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Parliamentary control of defence in Canada, 1945-1962. Lazar, Harvey 1963

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PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF DEFENCE IN CANADA, 1945-1962 by HARVEY LAZAR B.Sc,  McGill U n i v e r s i t y , 1960  A.THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1963  In presenting the  r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an  British  this thesis in partial  a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t the U n i v e r s i t y  Columbia, I agree that  available  for reference  mission for extensive p u r p o s e s may.  be  c a t i o n of  and  written  Department  of  study.  I f u r t h e r agree that  the Head o f my  Department or  I t i s understood that  ••/%  per-  /TQ.  by  copying, or p u b l i -  s h a l l not  permission.  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h V a n c o u v e r . 8 , Canada. Date  the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y  t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain  w i t h o u t my  of  c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s ,f or . s c h o l a r l y  g r a n t e d by  h i s representatives..  f u l f i l m e n t of  Columbia,.  "  be  allowed  ii ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis i s to examine the degree to which the Parliament  of Canada was able to control the defence  p o l i c y , administration and expenditures i n the 1945-1962 period.  of the Canadian government  Because of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power  between the two houses of Parliament, concerned with the House of Commons.  the thesis i s primarily In the second l a s t  chapter,  however, the r o l e of the Senate i s analyzed. The House of Commons has four p r i n c i p a l (although not mutually control.  exclusive) techniques  through which i t attempts to exercise  These include c r i t i c a l debate, control of finances,  select committees and the question period. these techniques  i s analyzed separately.  The use of each of Also, each of the four  i s analyzed with reference to the party i n opposition.  Hence  for each technique, the 1945-1957 and the 1957-1962 periods were dealt with separately. The analysis of the defence debates and question period indicated s t r i k i n g differences i n the pattern of opposition between the two periods. was  In the 1957-1962 period the L i b e r a l opposition  concerned primarily with destroying the prospects of the  government for the ensuing e l e c t i o n .  Hence the L i b e r a l s strove  to d i s c r e d i t the defence programme of the government. and p o l i t i c s were the major issues.  Policy  Both i n the debates and the  • • •  111 q u e s t i o n p e r i o d the o p p o s i t i o n d e a l t h a r s h l y and e x h a u s t i v e l y w i t h the defence p o l i c y o f the government.  The L i b e r a l  o p p o s i t i o n v i r t u a l l y i g n o r e d , however, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the defence  departments.  In c o n t r a s t ,  the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e o p p o s i t i o n  of the 1945-1957 p e r i o d devoted most o f i t s  energies,  during  q u e s t i o n time and the debates,  to the implementation of p o l i c y  and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of defence.  T h e i r e f f o r t s were culminated  by t h e i r success i n o b s t r u c t i n g the 1955 amendment to the Defence Production A c t .  On the o t h e r hand, the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e s  d i d not debate c r i t i c a l l y the major steps taken i n the development o f Canadian defence p o l i c y .  Indeed, they never questioned  the broad defence road t h a t the government chose to  follow.  House of Commons c o n t r o l o f defence expenditures was a myth.  No d i r e c t c o n t r o l over the estimates was  Nor d i d the debates i n Supply s e r v e ,  exercised.  even i n d i r e c t l y , to i n d i c a t e  that the House o f Commons s t i l l r e t a i n e d c o n t r o l o f the p u r s e . Moreover, s t a t u t o r y c o n t r o l s were l e s s e f f e c t i v e  for  defence  than the o t h e r f u n c t i o n s o f government. In the 1945 to 1957 p e r i o d ,  s e l e c t committees were  appointed w i t h p o s t - a u d i t f u n c t i o n s o n l y .  In f i v e o f  these  years the P u b l i c Accounts Committee d e a l t w i t h i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n defence expenditures as a r e s u l t o f i t s  examination o f  the  iv  annual Report o f the A u d i t o r G e n e r a l . duties,  Because o f i t s broad  c i r c u m s c r i b e d powers and p a r t i s a n atmosphere,  t h i s Committee was not e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r completing i t s  effective.  however,  In 1951,  however,  examination o f the A u d i t o r G e n e r a l ' s R e p o r t ,  the P u b l i c Accounts Committee d e a l t expenditures  and served u s e f u l l y  developments  i n the defence  s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h defence  to i n f o r m members o f c u r r e n t  establishment.  The work o f the 1951 P u b l i c Accounts Committee was c o n t i n u e d by the S p e c i a l Committee on Defence Expenditures t h a t met between 1951 and 1953. permanent s t a f f ,  T h i s Committee, d e s p i t e the l a c k of  r e c e i v e d an enormous amount of evidence  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of defence.  on  I t s u s e f u l n e s s was cut down,  however, by the p a r t i s a n atmosphere which prevented the Committee from making c o n s t r u c t i v e r e p o r t s to the House. w i t h the C u r r i e Report i n 1953,  After  dealing  the Committee was not r e - a p p o i n t e d .  Thus, the o n l y e f f e c t i v e and continuous  post-audit  s c r u t i n y was c a r r i e d out by the Defence Branch o f the O f f i c e o f the A u d i t o r G e n e r a l .  Its  e f f i c a c y was hampered t o o ,  however,  by the f a i l u r e o f the House to develop a technique f o r d e a l i n g r e g u l a r l y with Report;  f o r the House proper never debated  the  A u d i t o r General*s Report and the P u b l i c Accounts Committee d i d not meet r e g u l a r l y d u r i n g these y e a r s . S i n c e 1957,  the P u b l i c Accounts Committee has met  V  a n n u a l l y and r e p o r t e d to the House without p a r t i s a n examples o f i n e f f e c t i v e recommendations  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and waste.  have o f t e n been i n c l u d e d .  has not o n l y strengthened organ o f p o s t - a u d i t  its  control.  interference, Constructive  The Committee thus  own u s e f u l n e s s as an e f f e c t i v e I t has a l s o i n c r e a s e d  the  e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f the A u d i t o r G e n e r a l by guaranteeing more p u b l i c i t y f o r h i s annual r e p o r t than i t had been r e c e i v i n g earlier  in  years. These years a l s o marked the i n i t i a l ventures  a u d i t c o n t r o l through s e l e c t committee.  i n pre-  In 1958 and 1960  the  defence estimates were d e a l t w i t h through these committees. A l t h o u g h the work of these committees, e s p e c i a l l y committee,  the  1958  was an improvement over the performances of Committee  o f S u p p l y , they appeared to have no i n h e r e n t advantages over what a b e t t e r informed Committee o f Supply c o u l d reasonably be expected to a c c o m p l i s h .  Moreover, there was evidence  that  these s e l e c t committees might be used as the f o c a l p o i n t i n t e r e s t group p r e s s u r e s .  Finally,  the defence p o l i c y  for discussions  which accompanied the review o f the estimates c l e a r l y would have been more e f f e c t i v e had they been h e l d i n the House of Commons. Thus, s i n c e the Senate p l a y e d no s i g n i f i c a n t  role,  r e c o r d o f Parliament i n c o n t r o l l i n g defence was v e r y p o o r . There was no e f f e c t i v e p r e - a u d i t c o n t r o l of expenditure and  the  vi  p o s t - a u d i t c o n t r o l was a t no time comprehensive.  Defence  debates i n the 1945-1957 p e r i o d seldom probed i n t o the a t i o n s of p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s .  implic-  In more r e c e n t y e a r s , although the  debates have been more comprehensive, very high l e v e l of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n .  they have not been a t a Both these shortcomings,  i t might be n o t e d , were c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to the d e a r t h o f i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e on It is  defence.  suggested t h a t a s e l e c t standing committee o f  the House might p o s s i b l y h e l p to s t r e n g t h e n p a r l i a m e n t a r y c o n t r o l . Such a committee,  if  left  to i n v e s t i g a t e  problems o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  technology and weaponry, as w e l l as p a s t expenditures of fact)  might serve two purposes.  sufficient  First,  (all  matters  i t might accumulate  r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n to permit more  sophisticated  p o l i c y debates and more i n f o r m a t i v e d i s c u s s i o n of the  estimates.  Second, i t would p e r m i t b e t t e r c o n t r o l o f past expenditure through d e t a i l e d and comprehensive i n v e s t i g a t i o n of  defence.  viii  ACKNOWLEDGMENT  I would l i k e to thank P r o f e s s o r Donald V . Smiley for  h i s a s s i s t a n c e and p a t i e n c e i n the p r e p a r a t i o n o f  thesis. set  A l t h o u g h we have d i s a g r e e d about many o f the  out i n the t h e s i s , h i s numerous c r i t i c i s m s  have been i n v a l u a b l e . and  this  conclusions  N a t u r a l l y , however,  expressed i n the t h e s i s ,  ideas  and suggestions  f o r a l l the  opinions  I alone assume  responsibility. I would a l s o l i k e to express my g r a t i t u d e  to Miss  M. Joan O'Rourke, Miss Maureen F . W i l s o n , Miss Audrey M a l i n and especially of  Miss Susan L . Anderson o f the S o c i a l Sciences D i v i s i o n  the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia L i b r a r y .  Without  c o o p e r a t i o n and a s s i s t a n c e the task would have been Finally,  their  impossible.  I would l i k e to thank Miss M o l l i e Chapman f o r  Her many hours of work i n the t y p i n g o f the  thesis.  vii  TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CHAPTER  I  -  INTRODUCTION: SCOPE AND METHOD  1  CHAPTER  II  -  CONTROL OF DEFENCE POLICY, 1945-1957: THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE  29  CHAPTER I I I  -  CONTROL OF DEFENCE ADMINISTRATION, 1947-1957: THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE  68  CHAPTER  IV  -  CONTROL OF DEFENCE POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION, 1957-1962: THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE  109  CHAPTER  V  -  HOUSE OF COMMONS:  157  CONTROL OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURE CHAPTER  VI  -  COMMITTEE CONTROL OF DEFENCE, 1945-1957:  189  CHAPTER V I I  -  COMMITTEE CONTROL OF DEFENCE, 1957-1962:  241  CHAPTER V I H  -  THE TECHNIQUE OF THE QUESTION PERIOD,  272  1945-1962: CHAPTER  IX  -  THE ROLE OF THE SENATE  288  CHAPTER  X  -  CONCLUSION  302  APPENDIX  338  FOOTNOTES  340  BIBLIOGRAPHY  363  CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION:  SCOPE AND METHOD  Perhaps the g r e a t e s t  single challenge  c o n f r o n t i n g the  Canadian government o f today i s t h a t o f p r o v i d i n g f o r the c o u n t r y s T  security.  Threatened by an a r s e n a l that c o u l d end c i v i l i z e d  on t h i s c o n t i n e n t , and h i n d e r e d  by the l i m i t e d economic  life  resources  o f the n a t i o n , the government i s f a c e d w i t h a predicament t h a t apparently  defies solution. And  y e t none oppose the i d e a that some answer to the  seemingly i n e v i t a b l e d i s a s t e r must be found.  Indeed, i t i s to  a v o i d such a calamitous end that the defence and f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s o f t h i s government a r e p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d ;  and an important  r e q u i s i t e to b o t h o f these i s strong and f l e x i b l e  pre-  executive  leadership. The  problem o f defence g i v e s r i s e i n t u r n to a second  d i f f i c u l t y , t h a t o f r e c o n c i l i n g the growth i n e x e c u t i v e the t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l v a l u e s .  power w i t h  I t i s w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r aspect  of t h i s second problem t h a t I s h a l l be concerned i n the pages t h a t f o l l o w - the r e c o r d o f the Canadian Parliament i n c o n t r o l l i n g defence 1  2  p o l i c y , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and expenditures s i n c e the Second World In Canadian  the f i r s t h a l f of the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ,  War.  peacetime  defence p o l i c y , because of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h the  U n i t e d S t a t e s of America,  the supremacy o f the B r i t i s h Navy and  l e v e l o f contemporary m i l i t a r y technology, was  l i t t l e concerned  the with  the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a d i r e c t a t t a c k might be launched a g a i n s t Canada.  I t i s t r u e t h a t a t i n y permanent f o r c e and a somewhat  l a r g e r militia'*" were maintained d u r i n g these y e a r s , but primary r a i s o n d S t r e was T  not the defence of Canadian  their  territory  a g a i n s t e x t e r n a l a g g r e s s i o n but r a t h e r to serve as a nucleus  around  which l a r g e r f o r c e s might be m o b i l i z e d i n the event of a war  over-  seas.  T h i s " p e r f e c t s e c u r i t y " enjoyed by Canadians  d u r i n g these  years made the defence f u n c t i o n a simple one and a r e l a t i v e l y unimp o r t a n t aspect of the b u s i n e s s of Canadian By the end of World War had drawn to a c l o s e . technology brought of  armed c o n f l i c t .  Two,  government.  the e r a o f " p e r f e c t  security"  The permanent r e v o l u t i o n i n m i l i t a r y  to an abrupt end Canada's i s o l a t i o n from areas And w i t h the emergence o f the S o v i e t Union  as  a p o t e n t i a l enemy, i t became n e c e s s a r y f o r the government to r e a p p r a i s e i t s f u n c t i o n i f Canadian in  the years ahead.  Thus, f o r the f i r s t  c e n t u r y , a Canadian government was to  s e c u r i t y were to be  maintained  time s i n c e the n i n e t e e n t h  f o r c e d to take p o s i t i v e measures  ensure the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of Canada and the p h y s i c a l  3  safety of i t s  inhabitants.  To cope w i t h t h i s problem, the Canadian government turned b o t h inward, to i t s  own manpower and r e s o u r c e s ,  and outward,  to other western democracies t h a t were faced w i t h s i m i l a r d i f f i c u l t ies.  As a r e s u l t ,  the Canadian defence  establishment m u l t i p l i e d  many times growing from an i n t e r - w a r average o f fewer than 10,000 (civilian staff  and r e g u l a r f o r c e s )  over 165,000 ( c i v i l i a n s t a f f same p e r i o d annual defence  to one t h a t now numbers w e l l  and r e g u l a r f o r c e s ) .  During  expenditures grew from l e s s than $35  m i l l i o n s to sums r o u g h l y f i f t y  times g r e a t e r .  Defence became not  o n l y the b i g g e s t but a l s o the most widespread b u s i n e s s r e a c h i n g i n t o and a f f e c t i n g country.  the  almost every c o n s t i t u e n c y  i n Canada, i n the  And to f u r t h e r h e l p secure the g o a l o f peace came  membership i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , the North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y 2  Organization  3 and the North American A i r Defence Command .  As a r e s u l t of these post-war developments, other factors  forces  f u n c t i o n i n Canada has a s u f f i c i e n t  everywhere,  the  number of s p e c i a l  defence qualities  i t a p a r t as markedly d i f f e r e n t from the other f u n c t i o n s  government.  as  that have always been i n h e r e n t to the o r g a n i z a t i o n  and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of defence  to set  as w e l l  I s h a l l l o o k b r i e f l y a t f i v e o f these q u a l i t i e s .  First,  the s i z e o f the defence  particular significance.  organization is  I t i s not simply t h a t the  of  defence  of  department i s  the l a r g e s t o f the numerous departments o f government.  R a t h e r , i t has become so much l a r g e r than the o t h e r s , and so g e o g r a p h i c a l l y d i s p e r s e d ^ t h a t i t has become a much more d i f f i c u l t department to a d m i n i s t e r than any o t h e r i n the government. Second, because o f the permanent r e v o l u t i o n i n t e c h n o l o g y , the defence f u n c t i o n i s an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y complex one. o r g a n i z a t i o n t h e r e f o r e has a t i t s scientific  . The defence  disposal highly trained m i l i t a r y ,  and t e c h n i c a l p e r s o n n e l .  Moreover, because  defence  i s a government monopoly, there are few who are t r a i n e d i n these f i e l d s who are not i n the employ o f the government. Next, because o f her membership i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n s mentioned above, p a r t i c u l a r l y N . A . T . O .  and N . O . R . A . D . ,  Canadian  defence p l a n n i n g has been i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the grand s t r a t e g y o f the western a l l i a n c e . decision-making process, in  Although Canada does p a r t i c i p a t e i n the she n e c e s s a r i l y  l a c k s the  independence  t h i s f i e l d t h a t she has i n such o t h e r s as veterans*  h e a l t h , w e l f a r e , n o r t h e r n a f f a i r s and l a b o u r . i m p o r t a n t , a whole h o s t o f d e c i s i o n s  affairs,  Perhaps more  t h a t are made by f r i e n d l y  f o r e i g n governments, both d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y , h a v e a most f a r - r e a c h i n g impact on the defences o f Canada.  A n d , of  course,  s i n c e defence i s a matter o f r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h s ,  d e c i s i o n s and  developments i n the S o v i e t Union a l s o have an e f f e c t on defence p l a n n i n g i n Canada.  5  F o u r t h , f o r reasons that are too obvious to need to be e l a b o r a t e d here, the defence f u n c t i o n , u n l i k e most o t h e r s , i s enshrouded  i n a good d e a l of s e c r e c y . F i n a l l y , because  o f the n a t u r e of contemporary  military  technology and the s u p e r i o r i t y of weapons o f o f f e n c e over those of  defence, i t i s n e c e s s a r y that governments be  sufficiently  f r e e of e x t e r n a l checks t h a t they can r e a c t i n s t a n t l y to changes i n the type of t h r e a t or to changes i n the areas o f g r e a t e s t pressure. importance  Speed and f l e x i b i l i t y ,  t h e r e f o r e , are of major  i n performing the defence  function.  THE CANADIAN PARLIAMENT  E s p e c i a l l y s i n c e the days of the Great D e p r e s s i o n , the r o l e of the s t a t e i n the Canadian  s o c i e t y and economy has been  expanding a t a v e r y r a p i d r a t e .  As a r e s u l t of t h i s  expansion,  i n c r e a s i n g l y g r e a t e r amounts of power have been c o n c e n t r a t e d i n the e x e c u t i v e branch of government. One  of the major i n t e r e s t s o f those concerned w i t h the  f u t u r e of p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy has been to ensure that these new  e x e c u t i v e powers are employed both e f f e c t i v e l y and i n harmony  w i t h the i d e a l s of democratic government.  Before d e c i d i n g  e x a c t l y what i t i s that i s expected of the Canadian P a r l i a m e n t , however, i t i s n e c e s s a r y to look b r o a d l y a t the f u n c t i o n s of  6  Parliament. A survey of the l i t e r a t u r e on the B r i t i s h parliamentary system reveals quite c l e a r l y that there i s no consensus on the functions that Parliament should perform.  What i n fact has  happened i s that these functions have evolved through hundreds of years gradually changing to accommodate themselves to the p o l i t i c s and d i s t r i b u t i o n of power i n each h i s t o r i c a l period. Less than a hundred years ago Bagehot argued that the selection of a Prime Minister was the most important of the duties of Parliament.^  More recently, F r i e d r i c h wrote that i t i s " l e g i s l a t i o n  that i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y looked upon as t h e i r (Parliaments ) primary T  function."^ Despite this l a t t e r viewpoint, Parliament has never had exclusive control of l e g i s l a t i o n .  For many years i t has  been the cabinet which has introduced most, although not a l l , major b i l l s into the House of Commons.  And the right to i n t r o -  duce f i n a n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n has long been the p r i v i l e g e of the executive Only.  But Parliament was able to influence the type  of l e g i s l a t i o n that was introduced.  Members were not t o t a l l y  dependent on a central party organization and therefore the government of the day was uncertain of i t s majority i n the House of Commons.  Indeed, members of the House were so independent  that Professor Corry has concluded that  "seventy-five years ago,  the cabinet was continuously dependent on the w i l l of the  7  legislature,  which might be a s s e r t e d a g a i n s t  i t a t any t i m e . "  7  W i t h the e x t e n s i o n o f the f r a n c h i s e , important changes i n the p a r t y system developed.  Strong c e n t r a l p a r t y o r g a n i z a -  t i o n s matured and g r a d u a l l y the p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s o f these o r g a n i z a t i o n s , e i t h e r members o f the c a b i n e t or the  shadow  c a b i n e t , came to dominate t h e i r s u p p o r t e r s i n the back benches o f the Commons.  Leaders o f m a j o r i t y governments, by " p u t t i n g  on" the whips, were a b l e to ensure passage o f almost a l l g o v e r n ment sponsored  legislation.  Almost s i m u l t a n e o u s l y there was a growth i n the adminis-. t r a t i v e and t e c h n o l o g i c a l complexity o f many of the f u n c t i o n s o f government.  Because o f t h i s development most  members became l e s s competent,  through t h e i r l a c k o f a  a t e d understanding o f each o f the departments, sabotage government l e g i s l a t i o n . of unsuccessful  to d e a l w i t h and  but a l s o  o f modern government d i m i n i s h e d the p o s s i b i l i t i e s undermining a government b i l l .  sophistic-  T h u s , not o n l y d i d the p r i c e  r e b e l l i o n become g r e a t ;  Canadian defence,  ever-increasing  the of  complexities effectively  C e r t a i n l y on the s u b j e c t  where matters of s i z e ,  secrecy,  of  international  c o m p l i c a t i o n and t e c h n o l o g i c a l complexity are a l l i n v o l v e d , Canadian P a r l i a m e n t has proved w i l l i n g to g i v e the c o n s i d e r a b l e independence. to i n f l u e n c e defence  On o c c a s i o n s  the  executive  P a r l i a m e n t has  attempted  l e g i s l a t i o n , but such cases have been so  8  few s i n c e  the Naval B i l l  just a l i t t l e  of 1913 t h a t i t would r e q u i r e more than  exaggeration to look upon such cases as the  ment o f the t r a d i t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i v e  fulfil-  function.  Moreover, i n the p e r i o d when P a r l i a m e n t was s t i l l to i n f l u e n c e  legislation,  from s t a t u t o r y law. delegated  p o l i c y flowed p r i m a r i l y and d i r e c t l y  I n more r e c e n t y e a r s , much p o l i c y , through  l e g i s l a t i o n and other t e c h n i q u e s ,  special legislation  able  i s made without  (although g e n e r a l l y such p o l i c y r e q u i r e s  an i n c r e a s e i n the r e q u i r e d e s t i m a t e s ) .  In defence and o t h e r *  government f u n c t i o n s , most important d e c i s i o n s the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a s p e c i f i c  are made without  bill.  Thus, the de j u r e l e g i s l a t i v e  power that i s  r e t a i n e d by P a r l i a m e n t i s not a l l - e m b r a c i n g .  still  More i m p o r t a n t ,  almost a l l the de f a c t o power t h a t remains now r e s t s w i t h the c a b i n e t and c i v i l  service.  D e s p i t e the l a c k o f agreement on the r o l e o f P a r l i a m e n t it  is possible  to i d e n t i f y  (at  least)  two d i s t i n c t i v e  duties  t h a t P a r l i a m e n t seeks to f u l f i l  ( a p a r t from the now near v e s t i g i a l  legislative  members o f the Canadian P a r l i a m e n t  function).  First,  attempt to r e p r e s e n t the i n t e r e s t s groups. functions,  o f c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s and  Second, they seek to c o n t r o l the e x e c u t i v e .  Other  such as the e d u c a t i o n a l one, can be r e l a t e d to  two t h a t I have suggested h e r e .  8  the  9  A good deal has been written on the nature of p o l i t i c a l representation.  At one extreme Rousseau has argued that represen-  t a t i o n i s the pathology of democracy and that the interests of no single man can be represented by any but himself.  Therefore,  much as i n the days of the ancient Athenians, i t i s necessary that every c i t i z e n take h i s place i n the popular assembly.^ At the other end i s Hobbes who defended h i s leviathan by stating: A multitude of men are made one person when they are by one man or person represented. . . For i t i s the unity of the representers, not the unity of the represented, that makes the person one.10 Even i n democracies there i s no unanimity on the purposes of the representation function.  In a c l a s s i c speech on the  duties of a member of Parliament, Edmund Burke t o l d h i s B r i s t o l constituents that = " . . . not l o c a l purposes, not l o c a l prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, r e s u l t i n g from the general reason of the w h o l e . A c c o r d i n g l y ,  Burke placed the national  i n t e r e s t above those of his constituents.  Nor s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  he f a i l e d to retain h i s seat at the ensuing e l e c t i o n . At the opposite end of the democratic spectrum were the delegates sent to the Canadian House of Commons by c e r t a i n agrarian constituencies during the general e l e c t i o n of 1921. Chosen as representatives of the Progressive Party, they were free to pursue neither t h e i r own concept of the national i n t e r e s t  10  nor  t h a t o f any h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d p a r l i a m e n t a r y  tion.  Rather, they were the d e l e g a t e s  i n t h e i r own enforced by  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s and  party  organiza-  o f the farmer i n t e r e s t s  s u b j e c t to the  the c o n s t i t u e n c y o r g a n i z a t i o n .  discipline  To ensure such  behaviour, many o f the western P r o g r e s s i v e s were r e q u i r e d , i n advance o f t h e i r departure t i o n with  to Ottawa, to d e p o s i t a formal  the committees o f the conventions t h a t had  resigna-  nominated  12 them.  Through the use o f t h i s c o e r c i v e r e c a l l  many P r a i r i e members o f Parliament  technique,  were f o r c e d to adopt a very  p r e c i s e view o f t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f u n c t i o n . The  examples c i t e d above p o i n t to one  o f the primary  problems f a c i n g most r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n modern democratic assemblies - r e c o n c i l i n g demands and p r e s s u r e s and  pressure  welfare. has  groups w i t h  of constituents  the n e c e s s i t y o f promoting the  Since the time of Burke, however, the p a r t y  general system  changed s u f f i c i e n t l y to make i t e a s i e r to a v o i d , at  least  p a r t i a l l y , t h i s dilemma. Candidates f o r the Canadian House of Commons run platforms  on  t h a t are prepared b y the n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s  t h a t they r e p r e s e n t .  By v o t i n g i n the Commons a c c o r d i n g  to  d e c i s i o n s o f these p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , t h e r e f o r e , members  may  the  l e g i t i m a t e l y c l a i m to be a c t i n g i n accordance w i t h the wishes o f t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s (and o t h e r i n t e r e s t groups t h a t supported  11  them).  They may a l s o argue that they are v o t i n g i n the n a t i o n a l  interest;  f o r as P r o f e s s o r Ward has p o i n t e d out: A member of P a r l i a m e n t , by f o l l o w i n g without q u e s t i o n the d i c t a t e s of h i s p a r t y l e a d e r s i s perhaps not f a r from the i d e a l of u s i n g h i s f r e e judgment i n the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . T h i s i s because the p a r t y l e a d e r s , assuming on t h e i r p a r t a modicum of enlightenment, w i l l be doing t h e i r best to p l e a s e the e l e c t o r a t e i n order to win the next e l e c t i o n . ^ Members of P a r l i a m e n t , t h e r e f o r e , w i t h few  exceptions,  of which the P r o g r e s s i v e s were the o u t s t a n d i n g example, f i r s t and foremost r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  are  of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and  t h e i r p a r t y * s concept o f the n a t i o n a l  interest.^  A c a r e f u l p e r u s a l of Commons debates,  however,  reveals  t h a t the g r e a t m a j o r i t y of members a l s o f e e l an o b l i g a t i o n r e p r e s e n t the i n t e r e s t s  of t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  and  to  constituents.  T h u s , a l t h o u g h members o f the House o f Commons i n v a r i a b l y support the n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s adopted "by t h e i r p a r t y i n caucus,  they  seldom have much to say on these n a t i o n a l i s s u e s when they are debated i n the Commons.  G e n e r a l l y , backbenchers  discuss  n a t i o n a l i s s u e s only to the degree that they a f f e c t stituencies  t h e i r con-  (or the i n t e r e s t groups that they are concerned w i t h ) .  Moreover, on numerous other o c c a s i o n s  members r i s e w i t h the  sole  purpose o f t a l k i n g about persons and problems i n t h e i r home constituency.  T h i s aspect  be d i s c u s s e d a g a i n  below.^  of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  function w i l l  12  As a product o f the Great D e p r e s s i o n and the Second World War, the e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h o f government has a c q u i r e d numerous new functions.  T h i s development has p e r m i t t e d the e x e c u t i v e to w i e l d  enormous power over the l i f e o f the i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n . To ensure that these powers a r e used e f f e c t i v e l y a c c o r d w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l r i g h t s , i t the e x e c u t i v e be s u b j e c t body or b o d i e s ;  i s necessary  that  to some form of c o n t r o l by an independent  f o r without t h i s  danger o f c a b i n e t d i c t a t o r s h i p s  t h e r e would not o n l y be  (which would under the  North America A c t be l i m i t e d to f i v e y e a r s ) b u t ,  the  British  more menacing,  the p o s s i b i l i t y of r u l e by a permanent t e c h n o c r a t i c e l i t e would be accountable n e i t h e r to P a r l i a m e n t nor to the and t h e r e f o r e answerable o n l y to the d i c t a t e s o f i t s science.  and i n  that  electorate, own con-  The j o b o f p r e v e n t i n g the growth o f b o t h these types  o f d i c t a t o r s h i p , or any combination or v a r i a t i o n of them,  falls  p r i m a r i l y to the Canadian P a r l i a m e n t . Before attempting to present a d e f i n i t i o n o f the c o n t r o l function,  I s h a l l g l a n c e b r i e f l y a t the techniques  that  have  g r a d u a l l y evolved through which Parliament attempts to c o n t r o l the e x e c u t i v e .  These i n c l u d e :  the r i g h t to debate c r i t i c a l l y  and to d i s c u s s ;  the r i g h t to ask q u e s t i o n s ;  the r i g h t  to  approve o f methods f o r r a i s i n g moneys and the p r i v i l e g e of approving e x p e n d i t u r e s ;  the use of committees.  Each of  these  13  techniques may be thought of i n two separate ways - ways t h a t a r e suggested by the two types of d i c t a t o r s h i p mentioned above. First,  each may be viewed i n r e l a t i o n to the custom of  r e g u l a r l y scheduled f r e e c o m p e t i t i v e e l e c t i o n s  i n which the  government i s f o r c e d to a p p e a l to the v o t e r s o f the country to renew i t s  mandate.  In attempting to secure r e - e l e c t i o n ,  government must be a b l e to p o i n t to the success of i t s and the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f i t s  administration.  the  policies  On the o t h e r hand,  the o t h e r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s seek to achieve power not o n l y through the appeal o f t h e i r own p l a t f o r m s and c a n d i d a t e s , but a l s o by the degree o f t h e i r success i n d i s c r e d i t i n g the work o f the past government.^"  7  I t i s w i t h t h i s f u t u r e e l e c t i o n i n mind t h a t  these four p a r l i a m e n t a r y techniques mentioned above can be understood. A strong and s k i l f u l P a r l i a m e n t i s government on the d e f e n s i v e .  a b l e to put the  I t can f o r c e the government to  e x p l a i n why i t has adopted a c e r t a i n p o l i c y and why that p o l i c y is  s u p e r i o r to a l l o t h e r s .  When t h e r e are a l t e r n a t e  policies  t h a t have some e l e c t o r a l a p p e a l , P a r l i a m e n t can p r e s e n t these to the p e o p l e .  By c l o s e l y examining a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r a c t i c e s and  s c r u t i n i z i n g e x p e n d i t u r e s , P a r l i a m e n t does have i n i t s  possession  techniques whereby i t can b r i n g to the a t t e n t i o n of the v o t e r s some o f the inadequacies o f the  executive.  