimensions.

(b) **THE PATTERN OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY WAR**

Because the Chinese pattern of colonial revolution set an example for other Asiatic Communist parties, we shall

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8 The most important documents from this conference, the Opening Speech by Liu Shao-Chi and the Manifesto to All the Working People of the Asian and Australasian Countries, were published in *Working Class in the Struggle for National Liberation*, People's Publishing House, Ltd., Bombay 1950.

briefly summarize the most important features of the strategy of the Chinese Communists; from their co-operation with the Nationalists in the United Front in 1921, to their final bid for power in 1946.

The Chinese revolutionary war can be divided into five main stages:

(i) **THE FIRST STAGE - GATHERING STRENGTH**

When, in 1920, the Communist Party of China was established, it linked itself with the national revolution, at that time the main revolutionary force in China. The participation of the communists in the united front with the nationalists was of decisive importance to the communist party because the communists were able to develop their party into a mass organization. In the first place, by splitting up and organizing the Left intellectuals from within the Kuomintang, the communist party acquired important cadres; and secondly, by organizing the rank and file of the nationalists, the communists were able to extend the party mass base.

Another advantage the communists gained by linking themselves with the Kuomintang was that they, in taking part in the Kuomintang's military campaigns, were able to extend the base of their own operations and to establish communist cells over the vast Chinese territories. As Stalin pointed out:
"The Communist Party entered into a bloc with the national bourgeoisie in Canton in the first stage of the revolution in order to extend the territory of the revolution, form itself into a mass Party, create for itself opportunity of openly organizing the proletariat and to clear for itself the path towards the peasantry."

Although the communists were in command of large armies, they did not think of using them in an open struggle for power:

"The Party had considerable revolutionary armed forces under its control but was not able to make the most effective use of them. All these were the consequences of the lack of experience, of the lack of a profound revolutionary insight and of the lack of understanding in uniting Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution."

The political line of the Communist Party of China set up by the Comintern prescribed that the main task of Chinese Communists, in order to gain strength, was to take part in the National Front and in there conduct independent political and organizational work:

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1 Stalin in his article Comments on Current Affairs in China, published in Pravda, July 28th, 1927, in which he defends the policy of the Comintern against criticism of the bloc of Trotsky-Zinoviev-Radek. Reprinted in Stalin on China, p. 65.

"A united front can have revolutionary significance only if and when it does not hinder the Communist Party from conducting its independent political and organizational work, only if it does not prevent it from organizing the proletariat into an independent political force, rousing the peasantry against the landlords, openly organizing a revolution of workers and peasants and thus preparing the conditions necessary for the hegemony of the proletariat."  

(ii) THE SECOND STAGE - THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY BASE

The second stage of the Chinese Revolution was marked by ten years of civil war and by the end of the co-operation of the communists with the nationalists. The communists, in 1927, split the Kuomintang and with its left wing established an independent Kuomintang in the Province of Wuhan. It was composed of the communists, of the leftist bourgeoisie and leftist intelligentsia, and represented in relation to the Kuomintang in Canton a rival revolutionary government.

The communist strategists in Moscow realized that in the Kuomintang in Wuhan they possessed a revolutionary centre completely under their control, with highly developed upper level organizations, lacking, however, an adequate mass base. And this is precisely why the Chinese Communists were ordered

3 Stalin defending the policy of Comintern in China before a Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (B), August 1st, 1927. Reprinted in Stalin on China, p. 86.
to turn their activities towards the Chinese peasants, to develop agrarian revolution and to supply the top-heavy united front of the Kuomintang in Wuhan with an adequate mass base. For the point that the united front of the Kuomintang in Wuhan was used only as a means to facilitate access to the agrarian masses, see Stalin:

"The Communist Party entered into a bloc with the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia of the Kuomintang in Wuhan in the second stage of the revolution, in order to multiply its forces, extend the organization of the proletariat, wean away the broad masses of the peasantry from the Kuomintang leadership and create the conditions for the hegemony of the proletariat."1

The Chinese Communists were confronted with this new approach on November 30th, 1926, when Stalin, speaking in the Chinese Commission of the Executive Committee of the Communist International "On the Perspectives of the Revolution in China", outlined the policy on how to develop the agrarian revolution:

"What are the paths and ways through which the Chinese revolutionaries should pass in order to rouse the multi-million peasantry of China to revolution?

