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Department of PHILOSOPHY

The University of British Columbia, Vancouver 8, Canada.

Date September 18, 1961.
According to H. H. Price in "Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds", the belief in the existence of other minds is not one that can be strictly proven. The most that can be obtained in support of the belief is good reasons for holding it.

Price suggests that the best evidence derives from one's understanding of language. An exposition of, and a commentary on, Price's paper are given. Price argues that if I can verify a sentence which I hear and which I did not utter but which states something I was not in a position to know, or did not at the moment of hearing believe--then the utterance stands as good evidence for the existence of an other mind. From analogy he argues that since he uses symbols to refer to objects in the world, the foreign use of the same symbols must have occurred as a result of perceiving and thinking on the part of the other user. If the foreign utterance gave old information or was a platitude I already believed, then it is not impossible that the hearer was unconsciously the cause of the symbolic noises coming
from the other body. There are, according to Price, factual examples of intrusions of words and sentences from one's own 'unconscious'.

In the commentary, criticism is directed at Price's belief that he learns that symbols mean by introspecting how he uses them. Also, the need, for the purposes of his argument, to verify alleged foreign utterances is challenged. This raises a discussion of Price's use of a theory of 'unconscious believings'. It is concluded that Price was barking up the wrong tree in replacing solipsism by the possibility of one's unconscious animation of other bodies.

The suggestion is put forward that reference to the understanding of language as a means of settling the other minds problem is inadequate if it does not take into account the scheme of personal pronouns, particularly the pronoun 'I', since the rules governing their use are like rules for the separating of things, similar to the distinguishing of things in the world in order to make up a game.

As an attempt to make up for the inadequacy mentioned, a study of aspects of the concept of speech is made in part III. It emerges that the existence of a plurality of speakers is a presupposition of saying that someone says something, or even that propositions say something. Reference is made to the common grammar of 'I'. Relevant passages regarding 'I' in Wittgenstein's The Blue and Brown Books
and Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* are examined.

It is concluded that the primary sense of 'I' refers to, or, indicates the speaker, and that philosophically important senses of 'I' derive from that original sense. The speaker is claimed to be outside the mind-body problem as well as the other minds problem. Consequently, though it is possible for a speaker to refer to himself in the solipsistic manner, or to entertain doubts about the reality of other people's feelings, it makes no sense for him to imagine that his role as a speaker in a community of speakers thereby vanishes.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I wish to express my indebtedness to Prof. D. G. Brown for his advice during the preparation of this thesis and for his lectures concerning the set of philosophical problems of which this thesis merely scratches the surface.
In 1938, in a paper entitled "Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds", H. H. Price put forth what he called an argument from language for the existence of other minds.¹ What follows in this part of the thesis is a descriptive exposition of Price's paper. The first thing I do is to mention very briefly Price's reaction towards other treatments of the problem. These other treatments or considerations I call the 'environment' of the argument. Then, after a quick look at a short form of the argument itself, I attempt to itemize various descriptions that Price uses to build up his argument. These descriptions refer, for example, to such topics as introspection and the role of symbols in certain mental acts. Following the course of the paper, I return to a fuller exposition of Price's argument, together with some of the consequences Price draws from it. The exposition as a whole concludes with a brief consideration of what Price says about volitional and emotive language. Part II of this thesis is a commentary on various points in Price's paper.

(A) We ought not, according to Price, to expect

that strict proof of the existence of other minds is avail-
able. The certainty which follows upon formal demonstration
in logic and mathematics is not the sort of thing we should
hope to find concerning other minds. What we should look for
is good reasons for holding the belief that there are other
minds.

(B) Price distinguishes between the genesis of a
and Reality of Objects of Perception" had said that questions
of the form, 'How do we come to be convinced that other minds
exist?' are psychological questions and not properly matters
for philosophy.² For Moore, as apparently for Price, the
philosophical question is 'What reasons have we for our belief
in the existence of other minds?' To illustrate the distinc-
tion: it seems possible that the ways in which people come
to believe that there are other minds differ in kind and per-
versity; some of us may have absorbed the belief in the way
children are led to believe in Santa Claus, by being told
wonderful stories about a mythical person; in my case, at
any rate, no matter how hard I try, I cannot discover how or
when I first believed that there were other minds. Price's
distinction suggests that both ignorance as to genesis and

²G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies, (London: Kegan Paul,
of Objects of Perception" first appeared in Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, 1905-6.
alleged knowledge as to genesis do not matter, what counts for philosophy is the public justification of the belief by arguable standards of consistency and evidence.

(C) Price sees no reason to accept an Intuitive theory about other people's thoughts, emotions and other mental states. By the 'Intuitive Theory' he means a cluster of theories whose common element is the postulating of a special way of knowing which he calls "extrospective acquaintance". On such a theory we can sometimes have direct access to the mental states of others, like the direct access by means of introspection which we have to our own mental states.

(D) There is a "plausible but inconclusive argument" which might lead the credulous to think there is some special way of knowing describable by extrospective acquaintance. In his own words:

... unless there is some extrospective acquaintance, the beliefs which each one of us holds concerning other minds could not have the high degree of probability which some of them obviously do have.³

No doubt he meant to contrast probability with certainty; then we can say: unless it is at least sometimes certain that S is the case, how can it ever be highly probable that something is evidence for S? But this reformulation has its difficulties. What is the relation between extro- and introspective acquaintance and certainty? Does he mean that some-

³Price, op. cit., p. 428.
times other people's states are as incorrigible to me as mine are to me all of the time? That is to say, sometimes I actually have other people's thoughts, pains, images, etc.? Or is this acquaintance an infallible searchlight that ranges over my mental states whenever I wish and sometimes over the mental states of others—a kind of observing mechanism? In passing, it should be mentioned that John Wisdom, in Other Minds, put a question similar to our reformulation of Price's "plausible but inconclusive argument". While considering the possibility that many or all of our friends may be sad when they show signs of being happy, the possibility being there because it is not certain they are not sad, Wisdom asks in a footnote: "And if it isn't ever certain how can it sometimes be probable that behind A is a?"^4

(E) The simple Behaviouristic interpretation of other minds statements is rejected by Price because it fails to give an adequate account of one's own mind or mental states. My mental states have more in them than only bodily movements. He writes:

... what about statements concerning my own mind: These can be verified or refuted by introspection; so they are not to be analysed in a purely Behaviouristic way. But this leaves us with an intolerable asymmetry between statements about myself and statements about my neighbor. It seems perfectly obvious that words like 'hear', 'see', 'fear', 'think', have

exactly the same meaning when I apply them to my neighbor as when I apply them to myself.\footnote{Price, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 428-429. All succeeding pages references in this part of the thesis will refer to Price's paper.}

Having pointed to aspects of the environment of Price's main argument, we can now carry on with that argument. We are given material to be used as evidence for the existence of other minds. This material consists of various utterances that people make in certain circumstances. The first one of these is roughly a paradigm for all the others. We are waiting at a bus stop when someone says, "Look! there is the bus!"\footnote{p. 430.} I look around and see that it is approaching. A number of things have happened in this situation: (1) I heard some noises (2) took them as being words (3) understood what was said (4) verified the truth of what was said (5) gained some true information, since I did not know the bus was approaching. If I made a game of waiting at bus stops to encourage this situation and found that it often does happen, I would have evidence that those utterances proceeding from other bodies were due in part, at least, to their having of mental events similar to my own perceivings of the approaching buses. At any rate, the situation gives us a kind of \textit{corpus delecti}, the proof that a crime has been done. The ascription of the mental state of perceiving to the utterers of the noises is
a solution of the crime, the criminal is apprehended by explaining the mystery of 'getting new information'. The newer the information is, the deeper the mystery will be. For if the situation just gives you information you already have, it is not impossible that in some way you 'caused' the apparently intrusive utterance. But you could not have 'caused' the utterance if you did not have the information in the first place.

"Look! there is the bus!" like "There are snakes in the teapot" can be called informative singular propositions. But good evidence can be obtained from informative general propositions also, i.e., ones which involve acts of thinking, e.g., "some cats have no tails", "all gold dissolves in aqua regia". These are generalizations from a number of single perceptual acts (or singular propositions). They can be confirmed, if not verified.

It follows for Price that platitudes already believed by the hearer would not be very good evidence for the existence of other minds. Statements like, "Today is Saturday", "All cats have whiskers", "2 + 2 = 4" are not informative in the empirical sense found in "Look! there is the bus!". He notes, however, that there are "... novel tautologies as well as stale ones". The hearing of novel platitudes could
be evidence for foreign acts of thought. In the case of mathematical statements, it is possible to have an intrusion of new entailments not thought of before.

Having collected three kinds of utterances or "situations", since more is involved than just the utterance, namely, the hearing, understanding, and verifying by the hearer, Price suggests that three conditions must be kept in mind if the situations are to be used as evidence. (1) The sounds must be symbolic for me.\(^\text{10}\) That is to say, the sounds must symbolize some object or objects to me. He means that I must understand them. (2) The sounds must symbolize something true or false. I must be able either to verify the utterance or know what the world would be like if the utterance were true. (3) The utterance must give me new information. As we have seen, he has given two senses to 'new information' (a) information about the world and (b) the intrusion of novel tautologies and unthought of entailments. The information must be such that there would be very little suspicion of the sort Price feels concerning utterances which give old information, already believed, and stale tautologies. The suspicion being that the mental act behind the utterance is one's own in some queer way.