14  C o n t r o l t h e r e f o r e may be d e f i n e d as the power o f P a r l i a m e n t to i n f l u e n c e c a b i n e t p o l i c y and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n so i t w i l l remain b r o a d l y a c c e p t a b l e to a m a j o r i t y of the The c a b i n e t f e a r s the debates,  electorate  c r i t i c i s m s , and i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  o f P a r l i a m e n t o n l y to the extent t h a t they may weaken i t s e l e c t o r a l chances.  that  I f the government i s c o n f i d e n t of  future  its  a b i l i t y to secure r e - e l e c t i o n r e g a r d l e s s of p a r l i a m e n t a r y c r i t i c i s m s , i t may then be assumed t h a t the use o f the techniques o f c o n t r o l w i l l p r o v i d e P a r l i a m e n t w i t h l i t t l e power.  In Canadian  f e d e r a l p o l i t i c s , however, where a ten per cent i n c r e a s e i n the p o p u l a r v o t e o f the o f f i c i a l  o p p o s i t i o n , a t the expense o f  p a r t y i n power, i s g e n e r a l l y s u f f i c i e n t  the  to throw out the g o v e r n -  ment, such confidence can seldom be a b s o l u t e (as i t a p p a r e n t l y tends to be i n some o f the provinces)."  The amount o f power  t h a t P a r l i a m e n t i s a b l e to w i e l d w i l l v a r y w i t h a number o f f a c t o r s i n c l u d i n g the s k i l l w i t h which the techniques of c o n t r o l are used and the p r o s p e c t s o f each p a r t y , as viewed by t h a t p a r t y a t the forthcoming e l e c t i o n . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n of c o n t r o l i s  s u i t a b l e o n l y to  the  degree, however, that the p o l i t i c a l e x e c u t i v e i s a b l e to dominate the v a s t bureaucracy under i t .  And t h e r e i s reason to  t h a t t h i s i s not always the c a s e . terms the problem i s  1 9  Stated i n i t s  believe  simplest  t h a t i t i s necessary to ensure that  the  15  bureaucracy i s  doing i t s  most, a t a l l t i m e s ,  to promote the ends  o f government p o l i c y w h i l e a t the same time t a k i n g care to the r i g h t s t r a d i t i o n a l to the l i b e r a l democratic s t a t e . o f the w e l l - e n t r e n c h e d there i s  preserve Because  concept o f m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  the danger that i n s t e a d of l o o k i n g to uncover mal-  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and i l l e g a l a r b i t r a r y b u r e a u c r a t i c a c t i v i t y , m i n i s t e r w i l l i n s t e a d seek to c o n c e a l i t .  And i f t h i s i d e a  belittled,  still  as perhaps i t might b e ,  there i s  p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t because o f t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e , and s e c u r i t y o f t e n u r e ,  e x e c u t i v e w i l l be i n s u f f i c i e n t a r y democracy.  It  knowledge w i l l be a b l e  therefore  the f u t u r e o f p a r l i a m e n t to d e f i n e c o n t r o l i n  a second way i n o r d e r to supplement the f i r s t not to r e p l a c e  special  Thus c o n t r o l of the p o l i t i c a l  to guarantee  i s necessary  is  the v e r y r e a l  s e n i o r departmental o f f i c i a l s  to dominate t h e i r p o l i t i c a l master.  the  definition  although  it.  Control, in this  second sense, i s  d e f i n e d as the power  o f P a r l i a m e n t to ensure that the permanent bureaucracy (the s e r v i c e and armed f o r c e s )  is  doing i t s  maximum to achieve  the  ends of government p o l i c y w h i l e a t the same time t a k i n g c a r e p r e s e r v e the r i g h t s t r a d i t i o n a l to the l i b e r a l democratic Throughout t h i s  thesis therefore,  w i l l be used f o r the f i r s t c o n t r o l " f o r the  second.  civil  to  state.  the term " p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l "  type o f c o n t r o l and " b u r e a u c r a t i c  16  Members of P a r l i a m e n t thus have the duty to r e p r e s e n t and the duty to c o n t r o l .  As r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  almost i n v a r i a b l y f o l l o w the p o l i c i e s  of p a r t i e s  they  l a i d down by t h e i r  leaders.  Whatever i n f l u e n c e backbenchers do have i s e x e r t e d behind c l o s e d doors and not s u b j e c t to examination by o u t s i d e r s .  This  aspect  of the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f u n c t i o n , backbench i n f l u e n c e i n c a u c u s , is  t h e r e f o r e not i n v e s t i g a t e d i n t h i s  thesis.  As a l r e a d y seen, however, members a l s o r e p r e s e n t c o n stituencies,  sectional interests  and o t h e r g r o u p i n g s .  The  m o t i v a t i o n f o r e x e c u t i n g t h i s f u n c t i o n undoubtedly stems at  least  i n p a r t from the d e s i r e o f members to secure r e - e l e c t i o n .  From  one viewpoint the impact o f the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o"f a Commons member may be to secure r e d r e s s f o r an i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n o r win favours f o r a s p e c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . attempt i s  i t is  the  to i n f l u e n c e the p e r s o n n e l o f the department d e a l i n g  w i t h the p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . exercise  From a n o t h e r , however,  Thus from t h i s  second v i e w p o i n t ,  the  o f the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f u n c t i o n i s a form of c o n t r o l and  from t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f u n c t i o n w i l l  be viewed below. C o n t r o l o f the e x e c u t i v e  is  thus the most  significant  of the f u n c t i o n s that the P a r l i a m e n t s o f today seek to It  is  t r u e t h a t t h e r e are o t h e r s ,  fulfil.  each w i t h v a r y i n g amounts of  importance, b u t each o f those i s o f f a r l e s s s i g n i f i c a n c e than  17  the c o n t r o l one.  I t w i l l be the c o n t r o l f u n c t i o n t h a t i s examined  i n the pages to f o l l o w . I have a l r e a d y p o i n t e d out t h a t i t i s the purpose o f t h i s t h e s i s to i n v e s t i g a t e the degree to which the Canadian Parliament has been a b l e to c o n t r o l defence p o l i c y , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and expenditures s i n c e World War  Two.  The  s e v e r a l q u a l i t i e s which  are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the defence o r g a n i z a t i o n - s i z e ,  technical  complexity, monopoly o f t r a i n e d p e r s o n n e l , dependence on  foreign  d e c i s i o n s , s e c r e c y , and the n e c e s s i t y o f a s t r o n g f l e x i b l e e x e c u t i v e - i t no doubt has a l r e a d y been observed, make c o n t r o l of  defence a more d i f f i c u l t j o b than c o n t r o l o f the other f u n c t i o n s  of  government. But these s p e c i a l q u a l i t i e s have not been the o n l y  problem t h a t has f a c e d the Canadian P a r l i a m e n t .  I t must a l s o  be remembered t h a t " b i g defence" i s a p o s t - i 9 4 5 phenomenon i n Canada.  Before then t h e r e was  l i t t l e concern w i t h s e c u r i t y i n  peacetime and not s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e r e f o r e , i t was s u b j e c t of p a r l i a m e n t a r y i n q u i r y .  seldom the  I n coping w i t h the  defence  programme, t h e r e f o r e , the post-war P a r l i a m e n t s were d e a l i n g w i t h something new  to them.  Thus, i n a d d i t i o n to a l l i t s o t h e r  difficulties  the Canadian P a r l i a m e n t was  dealing with  defence.  very inexperienced i n  18 ORGANIZATION AND METHOD  In  the remainder  o f t h i s chapter I s h a l l d e a l f i r s t  the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the t h e s i s and second w i t h the c r i t e r i a for  evaluating c r i t i c a l  debate as a technique o f c o n t r o l .  with  used The  Senate, f o r reasons t h a t w i l l be made c l e a r i n the chapter that has been devoted to i t , i s n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l as a c o n t r o l body.  Hence the d i s c u s s i o n o f methodology and c r i t e r i a  that  f o l l o w s , although a p p l i c a b l e to the Senate, i s p r i m a r i l y  con-  cerned w i t h the House o f Commons. As mentioned e a r l i e r , t h e r e a r e f o u r p r i n c i p a l through which the Commons attempts  techniques  to perform i t s c o n t r o l  function.  The next seven chapters w i l l c o n s i d e r s u c c e s s i v e l y the technique of  critical  debate  ( t h r e e c h a p t e r s ) , the f i n a n c i a l and committee  c o n t r o l ( t h r e e c h a p t e r s ) and the q u e s t i o n p e r i o d (one c h a p t e r ) . The r o l e o f the Senate w i l l be d e a l t w i t h i n chapter n i n e . l a s t chapter w i l l d e a l w i t h the r e s u l t s o f the e n t i r e  The  investigation,  c o n c l u s i o n s and suggestions f o r improvement. In  the next t h r e e c h a p t e r s , c r i t i c a l  debate, as a  technique to c o n t r o l the e x e c u t i v e , w i l l be i n v e s t i g a t e d .  Before  proceeding t o the s u b s t a n t i v e d i s c u s s i o n , however, i t i s f i r s t n e c e s s a r y t o d e a l w i t h some p r e l i m i n a r y f a c t s about  defence  debates  and then w i t h the procedures used i n the a n a l y s i s . A l t h o u g h the government o f the day, f o r t h e most p a r t ,  19  i s a b l e to c o n t r o l the time o f the House, o p p o r t u n i t i e s a r e prov i d e d f o r members whereby they can debate defence p o l i c y and administration.  Amongst these a r e the Address i n r e p l y to the  Speech from the Throne, the motion to e n t e r Supply, the f i r s t item o f Supply, the motion to r e f e r the e s t i m a t e s o f the Department o f E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s to the Standing Committee on E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f defence l e g i s l a t i o n , the f i r s t item i n Supply f o r Defence P r o d u c t i o n , motions to adjourn to d i s c u s s a matter o f urgent p u b l i c importance, the motion to e n t e r Committee of Ways and Means and the Budget  Debate.  The l a s t f o u r o f these have been o f n e g l i g i b l e in  the years under study.  importance  The motion to e n t e r Ways and Means was  never used as an o p p o r t u n i t y to debate defence.  Not once,  since  1945, has t h e r e been a f u l l - s c a l e d i s c u s s i o n o f defence d u r i n g the  Budget Debate, a l t h o u g h o c c a s i o n a l l y an important statement  i s made a t t h i s t i m e . ^  Almost as i n s i g n i f i c a n t has been the  motion to adjourn to d i s c u s s a " d e f i n i t e matter o f urgent p u b l i c importance". War  Only seven times s i n c e the end o f the Second World  have such motions  twice d e b a t e d .  2 1  ( r e defence) been put to the Commons - o n l y  As w i l l be seen l a t e r i n more d e t a i l , t h e r e  a l s o has been s u r p r i s i n g l y l i t t l e debate i n Supply f o r Defence Production. The Address p r o v i d e s members w i t h an e x c e l l e n t  20  opportunity  t o d i s c u s s almost any t o p i c t h a t they wish.  however, the remarks o f the o p p o s i t i o n frontbenchers  Usually,  are d e t e r -  mined by the content o f the Throne Speech i t s e l f , o r by conspicuous omissions from i t , so t h a t i t i s during years o f defence i n n o v a t i o n ,  extreme c r i s i s , war o r scandal  has been o f major concern d u r i n g f o u r occasions  the Address.  t h a t defence  Thus, on o n l y  s i n c e 1945 were important debates on defence h e l d  22  at  this  time. Debates on defence l e g i s l a t i o n g e n e r a l l y f a l l i n t o  categories.  First,  the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f defence l e g i s l a t i o n i s  o f t e n used as an o p p o r t u n i t y or a p a r t i c u l a r aspect bill.  three  to debate defence p o l i c y  o f i t , without r e g a r d  generally  to the nature o f the  O c c a s i o n a l l y , there a r e p r o t r a c t e d debates, a t the r e s o l u -  t i o n stage o r on second r e a d i n g , on major p o l i c y o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e considerations  a r i s i n g out o f the terms o f the b i l l .  example o f t h i s was the Defence P r o d u c t i o n  An e x c e l l e n t  A c t o f 1953.  Finally,  q u i t e o f t e n d i s c u s s i o n i s l i m i t e d to the d e t a i l s o f the l e g i s l a t i o n . More than 90% o f defence d i s c u s s i o n ( e x c l u d i n g a f f a i r s ) occurred itself. "* 2  external  on the motion to enter Supply, o r during  I t was on those o c c a s i o n s  Supply  that defence r e c e i v e d i t s  most thorough a i r i n g s f o r b e f o r e  d e a l i n g w i t h the estimates and  t h e i r d e t a i l s , i t was (and s t i l l  i s ) customary f o r frontbenchers  to review p o l i c y and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e developments and f o r some  21 backbenchers to d i s c u s s  the o r g a n i z a t i o n and expenditures o f  defence department as i t a f f e c t e d  t h e i r own c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .  One o t h e r p o i n t i s worth n o t i n g . 1948,  the  On an average,  since  some 50.7% of the budgetary estimates have been on defence.  I n o t h e r words more o f our budgetary estimates have been f o r than f o r a l l o t h e r departments combined.  Despite t h i s ,  defence  only  s i x t e e n per cent o f the time i n Supply has been on defence and defence p r o d u c t i o n . o f the e s t i m a t e s .  The o t h e r 84% has been on the remaining h a l f The f i g u r e s  seem to suggest, t h e r e f o r e ,  that  the House s c r u t i n i z e d defence expenditures l e s s thoroughly than i t d i d the other expenditures of the government.  More w i l l be s a i d 24  about the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s f a c t towards the end of the The r e s t of the chapter d e a l s w i t h the c r i t e r i a have been s e l e c t e d  thesis. that  to e v a l u a t e the e f f e c t i v e n e s s w i t h which the  technique of c r i t i c a l debate has been used to c o n t r o l the  executive.  I n attempting to s e l e c t c r i t e r i a two problems i n p a r t i c u l a r have t r o u b l e d the  investigator.  First,  on matters of broad p o l i c y , the government w i l l  seldom, d i s c a r d o r modify t h e i r p l a n s r e g a r d l e s s o f the  soundness  of opposition c r i t i c i s m .  British  J e n n i n g s , i n w r i t i n g on the  P a r l i a m e n t , has argued t h a t "no matter how g r e a t the Government's effective  m a j o r i t y , i t can be compelled to g i v e way to a combina-  t i o n of c r i t i c i s m i n the House, complaints i n the l o b b i e s , and  22  agitation o u t s i d e . I n t h i s i s true.  On  Canada, t h e r e i s l i t t l e  evidence that  t h i s p o i n t P r o f e s s o r Dawson has  written:  The c a b i n e t must. . . a v o i d even the appearance o f defeat or of weakness. . „ . . C r i t i c i s m by the O p p o s i t i o n c a s t s i t s shadow b e f o r e i t invades the Cabinet meeting and the Government caucus; i t i s most i n f l u e n t i a l before i t i s formally voiced. How w i l l the O p p o s i t i o n a t t a c k t h i s p r o j e c t ? . . . What w i l l the farmers t h i n k o f i t ? How w i l l i t a f f e c t the Government v o t e i n O n t a r i o ? . . . These w i l l be a n t i c i p a t e d as f a r as p o s s i b l e when the measure i s being d r a f t e d , and the C a b i n e t w i l l then defend i t a r d e n t l y and r e f u s e to accept amendments o f any consequences. P r o f e s s o r Corry  apparently  agrees, p o i n t i n g out t h a t : "One  s e r v i c e o f the o p p o s i t i o n l i e s not  great  i n i t s spoken c r i t i c i s m s ,  but  27 i n the mere f a c e of b e i n g  there."  '  Thus, i t i s not p o s s i b l e to  measure c o n t r o l s o l e l y by measuring the impact o f c r i t i c i s m s and  opposition  a l t e r n a t i v e s on government p o l i c y f o r i t i s o n l y  the r a r e s t of o c c a s i o n s  on  t h a t suggestions w i l l be openly accepted.  Much more o f t e n , they w i l l be a n t i c i p a t e d and  discounted  i n advance.  A second d i f f i c u l t y i n measuring the c o n t r o l f u n c t i o n i s t h a t government backbench i n f l u e n c e i s l a r g e l y f e l t i n p a r t y and not i n the p u b l i c debates of the House.  caucus  Hence, a l t h o u g h govern-  ment backbenchers do a s s i s t the House i n c a r r y i n g out the c o n t r o l f u n c t i o n , t h i s i s done behind c l o s e d doors and not in this analysis. Four c r i t e r i a have been used to evaluate  e a s i l y measured the  skill  w i t h which the House employs the technique o f c r i t i c a l debate to  23  c o n t r o l executive  policy.  D e s p i t e the above q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  the a b i l i t y to cause  withdrawal o r m o d i f i c a t i o n o f government p o l i c y has to be used as the f i r s t standard f o r e v a l u a t i n g the a b i l i t y of the House to c o n t r o l the  executive.  The second c r i t e r i o n t h a t I have used i s o f defence First,  debate as judged by two separate  the q u a l i t y  considerations.  does the House f u l l y understand and debate the r e a s o n i n g  behind the d e c i s i o n ^  Second, does the House e f f e c t i v e l y  the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f such p o l i c y  debate  decision?  T h i s second c r i t e r i o n r e q u i r e s some e x p l a n a t i o n .  I  have p o i n t e d out above t h a t i n making p o l i c y , the government w i l l a n t i c i p a t e the q u a l i t y and n a t u r e o f o p p o s i t i o n c r i t i c i s m s , and the appeal that these c r i t i c i s m s w i l l have f o r the  electorate.  In so d o i n g , the government may, although not n e c e s s a r i l y , or a l t e r i t s  modify  o r i g i n a l or p r e f e r r e d p l a n s i n favour of those t h a t  w i l l a v o i d a n t a g o n i z i n g the v o t e r s .  The extent to which the  government i s w i l l i n g to "pre-modify" i t s  p l a n s t h e r e f o r e may  depend i n p a r t upon the degree to which i t  f e a r s the a b i l i t y o f  the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s to d i s c r e d i t i t s  policies  the v o t e r s .  a p t i t u d e i n debating  defence,  I f the House shows l i t t l e  the government w i l l f e e l  i n the eyes o f  f r e e to i g n o r e the p o t e n t i a l  impact of the Commons debates on the v o t e r .  On the other hand,  24  if  the more r e c e n t debates have shown t h a t the House i s a b l e  to  debate i n t e l l i g e n t l y the advantages and disadvantages of a p a r t i c u l a r defence p o l i c y , and a t t r a c t the i n t e r e s t of electorate,  the  there seems l i t t l e doubt but that the government w i l l  f e e l r e s t r a i n e d by the Commons.  (The a c t u a l amount o f r e s t r a i n t  w i l l depend, i n p a r t , on the extent  to  which the c a b i n e t  that the c r i t i c i s m s are h u r t i n g i t s  future election  The t h i r d c r i t e r i o n t h a t has been used i s  fears  chances). the a b i l i t y  to form r a t i o n a l and coherent a l t e r n a t i v e s to government p o l i c y . I am a r g u i n g here t h a t o p p o s i n g , without p r e s e n t i n g some alternati v e s , i s o n l y h a l f o f the task of the o p p o s i t i o n .  It is  useful  f o r the House (and i n t h i s t h e s i s t h i s i n v a r i a b l y means the opposition parties)  to o f f e r a t l e a s t a g e n e r a l programme f o r  t h a t which i t would wipe o u t . Finally,  and r e l a t e d to the above c r i t e r i a ,  is  the  a b i l i t y o f the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s to take and h o l d the i n i t i a t i v e i n debate.  I f the House i s a b l e to do t h i s i t can make c e r t a i n  t h a t i t goes i n t o d e t a i l on the s u b j e c t s i n which i t interested.  i s most  On the o t h e r hand the a b i l i t y o f the government  to s i d e - t r a c k debate away from the c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s to p e r i p h e r a l ones, i s a good s i g n t h a t the House i s  the  ineffectively  28 performing i t s  duties.  But debate on defence does not d e a l w i t h p o l i c y a l o n e .  25 I t i s a l s o concerned w i t h the whole spectrum o f the p o l i c y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n continuum. Between the two extremes on the continuum l i e a whole range o f i s s u e s t h a t cannot simply be c a l l e d p o l i c y o r a d m i n i s t r a tion.  I t i s r e l a t i v e l y c l e a r t h a t the d e c i s i o n to j o i n N.A.T.O.  was a p o l i c y one.  S i m i l a r l y the d e c i s i o n to a l t e r the d i v i s i o n  of labour i n the k i t c h e n s o f Camp Petawawa would be an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e one.  But what o f the numerous a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c i s i o n s  with p o l i t i c a l repercussions,  Thus the d e c i s i o n s to move  P r a i r i e Command Headquarters from C a l g a r y  to Edmonton, to c o n s t r u c t  f r i g a t e s i n Canada t h a t c o u l d be purchased l e s s e x p e n s i v e l y i n the U n i t e d Kingdom, and the d e c i s i o n to scrap the Arrow w e r e , a l l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ones w i t h v a r y i n g amounts o f p o l i t i c a l  content.  Indeed, even such a v i t a l d e c i s i o n as the one on n u c l e a r weapons, i f newspaper r e p o r t s a r e c o r r e c t , w i l l be based a t l e a s t i f not wholly,  partially  on s t r a t e g i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , d e s p i t e i t s enormous  p o l i t i c a l significance. I t i s c l e a r t h e r e f o r e t h a t no simple t i o n dichotomy e x i s t s .  p o l i c y - administra-  I t might be p o s s i b l e to develop a theory  w i t h x c a t e g o r i e s between the two extremes on the continuum and i n v e s t i g a t e the r o l e t h a t Parliament the c a t e g o r i e s .  plays i n handling  each o f  But u n l e s s an i n f i n i t e number o f c a t e g o r i e s  were e s t a b l i s h e d , i t would be i m p o s s i b l e  to s e l e c t a s u f f i c i e n t  26 number to a c h i e v e a h i g h degree o f accuracy i n the a n a l y s i s . Because the w r i t e r f e e l s t h a t there i s l i t t l e to gained i n accuracy by breaking seven c a t e g o r i e s , he has but  two.  Since  up  decided  be  the continuum i n t o s i x or to d i v i d e a l l d e c i s i o n s i n t o  the d i v i s i o n i s being used o n l y to e s t a b l i s h an  a n a l y t i c a l framework, the  l a c k of p r e c i s i o n w i l l not s e r i o u s l y  damage the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The and  method o f d i v i d i n g what I l o o s e l y r e f e r to as p o l i c y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n one  from the other  of p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n .  i s to s e t up  the  criterion  Every s i n g l e d e c i s i o n or a c t i o n which  i n i t s e l f i s s u f f i c i e n t l y important to damage s e r i o u s l y the e l e c t o r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f the government I r e f e r to as p o l i c y . Decisions  i n t h i s category would i n c l u d e broad p o l i c y , important  s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n s , d e c i s i o n s i n v o l v i n g l a r g e amounts of money and  important a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s .  hand, d e c i s i o n s and  On  the  a c t i o n s which i n themselves do not  other  appear  s u f f i c i e n t l y important to damage the e l e c t o r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f the government I r e f e r to as a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . mean t h a t these cannot have p o l i t i c a l  T h i s does not  significance for  the  cumulative p o l i t i c a l impact o f s e v e r a l of these might be greater  than any  single policy decision.  would be h a r d l y n o t i c e a b l e .  But  far  taken alone,  Such a c r i t e r i o n , o f course,  the disadvantage o f l e a v i n g the author w i t h the problem of  they has  27  determining which d e c i s i o n s and a c t i o n s a r e i n themselves  suffi-  c i e n t l y important t o damage s e r i o u s l y the e l e c t o r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f the government.  Despite  the s u b j e c t i v i t y i n v o l v e d here, the  c r i t e r i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t l y u s e f u l , I b e l i e v e , to a l l o w f o r a meaningful a n a l y s i s . Because o f the d e f i n i t i o n t h a t has been a s c r i b e d t o administration,  the c r i t e r i a f o r e v a l u a t i n g p a r l i a m e n t a r y  i n t h i s range o f e x e c u t i v e  d e c i s i o n and a c t i o n a r e n o t a l l s i m i l a r  to those f o r p o l i c y c o n t r o l . i s l e s s important. aptitude  The a b i l i t y  to develop a l t e r n a t i v e s  Rather, the standards that a r e used  i n extracting information;  investigated;  the g e n e r a l  uncover m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  control  include  the number o f problems  q u a l i t y o f debate;  and the a b i l i t y to  i n c l u d i n g the s k i l l w i t h which such  r e v e l a t i o n s a r e e x p l o i t e d as i n d i c a t e d b o t h by m o d i f i c a t i o n s i n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e procedure and a l s o p r o f i c i e n c y i n winning  headlines.  I t has o f t e n been argued t h a t the many years the Conservative  P a r t y was out o f o f f i c e l e f t i t s members without any  r e a l i s t i c concept o f how government operates and hence handicapped them i n f u l f i l l i n g  the r o l e o f the o p p o s i t i o n .  And i t i s t r u e  that a f t e r 1945 there were o n l y e l e v e n C o n s e r v a t i v e s i n the House b e f o r e  who had been  1935 and o n l y two o f these had been  cabinet  m i n i s t e r s , a l t h o u g h i t i s o f some i n t e r e s t to note that one had been a M i n i s t e r o f N a t i o n a l D e f e n c e .  2 9  I f the handicap was as  28  s e r i o u s as some have suggested,  i t might be expected t h a t  the  r e c o r d of the House o f Commons s i n c e 1957 would be c o n s i d e r a b l y different thesis,  from t h a t of the twelve years p r e v i o u s .  f o r each of the techniques o f c o n t r o l ,  1957-62 p e r i o d s w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d s e p a r a t e l y ,  To t e s t  this  the 1945-57 and so as to  facilitate  comparison. In the next t h r e e chapters I w i l l d e a l w i t h the technique o f c r i t i c a l debate.  The f i r s t w i l l cover c o n t r o l of  defence  p o l i c y under the L i b e r a l government and the second, c o n t r o l o f Liberal administration.  The t h i r d (chapter f o u r ) d e a l s w i t h  House of Commons c o n t r o l of p o l i c y and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s i n c e  1957.  CHAPTER I I CONTROL OF DEFENCE POLICY, 1945 - 1957: THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE  In  t h i s chapter I have examined the technique o f c r i t i c a l  debate as i t was used by members o f the House o f Commons i n attempting  to c o n t r o l defence p o l i c y .  Rather than i n q u i r i n g  i n t o the degree o f Commons i n f l u e n c e over each p o l i c y  briefly decision  made d u r i n g these years I have decided to examine a few i n d e t a i l . To b e g i n w i t h , however, i t must be understood  that  t h e r e has been almost complete unanimity i n Canada on the b a s i c g o a l o f the defence organization.^" t a i n the t e r r i t o r i a l  T h i s g o a l has been to main-  i n t e g r i t y and p h y s i c a l s e c u r i t y o f Canada by  opposing Communist a g g r e s s i o n .  And t h i s b a s i c agreement on  defence has been very n e c e s s a r y as i t i s i n any democracy; f o r i f t h e r e were sharp d i f f e r e n c e s on the fundamental  ends, the  framework o f our democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s would be menaced dangerously. To implement t h i s b a s i c g o a l , s e v e r a l key d e c i s i o n s were made d u r i n g the p e r i o d .  These I r e f e r to as broad p o l i c y .  30  Examples i n c l u d e the J o i n t D e c l a r a t i o n o f February 12, 1947 , 2  and  the formation  o f N.A.T.O.  To a c h i e v e the ends o f broad  p o l i c y , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n s a r e r e q u i r e d . Some o f these have v i r t u a l l y no p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . however, most c e r t a i n l y do.  Others,  I n the e a r l y post-war years the  government embarked upon a p o l i c y o f r e p a t r i a t i o n and d e m o b i l i z a tion.  The method and r e g u l a t i o n s employed i n implementing the  programme a f f e c t e d d i r e c t l y hundreds o f thousands o f servicemen and  their families.  pitfal-ls.  As such i t was a problem w i t h many p o l i t i c a l  I t i s t h i s type o f d e c i s i o n that I r e f e r to as adminis-  trative policy.  Ones o f s i m i l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e b u t o f a s t r a t e g i c  n a t u r e I have l a b e l l e d s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y . Two b a s i c c r i t e r i a have been used i n s e l e c t i n g the case s t u d i e s f o r t h i s chapter.  F i r s t because o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s  3 i n v o l v e d i n s e p a r a t i n g p o l i c y from a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d e c i s i o n s which were o f such g r e a t but  little  , I have s e l e c t e d  importance that there c o u l d be  doubt t h a t they f a l l v e r y c l o s e t o the p o l i c y end o f  the p o l i c y - a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  spectrum.  Second, I have attempted  to use a b a l a n c e d sampling by examining a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o l i c y and On has  s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s as w e l l as those on broad p o l i c y . t h i s b a s i s , House o f Commons c o n t r o l over f i v e key d e c i s i o n s been i n v e s t i g a t e d .  To c l a r i f y the purpose here i t should  perhaps be added t h a t i n the context  o f t h i s chapter a l o n e , the  31  word " i n f l u e n c e " might seem more d e s i r a b l e than " c o n t r o l " , but the l i g h t o f the d e f i n i t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l g i v e n and  i t was  defined  in  earlier,  i n terms of i n f l u e n c e ^ , the author sees no  reason to succumb to t h i s  temptation.  F i n a l l y , toward the end  o f the c h a p t e r , a few  pages w i l l  be devoted to the House as policy-maker.  DECISION TO DEMOBILIZE AND  The  REPATRIATE  d e c i s i o n to embark upon a p o l i c y of  r e p a t r i a t i o n and  demobilization  was  the most important defence  d e c i s i o n o f the e a r l y post-war years. several considerations peaceful  large-scale  I t was  influenced  by  i n c l u d i n g the t o t a l c o l l a p s e o f the enemy,  r e l a t i o n s and wartime c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h the S o v i e t U n i o n ,  c o n f i d e n c e i n the machinery of the U n i t e d monopoly of atomic weapons.  Nations and  Perhaps more important than a l l these,  the p r e s s u r e of domestic p o l i t i c s c o n t r i b u t e d appeared to be an i r r e s i s t i b l e  on  such a v a s t  s c a l e , was  w i t h i n s e v e r a l months the S o v i e t Union had w i t h the western w o r l d , and  the U n i t e d  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace, was  proving  hoped f o r .  Thus, a t l e a s t two  to what a t the  time  decision.  W i t h the advantage o f h i n d s i g h t demobilization,  the American  i t can now  be  seen t h a t  a serious error f o r ceased  cooperating  N a t i o n s , as a guarantor  l e s s e f f e c t i v e than had  of the premises t h a t the  been  decision  32  had been based upon proved What was decision?  Had  to be  ill-considered.  the r o l e o f the House o f Commons i n t h i s  i t c a u t i o n e d a g a i n s t such a step?  the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f such a step?  vital  D i d i t debate  D i d i t propose any  alternatives?  I s h a l l look f i r s t a t the r e a c t i o n of the o f f i c i a l o p p o s i t i o n , the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y . had  The  Conservatives  the o p p o r t u n i t y to debate d e m o b i l i z a t i o n d u r i n g the  Address,  the debates on post-war problems t h a t were g e n e r a l l y l a b e l l e d D e m o b i l i z a t i o n , and a g a i n i n Supply. T h e i r stand was  But they d i d not do  so.  v i r t u a l l y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h a t of the  L i b e r a l government.  There was  on which government p o l i c y was spokesmen concern  no c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f the premises based.  Nor  themselves w i t h the impact  on f u t u r e s e c u r i t y .  d i d the  Conservative  of demobilization  I f , i n a thorough debate, C o n s e r v a t i v e  members had e x p l a i n e d t h e i r reasons  f o r a c c e p t i n g t h i s major  d e c i s i o n , by c a r e f u l l y d i s s e c t i n g b o t h i t s premises and i m p l i c a t i o n s , i t c o u l d be argued t h a t these p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s , u n l i k e the w r i t e r , l a c k e d the advantage o f h i n d s i g h t , and l i g h t of the domestic c o u l d be expected.  t h a t i n the  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment, n o t h i n g more But  t h i s was  time d i d C o n s e r v a t i v e c r i t i c s  not what happened f o r a t no  ever come to g r i p s w i t h the fundamen-  t a l importance of the steps t h a t had been taken. The  c o n t r i b u t i o n of the C o o p e r a t i v e Commonwealth  33  Federation  was  similar.  Urging  t h a t the r e a l i t i e s of the  world  s i t u a t i o n be c a r e f u l l y i n v e s t i g a t e d , the l e a d e r o f that p a r t y , Mr.  C o l d w e l l , r e j e c t e d h i s p a r t y ' s i s o l a t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s o f the  i n t e r - w a r years.  