I think that in the present conditions we can speak of only three paths:

The first path is the path of formation of peasant committees and the penetration of Chinese revolutionaries in them in order to influence the peasantry. . ."

1 Reprinted in Stalin on China, p. 65.
The second path is the path of influencing the peasantry through the apparatus of new people's revolutionary power. There is no doubt that this power and the apparatus of this power must engage in satisfying the most urgent demands of the peasantry if it really wishes to advance the revolution. The task of the communists and of the revolutionaries in general in China consists in penetrating into the apparatus of this new power, bringing this apparatus nearer to the masses of peasants and helping the peasant masses to satisfy their most urgent demands through this apparatus, either by confiscating the landowner's land, or by reducing taxes and rents - depending on the circumstances.

The third path is the path of influencing the peasantry through the revolutionary army. The revolutionary army is the force which is the first to penetrate into the new provinces, which is the first to go right into the thick of the peasantry and above all through whom the peasantry judges the new power, its good or bad qualities. For this reason the communists and the Chinese revolutionaries in general must take all possible measures to neutralize the anti-peasant elements in the army, retain the revolutionary spirit in the army and direct things in such a way that the army helps the peasants and uses them for the revolution.

The development of the agrarian revolution, according to the above formula, went hand in hand with the growth of the communist army. The revolutionized peasants expropriated the land, under the protection of the army; and the army, on the other hand, grew through an influx of peasant recruits.

The most important feature of this period was that the communists were entirely in control of large territories in

which they had set up a Soviet system with very radical measures of collectivized agriculture. They have also increased their army from 10,000 men in 1928 to 62,000 in 1930, and consolidated their power to such a degree that in 1939 they were able to hold the First Congress of Soviets, which adopted the Soviet Constitution for China.

The Nationalist Government at that time was busy with military operations in the Northern Provinces, and it was not until 1930 that Chiang Kai-shek was in a position to undertake an offensive against the communist base in Kiangsi Province. From 1930 to 1934, the Nationalists organized altogether six offensives to uproot the centre of communist power in China.

The communists, facing total destruction, finally decided to move out and, in November 1934, they started their well-known "Long March" to the remote and secure area of Shensi Province in the North-West, which they reached in 1935. On their march they united individual and isolated islands of communists scattered throughout China to compensate for the losses they had suffered through the Nationalist attacks, and through starvation while on the march. In the new province they immediately introduced a Soviet political administration and extended also their influence to surrounding provinces.

It was during this period, when the Chinese communists were fighting for their existence against far superior Nationalists, that they realized that the armed struggle -
the armed agrarian revolution - was the only possible form of struggle in colonies and dependent countries against superior adversaries.

Thus, the Chinese Revolution in its second stage acquired through an armed struggle its permanent and large territorial base capable of supplying the communist armies with men and material for their further expansion.

(iii) THE THIRD STAGE - THE EXPANSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY BASE

The Chinese Revolution entered in its third stage when, in 1937, an agreement between the communists and the nationalists was signed to form the United Front against Japanese aggression which was taking place in the northern provinces. The communists were recognized as an independent force; and the fact that their armies were put on the same level with the Nationalist armies offered them unique opportunities.

The communists, under the pretext of fighting the Japanese, occupied the border states between Manchuria and China proper, and established Soviet Power in the Provinces of Shensi, Hopei and Chahar.

