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Continuity in Russian and Soviet nationalities policies : the deported peoples of World War II under… Hutchinson, John Charles 1962

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CONTINUITY IN RUSSIAN AND SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICIES: THE DEPORTED PEOPLES OF WORLD WAR I I UNDER TWO REGIMES by JOHN CHARLES HUTCHINSON B. A., U n i v e r s i t y of Manitoba, 1958 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of Slavonic Studies We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1962 In presenting t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree that permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n permission. John Charles Hutchinson Department of Slavonic Studies The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 8, Canada. Date CONTINUITY IN RUSSIAN AND SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICIES; THE DEPORTED PEOPLES OP WORLD WAR II UNDER TWO REGIMES. Abstract: This essay, as i t s t i t l e implies, traces elements of continuity i n the n a t i o n a l i t i e s p o l i c i e s of the Tsarist and Soviet governments of Russia by con-sidering the experiences under both regimes of the seven national minorities of the Soviet Union deported during World War II f o r alleged treasonable a c t i v i t y and/or collaboration with the Germans. The seven minorities are the Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars. The essay i s organized into four chapters. Chapter I has three parts, a l l concerned with necessary introductory material. Part i states the problem and the.principal thesis of the essay: that the deportations of these seven minorities during World War II were only tenuously related to the charges brought against these peoples by the Soviet government; but, on the other hand, the de-portations would seem to have been largely punishments i n f l i c t e d upon these peoples f o r t h e i r generally unsatisfactory behaviour during t h e i r two decades or more under Soviet r u l e . The essay goes further to demonstrate, however, that the be-haviour of a l l these minorities under Soviet rule was generally i n conformity with the i r behaviour under Tsarist rule, and that, as i t affected these groups at least, Soviet n a t i o n a l i t i e s policy was i n many essential respects hardly more than a continuation of e a r l i e r T sarist p o l i c y . Part i i outlines b r i e f l y the expansion; of the Russian Empire from i t s geographical centre near Moscow. Part i i i describes the h i s t o r i c a l backgrounds of the seven peoples and the circumstances through which each came under Russian r u l e . Chapter II i s divided into two parts. Part i discusses the evolution of the Tsarist government's policy of minority discrimination and r u s s i f i c a t i o n , with emphasis upon the doctrines of "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationalism" and of " o f f i c i a l nationality", and explores the reasons why these doctrines proved un-successful when Russia became through the process of expansion a vast multinational empire. Part i i treats i n d i v i d u a l l y the experiences of the seven peoples i n question under Tsarist r u l e . Chapter III i s i n three parts. Part i i s concerned with the develop-ment of national f e e l i n g among the non-Russian peoples of the Russian state, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the period 1905-17, with emphasis upon the seven peoples being studied here. Part i i i s an analysis of the p r i n c i p a l Bolshevik theoretical writ-ings on the national question, dealing c h i e f l y with Marxism and the National  Question. Part i i i describes the c r i t i c a l t r a n s i t i o n a l period between 1917-21, between the Bolshevik Revolution and the regime's f i n a l victory, and the r e -assertion of Russian authority over the t e r r i t o r i e s of the seven peoples. Chapter IV i s also i n three parts. Part i i s a broad survey of Soviet n a t i o n a l i t i e s policy's main phases since 1920, and also discusses some of the more salient congruities between Soviet p o l i c y and Tsarist policy, suggesting reasons f o r these continuities. Part i i treats i n d i v i d u a l l y the experiences under Soviet rule of the seven minorities with whom the essay i s concerned, with emphasis upon those elements of continuity which emerge between the i r treatment under the Soviet government and their e a r l i e r treatment under the Tsars. Part i i i i s confined to b r i e f concluding remarks. The notes have been placed at the end of each chapter. The bibliography follows the notes to chapter IV. CONTENTS Chapter I i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 i i 12 i i i 23 notes 46 Chapter I I i 51 i i . . . . . . 70 notes 128 Chapter I I I i 135 i i 150 i i i 168 notes 213 Chapter IV i 217 i i 243 i i i . . . 315 notes 321 c Bibliography . . . . . . . . • 330 I i Between 19^1 and 19*+5, the government of the U.S.S.R. expelled from membership i n "the Soviet family of peoples" the members of seven national m i n o r i t i e s : the Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars. According to the o f f i c i a l reasons given by the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s , a l l of these minorities were punished f o r the same reasons, t h e i r alleged c o l l e c t i v e pro-German and/or a n t i -Soviet attitudes and a c t i v i t i e s during World War I I , and the punishment of each group followed.a pattern which varied as l i t t l e as the accusations against them. A l l of the persons belonging to the condemned groups were expelled, often f o r c i b l y , from t h e i r homes and lands, whether these were i n th e i r i n d i g -enous areas or i n other parts of the Soviet Union, and transported, many of them under conditions of extreme hardship, to remote parts of the U.S.S.R., either i n S i b e r i a or i n Central Asia. The native t e r r i t o r i e s of these minorities, which had, u n t i l the time of the deportations, constituted either so-called Autonomous Republics or Autonomous Regions of the Union, ceased to e x i s t . They were abolished even as administrative units and incorporated into other administrative d i v i s i o n s of the U.S.S.R. A l l mention of the seven deported minorities, whether as " n a t i o n a l i t i e s " , as names of geographical areas, or otherwise, was c a r e f u l l y s t r i c k e n from the pages of almost a l l Soviet publications, including even the d e f i n i t i v e Large Soviet 2 Encyclopaedia, and, f o r a dozen years, was studiously avoided i n most l a t e r works. Maps were altered; r i v e r s , d i s t r i c t s , c i t i e s , towns, and v i l l a g e s were given new names, or else had t h e i r old names Russianized. So f a r as the average Soviet c i t i z e n was concerned, these seven national m i n o r i t i e s , numbering about 1,300,000 persons i n all," * " no longer existed. Indeed, f or more than a decade, the Soviet authorities went even further than t h i s , and attempted to conceal or to remove any evidence that these peoples ever had existed. They had become, i n Bertram Wolfe's phrase, "unpeoples". These are the bare and basic facts concerning the seven national minorities who have come to be known c o l l e c t i v e l y as the "Lost Peoples" of the Soviet Union, the bare and basic fa c t s which came only siowly to be known and appreciated i n the outside world during the l a t e 19^0's and early 1950's, and which f i n a l l y were divulged i n the Soviet Union i t s e l f , almost i n f u l l , i n February, 1956? by Premier N i k i t a Khrushchov during h i s famous so-called " d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n " speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—where, i n c i d e n t a l l y , these revelations were roundly condemned by both Premier Khrushchov and the delegates to the Congress, as evidence of bru t a l and inhuman crimes. Since 1956? steps have been taken to r e h a b i l i t a t e i n th e i r old t e r r i t o r i e s f i v e of the seven deported peoples. Along with a l l i n d i v i d u a l s s t i l l serving sentences i n the Soviet Union 3 f o r treasonable a c t i v i t i e s during the War, the Kalmyks and the four North Caucasian peoples—Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars—have been granted amnesties for t h e i r crimes and have had t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s restored to them. But there has as yet been no word about the other two groups, the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars. Despite the admitted enormity of the deportations by the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s , despite the f a c t that a l l other war-time t r a i t o r s and collaborators have been amnestied, and despite the f a c t that some, members of the other f i v e deported peoples are already reported as being back from e x i l e , i n t h e i r restored t e r r i t o r i e s , there i s s t i l l l i t t l e to report on these, more than f i v e years a f t e r Premier Khrushchev's speech. A number of possible reasons f o r the reluctance of the Soviet regime to r e h a b i l i t a t e the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars, and some of the implications of t h i s reluctance, are suggested i n the f i n a l chapter of t h i s study. S u f f i c e i t to state here that the continued Soviet silence with regard to the fate of these two groups does not appear encouraging, either f o r the groups themselves, or f o r those who predict, or think to see, s i g n i f i c a n t changes or a general "thaw" i n the n a t i o n a l i t y p o l i c i e s of the Soviet regime. The task at hand, however, i s to analyze the reasons f o r the o r i g i n a l deportations. Why were these seven groups chosen f o r deportation? I t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible to accept at face value the o f f i c i a l reasons put forward by the Soviet authorities f o r the stern and d r a s t i c measures i n s t i t u t e d against If the seven deported peoples. There are several reasons f o r t h i s extreme d i f f i c u l t y , not the l e a s t of which i s , f i r s t of a l l , that there i s l i t t l e evidence, apart from the claims of the Soviet authorities themselves, that the incidence of treason, defection, or collaboration was higher, or s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher, among any or a l l of these peoples than i t was, say, among the Ukrainians, the Byelorussians, the peoples of the B a l t i c states, or any of those n a t i o n a l i t i e s whose t e r r i t o r i e s were overrun by the German armies during World War I I — a n d t h i s statement would include the Great Russian people, also. C e r t a i n l y , i n any case, there i s no r e l i a b l e evidence that the number of war-time defectors and t r a i t o r s among any of the deported peoples was large enough to j u s t i f y the blanket condemnation of these entire peoples, and t h e i r subsequent punishments which approached genocidal proportions. Second, i t i s at l e a s t doubtful that many of the members of the peoples condemned could ph y s i c a l l y have collaborated with the Germans, whether or not they had wished to do so. A glance at the map of the Soviet Union i s enough to es t a b l i s h t h i s doubt. The German forces occupied only a portion of the Kalmyk Republic, and t h i s occupation was hardly more than episodic, l e s s than two months. The German armies penetrated only the extreme western regions of the Chechen-Ingush Republic. And they f a i l e d e n t i r e l y to reach the Volga-German A.S.S.R.2 This i s not to say, of course, that the German armies found no ind i v i d u a l s among the seven groups destined to become 5 "unpeoples" who were w i l l i n g to collaborate with them. Indeed, and as w i l l be seen, a section of the population of every one of the Soviet t e r r i t o r i e s which the Germans entered was found to greet the invaders as l i b e r a t o r s and to collaborate with them as f u l l y as possible. The large numbers of Soviet c i t i z e n s who ac t u a l l y took up arms on the side of the Germans against the Soviet Union—there were at l e a s t 700,000 of these^—comprised some members of almost every national and ethnic group which i s to be discovered within the borders of the U.S.S.R. I t i s true that among the German forces r e c r u i t e d from c i t i z e n s of the Soviet Union there were some national and ethnic groups whose contributions were disproportionately large, and t h i s was true of at l e a s t one of the deported peoples, the Kalmyks, of whom some M-,500 were active i n the Vlasov army and other units. But such disproportions cannot be taken to indicate with any degree of certainty either the l o y a l t y or the d i s l o y a l t y of the entire national or ethnic group to which these so l d i e r s belonged. Neither can they be taken to mean that these p a r t i c u l a r groups were either more or less l o y a l , c o l l e c t i v e l y , than were other groups whose contributions to the anti-Soviet armed forces -under German command were either larger or smaller. A multitude of other f a c t o r s , hardly r e l a t e d to the question of l o y a l t y , could account f o r these disproportions. The f a c t that some h,5Q0 Kalmyks were a c t i v e l y d i s l o y a l r e a l l y t e l l s very l i t t l e about the l o y a l t y or d i s l o y a l t y of the other 125,000 Kalmyks i n the U.S.S.R. And c e r t a i n l y , by i t s e l f , t h i s f a c t can hardly be 6 considered s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r the punishment by deportation of the entire n a t i o n a l i t y group, and i t s l o s s of a l l c i v i l r i g h t s . There i s no wish i n t h i s study to minimize the amount of actual collaboration among the deported n a t i o n a l i t i e s , and the evidence which i s available concerning t h i s question w i l l be discussed at some length i n Chapter IV. For the moment, however, the question of the g u i l t or innocence of portions of the Lost Peoples i s r e a l l y beside the point. In condemning and punishing entire n a t i o n a l i t i e s f o r crimes committed against the State by i n d i v i d u a l s , or numbers of i n d i v i d u a l s , belonging to those n a t i o n a l i t i e s , the Soviet regime demonstrated i t s willingness to depart from a l l c i v i l i z e d p r a c t i c e . In applying the p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e c t i v e g u i l t , or c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , to whole nations f o r the crimes of t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l members, the Soviet regime also betrayed i t s own Marxist-Leninist ideology, which admits of no such thing as a "bad" nation. For what reasons, one must ask, were these p a r t i c u l a r seven minorities singled out f o r s p e c i a l attention? I f the p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e c t i v e g u i l t were to be applied, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see by what standards i t could be applied to some nations, and not to a l l . As has been noted, there was a high incidence of defection and collaboration among a l l of the peoples of the Soviet Union during the War. P a r t i c u l a r l y among the Ukrainians and the peoples of the B a l t i c states, where anti-Soviet f e e l i n g seems to have been most prevalent, t h i s incidence was c e r t a i n l y higher, both i n 7 proportion to the total, populations of these areas and i n absolute f i g u r e s , than i t was among any of the deported peoples. Why, then, of a l l the peoples of the Soviet Union which were to some extent g u i l t y of war-time crimes, were these seven groups chosen to become "unpeoples"? The o f f i c i a l charges against these n a t i o n a l i t i e s neither s a t i s f y nor s u f f i c e . The explanation of the deportations must be sought elsewhere. The p o s s i b i l i t y that the Soviet authorities might have made th e i r choice of these peoples f o r deportation without any good and s u f f i c i e n t provocation cannot, of course, be discounted e n t i r e l y . But there are strong reasons f o r believing that such was not the case. I t becomes increasingly apparent, as time goes by, and as studies of the Soviet Union and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s increase both i n scope and i n thoroughness, that the Soviet regime usually has very good reasons of i t s own f o r every major step that i t takes, whether or not these reasons are r e a d i l y discernible to the outside observer. I t must be remembered, i n addition, that the actions against the Lost Peoples took place over a span of almost three years. They were not, c l e a r l y , the r e s u l t of a single, perhaps capricious, decision taken on the spur of the moment. They were obviously f i n e l y weighed and c a r e f u l l y considered actions, the r e s u l t of much thought, and parts of an o v e r a l l general p o l i c y . No regime, not even a regime so f i r m l y entrenched as the Soviet regime, takes i t upon i t s e l f to relocate more than a m i l l i o n and a quarter of i t s c i t i z e n s without having good reasons f o r so 8 doing. One can hardly escape from the conclusion that follows, that the deportation of c e r t a i n minorities forms, or formed at that time, an i n t e g r a l part of the n a t i o n a l i t i e s p o l i c y of the Soviet government. S t i l l , one asks, why these p a r t i c u l a r peoples? I t has been seen that a l l of the n a t i o n a l i t i e s of the U.S.S.R. whose lands were occupied by the German armies during World War II were g u i l t y of collaboration to some extent. Yet, of a l l the n a t i o n a l i t i e s , only these seven were deported. It has been noted that the Soviet government defied both world opinion and i t s own t h e o r e t i c a l tenets by applying the p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e c t i v e g u i l t to entire n a t i o n a l i t i e s f o r the crimes of t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l members. Yet the p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e c t i v e g u i l t was applied only to these seven. Now i t was obviously impossible (as Premier Khrushchov himself pointed out) f o r the Soviet government to eliminate some f o r t y or f i f t y m i l l i o n s of Ukrainians, and much more d i f f i c u l t f o r i t to eliminate several m i l l i o n s of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, than i t was to eliminate much smaller minori-t i e s . But the r e l a t i v e size of the groups condemned does not by i t s e l f appear to have been a decisive factor i n t h e i r deportations. Compare, fo r example, the r e l a t i v e sizes of the Chechens and the Volga Germans, numbering some 400,000 people each, to the Balkars, numbering one-tenth that many. Neither do the c u l t u r a l l e v e l s of the deported peoples--in any generally 9 accepted sense—appear to have had any d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p to t h e i r f a t e . These seven groups presented a c u l t u r a l spectrum of sorts, ranging from the rather highly c i v i l i z e d Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans to the s t i l l semi-nomadic herdsmen of the Northern Caucasus and the Kalmyk steppes. In the examination of the h i s t o r i e s of the Lost Peoples, i n the following pages, i t w i l l be noted that these peoples, despite the great number of differences which existed among them, had i n common a number of s i m i l a r i t i e s . I t i s through these s i m i l a r i t i e s that i t seems possible to explain what otherwise seems almost i n e x p l i c a b l e : why they were selected f o r deportation. I t i s notable that each of these groups, i n i t s own way, possessed a t r a d i t i o n of refusing to be assimilated, and that a l l , without exception, had presented to the Soviet authorities s p e c i a l problems which dated back long before the beginning of World War I I , as f a r back as the time of the Soviet's seizure of power, i n 1917. I t w i l l also be noted, however, that these t r a d i t i o n s predate the advent of the Soviet regime, and that the problems presented to the Soviet government by these peoples were not very d i f f e r e n t from the problems they had presented to the T s a r i s t government—if, indeed, they were not the same problems c a r r i e d over from the one regime to the next. I t would appear that the actual reasons f o r the Soviet government's decision to treat these minorities with such 10 severity, to expel them from t h e i r native t e r r i t o r i e s — m e n , women, and children alike--and to scatter them across Central Asia and S i b e r i a , stemmed l a r g e l y from the regime's experiences with these peoples between 1917 and World War I I . Notice w i l l be taken of existing evidence of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n among these peoples, and of t h e i r resistance to the Soviet way of l i f e , on the one hand, and of the Soviet regime's d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with these peoples, on the other. It i s suggested that the crimes attributed to these peoples during and aft e r the War, f o r which the deportations supposedly were punishment, served only as the f i n a l straw, i f , indeed, one were needed, and as a convenience: a reason f o r the elimination of these peoples which would appear both legitimate and j u s t i f i a b l e to the c i t i z e n s of the Soviet Union and to the r e s t of the world—although one wonders how either the p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e c t i v e g u i l t applied to whole n a t i o n a l i t i e s , or the practice of what amounts to genocide, can be j u s t i f i e d i n any case. A l l evidence makes i t appear that the Soviet authorities leaped at the opportunity to r i d themselves, f o r once and f o r a l l , of minorities which had proved extremely troublesome. By accusing the offending peoples of war-time coll a b o r a t i o n with the Germans, i t was possible to mask, however badly, the f a c t that the l i q u i d a t i n g of whole peoples was but one of the natural r e s u l t s of Soviet n a t i o n a l i t i e s p o l i c y c a r r i e d to i t s l o g i c a l outcome and extreme. In the Soviet scheme, the treatment accorded to the Lost Peoples was but the treatment to be accorded to any r e f r a c t o r y national minorities 11 which resisted too strenuously the Soviet process of forced acculturation, which aims, more or less openly, at establishing a "class, universal, and progressive" culture throughout the whole of the U.S.S.R., i f not the whole world. It would also appear, however, that, as the Soviet d i c t a t o r s h i p has i t s roots at l e a s t partly i n the T s a r i s t autocracy, the Soviet l i q u i d a t i o n of the Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars had i t s roots deeper i n the past than the beginning of the Soviet regime. The fate of these peoples would seem to have been at least p a r t i a l l y determined long before 1917, during the time when Russia and the Russian Empire were s t i l l ruled by the Tsars. I t w i l l be seen that, from the time of t h e i r coming under Russian r u l e , the deported n a t i o n a l i t i e s had i n common long h i s t o r i e s of either active or passive resistance to the T s a r i s t regime. In many respects, the l i q u i d a t i o n of the Lost Peoples seems to have been r e a l l y the f i n a l , perhaps i n e v i t a b l e , outcome of p o l i c i e s directed against them and the other minori-t i e s of the Russian Empire long years before, and l a r g e l y the r e s u l t of these peoples' resistance to T s a r i s t p o l i c i e s of r u s s i f i c a t i o n , as w ell as to modern p o l i c i e s of s o v i e t i z a t i o n . The story of these peoples i s a s t r i k i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n of the continuum of Russian hist o r y . The farther one delves into t h i s story, the more f i r m l y one becomes convinced that the deporta-tions of these seven n a t i o n a l i t i e s seem to follow d i r e c t l y and l o g i c a l l y from the p o l i c i e s of the T s a r i s t regime, and actually to culminate these p o l i c i e s . 12 i i At the height of i t s expansion, the Russian Empire extended over approximately one-sixth of the entire land surface of the globe. At the end of the nineteenth century, i t stood as the r e s u l t of nearly four centuries of almost continuous expansion achieved through conquest and colonization, and em-braced under the rule of i t s Tsar perhaps as many as one hundred and seventy-five national and ethnic minorities, speaking almost as many languages and d i a l e c t s , and possessing numerous and diverse p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , and c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s and i n s t i t u -t i o n s . Growing s t e a d i l y outward from i t s Great Russian nucleus centred i n the region between the headwaters of the Volga and Oka r i v e r s on the great Eurasian plain-r-the s i t e of Moscow—the Russian Empire had, by the close of the nineteenth century, long since ceased to be Great Russian i n I t s ethnical composition. The p r i n c i p a l i t y of Moscow began i t s emergence as a major p o l i t i c a l power during the fourteenth century, when most of what i s now the European portion of the U.S.S.R. was domin-ated by the s t i l l - p o w e r f u l Golden Horde, with i t s c a p i t a l at Sarai on the lower Volga, or was being drawn into the o r b i t of the recently-emerged Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which became united d y n a s t i c a l l y with the Kingdom of Poland i n 1386. Through the fourteenth and f i f t e e n t h centuries, the princes of Moscow were able one by one to subdue the i r r i v a l princes i n the Great Russian heartland, and slowly but surely to consolidate th e i r 13 p o s i t i o n of primacy as the r u l e r s of the most powerful of the Russian p r i n c i p a l i t i e s . , There were many reasons f o r the r i s e of Moscow during these centuries. I t s cen t r a l geographical p o s i t i o n , near to the sources of four major r i v e r s , the p r i n c i p a l trading routes i n a land where distances were, and are, immense; the personal q u a l i t i e s of her princes, including t h e i r exceptional mastery of the art of st a t e c r a f t and the happy and fort u i t o u s accident of t h e i r longevity; the not inconsiderable power and authority which devolved i n t o the hands of these princes through t h e i r capacity as c o l l e c t o r s of taxes f o r the Khan of the Golden Horde; the f a l l of Constantinople to another r i s i n g empire, that of the Turks, i n 1453, and the subsequent s h i f t i n g of the centre of eastern Orthodox C h r i s t i a n i t y from Constantinople to Moscow; the r e l a t i v e p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y weakness of her neighbouring states: a l l of these, and other reasons, account f o r the r i s e of the p r i n c i p a l i t y of Moscow to i t s position of primacy i n Russia and the gradual emergence of her princes as the supreme powers i n the land. The c i t y of Novgorod, the eastern terminus of the Hanseatic League, and, since the smashing of the old Kievan state organization by the Tatars i n the thirteenth century, the only Russian centre s t i l l capable of challenging the authority of Moscow, f i n a l l y was compelled to admit the suzerainty of Ivan I I I (1462-1505), i n 1478. With a l l of the Russian lands i n Ik submission to him, Ivan III f e l t himself strong enough, two years l a t e r , to challenge even the supremacy of the Golden Horde. His unanswered challenge to b a t t l e , i n l*+80, marked the end of almost two and a half centuries of Russian submission to "the Tatar, yoke"—at l e a s t , the formal ending of the Golden Horde's hold over Russia. The great empire founded by the armies of Ghenghis Khan, which, led by h i s nephew, had e a s i l y overthrown the princes of Kiev and c a r r i e d the Tatar forces deep into the heart of Central Europe, had i n r e a l i t y been i n decline for centuries. I t had been gradually decaying and becoming fragmented, as the c e n t r a l power diminished, i n t o separate and semi-independent khanates. One- of these, the Khan-ate of Crimea, had s p l i t away from the Horde as early as the f i r s t twenty years of the f i f t e e n t h century, had established i t s e l f as a r i v a l power, and became a l l i e d with the Ottoman Empire shortly before Ivan I l l ' s v i c t o r y over the Horde on the Oka, i n ikQO. The Muscovite state which arose out of the riverlands of the Eurasian p l a i n , between the dynamic and vigorous states to i t s West and the moribund A s i a t i c states to i t s South and East, was: an e n t i r e l y new h i s t o r i c a l phenomenon, a synthesis of elements both European and A s i a t i c , and vastly d i f f e r e n t from i t s predecessor, the old Kievan state which had been supreme from the tenth to the twelfth centuries. The Kievan state organization had been loose, at times bordering on the anarchis-t i c . Founded upon the strength of i t s commerce with 15 Constantinople, Central Europe, Scandinavia, and the Moslem world, i t had not known the i n s t i t u t i o n of serfdom; i t had been orientated d e f i n i t e l y westward, and, through the centuries, had established and maintained with the Western world close r e l i g i o u s , c u l t u r a l , and commercial t i e s . I t s great and most dangerous enemies had been i t s own lack of c e n t r a l i z e d authority and the nomads of the steppes—indeed, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to estimate which of these was i n the end most responsible f o r the f a l l of the Kievan state. Moscow, on the other hand, emerged into the sixteenth century with an already well-established p r i n c i p l e of autocracy, with the i n s t i t u t i o n of serfdom already bred i n t o i t s s o c i a l structure, and with i t s own unique c u l t u r a l inheritance compounded from old Russian, Byzantine, and o r i e n t a l elements. Consider also how d i f f e r e n t was the p o l i t i c a l scene i n which the Tsars of the "new" Russia found themselves. The coming and the receding of the waves of Tatar invasion had resulted i n much more than a mere s h i f t i n g of the locus of power among the eastern Slavs. In the early sixteenth century, the southern shores of the B a l t i c were now dominated by the Swedes and the Teutonic Knights. The old Kievan lands as f a r as the Dneiper r i v e r , and including the c i t y of Kiev i t s e l f , were now controlled by the nobles of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the power of which extended southward now almost to the l i t t o r a l of the Black Sea. The Black Sea coasts proper were ruled by the energetic Khanate of the Crimea, the remnant of the Golden Horde now become the vassal-state of another new 16 and expanding power, Ottoman Turkey. The road to expansion thus l a y to the E a s t — i n t o the vast lands which had become, with the decline of Tatar strength, i n modern parlance, a power vacuum, which waited only to be f i l l e d . This was to be Moscow's and Russia's destiny: these vast A s i a t i c steppe-lands, stretching almost uninterruptedly a l l the way to the P a c i f i c Ocean, and presenting few geographical obstacles to aggrandizement, apart from t h e i r tremendous distances•. But sparsely populated, i n the main, and by nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples who possessed few permanent i n s t i t u -t i o n s , t h i s immense and open p l a i n could offer no r e a l deterrent, i n the form of organized p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y resistance, to the pressures generated by a large and dynamic state. Russia's r u l e r s were to have t h e i r share of successes i n the West, i n the centuries to come; but always these were to be f a r more dearly bought and much more d i f f i c u l t to hold than t h e i r a cquisitions i n the East and South. The reign of Ivan IV (1533-8*0 graphically i l l u s t r a t e s the t r u t h of t h i s statement, and perhaps indicated even to the successors of "the T e r r i b l e " what were to be the p r i n c i p a l d i r e c t i o n s , and the manner, of Russia's future expansion. Ivan I V s conquest of the khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, i n the 1550's, not only d i s p e l l e d forever the threat of a renewed Tatar onslaught against Russia, but also obtained f o r Russia, f o r the f i r s t time, control of the whole course of the Volga 17 r iver down to the Caspian Sea. And s ignif icant ly , for the purposes of this study, these conquests also brought under the rule of the Tsars, for the f i r s t time, large numbers of Tatars and other Asiatic peoples who occupied the Volga steppes. In the West, i n contrast, Ivan IV found himself both balked and frustrated i n his attempts, extending over a quarter-century, to gain a foothold for Russia on the B a l t i c . After having sacked Novgorod, Russia's only principal outlet to the B a l t i c , Ivan IV was compelled, f i n a l l y , to surrender a l l of his sl ight but dearly-bought gains, and to abandon Livonia and Estonia to Poland and Sweden, respectively. And, while he was engaged on the B a l t i c , the Crimean Tatars, who were effectively to bar Russia from the use of the Black Sea for another two centuries, attacked and burned Moscow, i n 157l« The Russian Empire continued to expand i t s frontiers and to engulf al ien peoples, however, from the time of Ivan IV onward. Its growth proceeded almost as i f i t were a kind of organic process, which needed neither conscious guidance nor w i l l . Indeed, the Empire expanded steadily, i n spite of dynastic struggles, foreign invasions, and serious local uprisings; i t continued to extend Russian rule , often, without even the know-ledge of the Tsars, through the enterprise of private adventurers. A band of these, acting u n o f f i c i a l l y , as i t were, reached the Pacif ic as early as l6*+5, and thus staked Russia's claim to a l l of Siberia . 