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Parliamentary control of defence in Canada, 1945-1962. Lazar, Harvey 1963

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PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF DEFENCE IN CANADA, 1945-1962 by HARVEY LAZAR B.Sc, McGill University, 1960 A.THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Ap r i l , 1963 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r -m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g of t h i s t h e s i s ,f or . s c h o l a r l y purposes may. be g r anted by the Head o f my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . . I t i s understood t h a t copying, or p u b l i -c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department of The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia,. Vancouver.8, Canada. Date ••/% /TQ. " i i ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis is to examine the degree to which the Parliament of Canada was able to control the defence policy, administration and expenditures of the Canadian government in the 1945-1962 period. Because of the distribution of power between the two houses of Parliament, the thesis i s primarily concerned with the House of Commons. In the second last chapter, however, the role of the Senate is analyzed. The House of Commons has four principal (although not mutually exclusive) techniques through which i t attempts to exercise control. These include c r i t i c a l debate, control of finances, select committees and the question period. The use of each of these techniques i s analyzed separately. Also, each of the four i s analyzed with reference to the party in opposition. Hence for each technique, the 1945-1957 and the 1957-1962 periods were dealt with separately. The analysis of the defence debates and question period indicated striking differences in the pattern of opposition between the two periods. In the 1957-1962 period the Liberal opposition was concerned primarily with destroying the prospects of the government for the ensuing election. Hence the Liberals strove to discredit the defence programme of the government. Policy and p o l i t i c s were the major issues. Both in the debates and the • • • 111 question per iod the oppos i t ion deal t harshly and exhaustively with the defence p o l i c y of the government. The L i b e r a l oppos i t ion v i r t u a l l y ignored, however, the adminis trat ion of the defence departments. In contras t , the Progressive Conservative opposi t ion of the 1945-1957 per iod devoted most of i t s energies , during question time and the debates, to the implementation of p o l i c y and adminis trat ion of defence. The ir e f for t s were culminated by t h e i r success i n obstruct ing the 1955 amendment to the Defence Production A c t . On the other hand, the Progressive Conservatives d id not debate c r i t i c a l l y the major steps taken i n the develop-ment of Canadian defence p o l i c y . Indeed, they never questioned the broad defence road that the government chose to fo l low. House of Commons c o n t r o l of defence expenditures was a myth. No d i r e c t c o n t r o l over the estimates was exercised. Nor d id the debates i n Supply serve, even i n d i r e c t l y , to ind ica te that the House of Commons s t i l l re ta ined contro l of the purse. Moreover, s tatutory contro ls were less e f f ec t ive for defence than the other functions of government. In the 1945 to 1957 p e r i o d , se lect committees were appointed with post -audi t functions only . In f i v e of these years the Publ ic Accounts Committee deal t with i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n defence expenditures as a r e s u l t of i t s examination of the i v annual Report of the Audi tor General . Because of i t s broad dut i e s , c ircumscribed powers and p a r t i s a n atmosphere, however, th i s Committee was not e s p e c i a l l y e f f e c t i v e . In 1951, however, a f t er completing i t s examination of the Audi tor General 's Report , the Publ i c Accounts Committee deal t s p e c i f i c a l l y with defence expenditures and served u s e f u l l y to inform members of current developments i n the defence establishment. The work of the 1951 Publ i c Accounts Committee was continued by the Spec ia l Committee on Defence Expenditures that met between 1951 and 1953. This Committee, despite the lack of permanent s t a f f , rece ived an enormous amount of evidence on the adminis trat ion of defence. I t s usefulness was cut down, however, by the p a r t i s a n atmosphere which prevented the Committee from making construct ive reports to the House. A f t e r deal ing with the C u r r i e Report i n 1953, the Committee was not re-appointed. Thus, the only e f f ec t i ve and continuous post -audit scrut iny was c a r r i e d out by the Defence Branch of the Of f i ce of the Audi tor Genera l . I t s e f f i cacy was hampered too, however, by the f a i l u r e of the House to develop a technique for deal ing r e g u l a r l y with Report; for the House proper never debated the Audi tor General*s Report and the Publ ic Accounts Committee d i d not meet r e g u l a r l y during these years . Since 1957, the Publ i c Accounts Committee has met V annually and reported to the House without p a r t i s a n in ter ference , examples of i n e f f e c t i v e adminis trat ion and waste. Construct ive recommendations have often been inc luded . The Committee thus has not only strengthened i t s own usefulness as an e f fec t ive organ of post -audi t c o n t r o l . I t has also increased the ef fect iveness of the Audi tor General by guaranteeing more p u b l i c i t y for h i s annual report than i t had been rece iv ing i n e a r l i e r years . These years a lso marked the i n i t i a l ventures i n pre-audit c o n t r o l through se lect committee. In 1958 and 1960 the defence estimates were deal t with through these committees. Although the work of these committees, e spec ia l l y the 1958 committee, was an improvement over the performances of Committee of Supply, they appeared to have no inherent advantages over what a bet ter informed Committee of Supply could reasonably be expected to accomplish. Moreover, there was evidence that these se lect committees might be used as the foca l point for i n t e r e s t group pressures . F i n a l l y , the defence p o l i c y discussions which accompanied the review of the estimates c l e a r l y would have been more e f f ec t ive had they been held i n the House of Commons. Thus, s ince the Senate played no s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e , the record of Parliament i n c o n t r o l l i n g defence was very poor. There was no e f f ec t ive pre -audi t contro l of expenditure and v i pos t -audi t c o n t r o l was at no time comprehensive. Defence debates i n the 1945-1957 per iod seldom probed into the i m p l i c -at ions of p o l i c y dec i s ions . In more recent years , although the debates have been more comprehensive, they have not been at a very h igh l e v e l of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n . Both these shortcomings, i t might be noted, were c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to the dearth of information a v a i l a b l e on defence. I t i s suggested that a se lect standing committee of the House might poss ib ly help to strengthen parliamentary c o n t r o l . Such a committee, i f l e f t to invest igate problems of admin i s tra t ion , technology and weaponry, as we l l as past expenditures ( a l l matters of fact) might serve two purposes. F i r s t , i t might accumulate s u f f i c i e n t re levant information to permit more sophis t icated p o l i c y debates and more informative d iscuss ion of the estimates. Second, i t would permit be t ter contro l of past expenditure through de ta i l ed and comprehensive i n v e s t i g a t i o n of defence. v i i i ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would l i k e to thank Professor Donald V. Smiley for h i s ass is tance and patience i n the preparat ion of th i s t h e s i s . Although we have disagreed about many of the ideas set out i n the t h e s i s , h i s numerous c r i t i c i s m s and suggestions have been inva luable . N a t u r a l l y , however, for a l l the opinions and conclusions expressed i n the thes i s , I alone assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I would a lso l i k e to express my grat i tude to Miss M. Joan O'Rourke, Miss Maureen F . Wi l son , Miss Audrey Mal in and e spec ia l l y Miss Susan L . Anderson of the S o c i a l Sciences D i v i s i o n of the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia L i b r a r y . Without t h e i r cooperation and ass is tance the task would have been impossible . F i n a l l y , I would l i k e to thank Miss M o l l i e Chapman for Her many hours of work i n the typing of the t h e s i s . v i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION: 1 SCOPE AND METHOD CHAPTER II - CONTROL OF DEFENCE POLICY, 1945-1957: 29 THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE CHAPTER III - CONTROL OF DEFENCE ADMINISTRATION, 68 1947-1957: THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE CHAPTER IV - CONTROL OF DEFENCE POLICY AND 109 ADMINISTRATION, 1957-1962: THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE CHAPTER V - HOUSE OF COMMONS: 157 CONTROL OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURE CHAPTER VI - COMMITTEE CONTROL OF DEFENCE, 1945-1957: 189 CHAPTER VII - COMMITTEE CONTROL OF DEFENCE, 1957-1962: 241 CHAPTER V I H - THE TECHNIQUE OF THE QUESTION PERIOD, 272 1945-1962: CHAPTER IX - THE ROLE OF THE SENATE 288 CHAPTER X - CONCLUSION 302 APPENDIX 338 FOOTNOTES 340 BIBLIOGRAPHY 363 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: SCOPE AND METHOD Perhaps the greatest single challenge confronting the Canadian government of today i s that of providing for the country Ts security. Threatened by an arsenal that could end c i v i l i z e d l i f e on t h i s continent, and hindered by the limited economic resources of the nation, the government i s faced with a predicament that apparently defies solution. And yet none oppose the idea that some answer to the seemingly i n e v i t a b l e disaster must be found. Indeed, i t i s to avoid such a calamitous end that the defence and foreign p o l i c i e s of t h i s government are primarily directed; and an important pre-r e q u i s i t e to both of these i s strong and f l e x i b l e executive leadership. The problem of defence gives r i s e i n turn to a second d i f f i c u l t y , that of re c o n c i l i n g the growth i n executive power with the t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l values. I t i s with a p a r t i c u l a r aspect of t h i s second problem that I s h a l l be concerned i n the pages that follow - the record of the Canadian Parliament i n c o n t r o l l i n g defence 1 2 p o l i c y , administration and expenditures since the Second World War. In the f i r s t h a l f of the twentieth century, peacetime Canadian defence p o l i c y , because of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with the United States of America, the supremacy of the B r i t i s h Navy and the l e v e l of contemporary m i l i t a r y technology, was l i t t l e concerned with the p o s s i b i l i t y that a d i r e c t attack might be launched against Canada. I t i s true that a t i n y permanent force and a somewhat larger militia'*" were maintained during these years, but t h e i r primary raison d TStre was not the defence of Canadian t e r r i t o r y against external aggression but rather to serve as a nucleus around which larger forces might be mobilized i n the event of a war over-seas. This "perfect security" enjoyed by Canadians during these years made the defence function a simple one and a r e l a t i v e l y unim-portant aspect of the business of Canadian government. By the end of World War Two, the era of "perfect security" had drawn to a close. The permanent revolution i n m i l i t a r y technology brought to an abrupt end Canada's i s o l a t i o n from areas of armed c o n f l i c t . And with the emergence of the Soviet Union as a p o t e n t i a l enemy, i t became necessary for the government to re-appraise i t s function i f Canadian security were to be maintained i n the years ahead. Thus, for the f i r s t time since the nineteenth century, a Canadian government was forced to take p o s i t i v e measures to ensure the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of Canada and the physical 3 safety of i t s inhab i tant s . To cope with th i s problem, the Canadian government turned both inward, to i t s own manpower and resources , and outward, to other western democracies that were faced with s i m i l a r d i f f i c u l t -i e s . As a r e s u l t , the Canadian defence establishment m u l t i p l i e d many times growing from an inter-war average of fewer than 10,000 ( c i v i l i a n s t a f f and regular forces) to one that now numbers we l l over 165,000 ( c i v i l i a n s t a f f and regular forces ) . During the same per iod annual defence expenditures grew from less than $35 m i l l i o n s to sums roughly f i f t y times greater . Defence became not only the biggest but a lso the most widespread business i n Canada, reaching in to and a f f ec t ing almost every constituency i n the country. And to further help secure the goal of peace came membership i n the United Nat ions , the North A t l a n t i c Treaty 2 3 Organizat ion and the North American A i r Defence Command . As a r e s u l t of these post-war developments, as w e l l as other factors that have always been inherent to the organizat ion and adminis trat ion of defence forces everywhere, the defence funct ion i n Canada has a s u f f i c i e n t number of s p e c i a l q u a l i t i e s to set i t apart as markedly d i f f e r e n t from the other functions of government. I s h a l l look b r i e f l y at f i v e of these q u a l i t i e s . F i r s t , the s i ze of the defence organizat ion i s of p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e . I t i s not simply that the defence department i s the larges t of the numerous departments of government. Rather, i t has become so much larger than the others , and so geographical ly dispersed^ that i t has become a much more d i f f i c u l t department to administer than any other i n the government. Second, because of the permanent revo lu t ion i n technology, the defence funct ion i s an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y complex one. . The defence organizat ion therefore has at i t s d i sposa l h igh ly tra ined m i l i t a r y , s c i e n t i f i c and t echn ica l personnel . Moreover, because defence i s a government monopoly, there are few who are tra ined i n these f i e l d s who are not i n the employ of the government. Next, because of her membership i n the organizat ions mentioned above, p a r t i c u l a r l y N . A . T . O . and N . O . R . A . D . , Canadian defence planning has been integrated into the grand strategy of the western a l l i a n c e . Although Canada does p a r t i c i p a t e i n the decision-making process , she neces sar i ly lacks the independence i n th i s f i e l d that she has i n such others as veterans* a f f a i r s , h e a l t h , we l fare , northern a f f a i r s and labour. Perhaps more important, a whole host of decis ions that are made by f r i e n d l y fore ign governments, both d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y , h a v e a most far -reach ing impact on the defences of Canada. And, of course, s ince defence i s a matter of r e l a t i v e s trengths , decis ions and developments i n the Soviet Union also have an e f fect on defence planning i n Canada. 5 Fourth, for reasons that are too obvious to need to be elaborated here, the defence function, unlike most others, i s enshrouded i n a good deal of secrecy. F i n a l l y , because of the nature of contemporary m i l i t a r y technology and the superiority of weapons of offence over those of defence, i t i s necessary that governments be s u f f i c i e n t l y free of external checks that they can react i n s t a n t l y to changes i n the type of threat or to changes i n the areas of greatest pressure. Speed and f l e x i b i l i t y , therefore, are of major importance i n performing the defence function. THE CANADIAN PARLIAMENT Es p e c i a l l y since the days of the Great Depression, the r o l e of the state i n the Canadian society and economy has been expanding at a very rapid rate. As a r e s u l t of t h i s expansion, increasingly greater amounts of power have been concentrated i n the executive branch of government. One of the major int e r e s t s of those concerned with the future of parliamentary democracy has been to ensure that these new executive powers are employed both e f f e c t i v e l y and i n harmony with the ideals of democratic government. Before deciding exactly what i t i s that i s expected of the Canadian Parliament, however, i t i s necessary to look broadly at the functions of 6 Parliament. A survey of the literature on the Br i t i s h parliamentary system reveals quite clearly that there is no consensus on the functions that Parliament should perform. What in fact has happened i s that these functions have evolved through hundreds of years gradually changing to accommodate themselves to the pol i t i c s and distribution of power in each histori c a l period. Less than a hundred years ago Bagehot argued that the selection of a Prime Minister was the most important of the duties of Parliament.^ More recently, Friedrich wrote that i t i s "legislation that i s traditionally looked upon as their (Parliaments T) primary function."^ Despite this latter viewpoint, Parliament has never had exclusive control of legislation. For many years i t has been the cabinet which has introduced most, although not a l l , major b i l l s into the House of Commons. And the right to intro-duce financial legislation has long been the privilege of the executive Only. But Parliament was able to influence the type of legislation that was introduced. Members were not totally dependent on a central party organization and therefore the government of the day was uncertain of i t s majority in the House of Commons. Indeed, members of the House were so independent that Professor Corry has concluded that "seventy-five years ago, the cabinet was continuously dependent on the w i l l of the 7 l e g i s l a t u r e , which might be asserted against i t at any t ime ." 7 With the extension of the f r a n c h i s e , important changes i n the party system developed. Strong c e n t r a l party organiza-t ions matured and gradual ly the p o l i t i c a l leaders of these organizat ions , e i ther members of the cabinet or the shadow cabinet , came to dominate t h e i r supporters i n the back benches of the Commons. Leaders of majority governments, by "putting on" the whips, were able to ensure passage of almost a l l govern-ment sponsored l e g i s l a t i o n . Almost simultaneously there was a growth i n the adminis-. t r a t i v e and technologica l complexity of many of the ever- increas ing functions of government. Because of th i s development most members became less competent, through t h e i r lack of a s o p h i s t i c -ated understanding of each of the departments, to deal with and sabotage government l e g i s l a t i o n . Thus, not only d id the p r i c e of unsuccessful r e b e l l i o n become great; but a l so the complexit ies of modern government diminished the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of e f f e c t i v e l y undermining a government b i l l . C e r t a i n l y on the subject of Canadian defence, where matters of s i z e , secrecy, i n t e r n a t i o n a l complicat ion and technologica l complexity are a l l invo lved , the Canadian Parliament has proved w i l l i n g to g ive the executive considerable independence. On occasions Parliament has attempted to inf luence defence l e g i s l a t i o n , but such cases have been so 8 few since the Naval B i l l of 1913 that i t would require more than j u s t a l i t t l e exaggeration to look upon such cases as the f u l f i l -ment of the t r a d i t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i v e func t ion . Moreover, i n the per iod when Parliament was s t i l l able to inf luence l e g i s l a t i o n , p o l i c y flowed p r i m a r i l y and d i r e c t l y from statutory law. In more recent years , much p o l i c y , through delegated l e g i s l a t i o n and other techniques, i s made without s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n (although genera l ly such p o l i c y requires an increase i n the required est imates) . In defence and other * government funct ions , most important decis ions are made without the in troduct ion of a s p e c i f i c b i l l . Thus, the de jure l e g i s l a t i v e power that i s s t i l l re ta ined by Parliament i s not a l l - embrac ing . More important, almost a l l the de facto power that remains now res ts with the cabinet and c i v i l s erv i ce . Despite the lack of agreement on the r o l e of Parliament i t i s poss ib le to i d e n t i f y (at least ) two d i s t i n c t i v e duties that Parliament seeks to f u l f i l (apart from the now near v e s t i g i a l l e g i s l a t i v e func t ion) . F i r s t , members of the Canadian Parliament attempt to represent the in teres t s of c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s and groups. Second, they seek to c o n t r o l the executive. Other funct ions , such as the educational one, can be r e l a t e d to the 8 two that I have suggested here. 9 A good deal has been written on the nature of p o l i t i c a l representation. At one extreme Rousseau has argued that represen-tation i s the pathology of democracy and that the interests of no single man can be represented by any but himself. Therefore, much as in the days of the ancient Athenians, i t i s necessary that every citizen take his place in the popular assembly.^ At the other end is Hobbes who defended his leviathan by stating: A multitude of men are made one person when they are by one man or person represented. . . For i t is the unity of the representers, not the unity of the represented, that makes the person one.10 Even in democracies there i s no unanimity on the purposes of the representation function. In a classic speech on the duties of a member of Parliament, Edmund Burke told his Bristol constituents that = " . . . not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the w h o l e . A c c o r d i n g l y , Burke placed the national interest above those of his constituents. Nor surprisingly, he failed to retain his seat at the ensuing election. At the opposite end of the democratic spectrum were the delegates sent to the Canadian House of Commons by certain agrarian constituencies during the general election of 1921. Chosen as representatives of the Progressive Party, they were free to pursue neither their own concept of the national interest 10 nor that of any highly centralized parliamentary party organiza-ti o n . Rather, they were the delegates of the farmer interests i n t h e i r own constituencies and subject to the d i s c i p l i n e enforced by the constituency organization. To ensure such behaviour, many of the western Progressives were required, i n advance of t h e i r departure to Ottawa, to deposit a formal resigna-t i o n with the committees of the conventions that had nominated 12 them. Through the use of t h i s coercive r e c a l l technique, many P r a i r i e members of Parliament were forced to adopt a very precise view of t h e i r representative function. The examples c i t e d above point to one of the primary problems facing most representatives i n modern democratic assemblies - r e c o n c i l i n g demands and pressures of constituents and pressure groups with the necessity of promoting the general welfare. Since the time of Burke, however, the party system has changed s u f f i c i e n t l y to make i t easier to avoid, at least p a r t i a l l y , t h i s dilemma. Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons run on platforms that are prepared by the national p o l i t i c a l p arties that they represent. By voting i n the Commons according to the decisions of these p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , therefore, members may legitimately claim to be acting i n accordance with the wishes of t h e i r constituents (and other i n t e r e s t groups that supported 11 them). They may also argue that they are vot ing i n the na t iona l i n t e r e s t ; for as Professor Ward has pointed out: A member of Parl iament, by fo l lowing without question the d ic tates of h i s party leaders i s perhaps not far from the i d e a l of using h is free judgment i n the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . This i s because the party l eaders , assuming on t h e i r part a modicum of enlightenment, w i l l be doing t h e i r best to please the e lec torate i n order to win the next e l e c t i o n . ^ Members of Parl iament, therefore , with few exceptions, of which the Progressives were the outstanding example, are f i r s t and foremost representat ives of p o l i t i c a l par t i e s and t h e i r party*s concept of the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . ^ A c a r e f u l perusal of Commons debates, however, reveals that the great majority of members a lso f e e l an o b l i g a t i o n to represent the in teres t s of t h e i r const i tuencies and const i tuents . Thus, although members of the House of Commons i n v a r i a b l y support the nat iona l p o l i c i e s adopted "by t h e i r party i n caucus, they seldom have much to say on these na t iona l issues when they are debated i n the Commons. Genera l ly , backbenchers discuss na t iona l issues only to the degree that they a f fec t t h e i r con-s t i tuenc ies (or the i n t e r e s t groups that they are concerned wi th) . Moreover, on numerous other occasions members r i s e with the sole purpose of t a l k i n g about persons and problems i n t h e i r home constituency. This aspect of the representat ive funct ion w i l l be discussed again b e l o w . ^ 12 As a product of the Great Depression and the Second World War, the executive branch of government has acquired numerous new funct ions . This development has permitted the executive to wie ld enormous power over the l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n . To ensure that these powers are used e f f e c t i v e l y and i n accord with the t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l r i g h t s , i t i s necessary that the executive be subject to some form of contro l by an independent body or bodies; for without th i s there would not only be the danger of cabinet d i c ta torsh ips (which would under the B r i t i s h North America Act be l i m i t e d to f i v e y e a r s ) b u t , more menacing, the p o s s i b i l i t y of r u l e by a permanent technocrat ic e l i t e that would be accountable ne i ther to Parliament nor to the e l ec tora te , and therefore answerable only to the d ic ta tes of i t s own con-sc ience . The job of preventing the growth of both these types of d i c t a t o r s h i p , or any combination or v a r i a t i o n of them, f a l l s p r i m a r i l y to the Canadian Parliament. Before attempting to present a d e f i n i t i o n of the c o n t r o l func t ion , I s h a l l glance b r i e f l y at the techniques that have gradual ly evolved through which Parliament attempts to c o n t r o l the executive. These inc lude: the r i g h t to debate c r i t i c a l l y and to d iscuss; the r i g h t to ask questions; the r i g h t to approve of methods for r a i s i n g moneys and the p r i v i l e g e of approving expenditures; the use of committees. Each of these 13 techniques may be thought of i n two separate ways - ways that are suggested by the two types of d i c ta torsh ip mentioned above. F i r s t , each may be viewed i n r e l a t i o n to the custom of r e g u l a r l y scheduled free competit ive e lec t ions i n which the government i s forced to appeal to the voters of the country to renew i t s mandate. In attempting to secure r e - e l e c t i o n , the government must be able to point to the success of i t s p o l i c i e s and the effect iveness of i t s admin i s tra t ion . On the other hand, the other p o l i t i c a l par t i e s seek to achieve power not only through the appeal of t h e i r own platforms and candidates , but also by the degree of t h e i r success i n d i s c r e d i t i n g the work of the past government.^"7 I t i s with th i s future e l e c t i o n i n mind that these four parliamentary techniques mentioned above can be understood. A strong and s k i l f u l Parliament i s able to put the government on the defensive. I t can force the government to expla in why i t has adopted a c e r t a i n p o l i c y and why that p o l i c y i s superior to a l l o thers . When there are a l ternate p o l i c i e s that have some e l e c t o r a l appeal , Parliament can present these to the people. By c lo se ly examining adminis trat ive prac t i ces and s c r u t i n i z i n g expenditures, Parliament does have i n i t s possession techniques whereby i t can br ing to the a t tent ion of the voters some of the inadequacies of the executive. 14 Contro l therefore may be defined as the power of Parliament to inf luence cabinet p o l i c y and adminis trat ion so that i t w i l l remain broadly acceptable to a majority of the e lec torate The cabinet fears the debates, c r i t i c i s m s , and inves t igat ions of Parliament only to the extent that they may weaken i t s future e l e c t o r a l chances. I f the government i s confident of i t s a b i l i t y to secure r e - e l e c t i o n regardless of parliamentary c r i t -i c i sms , i t may then be assumed that the use of the techniques of c o n t r o l w i l l provide Parliament with l i t t l e power. In Canadian f edera l p o l i t i c s , however, where a ten per cent increase i n the popular vote of the o f f i c i a l oppos i t ion , at the expense of the party i n power, i s genera l ly s u f f i c i e n t to throw out the govern-ment, such confidence can seldom be absolute (as i t apparently tends to be i n some of the provinces)." The amount of power that Parliament i s able to wie ld w i l l vary with a number of fac tors inc lud ing the s k i l l with which the techniques of c o n t r o l are used and the prospects of each p a r t y , as viewed by that party at the forthcoming e l e c t i o n . This d e f i n i t i o n of c o n t r o l i s su i tab le only to the degree, however, that the p o l i t i c a l executive i s able to dominate the vast bureaucracy under i t . And there i s reason to be l i eve that th i s i s not always the c a s e . 1 9 Stated i n i t s simplest terms the problem i s that i t i s necessary to ensure that the 15 bureaucracy i s doing i t s most, at a l l t imes, to promote the ends of government p o l i c y while at the same time taking care to preserve the r ight s t r a d i t i o n a l to the l i b e r a l democratic s tate . Because of the well-entrenched concept of m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y there i s the danger that instead of looking to uncover mal-adminis trat ion and i l l e g a l a r b i t r a r y bureaucrat ic a c t i v i t y , the minis ter w i l l instead seek to conceal i t . And i f th i s idea i s b e l i t t l e d , as perhaps i t might be, there i s s t i l l the very r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y that because of t h e i r experience, spec ia l knowledge and secur i ty of tenure, senior departmental o f f i c i a l s w i l l be able to dominate t h e i r p o l i t i c a l master. Thus contro l of the p o l i t i c a l executive w i l l be i n s u f f i c i e n t to guarantee the future of parl iament-ary democracy. I t i s necessary therefore to define c o n t r o l i n a second way i n order to supplement the f i r s t d e f i n i t i o n although not to replace i t . C o n t r o l , i n th i s second sense, i s defined as the power of Parliament to ensure that the permanent bureaucracy (the c i v i l s erv ice and armed forces) i s doing i t s maximum to achieve the ends of government p o l i c y while at the same time taking care to preserve the r i g h t s t r a d i t i o n a l to the l i b e r a l democratic s ta te . Throughout th i s thes is therefore , the term " p o l i t i c a l contro l" w i l l be used for the f i r s t type of c o n t r o l and "bureaucratic contro l" for the second. 16 Members of Parliament thus have the duty to represent and the duty to c o n t r o l . As representat ives of par t i e s they almost i n v a r i a b l y fol low the p o l i c i e s l a i d down by t h e i r leaders . Whatever inf luence backbenchers do have i s exerted behind c losed doors and not subject to examination by outs iders . This aspect of the representat ion func t ion , backbench inf luence i n caucus, i s therefore not invest igated i n th i s thes i s . As already seen, however, members a lso represent con-s t i t u e n c i e s , s ec t iona l in teres t s and other groupings. The motivation for executing th i s funct ion undoubtedly stems at l east i n part from the des ire of members to secure r e - e l e c t i o n . From one viewpoint the impact of the representations o"f a Commons member may be to secure redress for an i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n or win favours for a spec ia l organizat ion . From another, however, the attempt i s to inf luence the personnel of the department deal ing with the p a r t i c u l a r case. Thus from th i s second viewpoint , the exercise of the representat ive funct ion i s a form of contro l and i t i s from th i s perspect ive that the representat ive funct ion w i l l be viewed below. Contro l of the executive i s thus the most s i g n i f i c a n t of the functions that the Parliaments of today seek to f u l f i l . I t i s true that there are others , each with varying amounts of importance, but each of those i s of far less s ign i f i cance than 17 the control one. I t w i l l be the control function that i s examined i n the pages to follow. I have already pointed out that i t i s the purpose of th i s thesis to investigate the degree to which the Canadian Parliament has been able to control defence p o l i c y , administration and expenditures since World War Two. The several q u a l i t i e s which are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the defence organization - s i z e , technical complexity, monopoly of trained personnel, dependence on foreign decisions, secrecy, and the necessity of a strong f l e x i b l e executive - i t no doubt has already been observed, make control of defence a more d i f f i c u l t job than control of the other functions of government. But these sp e c i a l q u a l i t i e s have not been the only problem that has faced the Canadian Parliament. I t must also be remembered that "big defence" i s a post - i 9 4 5 phenomenon i n Canada. Before then there was l i t t l e concern with security i n peacetime and not s u r p r i s i n g l y , therefore, i t was seldom the subject of parliamentary inquiry. In coping with the defence programme, therefore, the post-war Parliaments were dealing with something new to them. Thus, i n addition to a l l i t s other d i f f i c u l t i e s the Canadian Parliament was very inexperienced i n dealing with defence. 18 ORGANIZATION AND METHOD In the remainder of thi s chapter I s h a l l deal f i r s t with the organization of the thesis and second with the c r i t e r i a used for evaluating c r i t i c a l debate as a technique of control. The Senate, for reasons that w i l l be made clea r i n the chapter that has been devoted to i t , i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l as a control body. Hence the discussion of methodology and c r i t e r i a that follows, although applicable to the Senate, i s primarily con-cerned with the House of Commons. As mentioned e a r l i e r , there are four p r i n c i p a l techniques through which the Commons attempts to perform i t s control function. The next seven chapters w i l l consider successively the technique of c r i t i c a l debate (three chapters), the f i n a n c i a l and committee control (three chapters) and the question period (one chapter). The r o l e of the Senate w i l l be dealt with i n chapter nine. The l a s t chapter w i l l deal with the re s u l t s of the entire i n v e s t i g a t i o n , conclusions and suggestions for improvement. In the next three chapters, c r i t i c a l debate, as a technique to control the executive, w i l l be investigated. Before proceeding to the substantive discussion, however, i t i s f i r s t necessary to deal with some preliminary facts about defence debates and then with the procedures used i n the analysis. Although the government of the day, for the most part, 19 i s able to control the time of the House, opportunities are pro-vided f o r members whereby they can debate defence p o l i c y and administration. Amongst these are the Address i n reply to the Speech from the Throne, the motion to enter Supply, the f i r s t item of Supply, the motion to r e f e r the estimates of the Depart-ment of External A f f a i r s to the Standing Committee on External A f f a i r s , the introduction of defence l e g i s l a t i o n , the f i r s t item i n Supply for Defence Production, motions to adjourn to discuss a matter of urgent public importance, the motion to enter Committee of Ways and Means and the Budget Debate. The l a s t four of these have been of n e g l i g i b l e importance i n the years under study. The motion to enter Ways and Means was never used as an opportunity to debate defence. Not once, since 1945, has there been a f u l l - s c a l e discussion of defence during the Budget Debate, although occasionally an important statement i s made at t h i s t i m e . ^ Almost as i n s i g n i f i c a n t has been the motion to adjourn to discuss a " d e f i n i t e matter of urgent public importance". Only seven times since the end of the Second World War have such motions (re defence) been put to the Commons - only twice debated. 2 1 As w i l l be seen l a t e r i n more d e t a i l , there also has been s u r p r i s i n g l y l i t t l e debate i n Supply for Defence Production. The Address provides members with an excellent 20 opportunity to discuss almost any topic that they wish. Usually, however, the remarks of the opposition frontbenchers are deter-mined by the content of the Throne Speech i t s e l f , or by conspicuous omissions from i t , so that i t i s during years of defence innovation, extreme c r i s i s , war or scandal that defence has been of major concern during the Address. Thus, on only four occasions since 1945 were important debates on defence held 22 at t h i s time. Debates on defence l e g i s l a t i o n generally f a l l into three categories. F i r s t , the introduction of defence l e g i s l a t i o n i s often used as an opportunity to debate defence p o l i c y generally or a p a r t i c u l a r aspect of i t , without regard to the nature of the b i l l . Occasionally, there are protracted debates, at the resolu-t i o n stage or on second reading, on major p o l i c y or administrative considerations a r i s i n g out of the terms of the b i l l . An excellent example of this was the Defence Production Act of 1953. F i n a l l y , quite often discussion i s lim i t e d to the d e t a i l s of the l e g i s l a t i o n . More than 90% of defence discussion (excluding external a f f a i r s ) occurred on the motion to enter Supply, or during Supply i t s e l f . 2 " * I t was on those occasions that defence received i t s most thorough air i n g s f o r before dealing with the estimates and thei r d e t a i l s , i t was (and s t i l l i s ) customary for frontbenchers to review p o l i c y and administrative developments and for some 21 backbenchers to discuss the organizat ion and expenditures of the defence department as i t a f fected t h e i r own const i tuenc ies . One other point i s worth not ing . On an average, s ince 1948, some 50.7% of the budgetary estimates have been on defence. In other words more of our budgetary estimates have been for defence than for a l l other departments combined. Despite t h i s , only s ixteen per cent of the time i n Supply has been on defence and defence product ion. The other 84% has been on the remaining h a l f of the estimates. The f igures seem to suggest, therefore , that the House s c r u t i n i z e d defence expenditures less thoroughly than i t d id the other expenditures of the government. More w i l l be sa id 24 about the s ign i f i cance of t h i s fact towards the end of the thes i s . The res t of the chapter deals with the c r i t e r i a that have been selected to evaluate the effect iveness with which the technique of c r i t i c a l debate has been used to contro l the executive. In attempting to se lect c r i t e r i a two problems i n p a r t i c u l a r have troubled the i n v e s t i g a t o r . F i r s t , on matters of broad p o l i c y , the government w i l l seldom, d i scard or modify t h e i r plans regardless of the soundness of opposi t ion c r i t i c i s m . Jennings, i n w r i t i n g on the B r i t i s h Parliament, has argued that "no matter how great the Government's e f f ec t ive major i ty , i t can be compelled to give way to a combina-t ion of c r i t i c i s m i n the House, complaints i n the lobbies , and 22 a g i t a t i o n o u t s i d e . I n Canada, there i s l i t t l e evidence that t h i s i s true. On t h i s point Professor Dawson has written: The cabinet must. . . avoid even the appearance of defeat or of weakness. . „ ..Criticism by the Opposition casts i t s shadow before i t invades the Cabinet meeting and the Government caucus; i t i s most i n f l u e n t i a l before i t i s formally voiced. How w i l l the Opposition attack t h i s project?. . . What w i l l the farmers think of i t ? How w i l l i t a f f e c t the Government vote i n Ontario?. . . These w i l l be anticipated as f a r as possible when the measure i s being drafted, and the Cabinet w i l l then defend i t ardently and refuse to accept amendments of any consequences. Professor Corry apparently agrees, pointing out that: "One great service of the opposition l i e s not i n i t s spoken c r i t i c i s m s , but 27 i n the mere face of being there." ' Thus, i t i s not possible to measure control s o l e l y by measuring the impact of opposition c r i t i c i s m s and alternatives on government p o l i c y for i t i s only on the rarest of occasions that suggestions w i l l be openly accepted. Much more often, they w i l l be anticipated and discounted i n advance. A second d i f f i c u l t y i n measuring the control function i s that government backbench influence i s l a r g e l y f e l t i n party caucus and not i n the public debates of the House. Hence, although govern-ment backbenchers do a s s i s t the House i n carrying out the control function, t h i s i s done behind closed doors and not e a s i l y measured i n this analysis. Four c r i t e r i a have been used to evaluate the s k i l l with which the House employs the technique of c r i t i c a l debate to 23 contro l executive p o l i c y . Despite the above q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , the a b i l i t y to cause withdrawal or modi f icat ion of government p o l i c y has to be used as the f i r s t standard for evaluating the a b i l i t y of the House to contro l the executive. The second c r i t e r i o n that I have used i s the q u a l i t y of defence debate as judged by two separate cons iderat ions . F i r s t , does the House f u l l y understand and debate the reasoning behind the dec is ion^ Second, does the House e f f e c t i v e l y debate the impl icat ions of such p o l i c y dec i s ion? This second c r i t e r i o n requires some explanation. I have pointed out above that i n making p o l i c y , the government w i l l a n t i c i p a t e the q u a l i t y and nature of oppos i t ion c r i t i c i s m s , and the appeal that these c r i t i c i s m s w i l l have for the e l ec tora te . In so doing, the government may, although not n e c e s s a r i l y , modify or a l t e r i t s o r i g i n a l or preferred plans i n favour of those that w i l l avoid antagonizing the vo ters . The extent to which the government i s w i l l i n g to "pre-modify" i t s plans therefore may depend i n part upon the degree to which i t fears the a b i l i t y of the oppos i t ion par t i e s to d i s c r e d i t i t s p o l i c i e s i n the eyes of the voters . I f the House shows l i t t l e aptitude i n debating defence, the government w i l l f e e l free to ignore the p o t e n t i a l impact of the Commons debates on the voter . On the other hand, 24 i f the more recent debates have shown that the House i s able to debate i n t e l l i g e n t l y the advantages and disadvantages of a p a r t i c u l a r defence p o l i c y , and a t t r a c t the i n t e r e s t of the e l ec tora te , there seems l i t t l e doubt but that the government w i l l f e e l re s tra ined by the Commons. (The ac tua l amount of r e s t r a i n t w i l l depend, i n p a r t , on the extent to which the cabinet fears that the c r i t i c i s m s are hurt ing i t s future e l e c t i o n chances). The t h i r d c r i t e r i o n that has been used i s the a b i l i t y to form r a t i o n a l and coherent a l t erna t ive s to government p o l i c y . I am arguing here that opposing, without presenting some alternat-i v e s , i s only h a l f of the task of the oppos i t ion . I t i s u se fu l for the House (and i n th i s thes is th i s i n v a r i a b l y means the oppos i t ion par t i e s ) to o f f er at l eas t a general programme for that which i t would wipe out. F i n a l l y , and r e l a t e d to the above c r i t e r i a , i s the a b i l i t y of the oppos i t ion par t i e s to take and ho ld the i n i t i a t i v e i n debate. I f the House i s able to do th i s i t can make c e r t a i n that i t goes into d e t a i l on the subjects i n which i t i s most in teres ted . On the other hand the a b i l i t y of the government to s ide - t rack debate away from the c o n t r o v e r s i a l issues to the per iphera l ones, i s a good s ign that the House i s i n e f f e c t i v e l y 28 performing i t s dut ies . But debate on defence does not deal with p o l i c y alone. 