These conditions are secured in the utterance, "Look! there is the bus!" of the first situation. How am I

\(^{10}\) p. 441.
justified in believing that another mind or mental act not my own is responsible for the utterance? Price's answer is, of course, the substance of his main argument. But description and argument are entwined here and it is impossible to give an account of his argument without expounding his descriptions. The following is an attempt to itemize his descriptions.

(1) There is something called introspection. It is the awareness of one's mental states and acts. It is independent of mental acts (and states) in that it illuminates or reveals them. Thus I can introspect my perceivings. That is to say, I can notice that I perceive things over and above the act of perceiving itself. Perceiving is a type of "cognitive act". A "cognitive act", for Price, seems to be the consciousness of an object.

(2) By a mixture of introspection and perception I find that particular noises often go with particular cognitive acts. The noises may be "audible or imaged".\(^1\) A meaningful sentence is a complex of "noises" which go with a corresponding complex of objects found in a cognitive act. When the noises, "Here is a black cat" occur, "... it is usually accompanied by a specific sort of cognitive act, namely, the seeing and recognizing of a black cat".\(^2\)

\(^1\)p. 442  \(^2\)p. 443.
(3) The conjunction of cognitive acts and their characteristic noises, established in the language used, results in the mental act of thinking. "Thinking", Price suspects, is "... awareness by means of symbols".\(^\text{13}\) The occurrence of symbols, "sensible" or "imaged", "... is an integral part of thinking itself".\(^\text{14}\) But mere accompaniment of noises (auditory or imaged) with cognitive acts would not allow the noises to stand as symbols. Price is not sure whether symbols are an integral part of perceiving also. He says if they are present in perceiving they would not merely accompany perceiving, they would be instrumental to it.

(4) Noises are "instrumental to" cognitive acts in two ways. The hearing and understanding together of foreign born noises is an act of "imposed thinking". This happening is expressed by saying the proposition is entertained. What happens in "imposed thinking" is that "cognitive dispositions" are awakened in me because, in being a language user, I am so trained that when I hear my language noises, the ideas or images of the objects for which the words or arrangement of words stand, are aroused. Thus I know what it would be like for the utterance to be true, i.e.,

\(^{13}\) p. 443. \(^{14}\) p. 443.
correspond with a state of affairs in the world. "Spontaneous thinking", on the other hand, as it is expressed, say, in "Look! there is the bus!" during a situation in which I am the one seeing the bus, is due to a cognitive act of my own.

(5) It is not necessary to have experienced the precise state of affairs signified by an imposed utterance in order to understand the utterance. For as long as I have learned to use the same separate noise-symbols in my own acts of "spontaneous thinking", I can form a picture of what the state of affairs in the world would be like if the utterance were true.

We should now be in a position to see how one is justified in believing that the utterance "Look! there is the bus!" is related to a mental act (or acts--thinking and perceiving) which is not an episode in my biography. I have discovered by introspection that such sounds occur as media of a mental act, namely, the mental act of thinking. The sounds (audible or imaged) act as the means by which the mental act is accomplished. Therefore it is likely that the foreign born noises are similarly related to a mental act not my own. Here we strike the bottom of the argument. Price says:

The form of the argument is: situations a and b resemble each other in respect of a characteristic $c_1$; situation a also has the characteristic $c_2$; therefore situation b probably has the characteristic $c_2$ likewise. The noises I am now aware of closely resemble certain ones which I have been
aware of before (in technical phraseology, they are tokens of the same type), and the resemblance covers both their qualities and their manner of combination. Those which I was aware of before functioned as symbols in acts of spontaneous thinking. Therefore these present ones probably resemble them in that respect too; they too probably function as instruments to an act of spontaneous thinking, which in this case is not my own.\(^\text{15}\)

Price distinguishes between the analogical character of this argument and its value as establishing an explanation "... of an otherwise mysterious set of occurrences",\(^\text{16}\) i.e., the intelligibility or symbolic nature of the noises for me. One way of looking at the hypothesis established by the analogical argument is to see it as an explanation which he describes in the following way:

... if there is another mind which uses the same symbols as I do and combines them according to the same principles, and if this mind has produced these noises in the course of an act of spontaneous thinking; then I can account for the occurrence of these noises, and for the fact that they are combined in one of these mathematically improbable combinations. When I say these facts are 'explained' or 'accounted for' by our hypothesis, I mean that if the hypothesis is true these facts are instances of a rule which is already known to hold good in a large number of instances. The rule is, that symbolically-functioning combinations are produced in the course of acts of spontaneous thinking; and the instances in which it is already known to hold good have been presented to me by introspection.\(^\text{17}\)

He adds that the hypothesis is conceivable and verifiable in the weak sense, that is to say, it has explanatory power because we know what the world would be like if it were true

\(^{15}\)pp. 445-446. \(^{16}\)p. 446. \(^{17}\)p. 446.
and we know what kind of evidence will support the hypothesis.

The argument is designed to justify our belief in the existence of other minds. But Price has been concerned mainly with mental acts which somehow involve symbols. What he has tried to establish is the existence of language users. He nowhere suggests that when we speak of other minds we refer only to symbol-involved mental acts. Nevertheless, the argument is restricted to mental acts which involve symbols. That he is definite in saying that only an argument from the use of symbols will give us reasons for believing in the existence of other minds can be seen in the following quotation, "If I never understood any of the noises or marks which I hear or see, I should have no evidence for the existence of other minds". He means that in terms of the argument, no evidence can be obtained if I do not understand "any of the noises or marks . . . I hear or see". But there may be different kinds of evidence. He admits that in the case of animals, unless they use symbols we can understand, the evidence would have to be different in kind. He said:

The suggestion I wish to examine is that one's evidence for the existence of other minds is derived primarily from the understanding of language. And also:

I am concerned simply with an epistemological

\(^{18}\) p. 448. \(^{19}\) p. 429.
problem: how the understanding of language gives each of us reason to believe in the existence of other minds.

Understanding a symbol, for Price, entails that something is common between the speaker and the hearer and this is the object for which the symbol stands. Without a world of objects common to speaker and hearer, the existence of symbols would not be possible. There must be an external world. For Price, any evidence for the existence of other minds must also be evidence for the existence of the external world. There is yet another restriction due to the nature of his argument. Unless it can be established that animals use symbols, we would have no reason to suppose that they are conscious in the sense in which we are conscious of the world.

Price seems to mean that we must somehow be able to converse with an animal before we can obtain good reasons of the kind we have been considering for supposing that it is conscious. He does not seem to mean that all we need to observe is something that looks like conversation between two animals. He seems to mean we must understand the symbols directly and not by observing correlations between their sounds or gestures and their behaviour. Price concludes:

I only wish to insist that if the lower animals

\[20\text{p. 429.} \quad 21\text{p. 448.} \quad 22\text{p. 449.} \quad 23\text{p. 449.}\]
do not use symbols—symbols which we can understand and which convey information to us—then our evidence for the existence of animal minds is different in kind, and not merely in degree, from our evidence for human minds.\textsuperscript{24}

Price does not think the emotive function of language is relevant to "our present inquiry".\textsuperscript{25} His project was to point out good reasons for believing in other minds and to argue why they should be taken as good reasons. What makes the evidence he presents very relevant to this project, according to Price, is that, in the case of informative language, both speaker and hearer make use of symbols which refer to external world objects. And these same symbols take part in mental acts of which thinking is an example.\textsuperscript{26}

Nevertheless, Price felt that he had to say something about volitions and emotions. In his discussion of volitions it is noticeable that Price distinguishes between (a) the theoretical first time an utterance was understood and (b) the subsequent quick or ordinary understandings. As for (a), the utterance (his example is: "That door has got to be shut!")\textsuperscript{27} would have been first construed as propounding a proposition, but in a combination of words that, as yet, contains some unintelligible words. In the case of his exam-

\textsuperscript{24}P. 449.
\textsuperscript{25}P. 451.
\textsuperscript{26}See p. 451 on the "primacy of the object".
\textsuperscript{27}P. 453.
ple these unintelligible words are "... has got to be ...". The intelligible part of the sentence propounds this proposition: "The door is shut". Suppose I observe the door is not shut. The alleged proposition is therefore false. But it does give me a new piece of information, and so it can stand as evidence for an other mind. Imagine the speaker, or perhaps someone else, shutting the door. The proposition, construed out of a partly unintelligible sentence, is now true. If this situation happened often, I would connect the the unintelligible part of the sentence (and the speaker) with the changes observed, i.e., the shutting of the door. I would come to think the unintelligible part of the sentence has something to do with the influence of the speaker in making the proposition true, not the actions of getting up and shutting the door, but an influence that somehow motivates the actions, some sort of mental act of wanting them (the actions) to be done.

(b) In the absence of direct observations of changes (such as shutting doors), further utterances are understood by virtue of the resemblances among such expressions themselves, their structure, the tone of voice in which they are uttered, or their accompanying gestures. Price would perhaps say that these resemblances make up the 'grammar' of utterances expressing volitions.

\[28\] p. 454.
Initially, we get evidence that someone is entertaining certain thoughts. We have observed that someone used 'door' and 'be shut' which we understand. Not yet do we understand 'has got to'. In possession of this new information from a foreign mind, we verify it insofar as we understand the sentence; the door is not, in fact, shut. Say the speaker gets up and shuts the door. From this situation, according to Price, we get "... evidence of the occurrence of a foreign thought which affects the objective world."\(^\text{29}\) We get evidence of foreign volitions by noticing individuals change the world, as it were, to suit their utterances.