18 Alexis I (16^5-76) succeeded i n winning f o r the Empire the recognition of the Dneiper, or Zaporozhian, Cossacks i n 165^, recovering a portion of the Kievan lands which had been l o s t to Russia f o r some four hundred years, and bringing o f f i c i a l l y i n t o the service of the Empire the f i r s t of those anarchistic adventurers who, by one of the strange i r o n i e s of h i s t o r y , were to serve so f a i t h f u l l y m i l i t a r y and c o l o n i a l ends, conquering and pacifying other peoples f o r the autocracy. The transfer of the l o y a l t i e s of the Cossacks to Russia from Poland also s i g n i f i e d the power changes which had been gradually taking place i n the fortunes of the two empires. The decline of Poland was the sign of weakness i n the West f o r which the r u l e r s of Russia had long been waiting. I t was, however, l e f t to Peter the Great (1689-1725) d e f i n i t e l y to eliminate both Poland and Sweden as dangerous enemies, and to achieve the ambition of Ivan IV for setting Russia upon the shores of the B a l t i c . And much of Peter the Great's reputation r e s t s upon h i s having incorporated into Russian Livonia, Estonia, and a part of Finnish K a r e l i a , a f t e r the Great Northern War (1700-21), and upon h i s opening of h i s "window on Europe"—the new c a p i t a l on the B a l t i c , St. Peters-burg. But Peter the Great d i d not neglect the other borders of h i s realm, and the modern Russian Empire, as i t extended u n t i l the Revolution of 1917? r e a l l y dates from Peter's r e i g n — n o t t e r r i t o r i a l l y , but i n s p i r i t and i n i t s conception of Russia's mission as a c i v i l i z i n g power. Peter succeeded i n capturing a 19 foothold on the Black Sea by h i s seizure of the f o r t r e s s of Azov; h i s crushing defeat of the Cossacks who had a l l i e d themselves with Sweden brought about the f u l l incorporation i n t o the Empire of the entire eastern Ukraine and the f i n a l d i s s o l u -t i o n of the Cossack hetmanate there. He established strong naval bases on the Caspian Sea; and h i s Persian adventure i n 1722, undertaken against a decaying state lapsed in t o anarchy, though i t yielded no immediate t e r r i t o r i a l gains, demonstrated the p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of a r e l a t i v e l y easy flanking movement around the mountain chains of the Caucasus, and pointed the way f o r the Russian advance into Transcaucasia and Central Asia. S i r Bernard Pares, r e f e r r i n g to the period of Russian h i s t o r y between the death of Peter the Great and the accession of Catherine the Great, i n 17&2, has asked r h e t o r i c a l l y : "Who c would take t h i s miserable record as the h i s t o r y of a people? And yet, although i t s progress of growth was somewhat slower and l e s s spectacular than i n the reigns preceding and following these f o r t y years, Russia continued to expand. Further t e r r i -t o r i e s i n Finland were gained, past gains on the Black Sea coastal areas were consolidated, and the extreme l i m i t s of northeast Asia were reached. The most important development, however, during t h i s period, was the perfecting of the system of Cossack l i n e s — " s t a t i o n s " linked by f o r t s — w h i c h prevented the incursions of native and outlaw bands on the border settlements. But i t was also during t h i s period that Russia increased her influence with the kings of Georgia, and made her extremely 20 useful a l l i a n c e with the princes of Kabarda, who co n t r o l l e d the northern slope of the main chain of the Northern Caucasus, between the headwaters of the Kuban and Terek r i v e r s . Catherine the Great (1762-96) continued with great industry the p o l i c y of consolidation of the Empire while, at the same time, she also made spectacular extensions of i t s borders. Through her wars with Turkey, Catherine added to her state's t e r r i t o r i e s , f i n a l l y , the Black Sea coast, including Crimea and i t s inhabitants, the Crimean Tatars, and southwestern Ukraine to the Dneister r i v e r . Her scheming with Prussia and Austria brought under Russian r u l e , through the P a r t i t i o n s of Poland, not only Lithuania, Byelorussia, and large s l i c e s of western Ukraine, but also considerable portions of ethnic Poland, with I t s P o l i s h population and i t s large concentrations of Jews. In the southeast, the l a s t of the free Cossacks, those of the Don, Kuban, and Terek regions, were e f f e c t i v e l y brought under control and e n l i s t e d i n the service of the Empire. Most of eastern Transcaucasia was gained, and the northern approaches to the Caucasus were secured by the extending of the Cossack l i n e s . Catherine II also brought i n numbers of s e t t l e r s from Europe, p a r t i c u l a r l y from Germany, to farm and to s e t t l e the borderlands and to render them more secure. As the nineteenth century opened, Catherine II's son, Paul I (1796-1801), peacefully annexed the Kingdom of Georgia. Alexander I (1801-25) added modern, Finland to the 21 Empire i n 1809, had granted to Russia by the Congress of Vienna, i n 1815, the central regions of Poland, and, from Turkey, annexed Bessarabia and obtained f o r Russia extensive r i g h t s i n the Banubian p r i n c i p a l i t i e s . Nicholas I (1825-55) continued to record large gains f o r the Empire. His armies took Erivan and a large portion of Armenia from Persia, now d e f i n i t e l y moribund as a power. They conquered the immense reaches of the Kir g h i z steppes, and thus prepared f o r the l a t e r expansion into Turkmen-i s t a n . In eastern S i b e r i a , they encroached on China by establishing permanent settlements at the mouth of the Amur r i v e r . And from Turkey—"the sick man of Europe", as the Ottoman Empire was termed by Nicholas h i m s e l f — h i s most persistent enemy, the Tsar gained most of the eastern shore of the Black Sea, the mouth of the Danube, and the r i g h t to rule over the former Turkish dominions i n the Northern Caucasus—although i t was to be l e f t to h i s successors a c t u a l l y to enjoy t h i s r i g h t . Alexander II (1855-81)> the Tsar known as "the great l i b e r a t o r " f o r h i s emancipation of the serfs of Russia, as i f to make up f o r t h i s t i t l e , brought i n t o the o r b i t of Russian domination most of the peoples of Turkmenistan, and secured the m i l i t a r y conquest of the ancient Central Asian khanates of Khiva, Bokhara, and Kokand. At l a s t , i n the f i n a l year of h i s reign, the entire Transcaspian region was annexed, i n 1881. Alexander I I I (1881-94) completed the Russian advance into Central Asia, as f a r as the borders of Afghanistan. And f i n a l l y , under Nicholas II (1894-1917), the l a s t of the Romanovs, 22 Russia extended her m i l i t a r y and commercial influence into Northern Manchuria, Mongolia, and Korea, obtained from China the ports of Port Arthur and Talienwan, and thus set the stage for the Revolution of 1905, which was brought about so l a r g e l y by the disastrous Russo-Japanese c o n f l i c t , and which marked the begin-ning of the end f o r the Russian Empire. It i s perhaps impossible to exaggerate, or to over-emphasize, the d i v e r s i t y of the peoples brought under Russian r u l e through these centuries of expansion. While i t i s true that the coming of the Russians meant for a portion of these peoples the advent of a higher c i v i l i z a t i o n , these were mainly those peoples belonging to the small t r i b e s of S i b e r i a and the Ar c t i c regions. The c i v i l i z i n g mission of Russian imperialism could hardly be invoked i n the context of many of the peoples Russia came to rule over from the time of Peter the Great onward. The Poles, Germans, Finns, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Tatars, and many of the Moslem peoples of Central Asia were not only the c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l equals of the Russians, at the very l e a s t , but also were, i n many cases, materially r i c h e r . There was, however, no glorying i n d i v e r s i t y i n the Empire of the Tsars. A l l of the peoples of Russia, regardless of the richness of th e i r pasts, were, generally speaking, expect-ed to conform to a single standard. And that standard was the standard of the Great Russians. The weakness of the Russian Empire was not that i t contained a great d i v e r s i t y of peoples; 23 m u l t i n a t i o n a l i t y i n i t s e l f cannot be considered a weakness i n a state. The trouble was that the multinational character of a large proportion of the peoples of the Russian Empire was treated as i f i t d i d not exi s t at a l l — o r else was regarded as a kind of disease, which was to be gotten r i d of as quickly and as e f f i c a c i o u s l y as possible. The expansion of the Russian Empire has been very b r i e f l y traced i n general terms. The remainder of t h i s chapter consists of h i s t o r i c a l notes on the p a r t i c u l a r seven peoples who constitute the case studies f o r t h i s work, and of a closer inspection of the circumstances of th e i r coming under Russian r u l e . i i i The Volga Germans immigrated to Russia o r i g i n a l l y as a g r i c u l t u r a l s e t t l e r s or c o l o n i s t s , most of them i n response to the two imperial manifestoes of Catherine I I , i n 1762 and 17&3, I n v i t i n g colonists from Europe to take up land and to s e t t l e i n 6 the southern and eastern regions of the Russian Empire. Under the terms of these manifestoes, those who answered the c a l l were to receive not only free land and i n t e r e s t - f r e e loans to aid them i n becoming established i n t h e i r new homeland, but also other concessions which,.from the beginning of t h e i r l i f e i n Russia, marked them off from the vast majority of the peoples of the Empire as members of a h i g h l y - p r i v i l e g e d and favoured minor-i t y . They were promised the r i g h t of l o c a l self-government and 2k freedom from taxation and other burdens for a period of many years. And more important, p e r h a p s — i n view of the r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s of large numbers of the c o l o n i s t s — t h e y were guaranteed complete freedom of r e l i g i o n and exemption from a l l kinds of 7 either c i v i l i a n or m i l i t a r y service. The Germans of the Volga represented one aspect of one of Catherine II*s most consistent and steadfast p o l i c i e s : the s e t t l i n g and the pacifying of the recently-acquired f r o n t i e r -lands Of southern and eastern European Russia. At the time of Catherine's accession to the throne, these borderlands needed badly to be s t a b i l i z e d ; they provided a haven f o r bands of outlaws^-free Cossacks, adventurers, runaway s e r f s , r e l i g i o u s dissenters, and other a n t i - s o c i a l and criminal elements—which, along with the nomadic and semi-nomadic native t r i b e s which had not yet been f u l l y p a c i f i e d , posed a constant threat to both the a g r i c u l t u r a l settlements and the growing towns of the f r o n t i e r s . I t i s beyond the scope of t h i s study to attempt to analyze i n d e t a i l a l l of the considerations which played a part i n Catherine II's decision to s e t t l e foreigners—Europeans, and p a r t i c u l a r l y Germans—in the southern and eastern borderlands, but some of these considerations should at l e a s t be noted. Catherine h e r s e l f , of course, was a German princess, the dynasty was German, and most of the Empresses and Grand Duchesses, l i k e her, could trace t h e i r origins to the petty German courts; there was, i n Russian palace c i r c l e s , a strong conviction of the 25 s u p e r i o r i t y of the German peasant over the Russian peasant, as a s e t t l e r . To reinforce t h i s b e l i e f , there was, moreover, the example set by Catherine's i l l u s t r i o u s predecessor, Peter the Great, who had allowed the descendants of the Teutonic Knights to r e t a i n t h e i r countless p r i v i l e g e s , and t h e i r p o s i t i o n as conquerors and landlords over a subject population, aft e r h i s defeat of the Swedes i n the Great Northern War and h i s winning of the Livonian and Estonian provinces. These so-called " B a l t i c Barons" or "Herrenvolk" had responded well to Russian r u l e , and, i n the half-century or so aft e r the death of Peter, had proved themselves to be l o y a l , orderly, and industrious subjects, and 8 f a i t h f u l supporters of the T s a r i s t administration. But, apart from any considerations which might have t o l d i n favour of the Germans and other Europeans as s e t t l e r s and colonizers, there was also i n Russia a very serious shortage of Russian subjects who were capable of playing such a r o l e . Russia, despite her large population, was also a land of immense spaces, and was, there-fo r e , t h i n l y populated. But there were other reasons f o r the shortage of suitable s e t t l e r s i n Russia, the evolution of which may be traced through the half-century between the death of Peter the Great and the accession of Catherine I I . Under a succession of weak and s i c k l y r u l e r s , the Russian gentry had, since 1725, succeeded i n emancipating i t s e l f from the services which, under Peter, i t had had to perform, and i n return f o r which i t had been granted i t s many p r i v i l e g e s , including r i g h t s over the bodies of i t s peasants. The emancipation of the gentry was completed and 26 formalized scant months before Catherine came to the throne—by her husband, Peter I I I , i n May, 1 7 6 2—and should l o g i c a l l y have been followed by the emancipating of the serfs from the squires, now transformed f o r the f i r s t time i n t o something resembling an ordinary European aristocracy. But Catherine, i n r e a l i t y a foreig n adventuress who possessed no legitimate claim whatever to the throne of Russia, owed everything to the gentry. She was, therefore, i n no p o s i t i o n to challenge the entire s o c i a l system which had come int o being i n Russia, by emancipating the s e r f s ; and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , she was not prepared to challenge the very class which had elevated her to the throne.^ Serfdom remained—the maintenance of the status quo was a low price to pay f o r an Empire. The number of free peasants remained neglig-i b l e . I f the borderlands were to be p a c i f i e d and s e t t l e d , then, the s e t t l e r s had to be attracted from outside of the Empire. The pioneers who answered Catherine's manifestoes, as might be expected, seem to have been l a r g e l y persons who, f o r one reason or another, had been unsuccessful i n t h e i r native lands, and who wished to b u i l d i n Russia a new l i f e f o r their f a m i l i e s and themselves: ex-convicts, members of persecuted r e l i g i o u s and p a c i f i s t i c sects such as the Mennonites and Hutterites, d i s i n h e r i t e d sons, cashiered o f f i c e r s , p r o s t i t u t e s , ruined merchants and craftsmen, and the l i k e : A l l h i storians of the colonization, not excluding the descendants of the c o l o n i s t s themselves, described the majority of Catherine's 'pioneers' as the lowest 27 scum of the German people . . . a l l sorts of people •who had f a i l e d i n l i f e , and i d l e r s hoping to be transferred to a paradise where not the s l i g h t e s t 10 e f f o r t was expected of them 1. In a l l , about 25>000 of these answered the i n i t i a l appeals made for s e t t l e r s f o r the Empire's v i r g i n l a n d s : 1 1 a motley crew, perhaps, but probably l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t from the type of s e t t l e r which has been found s i m i l a r l y successful i n North America and i n other new areas of colonization. The Tatars of Crimea came under the rule of Russia at almost the same time as the German colonists were f l o c k i n g to, and establishing themselves upon t h e i r new lands i n the region of the middle Volga. Unlike the Volga Germans, however, the Tatars were not newcomers to Russia; neither were they anxious to become the subjects of Moscow. For more than f i v e centuries, the Crimean Tatars had occupied t h e i r peninsula, and had b u i l t f o r themselves a m i l i t a r i l y aggressive and commercially prosperous state. Nor were they, as were so many of the a l i e n peoples en-gulfed by the wave of Russian advancement, i n any way a backward people. Over the centuries, they had erected a c i v i l i z a t i o n and a culture of t h e i r own which were i n no way i n f e r i o r to those of Moscow. The Crimean Tatars were descendants of a part of the so-called Mongol armies of Ghenghis Khan which had s e t t l e d i n Crimea, driving out or assimilating the previous nomad inhabit-ants, i n the wake of the campaigns of the years 1237-^1, which 28 had carried the Tatars into the heart of Europe and which had established their suzerainty over all of Russia. The principal centre of the Tatar Golden Horde, from which Russia was to be taxed and plundered for more than 200 years, was founded at Sarai on the lower Volga, and, while the power of the Horde remained undiminished, Tatar Crimea was only one of a number of outposts of the Khan. With the decline of the power of the Golden Horde, however, and with its fragmenting into separate and independent khanates, the Crimean Tatars gradually asserted their autonomy, and declared themselves separate around 1^ 25. At the height of its power, this state, with its capital at Bakhchiserai, controlled most of the northern coasts of the Black Sea, exerted its influence deep into the southern Ukrainian "no-man's land" between the Black Sea and the lands ruled by Poland and Russia, and as far east as the region between the Don and Volga rivers and the Caucasus. The Crimean Khanate, although i t became tributary to the Ottoman Empire about 1470, some ten years before the signal failure of the moribund Golden Horde to suppress the challenge of the rising power of Moscow under Ivan III, was for centuries a powerful factor in any conflict involving Russia. In l480, for example, the Crimean Tatars joined Ivan III in his campaigns against the Lithuanians, thereby helping to prevent the extension of the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth farther into the old Kievan lands. A century later, while Ivan IV was in-volved in his Baltic campaigns, they attacked and sacked Moscow. 2 9 They waged numerous campaigns against both Poland and Russia, though these were more i n the form of r a i d s , seeking slaves and r i c h e s , than of sustained and f u l l - s c a l e wars. But the strength of the Khanate of Crimea was dependent f a r more upon commercial than upon m i l i t a r y considerations. From at l e a s t the middle of the f i f t e e n t h century, the Tatars c a r r i e d on a f l o u r i s h i n g trade not only with the centres surrounding the Black Sea, but also with the khanates of Central Asia and the settlements of the Mediterranean. Their recognition of the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, though i t had undoubted m i l i t a r y value, seems to have been dictated p r i n c i p a l l y by t h e i r wish to extend their trading routes; aft e r the capture of Constantinople by the Turks i n l*+53» i t was both necessary and desirable, i f trade with the ports of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean were to continue and to expand, that the most f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s possible should be established and maintained with the power c o n t r o l l i n g these waters, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the S t r a i t s . The closeness and the d u r a b i l i t y of the t i e s between Crimea and Turkey were, i n addition, greatly aided by the f a c t that the Crimean Tatars and the Anatolian Turks were co-r e l i g i o n i s t s - -Moslems of the Summite doc t r i n e — a n d spoke d i a l e c t s of Turki very nearly r e l a t e d , and c l o s e l y akin also to the d i a l e c t spoken by the Turks of Azerbaijan. With the f a l l of the Volga khanates to Russia, the Crimean Tatars found themselves much more proximate to Turkey than to any other Moslem state; and, over the centuries, t h i s geographical proximity, already 3 0 reinforced by r e l i g i o u s , l i n g u i s t i c , commercial and m i l i t a r y t i e s , became also a c u l t u r a l proximity. Crimea's trade was c a r r i e d on l a r g e l y i n a g r i c u l t u r a l produce: s i l k and cotton materials, and large quantities of wheat. J Slaves, however, also played a prominent part, e s p e c i a l l y i n trade with other Moslem centres, and were one of the chief objects of the Tatar raids into the P o l i s h and Russian borderlands. On the Crimean coasts, the practice of gardening, the c u l t i v a t i o n of vine-crops and tobacco, the r a i s i n g and breeding of f i n e c a t t l e , and the silk-worm industry a l l achieved high standards. Grain crops and cotton f l o u r i s h e d i n the coastal Ik uplands. Since being annexed by Catherine I I , Crimea has been ref e r r e d to commonly as "the Russian R i v i e r a " , but t h i s term describes accurately only about one per cent, of the peninsula's t o t a l area--the narrow southern coastal s t r i p . The uplands adjacent to t h i s — a b o u t another 19 per cent, of the t o t a l a r e a — are the areas e s p e c i a l l y favourable to the c u l t i v a t i o n of the s o i l . But the remaining f o u r - f i f t h s of the peninsula, beyond the coastal mountains, i s mostly an a r i d and wind-swept steppeland, very t h i n l y populated; and the regions of the northern and north-eastern peninsula are p a r t i c u l a r l y inhospitable. y With the aid of Turkey, then, the Crimean Tatars were able successfully to bar Russia from the Black Sea coasts for some three hundred years, and to erect and maintain a garden-like 3 1 c i v i l i z a t i o n on the shores of the s t e p p e s — a c i v i l i z a t i o n ' m a r k e d s t r o n g l y not only by T u r k i s h and other eastern i n f l u e n c e s , but a l s o by the i n f l u e n c e of western I t a l i a n c u l t u r e , and p a r t i c u l a r -l y that of Genoa. I t i s notable that Catherine the Great, on her grand tour of South Russia i n 1 7 8 7 ? was able to dazzle the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the crowned heads of Europe, who were accustomed to almost any l u x u r y , w i t h the splendour and opulence 16 of her newly-acquired Crimean "province". This a c q u i s i t i o n culminated long years of Russian advance toward the B l a c k Sea and a gradual encroachment upon those r e g i o n s , f i r s t , h e l d by the Cossacks of the Dneiper—who had themselves been able to capture the Tatar f o r t r e s s - t o w n of Azov i n 1637, and to o f f e r i t to the T s a r — t h e n , g r a d u a l l y upon the Tatar steppes. In I637, Michael I had feared to give offence t o Turkey and had refused t o accept the Cossacks' o f f e r of Azov. By 1696, however, Peter the Great was h i m s e l f able to s e i z e the f o r t r e s s f o r R u s s i a . Though he was compelled to r e t u r n the f o r t r e s s to Crimea by the Treaty of the P r u t h , i n 1711, the Russians had reached the B l a c k Sea, Turkey was begin-ning to l o s e i t s g r i p on i t s empire, and the Crimean Tatars were doomed to gradual i s o l a t i o n and annexation. Russia continued to encroach, l i t t l e by l i t t l e , through the eighteenth century. Catherine I's F i r s t T u r k i s h War, i n which the Russian f o r c e s were overwhelmingly s u c c e s s f u l , brought about the f i n a l severance of the long Turkish p o l i t i c a l connection w i t h Crimea. 32 By the terms of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kai n a r d j i , ending the war i n 1774, Russia gained her f i r s t footholds upon the peninsula proper, and annexed the fortress-towns of Kinburn, Yenikale, and Kerch. Crimea was declared "independent", which i n f a c t meant that a Russian protectorate was established, and a puppet khan was i n s t a l l e d two years l a t e r . These Russian manoeuvres provoked r e b e l l i o n s by the Tatars i n 1778, 1782, and 1783, each 17 of which had to be put down by Russian invasion. ' Following the l a s t invasion, on the plea of restoring and maintaining order, Crimea was annexed by Russia i n 1783. The Kalmyks were the only Mongol people, and the only Buddhist people i n Europe. Unlike so many of the A s i a t i c peoples who came into Europe i n the rear of the invading and conquering armies of Ghenghis Khan—for example, the Tatars of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Crimea—the Kalmyks were r e l a t i v e newcomers, having made t h e i r appearance i n the region of the lower Volga, and having appealed to the Tsar f o r h i s protection as la t e as the beginning of the seventeenth century, about l625» Known also as Torgout or Oirat Mongols, the Kalmyks belong to the western branch of the Mongol people which inhabits also eastern 1 8 Tibet and eastern Sinkiang. Their d i s t i n c t i v e Chinese physio-gnomy distinguished them almost as markedly from the Tatars as from the Slavs i n E u r a s i a . ^ They spoke a language v i r t u a l l y the same as that spoken i n Mongolia proper, and used the old Mongolian alphabet—indeed, i t was the Kalmyks who perfected the alphabet i n the middle of the seventeenth century. Also unlike 33 * most of the Turkic t r i b e s , which follow one or another of the branches of Islam, the Kalmyks were Buddhists of the Zonkavist or Lamaist r i t e , whose s p i r i t u a l centre i s Lhasa, i n Tibet, and whose supreme s p i r i t u a l r u l e r i s the Dalai Lama. On the c i s -Caspian steppes, they l i v e d a simple nomadic l i f e , under the supreme authority of t h e i r own khan, who exercised unlimited despotic and theocratic powers vested i n him by the D a l a i Lama 21 himself. Pastoral people, they wandered regul a r l y over the steppes with th e i r f a m i l i e s and t h e i r k i b i t k i — t h e i r f e l t family-tents which doubled as c a r t s — a n d with t h e i r herds and f l o c k s of c a t t l e , camels, and sheep. The Kalmyks who remained i n Russia aft e r 1771 were a mere remnant of the o r i g i n a l Kalmyk migration from Chinese Turkestan i n 1630—a great trek undertaken by about 50,000 22 f a m i l i e s with th e i r herds. The Kalmyks had l e f t t h e i r ancestral home and had driven t h e i r k i b i t k i and fl o c k s westward, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, to escape the rule of the expanding power of China, which threatened to subjugate a l l of the Mongol t r i b e s . They had s e t t l e d on the a r i d steppes both east and west of the Volga. And there, where r a i n f a l l averages only some *+-8 inches per year, where c u l t i v a t i o n of the s o i l i s possible i n only a few elevated areas, and where there are frequent d u s t s t o r m s t h e y continued to l i v e , f o r the most part, much as they had f o r centuries, following t h e i r f l o c k s , although a portion of them s e t t l e d on the shores of the Caspian and became fishermen. 34 The Kalmyks were also f i e r c e warriors. From the time of t h e i r appearance on the Volga steppes, the Russian a u t h o r i t i e s , taking advantage of the hereditary antagonism between the Kalmyks and the Turkic t r i b e s , employed them as a l l i e s against the Turks, 2k the Crimean Tatars, and against the r e c a l c i t r a n t tribes of the 25 Urals. y Any attempts, however, to strengthen t h i s a l l i a n c e and to bring the Kalmyks under more d i r e c t control resulted i n emigrations of large numbers of them to their homeland. I t i s recorded that Peter the Great, who as a rule was not noted f o r his kind treatment of A s i a t i c peoples, entrusted the safekeeping of the eastern borders of the Russian Empire to the Kalmyk Khan, when he took h i s f i r s t educational t r i p to Europe, i n l697» 2 ^ So great was Peter's regard for the Kalmyks as f i g h t e r s that they were among the A s i a t i c troops which he unleashed i n Livonia, i n 1702, to devastate that province so completely that i t could not f o r a long time serve as a base f o r any attack by the Swedes.2'' This, i t might be noted, was the f i r s t appearance of such s o l d i e r s i n Europe since the Tatar invasions of the thirteenth century. As l a t e as the year 1760, a combined force of Kalmyks and Cossacks raided B e r l i n , and, altogether, these Mongol troops served the m i l i t a r y p o l i c i e s of the Tsars very well. With th e i r almost b l i n d obedience to t h e i r khan, and with t h e i r low estimate of the worth of i n d i v i d u a l l i f e and the environing world—ideas basic to t h e i r r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s 2 ^ - - t h e y were fe a r l e s s warriors and f a i t h f u l a l l i e s . 35 In keeping with her desire to ease the administration problems and to consolidate the various t e r r i t o r i e s of the Russian Empire, however, Catherine II no longer wished to have the Kalmyks either as vassals or a l l i e s . They were to become d i r e c t l y subject to the Russian crown.^ Proud and independent, the majority of the Kalmyks refused to accede to t h i s change i n t h e i r status, and decided to follow t h e i r khan back to eastern Turkestan, rather than submit to Russia and Catherine's 1^ plan which threatened to abolish even the t i t l e of khan.-' Having already received a mission from the Chinese emperor, i n -v i t i n g them to return to Turkestan, the Kalmyks set o f f , i n the winter of 1771 > on another great migration. Across the steppes i n winter, pursued by the Russians, harassed by the nomadic Kirghiz and Kazakh t r i b e s , some two to three hundred thousand Kalmyks-* plodded eastward, taking t h e i r flocks and herds with them, on an eight-month march covering some three thousand 3k miles. J The descendants of these t r a v e l l e r s s t i l l l i v e i n Sinkiang, under the name of Torgout. Those who remained behind—a remnant numbering some 50,000^^—would have l e f t Russia, too. But the thawing of the ic e on the Volga i s supposed to have prevented t h e i r crossing With th e i r f e l l o w s . ^ This remnant was now confined almost e n t i r e l y to the low-lying north-western shore of the Caspian, and to the steppes south and west of the Volga. A l i e n and anomalous i n Europe, the Kalmyks who remained under Russia when th e i r a l l i a n c e with the Russians had f i n a l l y become vassalage 36 thus came under d i r e c t Russian ru l e at almost the same time as the Germans of the Volga and the Tatars of Crimea. The mountain peoples of the Northern Caucasus were the l a s t of the seven groups which t h i s study i s examining to come under e f f e c t i v e Russian domination. They were not f i n a l l y conquered u n t i l the second h a l f of the nineteenth century, and aft e r more than t h i r t y years of savage warfare, although Russia secured her f i r s t r e a l foothold i n the Northern Caucasus as early as the sixteenth century. Of a l l the peoples of the Russian Empire, none possessed a t r a d i t i o n more proud and lengthy of b i t t e r and implacable resistance to the encroachments of invaders, than the North Caucasian mountaineers, among whom were included the Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars. The largest of these four peoples, the Chechens (of whom the Ingushes are, i n f a c t , a c l o s e l y - r e l a t e d branch), are supposed to have been mentioned i n the works of Greek h i s t o r i a n s as many as 2,500 years ago.37 For a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, therefore, they are classed as indigenous Caucasians, of the type which has been well described: That peculiar type which i s native to these parts, so-c a l l e d 'autochthonous'—'out of the ground'—is quite permanent, always resurgent, mastering the bodies of new masters. The strong-boned physique, the broad square head with i t s thick wavy growth of hair and beard, the wide dark eyes, the sallow skin, are bred 37 to these mountain peoples from the Ice Age. This type i s c a l l e d Armenoid, or more appropriately, Alpine; i t has spread to Europe i n p r e h i s t o r i c times along the mountain belt as f a r as the Pyrenees . . . surviving, as a l l types, mostly i n those parts which were l i k e s t i n condition to i t s homeland.^ The Karachays and Balkars, i n comparison to the Chechens and Ingushes, were r e l a t i v e newcomers to the region. Closely-related Turkic peoples, the Karachays and Balkars arrived and s e t t l e d i n the North Caucasian mountains i n the twelfth century; one of the numerous peoples set i n motion during the great waves of Tatar expansion westward, they are thought to have come to the Caucasus from the n o r t h . ^ According to the l i n g u i s t i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of Marr, the Chechens and Ingushes belong to the language group of North IfO Caucasian Japhetides. The Karachays and Balkars, on the other hand, speak d i a l e c t s of a language classed among the Japhetic-Turkic hybrids — t h a t i s , a tongue c l o s e l y akin to a l l of the if? western Turkic languages, and e s p e c i a l l y to Kumyk, but having adopted the "th" sounds and other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s from the languages of i t s adjoining Caucasian neighbours. -> The Chechens and Ingushes occupied the corner formed by the upper and middle course of the Terek r i v e r and i t s r i g h t kh t r i b u t a r i e s , the Arzun and Assa r i v e r s , with the Ingushes being confined almost e n t i r e l y to the extreme western regions of t h i s 3 8 area. Located to the north of extremely ethnographically-mixed Daghestan, Chechnia extends along the eastern part of the north slopes of the main Caucasian chain, and i s a land of rugged peaks and deep v a l l e y s , covered with thick growths of beech f o r e s t s . J U n t i l the Russian conquest i n the l 8 5 0 ' s , t h i s region, so f a r as i s known, had never been conquered by an invading force, but had successfully withstood the all-conquering armies of the Tatars, i n 1221, and had defied a l l Tatar e f f o r t s f o r the century following; a f t e r a b r i e f r e s p i t e from invasion, the Chechens had repulsed the armies of the great Tamerlane, at the end of the fourteenth century; and, from the f i f t e e n t h century onward, they had r e s i s t e d with notable success the successive invasions of the Persians, the Ottoman Turks, and the Crimean Tatars. The Ingush lands, while almost equally rugged and forbidding, were rather l e s s defensible, and had come under a l i e n domination at l e a s t twice before the nineteenth c e n t u r y — under the kings of Georgia i n the eleventh century, and under k7 the princes of Kabarda i n the f i f t e e n t h . ' The Karachays and Balkars had undergone numerous occupations during the centuries of struggle among the various empires and r u s t i c p r i n c i p a l i t i e s f o r control of the trans-Caucasian passes. Separated from the Chechens and Ingushes both by mountains and by the lands of the Ossetians and the Kabardans, the Karachays and Balkars, though geographically contiguous, were also separated from each other. The Balkars, a nation of shepherds, kept themselves v i r t u a l l y confined to the highlands of the western slopes of the mountain 39 chain that divides the headwaters of the Kuban and Terek r i v e r s ; the Karachays occupied the f e r t i l e lowlands and va l l e y s to the West, where, l i k e most of the peoples of the Northern Caucasus, they practised a combination of farming and herding. They grazed t h e i r f l o c k s of sheep and goats, and th e i r herds of c a t t l e , on the higher meadows, and, i n the valleys and lowlands, developed a h i g h l y - s k i l l e d agriculture which s p e c i a l i z e d i n •+8 orcharding and bee-keeping. The Caucasus i s balkanized i n the extreme, abounding with both large and small enclaves of peoples, many of whom hist o r y has passed by, and i t i s almost impossible to c l a s s i f y s a t i s f a c t o r i l y even i t s larger language groups. For the purposes of t h i s study, however, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t that note be taken of the immediate neighbours of the four deported nations. The Ossetians and Kabardans have already been mentioned as the peoples separating the Chechens and Ingushes from the Karachays and Balkars. They controlled the main d e f i l e s of the Caucasian chain (through which was b u i l t , at the end of the eighteenth century, the famed Georgian M i l i t a r y Road from Vladikavkaz to T i f l i s , so well-described i n the works of Lermontov and Tolstoy, among others), and had made a l l i a n c e s with the Russians and the Empress Anne (1730-^0) i n the early eighteenth century. The Ossetians, on the one hand, were Ch r i s t i a n s , whose lands bordered on Georgia to the South; the Kabardans, on the other hand, were mixed Gherkess, or Circassian, and Tatar o r i g i n , and were h i s t o r i c a l l y pro-Russian. They separated the Chechens and the other t r i b e s of the eastern mountain regions of the North Caucasus not only from the Karachays and Balkars, but also from the much more numerous and mil i t a r i l y - i m p o r t a n t Cherkess, also indigenous Caucasians, who l i v e d along the Black Sea coast and along the Kuban r i v e r ' s lower reaches. The Cherkess, unlike the demo-c r a t i c t r i b e s of Chechnia and Daghestan, to the East, had a h i e r a r c h i c a l s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l organization. In Daghestan, along the Caspian coast, i n mountain ranges f u l l y as inaccessible as those of Chechnia, there was a land-owning class i n the lowlands, mainly descended from Tatar intruders, y but, i n the mountains, democratic predatory septs clo s e l y akin to those of the Chechens made up the larger part of the population. The four deported nations of the Northern Caucasus, then—Chechens and Ingushes, Karachays and Balkar s — w h i l e they shared a way of l i f e common to most of the mountain peoples, were divided by geography, and by race and language. Their c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s also d i f f e r e d : the Karachays and Balkars, on the one hand, having been exposed to the influence of Georgia and other neighbours, and also, along with the Cherkess and the Crimean Tatars, to the influence of Anatolian Turkey, though to a lesser extent than either of these groups; and the Chechens and Ingushes, on the other hand, deriving t h e i r c u l t u r a l t r a d i -tions almost e n t i r e l y from Persia, whose c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l influence had been dominant i n the eastern Caucasus f o r almost %0 two thousand years. Nevertheless, these peoples did share one extremely important attribute which minimized th e i r many differences and bound them together: t h e i r b e l i e f i n Islam. A l l were followers of the Summite doctrine of the Mohammedan f a i t h . I t i s impossible to over-emphasize or to exaggerate the importance of Islam among the peoples of the Northern Caucasus. To a l l of the Mohammedan mountain peoples, the Moslem r e l i g i o n was not only a r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n which regulated the d a i l y l i f e of i t s members i n almost every p a r t i c u l a r , but i t was also a s o c i a l , l e g a l , and p o l i t i c a l force. The numerous clergy of the Moslems—the imams and mullahs—were not only r e l i g i o u s leaders, but also judges, law-givers, teachers, i n t e l l e c t u a l s , and p o l i t i c a l , and sometimes, m i l i t a r y leaders. The Mohammedan f a i t h as a whole, of course, prescribes war and advocates violence toward a l l non-Moslems; " V e r i l y , God loves 51 those who f i g h t i n His cause", states the Koran. But the doctrine of Muridism which, toward the end of the seventeenth century attracted many of the North Caucasian Moslems—and influenced p a r t i c u l a r l y the Chechens, onto whose conforming way of l i f e i t s democratic and e g a l i t a r i a n tenets f i t t e d e s p e c i a l l y well--was something else again. The f a n t a s t i c f i g h t i n g strength of Muridism, the followers of which never attained very considerable numbers, can hardly be understood without comprehending the Murid conception of war. "Fight strenuously against the misbelievers and hypo-52 c r i t e s , and be stern toward them":^ t h i s quotation from the If 2 Koran, along with the other quoted above, sums up the creed of the Murids succinctly. For them, war was not to be fought f o r any idea or hope of material gain, or even f o r i d e a l s of p o l i t i c a l independence. War possessed great i n t r i n s i c value i n i t s e l f , as a v e h i c l e — i n d e e d , the, v e h i c l e — f o r s e l f - p u r i f i c a t i o n and s e l f - s a c r i f i c e . J I t was the means by which the Murid warrior cleansed h i s soul, preparing i t f o r paradise through h i s complete self-immolation."' His most sacred object and duty was T5T5 to die i n battle against the i n f i d e l . " Muridism blended mysticism with s o c i a l motives, and was f a n a t i c a l , a s c e t i c , and l e v e l l i n g . I t s adherents constituted a kind of warrior monastic order, i n which a l l of the i n i t i a t e d were equal and, at the same time, completely obedient to the s p i r i t u a l and m i l i t a r y leader, the imam. Forming an e l i t e r e l i g i o u s f i g h t i n g force, the Murids were r e l i e v e d of a l l normal duties toward the v i l l a g e elders and the landowners. Everything else was subordinated to th e i r r e l i g i o u s contemplation and to war. The f a l l of Astrakhan to Ivan IV, i n 1556, opened the way to the Caucasus f o r the Russians, and almost immediately the Kabardans, who had been a l l i e d with Astrakhan against the Crimean Tatars, formed a new a l l i a n c e with the Tsar. In 1561, Ivan IV married a Kabardan princess, thereby cementing the a l l i a n c e , and establishing Russia's influence i n the northern mountains. Forts were b u i l t on the Terek to protect Kabarda from the Daghestan t r i b e s , but no r e a l further progress was made u n t i l the 1720's. The Kabardans, though submitting to the *+3 suzerainty of the Tsars, remained p r a c t i c a l l y independent, and the only evidences of Russian influence lay i n the quasi-independent Cossack settlements on the plains, along the r i v e r v a l l e y s . Peter the Great undertook the conquest of the Persian provinces along the Caspian coast of the Caucasus i n 1722, and successfully occupied most of the coastal regions from Derbent to Baku before withdrawing. His campaign showed the r e l a t i v e ease with which the mountain ba r r i e r s could be flanked. The Empress Anne, i n the 1730's, continued to extend the Cossack l i n e s , however, more deeply into the mountains of Chechnia, f i r s t completing the l i n e from the lower Don r i v e r to the Terek. Then, Catherine the Great, i n the 1760's, undertook i n earnest the con-quest of the Caucasus. The Cossack l i n e was extended 250 miles up the Terek to Mozdok; i n 1772, through the Treaty of Karsou signed wifth Crimea, and the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji with Turkey i n 177k, Kabarda and Ossetia were formally annexed; i n 1777, Catherine approved the establishment of a new Cossack l i n e , the "Caucasian l i n e " , from Mozdok to the Sea of Azov, thus i s o l a t i n g the Cherkess t r i b e s ; u n t i l the end of her reign, Catherine made gradual gains, through either a l l i a n c e s or conquests, and successfully occupied northern and eastern Daghestan by the time of her death. She was also able to negotiate an a l l i a n c e with Georgia i n 1768, and i n 1783 signed a treaty which guaranteed Georgian t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . The Georgian protectorate was formally annexed by Paul I, i n 1801, and t h i s , along with the Russian v i c t o r i e s over the Persians, i n 1796, which had placed a l l of eastern Transcaucasia under Russian control, successfully completed the sustained flanking movement whereby the most d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n and the most h o s t i l e t r i b e s were gone around. The mountains themselves, with the Cherkess on the Black Sea coast and the t r i b e s of Daghestan and Chechnia on the eastern side of the Georgian M i l i t a r y Road, were yet to be conquered. But the Gherkess, a f t e r 1829 and the f a l l of the Turkish fortresses on the Black Sea coast, were cut o f f from contact with Turkey, except by sea; the Chechens and Ingushes, meantime, along with the t r i b e s of Daghestan, were completely i s o l a t e d i n t h e i r mountains. The Treaty of Adrianople had forced Turkey to abandon a l l her claims to suzerainty i n the Caucasus and l e f t the Turks with no pretensions to i n t e r f e r e with whatever measures the Russians might take to pacify the mountains and the mountaineers. Nevertheless, t h i s p a c i f i c a t i o n became the main preoccupation of the Russian armies f o r the following quarter of a century, and was not f i n a l l y completed u n t i l a f t e r the Crimean War. The f i r s t t h i r t y years of the Chechens and Ingushes under Russian r u l e , therefore, were spent i n armed r e v o l t , assisted whenever possible by the Karachays and Balkars and by the other mountain peoples. So b i t t e r l y fought were these b a t t l e s , and so f i e r c e and implacable were the mountain people as foes, that the period of the Russian campaigns i n the Caucasus stands almost by i t s e l f as a period i n Russian l i t e r a t u r e . 