The co-operation of the communists with the Nationalists in the united front followed the well-known pattern of all united fronts entered into and maintained by communists: to acquire a suitable environment which is used as a source of power. Mao Tse-tung is quite candid about this:
"An important part of the political line of the Chinese Communist Party is to unite with, as well as to struggle against, the bourgeoisie. An important part of the Party-building of the Chinese Communist Party is its development and tempering through unity with, as well as struggle against, the bourgeoisie.

Here unity means the united front; struggle means, during the time of unity, "peaceful" and "bloodless" ideological and organizational struggle, which will be transformed into an armed struggle when the proletariat is forced to break with the bourgeoisie. If the party does not know how to unite at a certain period with the bourgeoisie, it will not be able to advance, and the revolution will not develop. If the Party does not know how to carry on a resolute, stern, peaceful struggle against the bourgeoisie in time of unity, it will disintegrate ideologically, politically and organizationally, and the revolution will end in failure; and if the Party, when forced to break with the bourgeoisie does not carry on the resolute, stern, armed struggle against the latter, it will also disintegrate and the revolution will fail. All this has been borne out by the history of the past 18 years."¹


Because the strategy of Chinese Communist Party was based on "co-operation and unity" with, as well as "struggle against" the Nationalists, its policy followed an extremely zig-zag line. The leading party strategists changed the party line so many times and in such sharp turns, that the great majority of the membership could not grasp the situation, and change from democrats and reformists into radical revolutionaries and vice versa. For this reason the Chinese Communist Party was never a monolith. To cope with this situation and to secure the most "advantageous and correct party line in a given situation", the Chinese Communist Party developed the theory of intra-party struggle and the rules of its conduct. The party purges its membership from right opportunism when it operates on the revolutionary program. On the other hand, the party purges its membership from left radicalism when it co-operates in national front.


(Continued on the following page)
The communists played off the Japanese and nationalists against each other, subjecting the latter to heavy losses while building up their own strength.

The co-operation of the communists with the nationalists in the united front was decisive to the communist success and fatal to that of the nationalists, when the communists were able to grasp the slogans of nationalism, until now the domain of Chiang Kai-shek, and incorporate them into their own program.

In grasping and exploiting the slogans of nationalism and patriotism, the communists were able to break through the isolation in which they were placed by breaking away from the first United Front of the Kuomintang in Canton in 1927. They linked themselves with the nationalistic forces and, by a slow process of penetration, they gradually imposed their control and their hegemony over the Nationalist Revolution.

The simple fact that the communists were able to operate on the nationalist and patriotic platform facilitated an access to those strata of middle class and intelligentsia which the communists were not able to reach while operating on the platform of agrarian revolution only, and which strata were

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See also Liu Shao-chi: How to be a Good Communist. Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 1952. Series of lectures delivered by Liu Shao-chi in July, 1939 at the Institute of Marx-Leninism in Yanan introducing an intensive study of Marx-Leninism and "self-cultivation" as the only remedy for ideological instability and disorientation of membership.
the exclusive domain and the main support of Chiang Kai-shek. By means of skilful operations with nationalistic and patriotic slogans, the communists secured for themselves an excellent opportunity to conceal their real revolutionary aims, and an opportunity to carry out infiltration on the upper levels of Chinese society. They were able to penetrate and to form their nuclei in key organizations of the middle class and to prepare these for the communist-controlled united front.

Here lies the tragedy of the Chinese Nationalist Revolution. Denied access to the masses of peasantry because of the communist hegemony over agrarian revolution, and being gradually deprived of hegemony over the Nationalist Revolution, the Chiang Kai-shek forces lost ground and were pushed aside onto the periphery of the revolution.

This was the situation in 1940: the communists enjoyed hegemony over the agrarian revolution; they were gradually establishing hegemony over the nationalist revolution and they had at their disposal a colossal army. And it was exactly under these conditions that Mao Tse-tung wrote his masterpiece "The New Democracy", elaborating on the theory of the united front government with special reference to Chinese conditions.  

