UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Other minds and the employment of language Anderson, James Joseph 1961

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OTHER MINDS AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF LANGUAGE by  JAMES JOSEPH ANDERSON B.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 1957  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n t h e Department of PHILOSOPHY  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o t h e required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1961  In p r e s e n t i n g the  this thesis i n p a r t i a l fulfilment of  requirements f o r an advanced degree a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f  British  Columbia, I agree t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y  a v a i l a b l e f o r reference  and study.  I f u r t h e r agree t h a t  permission  f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by t h e Head o f my Department o r by h i s It i s understood t h a t f i n a n c i a l gain  copying or p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r  s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n  Department o f PHILOSOPHY The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Vancouver 3, Canada.  Date  representatives.  Columbia,  September 18, 1961.  permission.  ABSTRACT  A c c o r d i n g t o H. H. P r i c e i n "Our  Evidence f o r the  E x i s t e n c e of Other Minds", the b e l i e f i n the e x i s t e n c e of o t h e r minds i s not one t h a t can be s t r i c t l y proven. most t h a t can be o b t a i n e d i n support  The  of the b e l i e f i s good  reasons f o r h o l d i n g i t . P r i c e suggests t h a t the b e s t evidence d e r i v e s from one's u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of language.  An e x p o s i t i o n o f , and  commentary on, P r i c e ' s paper are g i v e n .  a  P r i c e argues t h a t  i f I can v e r i f y a sentence which I hear and which I d i d not u t t e r but which s t a t e s something I was  not i n a p o s i t i o n t o  know, or d i d not at the moment of h e a r i n g b e l i e v e — t h e n  the  u t t e r a n c e stands as good evidence f o r the e x i s t e n c e of an o t h e r mind.  From analogy he argues t h a t s i n c e he uses sym-  b o l s t o r e f e r t o o b j e c t s i n the w o r l d , the f o r e i g n use  of  the same symbols must have o c c u r r e d as a r e s u l t of p e r c e i v i n g and t h i n k i n g on the p a r t of the o t h e r u s e r . f o r e i g n u t t e r a n c e gave o l d i n f o r m a t i o n or was  I f the  a platitude I  a l r e a d y b e l i e v e d , t h e n i t i s not i m p o s s i b l e t h a t the was  hearer  u n c o n s c i o u s l y the cause of the symbolic n o i s e s coming  from t h e o t h e r body.  There a r e , a c c o r d i n g t o P r i c e , f a c t u a l  examples o f i n t r u s i o n s o f words and sentences from one's own 'unconscious'. I n t h e commentary, c r i t i c i s m i s d i r e c t e d a t P r i c e ' s b e l i e f t h a t he l e a r n s t h a t symbols mean by i n t r o s p e c t i n g how he uses them.  A l s o , the n e e d , f o r the purposes o f h i s a r g u -  ment, t o v e r i f y a l l e g e d f o r e i g n u t t e r a n c e s  i s challenged.  This r a i s e s a d i s c u s s i o n o f P r i c e ' s use o f a t h e o r y o f 'unconscious b e l i e v i n g s ' .  I t i s concluded t h a t P r i c e was  b a r k i n g up t h e wrong t r e e i n r e p l a c i n g s o l i p s i s m by t h e poss i b i l i t y o f one's u n c o n s c i o u s a n i m a t i o n o f o t h e r The  suggestion  bodies.  i s put f o r w a r d t h a t r e f e r e n c e t o  the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of language as a means of s e t t l i n g t h e o t h e r minds problem i s inadequate i f i t does n o t t a k e i n t o account t h e scheme of p e r s o n a l pronouns, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e pronoun ' I ' , s i n c e t h e r u l e s g o v e r n i n g t h e i r use are l i k e r u l e s f o r t h e s e p a r a t i n g o f t h i n g s , s i m i l a r t o the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g o f t h i n g s i n the w o r l d  i n o r d e r t o make up a game.  As an attempt t o make up f o r t h e inadequacy ment i o n e d , a study o f a s p e c t s o f t h e concept o f speech i s made i n part I I I .  I t emerges t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a p l u r a l i t y  of speakers i s a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  o f s a y i n g t h a t someone says  something, o r even t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n s say something.  Refer-  ence i s made t o t h e common grammar o f ' I ' . R e l e v a n t passages regarding  ' I ' i n Wittgenstein's iii  The Blue and Brown Books  and R y l e s The Concept of Mind a r e examined. 1  I t i s concluded t h a t the p r i m a r y sense of ' I * r e f e r s t o , or, i n d i c a t e s the speaker, and t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y import a n t senses of " I d e r i v e from t h a t o r i g i n a l sense. 1  The  speaker i s c l a i m e d t o be o u t s i d e the mind-body problem as w e l l as the o t h e r minds problem.  Consequently, though i t i s  p o s s i b l e f o r a speaker t o r e f e r to h i m s e l f i n the s o l i p s i s t i c manner, or t o e n t e r t a i n doubts about the r e a l i t y o f o t h e r people's f e e l i n g s , i t makes no sense f o r him t o imagine t h a t h i s r o l e as a speaker i n a community of speakers t h e r e b y vanishes.  iv  C O N T E N T S  PART I  PART I I  PART I I I  PART IV  AN EXPOSITION OP H.H. PRICE'S "OUR EVIDENCE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER MINDS". COMMENTARY TO "OUR EVIDENCE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER MINDS".  Page 1  22  A STUDY OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE CONCEPT OF SPEECH.  36  CONCLUSIONS.  61  BIBLIOGRAPHY  71  ACKNOWLEDGMENT  I w i s h t o e x p r e s s my indebtedness t o P r o f . D. G-. Brown f o r h i s a d v i c e d u r i n g the p r e p a r a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s and f o r h i s l e c t u r e s c o n c e r n i n g the s e t o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems of which t h i s t h e s i s merely s c r a t c h e s the s u r f a c e .  vi  PART  In Existence called  Minds",  an argument  from  follows  exposition  mention of  i n a paper  of Other  minds.What tive  1938,  the problem.  entitled  H. H.  i n this  put f o r t h  part  of the thesis The f i r s t  reaction  other treatments  call  t h e 'environment'  o f t h e argument.  look  at a short  itemize  various  argument.  o f t h e argument  descriptions  These  that  descriptions  topics„,as - i n t r o s p e c t i o n  and t h e r o l e  mental  the course  a of  acts.  fuller  Following  exposition  the consequences  a whole says  Price  draws  volitional  i s a commentary (A)  We  ought  itself, uses  on v a r i o u s  to build  o f symbols  i t .  points  not, according  1  up h i s  t o such  i n certain I return to some  The e x p o s i t i o n o f what Part  to Price,  as  Price  II of  i n Price's  H . H. P r i c e , " O u r E v i d e n c e f o r t h e E x i s t e n c e M i n d s " , P h i l o s o p h y . X I I I (1938), 425-456. 1  to  together with  language.  I  a quick  I attempt  f o r example,  consideration  and emotive  I do i s t o  after  of the paper,  from  descrip-  other treatments  Then,  argument,  concludes with a b r i e f  about  thesis  of Price's  i s a  or considerations  Price  refer,  he  of other  thing  towards  These  form  what  f o r the existence  paper.  Price's  "Our E v i d e n c e f o r t h e  Price  language  of Price's  very b r i e f l y  I  this  paper  t o expect  o f Other  2  that  strict  able. in  is  of the existence  The c e r t a i n t y  logic  hope  proof  and mathematics  to find  good  which  concerning  reasons  of other  f o l l o w s upon  formal  i s not the sort other  f o rholding  minds.  minds  demonstration  o f t h i n g we  What  the belief  i s avail-  we  that  should  should  there  look f o r  are other  minds. (B) belief and of  Price  d i s t i n g u i s h e s between  and i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  Reality  of Objects  t h e form,  exist?'  'How  the genesis  G. E . M o o r e ,  i n "The N a t u r e  o f P e r c e p t i o n " had said  d o we  come  t o be c o n v i n c e d  are psychological questions  of a  that  that  questions  other  and not p r o p e r l y  minds  matters  p for  philosophy.  philosophical in  question  the existence  tion: to  F o r Moore,  i t seems  believe that  as a p p a r e n t l y  i s 'What  of other  minds?'  possible that there  reasons  o f u s may  minds  versity;  some  children  a r e l e d t o b e l i e v e i n Santa  wonderful  stories  any  no m a t t e r  rate,  when  I first  distinction  about how  have  believed that suggests  absorbed  a mythical hard  that  have  i n which differ  Claus,  person;  both  were  other  ignorance  the  distinc-  people  come  and  per-  i n t h e way  by b e i n g i n my  the  f o r our b e l i e f  i n kind  the b e l i e f  I t r y , I cannot  there  we  To i l l u s t r a t e  t h e ways  are other  f o r Price,  told  case,  at  d i s c o v e r how minds.  or  Price's  as t o g e n e s i s  and  p G. E . M o o r e j P h i l o s o p h i c a l S t u d i e s , ( L o n d o n : Jiegan P a u l , T r e n c h , T r u b n e r , 1922), p p . 34-35. "The N a t u r e a n d R e a l i t y of O b j e c t s o f P e r c e p t i o n " f i r s t appeared i n P r o c e e d i n g s o f  the  Aristotelian  Society,  1905-6.  3  a l l e g e d knowledge as t o g e n e s i s do not m a t t e r , what counts f o r philosophy  i s the p u b l i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the b e l i e f  a r g u a b l e s t a n d a r d s of c o n s i s t e n c y (C)  and  evidence.  P r i c e sees no r e a s o n t o accept an  Intuitive  t h e o r y about o t h e r people's t h o u g h t s , emotions and mental s t a t e s .  By the  by  other  ' I n t u i t i v e Theory' he means a c l u s t e r  of t h e o r i e s whose common element i s the p o s t u l a t i n g of a s p e c i a l way ance".  of knowing which he c a l l s " e x t r o s p e c t i v e  On such a t h e o r y we  acquaint-  can sometimes have d i r e c t access  t o the mental s t a t e s of o t h e r s , l i k e the d i r e c t access by means of i n t r o s p e c t i o n which we have t o our own (D)  mental s t a t e s .  There i s a " p l a u s i b l e but i n c o n c l u s i v e a r g u -  ment" which might l e a d the c r e d u l o u s t o t h i n k t h e r e i s some s p e c i a l way ance.  of knowing d e s c r i b a b l e by e x t r o s p e c t i v e  I n h i s own  acquaint-  words:  . . . u n l e s s t h e r e i s some e x t r o s p e c t i v e a c q u a i n t ance, the b e l i e f s which each one of us h o l d s concerni n g o t h e r minds c o u l d not have the h i g h degree o f , p r o b a b i l i t y which some of them o b v i o u s l y do have. No doubt he meant t o - c o n t r a s t p r o b a b i l i t y w i t h c e r t a i n t y ; t h e n we  can say:  S i s the case, how  u n l e s s i t i s at l e a s t sometimes c e r t a i n t h a t can i t ever be h i g h l y p r o b a b l e t h a t some-  t h i n g i s evidence f o r S? ficulties.  But t h i s r e f o r m u l a t i o n has  What i s the r e l a t i o n between e x t r o - and  s p e c t i v e a c q u a i n t a n c e and P r i c e , op.  c i t . , p.  certainty? 428.  its difintro-  Does he mean t h a t some-  4  times o t h e r people's s t a t e s are as i n c o r r i g i b l e t o me as mine are t o me a l l o f the time?  That i s t o s a y , sometimes I a c t u -  a l l y have o t h e r people's t h o u g h t s , p a i n s , images, e t c . ? i s t h i s a c q u a i n t a n c e an i n f a l l i b l e s e a r c h l i g h t t h a t  Or  ranges  over my mental s t a t e s whenever I w i s h and sometimes over the mental s t a t e s of o t h e r s — a k i n d of o b s e r v i n g mechanism? p a s s i n g , i t s h o u l d be mentioned  In  t h a t John Wisdom, i n Other  Minds, put a q u e s t i o n s i m i l a r t o our r e f o r m u l a t i o n of P r i c e ' s " p l a u s i b l e but i n c o n c l u s i v e argument". p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t many or a l l  While c o n s i d e r i n g the  of our f r i e n d s may  be sad when  t h e y show s i g n s of b e i n g happy, the p o s s i b i l i t y b e i n g t h e r e because i t i s not c e r t a i n they are not sad, Wisdom asks i n a footnote:  "And i f i t i s n ' t ever c e r t a i n how  can i t some-  times be p r o b a b l e t h a t behind A i s a ? " ^ (E)  The s i m p l e B e h a v i o u r i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  o t h e r minds statements i s r e j e c t e d by P r i c e because i t f a i l s to g i v e an adequate  account of one's own mind or mental  states.  My mental s t a t e s have more i n them t h a n o n l y b o d i l y movements. He w r i t e s : . . . what about statements c o n c e r n i n g my own mind: These can be v e r i f i e d o r r e f u t e d by i n t r o s p e c t i o n ; so they are not t o be a n a l y s e d i n a p u r e l y B e h a v i o u r i s t i c way. But t h i s l e a v e s us w i t h an i n t o l e r a b l e asymmetry between statements about m y s e l f and s t a t e ments about my n e i g h b o r . I t seems p e r f e c t l y obvious t h a t words l i k e 'hear', 'see', ' f e a r ' , ' t h i n k ' , have John Wisdom. Other Minds, (2nd imp.; O x f o r d : B l a c k w e l l , 1956), p. 6.  Basil  5  e x a c t l y t h e same meaning when I a p p l y them t o my . n e i g h b o r as when I a p p l y them t o myself.^Having p o i n t e d t o a s p e c t s of t h e environment o f P r i c e ' s main argument, we can now c a r r y on w i t h t h a t argument. We a r e g i v e n m a t e r i a l t o be used as evidence f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e of  o t h e r minds.  This m a t e r i a l c o n s i s t s of v a r i o u s utterances  t h a t people make i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  The f i r s t one o f  these i s r o u g h l y a paradigm f o r a l l t h e o t h e r s . ing  a t a bus s t o p when someone s a y s , "Looki t h e r e i s t h e  busi" of  We a r e w a i t -  I l o o k around and see t h a t i t i s a p p r o a c h i n g .  t h i n g s have happened i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n :  A number  (1) I heard some  n o i s e s (2) took them as b e i n g words (3) understood what was • s a i d (4) v e r i f i e d t h e t r u t h o f what was s a i d (5) g a i n e d some t r u e i n f o r m a t i o n , s i n c e I d i d n o t know t h e bus was a p p r o a c h i n g . I f I made a game o f w a i t i n g a t bus s t o p s t o encourage  this  s i t u a t i o n and found t h a t i t o f t e n does happen, I would have evidence t h a t those u t t e r a n c e s p r o c e e d i n g from o t h e r b o d i e s were due i n p a r t , a t l e a s t , t o t h e i r h a v i n g o f mental events s i m i l a r t o my own p e r c e i v i n g s of t h e a p p r o a c h i n g buses.  At  any r a t e , t h e s i t u a t i o n g i v e s us a k i n d of corpus d e l e c t i , the p r o o f t h a t a crime has been done.  The a s c r i p t i o n o f t h e  mental s t a t e o f p e r c e i v i n g t o t h e u t t e r e r s o f t h e n o i s e s i s 5  P r i c e , op. c i t . . . pp. 428-429. A l l s u c c e e d i n g pages r e f e r ences i n t h i s p a r t of the t h e s i s w i l l r e f e r t o P r i c e ' s paper. 6  p . 430.  6  a s o l u t i o n o f t h e crime, t h e c r i m i n a l i s apprehended by e x p l a i n i n g t h e mystery of ' g e t t i n g new i n f o r m a t i o n ' .  The  newer t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s , t h e deeper t h e m y s t e r y w i l l be. For i f t h e s i t u a t i o n j u s t g i v e s you i n f o r m a t i o n you a l r e a d y have, i t i s n o t i m p o s s i b l e t h a t i n some way you 'caused' t h e apparently i n t r u s i v e utterance.  But y o u c o u l d n o t have  'caused' t h e u t t e r a n c e i f you d i d not have t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n the f i r s t  place. "Look] t h e r e i s t h e bus!" l i k e  "There a r e snakes i n 7  the t e a p o t " can be c a l l e d i n f o r m a t i v e s i n g u l a r p r o p o s i t i o n s . But good evidence can be o b t a i n e d from i n f o r m a t i v e g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s a l s o , i . e . , ones w h i c h i n v o l v e a c t s o f t h i n k i n g , e.g., "some c a t s have no t a i l s " , " a l l g o l d d i s s o l v e s i n aqua 8  regia".  These a r e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s from a number o f s i n g l e  perceptual acts (or singular propositions).  