45 This chapter has served as an introduction to the subject of the present study, and has sketched b r i e f l y the expansion of the Russian Empire and the h i s t o r i c a l backgrounds of the seven groups who are the study's p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s , as well as the circumstances of t h e i r coming under Russian r u l e . The background of each people was d i f f e r e n t , and the circumstances under which each group became subject to the Tsars varied consid-erably, i f the four North Caucasian peoples are treated as i f they comprised a single group. There were, however, among a l l seven minorities, many s i m i l a r i t i e s , or near s i m i l a r i t i e s which become immediately apparent. A l l , of course, were of non-Slavic n a t i o n a l i t y or race, and among them, represented the four p r i n c i p a l non-Slavic minorities to be embraced by the Russian Empire: the Volga Germans representing the Europeans; the Chechens and Ingushes, the autochthonous Caucasians; the Kalmyks, the Mongolic peoples; and the Crimean Tatars, Karachays and Balkars, the Turkic peoples. The majority (almost a l l ) of the members of each group professed r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s a l i e n to the o f f i c i a l b e l i e f s of the Russian Empire and the Russian Orthodox Church. The Volga Germans, f o r the most part, belonged either to the Lutheran Church or to various minor evangelical sects of Protestantism; the Kalmyks were Buddhists; and the other f i v e groups were Summite Moslems. A l l seven groups also had connections of some kind, whether c u l t u r a l , r e l i g i o u s , or p o l i t i c a l , outside of the Empire: the Volga Germans with their homeland; the Kalmyks with t h e i r brothers i n Chinese Turkestan and with t h e i r c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s i n Tibet; the Crimean Tatars, he Karachays and Balkars with Ottoman Turkey; and the Chechens and Ingushes, aft e r the disappearance of Persia as a p o l i t i c a l power, also with Turkey. A l l of these peoples came under e f f e c t i v e Russian rule and became c i t i z e n s of the Empire at approximately the same period of h i s t o r y — r o u g h l y , from the beginning of the l a s t quarter of the eighteenth century to the end of the f i r s t quarter of the nineteenth—during the great period of T s a r i s t imperialism. I t might be objected that the Kalmyks were subject to Russia long before t h i s ; but formally, at l e a s t , they were a l l i e s of Russia u n t i l the reign of Catherine I I , and did not become Russian subjects o f f i c i a l l y u n t i l 1771. F i n a l l y , and t h i s seems e s p e c i a l l y important i n retrospect, a l l of these peoples, with the exception of the Volga Germans, possessed lengthy h i s t o r i e s of resistance to Russian rule and were only brought into the Empire as reluctant subjects through the d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t force of Russian arms. A l l seven peoples, f o r these reasons, were marked out from the beginning f o r spe c i a l attention by the Russian a u t h o r i t i e s . Notes; I This t o t a l figure of 1,300,000 breaks down by groups as follows: Chechens Volga Germans Crimean Tatars Kalmyks Ingushes Karachays Balkars 407,690 382,000 202,000 134,271 92,074 75,717 42,666 The figures f o r a l l groups except the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars are taken from the o f f i c i a l 1939 Soviet census. The figures f o r these groups are estimates based on the percent-ages of Volga Germans and Crimean Tatars to the t o t a l populations of t h e i r national republics i n 1939 and 1936, respectively. For a close analysis of these and other figures r e l a t i n g to the de-portations, see ft. Conquest, The Soviet Deportation of N a t i o n a l i -t i e s (London: MacMillan, i 9 6 0 ) , e s p e c i a l l y chs. 4 and 12. p I t should be noted parenthetically i n t h i s regard that the Volga Germans present a case quite d i f f e r e n t from those of the other deported peoples, since t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s were not reached by H i t l e r ' s armies, and since, i n any case, th e i r deport-ation took place early i n the Mar, only months af t e r Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Collaboration for the Volga Germans was, therefore, e n t i r e l y out of the question, unless one i s prepared to countenance the extremely suspect charges of sabotage, etc., l a i d against them by the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s . I t should be noted further that, throughout the whole of t h i s study, the Volga Germans must to some extent be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from the other groups under discussion because of the exceptional and unique po s i t i o n they occupied f o r at l e a s t part of t h e i r time under both the Tsars and the Soviets. For these reasons, the Volga Germans must often be counted as the exception to general statements which apply to the other s i x peoples. 3Alexander D a l l i n , German Rule i n Russia, 1941-45 (London: MacMillan, 1957), p. 658. 4 Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, Clyde Kluckhohn, How the Soviet System Works (New York: Vintage Books, i 9 6 0 ) , p. 233. y S i r Bernard Pares, A History of Russia, d e f i n i t i v e ed., i n t r o . Richard Pares (New York":Knopf, 1953), P» 242. ^Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies (New York: Praeger, 1952), p. 69. Ibid. 1+8 o S i r John Maynard, Russia In Flux, ed. and abridged S. Haden Guest, from Russia In Flux and The Russian Feasant and Other Studies (New York: MacMillan, 19^9), p. W . 9Pares. op. c i t . , pp. 2*+9-50. x Kolarz, l o c . c i t . 1 1I,bid. 12W.E.D. All e n and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian B a t t l e f i e l d s (Cambridge: University Press, 1953), p. 16. 1 % o l a r z , op. c i t . . p. 76. l l f I b i d . •^Solomon Schwarz, The Jews In the Soviet Union (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1951), P* 258. l 6George Soloveytchik, Potemkin (New York: W.W. Morton, 19^7), PP. 17*+ f f . ^Conquest, OP. c i t . , p. 38. "'"^aldemar Jochelson, Peoples of A s i a t i c Russia (New York: American Museum of Natural History, 1928), p. 157. 1 9 A n a t o l e Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians, English trans. (New York: Putnam, 1928), v o l . I, p. 79. Conquest, OP. c i t . . p. 36. 2 1 K o l a r z , op. c i t . . p. 81. 2 2 I b i d . ^Conquest, l o c . c i t . Leroy-Beaulieu, l o c . c i t . 2-*Kolarz, l o c . c i t . 2 6 I b i d . 2^Pares, op. c i t . . p. 202. 2 8 I b i d . , p. 239. 2 9R.E. Hume, The World's Living Religions, revised ed. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1927), p. 82. 4 9 3°Kolarz, op. c i t . , p. 8 2 . 3 1 I b i d . , p. 8 1 . 3 2Leroy-Beaulieu, l o c . c i t . ^Conquest, O P . c i t . , p. 3 8 . ^ J o c h e l s o n , l o c . c i t . ^ K o l a r z , op. c i t . . p. 8 2 . 3^Leroy-Beaulieu, l o c . c i t . 3 7 j o c h e l s o n , pp. c i t . , p. 2 3 8 . 38W.E.D. A l l e n , A History of r^nrplan People (London: 1 9 3 2 ) , p. 2 1 , c i t e d i n A l l e n and Muratoff, pp. c i t , , p. l ? . 3 9 j O C h e l s o n , op. c i t . , p. 2 3 9 . I f 0 I b i d . , p. 1 4 3 . ^ I b i d . , p. 1 5 6 . ** 2Ibid. ^Conquest, op. c i t . , p. 4 2 . ^ J o c h e l s o n , pp. c i t . , p. 143. ^ ^ A l l e n and Muratoff, pp. c:Lt. ? P* 1 2 * **6A. Namitok, "The Caucasus", The^aucjtsian,, Review., I ( 1 9 5 5 ) , PP- 5 - 1 1 . ^Conquest, op. c i t . , p. 1 6 . ^ I b i d . . p. 14. ^ A l l e n and Muratoff, on. c i t . , p. 11 . 5°I Pid., p. 2 1 . ^J.M. Rodwell, trans, and ed., The Koran (London: Everyman's Library, n.d.'), ch. 6 1 , verse 4 7 ^ i t e d ~ i n Hume, o j u _ c i t . , p. 2 1 8 . ^ 2 I b i d . , chap. 6 6 , verse 1. 50 ^ A l l e n and Muratoff, O P , c i t . . p . 48. ^ I b i d . ^ I b i d . I I i I t i s probably an axiom of a u t o c r a t i c government th a t i t r e s t s p r i m a r i l y upon coercion and f o r c e . The a u t o c r a t i c government of T s a r i s t Russia was not an exception t o t h i s . I t s supporters were never able t o elaborate on i t s b e h a l f a broad and systematic theory o f autocracy, and, i n f a c t , the Russian auto-cracy possessed no great body of t h e o r e t i c a l w r i t i n g s . I t maintained i t s e l f , f o r four and one-half c e n t u r i e s , l a r g e l y through the use of i t s coercive apparatus. As l a t e as 1913, j u s t four short years before the l a s t o f the Russian a u t o c r a t s , Tsar Nicholas I I , was to be murdered by h i s B o l s h e v i k captors i n an Ekaterinburg c e l l a r , a strong p a r t i s a n of the p r i n c i p l e of auto-cracy wrote, i n h i s book devoted to a review of a l l the Russian w r i t i n g s i n support of the p r i n c i p l e , that "many strong foundations have already been l a i d f o r the determination of the essence" of the i m p e r i a l power. However, he concluded, "The next step i s to construct the theory o f the Russian autocracy 1'."^ T h i s , and i n 19131 I t seems h a r d l y appropriate that t h i s opening paragraph should be f o l l o w e d by any lengthy exegesis i n t h i s chapter of the theory of the T s a r i s t s t a t e . But i n order to understand c l e a r l y the p o s i t i o n of the n a t i o n a l and r e l i g i o u s m i n o r i t i e s of the Russian Empire, i t i s necessary to note at l e a s t b r i e f l y some of the main t h e o r e t i c a l t e n e t s of the autocracy and t o t r a c e the 52 outlines of the i r h i s t o r i c a l development. Unsatisfactory as were the i d e o l o g i c a l foundations of the Russian Empire, they nevertheless played an important part i n the formulation and the execution of the p o l i c i e s of the Russian government toward i t s a l i e n minorities. The Russian Empire, as i t existed u n t i l 1917,,was based upon the t r i p a r t i t e motto of "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationalism"—which meant, i n e f f e c t , the T s a r i s t autocracy, Russian Orthodoxy, and Russian nationalism, three elements f i r m l y connected with each other, and which, indeed, were so interdepend-ent that they can hardly be distinguished or separated i n the body of Russian l i t e r a t u r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y that of the nineteenth century, which sets out to discuss either one or another. A clear example of the re l a t i o n s h i p among the three p r i n c i p l e s i s to be found i n the following extract taken from the work of one of the leading exponents of the doctrine of " o f f i c i a l n a t i o n a l i t y " i n the reign of Nicholas I: F a i t h and autocracy created the Russian state and the one common fatherland f o r the Russian Slavs. Only f a i t h and autocracy can constitute the glory, the well being, and the power of Russia I F a i t h and autocracy are i n r e l a t i o n to vast Russia what gr a v i t a t i o n i s for our planet. This immense colossus, Russia, almost a separate continent, which contains within i t s e l f a l l the climates and a l l the tribes of mankind, can be held i n balance only by f a i t h 53 and autocracy. That i s why i n Russia there could never and cannot e x i s t any other n a t i o n a l i t y , except the n a t i o n a l i t y founded on Orthodoxy and autocracy. They alone can e s t a b l i s h f i r m l y our independent and o r i g i n a l existence^ Orthodoxy strengthens the o r i g i n a l i t y of the Russian people, and affirms the existence of our national language, thus preventing the Russians from mixing with aliens and from losing i t s [the language's] o r i g i n a l 2 character. This l i n k i n g , almost equating, of the three p r i n c i p l e s of auto-cracy, Orthodoxy, and nationalism was one of the outstanding c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the theory of the T s a r i s t state. I t was emphasized and re-emphasized by the i d e o l o g i s t s of the Empire. The passage quoted above i s the work of one of the most s e r v i l e writers of h i s age, J but such expressions of ultra-nationalism were by no means confined to the works of the satraps of the T s a r i s t court. From at l e a s t the middle of the eighteenth century u n t i l the f a l l of Tsardom, through the works of writers as varied i n other respects as Michael Lomonosov, Alexander Pushkin, Nicholas Gogol, Alexander Herzen, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and many others, Russian l i t e r a t u r e bears the unmistakeable accents of strong nationalism and patriotism. Used i n d i f f e r e n t contexts, the terms, "autocracy", "Orthodoxy", and "nationalism", i n Russian l i t e r a t u r e c a r r i e d connotations which were romantic and defensive, as well as dynastic and reactionary. A l l three terms acquired a supreme metaphysical, even mystical, importance which le d to a general f a i t h and b e l i e f i n the great mission of Russia and her people, to such doctrines as Pan-Slavism, and to such practices as r u s s i f i c a t i o n . The immense size of the Russian Empire, i t s unmeasured natural resources, i t s huge population, i t s autocratic government, i t s Orthodox r e l i g i o n , even i t s backwardness: a l l of these contributed to a firm b e l i e f i n the nation's manifest destiny. And superimposed upon t h i s b e l i e f was the boast that t h i s enormous state, with i t s unique past and promising future, was f u l l y coordinated, controlled, and directed by a single human w i l l — t h e w i l l of the Tsar. The supreme head of the Russian Empire was the absolute Tsar, "the father of a l l the Russian people", who owed hi s p o s i t i o n k to God and to God alone, and who was responsible only to Him. This, i n b r i e f , was the sacred dogma of autocracy. This p r i n c i p l e , as i t existed u n t i l 1917, was f u l l y shaped only during the reign of Peter the Great, although the concept of the Tsar as autocrat, derived from the Byzantine emperors, was introduced to the Russian monarchy as early as the f i f t e e n t h century. Peter stressed not only absolutism and the f u l l and unquestioning service by a l l to the State, but was also responsible f o r the legend of the Tsar's personal p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a l l matters r e l a t i n g to the administra-t i o n of the State, down to the most minute d e t a i l . The p r i n c i p l e of autocracy, as founded by Peter, was weakened under the succession of feeble monarchs which followed him, and during the 55 reign of Catherine the Great. But despite even the q u a s i - l i b e r a l veneer of the age of Catherine, i t was never challenged or c a l l e d seriously into question, and i t reasserted i t s e l f i n extreme— even pathological—form i n the reign of Paul I, whose attitude i s summed up concisely, and perhaps epitomized, i n h i s alleged assertion that the only man i n Russia who was important was the man who was speaking with the Tsar, and he was important only while so speaking. Paul I, personally and intensely concerned with legitimism and dynastic r i g h t s , added these concepts to the dogma of autocracy by replacing the s t r i c t l y u t i l i t a r i a n practice i n s t i t u t e d by Peter, of having the Tsar name h i s own successor, with a s t r i c t law of succession to the throne through the d i r e c t male l i n e . The preoccupations of Catherine's bastard son thus became an i n t e g r a l part of the theory of autocracy, and remained e s s e n t i a l to i t into the twentieth century. The p r i n c i p l e of Orthodoxy meant that the Russian Church was not only a state church, but also a national church.^ The complete subordination of the Russian Church to the Tsar, and the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of Orthodoxy with the autocracy— and so with the S t a t e — c a n also be traced to the reign of Peter the Great. C h r i s t i a n i t y was introduced into Russia with the conver-sion of the Grand Duke Vladimir of Kiev, i n the l a t e tenth century, to the Greek or Eastern r i t e derived from Constantinople. When the schism between the Greek and Roman churches took place, i n 1054, the Russians followed the lead of the Greeks, and continued 56 to acknowledge the leadership of the Patriarchate of Constantin-ople over t h e i r Church. However, the decline i n strength of the Eastern Empire, the Tatar invasions of the thirteenth century which cut Russia off from i t s great source of learning and culture, and the consequent r i s e i n Moscow of a new state power f a r l e s s influenced by the Byzantine t r a d i t i o n than Kiev had been, combined to make the Russian Church rather more independent i n practice than i t was i n theory. The decision of the Patriarch of Constan-tinople to reunite the Eastern Church with Rome, taken at the Council of Florence, i n 1^39, as a l a s t - d i t c h measure to save Constantinople from the Turks, was treated as a heresy i n Russia, and the Metropolitan of Moscow, a supporter of the decision, was driven out. The f a l l of Constantinople to the Turks, i n 1^53) f i n a l l y destroyed the already-weakened authority of the P a t r i a r -chate, and, from th i s time, the Russian Church was p r a c t i c a l l y independent. I t continued, however, to be c l o s e l y a l l i e d with the princes of Moscow. The marriage of Ivan I I I to Sophia, the niece of the l a s t Greek Emperor of Constantinople, not only helped the Russian r u l e r to e s t a b l i s h h i s claim to be the successor of the Emperor, and so the protector of the "true"—which i s to say, Orthodox—branch of C h r i s t i a n i t y , but also introduced into Moscow the Byzantine concept of the Autocrat—the monarch of uncontrolled authority whose power derived from God alone. About a century l a t e r , the independence of the Russian Church was declared formally by the Tsar Fyodor I (l58*f-98), by h i s establishing of the Patriarchate of Moscow. The firm a l l i a n c e of Church and State was 57 completed i n 1613, with the founding of the Romanov dynasty which was to rule Russia u n t i l 1917. The f i r s t Romanov Tsar, Michael I (1613-45), was also the son of the f i r s t Patriarch of Moscow, Ph i l a r e t . But i f , at t h i s time, the Church and the State were more or le s s equal, the complete subordinating of the Church to the State, a century l a t e r , was the work of Peter the Great. The Russian Church, s p l i t asunder by the disputes over the s c r i p t u r a l and the l i t u r g i c a l reforms of the Patriarch Nikon, i n the second ha l f of the seventeenth century, was forced to e n l i s t the a i d of the Tsar against i t s schismatics--the "Old B e l i e v e r s " — a n d found i t s e l f greatly weakened thereby, v i s - a - v i s the autocrat. To 1 eliminate the Church as a r i v a l power, Peter abolished the Patriarchate of Moscow i n 1721, and replaced i t with the Holy Synod, a council of bishops and other Church o f f i c i a l s presided over byj a Procurator—a layman appointed d i r e c t l y by the Tsar, and whose fiunction i t was, i n Peter's own phrase, to serve as "the Tsar's eye ., 7 The question of r e l i g i o n strongly influenced the o f f i c i a l policiejs of the Russian Empire toward i t s non-Russian minorities, approximately from the middle of the sixteenth century u n t i l the middle of the eighteenth. Where discrimination existed against the nonj-Russians, the p r i n c i p a l reason f o r i t seems to have been the desire to convert Moslems, Jews, and other non-Christians to Q the Orthodox f a i t h . The numbers of non-Orthodox i n Russia at 58 t h i s time were not, however, large. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, as the autocracy became gradually more secular-ize d , t h i s r e l i g i o u s element may have l o s t a l i t t l e of i t s primary importance, and purely p o l i t i c a l considerations possibly came to play a larger part i n the attitude of the Russian government toward o i t s minorities. But the question of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f remained always of prime importance f o r the simple reason that, from the middle of the eighteenth century onward, the Russian Empire began to embrace immense numbers of peoples who were not only non-Russians or non-Slavs, but who were also non-Orthodox. More and more, the Orthodox r e l i g i o n came to be treated as synonymous with Russian n a t i o n a l i t y . As one writer said at the beginning of the twentieth century, a r u l e r who, i n addition to being the Supreme Autocrat, was also, i n e f f e c t , the Supreme P o n t i f f , found himself "doubly bound to bring a l l h i s subjects within the f o l d of the Church", and therefore found i t "impossible to d i s t i n g u i s h between non-conformity and s e d i t i o n " . 1 ^ It i s a f a c t of Russia's h i s t o r y that the country's contacts with the non-Orthodox world had been si n g u l a r l y unfriendly and unfortunate. The Moslem Tatars, the Roman Catholic Poles, Lithuanians, and Teutonic Knights, the Protestant Swedes, the Moslem Turks: f o r centuries, non-Orthodoxy had defined the enemies of Russia. Russian nationalism was, therefore, i n a sense but another manifestation of, or an i d e n t i -f i c a t i o n with, the struggle of the "true F a i t h " against i t s enemies—the heretics and unbelievers. In the same way, the struggle of the Moslem peoples of Crimea, the Caucasus, and Central 59 Asia early became i d e n t i f i e d with the f i g h t of Islam against the i n f i d e l , and, i n the nineteenth century, the resistance of the Poles to Russian rule became i d e n t i f i e d with the c o n f l i c t between Roman Catholicism and Russian Orthodoxy. To be Russian was to be Orthodox. The question of r e l i g i o n , therefore, even during the most secularized periods of the autocracy, could never be buried very deeply i n the Russian national consciousness, and remained a v i t a l and important issue with regard to the position of the minorities of the Empire. The followers of the Tsar, though they respected the d i f f e r e n t C h r i s t i a n denominations and distinguished sharply between them and a l l the non-Christian forms of b e l i e f , consistently underlined t h e i r conviction that only the Orthodox Church and f a i t h were 11 e n t i r e l y correct and authentic. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, a century generally regarded as an age of secularism, i t was possible to write: i n the eyes of the government as well as of the people, the q u a l i t y of Orthodox C h r i s t i a n i s even now the surest pledge of patriotism and l o y a l t y . . . Even i n government language, a l i e n r e l i g i o n s are c a l l e d 'foreign confessions'. This expression i n i t s e l f d i r e c t s the suspicion of Russian patriotism to about one-third of the Russian subjects. . . Russia ;lboks upon non-Orthodox confessions I P as 'vehicles of foreign n a t i o n a l i t i e s ' . 60 The rapid absorption of millions of Roman Catholics, Jews, 13 Protestants, and Uniates in the West, of millions of Moslems among the Turks, Tatars, and Caucasians in the South and East, and of hundreds of thousands of Buddhists and lesser numbers of followers of other religions In the far East, thus raised new and complex questions within the Russian Empire. The Empire trans-formed itself in acquiring its vast new dominions and countless new peoples, especially from the middle of the eighteenth century onward. Its Great Russian majority was greatly reduced, in relation to the total population of the Empire, and the Russian Orthodox Church, which until this time had been, in fact as well as in theory, both a state and a national church, now found itself seriously challenged, for the first time, by other faiths within the State. The huge numbers of new subjects brought into the Empire presented cases very different from the cases of the peoples who had been conquered earlier; these were not Ukrainians, already Orthodox for the most part and speaking a language remarkably similar to the Russian, nor small and primitive tribes of the forests and steppes, attached only to vague, animistic religious beliefs, nor mere small groups or settlements of peoples pro-fessing Islam and other faiths, but more or less isolated from any considerable bodies of co-religionists. The steady outward expansion of the borders of the Empire had now brought Russia into conflict with well-established and militarily powerful states, had engaged Russia in struggle with these for lands inhabited by peoples co-religious with the enemy, and had succeeded in bringing 61 large numbers of these peoples under Russian r u l e . But despite the great changes which took place i n the national and r e l i g i o u s composition of the Empire, there were no s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n the ideology of the T s a r i s t autocracy. Although the Russian Empire transformed i t s e l f , i n the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from a state inhabited almost e n t i r e l y by Russians, or at l e a s t Slavs, of the Orthodox f a i t h into what was, i n f a c t , a multinational state with a population more than one-quarter non-Slav and more than one-third non-Orthodox, there were no attempts on the part of the i d e o l o g i s t s of the Empire to a l t e r or to transform the three p i l l a r s of Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationalism. These p r i n c i p l e s , which had been capable of ap p l i c a t i o n i n the former more compact and more homogeneous Russia, where they had been desirable, even necessary symbols of unity, thus became fo r the minorities of the Empire symbols of the wide gulf between themselves and the Russians. The p r i n c i p l e of autocracy continued u n t i l 1917 to be regarded as immutable. I t was unthinkable that i t should have been challenged or transformed, since by d e f i n i t i o n any change i n the p r i n c i p l e of autocracy would of necessity have entailed a weakening of i t . And so also were the twin concomitants of autocracy, the p r i n c i p l e s of Orthodoxy and nationalism, considered sacrosanct. They continued to be i d e n t i f i e d with the p r i n c i p l e of autocracy, and any suggestion that either of these should be weakened or altered i n any way was at once taken to mean an attack 62 upon a l l three p r i n c i p l e s , and thus an attempt to weaken the pr i n c i p l e of autocracy i t s e l f . I t was, therefore, t h e o r e t i c a l l y impossible f o r the T s a r i s t regime to formulate or to i n s t i t u t e any p o l i c i e s toward i t s national and r e l i g i o u s minorities except those designed to r u s s i f y the non-Russians and to convert to Orthodoxy the non-Orthodox. At least o f f i c i a l l y , no allowances could be made for the many d i f f e r e n t peoples of the Empire. In theory, f o r example, the p r i n c i p l e of autocracy did not allow f o r the recognition of separate h i s t o r i c a l and national t e r r i t o r i e s within the State: that i s to say, no t e r r i t o r i e s i n which the authority of the Russian Tsars would be anything l e s s than absolute, or i n which t h i s authority would re s t upon a d i f f e r e n t l e g a l basis than i t d i d i n Russia i t s e l f . In practice, t h i s p r i n c i p l e was not always applied consistently. The Tsars, through the centuries, did grant some measures of autonomy to th e i r newly-acquired territories—sometimes i n recognition of the spe c i a l status of these t e r r i t o r i e s , and sometimes i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l changes i n Russia. They even, i n ce r t a i n cases, entered into contractual r e l a t i o n s with their subject peoples, and i n t h i s way placed l i m i t s upon their own t h e o r e t i c a l l y unlimited Ik „ powers. For example, through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ukraine, Livonia, and Estonia a l l enjoyed considerable autonomy. Poland, from 1815 u n t i l 1831, and Finland, from 1809 u n t i l 1899, were, i n theory as well as i n practice, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarchies. But these exceptions, incompatible as they were with 63 the complete maintenance of the p r i n c i p l e of autocracy within Russia i t s e l f , sooner or l a t e r , under one pretext or another, had t h e i r p r i v i l e g e s retracted, t h e i r contracts u n i l a t e r a l l y abro-gated, and th e i r t e r r i t o r i e s , along with th e i r peoples, incorporat-15 ed into the regular administration of the Empire. y The Empire, though composed of myriad peoples with a great d i v e r s i t y of customs, creeds, and cultures, was treated c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y and administratively, with few exceptions, as i f i t s vast t e r r i t o r i e s s t i l l were d i s t r i c t s of a compact and homogeneous national unit. Nor did the p r i n c i p l e of autocracy from which a l l , i n theory, and from which most, i n practice, of the n a t i o n a l i t i e s p o l i c i e s of the Russian government derived, allow for any concessions which could have made l o y a l c i t i z e n s of the non-Orthodox and non-Russian minorities of the Empire. N a t i o n a l i t i e s other than Russian and r e l i g i o n s other than Orthodox were, as has been seen, ipso facto suspect. For the non-Russian minorities, then, r u s s i f i c a t i o n was a goal to be achieved only through the adopting of the Russian language; f o r the non-Orthodox minorities, i t was a goal to be reached only through apostasy. From the reign of CatherineII onward, the only consistent p o l i c i e s follow-ed by the Russian government toward the national minorities were the p o l i c i e s of crude repression and r u s s i f i c a t i o n ; no consistent p o l i c i e s were followed toward the r e l i g i o u s minorities of the Empire except those of discrimination, persecution, and prosely-t i z i n g . Generally speaking, Russian standards were the standards to which a l l the peoples of the Empire had to conform. The 61* r e f u s a l , or the i n a b i l i t y , of the T s a r i s t regime to modify or to adjust any of i t s i d e o l o g i c a l bases, which was i t s e l f the r e s u l t p a r t l y of the h i s t o r i c a l evolution of the autocracy, pa r t l y of i t s h i s t o r i c a l a l l i a n c e with the Russian Orthodox Church and i t s l a t e r u t i l i z i n g of the Church as a key instrument of national unity, and partly of the h i s t o r i c a l equating of the Russian Orth-odox f a i t h with Russian n a t i o n a l i t y , thus brought about a singular attempt to b u i l d and to maintain unity i n a multinational and mu l t i r e l i g i o u s state upon a national church—an attempt which from i t s beginning would seem to have borne within i t s e l f the seeds of i t s own ultimate bankruptcy and f a i l u r e . By refusing to admit to f u l l c i t i z e n s h i p i t s non-Russian and non-Orthodox peoples, the T s a r i s t regime at once divided i t s subjects into two classes: the p r i v i l e g e d majority of Russian and Orthodox, and the persecuted minorities of non-Russian and non-Orthodox. And through the implications of i t s own immutable ideology, the regime committed i t s e l f , or was committed, to waging what was, i n e f f e c t , open war against about one-third of i t s s u b j e c t s — i n the name of national unity. U n t i l the end of i t s days, the T s a r i s t regime pursued toward i t s minorities p o l i c i e s which embodied these contradictions. Even i t s p o l i c i e s of persecution and repression of the minorities were not, however, consistently followed. The vigour with which the Russian government applied to i t s various peoples the measures i m p l i c i t i n i t s ideology of "one Tsar, one Church, one Nation", varied considerably from the rule of one Tsar to 65 that of the next, and even from one portion of a Tsar's reign to another. The position of the various minorities of the Empire was conditioned by complicated combinations of circumstances, depending, f o r example, upon the d i f f e r e n t p e r s o n a l i t i e s , aims, and i n t e r e s t s of successive Tsars, upon t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i -c a l understanding, and upon the nature and amount of th e i r control over the many departments of t h e i r governments. I t depended also upon the varying l i n e s and circumlocutions of Russian foreign p o l i c y , upon the character and strength of the p o l i t i c a l opposition i n Russia i t s e l f to the regime, and upon the actions and attitudes of the various other minorities of the Empire toward Russian r u l e . I t would far exceed the l i m i t a t i o n s of t h i s study to attempt to d e t a i l the warp and the woof of Russian p o l i c y toward the national and r e l i g i o u s minorities of the Empire from the reign of Catherine II onward, and i t i s d i f f i c u l t even to summarize the p r i n c i p a l l i n e s of po l i c y followed under the d i f f e r e n t Tsars, since, i n the reign of each, pressures were increased upon c e r t a i n minorities and decreased upon others. For example, the reign of Nicholas I, otherwise the proponent extra-ordinary of " o f f i c i a l n a t i o n a l i t y " , u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y saw the Jews treated much less harshly than they were i n the reign of almost any other Tsar; i n the same manner, the reign of Alexander I I , which was notable f o r the concessions made to many other minorities, u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y saw the most vicious persecution of the Polish minority; s i m i l a r l y , the reign of Alexander I, which i n i t s i n i t i a l " l i b e r a l phase" saw the founding of the 66 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarchies of Finland and Poland, also saw implemented the f i r s t of the bruta l series of measures against the Jews, th e i r being confined to th e i r "Pale of Settlement". S t i l l , f o r a l l the inconsistencies which may be noted, i t does not seem inaccurate to state that the position of the national and r e l i g i o u s minorities of the Empire varied, i n general terms, only from bad to worse under the rule of the Tsars who succeeded ' Catherine I I . Nor does i t seem inaccurate to say that the most extreme forms of discrimination and persecution were suffered by the minorities of the Empire during the l a s t twenty years of the nineteenth century and the f i r s t f i v e years of the twentieth, and that t h e i r s i t u a t i o n became somewhat ameliorated, though not appreciably, only a f t e r the 1905 Revolution and during the period of Russia's so-called " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l experiment", from 1905-17. I t also would appear that the extent to which the minorities were persecuted under the d i f f e r e n t Tsars was roughly congrous with the extent to which repressive measures were employed also against the Russian subjects of the Empire. In summary and i n general, while Tsars changed, t h e i r n a t i o n a l i t y p o l i c i e s did not change; u n t i l the end of the T s a r i s t system, the p r i n c i p l e s of autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationalism remained constant and immutable. Throughout the nineteenth century, the T s a r i s t govern-ment depended almost e n t i r e l y upon those men who were the most f a i t h f u l upholders of these sacred dogmas, and so, unalterably opposed to any form of concessions to the minorities. Perhaps the best known of these was Konstantin Pobyedonostsev, who 67 occupied the o f f i c e of Procurator of the Holy Synod from 1880-1905, a l l through the years during which repressive measures against the minorities reached unprecedented heights of violence, and during which p o l i c i e s aiming at complete and utter suffocation of a l l discontent were enforced at home. Pobyedonostsev, who was also tutor to the l a s t two Tsars, has come to be regarded as the leading exponent, even as the symbol, of ultra-nationalism and black reaction. He was not an o r i g i n a l thinker, and hi s chief contribution to the theory of Tsardom was as a propagandist. Nevertheless, i t i s worth noting, at l e a s t i n summary, h i s p o l i t i -c a l philosophy, since i t represents almost the f i n a l shaping and expression of the three p r i n c i p l e s of autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationalism. I t reveals not only the main arguments i n favour of the T s a r i s t system of government, but also the flaws and weakness-17 es of those arguments. ' Pobyedonostsev was, f i r s t of a l l , an a n t i - r a t i o n a l i s t thinker, and h i s basic ideas concerning the nature of man were fundamental to h i s whole philosophy. Man, he thought, except for a small minority, an e l i t e , was as soft wax to be molded by three forces u t t e r l y beyond h i s c o n t r o l : the unconscious, the land, and histo r y . Man best displayed h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e not l o g i c a l l y , but i n t u i t i v e l y , not i n finding or showing reasons, but i n believing and tru s t i n g the "aut h o r i t i e s " and h i s "superiors". Education was., therefore, not only useless, but dangerous, and was to be r e s t r i c t e d to the "sacred books" and to a "correct" version of one's national his t o r y . In addition, 68 Pobyedonostsev equated society and r e l i g i o n . (He considered Russia to be both a society and a state.) He f e l t that the character of any state or society was shaped by i t s national f a i t h or church, and that the role of the church was "to create a community of be l i e v e r s " and thus "to answer the deeply-rooted human need fo r unity of b e l i e f " . I t followed from these premises, according to Pobyedonostsev, that no healthy state or society could have more than one church, and that any state which t o l e r -ated more than one creed was bound