"The New Democracy" is the most important piece of communist theory written outside the U.S.S.R., because it formulates the principles of the communist strategy of the United Front Government.

The main thesis of this work is based on the proposition that the complex revolutionary processes can be divided into individual actions of controllable magnitude; that the final bid for power is made when the monopoly of power is secured on the political level and, therefore, it does not require employment of naked power. And finally, that the economic organizations of hostile classes could be utilized in their original form in the communist's system of dictatorship as levers and transmission belts under the condition that the hostile classes are deprived of their political leadership.

The theory could not have originated anywhere else but in China because the other communist parties were not given an opportunity of long years of experimenting with united fronts. "The New Democracy", being written in 1940, served as a theoretical and practical guide to the communist parties of Europe in their struggle to establish broad patriotic united fronts under communist hegemony during the Second World War.
The communist revolution entered into its fourth stage when the Chinese communists, pursuing the conquest of power, opened on June 20th, 1946, a frontal military attack on the Nationalists. This operation was launched upon because the communists were in possession of sufficient military forces to bring about a quick decision by military means, when victory was politically well prepared, and when further dwelling on political operations was be ineffective and dangerous.

There was, however, one circumstance which could have brought about a change in the military and political situation to the disadvantage of the communists; this was the possibility of interference from outside in support of the Nationalists. And here we are confronted with the most remarkable feature of the communist conquest of power in China; namely, with the operation of isolation - of neutralization - which was carried out by the communists in the United States in order to secure for the Chinese communists a free hand in dealing with the Nationalists.

William Z. Foster, speaking to the National Committee of the Communist Party of the United States, urged the mobilization of American public opinion in order to prevent possible intervention of the United States in China's civil war:
"On the international scale, the key task, as emphasized in Comrade Dennis's report is to stop American intervention in China... The war in China is the key to all problems of the international front and it is here, above all else, where we have to deal the hardest blow to reaction... On the question of China, which is our key concentration, as Comrade Dennis pointed out, we want to hold 500 meetings all over the country to mobilize all the forces of the people that we can reach to put a stop to the intervention in China."

The tactics of neutralization carried out in the United States by the American Communist Party reached tremendous proportions, because the communists were able to utilize the influence of their direct and indirect operators, who had been deployed and planted already during the war into the higher governmental agencies, policy planning bodies, within the army, and within many public and scientific institutions.

The decisive role in influencing the United States policy makers was exercised by the communist controlled Institute of Pacific Relations. The top executives of this Institute submitted reports and analyses to the China desk in the State Department advising on policies favourable to the U.S.S.R., and generally to the communist movement in Asia.

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The most revealing facts of this situation were furnished by the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, which, after two years of investigations, published a report on the Institute of Pacific Relations. Especially instructive are the parts of the document dealing with the effects of the Institute on American public opinion, and with the effects of the Institute upon the United States foreign policy.

(v) THE FIFTH STAGE — THE CONSOLIDATION OF SEIZED POWER

As the beginning of the fifth stage of the Chinese Revolutionary War we can consider the period when the Chinese communists defeated the Nationalists' armies and established the People's Government of China on October 1st, 1949.

This period has all the characteristic features of the behaviour of a total power government, which after the conquest of power has to develop a system of dictatorship in order to

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4. See Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 7A. United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1952.


maintain its power. And, although this period corresponds functionally to the period after 1917 in Russia, there are however, fundamental differences in the methods of establishing dictatorship.

In the first place, the Chinese communists entered this period not only with full control of the broad mass base from below, but in addition to this they were also in control of a ready-made united front, comprising the broad cross-section of the middle class, enabling an immediate establishment of a new so-called People's Government.

The second difference to the Russian situation was that the dynamics of the Chinese agrarian revolution was soft-pedalled with the approaching communist victory.

