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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Other minds and the employment of language Anderson, James Joseph 1961

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OTHER MINDS AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF LANGUAGE by JAMES JOSEPH ANDERSON B.A., U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1957 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of PHILOSOPHY We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1961 In presenting t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the Un i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree tha t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree that permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It i s understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of PHILOSOPHY  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 3, Canada. Date September 18, 1961. ABSTRACT According to H. H. P r i c e i n "Our Evidence f o r the Existence of Other Minds", the b e l i e f i n the existence of other minds i s not one that can be s t r i c t l y proven. The most that can be obtained i n support of the b e l i e f i s good reasons f o r h o l d i n g i t . P r i c e suggests that the best evidence derives from one's understanding of language. An e x p o s i t i o n of, and a commentary on, P r i c e ' s paper are given. P r i c e argues that i f I can v e r i f y a sentence which I hear and which I d i d not u t t e r but which states something I was not i n a p o s i t i o n to know, or d i d not at the moment of hearing b e l i e v e — t h e n the utterance stands as good evidence f o r the existence of an other mind. From analogy he argues that since he uses sym-bols to r e f e r to objects i n the world, the f o r e i g n use of the same symbols must have occurred as a r e s u l t of p e r c e i v -i n g and t h i n k i n g on the part of the other user. I f the f o r e i g n utterance gave o l d information or was a p l a t i t u d e I already b e l i e v e d , then i t i s not impossible that the hearer was unconsciously the cause of the symbolic noises coming from the other body. There are, according to P r i c e , f a c t u a l examples of i n t r u s i o n s of words and sentences from one's own 'unconscious'. In the commentary, c r i t i c i s m i s d i r e c t e d at P r i c e ' s b e l i e f that he lear n s that symbols mean by i n t r o s p e c t i n g how he uses them. Al s o , the need,for the purposes of h i s argu-ment, to v e r i f y a l l e g e d f o r e i g n utterances i s challenged. This r a i s e s a d i s c u s s i o n of P r i c e ' s use of a theory of 'unconscious b e l i e v i n g s ' . I t i s concluded that P r i c e was barking up the wrong tree i n r e p l a c i n g s o l i p s i s m by the pos-s i b i l i t y of one's unconscious animation of other bodies. The suggestion i s put forward that reference to the understanding of language as a means of s e t t l i n g the other minds problem i s inadequate i f i t does not take i n t o account the scheme of personal pronouns, p a r t i c u l a r l y the pronoun ' I ' , since the r u l e s governing t h e i r use are l i k e r u l e s f o r the separating of t h i n g s , s i m i l a r to the d i s t i n g -u i s h i n g of things i n the world i n order to make up a game. As an attempt to make up f o r the inadequacy men-tio n e d , a study of aspects of the concept of speech i s made i n part I I I . I t emerges that the existence of a p l u r a l i t y of speakers i s a presupposition of saying that someone says something, or even that p r o p o s i t i o n s say something. Refer-ence i s made to the common grammar of ' I ' . Relevant passages regarding ' I ' i n Wittgenstein's The Blue and Brown Books i i i and R y l e 1 s The Concept of Mind are examined. I t i s concluded that the primary sense of ' I * r e f e r s t o , or, i n d i c a t e s the speaker, and that p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y impor-tant senses of " I 1 derive from that o r i g i n a l sense. The speaker i s claimed t o be outside the mind-body problem as w e l l as the other minds problem. Consequently, though i t i s pos s i b l e f o r a speaker to r e f e r to himself i n the s o l i p s i s -t i c manner, or to e n t e r t a i n doubts about the r e a l i t y of other people's f e e l i n g s , i t makes no sense f o r him to imagine that h i s r o l e as a speaker i n a community of speakers thereby van-i s h e s . i v C O N T E N T S Page PART I AN EXPOSITION OP H.H. PRICE'S "OUR EVIDENCE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER MINDS". 1 PART I I COMMENTARY TO "OUR EVIDENCE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER MINDS". 22 PART I I I A STUDY OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE CONCEPT OF SPEECH. 36 PART IV CONCLUSIONS. 61 BIBLIOGRAPHY 71 ACKNOWLEDGMENT I wish to express my indebtedness to Prof. D. G-. Brown f o r h i s advice during the preparation of t h i s t h e s i s and f o r h i s l e c t u r e s concerning the set of p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems of which t h i s t h e s i s merely scratches the surface. v i PART I I n 1938, i n a p a p e r e n t i t l e d "Our E v i d e n c e f o r t h e E x i s t e n c e o f O t h e r M i n d s " , H. H. P r i c e put f o r t h what he c a l l e d an argument f r o m l a n g u a g e f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f o t h e r m i n d s . W h a t f o l l o w s i n t h i s p a r t o f t h e t h e s i s i s a d e s c r i p -t i v e e x p o s i t i o n o f P r i c e ' s p a p e r . The f i r s t t h i n g I do i s t o m e n t i o n v e r y b r i e f l y P r i c e ' s r e a c t i o n t o w a r d s o t h e r t r e a t m e n t s o f t h e p r o b l e m . These o t h e r t r e a t m e n t s o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s I c a l l t h e ' e n v i r o n m e n t ' o f t h e argument. Then, a f t e r a q u i c k l o o k a t a s h o r t f o r m o f t h e argument i t s e l f , I a t t e m p t t o i t e m i z e v a r i o u s d e s c r i p t i o n s t h a t P r i c e u s e s t o b u i l d up h i s argument. These d e s c r i p t i o n s r e f e r , f o r example, t o s u c h topics„,as - i n t r o s p e c t i o n and t h e r o l e o f symbols i n c e r t a i n m e n t a l a c t s . F o l l o w i n g t h e c o u r s e o f t h e p a p e r , I r e t u r n t o a f u l l e r e x p o s i t i o n o f P r i c e ' s argument, t o g e t h e r w i t h some o f t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s P r i c e draws f r o m i t . The e x p o s i t i o n as a whole c o n c l u d e s w i t h a b r i e f c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f what P r i c e s a y s about v o l i t i o n a l and e m o t i v e l a n g u a g e . P a r t I I o f t h i s t h e s i s i s a commentary on v a r i o u s p o i n t s i n P r i c e ' s p a p e r (A) We ought n o t , a c c o r d i n g t o P r i c e , t o e x p e c t 1 H . H. P r i c e , "Our E v i d e n c e f o r t h e E x i s t e n c e o f O t h e r M i n d s " , P h i l o s o p h y . X I I I (1938), 425-456. 1 2 t h a t s t r i c t p r o o f o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f o t h e r minds i s a v a i l -a b l e . The c e r t a i n t y w h i c h f o l l o w s upon f o r m a l d e m o n s t r a t i o n i n l o g i c and m a t h e m a t i c s i s n o t t h e s o r t o f t h i n g we s h o u l d hope t o f i n d c o n c e r n i n g o t h e r m inds. What we s h o u l d l o o k f o r i s good r e a s o n s f o r h o l d i n g t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e r e a r e o t h e r m i nds. (B) P r i c e d i s t i n g u i s h e s between t h e g e n e s i s o f a b e l i e f and i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n . G. E. Moore, i n "The N a t u r e and R e a l i t y o f O b j e c t s o f P e r c e p t i o n " had s a i d t h a t q u e s t i o n s o f t h e for m , 'How do we come t o be c o n v i n c e d t h a t o t h e r minds e x i s t ? ' a r e p s y c h o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s and n o t p r o p e r l y m a t t e r s p f o r p h i l o s o p h y . F o r Moore, as a p p a r e n t l y f o r P r i c e , t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n i s 'What r e a s o n s have we f o r o u r b e l i e f i n t h e e x i s t e n c e o f o t h e r m i n d s ? ' To i l l u s t r a t e t h e d i s t i n c -t i o n : i t seems p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e ways i n w h i c h p e o p l e come t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e a r e o t h e r minds d i f f e r i n k i n d and p e r -v e r s i t y ; some o f us may have a b s o r b e d t h e b e l i e f i n t h e way c h i l d r e n a r e l e d t o b e l i e v e i n S a n t a C l a u s , by b e i n g t o l d w o n d e r f u l s t o r i e s a b o u t a m y t h i c a l p e r s o n ; i n my c a s e , a t any r a t e , no m a t t e r how h a r d I t r y , I c a n n o t d i s c o v e r how o r when I f i r s t b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e were o t h e r minds. P r i c e ' s d i s t i n c t i o n s u g g e s t s t h a t b o t h i g n o r a n c e as t o g e n e s i s and p G. E. Moore j P h i l o s o p h i c a l S t u d i e s , (London: Jiegan P a u l , T r e n c h , T r u b n e r , 1922), pp. 34-35. "The N a t u r e and R e a l i t y o f O b j e c t s o f P e r c e p t i o n " f i r s t a p p e a r e d i n P r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , 1905-6. 3 a l l e g e d knowledge as to genesis do not matter, what counts f o r philosophy i s the p u b l i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the b e l i e f by arguable standards of consistency and evidence. (C) P r i c e sees no reason to accept an I n t u i t i v e theory about other people's thoughts, emotions and other mental s t a t e s . By the ' I n t u i t i v e Theory' he means a c l u s t e r of t h e o r i e s whose common element i s the p o s t u l a t i n g of a s p e c i a l way of knowing which he c a l l s "extrospective acquaint-ance". On such a theory we can sometimes have d i r e c t access to the mental st a t e s of others, l i k e the d i r e c t access by means of i n t r o s p e c t i o n which we have to our own mental s t a t e s . (D) There i s a " p l a u s i b l e but i n c o n c l u s i v e argu-ment" which might lead the credulous to t h i n k there i s some s p e c i a l way of knowing describable by e x t r o s p e c t i v e acquaint-ance. In h i s own words: . . . unless there i s some extr o s p e c t i v e acquaint-ance, the b e l i e f s which each one of us holds concern-i n g other minds could not have the high degree o f , p r o b a b i l i t y which some of them obviously do have. No doubt he meant to-c o n t r a s t p r o b a b i l i t y w i t h c e r t a i n t y ; then we can say: unless i t i s at l e a s t sometimes c e r t a i n that S i s the case, how can i t ever be h i g h l y probable that some-t h i n g i s evidence f o r S? But t h i s r e f o r m u l a t i o n has i t s d i f -f i c u l t i e s . What i s the r e l a t i o n between e x t r o - and i n t r o -s p ective acquaintance and c e r t a i n t y ? Does he mean that some-P r i c e , op. c i t . , p. 428. 4 times other people's st a t e s are as i n c o r r i g i b l e to me as mine are to me a l l of the time? That i s to say, sometimes I a c t u -a l l y have other people's thoughts, pains, images, etc.? Or i s t h i s acquaintance an i n f a l l i b l e s e a r c h l i g h t that ranges over my mental s t a t e s whenever I wish and sometimes over the mental s t a t e s of o t h e r s — a k i n d of observing mechanism? In passing, i t should be mentioned that John Wisdom, i n Other  Minds, put a question s i m i l a r to our r e f o r m u l a t i o n of P r i c e ' s " p l a u s i b l e but i n c o n c l u s i v e argument". While considering the p o s s i b i l i t y that many or a l l of our f r i e n d s may be sad when they show signs of being happy, the p o s s i b i l i t y being there because i t i s not c e r t a i n they are not sad, Wisdom asks i n a footnote: "And i f i t i s n ' t ever c e r t a i n how can i t some-times be probable that behind A i s a?"^ (E) The simple B e h a v i o u r i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of other minds statements i s r e j e c t e d by P r i c e because i t f a i l s to give an adequate account of one's own mind or mental s t a t e s . My mental s t a t e s have more i n them than only b o d i l y movements. He w r i t e s : . . . what about statements concerning my own mind: These can be v e r i f i e d or r e f u t e d by i n t r o s p e c t i o n ; so they are not to be analysed i n a purely Behaviour-i s t i c way. But t h i s leaves us w i t h an i n t o l e r a b l e asymmetry between statements about myself and s t a t e -ments about my neighbor. I t seems p e r f e c t l y obvious that words l i k e 'hear', 'see', 'fear', 'think', have John Wisdom. Other Minds, (2nd imp.; Oxford: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1956), p. 6. 5 ex a c t l y the same meaning when I apply them to my . neighbor as when I apply them to myself.^-Having pointed to aspects of the environment of P r i c e ' s main argument, we can now car r y on wi t h that argument. We are given m a t e r i a l to be used as evidence f o r the existence of other minds. This m a t e r i a l c o n s i s t s of various utterances that people make i n c e r t a i n circumstances. The f i r s t one of these i s roughly a paradigm f o r a l l the others. We are w a i t -in g at a bus stop when someone says, "Looki there i s the b u s i " I look around and see that i t i s approaching. A number of things have happened i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n : (1) I heard some noises (2) took them as being words (3) understood what was • s a i d (4) v e r i f i e d the t r u t h of what was s a i d (5) gained some true i n f o r m a t i o n , since I d i d not know the bus was approaching. I f I made a game of w a i t i n g at bus stops to encourage t h i s s i t u a t i o n and found that i t oft e n does happen, I would have evidence that those utterances proceeding from other bodies were due i n p a r t , at l e a s t , to t h e i r having of mental events s i m i l a r to my own perceivings of the approaching buses. At any r a t e , the s i t u a t i o n gives us a kind of corpus d e l e c t i , the proof that a crime has been done. The a s c r i p t i o n of the mental sta t e of p e r c e i v i n g to the u t t e r e r s of the noises i s 5 P r i c e , op. c i t . . . pp. 428-429. A l l succeeding pages r e f e r -ences i n t h i s part of the t h e s i s w i l l r e f e r to P r i c e ' s paper. 6 p . 430. 