Foreign volitions are discovered, by means of the understanding of language, when the volitional utterance contains an informative element of the sort that has been discussed. This informative propositional part of the sentence must be false. By the actions of the speaker towards making the proposition true we discover a foreign volition. If we do not, as ordinarily we do not, observe any changes in the world following upon the utterance, yet recognize a volitional utterance, this can only be because we have often noticed various structural similarities in the sentences, or have observed certain tones of voice, to be common among the utterings of the sentences on those occasions when we do hear the

\(^{29}\text{p. 454.}\)
utterance and see the actions of the speaker.

Price apparently regards the relations of: utterance, false proposition, action of speaker towards making the proposition true—as the paradigm case of willing. For he asserts that there would be cases where no speaker at all is seen, but an utterance is heard, such as "Let there be a thunderstorm!" If this is followed by a thunderstorm, though we do not see anyone making a thunderstorm, we would have some evidence of a foreign volition. Price's treatment of this point is all too brief and so it would be unfair to take it too literally. What he means to say, I should imagine, is that it would occur to a hearer of "Let there be a thunderstorm!", who subsequently observed a thunderstorm, that there was a foreign volition behind the utterance. A peculiar meteorologist might, in fact, be announcing his prediction in this odd way through a hidden loudspeaker. From Price's standpoint, we would have good reason, at any rate, to judge that the utterance is in the imperative mood. With utterances expressive of emotions, Price finds that some thinking, as in the case of perceiving, is an integral part of every emotion. He writes:

Every emotion includes some thinking, and this thinking is not a mere accompaniment, but is an integral part of the emotion in question.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{30} p. 454.

\textsuperscript{31} I owe this point about the meteorologist to Prof. Brown.

\textsuperscript{32} p. 455.
In order to be afraid of something, for example, you must be convinced that something or other is the case. It may be a false belief as in the case of fears of imaginary dangers. Price's way of saying this is to say that "... certain objective universals ... must be present to the mind" else you could not hold a belief that something is the case.

Price's example of an emotive utterance is "Oh! A snake!" The information got from this utterance is that "... there is a snake in the immediate neighborhood". In this case there is no word or combination of words that is unintelligible (at the theoretical first hearing) as in the case of volitional utterances. Rather, the peculiar manner of saying the words is in question. The tone of voice is explained, according to Price, by observing, once again, "objective changes" in the world. I correlate the tone of voice with the changes that take place, the running away, the striking at the snake. Repeated observations of such situations give the inductive generalization that a statement like "Oh! A snake!" uttered by someone else is a type of "tendentious thought". A "tendentious thought", says Price, "... tends to change the objective world in certain ways." The identification of different emotional attitudes, Price concludes, is the result of correlating:

... differences in tone of voice (and in gesture
or facial configuration) with different sorts of objective changes which are liable to follow.\textsuperscript{37}

It is fascinating to watch Price put emotions and volitions under the wing of mental acts which involve the use of symbols. The sentence, or utterance which expresses an emotional attitude is a tendentious thought. The volitional utterance makes use of "objective universals". Part of the reason, of course, for his insistence on this is that he is after all trying to argue from the understanding of language to the existence of emotions and volitions. He sensed the peculiarity of what is implied by "subjective universals". That is to say, such private objects that they may designate, could not be a part of intersubjective discourse unless their existence can be gleaned from the use of "objective universals" in the various ways he attempted to set out. I am not sure whether he thought there were such things as "subjective universals" (e.g., 'pain' might be one). It is likely, though, because he seems to have held the Lockean view that the meaning of a symbol is strictly the object for which it stands. Had he not been so caught up in that view he might have gone all the way towards saying that there are no "subjective universals" such that their meanings are private, unpublic objects. He did write:

\begin{quote}
It seems perfectly obvious that words like 'hear',
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{37}p. 456.
'see', 'fear', 'think', have exactly the same meaning when I apply them to my neighbor as when I apply them to myself.\textsuperscript{38}

Longer consideration of the very point expressed in the quotation, together with a closer examination of introspection, would have considerably altered the direction his paper took.

From what has been said it may be thought that Price believed that babies do not have emotions because they do not yet have mental acts which involve symbols. They learn emotions when or as they learn to use symbols. Obviously Price does not mean this. He would say I believe, that they learn to express emotions by means of language when they learn the use of symbols. His statements are not always consistent with this, however, for he claims that "every emotion includes some thinking".\textsuperscript{39} I think he must mean that every linguistic expression or statement of an emotion presupposes some thinking. It will be remembered he stresses that you can't think without symbols.

But the principal thing about the emotional attitudes, for Price, is that they always lead to changes in the world, they affect conduct. One emotion which Price thinks may not show its practical effect at first glance is the 'emotion' of admiration concerning an historical personage. Take the case of an individual's admiration for the Emperor Valentinian I. How, he asks, could such an emotion be

\textsuperscript{38}p. 429. \textsuperscript{39}p. 455.
detected, or at least believed, by others? Valentinian I is not a perceivable object, but a thinkable one.\textsuperscript{40} There is no perceivable object to be affected by the admirer. Such an emotion, he thinks, would be revealed by the subject's utterances. One observes the great number of favorable things he says about the Emperor, and so on. Once again, as in the other cases, the need of the emotion, or its tendency, which allows us to identify it, is shown in the subject's actions.

\textsuperscript{40} p. 456.
PART II

There are three points concerning Price's paper that I would like to comment on. The first has to do with what he says about symbols and various language functions. The second relates to his reliance upon introspection. The third concerns the project of Price's paper as a whole and this consideration will introduce Part III of this thesis.

1.

Price distinguishes four different functions of language. These functions are: (1) the empirical (his examples are: "Look! there is the bus!", "Some cats have no tails."); (2) the non-empirical ("All cats have whiskers", "2 + 2 = 4"); (3) the volitional ("That door has got to be shut!"); and (4) the emotive ("Oh! A snake!"). These are ordinary forms of language but the list is by no means exhaustive. Price maintained that for his epistemological purposes he required only (1) and, to a lesser extent, (2). New and imposed utterances in categories (1) and (2) supply sufficient

\(^{1}\text{Op. cit., p. 451.}\)
evidence of other perceivers and thinkers.

According to Price, the reason why (1) and (2) are sufficient is that these utterances involve objects which both speaker and hearer are aware of. Indeed, for Price, it is the "primacy of the object"\(^2\) that makes it possible for us to get evidence of other minds at all. And the primary position of the physical and thinkable (e.g., historical persons) objects in his argument minimizes the emotive function of language. Emotive utterances make reference to things which only the utterer is aware of. If we had only purely emotive utterances to rely on, we could never get evidence, from language, of the existence of other minds.

But, according to Price, categories (3) and (4) have something in common with (1). It is, as we have already seen in the exposition, that they all propound propositions, though in the case of (3) and (4), in a queer way. Category (2), assertions of novel tautologies and entailments, could not, apparently, have anything in common with (3) and (4). If people uttered only mathematical-like entailments and tautologies, we could not find evidence from language that they have emotions. Price argued that such utterances would provide evidence of other thinkers.

Consideration of what Price says about (2) poses

\(^2\text{Op. cit.}, \text{ p. 451.}\)
an interesting question. We have seen the importance he placed on the object which both speaker and hearer are aware of. But in what respect does a tautology or an entailment belong to the external world? What is a tautologous object?

It seems to me that Price must say that a novel tautology or entailment is a new arrangement of certain symbols. The speaker and hearer would be aware of the sounds or figures of the new arrangement. The sounds or figures belong to the external world and their imaged counterparts must derive from them.

Then, are "unthought of entailments" simply new arrangements of certain kinds of symbols? But to say 'arrangements of certain kinds of symbols' would be misleading. Sounds and figures are arranged. Their participation in a game or system makes them symbols. Hence we can say: noises, marks, etc., without participation in a game or system are empty; symbols without noises or marks, etc., (sensible or imaged) are unthinkable.

Understanding a symbol in (2), then, does have a cognitive aspect. Noises must be heard or marks seen or at least one must imagine hearing or seeing noises and marks of the relevant kind. Of course, other sense data could apply here as well, such as the tactual data used in place of sounds and marks for the language of one who is deaf and blind. In addition to the admitted awareness of objects,
their particular roles in the system or game to which they belong must be realized. Being able to play the game allows me to recognize which arrangement of figures is a tautology.

It is, according to Price, by means of the common awareness of objects that we get access to other minds. The relation between minds, he thinks, is three-termed. The terms are: speaker--object--hearer. By 'object', Price's paper leads us to believe that he means a thing in the external world; something for which a symbol can stand. He does not seem to mean by 'object', a complex object such as a state of affairs in the world or a fact such as is described by the empirical sentences in category (1).

