

CONTINUITY IN RUSSIAN AND SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICIES:  
THE DEPORTED PEOPLES OF WORLD WAR II UNDER TWO REGIMES

by

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Abstract:

This essay, as its title implies, traces elements of continuity in the nationalities policies of the Tsarist and Soviet governments of Russia by considering the experiences under both regimes of the seven national minorities of the Soviet Union deported during World War II for alleged treasonable activity and/or collaboration with the Germans. The seven minorities are the Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars.

The essay is organized into four chapters. Chapter I has three parts, all concerned with necessary introductory material. Part i states the problem and the principal thesis of the essay: that the deportations of these seven minorities during World War II were only tenuously related to the charges brought against these peoples by the Soviet government; but, on the other hand, the deportations would seem to have been largely punishments inflicted upon these peoples for their generally unsatisfactory behaviour during their two decades or more under Soviet rule. The essay goes further to demonstrate, however, that the behaviour of all these minorities under Soviet rule was generally in conformity with their behaviour under Tsarist rule, and that, as it affected these groups at least, Soviet nationalities policy was in many essential respects hardly more than a continuation of earlier Tsarist policy. Part ii outlines briefly the expansion of the Russian Empire from its geographical centre near Moscow. Part iii describes the historical backgrounds of the seven peoples and the circumstances through which each came under Russian rule.

Chapter II is divided into two parts. Part i discusses the evolution of the Tsarist government's policy of minority discrimination and russification,

with emphasis upon the doctrines of "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationalism" and of "official nationality", and explores the reasons why these doctrines proved unsuccessful when Russia became through the process of expansion a vast multinational empire. Part ii treats individually the experiences of the seven peoples in question under Tsarist rule.

Chapter III is in three parts. Part i is concerned with the development of national feeling among the non-Russian peoples of the Russian state, particularly in the period 1905-17, with emphasis upon the seven peoples being studied here. Part ii is an analysis of the principal Bolshevik theoretical writings on the national question, dealing chiefly with Marxism and the National Question. Part iii describes the critical transitional period between 1917-21, between the Bolshevik Revolution and the regime's final victory, and the re-assertion of Russian authority over the territories of the seven peoples.

Chapter IV is also in three parts. Part i is a broad survey of Soviet nationalities policy's main phases since 1920, and also discusses some of the more salient congruities between Soviet policy and Tsarist policy, suggesting reasons for these continuities. Part ii treats individually the experiences under Soviet rule of the seven minorities with whom the essay is concerned, with emphasis upon those elements of continuity which emerge between their treatment under the Soviet government and their earlier treatment under the Tsars. Part iii is confined to brief concluding remarks.

The notes have been placed at the end of each chapter. The bibliography follows the notes to chapter IV.

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# I

## i

Between 1941 and 1945, the government of the U.S.S.R. expelled from membership in "the Soviet family of peoples" the members of seven national minorities: the Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars. According to the official reasons given by the Soviet authorities, all of these minorities were punished for the same reasons, their alleged collective pro-German and/or anti-Soviet attitudes and activities during World War II, and the punishment of each group followed a pattern which varied as little as the accusations against them. All of the persons belonging to the condemned groups were expelled, often forcibly, from their homes and lands, whether these were in their indigenous areas or in other parts of the Soviet Union, and transported, many of them under conditions of extreme hardship, to remote parts of the U.S.S.R., either in Siberia or in Central Asia. The native territories of these minorities, which had, until the time of the deportations, constituted either so-called Autonomous Republics or Autonomous Regions of the Union, ceased to exist. They were abolished even as administrative units and incorporated into other administrative divisions of the U.S.S.R. All mention of the seven deported minorities, whether as "nationalities", as names of geographical areas, or otherwise, was carefully stricken from the pages of almost all Soviet publications, including even the definitive Large Soviet

Encyclopaedia, and, for a dozen years, was studiously avoided in most later works. Maps were altered; rivers, districts, cities, towns, and villages were given new names, or else had their old names Russianized. So far as the average Soviet citizen was concerned, these seven national minorities, numbering about 1,300,000 persons in all,<sup>1</sup> no longer existed. Indeed, for more than a decade, the Soviet authorities went even further than this, and attempted to conceal or to remove any evidence that these peoples ever had existed. They had become, in Bertram Wolfe's phrase, "unpeoples".

These are the bare and basic facts concerning the seven national minorities who have come to be known collectively as the "Lost Peoples" of the Soviet Union, the bare and basic facts which came only slowly to be known and appreciated in the outside world during the late 1940's and early 1950's, and which finally were divulged in the Soviet Union itself, almost in full, in February, 1956, by Premier Nikita Khrushchov during his famous so-called "de-Stalinization" speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union--where, incidentally, these revelations were roundly condemned by both Premier Khrushchov and the delegates to the Congress, as evidence of brutal and inhuman crimes.

Since 1956, steps have been taken to rehabilitate in their old territories five of the seven deported peoples. Along with all individuals still serving sentences in the Soviet Union

for treasonable activities during the War, the Kalmyks and the four North Caucasian peoples--Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars--have been granted amnesties for their crimes and have had their territories restored to them. But there has as yet been no word about the other two groups, the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars. Despite the admitted enormity of the deportations by the Soviet authorities, despite the fact that all other war-time traitors and collaborators have been amnestied, and despite the fact that some members of the other five deported peoples are already reported as being back from exile, in their restored territories, there is still little to report on these, more than five years after Premier Khrushchov's speech. A number of possible reasons for the reluctance of the Soviet regime to rehabilitate the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars, and some of the implications of this reluctance, are suggested in the final chapter of this study. Suffice it to state here that the continued Soviet silence with regard to the fate of these two groups does not appear encouraging, either for the groups themselves, or for those who predict, or think to see, significant changes or a general "thaw" in the nationality policies of the Soviet regime. The task at hand, however, is to analyze the reasons for the original deportations. Why were these seven groups chosen for deportation?

It is extremely difficult, if not impossible to accept at face value the official reasons put forward by the Soviet authorities for the stern and drastic measures instituted against

the seven deported peoples. There are several reasons for this extreme difficulty, not the least of which is, first of all, that there is little evidence, apart from the claims of the Soviet authorities themselves, that the incidence of treason, defection, or collaboration was higher, or significantly higher, among any or all of these peoples than it was, say, among the Ukrainians, the Byelorussians, the peoples of the Baltic states, or any of those nationalities whose territories were overrun by the German armies during World War II--and this statement would include the Great Russian people, also. Certainly, in any case, there is no reliable evidence that the number of war-time defectors and traitors among any of the deported peoples was large enough to justify the blanket condemnation of these entire peoples, and their subsequent punishments which approached genocidal proportions. Second, it is at least doubtful that many of the members of the peoples condemned could physically have collaborated with the Germans, whether or not they had wished to do so. A glance at the map of the Soviet Union is enough to establish this doubt. The German forces occupied only a portion of the Kalmyk Republic, and this occupation was hardly more than episodic, less than two months. The German armies penetrated only the extreme western regions of the Chechen-Ingush Republic. And they failed entirely to reach the Volga-German A.S.S.R.<sup>2</sup>

This is not to say, of course, that the German armies found no individuals among the seven groups destined to become

"unpeoples" who were willing to collaborate with them. Indeed, and as will be seen, a section of the population of every one of the Soviet territories which the Germans entered was found to greet the invaders as liberators and to collaborate with them as fully as possible. The large numbers of Soviet citizens who actually took up arms on the side of the Germans against the Soviet Union--there were at least 700,000 of these<sup>3</sup>--comprised some members of almost every national and ethnic group which is to be discovered within the borders of the U.S.S.R. It is true that among the German forces recruited from citizens of the Soviet Union there were some national and ethnic groups whose contributions were disproportionately large, and this was true of at least one of the deported peoples, the Kalmyks, of whom some 4,500 were active in the Vlasov army and other units.<sup>4</sup> But such disproportions cannot be taken to indicate with any degree of certainty either the loyalty or the disloyalty of the entire national or ethnic group to which these soldiers belonged. Neither can they be taken to mean that these particular groups were either more or less loyal, collectively, than were other groups whose contributions to the anti-Soviet armed forces under German command were either larger or smaller. A multitude of other factors, hardly related to the question of loyalty, could account for these disproportions. The fact that some 4,500 Kalmyks were actively disloyal really tells very little about the loyalty or disloyalty of the other 125,000 Kalmyks in the U.S.S.R. And certainly, by itself, this fact can hardly be

considered sufficient grounds for the punishment by deportation of the entire nationality group, and its loss of all civil rights.

There is no wish in this study to minimize the amount of actual collaboration among the deported nationalities, and the evidence which is available concerning this question will be discussed at some length in Chapter IV. For the moment, however, the question of the guilt or innocence of portions of the Lost Peoples is really beside the point. In condemning and punishing entire nationalities for crimes committed against the State by individuals, or numbers of individuals, belonging to those nationalities, the Soviet regime demonstrated its willingness to depart from all civilized practice. In applying the principle of collective guilt, or collective responsibility, to whole nations for the crimes of their individual members, the Soviet regime also betrayed its own Marxist-Leninist ideology, which admits of no such thing as a "bad" nation. For what reasons, one must ask, were these particular seven minorities singled out for special attention? If the principle of collective guilt were to be applied, it is difficult to see by what standards it could be applied to some nations, and not to all. As has been noted, there was a high incidence of defection and collaboration among all of the peoples of the Soviet Union during the War. Particularly among the Ukrainians and the peoples of the Baltic states, where anti-Soviet feeling seems to have been most prevalent, this incidence was certainly higher, both in

proportion to the total populations of these areas and in absolute figures, than it was among any of the deported peoples. Why, then, of all the peoples of the Soviet Union which were to some extent guilty of war-time crimes, were these seven groups chosen to become "unpeoples"? The official charges against these nationalities neither satisfy nor suffice. The explanation of the deportations must be sought elsewhere.

The possibility that the Soviet authorities might have made their choice of these peoples for deportation without any good and sufficient provocation cannot, of course, be discounted entirely. But there are strong reasons for believing that such was not the case. It becomes increasingly apparent, as time goes by, and as studies of the Soviet Union and its institutions increase both in scope and in thoroughness, that the Soviet regime usually has very good reasons of its own for every major step that it takes, whether or not these reasons are readily discernible to the outside observer. It must be remembered, in addition, that the actions against the Lost Peoples took place over a span of almost three years. They were not, clearly, the result of a single, perhaps capricious, decision taken on the spur of the moment. They were obviously finely weighed and carefully considered actions, the result of much thought, and parts of an overall general policy. No regime, not even a regime so firmly entrenched as the Soviet regime, takes it upon itself to relocate more than a million and a quarter of its citizens without having good reasons for so

doing. One can hardly escape from the conclusion that follows, that the deportation of certain minorities forms, or formed at that time, an integral part of the nationalities policy of the Soviet government. Still, one asks, why these particular peoples?

It has been seen that all of the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. whose lands were occupied by the German armies during World War II were guilty of collaboration to some extent. Yet, of all the nationalities, only these seven were deported.

It has been noted that the Soviet government defied both world opinion and its own theoretical tenets by applying the principle of collective guilt to entire nationalities for the crimes of their individual members. Yet the principle of collective guilt was applied only to these seven.

Now it was obviously impossible (as Premier Khrushchov himself pointed out) for the Soviet government to eliminate some forty or fifty millions of Ukrainians, and much more difficult for it to eliminate several millions of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, than it was to eliminate much smaller minorities. But the relative size of the groups condemned does not by itself appear to have been a decisive factor in their deportations. Compare, for example, the relative sizes of the Chechens and the Volga Germans, numbering some 400,000 people each, to the Balkars, numbering one-tenth that many. Neither do the cultural levels of the deported peoples--in any generally

accepted sense--appear to have had any direct relationship to their fate. These seven groups presented a cultural spectrum of sorts, ranging from the rather highly civilized Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans to the still semi-nomadic herdsmen of the Northern Caucasus and the Kalmyk steppes.

In the examination of the histories of the Lost Peoples, in the following pages, it will be noted that these peoples, despite the great number of differences which existed among them, had in common a number of similarities. It is through these similarities that it seems possible to explain what otherwise seems almost inexplicable: why they were selected for deportation. It is notable that each of these groups, in its own way, possessed a tradition of refusing to be assimilated, and that all, without exception, had presented to the Soviet authorities special problems which dated back long before the beginning of World War II, as far back as the time of the Soviet's seizure of power, in 1917. It will also be noted, however, that these traditions predate the advent of the Soviet regime, and that the problems presented to the Soviet government by these peoples were not very different from the problems they had presented to the Tsarist government--if, indeed, they were not the same problems carried over from the one regime to the next.

It would appear that the actual reasons for the Soviet government's decision to treat these minorities with such

severity, to expel them from their native territories--men, women, and children alike--and to scatter them across Central Asia and Siberia, stemmed largely from the regime's experiences with these peoples between 1917 and World War II. Notice will be taken of existing evidence of dissatisfaction among these peoples, and of their resistance to the Soviet way of life, on the one hand, and of the Soviet regime's dissatisfaction with these peoples, on the other. It is suggested that the crimes attributed to these peoples during and after the War, for which the deportations supposedly were punishment, served only as the final straw, if, indeed, one were needed, and as a convenience: a reason for the elimination of these peoples which would appear both legitimate and justifiable to the citizens of the Soviet Union and to the rest of the world--although one wonders how either the principle of collective guilt applied to whole nationalities, or the practice of what amounts to genocide, can be justified in any case. All evidence makes it appear that the Soviet authorities leaped at the opportunity to rid themselves, for once and for all, of minorities which had proved extremely troublesome. By accusing the offending peoples of war-time collaboration with the Germans, it was possible to mask, however badly, the fact that the liquidating of whole peoples was but one of the natural results of Soviet nationalities policy carried to its logical outcome and extreme. In the Soviet scheme, the treatment accorded to the Lost Peoples was but the treatment to be accorded to any refractory national minorities

which resisted too strenuously the Soviet process of forced acculturation, which aims, more or less openly, at establishing a "class, universal, and progressive" culture throughout the whole of the U.S.S.R., if not the whole world.

It would also appear, however, that, as the Soviet dictatorship has its roots at least partly in the Tsarist autocracy, the Soviet liquidation of the Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars had its roots deeper in the past than the beginning of the Soviet regime. The fate of these peoples would seem to have been at least partially determined long before 1917, during the time when Russia and the Russian Empire were still ruled by the Tsars. It will be seen that, from the time of their coming under Russian rule, the deported nationalities had in common long histories of either active or passive resistance to the Tsarist regime. In many respects, the liquidation of the Lost Peoples seems to have been really the final, perhaps inevitable, outcome of policies directed against them and the other minorities of the Russian Empire long years before, and largely the result of these peoples' resistance to Tsarist policies of russification, as well as to modern policies of sovietization. The story of these peoples is a striking illustration of the continuum of Russian history. The farther one delves into this story, the more firmly one becomes convinced that the deportations of these seven nationalities seem to follow directly and logically from the policies of the Tsarist regime, and actually to culminate these policies.

At the height of its expansion, the Russian Empire extended over approximately one-sixth of the entire land surface of the globe. At the end of the nineteenth century, it stood as the result of nearly four centuries of almost continuous expansion achieved through conquest and colonization, and embraced under the rule of its Tsar perhaps as many as one hundred and seventy-five national and ethnic minorities, speaking almost as many languages and dialects, and possessing numerous and diverse political, social, and cultural traditions and institutions. Growing steadily outward from its Great Russian nucleus centred in the region between the headwaters of the Volga and Oka rivers on the great Eurasian plain--the site of Moscow--the Russian Empire had, by the close of the nineteenth century, long since ceased to be Great Russian in its ethnical composition.

The principality of Moscow began its emergence as a major political power during the fourteenth century, when most of what is now the European portion of the U.S.S.R. was dominated by the still-powerful Golden Horde, with its capital at Sarai on the lower Volga, or was being drawn into the orbit of the recently-emerged Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which became united dynastically with the Kingdom of Poland in 1386. Through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the princes of Moscow were able one by one to subdue their rival princes in the Great Russian heartland, and slowly but surely to consolidate their

position of primacy as the rulers of the most powerful of the Russian principalities.

There were many reasons for the rise of Moscow during these centuries. Its central geographical position, near to the sources of four major rivers, the principal trading routes in a land where distances were, and are, immense; the personal qualities of her princes, including their exceptional mastery of the art of statecraft and the happy and fortuitous accident of their longevity; the not inconsiderable power and authority which devolved into the hands of these princes through their capacity as collectors of taxes for the Khan of the Golden Horde; the fall of Constantinople to another rising empire, that of the Turks, in 1453, and the subsequent shifting of the centre of eastern Orthodox Christianity from Constantinople to Moscow; the relative political and military weakness of her neighbouring states: all of these, and other reasons, account for the rise of the principality of Moscow to its position of primacy in Russia and the gradual emergence of her princes as the supreme powers in the land.

The city of Novgorod, the eastern terminus of the Hanseatic League, and, since the smashing of the old Kievan state organization by the Tatars in the thirteenth century, the only Russian centre still capable of challenging the authority of Moscow, finally was compelled to admit the suzerainty of Ivan III (1462-1505), in 1478. With all of the Russian lands in

submission to him, Ivan III felt himself strong enough, two years later, to challenge even the supremacy of the Golden Horde. His unanswered challenge to battle, in 1480, marked the end of almost two and a half centuries of Russian submission to "the Tatar yoke"--at least, the formal ending of the Golden Horde's hold over Russia. The great empire founded by the armies of Ghenghis Khan, which, led by his nephew, had easily overthrown the princes of Kiev and carried the Tatar forces deep into the heart of Central Europe, had in reality been in decline for centuries. It had been gradually decaying and becoming fragmented, as the central power diminished, into separate and semi-independent khanates. One of these, the Khanate of Crimea, had split away from the Horde as early as the first twenty years of the fifteenth century, had established itself as a rival power, and became allied with the Ottoman Empire shortly before Ivan III's victory over the Horde on the Oka, in 1480.

The Muscovite state which arose out of the riverlands of the Eurasian plain, between the dynamic and vigorous states to its West and the moribund Asiatic states to its South and East, was an entirely new historical phenomenon, a synthesis of elements both European and Asiatic, and vastly different from its predecessor, the old Kievan state which had been supreme from the tenth to the twelfth centuries. The Kievan state organization had been loose, at times bordering on the anarchistic. Founded upon the strength of its commerce with

Constantinople, Central Europe, Scandinavia, and the Moslem world, it had not known the institution of serfdom; it had been orientated definitely westward, and, through the centuries, had established and maintained with the Western world close religious, cultural, and commercial ties. Its great and most dangerous enemies had been its own lack of centralized authority and the nomads of the steppes--indeed, it is difficult to estimate which of these was in the end most responsible for the fall of the Kievan state. Moscow, on the other hand, emerged into the sixteenth century with an already well-established principle of autocracy, with the institution of serfdom already bred into its social structure, and with its own unique cultural inheritance compounded from old Russian, Byzantine, and oriental elements. Consider also how different was the political scene in which the Tsars of the "new" Russia found themselves.

The coming and the receding of the waves of Tatar invasion had resulted in much more than a mere shifting of the locus of power among the eastern Slavs. In the early sixteenth century, the southern shores of the Baltic were now dominated by the Swedes and the Teutonic Knights. The old Kievan lands as far as the Dneiper river, and including the city of Kiev itself, were now controlled by the nobles of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the power of which extended southward now almost to the littoral of the Black Sea. The Black Sea coasts proper were ruled by the energetic Khanate of the Crimea, the remnant of the Golden Horde now become the vassal-state of another new

and expanding power, Ottoman Turkey. The road to expansion thus lay to the East--into the vast lands which had become, with the decline of Tatar strength, in modern parlance, a power vacuum, which waited only to be filled.

This was to be Moscow's and Russia's destiny: these vast Asiatic steppe-lands, stretching almost uninterruptedly all the way to the Pacific Ocean, and presenting few geographical obstacles to aggrandizement, apart from their tremendous distances. But sparsely populated, in the main, and by nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples who possessed few permanent institutions, this immense and open plain could offer no real deterrent, in the form of organized political or military resistance, to the pressures generated by a large and dynamic state. Russia's rulers were to have their share of successes in the West, in the centuries to come; but always these were to be far more dearly bought and much more difficult to hold than their acquisitions in the East and South.

The reign of Ivan IV (1533-84) graphically illustrates the truth of this statement, and perhaps indicated even to the successors of "the Terrible" what were to be the principal directions, and the manner, of Russia's future expansion. Ivan IV's conquest of the khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, in the 1550's, not only dispelled forever the threat of a renewed Tatar onslaught against Russia, but also obtained for Russia, for the first time, control of the whole course of the Volga

river down to the Caspian Sea. And significantly, for the purposes of this study, these conquests also brought under the rule of the Tsars, for the first time, large numbers of Tatars and other Asiatic peoples who occupied the Volga steppes. In the West, in contrast, Ivan IV found himself both balked and frustrated in his attempts, extending over a quarter-century, to gain a foothold for Russia on the Baltic. After having sacked Novgorod, Russia's only principal outlet to the Baltic, Ivan IV was compelled, finally, to surrender all of his slight but dearly-bought gains, and to abandon Livonia and Estonia to Poland and Sweden, respectively. And, while he was engaged on the Baltic, the Crimean Tatars, who were effectively to bar Russia from the use of the Black Sea for another two centuries, attacked and burned Moscow, in 1571.

The Russian Empire continued to expand its frontiers and to engulf alien peoples, however, from the time of Ivan IV onward. Its growth proceeded almost as if it were a kind of organic process, which needed neither conscious guidance nor will. Indeed, the Empire expanded steadily, in spite of dynastic struggles, foreign invasions, and serious local uprisings; it continued to extend Russian rule, often, without even the knowledge of the Tsars, through the enterprise of private adventurers. A band of these, acting unofficially, as it were, reached the Pacific as early as 1645, and thus staked Russia's claim to all of Siberia.

Alexis I (1645-76) succeeded in winning for the Empire the recognition of the Dneiper, or Zaporozhian, Cossacks in 1654, recovering a portion of the Kievan lands which had been lost to Russia for some four hundred years, and bringing officially into the service of the Empire the first of those anarchistic adventurers who, by one of the strange ironies of history, were to serve so faithfully military and colonial ends, conquering and pacifying other peoples for the autocracy. The transfer of the loyalties of the Cossacks to Russia from Poland also signified the power changes which had been gradually taking place in the fortunes of the two empires. The decline of Poland was the sign of weakness in the West for which the rulers of Russia had long been waiting.

It was, however, left to Peter the Great (1689-1725) definitely to eliminate both Poland and Sweden as dangerous enemies, and to achieve the ambition of Ivan IV for setting Russia upon the shores of the Baltic. And much of Peter the Great's reputation rests upon his having incorporated into Russian Livonia, Estonia, and a part of Finnish Karelia, after the Great Northern War (1700-21), and upon his opening of his "window on Europe"--the new capital on the Baltic, St. Petersburg. But Peter the Great did not neglect the other borders of his realm, and the modern Russian Empire, as it extended until the Revolution of 1917, really dates from Peter's reign--not territorially, but in spirit and in its conception of Russia's mission as a civilizing power. Peter succeeded in capturing a

foothold on the Black Sea by his seizure of the fortress of Azov; his crushing defeat of the Cossacks who had allied themselves with Sweden brought about the full incorporation into the Empire of the entire eastern Ukraine and the final dissolution of the Cossack hetmanate there. He established strong naval bases on the Caspian Sea; and his Persian adventure in 1722, undertaken against a decaying state lapsed into anarchy, though it yielded no immediate territorial gains, demonstrated the practicability of a relatively easy flanking movement around the mountain chains of the Caucasus, and pointed the way for the Russian advance into Transcaucasia and Central Asia.

Sir Bernard Pares, referring to the period of Russian history between the death of Peter the Great and the accession of Catherine the Great, in 1762, has asked rhetorically: "Who would take this miserable record as the history of a people?"<sup>5</sup> And yet, although its progress of growth was somewhat slower and less spectacular than in the reigns preceding and following these forty years, Russia continued to expand. Further territories in Finland were gained, past gains on the Black Sea coastal areas were consolidated, and the extreme limits of northeast Asia were reached. The most important development, however, during this period, was the perfecting of the system of Cossack lines--"stations" linked by forts--which prevented the incursions of native and outlaw bands on the border settlements. But it was also during this period that Russia increased her influence with the kings of Georgia, and made her extremely

useful alliance with the princes of Kabarda, who controlled the northern slope of the main chain of the Northern Caucasus, between the headwaters of the Kuban and Terek rivers.

Catherine the Great (1762-96) continued with great industry the policy of consolidation of the Empire while, at the same time, she also made spectacular extensions of its borders. Through her wars with Turkey, Catherine added to her state's territories, finally, the Black Sea coast, including Crimea and its inhabitants, the Crimean Tatars, and southwestern Ukraine to the Dneister river. Her scheming with Prussia and Austria brought under Russian rule, through the Partitions of Poland, not only Lithuania, Byelorussia, and large slices of western Ukraine, but also considerable portions of ethnic Poland, with its Polish population and its large concentrations of Jews. In the southeast, the last of the free Cossacks, those of the Don, Kuban, and Terek regions, were effectively brought under control and enlisted in the service of the Empire. Most of eastern Transcaucasia was gained, and the northern approaches to the Caucasus were secured by the extending of the Cossack lines. Catherine II also brought in numbers of settlers from Europe, particularly from Germany, to farm and to settle the borderlands and to render them more secure.

As the nineteenth century opened, Catherine II's son, Paul I (1796-1801), peacefully annexed the Kingdom of Georgia. Alexander I (1801-25) added modern Finland to the

Empire in 1809, had granted to Russia by the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, the central regions of Poland, and, from Turkey, annexed Bessarabia and obtained for Russia extensive rights in the Danubian principalities. Nicholas I (1825-55) continued to record large gains for the Empire. His armies took Erivan and a large portion of Armenia from Persia, now definitely moribund as a power. They conquered the immense reaches of the Kirghiz steppes, and thus prepared for the later expansion into Turkmenistan. In eastern Siberia, they encroached on China by establishing permanent settlements at the mouth of the Amur river. And from Turkey--"the sick man of Europe", as the Ottoman Empire was termed by Nicholas himself--his most persistent enemy, the Tsar gained most of the eastern shore of the Black Sea, the mouth of the Danube, and the right to rule over the former Turkish dominions in the Northern Caucasus--although it was to be left to his successors actually to enjoy this right.

Alexander II (1855-81), the Tsar known as "the great liberator" for his emancipation of the serfs of Russia, as if to make up for this title, brought into the orbit of Russian domination most of the peoples of Turkmenistan, and secured the military conquest of the ancient Central Asian khanates of Khiva, Bokhara, and Kokand. At last, in the final year of his reign, the entire Transcaspian region was annexed, in 1881. Alexander III (1881-94) completed the Russian advance into Central Asia, as far as the borders of Afghanistan. And finally, under Nicholas II (1894-1917), the last of the Romanovs,

Russia extended her military and commercial influence into Northern Manchuria, Mongolia, and Korea, obtained from China the ports of Port Arthur and Talienwan, and thus set the stage for the Revolution of 1905, which was brought about so largely by the disastrous Russo-Japanese conflict, and which marked the beginning of the end for the Russian Empire.

It is perhaps impossible to exaggerate, or to over-emphasize, the diversity of the peoples brought under Russian rule through these centuries of expansion. While it is true that the coming of the Russians meant for a portion of these peoples the advent of a higher civilization, these were mainly those peoples belonging to the small tribes of Siberia and the Arctic regions. The civilizing mission of Russian imperialism could hardly be invoked in the context of many of the peoples Russia came to rule over from the time of Peter the Great onward. The Poles, Germans, Finns, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Tatars, and many of the Moslem peoples of Central Asia were not only the cultural and political equals of the Russians, at the very least, but also were, in many cases, materially richer.

There was, however, no glorying in diversity in the Empire of the Tsars. All of the peoples of Russia, regardless of the richness of their pasts, were, generally speaking, expected to conform to a single standard. And that standard was the standard of the Great Russians. The weakness of the Russian Empire was not that it contained a great diversity of peoples;

multinationality in itself cannot be considered a weakness in a state. The trouble was that the multinational character of a large proportion of the peoples of the Russian Empire was treated as if it did not exist at all--or else was regarded as a kind of disease, which was to be gotten rid of as quickly and as efficaciously as possible.

The expansion of the Russian Empire has been very briefly traced in general terms. The remainder of this chapter consists of historical notes on the particular seven peoples who constitute the case studies for this work, and of a closer inspection of the circumstances of their coming under Russian rule.

### iii

The Volga Germans immigrated to Russia originally as agricultural settlers or colonists, most of them in response to the two imperial manifestoes of Catherine II, in 1762 and 1763, inviting colonists from Europe to take up land and to settle in the southern and eastern regions of the Russian Empire.<sup>6</sup> Under the terms of these manifestoes, those who answered the call were to receive not only free land and interest-free loans to aid them in becoming established in their new homeland, but also other concessions which, from the beginning of their life in Russia, marked them off from the vast majority of the peoples of the Empire as members of a highly-privileged and favoured minority. They were promised the right of local self-government and

freedom from taxation and other burdens for a period of many years. And more important, perhaps--in view of the religious beliefs of large numbers of the colonists--they were guaranteed complete freedom of religion and exemption from all kinds of either civilian or military service.<sup>7</sup>

The Germans of the Volga represented one aspect of one of Catherine II's most consistent and steadfast policies: the settling and the pacifying of the recently-acquired frontierlands of southern and eastern European Russia. At the time of Catherine's accession to the throne, these borderlands needed badly to be stabilized; they provided a haven for bands of outlaws--free Cossacks, adventurers, runaway serfs, religious dissenters, and other anti-social and criminal elements--which, along with the nomadic and semi-nomadic native tribes which had not yet been fully pacified, posed a constant threat to both the agricultural settlements and the growing towns of the frontiers.

It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to analyze in detail all of the considerations which played a part in Catherine II's decision to settle foreigners--Europeans, and particularly Germans--in the southern and eastern borderlands, but some of these considerations should at least be noted. Catherine herself, of course, was a German princess, the dynasty was German, and most of the Empresses and Grand Duchesses, like her, could trace their origins to the petty German courts; there was, in Russian palace circles, a strong conviction of the

superiority of the German peasant over the Russian peasant, as a settler. To reinforce this belief, there was, moreover, the example set by Catherine's illustrious predecessor, Peter the Great, who had allowed the descendants of the Teutonic Knights to retain their countless privileges, and their position as conquerors and landlords over a subject population, after his defeat of the Swedes in the Great Northern War and his winning of the Livonian and Estonian provinces. These so-called "Baltic Barons" or "Herrenvolk" had responded well to Russian rule, and, in the half-century or so after the death of Peter, had proved themselves to be loyal, orderly, and industrious subjects, and faithful supporters of the Tsarist administration.<sup>8</sup> But, apart from any considerations which might have told in favour of the Germans and other Europeans as settlers and colonizers, there was also in Russia a very serious shortage of Russian subjects who were capable of playing such a role. Russia, despite her large population, was also a land of immense spaces, and was, therefore, thinly populated. But there were other reasons for the shortage of suitable settlers in Russia, the evolution of which may be traced through the half-century between the death of Peter the Great and the accession of Catherine II. Under a succession of weak and sickly rulers, the Russian gentry had, since 1725, succeeded in emancipating itself from the services which, under Peter, it had had to perform, and in return for which it had been granted its many privileges, including rights over the bodies of its peasants. The emancipation of the gentry was completed and

formalized scant months before Catherine came to the throne--by her husband, Peter III, in May, 1762--and should logically have been followed by the emancipating of the serfs from the squires, now transformed for the first time into something resembling an ordinary European aristocracy. But Catherine, in reality a foreign adventuress who possessed no legitimate claim whatever to the throne of Russia, owed everything to the gentry. She was, therefore, in no position to challenge the entire social system which had come into being in Russia, by emancipating the serfs; and, in particular, she was not prepared to challenge the very class which had elevated her to the throne.<sup>9</sup> Serfdom remained--the maintenance of the status quo was a low price to pay for an Empire. The number of free peasants remained negligible. If the borderlands were to be pacified and settled, then, the settlers had to be attracted from outside of the Empire.

The pioneers who answered Catherine's manifestoes, as might be expected, seem to have been largely persons who, for one reason or another, had been unsuccessful in their native lands, and who wished to build in Russia a new life for their families and themselves: ex-convicts, members of persecuted religious and pacifistic sects such as the Mennonites and Hutterites, disinherited sons, cashiered officers, prostitutes, ruined merchants and craftsmen, and the like:

All historians of the colonization, not excluding the descendants of the colonists themselves, described the majority of Catherine's 'pioneers' as the lowest

scum of the German people . . . all sorts of people 'who had failed in life, and idlers hoping to be transferred to a paradise where not the slightest effort was expected of them'.<sup>10</sup>

In all, about 25,000 of these answered the initial appeals made for settlers for the Empire's virgin lands:<sup>11</sup> a motley crew, perhaps, but probably little different from the type of settler which has been found similarly successful in North America and in other new areas of colonization.

The Tatars of Crimea came under the rule of Russia at almost the same time as the German colonists were flocking to, and establishing themselves upon their new lands in the region of the middle Volga. Unlike the Volga Germans, however, the Tatars were not newcomers to Russia; neither were they anxious to become the subjects of Moscow. For more than five centuries, the Crimean Tatars had occupied their peninsula, and had built for themselves a militarily aggressive and commercially prosperous state. Nor were they, as were so many of the alien peoples engulfed by the wave of Russian advancement, in any way a backward people. Over the centuries, they had erected a civilization and a culture of their own which were in no way inferior to those of Moscow.

The Crimean Tatars were descendants of a part of the so-called Mongol armies of Ghenghis Khan which had settled in Crimea, driving out or assimilating the previous nomad inhabitants, in the wake of the campaigns of the years 1237-41, which

had carried the Tatars into the heart of Europe and which had established their suzerainty over all of Russia. The principal centre of the Tatar Golden Horde, from which Russia was to be taxed and plundered for more than 200 years, was founded at Sarai on the lower Volga, and, while the power of the Horde remained undiminished, Tatar Crimea was only one of a number of outposts of the Khan. With the decline of the power of the Golden Horde, however, and with its fragmenting into separate and independent khanates, the Crimean Tatars gradually asserted their autonomy, and declared themselves separate around 1425. At the height of its power, this state, with its capital at Bakhchiserai, controlled most of the northern coasts of the Black Sea, exerted its influence deep into the southern Ukrainian "no-man's land" between the Black Sea and the lands ruled by Poland and Russia, and as far east as the region between the Don and Volga rivers and the Caucasus.

The Crimean Khanate, although it became tributary to the Ottoman Empire about 1470, some ten years before the signal failure of the moribund Golden Horde to suppress the challenge of the rising power of Moscow under Ivan III, was for centuries a powerful factor in any conflict involving Russia. In 1480, for example, the Crimean Tatars joined Ivan III in his campaigns against the Lithuanians, thereby helping to prevent the extension of the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth farther into the old Kievan lands. A century later, while Ivan IV was involved in his Baltic campaigns, they attacked and sacked Moscow.

They waged numerous campaigns against both Poland and Russia, though these were more in the form of raids, seeking slaves and riches, than of sustained and full-scale wars.

But the strength of the Khanate of Crimea was dependent far more upon commercial than upon military considerations. From at least the middle of the fifteenth century, the Tatars carried on a flourishing trade not only with the centres surrounding the Black Sea, but also with the khanates of Central Asia and the settlements of the Mediterranean. Their recognition of the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, though it had undoubted military value, seems to have been dictated principally by their wish to extend their trading routes; after the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, it was both necessary and desirable, if trade with the ports of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean were to continue and to expand, that the most friendly relations possible should be established and maintained with the power controlling these waters, and particularly the Straits. The closeness and the durability of the ties between Crimea and Turkey were, in addition, greatly aided by the fact that the Crimean Tatars and the Anatolian Turks were co-religionists--Moslems of the Summite doctrine--and spoke dialects of Turki very nearly related, and closely akin also to the dialect spoken by the Turks of Azerbaijan.<sup>12</sup> With the fall of the Volga khanates to Russia, the Crimean Tatars found themselves much more proximate to Turkey than to any other Moslem state; and, over the centuries, this geographical proximity, already

reinforced by religious, linguistic, commercial and military ties, became also a cultural proximity.

Crimea's trade was carried on largely in agricultural produce: silk and cotton materials, and large quantities of wheat.<sup>13</sup> Slaves, however, also played a prominent part, especially in trade with other Moslem centres, and were one of the chief objects of the Tatar raids into the Polish and Russian borderlands. On the Crimean coasts, the practice of gardening, the cultivation of vine-crops and tobacco, the raising and breeding of fine cattle, and the silk-worm industry all achieved high standards. Grain crops and cotton flourished in the coastal uplands.<sup>14</sup>

Since being annexed by Catherine II, Crimea has been referred to commonly as "the Russian Riviera", but this term describes accurately only about one per cent. of the peninsula's total area--the narrow southern coastal strip. The uplands adjacent to this--about another 19 per cent. of the total area--are the areas especially favourable to the cultivation of the soil. But the remaining four-fifths of the peninsula, beyond the coastal mountains, is mostly an arid and wind-swept steppeland, very thinly populated; and the regions of the northern and north-eastern peninsula are particularly inhospitable.<sup>15</sup>

With the aid of Turkey, then, the Crimean Tatars were able successfully to bar Russia from the Black Sea coasts for some three hundred years, and to erect and maintain a garden-like

civilization on the shores of the steppes--a civilization marked strongly not only by Turkish and other eastern influences, but also by the influence of western Italian culture, and particularly that of Genoa. It is notable that Catherine the Great, on her grand tour of South Russia in 1787, was able to dazzle the representatives of the crowned heads of Europe, who were accustomed to almost any luxury, with the splendour and opulence of her newly-acquired Crimean "province".<sup>16</sup>

This acquisition culminated long years of Russian advance toward the Black Sea and a gradual encroachment upon those regions, first, held by the Cossacks of the Dneiper--who had themselves been able to capture the Tatar fortress-town of Azov in 1637, and to offer it to the Tsar--then, gradually upon the Tatar steppes. In 1637, Michael I had feared to give offence to Turkey and had refused to accept the Cossacks' offer of Azov. By 1696, however, Peter the Great was himself able to seize the fortress for Russia. Though he was compelled to return the fortress to Crimea by the Treaty of the Pruth, in 1711, the Russians had reached the Black Sea, Turkey was beginning to lose its grip on its empire, and the Crimean Tatars were doomed to gradual isolation and annexation. Russia continued to encroach, little by little, through the eighteenth century.

Catherine I's First Turkish War, in which the Russian forces were overwhelmingly successful, brought about the final severance of the long Turkish political connection with Crimea.

By the terms of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, ending the war in 1774, Russia gained her first footholds upon the peninsula proper, and annexed the fortress-towns of Kinburn, Yenikale, and Kerch. Crimea was declared "independent", which in fact meant that a Russian protectorate was established, and a puppet khan was installed two years later. These Russian manoeuvres provoked rebellions by the Tatars in 1778, 1782, and 1783, each of which had to be put down by Russian invasion.<sup>17</sup> Following the last invasion, on the plea of restoring and maintaining order, Crimea was annexed by Russia in 1783.

The Kalmyks were the only Mongol people, and the only Buddhist people in Europe. Unlike so many of the Asiatic peoples who came into Europe in the rear of the invading and conquering armies of Ghenghis Khan--for example, the Tatars of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Crimea--the Kalmyks were relative newcomers, having made their appearance in the region of the lower Volga, and having appealed to the Tsar for his protection as late as the beginning of the seventeenth century, about 1625. Known also as Torgout or Oirat Mongols, the Kalmyks belong to the western branch of the Mongol people which inhabits also eastern Tibet and eastern Sinkiang.<sup>18</sup> Their distinctive Chinese physiognomy distinguished them almost as markedly from the Tatars as from the Slavs in Eurasia.<sup>19</sup> They spoke a language virtually the same as that spoken in Mongolia proper, and used the old Mongolian alphabet--indeed, it was the Kalmyks who perfected the alphabet in the middle of the seventeenth century.<sup>20</sup> Also unlike

most of the Turkic tribes, which follow one or another of the branches of Islam, the Kalmyks were Buddhists of the Zonkavist or Lamaist rite, whose spiritual centre is Lhasa, in Tibet, and whose supreme spiritual ruler is the Dalai Lama. On the cis-Caspian steppes, they lived a simple nomadic life, under the supreme authority of their own khan, who exercised unlimited despotic and theocratic powers vested in him by the Dalai Lama himself.<sup>21</sup> Pastoral people, they wandered regularly over the steppes with their families and their kibitki--their felt family-tents which doubled as carts--and with their herds and flocks of cattle, camels, and sheep.

The Kalmyks who remained in Russia after 1771 were a mere remnant of the original Kalmyk migration from Chinese Turkestan in 1630--a great trek undertaken by about 50,000 families with their herds.<sup>22</sup> The Kalmyks had left their ancestral home and had driven their kibitki and flocks westward, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, to escape the rule of the expanding power of China, which threatened to subjugate all of the Mongol tribes. They had settled on the arid steppes both east and west of the Volga. And there, where rainfall averages only some 4-8 inches per year, where cultivation of the soil is possible in only a few elevated areas, and where there are frequent duststorms,<sup>23</sup> they continued to live, for the most part, much as they had for centuries, following their flocks, although a portion of them settled on the shores of the Caspian and became fishermen.

The Kalmyks were also fierce warriors. From the time of their appearance on the Volga steppes, the Russian authorities, taking advantage of the hereditary antagonism between the Kalmyks and the Turkic tribes, employed them as allies against the Turks, the Crimean Tatars,<sup>24</sup> and against the recalcitrant tribes of the Urals.<sup>25</sup> Any attempts, however, to strengthen this alliance and to bring the Kalmyks under more direct control resulted in emigrations of large numbers of them to their homeland. It is recorded that Peter the Great, who as a rule was not noted for his kind treatment of Asiatic peoples, entrusted the safekeeping of the eastern borders of the Russian Empire to the Kalmyk Khan, when he took his first educational trip to Europe, in 1697.<sup>26</sup> So great was Peter's regard for the Kalmyks as fighters that they were among the Asiatic troops which he unleashed in Livonia, in 1702, to devastate that province so completely that it could not for a long time serve as a base for any attack by the Swedes.<sup>27</sup> This, it might be noted, was the first appearance of such soldiers in Europe since the Tatar invasions of the thirteenth century. As late as the year 1760, a combined force of Kalmyks and Cossacks raided Berlin,<sup>28</sup> and, altogether, these Mongol troops served the military policies of the Tsars very well. With their almost blind obedience to their khan, and with their low estimate of the worth of individual life and the environing world--ideas basic to their religious beliefs<sup>29</sup>--they were fearless warriors and faithful allies.

In keeping with her desire to ease the administration problems and to consolidate the various territories of the Russian Empire, however, Catherine II no longer wished to have the Kalmyks either as vassals or allies. They were to become directly subject to the Russian crown.<sup>30</sup> Proud and independent, the majority of the Kalmyks refused to accede to this change in their status, and decided to follow their khan back to eastern Turkestan, rather than submit to Russia and Catherine's plan which threatened to abolish even the title of khan.<sup>31</sup> Having already received a mission from the Chinese emperor, inviting them to return to Turkestan, the Kalmyks set off, in the winter of 1771, on another great migration. Across the steppes in winter, pursued by the Russians, harassed by the nomadic Kirghiz and Kazakh tribes, some two to three hundred thousand Kalmyks<sup>32</sup> plodded eastward, taking their flocks and herds with them, on an eight-month march covering some three thousand miles.<sup>33</sup> The descendants of these travellers still live in Sinkiang, under the name of Torgout.<sup>34</sup>

Those who remained behind--a remnant numbering some 50,000<sup>35</sup>--would have left Russia, too. But the thawing of the ice on the Volga is supposed to have prevented their crossing with their fellows.<sup>36</sup> This remnant was now confined almost entirely to the low-lying north-western shore of the Caspian, and to the steppes south and west of the Volga. Alien and anomalous in Europe, the Kalmyks who remained under Russia when their alliance with the Russians had finally become vassalage

thus came under direct Russian rule at almost the same time as the Germans of the Volga and the Tatars of Crimea.

The mountain peoples of the Northern Caucasus were the last of the seven groups which this study is examining to come under effective Russian domination. They were not finally conquered until the second half of the nineteenth century, and after more than thirty years of savage warfare, although Russia secured her first real foothold in the Northern Caucasus as early as the sixteenth century. Of all the peoples of the Russian Empire, none possessed a tradition more proud and lengthy of bitter and implacable resistance to the encroachments of invaders, than the North Caucasian mountaineers, among whom were included the Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars.

The largest of these four peoples, the Chechens (of whom the Ingushes are, in fact, a closely-related branch), are supposed to have been mentioned in the works of Greek historians as many as 2,500 years ago.<sup>37</sup> For all practical purposes, therefore, they are classed as indigenous Caucasians, of the type which has been well described:

That peculiar type which is native to these parts, so-called 'autochthonous'--'out of the ground'--is quite permanent, always resurgent, mastering the bodies of new masters. The strong-boned physique, the broad square head with its thick wavy growth of hair and beard, the wide dark eyes, the sallow skin, are bred

to these mountain peoples from the Ice Age. This type is called Armenoid, or more appropriately, Alpine; it has spread to Europe in prehistoric times along the mountain belt as far as the Pyrenees . . . surviving, as all types, mostly in those parts which were likeliest in condition to its homeland.<sup>38</sup>

The Karachays and Balkars, in comparison to the Chechens and Ingushes, were relative newcomers to the region. Closely-related Turkic peoples, the Karachays and Balkars arrived and settled in the North Caucasian mountains in the twelfth century; one of the numerous peoples set in motion during the great waves of Tatar expansion westward, they are thought to have come to the Caucasus from the north.<sup>39</sup>

According to the linguistic classifications of Marr, the Chechens and Ingushes belong to the language group of North Caucasian Japhetides.<sup>40</sup> The Karachays and Balkars, on the other hand, speak dialects of a language classed among the Japhetic-Turkic hybrids<sup>41</sup>--that is, a tongue closely akin to all of the western Turkic languages, and especially to Kumyk,<sup>42</sup> but having adopted the "th" sounds and other characteristics from the languages of its adjoining Caucasian neighbours.<sup>43</sup>

The Chechens and Ingushes occupied the corner formed by the upper and middle course of the Terek river and its right tributaries, the Arzun and Assa rivers,<sup>44</sup> with the Ingushes being confined almost entirely to the extreme western regions of this

area. Located to the north of extremely ethnographically-mixed Daghestan, Chechnia extends along the eastern part of the north slopes of the main Caucasian chain, and is a land of rugged peaks and deep valleys, covered with thick growths of beech forests.<sup>45</sup> Until the Russian conquest in the 1850's, this region, so far as is known, had never been conquered by an invading force, but had successfully withstood the all-conquering armies of the Tatars, in 1221, and had defied all Tatar efforts for the century following; after a brief respite from invasion, the Chechens had repulsed the armies of the great Tamerlane, at the end of the fourteenth century; and, from the fifteenth century onward, they had resisted with notable success the successive invasions of the Persians, the Ottoman Turks, and the Crimean Tatars.<sup>46</sup> The Ingush lands, while almost equally rugged and forbidding, were rather less defensible, and had come under alien domination at least twice before the nineteenth century--under the kings of Georgia in the eleventh century, and under the princes of Kabarda in the fifteenth.<sup>47</sup> The Karachays and Balkars had undergone numerous occupations during the centuries of struggle among the various empires and rustic principalities for control of the trans-Caucasian passes. Separated from the Chechens and Ingushes both by mountains and by the lands of the Ossetians and the Kabardans, the Karachays and Balkars, though geographically contiguous, were also separated from each other. The Balkars, a nation of shepherds, kept themselves virtually confined to the highlands of the western slopes of the mountain

chain that divides the headwaters of the Kuban and Terek rivers; the Karachays occupied the fertile lowlands and valleys to the West, where, like most of the peoples of the Northern Caucasus, they practised a combination of farming and herding. They grazed their flocks of sheep and goats, and their herds of cattle, on the higher meadows, and, in the valleys and lowlands, developed a highly-skilled agriculture which specialized in orcharding and bee-keeping.<sup>48</sup>

The Caucasus is balkanized in the extreme, abounding with both large and small enclaves of peoples, many of whom history has passed by, and it is almost impossible to classify satisfactorily even its larger language groups. For the purposes of this study, however, it is sufficient that note be taken of the immediate neighbours of the four deported nations. The Ossetians and Kabardans have already been mentioned as the peoples separating the Chechens and Ingushes from the Karachays and Balkars. They controlled the main defiles of the Caucasian chain (through which was built, at the end of the eighteenth century, the famed Georgian Military Road from Vladikavkaz to Tiflis, so well-described in the works of Lermontov and Tolstoy, among others), and had made alliances with the Russians and the Empress Anne (1730-40) in the early eighteenth century. The Ossetians, on the one hand, were Christians, whose lands bordered on Georgia to the South; the Kabardans, on the other hand, were of mixed Cherkess, or Circassian, and Tatar origin, and were historically pro-Russian. They separated the Chechens and the other

tribes of the eastern mountain regions of the North Caucasus not only from the Karachays and Balkars, but also from the much more numerous and militarily-important Cherkess, also indigenous Caucasians, who lived along the Black Sea coast and along the Kuban river's lower reaches. The Cherkess, unlike the democratic tribes of Chechnia and Daghestan, to the East, had a hierarchical social and political organization. In Daghestan, along the Caspian coast, in mountain ranges fully as inaccessible as those of Chechnia, there was a land-owning class in the lowlands, mainly descended from Tatar intruders,<sup>49</sup> but, in the mountains, democratic predatory septs closely akin to those of the Chechens made up the larger part of the population.

The four deported nations of the Northern Caucasus, then--Chechens and Ingushes, Karachays and Balkars--while they shared a way of life common to most of the mountain peoples, were divided by geography, and by race and language. Their cultural traditions also differed: the Karachays and Balkars, on the one hand, having been exposed to the influence of Georgia and other neighbours, and also, along with the Cherkess and the Crimean Tatars, to the influence of Anatolian Turkey, though to a lesser extent than either of these groups; and the Chechens and Ingushes, on the other hand, deriving their cultural traditions almost entirely from Persia, whose cultural and political influence had been dominant in the eastern Caucasus for almost two thousand years.<sup>50</sup> Nevertheless, these peoples did share one extremely important attribute which minimized their many

differences and bound them together: their belief in Islam. All were followers of the Summite doctrine of the Mohammedan faith.

It is impossible to over-emphasize or to exaggerate the importance of Islam among the peoples of the Northern Caucasus. To all of the Mohammedan mountain peoples, the Moslem religion was not only a religious institution which regulated the daily life of its members in almost every particular, but it was also a social, legal, and political force. The numerous clergy of the Moslems--the imams and mullahs--were not only religious leaders, but also judges, law-givers, teachers, intellectuals, and political, and sometimes, military leaders. The Mohammedan faith as a whole, of course, prescribes war and advocates violence toward all non-Moslems; "Verily, God loves those who fight in His cause", states the Koran.<sup>51</sup> But the doctrine of Muridism which, toward the end of the seventeenth century attracted many of the North Caucasian Moslems--and influenced particularly the Chechens, onto whose conforming way of life its democratic and egalitarian tenets fitted especially well--was something else again.

The fantastic fighting strength of Muridism, the followers of which never attained very considerable numbers, can hardly be understood without comprehending the Murid conception of war. "Fight strenuously against the misbelievers and hypocrites, and be stern toward them":<sup>52</sup> this quotation from the

Koran, along with the other quoted above, sums up the creed of the Murids succinctly. For them, war was not to be fought for any idea or hope of material gain, or even for ideals of political independence. War possessed great intrinsic value in itself, as a vehicle--indeed, the vehicle--for self-purification and self-sacrifice.<sup>53</sup> It was the means by which the Murid warrior cleansed his soul, preparing it for paradise through his complete self-immolation.<sup>54</sup> His most sacred object and duty was to die in battle against the infidel.<sup>55</sup> Muridism blended mysticism with social motives, and was fanatical, ascetic, and levelling. Its adherents constituted a kind of warrior monastic order, in which all of the initiated were equal and, at the same time, completely obedient to the spiritual and military leader, the imam. Forming an elite religious fighting force, the Murids were relieved of all normal duties toward the village elders and the landowners. Everything else was subordinated to their religious contemplation and to war.

The fall of Astrakhan to Ivan IV, in 1556, opened the way to the Caucasus for the Russians, and almost immediately the Kabardans, who had been allied with Astrakhan against the Crimean Tatars, formed a new alliance with the Tsar. In 1561, Ivan IV married a Kabardan princess, thereby cementing the alliance, and establishing Russia's influence in the northern mountains. Forts were built on the Terek to protect Kabarda from the Daghestan tribes, but no real further progress was made until the 1720's. The Kabardans, though submitting to the

suzerainty of the Tsars, remained practically independent, and the only evidences of Russian influence lay in the quasi-independent Cossack settlements on the plains, along the river valleys.

Peter the Great undertook the conquest of the Persian provinces along the Caspian coast of the Caucasus in 1722, and successfully occupied most of the coastal regions from Derbent to Baku before withdrawing. His campaign showed the relative ease with which the mountain barriers could be flanked. The Empress Anne, in the 1730's, continued to extend the Cossack lines, however, more deeply into the mountains of Chechnia, first completing the line from the lower Don river to the Terek. Then, Catherine the Great, in the 1760's, undertook in earnest the conquest of the Caucasus.

The Cossack line was extended 250 miles up the Terek to Mozdok; in 1772, through the Treaty of Karsou signed with Crimea, and the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji with Turkey in 1774, Kabarda and Ossetia were formally annexed; in 1777, Catherine approved the establishment of a new Cossack line, the "Caucasian line", from Mozdok to the Sea of Azov, thus isolating the Cherkess tribes; until the end of her reign, Catherine made gradual gains, through either alliances or conquests, and successfully occupied northern and eastern Daghestan by the time of her death. She was also able to negotiate an alliance with Georgia in 1768, and in 1783 signed a treaty which guaranteed

Georgian territorial integrity. The Georgian protectorate was formally annexed by Paul I, in 1801, and this, along with the Russian victories over the Persians, in 1796, which had placed all of eastern Transcaucasia under Russian control, successfully completed the sustained flanking movement whereby the most difficult terrain and the most hostile tribes were gone around. The mountains themselves, with the Cherkess on the Black Sea coast and the tribes of Daghestan and Chechnia on the eastern side of the Georgian Military Road, were yet to be conquered. But the Cherkess, after 1829 and the fall of the Turkish fortresses on the Black Sea coast, were cut off from contact with Turkey, except by sea; the Chechens and Ingushes, meantime, along with the tribes of Daghestan, were completely isolated in their mountains. The Treaty of Adrianople had forced Turkey to abandon all her claims to suzerainty in the Caucasus and left the Turks with no pretensions to interfere with whatever measures the Russians might take to pacify the mountains and the mountaineers. Nevertheless, this pacification became the main preoccupation of the Russian armies for the following quarter of a century, and was not finally completed until after the Crimean War. The first thirty years of the Chechens and Ingushes under Russian rule, therefore, were spent in armed revolt, assisted whenever possible by the Karachays and Balkars and by the other mountain peoples. So bitterly fought were these battles, and so fierce and implacable were the mountain people as foes, that the period of the Russian campaigns in the Caucasus stands almost by itself as a period in Russian literature.