6 a s o l u t i o n of the crime, the c r i m i n a l i s apprehended by e x p l a i n i n g the mystery of 'ge t t i n g new information'. The newer the informat i o n i s , the deeper the mystery w i l l be. For i f the s i t u a t i o n j u s t gives you informat i o n you already have, i t i s not impossible that i n some way you 'caused' the apparently i n t r u s i v e utterance. But you could not have 'caused' the utterance i f you d i d not have the informat i o n i n the f i r s t place. "Look] there i s the bus!" l i k e "There are snakes i n 7 the teapot" can be c a l l e d informative s i n g u l a r p r o p o s i t i o n s . But good evidence can be obtained from informative general p r o p o s i t i o n s also, i . e . , ones which i n v o l v e acts of t h i n k i n g , e.g., "some cats have no t a i l s " , " a l l gold d i s s o l v e s i n aqua 8 r e g i a " . These are g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s from a number of s i n g l e perceptual acts (or s i n g u l a r p r o p o s i t i o n s ) . They can be con-firmed, i f not v e r i f i e d . I t f o l l o w s f o r P r i c e that p l a t i t u d e s already b e l i e v e d by the hearer would not be very good evidence f o r the e x i s t -ence of other minds. Statements l i k e , "Today i s Saturday", " A l l cats have whiskers", "2 + 2 = 4" are not informative i n the e m p i r i c a l sense found i n "Look! there i s the bus!". He notes, however, that there are " . . . novel t a u t o l o g i e s as Q w e l l as s t a l e ones". The hearing of novel p l a t i t u d e s could 6 p . 430. 7 p . 433. 8 p . 433. 9 p . 434. 7 be e v i d e n c e f o r f o r e i g n a c t s o f t h o u g h t . I n t h e c a s e o f m a t h e m a t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o have an i n t r u s i o n o f new e n t a i l m e n t s n o t t h o u g h t o f b e f o r e . H a v i n g c o l l e c t e d t h r e e k i n d s o f u t t e r a n c e s o r " s i t u -a t i o n s ", s i n c e more i s i n v o l v e d t h a n j u s t t h e u t t e r a n c e , name-l y , t h e h e a r i n g , u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and v e r i f y i n g by t h e h e a r e r , P r i c e s u g g e s t s t h a t t h r e e c o n d i t i o n s must be k e p t i n mind i f t h e s i t u a t i o n s a r e t o be u s e d as e v i d e n c e , (1) The sounds must be s y m b o l i c f o r me. 1 0 T h a t i s t o s a y , t h e sounds must s y m b o l i z e some o b j e c t o r o b j e c t s t o me. He means t h a t I must u n d e r s t a n d them. (2) The sounds must s y m b o l i z e s o m e t h i n g t r u e o r f a l s e . I must be a b l e e i t h e r t o v e r i f y t h e u t t e r a n c e o r know what t h e w o r l d would be l i k e i f t h e u t t e r a n c e were t r u e . (3) The u t t e r a n c e must g i v e me new i n f o r m a t i o n . As we have s e e n , he h a s g i v e n two s e n s e s t o 'new i n f o r m a t i o n ' (a) i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e w o r l d and (b) t h e i n t r u s i o n o f n o v e l t a u t o l o g i e s and u n t h o u g h t o f e n t a i l m e n t s . The i n f o r m a t i o n must be s u c h t h a t t h e r e would be v e r y l i t t l e s u s p i c i o n o f t h e s o r t P r i c e f e e l s c o n c e r n i n g u t t e r a n c e s w h i c h g i v e o l d i n f o r -m a t i o n , a l r e a d y b e l i e v e d , and s t a l e t a u t o l o g i e s . The s u s p i -c i o n b e i n g t h a t t h e m e n t a l a c t b e h i n d t h e u t t e r a n c e i s one's own i n some q u e e r way. The s e c o n d i t i o n s a r e s e c u r e d i n t h e u t t e r a n c e , " L o o k l t h e r e i s t h e b u s . " o f t h e f i r s t s i t u a t i o n . How am I 8 j u s t i f i e d i n believing that another mind or mental act not my own i s responsbile f o r the utterance? Price's answer i s , of course, the substance of his main argument. But description and argument are entwined here and i t i s impossible to give an account of his argument without expounding his descriptions. The following i s an attempt to itemize his descriptions. (1) There i s something called introspection. It i s the awareness of one's mental states and acts. It i s independent of mental acts (and states) i n that i t illuminates or reveals them. Thus I can introspect my perceivings. That i s to say, I can notice that I perceive things over and above the act of perceiving i t s e l f . Perceiving i s a type of "cognitive act". A "cognitive act", f o r Price, seems to be the conscious-ness of an object. (2) By a mixture of introspection and perception I f i n d that p a r t i c u l a r noises often go with particular cog-n i t i v e acts. The noises may be "audible or imaged"."^ A meaningful sentence i s a complex of "noises" which go with a corresponding complex of objects found i n a cognitive act. When the noises, "Here i s a black cat" occur, ". . . i t i s usually accompanied by a s p e c i f i c sort of cognitive act, namely, the seeing 12 and recognizing- of a black cat". "p. 442 p. 443. 9 (3) The conjunction of cognitive acts and t h e i r charac-t e r i s t i c noises, established i n the language used, results i n the mental act of thinking. "Thinking", Price suspects, i s ". . . awareness by means of 13 symbols". The occurrence of symbols, "sensible" or "imaged", ". . . i s an i n t e g r a l part of thinking i t s e l f " B u t mere accompaniment of noises (audi-tory or imaged) with cognitive acts would not allow the noises to stand as symbols. Price i s not sure whether symbols are an i n t e g r a l part of .perceiving also. He says i f they are present i n perceiving they would not merely accompany perceiving, they would be instrumental to i t . (4) Noises are "instrumental to" cognitive acts i n two ways. The hearing and understanding together of foreign born noises i s an act of "imposed thinking". This happening i s expressed by saying the proposition i s entertained. What happens i n "imposed thinking" i s that "cognitive dispositions" 'are awakened i n me because, i n being a language user, I am so trained that when I hear my language noises, the ideas or images of the objects f o r which the words or arrange-ment of words stand, are aroused. Thus I know what i t would be l i k e for the utterance to be true, i . e . , 1 3 p . 443. p. 443. 10 correspond w i t h a s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n the world. "Spontaneous t h i n k i n g " , on the ether hand, as i t i s expressed, say, i n "Look.1 there i s the bus!" during a s i t u a t i o n i n which I am the one seeing the bus, i s due to a c o g n i t i v e act of my own. (5) I t i s not necessary to have experienced the pr e c i s e s t a t e of a f f a i r s s i g n i f i e d by an imposed utterance i n order to understand the utterance. For as long as I have learned to use the same separate noise-symbols i n my own acts of "spontaneous t h i n k i n g " , I can form a p i c t u r e of what the s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n the world would be l i k e i f the utterance were t r u e . We should now be i n a p o s i t i o n to see how one i s j u s t i f i e d i n b e l i e v i n g that the utterance "Lookl there i s the bus I" i s r e l a t e d to a mental act (or a c t s — t h i n k i n g and per-c e i v i n g ) which i s not an episode i n my biography. I have d i s -covered by i n t r o s p e c t i o n that such sounds occur as media of a mental a c t , namely, the mental act of t h i n k i n g . The sounds (audible or imaged) act as the means by which the mental act i s accomplished. Therefore i t i s l i k e l y that the f o r e i g n born noises are s i m i l a r l y r e l a t e d to a mental act not my own. Here we s t r i k e the bottom of the argument. P r i c e says: The form of the argument i s : s i t u a t i o n s a and b resemble each other i n respect of a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c C ] _ ; s i t u a t i o n a a l s o has the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c C2', therefore s i t u a t i o n b probably has the character-i s t i c C2 l i k e w i s e . The noises I am now aware of c l o s e l y resemble c e r t a i n ones which I have been 11 aware of before ( i n t e c h n i c a l phraseology, they are tokens of the same typ e ) , and the resemblance covers both t h e i r q u a l i t i e s and t h e i r manner of combination. Those which I was aware of before functioned as symbols i n acts of spontaneous t h i n k i n g . Therefore these present ones probably resemble them i n that respect too; they too probably f u n c t i o n as i n s t r u -ments to an act of spontaneous t h i n k i n g , which i n t h i s case i s not my own.-*-5 P r i c e d i s t i n g u i s h e s between the a n a l o g i c a l charac-t e r of t h i s argument and i t s value as e s t a b l i s h i n g an explan-a t i o n ". . . of an otherwise mysterious set of occurrences","*" i . e . , the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y or symbolic nature of the noises f o r me. One way of l o o k i n g at the hypothesis e s t a b l i s h e d by the a n a l o g i c a l argument i s to see i t as an explanation which he describes i n the f o l l o w i n g way: . . . i f there i s another mind which uses the same symbols as I do and combines them according to the same p r i n c i p l e s , and i f t h i s mind; has produced these noises i n the course of an act of spontaneous t h i n k i n g : then I can account f o r the occurrence of these n o i s e s , and f o r the f a c t that they are com-bined i n one of these mathematically improbable combinations. When I say these f a c t s are 'explained' or 'accounted f o r ' by our hypothesis, I mean that i f the hypothesis i s true these f a c t s are instances of a r u l e which i s already known to hold good i n a lar g e number of instances. The r u l e i s , that symbol-i c a l l y - f u n c t i o n i n g combinations are produced i n the course of acts of spontaneous t h i n k i n g ; and the instances i n which i t i s already known' to hold good have been presented to me by introspection.-'-' He adds that the hypothesis i s conceivable and v e r i f i a b l e i n the weak sense, that i s to say, i t has explanatory power because we know what the world would be l i k e i f i t were true 1 5 p p . 445-446. 16 p. 446. 1 7 p . 446. 12 and we know what kind of evidence w i l l support the hypothesis. The argument i s designed to j u s t i f y our b e l i e f i n the existence of other minds. But Price has been concerned mainly with mental acts which somehow involve symbols. What he has t r i e d to establish i s the existence of language users. He nowhere suggests that when we speak of other minds we refer only to symbol-involved mental acts. Nevertheless, the argu-ment i s r e s t r i c t e d to mental acts which involve'symbols. That he i s de f i n i t e i n saying that only an argument from the use of symbols w i l l give us reasons for believing i n the exis-tence of other minds can be seen i n the following quotation, "If I never understood any of the noises or marks which I . hear or see, I should have no evidence f o r the existence of 18 other minds". He means that i n terms of the argument, no evidence can be obtained i f I do not understand "any of the noises or marks . . . I hear or see". But there may be d i f -ferent kinds of evidence. He admits that i n the case of animals, unless they use symbols we can understand, the e v i -dence would have to be diff e r e n t i n kind. He said: The suggestion I wish to examine i s that one's evidence f o r the existence of other minds i s derived primarily from the understanding of language. " And also: I am concerned simply with an epistemological p. 429. 13 problem: how the understanding of language gives each of us reason to b e l i e v e i n the existence of other minds. 2^ Understanding a symbol, f o r P r i c e , e n t a i l s that something i s common between the speaker and-the hearer and t h i s i s the object f o r which the symbol stands. Without a world of objects common to speaker and hearer, the existence 21 of symbols would not be p o s s i b l e . There must be an exter-n a l world. For P r i c e , any evidence f o r the existence of other minds must a l s o be evidence f o r the existence of the e x t e r n a l 22 world. There i s yet another r e s t r i c t i o n due to the nature of h i s argument. Unless i t can be e s t a b l i s h e d that animals use symbols, we would have no reason to suppose that they are conscious i n the sense i n which we are conscious of the w o r l d . 2 5 P r i c e seems to mean that we must somehow be able to converse w i t h an animal before we can obtain good reasons of the kind we have been considering f o r supposing that i t i s conscious. He does not seem to mean that a l l we need to observe i s something that looks l i k e conversation between two animals'. He seems to mean we must understand the symbols d i r e c t l y and not by observing c o r r e l a t i o n s between t h e i r sounds or gestures and t h e i r behaviour. P r i c e concludes: I only wish to i n s i s t that i f the lower animals 2 0p.429. 2 1 p . 448. 2 2 p . 449. 2 3 p . 449. 14 do not use symbols—symbols which we can under-stand and which convey information to u s — t h e n our evidence f o r the existence of animal minds i s d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d , and not merely i n degree, from our evidence f o r human minds.^4 P r i c e does not t h i n k the emotive f u n c t i o n of l a n -25 guage i s releva n t to "our present i n q u i r y " . His project was to point out good reasons f o r b e l i e v i n g i n other minds and to argue why they should be taken as good reasons. What makes the evidence he presents very relevant to t h i s p r o j e c t , according to P r i c e , i s t h a t , i n the case of informative l a n -guage, both speaker and hearer make use of symbols which r e f e r to e x t e r n a l world objects. And these same symbols take 26 part i n mental acts of which t h i n k i n g i s an example. Nevertheless, P r i c e f e l t that he had to say some-t h i n g about v o l i t i o n s and emotions. In h i s d i s c u s s i o n of v o l i t i o n s i t i s noti c e a b l e that P r i c e d i s t i n g u i s h e s between (a) the t h e o r e t i c a l f i r s t time an utterance was understood and (b) the subsequent quick or ordinary understandings. As f o r ( a ) , the utterance ( h i s example i s : "That door has got to be shut.' " 27) would have been f i r s t construed as propounding a p r o p o s i t i o n , but i n a combination of words t h a t , as yet, contains some u n i n t e l l i g i b l e words. In the case of h i s exam-2 4 P - 449. 2 5 P . 451. 26 See p. 451 on the "primacy of the object". 2 7 P . 453. 15 pie these u n i n t e l l i g i b l e words are " . . . has got to be . . .". The i n t e l l i g i b l e part of the sentence propounds t h i s propos-i t i o n : "The door i s shut". Suppose I observe the door i s not shut. The al l e g e d p r o p o s i t i o n i s therefore f a l s e . But i t does give me a new piece of information, and so i t can stand as evidence f o r an other mind. Imagine the speaker, or perhaps someone e l s e , s h u t t i n g the door. The p r o p o s i t i o n , construed out of a p a r t l y u n i n t e l l i g i b l e sentence, i s now tru e . I f t h i s s i t u a t i o n happened o f t e n , I would connect the the u n i n t e l l i g i b l e part of the sentence (and the speaker) w i t h the changes observed, i . e . , the s h u t t i n g of the door. I would come to th i n k the u n i n t e l l i g i b l e part of the sentence has something to do wit h the i n f l u e n c e of the speaker i n making the p r o p o s i t i o n t r u e , not the actions of g e t t i n g up and shut-t i n g the door, but an inf l u e n c e that somehow motivates the ac t i o n s , some so r t of mental act of wanting them (the a c t i o n s ) to be done. (b) In the absence of d i r e c t observations of changes (such as s h u t t i n g doors), f u r t h e r utterances are understood by v i r t u e of the resemblances among such expressions them-sel v e s , t h e i r s t r u c t u r e , the tone of voice i n which they are 28 u t t e r e d , or t h e i r accompanying gestures. P r i c e would per-haps say that these resemblances make up the 'grammar' of utterances expressing v o l i t i o n s . 