25 I t i s also concerned with the whole spectrum of the po l i c y -administration continuum. Between the two extremes on the continuum l i e a whole range of issues that cannot simply be c a l l e d p o l i c y or administra-t i o n . I t i s r e l a t i v e l y clear that the decision to j o i n N.A.T.O. was a p o l i c y one. S i m i l a r l y the decision to a l t e r the d i v i s i o n of labour i n the kitchens of Camp Petawawa would be an administra-t i v e one. But what of the numerous administrative decisions with p o l i t i c a l repercussions, Thus the decisions to move P r a i r i e Command Headquarters from Calgary to Edmonton, to construct f r i g a t e s i n Canada that could be purchased less expensively i n the United Kingdom, and the decision to scrap the Arrow were,all administrative ones with varying amounts of p o l i t i c a l content. Indeed, even such a v i t a l decision as the one on nuclear weapons, i f newspaper reports are correct, w i l l be based at least p a r t i a l l y i f not wholly, on strategic considerations, despite i t s enormous p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . I t i s clear therefore that no simple p o l i c y - administra-t i o n dichotomy e x i s t s . I t might be possible to develop a theory with x categories between the two extremes on the continuum and investigate the role that Parliament plays i n handling each of the categories. But unless an i n f i n i t e number of categories were established, i t would be impossible to sel e c t a s u f f i c i e n t 26 number to achieve a high degree of accuracy i n the analysis. Because the writer f e e l s that there i s l i t t l e to be gained i n accuracy by breaking up the continuum into six or seven categories, he has decided to divide a l l decisions into but two. Since the d i v i s i o n i s being used only to e s t a b l i s h an a n a l y t i c a l framework, the lack of p r e c i s i o n w i l l not seriously damage the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The method of dividing what I loosely r e f e r to as p o l i c y and administration one from the other i s to set up the c r i t e r i o n of p o l i t i c a l implication. Every single decision or action which i n i t s e l f i s s u f f i c i e n t l y important to damage seriously the e l e c t o r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the government I r e f e r to as p o l i c y . Decisions i n t h i s category would include broad p o l i c y , important str a t e g i c decisions, decisions involving large amounts of money and important administrative p o l i c y decisions. On the other hand, decisions and actions which i n themselves do not appear s u f f i c i e n t l y important to damage the e l e c t o r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the government I r e f e r to as administration. This does not mean that these cannot have p o l i t i c a l s i g nificance for the cumulative p o l i t i c a l impact of several of these might be far greater than any single p o l i c y decision. But taken alone, they would be hardly noticeable. Such a c r i t e r i o n , of course, has the disadvantage of leaving the author with the problem of 27 determining which decisions and actions are i n themselves s u f f i -c i e n t l y important to damage seriously the e l e c t o r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the government. Despite the s u b j e c t i v i t y involved here, the c r i t e r i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t l y u s e f u l , I believe, to allow f o r a meaningful analysis. Because of the d e f i n i t i o n that has been ascribed to administration, the c r i t e r i a f o r evaluating parliamentary control i n t h i s range of executive decision and action are not a l l s i m i l a r to those for p o l i c y c o n t r o l . The a b i l i t y to develop alternatives i s less important. Rather, the standards that are used include aptitude i n extracting information; the number of problems investigated; the general q u a l i t y of debate; and the a b i l i t y to uncover maladministration including the s k i l l with which such revelations are exploited as indicated both by modifications i n administrative procedure and also p r o f i c i e n c y i n winning headlines. I t has often been argued that the many years the Conservative Party was out of o f f i c e l e f t i t s members without any r e a l i s t i c concept of how government operates and hence handicapped them i n f u l f i l l i n g the r o l e of the opposition. And i t i s true that a f t e r 1945 there were only eleven Conservatives who had been i n the House before 1935 and only two of these had been cabinet ministers, although i t i s of some i n t e r e s t to note that one had been a Minister of National Defence. 2 9 I f the handicap was as 28 serious as some have suggested, i t might be expected that the record of the House of Commons since 1957 would be considerably d i f f e r e n t from that of the twelve years previous . To test th i s t h e s i s , for each of the techniques of c o n t r o l , the 1945-57 and 1957-62 periods w i l l be considered separate ly , so as to f a c i l i t a t e comparison. In the next three chapters I w i l l deal with the technique of c r i t i c a l debate. The f i r s t w i l l cover c o n t r o l of defence p o l i c y under the L i b e r a l government and the second, c o n t r o l of L i b e r a l admini s trat ion . The t h i r d (chapter four) deals with House of Commons c o n t r o l of p o l i c y and adminis trat ion since 1957. CHAPTER II CONTROL OF DEFENCE POLICY, 1945 - 1957: THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE In t h i s chapter I have examined the technique of c r i t i c a l debate as i t was used by members of the House of Commons i n attempt-ing to control defence p o l i c y . Rather than inquiring b r i e f l y into the degree of Commons influence over each p o l i c y decision made during these years I have decided to examine a few i n d e t a i l . To begin with, however, i t must be understood that there has been almost complete unanimity i n Canada on the basic goal of the defence organization.^" This goal has been to main-t a i n the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and physical security of Canada by opposing Communist aggression. And t h i s basic agreement on defence has been very necessary as i t i s i n any democracy; for i f there were sharp differences on the fundamental ends, the framework of our democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s would be menaced dangerously. To implement t h i s basic goal, several key decisions were made during the period. These I ref e r to as broad p o l i c y . 30 Examples include the Joint Declaration of February 12, 1947 2, and the formation of N.A.T.O. To achieve the ends of broad p o l i c y , administrative and strategic decisions are required. Some of these have v i r t u a l l y no p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . Others, however, most c e r t a i n l y do. In the early post-war years the government embarked upon a p o l i c y of r e p a t r i a t i o n and demobiliza-t i o n . The method and regulations employed i n implementing the programme affected d i r e c t l y hundreds of thousands of servicemen and t h e i r f a m i l i e s . As such i t was a problem with many p o l i t i c a l p i t f a l - l s . I t i s t h i s type of decision that I r e f e r to as adminis-t r a t i v e p o l i c y . Ones of sim i l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e but of a strategic nature I have l a b e l l e d strategic p o l i c y . Two basic c r i t e r i a have been used i n selecting the case studies for t h i s chapter. F i r s t because of the d i f f i c u l t i e s 3 involved i n separating p o l i c y from administration , I have selected decisions which were of such great importance that there could be but l i t t l e doubt that they f a l l very close to the p o l i c y end of the p o l i c y - administration spectrum. Second, I have attempted to use a balanced sampling by examining administrative p o l i c y and strategic p o l i c y decisions as well as those on broad p o l i c y . On t h i s basis, House of Commons control over f i v e key decisions has been investigated. To c l a r i f y the purpose here i t should perhaps be added that i n the context of t h i s chapter alone, the 31 word "influence" might seem more desirable than "co n t r o l " , but i n the l i g h t of the d e f i n i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l control given e a r l i e r , and i t was defined i n terms of influence^, the author sees no reason to succumb to t h i s temptation. F i n a l l y , toward the end of the chapter, a few pages w i l l be devoted to the House as policy-maker. DECISION TO DEMOBILIZE AND REPATRIATE The decision to embark upon a p o l i c y of large-scale r e p a t r i a t i o n and demobilization was the most important defence decision of the early post-war years. I t was influenced by several considerations including the t o t a l collapse of the enemy, peaceful r e l a t i o n s and wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union, confidence i n the machinery of the United Nations and the American monopoly of atomic weapons. Perhaps more important than a l l these, the pressure of domestic p o l i t i c s contributed to what at the time appeared to be an i r r e s i s t i b l e decision. With the advantage of hindsight i t can now be seen that demobilization, on such a vast scale, was a serious error for within several months the Soviet Union had ceased cooperating with the western world, and the United Nations, as a guarantor of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace, was proving less e f f e c t i v e than had been hoped fo r . Thus, at least two of the premises that the decision 32 had been based upon proved to be i l l - c o n s i d e r e d . What was the r o l e of the House of Commons i n th i s v i t a l decision? Had i t cautioned against such a step? Did i t debate the implications of such a step? Did i t propose any alternatives? I s h a l l look f i r s t at the reaction of the o f f i c i a l opposition, the Progressive Conservative Party. The Conservatives had the opportunity to debate demobilization during the Address, the debates on post-war problems that were generally l a b e l l e d Demobilization, and again i n Supply. But they did not do so. Their stand was v i r t u a l l y indistinguishable from that of the L i b e r a l government. There was no c r i t i c a l analysis of the premises on which government p o l i c y was based. Nor did the Conservative spokesmen concern themselves with the impact of demobilization on future security. I f , i n a thorough debate, Conservative members had explained t h e i r reasons for accepting this major decision, by c a r e f u l l y dissecting both i t s premises and implica-tions, i t could be argued that these parliamentarians, unlike the writer, lacked the advantage of hindsight, and that i n the l i g h t of the domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment, nothing more could be expected. But t h i s was not what happened for at no time did Conservative c r i t i c s ever come to grips with the fundamen-t a l importance of the steps that had been taken. The contribution of the Cooperative Commonwealth 33 Federation was s i m i l a r . Urging that the r e a l i t i e s of the world s i t u a t i o n be c a r e f u l l y investigated, the leader of that party, Mr. Coldwell, rejected his party's i s o l a t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s of the inter-war years. Indeed, c i t i n g the dangers of modern warfare, he urged that u n t i l the United Nations was ready to assign Canada i t s r o l e under A r t i c l e 43 of the charter that "we have to gear our p o l i c y to what t h i s house, t h i s government and t h i s country believe to be i n the best i n t e r e s t at the present time."** But despite these brave words, neither Mr. Coldwell nor h i s colleagues attempted to debate c r i t i c a l l y the decision to demobilize. Instead, Mr. Coldwell went on from his i n t e r e s t i n g remarks to urge that the Canadian government spend more money to promote s o c i a l and economic progress around the world as the best method of promoting i n t e r -national peace.^ Thus, much l i k e the Progressive Conservatives, the C.C.F. contributed nothing constructive i n the debate on the decision to demobilize. Only the S o c i a l Credit Party hinted at the p o s s i b i l i t y of dangers i n the future. The argument of i t s members, seldom comprehensive, and not at a l l based on a r a t i o n a l analysis of the forces at work i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , did nevertheless caution against excess optimism. In p a r t i c u l a r , they were suspicious of the United Nations and i t s u t i l i t y i n preserving peace. Wishful thinking about the United Nations, Mr. Blackmore reminded 34 the House, should not permit us to "forget the lesson of the League of Nations. . . I suggest" he s a i d , "that i f we t r u s t too f a r i n the secur i ty counc i l we s h a l l probably f i n d i t weighed i n Q the balance and found wanting, j u s t when we need i t . " The S o c i a l C r e d i t Party went further than mere des truct ive c r i t i c i s m . I t urged that instead of the United Nat ions , a c o l l e c t i v e secur i ty p o l i c y be centred around a vigorous 9 and strengthened Commonwealth. Although no s p e c i f i c mention was made of the Soviet Union , the emphasis on the necess i ty of c o l l e c t i v e secur i ty ind ica ted considerable scept ic ism about the future i n t e r n a t i o n a l atmosphere. Having warned the government and country about i t s unwarranted optimism i t seemed l o g i c a l that S o c i a l Credi tors might caution the government against too r a p i d demobi l izat ion . Yet the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party offered no d i r e c t res i s tance to demobi l i za t ion , forced no debate on the impl icat ions of demobi l i za t ion , and i n i t s time-honoured way continued to h in t at i n t e r n a t i o n a l conspiracies but of fered no evidence to substan-t i a t e such accusat ions. The post-war dec i s ion to demobilize was one of the most s i g n i f i c a n t of a l l defence decis ions ever taken i n Canada. I t s importance c e r t a i n l y merited a thorough i n v e s t i g a t i o n by the Canadian House of Commons. Although i t i s poss ib le to argue that the circumstances at the time made such a step almost . 35, obligatory f o r the government, i t surely should not have been accepted without question by the House. The Commons should have forced a careful consideration of the background and premises to the decision, and even i f a l l the parties were i n substantial agreement with the government, they should nevertheless have discussed the impact that such an action would have on the future of Canadian security. But the members of the House did none of these. They i n no way caused any modifications i n pol i c y . The quali t y of debate was poor. Indeed, the government exercised such great control over Parliament that there never was a debate on the significance of the decision to demobilize. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY On A p r i l 4, 1949, Canada and eight other western democracies signed the North A t l a n t i c Treaty. By a r t i c l e 5 of i t the signatories pledged: An armed attack against one or more of them i n Europe or North America s h a l l be considered an attack against them a l l ; and consequently they agree that, i f such an attack occurs, each of them, i n exercise of the ri g h t of i n d i v i d u a l or c o l l e c t i v e self-defence recognized by A r t i c l e 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, w i l l a s s i s t the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, i n d i v i d u a l l y and i n concert with other p a r t i e s , such action as i t deems necessary,including the use of armed forces, to restore and maintain the security of the North A t l a n t i c area.10 The decision to enter into a regional security pact, as 36 a peacetime step, was a r a d i c a l new development i n the t r a d i t i o n -a l l y i s o l a t i o n i s t Canadian defence p o l i c y . 1 1 The decision came as,no surprise, however, to those who had been giving c a r e f u l attention to the public statements of those i n charge of Canadian foreign p o l i c y . On March 17, 1948, the day that the Treaty of Brussels was signed, the Prime Minister stated that Canada was prepared ". . . to give substance to the conception of an e f f e c t i v e system of c o l l e c t i v e security by the development of regional pacts under the charter of the United N a t i o n s . " 1 2 Thus, well i n advance of the signing of the North A t l a n t i c Treaty i t had become clear that the Canadian government was most anxious to be a part of such an organization. Each of the opposition parties supported the government. Indeed, the Progressive Conservatives had anticipated the treaty by more than fourteen months. Speaking to the House early i n 1947 Mr. Bracken stated that i f the United Nations were not e f f e c t i v e i n guaranteeing security, then, "the democracies, by close collaboration with each other, must see to i t that t h e i r 13 combined strength i s such as w i l l deter any aggressor." When i n a speech outside the House Mr. St.Laurent, apparently trying to sound out American opinion, implied that there would be l i t t l e purpose i n Canada entering an A t l a n t i c security pact without the United S t a t e s , 1 4 he was sharply rebuffed by Mr. Pearkes, the 37 senior defence c r i t i c of the Conservative Party . Contrary to t h i s , the l a t t e r argued, Canada should take the i n i t i a t i v e and j o i n with or without the Americans. 1"* In 1947, i n presenting h is p a r t y f s ideas on defence, C . C . F . spokesman Mr. Probe stated that the defence funct ion should be p r i m a r i l y a c i v i l i a n o n e . ^ By 1947, however, the C . C . F . had o f f i c i a l l y announced i t s approval of plans for a reg iona l c o l l e c t i v e secur i ty pact . The C . C . F . , Mr. Coldwel l stated: Bel ieves that Canada should support and j o i n . . . a north a t l a n t i c s ecur i ty pact . E f f o r t s must be continued to b u i l d the world secur i ty system c a l l e d for i n the uni ted nat ions . But u n t i l such secur i ty i s achieved, a reg iona l pact , i n l i n e with the provis ions of the charter , w i l l increase the degree of mutual a i d and ass istance among western democracies . 1 ^ In subsequent speeches C . C . F . spokesmen emphasized two points i n p a r t i c u l a r . F i r s t , they pers i s t ed i n implying that the A t l a n t i c pact organizat ion was more c lo se ly l inked to the United Nations than i n fact i t was. Second, they urged that the pact be an economic one, as w e l l as a m i l i t a r y one. On th i s second point they had a c lose a l l y i n the Secretary of State for Externa l A f f a i r s , and A r t i c l e 2 of the Treaty , often a t t r i b u t e d to the e f for t s of the l a t t e r , does stress the importance of economic cooperation. I t does seem u n l i k e l y , however, and there i s no empir ica l evidence to support the idea , that the C . C . F . had any 38 influence on the decision to include the a r t i c l e . 1 8 One other point should be noted. By emphasizing these two aspects of the Treaty, in addition to the concept of c i v i l i a n defence, the C.C.F. gave the impression that they could not face up to the fact that this was f i r s t and foremost a military a l l i a n c e . 1 9 Like the other parties, the Social Credit group had also 20 indicated i t s approval well in advance of the signing. The debates on N.A.T.O. stretched over a period of approximately eighteen months. During this time, there were five debates on i t . The f i r s t two occurred during the foreign policy debates of Ap r i l and May of 1948, following Prime Minister St.Laurent's statements favouring a peacetime regional security pact. As already seen, the three main opposition parties were unanimous in supporting this concept. None of them, however, seemed to grasp the significance of the Prime Minister's statements nor 21 the implications for Canada. In the Address, on January 31, 1949, both the C.C.F. and the Social Credit Party went on record as supporting the 22 formation of an Atlantic security pact. On the next day, the new leader of the opposition, Mr. George Drew, moved that the House be adjourned to discuss a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely, a statement that had been made that the signing 39 of the Treaty might r e s u l t i n a war with the Soviet U n i o n . 2 3 At l a s t , i t appeared, the House of Commons was showing concern with the ramif icat ions of the proposed a l l i a n c e on the future of Canadian secur i ty . The Speaker r u l e d , however, that the motion was out of order. Nevertheless , he pointed out , the matter could be discussed almost immediately as the Address was about 24 to be re-opened. Strangely , and without explanat ion, the Conservatives d id not seize th i s opportunity . Not a s ing le Conservative member mentioned the Treaty i n t h e i r speeches. The climax of th i s episode occurred when Mr. Pearson condemned severely the Progressive Conservative Party for f a i l i n g to ind ica te i t s 25 viewpoint. C l e a r l y , the l o y a l oppos i t ion was having d i f f i c u l t y i n securing the i n i t i a t i v e i n the debate. In March, 1949, the Commons debated a r e s o l u t i o n that Canada p a r t i c i p a t e i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference with a view toward creat ing an a l l i a n c e of A t l a n t i c powers under the terms of 26 the Uni ted Nations charter . Mr. Coldwel l warned the government that s igning might i n i t i a t e an arms r a c e 2 7 , but apart from h i s v a l i d c o n t r i b u t i o n , l i t t l e that was new emanated from the front benches. The backbenchers were enthus ias t ic i f not e s p e c i a l l y profound. One member in terpre ted the pact as a s o l i d i f i c a t i o n 28 of the forces of C h r i s t i a n i t y i n t h e i r oppos i t ion to atheism. Others argued that Spain , since i t i s " r e a l l y a democratic nation^V 40 29 be i n v i t e d to j o i n . 7 Only the Bloc Popula ire ' s Mr. Maxime Raymond opposed the a l l i a n c e . Because Communism had i t s roots i n s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e , i t had to be fought by s o c i a l reform, not a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . One does not f i gh t an ideology with guns, 30 argued Monsieur Raymond. The debate on r a t i f i c a t i o n on A p r i l 28 and 29 was b r i e f , a l l par t i e s except the Bloc Populaire maintaining t h e i r uni ted f r o n t . The two members of the Bloc Populaire abstained from 31 v o t i n g . In a l l f i v e debates on the North A t l a n t i c Trea ty , the oppos i t ion p a r t i e s , except the Bloc Popu la i re , were i n harmony with the th inking of the government. The q u a l i t y of debate, as far as i t went was passable. But i t d i d n ' t go deep enough. Members, with but a few exceptions, ne i ther asked nor answered such absurdly simple questions as - i s th i s the best way to contain Soviet aggression? o r , are there any a l ternat ives? would t h i s render Canada more or less l i a b l e to attack? At times the Progressive Conservatives appeared ready to come to gr ips with the impl icat ions of such a treaty and hinted at some poss ib le repercuss ions . The two minor par t i e s scarce ly went th i s f a r . With not too much exaggeration the debate can be l ikened to that which might be expected from the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. The lack of c u r i o s i t y and questioning were p a r t i c u l a r l y 41 noteworthy. No alte r n a t i v e s were debated, no modifications suggested and no s i g n i f i c a n t questions asked or answered. The House did debate the background to the step. But i n attempting to determine the impact t h i s would have on Canadian security, the House performed no useful service for the Canadian p o l i t y . REMOBILIZATION On June 24, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th p a r a l l e l and invaded South Korea. On June 27 the Security Council of the United Nations recommended to the members of that organization that they should provide such assistance to the South Koreans as would be necessary to repel the aggressor, J Within three days the Canadian government made known that three destroyers were being dispatched at once to western P a c i f i c waters to a s s i s t United Nations forces. In August i t announced that a brigade, to be known as the Canadian Army Special Force, would be r e c r u i t e d to carry out obligations under the Charter and North A t l a n t i c Treaty. Before the year was out, these troops had arrived i n Korea. In h i s review of the world scene during the Address that year, the minister of external a f f a i r s stressed not only the war i n Korea, but also the danger of a c o n f l i c t with China, i n s t a b i l i t i e s i n the Middle East and Persia, and the precarious p o s i t i o n i n t 42 32 western Europe. I t was i n the l i g h t of t h i s background that defence minister Claxton spoke to the Commons three days l a t e r . The government had decided, he announced, to remobilize and re-arm. To carry out the programme that was planned, i t would be necessary to spend some $5 b i l l i o n over the following three 33 years. On May 8 he requested that the House approve the expenditure of $1.6 b i l l i o n (47% of government estimates) for defences i n order that the programme might be started. Thus did Canada respond to the i n s t a b i l i t i e s i n the world about her. Most of the members i n the Commons e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y supported the actions of the government. I f anything, the Conservatives argued, greater preparations, and not fewer,were required. Quite accurately Mr. Pearkes pointed out that i n the past few years " . . . the opposition had frequently taken a lead i n urging more e f f e c t i v e defence measures and asking for more adequate forces than were being provided i n the mi n i s t e r T s forecasts i n previous years." And on the new recruitment goal of 115,000 f u l l - t i m e active service personnel, he admitted that he didn*t "believe 115,000 men w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t to meet a l l those commitments," that the minister had referred to. His only complaint was that the moneys requested were to be spent i n such a short period that serious i n f l a t i o n might r e s u l t . Had the government begun three or four years e a r l i e r and spread the 43 programme out over a greater p e r i o d , such complications could have been avoided. F i n a l l y , he suggested that i n the l i g h t of the changing technology at l eas t three d o l l a r s should be.spent on the a i r arm for every one on the other two s e r v i c e s . 3 7 Mr. Harkness, vice-chairman of the Progressive Conserv-a t i v e defence committee, was even more e x p l i c i t : W i l l h i s (the m i n i s t e r T s ) programme give us the minimum forces necessary for the defence of Canada and to meet our commitments under the United Nations and the A t l a n t i c pact? I would r e s p e c t f u l l y suggest that i t w i l l do nei ther .^8 Instead of the s ingle brigade group maintained for the defence of Canada, he maintained". . . that the very minimum that we need now. . . i s three. . ."39 j n a d d i t i o n , other troops would be required to f u l f i l overseas o b l i g a t i o n s . ^ F i n a l l y , he urged with the support of much of h i s p a r t y , although not that of defence committee chairman Pearkes, that a system of compulsory 41 t r a i n i n g for the reserve forces be introduced. The c r i t i c i s m s and suggestions of the Conservative Party were i n d i v i d u a l l y sound. They were based on l o g i c a l arguments and there was no shortage of construct ive a l t e r n a t i v e s . But the programme of fered by the Conservat ives , when viewed as a whole, was i r r e s p o n s i b l e , i . e . i t was not the k ind of programme that the Conservatives could have implemented had they been voted into power. For i f a l l the suggestions of the Conservative c r i t i c s 44 had been c a r r i e d out , defence expenditures alone would have been greater than a l l the money ( inc luding defence) spent by the government i n 1951. JJoubtless because of the lack of agree-ment among the Conservative c r i t i c s themselves, the o v e r a l l programme of the Party showed l i t t l e concern for the resources or wealth of the Canadian economy. The C . C . F . r eac t ion was more pass ive . Referr ing to Mr. Claxton's announcement Mr. Thatcher stated: He sa id that during the next year $1.6 b i l l i o n w i l l be spent on n a t i o n a l defence. I t i s of course v i r t u a l l y impossible for opposi t ion members who have not taken part i n the many conferences under the A t l a n t i c pact , who have not attended the m i l i t a r y t a l k s , to know whether th i s i s too much or too l i t t l e . As oppos i t ion members we have l i t t l e choice but to accept the words of the minis ter that th i s spending i s v i t a l and e s s e n t i a l . ^ And Mr. Noseworthy contented himself by remarking that "govern-ment p o l i c y I am confident w i l l have the f u l l e s t poss ib le support of every member i n and of every p o l i t i c a l party here r e p r e s e n t e d . " ^ C . C . F . debate on the Address went no deeper. And i n Committee of Supply, the C . C . F . added nothing new. Indeed on the dec i s ion to rearm i t i s impossible to evaluate the q u a l i t y of C . C . F . debate for t h e i r members made no c o n t r i b u -t ions . To a man they s i l e n t l y acquiesced to the major dec i s ion . 45 The S o c i a l Cred i t Party a lso supported the re-armament programme. Mr. Low, speaking on the plans enumerated by the defence min i s t er , admitted that wi th broad contours of the pro-gramme h i s "group" was i n subs tant ia l agreement .^ S o c i a l C r e d i t o r s , l i k e part of the Conservative Par ty , a lso incorporated in to i t s programme the Canadian Legion recommendation "that a complete programme of preparedness inc lud ing compulsory t r a i n i n g i n the reserve forces for home defence be executed with the greatest poss ib le degree of equa l i ty of s a c r i f i c e and s e r v i c e . " ^ Along with the Progressive Conservatives the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party stressed the need for greater steps and greater speed i n b u i l d i n g Canadian defences. L i k e the debates on the dec i s ion to demobilize and on N . A . T . O . , the remobi l i za t ion debate was character ized by an aura of u n r e a l i t y . The Commons seemed not to grasp the s ign i f i cance of ' the steps that i t was f a c i l i t a t i n g . Almost before i t had begun the House passed over the v i t a l d e c i s i o n . As e s p e c i a l l y i n the case on demobi l i zat ion , the premise for House c r i t i c i s m s was the bas ic dec i s ion i t s e l f . I t i s true that i n the 1948-51 per iod both Conservatives and S o c i a l Cred i tors had made numerous suggest-ions that defences were inadequate. Nobody had even h in ted , how-ever, that f u l l remobi l i za t ion would be necessary. And yet , when the step was taken, the argument ra i sed was that i t went not far enough. 46 DEMOBILIZATION POLICY: AN ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY DECISION In the per iod immediately fo l lowing V - J Day, Canadian defence p o l i c y , l i k e that of a l l western democracies, was r i g i d l y channelled in to one programme - r e p a t r i a t i o n and demobi l izat ion . The bas ic p r i n c i p l e upon which demobi l izat ion i s based "is that of f i r s t - i n f i r s t - o u t , the p r i n c i p l e that the man with the longest and hardest service should be the f i r s t d ischarged." 4 ' ' As already seen, the House exercised absolute ly no contro l over the dec i s ion to demobilize; nor , i t seems, d id i t even attempt to do so. I t was more energet ic , however, i n debating the p r i n c i p l e s upon which demobi l izat ion had been based. In an amendment to the Speech from the Throne, the leader of the oppos i t ion , Mr. Bracken, charged that the government "had f a i l e d to demobilize our armed forces on a f a i r bas is and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , have f a i l e d to present serious disadvantages to overseas personnel." 4** In the debate that fol lowed, c r i t i c i s m s of p o l i c y by Tory defence c r i t i c s , Mr. P e a r k e s 4 9 and Mr. M e r r i t t , 5 ^ led the government to g ive a more thorough statement of p o l i c y . Aga in , i n the debate on the est imates, Mr. Harkness c r i t i c i z e d what he described as government d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against those who had seen ac t ive serv ice overseas. A r e l e n t l e s s attack by 53 Conservat ives , with moderate support from the C . C . F . had no a f f ec t 47 on government p o l i c y . The suggestion by Mr. M e r r i t t , that extra c r e d i t s be given those who had been i n ac t ive combat, although debated by the government, was u l t imate ly r e j e c t e d . - ^ But the House, on demobi l izat ion p o l i c y , d i d much that i t f a i l e d to do on the broader dec i s ion to demobil ize. I t o f fered s p e c i f i c proposals thus causing the government to debate a l t e r n a -t i v e s . I ts c r i t i c i s m s , often supported by concrete examples of i n j u s t i c e , forced the government to re-assess p o l i c y continuously i n the l i g h t of the c r i t i c i s m s emanating from the House. But perhaps most important the oppos i t ion succeeded i n putt ing the government on the defensive. I t forced the minis ter to s p e l l out i n considerable d e t a i l the reasons and j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for p o l i c y . I t forced the government to inves t igate and answer for the numerous cases of i n j u s t i c e c i t e d by the various members. In performing these functions with considerable l og i c and energy, the House of Commons e f f e c t i v e l y used the technique of c r i t i c a l debate to c o n t r o l the government. THE DETERRENT - A STRATEGIC POLICY DECISION On January 12, 1954, the American Secretary of S ta te , John Foster D u l l e s , t o l d the Counc i l on Fore ign Relat ions that i n the future American fore ign p o l i c y "would be p lac ing more r e l i a n c e on deterrent power and less dependence on defensive power."-^ 48 In p a r t i c u l a r , Mr. Dul l e s c i t e d two drawbacks to the post-war p o l i c y of containment. F i r s t , i t gave the enemy the advantage of being able to se lec t the time, place and method of at tack. Second, i t cost an astronomical amount of money - more than $50 b i l l i o n per year. Under the new s trategy , although not aban-doning l o c a l wars, we s h a l l be able " . . . to depend upon a great capaci ty to r e t a l i a t e , i n s t a n t l y , by means and at places of our own c h o o s i n g . O v e r the fo l lowing s i x years th i s s o - c a l l e d Dul les doctr ine came to have a most far -reach ing inf luence on the strategy of a l l N . A . T . O . countr i e s , inc lud ing that of Canada. In a white paper issued ear ly In 1952 the Canadian defence minis ter l i s t e d the object ives of defence p o l i c y as: (1) The immediate defence of Canada and North America from d i r e c t at tack; (2) implementation of any undertakings made by Canada under the Charter of the United Nations , or under the North A t l a n t i c Treaty Organizat ion , or other agreements for c o l l e c t i v e s ecur i ty ; (3) the organizat ion to b u i l d i n a t o t a l w a r . 5 7 The i d e n t i c a l three object ives were l i s t e d i n the white CO papers published the fo l lowing two years. By 1955 these had been p a r t i a l l y changed and by 1956 Mr. Campney's white paper revealed s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n s : 1. The aim of Canada's defence programme and planning i s to provide for the secur i ty of 49 Canada. Under present and foreseeable condit ions th i s can be done most e f f e c t i v e l y by c lose co-operation with our a l l i e s i n the North A t l a n t i c Treaty Organizat ion,and e s p e c i a l l y with the United States i n r e l a t i o n to the North American area. Our defence plans must a lso include a capacity to carry out ob l igat ions that may a r i s e out of Canada*s membership i n the United Nations Organizat ion . 2. The primary object ive recognized by Canada and our a l l i e s i s to prevent the outbreak of a t h i r d world war. This requires that there must be a powerful s t ra teg i c bomber force, backed by the means to ensure that th i s force can be immediately e f f ec t ive under any circumstances, and supported by the forces - in -be ing required to blunt an attack by a would-be aggressor for long enough to permit the West*s r e t a l i a t o r y forces to carry out t h e i r r o l e . This combination of forces const i tutes the best poss ib le deterrent under present condit ions . -* 9 In the ear ly 1950s, the defence of North America, as an object ive of defence p o l i c y , was not at a l l d i f f i c u l t to comprehend. The main danger to the continent was a i r at tack. To combat th i s required the in tegra t ion of three separate sets of operations - detect ion and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of enemy a i r c r a f t ; communication of th i s i n t e l l i g e n c e to a i r and ground u n i t s ; f i n a l l y , "trained personnel , a i r c r a f t and a n t i - a i r c r a f t weapons must be able to ann ih i l a t e or dr ive o f f the a t t a c k e r s . " ^ The defence of North America thus meant the a b i l i t y to dr ive o f f those who would at tack. As ear ly as mid-1954, these bas ic ideas had begun to change and by 1956, due to the continuing revo lu t ion i n weapon 50 technology and the impact of the Dul les doc tr ine , primary emphasis had sh i f t ed to the r e t a l i a t o r y power of the Uni ted States Strateg ic A i r Command6 1 and i t s a b i l i t y to deter aggression. The many developments i n defences, p a r t i c u l a r l y the new radar l i n e s , were j u s t i f i e d more as a method of protect ing the S . A . C . against surpr ise attack than as a d i r e c t means of saving the l i v e s of Canadians. Moreover, the new. master strategy changed much of the th inking behind the r o l e and purpose of Canada's mobile brigade group, in terceptor squadrons, and c i v i l defence preparat ions . Each of these came to be looked upon as having a r o l e i n the b u i l d i n g of a more balanced deterrent . There w i l l be no attempt i n th i s work to evaluate th i s change i n s trategy. That i s not the funct ion of th i s t h e s i s . But i t should be remembered that these changes had a most far -reaching impact on a l l Canadian defence thinking and on the r o l e of Canada i n North American defence. Hence the new strategy most c e r t a i n l y merited the c loses t i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the Canadian House of Commons. The f i r s t point to note i s that no great amount of time was devoted to the subject . On two occas ions , i n Committee of Supply for Nat ional Defence i n 1954 6 2 and again i n 1956, the changing strategy received some a t t en t ion . At two other t imes, i n an external a f f a i r s debate i n 1 9 5 4 , 6 4 and i n Supply for Nat ional Defence i n 1955, i t was discussed by a handful of speakers. No s ing le f u l l debate, however, was devoted wholly to th i s new strategy. Although Parliament was i n session when Mr. Dul les f i r s t gave voice to h i s new doc tr ine , the i n i t i a l Canadian response came not from the House of Commons but from the external a f f a i r s minis ter and the Canadian p r e s s . 6 6 I t was some two-and-a-half weeks before Mr. Diefenbaker, i n the middle of a long speech on fore ign p o l i c y , asked Mr. Pearson several questions concerning the impl ica t ions of the pronouncement made recent ly by Mr. Dul l e s : Have there been any discussions between Canada and the United States that th i s new p o l i c y means r e t a l i a t i o n by atomic bombs? To what extent was Canada consulted when that announcement of p o l i c y took p l a c e ? 6 7 Two months l a t e r Mr. Pearson endeavoured t o . e x p l a i n to the House what was meant by th i s new concept of the deterrent . Numerous c l a r i f i c a t i o n s by the American government since the January 12 speech, Mr. Pearson pointed out, had made i t c l ear that the key word i n the Dul les address was "capacity". L o c a l defence would not be abandoned. The nature of the response to a l l Soviet aggression would be determined by the circumstances. When the circumstances were favourable , the western a l l i a n c e , 68 i f i t so chose, would be able to r e t a l i a t e massively. This 52 statement by Mr. Pearson was warmly welcomed i n the House where some had feared that massive nuclear r e t a l i a t i o n would henceforth be the response to every form of aggression. Mr. Pearson a lso pointed out that the new strategy i n no way s i g n a l l e d a re turn to American i s o l a t i o n i s m . The United States , he contended, would consult wi th her a l l i e s before r e s o r t i n g to massive r e t a l i a t i o n .^9 Pert inent c r i t i c i s m s were r a i s e d by several Conservative c r i t i c s . Sure ly , the leader of the oppos i t ion t o l d the House, i t i s unreasonable to expect that valuable time would be s a c r i -f i c e d for consul ta t ion while bombs were f a l l i n g on the c i t i e s of the United States or one of her a l l i e s . 7 - The member for Kamloops argued that Mr. Dul les could only mean that consul tat ion would be he ld i n advance and only on the general condit ions that would provoke massive nuclear r e t a l i a t i o n . 7 1 Some s i x weeks l a t e r the chiefs of s t a f f of the N . A . T . O . countries met i n P a r i s . Almost immediately a f t er these meetings had ended, debate on n a t i o n a l defence was resumed, th i s time i n Committee of Supply. I t was at th i s time that members of the House were f i r s t informed of the impact that these new weapons would have on CanadaTs defence funct ion . The deterrent , to work e f f e c t i v e l y , Mr. Claxton pointed out , required not only des truct ive power but 53 also the means of d e l i v e r y . "That a b i l i t y must be protected . This cons iderat ion br ings into focus and gives new emphasis to the whole question of cont inenta l d e f e n c e . " 7 2 He explained that the communications i n the system "are hooked up so that w i th in seconds or a minute or so of an a i r c r a f t being found on the radar-scope at one of the radar s tat ions the i n t e l l i g e n c e of that i s rece ived at a i r defence command and at Colorada Springs where the United States s t r a t e g i c a l a i r force i s located." 7 -* Mr. Claxton also mentioned, although only secondar i ly , the importance of such warnings for c i v i l i a n defence and secur i ty p u r p o s e s . ^ Mr. Pearkes, speaking immediately a f ter the M i n i s t e r , analyzed the impl icat ions of the l a t t e r T s statement. He pointed out how vulnerable Canada*s c i t i e s were to Soviet s t r i k i n g power "It i s of l i t t l e comfort to those c i t i e s to know that i f they are attacked Uni ted States bombers are a v a i l a b l e to r e t a l i a t e . " 7 ^ General Pearkes appeared uncerta in i n which d i r e c t i o n Canada should face . At the beginning of h i s statement he stressed the necess i ty of more r a p i d development i n the early warning system, the requirement of larger in terceptor forces , and the importance of c i v i l defence p r e p a r a t i o n s . 7 6 These remarks, a l -though not incompatible wi th a strategy of deterrence, seemed to ind ica te that he preferred to place primary emphasis on defens-ive defence, as opposed to deterrence. He d id not , however, 54 give a f i n a l evaluation of the new strategy. During the following year, 1955, there was l i t t l e debate on the matter. Mr. Harkness, however, did take the time to try to analyze the more recent developments. He began by pointing out that for the f i r s t time i n several years, the wording of the objectives of defence p o l i c y , as spelled out i n the annual white paper, had been altere d . The new terms, he charged, were ambiguous. What do they mean? Do they indicate that we are to become more dependent upon the United States? "Is i t , s h a l l we say, a f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n of an o v e r - a l l command which A i r - . Marshall Slemon i n his speech not long ago indicated was a necessity as far as North America's a i r defence was concerned?" 7 7 We are not objecting i f th i s i s the case, he explained, but we do have a r i g h t to be informed. Mr. Harkness also renewed the theme that Mr. Pearkes had emphasized a year e a r l i e r . The Canadian people and Canada's i n d u s t r i a l centres are exposed to thermonuclear attack. The f i g h t e r squadrons that had been sent to Europe therefore ought 78 to be brought back at once. And as for c i v i l defence, a most v i t a l part of the defence function, i t was time that the govern-79 ment began to take p o s i t i v e measures i n th i s f i e l d . Mr. Campney, i n a b r i e f reply, indicated rather abruptly that the Honourable Member fo r Calgary West had .excited 55 himself over what was l i t t l e more than a change i n the wording of the object ives of defence p o l i c y . ^ But i n introducing h i s estimates the next year , Mr. Campney made i t qui te c l e a r , although only i m p l i c i t l y , that Mr. Harkness had indeed been accurate i n h i s c r i t i c i s m s . The defence minister began by reminding the House that no strategy 81 could guarantee s e c u r i t y . As long as the threat of war continues, he explained: Our best hope i s , undoubtedly, i n the maintenance of a strong compelling deterrent . P r i m a r i l y , of course, th i s deterrent at present i s based on the s tra teg ic a i r force of the United States , now being augmented by that of Great B r i t a i n . But , to be e f f e c t i v e , such s t ra teg ic a i r forces must be supplemented by warning l ine s to enable t h e i r r e t a l i a t o r y planes to get o f f the ground immed-i a t e l y an attack i s launched on the free world anywhere. They must also be supplemented by f i gh ter a i r power to blunt the edge of the thermo-nuclear at tack. They must a lso again be supple-mented by w e l l - t r a i n e d e f f i c i e n t ground forces to form a s h i e l d to prevent Europe being suddenly overrun by the ground forces of an aggressor. A l l these factors are j u s t as much part of the deterrent as the r e t a l i a t o r y forces themse lves . 8 2 Mr. Pearkes, and other Conservative c r i t i c s , approved 83 of the substance of the defence m i n i s t e r ' s speech. Thus, i n less than a year, oppos i t ion scept ic ism with the strategy of deterrence had been c leared away. Along with the government they too decided that the best guarantee of Canadian secur i ty was a c a r e f u l l y guarded deterrent . 56 C . C . F . c r i t i c s Cameron and G i l l i s were less sympathetic with the planning of the government. The former stated: I t i s true enough that the D.E.W. l i n e may s t i l l be of value i n provid ing s u f f i c i e n t warning for the United States s t ra teg i c a i r command to get those bombers in to the a i r to proceed with massive r e t a l i a t i o n . In that regard, i t i s of inestimable value . . . but I would point out i t has nothing whatever to do wi th Canada's part i n the protec t ion of North A m e r i c a . 