to be destroyed by i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t s . The church was the cement of society. The laws of the state, therefore, were to be employed always "to safeguard the dominant r e l i g i o n " , and, i n t h i s way, to safeguard "the unity and s t a b i l i t y " which were the ultimate ends of any state organization. Conversely, the laws of the state were also to be used to deny the r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s of the non-conforming r e l i g i o u s groups and the national minorities. These were always to be considered as "enemies of the state", f o r the simple reason that "the laws of the Orthodox Church were the laws of the state". The power of the state, asserted Pobyedonostsev, derived from a "unity of consciousness between the people, the state, and the national f a i t h " . The Tsar, he advised i n t h i s connection, was therefore always to speak of "the people" of Russia, and never of "the peoples". This mystical r e l a t i o n s h i p was always to be stressed. But i f the church was the cement of society, the autocracy was the foundation-stone upon which stable and orderly 69 government eould be b u i l t . The theory of autocracy acknowledged no l i m i t a t i o n s whatever to the power of the Tsar. I t thereby placed the Tsar above a l l c r i t i c i s m , and gave him a free hand to use whichever instruments he deemed necessary to achieve unity. And f o r Pobyedonostsev, of the three instruments available to a government, that of coercion was most important, that of educa-t i o n was next i n importance, and that of encouragement or reward was to be reserved only f o r the chosen few. Violent and a r b i t r a r y governmental action were more than j u s t i f i e d , then, to crush "those forces which threatened the unity and s t a b i l i t y of the state". I t was both the r i g h t and the duty of the autocracy to use i t s coercive powers against a l l "agents of destruction" c a r r i e d by foreign influences, including, of course, the non-Russian n a t i o n a l i t i e s and the non-Orthodox r e l i g i o n s . The autocracy ..thus provided the base from which a l l a l i e n ideas and i n s t i t u t i o n s could be opposed, whether these challenged the - autocracy i n the name of freedom i n general, or i n the name of national r i g h t s i n p a r t i c u l a r . Such, i n b r i e f , were the main points of Pobyedonostsev's p o l i t i c a l philosophy, which underlay the attempt of the Russian government, during h i s period of tenure i n the Holy Synod, to marshall and to u t i l i z e to the f u l l e s t the forces of Great Russian national sentiment against the growing a c t i v i t y of s o c i a l , p o l i t i -c a l , and national unrest i n the Empire. The systematic policy of r u s s i f i c a t i o n and national oppression which the T s a r i s t government launched under the d i r e c t i o n of Pobyedonostsev and hi s pupils, 70 Alexander III and Nicholas II, was probably the only systematic p o l i c y ever adopted by the government of the Russian Empire toward i t s minorities. Under Pobyedonostsev, any idea of possible c o n c i l i a t i o n with the minorities was dropped, just as any idea of possible c o n c i l i a t i o n with the forces of freedom was dropped by Alexander III i n 1881, and was to be abjured by Nicholas II u n t i l i t was too l a t e . From 1880 to 1905, the T s a r i s t government was reduced to the extremity of trying to create a national unity through sheer coercion. For years, even centuries, however, th i s outcome had been i m p l i c i t i n i t s i d e o l o g i -c a l foundations. i i Of the seven minorities who are the concern of t h i s study, only the Germans of the Volga found prosperity under the Tsars. Their position of extreme p r i v i l e g e i n the Russian Empire, which set them off and d i f f e r e n t i a t e d them from most of their f e l l o w - c i t i z e n s , Russian or non-Russian, u n t i l well into the second h a l f of the nineteenth century, combined with t h e i r own diligence and i n i t i a t i v e to contribute to t h e i r great success. By 1914 and the beginning of World War I, the colonies founded by the o r i g i n a l German s e t t l e r s on the middle Volga between Samara and Saratov had increased to more than two hundred v i l l a g e s with 1 o an aggregate population of more than 400,000 persons. From the time of their f i r s t coming to Russia, i n the 1760*s, u n t i l the emancipation of the serfs by Tsar Alexander II, i n 1 8 6 1 , the German s e t t l e r s on the Volga, as has been seen, possessed a tremendous number of advantages over the bulk of the peasant farmers of the Empire. They were among the small number of free peasant farmers i n a land of s e r f s — f r e e , i n contrast to the vast majority of the peasantry which s t i l l was bound to the s o i l and to i t s masters, to own th e i r own land, to work for themselves and for t h e i r own enrichment, and even to employ and to own serfs of t h e i r own. They had also the advantage of being s e t t l e d on the edge of t e r r i t o r i e s inhabited by A s i a t i c peoples; there was, therefore, no indigenous population with recognized p r i o r i t y claims or r i g h t s to their lands; i n addition, as Europeans, the Volga Germans were regarded by the T s a r i s t govern-ment as an important colonizing and c i v i l i z i n g element i n the borderlands. For a l l these reasons, the Russian authorities had no h e s i t a t i o n i n making to the colonists new and extensive grants of lands when the areas o r i g i n a l l y marked fo r German settlement became too small and too crowded to accommodate t h e i r growing f a m i l i e s . The Volga Germans continued a l l through the nineteenth century to found new v i l l a g e s on these lands, the l a s t so-called "new" v i l l a g e being founded as late as 1 9 0 2 . ^ In addition to th e i r having almost unlimited access to new l a n d s — lands, i n c i d e n t a l l y , among the most f e r t i l e i n R u s s i a — t h e Volga Germans also were able to maintain, u n t i l the second half of the century, a l l of the numerous concessions and p r i v i l e g e s which had been granted to them by Catherine II as conditions of their o r i g i n a l immigrations to Russia: r e l i g i o u s freedom, l o c a l s e l f -government, i n t e r e s t - f r e e state loans, exemption from taxation 72 and from m i l i t a r y service, and other r i g h t s . Their progressive, r i c h , and industrious communities r e f l e c t e d not only these p r i v i l e g e s , but also the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y Teutonic q u a l i t i e s of order, economy, family s o l i d a r i t y , and hard work f o r which the 20 Germans had been o r i g i n a l l y chosen by Catherine the Great. The Volga Germans thus became exceptionally successful farmers i n th e i r new homeland, and their p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n Russia seemed boundless: "The ambition of every man consisted i n leaving to each of h i s usually numerous sons at l e a s t the same amount of 21 land as he had o r i g i n a l l y possessed". Successful as they proved to be, however, the Volga Germans were l i t t l e more prosperous than were the various other concentrations of Germans within the Russian Empire. The t o t a l pp number of Germans i n Russia i n 1897 was about 1 , 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 — s o that the Volga group, although i t formed the largest single compact settlement, actually comprised only between one-quarter and o n e - f i f t h of the German subjects of the Tsar. A good many of these Germans had, of course, with the passage of years, become completely assimilated and r u s s i f i e d , and often could be d i s -tinguished from th e i r S l a v i c f e l l o w - c i t i z e n s only by t h e i r Teutonic surnames. Many spoke no language other than the Russian. Most of the Germans of the Empire who were more or less i s o l a t e d and who found themselves l i v i n g i n a t o t a l l y Russian environment, whether as peasant s e t t l e r s or as townsmen, were to a greater or lesser degree assimilated by the Russian majority of the population. They were found scattered the length and breadth of the Empire, 7 3 either singly.or i n small c l u s t e r s , and German professional men— doctors, lawyers, teachers, musicians, and the l i k e — a n d s k i l l e d craftsmen were to be discovered i n almost every Russian town, from the l a r g e s t — i n Moscow, for example, the bakers were pre-dominantly German J — t o the smallest, while single f a m i l i e s of German a g r i c u l t u r a l s e t t l e r s were to be seen i n almost every d i s t r i c t , t i l l i n g the land alongside t h e i r Russian and Ukrainian counterparts. The majority of the German subjects of the Tsar, however, were those of the three main areas of German settlement, who occupied positions unique i n the Empire, and who were very l i t t l e assimilated. These main areas of German settlement, besides the Volga region, were the B a l t i c provinces of Estonia and Livonia, and the "new" provinces of "South Russia", i n Ukraine. The B a l t i c Germans, the descendants of the medieval Teutonic orders of the Knights of the Cross and the Knights of the Sword, maintained i n Estonia and Livonia what was an essen-t i a l l y German c i v i l i z a t i o n , and comprised a German p a t r i c i a n class r u l i n g over the indigenous Estonians and L e t t s . Despite the f a c t that they had, since the collapse of their m i l i t a r y power i n the f i f t e e n t h century, been for a time under Swedish rule and then, since the reign of Peter the Great, under Russian r u l e , the B a l t i c Germans had succeeded i n retaining the ownership of most of the land i n their provinces, i n maintaining t h e i r own p r o v i n c i a l assemblies of the land-owning n o b i l i t y , t h e i r own c r a f t - g u i l d s and municipal i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the towns, the i r own: 7k system of German law i n the courts, t h e i r own school system— probably the most advanced i n the entire Empire—and even t h e i r own German university, at Dorpat. ' The University had been forced to close f o r a few years, during the reaction against German influence i n the Russian court, i n the reign of Elizabeth I ( 1 7 ^ 1 - 6 2 ) , but was re-opened by Catherine the Great. The so-c a l l e d " B a l t i c barons" had played an important part i n Peter the Great's program of westernization and integration of the country, and i n the administrations of h i s immediate successors, and had altogether proven to be l o y a l subjects and servants of the Empire. In the bureaucracy, the diplomatic service, and the army, they had achieved a representation quite disproportionate to t h e i r numerical strength, l a r g e l y on the basis of the i r superior education. In addition, t h e i r estates i n the B a l t i c provinces were among the r i c h e s t and most productive i n the Empire, and t h e i r old mercantile connections which dated from the halcyon days of the Hanseatie League provided them with a degree of wealth hardly attained by any comparable group of the Russian n o b i l i t y . The other s i g n i f i c a n t area of German s e t t l e -ment, besides the Volga and the B a l t i c shores, lay i n the region of the Black Sea, including part of Crimea proper, and, after I 8 7 8 , i n Bessarabia, at the mouth of the Dniester r i v e r . The German colonization of these regions was, however, of much l a t e r date, beginning only aft e r the e a r l i e r successes of the Volga s e t t l e r s had shown to the Russian authorities the d e s i r a b i l i t y of Germans as c o l o n i s t s , and a f t e r , of course, the Russian defeats of the Crimean Tatars and the Turks. The f i r s t contingents of 75 Germans appeared i n the Russian South as early as 1787 > but they did not begin to arrive and to s e t t l e i n s i g n i f i c a n t numbers ?6 u n t i l the f i r s t and second decades of the nineteenth century. Like the Germans of the Volga, those of South Russia were given both sp e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s and a free hand by the Russian a u t h o r i t i e s , and, l i k e the Volga Germans, they too prospered, s e t t l i n g i n the most f e r t i l e areas and increasing s t e a d i l y t h e i r land-holdings. By 18971 the Germans se t t l e d i n South Russia numbered about 340,000, while those of the B a l t i c t o t a l l e d some 165,000.2? Also l i k e the Volga Germans, but unlike the B a l t i c group which was almost s o l i d l y Lutheran, the German colonists of the Russian South were made up of considerable numbers of small, " s p l i n t e r " , C h r i s t i a n sects: Baptists, Hutterians, Stundists, and the l i k e . Although the Volga and South Russian Germans were not persecuted for t h e i r r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s u n t i l the end of the century, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that, when the repressive measures of the regime were turned upon them, they were directed much more against th e i r a l i e n r e l i g i o n s than against t h e i r a l i e n n a t i o n a l i t y . The large numbers of Germans i n Russia, their a l i e n ways, their economic power, and their great influence i n court-c i r c l e s , of course, could always provide appropriate and vulnerable targets for the exponents of Russian nationalism. I t has already been noted that as early as the mid-eighteenth century, there was a reaction among the Russian s e r v i c e - n o b i l i t y against the German advisers of the T s a r i s t court, provoked by the f a c t that the Germans were of foreign o r i g i n and that their positions were 7 6 coveted by native Russians, with the r e s u l t that the Germans had temporarily l o s t their ascendancy and had suffered the closing of the University of Dorpat, among other discriminatory measures. One can hardly suppose that t h i s anti-German prejudice on the part of at l e a s t a segment of the Russian n o b i l i t y ever died out completely. Anti-German f e e l i n g i n Russia seems, however, to have attracted a r e a l following or strength only toward the middle of the nineteenth century, and to have increased rather s t e a d i l y only after that, keeping pace generally with the r i s e of Russian national f e e l i n g — o r , as Lenin termed i t , "Great Russian chauvinism". I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note, i n t h i s connec-t i o n , the work of the Russian Slavophile h i s t o r i a n , G.P. Danilev-sky, who was not only a staunch defender of the T s a r i s t p o l i t i c a l system, but also an a n t i - l i b e r a l and an a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t , and who depicted a type of prosperous German col o n i s t that was almost pQ the prototype f o r Russian Germanophobes. This was i n h i s h i s t o r i c a l novel, The Refugees i n New Russia; the c o l o n i s t , Bogdan Bogdanovich Schultzwein by name, i s the epitome of the grasping and p h i l i s t i n e bourgeois, who, by questionable and devious means, without regard f o r the consequences to others, r e l e n t l e s s l y pursues only wealth, and eventually comes to own a l l of the land i n h i s entire d i s t r i c t . The book concludes: "But i s that anything at which to wonder, since he i s a German, and not even a Russian German, but a foreign German from Germany?" 2 9 The German, i t should be added, had long been a f a m i l i a r f i g u r e i n Russian l i t e r a t u r e . But i n the main he had been depicted not as an unpleasant character, but as the embodiment of most of the 77 p r a c t i c a l v i r t u e s — j u s t those that the Russian generally was supposed to lack. He was hard-headed and energetic, methodical, and a devotee of hard work and e f f i c i e n c y : sometimes colourless and not e n t i r e l y l i k e a b l e , but always admirable. In Goncharov's Oblomov. for example, the character against whom Oblomov's (supposedly Russian) t r a i t s of lassitude and sloth are contrasted i s , t y p i c a l l y , the half-German S t o l z , who i s almost too good to be true. Perhaps the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the Russian Germans which most offended Russian national f e e l i n g and which became a chronic source of h o s t i l i t y and suspicion was the continuing German character of t h e i r settlements. The German a g r i c u l t u r a l s e t t l e r s , while they grew successful and affluent i n t h e i r new country, "kept well together i n separate groups, a l i e n patches i n the midst of the native population, never mixing with i t or exerting any influence over i t " . ^ Their own domestic form of c i v i l i z a -t i o n , t h e i r manners and customs, t h e i r German language: a l l were preserved. They continued, long after the term had become no longer applicable, to bear the name of kolonist, and, a l -together, they formed a separate class i n the Russian Empire, far more German than Russian. The r i s i n g economic importance of the Volga German and . South Russian German farmers, e s p e c i a l l y after the emancipation of the serfs i n l 8 6 l , the consequent s c a r c i t y of land, and the upsurge i n migrations of Russian farmers to the former borderlands 78 of the Empire,-^2 provoked further h o s t i l i t y toward them. Russia was at thi s time greatly increasing i t s exports of grain to Europe, as a r e s u l t of the repeal of the Corn Laws i n B r i t a i n and the rapid growth i n population of the i n d u s t r i a l c i t i e s of B r i t a i n and the Continent—indeed, these developments cannot be ignored as contributing factors to the emancipation^--and the German farmers, who had been f o r years l e f t almost alone, became more and more the object of envy because of the s c a r c i t y of good land: B i t t e r resentment was caused by the f a c t that Russian land holdings i n the most f e r t i l e areas [ i . e . , Ukraine and the middle Volga region] were becoming smaller every year, while German wealth was proportionately increasing. In-dignation was also f e l t because of the large number of destitute Russian and Ukrainian peasants who had to work as farm labourers f o r German farmers. The latent anxiety and resentment f e l t about the posi t i o n of the Germans i n the Empire was unquestionably increased also by a change of profound importance i n Central Europe: that was the establishment, i n 1871, of the German Empire, with Bismarck as i t s leading statesman. Bismarck's pronouncements concerning the future of Russia could not help but to make uneasy a l l sections of the Russian population. Bismarck's view was that Russia should abandon a l l of i t s i n t e r e s t s i n Europe, and should turn i t s attentions eastward where i t s mission would be a c i v i l i z i n g one. This, of course, meant f o r Russia not only a renunciation of i t s t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i n the Sl a v i c and 79 Orthodox populations of Central Europe and the Balkans--the one foreign p o l i c y that perhaps appealed to a l l segments of the Russian people J — b u t also placed i n an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t l i g h t the huge German colonies located i n the various parts of the Empire. Almost co i n c i d e n t a l l y with the establishment of the German Empire, irresponsible and chauvinistic German voices began to demand the return of the " l o s t " German provinces on the B a l t i c ; and the large settlements of unassimilated Germans a l l over Russia now came to be regarded with more suspicion than before. There can be no doubt that the preponderance of German land holdings on the middle Volga and the Russian South, not to mention the almost complete German domination of the B a l t i c provinces, was i n f a c t as much of an anomaly as was the predomin-ance of Polish landed property i n Western Ukraine and i n Byelo-r u s s i a . The amount of land held by the German minorities was indeed large enough to give the Russian some cause f o r alarm. In the governments of Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, and Tauria, for example, where they comprised no more than 7 per cent, of the t o t a l population, German s e t t l e r s held as much as 23 per cent., 25.k per cent., and 39-5 per cent., respectively, of the area under c u l t i v a t i o n . - ^ In the Odessa d i s t r i c t , Germans owned as much as almost 60 per cent, of the sowing area, i n the Akkerman d i s t r i c t , almost **0 per cent., and the entire amount of land held by Germans i n South Russia was equivalent roughly i n area to the size of a l l Bohemia.37 In l 8 6 l , the average land holdings i n 80 the Empire were 19.25 acres i n the North, 5*50 acres i n the Black Earth zone, and 27*50 acres i n the steppes, with a mean holding for a family amounting to 22.50 a c r e s . ^ And yet the property i n the hands of a single German family at t h i s time frequently exceeded 270,000 acres. y When i t i s considered that the p o s i t i o n of the German farmer both on the Volga and on the B a l t i c was v i r t u a l l y unchallenged, and that h i s land holdings i n these regions were r e l a t i v e l y even greater than those i n South Russia, i t i s possible to appreciate the jealousy and fear which could e a s i l y be excited i n the Russian, whatever his station. Nor were the German holdings only large; their estates on the B a l t i c have frequently been described as " a g r i c u l t u r a l factories",'and those on the Volga and i n Ukraine, situated as they were i n the most desirable regions, were l i t t l e l e s s productive. I t i s , of course, almost impossible to mark exactly the time i n the h i s t o r y of the Germans of the Russian Empire when they began to suffer as a group f o r their unparallelled success i n Russia and f o r t h e i r stubborn retention of t h e i r a l i e n ways. I t i s equally d i f f i c u l t to state with certainty which of these attributes of the Germans—either th e i r prosperity or t h e i r remaining "German"—could be judged to have been of primary importance i n the change which gradually took place i n the attitude of the Russian population toward them, and ultimately i n their p o sition i n Russia. Notice has already been taken of one manifestation of Russian bias toward the B a l t i c Germans, i n the 1740's, and of the consequent lessening of German influence, f o r 81 a time at l e a s t , i n the Russian court. This reaction marks per-haps the f i r s t overt discriminatory action recorded against the Germans as such, but i t undoubtedly was the culmination of many years of growing anti-German sentiment, and cannot be supposed to have materialized overnight. No small group, and e s p e c i a l l y no small group regarded as foreign, could have attained both the influence and the affluence of the B a l t i c Germans without exciting at le a s t some resentment and h o s t i l i t y on the part of i t s r i v a l s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y , among i t s native-born r i v a l s . There were other instances of anti-German f e e l i n g and jealousy among the members of the Russian n o b i l i t y , from the mid-eighteenth century onward. Alexander I*s emancipation of the serfs of the B a l t i c provinces, f o r example, was widely interpreted by the Russian landowners as more evidence of the select position occupied by the B a l t i c Germans. The German barons were successful i n blocking, through t h e i r vehement protests and their l o y a l service i n the Napoleonic Wars, the decision of the Tsar, taken i n l 8 0 l + - 5 , to free t h e i r peasants with land, and persuaded Alexander f i n a l l y to approve of emancipation without land--in Estonia i n 1816 , and i n Livonia three years l a t e r — e v e n though the Tsar deemed t h i s solution to the problem of serfdom not acceptable f o r the rest of 1+0 the Empire. U n t i l the second h a l f of the century, i n Russia i t s e l f , not even voluntary emancipation with the granting of small acreage to the lib e r a t e d serfs was permitted—which, as population increased and as an over-supply of farm labour develop-ed, often came to mean a severe economic burden to the Russian landowner—a burden which the B a l t i c Germans, of course, were 8 2 spared. The B a l t i c Germans were not, however, t y p i c a l of the ' Germans of the Empire--their s e r f s , a f t e r a l l , were not even Russians, but mainly Estonians and L e t t s — a n d the envy and hatred which they provoked seems to have been confined l a r g e l y to the members of the Russian noble and landowning classes. The development of a widespread germanophobia among a l l classes of Russian society does not seem to have begun u n t i l after, the middle of the nineteenth century, and a f t e r , e s p e c i a l l y , the emancipation of a l l the serfs by Alexander I I , i n l 8 6 l . From th i s time onward, the search f o r new and f e r t i l e lands, exacerbat-ed by the beginning of the great overflow of population from the c e n t r a l Russian provinces, began to bring considerable numbers of Russian peasants into contact and competition with the already well-established German farmers i n the former borderlands of the Volga and South Russia. And there was another f a c t o r ; the freeing of the serfs brought about i n the Empire a complete disruption of the existing s o c i a l system, and, as the populations increased i n the formerly sparsely-populated regions, so did the numbers of government o f f i c i a l s . With the s o c i a l structure of Russia fundamentally altered, the so-called "Great Reforms" of Alexander II became inevi t a b l e and a matter of necessity i n almost every sphere: f i n a n c i a l , education, j u d i c i a l , administrative, and m i l i t a r y . The Germans of the Volga and of South Russia, l i k e many other peoples of the borderlands, were thus no longer l e f t l a r g e l y to t h e i r own devices and t h e i r old ways, but came into increasing competition with the predominantly Great Russian 8 3 peasantry, c l o s e l y followed to the borderlands by the predominant-l y Great Russian bureaucracy. For the Volga and South Russian Germans, however, unlike the German barons of the B a l t i c provinces, the r u s s i f i c a t i o n p o l i c i e s of the regime were directed f a r more against their a l i e n and dissident r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , than against t h e i r remaining "German". Neither the emancipation of the serfs nor the series of reforms which followed i t , however, was s u f f i c i e n t to cure the i l l s which a f f l i c t e d Russian agr i c u l t u r e . The emancipation l i t t l e improved the l o t of the peasant i f , indeed, i t did not worsen i t i n many cases. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of the land was unequal and inequitable, methods of c u l t i v a t i o n remained primitive, c a p i t a l f o r improvements was lacking, and good land remained scarce. Many measures of reform were either c u r t a i l e d or s t i l l b o r n , during the reaction which followed the i n i t i a l enthusiasm f o r the reforms of Alexander II5 and, i n any event, the Empire was too large, i t s bureaucracy too i n e f f i c i e n t and unreliable f o r a l l reform l e g i s l a t i o n to be put in t o practice. For example, the zemstva, the d i s t r i c t councils formed to deal with l o c a l adminis-t r a t i o n , were confined to the purely Russian provinces of the Empire, and th e i r w o r k — e s p e c i a l l y their educational work—even i n Russia i t s e l f was severely hampered by governmental i n t e r -ference and by a serious lack of tmoney. While the educational reform of Alexander II meant, fo r those national minorities whose t e r r i t o r i e s were not too remote and which were, therefore, more c l o s e l y administered, the replacing of t h e i r own schools, 84 where these existed, with Russian schools teaching a l l subjects i n the Russian language, the Germans of the Volga and the Russian South were but l i t t l e affected. The T s a r i s t government hoped that, along with the Orthodox r e l i g i o n , the Russian language would prove to be the great unifying bond f o r the multinational and heterogeneous Empire, once the i n i t i a l resistance to i t was overcome. But i t s bureaucracy lacked either talent or the machinery to extend even the most basic reforms in t o the more remote corners of the Empire. While the Poles were being subject-ed to a merciless r u s s i f i c a t i o n program, including the introduction of the Russian language as the language of i n s t r u c t i o n i n their schools for a l l subjects except P o l i s h language and l i t e r a t u r e - -i n keeping with the s p i r i t of Alexander II's pronouncement that "the happiness of Poland i s to be found i n complete fusion with 4l the peoples of my Empire" — a n d while the printing of the Ukrainian language was forbidden, along with i t s use by any government o f f i c i a l s , even i n Ukraine, the Germans of the Volga and South Russia remained l i t t l e touched by such measures. As one contemporary observer remarked: In the i s o l a t i o n of th e i r communes, they have made for themselves a small c i v i l i z a t i o n of their own, a domestic c i v i l i z a t i o n so to speak. . . very curious f o r the Lp p o l i t i c i a n and the philosopher to observe. The German peasant farmers thus continued to prosper, despite the growing h o s t i l i t y which their prosperity engendered, and despite the great d i s p a r i t y between their condition and the 8 5 wretched and miserable l o t of the mass of the newly-liberated Russian s e r f s . They continued to expand their land holdings, now acquiring not only v i r g i n lands, but also lands at the expense of the Russian farmer, as well. Landlords, unable to adjust to the emancipation of the s e r f s , and unaccustomed to having large amounts of cash, squandered t h e i r redemption payments and brought themselves to r u i n ; poor peasants, recently freed, found them-selves unable even to support themselves on their small plots, plunged into debt, and were forced to s e l l . The decades immed-i a t e l y following the emancipation of the serfs were years of boom and unprecedented opportunity f o r the kulak, the r i c h peasant, but years of disappointment, f r u s t r a t i o n , and bitterness f o r the poor. The Germans of the Volga, of South Russia and the B a l t i c , who, as has been seen, were numbered la r g e l y among the former, thus continued to do well while their Russian neighbours often became completely destitute. The Germans of the Volga and of South Russia found themselves seriously affected by only two p o l i c i e s of the T s a r i s t regimes during the l a s t decades of the nineteenth century, and both of these affected them f a r more as non-Orthodox sectarians than as Germans. Because of their remoteness i n the Empire, the i r general lack of i n t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c a l questions, th e i r basic conservatism and general contentment with the status quo, and the peculiar, close-knit character of their settlements, they were almost e n t i r e l y insulated from the winds of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l change which were beginning to blow with increasing 8 6 strength across a l l of the Empire during these years, and also, f o r the.most part, almost untouched by the progressively harsher measures taken by the T s a r i s t regime, to suppress these forces. They remained l a r g e l y unto themselves, hardly aware that the c o n f l i c t i n g tides of revolution and reaction swirled about them. The f i r s t of the measures of Alexander II to signal the beginning of a serious change i n th e i r status was the m i l i t a r y reform of 1874, which introduced compulsory m i l i t a r y service for a l l c i t i z e n s of European Russia and was made to apply also to the formerly-exempt German s e t t l e r s . This revoking of t h e i r p r i v i l e g e of exemption--which, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , had been one of the chief inducements held out by Catherine the Great to the o r i g i n a l c o l o n i s t s , a centyry before—caused thousands of German farmers to emigrate from Russia i n the l a t e 1 8 7 0 ' s . A few of these returned to Germany, but the majority, seeking a new home where th e i r p a c i f i s t b e l i e f s would not be offended, emigrated to North k* America. J The second action of the T s a r i s t regime to bring serious hardship to large numbers of the German peasant-farmers was the general stepping-up, i n the l 8 8 0 ' s and 1 8 9 0 ' s , of the government's attacks upon a l l forms of r e l i g i o u s dissent. It had long been a crime i n the Russian Empire to advise anyone to abandon the Orthodox r e l i g i o n , as i t was a crime even to advise anyone against entering i t . The Russian Orthodox Church admitted of no competition i n the matter of i t s kk propaganda monopoly. Under Pobyedonostsev and Alexander I I I , however, these laws began to be much more r i g i d l y enforced. A l l 87 over the Empire, the building of non-Orthodox churches was forbidden, severe penalties were imposed upon dissenting p r i e s t s and ministers, marriage ceremonies performed outside of the Orthodox Church were refused l e g a l recognition, and vigorous campaigns of conversion were waged. In l8?h, the Uniates were f o r c i b l y reunited with the Orthodox Church. The large numbers of German dissenters on the Volga and i n South Russia thus came under increasingly heavy attack from the regime—and i n South Russia, i n p a r t i c u l a r , where the doctrines of Stundism and other evangelical forms of C h r i s t i a n i t y were gaining s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of adherents among the Russian and Ukrainian peasantry, , away from the Orthodox f a i t h . y Again, many thousands of the persecuted German s e t t l e r s l e f t Russia f o r North America. But among the Germans of the Russian Empire, i t was only the B a l t i c Germans, i n the nineteenth century, who suffered the f u l l oppressive weight of T s a r i s t p o l i c i e s of r u s s i f i c a t i o n . In the B a l t i c provinces, under Alexander I I I , the Germans were attacked not only as dissenters, but also as Germans. Between 1885 and 1895» the Russian language was, f i r s t , imposed as the language f o r a l l o f f i c i a l acts i n these provinces, and then, as the o f f i c i a l spoken language of the administration; hundreds of Lutheran clergymen were arrested and imprisoned, and Orthodox pr o s e l y t i z i n g reached the point where government decorations were given to Orthodox p r i e s t s f o r the i r conversions of Lutherans; the German school system was brought under the repressive Russian Ministry of Education, and Russian was introduced as the language 8 8 of i n s t r u c t i o n ; the University of Dorpat was closed i n 1893> and shortly afterward reopened as the Russian University of Yuriev; the s p e c i a l German law courts were abolished, and even the members of the l o c a l administration, including the mayors of the 46 towns, were nominated by the T s a r i s t government. The German n o b i l i t y of the B a l t i c gained some r e l i e f only a f t e r the ascension of Nicholas I I , and then l a r g e l y , i t would appear, only because the Russian authorities saw i n i t a vested interest-group which could be u t i l i z e d to counteract the disruptive forces of Estonian and Latvian nationalism and separatism, as well as the forces of progress and freedom i n general. It would appear that considerations of a l i k e nature, as well as the remoteness of t h e i r settlements, were a l l that saved the Volga and South Russian Germans from similar and equally thorough measures of r u s s i f i c a t i o n . Forced by the events of the 1905 Revolution to make an uneasy a l l i a n c e with a l l the conservative elements of the Empire, the T s a r i s t regime, however, during the period of Russia's " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l experiment", abated considerably i t s campaigns of persecution against most of the national and r e l i g i o u s minorities as such—with the notable exception of the Jews--and concentrated most of i t s energies toward the suppressing of i t s p o l i t i c a l opposition. In the B a l t i c provinces, f o r example: Latvians and Estonians were c l e a r l y more affected by revolutionary ideas than Germans. Though the l a t t e r 8? might be eternal enemies of Slavdom, they had shown themselves l o y a l subjects of the Tsar. The mainten-ance of th e i r economic p r i v i l e g e s linked them to the established order. ' Some German landowners i n the B a l t i c provinces even were permitt-ed to bring i n numbers of German farmers from other parts of Russia, and to s e t t l e them on newly-acquired lands. But despite such c o n c i l i a t o r y measures toward c e r t a i n groups, the Russian government, from 1905 to 1917, was strongly imbued with Great Russian nationalism, and intermittent persecutions on national or r e l i g i o u s grounds continued during t h i s time. Increasing tension, e s p e c i a l l y i n the Balkans and the Middle East, between Russian and German and Austrian i n t e r e s t s , dictated that the German subjects of the Tsar, i n p a r t i c u l a r , were to be regarded with suspicion, and the laws of 1887, which not only forbade the a c q u i s i t i o n by foreigners of additional lands i n the western border regions, but which also stated that, upon the death of a "foreign" landowner, h i s estate was to be f o r c i b l y sold, remained i n e f f e c t . 1 * 9 The beginning of World War I, then, and the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s between Germany and Russia were bound to bring i n t o being i n Russia some measure of r e s t r i c t i o n against the Germans of the Empire. The B a l t i c Germans, of course, occupied the approaches to the Russian c a p i t a l of St. Petersburg, and many other Germans were se t t l e d i n strategic areas of Ukraine. From the beginning of the War, a l l kinds of charges were l e v e l l e d 90 against the Russian Germans. They were accused of almost every conceivable crime: of sabotage, espionage, manipulation of the Russian banking system and the forcing of i n f l a t i o n , and 50 defeatism. In response to the wave of extreme anti-German f e e l i n g which swept Russia, there were government-incited pogroms against the Germans and the members of other n a t i o n a l i t i e s . The o f f i c i a l anti-German measures adopted by the T s a r i s t government, however, were severe and far-reaching enough to s a t i s f y even the most rabid Russian n a t i o n a l i s t . In December, 1915j the Duma passed a decree proclaiming the confiscation of a l l German land holdings i n the western and southern regions of Russia, with compensation to the owners, a measure which i t was able to carry 51 out only to a s l i g h t extent. But t h i s decree was extended i n 1916 to include even the expulsion of the Volga Germans from their l a n d s — d e s p i t e the distance these were from any areas of strategic importance. This act was the culmination of decades of accumulated Russian grievances against the Germans of the Empire, and represented the f i n a l triumph of narrow Russian nationalism. The expulsion of the Volga Germans, however, which was to take place i n A p r i l , 1917, was not c a r r i e d out. A month before i t s plan could be effected, the T s a r i s t regime i t s e l f f e l l . This did not a l t e r i t s intention, however, of destroying the economic power of the Russian Germans, whose presence had been regarded as a blessing while there were s t i l l vast t r a c t s of u n t i l l e d land to be se t t l e d i n Russia, but which had, i n l a t e r years, become at le a s t a mixed blessing i n the eyes of the regime, and a curse i n the eyes of many of i t s people. 