They can be con-  firmed, i f not v e r i f i e d . It follows f o r Price that p l a t i t u d e s already believed by t h e h e a r e r would not be v e r y good evidence f o r t h e e x i s t ence o f o t h e r minds.  Statements l i k e ,  " A l l c a t s have w h i s k e r s " ,  "Today i s Saturday",  "2 + 2 = 4" a r e n o t i n f o r m a t i v e i n  the e m p i r i c a l sense found i n "Look! t h e r e i s t h e bus!". He n o t e s , however, t h a t t h e r e a r e " . . .  n o v e l t a u t o l o g i e s as  Q  w e l l as s t a l e ones". 6  p.  430.  7  The h e a r i n g o f n o v e l p l a t i t u d e s c o u l d  p . 433.  8  p . 433.  9  p . 434.  7  be  evidence  f o r foreign acts  mathematical of  new  statements,  entailments Having  a t i o n s ", ly,  since  the  suggests  situations  must  some  understand true or  have  object  or false.  true.  f o r me.  he h a s g i v e n  would  tautologies  and unthought  sort  Price feels  mation, cion own  that  already  being  that  i n some  "Lookl  there  there  the mental  by t h e hearer,  be k e p t  i n mind i f  ( 1 ) The  sounds  I must  either  give  He m e a n s t h a t  symbolize  something  to verify  the utterance  i f the utterance  me to  new  be v e r y  utterances  and s t a l e  As  'new i n f o r m a t i o n '  The  little which  of  we  (a)  novel  information  suspicion of the give  tautologies.  a c t behind  were  information.  and (b) t h e i n t r u s i o n  would  believed,  name-  t o me.  of entailments.  concerning  queer  These  the world  the utterance,  must  two s e n s e s  about  "situ-  i s t o say, t h e sounds  be l i k e  must  or  as evidence,  be a b l e  information  be s u c h  just  ( 2 ) The sounds must I must  intrusion  of utterances  and v e r i f y i n g  or objects  the world  must  than  That  1 0  (3) The u t t e r a n c e seen,  kinds  c o n d i t i o n s must  a r e t o be u s e d  them.  know w h a t  three  understanding, three  an  of  of before.  more i s i n v o l v e d  be s y m b o l i c  symbolize  not thought  that  I n the case  i t i s p o s s i b l e t o have  collected  the hearing,  Price  of thought.  old inforThe s u s p i -  the utterance  i s one's  way.  conditions  are secured  i s the bus." of the f i r s t  i n the utterance, situation.  How  am  I  8  j u s t i f i e d i n b e l i e v i n g that another mind or mental act not own  i s responsbile  f o r the u t t e r a n c e ?  P r i c e ' s answer i s , of  course, the substance of h i s main argument. and  argument are entwined here and  my  But  description  i t i s impossible  to  give  an account of h i s argument without expounding h i s d e s c r i p t i o n s . The  f o l l o w i n g i s an attempt to itemize h i s d e s c r i p t i o n s . (1) There i s something c a l l e d i n t r o s p e c t i o n .  I t i s the  awareness of one's mental s t a t e s and  It i s  independent of mental a c t s  (and  i l l u m i n a t e s or r e v e a l s them. my  perceivings.  acts.  s t a t e s ) i n that i t  Thus I can  That i s to say,  introspect  I can n o t i c e that  perceive  things over and  above the act of  itself.  P e r c e i v i n g i s a type o f " c o g n i t i v e a c t " .  perceiving  " c o g n i t i v e a c t " , f o r P r i c e , seems to be the ness of an  I  A  conscious-  object.  (2) By a mixture of i n t r o s p e c t i o n and that p a r t i c u l a r n o i s e s n i t i v e acts.  perception  I find  o f t e n go w i t h p a r t i c u l a r cog-  The n o i s e s may  be  "audible  or imaged"."^  A meaningful sentence i s a complex of "noises" which go w i t h a corresponding complex of o b j e c t s found i n a cognitive act.  When the n o i s e s ,  "Here i s a  black  c a t " occur, ". . . i t i s u s u a l l y accompanied by s p e c i f i c s o r t of c o g n i t i v e a c t , namely, the 12 and "p.  442  recognizing- of a black p.  cat". 443.  a  seeing  9 (3)  The  conjunction  t e r i s t i c noises,  of c o g n i t i v e acts and  t h e i r charac-  e s t a b l i s h e d i n the language used,  r e s u l t s i n the mental act of t h i n k i n g . P r i c e suspects,  "Thinking",  i s ". . . awareness by means of  13 symbols".  The  occurrence of symbols,  "sensible"  or "imaged", ". . . i s an i n t e g r a l part of t h i n k i n g i t s e l f " B u t  mere accompaniment of noises  (audi-  t o r y or imaged) with c o g n i t i v e acts would not  allow  the noises  sure  to stand as symbols.  P r i c e i s not  whether symbols are an i n t e g r a l part of .perceiving also.  He  says i f they are present i n p e r c e i v i n g  they  would not merely accompany p e r c e i v i n g , they would instrumental (4)  Noises are ways.  to i t .  "instrumental  The h e a r i n g  f o r e i g n born noises  and  t o " c o g n i t i v e acts i n  i s entertained.  two  understanding together of  i s an act of "imposed  This happening i s expressed by saying the  i s that  be  thinking". proposition  What happens i n "imposed t h i n k i n g "  " c o g n i t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n s " 'are awakened i n me  because, i n being a language user, I am that when I hear my  language n o i s e s ,  so t r a i n e d  the ideas  or  images of the o b j e c t s f o r which the words or arrange-  1 3  p.  ment of words stand, are aroused.  Thus I know what  i t would be l i k e f o r the utterance  to be t r u e , i . e . ,  443.  p.  443.  10  correspond w i t h a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i n t h e w o r l d . "Spontaneous t h i n k i n g " , on t h e e t h e r hand, as i t i s expressed, s a y , i n "Look. t h e r e i s t h e bus!" d u r i n g 1  a s i t u a t i o n i n which I am t h e one s e e i n g t h e bus, i s due t o a c o g n i t i v e a c t o f my own. (5) I t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t o have e x p e r i e n c e d t h e p r e c i s e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s s i g n i f i e d by an imposed u t t e r a n c e i n o r d e r t o understand  the utterance.  F o r as l o n g as I  have l e a r n e d t o use t h e same s e p a r a t e  noise-symbols  i n my own a c t s o f "spontaneous t h i n k i n g " , I can form a p i c t u r e o f what t h e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i n t h e w o r l d would be l i k e i f t h e u t t e r a n c e were t r u e . We s h o u l d now be i n a p o s i t i o n t o see how one i s j u s t i f i e d i n b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h e u t t e r a n c e "Lookl t h e r e i s t h e bus I" i s r e l a t e d t o a m e n t a l a c t ( o r a c t s — t h i n k i n g and p e r c e i v i n g ) w h i c h i s n o t an episode i n my b i o g r a p h y .  I have d i s -  covered by i n t r o s p e c t i o n t h a t such sounds occur as media o f a mental a c t , namely, t h e mental a c t of t h i n k i n g .  The sounds  ( a u d i b l e o r imaged) a c t as t h e means by which t h e mental a c t i s accomplished.  T h e r e f o r e i t i s l i k e l y t h a t the f o r e i g n  born n o i s e s a r e s i m i l a r l y r e l a t e d t o a mental a c t n o t my own. Here we s t r i k e t h e bottom o f t h e argument.  P r i c e says:  The form o f the argument i s : s i t u a t i o n s a and b resemble each o t h e r i n r e s p e c t of a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c C ] _ ; s i t u a t i o n a a l s o has the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c C2', t h e r e f o r e s i t u a t i o n b p r o b a b l y has t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c C2 l i k e w i s e . The n o i s e s I am now aware o f c l o s e l y resemble c e r t a i n ones which I have been  11  aware of b e f o r e ( i n t e c h n i c a l p h r a s e o l o g y , they are tokens of the same t y p e ) , and the resemblance covers both t h e i r q u a l i t i e s and t h e i r manner of c o m b i n a t i o n . Those which I was aware of b e f o r e f u n c t i o n e d as symbols i n a c t s o f spontaneous t h i n k i n g . Therefore these p r e s e n t ones p r o b a b l y resemble them i n t h a t r e s p e c t t o o ; they too p r o b a b l y f u n c t i o n as i n s t r u ments t o an a c t o f spontaneous t h i n k i n g , which i n t h i s case i s not my own.-*-5 P r i c e d i s t i n g u i s h e s between the a n a l o g i c a l c h a r a c ter  of t h i s argument and i t s v a l u e as e s t a b l i s h i n g an e x p l a n -  a t i o n ". . . of an o t h e r w i s e m y s t e r i o u s s e t o f occurrences","*" i.e., for  the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y or s y m b o l i c n a t u r e of the n o i s e s  me.  One way  of l o o k i n g a t the h y p o t h e s i s e s t a b l i s h e d by  the a n a l o g i c a l argument i s t o see i t as an e x p l a n a t i o n which he d e s c r i b e s i n the f o l l o w i n g  way:  . . . i f t h e r e i s another mind which uses the same symbols as I do and combines them a c c o r d i n g t o the same p r i n c i p l e s , and i f t h i s mind; has produced these n o i s e s i n the course of an a c t of spontaneous t h i n k i n g : then I can account f o r the occurrence of these n o i s e s , and f o r the f a c t t h a t they are comb i n e d i n one of these m a t h e m a t i c a l l y improbable c o m b i n a t i o n s . When I say these f a c t s are ' e x p l a i n e d ' or 'accounted f o r ' by our h y p o t h e s i s , I mean t h a t i f the h y p o t h e s i s i s t r u e these f a c t s are i n s t a n c e s of a r u l e which i s a l r e a d y known t o h o l d good i n a l a r g e number of i n s t a n c e s . The r u l e i s , t h a t symboli c a l l y - f u n c t i o n i n g combinations are produced i n the course of a c t s of spontaneous t h i n k i n g ; and the i n s t a n c e s i n which i t i s a l r e a d y known' t o h o l d good have been p r e s e n t e d t o me by introspection.-'-' He adds t h a t the h y p o t h e s i s i s c o n c e i v a b l e and v e r i f i a b l e i n the weak sense, t h a t i s t o say, i t has e x p l a n a t o r y power because we know what the w o r l d would be l i k e i f i t were t r u e 1 5  pp.  445-446.  16  p.  446.  1 7  p.  446.  12  and we know what k i n d of evidence w i l l support the h y p o t h e s i s . The argument i s designed t o j u s t i f y our b e l i e f i n the e x i s t e n c e of other minds.  But P r i c e has been  concerned  mainly w i t h mental a c t s which somehow i n v o l v e symbols.  What  he has t r i e d to e s t a b l i s h i s the e x i s t e n c e of language u s e r s . He nowhere suggests that when we speak of other minds we r e f e r only t o symbol-involved mental a c t s .  Nevertheless, the argu-  ment i s r e s t r i c t e d to mental a c t s which  involve'symbols.  That he i s d e f i n i t e i n s a y i n g that only an argument from the use of symbols w i l l give us reasons f o r b e l i e v i n g i n the e x i s tence of other minds can be seen i n the f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n , " I f I never understood  any of the n o i s e s or marks which I .  hear or see, I should have no evidence f o r the e x i s t e n c e o f 18 other minds". evidence  He means that i n terms of the argument, no  can be obtained i f I do not understand  n o i s e s or marks . . . I hear or see". f e r e n t kinds of evidence.  He admits  "any of the  But there may be d i f that i n the case of  animals, u n l e s s they use symbols we can understand, dence would have to be d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d . He s a i d : The suggestion I wish to examine i s that one's evidence f o r the e x i s t e n c e of other minds i s d e r i v e d p r i m a r i l y from the understanding o f language. " And a l s o : I am concerned  simply w i t h an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p. 429.  the e v i -  13  problem: how the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of language g i v e s each o f us r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e i n t h e e x i s t e n c e of other minds. ^ 2  U n d e r s t a n d i n g a symbol, f o r P r i c e , e n t a i l s t h a t something i s common between t h e speaker and-the h e a r e r and t h i s i s the o b j e c t f o r which the symbol s t a n d s .  Without a  w o r l d o f o b j e c t s common t o speaker and h e a r e r , t h e e x i s t e n c e 21 of symbols would n o t be p o s s i b l e . n a l world.  There must be an e x t e r -  F o r P r i c e , any evidence f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f o t h e r  minds must a l s o be evidence f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e e x t e r n a l 22 world.  There i s y e t another r e s t r i c t i o n due t o t h e n a t u r e  of h i s argument.  Unless i t can be e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t animals  use symbols, we would have no r e a s o n t o suppose t h a t t h e y a r e c o n s c i o u s i n t h e sense i n which we a r e c o n s c i o u s of t h e world.  2 5  P r i c e seems t o mean t h a t we must somehow be a b l e t o converse w i t h an a n i m a l b e f o r e we can o b t a i n good reasons o f the k i n d we have been c o n s i d e r i n g f o r s u p p o s i n g t h a t i t i s conscious.  He does n o t seem t o mean t h a t a l l we need t o  observe i s something t h a t l o o k s l i k e c o n v e r s a t i o n between two animals'.  He seems t o mean we must understand t h e symbols  d i r e c t l y and n o t by o b s e r v i n g c o r r e l a t i o n s between t h e i r sounds o r g e s t u r e s and t h e i r b e h a v i o u r . 20  P r i c e concludes:  I only wish to i n s i s t that i f the lower animals p.429. p . 448. p . 449. p . 449. 2 1  2 2  2 3  14  do not use s y m b o l s — s y m b o l s which we can understand and which convey i n f o r m a t i o n t o u s — t h e n our evidence f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n i m a l minds i s d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d , and n o t merely i n degree, from our evidence f o r human minds.^4 P r i c e does not t h i n k t h e emotive f u n c t i o n o f l a n 25 guage i s r e l e v a n t t o "our p r e s e n t i n q u i r y " .  His project  was t o p o i n t out good reasons f o r b e l i e v i n g i n o t h e r minds and t o argue why t h e y s h o u l d be t a k e n as good r e a s o n s . makes t h e evidence he p r e s e n t s v e r y r e l e v a n t t o t h i s  What  project,  a c c o r d i n g t o P r i c e , i s t h a t , i n the case o f i n f o r m a t i v e l a n guage, b o t h speaker and h e a r e r make use of symbols which r e f e r to external world objects.  And these same symbols t a k e 26  p a r t i n mental a c t s o f which t h i n k i n g i s an example. Nevertheless, Price f e l t  t h a t he had t o say some-  t h i n g about v o l i t i o n s and emotions.  I n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of  v o l i t i o n s i t i s n o t i c e a b l e t h a t P r i c e d i s t i n g u i s h e s between (a)  t h e t h e o r e t i c a l f i r s t time an u t t e r a n c e was understood  and (b) t h e subsequent q u i c k o r o r d i n a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . As for to  ( a ) , t h e u t t e r a n c e ( h i s example i s :  "That door has g o t  be shut.' " 27) would have been f i r s t  c o n s t r u e d as propounding  a p r o p o s i t i o n , but i n a c o m b i n a t i o n o f words t h a t , as y e t , c o n t a i n s some u n i n t e l l i g i b l e words. P - 449. P . 451. 26  I n the case of h i s exam-  2 4  2 5  See p. 451 on t h e "primacy o f t h e o b j e c t " . 2 7  P.  453.  15  p i e these u n i n t e l l i g i b l e words a r e " . . . has got t o be . . .". The i n t e l l i g i b l e ition:  p a r t o f t h e sentence propounds t h i s propos-  "The door i s s h u t " .  not shut.  Suppose I observe t h e door i s  The a l l e g e d p r o p o s i t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e f a l s e .  But  i t does g i v e me a new p i e c e o f i n f o r m a t i o n , and so i t can s t a n d as evidence f o r an o t h e r mind.  Imagine the speaker, o r  perhaps someone e l s e , s h u t t i n g t h e door.  The p r o p o s i t i o n ,  construed out o f a p a r t l y u n i n t e l l i g i b l e sentence, i s now true.  I f t h i s s i t u a t i o n happened o f t e n , I would connect t h e  the u n i n t e l l i g i b l e p a r t o f t h e sentence (and the speaker) w i t h the  changes observed, i . e . , t h e s h u t t i n g of t h e door.  I would  come t o t h i n k t h e u n i n t e l l i g i b l e p a r t o f t h e sentence has something t o do w i t h t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e speaker i n making the  p r o p o s i t i o n t r u e , not t h e a c t i o n s o f g e t t i n g up and s h u t -  t i n g t h e door, but an i n f l u e n c e t h a t somehow m o t i v a t e s the a c t i o n s , some s o r t o f mental a c t of wanting them (the a c t i o n s ) to be done. (b) I n t h e absence o f d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n s o f changes (such as s h u t t i n g d o o r s ) , f u r t h e r u t t e r a n c e s a r e understood by v i r t u e of t h e resemblances among such e x p r e s s i o n s thems e l v e s , t h e i r s t r u c t u r e , t h e tone o f v o i c e i n which they a r e 28 uttered,  o r t h e i r accompanying  gestures.  