8 ^ Whether or not the C . C . F . understood f u l l y the strategy of deterrence i s not easy to determine from the remarks that were made. I t i s c l e a r though that members of that party were not at a l l s a t i s f i e d with Canada's contr ibut ion to cont inenta l defence. No one from th i s p a r t y , however, e laborated on the r o l e that Canada should play i n cont inenta l defence. F i n a l l y , i t must be observed that the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party of fered l i t t l e i n the debates by way of c r i t i c i s m s or suggestions. Debates on the important s t ra teg i c innovations were b r i e f and scat tered . They caused no modif icat ions i n L i b e r a l p o l i c y . The i n i t i a t i v e or upper hand i n the debate rested ne i ther with the government nor the oppos i t ion but passed back and f o r t h from one to the other . On the whole, the debate, e s p e c i a l l y from Conservative c r i t i c s , was informed and i n t e l l i g e n t . They were able to grasp the s ign i f i cance of the changes that were being implemented, and at times they even hinted at one of i t s major shortcomings - i t s f a i l u r e to o f f er phys i ca l pro tec t ion to the inhabitants of North America. (They ignored,however, i t s inappropriateness for so-c a l l e d "brush- f i re" wars). Perhaps the most important and use fu l r e s u l t of the debates was i n c l a r i f y i n g and informing both the House of Commons and the people of Canada of t h e i r new r o l e i n the protec t ion of North America. For a long time there was much ambiguity on the meaning and s ign i f i cance of the new strategy and the Commons debates d id much to tear away the mantle of mystery that was for so long c lo th ing i t . THE COMMONS AS A POLICY MAKER: THE POST-WAR POLICY VACUUM The ear ly post-war years were ones of d r i f t and uncer ta in -ty i n defence p o l i c y . Although a bare o u t l i n e of the future r o l e 85 of the armed forces was re leased by the government, no statement was issued expla ining the underlying p o l i t i c a l , economic, s t ra teg i c or technolog ica l considerat ions behind these p lans . For the most p a r t , the House was sympathetic with the problems fac ing the government and the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n formulating p o l i c y during the t w i l i g h t years of 1945 and 1946. This a t t i tude d id not prevent each of the oppos i t ion p a r t i e s , however, from gradual ly developing broad defence p o l i c i e s of t h e i r own. 58 As mentioned above, the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party was most anxious that Canadian defence be b u i l t around a Commonwealth c o l l e c t i v e 86 secur i ty pact . In th i s they were warmly supported by the 87 Imper ia l i s t from Toronto Broadview, Mr. Tommy Church, and wi th in s ix months by the defence committee of the Progressive Conservative Party . Discuss ing the necess i ty of planning for the years ahead, the leader of the oppos i t ion pointed out that geography no longer protected Canadian shores. New weapons and the new technology make i t necessary, he argued, that Canada adopt a 88 p o s i t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c y and not one of appeasement. The background argument was e s s e n t i a l l y sound and the fundamentals endorsed by the other three Canadian p a r t i e s . Mr. Bracken went on to conclude "that the presentat ion and strengthening of the commonwealth of B r i t i s h nations i s at th i s stage i n our h i s t o r y the best hope of permanent peace i n a world 89 dominated by three spheres of in f luence ." Mr. Bracken was moved by at l eas t two separate s t i m u l i . F i r s t , he feared that Canada, i f she f a i l e d to d i r e c t her p o l i c y toward the Commonwealth, would gradual ly become a s a t e l l i t e of the United S t a t e s . 9 0 Many would argue that h i s t o r y has proved him an exce l lent prophet. Second, he believed that Great B r i t a i n , bolstered by the Commonwealth, would be strong enough to take i t s place i n the post-war world, as an equal with the two super-powers that were emerging.9^" In t h i s h i s t o r y thus f a r has proved that he was sadly mistaken. More important, the suggestion that the B r i t i s h Commonwealth might serve as a t h i r d sphere of influence indicated or implied that Canada, as part of the Commonwealth, might serve as a balancer i n the event that the other two powers might c o l l i d e , an idea that within a very short period was repugnant to many Canadians. By the summer of 1946, the C.C.F. , as we l l , had developed i t s own eleven-point programme for the defence of 92 Canada. Probably i t s central thesis was the argument that Canadian defence p o l i c y should be channelled through the United Nations. In his speech the C.C.F. spokesman, Mr. Probe, contended that a peacetime m i l i t a r y force should be operated as a part of the Canadian contribution to the United N a t i o n s . 9 3 Thus, during the years of L i b e r a l indecision,each of the opposition parties did develop defence p o l i c i e s that i t was able.to place before the House. In so doing the parties were performing one of t h e i r most important functions, presenting alternate p o l i c i e s to both the government and people of Canada. The p o l i c i e s of a l l three p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , however, seem to have had l i t t l e influence on the L i b e r a l p o l i c y that 60 subsequently emerged, and one explanation for t h i s , although not neces sar i ly the primary one, i s that the p o l i c i e s as put forward by the opposi t ion had l i t t l e r a t i o n a l appeal . I am not judging here the p o l i c i e s themselves but rather the empir i ca l data and r a t i o n a l i t y of argument on which they were based. In a l l three cases, a l o g i c a l and coherent argument, based upon the necessary minimum of i n t e l l i g e n c e and informat ion , was sadly l a c k i n g . By 1947, however, the government had given oppos i t ion c r i t i c s more subs tant ia l targets . The withdrawal of Canadian troops from the occupation zone i n Germany and the dec i s ion to 94 reduce the s ize of the post-war forces resu l ted i n severe c r i t i c i s m s from the oppos i t ion benches. The government, i t was charged, was abandoning i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s by withdrawing the occupation army from Germany. Is t h i s , asked Conservative c r i t i c s , a re turn to the p o l i c y of the inter-war years?95 The dec i s ion to lower recruitment t o t a l s , they main-ta ined , would seem to ind i ca te that the question was being 96 answered i n the a f f i r m a t i v e . Lest th i s be the case, the Tor ies reminded the government that we could no longer enjoy the p r i v i l e g e of l e i s u r e l y m o b i l i z -a t i o n . "Schemes which provide for the mobi l i za t ion of a f i r s t d i v i s i o n to take the f i e l d s i x months a f t er the outbreak of war or a f ter mob i l i za t ion has been ordered," Mr. Pearkes warned, "bear no 61 97 r e l a t i o n whatever to modern warfare ." The conclusion of the Progressive Conservative Party was that L i b e r a l Party contra-d i c t i o n s and indecis iveness stemmed from the fac t that i t had not been able to formulate a general defence p o l i c y . Speaker a f t er speaker from the Conservative benches attacked the indec i s iveness . Mr. Harkness stated th i s lack of a defence p o l i c y made i t "c lear . . . that a l l plans so enthusiast -i c a l l y expounded by the ministers concerned during the past two sessions were not based on any sound foundation of general p o l i c y , and, as a r e s u l t , amounted to nothing, and have not i n e f fect been scrapped." 9** Mr. M e r r i t t continued on the" same theme. "If I were to t ry to put my f inger on the bas ic trouble of the government" he s a i d , "I would say i t i s the fac t that ever s ince the end of h o s t i l i t i e s there has been an uncerta in purpose behind our forces and an uncerta in amount of money wherewith to carry out that p u r p o s e . " " This undoubtedly, he t o l d the Commons, could be traced to the p o l i c y of wait ing for concrete a c t i o n from the secur i ty c o u n c i l . The time had now come to s t a r t planning outside the framework of the United Nations. The cornerstone of p o l i c y must be that the primary funct ion of our defences i s to defend our shores against invas ion " u n t i l our fr iends can come to our a i d . " 1 0 0 The response of the government to the c r i t i c i s m s of the oppos i t ion , and the c r i t i c i s m s were both responsible and 62 accurate , was for the most part one of i n d i f f e r e n c e . The with-drawal from the occupation zone was b r i e f l y "explained away" by the Secretary of State for E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s and continued questioning from the opposi t ion d i d l i t t l e to provoke a more comprehensive answer . 1 ^ 1 The dec i s ion to r e c r u i t only up to 102 three-quarters establishment was excused as a temporary measure although one Tory preferred to give i t a d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . This step, Mr. M e r r i t t charged, was an economy measure, taken 103 i n the l i g h t of L i b e r a l losses i n the recent b y - e l e c t i o n s . And f i n a l l y , Conservative c r i t i c i s m s of government indecis iveness 104 on a p o l i c y for the reserve forces , were for the most part ignored. The f i r s t f u l l statement on post-war p o l i c y was not de l ivered to the House u n t i l J u l y 9, 1 9 4 7 , ^ 5 some f ive months a f ter the Conservative onslaught. Inasmuch as the government had pledged i t s e l f to disband the in ter im forces by September 30, 1947, and i t i s obvious that a f u l l statement of p o l i c y was necessary before recruitment to the permanent forces could begin, i t seems that the c r i t i c i s m s of the opposi t ion d id l i t t l e to speed up the formation and announcement of government p o l i c y . A survey of Canadian p e r i o d i c a l l i t e r a t u r e , during th i s p e r i o d , indicates that these organs of p u b l i c opinion were as l i t t l e inf luenced by the c r i t i c i s m s of the Conservative Party as the 63 government. Indeed the f a i l u r e of the Conservatives to win over to t h e i r s ide these various p e r i o d i c a l s and magazines, and the apathy of these organs seems to have been roughly i n d i c a t i v e of publ i c op in ion , i s perhaps a reasonable explanation for L i b e r a l ind i f f erence toward the Conservative a t tacks . During th i s per iod the House of Commons attempted both to create and destroy by serving both as a policy-maker and c r i t i c . In ne i ther r o l e d id i t e i ther contro l or inf luence the government. This was not so much because of the f a i l u r e of the Conservative Par ty , for t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s were both accurate and respons ib le . Rather i t seems more l i k e l y that i t was due to the emotional fat igue of the populat ion toward a l l t a l k of m i l i t a r y prepared-ness which made the job of the oppos i t ion a l l but impossible . THE PACIFIC PACT While the A t l a n t i c Pact was s t i l l being negot iated, Communist forces were d r i v i n g the forces of the Kuomintang o f f the mainland of China. Soon a f ter they succeeded, there were rumours that the United States was about to conclude a m u l t i l a t e r a l P a c i f i c secur i ty pact . On February 1, 1949, the member for Vancouver Quadra, the Honourable Howard Green, s tressed to the House of Commons that Canada had more than one c o a s t l i n e . There i s " . . . a need" 64 he urged, " f o r a Canadian p o l i c y i n the P a c i f i c . . . I f a regional pact i s to be set up for the P a c i f i c , I urge that Canada should become a f u l l partner i n that p a c t . 1 , 1 0 7 By the following year Mr. Green's ideas had grown i n popularity, c e r t a i n l y among B r i t i s h Columbia C o n s e r v a t i v e s . 1 0 8 Mr. Pearkes drew to the attention of the House the lack of a sub-marine defence on the West C o a s t 1 0 9 and Mr. Fulton reminded the Commons that greater precautions were being taken on the A t l a n t i c seaboard than the P a c i f i c . 1 1 0 By September, 1950 a P a c i f i c security pact had become part of the p o l i c y of the entire Progressive Conservative Party. The government at f i r s t claimed ignorance concerning the rumoured pact. Mr. Pearson did argue, however, that the A t l a n t i c pact would be f e l t the world over'. 1 1 1 He also stressed that Canada did have r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n the P a c i f i c area through the Charter of the United Nations. To add to these with more 112 s p e c i f i c ones would "be a very rash course." More important than Mr. Pearson's generalizations, however, i n explaining govern-ment reasoning, was the admission by his colleague, Mr. Claxton, that a fundamental premise of defence strategy was the b e l i e f that 113 the A t l a n t i c was the more exposed of the two coastlines. The Conservative Party was d i s s a t i s f i e d with L i b e r a l reasoning and Mr. G r e e n , 1 1 4 with the able assistance of h i s 65 party leader , and the Conservative senior fore ign a f f a i r s c r i t i c , 1 1 5 continued to r a i s e the matter i n almost every debate on fore ign p o l i c y . The P a c i f i c pact concept was dropped by the Conservatives by the middle 1950s and was not an issue i n the e lec t ions of 1957 or 1958. And from the Tory governments that were subsequently formed there were no ind ica t ions that a P a c i f i c secur i ty a l l i a n c e was s t i l l considered d e s i r a b l e . Thus the second major attempt at pol icy-making i n the House won as l i t t l e success as the e f for t s of 1945 to 1947. This chapter has been f i l l e d with much (perhaps too much), d e s c r i p t i v e a n a l y s i s . By reviewing and d i s sec t ing the reac t ion of the House to each of these dec i s ions , however, I have t r i e d to give some idea of the impact of the Commons on government defence p o l i c y . I t would be na ive , however, to hope that c o n t r o l could be measured simply by perusing the debates for as has already been mentioned, there i s much i n the workings of the parliamentary system that cannot be understood by reading Hansard. Within the l i m i t a t i o n s of the method, however, i t i s poss ib le to draw some general conclus ions . On broad p o l i c y there was general agreement among a l l the par t i e s (except the Bloc Populaire) i n the House of Commons. P o l i c y was formed by the government and supported by 66 the other p a r t i e s . There were no ind ica t ions that the ideas of the opposi t ion groups i n any way helped to shape those of the government. With in the contours of broad p o l i c y there were di f ferences i n emphasis between the p a r t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y a f t er beginning of rearmament i n 1951. Where these di f ferences occurred, however, the oppos i t ion par t i e s achieved no notable success i n d i s c r e d i t i n g government p o l i c y . The primary con-t r i b u t i o n of the House of Commons throughout these debates was to focus publ i c a t tent ion on matters the government apparently preferred not to discuss i n d e t a i l . Through t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s , suggestions and quest ions , members of the House were able to shed more l i g h t on defence developments than might otherwise have happened. They thus as s i s t ed i n making an understanding of the defence e f f o r t a simple matter for the general p u b l i c . I t i s important to note that i t was when the oppos i t ion p a r t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y the Progressive Conservat ives , d i r e c t l y attempted to inf luence p o l i c y that they were most u s e f u l . A l -though t h e i r ideas d id not r e s u l t i n changes of p o l i c y , they d id force the government to s p e l l out i n greater d e t a i l the reasons for t h e i r own p o l i c y dec i s ions . Thus, the absence of a l t erna t ive s to broad p o l i c y decis ions seems c e r t a i n l y to have been one of the primary reasons for the shallowness of the broad 67 p o l i c y debates. Perhaps the best that can be sa id of the House was that i t d i d appear to mirror Canadian pub l i c op in ion . C H A P T E R III CONTROL OF DEFENCE ADMINISTRATION, 1945 - 1957: THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE In t h i s chapter, control of L i b e r a l administration through the technique of c r i t i c a l debate w i l l be examined. I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d that i n order to es t a b l i s h an a n a l y t i c a l framework, p o l i c y was separated from administration by a c r i t e r i o n that was referred to as p o t e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l implica-t i o n . Administration was defined as an act or decision that, taken by i t s e l f , i s not important enough to a s s i s t or to damage s i g n i f i c a n t l y the prospects of the government i n a forthcoming el e c t i o n . I t should be noted,however, that an administrative matter need not be free of a l l p o l i t i c a l implications; f o r seemingly i n s i g n i f i c a n t matters are raised p e r i o d i c a l l y by the opposition and these often embarrass the government. When a series of apparently i n s i g n i f i c a n t matters i s raised, i t i s possible that t h e i r cumulative impact may q u a l i t a t i v e l y change 68 69 the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the entire issue and the t o t a l impact may be one of great p o l i t i c a l importance. The Petawawa i r r e g u l a r -i t i e s of 1950 - 51 are the outstanding examples of such an occurrence i n the defence department. The range of decisions i n the administration group i s great and includes important administrative, strategic and t a c t i c a l ones as well as the more routine a c t i v i t i e s . Within th i s chapter the important (administration) has been divorced from the routine (administration), much as p o l i c y was divded from administration, and each considered separately. The more important aspects of administration are considered f i r s t i n th i s chapter. The routine parts afterwards. Toward the end, control of l e g i s l a t i o n i s covered. In chapter two, several t y p i c a l decisions were used as case studies and from investigating these i t was possible to draw some general conclusions. At the l e v e l being studied now, however, i t i s more d i f f i c u l t to f i n d t y p i c a l decisions for s p e c i a l study. Despite t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , i t has been possible to select severalj not so much because they are t y p i c a l as because the effectiveness and pattern of Commons influence throughout the range i s such that the study of almost any few decisions would y i e l d s i m i l a r r e s u l t s . To demonstrate the general v a l i d i t y of thi s opinion, three have been selected and they were chosen for 70 two reasons. F i r s t , they revea l the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c pattern-perhaps a l i t t l e more c l e a r l y than t o t a l l y random choices would have. Second, they are d i s s i m i l a r enough i n subject matter that i t i s impossible to i n t e r p r e t the r e s u l t s as i n d i c a t i n g that the House i s e i ther e f f ec t ive or i n e f f e c t i v e only for a p a r t i c u l a r subject wi th in the range. The three are the u n i f i c a t i o n of s erv i ce s , the development and production of the CF-100 a i r c r a f t and the r o l e and preparedness of the mobile brigade group. UNIFICATION OF SERVICES During the ear ly post-war per iod there was considerable uncerta inty concerning the future organizat ion of the armed forces . The 1945 Speech from the Throne^stated that a "consol idat ion of a l l defence services under one minis ter of the crown w i l l be 2 made i n due course." In J u l y 1946, however, the government introduced B i l l 304 which gave i t the r i g h t to appoint as many as three extra defence minis ters (with deput ies ) , i n add i t ion to the M i n i s t e r of Nat ional Defence. The b i l l provided that these three ministers might be appointed to head separate departments for each of the three forces . Thus the b i l l c l e a r l y contradic ted the promises that had been made i n the 1945 Throne 3 Speech. Opinion i n the House of Commons ran strongly against 71 the b i l l . Mr. Pearkes pointed out the d e s i r a b i l i t y of i n t e r -service cooperation i n planning and spending 4 and suggested that as a s t a r t "perhaps the medical, dental, pay or commisariat services might. . . be combined, instead of there being a separate service for the army, the navy and the a i r f o r c e . " 5 Mr. C.Power, the wartime L i b e r a l Assco;cliat;e>!, Minister of National Defence and Minister of National Defence for A i r , c r i t i c i z e d the separate a i r arm maintained by the Royal Canadian Navy. This means, he argued, ". . . a double set of aerodromes, a double set of technical schools . . . a double set of s t a f f o f f i c e r s . . . a double set of planners and a double set of designers." 6 The opposition did not speak out for a single department, however, u n t i l the government introduced B i l l 304. But when the government did, the senior Conservative c r i t i c stated: An argument may be put forward for retaining a minister for a i r for a li m i t e d period while de-mobilization i s going on and while the a i r force i s readjusting to peacetime conditions. But i f we are to have any common doctrine between the services, I think the f i r s t step should be to get those services under one m i n i s t e r . 7 Q Cooperative Commonwealth Federation 0 c r i t i c , Mr. Probe, supported 9 Mr. Pearkes" thesis. On December 12, 1946, as part of an important shuffle i n the Mackenzie King Cabinet, i t was announced that the Honourable Brooke Claxton had been appointed Minister of National Defence 72 and that the three armed services were to be uni ted i n a s ing le department under him. The purpose of the step was to ensure the "maximum poss ib le degree of coordinat ion and to e l iminate d u p l i c a t i o n of functions i n the Navy, Army and A i r F o r c e . " 1 0 Immediately a f t er introducing the necessary l e g i s l a t i o n , the Prime M i n i s t e r announced to a press conference that the in tegra t ion of the forces into one department was a step that he had long planned."'"1 Some s i x days e a r l i e r Mr. Pearkes had attempted to take the c r e d i t for th i s development: I am pleased that the change has been made, and a lso that other recommendations coming from th i s s ide of the house have been adopted. We have suggested that the adminis trat ive services of the three departments might be amalgamated and. . . that course i s being fol lowed. The t r u t h seems to be somewhere between the assert ions of Prime M i n i s t e r King and Mr. Pearkes. C e r t a i n l y , the former T s statement has to be queried i n the l i g h t of B i l l 304. By the same token, however, there i s no evidence to suggest a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between c r i t i c i s m s i n the House and the l e g i s l a t i o n that was u l t imate ly passed. In the face of a h o s t i l e House of Commons the government permitted B i l l 304 to lapse . The subsequent l e g i s l a t i o n d i d include the major changes that had been recommended by the oppos i t ion p a r t i e s . 1 3 Considerable c o n t r o l (bearing i n mind 73 the d e f i n i t i o n given to the word) thus appears to have been exercised by the House of Commons. It i s perhaps useful to add that over the following four or f i v e years the Progressive Conservative Party continued to c r i t i c i z e the government fo r i t s f a i l u r e to eliminate duplication of services within the defence department. 1 4 Numerous suggestions were made by the c r i t i c s of t h i s party and some of them were l a t e r incorporated into the government's programme. While no doubt i t would be absurd to a t t r i b u t e these changes s o l e l y to the opposition, for many were already under review i n the department, i t seems equally clear that by bringing the various issues out into the open, the House of Commons did have some i n d i r e c t influence over the decisions taken by the government. THE CF-100 AIRCRAFT Through much of the 1950s, Canada's chief contribution to the a i r defence of North America was the twin-engine a l l -weather f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t numbered the.CF-100 and nicknamed the "Canuck". Because t h i s plane was both developed and produced i n t h i s country, i t cost the Canadian taxpayer many mi l l i o n s of d o l l a r s . Not only f o r strategic reasons, therefore, but also for f i n a n c i a l ones, the CF-100 was of considerable i n t e r e s t to members i n the Lower House. At f i r s t t h i s i n t e r e s t was r e s t r i c t e d 74 primarily to the government's success i n development and production. Later i t came to include the t a c t i c a l use of the a i r c r a f t . After the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s i n Korea, the House not unnaturally became increasingly concerned with the forces and weapons immediately ava i l a b l e and under development for the defence of Canada. Among these was the CF-100 and members set out to determine how soon this aeroplane would be ready. The defence minister, however, was less than cooperative: I do not suggest r e a l l y for a second that the disclosure of thi s (the date for operational use of the plane) information w i l l either hurt or help our prospective enemy i n any important way except perhaps t h i s : I t would enable him to t e l l exactly what kind of force for the interception of any a i r attack on t h i s continent he might f i r s t have to meet, and at what time i t would be ready. Then i t would indicate to him whether or not his own i n t e l l i g e n c e was e f f i c i e n t , accurate, r e l i a b l e , and which of his i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r s could be r e l i e d upon.15 The House learned nothing from the minister. Nor would his colleague Mr. Howe reveal the information although the l a t t e r T s remarks indicated that he was less concerned with problems of security than with the d i f f i c u l t y of predicting exactly when the f i r s t plane would be o f f the assembly l i n e . Mr. Howe did t e l l the House, however, that the planned rate of production was twenty planes per month - information Mr. Claxton apparently had been a f r a i d to reveal only s i x months earlier."*" 0 75 By the spring of 1951 members of the House were becoming r e s t l e s s . The international atmosphere had not improved. M i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s had been spent (and despite the f a c t that the government had been t e l l i n g the people of Canada how excellent a weapon was the CF-100)the Royal Canadian A i r F o r c e 1 7 18 s t i l l had no Canucks. These c r i t i c i s m s apparently were s u f f i c i e n t to put the government at least temporarily on the defensive for Mr. Claxton hastened to assure the House that the planned rate of production would be reached early i n the following 19 year. In October 1951, amidst much fanfare and p u b l i c i t y that some f e l t had unnecessary p o l i t i c a l overtones, the f i r s t CF-100 was turned over to the R.C.A.F. and Mr. Howe argued that although f u l l scale production ". . . was necessarily s t i l l many months o f f . . ." that Canada's record, i n comparison to the speed of a i r c r a f t development i n the United States and United Kingdom, was an "enviable" one. The government had silenced i t s c r i t i c s i n the House. Soon thereafter the government suffered several set-backs i n i t s programme, however, and the Progressive Conservative Party returned to the attack. Harshest of the c r i t i c s were 2,1 Messieurs Dinsdale and Harkness. The l a t t e r notably accused the government of having t r i e d to exploit i t s early successes with the a i r c r a f t for p o l i t i c a l purposes. 2 2 76 The M i n i s t e r of Nat ional Defence attempted to "brush off" h i s c r i t i c s but nevertheless was forced to admit f u l l production 23 would now not be commenced u n t i l 1953. The M i n i s t e r of Defence Production acknowledged that "set-backs and delays" had occurred. The opposi t ion continued to br ing pressure and p u b l i c i t y of t h i s k ind to the production programme u n t i l i t was near ly c o m p l e t e . 2 4 The Progressive Conservatives a lso attempted to exercise some inf luence over the t a c t i c a l use of the CF-100. In p a r t i c u l a r , they questioned the wisdom of the government i n equipping ten squadrons of the A u x i l i a r y A i r Force wi th CF- lOOs. Almost from the outset , the Conservative Party reg i s t ered i t s doubts. Mr. Dinsdale argued: "With the present type of t r a i n i n g going on i n the reserve squadrons, I am very s c e p t i c a l whether i t w i l l be poss ib le to br ing the reserve crews up to the standard of e f f i c i e n c y required for radar-equipped CF-100 a l l -weather f ighters and necessary to cope with any poss ib le a irborne a t t a c k . " 2 5 Mr. Harkness stressed the d i f f i c u l t y i n t r a i n i n g and 1ft maintaining navigators at operat ional e f f i c i e n c y . I t was not u n t i l the summer of 1955, more than two years a f t er these f i r s t suggestions, that the M i n i s t e r of Nat ional Defence even mentioned the subject and then i t was only a f t er further i n q u i r i e s by Mr. Dinsdale . An intens ive study of the 77 problem was i n progress, he t o l d the House, and he admitted that the s i t u a t i o n was " d o u b t f u l " . 2 7 By the following June, i n l i n e with the c r i t i c i s m s of the Conservative members, he admitted that conditions were too exacting to equip A u x i l i a r y personnel with the Canuck and that the department had decided to abandon that plan. The Progressive Conservative Party kept the CF-100 programme under c a r e f u l scrutiny from 1949 u n t i l 1957. C r i t i c -isms by i t s members were both responsible and, as i t turned out, quite accurate. Through t h e i r continued e f f o r t members were able to put the government on the defensive on several occasions each time forcing the responsible ministers to go through the p a i n f u l experience of j u s t i f y i n g questionable actions. In those cases members were able to acquire a good deal more information on the programme than the government might other-wise have decided to provide. F i n a l l y , the suggestion concerning the use of the a i r c r a f t by the A u x i l i a r y i s an i n d i c a t i o n of the extent of opposition influence. I t i s not suggested here that the government simply accepted an opposition c r i t i c i s m for according to Mr. Campney the matter was under review i n the 29 department even before the f i r s t Conservative c r i t i c i s m s . Rather i t i s being argued however that the opposition, through i t s energetic work, was able to bring into the public eye one of 78 the major weaknesses i n the programme of the government thus putting pressure on the government to make certa i n that i t was making the r i g h t decision. THE MOBILE STRIKING FORCE (AIRBORNE BRIGADE GROUP) In the autumn of 1945, while discussing plans for the future forces, defence minister Abbott announced that Canada Ts post-war army would contain a "small formation of e s s e n t i a l u n i t s " 30 ready to meet whatever dangers might a r i s e . Under ca r e f u l 31 questioning from Mr. Pearkes , the minister revealed that the formation he had referred to was a brigade group augmented by a d d i t i o n a l armour and a r t i l l e r y . The units that were to form the brigade, he admitted, would not be stationed at a single 32 location but rather they would be scattered across Canada. The p o s i t i o n of the Conservative Party on the brigade group was ably summarised by Mr. Harkness: I f we had a brigade group that could be a f i g h t i n g force and that was ready to go some place I would say that would at least be a good s t a r t . But i f we are to have a so-called brigade group which i s scattered a l l over the country i n dribs and drabs and i n that p o s i t i o n , i s no good for anything as f a r as f i g h t i n g i s concerned, then the government have nothing and are wasting the money of the taxpayer. 3 3 Through u n t i l 1950 t h i s continued to be the main c r i t i c i s m of the Progressive Conservative Party. 79 In June 1950 the defence minister expressed his con-fidence to the House that the force was well-organized, mobile 34 and very experienced. The minister's remarks provoked an onslaught from the Conservative benches. Mr. Hees pointed out that members of the striking force were being used to train the Emergency Force for Korea and he enquired how their own state 35 of preparedness could be retained while training other troops. Mr. Harkness stressed that although 80% of the establishment had been recruited, there was s t i l l much imbalance between the three battalions and that two of them had considerably fewer than the Of. 80% average. Finally, Mr. Pearkes attacked the entire purpose of the brigade group by questioning the idea that the only type of attack that would be launched against Canada would be a diversionary one, the strategic premise on which the airborne 37 brigade group had been based. In 1951, the Conservatives repeated but broadened their criticisms. They continued to stress that the formation 38 was not a brigade group since i t didn't even train together. Also, they began to emphasize that i t was not airborne for there 39 were insufficient transport planes to move the units. In replying the minister admitted that the necessary transport planes were lacking but he argued that the basic 80 s t ra teg ic considerat ions had a l t e r e d and that the defence depart-ment no longer v i s u a l i z e d using the brigade group as a whole. Rather i t was expected that no more than one b a t t a l i o n with 4 supporting uni t s would be required i n any one place at one time. Conservative c r i t i c i s m of the immobil ity of the force pers i s t ed through u n t i l the middle 1950s, however, when eventual ly they developed th i s c r i t i c i s m into a p o s i t i v e demand for a small f u l l y mobile army i n which armour and a r t i l l e r y , as we l l as i n f a n t r y , 41 could be r a p i d l y transported anywhere i n Canada. By 1956 the government had come around to the opposi t ion viewpoint; for on June 20 of that year Mr. Claxton announced plans for a more mobile army and admitted that the plans were " in l i n e with views '"* 42 expressed by some hon. members l a s t year ." The three cases studied i n th i s chapter are t y p i c a l (although perhaps a l i t t l e too f l a t t e r i n g to the Conservative Party) of opposi t ion debate and c r i t i c i s m at the l e v e l of what has loose ly been c a l l e d important adminis trat ive dec i s ions . General ly the debate was character ized by several f a c t o r s . F i r s t , i t was re s t ra ined and respons ib le . Opposit ion c r i t i c s , e s p e c i a l l y those of the Conservative Party , seemed to recognize that as members of a p o t e n t i a l a l t e r n a t i v e government, t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s and suggestions should be ones that they could honestly attempt to enforce should they achieve power. 81 Second, the Conservative Party tended to be pers i s tent and hardworking i n fo l lowing a l l developments i n the organ iza t ion , adminis trat ion and state of preparedness of the defences of Canada. The ir record i n c r i t i c i z i n g and suggesting was some-what mixed. On most occas ions , they had s u f f i c i e n t information at t h e i r d i s p o s a l , combined with the necessary personnel , to put the government under e f f ec t ive pressure. On th i s point i t should perhaps be pointed out that a l l members of the Progressive Conserv-a t i v e House of Commons Defence Committee had served i n the armed forces . The chairman, Mr. Pearkes, had achieved the rank of Major-General i n the permanent Army and the v ice-chairmen, Mr. M e r r i t t (1945-49) and Mr. Harkness (1949-57)had held the o f f i c e of Colonel during the war years . Thus they were not u n q u a l i f i e d i n evaluat ing the information a v a i l a b l e . The v a l i d i t y of t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s and suggestions, on more than one occas ion, were confirmed by subsequent modif icat ions i n the government's programme. On the other hand, as the years wore on from 1945 to 1957, these men became further and further removed from the defence organizat ion . The r a p i d changes i n the defence func t ion , together with the perennia l shortage of information on defence, made t h e i r job increas ing ly d i f f i c u l t . In p a r t i c u l a r i t became e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y hard for defence c r i t i c s to document substant ive ly t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s . 82 To give an a i r of v a l i d i t y to t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s , there-f o r e , members began turning to newspaper reports and e d i t o r i a l s and a r t i c l e s i n p e r i o d i c a l s . In the l a s t few years of L i b e r a l government, the remarks of r e t i r e d senior m i l i t a r y personnel served as an added r e s e r v o i r . The oppos i t ion were aware of the shortcomings of these various sources, however, and therefore waged a continuous b a t t l e with the government over the lack of f i r s t - h a n d information. Indeed the c e n t r a l theme of several of the Supply defence debates was the lack of information and not the adminis trat ion of n a t i o n a l defence. A t h i r d general comment may be made with reference to the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . L i b e r a l members almost never c r i t i c i z e d the government. On the other hand, on the few occasions when a government supporter d id speak out , h i s words were given c a r e f u l cons iderat ion . This was e s p e c i a l l y true of the infrequent remarks of the member for Quebec South, Mr. Power. S o c i a l C r e d i t c r i t i c i s m s were almost as few as L i b e r a l ones and of l i t t l e importance. The C . C . F . , although more ac t ive than the S o c i a l C r e d i t Par ty , nevertheless contr ibuted very l i t t l e at th i s l e v e l . In contrast to the above three p a r t i e s , the Progressive Conservatives were energetic and conscientious and i t was they alone who sustained debate at th i s more or less intermediate range i n the p o l i c y -adminis trat ion continuum. In genera l , the Progress ive Conservative Party made i t 83 impossible for the government to run roughshod over Parliament and the country. By cont inua l ly asking for informat ion, opposing and c r i t i c i z i n g , they forced the government to r e v e a l , expla in and j u s t i f y , which i n i t s e l f i s of great value . Although there i s no proof that any of t h e i r suggestions resu l ted d i r e c t l y i n 44 modif icat ions i n the L i b e r a l admin i s t ra t ion , the fact that many of t h e i r ideas were incorporated into the subsequent L i b e r a l programme does ind ica te at the very l eas t that t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s 45 were for the most part reasonable. Therefore i t seems to be safe to argue that the government d id f e e l somewhat re s t ra ined by the knowledge that an energetic and reasonable oppos i t ion was wait ing to deal with i t s programme. I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d that " p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l " was defined i n terms of e lect ions and e l e c t o r a l appeal . I t i s argued here that although the oppos i t ion f a i l e d to d i s c r e d i t the government i n the eyes of the v o t e r s , by proving maladministrat ion to them, i t d id keep up s u f f i c i e n t continuous pressure that the government probably was forced to re -appraise i t s programme p e r i o d i c a l l y i n the l i g h t of oppos i t ion s cru t iny . I t perhaps should a lso be added that much of the decision-making at th i s l e v e l i s of a general but not a p o l i t i c a l nature , thus making i t d i f f i c u l t to wage an e l e c t i o n i n terms of issues of t h i s k i n d . F i n a l l y , where the in ten t ion of the House of Commons 84 was to influence rather than to oppose and d i s c r e d i t government p o l i c i e s the words of the Honourable Ralph Campney are of no small importance: I would also add that not infrequently members of the opposition go to the Minister of National Defence to make private suggestions which are well received and occasionally bear f r u i t i n the determination of Government p o l i c y , and thi s i s a much more e f f e c t i v e way of influencing Government p o l i c y by members of the opposition than to bring such matters up i n i t i a l l y i n the House of Commons.^° This makes i t cle a r that not only i s there much that cannot be measured by a simple reading of the public documents. I t also indicates that although c l o s e l y r e l a t e d , influence and control (as defined here) are decidedly not synonymous. ROUTINE ADMINISTRATION The next problem, that i s investigated i n t h i s chapter i s Commons control of routine administration. The discussion i s divided into two parts. The f i r s t deals with what might be c a l l e d regular annual performance i n attempting to exercise control. The second covers two important v a r i a t i o n s from th i s pattern. A f t e r the general discussion of p o l i c y , administration and strategy i n Committee of Supply, debate i s less the monopoly of the few defence experts and more open to the backbenchers and 85 t h e i r inves t igat ions in to the d e t a i l s of admin i s tra t ion . In th i s part of the debate there were several categories of issues that were t y p i c a l l y discussed. F i r s t , there was some scrut iny of defence expenditures, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Supply for the Department of Defence Product ion. Contro l of f inance , however, i s invest igated i n another chapter .^ Second, there was much quest ioning of the min i s t er , part of the great search for information. Despite numerous charges to the contrary , c a r e f u l perusal of the debates has r e -vealed that with very few exceptions, the M i n i s t e r of Nat ional Defence (or h i s Parliamentary A s s i s t a n t ) was w i l l i n g to provide the information requested by the members i n the Commons. On the other hand, i t has to be.admitted that members r a r e l y attempted to penetrate beyond the wa l l of s e c u r i t y . In th i s respect members of the Progressive Conservative and the S o c i a l C r e d i t Par t i e s tended to be more to lerant toward secur i ty considerations than were members of the C . C . F . These informal question and answer periods were valuable as a method of removing much of the mantle of secrecy that covered the defence department. Equal ly s i g n i f i c a n t , they provided the opposi t ion par t i e s wi th much of the bas ic i n t e l l i g e n c e required to develop a general understanding of the governmentTs defence programme. Two a d d i t i o n a l points should be noted on th i s second 86 category of i s sue . F i r s t , opposi t ion members were not able to "dig up" s u f f i c i e n t instances of c o r r u p t i o n , maladministration or waste to disgrace the government. Indeed, more than one attempt to "blow up" i n s i g n i f i c a n t issues r e f l e c t e d more d i s -48 c r e d i t on the member than on the government. Second, the usefulness of the question per iod was l i m i t e d by the a b i l i t y of members to ask questions that would provide information use fu l i n making a sound general appra i sa l of the strengths and weaknesses of the defence programme. Apart from questions on t h e i r own cons t i tuenc ies , members, e s p e c i a l l y a f t er 1949, showed l i t t l e aptitude i n th i s f i e l d . During the 1945-49 p e r i o d , the defence funct ion was c lose enough to the numerous war veterans i n the House that they were able to question u s e f u l l y the adminis trat ion of the Department, e spec ia l l y on demobi l izat ion and r e p a t r i a t i o n . But i n the twenty- f i r s t and twenty-second Parl iaments , th i s important s k i l l was r e s t r i c t e d p r i m a r i l y to Mr. Harkness, and to a much lesser extent, Mr. Pearkes. Other members, although they might accumulate much information from t h e i r questions during the d i s cus s ion , seldom seemed quite c e r t a i n of the s ign i f i cance of the answers they received and how they might be turned to t h e i r advantage i n the general debates. A t h i r d type of issue r a i s e d during these debates 87 was the grievance of the individual citizen. Indeed, this was the only contribution of some backbenchers to the defence debate. Mr.X, from my riding, claims one member, despite an excellent war record and fine health, has been rejected from the post-war force. A long tirade on Mr. X Ts patriotism and his i n a b i l i t y to find alternate employment follows. The discussion typically closed with the minister's promise to investigate the case. Throughout Supply, two, three or more times each year, members seized the opportunity to air the grievances of their constituents. The record generally was mixed. Many of the cases presented, particularly by C.C.F. members, were well-documented and 49 sophisticated. ' Numerous other cases, however, quite often presented by French Canadian members although certainly not exclusive to them, indicated that the members were protesting against the rules and regulations of the defence department, and not merely an unfair interpretation or implementation of them."