Further, the process to utilize and exploit the skill of the middle class started in Russia in 1926. In China, however, this process took place immediately after the communists' victory. Of special significance are the steps taken by the Chinese Communist Government in order to check the loose forces of agrarian revolution, to eliminate their destructive effects on the economy of the country, and to restore agrarian production. This explains why the Chinese communists adopted a policy not of destroying, but of neutralization and preservation of the rich peasantry:

"By differentiation between stages we mean that in areas which the People's Liberation Army has just occupied, the tactics of neutralizing
the rich peasants and small and middle land­
lords should be set forth and carried out, 
reducing the sphere to be struck to only 
eliminating the Kuomintang's reactionary 
built feudal tyrannical elements - concentrating all strength 
for fulfillment of this task as the first 
stage in the work in new areas.2

Thus, the agrarian revolution in China, when it had 
served its purpose, was dealt the final blow by the same man 
who was by its dynamics carried to power. Mao Tse-tung very 
soon learned that the source of power of his party no longer 
rested with the poor peasants who were not able to organize 
production, but with the experienced, intelligent and efficient 
middle class and rich peasantry. In delivering a report to 
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on June 
15th, 1950, he expressed this clearly:

"Therefore, there should be a change in 
our policy toward rich peasants, a change from 
the policy of requisitioning the surplus land 
and the property of the rich peasants to one of 
preserving a rich-peasant economy, in order to 
help the early restoration of the production in 
the rural areas."3

2 Mao Tse-tung: Address to the Conference of Communist 
Cadres of Shansi and Suiyan, April 1, 1948 as reproduced in 
The Present Situation and Our Tasks (in Chinese), HongKong, 
1949. Reprinted Chinese Agrarian Reform and Bolshevik Land 
Policy by Ya-lun Chou, in Pacific Affairs, Vol.-XXV No. 1, 

3 Report of Mao Tse-tung to the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China, Peking, June 5th, 1950, American 
Consulate General, HongKong, Supplement No. 3, June 28th, 1950. 
Reprinted in Chinese Agrarian Reform and Bolshevik Land Policy. 
Ibid. p. 33.
According to the new political line, the poor peasant, the original wheel of the Chinese Revolution, is no longer allowed to expropriate the land and the property of his landlord, but it is his sacred duty to preserve his property and to protect it against those "Left-deviationists" who are not flexible enough to adjust themselves to current party line. It is also his sacred duty to remain in the present feudal relation of a landless peasant worker, from which bondage the communists promised to liberate him.

The Chinese communists soon realized that the unchecked dynamics of agrarian revolution is the main challenge to the consolidation of their power and proclaimed everything which goes against the preservation of feudalism and rich peasant economy as being counter-revolutionary. The policy of preserving the rich-peasant economy is not of a temporary nature, but is the long-term policy which will be carried through the whole period of the New Democracy, and this will take a somewhat lengthy time - possibly several decades.

"The policy adopted by us of preserving a rich-peasant economy is ... not temporary, but a long-term policy. That is to say, a rich-peasant economy will be preserved in the whole stage of the New Democracy."

The similar policy of "preserving" is applied in the

sphere of industry. Also here, the intelligence, skill and abilities of the middle class are utilized as a source of communist power in the period of consolidation of their dictatorship:

"At the present stage the national bourgeoisie is very important... In order to offset the pressure of the imperialists and to advance the backward economy one step forward, China must make use of every urban and rural capitalist enterprise which can benefit the national economy and is not detrimental to the people's standard of living. China must unite with the national bourgeoisie in the common struggle. Our present policy is to restrict capitalism, but not destroy it."5

Thus, the policy of "preservation" constitutes another important feature of the strategy of the Chinese Revolutionary War, which, together with the first one, namely, with the communists' ability to awaken, develop and monopolize agrarian revolution, represents a classic example of functional utilization of social stratification. The communists, in the first place, utilize the great revolutionary potentialities of unorganized agrarian masses for the conquest of power. Secondly, after the conquest, the communists utilize the productive potentialities of the middle class in the country as...