Price is mistaken in thinking that the discourse relation, which is the relation between people when they speak with one another, is only three-termed. Price's category (2), especially the logical and mathematical statements, may show only the three terms of speaker--object--hearer. For the symbols of mathematics and logic do not basically stand for things, the mathematical symbol is an object in itself which does not stand for some other thing. However, (1), (3) and (4), when uttered in the appropriate situations Price describes, show the following terms: (a) speaker (b) object (the mouthed noise, the sign) (c) object for which (b) stands and (d) the hearer. It is true that (b) and (c) may have the same cognitive value, i.e.; they may both
be seen or heard. The difference between them is that (b) belongs to a certain kind of game. Price claims that this peculiarity of (b) is found out by introspection. Much of his argument depends on this very point.

The resemblance between categories (1) and (2) is that certain objects (sensible or imaged signs) have definite ways in which they are to be used. In the case of (1), Price's paper suggests that the way those symbols are to be used is basically to stand for other objects. This is the kind of game we commonly play with words such as 'table', 'bus', 'cat', 'snake' and so on. Whereas in (2) the mathematical symbols are used in ways peculiar to mathematics but not basically to stand for other objects. Utterances belonging to (3) and (4) may also be included in this resemblance. The resemblance is, I repeat, that certain objects, called symbols, are used in certain definite ways. Furthermore, all these utterances are recognized as symbolic ones because the hearer already has some idea of the way they are used in those definite ways.

It seems to me, therefore, reasonable to suppose that imposed utterances can be evidence of other minds simply because they are new arrangements of symbols that I understand. The differences in the functions of the various categories Price sets out may be secondary. The mystery, for Price, should have been the fact that he understands the words of
new and imposed arrangements sufficiently to categorize the arrangements in the first place. Given Price's assumption that there are mental acts such that symbols are the agencies whereby the acts occur (Price claims thinking is one and derives the assumption from introspection), we can just as well argue for the existence of other mental acts merely from the bare occurrence of meaningful bits of language in one's environment. For evidence of foreign symbol-involved mental acts, given that assumption, it would be enough to say that you understand the imposed symbolic utterance.

Why is it necessary to verify the truth of the utterance? Price would reply, I imagine, that by verifying or checking the statement coming from an other body, I find out whether the other person uses those objects (symbols) in the way I use them. This, however, given the context of the statement, does not seem necessary. It is true that if a man sleeping in a bunk below you suddenly exclaimed, "Look! there is the bus!", then it would be advisable to consider ways of verifying the statement. But where the statement suits the situation in which it is said (e.g., at a bus stop), Price's inquiry would be like watching a person play chess and then asking whether the player really thinks he is playing chess.

In fairness to Price, it should be noted that he says it is not always possible to test a proposition to see if it means what you think it means, or that it was intended
to mean what you think it means. Examples of such propositions are propositions about the past.³ It is sufficient, for Price, if the hearer knows what it would be like for the proposition to be true.

Price admits that any intrusive utterance which I understand could be evidence of a foreign mind. But he concludes that the evidence would be weak. And the reason why it would be weak is that it is possible for the utterance to have originated in some way with me, the hearer. It is better evidence if the utterance states something I could not possibly be in a position to know. Price writes:

... the evidence will be strongest where the utterance I hear gives me new information; that is to say, where it symbolizes something which I do not already believe, but which I subsequently manage to verify for myself. For if I did already believe it at the time of hearing, I cannot exclude the possibility that it was my own believing which caused the foreign body to utter it. And this might happen even if my believing were, as we say, "unconscious"; as when I have been believing for many hours that today is Saturday, though until this moment I have not thought about the matter. I know by experience that my believings can cause my own body to utter symbolic noises; and for all I can tell they may sometimes cause a foreign body to do the same. Indeed, there is some empirical evidence in favor of this suggestion. The utterances of an entranced medium at a spiritualistic seance do sometimes seem to be caused by the unspoken beliefs of the sitters. That one mind—my own—can animate two or more bodies at the same time is therefore not an absurd hypothesis, but only a queer one. It cannot be ruled out of court a priori, but must be refuted by specific empirical evidence.⁴

⁴ p. 431.
And further:

Sentences proceeding from my own unconscious sometimes break in upon my train of thought in just this intrusive way. It is true that they usually present themselves to my mind in the form of verbal images. But occasionally they are actually uttered in audible whispers, and sometimes they are uttered aloud. How can I tell that these same unconscious processes in myself may not sometimes cause a foreign body to utter such intrusive noises? Their intrusive character is no bar to their unconscious origin. What we require is that they should symbolize something which I did not believe beforehand at all, even unconsciously.⁵

Price's notion that the intrusion of utterances I hear and understand does not preclude the possibility that I have somehow caused them, seems to me to be challengeable. For one thing, it is not just by inspecting (1) certain beliefs I have and (2) noises resulting from those beliefs, e.g., saying "Today is Saturday", after convincing myself that it is Saturday, that I learn (by such experiences) that I can induce my body to utter symbolic noises. It seems, rather, that I can have beliefs only after I learn to utter symbolic noises. In addition, there seems to me to be a muddle involved in thinking that an intrusive utterance from one's own 'unconscious' is ever thought by the speaker to be foreign. I do not refer to mediums, who probably would say some of their utterances do not really belong to them. I refer to those occasions when I suddenly say something or think of

something which has no relevance to what I am doing at the moment and also times when I say something I always believed but was not thinking of at the moment. Part of the strangeness of such phenomena is that I am clearly the owner of the utterance. Not only mediums, but also lecturers sometimes say things unconsciously believed by the hearer. Would it not be a distortion of criteria to say that the hearer can use his realization of what he always unconsciously believed as a criterion of the ownership of the lecturer's utterances? The fact is that a criterion is readily available. Unless a person is acting, or a parrot mimicking, and related cases, the one who speaks is the one who does the things necessary for the production of the intelligible utterance.

2.

Price's argument depends greatly upon introspection. Following Price: I discover that symbols stand for things by introspecting that that is the way I use them, particularly in acts of thinking. Thus enabled to recognize symbols I can infer that other symbol-involved mental acts occur when I find the familiar sounds, figures, etc., coming from somewhere else. In the final analysis, introspection supplies the criterion for deciding whether the other man thinks. Not that one introspects the other's thoughts, but the decider knows by introspection that a key way of using symbols is as
an instrument to a mental act. The decider spies the physical occurrence of symbols and reasons that they follow or are included in a mental act not his. His own case supplies the certainty which lends the probability to the hypothesis that the other individual thinks.

One way of challenging this argument is to point out that we don't learn that symbols stand for things by introspecting that we use symbols to stand for things. Neither is the notice we take of our own mental acts and states a way of learning the names of mental acts (thinking) and states (pains, fears). Rather, we are taught the use of words and the various symbols of ordinary language.

This commonplace observation shatters Price's reliance on what may be called his own case. For the observation shows that others are already included in the process of learning to use the word "thinking".

As children, we learned that when someone pinched us the resulting sensation is called 'pain' by English speaking persons. Let us imagine the following highly simplified teaching situation. The pupils, who are children, already

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6 The term 'knowing from one's own case' is used by Norman Malcolm, in "Knowledge of Other Minds", Journal of Philosophy, IV (1958), 969-978. Malcolm criticizes analogical arguments for the existence of other minds in general and the one used by Price in "Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds" in particular. Wittgenstein's use of the term can be found in Philosophical Investigations, pars. 293 and 295.
have some familiarity with the language. Today, they must
learn what 'pain' means. The teacher goes over to one child
and pinches his arm, saying: "What you just felt is called
'pain'." The teacher does the same thing with the other
children. Ideally, now everyone in the classroom knows what
pain is, though the children are not yet knowledgeable about
the great variety of ways of employing the word. A bright
child (or a dull one) might ask: "How do I know what I felt
when you pinched my arm is the same feeling the others felt
when you pinched their arms?" The teacher may reply, with
a note of irritation in his voice, "I have just been showing
you a fundamental way of using 'pain'. What you felt, under
the same circumstances of arm pinching, is the sort of thing
the others felt. If you want to speak English you must abide
by that rule." The child might settle back and wonder about
the teacher's dogmatism. Later he will find that if he wants
to be understood, he must abide by the rule.

Another reaction of the teacher might be to say:
"Excellent, Tommie, you were able to ask that question because
you noticed that I told the others to call what they felt
when I pinched their arms what I told you to call when I
pinched your arm. And you observed that you did not feel
anything when I pinched their arms, in particular, you did
not feel what I taught you to call 'pain'. Well, you see,
that's the way it is with the word 'pain'. Part of its mean-
ing is that you can't feel someone else's pain. Finally, to
clear up the question you asked, apparently you forgot that,
in addition to telling you to call what you felt 'pain', I
also said that you must call what they felt 'pain'. So you
see, knowing what Johnnie felt, as knowing what you felt, is
intimately related to my teaching you and the others what to
name what you and they felt."

The way this approach challenges introspection in
the special case in which Price makes use of the notion, i.e.,
as being the way we find out what 'thinking' means and,
indeed, that any symbol means, is that the new view recalls
the fact that other people have already taken part in the
fundamental stages of learning what thinking is. That is to
say, they have played a basic part in the learning of the use
of the word. It is a presupposition of the classroom, also,
that the teacher is familiar with the subject which he teaches.
Ordinarily, the identification of a mental act or state has
been aided by teaching.

3.