*0 So what, shouted the fiery "brass-hat" hunter Mr. Pouliot, i f Romeo Santerre lacks the minimum education required for the forces. Let us look at the human side of the story and forget the bureaucracy and i t s regulat-ions. In many cases of the latter kind, the irrational and poorly documented presentation seemed to suggest that the member was less con-cerned with influencing the government than in assuring his constituents 88 that he was working on t h e i r behal f . Despite the mixed r e c o r d , the opportunity to v e n t i l a t e grievance d id serve as an important safeguard against poss ib le a r b i t r a r y act ions of o f f i c i a l s of the Department of Nat ional Defence. In almost a l l cases presented the minis ter promised that the matter would be reviewed. Although modif icat ions i n the o r i g i n a l dec i s ion were secured on only a few occasions, a f u l l explanation was seldom denied the House. Yet the record i n the House of Commons i s dece iv ing , for most questions r a i s e d i n that chamber, a f f e c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s had already been brought to the a t tent ion of the m i n i s t e r , or h i s parl iamentary a s s i s tan t , i n p r i v a t e , and given c a r e f u l cons iderat ion . Most cases mentioned i n the House thus were ones where the r e s u l t s of the m i n i s t e r ' s inves t igat ions had been unsat i s fac tory to the member and were an attempt to force the former's hand. Thus, i f the record for securing redress appears to have only been mediocre, i t must be borne i n mind that numerous amicable settlements were made outside of the Commons and that the cases recorded i n Hansard were only the e x c e p t i o n s . 5 1 On numerous occasions members used the debates simply as an opportunity to ex to l t h e i r constituency and i t s c o n t r i b -u t i o n to the defence e f f o r t . They discussed the record of the l o c a l reserve regiment and i t s desperate need for a new armoury. 89 They pra i sed the t r a i n i n g camps, exercise areas , a i r p o r t s and serv ice academies located i n t h e i r const i tuenc ies . On such occas ions , mild censure of the government, even by a L i b e r a l member, was often added. Never, however, were discuss ions on l o c a l issues broadened by the oppos i t ion p a r t i e s into a general attack on the government. A s i m i l a r but more s i g n i f i c a n t type of c r i t i c i s m was the never-ending attack by maritime and western members against the concentrat ion of defence expenditure and industry i n c e n t r a l Canada. Indeed a reasonable method of descr ib ing the Committee of Supply for Defence Production would be to c a l l i t an open, d iv ided and weak pressure group i n which most of the members were working on behalf of the economy of t h e i r own const i tuency. There i s no evidence, however, that these representat ions had any inf luence on the several L i b e r a l adminis trat ions . Perhaps the c r i t i q u e s that evoked the most cautious r e p l i e s from the government were the ones on the number, place and r o l e of French Canadians i n the defence forces . The pro-por t ionate ly small number of French Canadians among the. senior personnel i n the forces , the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n securing promotion and the lack of a spec ia l m i l i t a r y academy for French Canadians were among the most thoroughly debated of the problems. In answering the various charges the minis ter always 9 0 took great pains to s p e l l out the a t t i tude of the defence department toward French Canada, often emphasizing the spec ia l considerat ions i t was rece iv ing and he i n e v i t a b l y c losed with assurances to the 52 members that the matter would be re-examined. Undoubtedly because of the p o l i t i c a l s ign i f i cance of French-Engl i sh r e l a t i o n s , the various matters r a i s e d for d iscuss ion were reviewed c a r e f u l l y by the government and inasmuch as there were modif icat ions i n the defence programme that coincided with suggestions of French Canadian members, i t seems l i k e l y that t h e i r representations d id have some inf luence on the government. In genera l , the debate on rout ine adminis trat ion was not a part of the organized oppos i t ion of the par t i e s i n the House of Commons. C e r t a i n l y the information and evidence accumulated were not trans la ted by the oppos i t ion defence committees in to general attacks on the adminis trat ion of the department. Much of the debate on rout ine adminis trat ion arose out of the r o l e of backbenchers as representat ives of const i tuents , const i tuencies and i n t e r e s t groups. Apart from a i r i n g the grievances of the i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s and some representations on behalf of French Canada however, these contr ibut ions had l i t t l e inf luence on the minister or cabinet . On the other hand, the usefulness of th i s type of debate to c o n t r o l the bureaucracy i s of some importance. I t i s r e g r e t t a b l e , therefore , i n the l i g h t 91. of t h i s , that so few backbenchers energe t i ca l l y pursued these dut ies . In most years the debate on rout ine adminis trat ion was made up of contr ibut ions i n the four or f i v e categories that have been mentioned. Genera l ly , they were free from the most overt p o l i t i c a l motives. On two occasions , however, the p o l i t i c s became the primary i ssue . The f i r s t was i n A p r i l 1949 when charges by Mr. Drew concerning c e r t a i n North Star a i r c r a f t were answered 53 i n c o r r e c t l y by the M i n i s t e r of Nat ional Defence. Subsequent evidence brought out by Mr. Drew undermined the min i s t er ' s p o s i t i o n . 5 4 Two days a f t er the o r i g i n a l accusat ions , Mr.Claxton admitted to the House of Commons that he had been p a r t i a l l y i n error and "that the t r u t h of th i s matter l i e s somewhere between what the leader of the oppos i t ion says today as to the s i t u a t i o n . . . and the perhaps too emphatic den ia l of what he sa id the other night (by m y s e l f ) . " 5 5 Even before th i s admission, the leader of the oppos i t ion demanded that the minis ter r e s i g n . "If the minis ter s t i l l respects our parliamentary system, he owes th i s house h i s r e s i g n -a t ion now." 5 6 This suggestion was supported by at l eas t one other member of the party and considerable p u b l i c i t y was given to i t i n the pro-Conservat ive press . The minis ter d i d not resign,however, 92 and within a few weeks the matter was forgotten. The second was by far the more important of the var i a t i o n s . On A p r i l 21, 1952 defence minister Claxton informed the House of Commons that due to thefts and other i r r e g u l a r i t i e s at Camp Petawawa, he had engaged Mr. George S. Currie, chartered accountant and a former Deputy Minister of National Defence, "to make a f u l l i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n , security and accounting procedures for engineering stores, equipment and services at Petawawa and elsewhere; his powers and terms of reference have no r e s t r i c t i o n s whatever."^^ Moments a f t e r the announcement by the minister, the leader of the opposition under standing order 21 moved: "the adjournment of the house for the purpose of discussing a d e f i n i t e matter of urgent public importance, namely, the necessity for an immediate inquiry into the administration, and es p e c i a l l y the accounting methods, of the Department of National Defence, the l a x i t y of which has been revealed by the wholesale looting of 58 m i l i t a r y property" and numerous other i r r e g u l a r i t i e s . The motion, however, was ruled out of order on technical grounds and although the matter was discussed occasionally during the remainder of the session, i t was not debated f u l l y u n t i l the seventh and l a s t session of the Parliament, a f t e r the Report had been tabled. F i n a l l y , on December 15, with Mr. Claxton i n 93 Paris for N . A . T . O . meetings, the Prime M i n i s t e r tabled the C u r r i e Report. The Report wr i t t en by Mr. C u r r i e was subject to two d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed types of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Members and supporters of the government stressed that " i t was only at Petawawa that extensive i r r e g u l a r i t i e s over a long period of time took p l a c e . " 5 9 They pointed out that i t "does not f i t the facts to i n d i c t or to smear the whole army works services personnel because of the s ins of a handful of c r o o k s . " 6 0 They emphasized that "the t o t a l loss r e s u l t i n g from misappropriations and i r r e g u l a r i t i e s by m i l i t a r y personnel at Petawawa was not l a r g e , " and f i n a l l y that many of the d i f f i c u l t i e s and shortcomings i n the army works services had "been caused. . . by the tremendous and sudden expansion of i t s a c t i v i t i e s brought about by the Korean war and by the large - sca le defence programme involved i n 62 carry ing out our NATO a c t i v i t i e s . " Natura l l y enough, oppos i t ion members concentrated on other aspects of the Report. I f the more serious i r r e g u l a r i t i e s had occurred at Petawawa, they could point to "the general break-down i n the system of admin i s t ra t ion , supervis ion and accounting" 1 and i t was to the c r e d i t of personnel at other depots that they had not walked through a "door which a fundamentally loose s i t u a t i o n had opened before t h e m . " 6 4 They emphasized the view 94 "that the genera l ly lax adminis trat ive s i t u a t i o n would give r i s e to waste and i n e f f i c i e n c y far more cos t l y than that covered by ac tua l d i s h o n e s t y . " 6 5 F i n a l l y they c o n t i n u a l l y re f erred to the fac t the degree "of i n t e l l i g e n c e and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " required was frequently missing "higher up" i n the echelons of the army and defence department . 6 6 Between December 15 and December 17, the date of the Christmas recess , the C u r r i e Report was dea l t with i n the debates on the Address. At the outset , i n tab l ing the document, the Prime M i n i s t e r expressed the hope "that i n a matter of t h i s k i n d no one would f e e l that any p o l i t i c a l advantage could be gained by taking broad, general statements out of t h e i r context i n any way which might r e f l e c t i n a wholesale manner on the great majority of l o y a l o f f i c e r s and men . . . and hard-working c i v i l s e r v a n t s . " 6 7 Moments a f t e r , the leader of the oppos i t ion announced that he 68 agreed with Mr. St . Laurent 's suggestion. Some two days l a t e r the C . C . F . member for Vancouver East commented on the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s a sp i ra t ions : The f i r s t thing I would say i n regard to the very f ine statement made by the Prime M i n i s t e r i s that he must be naive - and I think he i s not - i f he be l ieves that an opportunity of t h i s k i n d could be l e t pass without p o l i t i c a l use being made of i t by the oppos i t ion . That i s the nature of our p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n . As a matter of fac t there i s nothing that the government could do here that could please the oppos i t ion except the mistakes i t might make, 95 and the same would be true i f those who are on the government side of the house were oh th i s s ide and those who are on th i s side were on the other s ide of the house." 9 Natura l ly enough i t was the l a t t e r T s statement, not that of the Prime M i n i s t e r , that properly described the way i n which Canadian democracy funct ioned. For between the f i f t e e n t h and the seventeenth, almost every senior c r i t i c i n the Conservative ranks, inc lud ing i t s leader , dwelled at some length , and no doubt with considerable p leasure , on the choice quotations and d e t a i l s of i n c i d e n t s , that were so numerous i n Mr. C u r r i e ' s Report. Members of a l l three oppos i t ion par t i e s c a l l e d for the res ignat ion of the M i n i s t e r of Nat ional Defence 7 ^ ( s t i l l overseas) and many others emphasized that the government as a whole had to bear the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the maladministrat ion and waste. I t was not u n t i l the night before the l a s t s i t t i n g that the government decided to answer i t s c r i t i c s . In performing t h i s duty, the Act ing M i n i s t e r of Nat ional Defence, Mr. Campney, b e l i t t l e d the charges of the oppos i t ion , defended Mr. Claxton and enumerated the several recommendations i n the Report that had already been implemented. Perhaps most important, he reminded the Commons that Mr. C u r r i e had been appointed by the minis ter and i t was only at the l a t t e r T s indulgence, and not due to any o b l i g a t i o n , that the Report had been made p u b l i c . 7 1 On December 17, the Commons adjourned for i t s Christmas recess . 96 I t was not only among the p o l i t i c i a n s that the Report had created a s t i r . In the major newspapers i t was the subject of headlines and e d i t o r i a l s for several d a y s 7 2 and among the senior m i l i t a r y personnel (many of whom were present i n the Parliamentary g a l l e r i e s ) , i t caused considerable unrest . Indeed, when the Prime M i n i s t e r o r i g i n a l l y tabled the Report he made publ ic a memorandum from the Chie f of the General S ta f f i n which the l a t t e r expressed the fear that the Report would be i n c o r r e c t l y in terpreted as serving to censure the army as a whole. 7-* Between December 17 and January 12 rumours were numerous throughout Ottawa concerning poss ib le scapegoats from among the m i l i t a r y , the res ignat ion of the minis ter and a s to len copy of the R e p o r t . 7 4 Thus, there was considerable tension when the House reconvened on the afternoon of January 12. On the fo l lowing day the Prime M i n i s t e r moved the appointment of a se lect committee to examine defence expenditures and i t was on h i s motion that the debate on the Curr i e Report was re-opened. The f i r s t speaker on the motion was Mr. Claxton and he spent some one-and-a-half hours d iscuss ing the Report. He gave absolute ly no i n d i c a t i o n that he planned to res ign and assured the Commons, although undoubtedly h i s words were a lso intended for the senior m i l i t a r y personnel , that "there w i l l not be any e f f o r t to f i n d a scapegoat ." 7 5 He 97 closed by moving an amendment that c a l l e d on the Defence Expend-itur e s Committee "to give p r i o r i t y i n t h e i r examination to the expenditures and commitments of the Canadian army works services dealt with i n the Report of G.S. Currie. . . " 7 6 Much of the debate that followed dealt with the propriety of the amendment. This aspect of the dispute w i l l be studied i n a l a t e r chapter, however, when the work of the Defence Expenditures Committee i s i n v e s t i g a t e d . 7 7 What i s of i n t e r e s t here i s the attempt of the House of Commons to use the cumulative impact of these several examples of maladministration to d i s c r e d i t the government even further. The debate on the motion was held over a period of ten 78 days between January 13 and 2 2 . ° I t covered a wide v a r i e t y of matters including the Report proper, c i v i l i a n - m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s , stolen copies, government procedure i n dealing with the Report and a v a r i e t y of s p e c i f i c issues the most repeated of which were the horses on the p a y r o l l and the comedy of the stolen railway tracks. A l l three opposition parties supported the idea of re-appointing Mr. Currie under broader terms of reference and a sub-amendment 79 to that e f f e c t was moved by Mr. Knowles. Throughout the debate, continuous pressure was exerted and government members were not e s p e c i a l l y successful i n taking the i n i t i a t i v e away from t h e i r opponents. 98 The Currie Report provided the Commons with one of i t s most controversial topics i n years. Press reports indicate that g a l l e r i e s were f u l l and the spectators included even the wives of cabinet ministers. Once again, as i n mid-December, the Report was i n the headlines and e d i t o r i a l s of the country's newspapers, and perhaps most prominently, the object of innumerable cartoons. Undoubtedly i t has already been noticed that both the North Star incident and the Currie Report debates occurred only a few months before a general e l e c t i o n . The 1949 incident was only seized upon by the press for a few days and i t gradually d r i f t e d into i n s i g n i f i c a n c e . The Progressive Conservatives therefore b u i l t no part of t h e i r e l e c t i o n campaign upon i t . In contrast, much of the 1953 campaign of the Tories was centred on the notion that there was waste, extravagance and i n e f f i c i e n c y i n Ottawa. According to Professor Spencer "the c r i t i c i s m of the Defence Department . . . suggested that the tide was running against the L i b e r a l s . " 8 0 And of Mr. Claxton, Spencer has 81 argued that "he was widely viewed as an e l e c t o r a l l i a b i l i t y . " Unfortunately there has been no systematic study of the 1953 e l e c t i o n and there i s therefore no way of evaluating the impact of Mr. Currie's findings, and the way these were exploited 82 by the parties i n the Commons, on the el e c t i o n r e s u l t s . The L i b e r a l Party won close to h a l f of the popular vote and 171 of 265 s e a t s . 8 3 In 1949 i t had won 50% and 190 of 2 6 2 . 8 4 Although Mr. Claxton T s majority f e l l by 4700 votes , he nevertheless came close to doubling h i s Conservative opponent Ts re turn i n a con-st i tuency e l e c t i o n i n which minority par t i e s played v i r t u a l l y no 86 r o l e . Thus, although the Petawawa inc idents and the Report on them were explo i ted throughout the e l e c t i o n campaign, there i s no evidence that they had an important e f fec t on the r e s u l t . The two inc idents c i t e d above, p a r t i c u l a r l y the l a t t e r , are of in teres t as the only attempt to e f fect " p o l i t i c a l contro l" of the government by exp lo i t ing i n e f f e c t i v e adminis trat ion . I t should not be forgot ten , however, that they were far from t y p i c a l and at the lower l eve l s of adminis trat ion debates of th i s type were very much the exception. In most years , the only type of c o n t r o l that the Commons t r i e d to carry out was Bureaucrat ic , and as has been shown, the r e s u l t s there were substantive but . not except ional ly impressive. CONTROL OF LEGISLATION There i s one other aspect of contro l that must be considered and convenience, as much as l o g i c , has led me to examine i t as a part of th i s chapter. I am speaking of Commons 87 contro l of defence l e g i s l a t i o n . 100 Unquestionably the major b i l l introduced during the period was the national defence b i l l of 1950. 8 8 By t h i s b i l l the government attempted to bring a l l the laws on defence into a single act. The b i l l incorporated and condensed into 251 sections over 600 sections from several defence acts. As such, i t was the largest b i l l to have been brought before Parliament since 1934. I t i s important to note therefore that i t was introduced into the Senate f i r s t (1949) 8 9 and only a f t e r t h i s upper chamber had considered i t i n d e t a i l and amended i t extensive-l y did i t come before the Lower House. Two debates on the b i l l were held i n the House of Commons. Both at the r e s o l u t i o n stage and again before the second reading, 90 general discussion was held. A few controversial points were raised including parliamentary control over the size of the forces, and the r o l e of courts - p a r t i a l . From the outset, however, i t was agreed that the b i l l would be referred to a s p e c i a l committee for detailed consideration and such a committee was appointed toward 91 the end of May. The Special Committee of National Defence appointed con-s i s t e d of twenty-five members of whom seven were opponents of the government. I t was given the "power to send for persons, papers 92 and records. . ." and requested to report to the Commons. The Committee held some thirteen meetings on eight days. 101 Attendance v a r i e d between fourteen and twenty-two and averaged 17.9 or almost ITU. Witnesses summoned included the deputy m i n i s t e r , the judge advocate genera l , the judge advocate of the f l e e t and other senior o f f i c i a l s i n the l e g a l branch of the Department of Nat ional Defence. The b i l l was introduced by the min i s t er , who was a member of the Committee, and thoroughly reviewed by i t s members. An a i r of b ipar t i sansh ip p r e v a i l e d and amendments were introduced f r e e l y by a l l members and accepted or re jected with a very minimum of p o l i t i c a l controversy. In t o t a l some 47 amendments were presented, 30 of which were introduced by government supporters at the instance of the o f f i c i a l s of the department. Of the other seventeen amendments, which were the genuine product of Committee d e l i b e r -a t ions , most were textual although a few were of a substantive character . The l a t t e r ones tended toward increas ing u n i f i c a t i o n between the services and improving the guarantees of accused servicemen before m i l i t a r y t r i b u n a l s . The b i l l was reported back to the House and the amend-ments accepted. 9 -* Spokesmen of a l l p a r t i e s announced t h e i r approval of the workings of the Committee and expressed pleasure 94 that i t had been free from party p o l i t i c s . Inasmuch as the b i l l had already received second reading , however, th i s was not at a l l s u r p r i s i n g or revo lu t ionary . I t therefore seems to th i s 102 writer that the opposition parties expressed approval primarily i n order to document t h e i r case that a standing committee on defence was required rather to voice t h e i r pleasure at the i n -fluence the Committee had exercised over the terms of the b i l l , f o r although the b i l l was dissected section by section, and scru t i n i z e d i n much d e t a i l , the changes that emanated from the Committee as has been seen were very few. Thus, although the Committee did function e f f e c t i v e l y , and secured explanations for most of the sections, i t did not exercise much influence over the f i n a l terms of the b i l l . C e rtainly i t had less influence than the Senate. P r i o r to 1950, there were a va r i e t y of b i l l s introduced that aimed at amending the various defence acts. A l l of these were debated i n general and then considered i n Committee of the Whole. Most were passed over quickly as they were only of minor importance. Where major changes were suggested i n these b i l l s , however, the Commons was far from lazy and proved a jealous guardian of parliamentary r i g h t s . Section 22 of the 1947 M i l i t i a B i l l provided that the minister would determine the size of the M i l i t i a , a decision which considerably exercised the opposition members who claimed that parliamentary control over the siz e of the defence forces was one of the most important parliamentary guarantees against an a r b i t r a r y executive. Although 103 such control could s t i l l be exercised through granting of Supply, members were d i s s a t i s f i e d and one a f t e r the other they dragged out the lessons of E n g l i s h h i s t o r y and the significance of such i 95 , control.'-" The government bent to the w i l l of the opposition parties and f i n a l l y introduced a s a t i s f a c t o r y amendment. This, i t might be noted, was only one, although the most important, of 96 four or f i v e amendments introduced due to opposition c r i t i c i s m s . In the post-1950 period the custom arose whereby a l l amendments to defence l e g i s l a t i o n were introduced annually i n a single b i l l c a l l e d the Canadian Forces B i l l . Most of these were of minor importance and there was l i t t l e debate, therefore, on second readings. Each however was c a r e f u l l y s c r u t i n i z e d i n Committee of the Whole and on several occasions amendments introduced by opposition members were accepted. In each case 97 the e f f e c t of the amendments was to tighten the l e g i s l a t i o n . The one defence b i l l of the period to provoke controversy was the National Defence Act Amendment B i l l of 1952 under which the government appointed an Associate Minister of National Defence. In introducing the resolution the Prime Minister expressed the hope that the Minister would deal primarily with problems of p o l i c y and the Associate Minister with administration. The proposed l e g i s l a t i o n , however, did not s p e l l out the d e f i n i t e areas of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 104 From the very outset opposition members objected to the i n d e f i n i t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the Associate Minister. The leader of the opposition expressed the opinion that the new minister would be l i t t l e more than a g l o r i f i e d parliamentary 99 assistant unless he was given s p e c i f i c duties and Mr. Pearkes pointed out that i t would be impossible to separate p o l i c y from administration.''" 0 0 An opposition amendment requesting that the b i l l not be read a second time was defeated by the government10''" and a second one i n Committee of the Whole c a l l i n g 102 for an Associate Minister for A i r was s i m i l a r l y beaten down. 103 On t h i r d reading the b i l l was passed on d i v i s i o n . More in t e r e s t i n g were the several defence production and defence procurement b i l l s passed between 1950 and 1955. In 1950 the Defence Supplies B i l l and the E s s e n t i a l Materials B i l l were introduced. Although the f i r s t was passed without heated d e b a t e , d e s p i t e a d i v i s i o n , the l a t t e r was opposed strongly by the Progressive Conservative Party and e s p e c i a l l y Mr.Diefenbaker who claimed that the powers requested were too broad and would have the e f f e c t of giving the Minister of Trade and Commerce absolute and unlimited control of the nation's natural r e s o u r c e s . 1 0 5 Amendments subsequently moved were defeated by the government with the support of the two minor parties and the b i l l received t h i r d A- 106 reading. 105 Even more vigorous opposition greeted the Defence Production B i l l of 1951 which c a l l e d for the establishment of a Department of Defence Production. Almost every senior Conservative c r i t i c spoke out against the powers being entrusted to the m i n i s t e r 1 ^ 7 and i n Committee of the Whole several of the 108 sections were passed only on d i v i s i o n . Probably the only reason the b i l l was not opposed on t h i r d reading was because section 41 l i m i t e d the l i f e of the b i l l and therefore of the 109 minister's s p e c i a l powers to only f i v e years. In 1955 an amendment was introduced i n order to give the 1951 Act permanence. The b i l l was deceivingly short. I t contained but two sections of which only the l a t t e r was of i n t e r e s t for i t provided for the repeal of section 41 of the Department of Defence Production Act of 1951. Progressive Conservative spokesmen pointed out that the Act and the sp e c i a l powers i t provided had been introduced during the Korean c r i s i s . The s i t u a t i o n was no longer the same and to give permanence to these powers would seriously damage the*rights of Parliament and the i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n . 1 1 1 The case of the Li b e r a l s was summarized ably by Professor Corry i n an a r t i c l e shortly a f t e r the issue had ended: The in t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n i s s t i l l extremely grim. . . No defence against the hydrogen bomb has yet been devised, so we must go on trying. 106 The government has undertaken programmes which make heavy demands on materials that are s t i l l scarce , which involve" complicated arrangements with p r i v a t e industry . . . There i s much experimental work being undertaken i n e l e c t r o n i c s , supersonic planes and guided miss i l e s which may involve scores of m i l l i o n s of outlay over a per iod of years before even test re su l t s can be secured. I t was urged that , unless the government has adequate powers to push these projects over a long per iod of years and to intervene i n the pr iva te sector of the defence industry where necessary to guard against f a i l u r e , great sums of money may be squandered and e f f ec t i ve defence measures f a i l of completion.112-The L i b e r a l s gave no s a t i s f a c t o r y reason, however, for refus ing to inc lude a new terminal date for these powers which govern-ment members had admitted e a r l i e r were extraordinary . Even the C . C . F . , whose members were n a t u r a l l y suspicious of the motives of pr iva te indus try , demanded a new terminal date.I 1-* F i n a l l y , a f t er considerable pressure had been exerted from the House, Mr.Howe promised that the terms of the b i l l would be r e c o n s i d e r e d . 1 1 4 On second reading , the l a t t e r announced, however, that no changes would be m a d e . 1 1 5 To the Progressive Conservat ives , here was a most f lagrant example of the arrogant L i b e r a l govern-ment b e l i t t l i n g the r i g h t s of Parl iament. They therefore set about to obstruct the passage of the b i l l . Speaker a f ter speaker attacked the government and i n p a r t i c u l a r the M i n i s t e r of Defence Product ion , Mr. Howe. Several concessions were offered by the government 1 1 6 but the oppos i t ion would not r e l e n t . Al together , over 100 speeches were made between March and J u l y , 107 including more than 75 by Conservative members and these f i l l e d more than 500 pages of Hansard. 1 1 7 F i n a l l y , the Prime Minister introduced amendments not only providing for a new terminal date thus affirming that the powers were as the opposition had claimed decidedly extraordinary, but also that a l l regulations enforced under sections 23 to 31 (the ones giving the minister h i s powers) would be tabled i n the 118 House. The amendment further provided that at the request of any ten members of the Commons, any regulations tabled under 119 the Act had to be debated and within four days of the p e t i t i o n . "In persuading the government to retreat the Progressive Conservatives won" what Professor Corry c a l l e d " t h e i r greatest 120 v i c t o r y i n twenty years of opposition." And Professor Meisel has implied that the protracted L i b e r a l intransigence on the -Defence Production Act amendment contributed to the image of 121 a L i b e r a l Party that was both autocratic and arrogant , an image that helped to defeat i t i n the 1957 e l e c t i o n . I f Commons influence over government l e g i s l a t i o n was not p a r t i c u l a r l y great i n the years under review, t h i s undoubtedly was i n part because opposition c r i t i c i s m s were anticipated and discounted i n advance. For the House proved i t s e l f energetic i n s c r u t i n i z i n g a l l l e g i s l a t i o n , and where the rights of Parliament were being seriously undermined, important amendments 108 were obtained. Nevertheless i t has to be admitted that l e g i s l a t i o n passed during these years d id increase the power of the executive v i s - a - v i s the l e g i s l a t u r e and the r e s u l t s of Parl iament's e f for t s were only to cut down the amount of the executive ga in . Thus, although the Commons d i d serve as a u s e f u l instrument i n s c r u t i n i z i n g and amending defence l e g i s l a t i o n , much of the l e g i s l a t i o n i t was reviewing served to strengthen the powers of the executive. C H A P T E R IV CONTROL OF DEFENCE POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION, 1957-62: THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE In 1958, a f t e r less than a year of minority government, the people of Canada returned the Progressive Conservative Party to power with the greatest majority i n the hist o r y of Canadian government. As a c o r o l l a r y , n a t u r a l l y , the opposition was numer-i c a l l y the weakest i n Canadian history. The So c i a l Credit Party elected no members, the C.C.F. but eight and the L i b e r a l Party some 49. To these opposition members f e l l the job that the Conservatives had been attempting to perform f o r 22 years - that of c o n t r o l l i n g the ever-increasing growth i n executive power. And a part of t h i s job was to control defence p o l i c y and administration. Control of defence p o l i c y i s dealt with f i r s t and as i n chapter two several case studies have been examined to determine the extent of Commons control over defence p o l i c y . THE NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE COMMAND On August 1, 1957, A i r Marshal Slemon was appointed through order-in-council deputy commander of an integrated 109 110 a i r defence system for North America. In th i s way was the publ i c informed of the establishment of N . O . R . A . D . The govern-ment released no other statement. Soon thereafter members i n the House began to ask questions about N . O . R . A . D . and request information concerning i t s impact on Canadian defence and s o v e r e i g n t y . 1 On November 13, the Prime M i n i s t e r explained to members of the House the reasons why there had been no formal debate. The d e c i s i o n , he argued, involved no new p r i n c i p l e s but was simply the cont inuat ion and l o g i c a l conclus ion of steps taken e a r l i e r by the L i b e r a l admin i s tra t ion . He traced the h i s t o r y of Canadian-American defence co-operat ion s ince Ogdensburg and placed spec ia l emphasis upon the statement of defence co-operat ion that had been announced on February 12, 1947. He pointed out that Canada and the Uni ted States were formally bound together i n the Canada - Uni ted States reg iona l planning group of N . A . T . O . and that the House of Commons had already debated the N . A . T . O . issue and that N . O . R . A . D . was merely a further step i n the e f f o r t to implement the object ives of the Canada - United States reg iona l planning group. The dec i s ion had been made known to o the N.Jk.T.0. Counc i l before i t was announced p u b l i c l y . The dec i s ion to e s t a b l i s h an integrated operat ional a i r defence system, the Prime M i n i s t e r added, could not be a I l l surprise to the L i b e r a l s because on May 11, 1956 there had been an agreement between the chiefs of s t a f f "of the two countries to r e f e r the matter to a j o i n t study group. This group had reported i n favour of establishing an integrated operational control system for North America under a single commander. The matter had come before the St.Laurent cabinet, the Prime Minister claimed, but the decision had been postponed. Mr. Diefenbaker then suggested that the reason f o r the delay had been the 3 approaching general e l e c t i o n . The Prime Minister raised three further points. F i r s t , he argued that the agreement was a continuation of the a c t i v i t i e s of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and that the business 4 of that board had never i n the past been debated i n the House. Second, i n reply to the argument that f u l l debate had been permitted on N.A.T.O., he maintained that t h i s had been necessary because the North A t l a n t i c Treaty committed Canada to sending troops abroad, a matter which required the consent 5 of the Parliament of Canada. Third, the Prime Minister attempted to convey the idea that any further discussion would be a breach of security. " I f the opposition w i l l take the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of saying they want these matters, which can be of dangerous impact i f given f u l l p u b l i c i t y i n the house, discussed i n d e t a i l . . . i t w i l l be done, 112 but the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i l l be t h e i r s . " 6 I t was c l e a r to a l l that the Prime M i n i s t e r preferred to avoid a f u l l d i scuss ion of h i s h a s t i l y concluded agreement. The most s tra ight - forward statement of the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n was given by Mr. Paul M a r t i n . "We are a nat ion dedicated to the p r i n c i p l e of parl iamentary democracy and under our system of government while the cabinet , the executive i s responsible for the formulation of fore ign p o l i c y and also responsible for i t s execution, nevertheless e i ther during the stage of negot ia t ion -and that i s a matter to be determined by the government - or a f t er negot iat ions have been concluded and p o l i c i e s decided on i t i s the o b l i g a t i o n of government to submit i t s p o l i c i e s to the represent-at ions of the people for approva l ." "In t h i s p a r t i c u l a r matter" he stressed " . . . . we have no document whatsoever, no i n t e r i m agreement, no order i n c o u n c i l , no minute of c a b i n e t . " 7 We have rece ived no information and been permitted no debate. On December 5, the Committee of Supply began i t s debates on the defence estimates for the coming year. The new defence m i n i s t e r , Mr. Pearkes, took the opportunity to provide some further information on defence and at the time he revealed that the f i n a l formal note for N . O . R . A . D . had not yet been completed. When i t was completed, he announced, i t ^would be presented to 113 8 the House of Commons. On May 19, 1958, some n ine -and-a -ha l f months a f t er the o r i g i n a l announcement, external a f f a i r s minis ter Smith tabled the agreement i n the Commons. Mr. Smith announced, 9 i n rep ly to a question by the leader of the opposi t ion , that the government d id not plan to submit the agreement to the House of Commons i n the form of a r e s o l u t i o n . The reason, he explained, was that the "government regards th i s as an a m p l i f i c a t i o n of 10 and extension under the North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y . 7 Mr. Smith d i d suggestion, however, that there would be ample opportunity to discuss the agreement during other d e b a t e s . 1 1 I t can be seen that the government wished to avoid a " f u l l - d r e s s " debate on the N . O . R . A . D . agreement. I t s j u s t i f i c -a t ion for th i s a t t i tude rested on two key po in t s . F i r s t , the government i n s i s t e d that no new p r i n c i p l e s were involved i n the agreement. Second, i t attempted to show that other agree-ments of a s i m i l a r type had been concluded by L i b e r a l governments but never presented to the House i n r e s o l u t i o n form. The second p o i n t , however, to be of any importance, rested on the f i r s t ; for i f i t could be shown that the agreement involved bas ic changes, i t was c l ear that precedent favoured the oppos i t ion par t i e s and not the government. Although i t ra i sed numerous per iphera l issues 1 2 the 114 fundamental basis of the government p o s i t i o n was that the N.O.R.A.D. agreement was merely a further step to implement the goals set out by the North A t l a n t i c Treaty. As a r e s u l t , no resolution was required. The case of the government was r e l a t i v e l y simple. The commander of N.O.R.A.D., as he would be seeking to implement the goals of the Canada - United States regional planning group of N.A.T.O., and since he would be protecting part of the Strategic A i r Command, upon which N.A.T.O. depended, would be reporting to the North A t l a n t i c Council. Therefore, the govern-ment contended, N.O.R.A.D. could be likened to any of the other 13 m i l i t a r y commands of N.A.T.O. The opposition p a r t i e s , however, e a s i l y destroyed the government's case. The leader of the opposition pointed out quite c o r r e c t l y that the commanders of the various N.A.T.O. commands not only report to the North A t l a n t i c Council but receive p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y guidance from i t . In contrast, the commander of N.O.R.A.D. was responsible to the governments of Canada arid the United States. N.O.R.A.D. therefore does not, 14 he maintained, derive i t s authority i n any way from the N.A.T.O. Mr. Knowles of the C.C.F. party announced that his party agreed with Mr. Pearson's reasoning. Even the Prime Minister, there-a f t e r , emphasized only the p r i n c i p l e s involved and not the 0 115 l e g a l i t y of the case he had presented. 1 5 The other peripheral objections raised by the Conservatives were also demolished by members of the House. Mr. Pearson pointed out that i n the o r i g i n a l N.A.T.O. debates i t had not been known that Canada would be sending troops abroad. 1 6 And he also repudiated the notion that the subject of such an agreement had ever been considered by the L i b e r a l c a b i n e t . 1 7 On the question of security, Mr. Martin explained that the House was not requesting the d e t a i l s of the agreement but only i t s general p r i n c i p l e s and that the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for security rested with the government and not the o p p o s i t i o n . 1 8 The conclusion seems ine v i t a b l e that the Prime Minister and government did attempt to place a number of "straw-men" i n the way of the Commons. The agreement was i n operation for many months before the opposition was able to get any discussion and even then i t was only under the most trying of circumstances. Ultimately, a f t e r much pressure was exerted, both i n the House and outside, the Prime Minister consented to present the agreement to the House i n the form of a resolution. The resolution read: That i t i s expedient that the houses of parliament do approve an exchange of notes constituting an agreement between the government of Canada and the government of the United States of America concerning the organization and operation of the North American a i r defence command (NORAD) signed 116 at Washington May 12. 1958 and that t h i s house do approve the same. ° The debate that followed on June 10 and June 11 concentrated on two points. F i r s t , there was much discussion of the procedure followed by the government. As much of i t was a rehashing of arguments presented over the previous s i x months, and these have been discussed above, there i s no need to repeat them here i n d e t a i l . The es s e n t i a l f e a t u r e of these was the assertion that the government had flown i n the face of Parliament by attempting to eliminate the right s of the represen-20 tatives of the electorate. The L i b e r a l Party reaction to the substance of the agreement was one of cautious and i n q u i s i t i v e acquiescence. The leader of the opposition began by emphasizing the b i l a t e r a l character of the agreement. Although he agreed that N.O.R.A.D. did have some connection with N.A.T.O., he pointed out that i t was not responsible to nor did i t receive instructions from the l a t t e r organization. He quoted a statement by the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O. as the very best possible proof that N.O.R.A.D. _ ^ ~ _ 21 was not a command of N.A.T.O. Mr. Pearson went on to argue that the agreement was very d i f f i c u l t to analyze for i t did not give the f i n a l conditions or circumstances upon which i t s commander could act. Rather, i t only st i p u l a t e d that negotiations should be continued 117 u n t i l a f i n a l decision could be reached. It was then only an 22 agreement to agree to do something. Finally he contradicted a point emphasized several times by Mr. Diefenbaker - that the agreement was purely defensive. N.O.R.A.D. communications, he pointed out, aren Tt divorced from the retaliatory power of 23 the Strategic Air Command. Indeed i t was N.O.R.A.D. i n t e l l t igence that would send the bombers of S.A.C. winging on their missions. Mr. Pearson and other Liberals asked several questions concerning the relationship of the commander and deputy commander to the two governments and the extent of their autonomy. In particular, Mr. Martin questioned discrepancies in statements 24 between General Partridge and the government. The Liberals concluded by suggesting that there should be an effort to put 25 N.O.R.A.D. further under the control of the N.A.T.O. Council. The C.C.F. reaction was more dogmatic. Mr. Herridge repeated the points made earlier by Mr. Pearson concerning N.O.R.A.D.Ts relationship to N.A.T.O. This agreement, he stated, is a bilateral one and nothing more and although defensive, i t i s closely integrated into the offensive system. N.O.R.A.D. instantly alerts S.A.C. and of course S.A.C. i s totally independent of N.A.T.O. and under the control of the United States alone, he contended. 2 6 It i s one thing, he went on, to surrender 118 sovereignty to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizat ion such as the United Nations or N . A . T . O . I t i s something quite d i f f e r e n t 2 for Canadian a i r un i t s to be serving under an American commander. F i n a l l y , he stressed the economic impl icat ions of such a step. I t would, he reasoned, and l a t e r events proved him c o r r e c t , force Canada into greater dependence upon the technol -o g i c a l s k i l l s and economic a b i l i t i e s of the United States."As defence requirements become more and more complex i t would seem that our economy w i l l become more and more inter-dependent with that of the United S t a t e s . " 2 8 Because i t was c l ear that i t would be impossible to combine defence with economic sovereignty i t was imperative that we take great care to preserve our p o l i t i c a l sovereignty v i s - a - v i s the United States . Ways and means should be explored, therefore , to br ing the North American 29 defence arrangements d i r e c t l y under the N . A . T . O . C o u n c i l . Because the C . C . F . s t i l l had reservat ions , and des ired further c l a r i f i c a t i o n s , Mr. Herridge requested that the agreement be j \ . • . 30 re ferred to the Standing Committee on Externa l A f f a i r s . By the fo l lowing morning, however, i t was c l ear that the government had no i n t e n t i o n of complying with the request of the C . C . F . Mr. Howard, therefore , moved an amendment to the r e s o l u t i o n so that the agreement would f a l l "within the s tructure of N . A . T . O . " 3 1 This was supported i n the i n t e l l i g e n t i f somewhat repe t i t i ous speeches of Messieurs Winch and Regier. The l a t t e r c losed h i s speech with a demand that the Prime M i n i s t e r answer some of the i n q u i r i e s and accusations brought against the agree-ment, inc lud ing a rather poorly explained C . C . F . theory that i t 32 would weaken N . A . T . O . The Prime M i n i s t e r , i n a method c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of many of h i s contr ibut ions to defence debate, ignored many of the c r i t i c i s m s and instead attacked those who had questioned the agreement. The members of the C . C . F . who. had spoken were a l l from B r i t i s h Columbia. They wished to br ing N . O . R . A . D . under N . A . T . O . c o n t r o l . Yet at a convention on June 2, 1958, the C . C . F . of B r i t i s h Columbia had urged that Canada withdraw from N . A . T . O . Who i s ambiguous, he a s k e d ? 