P r i c e would p e r -  haps say t h a t these resemblances make up t h e 'grammar' o f utterances expressing v o l i t i o n s .  16  I n i t i a l l y , we get evidence t h a t someone i s e n t e r t a i n i n g c e r t a i n thoughts. 'door' and  We have observed t h a t someone used  'be shut' which we understand.  understand 'has got t o ' .  Not y e t do  I n p o s s e s s i o n of t h i s new  we informa-  t i o n from a f o r e i g n mind, we v e r i f y i t i n s o f a r as we  under-  stand the sentence;  Say  the door i s n o t , i n f a c t , shut.  speaker g e t s up and shuts the door. a c c o r d i n g t o P r i c e , we get " . . .  Prom t h i s  the  situation,  evidence of the  occurrence pq  01 a i o r e i g n thought which a f f e c t s the o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . " We get evidence of f o r e i g n v o l i t i o n s by n o t i c i n g i n d i v i d u a l s change the w o r l d , as i t were, t o s u i t t h e i r u t t e r a n c e s . F o r e i g n v o l i t i o n s are d i s c o v e r e d , by means of the understanding  of language, when the v o l i t i o n a l u t t e r a n c e  con-  t a i n s an i n f o r m a t i v e element of the s o r t t h a t has been d i s cussed.  T h i s i n f o r m a t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n a l p a r t of the sentence  must be f a l s e .  By the a c t i o n s of the speaker towards making  the p r o p o s i t i o n t r u e we d i s c o v e r a f o r e i g n v o l i t i o n .  I f we  do n o t , as o r d i n a r i l y we do n o t , observe any changes i n the w o r l d f o l l o w i n g upon the u t t e r a n c e , y e t r e c o g n i z e a v o l i t i o n a l u t t e r a n c e , t h i s can o n l y be because we have o f t e n n o t i c e d v a r i o u s s t r u c t u r a l s i m i l a r i t i e s i n the sentences,  or have  observed c e r t a i n tones of v o i c e , t o be common among the u t t e r i n g s of the sentences on those o c c a s i o n s when we do hear the 2 9  p.  454.  17  u t t e r a n c e and see t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e speaker. P r i c e apparently regards the r e l a t i o n s o f : u t t e r ance, f a l s e p r o p o s i t i o n , a c t i o n o f speaker towards making t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t r u e — a s t h e paradigm case o f w i l l i n g .  F o r he  a s s e r t s t h a t t h e r e would be cases where no speaker a t a l l i s seen, but an u t t e r a n c e i s h e a r d , such as " L e t t h e r e be a 30 thunderstorm]"  I f t h i s i s f o l l o w e d by a thunderstorm,  though we do not see anyone making a thunderstorm, we would have some evidence o f a f o r e i g n v o l i t i o n .  P r i c e ' s treatment  of t h i s p o i n t i s a l l t o o b r i e f and so i t would be u n f a i r t o take i t too l i t e r a l l y .  What he means t o say, I s h o u l d imag-  i n e , i s t h a t i t would occur t o a h e a r e r o f " L e t t h e r e be a thunderstorm.'", who s u b s e q u e n t l y observed a t h u n d e r s t o r m , t h a t t h e r e was a f o r e i g n v o l i t i o n behind t h e u t t e r a n c e .  A  p e c u l i a r m e t e o r o l o g i s t might, i n f a c t , be announcing h i s p r e 31  d i c t i o n i n t h i s odd way through a h i d d e n l o u d s p e a k e r . From P r i c e ' s s t a n d p o i n t , we would have good r e a s o n , a t any r a t e , t o judge t h a t t h e u t t e r a n c e i s i n t h e i m p e r a t i v e mood. With u t t e r a n c e s e x p r e s s i v e o f emotions, P r i c e f i n d s t h a t some t h i n k i n g , as i n t h e case o f p e r c e i v i n g , i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f e v e r y emotion. He w r i t e s : Every emotion i n c l u d e s some t h i n k i n g , and t h i s t h i n k i n g i s not a mere accompaniment, but i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e emotion i n q u e s t i o n .  _____ 31  I owe t h i s p o i n t about t h e m e t e o r o l o g i s t t o P r o f . Brown. 32 D  p.  455.  18  I n o r d e r t o be a f r a i d of something, f o r example, you must be convinced t h a t something or o t h e r i s the case.  I t may  f a l s e b e l i e f as i n the case of f e a r s of imaginary P r i c e ' s way  of s a y i n g t h i s i s t o say t h a t " . . .  be a  dangers. certain 33  o b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l s . . . must be present t o the mind" e l s e you c o u l d not h o l d a b e l i e f t h a t something i s the  case.  P r i c e ' s example of an emotive u t t e r a n c e i s "Oh! snake]"  A  The i n f o r m a t i o n got from t h i s u t t e r a n c e i s t h a t 35 ". . . t h e r e i s a snake i n the immediate neighborhood". 3 4  I n t h i s case t h e r e i s no word or combination of words t h a t i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e ( a t the t h e o r e t i c a l f i r s t h e a r i n g ) as i n the case of v o l i t i o n a l u t t e r a n c e s .  R a t h e r , the p e c u l i a r manner  of s a y i n g the words i s i n q u e s t i o n .  The tone of v o i c e i s  e x p l a i n e d , a c c o r d i n g to P r i c e , by o b s e r v i n g , once a g a i n , " o b j e c t i v e changes" i n the w o r l d .  I c o r r e l a t e the tone  of  v o i c e w i t h the changes t h a t take p l a c e , the r u n n i n g away, the s t r i k i n g at the snake.  Repeated o b s e r v a t i o n s of such  s i t u a t i o n s g i v e the i n d u c t i v e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n t h a t a like  "Oh]  statement  A s n a k e ] " u t t e r e d by someone e l s e i s a type of  " t e n d e n t i o u s thought".  A " t e n d e n t i o u s thought",  says P r i c e , 36  ". , . tends t o change the o b j e c t i v e w o r l d i n c e r t a i n ways." The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t e m o t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s , P r i c e c o n c l u d e s , i s the r e s u l t of c o r r e l a t i n g : 3 3  . . . d i f f e r e n c e s i n tone of v o i c e (and i n g e s t u r e p . 455. p . 455. p . 455. p. 455. 3 4  3 5  3 6  19 or f a c i a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n ) w i t h d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of o b j e c t i v e changes which are l i a b l e t o f o l l o w . 5 7 I t i s f a s c i n a t i n g t o watch P r i c e put emotions and v o l i t i o n s under the wing of mental a c t s which i n v o l v e the of symbols. emotional  The  sentence, or u t t e r a n c e which expresses an  a t t i t u d e i s a tendentious  thought.  The  u t t e r a n c e makes use of " o b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l s " . reason,  use  volitional  P a r t of the  of course, f o r h i s i n s i s t e n c e on t h i s i s t h a t he i s  a f t e r a l l t r y i n g t o argue from the u n d e r s t a n d i n g to the e x i s t e n c e of emotions and v o l i t i o n s .  of language  He sensed the  p e c u l i a r i t y of what i s i m p l i e d by " s u b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l s " . That i s to say, such p r i v a t e o b j e c t s t h a t they may  designate,  c o u l d not be a p a r t of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e d i s c o u r s e u n l e s s  their  e x i s t e n c e can be gleaned from the use of " o b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l s " i n the v a r i o u s ways he attempted to set out.  I am not  sure  whether he thought t h e r e were such t h i n g s as " s u b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l s " (e.g.,  'pain' might be one).  It is likely,  though, because he seems t o have h e l d the Lockean view t h a t the meaning of a symbol i s s t r i c t l y the o b j e c t f o r which i t stands.  Had  he not been so caught up i n t h a t view he might  have gone a l l the way  towards s a y i n g t h a t t h e r e are no  "sub-  j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l s " such t h a t t h e i r meanings are p r i v a t e , unpublic objects.  He d i d w r i t e :  I t seems p e r f e c t l y obvious t h a t words l i k e p.  456.  'hear',  20  'see', ' f e a r ' , ' t h i n k ' , have e x a c t l y t h e same meani n g when I a p p l y t h e n L t o my n e i g h b o r as when I a p p l y them t o myself.^° Longer c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e v e r y p o i n t expressed i n t h e quot a t i o n , t o g e t h e r w i t h a c l o s e r e x a m i n a t i o n of i n t r o s p e c t i o n , would have c o n s i d e r a b l y a l t e r e d t h e d i r e c t i o n h i s paper took. Prom what has been s a i d i t may be thought t h a t P r i c e b e l i e v e d t h a t b a b i e s do not have emotions because they do not y e t have mental a c t s which i n v o l v e symbols.  They  l e a r n emotions when o r as they l e a r n t o use symbols. l y P r i c e does not'mean t h i s .  Obvious-  He would say I b e l i e v e , t h a t  they l e a r n t o express emotions by means o f language when t h e y l e a r n the use o f symbols.  H i s statements a r e not always con-  s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s , however, f o r he c l a i m s t h a t "every emotion 39  i n c l u d e s some t h i n k i n g " .  I t h i n k he must mean t h a t every  l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n o r statement o f an emotion presupposes some t h i n k i n g .  I t w i l l be remembered he s t r e s s e s t h a t you  can't t h i n k w i t h o u t symbols. But t h e p r i n c i p a l t h i n g about t h e e m o t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s , f o r P r i c e , i s t h a t they always l e a d t o changes i n t h e w o r l d , t h e y a f f e c t conduct.  One emotion which P r i c e t h i n k s  may not show i t s p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t a t f i r s t g l a n c e i s t h e 'emotion' o f a d m i r a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g an h i s t o r i c a l personage. Take t h e case o f an i n d i v i d u a l ' s a d m i r a t i o n f o r t h e Emperor V a l e n t i n i a n I . How, he a s k s , c o u l d such an emotion be p. 455.  21  d e t e c t e d , o r a t l e a s t b e l i e v e d , by o t h e r s ?  Valentinian I i s  not a p e r c e i v a b l e o b j e c t , but a t h i n k a b l e one. ^ 4<  p e r c e i v a b l e o b j e c t t o be a f f e c t e d by the a d m i r e r .  There i s no Such an  emotion, he t h i n k s , would be r e v e a l e d by the s u b j e c t ' s u t t e r ances.  One observes the g r e a t number o f f a v o r a b l e t h i n g s he  says about t h e Emperor, and so on.  Once a g a i n , as i n t h e  o t h e r cases, the need o f the emotion, o r i t s tendency, which a l l o w s us t o i d e n t i f y i t ,  % .  456.  i s shown i n t h e s u b j e c t ' s a c t i o n s .  22  PART I I  There a r e t h r e e p o i n t s c o n c e r n i n g P r i c e ' s paper t h a t I would l i k e t o comment on.  The f i r s t has t o do w i t h  what he says about symbols and v a r i o u s language f u n c t i o n s . The second r e l a t e s t o h i s r e l i a n c e upon i n t r o s p e c t i o n .  The  t h i r d concerns the p r o j e c t o f P r i c e ' s paper as a whole and t h i s consideration w i l l introduce Part I I I of t h i s t h e s i s . 1. P r i c e d i s t i n g u i s h e s f o u r d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n s of language.  These f u n c t i o n s a r e :  ples are:  "Look.' t h e r e i s t h e b u s J " ,  tails.");  (2) t h e n o n - e m p i r i c a l  "2+2=4");  (1) the e m p i r i c a l ( h i s exam"Some c a t s have no  ( " A l l c a t s have  whiskers",  (3) t h e v o l i t i o n a l ("That door has got t o be  shut.'"); and (4) the emotive ("OhI A snake.'").  These a r e  o r d i n a r y forms of language but the l i s t i s by no means exhaustive.  P r i c e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t f o r h i s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l purposes  he r e q u i r e d o n l y (1) and, t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t , imposed u t t e r a n c e s  i n categories  Op. c i t . , p. 451.  ( 2 ) . JTew and  (1) and (2) s u p p l y  1  sufficient  23  evidence o f o t h e r p e r c e i v e r s and t h i n k e r s . A c c o r d i n g t o P r i c e , t h e r e a s o n why (1) and (2) a r e s u f f i c i e n t i s t h a t these u t t e r a n c e s i n v o l v e o b j e c t s which both speaker and h e a r e r a r e aware o f . 2 i s t h e "primacy o f t h e o b j e c t "  Indeed, f o r P r i c e , i t  t h a t makes i t p o s s i b l e f o r us  t o g e t evidence o f o t h e r minds a t a l l .  And the primary  posi-  t i o n o f t h e p h y s i c a l and t h i n k a b l e (e.g., h i s t o r i c a l p e r s o n s ) o b j e c t s i n h i s argument m i n i m i z e s t h e emotive f u n c t i o n of language.  Emotive u t t e r a n c e s make r e f e r e n c e t o t h i n g s which  o n l y t h e u t t e r e r i s aware o f .  I f we had o n l y p u r e l y emotive  u t t e r a n c e s t o r e l y on, we c o u l d never g e t evidence,  from  language, o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f o t h e r minds. But, a c c o r d i n g t o P r i c e , c a t e g o r i e s (3) and (4) have something i n common w i t h ( l ) .  I t i s , as we have a l r e a d y seen  i n t h e e x p o s i t i o n , t h a t they a l l propound p r o p o s i t i o n s , though i n t h e case o f (3) and ( 4 ) , i n a queer way.  Category ( 2 ) ,  a s s e r t i o n s o f n o v e l t a u t o l o g i e s and e n t a i l m e n t s , c o u l d n o t , a p p a r e n t l y , have a n y t h i n g i n common w i t h (3) and ( 4 ) . I f people u t t e r e d o n l y m a t h e m a t i c a l - l i k e  e n t a i l m e n t s and t a u t o l -  o g i e s , we c o u l d n o t f i n d evidence from language t h a t they have emotions.  P r i c e argued t h a t such u t t e r a n c e s would p r o v i d e  evidence o f o t h e r t h i n k e r s . C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f what P r i c e says about (2) poses Op.  c i t . , p. 451.  24  an i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n .  We have seen the importance  he  p l a c e d on the o b j e c t which both speaker and h e a r e r are aware of.  But i n what r e s p e c t does a t a u t o l o g y o r an e n t a i l m e n t  belong to the e x t e r n a l world?  What i s a t a u t o l o g o u s o b j e c t ?  I t seems t o me t h a t P r i c e must say t h a t a n o v e l t a u t o l o g y or e n t a i l m e n t i s a new bols.  arrangement of c e r t a i n sym-  The speaker and h e a r e r would be aware of the sounds or  f i g u r e s of the new  arrangement.  The sounds or f i g u r e s  belong  t o the e x t e r n a l w o r l d and t h e i r imaged c o u n t e r p a r t s must d e r i v e from them. Then, a r c "unthought of e n t a i l m e n t s " s i m p l y arrangements of c e r t a i n k i n d s of symbols?  But t o say  new 'arrange-  ments of c e r t a i n k i n d s of symbols' would be m i s l e a d i n g . and f i g u r e s are arranged. system makes them symbols.  Sounds  T h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a game or Hence we can say:  n o i s e s , marks,  e t c . , w i t h o u t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a game or system are empty; symbols w i t h o u t n o i s e s or marks, e t c . , ( s e n s i b l e or imaged) are u n t h i n k a b l e . Understanding c o g n i t i v e aspect.  a symbol i n ( 2 ) , then, does have a  Noises must be heard o r marks seen or a t  l e a s t one must imagine h e a r i n g or s e e i n g n o i s e s and marks of the r e l e v a n t k i n d .  Of course, o t h e r sense d a t a c o u l d a p p l y  here as w e l l , such as the t a c t u a l d a t a used i n p l a c e of sounds and marks f o r the language of one who blind.  i s deaf  and  I n a d d i t i o n t o the admitted awareness of o b j e c t s ,  25  t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r r o l e s i n t h e system o r game t o which they belong must be r e a l i z e d .  B e i n g a b l e t o p l a y t h e game a l l o w s  me t o r e c o g n i z e which arrangement o f f i g u r e s i s a tauto3.ogy. I t i s , a c c o r d i n g t o P r i c e , by means o f the common awareness of o b j e c t s t h a t we g e t access  t o o t h e r minds.  r e l a t i o n between minds, he t h i n k s , i s three-termed. terms a r e :  speaker—object—hearer.  The  The  By ' o b j e c t ' , P r i c e ' s  paper l e a d s us t o b e l i e v e t h a t he means a t h i n g i n t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d ; something f o r which a symbol can s t a n d .  He does  not seem t o mean by ' o b j e c t ' , a'complex o b j e c t such as a s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n t h e w o r l d o r a f a c t such as i s d e s c r i b e d by the e m p i r i c a l sentences i n c a t e g o r y ( 1 ) . P r i c e i s mistaken i n t h i n k i n g that the discourse r e l a t i o n , w h i c h i s t h e r e l a t i o n between people when they speak w i t h one another,  i s only three-termed.  