9 1 The Crimean Tatars fared very d i f f e r e n t l y under the Tsars than did the Volga Germans. For them, there was no even b r i e f period of prosperity. Through the whole of the nineteenth eentury, the hist o r y of the Crimean peninsula, so far as i t s Tatar population i s concerned, reads as a kind of success story i n reverse. From the time of i t s being annexed by Russia, i n 1 7 8 3 , through the f i r s t h a l f of the century, the peninsula became stea d i l y more desiccated and depopulated. I t s farms i n the main were l e f t neglected, many of i t s v i l l a g e s deserted. A great part of the Tatar population emigrated from Crimea to Turkey i n search of rule less incompatible than the Russian, while that portion which remained was forced r e l e n t l e s s l y by the Russian authorities away, f i r s t , from the f e r t i l e coastal s t r i p up into the mountains, then from the mountains into the near-desert steppes, where i t became more and more impoverished. In mid-century, during the Crimean War, the peninsula was partly devastated by the m i l i t a r y operations of the combatants of both sides, and the Tatars suffered further r e s t r i c t i o n s . Then, following the War and further large emigrations of Tatars, considerable influxes of Russian, Ukrainian, and other s e t t l e r s poured into the peninsula, hungry f o r land, u n t i l , by the turn of the century, the Crimean Tatars made up only about one-quarter of the area's t o t a l population. As the r e s u l t of the i r mass emigrations across the Black Sea and of the influxes of non-Tatar peoples, the Tatars who remained i n Crimea represented a mere tattered remnant of the advanced c i v i l i z a t i o n which had once in s p i r e d the poet Pushkin to write h i s famous "The Fountain 92 of Bakhchiserai". Exactly one century after the Russian annexa-t i o n of Crimea, a Russian observer sadly wrote that l i t t l e remained i n the peninsula of the grandeur and great wealth that 52 had existed under the rule of the Tatar Khans.' The l a s t of the Tatar Khans, the puppet Chagin G i r e i , who had been i n s t a l l e d by Catherine the Great, was driven out of Crimea by the Tatars themselves i n 1783, during the course of the national r e b e l l i o n which gave Catherine the s l i g h t pretext she needed fo r her annexation of the peninsula, and f o r her troops' severe repression of a l l resistance offered by the Tatar population. In the ancient manner of such operations, the f i n a l Russian invasion of Crimea was thus ca r r i e d out on the plea of restoring order. Immediately that Catherine had acquired her new province, however, a l l doubt vanished that t h i s "restoring of order" was a Russian conquest.. Russian troops drove many of the Tatar nobles and merchants from their palaces and estates on the choice coastal lands, and d i s t r i b u t e d these properties among her favourites, including Potyomkin, the conqueror of the peninsula, who immediately began hi s reorganization of the whole t e r r i t o r y . And almost immediately, the Tatars showed their hatred f o r the conquerors and t h e i r unwillingness to l i v e under Russian rule by i n i t i a t i n g , i n 1784, the f i r s t of their mass treks to Turkey, which were to continue almost without pause u n t i l the end of the Russian T s a r i s t regime, and even afterward. At the time of the annexation, the Tatars i n Crimea 9 3 numbered perhaps three-quarters of a m i l l i o n . J But the f i r s t wave of emigration, between X?8h and 1 7 9 1 , reduced t h i s t o t a l by about a t h i r d . J The exodus of the Tatars became a p a t t e r n i n the h i s t o r y of Crimea; smaller numbers f l e d i n 1 8 0 7 and 1 8 1 1 , and l a r g e r numbers f o l l o w e d them to Turkey during and a f t e r the Russo-Turkish War of 1 8 2 8 - 9 . The next r e a l l y c onsiderable wave of Tatar emigration d i d not begin u n t i l a f t e r the Crimean War, when, between the years 1 8 5 9 and 1 8 6 3 , the number who f l e d to Turkey has been v a r i o u s l y estimated as between 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 and 5 5 2 3 0 , 0 0 0 . J The exodus never h a l t e d completely, although i n the years between the great migrations i t subsided to a mere t r i c k l e . I t increased i n momentum again a f t e r 1 8 7 5 , however, and a p p r o x i -mately 1 , 0 0 0 Tatars each year, on the average, are thought to have l e f t a f t e r t h i s , d e s p i te the f a c t that the Russian a u t h o r i t i e s had by t h i s time made f u r t h e r emigration u n l a w f u l . ^ In I 8 7 O , w h i l e the a t t e n t i o n of the world was d i v e r t e d to the Franco-P r u s s i a n War and the c o l l a p s e of the French Empire of Napoleon I I I , R u s s i a repudiated the clause of the Treaty of P a r i s which banned i t s warships from the Black Sea, and Crimea took on renewed importance, both m i l i t a r y and economic. The Russian a u t h o r i t i e s t herefore began r e f u s i n g to i s s u e passports t o f u r t h e r emigrants i n 1 8 7 6 , f o l l o w i n g the recommendations of an I m p e r i a l 5 7 commission.^ Having come to r e a l i z e the economic disadvantage of mass m i g r a t i o n s , they d i d not want the peninsula wholly devoid of T a t a r s — a t l e a s t , not before t h e i r l o s s c ould be balanced by the b r i n g i n g i n of new c o l o n i s t s . 9k The great exodus of the Tatar population from Crimea i n the nineteenth century was a phenomenon of epic proportions which i n f l i c t e d u n told hardship and great s u f f e r i n g upon the Tatar people. Yet, i t would not be c o r r e c t to place the e n t i r e blame f o r t h i s exodus upon the Russian a u t h o r i t i e s . The migrations of the Tat a r s , of course, f o l l o w e d a d e f i n a b l e p a t t e r n , and reached t h e i r peaks during those periods when Russia was at war w i t h Turkey, or when r e l a t i o n s between the two empires were most severely s t r a i n e d . As has already been noted i n Chapter I , the Crimean Ta t a r s , since the f i f t e e n t h century almost e n t i r e l y cut o f f from contact w i t h t h e i r Tatar brothers and c o - r e l i g i o n -i s t s i n the Volga r e g i o n , and i n c r e a s i n g l y barred from e f f e c t i v e i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h those of the Caucasus and C e n t r a l A s i a , had maintained the c l o s e s t of r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h Turkey proper. The f i r s t mass emigration of the Tat a r s , i n 1 7 8 3 , i n d i c a t e d q u i t e c l e a r l y to t h e i r Russian conquerors where the sympathies of the mass of the people of Crimea l a y . The Tatars openly demonstrated t h e i r preference f o r continued T u r k i s h r u l e by choosing to give up a l l of t h e i r m a t e r i a l possessions r a t h e r than to l i v e under the i n f i d e l Tsar. This study has no wish to become i n any sense an apology f o r the a c t i o n s of the T s a r i s t regime toward the Tatars of Crimea. But i t i s obvious that the Russians had strong grounds f o r m i s t r u s t i n g those Tatars who, f o r one reason or another, chose to remain i n Crimea wh i l e thousands of t h e i r fellow-countrymen l e f t ; and i t i s d i f f i c u l t , t h e r e f o r e , to c r i t i c i z e t h e i r t a k i n g of s e c u r i t y precautions against these 95 people, p a r t i c u l a r l y during times of war. These precautions may, i n f a c t , have been unnecessary and, therefore, stupid; they may have been c a r r i e d out, as such operations often are by s o l d i e r s , with some b r u t a l i t y . But they were c e r t a i n l y neither indiscriminate nor b r u t a l by twentieth-century standards, and consisted c h i e f l y , as has been seen, i n moving the Tatars inland, away from the coasts and, e s p e c i a l l y , away from areas close to the great naval bases of Sevastopol and Odessa, and other f o r t i f i e d points. In e f f e c t , t h i s also meant depriving the Tatars of t h e i r most f e r t i l e areas of c u l t i v a t i o n , and i t meant uprooting them from their established homes on or near the coasts. But, c e r t a i n l y , their l o t could have been very much worse. During the Crimean War, f o r example, i t was suggested that the entire Tatar population should be deported from the 58 peninsula to the i n t e r i o r provinces of Russia^ — a measure which Nicholas I was unable to be persuaded was either p r a c t i c a l or necessary at that time. It i s surely not accurate to state, as so many writers have stated, that the Russian government was determined to exterminate or to drive from Crimea the entire Tatar population, 59 merely on the grounds that i t was non-Slav. ' And i t seems no more true to say that the T s a r i s t government persecuted the Tatars merely so that i t could s t e a l their lands, as some Soviet 60 sources would have their readers believe. There i s to be considered, f i r s t of a l l , the Russian record of cooperation, even friendship, toward the Tatars of the Volga and of Central 96 Asia, and the Russian encouragement of commerce and education among these and other Tatar groups.^ 1 While i t i s true that, i n the second h a l f of the nineteenth century, there were r e s t r i c t i v e measures taken against these Tatar groups as well, and some s i n i s t e r designs behind the Russian encouragement of Tatar languages, on the whole these p o l i c i e s can hardly be reconciled with any alleged unjust persecutions of the Crimean Tatars, qua Tatars. I t i s surely more reasonable to attribute the suspicion and harshness of the Russians toward them to the f a c t that the Tatars, from the beginning, made no secret of t h e i r preference fo r Turkey, or of t h e i r support f o r Turkish causes. They were, i n short, extremely r e c a l c i t r a n t and unwilling subjects, and, from the Russian point of view, for t h i s reason alone a d e f i n i t e hazard and l i a b i l i t y to the security of Russian naval and m i l i t a r y operations on the Black Sea. I t has been seen that the question of "foreign confessions" was a constant factor underlying the attitude of the T s a r i s t authorities toward i t s subject minorities; and, as regarded Islam i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s question of r e l i g i o n was intimately connected with Russian foreign policy. Russia and Turkey, i t must be remembered, were the most constant antagonists of Europe, either at war or on the verge of war almost s t e a d i l y through the century and one-half after 1780, and a c t u a l l y engaged i n seven separate wars against each other during t h i s time. In approaching the question of how to deal with the Crimean Tatars, then, the Russians found themselves confronted with something of a dilemma: whether to assume that the Tatars were l o y a l , to take no precautions against their possible d i s -l o y a l t y , and thus to run the r i s k of allowing secret a l l i e s of 97 Turkey to remain i n strategic positions; or to assume that they were d i s l o y a l , to take whatever security precautions against them seemed necessary, and thus to drive them from the peninsula to become the open a l l i e s of Turkey. I t has been seen that the * t Russian government, according to i t s doctrine of " o f f i c i a l n a t i o n a l i t y " , was at l e a s t strongly disposed toward regarding a l l non-Orthodox and non-Slavic populations ipso facto as enemies of Russia. And c e r t a i n l y , the evidence which the Crimean Tatars gave of t h e i r l o y a l t y to Russia l e f t l i t t l e doubt that t h i s attitude was the correct one to be adopted i n their case. No other except the second alternative r e a l l y was possible under exis t i n g conditions. The T s a r i s t government, i t would also seem, valued Crimea f a r more fo r the m i l i t a r y advantages i t assured than f o r i t s a g r i c u l t u r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s o r — s o long as Turkey maintained co n t r o l of the S t r a i t s — f o r i t s commercial value. I t would appear that the population of the peninsula was, i n f a c t , super-fluous or merely i n c i d e n t a l to the question of Crimea's strategic value. For their f i r s t century and one-half under Russian r u l e , then, the Crimean Tatars were hardly more than helpless pawns i n the game of i n t e r n a t i o n a l power p o l i t i c s . I t was their great misfortune that they should have been so c l o s e l y a l l i e d , both p h y s i c a l l y and s p i r i t u a l l y , with the nation that was the most ubiquitous enemy of their new masters, and i t was t h e i r secondary misfortune that they should have occupied those areas of their peninsula which were, f i r s t , m i l i t a r i l y , and second, economically, most desirable. 98 None of the foregoing, of course, obviates the f a c t that the Crimean Tatars did indeed suffer t e r r i b l y under the ru l e of the Tsars. Forced from the lush and hospitable coastal areas into the a r i d and inhospitable steppes of the i n t e r i o r of t h e i r peninsula, many of them were faced with the simple choice of emigration or starvation. They were singularly unfortunate, also, as the decades of Russian rule passed, i n being deprived of close.contacts with the other Tatar groups of the Russian J Empire—not only by the great distances which separated them phy s i c a l l y from these, but also by the c u l t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c gulfs which had deepened, over the centuries, between them and the other Tatar settlements. The Crimean Tatars were more or les s forced, because of t h i s , to continue to seek t h e i r wider associations with Turkey, their t r a d i t i o n a l a l l y , and to place also t h e i r hopes of l i b e r a t i o n i n Russia's most constant foe. Through th i s combination of circumstances, then, not the l e a s t of which was their own steadfast and implacable h o s t i l i t y to Russian r u l e , the Crimean Tatars st e a d i l y became fewer i n number and more poverty-stricken. Yet i t was not u n t i l the second h a l f of the nineteenth century that Russian colonization of the peninsula advanced at a l l r a p i d l y . At the time of the Crimean War, f o r example, only some 15,000 Russians had made their homes there.' J This amazingly slow flowing of Russian s e t t l e r s into Crimea indicates how l i t t l e concern the T s a r i s t regime must have had f o r any considerations except the m i l i t a r y . Coloniza-t i o n began to increase, however, i n the second h a l f of the 9 9 century, the f i r s t s e t t l e r s i n c l u d i n g numbers of Germans, Czechs, B u l g a r i a n s , and Estonians; but only i n the l a s t two decades before 1900 d i d the i n f l u x of Russian, U k r a i n i a n , and Jewish newcomers assume major p r o p o r t i o n s . ^ Nevertheless, these new a r r i v a l s , together w i t h continued emigration, conspired to reduce the number of Tatar i n h a b i t a n t s , r e l a t i v e t o the number. of newcomers, and they became but a s m a l l m i n o r i t y i n t h e i r homeland. A contemporary estimate, i n 18l62, placed the number of Tatars i n Crimea at about 100,000; ' and though they had 66 increased t o 196 ,354 by 1917, they comprised at t h i s time only about 25 per cent, of the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n o f the p e n i n s u l a . They were a l s o v e r y poor, d e s p i t e t h e i r small numbers forming the bulk hi of the region's l a n d l e s s a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b ourers. In 16*77, more than one-half of a l l the land i n Crimea was s t i l l concentrated i n the hands of about a thousand noblemen; and though t h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n decreased as small peasant holdings increased toward the end of the century, over f i f t y per cent, of a l l the acreage i n the peninsula was, i n 1917, s t i l l i n the hands of e i t h e r the great e s t a t e s , the government, or the Orthodox C h u r c h . 6 9 . But, d e s p i t e t h e i r -poverty and t h e i r steady l o s s of p o p u l a t i o n , the Crimean Tatars maintained, a l l though the nineteenth century, t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y high standard of education 70 and t h e i r considerable p r e s t i g e i n the Turkic and Moslem world. Despite t h e i r small and r e l a t i v e l y decreasing numbers, they continued to be g e n e r a l l y regarded, along w i t h the A z e r b a i j a n 100 Turks, as among the most advanced and dynamic of the Tsars' Moslem subjects—ranking second only to the Volga Tatars i n respect to their general l e v e l of education and t h e i r develop-71 ment of national f e e l i n g . I t i s notable that i t was a represent-ative of the numerically small Crimean Tatar i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , Izmail Bey Gasprinsky (1851-1915), who provided much of the impetus f o r the Tatar p o l i t i c a l , r e l i g i o u s , and c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l 72 a l l over the Empire, i n the 1880's and l890's' — a r e v i v a l which was without question the most v i t a l and important of the nation-a l movements to spring from among the seven peoples with whom thi s study i s concerned, and c e r t a i n l y among the most i n f l u e n t i a l movements launched by any of the national minorities of the Russian Empire. U n t i l after the Crimean War and the beginning of large-scale European settlement i n the peninsula, the Tatar population came under the d i r e c t rule of the Viceroy of Crimea, the m i l i t a r y governor of the province, who exercised both c i v i l and m i l i t a r y authority. Conditioned as i t was, from the time of their con-quest, by the c h r o n i c a l l y h o s t i l e r e l a t i o n s which existed between Russia and Turkey, the l o t of the Tatars was not a happy one. The treatment accorded to the Tatar population of Crimea consist-ed i n the main of attempts by the Russian authorities to i s o l a t e i t from any p o s s i b i l i t y of contacts with i t s former Turkish a l l i e s or with i t s own emigrants. And i t can be said that these attempts were, on the whole, successful. For t h e i r f i r s t seven or eight decades under Russian r u l e , then, the Tatars found 101 t h e i r c u l t u r a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e , which had been f o r centuries a l i v e to a l l sorts of currents and influences, forced into a state of suspended animation and insulated from the outside world. Education i n Crimea, during t h i s period, thus remained confined to the mosque schools, the medresse, which taught i n Arabic and r e s t r i c t e d education almost wholly to subjects bearing on r e l i g i o n . J But Russian m i l i t a r y r u l e also had i t s advantages fo r the Tatars. I t brought, f i r s t of a l l , a minimum of outside interference i n the everyday l i f e of the Tatar v i l l a g e s . And while i t denied to the Tatar leaders the c u l t u r a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l nourishment which only new ideas could provide, i t also served to protect them from both the p r o s e l y t i z i n g e f f o r t s of the Russian Orthodox Church and the secularizing influences of western philosophies. The Crimean Tatars were thus able to maintain and to develop their national consciousness based on their b e l i e f i n Islam. Islam remained among them, u n t i l the second h a l f of the nineteenth century, not only a set of b e l i e f s , but also .a way of l i f e a f f e c t i n g family r e l a t i o n s , law, commerce, education, and v i r t u a l l y every other aspect of human a c t i v i t y . In t h i s regard, the Crimean Tatars provided a strong contrast to the Tatars of the Volga, who, after being subjected to the attempts of the Orthodox Church, with the backing of the Russian government, f o r c i b l y to convert them, i n the l a s t years of the eighteenth century had shown themselves w i l l i n g to compromise with the Russian regime i n return for r e l i g i o u s tolerance and commercial 75 p r i v i l e g e s . J There was no question of cooperation or compromise with the Russians f o r the Crimean Tatars. U n t i l the second h a l f 102 of the nineteenth century, they remained a captive population i n thei r peninsula, looking toward the day when, with the help of thei r Turkish a l l i e s , they could r i d themselves of their a l i e n and i n f i d e l masters. With the coming of serious influxes of German, Russian, and other s e t t l e r s , however, after the mid-century, and the advent of the regular Russian system of administration i n Crimea, the slumber of the Tatar i n t e l l e c t u a l s , which had been l a r g e l y the re s u l t of their i s o l a t i o n , came to an end. As Russian schools were founded, the Tatars began to attend them as well as their own medresse, and Russian l i b e r a l and r a d i c a l ideas soon began to displace many of the older r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s and to f i n d favour. The re s u l t i n g ferment of national and s o c i a l ideas--so often intermingled among subject peoples—brought f o r t h i n the l880's the program of Gasprinsky, which launched the Crimean Tatar i n t e l l i g e n t s i a on i t s campaign fo r r a c i a l equality i n the Empire and the democratization of the regime. The Tatar national movement founded by Gasprinsky r e f l e c t e d the ideas of the two p r i n c i p a l wings of contemporary Russian p o l i t i c a l thought. In i t s emphasis on the p o s s i b i l i t y of common p o l i t i c a l action based upon common language, common r e l i g i o n , and common culture, i t followed the main premise of the Russian Slavophiles, while i n i t s fundamentally progressive and democratic character, i t followed the l i n e s of the Russian l i b e r a l and r a d i c a l leaders of the time, among them Belinsky, 103 Chernyshevsky, and Dobrolyubov.^ The Tatar r e v i v a l was founded o f f i c i a l l y by Gasprinsky i n h i s native c i t y of Bakhchiserai, i n I883, with the establishment of h i s Turkish language newspaper, "The Interpreter", and i n 1881*, with h i s founding of a new school system, based onlithe p r i n c i p l e s of modern education, to 77 replace the old medresse.'' The f i r s t Turko-Tatar publication i n Russia f o r several decades, "The Interpreter" spec i a l i z e d i n giving c u l t u r a l news from a l l the Empire's d i f f e r e n t Moslem communities, i n an e f f o r t to i n t e r e s t these widely-scattered 78 groups i n each other's a f f a i r s . I t very quickly became the 7 9 prototype f o r a l l Moslem pe r i o d i c a l s i n the Empire. 7 Gasprin-sky' s model school was widely copied, and by 1905 there were as 80 ' many as 5,000 such primary schools among the Russian Moslems. Within a single generation, on the basis of the experience which these e f f o r t s provided, there grew up i n Russia a considerable network of p e r i o d i c a l publications and "new method" or .iadidist schools which equipped their pupils with an education at l e a s t 8 l as modern as that of t h e i r Russian contemporaries. Gasprin-sky 's i n i t i a l aim was to unite a l l the Tatars of the Russian Empire into a single p o l i t i c a l force, but i t soon expanded i n -scope to include a l l the Turkic-speaking and Moslem peoples of Russia, and, i n i t s f i n a l form, a l l the Turkic-speaking and Moslem peoples everywhere, on the bases of their common language, r e l i g i o n , and culture. The great weakness of h i s movement, however, was h i s insistence that the common language should be that spoken by the Turks of Constantinople; many Russian Moslems whose languages had developed a long way from any common Turkic 104 language, and whose cultures were f e l t to be at l e a s t the equals Op of the Ottoman Turks', preferred to maintain their own d i a l e c t s . A second weakness, almost equally serious, was Gasprinsky's insistence that the Russian Moslems could achieve p o l i t i c a l power only under the leadership of Turkey; again, many of the Russian Moslem groups refused to accept the hegemony of Turkey, and consequently sought ways of achieving t h e i r p o l i t i c a l independence outside of the movement.^ A t h i r d obstacle to the success of the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic doctrines was the h o s t i l i t y which they engendered among the more conservative elements of Islam i n the Empire; with i t s openly progressive and "westernizing" character, the national movement of Gasprinsky was from the outset an t i - c l e r i c a l — t h e j a d i d i s t schools replacing the t r a d i t i o n a l medresse—and thus i n the paradoxical p o s i t i o n of having to uproot those very ideas which provided i t s fundamental raison  d ' e t r e . ^ I t therefore f a i l e d to take hold among any very large numbers of Moslems i n the more conservative and more clergy-dominated regions, e s p e c i a l l y i n the North Caucasus and i n Central Asia. A fourth obstacle to the success of the Tatar n a t i o n a l -i s t s was, of course, the opposition of the T s a r i s t a u t h o r i t i e s . Here, however, another paradox i s evident. Those very elements of Tatar nationalism, as preached by Gasprinsky and h i s followers, which worked against the success of the movement—Ottoman Turkish leadership and language, and progressive p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l ideas--made the movement appear to be doubly dangerous i n the eyes 1 0 5 of the Russian government. The movement was directed not only against the Russian Empire—and, therefore, not only the obvious work of Russia's great i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v a l , Turkey—but also against the i n s t i t u t i o n of the T s a r i s t autocracy, the very foundation of the Empire. Every e f f o r t was made to stamp out a l l evidence of Tatar nationalism and i t s wider expressions, Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. The Crimean Tatars, under Alexander III and Nicholas I I , suffered a l l of the repressive measures applied to the other r e l i g i o u s minorities. Their mosques were closed by the Russian a u t h o r i t i e s , lands belonging to t h e i r clergy were confiscated, and Orthodox missionaries conducted vigorous campaigns of conversion among them, backed up by the f u l l weight of the govern-85 ment's discriminatory laws. y The Tatar peasant continued to lose ground to the European s e t t l e r , and, as has been noted, the bulk of the Tatar population i n Crimea possessed very l i t t l e land at the end of the nineteenth century. But a l l of the regime's measures appear to have been r e l a t i v e l y i n e f f e c t i v e , to have been only a hindrance to the growing p o l i t i c a l and national consciousness of the Tatars, and not an obstacle. The T s a r i s t attempt, i n 1886, for example, to make the new m i l i t a r y service law apply also to i t s Moslem subjects of European Russia, brought great unrest among the Crimean Tatars, and the threat of another wholesale emigration. Following r i o t s and demonstrations by the Tatars, they were temporarily exempted, and the law was not 86 subsequently enforced. Gasprinsky continued to spread h i s ideas 106 almost unhindered by either police a c t i v i t y or the censorship; h i s "new method" school system continued to expand and to t r a i n an entire new generation of Tatar i n t e l l e c t u a l s , including, f o r 87 the f i r s t time, numbers of women. ' Numerous p o l i t i c a l , r e l i g i o u s , and regional differences, however, too fundamental to be overcome before 1917, prevented the Crimean Tatars from achieving f u l l cooperation with the various other Tatar groups of the Empire, and the numerical superiority alone of some other groups, p a r t i c u l a r l y that of the Volga Tatars, precluded the p o s s i b i l i t y of approval f o r the whole of Gasprin-sky' s program i n the All-Russian Moslem congresses. Though they played a secondary role i n the Dumas, the Crimean Tatars neverthe-le s s played an important r o l e , contributing many of the most active and r a d i c a l members to the Moslem caucus which aligned i t s e l f , i n 1907, with the Russian l i b e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Demo-crats i n the Second Duma. The continued prominence of the Crimean Tatar delegates to a l l of the many p o l i t i c a l gatherings of the Russian Moslems after 1905 attests to t h e i r leadership 88 and influence. Undoubtedly, the Russian administration became increasingly alarmed at the i n t e n s i t y of Tatar p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and the growth of the .ladidist movement i n Crimea. They were incompatible with both the security and the very idea of the Russian State. But, apart from i t s usual practices of continued discrimination and occasional harassment, the regime found i t s e l f powerless to hinder them e f f e c t i v e l y . In the case of the Crimean Tatars, the very p o l i c i e s of the T s a r i s t regime which were designed 107 to combat national f e e l i n g i n f a c t seem to have stimulated i t s growth. The Kalmyks, on the barren reaches of semi-desert around the northwestern shores of the Caspian Sea, also suffered great hardship under the rule of the Russian Tsars. Throughout the whole of their century and one-half under Russian authority, they were the victims of p o l i c i e s aimed at converting them from their Buddhist f a i t h to Orthodox C h r i s t i a n i t y , at shattering the foundations of t h e i r economic l i f e , at s e t t l i n g them and thus bringing them under more s t r i c t c o n t r o l , at breaking the power of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s leaders, and, ultimately, at for c i n g their assimilation. The approximately 50,000 Kalmyks who remained on Russian t e r r i t o r y a f t e r 1771 and the great migration of the majority of their people back to Chinese Turkestan, and aft e r the t i t l e of their khan had been abolished by Catherine the Great, were placed by the Empress under the d i r e c t supervision of a "Kalmyk O f f i c e " situated i n Astrakhan, from where the i r "Chief Guardian"—the Russian governor-general of Astrakhan-exercised h i s extraordinary, almost d i c t a t o r i a l powers over the peoples of the steppes and directed the a c t i v i t i e s of the numer-ous "Sub-Guardians" i n every d i s t r i c t of Kalmykia. 8 9 The l e g a l position of the Kalmyks and the other non-Russian subjects of the Empire was f u l l y defined, however, only under Alexander I by the c o d i f i c a t i o n of the Russian law c a r r i e d out by Speransky, which set out the basic p r i n c i p l e s f o r t h e i r administration 108 which were to be followed u n t i l 1917. The Kalmyks, along with the mountaineer peoples of the Northern Caucasus, along with the Jews, and with most of the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes of S i b e r i a and Central Asia, f e l l under the Russian s o c i a l category or class of i n o r o d t s y — which i s perhaps best rendered by the French term peuples  allogenes, or by the term "wandering peoples". The inorodets i n the Russian Empire was not subject to the general laws of the Empire or of the d i s t r i c t i n which he l i v e d , but to spe c i a l laws. He was, i n e f f e c t , allowed to maintain h i s r i g h t to s e l f -r u l e , to h i s own native courts of law, and to h i s t r a d i t i o n a l forms of t r i b a l organization. In theory, the inorodets gave nothing whatever to the Russian government except a f i x e d tax or annual t r i b u t e , and i n return received nothing except the on r i g h t to continue l i v i n g within h i s defined area. However, the Kalmyks, l i k e so many other peoples i n their c l a s s , found themselves subjected to governmental pressures, a l l through the nineteenth century, to give up their status as inorodtsy--to forsake their nomadic habits and to s e t t l e upon the land as farmers or i n the towns as labourers—and to become regular c i t i z e n s of the Empire, with a l l the duties and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of whatever class they joined. So f a r as the Russian law was concerned, these were the only requirements f o r any member of the inorodtsy to become a regular c i t i z e n . ^ But i n practice, be-coming a regular c i t i z e n meant fo r the inorodets also the incurring of the l i a b i l i t y of compulsory m i l i t a r y service, h i s 109 i s o l a t i o n from his t r i b a l group and continuing discrimination against him because of h i s habits or appearance, and, most important, h i s giving up of h i s old r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s and h i s embracing of the Orthodox f a i t h . This l a s t , i n p a r t i c u l a r , very few of the Kalmyks were w i l l i n g to do. One of the outstanding c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Kalmyks who remained i n the Russian Empire was their deep attach-ment to their Buddhist f a i t h and the respect with which they regarded their p r i e s t s . The influence of the p r i e s t s over the nomads was remarkable, and few Kalmyks ever undertook actions of any consequence without f i r s t meeting with their p r i e s t s for qp consultation. The Kalmyks of Russia, a l l through the nineteenth century and despite even the most severe periods of r e l i g i o u s oppression under the Tsars, maintained not only their r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , but also their extremely close t i e s with Lhasa, the c a p i t a l of t h e i r f a i t h toward which they looked for a l l s p i r i t u a l guidance. Even i n the worst days of T s a r i s t persecution, frequent exchanges of v i s i t s between Tibetan and Kalmyk pr i e s t s CO continued. '-J From the time of t h e i r f i r s t coming under Russian r u l e , therefore, the Kalmyks were subjected to vigorous campaigns of proselytism by the Orthodox Church and to other measures designed to convert them from their a l i e n f a i t h . Even before 1771, along with various other tribes of the eastern borderlands, the Kalmyks suffered the e f f o r t s of the Russian Church's missionaries f o r c i b l y to convert them. One of t h e i r p r i n c i p a l objections to Russian 110 r u l e , and one of the primary reasons for their great emigration, was the Russian administration's h o s t i l i t y toward, and persecution 9k of, Buddhism. Under Catherine I I , the e f f o r t toward conversion increased; i t was an important part of the duties of each Kalmyk "Sub-Guardian" to impress upon the nomads the advantages to be gained through th e i r adopting of the Orthodox f a i t h . Alexander I began the practice of nominating personally the Kalmyk Grand Lama, i n an attempt to gain greater control over the nomads through the 95 influencing of the i r r e l i g i o u s leader. y This p o l i c y was follow-ed, although with a minimum of success, u n t i l almost the end of the nineteenth century. Under Pobyedonostsev, however, the di g n i t y which accrued to the Kalmyk Grand Lama through his . o f f i c i a l recognition by the Russian State was c a l l e d into question, then abolished; the l a s t Kalmyk Lama to be appointed by a Tsar died i n 1886, and no successor was ever named.^ While i t was thus beheaded, Kalmyk Buddhism also became the target of renewed and i n t e n s i f i e d campaigns of repression and r u s s i f i c a t i o n — campaigns similar to those undergone by a l l of the non-Orthodox r e l i g i o u s groups i n the l880's and 1890's. Its places of worship were ordered closed; many of i t s properties were confiscated; and increased c i v i l d i s a b i l i t i e s were imposed upon i t s adherents.^ None of these measures, however, proved successful i n weaning the Kalmyks away from Buddhism. The nomads clung tenaciously to their b e l i e f s , and continued to be regarded, u n t i l the end of the century, as an a l i e n and unreliable group which refused to adjust i t s e l f to the T s a r i s t conception of Empire. I l l Because of their singular q u a l i t i e s and their r e f u s a l to conform, the Kalmyks suffered gradual economic deprivation at the hands of the Russian au t h o r i t i e s . As the nineteenth century progressed, they became subject to s p e c i a l r e s t r i c t i v e measures which discriminated against them to the advantage of the new s e t t l e r s who came i n ever larger numbers to the borderlands either i n search of land or to s e t t l e on the shores of the Caspian Sea as fishermen. One of the o r i g i n a l r e s t r i c t i o n s placed upon the Kalmyks, as inorodtsy, at the beginning of the century, was the "ten verst l i m i t " , which forbade the nomadic tribes from approaching any closer than that distance (about s i x miles) to any 98 Russian or European settlement. As the colonization of the eastern reaches of the Empire increased, as the plow cut into the most f e r t i l e lands f r i n g i n g Kalmykia, and as commercial f i s h i n g became an increasingly important industry i n the Caspian Sea, the Kalmyks gradually found themselves circumscribed by European settlements and areas of c u l t i v a t i o n , their freedom of movement severely r e s t r i c t e d , and access denied to both sources of water and suitable grazing lands f o r their animals. They were driven deeper and deeper into the less desirable regions, and became ever less prosperous. Under Nicholas I, a further measure was taken against those Kalmyks who had s e t t l e d as fishermen along the shores of the Caspian. The "ten verst l i m i t " was made also to apply to them, unless they became apostates, and Kalmyk nomads were henceforth forbidden e n t i r e l y to f i s h i n the waters either of the Caspian or the Volga r i v e r . Then, i n the l 8 6 0 ' s , under Alexander I I , the Russian authorities 1 1 2 added another ten versts to the allowable l i m i t s of Kalmyk 99 proximity to Russian settlements. ' Confined thus to the a r i d and inhospitable steppes, while Russian and other settlements prospered on the economically desirable fringes of t h e i r lands, the Kalmyks became impoverished. The periodic droughts and famines which are endemic on the Volga struck them even more severely than they did the European population. Although the number of Kalmyks i n the Russian Empire increased to more than 1 3 0 , 0 0 0 by 1 8 9 0 , 1 0 0 the number of t h e i r c a t t l e decreased, between 1 8 0 3 and I 8 9 6 , from more than 2 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 to a mere J+53,000 head. 1 0 Nevertheless, although they were discriminated against, even persecuted i n these ways, the Kalmyks served the Tsars extremely well i n the Russian army, and were valuable troops against either European foes or other native t r i b e s . In 1 8 1 2 , f o r example, ten Kalmyk regiments of cavalry took part i n the defence of Russia against Napoleon's great army of invasion; and two years l a t e r , when Napoleon had been defeated, and the Russian armies entered Paris v i c t o r i o u s under th e i r Tsar, Alexander I, they included three regiments of Kalmyk cavalry, 1 0 2 two of them mounted on camels. Kalmyks continued to be employed by the Tsars with great success against r e c a l c i t r a n t Turkic t r i b e s during the campaigns of expansion into Central Asia. By the end of the century, however, when both Central Asia and the Caucasus had been more or less secured, and when there remained within the Empire few native t r i b e s against whom the Kalmyks could be employed i n punitive expeditions, t h e i r 113 employment i n the Russian armies diminished considerably. U n t i l World War I, then, the Kalmyks generally main-tained t h e i r old way of l i f e . Despite a l l the measures taken against them and the high price they were compelled to pay f o r the i r non-conformity, very few of them relinquished either their r e l i g i o n or their nomadic t r a d i t i o n . They remained an anomaly i n Europe, wandering over th e i r steppes with their herds and f l o c k s , and their k i b i t k i — o r i e n t a l i n appearance, i s o l a t e d and poor, apparently impervious to change. There i s a ce r t a i n timelessness evident i n the Kalmyks and i n their stubborn resistance to change. Perhaps i t was their a r t i c l e s of f a i t h which allowed them to accept their l o t so philosophically. Buddhism teaches that l i f e i s miserable and worthless, that a l l worldly possessions are transitory and evanescent, and that decay i s inherent i n a l l component things of t h i s earth. The perfect human l i f e , f o r the Buddhist, i s the l i f e of patient, long-suffering quietude, of f a t a l i s t i c endurance of a l l things, and the f i n a l beatitude i s fo r the most part an escape from l i f e , rather than a continually enlarging l i f e . 