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5 From an article published in For A Lasting Peace For A People's Democracy, of July 19, 1949, commemorating the 28th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China. For this point see also Mao Tse-tung: People's Democratic Dictatorship, Lawrence & Wishard Ltd., London, 1950.
well as in industry to increase and to maintain their power.

(c) **THE VIET-NAM PATTERN OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR**

(a) **GENERAL PROPOSITION**

The revolutionary experiences which finally led the Chinese Communists to power serve as a school of apprenticeship for the other communist parties of Asia in shaping their strategy of conquest. The merits of the Chinese Communists are recognized as a standard, and they are fully utilized by the Communist International in directing the activities of its agencies in various parts of Asia.

The most remarkable proof to this end is supplied by the Manifesto and Platform of the Viet-Nam Lao Dong Party.\(^1\) The Platform, recently adopted, outlines in a very comprehensive blueprint the strategy of revolutionary war applicable in all colonial countries.

The strategy of revolutionary war as exemplified in the Manifesto not only utilizes the experiences of the Chinese communists, but with an amazing logic and sensitivity to

\(^1\) The Manifesto and Platform of the Viet-Nam Lao Dong Party, supplement to *People's China*, Vol.-III, No. 9, May 1, 1951. The Manifesto and the Platform were adopted at the Founding Congress of the Communist Party of Viet-Nam in February 1951.
power implications it develops and formulates the new maxims of revolutionary war.

Because this document is of immense importance for the understanding of the processes taking place in all parts of Asia, we endeavour to interpret and summarise briefly its most important features.

(b) THE STAGES OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The colonial revolution is a form of the revolutionary war and is carried out by armed struggle in three stages:

(a) The defensive stage with the main strategic objects being to secure and protect the territorial base of the revolution.

(b) In the second stage the communists are fighting vis-a-vis with the opposing forces for the balance of power, using the occupied territory as a base for their expansion. Every territorial gain must be immediately consolidated with the base. Part of the man power is utilized in the production of supplies for the fronts and the rest serves in the army. The main feature of this stage is guerrilla warfare.

(c) The third stage is carried out predominantly with military operations attacking the opponent's armies on all fronts and is conducted under the rules of orthodox war combined with the guerrilla warfare.

Because these three stages of colonial revolution are
of unpredictable duration, the protracted character of revolutionary war, until recently underestimated by the strategist of countermeasures, is its most important feature.

The time factor, in contrast to orthodox warfare, has a totally different value in the revolutionary war. The orthodox war starts with ready made armies and the time factor is considered only in relation to their mobility and to their stamina in action. The revolutionary war, on the other hand, starts without professional armies and the time factor is considered in relation to the development of armies, in relation to the building up of the territorial base of the revolution. The revolutionary war, its extent, progress and potentialities cannot be understood and evaluated correctly unless the time element is considered the key factor in its strategy.

(c) THE FORMS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The revolutionary war consists of a combination of political-economic measures with purely military operations, where the political considerations determine the strategic objective of military operations, and where the latter are always subordinated to the former. Thus, the revolutionary war thoroughly confirms the old and famous Clausewitz truism that armies are instruments of politics and that war is only the continuation of politics by other means.
The measures constituting political-economic operations of the revolutionary war could be described as follows:

(a) Expropriation and re-division of land.
(b) Introduction of a new political administration with the United Front as its main feature.
(c) Organization of production to secure supplies for the fronts.
(d) Enlarging of the army by an influx of revolutionized peasants.

The military measures of revolutionary war consist of:

(a) Military operations of orthodox warfare with regular armies.
(b) The operations of guerrilla warfare in the rear of the communists' opponents with irregular armies.
(c) Acts of military and economic sabotage.

The revolutionary war, where both the above groups of operations are interwoven, is a very complex phenomenon with quite unique features. From the military point of view the strategy of revolutionary war presents a problem which can be successfully tackled only if certain axioms of orthodox military strategy are modified and adjusted to the proposition that war is just an instrument of politics.