Price's cate-  gory ( 2 ) , e s p e c i a l l y t h e l o g i c a l and m a t h e m a t i c a l may show o n l y t h e t h r e e terms.of  statements,  speaker—object—hearer.  For t h e symbols of mathematics and l o g i c do not b a s i c a l l y stand f o r t h i n g s , t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l symbol i s an o b j e c t i n i t s e l f which does not s t a n d f o r some o t h e r t h i n g . (1),  However,  ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) , when u t t e r e d i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s i t u a t i o n s  P r i c e d e s c r i b e s , show the f o l l o w i n g terms:  (a) speaker  (b) o b j e c t (the mouthed n o i s e , the s i g n ) ( c ) o b j e c t f o r which (b) stands and (d) t h e h e a r e r .  I t i s t r u e t h a t (b) and  (c) may have t h e same c o g n i t i v e v a l u e , i . e . , they may b o t h  be seen or heard.  The  d i f f e r e n c e between them i s that  belongs to a c e r t a i n kind o f game.  P r i c e claims  that  p e c u l i a r i t y of (b) i s found out by i n t r o s p e c t i o n . h i s argument depends on t h i s very The  this  Much of  point.  resemblance between c a t e g o r i e s  that c e r t a i n objects  (b)  ( 1 ) and  (2) is  ( s e n s i b l e or imaged s i g n s ) have d e f i n i t e  ways i n which they are to be used.  In the case of ( 1 ) ,  P r i c e ' s paper suggests that the way  those symbols are to  used i s b a s i c a l l y to stand kind of game we •bus', 'cat',  f o r other  objects.  This i s the  commonly p l a y with words such as  'snake' and  so on.  be  'table',  Whereas i n ( 2 ) the mathemat-  i c a l symbols are used i n ways p e c u l i a r to mathematics but b a s i c a l l y to stand  f o r other o b j e c t s .  to ( 3 ) and  a l s o be i n c l u d e d i n t h i s resemblr.nce.  The  ( 4 ) may  resemblance i s , I repeat,  Utterances  that c e r t a i n o b j e c t s ,  symbols, are used i n c e r t a i n d e f i n i t e ways. these utterances  are recognized  hearer a l r e a d y has  not  belonging  called  Furthermore, a l l  as symbolic ones because the  some i d e a of the way  they are used i n those  d e f i n i t e ways. I t seems to me, that imposed u t t e r a n c e s because they are new The  t h e r e f o r e , reasonable to suppose  can be evidence of other minds  arrangements of symbols that I understand.  d i f f e r e n c e s i n the f u n c t i o n s of the v a r i o u s  P r i c e sets out may  simply  be secondary.  categories  The mystery, f o r P r i c e ,  should have been the f a c t that he understands the words of  27  new  and  imposed  arrangements that  i n the  there are  whereby ives  the  the  argue bare  For  understand Why  or  the  way  I use  statement, sleeping is  the  them.  does  in a  then  situation  i n which  would  says if  be  whether In  foreign  the  i t i s not  always  i t means what  be  i t is said  you  those  where  i n  derwell  from  the  one's  to  mental  say  Price,  possible  a  that  g i v e n the  that  thinks  to  or  verifying  he  that  a  in the  i f a  suits  stop), chess  noted  i t was  man  there of  the  Price's  and  then  chess.  that  proposition that  of  "Look!  i s playing be  find  c o n s i d e r ways  bus  play  I  context  statement  i t should to test  the  (symbols)  exclaimed,  the  of  by  It i s true  person  i t means,  truth  objects  (e.g., at a  realy  think  merely  as  o t h e r body,  advisable  watching  to  the  an  suddenly  But  player  and  just  enough  I imagine,  however,  i t would  fairness  be  to v e r i f y  seem n e c e s s a r y .  like  agencies  i s one  can  acts  the  symbol-involved  coming from  statement.  we  assumption  are  of language  i t would  bunk below y o u  bus!",  symbols  the  symbolic utterance.  This,  not  the  asking  of  other person uses  verifying  inquiry  bits  reply,  statement  categorize  claims thinking  i s i t necessary  the  that  to  Price's  other mental  imposed  would  Given  introspection),  assumption,  the  checking the whether  from  evidence  Price  out  (Price  of meaningful  given that  utterance?  such  existence of  occurrence  sufficiently  place.  acts  occur  assumption  f o r the  acts,  first  mental  acts  environment.  you  arrangements  to  he see  intended  28  t o mean what you t h i n k i t means.  Examples  of such p r o p o s i t i o n s  3  are p r o p o s i t i o n s about the p a s t .  I t i s sufficient, for Price,  i f the h e a r e r knows what i t would be l i k e f o r the p r o p o s i t o n t o be t r u e . P r i c e admits t h a t any i n t r u s i v e u t t e r a n c e which I understand c o u l d be evidence of a f o r e i g n mind. c l u d e s t h a t the evidence would be weak.  But he con-  And the r e a s o n why  i t would be weak i s t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r the u t t e r a n c e t o have o r i g i n a t e d i n some way w i t h me,  the h e a r e r .  I t i s better  evidence i f the u t t e r a n c e s t a t e s something I c o u l d not poss i b l y be i n a p o s i t i o n t o know. P r i c e w r i t e s : . . . the evidence w i l l be s t r o n g e s t where the u t t e r ance I hear g i v e s me new i n f o r m a t i o n ; t h a t i s t o say, where i t s y m b o l i z e s something which I do not a l r e a d y b e l i e v e , but which I s u b s e q u e n t l y manage t o v e r i f y f o r m y s e l f . F o r i f I d i d a l r e a d y b e l i e v e i t a t the time of h e a r i n g , I cannot exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i t was my own b e l i e v i n g which caused the f o r e i g n body t o u t t e r i t . And t h i s might happen even i f my b e l i e v i n g were, as we say, "unconscious"; as when I have been b e l i e v i n g f o r many hours t h a t today i s Saturday, though u n t i l t h i s moment I have not thought about the m a t t e r . I know by e x p e r i e n c e t h a t my b e l i e v i n g s can cause my own body t o u t t e r s y m b o l i c n o i s e s ; and f o r a l l I can t e l l they may sometimes cause a f o r e i g n body t o do the same. Indeed, t h e r e i s some e m p i r i c a l evidence i n f a v o r o f t h i s suggest i o n . The u t t e r a n c e s o f an e n t r a n c e d medium a t a s p i r i t u a l i s t i c seance do sometimes seem t o be caused by the unspoken b e l i e f s of the s i t t e r s . That one mind—my o w n — c a n animate two or more b o d i e s at the same time i s t h e r e f o r e not an absurd h y p o t h e s i s , but o n l y a queer one. I t cannot be r u l e d out o f c o u r t a p r i o r i , but must be r e f u t e d by s p e c i f i c e m p i r i c a l evidence.4 Op. c i t . , p. 442. 4  P-  431.  29  And  further: S e n t e n c e s p r o c e e d i n g f r o m my own u n c o n s c i o u s s o m e t i m e s b r e a k i n u p o n my t r a i n o f t h o u g h t i n j u s t t h i s i n t r u s i v e way. I t i s true that they u s u a l l y p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s t o my m i n d i n t h e f o r m o f v e r b a l images. But o c c a s i o n a l l y t h e y are a c t u a l l y u t t e r e d i n a u d i b l e w h i s p e r s , and sometimes t h e y a r e u t t e r e d aloud. How c a n I t e l l t h a t t h e s e same u n c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s e s i n m y s e l f may n o t s o m e t i m e s c a u s e a f o r e i g n body t o u t t e r such i n t r u s i v e n o i s e s ? Their i n t r u s i v e c h a r a c t e r i s no b a r t o t h e i r u n c o n s c i o u s origin. What we r e q u i r e i s t h a t t h e y s h o u l d s y m b o l i z e something which I d i d not b e l i e v e beforehand at a l l , even uncons c i o u s l y . 5 Price's  notion that  hear  and  have  somehow c a u s e d  For  understand  does not them,  one  thing,  i t i s not  beliefs  I have  and  e.g., it  saying  "Today  i s Saturday,  induce  my  that  can  I  noises. ved  body  In  do  not  refer  that  s e e m s t o me just  I learn  beliefs  that  by  (by  those  o c c a s i o n s when  to  such  intrusive by  really  I suddenly  pp. 431-432.  possibility  (1)  from  those  to u t t e r  t o be  speaker  belong say  that  I t seems,  would  t o them.  something  say  can  symbolic  one's  t o be  I  that  rather,  a muddle  utterance from  probably  I  beliefs,  convincing myself  I learn  the  that  certain  experiences)  t o me  I  be c h a l l e n g e a b l e .  noises.  seems  thought  not  after  only after  t o m e d i u m s , who  u t t e r a n c e s do  the  of utterances  inspecting  symbolic  there an  i s ever  their  Op. c i t . ,  preclude  i s Saturday",  addition,  i n thinking  intrusion  noises resulting  to utter  have  'unconscious' I  (2)  the  involown  foreign. some  I refer or t h i n k  of to of  30  s o m e t h i n g w h i c h has moment hut  and  was  ness  also  not  of  say  things  not  be  use  his  as  a  The  a  relevance when  of  Not  only  fact  of  i s that  is acting,  the  one  who  speaks  for  the  production  a  am  but  I  clearly  by  doing always of  the  say  the  strange-  owner  the  hearer  i s the  one  who  does  of  intelligible  and  the  can  utterances? Unless  related  things  i t  believed  lecturer's  mimicking,  the  Would  always, u n c o n s c i o u s l y of  of  sometimes  hearer.  that  the  believed  the  lecturers  the  at  is readily available.  parrot  the  am  Part  also  to  ownership  criterion or  I  he  I  something  believed  what  what  moment.  criteria  of  the a  the  mediums,  d i s t o r t i o n of  to  say  i s that  unconsciously  realization  I  at  phenomena  criterion  person  times  thinking  such  utterance.  no  a  cases,  necessary  utterance.  2.  Following  Price's  argument  Price:  I  introspecting in  acts  infer find else.  of  that the  that  discover that  thinking. other  f a m i l i a r sounds, final  criterion  for  deciding  knows by  enabled  introspects  whether  the  a  to  stand them,  recognize  etc.,  acts  the  key  other  way  of  for  things  symbols  from  using  the  I  when  can  I  somewhere the  thinks.  but  by  particularly  supplies  man  thoughts,  introspection.  occur  coming  introspection  other's  introspection that  I use  mental  figures,  analysis,  g r e a t l y upon symbols  way  symbol-involved  the  one  that  i s the  Thus  In  that  depends  Not decider  symbols  is  as  31  an instrument to a mental a c t .  The  d e c i d e r s p i e s the  physi-  c a l occurrence of symbols and reasons that they f o l l o w or are i n c l u d e d i n a mental act not h i s .  H i s own  case s u p p l i e s  the  c e r t a i n t y which lends the p r o b a b i l i t y to the hypothesis that the other i n d i v i d u a l t h i n k s . One out that we  way  of c h a l l e n g i n g t h i s argument i s to point  don't l e a r n that symbols stand  s p e c t i n g that we use the notice' we  symbols to stand  take of our own  the v a r i o u s  Rather, we  for things.  mental acts and  l e a r n i n g the names of mental acts (pains, f e a r s ) .  l e a r n i n g to use As  be c a l l e d h i s own  teaching  of  states  of words and  shatters Price's  case.  For the  reli-  observation  are a l r e a d y i n c l u d e d i n the process of  the word " t h i n k i n g " .  c h i l d r e n , we  learned that when someone pinched  us the r e s u l t i n g s e n s a t i o n i n g persons.  Neither i s  language.  T h i s commonplace o b s e r v a t i o n  shows that others  intro-  s t a t e s a way  ( t h i n k i n g ) and  are taught the use  symbols of o r d i n a r y  ance on what may  f o r things by  i s called  'pain' by E n g l i s h speak-  Let us imagine the f o l l o w i n g h i g h l y  situation.  The  p u p i l s , who  simplified  are c h i l d r e n , a l r e a d y  ^The term 'knowing from one's own case' i s used by Norman Malcolm, i n "Knowledge of Other Minds", J o u r n a l of Philosophy. LV (1958), 969-978. Malcolm c r i t i c i z e s a n a l o g i c a l arguments f o r the existence of other minds i n general and the one used by P r i c e i n "Our Evidence f o r the Existence of Other Minds" in particular. Wittgenstein's use of the term can be found i n P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , pars. 293 and 295.  32  have  some f a m i l i a r i t y  learn and  what  ' p a i n ' means.  pinches  'pain'."  the  Ideally,  i s , though great  child  now  variety  when y o u p i n c h e d  their  you  a f u n d a m e n t a l way  the  same  the  others  by  that  the to  teacher's  Another  you when  I pinched  pinched  your  their  arm.  I pinched  not  what  I taught  feel  that's  t h e way  abide  felt felt  with showing  you f e l t ,  under  of thing  back  and wonder  find  that  abide about  i f he  wants  by t h e r u l e .  able  to call  I told  arms,  you to c a l l t h e word  might  to ask that  the others  i t i s with  been  i s the sort  L a t e r he w i l l  their  reply,  just  What  settle  And y o u o b s e r v e d  when  I  t o s p e a k E n g l i s h y o u must  arms what  anything  what  A bright  the others may  " I have  reaction of the teacher  I told  knows  d o I know w h a t  'pain'.  might  Tommie, y o u w e r e  noticed that  "How  o f arm p i n c h i n g ,  he must  the other  t h e word.  The t e a c h e r  I f y o u want  be u n d e r s t o o d ,  "Excellent,  ask:  of using  dogmatism.  child  i s called  i n the classroom  i n h i s voice,  The c h i l d  felt  must  a r e n o t y e t knowledgeable, about  arms?"  circumstances  rule."  t o one  a r m i s t h e same f e e l i n g  of i r r i t a t i o n  felt.  over  goes  o f employing  one) might my  they  t h e same t h i n g w i t h  everyone  o f ways  Today,  "What y o u j u s t  the children  (or a dull  note  The t e a c h e r  does  when y o u p i n c h e d  a  the language.  h i s arm, s a y i n g :  The t e a c h e r  children. pain  with  be t o s a y :  question  what  they  you to c a l l  that  i n particular, 'pain'.  Well,  'pain .  Part  1  felt  when  you d i d not  because  I  feel  youd i d you see,  o f i t s mean-  33  ing  i s t h a t you can't f e e l someone e l s e ' s p a i n .  c l e a r up the q u e s t i o n you asked, a p p a r e n t l y  F i n a l l y , to  you f o r g o t t h a t ,  i n a d d i t i o n t o t e l l i n g you t o c a l l what you f e l t a l s o s a i d t h a t you must c a l l what t h e y f e l t  'pain', I  'pain'.  So  you  see, knowing what Johnnie f e l t , as knowing what you f e l t , i s i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d t o my  t e a c h i n g you and the o t h e r s what t o  name what you and they f e l t . " The way  t h i s approach c h a l l e n g e s  the s p e c i a l case i n which P r i c e makes use as b e i n g the way  introspection i n of the n o t i o n , i . e . ,  we f i n d out what ' t h i n k i n g ' means and,  i n d e e d , t h a t any symbol means, i s t h a t the new  view r e c a l l s  the f a c t t h a t o t h e r people have a l r e a d y t a k e n p a r t i n the fundamental s t a g e s of l e a r n i n g what t h i n k i n g i s .  That i s t o  say, they have p l a y e d a b a s i c p a r t i n the l e a r n i n g of the o f the word.  I t i s a presupposition  t h a t the t e a c h e r  of the c l a s s r o o m , a l s o ,  i s f a m i l i a r w i t h the s u b j e c t which he  teaches.  O r d i n a r i l y , the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a m e n t a l a c t or s t a t e been a i d e d by  use  has  teaching. 3.  Perhaps the motive behind P r i c e ' s r e f e r e n c e  to  un-  c o n s c i o u s b e l i e v i n g s as b e i n g a source of doubt about the ownership of f o r e i g n u t t e r a n c e s ,  r a t h e r than t o the  tradition-  a l s c e p t i c a l s o l i p s i s t p o s i t i o n i s t h a t he wanted t o frame the o t h e r minds problem i n terms of m a t t e r s of f a c t .  He  may  34  have thought that n o t h i n g s t r i c t l y counts as a  solipsistic  experience but there are cases of suddenly being invaded by u t t e r a n c e s from one's unconscious.  This g i v e s us reason to  suspect that a l l sentences we meet w i t h may doing.  In t h i s way,  be of our  own  P r i c e imagines that the p h i l o s o p h i c a l  problem of the e x i s t e n c e of other minds i s a matter of f a c t problem.  That he t h i n k s i t i s a matter of f a c t problem i s  shown where he d i s c u s s e s the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of demonstrating that there are other minds.  He says:  " . . .  i n the sphere  7 of matters of f a c t i t i s a mistake to expect demonstration." No doubt there i s an important sense i n which doubts about other minds enter i n t o f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n s .  A physician  might not be sure as to whether h i s p a t i e n t f e e l s p a i n a f t e r an i n j e c t i o n .  