This chapter has served as an introduction to the subject of the present study, and has sketched briefly the expansion of the Russian Empire and the historical backgrounds of the seven groups who are the study's particular interests, as well as the circumstances of their coming under Russian rule. The background of each people was different, and the circumstances under which each group became subject to the Tsars varied considerably, if the four North Caucasian peoples are treated as if they comprised a single group. There were, however, among all seven minorities, many similarities, or near similarities which become immediately apparent. All, of course, were of non-Slavic nationality or race, and among them, represented the four principal non-Slavic minorities to be embraced by the Russian Empire: the Volga Germans representing the Europeans; the Chechens and Ingushes, the autochthonous Caucasians; the Kalmyks, the Mongolic peoples; and the Crimean Tatars, Karachays and Balkars, the Turkic peoples. The majority (almost all) of the members of each group professed religious beliefs alien to the official beliefs of the Russian Empire and the Russian Orthodox Church. The Volga Germans, for the most part, belonged either to the Lutheran Church or to various minor evangelical sects of Protestantism; the Kalmyks were Buddhists; and the other five groups were Summite Moslems. All seven groups also had connections of some kind, whether cultural, religious, or political, outside of the Empire: the Volga Germans with their homeland; the Kalmyks with their brothers in Chinese Turkestan and with their co-religionists in Tibet; the Crimean Tatars,

Karachays and Balkars with Ottoman Turkey; and the Chechens and Ingushes, after the disappearance of Persia as a political power, also with Turkey. All of these peoples came under effective Russian rule and became citizens of the Empire at approximately the same period of history--roughly, from the beginning of the last quarter of the eighteenth century to the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth--during the great period of Tsarist imperialism. It might be objected that the Kalmyks were subject to Russia long before this; but formally, at least, they were allies of Russia until the reign of Catherine II, and did not become Russian subjects officially until 1771. Finally, and this seems especially important in retrospect, all of these peoples, with the exception of the Volga Germans, possessed lengthy histories of resistance to Russian rule and were only brought into the Empire as reluctant subjects through the direct or indirect force of Russian arms. All seven peoples, for these reasons, were marked out from the beginning for special attention by the Russian authorities.

Notes: I

<sup>1</sup>This total figure of 1,300,000 breaks down by groups as follows:

Chechens	407,690
Volga Germans	382,000
Crimean Tatars	202,000
Kalmyks	134,271
Ingushes	92,074
Karachays	75,737
Balkars	42,666

The figures for all groups except the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars are taken from the official 1939 Soviet census. The figures for these groups are estimates based on the percentages of Volga Germans and Crimean Tatars to the total populations of their national republics in 1939 and 1936, respectively. For a close analysis of these and other figures relating to the deportations, see R. Conquest, The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities (London: MacMillan, 1960), especially chs. 4 and 12.

<sup>2</sup>It should be noted parenthetically in this regard that the Volga Germans present a case quite different from those of the other deported peoples, since their territories were not reached by Hitler's armies, and since, in any case, their deportation took place early in the War, only months after Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Collaboration for the Volga Germans was, therefore, entirely out of the question, unless one is prepared to countenance the extremely suspect charges of sabotage, etc., laid against them by the Soviet authorities. It should be noted further that, throughout the whole of this study, the Volga Germans must to some extent be differentiated from the other groups under discussion because of the exceptional and unique position they occupied for at least part of their time under both the Tsars and the Soviets. For these reasons, the Volga Germans must often be counted as the exception to general statements which apply to the other six peoples.

<sup>3</sup>Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-45 (London: MacMillan, 1957), p. 658.

<sup>4</sup>Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, Clyde Kluckhohn, How the Soviet System Works (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 233.

<sup>5</sup>Sir Bernard Pares, A History of Russia, definitive ed., intro. Richard Pares (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 242.

<sup>6</sup>Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies (New York: Praeger, 1952), p. 69.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Sir John Maynard, Russia In Flux, ed. and abridged S. Haden Guest, from Russia In Flux and The Russian Peasant and Other Studies (New York: MacMillan, 1949), p. 447.

<sup>9</sup>Pares, op. cit., pp. 249-50.

<sup>10</sup>Kolarz, loc. cit.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields (Cambridge: University Press, 1953), p. 16.

<sup>13</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 76.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Solomon Schwarz, The Jews In the Soviet Union (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1951), p. 258.

<sup>16</sup>George Soloveytchik, Potemkin (New York: W.W. Morton, 1947), pp. 174 ff.

<sup>17</sup>Conquest, op. cit., p. 38.

<sup>18</sup>Waldemar Jochelson, Peoples of Asiatic Russia (New York: American Museum of Natural History, 1928), p. 157.

<sup>19</sup>Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians, English trans. (New York: Putnam, 1928), vol. I, p. 79.

<sup>20</sup>Conquest, op. cit., p. 36.

<sup>21</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 81.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Conquest, loc. cit.

<sup>24</sup>Leroy-Beaulieu, loc. cit.

<sup>25</sup>Kolarz, loc. cit.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Pares, op. cit., p. 202.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 239.

<sup>29</sup>R.E. Hume, The World's Living Religions, revised ed. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1927), p. 82.

- <sup>30</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 82.
- <sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 81.
- <sup>32</sup>Leroy-Beaulieu, loc. cit.
- <sup>33</sup>Conquest, op. cit., p. 38.
- <sup>34</sup>Jochelson, loc. cit.
- <sup>35</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 82.
- <sup>36</sup>Leroy-Beaulieu, loc. cit.
- <sup>37</sup>Jochelson, op. cit., p. 238.
- <sup>38</sup>W.F.D. Allen, A History of the Georgian People (London: 1932), p. 21, cited in Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 15.
- <sup>39</sup>Jochelson, op. cit., p. 239.
- <sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 143.
- <sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 156.
- <sup>42</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>43</sup>Conquest, op. cit., p. 42.
- <sup>44</sup>Jochelson, op. cit., p. 143.
- <sup>45</sup>Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 12.
- <sup>46</sup>A. Namitok, "The Caucasus", The Caucasian Review, I (1955), pp. 5-11.
- <sup>47</sup>Conquest, op. cit., p. 16.
- <sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 14.
- <sup>49</sup>Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 11.
- <sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 21.
- <sup>51</sup>J.M. Rodwell, trans. and ed., The Koran (London: Everyman's Library, n.d.), ch. 61, verse 4, cited in Hume, op. cit., p. 218.
- <sup>52</sup>Ibid., chap. 66, verse 1.

<sup>53</sup>Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 48.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

## II

### i

It is probably an axiom of autocratic government that it rests primarily upon coercion and force. The autocratic government of Tsarist Russia was not an exception to this. Its supporters were never able to elaborate on its behalf a broad and systematic theory of autocracy, and, in fact, the Russian autocracy possessed no great body of theoretical writings. It maintained itself, for four and one-half centuries, largely through the use of its coercive apparatus. As late as 1913, just four short years before the last of the Russian autocrats, Tsar Nicholas II, was to be murdered by his Bolshevik captors in an Ekaterinburg cellar, a strong partisan of the principle of autocracy wrote, in his book devoted to a review of all the Russian writings in support of the principle, that "many strong foundations have already been laid for the determination of the essence" of the imperial power. However, he concluded, "The next step is to construct the theory of the Russian autocracy".<sup>1</sup> This, and in 1913!

It seems hardly appropriate that this opening paragraph should be followed by any lengthy exegesis in this chapter of the theory of the Tsarist state. But in order to understand clearly the position of the national and religious minorities of the Russian Empire, it is necessary to note at least briefly some of the main theoretical tenets of the autocracy and to trace the

outlines of their historical development. Unsatisfactory as were the ideological foundations of the Russian Empire, they nevertheless played an important part in the formulation and the execution of the policies of the Russian government toward its alien minorities.

The Russian Empire, as it existed until 1917, was based upon the tripartite motto of "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationalism"--which meant, in effect, the Tsarist autocracy, Russian Orthodoxy, and Russian nationalism, three elements firmly connected with each other, and which, indeed, were so interdependent that they can hardly be distinguished or separated in the body of Russian literature, particularly that of the nineteenth century, which sets out to discuss either one or another. A clear example of the relationship among the three principles is to be found in the following extract taken from the work of one of the leading exponents of the doctrine of "official nationality" in the reign of Nicholas I:

Faith and autocracy created the Russian state and the one common fatherland for the Russian Slavs. Only faith and autocracy can constitute the glory, the well being, and the power of Russia! Faith and autocracy are in relation to vast Russia what gravitation is for our planet. This immense colossus, Russia, almost a separate continent, which contains within itself all the climates and all the tribes of mankind, can be held in balance only by faith

and autocracy. That is why in Russia there could never and cannot exist any other nationality, except the nationality founded on Orthodoxy and autocracy. They alone can establish firmly our independent and original existence. Orthodoxy strengthens the originality of the Russian people, and affirms the existence of our national language, thus preventing the Russians from mixing with aliens and from losing its [the language's] original character.<sup>2</sup>

This linking, almost equating, of the three principles of autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationalism was one of the outstanding characteristics of the theory of the Tsarist state. It was emphasized and re-emphasized by the ideologists of the Empire. The passage quoted above is the work of one of the most servile writers of his age,<sup>3</sup> but such expressions of ultra-nationalism were by no means confined to the works of the satraps of the Tsarist court. From at least the middle of the eighteenth century until the fall of Tsardom, through the works of writers as varied in other respects as Michael Lomonosov, Alexander Pushkin, Nicholas Gogol, Alexander Herzen, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and many others, Russian literature bears the unmistakeable accents of strong nationalism and patriotism. Used in different contexts, the terms, "autocracy", "Orthodoxy", and "nationalism", in Russian literature carried connotations which were romantic and defensive, as well as dynastic and reactionary. All three terms acquired a

supreme metaphysical, even mystical, importance which led to a general faith and belief in the great mission of Russia and her people, to such doctrines as Pan-Slavism, and to such practices as russification. The immense size of the Russian Empire, its unmeasured natural resources, its huge population, its autocratic government, its Orthodox religion, even its backwardness: all of these contributed to a firm belief in the nation's manifest destiny. And superimposed upon this belief was the boast that this enormous state, with its unique past and promising future, was fully coordinated, controlled, and directed by a single human will--the will of the Tsar.

The supreme head of the Russian Empire was the absolute Tsar, "the father of all the Russian people", who owed his position to God and to God alone, and who was responsible only to Him.<sup>4</sup> This, in brief, was the sacred dogma of autocracy. This principle, as it existed until 1917, was fully shaped only during the reign of Peter the Great, although the concept of the Tsar as autocrat, derived from the Byzantine emperors, was introduced to the Russian monarchy as early as the fifteenth century. Peter stressed not only absolutism and the full and unquestioning service by all to the State, but was also responsible for the legend of the Tsar's personal participation in all matters relating to the administration of the State, down to the most minute detail. The principle of autocracy, as founded by Peter, was weakened under the succession of feeble monarchs which followed him, and during the

reign of Catherine the Great. But despite even the quasi-liberal veneer of the age of Catherine, it was never challenged or called seriously into question, and it reasserted itself in extreme-- even pathological--form in the reign of Paul I, whose attitude is summed up concisely, and perhaps epitomized, in his alleged assertion that the only man in Russia who was important was the man who was speaking with the Tsar, and he was important only while so speaking. Paul I, personally and intensely concerned with legitimism and dynastic rights, added these concepts to the dogma of autocracy by replacing the strictly utilitarian practice instituted by Peter, of having the Tsar name his own successor, with a strict law of succession to the throne through the direct male line.<sup>5</sup> The preoccupations of Catherine's bastard son thus became an integral part of the theory of autocracy, and remained essential to it into the twentieth century.

The principle of Orthodoxy meant that the Russian Church was not only a state church, but also a national church.<sup>6</sup> The complete subordination of the Russian Church to the Tsar, and the identification of the principle of Orthodoxy with the autocracy-- and so with the State--can also be traced to the reign of Peter the Great. Christianity was introduced into Russia with the conversion of the Grand Duke Vladimir of Kiev, in the late tenth century, to the Greek or Eastern rite derived from Constantinople. When the schism between the Greek and Roman churches took place, in 1054, the Russians followed the lead of the Greeks, and continued

to acknowledge the leadership of the Patriarchate of Constantinople over their Church. However, the decline in strength of the Eastern Empire, the Tatar invasions of the thirteenth century which cut Russia off from its great source of learning and culture, and the consequent rise in Moscow of a new state power far less influenced by the Byzantine tradition than Kiev had been, combined to make the Russian Church rather more independent in practice than it was in theory. The decision of the Patriarch of Constantinople to reunite the Eastern Church with Rome, taken at the Council of Florence, in 1439, as a last-ditch measure to save Constantinople from the Turks, was treated as a heresy in Russia, and the Metropolitan of Moscow, a supporter of the decision, was driven out. The fall of Constantinople to the Turks, in 1453, finally destroyed the already-weakened authority of the Patriarchate, and, from this time, the Russian Church was practically independent. It continued, however, to be closely allied with the princes of Moscow. The marriage of Ivan III to Sophia, the niece of the last Greek Emperor of Constantinople, not only helped the Russian ruler to establish his claim to be the successor of the Emperor, and so the protector of the "true"--which is to say, Orthodox--branch of Christianity, but also introduced into Moscow the Byzantine concept of the Autocrat--the monarch of uncontrolled authority whose power derived from God alone. About a century later, the independence of the Russian Church was declared formally by the Tsar Fyodor I (1584-98), by his establishing of the Patriarchate of Moscow. The firm alliance of Church and State was

completed in 1613, with the founding of the Romanov dynasty which was to rule Russia until 1917. The first Romanov Tsar, Michael I (1613-45), was also the son of the first Patriarch of Moscow, Philaret.

But if, at this time, the Church and the State were more or less equal, the complete subordinating of the Church to the State, a century later, was the work of Peter the Great. The Russian Church, split asunder by the disputes over the scriptural and the liturgical reforms of the Patriarch Nikon, in the second half of the seventeenth century, was forced to enlist the aid of the Tsar against its schismatics--the "Old Believers"--and found itself greatly weakened thereby, vis-à-vis the autocrat. To eliminate the Church as a rival power, Peter abolished the Patriarchate of Moscow in 1721, and replaced it with the Holy Synod, a council of bishops and other Church officials presided over by a Procurator--a layman appointed directly by the Tsar, and whose function it was, in Peter's own phrase, to serve as "the Tsar's eye".<sup>7</sup>

The question of religion strongly influenced the official policies of the Russian Empire toward its non-Russian minorities, approximately from the middle of the sixteenth century until the middle of the eighteenth. Where discrimination existed against the non-Russians, the principal reason for it seems to have been the desire to convert Moslems, Jews, and other non-Christians to the Orthodox faith.<sup>8</sup> The numbers of non-Orthodox in Russia at

this time were not, however, large. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, as the autocracy became gradually more secularized, this religious element may have lost a little of its primary importance, and purely political considerations possibly came to play a larger part in the attitude of the Russian government toward its minorities.<sup>9</sup> But the question of religious belief remained always of prime importance for the simple reason that, from the middle of the eighteenth century onward, the Russian Empire began to embrace immense numbers of peoples who were not only non-Russians or non-Slavs, but who were also non-Orthodox. More and more, the Orthodox religion came to be treated as synonymous with Russian nationality. As one writer said at the beginning of the twentieth century, a ruler who, in addition to being the Supreme Autocrat, was also, in effect, the Supreme Pontiff, found himself "doubly bound to bring all his subjects within the fold of the Church", and therefore found it "impossible to distinguish between non-conformity and sedition".<sup>10</sup> It is a fact of Russia's history that the country's contacts with the non-Orthodox world had been singularly unfriendly and unfortunate. The Moslem Tatars, the Roman Catholic Poles, Lithuanians, and Teutonic Knights, the Protestant Swedes, the Moslem Turks: for centuries, non-Orthodoxy had defined the enemies of Russia. Russian nationalism was, therefore, in a sense but another manifestation of, or an identification with, the struggle of the "true Faith" against its enemies--the heretics and unbelievers. In the same way, the struggle of the Moslem peoples of Crimea, the Caucasus, and Central

Asia early became identified with the fight of Islam against the infidel, and, in the nineteenth century, the resistance of the Poles to Russian rule became identified with the conflict between Roman Catholicism and Russian Orthodoxy.

To be Russian was to be Orthodox. The question of religion, therefore, even during the most secularized periods of the autocracy, could never be buried very deeply in the Russian national consciousness, and remained a vital and important issue with regard to the position of the minorities of the Empire. The followers of the Tsar, though they respected the different Christian denominations and distinguished sharply between them and all the non-Christian forms of belief, consistently underlined their conviction that only the Orthodox Church and faith were entirely correct and authentic.<sup>11</sup> Even at the end of the nineteenth century, a century generally regarded as an age of secularism, it was possible to write:

in the eyes of the government as well as of the people, the quality of Orthodox Christian is even now the surest pledge of patriotism and loyalty. . . . Even in government language, alien religions are called 'foreign confessions'. This expression in itself directs the suspicion of Russian patriotism to about one-third of the Russian subjects. . . . Russian looks upon non-Orthodox confessions as 'vehicles of foreign nationalities'.<sup>12</sup>

The rapid absorption of millions of Roman Catholics, Jews, Protestants, and Uniates<sup>13</sup> in the West, of millions of Moslems among the Turks, Tatars, and Caucasians in the South and East, and of hundreds of thousands of Buddhists and lesser numbers of followers of other religions in the far East, thus raised new and complex questions within the Russian Empire. The Empire transformed itself in acquiring its vast new dominions and countless new peoples, especially from the middle of the eighteenth century onward. Its Great Russian majority was greatly reduced, in relation to the total population of the Empire, and the Russian Orthodox Church, which until this time had been, in fact as well as in theory, both a state and a national church, now found itself seriously challenged, for the first time, by other faiths within the State. The huge numbers of new subjects brought into the Empire presented cases very different from the cases of the peoples who had been conquered earlier; these were not Ukrainians, already Orthodox for the most part and speaking a language remarkably similar to the Russian, nor small and primitive tribes of the forests and steppes, attached only to vague, animistic religious beliefs, nor mere small groups or settlements of peoples professing Islam and other faiths, but more or less isolated from any considerable bodies of co-religionists. The steady outward expansion of the borders of the Empire had now brought Russia into conflict with well-established and militarily powerful states, had engaged Russia in struggle with these for lands inhabited by peoples co-religious with the enemy, and had succeeded in bringing

large numbers of these peoples under Russian rule.

But despite the great changes which took place in the national and religious composition of the Empire, there were no significant changes in the ideology of the Tsarist autocracy. Although the Russian Empire transformed itself, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from a state inhabited almost entirely by Russians, or at least Slavs, of the Orthodox faith into what was, in fact, a multinational state with a population more than one-quarter non-Slav and more than one-third non-Orthodox, there were no attempts on the part of the ideologists of the Empire to alter or to transform the three pillars of Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationalism. These principles, which had been capable of application in the former more compact and more homogeneous Russia, where they had been desirable, even necessary symbols of unity, thus became for the minorities of the Empire symbols of the wide gulf between themselves and the Russians.

The principle of autocracy continued until 1917 to be regarded as immutable. It was unthinkable that it should have been challenged or transformed, since by definition any change in the principle of autocracy would of necessity have entailed a weakening of it. And so also were the twin concomitants of autocracy, the principles of Orthodoxy and nationalism, considered sacrosanct. They continued to be identified with the principle of autocracy, and any suggestion that either of these should be weakened or altered in any way was at once taken to mean an attack

upon all three principles, and thus an attempt to weaken the principle of autocracy itself. It was, therefore, theoretically impossible for the Tsarist regime to formulate or to institute any policies toward its national and religious minorities except those designed to russify the non-Russians and to convert to Orthodoxy the non-Orthodox. At least officially, no allowances could be made for the many different peoples of the Empire.

In theory, for example, the principle of autocracy did not allow for the recognition of separate historical and national territories within the State: that is to say, no territories in which the authority of the Russian Tsars would be anything less than absolute, or in which this authority would rest upon a different legal basis than it did in Russia itself. In practice, this principle was not always applied consistently. The Tsars, through the centuries, did grant some measures of autonomy to their newly-acquired territories--sometimes in recognition of the special status of these territories, and sometimes in anticipation of political changes in Russia. They even, in certain cases, entered into contractual relations with their subject peoples, and in this way placed limits upon their own theoretically unlimited powers.<sup>14</sup> For example, through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ukraine, Livonia, and Estonia all enjoyed considerable autonomy. Poland, from 1815 until 1831, and Finland, from 1809 until 1899, were, in theory as well as in practice, constitutional monarchies. But these exceptions, incompatible as they were with

the complete maintenance of the principle of autocracy within Russia itself, sooner or later, under one pretext or another, had their privileges retracted, their contracts unilaterally abrogated, and their territories, along with their peoples, incorporated into the regular administration of the Empire.<sup>15</sup> The Empire, though composed of myriad peoples with a great diversity of customs, creeds, and cultures, was treated constitutionally and administratively, with few exceptions, as if its vast territories still were districts of a compact and homogeneous national unit.

Nor did the principle of autocracy from which all, in theory, and from which most, in practice, of the nationalities policies of the Russian government derived, allow for any concessions which could have made loyal citizens of the non-Orthodox and non-Russian minorities of the Empire. Nationalities other than Russian and religions other than Orthodox were, as has been seen, ipso facto suspect. For the non-Russian minorities, then, russification was a goal to be achieved only through the adopting of the Russian language; for the non-Orthodox minorities, it was a goal to be reached only through apostasy.<sup>16</sup> From the reign of Catherine II onward, the only consistent policies followed by the Russian government toward the national minorities were the policies of crude repression and russification; no consistent policies were followed toward the religious minorities of the Empire except those of discrimination, persecution, and proselytizing. Generally speaking, Russian standards were the standards to which all the peoples of the Empire had to conform. The

refusal, or the inability, of the Tsarist regime to modify or to adjust any of its ideological bases, which was itself the result partly of the historical evolution of the autocracy, partly of its historical alliance with the Russian Orthodox Church and its later utilizing of the Church as a key instrument of national unity, and partly of the historical equating of the Russian Orthodox faith with Russian nationality, thus brought about a singular attempt to build and to maintain unity in a multinational and multireligious state upon a national church--an attempt which from its beginning would seem to have borne within itself the seeds of its own ultimate bankruptcy and failure. By refusing to admit to full citizenship its non-Russian and non-Orthodox peoples, the Tsarist regime at once divided its subjects into two classes: the privileged majority of Russian and Orthodox, and the persecuted minorities of non-Russian and non-Orthodox. And through the implications of its own immutable ideology, the regime committed itself, or was committed, to waging what was, in effect, open war against about one-third of its subjects--in the name of national unity. Until the end of its days, the Tsarist regime pursued toward its minorities policies which embodied these contradictions.

Even its policies of persecution and repression of the minorities were not, however, consistently followed. The vigour with which the Russian government applied to its various peoples the measures implicit in its ideology of "one Tsar, one Church, one Nation", varied considerably from the rule of one Tsar to

that of the next, and even from one portion of a Tsar's reign to another. The position of the various minorities of the Empire was conditioned by complicated combinations of circumstances, depending, for example, upon the different personalities, aims, and interests of successive Tsars, upon their individual political understanding, and upon the nature and amount of their control over the many departments of their governments. It depended also upon the varying lines and circumlocutions of Russian foreign policy, upon the character and strength of the political opposition in Russia itself to the regime, and upon the actions and attitudes of the various other minorities of the Empire toward Russian rule. It would far exceed the limitations of this study to attempt to detail the warp and the woof of Russian policy toward the national and religious minorities of the Empire from the reign of Catherine II onward, and it is difficult even to summarize the principal lines of policy followed under the different Tsars, since, in the reign of each, pressures were increased upon certain minorities and decreased upon others. For example, the reign of Nicholas I, otherwise the proponent extraordinary of "official nationality", uncharacteristically saw the Jews treated much less harshly than they were in the reign of almost any other Tsar; in the same manner, the reign of Alexander II, which was notable for the concessions made to many other minorities, uncharacteristically saw the most vicious persecution of the Polish minority; similarly, the reign of Alexander I, which in its initial "liberal phase" saw the founding of the

constitutional monarchies of Finland and Poland, also saw implemented the first of the brutal series of measures against the Jews, their being confined to their "Pale of Settlement". Still, for all the inconsistencies which may be noted, it does not seem inaccurate to state that the position of the national and religious minorities of the Empire varied, in general terms, only from bad to worse under the rule of the Tsars who succeeded Catherine II. Nor does it seem inaccurate to say that the most extreme forms of discrimination and persecution were suffered by the minorities of the Empire during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century and the first five years of the twentieth, and that their situation became somewhat ameliorated, though not appreciably, only after the 1905 Revolution and during the period of Russia's so-called "constitutional experiment", from 1905-17. It also would appear that the extent to which the minorities were persecuted under the different Tsars was roughly congruous with the extent to which repressive measures were employed also against the Russian subjects of the Empire. In summary and in general, while Tsars changed, their nationality policies did not change; until the end of the Tsarist system, the principles of autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationalism remained constant and immutable.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Tsarist government depended almost entirely upon those men who were the most faithful upholders of these sacred dogmas, and so, unalterably opposed to any form of concessions to the minorities. Perhaps the best known of these was Konstantin Pobiedonostsev, who

occupied the office of Procurator of the Holy Synod from 1880-1905, all through the years during which repressive measures against the minorities reached unprecedented heights of violence, and during which policies aiming at complete and utter suffocation of all discontent were enforced at home. Pobyedonostsev, who was also tutor to the last two Tsars, has come to be regarded as the leading exponent, even as the symbol, of ultra-nationalism and black reaction. He was not an original thinker, and his chief contribution to the theory of Tsardom was as a propagandist. Nevertheless, it is worth noting, at least in summary, his political philosophy, since it represents almost the final shaping and expression of the three principles of autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationalism. It reveals not only the main arguments in favour of the Tsarist system of government, but also the flaws and weaknesses of those arguments.<sup>17</sup>

Pobyedonostsev was, first of all, an anti-rationalist thinker, and his basic ideas concerning the nature of man were fundamental to his whole philosophy. Man, he thought, except for a small minority, an elite, was as soft wax to be molded by three forces utterly beyond his control: the unconscious, the land, and history. Man best displayed his intelligence not logically, but intuitively, not in finding or showing reasons, but in believing and trusting the "authorities" and his "superiors". Education was, therefore, not only useless, but dangerous, and was to be restricted to the "sacred books" and to a "correct" version of one's national history. In addition,

Pobyedonostsev equated society and religion. (He considered Russia to be both a society and a state.) He felt that the character of any state or society was shaped by its national faith or church, and that the role of the church was "to create a community of believers" and thus "to answer the deeply-rooted human need for unity of belief". It followed from these premises, according to Pobyedonostsev, that no healthy state or society could have more than one church, and that any state which tolerated more than one creed was bound to be destroyed by internal conflicts.

The church was the cement of society. The laws of the state, therefore, were to be employed always "to safeguard the dominant religion", and, in this way, to safeguard "the unity and stability" which were the ultimate ends of any state organization. Conversely, the laws of the state were also to be used to deny the rights and privileges of the non-conforming religious groups and the national minorities. These were always to be considered as "enemies of the state", for the simple reason that "the laws of the Orthodox Church were the laws of the state". The power of the state, asserted Pobyedonostsev, derived from a "unity of consciousness between the people, the state, and the national faith". The Tsar, he advised in this connection, was therefore always to speak of "the people" of Russia, and never of "the peoples". This mystical relationship was always to be stressed.

But if the church was the cement of society, the autocracy was the foundation-stone upon which stable and orderly

government could be built. The theory of autocracy acknowledged no limitations whatever to the power of the Tsar. It thereby placed the Tsar above all criticism, and gave him a free hand to use whichever instruments he deemed necessary to achieve unity. And for Pobyedonostsev, of the three instruments available to a government, that of coercion was most important, that of education was next in importance, and that of encouragement or reward was to be reserved only for the chosen few. Violent and arbitrary governmental action were more than justified, then, to crush "those forces which threatened the unity and stability of the state". It was both the right and the duty of the autocracy to use its coercive powers against all "agents of destruction" carried by foreign influences, including, of course, the non-Russian nationalities and the non-Orthodox religions. The autocracy thus provided the base from which all alien ideas and institutions could be opposed, whether these challenged the autocracy in the name of freedom in general, or in the name of national rights in particular.

Such, in brief, were the main points of Pobyedonostsev's political philosophy, which underlay the attempt of the Russian government, during his period of tenure in the Holy Synod, to marshal and to utilize to the fullest the forces of Great Russian national sentiment against the growing activity of social, political, and national unrest in the Empire. The systematic policy of russification and national oppression which the Tsarist government launched under the direction of Pobyedonostsev and his pupils,

Alexander III and Nicholas II, was probably the only systematic policy ever adopted by the government of the Russian Empire toward its minorities. Under Pobyedonostsev, any idea of possible conciliation with the minorities was dropped, just as any idea of possible conciliation with the forces of freedom was dropped by Alexander III in 1881, and was to be abjured by Nicholas II until it was too late. From 1880 to 1905, the Tsarist government was reduced to the extremity of trying to create a national unity through sheer coercion. For years, even centuries, however, this outcome had been implicit in its ideological foundations.

## ii

Of the seven minorities who are the concern of this study, only the Germans of the Volga found prosperity under the Tsars. Their position of extreme privilege in the Russian Empire, which set them off and differentiated them from most of their fellow-citizens, Russian or non-Russian, until well into the second half of the nineteenth century, combined with their own diligence and initiative to contribute to their great success. By 1914 and the beginning of World War I, the colonies founded by the original German settlers on the middle Volga between Samara and Saratov had increased to more than two hundred villages with an aggregate population of more than 400,000 persons.<sup>18</sup>

From the time of their first coming to Russia, in the 1760's, until the emancipation of the serfs by Tsar Alexander II,

in 1861, the German settlers on the Volga, as has been seen, possessed a tremendous number of advantages over the bulk of the peasant farmers of the Empire. They were among the small number of free peasant farmers in a land of serfs--free, in contrast to the vast majority of the peasantry which still was bound to the soil and to its masters, to own their own land, to work for themselves and for their own enrichment, and even to employ and to own serfs of their own. They had also the advantage of being settled on the edge of territories inhabited by Asiatic peoples; there was, therefore, no indigenous population with recognized priority claims or rights to their lands; in addition, as Europeans, the Volga Germans were regarded by the Tsarist government as an important colonizing and civilizing element in the borderlands. For all these reasons, the Russian authorities had no hesitation in making to the colonists new and extensive grants of lands when the areas originally marked for German settlement became too small and too crowded to accommodate their growing families. The Volga Germans continued all through the nineteenth century to found new villages on these lands, the last so-called "new" village being founded as late as 1902.<sup>19</sup> In addition to their having almost unlimited access to new lands--lands, incidentally, among the most fertile in Russia--the Volga Germans also were able to maintain, until the second half of the century, all of the numerous concessions and privileges which had been granted to them by Catherine II as conditions of their original immigrations to Russia: religious freedom, local self-government, interest-free state loans, exemption from taxation

and from military service, and other rights. Their progressive, rich, and industrious communities reflected not only these privileges, but also the characteristically Teutonic qualities of order, economy, family solidarity, and hard work for which the Germans had been originally chosen by Catherine the Great.<sup>20</sup> The Volga Germans thus became exceptionally successful farmers in their new homeland, and their possibilities in Russia seemed boundless: "The ambition of every man consisted in leaving to each of his usually numerous sons at least the same amount of land as he had originally possessed".<sup>21</sup>

Successful as they proved to be, however, the Volga Germans were little more prosperous than were the various other concentrations of Germans within the Russian Empire. The total number of Germans in Russia in 1897 was about 1,800,000<sup>22</sup>--so that the Volga group, although it formed the largest single compact settlement, actually comprised only between one-quarter and one-fifth of the German subjects of the Tsar. A good many of these Germans had, of course, with the passage of years, become completely assimilated and russified, and often could be distinguished from their Slavic fellow-citizens only by their Teutonic surnames. Many spoke no language other than the Russian. Most of the Germans of the Empire who were more or less isolated and who found themselves living in a totally Russian environment, whether as peasant settlers or as townsmen, were to a greater or lesser degree assimilated by the Russian majority of the population. They were found scattered the length and breadth of the Empire,

either singly or in small clusters, and German professional men--doctors, lawyers, teachers, musicians, and the like--and skilled craftsmen were to be discovered in almost every Russian town, from the largest--in Moscow, for example, the bakers were predominantly German<sup>23</sup>--to the smallest,<sup>24</sup> while single families of German agricultural settlers were to be seen in almost every district, tilling the land alongside their Russian and Ukrainian counterparts. The majority of the German subjects of the Tsar, however, were those of the three main areas of German settlement, who occupied positions unique in the Empire, and who were very little assimilated. These main areas of German settlement, besides the Volga region, were the Baltic provinces of Estonia and Livonia, and the "new" provinces of "South Russia", in Ukraine.

The Baltic Germans, the descendants of the medieval Teutonic orders of the Knights of the Cross and the Knights of the Sword, maintained in Estonia and Livonia what was an essentially German civilization, and comprised a German patrician class ruling over the indigenous Estonians and Letts. Despite the fact that they had, since the collapse of their military power in the fifteenth century, been for a time under Swedish rule and then, since the reign of Peter the Great, under Russian rule, the Baltic Germans had succeeded in retaining the ownership of most of the land in their provinces, in maintaining their own provincial assemblies of the land-owning nobility, their own craft-guilds and municipal institutions in the towns, their own

system of German law in the courts, their own school system--probably the most advanced in the entire Empire--and even their own German university, at Dorpat.<sup>25</sup> The University had been forced to close for a few years, during the reaction against German influence in the Russian court, in the reign of Elizabeth I (1741-62), but was re-opened by Catherine the Great. The so-called "Baltic barons" had played an important part in Peter the Great's program of westernization and integration of the country, and in the administrations of his immediate successors, and had altogether proven to be loyal subjects and servants of the Empire. In the bureaucracy, the diplomatic service, and the army, they had achieved a representation quite disproportionate to their numerical strength, largely on the basis of their superior education. In addition, their estates in the Baltic provinces were among the richest and most productive in the Empire, and their old mercantile connections which dated from the halcyon days of the Hanseatic League provided them with a degree of wealth hardly attained by any comparable group of the Russian nobility. The other significant area of German settlement, besides the Volga and the Baltic shores, lay in the region of the Black Sea, including part of Crimea proper, and, after 1878, in Bessarabia, at the mouth of the Dniester river. The German colonization of these regions was, however, of much later date, beginning only after the earlier successes of the Volga settlers had shown to the Russian authorities the desirability of Germans as colonists, and after, of course, the Russian defeats of the Crimean Tatars and the Turks. The first contingents of

Germans appeared in the Russian South as early as 1787, but they did not begin to arrive and to settle in significant numbers until the first and second decades of the nineteenth century.<sup>26</sup> Like the Germans of the Volga, those of South Russia were given both special privileges and a free hand by the Russian authorities, and, like the Volga Germans, they too prospered, settling in the most fertile areas and increasing steadily their land-holdings. By 1897, the Germans settled in South Russia numbered about 340,000, while those of the Baltic totalled some 165,000.<sup>27</sup> Also like the Volga Germans, but unlike the Baltic group which was almost solidly Lutheran, the German colonists of the Russian South were made up of considerable numbers of small, "splinter", Christian sects: Baptists, Hutterians, Stundists, and the like. Although the Volga and South Russian Germans were not persecuted for their religious beliefs until the end of the century, it is significant that, when the repressive measures of the regime were turned upon them, they were directed much more against their alien religions than against their alien nationality.

The large numbers of Germans in Russia, their alien ways, their economic power, and their great influence in court-circles, of course, could always provide appropriate and vulnerable targets for the exponents of Russian nationalism. It has already been noted that as early as the mid-eighteenth century, there was a reaction among the Russian service-nobility against the German advisers of the Tsarist court, provoked by the fact that the Germans were of foreign origin and that their positions were

coveted by native Russians, with the result that the Germans had temporarily lost their ascendancy and had suffered the closing of the University of Dorpat, among other discriminatory measures. One can hardly suppose that this anti-German prejudice on the part of at least a segment of the Russian nobility ever died out completely. Anti-German feeling in Russia seems, however, to have attracted a real following or strength only toward the middle of the nineteenth century, and to have increased rather steadily only after that, keeping pace generally with the rise of Russian national feeling--or, as Lenin termed it, "Great Russian chauvinism". It is interesting to note, in this connection, the work of the Russian Slavophile historian, G.P. Danilevsky, who was not only a staunch defender of the Tsarist political system, but also an anti-liberal and an anti-capitalist, and who depicted a type of prosperous German colonist that was almost the prototype for Russian Germanophobes.<sup>28</sup> This was in his historical novel, The Refugees in New Russia; the colonist, Bogdan Bogdanovich Schultzein by name, is the epitome of the grasping and philistine bourgeois, who, by questionable and devious means, without regard for the consequences to others, relentlessly pursues only wealth, and eventually comes to own all of the land in his entire district. The book concludes: "But is that anything at which to wonder, since he is a German, and not even a Russian German, but a foreign German from Germany?"<sup>29</sup> The German, it should be added, had long been a familiar figure in Russian literature. But in the main he had been depicted not as an unpleasant character, but as the embodiment of most of the

practical virtues--just those that the Russian generally was supposed to lack. He was hard-headed and energetic, methodical, and a devotee of hard work and efficiency: sometimes colourless and not entirely likeable, but always admirable. In Goncharov's Oblomov, for example, the character against whom Oblomov's (supposedly Russian) traits of lassitude and sloth are contrasted is, typically, the half-German Stolz, who is almost too good to be true.<sup>30</sup>

Perhaps the characteristic of the Russian Germans which most offended Russian national feeling and which became a chronic source of hostility and suspicion was the continuing German character of their settlements. The German agricultural settlers, while they grew successful and affluent in their new country, "kept well together in separate groups, alien patches in the midst of the native population, never mixing with it or exerting any influence over it".<sup>31</sup> Their own domestic form of civilization, their manners and customs, their German language: all were preserved. They continued, long after the term had become no longer applicable, to bear the name of kolonist, and, altogether, they formed a separate class in the Russian Empire, far more German than Russian.

The rising economic importance of the Volga German and South Russian German farmers, especially after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, the consequent scarcity of land, and the upsurge in migrations of Russian farmers to the former borderlands

of the Empire,<sup>32</sup> provoked further hostility toward them. Russia was at this time greatly increasing its exports of grain to Europe, as a result of the repeal of the Corn Laws in Britain and the rapid growth in population of the industrial cities of Britain and the Continent--indeed, these developments cannot be ignored as contributing factors to the emancipation<sup>33</sup>--and the German farmers, who had been for years left almost alone, became more and more the object of envy because of the scarcity of good land:

Bitter resentment was caused by the fact that Russian land holdings in the most fertile areas [i.e., Ukraine and the middle Volga region] were becoming smaller every year, while German wealth was proportionately increasing. Indignation was also felt because of the large number of destitute Russian and Ukrainian peasants who had to work as farm labourers for German farmers.<sup>34</sup>

The latent anxiety and resentment felt about the position of the Germans in the Empire was unquestionably increased also by a change of profound importance in Central Europe: that was the establishment, in 1871, of the German Empire, with Bismarck as its leading statesman. Bismarck's pronouncements concerning the future of Russia could not help but to make uneasy all sections of the Russian population. Bismarck's view was that Russia should abandon all of its interests in Europe, and should turn its attentions eastward where its mission would be a civilizing one. This, of course, meant for Russia not only a renunciation of its traditional interest in the Slavic and

Orthodox populations of Central Europe and the Balkans--the one foreign policy that perhaps appealed to all segments of the Russian people<sup>34</sup>--but also placed in an entirely different light the huge German colonies located in the various parts of the Empire. Almost coincidentally with the establishment of the German Empire, irresponsible and chauvinistic German voices began to demand the return of the "lost" German provinces on the Baltic; and the large settlements of unassimilated Germans all over Russia now came to be regarded with more suspicion than before.

There can be no doubt that the preponderance of German land holdings on the middle Volga and the Russian South, not to mention the almost complete German domination of the Baltic provinces, was in fact as much of an anomaly as was the predominance of Polish landed property in Western Ukraine and in Byelorussia. The amount of land held by the German minorities was indeed large enough to give the Russian some cause for alarm. In the governments of Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, and Tauria, for example, where they comprised no more than 7 per cent. of the total population, German settlers held as much as 23 per cent., 25.4 per cent., and 39.5 per cent., respectively, of the area under cultivation.<sup>36</sup> In the Odessa district, Germans owned as much as almost 60 per cent. of the sowing area, in the Akkerman district, almost 40 per cent., and the entire amount of land held by Germans in South Russia was equivalent roughly in area to the size of all Bohemia.<sup>37</sup> In 1861, the average land holdings in

the Empire were 19.25 acres in the North, 5.50 acres in the Black Earth zone, and 27.50 acres in the steppes, with a mean holding for a family amounting to 22.50 acres.<sup>38</sup> And yet the property in the hands of a single German family at this time frequently exceeded 270,000 acres.<sup>39</sup> When it is considered that the position of the German farmer both on the Volga and on the Baltic was virtually unchallenged, and that his land holdings in these regions were relatively even greater than those in South Russia, it is possible to appreciate the jealousy and fear which could easily be excited in the Russian, whatever his station. Nor were the German holdings only large; their estates on the Baltic have frequently been described as "agricultural factories", and those on the Volga and in Ukraine, situated as they were in the most desirable regions, were little less productive.

It is, of course, almost impossible to mark exactly the time in the history of the Germans of the Russian Empire when they began to suffer as a group for their unparalleled success in Russia and for their stubborn retention of their alien ways. It is equally difficult to state with certainty which of these attributes of the Germans--either their prosperity or their remaining "German"--could be judged to have been of primary importance in the change which gradually took place in the attitude of the Russian population toward them, and ultimately in their position in Russia. Notice has already been taken of one manifestation of Russian bias toward the Baltic Germans, in the 1740's, and of the consequent lessening of German influence, for

a time at least, in the Russian court. This reaction marks perhaps the first overt discriminatory action recorded against the Germans as such, but it undoubtedly was the culmination of many years of growing anti-German sentiment, and cannot be supposed to have materialized overnight. No small group, and especially no small group regarded as foreign, could have attained both the influence and the affluence of the Baltic Germans without exciting at least some resentment and hostility on the part of its rivals, and particularly, among its native-born rivals. There were other instances of anti-German feeling and jealousy among the members of the Russian nobility, from the mid-eighteenth century onward. Alexander I's emancipation of the serfs of the Baltic provinces, for example, was widely interpreted by the Russian landowners as more evidence of the select position occupied by the Baltic Germans. The German barons were successful in blocking, through their vehement protests and their loyal service in the Napoleonic Wars, the decision of the Tsar, taken in 1804-5, to free their peasants with land, and persuaded Alexander finally to approve of emancipation without land--in Estonia in 1816, and in Livonia three years later--even though the Tsar deemed this solution to the problem of serfdom not acceptable for the rest of the Empire.<sup>40</sup> Until the second half of the century, in Russia itself, not even voluntary emancipation with the granting of small acreage to the liberated serfs was permitted--which, as population increased and as an over-supply of farm labour developed, often came to mean a severe economic burden to the Russian landowner--a burden which the Baltic Germans, of course, were

spared. The Baltic Germans were not, however, typical of the Germans of the Empire--their serfs, after all, were not even Russians, but mainly Estonians and Letts--and the envy and hatred which they provoked seems to have been confined largely to the members of the Russian noble and landowning classes.

The development of a widespread germanophobia among all classes of Russian society does not seem to have begun until after the middle of the nineteenth century, and after, especially, the emancipation of all the serfs by Alexander II, in 1861. From this time onward, the search for new and fertile lands, exacerbated by the beginning of the great overflow of population from the central Russian provinces, began to bring considerable numbers of Russian peasants into contact and competition with the already well-established German farmers in the former borderlands of the Volga and South Russia. And there was another factor; the freeing of the serfs brought about in the Empire a complete disruption of the existing social system, and, as the populations increased in the formerly sparsely-populated regions, so did the numbers of government officials. With the social structure of Russia fundamentally altered, the so-called "Great Reforms" of Alexander II became inevitable and a matter of necessity in almost every sphere: financial, education, judicial, administrative, and military. The Germans of the Volga and of South Russia, like many other peoples of the borderlands, were thus no longer left largely to their own devices and their old ways, but came into increasing competition with the predominantly Great Russian

peasantry, closely followed to the borderlands by the predominantly Great Russian bureaucracy. For the Volga and South Russian Germans, however, unlike the German barons of the Baltic provinces, the russification policies of the regime were directed far more against their alien and dissident religious beliefs, than against their remaining "German".

Neither the emancipation of the serfs nor the series of reforms which followed it, however, was sufficient to cure the ills which afflicted Russian agriculture. The emancipation little improved the lot of the peasant if, indeed, it did not worsen it in many cases. The distribution of the land was unequal and inequitable, methods of cultivation remained primitive, capital for improvements was lacking, and good land remained scarce. Many measures of reform were either curtailed or stillborn, during the reaction which followed the initial enthusiasm for the reforms of Alexander II; and, in any event, the Empire was too large, its bureaucracy too inefficient and unreliable for all reform legislation to be put into practice. For example, the zemstva, the district councils formed to deal with local administration, were confined to the purely Russian provinces of the Empire, and their work--especially their educational work--even in Russia itself was severely hampered by governmental interference and by a serious lack of money. While the educational reform of Alexander II meant, for those national minorities whose territories were not too remote and which were, therefore, more closely administered, the replacing of their own schools,

where these existed, with Russian schools teaching all subjects in the Russian language, the Germans of the Volga and the Russian South were but little affected. The Tsarist government hoped that, along with the Orthodox religion, the Russian language would prove to be the great unifying bond for the multinational and heterogeneous Empire, once the initial resistance to it was overcome. But its bureaucracy lacked either talent or the machinery to extend even the most basic reforms into the more remote corners of the Empire. While the Poles were being subjected to a merciless russification program, including the introduction of the Russian language as the language of instruction in their schools for all subjects except Polish language and literature--in keeping with the spirit of Alexander II's pronouncement that "the happiness of Poland is to be found in complete fusion with the peoples of my Empire"<sup>41</sup>--and while the printing of the Ukrainian language was forbidden, along with its use by any government officials, even in Ukraine, the Germans of the Volga and South Russia remained little touched by such measures. As one contemporary observer remarked:

In the isolation of their communes, they have made for themselves a small civilization of their own, a domestic civilization so to speak. . . very curious for the politician and the philosopher to observe.<sup>42</sup>

The German peasant farmers thus continued to prosper, despite the growing hostility which their prosperity engendered, and despite the great disparity between their condition and the

wretched and miserable lot of the mass of the newly-liberated Russian serfs. They continued to expand their land holdings, now acquiring not only virgin lands, but also lands at the expense of the Russian farmer, as well. Landlords, unable to adjust to the emancipation of the serfs, and unaccustomed to having large amounts of cash, squandered their redemption payments and brought themselves to ruin; poor peasants, recently freed, found themselves unable even to support themselves on their small plots, plunged into debt, and were forced to sell. The decades immediately following the emancipation of the serfs were years of boom and unprecedented opportunity for the kulak, the rich peasant, but years of disappointment, frustration, and bitterness for the poor. The Germans of the Volga, of South Russia and the Baltic, who, as has been seen, were numbered largely among the former, thus continued to do well while their Russian neighbours often became completely destitute.

The Germans of the Volga and of South Russia found themselves seriously affected by only two policies of the Tsarist regimes during the last decades of the nineteenth century, and both of these affected them far more as non-Orthodox sectarians than as Germans. Because of their remoteness in the Empire, their general lack of interest in political questions, their basic conservatism and general contentment with the status quo, and the peculiar, close-knit character of their settlements, they were almost entirely insulated from the winds of social and political change which were beginning to blow with increasing

strength across all of the Empire during these years, and also, for the most part, almost untouched by the progressively harsher measures taken by the Tsarist regime to suppress these forces. They remained largely unto themselves, hardly aware that the conflicting tides of revolution and reaction swirled about them. The first of the measures of Alexander II to signal the beginning of a serious change in their status was the military reform of 1874, which introduced compulsory military service for all citizens of European Russia and was made to apply also to the formerly-exempt German settlers. This revoking of their privilege of exemption--which, it will be recalled, had been one of the chief inducements held out by Catherine the Great to the original colonists, a century before--caused thousands of German farmers to emigrate from Russia in the late 1870's. A few of these returned to Germany, but the majority, seeking a new home where their pacifist beliefs would not be offended, emigrated to North America.<sup>43</sup> The second action of the Tsarist regime to bring serious hardship to large numbers of the German peasant-farmers was the general stepping-up, in the 1880's and 1890's, of the government's attacks upon all forms of religious dissent.

It had long been a crime in the Russian Empire to advise anyone to abandon the Orthodox religion, as it was a crime even to advise anyone against entering it. The Russian Orthodox Church admitted of no competition in the matter of its propaganda monopoly.<sup>44</sup> Under Pobiedonostsev and Alexander III, however, these laws began to be much more rigidly enforced. All

over the Empire, the building of non-Orthodox churches was forbidden, severe penalties were imposed upon dissenting priests and ministers, marriage ceremonies performed outside of the Orthodox Church were refused legal recognition, and vigorous campaigns of conversion were waged. In 1874, the Uniates were forcibly reunited with the Orthodox Church. The large numbers of German dissenters on the Volga and in South Russia thus came under increasingly heavy attack from the regime--and in South Russia, in particular, where the doctrines of Stundism and other evangelical forms of Christianity were gaining significant numbers of adherents among the Russian and Ukrainian peasantry, away from the Orthodox faith.<sup>45</sup> Again, many thousands of the persecuted German settlers left Russia for North America.

But among the Germans of the Russian Empire, it was only the Baltic Germans, in the nineteenth century, who suffered the full oppressive weight of Tsarist policies of russification. In the Baltic provinces, under Alexander III, the Germans were attacked not only as dissenters, but also as Germans. Between 1885 and 1895, the Russian language was, first, imposed as the language for all official acts in these provinces, and then, as the official spoken language of the administration; hundreds of Lutheran clergymen were arrested and imprisoned, and Orthodox proselytizing reached the point where government decorations were given to Orthodox priests for their conversions of Lutherans; the German school system was brought under the repressive Russian Ministry of Education, and Russian was introduced as the language

of instruction; the University of Dorpat was closed in 1893, and shortly afterward reopened as the Russian University of Yuriev; the special German law courts were abolished, and even the members of the local administration, including the mayors of the towns, were nominated by the Tsarist government.<sup>46</sup> The German nobility of the Baltic gained some relief only after the ascension of Nicholas II, and then largely, it would appear, only because the Russian authorities saw in it a vested interest-group which could be utilized to counteract the disruptive forces of Estonian and Latvian nationalism and separatism, as well as the forces of progress and freedom in general. It would appear that considerations of a like nature, as well as the remoteness of their settlements, were all that saved the Volga and South Russian Germans from similar and equally thorough measures of russification.

Forced by the events of the 1905 Revolution to make an uneasy alliance with all the conservative elements of the Empire, the Tsarist regime, however, during the period of Russia's "constitutional experiment", abated considerably its campaigns of persecution against most of the national and religious minorities as such--with the notable exception of the Jews--and concentrated most of its energies toward the suppressing of its political opposition. In the Baltic provinces, for example:

Latvians and Estonians were clearly more affected by revolutionary ideas than Germans. Though the latter

might be eternal enemies of Slavdom, they had shown themselves loyal subjects of the Tsar. The maintenance of their economic privileges linked them to the established order.<sup>47</sup>

Some German landowners in the Baltic provinces even were permitted to bring in numbers of German farmers from other parts of Russia, and to settle them on newly-acquired lands.<sup>48</sup> But despite such conciliatory measures toward certain groups, the Russian government, from 1905 to 1917, was strongly imbued with Great Russian nationalism, and intermittent persecutions on national or religious grounds continued during this time. Increasing tension, especially in the Balkans and the Middle East, between Russian and German and Austrian interests, dictated that the German subjects of the Tsar, in particular, were to be regarded with suspicion, and the laws of 1887, which not only forbade the acquisition by foreigners of additional lands in the western border regions, but which also stated that, upon the death of a "foreign" landowner, his estate was to be forcibly sold, remained in effect.<sup>49</sup>

The beginning of World War I, then, and the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Russia were bound to bring into being in Russia some measure of restriction against the Germans of the Empire. The Baltic Germans, of course, occupied the approaches to the Russian capital of St. Petersburg, and many other Germans were settled in strategic areas of Ukraine. From the beginning of the War, all kinds of charges were levelled

against the Russian Germans. They were accused of almost every conceivable crime: of sabotage, espionage, manipulation of the Russian banking system and the forcing of inflation, and defeatism.<sup>50</sup> In response to the wave of extreme anti-German feeling which swept Russia, there were government-incited pogroms against the Germans and the members of other nationalities. The official anti-German measures adopted by the Tsarist government, however, were severe and far-reaching enough to satisfy even the most rabid Russian nationalist. In December, 1915, the Duma passed a decree proclaiming the confiscation of all German land holdings in the western and southern regions of Russia, with compensation to the owners, a measure which it was able to carry out only to a slight extent.<sup>51</sup> But this decree was extended in 1916 to include even the expulsion of the Volga Germans from their lands--despite the distance these were from any areas of strategic importance. This act was the culmination of decades of accumulated Russian grievances against the Germans of the Empire, and represented the final triumph of narrow Russian nationalism. The expulsion of the Volga Germans, however, which was to take place in April, 1917, was not carried out. A month before its plan could be effected, the Tsarist regime itself fell. This did not alter its intention, however, of destroying the economic power of the Russian Germans, whose presence had been regarded as a blessing while there were still vast tracts of untilled land to be settled in Russia, but which had, in later years, become at least a mixed blessing in the eyes of the regime, and a curse in the eyes of many of its people.