Perhaps the motive behind Price's reference to un-
conscious believing as being a source of doubt about the
ownership of foreign utterances, rather than to the tradition-
al sceptical solipsist position is that he wanted to frame
the other minds problem in terms of matters of fact. He may
have thought that nothing strictly counts as a solipsistic experience but there are cases of suddenly being invaded by utterances from one's unconscious. This gives us reason to suspect that all sentences we meet with may be of our own doing. In this way, Price imagines that the philosophical problem of the existence of other minds is a matter of fact problem. That he thinks it is a matter of fact problem is shown where he discusses the impossibility of demonstrating that there are other minds. He says: "... in the sphere of matters of fact it is a mistake to expect demonstration." 7

No doubt there is an important sense in which doubts about other minds enter into factual situations. A physician might not be sure as to whether his patient feels pain after an injection. Or a psychiatrist might be in the position of trying to argue a paranoiac out of believing that he, the paranoiac, was behind every intelligible utterance he hears. For that matter, there are factual situations where people say, without any hesitation, that they know perfectly well the mind of another. Sometimes girls say this about boy friends.

But there is something definitely odd or incoherent about deriving scepticism about the existence of other minds from uses of language. Price both derives his scepticism about other minds from the employment of language and obtains

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7 Price, op. cit., p. 430.
his reasons for believing in them from the employment of language. The oddity of all this is that language already contains symbols or a conceptual scheme which makes reference to or indicates language users other than myself; and in such a way that ordinary sentences, to a great extent, depend for their sense on such a conceptual scheme functioning. Curiosity about this scheme, it seems to me, is not so much factual as terminological. It is like wondering about the rules of a game as against watching the play of a game.

The inadequacy of Price's paper lies in its failure to come to grips with these terminological matters, e.g., the scheme of personal pronouns which makes the statement of his problem, as well as its alleged solution, possible. Nevertheless, "Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds" has great appeal as a valuable propaedeutic for the study of the relation between the notion of solipsism and that employment of language which is called 'speaking with others'.

Price's paper serves to reveal a new starting point. Part III of this thesis will attempt to examine the relationship between the concept of speech and the individuals who can do the things required for speaking. I explore what Price fatally neglected and that is the terminology involved in saying that someone said something. Part III is therefore a study of the frame, or aspects of the frame, in which both Price's problem and solution appear.
PART III

Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things and not of human beings? . . . Did ever man believe in horsemanship and not in horses? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for yourself. There is no man who ever did. (Apology, 27)

"If you can discuss the other minds problem, or anything else for that matter, the problem exists only to solve itself." Such a remark has something in common with Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*. Descartes' dictum is enforced by the fact that people do tend to speak as though thinking is something that existent conscious beings do. It is equally true that most people tend to speak as though intelligible, overt utterances, such as occur during a discussion, are things produced by existent conscious beings. In reply to a question like, "Do you think John has a mind?", it is not unusual to hear, "Of course I do, I've just been speaking with him." So usual is that kind of reaction that many people are shocked at the blindness of a man who says he entertains solipsism or who

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merely dislodges himself from the apparent certainty of the common reply noted above. The common reply suggests a parody of Descartes' dictum: we speak, therefore we are.

In this part I intend to discuss the idea that a plurality of different speakers is a necessary feature of the concept of speech. I take this view to mean that if anything is correctly called speech then more than one user of the language of that act of speech must exist at the time of the utterance or before it or after it, and if not in fact, then in principle. No one would dispute that a discussion is made up of a number of separate acts of speech. What is disputable is to say that an individual act of speech presupposes other speakers, not only in the role of listeners or understanders but also as potential speakers. I think there is a way of showing that an individual act of speech presupposes, or, rather, requires for its status as an act of speech, that there be other speakers. The way can be suggested by looking at how certain games are named.

If John told Bill that he played tennis the other day, and if John used the word 'tennis' correctly, then Bill knows that an activity occurred in which more than one person took part. This is something that Bill might have learned from observations of previous tennis tournaments (these inform him of the official use of 'tennis'). But he need not have learned the meaning of the word by witnessing tennis
games. It is enough to read a tennis rule book. The permissible number of players (just as little white balls, rackets, white lines, etc.) is set out by the rules. Similarly: the number of players, the function, approximate shape and the number of pieces, the design of the board—-are defined by the rules of the game of chess. Tennis and chess are inconceivable without these elements. The games are defined by means of them. It is easy to see the necessity for more than one player in tennis. There are rule books to which one can refer.

The suggestion is useful only if there is some kind of resemblance between speaking and various games. Many games, though not all, can be described as rule-bound activities that can be done correctly or incorrectly both at will or by mistake. Playing these games requires certain skills. A player may know the rules yet not be able, all of the time, to follow them—-because he may lack the appropriate skill. In addition, a great deal of variation is possible, in the following out of the rules. The games may be played badly or well, quickly or slowly, stupidly or smartly. There are certain techniques or styles of play. The word 'play' refers to the movements that can be governed by the rules of the game. There could be an infinity of such movements; but there is no need of an infinity of rules to cover each kind of movement. Saying things intelligibly resembles that kind of game.
activity. Unfortunately, no official rule book for speaking intelligibly exists. Grammar books give only some of the rules of language. If Wittgenstein is right, there never will be such an official rule book because language is made up of countless games within games.

We are concerned with a particular form of language called speech. Being able to use 'speech' unhesitatingly, you would think everything about the word lies before us. Perhaps, as Wittgenstein maintained of such words, there is no general definition that would encompass all uses of such a general word. Instead, we develop a nose for detecting "family resemblances". As if each event we call 'speech' has something in common with one or more uses of the word but none individually has anything in common with all other uses of the word, i.e., except the label 'speech'. The analogy of families does point I think to what we want.

The analogy presents a picture of parents and offspring. The original parents, say Adam and Eve, could not have had all human characteristics. For some of the characteristics would be contradictory. Adam and Eve might have been blonde, whereas one of their offspring might be brunette. Adam and Eve could not have been brunette when they were blonde. New characteristics are generated by the union of Adam and Eve's offspring. It is a kind of inductive principle that new offspring will have characteristics that the parents
don't have. But the seeker after what is common to a family of uses of a word may be interested not so much in the flexible, varying uses, which are offspring of some vaguely distant original parents, as in the basis of the appearance of the familial resemblances. A possibility is that the place where things can be found to be common throughout all uses of the concept of speech is a condition (or a set of conditions) which allows acts of speech to take place at all. Consider, again, the game of tennis. If tennis is to be played there must be creatures capable of running, obeying rules, holding rackets—the world must be such that balls bounce—and so on. None of these conditions are mentioned in tennis rule books. Yet the game could not be played unless they were fulfilled. It probably would not occur to anyone to invent tennis, even imaginatively, if such material and properties of bodies were not available.

Similarly, it may be that an act of speech could not take place unless there could be a plurality of speakers. It is suggested that the relation between calling anything speech and the notion of a plurality of speakers is like the relation between calling a phenomenon tennis and those features of the world which make the practice of the game possible.

In the absence of rule books such as are available for tennis and chess, only an examination of typical utter-
ances will suffice to yield material for conclusions on the question of whether an act of speech, i.e., any intelligible linguistic utterance, necessarily presupposes the existence of other speakers. Any utterance, a use of language, implies a user of language. It is expedient to look at cases of speech where reference to this user or speaker is part of the meaning of the sentence. 'I' is used mainly to denote the speaker himself. Consider, then, the utterances of the same I-sentence by two different speakers.

I am standing on a highway with someone else (an other body resembling mine) when, upon the appearance of a bus, we both utter, "I see a bus". Let us call my utterance, "'I see a bus'--A", or just A and the other's utterance "'I see a bus'--B" or just B. Having seen the bus and knowing English I said "'I see a bus'--A". No speaker of the English language would associate my seeing of the bus with "'I see a bus'--B". Why not? Not because I am not seeing the bus, I am. Suppose I do not see a bus or utter A yet I hear "'I see a bus'--B". Why should I not reply to the hearing of B by saying, "No, I am not"? Suppose a bus does not come into my visual field and I hear "'I see a bus'--B". I would not say, "Yes, I do", either aloud or to myself. I might say, "I suppose you do because I happen to see it also." The reason why I might say the latter and never "Yes, I do" is that I must practise a rule for the use of 'I'. Certainly not because
I am aware of his visual sensations which would tell me that he sees the bus just as I do. It is true that if I don't see the bus yet hear the other utter B then my visual sensations, which do not include the seeing of the bus, in a sense tell me that someone else is seeing a bus. But only if I know what he means. I know what he means because I practise the rule about using 'I'. The rule is that out of a number of different utterances of the sound 'I', only my uttering of it refers to me as the speaker. A foreign or separate utterance of 'I', a noise I do not make, cannot, by the rule, indicate me as the speaker. The separation of these utterances of 'I' simply stems from the fact that there are various individuals who can and do make the sound. The sounds, and the noise-making individuals, are the raw materials of the language game for 'I'. It is not the rule which legislates the separation of the sounds; this is due to the facts of human physiology. But the meaningful use of 'I' is governed by the rule. It asserts that uses of 'I' by different noise-makers indicate each noise-maker separately. Primarily, the separation is a matter of the direction the sound comes from, i.e., with respect to the position of my body and the other noise-maker's body. Of course, some of my utterances of 'I' are quotations of other separate or foreign utterings as in: "He said, 'I am going home'". Such cases are recognitions of separate utterances of 'I'. 
Suppose there were no such rule. Then the I's in A and B would be indistinguishable as far as meaning is concerned though they would still be distinguishable as separate sounds coming from different places. Without the rule one would perhaps be struck by the similarity of the sounds 'I' and 'I' and that would be all.