Or a p s y c h i a t r i s t might be i n the p o s i t i o n of  t r y i n g to argue a paranoiac out of b e l i e v i n g that he, the p a r a n o i a c , was  behind every i n t e l l i g i b l e u t t e r a n c e he hears.  For  that matter, there are f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n s where people say-, without any h e s i t a t i o n , that they know p e r f e c t l y w e l l the mind, of another.  Sometimes g i r l s say t h i s about boy f r i e n d s .  But there i s something d e f i n i t e l y odd or incoherent about d e r i v i n g s c e p t i c i s m about the e x i s t e n c e of other minds from uses of language.  P r i c e both d e r i v e s h i s s c e p t i c i s m  about other minds from the employment of language and o b t a i n s P r i c e , op. c i t . , p.  430.  35 h i s reasons f o r b e l i e v i n g i n them from the employment of language.  The o d d i t y of a l l t h i s i s t h a t language a l r e a d y  c o n t a i n s symbols o r a c o n c e p t u a l scheme which makes r e f e r ence t o o r i n d i c a t e s language u s e r s o t h e r t h a n m y s e l f ; and i n such a way t h a t o r d i n a r y s e n t e n c e s , t o a g r e a t e x t e n t , depend f o r t h e i r sense on such a c o n c e p t u a l scheme f u n c t i o n ing.  C u r i o s i t y about t h i s scheme, i t seems t o me, i s not so  much f a c t u a l as t e r m i n o l o g i c a l .  I t i s l i k e wondering about  the r u l e s o f a game as a g a i n s t w a t c h i n g the p l a y o f a game. The inadequacy of P r i c e ' s paper l i e s i n i t s f a i l ure t o come t o g r i p s w i t h t h e s e t e r m i n o l o g i c a l m a t t e r s , e.g., the scheme o f p e r s o n a l pronouns which makes t h e statement o f h i s problem, as w e l l as i t s a l l e g e d s o l u t i o n , p o s s i b l e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , "Our E v i d e n c e f o r t h e E x i s t e n c e of Other Minds" has g r e a t a p p e a l as a v a l u a b l e p r o p a e d e u t i c f o r the s t u d y o f the r e l a t i o n between t h e n o t i o n of s o l i p s i s m and t h a t employment o f language which i s c a l l e d  'speaking w i t h o t h e r s ' .  P r i c e ' s paper s e r v e s t o r e v e a l a new s t a r t i n g p o i n t . P a r t I I I o f t h i s t h e s i s w i l l attempt t o examine t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e concept of speech and t h e i n d i v i d u a l s who can do t h e t h i n g s r e q u i r e d f o r s p e a k i n g .  I e x p l o r e what  P r i c e f a t a l l y n e g l e c t e d and t h a t i s t h e t e r m i n o l o g y i n v o l v e d i n s a y i n g t h a t someone s a i d something.  Part I I I i s therefore  a s t u d y of t h e frame, or a s p e c t s of the frame, i n which b o t h P r i c e ' s problem and s o l u t i o n appear.  36  PART I I I  D i d ever man, M e l e t u s , b e l i e v e i n t h e e x i s t e n c e of human t h i n g s and not o f human b e i n g s ? . . . D i d ever man b e l i e v e i n horsemanship and not i n h o r s e s ? No, my f r i e n d ; I w i l l answer t o you and to. t h e c o u r t , as you r e f u s e t o answer f o r y o u r s e l f . There i s no man who ever d i d . (Apology, 27)1  " I f you can d i s c u s s t h e other minds problem, o r anyt h i n g e l s e f o r t h a t m a t t e r , t h e problem e x i s t s o n l y t o s o l v e itself."  Such a remark has something i n common w i t h  c o g i t o ergo sum.  Descartes'  d i c t u m i s enforced  Descartes'  by t h e f a c t  t h a t people do tend t o speak as though t h i n k i n g i s something t h a t e x i s t e n t 'conscious b e i n g s do.  I t i s equally true that  most people tend t o speak as though i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  overt  utter-  ances, such as occur d u r i n g a d i s c u s s i o n , are t h i n g s produced by e x i s t e n t c o n s c i o u s beings.  In reply to a question  like,  "Do you t h i n k John has a mind?", i t i s not u n u s u a l t o h e a r , "Of course I do, I've j u s t been s p e a k i n g w i t h him." So u s u a l i s t h a t k i n d o f r e a c t i o n t h a t many people a r e shocked a t t h e b l i n d n e s s o f a man who says he e n t e r t a i n s s o l i p s i s m o r who "^The Dialogues, of P l a t o , t r a n s . B. Jowett (New York: Random House), I , p. 410.  37  merely d i s l o d g e s  h i m s e l f from t h e apparent c e r t a i n t y o f t h e  common r e p l y noted above. of D e s c a r t e s '  dictum:  The common r e p l y suggests a parody  we speak, t h e r e f o r e we a r e .  In t h i s part I intend to discuss the idea that a p l u r a l i t y o f d i f f e r e n t speakers i s a n e c e s s a r y f e a t u r e o f the concept o f speech. is  I take t h i s view t o mean t h a t i f a n y t h i n g  c o r r e c t l y c a l l e d speech t h e n more t h a n one u s e r o f the  language o f t h a t a c t of speech must e x i s t a t the time o f t h e utterance  o r b e f o r e i t o r a f t e r i t , and i f not i n f a c t , t h e n  in principle,  llo one would d i s p u t e t h a t a d i s c u s s i o n i s made  up o f a number o f separate  a c t s o f speech.  What i s d i s p u t -  a b l e i s t o say t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l a c t o f speech presupposes o t h e r speakers,  not o n l y i n the r o l e o f l i s t e n e r s o r under-  s t a n d e r s but a l s o as p o t e n t i a l speakers.  I t h i n k there i s a  way o f showing t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l a c t o f speech presupposes, o r , r a t h e r , r e q u i r e s f o r i t s s t a t u s as an a c t o f speech, t h a t t h e r e be o t h e r speakers.  The way can be suggested by l o o k i n g  at how c e r t a i n games a r e named. I f John t o l d B i l l t h a t he played t e n n i s the o t h e r day,  and i f John used t h e word ' t e n n i s ' c o r r e c t l y , t h e n B i l l  knows t h a t an a c t i v i t y o c c u r r e d took p a r t .  i n which more than one person  T h i s i s something t h a t B i l l might have l e a r n e d  from o b s e r v a t i o n s  o f p r e v i o u s t e n n i s tournaments  i n f o r m him o f the o f f i c i a l use o f ' t e n n i s ' ) .  (these  But he need n o t  have l e a r n e d t h e meaning o f t h e word by w i t n e s s i n g  tennis  38  games.  I t i s enough t o read a t e n n i s r u l e book.  s i b l e number o f p l a y e r s  The permis-  ( j u s t as l i t t l e w h i t e b a l l s ,  w h i t e l i n e s , e t c . ) i s s e t out by t h e r u l e s .  rackets,  Similarly:  the  number o f p l a y e r s , t h e f u n c t i o n , approximate shape and t h e number of p i e c e s , t h e d e s i g n o f t h e b o a r d — a r e d e f i n e d by the r u l e s o f t h e game o f chess. c e i v a b l e w i t h o u t these elements. means of them.  Tennis and chess a r e i n c o n The games a r e d e f i n e d by  I t i s easy t o see t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r more  than one p l a y e r i n t e n n i s .  There a r e r u l e books t o which one  can r e f e r . The  suggestion  i s u s e f u l o n l y i f t h e r e i s some k i n d  of resemblance between s p e a k i n g and v a r i o u s games. games, though n o t a l l , can be d e s c r i b e d  Many  as r u l e - b o u n d a c t i v -  i t i e s t h a t can be done c o r r e c t l y o r i n c o r r e c t l y both a t w i l l or by m i s t a k e .  P l a y i n g t h e s e games r e q u i r e s c e r t a i n s k i l l s .  A p l a y e r may know t h e r u l e s y e t not be a b l e , a l l o f t h e t i m e , t o f o l l o w t h e m — b e c a u s e he may l a c k t h e a p p r o p r i a t e  skill.  I n a d d i t i o n , a g r e a t d e a l o f v a r i a t i o n i s p o s s i b l e , i n the f o l l o w i n g out o f t h e r u l e s .  The games may be played  or w e l l , q u i c k l y o r s l o w l y , s t u p i d l y o r s m a r t l y . c e r t a i n techniques or s t y l e s of play.  badly  There a r e  The word 'play' r e f e r s  t o t h e movements t h a t can be governed by t h e r u l e s o f t h e game.  There c o u l d be an i n f i n i t y o f such movements; but t h e r e  i s no need o f an i n f i n i t y o f r u l e s t o cover each k i n d of movement.  S a y i n g t h i n g s i n t e l l i g i b l y resembles t h a t k i n d o f game  •59  activity.  U n f o r t u n a t e l y , no o f f i c i a l r u l e book f o r s p e a k i n g  i n t e l l i g i b l y exists. r u l e s o f language.  Grammar books g i v e o n l y some of t h e I f W i t t g e n s t e i n i s r i g h t , t h e r e never w i l l  be such an o f f i c i a l r u l e book because language i s made up o f c o u n t l e s s games w i t h i n games. We a r e concerned w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r form o f language c a l l e d speech.  B e i n g a b l e t o use 'speech' u n h e s i t a t i n g l y ,  you would t h i n k e v e r y t h i n g about t h e word l i e s b e f o r e u s . Perhaps, as W i t t g e n s t e i n m a i n t a i n e d of such words, t h e r e i s no g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n t h a t would encompass a l l uses o f such a g e n e r a l word.  I n s t e a d , we d e v e l o p a nose f o r d e t e c t i n g  " f a m i l y resemblances".  As i f each event we c a l l  'speech' has  something i n common w i t h one o r more uses of t h e word but none i n d i v i d u a l l y has a n y t h i n g i n common w i t h a l l o t h e r uses o f the  word, i . e . , except the l a b e l 'speech'.  The analogy o f  f a m i l i e s does p o i n t I t h i n k t o what we want. The analogy p r e s e n t s a p i c t u r e o f p a r e n t s and o f f spring.  The o r i g i n a l p a r e n t s , say Adam and Eve, c o u l d n o t  have had a l l human c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . t e r i s t i c s would be c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  F o r some o f t h e c h a r a c Adam and Eve might have  been b l o n d e , whereas one o f t h e i r o f f s p r i n g might be b r u n e t t e . Adam and Eve c o u l d n o t have been b r u n e t t e when they were blonde.  New c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e generated by the u n i o n o f  Adam and Eve's o f f s p r i n g .  I t i s a kind of inductive p r i n c i p l e  t h a t new o f f s p r i n g w i l l have c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t t h e p a r e n t s  40  don't have.  But the seeker a f t e r what i s common t o a f a m i l y  of uses o f a word may be i n t e r e s t e d n o t so much i n the f l e x i b l e , v a r y i n g u s e s , which a r e o f f s p r i n g o f some v a g u e l y  dis-  t a n t o r i g i n a l p a r e n t s , as i n t h e b a s i s o f t h e appearance o f the f a m i l i a l resemblances.  A p o s s i b i l i t y i s that the place  where t h i n g s can be found t o be common throughout a l l uses of t h e concept o f speech i s a c o n d i t i o n (or a s e t o f c o n d i t i o n s ) which a l l o w s a c t s of speech t o take p l a c e a t a l l . C o n s i d e r , a g a i n , t h e game of t e n n i s . p l a y e d t h e r e must be c r e a t u r e s capable  I f t e n n i s i s t o be of r u n n i n g ,  obeying  r u l e s , h o l d i n g r a c k e t s — t h e w o r l d must be such t h a t  balls  b o u n c e — a n d so on. None o f these c o n d i t i o n s a r e mentioned i n t e n n i s r u l e books. they were f u l f i l l e d .  Y e t t h e game c o u l d not be p l a y e d  unless  I t p r o b a b l y would n o t occur t o anyone  to i n v e n t t e n n i s , even i m a g i n a t i v e l y , i f such m a t e r i a l and p r o p e r t i e s o f bodies were n o t a v a i l a b l e . Similarly,  i t may be t h a t an a c t o f speech c o u l d  not t a k e p l a c e u n l e s s t h e r e c o u l d be a p l u r a l i t y of speakers. I t i s suggested t h a t the r e l a t i o n  between c a l l i n g  anything  speech and t h e n o t i o n o f a p l u r a l i t y of speakers i s l i k e t h e relation  between c a l l i n g a phenomenon t e n n i s and those f e a t -  u r e s of t h e w o r l d which make the p r a c t i c e o f t h e game p o s s i ble. I n t h e absence o f r u l e books such as a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r t e n n i s and chess, o n l y an examination  of typical  utter-  41  ances w i l l s u f f i c e t o y i e l d m a t e r i a l f o r c o n c l u s i o n s on the q u e s t i o n of whether an a c t of speech, i . e . , any  intelligible  l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e , n e c e s s a r i l y presupposes the e x i s t e n c e o f o t h e r speakers. a u s e r of language.  Any u t t e r a n c e , a use of language, i m p l i e s I t i s expedient  to l o o k a t cases  of  speech where r e f e r e n c e to t h i s u s e r or speaker i s p a r t of the meaning of the sentence. the speaker h i m s e l f . same I-sentence  ' I ' i s used m a i n l y t o denote  C o n s i d e r , then, the u t t e r a n c e s of the  by two d i f f e r e n t  speakers.  I am s t a n d i n g on a highway w i t h someone e l s e (an o t h e r body r e s e m b l i n g mine) when, upon the appearance of a bus, we both u t t e r , " I see a bus".  Let us c a l l my  utterance,  " ' I see a b u s ' — A " , or j u s t A and the o t h e r ' s u t t e r a n c e " ' I see a b u s ' — B " or j u s t B.  Having seen the bus and knowing  E n g l i s h I s a i d " ' I see a b u s ' — A " . language would a s s o c i a t e my bus'—B". am.  Why  not?  No speaker of the E n g l i s h  s e e i n g of the bus w i t h " ' I see a  Not because I am not s e e i n g the bus,  I  Suppose I do not see a bus or. u t t e r A yet I hear " ' I see  a bus'—B".  V/hy s h o u l d I not r e p l y to the h e a r i n g of B by  s a y i n g , "No,  I am not"?  Suppose a bus does not come i n t o  v i s u a l f i e l d and I hear '•" I see a b u s ' — B " . "Yes, I do",  e i t h e r a l o u d or t o myself.  say,  I might say, " I sup-  pose you do because I happen to see i t a l s o . " why  I would not  my  The  reason  I might say the l a t t e r and never "Yes, I do" i s t h a t I  must p r a c t i s e a r u l e f o r the use of ' I ' . C e r t a i n l y not because  42  I am aware of h i s v i s u a l s e n s a t i o n s which would t e l l me he sees the bus  j u s t as I do.  that  I t i s t r u e t h a t i f I don't see  the bus y e t hear the other u t t e r B then my v i s u a l s e n s a t i o n s , which do not i n c l u d e the s e e i n g of the bus, i n a sense t e l l me t h a t someone e l s e i s s e e i n g a bus. what he means.  But o n l y i f I know  I know what he means because I p r a c t i s e the  r u l e about u s i n g ' I ' . The r u l e i s t h a t out of a number of d i f f e r e n t u t t e r a n c e s of the sound ' I ' , o n l y my u t t e r i n g o f i t r e f e r s to me as the speaker.  A f o r e i g n or s e p a r a t e  utterance  of ' I ' , a n o i s e I do not make, cannot, by the r u l e , i n d i c a t e me as the speaker.  The  s e p a r a t i o n of these u t t e r a n c e s o f  ' I ' s i m p l y stems from the f a c t t h a t t h e r e are v a r i o u s v i d u a l s who  can and do make the sound.  indi-  The sounds, and  the  noise-making i n d i v i d u a l s , are the raw m a t e r i a l s of the language game f o r ' I ' . I t i s not the r u l e which l e g i s l a t e s the  separ-  a t i o n of the sounds; t h i s i s due to the f a c t s of human physiology. rule.  But the meaningful use o f ' I ' i s governed by the I t a s s e r t s t h a t uses of ' I ' by d i f f e r e n t noise-makers  i n d i c a t e each noise-maker s e p a r a t e l y .  P r i m a r i l y , the  separ-  a t i o n i s a matter of the d i r e c t i o n the sound comes from, i.e.,  w i t h r e s p e c t t o the p o s i t i o n of my body and the  noise-maker's body.  other  Of course, some of my u t t e r a n c e s of ' I '  are q u o t a t i o n s of o t h e r s e p a r a t e or f o r e i g n u t t e r i n g s as i n : "He  said,  'I am going home'".  of s e p a r a t e u t t e r a n c e s of ' I ' .  Such cases are r e c o g n i t i o n s  43  Suppose t h e r e were no such r u l e .  Then t h e I's i n  A and B would be i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e as f a r as meaning i s concerned though they would s t i l l be d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e as s e p a r a t e sounds coming from d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s .  Without t h e r u l e one  would perhaps be s t r u c k by t h e s i m i l a r i t y o f t h e sounds ' I ' and ' I ' and t h a t would be a l l . The q u e s t i o n may be asked:  suppose my n o i s e s , which  include ' I ' , are transmitted t o a loudspeaker at the other end o f t h e room, then i s t h i s a f o r e i g n use o f ' I ' f o r me? Does t h e r u l e a p p l y t o such a case? are  called  speaker?  'speakers'.  Indeed, such c o n t r i v a n c e s  Does t h e ' I ' i n d i c a t e the m e c h a n i c a l  A l s o , d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s may be heard on t h e  r a d i o i n which case t h e sounds may a l l come from t h e same direction.  