1 0 ^ By the same token, those b e l i e f s which enabled the Kalmyks to r e s i s t success-f u l l y a l l e f f o r t s by the T s a r i s t authorities to persuade them to give up their r e l i g i o n and their way of l i f e made them r e s i s t a n t to other ideas of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l change. The conservatism of the Kalmyks, coupled with their i s o l a t i o n from the other peoples of the Empire, l e f t them almost untouched by the pre-revolutionary a g i t a t i o n a f f e c t i n g most of the peoples of the Tsar Ilk during the l a s t decades of the regime. The T s a r i s t regime absorbed a few f a m i l i e s of the Kalmyk n o b i l i t y , but these were i s o l a t e d cases, and the majority found no a t t r a c t i o n either i n Russian c i v i l i z a t i o n or i n the Russian Orthodox r e l i g i o n . The peoples of the Northern Caucasus became Russian subjects o f f i c i a l l y i n 1829, by the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople between Russia and Turkey. I t was not u n t i l another t h i r t y years had passed, however, that the armies of the Tsar were able f i n a l l y to proclaim their conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan, and not f o r f i v e more years that they were able to announce that there were no more t r i b e s to conquer i n the Caucasus. Under T s a r i s t r u l e , the mountain peoples were never considered e n t i r e l y p a c i f i e d . In the main mountain chains of the Northern Caucasus, the h i s t o r y of the Russian Empire consists of more than t h i r t y years of cruel warfare and severe r e p r i s a l by both the mountain peoples and the Russian armies, followed by another half-century of intermittent i n s u r r e c t i o n and savage repression. Russian p o l i c i e s i n the Northern Caucasus, administered by m i l i t -ary a u t h o r i t i e s , were f u l l y as repressive as they were anywhere i n the Empire. The Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars, along with numerous other t r i b e s , were not only forced at l a s t to submit to the i n f i d e l Tsar, but also to witness hundreds of thousands of th e i r countrymen and c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s deported, their Moslem f a i t h v i c i o u s l y persecuted, their homes destroyed, the i r lands confiscated and d i s t r i b u t e d among the i r enemies, and t h e i r freedom r i g i d l y c u r t a i l e d . 115 U n t i l after the surrender of Shamil, the Murid leader of the Northern Caucasus resistance, i n 1859) and the f i n a l Russian campaign against the Cherkess, i n 1864, i t i s extremely-d i f f i c u l t to d i f f e r e n t i a t e exactly among the numerous and diverse mountain peoples, except f o r the two larger t r i b e s or groups, the Cherkess and the Chechens. I t seems wise, therefore, to concentrate primarily upon the Chechens and th e i r resistance, since t h e i r clashes with the Russian armies have been most frequent and best described. I t was the Chechens who provided the hard core of the Moslem warriors who fought the Russians f o r t h i r t y years, and who, as early as the Russo-Turkish War of 1769-74, had responded to the c a l l to gazavat (holy war) against the C h r i s t i a n intruders from the north, and come out under the leadership of the mysterious Shekh Mansur, who was perhaps an 104 I t a l i a n adventurer i n the pay of Turkey. I t was the Chechens among whom the Murid movement, though born i n neighbouring Daghestan, found i t s greatest strength and support, and among whom, with their primitive t r i b a l communism, the doctrines of eg a l i t a r i a n Muridism exerted th e i r widest appeal. From 1818 onward, the resistance of the Chechens to the advancing l i n e s of Cossack settlement began to assume major proportions. In that year, the Russian general, Yermolov, established the f o r t r e s s of Grozny i n Chechnia, with the words: "I wish that the terror of my name should guard our f r o n t i e r s more potently than chains of fo r t r e s s e s , that my word should be 105 for the natives a law more inevitable than death". y And i n 116 the years following, Yermolov c a r r i e d out regular punitive expeditions against the Chechens and other t r i b e s , burning and destroying their auly--their v i l l a g e s . Such a challenge could hardly have been ignored by peoples who had for centures known no other rule save that of their own elected councils, and raids on the Cossack fortresses and settlements only increased i n f r e -quency. Nevertheless, i n the Russian campaigns i n the Eastern' Caucasus, i n 1 8 2 8 - 2 9 , some four regiments of Moslem cavalry were recruited among the North Caucasians, including the Chechens, and proved to be of invaluable help to the Russians. After I83O and the Treaty of Adrianople, Russia had i t s position i n the Caucasus sanctioned by a defeated Turkey, and there remained to be conquered two main enemies: the Chechens and the mixed tri b e s of Daghestan, who controlled the mountains on the east of the main chain of the Caucasus, from the upper Terek r i v e r to.the f o o t h i l l s of Daghestan overlooking the Caspian; and the Cherkess-, who controlled the main chain to the west, from the Taman1 penin-sula to the sources of the Kuban and Ingur r i v e r s . The Chechens and the Daghestan tr i b e s were e n t i r e l y i s o l a t e d , and the Cherkess were cut off from a l l d i r e c t contact with Turkey except by sea. Two pockets of resistance--the Russians expected t h e i r reduction to be quickly effected. In I 8 3 O , however, the i r armies were given a taste of what the next three decades were to provide when i n Chechnia, under the leadership of the imam, Khazi Mullah, the puritan Murid movement erupted, determined to unite a l l the Moslems of the region against the C h r i s t i a n intruders and to drive out the Russians and the i r Cossack a l l i e s . Before the 117 imam was k i l l e d and h i s forces temporarily scattered, i t took the Russian army three years of campaigning with over 10,000 107 men i n the f i e l d , and cost i t more than 3,000 casua l t i e s . ' A Russian publication at the turn of t h i s century claimed that the peoples of the Northern Caucasus fought as f i e r c e l y as they did against Russia only because they were too remote from the world of p o l i t i c a l and diplomatic r e a l i t i e s of the nineteenth century to r e a l i z e the hopelessness of th e i r own s i t u a t i o n or the power of the Russian Empire, and, further, that they deceived themselves by thinking that Russia could not possibly have been so great and so powerful as was sometimes asserted, i f i t would bother f i g h t i n g f o r the barren Caucasus mountains. It i s possible that there i s a grain of truth i n th i s statement, but not, i t would seem, much more than a kernel. I t would be as wrong to attribute the desperate resistance of the North Caucasian tribes^merely to t h e i r ignorance of Russia's might, as i t would be wrong to characterize their war as a p a t r i o t i c war, or as a war for national independence. 1 0 9 But i t cannot be doubted that the spark which served to i g n i t e the flame of war i n the Northern Caucasus was e s s e n t i a l l y a r e l i g i o u s spark--the doctrines of Muridism, the doctrines of egalitarianism, of v i o l e n t hatred for the i n f i d e l , and of war as an end i n i t s e l f . As d i f f i c u l t as i t may be f o r the modern h i s t o r i a n i n a secular age to reconcile the high i n t e l l i g e n c e of the mountaineers with any idea of f a n a t i c a l r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , the f e r o c i t y of the Murid wars i s otherwise in e x p l i c a b l e . 1 1 8 Undoubtedly, the Russian forces f a i l e d to understand, at l e a s t at f i r s t , the r e a l force of the Murids. Only a year a f t e r the death of Khazi Mullah, the gazavat i g n i t e d again, t h i s time under the imam, Shamil, who was to lead i t f o r a quarter-century. It i s beyond the scope of t h i s study to trace the campaigns of Shamil and h i s Russian adversaries, and i t must s u f f i c e to sum them up as a continuing g u e r i l l a , which struck, disappeared, then struck again, then disappeared again, while the Russian regular armies and Cossacks inexorably closed i n , over twenty-five years, l i t e r a l l y pacifying the native auls one by one, and gradually confining the movement of Shamil to a more r e s t r i c t e d area. For years, the mountain auls of Chechnia proved almost impossible of access; perched high on rocky crags, they could be reached only through d i f f i c u l t passages of beech-forests and steep d e f i l e s , where large forces could be cut to pieces by sharpshooters were not the entire surrounding area secured. The Russian m i l i t a r y campaigns i n the Northern Caucasus, after Shamil had refused to surrender with honour i n 1 8 3 7 — t h e whole conception of gazavat imposed a continuing s t r u g g l e ^ ^ — w e r e methodical campaigns waged against the entire population; roads were constructed, v i l l a g e s destroyed, forests chopped down, fortresses b u i l t , and the p a c i f i e d areas were r e s e t t l e d with Cossacks and other s e t t l e r s . ' Included among these should be mentioned the more than 4 5 , 0 0 0 Polish families which were trans-planted to the Don and Caucasus f o r t h e i r part i n the P o l i s h Rebellion of 1 8 3 0 - 3 1 . 1 1 2 1 1 9 Shamil 1s g u e r i l l a was d i r e c t e d p r i n c i p a l l y a g a i n s t the s e t t l e r s and the communities of Cossacks which had f o r c e n t u r i e s been the advance posts of the Russian Empire, but towns, i n c l u d i n g Vladikavkaz and K i t z l y a r , were besieged, i s o l a t e d Russian detachments were destroyed, the Russian communications kept d i s r u p t e d . At the height of the struggle i n the Northern Caucasus, Russian c a s u a l t i e s rose t o more than 1 2 , 0 0 0 a y e a r . 1 1 ^ This c l e a r l y was no or d i n a r y g u e r i l l a -war, but a h i g h l y organized and c a r e f u l l y d i r e c t e d war of a t t r i t i o n . Under Shamil, Dagestan and the adjacent mountains were d i v i d e d up i n t o twenty provinces, each of which was bound to place 2 0 0 horsemen i n the f i e l d at the imam's b i d d i n g ; the e n t i r e male p o p u l a t i o n between the ages of f i f t e e n and f i f t y was armed and d r i l l e d ; a p o s t a l s e r v i c e and even a foundry f o r cannon'were e s t a b l i s h e d . 1 1 ^ In Shamil, " f a n a t i c i s m v/as tempered by deep me d i t a t i o n , and c r u e l t y by an 115 i n s t i n c t f o r s t a t e c r a f t " . ' He knew how to e x c i t e the enthusiasm and f a n a t i c i s m of h i s f o l l o w e r s ; ; however, h i s r u t h l e s s i n s i s t e n c e on p u r i t a n i s m , s a c r i f i c e , and obedience tended t o a l i e n a t e those v i l l a g e r s who were not among the e l e c t , but who were expected to s u f f e r both the exactions of the Murids and the r e p r i s a l s of the Russians, w h i l e h i s r a d i c a l i s m and h i s l e v e l l i n g m i s s i o n roused the h o s t i l i t y of the Dagestan landowners, many of whom h i s Murids drove from t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s . 1 1 ^ * The breakdown of Shamil's movement began i n 1 8 4 5 , w i t h h i s f a i l u r e t o u n i t e h i s f o r c e s w i t h those of the Cherkess and the consequent l e s s e n i n g of support among those t r i b e s which were 120 more exposed than were the Chechens to Russian punitive r a i d s . But, f o r another fourteen years, Shamil and h i s followers con-tested the possession of every peak and v a l l e y against the advancing Russian battalions. Their hopes were raised momentar-i l y by the outbreak of the Crimean War, and f o r a time the 117 B r i t i s h contemplated an invasion of the Caucasus. ' But though the Russians were forced to maintain a l l their garrisons i n Chechnia and Daghestan throughout the War, and though the Murids made thi s important contribution to the weakening of the p o t e n t i a l Russian forces in-Crimea, no m i l i t a r y contact was « • <-. lift established with either the B r i t i s h or the Turks. The Crimean War, therefore, merely delayed what was i n e v i t a b l e . Following the Treaty of Paris, i n 1856, the Russian government proceeded to li q u i d a t e the resistance of the Caucasian mountaineers; the existence of wide, unconquered areas where the t r i b e s were free to attack Russian i n t e r i o r l i n e s of communication had raised serious d i f f i c u l t i e s during 1853-56; and forces amounting to three armies were concentrated i n Chechnia and Daghestan f o r the purpose."1"19 The f i n a l reduction of the Murid resistance was s t i l l no easy task, however, despite the decline i n Shamil's popularity because of h i s i r o n rule and the devastations of twenty-five years which the people had suffered. Only i n the spring of 1859, when Shamil was reduced to 500 l o y a l supporters, did he surrender — to Prince Baryatinsky's army of ^0,000 men with forty-eight g u n s . 1 2 0 In the north-west, the Cherkess held out under th e i r leader, Mohammed Emir. But the 1 2 1 Cossack posts were pushed forward r e l e n t l e s s l y , and the t r i b e s -men were given the choice of s e t t l i n g on the p l a i n s or emigrating to Turkey. A few of the Cherkess adopted the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e and peopled the lower reaches of the Kuban, and about 7 0 , 0 0 0 crossed to Turkey; the m a j o r i t y , however, continued to f i g h t d e s p e r ately u n t i l 1 8 6 4 , when they were f o r c e d f i n a l l y t o c a p i t u l -ate to the Combined f o r c e s of the Grand Duke Michael. The Russian " r e s t o r i n g of order" i n the Northern Caucasus was c a r r i e d out wit h the utmost b r u t a l i t y . The Cherkess were d r i v e n from t h e i r mountains to the swampy shores of the 121 Black Sea, where thousands perished from m a l a r i a . The s u r v i v o r s , who „not u n n a t u r a l l y s t i l l resented the settlement of t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s by Cossacks and Russians from the great peasant mi g r a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from the emancipating of the serfs", were again given the choice of s e t t l i n g i n other parts of the 122 Empire or of emigrating to Turkey. The m a j o r i t y of the Cherkess chose the second " s o l u t i o n " , and, between l 8 6 l and 1 8 6 4 , between f i v e and s i x hundred thousand l e f t the Caucasus f o r 123 Turkey, J m a t r e k that one s e m i - o f f i c i a l Russian p u b l i c a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i z e d as "a calam i t y of such proportions [ a s ] has r a r e l y 1 2 4 b e f a l l e n humanity". Owing to s t a r v a t i o n , d i s e a s e , and the hardships of the journey, the c a s u a l t i e s of the d e p o r t a t i o n were enormous. In Chechnia and the eastern mountains, the T s a r i s t " p a c i f i c a t i o n " took the form of f o r c i b l e attempts to convert the Moslem tribesmen t o C h r i s t i a n i t y , the i n t r o d u c t i o n of corpor-a l punishment f o r minor offenses, burnings of v i l l a g e s , s e i z u r e s 122 of lands and their transfer into the hands of Russian o f f i c e r s and Cossacks, and complete disregard f o r l o c a l customs and 125 t r a d i t i o n s . J In the eastern mountains, too, there were transfers of population. Immediately after the conquest, the inhabitants of forty-four Chechen auls were expelled from t h e i r mountain homes onto the plains, where they could more e a s i l y be c o n t r o l l e d . 1 2 6 At the same time, the majority of the Karachays were driven from their plains into the mountains by the advancing waves of s e t t l e r s who came to take possession of their f o o t h i l l s : there, amid barren rocks, they l i v e d i n conditions of extreme 127 poverty, earning a scanty l i v i n g through nomadic cattle-breeding. Those Chechens who s t i l l proved to be rebe l l i o u s were also deport-ed to Turkey; i n 1865, seething with hatred over being forced out of t h e i r age-old mountain homes, many of the Chechens on the plains revolted. In the summer of 1865, about o n e - f i f t h of the entire Chechen population, about 1+0,000 people, were forced to leave f o r Turkey, where welcome was extended to them at the 128 express demand of the Russian government. Yet even these extreme measures did not solve the problem of the native population of the North Caucasus. The t r i b e s which remained proved to be constantly i n a state of un-r e s t , prepared at any time to come out i n force against their Russian masters. The Chechens, i n p a r t i c u l a r , who were the most numerous people l e f t i n the region af t e r the deportations of the early l860's, continued to demonstrate th e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with Russian r u l e , and to flame into r e v o l t at almost regular 123 i n t e r v a l s . And i n response to these expressions of hatred, the T s a r i s t government had no other solution to off e r except further repression. The Caucasus remained u n t i l 1917 under the adminis-t r a t i o n of a m i l i t a r y governor who, while formally c a l l e d a viceroy, was f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes a f u l l - f l e d g e d governor-general, wiibh the powers to employ any means f e l t necessary f o r the performance of h i s duty; to maintain order and suppress anti-government a c t i v i t y , he had the r i g h t to order arrests or 12 expulsions without any resort to courts or due processes of law. Even afte r the surrender of Shamil and the expulsion of the most v i t a l and h o s t i l e of the subject population, the Russians f e l t l on compelled to maintain very strong forces i n the Caucasus, J and to render the peoples quiescent only through coercion. The Russians did t r y to weaken the p o t e n t i a l l y active element i n the mountains by drafting the young men into the Russian army fo r service outside of t h e i r homeland, and, when mixed with Russian troops on the Turkish front, these proved to be excellent and r e l i a b l e s o l d i e r s . T h e r e were also, of course, important elements i n the population of the Northern Caucasus which were pro-Russian, and even larger numbers who were i n d i f f e r e n t to Russian r u l e . These included the land-owning class of Daghestan, a conservative element which had opposed the popular program of Shamil and sought Russian support f o r i t s p r i v i l e g e s , the Kabardans and the Ossetians, Russia's t r a d i t i o n a l a l l i e s , and the ever-increasing numbers of Russian, Cossack, and other s e t t l e r s who came to s e t t l e on the lands of the defeated peoples. 12k But Chechnia was always ready f o r r e v o l t . In 1877, with the outbreak of another war between Russia and Turkey, a c e r t a i n Hadji A l i Bey proclaimed himself imam, and "the wild Chechens brought out the muskets they had buried twenty years b e f o r e " . T h e r e v o l t was quickly suppressed, within a f o r t -night, but the Russian governor was not s a t i s f i e d and sent columns of troops into the heart of Chechnia, demanding the surrender of a l l the rebels. These punitive columns only pro-voked more resistance, however, and the disorders spread to neighbouring Daghestan and thereby prevented any further dispatch of Russian reinforcements to the Turkish front. The r i s i n g s drew upon the Chechens executions, the burning of more v i l l a g e s , and the destruction of t h e i r c r o p s . A f t e r the war came to a close, hundreds of f a m i l i e s , including whole t r i b e s which had r e b e l l e d against Russian r u l e , were forced to migrate from their mountain homes to the f l a t , cold regions of the north. The greater number of these were allowed, however, to return to t h e i r homes i n 1881, by the new Tsar, Alexander I I I . 1 ^ The m i l i t a r y service law of l8?k, when i t was extended to include the inhabitants of the Caucasus i n 1886, although i t temporarily exempted the Moslems from their f i f t e e n years' com-pulsory service, provoked more unrest among the Chechens, even as i t d i d i n Crimea. The Chechens showed their unwillingness to serve i n the armies of the Tsar: The government merely had demanded of these highlanders a l i s t of t h e i r f a m i l i e s ; the majority of the auls 125 ( v i l l a g e s ) refused to give i t , fearing l e s t they might be supplying a census to be used i n drafting r e c r u i t s . Some talked of going over to Turkey with t h e i r f a m i l i e s , stock, and chatte l s ; others announced the coming of a new imam, who was to take command of the true believers. To overcome t h e i r c r e d u l i t y and stubborness, an expedi-t i o n consisting of ten battalions had to be dispatched into the wilds. A Russian monograph, published i n 1894, said that the Chechens could not yet be considered f u l l y p a c i f i e d , and that numbers of them s t i l l looked across to Turkey, whither they dreamed of e m i g r a t i n g . 1 ^ there were further outbreaks of violence among the Chechens i n 1898 and 1906.^ i n 1898, an attempt was made on the l i f e of the viceroy, Prince Golitsyn, i n r e p r i s a l f o r h i s extensive interference with l o c a l customs and the Moslem f a i t h . A t t a c k s were made by the Chechens on the Orthodox missionaries who, with government backing, were carrying out an intensive campaign of pr o s e l y t i z i n g among the native v i l l a g e r s , and once more Russian troops had to be used to pacify the region. In 1906, as an aftermath of the 1905 Revolution, the Chechens again swooped down upon the Russian and Cossack settlements, i n an e f f o r t to win back by armed force the lands they considered 139 to be t h e i r s by inheritance. Again, the only answer was armed force and r e p r i s a l . I t i s true that the Chechens represent a most extreme example of continued r e c a l c i t r a n c e , and i t i s perhaps a moot 126 point whether any measures could have been taken by the T s a r i s t regime to ameliorate their treatment and to reconcile them to Russian r u l e . The treatment accorded to the Chechens, however, was l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t from that accorded to the Ingushes, Kara-chays, Balkars, or any of those peoples who took part i n the Moslem-resistance to Russia. None of these were given any reason to f e e l anything but hatred toward the Russians. The Chechens were, i n 1911*, the poorest people i n the whole Northern Caucasus, with average land allotments of only 8.1 acres, while the Ingushes, the next poorest, averaged only 15.76 acres. Along with the Karachays and Balkars, and numerous smaller peoples, they eked out a bare l i v i n g on t h e i r t i n y rocky p l o t s , concentrating their hatred on the Russian troops, the s e t t l e r s of t h e i r old lands, and, around the turn of the century, on the landless proletarians who were now beginning to arrive i n increasing numbers to work i n the developing North Caucasus o i l industry centred around Grozny i L - l and Maikop. These so-called inogorodtsy, an urban element, added to the general h o s t i l i t y i n the Northern Caucasus, d i s l i k -ing both the native t r i b e s and the Cossacks, the former because they were natives, and the Cossacks f o r th e i r p r i v i l e g e s , their wealth, and their readiness to help the government stamp out popular resistance against absolutism. The Chechens and their fellows of the Northern Caucasus i l l u s t r a t e the complete bankruptcy of T s a r i s t n a t i o n a l i t y p o l i c i e s . No attempt ever was made to win th e i r support f o r , or even th e i r acceptance of, Russian r u l e . Even those r i g h t s which 127 they were supposedly guaranteed as inorodtsy were consistently v i o l a t e d by th e i r Russian administrators, either d e l i b e r a t e l y or inadvertently because knowledge of native languages and rig h t s was rare among the members of the T s a r i s t bureaucracy. The Chechens and the other North Caucasians who took part i n the Murid Wars were always treated by the T s a r i s t regime as savages and as criminals, when i n f a c t they were neither. They were systematically persecuted and exploited, u n t i l hatred and h o s t i l i t y toward the regime were bred into them through the generations. They were c l e a r l y regarded as unassimilable by the Russian government, and, i n consequence, were treated as perpet-ual enemies of the State. The T s a r i s t p o l i c i e s of repression and coercion, with t h e i r deportations and other savage measures, did not solve the problem of the Chechens and the other peoples of the Northern Caucasus. The Chechens, i n p a r t i c u l a r , with a b i r t h - r a t e abnormally high for the Empire, merely waited f o r t h e i r opportunity to drive out the soldiers of the "Russian Tsar and to reclaim t h e i r lands from h i s s e t t l e r s . The immediate r e s u l t of T s a r i s t p o l i c i e s i n the North Caucasus was a kind of uneasy truce imposed through armed force and suppression of the native t r i b e s ; but the long-term e f f e c t was to leave a legacy of bitterness and hatred which was to carry over into the Soviet regime. 128 Notes: II i P.E. Kazansky, V l a s t 1 vserossiiskovo imperatora (Odessa: 1913, P« 39, c i t e d i n G.T. Robinson, "Part IV Review", i n Ernest J. Simmons, ed., Continuity and Change i n Russian and  Soviet Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), P» o F. Bulgarin, Rossiya v istoricheskom. statisticheskom,  geograficheskom i literatumom otnosheniyakh. Ruchnaya kniga  diya russikh vsekh s o s l o v l i . History, part h (St. Petersburg: 1837), pp. 291-3, c i t e d i n Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and O f f i c i a l N ationality i n Russia. 1825-55 (Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1959), p. 77• ^Pares, op. c i t . , p. $hh. L Hugh Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1911+ (New York: Praeger, 1952), p. 12. ^Riasanovsky, op. c i t . , pp. 185-6. 6Leroy-Beaulieu, op. c i t . , I l l , p. 510. ^Pares, op. c i t . , p. 218. 8 *"" Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-23 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 195^), p. 6. 9 C f . i b i d . I t should be noted that Mr. Pipes i s more ce r t a i n that the question of r e l i g i o n had ceased to play any very s i g n i f i c a n t part i n influencing o f f i c i a l attitudes toward the minorities of the Russian Empire during the nineteenth century than i s the present writer. 1 0F.H. Skrine, The Expansion of Russia (Cambridge: University Press, 1903;-,: p. 122. "^Riasanovsky, op. c i t . , pp. 8J+-5. 12 Leroy-Beaulieu, op. c i t . , I I I , pp. 501-11, passim. "^The Uniate or Greek Catholic Church was founded i n the closing years of the sixteenth century, i n an e f f o r t to unite with Rome the Orthodox population under P o l i s h r u l e . I t recognized papal authority but, at the same time, retained the Eastern r i t e and allowed i t s services to be conducted i n the native languages of i t s adherents. lh Pipes, op. c i t . , p. 3. 129 • ^ I p i a . ^Leroy-Beaulieu, op, c i t . . I l l , p. 510. 1 7 F o r the following summary of the views of Pobyedono-stsev, I am indebted to the a r t i c l e by Robert Byrnes, "Pobyedonostsev and the Instruments of Government", i n Simmons, op. c i t . , pp. 113-25, passim. l 8Seton-Watson, op. c i t . , p. 3*+5 Kolarz, op. c i t . , p. 69. 1 9 I b i d . , p. 70. 2 0Leroy-Beaulieu, op. c i t . , I, p. 47. 2 1 E . Schmid, Die Deutschen Bauern i n Suedrussland ( B e r l i n : 1917), PP. 31-2, c i t e d i n Kolarz, l o c . c i t . PP Seton-Watson, l o c . c i t . 2 3 I b i d . , p. 35. Kolarz, l o c . c i t . 2^Seton-Watson, l o c . . c i t . of Kolarz, pp. c i t . , p. 70. 2 7Seton-Watson, op. c i t . , p. 34. 2 ^ C f . Marc Slonin, kn Outline of Russian Literature (New York: Mentor Books, 1959), p. 92. Slonin also c r e d i t s Danilevsky with having introduced the notion of national " c u l t u r a l types" l a t e r taken up and developed by Oswald Spengler. 2 9G.P. Danilevsky, Sochineniya, 9th ed. (St. Petersburg, 1902), I I , p. 123. 3°Ivan Goncharov, Oblomov, trans. David Margarshack (Great B r i t a i n : Penguin Books, 1954). •^Leroy-Beaulieu, loc. c i t . 3 2 P a r e s , op. c i t . , p. 386. 3 3 I b i d . ^ K o l a r z , op. c i t . , p. 71. 3^Pares, op. c i t . , p. 393-130 3 6Kolarz, l o c . c i t . 37 pp. 161-2. 48 Ibid. 3^Skrine, op. c i t . , p. 186. 3%chmid, i n Kolarz, op. c i t . , p. 70. ^ P a r e s , op. c i t . , pp. 323-4. ^ I b i d . , pp. 374-6. 4? Leroy-Beaulieu, l o c . c i t . l f 3 I b i d . ^ I b i d . , I I I , p. 513. ^ I b i d . , p. 450; cf. Seton-Watson, op. c i t . , p. 29. s p a r e s , op. c i t . , pp. 428-9; Seton-Watson, op. c i t . , ** 7Ibid., p. 305. Ibid. spares, pp. c i t . , p. 427. ^°Robert W . Coonrod, "The Duma's Attitude Toward War-time Problems of Minority Groups", The American Sla v i c and East Euro-pean Review, XIII (1954), p, 29. ^ K o l a r z , op. c i t . , pp. 71-2. 5 2Ibid., p. 76. 53pf. i b i d , and Pipes, op. c i t . , p. 12. There i s wide disagreement on thi s estimate between these two authors. Kolarz states that the Crimean Tatars numbered about one m i l l i o n at this time, while Pipes estimates one-half that number. 54 J Kolarz, l o c . c i t . "^Cf. i b i d . , p. 77, and Conquest, op. c i t . , p. 44. -^Kolarz, l o c . c i t . ^ 7 I b i d . 5 8 I b i d . 131 ^ 9The bulk of the l i t e r a t u r e on this question which i s available i s the work of members of the anti-Russian or anti-Soviet emigrations and does not admit, or dismisses without discussion, even the p o s s i b i l i t y that the Russian government had legitimate reasons for regarding the Crimean Tatars with some suspicion. Nor are Soviet sources more reasonable. As I have argued here, the attitudes and actions of the Crimean Tatars themselves were not the l e a s t of the reasons for the measures against them taken by the T s a r i s t regime. 6°Bolshaya Sovyetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1st ed. (Moscow: 1937), 35, c i t e d i n Conquest, l o c . c i t . 6 lSerge A. Zenkovsky, "A Century of Tatar Revival", ' The American Sla v i c and East European Review. XII (1953), PP' 303-18; Seton-Watson, op. c i t . , p. fol 6 2 The reference here i s to the a c t i v i t i e s of Ilminsky, a f r i e n d of Pobyedonostsev and professor of Oriental languages, who encouraged the study of the Turkic languages of the Volga-Ural region i n the l850's with the aim of perpetuating every possible element of d i v e r s i t y and i n this way removing the smaller ethnic and l i n g u i s t i c groups from the orbi t of Volga Tatar i n -fluence. To further t h i s end, he also encouraged the use of the C y r i l l i c , rather than the Arabic, alphabet f o r publications i n these languages. ^ K o l a r z , op. c i t . , pp. 77-8. 6 I f I b i d . , p. 78. 65 -'Pipes, l o c . c i t . 6 6 I b i d . 6 7 I b i d . , p. 189. 68 S.A. Usovy, Istoriko-ekonomicheskiye ocherki Kryma (Simferopol: 1925), P. 69, c i t e d i b i d . 6 9 V e s ' Krvm, 1920-25 (Simferopol: 1926), pp. 65 f f . , c i t e d i b i d . 7 0 Kolarz, l o c . c i t . 71 Seton-Watson, l o c . c i t . 7 2Zenkovsky, pp. c i t . , passim. 73pipes, op. c i t . , p. 13. 7 l*Ibid. 132 7^Seton-Watson, l g c ^ ^ c i t . 7 6Zenkovsky, op. c i t . , p. 3 l 4 . 7 7 P i p e s , l o c . c i t . 7 8Seton-Watson, op. c i t . , p. 163. 7 9Pipes,. l o c . c i t . 8 0Seton-Watson, OP. c i t . , p. 164. 8 l I b i d . 8 2 I b i d . , pp. 163-4; Zenkovsky, pp. c i t . , P- 316". 8 3 I b i d . 8 l fPipes, l o c . c i t . 8 5 ? a r e s , op. c i t . , PP- 426-7. f 8 6Leroy-Beaulieu, op. c i t . , H I , P« 582. 8 7Seton-Watson, op. c i t . , p. 164. 8 8Seree k. Zenkovsky, "Kulturkampf i n ^ - R e v o l u t i o n a r y Central A s i a % K e ^ ^ ^ ™ (1955), P. 31. 8 9 K o l a r z , op. c i t . , p. 82. 9°Pipes, OP. c i t . , p. 3* 9 1 I b i d . 9 2 K o l a r z , op. c i t . , P» 83. 9 3 I b i d . ^Conquest, op. c i t . , p. 37. 9^Leroy-Beaulieu, pp. c i t . , I, p. 80. 9 6 I b i d . , I l l , P. 584. 9 7 P a r e s , OP. c i t . , p. 427. 9 8 K o l a r z , l o c . c i t . " i b i d . 1 0 0 L e r o y - B e a u l i e u , op. c i t . , I, p. 79* 133 1 0 1 K o l a r z , l o c . c i t . 1 Q 2 I b i d . 1 0%ume, op. c i t . . pp. 59-82, passim. 1 0 l +Conquest, op. c i t . , p. 6; A l l e n and Muratoff, OP. c i t . . p. k?. 1 0^John F. Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus (London: 1908), p. 108, c i t e d i n Kolarz, op. c i t . , p. 187. 1 0 6 A l l e n and Muratoff, op. c i t . , p. kO. 1 0 7 I b i d . , p. k7. 1 0 8 K o l a r z , OP. c i t . . pp. 181-2. 1 Q 9 C f . i b i d , and Conquest, op. c i t . , pp. 1 1 0 A l l e n and Muratoff, OP. c i t . , p. 50. 1 1 : LConquest, op. c i t . , pp. 17-18. P. 231. i b i d . 1 1 2 S k r i n e , op. c i t . , p. 122; Riasanovsky, op. c i t . , " ^ A l l e n and Muratoff, 00. c i t . , p. 51. l l l + S k r i n e , op. c i t . , p. 131+. 1 1 ^ I b i d . l l 6 A l l e n and Muratoff, op. c i t . , p. ^9. 1 1 7 S k r i n e , op. c i t . , p. 156. l l 8 A l l e n and Muratoff, op. c i t . , p. 59. 1 1 9 I b i d . , p. 106. 1 2 Q I b i d . , p. 107. 1 2 1 S k r i n e , op. c i t . , p. 229. 1 2 2 A l l e n and Muratoff, l o c . c i t . 1 2 3 l b i d . . p. 108; Kolarz, op. c i t . , p. 182. 1 2 \ a v k a z s k y Sbornik ( T i f l i s : 1877), I I , p. ^57, c i t e d 125 ^R. Adighe, "Literature on Daghestan and Its People", The Caucasian Review. IV (1957), p. 105. 1 2 6 K o l a r z , pp. c i t . , p. 186. 1 2 7 I b i d . , p. 190. 1 2 8 I b i d . , p. 186. 1 2 9 P i p e s , OP. c i t . , p. h. ^ A l l e n and Muratoff, op. c i t . , p. 130. 1 3 1 I b i d . ^ I b i d . 1 3 3 c o n q U e s t , op. c i t . , p. 18. -^Leroy-Beaulieu, op. c i t . , III,, pp. **05-6. 1 3 ^ I b i d . , p. 582. ^ K o l a r z , l o c . c i t . 1 3 7R. Traho, "Circassians" (Munich: 1956), p. 57 c i t e d i n Adighe, l o c . c i t . 1 3 8 P a r e s , op. c i t . , p. ^31. 