16 I n i t i a l l y , we get evidence that someone i s enter-t a i n i n g c e r t a i n thoughts. We have observed that someone used 'door' and 'be shut' which we understand. Not yet do we understand 'has got t o ' . In possession of t h i s new informa-t i o n from a f o r e i g n mind, we v e r i f y i t i n s o f a r as we under-stand the sentence; the door i s not, i n f a c t , shut. Say the speaker gets up and shuts the door. Prom t h i s s i t u a t i o n , according to P r i c e , we get " . . . evidence of the occurrence pq 01 a i o r e i g n thought which a f f e c t s the o b j e c t i v e world." We get evidence of f o r e i g n v o l i t i o n s by n o t i c i n g i n d i v i d u a l s change the world, as i t were, to s u i t t h e i r utterances. Foreign v o l i t i o n s are discovered, by means of the understanding of language, when the v o l i t i o n a l utterance con-t a i n s an informative element of the s o r t that has been d i s -cussed. This informative p r o p o s i t i o n a l part of the sentence must be f a l s e . By the actions of the speaker towards making the p r o p o s i t i o n true we discover a f o r e i g n v o l i t i o n . I f we do not, as o r d i n a r i l y we do not, observe any changes i n the world f o l l o w i n g upon the utterance, yet recognize a v o l i t i o n -a l utterance, t h i s can only be because we have oft e n n o t i c e d various s t r u c t u r a l s i m i l a r i t i e s i n the sentences, or have observed c e r t a i n tones of v o i c e , to be common among the u t t e r -ings of the sentences on those occasions when we do hear the 2 9 p . 454. 17 utterance and see the act i o n s of the speaker. P r i c e apparently regards the r e l a t i o n s of: u t t e r -ance, f a l s e p r o p o s i t i o n , a c t i o n of speaker towards making the p r o p o s i t i o n t r u e — a s the paradigm case of w i l l i n g . For he asse r t s that there would be cases where no speaker at a l l i s seen, but an utterance i s heard, such as "Let there be a 30 thunderstorm]" I f t h i s i s followed by a thunderstorm, though we do not see anyone making a thunderstorm, we would have some evidence of a f o r e i g n v o l i t i o n . P r i c e ' s treatment of t h i s point i s a l l too b r i e f and so i t would be u n f a i r to take i t too l i t e r a l l y . What he means to say, I should imag-i n e , i s that i t would occur to a hearer of "Let there be a thunderstorm.'", who subsequently observed a thunderstorm, that there was a f o r e i g n v o l i t i o n behind the utterance. A p e c u l i a r meteorologist might, i n f a c t , be announcing h i s pre-31 d i c t i o n i n t h i s odd way through a hidden loudspeaker. From P r i c e ' s standpoint, we would have good reason, at any r a t e , to judge that the utterance i s i n the imperative mood. With utterances expressive of emotions, P r i c e f i n d s that some t h i n k i n g , as i n the case of p e r c e i v i n g , i s an i n t e g r a l part of every emotion. He w r i t e s : Every emotion includes some t h i n k i n g , and t h i s t h i n k i n g i s not a mere accompaniment, but i s an i n t e g r a l part of the emotion i n question. _____ 31 I owe t h i s point about the meteorologist to Prof. Brown. 32 D p. 455. 18 In order to be a f r a i d of something, f o r example, you must be convinced that something or other i s the case. I t may be a f a l s e b e l i e f as i n the case of fears of imaginary dangers. P r i c e ' s way of saying t h i s i s to say that " . . . c e r t a i n 33 o b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l s . . . must be present to the mind" else you could not hold a b e l i e f that something i s the case. P r i c e ' s example of an emotive utterance i s "Oh! A s n a k e ] " 3 4 The information got from t h i s utterance i s that 35 ". . . there i s a snake i n the immediate neighborhood". In t h i s case there i s no word or combination of words that i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e (at the t h e o r e t i c a l f i r s t hearing) as i n the case of v o l i t i o n a l utterances. Rather, the p e c u l i a r manner of saying the words i s i n question. The tone of v o i c e i s explained, according to P r i c e , by observing, once again, "objective changes" i n the world. I c o r r e l a t e the tone of voice with the changes that take place, the running away, the s t r i k i n g at the snake. Repeated observations of such s i t u a t i o n s give the i n d u c t i v e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n that a statement l i k e "Oh] A snake]" u t t e r e d by someone else i s a type of "tendentious thought". A "tendentious thought", says P r i c e , 36 ". , . tends to change the o b j e c t i v e world i n c e r t a i n ways." The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t emotional a t t i t u d e s , P r i c e concludes, i s the r e s u l t of c o r r e l a t i n g : . . . d i f f e r e n c e s i n tone of v o i c e (and i n gesture 3 3 p . 455. 3 4 p . 455. 3 5 p . 455. 3 6 p . 455. 19 or f a c i a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n ) w i t h d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of o b j e c t i v e changes which are l i a b l e to follow.57 I t i s f a s c i n a t i n g to watch P r i c e put emotions and v o l i t i o n s under the wing of mental acts which involve the use of symbols. The sentence, or utterance which expresses an emotional a t t i t u d e i s a tendentious thought. The v o l i t i o n a l utterance makes use of " o b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l s " . Part of the reason, of course, f o r h i s i n s i s t e n c e on t h i s i s that he i s a f t e r a l l t r y i n g to argue from the understanding of language to the existence of emotions and v o l i t i o n s . He sensed the p e c u l i a r i t y of what i s i m p l i e d by " s u b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l s " . That i s to say, such p r i v a t e objects that they may designate, could not be a part of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e discourse unless t h e i r existence can be gleaned from the use of " o b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l s " i n the various ways he attempted to set out. I am not sure whether he thought there were such things as " s u b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l s " (e.g., 'pain' might be one). I t i s l i k e l y , though, because he seems to have held the Lockean view that the meaning of a symbol i s s t r i c t l y the object f o r which i t stands. Had he not been so caught up i n that view he might have gone a l l the way towards saying that there are no "sub-j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l s " such that t h e i r meanings are p r i v a t e , unpublic objects. He d i d w r i t e : I t seems p e r f e c t l y obvious that words l i k e 'hear', p. 456. 20 'see', 'fear', 'think', have e x a c t l y the same mean-ing when I apply thenLto my neighbor as when I apply them to myself.^° Longer c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the very point expressed i n the quo-t a t i o n , together wi t h a c l o s e r examination of i n t r o s p e c t i o n , would have considerably a l t e r e d the d i r e c t i o n h i s paper took. Prom what has been s a i d i t may be thought that P r i c e b e l i e v e d that babies do not have emotions because they do not yet have mental acts which involve symbols. They l e a r n emotions when or as they l e a r n to use symbols. Obvious-l y P r i c e does not'mean t h i s . He would say I b e l i e v e , that they l e a r n to express emotions by means of language when they l e a r n the use of symbols. His statements are not always con-s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s , however, f o r he claims that "every emotion 39 includes some t h i n k i n g " . I th i n k he must mean that every l i n g u i s t i c expression or statement of an emotion presupposes some t h i n k i n g . I t w i l l be remembered he stresses that you can't t h i n k without symbols. But the p r i n c i p a l t h i n g about the emotional a t t i -tudes, f o r P r i c e , i s that they always lead to changes i n the world, they a f f e c t conduct. One emotion which P r i c e t h i n k s may not show i t s p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t at f i r s t glance i s the 'emotion' of admiration concerning an h i s t o r i c a l personage. Take the case of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s admiration f o r the Emperor V a l e n t i n i a n I. How, he asks, could such an emotion be p. 455. 21 detected, or at l e a s t b e l i e v e d , by others? V a l e n t i n i a n I i s not a perceivable object, but a think a b l e one. 4 <^ There i s no perceivable object to be a f f e c t e d by the admirer. Such an emotion, he t h i n k s , would be revealed by the subject's u t t e r -ances. One observes the great number of favorable things he says about the Emperor, and so on. Once again, as i n the other cases, the need of the emotion, or i t s tendency, which allows us to i d e n t i f y i t , i s shown i n the subject's a c t i o n s . % . 456. 22 PART I I There are three points concerning P r i c e ' s paper that I would l i k e to comment on. The f i r s t has to do with what he says about symbols and various language f u n c t i o n s . The second r e l a t e s to h i s r e l i a n c e upon i n t r o s p e c t i o n . The t h i r d concerns the pro j e c t of P r i c e ' s paper as a whole and t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i l l introduce Part I I I of t h i s t h e s i s . 1. P r i c e d i s t i n g u i s h e s f o u r d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n s of language. These functions are: (1) the e m p i r i c a l (his exam-ples are: "Look.' there i s the busJ", "Some cats have no t a i l s . " ) ; (2) the non-empirical ( " A l l cats have whiskers", " 2 + 2 = 4 " ) ; (3) the v o l i t i o n a l ("That door has got to be shut.'"); and (4) the emotive ("OhI A snake.'"). These are ordinary forms of language but the l i s t i s by no means exhaus-t i v e . P r i c e maintained that f o r h i s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l purposes he required only (1) and, to a l e s s e r extent, ( 2 ) . 1 JTew and imposed utterances i n categories (1) and (2) supply s u f f i c i e n t Op. c i t . , p. 451. 23 evidence of other perceivers and t h i n k e r s . According to P r i c e , the reason why (1) and (2) are s u f f i c i e n t i s that these utterances involve objects which both speaker and hearer are aware of. Indeed, f o r P r i c e , i t 2 i s the "primacy of the object" that makes i t p o s s i b l e f o r us to get evidence of other minds at a l l . And the primary p o s i -t i o n of the p h y s i c a l and thi n k a b l e (e.g., h i s t o r i c a l persons) objects i n h i s argument minimizes the emotive f u n c t i o n of language. Emotive utterances make reference to things which only the u t t e r e r i s aware of. I f we had only purely emotive utterances to r e l y on, we could never get evidence, from language, of the existence of other minds. But, according to P r i c e , categories (3) and (4) have something i n common wit h ( l ) . I t i s , as we have already seen i n the e x p o s i t i o n , that they a l l propound p r o p o s i t i o n s , though i n the case of (3) and (4), i n a queer way. Category (2), a s s e r t i o n s of novel t a u t o l o g i e s and entailments, could not, apparently, have anything i n common wit h (3) and (4). I f people u t t e r e d only mathematical-like entailments and t a u t o l -ogies, we could not f i n d evidence from language that they have emotions. P r i c e argued that such utterances would provide evidence of other t h i n k e r s . Consideration of what P r i c e says about (2) poses Op. c i t . , p. 451. 24 an i n t e r e s t i n g question. We have seen the importance he placed on the object which both speaker and hearer are aware of. But i n what respect does a tautology or an entailment belong to the e x t e r n a l world? What i s a tautologous object? I t seems to me that P r i c e must say that a novel tautology or entailment i s a new arrangement of c e r t a i n sym-bol s . The speaker and hearer would be aware of the sounds or f i g u r e s of the new arrangement. The sounds or f i g u r e s belong to the e x t e r n a l world and t h e i r imaged counterparts must der-iv e from them. Then, arc "unthought of entailments" simply new arrangements of c e r t a i n kinds of symbols? But to say 'arrange-ments of c e r t a i n kinds of symbols' would be misleading. Sounds and f i g u r e s are arranged. Their p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a game or system makes them symbols. Hence we can say: noises, marks, et c . , without p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a game or system are empty; symbols without noises or marks, e t c . , ( s e n s i b l e or imaged) are unthinkable. Understanding a symbol i n (2), then, does have a c o g n i t i v e aspect. Noises must be heard or marks seen or at l e a s t one must imagine hearing or seeing noises and marks of the r e l e v a n t k i n d . Of course, other sense data could apply here as w e l l , such as the t a c t u a l data used i n place of sounds and marks f o r the language of one who i s deaf and b l i n d . In a d d i t i o n to the admitted awareness of obj e c t s , 2 5 t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r r o l e s i n the system or game to which they belong must be r e a l i z e d . Being able to play the game allows me to recognize which arrangement of f i g u r e s i s a tauto3.ogy. I t i s , according to P r i c e , by means of the common awareness of objects that we get access to other minds. The r e l a t i o n between minds, he t h i n k s , i s three-termed. The terms are: s p e a k e r — o b j e c t — h e a r e r . By 'object', P r i c e ' s paper leads us to be l i e v e that he means a t h i n g i n the exter-n a l world; something f o r which a symbol can stand. He does not seem to mean by 'object', a'complex object such as a st a t e of a f f a i r s i n the world or a f a c t such as i s described by the e m p i r i c a l sentences i n category ( 1 ) . P r i c e i s mistaken i n t h i n k i n g that the discourse r e l a t i o n , which i s the r e l a t i o n between people when they speak wi t h one another, i s only three-termed. P r i c e ' s cate-gory ( 2 ) , e s p e c i a l l y the l o g i c a l and mathematical statements, may show only the three terms.of s p e a k e r — o b j e c t — h e a r e r . For the symbols of mathematics and l o g i c do not b a s i c a l l y stand f o r t h i n g s , the mathematical symbol i s an object i n i t s e l f which does not stand f o r some other t h i n g . However, ( 1 ) , ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) , when u t t e r e d i n the appropriate s i t u a t i o n s P r i c e d escribes, show the f o l l o w i n g terms: (a) speaker (b) object (the mouthed noise, the sign) (c) object f o r which (b) stands and (d) the hearer. I t i s true that (b) and (c) may have the same c o g n i t i v e value, i . e . , they may both be seen or heard. The difference between them i s that (b) belongs to a certain kind of game. Price claims that t h i s p e c u l i a r i t y of (b) i s found out by