I n these c a s e s , a d d i t i o n a l c r i t e r i a f o r t h e sep-  a r a t e n e s s o f t h e sounds would have t o be n o t e d , such a s , i n the  case o f the r a d i o , t h e t i m b r e o f t h e v a r i o u s v o i c e s .  In  the  case o f t h e d i s t a n t l o u d s p e a k e r , o t h e r s may d i s c o v e r t h e  ownership o f t h e v o i c e heard by f o l l o w i n g t h e w i r e s , o r p e r haps by c u t t i n g them.  By a l l appearances, i t i s not u n u s u a l  f o r people t o t a k e a m e c h a n i c a l speaker as l i t e r a l l y a speaker i n t h e sense o f t a k i n g up an a t t i t u d e as b e f o r e a speaker. Sometimes we l o o k d i r e c t l y a t p i e c e s o f f u r n i t u r e when we hear i n t e l l i g i b l e speech e m i t t e d from them and l i s t e n as we would t o a human speaker. the  But i t would make no sense t o say  ' I ' one may hear i n t h a t way i n d i c a t e s t h e s p e a k i n g box.  44  It  would  begin  answered but  was  questions not  a  As roughly  what  tennis.  Can  gible a  use  I  the  of  'I'.  caused  way,  The  otherwise  or  so  much  be  the  nature.  of  occurrences  put  the  noise  you  how  and  of  the  activity user  a  B must  would  a  the  has  to  The  rule  sounds.  must  where  be  can  able  to  what  must  the  coherent  certain  rule occur-  like  a  rule  about  how  tennis rules  up  law  regularities  the  to  tell  ball.  'refereed'. call  from  solecism.  smack a w h i t e be  mysterious  solipsist  It is a  to  Even i f  (1) a b s o l u t e l y  the  as  the  different  ' I ' i s not  just  is  t o mouth  i n which  with  of  practised  different  world  for  a  mean  radical  do  Obviously  i n some  out  classical  commits  that  set  of  intelli-  requires this.  radically  the  the  able  bus'—B",  coherently;  approximately  the  sound  be  out  playing  examine?  be  descriptive  certain  t o work  ' I ' i s an  means t h a t  'I'.  to  must  'I' of A  practised  I t i s not  chosen  bodies  Even  box  appearance  figure  concerning  can  'I' of  he  to  rule  feature of  sound  of  Using  else  second  ' I ' can of  or  done  " ' I see  the  speaking  the hearer's  a  ( 2 ) mean s o m e t h i n g  A  rence  of  utterance  be  such  different meaning  on  i f the  some k i n d .  have  where  c u s t o m a r i l y means.  admit  for  of  we  this  i s r e q u i r e d f o r the  same t h i n g  a world  say  i t i s possible  of world  n e v e r t h e l e s s the  nothing  to  commented  seen,  'I' that  the  "speaker"  it  and  have  sort  a number  sound  sense  transmitter of we  f e a t u r e of  that  t o make  This  sound  at  will  45  whenever he t h i n k s i t i s the r i g h t time t o do so a c c o r d i n g t o the r u l e .  I n w r i t i n g , a mark r e p l a c e s the n o i s e .  must be a b l e t o use the marks a t w i l l .  The  user  Things t h a t are  ' f i x e d ' , i . e . , i n c a p a b l e of b e i n g c a l l e d up at w i l l on proper o c c a s i o n a c c o r d i n g to the r u l e , c o u l d not n o i s e s or marks.  the  replace  Because of t h i s , headaches, i t c h e s ,  tooth-  aches or a degree of blood p r e s s u r e , not u s u a l l y b e i n g t h i n g s t h a t can be c a l l e d up at w i l l , c o u l d not r e p l a c e n o i s e s  or  marks.  But  Gestures can r e p l a c e them and so c o u l d images.  the use of images f o r t h i s purpose would not be  'official'  because t h e i r use c o u l d not be r e f e r e e d by someone e l s e . sound ' I ' has no f u n c t i o n of i t s e l f ; l e f t t o i t s e l f , occur o n l y a c c i d e n t a l l y resemble a h i c c u p .  and i f at a l l r e g u l a r l y  I t gets i t s meaning by b e i n g  The  i t would  i t would wilfully  mouthed i n accordance w i t h the r u l e f o r ' I ' . I t takes i t s r o l e as a symbol by the d e f i n i t e way work. The  i n which i t i s put t o  S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , we don't hear t h i s s i g n i f i c a n t ' I ' .  sound l o s e s i t s w h o l l y a c o u s t i c q u a l i t y when i t becomes  a symbol. stood.  We  say t h a t the symbol i s understood or misunder-  S i m i l a r l y , i t can be s a i d t h a t we don't j u s t hear  sentences.  We understand them or we don't understand them.  Complete non-understanding of a sentence r e c o g n i z e s o n l y an a c o u s t i c phenomenon. Suppose the w o r l d was c o u l d speak.  such t h a t o n l y one  individual  That i s t o say, o n l y one person c o u l d make the  46  necessary  n o i s e s and combinations of n o i s e s a t w i l l .  Then  t h e r e would be no need f o r the word ' I . D i f f e r e n t speakers 1  c o u l d not be d i s t i n g u i s h e d because i n t h i s w o r l d t h e r e i s o n l y one speaker.  Conceivably,  t h e s o l i t a r y speaker would,  say, i n s t e a d o f 1 am h o t ' o r ' I see a bus', 1  ' I t i s h o t ' o r 'A bus i s t h e r e ' .  something l i k e  We should ask, why i s n ' t  the s e n s a t i o n o r t h e p e r c e p t i o n enough?  Why should he mouth  these v o l u n t a r y n o t i c e s o f t h e s e n s a t i o n and p e r c e p t i o n ? Perhaps, i f he w r i t e s , he wants t o keep a r e c o r d o f t h i n g s he sees and f e e l s a t d i f f e r e n t times and p l a c e s .  Or, r a t h e r , we  s h o u l d say t h a t he wants t o r e c o r d t h i n g s f e l t and seen a t d i f f e r e n t times and p l a c e s .  I t would not make sense f o r him  to say t h a t he f e l t o r had seen a n y t h i n g a t a l l . What he 'says' c o u l d not be c a l l e d speech, i . e . , he c o u l d n o t take the r o l e o f a speaker, s i n c e speakers a r e i n d i c a t e d by r e f e r e n c e t o o t h e r speakers.  Because he i s n o t  a b l e t o a c t i n accordance w i t h t h e r u l e f o r ' I ' (as i n a w o r l d where b a l l s do not bounce t h e r e c o u l d be no t e n n i s games), i t would make no sense f o r him t o say t h a t he says anything.  Should he u t t e r something l i k e  'pain a t two o ' c l o c k  l a s t F r i d a y a t t h e w e l l ' , t h e r e would be no q u e s t i o n , f o r him,  o f who s a i d i t .  The u t t e r a n c e c o u l d not be addressed  to anyone e l s e because t h e r e i s no o t h e r c r e a t u r e capable o f understanding  it.  A g a i n , you wonder why t h e c r e a t u r e would  make t h e u t t e r a n c e , o r w r i t e i t down, a t a l l .  Perhaps t h e  47  a c t o f w r i t i n g i t down resembles the d e v i c e o f b l a z i n g t r e e s so t h a t you know your way around the f o r e s t ; i n t h e p r e s e n t case, a t h i c k f o r e s t o f s e n s a t i o n s and p e r c e p t i o n s w i t h no ' I ' a t t a c h e d t o each s e n s a t i o n or p e r c e p t i o n .  The b l a z e  'pain a t two o ' c l o c k l a s t F r i d a y a t t h e w e l l ' may perhaps be used by him as a warning o f danger t o h i s l i f e .  But why  wouldn't a simple memory image of the event p a i n - a t - t h e - w e l l do?  Because, I suppose, memory images a r e o f t e n f a i n t and  a l s o tend t o decay. ful  Marks l a s t l o n g e r and so a r e more s u c c e s -  i n p r e s e r v i n g the c r e a t u r e ' s l i f e .  Maybe he d i s c o v e r e d  t h a t imaging i s a poor memory d e v i c e and t h a t making marks i s a b e t t e r one.  complex  A language w i t h no ' I ' i n i t , where  n o t h i n g i s r e a l l y s a i d i n t h e sense t h a t i t makes no sense to  say t h e r e a r e a c t s o f speech i n i t , t h e n , i s c o n c e i v a b l e ,  though i t i s a f a n t a s y based on our knowledge o f t h e use o f language i n t h i s It  world.  i s claimed t h a t , from t h e way we a c t u a l l y use  ' I ' , a r u l e can be found which shows c l e a r l y , s i n c e we f i n d the r u l e by o b s e r v i n g i t s a p p l i c a t i o n , t h a t t h e concept o f speech, i . e . , t o say of something t h a t i t i s an a c t of speech, which i s the same as t o say t h a t someone says something, r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e r e be a p l u r a l i t y o f speakers.  I n making  t h i s c l a i m i t was i m p l i e d t h a t t h e I - r u l e i s one f o r speakers. These a r e c r e a t u r e s who can mouth t h e sound  ' I ' at w i l l  whenever they f a n c y i t i s t h e r i g h t time a c c o r d i n g t o the  48  rule. one  I n f a c t , the r u l e h e l p s t o s e t such c r e a t u r e s out from  another. But  speaker.  ' I ' i s not used o n l y as a r e f e r e n c e t o the  B e r k e l e y , f o r example, s a i d :  What I am m y s e l f , t h a t which I denote by the term I , i s the same w i t h what i s meant by s o u l or s p i r i t u a l substance. 2  However, I doubt v e r y much whether by t h i s sentence B e r k e l e y wanted t o deny t h a t ' I ' , as i n the f i r s t two occurrences of i t i n h i s sentence, r e f e r s t o the one s p e a k i n g , the u t t e r e r o r w r i t e r of the sentence.  He does a f t e r a l l want t o say  t h a t the u t t e r e r of the sentence, B e r k e l e y h i m s e l f , as w e l l as o t h e r u t t e r e r s of o t h e r sentences, have s o u l s or are essent i a l l y " s p i r i t u a l substances".  We understand the g i s t of the  sentence when we know the I - r u l e .  What he does i s t o g i v e an  a d d i t i o n a l and secondary r e f e r e n c e t o ' I ' , namely, t h a t the one s p e a k i n g i s a l s o a s p i r i t u a l substance.  I n so d o i n g ,  t h i s secondary and a d d i t i o n a l r e f e r e n c e becomes p a r a s i t i c the r u l e f o r ' I ' .  on  The r u l e r e q u i r e s a p l u r a l i t y of' speakers  and t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s c a r r i e d i n t o the new r e f e r e n c e s t a t e d by B e r k e l e y .  I t i s as though he has t a k e n h o l d of an a l r e a d y  a v a i l a b l e c o n c e p t u a l g r i d and p l a c e d i t on a new  field.  I n the Blue Book, W i t t g e n s t e i n t r i e d t o show t h a t ' I ' may  be used not t o r e f e r t o any p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g a t a l l .  The P r i n c i p l e s of Human Knowledge, (La S a l l e : C o u r t , 1946), sec. 139, p.116.  Open  49  There a r e t i m e s , he thought, when we use ' I ' i n such a way t h a t i t does not ' p o i n t ' t o t h e one s p e a k i n g ,  i . e . , to the  bearer o f a proper name, which i s u s u a l l y a r e f e r e n c e t o a d e f i n i t e and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s e t o f p h y s i c a l appearances. Such uses o f ' I ' a r e t o be found i n u t t e r a n c e s which a r e expressions  o f mental a c t s o r s t a t e s .  q u e s t i o n " , wrote W i t t g e n s t e i n , I say ' I have t o o t h a c h e ' . "  ,f  " . . . t h e r e i s no  o f r e c o g n i z i n g a person when  He a p p a r e n t l y meant t o say t h a t  the game o f p o i n t i n g out an o b j e c t , as when you r e f e r t o i t , i s an a c t i v i t y whereby you c o n s c i o u s l y choose a p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g ( t o n o t i c e i t f o r some r e a s o n or o t h e r ) out o f a number of d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s which p o s s i b l y c o u l d be n o t i c e d i n i t s place.  With ' I have t o o t h a c h e ' , u t t e r e d by me, t h e r e i s no  q u e s t i o n of me r e c o g n i z i n g a p a r t i c u l a r person, namely, myself.  The n o n - p o i n t i n g  o r t h i n g l e s s use o f ' I ' i s expressed  by s a y i n g i t i s a s u b j e c t u s e . W i t t g e n s t e i n d i s t i n g u i s h e d between a s u b j e c t and an o b j e c t use o f ' I ' i n t h e f o l l o w i n g way: There a r e two d i f f e r e n t cases i n t h e use of " I " ( o r "my") which I might c a l l "the use as o b j e c t " and "the use as s u b j e c t " . Examples o f t h e f i r s t k i n d a r e these: "My arm i s broken", " I have grown s i x i n c h e s " , " I have a bump on my f o r e h e a d " , "The wind blows my h a i r about". Examples o f t h e second k i n d a r e : " I see so-and-so", " I hear so-and-so", " I t r y t o l i f t . my arm", " I t h i n k i t w i l l r a i n " , " I have toothache". Ludwig W i t t g e n s t e i n , The Blue and Brown Books, B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1958), p T b T 4  0p.  c i t . , pp.66-67.  (Oxford:  50  The f i r s t use o f ' I ' , i t s use as o b j e c t , i s modelled the use o f a d e m o n s t r a t i v e phrase l i k e  after  ' t h i s person', where  'person' suggests a d e f i n i t e and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s e t o f physi c a l appearances.  Even h e r e , however, W i t t g e n s t e i n seems t o  say t h a t by u s i n g ' I ' we do not always mean t o p o i n t t o an o b j e c t , such as the person s p e a k i n g — a n y more than when someone p o i n t s t o t h e sun he i s not t h e r e b y p o i n t i n g both t o him5  s e l f and t o t h e sun. W i t t g e n s t e i n h i n t s a t what he means by t h e second c a t e g o r y o f t h e use o f ' I ' by s a y i n g t h a t t h e u t t e r a n c e ' I have t o o t h a c h e ' i s something l i k e a moan, n o t a sentence about a p a r t i c u l a r person ( f o r t h e u t t e r e r ) as ' I am s i x f e e t t a l l ' would be.  The second use o f ' I ' i s n o n - p e r s o n a l ,  T h i s i s what W i t t g e n s t e i n meant by s a y i n g t h a t ache' does n o t r e p l a c e 'L.W. has t o o t h a c h e ' .  ' I have t o o t h When I say ' I  have a t o o t h a c h e ' when I do have a t o o t h a c h e , t h e u t t e r a n c e t a k e s t h e p l a c e o f , o r i s l i k e a moan. mistaken.  The moan can't be  One o f t h e reasons W i t t g e n s t e i n had, i n the B l u e  Book, f o r s a y i n g t h e moan can't be m i s t a k e n i s t h a t a moan i s not an end r e s u l t o f an o b s e r v a t i o n o f a p a i n , a f t e r ing other p o i n t a b l e things.  reject-  He i s c a r e f u l t o add t h a t you  can p o i n t t o t h e p l a c e o f an ache.^ A primitive Op. c i t . , p.67. 6  p.68.  e x p r e s s i o n o f emotion such as a moan  51  ought t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from an a c t of speech.  An a c t of  speech r e q u i r e s a t l e a s t those c o n d i t i o n s t h a t have alreadybeen i n d i c a t e d f o r the use of the I - r u l e . number and are v e r y prominent and obvious.  These are two Firstly,  in  a  speaker must be a b l e t o mouth the sounds t h a t o t h e r speakers can mouth, or be a b l e t o t r a n s l a t e them i n t o some o t h e r mode of symbols.  Secondly, a speaker must be a b l e t o mouth these  sounds a t w i l l a c c o r d i n g t o the conventions  t h a t have been  e s t a b l i s h e d , i n v a r i o u s ways, by the community of  speakers.  A moan, i t seems s a f e to say, s t a r t e d out as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n of p a i n .  That i s to say, i t was  k i n d of i n v o l u n t a r y attachment to severe p a i n s . l e a r n e d t o pretond moanings.  a  Then we  t h a t we had p a i n s by f a l s e or i n s i n c e r e  Consequently, moans came to stand f o r bad  pains.  They became s i g n s of p a i n , whereas b e f o r e , when the moaning sound was was  a n a t u r a l , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n of p a i n , i t  at one w i t h , o r was  be used f r e e l y .  a c r i t e r i o n of p a i n .  Moans c o u l d  now  People c o u l d understand these uses because  of the p r e v i o u s h i s t o r y of moans, i . e . , they were once an i n t e g r a l p a r t of bad  pains.  What happened i n t h i s n a t u r a l h i s t o r y of moans was t h a t moans came t o say something.  I n t h i s new  c a p a c i t y , the  c o n d i t i o n s which are r e q u i r e d f o r an a c t of speech t o t a k e p l a c e were f u l f i l l e d . like  And  'I have a toothache'  so i n s t e a d of s a y i n g t h a t sentences can somehow r e p l a c e moans, we  52  should say t h a t a moan can r e p l a c e a sentence l i k e toothache'.  ' I have a  I n which case i t makes sense t o say t h a t the  moan says something and i s s a i d by someone i n d i c a t e d by the ' I ' , namely, a speaker, who  i s a p e c u l i a r s o c i a l being, i . e . ,  n e c e s s a r i l y one among o t h e r s . A c c o r d i n g t o the b r i e f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n g i v e n of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a n a l y s i s of the grammar of ' I ' , not every I-sentence i m p l i e s a r e f e r e n c e t o the speaker, not even t o the bare e x t e n t t h a t , as I have c l a i m e d , i t c o u l d be s a i d of every I-sentence ( e x c l u d i n g those which are q u o t a t i o n s o r are sentences about the word 'I') t h a t someone, a s p e a k e r , s a i d something.  