1 3 < 7Conquest, l o c . c i t . l I f 0V.P. Pozhidaev, Gortsy Severnovo Kavkaza (Mosc Leningrad: 1926), c i t e d i n Pipes, op. c i t . , p. 95. ^ K o l a i l l + 2Pipe£ op. c i t . , p. l o c . c i t . op. c i t . , p. I l l i This i s not the place to chronicle i n any d e t a i l events i n the Russian Empire i n the years immediately prior to World War I. Nor i s i t the place to describe the minutiae of Russia's involvement i n the War, the complex combinations of circumstances leading up to the stunning collapse of the T s a r i s t autocracy i n 1917) or the singular drama of the collapse i t s e l f . A l l of these have been well described elsewhere. However, i t does seem d e s i r -able to note at thi s juncture at l e a s t one or two s a l i e n t facts germane to these events, before any discussion of Bolshevik p o l i c y should be undertaken. It should be noted, f i r s t of a l l , that the years between the Revolution of 1905 and the outbreak of World War I were f o r T s a r i s t Russia years of almost unparalleled material prosperity and economic growth, years during which the flame of revolution which had burned so brightly i n 1905 seemed to gutter and temporarily to die. For with the increase i n material prosperity during these years came a general lessening i n opposition to the T s a r i s t regime and a general increase i n s a t i s f a c t i o n with the status quo. There was at le a s t a wider acceptance of things as they were. And with t h i s acceptance of the established order, i t s e l f informed by a growth i n the national wealth of the Empire, came also a marked increase i n Russian nationalism and patriotism. Second, and t h i s point i s c o r o l l a r y to the foregoing, few of the leaders of the various Russian revolutionary parties were at t h i s time optimistic 1 3 6 concerning t h e i r chances for success; and probably fewer s t i l l even dared to hope that the beginning of World War I would i n future be reckoned as the beginning of the end f o r the i n s t i t u t i o n of Tsardom, that i n less than three years the ancient and seeming-l y immutable Russian autocracy would crash ignominiously into dust. These points are raised only to draw attention to the fa c t that the basic document fo r Soviet n a t i o n a l i t y policy was conceived and drawn up at the very time when i t s prospects f o r ever being actually r e a l i z e d were at the i r most bleak, when the ess e n t i a l conditions prerequisite to revolution seemed impossible of attainment u n t i l some time i n the distant future. Marxism and  the National Question, written during the winter of 1 9 1 2 - 1 3 and published under the name of S t a l i n , r e f l e c t s , however, the importance which the Bolsheviks attached to the national question at t h i s time, and also indicates t h e i r r e a l i z a t i o n of the urgency to put forward a d e f i n i t e and concrete national program. For i n f a c t , while i n Russia i t s e l f a period of unprecedented prosperity had resulted i n a c e r t a i n measure of complacency and s a t i s f a c t i o n among the general run of the population, at the same time contributing to extremely heightened fe e l i n g s of nationalism and patriotism, and while these developments had seemed to ecli p s e temporarily the prospect of revolution, the s i t u a t i o n i n many of the non-Russian parts of the Empire, i n the borderlands, was f a s t moving i n a contrary d i r e c t i o n . The tensions which had always existed between Russian "masters" and the subject peoples of the 137 Empire were heightening increasingly. A general r i s e i n national consciousness among the minorities had been noticeable since at le a s t 1905) due not only to continued Imperial p o l i c i e s of national oppression and forced r u s s i f i c a t i o n , but also due to increased Russian economic e x p l o i t a t i o n of the borderlands and consequent large influxes of Russian farmers, workers, and o f f i c i a l s into these areas, and had fostered a remarkable acceleration i n the founding and spread of coherent national movements. I t has been seen how Gasprinsky's pan-Turkic movement, fo r example, had grown from i t s modest beginnings among the few members of the Crimean Tatar i n t e l l i g e n t s i a to spread, acquiring regional and l o c a l mutations as i t did so, to v i r t u a l l y a l l of the Tatar groups of the Empire, and even outside the Empire. If the example of the Crimean Tatars can i n no way be considered t y p i -c a l , i t must be r e c a l l e d that t h e i r national movement was not unique, but had much i n common with other, similar movements among many peoples. I t s p r i n c i p a l d i s t i n c t i v e t r a i t i n comparison to the movements s t i r r i n g among many of the other peoples of Russia lay only i t s e a r l i e r and f u l l e r development. In many of the borderlands, e s p e c i a l l y those where the i n t e r e s t s of the national minorities came into c o n f l i c t with the in t e r e s t s of ethnic Russians, the bearers of a new and heightened Russian nationalism, there had been a profound increase i n national oppression, which i s the chief motivating force, probably, for any national movement. There were enormously wide differences, of course, i n 1 3 8 the extent to which national consciousness was developed among the various minorities of the Russian Empire before 191k, and manifold v a r i a t i o n s i n the directions toward which d i f f e r e n t national movements pointed and strove. The Poles and Finns, to take extreme examples at one end of the scale, were already-self-contained nations with concrete and well-defined national programs for complete l i b e r a t i o n , extending even to demands f o r separate and independent statehood. On the other hand, however, and i n sharp contrast to the Poles and Finns, the bulk of the minorities of the Empire were much les s advanced. The Ukrainians and Byelorussians, f o r example, while cherishing t h e i r own d i s t i n c t i v e languages and national t r a d i t i o n s , had absorbed a substantial amount of Russian culture through th e i r centuries of f a m i l i a r contacts, and possessed i n general neither strong consciousness of their differences nor much i n t e r e s t i n the question of t h e i r possible independent statehood. Their national movements, as the events of the Revolution and the C i v i l Mar were to demonstrate convincingly, were i n f i n i t e l y more verbal than viable. Confined as they were i n each case to a single extreme-l y rabid and vocal stratum of the population, t h e i r national i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , these national movements had by 19lk sunk only a few tenuous roots into the broad culture of t h e i r peoples. As regards.the rest of the peoples of the Empire—the multitude of smaller, non-Slavic minorities for the most p a r t — i t i s d i f f i c u l t to generalize about them. Many lacked even the germinal national consciousness of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, i n the vast 139 majority of cases because they lacked also any class which could, be described as a national i n t e l l i g e n t s i a . Many others stood f o r nothing more than a vague bettering of their conditions of l i f e , and possessed no cogent national aspirations. Others,' l i k e the Crimean Tatars, were highly developed. But unlike the Crimean Tatars, most of the minority peoples, where the i r demands were at a l l cogent and well-defined, and where there existed an a r t i c u l a t e and conscious stratum to voice these demands, were over-whelmingly i n favour of some form of self-government or autonomy within the existing state structure, r a r e l y desirous of independ-ent statehood f o r themselves, and interested generally only i n the ameliorating of some s p e c i f i c conditions of s o c i a l or economic inequality. A l l the same, i t would be a serious error to render only s l i g h t importance to the national ferment among the peoples of Russia i n the years immediately preceding World War I. The vagueness and inchoateness of th e i r national aspirations and desiderata should not be allowed to obscure the indisputable f a c t that the majority of these peoples were awakening and s t i r r i n g p o l i t i c a l l y — e v e n though t h e i r national consciousness was s t i l l most often i n an i n c i p i e n t stage. It i s r a r e l y that a national movement springs f u l l blown and f u l l y developed into l i f e ; almost i n v a r i a b l y , p o l i t i c a l movements have their najssance i n s o c i a l or c u l t u r a l movements, movements originating i n the demands of minorities for rig h t s denied to them: such things as 1^ 0 the r i g h t s to their national languages, schools, r e l i g i o n s , customs, and so on. Demands of these kinds were being heard ever more frequently and more audibly, throughout the borderlands of the Empire e s p e c i a l l y , during the pre-1911+ decade, and were voiced most vociferously i n those regions which already possessed, or were i n the process of acquiring, considerable Russian or other Sl a v i c populations. In those areas, where the Russian newcomer was almost invar i a b l y favoured i n countless ways over the indigenous inhabitant, the mere opportunity for the l a t t e r to compare and contrast h i s s i t u a t i o n with that of the Russian gave r i s e n a t u r a l l y to the question of equality of r i g h t s . Where that indigenous inhabitant was discriminated against or exploited because of h i s race, colour, or creed, h i s reaction most frequent-l y took the palpable form of defensive anti-Russianism. I t i s d i f f i c u l t , of course, to gauge even approximately the extent to which national movements among any peoples are informed by t h i s negative aspect of national f e e l i n g ; but at the same time i t cannot be doubted that the national movements of the peoples of the Russian Empire were with few exceptions compounded l a r g e l y from some type of Russophobia. The problem at hand, however, i s neither nationalism i n general nor nationalism among the peoples of the Russian Empire. The i n t e r e s t here i s i n seven p a r t i c u l a r peoples of the Empire. If i t may be assumed that national consciousness among a l l these stemmed at least p a r t l y from anti-Russian sentiment--if t h i s could be said to be the condition common to a l l of the i r national ll+l movements--it may be advisable to survey summarily same of the other conditions informing t h e i r national consciousness, and to note b r i e f l y so f a r as i s possible to what extent t h e i r national consciousness was developed at the beginning of World War I. I t has been remarked e a r l i e r how the Crimean Tatars, who at the outset of their l i f e under Russian rule had been expelled from their choice and productive coastal locations, and then l a t e r gradually deprived even of their marginal inland farms as Russian and other settlement i n Crimea increased, had become increasingly poverty-stricken and d i s s a t i s f i e d ; i t has also been seen how th e i r p o l i t i c a l r e v i v a l began as a c u l t u r a l r e v i v a l , i n large measure as a means of c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - h e l p , as a healthy response to their threatened national a n n i h i l a t i o n , which drew upon both th e i r t r a d i t i o n of education and modern ideologies, and how i t became i n time transformed through the creative genius of Gasprinsky Into a v i t a l and dynamic force with p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , and economic connotations. O r i g i n a l l y stimulated by a negative, anti-Russian matrix, i t developed into a po s i t i v e and organic national movement, then i n t o a supra-national, pan-Turkic movement possessing enormous p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . At the outbreak of World War I, p o l i t i c a l l i f e among the Russian Moslems showed three p r i n c i p a l tendencies; on the extreme r i g h t were the r e l i g i o u s groups, comprised of the orthodox Moslem clergy and the wealthiest elements of Moslem society, generally conservative i n views; the centre group was l i b e r a l , westernized, and i n p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l ideologies quite c l o s e l y associated Ik2 with the Russian Kadets; and on the l e f t were the young Moslem i n t e l l e c t u a l s , westernized and secularized l i k e the l i b e r a l s , but strongly imbued also with the ideas of s o c i a l i s m . 1 Among the Crimean Tatars, i t was the l a t t e r group, the left-wing i n t e l l e c t u a l s , which predominated, possessing an advanced p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l program roughly comparable to that of Russian S o c i a l Revolutionaries, and intensely n a t i o n a l i s t i c , strongly i n favour of separatism. The Crimean Tatars were exceptional, however, among the peoples of the Russian borderlands to the East and South: exceptional i n their geographical, h i s t o r i c a l , and c u l t u r a l proximity to Western influences and ideas, i n their inherent, deeply-rooted t r a d i t i o n of education, and i n the i r possessing of an outstanding i n d i v i d u a l l i k e Gasprinsky to activate and to channel t h e i r resources. Few of the peoples of the Russian Empire were either as vigorous or progressive as the Crimean Tatars, and c e r t a i n l y none of the other s i x who are the special province of t h i s study approached them i n the sphere of p o l i t i c a l s o phistication. Nevertheless, to repeat, i t would be erroneous to assume that national f e e l i n g was not at lea s t embryonic among these other peoples, whether i t manifested i t s e l f only as a kind of negative and defensive cohesiveness, whether i t was found i n a r e l i g i o u s guise, or whether i t was masqueraded i n some other form not r e a d i l y recognizeable as national f e e l i n g at a l l . National f e e l i n g assumes many forms and seeks a multitude of channels of expression. 143 Among the mountain tr i b e s of the North Caucasus, for example, national consciousness was based very l a r g e l y upon t h e i r community of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f compounded with the most rabid form of anti-Russianism and an ancient t r a d i t i o n of implacable resistance to outside invaders. When World War I began, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , less than sixt y years had elapsed since the surrender of Shamil. The t r a d i t i o n s and legends of h i s epic struggle against the Russians s t i l l l i v e d i n the minds of h i s countrymen ' and c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s , nourished and r e v i t a l i z e d from time to time by new uprisings and ra i d s . The doctrines of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism had made some progress i n the mountains, s p e c i f i c a l l y among those mullahs who were accustomed to v i s i t the holy places of t h e i r r e l i g i o n i n Turkey, and also among some of the more progressive i n t e l l e c t u a l s who r e a l i z e d both the dynamism and p the need of wider associations. But i n Chechnia and i n Dagestan, the dominating factor was undoubtedly the p r i e s t l y class of mullahs who, i n c i d e n t a l l y , comprised no les s than 4 per cent, of the population. 3 And though i t was manifested i n national form, the fever which burnt i n the North Caucasus was i n f a c t r e l i g i o u s fever, the Muridism of Shamil which stressed the role of the God-appointed. Imam, or s p i r i t u a l leader, who exercised complete control over h i s followers. The mountain tribes embraced, not only the r i g h t wing of Moslem p o l i t i c a l l i f e , but the extreme r i g h t wing; their hatred was not only of things Russian, but of things western: As a matter of f a c t [wrote a leading Communist of Dages-tan, describing the doctrines of the Moslems i n the 1 4 4 North Caucasus} there i s no o p p o s i t i o n on the part of the c l e r i c a l i n t e l l i g e n t s i a to the Soviet power as the bearer of Communism . . . The c l e r i c a l i n t e l l i g e n t s i a of Dagestan looks upon the Soviet power not as Commun- i s t i c but as a t h e i s t i c and as the bearer of western c i v i l i z a t i o n — ' t h e s i n f u l , the a c c u r s e d ' — . . . A l l European c i v i l i z a t i o n i s the i n v e n t i o n of the D e v i l , whether i t takes the form of c a p i t a l i s m or of commun-ism . . . and h o s t i l i t y t o European c i v i l i z a t i o n i s a phenomenon more complicated than any mere r e l i g i o s i t y and one f a r more d i f f i c u l t t o deal w i t h . ^ I r r e c o n c i l a b l e hatred of everything European and e v e r y t h i n g Russian, hatred i n s p i r e d not only t h e o l o g i c a l l y , but tempered also by v i v i d memories of savage warfare, c r u e l r e p r i s a l s , mass t r a n s f e r s of whole populations, and s e i z u r e s of l a n d s : i n the North Caucasus, only the opportunity was l a c k i n g f o r the f a n a t i c a l tribesmen t o come out once more en masse against the Cossack and Russian e x p r o p r i a t o r s . Not n a t i o n a l i s m i n a modern form, perhaps; but a k i n d of p a t h o l o g i c a l , or even z o o l o g i c a l , n a t i o n a l i s m . Not a d e l i b e r a t e l y i n g r a i n e d and a r t i f i c i a l l y s t i m u lated movement; but f u l l y as v o l a t i l e and as v i o l e n t , and i n f i n i t e l y more n a t u r a l , bred i n t o the bone, so to speak. For the Chechens and Ingushes, peace was only a time between wars so long as the Russian remained on t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . For the Karachays and B a l k a r s , though l e s s s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by Muridism, fewer i n number, and more a c c e s s i b l e of a t t a c k , the bond of Islam, 1 4 5 nevertheless, a n d hatred of a common foe, dictated t h e i r support fo r any r i s i n g by the i r fellows. The way of l i f e of the Kalmyks had not altered appreciably f o r centuries. Their wholly conservative t r a d i t i o n , which has been remarked upon e a r l i e r , proved to be an e f f e c t i v e discouragement to the taking hold of new ideas among them. Reflecting not only the e s s e n t i a l l y life-denying precepts of thei r Zonkavist Buddhism, which scorned the external world and accepted the most harsh conditions as the immutable companions and c o r o l l a r i e s of l i f e , but also t h e i r physical i s o l a t i o n on thei r cis-Caspian steppes, and the i r almost invariable experience of evinced h o s t i l i t y from their European and Turkic neighbours, t h i s inherent conservatism served as an ef f i c a c i o u s prophylactic i n preventing the implanting of modern s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l ideologies. But i f i t patently r e f l e c t e d the a t t r a c t i o n of the outside world i n negative terms—remarkably few Kalmyks, even Kalmyk nobles who had ready access to the upper echelons of Russian society, deserted either t h e i r nation or t h e i r r e l i g i o n during t h e i r centuries of contact with the Russians, despite , a l l the blandishments and coercions of the T s a r i s t missionary and a d m i n i s t r a t o r — i t must be assumed that t h i s t r a d i t i o n also acted i n a positive way to heighten the f e e l i n g of Kalmyk nation-a l i d e n t i t y , that i t fostered i n the breast of the i n d i v i d u a l Kalmyk an innate sense of the T i g h t n e s s of his society as he knew i t , even as i t made him regard the environing outside world, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Russian world, as the manifestation of a complete misunderstanding of the whole meaning of l i f e . Perhaps a l l the 146 foregoing adds up only to the f a c t that the Kalmyks r e j e c t e d Russian c i v i l i z a t i o n simply because of i t s e s s e n t i a l l y w o r l d l y s p i r i t , that they d i d not i n f a c t understand i t . But i n the p a s s i v i t y of the Kalmyks to the aggressiveness of the Russian Tsar, the e x p l o i t i n g by h i s s u b j e c t s , and the a c t i v e p r o s e l y t i z i n g by h i s m i s s i o n a r i e s , there would also seem to have r e s i d e d a pride of a c e r t a i n k i n d , the pride of the weak and r i g h t e o u s when confronted by an overwhelmingly s t r o n g e r — b u t completely m i s g u i d e d — a d v e r s a r y : a p r i d e of h u m i l i t y , perhaps. C e r t a i n l y , i t would seem to have been the case t h a t the more v i c i o u s and more punishing the measures taken against them, i n the e f f o r t to d e n a t i o n a l i z e them, the more stubbornly and implacably the Kalmyks nurtured t h e i r group i d e n t i t y , even t a k i n g a kind of p r i d e — a l b e i t a perverse, defensive, kind of p r i d e — i n the i m m u t a b i l i t y of t h e i r ancient i n s t i t u t i o n s . The simple t r u t h would appear to be that when a n a t i o n i s persecuted, i t s r e a c t i o n w i l l u n f a i l i n g l y redound to i t s n a t i o n a l m a t r i x . Few of the m i n o r i t i e s of the Russian Empire were so c o n s i s t e n t l y badgered as the Kalmyks, so u n r e m i t t i n g l y subjected t o n a t i o n a l oppression; t h e i r g r a z i n g lands occupied by Europeans, t h e i r f l o c k s and herds decimated, t h e i r r e l i g i o u s f a i t h beheaded and p r o s e l y t i z e d u n m e r c i f u l l y , e f f e c t i v e l y o s t r a c i z e d and confined to areas without access to water and fishing-grounds, the Kalmyks l i t e r a l l y were compressed i n t o a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n a t i o n . I f t h e i r expressed n a t i o n a l ambitions were minimal, embracing only a d e s i r e f o r the most modest form of n a t i o n a l autonomy, an end to Russian oppression, and c e r t a i n economic concessions necessary to insure t h e i r v i a b i l i t y 147 as a national group, t h i s was s o l e l y because of the severe l i m i t a t i o n s and circumscriptions which the si n g u l a r l y conserva-t i v e t r a d i t i o n and h i s t o r i c a l circumstances of the Kalmyks imposed upon their p o l i t i c a l horizons. The Kalmyk t r a d i t i o n , so powerfully conditioned by r e l i g i o u s precepts, and the Kalmyk experience, so e s s e n t i a l l y unsophisticated, simply did not countenance or comprehend any ideas of r a d i c a l p o l i t i c a l or s o c i a l change. The Kalmyks were reactionaries i n the proper sense of that word, i n that they sought not merely to r e t a i n the status quo, but actually to restore the status quondam. I f the Kalmyk national t r a d i t i o n thus l i m i t e d i t s peoples' p o l i t i c a l goals, i t nevertheless, and at the same time, was the centre from which a l l Kalmyk national f e e l i n g radiated and drew sustenance. Living almost e n t i r e l y unto themselves, p a r t i c i p a t i n g l i t t l e i n the l i f e of their adopted country, the Volga Germans, l i k e the Kalmyks, also exhibited remarkable national cohesiveness and exclusiveness. Except i n the economic sphere, the Volga Germans for generations steadfastly refused to integrate themselves int o the Russian community; from the time of t h e i r f i r s t coming to Russia, c u l t u r a l l y , s o c i a l l y , and p o l i t i c a l l y they remained a c l e a r l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d national community of t h e i r own. But un-l i k e the Kalmyks and the host of non-European national minorities who comprised the Russian Empire, and whose nationalism was i n large measure derived from the f a c t they were oppressed minorities whose.very su r v i v a l depended upon some form of common action, the ll+8 Volga Germans were u n t i l very recently a highly p r i v i l e g e d minority whose sense of national i d e n t i t y would appear to have been nurtured and stimulated by the f a c t of the i r superior p o s i t i o n i n Russian s o c i e t y — a p o s i t i o n which was i n f i n i t e l y superior to that of any other national minority, and to that of most of the Russian population as well. Only i n the three or four decades immediately preceding World War I did the Volga Germans begin to f e e l the weight of national oppression, and even then to an extent s i g n i f i c a n t l y less than t h e i r B a l t i c cousins. No, even i f i t be admitted that the years leading up to World War I saw an increasing economic threat to the Volga Germans and a consequent drawing together of the Germans i n the face of t h i s common danger, the merely defensive element i n t h e i r national self-consciousness would seem s t i l l to have been only i n addition and a n c i l l a r y to other elements. The many pr i v i l e g e s granted them which f i r s t drew them to s e t t l e i n Russia—economic concessions of various description, exemption from m i l i t a r y service, r e l i g i o u s freedom, national schools, l o c a l self-government—from the outset created f o r the Volga Germans a kind of national cocoon which e f f e c t i v e l y insulated them against outside influences by allowing them to l i v e i n Russia without s p i r i t u a l l y leaving Germany, to become psychologically as s e l f - . s u f f i c i e n t i n their new country as they were economically s e l f -s u f f i c i e n t . In short, they had no need of things Russian. And anent th i s psychological s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , i t i s probably safe to assume that i t encouraged an attitude, a certainty, of the innate s u p e r i o r i t y of German i n s t i t u t i o n s over Russian i n s t i t u t i o n s , of 149 German people over Russian people. The prosperity and t i d i n e s s of the German v i l l a g e as compared with the wretchedness and f i l t h of the Russian v i l l a g e , the t h r i f t and industry of the German c o l o n i s t as compared with the drunkeness and sloth of the Russian muzhik: such s u p e r f i c i a l comparisons were e a s i l y to be interpreted by the comfortable and cosy German mind as indisputable evidence of the b a s i c a l l y higher q u a l i t i e s of the German s e t t l e r — n e v e r , of course, as mere r e f l e c t i o n s of the many p r i v i l e g e s bestowed upon him. The wealth, the prosperity, and the smugness of the Volga Germans seem to have rendered them i n s e n s i t i v e to the mounting Russian antagonism toward them. Wishing only to be l e f t alone and to f r u c t i f y as they had i n the past, they seem to have been l i t t l e aware of the h o s t i l i t y which their dominant p o s i t i o n engendered, and the occasional measures taken against them before the War seem to have been l a r g e l y ignored as symptoms of t h i s h o s t i l i t y . At least the Volga Germans did not react to these measures i n t y p i c a l f a s h i o n — t h a t i s , by drawing together fo r p o l i t i c a l action and defence. When World War I's beginning rendered t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the Russian Empire e n t i r e l y anomalous, then, they were generally unprepared. Their national unity ' f a i l e d to manifest i t s e l f i n any s i g n i f i c a n t , p o l i t i c a l terms, and remained for the most part i n a r t i c u l a t e . World War I nevertheless did have the e f f e c t of stimulating national consciousness generally among the minorities of the Russian Empire. Since i t was ostensibly being fought, at least i n part, f o r the -right of the Balkan Slavs to s e l f -determination, i t could not help but awaken i n the nation a l 1 5 0 minorities of Russia an aspi r a t i o n toward greater freedom, whether th i s freedom was to be sought i n the p o l i t i c a l , economic, s o c i a l , or c u l t u r a l spheres. I f they were being asked to f i g h t f o r the national l i b e r a t i o n of the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian and former Turkish empires, i t was not unreasonable f o r the peoples of the Russian Empire to hope for a betterment of thei r own l o t , f o r some degree of national freedom f o r themselves. National freedom should be sought within, as well as outside, the Empire. In addition, there was the i d e n t i t y of Russia's foes; the War could not be popular with many of the national minorities, p a r t i c u l a r l y those possessing close t i e s with either Germany or Turkey, s t i l l regarding these enemy nations as the "homeland". Among these, of course, were the Volga Germans, the Crimean Tatars, and to some lesser extent, the peoples of the North Caucasus. i i The broad, e s s e n t i a l t h e o r e t i c a l outlines for Bolshevik and, l a t e r , Soviet n a t i o n a l i t y p o l i c i e s are contained i n S t a l i n ' s Marxism, and the National Question, published i n 1913. While many of S t a l i n ' s other t h e o r e t i c a l writings have been either repudiat-ed or corrected by h i s successors, e s p e c i a l l y since 1956, Marxism and the National Question remains today as the basic and authoritative Soviet document as regards the national question, whether i n the Soviet Union i t s e l f or i n other parts of the world, never having been c r i t i c i z e d or superseded by l a t e r Soviet i .151 t h e o r e t i c a l works on the s u b j e c t . Indeed, these more rec e n t w r i t i n g s have served only t o e l u c i d a t e and to elaborate upon the fundamental dictums set f o r t h by S t a l i n i n 1913, and to i l l u s t r a t e the continuing importance of h i s work on t h i s aspect of Soviet i d e o l o g y . Extremely few of the n a t i o n a l i t y p o l i c i e s implemented . by the Soviet regime since i t s coming to power, up to and perhaps i n c l u d i n g the mass deportations of peoples, are not i m p l i c i t i n , or cannot be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h , the b a s i c t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s s t a t e d i n Marxism and the N a t i o n a l Question. Another measure of the respect w i t h which the work has always been held by M a r x i s t s can be gained from the judgement of Leon Trotsky, t h a t : "On the b a s i s of that s i n g l e a r t i c l e , which was f o r t y p r i n t e d pages long, i t s author i s e n t i t l e d to r e c o g n i t i o n as an outstanding t h e o r e t i c i a n " . ^ Trotsky, of course, was h i m s e l f an outstanding Marxist t h e o r e t i c i a n , and a l s o among S t a l i n ' s most b i t t e r r i v a l s and d e t r a c t o r s ; coming from him, t h i s i s h i g h p r a i s e , indeed. And the f a c t t h a t he proceeds, a f t e r t h i s h i g h p r a i s e f o r the author of Marxism and the N a t i o n a l Question, to present evidence f o r h i s c o n t e n t i o n that the author was not S t a l i n at a l l , but Lenin, i n no way i n v a l i d a t e s or weakens h i s e v a l u a t i o n o f the importance of the work. The question of authorship cannot be decided here; i t is beyond the province of t h i s paper. But the . p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the w r i t e r was Lenin and not S t a l i n , f a r from d i m i n i s h i n g or l e s s e n i n g the importance of the work, i n f a c t adds immeasurably t o i t . None of Lenin's teachings, a f t e r a l l , have been e i t h e r superseded o r c a l l e d i n t o question by h i s successors. I t seems e s s e n t i a l , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t pause should be made here t o 1 5 2 examine b r i e f l y at l e a s t the p r i n c i p a l points made i n Marxism and the National Question. They shed a great deal of l i g h t upon the measures employed by the Soviet regime i n i t s dealing with the national question i n the U.S.S.R. The ce n t r a l theses of Marxism and the National Question may perhaps be summed up i n the following propositions. Marxists recognize the r i g h t of a l l nations to self-determination. They recognize the necessity for regional autonomy within a given state, and the need f o r sp e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n guaranteeing minority r i g h t s . At the same time, however, and over-riding a l l other considera-ti o n s , they claim the need f o r a single proletarian party, an 6 i n d i v i s i b l e c o l l e c t i v e , cutting across a l l national l i n e s . Leninist-Marxist theory propounds that a l l nations vare trans i t o r y phenomena belonging only to a c e r t a i n stage of h i s t o r i c a l and economic development, the epoch of capitalism. National questions, therefore, must i n every case be subordinated to the broader, more important issue of the class struggle, the class struggle between the bourgeoisie, the class which i s the bearer of capitalism, and the p r o l e t a r i a t , the class which i s the bearer of the coming stage of h i s t o r i c a l and economic develop-ment, socialism. Capitalism and socialism, i n this"scheme, are fundamentally h o s t i l e and i r r e c o n c i l a b l e . That, of course, i s the essence of the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the p r o l e t a r i a t , the class struggle which the p r o l e t a r i a t i s destined to win simply because "History i s on i t s side", because socialism represents a higher stage of h i s t o r i c a l and economic development 153 than does capitalism. As surely as capitalism triumphed over feudalism or medievalism, progressive socialism i s bound to triumph over reactionary capitalism. And just as surely, the internationalism of the world p r o l e t a r i a t i s bound to triumph over the nationalism of the bourgeoisie. I t i s fundamental to these doctrines that, while the in t e r e s t s of the p r o l e t a r i a t demand the removal of a l l obstacles between workers of d i f f e r e n t nations, and demand their unity i n the pursuit of a common goal, the defeat of capitalism and the triumph of labour--Marx's own s t i r r i n g c a l l to arms, 'Workers of the world, uniteJ", w i l l be r e c a l l e d — t h e i n t e r e s t s of the bourgeoisie demand not the i n t e -gration of the workers, not their i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y on,the basis of cla s s , but their segregation and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n on the basis of n a t i o n a l i t y . Nations come into existence, Marxist theory holds, only with the breakdown of the feudal order and the development of capitalism. Capitalism demands national states and s t r i v e s to create them. S t a l i n writes, i n Marxism and the National Question: "The process of the elimination of feudalism and the development of capitalism was at the same time a process of the amalgamation 6 of peoples into nations". And Lenin, writing elsewhere, elaborates: Throughout the world, the period of the f i n a l v i c t o r y of capitalism over feudalism was linked with national move-ments. The economic basis of these movements i s that i n order to achieve complete v i c t o r y f o r commodity production 15k the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, must have p o l i t i c a l l y united t e r r i t o r i e s with a population speaking the same language, while a l l obstacles to the development of t h i s language and to i t s consolidation 7 must be removed."' The complex phenomenon known as nationalism i s written off i n th i s rather crude and over-simplified economic way also by S t a l i n : "Its aim [which i s to say, the bourgeoisie of any nation] i s to s e l l i t s goods and to outcompete the bourgeoisie of another n a t i o n a l i t y . . . The market i s the f i r s t school i n which the 8 bourgeoisie learns i t s nationalism". These passages make clear the Marxist view that nations belong only to a c e r t a i n stage of h i s t o r i c a l and economic development; as S t a l i n e x p l i c i t l y d e f i n -ed i t , "A nation i s not merely a h i s t o r i c a l category but a h i s t o r i c a l category belonging to a d e f i n i t e epoch, the epoch of q r i s i n g capitalism". I t follows from this schema that national consciousness, therefore, did not e x i s t before the r i s e of bourgeois class consciousness, and that i t w i l l cease to ex i s t with the success of the proletarian revolution and the eradication of class differences. C l e a r l y , national consciousness i s ephemeral and must give way to class consciousness. Nationalism, according to the Soviet i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i s ; i n every case "bourgeois" nationalism—indeed, these two terms are p r a c t i c a l l y inseparable i n Soviet terminology. Nations come int o being, S t a l i n explains, usually as national states. This i s the general r u l e , and i t i s exemplified 155 by such nations as England, France, e t c . In E a s t e r n Europe, however, the exception became the r u l e ; there the p a t t e r n which emerged was one of m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t a t e s . The development of m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t a t e s — a n d t h i s i s the more p e r t i n e n t , of course, a Propos of the Russian Empire and t h i s study—was p o s s i b l e only under s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s , where feudalism was s t i l l to some extent extant, where c a p i t a l i s m was but f e e b l y developed, where c l a s s consciousness was not h i g h l y developed, and where m i n o r i t y nations had not yet had time to c o n s o l i d a t e themselves economical-l y . 1 0 In m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t a t e s , the s t r u g g l e of,the bourgeoisie of the m a j o r i t y n a t i o n against the bourgeoisie of the m i n o r i t y nations c a r r i e s over from the economic to the p o l i t i c a l sphere, and r e s u l t s i n p o l i c i e s of r e p r e s s i o n of m i n o r i t y r i g h t s . At t h i s stage, bourgeoisie and p r o l e t a r i a t of the oppressed m i n o r i t y n a t i o n s have a common i n t e r e s t i n t h e i r l i b e r a t i o n from a l i e n m a j o r i t y domination, and therefore share i n the n a t i o n a l s t r u g g l e . For though a l l n a t i o n a l movements are p a t e n t l y bourgeois, and though the i n t e r e s t s of the p r o l e t a r i a t are fundamentally i n t e r n a t i o n a l and a n t i - n a t i o n a l , p o l i c i e s of r e p r e s s i o n — r e p r e s s i o n of language, l i m i t a t i o n of freedom of movement, disfranchisement, r e s t r i c t i o n of schools, and such l i k e measures—nevertheless 11 c o n s t i t u t e a s e r i o u s danger to the p r o l e t a r i a t . They not only hinder the i n t e l l e c t u a l development of the oppressed m i n o r i t y p r o l e t a r i a t through denying i t the use of i t s own language, but a l s o d i v e r t l a r g e segments of the populace from s o c i a l questions and the question of the c l a s s s t r u g g l e to n a t i o n a l questions, and are u t i l i z e d through p o l i c i e s of " d i v i d e and r u l e " to foment 156 hatred between n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s . N a t i o n a l oppression, there-f o r e , i s always to be combatted, i n order "to reduce the n a t i o n -a l s t r u g g l e to a minimum, t o sever i t s r o o t s , to render i t as 12 innocuous as p o s s i b l e f o r the p r o l e t a r i a t " . I n s h o r t , w h i l e the n a t i o n a l s t r u g g l e must always be reduced, i t must be reduced only because i t i s an obstacle to the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of the p r o l e t a r i a t — o n l y because the c l a s s s t r u g g l e must be i n t e n s i f i e d . What seems obvious from the outset here i s an apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n between the views of n a t i o n a l i s m and i n t e r n a t i o n a l -ism. While the aim of Communism i s "not only to a b o l i s h the present d i v i s i o n of mankind i n t o small s t a t e s and a l l - n a t i o n a l i s o l a t i o n , not only to b r i n g the nations c l o s e r together, but a l s o to merge them",'1'3 n e v e r t h e l e s s , and at the same time, L e n i n i s t s unequivocally support the r i g h t of a l l n a t i o n s to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . S t a l i n s t a t e s f l a t l y , f o r example, that "the r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s an e s s e n t i a l element i n the Ik s o l u t i o n of the n a t i o n a l problem; and, f u r t h e r e l u c i d a t i n g upon t h i s , he comments: The r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n means that only the n a t i o n i t s e l f has the r i g h t to determine i t s d e s t i n y , that no one has the r i g h t f o r c i b l y to i n t e r f e r e i n the l i f e of the n a t i o n , to destroy i t s schools and other i n s t i t u t i o n s , to v i o l a t e i t s h a b i t s or customs, to repress i t s language, or c u r t a i l i t s r i g h t s . . . Nations are sovereign and a l l n a t i o n s are e q u a l . ^ 157 The r i g h t of self-determination, proclaimed by the Bolsheviks, was undoubtedly one of the most important single factors i n r a l l y i n g many of the minorities of the Russian Empire to support Lenin i n the Russian C i v i l Mar. But i t was, as has been seen, only one part of an apparent paradox, and by i t s e l f gives l i t t l e i n s i g h t into Soviet n a t i o n a l i t y p o l i c y . The single, probably the most e s s e n t i a l , key to Soviet n a t i o n a l i t y policy l i e s i n the understanding of the method by which the doctrine of s e l f -determination of nations i s reconciled with the apparently i r r e c o n c i l a b l e f i r s t premise of Marxism, that the s o l i d a r i t y of class i s in t e r n a t i o n a l . In a word, t h i s method i s the d i a l e c t i c . For l i k e a l l Bolshevik doctrines of p o l i t i c a l r i g h t , the ri g h t of self-determination of nations i s conditional and dynamic. That i s , i t depends upon the character of the society i n which the r i g h t i s invoked. What must be taken into account i s the stage of h i s t o r i c a l and economic development attained by a nation i n question; whether that nation i s developing from feudalism to bourgeois democracy, or from bourgeois democracy to proletarian democracy. As S t a l i n puts i t : "The economic, p o l i t i c a l , and c u l t u r a l conditions of a given nation constitute the only key to the question how a pa r t i c u l a r nation ought to arrange i t s l i f e and what forms i t s future c o n s t i t u t i o n ought to take". I f a national bourgeoisie, then, i s s t i l l struggling to complete i t s bourgeois revolution, i f i t i s s t i l l engaged i n i t s struggle with medievalism, then national struggle represents the forces of progress. The bourgeoisie, at this stage of h i s t o r i c a l 158 development, r i s i n g capitalism, i s s t i l l the legitimate bearer of the nation's w i l l and should i n t h i s context be supported by the p r o l e t a r i a t , which also stands to gain from l i b e r a t i o n from a l i e n domination. But i f the bourgeoisie has already completed i t s revolution, i f the struggle with medievalism i s over and the stage i s already set for the next stage of development, the t r a n s i t i o n to proletarian democracy, then national struggle i n this context represents the forces of reaction. The bourgeoisie, at t h i s stage of h i s t o r i c a l development, full-blown capitalism, i s no longer the legitimate bearer of the nation's w i l l . This r o l e now devolves upon the p r o l e t a r i a t , class-conscious and int e r n a t i o n a l i n outlook, imbued with the h i s t o r i c a l p r i n c i p l e of int e r n a t i o n a l unity, and dedicated to the erasing or breaking down of a l l national b a r r i e r s . The r i g h t of nations to s e l f -determination i s not, therefore, an i n t r i n s i c or inalienable r i g h t ; i t i s v a l i d only insofar as i t represents a necessary and progressive step toward the v i c t o r y of socialism. The apparent paradox of the Bolshevik p o s i t i o n i s thus resolved. It i s possible to assert, as S t a l i n does, that: "A cl a s s conscious p r o l e t a r i a t has i t s own t r i e d banner and i t does not need to 17 march under the banner of the bourgeoisie", ' and, moments l a t e r , to add the seemingly paradoxical statement, that Marxists " w i l l continue to combat the policy of national oppression i n a l l i t s 1 Q forms, subtle or crude". The t r a n s i t i o n to capitalism and bourgeois democracy and their c o r o l l a r y , nationalism, w i l l be supported—but only because this t r a n s i t i o n represents a progress-ive movement toward the coming proletarian revolution. 