introspection. Much of his argument depends on t h i s very point. The resemblance between categories ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) i s that certain objects (sensible or imaged signs) have d e f i n i t e ways i n which they are to be used. In the case of ( 1 ) , Price's paper suggests that the way those symbols are to be used i s b a s i c a l l y to stand f o r other objects. This i s the kind of game we commonly play with words such as 'table', •bus', 'cat', 'snake' and so on. Whereas i n ( 2 ) the mathemat-i c a l symbols are used i n ways peculiar to mathematics but not b a s i c a l l y to stand f o r other objects. Utterances belonging to ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) may also be included i n this resemblr.nce. The resemblance i s , I repeat, that certain objects, called symbols, are used i n certain d e f i n i t e ways. Furthermore, a l l these utterances are recognized as symbolic ones because the hearer already has some idea of the way they are used i n those de f i n i t e ways. It seems to me, therefore, reasonable to suppose that imposed utterances can be evidence of other minds simply because they are new arrangements of symbols that I understand. The differences i n the functions of the various categories Price sets out may be secondary. The mystery, fo r Price, should have been the fact that he understands the words of 27 new and imposed a r r a n g e m e n t s s u f f i c i e n t l y t o c a t e g o r i z e t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . G i v e n P r i c e ' s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e r e a r e m e n t a l a c t s s u c h t h a t symbols a r e t h e a g e n c i e s whereby t h e a c t s o c c u r ( P r i c e c l a i m s t h i n k i n g i s one and d e r -i v e s t h e a s s u m p t i o n f r o m i n t r o s p e c t i o n ) , we c a n j u s t as w e l l a r g u e f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f o t h e r m e n t a l a c t s m e r e l y f r o m t h e b a r e o c c u r r e n c e o f m e a n i n g f u l b i t s o f l a n g u a g e i n one's e n v i r o n m e n t . F o r e v i d e n c e o f f o r e i g n s y m b o l - i n v o l v e d m e n t a l a c t s , g i v e n t h a t a s s u m p t i o n , i t would be enough t o s a y t h a t y o u u n d e r s t a n d t h e imposed s y m b o l i c u t t e r a n c e . Why i s i t n e c e s s a r y t o v e r i f y t h e t r u t h o f t h e u t t e r a n c e ? P r i c e w o u l d r e p l y , I i m a g i n e , t h a t by v e r i f y i n g o r c h e c k i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t coming f r o m a n o t h e r body, I f i n d o u t w h e t h e r t h e o t h e r p e r s o n u s e s t h o s e o b j e c t s ( s y m b o l s ) i n t h e way I u s e them. T h i s , however, g i v e n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e s t a t e m e n t , does n o t seem n e c e s s a r y . I t i s t r u e t h a t i f a man s l e e p i n g i n a bunk below y o u s u d d e n l y e x c l a i m e d , "Look! t h e r e i s t h e b u s ! " , t h e n i t would be a d v i s a b l e t o c o n s i d e r ways o f v e r i f y i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t . But where t h e s t a t e m e n t s u i t s t h e s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h i t i s s a i d ( e . g . , a t a bus s t o p ) , P r i c e ' s i n q u i r y would be l i k e w a t c h i n g a p e r s o n p l a y c h e s s and t h e n a s k i n g w h e t h e r t h e p l a y e r r e a l y t h i n k s he i s p l a y i n g c h e s s . I n f a i r n e s s t o P r i c e , i t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t he s a y s i t i s n o t a l w a y s p o s s i b l e t o t e s t a p r o p o s i t i o n t o s e e i f i t means what y o u t h i n k i t means, o r t h a t i t was i n t e n d e d 28 to mean what you t h i n k i t means. Examples of such p r o p o s i t i o n s 3 are p r o p o s i t i o n s about the past. I t i s s u f f i c i e n t , f o r P r i c e , i f the hearer knows what i t would be l i k e f o r the propositon to be t r u e . P r i c e admits that any i n t r u s i v e utterance which I understand could be evidence of a f o r e i g n mind. But he con-cludes that the evidence would be weak. And the reason why i t would be weak i s that i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r the utterance to have o r i g i n a t e d i n some way w i t h me, the hearer. I t i s b e t t e r evidence i f the utterance s t a t e s something I could not pos-s i b l y be i n a p o s i t i o n to know. P r i c e w r i t e s : . . . the evidence w i l l be strongest where the u t t e r -ance I hear gives me new information; t h a t i s to say, where i t symbolizes something which I do not already b e l i e v e , but which I subsequently manage to v e r i f y f o r myself. For i f I d i d already b e l i e v e i t at the time of hearing, I cannot exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y that i t was my own b e l i e v i n g which caused the f o r e i g n body to u t t e r i t . And t h i s might happen even i f my b e l i e v i n g were, as we say, "unconscious"; as when I have been b e l i e v i n g f o r many hours that today i s Saturday, though u n t i l t h i s moment I have not thought about the matter. I know by experience that my b e l i e v i n g s can cause my own body to u t t e r symbolic noises; and f o r a l l I can t e l l they may sometimes cause a f o r e i g n body to do the same. Indeed, there i s some e m p i r i c a l evidence i n favor of t h i s sugges-t i o n . The utterances of an entranced medium at a s p i r i t u a l i s t i c seance do sometimes seem to be caused by the unspoken b e l i e f s of the s i t t e r s . That one mind—my own—can animate two or more bodies at the same time i s therefore not an absurd hypothesis, but only a queer one. I t cannot be r u l e d out of court a p r i o r i , but must be r e f u t e d by s p e c i f i c e m p i r i c a l evidence.4 Op. c i t . , p. 442. 4P- 431. 29 And f u r t h e r : S e n t e n c e s p r o c e e d i n g f r o m my own u n c o n s c i o u s some-t i m e s b r e a k i n upon my t r a i n o f t h o u g h t i n j u s t t h i s i n t r u s i v e way. I t i s t r u e t h a t t h e y u s u a l l y p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s t o my mind i n t h e f o r m o f v e r b a l images. But o c c a s i o n a l l y t h e y a r e a c t u a l l y u t t e r e d i n a u d i b l e w h i s p e r s , and sometimes t h e y a r e u t t e r e d a l o u d . How can I t e l l t h a t t h e s e same u n c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s e s i n m y s e l f may n o t sometimes c a u s e a f o r -e i g n body t o u t t e r s u c h i n t r u s i v e n o i s e s ? T h e i r i n t r u s i v e c h a r a c t e r i s no b a r t o t h e i r u n c o n s c i o u s o r i g i n . What we r e q u i r e i s t h a t t h e y s h o u l d s y m b o l i z e s o m e t h i n g w h i c h I d i d n o t b e l i e v e b e f o r e h a n d a t a l l , e v e n u n c o n s c i o u s l y . 5 P r i c e ' s n o t i o n t h a t t h e i n t r u s i o n o f u t t e r a n c e s I h e a r and u n d e r s t a n d does n o t p r e c l u d e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t I have somehow c a u s e d them, seems t o me t o be c h a l l e n g e a b l e . F o r one t h i n g , i t i s n o t j u s t by i n s p e c t i n g (1) c e r t a i n b e l i e f s I have and (2) n o i s e s r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h o s e b e l i e f s , e.g., s a y i n g "Today i s S a t u r d a y " , a f t e r c o n v i n c i n g m y s e l f t h a t i t i s S a t u r d a y , t h a t I l e a r n (by s u c h e x p e r i e n c e s ) t h a t I c a n i n d u c e my body t o u t t e r s y m b o l i c n o i s e s . I t seems, r a t h e r , t h a t I c a n have b e l i e f s o n l y a f t e r I l e a r n t o u t t e r s y m b o l i c n o i s e s . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e seems t o me t o be a muddle i n v o l -v e d i n t h i n k i n g t h a t a n i n t r u s i v e u t t e r a n c e f r o m one's own ' u n c o n s c i o u s ' i s e v e r t h o u g h t by t h e s p e a k e r t o be f o r e i g n . I do n o t r e f e r t o mediums, who p r o b a b l y would s a y some o f t h e i r u t t e r a n c e s do n o t r e a l l y b e l o n g t o them. I r e f e r t o t h o s e o c c a s i o n s when I s u d d e n l y s a y s o m e t h i n g o r t h i n k o f Op. c i t . , pp. 4 3 1 - 4 3 2 . 30 s o m e t h i n g w h i c h has no r e l e v a n c e t o what I am d o i n g a t t h e moment and a l s o t i m e s when I s a y s o m e t h i n g I a l w a y s b e l i e v e d h u t was n o t t h i n k i n g o f a t t h e moment. P a r t o f t h e s t r a n g e -n e s s o f s u c h phenomena i s t h a t I am c l e a r l y t h e owner o f t h e u t t e r a n c e . Not o n l y mediums, b u t a l s o l e c t u r e r s sometimes s a y t h i n g s u n c o n s c i o u s l y b e l i e v e d by t h e h e a r e r . Would i t n o t be a d i s t o r t i o n o f c r i t e r i a t o s a y t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n u s e h i s r e a l i z a t i o n o f what he always, u n c o n s c i o u s l y b e l i e v e d as a c r i t e r i o n o f t h e o w n e r s h i p o f t h e l e c t u r e r ' s u t t e r a n c e s ? The f a c t i s t h a t a c r i t e r i o n i s r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e . U n l e s s a p e r s o n i s a c t i n g , o r a p a r r o t m i m i c k i n g , and r e l a t e d c a s e s , t h e one who s p e a k s i s t h e one who does t h e t h i n g s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e i n t e l l i g i b l e u t t e r a n c e . 2. P r i c e ' s argument depends g r e a t l y upon i n t r o s p e c t i o n . F o l l o w i n g P r i c e : I d i s c o v e r t h a t symbols s t a n d f o r t h i n g s by i n t r o s p e c t i n g t h a t t h a t i s t h e way I u s e them, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a c t s o f t h i n k i n g . Thus e n a b l e d t o r e c o g n i z e symbols I c a n i n f e r t h a t o t h e r s y m b o l - i n v o l v e d m e n t a l a c t s o c c u r when I f i n d t h e f a m i l i a r s ounds, f i g u r e s , e t c . , coming f r o m somewhere e l s e . I n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , i n t r o s p e c t i o n s u p p l i e s t h e c r i t e r i o n f o r d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r t h e o t h e r man t h i n k s . Not t h a t one i n t r o s p e c t s t h e o t h e r ' s t h o u g h t s , b u t t h e d e c i d e r knows by i n t r o s p e c t i o n t h a t a k e y way o f u s i n g symbols i s as 31 an instrument to a mental act. The decider spies the physi-c a l occurrence of symbols and reasons that they follow or are included i n a mental act not h i s . His own case supplies the certainty which lends the probability to the hypothesis that the other i n d i v i d u a l thinks. One way of challenging t h i s argument i s to point out that we don't learn that symbols stand for things by i n t r o -specting that we use symbols to stand for things. Neither i s the notice' we take of our own mental acts and states a way of learning the names of mental acts (thinking) and states (pains, fea r s ) . Rather, we are taught the use of words and the various symbols of ordinary language. This commonplace observation shatters Price's r e l i -ance on what may be called his own case. For the observation shows that others are already included i n the process of learning to use the word "thinking". As children, we learned that when someone pinched us the r e s u l t i n g sensation i s call e d 'pain' by English speak-ing persons. Let us imagine the following highly simplified teaching s i t u a t i o n . The pupils, who are children, already ^The term 'knowing from one's own case' i s used by Norman Malcolm, i n "Knowledge of Other Minds", Journal of Philosophy. LV (1958), 969-978. Malcolm c r i t i c i z e s analogical arguments for the existence of other minds i n general and the one used by Price i n "Our Evidence f o r the Existence of Other Minds" i n p a r t i c u l a r . Wittgenstein's use of the term can be found i n Philosophical Investigations, pars. 293 and 295. 32 have some f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h e l a n g u a g e . Today, t h e y must l e a r n what ' p a i n ' means. The t e a c h e r goes o v e r t o one c h i l d and p i n c h e s h i s arm, s a y i n g : "What y o u j u s t f e l t i s c a l l e d ' p a i n ' . " The t e a c h e r does t h e same t h i n g w i t h t h e o t h e r c h i l d r e n . I d e a l l y , now e v e r y o n e i n t h e c l a s s r o o m knows what p a i n i s , t h o u g h t h e c h i l d r e n a r e n o t y e t kno w l e d g e a b l e , a b o u t t h e g r e a t v a r i e t y o f ways o f e m p l o y i n g t h e word. A b r i g h t c h i l d ( o r a d u l l one) might a s k : "How do I know what I f e l t when y o u p i n c h e d my arm i s t h e same f e e l i n g t h e o t h e r s f e l t when y o u p i n c h e d t h e i r arms?" The t e a c h e r may r e p l y , w i t h a n o t e o f i r r i t a t i o n i n h i s v o i c e , " I have j u s t b e en s h o w i n g y o u a f u n d a m e n t a l way o f u s i n g ' p a i n ' . What y o u f e l t , u n d e r t h e same c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f arm p i n c h i n g , i s t h e s o r t o f t h i n g t h e o t h e r s f e l t . I f y o u want t o s p e a k E n g l i s h y o u must a b i d e by t h a t r u l e . " The c h i l d m i g h t s e t t l e b a c k and wonder a b o u t t h e t e a c h e r ' s dogmatism. L a t e r he w i l l f i n d t h a t i f he wants t o be u n d e r s t o o d , he must a b i d e by t h e r u l e . A n o t h e r r e a c t i o n o f t h e t e a c h e r m i g h t be t o s a y : " E x c e l l e n t , Tommie, y o u were a b l e t o a s k t h a t q u e s t i o n b e c a u s e y o u n o t i c e d t h a t I t o l d t h e o t h e r s t o c a l l what t h e y f e l t when I p i n c h e d t h e i r arms what I t o l d y o u t o c a l l when I p i n c h e d y o u r arm. And y o u o b s e r v e d t h a t y o u d i d n o t f e e l a n y t h i n g when I p i n c h e d t h e i r arms, i n p a r t i c u l a r , y o u d i d n o t f e e l what I t a u g h t y o u t o c a l l ' p a i n ' . W e l l , y o u s e e , t h a t ' s t h e way i t i s w i t h t h e word ' p a i n 1 . P a r t o f i t s mean-33 i n g i s that you can't f e e l someone el s e ' s pain. F i n a l l y , to c l e a r up the question you asked, apparently you forgot t h a t , i n a d d i t i o n to t e l l i n g you to c a l l what you f e l t 'pain', I a l s o s a i d that you must c a l l what they f e l t 'pain'. So you see, knowing what Johnnie f e l t , as knowing what you f e l t , i s i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d to my teaching you and the others what to name what you and they f e l t . " The way t h i s approach challenges i n t r o s p e c t i o n i n the s p e c i a l case i n which P r i c e makes use of the n o t i o n , i . e . , as being the way we f i n d out what ' t h i n k i n g ' means and, indeed, that any symbol means, i s that the new view r e c a l l s the f a c t that other people have already taken part i n the fundamental stages of l e a r n i n g what t h i n k i n g i s . That i s to say, they have played a basic part i n the l e a r n i n g of the use of the word. I t i s a presupposition of the classroom, a l s o , that the teacher i s f a m i l i a r w i t h the subject which he teaches. O r d i n a r i l y , the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a mental act or s t a t e has been aided by teaching. 