The Crimean Tatars fared very differently under the Tsars than did the Volga Germans. For them, there was no even brief period of prosperity. Through the whole of the nineteenth century, the history of the Crimean peninsula, so far as its Tatar population is concerned, reads as a kind of success story in reverse. From the time of its being annexed by Russia, in 1783, through the first half of the century, the peninsula became steadily more desiccated and depopulated. Its farms in the main were left neglected, many of its villages deserted. A great part of the Tatar population emigrated from Crimea to Turkey in search of rule less incompatible than the Russian, while that portion which remained was forced relentlessly by the Russian authorities away, first, from the fertile coastal strip up into the mountains, then from the mountains into the near-desert steppes, where it became more and more impoverished. In mid-century, during the Crimean War, the peninsula was partly devastated by the military operations of the combatants of both sides, and the Tatars suffered further restrictions. Then, following the War and further large emigrations of Tatars, considerable influxes of Russian, Ukrainian, and other settlers poured into the peninsula, hungry for land, until, by the turn of the century, the Crimean Tatars made up only about one-quarter of the area's total population. As the result of their mass emigrations across the Black Sea and of the influxes of non-Tatar peoples, the Tatars who remained in Crimea represented a mere tattered remnant of the advanced civilization which had once inspired the poet Pushkin to write his famous "The Fountain

of Bakhchiserai". Exactly one century after the Russian annexation of Crimea, a Russian observer sadly wrote that little remained in the peninsula of the grandeur and great wealth that had existed under the rule of the Tatar Khans.<sup>52</sup>

The last of the Tatar Khans, the puppet Chagin Girei, who had been installed by Catherine the Great, was driven out of Crimea by the Tatars themselves in 1783, during the course of the national rebellion which gave Catherine the slight pretext she needed for her annexation of the peninsula, and for her troops' severe repression of all resistance offered by the Tatar population. In the ancient manner of such operations, the final Russian invasion of Crimea was thus carried out on the plea of restoring order. Immediately that Catherine had acquired her new province, however, all doubt vanished that this "restoring of order" was a Russian conquest. Russian troops drove many of the Tatar nobles and merchants from their palaces and estates on the choice coastal lands, and distributed these properties among her favourites, including Potyomkin, the conqueror of the peninsula, who immediately began his reorganization of the whole territory. And almost immediately, the Tatars showed their hatred for the conquerors and their unwillingness to live under Russian rule by initiating, in 1784, the first of their mass treks to Turkey, which were to continue almost without pause until the end of the Russian Tsarist regime, and even afterward.

At the time of the annexation, the Tatars in Crimea

numbered perhaps three-quarters of a million.<sup>53</sup> But the first wave of emigration, between 1784 and 1791, reduced this total by about a third.<sup>54</sup> The exodus of the Tatars became a pattern in the history of Crimea; smaller numbers fled in 1807 and 1811, and larger numbers followed them to Turkey during and after the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-9. The next really considerable wave of Tatar emigration did not begin until after the Crimean War, when, between the years 1859 and 1863, the number who fled to Turkey has been variously estimated as between 150,000 and 230,000.<sup>55</sup> The exodus never halted completely, although in the years between the great migrations it subsided to a mere trickle. It increased in momentum again after 1875, however, and approximately 1,000 Tatars each year, on the average, are thought to have left after this, despite the fact that the Russian authorities had by this time made further emigration unlawful.<sup>56</sup> In 1870, while the attention of the world was diverted to the Franco-Prussian War and the collapse of the French Empire of Napoleon III, Russia repudiated the clause of the Treaty of Paris which banned its warships from the Black Sea, and Crimea took on renewed importance, both military and economic. The Russian authorities therefore began refusing to issue passports to further emigrants in 1876, following the recommendations of an Imperial commission.<sup>57</sup> Having come to realize the economic disadvantage of mass migrations, they did not want the peninsula wholly devoid of Tatars--at least, not before their loss could be balanced by the bringing in of new colonists.

The great exodus of the Tatar population from Crimea in the nineteenth century was a phenomenon of epic proportions which inflicted untold hardship and great suffering upon the Tatar people. Yet, it would not be correct to place the entire blame for this exodus upon the Russian authorities. The migrations of the Tatars, of course, followed a definable pattern, and reached their peaks during those periods when Russia was at war with Turkey, or when relations between the two empires were most severely strained. As has already been noted in Chapter I, the Crimean Tatars, since the fifteenth century almost entirely cut off from contact with their Tatar brothers and co-religionists in the Volga region, and increasingly barred from effective intercourse with those of the Caucasus and Central Asia, had maintained the closest of relationships with Turkey proper. The first mass emigration of the Tatars, in 1783, indicated quite clearly to their Russian conquerors where the sympathies of the mass of the people of Crimea lay. The Tatars openly demonstrated their preference for continued Turkish rule by choosing to give up all of their material possessions rather than to live under the infidel Tsar. This study has no wish to become in any sense an apology for the actions of the Tsarist regime toward the Tatars of Crimea. But it is obvious that the Russians had strong grounds for mistrusting those Tatars who, for one reason or another, chose to remain in Crimea while thousands of their fellow-countrymen left; and it is difficult, therefore, to criticize their taking of security precautions against these

people, particularly during times of war. These precautions may, in fact, have been unnecessary and, therefore, stupid; they may have been carried out, as such operations often are by soldiers, with some brutality. But they were certainly neither indiscriminate nor brutal by twentieth-century standards, and consisted chiefly, as has been seen, in moving the Tatars inland, away from the coasts and, especially, away from areas close to the great naval bases of Sevastopol and Odessa, and other fortified points. In effect, this also meant depriving the Tatars of their most fertile areas of cultivation, and it meant uprooting them from their established homes on or near the coasts. But, certainly, their lot could have been very much worse. During the Crimean War, for example, it was suggested that the entire Tatar population should be deported from the peninsula to the interior provinces of Russia<sup>58</sup>--a measure which Nicholas I was unable to be persuaded was either practical or necessary at that time.

It is surely not accurate to state, as so many writers have stated, that the Russian government was determined to exterminate or to drive from Crimea the entire Tatar population, merely on the grounds that it was non-Slav.<sup>59</sup> And it seems no more true to say that the Tsarist government persecuted the Tatars merely so that it could steal their lands, as some Soviet sources would have their readers believe.<sup>60</sup> There is to be considered, first of all, the Russian record of cooperation, even friendship, toward the Tatars of the Volga and of Central

Asia, and the Russian encouragement of commerce and education among these and other Tatar groups.<sup>61</sup> While it is true that, in the second half of the nineteenth century, there were restrictive measures taken against these Tatar groups as well, and some sinister designs behind the Russian encouragement of Tatar languages,<sup>62</sup> on the whole these policies can hardly be reconciled with any alleged unjust persecutions of the Crimean Tatars, qua Tatars. It is surely more reasonable to attribute the suspicion and harshness of the Russians toward them to the fact that the Tatars, from the beginning, made no secret of their preference for Turkey, or of their support for Turkish causes. They were, in short, extremely recalcitrant and unwilling subjects, and, from the Russian point of view, for this reason alone a definite hazard and liability to the security of Russian naval and military operations on the Black Sea. It has been seen that the question of "foreign confessions" was a constant factor underlying the attitude of the Tsarist authorities toward its subject minorities; and, as regarded Islam in particular, this question of religion was intimately connected with Russian foreign policy. Russia and Turkey, it must be remembered, were the most constant antagonists of Europe, either at war or on the verge of war almost steadily through the century and one-half after 1780, and actually engaged in seven separate wars against each other during this time. In approaching the question of how to deal with the Crimean Tatars, then, the Russians found themselves confronted with something of a dilemma: whether to assume that the Tatars were loyal, to take no precautions against their possible disloyalty, and thus to run the risk of allowing secret allies of

Turkey to remain in strategic positions; or to assume that they were disloyal, to take whatever security precautions against them seemed necessary, and thus to drive them from the peninsula to become the open allies of Turkey. It has been seen that the Russian government, according to its doctrine of "official nationality", was at least strongly disposed toward regarding all non-Orthodox and non-Slavic populations ipso facto as enemies of Russia. And certainly, the evidence which the Crimean Tatars gave of their loyalty to Russia left little doubt that this attitude was the correct one to be adopted in their case. No other except the second alternative really was possible under existing conditions.

The Tsarist government, it would also seem, valued Crimea far more for the military advantages it assured than for its agricultural possibilities or--so long as Turkey maintained control of the Straits--for its commercial value. It would appear that the population of the peninsula was, in fact, superfluous or merely incidental to the question of Crimea's strategic value. For their first century and one-half under Russian rule, then, the Crimean Tatars were hardly more than helpless pawns in the game of international power politics. It was their great misfortune that they should have been so closely allied, both physically and spiritually, with the nation that was the most ubiquitous enemy of their new masters, and it was their secondary misfortune that they should have occupied those areas of their peninsula which were, first, militarily, and second, economically, most desirable.

None of the foregoing, of course, obviates the fact that the Crimean Tatars did indeed suffer terribly under the rule of the Tsars. Forced from the lush and hospitable coastal areas into the arid and inhospitable steppes of the interior of their peninsula, many of them were faced with the simple choice of emigration or starvation. They were singularly unfortunate, also, as the decades of Russian rule passed, in being deprived of close contacts with the other Tatar groups of the Russian Empire--not only by the great distances which separated them physically from these, but also by the cultural and linguistic gulfs which had deepened, over the centuries, between them and the other Tatar settlements. The Crimean Tatars were more or less forced, because of this, to continue to seek their wider associations with Turkey, their traditional ally, and to place also their hopes of liberation in Russia's most constant foe. Through this combination of circumstances, then, not the least of which was their own steadfast and implacable hostility to Russian rule, the Crimean Tatars steadily became fewer in number and more poverty-stricken. Yet it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that Russian colonization of the peninsula advanced at all rapidly. At the time of the Crimean War, for example, only some 15,000 Russians had made their homes there.<sup>63</sup> This amazingly slow flowing of Russian settlers into Crimea indicates how little concern the Tsarist regime must have had for any considerations except the military. Colonization began to increase, however, in the second half of the

century, the first settlers including numbers of Germans, Czechs, Bulgarians, and Estonians; but only in the last two decades before 1900 did the influx of Russian, Ukrainian, and Jewish newcomers assume major proportions.<sup>64</sup> Nevertheless, these new arrivals, together with continued emigration, conspired to reduce the number of Tatar inhabitants, relative to the numbers of newcomers, and they became but a small minority in their homeland. A contemporary estimate, in 1862, placed the number of Tatars in Crimea at about 100,000;<sup>65</sup> and though they had increased to 196,854 by 1917,<sup>66</sup> they comprised at this time only about 25 per cent. of the total population of the peninsula. They were also very poor, despite their small numbers forming the bulk of the region's landless agricultural labourers.<sup>67</sup> In 1877, more than one-half of all the land in Crimea was still concentrated in the hands of about a thousand noblemen;<sup>68</sup> and though this concentration decreased as small peasant holdings increased toward the end of the century, over fifty per cent. of all the acreage in the peninsula was, in 1917, still in the hands of either the great estates, the government, or the Orthodox Church.<sup>69</sup>

But, despite their poverty and their steady loss of population, the Crimean Tatars maintained, all through the nineteenth century, their relatively high standard of education and their considerable prestige in the Turkic and Moslem world.<sup>70</sup> Despite their small and relatively decreasing numbers, they continued to be generally regarded, along with the Azerbaijan

Turks, as among the most advanced and dynamic of the Tsars' Moslem subjects--ranking second only to the Volga Tatars in respect to their general level of education and their development of national feeling.<sup>71</sup> It is notable that it was a representative of the numerically small Crimean Tatar intelligentsia, Izmail Bey Gasprinsky (1851-1915), who provided much of the impetus for the Tatar political, religious, and cultural revival all over the Empire, in the 1880's and 1890's<sup>72</sup>--a revival which was without question the most vital and important of the national movements to spring from among the seven peoples with whom this study is concerned, and certainly among the most influential movements launched by any of the national minorities of the Russian Empire.

Until after the Crimean War and the beginning of large-scale European settlement in the peninsula, the Tatar population came under the direct rule of the Viceroy of Crimea, the military governor of the province, who exercised both civil and military authority. Conditioned as it was, from the time of their conquest, by the chronically hostile relations which existed between Russia and Turkey, the lot of the Tatars was not a happy one. The treatment accorded to the Tatar population of Crimea consisted in the main of attempts by the Russian authorities to isolate it from any possibility of contacts with its former Turkish allies or with its own emigrants. And it can be said that these attempts were, on the whole, successful. For their first seven or eight decades under Russian rule, then, the Tatars found

their cultural and intellectual life, which had been for centuries alive to all sorts of currents and influences, forced into a state of suspended animation and insulated from the outside world.

Education in Crimea, during this period, thus remained confined to the mosque schools, the medresse, which taught in Arabic and restricted education almost wholly to subjects bearing on religion.<sup>73</sup> But Russian military rule also had its advantages for the Tatars. It brought, first of all, a minimum of outside interference in the everyday life of the Tatar villages. And while it denied to the Tatar leaders the cultural and intellectual nourishment which only new ideas could provide, it also served to protect them from both the proselytizing efforts of the Russian Orthodox Church and the secularizing influences of western philosophies. The Crimean Tatars were thus able to maintain and to develop their national consciousness based on their belief in Islam. Islam remained among them, until the second half of the nineteenth century, not only a set of beliefs, but also a way of life affecting family relations, law, commerce, education, and virtually every other aspect of human activity.<sup>74</sup> In this regard, the Crimean Tatars provided a strong contrast to the Tatars of the Volga, who, after being subjected to the attempts of the Orthodox Church, with the backing of the Russian government, forcibly to convert them, in the last years of the eighteenth century had shown themselves willing to compromise with the Russian regime in return for religious tolerance and commercial privileges.<sup>75</sup> There was no question of cooperation or compromise with the Russians for the Crimean Tatars. Until the second half

of the nineteenth century, they remained a captive population in their peninsula, looking toward the day when, with the help of their Turkish allies, they could rid themselves of their alien and infidel masters.

With the coming of serious influxes of German, Russian, and other settlers, however, after the mid-century, and the advent of the regular Russian system of administration in Crimea, the slumber of the Tatar intellectuals, which had been largely the result of their isolation, came to an end. As Russian schools were founded, the Tatars began to attend them as well as their own medresse, and Russian liberal and radical ideas soon began to displace many of the older religious beliefs and to find favour. The resulting ferment of national and social ideas--so often intermingled among subject peoples--brought forth in the 1880's the program of Gasprinsky, which launched the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia on its campaign for racial equality in the Empire and the democratization of the regime.

The Tatar national movement founded by Gasprinsky reflected the ideas of the two principal wings of contemporary Russian political thought. In its emphasis on the possibility of common political action based upon common language, common religion, and common culture, it followed the main premise of the Russian Slavophiles, while in its fundamentally progressive and democratic character, it followed the lines of the Russian liberal and radical leaders of the time, among them Belinsky,

Chernyshevsky, and Dobrolyubov.<sup>76</sup> The Tatar revival was founded officially by Gasprinsky in his native city of Bakhchiserai, in 1883, with the establishment of his Turkish language newspaper, "The Interpreter", and in 1884, with his founding of a new school system, based on the principles of modern education, to replace the old medresse.<sup>77</sup> The first Turko-Tatar publication in Russia for several decades, "The Interpreter" specialized in giving cultural news from all the Empire's different Moslem communities, in an effort to interest these widely-scattered groups in each other's affairs.<sup>78</sup> It very quickly became the prototype for all Moslem periodicals in the Empire.<sup>79</sup> Gasprinsky's model school was widely copied, and by 1905 there were as many as 5,000 such primary schools among the Russian Moslems.<sup>80</sup> Within a single generation, on the basis of the experience which these efforts provided, there grew up in Russia a considerable network of periodical publications and "new method" or jadidist schools which equipped their pupils with an education at least as modern as that of their Russian contemporaries.<sup>81</sup> Gasprinsky's initial aim was to unite all the Tatars of the Russian Empire into a single political force, but it soon expanded in scope to include all the Turkic-speaking and Moslem peoples of Russia, and, in its final form, all the Turkic-speaking and Moslem peoples everywhere, on the bases of their common language, religion, and culture. The great weakness of his movement, however, was his insistence that the common language should be that spoken by the Turks of Constantinople; many Russian Moslems whose languages had developed a long way from any common Turkic

language, and whose cultures were felt to be at least the equals of the Ottoman Turks', preferred to maintain their own dialects.<sup>82</sup> A second weakness, almost equally serious, was Gasprinsky's insistence that the Russian Moslems could achieve political power only under the leadership of Turkey; again, many of the Russian Moslem groups refused to accept the hegemony of Turkey, and consequently sought ways of achieving their political independence outside of the movement.<sup>83</sup> A third obstacle to the success of the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic doctrines was the hostility which they engendered among the more conservative elements of Islam in the Empire; with its openly progressive and "westernizing" character, the national movement of Gasprinsky was from the outset anti-clerical--the jadidist schools replacing the traditional medresse--and thus in the paradoxical position of having to uproot those very ideas which provided its fundamental raison d'être.<sup>84</sup> It therefore failed to take hold among any very large numbers of Moslems in the more conservative and more clergy-dominated regions, especially in the North Caucasus and in Central Asia.

A fourth obstacle to the success of the Tatar nationalists was, of course, the opposition of the Tsarist authorities. Here, however, another paradox is evident. Those very elements of Tatar nationalism, as preached by Gasprinsky and his followers, which worked against the success of the movement--Ottoman Turkish leadership and language, and progressive political and social ideas--made the movement appear to be doubly dangerous in the eyes

of the Russian government. The movement was directed not only against the Russian Empire--and, therefore, not only the obvious work of Russia's great international rival, Turkey--but also against the institution of the Tsarist autocracy, the very foundation of the Empire. Every effort was made to stamp out all evidence of Tatar nationalism and its wider expressions, Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism.

The Crimean Tatars, under Alexander III and Nicholas II, suffered all of the repressive measures applied to the other religious minorities. Their mosques were closed by the Russian authorities, lands belonging to their clergy were confiscated, and Orthodox missionaries conducted vigorous campaigns of conversion among them, backed up by the full weight of the government's discriminatory laws.<sup>85</sup> The Tatar peasant continued to lose ground to the European settler, and, as has been noted, the bulk of the Tatar population in Crimea possessed very little land at the end of the nineteenth century. But all of the regime's measures appear to have been relatively ineffective, to have been only a hindrance to the growing political and national consciousness of the Tatars, and not an obstacle. The Tsarist attempt, in 1886, for example, to make the new military service law apply also to its Moslem subjects of European Russia, brought great unrest among the Crimean Tatars, and the threat of another wholesale emigration. Following riots and demonstrations by the Tatars, they were temporarily exempted, and the law was not subsequently enforced.<sup>86</sup> Gasprinsky continued to spread his ideas

almost unhindered by either police activity or the censorship; his "new method" school system continued to expand and to train an entire new generation of Tatar intellectuals, including, for the first time, numbers of women.<sup>87</sup>

Numerous political, religious, and regional differences, however, too fundamental to be overcome before 1917, prevented the Crimean Tatars from achieving full cooperation with the various other Tatar groups of the Empire, and the numerical superiority alone of some other groups, particularly that of the Volga Tatars, precluded the possibility of approval for the whole of Gasprinsky's program in the All-Russian Moslem congresses. Though they played a secondary role in the Dumas, the Crimean Tatars nevertheless played an important role, contributing many of the most active and radical members to the Moslem caucus which aligned itself, in 1907, with the Russian liberal Constitutional Democrats in the Second Duma. The continued prominence of the Crimean Tatar delegates to all of the many political gatherings of the Russian Moslems after 1905 attests to their leadership and influence.<sup>88</sup> Undoubtedly, the Russian administration became increasingly alarmed at the intensity of Tatar political activity and the growth of the jadidist movement in Crimea. They were incompatible with both the security and the very idea of the Russian State. But, apart from its usual practices of continued discrimination and occasional harassment, the regime found itself powerless to hinder them effectively. In the case of the Crimean Tatars, the very policies of the Tsarist regime which were designed

to combat national feeling in fact seem to have stimulated its growth.

The Kalmyks, on the barren reaches of semi-desert around the northwestern shores of the Caspian Sea, also suffered great hardship under the rule of the Russian Tsars. Throughout the whole of their century and one-half under Russian authority, they were the victims of policies aimed at converting them from their Buddhist faith to Orthodox Christianity, at shattering the foundations of their economic life, at settling them and thus bringing them under more strict control, at breaking the power of their political and religious leaders, and, ultimately, at forcing their assimilation.

The approximately 50,000 Kalmyks who remained on Russian territory after 1771 and the great migration of the majority of their people back to Chinese Turkestan, and after the title of their khan had been abolished by Catherine the Great, were placed by the Empress under the direct supervision of a "Kalmyk Office" situated in Astrakhan, from where their "Chief Guardian"--the Russian governor-general of Astrakhan--exercised his extraordinary, almost dictatorial powers over the peoples of the steppes and directed the activities of the numerous "Sub-Guardians" in every district of Kalmykia.<sup>89</sup> The legal position of the Kalmyks and the other non-Russian subjects of the Empire was fully defined, however, only under Alexander I by the codification of the Russian law carried out by Speransky, which set out the basic principles for their administration

which were to be followed until 1917.

The Kalmyks, along with the mountaineer peoples of the Northern Caucasus, along with the Jews, and with most of the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes of Siberia and Central Asia, fell under the Russian social category or class of inorodtsy--which is perhaps best rendered by the French term peuples allogenes, or by the term "wandering peoples". The inorodets in the Russian Empire was not subject to the general laws of the Empire or of the district in which he lived, but to special laws. He was, in effect, allowed to maintain his right to self-rule, to his own native courts of law, and to his traditional forms of tribal organization. In theory, the inorodets gave nothing whatever to the Russian government except a fixed tax or annual tribute, and in return received nothing except the right to continue living within his defined area.<sup>90</sup> However, the Kalmyks, like so many other peoples in their class, found themselves subjected to governmental pressures, all through the nineteenth century, to give up their status as inorodtsy--to forsake their nomadic habits and to settle upon the land as farmers or in the towns as labourers--and to become regular citizens of the Empire, with all the duties and responsibilities of whatever class they joined. So far as the Russian law was concerned, these were the only requirements for any member of the inorodtsy to become a regular citizen.<sup>91</sup> But in practice, becoming a regular citizen meant for the inorodets also the incurring of the liability of compulsory military service, his

isolation from his tribal group and continuing discrimination against him because of his habits or appearance, and, most important, his giving up of his old religious beliefs and his embracing of the Orthodox faith.

This last, in particular, very few of the Kalmyks were willing to do. One of the outstanding characteristics of the Kalmyks who remained in the Russian Empire was their deep attachment to their Buddhist faith and the respect with which they regarded their priests. The influence of the priests over the nomads was remarkable, and few Kalmyks ever undertook actions of any consequence without first meeting with their priests for consultation.<sup>92</sup> The Kalmyks of Russia, all through the nineteenth century and despite even the most severe periods of religious oppression under the Tsars, maintained not only their religious beliefs, but also their extremely close ties with Lhasa, the capital of their faith toward which they looked for all spiritual guidance. Even in the worst days of Tsarist persecution, frequent exchanges of visits between Tibetan and Kalmyk priests continued.<sup>93</sup>

From the time of their first coming under Russian rule, therefore, the Kalmyks were subjected to vigorous campaigns of proselytism by the Orthodox Church and to other measures designed to convert them from their alien faith. Even before 1771, along with various other tribes of the eastern borderlands, the Kalmyks suffered the efforts of the Russian Church's missionaries forcibly to convert them. One of their principal objections to Russian

rule, and one of the primary reasons for their great emigration, was the Russian administration's hostility toward, and persecution of, Buddhism.<sup>94</sup> Under Catherine II, the effort toward conversion increased; it was an important part of the duties of each Kalmyk "Sub-Guardian" to impress upon the nomads the advantages to be gained through their adopting of the Orthodox faith. Alexander I began the practice of nominating personally the Kalmyk Grand Lama, in an attempt to gain greater control over the nomads through the influencing of their religious leader.<sup>95</sup> This policy was followed, although with a minimum of success, until almost the end of the nineteenth century. Under Pobyedonostsev, however, the dignity which accrued to the Kalmyk Grand Lama through his official recognition by the Russian State was called into question, then abolished; the last Kalmyk Lama to be appointed by a Tsar died in 1886, and no successor was ever named.<sup>96</sup> While it was thus beheaded, Kalmyk Buddhism also became the target of renewed and intensified campaigns of repression and russification-- campaigns similar to those undergone by all of the non-Orthodox religious groups in the 1880's and 1890's. Its places of worship were ordered closed; many of its properties were confiscated; and increased civil disabilities were imposed upon its adherents.<sup>97</sup> None of these measures, however, proved successful in weaning the Kalmyks away from Buddhism. The nomads clung tenaciously to their beliefs, and continued to be regarded, until the end of the century, as an alien and unreliable group which refused to adjust itself to the Tsarist conception of Empire.

Because of their singular qualities and their refusal to conform, the Kalmyks suffered gradual economic deprivation at the hands of the Russian authorities. As the nineteenth century progressed, they became subject to special restrictive measures which discriminated against them to the advantage of the new settlers who came in ever larger numbers to the borderlands either in search of land or to settle on the shores of the Caspian Sea as fishermen. One of the original restrictions placed upon the Kalmyks, as inorodtsy, at the beginning of the century, was the "ten verst limit", which forbade the nomadic tribes from approaching any closer than that distance (about six miles) to any Russian or European settlement.<sup>98</sup> As the colonization of the eastern reaches of the Empire increased, as the plow cut into the most fertile lands fringing Kalmykia, and as commercial fishing became an increasingly important industry in the Caspian Sea, the Kalmyks gradually found themselves circumscribed by European settlements and areas of cultivation, their freedom of movement severely restricted, and access denied to both sources of water and suitable grazing lands for their animals. They were driven deeper and deeper into the less desirable regions, and became ever less prosperous. Under Nicholas I, a further measure was taken against those Kalmyks who had settled as fishermen along the shores of the Caspian. The "ten verst limit" was made also to apply to them, unless they became apostates, and Kalmyk nomads were henceforth forbidden entirely to fish in the waters either of the Caspian or the Volga river. Then, in the 1860's, under Alexander II, the Russian authorities

added another ten versts to the allowable limits of Kalmyk proximity to Russian settlements.<sup>99</sup> Confined thus to the arid and inhospitable steppes, while Russian and other settlements prospered on the economically desirable fringes of their lands, the Kalmyks became impoverished. The periodic droughts and famines which are endemic on the Volga struck them even more severely than they did the European population. Although the number of Kalmyks in the Russian Empire increased to more than 130,000 by 1890,<sup>100</sup> the number of their cattle decreased, between 1803 and 1896, from more than 2,500,000 to a mere 453,000 head.<sup>101</sup>

Nevertheless, although they were discriminated against, even persecuted in these ways, the Kalmyks served the Tsars extremely well in the Russian army, and were valuable troops against either European foes or other native tribes. In 1812, for example, ten Kalmyk regiments of cavalry took part in the defence of Russia against Napoleon's great army of invasion; and two years later, when Napoleon had been defeated, and the Russian armies entered Paris victorious under their Tsar, Alexander I, they included three regiments of Kalmyk cavalry, two of them mounted on camels.<sup>102</sup> Kalmyks continued to be employed by the Tsars with great success against recalcitrant Turkic tribes during the campaigns of expansion into Central Asia. By the end of the century, however, when both Central Asia and the Caucasus had been more or less secured, and when there remained within the Empire few native tribes against whom the Kalmyks could be employed in punitive expeditions, their

employment in the Russian armies diminished considerably.

Until World War I, then, the Kalmyks generally maintained their old way of life. Despite all the measures taken against them and the high price they were compelled to pay for their non-conformity, very few of them relinquished either their religion or their nomadic tradition. They remained an anomaly in Europe, wandering over their steppes with their herds and flocks, and their kibitki--oriental in appearance, isolated and poor, apparently impervious to change. There is a certain timelessness evident in the Kalmyks and in their stubborn resistance to change. Perhaps it was their articles of faith which allowed them to accept their lot so philosophically. Buddhism teaches that life is miserable and worthless, that all worldly possessions are transitory and evanescent, and that decay is inherent in all component things of this earth. The perfect human life, for the Buddhist, is the life of patient, long-suffering quietude, of fatalistic endurance of all things, and the final beatitude is for the most part an escape from life, rather than a continually enlarging life.<sup>103</sup> By the same token, those beliefs which enabled the Kalmyks to resist successfully all efforts by the Tsarist authorities to persuade them to give up their religion and their way of life made them resistant to other ideas of social and political change. The conservatism of the Kalmyks, coupled with their isolation from the other peoples of the Empire, left them almost untouched by the pre-revolutionary agitation affecting most of the peoples of the Tsar

during the last decades of the regime. The Tsarist regime absorbed a few families of the Kalmyk nobility, but these were isolated cases, and the majority found no attraction either in Russian civilization or in the Russian Orthodox religion.

The peoples of the Northern Caucasus became Russian subjects officially in 1829, by the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople between Russia and Turkey. It was not until another thirty years had passed, however, that the armies of the Tsar were able finally to proclaim their conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan, and not for five more years that they were able to announce that there were no more tribes to conquer in the Caucasus. Under Tsarist rule, the mountain peoples were never considered entirely pacified. In the main mountain chains of the Northern Caucasus, the history of the Russian Empire consists of more than thirty years of cruel warfare and severe reprisal by both the mountain peoples and the Russian armies, followed by another half-century of intermittent insurrection and savage repression. Russian policies in the Northern Caucasus, administered by military authorities, were fully as repressive as they were anywhere in the Empire. The Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars, along with numerous other tribes, were not only forced at last to submit to the infidel Tsar, but also to witness hundreds of thousands of their countrymen and co-religionists deported, their Moslem faith viciously persecuted, their homes destroyed, their lands confiscated and distributed among their enemies, and their freedom rigidly curtailed.

Until after the surrender of Shamil, the Murid leader of the Northern Caucasus resistance, in 1859, and the final Russian campaign against the Cherkess, in 1864, it is extremely difficult to differentiate exactly among the numerous and diverse mountain peoples, except for the two larger tribes or groups, the Cherkess and the Chechens. It seems wise, therefore, to concentrate primarily upon the Chechens and their resistance, since their clashes with the Russian armies have been most frequent and best described. It was the Chechens who provided the hard core of the Moslem warriors who fought the Russians for thirty years, and who, as early as the Russo-Turkish War of 1769-74, had responded to the call to gazavat (holy war) against the Christian intruders from the north, and come out under the leadership of the mysterious Shekh Mansur, who was perhaps an Italian adventurer in the pay of Turkey.<sup>104</sup> It was the Chechens among whom the Murid movement, though born in neighbouring Daghestan, found its greatest strength and support, and among whom, with their primitive tribal communism, the doctrines of egalitarian Muridism exerted their widest appeal.

From 1818 onward, the resistance of the Chechens to the advancing lines of Cossack settlement began to assume major proportions. In that year, the Russian general, Yermolov, established the fortress of Grozny in Chechnia, with the words: "I wish that the terror of my name should guard our frontiers more potently than chains of fortresses, that my word should be for the natives a law more inevitable than death".<sup>105</sup> And in

the years following, Yermolov carried out regular punitive expeditions against the Chechens and other tribes, burning and destroying their auls--their villages. Such a challenge could hardly have been ignored by peoples who had for centuries known no other rule save that of their own elected councils, and raids on the Cossack fortresses and settlements only increased in frequency. Nevertheless, in the Russian campaigns in the Eastern Caucasus, in 1828-29, some four regiments of Moslem cavalry were recruited among the North Caucasians, including the Chechens, and proved to be of invaluable help to the Russians.<sup>106</sup> After 1830 and the Treaty of Adrianople, Russia had its position in the Caucasus sanctioned by a defeated Turkey, and there remained to be conquered two main enemies: the Chechens and the mixed tribes of Daghestan, who controlled the mountains on the east of the main chain of the Caucasus, from the upper Terek river to the foothills of Daghestan overlooking the Caspian; and the Cherkess, who controlled the main chain to the west, from the Taman' peninsula to the sources of the Kuban and Ingur rivers. The Chechens and the Daghestan tribes were entirely isolated, and the Cherkess were cut off from all direct contact with Turkey except by sea. Two pockets of resistance--the Russians expected their reduction to be quickly effected. In 1830, however, their armies were given a taste of what the next three decades were to provide when in Chechnia, under the leadership of the imam, Khazi Mullah, the puritan Murid movement erupted, determined to unite all the Moslems of the region against the Christian intruders and to drive out the Russians and their Cossack allies. Before the

imam was killed and his forces temporarily scattered, it took the Russian army three years of campaigning with over 10,000 men in the field, and cost it more than 3,000 casualties.<sup>107</sup>

A Russian publication at the turn of this century claimed that the peoples of the Northern Caucasus fought as fiercely as they did against Russia only because they were too remote from the world of political and diplomatic realities of the nineteenth century to realize the hopelessness of their own situation or the power of the Russian Empire, and, further, that they deceived themselves by thinking that Russia could not possibly have been so great and so powerful as was sometimes asserted, if it would bother fighting for the barren Caucasus mountains.<sup>108</sup> It is possible that there is a grain of truth in this statement, but not, it would seem, much more than a kernel. It would be as wrong to attribute the desperate resistance of the North Caucasian tribes merely to their ignorance of Russia's might, as it would be wrong to characterize their war as a patriotic war, or as a war for national independence.<sup>109</sup> But it cannot be doubted that the spark which served to ignite the flame of war in the Northern Caucasus was essentially a religious spark--the doctrines of Muridism, the doctrines of egalitarianism, of violent hatred for the infidel, and of war as an end in itself. As difficult as it may be for the modern historian in a secular age to reconcile the high intelligence of the mountaineers with any idea of fanatical religious beliefs, the ferocity of the Murid wars is otherwise inexplicable.

Undoubtedly, the Russian forces failed to understand, at least at first, the real force of the Murids. Only a year after the death of Khazi Mullah, the gazavat ignited again, this time under the imam, Shamil, who was to lead it for a quarter-century. It is beyond the scope of this study to trace the campaigns of Shamil and his Russian adversaries, and it must suffice to sum them up as a continuing guerilla, which struck, disappeared, then struck again, then disappeared again, while the Russian regular armies and Cossacks inexorably closed in, over twenty-five years, literally pacifying the native auls one by one, and gradually confining the movement of Shamil to a more restricted area. For years, the mountain auls of Chechnia proved almost impossible of access; perched high on rocky crags, they could be reached only through difficult passages of beech-forests and steep defiles, where large forces could be cut to pieces by sharpshooters were not the entire surrounding area secured. The Russian military campaigns in the Northern Caucasus, after Shamil had refused to surrender with honour in 1837--the whole conception of gazavat imposed a continuing struggle<sup>110</sup>--were methodical campaigns waged against the entire population; roads were constructed, villages destroyed, forests chopped down, fortresses built, and the pacified areas were resettled with Cossacks and other settlers.<sup>111</sup> Included among these should be mentioned the more than 45,000 Polish families which were transplanted to the Don and Caucasus for their part in the Polish Rebellion of 1830-31.<sup>112</sup>

Shamil's guerilla was directed principally against the settlers and the communities of Cossacks which had for centuries been the advance posts of the Russian Empire, but towns, including Vladikavkaz and Kitzlyar, were besieged, isolated Russian detachments were destroyed, the Russian communications kept disrupted. At the height of the struggle in the Northern Caucasus, Russian casualties rose to more than 12,000 a year.<sup>113</sup> This clearly was no ordinary guerilla war, but a highly organized and carefully directed war of attrition. Under Shamil, Dagestan and the adjacent mountains were divided up into twenty provinces, each of which was bound to place 200 horsemen in the field at the imam's bidding; the entire male population between the ages of fifteen and fifty was armed and drilled; a postal service and even a foundry for cannon were established.<sup>114</sup> In Shamil, "fanaticism was tempered by deep meditation, and cruelty by an instinct for statecraft".<sup>115</sup> He knew how to excite the enthusiasm and fanaticism of his followers; however, his ruthless insistence on puritanism, sacrifice, and obedience tended to alienate those villagers who were not among the elect, but who were expected to suffer both the exactions of the Murids and the reprisals of the Russians, while his radicalism and his levelling mission roused the hostility of the Dagestan landowners, many of whom his Murids drove from their properties.<sup>116</sup>

The breakdown of Shamil's movement began in 1845, with his failure to unite his forces with those of the Cherkess and the consequent lessening of support among those tribes which were

more exposed than were the Chechens to Russian punitive raids. But, for another fourteen years, Shamil and his followers contested the possession of every peak and valley against the advancing Russian battalions. Their hopes were raised momentarily by the outbreak of the Crimean War, and for a time the British contemplated an invasion of the Caucasus.<sup>117</sup> But though the Russians were forced to maintain all their garrisons in Chechnia and Daghestan throughout the War, and though the Murids made this important contribution to the weakening of the potential Russian forces in Crimea, no military contact was established with either the British or the Turks.<sup>118</sup> The Crimean War, therefore, merely delayed what was inevitable.

Following the Treaty of Paris, in 1856, the Russian government proceeded to liquidate the resistance of the Caucasian mountaineers; the existence of wide, unconquered areas where the tribes were free to attack Russian interior lines of communication had raised serious difficulties during 1853-56; and forces amounting to three armies were concentrated in Chechnia and Daghestan for the purpose.<sup>119</sup> The final reduction of the Murid resistance was still no easy task, however, despite the decline in Shamil's popularity because of his iron rule and the devastations of twenty-five years which the people had suffered. Only in the spring of 1859, when Shamil was reduced to 500 loyal supporters, did he surrender--to Prince Baryatinsky's army of 40,000 men with forty-eight guns.<sup>120</sup> In the north-west, the Cherkess held out under their leader, Mohammed Emir. But the

Cossack posts were pushed forward relentlessly, and the tribesmen were given the choice of settling on the plains or emigrating to Turkey. A few of the Cherkess adopted the first alternative and peopled the lower reaches of the Kuban, and about 70,000 crossed to Turkey; the majority, however, continued to fight desperately until 1864, when they were forced finally to capitulate to the combined forces of the Grand Duke Michael.

The Russian "restoring of order" in the Northern Caucasus was carried out with the utmost brutality. The Cherkess were driven from their mountains to the swampy shores of the Black Sea, where thousands perished from malaria.<sup>121</sup> The survivors, who not unnaturally still resented the settlement of their territories by Cossacks and Russians from the great peasant migration resulting from the emancipating of the serfs, were again given the choice of settling in other parts of the Empire or of emigrating to Turkey.<sup>122</sup> The majority of the Cherkess chose the second "solution", and, between 1861 and 1864, between five and six hundred thousand left the Caucasus for Turkey,<sup>123</sup> in a trek that one semi-official Russian publication characterized as "a calamity of such proportions [as] has rarely befallen humanity".<sup>124</sup> Owing to starvation, disease, and the hardships of the journey, the casualties of the deportation were enormous. In Chechnia and the eastern mountains, the Tsarist "pacification" took the form of forcible attempts to convert the Moslem tribesmen to Christianity, the introduction of corporal punishment for minor offenses, burnings of villages, seizures

of lands and their transfer into the hands of Russian officers and Cossacks, and complete disregard for local customs and traditions.<sup>125</sup> In the eastern mountains, too, there were transfers of population. Immediately after the conquest, the inhabitants of forty-four Chechen auls were expelled from their mountain homes onto the plains, where they could more easily be controlled.<sup>126</sup> At the same time, the majority of the Karachays were driven from their plains into the mountains by the advancing waves of settlers who came to take possession of their foothills: there, amid barren rocks, they lived in conditions of extreme poverty, earning a scanty living through nomadic cattle-breeding.<sup>127</sup> Those Chechens who still proved to be rebellious were also deported to Turkey; in 1865, seething with hatred over being forced out of their age-old mountain homes, many of the Chechens on the plains revolted. In the summer of 1865, about one-fifth of the entire Chechen population, about 40,000 people, were forced to leave for Turkey, where welcome was extended to them at the express demand of the Russian government.<sup>128</sup>

Yet even these extreme measures did not solve the problem of the native population of the North Caucasus. The tribes which remained proved to be constantly in a state of unrest, prepared at any time to come out in force against their Russian masters. The Chechens, in particular, who were the most numerous people left in the region after the deportations of the early 1860's, continued to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with Russian rule, and to flame into revolt at almost regular

intervals. And in response to these expressions of hatred, the Tsarist government had no other solution to offer except further repression. The Caucasus remained until 1917 under the administration of a military governor who, while formally called a viceroy, was for all practical purposes a full-fledged governor-general, with the powers to employ any means felt necessary for the performance of his duty; to maintain order and suppress anti-government activity, he had the right to order arrests or expulsions without any resort to courts or due processes of law.<sup>129</sup> Even after the surrender of Shamil and the expulsion of the most vital and hostile of the subject population, the Russians felt compelled to maintain very strong forces in the Caucasus,<sup>130</sup> and to render the peoples quiescent only through coercion. The Russians did try to weaken the potentially active element in the mountains by drafting the young men into the Russian army for service outside of their homeland, and, when mixed with Russian troops on the Turkish front, these proved to be excellent and reliable soldiers.<sup>131</sup> There were also, of course, important elements in the population of the Northern Caucasus which were pro-Russian, and even larger numbers who were indifferent to Russian rule. These included the land-owning class of Daghestan, a conservative element which had opposed the popular program of Shamil and sought Russian support for its privileges, the Kabardans and the Ossetians, Russia's traditional allies, and the ever-increasing numbers of Russian, Cossack, and other settlers who came to settle on the lands of the defeated peoples.

But Chechnia was always ready for revolt. In 1877, with the outbreak of another war between Russia and Turkey, a certain Hadji Ali Bey proclaimed himself imam, and "the wild Chechens brought out the muskets they had buried twenty years before".<sup>132</sup> The revolt was quickly suppressed, within a fortnight, but the Russian governor was not satisfied and sent columns of troops into the heart of Chechnia, demanding the surrender of all the rebels. These punitive columns only provoked more resistance, however, and the disorders spread to neighbouring Daghestan and thereby prevented any further dispatch of Russian reinforcements to the Turkish front. The risings drew upon the Chechens executions, the burning of more villages, and the destruction of their crops.<sup>133</sup> After the war came to a close, hundreds of families, including whole tribes which had rebelled against Russian rule, were forced to migrate from their mountain homes to the flat, cold regions of the north. The greater number of these were allowed, however, to return to their homes in 1881, by the new Tsar, Alexander III.<sup>134</sup>

The military service law of 1874, when it was extended to include the inhabitants of the Caucasus in 1886, although it temporarily exempted the Moslems from their fifteen years' compulsory service, provoked more unrest among the Chechens, even as it did in Crimea. The Chechens showed their unwillingness to serve in the armies of the Tsar:

The government merely had demanded of these highlanders a list of their families; the majority of the auls

(villages) refused to give it, fearing lest they might be supplying a census to be used in drafting recruits. Some talked of going over to Turkey with their families, stock, and chattels; others announced the coming of a new imam, who was to take command of the true believers. To overcome their credulity and stubbornness, an expedition consisting of ten battalions had to be dispatched into the wilds.<sup>135</sup>

A Russian monograph, published in 1894, said that the Chechens could not yet be considered fully pacified, and that numbers of them still looked across to Turkey, whither they dreamed of emigrating.<sup>136</sup> And there were further outbreaks of violence among the Chechens in 1898 and 1906.<sup>137</sup> In 1898, an attempt was made on the life of the viceroy, Prince Golitsyn, in reprisal for his extensive interference with local customs and the Moslem faith.<sup>138</sup> Attacks were made by the Chechens on the Orthodox missionaries who, with government backing, were carrying out an intensive campaign of proselytizing among the native villagers, and once more Russian troops had to be used to pacify the region. In 1906, as an aftermath of the 1905 Revolution, the Chechens again swooped down upon the Russian and Cossack settlements, in an effort to win back by armed force the lands they considered to be theirs by inheritance.<sup>139</sup> Again, the only answer was armed force and reprisal.

It is true that the Chechens represent a most extreme example of continued recalcitrance, and it is perhaps a moot

point whether any measures could have been taken by the Tsarist regime to ameliorate their treatment and to reconcile them to Russian rule. The treatment accorded to the Chechens, however, was little different from that accorded to the Ingushes, Karachays, Balkars, or any of those peoples who took part in the Moslem resistance to Russia. None of these were given any reason to feel anything but hatred toward the Russians. The Chechens were, in 1914, the poorest people in the whole Northern Caucasus, with average land allotments of only 8.1 acres, while the Ingushes, the next poorest, averaged only 15.76 acres.<sup>140</sup> Along with the Karachays and Balkars, and numerous smaller peoples, they eked out a bare living on their tiny rocky plots, concentrating their hatred on the Russian troops, the settlers of their old lands, and, around the turn of the century, on the landless proletarians who were now beginning to arrive in increasing numbers to work in the developing North Caucasus oil industry centred around Grozny and Maikop.<sup>141</sup> These so-called inogorodtsy, an urban element, added to the general hostility in the Northern Caucasus, disliking both the native tribes and the Cossacks, the former because they were natives, and the Cossacks for their privileges, their wealth, and their readiness to help the government stamp out popular resistance against absolutism.<sup>142</sup>

The Chechens and their fellows of the Northern Caucasus illustrate the complete bankruptcy of Tsarist nationality policies. No attempt ever was made to win their support for, or even their acceptance of, Russian rule. Even those rights which

they were supposedly guaranteed as inorodtsy were consistently violated by their Russian administrators, either deliberately or inadvertently because knowledge of native languages and rights was rare among the members of the Tsarist bureaucracy. The Chechens and the other North Caucasians who took part in the Murid Wars were always treated by the Tsarist regime as savages and as criminals, when in fact they were neither. They were systematically persecuted and exploited, until hatred and hostility toward the regime were bred into them through the generations. They were clearly regarded as unassimilable by the Russian government, and, in consequence, were treated as perpetual enemies of the State. The Tsarist policies of repression and coercion, with their deportations and other savage measures, did not solve the problem of the Chechens and the other peoples of the Northern Caucasus. The Chechens, in particular, with a birth-rate abnormally high for the Empire,<sup>142</sup> merely waited for their opportunity to drive out the soldiers of the Russian Tsar and to reclaim their lands from his settlers. The immediate result of Tsarist policies in the North Caucasus was a kind of uneasy truce imposed through armed force and suppression of the native tribes; but the long-term effect was to leave a legacy of bitterness and hatred which was to carry over into the Soviet regime.

Notes: II

<sup>1</sup>P.E. Kazansky, Vlast' vserossiiskovo imperatora (Odessa: 1913, p. 39, cited in G.T. Robinson, "Part IV Review", in Ernest J. Simmons, ed., Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 363.

<sup>2</sup>F. Bulgarin, Rossiia v istoricheskom, statisticheskom, geograficheskom i literaturnom otnosheniyakh. Ruchnaya kniga dlya russikh vsekh soslovii. History, part 4 (St. Petersburg: 1837), pp. 291-3, cited in Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-55 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), p. 77.

<sup>3</sup>Pares, op. cit., p. 344.

<sup>4</sup>Hugh Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914 (New York: Praeger, 1952), p. 12.

<sup>5</sup>Riasanovsky, op. cit., pp. 185-6.

<sup>6</sup>Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., III, p. 510.

<sup>7</sup>Pares, op. cit., p. 218.

<sup>8</sup>Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-23 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 6.

<sup>9</sup>Cf. ibid. It should be noted that Mr. Pipes is more certain that the question of religion had ceased to play any very significant part in influencing official attitudes toward the minorities of the Russian Empire during the nineteenth century than is the present writer.

<sup>10</sup>F.H. Skrine, The Expansion of Russia (Cambridge: University Press, 1903), p. 122.

<sup>11</sup>Riasanovsky, op. cit., pp. 84-5.

<sup>12</sup>Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., III, pp. 501-11, passim.

<sup>13</sup>The Uniate or Greek Catholic Church was founded in the closing years of the sixteenth century, in an effort to unite with Rome the Orthodox population under Polish rule. It recognized papal authority but, at the same time, retained the Eastern rite and allowed its services to be conducted in the native languages of its adherents.

<sup>14</sup>Pipes, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., III, p. 510.

<sup>17</sup>For the following summary of the views of Pobyedonostsev, I am indebted to the article by Robert Byrnes, "Pobyedonostsev and the Instruments of Government", in Simmons, op. cit., pp. 113-25, passim.

<sup>18</sup>Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 34; Kolarz, op. cit., p. 69.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>20</sup>Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., I, p. 47.

<sup>21</sup>E. Schmid, Die Deutschen Bauern in Suedrussland (Berlin: 1917), pp. 31-2, cited in Kolarz, loc. cit.

<sup>22</sup>Seton-Watson, loc. cit.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>24</sup>Kolarz, loc. cit.

<sup>25</sup>Seton-Watson, loc. cit.

<sup>26</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 70.

<sup>27</sup>Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 34.

<sup>28</sup>Cf. Marc Slonin, An Outline of Russian Literature (New York: Mentor Books, 1959), p. 92. Slonin also credits Danilevsky with having introduced the notion of national "cultural types" later taken up and developed by Oswald Spengler.

<sup>29</sup>G.P. Danilevsky, Sochineniya, 9th ed. (St. Petersburg, 1902), II, p. 123.

<sup>30</sup>Ivan Goncharov, Oblomov, trans. David Margarshack (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1954).

<sup>31</sup>Leroy-Beaulieu, loc. cit.

<sup>32</sup>Pares, op. cit., p. 386.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 71.

<sup>35</sup>Pares, op. cit., p. 393.

<sup>36</sup>Kolarz, loc. cit.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>Skrine, op. cit., p. 186.

<sup>39</sup>Schmid, in Kolarz, op. cit., p. 70.

<sup>40</sup>Pares, op. cit., pp. 323-4.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., pp. 374-6.

<sup>42</sup>Leroy-Beaulieu, loc. cit.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., III, p. 513.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 450; cf. Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>46</sup>Pares, op. cit., pp. 428-9; Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 161-2.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 305.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Pares, op. cit., p. 427.

<sup>50</sup>Robert W. Coonrod, "The Duma's Attitude Toward War-time Problems of Minority Groups", The American Slavic and East European Review, XIII (1954), p. 29.

<sup>51</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., pp. 71-2.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 76.

<sup>53</sup>Cf. ibid. and Pipes, op. cit., p. 12. There is wide disagreement on this estimate between these two authors. Kolarz states that the Crimean Tatars numbered about one million at this time, while Pipes estimates one-half that number.

<sup>54</sup>Kolarz, loc. cit.

<sup>55</sup>Cf. ibid., p. 77, and Conquest, op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>56</sup>Kolarz, loc. cit.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>The bulk of the literature on this question which is available is the work of members of the anti-Russian or anti-Soviet emigrations and does not admit, or dismisses without discussion, even the possibility that the Russian government had legitimate reasons for regarding the Crimean Tatars with some suspicion. Nor are Soviet sources more reasonable. As I have argued here, the attitudes and actions of the Crimean Tatars themselves were not the least of the reasons for the measures against them taken by the Tsarist regime.

<sup>60</sup>Bolshaya Sovyetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1st ed. (Moscow: 1937), 35, cited in Conquest, loc. cit.

<sup>61</sup>Serge A. Zenkovsky, "A Century of Tatar Revival", The American Slavic and East European Review, XII (1953), pp. 303-18; Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 38.

<sup>62</sup>The reference here is to the activities of Ilminsky, a friend of Pobyedonostsev and professor of Oriental languages, who encouraged the study of the Turkic languages of the Volga-Ural region in the 1850's with the aim of perpetuating every possible element of diversity and in this way removing the smaller ethnic and linguistic groups from the orbit of Volga Tatar influence. To further this end, he also encouraged the use of the Cyrillic, rather than the Arabic, alphabet for publications in these languages.

<sup>63</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., pp. 77-8.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>65</sup>Pipes, loc. cit.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 189.

<sup>68</sup>S.A. Usov, Istoriko-ekonomicheskiye ocherki Kryma (Simferopol: 1925), p. 69, cited ibid.

<sup>69</sup>Ves' Krym, 1920-25 (Simferopol: 1926), pp. 65 ff., cited ibid.

<sup>70</sup>Kolarz, loc. cit.

<sup>71</sup>Seton-Watson, loc. cit.

<sup>72</sup>Zenkovsky, op. cit., passim.

<sup>73</sup>Pipes, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid.

- 75 Seton-Watson, loc. cit.
- 76 Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 314.
- 77 Pipes, loc. cit.
- 78 Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 163.
- 79 Pipes, loc. cit.
- 80 Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 164.
- 81 Ibid.
- 82 Ibid., pp. 163-4; Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 316.
- 83 Ibid.
- 84 Pipes, loc. cit.
- 85 Pares, op. cit., pp. 426-7.
- 86 Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., III, p. 582.
- 87 Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 164.
- 88 Serge A. Zenkovsky, "Kulturkampf in Pre-Revolutionary Central Asia", The American Slavic and East European Review, XIV (1955), p. 31.
- 89 Kolarz, op. cit., p. 82.
- 90 Pipes, op. cit., p. 3.
- 91 Ibid.
- 92 Kolarz, op. cit., p. 83.
- 93 Ibid.
- 94 Conquest, op. cit., p. 37.
- 95 Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., I, p. 80.
- 96 Ibid., III, p. 584.
- 97 Pares, op. cit., p. 427.
- 98 Kolarz, loc. cit.
- 99 Ibid.
- 100 Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., I, p. 79.

<sup>101</sup>Kolarz, loc. cit.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid.

<sup>103</sup>Hume, op. cit., pp. 59-82, passim.

<sup>104</sup>Conquest, op. cit., p. 6; Allen and Muratoff, op. cit.,  
p. 47.

<sup>105</sup>John F. Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the  
Caucasus (London: 1908), p. 108, cited in Kolarz, op. cit., p. 187.

<sup>106</sup>Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 40.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>108</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., pp. 181-2.

<sup>109</sup>Cf. ibid. and Conquest, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

<sup>110</sup>Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 50.

<sup>111</sup>Conquest, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

<sup>112</sup>Skrine, op. cit., p. 122; Riasanovsky, op. cit.,  
p. 231.

<sup>113</sup>Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 51.

<sup>114</sup>Skrine, op. cit., p. 134.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid.

<sup>116</sup>Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>117</sup>Skrine, op. cit., p. 156.

<sup>118</sup>Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 59.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid., p. 106.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>121</sup>Skrine, op. cit., p. 229.

<sup>122</sup>Allen and Muratoff, loc. cit.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid., p. 108; Kolarz, op. cit., p. 182.

<sup>124</sup>Kavkazsky Sbornik (Tiflis: 1877), II, p. 457, cited  
ibid.

<sup>125</sup>R. Adighe, "Literature on Daghestan and Its People",  
The Caucasian Review, IV (1957), p. 105.

- <sup>126</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 186.
- <sup>127</sup>Ibid., p. 190.
- <sup>128</sup>Ibid., p. 186.
- <sup>129</sup>Pipes, op. cit., p. 4.
- <sup>130</sup>Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 130.
- <sup>131</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>132</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>133</sup>Conquest, op. cit., p. 18.
- <sup>134</sup>Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., III, pp. 405-6.
- <sup>135</sup>Ibid., p. 582.
- <sup>136</sup>Kolarz, loc. cit.
- <sup>137</sup>R. Traho, "Circassians" (Munich: 1956), p. 57,  
cited in Adighe, loc. cit.
- <sup>138</sup>Pares, op. cit., p. 431.
- <sup>139</sup>Conquest, loc. cit.
- <sup>140</sup>V.P. Pozhidaev, Gortsy Severnovo Kavkaza (Moscow-Leningrad: 1926), cited in Pipes, op. cit., p. 95.
- <sup>141</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 188.
- <sup>142</sup>Pipes, loc. cit.
- <sup>143</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 186.