159 S t a l i n makes this clear i n Marxism and the National 'Question: "The obligations of S o c i a l Democrats, who defend the i n t e r e s t s of the p r o l e t a r i a t , and the r i g h t s of a nation, which 19 consists of various classes, are two d i f f e r e n t things". 7 In every case, the national question i s a subordinate question to that of the i n t e r e s t s of the p r o l e t a r i a t as a whole, only a part of that larger question, and always to be considered from the point of view of that larger question. While a nation has the r i g h t , therefore, "to arrange i t s own l i f e on autonomous PO l i n e s " , the r i g h t of self-determination must not, and w i l l not, always be to the advantage of a nation, which i s to say, to the advantage of the majority of i t s population--which i s to 21 say, of i t s p r o l e t a r i a t . Further, i f the i n t e r e s t s of the nation, comprised of a l l classes, and the i n t e r e s t s of the p r o l e t a r i a t , one c l a s s , should c o n f l i c t , they are always to be resolved i n the i n t e r e s t s of the l a t t e r . S t a l i n makes thi s point at l e a s t twice i n Marxism and the National Question, but nowhere i n the same unequivocal and terse manner as Lenin, writing elsewhere: There i s not a single Marxist who, without making a t o t a l break with the foundations of Marxism and Socialism, could deny that the i n t e r e s t s of S o c i a l -ism are above the i n t e r e s t s of the r i g h t s of nations 22 to self-determination. The r i g h t of self-determination, where i t c o n f l i c t s with the higher r i g h t of the p r o l e t a r i a t to e s t a b l i s h or to maintain i t s 160 d i c t a t o r s h i p , cannot be allowed consideration. Marxism and the  National Question was written, of course, before there was an established s o c i a l i s t state, when the advent of successful revolution i n Russia s t i l l appeared f a r distant. The author does not e x p l i c i t l y state, therefore, the Bolshevik position with regard to the right s of minority nations v i s - a - v i s an already established Communist power. But the merciless l o g i c of Marxism makes i m p l i c i t from what has already been said the program which must be followed, should the s o c i a l i s t revolution be successful and should a s o c i a l i s t state actually be established. I f the int e r e s t s of nations i n general are always to be considered as secondary and subordinate to the in t e r e s t s of the class struggle, i t cannot but follow, of course, that they are always to be subordinated to the proletarian revolution incarnate. It i s always i n the in t e r e s t s of the revolution and of a l l progressive peoples that the revolution should enlarge i t s e l f . I t goes without saying, then, that the only nations which would wish to separate themselves from an established s o c i a l i s t state would be reactionary nations, nations i n which the p r o l e t a r i a t was s t i l l being exploited and oppressed. Such nations did not deserve to have the i r r i g h t s or inte r e s t s considered; their r i g h t s were, i n any case, r i g h t s i n f e r i o r to the r i g h t of the p r o l e t a r i a t , and always to be disregarded should they c o n f l i c t with that higher r i g h t . Under socialism, when r e a l , and not merely formal, equality exists among nations, the r i g h t of nations to s e l f -determination ceases to have any r e a l meaning, and act u a l l y becomes a superfluous r i g h t . In a s o c i a l i s t state, there w i l l be 161 no exploiting and exploited nations, just as there w i l l be no exploiting and exploited classes. The only conditions under which any nation would wish to secede or to e x i s t independently w i l l no longer e x i s t , and the r i g h t of self-determination w i l l never be invoked. (It i s both in t e r e s t i n g and useful to note here how this schematic and inadequate Bolshevik treatment of the national question, which r e f l e c t s the small use which either Marx or his successors had for nationalism i n their theories, and which resulted, as w i l l be seen, i n their consequent gross underestimate of the powers of nationalism, i s c a r r i e d over into their treatment of the r e l i g i o u s question. The r e l i g i o u s question i s not, of course, more than a subsidiary i n t e r e s t of this study. But i t i s an important subsidiary i n t e r e s t , In view of the f a c t that a l l seven of the minority groups with which th i s study i s s p e c i f i c a l l y concerned possessed strong r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n s , and that these were, i n almost a l l cases, c l o s e l y and irrevocably connected among them with the national question. In the Marxist view, of course, r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f i s regarded as a r e l i c from the past even more anachronistic than nationalism, as a r e l i c associated with not merely the comparatively recent c a p i t a l i s t or bourgeois stage, but with the long-moribund feudal or medieval stage of h i s t o r i c a l and economic development. Marxism, with i t s crude and m a t e r i a l i s t i c categorizations, cannot possibly be reconciled with any brand of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f . Marx himself termed r e l i g i o n , "the opiate of the people", and the good Marxist--162 one who possesses a "correct understanding" of the in t e r e s t s of the p r o l e t a r i a t — m u s t regard r e l i g i o n , l i k e nationalism, as another transitory phenomenon peculiar to a p a r t i c u l a r stage of development, one destined to pass away with the passing of the concrete h i s t o r i c a l conditions which made i t possible. S t a l i n states the Marxist position as follows: Marxists w i l l always protest against the persecution of Catholics and Protestants, they w i l l always defend the rig h t s of nations to profess any r e l i g i o n they please, but at the same time, on the basis of a correct under-standing of the in t e r e s t s of the p r o l e t a r i a t , they w i l l carry on agitation against Catholicism, Protestantism, and the r e l i g i o n of the Orthodox Church [not to mention, of course, either Islam or the Jewish f a i t h ] i n order to secure the triumph of the s o c i a l i s t world conception. 2 3 The persistence of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s demonstrates to the Marxist that those who believe are not yet f u l l y emancipated from feudal-ism, or at l e a s t from feudal concepts, just as the persistence of nationalism informs him that the n a t i o n a l i s t s have not yet been able to divest themselves of a l l vestiges of capitalism, or at l e a s t of a l l bourgeois habits of mind. Quite simply, one cannot be both a Marxist and a r e l i g i o u s believer, just as one cannot be both a Marxist and a n a t i o n a l i s t . The categories are mutually exclusive. The ri g h t of r e l i g i o u s freedom, then, i s to be supported i f and when such support constitutes a progressive step toward socialism, just as the r i g h t of nations to s e l f -determination i s to be supported i n similar circumstances. 163 But, at the same time, i t must be borne i n mind that these r i g h t s are always subordinate r i g h t s , and that their being invoked must serve only as means to a d e f i n i t e end. They are feudal or bourgeois r i g h t s , i n f a c t , i n themselves obstructive and h o s t i l e to the consolidation of the p r o l e t a r i a t , but they may under ce r t a i n conditions be u t i l i z e d to hasten t h i s consolidation. Under socialism, of course, they w i l l cease to have any v a l i d i t y whatsoever. Religion, i n the Marxist scheme, i s merely the t o o l of the feudal, a r i s t o c r a t i c r u l i n g classes, employed only to render the masses subservient to their r u l e r s and exploiters, and resigned to the existing order of things. But with the i n t e n s i -f i c a t i o n of the class struggle, when the masses become aware of the true nature of r e l i g i o n , they w i l l abandon i t ; and, under socialism, of course, when r e a l equality, and not merely "equality i n the sight of God" s h a l l have be en established among men, r e l i g i o n w i l l no longer possess any raison d'etre, and w i l l pass away. The inadequacy and s u p e r f i c i a l i t y of t h i s Marxist schema for the r e l i g i o u s question are f u l l y as s t a r t l i n g as those of the Marxist program put forward for "solving" the n a t i o n a l i t y problem. Both of these make clear and unmistakeable however, the s l i g h t importance which the Marxist theoreticians placed upon either r e l i g i o n or nationalism, and help to explain the f a i l u r e s and shortcomings of many Soviet p o l i c i e s , when the phenomena of nationalism and r e l i g i o n were encountered i n the fl e s h . ) There are two or three other s a l i e n t points i n Marxism, and the National .Question which remain to be at le a s t b r i e f l y 164 examined before t h e o r e t i c a l considerations are l e f t , however: not only f o r the sake of completeness, but also because they, too, r e f l e c t the f a i l u r e of Marxist theories to come f u l l y to grips with the r e a l i t i e s and complexities of the national question. The f i r s t of these points i s the Bolshevik concept of regional autonomy; and. perhaps the best way of explaining t h i s concept i s to contrast i t with the concept of national autonomy put forward by other Marxist groups, and rejected by the Bolsheviks. While national autonomy, on the one hand, t r i e s to draw into single nations peoples whom the very march of r e a l events are dispersing, Bolshevik regional autonomy claims to deal with a d e f i n i t e population inhabiting a d e f i n i t e t e r r i t o r y . While national autonomy stimulates nationalism by advocating the demarcation of peoples along national l i n e s , the organization of nations, and the preservation and c u l t i v a t i o n of national p e c u l i a r i t i e s , Bolshevik regional autonomy claims to break down national p a r t i t i o n s and to unite populations i n order to hasten their d i v i s i o n i n a d i f f e r e n t way, according to c l a s s ; further, i t claims to draw those nations which are "belated", whose c u l t u r a l standards are lower, into the common stream of a higher culture, while national autonomy leads to the unacceptable doctrine that "national existence l i e s i n i s o l a t i o n " , and into such p i t f a l l s as the placing of the inte r e s t s of one nation over the i n t e r e s t s of a l l . And f i n a l l y , while national autonomy suggests organizational federalism on the basis of n a t i o n a l i t y , Bolshevik regional autonomy seeks to hasten the organization of 165 the workers on the basis of the i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l class s o l i d a r i t y , and therefore provides the best means of exploiting the natural p o t e n t i a l of a region without recourse to i n d i v i d u a l national consent. J The concept of regional autonomy, therefore, i s "the only progressive and the only acceptable solution" f o r 26 the national problem, according to S t a l i n . As regards the righ t s of minorities under the concept of regional autonomy, S t a l i n makes the following e x p l i c i t analysis of the causes for minority discontent, and offers his s p e c i f i c remedies f o r such discontent. His analysis i s s t a r t l i n g -l y an ov e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n : A minority i s discontented not because there i s no national union but because i t does not enjoy the ri g h t to use i t s native language. Permit i t to use i t s native language and the discontent w i l l pass of i t s e l f . A minority i s discontented not because there i s no a r t i f i c i a l union but because i t does not possess i t s own schools. Give i t i t s own schools and a l l ground for discontent w i l l disappear. A minority i s discontented not because there i s no national union, but because i t does not enjoy l i b e r t y of conscience, l i b e r t y of movement, etc. Give i t these 27 l i b e r t i e s and i t w i l l cease to be discontented. S t a l i n f e l t , i n other words, that the forms of equality would be s u f f i c i e n t to s a t i s f y the national discontent of minorities. 166 Such shallow and crude formulations betray the Bolsheviks' simple lack of understanding of national aspirations, and, of course, have not provided adequate p o l i c i e s i n practice. Nevertheless, S t a l i n ' s f a c i l e solution to the n a t i o n a l i t y problem remains the basis of the Communist formula, "national i n form, s o c i a l i s t i n content", which has for decades been the standard formula by which the minority nations of the U.S.S.R. express their c u l t u r a l aspirations. r F i n a l l y , and underlying a l l other theses on the national question, there i s the Bolshevik concept of Party, Lenin's own greatest single contribution to the body of Marxist doctrine. I t has been seen that the s o l i d a r i t y of cla s s , i n the Marxist view, cuts across a l l national boundaries and differences; S t a l i n concludes Marxism and the National Question with the state-ment that: "the p r i n c i p l e of in t e r n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y of the workers i s an es s e n t i a l element i n the solution of the national problem", and i t i s only natural that the Party of the pr o l e t a r i a t should, therefore, also tolerate no national wings, but should constitute only one, single, unified Party, highly cen t r a l i z e d and highly d i s c i p l i n e d . To quote from the Party program of 1918 i s to leave no doubt about the degree of autonomy tolera b l e to the Party: The Eighth Congress of the R.K.P. [Russian Communist Party] resolves: there must e x i s t a single centralized Communist Party with a single Central Committee leading 167 a l l Party work i n a l l sections of the R.S.F.S.R. A l l decisions of the R.K.P. and i t s d i r e c t i n g organs are unconditionally binding on a l l branches of the Party, regardless of their national composition. y What S t a l i n should i n f a c t have written, i n concluding Marxism and  the National Question, i s that "the p r i n c i p l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y of the Party of the workers i s the e s s e n t i a l element i n the solution of the national problem". In summary, then, i t may be said that the Bolsheviks f a i l e d to take very seriously the power of either national or r e l i g i o u s f e e l i n g , and that they were almost without reservation convinced that class l o y a l t i e s would in e v i t a b l y triumph over' "bourgeois" national or "feudal" r e l i g i o u s l o y a l t i e s . They therefore regarded national problems not as something really, to be solved, but as something to be u t i l i z e d , to be exploited i n the struggle to e s t a b l i s h the d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t . Just how. gross was their miscalculation of national f e e l i n g among the national minorities of the old Empire, among seven of these, at l e a s t , w i l l be seen below. And so also w i l l be seen some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered by the Bolsheviks i n trying to apply i n practice theories which bore l i t t l e r e l a t i o n s h i p to the actual conditions at hand. Nevertheless, with a l l of i t s short-comings, and despite i t s being conditioned by d e f i n i t e p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l presuppositions, the Bolshevik p o l i c y of national s e l f -determination proved to be e f f i c a c i o u s and successful, during the 1 6 8 e a r l i e s t years of the regime, i n r a l l y i n g around the Bolshevik centre a majority of the national m i n o r i t i e s — a factor which proved of no small importance i n the f i n a l outcome of the Revolution and. the C i v i l War. i i i The Bolshevik Revolution of October, 1 9 1 7 , was i n general welcomed by the national minorities of Russia at lea s t as h e a r t i l y as i t was by the people of Russia proper. During the preceding months of the so-called "bourgeois" revolution, the uncertainty and he s i t a t i o n of the Provisional Government with regard to the national question, and the government's apparent unwillingness r e a l l y to come to grips with the question, had stimulated and activated nascent nationalism and separatism i n nearly a l l of the border regions of the former Russian Empire. By removing, or at lea s t relaxing, the s t a b i l i z i n g and. c e n t r a l i z -ing influence of the former imperial administrative apparatus i n these regions, the Provisional Government had seriously upset the precarious equilibrium which the T s a r i s t regime had been able to maintain, and, at the same time, by i t s paralysis of decision i t set int o motion c e n t r i f u g a l forces of nationalism i n a l l i t s a f f i n i t e l o c a l forms. I t had been almost a sine qua  non of the February Revolution that brought the Provisional Government to power that something would have to be done immediate-l y to redress the grievances of the national minorities. And, since the abdication of the Tsar, the minorities had impatiently 1 6 9 awaited some kind of positive action on their behalf. But f i r s t Milyukov, and then Kerensky temporized, unsure which course to take, unwilling so long as Russia was s t i l l at war with Germany and i t s a l l i e s either to introduce serious s o c i a l reforms or to grant any considerable concessions to the n a t i o n a l i t i e s of the borderlands. The m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n , they pleaded, was s t i l l too grave, the p o l i t i c a l future s t i l l too uncertain, to permit of any such measures immediately. The threats of disruption and confusion that were i m p l i c i t i n either course had frightened them and, despite their good intent, had sapped their w i l l to act. The national and agrarian questions were both to be attended to i n good time by the Constituent Assembly, i f and when i t met. Understandably, however, these arguments frequently appeared to the anxious and expectant peoples of the borderlands as evidence merely of the regime's unwillingness to dispense new l i b e r t i e s , as mere temporizing and procrastinating on behalf of the established order. And this impression was c e r t a i n l y heightened by the stated determination of the Provisional Government to continue the War—a struggle which from the beginning had been unpopular among many of the minority peoples, e s p e c i a l l y among those with Turkish p r e d i l e c t i o n s — t o a v i c t o r i o u s end. Throughout the borderlands of European Russia, then, continued delay had had the e f f e c t of r a i s i n g doubt about the s i n c e r i t y of the new government. Doubt had grown into overt suspicion that the aspirations of the minorities were being not only ignored, but even d e l i b e r a t e l y betrayed. Throughout a l l of the f r o n t i e r regions, the o r i g i n a l expectancy and joy which had 170 greeted the February Revolution were being rapi d l y transformed through disappointment into impatience and even h o s t i l i t y . Lenin's doctrine of immediate self-determination f o r a l l the national minorities of the old Empire, coupled with the consistent agitation of the Bolsheviks f o r an immediate end to the War and immediate agrarian reform, could not help but to exert a tremendous appeal i n the border regions. Lenin and. h i s followers, after a l l , were promising immediately concrete solutions to a l l those important problems the Provisional Govern-ment i n s i s t e d upon postponing u n t i l some vague, indeterminate future date--and, e s p e c i a l l y g a l l i n g , the insistence that the War must f i r s t be fought to a conclusion. The Bolshevik seizure of power i n October, 1917, therefore, was at f i r s t greeted i n the border regions with the almost unanimous support of the non-Russian peoples. At the same time, however, the Russian s e t t l e r s i n these regions, with the exception of the jnogorodtsy, the proletarians of the towns, saw at once i n the Bolshevik doctrine of national self-determination a threat to th e i r established position. C l e a r l y , i f the indigenous peoples were actually able to assert their independence, i t meant the end of the posi-t i o n , wealth, and p r i v i l e g e of the Cossack and the Russian. Since the February Revolution, as conditions i n the borderlands had become steadily more anarchical with the p e t r i f i c a t i o n of the Provisional Government's authority, clashes between the Russian 171 and non-Russian had become increasingly frequent: the Russian s e t t l e r steadfastly determined to hold on to h i s established possessions and r i g h t s , and the native inhabitant equally deter-mined to reclaim what he considered to be r i g h t f u l l y h i s . The opposing elements i n the borderlands had thus f o r some time been aligning themselves f o r the showdown that had to come, organiz-ing themselves into h o s t i l e camps, and looking around for possible a l l i e s . The Bolshevik seizure of power, then, with a l l that i t implied, had the immediate e f f e c t of polari z i n g the opposition elements i n the border regions into those alignments which were l a t e r to constitute the main protagonists of the C i v i l Mar, and of bringing to the national struggle i n these regions a l l the horrors of a class war, and, i n some cases, of a r e l i g i o u s war, as well. But even i f the doctrine of national self-determination proved to be the deciding factor i n swinging to the Bolshevik side the majority of the non-Russian peoples of the borderlands, i t cannot be considered t h e o r e t i c a l l y to have been an adequate solution to the national problem. In the f i r s t place, by offering the national minorities v i r t u a l l y no choice between assimilation and complete independence, the Bolshevik doctrine of national self-determination ignored the f a c t that.neither a s s i m i l a t i o n nor complete independence was what most of the minorities wanted; and, second, i t ignored the f a c t that complete independ-ence was patently an i m p o s s i b i l i t y f o r the vast majority of the small nations. What was wanted i n most cases was some form of fe d e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p within the new Soviet state, some form of 172 autonomy which would provide assurance of m i n o r i t y r i g h t s and, at the same time, provide the advantages to be d e r i v e d from continued a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h a l a r g e and powerful s t a t e . As has been seen, however, both the idea of f e d e r a l i s m and the d o c t r i n e of n a t i o n a l autonomy were incompatible w i t h Bolshevik d o c t r i n e , c o n f l i c t i n g as they d i d w i t h the i n s i s t e n c e of M a r x i s t tenets upon the n e c e s s i t y of a h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d s t a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n and a form of r e g i o n a l , r a t h e r than n a t i o n a l , autonomy based i n the main upon the " n a t u r a l " economic u n i t . I t must be admitted, however, that any such n i g g l i n g t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r e a l l y beg the e s s e n t i a l questions about the n a t i o n a l program put f o r t h by the Bolsheviks. I t i s p o s s i b l e , of course, to accuse Lenin and h i s f o l l o w e r s of the most b l a t a n t cynicism i n t h e i r d e a l i n g s w i t h the n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s , and t o b u i l d up a case demonstrating t h a t they i n f a c t had no i n t e n t i o n at any time of s o l v i n g the n a t i o n a l problem, but only of e x p l o i t i n g i t . One can say that the exhortations to the n a t i v e s t o overthrow by f o r c e a l l e x i s t i n g a u t h o r i t y , where t h i s remained, and t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r own organs of self-government, the encouragement of the n a t i v e s to d r i v e out the Cossacks and other s e t t l e r s and to s e i z e t h e i r l a n d s — t h a t a l l such measures were mere t a c t i c a l consider-a t i o n s employed by m a c h i a v e l l i a n r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s i n t h e i r b i d f o r power. One can c l a i m t h a t Lenin and h i s f o l l o w e r s were only making a v i r t u e out of a n e c e s s i t y i n proclaiming and supporting the r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , at a time when the anarchy of the R e v o l u t i o n had r e s u l t e d i n the p o l i t i c a l fragmentation of the o l d Empire. But when these and a l l other accusations have 1 7 3 been made, the f a c t remains that nothing done by Lenin and h i s f o l l o w e r s i n the e a r l y stages of the n a t i o n a l struggle was out of keeping with the b a s i c d o c t r i n e s of the P a r t y as set f o r t h by S t a l i n i n Marxism and the N a t i o n a l Question, d o c t r i n e s enunciated unmistakably c l e a r l y when no Bolshevik l e a d e r , no matter how o p t i m i s t i c , could have p r e d i c t e d what was to happen. To accuse Lenin and h i s f o l l o w e r s only of c y n i c i s m and opportunism i n t h e i r treatment of the n a t i o n a l question i n the borderlands i s to a t t r i b u t e t o them much more cunning and f o r e s i g h t than they a c t u a l l y possessed, and to give them f a r more c r e d i t f o r c a l c u l a t i o n and a thorough knowledge of p e r t a i n i n g c o n d i t i o n s than they deserve. There can be l i t t l e doubt that Lenin and h i s f o l l o w e r s were wholly sincere i n t h e i r b e l i e f that c l a s s antagonisms and l o y a l t i e s were of much greater and l a s t i n g importance than were e i t h e r n a t i o n a l or r e l i g i o u s antagonisms and l o y a l t i e s . They were undoubtedly c e r t a i n that the B o l s h e v i k regime, once i t was f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d , would be able t o . d e a l w i t h l o c a l problems i n the borderlands s t r i c t l y on a c l a s s b a s i s . The t r u t h , t h e r e f o r e , would seem to be t h a t Lenin and h i s f o l l o w e r s were g u i l t y not of b l a t a n t cynicism and mere e x p l o i t a t i o n o f the n a t i o n a l s t r u g g l e i n the border regions, but of a p p a l l i n g ignorance and innocence of what the n a t i o n a l s t r u g g l e a c t u a l l y i n v o l v e d . F i n a l l y , and t h i s i s the i n d i s p u t a b l e f a c t about Bolshevik n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s , the s i n g l e a t t r i b u t e which perhaps no argument can i n v a l i d a t e , Lenin and h i s f o l l o w e r s were s u c c e s s f u l . Whether through cleverness or a c c i d e n t , t h e i r p o l i c y 174 of national self-determination, promised without reservation to a l l of the national minorities, succeeded i n e n l i s t i n g along-side the Bolsheviks most of those who opposed the re - c o n s t i t u t i o n of the Empire as i t had been, and proved of immeasurable value i n helping to save the Revolution from those who sought to destroy i t and to restore a less r a d i c a l regime. E.H. Carr has evaluated i t s importance: Unqualified recognition of the r i g h t of secession not only enabled the Soviet regime—as nothing else could have done— to ride the torrent of a disruptive nationalism, but raised i t s prestige high above that of the 'white' generals who, bred i n the pan-Russian t r a d i t i o n of the Tsars, refused any concession to the subject n a t i o n a l i t i e s ; i n the borderlands where other than Russian, or other than Great Russian elements predominated, and where the decisive campaigns of the c i v i l war were fought, t h i s factor t o l d 30 heavily i n favour of the Soviet cause.-" Further, E.H. Carr goes on, there was a palpable i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the Soviet doctrine of n a t i o n a l i t y i n the borderlands with s o c i a l , and p a r t i c u l a r l y land, reform. The Soviets were success-f u l i n persuading peasants to a l i g n themselves under Bolshevik, even i f t h i s meant Russian, leadership against those forces wishing to restore the previous s o c i a l order. He writes: Whatever national and l i n g u i s t i c d i v e r s i t i e s might separate them, the peasants everywhere were i n 175 overwhelming majority opposed to a counter-revolution . . . and so long as fear of counter-revolution was not ex t i n c t , the community of in t e r e s t between the Russian workers and the peasant masses of the subject peoples on which Bolshevik propaganda i n s i s t e d had a perfectly s o l i d basis . . . The combination between the recognition of a formal right of national self-determination and the recognition of a r e a l need f o r unity i n pursuit of common soc i a l and economic ends, which was the essence of the Bolshevik doctrine of nationalism, proved a v i t a l 31 contribution to the Soviet v i c t o r y . Through t h e i r doctrine of national self-determination, the Bolsheviks thus found themselves, on the one hand, t a c i t l y encouraging the dismemberment of the t e r r i t o r i e s of the old Empire; at the same time, on the other hand, through t h e i r m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s with the mi n o r i t i e s , the vagaries of the C i v i l War, and the harsh r e a l i t i e s of p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s , they found themselves assuring the ultimate re-constitution of the unity of the old state, under t h e i r own new leadership. One can hardly grant, however, that t h e i r o r i g i n a l encouragement of the process of dispersal was i n any way regarded by them at the time as a c r a f t i l y premeditated gesture destined to lead to t h i s ultimate unity, as a l o g i c a l and fully-reasoned t a c t i c a l step or prelude to the f i n a l r e a l i z a t i o n of reunion. Rather, i t must be seen, f i r s t , as evidence of t h e i r s i n c e r i t y and l o y a l t y to the p r i n c i p l e of self-determination (with the l i m i t s , of course, imposed upon i t 176 by Marxism's schemata), and, second, as evidence of the confused and. contradictory channels i n which the C i v i l War was to run i n the Russian borderlands. For the f i r s t three years of their r u l e , the Bolsheviks were forced v i r t u a l l y to put aside th e o r e t i -c a l questions, to s a c r i f i c e them to the contingencies of their blood and i r o n struggle with the White armies and the forces of counter-revolution. Theory i n many cases was l a t e r manipulated to coincide with accomplished f a c t - - i t was not u n t i l l a t e r , i n the t h i r t i e s , that the contrary process, the manipulating of fa c t s to s u i t theories, with i t s rewriting of h i s t o r y , was practised extensively. So f a r as Lenin and h i s colleagues were concerned, their f i r s t duty was to save the Revolution. And a l l other questions became secondary to t h i s prime duty with the widespread outbreak of c i v i l war i n early 1918. Nothing else r e a l l y mattered. F i r s t , the Revolution had to survive. Is Because of the turbulence of the revolutionary struggle i n the eastern borderlands, the tr a n s i t o r i n e s s of governments, the bizarre s h i f t i n g of fortunes, and the strange peripheral c o n f l i c t s which developed, i t i s d i f f i c u l t indeed to generalize about the events of 1917-21 i n these regions. But f o r the main purpose here, which i s merely to sketch a broad framework, a kind of context, as i t were, i n which the experiences and a c t i v i t i e s of p a r t i c u l a r peoples may be observed, i t may be possible to be content with a very general summary, no matter how imperfect. Bearing i n mind that the exceptional was almost the norm during the C i v i l Mar i n the borderlands, and that any 177 summary of the C i v i l War must of n e c e s s i t y i n v o l v e d r a s t i c o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s , perhaps the f o l l o w i n g w i l l serve. In almost every case i n the eastern border regions where non-Russian peoples c o n s t i t u t e d m a j o r i t i e s , the B o l s h e v i k s , e s s e n t i a l l y an urban element, found themselves at some point a l l i e d w i t h the n a t i v e p o p u l a t i o n against the Russian and Cossack elements who opposed r e v o l u t i o n a r y change. The d i f f e r e n t stages of the C i v i l War o f t e n saw the predominantly Russian urbmiand a g r a r i a n p r o l e t a r i a t f i g h t i n g alongside the indigenous peoples against the defenders of the s t a t u s quo. In some cases, the B o l s h e v i k s thus found themselves i n e f f e c t w h o l l y dependent upon b a s i c a l l y c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n a r y groups f o r support; the numbers, or considerable numbers, of urban and a g r i c u l t u r a l workers i n the North Caucasus f o r a time refused f i r m support to e i t h e r s i d e i n the s t r u g g l e , and the m i l i t a r y f o r t u n e s of the moment, f o r example, l a r g e l y d i c t a t e d t h e i r sympathies, wherever they considered i t necessary, t h e r e f o r e , t o encourage and t o sympathize w i t h the s e p a r a t i s t and n a t i o n a l i s t a s p i r a t i o n s of the indigenous i n h a b i t a n t s , the B o l s e h v i k s d i d so; and, s i m i l a r l y , where they found i t was t o t h e i r advantage to support even " r e a c t i o n a r y " elements, they d i d t h i s a l s o . But as the f o r t u n e s of the s t r u g g l e s h i f t e d g r a d u a l l y t o favour the B o l s h e v i k s , a change g r a d u a l l y began to take place, w i t h the Russian s e t t l e r s i n the borderlands coming over i n i n c r e a s i n g numbers t o the side of the R e v o l u t i o n . As Soviet power became e s t a b l i s h e d more f i r m l y , the n a t i v e peasantry found i t s e l f i n c r e a s i n g l y i s o l a t e d , and i t s e a r l i e r a l l i a n c e with the B o l s h e v i k s stood r e v e a l e d f o r what i t 178 a c t u a l l y had been a l l along, a temporary joining together of fundamentally antagonistic forces united only f o r the purpose of defeating a foe who threatened both. Once the common enemy had been disposed of, there was seen to exis t l i t t l e community of i n t e r e s t between the vic t o r i o u s a l l i e s and, indeed, e s s e n t i a l and i r r e c o n c i l a b l e c o n f l i c t s between the two parties. The h i s t o r i c a l antipathy between Russian and non-Russian reasserted i t s e l f . The Russian peasantry and the Russian i n d u s t r i a l p r o l e t a r i a t i n the borderlands, by ethnic o r i g i n , h i s t o r i c a l continuity, and r a c i a l sympathy oriented toward Russia, whatever i t s government, and t r a d i t i o n a l l y h o s t i l e to the demands of the l o c a l inhabitants, had l i t t l e i n t e n t i o n of respecting the pr i n c i p l e of national self-determination f o r the minorities, once the immediate danger of counter-revolution had been met. They sought to spread Bolshevik influence i n these regions by undermining or suppressing a l l native i n s t i t u t i o n s of s e l f -government they had hitherto tolerated, e s p e c i a l l y those which i n any way seemed to threaten or to oppose their authority and policy of r i g i d c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . Once i t s raison d'etre, the common aim of defeating the White armies, was accomplished, the uneasy a l l i a n c e between Russian Bolshevik and native n a t i o n a l i s t s p l i t asunder. The various l o c a l governments and councils which had sprung into being during the period of common danger were now r u t h l e s s l y suppressed or emasculated by the B o l s h e v i k s — i n some cases through d i r e c t force of arms, but i n most cases through 179 the establishing of puppet organs composed of the "leading and progressive" elements among the native populations, supported and advised by Russian Bolsheviks. The pattern has since become f a m i l i a r : an i n i t i a l t a c t i c a l a l l i a n c e of the d i s c i p l i n e d Bolsheviks with less experienced l o c a l leaders, followed by i n f i l t r a t i o n or d i s p e r s a l of the l o c a l organs of government, and ultimately by a puppet regime. The pattern, so successful in. the early stages of the formation of the Soviet state, was to be followed with equal success i