The question may be asked: suppose my noises, which include 'I', are transmitted to a loudspeaker at the other end of the room, then is this a foreign use of 'I' for me? Does the rule apply to such a case? Indeed, such contrivances are called 'speakers'. Does the 'I' indicate the mechanical speaker? Also, different individuals may be heard on the radio in which case the sounds may all come from the same direction. In these cases, additional criteria for the separateness of the sounds would have to be noted, such as, in the case of the radio, the timbre of the various voices. In the case of the distant loudspeaker, others may discover the ownership of the voice heard by following the wires, or perhaps by cutting them. By all appearances, it is not unusual for people to take a mechanical speaker as literally a speaker in the sense of taking up an attitude as before a speaker. Sometimes we look directly at pieces of furniture when we hear intelligible speech emitted from them and listen as we would to a human speaker. But it would make no sense to say the 'I' one may hear in that way indicates the speaking box.
It would begin to make sense to say this if the speaking box answered questions and commented on the hearer's appearance but was not a transmitter of some kind.

As we have seen, it is possible to figure out roughly what sort of world is required for the playing of tennis. Can the same thing be done concerning the intelligible use of 'I' that we have chosen to examine? Obviously a feature of a world where such a rule can be practised is that a number of different bodies must be able to mouth the sound 'I'. The meaning of the sound requires this. Even if I caused the utterance "'I see a bus'-B", in some mysterious way, nevertheless the 'I' of B must set out a different "speaker" otherwise the 'I' of A would mean (1) absolutely nothing or (2) mean something radically different from what it customarily means. Even the classical solipsist must admit so much or else he commits a radical solecism.

A second feature of the world in which the rule for 'I' can be practised has to do with the coherent occurrence of the sound 'I'. The rule for 'I' is not like a law of nature. It is not descriptive of certain regularities of occurrences of certain sounds. It is a rule about how to put the noise to work coherently; just as tennis rules tell you how and approximately where to smack a white ball. Using 'I' is an activity that can be 'refereed'. This means that the user must be able to call up the sound at will
whenever he thinks it is the right time to do so according to the rule. In writing, a mark replaces the noise. The user must be able to use the marks at will. Things that are 'fixed', i.e., incapable of being called up at will on the proper occasion according to the rule, could not replace noises or marks. Because of this, headaches, itches, toothaches or a degree of blood pressure, not usually being things that can be called up at will, could not replace noises or marks. Gestures can replace them and so could images. But the use of images for this purpose would not be 'official' because their use could not be refereed by someone else. The sound 'I' has no function of itself; left to itself, it would occur only accidentally and if at all regularly it would resemble a hiccup. It gets its meaning by being wilfully mouthed in accordance with the rule for 'I'. It takes its role as a symbol by the definite way in which it is put to work. Strictly speaking, we don't hear this significant 'I'. The sound loses its wholly acoustic quality when it becomes a symbol. We say that the symbol is understood or misunderstood. Similarly, it can be said that we don't just hear sentences. We understand them or we don't understand them. Complete non-understanding of a sentence recognizes only an acoustic phenomenon.

Suppose the world was such that only one individual could speak. That is to say, only one person could make the
necessary noises and combinations of noises at will. Then there would be no need for the word 'I'. Different speakers could not be distinguished because in this world there is only one speaker. Conceivably, the solitary speaker would say, instead of 'I am hot' or 'I see a bus', something like 'It is hot' or 'A bus is there'. We should ask, why isn't the sensation or the perception enough? Why should he mouth these voluntary notices of the sensation and perception? Perhaps, if he writes, he wants to keep a record of things he sees and feels at different times and places. Or, rather, we should say that he wants to record things felt and seen at different times and places. It would not make sense for him to say that he felt or had seen anything at all.

What he 'says' could not be called speech, i.e., he could not take the role of a speaker, since speakers are indicated by reference to other speakers. Because he is not able to act in accordance with the rule for 'I' (as in a world where balls do not bounce there could be no tennis games), it would make no sense for him to say that he says anything. Should he utter something like 'pain at two o'clock last Friday at the well', there would be no question, for him, of who said it. The utterance could not be addressed to anyone else because there is no other creature capable of understanding it. Again, you wonder why the creature would make the utterance, or write it down, at all. Perhaps the
act of writing it down resembles the device of blazing trees so that you know your way around the forest; in the present case, a thick forest of sensations and perceptions with no 'I' attached to each sensation or perception. The blaze 'pain at two o'clock last Friday at the well' may perhaps be used by him as a warning of danger to his life. But why wouldn't a simple memory image of the event pain-at-the-well do? Because, I suppose, memory images are often faint and also tend to decay. Marks last longer and so are more successful in preserving the creature's life. Maybe he discovered that imaging is a poor memory device and that making complex marks is a better one. A language with no 'I' in it, where nothing is really said in the sense that it makes no sense to say there are acts of speech in it, then, is conceivable, though it is a fantasy based on our knowledge of the use of language in this world.

It is claimed that, from the way we actually use 'I', a rule can be found which shows clearly, since we find the rule by observing its application, that the concept of speech, i.e., to say of something that it is an act of speech, which is the same as to say that someone says something, requires that there be a plurality of speakers. In making this claim it was implied that the I-rule is one for speakers. These are creatures who can mouth the sound 'I' at will whenever they fancy it is the right time according to the
rule. In fact, the rule helps to set such creatures out from one another.

But 'I' is not used only as a reference to the speaker. Berkeley, for example, said:

What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance.²

However, I doubt very much whether by this sentence Berkeley wanted to deny that 'I', as in the first two occurrences of it in his sentence, refers to the one speaking, the utterer or writer of the sentence. He does after all want to say that the utterer of the sentence, Berkeley himself, as well as other utterers of other sentences, have souls or are essentially "spiritual substances". We understand the gist of the sentence when we know the I-rule. What he does is to give an additional and secondary reference to 'I', namely, that the one speaking is also a spiritual substance. In so doing, this secondary and additional reference becomes parasitic on the rule for 'I'. The rule requires a plurality of speakers and this condition is carried into the new reference stated by Berkeley. It is as though he has taken hold of an already available conceptual grid and placed it on a new field.

In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein tried to show that 'I' may be used not to refer to any particular thing at all.

There are times, he thought, when we use 'I' in such a way that it does not 'point' to the one speaking, i.e., to the bearer of a proper name, which is usually a reference to a definite and characteristic set of physical appearances. Such uses of 'I' are to be found in utterances which are expressions of mental acts or states. "... there is no question", wrote Wittgenstein, "of recognizing a person when I say 'I have toothache'." He apparently meant to say that the game of pointing out an object, as when you refer to it, is an activity whereby you consciously choose a particular thing (to notice it for some reason or other) out of a number of different things which possibly could be noticed in its place. With 'I have toothache', uttered by me, there is no question of me recognizing a particular person, namely, myself. The non-pointing or thingless use of 'I' is expressed by saying it is a subject use. Wittgenstein distinguished between a subject and an object use of 'I' in the following way:

There are two different cases in the use of "I" (or "my") which I might call "the use as object" and "the use as subject". Examples of the first kind are these: "My arm is broken", "I have grown six inches", "I have a bump on my forehead", "The wind blows my hair about". Examples of the second kind are: "I see so-and-so", "I hear so-and-so", "I try to lift my arm", "I think it will rain", "I have toothache".

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The first use of 'I', its use as object, is modelled after the use of a demonstrative phrase like 'this person', where 'person' suggests a definite and characteristic set of physical appearances. Even here, however, Wittgenstein seems to say that by using 'I' we do not always mean to point to an object, such as the person speaking—any more than when someone points to the sun he is not thereby pointing both to himself and to the sun.\(^5\)

Wittgenstein hints at what he means by the second category of the use of 'I' by saying that the utterance 'I have toothache' is something like a moan, not a sentence about a particular person (for the utterer) as 'I am six feet tall' would be. The second use of 'I' is non-personal. This is what Wittgenstein meant by saying that 'I have toothache' does not replace 'L.W. has toothache'. When I say 'I have a toothache' when I do have a toothache, the utterance takes the place of, or is like a moan. The moan can't be mistaken. One of the reasons Wittgenstein had, in the Blue Book, for saying the moan can't be mistaken is that a moan is not an end result of an observation of a pain, after rejecting other pointable things. He is careful to add that you can point to the place of an ache.\(^6\)

A primitive expression of emotion such as a moan

\(^6\)p.68.
ought to be distinguished from an act of speech. An act of speech requires at least those conditions that have already been indicated for the use of the I-rule. These are two in number and are very prominent and obvious. Firstly, a speaker must be able to mouth the sounds that other speakers can mouth, or be able to translate them into some other mode of symbols. Secondly, a speaker must be able to mouth these sounds at will according to the conventions that have been established, in various ways, by the community of speakers.

A moan, it seems safe to say, started out as a characteristic expression of pain. That is to say, it was a kind of involuntary attachment to severe pains. Then we learned to pretend that we had pains by false or insincere moanings. Consequently, moans came to stand for bad pains. They became signs of pain, whereas before, when the moaning sound was a natural, characteristic expression of pain, it was at one with, or was a criterion of pain. Moans could now be used freely. People could understand these uses because of the previous history of moans, i.e., they were once an integral part of bad pains.