### III

#### i

This is not the place to chronicle in any detail events in the Russian Empire in the years immediately prior to World War I. Nor is it the place to describe the minutiae of Russia's involvement in the War, the complex combinations of circumstances leading up to the stunning collapse of the Tsarist autocracy in 1917, or the singular drama of the collapse itself. All of these have been well described elsewhere. However, it does seem desirable to note at this juncture at least one or two salient facts germane to these events, before any discussion of Bolshevik policy should be undertaken. It should be noted, first of all, that the years between the Revolution of 1905 and the outbreak of World War I were for Tsarist Russia years of almost unparalleled material prosperity and economic growth, years during which the flame of revolution which had burned so brightly in 1905 seemed to gutter and temporarily to die. For with the increase in material prosperity during these years came a general lessening in opposition to the Tsarist regime and a general increase in satisfaction with the status quo. There was at least a wider acceptance of things as they were. And with this acceptance of the established order, itself informed by a growth in the national wealth of the Empire, came also a marked increase in Russian nationalism and patriotism. Second, and this point is corollary to the foregoing, few of the leaders of the various Russian revolutionary parties were at this time optimistic

concerning their chances for success; and probably fewer still even dared to hope that the beginning of World War I would in future be reckoned as the beginning of the end for the institution of Tsardom, that in less than three years the ancient and seemingly immutable Russian autocracy would crash ignominiously into dust.

These points are raised only to draw attention to the fact that the basic document for Soviet nationality policy was conceived and drawn up at the very time when its prospects for ever being actually realized were at their most bleak, when the essential conditions prerequisite to revolution seemed impossible of attainment until some time in the distant future. Marxism and the National Question, written during the winter of 1912-13 and published under the name of Stalin, reflects, however, the importance which the Bolsheviks attached to the national question at this time, and also indicates their realization of the urgency to put forward a definite and concrete national program. For in fact, while in Russia itself a period of unprecedented prosperity had resulted in a certain measure of complacency and satisfaction among the general run of the population, at the same time contributing to extremely heightened feelings of nationalism and patriotism, and while these developments had seemed to eclipse temporarily the prospect of revolution, the situation in many of the non-Russian parts of the Empire, in the borderlands, was fast moving in a contrary direction. The tensions which had always existed between Russian "masters" and the subject peoples of the

Empire were heightening increasingly. A general rise in national consciousness among the minorities had been noticeable since at least 1905, due not only to continued Imperial policies of national oppression and forced russification, but also due to increased Russian economic exploitation of the borderlands and consequent large influxes of Russian farmers, workers, and officials into these areas, and had fostered a remarkable acceleration in the founding and spread of coherent national movements. It has been seen how Gasprinsky's pan-Turkic movement, for example, had grown from its modest beginnings among the few members of the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia to spread, acquiring regional and local mutations as it did so, to virtually all of the Tatar groups of the Empire, and even outside the Empire. If the example of the Crimean Tatars can in no way be considered typical, it must be recalled that their national movement was not unique, but had much in common with other, similar movements among many peoples. Its principal distinctive trait in comparison to the movements stirring among many of the other peoples of Russia lay only in its earlier and fuller development. In many of the borderlands, especially those where the interests of the national minorities came into conflict with the interests of ethnic Russians, the bearers of a new and heightened Russian nationalism, there had been a profound increase in national oppression, which is the chief motivating force, probably, for any national movement.

There were enormously wide differences, of course, in

the extent to which national consciousness was developed among the various minorities of the Russian Empire before 1914, and manifold variations in the directions toward which different national movements pointed and strove. The Poles and Finns, to take extreme examples at one end of the scale, were already self-contained nations with concrete and well-defined national programs for complete liberation, extending even to demands for separate and independent statehood. On the other hand, however, and in sharp contrast to the Poles and Finns, the bulk of the minorities of the Empire were much less advanced. The Ukrainians and Byelorussians, for example, while cherishing their own distinctive languages and national traditions, had absorbed a substantial amount of Russian culture through their centuries of familiar contacts, and possessed in general neither strong consciousness of their differences nor much interest in the question of their possible independent statehood. Their national movements, as the events of the Revolution and the Civil War were to demonstrate convincingly, were infinitely more verbal than viable. Confined as they were in each case to a single extremely rabid and vocal stratum of the population, their national intelligentsia, these national movements had by 1914 sunk only a few tenuous roots into the broad culture of their peoples. As regards the rest of the peoples of the Empire--the multitude of smaller, non-Slavic minorities for the most part--it is difficult to generalize about them. Many lacked even the germinal national consciousness of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, in the vast

majority of cases because they lacked also any class which could be described as a national intelligentsia. Many others stood for nothing more than a vague bettering of their conditions of life, and possessed no cogent national aspirations. Others, like the Crimean Tatars, were highly developed. But unlike the Crimean Tatars, most of the minority peoples, where their demands were at all cogent and well-defined, and where there existed an articulate and conscious stratum to voice these demands, were overwhelmingly in favour of some form of self-government or autonomy within the existing state structure, rarely desirous of independent statehood for themselves, and interested generally only in the ameliorating of some specific conditions of social or economic inequality.

All the same, it would be a serious error to render only slight importance to the national ferment among the peoples of Russia in the years immediately preceding World War I. The vagueness and inchoateness of their national aspirations and desiderata should not be allowed to obscure the indisputable fact that the majority of these peoples were awakening and stirring politically--even though their national consciousness was still most often in an incipient stage. It is rarely that a national movement springs full blown and fully developed into life; almost invariably, political movements have their naissance in social or cultural movements, movements originating in the demands of minorities for rights denied to them: such things as

the rights to their national languages, schools, religions, customs, and so on. Demands of these kinds were being heard ever more frequently and more audibly, throughout the borderlands of the Empire especially, during the pre-1914 decade, and were voiced most vociferously in those regions which already possessed, or were in the process of acquiring, considerable Russian or other Slavic populations. In those areas, where the Russian newcomer was almost invariably favoured in countless ways over the indigenous inhabitant, the mere opportunity for the latter to compare and contrast his situation with that of the Russian gave rise naturally to the question of equality of rights. Where that indigenous inhabitant was discriminated against or exploited because of his race, colour, or creed, his reaction most frequently took the palpable form of defensive anti-Russianism. It is difficult, of course, to gauge even approximately the extent to which national movements among any peoples are informed by this negative aspect of national feeling; but at the same time it cannot be doubted that the national movements of the peoples of the Russian Empire were with few exceptions compounded largely from some type of Russophobia.

The problem at hand, however, is neither nationalism in general nor nationalism among the peoples of the Russian Empire. The interest here is in seven particular peoples of the Empire. If it may be assumed that national consciousness among all these stemmed at least partly from anti-Russian sentiment--if this could be said to be the condition common to all of their national

movements--it may be advisable to survey summarily some of the other conditions informing their national consciousness, and to note briefly so far as is possible to what extent their national consciousness was developed at the beginning of World War I.

It has been remarked earlier how the Crimean Tatars, who at the outset of their life under Russian rule had been expelled from their choice and productive coastal locations, and then later gradually deprived even of their marginal inland farms as Russian and other settlement in Crimea increased, had become increasingly poverty-stricken and dissatisfied; it has also been seen how their political revival began as a cultural revival, in large measure as a means of collective self-help, as a healthy response to their threatened national annihilation, which drew upon both their tradition of education and modern ideologies, and how it became in time transformed through the creative genius of Gasprinsky into a vital and dynamic force with political, social, and economic connotations. Originally stimulated by a negative, anti-Russian matrix, it developed into a positive and organic national movement, then into a supra-national, pan-Turkic movement possessing enormous potentialities. At the outbreak of World War I, political life among the Russian Moslems showed three principal tendencies; on the extreme right were the religious groups, comprised of the orthodox Moslem clergy and the wealthiest elements of Moslem society, generally conservative in views; the centre group was liberal, westernized, and in political and social ideologies quite closely associated

with the Russian Kadets; and on the left were the young Moslem intellectuals, westernized and secularized like the liberals, but strongly imbued also with the ideas of socialism.<sup>1</sup> Among the Crimean Tatars, it was the latter group, the left-wing intellectuals, which predominated, possessing an advanced political and social program roughly comparable to that of Russian Social Revolutionaries, and intensely nationalistic, strongly in favour of separatism.

The Crimean Tatars were exceptional, however, among the peoples of the Russian borderlands to the East and South: exceptional in their geographical, historical, and cultural proximity to Western influences and ideas, in their inherent, deeply-rooted tradition of education, and in their possessing of an outstanding individual like Gasprinsky to activate and to channel their resources. Few of the peoples of the Russian Empire were either as vigorous or progressive as the Crimean Tatars, and certainly none of the other six who are the special province of this study approached them in the sphere of political sophistication. Nevertheless, to repeat, it would be erroneous to assume that national feeling was not at least embryonic among these other peoples, whether it manifested itself only as a kind of negative and defensive cohesiveness, whether it was found in a religious guise, or whether it was masqueraded in some other form not readily recognizeable as national feeling at all. National feeling assumes many forms and seeks a multitude of channels of expression.

Among the mountain tribes of the North Caucasus, for example, national consciousness was based very largely upon their community of religious belief compounded with the most rabid form of anti-Russianism and an ancient tradition of implacable resistance to outside invaders. When World War I began, it will be recalled, less than sixty years had elapsed since the surrender of Shamil. The traditions and legends of his epic struggle against the Russians still lived in the minds of his countrymen and co-religionists, nourished and revitalized from time to time by new uprisings and raids. The doctrines of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism had made some progress in the mountains, specifically among those mullahs who were accustomed to visit the holy places of their religion in Turkey, and also among some of the more progressive intellectuals who realized both the dynamism and the need of wider associations.<sup>2</sup> But in Chechnia and in Dagestan, the dominating factor was undoubtedly the priestly class of mullahs who, incidentally, comprised no less than 4 per cent. of the population.<sup>3</sup> And though it was manifested in national form, the fever which burnt in the North Caucasus was in fact religious fever, the Muridism of Shamil which stressed the role of the God-appointed Imam, or spiritual leader, who exercised complete control over his followers. The mountain tribes embraced not only the right wing of Moslem political life, but the extreme right wing; their hatred was not only of things Russian, but of things western:

As a matter of fact [wrote a leading Communist of Dagestan, describing the doctrines of the Moslems in the

North Caucasus] there is no opposition on the part of the clerical intelligentsia to the Soviet power as the bearer of Communism . . . The clerical intelligentsia of Dagestan looks upon the Soviet power not as Communistic but as atheistic and as the bearer of western civilization--'the sinful, the accursed'-- . . . All European civilization is the invention of the Devil, whether it takes the form of capitalism or of communism . . . and hostility to European civilization is a phenomenon more complicated than any mere religiosity and one far more difficult to deal with.<sup>4</sup>

Irreconcilable hatred of everything European and everything Russian, hatred inspired not only theologically, but tempered also by vivid memories of savage warfare, cruel reprisals, mass transfers of whole populations, and seizures of lands: in the North Caucasus, only the opportunity was lacking for the fanatical tribesmen to come out once more en masse against the Cossack and Russian expropriators. Not nationalism in a modern form, perhaps; but a kind of pathological, or even zoological, nationalism. Not a deliberately ingrained and artificially stimulated movement; but fully as volatile and as violent, and infinitely more natural, bred into the bone, so to speak. For the Chechens and Ingushes, peace was only a time between wars so long as the Russian remained on their territories. For the Karachays and Balkars, though less strongly influenced by Muridism, fewer in number, and more accessible of attack, the bond of Islam,

nevertheless, and hatred of a common foe, dictated their support for any rising by their fellows.

The way of life of the Kalmyks had not altered appreciably for centuries. Their wholly conservative tradition, which has been remarked upon earlier, proved to be an effective discouragement to the taking hold of new ideas among them. Reflecting not only the essentially life-denying precepts of their Zonkavist Buddhism, which scorned the external world and accepted the most harsh conditions as the immutable companions and corollaries of life, but also their physical isolation on their cis-Caspian steppes, and their almost invariable experience of evinced hostility from their European and Turkic neighbours, this inherent conservatism served as an efficacious prophylactic in preventing the implanting of modern social and political ideologies. But if it patently reflected the attraction of the outside world in negative terms--remarkably few Kalmyks, even Kalmyk nobles who had ready access to the upper echelons of Russian society, deserted either their nation or their religion during their centuries of contact with the Russians, despite all the blandishments and coercions of the Tsarist missionary and administrator--it must be assumed that this tradition also acted in a positive way to heighten the feeling of Kalmyk national identity, that it fostered in the breast of the individual Kalmyk an innate sense of the rightness of his society as he knew it, even as it made him regard the environing outside world, particularly the Russian world, as the manifestation of a complete misunderstanding of the whole meaning of life. Perhaps all the

foregoing adds up only to the fact that the Kalmyks rejected Russian civilization simply because of its essentially worldly spirit, that they did not in fact understand it. But in the passivity of the Kalmyks to the aggressiveness of the Russian Tsar, the exploiting by his subjects, and the active proselytizing by his missionaries, there would also seem to have resided a pride of a certain kind, the pride of the weak and righteous when confronted by an overwhelmingly stronger--but completely misguided--adversary: a pride of humility, perhaps. Certainly, it would seem to have been the case that the more vicious and more punishing the measures taken against them, in the effort to denationalize them, the more stubbornly and implacably the Kalmyks nurtured their group identity, even taking a kind of pride--albeit a perverse, defensive, kind of pride--in the immutability of their ancient institutions. The simple truth would appear to be that when a nation is persecuted, its reaction will unfailingly redound to its national matrix. Few of the minorities of the Russian Empire were so consistently badgered as the Kalmyks, so unremittingly subjected to national oppression; their grazing lands occupied by Europeans, their flocks and herds decimated, their religious faith beheaded and proselytized unmercifully, effectively ostracized and confined to areas without access to water and fishing-grounds, the Kalmyks literally were compressed into a self-conscious nation. If their expressed national ambitions were minimal, embracing only a desire for the most modest form of national autonomy, an end to Russian oppression, and certain economic concessions necessary to insure their viability

as a national group, this was solely because of the severe limitations and circumscriptions which the singularly conservative tradition and historical circumstances of the Kalmyks imposed upon their political horizons. The Kalmyk tradition, so powerfully conditioned by religious precepts, and the Kalmyk experience, so essentially unsophisticated, simply did not countenance or comprehend any ideas of radical political or social change. The Kalmyks were reactionaries in the proper sense of that word, in that they sought not merely to retain the status quo, but actually to restore the status quondam. If the Kalmyk national tradition thus limited its peoples' political goals, it nevertheless, and at the same time, was the centre from which all Kalmyk national feeling radiated and drew sustenance.

Living almost entirely unto themselves, participating little in the life of their adopted country, the Volga Germans, like the Kalmyks, also exhibited remarkable national cohesiveness and exclusiveness. Except in the economic sphere, the Volga Germans for generations steadfastly refused to integrate themselves into the Russian community; from the time of their first coming to Russia, culturally, socially, and politically they remained a clearly differentiated national community of their own. But unlike the Kalmyks and the host of non-European national minorities who comprised the Russian Empire, and whose nationalism was in large measure derived from the fact they were oppressed minorities whose very survival depended upon some form of common action, the

Volga Germans were until very recently a highly privileged minority whose sense of national identity would appear to have been nurtured and stimulated by the fact of their superior position in Russian society--a position which was infinitely superior to that of any other national minority, and to that of most of the Russian population as well. Only in the three or four decades immediately preceding World War I did the Volga Germans begin to feel the weight of national oppression, and even then to an extent significantly less than their Baltic cousins. No, even if it be admitted that the years leading up to World War I saw an increasing economic threat to the Volga Germans and a consequent drawing together of the Germans in the face of this common danger, the merely defensive element in their national self-consciousness would seem still to have been only in addition and ancillary to other elements. The many privileges granted them which first drew them to settle in Russia--economic concessions of various description, exemption from military service, religious freedom, national schools, local self-government--from the outset created for the Volga Germans a kind of national cocoon which effectively insulated them against outside influences by allowing them to live in Russia without spiritually leaving Germany, to become psychologically as self-sufficient in their new country as they were economically self-sufficient. In short, they had no need of things Russian. And anent this psychological self-sufficiency, it is probably safe to assume that it encouraged an attitude, a certainty, of the innate superiority of German institutions over Russian institutions, of

German people over Russian people. The prosperity and tidiness of the German village as compared with the wretchedness and filth of the Russian village, the thrift and industry of the German colonist as compared with the drunkenness and sloth of the Russian muzhik: such superficial comparisons were easily to be interpreted by the comfortable and cosy German mind as indisputable evidence of the basically higher qualities of the German settler--never, of course, as mere reflections of the many privileges bestowed upon him. The wealth, the prosperity, and the smugness of the Volga Germans seem to have rendered them insensitive to the mounting Russian antagonism toward them. Wishing only to be left alone and to fructify as they had in the past, they seem to have been little aware of the hostility which their dominant position engendered, and the occasional measures taken against them before the War seem to have been largely ignored as symptoms of this hostility. At least the Volga Germans did not react to these measures in typical fashion--that is, by drawing together for political action and defence. When World War I's beginning rendered their position in the Russian Empire entirely anomalous, then, they were generally unprepared. Their national unity failed to manifest itself in any significant, political terms, and remained for the most part inarticulate.

World War I nevertheless did have the effect of stimulating national consciousness generally among the minorities of the Russian Empire. Since it was ostensibly being fought, at least in part, for the right of the Balkan Slavs to self-determination, it could not help but awaken in the national

minorities of Russia an aspiration toward greater freedom, whether this freedom was to be sought in the political, economic, social, or cultural spheres. If they were being asked to fight for the national liberation of the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian and former Turkish empires, it was not unreasonable for the peoples of the Russian Empire to hope for a betterment of their own lot, for some degree of national freedom for themselves. National freedom should be sought within, as well as outside, the Empire. In addition, there was the identity of Russia's foes; the War could not be popular with many of the national minorities, particularly those possessing close ties with either Germany or Turkey, still regarding these enemy nations as the "homeland". Among these, of course, were the Volga Germans, the Crimean Tatars, and to some lesser extent, the peoples of the North Caucasus.

## ii

The broad, essential theoretical outlines for Bolshevik and, later, Soviet nationality policies are contained in Stalin's Marxism and the National Question, published in 1913. While many of Stalin's other theoretical writings have been either repudiated or corrected by his successors, especially since 1956, Marxism and the National Question remains today as the basic and authoritative Soviet document as regards the national question, whether in the Soviet Union itself or in other parts of the world, never having been criticized or superseded by later Soviet

theoretical works on the subject. Indeed, these more recent writings have served only to elucidate and to elaborate upon the fundamental dictums set forth by Stalin in 1913, and to illustrate the continuing importance of his work on this aspect of Soviet ideology. Extremely few of the nationality policies implemented by the Soviet regime since its coming to power, up to and perhaps including the mass deportations of peoples, are not implicit in, or cannot be reconciled with, the basic theoretical principles stated in Marxism and the National Question. Another measure of the respect with which the work has always been held by Marxists can be gained from the judgement of Leon Trotsky, that: "On the basis of that single article, which was forty printed pages long, its author is entitled to recognition as an outstanding theoretician".<sup>5</sup> Trotsky, of course, was himself an outstanding Marxist theoretician, and also among Stalin's most bitter rivals and detractors; coming from him, this is high praise, indeed. And the fact that he proceeds, after this high praise for the author of Marxism and the National Question, to present evidence for his contention that the author was not Stalin at all, but Lenin, in no way invalidates or weakens his evaluation of the importance of the work. The question of authorship cannot be decided here; it is beyond the province of this paper. But the possibility that the writer was Lenin and not Stalin, far from diminishing or lessening the importance of the work, in fact adds immeasurably to it. None of Lenin's teachings, after all, have been either superseded or called into question by his successors. It seems essential, therefore, that pause should be made here to

examine briefly at least the principal points made in Marxism and the National Question. They shed a great deal of light upon the measures employed by the Soviet regime in its dealing with the national question in the U.S.S.R.

The central theses of Marxism and the National Question may perhaps be summed up in the following propositions. Marxists recognize the right of all nations to self-determination. They recognize the necessity for regional autonomy within a given state, and the need for special legislation guaranteeing minority rights. At the same time, however, and over-riding all other considerations, they claim the need for a single proletarian party, an indivisible collective, cutting across all national lines.

Leninist-Marxist theory propounds that all nations are transitory phenomena belonging only to a certain stage of historical and economic development, the epoch of capitalism. National questions, therefore, must in every case be subordinated to the broader, more important issue of the class struggle, the class struggle between the bourgeoisie, the class which is the bearer of capitalism, and the proletariat, the class which is the bearer of the coming stage of historical and economic development, socialism. Capitalism and socialism, in this scheme, are fundamentally hostile and irreconcilable. That, of course, is the essence of the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the class struggle which the proletariat is destined to win simply because "History is on its side", because socialism represents a higher stage of historical and economic development

than does capitalism. As surely as capitalism triumphed over feudalism or medievalism, progressive socialism is bound to triumph over reactionary capitalism. And just as surely, the internationalism of the world proletariat is bound to triumph over the nationalism of the bourgeoisie. It is fundamental to these doctrines that, while the interests of the proletariat demand the removal of all obstacles between workers of different nations, and demand their unity in the pursuit of a common goal, the defeat of capitalism and the triumph of labour--Marx's own stirring call to arms, "Workers of the world, unite!", will be recalled--the interests of the bourgeoisie demand not the integration of the workers, not their international solidarity on the basis of class, but their segregation and differentiation on the basis of nationality.

Nations come into existence, Marxist theory holds, only with the breakdown of the feudal order and the development of capitalism. Capitalism demands national states and strives to create them. Stalin writes, in Marxism and the National Question: "The process of the elimination of feudalism and the development of capitalism was at the same time a process of the amalgamation of peoples into nations".<sup>6</sup> And Lenin, writing elsewhere, elaborates:

Throughout the world, the period of the final victory of capitalism over feudalism was linked with national movements. The economic basis of these movements is that in order to achieve complete victory for commodity production

the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, must have politically united territories with a population speaking the same language, while all obstacles to the development of this language and to its consolidation must be removed."<sup>7</sup>

The complex phenomenon known as nationalism is written off in this rather crude and over-simplified economic way also by Stalin: "Its aim [which is to say, the bourgeoisie of any nation] is to sell its goods and to outcompete the bourgeoisie of another nationality. . . . The market is the first school in which the bourgeoisie learns its nationalism".<sup>8</sup> These passages make clear the Marxist view that nations belong only to a certain stage of historical and economic development; as Stalin explicitly defined it, "A nation is not merely a historical category but a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism".<sup>9</sup> It follows from this schema that national consciousness, therefore, did not exist before the rise of bourgeois class consciousness, and that it will cease to exist with the success of the proletarian revolution and the eradication of class differences. Clearly, national consciousness is ephemeral and must give way to class consciousness. Nationalism, according to the Soviet interpretation, is in every case "bourgeois" nationalism--indeed, these two terms are practically inseparable in Soviet terminology.

Nations come into being, Stalin explains, usually as national states. This is the general rule, and it is exemplified

by such nations as England, France, etc. In Eastern Europe, however, the exception became the rule; there the pattern which emerged was one of multinational states. The development of multinational states--and this is the more pertinent, of course, à propos of the Russian Empire and this study--was possible only under specific conditions, where feudalism was still to some extent extant, where capitalism was but feebly developed, where class consciousness was not highly developed, and where minority nations had not yet had time to consolidate themselves economically.<sup>10</sup> In multinational states, the struggle of the bourgeoisie of the majority nation against the bourgeoisie of the minority nations carries over from the economic to the political sphere, and results in policies of repression of minority rights. At this stage, bourgeoisie and proletariat of the oppressed minority nations have a common interest in their liberation from alien majority domination, and therefore share in the national struggle. For though all national movements are patently bourgeois, and though the interests of the proletariat are fundamentally international and anti-national, policies of repression--repression of language, limitation of freedom of movement, disfranchisement, restriction of schools, and such like measures--nevertheless constitute a serious danger to the proletariat.<sup>11</sup> They not only hinder the intellectual development of the oppressed minority proletariat through denying it the use of its own language, but also divert large segments of the populace from social questions and the question of the class struggle to national questions, and are utilized through policies of "divide and rule" to foment

hatred between national minorities. National oppression, therefore, is always to be combatted, in order "to reduce the national struggle to a minimum, to sever its roots, to render it as innocuous as possible for the proletariat".<sup>12</sup> In short, while the national struggle must always be reduced, it must be reduced only because it is an obstacle to the consolidation of the proletariat--only because the class struggle must be intensified.

What seems obvious from the outset here is an apparent contradiction between the views of nationalism and internationalism. While the aim of Communism is "not only to abolish the present division of mankind into small states and all-national isolation, not only to bring the nations closer together, but also to merge them",<sup>13</sup> nevertheless, and at the same time, Leninists unequivocally support the right of all nations to self-determination. Stalin states flatly, for example, that "the right of self-determination is an essential element in the solution of the national problem;<sup>14</sup> and, further elucidating upon this, he comments:

The right of self-determination means that only the nation itself has the right to determine its destiny, that no one has the right forcibly to interfere in the life of the nation, to destroy its schools and other institutions, to violate its habits or customs, to repress its language, or curtail its rights . . . Nations are sovereign and all nations are equal.<sup>15</sup>

The right of self-determination, proclaimed by the Bolsheviks, was undoubtedly one of the most important single factors in rallying many of the minorities of the Russian Empire to support Lenin in the Russian Civil War. But it was, as has been seen, only one part of an apparent paradox, and by itself gives little insight into Soviet nationality policy. The single, probably the most essential, key to Soviet nationality policy lies in the understanding of the method by which the doctrine of self-determination of nations is reconciled with the apparently irreconcilable first premise of Marxism, that the solidarity of class is international. In a word, this method is the dialectic. For like all Bolshevik doctrines of political right, the right of self-determination of nations is conditional and dynamic. That is, it depends upon the character of the society in which the right is invoked. What must be taken into account is the stage of historical and economic development attained by a nation in question: whether that nation is developing from feudalism to bourgeois democracy, or from bourgeois democracy to proletarian democracy. As Stalin puts it: "The economic, political, and cultural conditions of a given nation constitute the only key to the question how a particular nation ought to arrange its life and what forms its future constitution ought to take".<sup>16</sup> If a national bourgeoisie, then, is still struggling to complete its bourgeois revolution, if it is still engaged in its struggle with medievalism, then national struggle represents the forces of progress. The bourgeoisie, at this stage of historical

development, rising capitalism, is still the legitimate bearer of the nation's will and should in this context be supported by the proletariat, which also stands to gain from liberation from alien domination. But if the bourgeoisie has already completed its revolution, if the struggle with medievalism is over and the stage is already set for the next stage of development, the transition to proletarian democracy, then national struggle in this context represents the forces of reaction. The bourgeoisie, at this stage of historical development, full-blown capitalism, is no longer the legitimate bearer of the nation's will. This role now devolves upon the proletariat, class-conscious and international in outlook, imbued with the historical principle of international unity, and dedicated to the erasing or breaking down of all national barriers. The right of nations to self-determination is not, therefore, an intrinsic or inalienable right; it is valid only insofar as it represents a necessary and progressive step toward the victory of socialism. The apparent paradox of the Bolshevik position is thus resolved. It is possible to assert, as Stalin does, that: "A class conscious proletariat has its own tried banner and it does not need to march under the banner of the bourgeoisie",<sup>17</sup> and, moments later, to add the seemingly paradoxical statement, that Marxists "will continue to combat the policy of national oppression in all its forms, subtle or crude".<sup>18</sup> The transition to capitalism and bourgeois democracy and their corollary, nationalism, will be supported--but only because this transition represents a progressive movement toward the coming proletarian revolution.

Stalin makes this clear in Marxism and the National Question: "The obligations of Social Democrats, who defend the interests of the proletariat, and the rights of a nation, which consists of various classes, are two different things".<sup>19</sup> In every case, the national question is a subordinate question to that of the interests of the proletariat as a whole, only a part of that larger question, and always to be considered from the point of view of that larger question. While a nation has the right, therefore, "to arrange its own life on autonomous lines",<sup>20</sup> the right of self-determination must not, and will not, always be to the advantage of a nation, which is to say, to the advantage of the majority of its population--which is to say, of its proletariat.<sup>21</sup> Further, if the interests of the nation, comprised of all classes, and the interests of the proletariat, one class, should conflict, they are always to be resolved in the interests of the latter. Stalin makes this point at least twice in Marxism and the National Question, but nowhere in the same unequivocal and terse manner as Lenin, writing elsewhere:

There is not a single Marxist who, without making a total break with the foundations of Marxism and Socialism, could deny that the interests of Socialism are above the interests of the rights of nations to self-determination.<sup>22</sup>

The right of self-determination, where it conflicts with the higher right of the proletariat to establish or to maintain its

dictatorship, cannot be allowed consideration. Marxism and the National Question was written, of course, before there was an established socialist state, when the advent of successful revolution in Russia still appeared far distant. The author does not explicitly state, therefore, the Bolshevik position with regard to the rights of minority nations vis-à-vis an already established Communist power. But the merciless logic of Marxism makes implicit from what has already been said the program which must be followed, should the socialist revolution be successful and should a socialist state actually be established. If the interests of nations in general are always to be considered as secondary and subordinate to the interests of the class struggle, it cannot but follow, of course, that they are always to be subordinated to the proletarian revolution incarnate. It is always in the interests of the revolution and of all progressive peoples that the revolution should enlarge itself. It goes without saying, then, that the only nations which would wish to separate themselves from an established socialist state would be reactionary nations, nations in which the proletariat was still being exploited and oppressed. Such nations did not deserve to have their rights or interests considered; their rights were, in any case, rights inferior to the right of the proletariat, and always to be disregarded should they conflict with that higher right. Under socialism, when real, and not merely formal, equality exists among nations, the right of nations to self-determination ceases to have any real meaning, and actually becomes a superfluous right. In a socialist state, there will be

no exploiting and exploited nations, just as there will be no exploiting and exploited classes. The only conditions under which any nation would wish to secede or to exist independently will no longer exist, and the right of self-determination will never be invoked.

(It is both interesting and useful to note here how this schematic and inadequate Bolshevik treatment of the national question, which reflects the small use which either Marx or his successors had for nationalism in their theories, and which resulted, as will be seen, in their consequent gross underestimate of the powers of nationalism, is carried over into their treatment of the religious question. The religious question is not, of course, more than a subsidiary interest of this study. But it is an important subsidiary interest, in view of the fact that all seven of the minority groups with which this study is specifically concerned possessed strong religious traditions, and that these were, in almost all cases, closely and irrevocably connected among them with the national question. In the Marxist view, of course, religious belief is regarded as a relic from the past even more anachronistic than nationalism, as a relic associated with not merely the comparatively recent capitalist or bourgeois stage, but with the long-moribund feudal or medieval stage of historical and economic development. Marxism, with its crude and materialistic categorizations, cannot possibly be reconciled with any brand of religious belief. Marx himself termed religion, "the opiate of the people", and the good Marxist--

one who possesses a "correct understanding" of the interests of the proletariat--must regard religion, like nationalism, as another transitory phenomenon peculiar to a particular stage of development, one destined to pass away with the passing of the concrete historical conditions which made it possible. Stalin states the Marxist position as follows:

Marxists will always protest against the persecution of Catholics and Protestants, they will always defend the rights of nations to profess any religion they please, but at the same time, on the basis of a correct understanding of the interests of the proletariat, they will carry on agitation against Catholicism, Protestantism, and the religion of the Orthodox Church [not to mention, of course, either Islam or the Jewish faith] in order to secure the triumph of the socialist world conception.<sup>23</sup>

The persistence of religious beliefs demonstrates to the Marxist that those who believe are not yet fully emancipated from feudalism, or at least from feudal concepts, just as the persistence of nationalism informs him that the nationalists have not yet been able to divest themselves of all vestiges of capitalism, or at least of all bourgeois habits of mind. Quite simply, one cannot be both a Marxist and a religious believer, just as one cannot be both a Marxist and a nationalist. The categories are mutually exclusive. The right of religious freedom, then, is to be supported if and when such support constitutes a progressive step toward socialism, just as the right of nations to self-determination is to be supported in similar circumstances.

But, at the same time, it must be borne in mind that these rights are always subordinate rights, and that their being invoked must serve only as means to a definite end. They are feudal or bourgeois rights, in fact, in themselves obstructive and hostile to the consolidation of the proletariat, but they may under certain conditions be utilized to hasten this consolidation. Under socialism, of course, they will cease to have any validity whatsoever. Religion, in the Marxist scheme, is merely the tool of the feudal, aristocratic ruling classes, employed only to render the masses subservient to their rulers and exploiters, and resigned to the existing order of things. But with the intensification of the class struggle, when the masses become aware of the true nature of religion, they will abandon it; and, under socialism, of course, when real equality, and not merely "equality in the sight of God" shall have been established among men, religion will no longer possess any raison d'être, and will pass away. The inadequacy and superficiality of this Marxist schema for the religious question are fully as startling as those of the Marxist program put forward for "solving" the nationality problem. Both of these make clear and unmistakeable however, the slight importance which the Marxist theoreticians placed upon either religion or nationalism, and help to explain the failures and shortcomings of many Soviet policies, when the phenomena of nationalism and religion were encountered in the flesh.)

There are two or three other salient points in Marxism and the National Question which remain to be at least briefly

examined before theoretical considerations are left, however: not only for the sake of completeness, but also because they, too, reflect the failure of Marxist theories to come fully to grips with the realities and complexities of the national question. The first of these points is the Bolshevik concept of regional autonomy; and perhaps the best way of explaining this concept is to contrast it with the concept of national autonomy put forward by other Marxist groups, and rejected by the Bolsheviks. While national autonomy, on the one hand, tries to draw into single nations peoples whom the very march of real events are dispersing, Bolshevik regional autonomy claims to deal with a definite population inhabiting a definite territory. While national autonomy stimulates nationalism by advocating the demarcation of peoples along national lines, the organization of nations, and the preservation and cultivation of national peculiarities, Bolshevik regional autonomy claims to break down national partitions and to unite populations in order to hasten their division in a different way, according to class; further, it claims to draw those nations which are "belated", whose cultural standards are lower, into the common stream of a higher culture, while national autonomy leads to the unacceptable doctrine that "national existence lies in isolation",<sup>24</sup> and into such pitfalls as the placing of the interests of one nation over the interests of all. And finally, while national autonomy suggests organizational federalism on the basis of nationality, Bolshevik regional autonomy seeks to hasten the organization of

the workers on the basis of their international class solidarity, and therefore provides the best means of exploiting the natural potential of a region without recourse to individual national consent.<sup>25</sup> The concept of regional autonomy, therefore, is "the only progressive and the only acceptable solution" for the national problem, according to Stalin.<sup>26</sup>

As regards the rights of minorities under the concept of regional autonomy, Stalin makes the following explicit analysis of the causes for minority discontent, and offers his specific remedies for such discontent. His analysis is startlingly an over-simplification:

A minority is discontented not because there is no national union but because it does not enjoy the right to use its native language. Permit it to use its native language and the discontent will pass of itself.

A minority is discontented not because there is no artificial union but because it does not possess its own schools. Give it its own schools and all ground for discontent will disappear.

A minority is discontented not because there is no national union, but because it does not enjoy liberty of conscience, liberty of movement, etc. Give it these liberties and it will cease to be discontented.<sup>27</sup>

Stalin felt, in other words, that the forms of equality would be sufficient to satisfy the national discontent of minorities.

Such shallow and crude formulations betray the Bolsheviks' simple lack of understanding of national aspirations, and, of course, have not provided adequate policies in practice. Nevertheless, Stalin's facile solution to the nationality problem remains the basis of the Communist formula, "national in form, socialist in content", which has for decades been the standard formula by which the minority nations of the U.S.S.R. express their cultural aspirations.

Finally, and underlying all other theses on the national question, there is the Bolshevik concept of Party, Lenin's own greatest single contribution to the body of Marxist doctrine. It has been seen that the solidarity of class, in the Marxist view, cuts across all national boundaries and differences; Stalin concludes Marxism and the National Question with the statement that: "the principle of international solidarity of the workers is an essential element in the solution of the national problem",<sup>28</sup> and it is only natural that the Party of the proletariat should, therefore, also tolerate no national wings, but should constitute only one, single, unified Party, highly centralized and highly disciplined. To quote from the Party program of 1918 is to leave no doubt about the degree of autonomy tolerable to the Party:

The Eighth Congress of the R.K.P. [Russian Communist Party] resolves: there must exist a single centralized Communist Party with a single Central Committee leading

all Party work in all sections of the R.S.F.S.R. All decisions of the R.K.P. and its directing organs are unconditionally binding on all branches of the Party, regardless of their national composition.<sup>29</sup>

What Stalin should in fact have written, in concluding Marxism and the National Question, is that "the principle of international solidarity of the Party of the workers is the essential element in the solution of the national problem".

In summary, then, it may be said that the Bolsheviks failed to take very seriously the power of either national or religious feeling, and that they were almost without reservation convinced that class loyalties would inevitably triumph over "bourgeois" national or "feudal" religious loyalties. They therefore regarded national problems not as something really to be solved, but as something to be utilized, to be exploited in the struggle to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. Just how gross was their miscalculation of national feeling among the national minorities of the old Empire, among seven of these, at least, will be seen below. And so also will be seen some of the difficulties encountered by the Bolsheviks in trying to apply in practice theories which bore little relationship to the actual conditions at hand. Nevertheless, with all of its shortcomings, and despite its being conditioned by definite political and social presuppositions, the Bolshevik policy of national self-determination proved to be efficacious and successful, during the

earliest years of the regime, in rallying around the Bolshevik centre a majority of the national minorities--a factor which proved of no small importance in the final outcome of the Revolution and the Civil War.

### iii

The Bolshevik Revolution of October, 1917, was in general welcomed by the national minorities of Russia at least as heartily as it was by the people of Russia proper. During the preceding months of the so-called "bourgeois" revolution, the uncertainty and hesitation of the Provisional Government with regard to the national question, and the government's apparent unwillingness really to come to grips with the question, had stimulated and activated nascent nationalism and separatism in nearly all of the border regions of the former Russian Empire. By removing, or at least relaxing, the stabilizing and centralizing influence of the former imperial administrative apparatus in these regions, the Provisional Government had seriously upset the precarious equilibrium which the Tsarist regime had been able to maintain, and, at the same time, by its paralysis of decision it set into motion centrifugal forces of nationalism in all its affinite local forms. It had been almost a sine qua non of the February Revolution that brought the Provisional Government to power that something would have to be done immediately to redress the grievances of the national minorities. And, since the abdication of the Tsar, the minorities had impatiently

awaited some kind of positive action on their behalf. But first Milyukov, and then Kerensky temporized, unsure which course to take, unwilling so long as Russia was still at war with Germany and its allies either to introduce serious social reforms or to grant any considerable concessions to the nationalities of the borderlands. The military situation, they pleaded, was still too grave, the political future still too uncertain, to permit of any such measures immediately. The threats of disruption and confusion that were implicit in either course had frightened them and, despite their good intent, had sapped their will to act. The national and agrarian questions were both to be attended to in good time by the Constituent Assembly, if and when it met. Understandably, however, these arguments frequently appeared to the anxious and expectant peoples of the borderlands as evidence merely of the regime's unwillingness to dispense new liberties, as mere temporizing and procrastinating on behalf of the established order. And this impression was certainly heightened by the stated determination of the Provisional Government to continue the War--a struggle which from the beginning had been unpopular among many of the minority peoples, especially among those with Turkish predilections--to a victorious end. Throughout the borderlands of European Russia, then, continued delay had had the effect of raising doubt about the sincerity of the new government. Doubt had grown into overt suspicion that the aspirations of the minorities were being not only ignored, but even deliberately betrayed. Throughout all of the frontier regions, the original expectancy and joy which had

greeted the February Revolution were being rapidly transformed through disappointment into impatience and even hostility.

Lenin's doctrine of immediate self-determination for all the national minorities of the old Empire, coupled with the consistent agitation of the Bolsheviks for an immediate end to the War and immediate agrarian reform, could not help but to exert a tremendous appeal in the border regions. Lenin and his followers, after all, were promising immediately concrete solutions to all those important problems the Provisional Government insisted upon postponing until some vague, indeterminate future date--and, especially galling, the insistence that the War must first be fought to a conclusion. The Bolshevik seizure of power in October, 1917, therefore, was at first greeted in the border regions with the almost unanimous support of the non-Russian peoples.

At the same time, however, the Russian settlers in these regions, with the exception of the inogorodtsy, the proletarians of the towns, saw at once in the Bolshevik doctrine of national self-determination a threat to their established position. Clearly, if the indigenous peoples were actually able to assert their independence, it meant the end of the position, wealth, and privilege of the Cossack and the Russian. Since the February Revolution, as conditions in the borderlands had become steadily more anarchical with the petrification of the Provisional Government's authority, clashes between the Russian

and non-Russian had become increasingly frequent: the Russian settler steadfastly determined to hold on to his established possessions and rights, and the native inhabitant equally determined to reclaim what he considered to be rightfully his. The opposing elements in the borderlands had thus for some time been aligning themselves for the showdown that had to come, organizing themselves into hostile camps, and looking around for possible allies. The Bolshevik seizure of power, then, with all that it implied, had the immediate effect of polarizing the opposition elements in the border regions into those alignments which were later to constitute the main protagonists of the Civil War, and of bringing to the national struggle in these regions all the horrors of a class war, and, in some cases, of a religious war, as well.

But even if the doctrine of national self-determination proved to be the deciding factor in swinging to the Bolshevik side the majority of the non-Russian peoples of the borderlands, it cannot be considered theoretically to have been an adequate solution to the national problem. In the first place, by offering the national minorities virtually no choice between assimilation and complete independence, the Bolshevik doctrine of national self-determination ignored the fact that neither assimilation nor complete independence was what most of the minorities wanted; and, second, it ignored the fact that complete independence was patently an impossibility for the vast majority of the small nations. What was wanted in most cases was some form of federal relationship within the new Soviet state, some form of

autonomy which would provide assurance of minority rights and, at the same time, provide the advantages to be derived from continued association with a large and powerful state. As has been seen, however, both the idea of federalism and the doctrine of national autonomy were incompatible with Bolshevik doctrine, conflicting as they did with the insistence of Marxist tenets upon the necessity of a highly centralized state organization and a form of regional, rather than national, autonomy based in the main upon the "natural" economic unit. It must be admitted, however, that any such niggling theoretical considerations really beg the essential questions about the national program put forth by the Bolsheviks. It is possible, of course, to accuse Lenin and his followers of the most blatant cynicism in their dealings with the national minorities, and to build up a case demonstrating that they in fact had no intention at any time of solving the national problem, but only of exploiting it. One can say that the exhortations to the natives to overthrow by force all existing authority, where this remained, and to establish their own organs of self-government, the encouragement of the natives to drive out the Cossacks and other settlers and to seize their lands--that all such measures were mere tactical considerations employed by machiavellian revolutionaries in their bid for power. One can claim that Lenin and his followers were only making a virtue out of a necessity in proclaiming and supporting the right of self-determination, at a time when the anarchy of the Revolution had resulted in the political fragmentation of the old Empire. But when these and all other accusations have

been made, the fact remains that nothing done by Lenin and his followers in the early stages of the national struggle was out of keeping with the basic doctrines of the Party as set forth by Stalin in Marxism and the National Question, doctrines enunciated unmistakably clearly when no Bolshevik leader, no matter how optimistic, could have predicted what was to happen. To accuse Lenin and his followers only of cynicism and opportunism in their treatment of the national question in the borderlands is to attribute to them much more cunning and foresight than they actually possessed, and to give them far more credit for calculation and a thorough knowledge of pertaining conditions than they deserve. There can be little doubt that Lenin and his followers were wholly sincere in their belief that class antagonisms and loyalties were of much greater and lasting importance than were either national or religious antagonisms and loyalties. They were undoubtedly certain that the Bolshevik regime, once it was firmly established, would be able to deal with local problems in the borderlands strictly on a class basis. The truth, therefore, would seem to be that Lenin and his followers were guilty not of blatant cynicism and mere exploitation of the national struggle in the border regions, but of appalling ignorance and innocence of what the national struggle actually involved. Finally, and this is the indisputable fact about Bolshevik national policies, the single attribute which perhaps no argument can invalidate, Lenin and his followers were successful. Whether through cleverness or accident, their policy

of national self-determination, promised without reservation to all of the national minorities, succeeded in enlisting alongside the Bolsheviks most of those who opposed the re-constitution of the Empire as it had been, and proved of immeasurable value in helping to save the Revolution from those who sought to destroy it and to restore a less radical regime. E.H. Carr has evaluated its importance:

Unqualified recognition of the right of secession not only enabled the Soviet regime--as nothing else could have done--to ride the torrent of a disruptive nationalism, but raised its prestige high above that of the 'white' generals who, bred in the pan-Russian tradition of the Tsars, refused any concession to the subject nationalities; in the borderlands where other than Russian, or other than Great Russian elements predominated, and where the decisive campaigns of the civil war were fought, this factor told heavily in favour of the Soviet cause.<sup>30</sup>

Further, E.H. Carr goes on, there was a palpable identification of the Soviet doctrine of nationality in the borderlands with social, and particularly land, reform. The Soviets were successful in persuading peasants to align themselves under Bolshevik, even if this meant Russian, leadership against those forces wishing to restore the previous social order. He writes:

Whatever national and linguistic diversities might separate them, the peasants everywhere were in

overwhelming majority opposed to a counter-revolution . . . and so long as fear of counter-revolution was not extinct, the community of interest between the Russian workers and the peasant masses of the subject peoples on which Bolshevik propaganda insisted had a perfectly solid basis . . . The combination between the recognition of a formal right of national self-determination and the recognition of a real need for unity in pursuit of common social and economic ends, which was the essence of the Bolshevik doctrine of nationalism, proved a vital contribution to the Soviet victory.<sup>31</sup>

Through their doctrine of national self-determination, the Bolsheviks thus found themselves, on the one hand, tacitly encouraging the dismemberment of the territories of the old Empire; at the same time, on the other hand, through their military alliances with the minorities, the vagaries of the Civil War, and the harsh realities of practical politics, they found themselves assuring the ultimate re-constitution of the unity of the old state, under their own new leadership. One can hardly grant, however, that their original encouragement of the process of dispersal was in any way regarded by them at the time as a craftily premeditated gesture destined to lead to this ultimate unity, as a logical and fully-reasoned tactical step or prelude to the final realization of reunion. Rather, it must be seen, first, as evidence of their sincerity and loyalty to the principle of self-determination (with the limits, of course, imposed upon it

by Marxism's schemata), and, second, as evidence of the confused and contradictory channels in which the Civil War was to run in the Russian borderlands. For the first three years of their rule, the Bolsheviks were forced virtually to put aside theoretical questions, to sacrifice them to the contingencies of their blood and iron struggle with the White armies and the forces of counter-revolution. Theory in many cases was later manipulated to coincide with accomplished fact--it was not until later, in the thirties, that the contrary process, the manipulating of facts to suit theories, with its rewriting of history, was practised extensively. So far as Lenin and his colleagues were concerned, their first duty was to save the Revolution. And all other questions became secondary to this prime duty with the widespread outbreak of civil war in early 1918. Nothing else really mattered. First, the Revolution had to survive.

B Because of the turbulence of the revolutionary struggle in the eastern borderlands, the transitoriness of governments, the bizarre shifting of fortunes, and the strange peripheral conflicts which developed, it is difficult indeed to generalize about the events of 1917-21 in these regions. But for the main purpose here, which is merely to sketch a broad framework, a kind of context, as it were, in which the experiences and activities of particular peoples may be observed, it may be possible to be content with a very general summary, no matter how imperfect. Bearing in mind that the exceptional was almost the norm during the Civil War in the borderlands, and that any

summary of the Civil War must of necessity involve drastic over-simplifications, perhaps the following will serve. In almost every case in the eastern border regions where non-Russian peoples constituted majorities, the Bolsheviki, essentially an urban element, found themselves at some point allied with the native population against the Russian and Cossack elements who opposed revolutionary change. The different stages of the Civil War often saw the predominantly Russian urban and agrarian proletariat fighting alongside the indigenous peoples against the defenders of the status quo. In some cases, the Bolsheviki thus found themselves in effect wholly dependent upon basically counter-revolutionary groups for support; the numbers, or considerable numbers, of urban and agricultural workers in the North Caucasus for a time refused firm support to either side in the struggle, and the military fortunes of the moment, for example, largely dictated their sympathies. Wherever they considered it necessary, therefore, to encourage and to sympathize with the separatist and nationalist aspirations of the indigenous inhabitants, the Bolshheviks did so; and, similarly, where they found it was to their advantage to support even "reactionary" elements, they did this also. But as the fortunes of the struggle shifted gradually to favour the Bolsheviki, a change gradually began to take place, with the Russian settlers in the borderlands coming over in increasing numbers to the side of the Revolution. As Soviet power became established more firmly, the native peasantry found itself increasingly isolated, and its earlier alliance with the Bolsheviki stood revealed for what it

actually had been all along, a temporary joining together of fundamentally antagonistic forces united only for the purpose of defeating a foe who threatened both. Once the common enemy had been disposed of, there was seen to exist little community of interest between the victorious allies and, indeed, essential and irreconcilable conflicts between the two parties. The historical antipathy between Russian and non-Russian reasserted itself.

The Russian peasantry and the Russian industrial proletariat in the borderlands, by ethnic origin, historical continuity, and racial sympathy oriented toward Russia, whatever its government, and traditionally hostile to the demands of the local inhabitants, had little intention of respecting the principle of national self-determination for the minorities, once the immediate danger of counter-revolution had been met. They sought to spread Bolshevik influence in these regions by undermining or suppressing all native institutions of self-government they had hitherto tolerated, especially those which in any way seemed to threaten or to oppose their authority and policy of rigid centralization. Once its raison d'être, the common aim of defeating the White armies, was accomplished, the uneasy alliance between Russian Bolshevik and native nationalist split asunder. The various local governments and councils which had sprung into being during the period of common danger were now ruthlessly suppressed or emasculated by the Bolsheviks--in some cases through direct force of arms, but in most cases through

the establishing of puppet organs composed of the "leading and progressive" elements among the native populations, supported and advised by Russian Bolsheviks. The pattern has since become familiar: an initial tactical alliance of the disciplined Bolsheviks with less experienced local leaders, followed by infiltration or dispersal of the local organs of government, and ultimately by a puppet regime. The pattern, so successful in the early stages of the formation of the Soviet state, was to be followed with equal success in Eastern Europe thirty years later. And, furthermore, Communist ideology fully justified such measures. The necessities of the class struggle could always be invoked. Communism called for an alliance of the workers, peasants, and soldiers against all forces of counter-revolution, and bourgeois nationalism could always be reckoned among these forces. The Russian of the eastern borderlands, therefore, whatever his station, once he had identified himself with the Revolution, was given all the excuse he needed to destroy the power and political institutions of the native--something which it was almost inevitable that he should have sought to do, anyway. For the essential and deciding factor in the struggle for the borderlands was that the Revolution, despite its claims of internationalism, was in fact a Russian revolution, just as the Bolsheviks, or the Communists as they became in 1918, were in fact a Russian political party. As Professor Pipes has written: "The triumph of Bolshevism in many borderland areas was interpreted as the victory of the city over the village, the worker over the peasant, the Russian colonist over the native".<sup>32</sup>

Once these generalizations are stated, it becomes the task at hand to alter the focus of attention from the general to the particular, and to examine the distinct character assumed by the national struggle in those regions inhabited by the peoples with whom this study is specifically concerned. In each case--whether on the Lower Volga, the Crimean peninsula, or the cis-Caspian steppes, or in the mountains of the North Caucasus--the struggle for political power manifested itself in peculiar fashion conditioned by various local circumstances. For if there were salient contradictions between the centralizing tendencies of Bolshevism, on the one hand, and the separatist national movements which had developed so rapidly since the outbreak of World War I, on the other hand, there also existed in each border region indigenous social, political, and economic factors fundamentally at variance with those found in Russia itself, factors which served only to complicate and to colour the basic issue: the issue of power. The problem of bringing the concept of class struggle, for example, to peoples possessing neither capitalism nor developed class differentiation was not a problem to be encountered in Russia itself or, for that matter, in the western borderlands. But in the eastern borderlands where such conditions did pertain, the national struggle was bound to take on a wide variety of guises, to be informed strongly by local influences.

The preceding chapter has described some evidence of the perceptible rise of incipient anti-German feeling through almost all classes of Russian society especially during the second half of the nineteenth century, evidence of a growing antipathy toward Germans in general, not just the Germans of the Empire, which was informed not only by the marked increase in Russian nationalism and patriotism during these decades, but also by significant political and social trends both outside and within Russia proper. The mere presence of Russian nationalism in its most pathological forms, manifested as it was in the official governmental sanctioning of violence against minorities, and in its hostile and discriminatory measures against all of the non-Russian peoples, was a contributing factor in the rise of anti-German feeling, of course. But other, more cogent and concrete reasons may be cited for the particular vehemence with which Germans came to be especially regarded: the rise of a new, united Germany under Bismarck and the emergence of this powerful rival of Russian claims in Eastern and Southern Europe, evidence of German ambition, and the awesome display of German armed might in the Franco-German War, for example. These and other events provided ample cause for sober reflection and grave concern among at least certain strata of Russian society. And, on the domestic scene, among almost all classes, a growing Russian consciousness of the disproportionate amounts of wealth, position, prestige, and power wielded by the German communities of Russia itself contributed to produce a predictably negative response compounded from elements of envy, hatred, and fear.

This latent and infectious Germanophobia was, quite naturally, powerfully stimulated by the outbreak of World War I. The Russian Germans found themselves the victims of all kinds of irresponsible charges: that they were guilty of sabotage, espionage, defeatism, and many other forms of covert or overt disloyalty. And it was in this atmosphere of wartime hysteria, in April, 1916, that the Imperial Duma passed its decree proclaiming the confiscation of all German lands, with compensation to the owners, and promising the expulsion of the Volga Germans, specifically, from their lands by April, 1917.<sup>33</sup> Whether there was in fact any genuine cause or justification for such measures against non-Russian citizens who had, by and large, been loyal and faithful subjects, or whether the sole basis for such measures was purely and simply the almost instinctive Russian anti-Germanism coming to the fore under pressure, must remain a matter for conjecture. But, in the event, the Duma's extreme measures against the economic preeminence of the Volga Germans proved stillborn. Like so many of the Duma's acts, the laws against "German dominance" fell into abeyance with the sudden collapse of the Tsarist regime in February, 1917.

With the coming of the February Revolution and the formation of the Provisional Government, most of the national minorities expected some prompt action to redress their most serious grievances. The dilatoriness of the Provisional Government, however, combined with the withering away of its administrative organs in all but the main Russian centres, provoked the

establishment of local organs of government. Immediately following the abdication of the Tsar, even, a congress of Volga Germans proclaimed the founding of an Autonomous German Province, seeking in this way to hasten the advent of social and political reforms.<sup>34</sup> But throughout the anarchical period of the Provisional Government, all appeals were denied. The Volga Germans, still in effect under sentence of expulsion from their lands, applied to Kerensky to have the decree of the Duma revoked. But Kerensky, unwilling to go so far without full assurance of genuine popular support--which meant for him the convoking of a Constituent Assembly--would agree only to stay the decree until such time as an elected body could decide upon it. As in all the borderlands, therefore, the months preceding the October Revolution of the Bolsheviks witnessed a scene of expanding anarchy in the Lower Volga region, the result of confused status and conflicting aspirations. Chaos reigned supreme.