Indeed, c i t i n g the dangers of modern warfare,  he urged t h a t u n t i l the U n i t e d Nations was i t s r o l e under A r t i c l e 43  ready  to a s s i g n Canada  of the c h a r t e r t h a t "we  p o l i c y to what t h i s house, t h i s government and  have to gear our  t h i s country b e l i e v e  to be i n the b e s t i n t e r e s t a t the p r e s e n t time."** these brave words, n e i t h e r Mr. to debate c r i t i c a l l y Mr.  But  despite  C o l d w e l l nor h i s c o l l e a g u e s attempted  the d e c i s i o n to d e m o b i l i z e .  Instead,  C o l d w e l l went on from h i s i n t e r e s t i n g remarks to urge t h a t the  Canadian government spend more money to promote s o c i a l and progress  around the world as the b e s t method of promoting  n a t i o n a l peace.^  Thus, much l i k e the P r o g r e s s i v e  economic inter-  Conservatives,  the C.C.F. c o n t r i b u t e d n o t h i n g c o n s t r u c t i v e i n the debate on d e c i s i o n to  the  demobilize.  Only the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y h i n t e d a t the o f dangers i n the f u t u r e .  The  possibility  argument o f i t s members, seldom  comprehensive, and not a t a l l based on a r a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s of  the  f o r c e s a t work i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , d i d n e v e r t h e l e s s c a u t i o n a g a i n s t excess optimism. U n i t e d Nations  In p a r t i c u l a r , they were s u s p i c i o u s o f  and i t s u t i l i t y i n p r e s e r v i n g peace.  t h i n k i n g about the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , Mr.  the  Wishful  Blackmore reminded  34 the House, should not permit us to "forget League of N a t i o n s .  .  the l e s s o n o f  the  . I suggest" he s a i d , "that i f we t r u s t  too  f a r i n the s e c u r i t y c o u n c i l we s h a l l p r o b a b l y f i n d i t weighed i n Q  the balance and found w a n t i n g , j u s t when we need  it."  The S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y went f u r t h e r than mere destructive c r i t i c i s m . Nations, a c o l l e c t i v e  I t urged t h a t i n s t e a d o f the U n i t e d s e c u r i t y p o l i c y be c e n t r e d around a v i g o r o u s  9 and strengthened Commonwealth. was made of the S o v i e t U n i o n , collective  A l t h o u g h no s p e c i f i c  the emphasis on the n e c e s s i t y of  s e c u r i t y i n d i c a t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e s c e p t i c i s m about  f u t u r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l atmosphere. and country about i t s  demobilization.  the  Having warned the government  unwarranted optimism i t  seemed l o g i c a l  S o c i a l C r e d i t o r s might c a u t i o n the government a g a i n s t  resistance  mention  too  that  rapid  Yet the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y o f f e r e d no d i r e c t  to d e m o b i l i z a t i o n , f o r c e d no debate on the i m p l i c a t i o n s  of d e m o b i l i z a t i o n , and i n i t s  time-honoured way continued to h i n t  a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n s p i r a c i e s but o f f e r e d no evidence  to  substan-  t i a t e such a c c u s a t i o n s . The post-war d e c i s i o n to d e m o b i l i z e was one o f the most s i g n i f i c a n t of a l l defence  decisions  ever taken i n Canada.  Its  importance c e r t a i n l y m e r i t e d a thorough i n v e s t i g a t i o n by the Canadian House of Commons.  Although i t  is possible  to argue  t h a t the circumstances a t the time made such a step almost  .  35,  o b l i g a t o r y f o r the government, i t s u r e l y should not have been accepted without  q u e s t i o n by the House.  The Commons should have  f o r c e d a c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the background and premises t o the d e c i s i o n , and even i f a l l the p a r t i e s were i n s u b s t a n t i a l agreement w i t h the government, they should n e v e r t h e l e s s have d i s c u s s e d the impact of Canadian s e c u r i t y . these.  t h a t such an a c t i o n would have on the f u t u r e But the members o f the House d i d none o f  They i n no way caused  q u a l i t y o f debate was poor.  any m o d i f i c a t i o n s i n p o l i c y .  The  Indeed, the government e x e r c i s e d  such g r e a t c o n t r o l over Parliament t h a t t h e r e never was a debate on the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the d e c i s i o n t o d e m o b i l i z e .  THE  NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY  On A p r i l 4, 1949, Canada and e i g h t other western democracies signed the North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y . it  By a r t i c l e 5 o f  t h e s i g n a t o r i e s pledged: An armed a t t a c k a g a i n s t one o r more o f them i n Europe o r North America s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d an a t t a c k a g a i n s t them a l l ; and consequently they agree t h a t , i f such an a t t a c k o c c u r s , each of them, i n e x e r c i s e o f the r i g h t o f i n d i v i d u a l or c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - d e f e n c e r e c o g n i z e d by A r t i c l e 51 o f the C h a r t e r o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , w i l l a s s i s t the p a r t y o r p a r t i e s so a t t a c k e d by t a k i n g f o r t h w i t h , i n d i v i d u a l l y and i n c o n c e r t w i t h other p a r t i e s , such a c t i o n as i t deems n e c e s s a r y , i n c l u d i n g the use o f armed f o r c e s , t o r e s t o r e and m a i n t a i n the s e c u r i t y o f the North A t l a n t i c area.10 The d e c i s i o n t o e n t e r i n t o a r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y p a c t , as  36 a peacetime s t e p , was  a r a d i c a l new  development i n the  a l l y i s o l a t i o n i s t Canadian defence p o l i c y . as,no s u r p r i s e , however, to those who  The  1 1  tradition-  d e c i s i o n came  had been g i v i n g c a r e f u l  a t t e n t i o n to the p u b l i c statements of those i n charge of Canadian foreign policy. B r u s s e l s was prepared ".  On March 17,  signed,  1948,  the day  t h a t the T r e a t y  the Prime M i n i s t e r s t a t e d t h a t Canada  . . to g i v e substance to the conception  of was  of an e f f e c t i v e  system of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y by the development of r e g i o n a l under the c h a r t e r of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . "  that the Canadian government was such an  Thus, w e l l i n advance  1 2  o f the s i g n i n g of the North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y  pacts  i t had  become c l e a r  most anxious to be a p a r t  of  organization. Each of the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s supported the government.  Indeed, the P r o g r e s s i v e  Conservatives  by more than f o u r t e e n months. 1947  Mr.  had a n t i c i p a t e d the t r e a t y  Speaking to the House e a r l y i n  Bracken s t a t e d t h a t i f the U n i t e d Nations were not  e f f e c t i v e i n guaranteeing s e c u r i t y , then, "the democracies, by c l o s e c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h each o t h e r , must see  to i t t h a t  their  13 combined s t r e n g t h i s such as w i l l deter any i n a speech o u t s i d e  the House Mr.  aggressor."  St.Laurent,  apparently  When trying  to sound out American o p i n i o n , i m p l i e d that there would be  little  purpose i n Canada e n t e r i n g an A t l a n t i c s e c u r i t y pact without United  States,  1 4  he was  s h a r p l y r e b u f f e d by Mr.  Pearkes,  the  the  37  s e n i o r defence this,  c r i t i c o f the C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y .  Contrary  to  the l a t t e r argued, Canada should take the i n i t i a t i v e and  j o i n w i t h or without the Americans. "* 1  In C.C.F.  1947,  i n p r e s e n t i n g h i s p a r t y s ideas on  spokesman M r . Probe s t a t e d that the defence  should be p r i m a r i l y a c i v i l i a n o n e . ^ C.C.F.  defence,  f  had o f f i c i a l l y announced i t s  regional collective  security pact.  By 1947,  function  however,  the  a p p r o v a l of p l a n s f o r a The C . C . F . ,  Mr. Coldwell  stated: B e l i e v e s that Canada should support and j o i n . . . a north a t l a n t i c security pact. E f f o r t s must be continued to b u i l d the w o r l d s e c u r i t y system c a l l e d f o r i n the u n i t e d n a t i o n s . But u n t i l such security i s achieved, a regional pact, i n l i n e w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of the c h a r t e r , w i l l i n c r e a s e the degree of mutual a i d and a s s i s t a n c e among western d e m o c r a c i e s . ^ 1  In  subsequent  particular.  speeches C . C . F . First,  spokesmen emphasized two p o i n t s  in  they p e r s i s t e d i n i m p l y i n g that the A t l a n t i c  pact o r g a n i z a t i o n was more c l o s e l y than i n f a c t i t was.  l i n k e d to the U n i t e d Nations  Second, they urged that the p a c t be an  economic one, as w e l l as a m i l i t a r y one.  On t h i s  second p o i n t  they had a c l o s e a l l y i n the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r E x t e r n a l Affairs, efforts  and A r t i c l e 2 of the T r e a t y , o f t e n a t t r i b u t e d to of the l a t t e r ,  cooperation.  does s t r e s s the importance o f  the  economic  I t does seem u n l i k e l y , however, and there i s no  e m p i r i c a l evidence  to support the i d e a , t h a t the C . C . F .  had any  38 influence on the decision to include the a r t i c l e . point should be noted.  1 8  One  other  By emphasizing these two aspects of  the Treaty, i n addition to the concept of c i v i l i a n defence, the C.C.F. gave the impression fact that this was  that they could not face up to the  f i r s t and foremost a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e .  1 9  Like the other p a r t i e s , the S o c i a l Credit group had also  20 indicated i t s approval well i n advance of the signing. The debates on N.A.T.O. stretched over a period of approximately eighteen months.  During this time, there were  f i v e debates on i t . The f i r s t two occurred during the foreign p o l i c y debates of A p r i l and May  of 1948,  following Prime Minister St.Laurent's  statements favouring a peacetime regional security pact.  As  already seen, the three main opposition parties were unanimous i n supporting  this concept.  None of them, however, seemed to  grasp the significance of the Prime Minister's statements nor  21 the implications for Canada. In the Address, on January 31, 1949,  both the C.C.F.  and the S o c i a l Credit Party went on record as supporting  the  22  formation of an A t l a n t i c security pact. new  On the next day,  the  leader of the opposition, Mr. George Drew, moved that the  House be adjourned to discuss a d e f i n i t e matter of urgent public importance, namely, a statement that had been made that the signing  39  of the T r e a t y might r e s u l t At l a s t ,  i n a war w i t h the S o v i e t  Union.  2 3  i t appeared, the House o f Commons was showing concern  w i t h the r a m i f i c a t i o n s of the proposed a l l i a n c e on the f u t u r e o f Canadian s e c u r i t y . was out o f o r d e r .  The Speaker r u l e d , however, Nevertheless,  that  he p o i n t e d o u t ,  the  the motion matter  c o u l d be d i s c u s s e d almost immediately as the Address was about 24 to be re-opened.  S t r a n g e l y , and without e x p l a n a t i o n ,  C o n s e r v a t i v e s d i d not s e i z e t h i s  opportunity.  Not a  the  single  C o n s e r v a t i v e member mentioned the T r e a t y i n t h e i r speeches. c l i m a x of t h i s  episode o c c u r r e d when M r . Pearson condemned  the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y f o r f a i l i n g to i n d i c a t e  The severely its  25 viewpoint.  Clearly,  the l o y a l o p p o s i t i o n was having  i n s e c u r i n g the i n i t i a t i v e In March,  1949,  i n the  difficulty  debate.  the Commons debated a r e s o l u t i o n  that  Canada p a r t i c i p a t e i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference w i t h a view toward c r e a t i n g an a l l i a n c e o f A t l a n t i c powers under the terms of 26  the U n i t e d Nations c h a r t e r .  M r . C o l d w e l l warned the  t h a t s i g n i n g might i n i t i a t e an arms r a c e valid contribution, l i t t l e  2 7  ,  government  but a p a r t from h i s  t h a t was new emanated from the  front  benches. profound.  The backbenchers were e n t h u s i a s t i c i f not e s p e c i a l l y One member i n t e r p r e t e d the p a c t as a s o l i d i f i c a t i o n 28  o f the f o r c e s  of C h r i s t i a n i t y i n t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n to  Others argued t h a t S p a i n , s i n c e i t  is  atheism.  " r e a l l y a democratic n a t i o n ^ V  40  29 be i n v i t e d to j o i n .  Only the B l o c P o p u l a i r e ' s Mr. Maxime  7  Raymond opposed the a l l i a n c e . in social injustice,  Because Communism had i t s  roots  i t had to be fought by s o c i a l r e f o r m , not a  military alliance.  One does not f i g h t an i d e o l o g y w i t h guns, 30 argued Monsieur Raymond. The debate on r a t i f i c a t i o n on A p r i l 28 and 29 was b r i e f , a l l parties front.  except the B l o c P o p u l a i r e m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i r u n i t e d  The two members of the B l o c P o p u l a i r e a b s t a i n e d from 31  voting. In a l l f i v e opposition parties,  debates on the North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y ,  the  except the B l o c P o p u l a i r e , were i n harmony  w i t h the t h i n k i n g of the government. f a r as i t went was p a s s a b l e .  But i t  Members, w i t h but a few e x c e p t i o n s , such a b s u r d l y simple q u e s t i o n s c o n t a i n S o v i e t aggression?  The q u a l i t y o f debate,  as  d i d n ' t go deep enough.  n e i t h e r asked nor answered  as - i s  this  the b e s t way to  o r , are there any a l t e r n a t i v e s ?  t h i s render Canada more or l e s s l i a b l e to a t t a c k ?  A t times  would the  P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e s appeared ready to come to g r i p s w i t h the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f such a t r e a t y and h i n t e d a t some p o s s i b l e repercussions.  The two minor p a r t i e s  W i t h not too much exaggeration which might be expected Union.  s c a r c e l y went t h i s  far.  the debate can be l i k e n e d to  from the Supreme S o v i e t o f the  that  Soviet  The l a c k of c u r i o s i t y and q u e s t i o n i n g were p a r t i c u l a r l y  41 noteworthy.  No a l t e r n a t i v e s were debated, no m o d i f i c a t i o n s  suggested and no s i g n i f i c a n t q u e s t i o n s asked o r answered. House d i d debate the background to the s t e p .  The  But i n attempting  to determine the impact t h i s would have on Canadian s e c u r i t y , the House performed no u s e f u l s e r v i c e f o r the Canadian p o l i t y .  REMOBILIZATION  On June 24, 1950, North Korean troops c r o s s e d the 38th p a r a l l e l and invaded South Korea.  On June 27 the S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l of the U n i t e d Nations recommended t o the members of t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n that they should p r o v i d e such a s s i s t a n c e to the South Koreans as would be n e c e s s a r y to r e p e l the a g g r e s s o r ,  J  Within  three days the Canadian government made known t h a t t h r e e d e s t r o y e r s were b e i n g d i s p a t c h e d a t once to western P a c i f i c waters to a s s i s t U n i t e d Nations f o r c e s .  In August i t announced  that a b r i g a d e ,  to be known as the Canadian Army S p e c i a l F o r c e , would be r e c r u i t e d to c a r r y out o b l i g a t i o n s under the C h a r t e r and North A t l a n t i c Treaty.  B e f o r e the year was  out, these troops had a r r i v e d i n  Korea. In h i s review o f the w o r l d scene d u r i n g the Address t h a t year, the m i n i s t e r o f e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s s t r e s s e d not o n l y the war i n Korea, but a l s o the danger o f a c o n f l i c t w i t h C h i n a , i n s t a b i l i t i e s i n the M i d d l e E a s t and P e r s i a , and the p r e c a r i o u s p o s i t i o n i n  t  42 western Europe.  32  I t was i n the l i g h t o f t h i s background that  defence m i n i s t e r C l a x t o n The  spoke t o the Commons three days  government had decided,  arm.  later.  he announced, t o r e m o b i l i z e and r e -  To c a r r y out the programme t h a t was planned, i t would be  necessary t o spend some $5 b i l l i o n over the f o l l o w i n g  three  33 years.  On May 8 he requested t h a t t h e House approve the  expenditure o f $1.6 b i l l i o n defences i n order  (47% o f government e s t i m a t e s ) f o r  that the programme might be s t a r t e d .  Thus  d i d Canada respond t o t h e i n s t a b i l i t i e s i n the world about h e r . Most o f the members i n the Commons e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y supported the a c t i o n s o f the government. Conservatives required. past  argued, g r e a t e r p r e p a r a t i o n s ,  I f a n y t h i n g , the and n o t fewer,were  Q u i t e a c c u r a t e l y Mr. Pearkes p o i n t e d out t h a t i n the  few years " . . . the o p p o s i t i o n had f r e q u e n t l y taken a l e a d i n  u r g i n g more e f f e c t i v e defence measures and asking  f o r more adequate  f o r c e s than were being p r o v i d e d  forecasts i n  previous  years."  i n the m i n i s t e r s T  And on t h e new r e c r u i t m e n t  f u l l - t i m e a c t i v e service personnel,  g o a l o f 115,000  he admitted that he d i d n * t  " b e l i e v e 115,000 men w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t t o meet a l l those commitments,"  t h a t the m i n i s t e r had r e f e r r e d t o .  H i s only  complaint was that the moneys requested were t o be spent i n such a short p e r i o d t h a t s e r i o u s i n f l a t i o n might r e s u l t .  Had the  government begun three o r f o u r years e a r l i e r and spread the  43 programme out over a g r e a t e r p e r i o d , such c o m p l i c a t i o n s have been a v o i d e d .  Finally,  could  he suggested t h a t i n the l i g h t  of  the changing technology a t l e a s t three d o l l a r s should b e . s p e n t on the a i r arm f o r every one on the other two  services.  3 7  Mr. Harkness, v i c e - c h a i r m a n of the P r o g r e s s i v e Conservative  defence committee,  was even more e x p l i c i t :  W i l l h i s (the m i n i s t e r s ) programme g i v e us the minimum f o r c e s necessary f o r the defence of Canada and to meet our commitments under the U n i t e d Nations and the A t l a n t i c pact? I would r e s p e c t f u l l y suggest t h a t i t w i l l do neither.^8 T  I n s t e a d o f the s i n g l e b r i g a d e group maintained f o r the of Canada, he maintained". need now.  .  . is  three.  be r e q u i r e d to f u l f i l  .  defence  . . that the v e r y minimum that we ."39  j  n  a d d i t i o n , other troops would  overseas o b l i g a t i o n s . ^  Finally,  he  urged w i t h the support of much of h i s p a r t y , although not  that  of defence committee chairman P e a r k e s , t h a t a system o f compulsory 41 t r a i n i n g f o r the r e s e r v e  f o r c e s be i n t r o d u c e d .  The c r i t i c i s m s and suggestions of the C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y were i n d i v i d u a l l y sound.  They were based on l o g i c a l  arguments  and there was no shortage o f c o n s t r u c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e s .  But the  programme o f f e r e d by the C o n s e r v a t i v e s , when viewed as a whole, was i r r e s p o n s i b l e , i . e .  i t was not the k i n d of programme t h a t  the C o n s e r v a t i v e s c o u l d have implemented had they been voted power.  F o r i f a l l the suggestions of the C o n s e r v a t i v e  into  critics  44  had  been c a r r i e d o u t , defence  expenditures alone would have been  g r e a t e r than a l l the money ( i n c l u d i n g defence) government i n 1951.  spent by the  JJoubtless because of the l a c k of  ment among the C o n s e r v a t i v e c r i t i c s themselves, programme of the P a r t y showed l i t t l e  agree-  the o v e r a l l  concern f o r the  resources  or wealth o f the Canadian economy. The Mr.  C.C.F.  r e a c t i o n was more p a s s i v e .  Referring  to  C l a x t o n ' s announcement M r . Thatcher s t a t e d : He s a i d that d u r i n g the next year $1.6 b i l l i o n w i l l be spent on n a t i o n a l defence. I t i s of course v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e f o r o p p o s i t i o n members who have not taken p a r t i n the many conferences under the A t l a n t i c p a c t , who have not attended the m i l i t a r y t a l k s , to know whether t h i s i s too much o r too l i t t l e . As o p p o s i t i o n members we have l i t t l e c h o i c e but to accept the words o f the m i n i s t e r t h a t t h i s spending i s v i t a l and e s s e n t i a l . ^  And M r . Noseworthy contented h i m s e l f by remarking t h a t "government p o l i c y I am c o n f i d e n t w i l l have the f u l l e s t  possible  support o f every member i n and o f every p o l i t i c a l p a r t y here represented."^  C.C.F.  debate on the Address went no deeper.  And i n Committee o f S u p p l y , the C . C . F . Indeed on the d e c i s i o n to rearm i t the q u a l i t y of C . C . F . tions. decision.  is  added n o t h i n g new. i m p o s s i b l e to  evaluate  debate f o r t h e i r members made no c o n t r i b u -  To a man they s i l e n t l y a c q u i e s c e d to the major  45 The S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y a l s o programme.  supported the re-armament  Mr. Low, speaking on the p l a n s enumerated by the  defence m i n i s t e r , admitted that w i t h broad contours of the p r o gramme h i s  "group" was i n s u b s t a n t i a l a g r e e m e n t . ^  Creditors,  l i k e p a r t of the C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y , a l s o i n c o r p o r a t e d  into i t s  Social  programme the Canadian L e g i o n recommendation "that a  complete programme of preparedness i n c l u d i n g compulsory t r a i n i n g i n the r e s e r v e f o r c e s greatest possible  f o r home defence be executed w i t h the  degree o f e q u a l i t y o f s a c r i f i c e and  service."^  A l o n g w i t h the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e s the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y stressed  the need f o r g r e a t e r steps and g r e a t e r speed i n b u i l d i n g  Canadian defences. L i k e the debates on the d e c i s i o n to d e m o b i l i z e and on N.A.T.O., unreality.  the r e m o b i l i z a t i o n debate was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an aura o f The Commons seemed not to grasp the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f '  the steps t h a t i t was f a c i l i t a t i n g .  Almost b e f o r e i t had begun  the House passed over the v i t a l d e c i s i o n .  As e s p e c i a l l y  i n the  case on d e m o b i l i z a t i o n , the premise f o r House c r i t i c i s m s was basic decision i t s e l f .  It is  the  t r u e t h a t i n the 1948-51 p e r i o d  b o t h C o n s e r v a t i v e s and S o c i a l C r e d i t o r s had made numerous suggestions t h a t defences were inadequate. ever,  that f u l l  Nobody had even h i n t e d , how-  r e m o b i l i z a t i o n would be n e c e s s a r y .  And y e t ,  when  the step was t a k e n , the argument r a i s e d was t h a t i t went not f a r enough.  46  DEMOBILIZATION POLICY:  AN ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY DECISION  In the p e r i o d immediately f o l l o w i n g V - J Day, Canadian defence p o l i c y ,  l i k e that o f a l l western democracies,  was r i g i d l y  c h a n n e l l e d i n t o one programme - r e p a t r i a t i o n and d e m o b i l i z a t i o n . The b a s i c p r i n c i p l e upon which d e m o b i l i z a t i o n i s based "is  that  of  longest  first-in first-out,  and h a r d e s t  service  the p r i n c i p l e that the man w i t h the  should be the f i r s t  discharged." '' 4  As a l r e a d y seen, the House e x e r c i s e d c o n t r o l over the d e c i s i o n to d e m o b i l i z e ; even attempt  to do so.  absolutely  nor, i t  I t was more e n e r g e t i c ,  no  seems, d i d  however,  it  in  debating the p r i n c i p l e s upon which d e m o b i l i z a t i o n had been based. I n an amendment to the Speech from the Throne, l e a d e r of the o p p o s i t i o n , M r . B r a c k e n , charged t h a t the "had  f a i l e d to d e m o b i l i z e our armed f o r c e s  p a r t i c u l a r , have f a i l e d to p r e s e n t personnel." ** 4  serious  the government  4 9  government  on a f a i r b a s i s a n d , i n disadvantages  In the debate t h a t f o l l o w e d ,  by Tory defence c r i t i c s , Mr. P e a r k e s  the  to overseas  c r i t i c i s m s of  and M r . M e r r i t t , ^ 5  to g i v e a more thorough statement o f  policy led  policy.  A g a i n , i n the debate on the e s t i m a t e s , M r . Harkness c r i t i c i z e d what he d e s c r i b e d as government d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t seen a c t i v e  service overseas.  those who had  A r e l e n t l e s s a t t a c k by  53 C o n s e r v a t i v e s , w i t h moderate support from the C . C . F . had no  affect  47  on government p o l i c y .  The s u g g e s t i o n by M r . M e r r i t t ,  that  extra  c r e d i t s be g i v e n those who had been i n a c t i v e combat, a l t h o u g h debated by the government, was u l t i m a t e l y But it  rejected.-^  the House, on d e m o b i l i z a t i o n p o l i c y , d i d much t h a t  f a i l e d to do on the broader d e c i s i o n to d e m o b i l i z e .  It  offered  s p e c i f i c p r o p o s a l s thus c a u s i n g the government to debate a l t e r n a tives.  Its  injustice, in  c r i t i c i s m s , often  supported by c o n c r e t e examples  f o r c e d the government to r e - a s s e s s p o l i c y c o n t i n u o u s l y  the l i g h t of the c r i t i c i s m s emanating from the House.  But  perhaps most important the o p p o s i t i o n succeeded i n p u t t i n g government on the d e f e n s i v e .  I t f o r c e d the m i n i s t e r to  out i n c o n s i d e r a b l e d e t a i l the reasons and j u s t i f i c a t i o n s policy.  of  It  the  spell for  f o r c e d the government to i n v e s t i g a t e and answer f o r  the numerous cases o f i n j u s t i c e c i t e d by the v a r i o u s members.  In  performing these f u n c t i o n s w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e l o g i c and energy, the House o f Commons e f f e c t i v e l y  used the technique o f  critical  debate to c o n t r o l the government.  THE DETERRENT - A STRATEGIC POLICY DECISION  On January 12,  1954,  the American S e c r e t a r y of  State,  John F o s t e r D u l l e s , t o l d the C o u n c i l on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s t h a t  in  the f u t u r e American f o r e i g n p o l i c y "would be p l a c i n g more r e l i a n c e on d e t e r r e n t power and l e s s dependence on d e f e n s i v e power."-^  48  I n p a r t i c u l a r , M r . D u l l e s c i t e d two drawbacks to the p o l i c y of containment.  First,  i t gave the enemy the  o f being a b l e to s e l e c t the t i m e , p l a c e and method o f  post-war advantage attack.  Second, i t c o s t an a s t r o n o m i c a l amount of money - more than $50 b i l l i o n per y e a r .  Under the new s t r a t e g y ,  doning l o c a l wars, we s h a l l be a b l e " . . c a p a c i t y to r e t a l i a t e ,  a l t h o u g h not aban-  . to depend upon a g r e a t  i n s t a n t l y , by means and a t p l a c e s o f our  own c h o o s i n g . O v e r  the f o l l o w i n g s i x years t h i s  so-called  D u l l e s d o c t r i n e came to have a most f a r - r e a c h i n g i n f l u e n c e on the s t r a t e g y of a l l N . A . T . O .  countries,  i n c l u d i n g t h a t of Canada.  I n a white paper i s s u e d e a r l y In 1952 the Canadian m i n i s t e r l i s t e d the o b j e c t i v e s  defence  o f defence p o l i c y a s :  (1)  The immediate defence of Canada and North America from d i r e c t a t t a c k ;  (2)  implementation o f any u n d e r t a k i n g s made by Canada under the C h a r t e r of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , or under the North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n , or other agreements f o r c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y ;  (3)  the o r g a n i z a t i o n to b u i l d i n a t o t a l w a r .  The i d e n t i c a l three o b j e c t i v e s  5 7  were l i s t e d i n the white CO  papers p u b l i s h e d the f o l l o w i n g two y e a r s .  By 1955 these had  been p a r t i a l l y changed and by 1956 M r . Campney's white paper revealed s i g n i f i c a n t 1.  alterations:  The aim of Canada's defence programme and p l a n n i n g i s to p r o v i d e f o r the s e c u r i t y o f  49 Canada. Under present and f o r e s e e a b l e c o n d i t i o n s t h i s can be done most e f f e c t i v e l y by c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h our a l l i e s i n the North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d e s p e c i a l l y w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n r e l a t i o n to the North American area. Our defence plans must a l s o i n c l u d e a c a p a c i t y to c a r r y out o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t may a r i s e out o f Canada*s membership i n the U n i t e d Nations Organization. 2.  The primary o b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i z e d by Canada and our a l l i e s i s to prevent the outbreak of a t h i r d world war. T h i s r e q u i r e s t h a t there must be a powerful s t r a t e g i c bomber f o r c e , backed by the means to ensure t h a t t h i s f o r c e can be immediately e f f e c t i v e under any c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and supported by the f o r c e s - i n - b e i n g r e q u i r e d to b l u n t an a t t a c k by a would-be aggressor f o r long enough to permit the West*s r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e s to c a r r y out t h e i r r o l e . T h i s combination of f o r c e s c o n s t i t u t e s the b e s t p o s s i b l e d e t e r r e n t under present c o n d i t i o n s . - * 9  I n the e a r l y 1950s, the defence o f North A m e r i c a , an o b j e c t i v e of defence p o l i c y , was not at a l l d i f f i c u l t comprehend.  as  to  The main danger to the c o n t i n e n t was a i r a t t a c k .  To combat t h i s r e q u i r e d the i n t e g r a t i o n o f three separate  sets  o f o p e r a t i o n s - d e t e c t i o n and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f enemy a i r c r a f t ; communication of t h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e finally,  to a i r and ground u n i t s ;  " t r a i n e d p e r s o n n e l , a i r c r a f t and a n t i - a i r c r a f t weapons  must be a b l e to a n n i h i l a t e o r d r i v e o f f the a t t a c k e r s . " ^  The  defence of North America thus meant the a b i l i t y to d r i v e o f f those who would a t t a c k . As e a r l y as mid-1954, change and by 1956,  these b a s i c ideas had begun to  due to the c o n t i n u i n g r e v o l u t i o n i n weapon  50  technology and the impact o f the D u l l e s d o c t r i n e , primary emphasis had s h i f t e d  to the r e t a l i a t o r y power o f the U n i t e d  S t a t e s S t r a t e g i c A i r Command The many developments lines, against  61  and i t s  a b i l i t y to d e t e r  aggression.  i n d e f e n c e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the new radar  were j u s t i f i e d more as a method o f p r o t e c t i n g the  S.A.C.  s u r p r i s e a t t a c k than as a d i r e c t means o f saving  l i v e s of Canadians.  Moreover, the new. master s t r a t e g y  the changed  much o f the t h i n k i n g behind the r o l e and purpose of Canada's mobile b r i g a d e group, i n t e r c e p t o r squadrons, and c i v i l preparations.  Each o f these came to be looked upon as having  a r o l e i n the b u i l d i n g o f a more b a l a n c e d  deterrent.  There w i l l be no attempt i n t h i s work to this  change i n s t r a t e g y .  thesis.  defence  But i t  evaluate  That i s not the f u n c t i o n o f  this  should be remembered t h a t these changes had a  most f a r - r e a c h i n g impact on a l l Canadian defence t h i n k i n g and on the r o l e of Canada i n N o r t h American defence.  Hence the new  s t r a t e g y most c e r t a i n l y m e r i t e d the c l o s e s t i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of  the  Canadian House o f Commons. The f i r s t p o i n t to note i s was devoted to the s u b j e c t .  On two o c c a s i o n s ,  Supply f o r N a t i o n a l Defence i n 1 9 5 4 changing s t r a t e g y  t h a t no g r e a t amount o f  62  i n an e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s  i n Committee o f  and a g a i n i n 1956,  r e c e i v e d some a t t e n t i o n . debate i n 1 9 5 4 ,  6 4  time  A t two other  the times,  and i n Supply f o r N a t i o n a l  Defence i n 1955, No s i n g l e f u l l  i t was d i s c u s s e d by a h a n d f u l of  speakers.  debate, however, was devoted w h o l l y to t h i s new  strategy. Although P a r l i a m e n t was i n s e s s i o n when M r . D u l l e s  first  gave v o i c e to h i s new d o c t r i n e , the i n i t i a l Canadian response came not from the House o f Commons but from the e x t e r n a l m i n i s t e r and the Canadian p r e s s .  6 6  affairs  I t was some t w o - a n d - a - h a l f  weeks b e f o r e M r . D i e f e n b a k e r , i n the middle of a long speech on f o r e i g n p o l i c y , asked M r . Pearson s e v e r a l questions  concerning the  i m p l i c a t i o n s of the pronouncement made r e c e n t l y by M r . D u l l e s : Have there been any d i s c u s s i o n s between Canada and the U n i t e d S t a t e s t h a t t h i s new p o l i c y means r e t a l i a t i o n by atomic bombs? To what extent was Canada c o n s u l t e d when t h a t announcement of p o l i c y took p l a c e ? 