3 3 Mr. Diefenbaker made a s i m i l a r attack upon the L i b e r a l Par ty . In the recent e l e c t i o n , he s ta ted , the L i b e r a l s had argued that unless favourable trading terms were received from the United States we ought not co-operate i n cont inenta l defence. He b i t t e r l y c r i t i c i z e d them for p lay ing p o l i t i c s with Canadian s e c u r i t y . This technique of the counter-at tack, i t might be noted, was frequently used by the Prime M i n i s t e r i n rep ly ing to oppos i t ion c r i t i c i s m s . Despite some qualms, the L i b e r a l Party voted i n favour of the r e s o l u t i o n . The C . C . F . , however, opposed i t . Thus, for 120 the f i r s t time since World War Two, the unanimity of the House of ' ' " ' - 35 Commons on major defence p o l i c y was broken. On th i s occas ion, both before and during debate, the government had attempted to run roughshod over the House of Commons. The agreement was i n operation for over ten months before the House was allowed to debate i t . In the i n t e r i m , l i t t l e information was given to the House. F i n a l l y , a f t er being returned with a huge majority i n the 1958 e l e c t i o n , some debate was permitted. I t i s tempting to speculate that the Prime M i n i s t e r avoided debate for fear that h i s minority govern-ment might be forced to the p o l l s on what perhaps he conceived to be an undesirable i s sue . But i f th i s was the reason, i t does not explain the r e s t r i c t i o n s on the debate which followed h i s sweeping v i c t o r y . For even i n th i s debate, l i t t l e new information was provided. Indeed, the f i n a l impression rece ived from these debates was that the government had showed l i t t l e regard for the r igh t s of Parl iament. THE ARROW DEBATE On February 20, 1959, the Prime M i n i s t e r announced to a surprised House of Commons that the government had decided to terminate development and production of the CF-105 a i r c r a f t (and the Iroquois e n g i n e ) . 3 6 Although the c a n c e l l a t i o n of two 121 associated projects (the A s t r a f i r e contro l system and Sparrow miss i l e ) some s i x months e a r l i e r had been widely in terpreted as the death-knel l of the Arrow, subsequent equivocation by the 37 defence minister and the outspoken approval of the Arrow by 38 the commander of N . O . R . A . D . together had served to r e - k i n d l e the doubts concerning the future of th i s a i r c r a f t . A l l that seemed c e r t a i n was that a f i n a l dec i s ion would be made on March 31, when the operative contract had lapsed. Thus, the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s statement, coming as i t d i d f ive -and-akhal f weeks e a r l i e r than expected, not only shocked the Canadian p u b l i c , but a lso played havoc with a subs tant ia l segment of the a i r c r a f t indus try . The reasons for the dec i s ion were severa l . The f i r s t reason put forward by Mr. Diefenbaker was s t r a t e g i c . In recent months, he argued, i n t e l l i g e n c e reports concerning the bomber threat have changed markedly. The CF-105, designed to combat the manned bomber, would not be operat ional u n t i l 1962 and by that time, he i n d i c a t e d , the danger from the bomber would be 39 great ly reduced. Second, he emphasized the p r o h i b i t i v e cost of the a i r c r a f t . O r i g i n a l p lans , he explained, c a l l e d for 500 to 600 a i r c r a f t to be ready by 1958. I t was expected that these 122 would cost $1.5 to $2 m i l l i o n each. The present need was but 100 planes and the estimates from A . V. Roe ind icated that they would cost a t o t a l of $780 m i l l i o n s excluding the $303 m i l l i o n s that had been spent up to September 1958. Our only hope, therefore , had been to s e l l some to our a l l i e s . The Uni ted States had ind icated that i t was not in teres ted and Canada had rece ived no favourable answers from overseas despite 40 recent negot iat ions with the Uni ted Kingdom. Before proceeding to discuss the new defence p lans , the Prime M i n i s t e r admitted frankly that there was no a l ternate contracts a v a i l a b l e for the companies involved but that s ince defence expenditures could be j u s t i f i e d only by defence r e q u i r e -41 ments, he had but l i t t l e choice i n the matter. Almost two years before the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s statement, oppos i t ion members had begun to debate the CF-105. On one occasion the C . C . F . member for A s s i n i b o i a had drawn the a t t ent ion of the minis ter to the "dead duck" l a b e l that Lieutenant-General 42 Simonds had pinned on the c r a f t . A second representat ive of the same party had stressed the exorbitant cost of the a i r p l a n e . Never again, he argued, should Canada embark upon such a cos t l y programme without the endorsement of other countries that would guarantee o r d e r s . ^ 3 Members of the C . C . F . cont inua l ly peppered the government with questions on the projec t and i n t e r m i t t e n t l y 123 urged the government to make a c r i t i c a l review of the p r o j e c t . 4 4 The L i b e r a l Party had been less harsh than the C . C . F . but nevertheless considerably concerned about the future of the Arrow. On August 8, 1958, the leader of the opposi t ion had t o l d the Commons: A dec i s ion has to be taken as to whether or not to go ahead to the point where these planes w i l l be introduced into our squadrons. . . or do we abandon the projec t i n the l i g h t of developments i n the l a s t two years which seem to be emphasizing the importance of other forms of a i r defence, which may not replace but w i l l c e r t a i n l y have to supplement the C F - 1 0 5 ? 4 5 By the fo l lowing January he was less i n q u i s i t i v e and more censorious. The L i b e r a l P a r t y , he explained, had recon-sidered the projec t every s i x months while i t was i n o f f i c e . I t i s obvious, however, that the Progressive Conservatives have not done so s ince they came to power. Mr. Pearson charged the government with i n d e c i s i o n , v a c i l l a t i o n and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . 4 6 In r e t u r n , he was t o l d by the Prime M i n i s t e r that i t was the 47 L i b e r a l Party that was too i n d e f i n i t e . I t i s c l ear then that w e l l i n advance of i t s f i n a l d e c i s i o n , the government had been under f a i r l y continuous pressure from the House of Commons to come to an ear ly and d e f i n i t e dec i s ion . And from the tone of oppos i t ion comments, although ne i ther party chose to commit i t s e l f i r r e v o c a b l y , i t appeared 124 that both expected a conclus ion i n the negative. The statement of the Prime M i n i s t e r , i n which the c a n c e l l a t i o n of the Arrow was announced, was made on a F r i d a y afternoon. The fo l lowing Monday the defence c r i t i c of the L i b e r a l Party moved the adjournment of the House to discuss a d e f i n i t e matter of urgent pub l i c importance "namely the c r i s i s i n the a i r c r a f t indus try . . . invo lv ing mass l a y - o f f s and threatened d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of th i s important sector of our Canadian defence p r o d u c t i o n . " 4 8 The Prime M i n i s t e r ind ica ted that he welcomed an opportunity for d i s c u s s i o n . 4 9 Thus, the f i r s t of two f u l l debates on the Arrow was begun. The s t ra teg i c bases for the dec i s ion of the government were discussed but b r i e f l y . C . C . F . spokesman, Mr. Argue, ignored them t o t a l l y 5 0 and from the L i b e r a l Party only Mr. He l lyer questioned the v a l i d i t y of Mr. Diefenbaker's reasoning. Although he d i d n ' t doubt that the i n t e r - c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e would be the major threat by the mid-1960s, Mr. He l lyer explained he d i d n ' t understand how t h i s could be r e l a t e d to an absolute ly diminished bomber threat . Even i f by the mid-1960s the bomber i s only a supplementary weapon, he contended, the information of the L i b e r a l s ind icates that there would s t i l l be 1000 - 2000 such a i r c r a f t that could be sent against the North American 51 . cont inent . 125 Mr. Pearkes, i n r e b u t t a l , revealed that the government i n t e l l i g e n c e showed that the Russians had far fewer bombers that could f l y to North American targets and return to Russia than had been suggested by Mr.. Hellyer. More important, the Russians had no new ones i n production and had cut o f f t h e i r development programme. 5 2 L i b e r a l c r i t i c s accepted these comments and did not question the accuracy of Mr. Pearkes* information. A second issue debated was the problem of Canadian sovereignty. Our f a i l u r e to s e l l the CF-105 to the United States, maintained Mr. Argue, showed as predicted i n the d i s -cussion on N.O.R.A.D., that our partnership for continental defence i s a decidedly unbalanced one. We are not getting a f a i r share of the defence production orders. We are becoming increasingly dependent on American technical s k i l l s . Canadian soverignty i s being swallowed up by the economy of the United 53 States. But both the strategic and sovereignty issues were peripheral i n the debate. The subjects discussed most thoroughly were the future of the Canadian a i r c r a f t industry, the unemploy-ment problem that had been created and perhaps most important, the procedure and timing of the government action. Mr. Hellyer stated the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n quite succinctly: 126 If the government decided that the Avro Arrow was not the most important machine necessary to our defence at the present time we would be obliged to go along with that decision and i t must be accepted, but the fact which cannot be accepted "is that at a time when there i s obviously a very urgent military requirement for some defence machinery the government should and after eighteen months, simply cancel the contract over-night without giving adequate consideration as to what i t should do in lieu thereof. 5 4 It has taken years, he continued, to acquire the engineering and technical s k i l l s required for our aircraft industry and now by one ill-considered step, these are to be lost probably forever. Other members attacked the failure of the government to cushion the blow and questioned the responsible minister con-cerning the possibilities of alternate employment. The position of the Prime Minister was a sound one economically. "The production of obsolete weapons as a make-work programme is an unjustifiable expenditure of public funds." In shifting the blame to the A . V . Roe Company, however, and in emphasizing that i t had received sufficient prior warning, 5 6 he was on less firm ground. If the comments in the House were to be judged in the manner of a university debate, there would no doubt be many who would give the verdict to the government. The logic of the Conservative case, however, seemed relatively unimportant in light of the fact that quite suddenly thousands had been thrown 0 127 out of work. The debate was renewed a week l a t e r on the motion that the House go into Committee of Supply. On such motions i t i s the prerogat ive of the o f f i c i a l oppos i t ion to choose the topic for debate and on th i s occasion t h e i r leader ind icated that h i s p lan was "to r a i s e c e r t a i n questions concerning defence p o l i c y and defence planning i n the country with s p e c i a l reference to the necess i ty of planning defence p r o d u c t i o n . " 5 7 In construct ing h i s argument, the leader of the oppos-i t i o n stressed three key factors that occurred between August 27 and October 4 of 1957. These were the launching of the f i r s t 58 Russian i n t e r - c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e , the completion of the f i r s t Arrow, and the successful launching of the f i r s t Sputnik. At that time, and not a year-and-a-ha l f l a t e r , the necessary information was a v a i l a b l e for making a f i n a l d e c i s i o n . The 59 government, he claimed, had blundered d i s a s t r o u s l y . F i n a l l y , Mr. Pearson went on, to replace the Arrow with the American produced Bomarc would make us more dependent on United States defence production capacity than ever b e f o r e . 0 ^ In c l o s i n g , he moved an amendment that "this house regrets that the prolonged delay of the government i n determining a i r defence p o l i c y and planning i n cooperation with our a l l i e s i s preventing the e f f ec t ive use of Canada Ts defence production f a c i l i t i e s and manp'ower . " o l 128 To t h i s , the C . C . F . spokesman added "and i s so contr ibut ing to the erosion of Canadian sovereignty." Subsequent C . C . F . members placed primary emphasis on the numerous unemployed whereas L i b e r a l representat ives attacked the lack of government p o l i c y . Both p a r t i e s , however, supported both the sub-amendment and the amendment each of which was crushed by the government's . 63 major i ty . Debate on the Arrow dec i s ion was i n t e l l i g e n t and i n -formed. Both the background and V; the impl icat ions of th i s step were considered c a r e f u l l y by the oppos i t ion p a r t i e s . The government was put on the defensive by these p a r t i e s . I t was forced to s p e l l out , and i n great d e t a i l , the motivation for i t s a c t i o n . Due to the exce l lent coverage of the debates by the media of mass communication, the general publ i c was there-fore given an opportunity to evaluate the wisdom of the government's procedure i n the l i g h t of the government's own defence and the oppos i t ion's c r i t i c i s m s . Poss ib ly one i n d i c a t i o n that the opposi t ion d id success fu l ly d i s c r e d i t the government p o s i t i o n was that on p r a c t i c a l l y a l l subsequent opportun i t i e s , the opposi t ion par t i e s had l i t t l e h e s i t a t i o n i n br ing ing the. matter up i n debate and dwell ing on i t 129 at considerable length, no doubt with the voter i n mind. And i f one wished to speculate, i t would perhaps be in t e r e s t i n g to attempt to trace out the rel a t i o n s h i p between cancellation of the contract and Conservative f a i l u r e s i n t r a d i t i o n a l l y "Tory Toronto" i n the 1962 general e l e c t i o n . NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE GREAT (IN)DECISION The most continuous and extended debate oh Canadian defence since the Second World War has centred on Canadian acceptance or non-acceptance of nuclear weapons. The problem i s a most complex one and cl o s e l y connected to a number of additio n a l matters not a l l of which are d i r e c t l y related to one another. These include the influence of public opinion and the future e l e c t o r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of each of the pa r t i e s , Canada's rol e i n N.A.T.O. and N.O.R.A.D., the necessity of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and perhaps most important broad p o l i c y and the d i r e c t i o n into which Canada's defence e f f o r t should be channelled. The nuclear weapons debate thus has many faces each of which i s of considerable importance. Probably the greatest single challenge that faced members of Canada's twenty-fourth Parliament was that of securing from the government a d e f i n i t e commitment on whether Canada would accept nuclear weapons. Before looking at the attitude of the 130 government, however, I s h a l l examine f i r s t the p o s i t i o n of the other p a r t i e s . From the e l e c t i o n of 1957 u n t i l August 1960 the L i b e r a l Party put forward no s p e c i f i c p o l i c y . Pol icy-making, they c la imed, was the r o l e of the government. Thus, much of t h e i r energy was d irec ted toward obtaining from the government c l ear statements of the defence programme. At times, however, a f ter c a r e f u l l y acknowledging the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n making such a d e c i s i o n , the L i b e r a l leaders put forward vague.suggestions of what a L i b e r a l 64 p o l i c y might be. Concerning North American defence, the leader of the oppos i t ion made no d e f i n i t e commitment. But he d id question the propr ie ty of having Canadian and American Bomarc squadrons under a s ingle command ( N . O . R . A . D . ) i n which the l a t t e r would be bet ter armed than the former. The p o s s i b i l i t y of such a s i t u a t i o n , he suggested, i s i n t o l e r a b l e . ^ 5 Soon thereaf ter , members of the L i b e r a l Party began to attack the defensive value of the Bomarc, the weapon for which i t was most l i k e l y that nuclear warheads would be o b t a i n e d . ^ In 67 t h i s a c t i o n , they were supported strongly by the C . C . F . Toward the end of May, while th i s mi s s i l e was s t i l l under considerable f i r e i n Parl iament, the Congress of the United States cut one - th i rd 131 of i t s appropriat ions for t h i s weapon. Despite t h i s , although no doubt with some uneasiness, the M i n i s t e r of Nat ional Defence i n s i s t e d that development of the Bomarc "B", the mark which " 68 Canada was to rece ive , was proceeding on schedule. On February 20, 1959, the Prime M i n i s t e r had admitted: The f u l l p o t e n t i a l of these defensive weapons (Bomarc) i s achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads. The government i s therefore examining with the United States government questions connected with the a c q u i s i t i o n of nuclear warheads for Bomarc and other defensive weapons for use by the Canadian forces i n Canada, and the storage of warheads i n Canada. Problems connected with the arming of the Canadian brigade i n Europe with short range nuclear weapons for N . A . T . O . " s defence tasks are a lso being s t u d i e d . 6 9 To prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons to many countr i e s , however, the Prime M i n i s t e r announced that i t was the p o l i c y of the government to prevent the production of such weapons i n Canada although he was qui te c e r t a i n that the required s c i e n t i f i c and t echnica l "know-how" was a v a i l a b l e . 7 0 The p o s i t i o n of the C . C . F . was c l ear from the outset . There i s no defence against the I . C . B . M . the argument went, and therefore no reason to accept defensive weapons with nuclear warheads. Both i n North America and i n Europe i t i s only the deterrent power of S . A . C . that i s preventing aggression. There i s no need for Canada to contr ibute to th i s f o r c e . 7 1 As a r e s u l t , the C . C . F . claimed that i n "Canada there s h a l l be no attempt 132 to either manufacture atomic or nuclear weapons, to use them, or, 72 for that matter, to store them on Canadian s o i l . " The L i b e r a l s c r i t i c i z e d the usefulness of the Bomarc 7 3 but offered no d e f i n i t e p o l i c y concerning nuclear weapons for Canadian forces i n Canada. Mr. Pearson did come very close, however, to advocating that the brigade group i n Europe be armed with such weapons: I f these weapons were not used, N.A.T.O. forces i n Europe would be facing armies which had them and would not hesitate to use them. Unless we can get inte r n a t i o n a l agreement on t h i s matter, the r e s u l t i n g m i l i t a r y d i s p a r i t y created might well be considered i n t o l e r a b l e to N.A.T.O. morale. I f the Canadian forces were deprived of these weapons or were not permitted to use them. . . th e i r morale could hardly be expected to remain very high i f they were serving alongside N.A.T.O. forces which had these t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons. 7 4 By January of 1960 the p o l i c y of the L i b e r a l Party had begun to s o l i d i f y . Canada should accept no nuclear weapons, i t was argued, that she does not control or are not controlled by N.A.T.O.75 The Prime Minister, i n reply, accused the opposition of inconsistency, pointed out that American laws upheld the p r i n c i p l e of United States ownership and he closed by assuring the House of Commons that there " s h a l l be Canadian control of use i n Canada." 7 6 In the meantime, the United States had experienced further d i f f i c u l t i e s with the Bomarc. F i n a l l y , toward the end of 133 March, 1960, the Congress cut appropriations for the Bomarc from $421 million to $50 million, a step which indicated very clearly i t s disenchantment with the missile's effectiveness. On March 25, the senior defence c r i t i c of the Liberty Party, with C.C.F. support, urged the House to refuse interim supply to the government on the grounds that i t would be spent on the useless Bomarc. He therefore moved that the government's request be cut by one million dollars. On a straight party vote, the govern-77 ment defeated the amendment. On the Monday next, the cuts in Bomarc appropriations by the American Congress were made the subject of a Liberal motion that the House be adjourned to discuss a definite matter of 78 urgent public importance. As on the CF-105 cancellation, the Prime Minister announced he was more than willing to permit such 79 a debate. The Bomarc, and defence policy generally, were debated quite f u l l y but no new statements were made on nuclear weapons policy. The government continued to defend the value 80 of the Bomarc. Thus, when some five weeks later by a vote of 327 to 3 the United States House of Representatives decided to cease spending funds on the Bomarc, the Diefenbaker administration was put in a most embarrassing position. By the spring, 1960, the defence policy of the govern-ment (or the lack of one) had been thoroughly discredited, not 134 only by the opposi t ion p a r t i e s , but by the numerous organs of publ i c op in ion , inc lud ing even a considerable segment of the 81 Conservative press . In the Commons members time and again t r i e d to press the government into making a d e f i n i t e statement. Repl ies s i m i l a r to the fo l lowing were the best they could draw out however. On Ju ly 14, the Prime M i n i s t e r stated: I t i s a w e l l known fact that United States law requires that the ownership of nuclear weapons must remain with the Uni ted States . . . At the same time, as I have sa id before i n the house, i f and when nuclear weapons are acquired by the Canadian forces , these weapons w i l l not be used except as the Canadian government decides and i n the manner approved by the Canadian government. One determines a course by f i r s t taking the necessary steps as to the p r i n c i p l e s on which nuclear weapons would be accepted. Then when we have a r r i v e d at that point a determination w i l l be made on the bas is of i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i tuat ions e x i s t i n g , which are very grave, and i n the l i g h t of any subsequent circumstances that may develop between now and the time we would be i n a p o s i t i o n i n any event to have atomic weapons . 8 2 Three weeks l a t e r defence minis ter Pearkes argued: The Bomarc, the CF-104, the Honest John w i l l not be coming into serv ice with the Canadian forces u n t i l l a t e i n 1961. What we are undertaking and what has already been made p e r f e c t l y c l e a r i s that we are d iscuss ing with the United States arrangements which w i l l be acceptable to both countries as to condit ions under which such weapons w i l l be a v a i l a b l e to Canada i f and when requ ired . . . We are . . . going ahead with the procurement of veh ic l e s which can use these nuclear weapons, but the dec i s ion as to the a c q u i s i t i o n of the nuclear warheads depends on circumstances which might develop i n the f u t u r e . 8 3 135 Thus, up u n t i l August 1960 only the C.C.F. had taken a definite stand on nuclear weapons and defence policy. North American security, i t was their feeling, depended solely on the Strategic Air Command and i t s a b i l i t y to deter. Much the same was also true in Europe. Therefore there was no purpose i n accepting tactical nuclear weapons. The strategy of N.A.T.O. should be centred on the development of strong conventional forces and i t was toward this goal that Canada should channel her efforts. Very much in contrast, the Liberal Party had made no such definite policy statements. In the meantime, government policy was to make no definite commitments but to "play things by ear." On August 4, 1960 the senior Liberal defence c r i t i c , Mr. Hellyer, delivered an important address in Committee of Supply. In i t he announced several important decisions of the Liberal Party defence committee. He c r i t i c i z e d the adoption of the Sage-Bomarc system and argued that Canada's role in continental defence should be one of identification (called "bird-watching" by the supporters of the government). To this end, the CF-100 should be replaced by a supersonic jet interceptor. Such a step, he claimed, would strengthen the alert system for the deterrent. Naturally, i t would also eliminate the necessity of storing or accepting nuclear warheads in Canada. Finally, to increase Canadian independence of the United States N.O.R.A.D. should be 136 84 made a part of N.A.T.O. On the following day, the leader of the opposition made known the nuclear weapons policy of his party for Europe. No N.A.T.O. forces should have nuclear weapons under national control. A l l , including the United States and United Kingdom, should be under the control of N.A.T.O. thus decreasing the number of 85 agencies which could independently begin a nuclear war. Concerning the Canadian brigade group in Germany, Mr. Pearson announced that i t was now the policy of his party, in contrast to what he had suggested a few years earlier, to avoid arming them with tactical nuclear weapons. He gave three reasons for the change. F i r s t , the information that was now available indicated that they would not provide the increased security that had formerly been anticipated. Second, i t might discourage the western European a l l i e s from building up their own conventional forces. Third, recent tests had shown that small nuclear bombs were pro-portionately "more dirty" than large ones, that i s , they gave off 86 vast amounts of dangerous fall-out. The Conservatives had an instant advantage in the debate for Mr. Hellyer's speech had irresponsibly been published by one newspaper in advance of delivery to the House, thus per-mitting the defence minister, Mr. Pearkes, to answer i t even before i t was presented. Even with this advantage and 137 Mr. Diefenbaker's harsh c r i t i c i s m s of L i b e r a l i n c o n s i s t e n c y 8 7 , the Conservatives could scarcely answer the charge i n the pro-Conservative Province that they had no p o l i c y . "The L i b e r a l defence p o l i c y may or may not be the r i g h t one. We aren't going to argue that here. What i s important i s that i t i s a POLICY, a p o s i t i v e one." 8 8 Toward the end of 1960, a new l i g h t was shone on Conservative indecisiveness with the considerable references, both i n the Commons and outside of i t , to the so-called " s p l i t " within the Cabinet on nuclear weapons p o l i c y . On January 31, 1961, the member for Burnaby-Coquitlam raised a grievance - that the Minister of National Defence had requested members of the armed forces to use t h e i r influence to counter "ban the bomb" 89 movements. Subsequent speeches dwelled on t h i s a ttitude i n the l i g h t of the encouragement that the minister of external 90 a f f a i r s had given to another group with a si m i l a r viewpoint. In the Supply debates of 1961 L i b e r a l Party and C.C.F. speakers r e i t e r a t e d t h e i r viewpoint on nuclear weapons. The Progressive Conservative minister could do no better than to draw an analogy between the weapons being purchased for Canada and the r i f l e of a hermit. The analogy, as i t turned out, was more appropriate than he at f i r s t r e a l i z e d : The s i t u a t i o n i s much the same as that of a man 138 l i v i n g i n a lonely cabin i n the woods who fears he may be attacked by a bear. He does not wait u n t i l the bear a c t u a l l y attacks him to buy a r i f l e , but secures i t beforehand and has i t ready i n the event of need.91 Not unnaturally, Mr. Harkness, the new defence minister, was asked whether the hermit would purchase h i s ammunition before or a f t e r he was a t t a c k e d . 9 2 Although the minister did make some excellent c r i t i c i s m s of the p o l i c i e s advocated by those i n opposition, he again refused to c l a r i f y government plans. Member a f t e r member t r i e d to force the minister's hand u n t i l f i n a l l y , i n reply to a harsh r i d i n g by Mr. Martin, he retorted: What the hon. member i s try i n g to do i s bludgeon me into making a yes or no statement at t h i s time as to the securing of nuclear weapons. I t e l l him r i g h t away that he i s not going to bludgeon me into making any statement before the government i s ready to make i t . The l a s t occasions, i n the twenty-fourth Parliament, for debating the nuclear arms question were the Address at the outset of the f i f t h session, and the b r i e f Supply debates that followed not long thereafter. By t h i s time, both the L i b e r a l and New Democratic P a r t i e s 9 4 p o l i c i e s had been developed f u l l y . The former group saw no need f o r nuclear weapons i n North America on the grounds that such weapons would protect neither the deterrent nor the centres of population. Like the N.D.P., they had come to the conclusion that the only defence against a pre-emptive s t r i k e was deterrence 139 and because the deterrent was mobile, there was no longer any need to protect i t . And i n Europe, both parties agreed that the greatest emphasis should be placed on conventional weapons. They d i f f e r e d , however, i n that the L i b e r a l Party advocated t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons under N.A.T.O. (as opposed to national) co n t r o l , although not for Canadian forces whereas the N.D.P. objected vehemently to a nuclear strategy for N.A.T.O. Thus both opposition parties brought coherent and r a t i o n a l defence p o l i c i e s before the country. And with a general e l e c t i o n soon i n the o f f i n g , both, but the L i b e r a l s i n p a r t i c u l a r , l o s t l i t t l e opportunity to embarrass the government. During the Address numerous opposition speakers attacked the i n a b i l i t y of the government to develop a p o l i c y . In the month of March alone, questions both formal and informal, on nuclear weapons, were hurled at the government on at least s i x oc c a s i o n s . 9 5 In p a r t i c u l a r , L i b e r a l speakers asked the govern-ment to r a t i o n a l i z e the decision to accept a s t r i k e reconnaissance r o l e i n Europe, which required t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons, without a p o l i t i c a l decision f i r s t on whether they were w i l l i n g to so arm the i r f o r c e s . 9 6 Almost every senior c r i t i c i n the L i b e r a l Party chose to debate the matter. Indeed, so often was i t raised that even N.D.P. member Mr. Herridge questioned whether the L i b e r a l s were not playing p o l i t i c s with the swelling tide of 140 opposition to nuclear weapons. 9 7 The l a s t words of the defence minister on the matter, however, before closing debate, were a mere r e p e t i t i o n of statements made on numerous e a r l i e r occasions. Thus did the debate on nuclear weapons i n the twenty-fourth Parliament draw to an end. COMPARISONS TO THE 1945-57 PERIOD The nuclear weapons and po l i c y debates of the twenty-fourth Parliament, I would submit, were the very antithesis of those that had been held between 1945 and 1957. In the e a r l i e r years, there had been concensus on broad p o l i c y although considerable disagreement on method of implementation i n the area of administration and sometimes stra t e g i c p o l i c y . But the overwhelming impression was one of agreement - agreement to demobilize, agreement to j o i n N.A.T.O. and agreement to remobilize. In contrast, the post-1957 period has been one of disagreement. . The government and opposition have divided on nuclear weapons p o l i c y , on continental defence including N.O.R.A.D., and on the role of N.A.T.O. The opposition p a r t i e s however have done more than c r i t i c i z e . They have also put forward detailed and r a t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e s to government p o l i c y . And where p o l i c y has been lacking, as on nuclear weapons, proposals 141 have been suggested to f i l l the vacuum. Debate, on the whole, was of a considerably higher q u a l i t y than i t was i n the pre-1957 p e r i o d . Both oppos i t ion par t i e s showed a b i l i t y not only i n debating the background to the various p o l i c y problems, but a lso i n d iscuss ing t h e i r impl i ca t ions . Arguments on the whole were more comprehensive, more de ta i l ed and bet ter documented than they were when the Conservatives were the o f f i c i a l oppos i t ion . On numerous occasions the government was forced very much onto the defensive, something that seldom occurred i n the 1945-57 per iod . Indeed, the opposi t ion par t i e s were apparently so convinced that they had d i s c r e d i t e d the government's defence programme that both L i b e r a l s and New Democrats attempted to make defence one of the major issues of the 1962 general e l e c t i o n campaign. In the next few pages I have attempted to account for the dif ferences i n the pat tern of oppos i t ion between the 1945-57 and 1957-62 per iods . I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d that the reason for separating the study into chronologica l periods was to test for d i f ferences i n the funct ioning of the oppos i t ion i n the two per iods . The f i r s t explanation, therefore , that n a t u r a l l y comes to mind i s that the L i b e r a l Party was more capable of handling the duties of an opposi t ion than was the Conservative Party and dif ferences 142 i n the organizat ion and personnel of the two par t i e s do suggest reasons to support th i s thes i s . In the 1945-57 per iod the Progressive Conservatives handled defence through a House of Commons Defence Committee which was made up of a l l Conservative members of Parliament who wished to belong to i t . At the beginning of each session the committee e lected a chairman, vice-chairman and secretary. 98 Inasmuch as "there were no meetings of the 'Shadow C a b i n e t ™ the defence programme of the Conservatives was determined by th i s Defence Committee i n the House of Commons with the ass is tance at times of the party leader. In contras t , Mr. He l lyer informed the author that L i b e r a l p o l i c y since 1957 has been formed by what might be r e f e r r e d to as the Defence Committee of the Shadow Cabinet . Thus major defence decis ions were made at Shadow Cabinet l e v e l by the L i b e r a l oppos i t ion; at the Commons committee l e v e l by the 99 C o n s e r v a t i v e s . " Dif ferences i n the composition of the Conservative and L i b e r a l Defence Committees are a lso noteworthy. Without exception, the senior c r i t i c s of the Progressive Conservative Party were a l l inexperienced i n the operations of g o v e r n m e n t . 1 0 0 None had served i n a f edera l or even a p r o v i n c i a l cabinet . On the other hand, the par ty ' s ch ie f c r i t i c , Mr. Pearkes, had been a 143 professional s o l d i e r and many of i t s other members had achieved senior ranks while serving with the armed forces during one or the other of the two world wars. Thus the Conservative c r i t i c s were more f a m i l i a r with m i l i t a r y organization than with the general administration of government. In contrast, the personnel of the L i b e r a l committee contained no professional soldiers and fewer men with wartime experience. But the composition of t h i s L i b e r a l committee i s less important than that of the Shadow Cabinet for i t was at the l a t t e r l e v e l that L i b e r a l decision-making was carr i e d out. The two senior defence c r i t i c s , Mr. Pearson and Mr. Hellyer, were experienced i n the administration of the government, and several other key figures i n the Shadow Cabinet had held important p o r t f o l i o s i n the King and St. Laurent governments. The Li b e r a l s thus brought a decidedly d i f f e r e n t set of credentials to the job of opposing from those borne by t h e i r Conservative predecessors. And with these differences there evolved decidedly d i f f e r e n t patterns of opposition. On administrative and st r a t e g i c methods of implementing broad p o l i c y the Progressive Conservatives were energetic c r i t i c s . But i n preparing a comprehensive defence programme which they could o f f e r i n opposition to the govern-ment they were t o t a l l y unsuccessful nor does i t appear that they made serious e f f o r t s to do so. The control that they did 144 exerc i se , although probably not by des ign, tended to bureaucrat ic c o n t r o l rather than p o l i t i c a l . The pattern of L i b e r a l contro l has been almost the d i r e c t ant i thes i s of that weaved by the Progressive Conservatives . The former ignored implementation of broad p o l i c y f a r more than the Conservatives . But whereas the Conservative opposit ions had been prepared to accept broad p o l i c y , the L i b e r a l s have not. Defence p o l i c y has been one of the subjects most c r i t i c i z e d by the L i b e r a l opposi t ion and a l t erna t ive s c e r t a i n l y have not been l a c k i n g . Moreover, the L i b e r a l Party has shown l i t t l e h e s i t a t i o n i n taking t h e i r case to the people by making defence a major i ssue i n the 1962 e l e c t i o n . Thus i t i s c l ear that p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l and not bureaucrat ic has been the primary goal of Messieurs He l lyer and Pearson. The di f ferences i n the pat tern of oppos i t ion , therefore , and the di f ferences i n the success of the oppos i t ion apparently can be explained by the di f ferences i n the personnel , experience and organizat ion of the two p a r t i e s . In any event these factors do o f fer one explanation for the di f ferences i n q u a l i t y of oppos i t ion between the two per iods . Several other explanations for t h i s changing pat tern are a l so worthy of note, however, for although none contradic t t h i s f i r s t theory, they do supplement i t by br ing ing i n other 145 facts which are decidedly re levant . A second explanat ion, and one which has been consciously or unconsciously approved by a l l three p a r t i e s , i s that the range of poss ib le a l t e r n a t i v e defence p o l i c i e s has increased markedly i n the post-1957 (post-Sputnik, p o s t - I . C . B . M . ) p e r i o d . 1 0 1 The argument here i s that the bas ic concept of defence s ince pre -h i s t o r i c times - the idea that defence i s secured by destroying the persons and weapons of offence - has been placed under consider-able s t r a i n by recent technolog ica l developments. Because of these bas ic changes, through which the methods of attack have completely outdistanced the means of defence, a fundamental r e -assessment of defence has been requ ired . In making such an a n a l y s i s , the a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c i e s that are a v a i l a b l e , and the ease with which any s ing le p o l i c y may be c r i t i c i z e d , has made i t a simple task for almost any oppos i t ion to put any government under considerable pressure . I t i s thus poss ib le to argue that the improved debates i n the Commons are due i n part to the changing character of the defence funct ion which has f a c i l i t a t e d the job of the oppos i t ion . And to strengthen th i s content ion, i t can be argued that the recent improvements i n the defence debate have not been confined to the House of Commons alone, but rather have occurred throughout Canada i n the numerous speeches, bookle ts , a r t i c l e s and textbooks that have 146 been prepared ort the defence dilemma. Another theory that must be considered i s that which states that i n defence and fore ign a f f a i r s , p o l i c y should be b i -p a r t i s a n . To th i s p r i n c i p l e numerous Conservatives have stated t h e i r approval . Concerning th i s idea Professor Ke irs tead ' s remarks are we l l worth cons ider ing . On March 25, 1962, the Ottawa Evening Journal stated e d i t o r i a l l y : We are being t o l d that there i s now a good chance of Canada r e t a i n i n g a b i p a r t i s a n fore ign p o l i c y ! . . . F o o l i s h u n r e a l i s t i c t a l k . . . A c t u a l l y a b i -p a r t i s a n fore ign p o l i c y has no place whatever i n a B r i t i s h Parliamentary system . . . Opposi t ion i s not consulted beforehand regarding what the p o l i c i e s are to be about. In rep ly Professor Ke ir s tead wrote: This view i s surely a correc t though incomplete statement of the r o l e of the Opposit ion i n a parl iamentary system. I t i s incomplete because i t omits to state that the Parliamentary system for i t s proper operat ion depends on an agreement on the fundamental aims of p o l i c y . When the nat ion becomes s p l i t between hopeless ly i r r e c o n -c i l a b l e ph i losophies , then the state cannot ex i s t and a dec i s ion i s normally l e f t to the abitrament of f orce . I f some credence be given to the idea that between 1945 and 1957 the Conservatives were motivated i n part by the des ire for b ipar t i sansh ip i n defence, then thus another reason, one which does not r e f l e c t on the a b i l i t y of the oppos i t ion , appears for expla in ing the unanimity on broad p o l i c y before 1957. 147 F i n a l l y , a f a i r l y good case can be made that with the exception of the abbreviated N . O . R . A . D . debate, the Diefenbaker government has been more w i l l i n g to discuss c o n t r o v e r s i a l issues than were the various L i b e r a l governments. On a l l f i ve occasions between 1945 and 1957 when defence matters were the subject of oppos i t ion motions to adjourn (to discuss a d e f i n i t e matter of urgent publ ic importance), the L i b e r a l government purposely avoided such debates. In contras t , the Diefenbaker government on the only two occasions that they have been moved, has welcomed such motions and on such p o l i t i c a l l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l topics as the Arrow and the B o m a r c . 1 0 5 This impression i s strengthened by changes i n the committee system since 1958 at the i n i t i a t i v e of the government which has also encouraged rather than discouraged parliamentary i n q u i r y . I t was mentioned e a r l i e r that the L i b e r a l s have presented be t ter documented and more d e t a i l e d c r i t i c i s m s and a l t erna t ive s than d id t h e i r Conservative predecessors. I t i s u s e f u l therefore to compare the information that has been a v a i l -able to the two opposi t ions; for i f the L i b e r a l s were given much more information on defence than the Conservat ives , th i s might account for t h e i r superior brand of oppos i t ion . But i t was the Conservat ives , and not the L i b e r a l s , who were supplied with greater information. Not only were there annual reports for the defence departments but also there were numerous white papers. And between 1951 and 1953 c lose to 1500 pages of evidence was gathered by the Spec ia l Committee on Defence Expenditure. In contras t , the annual report for the Department of Nat ional Defence was hal ted by Mr. Pearkes a f t er 1957 and white papers have been extremely i r r e g u l a r . Furthermore, a L i b e r a l spokesman has argued i n an interview with the wr i t er that members of the Progressive Conservative opposi t ion were permitted a considerable amount of leeway i n t a l k i n g informal ly to senior m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n personnel of the defence establishment, a courtesy, he contended, that the Tor ies have not granted to the L i b e r a l s s ince the 1957 e l e c t i o n . 1 0 6 And i n j u s t i c e to th i s viewpoint, i t must be pointed out that there have been some ind ica t ions of inamicable r e l a t i o n s between the Diefenbaker cabinet and some of i t s senior personnel no doubt stemming from the c lose L i b e r a l - C i v i l Service t i e s that were b u i l t up during the 22 years of L i b e r a l g o v e r n m e n t . 1 0 7 On the other hand information from extra-governmental sources has increased s ince 1957 thus compensating p a r t i a l l y for the decreased volume of government-released information. The recent changes i n technology have given r i s e to numerous new studies on problems of s t r a t e g y 1 0 8 ; and Canadian newspapers and journals have become far more in teres ted i n the problems of defence. 149 But information simply does not ex i s t . I t must be obtained through ingenuity and energy. And the sources of each i n d i v i d u a l member w i l l vary . Thus although General Pearkes had admitted that the records of the American Congressional Committees "are very c o m p l e t e " 1 0 9 , h i s former colleague Mr. Harkness has wr i t t en th i s author that "far less information was obtained from American Congressional Committee Invest igat ions than from Canadian and other s o u r c e s . " 1 1 ^ In contrast to th i s Mr. He l lyer has informed the author that these American hearings are h i s par ty ' s primary source of information 1 and Mr. Coldwel l has indicated-that the C . C . F . drew heavi ly on both B r i t i s h and American sources. The point being made here i s that most of the required i n t e l l i g e n c e does seem to be a v a i l a b l e but often i n places where members have d i f f i c u l t y i n gaining access to i t . Although more f i r s t - h a n d information was given before 1957 than i n the years s ince , i t would be unwise to exaggerate the volume or use of much that was pro-v ided i n e i ther per iod . Neither o f f i c i a l opposi t ion party was given large amounts of use fu l f i r s t - h a n d information. Most of what they accumulated came through hours of homework with the records of inves t igat ions of the l e g i s l a t u r e s of other countr ies , and other non-Canadian sources. In short , ne i ther i n the pre-1957 per iod nor i n the years since has the Canadian Parliament been provided with adequate information on defence. 