Apart from the necessity to re-evaluate the time factor in the strategy of revolutionary war, there is also the necessity to re-evaluate the principle of maximal concentration in time and space, that iron law of orthodox military strategy. The communist strategy of revolutionary war applies the principle of concentration simultaneously with the principle of dispersion, splitting the military operations into a series of individual isolated combats in which their adversary is not
able to make use of the material superiority and concentration of his regular armies.

Also from the political point of view the revolutionary war, outlined by the platform of the Viet-Nam Communist Party, has its unique features. The revolutionary war of the Viet-Nam pattern does not stir the peasant masses so deeply as the revolution in China did, and it does not carry out the agrarian revolution on a scale which would paralyze the economy of the country. The agrarian revolution no longer expropriates the land and the property of the middle class and landlords. Instead, its forces are channeled into agrarian reforms of which the main task is to reduce land rent and interest on leased land and to mobilize the peasantry for the armed struggle.2

The colonial revolution of the Viet-Nam pattern, in order to maintain production on a high level, leaves the countryside with its feudal productive relations intact.

It is carried out solely on a nationalistic platform in order to appeal to the more developed and advanced strata of modern Asiatic society. The main stress is laid on the preservation of landlords and a national bourgeoisie and on their participation in national fronts. In this respect the Manifesto is most revealing:

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2 Manifesto, Paragraph 6, Carrying Out Agrarian Reform, p. 7.
"The motive forces of the Viet-Nam revolution at present are the people comprising primarily the workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, followed by the patriotic and progressive personages and landlords. The basic mass of the people consists of the workers, peasants and intellectual workers (intellectual workers belong to various strata of the people, mostly to the petty bourgeoisie). The leading class in the Viet-Nam revolution is the working class."  

The communist strategists recognize that the success or failure of the colonial revolution no longer depends on the revolutionary spirit of the peasantry, but on the ability of the Communist Parties of Asia to utilize the productive organizations of the bourgeoisie.

Thus, the main battle in the countries of Asia, just as the battle in the industrial countries of the West, is waged for the subjugation of the middle class, in which struggle the ideological instability and the inability of the middle class to unite is the main ally of the communists.

The middle class of colonial countries is divided by the communists into antagonistic factions to be, with the help of the peasantry, deprived of its political leadership. It is not destroyed, but only paralyzed, in order to be able to perform its economic functions under communist control.

It is not at all accidental that the Communist Party of

3 Ibid., p. 5.
Viet-Nam is the first of the colonial countries to have formulated a clear-cut strategy of colonial war. Viet-Nam, because of its key geographical position and its highest production of rice among all colonial countries, is considered by the Moscow strategists to be the natural base for the expansion of a revolutionary war into the whole of Asia. This pattern of conquest of South-East Asia, using Indo-China as a base of its operations, was already once successfully realized — in the Second World War by Japan.

If the communist strategists in Moscow were in control of Viet-Nam and were backed in their operations by the armies of Mao Tse-tung, the door to Malaya and Indonesia in the South, to the Phillipines in the East and to Thailand and Burma in the West, would be wide open.

Hence, we can conclude with a certain degree of certainty, that the awakening and the development of the revolutionary wars of the Viet-Nam pattern in all Asiatic countries, and their integration into one colossal revolutionary process to set ablaze this soft spot of the earth, is likely to be the program of Moscow in this region for the next few years. 4

4 For this point see Crisis of the Colonial System, National Liberation Struggle of the People of East Asia, Reports presented in 1949 to the Pacific Institute of the Academy of Sciences, USSR. People's Publishing House, Ltd. Bombay, 1951.

See also E. L. Katzenbach: Indo-China: A Military-Political Appreciation, World Politics, Vol.-IV, No. 2, (Continued on the following page)


CONCLUSION

In this final section an attempt will be made to formulate some conclusions as they follow from Part I and Part II of this essay.