6 7  Two months l a t e r M r . Pearson endeavoured t o . e x p l a i n to the House what was meant by t h i s new concept of the d e t e r r e n t . Numerous c l a r i f i c a t i o n s by the American government s i n c e  the  January 12 speech, M r . Pearson p o i n t e d o u t , had made i t c l e a r the key word i n the D u l l e s address was " c a p a c i t y " . would not be abandoned.  Local  defence  The nature of the response to a l l  S o v i e t a g g r e s s i o n would be determined by the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . When the circumstances were f a v o u r a b l e , the western a l l i a n c e ,  68 if  it  so chose, would be a b l e to r e t a l i a t e m a s s i v e l y .  that  This  52  statement  by M r . Pearson was warmly welcomed i n the House where  some had f e a r e d t h a t massive n u c l e a r r e t a l i a t i o n would h e n c e f o r t h be the response to every form of  aggression.  Mr. Pearson a l s o p o i n t e d out t h a t the new s t r a t e g y no way s i g n a l l e d a r e t u r n to American i s o l a t i o n i s m . States,  The U n i t e d  he contended, would c o n s u l t w i t h her a l l i e s  r e s o r t i n g to massive  in  before  retaliation.^9  P e r t i n e n t c r i t i c i s m s were r a i s e d by s e v e r a l C o n s e r v a t i v e critics. it  S u r e l y , the l e a d e r of the o p p o s i t i o n t o l d the House,  i s unreasonable to expect t h a t v a l u a b l e time would be s a c r i -  f i c e d f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n w h i l e bombs were f a l l i n g on the c i t i e s o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s or one o f her a l l i e s . -  The member f o r Kamloops  7  argued t h a t M r . D u l l e s c o u l d o n l y mean t h a t c o n s u l t a t i o n would be h e l d i n advance and only on the g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t would provoke massive n u c l e a r r e t a l i a t i o n .  7 1  Some s i x weeks l a t e r the c h i e f s c o u n t r i e s met i n P a r i s .  of s t a f f  o f the N . A . T . O .  Almost immediately a f t e r these meetings  had ended, debate on n a t i o n a l defence was resumed, t h i s time i n Committee of Supply. I t was at t h i s time t h a t members of the House were  first  informed of the impact t h a t these new weapons would have on Canada s defence T  function.  The d e t e r r e n t ,  to work  effectively,  Mr. C l a x t o n p o i n t e d o u t , r e q u i r e d not o n l y d e s t r u c t i v e power but  53  a l s o the means of d e l i v e r y .  "That a b i l i t y must be p r o t e c t e d .  T h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n b r i n g s i n t o focus and g i v e s new emphasis the whole q u e s t i o n o f c o n t i n e n t a l d e f e n c e . "  to  He e x p l a i n e d t h a t  7 2  the communications i n the system "are hooked up so t h a t w i t h i n seconds or a minute o r so o f an a i r c r a f t b e i n g found on the  radar-  scope a t one of the r a d a r s t a t i o n s the i n t e l l i g e n c e  is  r e c e i v e d a t a i r defence  o f that  command and a t C o l o r a d a S p r i n g s where  United States s t r a t e g i c a l a i r force i s  located." -*  Mr. Claxton  7  a l s o mentioned, a l t h o u g h o n l y s e c o n d a r i l y , the importance of warnings f o r c i v i l i a n defence and s e c u r i t y  the M i n i s t e r ,  statement.  T  such  purposes.^  Mr. P e a r k e s , speaking immediately a f t e r a n a l y z e d the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the l a t t e r s  the  He p o i n t e d  out how v u l n e r a b l e Canada*s c i t i e s were to S o v i e t s t r i k i n g power "It i s o f l i t t l e  comfort to those c i t i e s to know t h a t i f they are  a t t a c k e d U n i t e d S t a t e s bombers are a v a i l a b l e to  retaliate." ^ 7  G e n e r a l Pearkes appeared u n c e r t a i n i n which d i r e c t i o n Canada should f a c e .  A t the b e g i n n i n g o f h i s statement he  stressed  the n e c e s s i t y o f more r a p i d development i n the e a r l y warning system,  the requirement of l a r g e r i n t e r c e p t o r f o r c e s ,  importance of c i v i l defence p r e p a r a t i o n s . though not i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a s t r a t e g y  7 6  and the  These remarks, a l -  of d e t e r r e n c e ,  seemed  to i n d i c a t e t h a t he p r e f e r r e d to p l a c e primary emphasis on i v e defence,  as opposed to d e t e r r e n c e .  He d i d n o t ,  defens-  however,  54 g i v e a f i n a l e v a l u a t i o n o f the new  strategy.  During the f o l l o w i n g year, 1955, on the matter. to  there was  little  debate  Mr. Harkness, however, d i d take the time to t r y  a n a l y z e the more r e c e n t developments.  He began by p o i n t i n g  out  that f o r the f i r s t  time i n s e v e r a l y e a r s , the wording o f  the  o b j e c t i v e s o f defence p o l i c y , as s p e l l e d out i n the annual  white paper, had been a l t e r e d . ambiguous. to  What do they mean?  The new  terms, he charged, were  Do they i n d i c a t e that we are  become more dependent upon the U n i t e d S t a t e s ? " I s i t ,  we say, a f i r s t  i n d i c a t i o n o f an o v e r - a l l command which A i r - .  M a r s h a l l Slemon i n h i s speech not long ago i n d i c a t e d was n e c e s s i t y as f a r as North America's a i r defence was We  shall  a  concerned?"  a r e not o b j e c t i n g i f t h i s i s the case, he e x p l a i n e d , but we  77  do  have a r i g h t to be informed. Mr. Harkness a l s o renewed the theme t h a t Mr. had emphasized  a year e a r l i e r .  Pearkes  The Canadian people and Canada's  i n d u s t r i a l c e n t r e s are exposed to thermonuclear a t t a c k . f i g h t e r squadrons  The  that had been sent to Europe t h e r e f o r e ought 78  to be brought back a t once.  And as f o r c i v i l defence, a most  v i t a l p a r t o f the defence f u n c t i o n , i t was  time that the govern79  ment began to take p o s i t i v e measures i n t h i s Mr.  field.  Campney, i n a b r i e f r e p l y , i n d i c a t e d r a t h e r  a b r u p t l y t h a t the Honourable Member f o r C a l g a r y West had .excited  55 h i m s e l f over what was l i t t l e more than a change i n the wording of the o b j e c t i v e s  o f defence  policy.^  But i n i n t r o d u c i n g h i s estimates the next  year,  Mr. Campney made i t q u i t e c l e a r , a l t h o u g h o n l y i m p l i c i t l y , t h a t Mr. Harkness had indeed been a c c u r a t e i n h i s c r i t i c i s m s . defence m i n i s t e r began by reminding the House that no  The  strategy  81 c o u l d guarantee s e c u r i t y . continues,  As long as the t h r e a t of war  he e x p l a i n e d : Our b e s t hope i s , u n d o u b t e d l y , i n the maintenance of a s t r o n g c o m p e l l i n g d e t e r r e n t . P r i m a r i l y , of c o u r s e , t h i s d e t e r r e n t a t p r e s e n t i s based on the s t r a t e g i c a i r f o r c e of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , now b e i n g augmented by that of Great B r i t a i n . But, to be e f f e c t i v e , such s t r a t e g i c a i r f o r c e s must be supplemented by warning l i n e s to enable t h e i r r e t a l i a t o r y planes to get o f f the ground immedi a t e l y an a t t a c k i s launched on the f r e e w o r l d anywhere. They must a l s o be supplemented by f i g h t e r a i r power to b l u n t the edge o f the thermonuclear attack. They must a l s o a g a i n be s u p p l e mented by w e l l - t r a i n e d e f f i c i e n t ground f o r c e s to form a s h i e l d to prevent Europe being suddenly o v e r r u n by the ground f o r c e s of an a g g r e s s o r . All these f a c t o r s are j u s t as much p a r t of the d e t e r r e n t as the r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e s themselves. 8 2  Mr. P e a r k e s , and other C o n s e r v a t i v e c r i t i c s , approved 83 o f the substance of the defence m i n i s t e r ' s speech.  Thus,  i n l e s s than a y e a r , o p p o s i t i o n s c e p t i c i s m w i t h the s t r a t e g y d e t e r r e n c e had been c l e a r e d away.  A l o n g w i t h the government  they too decided t h a t the b e s t guarantee of Canadian s e c u r i t y was a c a r e f u l l y guarded d e t e r r e n t .  of  56  C.C.F.  c r i t i c s Cameron and G i l l i s were l e s s  w i t h the p l a n n i n g of the government.  The former  sympathetic  stated:  I t i s t r u e enough t h a t the D . E . W . l i n e may s t i l l be of v a l u e i n p r o v i d i n g s u f f i c i e n t warning f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s s t r a t e g i c a i r command to get those bombers i n t o the a i r to proceed w i t h massive retaliation. In that regard, i t i s of inestimable v a l u e . . . but I would p o i n t out i t has nothing whatever to do w i t h Canada's p a r t i n the p r o t e c t i o n of N o r t h A m e r i c a . ^ 8  Whether or not the C . C . F .  understood f u l l y the s t r a t e g y  of  deterrence i s not easy to determine from the remarks that were made. all  It is  satisfied  c l e a r though t h a t members of t h a t p a r t y were not w i t h Canada's c o n t r i b u t i o n to c o n t i n e n t a l  No one from t h i s p a r t y , however,  e l a b o r a t e d on the r o l e  Canada should p l a y i n c o n t i n e n t a l Finally, Party offered  at  defence. that  defence.  i t must be observed t h a t the S o c i a l C r e d i t  little  i n the debates by way of c r i t i c i s m s or  suggestions. Debates  on the important s t r a t e g i c  b r i e f and s c a t t e r e d . policy.  i n n o v a t i o n s were  They caused no m o d i f i c a t i o n s  The i n i t i a t i v e or upper hand i n the debate  in Liberal rested  n e i t h e r w i t h the government nor the o p p o s i t i o n but passed back and  f o r t h from one to the On the whole,  other.  the debate,  especially  c r i t i c s , was informed and i n t e l l i g e n t . the s i g n i f i c a n c e  from C o n s e r v a t i v e  They were a b l e to grasp  o f the changes t h a t were b e i n g implemented, and  a t times  they even h i n t e d at one o f i t s  major shortcomings -  its  f a i l u r e to o f f e r p h y s i c a l p r o t e c t i o n to the i n h a b i t a n t s o f North America.  (They ignored,however,  its  inappropriateness for  so-  c a l l e d "brush-fire" wars). Perhaps the most important and u s e f u l r e s u l t of  the  debates was i n c l a r i f y i n g and i n f o r m i n g b o t h the House o f Commons and  the people o f Canada o f t h e i r new r o l e i n the p r o t e c t i o n o f  North A m e r i c a .  F o r a long time t h e r e was much ambiguity on the  meaning and s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f the new s t r a t e g y and the Commons  debates d i d much to tear away the mantle o f mystery that was f o r so long c l o t h i n g  it.  THE COMMONS AS A POLICY MAKER:  THE POST-WAR POLICY VACUUM  The e a r l y post-war years were ones o f d r i f t t y i n defence p o l i c y .  and u n c e r t a i n -  A l t h o u g h a b a r e o u t l i n e of the f u t u r e r o l e 85  of  the armed f o r c e s was r e l e a s e d by the government,  no statement  was i s s u e d e x p l a i n i n g the u n d e r l y i n g p o l i t i c a l , economic, strategic  or t e c h n o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s b e h i n d these p l a n s . For  the most p a r t , the House was sympathetic w i t h the  problems f a c i n g the government and the d i f f i c u l t i e s p o l i c y d u r i n g the t w i l i g h t years o f 1945 and 1946.  i n formulating This  d i d not prevent each o f the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , however, g r a d u a l l y d e v e l o p i n g broad defence p o l i c i e s  of t h e i r own.  attitude from  58  As mentioned above,  the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y was most  anxious  t h a t Canadian defence be b u i l t around a Commonwealth c o l l e c t i v e 86 security pact.  I n t h i s they were warmly supported by the  87 Imperialist  from Toronto Broadview, Mr. Tommy C h u r c h , and w i t h i n  s i x months by the defence Party.  committee of the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e  D i s c u s s i n g the n e c e s s i t y o f p l a n n i n g f o r the years ahead,  the l e a d e r o f the o p p o s i t i o n p o i n t e d out that geography no longer p r o t e c t e d Canadian s h o r e s . technology make i t n e c e s s a r y ,  positive  New weapons and the new  he a r g u e d , t h a t Canada adopt a 88  i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c y and not one of  appeasement.  The background argument was e s s e n t i a l l y  sound and  the fundamentals endorsed by the other three Canadian p a r t i e s . Mr. Bracken went on to conclude "that the p r e s e n t a t i o n and s t r e n g t h e n i n g of the commonwealth of B r i t i s h n a t i o n s i s a t  this  stage i n our h i s t o r y the b e s t hope of permanent peace i n a w o r l d 89 dominated by three spheres of  influence."  Mr. Bracken was moved by a t l e a s t two separate First,  he f e a r e d t h a t Canada, i f  she f a i l e d to d i r e c t her  p o l i c y toward the Commonwealth, would g r a d u a l l y become a satellite  of the U n i t e d S t a t e s .  9 0  h i s t o r y has proved him an e x c e l l e n t  Many would argue that prophet.  Second,  stimuli.  he b e l i e v e d that Great B r i t a i n , b o l s t e r e d by the Commonwealth, would be strong  enough t o take i t s p l a c e i n the post-war w o r l d ,  as an equal w i t h the two super-powers t h a t were emerging. ^" 9  In t h i s h i s t o r y thus f a r has proved t h a t he was s a d l y mistaken. More important, the suggestion  that the B r i t i s h Commonwealth  might serve as a t h i r d sphere o f i n f l u e n c e i n d i c a t e d o r i m p l i e d t h a t Canada, as p a r t o f the Commonwealth, might serve as a b a l a n c e r i n the event t h a t the other t h a t w i t h i n a very By  two powers might c o l l i d e , an i d e a  short p e r i o d was repugnant to many Canadians.  the summer o f 1946, the C.C.F. , as w e l l , had  developed i t s own e l e v e n - p o i n t  programme f o r the defence o f  92 Canada.  Probably i t s c e n t r a l t h e s i s was the argument t h a t  Canadian defence p o l i c y should be c h a n n e l l e d Nations.  through t h e U n i t e d  I n h i s speech the C.C.F. spokesman, Mr. Probe,  contended t h a t a peacetime m i l i t a r y f o r c e should be operated as a p a r t o f the Canadian c o n t r i b u t i o n to the U n i t e d Thus, during  Nations.  9 3  the years o f L i b e r a l i n d e c i s i o n , e a c h o f  the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s d i d develop defence p o l i c i e s that i t was able.to place before  t h e House.  I n so doing the p a r t i e s were  performing one o f t h e i r most important f u n c t i o n s ,  presenting  a l t e r n a t e p o l i c i e s to both the government and people o f Canada. The  p o l i c i e s o f a l l three p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , however,  seem to have had l i t t l e  i n f l u e n c e on the L i b e r a l p o l i c y t h a t  60  subsequently emerged, and one e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s , necessarily  the primary one,  by the o p p o s i t i o n had l i t t l e here the p o l i c i e s  is  that the p o l i c i e s  r a t i o n a l appeal.  although not  as put forward  I am not j u d g i n g  themselves but r a t h e r the e m p i r i c a l data and  r a t i o n a l i t y o f argument on which they were based.  In a l l  c a s e s , a l o g i c a l and coherent argument, based upon the minimum of i n t e l l i g e n c e By 1947,  three  necessary  and i n f o r m a t i o n , was s a d l y l a c k i n g .  however,  the government had g i v e n o p p o s i t i o n  c r i t i c s more s u b s t a n t i a l t a r g e t s .  The withdrawal o f Canadian  troops from the o c c u p a t i o n zone i n Germany and the d e c i s i o n  to  94 reduce the s i z e o f the post-war f o r c e s c r i t i c i s m s from the o p p o s i t i o n benches. c h a r g e d , was abandoning i t s  r e s u l t e d i n severe The government,  i t was  international responsibilities  withdrawing the o c c u p a t i o n army from Germany.  Is  this,  by  asked  C o n s e r v a t i v e c r i t i c s , a r e t u r n to the p o l i c y o f the i n t e r - w a r years?95  The d e c i s i o n to lower r e c r u i t m e n t t o t a l s ,  they main-  t a i n e d , would seem to i n d i c a t e t h a t the q u e s t i o n was b e i n g 96 answered i n the a f f i r m a t i v e . L e s t t h i s be the c a s e , the T o r i e s reminded the government t h a t we c o u l d no longer enjoy the p r i v i l e g e of l e i s u r e l y m o b i l i z ation.  "Schemes which p r o v i d e f o r the m o b i l i z a t i o n of a f i r s t  d i v i s i o n to take the f i e l d s i x months a f t e r the outbreak of war o r a f t e r m o b i l i z a t i o n has been o r d e r e d , " M r . Pearkes warned, "bear no  61  r e l a t i o n whatever to modern w a r f a r e . "  97  The c o n c l u s i o n o f  the  P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y was t h a t L i b e r a l P a r t y c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and i n d e c i s i v e n e s s  stemmed from the f a c t t h a t i t had  not been a b l e to formulate a g e n e r a l defence Speaker a f t e r  speaker from the C o n s e r v a t i v e benches  a t t a c k e d the i n d e c i s i v e n e s s . a defence p o l i c y made i t  policy.  M r . Harkness s t a t e d t h i s  "clear.  .  . t h a t a l l p l a n s so  lack of enthusiast-  i c a l l y expounded by the m i n i s t e r s concerned d u r i n g the p a s t  two  s e s s i o n s were not based on any sound f o u n d a t i o n of g e n e r a l p o l i c y , and, as a r e s u l t , scrapped." **  amounted to n o t h i n g , and have not i n e f f e c t  been  Mr. M e r r i t t c o n t i n u e d on the" same theme. " I f I were  9  to t r y to put my f i n g e r on the b a s i c t r o u b l e of the government" he said,  "I would say i t  hostilities  is  the f a c t t h a t ever s i n c e the end of  there has been an u n c e r t a i n purpose behind our  and an u n c e r t a i n amount of money wherewith to c a r r y out purpose.""  forces  that  T h i s u n d o u b t e d l y , he t o l d the Commons, c o u l d be  t r a c e d to the p o l i c y of w a i t i n g f o r c o n c r e t e a c t i o n from the security council.  The time had now come to s t a r t p l a n n i n g o u t s i d e  the framework o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  The c o r n e r s t o n e of p o l i c y  must be t h a t the primary f u n c t i o n o f our defences i s shores a g a i n s t  to defend our  i n v a s i o n " u n t i l our f r i e n d s can come to our  aid."  The response of the government to the c r i t i c i s m s of the o p p o s i t i o n , and the c r i t i c i s m s were b o t h r e s p o n s i b l e and  1 0 0  62  accurate,  was f o r the most p a r t one o f i n d i f f e r e n c e .  The w i t h -  drawal from the o c c u p a t i o n zone was b r i e f l y "explained away" by the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s and continued questioning  from the o p p o s i t i o n d i d l i t t l e  comprehensive  answer. ^ 1  t o provoke a more  The d e c i s i o n t o r e c r u i t o n l y up t o  1  102 three-quarters  establishment  was excused as a temporary measure  although one Tory p r e f e r r e d to g i v e i t  a different  interpretation.  T h i s s t e p , M r . M e r r i t t charged, was an economy measure,  taken 103 i n the l i g h t of L i b e r a l l o s s e s i n the r e c e n t b y - e l e c t i o n s . And f i n a l l y , C o n s e r v a t i v e c r i t i c i s m s o f government i n d e c i s i v e n e s s 104 on a p o l i c y f o r the r e s e r v e  forces,  were f o r the most p a r t  ignored. The f i r s t  full  statement on post-war p o l i c y was not  d e l i v e r e d to the House u n t i l J u l y 9, after  the C o n s e r v a t i v e o n s l a u g h t .  had pledged i t s e l f 1947,  and i t  is  1947,^  5  some f i v e  Inasmuch as the  to disband the i n t e r i m f o r c e s  obvious t h a t a f u l l  government  by September  it  seems t h a t the c r i t i c i s m s  could  of the o p p o s i t i o n d i d  to speed up the formation and announcement A survey o f Canadian p e r i o d i c a l l i t e r a t u r e , indicates  30,  statement o f p o l i c y was  n e c e s s a r y b e f o r e r e c r u i t m e n t to the permanent f o r c e s begin,  months  of government  little policy.  during t h i s p e r i o d ,  t h a t these organs o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n were as  little  i n f l u e n c e d by the c r i t i c i s m s o f the C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y as  the  63  government.  Indeed the f a i l u r e of the C o n s e r v a t i v e s to win  over to t h e i r s i d e these v a r i o u s p e r i o d i c a l s and magazines,  and  the apathy of these organs seems to have been roughly i n d i c a t i v e o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n , i s perhaps a reasonable e x p l a n a t i o n f o r L i b e r a l indifference  toward the C o n s e r v a t i v e  attacks.  During t h i s p e r i o d the House of Commons attempted b o t h to c r e a t e and destroy by s e r v i n g both as a p o l i c y - m a k e r and c r i t i c . In neither r o l e d i d i t  e i t h e r c o n t r o l or i n f l u e n c e  the  government.  T h i s was not so much because o f the f a i l u r e o f the C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y , f o r t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s were b o t h a c c u r a t e and r e s p o n s i b l e . Rather i t fatigue  seems more l i k e l y t h a t i t was due to the  emotional  o f the p o p u l a t i o n toward a l l t a l k o f m i l i t a r y p r e p a r e d -  ness which made the j o b o f the o p p o s i t i o n a l l but  impossible.  THE PACIFIC PACT  W h i l e the A t l a n t i c Pact was s t i l l being Communist f o r c e s were d r i v i n g the f o r c e s mainland o f C h i n a .  Soon a f t e r  negotiated,  o f the Kuomintang o f f  they succeeded,  the  there were rumours  that the U n i t e d S t a t e s was about to conclude a m u l t i l a t e r a l P a c i f i c security  pact. On February 1,  1949,  the member f o r Vancouver Quadra,  the Honourable Howard G r e e n , s t r e s s e d to the House o f Commons that Canada had more than one c o a s t l i n e .  There i s  ".  .  . a need"  64  he urged,  " f o r a Canadian p o l i c y i n the P a c i f i c .  . . If a regional  p a c t i s to be s e t up f o r the P a c i f i c , I urge t h a t Canada should become a f u l l p a r t n e r i n that p a c t . By the f o l l o w i n g year Mr.  1 , 1 0 7  Green's ideas had grown i n  p o p u l a r i t y , c e r t a i n l y among B r i t i s h Columbia C o n s e r v a t i v e s . Mr.  1 0 8  Pearkes drew to the a t t e n t i o n o f the House the l a c k o f a sub-  marine defence on the West C o a s t  1 0 9  and Mr.  F u l t o n reminded the  Commons t h a t g r e a t e r p r e c a u t i o n s were being taken on the A t l a n t i c seaboard  than the P a c i f i c .  By September, 1950  1 1 0  a Pacific  s e c u r i t y p a c t had become p a r t of the p o l i c y o f the e n t i r e Progressive Conservative  Party.  The government a t f i r s t the rumoured p a c t .  Mr.  claimed ignorance  concerning  Pearson d i d argue, however, t h a t the  A t l a n t i c pact would be f e l t the world o v e r ' .  111  He a l s o s t r e s s e d  t h a t Canada d i d have r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n the P a c i f i c a r e a the C h a r t e r of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  through  To add to these w i t h more 112  s p e c i f i c ones would "be a v e r y r a s h c o u r s e . " than Mr.  More  important  Pearson's g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s , however, i n e x p l a i n i n g govern-  ment r e a s o n i n g , was  the admission by h i s c o l l e a g u e , Mr.  t h a t a fundamental premise of defence  the A t l a n t i c was  the more exposed o f the two  The C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y was r e a s o n i n g and Mr.  s t r a t e g y was  Green,  1 1 4  Claxton,  the b e l i e f t h a t 113  coastlines.  d i s s a t i s f i e d with L i b e r a l  w i t h the a b l e a s s i s t a n c e of h i s  65  party leader, critic,  1 1 5  and the C o n s e r v a t i v e s e n i o r f o r e i g n  affairs  c o n t i n u e d to r a i s e the matter i n almost every  debate  on f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The P a c i f i c p a c t concept was dropped by the  Conservatives  by the middle 1950s and was not an i s s u e i n the e l e c t i o n s of or 1958.  And from the Tory governments  formed there were no i n d i c a t i o n s was s t i l l c o n s i d e r e d  that were  subsequently  that a P a c i f i c s e c u r i t y  alliance  desirable.  Thus the second major attempt a t p o l i c y - m a k i n g i n House won as l i t t l e  1957  success as the e f f o r t s  of 1945 to  1947.  T h i s chapter has been f i l l e d w i t h much (perhaps much), d e s c r i p t i v e a n a l y s i s .  too  By r e v i e w i n g and d i s s e c t i n g  r e a c t i o n of the House to each o f these d e c i s i o n s ,  the  however,  the I have  t r i e d to g i v e some i d e a of the impact o f the Commons on government defence p o l i c y .  I t would be n a i v e , however,  to hope t h a t  control  c o u l d be measured simply by p e r u s i n g the debates f o r as has a l r e a d y been mentioned,  there i s much i n the workings of the p a r l i a m e n t a r y  system t h a t cannot be understood by r e a d i n g Hansard. l i m i t a t i o n s of the method, however, general  it  is possible  Within  the  to draw some  conclusions. On broad p o l i c y there was g e n e r a l agreement among  all  the p a r t i e s  Commons.  (except the B l o c P o p u l a i r e ) i n the House of  P o l i c y was formed by the government and supported by  66  the other p a r t i e s .  There were no i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t the i d e a s  the o p p o s i t i o n groups i n any way helped to shape those of  of  the  government. W i t h i n the contours of broad p o l i c y there were differences  i n emphasis between the p a r t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y  b e g i n n i n g o f rearmament i n 1951.  Where these  after  differences  o c c u r r e d , however, the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s achieved no n o t a b l e success i n d i s c r e d i t i n g government p o l i c y .  The primary c o n -  t r i b u t i o n of the House of Commons throughout these debates  was  to focus p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n on matters the government a p p a r e n t l y p r e f e r r e d not to d i s c u s s  in detail.  suggestions and q u e s t i o n s ,  Through t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s ,  members o f the House were a b l e  shed more l i g h t on defence developments have happened.  They thus a s s i s t e d  than might  to  otherwise  i n making an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of the defence e f f o r t a simple matter f o r the g e n e r a l p u b l i c . It is parties,  important to note t h a t i t was when the o p p o s i t i o n  e s p e c i a l l y the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e s , d i r e c t l y  attempted to i n f l u e n c e p o l i c y that they were most u s e f u l .  Al-  though t h e i r ideas d i d not r e s u l t i n changes o f p o l i c y ,  they  d i d f o r c e the government to s p e l l out i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l  the  reasons f o r t h e i r own p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . alternatives  to broad p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s  T h u s , the absence  of  seems c e r t a i n l y to have  been one of the primary reasons f o r the shallowness  of the broad  67  p o l i c y debates.  Perhaps the b e s t t h a t can be s a i d o f  the  House was that i t d i d appear to m i r r o r Canadian p u b l i c o p i n i o n .  C H A P T E R  III  CONTROL OF DEFENCE ADMINISTRATION,  1945 - 1957:  THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE  In t h i s chapter,  control of L i b e r a l administration  through the technique o f c r i t i c a l debate w i l l be examined. I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t i n order a n a l y t i c a l framework, p o l i c y was separated  to e s t a b l i s h an  from a d m i n i s t r a t i o n by  a c r i t e r i o n that was r e f e r r e d to as p o t e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l tion.  Administration  implica-  was d e f i n e d as an a c t o r d e c i s i o n t h a t ,  taken by i t s e l f , i s n o t important enough to a s s i s t o r to damage s i g n i f i c a n t l y the p r o s p e c t s election.  o f the government i n a forthcoming  I t should be noted,however, t h a t an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  matter need n o t be f r e e o f a l l p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s ; f o r seemingly i n s i g n i f i c a n t matters a r e r a i s e d p e r i o d i c a l l y by the o p p o s i t i o n and these o f t e n embarrass the government. series o f apparently  When a  i n s i g n i f i c a n t matters i s r a i s e d , i t i s  p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e i r cumulative impact may q u a l i t a t i v e l y change  68  69 the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the e n t i r e i s s u e and the t o t a l impact may be one o f g r e a t p o l i t i c a l importance. i t i e s o f 1950 - 51 a r e the o u t s t a n d i n g  The Petawawa i r r e g u l a r examples o f such an  occurrence i n the defence department. The  range o f d e c i s i o n s i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n group i s  g r e a t and i n c l u d e s important a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , s t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a l ones as w e l l as the more r o u t i n e a c t i v i t i e s . t h i s chapter  the important  ( a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) has been d i v o r c e d  from the r o u t i n e ( a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) , much as p o l i c y was from a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and each c o n s i d e r e d important aspects chapter.  Within  separately.  of administration are considered  The r o u t i n e p a r t s afterwards.  divded The more  first  i n this  Toward the end, c o n t r o l  o f l e g i s l a t i o n i s covered. In chapter  two, s e v e r a l t y p i c a l d e c i s i o n s were used  as case s t u d i e s and from i n v e s t i g a t i n g these i t was p o s s i b l e t o draw some g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n s . however, i t i s more d i f f i c u l t study.  Despite  A t the l e v e l being  s t u d i e d now,  to f i n d t y p i c a l d e c i s i o n s f o r s p e c i a l  t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , i t has been p o s s i b l e t o s e l e c t  s e v e r a l j n o t so much because they a r e t y p i c a l as because the e f f e c t i v e n e s s and p a t t e r n o f Commons i n f l u e n c e throughout the range i s such t h a t the study o f almost any few d e c i s i o n s would yield similar results.  To demonstrate the g e n e r a l v a l i d i t y o f  t h i s o p i n i o n , t h r e e have been s e l e c t e d and they were chosen f o r  70 two r e a s o n s .  First,  perhaps a l i t t l e  they r e v e a l the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p a t t e r n -  more c l e a r l y than t o t a l l y random c h o i c e s would  have.  Second, they are d i s s i m i l a r enough i n s u b j e c t  that i t  is  i m p o s s i b l e to i n t e r p r e t the r e s u l t s  the House i s  either effective  s u b j e c t w i t h i n the range. services,  or i n e f f e c t i v e  matter  as i n d i c a t i n g t h a t  only for a p a r t i c u l a r  The three are the u n i f i c a t i o n o f  the development and p r o d u c t i o n of the CF-100 a i r c r a f t  and the r o l e and preparedness of the mobile b r i g a d e group.  UNIFICATION OF SERVICES  During the e a r l y post-war p e r i o d there was c o n s i d e r a b l e u n c e r t a i n t y concerning the f u t u r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the armed f o r c e s . The 1945 Speech from the Throne^stated t h a t a " c o n s o l i d a t i o n of all  defence  s e r v i c e s under one m i n i s t e r o f the crown w i l l be 2  made i n due c o u r s e . " introduced B i l l  In J u l y 1946, however,  304 which gave i t  as three e x t r a defence  ministers  the government  the r i g h t to appoint as many (with d e p u t i e s ) ,  to the M i n i s t e r of N a t i o n a l Defence.  i n addition  The b i l l p r o v i d e d t h a t  these three m i n i s t e r s might be appointed to head departments f o r each of the three f o r c e s .  separate  Thus the b i l l  clearly  c o n t r a d i c t e d the promises t h a t had been made i n the 1945 Throne 3 Speech. O p i n i o n i n the House o f Commons r a n s t r o n g l y  against  71  the b i l l .  Mr.  Pearkes  p o i n t e d out the d e s i r a b i l i t y of i n t e r -  s e r v i c e c o o p e r a t i o n i n p l a n n i n g and s p e n d i n g  4  and suggested  as a s t a r t "perhaps the m e d i c a l , d e n t a l , pay or  that  commisariat  s e r v i c e s might. . . be combined, i n s t e a d of t h e r e being a separate s e r v i c e f o r the army, the navy and the a i r f o r c e . "  5  Mr.  C.Power,  the wartime L i b e r a l Assco;cliat;e>!, M i n i s t e r of N a t i o n a l Defence and M i n i s t e r o f N a t i o n a l D e f e n c e f o r A i r , c r i t i c i z e d the s e p a r a t e a i r arm maintained by the Royal Canadian Navy. ".  . .a  double  . . . a double and a double  s e t o f aerodromes, a double set of s t a f f o f f i c e r s .  set of d e s i g n e r s . "  T h i s means, he  argued,  s e t of t e c h n i c a l s c h o o l s  . . a double  set of planners  6  The o p p o s i t i o n d i d not speak out f o r a s i n g l e department, however, u n t i l the government i n t r o d u c e d B i l l 304.  But when the  government d i d , the s e n i o r C o n s e r v a t i v e c r i t i c s t a t e d : An argument may be put forward f o r r e t a i n i n g a m i n i s t e r f o r a i r f o r a l i m i t e d p e r i o d w h i l e dem o b i l i z a t i o n i s going on and w h i l e the a i r f o r c e i s r e a d j u s t i n g to peacetime c o n d i t i o n s . But i f we are to have any common d o c t r i n e between the s e r v i c e s , I t h i n k the f i r s t step should be to get those s e r v i c e s under one m i n i s t e r . 