150 In the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , therefore , the changing pattern and improved q u a l i t y of oppos i t ion since 1957 can be a t t r i b u t e d to no s ing le cause alone. There seems to be l i t t l e doubt, however, but that the organizat ion and experience of the L i b e r a l Party members has been one of the major reasons for th i s change. Other factors have a lso a s s i s t ed the L i b e r a l opposi t ion i n e f f ec t ing p o l i t i c a l contro l and not the least important of these has been the wi l l ingness of the Prime M i n i s t e r to use the House of Commons as a forum for debate. But perhaps most important of these other factors has been the revo lu t ion i n technology and the d i f f i c u l t i e s that th i s has caused for defence pol icy-makers . With the l i n e between p o l i c y and strategy becoming increas ing ly b l u r r e d , the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of exerc i s ing e f f ec t ive p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l have grown r a p i d l y . Thus, a new o f f i c i a l oppos i t ion , a cooperative government and a changing environment have a l l helped to make the House of Commons a <•> more e f f ec t ive instrument i n the contro l of defence p o l i c y . This by no means indicates that the House has been able to determine a defence p o l i c y . I t does s i g n i f y , however, that through continuous c r i t i c i s m , much of which has been wel l - founded, the Commons has a s s i s t ed i n arousing pub l i c op in ion , and by so doing , i t has made the government f e e l the pressure of publ i c concern with i t s defence p o l i c y . 151 CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 1 The procedure of separating the more important admin-i s t r a t i v e decis ions from the rout ine ones w i l l be employed again here as i t was i n chapter three. In approaching Commons contro l over the f i r s t of these categories (important administrat ion) however, the case study method w i l l not be used, as i t was for the 1945 to 1957 p e r i o d . I am avoiding th i s technique for two reasons. F i r s t , for a v a r i e t y of reasons, i t i s not necessary. Second, i t i s far more d i f f i c u l t to choose t y p i c a l dec i s ions . I s h a l l examine th i s second reason f i r s t . In the e a r l i e r p e r i o d , there was s u f f i c i e n t debate i n th i s intermediate range of the p o l i c y - a d m i n i s t r a t i o n continuum (important administrat ion) to permit the wr i t er to se lect c e r t a i n decis ions which could be studied as t y p i c a l cases of the more general phenomenon. In the more recent per iod th i s i s more d i f f i c u l t . The f i r s t reason i s because there has been far less d i scuss ion i n th i s range. There have been far fewer debates and perhaps equal ly important, when there were debates, the House was more concerned with p o l i c y matters than i t was i n the 112 pre-1957 years , and much less concerned with admin i s tra t ion . Or i t might be f a i r e r to state that because there was concensus 152 on broad p o l i c y i n the f i r s t p e r i o d , there was more time to consider the methods and machinery of implementation, whereas i n the 1957 to 1962 per iod there has been less time for adminis tra-t i o n because of the controversy raging over p o l i c y . Thus, regardless of the reason emphasized the i n s u f f i c i e n t quant i ty of debate makes i t d i f f i c u l t to choose t y p i c a l dec i s ions . I a lso stated that i t i s not necessary to choose such case s tudies . With the advent of the new methods of d e l i v e r y , against which there are no known defences, and with growing refinement of the means of mass des t ruc t ion , a greater and greater proport ion of the s t ra teg ic and weapons decis ions have become matters with p o t e n t i a l l y great p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . For with the subject of nuclear armament constantly i n mind, and with the very s ecur i ty of North America d i r e c t l y threatened, problems of weapons technology can no longer be passed o f f as p r i m a r i l y admin i s tra t ive . Probably the best example of th i s i s the Arrow - Bomarc debates, e s p e c i a l l y i f compared to the CF-100 debates of the e a r l i e r p e r i o d . But poss ib ly the same could be s a i d , although admittedly to a l esser degree, of such subjects as the F-104b, the Honest John and other weapons which to be e f f ec t i ve require nuclear weapons. Thus, i t i s being suggested that numerous problems i n the defence funct ion which were prev ious ly treated as adminis trat ive ones, a l b e i t th i s was no doubt a very a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n , would now have to be considered p o l i t i c a l - ( a s defined) because of the changing character of the defence funct ion . For purposes of th i s the s i s , however, i t matters l i t t l e whether these matters are considered to be s t ra teg ic p o l i c y or important admin i s tra t ion , for regardless of how they are l a b e l l e d , much of what has already been sa id i n evaluating House of Commons c o n t r o l over L i b e r a l p o l i c y holds true again here. Debate was of a rather high q u a l i t y . Both opposi t ion par t i e s showed a b i l i t y i n debating the various s t ra teg ic and weapons dec i s ions , and i n d iscuss ing t h e i r impl icat ions on Canadian defence preparedness. The debate was re s t ra ined and f o r the most part responsible although there can c e r t a i n l y be no doubt that the various matters debated were considered to be f a i r " p o l i t i c a l game". There was no not ion of b i p a r t i s a n s h i p . Arguments put forward tended to be more d e t a i l e d and better documented than they were when the Conservatives were i n oppos i t ion . On numerous occasions the oppos i t ion was able to force the government very much onto the defensive. The L i b e r a l P a r t y , much l i k e the Progressive Conserv-at ives of the e a r l i e r p e r i o d , were p r i m a r i l y responsible for whatever debate occurred at th i s l e v e l . Government supporters 154 sa id l i t t l e . In contrast to the 1945 - 57 e r a , however, the C . C . F . (and N . D . P . ) proved to be e f f ec t i ve and energetic c r i t i c s . This i s e s p e c i a l l y noteworthy i n l i g h t of the fact that there were but eight representat ives of th i s l e f t wing group i n the Commons. Despite a l l that has been s a i d , there are some ind ica t ions that less contro l was exercised than when the Conservatives were the oppos i t ion . F i r s t , on departmental admin i s tra t ion , there was f a r less debate than there was during the previous three Parl iaments . I t i s true that the f i r s t item i n the defence estimates was e n t i t l e d "departmental adminis trat ion" and there was i n v a r i a b l y considerable d i scuss ion on i t , but th i s was because p o l i c y debates are always held under the f i r s t item i n the estimates and not because the subject matter debated was the adminis trat ion of the department. In the 1945 -57 p e r i o d , there were numerous discussions and i n q u i r i e s into such subjects as u n i f i c a t i o n s of s erv ices , the c i v i l i a n - m i l i t a r y r a t i o , the r o l e of senior m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n personnel , and general departmental e f fect iveness . In defence production debates, as b r i e f as they were, there was at l east a l i t t l e d iscuss ion of contract arrangements and other such s i m i l a r items. In the more recent p e r i o d , there were far fewer debates on such s i g n i f i c a n t matters. 155 ROUTINE ADMINISTRATION In drawing, some general conclusions on contro l of rout ine adminis trat ion between 1945 and 1957, I wrote i n the previous chapter: Much of the debate on rout ine adminis trat ion arose out of the r o l e of backbenchers as representat ives of const i tuents , const i tuencies and i n t e r e s t groups. Apart from a i r i n g the grievances of i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s and some representations on behal f of French Canada, however, these contr ibut ions had l i t t l e inf luence on the minis ter or cabinet . On the other hand, the usefulness of th i s type of debate to contro l the bureaucracy i s of some importance. I t i s r e g r e t t a b l e , therefore , i n the l i g h t of th i s that so few backbenchers e n e r g e t i c a l l y pursued these dut i e s . H 3 The regrets expressed i n the previous chapter must be r e i t e r a t e d again for the 1957 - 62 years . Indeed, c a r e f u l perusal has ind ica ted that the record of backbenchers has been increas ing ly less impressive and far fewer have even troubled to pursue th i s l i n e of work i n th i s l a t t e r p e r i o d . There were scarce ly more than four or f i v e i n q u i r i e s into p a r t i c u l a r contracts over the e n t i r e two P a r l i a m e n t s i 1 4 and the author 115 noted but one example of v e n t i l a t i o n of grievance. Although th i s of course does not mean that other cases were not brought before the minis ter p r i v a t e l y , i t i s qui te probably a good i n d i c a t o r of the r e l a t i v e d i s i n t e r e s t of members during these years. 156 No doubt th i s dismal performance i s r e l a t e d to the overwhelming majority enjoyed by the Conservative Party i n the House of Commons. But i f th i s serves as a reason i t i s unsat i s fac tory as an excuse; for no backbencher need f e e l so obl iged to h i s party leaders that he g ive up the r i g h t to speak with an independent vo ice on non-pol icy matters of p a r t i c u l a r concern to h i s own const i tuency. The record of the past f i v e years , therefore , appears to stand as an indictment against the general q u a l i t y of backbencher who has sat i n support of the • " ~ «- 1 1 6 government. CHAPTER V HOUSE OF COMMONS CONTROL OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURES In e a r l i e r chapters i t was seen that despite some improvements i n recent years, the House of Commons has exercised l i t t l e control over government defence p o l i c y . But what of the power of the purse, h i s t o r i c a l l y perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t of Parliament's powers? On thi s subject, Paul E i n z i g has written: I t was through . . . control of the nation's purse-strings that the Commons became the guardians of human r i g h t s . . . Control over finance enabled Parliament to secure the safety of the l i f e , l i b e r t i e s , and right s of the subject against a r b i t r a r y acts by the Executive. I t was because the Commons were i n a po s i t i o n to withhold supplies that they had been able to secure freedom and impartial j u s t i c e for the c i t i z e n s , to safeguard the interests of the weak and defenceless, and to enable the formerly destitute ;masses to a t t a i n a standard of l i v i n g i n conformity with human dignity. Surely, i f these t r a d i t i o n a l powers exis t only i n an attenuated form today, i t i s possible not only f o r the Commons 157 158 to contro l the adminis trat ion of the defence departments, but a l s o , a l b e i t i n d i r e c t l y , to inf luence defence p o l i c y . In th i s chapter, therefore , I s h a l l examine Commons contro l of defence expenditure. The House of Commons (as opposed to i t s standing and spec ia l committees and o f f i c e r s ) has two opportunit ies to c o n t r o l defence expenditures and both occur i n Committee of Supply. F i r s t , i t has the power to s c r u t i n i z e and decide on the estimates of the Department of Nat ional Defence. Second, i t performs the same funct ion for the Department of Defence Product ion. I s h a l l discuss the f i r s t of these immediately below. Before inves-t i g a t i n g the r o l e of the House, however, i t i s important to take note of the task that faced honourable members by looking both at the form of the estimates and also at the information with which members were suppl ied . From 1945 u n t i l 19,47, the bulk of the defence estimates wa:s< div ided in to two main votes and l i s t e d under the general heading of Demobi l izat ion and Reconversion. One provided the moneys for army, naval and a i r force establishments; the other for defence research and development. In 1948 these two items were transferred to the estimates of the Department of Nat ional Defence. In 1953, they were combined in to a s ing le nearly a l l - i n c l u s i v e vote<... For example, the amount voted i n 1955-56, 159 was $1,769,680,500 and of th i s $1,729,285,194 were included i n 2 vote 236. This method of presenting the estimates, i t must be pointed out, was r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from that of other departments where i t was customary to break the departmental estimates into a number of separate items some of which might be as much as $20,000,000 or $30,000,000, but most of which were much l e s s . The average backbencher ( i f there i s such a person) , when confronted with item 236, was no doubt overwhelmed. To a s s i s t him i n h i s task, therefore , the government suppl ied him with two primary sources of information. F i r s t , he had the "deta i l s of services" p r i n t e d i n a separate sect ion of the estimates "bluebook". General ly these d e t a i l s were seven or eight times the length of the estimates proper. For the s ing le major defence item they ran to t h i r t y or t h i r t y - f i v e pages and were set up under eight major d i v i s i o n s inc lud ing M i n i s t e r of Nat ional Defence, Departmental A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Inspection Serv ices , Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army, Royal Canadian A i r Force , Defence Research and Development and Mutual A i d . Under these were sub-div i s ions and under each of the l a t t e r , the minor p a r t i c u l a r s . The amount of money requested for each p a r t i c u l a r , as we l l as the sum voted the previous year , were (and of course s t i l l are) g iven. 160 But the d e t a i l s i n the "bluebook" d id l i t t l e to s i m p l i -fy the problem of the backbencher. Although members were.given some idea of where the moneys were being spent, the d e t a i l s provided few suggestions as to why. Moreover, complete d e t a i l s were provided (and continue to be), where they were of least value and few d e t a i l s where they could be u s e f u l l y employed. Thus, the p o s i t i o n and sa lary of every grade of c i v i l employee was l i s t e d 3 i n every year a f ter 1952,e.g.under Royal Canadian Navy one f inds: Royal Canadian Navy - Ac t ive Force and General . C i v i l S ta f f -Number Amount 1955-56 1954-55 D e t a i l s 1955-56 1954-55 $ $ 7,900 15,000 33,540 13,800 40,080 50,880 61,320 41,880 52,740 35,200 109,440 99,240 70,800 52,380 45,780 42,840 8,000 7,360 6,860 39,600 23,840 11,880 10,600 5,580 5,180 31,440 33,180 4,620* 4,320 6,580 5,980 1 2 5 2 6 8 10 7 9 10 20 19 14 11 11 10 1 1 1 6 4 2 2 1 1 6 7 1 1 1 1 Engineer,Grade 8 ($7,300-$7,900) Engineers,Grade 7($6,420-$ 7,200) Engineers,Grade 6($6,120-$6,840) Engineers,Grade 5($5,820-$6,540) Engineers,Grade 4($5,960-$6,180) Engineers,Grade 3($5,100-$5,820) Engineers,Grade 2($4,680-$5,400) Engineers,Grade l($3,540-$4,620) D i r e c t o r of Studies , Royal Roads Professor,Grade 2, Royal Roads Professors ,Grade 1, Royal Roads ($6,120-$6,800) Associate Professors , Royal Roads R e g i s t r a r , Royal Roads ($5,160-$5,500) Ass i s tant Professors , Royal Roads ($4,680-$5,400) L e c t u r e r , Royal Roads ($3,360-$4,620) Ins truc tor i n Radio Theory ($5,980-$6,580) 161 Royal Canadian Navy - A c t i v e Force and C i v i l S ta f f - (cont'd) General . Number D e t a i l s Amount 1955 -56 1954-55 1955-56 1954-55 '• - $ - $ 4 4 Instructors ,Grade 2 , N a t T l Def. ($3,570-$4,320) 16,980 14,760 16 14 Instructors ,Grade 1,Nat*1 Def* : ' ($3,150-$3,800) 57,150 45,920 1 1 Admini s tra t ive Of f i cer ,Grade 7 ($6,900-$7,800) 7,800 7,160 2 2 Adminis trat ive Of f i cers ,Grade 6 ($6,080-$7,000) 13,500 12,960 2 Adminis trat ive Of f i cers ,Grade 5 ($5,720-$6,360) 12,480 4 2 Admini s tra t ive Of f i cers ,Grade 4 ($5,330-$5,970) 23,400 10,560 9 12 Adminis trat ive Of f i cers ,Grade 3 ($4,750-$5,550) 48,750 56,160 In f a c t , the excerpt given above includes but one-seventeenth of the d e t a i l s under Royal Canadian Navy - C i v i l S ta f f for the year 1956. Thus the member of Parliament was presented with an enormous array of f a c t s , f igures and s a l a r i e s which, although very exhaustive, hardly d id much to expla in the r o l e and necess i ty of the i n d i v i d u a l c i v i l i a n s t a f f members i n the en t i re organizat ion . The member "could not see the forest for the trees". On the other hand, there were instances of the very opposite . Consider the fo l lowing "deta i l s" under A i r Serv ices . 162 Number 1955-56 1954-55 Number Det a i l s 1955-56 1954-55 Royal Canadian A i r Force Regular and General Major procurement of Equipment A i r c r a f t and Engines Mechanical Equipment, including Transport Armament Equipment Signal and Wireless Equipment Special Training Equipment Miscellaneous Technical Equipment Ammunition and Bombs Repairs and Upkeep of Equipment $ $ 293,534,000 395,381,000 4,763,000 1,500,000 34,773,000 9,178,000 8,919,000 15,972,000 9,785,000 2,552,000 30,111,000 10,665,000 9,195,000 12,714,000 119,292,000 124,947,000 In the f i r s t table f o r the benefit of members, the government broke less than $700,000 i n expenditure into 132 positions. In the l a t t e r on an expenditure of close to $300 mi l l i o n s for a i r c r a f t and engines, no breakdown was provided. While no doubt the matter of security i s more important f o r expend-it u r e s on a i r c r a f t and engines than f o r c i v i l i a n personnel, t h i s i n no way begins to account for the t o t a l lack of information on a i r c r a f t and for equipment generally. Indeed, the word ludicrous does not seem imappropriate f o r d e t a i l s of th i s kind. 163 The d i f f i c u l t y i n understanding the purpose of the estimates was p a r t l y a l l e v i a t e d by the annual white paper publ ished by the Min i s t er of Nat ional Defence. This deal t with such subjects as t r a i n i n g , manpower, equipment and construct ion . The paper, e n t i t l e d Canada's Defence Programme, was f i r s t publ ished i n 1949-50 and made a v a i l a b l e to members before cons iderat ion of the estimates. Although short on d e t a i l s , i t d id provide s u f f i c i e n t information on current developments to enable members to under-stand much that the estimates "bluebook" d id not exp la in . The l a s t of these was publ ished i n 1955-56, 5 with a promise from the minis ter that i n the future the white paper and annual departmental report would be combined in to a s ing le document. Intermittent white papers and annual reports (only three i n number) have been published s ince then. F i n a l l y , i n May 1961, a new booklet c a l l e d Nat ional Defence: Explanatory M a t e r i a l Re la t ing to 1961-62  Est imates , was issued to a s s i s t members. This l a s t paper devoted some twelve pages to expla in ing reasons for increases and de-creases i n the various estimates and because of t h i s , i t was more use fu l than e a r l i e r ones which general ly were but h a l f as long on these explanations. When compared to the "Explanatory Notes" which accompany the estimates of the B r i t i s h armed serv i ce s , however, i t can be seen that the 1961-62 paper was no doubt less i l l u m i n a t i n g than we l l i t might have been. 164 Thus the two sources of information together provided both a broad outline and numerous details. Unfortunately the details proved to be almost useless as they provided l i t t l e insight into the operations and administration of the defence department. Perhaps the best proof of this was that members based very few questions in Supply on these details. And the white papers dealt too much with policy, which was later repeated in the minister's policy address to the House, and not enough with current expenditures and the progress of current programmes. Together the two sources went only a very short way toward assisting the backbencher in understanding the purposes of the defence expenditures. With these brief introductory remarks i t i s now possible to look at the record of the House of Commons. Fi r s t , i n each of the years under investigation, the defence estimates were passed by the Commons as originally presented. In no single instance was any member able to secure any modification, no matter how small, in the government's defence estimates. Thus, no direct control was exercised over expenditures. Moreover,, the debates on details seldom served as an investigation into the financial operations or financial efficiency of the Department of National Defence. Apart from 165 the very rare occasions when a member delved into the s p e c i f i c purposes, arrangements and methods of expenditure i n his own constituency, the debates on d e t a i l s tended to be debates on administration, technology, equipment or t a c t i c s and not on the "minor p a r t i c u l a r s " i n the estimates d e t a i l s . Although there were often general questions on the reasons for increases or decreases i n the estimates, these did l i t t l e except to illuminate trends i n spending. Moreover they were only useful to the degree that members were acquainted with the basic f i n a n c i a l operations of the department and a l l too often the indications were that t h i s fundamental knowledge was lacking. In short, i n no single year did the Committee of Supply acquire a t r u l y d etailed understanding of the destination of the appropriated moneys. Perhaps even more important i s the f a c t that the " d e t a i l s " of estimates were not (and s t i l l are not) of any l e g a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . I f , as i s the case, Parliament grants to the Crown a certa i n service i n a given year, without any more d e f i n i t e appropriation i n the terms of the grant, i t i s l e g a l l y competent to the executive to expend that sum at i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n the year upon that service. That i s , to say, since the parliamentary enactment deals with the vote only, the Government i s not l e g a l l y bound to adhere to the d e t a i l s submitted to Parliament, provided the expenditure i s r e s t r i c t e d to "the four corners of the vote". Morally, however the Government must adhere to those d e t a i l s as f a r as i s consistent with the in t e r e s t s of the public service, since i t s good f a i t h i s pledged by the d e t a i l s given to Parliament, and the Comptroller and Auditor General would c o r r e c t l y bring divergencies to n o t i c e . 7 166 As has already been mentioned, for many years almost the ent i re estimate of the defence department, u n l i k e that of every other department, was passed under a s ing le vote . Thus, i n e f f e c t , there were no l e g a l r e s t r i c t i o n s on the department to prevent i t from spending i t s $1.5 or $2.0 b i l l i o n as i t saw f i t , without reference to the d e t a i l s considered and approved by Parl iament. This was p a r t i a l l y modified by the F i n a n c i a l Adminis trat ion Act of 1951 which required that any such changes 8 be approved by the Treasury Board;, but i t i s a lso we l l to remember that th i s body i s a committee of the cabinet and i t s decis ions are seldom debated i n the House of Commons. Thus, the s ing le r e s t r a i n t on the government was the moral one. And there i s evidence that th i s was not except ional ly strong. Con-s ider the rep ly of the A s s i s t a n t Deputy M i n i s t e r of Finance to a member of the 1950 Publ i c Accounts Committee which although given with reference to the Department of Finance has p a r t i c u l a r s ign i f i cance for the point being developed here. iQ. Would the grouping of these small votes into larger items tend to avoid the necess i ty for supplementary estimates. A . Perhaps to a small degree but i t would do so at the expense of perhaps some of the de ta i l ed c o n t r o l which parliament now has over the purpose for which the money can be spent. . . There would not be the same measure of c o n t r o l as i s now exercised by the House. I t can r e a d i l y be seen that the danger that the a s s i s tant deputy 167 minis ter was r e f e r r i n g to already ex is ted i n Nat ional Defence. Moreover, there i s evidence that the Department of Nat ional Defence has employed these unique powers. C e r t a i n l y the testimony of the deputy minister to the 1958 Estimates Committee indicates t h i s : The Chairman: Repairs and upkeep of equipment. Mr.Bourget: Do you know how much of the item of $21 m i l l i o n was spent l a s t year? Mr.Armstrong: $28,186,034. Mr.Bourget: Did you borrow from some of these other items? Mr.Armstrong: In these estimates we may transfer between the various headings that are shown here wi th in the t o t a l amount of the vote. The author i ty for such a transfer i s the treasury board. . . Mr.Benidickson:Within the t o t a l vote? Mr.Armstrong: Yes. Mr.Benidickson:So you have pre t ty wide freedom wi th in the $1,600 mi l l i on? Mr.Armstrong: There i s freedom to transfer w i th in the amount of $1,600,000, that i s r i g h t . 3 - 0 This s i t u a t i o n was recognized as undesirable by the 1958 Estimates Committee and as a part of i t s f i f t h report to the Commons i t recommended: No.220 of the Main Est imates , an amount of over $1,600,000 should be d iv ided into a number of smaller items. The Standing Committee on Estimates then could more e a s i l y consider the expenditures and be i n a p o s i t i o n to bet ter recommend what savings could be ef fected i n a p a r t i c u l a r area , and Parliament would have more contro l over expenditures as the opportunity to transfer funds w i th in smaller votes would be l e s s e n e d . H Although no change was made i n the 1958-59 estimates, the v a l i d i t y 168 of the c r i t i c i s m impl ied i n the Committee's recommendations was acknowledged by the form i n which the defence estimates were presented to the House i n the years thereafter; for since 1959 they have been presented as some f i f t e e n separate votes . I t thus has become more d i f f i c u l t for the government to spend moneys where Parliament had not intended. One i n d i c a t i o n that t h i s new method has improved parliamentary c o n t r o l has been the increased frequency and s i ze of the supplementary estimates requested by the defence department. Although I was unable to obtain a complete record of supplementary estimates since World War Two, the record was such between 1954 and 1957 to ind ica te that they were resorted to only occas iona l ly . In contras t , s ince 1958, supplementaries have been requested annually and i n 1961-62 t o t a l l e d some $70 m i l l i o n s as a r e s u l t of the B e r l i n c r i s i s . I t i s c l e a r , however, that from 1945 to 1958 i t was much eas ier for the defence department to avoid de ta i l ed parliamentary c o n t r o l than i t was for other departments and there i s every i n d i c a t i o n that i t d i d so. Even today t h i s i s true although no doubt to a l esser de-gree; for votes 235, 237 and 239 of the 1961-62 Estimates provided the Department of Nat ional Defence with $208,135,049, $359,572,000 and $536,666,000 r e s p e c t i v e l y , thus making the s h i f t i n g of funds s t i l l 169 a rather simple m a t t e r . 1 2 One f i n a l point remains to be made and th i s stems from the paradoxical but accurate p o s i t i o n that th i s wr i t er has presented on supplementary estimates. I have argued that the increased use of supplementaries i s evidence of improved parliamentary c o n t r o l . The paradox ar i se s from the fact that supplementaries are u s u a l l y associated with diminished parl iament-ary c o n t r o l ; for they ind ica te the extent of executive power over the l e g i s l a t i v e branch by prov id ing the executive with a technique whereby i t can o b t a i n an almost l i m i t l e s s supply of money. And yet even th i s i s an improvement over the previous s i t u a t i o n for at l eas t under such circumstances Parliament knows something about the purposes of the expenditures for which i t i s granting moneys. In the e a r l i e r p e r i o d , i t lacked even th i s knowledge. F i n a l l y , i t has to be admitted that even s ince 1958 the supplementary and further supplementary have been used moderately by the defence department; for only i n 1961-62 d i d they exceed one per cent of the o r i g i n a l estimate and i n most years they were much lower. Unfortunately i t i s impossible to conclude whether th i s moderation i s a r e f l e c t i o n of accurate departmental budgeting and good parliamentary c o n t r o l or simply an i n d i c a t i o n that the votes are s t i l l great enough to permit s h i f t i n g of funds without requesting supplementaries. Regardless of which 170 is the more accurate answer, i t is obvious that even today very l i t t l e control over defence expenditure i s exercised by Committee of Supply for National Defence. On April 1, 1951, the Department of Defence Production was established to replace the Canadian Commercial Corporation as the procurement, agency of the rapidly expanding defence department. It thus received exclusive authority to purchase and acquire defence supplies and construct defence projects (through Defence Construction Limited) required by the Department of National Defence. Naturally, therefore, close scrutiny of i t s work was necessary to ensure that the moneys of the defence department were not wasted. In an earlier chapter a brief summary of Defence Production debates was given. In this chapter, two years, 1953-54 and 1959-60, are analyzed more closely. In the f i r s t , 1953-54, the estimates of the Department of Defence Production were scrutinized and approved in less than five hours. This amount of time, although slightly less . 1 3 than for most years,, was not exceptionally brief. The Progressive Conservative Party concentrated i t s criticisms upon the strategic and economic dangers of over-centralizing defence industry. The C.C.F. questioned the general purchasing policy of the Defence Production Department. 171 In a d d i t i o n , there were the usual representat ions on behalf of constituency and p r o v i n c i a l i n t e r e s t s . Thus l i t t l e time was devoted to inves t iga t ing the d e t a i l s of expenditure. Questions were asked on the terms of contracts for such assorted items as bear ings , an thrac i t e , n a i l s and ships . Government c a p i t a l investment into several defence indus tr i e s was discussed. In each case the minister provided de ta i l ed explanations on the purpose and method of the p a r t i c u l a r expenditures. In e f f e c t , therefore , the government was being forced to account for at l east a small amount of the money that made up the defence estimate. On one enquiry the minister 14 admitted that there had been waste. In a second instance he agreed that the o r i g i n a l estimate for a p a r t i c u l a r item had quadrupled i n a per iod of four y e a r s . 1 5 Debate was on the subs tant ia l operations and expenditures of government and riot enmeshed i n abstract g e n e r a l i t i e s . But the discussions of concrete expenditures las ted but a ha l f -hour . Contro l of defence expenditures, therefore , was not exercised through the estimate debates of the Department of Defence Production. Since the Progressive Conservative Party has come to power there has been only one debate i n the Commons on Defence Production estimates. In a l l other years d i scuss ion las ted only a few m i n u t e s . 1 6 Thus the s ing le debate described below cannot be c a l l e d t y p i c a l of those between 1957 and 1962 but 172 rather the only one of th i s per iod . In many respects the d i scuss ion introduced by the L i b e r a l opposi t ion i n 1959 was s i m i l a r to the ones that were led by the Progressive Conservatives when they were i n oppos i t ion . P o l i c y , and not f i n a n c i a l d e t a i l s , was the subject of much of the debate. Defence product ion-sharing with the Uni ted States , the powers of the min i s t er , d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of defence i n d u s t r y and the development of secondary industry were a l l discussed. And as u s u a l , backbenchers revealed const i tuency, p r o v i n c i a l and sec t iona l i n t e r e s t s . 1 7 Honourable members of the L i b e r a l Party queried the government on the l i q u i d a t i o n of the "Avro Arrow" and d i d secure new information on the t o p i c . Estimates of expenditures on the F-104 a i r c r a f t were reviewed. Sweeping c r i t i c i s m s of the Mid-Canada Line as recorded i n Saturday Night were put on record by a representat ive of the C . C . F . and much new data on the f inancing of that project was g iven. On these and other more minor matters, despite the fac t that the opposi t ion was far more p a r t i s a n , than was o r d i n a r i l y the case i n Committee of Supply, the minis ter was quite cooperative i n se t t ing f o r t h the reasoning and h i s t o r y behind the p a r t i c u l a r expenditure. But , l i k e the d i scuss ion of the estimates for 1953-54, the debates i n 1959 only began to "scratch the surface". Perhaps 173 the most f r u s t r a t i n g part for one who i s concerned with greater contro l over expenditure i s that the b r i e f discussions i n Supply ( for defence production) have been extremely u s e f u l . They have deal t with problems and methods i n awarding contracts and i n procuring equipment. They have shown how the i n d i v i d u a l back-bencher, simply by being aware of government defence a c t i v i t y i n h i s own const i tuency, can keep watch on defence expenditure. And yet , despite a l l t h i s , the House of Commons has for the most part ignored the estimates of the Department of Defence Production and the opportunity that the debate on these provides for s c r u t i n i z i n g the expenditure for n a t i o n a l defence. I t must be concluded, therefore , that ne i ther the L i b e r a l nor the Conservative opposit ions have been able to achieve any notable success i n c o n t r o l l i n g the defence expend-i t u r e s of the Canadian government. The C . C . F . has played a per iphera l r o l e ; the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party i n the years that i t was represented, scarce ly even attempted to a s s i s t i n th i s funct ion . In f a c t , then, House of Commons contro l of defence expenditures must be wr i t t en o f f as being l i t t l e more than a myth. Indeed, even some of the s tatutory controls that have been devised by Parliament have been p a r t i a l l y by-passed. Sect ion 30 of the F i n a n c i a l Adminis trat ion Act reads i n part : 174 (1) No contract provid ing for the payment of any money by Her Majesty s h a l l be entered in to or have any force or e f fect unless the Comptroller c e r t i f i e s that t h e r e . i s a s u f f i c i e n t unencumbered balance a v a i l a b l e out of an appropriat ion or out of an item Included i n estimates before the House of "Commons to discharge any commitments under such contract that would, under the provis ions thereof , come i n course of payment during the f i s c a l year i n which the contract was entered i n t o . 1 8 But the annual vote for the defence department permits the government to commit moneys i n excess of i t s request. Thus, i n 1955-56, vote 236 stated: To provide for the Canadian Forces , the Defence Research Board and other expenditures r e l a t i n g to defence. . . . and not withstanding Sect iqn 30 of the F i n a n c i a l Adminis trat ion Act to authorize t o t a l commitments for the foregoing purposes of $4,269,726,540 regardless of the year i n which such commitments w i l l come i n course of payment (of which i t i s estimated that $2,443,441,346 w i l l come due for payment i n future years ) . 1 9 The reason for waiving sect ion 30 stems from the spec ia l nature of the defence funct ion and the necess i ty of planning ahead. A defence programme i s always a long-term one and not prepared on a twelve month b a s i s . The author iza t ion permits the defence department to place contracts i n excess of estimates i n the expectation that some contracts w i l l not be f u l f i l l e d u n t i l future years . In e f f ec t , therefore , i t i s necessary for the defence department to ca l cu la t e c o r r e c t l y the rate at which 175 goods w i l l be de l ivered and hence the moneys to be pa id to contractors . And there has been no oppos i t ion i n the Commons to th i s necessary step. Since the Commons cannot b ind i t s e l f for future years the future commitment i n a vote such as 236 i s a purely moral one. In p r a c t i c e , however, i t does t i e the hands of the House e s p e c i a l l y i f rate of de l i very exceeds departmental expectation so that goods are rece ived for which no money i s a v a i l a b l e . 20 Thus, when i n 1949-50 $415 m i l l i o n was committed but only $348 m i l l i o n voted: The Comptroller of the Treasury operated h is accounts as though he had $415 m i l l i o n a v a i l a b l e for commitments. . . A c t u a l l y when we (the s t a f f of the Auditor General) were making the audit of th i s year. . . we discovered there were about $12 m i l l i o n worth of accounts which were ready for payment but which were not paid i n the year . . . suppl iers made d e l i v e r i e s fas ter than the department had a n t i c i p a t e d . 2 1 Therefore , at the very l e a s t , there can be no doubt that the Commons of the fo l lowing years was bound, i n advance, at l east for the $12 m i l l i o n . Not much object ion can be r a i s e d against th i s p r a c t i c The only purpose here i s to point out that the s tatutory safe-guards over expenditure, as guaranteed by the F i n a n c i a l Adminis trat ion A c t , are somewhat weaker for defence than they 176 are for other departments. Another important p r i v i l e g e , p e c u l i a r only to the defence departments, i s that provided for under sect ion 17(1) of the Defence Production Act which gives the M i n i s t e r of Defence Production far greater d i s c r e t i o n i n entering in to contracts than i s permitted to other ministers under sections' 36 (and 16) of the Publ i c Works A c t . Under section 36 of th i s l a t t e r Act i t i s wr i t t en : Where a work i s to be executed under the d i r e c t i o n of a department of the Government, the M i n i s t e r having charge of that department s h a l l i n v i t e tenders by pub l i c advertisement for the execution of the work except i n cases where (a) the work i s one of press ing emergency i n which the delay would be i n j u r i o u s to the pub l i c i n t e r e s t , (b) the work can be more expedit ious ly and economically executed by the employees of the department concerned, or (c) the estimated cost of the work i s less than f i f t e e n thousand d o l l a r s , and i t appears to the M i n i s t e r , i n view of the nature of the work, that i t i s not advisable to i n v i t e t e n d e r s . 2 2 In contras t , the M i n i s t e r of Defence Production i s given far greater freedom to negotiate contracts . Indeed, he i s free to negotiate every contract if" he wishes, subject only to the 23 approval of Governor i n Counc i l (and not Parl iament) . In p r a c t i c e , by far the greater number of contracts are l e t by competitive tender but these general ly turn out to be the 177 smaller ones. For example, i n the l a s t s ix months of the 1950-51 f i s c a l year , 53,704 contracts were made of which 42,632 were f ixed p r i c e through competitive tender. Despite t h i s , the value of those decided by tender was only-$94 m i l l i o n whereas the t o t a l value of the other types was $429 m i l l i o n . 2 4 In a number of very. important cases the c a l l i n g of tenders i s not pos s ib l e . There may be a lack of competing sources of supply, spec i f i ca t ions may not be prec i se enough to provide a su i tab le bas is for f i rm p r i c e tenders, s ecur i ty consider-ations may r e s t r i c t the range of poss ib le s u p p l i e r s , or an i s o l a t e d de l i very point may have the same e f fec t ; or a requirement may be so large as to tax the f a c i l i t i e s of any s ing le p lan t . 5 Even where tenders could be c a l l e d th i s i s not always done. In the construct ion of sh ips , for example, contracts are a l l o c -ated to shipyards across the country because " i t i s considered des irable to maintain a working team i n the various shipyards so that we can always have a nucleus of tra ined shipwrights , r iggers and so f o r t h , i n case at any time i t i s necessary to expand as 26 was necessary i n 1950." The reasons for so many negotiated contracts stem from the unique nature of the defence funct ion and the general p r i n c i p l e that these are sometimes necessary has never been challenged by any of the Canadian p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . But th i s does not detract from the fac t that a great deal of power i s l e f t with the executive and that the r e s u l t s are not always 178 s a t i s f a c t o r y . A f t e r inves t iga t ing one "cost-plus" contract and f ind ing evidence of considerable waste, the 1959 Publ i c Accounts Committee concluded: Your Committee i s of the opinion that i t would be i n the pub l i c i n t e r e s t were (a) l e g i s l a t i o n to regulate more s t r ingent ly and-comprehensively cost -p lus awards (b) the regulat ing p r o v i s i o n of the Defence Production Act reserved to indisputable defence projects of such a nature that i t i s not poss ib le to l e t by tender, and (c) that subs tant ia l contracts should not be l e t u n t i l plans and s p e c i f i c a t i o n s are c o m p l e t e . 2 7 Thus f a r , no amendments have been introduced into Parliament to implement these recommendations. Another important s tatutory contro l over publ i c moneys i s sect ion 35 of the F i n a n c i a l Admini s tra t ion A c t : The balance of an appropr iat ion granted for a f i s c a l year s h a l l l a p s e . 2 8 This wording d i f f e r e d s l i g h t l y from the 1931 Consol idated Revenue and Audit Act which stated: Balance of appropriat ions which remained unexpended at the end of a f i s c a l year s h a l l lapse and be wr i t t en o f f . 2 9 Although no reason for th i s change was given to the Committee of the Whole or the Standing Committee which deal t with i t , 3 0 nor was any requested, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to speculate about the a l t e r a t i o n i n the l i g h t of the Defence Appropr ia t ion 179 Act of 1950. By sect ion three of th i s Act the cabinet was given author i ty to provide equipment, s erv ices , supplies and f a c i l i t i e s for the armed forces of Canada and her North A t l a n t i c Treaty a l l i e s ; "and from and out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund there may be paid and appl ied for these purposes at any time, notwithstanding sect ion th ir ty - two of the Consol idated Revenue and Audi t A c t , 19.31., i n a d d i t i o n to any other grants of Parl iament, sums not exceeding a t o t a l of three hundred 31 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . " The Act further provided that when any transfer of defence equipment of supplies i s made to such an a l l y , and the costs were not paid from the three hundred m i l l i o n d o l l a r a pprop r ia t i on , that "the estimated present value of such equipment or supplies s h a l l be charged to that appropr iat ion and a corresponding amount s h a l l be paid into a s p e c i a l account of the Consol idated Revenue Fund which may be used at any time, subject to the approval of the Governor i n C o u n c i l , to purchase equipment or supplies for the n a v a l , army or a i r services of the 32 Canadian Forces ." I t appears, therefore , that the change i n the 1931 Act was made i n order to permit th i s continuing appropr ia t ion . Perhaps more important, the 1950 l e g i s l a t i o n created a spec ia l fund, used u n t i l the la te 1950s, over which Parliament had no c o n t r o l . Although there was no oppos i t ion to these developments, 180 they are noteworthy both as reminders of the uniqueness of the 33 defence function, and also as i n d i c a t i o n that the defence departments are less r e s t r i c t e d by the statutory safeguards of Parliament than are other departments. In the examples I have given above, I am not suggesting that the defence departments are free from statutory controls for most c e r t a i n l y the Comptroller of the Treasury, the Treasury Board, the Auditor General and even the C i v i l Service Commission ( a l l creatures of Parliament) do play a most important r o l e i n co n t r o l l i n g the expenditures of the defence departments. The few examples that I have given, however, do indicate that some of the statutory controls, at least, are less e f f e c t i v e for defence then they are for the other functions of government. Thus not only i s Commons control v i r t u a l l y non-existent; but also, there are grounds f o r questioning the u t i l i t y of the statutory methods. Although no doubt both these conclusions can be attributed to the special character of the defence function, t h i s i n i t s e l f does not serve as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for perpetuating what I would suggest i s a most undesirable state of a f f a i r s . Indeed, the House of Commons has not been unaware of i t s ineffectiveness i n c o n t r o l l i n g government expenditures and i t has been p a r t l y out of i t s attempt to solve t h i s problem that the committee system has arisen. Three committees, i n 181 p a r t i c u l a r , have been employed to contro l the expenditures of the defence departments. These are "the Standing Committees on Publ i c Accounts and Estimates and the Spec ia l Committee on Defence Expenditures. Each of these i s examined thoroughly i n the next two chapters. In the remainder.of t h i s chapter i t i s my purpose to review b r i e f l y the h i s t o r i c a l development of committee contro l of defence expenditure. THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE The o ldest of these committees i s the one on Publ i c Accounts which dates back to Confederation. Up u n t i l World War One i t met r e g u l a r l y and according to Professor Ward i t was very ac t ive i n s c r u t i n i z i n g government expenditures.