From the p o i n t of view t h a t has been t a k e n  as a r e s u l t of the a n a l y s i s of the two d i f f e r e n t u t t e r a n c e s of " I see a bus", the Blue Book treatment i s m i s t a k e n .  The  W i t t g e n s t e i n of the Blue Book would say t h a t the u t t e r a n c e " ' I see a b u s ' — A " c o n t a i n s a n o n - p e r s o n a l use o f ' I ' . wants t o r i d us of the n o t i o n t h a t there, i s a r e a l , I h i d d e n w i t h i n the body.  He  essential  I n t r y i n g t o a c h i e v e .that aim, he  n e g l e c t e d the importance of ' I ' as a s a y e r , as the l i n g u i s t i c person, the language u s e r .  There i s more t o b e i n g a speaker  than j u s t a u n i q u e , p r i v a t e person t o which much p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n has been devoted c o n c e r n i n g i d e n t i t y .  Apprec-  i a t i o n of t h i s p o i n t s t o the source of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s m i s t a k e . He wrongly assumed t h a t 'speaker' and the same s o r t o f t h i n g .  'person' s i g n i f y r o u g h l y  But the r o l e of b e i n g a speaker has  53  c e r t a i n p e c u l i a r i t i e s which the r o l e o f b e i n g a person does not have.  B e i n g a speaker i s a r o l e i n a k i n d o f game t h a t  r e q u i r e s o t h e r speakers.  I t always makes sense t o t a k e i t  f o r g r a n t e d t h a t I-sentences l i k e feet t a l l , 1  ' I see a bus', ' I am s i x  'I have a t o o t h a c h e ' s a i d on a p p r o p r i a t e o c c a s i o n s  i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c game o f s a y i n g t h i n g s , i m p l i e s a r e f e r e n c e t o a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f t h i n g , t h e speaker, a p a r t i c i p a t o r i n the game of which t h e sentence i s a move.  I f I heard t h e  u t t e r a n c e ' I have a headache' coming from under t h e t a b l e I would be i n c l i n e d t o l o o k under t h e t a b l e f o r a person, r e c o g n i z a b l e by a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p h y s i c a l appearance.  However, my  u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the u t t e r a n c e , b e f o r e I l o o k e d under t h e t a b l e , a l r e a d y a s s u r e d me t h a t someone s a i d something. y e t t h i s someone has o n l y t h e r o l e o f a speaker.  As  This i s  s u f f i c i e n t and p r i m a r y f o r t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e ' I ' i n the sentence.  F i n d i n g a person under t h e t a b l e , I might s a y ,  "Oh, i t ' s you who have a headache"—meaning ' t h i s person' w i t h a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p h y s i c a l appearance.  Or, I might r e c o g -  n i z e a person by t h e v o i c e a l o n e and t h i s c o u l d take t h e p l a c e o f l o o k i n g under t h e t a b l e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s , I c o u l d have  s a i d , "Oh, i t ' s you who have a headache" even i f I d i d n o t l o o k under t h e t a b l e or r e c o g n i z e t h e v o i c e . s t r a n g e t o say t h i s but n o t u n i n t e l l i g i b l e .  I t would be I t i s not u n i n t e l -  l i g i b l e because t h e p r i m a r y r e f e r e n c e o f ' I ' i s t o t h e bare speaker.  The r o l e o f speaker i s something t h a t can be assumed  54  o n l y a f t e r some t r a i n i n g i n t h e p r a c t i s e o f a n a t u r a l l a n g uage . I t i s t r u e , as W i t t g e n s t e i n s a i d , t h a t when I say 'I f e e l p a i n ' I do n o t p i c k out one person from among o t h e r s , 7  i.e.,  I do not p o i n t t o a person.  I p o i n t t o t h e one speaking.  Nor need i t be s a i d t h a t  The r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s t h a t I  do not make up t h e meaning o f ' I ' every time I use i t .  This  has a l r e a d y been done f o r me by t h e c o n v e n t i o n s of language. I t i s a t r i v i a l f e a t u r e o f t h e employment o f language t h a t any g i v e n b i t o f employment i m p l i e s a u s e r . i n t h e Blue Book mean t o say t h a t  Does W i t t g e n s t e i n  ' I have t o o t h a c h e ' , u t t e r e d  t r u t h f u l l y , i s n o t a case o f employment of language? says t h e u t t e r a n c e  i s s i m i l a r t o a moan.  can by h a b i t r e p l a c e a moan. a sentence. The  He  No doubt a sentence  S u r e l y , then, i t ceases t o be  We can say o f i t t h a t n o t h i n g has been s a i d .  sentence has been used, but not t o say a n y t h i n g .  If i t  i s not an a c t o f speech then o f course the common r u l e f o r ' I ' does n o t a p p l y .  The concept o f speech does n o t cover  moans of t h a t s o r t . Some support f o r what has been s a i d about ' I ' as b e i n g always a r e f e r e n c e t o , or i n d i c a t i o n o f , a p a r t i c u l a r speaker as one among a community o f speakers ( e x c l u d i n g the s p e c i a l cases o f ' I ' a l r e a d y noted) can be gleaned from See W i t t g e n s t e i n , op. c i t • , p.68.  55  R y l e ' s e x p l a n a t i o n o f the word ' I ' i n the Concept o f Mind. R y i e f e l t i t was n e c e s s a r y t o d i s p e l the i l l u s i o n o f an I-substance o f the s o r t B e r k e l e y c l a i m e d i s denoted by ' I ' . R y l e ' s method was t o argue t h a t ' I ' i s n o t the k i n d of word t h a t can be t h e name of a n y t h i n g . 'index word' l i k e  He s a i d t h a t ' I ' i s an  'here' and 'now'.  The p o i n t i s t h a t these  words i n d i c a t e o n l y as l o n g as t h e p a r t i c u l a r moment d u r i n g which they a r e u t t e r e d .  The same goes f o r t h e words 'he',  'you',  R y i e wrote  'they' and 'we'.  that:  ' I ' can i n d i c a t e t h e p a r t i c u l a r person from whom t h e n o i s e ' I ' , o r t h e w r i t t e n mark ' I ' , i s s u e s ; 'you' can i n d i c a t e t h e one person who hears me say 'you', or i t can i n d i c a t e t h a t p e r s o n , whoever he i s (and t h e r e may be s e v e r a l ) who reads t h e 'you' t h a t I w r i t e , o r have p r i n t e d . I n a l l cases t h e p h y s i c a l occurrence o f an i n d e x word i s b o d i l y annexed t o what t h e word i n d i c a t e s . Hence 'you' i s not a queer name t h a t I and o t h e r s sometimes g i v e you; i t i s an i n d e x word which, i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r c o n v e r s a t i o n a l s e t t i n g , i n d i c a t e s t o y o u j u s t who i t i s t o whom I am a d d r e s s i n g my remarks. ' I ' i s n o t an e x t r a name f o r an e x t r a b e i n g ; i t i n d i c a t e s when I say o r w r i t e i t , t h e same i n d i v i d u a l who can a l s o be addressed by t h e proper name ' G i l b e r t R y i e ' . ' I ' i s not an a l i a s f o r ' G i l b e r t R y i e ' , i t i n d i c a t e s the person whom ' G i l b e r t R y i e ' names, when G i l b e r t R y i e uses 'I',° L a t e r on i n t h e c h a p t e r he s a i d : An ' I ' sentence i n d i c a t e s whom i n p a r t i c u l a r i t i s about by b e i n g i t s e l f u t t e r e d o r w r i t t e n by someone in particular.9 To these q u o t a t i o n s t h e r e s h o u l d be added: G i l b e r t R y i e , The Concept o f Mind. 1949), p.183. 9  p.l97.  (London:  Hutchinson,  56  ' I ' , i n my use of i t , i n d i c a t e s me. ^ By  always i n d i c a t e s me and o n l y  'me', R y l e means 'the person who u t t e r s  speaker.  ' I ' , i . e . , the  R y l e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h e 'index words' which a r e  c a l l e d p e r s o n a l pronouns i n d i c a t e o r mention persons but, i n a way d i f f e r e n t from the way names do.  The index words i n d i -  cate o n l y a t the time of t h e i r u t t e r a n c e and a r e dependent on the c i r c u m s t a n c e s a t the time o f t h e u t t e r a n c e .  He goes on  t o show, by examples, t h a t they can i n d i c a t e t h e v a r y i n g r o l e s t h a t persons assume when they t a l k about themselves as w e l l as the r o l e s t h a t o t h e r persons are o f t e n s a i d t o ta,ke, examples o f .both cases a r e , s o u l s , minds, s u b j e c t s o f experi e n c e , p r e s i d e n t s , husbands, .automobile d r i v e r s , and so on. But i n no case can t h e index words be t h e names of a n y t h i n g , though they can stand i n p l a c e o f names. From t h e q u o t a t i o n s o f f e r e d , and p a r t i c u l a r l y  from  the l a s t one, R y l e can be t a k e n t o mean t h a t ' I ' has the ' b e s e t t i n g ' p r o p e r t y o f always i n d i c a t i n g me i n whatever r o l e I assume when I use ' I ' . P r i m a r i l y , however, R y l e seems t o mean t h a t ' I ' i n d i c a t e s t h e speaker.  He does not want t o  say t h a t b e i n g a speaker i s something  d i f f e r e n t from b e i n g a  person.  Indeed, p a r t o f h i s purpose i n t h e Concept of Mind  i s t o show t h a t each of us i s n o t a complex o f b e i n g s .  His  t h e o r y of " h i g h e r o r d e r a c t i o n s " h e l p s him t o argue t h a t Op.  c i t . , p.198.  57  p o i n t , i n t h a t the t h e o r y e x p l a i n s the d i f f e r e n t senses of i n d e x words i n the same sentence. Though I have s a i d t h a t speakers should  be  distin-  g u i s h e d from p e r s o n s , I do n o t mean to suggest t h a t b e i n g  a  speaker i s t o be a d i f f e r e n t e n t i t y a l t o g e t h e r from what i s o r d i n a r i l y meant by b e i n g a person; any more t h a n I would t h a t b e i n g a t e n n i s p l a y e r i s t o be a k i n d of What I have been at pains to emphasize i s t h a t  'extra  say  being'..  ' I ' has  an  a d d i t i o n a l ' b e s e t t i n g ' p r o p e r t y which i s no l e s s i m p o r t a n t than the one noted by R y l e .  This a d d i t i o n a l p r o p e r t y  is  t h a t i t r e q u i r e s a p l u r a l i t y of d i f f e r e n t speakers as a cond i t i o n of i t s use. the use  A consequence of these two p r o p e r t i e s  of ' I ' i s t h a t any a c t of speech, s i n c e any  of  employ-  ment of language i m p l i e s a u s e r , r e q u i r e s as a c o n d i t i o n o f so d e s c r i b i n g something, t h a t t h e r e be a number of d i f f e r e n t speakers. An a c t of speech i s p o s s i b l e because of the t h a t t h e r e are c r e a t u r e s who speaking.  We may  o r d i n a r i l y we do. are made. had  can do the t h i n g s n e c e s s a r y f o r  r e f e r to these beings as  'persons'  and  They are the m a t e r i a l out of which speakers  As we have n o t e d , 'Wittgenstein i n the Blue Book  described  i n two  fact  our tendency to use  the word ' I ' ( o r 'person')  d i f f e r e n t senses, an o b j e c t sense and a s u b j e c t  The  o b j e c t sense r e f e r s to ' t h i s body' and the s u b j e c t  has  to do w i t h the  'subject or owner of  experiences'.  sense. sense  58  W i t t g e n s t e i n seems t o have d e n i e d t h a t t h e r e i s a  subject  sense of 'person', i . e . , t h e r e i s no i n d i v i d u a l mentioned i n a sentence l i k e ,  'I have a headache'.  answer, or the b e g i n n i n g lem.  Such a view i s an  of an answer, to the mind-body prob-  Does the a m b i g u i t y observed by W i t t g e n s t e i n , which i s  a r e f l e c t i o n of the mind-body problem, extend i n t o one's r o l e as a speaker? I submit t h a t i t does not, f o r the f o l l o w i n g r e a s ons.  A speaker i s one who  information.  can t e l l of e x p e r i e n c e s and  T e l l e r s depend ( i n the r e l e v a n t sense t h a t  s e l l e r s depend on buyers) on a u d i t o r s who The  can understand them.  t e l l e r , s a y e r , or speaker c o e x i s t s i n a l a r g e r  ment of ' t e l l e e s ' and  a l s o of o t h e r t e l l e r s ,  t e l l e r can be i d e n t i f i e d as such. stand a t a l e e n t a i l s t h a t you a man  give  environ-  s i n c e any  given  A l s o , b e i n g a b l e t o under-  can t e l l one.  L e t us  imagine  t e l l i n g a s t o r y about h i m s e l f to a group of a u d i t o r s .  No m a t t e r what strange  t a l e he t e l l s , whether i t i s about  some f a n t a s t i c dream he had  or about a f a c e l i f t i n g  the s t o r y makes sense r e s p e c t i n g who  operation,  i t i s t h a t i s the  sub-  j e c t of the s t o r y because of the p r i o r r e c o g n i t i o n b o t h by h i m s e l f and by the o t h e r s , t h a t i t i s the t e l l e r , r i g h t t h e r e at t h a t moment, who  i s 'being r e f e r r e d t o ' .  s t a t u s as a t e l l e r i s due ' s o c i a l ' conceptual  But the  to the p r i o r e x i s t e n c e  of  scheme t h a t has been d e s c r i b e d .  teller's the This  scheme i s the means whereby we u n d e r s t a n d what he means by  59  ' I ' i n t h e course of h i s t e l l i n g t h e s t o r y — e v e n i f t h e t a l e i s about an I (a person) roaming about i n i t s own dream. Or, imagine B e r k e l e y s i t t i n g i n a garden and s a y i n g to a group of people: ual  substance."  "The word ' I ' denotes s o u l o r s p i r i t -  U n l e s s t h e group were made up of v e r y s m a l l  c h i l d r e n he would not be d e f i n i n g a new word.  For adults,  the word a l r e a d y has a meaning d e s c r i b a b l e by s a y i n g t h a t i t i s an i n d e x word i n d i c a t i n g the speaker. i n g an o l d word,  Berkeley i s d e f i n -  r/e c o u l d imagine him s a y i n g , " I once wrote  a book i n which I s t a t e d t h a t the word ' I ' denotes s o u l o r s p i r i t u a l substance."  That statement, i n the g i v e n i m a g i n -  able context, i l l u s t r a t e s r e g a r d i n g the use o f ' I ' .  t h e f a m i l i a r c o n c e p t u a l scheme A t t h e moment o f u t t e r i n g t h e sen-  t e n c e , t h e speaker i s i d e n t i f i a b l e as an i n d i v i d u a l o f a c e r t a i n type.  A type which i s dependent on h i s b e i n g a b l e  to speak a t a l l . Now imagine a m e t a p h y s i c i a n s a y i n g , a f t e r f i n d i n g t h a t he had no e x p e r i e n c e of o t h e r minds, t h a t : " I alone exist".  That statement, t o o i s a t e l l i n g .  a b l e as a t e l l i n g .  I t i s understand-  The s t o r y t h e speaker wants t o convey  makes sense, again,, because of our c o n c e p t u a l scheme f o r ' I ' . I t i s no use s a y i n g t h a t what he wants t o say can't be s a i d . I t can be s a i d , by t h e grace o f t h e r u l e f o r ' I ' .  But t h e  p o i n t which I want t o make i s t h a t t h e speaker a t t h e time of the u t t e r a n c e does n o t t a k e p a r t i n t h e s t o r y he attempts  60  t o t e l l by " I a l o n e e x i s t " .  Not because t e l l i n g a t a l e i s  not l i v i n g i t , but because the t e l l i n g of the t a l e i n v o l v e s those t h i n g s which are n e c e s s a r y f o r an a c t of -speech, and t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , though they harbour the t e l l i n g of the t a l e , p r o h i b i t the a p p l i c a t i o n of the s t o r y to the of speakers,  which i n c l u d e s the s o l i p s i s t i c  I t may a sense of a speaker.  1  plurality  speaker.  be o b j e c t e d t h a t the m e t a p h y s i c i a n  i s using  I ' t h a t i s not u l t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d to h i s r o l e as I n t h a t case, t h e n , even h i s s t o r y would be  unin-  t e l l i g i b l e , f o r i t would v i o l a t e the b a s i c r u l e s f o r the i n t e l l i g i b l e use of ' I ' . S o l i p s i s m i s t h e r e f o r e speakable as an h y p o t h e s i s  about the speaker, i . e . , one among o t h e r s .  But the i d e a of s o l i p s i s m c o n t r a d i c t s the c o n d i t i o n s of i t s statement.  61  PART I V  This In  the f i r s t  is  outside  arise  concluding  section  problems  section  (such  contains  together  with  eralized  evaluation  lines  i s made u p o f t h r e e  I elaborate  out of p r e d i c a t i n g  second  part  on t h e i d e a  as t h e mind-body certain  things  problem)  a summary a n d r e t r o s p e c t  of Price's  paper  the speaker which  o f the speaker.  some o f i t s c o n c l u s i o n s .  o f thought  that  sections.  of Part I I I  In the t h i r d ,  i s made  The  a  gen-  following the  of part I I I .  1. To is  outside  senses 'I'  t i e up the reasons  the mind-body  of 'I'), I shall  h a s two u s e s ,  t h e n he does  ' I 'denotes  that  together  usage. must  be, t a k e n  indicated the  by  soul  they  Rather,  problem say that  same t h i n g  when  i n both  draw  cases,  as the r o o t  manner o f h i s e x i s t e n c e .  Berkeley  the word  d i d when he  substance.  senses  I don't  mean  o f ' I ' o u t o f common  the thing  that  of 'I'.  