7  Q  Cooperative Commonwealth F e d e r a t i o n Mr.  Pearkes"  thesis.  0  c r i t i c , Mr.  Probe,  supported  9  On December 12, 1946,  as p a r t of an important  i n the Mackenzie King C a b i n e t , i t was  shuffle  announced t h a t the Honourable  Brooke C l a x t o n had been appointed M i n i s t e r o f N a t i o n a l Defence  72  and t h a t the t h r e e armed s e r v i c e s were to be u n i t e d i n a s i n g l e department under him.  The purpose o f the step was to ensure  the "maximum p o s s i b l e degree o f c o o r d i n a t i o n and to e l i m i n a t e d u p l i c a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s i n the Navy, Army and A i r F o r c e . " Immediately a f t e r i n t r o d u c i n g the necessary l e g i s l a t i o n ,  1 0  the  Prime M i n i s t e r announced to a p r e s s conference that the i n t e g r a t i o n o f the f o r c e s i n t o one department was a step that he had long planned."'"  1  Some s i x days e a r l i e r M r . Pearkes had attempted to take the c r e d i t f o r t h i s  development:  I am p l e a s e d t h a t the change has been made, and a l s o that other recommendations coming from t h i s s i d e o f the house have been adopted. We have suggested t h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s e r v i c e s of the three departments might be amalgamated and. . . t h a t course i s b e i n g f o l l o w e d . The t r u t h seems to be somewhere between the of Prime M i n i s t e r King and M r . P e a r k e s .  Certainly,  statement has to be q u e r i e d i n the l i g h t of B i l l  304.  assertions the f o r m e r s T  By the  same t o k e n , however, t h e r e i s no evidence to suggest a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between c r i t i c i s m s i n the House and the  legislation  that was u l t i m a t e l y p a s s e d . I n the face of a h o s t i l e House of Commons the government permitted B i l l  304 to l a p s e .  The subsequent l e g i s l a t i o n d i d  i n c l u d e the major changes t h a t had been recommended by the opposition p a r t i e s .  1 3  Considerable control  ( b e a r i n g i n mind  73 the d e f i n i t i o n g i v e n  to the word) thus appears to have been  e x e r c i s e d by the House o f Commons. I t i s perhaps u s e f u l to add or f i v e years the P r o g r e s s i v e criticize  t h a t over the f o l l o w i n g  Conservative  P a r t y continued  four  to  the government f o r i t s f a i l u r e to e l i m i n a t e d u p l i c a t i o n  o f s e r v i c e s w i t h i n the defence d e p a r t m e n t .  14  were made by  some of them were  the c r i t i c s o f t h i s p a r t y and  l a t e r incorporated  Numerous suggestions  i n t o the government's programme.  While no  doubt i t would be absurd to a t t r i b u t e these changes s o l e l y to  the  o p p o s i t i o n , f o r many were a l r e a d y under review i n the department, it  seems e q u a l l y c l e a r t h a t by b r i n g i n g the v a r i o u s  issues  out  i n t o the open, the House o f Commons d i d have some i n d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e over the d e c i s i o n s taken by the government.  THE  CF-100 AIRCRAFT  Through much o f the 1950s, Canada's c h i e f c o n t r i b u t i o n to the a i r defence of North America was  the twin-engine a l l -  weather f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t numbered the.CF-100 and nicknamed "Canuck".  Because t h i s plane was  both developed and  the  produced  i n t h i s c o u n t r y , i t c o s t the Canadian taxpayer many m i l l i o n s of dollars. for  Not  o n l y f o r s t r a t e g i c reasons, t h e r e f o r e , but  f i n a n c i a l ones, the CF-100 was  members i n the Lower House.  of considerable  At f i r s t  also  i n t e r e s t to  t h i s i n t e r e s t was  restricted  74  p r i m a r i l y t o the government's success production. the  i n development and  L a t e r i t came t o i n c l u d e the t a c t i c a l use o f  aircraft. A f t e r the outbreak o f h o s t i l i t i e s i n Korea, the House  not u n n a t u r a l l y became i n c r e a s i n g l y concerned w i t h the f o r c e s and weapons immediately a v a i l a b l e and under development f o r the defence o f Canada.  Among these was the CF-100 and members s e t  out to determine how soon t h i s aeroplane  would be ready.  The  defence m i n i s t e r , however, was l e s s than c o o p e r a t i v e : I do n o t suggest r e a l l y f o r a second t h a t the d i s c l o s u r e o f t h i s (the date f o r o p e r a t i o n a l use of the plane) i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l e i t h e r h u r t o r h e l p our p r o s p e c t i v e enemy i n any important way except perhaps t h i s : I t would enable him to t e l l e x a c t l y what k i n d o f f o r c e f o r the i n t e r c e p t i o n o f any a i r a t t a c k on t h i s c o n t i n e n t he might f i r s t have to meet, and a t what time i t would be ready. Then i t would i n d i c a t e t o him whether o r n o t h i s own i n t e l l i g e n c e was e f f i c i e n t , a c c u r a t e , r e l i a b l e , and which o f h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r s c o u l d be r e l i e d upon.15 The  House l e a r n e d nothing  from the m i n i s t e r .  Nor would h i s  c o l l e a g u e Mr. Howe r e v e a l the i n f o r m a t i o n although  the l a t t e r s T  remarks i n d i c a t e d t h a t he was l e s s concerned w i t h problems o f s e c u r i t y than w i t h the d i f f i c u l t y o f p r e d i c t i n g e x a c t l y when the first  plane would be o f f the assembly l i n e .  Mr. Howe d i d  tell  the House, however, t h a t the planned r a t e o f p r o d u c t i o n was twenty planes p e r month - i n f o r m a t i o n Mr. C l a x t o n a p p a r e n t l y had been a f r a i d t o r e v e a l o n l y s i x months earlier."*"  0  75 By the s p r i n g o f 1951 restless.  The  members o f the House were becoming  i n t e r n a t i o n a l atmosphere had not  M i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s had been spent  improved.  (and d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t  the government had been t e l l i n g the people o f Canada e x c e l l e n t a weapon was  how  the CF-100)the Royal Canadian A i r F o r c e  1 7  18 s t i l l had no Canucks.  These c r i t i c i s m s  a p p a r e n t l y were  s u f f i c i e n t to put the government a t l e a s t t e m p o r a r i l y on d e f e n s i v e f o r Mr. planned  C l a x t o n hastened  the  to a s s u r e the House t h a t the  r a t e o f p r o d u c t i o n would be reached  e a r l y i n the f o l l o w i n g  19 year.  In October 1951,  amidst much f a n f a r e and  t h a t some f e l t had unnecessary CF-100 was  p o l i t i c a l overtones, the  turned over to the R.C.A.F. and Mr.  t h a t although f u l l  publicity  s c a l e p r o d u c t i o n ".  first  Howe argued  . . was n e c e s s a r i l y  s t i l l many months o f f . . ." t h a t Canada's r e c o r d , i n comparison to the speed of a i r c r a f t development i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s U n i t e d Kingdom, was  an " e n v i a b l e " one.  and  The government had  s i l e n c e d i t s c r i t i c s i n the House. Soon t h e r e a f t e r the government s u f f e r e d s e v e r a l s e t backs i n i t s programme, however, and the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y r e t u r n e d to the a t t a c k . 2,1 Messieurs D i n s d a l e  Harshest  and Harkness.  The  o f the c r i t i c s were  l a t t e r notably  the government of having t r i e d to e x p l o i t i t s e a r l y w i t h the a i r c r a f t f o r p o l i t i c a l  purposes.  2 2  accused  successes  76  The M i n i s t e r of N a t i o n a l Defence attempted to "brush o f f " h i s c r i t i c s but n e v e r t h e l e s s  was f o r c e d to admit f u l l p r o d u c t i o n 23  would now not be commenced u n t i l  1953.  P r o d u c t i o n acknowledged t h a t "set-backs  The M i n i s t e r o f Defence and delays" had o c c u r r e d .  The o p p o s i t i o n c o n t i n u e d to b r i n g p r e s s u r e and p u b l i c i t y of k i n d to the p r o d u c t i o n programme u n t i l i t was n e a r l y  complete.  The P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e s a l s o attempted to some i n f l u e n c e over the t a c t i c a l use o f the CF-100.  this 2 4  exercise  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  they questioned the wisdom o f the government i n equipping ten squadrons o f the A u x i l i a r y A i r F o r c e w i t h C F - l O O s . Almost from the o u t s e t , its  doubts.  the C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y r e g i s t e r e d  M r . D i n s d a l e argued: "With the p r e s e n t  t r a i n i n g going on i n the r e s e r v e squadrons, I am very whether i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e standard of e f f i c i e n c y weather f i g h t e r s attack."  2 5  type o f sceptical  to b r i n g the r e s e r v e crews up to  the  r e q u i r e d f o r r a d a r - e q u i p p e d CF-100 a l l -  and necessary  to cope w i t h any p o s s i b l e a i r b o r n e  M r . Harkness s t r e s s e d  the d i f f i c u l t y i n t r a i n i n g and 1ft  maintaining navigators at o p e r a t i o n a l I t was not u n t i l a f t e r these f i r s t  efficiency.  the summer o f 1955,  more than two years  s u g g e s t i o n s , t h a t the M i n i s t e r of N a t i o n a l  Defence even mentioned the s u b j e c t and then i t was o n l y f u r t h e r i n q u i r i e s by M r . D i n s d a l e .  An i n t e n s i v e  after  study of  the  77  problem was  i n p r o g r e s s , he t o l d the House, and he  t h a t the s i t u a t i o n was  "doubtful".  2 7  admitted  By the f o l l o w i n g June,  i n l i n e w i t h the c r i t i c i s m s o f the C o n s e r v a t i v e members, he admitted  t h a t c o n d i t i o n s were too e x a c t i n g t o equip A u x i l i a r y  p e r s o n n e l w i t h the Canuck and t h a t the department had  decided  to abandon t h a t p l a n . The P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y kept the CF-100 programme under c a r e f u l s c r u t i n y from 1949 u n t i l 1957.  Critic-  isms by i t s members were b o t h r e s p o n s i b l e and, as i t turned out, quite accurate.  Through t h e i r c o n t i n u e d e f f o r t members were  a b l e to put the government on the d e f e n s i v e on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s each time f o r c i n g the r e s p o n s i b l e m i n i s t e r s to go through p a i n f u l experience of j u s t i f y i n g q u e s t i o n a b l e a c t i o n s .  the In  those cases members were a b l e to a c q u i r e a good d e a l more i n f o r m a t i o n on the programme than the government might o t h e r wise have decided to p r o v i d e .  F i n a l l y , the s u g g e s t i o n concerning  the use o f the a i r c r a f t by the A u x i l i a r y i s an i n d i c a t i o n o f the extent of o p p o s i t i o n i n f l u e n c e .  I t i s not suggested here t h a t  the government simply accepted an o p p o s i t i o n c r i t i c i s m f o r a c c o r d i n g to Mr.  Campney the matter was  under review i n the 29  department even b e f o r e the f i r s t C o n s e r v a t i v e c r i t i c i s m s . Rather  i t i s b e i n g argued however t h a t the o p p o s i t i o n , through  i t s e n e r g e t i c work, was  a b l e to b r i n g i n t o the p u b l i c eye one  of  78  the major weaknesses i n the programme of the government thus p u t t i n g pressure  on the government to make c e r t a i n that i t was  making the r i g h t d e c i s i o n .  THE  MOBILE STRIKING FORCE (AIRBORNE BRIGADE GROUP)  In the autumn of 1945,  w h i l e d i s c u s s i n g plans  f o r the  f u t u r e f o r c e s , defence m i n i s t e r Abbott announced t h a t Canada s T  post-war army would c o n t a i n a " s m a l l formation  of e s s e n t i a l u n i t s "  30 ready to meet whatever dangers might a r i s e . 31 questioning formation  from Mr.  he had  , the m i n i s t e r r e v e a l e d  r e f e r r e d to was  a d d i t i o n a l armour and the b r i g a d e ,  Pearkes  group was  a brigade  artillery.  The  he admitted, would not be  l o c a t i o n but r a t h e r they would be The  Under c a r e f u l  the  group augmented by  u n i t s that were to form stationed at a s i n g l e 32  s c a t t e r e d across  p o s i t i o n o f the C o n s e r v a t i v e  a b l y summarised by Mr.  that  Canada.  P a r t y on the  brigade  Harkness:  I f we had a b r i g a d e group t h a t c o u l d be a f i g h t i n g f o r c e and t h a t was ready to go some p l a c e I would say t h a t would a t l e a s t be a good s t a r t . But i f we are to have a s o - c a l l e d b r i g a d e group which i s s c a t t e r e d a l l over the country i n d r i b s and drabs and i n t h a t p o s i t i o n , i s no good f o r anything as f a r as f i g h t i n g i s concerned, then the government have nothing and are wasting the money of the t a x p a y e r . Through u n t i l 1950 t h i s continued to be the main c r i t i c i s m of 3 3  the P r o g r e s s i v e  Conservative  Party.  79  In June 1950 the defence minister expressed his confidence to the House that the force was well-organized,  mobile  34 and very experienced.  The minister's remarks provoked an  onslaught from the Conservative  benches.  Mr. Hees pointed out  that members of the s t r i k i n g force were being used to t r a i n the Emergency Force for Korea and he enquired how t h e i r own state 35  of preparedness could be retained while training other  troops.  Mr. Harkness stressed that although 80% of the establishment had been r e c r u i t e d , there was s t i l l much imbalance between the three battalions and that two of them had considerably fewer than the Of.  80% average.  F i n a l l y , Mr. Pearkes attacked the entire purpose  of the brigade group by questioning the idea that the only type of attack that would be launched against Canada would be a diversionary one, the strategic premise on which the airborne 37 brigade group had been based. In 1951, the Conservatives their criticisms.  repeated but broadened  They continued  to stress that the formation 38 was not a brigade group since i t didn't even t r a i n together. Also, they began to emphasize that i t was not airborne for there 39 were i n s u f f i c i e n t transport planes to move the u n i t s . In replying the minister admitted that the necessary transport planes were lacking but he argued that the basic  80  strategic  considerations  had a l t e r e d and t h a t the defence d e p a r t -  ment no longer v i s u a l i z e d u s i n g the b r i g a d e group as a whole. Rather i t was expected  t h a t no more than one b a t t a l i o n w i t h 4  s u p p o r t i n g u n i t s would be r e q u i r e d i n any one p l a c e a t one C o n s e r v a t i v e c r i t i c i s m of the i m m o b i l i t y of the f o r c e  persisted  through u n t i l the middle 1950s, however, when e v e n t u a l l y developed t h i s  c r i t i c i s m into a positive  time.  they  demand f o r a s m a l l f u l l y  mobile army i n which armour and a r t i l l e r y , as w e l l as i n f a n t r y , 41 c o u l d be r a p i d l y t r a n s p o r t e d anywhere i n Canada.  By 1956  government had come around to the o p p o s i t i o n v i e w p o i n t ;  the  f o r on  June 20 of that year M r . C l a x t o n announced p l a n s f o r a more mobile army and admitted t h a t the p l a n s were " i n l i n e w i t h views '"* 42 expressed by some hon. members l a s t  year."  The three cases s t u d i e d i n t h i s (although perhaps a l i t t l e  too f l a t t e r i n g  chapter are t y p i c a l to the C o n s e r v a t i v e  P a r t y ) of o p p o s i t i o n debate and c r i t i c i s m at the l e v e l of what has l o o s e l y been c a l l e d important a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  decisions.  G e n e r a l l y the debate was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by s e v e r a l  factors.  First, critics, recognize  i t was r e s t r a i n e d and r e s p o n s i b l e .  especially  Opposition  those of the C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y , seemed to  t h a t as members of a p o t e n t i a l a l t e r n a t i v e  government,  t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s and suggestions should be ones t h a t they c o u l d honestly  attempt  to enforce  should they achieve  power.  81 Second,  the C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y tended to be p e r s i s t e n t  and hardworking i n f o l l o w i n g a l l developments i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and s t a t e of preparedness Canada.  organization,  of the defences o f  T h e i r r e c o r d i n c r i t i c i z i n g and suggesting was some-  what mixed.  On most o c c a s i o n s ,  at t h e i r d i s p o s a l ,  they had s u f f i c i e n t  information  combined w i t h the necessary p e r s o n n e l ,  the government under e f f e c t i v e p r e s s u r e .  to put  On t h i s p o i n t i t  should  perhaps be p o i n t e d out that a l l members o f the P r o g r e s s i v e Conserva t i v e House of Commons Defence Committee had served i n the armed forces.  The chairman, M r . P e a r k e s , had achieved the rank of  M a j o r - G e n e r a l i n the permanent Army and the v i c e - c h a i r m e n , Mr. M e r r i t t  (1945-49) and M r . Harkness (1949-57)had h e l d the  o f C o l o n e l d u r i n g the war y e a r s . i n evaluating  Thus they were not u n q u a l i f i e d  the i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e .  The v a l i d i t y of  c r i t i c i s m s and s u g g e s t i o n s , on more than one o c c a s i o n , confirmed by subsequent m o d i f i c a t i o n s  their  were  i n the government's  programme.  On the other hand, as the years wore on from 1945 1957,  to  these men became f u r t h e r and f u r t h e r removed from the  defence o r g a n i z a t i o n .  The r a p i d changes i n the defence  together w i t h the p e r e n n i a l shortage  In p a r t i c u l a r i t  e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y hard f o r defence c r i t i c s  to document  criticisms.  function,  of i n f o r m a t i o n on d e f e n c e ,  made t h e i r j o b i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t .  their  office  became  substantively  82 To g i v e an a i r o f v a l i d i t y to t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s , fore,  there-  members began t u r n i n g to newspaper r e p o r t s and e d i t o r i a l s  and a r t i c l e s government,  in periodicals.  In the l a s t  few years of  Liberal  the remarks of r e t i r e d s e n i o r m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l  served as an added r e s e r v o i r .  The o p p o s i t i o n were aware of  the shortcomings o f these v a r i o u s s o u r c e s ,  however, and t h e r e f o r e  waged a continuous b a t t l e w i t h the government over the l a c k o f first-hand information. the Supply defence  Indeed the c e n t r a l theme of s e v e r a l of  debates was the l a c k of i n f o r m a t i o n and not  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of n a t i o n a l  defence.  A t h i r d g e n e r a l comment may be made w i t h r e f e r e n c e the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . the government.  to  L i b e r a l members almost never c r i t i c i z e d  On the o t h e r hand, on the few o c c a s i o n s when  a government supporter d i d speak o u t , h i s words were g i v e n c a r e f u l consideration.  T h i s was e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e of the i n f r e q u e n t remarks  o f the member f o r Quebec S o u t h , Mr. Power.  Social Credit  c r i t i c i s m s were almost as few as L i b e r a l ones and of importance.  The C . C . F . ,  Credit Party, nevertheless  a l t h o u g h more a c t i v e than the S o c i a l contributed very l i t t l e  In c o n t r a s t to the above three p a r t i e s , were e n e r g e t i c  little  and c o n s c i e n t i o u s  at t h i s  level.  the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e s  and i t was they alone who s u s t a i n e d  debate a t t h i s more o r l e s s i n t e r m e d i a t e range i n the p o l i c y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n continuum. In g e n e r a l ,  the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y made i t  83  i m p o s s i b l e f o r the government to r u n roughshod over P a r l i a m e n t and the c o u n t r y .  By c o n t i n u a l l y a s k i n g f o r i n f o r m a t i o n , opposing  and c r i t i c i z i n g , they f o r c e d the government to r e v e a l , and j u s t i f y ,  which i n i t s e l f  i s of g r e a t v a l u e .  explain  A l t h o u g h there  i s no p r o o f t h a t any o f t h e i r suggestions r e s u l t e d d i r e c t l y i n  44 modifications  i n the L i b e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  the f a c t t h a t many  o f t h e i r ideas were i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the subsequent  Liberal  programme does i n d i c a t e a t the v e r y l e a s t t h a t t h e i r  criticisms  45  were f o r the most p a r t r e a s o n a b l e .  Therefore i t  safe to argue t h a t the government d i d f e e l by the knowledge t h a t an e n e r g e t i c  somewhat  seems to be restrained  and reasonable o p p o s i t i o n was  w a i t i n g to d e a l w i t h i t s programme. I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t " p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l " was i n terms o f e l e c t i o n s and e l e c t o r a l a p p e a l .  It  i s argued here  t h a t a l t h o u g h the o p p o s i t i o n f a i l e d to d i s c r e d i t the i n the eyes o f the v o t e r s , it  d i d keep up s u f f i c i e n t  government  by p r o v i n g m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to continuous p r e s s u r e that the  p r o b a b l y was f o r c e d to r e - a p p r a i s e i t s the l i g h t o f o p p o s i t i o n s c r u t i n y .  defined  them,  government  programme p e r i o d i c a l l y i n  I t perhaps should a l s o be  added t h a t much of the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a t t h i s  level  i s of a  g e n e r a l but not a p o l i t i c a l n a t u r e , thus making i t d i f f i c u l t  to  wage an e l e c t i o n i n terms o f i s s u e s o f t h i s k i n d . F i n a l l y , where the i n t e n t i o n of the House o f Commons  84  was to i n f l u e n c e r a t h e r than t o oppose and d i s c r e d i t government p o l i c i e s the words o f the Honourable Ralph Campney a r e o f no small  importance: I would a l s o add t h a t n o t i n f r e q u e n t l y members of the o p p o s i t i o n go to the M i n i s t e r o f N a t i o n a l Defence t o make p r i v a t e suggestions which a r e w e l l r e c e i v e d and o c c a s i o n a l l y bear f r u i t i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f Government p o l i c y , and t h i s i s a much more e f f e c t i v e way o f i n f l u e n c i n g Government p o l i c y by members o f the o p p o s i t i o n than to b r i n g such matters up i n i t i a l l y i n the House o f Commons.^° T h i s makes i t c l e a r t h a t n o t o n l y i s t h e r e much t h a t  cannot be measured by a simple r e a d i n g  o f the p u b l i c documents.  I t a l s o i n d i c a t e s t h a t a l t h o u g h c l o s e l y r e l a t e d , i n f l u e n c e and c o n t r o l (as d e f i n e d here) a r e d e c i d e d l y n o t synonymous.  ROUTINE ADMINISTRATION  The  next problem,  t h a t i s i n v e s t i g a t e d i n t h i s chapter  i s Commons c o n t r o l o f r o u t i n e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . i s d i v i d e d i n t o two p a r t s .  The d i s c u s s i o n  The f i r s t d e a l s w i t h what might be  c a l l e d r e g u l a r annual performance i n attempting to e x e r c i s e control.  The second covers two important v a r i a t i o n s from t h i s  pattern. A f t e r the g e n e r a l and  d i s c u s s i o n of p o l i c y , administration  s t r a t e g y i n Committee o f Supply, debate i s l e s s the monopoly  of the few defence experts  and more open t o the backbenchers and  85  their investigations  i n t o the d e t a i l s  of administration.  t h i s p a r t of the debate there were s e v e r a l c a t e g o r i e s t h a t were t y p i c a l l y First,  of  In issues  discussed.  there was some s c r u t i n y o f defence  expenditures,  p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Supply f o r the Department o f Defence P r o d u c t i o n . C o n t r o l o f f i n a n c e , however,  is  investigated  i n another c h a p t e r . ^  Second, there was much q u e s t i o n i n g o f the m i n i s t e r , p a r t of the g r e a t s e a r c h f o r i n f o r m a t i o n .  D e s p i t e numerous  charges to the c o n t r a r y , c a r e f u l p e r u s a l of the debates has r e v e a l e d t h a t w i t h v e r y few e x c e p t i o n s , Defence  the M i n i s t e r of N a t i o n a l  (or h i s P a r l i a m e n t a r y A s s i s t a n t ) was w i l l i n g to p r o v i d e  the i n f o r m a t i o n requested by the members i n the Commons.  On the  other hand, i t has to b e . a d m i t t e d that members r a r e l y attempted to p e n e t r a t e beyond the w a l l o f s e c u r i t y .  In t h i s  respect  members o f the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e and the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t i e s tended to be more t o l e r a n t toward s e c u r i t y than were members of the C . C . F .  considerations  These i n f o r m a l q u e s t i o n and  answer p e r i o d s were v a l u a b l e as a method of removing much o f the mantle of secrecy Equally s i g n i f i c a n t ,  that covered the defence  department.  they p r o v i d e d the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s w i t h  much of the b a s i c i n t e l l i g e n c e  r e q u i r e d to develop a g e n e r a l  understanding of the government s T  defence programme.  Two a d d i t i o n a l p o i n t s should be noted on t h i s  second  86  category o f i s s u e .  First,  to "dig up" s u f f i c i e n t  o p p o s i t i o n members were not  instances  able  of c o r r u p t i o n , maladministration  or waste to d i s g r a c e the government.  Indeed, more than one  attempt to "blow up" i n s i g n i f i c a n t i s s u e s r e f l e c t e d more d i s 48 c r e d i t on the member than on the government. Second, the u s e f u l n e s s o f the q u e s t i o n p e r i o d was l i m i t e d by the a b i l i t y of members to ask questions  that would  p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n u s e f u l i n making a sound g e n e r a l a p p r a i s a l o f the strengths from questions after  1949,  and weaknesses o f the defence programme. on t h e i r own c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ,  showed l i t t l e  aptitude i n this f i e l d .  1945-49 p e r i o d , the defence numerous war v e t e r a n s usefully  members,  Apart  especially During  f u n c t i o n was c l o s e enough to  the  i n the House t h a t they were a b l e to  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the Department, e s p e c i a l l y  d e m o b i l i z a t i o n and r e p a t r i a t i o n . twenty-second P a r l i a m e n t s , t h i s  the  But i n the t w e n t y - f i r s t  question on and  important s k i l l was r e s t r i c t e d  p r i m a r i l y to M r . Harkness, and to a much l e s s e r e x t e n t , M r . P e a r k e s . Other members, a l t h o u g h they might accumulate much i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e i r q u e s t i o n s  d u r i n g the d i s c u s s i o n ,  c e r t a i n of the s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f the answers  seldom seemed q u i t e they r e c e i v e d and  how they might be turned to t h e i r advantage i n the g e n e r a l debates. A t h i r d type of i s s u e r a i s e d d u r i n g these debates  87  was  the grievance  of the i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n .  Indeed, this was  the  only contribution of some backbenchers to the defence debate. from my r i d i n g , claims one member, despite an excellent war  record  and f i n e health, has been rejected from the post-war force. long tirade on Mr. X s T  Mr.X,  A  patriotism and his i n a b i l i t y to f i n d  alternate employment follows.  The discussion t y p i c a l l y closed  with the minister's promise to investigate the case. Throughout Supply, two, members seized the opportunity constituents.  three or more times each year,  to a i r the grievances  The record generally was  mixed.  of t h e i r  Many of the cases  presented, p a r t i c u l a r l y by C.C.F. members, were well-documented and 49  sophisticated.  '  Numerous other cases, however, quite often  presented by French Canadian members although c e r t a i n l y not exclusive to them, indicated that the members were protesting against  the  rules and regulations of the defence department, and not merely an unfair i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or implementation of them."*  0  So what, shouted  the f i e r y "brass-hat" hunter Mr. Pouliot, i f Romeo Santerre the minimum education required for the forces.  lacks  Let us look at the  human side of the story and forget the bureaucracy and i t s regulations.  In many cases of the l a t t e r kind, the i r r a t i o n a l and  poorly  documented presentation seemed to suggest that the member was  less con-  cerned with influencing the government than i n assuring h i s constituents  88 t h a t he was working on t h e i r  behalf.  D e s p i t e the mixed r e c o r d ,  the o p p o r t u n i t y t o  ventilate  g r i e v a n c e d i d serve as an important safeguard a g a i n s t a r b i t r a r y actions Defence.  of o f f i c i a l s  possible  o f the Department of N a t i o n a l  In almost a l l cases p r e s e n t e d the m i n i s t e r promised  t h a t the matter would be r e v i e w e d .  Although modifications  in  the o r i g i n a l d e c i s i o n were secured on o n l y a few o c c a s i o n s , full  a  e x p l a n a t i o n was seldom denied the House. Yet the r e c o r d i n the House o f Commons i s d e c e i v i n g ,  most questions citizens minister,  r a i s e d i n t h a t chamber, a f f e c t i n g  individual  had a l r e a d y been brought t o the a t t e n t i o n of or h i s p a r l i a m e n t a r y a s s i s t a n t ,  careful consideration. ones where the r e s u l t s  the  i n p r i v a t e , and g i v e n  Most cases mentioned i n the House thus were of the m i n i s t e r ' s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  had been  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y to the member and were an attempt to f o r c e former's hand.  for  Thus, i f the r e c o r d f o r s e c u r i n g r e d r e s s  the appears  to have o n l y been mediocre, i t must be borne i n mind t h a t numerous amicable s e t t l e m e n t s were made o u t s i d e of the Commons and t h a t the cases r e c o r d e d i n Hansard were o n l y the  exceptions.  On numerous o c c a s i o n s members used the debates s i m p l y as an o p p o r t u n i t y to e x t o l t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n c y u t i o n to the defence  effort.  l o c a l r e s e r v e regiment and i t s  and i t s c o n t r i b -  They d i s c u s s e d the r e c o r d o f  the  desperate need f o r a new armoury.  5 1  89  They p r a i s e d the t r a i n i n g camps, e x e r c i s e s e r v i c e academies occasions,  a r e a s , a i r p o r t s and  located i n their constituencies.  m i l d censure of the government,  member, was o f t e n added.  On such  even by a L i b e r a l  Never, however, were d i s c u s s i o n s  on  l o c a l i s s u e s broadened by the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s i n t o a g e n e r a l a t t a c k on the  government.  A s i m i l a r but more s i g n i f i c a n t  type of c r i t i c i s m was  the n e v e r - e n d i n g a t t a c k by maritime and western members the c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f defence Canada.  against  expenditure and i n d u s t r y i n c e n t r a l  Indeed a r e a s o n a b l e method o f d e s c r i b i n g the Committee  o f Supply f o r Defence P r o d u c t i o n would be to c a l l i t an open, d i v i d e d and weak p r e s s u r e group i n which most o f the members were working on b e h a l f of the economy o f t h e i r own c o n s t i t u e n c y . There i s no e v i d e n c e , however,  t h a t these r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  had  any i n f l u e n c e on the s e v e r a l L i b e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . Perhaps the c r i t i q u e s t h a t evoked the most replies  cautious  from the government were the ones on the number, p l a c e  and r o l e of F r e n c h Canadians i n the defence  forces.  The p r o -  p o r t i o n a t e l y s m a l l number o f F r e n c h Canadians among the. s e n i o r p e r s o n n e l i n the f o r c e s ,  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n s e c u r i n g promotion  and the l a c k o f a s p e c i a l m i l i t a r y academy f o r French Canadians were among the most thoroughly debated o f the problems. I n answering the v a r i o u s charges the m i n i s t e r always  90  took g r e a t pains to s p e l l out the a t t i t u d e of the defence toward French Canada, o f t e n emphasizing the s p e c i a l  department  considerations  i t was r e c e i v i n g and he i n e v i t a b l y c l o s e d w i t h assurances  to  the  52 members that the matter would be re-examined. because of the p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e  Undoubtedly  of F r e n c h - E n g l i s h r e l a t i o n s ,  the v a r i o u s matters r a i s e d f o r d i s c u s s i o n were reviewed c a r e f u l l y by the government and inasmuch as there were m o d i f i c a t i o n s  in  the defence programme that c o i n c i d e d w i t h suggestions of F r e n c h Canadian members, i t  seems l i k e l y that t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  did  have some i n f l u e n c e on the government. In g e n e r a l ,  the debate on r o u t i n e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was  not a p a r t of the o r g a n i z e d o p p o s i t i o n of the p a r t i e s i n House o f Commons.  