-* 5 Gradual ly the Committee f e l l in to disuse and between 1930 and 1945 i t met but four times. Post-World War Two developments, however, have been more encouraging for the Committee has met twelve times since 1945 and even more important, i t has convened annually since the 1957 change i n government. The House of Commons recommends to the Committee the scope of i t s a c t i v i t y for each sess ion. The orders general ly include a request that the Committee review and report on the Pub l i c Accounts and that i t comment on the Report of the 182 Auditor General for the f i s c a l year just ended. In fact, the Committee decides, through i t s subcommittee on agenda and procedure (steering committee) which aspects of the departments i t wishes to investigate in detail. Thus the generality of the orders from the House permit the Committee to exercise a great deal of independence in determining the agenda. What are the aims of the Committee? The orders are extremely vague. It i s "empowered to examine and inquire into such matters and things as may be referred to i t by the House, and to report from time to time i t s observations and opinions thereon, with power to send for persons, papers and records." Because the " a l l such matters and things" invariably includes the Public Accounts and the Auditor General's Report, i t is clear that the aims of the Committee are closely related to the functions of the Auditor General and the purposes for which he keeps the Public Accounts. In the words of a past incumbent the functions of the Auditor General are to ascertain whether: (a) the accounts were fait h f u l l y and properly kept; (b) a l l public money was f u l l y accounted for, and the rules and procedures applied secured an effective check on the assessment, collection and proper allocation of the revenue; (c) expenditures were for the purpose for which - appropriations were made as authorized, and (d) essential records were maintained of public property, and the rules and procedures applied suitably safeguarded and controlled. 183 Fol lowing from th i s i t could be argued that the aims of the Publ ic Accounts Committee have been at l east three-f o l d . F i r s t , i t has the job of ensuring that the moneys spent by the departments are used for the purpose that Parliament voted them. Second, i t ensures that a l l necessary l ega l procedures are followed i n handling pub l i c moneys. F i n a l l y , and more genera l ly , i t attempts to ensure that economy i s used i n the expenditure of publ i c moneys. The aims of the Committee, however, cannot be i n t e r -preted so l e ly by determining the functions of the Audi tor General; for the Audi tor General belongs to no par ty whereas the Publ ic Accounts Committee i s made up of members who are represent ing p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . The post-war h i s t o r y of the Committee has been a changing one. Although less dominated by p o l i t i c a l considerations than most Commons committees, the Publ ic Accounts Committee, up u n t i l 1958, was not at a l l s i m i l a r i n type to the n o n - p o l i t i c a l B r i t i s h model. A f t e r the general e l e c t i o n of 1958, however, the Diefenbaker adminis trat ion i n s t i t u t e d important changes and one of these was to secure the appointment of a chairman from the oppos i t ion . Since then, the atmosphere of the Committee has changed markedly, and with t h i s change i t s goals have come very c lose to the 184 three n o n - p o l i t i c a l ones suggested e a r l i e r . THE DEFENCE EXPENDITURES COMMITTEES Soon a f t e r the close of the Second World War, members of the opposition parties began to press for a committee of the 38 House to investigate the defence programme of the government. Although not a l l who spoke were s p e c i f i c , most envisioned a committee with far-reaching powers, c e r t a i n l y one that would 39 deal with more than finances. In 1949 defence spending turned upward and by 1951 the government had embarked on a programme of large-scale re-armament. Toward the end of 1951 the Prime Minister met with leaders of the opposition parties and out of t h e i r discussion came an understanding whereby the government agreed to the establishment of a Special Committee on Defence Expenditures. On November 13 the Prime Minister introduced his motion: That a select committee be appointed to examine a l l expenditures of public moneys for national defence and a l l commitments for expenditure for national defence since March 31, 1950, and to report from time to time t h e i r observations and opinions thereon, and i n p a r t i c u l a r , what, i f any, economies consistent with the execution of the p o l i c y decided by the government may be effected therein, with power to send for persons, papers and records arid to examine witnesses; and that notwithstanding Standing Order 65, the committee s h a l l consist of twenty-six Members to be designated by the House at a l a t e r date. 0 185 The purpose of the committee, Mr. St . Laurent announced, i s " . . . t o see to i t that w i th in the p o l i c i e s recommended by the government and accepted by parl iament , the country i s ge t t ing f u l l . v a l u e for the appropriat ions that have been p r o v i d e d . " 4 1 He hoped, he stated that th i s would be a continuing committee. Messieurs Drew, Coldwel l and Shaw, the l a t t e r speaking on behalf of the S o c i a l C r e d i t Par ty , a l l ind icated t h e i r approval of the terms of reference . Only Mr. G i l l i s of the C . C . F . announced d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . The scope of the committee has been too r e s t r i c t e d , he argued. Moreover, how does one define po l icy? He d id not i n d i c a t e , however, that despite h i s doubts, he planned to oppose the governmentTs m o t i o n . 4 2 Thus was the Defence Expenditures Committee created. I t s terms of reference provided i t with s l i g h t l y greater powers than the Pub l i c Accounts Committee; for i t was not , l i k e the Publ ic Accounts Committee, r e s t r i c t e d to past expenditures, as reported i n the Publ ic Accounts. I t cou ld , i n a d d i t i o n , examine "commitments for expenditure", i . e . i t could look in to the current expenditures of the government. The committee was re-appointed i n 1952 under i d e n t i c a l terms of reference and again i n 1953. In the l a t t e r year, however, the i n i t i a l government motion, which was not d i f f eren t from those of the two previous years , was amended by the 186 government so that the committee would i n i t i a l l y "give p r i o r i t y i n t h e i r examination to the expenditures and commitments of the Canadian Army Works Services as dealt with i n the Report of G.S. Currie, Esquire, Chartered Accountant, tabled i n the House of Commons on December 15, 1952. . . " 4 3 The amendment was moved by defence minister Claxton and although vehemently opposed by opposition members who variously c a l l e d i t an inv e s t i g a t i o n into an inves t i g a t i o n ("we need no inquiry into the report of another i n q u i r y " ) , and an attempt to "whitewash" the Currie report with the committee's L i b e r a l majority, i t was passed on d i v i s i o n by the government's su p p o r t e r s . 4 4 From 1953 u n t i l 1960, despite Mr. St. Laurent's aspirations that i t be a continuing committee, the Defence Expenditures Committee did not meet. Nor were the opposition parties anxious f o r a committee to be re-appointed unless i t were given wider powers. 4 5 Members did request, however, an expenditures committee that would deal with estimates as well as accounts; 4 0 some even went so far as to indicate that they 47 would wish a committee to hear independent witnesses. The Defence Expenditures Committee did not meet during th i s period for two reasons. F i r s t , the leader of the opposition indicated to the government that he was not interested i n a committee of the 1951-53 v i n t a g e . 4 8 Second, the government was 187 unwilling to submit the/defence estimates to a House committee as requested by Mr. Drew both through correspondence with the 49 Prime Minister and i n the debates i n the Commons. By 1956 a l l opposition parties were clamouring loudly for a Standing Committee on Defence but the government refused to relent. During the twenty-third Parliament (1957-58), the chorus was led by the C.C.F. and S o c i a l Credit Party, but once again t h e i r appeal f e l l on deaf ears. THE ESTIMATES COMMITTEE In February 1955 the L i b e r a l government introduced a motion c a l l i n g for the creation of a select committee on estimates "to consider such of the estimates as may be referred to i t . . . , , 5 ° I t was the intention of the government that the estimates of a d i f f e r e n t department would be referred to the Committee each year f o r detailed study. I t was to t h i s Committee that the Diefenbaker govern-ment turned to s a t i s f y the demands of the C.C.F. and S o c i a l Credit Party. On June 3, 1958, for the f i r s t time since Confederation, the estimates of the defence department(s) were referred to a select committee of the House, the Standing Committee on Estimates, for examination and a p p r o v a l . 5 1 The Defence Expenditures Committee thus appeared to be an instrument 188 of the past . S u r p r i s i n g l y , , however, a Defence Expenditures Committee was appointed again i n 1960 to deal with both accounts and 52 estimates. Since then, there have been no ind ica t ions that another would be set up. Thus, i t i s impossible to pred ic t what place th i s Committee w i l l hold i n the House of Commons of the future . What i s c l e a r , however, i s that the House, up u n t i l now, has evolved no permanent apparatus to deal s p e c i f i c a l l y with defence expenditures. In th i s chapter i t has been seen that the Committee of Supply has been unable to exert c o n t r o l , d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t , over defence expenditures. In the next two, I s h a l l examine the work of the committees of the House that have deal t wi th defence and the degree to which these have been usefu l i n c o n t r o l l i n g the expenditure of the defence d o l l a r . C H A P T E R V I COMMITTEE CONTROL OF DEFENCE, 1945 - 57 P r i o r to the Korean c r i s i s , there were no attempts to contro l defence through the appointment of se lect committees of the House of Commons. The War Expenditures Committee had f in i shed i t s work i n 1946 and i n the fo l lowing year the Standing Committee on Publ ic Accounts had been summoned for the f i r s t time since the end of the Second World War. The Committee met no fewer than twenty-two times during the 1947 sess ion, but i t s inves t igat ions excluded the defence department. The Committee was not c a l l e d together i n 1948 and met but once i n 1949. The lack of i n t e r e s t i n defence displayed by the House (and i t s committees) d i d not mean that the defence department and i t s procurement agency, the Canadian Commercial Corporat ion , were free from a l l contro ls except those enforced by the executive; for although the P u b l i c Accounts Committee showed l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n defence expenditure, the same was not true of i t s servant, the Audi tor General of Canada. 189 190 THE OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL The Audi tor General i s appointed by the Governor- in-Counci l and holds o f f i c e "during good behaviour u n t i l he a t ta ins the age of s i x t y - f i v e years*." He can be removed by the Governor General only "on address of the Senate and the House of Commons-'"? L i k e federa l ly -appointed judges, h i s sa lary does not come from an annual appropr ia t ion , which the governing party could b lock , but d i r e c t l y from the Consol idated Revenue Fund. In 1937, the United States Pres ident T s Committee on Adminis trat ive Management concluded: A true audit can be conducted only by other o f f i c e r s than those charged with the making of decis ions upon expenditures. No pub l i c o f f i c e r should be authorized to audit h i s Own accounts or f i n a n c i a l acts and dec i s ions . The maximum safeguard i s provided when the auditor i s e n t i r e l y independent of the adminis trat ion and exercises no executive au thor i ty . The contro l of expenditures i s e s s e n t i a l l y an executive func t ion , whereas the audit of such expenditures should be independent of executive author i ty or d i r e c t i o n . Such a p o s i t i o n of independence i s enjoyed by the Auditor General of Canada. The O f f i c e of the Auditor General i s d iv ided in to f i v e branches. Two are mainly concerned with the audit of large c i v i l spending departments; a t h i r d deals with the audit of large revenue departments; most Crown Corporations are handled 191 by a fourth; the f i n a l one deals almost exc lus ive ly with the Departments of Nat ional Defence and Defence Product ion. In the Of f i ce of the Audi tor General i s a s t a f f numbering c lose to 150 and of these some 32 are attached to the Defence Branch inc lud ing 21 i n Nat ional Defence and eleven 3 i n Defence Product ion. Although these men are not permanently attached to the Defence Branch i n the sense that t h e i r ent i re careers are spent wi th in i t , they are not rotated frequent ly . Therefore , many have spent more than a few years i n the Defence Branch making i t poss ib le for them to become f a m i l i a r with the complex and large - sca le expenditures on defence. I t i s of course impossible for such a small s t a f f to even begin a f u l l audit of the defence department and indeed t h i s i s not even attempted. Rather, a tes t audit i s employed and the extent of the tes t var i e s with the nature of the expenditure, the amount invo lved , the system of i n t e r n a l c o n t r o l , and the degree 4 to which weaknesses are discovered as the audit progresses. On t r a v e l l i n g expenses- t an item which lends i t s e l f to extravagance, the. tes t may run as high as 70 to 807» of the expenditure. On most items, however, a ten per cent tes t i s considered s u f f i c i e n t . 5 Normally, vouchers are test-checked d a i l y as they are rece ived from the Comptroller General . The audit i s thus 192 continuous and seldom f a l l s more than t h i r t y days behind expend-i t u r e . In a d d i t i o n , the Audi tor General employs the technique of a "project" examination through which Defence Branch auditors make an "on the spot" check of a p a r t i c u l a r camp, p r o j e c t , o f f i c e or other centre of expenditure. These are p r i m a r i l y inves t igat ions in to the system of i n t e r n a l audi t employed and the reports of the i n t e r n a l auditors are c a r e f u l l y perused by o f f i c e r s of the Audi tor General 's o f f i c e for signs of l a x i t y i n the i n t e r n a l c o n t r o l s . ^ In the Department of Defence Product ion , the i n i t i a l audit i s c a r r i e d out by the Treasury cost accounting sections and the Treasury reports are examined by the auditors of the Defence Branch attached to the Department of Defence Product ion. I f these reports ind ica te anything doubtful the expense i s invest igated thoroughly. In a d d i t i o n , a l l expenditures i n excess of $100,000 are automatical ly given s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n . For some of the larger s u p p l i e r s , such as Canadair and A . V . Roe, the "project" test i s a l so u s e d . 7 As cases of unauthorized, extravagant and non-productive expenditures are revealed , and other i r r e g u l a r i t i e s d iscovered, they are reported to the departments concerned. I f the items are minor and amended s a t i s f a c t o r i l y by the department, they may not be mentioned i n the annual Report of the Audi tor General to Parl iament. But regardless of the act ions taken, the Audi tor 193 General i s bound l e g a l l y to report a l l cases i n which (a) any o f f i c e r or employee has w i l f u l l y or negligently omitted to c o l l e c t or receive any money belonging to Canada, (b) any public money was not duly accounted for and passed into the Consolidated Revenue Fund, (c) any appropriation was exceeded or applied to a purpose or i n a manner not authorized by Parliament, (d) an expenditure was not authorized or was not properly vouched or c e r t i f i e d , (e) there has been a deficiency or loss through the fraud, default or mistake of any person, or (f) a spe c i a l warrant authorized the payment of any money.8 Furthermore, the Auditor General has the r i g h t to include any other cases that he considers should be brought to the notice of Parliament. The O f f i c e of the Auditor General i s es p e c i a l l y u s e f u l i n a s s i s t i n g i n the control of defence expenditures for section 66 of the F i n a n c i a l Administration Act provides that "Notwith-standing any Act, the Auditor General i s e n t i t l e d to free access at a l l convenient times to a l l f i l e s , documents and other records r e l a t i n g to the accounts of every department, and he i s also e n t i t l e d to require and receive from members of the public service such information, reports and explanations as he may deem necessary for the proper performance of h i s d u t i e s . " 9 Thus, unlike the House of Commons, the Auditor General i s not hindered i n his task by security regulations. 194 THE AUDITOR GENERAL AND THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE Returning to the ear ly post-war y e a r s 1 0 i t can be seen therefore that the defence department was not as free from parliamentary contro l as the work i n the House and lack of work i n committee would i n d i c a t e . The test audit by the Auditor General brought to l i g h t numerous i r r e g u l a r i t i e s . Thus i n h i s report for 1947-48 the Audi tor General informed the House that the department had made charges to appropriat ions although the money had not a c t u a l l y been pa id u n t i l the fol lowing y e a r . 1 1 12 He mentioned several procedural and l e g a l i r r e g u l a r i t i e s , moneys spent under wrong v o t e s 1 3 , losses due to f r a u d 1 4 and numerous other i n c i d e n t s . One report noted the f a i l u r e to take advantage of discounts for ten-day payments 1 5 , another an omission i n c o l l e c t i n g revenues. 1** On a t h i r d occasion hap-hazard accounting procedures i n the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve were brought to l i g h t . 1 7 Thus, the s t a f f of the Auditor General d i d keep the defence department under independent observat ion. Although the Audi tor General has the l e g a l power required to make h is i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , he cannot compel the defence department to implement h i s recommendations. He can only suggest changes and record i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n h i s report . The extent of h i s in f luence , therefore , i s r e l a t e d to the i n t e r e s t that the 195 House of Commons shows i n h i s r e p o r t s , the ac t ion the House takes upon rece iv ing these r e p o r t s , and the amount of p u b l i c i t y the Commons secures for the reported i r r e g u l a r i t i e s . Although very occas iona l ly during a debate a member may c i t e i r r e g u l a r i t i e s noted i n the Audi tor General 's Report, the House does not have any es tabl i shed procedure for deal ing with these reports nor are they ever debated. I t i s the custom, however, when the Publ i c Accounts Committee meets, to re fer the Audi tor General 's Report to th i s Committee. Because the Publ i c Accounts Committee met during only one session i n the l a te 1940s (apart from the s ing le meeting i n 1949) the Audi tor General received but a minimum of ass is tance i n performing h i s tasks . Due to the lack of a i d from Parl iament , therefore , c o n t r o l of defence expenditures was not as e f f ec t ive as w e l l i t might have been. Except during the year 1951, a l l inves t igat ions of the Publ ic Accounts Committee in to defence expenditures have stemmed from the Reports of the Audi tor General . Since the Committee d i d not meet r e g u l a r l y during the years of L i b e r a l government, the Report was examined on only f i v e occasions , 1947, 1950, 1951, 1952 and 1956 and i t was only during the l a t t e r four years that defence expenditures were discussed. lft 19 In 1950 and again i n 1951 , members of the Committee 196 r a i s e d the several defence items mentioned i n the Report. But because members lacked the necessary background information to conduct an i n t e l l i g e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the d iscuss ion seldom went beyond a request that the Audi tor General expla in and expand upon the remarks i n h i s Report. Indeed, poss ib ly because of h i s personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , great experience and considerable in f luence , i t often seemed that the Audi tor Genera l , Mr. Watson S e l l a r , was not the witness of the Committee, but i t s leading member, so much did he tend to dominate the hearings . In no case was there a thorough i n v e s t i g a t i o n and none of the i r r e g -u l a r i t i e s r a i s e d by the Audi tor General ' s Report were mentioned i n the Committee's reports to the House. I t should nevertheless be noted that the Committee's questions were not so much l i m i t e d by a lack of c u r i o s i t y as the assurances of the Audi tor General that the matter was being watched c l o s e l y or that the pathology had already been cured. In 1952 and 1956 the Committee d isplayed greater i n -i t i a t i v e . In both years cases arose i n which the Committee, a f ter examining the Audi tor Genera l , was s t i l l u n s a t i s f i e d wi th the explanations and sought further information. In 1952, the Committee brought before i t Commander E . J . Apps to expla in the reason that a radar equipment contract had been placed without a c a l l for tenders. The members, 197 unquestionably showing the benef i t of the f u l l b r i e f i n g on defence contracts they had received a year e a r l i e r 2 0 , quizzed the Commander i n some d e t a i l . His testimony, for the most p a r t , d i d j u s t i f y the ac t ion taken. Simultaneously, however, the Armed Forces were warned that the Audi tor General was beginning to 21 acquire teeth. Item 36 of the 1956 Report of the Audi tor General brought to the a t tent ion of the Commons that the Department of Nat ional Defence was paying more for naval guns manufactured i n Sore l than was the Government of the Uni ted States . Again the Committee decided to obtain f i r s t - h a n d information and therefore requested the presence of the Deputy M i n i s t e r of Defence Product ion, Mr. A . D . Golden. His explanat ion, presented i n considerable 22 d e t a i l , d id not s a t i s f y Committee members from the oppos i t ion par t i e s and although t h i s item was not noted i n the Committee's report to the House ( a l l reports during the per iod tended to be innocuous and c e r t a i n l y of no i n t e r e s t on defence), th i s contract 23 was the subject of some debate i n the House of Commons. Despite the increased in teres t of the Committee i n the Reports of the Audi tor General , i t was the Report for 1952, one that the Committee d id not deal wi th , that was the most i n f l u e n t i a l of a l l those prepared during the years of L i b e r a l adminis trat ion . To understand the reason, i t i s necessary to look f i r s t at the 198 background to that Report. Toward the middle of December, 1952, the M i n i s t e r of Nat ional Defence made pub l i c the h ighly c o n t r o v e r s i a l report of Mr. C u r r i e 1 s inves t igat ions in to the accounting and adminis-t r a t i v e procedures of the Army Works* Serv ices . The r e p o r t , as noted i n chapter three c r i t i c i z e d severely the "general breakdown i n the system of admin i s tra t ion , supervis ion and accounting. . ." . ' The ensuing session of Parliament turned out to be one of the most turbulent years and the point most strenuously argued was the intended breadth of Mr. C u r r i e Y s c r i t i c i s m s . Were they r e s t r i c t e d to the Army Works* Service or d id they apply to the e n t i r e Canadian Army? Was the loss only $35,000 or had far greater losses been incurred due to the general ly lax administrat ion? E a r l y i n January 1953, Mr. Watson S e l l a r tabled h i s annual report for 1952. In i t he noted several substantive losses ( inc luding one for $80,000 at C h u r c h i l l when gasol ine o f f tankers was inadvertent ly pumped into tanks already containing o i l ) and then devoted no less than twelve items to accounting procedures i n the Armed Forces . "Surveys made of accounting systems - there are at l east eight - ind ica te that no sustained e f f o r t has been made to achieve uni formity i n systems wi th in the S e r v i c e s ; l * 2 4 The Audi tor General went on to l i s t seven s p e c i f i c charges , a l l very harsh , against the department's procedure and 199 from there he went far ther a f i e l d to attack such r e l a t e d topics 25 as tardiness i n i s su ing pay and allowances. So serious were the c r i t i c i s m s that the department took the unprecedented step of rep ly ing to the report and attempting to b e l i t t l e i t s f ind ings . For two days the C u r r i e Report was forced to share page one headlines and the e d i t o r i a l pages with the Audi tor General 's f ind ings . Opposition members looked upon Mr. S e l l a r ' s report as strong supporting evidence to j u s t i f y t h e i r demand that a wider i n v e s t i g a t i o n in to the en t i re defence department be authorized. The impact of the Report, with the great amount of p u b l i c i t y i t rece ived , both i n the press and i n the House, put enormous pressure on the department and the govern-ment which they attempted to r e s i s t but which eventual ly re su l t ed i n changes, although only minor, i n accounting procedures. COMMITTEES AND DEFENCE, 1951-53 The bulk of committee inves t igat ions into the defence departments *was concentrated into three years , 1951 to 1953. During that per iod the Publ i c Accounts Committee (1951) devoted eighteen meetings to the defence accounts and over the three year p e r i o d , the Spec ia l Committee on Defence Expenditure he ld no 9 A fewer than forty-seven meetings. In 1950, at the request of C . C . F . member Ross Thatcher, 200 the Publ ic Accounts Committee was summoned to deal with the Publ i c Accounts. Although the Committee met some 26 t imes, i t spent f i f t e e n of these meetings on a memorandum (on the form of the estimates) submitted by the Audi tor Genera l , seven more on the Audi tor General 's annual Report and one on the accounts of War Assets Corporat ion . This agenda, adopted by the sub-committee on agenda and procedure, was opposed by C . C . F . members who f e l t that the main committee was being s ide- tracked from i t s most important duty, an examination of the Publ i c Accounts and i n p a r t i c u l a r , the defence accounts. During the fourteenth meeting C . C . F . members voted against continuing with the Audi tor General 's memorandum and moved an amendment to the s teer ing sub-committee's repor t . In the amendment they urged that the committee deal s p e c i f i c a l l y wi th the Pub l i c Accounts at the 2 7 next meeting. I t was l a r g e l y as a r e s u l t of the continuous badgering by the C . C . F . p a r t y , although by the fo l lowing year they a lso had the support of other oppos i t ion groups, that the 1951 Committee determined to devote i t s a t t ent ion to the defence accounts. The main Committee, approving a motion by Mr. Thatcher, decided to spend s ix meetings on the Audi tor General ' s Report and then begin d i r e c t l y with the expenditures of the defence 28 department up u n t i l March 31, 1950. By the s i x t h meeting, 201 the Committee was ready to deal with the defence accounts. Early i n i t s discussions the Committee f e l l to bickering over i t s terms of reference and the powers that they provided. Rather than begin with the items i n the Public Accounts, the hearings started with the presentation of a memorandum by Mr. CM. Drury, Deputy Minister of National Defence, on the department's i n t e r n a l c o n t r o l of defence spending. 2 9 In the course of the next three meetings, i n which members questioned Mr. Drury on numerous items including the memorandum, u n i f i c a t i o n and coordination of services and equipment, three disputes rapid l y came to the fore. On A p r i l 17, Mr. Fleming began to ask questions on expenditures incurred a f t e r March 31, 1950. The chairman being absent, the vice-chairman, Mr. C r o l l , u n o f f i c i a l l y ruled that Mr. Fleming had gone beyond the Committee's terms of reference. Opposition members i n s t a n t l y r a l l i e d to the l a t t e r ' s support and C.C.F. representatives, Messieurs Thatcher and Stewart, also complained that the Committee was too circumscribed by i t s orders 30 to be of s i g n i f i c a n t value. At the following meeting, a week l a t e r , the chairman Mr. Picard, took a more moderate position: I would not l i k e to rul e d e f i n i t e l y that any question implying projection past March 31, 1950, should be ruled out of order j u s t for that reason. We should not, however, go into a study of any expenditures made a f t e r March 31, 1950; but we may 202 question as to whether or not , s ince March of 1950, a recommendation or dec i s ion of the department may have bettered the service or made i t worse. I would not r u l e against that . Before the next meeting was over, however, Mr. Fleming decided to test the extent of the c h a i r ' s leniency by requesting de ta i l ed information on the per iod a f t er March 31, 1950. The Committee d iv ided on government-opposition l ines and the c h a i r ' s r u l i n g , that the request was out of order , was upheld by a vote of nine 32 to seven. Not as yet discouraged Mr. Fleming i n i t i a t e d the proceedings at the next meeting by moving a re so lu t ion that the Committee recommend to the House that the terms of reference be enlarged to include expenditures up u n t i l March 31, 1951. The debate on the motion again revealed the cleavage between government supporters , most of whom did l i t t l e except vote , and 33 the oppos i t ion . Once again , the motion was defeated. Despite t h i s , the chairman tended to,be l en ient on th i s matter and i t was only i n cases where members p e r s i s t e d i n requesting d e t a i l e d s t a t i s t i c s on the 1950-51 expenditures that he ru led such questions out of order . A second dispute revolved around the d i scuss ion of p o l i c y . The orders from the Commons d id nothing except r e f e r the Publ i c Accounts and Audi tor General 's Report to the 203 Committee. There was no i n d i c a t i o n that the Committee should be permitted to. investigate government p o l i c y . As seen i n an e a r l i e r chapter, however, defining p o l i c y i s not a simple matter. The issue was raised on a request that the deputy minister explain the reasons that the government had decided to purchase the American r i f l e and not the B r i t i s h model, which was less expensive. 3 5 Immediately Mr. C r o l l , not i n the chair, complained that the deputy minister should not be forced to express opinions on government p o l i c y . Once again a dispute arose i n the Committee. Shortly thereafter, opposition members resumed t h e i r l i n e of questioning and without opposition from the chairman. This time, government supporters C r o l l and Benedickson, questioned the chair, and the former i n p a r t i c u l a r was harsh i n complaining that too much leeway was being accorded. The chairman, however, upheld the opposition members and Mr. C r o l l did not go so f a r ,.36 as to request a vote. A t h i r d controversy arose from the matter of security. Progressive Conservative and S o c i a l Credit Party members never challenged witnesses who refused to deal with"questions on grounds of security. Indeed, i t was not uncommon for members of the Conservative Party to preface t h e i r remarks with "subject to security considerations" and other s i m i l a r phrases. C.C.F. members, however, were more s c e p t i c a l , although they never 204 d i r e c t l y challenged witnesses on these po in t s . "I do not want to object" Mr. Thatcher stated on one occas ion, "but I do not see how we can f igure or decide when such a vast sum of money has been spent, whether we are ge t t ing value for i t i f we do not know what we g o t v " 3 7 This f e e l i n g , perhaps stemming from the s o c i a l i s t ' s na tura l d i s t r u s t of the m i l i t a r y , character ized the a t t i tude of the C . C . F . through much of the Committee's hearings . Despite these three controvers ies , and the par t i san atmosphere that they engendered, the work of the Committee was f a r from inconsequent ia l . The Committee spent s i x meetings on some of the more general problems of the department. I t deal t at length with i n t e r n a l c o n t r o l of expenditure, u n i f i c a t i o n and coordinat ion of 38 s erv i ce s , other adminis trat ive problems and with equipment. During these meetings the Committee was dominated by a few members, e s p e c i a l l y Messieurs Fleming, Thatcher and chairman P i c a r d . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Committee and i t s ch i e f witness , the ;deputy minis ter , was c o r d i a l . Throughout, the l a t t e r was frank and seemed anxious to cooperate. I t i s customary for wr i ters deal ing with parliamentary c o n t r o l to r e f e r to the sa lutary impact upon the departments of committee inves t igat ions in to t h e i r adminis trat ion and f inances . 205 In t h i s case, the very opposite was t rue . The spokesman of the department had a sa lutary e f fec t upon members of the Committee and a l l others who chose to read i t s minutes and proceedings. Between 1945 and 1951 there had been no parliamentary mechanism whereby members could keep abreast of adminis trat ive developments i n defence. Debates i n the House, with occas ional exceptions, had been general and not very informative and departmental pub l i ca t ions few and of l i m i t e d value . The 1951 Committee hearings d id much to f i l l the breach. E s p e c i a l l y i n the ear ly meetings the members of the Committee, apparently recognizing how much they had to l e a r n , spent almost a l l t h e i r time i n asking questions and accumulating information. On one occasion some general questions on r e c r u i t i n g and adver t i s ing expenditures showed that there was considerable doubt about successes being achieved, p a r t i c u l a r l y for the reserve forces . Under more c a r e f u l examination the deputy min i s ter explained that the problem was not so much i n securing r e c r u i t s for the reserves , but i n r e t a i n i n g them. This frank admission, hardly one that would have been e a s i l y secured i n the House, became the subject of another dispute . Mr. Thatcher suggested recommending an independent inqu iry in to the problem. The motion was ru l ed out of order by the chairman, and th i s 206 dec i s ion was upheld on a s t ra ight party vote . Despite the p o l i t i c s , a Captain C a r r i c k was brought before the Committee at the next meeting and questioned at some length on the t r a i n i n g programme of the reserve f o r c e s . ^ 0 Through the added p u b l i c i t y provided at the hear ings , therefore , considerable pressure for a quick so lu t ion (the problem was already under departmental study) was brought to bear on the department. The fo l lowing s i x meetings covered the i n d i v i d u a l items i n the Publ ic Accounts and i n handling these Mr. Drury was ass i s ted by the associate deputy m i n i s t e r , Mr. A . E . Ross. The hearings once again became a r a p i d - f i r e question p e r i o d . Thus, while doubtless ly searching for p o l i t i c a l advantage, members were simultaneously acqu ir ing the necessary bas ic information on which they could base sound c r i t i c i s m s of the e n t i r e defence programme. Although questions were n a t u r a l l y more s p e c i f i c than during the general discuss ions fo l lowing the deputy m i n i s t e r ' s memorandum, i n q u i r i e s were for the most part devoid of any ind ica t ions that the member was we l l informed on the subject . There were exceptions, however, when members were able to inform themselves i n advance on a p a r t i c u l a r expenditure, usua l ly because i t was i n t h e i r home const i tuenc ies . Then, with the advantage of independent informat ion, members on a few 207 occasions were able to give departmental o f f i c i a l s several anxious minutes with t h e i r documented i n q u i r i e s . Despite the des ire evinced at the outset for s c r u t i n -i z i n g defence expenditures, the s i x meetings on the defence accounts were poorly attended. Those who d i d show began to d r i f t out we l l before the meeting had ended so that i n f i v e of the s i x meetings the quorum was l o s t i n advance of the usual hour for adjournment. Equa l ly important, the great majority of the members seldom uttered a word. Indeed were i t not for the energy and c u r i o s i t y of Mr. Fleming i t i s questionable i f more than two meetings would have been required for he at most times was the only force keeping the Committee at work. House defence c r i t i c s , Messieurs Harkness and Pearkes, contr ibuted l i t t l e , and L i b e r a l members sa id even l e s s . The l a s t s i x meetings of the Committee deal t with the Canadian Commercial Corporat ion , the defence department's pro -curement agency during the year under review. I t s Managing D i r e c t o r , Mr.W.D. Low, was ch i e f witness , although for one meeting, at the i n v i t a t i o n of the Committee, the responsible minis ter attended (as a witness) to expla in departmental p o l i c y . The pat tern of e a r l i e r meetings was repeated. Mr. Low opened with a statement on the r o l e of the Corporat ion . In i t , he traced out i n considerable d e t a i l the method of awarding 208 contracts . Close to h a l f of the d i scuss ion during the ensuing s ix meetings dealt both genera l ly and p a r t i c u l a r l y with contracts and r e l a t e d problems. A wealth of information was given to the Committee and in teres ted members were able to master t h i s i n t r i c a t e problem as discuss ions i n the House of Commons and i n Defence Expenditure Committees of l a t e r years c l e a r l y revealed. Much of the remaining time was devoted to the problems i n decentra l i z ing defence industry and p o l i c i e s were explained by the min i s t er , C D . Howe. On th i s point even a few L i b e r a l backbenchers showed i n i a t i v e , although for the most part i t was again Mr. Fleming, and to a lesser extent Mr. Thatcher, who were the outstanding members. The f i f t h and f i n a l report of the Committee to the House of Commons was a f a c t u a l summary of the Committee's work. I t was non-committal, however, about the "ef f i c iency and economy" of the department. No recommendations were included: Your Committee. . . was not able to go deeply enough in to a l l the d e t a i l e d amounts of each of the numerous items t o t a l l i n g $380,948,197.62 to express a d e f i n i t e opinion as to the propr ie ty of a l l these items of expenditures, or as to the e f f i c i e n c y of a l l operations performed by these departments, but i t i s pleased to note that through the evidence adduced and the documents produced, i t has no grounds to cast blame on the Department of Nat ional Defence or the Canadian Commercial. Corporat ion , or t h e i r o f f i c i a l s , on any of the items looked i n t o . 209 The report was accurate to the extent that the Committee was unable to uncover evidence to c r i t i c i z e the department. There i s , however, at l eas t a trace of irony i n that the repor t , l arge ly the work of the L i b e r a l members of the s teer ing committee, defends the adminis trat ion of a department that L i b e r a l members were unwi l l ing to question from the very outset of the hearings. The Committee i n no way resembled the b i p a r t i s a n B r i t i s h Publ i c Accounts Committee. The more i n f l u e n t i a l L i b e r a l s present acted only to protect the i n t e r e s t of the government and the remainder of the government supporters , except perhaps for Mr. Cruickshank, contr ibuted nothing. This' was an opposi t ion committee and the representat ives of the L i b e r a l Party accepted th i s from the beginning. The primary value of the Committee undoubtably lay i n i t s usefulness in_educating i t s members. I t was given great amounts of information thus provid ing most members with t h e i r f i r s t r e a l understanding of the operations of the defence department. I t i s therefore d i f f i c u l t to c a l l the Committee a success or a f a i l u r e . I f i t s purposes were b i p a r t i s a n , i t was p a r t i a l l y successful i n that i t d id accumulate much information and thus lay part of a reasonably good foundation for future 210 inves t i ga t ions . (In th i s sense i t s value can be analyzed only a f t er a care fu l cons iderat ion of the remainder of the 1945-57 per iod . ) I f the view be held that there i s no place for b i -part i sanship i n our party system, and therefore that the goal of the opposi t ion par t i e s i n the Committee should be to reveal i r r e g u l a r i t i e s that would a s s i s t them i n winning the next e l e c t i o n , then c l e a r l y the Committee was a f a i l u r e . THE DEFENCE EXPENDITURES COMMITTEES As seen i n the previous chapter, the dec i s ion to e s t a b l i s h a Defence Expenditures Committee was the r e s u l t of a meeting among the heads of the four par t i e s i n the House of Commons. As such i t was the culmination of f i ve years of con-tinued pressure by the oppos i t ion par t i e s both wi th in the House and outside of i t . The f i r s t Committee was appointed on November 13, 1951. I t s terms of reference r e s t r i c t e d i t to examining a l l expenditures " . . . and a l l commitments for expenditure for nat iona l defence since March 31, 1950.".'43 I t was to report i t s observations and opinions to the House and l i k e the Publ i c Accounts Committee, i t s recommendations were to be consistent with government p o l i c y . L i k e a l l standing committees i t had the power to send for persons, 211 papers and records . I t was somewhat smaller than the Publ i c Accounts Committee, however, numbering only t w e n t y - s i x ^ members inc lud ing s ix Progressive Conservat ives , two C . C . F . members and one representat ive of the S o c i a l C r e d i t group. There can be no doubt but that the o f f i c i a l oppos i t ion attached great importance to th i s new Committee. There are at l eas t three ind ica t ions of t h i s . F i r s t , when speaking i n the House of Commons, the leader of the opposi t ion expressed h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with i t s orders of reference. "I do not propose to discuss the terms of reference because I am s a t i s f i e d that so long as the committee or the majority of the committee carry forward the intent ions expressed by the Prime M i n i s t e r the terms of reference w i l l be adequate ." 4 5 Second, the q u a l i t y of Conservative representat ion on the Committee ind ica ted the high hopes that Mr. Drew had for i t . To serve on the Committee he chose f i v e of h i s ablest parl iamentarians inc lud ing four future Conservative cabinet min i s t ers , and i n a d d i t i o n , he decided to s i t on i t h imsel f . (The L i b e r a l contingent, although less impress ive , d id inc lude four parliamentary ass i s tants inc lud ing both ass i s tants to the defence minis ter and the one ass i s tant to the M i n i s t e r of Defence Production as we l l as a former M i n i s t e r of Nat ional Defence for A i r . ) 212 F i n a l l y , the exce l lent attendance record indicates the importance members attached to the Committee. For the four business meetings held i n 1951, an average of 22.5 members were present and for the l a s t of these meetings the names of a l l nine opposi t ion members appear i n the m i n u t e s . 4 6 The 1951 Committee held i t s organiza t iona l meeting on November 29, a l i t t l e more than two weeks a f t er i t was created. Exact ly one month l a t e r the f i f t h session of the twenty- f i r s t Parliament was prorogued. From the outset , therefore , members r e a l i z e d that they were working against a fast-approaching deadl ine . Because of t h i s there was considerable pressure from opposi t ion members, e spec ia l l y the leader of the oppos i t ion , to schedule a d d i t i o n a l meetings. On three occasions Mr. DrewTs requests were defeated by the L i b e r a l major i ty . I t should be noted that there was a general although u n o f f i c i a l understanding, to which Mr. Drew subscribed, that the Committee would be set up again ear ly i n the fo l lowing session and that the best the 1951 Committee could hope for was to begin to c l ear the way. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to understand, therefore , why Mr. Drew p e r s i s t e d i n causing unnecessary f r i c t i o n thus awakening p a r t i s a n fee l ings even before the inves t igat ions had begun. Although recorded votes were not taken on the f i r s t two of these occasions , i n the t h i r d case, 213 C . C . F . members voted with the government . 4 7 (No S o c i a l C r e d i t member was present . ) The f i r s t two meetings were rather general and during these the Deputy Min i s t er s of Nat ional Defence, Defence Production and Finance, presented memoranda on the ro l e of t h e i r respect ive departments i n the f i n a n c i a l adminis trat ion of defence. The presentat ion , i n each case, was followed by a general question per iod i n which Committee members attempted to acquire a broad knowledge of how each of the three departments helped to guarantee that the defence d o l l a r s were spent with the proper economy. At the l a s t two meetings (there were only four) con-s iderable information was tabled i n response to questions asked at e a r l i e r meetings. In t o t a l some 70 pages of d e t a i l were submitted inc lud ing information on such various topics as cost and construct ion of barracks , purchase and lease of lands and b u i l d i n g s , orders placed by the Canadian Commercial Corporat ion and Department of Defence Product ion, pay and allowances, and estimates, allotments and e x p e n d i t u r e s . 