3. Perhaps the motive behind P r i c e ' s reference to un-conscious b e l i e v i n g s as being a source of doubt about the ownership of f o r e i g n utterances, r a t h e r than to the t r a d i t i o n -a l s c e p t i c a l s o l i p s i s t p o s i t i o n i s that he wanted to frame the other minds problem i n terms of matters of f a c t . He may 34 have thought that nothing s t r i c t l y counts as a s o l i p s i s t i c experience but there are cases of suddenly being invaded by utterances from one's unconscious. This gives us reason to suspect that a l l sentences we meet with may be of our own doing. In t h i s way, Price imagines that the philosophical problem of the existence of other minds i s a matter of fact problem. That he thinks i t i s a matter of fact problem i s shown where he discusses the im p o s s i b i l i t y of demonstrating that there are other minds. He says: " . . . i n the sphere 7 of matters of fact i t i s a mistake to expect demonstration." No doubt there i s an important sense i n which doubts about other minds enter into f a c t u a l situations. A physician might not be sure as to whether his patient f e e l s pain aft e r an i n j e c t i o n . Or a psyc h i a t r i s t might be i n the position of tr y i n g to argue a paranoiac out of believing that he, the para-noiac, was behind every i n t e l l i g i b l e utterance he hears. For that matter, there are f a c t u a l situations where people say-, without any hesitation, that they know perfectly well the mind, of another. Sometimes g i r l s say t h i s about boy friends. But there i s something d e f i n i t e l y odd or incoherent about deriving scepticism about the existence of other minds from uses of language. Price both derives his scepticism about other minds from the employment of language and obtains Price, op. c i t . , p. 430. 35 h i s reasons f o r b e l i e v i n g i n them from the employment of language. The oddity of a l l t h i s i s that language already contains symbols or a conceptual scheme which makes r e f e r -ence to or i n d i c a t e s language users other than myself; and i n such a way that ordinary sentences, to a great extent, depend f o r t h e i r sense on such a conceptual scheme f u n c t i o n -i n g . C u r i o s i t y about t h i s scheme, i t seems to me, i s not so much f a c t u a l as t e r m i n o l o g i c a l . I t i s l i k e wondering about the r u l e s of a game as against watching the play of a game. The inadequacy of P r i c e ' s paper l i e s i n i t s f a i l -ure to come to g r i p s w i t h these t e r m i n o l o g i c a l matters, e.g., the scheme of personal pronouns which makes the statement of h i s problem, as w e l l as i t s a l l e g e d s o l u t i o n , p o s s i b l e . Nevertheless, "Our Evidence f o r the Existence of Other Minds" has great appeal as a valuable propaedeutic f o r the study of the r e l a t i o n between the n o t i o n of s o l i p s i s m and that employ-ment of language which i s c a l l e d 'speaking w i t h others'. P r i c e ' s paper serves to r e v e a l a new s t a r t i n g p o i n t . Part I I I of t h i s t h e s i s w i l l attempt to examine the r e l a t i o n -ship between the concept of speech and the i n d i v i d u a l s who can do the things required f o r speaking. I explore what P r i c e f a t a l l y neglected and that i s the terminology involved i n saying that someone s a i d something. Part I I I i s therefore a study of the frame, or aspects of the frame, i n which both P r i c e ' s problem and s o l u t i o n appear. 36 PART I I I Did ever man, Meletus, b e l i e v e i n the existence of human things and not of human beings? . . . Did ever man b e l i e v e i n horsemanship and not i n horses? No, my f r i e n d ; I w i l l answer to you and to. the court, as you refuse to answer f o r y o u r s e l f . There i s no man who ever d i d . (Apology, 27)1 " I f you can discuss the other minds problem, or any-t h i n g else f o r that matter, the problem e x i s t s only to solve i t s e l f . " Such a remark has something i n common with Descartes' cogito ergo sum. Descartes' dictum i s enforced by the f a c t that people do tend to speak as though t h i n k i n g i s something that e x i s t e n t 'conscious beings do. I t i s equal l y true that most people tend to speak as though i n t e l l i g i b l e , overt u t t e r -ances, such as occur during a d i s c u s s i o n , are things produced by e x i s t e n t conscious beings. In r e p l y to a question l i k e , "Do you t h i n k John has a mind?", i t i s not unusual to hear, "Of course I do, I've j u s t been speaking w i t h him." So usual i s that kind of r e a c t i o n that many people are shocked at the blindness of a man who says he e n t e r t a i n s s o l i p s i s m or who "^ The Dialogues, of P l a t o , t r a n s . B. Jowett (New York: Random House), I , p. 410. 37 merely dislodges h i m s e l f from the apparent c e r t a i n t y of the common r e p l y noted above. The common r e p l y suggests a parody of Descartes' dictum: we speak, therefore we are. In t h i s part I intend to discuss the idea that a p l u r a l i t y of d i f f e r e n t speakers i s a necessary feature of the concept of speech. I take t h i s view to mean that i f anything i s c o r r e c t l y c a l l e d speech then more than one user of the language of that act of speech must e x i s t at the time of the utterance or before i t or a f t e r i t , and i f not i n f a c t , then i n p r i n c i p l e , llo one would dispute that a d i s c u s s i o n i s made up of a number of separate acts of speech. What i s d i s p u t -able i s to say that an i n d i v i d u a l act of speech presupposes other speakers, not only i n the r o l e of l i s t e n e r s or under-standers but a l s o as p o t e n t i a l speakers. I t h i n k there i s a way of showing that an i n d i v i d u a l act of speech presupposes, or, r a t h e r , r e q u i r e s f o r i t s status as an act of speech, that there be other speakers. The way can be suggested by l o o k i n g at how c e r t a i n games are named. I f John t o l d B i l l that he played tennis the other day, and i f John used the word 'tennis' c o r r e c t l y , then B i l l knows that an a c t i v i t y occurred i n which more than one person took p a r t . This i s something that B i l l might have learned from observations of previous tennis tournaments (these inform him of the o f f i c i a l use of ' t e n n i s ' ) . But he need not have learned the meaning of the word by witn e s s i n g tennis 38 games. I t i s enough to read a tennis r u l e book. The permis-s i b l e number of players ( j u s t as l i t t l e white b a l l s , r a c k e t s , white l i n e s , etc.) i s set out by the r u l e s . S i m i l a r l y : the number of p l a y e r s , the f u n c t i o n , approximate shape and the number of pieces, the design of the b o a r d — a r e defined by the r u l e s of the game of chess. Tennis and chess are incon-ceivable without these elements. The games are defined by means of them. I t i s easy to see the n e c e s s i t y f o r more than one player i n t e n n i s . There are r u l e books to which one can r e f e r . The suggestion i s u s e f u l only i f there i s some ki n d of resemblance between speaking and various games. Many games, though not a l l , can be described as rule-bound a c t i v -i t i e s that can be done c o r r e c t l y or i n c o r r e c t l y both at w i l l or by mistake. P l a y i n g these games requires c e r t a i n s k i l l s . A player may know the r u l e s yet not be able, a l l of the time, to f o l l o w them—because he may l a c k the appropriate s k i l l . In a d d i t i o n , a great deal of v a r i a t i o n i s p o s s i b l e , i n the f o l l o w i n g out of the r u l e s . The games may be played badly or w e l l , q u i c k l y or slowly, s t u p i d l y or smartly. There are c e r t a i n techniques or s t y l e s of play. The word 'play' r e f e r s to the movements that can be governed by the r u l e s of the game. There could be an i n f i n i t y of such movements; but there i s no need of an i n f i n i t y of r u l e s to cover each kind of move-ment. Saying things i n t e l l i g i b l y resembles that kind of game •59 a c t i v i t y . Unfortunately, no o f f i c i a l r u l e book f o r speaking i n t e l l i g i b l y e x i s t s . Grammar books give only some of the r u l e s of language. I f Wittgenstein i s r i g h t , there never w i l l be such an o f f i c i a l r u l e book because language i s made up of countless games w i t h i n games. We are concerned w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r form of language c a l l e d speech. Being able to use 'speech' u n h e s i t a t i n g l y , you would t h i n k everything about the word l i e s before us. Perhaps, as Wittgenstein maintained of such words, there i s no general d e f i n i t i o n that would encompass a l l uses of such a general word. Instead, we develop a nose f o r d e t e c t i n g "family resemblances". As i f each event we c a l l 'speech' has something i n common wit h one or more uses of the word but none i n d i v i d u a l l y has anything i n common with a l l other uses of the word, i . e . , except the l a b e l 'speech'. The analogy of f a m i l i e s does point I t h i n k to what we want. The analogy presents a p i c t u r e of parents and o f f -s p r i n g . The o r i g i n a l parents, say Adam and Eve, could not have had a l l human c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . For some of the charac-t e r i s t i c s would be c o n t r a d i c t o r y . Adam and Eve might have been blonde, whereas one of t h e i r o f f s p r i n g might be brunette. Adam and Eve could not have been brunette when they were blonde. New c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are generated by the union of Adam and Eve's o f f s p r i n g . I t i s a kind of i n d u c t i v e p r i n c i p l e that new o f f s p r i n g w i l l have c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that the parents 40 don't have. But the seeker a f t e r what i s common to a f a m i l y of uses of a word may be i n t e r e s t e d not so much i n the f l e x -i b l e , v a r y i n g uses, which are o f f s p r i n g of some vaguely d i s -tant o r i g i n a l parents, as i n the basis of the appearance of the f a m i l i a l resemblances. A p o s s i b i l i t y i s that the place where things can be found to be common throughout a l l uses of the concept of speech i s a c o n d i t i o n (or a set of condi-t i o n s ) which allows acts of speech to take place at a l l . Consider, again, the game of t e n n i s . I f tennis i s to be played there must be creatures capable of running, obeying r u l e s , h o l d i n g r a c k e t s — t h e world must be such that b a l l s bounce—and so on. None of these conditions are mentioned i n tennis r u l e books. Yet the game could not be played unless they were f u l f i l l e d . I t probably would not occur to anyone to invent t e n n i s , even i m a g i n a t i v e l y , i f such m a t e r i a l and pro p e r t i e s of bodies were not a v a i l a b l e . S i m i l a r l y , i t may be that an act of speech could not take place unless there could be a p l u r a l i t y of speakers. I t i s suggested that the r e l a t i o n between c a l l i n g anything speech and the not i o n of a p l u r a l i t y of speakers i s l i k e the r e l a t i o n between c a l l i n g a phenomenon tennis and those f e a t -ures of the world which make the p r a c t i c e of the game p o s s i -b l e . In the absence of r u l e books such as are a v a i l a b l e f o r tennis and chess, only an examination of t y p i c a l u t t e r -41 ances w i l l s u f f i c e to y i e l d m a t e r i a l f o r conclusions on the question of whether an act of speech, i . e . , any i n t e l l i g i b l e l i n g u i s t i c utterance, n e c e s s a r i l y presupposes the existence of other speakers. Any utterance, a use of language, i m p l i e s a user of language. I t i s expedient to look at cases of speech where reference to t h i s user or speaker i s part of the meaning of the sentence. ' I ' i s used mainly to denote the speaker himself. Consider, then, the utterances of the same I-sentence by two d i f f e r e n t speakers. I am standing on a highway wi t h someone el s e (an other body resembling mine) when, upon the appearance of a bus, we both u t t e r , " I see a bus". Let us c a l l my utterance, " ' I see a bus'—A", or j u s t A and the other's utterance " ' I see a bus'—B" or j u s t B. Having seen the bus and knowing E n g l i s h I s a i d " ' I see a bus'—A". No speaker of the E n g l i s h language would associate my seeing of the bus w i t h " ' I see a bus'—B". Why not? Not because I am not seeing the bus, I am. Suppose I do not see a bus or. u t t e r A yet I hear " ' I see a bus'—B". V/hy should I not r e p l y to the hearing of B by saying, "No, I am not"? Suppose a bus does not come i n t o my v i s u a l f i e l d and I hear '•" I see a bus'—B". I would not say, "Yes, I do", e i t h e r aloud or to myself. I might say, " I sup-pose you do because I happen to see i t a l s o . " The reason why I might say the l a t t e r and never "Yes, I do" i s that I must p r a c t i s e a r u l e f o r the use of ' I ' . C e r t a i n l y not because 42 I am aware of h i s v i s u a l sensations which would t e l l me that he sees the bus j u s t as I do. I t i s true that i f I don't see the bus yet hear the other u t t e r B then my v i s u a l sensations, which do not include the seeing of the bus, i n a sense t e l l me that someone else i s seeing a bus. But only i f I know what he means. I know what he means because I p r a c t i s e the r u l e about using ' I ' . The r u l e i s that out of a number of d i f f e r e n t utterances of the sound ' I ' , only my u t t e r i n g of i t r e f e r s to me as the speaker. A f o r e i g n or separate utterance of ' I ' , a noise I do not make, cannot, by the r u l e , i n d i c a t e me as the speaker. The separation of these utterances of ' I ' simply stems from the f a c t that there are various i n d i -v i d u a l s who can and do make the sound. The sounds, and the noise-making i n d i v i d u a l s , are the raw m a t e r i a l s of the language game f o r ' I ' . I t i s not the r u l e which l e g i s l a t e s the separ-a t i o n of the sounds; t h i s i s due to the f a c t s of human phys-i o l o g y . But the meaningful use of ' I ' i s governed by the r u l e . I t a s s e r t s that uses of ' I ' by d i f f e r e n t noise-makers i n d i c a t e each noise-maker separately. P r i m a r i l y , the separ-a t i o n i s a matter of the d i r e c t i o n the sound comes from, i . e . , w ith respect to the p o s i t i o n of my body and the other noise-maker's body. Of course, some of my utterances of ' I ' are quotations of other separate or f o r e i g n u t t e r i n g s as i n : "He s a i d , 'I am going home'". Such cases are r e c o g n i t i o n s of separate utterances of ' I ' . 