C e r t a i n l y the i n f o r m a t i o n and evidence  accumulated were not t r a n s l a t e d by the o p p o s i t i o n committees  the  defence  i n t o g e n e r a l a t t a c k s on the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of  the  department. Much of the debate on r o u t i n e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n arose of the r o l e of backbenchers as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s constituencies grievances  and i n t e r e s t  groups.  of the i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s  of  constituents,  A p a r t from a i r i n g  the  and some r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  on b e h a l f of F r e n c h Canada however, these c o n t r i b u t i o n s had i n f l u e n c e on the m i n i s t e r or c a b i n e t . usefulness of this o f some importance.  out  little  On the other hand, the  type of debate to c o n t r o l the bureaucracy i s It  is regrettable,  therefore,  i n the  light  91. of t h i s ,  that so few backbenchers e n e r g e t i c a l l y pursued these  duties. In most years the debate on r o u t i n e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was made up of c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n the four or f i v e c a t e g o r i e s been mentioned. political  Generally,  that have  they were f r e e from the most o v e r t  motives. On two o c c a s i o n s , however, the p o l i t i c s became the  primary i s s u e .  The f i r s t was i n A p r i l  1949 when charges by  Mr. Drew c o n c e r n i n g c e r t a i n North S t a r a i r c r a f t were answered 53  i n c o r r e c t l y by the M i n i s t e r of N a t i o n a l Defence.  Subsequent  evidence brought out by M r . Drew undermined the m i n i s t e r ' s position.  Two days a f t e r the o r i g i n a l a c c u s a t i o n s , M r . C l a x t o n  5 4  admitted to the House o f Commons t h a t he had been p a r t i a l l y  in  e r r o r and "that the t r u t h of t h i s matter l i e s somewhere between what the l e a d e r o f the o p p o s i t i o n says today as to the s i t u a t i o n .  . .  and the perhaps too emphatic d e n i a l o f what he s a i d the o t h e r n i g h t (by m y s e l f ) . "  5 5  Even b e f o r e t h i s a d m i s s i o n , the l e a d e r of the o p p o s i t i o n demanded t h a t the m i n i s t e r r e s i g n .  " I f the m i n i s t e r  still  r e s p e c t s our p a r l i a m e n t a r y system, he owes t h i s house h i s r e s i g n ation now."  5 6  T h i s suggestion was supported by a t l e a s t one o t h e r  member of the p a r t y and c o n s i d e r a b l e p u b l i c i t y was g i v e n to i t the p r o - C o n s e r v a t i v e p r e s s .  in  The m i n i s t e r d i d not r e s i g n , h o w e v e r ,  92 and w i t h i n a few weeks t h e matter was f o r g o t t e n . The variations.  second was by f a r the more important o f the On A p r i l 21, 1952 defence m i n i s t e r C l a x t o n  the House o f Commons that due to t h e f t s and other  informed  irregularities  a t Camp Petawawa, he had engaged Mr. George S. C u r r i e ,  chartered  accountant and a former Deputy M i n i s t e r o f N a t i o n a l Defence, " t o make a f u l l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the s i t u a t i o n , s e c u r i t y and accounting procedures f o r engineering Petawawa and elsewhere;  s t o r e s , equipment and s e r v i c e s a t  h i s powers and terms o f r e f e r e n c e  have  no r e s t r i c t i o n s whatever."^^ Moments a f t e r the announcement by the m i n i s t e r , the l e a d e r o f the o p p o s i t i o n under standing  order  21 moved:  "the  adjournment o f the house f o r the purpose o f d i s c u s s i n g a d e f i n i t e matter o f urgent p u b l i c importance, namely, the n e c e s s i t y f o r an immediate i n q u i r y i n t o the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and e s p e c i a l l y the accounting  methods, o f the Department o f N a t i o n a l Defence, the  l a x i t y o f which has been r e v e a l e d by the wholesale l o o t i n g o f 58 m i l i t a r y property"  and numerous other i r r e g u l a r i t i e s .  The  motion, however, was r u l e d out o f order on t e c h n i c a l grounds and  although the matter was d i s c u s s e d  o c c a s i o n a l l y during the  remainder o f the s e s s i o n , i t was n o t debated f u l l y u n t i l the seventh and l a s t s e s s i o n o f the P a r l i a m e n t , a f t e r the Report had been t a b l e d .  F i n a l l y , on December 15, w i t h Mr. C l a x t o n i n  93 Paris for N.A.T.O.  meetings,  the Prime M i n i s t e r t a b l e d the C u r r i e  Report. The Report w r i t t e n by M r . C u r r i e was s u b j e c t to d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed types of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . s u p p o r t e r s o f the government s t r e s s e d  two  Members and  t h a t " i t was o n l y a t  Petawawa that e x t e n s i v e i r r e g u l a r i t i e s over a long p e r i o d of took p l a c e . "  5 9  They p o i n t e d out t h a t i t  "does not f i t  to i n d i c t o r to smear the whole army works s e r v i c e s because o f the s i n s of a h a n d f u l of c r o o k s . "  6 0  the  time facts  personnel  They emphasized  t h a t "the t o t a l l o s s r e s u l t i n g from m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n s and i r r e g u l a r i t i e s by m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l a t Petawawa was not and  f i n a l l y t h a t many of the d i f f i c u l t i e s  the army works s e r v i c e s and  had "been caused.  sudden expansion of i t s  activities  Korean war and by the l a r g e - s c a l e  large,"  and shortcomings .  . by the  in  tremendous  brought about by the  defence programme i n v o l v e d i n 62  c a r r y i n g out our NATO  activities."  N a t u r a l l y enough, o p p o s i t i o n members c o n c e n t r a t e d on other a s p e c t s of the R e p o r t . had  I f the more s e r i o u s  irregularities  o c c u r r e d a t Petawawa, they c o u l d p o i n t to "the g e n e r a l b r e a k -  down i n the system of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , s u p e r v i s i o n and accounting" and  i t was to the c r e d i t o f p e r s o n n e l a t o t h e r depots  that  they  had not walked through a "door which a fundamentally loose s i t u a t i o n had opened b e f o r e t h e m . "  6 4  They emphasized the  view  1  94  "that the g e n e r a l l y l a x a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s i t u a t i o n would g i v e to waste and i n e f f i c i e n c y actual dishonesty." fact  6 5  f a r more c o s t l y  rise  than that covered by  F i n a l l y they c o n t i n u a l l y r e f e r r e d to  the degree "of i n t e l l i g e n c e  the  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " r e q u i r e d  was f r e q u e n t l y m i s s i n g "higher up" i n the echelons o f the army and defence  department.  6 6  Between December 15 and December 17,  the date o f  the  Christmas r e c e s s ,  the C u r r i e Report was d e a l t w i t h i n the debates  on the A d d r e s s .  A t the o u t s e t , i n t a b l i n g the document,  Prime M i n i s t e r expressed no one would f e e l  the  the hope "that i n a matter of t h i s  kind  t h a t any p o l i t i c a l advantage c o u l d be gained  by t a k i n g b r o a d , g e n e r a l statements out of t h e i r context i n any way which might r e f l e c t of l o y a l o f f i c e r s Moments a f t e r ,  i n a w h o l e s a l e manner on the g r e a t m a j o r i t y  and men .  .  . and hard-working c i v i l  servants."  the l e a d e r of the o p p o s i t i o n announced t h a t he  68 agreed w i t h M r . S t . L a u r e n t ' s  suggestion.  Some two days l a t e r the C . C . F .  member f o r Vancouver E a s t  commented on the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s a s p i r a t i o n s : The f i r s t t h i n g I would say i n r e g a r d to the v e r y f i n e statement made by the Prime M i n i s t e r i s that he must be n a i v e - and I t h i n k he i s not - i f he b e l i e v e s t h a t an o p p o r t u n i t y o f t h i s k i n d c o u l d be l e t pass without p o l i t i c a l use b e i n g made of i t by the opposition. That i s the n a t u r e of our p o l i t i c a l institution. As a matter o f f a c t there i s n o t h i n g t h a t the government c o u l d do here t h a t c o u l d p l e a s e the o p p o s i t i o n except the mistakes i t might make,  6 7  95 and the same would be t r u e i f those who are on the government s i d e of the house were oh t h i s s i d e and those who are on t h i s s i d e were on the other s i d e of the h o u s e . " 9  N a t u r a l l y enough i t was the l a t t e r s T  t h a t of the Prime M i n i s t e r ,  statement,  not  t h a t p r o p e r l y d e s c r i b e d the way i n  which Canadian democracy f u n c t i o n e d .  F o r between the  fifteenth  and the seventeenth,  almost every s e n i o r c r i t i c i n the C o n s e r v a t i v e  ranks, including i t s  l e a d e r , dwelled a t some l e n g t h , and no doubt  with considerable pleasure, of i n c i d e n t s ,  on the c h o i c e q u o t a t i o n s and d e t a i l s  t h a t were so numerous i n M r . C u r r i e ' s R e p o r t .  Members of a l l three o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s c a l l e d f o r the o f the M i n i s t e r of N a t i o n a l D e f e n c e ^ 7  (still  resignation  overseas) and many  others emphasized t h a t the government as a whole had to bear the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and waste. I t was not u n t i l  the n i g h t b e f o r e the l a s t  the government decided to answer i t s  critics.  sitting  that  I n performing  t h i s d u t y , the A c t i n g M i n i s t e r o f N a t i o n a l Defence, M r . Campney, b e l i t t l e d the charges of the o p p o s i t i o n , defended M r . C l a x t o n and enumerated the s e v e r a l recommendations i n the Report t h a t had a l r e a d y been implemented.  Perhaps most i m p o r t a n t , he reminded  the Commons t h a t M r . C u r r i e had been appointed by the m i n i s t e r and i t was o n l y a t the l a t t e r s T  obligation, 17,  i n d u l g e n c e , and not due to any  t h a t the Report had been made p u b l i c .  the Commons adjourned f o r i t s  7 1  Christmas r e c e s s .  On December  96  I t was not o n l y among the p o l i t i c i a n s had c r e a t e d a s t i r . of headlines  In the major newspapers  and e d i t o r i a l s  for several d a y s  t h a t the Report  i t was the 7 2  and among the  s e n i o r m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l (many of whom were p r e s e n t Parliamentary g a l l e r i e s ) ,  it  subject  i n the  caused c o n s i d e r a b l e u n r e s t .  Indeed,  when the Prime M i n i s t e r o r i g i n a l l y t a b l e d the Report he made p u b l i c a memorandum from the C h i e f o f the G e n e r a l S t a f f i n which the l a t t e r expressed  the f e a r that the Report would be i n c o r r e c t l y  i n t e r p r e t e d as s e r v i n g to censure the army as a whole. -*  Between  7  December 17 and January 12 rumours were numerous throughout Ottawa concerning p o s s i b l e  scapegoats from among the m i l i t a r y ,  the r e s i g n a t i o n o f the m i n i s t e r and a s t o l e n copy o f the R e p o r t . Thus, there was c o n s i d e r a b l e t e n s i o n when the House reconvened on the a f t e r n o o n o f January 12. On the f o l l o w i n g day the Prime M i n i s t e r moved the appointment o f a s e l e c t committee  to examine defence  expenditures  and i t was on h i s motion t h a t the debate on the C u r r i e Report was re-opened.  The f i r s t  speaker on the motion was M r . C l a x t o n  and he spent some o n e - a n d - a - h a l f hours d i s c u s s i n g  the R e p o r t .  He gave a b s o l u t e l y no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t he planned to  resign  and assured the Commons, although undoubtedly h i s words were a l s o i n t e n d e d f o r the s e n i o r m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l , "there w i l l not be any e f f o r t  to f i n d a s c a p e g o a t . "  7 5  that He  7 4  97  c l o s e d by moving an amendment t h a t c a l l e d on the Defence Expendi t u r e s Committee " t o g i v e p r i o r i t y i n t h e i r examination to e x p e n d i t u r e s and  the  commitments of the Canadian army works s e r v i c e s  d e a l t w i t h i n the Report of G.S.  Currie. . ."  Much o f  7 6  the  debate that f o l l o w e d d e a l t w i t h the p r o p r i e t y o f the amendment. T h i s aspect  of the d i s p u t e w i l l be s t u d i e d i n a l a t e r  chapter,  however, when the work of the Defence Expenditures Committee i s investigated.  What i s o f i n t e r e s t here i s the attempt o f  7 7  House o f Commons to use  the  the cumulative impact of these s e v e r a l  examples of m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  to d i s c r e d i t the government even  further. The  debate on the motion was  h e l d over a p e r i o d o f  ten  78 days between January 13 and  22.°  I t covered a wide v a r i e t y o f  matters i n c l u d i n g the Report p r o p e r , c i v i l i a n - m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s , s t o l e n c o p i e s , government procedure i n d e a l i n g w i t h the Report  and  a v a r i e t y o f s p e c i f i c i s s u e s the most repeated of which were the horses on the p a y r o l l and  the comedy o f the s t o l e n r a i l w a y  All  three o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s supported the i d e a o f  Mr.  C u r r i e under broader terms of r e f e r e n c e 79  to that e f f e c t was continuous p r e s s u r e  moved by Mr. was  exerted  Knowles.  and  tracks.  re-appointing  a sub-amendment  Throughout the debate,  and government members were not  e s p e c i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l i n t a k i n g the i n i t i a t i v e away from t h e i r opponents.  98 The C u r r i e Report p r o v i d e d the Commons w i t h one o f i t s most c o n t r o v e r s i a l t o p i c s i n y e a r s .  Press r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e  t h a t g a l l e r i e s were f u l l and the s p e c t a t o r s i n c l u d e d even the wives o f c a b i n e t m i n i s t e r s .  Once a g a i n , as i n mid-December,  the Report was i n the h e a d l i n e s and e d i t o r i a l s o f the country's newspapers, and perhaps most prominently, innumerable  the o b j e c t o f  cartoons.  Undoubtedly i t has a l r e a d y been n o t i c e d t h a t both the North S t a r i n c i d e n t and the C u r r i e Report debates o c c u r r e d o n l y a few months b e f o r e a g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n .  The 1949 i n c i d e n t was  o n l y s e i z e d upon by the p r e s s f o r a few days and i t g r a d u a l l y drifted into insignificance.  The P r o g r e s s i v e  Conservatives  t h e r e f o r e b u i l t no p a r t o f t h e i r e l e c t i o n campaign upon i t .  In  c o n t r a s t , much o f the 1953 campaign o f the T o r i e s was c e n t r e d on the n o t i o n t h a t t h e r e was waste, extravagance and i n e f f i c i e n c y i n Ottawa.  According  to P r o f e s s o r Spencer "the c r i t i c i s m o f t h e  Defence Department . . . suggested a g a i n s t the L i b e r a l s . "  8 0  t h a t the t i d e was running  And o f Mr. C l a x t o n , Spencer has 81  argued t h a t "he was w i d e l y viewed as an e l e c t o r a l  liability."  U n f o r t u n a t e l y there has been no systematic study o f the 1953  e l e c t i o n and there i s t h e r e f o r e no way o f e v a l u a t i n g the  impact o f Mr. C u r r i e ' s f i n d i n g s , and the way these were e x p l o i t e d 82 by the p a r t i e s i n the Commons, on the e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s . The  L i b e r a l P a r t y won c l o s e 265 s e a t s .  to h a l f of the popular vote and 171 o f  In 1949 i t had won 50% and 190 o f 2 6 2 .  8 3  Mr. C l a x t o n s m a j o r i t y f e l l by 4700 v o t e s , T  close  8 4  Although  he n e v e r t h e l e s s  came  to d o u b l i n g h i s C o n s e r v a t i v e opponent s r e t u r n i n a c o n T  s t i t u e n c y e l e c t i o n i n which m i n o r i t y p a r t i e s p l a y e d v i r t u a l l y no 86 role.  Thus, a l t h o u g h the Petawawa i n c i d e n t s and the Report on  them were e x p l o i t e d throughout the e l e c t i o n campaign, there no evidence t h a t they had an important e f f e c t The are of  on the r e s u l t .  two i n c i d e n t s c i t e d above, p a r t i c u l a r l y the  of i n t e r e s t as the o n l y attempt to e f f e c t  is  "political  latter, control"  the government by e x p l o i t i n g i n e f f e c t i v e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  I t should not be f o r g o t t e n , however, t h a t they were f a r from t y p i c a l and a t the lower l e v e l s  of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n debates o f  type were v e r y much the e x c e p t i o n .  this  I n most y e a r s , the o n l y  type o f c o n t r o l t h a t the Commons t r i e d to c a r r y out was B u r e a u c r a t i c , and  as has been shown, the r e s u l t s t h e r e were s u b s t a n t i v e but .  not e x c e p t i o n a l l y i m p r e s s i v e . CONTROL OF LEGISLATION  There i s one other aspect o f c o n t r o l that must be c o n s i d e r e d and convenience, as much as l o g i c , has l e d me to examine i t as a p a r t o f t h i s c h a p t e r . 87 c o n t r o l of defence  legislation.  I am speaking of Commons  100  U n q u e s t i o n a b l y the major b i l l p e r i o d was  the n a t i o n a l defence b i l l  introduced  of 1 9 5 0 .  88  during By  the  this  bill  the government attempted to b r i n g a l l the laws on defence i n t o a single act.  The b i l l  s e c t i o n s over 600 i t was  introduced  condensed i n t o  to have been brought b e f o r e  251  As  such,  Parliament  I t i s important to note t h e r e f o r e t h a t i t was i n t o the Senate f i r s t  upper chamber had ly  and  s e c t i o n s from s e v e r a l defence a c t s .  the l a r g e s t b i l l  s i n c e 1934.  incorporated  considered  d i d i t come b e f o r e Two  (1949)  8 9  and  i t i n d e t a i l and  only a f t e r t h i s amended i t e x t e n s i v e -  the Lower House.  debates on the b i l l were h e l d i n the House of Commons.  Both a t the r e s o l u t i o n stage and  again b e f o r e  the second  reading,  90 general  d i s c u s s i o n was  held.  r a i s e d i n c l u d i n g parliamentary and  the r o l e o f courts - p a r t i a l .  A few  c o n t r o v e r s i a l p o i n t s were  c o n t r o l over the s i z e o f the  forces,  From the o u t s e t , however, i t was  agreed t h a t the b i l l would be r e f e r r e d to a s p e c i a l committee f o r d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n and 91 the end of May. The  and  appointed toward  S p e c i a l Committee o f N a t i o n a l Defence a p p o i n t e d con-  s i s t e d of t w e n t y - f i v e government.  such a committee was  I t was  members of whom seven were opponents of  the  g i v e n the "power to send f o r persons, papers 92 r e c o r d s . . ." and requested to r e p o r t to the Commons. The Committee h e l d some t h i r t e e n meetings on e i g h t days.  101 Attendance v a r i e d between f o u r t e e n and twenty-two 17.9 o r almost ITU. minister,  Witnesses  summoned i n c l u d e d the deputy  the judge advocate g e n e r a l ,  f l e e t and other s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s Department o f N a t i o n a l Defence.  and averaged  the judge advocate o f  i n the l e g a l branch o f  the  the  The b i l l was i n t r o d u c e d by the  m i n i s t e r , who was a member of the Committee, and thoroughly reviewed by i t s  members.  An a i r o f b i p a r t i s a n s h i p p r e v a i l e d  and amendments were i n t r o d u c e d f r e e l y by a l l members and accepted or r e j e c t e d w i t h a v e r y minimum of p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o v e r s y . In t o t a l some 47 amendments were p r e s e n t e d , which were i n t r o d u c e d by government supporters a t the of  the o f f i c i a l s  o f the department.  Of the other  30 o f instance  seventeen  amendments, which were the genuine product o f Committee d e l i b e r ations,  most were t e x t u a l although a few were o f a  character.  substantive  The l a t t e r ones tended toward i n c r e a s i n g u n i f i c a t i o n  between the s e r v i c e s  and improving the guarantees o f  accused  servicemen b e f o r e m i l i t a r y t r i b u n a l s . The b i l l was r e p o r t e d back to the House and the amendments a c c e p t e d . - * 9  Spokesmen of a l l p a r t i e s announced t h e i r  a p p r o v a l of the workings of the Committee and expressed  pleasure  94 that i t had been f r e e from p a r t y p o l i t i c s .  Inasmuch as  the  b i l l had a l r e a d y r e c e i v e d second r e a d i n g , however,  t h i s was not  at a l l s u r p r i s i n g or r e v o l u t i o n a r y .  seems to  It  therefore  this  102  w r i t e r t h a t the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s expressed a p p r o v a l p r i m a r i l y i n order to document t h e i r case t h a t a s t a n d i n g committee on defence was r e q u i r e d r a t h e r to v o i c e t h e i r p l e a s u r e a t the i n f l u e n c e the Committee had e x e r c i s e d over the terms o f the b i l l , for  a l t h o u g h the b i l l  was d i s s e c t e d s e c t i o n by s e c t i o n , and  s c r u t i n i z e d i n much d e t a i l , t h e changes t h a t emanated from the Committee as has been seen were v e r y few.  Thus, although the  Committee d i d f u n c t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y , and secured e x p l a n a t i o n s for  most o f the s e c t i o n s , i t d i d n o t e x e r c i s e much i n f l u e n c e  over the f i n a l  terms o f the b i l l .  C e r t a i n l y i t had l e s s  i n f l u e n c e than the Senate. P r i o r t o 1950, t h e r e were a v a r i e t y o f b i l l s i n t r o d u c e d t h a t aimed a t amending the v a r i o u s defence a c t s .  A l l o f these  were debated i n g e n e r a l and then c o n s i d e r e d i n Committee o f the Whole.  Most were passed over q u i c k l y as they were o n l y o f  minor importance.  Where major changes were suggested i n these  b i l l s , however, the Commons was f a r from l a z y and proved a jealous guardian of parliamentary r i g h t s . 1947 M i l i t i a B i l l  S e c t i o n 22 o f the  p r o v i d e d t h a t the m i n i s t e r would  determine  the s i z e o f the M i l i t i a , a d e c i s i o n which c o n s i d e r a b l y e x e r c i s e d the o p p o s i t i o n members who claimed t h a t p a r l i a m e n t a r y c o n t r o l over the s i z e o f the defence f o r c e s was one o f the most important p a r l i a m e n t a r y guarantees a g a i n s t an a r b i t r a r y e x e c u t i v e .  Although  103 such c o n t r o l c o u l d s t i l l be e x e r c i s e d through g r a n t i n g o f Supply, members were d i s s a t i s f i e d and  one  a f t e r the other they dragged  out the lessons of E n g l i s h h i s t o r y and i  95  the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f such  ,  control.'-"  The  p a r t i e s and  government bent to the w i l l of the  opposition  f i n a l l y i n t r o d u c e d a s a t i s f a c t o r y amendment.  might be noted, was  o n l y one,  This, i t  although the most important, of 96  f o u r or f i v e amendments i n t r o d u c e d due  to o p p o s i t i o n  criticisms.  In the post-1950 p e r i o d the custom arose whereby a l l amendments to defence l e g i s l a t i o n were i n t r o d u c e d a n n u a l l y a single b i l l  c a l l e d the Canadian Forces  were of minor importance and on second r e a d i n g s .  there was  Each however was  Committee of the Whole and  Bill.  little  Most of these debate, t h e r e f o r e ,  carefully scrutinized i n  on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s  i n t r o d u c e d by o p p o s i t i o n members were accepted.  the e f f e c t of the amendments was The controversy  one  was  defence b i l l  to t i g h t e n the  amendments In each case 97 legislation.  of the p e r i o d to provoke  the N a t i o n a l Defence A c t Amendment B i l l  under which the government appointed N a t i o n a l Defence.  in  of  1952  an A s s o c i a t e M i n i s t e r of  In i n t r o d u c i n g the r e s o l u t i o n the Prime  M i n i s t e r expressed the hope t h a t the M i n i s t e r would d e a l p r i m a r i l y w i t h problems of p o l i c y and with administration. not  The  the A s s o c i a t e M i n i s t e r  proposed l e g i s l a t i o n , however, d i d  s p e l l out the d e f i n i t e areas of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  104 From the v e r y o u t s e t o p p o s i t i o n members o b j e c t e d to the i n d e f i n i t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f the A s s o c i a t e M i n i s t e r . l e a d e r o f the o p p o s i t i o n expressed m i n i s t e r would be l i t t l e  the o p i n i o n t h a t the  more than a g l o r i f i e d  The  new  parliamentary  99 a s s i s t a n t u n l e s s he was  given s p e c i f i c duties  and Mr.  p o i n t e d out t h a t i t would be i m p o s s i b l e to separate from administration.''"  00  Pearkes  policy  An o p p o s i t i o n amendment r e q u e s t i n g  t h a t the b i l l not be read a second time was defeated by the government ''" and a second one i n Committee o f the Whole c a l l i n g 102 f o r an A s s o c i a t e M i n i s t e r f o r A i r was s i m i l a r l y beaten down. 103 10  On  t h i r d r e a d i n g the b i l l was  passed on  division.  More i n t e r e s t i n g were the s e v e r a l defence p r o d u c t i o n and defence procurement b i l l s passed between 1950 In 1950  the Defence S u p p l i e s B i l l  and  1955.  the E s s e n t i a l M a t e r i a l s  were i n t r o d u c e d .  Although  debate,despite  a d i v i s i o n , the l a t t e r was  the f i r s t was  by the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y and who  and  passed without  Bill  heated  opposed s t r o n g l y  e s p e c i a l l y Mr.Diefenbaker  claimed t h a t the powers requested were too broad and would  have the e f f e c t of g i v i n g the M i n i s t e r of Trade and Commerce a b s o l u t e and u n l i m i t e d c o n t r o l o f the n a t i o n ' s n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s . Amendments subsequently  moved were d e f e a t e d by the government w i t h  the support of the two minor p a r t i e s and the b i l l r e c e i v e d t h i r d A106 reading.  1 0 5  105 Even more v i g o r o u s Production B i l l  opposition greeted  o f 1951 which c a l l e d f o r the establishment  a Department o f Defence P r o d u c t i o n . Conservative to  the Defence  critic  the m i n i s t e r ^ 1  7  Almost every  senior  spoke out a g a i n s t the powers being and i n Committee  of  entrusted  o f the Whole s e v e r a l o f the 108  s e c t i o n s were passed o n l y on d i v i s i o n . reason  Probably  the o n l y  the b i l l was not opposed on t h i r d r e a d i n g was because  s e c t i o n 41 l i m i t e d the l i f e  o f the b i l l  m i n i s t e r ' s s p e c i a l powers to o n l y f i v e In 1955 an amendment was the 1951 A c t permanence.  and t h e r e f o r e of the 109 years.  i n t r o d u c e d i n order to g i v e  The b i l l was d e c e i v i n g l y s h o r t .  It  c o n t a i n e d but two s e c t i o n s o f which o n l y the l a t t e r was o f i n t e r e s t for  i t provided  f o r the r e p e a l o f s e c t i o n 41 o f the Department  o f Defence P r o d u c t i o n A c t o f 1951. Progressive Conservative  spokesmen p o i n t e d out t h a t  the A c t and the s p e c i a l powers i t p r o v i d e d had been d u r i n g the Korean c r i s i s .  introduced  The s i t u a t i o n was no longer the same  and to g i v e permanence to these powers would s e r i o u s l y damage t h e * r i g h t s o f Parliament  and the i n d i v i d u a l  The case o f the L i b e r a l s was  citizen.  summarized  1 1 1  a b l y by  P r o f e s s o r Corry i n an a r t i c l e s h o r t l y a f t e r the i s s u e had ended: The i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n i s s t i l l extremely grim. . . No defence a g a i n s t the hydrogen bomb has y e t been d e v i s e d , so we must go on t r y i n g .  106 The government has undertaken programmes which make heavy demands on m a t e r i a l s t h a t are s t i l l s c a r c e , which involve" c o m p l i c a t e d arrangements w i t h p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y . . . There i s much experimental work b e i n g undertaken i n e l e c t r o n i c s , s u p e r s o n i c planes and guided m i s s i l e s which may i n v o l v e scores of m i l l i o n s of o u t l a y over a p e r i o d of years b e f o r e even t e s t r e s u l t s can be s e c u r e d . I t was urged t h a t , u n l e s s the government has adequate powers to push these p r o j e c t s over a long p e r i o d of years and to i n t e r v e n e i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r of the defence i n d u s t r y where necessary to guard a g a i n s t f a i l u r e , g r e a t sums o f money may be squandered and e f f e c t i v e defence measures f a i l of completion.112The L i b e r a l s gave no s a t i s f a c t o r y r e a s o n , however, f o r r e f u s i n g to i n c l u d e a new t e r m i n a l date f o r these powers which g o v e r n ment members had admitted e a r l i e r were e x t r a o r d i n a r y .  Even the  C . C . F . , whose members were n a t u r a l l y s u s p i c i o u s o f the motives o f p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y , demanded a new t e r m i n a l date.I -* 1  Finally,  after  c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s s u r e had been e x e r t e d from the House, Mr.Howe promised t h a t the terms o f the b i l l would be r e c o n s i d e r e d . On second r e a d i n g , the l a t t e r announced, however, no changes would be m a d e .  1 1 5  1 1 4  that  To the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e s ,  here was a most f l a g r a n t example of the a r r o g a n t L i b e r a l g o v e r n ment b e l i t t l i n g the r i g h t s o f P a r l i a m e n t .  They t h e r e f o r e  about to o b s t r u c t the passage of the b i l l .  Speaker a f t e r  set  speaker a t t a c k e d the government and i n p a r t i c u l a r the M i n i s t e r of Defence P r o d u c t i o n , M r . Howe. o f f e r e d by the g o v e r n m e n t  116  S e v e r a l concessions  were  but the o p p o s i t i o n would not  relent.  A l t o g e t h e r , over 100 speeches were made between March and J u l y ,  107 i n c l u d i n g more than 75 by C o n s e r v a t i v e more than 500  pages of H a n s a r d .  members and  filled  1 1 7  F i n a l l y , the Prime M i n i s t e r i n t r o d u c e d o n l y p r o v i d i n g f o r a new  these  amendments not  t e r m i n a l date thus a f f i r m i n g that  powers were as the o p p o s i t i o n had  claimed  but a l s o t h a t a l l r e g u l a t i o n s enforced  decidedly  the  extraordinary,  under s e c t i o n s 23 to  31  (the ones g i v i n g the m i n i s t e r h i s powers) would be t a b l e d i n the 118 House. of any  The  amendment f u r t h e r p r o v i d e d  ten members o f the Commons, any  t h a t a t the  request  r e g u l a t i o n s t a b l e d under 119  the A c t had  to be debated and w i t h i n f o u r days of the  " I n persuading the government to r e t r e a t the Conservatives  won"  what P r o f e s s o r C o r r y  petition.  Progressive  called "their  greatest  120  v i c t o r y i n twenty years of o p p o s i t i o n . " has  And  Professor  i m p l i e d t h a t the p r o t r a c t e d L i b e r a l i n t r a n s i g e n c e on the -  Defence P r o d u c t i o n  A c t amendment c o n t r i b u t e d  a L i b e r a l P a r t y t h a t was  b o t h a u t o c r a t i c and  image t h a t helped to d e f e a t  i t i n the 1957  to the image of 121 arrogant  , an  election.  I f Commons i n f l u e n c e over government l e g i s l a t i o n not p a r t i c u l a r l y g r e a t was  Meisel  i n the years under review, t h i s undoubtedly  i n p a r t because o p p o s i t i o n c r i t i c i s m s were a n t i c i p a t e d  discounted  i n advance.  was  F o r the House proved i t s e l f  and  energetic  i n s c r u t i n i z i n g a l l l e g i s l a t i o n , and where the r i g h t s of P a r l i a m e n t were being  s e r i o u s l y undermined, important amendments  108  were o b t a i n e d .  Nevertheless  i t has to be admitted t h a t  passed d u r i n g these years d i d i n c r e a s e the power of the vis-a-vis  legislation executive  the l e g i s l a t u r e and the r e s u l t s o f P a r l i a m e n t ' s  were o n l y to cut down the amount of the e x e c u t i v e g a i n .  efforts Thus,  a l t h o u g h the Commons d i d serve as a u s e f u l instrument i n s c r u t i n i z i n g and amending defence  legislation,  much o f  the  l e g i s l a t i o n i t was r e v i e w i n g served to s t r e n g t h e n the powers of the  executive.  C H A P T E R  IV  CONTROL OF DEFENCE POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION, 1957-62: THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE  In 1958, a f t e r l e s s than a year o f m i n o r i t y the people o f Canada r e t u r n e d  the P r o g r e s s i v e  to power w i t h the g r e a t e s t m a j o r i t y government.  government,  Conservative  Party  i n the h i s t o r y o f Canadian  As a c o r o l l a r y , n a t u r a l l y , the o p p o s i t i o n was numer-  i c a l l y the weakest i n Canadian h i s t o r y .  The S o c i a l C r e d i t  Party  e l e c t e d no members, the C.C.F. b u t e i g h t and the L i b e r a l P a r t y some 49.  To these o p p o s i t i o n members f e l l  the j o b t h a t the C o n s e r v a t i v e s  had been attempting t o perform f o r 22 years - t h a t o f c o n t r o l l i n g the e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g growth i n e x e c u t i v e  power.  And a p a r t o f t h i s  j o b was t o c o n t r o l defence p o l i c y and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Control of  defence p o l i c y i s d e a l t w i t h f i r s t and as i n chapter two s e v e r a l case s t u d i e s have been examined t o determine the extent  o f Commons c o n t r o l  over defence p o l i c y . THE NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE COMMAND On August 1, 1957, A i r Marshal Slemon was appointed through o r d e r - i n - c o u n c i l deputy commander o f an i n t e g r a t e d 109  110  air  defence system f o r N o r t h A m e r i c a .  p u b l i c informed of the establishment ment r e l e a s e d no other  its  about N . O . R . A . D .  