4 8 The 1951 Committee, because i t had time to deal only with basic background informat ion, and because i t was c e r t a i n that i t would be re - cons t i tu ted the fo l lowing year , d id not make a f i n a l report to the House of Commons. In but four meetings, however, i t had accumulated an enormous amount of information 214 on defence expenditures. The 1952 Committee was appointed with i d e n t i c a l terms of reference as the 1951 Committee and began s i t t i n g i n l a t e A p r i l . The 1952 Defence Expenditure Committee contained nine newcomers inc lud ing one from each of the opposi t ion p a r t i e s . Most notably , Mr. Drew gave up h i s seat on the Committee. Government membership was considerably strengthened when three new parliamentary ass i s tants were added (two were dropped) and two of the more outspoken L i b e r a l backbenchers appointed. Yet more important than the newcomers were the seventeen re turning members and the r e - e l e c t i o n of the chairman. They ind ica ted that cont inu i ty would be preserved and hence that i t would be un-necessary to go back over mater ia l covered at the 1951 meetings. Indeed, th i s cont inu i ty was emphasized at the outset when some 49 33 pages of answers to questions asked i n 1951 were tab led . Attendance dec l ined , but only s l i g h t l y , from the 1951 record . The members at each meeting ranged between seventeen and 23. The average "turn-out" per meeting was 20.2 and of these, 6.9 were oppos i t ion members. At the f i r s t business meeting the nine man sub-committee on agenda and procedure ( f ive L i b e r a l s , two Conservat ives , the 215 C . C . F . member, one S o c i a l Cred i t er ) reported to the main Committee. In i t s r epor t , i t recommended that the Committee began by deal ing with expenditures and commitments r e l a t i n g f i r s t to mechanical equipment inc lud ing transport; then to armament excluding a i r c r a f t and ships; t h i r d to a i r c r a f t ; and then f i n a l l y to sh ips . The recommendation was unanimously approved and hearings began with Mr. Mackenzie, the Deputy M i n i s t e r of Defence Product ion , g iv ing a short summary of the f i r s t t o p i c , mechanized equipment. At the same time he tabled (not on record) a book-l e t e n t i t l e d Canadian Defence Orders: A p r i l 1950 - January 1952). This was an exhaustive 46-page compilat ion of the p r i n c i p a l items of operat ional equipment ordered by the Canadian Commercial Corporation and the Department of Defence Production on behal f of the Department of Nat ional Defence. I t served, through most of the hearings , as the Committee's most ready source of information. During the f i r s t two meetings, Mr. Mackenzie and Mr. Drury , with the ass is tance of Mr. K . O . Grant , head of the Mechanical Transport D i v i s i o n of the defence production depart-ment, dealt i n d e t a i l with f i n a n c i a l , t e chn ica l and t a c t i c a l questions on th i s subject . De ta i l ed d i scuss ion of the compara-t i v e value of Centurion and Sherman tanks was prolonged over several meetings, with f u l l information given from the 216 departments. Equal ly f r u i t f u l inves t igat ions were made in to jeeps , trucks and other equipment. The i n i t i a l impression, a f t er but three meetings, was that i f the evidence continued to come f o r t h as completely and as r a p i d l y i n the fol lowing meetings, then by the end of the sess ion, members would have a very f u l l p i c t u r e of the state of preparedness of the armed forces , something a l l admitted they were l a c k i n g . But such was not to be the case. The Committee's ear ly meetings coincided with the news of the f t , fraud and f i r e at Petawawa and Ottawa and the opposi t ion members were d i s t r a c t e d . Even at the second meeting Mr. Harkness brought the problem to the a t tent ion of the committee: I think the general p u b l i c w i l l consider that we are probably remiss i n our r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i f we do not go in to the thefts at Petawawa. . . The M i n i s t e r of Nat ional Defence p r a c t i c a l l y i n v i t e d us to make t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n when he spoke i n the House of Commons on Monday l a s t . . . And indeed Mr. Harkness was correct for the minis ter had announced that i f the Committee wished to look in to stock-keeping, accounting or audi t ing procedures, or any r e l a t e d matter, a l l f a c i l i t i e s would be provided. In r e b u t t a l , however, Mr. Drew had paradox ica l ly argued that such matters were not wi th in the terms of reference of the Commit tee , 5 1 a p o s i t i o n i t can be seen that h i s party soon found expedient to abandon. The dispute was put o f f for a few days with the dec i s ion to re fer 217 i t to the steering sub-committee. In the sub-committee Mr. Harkness moved a resolution which c a l l e d for the Committee to investigate the administration at Petawawa. He also recommended that the Committee deal with the Currie Report when t h i s report had been completed. The sub-committee did not support the resolution, however, and Mr.Harkness 52 was also stymied i n the main Committee. The reason most often given by L i b e r a l s f o r opposing the resolution was that they doubted the propriety of a parliamentary inquiry into a matter which was s t i l l sub-judice. They suggested instead a more general i n v e s t i g a t i o n , rather than one that dealt p a r t i c u l a r -l y with Petawawa, and an amendment was so moved by a L i b e r a l 53 backbencher. Thus, a f t e r but three meetings the Committee was diverted from i t s o r i g i n a l agenda" and i t began an examination into administrative procedures within the department "f o r the r e c e i p t , stockkeeping, issue and accounting of stores, material and equipment at m i l i t a r y camps and establishments and i n p a r t i c u l a r the steps taken to prevent, discover, and eliminate the l o s s , misuse or wastage of government property of every k i n d . " 5 4 But before long the Petawawa issue was again before the Committee. A Conservative member, within the terms of reference of the revised agenda, began asking questions on the Petawawa 218 incidents. The Committee s p l i t with the government majority again triumphant. The L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n was explained quite c l e a r l y by Chairman C r o l l : The purpose of t h i s request was to obtain information of thefts or materials missing i n Petawawa. I have repeatedly stated. . . i n view of the investigations now proceeding at Petawawa, criminal prosecutions - and there may be others s t i l l who may be charged - i t would seem a better course not to deal with Petawawa at the p a r t i c u l a r time; but there i s no reason why other requests cannot be made. The point made. . . was. . . that t h i s was no desire to stop you from pursuing that course of questioning i n any camp with the exception of the camp where prosecutions, are now proceeding as a r e s u l t of shortages. 5 5 To the Conservatives however i t was j u s t another attempt by the government to prevent them from inq u i r i n g into i r r e g u l a r -i t i e s which required i n v e s t i g a t i o n . "We are allowed to inves-tigate everything except that which needs to be i n v e s t i g a t e d , " 5 0 complained Mr. MacDonnell and with considerable bitterness. The i d e n t i c a l subject was r a i s e d again nine days l a t e r and was once more the subject f o r b i t t e r partisan argument. The motion was raised "That as soon as Mr. George S. Currie has completed his i n v e s t i g a t i o n at Petawawa, hi s report be placed before t h i s committee and that he be c a l l e d for questioning on i t . " 5 7 On each of these occasions, the Committee was tumbled into hours of bickering. 2,19 The remainder of the inquiry was exhaustive and ill u m i n a t i n g . F u l l facts were disclosed on the much p u b l i c i z e d "disappearance" of the army camp at Farnham. 5 8 A detailed document was presented, i n reply to a request by a Conservative member, that included a l l losses due to th e f t , fraud, f i r e and other w r i t e - o f f s , that had been incurred i n a l l i n s t a l l a t i o n s 59 during the two f i s c a l years j u s t past. I t was on thi s document that much of the subsequent investigation was based. Based on the information i n the document the Committee began a detailed i n v e s t i g a t i o n into f i r e losses at the Central Ordnance Depot i n Ottawa.^ The report of the Court of Inquiry was studied and to ensure that the department was proceeding with the Court's recommendations, members of the Committee made a first-hand examination. Most expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n that they were shown as much as was necessary to confirm that the recommendations were being implemented. Only Mr. Stewart, an accountant by profession, f e l t that he was given i n s u f f i c i e n t leeway and a return v i s i t was arranged e s p e c i a l l y for him. Af t e r he t o l d fellow Committee members, "I saw i n d e t a i l what I had wanted to see previously and from what I did see I am quite s a t i s f i e d that the system down there i s as good as human ingenuity can make i t . " 6 1 A s i m i l a r but less extensive inquiry was ca r r i e d out into 220 losses due to f i r e at No.6 repair depot at Trenton and other 63 losses were considered before the Committee returned to i t s o r i g i n a l agenda. The reversion to the o r i g i n a l agenda led to calmer and generally more useful i n q u i r i e s . With the assistance of senior o f f i c i a l s from the Departments of National Defence, Defence Production and Finance a rather, thorough invest i g a t i o n into armaments was c a r r i e d out. On one occasion, when the witness was apparently being forced to answer a question on what appeared to be a matter that was on the p o l i c y side of the fuzzy l i n e that separates p o l i c y and administration, L i b e r a l 64 objections were overruled by the chairman. On many types of equipment,information was provided on q u a l i t y , p r i c e , contracts and p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a l l i e d standardization. The agenda was al t e r e d again for the f i f t e e n t h meeting, and opposition members given the opportunity to go "scandal-hunting". Mr. MacDonnell's favourite subjects, including serving forks, teapots, rugs, carpets and lamps, were examined by the Committee. Departmental o f f i c i a l s were able to explain, without any d i f f i c u l t y , however, the reasoning for each of the orders except the f i r s t . 6 5 This f i r s t matter had i n i t i a l l y been ra i s e d when Mr. MacDonnell had put a question on the order paper of the House 221 requesting information concerning a tender for 63,000 serving forks . Subsequently, while a l l the time Mr. MacDonnell was g i v i n g the matter as much p u b l i c i t y as p o s s i b l e , the order was decreased to 40,000 and again to 14,000. Not unnatura l ly , Mr. MacDonnell chose to a t t r i b u t e the savings to the extraordinary p u b l i c i t y he had given the matter. The explanation given before the Committee made l i g h t of Mr. MacDonnell T s claims and reasoned that the changes had been as a r e s u l t of the i n t e r n a l check wi th in the department as w e l l as a changing i n t e r n a t i o n a l atmosphere that no longer necess i tated a good deal of s t o c k p i l i n g . For years afterwards, however, Mr. MacDonnell continued to r e f e r to departmental waste and i n v a r i a b l y h i s lone example was serving forks . Having l o s t considerable time due to the two addit ions to i t s agenda, the Committee had but two meetings to deal with a i r c r a f t and i t never made a s t a r t on sh ips . The f i n a l report of the 1952 Committee was long (nine pages) and f a c t u a l . , I t ne i ther censured the government nor made any recommendations. To th i s rather co lour less r e p o r t , c e r t a i n l y a l i t t l e too f a c t u a l to c o r r e c t l y represent what the evidence had suggested, Messieurs Fu l ton and Harkness of fered a rather long amendment which claimed, i n p a r t , that there had been " l a x i t y and 222 negligence i n the Defence Department with respect to designing and enforcing measures to prevent loss to the publ i c of Canada by f i r e , theft and f r a u d . " 6 6 To a l l e v i a t e th i s s i t u a t i o n they proposed an independent inqu iry in to the en t i re problem. The amendment a lso censured the department for accepting American type weapons when there were superior B r i t i s h type ones a v a i l a b l e . F i n a l l y , i n a c a t c h - a l l paragraph i t was stated that the Committee was " . . . concerned over the high cost of defence i n s t a l l a t i o n s and strongly recommends that the Department of Nat ional Defence and the Department of Defence Production consider p o s i t i v e measures to reduce such c o s t s . " 6 7 The amendment was resolved i n the negative. Although th i s wr i t er fee ls that the evidence d id not j u s t i f y the l a t t e r two points i n the Conservative amendment, i t d i d , at l east p a r t i a l l y , support the f i r s t observat ion. In th i s respect the report i s more use fu l i n representing the general state of mind of the government supporters on the Committee than as an accurate a n a l y t i c a l account of what was accomplished. They were there to protect the government, not to inquire into defence expenditures. On many occasions L i b e r a l s phrased questions to help hard-pressed witnesses. This was e s p e c i a l l y true of the several parliamentary ass i s tants who 223 although not members of the government, almost always behaved as i f they had a cabinet min i s t er ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . As a r e s u l t , the f i n a l report f a i l e d to say c e r t a i n things that needed saying. And i f the opposi t ion amendment car ica tured what the evidence i n d i c a t e d , i t was not more inaccurate than the excess ively fac tua l report that the government supporters d id send to the House of Commons. The legacy of the 1952 Committee was two-fold. Gn the one hand there were encouraging f a c t o r s . A great deal of information on the state of preparedness had been accumulated and doubtless would be use fu l i n making a comprehensive evaluat ion of Canada's defence programme. The i n q u i r i e s in to the f i r e , fraud and theft losses were thorough and unquestionably served to remind the department that Parliament was able to check in to i t s adminis trat ive e f f i c i e n c y when i t so des ired . There was a negative s ide , as w e l l , however, to the 1952 Committee, although i t seems riot to have been recognized as such at the time. The Committee had served as a forum for hours of t o t a l l y p a r t i s a n haggl ing . The Conservatives had attempted, and not without good reason, to employ the Committee as a mechanism to invest igate the Petawawa i r r e g u l a r i t i e s and examine the C u r r i e Report. They stated t h e i r case, and a f ter a good deal of d i s cus s ion , they were defeated. 224 Yet the Conservatives p e r s i s t e d i n r a i s i n g the same issue time and time again. Surely they knew the L i b e r a l s were not about to re l en t on the matter. The government had made th i s c l ear from the outset . The only other explanation for the Conservat ive's a c t i o n , therefore , i s that they wished to use the Committee to give added p u b l i c i t y to the Petawawa i r r e g u l a r i t i e s . In so doing, they set a precedent that helped to destroy the Committee. Thus, the 1952 Committee had two faces . One was object ive (as object ive as Canadian committees ever a r e ) , r e l a t i v e l y non-part i san (government supporters d id not hinder inves t igat ions although they seldom a s s i s t e d ) , and unquestionably of great value i n throwing l i g h t upon current developments i n the defence e f f o r t and the state of n a t i o n a l preparedness. The second face was a "scandal-hunting" one. I t threw government supporters v i o l e n t l y against the wa l l separating the par t i e s and reminded them that the f i r s t purpose of the oppos i t ion members was to turn the government out of o f f i c e . In 1952, however, the second face was hardly no t i ced . Only h i s t o r i c a l perspect ive c l e a r l y brings i t out. Indeed, at the end of the 1952 sess ion, there was a general consensus that the Defence Expenditures Committee had thus far proved to be an encouragingly successful experiment. 225 This experiment might have succeeded too, were i t not for the Petawawa inc idents and the C u r r i e Report . As mentioned i n the previous chapter , despite the b i t t e r opposi t ion of Conservative members, the subject of t h i s h ighly c o n t r o v e r s i a l Report was re ferred to the 1953 Committee. Professor Ward, i n h i s a n a l y s i s , implies that the dec i s ion of the government to use the Committee for i t s own purposes resu l ted i n the des truct ion of the Committee as a use fu l 69 organ of c o n t r o l . In th i s t h e s i s , i t i s argued that Ward's explanation for the co l lapse of the Committee, although p a r t i a l l y t rue , i s f a r from complete. The f i r s t point that Ward ignores i s that the 1952 Committee had been far from devoid of p a r t i s a n a c t i v i t y . Viewed i n th i s l i g h t , the dec i s ion of the government was only another step, a l b e i t a much larger one, i n the d i r e c t i o n that the 1952 Committee had headed. Indeed, i n the debates i n the House of Commons M r . C r o l l took considerable pleasure i n reminding the opposi t ion that less than a year e a r l i e r i t was they that had been clamouring for the r i g h t to examine the Petawawa i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n the Defence Expenditures Commit tee . 7 0 In defending h i s argument Ward mentions the Conservative thes is "that the examination of the C u r r i e report by the Committee on Defence Expenditures could serve no purpose beyond preventing 226 the committee from doing anything e l s e ." This i s hardly compatible, however with the fact that the Committee held f i f t e e n meetings on subjects t o t a l l y unrelated to the C u r r i e Report. Aga in , Ward mentions that several of the meetings were " v i r t u a l l y boycotted" by Conservative members, implying that they d id so to show t h e i r displeasure or disgust with the dec i s ion to r e f e r the Report to the Committee. In f a c t , a l l s i x Conservative members attended every meeting at which Mr. C u r r i e was present. The only " v i r t u a l boycott" was at the twenty-second meeting and the reason for th i s ac t ion was that the M i n i s t e r of Nat ional Defence was simultaneously making a p o l i c y statement i n the House. I t i s true that members of the Conservative Party re f ra ined from questioning Mr. C u r r i e (poss ib ly th i s i s what Ward means by,"boycott") but they d id p a r t i c i p a t e i n the other 23 meetings of the Committee. There was l i t t l e demand a f t er 1953 for a Defence Expenditures Committee of the 1951-1953 type and i t does seem l i k e l y that by r e f e r r i n g the C u r r i e Report to-the 1953 Committee the government hastened i t s end. But th i s c e r t a i n l y was not the only reason. Both i n 1952 and again i n 1953, the opposi t ion d id not hes i ta te to "play p o l i t i c s " with the Committee. At no time d i d 227 they treat i t to a non-part i san committee (as the B r i t i s h Publ ic Accounts Committee); To the extent that i t was such a non-p a r t i s a n committee, even i n 1953, i t was an extremely use fu l organ. Therefore i t seems qui te l i k e l y that i t was as much the i n a b i l i t y of the oppos i t ion to achieve p o l i t i c a l advantages through i t (by uncovering headline-making i r r e g u l a r i t i e s ) as much as any L i b e r a l a c t i o n , that l ed to i t s sudden demise. The 1953 Committee, l i k e i t s 1952 predecessor, revealed a good deal of c o n t i n u i t y . I t r e - e l ec t ed Mr. C r o l l as chairman for a t h i r d consecutive year. Of the twenty-six members, only f i v e had not served i n 1951 or 1952 and of these only two, one of whom was Mr. Fleming, were oppos i t ion members. Attendance improved over 1952. An average of 21.6 members attended each meeting and of these 7.3 were members of the oppos i t ion . Attendance d id taper o f f during the l a s t ten meetings (average 18.9) , no doubt due to the heavier schedule fac ing Commons members toward the end of the sess ion. The f i r s t s i x meetings of the Committee were devoted to the expenditures and commitments of the Army Works Serv i ce s , the branch of the Canadian Army that had been invest igated by Mr. C u r r i e . The hearings began with a short chronolog ica l report of the Petawawa i r r e g u l a r i t i e s by the judge advocate general . Subsequently, with great p u b l i c i t y , Mr. C u r r i e was 228 summoned as witness to give evidence per ta in ing to h i s i n v e s t i g -at ions and Report. The long expected "fire-works" were about to begin! To the surpr i se of the press and the n a t i o n , however, they f a i l e d to m a t e r i a l i z e . Conservative members, although a l l s i x were present , r e f r a i n e d from asking any quest ions. L i b e r a l members d id the majority of the work but they d i d not deal with the sections of the report that they had denounced i n the House of Commons, p a r t i c u l a r l y the charges that there were horses on the p a y r o l l . Only the C . C . F . members attempted to contr ibute u s e f u l l y . They concentrated t h e i r questions on Mr. C u r r i e ' s recommendations but the Committee was uninterested and t h e i r i n q u i r i e s soon petered out. On numerous occasions there were awkward s i l ences when no members spoke. F i n a l l y , a f ter two meetings, the chairman thanked Mr. C u r r i e and expressed the opinion that " i t i s qui te probable we w i l l need you again at which time I w i l l communicate with you. . . " 7 2 The need d id not a r i s e . The hearings had been an ant i - c l imax to the en t i re Petawawa i r r e g u l a r i t i e s . L i b e r a l members, for the most p a r t , had asked questions on those sections of the report that were not c o n t r o v e r s i a l and they had phrased t h e i r i n q u i r i e s to ensure the answer most favourable to the government. Mr. Fleming T s 229 observations were quite accurate when i n the subsequent debate (by th i s time the discuss ions had almost a l l the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a f u l l - d r e s s p o l i t i c a l b a t t l e i n the House of Commons) he pointed out: L i b e r a l members were so far away i n t h e i r quest ions , so far removed from the r e a l e ssent ia l s of contentious points i n the C u r r i e Report , that t h e i r abstent ion from asking Mr. C u r r i e questions was r e a l l y marvellous to behold. . . . My weren't they models of d i s c r e t i o n and de l i cacy i n t h e i r approach. . . Now that Mr. C u r r i e i s gone they are as brave as l i ons and as r o a r i n g , too, but when Mr. C u r r i e was here they were l i k e l i t t l e cooing doves. L i b e r a l s n a t u r a l l y concentrated on the s i l ence of Conservative members. "It i s qui te obvious. . . that they are t r y i n g to run away from the loose charges they have made through-out th i s d iscuss ion" argued M r . J u t r a s , r e f e r r i n g to the debate i n the House, "and i t i s a l so qui te obvious that they made a l o t of charges and are now going to t ry to c lose the committee, and c lose any i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , so that a l l loose charges w i l l remain upon Hansard ." 7 ^ In r e b u t t a l , Conservative members claimed that they saw no need for quest ioning Mr. C u r r i e . They accepted h is report i n to to , they argued and saw no reason for re-hashing i t i n committee. At the beginning of the fourth meeting the s teer ing sub-committee reported and suggested an agenda whereby the Committee 230 would deal f i r s t with Appendix B of the C u r r i e Report , then with defence construct ion and f i n a l l y with the production and ac-q u i s i t i o n of a i r c r a f t . Several c o n t r o v e r s i a l amendments and subLamendments were proposed on the motion to accept the r e p o r t . The debate on these stretched out over three meetings but a l l were eventual ly re jec ted by the government supporters and the sub-committee's agenda adopted. Appendix B of the C u r r i e Report was a summary of i r r e g u l a r i t i e s , other than the Petawawa ones, l i s t e d by the Chie f Audi tor of the Department Of Nat ional Defence i n some of h i s intra-departmental r epor t s . Almost four f u l l meetings were devoted to i t and for the most part they were a waste of time. Conservative members went in to considerable d e t a i l on several of the cases and they d id acquire a l i t t l e added information. But at the end of the question per iod they only re -e s tab l i shed what had already been es tabl i shed by the ch ie f audi tor and p u b l i c i s e d i n Appendix B. The Conservatives soon r e a l i z e d th i s and requested ( for a second time) the o r i g i n a l reports of the ch ie f a u d i t o r , hoping perhaps to f i n d some use fu l p o l i t i c a l morsels i n these r e p o r t s . Instead, the ch i e f auditor himself was c a l l e d but l i t t l e new information was o b t a i n e d . 7 5 I t was only when the Committee turned to the second 231 item on i t s agenda, cons truc t ion , that i t began to funct ion again as i t had through much of 1952. The Committee began by l i s t e n i n g to general statements by the Ass i s tant Deputy M i n i s t e r of Nat ional Defence (Real Estate A d v i s e r ) 7 6 and by the Superin-tendent of Engineering and Construct ion Requirements from the Of f i ce of the A s s i s t a n t Deputy M i n i s t e r (Requirements ) . 7 7 The former spoke on the a c q u i s i t i o n of property and the l a t t e r on the p r i n c i p l e s of the defence construct ion programme. Subsequent-l y there was quest ioning , both general and s p e c i f i c , on the two statements and a large amount of informat ion, much of i t tabled i n the appendices, was provided. Eight locat ions were inves t igated c l o s e l y by the Defence Expenditures Committee. For each documents containing statements of purpose and d e t a i l s of expenditures were tab led . Of the eight i n q u i r i e s , the ones at Cold Lake and Penhold were most exhaustive. The Cold Lake i n q u i r y was i n i a t e d and led by the L i b e r a l backbencher represent ing the constituency next to the one i n which Cold Lake i s s i tua ted . He began by tab l ing ten questions and on the bas is of the answers returned, a thorough i n v e s t i g a t i o n in to the pr i ce s pa id for the t rac t s of land was commenced. 7 8 One member presented a l e t t e r from an i r a t e deposed 232 landholder complaining of the d i f f i c u l t y i n achieving an amicable settlement for the land that had once been h i s . O f f i c i a l s were summoned and forced to explain the reasoning behind the p r i c e paid for each land t r a c t . Before f i n i s h i n g , the Committee was able to account for each d o l l a r that had been spent and at l eas t a handful of o f f i c i a l s were reminded of the powers of Parl iament. L ike the Cold Lake i n q u i r y , the i n v e s t i g a t i o n in to contract delays at Penhold was led by the member representing a constituency bordering on the one where Penhold i s located . Each contract was inves t igated c a r e f u l l y , along with the reasons for delays . The use of government equipment by contractors was looked i n t o . Contract changes were c a r e f u l l y s c r u t i n i z e d and o f f i c i a l s c a l l e d i n to expla in the reasons i n each case. In a very r e a l sense, every d o l l a r of expenditure was examined. Despite t h i s , however, the government d id not come out too badly . A motion was made by Mr. Fleming c a l l i n g for a complete i n v e s t i g a t i o n by Mr. C u r r i e into the construct ion of the R . C . A . F . s t a t i o n at Penhold. Although he had rece ived f u l l information from the department's o f f i c i a l s , he s a i d , he f e l t the need for independent engineers and contractors to go out on l oca t ion and check t h e i r 79 a c c u r a c y . ' L i b e r a l members, qui te r i g h t l y I f e e l , argued that there was no j u s t i f i c a t i o n for such an i n q u i r y . Exhaustive 233 questioning and f u l l information had brought out no substantive reasons for requesting further inquiry. With th i s opinion, C.C.F. member Mr. Herridge was i n agreement and the motion was defeated nine votes to f i v e , Mr. Thomas (Social Credit) voting with the opposition. Apart from these i n q u i r i e s , which. I would submit were an excellent synthesis of objective inquiry and p o l i t i c a l expediency, the Committee went into various other problems including schools, churches, married servicemen 1s quarters and a host of other items. Evidence was presented by the senior o f f i c i a l s of Defence Construction Limited and of Central Mortgage and Housing. The f i n a l f i f t e e n meetings (unlike the f i r s t eleven) were amongst the very best that the Committee held over i t s three year h i s t o r y . Not only were further amounts of information placed on record but equally important there was detailed inquiry both into the e f f i c i e n c y of expenditure and also into the work of numerous departmental o f f i c i a l s . The f i n a l report of the 1953 Committee did come very close to whitewashing the Currie Report. I t ignored several of Mr. Currie's most serious accusations and made l i g h t of others by incorporating government explanations for them. I t constituted 234 an unfair summary of what Mr. Currie Ts report, together with the Committee hearings, indicated to be the t r u t h . 8 0 The report factually summarized the results of the Committee's inquiries into the department's construction programme and concluded that "the construction programme in the face of numerous d i f f i c u l t i e s has been well conceived and carefully supervised and the public has received good value for i t s money." A. more accurate report would have indicated only that no serious irregularities had been revealed by the Committee's inquiries. The closing paragraph of the report stated that "the deliberations of your Committee have proved of constructive assistance to the Departments of National Defence and Defence Production in the administration of a large and complicated defence programme and have served as a constant reminder to those responsible of the degree to which economy must be achieved in 82 the making of public expenditures." With this conclusion this author i s in substantial agreement. As had happened a year earlier, a Conservative amend-, ment was offered. This time i t was so extensive (four pages) that i t cut out the core of the actual report and replaced i t with an opposition version of what had happened. o F i r s t , i t presented the reverse picture of the.Currie 235 Report and recommended that Mr. C u r r i e be re-appointed to carry out an "unres tr ic ted inqu iry in to a l l aspects of the organ iza t ion , accounting, and adminis trat ion of the Department of Nat ional Defence. . , " 8 3 The report complained that the Committee's i n v e s t i g -at ions into other i r r e g u l a r i t i e s as mentioned i n Appendix B had been " s t u l t i f i e d and f rus tra ted" by t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to examine the o r i g i n a l reports of the ch i e f aud i tor . ( I t d id not mention these were h igh ly subject ive intra-departmental reports from the c h i e f auditor to the as s i s tant deputy minis ter (finance) and hardly f a i r game for a parl iamentary committee). Despite th i s handicap, the Committee had found, i t argued, that there was an "inexcusable lack of a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n r e l a t i o n to the expendi-ture of pub l i c funds. . , " 8 4 As a r e s u l t of i t s i n v e s t i g a t i o n in to the construct ion programme, the amendment suggested that the "Committee was again impressed by the free-and-easy ways i n which large amounts of 85 publ i c money were spent." The Conservative amendment, l i k e the f i n a l L i b e r a l r e p o r t , had some conclusions that were j u s t i f i e d and others that were not j u s t i f i e d by the evidence accumulated. As might be expected, a more accurate report would have incorporated features of both of these. 236 The f i n a l r e p o r t , we can see then, not u n l i k e the 1951 report of the Publ i c Accounts Committee and the 1952 report of the Defence Expenditures Committee, showed that despite the fact that the 1953 Committee d id have some r e l a t i v e l y non-part i san c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (which were most obvious during the Cold Lake inqu iry which was led by a L i b e r a l ) , i n the l a s t a n a l y s i s , a l l three committees were p o l i t i c a l f i r s t and non-part isan inves-t iga t ions into defence expenditures only second. I t i s now poss ib le to draw c e r t a i n conclusions con-cerning committee c o n t r o l of defence expenditures during the 1945-1957 p e r i o d . F i r s t , there was no pre -audi t c o n t r o l . Both the Audi tor General and the Publ ic Accounts Committee, by the very nature of t h e i r funct ions , had no pre -audi t funct ion . The Spec ia l Committee on Defence Expenditures , by i t s orders of reference , was l i m i t e d to past expenditure. Second, continuous pos t -audi t c o n t r o l was c a r r i e d out by the Audi tor General and a s t a f f of near ly t h i r t y who were at work on defence expenditures. They were able to keep a c a r e f u l watch on a day-to-day b a s i s , through test a u d i t s , on departmental f inances . Most of t h e i r many c r i t i c i s m s were accepted by the two defence departments and a l t e r a t i o n s were 237 made by these departments to accommodate the Audi tor General 's viewpoints . I t i s noteworthy that the man who was Ass i s tant Deputy M i n i s t e r (Finance) of Nat ional Defence during most of th i s p e r i o d , has ind ica ted to th i s w r i t e r h i s very high opinion of the Audi tor General 's s t a f f and the necess i ty of t h e i r funct ion . The Audi tor General received sporadic ass istance from the Publ ic-Accounts Committee, on the f i v e occasions when i t received h i s annual repor t . The Committee, on two occasions , made de ta i l ed i n q u i r i e s into items mentioned by the Auditor General and the impact of these c e r t a i n l y was to increase the power and pres t ige of the Audi tor General v i s - a - v i s the defence departments. The 1952 Report of the Audi tor Genera l , however, was by far the most s i g n i f i c a n t of those he presented, w i th in the terms of reference of th i s thes i s ; for i t showed the defence department that the Audi tor General was capable of putt ing i t i n under the most extreme kind of publ i c pressure. Although i t i s impossible to mathematically measure the extent of the c o n t r o l ef fected by the Audi tor Genera l , there seems to be l i t t l e question but that he served as a h ighly e f f ec t ive organ i n c o n t r o l l i n g defence expenditures during these years. That a more v i r u l e n t Pub l i c Accounts Committee 238 would have improved i t even more does not detract from the fac t that the Audi tor General and h i s s t a f f d id keep a continuous watch over the p u b l i c moneys being spent for defence purposes. F i n a l l y , there was the work of the four committees between 1951 and 1953. At the time that these committees were meeting, the government was i n the midst of i t s f i v e b i l l i o n d o l l a r three-year defence programme and there i s no doubt but that a l l four committees served, very u s e f u l l y , to keep members abreast of defence developments and thus helped them i n evaluat ing the e n t i r e programme. The ir greatest va lue , therefore , was i n informing and educating members. By the same token, however, the fac t that the Defence Expenditures Committee ceased meeting a f t er 1953 unquestionably served to d imin i sh , although not to destroy, i t s long-run value . Had the Defence Expenditures Committee been a continuing one, as Mr. S t . Laurent had f i r s t ind ica ted i t would be, the inform-a t i o n and experience accumulated between 1951 and 1953 would doubtless have a s s i s t ed further i n q u i r i e s and eased the problems i n c o n t r o l l i n g the executive and i t s expenditures. The committees a lso made several d e t a i l e d inves t igat ions 239 into specific expenditures and in so doing forcibly reminded departmental o f f i c i a l s of the power of Parliament and of the fact that they were accountable to the representatives of the electorate. Unfortunately, this aspect of the committees1 work was hampered by the primarily partisan attitude of almost a l l the members. From the viewpoint of the opposition parties, this attitude would have been easily understandable had they had the opportunity of achieving really significant p o l i t i c a l ends through these tactics. But the committees received so l i t t l e day-to-day publicity, such restricted orders of reference and government supporters were so well disciplined that from the outset i t was very unlikely that these committees could be used successfully for p o l i t i c a l purposes. As a method of controlling the bureaucracy and asva source of information, the committee meetings were occasionally useful. By attempting to change them into debates of a miniature House of Commons, the opposition sacrificed the opportunity of exercising strong bureaucratic control, without achieving p o l i t i c a l advantage. Simultaneously, they gave up the committees as a source of information upon which sounder criticisms of policy might have been constructed. Undoubtedly, as a result of this, the long-run losers were the Canadian public for they were deprived of the reasonably strong bureaucratic control that might have been exercised and the improved debate that almost certainly would have followed. C H A P T E R VII COMMITTEE CONTROL OF DEFENCE, 1957-1962 Contro l of defence expenditures during the twenty-fourth Parliament was for the most part c a r r i e d out by the same organs of the House of Commons as were used during the previous th i r t een years. There was the Publ i c Accounts Committee, the Audi tor General and a Spec ia l Committee on Defence Expenditures. (In a d d i t i o n , the Standing Committee on Estimates dealt with the defence departments i n 1958.) But i t was i n name only that these committees resembled the committees that had been employed i n the four previous Par l iaments 1 ; for both i n s p i r i t and i n organizat ion and powers, they d i f f e r e d remarkably from those that had been appointed by the L i b e r a l governments. In the pages that fo l low, I s h a l l discuss the changes that have occurred i n recent years and the impact they have had on the defence c o n t r o l funct ion of the House of Commons. 241 242 THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE AND THE AUDITOR GENERAL 2 Soon a f t er the 1958 e l e c t i o n the Diefenbaker government proposed to the House of Commons that a member of the o f f i c i a l opposi t ion be chosen as chairman of the Publ i c Accounts Committee. Short ly thereaf ter , Mr. Alan McNaughton, L i b e r a l member for Montreal Mount-Royal, was se lected . He reta ined h i s p o s i t i o n throughout the twenty-fourth Parl iament. 3 As seen i n the previous chapter , the chairmen of the Publ ic Accounts Committees between 1945 and 1957 had been both reasonable and non-part i san i n pres id ing over the committees. 4 On more than one occasion Mr. P icard had permitted opposi t ion members such extensive leeway i n t h e i r questioning that he had been queried by members of h i s own party . The s e l ec t ion of a chairman from amongst the ranks of the oppos i t ion d id not neces sar i ly mean, therefore , that the oppos i t ion members would have greater freedom to pursue t h e i r work than they had had i n e a r l i e r years. But i t was a s ign of a new a t t i tude on the part of the government toward the Pub l i c Accounts Committee. I t r e f l e c t e d the not ion that much l i k e the B r i t i s h Publ ic Accounts Committee, the Canadian Committee ought to carry on i t s business with a minimum of par t i san a c t i v i t y . A second change was inaugurated by the Conservative 243 government. Before 1958, the Committee had assembled only when a member requested such a meeting by p e t i t i o n i n g the chairman. As a r e s u l t , the Committee d id not meet r e g u l a r l y . Under the new government i t "became understood" that the Committee would meet annually i f for no other reason than to examine the Report of the Audi tor G e n e r a l . 5 The Standing Committee on P u b l i c Accounts made no d i r e c t inves t igat ions in to defence expenditures or adminis trat ion during the twenty-fourth Parl iament, but i t d i d deal with numerous i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n the defence departments as a by-product of i t s examinations in to the annual Reports of the Audi tor General . In th i s chapter I s h a l l examine the Report of the Audi tor General for 1959, one which I be l i eve was t y p i c a l of those presented to the House of Commons during the per iod under review, and the method with which the Publ ic Accounts Committee handled i t . The 1959 Report of the Audi tor General devoted numerous items to i r r e g u l a r i t i e s and points of i n t e r e s t i n the defence departments. Two r e f e r r e d to a rather complex l ega l s i t u a t i o n whereby ex i s t ing f edera l l e g i s l a t i o n was preventing the defence department from rece iv ing a $93,000 rebate from a contractor whom the department f e l t had been o v e r p a i d . 6 ' In subsequent weeks witnesses were summoned from the Departments of Nat ional Defence, 244 Defence Product ion, Transport and J u s t i c e and from the A i r Transport B o a r d . 7 The f i n a l l e g a l opinion given by the Depart-ment of Jus t i ce expressed the view that there was no, method whereby the government could compel the contractor to grant the rebate. This d id not , however, prevent the Committee from making a recommendation to the House of Commons. "Your Committee i s of the op in ion ," i t read , "that i t would be i n the pub l i c i n t e r e s t were appropriate cons iderat ion given to the pert inent prov i s ions of the Aeronautics A c t , and a lso those i n the Defence Act which treat with the powers of the M i n i s t e r of Defence Production where he i s s a t i s f i e d that a party to one or more contracts has been paid an amount i n excess of the f a i r and reasonable cost of performing the contracts together with a f a i r and reasonable p r o f i t . " 8 Several items i n the Audi tor General 's Report questioned the r e g u l a r i t y of defence contracts that had been negotiated by the responsible government departments. One case, an i n t e r -9 departmental one that was handled by the Department of Transport , although considered a defence p r o j e c t , was r a i s e d i n the Committee's report and i n terms that would never have been used between 1945 and 1957: Your Committee was informed that departmental t echn ica l opinion now i s that cost might have 245 been $600,000 less had tenders been i n v i t e d and a f i r m - p r i c e contract entered i n t o . The estimate i s , of course, conjec tura l but does aggravate doubt with respect to the e f f i c i e n c y of contract ing on a cos t -p lus b a s i s . The Report then went on to say: I t i s recognized however that use of th i s form of contract may sometimes be unavoidable i n s i tuat ions of urgency or of nove l ty , remoteness of l o c a t i o n e tc . but your Committee i s of the opinion that i t would be i n the pub l i c i n t e r e s t were (a) l e g i s l a t i o n to regulate more s t r ingent ly and comprehensively cost -p lus awards (b) the regulat ing provis ions of the Defence Production Act reserved to indisputable defence projects of such a nature that i t i s not poss ib le to l e t by tenders, and (c) that subs tant ia l contracts should not be l e t u n t i l plans and spec i f i ca t ions are complete. Three other items i n the Report of the Auditor General were h ighly c r i t i c a l of "Unusual Transportat ion C o s t s . " 1 1 The f i r s t of these brought to the a t tent ion of the Committee the expenditure of some $29,000 i n transport ing by Trans-Canada A i r l i n e s a Newfoundland m i l i t i a u n i t to summer camp at Petawawa. The Report noted that the cost would have been $7,000 less had Royal Canadian A i r Force planes been used. ( I n d i r e c t l y , i t a lso r a i s e d the considerat ions that permitted a m i l i t i a u n i t to be moved such great distances to rece ive such a b r i e f per iod of t r a i n i n g . ) The Committee summoned the deputy minis ter and a f u l l 246 explanation was provided. He d i sc losed that the troops had refused to t r a v e l by the R . C . A . F . T s C-119 transport a i r c r a f t and that as a r e s u l t the higher costs had been incurred . He a lso admitted that the m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r who had authorized the expenditure had neglected to ask the permission of the Treasury Board and although i t had subsequently approved of the expenditure, there was no question but that the o f f i c e r s responsible had 12 "incurred the displeasure" of the Board. A second case, the worst of numerous ones that had been uncovered o r i g i n a l l y by the Chief Audi tor of the Department of Nat ional Defence, revealed that $313.88 had been pa id to move the furn i ture and ef fects of a serviceman and h i s family a distance of one h a l f mi le . This too was thoroughly invest igated by the Committee and i n i t s report to the House the Committee was again c r i t i c a l of the defence department. I t recommended that along with a "review of regulat ions and p r a c t i c e s , cons iderat ion be given to extending the f i n a n c i a l r o l e of the c i v i l i a n s i n the Department (as opposed to i t s m i l i t a r y personnel) to prevent the recurrence of s i m i l a r extravagances i n the f u t u r e . " 1 3 F i n a l l y , the report to the House of Commons recommended that a new method be devised for l i s t i n g "National Defence Expenditures on Educat ion ," a matter that had a lso been o r i g i n a l l y 247 r a i s e d by the Audi tor General . The Committee found that expend-i t u r e s were d i s t r i b u t e d under several separate misleading sub-items so that i t was d i f f i c u l t i f not impossible for members to determine the amount being expended on education: Your Committ ee i s of the opinion that i t would be more informative were the Department of Nat ional Defence costs ( for education) consol idated and su i tab ly d i s c lo sed . Whether th i s may be more e f f i c i e n t l y done by use of a s p e c i a l vote or otherwise i s regarded as a matter for the Treasury Board to c o n s i d e r . I 4 The Publ ic Accounts Committee was not s a t i s f i e d with simply c r i t i c i z i n g and recommending economies. I t a lso decided to determine the extent to which the recommendations were being implemented. This task i t assigned to the Audi tor General and beginning i n 1960 he s tarted submitting memoranda (pr inted as appendices to the proceedings of the Publ ic Accounts Committee) on the act ions taken by the departments i n response to the Committee's recommendations. 1 5 1959 was not an exception, but rather a t y p i c a l year for the "new" Publ i c Accounts Committee. A person reading i t s proceedings, unaware of members1 party a f f i l i a t i o n s , would have much d