The Bolshevik seizure of power only served to confuse the situation still further. On the one hand, the Bolsheviks immediately gained the gratitude of the Volga Germans, and the right, incidentally, to term themselves "the saviours" of the colonists, by quickly rescinding the Duma's expulsion decree<sup>35</sup>--thus going one better the Kerensky regime they had overthrown by removing at a stroke the implied threat which had been haunting the Germans for more than eighteen months. In addition, Lenin's unqualified recognition of the right of all nations to self-determination, his followers' proclaiming of national equality

and minority rights, and the constantly reiterated promise of the Bolsheviks to secure peace as quickly as possible: all these promises of the new government undoubtedly carried great appeal for the Volga Germans who, like all of the Russian minorities, had been bent to some extent under the dead weight of national oppression, and who, of all the peoples of the former Russian Empire, found the prospect of continued hostilities against "the homeland" particularly distasteful. On the other hand, however, Bolshevik pronouncements of an immediate and thoroughgoing land reform for all parts of the former Empire were greeted with considerably less enthusiasm on the Lower Volga. Such measures could never hope to inspire strong support among a population the majority of whom were landholders of considerable means, informed by a fundamentally individualistic and conservative tradition. Although there had been some industrial expansion in their towns, the vast majority of the Volga Germans were in 1918 still farmers as their fathers and grandfathers had been ever since coming to Russia. They were not revolutionaries, far from it; in fact they were largely apolitical, unconcerned with politics in any wider sense, little interested outside of their own organs of self-government except when the affairs of state disrupted or disturbed their daily life. Further, many of the Volga Germans, as members of pacifist religious congregations, opposed Bolshevism on the grounds of its anti-religious character. Altogether, it is difficult to escape from the conclusion that, on the whole, the Volga Germans played no very significant role in the resolution of the struggle

for power in the Lower Volga region. And, if they did, they were largely on the side of the anti-Bolshevik forces. Among the Volga Germans, it would appear that the issue of survival came first, generally speaking, the question of ownership of the land came second, and the question of political, social, and economic reform came only a distant third.

Support for the Bolsheviks, at least in the initial stages of the Civil War, resided chiefly in the industrial proletariat of the towns, a proletariat composed largely of Russians and Ukrainians. In the town of Pokrovsk, for example, the population was still in 1926 about 44 per cent. Russian and 42 per cent. Ukrainian; only 11 per cent. were Germans--even though at this time Pokrovsk had already been for four years the capital of the German Volga territory.<sup>36</sup> From the moment of their assuming power, the Bolsheviks did enjoy some support among certain German village proletarians; but one authority estimates there were less than 200 organized Communist Party members in the German colony at the time of the Revolution, out of a population of some 400,000 persons.<sup>37</sup>

In the light of this evidence, it is difficult to give credence to any idea of mass support for the Bolsheviks among the German population, and almost impossible to reconcile later Soviet claims of such support with the statement of an impartial observer, made only some two decades prior to the Revolution, that:

In the isolation of their small communes, they have made for themselves a small civilization of their own, a domestic civilization so to speak . . . very curious for the politician and the philosopher to observe.<sup>38</sup>

In a society where class differentiation was slight, and where the Russian was regarded largely as an intruder and agent of oppression, the appeal of the Bolsheviks could not be strong. Any initial support for the Bolsheviks engendered by their vigorous assertion of the principle of self-determination evaporated after the October Revolution when these same Bolsheviks appeared now in the Lower Volga asserting the authority of a Russian government in Petrograd, and, perhaps more significant, also challenging the existing social order.

Situated as it was on the extreme western confines of the Lower Volga region, relatively close to the Bolshevik centres of power in the Civil War, the Volga German community nevertheless became one of the first national territories to be granted a form of autonomy by the Bolsheviks. On 29 October, 1918, the founding of a Volga German Autonomous Workers' Commune was proclaimed, with its own congress of Soviets and executive committee.<sup>39</sup> At this time, however, when the writ of the Soviet government extended hardly beyond the principal Russian centres, and when the authority of the anti-Bolshevik government in Samara actually controlled the larger part of the Middle and Lower Volga, the existence of the Commune was more on paper than real, and the strength of its claims to rule would seem to have

rested primarily upon the Russian workers of the towns, not upon the German agricultural settlers.

Soviet claims that large numbers of German "village proletarians" made important contributions to the ultimate victorious outcome of the Civil War, not only by organizing partisan detachments in their own districts, but also by fighting with distinction as Red Army units on all fronts--against the Germans in Ukraine, for example, against Wrangel and Denikin in the Russian South, and against the Poles--are possibly, as Mr. Kolarz asserts, Soviet historical transmogrifications of the fact that the so-called Volga German detachments of the Red Army were actually comprised chiefly of Communist ex-prisoners of war from the Imperial German Army.<sup>40</sup> But the mention of German prisoners gives cause for reflection, on a more profound level, upon the reasons why the Bolsheviks attached so much importance to the founding of a German Communist authority on the Lower Volga, even where this authority rested upon small popular support and had largely to be maintained by force.

It was one of the beliefs of Lenin and his supporters that the Revolution could not survive in Russia alone, that the support of the proletarians of all nations was necessary for its survival, and that in Germany, in particular, the workers' revolution was imminent. The founding of German Communist regimes in Russia, therefore, was conceived of as possessing an immense propaganda value designed to further the expected German workers'

uprising. The value of the Volga German settlement as a show-place of Soviet nationality policies was ever uppermost in the minds of Soviet planners, then; as one leading Communist stated a dozen years after the founding of the Autonomous Workers' Commune:

The situation of the Volga Germans is of interest to the German proletariat because they can follow our achievements by studying the example of the Volga Germans. The latter are of interest to the German bourgeoisie, too, who wish to use the case of the Volga Germans for focusing attention on our negative sides.<sup>41</sup>

It was, of course, an axiom of Marxism that national aspirations were always subordinate to the cause of world revolution. And the Volga Germans, despite the miniscule number of proletarians among them, and despite their general lack of sympathy for the Bolshevik regime, therefore had little say in whether or not they would embrace Communism. It was imposed upon them from the outside.

The struggle for political authority in Crimea during the Russian Civil War was infinitely lengthier and more complex than the struggle in the Volga German territories, and, indeed, was not ultimately decided in favour of the Bolsheviks until the late 1920's. It was in Crimea, in that "favored pleasure ground of Tsars and Grand Dukes . . . where the combined beauty of surging seas and blue sky, of palms and cypresses and vineyards

against a background of mountains suggests the French Riviera",<sup>42</sup> that Tsarist Russia was to make its last, desperate stand. And even after the final expulsion of Baron Wrangel, the last White general, from the peninsula in October, 1920, the turbulent Crimean Tatar population was to continue to defy the Soviet administration for almost another whole year, and finally to join the newly-formed R.S.F.S.R. only in October, 1921, on terms at least partially dictated by its national leaders.

In the chaotic interval between the February and October Revolutions, in July, 1917, the Tatar Nationalist Party was founded in Crimea which from this time until the final sovietization of the peninsula enjoyed virtually complete control over the Tatar population, almost unchallenged by either the right-wing clericals or the liberals.<sup>43</sup> Comprised mainly of young Moslem intellectuals subscribing not only to the secularism and westernism of the liberals, but also imbued with the ideas of socialism, mainly of the Social Revolutionary type,<sup>44</sup> the Tatar Nationalist Party, or Milli Firka, was by September of 1917 already strong enough even to order closed a conference of its rivals, the conservative Tatar clergy, in Bakhchiserai.<sup>45</sup> Just two months later, following the Bolshevik coup, and alarmed by the deterioration of public order in the peninsula, the Milli Firka convened its own Tatar National Assembly (Kurultai) and created a de facto Tatar government, with its own constitution, army, and laws.<sup>46</sup>

There is some doubt whether the leaders of the Kurultai ever actually took at face-value Bolshevik promises of self-determination. If they did, certainly they were to be disappointed. For example, Lenin's declaration of the rights of the peoples of Russia, in December, 1917, seemed to encourage and to countenance the existing organs of government in Crimea; it was couched in the following extravagant terms:

Moslems of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and Crimea, Kirghiz and Sarts of Siberia and of Turkestan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, Chechens and Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, and all of you whose mosques and prayer-houses have been destroyed, whose beliefs and customs have been trampled upon by the Tsars and the oppressors of Russia: Your beliefs and usages, your national and cultural institutions are forever free and inviolable. Organize your national life in complete freedom. This is your right. Know that your rights, like those of all the peoples of Russia, are under the mighty protection of the Revolution and its organs, the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies.<sup>47</sup>

But Bolshevik actions, on the contrary, effectively gave the lie to Lenin's high-flown promises, and revealed to the Tatar nationalists exactly how free and inviolable their national institutions would be under a Soviet regime. In January, 1918, utilizing mainly Russian naval and military units recruited from the Black

Sea bases, the Bolsheviks succeeded in breaking the military power of the Tatar nationalists, and in overthrowing the Kurultai. Lacking the military experience of the Bolshevik forces, the Tatar militia was dispersed rather easily. But the atrocities committed against the Tatar population, particularly in Sevastopol, were long remembered, and served only to stiffen Tatar resistance to the newly proclaimed Tatar Soviet Republic of Crimea,<sup>48</sup> which in fact was based upon the support of the Russian and Ukrainian workers of the towns and the revolutionary sailors of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.<sup>49</sup>

The first Communist regime in Crimea lasted only three months, however, until April, 1918. The Tatar nationalists, unwilling to accede to demands that they must join the Communist Party before being allowed to participate in the Soviets, and equally unwilling to accept the condition that orders emitting from Moscow were without question to be obeyed, refused to cooperate with the Bolsheviks. The mass of the Tatars, fervent supporters of the Milli Firka, with their leaders thus effectively excluded from all positions of authority, and with themselves subject constantly to the excesses of the Red sailors, waited with great impatience for the arrival of German forces. With German armies advancing through Ukraine, and their invasion imminent, some of the Tatar villages rebelled and threw out their Communist officials in the middle of April; nationalist partisan units began to appear in ever increasing numbers; and, just before the arrival of the German armies at the end of April,

a general uprising of the Tatars brought the Communist regime toppling down and the summary execution of all its leaders.<sup>50</sup>

But the German occupation failed the Milli Firka as badly as the Communists had. Instead of cooperation and encouragement, the Tatars received from the German authorities the type of treatment usually accorded a conquered people. Despite the requests of Turkey that they should treat the Tatar nationalists as valuable allies and mutual friends, the Germans excluded them completely from the puppet government they set up under a Russian general named Sulkevich, and, as they did also in Ukraine with their puppet Skoropadsky regime, exploited the natural resources of Crimea solely for their own benefit.<sup>51</sup>

With the downfall of German power in November, 1918, and the withdrawal of all German forces, there followed another brief interlude of Milli Firka rule, marred by intermittent struggles with Soviet forces. Thereupon, a group of White refugees from Bolshevik rule, the majority of them Kadets, formed a government of Crimea wholly pan-Russian in composition and sentiment, and having no pretensions whatever of representing the Tatars. It was this government which divided its authority somewhat uneasily with the military administration of the White general, Denikin, after his triumphant entry in June, 1919, and later with Baron Wrangel until the withdrawal of his forces in October, 1920, and which maintained its position, enjoying even some measure of support and recognition from the allies, until the final Soviet occupation.<sup>52</sup>

The Tatar nationalists were finally disillusioned by the period of White rule in the Crimean Peninsula, their hope for some kind of national independence cruelly frustrated. None of the White generals, of course, fighting as they were for the reconstitution of the old Russian Empire, admitted either sympathy or understanding for the national aspirations of the Tatars, or of any of the national minorities of Russia. The possibility of Turkish aid, at least of tangible aid, evaporated with Turkey's military defeat. And any question of support from either Britain or France was rendered superfluous by the alliance of these countries with the reactionary and anti-national Whites, half-hearted though these efforts by the allies actually were. With all other avenues closed to them, with their separatist dreams shattered, decimated and exhausted by more than three years of bitter and continuous struggle, the Tatar nationalist leaders now had nowhere to turn but to the Bolsheviks. The only hope for any even partial realization of their shattered ambitions now lay in their achieving of a kind of modus vivendi with their former foes. Perhaps by supporting the Communist regime they could ultimately promote national Tatar aims. After the withdrawal of the Wrangel army, then, the Tatar nationalists greeted the final re-entry of the Red Army, determined to co-operate with its leaders, if co-operation were at all possible.

The Crimean Tatars, like so many of their less politically advanced fellow-Moslems, thus had telescoped into the three or four short years of the Revolution and the Civil War

an ideological and social evolution which under normal circumstances might have taken an entire generation. After the chaotic events of the revolutionary upheaval, the Tatar peasant--not only, as before, the member of the Tatar middle class or intelligentsia--now regarded himself as the member of a nation, not first and foremost as a Moslem.<sup>53</sup> The Soviet leadership clearly grasped this change and sought to turn it to its own advantage. Once Crimea was effectively occupied, the Soviet regime therefore sought to reestablish the equilibrium between Russian and Tatar which had been so violently disturbed by the events of recent years. It exerted pressure upon Soviet organs in Crimea to curtail their persecution of Tatar nationalists, and to offer the Tatars concessions, whether economic or cultural, so as to win over to the regime the Tatar nationalists now defected from the side of the defeated Whites. At the same time, the Soviet regime continued to insist upon the rigid centralization of political power, and to suppress ruthlessly any political opposition. It thus pursued a dual course, seeking to enlist the sympathies of the Tatars of all classes through economic and cultural freedoms, but simultaneously strengthening its political authority over them.

The founding of the Crimean Autonomous Republic in October, 1921, was obviously in line with the first part of this dual policy, and was a clear concession on the part of the Soviet regime to local Tatar nationalism. The Tatar element in the peninsula was by this time reduced to about one-quarter of

the total population, and in May, 1921, a meeting of the Crimean Provincial Committee of the Communist Party even voted by a margin of 96 votes to 52 against the establishing of a Crimean Republic, deciding that, in view of the ethnic composition of the peninsula, it should retain its present status as merely another Russian province.<sup>54</sup> But these factors failed to influence the Soviet authorities in Moscow, who overruled the provincial decision and brought the Crimean Republic into being.

Soviet policy in Crimea was at the beginning conducted without regard for the Tatar population. The Soviet authorities in the peninsula refused to accept the cooperation offered them by the Milli Firka, and in so doing signified their rejection of the bulk of the Tatar intelligentsia. Further, their agricultural policies failed to satisfy, if they did not wholly antagonize, the Tatar peasants; instead of distributing the land confiscated from the Church and the great estates to the poor peasantry and the landless agricultural laborers, the Soviet authorities transferred most of it to gigantic state farms, or sovkhozy, through late 1920 and 1921, and, in the process, many irregularities took place which discriminated against the Tatars in favour of Russian settlers.<sup>55</sup> Early in 1921, the Tatar Sultan-Galiev was sent from Moscow to report on conditions in Crimea, and his findings, submitted in May, seem to have been the chief factor in the Central Committee's decision to overrule the local Communists and to placate the Tatar nationalists by founding a national republic. Sultan-Galiev was extremely

critical of Soviet rule in the peninsula. His report accused the work of the Party there of being entirely disorganized and out of touch with the Moslem population, the administration of the sovkhozy of completely ignoring the needs of the local population, and the education of the Tatars of being seriously neglected. His suggestions included that a Crimean Republic should be created, that Tatars in large numbers should at once be admitted to Party organizations, and that the operations of the state farms should be drastically curtailed.<sup>56</sup>

The decision by the Soviet leaders that the Tatars should have a Crimean Republic was influenced, however, by wider considerations than those of Tatar national feeling. First, there was the extremely high prestige of the Crimean Tatars to consider; their treatment by the Soviet government, and their reaction to it, could be of great importance in the future relationship of the Soviets to all the Turko-Tatar peoples, not only of Russia's eastern borderlands, but in other countries as well. Second, and relative to what has just been said, the establishment of the Crimean Republic, like the establishment of a Volga German Commune, was designed to provide another "show window" for foreign communists; in this case, of Turkey where one-third of the members of the Central Committee of the Turkish Communist Party were at this time Crimean Tatars, as was the leader of the Turkish trade union movement.<sup>57</sup> The Soviet government was convinced that a Crimean Autonomous Republic would have immense "international importance", and that

it would serve very well as a "window of Russia into Turkey and into the East".<sup>58</sup>

Very shortly after the creation of the Crimean Republic, however, the other side of Soviet policy was revealed. The Milli Firka was officially branded as an illegal, counter-revolutionary organ, and suppressed, in keeping with the general Soviet view that any and all political organizations which challenged the authority of Moscow were not to be tolerated.

Detailed descriptions of the course of the revolutionary struggle in the lonely and isolated Kalmyk steppes are few, and only the broadest outlines can be discerned. Conducted in a region remote from any except the most primitive outposts of civilization, only subsidiary and peripheral to the principal campaigns of the Civil War waged on more strategic fronts, its outcome little likely to have affected the result of the Civil War as a whole, the campaign to establish Soviet power in Kalmykia remains shrouded in obscurity.

The Kalmyks, of course, by Soviet standards were considered an extremely backward and primitive people, strongly imbued with anachronistic religious and political ideas. Volume 30 of The Large Soviet Encyclopaedia's first edition, published in 1937, for instance, describes the almost total absence of class hatreds among the Kalmyks during the 1905 Revolution in the following way: "The Kalmyk peasantry for the most part showed

itself the ideological prisoner of its own bourgeoisie, spiritual leaders, and feudalists".<sup>59</sup> During the upheaval of 1905, the Kalmyk leaders, like the leaders of so many of the minor nationalities of the Russian Empire, had put forward demands for some form of cultural autonomy, for national representation in the Duma, for irrigation projects to water their arid lands, and for assurances against further Russian encroachment upon their territory.<sup>60</sup> In other words, they sought only what may be described as the very minimal guarantees of national equality within the Empire, and to have alleviated the worst of the oppressive measures employed against them. If their thought did not revolve in the framework of the Marxist dialectic, it nevertheless demonstrated the felicity of one statement about nationalism which the Soviet regime had not itself learned, at least until recently, that resistance to oppression which may be interpreted or felt as national oppression will invariably take national forms. If the aims of the Kalmyk leaders were national aims, it was because the Kalmyks had for centuries been oppressed as a people by the Tsarist regime, and discriminated against not individually, but as a nation.

The Buddhist religion of the Kalmyks had been one of the particular targets of Tsarist administrators and Orthodox proselytizers. And even though it may be easy to exaggerate the depth and strength of religious feeling among the Kalmyks or, for that matter, any of the nomadic peoples, and especially among those leaders who headed their national movements, it is

certain that there was even less understanding and sympathy among these people for the purposes and methods of the Bolsheviks in 1917, where in fact these purposes and methods were able to reach and to be made known to them. Even though a Kalmyk congress met in 1917, as early as March, to establish a Central Committee and to elaborate national aims, the remoteness of Kalmykia presupposes a certain lag in time between events in Russia proper and their repercussions in the steppes. Further, one of the minor issues involved in the Russian Civil War was the question of religion: which is to say, the godless, militant atheism of the Communists against religious belief whatever its form, whether Orthodox Christianity, other forms of Christianity, Mohammedanism, Buddhism, or any other. The Soviet leaders in Petrograd and Moscow had little knowledge of the eastern parts of the vast domain they had so suddenly and recently acquired; as concerned religion, they had in their minds a vague picture of oppressed peoples awaiting emancipation from superstitious priests as eagerly as from Tsarist administrators, and possessed little idea of the hold Buddhism and its priests had over the Kalmyks. The intransigent attitude of Soviet emissaries toward religion, then, undoubtedly intensified the opposition toward them among a people with whom religion remained a tenacious and vigorous institution, affecting almost every part of daily life, and offering far more fierce resistance than the Orthodox Church to new beliefs and practices. Their hostility to all religious belief, coupled with the inapplicability of their plans drawn up in Moscow for communities engaged in primitive, subsistence

agriculture and fishing, or to nomads whose chief problems were the insufficiency of their flocks and herds and their difficulty of access to grazing lands, were contributory reasons for the Bolsheviks' lack of appeal to the Kalmyks. Finally, and perhaps most significant in this regard, there were, of course, few trained Communists in Kalmykia. As Soviet sources have admitted, "In 1917 the Astrakhan proletariat stood at the head of the Revolution in the steppes".<sup>61</sup> In brief, in Kalmykia as in so many of the non-Russian regions of Russia, support for the Bolsheviks resided primarily among Russian workers, and, certainly, the Bolsheviks were not willing to apply the principle of self-determination, with its corollaries of national equality and non-discrimination, where it would subordinate a small and relatively progressive Russian minority to the backward peasant masses as represented by a mere handful of nationally minded Kalmyk leaders. The Revolution in the steppes, therefore, found its appeals for Kalmyk support falling largely upon deaf ears.

During the course of the Civil War, numerous appeals were made to the Kalmyks to support the Revolution, including one above Lenin's name, made in July, 1919, which gave a fitting description of Kalmyk history under the Tsars. It stated:

Kalmyk brothers, the entire past of your people is an uninterrupted chain of suffering. Owing to their economic and political backwardness, your people have always been an object of exploitation by stronger neighbours. The Government which extended its power by

bloody conquest over many foreign races has likewise fastened the chains of slavery on the freedom-loving Kalmyk people.<sup>62</sup>

This proclamation announced the intention of convening a Kalmyk worker's congress, and asked for Kalmyk enlistments in the Red Army to fight against the White forces of General Denikin; it was followed shortly afterwards by a decree forbidding further Russian settlement in Kalmyk lands, and, like the almost identical decrees issued about the same time to the Kazakhs and other peoples, assuring the "toiling Kalmyk people" of the full enjoyment of their land under a Soviet regime.<sup>63</sup> But these decrees for the most part served only the purposes of propaganda and exhortation rather than the establishment of working political and social institutions; it is difficult to judge accurately the effects of such efforts, but certainly the weight of the Kalmyk fighting forces was on the side of the Whites all through the Civil War. Although the Whites were patently hostile and opposed to the national aspirations of all minorities, and though they represented Russian interests perhaps even more blatantly than the Russian Bolshevik proletarians of Astrakhan, they also stood on the side of religion and the established order, both preferable for the Kalmyks to the abstract, incomprehensible, remote theories of anti-religious Bolshevism. In addition, until the second half of 1919, at the very least, the military fortunes of the Bolsheviks in the eastern steppes were at low ebb, and the White armies of Cossacks and counter-revolution dominated the

Kalmyk lands. As in almost all of the eastern borderlands, so long as Bolshevik military control in Kalmykia remained intermittent and precarious, there was little chance of the local population's rallying to its support.

The first congress of Kalmyk leaders after the February Revolution, meeting in March, 1917, at first declared itself for a moderate form of democratic self-government.<sup>64</sup> But with the failure of the Provisional Government to take cognizance of minority demands, efforts were made to seek help elsewhere. In August, 1917, for example, Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany received at Spa a representative of the Kalmyk leadership congress, a Kalmyk prince, at the same time he received Kraznov, the ataman of the Don Cossacks, and the Ukrainian hetman, Skoropadsky.<sup>65</sup> In January, 1918, following the Bolshevik overthrow of the Provisional Government, the newly-formed Astrakhan Soviet--there was in fact no Communist Party organization at all in Kalmykia until that year--was attacked and dispersed by the Kalmyks, and frequent clashes occurred between Kalmyks and Russian workers.<sup>66</sup> For most of the Civil War period, the Kalmyks supported and fought alongside the forces of counter-revolution, the White armies in Kalmykia. The decline of White military fortunes, however, and the increasing power of Moscow, rendered inevitable the ultimate addition of the Kalmyk territories and their people to the Soviet state. Though Party organization was still everywhere embryonic, though boundaries were still in dispute, and though Kalmyk resistance to the new regime was still rife and remained to be crushed by

force, a Kalmyk Autonomous Region was formally established in November, 1920.<sup>67</sup> Many of the Kalmyks, however, were far away, unable to participate in the building of socialism in their lands. W.H. Chamberlain describes the retreat of White armies toward the Black Sea and permanent exile or death at the hands of their Red Army pursuers, in the early part of that year:

In the raw early spring days of 1920 a host of tens of thousands of fugitives poured along the roads to Novorossisk. The troops still retained some elements of discipline, although they had lost all stomach for fighting. Mixed in with them were masses of civilian fugitives, especially families of the Don Cossacks. Kalmyks from the neighborhood of Astrakhan, with their camels and mullahs [sic] in bright robes, added a touch of oriental color to this drab and gloomy picture of masses of uprooted people, fleeing to unknown destinations, ready to go anywhere if they could only escape from the oncoming tide of Bolshevism. If the Russian fugitives were mainly people of the propertied and educated classes, families of army officers, etc., the Don Cossacks and Kalmyks fled in whole communities, dragging along with them the few household goods they could transport.<sup>68</sup>

The co-nationals of these Kalmyk fugitives, however, whether or not they had been supporters of the "camp of reaction", were forced to reconcile themselves to Soviet rule, and to be catapulted rudely forward into the twentieth century.

In the North Caucasus, as in most of the non-Russian regions of the Russian Empire, first reaction to the February Revolution by the native inhabitants was one of enthusiasm and high hope. Among the Chechens and Ingushes, and the various mountain tribes of Dagestan, it was hoped that the new Russian democracy would take immediate steps to redress their long-standing grievances, and especially that it would move at once to restore to their original owners the lands lost by the natives in the previous century to the Cossacks and Russian settlers. During the confusion of 1917, therefore, political activity in the North Caucasus was both violent and disparate, as it became apparent that a struggle for power was developing. On the one hand stood the Cossack and Russian settlers, determined to maintain the status quo and to defend their interests against both natives and revolutionaries. But at the same time, the Bolsheviks maintained a considerable following among the urban proletarian element of the towns, the inogorodtsy, and, as the months passed, attracted to their cause the poorer settlers and numbers of Russian soldiers returning home from the crumbling Turkish front. Nor were the natives, on the other hand, more unified. Their political activity also flowed in two main channels. There was a Chechen national committee elected in Grozny shortly after the February Revolution, and Chechens also took part in two congresses of all the Moslem tribes of the North Caucasus in Vladikavkaz, in May and September, which proclaimed a so-called "Mountain Republic".<sup>69</sup> But the congresses which led to the forming of the Mountain Republic, though they had a more or

less marked religious flavour, were not at all revolutionary in the social sense.<sup>70</sup> They were in fact dominated and influenced by such men as Tapa Chermoyev, a Grozny millionaire oil magnate, and Prince Tarkovsky, a rich local landowner:<sup>71</sup> they were moderate in their aims, and willing to co-operate with the Russian bourgeois parties, whose programs they generally supported. In the mountains, however, as the Chechens and Ingushes, and the Dagestan mountain tribes, became increasingly imbued with impatience and restlessness over the failure of the Provisional Government to restore native lands, more extreme national and religious leaders came to the fore. The two most influential of these to emerge in the latter part of 1917 were the mullah, Najmudin Gotsinksky, who was proclaimed Imam of Dagestan and Chechnia by his followers in traditional succession to Shamil, and the Sheik Uzun Hadji, the Emir of Chechnia, of whom a prominent Dagestan Bolshevik said, he "more completely than any other leader gave expression to the spirit and aims of the Dagestan 'clericals'".<sup>72</sup> Uzun Hadji's program was both fanatically religious and rabidly national:

Internally he sought to set up a petty 'Caliphate of the Caucasus', a theocracy based upon the democratic equality of all true believers. In his foreign policy he was inspired by an irreconcilable hatred of everything Russian and a passionate striving after complete independence from the infidels and a union with Turkey, which country he envisaged as destined to hold hegemony over all Muslim lands.<sup>73</sup>

In the early part of 1917, there thus existed an uneasy alliance between the Cossack and Russian farmers and the Moslem liberals, both sides willing to accommodate one another and to wait for the meeting of a Constituent Assembly. The October Revolution, however, even as it signalled the eruption of violence, also rapidly increased the influence of the extremist groups.

It is not clear whether Bolshevik propaganda urging the natives to overthrow all existing institutions and to seize the land was particularly influential in deciding the Chechens and Ingushes to take matters into their own hands. Nevertheless, in December, 1917, having waited with growing rancour for almost a year to have their lands restored, the Chechens and Ingushes, under the leadership of Uzun Hadji, swooped down from their mountains to reclaim land by force, striking not only at the Cossack villages all along the line of the Sunzha River, but also at the towns of Grozny and Vladikavkaz, looting and pillaging.<sup>74</sup> These attacks on the settlements of the plains, whether or not actually stimulated by the propaganda of the Bolsheviks, did redound greatly to their benefit; first, they ended for at least the time being any possibility of further co-operation between the Cossacks and the native moderates; second, they served to discredit and to undermine the authority of those who had countenanced such co-operation; and, third, they gave the Bolsheviks an opportunity to spring to the fore. The Bolsheviks thus took over and co-ordinated the defence of the Russians against the natives, utilizing for this purpose their

numbers of disciplined workers and soldiers.<sup>75</sup> In January, 1918, a Terek People's Soviet was founded, ostensibly in the cause of common defence, including in its deputies both Russians and Cossacks, and even some natives--though not, of course, Chechens or Ingushes, who continued intermittently to raid.<sup>76</sup> Gradually, through 1918, the Soviet moved further toward the Bolshevik camp.

The final split between the Cossacks and the Bolsheviks in the North Caucasus came in the early summer of 1918, and occurred over the decision of the local Bolsheviks immediately to socialize all lands. Meantime, the Terek Soviet's authority was repudiated by the mountain peoples entirely in May, and a North Caucasian Government proclaimed its independence, signing a separate peace treaty with Turkey and gaining de facto recognition from the other Central Powers.<sup>77</sup> Hostility between the Bolshevik proletarians and the Cossack landowners over the land issue soon led to open conflict and in August, 1918, Cossack forces attacked and captured Vladikavkaz, overthrowing the Soviet which had been drifting increasingly leftward, and forcing the Bolsheviks, including Stalin's close friend, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, and others who had been sent to the area with him in July, to flee. The Cossack action immediately simplified the issue to be decided in the North Caucasus, the question of land; and it also polarized the opposing elements in the coming struggle.

Clearly unable by themselves to overcome the forces of counter-revolution, the Bolsheviks now joined forces with the

mountain peoples who, as regarded the land question at least, were their natural allies at this stage of the struggle.

Forced to seek refuge in the mountains, Ordzhonikidze made an alliance with the Chechens and Ingushes, promising lands to them in return for their support.<sup>78</sup> For more than another year, Bolshevik authority rested almost exclusively upon the military strength of the mountain Moslems. Until the final attempt of the White general, Denikin, to capture Moscow in August, 1919, only the partisan activity of the Chechens and Ingushes, operating with some Bolshevik support, disturbed the almost complete hold of the White forces on the Terek region. It is interesting to speculate whether the course of the Russian Civil War might have been changed had not Denikin's movement been so strongly animated by a pan-Russian nationalistic psychology, if Denikin had been equipped and willing to conciliate the non-Russian nationalities who were at the same time asserting their right to national independence; but certainly his attempt to conscript the peoples of the North Caucasus--who had been traditionally exempt from Russian military service--was an important blunder on his part, raising as it did in his wake full-scale civil war which weakened and bled his already-limited forces.<sup>79</sup> In effect, the tribes of Chechnia and Dagestan were thus not only not won over to his side, but actually forced into the arms of his enemies. After Denikin's defeat, they continued to be the mainstay of Bolshevik power until the final victories of March, 1920.

Already, before this however, there had been clashes

between Bolsheviks and mountaineers. With the power of the White armies broken, the Chechens and Ingushes demanded fulfilment of the promises made to them during the Civil War. They insisted not only on the lands they had been promised, but also upon the expulsion of all Russian and Cossack settlers who had settled in the North Caucasus over the past hundred years; and, to underline this demand, they began again to attack Russian settlements.<sup>80</sup> This full-scale insurrection against their former allies, which reached its height in September, 1920, immediately took on the character of a movement for national independence and of a holy war against the Russians.<sup>81</sup> As more than one authority has noted, the struggle of the mountain peoples of the North Caucasus against the White armies was far more anti-Russian than it was pro-Bolshevik, and the fundamental hostility of the mountain peoples did not disappear in their villages with the mere substitution of Red commissars for Tsarist officials.<sup>82</sup> Finally, whole Cossack settlements were uprooted and expelled from Chechnia, with their lands, livestock, and buildings being turned over to the Chechens and Ingushes by the Soviet authorities.<sup>83</sup>

This transfer of population had not yet been completed, nor were the Chechens yet fully pacified, when Stalin himself made an extensive tour of the Northern Caucasus in October-November, 1920. An armistice had just been signed with Poland, the armies of Wrangel were in full retreat toward Crimea, and Stalin had just defined in "Pravda" the new policy of "Soviet autonomy".<sup>84</sup> Speaking to the peoples of Dagestan in November, Stalin warned that an end must be put to continued violence:

"The Soviet Government is able to concern itself with the question of the autonomy of the Dagestan people". Dagestan was to be "governed according to its own peculiarities, its own way of life and customs". Even Moslem religious custom was not to be disturbed: "the Soviet Government considers the shariat [the Moslem code of law] as fully valid customary law". But on the other hand, and the voice of authority was unmistakeable: "the autonomy of Dagestan does not mean and cannot mean separation from Soviet Russia".<sup>85</sup> A few days later, speaking in Vladikavkaz to a congress of the peoples of the Terek region, grouped together under the term "Mountaineers", Stalin commented on the history of relations between the Mountaineers and the Cossacks: "the living together of the Mountaineers and Cossacks within the limits of a single administrative unit led to endless disturbances". The treachery of certain of the Cossacks had compelled the Soviet Government to expel the offending communities and to settle Mountaineers on the lands. It had now been decided, Stalin added, in a manner which betrayed how little part the peoples concerned had in the decision, it had now been decided to complete the process of separation between the Mountaineers and Cossacks by declaring the Terek River the new frontier between Ukraine and a new Mountaineer Soviet Republic".<sup>86</sup> (It is interesting to note here this early example of Soviet transfer of population, especially in the light of what was later to happen to the Chechens and the other minorities with whom this study is dealing.)

Two months later, despite continued unrest among the peoples of the region, the Autonomous Mountain Socialist Soviet Republic was decreed, embracing under one administration seven peoples: Kabardinians, Cherkess, and Ossétins, in addition to the Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars.<sup>87</sup> At the same time, January, 1921, a separate Dagestan A.S.S.R. was proclaimed. The issue of political power had been decided. Moscow was the victor and was to be the ultimate source of authority.

The complete victory of the Russian Bolsheviks over their adversaries in the Civil War clearly decided the principal issue which had been at stake in the struggle, the question of who was to assert political authority over the diverse peoples and vast domains of the former Russian Empire. The Bolshevik victory also served to establish firmly the borders of the new Soviet state as they were to remain until World War II; the new Soviet Russia was in fact to be in large measure a reconstitution of the old Imperial Russia, except in the West where it was minus Finland, the Baltic provinces, Poland, and slices of western Ukraine and Byelorussia which had been conquered by nascent Poland. In other words, new states rose in those areas of the former Empire not only where national feeling had been most powerfully developed, but also where some measure of tangible assistance to the separatist forces was thrown into the struggle by one or another of the great European powers, and proved instrumental in their establishment. On the contrary, as has been seen, in the borderlands of the South and East, where

nationalism was in general less well developed, and where also any outside assistance was merely of the token variety or was hastily withdrawn, the struggle for national independence ended in failure, the national governments and local authorities which had emerged were overthrown or dispersed by the Bolsheviks, and Moscow became once more the centre of political power. The Bolshevik success in the borderlands did not, however, provide immediately a satisfactory solution for the national problem; it did not even settle immediately the fundamental question of what formal relationship was to exist between the Soviet power located in Moscow and the former Tsarist colonial dependencies. The national problem--actually the sum total of numerous smaller, ancillary, but related problems--was to prove an almost endless source of headaches for the Soviet regime.

Notes: III

- <sup>1</sup> Pipes, op.cit., p. 75.
- <sup>2</sup> Allen and Muratoff, op.cit., p. 501.
- <sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 502.
- <sup>4</sup> Samurski, Dagestan (Moscow: 1925), p.131, cited ibid., p.501.
- <sup>5</sup> Leon Trotsky, Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence (New York: Grossët and Dunlap, 1941), pp.156-7.
- <sup>6</sup> J. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1941), p. 17.
- <sup>7</sup> V. I. Lenin, Selected Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.), IV, p. 250.
- <sup>8</sup> Stalin, op.cit., p.19.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 21.
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 17-18.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 24.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>13</sup> Lenin, op.cit., V, p. 270.
- <sup>14</sup> Stalin, op.cit., p.71.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., p.23.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid., p.27.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid., p.20.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., p.23.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., p.25.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup> V.I.Lenin, Works. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1934), XXVI, p. 408.

- <sup>23</sup>Stalin, op. cit., p. 65.
- <sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 53.
- <sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 74-5.
- <sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 62.
- <sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 73.
- <sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 76.
- <sup>29</sup>Communist Party Programme, 1918, cited in Conquest, op. cit., pp. 110-11.
- <sup>30</sup>E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution (London: MacMillan, 1950), I, p. 257. Present writer's italics.
- <sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 258.
- <sup>32</sup>Pipes, op. cit., p. 53.
- <sup>33</sup>Coonrod, op. cit., p. 34.
- <sup>34</sup>Conquest, op. cit., p. 34.
- <sup>35</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 72.
- <sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 73.
- <sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 74.
- <sup>38</sup>Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., I, p. 47.
- <sup>39</sup>Carr, op. cit., p. 322.
- <sup>40</sup>Bolshaya Sovyetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1st ed. (Moscow: 1939), 41, cited in Kolarz, loc. cit.
- <sup>41</sup>F. Dimanshtein, "Revolutsiya i Natsionalnosti", 4, (April, 1931), p. 19, cited ibid.
- <sup>42</sup>William Henry Chamberlain, The Russian Revolution 1917-21 (New York: MacMillan, 1954), 2, p. 321.
- <sup>43</sup>Pipes, op. cit., p. 81.
- <sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 75.
- <sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 81.
- <sup>46</sup>Ibid.

- <sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 155; Carr, op. cit., p. 263.
- <sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 321.
- <sup>49</sup>"Revolyuetsiya i Natsionalnosti", 12 (December, 1935), pp. 66-7, cited in Conquest, op. cit., p. 45.
- <sup>50</sup>Pipes, op. cit., pp. 186-7.
- <sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 187; Carr, loc. cit.
- <sup>52</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>53</sup>Pipes, op. cit., p. 192.
- <sup>54</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 78.
- <sup>55</sup>Pipes, op. cit., p. 189.
- <sup>56</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>57</sup>Kolarz, loc. cit.
- <sup>58</sup>"Zhizn' Natsionalnosti" (10 October, 1921), cited ibid.
- <sup>59</sup>Conquest, op. cit., p. 38.
- <sup>60</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>61</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>62</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 83; Conquest, op. cit., p. 39.
- <sup>63</sup>Carr, op. cit., p. 324; Collection of Decrees and Regulations of the Worker's and Peasant's Government, 37, Article 368, cited in Conquest, loc. cit.
- <sup>64</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 84.
- <sup>65</sup>Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 480.
- <sup>66</sup>Conquest, loc. cit.
- <sup>67</sup>Ibid.; Carr, op. cit., p. 326.
- <sup>68</sup>Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 287.
- <sup>69</sup>Carr, op. cit., p. 318; Conquest, op. cit., p. 20.
- <sup>70</sup>Carr, loc. cit.
- <sup>71</sup>Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 502.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Pipes, op. cit., p. 97.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid.

<sup>77</sup>Conquest, op. cit., p. 84.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., p. 21; Pipes, op. cit., p. 196.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 187.

<sup>80</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 187.

<sup>81</sup>Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., p. 511.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p. 509.

<sup>83</sup>Pipes, op. cit., p. 198.

<sup>84</sup>Carr, op. cit., pp. 327-8.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 328.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid.

<sup>87</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 183.

#### IV

##### i

Before examining Soviet nationalities policy as it directly concerned the seven peoples who are this essay's special interests, and before seeking to establish some of the essential parallels between Soviet and earlier Tsarist policies which this examination reveals, at least a brief analysis must be made of the broadest outlines of Soviet policy. Such a brief summary as is possible here cannot, of course, comprise an adequate description of an extremely complex problem, or set of interrelated problems, and must of necessity claim to be nothing more than an analysis, a simplification. The position of the various minorities has, for example, varied rather extensively under the Soviet regime; nationalities policy as such is at times very difficult to distinguish or to separate from the more universal policies of the regime. The following appraisal must, therefore, be understood in the most general terms.

The major phases of Soviet nationalities policy from the end of the Civil War until the death of Stalin in 1953 may, however, be characterized as having corresponded quite accurately to the principal phases of the Soviet government's general policies during this period. To some considerable extent, then, the experiences of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union may be said to have been roughly similar to those of the population at large. But, it must be emphasized, only to some considerable extent: for it is perhaps not inaccurate also to tender the generalization that, in fact, while the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. were subjected during these years to all of the intense pressures and great demands made upon their Russian fellows, they were in addition, especially after 1928, subjected to other, perhaps equally strong pressures primarily because of their non-Russian nationality. And, furthermore, these pressures which were in addition to those of general Soviet experience were very largely maintained, or even increased

during those periods marked by a relative relaxing of the burdens borne by the population as a whole.

Between 1921 and 1928, during the period of N.E.P., the years of the nation's recovery from the devastation, destruction, and disorders wrought by World War I and the Civil War, and the era — at least until after Stalin's death — when life in the Soviet Union most nearly approximated what in the West might be termed "normal" conditions, the non-Russian peoples, along with their Russian counterparts, derived some considerable benefits from the prevailing atmosphere of cultural and economic liberalism. More concretely, widespread reforms were carried out during this period in a great number of spheres, and those dealing with land and education were of particular importance and value to the minorities, giving promise that the most distressing aspects of Tsarist policy — in a broad sense, the subordination of all other national interests to those of the Great Russian majority — had indeed been reversed. Great encouragement was given to the development of minority cultures, in keeping with the government's proclamations regarding the linguistic, cultural, and political equality of all peoples of the Soviet Union. The political equality of the non-Russians was from the beginning, of course, hardly more than nominal; but the achievements in the cultural sphere during this era were gratifying. As the N.E.P. period drew to a close, however, as Stalin overcame all overt opposition and consolidated his position as undoubted master of the state, as the strings of centralization were drawn ever tighter into his hands, and as the massive construction of the first modern totalitarian state was completed, the cultural activities of the minorities, and also those of the Russians, became increasingly circumscribed. A shift, and then a reversal, in nationalities policy became apparent. Attacks upon "Great Russian chauvinism," perhaps as frequent in the initial years of Soviet rule as were denunciations of "local nationalism", were

heard less and less often, while many minority customs, traditions, habits, and institutions, hitherto encouraged, or at least tolerated, by the government, now came under heavy fire, and numbers of national and local leaders were removed for professed "bourgeois nationalism". Still, for all such measures, which in any case affected as yet only small segments of the minority peoples, chiefly political and religious leaders, the N.E.P. period from 1921 to 1928 was in general a time of substantial government concessions to the minorities, of important achievement by them, and of relative satisfaction for them.

The virtual reversal of this policy began on a large scale in 1928, with the beginning of the historic First Five-Year Plan. The earlier sporadic attacks upon sections of the non-Russian nationalities proved to have been merely the prelude to the full symphony of terror Stalin unleashed to accompany the campaign to develop industrialization in Russia and the concomitant collectivization campaign. From this time onward, although the change was not fully apparent at first, the former official attitudes to minority culture and Russian-non-Russian relationships moved increasingly toward attitudes resembling those of the Tsarist regime. Few strata of the Soviet population were spared at least some degree of hardship and privation from the upheavals and dislocations brought about by Stalin's great "revolution from above", his effort to transform still backward and predominantly agricultural Russia into a leading, well-disciplined, industrial nation. But even in this context, the sufferings of many of the minorities were truly exceptional. While even the more docile Russian peasantry, who already possessed the tradition of their peasant commune, offered considerable resistance to collectivization, the resistance of many of the non-Russian peasants was infinitely more bitter. Having been told just short years before that their geographical heritage would henceforth be preserved and that the lands they farmed were theirs, they refused to give up

their lands to the state; and in consequence they felt for the first time the awful power of totalitarianism. Stalin's "weeding out" of the "undesirable elements" in Soviet agriculture, his "elimination of the kulaks as a class", brought in many regions what amounted to open warfare between the government and the recalcitrant peasants; his program of "social engineering", involving as it did such items as deliberately-induced famines, wholesale arrests, and terror in all its forms that have since become so familiar, cost several million lives. In many of the non-Russian areas, too, the conflict became one essentially between Russians and non-Russians; and undoubtedly for this reason, the campaign against the kulaks broadened into a vast drive against all manifestations of "nationalism", extending far beyond the village into minority government, school, literary, and artistic circles.

These years of perhaps unprecedented violence by a government against its citizens were followed, mercifully, by a brief respite for the population generally from 1933 to 1935. But the terror hardly abated for many of the minorities, and especially those which had shown themselves most opposed to collectivization. Then, in 1934, the new doctrine of "Soviet patriotism" was crystallized. In essence this formula was a return to the "official nationality" of the Tsars, stressing the leading historical role of the Russian people in the promoting of progress, involving a heavy emphasis upon the dominant virtues of Russian influence, Russian language, and Russian culture, and reviving many of the glories of the prerevolutionary Russian past. To amend Orwell, though perhaps not in a way to which he would have objected: "All peoples of the Soviet Union were equal, but the Russians were more equal than the others". It will be seen what some of the implications of this return to the imperial policy of russification were for those nationalities which were not only non-Russian, but historically anti-Russian.

The years from 1936 to 1939 made some of these frighteningly clear; this was the period of the great purge, the yezhovshchina, beside which the scope and horror of all previous purges appeared almost trivial in comparison. The police terror searched for and rooted out real and believed enemies of the state in almost every corner of the vast U.S.S.R., but again the national minorities were the victims of special attention and particularly harsh treatment. Attacked with the utmost violence and savagery, they contributed disproportionately large numbers of persons, both Party members and plain citizens alike, to the millions exiled, tortured, or killed; literally hundreds of thousands of national and local leaders in all fields, the cream of at least one generation, disappeared into the labour camps, the prison cells, and the unmarked graves of the Soviet police during those years of extensive and sanguinary purging of all administrative bodies.

The great purge had hardly subsided — indeed, it can be argued that it was only interrupted — by the beginning of World War II. The invasion of the German armies, their rapid advance, and its great losses of territory, resources, and population, not least because of the unwillingness of vast sections of the population of the western borderlands to defend it, imposed terrific strains upon the Soviet regime almost immediately. Seeking desperately to rally all its internal strength during the dark, early years of the War, it in fact reverted fully to nationalistic appeals, resurrecting virtually all the traditional symbols of Russian unity (which the Bolsheviks had so scorned), and going so far as to make an alliance with the Orthodox Church, its sworn enemy and the former ally of the Tsars. World War II ended, of course, with Soviet armies sweeping across eastern Europe into Berlin, and with about ninety millions more non-Russians either being incorporated within the expanded borders of the U.S.S.R. itself or finding themselves under some greater or lesser degree of Soviet rule; but it also demonstrated that the efforts

of the Soviet government over the preceding two decades and more to achieve a certain homogeneity among the nationalities already within its borders had not been notably successful — if, indeed, they could not be regarded as a total failure. For if the German invasion and occupation of large parts of the U.S.S.R. did not quite reveal that the country was a mere congeries held together only by its police, armies, bureaucracies, and sheer habit, it did nevertheless show quite unmistakably that Soviet claims that the nationalities problem had been "solved" since 1921, chiefly on the bases of Stalin's formulations and policy, were patently unfounded on fact. It was generally recognized that it had been the Great Russians who had been the heart of Soviet resistance and ultimate victory. The intense upsurge in Russian patriotism generated by the War made the unassimilated minorities even more suspect than they had been; their unreliability contrasted sharply with Russian heroism, and official propaganda underlined the contrast. There is hardly need to repeat at this juncture that at least seven entire non-Russian peoples were as a result of the War accused of collective treason, deprived of all civil rights, and deported to Soviet Asia — which actions comprise the matrix of the problem with which this paper is concerned.

The postwar years from 1945 until Stalin's death were for the population as a whole most strongly marked by the government's failure to ease or ameliorate its demands for discipline, unity, and sacrifice, now generally felt to be intolerable and unnecessary demands after the nation's recent ordeals. For the minorities, indeed, the immediate postwar years saw the regime's strongly nationalistic policy intensified. Russification was now the hardly-disguised goal, and the means were increased emphasis upon the Russian language, increased numbers of Russian officials in minority areas, increased stress in virtually all propaganda upon the leading role of the Russian people, and constant minor purges of the minority leadership.

The rewriting of history became extensive, flourishing in this rabid nationalistic environment, especially with regard to Russian imperial expansion under the Tsars; old Russia was no longer referred to as having been "the prison of peoples", for example; but Russian imperialism was now officially proclaimed to have been in reality a blessing to the non-Russian, colonial peoples, a progressive and even liberating event. The postwar years also witnessed a great increase in transfers of peoples, vast numbers of them, to the huge and heterogeneous "melting pots" around the U.S.S.R.'s many new industrial complexes, undoubtedly reflecting both the changing patterns of Soviet life and the regime's determination, reinforced by its wartime experience, to hasten the breaking-down of national idiosyncracies and to speed the diluting of its multitude of racial stocks into a homogeneous and undifferentiated unity. So should the eliminating of distinctive national units in the Soviet armed forces be seen as another move toward this goal.

Finally, since 1953, like the Russians, the non-Russian nationalities have clearly derived some benefits from the official disavowals of some of the excesses of Stalin's rule and his successors' generally more reasonable attitudes toward the questions of rigid conformity and reliance on coercion to achieve ends. Almost all of the peoples deported as national entities during World War II have been amnestied and at least partially rehabilitated; some of the most blatant expressions of pan-Russianism have been modified and toned down; and it would appear that the methods to be adopted by the present Soviet rulers toward the national minorities have in general been substantially altered, even though there is little reason to believe at this time that either the direction of Soviet nationalities policy, or its ultimate goal of minority assimilation, have been fundamentally changed since Stalin's time.<sup>1</sup>

This very brief and necessarily somewhat arbitrary review of Soviet nationalities policy's main phases could be expanded almost indefinitely from any number

of points. On the other hand, and perhaps more desirably for the purposes of this essay, it may also be summarized even more concisely into just two principal periods, divided as if the year 1928 marked the historical watershed between them. That year was the rough transitional point from the early Soviet period, before Stalin had fully attained his position of eminence, and when some sort of meaningful distinction could still be drawn between the various spheres of Soviet life to the full-blown "Stalin era", when politics -- as understood in the U.S.S.R. -- came increasingly to dominate, or at least to play some important part in, almost every field of activity: or, to put it another way, from the very brief period of national cultural revival or naissance, in keeping with the strategic withdrawal from dogmatic Bolshevism which marked so many fields under the N.E.P., to the Stalinist period of totalitarianism, when the regime had both the power and the will to impose its own models for conformity upon all of its peoples, and fell back for its models upon a great many of those from the imperial Russian past, including the policy of russification.

Here, however, is one of the many paradoxes which must dominate any discussion of Soviet nationalities policy and which prevent any straight equating of it with Tsarist policy. On the one hand, Soviet policy since 1928, in some areas beginning even earlier than this, has followed a fairly clear-cut pattern; it has been characterized by recurrent purges of non-Russian political leaders and intellectuals; by standardized education; by massive propaganda; by resettlement and employment measures which have scattered countless persons and groups far from their indigenous areas across the length and breadth of the Soviet Union; by large numbers of Russian specialists in all fields being imported into the non-Russian regions, assuring their more rapid industrial development, their close supervision and ultimate Russian control, and also accelerating the prerevolutionary trend toward the russifying of the non-Russian areas; and, finally, by countless variations upon the old imperial policy of "divide and rule". The very scale of Soviet nationalities policy almost forbids

the conclusion that it has been merely a continuation of Tsarist policy, and yet, as will be seen, the resemblances between the two almost equally strongly suggest that such a conclusion is not fundamentally incorrect. The paradox seems to lie, however, in the fact that the Soviet government, for all its measures to hasten the assimilation of its national minorities, has also felt itself compelled to continue measures obviously inimical to this goal and bound to delay its being achieved. It has continued to organize its administrative divisions in the non-Russian territories in terms of their national composition, thus maintaining at least the outward appearance and the formal machinery of minority political autonomy. And it has continued to encourage the diverse cultural activities of the minority peoples, even though the strictures placed upon these activities by the formula, "national in form, socialist in content", have reduced minority "cultural autonomy" to hardly more than folklore autonomy in practice. For all its strictures upon non-Russian development, it would still seem undeniable that the Soviet government has in fact encouraged both the retention and the development of minority national-consciousness, while it has simultaneously sought to eradicate it.

The paradox, as has been said, is only one of many which lie close to the heart of Soviet nationalities policy. There are, in fact, too many, with roots deep within the fundamental tenets of Bolshevism, the character and circumstances of the October Revolution, and the entire sweep of Russian history, to allow either a complete or systematic appraisal of them here. Possibly it will be enough to comment in brief upon those contradictions which will shed light upon the experiences of the seven deported peoples whose story is being followed in these pages; or, perhaps it should be said, to confine comment to those central paradoxes which seem to aid in the understanding of their experiences. One of these appears of particular relevance — though it is also central to the nationalities problem in a much broader sense and, perhaps, to the nature of the entire Soviet regime: that is, the irreconcilability

between the aims of Lenin and his colleagues and the human instruments through which those aims were to be realized.