The  The g o v e r n -  members i n the House began to ask and request  impact on Canadian defence and On November 13,  of  of N.O.R.A.D.  the  statement.  Soon t h e r e a f t e r questions  I n t h i s way was  i n f o r m a t i o n concerning  sovereignty.  1  the Prime M i n i s t e r e x p l a i n e d to members  the House the reasons why there had been no formal debate. d e c i s i o n , he argued, i n v o l v e d no new p r i n c i p l e s but was  simply the c o n t i n u a t i o n and l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n o f steps e a r l i e r by the L i b e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . of  He t r a c e d the  taken history  Canadian-American defence c o - o p e r a t i o n s i n c e Ogdensburg and  p l a c e d s p e c i a l emphasis upon the statement o f defence t h a t had been announced on February 12,  1947.  co-operation  He p o i n t e d out  t h a t Canada and the U n i t e d S t a t e s were f o r m a l l y bound together i n the Canada - U n i t e d S t a t e s r e g i o n a l p l a n n i n g group of and  N.A.T.O.  that the House o f Commons had a l r e a d y debated the N . A . T . O .  i s s u e and that N . O . R . A . D . effort  was merely a f u r t h e r step i n  to implement the o b j e c t i v e s  r e g i o n a l p l a n n i n g group.  the  of the Canada - U n i t e d S t a t e s  The d e c i s i o n had been made known to o  the N . J k . T . 0 . C o u n c i l b e f o r e i t was announced p u b l i c l y . The d e c i s i o n to e s t a b l i s h an i n t e g r a t e d air  defence system,  operational  the Prime M i n i s t e r added, c o u l d not be a  Ill  s u r p r i s e to the L i b e r a l s because  on May  11, 1956  t h e r e had been  an agreement between the c h i e f s of s t a f f "of the two c o u n t r i e s to  r e f e r the matter to a j o i n t study group.  T h i s group  had  r e p o r t e d i n favour o f e s t a b l i s h i n g an i n t e g r a t e d o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l system f o r North America under a s i n g l e commander.  The  matter had come b e f o r e the S t . L a u r e n t c a b i n e t , the Prime M i n i s t e r c l a i m e d , but the d e c i s i o n had been postponed.  Mr.  Diefenbaker  then suggested that the reason f o r the d e l a y had been the 3 approaching g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n . The Prime M i n i s t e r r a i s e d t h r e e f u r t h e r p o i n t s . he argued t h a t the agreement was of  First,  a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the a c t i v i t i e s  the Permanent J o i n t Board on Defence  and t h a t the b u s i n e s s 4  of  t h a t board had never i n the p a s t been debated i n the House. Second, i n r e p l y to the argument that f u l l  debate  had  been p e r m i t t e d on N.A.T.O., he maintained t h a t t h i s had been n e c e s s a r y because  the N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r e a t y committed Canada  to  sending troops abroad, a matter which r e q u i r e d the consent 5  of  the P a r l i a m e n t of Canada. T h i r d , the Prime M i n i s t e r attempted  to convey  the i d e a  t h a t any f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n would be a breach of s e c u r i t y .  "If  the o p p o s i t i o n w i l l take the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of saying they want these m a t t e r s , which can be o f dangerous impact i f g i v e n f u l l p u b l i c i t y i n the house, d i s c u s s e d i n d e t a i l  ...  i t w i l l be done,  112  but the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i l l be t h e i r s . "  6  I t was c l e a r to a l l  that the Prime M i n i s t e r p r e f e r r e d to a v o i d a f u l l  discussion of  h i s h a s t i l y concluded agreement. The most s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d statement p o s i t i o n was g i v e n by M r . P a u l M a r t i n .  of the L i b e r a l  "We are a n a t i o n d e d i c a t e d  to the p r i n c i p l e of p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy and under our system o f government w h i l e the c a b i n e t ,  the e x e c u t i v e  i s responsible  the f o r m u l a t i o n of f o r e i g n p o l i c y and a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e f o r execution, nevertheless  for  its  e i t h e r d u r i n g the stage of n e g o t i a t i o n  -  and that i s a matter to be determined by the government - or a f t e r negotiations  have been concluded and p o l i c i e s  o b l i g a t i o n o f government to submit i t s  decided on i t  policies  to the  is  the  represent-  a t i o n s of the people f o r a p p r o v a l . " "In t h i s p a r t i c u l a r matter" he s t r e s s e d no document whatsoever, no minute o f c a b i n e t . "  ".  . . . we have  no i n t e r i m agreement, no order i n c o u n c i l ,  7  We have r e c e i v e d no i n f o r m a t i o n and  been p e r m i t t e d no debate. On December 5,  the Committee o f Supply began i t s  on the defence estimates f o r the coming y e a r .  debates  The new defence  m i n i s t e r , M r . P e a r k e s , took the o p p o r t u n i t y to p r o v i d e some f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n on defence the f i n a l  and a t the time he r e v e a l e d t h a t  formal note f o r N . O . R . A . D . had not yet been completed.  When i t was completed, he announced, i t ^would be p r e s e n t e d  to  113 the House of Commons.  8  On May 19,  1958,  some n i n e - a n d - a - h a l f  months a f t e r the o r i g i n a l announcement, e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s m i n i s t e r Smith t a b l e d the agreement i n the Commons.  M r . Smith announced, 9  i n r e p l y to a q u e s t i o n by the l e a d e r o f the o p p o s i t i o n , t h a t  the  government d i d not p l a n to submit the agreement to the House o f Commons i n the form of a r e s o l u t i o n .  The r e a s o n , he e x p l a i n e d ,  was that the "government regards t h i s as an a m p l i f i c a t i o n o f 10 and e x t e n s i o n under the North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y . 7 d i d suggestion,  M r . Smith  however, t h a t there would be ample o p p o r t u n i t y  to d i s c u s s the agreement during other  debates.  1 1  I t can be seen t h a t the government wished to a v o i d a " f u l l - d r e s s " debate on the N . O . R . A . D .  agreement.  Its  a t i o n f o r t h i s a t t i t u d e r e s t e d on two key p o i n t s .  justific-  First,  the  government i n s i s t e d t h a t no new p r i n c i p l e s were i n v o l v e d i n the agreement.  Second, i t attempted to show t h a t o t h e r a g r e e -  ments of a s i m i l a r type had been concluded by L i b e r a l governments but never p r e s e n t e d to the House i n r e s o l u t i o n form.  The second  p o i n t , however, to be of any importance, r e s t e d on the  first;  for i f i t changes,  c o u l d be shown t h a t the agreement i n v o l v e d b a s i c i t was c l e a r that precedent favoured the o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s and not the government. A l t h o u g h i t r a i s e d numerous p e r i p h e r a l  issues the 12  114 fundamental b a s i s o f the government p o s i t i o n was t h a t the N.O.R.A.D. agreement was merely a f u r t h e r step t o implement the g o a l s s e t out by the North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y .  As a r e s u l t , no r e s o l u t i o n  was r e q u i r e d . The  case o f the government was r e l a t i v e l y simple.  commander o f N.O.R.A.D., as he would be seeking  The  t o implement  the g o a l s o f the Canada - U n i t e d S t a t e s r e g i o n a l p l a n n i n g  group  o f N.A.T.O., and s i n c e he would be p r o t e c t i n g p a r t o f the S t r a t e g i c A i r Command, upon which N.A.T.O. depended, would be r e p o r t i n g t o the North A t l a n t i c C o u n c i l .  Therefore,  the govern-  ment contended, N.O.R.A.D. c o u l d be l i k e n e d t o any o f the other 13 m i l i t a r y commands o f N.A.T.O. The  o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , however, e a s i l y destroyed the  government's case.  The leader o f the o p p o s i t i o n p o i n t e d out  q u i t e c o r r e c t l y t h a t the commanders o f the v a r i o u s N.A.T.O. commands n o t only r e p o r t t o the North A t l a n t i c C o u n c i l b u t r e c e i v e p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y guidance from i t .  In contrast,  the commander o f N.O.R.A.D. was r e s p o n s i b l e to the governments o f Canada arid the U n i t e d  States.  N.O.R.A.D. t h e r e f o r e does n o t , 14  he maintained, d e r i v e i t s a u t h o r i t y i n any way from the N.A.T.O. Mr.  Knowles o f the C.C.F. p a r t y announced t h a t h i s p a r t y agreed  w i t h Mr. Pearson's r e a s o n i n g .  Even the Prime M i n i s t e r , t h e r e -  a f t e r , emphasized o n l y the p r i n c i p l e s i n v o l v e d and n o t the 0  115 l e g a l i t y o f the case he had p r e s e n t e d .  1 5  The other p e r i p h e r a l o b j e c t i o n s r a i s e d by the C o n s e r v a t i v e s were a l s o demolished by members o f the House. Mr.  Pearson p o i n t e d out t h a t i n the o r i g i n a l N.A.T.O. debates  i t had n o t been known t h a t Canada would be sending abroad.  troops  And he a l s o r e p u d i a t e d the n o t i o n t h a t the s u b j e c t  1 6  of such an agreement had ever been c o n s i d e r e d by the L i b e r a l cabinet.  On the q u e s t i o n o f s e c u r i t y , Mr. M a r t i n  1 7  explained  t h a t the House was n o t r e q u e s t i n g the d e t a i l s o f the agreement but o n l y i t s g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s and t h a t the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s e c u r i t y r e s t e d w i t h the government and n o t the o p p o s i t i o n . The  1 8  c o n c l u s i o n seems i n e v i t a b l e t h a t the Prime M i n i s t e r  and government d i d attempt t o p l a c e a number o f "straw-men" i n the way o f the Commons.  The agreement was i n o p e r a t i o n f o r  many months b e f o r e the o p p o s i t i o n was a b l e t o g e t any d i s c u s s i o n and even then i t was o n l y under the most t r y i n g o f circumstances. U l t i m a t e l y , a f t e r much p r e s s u r e was e x e r t e d , both i n the House and o u t s i d e , the Prime M i n i s t e r consented  to p r e s e n t  the agreement to the House i n the form o f a r e s o l u t i o n . resolution  The  read: That i t i s expedient t h a t the houses o f p a r l i a m e n t do approve an exchange o f notes c o n s t i t u t i n g an agreement between t h e government o f Canada and the government o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America concerning the o r g a n i z a t i o n and o p e r a t i o n o f the North American a i r defence command (NORAD) signed  116 a t Washington May 12. 1958 and t h a t t h i s house do approve the same. ° The  debate t h a t f o l l o w e d on June 10 and June 11  c o n c e n t r a t e d on two p o i n t s . o f the procedure  F i r s t , there was much d i s c u s s i o n  f o l l o w e d by the government.  As much o f i t  was a rehashing o f arguments p r e s e n t e d over the p r e v i o u s s i x months, and these have been d i s c u s s e d above, t h e r e i s no need to repeat them here i n d e t a i l .  The e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e o f these  was the a s s e r t i o n t h a t the government had flown i n the f a c e o f P a r l i a m e n t by attempting  t o e l i m i n a t e t h e r i g h t s o f the r e p r e s e n 20  t a t i v e s o f the e l e c t o r a t e . The L i b e r a l P a r t y r e a c t i o n t o the substance  o f the  agreement was one o f c a u t i o u s and i n q u i s i t i v e acquiescence. l e a d e r o f the o p p o s i t i o n began by emphasizing c h a r a c t e r o f the agreement.  The  the b i l a t e r a l  Although he agreed  t h a t N.O.R.A.D.  d i d have some c o n n e c t i o n w i t h N.A.T.O., he p o i n t e d out t h a t i t was n o t r e s p o n s i b l e t o n o r d i d i t r e c e i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s from the l a t t e r organization.  He quoted a statement  by the S e c r e t a r y -  General o f N.A.T.O. as the v e r y b e s t p o s s i b l e p r o o f t h a t N.O.R.A.D. _ ^ ~ _ 21 was not a command o f N.A.T.O. Mr.  Pearson went on t o argue t h a t the agreement was  v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o analyze f o r i t d i d n o t g i v e the f i n a l c o n d i t i o n s o r circumstances Rather,  upon which i t s commander c o u l d a c t .  i t o n l y s t i p u l a t e d t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s should be continued  117  u n t i l a f i n a l decision could be reached.  I t was  then only an  22 agreement to agree to do something.  F i n a l l y he contradicted  a point emphasized several times by Mr. Diefenbaker - that the agreement was purely defensive. N.O.R.A.D. communications, he pointed out, a r e n t divorced from the r e t a l i a t o r y power of 23 T  the Strategic A i r Command.  Indeed i t was N.O.R.A.D. i n t e l l t  igence that would send the bombers of S.A.C. winging on their missions. Mr. Pearson and other Liberals asked several questions concerning the relationship of the commander and deputy commander to the two governments and the extent of their autonomy. In p a r t i c u l a r , Mr. Martin questioned discrepancies i n statements 24 between General Partridge and the government.  The Liberals  concluded by suggesting that there should be an e f f o r t to put 25 N.O.R.A.D. further under the control of the N.A.T.O. Council. The C.C.F. reaction was more dogmatic.  Mr.  Herridge  repeated the points made e a r l i e r by Mr. Pearson concerning N.O.R.A.D. s relationship to N.A.T.O. T  This agreement, he stated,  i s a b i l a t e r a l one and nothing more and although defensive, i t i s closely integrated into the offensive system.  N.O.R.A.D. i n s t a n t l y  a l e r t s S.A.C. and of course S.A.C. i s t o t a l l y independent of N.A.T.O. and under the control of the United States alone, he contended.  26  I t i s one thing, he went on, to surrender  118 sovereignty  to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n such as  U n i t e d Nations or N . A . T . O . for  Canadian a i r u n i t s Finally,  a step. correct,  It is  something q u i t e  the  different  to be s e r v i n g under an American commander.  he s t r e s s e d the economic i m p l i c a t i o n s of  I t would, he reasoned,  2  such  and l a t e r events proved him  f o r c e Canada i n t o g r e a t e r dependence upon the  o g i c a l s k i l l s and economic a b i l i t i e s  technol-  o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s . " A s  defence requirements become more and more complex i t would seem t h a t our economy w i l l become more and more i n t e r - d e p e n d e n t t h a t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s . "  2 8  Because i t was c l e a r that  would be i m p o s s i b l e to combine defence w i t h economic  with it  sovereignty  i t was i m p e r a t i v e t h a t we take g r e a t c a r e to p r e s e r v e our political  sovereignty  vis-a-vis  the U n i t e d S t a t e s .  means should be e x p l o r e d , t h e r e f o r e ,  Ways and  to b r i n g the North American 29  defence arrangements d i r e c t l y under the N . A . T . O . Because the C . C . F .  s t i l l had r e s e r v a t i o n s ,  Council.  and d e s i r e d f u r t h e r  clarifications,  M r . H e r r i d g e requested t h a t the agreement be j \ .• . 30 r e f e r r e d to the Standing Committee on E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s . By the f o l l o w i n g morning, however,  i t was c l e a r  that  the government had no i n t e n t i o n of complying w i t h the request the C . C . F .  M r . Howard, t h e r e f o r e ,  moved an amendment to  r e s o l u t i o n so that the agreement would f a l l of  N.A.T.O."  3 1  " w i t h i n the  T h i s was supported i n the i n t e l l i g e n t  of  the  structure if  somewhat  repetitious  speeches of M e s s i e u r s Winch and R e g i e r .  The l a t t e r  c l o s e d h i s speech w i t h a demand that the Prime M i n i s t e r answer some o f the i n q u i r i e s and a c c u s a t i o n s  brought a g a i n s t  ment, i n c l u d i n g a r a t h e r p o o r l y e x p l a i n e d C . C . F .  the  agree-  theory t h a t  it  32 would weaken The  N.A.T.O. Prime M i n i s t e r , i n a method c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of  many of h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n s to defence debate, the  c r i t i c i s m s and i n s t e a d a t t a c k e d those who had questioned  the agreement. all  i g n o r e d many o f  The members o f the C . C . F .  from B r i t i s h Columbia.  under N . A . T . O . the C . C . F .  control.  who. had spoken were  They wished to b r i n g N . O . R . A . D . Yet a t a convention on June 2,  of B r i t i s h Columbia had urged t h a t Canada withdraw  from N . A . T . O .  Who i s ambiguous, he a s k e d ?  3 3  Mr. Diefenbaker made a s i m i l a r a t t a c k upon the Party.  1958,  I n the r e c e n t e l e c t i o n ,  he s t a t e d ,  Liberal  the L i b e r a l s had  argued t h a t u n l e s s f a v o u r a b l e t r a d i n g terms were r e c e i v e d from the U n i t e d S t a t e s we ought not c o - o p e r a t e  i n continental  defence.  He b i t t e r l y c r i t i c i z e d them f o r p l a y i n g p o l i t i c s w i t h Canadian security.  T h i s technique of the c o u n t e r - a t t a c k ,  i t might be  n o t e d , was f r e q u e n t l y used by the Prime M i n i s t e r i n r e p l y i n g to opposition  criticisms. Despite  of  the r e s o l u t i o n .  some qualms, the L i b e r a l P a r t y v o t e d i n favour The C . C . F . ,  however,  opposed i t .  Thus,  for  120  the f i r s t  time s i n c e World War Two, the unanimity of the House of  ' '" ' 35 Commons on major defence p o l i c y was broken. On t h i s o c c a s i o n , b o t h b e f o r e and during debate,  the  government had attempted to run roughshod over the House of Commons.  The agreement was i n o p e r a t i o n f o r over ten months  before the House was allowed to debate i t .  In the i n t e r i m ,  little  Finally,  i n f o r m a t i o n was g i v e n to the House.  after  being r e t u r n e d w i t h a huge m a j o r i t y i n the 1958 e l e c t i o n , debate was p e r m i t t e d .  It is  tempting to s p e c u l a t e  that  some the  Prime M i n i s t e r avoided debate f o r f e a r t h a t h i s m i n o r i t y g o v e r n ment might be f o r c e d to the p o l l s on what perhaps he conceived to be an u n d e s i r a b l e i s s u e .  But i f t h i s was the r e a s o n ,  it  does not e x p l a i n the r e s t r i c t i o n s on the debate which f o l l o w e d h i s sweeping v i c t o r y .  F o r even i n t h i s debate,  i n f o r m a t i o n was p r o v i d e d .  Indeed,  the f i n a l  little  new  impression received  from these debates was t h a t the government had showed  little  r e g a r d f o r the r i g h t s of P a r l i a m e n t .  THE ARROW DEBATE  On February 20,  1959,  the Prime M i n i s t e r announced to  a s u r p r i s e d House of Commons t h a t the government had decided  to  terminate development and p r o d u c t i o n of the CF-105 a i r c r a f t (and the I r o q u o i s e n g i n e ) .  3 6  A l t h o u g h the c a n c e l l a t i o n of  two  121 associated missile)  projects  (the A s t r a f i r e c o n t r o l system and Sparrow  some s i x months e a r l i e r had been w i d e l y  as the d e a t h - k n e l l of the Arrow, subsequent  interpreted  e q u i v o c a t i o n by the  37 defence m i n i s t e r  and the outspoken a p p r o v a l of the Arrow by 38  the commander o f N . O . R . A . D .  together had served to r e - k i n d l e  doubts concerning the f u t u r e of t h i s a i r c r a f t .  the  A l l that seemed  c e r t a i n was t h a t a f i n a l d e c i s i o n would be made on March 31, when the o p e r a t i v e c o n t r a c t had l a p s e d . M i n i s t e r ' s statement, coming as i t e a r l i e r than expected,  Thus, the Prime  d i d f i v e - a n d - a k h a l f weeks  not o n l y shocked the Canadian p u b l i c , but  a l s o p l a y e d havoc w i t h a s u b s t a n t i a l  segment of the a i r c r a f t  industry. The reasons  f o r the d e c i s i o n were s e v e r a l .  The f i r s t  reason put forward by M r . Diefenbaker was s t r a t e g i c .  In r e c e n t  months, he argued, i n t e l l i g e n c e  r e p o r t s concerning the bomber  t h r e a t have changed markedly.  The C F - 1 0 5 , designed to combat  the manned bomber, would not be o p e r a t i o n a l u n t i l 1962 and by t h a t time, he i n d i c a t e d , the danger from the bomber would be 39 g r e a t l y reduced. Second, he emphasized the p r o h i b i t i v e c o s t o f aircraft.  O r i g i n a l p l a n s , he e x p l a i n e d ,  600 a i r c r a f t to be ready by 1958.  c a l l e d f o r 500  I t was expected  that  the to these  122 would c o s t $1.5  to $2 m i l l i o n each.  The present need was but  100 planes and the estimates from A . V . Roe i n d i c a t e d  that  they would c o s t a t o t a l o f $780 m i l l i o n s e x c l u d i n g the $303 m i l l i o n s t h a t had been spent up to September 1958. hope,  therefore,  had been to s e l l  Our o n l y  some to our a l l i e s .  The  U n i t e d S t a t e s had i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t was not i n t e r e s t e d Canada had r e c e i v e d no f a v o u r a b l e answers  and  from overseas d e s p i t e 40  recent negotiations  w i t h the U n i t e d Kingdom.  Before proceeding to d i s c u s s  the new defence p l a n s ,  the Prime M i n i s t e r admitted f r a n k l y that there was no  alternate  c o n t r a c t s a v a i l a b l e f o r the companies i n v o l v e d but that defence expenditures  ments,  since  c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d o n l y by defence r e q u i r e 41  he had but l i t t l e  c h o i c e i n the  matter.  Almost two years b e f o r e the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s statement, o p p o s i t i o n members had begun to debate the CF-105. o c c a s i o n the C . C . F . of  On one  member f o r A s s i n i b o i a had drawn the  attention  the m i n i s t e r to the "dead duck" l a b e l t h a t L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l 42  Simonds had pinned on the c r a f t .  A second r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of  the same p a r t y had s t r e s s e d the e x o r b i t a n t c o s t of the a i r p l a n e . Never a g a i n , he a r g u e d , should Canada embark upon such a programme without the endorsement guarantee o r d e r s . ^  3  of other c o u n t r i e s  Members o f the C . C . F .  the government w i t h q u e s t i o n s  costly  t h a t would  c o n t i n u a l l y peppered  on the p r o j e c t and i n t e r m i t t e n t l y  123  urged the government to make a c r i t i c a l review of the  project.  The L i b e r a l P a r t y had been l e s s h a r s h than the  C.C.F.  but n e v e r t h e l e s s c o n s i d e r a b l y concerned about the f u t u r e o f Arrow.  On August 8,  1958,  4 4  the  the l e a d e r of the o p p o s i t i o n had  t o l d the Commons: A d e c i s i o n has to be taken as to whether or not to go ahead to the p o i n t where these planes w i l l be i n t r o d u c e d i n t o our squadrons. . . or do we abandon the p r o j e c t i n the l i g h t of developments i n the l a s t two years which seem to be emphasizing the importance of other forms of a i r defence, which may not r e p l a c e but w i l l c e r t a i n l y have to supplement the C F - 1 0 5 ? 4 5  By the f o l l o w i n g January he was l e s s i n q u i s i t i v e and more c e n s o r i o u s .  The L i b e r a l P a r t y , he e x p l a i n e d , had r e c o n -  s i d e r e d the p r o j e c t every s i x months w h i l e i t was i n It  i s o b v i o u s , however,  have not done so s i n c e  t h a t the P r o g r e s s i v e they came to power.  office.  Conservatives M r . Pearson charged  the government w i t h i n d e c i s i o n , v a c i l l a t i o n and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . I n r e t u r n , he was t o l d by the Prime M i n i s t e r that i t was  4 6  the  47 L i b e r a l P a r t y t h a t was too It decision,  is  indefinite.  c l e a r then that w e l l i n advance of i t s  the government had been under f a i r l y continuous  from the House of Commons to come to an e a r l y and decision.  final  definite  And from the tone of o p p o s i t i o n comments,  n e i t h e r p a r t y chose to commit i t s e l f  pressure  irrevocably, i t  although appeared  124  t h a t both expected a c o n c l u s i o n i n the  negative.  The statement of the Prime M i n i s t e r , i n which the c a n c e l l a t i o n o f the Arrow was announced, was made on a F r i d a y afternoon.  The f o l l o w i n g Monday the defence c r i t i c of  the  L i b e r a l P a r t y moved the adjournment o f the House to d i s c u s s definite  a  matter o f urgent p u b l i c importance "namely the c r i s i s  the a i r c r a f t i n d u s t r y .  .  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of this  important s e c t o r o f our Canadian defence  production."  4 8  . i n v o l v i n g mass l a y - o f f s  in  and threatened  The Prime M i n i s t e r i n d i c a t e d t h a t he welcomed an  opportunity for d i s c u s s i o n .  Thus, the f i r s t of two  4 9  full  debates on the Arrow was begun. The s t r a t e g i c  bases f o r the d e c i s i o n of the  were d i s c u s s e d but b r i e f l y . them t o t a l l y questioned  5 0  C.C.F.  government  spokesman, M r . A r g u e ,  ignored  and from the L i b e r a l P a r t y o n l y M r . H e l l y e r  the v a l i d i t y o f M r . D i e f e n b a k e r ' s r e a s o n i n g .  Although  he d i d n ' t doubt t h a t the i n t e r - c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e would be the major t h r e a t by the mid-1960s,  M r . H e l l y e r e x p l a i n e d he  d i d n ' t understand how t h i s c o u l d be r e l a t e d to an a b s o l u t e l y d i m i n i s h e d bomber t h r e a t .  Even i f by the mid-1960s the bomber  i s o n l y a supplementary weapon, he contended, the L i b e r a l s i n d i c a t e s  t h a t there would s t i l l be 1000 - 2000  such a i r c r a f t t h a t c o u l d be sent a g a i n s t 51 continent.  the i n f o r m a t i o n o f  .  the N o r t h American  125 Mr.  Pearkes, i n r e b u t t a l , r e v e a l e d t h a t the government  i n t e l l i g e n c e showed t h a t the Russians had f a r fewer bombers that c o u l d f l y t o North American t a r g e t s and r e t u r n to R u s s i a than had been suggested by Mr.. H e l l y e r .  More important, the  Russians had no new ones i n p r o d u c t i o n and had cut o f f t h e i r development programme.  52  Liberal critics  comments and d i d n o t q u e s t i o n the accuracy  accepted  these  o f Mr. Pearkes*  information. A second i s s u e debated was the problem o f Canadian sovereignty.  Our f a i l u r e to s e l l  S t a t e s , maintained  the CF-105 t o the U n i t e d  Mr. Argue, showed as p r e d i c t e d i n the d i s -  c u s s i o n on N.O.R.A.D., t h a t our p a r t n e r s h i p f o r c o n t i n e n t a l defence i s a d e c i d e d l y unbalanced one. fair  We a r e not g e t t i n g a  share o f the defence p r o d u c t i o n o r d e r s .  We a r e becoming  i n c r e a s i n g l y dependent on American t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s . soverignty i s being  Canadian  swallowed up by the economy o f the U n i t e d  53 States. But b o t h the s t r a t e g i c and s o v e r e i g n t y i s s u e s were p e r i p h e r a l i n the debate.  The s u b j e c t s d i s c u s s e d most  thoroughly  were the f u t u r e o f the Canadian a i r c r a f t i n d u s t r y , the unemployment problem t h a t had been c r e a t e d and perhaps most  important,  the procedure and t i m i n g o f the government a c t i o n . Mr.  H e l l y e r s t a t e d the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n q u i t e s u c c i n c t l y :  126  I f the government decided that the Avro Arrow was not the most important machine necessary to our defence at the present time we would be obliged to go along with that decision and i t must be accepted, but the fact which cannot be accepted "is that at a time when there i s obviously a very urgent m i l i t a r y requirement for some defence machinery the government should and a f t e r eighteen months, simply cancel the contract overnight without giving adequate consideration as to what i t should do i n l i e u t h e r e o f . 54  I t has taken years, he continued, to acquire the engineering and technical s k i l l s required for our a i r c r a f t industry and now  by  one i l l - c o n s i d e r e d step, these are to be l o s t probably forever. Other members attacked the f a i l u r e of the government to cushion the blow and questioned the responsible minister concerning the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of alternate employment. The p o s i t i o n of the Prime M i n i s t e r was a sound one economically.  "The production of obsolete weapons as a make-  work programme i s an u n j u s t i f i a b l e expenditure of public funds." In s h i f t i n g the blame to the A . V . Roe Company, however, and i n emphasizing  that i t had received s u f f i c i e n t p r i o r warning,  56  he was on less firm ground. I f the comments i n the House were to be judged i n the manner of a u n i v e r s i t y debate, there would no doubt be many who would give the verdict to the government.  The logic of the  Conservative case, however, seemed r e l a t i v e l y unimportant  in  l i g h t of the fact that quite suddenly thousands had been thrown  127  0  out of work. The debate was renewed a week l a t e r on the motion t h a t the House go i n t o Committee o f Supply.  On such motions i t  the p r e r o g a t i v e of the o f f i c i a l o p p o s i t i o n to choose the f o r debate and on t h i s o c c a s i o n t h e i r l e a d e r i n d i c a t e d h i s p l a n was "to r a i s e c e r t a i n q u e s t i o n s  topic  that  concerning defence p o l i c y  and defence p l a n n i n g i n the country w i t h s p e c i a l r e f e r e n c e n e c e s s i t y of p l a n n i n g defence p r o d u c t i o n . "  and October 4 o f 1957.  to  the  5 7  In c o n s t r u c t i n g h i s argument, the l e a d e r of the i t i o n s t r e s s e d three key f a c t o r s  is  oppos-  t h a t o c c u r r e d between August 27  These were the l a u n c h i n g of the  first  58  Russian i n t e r - c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e , the f i r s t Arrow, and the s u c c e s s f u l  the completion o f  l a u n c h i n g of the f i r s t S p u t n i k .  A t t h a t t i m e , and not a y e a r - a n d - a - h a l f l a t e r ,  the  necessary  i n f o r m a t i o n was a v a i l a b l e f o r making a f i n a l d e c i s i o n . 59 government,  The  he c l a i m e d , had blundered d i s a s t r o u s l y .  F i n a l l y , M r . Pearson went o n , to r e p l a c e the Arrow w i t h the American produced Bomarc would make us more dependent on U n i t e d S t a t e s defence p r o d u c t i o n c a p a c i t y than ever b e f o r e . ^ 0  he moved an amendment t h a t " t h i s house r e g r e t s  In c l o s i n g ,  that the prolonged  delay of the government i n determining a i r defence p o l i c y and p l a n n i n g i n c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h our a l l i e s  i s p r e v e n t i n g the  use of Canada s defence p r o d u c t i o n f a c i l i t i e s T  effective  and manp'ower . "  o  l  128  To t h i s ,  the C . C . F .  spokesman added "and i s  the e r o s i o n of Canadian s o v e r e i g n t y . "  so c o n t r i b u t i n g to  Subsequent  C.C.F.  members p l a c e d primary emphasis on the numerous unemployed whereas L i b e r a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s policy. and  Both p a r t i e s , however,  a t t a c k e d the l a c k of government supported b o t h the  the amendment each o f which was crushed by the  sub-amendment government's  . 63 majority.  formed.  Debate on the Arrow d e c i s i o n was i n t e l l i g e n t  and i n -  Both the background and V; the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f  this  step were c o n s i d e r e d c a r e f u l l y by the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s . government was put on the d e f e n s i v e  by these p a r t i e s .  f o r c e d to s p e l l o u t , and i n g r e a t d e t a i l , its  action.  Due to the e x c e l l e n t  The  I t was  the m o t i v a t i o n f o r  coverage o f the debates by  the media of mass communication, the g e n e r a l p u b l i c was f o r e g i v e n an o p p o r t u n i t y to e v a l u a t e  the wisdom of  there-  the  government's procedure i n the l i g h t o f the government's own defence and the o p p o s i t i o n ' s  criticisms.  P o s s i b l y one  i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the o p p o s i t i o n d i d s u c c e s s f u l l y government p o s i t i o n was that on p r a c t i c a l l y a l l o p p o r t u n i t i e s , the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s had l i t t l e  discredit  the  subsequent hesitation  i n b r i n g i n g the. matter up i n debate and d w e l l i n g on i t  129  a t c o n s i d e r a b l e l e n g t h , no doubt w i t h the v o t e r i n mind.  And i f  one wished t o s p e c u l a t e , i t would perhaps be i n t e r e s t i n g t o attempt t o t r a c e out the r e l a t i o n s h i p between c a n c e l l a t i o n o f the c o n t r a c t and C o n s e r v a t i v e i n the 1962 g e n e r a l  NUCLEAR WEAPONS:  The  f a i l u r e s i n t r a d i t i o n a l l y "Tory  Toronto"  election.  THE GREAT (IN)DECISION  most continuous  and extended debate oh Canadian  defence s i n c e the Second World War has c e n t r e d on Canadian acceptance o r non-acceptance o f n u c l e a r weapons.  The problem  i s a most complex one and c l o s e l y connected t o a number o f a d d i t i o n a l matters n o t a l l o f which are d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o one another.  These i n c l u d e the i n f l u e n c e o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n and the  f u t u r e e l e c t o r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f each o f the p a r t i e s , Canada's r o l e i n N.A.T.O. and N.O.R.A.D., the n e c e s s i t y o f p r e v e n t i n g the spread o f n u c l e a r weapons and perhaps most important  broad  policy  and the d i r e c t i o n i n t o which Canada's defence e f f o r t should be channelled.  