43 Suppose there were no such r u l e . Then the I's i n A and B would be i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e as f a r as meaning i s con-cerned though they would s t i l l be d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e as separate sounds coming from d i f f e r e n t places. Without the r u l e one would perhaps be struck by the s i m i l a r i t y of the sounds ' I ' and ' I ' and that would be a l l . The question may be asked: suppose my noises, which include ' I ' , are transmitted to a loudspeaker at the other end of the room, then i s t h i s a f o r e i g n use of ' I ' f o r me? Does the r u l e apply to such a case? Indeed, such contrivances are c a l l e d 'speakers'. Does the ' I ' i n d i c a t e the mechanical speaker? A l s o , d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s may be heard on the radi o i n which case the sounds may a l l come from the same d i r e c t i o n . In these cases, a d d i t i o n a l c r i t e r i a f o r the sep-arateness of the sounds would have to be noted, such as, i n the case of the r a d i o , the timbre of the various v o i c e s . In the case of the d i s t a n t loudspeaker, others may discover the ownership of the voice heard by f o l l o w i n g the wires, or per-haps by c u t t i n g them. By a l l appearances, i t i s not unusual f o r people to take a mechanical speaker as l i t e r a l l y a speaker i n the sense of t a k i n g up an a t t i t u d e as before a speaker. Sometimes we look d i r e c t l y at pieces of f u r n i t u r e when we hear i n t e l l i g i b l e speech emitted from them and l i s t e n as we would to a human speaker. But i t would make no sense to say the ' I ' one may hear i n that way i n d i c a t e s the speaking box. 44 I t would b e g i n t o make s e n s e t o s a y t h i s i f t h e s p e a k i n g box answered q u e s t i o n s and commented on t h e h e a r e r ' s a p p e a r a n c e b u t was n o t a t r a n s m i t t e r o f some k i n d . As we have s e e n , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o f i g u r e out r o u g h l y what s o r t o f w o r l d i s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e p l a y i n g o f t e n n i s . Can t h e same t h i n g be done c o n c e r n i n g t h e i n t e l l i -g i b l e u s e o f ' I ' t h a t we have c h o s e n t o examine? O b v i o u s l y a f e a t u r e o f a w o r l d where s u c h a r u l e c a n be p r a c t i s e d i s t h a t a number o f d i f f e r e n t b o d i e s must be a b l e t o mouth t h e sound ' I ' . The meaning o f t h e sound r e q u i r e s t h i s . E v e n i f I c a u s e d t h e u t t e r a n c e " ' I see a b u s ' — B " , i n some m y s t e r i o u s way, n e v e r t h e l e s s t h e ' I ' o f B must s e t out a d i f f e r e n t " s p e a k e r " o t h e r w i s e t h e ' I ' o f A would mean (1) a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g o r (2) mean s o m e t h i n g r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m what i t c u s t o m a r i l y means. E v e n t h e c l a s s i c a l s o l i p s i s t must admit so much o r e l s e he commits a r a d i c a l s o l e c i s m . A s e c o n d f e a t u r e o f t h e w o r l d i n w h i c h t h e r u l e f o r ' I ' c a n be p r a c t i s e d h a s t o do w i t h t h e c o h e r e n t o c c u r -r e n c e o f t h e sound ' I ' . The r u l e f o r ' I ' i s n o t l i k e a law o f n a t u r e . I t i s n o t d e s c r i p t i v e o f c e r t a i n r e g u l a r i t i e s o f o c c u r r e n c e s o f c e r t a i n s o u n d s . I t i s a r u l e a b o u t how t o put t h e n o i s e t o work c o h e r e n t l y ; j u s t as t e n n i s r u l e s t e l l y o u how and a p p r o x i m a t e l y where t o smack a w h i t e b a l l . U s i n g ' I ' i s a n a c t i v i t y t h a t c a n be ' r e f e r e e d ' . T h i s means t h a t t h e u s e r must be a b l e t o c a l l up t h e sound a t w i l l 45 whenever he t h i n k s i t i s the r i g h t time to do so according to the r u l e . In w r i t i n g , a mark replaces the noise. The user must be able to use the marks at w i l l . Things that are ' f i x e d ' , i . e . , incapable of being c a l l e d up at w i l l on the proper occasion according to the r u l e , could not replace noises or marks. Because of t h i s , headaches, i t c h e s , t o o t h -aches or a degree of blood pressure, not u s u a l l y being things that can be c a l l e d up at w i l l , could not replace noises or marks. Gestures can replace them and so could images. But the use of images f o r t h i s purpose would not be ' o f f i c i a l ' because t h e i r use could not be refereed by someone e l s e . The sound ' I ' has no f u n c t i o n of i t s e l f ; l e f t to i t s e l f , i t would occur only a c c i d e n t a l l y and i f at a l l r e g u l a r l y i t would resemble a hiccup. I t gets i t s meaning by being w i l f u l l y mouthed i n accordance w i t h the r u l e f o r ' I ' . I t takes i t s r o l e as a symbol by the d e f i n i t e way i n which i t i s put to work. S t r i c t l y speaking, we don't hear t h i s s i g n i f i c a n t ' I ' . The sound loses i t s wholly a c o u s t i c q u a l i t y when i t becomes a symbol. We say that the symbol i s understood or misunder-stood. S i m i l a r l y , i t can be s a i d that we don't j u s t hear sentences. We understand them or we don't understand them. Complete non-understanding of a sentence recognizes only an a c o u s t i c phenomenon. Suppose the world was such that only one i n d i v i d u a l could speak. That i s to say, only one person could make the 46 necessary noises and combinations of noises at w i l l . Then there would be no need f o r the word ' I 1 . D i f f e r e n t speakers could not be d i s t i n g u i s h e d because i n t h i s world there i s only one speaker. Conceivably, the s o l i t a r y speaker would, say, instead of 11 am hot' or 'I see a bus', something l i k e ' I t i s hot' or 'A bus i s there'. We should ask, why i s n ' t the sensation or the perception enough? Why should he mouth these voluntary n o t i c e s of the sensation and perception? Perhaps, i f he w r i t e s , he wants to keep a record of things he sees and f e e l s at d i f f e r e n t times and places. Or, r a t h e r , we should say that he wants to record things f e l t and seen at d i f f e r e n t times and places. I t would not make sense f o r him to say that he f e l t or had seen anything at a l l . What he 'says' could not be c a l l e d speech, i . e . , he could not take the r o l e of a speaker, since speakers are i n d i c a t e d by reference to other speakers. Because he i s not able to act i n accordance w i t h the r u l e f o r ' I ' (as i n a world where b a l l s do not bounce there could be no tennis games), i t would make no sense f o r him to say that he says anything. Should he u t t e r something l i k e 'pain at two o'clock l a s t F r i d a y at the w e l l ' , there would be no question, f o r him, of who s a i d i t . The utterance could not be addressed to anyone el s e because there i s no other creature capable of understanding i t . Again, you wonder why the creature would make the utterance, or w r i t e i t down, at a l l . Perhaps the 47 act of w r i t i n g i t down resembles the device of b l a z i n g trees so that you know your way around the f o r e s t ; i n the present case, a t h i c k f o r e s t of sensations and perceptions w i t h no ' I ' attached to each sensation or perception. The blaze 'pain at two o'clock l a s t F r i d a y at the w e l l ' may perhaps be used by him as a warning of danger to h i s l i f e . But why wouldn't a simple memory image of the event p a i n - a t - t h e - w e l l do? Because, I suppose, memory images are often f a i n t and also tend to decay. Marks l a s t longer and so are more succes-f u l i n preserving the creature's l i f e . Maybe he discovered that imaging i s a poor memory device and that making complex marks i s a b e t t e r one. A language with no ' I ' i n i t , where nothing i s r e a l l y s a i d i n the sense that i t makes no sense to say there are acts of speech i n i t , then, i s conceivable, though i t i s a fantasy based on our knowledge of the use of language i n t h i s world. I t i s claimed t h a t , from the way we a c t u a l l y use ' I ' , a r u l e can be found which shows c l e a r l y , since we f i n d the r u l e by observing i t s a p p l i c a t i o n , that the concept of speech, i . e . , to say of something that i t i s an act of speech, which i s the same as to say that someone says something, re q u i r e s that there be a p l u r a l i t y of speakers. In making t h i s claim i t was implied that the I - r u l e i s one f o r speakers. These are creatures who can mouth the sound ' I ' at w i l l whenever they fancy i t i s the r i g h t time according to the 48 r u l e . In f a c t , the r u l e helps to set such creatures out from one another. But ' I ' i s not used only as a reference to the speaker. Berkeley, f o r example, s a i d : What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, i s the same wi t h what i s meant by s o u l or s p i r i t u a l substance. 2 However, I doubt very much whether by t h i s sentence Berkeley wanted to deny that ' I ' , as i n the f i r s t two occurrences of i t i n h i s sentence, r e f e r s to the one speaking, the u t t e r e r or w r i t e r of the sentence. He does a f t e r a l l want to say that the u t t e r e r of the sentence, Berkeley h i m s e l f , as w e l l as other u t t e r e r s of other sentences, have souls or are essen-t i a l l y " s p i r i t u a l substances". We understand the g i s t of the sentence when we know the I - r u l e . What he does i s to give an a d d i t i o n a l and secondary reference to ' I ' , namely, that the one speaking i s also a s p i r i t u a l substance. In so doing, t h i s secondary and a d d i t i o n a l reference becomes p a r a s i t i c on the r u l e f o r ' I ' . The r u l e r e q uires a p l u r a l i t y of' speakers and t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s c a r r i e d i n t o the new reference s t a t e d by Berkeley. I t i s as though he has taken hold of an already a v a i l a b l e conceptual g r i d and placed i t on a new f i e l d . In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein t r i e d to show that ' I ' may be used not to r e f e r to any p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g at a l l . The P r i n c i p l e s of Human Knowledge, (La S a l l e : Open Court, 1946), sec. 139, p.116. 49 There are times, he thought, when we use ' I ' i n such a way that i t does not 'point' to the one speaking, i . e . , to the bearer of a proper name, which i s u s u a l l y a reference to a d e f i n i t e and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c set of p h y s i c a l appearances. Such uses of ' I ' are to be found i n utterances which are expressions of mental acts or s t a t e s . " . . . there i s no question", wrote Wittgenstein, , fof re c o g n i z i n g a person when I say 'I have toothache'." He apparently meant to say that the game of p o i n t i n g out an object, as when you r e f e r to i t , i s an a c t i v i t y whereby you consciously choose a p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g (to n o t i c e i t f o r some reason or other) out of a number of d i f f e r e n t things which p o s s i b l y could be noticed i n i t s place. With 'I have toothache', u t t e r e d by me, there i s no question of me re c o g n i z i n g a p a r t i c u l a r person, namely, my-s e l f . The non-pointing or t h i n g l e s s use of ' I ' i s expressed by saying i t i s a subject use. Wittgenstein d i s t i n g u i s h e d between a subject and an object use of ' I ' i n the f o l l o w i n g way: There are two d i f f e r e n t cases i n the use of " I " (or "my") which I might c a l l "the use as object" and "the use as subject". Examples of the f i r s t k ind are these: "My arm i s broken", " I have grown s i x inches", " I have a bump on my forehead", "The wind blows my h a i r about". Examples of the second kind are: " I see so-and-so", "I hear so-and-so", " I t r y to l i f t . my arm", " I think i t w i l l r a i n " , "I have toothache". Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, (Oxford: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1958), pTbT 40p. c i t . , pp.66-67. 50 The f i r s t use of ' I ' , i t s use as object, i s modelled a f t e r the use of a demonstrative phrase l i k e ' t h i s person', where 'person' suggests a d e f i n i t e and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c set of phys-i c a l appearances. Even here, however, Wittgenstein seems to say that by us i n g ' I ' we do not always mean to point to an object, such as the person speaking—any more than when some-one points to the sun he i s not thereby p o i n t i n g both to him-5 s e l f and to the sun. Wittgenstein h i n t s at what he means by the second category of the use of ' I ' by saying that the utterance 'I have toothache' i s something l i k e a moan, not a sentence about a p a r t i c u l a r person ( f o r the u t t e r e r ) as 'I am s i x f e e t t a l l ' would be. The second use of ' I ' i s non-personal, This i s what Wittgenstein meant by saying that 'I have t o o t h -ache' does not replace 'L.W. has toothache'. When I say 'I have a toothache' when I do have a toothache, the utterance takes the place of, or i s l i k e a moan. The moan can't be mistaken. One of the reasons Wittgenstein had, i n the Blue  Book, f o r saying the moan can't be mistaken i s that a moan i s not an end r e s u l t of an observation of a pain, a f t e r r e j e c t -i n g other pointable t h i n g s . He i s c a r e f u l to add that you can point to the place of an ache.^ A p r i m i t i v e expression of emotion such as a moan Op. c i t . , p.67. 6 p . 6 8 . 