It is hardly an original observation that the Soviet government, for all its claim to represent the interests of the international working class, has been from its earliest days essentially a Russian national government, the heir and successor -- albeit an unnatural heir -- to the Tsarist government and the short-lived Provisional Government it followed. The cruel logic of events dictated that the Bolsheviks, in spite of their hopes that they were initiating a great international revolution based on the Marxist conception of the class struggle, should have been thrown back almost entirely upon their own national resources: in geographical terms, upon a reduced version of the former Russian Empire, the state Marx himself, ironically enough, had judged as probably the least promising in Europe for revolution, and one which was to lose, in addition, some of its most highly industrialized areas in the West. The call to proletarians of all lands to unite and follow the Russian lead was either stifled or largely ignored, and the general European uprising which was expected -- which was indeed regarded by the Bolsheviks as a prime requisite for the survival of their regime -- proved stillborn. The Soviet government was, then a Russian national government long before Stalin's dictum of "socialism in one country" signified the (it was said) temporary subordinating of the international class struggle to Russian national interests, and became the official informing spirit of the regime's policies: that is, when the revolutionary doctrines of international class solidarity and national egalitarianism still mean something more to the majority of the Bolsheviks than mere totems toward which ritual homage had to be paid. If E. H. Carr is correct in estimating that the summer of 1920 was the last period during which belief in the imminence of the European revolution was a dominant factor in Soviet foreign policy,<sup>2</sup> it perhaps can be said with relative certainty that the

emergence of "socialism in one country" as the dominant doctrine of the Soviet government was inevitable, or at least implicit, from that date. Surely the autumn of 1920, at the latest, when peace had been made with Poland, only tattered remnants of overt military opposition remained on Russian soil, and the government was obliged to face the fact that it had survived, must be taken as the time when Lenin and his fellows were quite definitely a government of national, not international, revolutionaries. They had then to turn themselves to the immense task of actually governing the vast country they had won: a country with its borders shortened, its economy wrecked through war both foreign and civil, revolutionary experiments, and foreign blockade, its peoples increasingly restless, its diplomatic contacts with the outside world almost severed. The bulk of the material resources and the human resources necessary for reconstruction had to be drawn, somehow, from within. Here the chief concern is with the human resources: who were the people upon whom the success or failure of the task ahead depended? Under the Tsarist government, it has been emphasized, the Russians had for decades, even for centuries, played the leading and dominant role; despite their having comprised in 1914 a bare majority of the population, their primacy and the primacy also of their language and culture had always been stressed over the myriads of other peoples, languages, and cultures. Not that the Russians were by European standards to be regarded as either advanced or progressive, but in relation to most of the peoples of the Russian state, especially those of the East, they were significantly advanced — that is to say, in the modern sense of being infinitely better trained and better educated for the tasks involved in the building and operating of an industrial society. At the end of the Civil War, then, not only were the overwhelming bulk of the nation's technicians and industrial workers Russian-speaking; so were most of those who could be expected quickly to attain the skills necessary for factory and technical work. This is not to mention the professional classes: military officers, teachers, doctors, lawyers, administrators,

down even to clerks of the most humble station -- in short, all those classes of society for whose experience the Soviet government had such desperate need. Just as the Red Army was built chiefly around cadres of former Tsarist officers, so was the civil service of the new Soviet government to be erected around the experienced core of the old Tsarist bureaucracy, particularly in the higher grades.<sup>3</sup>

It has often been cynically remarked that governments may come and go, but that bureaucracies immutably remain. The supreme importance of this situation for the future course of Soviet nationalities policy can hardly, however, be overestimated, in examining the early days of the new regime. That the Soviet government was compelled to employ virtually the identical bureaucracy as its predecessor to initiate and perform tasks utterly alien to those it was trained and accustomed to performing, was undoubtedly a factor of decisive importance for the success or failure of its nationalities policy, and for the many peoples with whom this policy was concerned. This was also, it is felt, one of the most significant keys to the congruities which may be seen to exist between the policies of the new and the old regimes. It was one of the vital residues of Tsarist rule that the deliberate inequality of its national and social structure should have imposed upon its successors the necessity to rely upon an official class which possessed neither sympathy nor understanding for the aspirations and desires of the national minorities, which was, indeed, by training and experience, by habit of mind and general outlook, positively hostile to them. Lenin perceived the incipient dangers in the situation; writing to Trotsky in December, 1922, just a little more than one year before his death, he expressed his fears for the interests of the minorities:

. . . it is quite obvious that the 'freedom of exit from the Union', with which we justify ourselves, will prove to be nothing but a scrap of paper, incapable of defending the minorities in Russia from the inroads of that hundred per cent Russian, the Great Russian chauvinist -- in reality, the scoundrel, the

violator, which the typical Russian bureaucrat is.<sup>4</sup>

Lenin could warn and inveigh against the bureaucracy he had inherited from the Romanovs. But there was in fact no alternative. The historical legacy dictated that the Russians, of all the peoples in Russia, were the best endowed for the road ahead — not well endowed themselves, but only better endowed than the others. It would take many years and immense educational projects to produce an elite truly representative of all the peoples in Russia still to be found in the many transitional stages between tribal community and modern society. Meantime the start on the road to socialism had to be made, though the machinery creaked and groaned and was obviously badly fitted for the journey.

The road was, of course, a treacherous one, fraught with obstacles which, had Lenin and his fellows clearly perceived them at the outset, might perhaps have made even their stout hearts fail. Not the least of these obstacles was the immense gulf which existed between the Russians and many of the minorities, the palpable antipathy between those in the driver's seat and their uncertain and unwilling passengers. The gulf between Russian and non-Russian, virtually impassable during the old regime, temporarily bridged in some cases during the Civil War, was by the end of 1920 close upon its former dimensions. On the side of the Russians, national solidarity and patriotism had been roused by the Revolution itself, raised to their apogee by foreign intervention and especially — in keeping with Russian tradition — by war against Russia's historical enemies, the Poles, and sustained by threatened and (in the West) successful attempts to dismember Russian domains. During the Civil War, the interests of revolutionism and Russian nationalism converged, flowing into each other and intermingling so as to become almost indistinguishable. The minorities which remained under Russian rule remained, therefore, also suspect as potential sources of further conflict and weakness; it was hardly to be either forgiven or forgotten overnight that many of these minorities had, after all, been to some extent

guilty of disloyalty to Russia — many, in fact, had been retained within Russia's borders only through the bayonets of the Red Army. On the other side, too, this fact could hardly be forgotten. There was an obvious parallel to be drawn between the Red Army's occupation of many of the non-Russian areas and the earlier pattern of Tsarist conquest and expansion into the power-vacuums of the East and South. The Bolsheviks drew dialectical distinctions between their "liberation" and the "imperialism" of other governments, but these distinctions were hardly comprehensible to those untrained in Marxist modes of thought. The new Russians acted very much like the old ones; and even the Soviet Commissar for Nationalities awakened memories of countless other imperial governments when he justified Soviet annexations by the ancient plea of "the lesser of two evils".<sup>5</sup> Certainly, in any case, there was a profound disappointment in the contrast between the words of the Bolsheviks and the actions and attitudes of their emissaries, between the high hopes which had been raised, at least partly by Bolshevik propaganda, and the paltry extent to which these hopes had been realized. Even as there was in Russia itself a cooling of enthusiasm for the Bolsheviks — more properly, the Communists, as they became in 1918 — as their victory became certain but their government nevertheless retained its dictatorial and bureaucratic character, so there was a corresponding disenchantment in the non-Russian borderlands, largely for the same reasons.<sup>6</sup> But with this significant difference: if the Russians found themselves becoming less enamoured of the regime's continued ruthless use of military and police power, the government was, after all, still their national government; in the borderlands, however, arbitrary and unjust measures were, again, the actions of an alien, foreign power, and therefore to be more harshly and critically judged.

It has been argued here that Soviet nationalities policy was from very early on influenced strongly by the attitudes toward the unassimilated minorities of

Russia found in their most extreme forms among the Great Russian bureaucracy, that palpable link between the old and the new regimes; it may be suggested that many of its characteristics were therefore foreseeable from the moment that the interests of the Bolsheviks converged with Russian national interests in the face of foreign intervention and demanded that any means, up to and including direct military conquest, should be used to retain within the framework of the Russian state as many as possible of the non-Russian areas which threatened to break away; and it has been noted that it was conditioned by the mutual distrust and hostility with which Russian and non-Russian viewed one another. All these considerations apart, however, there were unresolved conflicts in the basic Bolshevik theses on the national question, conflicts in fact traceable to the fundamental premises of Bolshevism, which would seem to have been of at least equal importance in the shaping of the nationalities policy which eventually emerged. Attention must now be turned to some of these.

Some of these conflicts have been seen in the previous chapter. The most salient inner contradiction which Bolshevik formulations on the national question contained was, of course, the seeming irreconcilability of the doctrine of national self-determination, on the one hand, and the supranational character of Marxian class analyses, on the other. The apparent conflict between these beliefs was resolved satisfactorily enough in a theoretical way by the dialectical insistence upon the conditional and dynamic aspects of the first; the case of each nation was to be judged on its own merits at the appropriate time. In practice, as has also been seen, very little attention was in fact given to the niceties of theory; the right of nations to self-determination, so loudly proclaimed by the Bolsheviks both before and after their seizure of power, was brutally overridden in the struggle which followed, and the decisive element in the struggle was, in almost every area outside of Russia proper, superior military force. But even in theory, it must be emphasized, the Bolshevik solution was patently unsatisfactory for the minorities, since it presupposed that

the fate of nations should be determined by the decision of the Russian Bolshevik Party. The Party, as it had been conceived and organized by Lenin, was in its own eyes the sole bearer of the "truth", of the "correct" line to be followed, the chosen instrument for achieving the prognosis set out by Marx of the determinable form which history should take. It was above criticism, and therefore justified in employing any and all means which were necessary to achieve power, just as it was justified in suppressing all opposition to its rule once it had achieved power. It is hardly too much to say that Lenin's conception of the Party and its role, as a kind of Hegelian hero, in fact implied the suppression of all outside opposition, and carried within itself the seeds of Soviet totalitarianism. Even Trotsky once wrote, in his unfinished Stalin: "..... it is rather tempting to draw the inference that future Stalinism was already rooted in Bolshevik centralism or, more sweepingly, in the underground hierarchy of professional revolutionists".<sup>7</sup> He, of course, could or would not allow himself to be tempted further than this, since such an admission would have done violence to the meaning of the central events of his own life, but his arguments against the drawing of this inference are in fact strangely feeble and unconvincing, and hardly serve to prevent others, less personally involved in the events of 1917 and afterward, from drawing it. For the sole justification of Lenin's concept of Party lay in the absolute conviction that the Party, and only the Party, was right; its ends justified its means. Stalin rose from the Party which Lenin built up: a small, disciplined, self-selecting and self-perpetuating clique of intellectuals -- in effect, a theocracy -- with both the right and the duty to force history along the lines it deemed the correct ones, and also to liquidate, if it could, all opposition to itself.

Centralized authority was the essence of Communist rule. Lenin and his colleagues were, as has been noted, deeply committed from the outset to the building of a highly centralized state, a hierarchical system of institutions ruled from the

top by the Party. If the Soviet government is officially proclaimed to be the most democratic in the world, to be based wholly on the interests of its peoples, it is in fact upon the Communist Party that power ultimately rests, almost absolute power, and the government is in reality only another instrument of the Party. The Party is a government within a government, controlling (or seeking to control) virtually every sphere of human activity. And with reference to the national problem specifically, at least in its widest context, the same thing holds true. The Soviet Union is federal in structure, and its constitution appears to give considerable freedom to the various republics which comprise it; but in reality its republics do not decide even the most minor matters for themselves without reference to the general policy directives emanating from the small elite in the Moscow centre. The federal structure which the Communists accepted for their state in 1918 — it might be well to note here — and which still obtains in the U.S.S.R., did not signify any departure from their idea of a centralized state; it was, as Stalin pointed out then, in view of the circumstances under which it was adopted, actually a definite move in the direction of centralism.<sup>8</sup> It was, in reality, little more than a formal concession to the minorities, a mask for the fact that Soviet rule had been imposed upon many parts of the country by force, against the will of their peoples, and was in keeping with Stalin's general belief that the forms of equality would suffice to placate minority national consciousness. As early as 1923, even the appearance of meaningful "autonomy" for the constituent peoples was virtually dismissed at the Twelfth Party Congress as a harmless fiction:

There has been talk here of independent and autonomous republics (said the Georgian delegate, Makharadze) ..... it is clear to us all what sort of autonomy, what sort of independence this is. We have, after all, a single central organ, which in the final resort determines absolutely everything for all the republics, even the tiny republics, including general directives right up to the appointment of responsible leaders for this or that republic — all this derives from the one organ, so that to speak under these conditions of autonomy, of independence, reflects to the highest degree an intrinsically incomprehensible proposition.<sup>9</sup>

Was it then possible to reconcile Communism with any idea of national equality, when so many of the peoples of the East and South were either ignorant of or rejected its basic doctrines? Among Russian Moslems, for example, Marxism had made very few inroads, and, where it had been accepted, had been embraced chiefly in its Menshevik guise;<sup>10</sup> among the vast majority of peoples it was hardly known in any of its forms, or, where it was known, was rejected principally because of its atheistic and materialistic biases. Could there have been national equality, or even autonomy, for the various minorities when, given the national and social structure of the Soviet state, Russian standards — at least insofar as they dovetailed with the requirements of the regime — were the standards to which the non-Russian had to attain? The answer to these questions must be in the negative. Within the borders of the Soviet state, Communism in fact implied russification. E. H. Carr has described how the process occurred even under the very eyes of Lenin:

The growing concentration of authority and administrative control at the centre had the inevitable effect . . . of subordinating the other nationalities to the Great Russian core round which they were assembled. It was not enough that members of the lesser nationalities should have as large a proportion as was due them, or sometimes a larger proportion, of posts of influence and authority in the administrative machine. Many non-Russian occupants of these posts assimilated themselves without effort and without deliberate intention to the outlook of the numerically preponderant Great Russian group; those who resisted assimilation were less likely to make successful careers. Moscow was the administrative capital — the centre where the major decisions were made. The bureaucratic mentality against which Lenin almost automatically inveighed tended almost automatically to become a Great Russian mentality . . . Centralization meant standardization, and the standards adopted were naturally Great Russian standards.<sup>11</sup>

Was it even possible in reality for any sort of true cultural autonomy to exist for the national minorities under the banner, "national in form, socialist in content"? Again the question must be answered with an unqualified negative. In the first place, the very slogan itself implied that the national elements in any aspect of cultural life possess no more than mere formal or extrinsic values. Form

and content in any work of art cannot be thus artificially and arbitrarily separated, since the relationship between them in any society is complex and manifold, developing integrally through various processes of interaction and interrelationship more or less spontaneously. To reduce the tolerated expressions of national culture to those which were "socialist in content" was to impose upon the non-Russian minorities and their cultural life alien and foreign norms to which their cultural life had to cleave: specifically, the norms of "socialist Russia". As more than one observer has remarked, the formula "national in form, socialist in content" meant for the bulk of the national minorities hardly more than the right to praise Stalin in their own languages. This is undoubtedly an exaggeration; but from the late twenties onward, it did in fact mean that minority cultural life became increasingly subordinated to Russian models. As early as 1924, Trotsky defined the limits to which art would be allowed to go; in Literature and Revolution he wrote:

If the Revolution has the right to destroy bridges and art monuments whenever necessary, it will stop still less from laying its hands on any tendency in art, no matter how great its achievement in form, which threatens to disintegrate the revolutionary environment or to arouse the internal forces of the Revolution, that is, the proletariat, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia, to a hostile opposition to one another. Our standard is, clearly, political, imperative, and intolerant.<sup>12</sup>

How this standard would be applied to the cultural activities of the national minorities is also clear, even though not stated explicitly here: nothing which could in any sense be construed as a threat to the internal unity of the Soviet state would be tolerated. Art, music, folklore, literature — all fields of minority cultural endeavour, in short — were to be judged by political criteria: which meant, as the entire content of Soviet politics became increasingly russianized, and as the content of Soviet culture tended increasingly to resemble traditional Russian culture, that the area of cultural remaining for the minorities would become ever smaller and more restricted.

Socialism in one country -- not as an ideology, but as a fact -- would appear to have implied from the outset the apotheosis of the state. The state, wherever it is found, of course, demands the final earthly allegiance of its inhabitants; but in Soviet Russia at least two principal elements converged to raise the state to a position of unusually exalted eminence. The Leninist conception of the Communist Party's unique and individual role in the history of mankind, blending as it did so well with the widespread belief in Russia's messianic mission in the world, combined to give rise to a state which demanded recognition not only as the ultimate political authority for all its citizens, but also as the final moral authority. Moreover, the Soviet Russian state, claiming to be the living embodiment of the teleological progressive principles of mankind, demanded recognition as the final moral arbiter not only for the peoples within its borders, but also for all the peoples of the world. In its own eyes, the government of Soviet Russia -- rather, it should be said, the Communist Party -- was always correct in its decisions simply by definition. It needed no justifications for its actions beyond the fact of its own existence. Marx had discovered the key to the future and the Communist Party had that key. Once this initial presupposition was accepted, it was an easy, natural, and perhaps inevitable step to the position that the people which had been responsible for bringing into being a Communist government was a people especially endowed. It was Russia, after all, of all the nations of the world, which had given rise to this phenomenon, the first true "socialist" government, the government of the future. All things peculiarly Russian, therefore, became significant; the history of Russia became the quintessence of all human history, Russian civilization became officially recognized as the embodiment of all civilized virtues, and Russian culture became regarded as the highest culture in the world. With the convergence of Communism and Russian history, those who resisted russification were now seen to be guilty also of resisting progress, the march of history, the laws of human evolution elucidated by Marx and

applied by his true disciples, the Russian Communist Party. The interests of the Russian state ruled by this party were now to be seen as the interests of all progressive humanity. Thus the doctrine of official nationality, despised by the early Bolsheviks, came to be revived in a more ideologically consistent and more virulent form, inflated into a principle for world imperialism.

Within the Russian state itself, there was from the beginning, then, a striking resemblance between the approaches of the Soviet and Tsarist governments to the unassimilated peoples: the concept of the Russian state as a civilizing influence, as the bearer of an historical mission, in addition to, and reinforcing, the pre-occupation with national security which demanded the russification of minorities. The analogy between Communism and various religious doctrines has been drawn too often to require extensive elucidation here, but the analogy is nevertheless still a useful one. Marxism is, in a very profound sense, a religion, one of the secular religions of the Enlightenment — indeed, perhaps the most intolerant form of rationalism — though it too, like all religions, contains its own quota of irrational elements. The Russian Communists, seeking to spread their doctrines among the non-Russian peoples of the borderlands, were missionaries in very much the same way as the missionaries of the Orthodox Church were in the nineteenth century, endeavouring to convert the unconverted. The Communists were not, however, like the Church, concerned merely with the saving of souls, content with mere passive acceptance of their rule, or satisfied to leave the institutions of the non-Russian peoples much as they found them. Their crusading spirit was genuine enough, of course — that word "crusading" is used here with full consciousness of both its favourable and unfavourable connotations — but Communism also embodied very definite ideas about how society should be structured, organized, and controlled, ideas fundamental to Marx's hypothesis that the social, cultural, and political forms of any society are determined (chiefly)

by material and economic forces. It was therefore dedicated to altering radically the basic patterns of life then existing among the many and variegated peoples with whom it came in contact. The specific program of the Russian Communists did not differ fundamentally from the programs put forward by other socialist parties, in that it included such familiar items as emphasis upon an industrially based economy, state ownership and operation of the means of production, nationalization of the land, and restrictions upon private property, accompanied by plans for social reforms such as universal education, equality of the sexes, racial equality, and the like. For the Russian Communists, as has been seen, national equality was regarded as being primarily a function of economic equality, and economic equality among the different nations of Russia itself was to be created by the breaking down of the existing lines of demarcation between the state's industrialized areas and the non-industrial areas of the borderlands through the distributing of the processes of production throughout the whole state. The Soviet economy was, in keeping with Marxist doctrine, to be centrally controlled and highly integrated; and it followed, at least in theory, that the populations of the various areas would in the process also be integrated — proletarianized, as it were — and that, finally, national differences would be resolved and national antagonisms cease to exist. But where Lenin's Communism broke away most radically from the socialist tradition of western Europe, and even from the other versions of Russian socialism, was not so much in its programmatic goals as in its disregard for democratic processes, its intolerance of opposition, its willingness to resort to violence, and its insistence upon the necessity of a proletarian — which is to say, Party — dictatorship, for at least a limited period. It is perhaps characteristic of all healthy heresies that they are utterly convinced of their own rectitude, but Lenin's Communism was to a remarkable degree, feeling that it had both the right and the duty to impose its will upon the peoples under its rule by whatever means should prove necessary. To put it as bluntly as possible: the Party

knew what was in the best long-term interests of its peoples better than they themselves knew, and that was what they were going to get, whether or not they liked it.

The industrialization of parts of the borderlands had been begun under the Tsarist regime, particularly from the early 1890's onward — among the groups with whom this essay is concerned, the exploitation of the Grozny oil fields in Chechnia was a notable example of this — but the process had been uneven and on a comparatively small scale, and had been seriously interrupted by the outbreak of war in 1914 and the events which followed. Nor was the Soviet government able in its initial years to continue this development, at least on a large scale, because of the numerous other problems with which it had to grapple. The N.E.P. period, which has been described as a time of "human and institutional capital formation",<sup>13</sup> was of necessity a time of political consolidation, economic recovery, and especially, of education for the gigantic tasks ahead. Among the reasons why N.E.P. had been regarded as necessary by Lenin had been to give time to build up the general level of education in Russian, and this was also one of the reasons why rapid industrialization, which along with collectivization was from the time of the Revolution high on the Soviet list of priorities, was not undertaken sooner than it was. But if the educational level of the Russian state was generally low, that of many of the non-Russian peoples of the eastern borderlands was much lower. The gap which existed between Russian standards of educational fitness for the building of a new technological society and the relative backwardness of these peoples had not yet had time to be appreciably narrowed before 1928. Indeed, some of the minority regions were still not yet considered fully pacified. Despite the most strenuous efforts by the Soviet regime, the effects of its educational program were still at most superficial in many areas. The number and diversity of languages alone provided a staggering educational problem.

Shortages of trained teachers, of educational facilities and materials, the inertia of many of the minorities and their inability really to comprehend the nature of the tasks confronting them, the habit, ingrained under the Tsars, of taking no active part in any sort of government work, racial and religious antipathies: the results of decades of salutary neglect or persecution were not quickly or easily overcome. The impact of industrialization upon many of the eastern peoples, then, particularly upon those still engaged in more or less primitive subsistence agriculture or semi-nomadic livestock raising, can hardly be exaggerated. Nor can the impact of the two campaigns which accompanied the Soviet industrialization: the collectivization of agriculture, and the beginning of Soviet forced acculturation, the first serious efforts by the regime to erect its "class, universal, and progressive" civilization.

The complex reasons behind Stalin's decision to launch industrialization when he did, and his reasons for increasing its tempo so precipitately as he did, need hardly concern us here. It does seem advisable, however, to look briefly at some of the factors which motivated collectivization, which was of more direct significance for the peoples who are the subject of this essay, all of whom were still in 1928 engaged chiefly in some form of agriculture. It will be recalled, first, that the original program of the Bolsheviks had called for nationalization of the land, but that Lenin, in 1917, had abandoned this demand, adopted the "bourgeois" program which gave most of the land to the peasants, and thus won the widespread support of the peasantry. The N.E.P. period had witnessed, as a result, a significant growth in the number of small holdings in Russia, a falling off of productivity among these, on the one hand, and a great increase in the power of the big farmers, on the other. Industrialization thus demanded collectivization for at least two reasons: first, to draw from the land the huge labour supply which was

now needed; second, to ensure a steady supply of food for this increased urban population. Mechanization of agriculture was to replace the missing men drawn into industry, but it was believed that mechanization was feasible only for large farms; the Soviet emphasis upon heavy industry also meant that there would be a drought of consumer goods, and that independent farmers would be reluctant to surrender their produce against non-existent commodities. It followed that the peasants, in short, would have to be forced to work for virtually nothing, if industrialization were to be achieved; and the kolkhozes and sovkhozes were thought to be the solution, since they, being under central state control, would make the peasant in effect dependent upon the state for even the basic necessities of life. The collectivization might, then, with few reservations, be described as having been an industrializing of agriculture, a proletarianizing of the peasantry. The present state of Soviet agriculture would seem to indicate that, economically, collectivization has very little to be said in its favour, but that, in a political sense, it represented an important step toward totalitarianism, the establishing of total control by the state over all of its citizens. From 1928 onward, this was the direction in which Soviet society, guided by Stalin, inexorably moved.

Bertram Wolfe has spoken of Peter the Great's "sudden injection" into eighteenth century Russia of "'Westernism' by 'Eastern' standards, by fiat from on high, which did little to prepare the people spiritually for what was taking place"; he has described the results of Peter's policy as a "forced march into a strange new world", and a "deep split in the Russian psyche, a crisis in religion, culture, politics, feeling, and thought".<sup>14</sup> Very much the same thing could be said of Stalin's "revolution from above", but with the significant difference that, whereas Peter the Great was seeking to transform what was still in his time a fairly compact national state with minorities only on its periphery, Stalin sought to

revolutionize a vast empire embracing nearly one-sixth of the world's land area and myriads of peoples, only a bare majority of whom were Russians and some 70 per cent Slavs, and in many various stages of economic and social development. Stalin's state was also totalitarian, subjecting all its peoples to almost relentless pressures, and trying to mold the whole of diverse Soviet Russia into a single pattern from which any "undesirable" impulse would be excluded or expelled. Totalitarianism is, of course, a twentieth century phenomenon, which became possible only with the advent of modern methods of communication and control, and with the triumph of the belief, represented in such exaggerated form by Russian Communism, that man and society are perfectible. And unlike the Tsarist regime, which lacked the power to do so, and perhaps also the will, Stalin's totalitarianism embarked on a campaign in the early thirties not only to silence or to render ineffectual its enemies and critics, but actually to exterminate them, if their basic patterns of life could not be changed to those of Russian Communism. All of which is not meant to suggest that Stalin alone was responsible for the course which Soviet nationalities took. It has been seen that there only met in Stalin the confluence of certain aspects of Marxism's ambiguous legacy, modified and shaped by Lenin into a basis for totalitarianism, and some of the main currents of the Russian historical past. Even in Stalin's Russia, it can hardly be doubted that popular opinion played some important part in impelling the Soviet leaders toward a goal they did not originally seek, though it was at least implied in their concept of a supranational internationalism. Once Communism triumphed in Russia alone, its aims to achieve short-run ends — perhaps most notably, absolute inner security in the face of a hostile environing world — helped to force its acceptance of far-reaching policies the implications of which were perhaps not fully understood. The policy of minority assimilation was one of these. From the point of view of the Soviet government — and also, one suspects, from the point of view of the majority of Soviet citizens —

the presence of large unassimilated minorities in regions possessing strategic or economic importance to the state was felt, rightly or wrongly, to constitute a menace to security. And it was this fear, shared by the regime and the majority of its citizens alike, representing another blending of Communist and Russian national interests, which seems to have dictated the extreme measures instituted by the government against so many of its national minorities, and to have been the prime reason for its abandonment of scruple with regard to the minorities.

ii

Turning now from a general description of the broad outlines of Soviet nationalities policy and a brief analysis of some of its antecedents and aims, this section will describe the individual cases of the seven minorities whose experiences under the Soviet regime culminated during World War II in their deportation. If one obvious point has emerged from the foregoing pages dealing specifically with these peoples, it is that at the time of the Revolution none of these groups felt itself to be Russian; and it is perhaps equally clear that none of them was accepted as such by Russian society or, for that matter, by the governments of Russia, either the old or the new. Despite all previous efforts to russify or assimilate them, all of the peoples with whom this essay is concerned were still in 1917 quite remarkable examples of organic communities, clearly differentiated islands in a Russian sea, upon which the influences of Russian culture had made but very little impression. At least five of these peoples, the Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars, were still in fact communities which may be accurately described by David Riesman's term, "tradition-directed".<sup>15</sup> This is not to suggest that they existed in some pristine state, but only that they had proved strongly resistant to Russian patterns of life, and that the dominant environing

Russian culture had not yet seriously affected or begun to break down their traditional social orders. Generally speaking, they retained their accepted social hierarchies and economic inequalities, their stable customs, their community-guided systems of cultural organization, their common membership in community religious beliefs, and their common acceptance of traditional values. Their experiences with Russian society had been such as to repel, rather than to attract them toward it. The Volga Germans, on the other hand, while also still essentially conservative in their social patterns, reflected a much stronger emphasis upon social mobility and accumulation of personal property within the community. They would seem to be best described, in sociological terms, as "inner-directed";<sup>16</sup> while the Crimean Tatars would appear to have been in the transitional stage between a "tradition-directed" and an "inner-directed" group. For the most part, particularly their peasant majority, they were still strongly influenced and guided by tradition, but they also possessed an extremely influential, if not numerically large, intelligentsia chiefly inclining toward progressive western philosophies. The point that is most important about all seven peoples, however, is that their sense of being alien from, if not actually hostile to, the Great Russian majority in the country, their consciousness of their differences as foreign communities, had not been seriously undermined, generally speaking, by 1917. And their experiences between 1917 and 1921 had been, in every case, though individual circumstances had varied, such as to reinforce this consciousness and to strengthen their sense of community.

Even if it had possessed the best of intentions toward these minorities, then, the Soviet government was from the beginning of its rule faced with immense difficulties. Not to speak of the physical obstacles it faced -- great distances, scattered populations, rugged terrain, shortages of trained personnel speaking indigenous languages, lack of Party organization, for example -- before these areas

could be transformed into loyal and orderly sections of Soviet society, before even a genuine start could be made to building a Soviet social order, somehow the suspicion and distrust which remained as evidence of "colonial mentality" from the past years and oppressions of Tsarist rule had to be overcome. This was an especially formidable task, particularly in those areas of the North Caucasus and Kalmykia where pockets of armed resistance to the regime remained to be liquidated, and enjoyed at least the silent support, if not the collaboration, of parts of the population. The pacification of these areas required from the outset of Soviet rule that the regime, like the Tsarist regime, should have to wage war against a section of its own people, and such actions as were necessary undoubtedly wakened recollections of past Russian outrages.

This particular problem does not seem to have existed in the Volga German lands. The Volga Germans appear to have accepted the fact of Soviet rule with passivity, and their experience under Soviet rule was in other respects quite different from the experiences of the six other Lost Peoples with whom they have been associated. From the time that their territory was organized into a Volga German Autonomous Workers' Commune in October, 1918, they were accorded a position of special importance by the government. There were at least three principal reasons for this: first, because of their considerable numbers and their advanced civilization in relation to so many of the non-Russian minorities, they possessed potential value for the regime as a source of people for the tasks of administration; second, and as has been seen, their community was from the first thought by the Soviet leaders to be of immense propaganda value in the attempt to spread revolution to other countries, especially Germany; third, with their unusually successful record as farmers, they had great practical value in a country where agriculture was chronically in a state of crisis, bordering on famine after the chaos caused by years of war and civil war.

For all these reasons, the Soviet regime, to judge from the dominant tone of its official announcements about the Volga Germans from 1918 onward, seemed to place especial weight upon the effects of its policy in their territory. In its propaganda for both domestic and foreign consumption, the government held up the Volga German community as a fine example, almost as a model, of how non-Russian minorities were prospering and flourishing under socialism. The Volga German Commune -- which was elevated to the status of an autonomous republic in February, 1924 -- until the sudden announcement of the republic's abolishment in September, 1941, was lauded as being representative of the happy and productive national communities within the U.S.S.R.; and in addition to this monotonous rehearsing of their virtues, the Volga German settlements were widely advertised and displayed as "show-windows" of Soviet policy, being visited by large numbers of foreign communists, fellow travellers, and curious tourists. A few examples of government statements about the Volga Germans will suffice to illustrate what has been said. As early as 1931, their republic was claimed by the authorities to have been already collectivized up to 86 per cent -- an achievement at that time quite unmatched anywhere in the Soviet Union.<sup>17</sup> In 1935 it was one of the extremely few national territories in which the development of higher education was judged to be proceeding at a "normal rate",<sup>18</sup> and in which the development of the training and retraining of Soviet leadership cadres was felt to be satisfactory.<sup>19</sup> The official figures released for the elections to the Volga German Supreme Soviet, held on 26 June, 1938, were cited as evidence of German loyalty and contentment; 99.8 per cent of the republic's eligible voters were said to have cast their ballots, and of these 99.7 per cent were said to have voted for the communist candidates.<sup>20</sup> And volume 41 of the first edition of the Large Soviet Encyclopaedia, published on the eve of World War II in 1939, was a virtual paean of praise, stressing not only the Volga Germans' devotion to the government, but also the singular efficiency of

their collective farms:

During the first and second Stalin Five-Year Plans, in the periods of the all-out socialist offensive against the capitalist elements of town and country, the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was the foremost in carrying out collectivization in the countryside, and effectively mechanized its agriculture. Industry also developed . . . The future development of the national economy and culture of the Volga German . . . Republic, its rapid progress toward a better, still more joyous life, and toward Communism, are guaranteed by the Stalinist Constitution, by the resolute Stalinist leadership of the Central Committee . . . and the limitless devotion of the working people of the Volga German . . . Republic to the cause of Communism.<sup>21</sup>

If these and similar pronouncements were to be taken at face-value, of course, it would be difficult indeed to reconcile them with subsequent pronouncements and events. But behind this extravagant praise, there is clear evidence that conditions in the Volga German Republic were far less satisfactory, for both the German population and the authorities, than the Soviet government wished the outside world and its own peoples to believe. The fate of the Volga Germans illustrates quite clearly the differences between official Soviet accounts of events and what actually took place.

As early as August, 1922, while the German settlement was still administered as an autonomous commune, its administrative capital was moved from Marxstadt, in the geographical centre of the settlement, to the predominantly Slavic town of Pokrovsk, on the left bank of the Volga opposite Saratov. Renamed Engels in the early thirties, the nominal capital of the German Republic, though it was the single city in the republic with the largest concentration of German communists, even by 1934 counted among its Party membership less than one-third of German origin.<sup>22</sup> The moving of the Volga German capital and the timing of the move -- though it is possible, of course, that there were perfectly feasible administrative reasons for it -- would seem to suggest that the regime already had begun to have serious doubts

about the reliability of the German population. Possibly the reason for these doubts was that the Volga German farmers, like peasants all over the country, had resisted the ruthless government requisitions of grain to feed the starving towns and provision its armies during the Civil War, and possibly their resistance had been particularly stubborn during the famine of 1921-22, when requisitioning had been resumed, only too easily degenerating into plunder when it was carried out by Russians against non-Russians. But, whatever its reasons, it can hardly be doubted that the regime very early considered the Russian and Ukrainian population of the Volga Republic more reliable; the social composition of the republic, the Slavs representing a large percentage of industrial workers while the Germans were almost wholly farmers, indicated the correctness of such a view. The 1926 census revealed the ethnic population of the republic, incidentally, as 66.4 per cent German, 20.4 per cent Russian, and 12 per cent Ukrainian;<sup>23</sup> but it would appear that the Volga Germans did not at any time under Soviet rule play the leading role, or even a significant role, in the administration of their republic.

The Volga Germans' record achievements during collectivization were, despite the generally lyrical Soviet claims to the contrary, quite obviously achieved only at a most terrible price. The decade of Soviet rule which elapsed between the founding of the Volga German Commune and the beginning of collectivization was not time enough to have transformed the strongly individualistic German farmers into ideal Soviet citizens, ready and willing to surrender their holdings to the state and to become hardly more than farm labourers on state-run collectives, which were to be supplied with their own implements and livestock. More, the encouragement given to private farming under N.E.P. had greatly increased the economic strength of the big farmers in Russia, among whom a disproportionately large number of Volga Germans were evident, since they, unlike the middle or poor peasants, who had to sell this year's crop at prevailing prices in order to buy seed for next year,

were, able to wait until the market improved and to demand high prices for their produce. This condition, which had grown out of the agricultural upheaval of 1917, had worked to create extreme tensions between city and countryside by the end of 1927 -- the urban workers demanding cheap food, the kulaks demanding higher prices for the food in their granaries -- and in districts where the urban-rural balance reflected also the ethnic composition of the populace these tensions, perhaps inevitably, assumed a national, as well as a class basis. When collectivization began in the Volga German Republic, then, the resulting struggle not only pitted town and poor peasant against kulak, but Russian against German. Once again, the will of the regime blended with the long-time aspirations of narrow Russian nationalism: in this instance, to break forever the economic power of the German agricultural settlers. It cannot be said with certainty how many of the Volga Germans were affected by the measures of the government between 1927 and 1933, how many were herded forcibly into collectives, deported to Kazakhstan, or killed, but the number must have run very high. Several thousand families emigrated abroad during these years, choosing to lose almost everything rather than be collectivized; and further thousands of families were expelled from the republic for their resistance, or, after Stalin's instructions to "liquidate the kulaks as a class", in December, 1929, made it clear that they were not to be admitted to the collective farms after their being expropriated, simply on the basis of their wealth.<sup>24</sup> The hardships thus imposed upon the more well-to-do of the Volga Germans during these years of grave economic and political crisis even stimulated a "Brothers in Distress" in Germany.<sup>25</sup>

While collectivization was crushing the Volga Germans' economic leaders, there were thorough and extensive purges simultaneously against German leaders in all fields. The purges extended even to the highest levels of the republic's

administration, into the top ranks of the local Party apparatus. In 1936, for example, the Volga German Prime Minister, Welsch, admitted that "not a few nationalist and anti-Soviet elements had to be expelled from the parliament and government of the republic during the collectivization period";<sup>26</sup> and these radical purges continued, of course, well after collectivization had been completed, until the eve of World War II -- Welsch, who had conducted the previous purges, along with the republic's president, was himself arrested in 1937.<sup>27</sup> All such attacks were obviously aimed at destroying the cohesion and solidarity of the German community. Meantime, the whole of the period between World Wars witnessed a steady influx of Slavs -- Russians and Ukrainians -- into the Volga German Republic, as industrialization grew, and as urban settlement increased apace. The results of all these measures upon the remaining Volga Germans do not appear, however, to have been at all what was hoped for; apathy and indifference, rather than enthusiastic support, would seem to have been the general response; that the Volga Germans remained largely indifferent to political matters is perhaps indicated by the fact that, of 830 persons working in the district soviets of the republic in 1935, only 38 persons, less than 5 per cent had completed their full courses for local government.<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, this figure may be taken to indicate something of the scope of the purges undertaken in connection with collectivization.

Although conditions in the Volga German Republic were far from being all that the Soviet government desired, this did not prevent the government from continuing to praise the Volga Germans until almost the moment of Hitler's invasion of the U.S.S.R. It would seem that the Soviet leaders were unable ever to abandon completely their hope for revolution in Germany, even after the debacle of German Communism in 1921, the strains imposed upon German-Soviet relations by the plaintive tales told in Germany by refugees from the Volga during collectivization,

and the rise of Hitler in 1933, followed by his proscription of all political parties except his own Nazis. But there were other, more cogent reasons for the Soviet government's desire to impress Germany with its treatment of its German minorities, outside the context of world revolution. It was one of the results of World War I that the two outcast nations of Europe, Germany and Soviet Russia, should have turned toward each other; as early as 6 May, 1921, Germany hastened to sign a provisional trade agreement with Russia, and even before the Treaty of Rapallo was signed between the two nations on 16 April, 1922, German industry was establishing economic arrangements with the Soviet government, and was in addition already building factories and munitions plants in in the R.S.F.S.R.<sup>29</sup> Military cooperation between the two countries was greatly reduced after 1933, but close economic cooperation continued until 1941. Thus, despite the ideological differences between the Soviet and German governments, strong political and economic considerations bound them together, and there were sound reasons for the Soviet desire to stress the loyalty of its Germans and to publish such statements as: "These people are demonstrating to the whole world what the industrious gifted German people are capable of when they are free from the yoke of capitalism".<sup>30</sup> The concluding of the so-called "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" on 23 August, 1939, providing guarantees of peaceful intentions between Germany and the Soviet Union and neutrality by the other country if one were attacked by a third power, served merely to change the tone of Soviet pronouncements concerning the Volga Germans, with references to the hideousness of Hitler's regime now being eliminated, along with odious comparisons between living under capitalism and communism.<sup>31</sup> But the Volga Germans continued to be singled out among the national minorities for special praise until Hitler's invasion of the U.S.S.R., on 22 June, 1941, abruptly terminated Soviet-German friendship and cooperation, and helped to seal their fate.

It is indeed questionable that the fact of Nazi invasion should be viewed as having been wholly, or even chiefly, responsible for the harsh administrative measures subsequently applied against the Volga Germans. These measures were, as has been seen, different only in degree, not in kind, from the practices followed by the Soviet government against the Volga Germans from the late twenties onward, and aimed at achieving the same final goal. The strong German character of the Volga German community, which had survived for decades and generations of life in Russia, which had survived the campaigns of the Tsars against it, and then the more harsh measures of the Soviet state, could be no more tolerated in Soviet Russia than it had been in Tsarist Russia. Certainly the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union revealed the Soviet regime's belief that, despite all its assurances of minority loyalty, the assimilation of the Volga Germans into the Soviet population as a whole -- which would have meant, in point of fact, their becoming russified -- had not proceeded far enough and fast enough to guarantee their loyalty.

At first glance, the deportation of the Volga Germans, along with all other German settlements in the U.S.S.R. not already overrun by the enemy, would appear to have been fundamentally a defensive measure, rather than a punitive measure, as were the deportations of the six other Lost Peoples. Some strong points can be advanced to support this view. For example, the rapid advance of the German armies across the western marches of the Soviet Union was at least partly attributable to the defections of non-Russians, in the first summer of the War, and to their unwillingness to defend a Soviet government. Then, the regime had also the recent examples of Austria and Czechoslovakia to ponder; in each of these countries the existence of large German communities had been instrumental in undermining the possibility of resistance to Hitler -- a fact which quite

naturally gave rise to serious concern over the question of how the German communities of the Soviet Union would now react when confronted by German invasion. The evidence of the first summer of the War certainly gave little guarantee that the minorities would be reliable. Second, the Soviet government had a precedent -- a number of precedents, in fact -- for taking precautionary measures. There had been the legislative action taken against the same Volga Germans in similar circumstances by the Imperial Duma in 1916; the Soviet government itself had removed thousands of Finns from the environs of Leningrad in 1939, during its Finnish War;<sup>32</sup> it had also the precedents set by other governments, neither Russian nor Communist, in time of war, against civilian populations ethnically related to their enemies; to cite but one example immediately, the actions taken by the British army against the non-combatant Boer population in the South African War. The practice of arresting and removing from strategic areas those peoples whose loyalties were at all doubtful, and particularly those deriving from the same national origin as the enemy, had come by World War II to be generally regarded as an accepted practice during wartime, one which almost all governments felt to be fully justifiable as a prophylactic measure. Indeed, deportations remarkably similar were undertaken by the governments of the United States and Canada less than one year later against all persons of Japanese birth or descent living on the West Coast of North America; and these transfers of population, too, were marked by rather harsh expropriations of property and accompanied by some hardship.

What undermines, if it does not destroy, such arguments, however, is that the Soviet regime itself hardly sought to defend its deportation of the Volga Germans on the grounds that the German population represented merely a potential soft spot in the Soviet Union's defences; it did not invoke the clearly established precedent of "regrettable but necessary" action taken in time of war, in the

interests of the peoples involved as well as in the interests of national security. Instead, the Soviet government accused "thousands and tens of thousands" of Volga Germans of being German agents, and the entire Volga German population of aiding and abetting these "spies". The text of the decree announcing the government's decision to deport the Volga Germans reads as follows:

According to trustworthy information received by the military authorities there are among the German population living in the Volga area thousands and tens of thousands of diversionists and spies who on a signal being given in Germany are to carry out sabotage in the area inhabited by the Germans of the Volga.

None of the Germans living in the Volga area have reported to the Soviet authorities the existence of such a large number of diversionists and spies among the Volga Germans; consequently the German population of the Volga conceals enemies of the Soviet people and of Soviet authority in its midst.

In case of diversionist acts being carried out at a signal from Germany by German diversionists and spies in the Volga German Republic or in adjacent areas and bloodshed taking place, the Soviet government will be obliged, according to the laws in force during the war period, to take punitive measures against the whole of the German population of the Volga.

In order to prevent undesirable events of this nature and to prevent serious bloodshed, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. has found it necessary to transfer the whole of the German population living in the Volga area into other areas, with the promise, however, that the migrants shall be allotted land and that they should be given assistance by the state in settling in the new areas.

For the purposes of resettlement, areas having much arable land in the Novosibirsk and Omsk provinces, the Altai territory, Kazakhstan, and other neighbouring localities have been allotted.

In connection herewith the State Committee of Defence has been instructed to carry out urgently the transfer of all Germans of the Volga and to allot to the Germans of the Volga who are being transferred lands and domains in the new areas.<sup>33</sup>

The decree, dated 28 August, 1941, was put into effect at once, being published on 2 September; another decree, one week later, formally abolished the Volga German A.S.S.R. and divided its territories between the Russian provinces of Saratov and Stalingrad.<sup>34</sup>

The decree on the deportation of the Volga Germans almost speaks for itself, but it nevertheless prompts further comment. The crimes which it attributed to the Volga Germans — besides those listed above, the storing of hordes of weapons and ammunition for Nazi paratroops, and the harbouring also of Nazi spies were reported<sup>35</sup> — are strongly reminiscent of the charges levelled against the defendants in the trials of the great purges, and cannot really be taken seriously. After more than twenty years of Soviet rule, during which time the interior of the Soviet Union was virtually a forbidden territory to all except the most trusted visitors, it was hardly likely that large supplies of arms and ammunition could have been cached in the Volga German Republic, awaiting the happy circumstance of Nazi invasion. Nor can the alleged numbers of "spies and diversionists" — "thousands and tens of thousands" — fail to arouse some suspicion, even when the usual margin for blatant exaggeration in wartime propaganda is allowed. Not only the monstrosity of the charges laid by the Soviet authorities elicits disbelief, however; their vagueness is troubling; but even more troubling is the form in which the accusation was made. The Soviet authorities claimed to possess "trustworthy information" of the armies of spies and diversionists allegedly in hiding in the republic (this "trustworthy" source was not revealed); despite the large numbers of these agents, "none of the Germans" — not one — was said to have reported their presence in the republic (should it be assumed that the source reporting on the location of these spies was, then, a Russian?); and the conclusion followed from these shaky premises — "consequently", the Volga Germans were guilty. The conclusion which should be drawn, it would seem, is that an anonymous accusation, but one presumably from a Russian source, was enough to convict, without trial, more than 400,000 men, women, and children, and to force them into exile for more than a dozen years. Finally, the clumsy attempts by the framers of the decree to reflect a humanitarian

light upon their fiat are notable; these mass uprootings of hundreds of thousands of people were actually said to have been enforced to prevent punitive measures having to be taken against the entire Volga German population, and the transfers were to be made to areas having much arable land; the settlers were to have had state assistance in settling in their new lands.

Some of these points will arise again below. But all such questions aside for the moment, the deportation of the Volga Germans was carried out, quickly and thoroughly, precluding any possibility of collaboration with Hitler's advancing armies -- which, ironically, never did reach the lands of the former Volga German Republic. Not even the several thousand Germans belonging to Communist Party organizations were spared, and no distinction was made between those Germans whose families had resided on the Volga for generations, who perhaps did not even know the German language, and the most recent arrivals, German communist refugees from Hitler. It was enough even to feel German; a newcomer who experienced the deportation explained:

In January, 1939, a census had taken place in the Soviet Union, in which people had to indicate not only their national status but their national origin. In giving this, one could use one's own discretion whether to follow family tradition or a personal sense of belonging to a particular culture. Many Soviet citizens, without giving much thought to the question, had simply written "Nemets" or "Nemka" (German). Little did they know that this was one day to determine their fate.<sup>36</sup>

The Volga Germans were not, of course, alone in their dispersal; all Germans in the European part of the U.S.S.R. who had not been overrun by the German armies, with the exception of a miniscule number in the leadership of the Communist International, were also rounded up and deported to Siberia or Central Asia.

For the purposes of Russian nationalism, of course, the assimilation of the Volga Germans and the other German communities in Russia was a highly desirable

goal. It was at the same time a goal almost impossible of realization so long as the Germans remained organized into their compact and prosperous areas of settlement. So long as they lived in this way, the solidarity of the Volga Germans proved remarkable, and they were able to resist quite successfully the attempts of the Soviet government to hasten their integration into the Soviet population at large, even as they had stubbornly resisted the similar efforts of the Tsarist regime. The Tsarist regime had realized this difficulty; and its condemnation of the Volga Germans to expropriation and deportation, after their prosperity and their chosen segregation had become intolerable to Russian nationalism, was clearly designed to break their economic power on the lower Volga, to scatter these successful farmers across the country, and thus to destroy their strong sense of community. Although it advanced different reasons for doing so, the Soviet government was also committed to essentially the same goal of assimilating and integrating the Volga Germans into the undifferentiated population it sought to achieve. At the same time, however, the Soviet government was also committed to the contradictory policy of encouraging and maintaining the German community on the Volga. Through its claim to the leadership of international Communism, through its continued doctrinal insistence upon the (at least formal) equality of all nations under its rule, through its need to impress foreign communists, fellow travellers, and uncommitted peoples with the appearance of toleration in the U.S.S.R., and, in general, through considerations of foreign policy relating to the -- sometimes conflicting -- aims of both international Communism and Russian nationalism, the Soviet government found itself obliged to leave the Volga Germans chiefly in their compact settlement, and to draw attention to their accomplishments as a group. Until World War II, then, this schizophrenic policy was followed; although the emphasis from 1927 onward was increasingly inclined toward Russian national interests, in general with regard to the Volga

Germans the regime made hardly any effort to resolve the conflicts in this policy, and tried to steer a broad middle course, to work both sides of the street, as it were. And on the whole, it did so successfully, emasculating the Volga German leadership through purges, breaking their economic power through collectivization, and at the same time deriving considerable prestige abroad through its propaganda efforts.

The deportation of the Volga Germans in 1941 was without doubt a signal triumph for Russian nationalism, the achieving of one its most ardently pursued desiderata. It might be argued here that this deportation was in fact only a temporary aberration by the Soviet authorities -- that they merely fell victim to the same sort of hysterical Germanophobia as had afflicted the Tsarist Duma in 1916, which was perhaps understandable when the circumstances of late summer, 1941, are recalled -- but the general lines of Soviet nationalities policy since at least the late twenties, its increasingly being informed by Russian nationalism, compels strong doubt that this was the case. Even more compelling is the behaviour of the Soviet government since 1941, since it has been freed almost entirely from the necessity to please or to impress Germans outside of the Soviet Union with its treatment of its German minorities. Since 1945, of course, one-half of Germany has been firmly aligned with the anti-Soviet forces of the West, while the other half has been under direct Soviet control, probably the most closely watched and rigidly controlled of all the satellite nations of eastern Europe. It has been possible, therefore, for the regime to discard any idea of the propaganda value possessed by its German minorities, and to proceed with the hurrying of German assimilation. Consider the position of the Volga Germans since 1941: for more than a dozen years after their deportation, all Soviet political, ethnographical, and geographical literature published in that period

completely ignored the fact that there were, or ever had been, any substantial German minorities in the Soviet Union; until at least 1959, the Germans even disappeared from statistics relating to the U.S.S.R.'s ethnic composition. Dispersed throughout Siberia and Central Asia, in Kazakhstan in particular, the Volga Germans appear destined for complete denationalization.

It is also to be noted that the Volga Germans are one of the two national groups, of the seven which were deported during World War II, that have not been rehabilitated in their old lands since Stalin's death. They have been amnestied; but the decree of 13 September, 1955, which announced their amnesty, also made clear that they would not be allowed to gather together again.<sup>37</sup> Certainly, if the ultimate goal of Soviet nationalities policy with regard to the Volga Germans were not their russification and integration into the population at large, it would have been possible, as Mr. Kolarz has suggested, to have had a new German Autonomous Republic formed in some other part of the Soviet Union.<sup>38</sup> But the Soviet government has not established even a national area, the smallest of its national administrative units, for the Germans. Even now, any mention of the large German minority in the U.S.S.R. is extremely infrequent in Soviet publications; when citizens with obviously German surnames are discussed in the press, for example, there is rarely overt mention of their national origin. Finally, the figures given in the 1959 Soviet census — the first official figures for twenty years to admit the existence of considerable numbers of Germans in the state — note 1,619,000 Germans.<sup>39</sup> And of these, only 75 per cent are listed as regarding the German language as their native tongue — an indication, perhaps, that Soviet policy is at last beginning to achieve its goal. The Soviet government, after holding it in abeyance for some twenty-five years, thus can be said to have finally implemented the anti-German legislation enacted by the Imperial

Duma in 1916, and, in a very real sense, to have achieved one of the key goals of Tsarist nationalities policy when it eliminated the Volga Germans from Europe.

The story of the Volga Germans, then, illuminates some definite and specific elements of continuity between the nationalities policies of the Tsarist and Soviet governments. It might even be said that it demonstrates that Soviet policy toward the Volga Germans has been fundamentally a continuation -- if, indeed, not the culmination -- of Tsarist policy. The general underlying factor, of course, lies in the strength of Russian nationalism. Under both regimes, Russian nationalism has appeared unable to tolerate the continued existence of large unassimilated minorities. Both regimes, however, did not take extreme measures against the rich Volga German community so long as it served a useful purpose for them; they harried the German settlers in a wide variety of ways, but so long as the Volga Germans served as a colonizing and civilizing influence in the eastern borderlands, under the Tsars, and so long as they provided a combination of rich harvests and food for the propaganda machine, under the Soviet regime, they were not finally marked for deportation. The question of deportation itself immediately suggests, of course, the striking parallels between the Tsarist and Soviet regimes not only in the method they chose to break the German settlement on the Volga, but also in the similar circumstances surrounding the decisions of both, when their armies were reeling under German attack, and in the striking similarities in the charges which they brought against the Volga Germans to justify their actions against them. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Volga Germans were used as scapegoats by both the Tsarist and Soviet governments. Extremely vulnerable to such measures because of the ease with which they could be identified with the enemy, because of their prosperity which generated envy, and because of their exclusiveness which bred hatred and fear,

the Volga Germans were made to serve in both World Wars to divert the attention of the Russian people from the mistakes of their governments, in each case allowing the regime to deflect at least a portion of the blame for its military defeats onto them — the alien, the strange, the natural enemy, it would seem, of Russian nationalism.

Unlike the Volga Germans, a significant proportion of whom found at least temporary prosperity and satisfaction under Soviet rule, the Crimean Tatars were from almost the outset of the Soviet regime cruelly disappointed and frustrated. The narrow administrative autonomy actually granted to the Tatars provided a sombre contrast to the vision of broad political autonomy that the majority of the Tatar political leadership had so long cherished, and which had seemed to be promised when the Tatar Republic was created. Soviet rule in Crimea not only failed to effect a genuine rise in the depressed material and economic standards of the Tatar peasantry, thus creating deep dissatisfaction, but in fact brought with it two famines of disastrous proportions within its first decade. And the restrictions which were very early placed upon all forms of Tatar cultural life, religion, education, language, literature, were under the Soviet regime at least as heavy as those which had been endured under the Tsars. Under the new government, as under the old, it would appear that the Tatars generally continued to feel themselves dispossessed and discriminated against in their own centuries-old homeland.

As in the case of the Volga Germans, however — indeed, as in the case of virtually every Soviet minority — very little of this dissatisfaction was allowed to show in official Soviet statements about the Tatars or their republic. Once again, if the mass of Soviet documents relating to the Crimean Tatars were to be seriously taken, the alleged treason of the Tatars in World War II and their

subsequent deportation would appear bewildering. Their progress in almost every field would appear to have been exemplary. They maintained under Soviet rule one of the best records for education outside the European areas of the R.S.F.S.R. — perhaps true enough in view of their traditionally high educational standard; but the public utterances of Tatar leaders would seem always to have conformed to the most rigid tests of Soviet orthodoxy, invariably evincing gratitude and loyalty to the Soviet leadership; the voting of the Tatar population in Soviet elections inevitably was said to have achieved the required approximation of unanimity, and was cited as evidence of loyalty; the achievements of the Tatars in government economic plans were uniformly pronounced as satisfactory. The list need hardly be continued. Behind the facade of amicability, the Soviet regime pursued in Crimea, from as early as 1923, a policy designed to destroy all possibility of independent Tatar leadership, all independent Tatar thought and national feeling — a policy which would seem to have been destined, almost inevitably, to culminate in the Tatars' deportation from their peninsula.