What happened in this natural history of moans was that moans came to say something. In this new capacity, the conditions which are required for an act of speech to take place were fulfilled. And so instead of saying that sentences like 'I have a toothache' can somehow replace moans, we
should say that a moan can replace a sentence like 'I have a toothache'. In which case it makes sense to say that the moan says something and is said by someone indicated by the 'I', namely, a speaker, who is a peculiar social being, i.e., necessarily one among others.

According to the brief interpretation given of Wittgenstein's analysis of the grammar of 'I', not every I-sentence implies a reference to the speaker, not even to the bare extent that, as I have claimed, it could be said of every I-sentence (excluding those which are quotations or are sentences about the word 'I') that someone, a speaker, said something. From the point of view that has been taken as a result of the analysis of the two different utterances of "I see a bus", the Blue Book treatment is mistaken. The Wittgenstein of the Blue Book would say that the utterance "'I see a bus'--A" contains a non-personal use of 'I'. He wants to rid us of the notion that there is a real, essential I hidden within the body. In trying to achieve that aim, he neglected the importance of 'I' as a sayer, as the linguistic person, the language user. There is more to being a speaker than just a unique, private person to which much philosophical discussion has been devoted concerning identity. Appreciation of this points to the source of Wittgenstein's mistake. He wrongly assumed that 'speaker' and 'person' signify roughly the same sort of thing. But the role of being a speaker has
certain peculiarities which the role of being a person does not have. Being a speaker is a role in a kind of game that requires other speakers. It always makes sense to take it for granted that I-sentences like 'I see a bus', 'I am six feet tall', 'I have a toothache' said on appropriate occasions in the linguistic game of saying things, implies a reference to a particular kind of thing, the speaker, a participator in the game of which the sentence is a move. If I heard the utterance 'I have a headache' coming from under the table I would be inclined to look under the table for a person, recognizable by a characteristic physical appearance. However, my understanding of the utterance, before I looked under the table, already assured me that someone said something. As yet this someone has only the role of a speaker. This is sufficient and primary for the understanding of the 'I' in the sentence. Finding a person under the table, I might say, "Oh, it's you who have a headache"—meaning 'this person' with a characteristic physical appearance. Or, I might recognize a person by the voice alone and this could take the place of looking under the table. Nevertheless, I could have said, "Oh, it's you who have a headache" even if I did not look under the table or recognize the voice. It would be strange to say this but not unintelligible. It is not unintelligible because the primary reference of 'I' is to the bare speaker. The role of speaker is something that can be assumed
only after some training in the practise of a natural language.

It is true, as Wittgenstein said, that when I say 'I feel pain' I do not pick out one person from among others, i.e., I do not point to a person. Nor need it be said that I point to the one speaking. The reason for this is that I do not make up the meaning of 'I' every time I use it. This has already been done for me by the conventions of language. It is a trivial feature of the employment of language that any given bit of employment implies a user. Does Wittgenstein in the Blue Book mean to say that 'I have toothache', uttered truthfully, is not a case of employment of language? He says the utterance is similar to a moan. No doubt a sentence can by habit replace a moan. Surely, then, it ceases to be a sentence. We can say of it that nothing has been said. The sentence has been used, but not to say anything. If it is not an act of speech then of course the common rule for 'I' does not apply. The concept of speech does not cover moans of that sort.

Some support for what has been said about 'I' as being always a reference to, or indication of, a particular speaker as one among a community of speakers (excluding the special cases of 'I' already noted) can be gleaned from

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7See Wittgenstein, op. cit., p.68.
Ryle's explanation of the word 'I' in the *Concept of Mind.*

Ryle felt it was necessary to dispel the illusion of an I-substance of the sort Berkeley claimed is denoted by 'I'. Ryle's method was to argue that 'I' is not the kind of word that can be the name of anything. He said that 'I' is an 'index word' like 'here' and 'now'. The point is that these words indicate only as long as the particular moment during which they are uttered. The same goes for the words 'he', 'you', 'they' and 'we'. Ryle wrote that:

'I' can indicate the particular person from whom the noise 'I', or the written mark 'I', issues; 'you' can indicate the one person who hears me say 'you', or it can indicate that person, whoever he is (and there may be several) who reads the 'you' that I write, or have printed. In all cases the physical occurrence of an index word is bodily annexed to what the word indicates. Hence 'you' is not a queer name that I and others sometimes give you; it is an index word which, in its particular conversational setting, indicates to you just who it is to whom I am addressing my remarks. 'I' is not an extra name for an extra being; it indicates when I say or write it, the same individual who can also be addressed by the proper name 'Gilbert Ryle'. 'I' is not an alias for 'Gilbert Ryle', it indicates the person whom 'Gilbert Ryle' names, when Gilbert Ryle uses 'I'.

Later on in the chapter he said:

An 'I' sentence indicates whom in particular it is about by being itself uttered or written by someone in particular.

To these quotations there should be added:

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9 p.197.
'I', in my use of it, always indicates me and only indicates me. By 'me', Ryle means 'the person who utters 'I', i.e., the speaker. Ryle maintained that the 'index words' which are called personal pronouns indicate or mention persons but, in a way different from the way names do. The index words indicate only at the time of their utterance and are dependent on the circumstances at the time of the utterance. He goes on to show, by examples, that they can indicate the varying roles that persons assume when they talk about themselves as well as the roles that other persons are often said to take, examples of both cases are, souls, minds, subjects of experience, presidents, husbands, automobile drivers, and so on. But in no case can the index words be the names of anything, though they can stand in place of names.

From the quotations offered, and particularly from the last one, Ryle can be taken to mean that 'I' has the 'besetting' property of always indicating me in whatever role I assume when I use 'I'. Primarily, however, Ryle seems to mean that 'I' indicates the speaker. He does not want to say that being a speaker is something different from being a person. Indeed, part of his purpose in the Concept of Mind is to show that each of us is not a complex of beings. His theory of "higher order actions" helps him to argue that

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point, in that the theory explains the different senses of index words in the same sentence.

Though I have said that speakers should be distinguished from persons, I do not mean to suggest that being a speaker is to be a different entity altogether from what is ordinarily meant by being a person; any more than I would say that being a tennis player is to be a kind of 'extra being'. What I have been at pains to emphasize is that 'I' has an additional 'besetting' property which is no less important than the one noted by Ryle. This additional property is that it requires a plurality of different speakers as a condition of its use. A consequence of these two properties of the use of 'I' is that any act of speech, since any employment of language implies a user, requires as a condition of so describing something, that there be a number of different speakers.

An act of speech is possible because of the fact that there are creatures who can do the things necessary for speaking. We may refer to these beings as 'persons' and ordinarily we do. They are the material out of which speakers are made. As we have noted, Wittgenstein in the Blue Book had described our tendency to use the word 'I' (or 'person') in two different senses, an object sense and a subject sense. The object sense refers to 'this body' and the subject sense has to do with the 'subject or owner of experiences'.
Wittgenstein seems to have denied that there is a subject sense of 'person', i.e., there is no individual mentioned in a sentence like, 'I have a headache'. Such a view is an answer, or the beginning of an answer, to the mind-body problem. Does the ambiguity observed by Wittgenstein, which is a reflection of the mind-body problem, extend into one's role as a speaker?

I submit that it does not, for the following reasons. A speaker is one who can tell of experiences and give information. Tellers depend (in the relevant sense that sellers depend on buyers) on auditors who can understand them. The teller, sayer, or speaker coexists in a larger environment of 'tellees' and also of other tellers, since any given teller can be identified as such. Also, being able to understand a tale entails that you can tell one. Let us imagine a man telling a story about himself to a group of auditors. No matter what strange tale he tells, whether it is about some fantastic dream he had or about a face lifting operation, the story makes sense respecting who it is that is the subject of the story because of the prior recognition both by himself and by the others, that it is the teller, right there at that moment, who is 'being referred to'. But the teller's status as a teller is due to the prior existence of the 'social' conceptual scheme that has been described. This scheme is the means whereby we understand what he means by
'I' in the course of his telling the story—even if the tale is about an I (a person) roaming about in its own dream.

Or, imagine Berkeley sitting in a garden and saying to a group of people: "The word 'I' denotes soul or spiritual substance." Unless the group were made up of very small children he would not be defining a new word. For adults, the word already has a meaning describable by saying that it is an index word indicating the speaker. Berkeley is defining an old word. We could imagine him saying, "I once wrote a book in which I stated that the word 'I' denotes soul or spiritual substance." That statement, in the given imaginable context, illustrates the familiar conceptual scheme regarding the use of 'I'. At the moment of uttering the sentence, the speaker is identifiable as an individual of a certain type. A type which is dependent on his being able to speak at all.

Now imagine a metaphysician saying, after finding that he had no experience of other minds, that: "I alone exist". That statement, too is a telling. It is understandable as a telling. The story the speaker wants to convey makes sense, again, because of our conceptual scheme for 'I'. It is no use saying that what he wants to say can't be said. It can be said, by the grace of the rule for 'I'. But the point which I want to make is that the speaker at the time of the utterance does not take part in the story he attempts
to tell by "I alone exist". Not because telling a tale is not living it, but because the telling of the tale involves those things which are necessary for an act of speech, and their existence, though they harbour the telling of the tale, prohibit the application of the story to the plurality of speakers, which includes the solipsistic speaker.