Communism represents a system of total power because it sets itself total aims, operates upon total sources and resorts to total strategy in pursuit of its objectives. Once the communists reject the principle of political equilibrium and set the machinery of dictatorship in operation they embark on the field of total power from which there is no return. The machinery of total power has to roll ahead or die.

The objective law of the necessity of total power is a continuous drive for an increase of power and a continuous expansion of the power structure by the acquisition of new power areas within and outside its base.
The expansion of the communist power system within its base is carried out by its static capacities — by the force of social gravity. The machinery of dictatorship conquers the new power areas within the population by exploiting the social-biologic processes of certain social classes. Further, by the acquisition of new power areas within its material base it also increases its monopoly of power in the realm of economics. It exploits natural resources and organizes the human element into suitable formations for this exploitation. This process of expansion within the material base reinforces/political power of communist dictatorship with economic power and integrates it by a high exponent.

The base of the communist power system is the U.S.S.R. and the Peoples' Democracies. It functions in a static capacity, increasing the strength of the communist power system by the acquisition of new power areas from within its population and natural resources.

On the other hand, the expansion of the communist power system outside its base is realized by its dynamic capacities, and is carried out by the functioning of the communist parties in free democratic countries. These penetrate into the depth of free societies, generate and release there social forces and integrate them into the communist power system. Their ultimate aim is to seize power, to establish communist dictatorship and to enlarge the base of the communist power system.
Now, finally, we can formulate some conclusions concerning the possibility of checking the expansion of the communist power machinery.

In countries where communists have been able to establish the machinery of dictatorship, under the present conditions, there does not seem to be any possibility of checking the increase of communist power.

In free societies, where the communist parties operate in dynamic capacities and where the time factor is the key element in their strategy, there is only one way to check expansion of communism: an absolute denial of access for the communists to the institutional structure of democratic society and their complete isolation.

Any partial containment of communism, no matter whether on a national or an international scale; also any partial solution based on the co-existence, or on the division of spheres of influence do not constitute any solution whatsoever. These measures work inevitably towards the strengthening of the communist power system. Actually, the whole problem boils down to the point where the free world must counter and meet communism on the same power level as communism is approaching the free world. The free world has to be ready to wage an atomic war in self-defence to-morrow, as well as to be able to withstand the protracted cold war for ten or fifteen years, depending upon what the communist strategists consider.
to be more advantageous to them.

As far as the present, and as far as developments in the immediate future indicate, the communist strategists have decided upon a protracted cold war for which their adversaries are rather poorly equipped. Should this be the case, the free world faces two problems, the mastering of which will decide its fate.

In the first place, the free world has to deal radically with the colossal communist fifth column before these paralyze the spinal cord of democratic societies - their institutional structures - and before they undermine the will to resist the communist aggression.

Secondly, the free world has to develop new techniques of grand scale mass communications to be able to increase resentment, to awaken latent democratic forces in the countries dominated by the communists and to provide an objective opportunity for their self-expression by active support.

Thus, the time element, being the key factor in the communist strategy of protracted cold war becomes inevitably the key factor in the strategy of the free world in its self-defence.

Unless this is understood, there can be no realistic approach to the problem of world communism.
At a recent Communist conference in London, a chart showing "The Advance of Communism" was displayed, giving the Communists' own estimate of their strength. The total world membership claimed was 18,592,300. According to the chart, "All parties in this list base themselves on the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin." This is the listing that appeared on the chart:

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PART 1

BOOKS


Gouzenko Igor: "This Was My Choice", J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., Toronto, 1948.


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<td>International Publishers Co.</td>
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<td>New York, NY</td>
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<td>WALSH Edmund A.</td>
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<td>New York, NY</td>
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<td>YNDRICH Jan</td>
<td>&quot;Tito vs Stalin: The Battle of the Marshals&quot;</td>
<td>Ernest Benn Ltd.</td>
<td>London, UK</td>
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PART II.

DOCUMENTS


Documents of the United States Government:

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