Tatar nationalism was the force to which the Soviet government was extremely sensitive in Crimea. It will be recalled that the strongest of the Tatar political parties after the Revolution was the Milli Firka, the Tatar nationalist party. It was the Milli Firka which declared itself for an independent Tatar Crimea, which led the bitter struggle against all communist forces in the peninsula, and which finally surrendered its hope of independence only in 1921, when the cause was patently hopeless. The Milli Firka was, of course, declared illegal almost simultaneously with the creation of the Tatar Republic; but on the urging of Sultan Galiev, who advised that Tatar nationalists should be admitted in large numbers to the Communist Party, many of the Milli Firka's more left-wing members did in fact join the Party when their own nationalist party was proscribed. There was little doubt that these leaders were Tatar patriots as much as they were

communist, who joined the Party chiefly for the reason that they believed they could best promote the welfare of their people from inside, rather than outside, the government. But the Soviet regime had already, in Mr. Deutscher's words, "reached the threshold of what was later to be called the totalitarian state";<sup>40</sup> the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, meeting in March, 1921, had not only upheld the earlier ban on all rival political parties, but had also banned all oppositional groups within the ruling party. The period of Tatar "national communism" was, therefore, to be short-lived. That it was even temporarily tolerated by the Soviet authorities would appear to have been a concession made in the interests of furthering Soviet foreign policy. In the early years of the twenties, Turkey — with which the Tatar nationalists had so many intimate ties — was, like Germany, one of the principal focuses of Soviet foreign policy. Although it was itself involved in disputes with Turkey over the Caucasus, the Soviet government nevertheless strongly supported the Turkish nationalist revolution led by Mustapha Kemal Pasha (later Ataturk), throughout late 1920, 1921 and 1922 seeking to align Turkey with Russia in an "anti-imperialist front", thereby to weaken the position of the western "imperialist" powers, particularly Great Britain, in the Middle East. Of special concern to the Soviet government was the question of the Straits; it sought, with memories of the Civil War still very fresh, to secure a settlement of the Straits question which would deny the access of foreign warships to the Black Sea. In pursuit of this goal, the Soviet government sent heavy shipments of munitions to Kemal to aid him in his struggle against the Greeks (who were in turn strongly encouraged by Britain), which dispute ended in decisive Turkish victory in September, 1922; a brisk trade was carried on with Turkey across the Black Sea; and the Soviet government sought to achieve another victory like its triumph at Rapallo at the Lausanne conference of 1922-23, which met to decide final terms of peace for Turkey and to draft a

new convention for the Straits.<sup>41</sup> With its failure at Lausanne, however, the Soviet government's tolerance of Tatar "national communism" came to an end. When relations between Soviet Russia and Turkey cooled, probably because Turkey did not wish to be left to cope with Russia single-handedly, repercussions were immediately felt in Crimea. It was observed by Bukharin at the Twelfth Party Congress in April, 1923, that Turkey, "in spite of all persecutions of communists, plays a revolutionary role, since she is a destructive instrument in relation to the imperialist system as a whole".<sup>42</sup> Though Soviet-Turkish cooperation continued in many fields until the eve of World War II, there was no longer quite the warmth on either side as had existed before the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July, 1923. Certainly, if Soviet Russia did not allow Kemal's persecutions of Turkish communists to prejudice its military and economic cooperation with Turkey, Turkey had small justification for protesting against Soviet purges of the Tatar nationalists in Crimea. The dismissal from office of Sultan-Galiev, chairman of the Tatar Council of People's Commissars and formerly chief advisor to Stalin on Moslem affairs, came in the fall of 1923, and was one of the earliest instances of a purge of so prominent a figure in the Party.<sup>43</sup> The fall of Sultan-Galiev, who had played such a dominant role in the decision to set up a separate Tatar Crimea, reflected not only the eclipse of the hopes of the Tatar nationalists for some meaningful political autonomy, but also the definite emergence into power of the extremely pro-centralist elements of the Party, personified by Stalin, all over the Soviet state. From this time onward, the campaigns against the "bourgeois nationalism" of the Tatars — their emphasis on their separateness from the Russians and other peoples of the state — or their "cosmopolitanism" — their emphasis upon the ties between themselves and Turkey or other Islamic groups — became increasingly frequent and bitter.

The desperate condition of the Tatar peasantry perhaps lay at the root of

the friction between the Tatar and European sections of the Party in Crimea. The poverty and wretchedness of the Tatar peasants had, of course, been the principal reason why Sultan-Galiev, in the same report that had recommended political concessions to the Tatars, had also urged that the operations of the state farms should be drastically curtailed and that lands should be made immediately available to the individual Tatar peasants. His appraisal of the condition of agriculture in the peninsula early in 1921 was proved correct in the winter of 1921-22. For the first winter of the Republic's existence witnessed a famine of terrible proportions in the whole of the peninsula. Estimates of the number of persons who perished in Crimea in its first horrifying winter under Soviet rule have run as high as one-fifth of the total population.<sup>44</sup> But the Tatar population, almost without land of its own and almost wholly dependent upon the new state farms, was especially hard-hit by both starvation and disease.<sup>45</sup> The Crimean Republic, then, was hardly from its very beginning a propaganda asset for the Soviet government in Turkey; in early 1922, a delegation of Crimean Tatars even travelled to Turkey to beg help and relief for the victims of the famine.<sup>46</sup> There is no way of estimating to what extent the Soviet regime's economic policy was contributory to the scale of the disaster of 1921-22, but it can hardly be doubted that the chaos caused by the immediate sovietization of the land played at least some part in the terrible proportions the famine achieved. Following the famine, Crimean agriculture was slow to recover. The huge new state farms were faced by a serious labour shortage. Before the Revolution, when they were still private estates and church lands, before their confiscation by the Soviet government, the state farms had depended very largely upon migrant workers from Ukraine; but famine had also stalked its grisly path through Ukraine during the winter of 1921-22, in the wake of civil war, and the consequent lack of migrant labour, along with the great loss of life in the peninsula itself, combined to make cultivation virtually cease on many of the former

great estates.<sup>47</sup> Some idea of the extent to which Crimean agriculture was crippled by World War I, the Civil War, revolutionary land policy, and famine is indicated by the fall of total acreage under cultivation between 1916 and 1924. In 1916 the total area under cultivation in Crimea was 2,100,600 acres, while eight years later, in 1924, it was still only 1,053,000 acres — a decrease of almost 50 per cent.<sup>48</sup> This was the economic background against which the purges of the Tatar intellectuals were begun.

To meet the grave economic crisis, the Soviet government began another operation almost certain to provoke further animosity on the part of the Tatars — a policy which, even though its primary purpose was not to strengthen further the non-Tatar elements in the Republic, nevertheless had that effect, and was bound to make the Tatar minority feel even more threatened and insecure. In 1925 and 1926 large numbers of new settlers swarmed into the peninsula to establish themselves on the state farms; the majority of them Russians, but considerable numbers also Ukrainian or Jewish, these settlers were brought in by the regime in an effort to make Crimean agriculture at least productive enough to supply the peninsula's own population.<sup>49</sup> Some such action was clearly necessary, but the Tatar leaders appear to have opposed the influx of Europeans, possibly fearing that their people would be swamped in an occidental sea. But the purges, which had already been building in intensity, only served to remove such opposition; the prime minister of the Republic, Veli Ibragimov, was arrested in 1927 and executed the following year; at the same time, thousands of his followers were eliminated from the administration, the greater part of them for alleged "nationalistic deviations".<sup>50</sup>

The pattern of successive purging of minority leaders, which began so much earlier against the Crimean Tatars than against most of the Soviet Union's lesser peoples, was — perhaps predictably — continued with especial vehemence

after 1928. The extreme savagery of the attacks upon the Tatars -- not only the intellectuals, but also the peasants -- from 1928 all through the thirties, seems hardly explicable except in terms of racial hatred. It would seem as if the Soviet authorities in Crimea -- not necessarily those in Moscow, but those with whom the Tatars were in close contact -- were determined to isolate the Tatars completely, to leave them entirely leaderless, such was the violence exerted against them. Collectivization in Crimea is estimated to have resulted in the expulsion from their villages of perhaps as many as 30-40,000 Tatar peasants with "kulak" or "capitalist" mentalities; the number of deaths resulting from an uprising of the Tatar peasantry against the regime in 1930, and another fearsome famine from 1931-34 -- this time, deliberately induced by the authorities to break the resistance of those who opposed collectivization -- is not known. The Tatar political leadership was decimated by waves of purges which struck it exceptionally hard, even for those years. Mehmed Kubay, the Republic's president, was destroyed in 1934 for protesting against the government policy of continued forced famine, its refusal to lower its quotas for delivery or to release food from its stores to the starving peasants; and his successor, Ilias Tarakhan, along with most of the Republic's top Party officialdom, disappeared between 1936 and 1938.<sup>51</sup> All told, famine and disease, collectivization and purge, deportation and immigration of non-Tatars combined to reduce the percentage of Tatars in Crimea from 26.2 to 23.1 between 1926 and 1936.<sup>52</sup> By 1936 the number of Tatars in the membership of the Communist Party in the Crimean A.S.S.R. was only 2,257 of a total of 16,252 members.<sup>53</sup>

The execution of Veli Ibragimov in 1928 also touched off the Soviet campaign to eliminate all evidence of "Veli-Ibragimovism", as manifestations of Tatar nationalism now came to be termed, in the spheres of Tatar education and culture. The Crimean People's Commissariat of Education was drastically purged, Tatar literary journals were forbidden to publish, and new text-books were substituted in the Tatar

schools for those found to be imbued with "nationalist" content.<sup>54</sup> Another blow was struck at the foundations of Tatar culture — and also at the still considerable power of the Moslem clergy, a special target of attack for the whole of the Soviet period — by the decision of the regime in 1929 to latinize the alphabets of all Turkic "peoples of Arabic letters".<sup>55</sup> Throughout the thirties, the Turkic languages as a group were subjected to a variety of discriminatory measures; everything possible was done to differentiate from one another what were essentially dialects of the same language, in an effort to combat pan-Turkism and similar sentiments which feelings of linguistic unity might have encouraged; and there were also more forthright measures of linguistic russification: for example, the substitution of Soviet "international words" for genuine Turkic words in Turkic periodical literature, words such as the Russian revolyutsiya, partiya, and respublika for the corresponding Turkic words, inquilab, firka, and dzhumhuriya.<sup>56</sup> Then, in the late thirties, in an abrupt volte face decision, the Soviet government decreed that all those alphabets which had been latinized only a decade earlier were to adopt the Cyrillic characters used by the Russians<sup>57</sup> — a measure which not only effectively cut off the younger generation of Turkic peoples from much of their national cultural inheritance, as the change to latin alphabets had served to cut off the generation of the twenties, but which also was obviously calculated to facilitate and to hasten the learning of the Russian language by the Turkic minorities. Despite — perhaps even because of — the campaigns waged against it, Crimean literature was still described, however, as possessing "talented writers grown up in the struggle with the remnants of bourgeois nationalism",<sup>58</sup> as late as 1937.

It is doubtful that the nationalism of the Crimean Tatars actually survived and retained its traditional strength through all the years of Soviet rule. It would seem to have been successfully eliminated — at least as a coherent movement with a clearly-defined program for national self-determination — with the

sweeping away of its most staunch proponents, those Tatar intellectuals more or less identified with the Milli Firka, in the drastic purges of the late twenties and early thirties. When it entered Crimea in 1942, the German Army found very few of the Crimean Tatars, a mere fraction, expressed articulate national feeling -- though Moslem religious consciousness was found to be widespread among them.<sup>59</sup> It then becomes necessary to ask why the Soviet government continued to appear so hypersensitive to Crimean Tatar nationalism and to attack any real or imagined manifestation of it with such vehemence. The answer would seem to be, in its simplest form, that the Soviet authorities were, in their strenuous campaigns and constant vigilance against Tatar nationalism, in fact waging war against a ghost, a phantom, the mere memory of the once-powerful movement spawned by Gasprinsky, seeking to make certain that that ghost never again acquired actual flesh and blood. The regime appears from its earliest days to have been particularly touchy about the spectres of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, frightened not so much of the strength that any of the various movements among the Turkic peoples actually possessed, as of their immense potentialities were some vigorous and dynamic leadership to arise and unite the various and disparate Turkic and Moslem peoples of the U.S.S.R. Hence, the apparent determination of the Soviet government not only to attack Tatar nationalism at its very branch and root, but also to upturn the fertile soil in which its first seeds had sprouted.

Despite the vigour with which the Crimean Tatars were assaulted by the Soviet regime, they were not, as will be seen, reconciled to Soviet rule by either coercion or education. In eliminating the Tatar nationalist intellectuals, the government eliminated the articulate voice, the mouthpiece, of Tatar discontent; but it did not eliminate either the discontent which the mass of the Tatars felt under Soviet rule or the grounds for that discontent. It must be felt that the Crimean Tatar intellectuals who fell in the purges of the twenties and thirties,

at the height of the struggle against Tatar nationalism, were a significant loss for the regime as well as for the Tatar peasantry. For if these leaders represented, in Soviet eyes, the disruptive force of Tatar nationalism, they also represented the only effective link between the regime and the Tatar village, the sole effective channel of communication between the Soviet centre and the Tatar periphery in Crimea, and perhaps the only group which could have persuaded the Tatar villagers to accept the regime and its policies, in particular its "enlightened" attempts to destroy the Moslem religion. Deprived of leadership, the Tatar village seems, after the desperate struggle against collectivization, to have lapsed into apathy; politically impotent, it seems to have drawn back only into misery and helplessness, virtually resigned to its bitter future as an alien body in an environing Slavic and Jewish sea.

The extent to which the Tatars actually collaborated with the Germans during the occupation of the peninsula through late 1942, 1943, and part of 1944 seems to have been exaggerated by both the Germans and the Soviet government: by the Germans for reasons of anti-Soviet propaganda, and by the Soviet regime to justify its subsequent harsh measures against the Tatars. Nevertheless, there is hardly any reason to doubt that the mass of the Tatars at least did not resist the Germans or their administration. Twenty years' experience under Soviet government had not imbued them with loyalty to the Soviet regime, and Nazi rule could hardly have been worse in prospect. It is worth noting, in this regard, the reasons listed by one authority for the failure of German policy in Crimea to attract the wholehearted support of the Tatar population; they shed considerable light upon the effects twenty years of Soviet rule had worked on the Tatars. German policy in Crimea was designed to produce a strong political effect in Turkey through establishing an administration in which the Crimean Tatars would participate significantly;

but the Germans were deterred from a clear-cut pro-Tatar program by the fact that the Tatars, after all, comprised only about one-fifth of the peninsula's total population. Though Russians were ousted extensively from positions in the local government and economy, there were not nearly enough trained Tatars available to provide for their effective replacement. The German policy of land reform, which was to deliver to the Tatar peasantry a disproportionate 40 per cent of the land in the peninsula, was extremely slow in being put into practice, despite the overwhelming bent of the peasants to regain possession of the land.<sup>60</sup> Then, although the German troops were under strict orders to treat the Tatar population as friendly, and, in particular, to respect all manifestations of the Moslem religion, there were incidents which caused friction. There were some serious errors, for example, in the carrying out of Nazi racial policy; several hundred Tatars who, as Moslems, were circumcized, were mistaken for Jews and murdered.<sup>61</sup> Other German measures, such as conscription of forced labour for German factories and military operations against Soviet partisans which indiscriminately took heavy tolls of the innocent Tatar civilian population, served further to spread disaffection. Finally, many of the Crimean Tatar leaders, a sizeable proportion of whom were nationalist who had lived for many years in Turkey — and who styled themselves, characteristically, as Crimean Turks — found themselves frustrated, on the one hand, by the lack of interest shown by the Tatar population generally toward any question except that of land, and, on the other hand, by the increased controls which the Germans placed upon the Tatars, particularly as the German war-machine was brought to a stop, stalemated, and then forced backward. The measure of self-government which these leaders sought, far greater than the symbolic Tatar control over local cultural and religious affairs which the German authorities envisaged, was never achieved, just as the land question — the question, it would appear, for the bulk of the Tatars — was never satisfactorily settled.<sup>62</sup>

The decision by the Soviet government to inaugurate extreme measures against the Tatar population as a whole was obviously taken long before the first Soviet troops reentered Crimea in May, 1944. At the same time, this decision was quite patently based upon the entire unsatisfactory record that the Tatars had amassed in their years under Soviet rule, and the extent of their collaboration during the German occupation appears to have been hardly taken into account. The swiftness and certainty with which the Soviet forces moved to begin the deportation operation, immediately that the German armies had been expelled from the peninsula, leaves little doubt that the Soviet government had decided beforehand to rid itself, once and for all, of the prickly Tatar national minority in Crimea. Within a month after its reoccupation by Soviet forces, the Crimean A.S.S.R. was abolished and the territory became the Crimea Province of the R.S.F.S.R. The Tatar population was removed and is thought to have been scattered in small groups all over the eastern part of the Soviet Union: from Kostroma in European Russia to Birobidzhan in the far East, from Uzbekistan in the South to the northernmost Soviet Arctic settlements.<sup>63</sup> The short span of time between the Soviet army's reentry of Crimea in May, 1944, and the completion of the deportation operation against the Tatars in June indicates that the Soviet authorities made no thorough investigation of the facts concerning the Tatars' collaboration. And it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the deportation of the Tatars was, from the Soviet point of view, the culmination of centuries of Russian advance toward the Black Sea coast, of Slavic colonization in the former lands of the Crimean Khanate, and of traditional hostility between the Russians and the Tatars. The deportation of the Tatars from Crimea was, without question, in conformity with the logic of the peninsula's history.

Crimea is now a Slavic province. The Germans destroyed most of the peninsula's large Jewish settlement, and the Soviet government itself, of course, removed

the Tatars, the other significant minority. In this regard, an article printed in "Izvestiya" on the historical background of Crimea is relevant; eight years after the deportation of the Tatars, on 4 June, 1952, this article asserted that Russians had been settled in the peninsula long before the arrival of the Tatars in the thirteenth century.<sup>64</sup> The second edition of the Large Soviet Encyclopaedia, volume 23, in its article on Crimea Province, made no reference whatever to the existence of the former Crimean A.S.S.R., stated only that the present territory was founded on 30 June, 1944, and listed its population as wholly Russian and Ukrainian.<sup>65</sup> The Tatars were referred to obliquely in the same volume's article on the Crimean Khanate; but the general tone of the article was, quite predictably, extremely hostile, the Khanate was characterized chiefly as having been merely a centre for slave-trading and aggression, and the Russian annexation of the Khanate was said to have had "great progressive significance for the social, economic, and cultural development of Crimea".<sup>66</sup>

The Crimean Tatars and the Volga Germans are the two peoples, of the seven deported during World War II, which have not been allowed to resettle in their old territories. And the Crimean Tatars are the only one of the seven Lost Peoples which has not been granted some form of amnesty since Stalin's death in 1953. Once again, it would seem that the fortunes of the Crimean Tatars have been at least to some extent dictated by Soviet foreign policy, in particular by Soviet-Turkish relations. These have been, to say the least, cool since 1941. Turkey's failure to align itself with the other nations of the anti-Hitler alliance after Hitler's attack on Soviet Russia, along with what would appear to have been general sympathy in Turkey for Nazi Germany and approval of German eastern policy, resulted in the Soviet Union's unilateral denunciation, in March, 1945, of its non-aggression pact with Turkey, which had been in force since 1925. Since World War II, Turkey has participated actively in the anti-Soviet alliances of the West, N.A.T.O. and the

Baghdad Pact, and its posture toward the U.S.S.R. has been unfailingly defensive and unfriendly. There has, then, been little reason for the Soviet government to consider the possible political effect in Turkey of its policy toward the Crimean Tatars. Even the Volga Germans have been released from their confinement to "special settlement", but the Crimean Tatars remain an "unpeople" in the fullest sense of that term — possibly because Germany has been since 1945 only partly aligned against the Soviet Union, while Turkey, the nation with whom the Crimean Tatars have been traditionally associated, has been fully committed to anti-Soviet policies. This is not to suggest a simple or a direct relationship between the Soviet government's attitudes toward its various minorities and its foreign relations with the powers the minorities are associated with — and certainly, not to postulate an equation as simple as: that friendly relations with the Soviet Union imply one sort of policy, equivocal relations imply another sort, and unfriendly relations imply another, for the minorities involved. But it would appear that the Soviet Union's relations with foreign powers do play at least some integral part in the complicated and shifting equation that determines the government's treatment of its national minorities. In the case of the Crimean Tatars, as compared to those of the other Lost Peoples, the Soviet government has evidently not thought that the propaganda advantages which might be gained in the Moslem countries through the return of the Crimean Tatars to their homeland would be great enough to outweigh the disadvantages of such a measure.

A further light is thrown upon the failure of the post-Stalin Soviet government to rehabilitate, or even amnesty, the Tatars when it is reflected that, of all the locales from which the deportations were made during World War II, Crimea is perhaps the only one which possessed, and still possesses, genuine military importance to the regime. Besides raising the obvious question of the continuities between the foreign policies of the Tsarist and Soviet governments of Russia, this

point raises another question which can hardly be avoided and which throws into sharp relief the basic resemblances in the position of the Tatars in Crimea under both regimes: in view of the fact that Crimea was the site of important military and naval establishments, given the possibility of enemy attack or invasion, were the Crimean Tatars to be regarded as dangerous, as a threat to the national security of the Russian state? The answer to this question, one would think, must be a hardly-qualified "yes". They had never shown themselves as a group to be fully reconciled to Russian domination of their destinies; they remained, under Soviet rule as under Tsarist rule, an alienated and dissatisfied minority; they were, therefore, from the point of view of security, to be rightly regarded as dangerous, as an at least potential ally for any enemy of the Russian state.

The enduring alienation and dissatisfaction of the Tatar minority under Soviet rule leads back, inevitably, to the failure of Soviet nationalities policy to satisfy even the minimum Tatar aspirations. If, for example, the Tatars failed to assume any important role in the government of Soviet Crimea, and thereby failed to acquire some vested interest in the regime, the responsibility lay not in their unwillingness to cooperate, but in the suspicion of the non-Tatar inhabitants and their unwillingness to allow genuine Tatar participation. Deep tensions existed between Tatar and non-Tatar in Crimea from the outset of Soviet rule, not only in the administration but also in the countryside, tensions which were the result of centuries-old historical antagonisms. Jealousies, national rivalries, racial and religious antipathies: all were present. In this kind of situation it was inherent that, if problems failed to be solved, quotas to be met, results to be achieved -- and in Crimea the chaotic conditions of the early twenties must surely have made all administration a nightmare -- such failures would naturally be blamed upon "traitors" within. As a minority, and a minority with an already stained record, the Tatars were easily cast into the traitor's mold, especially easily when, after

Lenin's final illness, the central Soviet authorities in Moscow were more free to follow their natural inclination and to support Russian against non-Russian in any dispute. In any critical period, of course, there is a temptation when things go wrong to evade responsibility by finding a simple solution: an appealing slogan or a convenient scapegoat. In Crimea it would appear that the charge of "Tatar nationalism" was used repeatedly to justify mistakes and failures in Soviet plans, particularly in agriculture, which was almost constantly in a state of crisis, and at the same time to discredit the Tatar minority, to destroy its initiative, and to keep it from playing any significant role — except, perhaps, that of victim. Soviet rule in Crimea brought to the Tatars not the end of colonialism, but only a new form of colonialism, proletarian colonialism: fully as intolerant and discriminatory as the colonialism of the Tsars, and infinitely more repressive because of its massive apparatus of control. It will be recalled that it was one of the generals of Nicholas I who first suggested that the Tatar population of Crimea should be deported, during the Crimean War; but it was left to the Soviet government actually to achieve the Russian dream of a Slav Crimea nearly a century later during another war.

There is a shortage of factual information concerning the behaviour of the Kalmyks under the Soviet regime, particularly with regard to the seven or eight years immediately following the establishment of the Kalmyk Autonomous Region in November, 1920. There is little reason to suppose, however, that the Soviet government was very successful in its attempts to allay the suspicion of the Kalmyks for all things Russian and to turn them into good Soviet citizens. Such scraps of evidence as are available strongly suggest, on the contrary, that the Kalmyks, at least the vast majority of them, insofar as they were at all politically conscious and made any distinctions, continued to regard the Russian Communist primarily as

the successor to the Russian Tsarist official, and that they resisted the policy of the Soviet regime at least as stubbornly as they resisted the policy of the Tsars. And in fact, when the ideological and theoretical foundations of Soviet policy are disregarded, the aims of the Soviet government with regard to the Kalmyks were strikingly similar to the aims of the Tsarist regime: seeking to persuade the Kalmyks to renounce their nomadic habits of life, to reject their Buddhist faith, and to replace their strongly hierarchical social structure — in short, to transform themselves, to rid themselves of their peculiar traditional culture and character, and to merge themselves as quickly as possible with the corporate Soviet population. The deportation of the Kalmyks in 1943 in itself almost answers the question of whether Soviet policy was a success or a failure. Along with the deportations of the Crimean Tatars and the peoples of the North Caucasus, it may be seen as an admission of Soviet defeat, indicating quite certainly that the Soviet authorities were generally unsuccessful in their efforts to denationalize or proletarianize the Kalmyks, that the "feudal" backwardness of this people was not easily to be overcome, and especially not by a regime which not only retained the essentially Russian character of the oppressive Tsarist regime, but which also sought to effect measures which were in fact scarcely distinguishable. It is surely reasonable to suppose that a Kalmyk, if he is being oppressed in some way by a Russian (or feels he is being oppressed), will not care very much whether that Russian is a Tsarist or a Soviet administrator; he will not like him. And the important thing for the Kalmyk is only that the oppression should stop.

In dealing with the Kalmyk Autonomous Region, the Soviet authorities were at once, of course, faced with the most formidable difficulties, difficulties in addition to the central one of Kalmyk suspicion engendered by generations of harsh treatment and increasing poverty. Possibly the key question for the nomadic

Kalmyks, who had been steadily pushed by Russian settlement into the less fertile areas of their territory, where their livestock economy had greatly suffered, was whether the new government would keep its promises to end Russian settlement and to return to the Kalmyks their geographical inheritance, the lands they still regarded as their own. The grazing of herds, of course, requires much land. But there were some extremely cogent reasons why the Communists in Kalmykia could not undertake immediately any agrarian reform so far-reaching, even if such reform had been thought desirable. In the first place, Communist Party organization in the Kalmyk Autonomous Region was merely embryonic; in 1921 the entire Party membership in the region, including candidate members, totalled only slightly over six hundred persons<sup>67</sup> — and it can hardly be thought that more than a handful of these were Kalmyks. Second, distances in the territory were immense, the population was for the most part unsettled in any permanent location, and such communication as did exist was still widely disrupted. These staggering physical difficulties were further compounded by the fact that most of the Kalmyk population had been until very recently enemies, fighting actively against the Red Army on the side of the Whites: and still further by the existence of organized Kalmyk guerilla bands operating on the steppe. Some of these die-hard groups persisted in their resistance until at least as late as 1926. Furthermore, the whole economy of the territory had suffered severe dislocation during the Civil War; and the famine of 1921, which struck virtually every part of European Russia where fighting had been intense or prolonged, appears to have been of particularly distressing proportions in Kalmykia.<sup>68</sup> However politically desirable or expedient it would have been, therefore, for the Soviet government to break up immediately the cultivated holdings of the Russian settlers for the purpose of restoring grazing lands to the Kalmyk herdsmen, however just such a step would have been, it could hardly have resulted in anything but an immediate and sharp decline in agricultural production, the alienation of the support

of the Russian farmers who would have been dispossessed (and who had proved themselves far more loyal in support of the regime than the Kalmyks), and, in short, a loss of the two elements deemed particularly necessary by the Soviet government just at that time, foodstuffs and friendship. The short-run needs of the regime obviously outweighed its long-run promises; which is not to say that any government, confronted with the choice that faced the Soviet authorities in Kalmykia in the early twenties, would or could have chosen differently. The Communists, moreover, were in fact acting in accordance with their ideology in favouring intensive agriculture over extensive agriculture. None of these sound reasons obviates, however, the suspicion that Kalmyk support was forfeited by the Soviet government when it failed to implement in Kalmykia in its early years some land reform which would have allowed the Kalmyks the areas they needed for their herds.

But if the first few years of Soviet rule in Kalmykia quite certainly failed to win the support of the mass of the Kalmyks for the regime chiefly because they were non-revolutionary and did not seriously disturb the status quo, when Soviet policy did become revolutionary, in the late twenties, it even more certainly transformed Kalmyk feelings toward the regime from coolness to hostility. When a Soviet publication admitted in 1926 that all of the "objective prerequisites for banditry on a small scale" (Kalmyk resistance to Soviet authority) had not yet been completely liquidated, it listed among these "objective prerequisites" the existence of rival clans among the Kalmyk nobility.<sup>69</sup> And when in October, 1929, the Soviet government began its first really concentrated offensive against the Kalmyks' traditional way of life, it sought especially to destroy the power of their so-called "feudal aristocracy", ordering the confiscation of their property and the immediate transportation of all members of the "Noyony" and "Zaisangi" to locations "beyond the borders of Kalmykia".<sup>70</sup> As Mr. Kolarz has pointed out, this attack upon the Kalmyk tribal leaders which was launched in conjunction with the beginning

of collectivization, while it constituted formally a measure of the class struggle, was in reality a far-reaching Russian interference with the destinies of the whole Kalmyk people; effected with the help of only a tiny number of Kalmyk Communists, the expulsion of the nobility removed the group which not only symbolized for the Kalmyks their historical national tradition, but also contained the hereditary heads of the Kalmyks' organs of self-government. The action must have appeared to the majority of the Kalmyks, therefore, as a continuation of the repeated measures taken by the old Russian government to limit the authority of the Kalmyk leaders and to increase the influence of the Russian state.<sup>71</sup> It may be argued that the removal of the Kalmyk nobility, whose authority over their people was often tyrannical and harsh, was at least from an abstract point of view a progressive act, but for the bulk of the Kalmyks, whose minds were hardly acquainted with the notions of western "progressive" thought, it could hardly have appeared as anything other than a palpable attempt to undermine the fundamental bases of their political and social organization. And this, indeed, was what it was. For the defeat of the Kalmyk "feudal aristocracy" was not an isolated action, but represented only one aspect of a comprehensive Soviet campaign to alter the whole structure of Kalmykia's economy and politics. It was only one stage in the attempt to uproot Kalmyk traditional culture and replace it with a new synthetic Soviet culture.

In keeping with its policy of atomizing all opposition and depriving peoples of their leaders in all fields, the Soviet government almost simultaneously began its drive against the Buddhist religion, killing or driving into exile virtually all of the Buddhist lamas in the territory. Nor did the Kalmyks escape the literary revolution inflicted upon most of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union; their alphabet, too, was forced to adopt Latin characters in 1929 and, less than ten years later, to change again from Latin characters to the Cyrillic characters used in the Russian language.<sup>72</sup> Few details can be learned of the Kalmyks' resistance

to the collectivization campaign; but at least 20,000 people are thought to have been driven out of the region as "kulaks" and "feudalists", and about the same number are thought to have perished in the famine which accompanied collectivization in Kalmykia as it did in Ukraine, Crimea, and other parts of the U.S.S.R. where resistance was stubborn. One Kalmyk Communist, Chapchayev, spoke for a movement which favoured a reversal of the whole collectivization drive in 1933, advocating that the region should be reorganized on a basis similar to that of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic, then sovietized but not collectivized, on the grounds that semi-nomadic Kalmykia was economically more comparable to that land than to most parts of the Soviet Union.<sup>73</sup> Such pleas brought not an easing of government pressures, however, but only the predictable drastic purges of the local Party machinery and further widespread arrests of Kalmyk intellectuals.<sup>74</sup>

Collectivization in the Kalmyk Autonomous Region would seem to have been largely completed by 1933 — at least in that year the region was raised in status and became an A.S.S.R., though Party membership was still in 1933 a mere 3,143 persons.<sup>75</sup> There is some evidence, however, that — as in Crimea and the Volga German Republic — there was still a deep gulf between the Kalmyks and the Russian population; it is worthy of note that a survey of court proceedings undertaken in the region of the lower Volga in 1932 against persons accused of "chauvinism" — which is to say, in Soviet terminology, national feeling of any but the Russian or all-Soviet variety — revealed that 73 per cent of all those convicted had been working for a wage for less than two years, and were in the main Kalmyks and Kazakhs employed chiefly in the fisheries.<sup>76</sup> Although it was claimed by the Soviet regime in 1937 that the rate of literacy in the Kalmyk A.S.S.R. had been raised from 4 to 90 per cent,<sup>77</sup> it was noted in another official source only two years earlier that the Kalmyks were still among the non-Russian minorities "of considerable backwardness" in the field of education.<sup>78</sup> Which point raises, of course, the whole question of

the dependability of Soviet statistics and, indeed, of any Soviet pronouncements concerning either the national minorities or any other subject. And with particular reference to such statistics as the above, or those dealing with any aspect of cultural life, everything depends upon how such words as "literacy" are defined, whether "literacy" in this case, for example, means the ability to read the classical literature in one's own language, the ability to read a newspaper, or merely the ability to read and write one's own name. At any rate, the Soviet authorities deserve small credit for their contributions to Kalmyk cultural life. Genuine Kalmyk literature, for example, was found obnoxious and came under heavy fire; the great Kalmyk epic, "Dzhangar", was singled out for extensive expurgation because of its "religious and reactionary content", and Soviet writers were instructed to rewrite it and to "purge it carefully of the harmful influences of the age and the tendencies of the ruling class".<sup>79</sup> While genuine literary works were thus disfigured, a new synthetic epic was produced which was more in keeping with Soviet ideas of minority cultural autonomy; supposed to have been composed by "the Kalmyk people" to honour Stalin on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday in 1939, "Yorel" depicts the legendary heroes of Kalmyk literature finding their reincarnation in Stalin, and ends with a Kalmyk request to Stalin to lead them onward into Communism.<sup>80</sup> Such were some of the measures by which, "stone by stone, the indestructible foundation of the Kalmyk socialist edifice" was laid.<sup>81</sup> In the Kalmyk Republic, where the nomadic herdsmen embodied almost the polar opposites of what the Soviet system desired, almost everything had to be done in opposition to the wishes of the population. Even the capital of the Republic, Elista, was founded by the Soviet government, since the Kalmyks had no permanent settlements of their own, and it was not begun until 1927.<sup>82</sup>

Earlier, some notice was taken of some of the internal contradictions of

Soviet nationalities policy. The story of the Kalmyks strikingly reveals some of these. While it was one of the more positive aspects of Soviet policy that the larger and more advanced nations should assist the smaller and more backward nations by providing them with material aid, education of all types, the loan of technical advisers and experts, and the training of the members of the backward nations, it was quite a different matter how all of these things could have been done without imposing the standards of the larger nations upon the smaller peoples.<sup>83</sup> There was a contradiction, in other words, between the Soviet desire to move the smaller peoples forward, on the one hand, and the Soviet promise that these peoples would be encouraged to retain intact their old ways. Perhaps the Soviet leaders, Lenin as well as Stalin, made their fatal error in supposing that all peoples would be glad to adapt themselves to twentieth-century civilization and would welcome the "raising" of their cultural standards in the process. The Kalmyks, among other peoples in the U.S.S.R., glaringly exposed the basic fallacy of such an assumption. For it would appear that only a very few Kalmyks were capable of understanding that the removals of their political, religious, and intellectual leaders, the attempts to change their traditional way of life, the efforts to settle them in permanent towns and villages, the destruction of their culture and their traditions were for their own good. Understandably enough, in view of their past experiences with Russian authority, the Kalmyks continued to resist all such measures, viewing them with suspicion instead of with equanimity or even joy. And such was the nature of the Soviet totalitarian state that it was wont to crush any and all opposition it encountered, without stopping to question the correctness of its own basic assumptions. It is at once both difficult to believe and sobering to reflect that the men in the Soviet government probably were convinced that their nationalities policy would in fact succeed.

The German armies invaded and occupied only the western portion of the Kalmyk A.S.S.R., and their occupation lasted only from the late summer of 1942 until New Year's Day, 1943, when they were driven from the capital, Elista. As in Crimea, the Germans tried to take into account the traditions of the local population, at least the non-Russian population, and showed respect for native religious institutions. Unlike Crimea, however, their occupation of part of Kalmykia was too episodic, their hold on the territory too precarious, to permit of any genuine reorganization. Nevertheless, the Germans appear to have met with virtually no opposition or popular hostility from the Kalmyks, and when the Germans began their long retreat westward they were joined by considerable numbers of able-bodied Kalmyks, many of whom later fought in Wehrmacht units on fronts from Russia to Italy. About 4,500 Kalmyks served in the Vlassov army alone;<sup>84</sup> a Kalmyk Cavalry Corps was formed after the German retreat in 1943; and other Kalmyks served in smaller numbers in various capacities.<sup>85</sup> Soviet wartime propaganda concerning the Kalmyks gave no hint of these large-scale defections: a letter to Stalin expressing the determination of the Kalmyks to fight with every resource was widely quoted in the Soviet press in October, 1942; in February, 1943, there was still a Kalmyk Provincial Committee of the Communist Party in existence, announcing at that time its intention to reopen shortly Kalmyk schools, and also that that Kalmyk population had succeeded in collecting some 7 million rubles to purchase arms for the Soviet forces.<sup>86</sup> Then . . . silence — which was to last for more than a dozen years.

So far as is known, the Soviet government never issued an official statement with regard to the deportation of the Kalmyks as a community, nor complained publicly at any time of their unreliability during the War. Even the decree which abolished the Kalmyk Republic was never made public, although its date was subsequently established as having been in late December, 1943.<sup>87</sup> The redrawing of boundaries

on Soviet maps, a border altered there, a place-name changed here: it was only through such indirect evidence that the world came to realize that an entire small nation, numbering some 135,000 people, had disappeared. The dividing of the former Kalmyk A.S.S.R., with the major portion of its territory going to a new Astrakhan Province, and smaller segments going to the provinces of Stalingrad and Rostov, and to the territory of Stavropol; the changing of the name of Elista to the Russian Stepnoy, and the altering of the name of the Kalmyk fishing community of Lagan' to the Russian Kaspiskoye: such were the flimsy clues to the fate of the Kalmyks.<sup>88</sup> There can be little doubt that the deportation of the Kalmyks was carried out as thoroughly as was the government's policy of censoring all reports of the operation. The second edition of the Large Soviet Encyclopaedia, volume 3, for example, which was published in 1950, made no reference whatever to the Kalmyks, historically or otherwise, in its seven pages devoted to Astrakhan Province.<sup>89</sup>

Once again, however, as in the cases of the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars, and, it will be seen, also in the case of the North Caucasian peoples, there is ample reason for doubting that the extent of Kalmyk treachery during World War II was the principal reason for their deportation, or more than an acceptable excuse seized upon by the Soviet government to justify its action. It is evident from even the scanty evidence which is available, that the Kalmyks were never very good Soviet citizens and that their progress under Soviet rule was, from the point of view of the regime, extremely slow and painful. The extent of their treason during the War and their apparent acceptance of German rule were only two of their many shortcomings. Even if it were admitted that the Soviet government had considerably raised the economic standards of the Kalmyks between World War I and World War II — and there is certainly little evidence that this

was the case, while there is a fair body of evidence to indicate that the Kalmyks were in fact worse off under Soviet rule than they had ever been since their coming to Russia: witness two famines and the trauma of collectivization, which was accompanied in nearly all parts of the Soviet Union by desperate butchering of livestock — there is no reason to suppose that the Soviet government was able in such a short time to effect any deep change in the fundamental character of the Kalmyk people. It may be argued, as it is argued by even the present Soviet leaders, who should perhaps know better, that the economic nexus is the most important to man, and that economic satisfaction should cause hostility to alien domination to evaporate. But to any person who is not politically or historically illiterate, such assertions are, of course, refuted by countless examples. On the other hand — and though this has been stated previously, it perhaps bears to be underlined — the proposition that resistance to national oppression will invariably take national form may be described as the iron law of nationalism. With the Kalmyks, as with so many of their minority peoples, the Soviet leaders seem to have almost inevitably stimulated national feeling through their attempts to destroy its more obvious manifestations.

Here there may be seen another of the parallels between Soviet and Tsarist policies, at least a general likeness in their propensities for fostering the very attitudes they sought to erase. But Soviet policy with regard to the Kalmyks bears far more convincing congruities with Tsarist policy than this: in its goals, for instance, to settle and thus to be able to control the Kalmyks more effectively, with the long-range aim of russifying them; in its specific methods to achieve these goals — a primary reliance upon coercion rather than persuasion, attacks upon the Kalmyk leaders, both the hereditary nobility and the clergy, and economic strictures upon the people generally. It is also tempting to advance the failures of the policies of both regimes, when seeking to draw these

parallels, but this claim can be only most cautiously put forward. For it would appear from recent Soviet figures that the Soviet regime has in fact achieved some success in its endeavour to fragment the compact Kalmyk national group. The 1959 census figures published in "Pravda" on 4 February, 1960, list only 106,000 Kalmyks in the U.S.S.R.,<sup>90</sup> compared with the 134,271 listed in the 1939 census figures, and there is some reason to suspect that even this figure may have been inflated. Persistent reports that the deportation of the Kalmyks was carried out with extreme brutality, the notable scarcity of information about the Kalmyks and their whereabouts for almost fifteen years, the small numbers whose return has been reported in their old homeland, and the fact that when the Kalmyk national territory was reconstituted in January, 1957, it was downgraded to the status of an autonomous province, all pointed to the conclusion that the numbers of Kalmyks had been seriously reduced since 1943, even before these figures were published. It would appear, then, that the Kalmyks, who have an at least normal birthrate — most nomadic peoples have very high birthrates — have been either so scattered that they cannot be found or so assimilated that they no longer regard themselves as Kalmyks. Or it may be the case that the Soviet government has been successful in eliminating the Kalmyk problem only through its eliminating of Kalmyks; the missing may be dead. Finally, that the Kalmyk Autonomous Province was once again raised to the status of an autonomous republic on 29 July, 1958, may indicate that some significant demographic change had taken place in the territory, that some or all of the numbers of apparently missing Kalmyks had after all been found; on the other hand, it is possible that the Soviet government's decision once again to elevate the Kalmyk province to its pre-deportation status as an A.S.S.R. merely reflected the regime's increased sensitivity to world opinion, especially in Asia and Africa, and was designed to put a stop to speculation about the apparent drastic decline in the number of Kalmyks and enquiries about the fate of the missing thousands

which the reduction in the status of their territory naturally stimulated.<sup>91</sup>

In the North Caucasus, the Soviet regime was confronted in its initial years by the same essential problem that had faced the Tsarist administrators ever since their conquests of the mountain tribes in the mid-nineteenth century: how to reconcile the tribesmen to Russian rule. Certainly this was the primary task which had to be accomplished before any positive steps could be taken in the direction of bringing these peoples to the stage where they could prove an asset, rather than a liability, to the regime. Some measure of trust had to be won, some degree of confidence, before the Soviet government could expect the mountain peoples to transform themselves into loyal and reliable citizens and thus associate themselves with the socialist transformation of their society. It is evident, however, that even this primary problem was still not overcome by the time of World War II, and that its solution was still as far from being reached in 1942 as it had been in 1920. In the cases of the four deported mountain peoples, therefore, it would appear that there is even less doubt than in the cases of the peoples already examined that the Soviet government's decision on their deportations was overwhelmingly predicated upon the sorry record amassed by these peoples between the wars, and hardly related at all to the question of their collaboration with the Germans during World War II. From the time that the authority of the Soviet regime was established over the North Caucasus, all of the four peoples subsequently removed, but the Chechens in particular, proved themselves to be among the most troublesome, perplexing, and uncooperative of all the minority nations of the U.S.S.R., possessing as a group the most unsavoury record, from the point of view of the regime, which not only betrayed their stubborn lack of enthusiasm for the regime, their failure of positive achievement, and their spirit of determined passive resistance, but also was marred by evidence of their outright hostility, extending to armed

revolt. Long before the German armies entered the North Caucasus in 1942, to offer the Soviet government a quasi-legitimate reason for deporting the Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars, these four peoples stood already guilty of almost every crime it was possible for minority nations to commit.

The remarkable number of administrative changes in the first two decades of Soviet rule in the North Caucasus may be taken to indicate some of the government's uncertainty about how best to handle this area of chronic unrest. The original Mountain Republic, established by the Soviet regime in January, 1920, with its capital at Vladikavkaz, was extremely short-lived. As early as September, 1921, the idea of regional autonomy so prominent in Bolshevik theory was abandoned, and the Mountain Republic was begun to be broken down into distinctive national units, when the Kabardinians were split away into their own autonomous province. In January, 1922, the Balkars were joined together with the Kabardinians, while at the same time the Cherkess and Karachays were given a joint autonomous province; then, in December, 1922, the Chechens were organized into an autonomous province of their own, leaving only two of the original seven national components still in the Mountain Republic. In July, 1924, these two, the Ossetins and the Ingushes, were also given their own territories, and the brief experiment of a unified Soviet North Caucasus was finished. Even after this dismemberment had been completed, however, further administrative adjustments continued to be made. In April, 1926, the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Province was divided into two separate provinces; in January, 1934, the Chechens and Ingushes were joined together into a single autonomous province. And finally, in December, 1936, when three autonomous provinces were elevated to the status of autonomous republics — the Kabardinian-Balkar A.S.S.R., the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., and the North Ossetin A.S.S.R. — the administrative organization which was retained until the

changes made necessary by the deportations of 1943-44 was settled.<sup>92</sup>

This shuffling and reshuffling of peoples into different administrative units, though it most certainly would seem to betray the regime's lack of conviction in its earlier decisions, would seem also, however, to have been symptomatic of the basic mistrust felt by the government toward the peoples of the North Caucasus, and to have reflected elements of a policy of divide and rule. It is notable, for example, that the first of the North Caucasian groups to be granted a formal measure of independence was the historically pro-Russian Kabardinians. And subsequent changes throughout the twenties appear to have been attempts to pair off peoples whose pro-Russian and anti-Russian pasts and sentiments would serve, as it were, to cancel each other, or, where this arrangement was not feasible, to split up and to isolate those groups which had proved most recalcitrant to Russian rule in the past. Thus, the pairing of the Balkars with the Kabardinians and their separation from the Karachays, whose territory they in fact shared, and the long isolation of the Chechens and the Ingushes, so intimately associated in other than a geographical sense, until their being amalgamated in 1934, seem to indicate that some such considerations were at least broadly operative in Soviet decisions. The fear of movements of unity among the Moslem peoples, as was seen in discussing the Crimean Tatars, was a potent factor in Soviet policy toward the Moslem minorities; and in the North Caucasus, there was clearly some danger in uniting the mountain peoples into a single political unit, even if that unit were under the closest possible scrutiny and control. From the Soviet point of view, it was preferable to keep the various peoples separated and to have all lines of political authority proceed from the Moscow centre, lessening the possibility of any common action against the central authority; the policy of centralism, along with the incipient dangers of pan-Islamism, dictated that all possible centres of resistance to the

regime should be as far as possible atomized. The years 1917-20 had proved that, despite the complex demography of the North Caucasus, the heterogeneity of its peoples and its linguistic complexities, it had nevertheless been possible for the mountaineers to cooperate in common cause. It was obviously more desirable, so far as the central authorities were concerned, to perpetuate and even encourage the divisions among the mountain peoples, to separate them from each other in as many ways as possible, and to try to teach them each to regard Moscow as the sole source of authority and favour, than to be confronted with a politically-unified North Caucasus comprising some 1,500,000 inhabitants, most of whom were already to some extent united by their common innate hatred and suspicion of the alien and infidel Russian from whom their past experience had taught them to expect little except further outrage and oppression.

When the Mountain Republic was brought into existence in January, 1920, the age-old hostility between mountaineer and Russian had already reasserted itself, and the Soviet government first found itself compelled to act as arbiter in a bitter struggle being waged by the Chechens and other mountain peoples against the Cossacks and Russians. As in so many of the minority territories, the key issue between the protagonists was the land question. The premature decision taken by the Soviet authorities in the North Caucasus, principally the Red Army and the local inogorodtsy who had small use for either Cossaks or natives, to nationalize all land immediately had alienated the Cossack farmers and inflamed the natives; but, as the prospect of Soviet victory in the Civil War became more certain and many Cossacks made their peace and went over to the Soviet regime, the savage struggle in the territory had become a struggle along national, rather than ideological, lines, which was settled only late in 1920 by the expelling of large numbers of Cossacks and their families and the settling of natives on their lands. Rather, the conflict was temporarily and partially settled by these measures; for the Chechens,

who had been promised the return of their lands by Ordzhonikidze for their support of the Soviet cause during the Civil War, the settlement was undoubtedly a profound disappointment. The lands were not theirs, even though they were allowed to work them; they were still controlled by Russians, even though these Russians claimed to disassociate themselves from the past regime. It is worth noting here Trotsky's analysis of the effect of a similar Soviet settlement in Georgia, if only because of the way in which he explicitly defined the national basis of the dissatisfactions such settlements caused:

In regions where the toiling masses prior to the Revolution had managed in most cases to go over to Bolshevism (i.e., chiefly in the central Russian provinces), they accepted subsequent difficulties and sufferings as connected with their own cause. This was not so in the more backward regions, where the sovietization was carried out by the Army. There the toiling masses considered further deprivations a result of the regime imposed from the outside.<sup>95</sup>

In the last sentence quoted here, Trotsky perhaps defined the fundamental weakness of Soviet nationalities policy not only in the North Caucasus, but in many of the non-Russian territories: "There the toiling masses considered further deprivations a result of the regime imposed from the outside". The Soviet policy of enforced sovietization not only failed to attract the support of the hypothetical native revolutionary masses of the North Caucasus, which were expected to be deeply hostile toward their reactionary national and religious leaders, but seem in fact to have had the contrary effect, that of completing the alienation of those natives who had earlier been strong supporters of the Soviet cause. Again it is instructive to note the analysis of another early Bolshevik, Todorski, who was commander of the Red Army in the eastern mountains of the North Caucasus during the Civil War; he makes clear the deep gulf which existed between the Russian Communists and the natives:

One asset for the counter-revolutionary agitation was the want of any well-considered policy in relation to the mountaineers on the part of the communist leaders. The greater part of the Soviet workers applied, mechanically, the Russian method of going to work, which frequently led to precisely the opposite effect of what was intended . . . The revolutionary propaganda suffered from many very serious defects. No account was taken of the cultural level of the mountaineer, nor the special conditions of his existence; the propaganda was of an abstract nature, incomprehensible and remote, as far as concerned those for whom it was meant . . . The 'poor' did not now realize any material advantage . . . There was hardly any land to divide. The rich land owners had driven away their flocks into Georgia, and the population was frightened by the former power of the beys and propaganda of the 'clericals', took no willing part in the confiscation of property and, indeed, abstained from it in spite of the encouragement of the revolutionary bodies . . . So it was, then, that in places there was no Soviet authority but only its outward show, under which there continued to exist in full the former social relations, the former conditions of life. Only in the towns, in thickly populated places, and in part, in the lowland auls, was there a beginning of real progress in the revolutionary sense.<sup>94</sup>

It would seem, in brief, that the peoples of the North Caucasus were infinitely more concerned with the lands occupied by the Russian settlers, than with the lands of their own rulers and the property of their clergy, with the expulsion of the Slavic intruders rather than with the destruction of their own political and religious hierarchies. For the majority of the mountain peoples, it would appear that, from the time that the Bolshevik Revolution fully assumed the refurbished mantle of the Russian state, any idea of genuine cooperation with the new rulers, even to the extent of admitting that their authority in the mountains could be permanent, was out of the question. Their whole history and tradition, not to mention their religion, inclined them toward uncompromising enmity to Russian rule, as it had their fathers and grandfathers. And not only did they manifest their hostility to Russian rule by ignoring the pleas, commands, and threats of the government; a portion of them continued to follow the time-honoured methods of their ancestors, coming out regularly in armed insurrection, regardless of success or failure.

Some measure of armed resistance to the Soviet authorities seems to have persisted in the North Caucasus all through the two decades before World War II. After the bloody struggle of 1920-21 had been more or less successfully terminated, at least some of the mountaineers continued to maraud and to raid the Russian settlements, their irksome, if not very dangerous, forays punctuating the whole period between the wars. Local conditions in the North Caucasus, of course, as was demonstrated so convincingly in the nineteenth century, conspired to frustrate the most determined efforts by the authorities to stamp out completely such "banditry"; the mountainous terrain, the lack of roads, the severe weather, and the prevailing poverty, general hostility and warlike traditions of the local population made the complete suppression of guerilla activity impossible. Soviet reprisals against the villagers in areas where outbursts of hostile activity occurred, naturally enough, only increased the antipathy between rulers and ruled. One measure which aroused particular indignation was the arrest of women, which had been avoided even under the Tsars.<sup>95</sup> Far more serious than these chronic outbursts by small hostile bands and the reprisals which they brought, however, were the three general uprisings in which a significant portion of the population appears to have taken part. The first of these after 1921 came in the winter of 1929-30 as a part of the natives' resistance to collectivization, and was taken part in by all of the peoples subsequently deported, led by the Chechens and Balkars, whose lands were least accessible. For a short period in the winter of 1929-30 almost the whole of Balkaria is said to have been in rebel control; and, following the Soviet restoration of order, perhaps as many as 3,000 Balkars and Karachays were executed.<sup>96</sup> The number of casualties resulting from the collectivization campaign cannot be learned, but it can hardly be doubted that it was very high; the Chechens especially had not been satisfied with the earlier land settlement. In a space of ten years, they had been promised their lands, had seen them taken

away and risen in mass to protest, had had the lands restored to their use, and then, in 1929, were again to be compelled to surrender them to the state. But determined as the resistance of the Chechens and other peoples must have been, the Soviet government's determination to enforce collectivization was now matched by its power to enforce it. Executions, deportation, and famine — the familiar pattern of the time — seems to have been pressed with special vehemence in the territory. And, of course, the purges: an article in "Pravda" on 8 September, 1937, published under the title, "bourgeois nationalist centre of intrigue", described terrorist operations on a large scale throughout the whole of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., and added, obviously pointing to the coming purge, that "hostile elements have penetrated most greatly in those districts under the direct leadership of the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Chechen-Ingush, Gorchkanov, the second secretary of the Regional Party Committee, Bakhaev, and the head of the Agitprop Section, Oknev".<sup>97</sup> This would appear to have been the signal for the purging of almost all the top local leaders in the republic. The second general uprising of the mountain peoples under Soviet rule erupted during the winter of 1939-40, and was led by a poet, Izrailov by name and a former Communist, and was again centred in the Chechen and Balkar territories. This time the rebels were able again to hold a large sector of the mountains for some weeks, even against entire Soviet divisions with air support, before they were suppressed.<sup>98</sup> The third rising, which appears almost to have been a continuation of the second, was in the rear of Soviet forces already reeling under German attack in the early part of World War II, was led by the Chechens — again — and the Karachays, and wreaked considerable confusion in Soviet military plans.<sup>99</sup> More will be said about this rising below, in discussing the question of the mountaineers' collaboration, however.