51 ought to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from an act of speech. An act of speech requires at l e a s t those conditions that have already-been i n d i c a t e d f o r the use of the I - r u l e . These are two i n number and are very prominent and obvious. F i r s t l y , a speaker must be able to mouth the sounds that other speakers can mouth, or be able to t r a n s l a t e them i n t o some other mode of symbols. Secondly, a speaker must be able to mouth these sounds at w i l l according to the conventions that have been e s t a b l i s h e d , i n various ways, by the community of speakers. A moan, i t seems safe to say, s t a r t e d out as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c expression of pain. That i s to say, i t was a kind of i n v o l u n t a r y attachment to severe pains. Then we learned to pretond that we had pains by f a l s e or i n s i n c e r e moanings. Consequently, moans came to stand f o r bad pains. They became signs of pain, whereas before, when the moaning sound was a n a t u r a l , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c expression of pain, i t was at one with,or was a c r i t e r i o n of pain. Moans could now be used f r e e l y . People could understand these uses because of the previous h i s t o r y of moans, i . e . , they were once an i n t e g r a l part of bad pains. What happened i n t h i s n a t u r a l h i s t o r y of moans was that moans came to say something. In t h i s new c a p a c i t y , the conditions which are required f o r an act of speech to take place were f u l f i l l e d . And so instead of saying that sentences l i k e 'I have a toothache' can somehow replace moans, we 52 should say that a moan can replace a sentence l i k e 'I have a toothache'. In which case i t makes sense to say that the moan says something and i s s a i d by someone i n d i c a t e d by the ' I ' , namely, a speaker, who i s a p e c u l i a r s o c i a l being, i . e . , n e c e s s a r i l y one among others. According to the b r i e f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n given of Wittgenstein's a n a l y s i s of the grammar of ' I ' , not every I-sentence i m p l i e s a reference to the speaker, not even to the bare extent t h a t , as I have claimed, i t could be s a i d of every I-sentence (excluding those which are quotations or are sentences about the word 'I') that someone, a speaker, s a i d something. From the point of view that has been taken as a r e s u l t of the a n a l y s i s of the two d i f f e r e n t utterances of " I see a bus", the Blue Book treatment i s mistaken. The Wittgenstein of the Blue Book would say that the utterance " ' I see a bus'—A" contains a non-personal use of ' I ' . He wants to r i d us of the n o t i o n that there, i s a r e a l , e s s e n t i a l I hidden w i t h i n the body. In t r y i n g to achieve .that aim, he neglected the importance of ' I ' as a sayer, as the l i n g u i s t i c person, the language user. There i s more to being a speaker than j u s t a unique, p r i v a t e person to which much p h i l o s o p h i -c a l d i s c u s s i o n has been devoted concerning i d e n t i t y . Apprec-i a t i o n of t h i s points to the source of Wittgenstein's mistake. He wrongly assumed that 'speaker' and 'person' s i g n i f y roughly the same so r t of t h i n g . But the r o l e of being a speaker has 53 c e r t a i n p e c u l i a r i t i e s which the r o l e of being a person does not have. Being a speaker i s a r o l e i n a kind of game that requires other speakers. I t always makes sense to take i t f o r granted that I-sentences l i k e 'I see a bus', 'I am s i x feet t a l l 1 , 'I have a toothache' s a i d on appropriate occasions i n the l i n g u i s t i c game of saying t h i n g s , i m p l i e s a reference to a p a r t i c u l a r kind of t h i n g , the speaker, a p a r t i c i p a t o r i n the game of which the sentence i s a move. I f I heard the utterance 'I have a headache' coming from under the t a b l e I would be i n c l i n e d to look under the ta b l e f o r a person, recog-n i z a b l e by a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p h y s i c a l appearance. However, my understanding of the utterance, before I looked under the t a b l e , already assured me that someone s a i d something. As yet t h i s someone has only the r o l e of a speaker. This i s s u f f i c i e n t and primary f o r the understanding of the ' I ' i n the sentence. F i n d i n g a person under the t a b l e , I might say, "Oh, i t ' s you who have a headache"—meaning ' t h i s person' w i t h a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p h y s i c a l appearance. Or, I might recog-n i z e a person by the voice alone and t h i s could take the place of l o o k i n g under the t a b l e . Nevertheless, I could have s a i d , "Oh, i t ' s you who have a headache" even i f I d i d not look under the ta b l e or recognize the vo i c e . I t would be strange to say t h i s but not u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . I t i s not u n i n t e l -l i g i b l e because the primary reference of ' I ' i s to the bare speaker. The r o l e of speaker i s something that can be assumed 54 only a f t e r some t r a i n i n g i n the p r a c t i s e of a n a t u r a l l a n g -uage . I t i s t r u e , as Wittgenstein s a i d , that when I say 'I f e e l pain' I do not pick out one person from among others, 7 i . e . , I do not point to a person. Nor need i t be s a i d that I point to the one speaking. The reason f o r t h i s i s that I do not make up the meaning of ' I ' every time I use i t . This has already been done f o r me by the conventions of language. I t i s a t r i v i a l feature of the employment of language that any given b i t of employment implies a user. Does Wit t g e n s t e i n i n the Blue Book mean to say that 'I have toothache', u t t e r e d t r u t h f u l l y , i s not a case of employment of language? He says the utterance i s s i m i l a r to a moan. No doubt a sentence can by hab i t replace a moan. Surely, then, i t ceases t o be a sentence. We can say of i t that nothing has been s a i d . The sentence has been used, but not to say anything. I f i t i s not an act of speech then of course the common r u l e f o r ' I ' does not apply. The concept of speech does not cover moans of that s o r t . Some support f o r what has been s a i d about ' I ' as being always a reference t o , or i n d i c a t i o n of, a p a r t i c u l a r speaker as one among a community of speakers (excluding the s p e c i a l cases of ' I ' already noted) can be gleaned from See Wittgenstein, op. c i t • , p.68. 55 Ryle's explanation of the word ' I ' i n the Concept of Mind. Ryie f e l t i t was necessary to d i s p e l the i l l u s i o n of an I-sub-stance of the so r t Berkeley claimed i s denoted by ' I ' . Ryle's method was to argue that ' I ' i s not the k i n d of word that can be the name of anything. He s a i d that ' I ' i s an 'index word' l i k e 'here' and 'now'. The point i s that these words i n d i c a t e only as long as the p a r t i c u l a r moment during which they are ut t e r e d . The same goes f o r the words 'he', 'you', 'they' and 'we'. Ryie wrote t h a t : ' I ' can i n d i c a t e the p a r t i c u l a r person from whom the noise ' I ' , or the w r i t t e n mark ' I ' , i s s u e s ; 'you' can i n d i c a t e the one person who hears me say 'you', or i t can i n d i c a t e that person, whoever he i s (and there may be several) who reads the 'you' that I w r i t e , or have p r i n t e d . In a l l cases the p h y s i c a l occurrence of an index word i s b o d i l y annexed to what the word i n d i c a t e s . Hence 'you' i s not a queer name that I and others sometimes give you; i t i s an index word which, i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r conversa-t i o n a l s e t t i n g , i n d i c a t e s to you j u s t who i t i s to whom I am addressing my remarks. ' I ' i s not an ext r a name f o r an ex t r a being; i t i n d i c a t e s when I say or w r i t e i t , the same i n d i v i d u a l who can al s o be addressed by the proper name ' G i l b e r t Ryie'. ' I ' i s not an a l i a s f o r ' G i l b e r t Ryie', i t i n d i c a t e s the person whom ' G i l b e r t Ryie' names, when G i l b e r t Ryie uses 'I',° Later on i n the chapter he s a i d : An ' I ' sentence i n d i c a t e s whom i n p a r t i c u l a r i t i s about by being i t s e l f u t t e r e d or w r i t t e n by someone i n p a r t i c u l a r . 9 To these quotations there should be added: G i l b e r t Ryie, The Concept of Mind. (London: Hutchinson, 1949), p.183. 9 p . l 9 7 . 56 ' I ' , i n my use of i t , always i n d i c a t e s me and only i n d i c a t e s me. ^ By 'me', Ryle means 'the person who u t t e r s ' I ' , i . e . , the speaker. Ryle maintained that the 'index words' which are c a l l e d personal pronouns i n d i c a t e or mention persons but, i n a way d i f f e r e n t from the way names do. The index words i n d i -cate only at the time of t h e i r utterance and are dependent on the circumstances at the time of the utterance. He goes on to show, by examples, that they can i n d i c a t e the v a r y i n g r o l e s that persons assume when they t a l k about themselves as w e l l as the r o l e s that other persons are oft e n s a i d to ta,ke, examples of .both cases are, s o u l s , minds, subjects of exper-ience, p r e s i d e n t s , husbands, .automobile d r i v e r s , and so on. But i n no case can the index words be the names of anything, though they can stand i n place of names. From the quotations o f f e r e d , and p a r t i c u l a r l y from the l a s t one, Ryle can be taken to mean that ' I ' has the 'besetting' property of always i n d i c a t i n g me i n whatever r o l e I assume when I use ' I ' . P r i m a r i l y , however, Ryle seems to mean that ' I ' i n d i c a t e s the speaker. He does not want to say that being a speaker i s something d i f f e r e n t from being a person. Indeed, part of h i s purpose i n the Concept of Mind i s to show that each of us i s not a complex of beings. His theory of "higher order a c t i o n s " helps him to argue that Op. c i t . , p. 1 9 8 . 57 p o i n t , i n that the theory explains the d i f f e r e n t senses of index words i n the same sentence. Though I have s a i d that speakers should be d i s t i n -guished from persons, I do not mean to suggest that being a speaker i s to be a d i f f e r e n t e n t i t y a l t o g e t h e r from what i s o r d i n a r i l y meant by being a person; any more than I would say that being a tennis player i s to be a kind of 'extra being'.. What I have been at pains to emphasize i s that ' I ' has an a d d i t i o n a l 'besetting' property which i s no l e s s important than the one noted by Ryle. This a d d i t i o n a l property i s that i t requires a p l u r a l i t y of d i f f e r e n t speakers as a con-d i t i o n of i t s use. A consequence of these two p r o p e r t i e s of the use of ' I ' i s that any act of speech, since any employ-ment of language im p l i e s a user, r e q u i r e s as a c o n d i t i o n of so d e s c r i b i n g something, that there be a number of d i f f e r e n t speakers. An act of speech i s p o s s i b l e because of the f a c t that there are creatures who can do the things necessary f o r speaking. We may r e f e r to these beings as 'persons' and o r d i n a r i l y we do. They are the m a t e r i a l out of which speakers are made. As we have noted, 'Wittgenstein i n the Blue Book had described our tendency to use the word ' I ' (or 'person') i n two d i f f e r e n t senses, an object sense and a subject sense. The object sense r e f e r s to ' t h i s body' and the subject sense has to do w i t h the 'subject or owner of experiences'. 58 W i t t g e n s t e i n seems to have denied that there i s a subject sense of 'person', i . e . , there i s no i n d i v i d u a l mentioned i n a sentence l i k e , 'I have a headache'. Such a view i s an answer, or the beginning of an answer, to the mind-body prob-lem. Does the ambiguity observed by Wittgenstein, which i s a r e f l e c t i o n of the mind-body problem, extend i n t o one's r o l e as a speaker? I submit that i t does not, f o r the f o l l o w i n g reas-ons. A speaker i s one who can t e l l of experiences and give information. T e l l e r s depend ( i n the relevant sense that s e l l e r s depend on buyers) on a u d i t o r s who can understand them. The t e l l e r , sayer, or speaker c o e x i s t s i n a l a r g e r environ-ment of ' t e l l e e s ' and also of other t e l l e r s , since any given t e l l e r can be i d e n t i f i e d as such. A l s o , being able to under-stand a t a l e e n t a i l s that you can t e l l one. Let us imagine a man t e l l i n g a s t o r y about himself to a group of a u d i t o r s . No matter what strange t a l e he t e l l s , whether i t i s about some f a n t a s t i c dream he had or about a face l i f t i n g operation, the s t o r y makes sense r e s p e c t i n g who i t i s that i s the sub-j e c t of the s t o r y because of the p r i o r r e c o g n i t i o n both by himself and by the others, that i t i s the t e l l e r , r i g h t there at that moment, who i s 'being r e f e r r e d t o ' . But the t e l l e r ' s status as a t e l l e r i s due to the p r i o r existence of the ' s o c i a l ' conceptual scheme that has been described. This scheme i s the means whereby we understand what he means by 59 ' I ' i n the course of h i s t e l l i n g the s t o r y — e v e n i f the t a l e i s about an I (a person) roaming about i n i t s own dream. Or, imagine Berkeley s i t t i n g i n a garden and saying to a group of people: "The word ' I ' denotes soul or s p i r i t -u a l substance." Unless the group were made up of very small c h i l d r e n he would not be d e f i n i n g a new word. For a d u l t s , the word already has a meaning describable by saying that i t i s an index word i n d i c a t i n g the speaker. Berkeley i s d e f i n -i n g an old word, r/e could imagine him saying, "I once wrote a book i n which I stated that the word ' I ' denotes s o u l or s p i r i t u a l substance." That statement, i n the given imagin-able context, i l l u s t r a t e s the f a m i l i a r conceptual scheme regarding the use of ' I ' . At the moment of u t t e r i n g the sen-tence, the speaker i s i d e n t i f i a b l e as an i n d i v i d u a l of a c e r t a i n type. A type which i s dependent on h i s being able to speak at a l l . Now imagine a metaphysician saying, a f t e r f i n d i n g that he had no experience of other minds, t h a t : " I alone e x i s t " . That statement, too i s a t e l l i n g . I t i s understand-able as a t e l l i n g . The s t o r y the speaker wants to convey makes sense, again,, because of our conceptual scheme f o r ' I ' . I t i s no use saying that what he wants to say can't be s a i d . I t can be s a i d , by the grace of the r u l e f o r ' I ' . But the point which I want to make i s that the speaker at the time of the utterance does not take part i n the s t o r y he attempts 60 to t e l l by " I alone e x i s t " . Not because t e l l i n g a t a l e i s not l i v i n g i t , but because the t e l l i n g of the t a l e involves those things which are necessary f o r an act of -speech, and t h e i r existence, though they harbour the t e l l i n g of the t a l e , p r o h i b i t the a p p l i c a t i o n of the s t o r y to the p l u r a l i t y of speakers, which includes the s o l i p s i s t i c speaker. I t may be objected that the metaphysician i s using a sense of 1 I ' that i s not u l t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d to h i s r o l e as a speaker. In that case, then, even h i s s t o r y would be u n i n -t e l l i g i b l e , f o r i t would v i o l a t e the basic r u l e s f o r the i n t e l l i g i b l e use of ' I ' . S o l i p s i s m i s therefore speakable as an hypothesis about the speaker, i . e . , one among others. But the idea of s o l i p s i s m c o n t r a d i c t s the conditions of i t s statement. 61 PART IV T h i s c o n c l u d i n g p a r t i s made up o f t h r e e s e c t i o n s . I n t h e f i r s t s e c t i o n I e l a b o r a t e on t h e i d e a t h a t t h e s p e a k e r i s o u t s i d e p r o b l e m s ( s u c h as t h e mind-body p r o b l e m ) w h i c h a r i s e o u t o f p r e d i c a t i n g c e r t a i n t h i n g s o f t h e s p e a k e r . The s e c o n d s e c t i o n c o n t a i n s a summary and r e t r o s p e c t o f P a r t I I I t o g e t h e r w i t h some o f i t s c o n c l u s i o n s . I n t h e t h i r d , a g e n -e r a l i z e d e v a l u a t i o n o f P r i c e ' s p a p e r i s made f o l l o w i n g t h e l i n e s o f t h o u g h t o f p a r t I I I . 