i s told Just  b y t h e two  a n d one f o r t h e m i n d ,  reference  ' I 'and something  the speaker  someone s a y s  that  or s p i r i t u a l  merely  I say that  (as expressed  one f o r t h e b o d y  the very  said  why  speaks  i s , and  The s p e a k e r i s  of h i s situation or  as t h i s  fact  makes  62  B e r k e l e y ' s e x p l a n a t i o n o f ' I ' u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , so does i t make the  d u a l i s t i c mind-body s t o r y u n d e r s t a n d a b l e .  They are a l l  of them 'hypotheses' about t h e speaker; but s a y i n g t h a t ' I ' i n d i c a t e s t h e speaker d e r i v e s from a r u l e o f language.  The  a l l e g e d m i n d - i n d i c a t i n g use o f ' I ' , as i n t h e sentence ' I understand what you say', has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been thought t o mention an u t t e r l y p r i v a t e , u n s o c i a l a r e a .  But, metaphoric-  a l l y s p e a k i n g , t h e r u l e f o r ' I ' shows t h a t ' I ' does n o t , i n i t s p r i m a r y sense, harbour a p r i v a t e , region.  inaccessible-to-others  N e v e r t h e l e s s the scheme which t h e r u l e suggests  a l l o w s us t o t a l k of the ' I ' as though i t i n h a b i t e d such a place.  The d i s t i n c t i o n between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e senses o f  ' I ' i s m a i n t a i n e d , o r made p o s s i b l e , by u s i n g t h e r u l e f o r ' I ' , i . e . , by u t t e r i n g i n t e l l i g i b l e I - s e n t e n c e s .  A l l senses  or pseudo-senses o f ' I ' t h a t e x c l u d e t h e speaker a l t o g e t h e r are  n o t f a l s e o r p o s s i b l y t r u e ; they a r e s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y  a c c o r d i n g t o t h e r u l e which a r i s e s out of t h e customary usage of " I ' .  There a r e , t h e r e f o r e , two senses of 'sense'  to be found i n the phrase "senses o f ' I ' " . are  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e as f o l l o w s :  These two senses  (1) o r i g i n a l speaker sense  and (2) senses which a r e dependent upon o r g e t t h e i r  'life'  from ( 1 ) . I f t h e speaker i s o u t s i d e t h e mind-body problem, i t f o l l o w s t h a t he i s o u t s i d e t h e 'other minds problem well.  1  as  T h i s may h e l p t o e x p l a i n our p e r s i s t e n t tendency t o  63  r e g a r d t h e t a l k o f s o l i p s i s m as a b s u r d . a b s u r d i t y i n c l i n e s us t o s a y We  'we  The  f e e l i n g of i t s  s p e a k , t h e r e f o r e we a r e ' .  t e n d t o t h i n k t h a t i f t h e r e i s no s e n s e i n d o u b t i n g t h a t  t h e w o r l d i s p e o p l e d w i t h s p e a k e r s t h e n t h e r e i s no p o i n t i n the doubts about o t h e r minds.  However, t h e o t h e r m i n d s p r o b -  l e m , t h e m i n d - b o d y p r o b l e m , and B e r k e l e y ' s d e n o t a t i o n o f ' I ' are i n t e l l i g i b l e .  The r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r ,  as s p e a k e r , i s e a s i l y r e c o g n i z a b l e and u n m y s t e r i o u s and i s t h e f o u n t a i n , so t o s p e a k , o f t h e s e p r o b l e m s and senses of ' I ' . example,  dependent  • W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e o t h e r minds problem, f o r  i t i s n o t t h e s p e a k e r whose e x i s t e n c e i s p u t  question.  he  into  I t i s h i s p l a y i n g o f t h e game o f s p e a k i n g t h a t  makes t h e p r o b l e m p o s s i b l e .  The a n s w e r ,  t h e n , 'we  speak,  t h e r e f o r e we a r e ' i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a c o r r e c t s o l u t i o n o f the o t h e r minds problem. u t i o n on t h e g r o u n d s  I t c a n o f c o u r s e be g i v e n as a  that speaking i s a kind  No d o u b t t h e word  of mental a c t .  ' o u t s i d e ' , as i t h a s b e e n u s e d  here, contains v a r i o u s hidden assumptions. a metaphor.  I t i s , of course,  The u s e o f t h e m e t a p h o r h a s b e e n i l l u s t r a t e d  saying that the t e l l e r  o f an h i s t o r i c a l  t h e e p i s o d e , i . e . , he i s p i c t u r e d i n a d i f f e r e n t The  by  autobiographical  e p i s o d e i s o u t s i d e o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h he t e l l s  i n a different place.  sol-  of  situation,  s i t u a t i o n of the t e l l i n g i s  s p a t i a l l y and t e m p o r a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e e p i s o d e w h i c h i s told.  From t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h e e p i s o d e , t h e p r e s e n t  64  speaker, .the t e l l e r o f t h e e p i s o d e , i s n o t i n the episode's bounds.  But the speaker, by h i s s p e a k i n g , has drawn the  bounds of t h e s t o r y . told.  There i s no o t h e r way t h e s t o r y can be  I have made t h e l a r g e r and e q u a l l y obvious c l a i m t h a t  the speaker i s always n e c e s s a r i l y o u t s i d e what i s t o l d .  In  the same way, i t seems t h a t the sounds he mouths a r e o u t s i d e what these sounds mean. o n l y a t e m p o r a l one.  This f a c t o r o f n e c e s s i t y i s n o t  I t s p r i n g s from what i s r e q u i r e d t o  p l a y the game o f speaking. 2.  The  d i s c u s s i o n i n p a r t I I I began w i t h the aim of  e x p l o r i n g t h e concept of speech and i t s r e l a t i o n t o a p l u r a l i t y of speakers.  A sample speech s i t u a t i o n was t a k e n t o  see i f a r u l e c o u l d be found c o n c e r n i n g t h e symbol which i n d i c a t e s the speaker.  F o l l o w i n g the s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t from  the r u l e s o f a game such as t e n n i s one could determine c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of the w o r l d t h a t would make the p r a c t i c e o f the game p o s s i b l e , i t was found t h a t t h e r e a r e a t l e a s t two world-features was  n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e p r a c t i c e o f t h e r u l e which  e l i c i t e d from t h e sample speech s i t u a t i o n .  c l a i m e d , a r e (1) a p l u r a l i t y o f speakers and ( 2 )  Those, i t was creatures  who c o u l d u t t e r sounds a t w i l l . To be t r u t h f u l , i t seemed t o me t h a t an odd jump was  t a k e n from t a l k about t h e concept o f speech t o t a l k about  65  ' I , a symbol f o r the speaker. 1  essary.  N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t seemed nec-  The e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s , I b e l i e v e , can be seen by  comparing the concept of speech w i t h the concept of experience.  I don't t h i n k you can t a l k about the concept of  e x p e r i e n c e w i t h o u t t a l k i n g about e x p e r i e n c e r s .  Similarly,  t a l k about the concept of speech i n v o l v e s t a l k i n g about speakers.  I t so happens t h a t the i n s t r u m e n t s of speech  i n c l u d e symbols f o r the speaker and these are an e l e m e n t a l p a r t of the employment of symbols i n speech.  Indeed, speakers  are as v i t a l t o symbol u s i n g as the a c t u a l symbols themselves. I t was not c l a i m e d t h a t t h e r e are a number of speakers i n the w o r l d on the grounds t h a t t h e r e i s a r u l e f o r the use o f a symbol t h a t i n d i c a t e s d i f f e r e n t s p e a k e r s . V/hat i s c l a i m e d i s t h a t the w o r l d i s such t h a t the r u l e can be and i s p r a c t i s e d . The r u l e which d i f f e r e n t i a t e s speakers i s not v i o l a t e d or c o n t r a d i c t e d by s o l i p s i s m i f s o l i p s i s m i s t a k e n as an h y p o t h e s i s about a p a r t i c u l a r speaker.  What i s f a l s i f i e d  or i g n o r e d by such a s o l i p s i s m a r e those c o n d i t i o n s which make the p r a c t i c e of the r u l e p o s s i b l e .  The q u e s t i o n ,  do you know the r u l e i s p r a c t i s e d ? " , i s not a t e l l i n g  "How one.  F o r the r u l e has been e l i c i t e d from the w o r l d , from s i t u a t i o n s i n the w o r l d , as i n the case of the two u t t e r a n c e s of " I see a bus".  I t i s not an a p r i o r i r u l e .  l o g i c a l - r u l e - l i k e properties.  But i t does have  A c c o r d i n g t o the r u l e , I can't  66  s a y " 1 s a i d x' and 'He s a i d x' mean e x a c t l y t h e same t h i n g " . 1  The  c o n v e n t i o n i s s o common and o v e r w h e l m i n g  s t r a i n t o i m a g i n e what i t i s t h a t to the r u l e .  that i ti s a  c a n ' t be s a i d ,  according  I t does n o t mean " I s a i d what he s a i d " o r e v e n  "I s a i d x w i t h h i s v o c a l chords".  As f a r a s t h e r u l e  goes,  " ' I s a i d x' and 'He s a i d x' mean e x a c t l y t h e same t h i n g " i s meaningless  or a kind of contradiction.  Wittgenstein analagous  I n t h e B l u e Book,  maintained that that kind of meaninglessness i s  to saying  "'3 x 18 i n c h e s  "This", said Wittgenstein,  won't go i n t o .3 f e e t ' " .  1  " i s a g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e and s t a t e s  2 a logical impossibility." the  Wittgenstein's  sentence " I can't f e e l h i s pain".  reference  i sto  While i t i s true  that  our sentence s t a t e s a g r a m m a t i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y , as i t were, I still ity  think that there  i s a sense i n which t h e i m p o s s i b i l -  o r t h e unusualness o f i t a r i s e s out of f e a t u r e s  world;  i n t h e sense t h a t the world  of the r u l e . the world part  Indeed, t h a t k i n d  of the  submits t o the p r a c t i c e  of u t i l i z a t i o n of f a c t s i n  i s one o f t h e p r i n c i p a l p o i n t s  i t was t h e t a s k o f  I I I of t h i s t h e s i s to consider. What v a l u e  does t h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f  s p e e c h h a v e f o r the p r o b l e m o f o t h e r m i n d s ? that speakers are outside  t h e problem.  "'"The B l u e and Brown B o o k s , Loc. c i t .  p. 56.  I t was s a i d  The c o n t r i b u t i o n o f  67  the d i s c u s s i o n t o the problem i s the attempt t o show t h a t whatever the f i n a l a n a l y s i s w i l l be as t o what 'having a mind' or 'having s e n s a t i o n s  and  thoughts' c o n s i s t s o f ,  can be no doubt, I b e l i e v e doubt i s i n c o h e r e n t  there  here, that I  am a speaker and t h a t b e i n g a speaker i s a form of a c t i v i t y which i n v o l v e s o t h e r speakers.  This i s j u s t as much a r o c k  bottom f a c t as P r i c e ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t we get new by means of symbols.  The  information  o t h e r minds problem comes about  by p r e d i c a t i n g c e r t a i n t h i n g s about s p e a k e r s , or at l e a s t one  p a r t i c u l a r speaker.  I mean such t h i n g s as p r i v a t e sen-  s a t i o n s which o n l y he can know.  And  from t h a t s t a r t i n g p o i n t  the other minds s c e p t i c endeavours t o s e a r c h i n t o how knowledge of other people's s e n s a t i o n s . t h a t he operates w i t h a t r u e and  he g e t s  I t appears t o  him  s p e c i a l sense of ' I ' but  i n f a c t i t i s a secondary sense which d e r i v e s from h i s r o l e as a speaker.  3I n some r e s p e c t s P r i c e , i n "Our Existence  Evidence f o r the  of Other Minds", d e a l t w i t h the c o n d i t i o n s  m e a n i n g f u l speech.  He s a i d , i n e f f e c t , t h a t the  "Look! there i s the bus!"  of  utterance  can be e x p l a i n e d by assuming t h a t  the u t t e r e r i s a l s o a p e r c e i v e r and t h i n k e r .  These assump-  t i o n s can be viewed as c o n d i t i o n s of the m e a n i n g f u l use Op.  c i t . , p.  439.  of  68  the u t t e r a n c e .  At any r a t e , f o r P r i c e , at l e a s t two  of the  c o n d i t i o n s of m e a n i n g f u l speech are the m e n t a l a c t s of  per-  c e i v i n g and t h i n k i n g . A c o n c l u s i o n of t h i s t h e s i s i s t h a t P r i c e missed an a l l - i m p o r t a n t c o n d i t i o n of the employment of n a t u r a l l a n guage.  I t i s t h a t the w o r l d must c o n t a i n or at l e a s t have  c o n t a i n e d , a p l u r a l i t y of speakers. t h e r e must be, and a r e , c r e a t u r e s who was  v a g u e l y f e l t by P r i c e .  He  That, f o r our language, can use n o i s e s a t w i l l ,  wrote:  I t may be o b j e c t e d t h a t one cannot l e a r n t o understand language u n l e s s one a l r e a d y b e l i e v e s (or knows?) t h a t the n o i s e s one hears are produced by a mind other t h a n o n e s e l f . For i f n o t , how c o u l d i t ever occur to one t h a t those queer n o i s e s which one hears are symb o l s at a l l ? Must one not assume from the s t a r t t h a t these n o i s e s are i n t e n d e d t o stand f o r something?^ P r i c e ' s argument a g a i n s t t h i s can be d e s c r i b e d , somewhat i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c a l l y , as f o l l o w s :  s i n c e I do not observe an  a c t of i n t e n d i n g an o b j e c t to be a symbol, I must l e a r n t h a t i t i s so i n t e n d e d by i n t r o s p e c t i n g the use of symbols i n my own  thinking.  The  o b j e c t i o n to P r i c e ' s r e l i a n c e on  intro-  s p e c t i o n has a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d i n s e c t i o n 2 of p a r t I I . According  t o P r i c e , the d i s c o v e r y t h a t symbols mean  "...  begins by n o t i c i n g a c o r r e l a t i o n between a c e r t a i n type of o b j e c t and a c e r t a i n type of n o i s e , as one might n o t i c e a c o r r e l a t i o n between any two Op.  c i t . , p.  439.  t y p e s of e n t i t i e s which are  69 frequently  combined,  say, thunder and l i g h t n i n g . "  Of course one must p r i v a t e l y pay a t t e n t i o n to the l e a r n i n g of symbols and r e f l e c t i o n w i l l supplement tion.  However, P r i c e d i d not  instruc-  n o t i c e that symbols i n our  n a t u r a l languages are used i n sentences i n such a way a speaker says something to a hearer, who What he n e g l e c t e d to n o t i c e was  that  i s another speaker.  that t h i s i s j u s t as much a  part of l e a r n i n g to use symbols as l e a r n i n g to recognize the sounds and f i g u r e s of the symbols themselves. speakers are parts  Different  of the meaning-atomosphere of the symbols.  The language P r i c e d e s c r i b e s a language one speaks.  h i s l e a r n i n g of i s not  In some respects  h i s language  b l e s what W i t t g e n s t e i n c a l l e d a 'private language'.  resemThe  d i f f e r e n c e i s that P r i c e t a c i t l y admits that he l e a r n s language, he does not invent  i t , nor i s i t only about  this private  sensations. The problem of other minds must be seen i n a l i g h t d i f f e r e n t from the one i n which i t appears i n P r i c e ' s Evidence f o r the Existence  of Other Minds".  have t r i e d to show i s that though there may problems connected w i t h interminable ^Op.  c i t . , p.  Part  "Our  of what I  indeed be s p e c i a l  doubts about other  439.  P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , German Text and E n g l i s h T r a n s l a t i o n by G.E.M. Anscombe ( 2 n d ed.; Oxford: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1 9 5 8 ) , pars. 2 4 4 - 2 7 0 .  70  people's s e n s a t i o n s and s i l e n t thoughts, the problems would not a r i s e i f there was not a p l u r a l i t y of speakers.  71  BIBLIOGRAPHY B e r k e l e y , George. The P r i n c i p l e s of Human Knowledge. La S a l l e : Open C o u r t , 1946. Malcolm, Norman. " W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s Philosophical I n v e s t i g a t i o n s " , P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, L X I I I (1954), 530-559 "Knowledge of Other Minds", J o u r n a l P h i l o s o p h y . LV (1958), 969-978. Moore, G.E. P h i l o s o p h i c a l Studies. P a u l , Trench, Trubner, 1922.  London:  of Kegan  Plato. "Apology", The D i a l o g u e s of P l a t o , t r a n s . B. J o w e t t , New York: Random House, I . P r i c e , H.H. "Our Evidence f o r the E x i s t e n c e of Other Minds", P h i l o s o p h y , X I I I (1938), 425-456. Ryie, G i l b e r t . 1949.  The  Concept of Mind.  London:  Hutchinson,  Strawson, P e t e r . C r i t i c a l N o t i c e of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , Mind, n . s . L X I I I (1954), 70-99. Wisdom, John. Other Minds. B l a c k w e l l , 1956. Wittgenstein, 6 t h imp.  Ludwig. London:  The Blue and B l a c k w e l l , 1958.  2nd  imp.  Oxford:  Basil  Tractatus Logico-Phiiosophicus. R o u t l e d g e , Kegan P a u l , 1955. Brown Books.  Oxford:  Basil  . Philosophical Investigations. German Text and :English T r a n s l a t i o n by G.E.M. Anscombe. ' 2nd ed. i O x f o r d : B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1958.  

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