It might well be asked at this point whether reports of the armed

insurrections of the mountain peoples, both those on a large scale and those more localized but chronic outbursts of guerilla activity, reflect the general attitude of the mountain population toward Soviet authority, or whether they in fact reflect merely the attitudes of a fanatical minority, the most hostile and active few. Do such reports necessarily indicate either the indifference or hostility to the regime of the population at large? The question cannot, of course, be answered unequivocally. It may be noted, however, at least in passing, that Shamil's forces in the nineteenth century rarely exceeded more than 1,000 men under arms at any one time and yet, with the support of the majority of the mountain population, were able to inflict huge numbers of casualties upon much larger Russian forces. At the same time, Soviet sources are uncharacteristically replete with official admissions, some of them extremely frank, that the regime was at best only tenuously rooted in the Moslem population of the North Caucasus, and that indifference and resistance to the regime were very widespread. These admissions of the failure of Soviet nationalities policy in the North Caucasus would appear to have a special significance, because of the contrast they offer when placed alongside the usually unfailing panegyric tone of Soviet pronouncements on the minorities. Like all of the Soviet peoples, the mountaineers were highly praised, too; and at least one of the curious and bizarre documents relating to them — such works do have a curious and bizarre quality when contrasted with actual happenings — will be noted below. From Soviet sources alone, however, it is difficult not to be forced to the conclusion that the Soviet administration in the North Caucasus was almost as remote from the local peoples as the Tsarist regime had been.

When the Soviet campaign to latinize the alphabets of the peoples employing Arabic and other forms of script was begun in the North Caucasus in 1929, for example, it is noteworthy that the resistance to latinization manifested itself in a religious guise:

The same resistance to latinization emanated also from the home-bred sheikhs, murids, and mullahs in Dagestan and among the mountain peoples of the North Caucasus. The latter . . . drawing upon the services of their hirelings (bandit elements) met literally with daggers drawn the first copies of the Soviet alphabets in the new script which appeared in the mountain villages. The hunger strike proclaimed by the Chechen mullahs in protest against latinization was a characteristic token of this opposition.<sup>100</sup>

Islam, possessing no real hierarchical structure, is difficult to destroy, and the intensive Soviet campaigns against it do not appear to have met with more than very limited success. Indeed, in view of the strength of the Moslem faith and its religious leaders among the mountain peoples, and in view of the truism that religious faith appears almost inevitably only to be strengthened through persecution, it may perhaps be taken for granted that Soviet attempts to undermine Islam by direct attack served to stiffen the anti-Soviet attitudes of the local peoples. It seems clear that the Soviet authorities simply failed to comprehend the importance of the religious factor in the lives of the mountaineers. When the shariat was declared illegal in 1929 — in direct breach of Stalin's promise made less than ten years earlier — its courts nevertheless continued to function and to dispense justice according to Moslem law under the guise of "reconciliation commissions"; and, according to one observer, there were still in tiny Chechnia alone in 1931 more than 2,600 mosques and Arabic schools, and more than 1,250 mullahs.<sup>101</sup> Among the Ingushes, too, Islam stubbornly retained its strength. A delegate to the All-Union Congress of Godless Pedagogists in 1931 complained, for example, that the Ingush children still refused to use textbooks they considered either atheistic or anti-religious, that teachers were sometimes forced to leave their schools in the Ingush region when they tried to introduce anti-religious propaganda into the classroom, and that such attempts generally met with hostility, that Moslem schools continued to teach in the summer all those things which the secular Soviet schools tried during the winter to teach the children to disregard,

and that numbers of Ingushes who were members of the Party or the Komsomols still continued to practice their religion faithfully.<sup>102</sup>

It is when Soviet statements about the difficulties of administration in the North Caucasus are examined, however, that the true extent of the gulf between the regime and the population over which it ruled becomes glaringly evident. On the one hand, there are such statements as the following, made in 1933, that among the Chechens and in other backward areas "every intelligent official who is more or less loyal is precious to us and almost irreplaceable".<sup>103</sup> Such flat assertions are heavily dramatized, on the other hand, by specific examples and cold figures of the national composition of some of the various Soviet administrative organs in the North Caucasus. That the affairs of the mountain peoples were in reality run by Russian, or at least non-indigenous, officials is quite clear from the following array of evidence published in 1935:

. . . the part played by the indigenous population in the Soviet apparatus is little developed. Among the 398 leading and responsible officials of the district executive committees and village soviets of Kabardino-Balkaria, only 206 are indigenous; yet 25 of the above posts are vacant . . . In the apparatus of Chechen-Ingush provincial executive committees there are officials who know neither the Chechen nor the Ingush language. The secretary of the Balkar village soviet in the Chechen-Ingush Province accepts applications from the local population only in the Russian language . . . in the multinational North Caucasian territory, the territorial land administration has, among its staff of 300, not a single indigenous member. Nor are there any in the territorial administrations for communications (!!!), internal trade, finance, communal economy, the State Bank and the Agricultural Bank. The officials of the Public Attorney's Office of the territory, when receiving indigenous callers, were compelled to search the whole city for a casual interpreter.<sup>104</sup>

A decree published on 7 January, 1936, stated that, of the more than 1,300 top officials in the North Caucasus, ranging from the provincial administration all the way down to the village soviets, a mere seventeen belonged to any of the mountain nationalities; the same decree denounced this gross disproportion, and

promised that the local languages would soon be coming into official use.<sup>105</sup>

(It may be noted parenthetically in this connection that one of the most consistent charges hurled by the Communists at the Tsarist bureaucracy was its inability to establish close contact with the peoples whose affairs it administered because of its lack of understanding of local languages and customs.) One of the effects of the Soviet regime's lack of indigenous officials, of course, was that its Russian-language directives simply failed to reach the peoples for whom they were intended; another result was that the local Soviet organs in Chechnia and other districts were unable to carry out their orders properly for the reason that they were unable to understand them, which sometimes led to conflicts between the Russians and non-Russians in the administration.<sup>106</sup>

At one point in 1934, friction between Russians and Chechens apparently reached such a pass that Mikhail Kalinin was himself forced to journey to the Caucasus to calm both sides, and to try to persuade them to live together in peace, to intermarry, and to respect one another.<sup>107</sup> Nor were the Karachays and Balkars more politically educable than the Chechens; it was noted in 1935 that: "one can count on one's fingers the people working in the soviets who have finished the courses for local government . . . in the Karachay province only one out of 140 officials has finished the courses . . . in the Kabardin-Balkar province 17 out of 398".<sup>108</sup> And again, with regard to their progress achieved in developing the higher education of specialists, the Balkars and the Chechens were listed at this time among the nationalities showing "considerable backwardness".<sup>109</sup>

The particular vehemence with which the frequent purges struck the non-Russian segments of the Soviet administration was undoubtedly one of the contributory causes for the miniscule number of indigenous officials in the North Caucasus. As elsewhere among the national minorities, Soviet policy in the North

Caucasus contradicted itself. On the one hand, it apparently made every effort to foster local participation in government affairs, recognizing that it was in its own interests and also in the interests of the local peoples, if they were ever to be made genuinely loyal, to do so. On the other hand, though, it meted out severe retribution for all political or doctrinal heterodoxy, anything that seemed to challenge its rigidly-centralized authority. But if the regime's endless purges of its indigenous officials may be held responsible for some measure of the chronic shortage of such men, the measure for which it may be held responsible must be small indeed. The overwhelming weight of the evidence presented here indicates that the principal reason for the failure of the mountain peoples to play more than a very minor role in the administration of their own affairs lay in their fundamental inability to come to terms with the fact of continued Russian domination. For all its intentions, its efforts, its administrative reorganizations, and its streams of directives, the Soviet government patently failed to win acceptance from the majority of the mountaineers. For them it was still a foreign colonial administration. Although the Russian Communists came to the North Caucasus with definite progressive ideas for raising the material and cultural standards of the mountain peoples, their policy foundered from the outset upon the timeless rocks of local tradition.

During the purge trial of Bukharin, Rykov, Yagoda, and other leading Communist figures in March, 1938, for their alleged treasonable conspiracy to restore bourgeois capitalism in the Soviet Union, statements were made which strongly suggested the regime's sensitivity to the failure of its nationalities policy in the North Caucasus. The testimony of one V.I. Ivanov, a former second secretary of the Party in the region, stated that Bukharin, as leader of the so-called Rightist opposition, had been certain that "the North Caucasus would play a very important part in our struggle against the Party and the Soviet power", and had stated further

that, "we must make it our task to transform the North Caucasus into a Russian Vendee".<sup>110</sup> The testimony of Rykov, the former Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R., also stated that he and his cohorts paid "special attention to the North Caucasus" because of "the specific character of its traditions", in addition to its political and economic importance.<sup>111</sup> Such statements are revealing, whether one believes or not that the trial itself was a travesty of justice. For if these statements were authentic, and if they did in fact represent the actual views and plans of highly-informed conspirators, they prove beyond reasonable doubt that the North Caucasus was one of the Soviet Union's weakest areas, one in which deep-seated hatred for the regime still smouldered, waiting only to be fanned into open revolt. On the other hand, if these damning statements were words put into the mouths of the defendants by the Soviet authorities, and not their own views, it is revealed that the government was extremely conscious of its vulnerability in the North Caucasus, and was already pointing out the disloyalty of the population there. Taken either way, these statements present an oblique foreshadowing of the subsequent deportations.

Regardless of who said it, the characterizing of the North Caucasus as a possible "Russian Vendee" proved a profoundly apt description. The actual behaviour of the mountain peoples was in sharp contrast to the official perorations concerning their loyalty, when the German armies swept into the region in August-September, 1942. As late as that August, the Chechens and other peoples were still being praised in Soviet propaganda as "good" nations; the Chechens, and also the Ingushes and the Balkars, were reported to have played a prominent part in a large "anti-fascist" meeting held in Ordzhonikidze, and to have pledged their "boundless devotion to our beloved motherland, the Soviet Union, and the great Russian people".<sup>112</sup> And even after the Germans had already occupied large portions of the North Caucasus, in October, 1942, Kalinin issued a report on conditions in the mountains which said, in part:

The Caucasus is the most enlightening demonstration of the reforming, beneficial effect of the Soviet system on the psychology and character of people who, not without reason, saw danger to themselves everywhere. The Caucasians have now become a social people who see in the collective system their bulwark, the foundation of material prosperity and a higher intellectual life . . . The whole Caucasus has become one mountain village for its peoples. The whole Soviet land, from border to border, has become their beloved home. National enmity has given way to mutual understanding, <sup>113</sup> estrangement to cooperation . . . Yes, it is a miracle.

Further, Kalinin went on, the people of the North Caucasus were displaying their loyalty by offering determined resistance to the enemy, derailing trains, blowing up bridges, and destroying ammunition and fuel depots. <sup>114</sup> In actual fact, when the Germans reached the North Caucasus, they found that the insurrections of the mountaineers had already prepared the way for a change of regime. Their mass rising in the rear of Soviet forces already hard-pressed by the Germans had compelled the Soviet troops to fall back from Rostov to the Greater Caucasian Mountains without giving battle, holding fast only to the principal roads to the South and to the Grozny oil fields. <sup>115</sup> The advancing Germans reached only the outer fringes of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. before they were halted, but in the Karachay-Cherkess A.P. and the Kabardino-Balkar A.S.S.R. they were accorded a warm and generous welcome, though the Cherkess and the pro-Russian Kabardinians were rather more reserved in their enthusiasm than the Karachays and Balkars. The native leaders had already assumed authority in the Karachay capital, Mikoyan-Shakhar, in Klikhori, and in other centres; and these leaders were immediately recognized by the Germans and given control over local cultural and religious matters. The Germans also showed their recognition of the fact that the collective farms and harsh treatment of religion were the two most hated aspects of the Soviet system; collectivization was immediately abolished in the pastoral areas, the mosques which had been shut down were reopened, and Moslem religious holidays were celebrated under German aegis,

with exchanges of gifts between the Germans and the mountaineers. During their occupation of the Karachay region, the Germans were apparently singularly successful, finding no evidence of hostility among the local population; and though support for the Germans was less unanimous in the Kabardino-Balkar region, the native government approved by the German officers also received genuine popular backing during its sixty-five days of rule.<sup>116</sup> In all the regions of the North Caucasus they occupied, the Germans were able to form military units of local volunteers; that some of these were sent into action in the North Caucasus itself perhaps reflects the solid trust in which the mountaineers were held by the invaders.<sup>117</sup>

In all areas of the Soviet Union, the Germans placed the highest premium upon cooperation with the non-Russian nationalities — except, of course, the Jews — but this occupation policy was especially successful in the North Caucasus. The warm response the Germans found in satisfying only the most basic demands of the mountain peoples indicated the depth of discontent which two decades of Soviet rule had fostered. The question of land reform, and especially the breaking up of the collectives, genuinely free local elections for the mountaineers, and the ending of Moslem religious persecution were enough to assure the Germans of hardly qualified support; which speaks volumes about the failure of Soviet policy to win over the population. Seen in a longer view, the collaboration of the mountain peoples was, by almost any standard, far less pro-German than it was anti-Soviet and anti-Russian. The reforms which the Germans approved for the mountaineers were merely those which these peoples had craved for more than twenty years of Soviet rule, and which they had been denied. The anti-Russian, rather than pro-German, orientation of the North Caucasians was demonstrated by the stubborn refusals of their leaders during World War II to associate themselves or their military units with the Vlasov movement, which they regarded as only yet another manifestation of Russian nationalism, and by their continued insistence that the liberation of

their homelands from all vestiges of Russian rule and the pledge of their future independence and sovereignty were essential preconditions for cooperation with either Germans or Vlasovites.<sup>118</sup>

The deportation of the Karachays was carried out in December, 1943; the Chechens and Ingushes were rounded up and removed from their republic in February-March, 1944, and the Balkars were transported during March-April, 1944. The Karachay A.P. was ceded mostly to Georgia, with the remainder going to the Krasnodar and Stavropol territories and to the Cherkess A.P. The main portion of the Balkar territory was also ceded to Georgia, the remainder being retained in a newly-renamed Kabardinian A.S.S.R. The Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. was largely incorporated into the new Grozny Province, an extreme eastern strip being granted to Dagestan and the southernmost region also going to Georgia.<sup>119</sup> There are numerous reports that the deportation operations were carried out with the utmost brutality and considerable loss of life; the resistance of the Chechens was unusually and characteristically violent. Public admission of the deportations of the mountain peoples and the liquidations of their national territories was not made until 26 June, 1946, more than two years after the events. A decree was published in "Izvestiya" which announced together the measures which had been taken against the Chechens and the Crimean Tatars, and gave the following reasons for the measures:

. . . many Chechens and Crimean Tatars, encouraged by Germans agents, joined voluntarily units organized by the Germans and, together with Germans troops, engaged in armed combat with units of the Soviet Army; at the bidding of the Germans they also formed diversionary bands for struggle against Soviet authority in the rear; the majority of the population of the Chechen-Ingush and Crimean A.S.S.R.'s took no action to oppose these traitors to the fatherland.<sup>121</sup>

This laconic announcement indicates much about the realities of Soviet nationalities policy in the North Caucasus. Incidentally, like the deportation of the Kalmyks, the removal of the Karachays and Balkars was never officially announced, so far as

can be found and was discovered only later through indirect evidence. But to return to the decree above: it is at once obvious from the wording of the decree itself that the Chechens and Ingushes were not as nations guilty of widespread treason during World War II; they merely, as was admitted here, failed to restrain the minority who did actually collaborate with the enemy. The Chechens and Ingushes were denied the opportunity for general collaboration, since their territory, unlike those of the Karachays and Balkars, was penetrated only slightly by German forces. In other words, the Chechens and Ingushes were deported for continuing to behave in wartime in the same manner as they had behaved under Soviet rule for more than twenty years, and as they had behaved under Tsarist rule for more than sixty years before that. The scale of their treason during World War II could hardly have been higher, it must seem, than the scale of their "banditry" against Russian rule for almost a century. The Chechens and Ingushes were guilty, not of widespread treason during World War II, but of being peoples with long histories and enduring traditions of implacable hostility to Russian domination. Once again, the connection between Tsar and commissar materializes; Nicholas I is supposed to have remarked at the height of the Shamil resistance that he wished the entire population of the North Caucasus which was opposed to Russian rule could be either killed or deported. The Soviet government partly fulfilled this wish. While it probably failed to kill or remove all of the anti-Russian elements in the North Caucasus, it did, on the other hand, remove in entirety the most offensive nations, without bothering to differentiate between their loyal and disloyal sections. Totalitarianism, it would appear, tolerates or recognizes no middle ground between active support and active opposition.

During the long period of official silence about the deported peoples, between the decree published in "Izvestiya" in 1946 and the brief announcement in the "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda" in 1955 that gave the first hint of possible rehabilitation,

two controversies raged in the Soviet Union which concerned the deportees, especially those of the North Caucasus. The first of these concerned the status of Shamil, the great nineteenth century leader of the fight against Russia, and the second concerned the part played by the Chechens and Ingushes in the establishing of Soviet authority in the North Caucasus. Both controversies represented official efforts to blacken retrospectively the records of the deported peoples, and both also illustrated the regime's extreme policy of cultural russification.

In its earliest days, the Soviet government was almost entirely enthusiastic about Shamil and his long struggle against Russia. The fierce resistance of Shamil and his murids was highly praised, and the Soviet government sought to depict it as heroic and liberating, as an antipodal contrast to the colonialism and imperialism of the old Russian regime, and, in general, sought to give the impression that the ideals of Shamil had been realized for his people only after the Revolution. The first edition of the Large Soviet Encyclopaedia, volume 61, published in 1933, for instance, stated about the Murid movement:

The movement was aroused by the colonial policy of Russia, which robbed the original population of their forests, tore away the best parts of their land for Cossack colonization, and in every way supported and sustained the despotism of the local feudalists. The popular rising carried out against Russia and against the local ruling strata was basically anti-feudal.<sup>122</sup>

The piece went on to establish that the resistance of the mountaineers was beyond question a progressive movement, quoting Engels on the religious forms of medieval peasant uprisings, of which he said that "from the equality of the sons of God they deduced civil equality", quoting one of the Murid leaders who said "equality must exist among all Mohammedans", quoting Marx's own evaluation of Shamil, that he was "a great democrat", and saying that Shamil's general ideas and the movement through which he sought to realize his ideas produced an extraordinary unity even in the multiracial and multilingual Caucasus, succeeding in achieving unity in

"the direct struggle against the colonial policy of Tsarism for its national liberation".<sup>123</sup> And as late as 1947, a Soviet history textbook for high schools was still paying tribute to Shamil's qualities:

Shamil was an outstanding political leader and military commander . . . a superb orator . . . Shamil was a gifted organizer of the state structure of the mountaineers and their armed struggle against the Tsarist colonizers . . . Shamil's action was directed at that time not only against Tsarism, but against the local feudal lords and was democratic and progressive.<sup>124</sup>

With the deportations of the four North Caucasian peoples, however, and the final crystallization of the Soviet policy upholding the primacy of the Great Russians among the peoples of the U.S.S.R., there followed a reevaluation of Shamil in all Soviet literature. The new official line was finally laid down in 1950 in an article in the magazine, Bolshevik, which characterized Shamil's movement as reactionary because it was anti-Russian, pro-British and pro-Turkish, as having been undemocratic and lacking in popular support among the mountaineers, and as having been responsible for creating national dissension among them. On the other hand, the Tsarist conquest of the North Caucasus was now officially come to be regarded as a progressive event supported by all the advanced peoples in the region. To quote the central paragraphs of the article:

In the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries the peoples of the Caucasus were urgently faced with the problem of their future fate. They could have been engulfed and enslaved by backward and feudal Turkey and Persia, or they could have been annexed by Russia. Russian annexation was for them the only possible path for their economic and cultural development . . . Despite the arbitrariness and cruelty of the Tsarist colonizers, Russia's annexation of the Caucasus played a positive and progressive role for the history of the Caucasian nations. The proximity of the Russian nation, the common struggle along with the workers and peasants of Russia against the Tsarist autocracy, sharing in the advanced Russian culture, and contacts with the representatives of progressive Russian revolutionary thought, promoted the raising of the material and spiritual culture of the Caucasian nations and provided the stimulus for the development of the revolutionary movement of the Caucasian peoples.<sup>125</sup>

Shamil, as the leader of the struggle against Russia and the hero of the Caucasian mountaineers, thus became in Soviet eyes an "Anglo-Turkish agent" and his movement a manifestation of mere "Mohammedan fanaticism".<sup>126</sup> There was another modification in this line, however, beginning in 1956 with the rehabilitation of the deported mountain peoples imminent. The new position which gradually emerged appeared to be something of a compromise between the two extreme views previously upheld. Shamil was judged now to have had honourable motives in opposing the Tsars, but mistaken motives: honourable in that he was fighting for national liberation — progress as he understood it, but mistaken in that he was fighting against Russia — whose annexation of the North Caucasus brought genuine progress. The essential point of the post-deportation line was therefore not altered; "unification with Russia" was to be seen as the key issue in the history of the region, and all individuals and nations were to be judged solely in relation to their position on this issue. As Mr. Conquest has said: "nothing that justifies independence from Russia, in 1860 or in 1958, is to be tolerated".<sup>127</sup>

The second controversy which is of interest here was the public denunciation of the Soviet composer, V. Muradelli — whose name would seem to indicate his Caucasian origin — by no less a body than the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1948 for his opera, "The Great Friendship". Two points in the long resolution passed by the Central Committee are of particular relevance; in its criticism of Muradelli's score, it may be noted, the Central Committee made it quite plain that Russian models were the models which were to be imitated by Soviet artists, whatever their national background; and, in the second excerpt quoted below, it simply denied the accuracy of Muradelli's libretto and deliberately falsified the situation which did in fact exist in the Caucasus during the years 1918-20:

Trying to be 'pseudo-original', the composer Muradelli simply forgot the best tradition and experience of classical opera in general and of Russian classical opera in particular, although the latter is distinct by its internal content, its wealth of melodies, and the width of its diapason, by its national character, by its refined, beautiful, and clear musical form. These qualities of Russian classical opera made it the best opera in the world.<sup>128</sup> The libretto of the opera is historically false and artificial although it pretends to depict the struggle for Soviet authority and friendship of nations in the Northern Caucasus in the years 1918-20. While listening to the opera, one may gather the untrue impression that the Caucasian nations, such as the Georgians and the Ossetins, were then at loggerheads with the Russian nation; this is historically false because it was the Ingushes and the Chechens who represented in that period the obstacle<sup>129</sup> to the friendship of nations in the Northern Caucasus.

Once again the civilizing influence of Russia was invoked, Russia's mission to raise the cultural levels of all its peoples. So much for national cultural autonomy. In the second instance, proof is presented that history, under the Soviet regime, was merely politics projected into the past. Once the Chechens and Ingushes had been declared enemies of the Soviet state, it was thought necessary to prove that there was nothing to be said in their favour. To give the truth, that the Chechens and Ingushes were actually during those years the mainstay of the Soviet hold in the mountains would have reflected badly upon the judgment of the regime; that it could have been so mistaken as to ally itself, even temporarily, with these peoples, who had since proved themselves to be traitors and worse, would perhaps have led to questions concerning the government's infallibility — if the regime had been mistaken then, was it not possible that it was mistaken now? If it was admitted that the government could be wrong, was it not possible to question any of its actions and decisions? It is in the special nature of the totalitarian state that it must be thought infallible; this is one of the myths that totalitarian leaders must seek at all costs to maintain. And since in real life no one is infallible, it becomes necessary to alter the past, to prove that this and that did

not happen in quite this or that way, to turn defeats into victories, to change history so as to point up the correctness of the regime at all times. In this manner, the failure to achieve projected targets in Soviet economic plans was blamed upon foreign agents, "spies", "wreckers", as were the crushing defeats inflicted upon Soviet forces in the early part of World War II explained by German "treachery" and, at least in part, by the existence of undetected "fascist nations" among the Soviet Union's peoples, groups still infected with "bourgeois nationalism". That Stalin's nationalities policy was at all responsible for the different degrees of antipathy to Soviet rule shown by the national minorities was the question, of course, that could not be asked.

The rehabilitations of the four North Caucasian peoples and the Kalmyks were foreshadowed by scattered references to these peoples which began to appear in Soviet publications through 1955 and 1956, by the controversy which raged in the pages of Soviet historical journals through 1956 about the question of Shamil, and which resulted in the official attitude toward him and his movement being modified, but especially by the sensational "destalinization" speech to the 20th Party Congress on 24-5 February, 1956, by Nikita Khrushchev, then first secretary. Khrushchev denounced the deportations as "monstrous acts", and then went on to say:

Not only a Marxist-Leninist but also no man of common sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations responsible for inimical activity, including women, children, old peoples, Communists and Komsomols, to use mass repression against them, and to expose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual persons or groups of persons.<sup>130</sup>

Nevertheless, despite the indignant tone of this speech, the actual decrees rehabilitating the five deported groups and restoring to them their national territories were not made law for nearly a full year.<sup>131</sup> And the resettlement of the exiles was not expected to be completed until 1960, more than three years later.<sup>132</sup> While it is not the intention here to trace the course of the

rehabilitations of these peoples, it may be mentioned in passing that reports in Soviet publications indicate quite certainly that the mountaineers, particularly the Chechens, do not appear to have been more reconciled to the regime through their years in exile, and are in fact creating considerable difficulty in their return.<sup>133</sup>

The mountain peoples illustrate that analogies between the policies of their Tsarist and Soviet rulers are more than superficial. It is notable, first, that both regimes sought to achieve the same long-range goal in the North Caucasus: a secure and pacified region which would not provide ready allies for any enemy of the Russian state. (It is perhaps a curious fact about both regimes that security measures were a preoccupation, almost a psychopathic preoccupation, and that the Soviet government had even more reason than the Tsarist government had had to fear for the North Caucasus: because of the increasing importance of the oil fields in the North Caucasus itself, and because of its great dependence upon the oil from the major fields in Azerbaijan.) In the cases of both Tsarist and Soviet regimes, as it turned out, a secure North Caucasus meant, or came to be virtually synonymous with, a Russian North Caucasus, because of the stubborn failure of the mountain peoples of the region to adjust themselves to the altered conditions arising from their being incorporated into, first, a great Christian empire, and second, a modern totalitarian state, both of which were seeking to transform their ways of life. Broadly understood, russification was the policy which both regimes followed. The most salient point of friction between the Moslem mountaineers and their Russian rulers, either before or after the Revolution, would appear to have been without question the conflicts which russification brought to peoples whose consciences had been moulded by the laws of the Koran. Both the Christianity of the Tsars and the Communism of the Soviet government made revolutionary demands

upon the mountaineers, demanding that their subjects should renounce their religion which conditioned virtually every facet of their consciousness and activity before they would be regarded as loyal. In the North Caucasus, as has been seen, this was roughly equivalent to waving a red flag in front of a Bull, since the religious matrixes of the Moslem mountaineers were in their own way at least as intolerant and discriminatory as were either the religious or political motivations which prompted the actions of the successive Russian governments. Another very important congruity between Tsarist and Soviet policies was that both governments, when confronted with Islam at its most tenacious in the North Caucasus, proved unwilling or unable to adopt more moderate and patient methods in combatting it; both regimes sought with all resources they could muster to destroy or to undermine the Moslem faith in a short time. Direct persecution, indirect persecution through attacks upon religious leaders and institutions under the guise of social or political measures, attempts to infiltrate the faith and to set up or encourage other, rival churches, anti-Moslem propaganda: the methods chosen by both governments, though damaging to Islam — and, of course, infinitely more damaging under the Soviet regime because of the infinitely vaster scale of its resources, proved very largely ineffective in destroying the religious beliefs of the mountain population. It is a truism that religions flourish under persecution, one that is almost beyond the need of further demonstration.

It is also to be noted, moreover, that the Soviet government also continued the Tsarist policy of encouraging, either directly or indirectly, Russian settlement in and around the major centres; but again, under the Soviet regime this trend was very much accelerated and increased, particularly around Grozny and Maikop, the centres of the North Caucasian oil industry, where Russians continued to agglomerate, the native population never attaining more than minority status, even in its own capital city. Along with the Soviet government's land

policy, which could hardly have been more offensive to the mountaineers, waking as it did echoes of earlier seizures of native lands under the Tsars, the overwhelming weight of Russian dominance in the cities and towns must have made the mountaineers feel that there was little to choose between the policies of their present and their former masters.

And, in the last resort, both Tsarist and Soviet governments turned to the policy of deportation to solve the nationalities problem in the North Caucasus. Deportation of the mountaineers was not, of course, an idea original with the Soviet regime — witness the massive deportations of hundreds of thousands of Cherkess, Chechens, and others to Turkey following the final Russian conquest of the territory after the Crimean War, and the numerous smaller transfers of population within the territory which had taken place under the Tsars. In its deportations of thousands of mountaineers during the collectivization crisis and other periods of unrest, and even in its wholesale deportations of the four entire peoples during World War II, the Soviet government was in effect merely continuing another of the policies initiated by the old regime. Again, of course, Soviet operations were on a very much larger scale. But it would seem, in fact, that the increased scale of Soviet policy in the North Caucasus was its principal differentiating element from Tsarist policy; in almost all other respects, and certainly in its broad outlines, the Soviet government actually merely continued the measures of the Tsars.

Soviet policy may be seen as parallelling Tsarist policy also in its apparent long-range effects. It seems not only to have failed to reconcile the mountaineers to continued Russian domination, much less to win them over actively to the side of their rulers, but also to have strengthened and tempered the hostility of these peoples through the enlargement of the continuity of martyrdom of their religious leaders. Unlike the other peoples deported during World War II

and with whom they are associated, the Chechens and the other mountaineers appear never to have come even close to achieving any sort of genuine compromise with the Russian aliens, either the old ones or the new. Unlike the Volga Germans, who appear to have been reasonably satisfied with Soviet rule during its first years, when they derived considerable economic benefits from it, the mountaineers seem to have been dissatisfied with the Soviet government from the outset because of its failure actually to return to them the lands they had been promised and which, indeed, they still regarded as their historical legacy from which they had been cheated. Unlike the Crimean Tatars, whose political leaders were able to achieve an at least temporary workable compromise with the Soviet government, the mountaineers did not possess a westernized intelligentsia of the type the Crimean Tatars possessed, an intelligentsia dedicated to the idea of progress and able to accept, perhaps even support, Soviet attacks upon Islam as attacks upon a mutual enemy, a reactionary and anachronistic caste of mullahs. The mountaineers, still intensely animated by their religious beliefs, and looking still to their mullahs as their source of legal, as well as moral and spiritual authority, saw in the Soviet campaigns against Islam an attack upon the very foundations of their way of life and, therefore, a wedge of the broadest kind driven between them and their rulers. And unlike the Kalmyks, who in general seem to have accepted Soviet authority and Soviet policy more or less passively, the mountaineers believed strongly in the practice of violent resistance: not only did the mountains in which they lived make armed resistance to a much more powerful enemy a practical and even effective way of demonstrating their hostility and discontent that would have been impossible on the steppe; but also their belief in the most militant articles of the Moslem faith was in stark contrast to the Buddhism of the Kalmyks which stressed quietism and acceptance. They believed in challenging the government, whether it was a Tsarist or a Soviet government. The Soviet government, however, demonstrated that

it was quite a different kind of government from what the Tsarist regime had been, that though it shared many of the old regime's characteristics and followed its policies, it did not scruple to differentiate between loyal and disloyal citizens and was willing to deport entire peoples, not merely their rebellious elements.

### iii

The story of the mountain peoples and their fate under Soviet rule serves to illuminate brightly the principal threads of continuity which ran between the nationalities policies of the Tsarist and Soviet governments. The mountain peoples, of all those which were deported during World War II, were perhaps the group which continued in its own behaviour to act most nearly as it had under the Tsars. As has been seen, they in fact reached no working compromise with the Soviet authorities, as did the Volga Germans, the Crimean Tatars, and even the Kalmyks. They therefore presented the Soviet government with essentially the same problems they had presented to the Tsarist government; because of their particularly rugged physical environment and the peculiar difficulties that mountainous country presents for administration, communication, and pacification if it is necessary, because of their inability to be cowed by even the most extreme measures used against them, because of their exceptionally strong antipathies toward Russian rule, in some measure — in some considerable measure, one must think — traceable to their faith in Islam, and because of their willingness constantly to challenge their rulers more or less openly whenever the opportunity was given them, the task was to pacify them, rather than to win them over and to expect from them positive support. In its attempts to pacify the mountain peoples, the Soviet government

revealed itself to be at least as brutal and as arbitrary as the Tsarist regime had been. And, of course, in its deportations of the Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars, the Soviet government showed that it could exceed even the mass deportations undertaken by the Tsarist government in the eighteen-sixties, which were described, it will be recalled, as "such a disaster as has rarely befallen humanity". And in other respects, too, the Soviet government exceeded its predecessor: for instance, in the extent of its interference with the traditional customs and habits of the mountaineers. The Soviet government's grand attempt to give the mountain peoples a new basis for their relations with their families, husbands, wives, children, new values, new dispositions — in fact, its attempt to instill a new religion among the mountain peoples, at the same time as it tried to change radically the material bases of their lives — was, of course, much more than the Tsarist government had ever tried to do, more integral, more comprehensive, more rational than the comparatively puny efforts made by Russian Orthodox missionaries and soldiers to convert these peoples. And yet, for four of the groups of the North Caucasus, at least, Soviet policy would seem to have failed just as badly as Tsarist policy — even more badly, perhaps, in view of its tremendously more organized and official character, and the effort, thought, and expense which it entailed.

It might be objected that any government, when faced with a population so unremittingly hostile as the Chechens, say, would have been necessarily very circumscribed and limited in the number of alternatives open to it. When subject peoples are not only willing to rise in revolt against the occupying power, but also are in fact constantly in revolt, at least a portion of them, what is a government to do? Obviously, there are at least two things a government can do: either wage war upon a portion of its subjects because of its revolt, or try to seek the causes for the unrest and discord, and remedy them. The Soviet government, like the Tsarist government, invariably chose the first alternative, relying chiefly on

coercion and very little on persuasion. If the mountain peoples, then, could be described as having embodied the nationalities problem in very extreme form, at the same time the nationalities policy of the Soviet government was manifested in the North Caucasus in its most extreme forms. There is much to said for the study of any government through the extremes of its policies; perhaps it may even be asserted that it is only when the extremes of a government's policies are examined that it is genuinely possible to say to what extent those policies differ from or resemble the policies of other governments. All regimes, for example, obviously depend to some degree on coercion; but it does not follow from this that all regimes are the same. What matters, surely, in any particular case, is not whether this or that government relies on force, but how much it relies on force, particularly as an instrument of policy. And the answer to this question with regard to the Soviet regime and its nationalities policy could not really be given unless the Soviet authorities had in some instance been confronted by a population strongly predisposed to resist whatever measures they wished to impose upon it. There is a certain value, therefore, in taking Soviet nationalities policy in the North Caucasus as a kind of model from which conclusions may be drawn about the nature of Soviet nationalities policy in general, for in the North Caucasus the regime was indeed confronted by just such a population. It is abundantly clear from the foregoing accounts of Soviet policy in the North Caucasus that, like the officials of the Tsars, the Soviet officials depended upon coercion as the chief method of achieving their government's ends, seeking to enforce principally by force their own patterns of conformity upon a population unwilling to accept them, heedless of the further opposition that was raised, and regardless of the immense cost involved in terms of human suffering and human life.

This was the case also, of course, with the other deported peoples, whose non-conformity did not manifest itself in such violent ways as did the non-

conformity of the Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays and Balkars, whose general patterns of behaviour under Soviet rule seem to have been little marred by violence, except in their resistance to collectivization, and whose progress under Communism would seem on the whole to have been hardly below average. The Kalmyks would appear to have been very resistant to the changes introduced by the Soviet regime which struck at the very heart of their traditional semi-nomadic culture, but their resistance seems to have been of a passive nature; among the Crimean Tatars, a considerable number of their leaders made genuine efforts to cooperate with the Soviet authorities, even though their concern for the depressed condition of their Tatar peasantry brought down upon their heads denunciations of "Tatar nationalism"; the Volga Germans, indeed, seem to have continued under the Soviet regime to be, in the main, obedient and industrious citizens. Yet all were finally torn up from their homes and surroundings and deported, after bearing the regime's oppressive attacks for more than twenty years, and after these attacks had seemingly failed in their purpose.

If it is asked just what the purpose of the Soviet government's concerted attacks upon these peoples was, the answer must, of course, be a complex one, if it is to be at all complete. But if a partial answer will suffice, it would seem to have been the principle goal of Soviet nationalities policy to teach the North Caucasus mountaineer, the Kalmyk herdsman, the Crimean Tatar peasant, and the Volga German farmer to accept without reservation the ideals and habits of mind of the — one almost writes, the Leningrad worker, but it is probably more accurate to write — men in the Kremlin, or what they say the Leningrad worker should possess in these lines. And it is here, in its broadest as well as its most narrow sense, that the nationalities policy of the Soviet regime is seen to converge with the nationalities policy of the Tsarist regime. Russification was the goal of both, whether it was admittedly so, as it was under the Tsars, or

whether it was merely "unofficially" so, as it was under the Soviet regime.

In a very genuine sense, then, it may be said that Soviet nationalities policy brought the russification policy of the Tsars to a new and heightened realization, seeking to russify the non-Russians in the name of internationalism, to disrupt and to change the habits, sentiments, and dispositions which centuries of national experience had wrought. Despite the extreme contrasts in the ideas of the two regimes, their sentiments appear to have remained very nearly constant, and in the long run it would seem that it is always the constant that prevails over the variable. It has often been remarked that the nationalism of the Russians is one of their most enduring characteristics as a people, a constant sentiment which is a product of their nation's unique and sorrowful history. But it would appear that both the Tsarist and Soviet governments of Russia, in seeking to harness and manipulate the profoundly powerful force of Russian nationalism, seeing in it a potent force for unity, and feeding it upon fear and misunderstanding of foreigners, both those outside and those within the Russian state, either disregarded or were prepared to countenance the disunity which any doctrine of official nationality, undisguised and blatant or thinly disguised as Soviet patriotism, would bring when it was embraced in a multinational state and made the basis for unity. For the nationalism of other peoples, like Russian nationalism, was also a powerful sentiment, as little likely to be changed within a generation, or even two or three generations, as many other enduring types of human behaviour which change only with a slowness comparable to the kinds of change measured by geologists. Nationalism — minority nationalism — was looked upon as distasteful and dangerous by the rulers of both Tsarist and Soviet Russia. The present Soviet rulers explain that it is illogical and irrational, that it does not make sense. But whether or not it makes sense, is rational, or logical, like drunkenness, suicide, religion, love, it continues to play an important part in the behaviour of human beings.

The crimes of the Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, and Balkars were that they stubbornly refused to behave and to think as nineteenth or twentieth century Russians, which they were not, or were unable to transform themselves rapidly into what they were not. Not rapidly enough, anyway, for the narrow Russian nationalism of which both Tsarist and Soviet governments were the bearers.

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Notes: IV

<sup>1</sup>At this point it becomes quite obvious that the line which divides history from commentary on current affairs, a line often not very clearly demarcated, has been crossed. To attempt here to assess the overall or long-range significance of the changes in Soviet nationalities policy introduced since the death of Stalin would, it is felt, be presumptuous and rash in the light of the very fragmentary and incomplete information which is available, and would, in addition, take this essay beyond its necessary limits. Further comment on Soviet policy since 1953 is for these reasons confined to those specific measures which have had some direct effect upon the fortunes of the deported peoples since that time: principally the measures relating to their rehabilitation and their being amnestied—in the case of the Volga Germans, to their being amnestied without rehabilitation, and in the case of the Crimean Tatars, neither amnesty nor rehabilitation. It is not felt, incidentally, that defence need be made for the assumption which underlies all references to post-Stalin Soviet policy, which is stated explicitly above: that, despite what seem to be important changes in the methods and emphases of present Soviet nationalities policy, its ultimate goal has not been altered. The onus of proof to the contrary would seem to lie upon those who question the validity of this assumption; and, in another sense, it would seem to depend upon the future actions of the Soviet government. Certainly there is as yet not sufficient evidence available to justify a belief that Khrushchov has either altered the direction or changed the goal of the Stalinist policy of minority assimilation.

<sup>2</sup>Carr, op. cit., III, p. 271

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 273-4; Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 242

<sup>4</sup>Trotsky, op. cit., p. 374

<sup>5</sup>Stalin, Sochineniya (Moscow: State Publishing House, 1946—), IV, p. 365: in 1920 Stalin stated the Bolshevik position with regard to the non-Russian borderlands in straightforward and unequivocal terms, as an "either/or" proposition: "Either they go along with Russia, and then the toiling masses of the border regions will be freed from imperialist oppression; or they go along with the entente, and then the yoke of imperialism is inevitable. There is no their course".

<sup>6</sup>Deutscher, op. cit., pp. 217-27. These pages offer a lucid and concise summary of the factors responsible for the regime's loss of support just at its moment of victory, which forced the retreats from dogmatic Bolshevism embodied in the "reforms" of N.E.P.

<sup>7</sup>Trotsky, op. cit., p. 61

<sup>8</sup>Stalin, Sochineniya, XIII, pp. 32-3.

<sup>9</sup>Dvenatsatyi S'ezd Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (Bol'shevikov), Stenograficheskiy Otchet—17-25 Aprelya, 1923 g. (Moscow: 1923), p. 472

<sup>10</sup>Pipes, op. cit., p. 273

<sup>11</sup>Carr, op. cit., I, p. 367

<sup>12</sup>Trotsky, Literature and Revolution (New York: Russell and Russell, n.d. 1924), p. 220.

<sup>13</sup>Walt W. Rostow, The Dynamics of Soviet Society (New York: Mentor, 1954), p. 84.

<sup>14</sup>Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), p. 23.

<sup>15</sup>David Riesman, with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd, abridged ed. (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953), pp. 21-28 passim. The length of this note from Riesman's description of "tradition-direction" is justified, one feels, by the clarity with which it sets out the distinguishing characteristics of this type of society: ". . . total population does not increase or does so very slowly, for the number of births equals roughly the number of deaths, and both are very high. In societies of this type, a high proportion of the population is young, life expectancy is low, and the turnover of generations is extremely rapid. Such societies are said to be in the phase of 'high growth potential'; for should something happen to decrease the very high death rate (greater production of food, new sanitary measures, new knowledge of the causes of disease, and so on), a 'population explosion' would result . . . The society of high growth potential develops in its typical members a social character whose conformity is insured by their tendency to follow tradition. . . The phase of high growth potential characterizes more than half the world's population . . . most areas of the world relatively untouched by industrialization. . . these societies tend to be stable in the sense that social practices, including the 'crimes' that keep population down, are institutionalized and patterned . . . In viewing such a society we inevitably associate the relative stability of the man-land ratio, whether high or low, with the tenacity of custom and social structure . . . the conformity of the individual tends to be dictated to a very large degree by power relations among the various age and sex groups . . . relations which have endured for centuries and are modified but slightly, if at all, by successive generations. The culture controls behavior minutely . . . careful and rigid etiquette governs the fundamentally influential sphere of kin relationships. Moreover, the culture, in addition to its economic tasks, provides ritual, routine, and religion to occupy and orient everyone. Little energy is directed toward finding new solutions to the age-old problems, let us say, of agricultural technique or 'medicine', the problems to which people are acculturated . . . In such societies a person who might have become at a later historical stage an innovator or rebel . . . is drawn instead into roles like those of the shaman or sorcerer . . . that make a socially acceptable contribution . . . only very rarely is one driven out of his social world . . . A whole way of life—an outlook on chance, on children, on the place of women, on sexuality, on the very meaning of existence—lies between the societies in which human fertility is allowed to take its course and toll and those which prefer to pay other kinds of toll to cut down on fertility by calculation, and, conceivably . . . by a decline in sexual energy itself."

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. 28-33 passim. Only a brief note seems necessary here to establish that the Volga Germans were, quite clearly, the type of society so well-defined and described by Professor Tawney: ". . . Because of improved methods of agriculture the land is able to support more people, and these in turn produce still

more people . . . Such a society is characterized by increased personal mobility, by a rapid accumulation of capital (teamed with devastating technological shifts), and by an almost constant expansion: intensive expansion in the production of goods and people . . . the source of direction is 'inner' in the sense that it is implanted early in life by the elders and directed toward generalized but nonetheless inescapably destined goals . . . the rapid accumulation of productive capital requires that people be imbued with the 'Protestant ethic'".

<sup>17</sup>Bolshaya Sovyetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1st ed. (Moscow: State Scientific Institute, 1926-48), 41 (1939), p. 601. Hereafter noted as B.S.E.

<sup>18</sup>B.R., "On National Cadres of Specialists", Revolutsiya i Natsionalnost 10 (1935), p. 53.

<sup>19</sup>A. Telikhanov, "On Soviet National Cadres", Revolutsiya i Natsionalnost 12 (1935), p. 67.

<sup>20</sup>B.S.E., op. cit., p. 603

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 596

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 64 (1933), p. 239

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 41, 597.

<sup>24</sup>Stalin, Problems of Leninism, authorized translation from the 11th ed. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1945), pp. 301 ff.

<sup>25</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 74.

<sup>26</sup>A. Welsch, "The Working Population of the German Socialist Countryside", Revolutsiya i Natsionalnost, 1 (1936), p. 57.

<sup>27</sup>Kolarz, loc. cit.

<sup>28</sup>Telikhanov, op. cit., p. 68.

<sup>29</sup>Carr, op. cit., III, pp. 305-82, 426-39.

<sup>30</sup>"Moscow News" (16 January, 1939).

<sup>31</sup>Wolfgang Leonhard, Child of the Revolution (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1958), pp. 75-125. An eye-witness account of the confusions during this period.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 170

<sup>33</sup>"Ukaz Verhovnovo Sovyeta SSSR, 38, 2 Sentyabrya, 1941 g.", Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Prizidiuma Verhovnovo Sovyeta SSSR, 1938-Iyul', 1956 gg., (Moscow: State Publishing House of Legal Literature, 1956), p. 40.

<sup>34</sup>"Ukaz Verhovnovo Sovyeta SSSR, 40, 7 Sentyabrya, 1941 g.", ibid., p. 41.

<sup>35</sup>"The New York Times", (25 September, 1941).

<sup>36</sup>Leonhard, op. cit., p. 135.

<sup>37</sup>Osteuropa-Recht, I (July, 1958), cited in Conquest, op. cit., pp. 144-5.

"Considering the fact that the existing restrictions in the legal position of German Special Settlers and members of their families, who were deported to various regions of the country, are no longer necessary in future, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. decides:

1. Germans and members of their families who at the time of the Great Patriotic War were exiled to a Special Settlement are to be released from attachment to the Special Settlement and freed from the administrative control of the organs of the M.V.D. The same is valid for German citizens of the U.S.S.R. who after their repatriation from Germany were put in a Special Settlement.

2. It is laid down that the revocation of the restrictions on the Germans connected with Special Settlement does not imply the return of the property confiscated in connection with the deportation, and further they do not have the right to return to the regions from which they were deported."

It is to be noted that the Soviet government treated the Germans even more harshly than the Tsarist government did; the Duma's declaration on the deportation of the Germans in 1916 had stipulated that they be compensated for their losses.

<sup>38</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., pp. 75-6.

<sup>39</sup>"Pravda" (4 February, 1960).

<sup>40</sup>Deutscher, op. cit., p. 222.

<sup>41</sup>Carr, op. cit., pp. 467-89.

<sup>42</sup>Dvenatsatyi S'ezd Rossiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (Bol'shevikov), Stenograficheskiy Otchet, p. 24.

<sup>43</sup>Trotsky, Stalin, p. 417.

<sup>44</sup>Solomon M. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Union (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1951), p. 270.

<sup>45</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., pp. 78-9.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Schwarz, loc. cit.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Kolarz, op. cit., p. 79.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-45 (London: MacMillan, 1957), p. 261; Conquest, op. cit., p. 87.

<sup>52</sup>B.S.E., 35 (1937), p. 302

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 318

<sup>54</sup>Kolarz, loc. cit.

<sup>55</sup>Schwarz, op. cit., p. 69

<sup>56</sup>Jacob Ornstein, "Soviet Language Policy: Theory and Practice", The Slavonic and East European Journal, XVII (1959), p. 7.

<sup>57</sup>Schwarz, loc. cit.

<sup>58</sup>B.S.E., op. cit., p. 320.

<sup>59</sup>Dallin, loc. cit.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 262.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 418.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid.

<sup>63</sup>Nicholas Poppe, "The Crimean Tatars—Annihilation or Survival?", The Ukrainian Quarterly, VIII (1952), pp. 220-24.

<sup>64</sup>"Izvestiya" (4 June, 1952).

<sup>65</sup>B.S.E., 2nd ed., 23 (1953), p. 547.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., pp. 559-60.

<sup>67</sup>B.S.E., 1st ed., 30 (1937), p. 760.

<sup>68</sup>Carr, op. cit., I, p. 367.

<sup>69</sup>—Borisov, Kalmykia (Moscow: 1926), cited in Kolarz, op. cit., p. 84  
Cf. B.S.E., loc. cit., where it was claimed that the last "bandits" were eliminated in Kalmykia in 1926.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., pp. 84-5.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

<sup>72</sup>Schwarz, loc. cit.

<sup>73</sup>Conquest, op. cit., p. 86.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid.

<sup>75</sup>B.S.E., loc. cit.

<sup>76</sup>V. Pomerantsev, "The Locale of Chauvinist Activity and Methods of Fighting It", Sovetskaya Yustitsiya, 19 (1932), pp. 18 ff., cited in Schwarz, op. cit., p. 295.

<sup>77</sup>B.S.E., loc. cit.

<sup>78</sup>B.R., loc. cit.

<sup>79</sup>O.F., "On Kalmyk Literature", Revolutsiya i Natsionalnosti, 6 (1934), p. 45.

<sup>80</sup>Poetsiya Kalmykii (Moscow: State Publishing House, 1940), pp. 27-9.

<sup>81</sup>B.S.E., op. cit., p. 757.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p. 745; "Soviet War News" (18 January, 1943).

<sup>83</sup>Carr, op. cit., p. 365.

<sup>84</sup>Dallin, op. cit., p. 252.

<sup>85</sup>R. A. Bauer, A. Inkeles, C. Kluckhohn, How the Soviet System Works (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 223.

<sup>86</sup>"Soviet War News" (9 February, 1943).

<sup>87</sup>Nikita S. Khrushchov, Special Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 24-25 February, 1956, annotated by Boris I. Nikolaevsky (New York: the New Leader, n.d.), p. S44. Khrushchov's speech only confirmed what had earlier been suspected, however, from such Soviet sources as B.S.E., 2nd ed., 3 (1950), p. 278, which gave 26 December, 1943, as the date of the founding of Astrakhan Province.

<sup>88</sup>Cf. Conquest, op.cit., pp. 63-4.

<sup>89</sup>B.S.E., op. cit., pp. 278-85.

<sup>90</sup>"Pravda" (4 February, 1960).

<sup>91</sup>Whether a territory of the Soviet Union is to be administered as an autonomous republic or as an autonomous province does not seem to depend on the number of its total population, but, rather, on the number of its titular population. On the one hand, no hard and fast rule seems to apply. On the other hand, however, it has been noted that the Jews were promised that their autonomous province of Birobidzhan would be raised to autonomous republic status when its Jewish population reached the 100,000 mark (Kolarz, The Peoples of the Soviet Far East (London: George Phillips, 1954), p. 177. The Kalmyk A.S.S.R. was the smallest autonomous

republic in the Soviet Union in 1939, with a total population of 220,723 of which 134,271 were Kalmyks. The largest autonomous provinces in 1939 had titular populations ranging from about 65,000 to between 80-90,000. This was, of course, only one of the reasons why the reestablishment of the Kalmyk territory as an autonomous province was seen to imply a quite drastic decline in the number of Kalmyks.

<sup>92</sup>Pipes, op. cit., p. 223; Kolarz, op. cit., p. 183.

<sup>93</sup>Trotsky, op. cit., p. 268.

<sup>94</sup>A. Todorski, "Krasnaya armiya v gorakh", Voyennii Vestnik (1924), pp. 44-5, cited in Allen and Muratoff, op. cit., pp. 509-10.

<sup>95</sup>Conquest, op. cit., p. 86.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., p. 85; R. Karcha, "Genocide in the Northern Caucasus", The Caucasian Review, II (1956), p. 83.

<sup>97</sup>"Pravda" (8 September, 1937).

<sup>98</sup>Karcha, op. cit., pp. 83-4.

<sup>99</sup>Dallin, op. cit., p. 244.

<sup>100</sup>N. Feoktistov, "The Literary Organization of the North Caucasus", Revolutsiya i Natsionalnosti, 6 (1934), p. 43.

<sup>101</sup>Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies, p. 187.

<sup>102</sup>"Second All-Union Congress of Godless Pedagogists", Antireligioznik, 11 (1931), pp. 74-5.

<sup>103</sup>K. Tobolov, "On National Cadres", Sovetskoye Stroitel'stvo, 7-8 (1933), p. 34.

<sup>104</sup>Telikhanov, op. cit., p. 67.

<sup>105</sup>T. Ayupov, "The Soviet Apparatus in Chechen-Ingushia", Revolutsiya i Natsionalnosti, 2 (1936), pp. 41-3.

<sup>106</sup>S. Dimanshtein, "The Nationalities Policy of the Soviet Power and M.I. Kalinin", Revolutsiya i Natsionalnosti, 4 (1934), p. 10.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid.

<sup>108</sup>Telikhanov, op. cit., p. 69.

<sup>109</sup>Tobolov, loc. cit.

<sup>110</sup>Report on the Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites, English ed. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1938), pp. 118-21 passim.

- 111 Ibid., pp. 164-6 passim.
- 112 "Soviet War News" (3 September, 1942).
- 113 "Soviet War News" (6 October, 1942).
- 114 Ibid.
- 115 Dallin, loc. cit.
- 116 Ibid., pp. 245-7.
- 117 Ibid., p. 540.
- 118 Ibid., pp. 610-12.
- 119 Conquest, op. cit., p. 56.
- 120 Vassam Ghiray Djabagui, "Soviet Colonization in the Caucasus", The Caucasian Review, II (1956), p. 56. Many unofficial accounts testify to this.
- 121 "Izvestiya" (26 July, 1954).
- 122 B.S.E., 1st ed., 61 (1933), pp. 804-5.
- 123 Ibid., p. 805.
- 124 A.M. Pankratova et al. Istoriya SSSR (Moscow: State Educational-Pedagogical Publication of the Ministry of Education of the R.S.F.S.R., 1947), II, pp. 174-5.
- 125 M.D. Bagirov, "On the Problem of the Character of the Murid Movement and Shamil", Bolshevik, 13 (1950), p. 31.
- 126 B.S.E., 2nd ed., 19 (1953), p. 270.
- 127 Conquest, op. cit., p. 152; this author traces the main outlines of the whole Shamil controversy in ibid., pp. 72-81, 148-53.
- 128 "Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party", Bolshevik, 10 (1948), p. 10; "Pravda" (11 February, 1948).
- 129 Ibid., p. 13.
- 130 Khrushchov, op. cit., p. S45.

<sup>131</sup>"Pravda" (12 February, 1957).

<sup>132</sup>Ibid.

<sup>133</sup>Cf. "Groznerskii Rabochii" (12 January, 31 January, 25 March, 1958),  
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