It may be objected that the metaphysician is using a sense of 'I' that is not ultimately related to his role as a speaker. In that case, then, even his story would be unintelligible, for it would violate the basic rules for the intelligible use of 'I'. Solipsism is therefore speakable as an hypothesis about the speaker, i.e., one among others. But the idea of solipsism contradicts the conditions of its statement.
PART IV

This concluding part is made up of three sections. In the first section I elaborate on the idea that the speaker is outside problems (such as the mind-body problem) which arise out of predicking certain things of the speaker. The second section contains a summary and retrospect of Part III together with some of its conclusions. In the third, a generalized evaluation of Price's paper is made following the lines of thought of part III.

1.

To tie up the reasons why I say that the speaker is outside the mind-body problem (as expressed by the two senses of 'I'), I shall say that when someone says the word 'I' has two uses, one for the body and one for the mind, then he does the very same thing that Berkeley did when he said 'I' denotes soul or spiritual substance. I don't mean that together they merely draw senses of 'I' out of common usage. Rather, in both cases, the thing that speaks is, and must be, taken as the root reference of 'I'. The speaker is indicated by 'I' and something is told of his situation or the manner of his existence. Just as this fact makes
Berkeley's explanation of 'I' understandable, so does it make
the dualistic mind-body story understandable. They are all
of them 'hypotheses' about the speaker; but saying that 'I'
indicates the speaker derives from a rule of language. The
alleged mind-indicating use of 'I', as in the sentence 'I
understand what you say', has traditionally been thought to
mention an utterly private, unsocial area. But, metaphorically
speaking, the rule for 'I' shows that 'I' does not, in
its primary sense, harbour a private, inaccessible-to-others
region. Nevertheless the scheme which the rule suggests
allows us to talk of the 'I' as though it inhabited such a
place. The distinction between public and private senses of
'I' is maintained, or made possible, by using the rule for
'I', i.e., by uttering intelligible I-sentences. All senses
or pseudo-senses of 'I' that exclude the speaker altogether
are not false or possibly true; they are self-contradictory
according to the rule which arises out of the customary
usage of 'I'. There are, therefore, two senses of 'sense'
to be found in the phrase "senses of 'I'". These two senses
are distinguishable as follows: (1) original speaker sense
and (2) senses which are dependent upon or get their 'life'
from (1).

If the speaker is outside the mind-body problem,
it follows that he is outside the 'other minds problem' as
well. This may help to explain our persistent tendency to
regard the talk of solipsism as absurd. The feeling of its absurdity inclines us to say 'we speak, therefore we are'. We tend to think that if there is no sense in doubting that the world is peopled with speakers then there is no point in the doubts about other minds. However, the other minds problem, the mind-body problem, and Berkeley's denotation of 'I' are intelligible. The reason for this is that the speaker, as speaker, is easily recognizable and unmysterious and he is the fountain, so to speak, of these problems and dependent senses of 'I'. With regard to the other minds problem, for example, it is not the speaker whose existence is put into question. It is his playing of the game of speaking that makes the problem possible. The answer, then, 'we speak, therefore we are' is not necessarily a correct solution of the other minds problem. It can of course be given as a solution on the grounds that speaking is a kind of mental act.

No doubt the word 'outside', as it has been used here, contains various hidden assumptions. It is, of course, a metaphor. The use of the metaphor has been illustrated by saying that the teller of an historical autobiographical episode is outside of the situation in which he tells of the episode, i.e., he is pictured in a different situation, in a different place. The situation of the telling is spatially and temporally different from the episode which is told. From the point of view of the episode, the present
speaker, the teller of the episode, is not in the episode's bounds. But the speaker, by his speaking, has drawn the bounds of the story. There is no other way the story can be told. I have made the larger and equally obvious claim that the speaker is always necessarily outside what is told. In the same way, it seems that the sounds he mouths are outside what these sounds mean. This factor of necessity is not only a temporal one. It springs from what is required to play the game of speaking.

2.

The discussion in part III began with the aim of exploring the concept of speech and its relation to a plurality of speakers. A sample speech situation was taken to see if a rule could be found concerning the symbol which indicates the speaker. Following the suggestion that from the rules of a game such as tennis one could determine certain features of the world that would make the practice of the game possible, it was found that there are at least two world-features necessary for the practice of the rule which was elicited from the sample speech situation. Those, it was claimed, are (1) a plurality of speakers and (2) creatures who could utter sounds at will.

To be truthful, it seemed to me that an odd jump was taken from talk about the concept of speech to talk about
'I', a symbol for the speaker. Nevertheless, it seemed necessary. The explanation for this, I believe, can be seen by comparing the concept of speech with the concept of experience. I don't think you can talk about the concept of experience without talking about experiencers. Similarly, talk about the concept of speech involves talking about speakers. It so happens that the instruments of speech include symbols for the speaker and these are an elemental part of the employment of symbols in speech. Indeed, speakers are as vital to symbol using as the actual symbols themselves.

It was not claimed that there are a number of speakers in the world on the grounds that there is a rule for the use of a symbol that indicates different speakers. What is claimed is that the world is such that the rule can be and is practised.

The rule which differentiates speakers is not violated or contradicted by solipsism if solipsism is taken as an hypothesis about a particular speaker. What is falsified or ignored by such a solipsism are those conditions which make the practice of the rule possible. The question, "How do you know the rule is practised?", is not a telling one. For the rule has been elicited from the world, from situations in the world, as in the case of the two utterances of "I see a bus". It is not an a priori rule. But it does have logical-rule-like properties. According to the rule, I can't
say "'I said x' and 'He said x' mean exactly the same thing". The convention is so common and overwhelming that it is a strain to imagine what it is that can't be said, according to the rule. It does not mean "I said what he said" or even "I said x with his vocal chords". As far as the rule goes, "'I said x' and 'He said x' mean exactly the same thing" is meaningless or a kind of contradiction. In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein maintained that that kind of meaninglessness is analagous to saying "'3 x 18 inches won't go into 3 feet'".¹ "This", said Wittgenstein, "is a grammatical rule and states a logical impossibility."² Wittgenstein's reference is to the sentence "I can't feel his pain". While it is true that our sentence states a grammatical impossibility, as it were, I still think that there is a sense in which the impossibility or the unusualness of it arises out of features of the world; in the sense that the world submits to the practice of the rule. Indeed, that kind of utilization of facts in the world is one of the principal points it was the task of part III of this thesis to consider.

What value does this discussion of the concept of speech have for the problem of other minds? It was said that speakers are outside the problem. The contribution of

¹The Blue and Brown Books, p. 56.
²Loc. cit.
the discussion to the problem is the attempt to show that whatever the final analysis will be as to what 'having a mind' or 'having sensations and thoughts' consists of, there can be no doubt, I believe doubt is incoherent here, that I am a speaker and that being a speaker is a form of activity which involves other speakers. This is just as much a rock bottom fact as Price's assertion that we get new information by means of symbols. The other minds problem comes about by predicing certain things about speakers, or at least one particular speaker. I mean such things as private sensations which only he can know. And from that starting point the other minds sceptic endeavors to search into how he gets knowledge of other people's sensations. It appears to him that he operates with a true and special sense of 'I' but in fact it is a secondary sense which derives from his role as a speaker.

3.

In some respects Price, in "Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds", dealt with the conditions of meaningful speech. He said, in effect, that the utterance "Look! there is the bus!" can be explained by assuming that the utterer is also a perceiver and thinker. These assumptions can be viewed as conditions of the meaningful use of

the utterance. At any rate, for Price, at least two of the conditions of meaningful speech are the mental acts of perceiving and thinking.

A conclusion of this thesis is that Price missed an all-important condition of the employment of natural language. It is that the world must contain or at least have contained, a plurality of speakers. That, for our language, there must be, and are, creatures who can use noises at will, was vaguely felt by Price. He wrote:

It may be objected that one cannot learn to understand language unless one already believes (or knows?) that the noises one hears are produced by a mind other than oneself. For if not, how could it ever occur to one that those queer noises which one hears are symbols at all? Must one not assume from the start that these noises are intended to stand for something?\(^4\)

Price's argument against this can be described, somewhat impressionistically, as follows: since I do not observe an act of intending an object to be a symbol, I must learn that it is so intended by introspecting the use of symbols in my own thinking. The objection to Price's reliance on introspection has already been discussed in section 2 of part II. According to Price, the discovery that symbols mean "... begins by noticing a correlation between a certain type of object and a certain type of noise, as one might notice a correlation between any two types of entities which are

frequently combined, say, thunder and lightning."⁵

Of course one must privately pay attention to the learning of symbols and reflection will supplement instruction. However, Price did not notice that symbols in our natural languages are used in sentences in such a way that a speaker says something to a hearer, who is another speaker. What he neglected to notice was that this is just as much a part of learning to use symbols as learning to recognize the sounds and figures of the symbols themselves. Different speakers are parts of the meaning-atomosphere of the symbols.

The language Price describes his learning of is not a language one speaks. In some respects his language resembles what Wittgenstein called a 'private language'.⁶ The difference is that Price tacitly admits that he learns this language, he does not invent it, nor is it only about private sensations.

The problem of other minds must be seen in a light different from the one in which it appears in Price's "Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds". Part of what I have tried to show is that though there may indeed be special problems connected with interminable doubts about other

people's sensations and silent thoughts, the problems would not arise if there was not a plurality of speakers.
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