1. To t i e up t h e r e a s o n s why I s a y t h a t t h e s p e a k e r i s o u t s i d e the mind-body p r o b l e m (as e x p r e s s e d by t h e two s e n s e s o f ' I ' ) , I s h a l l s a y t h a t when someone s a y s the word ' I ' h a s two u s e s , one f o r t h e body and one f o r t h e mind, t h e n he does t h e v e r y same t h i n g t h a t B e r k e l e y d i d when he s a i d ' I ' d e n o t e s s o u l o r s p i r i t u a l s u b s t a n c e . I d o n ' t mean t h a t t o g e t h e r t h e y m e r e l y draw s e n s e s o f ' I ' o u t o f common u s a g e . R a t h e r , i n b o t h c a s e s , t h e t h i n g t h a t s p e a k s i s , and must be, t a k e n as the r o o t r e f e r e n c e o f ' I ' . The s p e a k e r i s i n d i c a t e d by ' I ' and s o m e t h i n g i s t o l d o f h i s s i t u a t i o n o r t h e manner o f h i s e x i s t e n c e . J u s t a s t h i s f a c t makes 62 Berkeley's explanation of ' I ' understandable, so does i t make the d u a l i s t i c mind-body s t o r y understandable. They are a l l of them 'hypotheses' about the speaker; but saying that ' I ' i n d i c a t e s the speaker derives from a r u l e of language. The al l e g e d m i n d - i n d i c a t i n g use of ' I ' , as i n the sentence 'I understand what you say', has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been thought to mention an u t t e r l y p r i v a t e , u n s o c i a l area. But, metaphoric-a l l y speaking, the r u l e f o r ' I ' shows that ' I ' does not, i n i t s primary sense, harbour a p r i v a t e , i n a c c e s s i b l e - t o - o t h e r s region. Nevertheless the scheme which the r u l e suggests allows us to t a l k of the ' I ' as though i t inhabited such a place. The d i s t i n c t i o n between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e senses of ' I ' i s maintained, or made p o s s i b l e , by usi n g the r u l e f o r ' I ' , i . e . , by u t t e r i n g i n t e l l i g i b l e I-sentences. A l l senses or pseudo-senses of ' I ' that exclude the speaker a l t o g e t h e r are not f a l s e or p o s s i b l y t r u e ; they are s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y according to the r u l e which a r i s e s out of the customary usage of " I ' . There are, t h e r e f o r e , two senses of 'sense' to be found i n the phrase "senses of ' I ' " . These two senses are d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e as f o l l o w s : (1) o r i g i n a l speaker sense and (2) senses which are dependent upon or get t h e i r ' l i f e ' from (1). I f the speaker i s outside the mind-body problem, i t f o l l o w s that he i s outside the 'other minds problem 1 as w e l l . This may help to e x p l a i n our p e r s i s t e n t tendency to 63 r e g a r d the t a l k of s o l i p s i s m as absurd. The f e e l i n g of i t s a b s u r d i t y i n c l i n e s us t o say 'we speak, t h e r e f o r e we a r e ' . We tend t o t h i n k t h a t i f t h e r e i s no sense i n d o u b t i n g t h a t the w o r l d i s peopled w i t h speakers t h e n t h e r e i s no p o i n t i n the doubts about o t h e r minds. However, the o t h e r minds prob-lem, the mind-body problem, and B e r k e l e y ' s d e n o t a t i o n of ' I ' are i n t e l l i g i b l e . The r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s t h a t the speaker, as speaker, i s e a s i l y r e c o g n i z a b l e and u n m y s t e r i o u s and he i s the f o u n t a i n , so t o speak, of these problems and dependent senses o f ' I ' . • With r e g a r d t o the o t h e r minds problem, f o r example, i t i s not the speaker whose e x i s t e n c e i s put i n t o q u e s t i o n . I t i s h i s p l a y i n g o f the game of s p e a k i n g t h a t makes the problem p o s s i b l e . The answer, t h e n , 'we speak, t h e r e f o r e we a r e ' i s not n e c e s s a r i l y a c o r r e c t s o l u t i o n of the o t h e r minds problem. I t can of course be g i v e n as a s o l -u t i o n on the grounds t h a t s p e a k i n g i s a k i n d of mental a c t . No doubt the word ' o u t s i d e ' , as i t has been used h e r e , c o n t a i n s v a r i o u s h i d d e n assumptions. I t i s , of c o u r s e , a metaphor. The use o f the metaphor has been i l l u s t r a t e d by s a y i n g t h a t the t e l l e r of an h i s t o r i c a l a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l episode i s o u t s i d e of the s i t u a t i o n i n which he t e l l s o f the e p i s o d e , i . e . , he i s p i c t u r e d i n a d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n , i n a d i f f e r e n t p l a c e . The s i t u a t i o n of the t e l l i n g i s s p a t i a l l y and t e m p o r a l l y d i f f e r e n t from the episode which i s t o l d . From the p o i n t of v i e w of the e p i s o d e , the p r e s e n t 64 speaker, .the t e l l e r of the episode, i s not i n the episode's bounds. But the speaker, by h i s speaking, has drawn the bounds of the s t o r y . There i s no other way the s t o r y can be t o l d . I have made the l a r g e r and equal l y obvious c l a i m that the speaker i s always n e c e s s a r i l y outside what i s t o l d . In the same way, i t seems that the sounds he mouths are outside what these sounds mean. This f a c t o r of n e c e s s i t y i s not only a temporal one. I t springs from what i s required to play the game of speaking. 2. The d i s c u s s i o n i n part I I I began w i t h the aim of exp l o r i n g the concept of speech and i t s r e l a t i o n to a p l u r -a l i t y of speakers. A sample speech s i t u a t i o n was taken to see i f a r u l e could be found concerning the symbol which i n d i c a t e s the speaker. Fol l o w i n g the suggestion that from the r u l e s of a game such as tennis one could determine cer-t a i n features of the world that would make the p r a c t i c e of the game p o s s i b l e , i t was found that there are at l e a s t two world-features necessary f o r the p r a c t i c e of the r u l e which was e l i c i t e d from the sample speech s i t u a t i o n . Those, i t was claimed, are (1) a p l u r a l i t y of speakers and (2) creatures who could u t t e r sounds at w i l l . To be t r u t h f u l , i t seemed to me that an odd jump was taken from t a l k about the concept of speech to t a l k about 65 ' I 1 , a symbol f o r the speaker. Nevertheless, i t seemed nec-essary. The explanation f o r t h i s , I b e l i e v e , can be seen by comparing the concept of speech w i t h the concept of exper-ience. I don't t h i n k you can t a l k about the concept of experience without t a l k i n g about experiencers. S i m i l a r l y , t a l k about the concept of speech involves t a l k i n g about speakers. I t so happens that the instruments of speech include symbols f o r the speaker and these are an elemental part of the employment of symbols i n speech. Indeed, speakers are as v i t a l to symbol using as the a c t u a l symbols themselves. I t was not claimed that there are a number of speakers i n the world on the grounds that there i s a r u l e f o r the use of a symbol that i n d i c a t e s d i f f e r e n t speakers. V/hat i s claimed i s that the world i s such that the r u l e can be and i s p r a c t i s e d . The r u l e which d i f f e r e n t i a t e s speakers i s not v i o -l a t e d or contradicted by s o l i p s i s m i f s o l i p s i s m i s taken as an hypothesis about a p a r t i c u l a r speaker. What i s f a l s i f i e d or ignored by such a s o l i p s i s m are those conditions which make the p r a c t i c e of the r u l e p o s s i b l e . The question, "How do you know the r u l e i s p r a c t i s e d ? " , i s not a t e l l i n g one. For the r u l e has been e l i c i t e d from the world, from s i t u a -t i o n s i n the world, as i n the case of the two utterances of " I see a bus". I t i s not an a p r i o r i r u l e . But i t does have l o g i c a l - r u l e - l i k e p r o p e r t i e s . According to the r u l e , I can't 66 say " 11 s a i d x' and 'He s a i d x' mean e x a c t l y the same t h i n g " . The c o n v e n t i o n i s so common and overwhelming t h a t i t i s a s t r a i n t o imagine what i t i s t h a t can't be s a i d , a c c o r d i n g t o the r u l e . I t does not mean " I s a i d what he s a i d " o r even " I s a i d x w i t h h i s v o c a l chords". As f a r as the r u l e goes, " ' I s a i d x' and 'He s a i d x' mean e x a c t l y t h e same t h i n g " i s meaningless or a k i n d o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n . I n the Bl u e Book, W i t t g e n s t e i n m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h a t k i n d of meaninglessness i s analagous t o s a y i n g "'3 x 18 i n c h e s won't go i n t o .3 f e e t ' " . 1 " T h i s " , s a i d W i t t g e n s t e i n , " i s a g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e and s t a t e s 2 a l o g i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y . " W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e f e r e n c e i s t o the sentence " I can't f e e l h i s p a i n " . While i t i s t r u e t h a t our sentence s t a t e s a g r a m m a t i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y , as i t were, I s t i l l t h i n k t h a t t h e r e i s a sense i n which the i m p o s s i b i l -i t y or t h e unu s u a l n e s s of i t a r i s e s out of f e a t u r e s of the w o r l d ; i n t h e sense t h a t the w o r l d submits t o the p r a c t i c e of the r u l e . Indeed, t h a t k i n d of u t i l i z a t i o n of f a c t s i n the w o r l d i s one o f the p r i n c i p a l p o i n t s i t was the t a s k of p a r t I I I of t h i s t h e s i s t o c o n s i d e r . What v a l u e does t h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f the concept o f speech have f o r the problem of o t h e r minds? I t was s a i d t h a t speakers are o u t s i d e the problem. The c o n t r i b u t i o n o f "'"The Bl u e and Brown Books, p. 56. Loc. c i t . 67 the d i s c u s s i o n to the problem i s the attempt to show that whatever the f i n a l a n a l y s i s w i l l be as to what 'having a mind' or 'having sensations and thoughts' c o n s i s t s of, there can be no doubt, I be l i e v e doubt i s incoherent here, that I am a speaker and that being a speaker i s a form of a c t i v i t y which involves other speakers. This i s j u s t as much a rock bottom f a c t as P r i c e ' s a s s e r t i o n that we get new information by means of symbols. The other minds problem comes about by p r e d i c a t i n g c e r t a i n things about speakers, or at l e a s t one p a r t i c u l a r speaker. I mean such things as p r i v a t e sen-sations which only he can know. And from that s t a r t i n g point the other minds s c e p t i c endeavours to search i n t o how he gets knowledge of other people's sensations. I t appears to him that he operates with a true and s p e c i a l sense of ' I ' but i n f a c t i t i s a secondary sense which derives from h i s r o l e as a speaker. 3-In some respects P r i c e , i n "Our Evidence f o r the Existence of Other Minds", de a l t with the conditions of meaningful speech. He s a i d , i n e f f e c t , that the utterance "Look! there i s the bus!" can be explained by assuming that the u t t e r e r i s a l s o a p e r c e i v e r and t h i n k e r . These assump-t i o n s can be viewed as conditions of the meaningful use of Op. c i t . , p. 439. 68 the utterance. At any r a t e , f o r P r i c e , at l e a s t two of the conditions of meaningful speech are the mental acts of per-c e i v i n g and t h i n k i n g . A conclusion of t h i s t h e s i s i s that P r i c e missed an a l l - i m p o r t a n t c o n d i t i o n of the employment of n a t u r a l l a n -guage. I t i s that the world must contain or at l e a s t have contained, a p l u r a l i t y of speakers. That, f o r our language, there must be, and are, creatures who can use noises at w i l l , was vaguely f e l t by P r i c e . He wrote: I t may be objected that one cannot l e a r n to under-stand language unless one already b e l i e v e s (or knows?) that the noises one hears are produced by a mind other than oneself. For i f not, how could i t ever occur to one that those queer noises which one hears are sym-bols at a l l ? Must one not assume from the s t a r t that these noises are intended to stand f o r something?^ P r i c e ' s argument against t h i s can be described, somewhat i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c a l l y , as f o l l o w s : since I do not observe an act of intending an object to be a symbol, I must l e a r n that i t i s so intended by i n t r o s p e c t i n g the use of symbols i n my own t h i n k i n g . The o b j e c t i o n to P r i c e ' s r e l i a n c e on i n t r o -s pection has already been discussed i n s e c t i o n 2 of part I I . According to P r i c e , the discovery that symbols mean " . . . begins by n o t i c i n g a c o r r e l a t i o n between a c e r t a i n type of object and a c e r t a i n type of noise, as one might n o t i c e a c o r r e l a t i o n between any two types of e n t i t i e s which are Op. c i t . , p. 439. 69 frequently combined, say, thunder and li g h t n i n g . " Of course one must privately pay attention to the learning of symbols and r e f l e c t i o n w i l l supplement instruc-tion. However, Price did not notice that symbols i n our natural languages are used i n sentences i n such a way that a speaker says something to a hearer, who i s another speaker. What he neglected to notice was that t h i s i s just as much a part of learning to use symbols as learning to recognize the sounds and figures of the symbols themselves. Different speakers are parts of the meaning-atomosphere of the symbols. The language Price describes his learning of i s not a language one speaks. In some respects his language resem-bles what Wittgenstein called a 'private language'. The difference i s that Price t a c i t l y admits that he learns t h i s language, he does not invent i t , nor is i t only about private sensations. The problem of other minds must be seen i n a l i g h t d ifferent from the one i n which i t appears i n Price's "Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds". Part of what I have t r i e d to show i s that though there may indeed be special problems connected with interminable doubts about other ^Op. c i t . , p. 4 3 9 . Philosophical Investigations, German Text and English Translation by G.E.M. Anscombe ( 2 n d ed.; Oxford: B a s i l Blackwell, 1 9 5 8 ) , pars. 2 4 4 - 2 7 0 . 70 people's sensations and s i l e n t thoughts, the problems would not arise i f there was not a p l u r a l i t y of speakers. 71 BIBLIOGRAPHY Berkeley, George. The P r i n c i p l e s of Human Knowledge. La S a l l e : Open Court, 1946. Malcolm, Norman. "Wittgenstein's P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s " , P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, L X I I I (1954), 530-559 "Knowledge of Other Minds", Journal of  Philosophy. LV (1958), 969-978. Moore, G.E. P h i l o s o p h i c a l Studies. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1922. P l a t o . "Apology", The Dialogues of P l a t o , t r a n s . B. Jowett, New York: Random House, I. P r i c e , H.H. "Our Evidence f o r the Existence of Other Minds", Philosophy, X I I I (1938), 425-456. Ryie, G i l b e r t . The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson, 1949. Strawson, Peter. C r i t i c a l Notice of Wittgenstein's P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , Mind, n.s.LXIII (1954), 70-99. Wisdom, John. Other Minds. 2nd imp. Oxford: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1956. W i t t g e n s t e i n , Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Phiiosophicus. 6th imp. London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1955. The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1958. . P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s . German Text and :English T r a n s l a t i o n by G.E.M. Anscombe. ' 2nd ed. i Oxford: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1958. 

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