The n u c l e a r weapons debate thus has many f a c e s each  o f which i s o f c o n s i d e r a b l e importance. Probably  the g r e a t e s t s i n g l e c h a l l e n g e t h a t f a c e d  members o f Canada's twenty-fourth  P a r l i a m e n t was t h a t o f s e c u r i n g  from the government a d e f i n i t e commitment on whether Canada would accept n u c l e a r weapons.  Before  l o o k i n g a t the a t t i t u d e o f the  130 government, however, other  I s h a l l examine f i r s t  the p o s i t i o n of  the  parties. From the e l e c t i o n of 1957 u n t i l August 1960 the  P a r t y put forward no s p e c i f i c  policy.  was the r o l e o f the government.  P o l i c y - m a k i n g , they c l a i m e d ,  Thus, much o f t h e i r energy was  d i r e c t e d toward o b t a i n i n g from the government c l e a r o f the defence programme.  At times,  acknowledging the d i f f i c u l t i e s  Liberal  however,  after  statements carefully  i n v o l v e d i n making such a d e c i s i o n ,  the L i b e r a l l e a d e r s put forward v a g u e . s u g g e s t i o n s of what a L i b e r a l 64 p o l i c y might be. Concerning N o r t h American defence, o p p o s i t i o n made no d e f i n i t e  commitment.  the l e a d e r o f  the  But he d i d q u e s t i o n  the  p r o p r i e t y o f having Canadian and American Bomarc squadrons under a single  command ( N . O . R . A . D . )  armed than the former. suggested, i s  i n which the l a t t e r would be  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f such a s i t u a t i o n ,  he  members of the L i b e r a l P a r t y began  to  intolerable.^  Soon t h e r e a f t e r ,  better  5  a t t a c k the d e f e n s i v e v a l u e of the Bomarc, the weapon f o r which i t was most l i k e l y that n u c l e a r warheads would be o b t a i n e d . ^ 67 t h i s a c t i o n , they were supported s t r o n g l y by the C . C . F .  In  Toward  the end of May, w h i l e t h i s m i s s i l e was s t i l l under c o n s i d e r a b l e fire  i n P a r l i a m e n t , the Congress o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s cut o n e - t h i r d  131 of  its  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r t h i s weapon.  Despite  this,  although  no doubt w i t h some u n e a s i n e s s , the M i n i s t e r of N a t i o n a l Defence insisted  t h a t development o f the Bomarc " B " , the mark which  Canada was to r e c e i v e ,  " 68 schedule.  was proceeding on  On February 20,  1959,  the Prime M i n i s t e r had admitted:  The f u l l p o t e n t i a l of these d e f e n s i v e weapons (Bomarc) i s achieved only when they are armed w i t h n u c l e a r warheads. The government i s t h e r e f o r e examining w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s government questions connected w i t h the a c q u i s i t i o n o f n u c l e a r warheads f o r Bomarc and other d e f e n s i v e weapons f o r use by the Canadian f o r c e s i n Canada, and the storage o f warheads i n Canada. Problems connected w i t h the arming o f the Canadian b r i g a d e i n Europe w i t h s h o r t range n u c l e a r weapons f o r N . A . T . O . " s defence tasks are a l s o being studied. 6 9  To prevent the d i s s e m i n a t i o n o f n u c l e a r weapons to many countries,  however,  the Prime M i n i s t e r announced t h a t i t was  the  p o l i c y o f the government to prevent the p r o d u c t i o n o f such weapons in and  Canada a l t h o u g h he was q u i t e c e r t a i n t h a t the r e q u i r e d t e c h n i c a l "know-how" was The  p o s i t i o n of the C . C . F .  There i s no defence a g a i n s t and  available.  7 0  was c l e a r from the  the I . C . B . M .  scientific  outset.  the argument went,  t h e r e f o r e no reason to accept d e f e n s i v e weapons w i t h n u c l e a r  warheads.  Both i n N o r t h America and i n Europe i t  d e t e r r e n t power of S . A . C .  that i s preventing aggression.  i s no need f o r Canada to c o n t r i b u t e to t h i s result,  the C . C . F .  i s only  force.  7 1  the There  As a  c l a i m e d that i n "Canada there s h a l l be no attempt  132 to e i t h e r manufacture atomic o r n u c l e a r weapons, to use them, o r , 72 f o r t h a t matter, to s t o r e them on Canadian  soil."  The L i b e r a l s c r i t i c i z e d the u s e f u l n e s s o f the B o m a r c  7 3  but o f f e r e d no d e f i n i t e p o l i c y concerning n u c l e a r weapons f o r Canadian f o r c e s i n Canada. however, to advocating  Mr. Pearson d i d come v e r y c l o s e ,  t h a t the b r i g a d e group i n Europe be armed  w i t h such weapons: I f these weapons were n o t used, N.A.T.O. f o r c e s i n Europe would be f a c i n g armies which had them and would n o t h e s i t a t e to use them. U n l e s s we can g e t i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement on t h i s matter, the r e s u l t i n g m i l i t a r y d i s p a r i t y c r e a t e d might w e l l be c o n s i d e r e d i n t o l e r a b l e t o N.A.T.O. morale. I f the Canadian f o r c e s were d e p r i v e d o f these weapons o r were not p e r m i t t e d to use them. . . t h e i r morale c o u l d h a r d l y be expected to remain v e r y h i g h i f they were s e r v i n g a l o n g s i d e N.A.T.O. f o r c e s which had these t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r weapons. 74  By January o f 1960 the p o l i c y o f the L i b e r a l P a r t y had begun to s o l i d i f y .  Canada should accept no n u c l e a r weapons, i t  was argued, t h a t she does n o t c o n t r o l o r a r e n o t c o n t r o l l e d by N.A.T.O.  75  The Prime M i n i s t e r , i n r e p l y , accused  the o p p o s i t i o n  of i n c o n s i s t e n c y , p o i n t e d out t h a t American laws upheld the p r i n c i p l e o f U n i t e d S t a t e s ownership and he c l o s e d by a s s u r i n g the House o f Commons t h a t t h e r e " s h a l l be Canadian c o n t r o l o f use  i n Canada."  76  In the meantime, the U n i t e d S t a t e s had experienced f u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h e Bomarc.  F i n a l l y , toward the end o f  133 March, 1960, the Congress cut appropriations f o r the Bomarc from $421 m i l l i o n to $50 m i l l i o n , a step which indicated very c l e a r l y i t s disenchantment with the missile's effectiveness.  On  March 25, the senior defence c r i t i c of the Liberty Party, with C.C.F. support, urged the House to refuse interim supply to the government on the grounds that i t would be spent on the useless Bomarc.  He therefore moved that the government's request be  cut by one m i l l i o n d o l l a r s .  On a straight party vote, the govern77  ment defeated the amendment. On the Monday next, the cuts i n Bomarc appropriations by the American Congress were made the subject of a L i b e r a l motion that the House be adjourned to discuss a d e f i n i t e matter of 78 urgent public importance. As on the CF-105 cancellation, the Prime Minister announced he was more than w i l l i n g to permit such 79 a debate.  The Bomarc, and defence p o l i c y generally, were  debated quite f u l l y but no new statements were made on nuclear weapons p o l i c y .  The government continued to defend the value  80 of the Bomarc.  Thus, when some f i v e weeks l a t e r by a vote  of 327 to 3 the United States House of Representatives decided to cease spending funds on the Bomarc, the Diefenbaker administration was put i n a most embarrassing p o s i t i o n . By the spring, 1960, the defence p o l i c y of the government (or the lack of one) had been thoroughly discredited, not  134  o n l y by the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , but by the numerous organs of p u b l i c o p i n i o n , i n c l u d i n g even a c o n s i d e r a b l e segment o f  the  81 Conservative press.  In the Commons members time and a g a i n t r i e d  t o p r e s s the government i n t o making a d e f i n i t e  statement.  Replies  s i m i l a r to the f o l l o w i n g were the b e s t they c o u l d draw out however. On J u l y 14, the Prime M i n i s t e r s t a t e d : I t i s a w e l l known f a c t t h a t U n i t e d S t a t e s law r e q u i r e s t h a t the ownership o f n u c l e a r weapons must remain w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s . . . A t the same t i m e , as I have s a i d b e f o r e i n the house, i f and when n u c l e a r weapons are a c q u i r e d by the Canadian f o r c e s , these weapons w i l l not be used except as the Canadian government decides and i n the manner approved by the Canadian government. One determines a course by f i r s t t a k i n g the necessary steps as to the p r i n c i p l e s on which n u c l e a r weapons would be a c c e p t e d . Then when we have a r r i v e d a t t h a t p o i n t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i l l be made on the b a s i s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n s e x i s t i n g , which a r e v e r y g r a v e , and i n the l i g h t of any subsequent circumstances t h a t may develop between now and the time we would be i n a p o s i t i o n i n any event to have atomic w e a p o n s . 82  Three weeks l a t e r defence m i n i s t e r Pearkes argued: The Bomarc, the CF-104, the Honest John w i l l not be coming i n t o s e r v i c e w i t h the Canadian f o r c e s u n t i l l a t e i n 1961. What we a r e u n d e r t a k i n g and what has a l r e a d y been made p e r f e c t l y c l e a r i s t h a t we are d i s c u s s i n g w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s arrangements which w i l l be a c c e p t a b l e to b o t h c o u n t r i e s as to c o n d i t i o n s under which such weapons w i l l be a v a i l a b l e to Canada i f and when r e q u i r e d . . . We a r e . . . going ahead w i t h the procurement of v e h i c l e s which can use these n u c l e a r weapons, but the d e c i s i o n as to the a c q u i s i t i o n of the n u c l e a r warheads depends on circumstances which might develop i n the f u t u r e . 8 3  135 Thus, up u n t i l August 1960  only the C.C.F. had taken  a d e f i n i t e stand on nuclear weapons and defence p o l i c y . American security, i t was  their f e e l i n g , depended solely on the  Strategic A i r Command and i t s a b i l i t y to deter. was  North  also true i n Europe.  Much the same  Therefore there was no purpose i n  accepting t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons.  The strategy of N.A.T.O.  should be centred on the development of strong conventional forces and i t was  toward this goal that Canada should channel her e f f o r t s .  Very much i n contrast, the L i b e r a l Party had made no such d e f i n i t e p o l i c y statements.  In the meantime, government p o l i c y was  to  make no d e f i n i t e commitments but to "play things by ear." On August 4, 1960  the senior L i b e r a l defence c r i t i c ,  Mr. Hellyer, delivered an important  address i n Committee of Supply.  In i t he announced several important Party defence committee.  decisions of the L i b e r a l  He c r i t i c i z e d the adoption of the Sage-  Bomarc system and argued that Canada's r o l e i n continental defence should be one of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (called "bird-watching" by the supporters of the government).  To t h i s end, the CF-100 should  be replaced by a supersonic j e t interceptor.  Such a step, he  claimed, would strengthen the a l e r t system for the deterrent. Naturally, i t would also eliminate the necessity of storing or accepting nuclear warheads i n Canada.  F i n a l l y , to increase  Canadian independence of the United States N.O.R.A.D. should be  136  made a part of N.A.T.O.  84  On the following day, the leader of the opposition made known the nuclear weapons p o l i c y of h i s party f o r Europe.  No  N.A.T.O. forces should have nuclear weapons under national control. A l l , including the United States and United Kingdom, should be under the control of N.A.T.O. thus decreasing the number of 85  agencies which could independently begin a nuclear war. Concerning  the Canadian brigade group i n Germany,  Mr. Pearson announced that i t was now the p o l i c y of h i s party, i n contrast to what he had suggested a few years e a r l i e r , to avoid arming them with t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons. for the change.  He gave three reasons  F i r s t , the information that was now a v a i l a b l e  indicated that they would not provide the increased security that had formerly been anticipated.  Second, i t might discourage the  western European a l l i e s from b u i l d i n g up t h e i r own conventional forces. Third, recent tests had shown that small nuclear bombs were proportionately "more d i r t y " than large ones, that i s , they gave o f f 86  vast amounts of dangerous f a l l - o u t . The Conservatives had an instant advantage i n the debate for Mr. Hellyer's speech had irresponsibly been published by one newspaper i n advance of delivery to the House, thus permitting the defence minister, Mr. Pearkes, to answer i t even before i t was presented.  Even with this advantage and  137 Mr. D i e f e n b a k e r ' s h a r s h c r i t i c i s m s of L i b e r a l i n c o n s i s t e n c y , 8 7  the C o n s e r v a t i v e s c o u l d s c a r c e l y answer the charge i n the proC o n s e r v a t i v e P r o v i n c e that they had no p o l i c y . defence p o l i c y may to  or may  argue t h a t here.  a positive one."  "The  not be the r i g h t one.  We  Liberal a r e n ' t going  What i s important i s t h a t i t i s a POLICY,  8 8  Toward the end of 1960,  a new  l i g h t was  shone on  C o n s e r v a t i v e i n d e c i s i v e n e s s w i t h the c o n s i d e r a b l e r e f e r e n c e s , b o t h i n the Commons and o u t s i d e o f i t , to the s o - c a l l e d w i t h i n the Cabinet on n u c l e a r weapons p o l i c y . 1961,  the member f o r Burnaby-Coquitlam  "split"  On January  31,  r a i s e d a grievance - that  the M i n i s t e r o f N a t i o n a l Defence had requested members o f the armed f o r c e s to use t h e i r i n f l u e n c e t o counter "ban  the bomb"  89 movements.  Subsequent speeches  dwelled on t h i s a t t i t u d e i n  the l i g h t of the encouragement t h a t the m i n i s t e r o f e x t e r n a l 90 a f f a i r s had g i v e n to another group w i t h a s i m i l a r v i e w p o i n t . In  the Supply debates of 1961 L i b e r a l P a r t y and C.C.F.  speakers r e i t e r a t e d t h e i r v i e w p o i n t on n u c l e a r weapons.  The  P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e m i n i s t e r c o u l d do no b e t t e r than to draw an analogy between the weapons being purchased the r i f l e of a hermit.  The analogy, as i t turned out, was  a p p r o p r i a t e than he a t f i r s t The  f o r Canada and  realized:  s i t u a t i o n i s much the same as that of a  man  more  138  l i v i n g i n a l o n e l y c a b i n i n the woods who f e a r s he may be a t t a c k e d by a bear. He does not w a i t u n t i l the bear a c t u a l l y a t t a c k s him to buy a r i f l e , but secures i t beforehand and has i t ready i n the event o f need.91 Not u n n a t u r a l l y , Mr. was  Harkness, the new  defence m i n i s t e r ,  asked whether the hermit would purchase h i s ammunition b e f o r e  o r a f t e r he was  attacked.  9 2  Although  the m i n i s t e r d i d make some  e x c e l l e n t c r i t i c i s m s of the p o l i c i e s advocated by those i n o p p o s i t i o n , he a g a i n r e f u s e d to c l a r i f y government p l a n s .  Member a f t e r member  t r i e d to f o r c e the m i n i s t e r ' s hand u n t i l f i n a l l y , i n r e p l y to a h a r s h r i d i n g by Mr. M a r t i n , he r e t o r t e d : What the hon. member i s t r y i n g to do i s bludgeon me i n t o making a yes or no statement a t t h i s time as to the s e c u r i n g o f n u c l e a r weapons. I t e l l him r i g h t away t h a t he i s not going to bludgeon me i n t o making any statement b e f o r e the government i s ready to make i t . The debating of  l a s t o c c a s i o n s , i n the twenty-fourth  Parliament,  for  the n u c l e a r arms q u e s t i o n were the Address a t the o u t s e t  the f i f t h  s e s s i o n , and the b r i e f Supply debates t h a t f o l l o w e d  not long t h e r e a f t e r . Democratic P a r t i e s  9 4  By t h i s time, b o t h the L i b e r a l and p o l i c i e s had been developed  fully.  New The  former  group saw no need f o r n u c l e a r weapons i n North America on the grounds t h a t such weapons would p r o t e c t n e i t h e r the d e t e r r e n t nor the of  population.  centres  L i k e the N.D.P., they had come to the c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t the o n l y defence a g a i n s t a pre-emptive s t r i k e was  deterrence  139  and because the d e t e r r e n t was mobile, need t o p r o t e c t i t .  t h e r e was no longer any  And i n Europe, both p a r t i e s agreed  that  the g r e a t e s t emphasis should be p l a c e d on c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons. They d i f f e r e d , however, i n t h a t the L i b e r a l P a r t y advocated t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r weapons under N.A.T.O. (as opposed t o n a t i o n a l ) c o n t r o l , a l t h o u g h n o t f o r Canadian f o r c e s whereas the N.D.P. o b j e c t e d vehemently to a n u c l e a r s t r a t e g y f o r N.A.T.O. o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s brought coherent b e f o r e the country.  Thus both  and r a t i o n a l defence p o l i c i e s  And w i t h a g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n soon i n the  o f f i n g , both, b u t the L i b e r a l s i n p a r t i c u l a r , l o s t  little  o p p o r t u n i t y to embarrass the government. During  the Address numerous o p p o s i t i o n speakers  the i n a b i l i t y o f the government to develop  a policy.  attacked  I n the  month o f March a l o n e , q u e s t i o n s both f o r m a l and i n f o r m a l , on n u c l e a r weapons, were h u r l e d a t the government on a t l e a s t s i x occasions.  9 5  I n p a r t i c u l a r , L i b e r a l speakers  asked the govern-  ment to r a t i o n a l i z e the d e c i s i o n to accept a s t r i k e  reconnaissance  r o l e i n Europe, which r e q u i r e d t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r weapons, without a p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n f i r s t on whether they were w i l l i n g t o so arm their f o r c e s .  9 6  Almost every s e n i o r c r i t i c  P a r t y chose t o debate the matter.  i n the L i b e r a l  Indeed, so o f t e n was i t  r a i s e d t h a t even N.D.P. member Mr. H e r r i d g e q u e s t i o n e d whether the L i b e r a l s were n o t p l a y i n g p o l i t i c s w i t h the s w e l l i n g t i d e o f  140 o p p o s i t i o n to n u c l e a r  weapons.  97  The l a s t words o f the defence m i n i s t e r on the matter, however, b e f o r e c l o s i n g debate, were a mere r e p e t i t i o n o f statements made on numerous  e a r l i e r occasions.  Thus d i d the  debate on n u c l e a r weapons i n the twenty-fourth Parliament  draw  to an end.  COMPARISONS TO THE 1945-57 PERIOD  The n u c l e a r weapons and p o l i c y debates o f the twentyf o u r t h Parliament,  I would submit, were the v e r y a n t i t h e s i s o f  those t h a t had been h e l d between 1945 and 1957. In the e a r l i e r y e a r s , there had been concensus on broad p o l i c y a l t h o u g h c o n s i d e r a b l e disagreement on method o f implementation  i n the area o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and sometimes  strategic policy.  But the overwhelming impression was one o f  agreement - agreement to d e m o b i l i z e , agreement t o j o i n N.A.T.O. and agreement t o r e m o b i l i z e .  I n c o n t r a s t , the post-1957 p e r i o d  has been one o f disagreement. . The government and o p p o s i t i o n have d i v i d e d on n u c l e a r weapons p o l i c y , on c o n t i n e n t a l defence i n c l u d i n g N.O.R.A.D., and on the r o l e o f N.A.T.O. however have done more than c r i t i c i z e . forward  The o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s They have a l s o put  d e t a i l e d and r a t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e s to government p o l i c y .  And where p o l i c y has been l a c k i n g , as on n u c l e a r weapons,  proposals  141 have been suggested to f i l l Debate,  the vacuum.  on the whole, was of a c o n s i d e r a b l y h i g h e r  q u a l i t y than i t was i n the pre-1957 p e r i o d . parties  Both o p p o s i t i o n  showed a b i l i t y not o n l y i n debating the background to  the v a r i o u s p o l i c y problems, but a l s o i n d i s c u s s i n g implications.  their  Arguments on the whole were more comprehensive,  more d e t a i l e d and b e t t e r  documented than they were when the  C o n s e r v a t i v e s were the o f f i c i a l On numerous occasions much onto the d e f e n s i v e , 1945-57 p e r i o d .  Indeed,  opposition. the government was f o r c e d v e r y  something  that seldom o c c u r r e d i n the  the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s were a p p a r e n t l y  so convinced t h a t they had d i s c r e d i t e d the government's  defence  programme t h a t b o t h L i b e r a l s and New Democrats attempted  to  make defence one of the major i s s u e s of the 1962 g e n e r a l  election  campaign.  In the next few pages I have attempted to account  the d i f f e r e n c e s  for  i n the p a t t e r n o f o p p o s i t i o n between the 1945-57  and 1957-62 p e r i o d s . I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t the reason f o r  separating  the study i n t o c h r o n o l o g i c a l p e r i o d s was to t e s t f o r  differences  i n the f u n c t i o n i n g of the o p p o s i t i o n i n the two p e r i o d s . first  explanation,  therefore,  The  t h a t n a t u r a l l y comes to mind i s  t h a t the L i b e r a l P a r t y was more capable of h a n d l i n g the of an o p p o s i t i o n than was the C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y and  duties  differences  142 i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n and p e r s o n n e l of the two p a r t i e s do suggest reasons  to support t h i s  thesis.  In the 1945-57 p e r i o d the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e s handled defence  through a House of Commons Defence Committee  which was made up of a l l C o n s e r v a t i v e members of P a r l i a m e n t who wished to belong to i t .  A t the b e g i n n i n g of each s e s s i o n the  committee e l e c t e d a chairman, v i c e - c h a i r m a n and s e c r e t a r y . 98 Inasmuch as "there were no meetings o f the  'Shadow C a b i n e t ™  the defence programme of the C o n s e r v a t i v e s was determined by  this  Defence Committee i n the House of Commons w i t h the a s s i s t a n c e a t times of the p a r t y l e a d e r . In c o n t r a s t , Mr. H e l l y e r informed the author t h a t L i b e r a l p o l i c y s i n c e 1957 has been formed by what might be r e f e r r e d to as the Defence Committee of the Shadow C a b i n e t . defence  Thus major  d e c i s i o n s were made a t Shadow C a b i n e t l e v e l by the  L i b e r a l opposition;  a t the Commons committee l e v e l by the  99 Conservatives." Differences  i n the composition of the C o n s e r v a t i v e and  L i b e r a l Defence Committees are a l s o noteworthy.  Without e x c e p t i o n ,  the s e n i o r c r i t i c s of the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y were all  i n e x p e r i e n c e d i n the o p e r a t i o n s of g o v e r n m e n t .  served i n a f e d e r a l o r even a p r o v i n c i a l c a b i n e t .  1 0 0  None had  On the  hand, the p a r t y ' s c h i e f c r i t i c , M r . P e a r k e s , had been a  other  143 p r o f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e r and many o f i t s o t h e r members had achieved s e n i o r ranks w h i l e s e r v i n g w i t h the armed f o r c e s d u r i n g one o r the other o f the two world wars.  Thus the C o n s e r v a t i v e  critics  were more f a m i l i a r w i t h m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n than w i t h the g e n e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f government. In  c o n t r a s t , the p e r s o n n e l o f the L i b e r a l committee  c o n t a i n e d no p r o f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e r s and fewer men w i t h wartime experience.  But the composition o f t h i s L i b e r a l committee i s  l e s s important  than t h a t o f the Shadow Cabinet f o r i t was a t the  l a t t e r l e v e l t h a t L i b e r a l decision-making was c a r r i e d out.  The  two s e n i o r defence c r i t i c s , Mr. Pearson and Mr. H e l l y e r , were experienced i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the government, and s e v e r a l o t h e r key f i g u r e s i n the Shadow Cabinet had h e l d important p o r t f o l i o s i n the King and S t . Laurent governments.  The L i b e r a l s  thus brought a d e c i d e d l y d i f f e r e n t s e t o f c r e d e n t i a l s t o the j o b of  opposing  from those borne by t h e i r C o n s e r v a t i v e p r e d e c e s s o r s .  And w i t h these d i f f e r e n c e s t h e r e evolved d e c i d e d l y d i f f e r e n t patterns of opposition. methods o f implementing were e n e r g e t i c c r i t i c s .  On a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and s t r a t e g i c  broad p o l i c y the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e s But i n p r e p a r i n g a comprehensive  defence  programme which they c o u l d o f f e r i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the government they were t o t a l l y u n s u c c e s s f u l nor does i t appear t h a t they made s e r i o u s e f f o r t s t o do so.  The c o n t r o l t h a t they d i d  144 exercise,  a l t h o u g h p r o b a b l y not by d e s i g n ,  tended to b u r e a u c r a t i c  c o n t r o l r a t h e r than p o l i t i c a l . The p a t t e r n of L i b e r a l c o n t r o l has been almost direct antithesis  of t h a t weaved by the P r o g r e s s i v e  the  Conservatives.  The former ignored implementation of broad p o l i c y f a r more than the C o n s e r v a t i v e s .  But whereas the C o n s e r v a t i v e  oppositions  had been prepared to accept broad p o l i c y , the L i b e r a l s have n o t . Defence p o l i c y has been one of the s u b j e c t s most c r i t i c i z e d by the L i b e r a l o p p o s i t i o n and a l t e r n a t i v e s lacking.  c e r t a i n l y have not  Moreover, the L i b e r a l P a r t y has shown l i t t l e  been  hesitation  i n t a k i n g t h e i r case to the people by making defence a major i s s u e i n the 1962 e l e c t i o n .  Thus i t  is  c l e a r that p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l and not b u r e a u c r a t i c has been the primary g o a l of M e s s i e u r s H e l l y e r and Pearson. The d i f f e r e n c e s and the d i f f e r e n c e s  i n the p a t t e r n of o p p o s i t i o n ,  therefore,  i n the success of the o p p o s i t i o n a p p a r e n t l y  can be e x p l a i n e d by the d i f f e r e n c e s and o r g a n i z a t i o n of the two p a r t i e s .  i n the p e r s o n n e l ,  experience  In any event these  do o f f e r one e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the d i f f e r e n c e s  factors  i n q u a l i t y of  o p p o s i t i o n between the two p e r i o d s . S e v e r a l other e x p l a n a t i o n s a r e a l s o worthy of n o t e , this  first  theory,  however,  f o r t h i s changing p a t t e r n  f o r a l t h o u g h none c o n t r a d i c t  they do supplement i t by b r i n g i n g i n other  145 f a c t s which are d e c i d e d l y  relevant.  A second e x p l a n a t i o n , and one which has been or u n c o n s c i o u s l y approved by a l l three p a r t i e s , of p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e defence p o l i c i e s  is  t h a t the range  has i n c r e a s e d markedly  i n the post-1957 ( p o s t - S p u t n i k , p o s t - I . C . B . M . ) p e r i o d . argument here i s h i s t o r i c times  t h a t the b a s i c concept o f defence  - the i d e a t h a t defence  persons and weapons of offence  is  secured by d e s t r o y i n g  - has been p l a c e d under c o n s i d e r Because of  through which the methods of a t t a c k have  completely o u t d i s t a n c e d the means o f defence, assessment of defence has been r e q u i r e d . analysis,  The  1 0 1  since pre-  a b l e s t r a i n by r e c e n t t e c h n o l o g i c a l developments. these b a s i c changes,  consciously  the a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c i e s  a fundamental r e -  In making such an  t h a t are a v a i l a b l e , and  the ease w i t h which any s i n g l e p o l i c y may be c r i t i c i z e d , has made i t a simple t a s k f o r almost any o p p o s i t i o n to put any government under c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s s u r e .  It  is  thus  possible  to argue t h a t the improved debates i n the Commons are due i n p a r t to the changing c h a r a c t e r of the defence f a c i l i t a t e d the j o b of the o p p o s i t i o n . contention, defence  f u n c t i o n which has  And to strengthen  this  i t can be argued that the r e c e n t improvements i n the  debate have not been c o n f i n e d to the House of Commons  a l o n e , but r a t h e r have o c c u r r e d throughout Canada i n the numerous speeches, b o o k l e t s ,  a r t i c l e s and textbooks  t h a t have  the  146  been prepared ort the defence dilemma. Another theory t h a t must be c o n s i d e r e d i s s t a t e s t h a t i n defence and f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , partisan.  t h a t which  p o l i c y should be b i -  To t h i s p r i n c i p l e numerous C o n s e r v a t i v e s have  their approval.  Concerning t h i s i d e a P r o f e s s o r  remarks are w e l l worth c o n s i d e r i n g . Ottawa Evening J o u r n a l s t a t e d  stated  Keirstead's  On March 25,  1962,  the  editorially:  We are being t o l d t h a t there i s now a good chance of Canada r e t a i n i n g a b i p a r t i s a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y ! . . . Foolish unrealistic talk. . . Actually a b i p a r t i s a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y has no p l a c e whatever i n a B r i t i s h P a r l i a m e n t a r y system . . . O p p o s i t i o n i s not c o n s u l t e d beforehand r e g a r d i n g what the p o l i c i e s are to be about. I n r e p l y P r o f e s s o r K e i r s t e a d wrote: T h i s view i s s u r e l y a c o r r e c t though incomplete statement o f the r o l e o f the O p p o s i t i o n i n a p a r l i a m e n t a r y system. I t i s incomplete because i t omits to s t a t e t h a t the P a r l i a m e n t a r y system f o r i t s p r o p e r o p e r a t i o n depends on an agreement on the fundamental aims of p o l i c y . When the n a t i o n becomes s p l i t between h o p e l e s s l y i r r e c o n c i l a b l e p h i l o s o p h i e s , then the s t a t e cannot e x i s t and a d e c i s i o n i s n o r m a l l y l e f t to the abitrament of f o r c e . If  some credence be g i v e n to the i d e a that between  1945 and 1957 the C o n s e r v a t i v e s were motivated i n p a r t by the desire  f o r b i p a r t i s a n s h i p i n defence,  one which does n o t r e f l e c t  then thus another  on the a b i l i t y of the  reason,  opposition,  appears f o r e x p l a i n i n g the unanimity on broad p o l i c y b e f o r e  1957.  147 Finally,  a f a i r l y good case can be made that w i t h  e x c e p t i o n o f the a b b r e v i a t e d N . O . R . A . D .  debate,  government has been more w i l l i n g to d i s c u s s than were the v a r i o u s L i b e r a l governments.  the  the Diefenbaker  controversial issues On a l l f i v e  occasions  between 1945 and 1957 when defence matters were the s u b j e c t o p p o s i t i o n motions to a d j o u r n (to d i s c u s s  a definite  of  matter o f  urgent p u b l i c i m p o r t a n c e ) , the L i b e r a l government p u r p o s e l y avoided such debates.  In c o n t r a s t ,  o n l y two occasions  the Diefenbaker government on the  t h a t they have been moved, has welcomed  motions and on such p o l i t i c a l l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l t o p i c s and the B o m a r c .  1 0 5  This impression i s  such  as the Arrow  strengthened by changes i n  the  committee system s i n c e 1958 a t the i n i t i a t i v e o f the government which has a l s o encouraged r a t h e r than d i s c o u r a g e d p a r l i a m e n t a r y i n q u i r y . I t was mentioned e a r l i e r t h a t the L i b e r a l s have presented b e t t e r documented and more d e t a i l e d c r i t i c i s m s and alternatives useful  than d i d t h e i r C o n s e r v a t i v e p r e d e c e s s o r s .  therefore  It  is  to compare the i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t has been a v a i l -  a b l e to the two o p p o s i t i o n s ;  for i f  the L i b e r a l s were g i v e n much  more i n f o r m a t i o n on defence than the C o n s e r v a t i v e s , account f o r t h e i r s u p e r i o r brand o f o p p o s i t i o n .  this  But i t  might was  the C o n s e r v a t i v e s , and not the L i b e r a l s , who were s u p p l i e d w i t h greater information.  Not o n l y were there annual r e p o r t s  the defence departments but a l s o there were numerous white  for  papers.  And between 1951 and 1953 c l o s e to 1500 pages o f  evidence was gathered by the S p e c i a l Committee on Defence Expenditure.  In c o n t r a s t ,  the annual r e p o r t f o r the Department  o f N a t i o n a l Defence was h a l t e d by M r . Pearkes a f t e r white papers have been extremely i r r e g u l a r .  1957 and  Furthermore, a  L i b e r a l spokesman has argued i n an i n t e r v i e w w i t h the w r i t e r t h a t members of the P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e o p p o s i t i o n were p e r m i t t e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount o f leeway i n t a l k i n g i n f o r m a l l y to s e n i o r m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n p e r s o n n e l of the establishment,  a courtesy,  he contended,  defence  that the T o r i e s have  not g r a n t e d to the L i b e r a l s s i n c e the 1957 e l e c t i o n . in justice  to t h i s v i e w p o i n t ,  1 0 6  i t must be p o i n t e d out that  And there  have been some i n d i c a t i o n s of i n a m i c a b l e r e l a t i o n s between the Diefenbaker c a b i n e t and some o f i t s  s e n i o r p e r s o n n e l no doubt  stemming from the c l o s e L i b e r a l - C i v i l S e r v i c e t i e s that were b u i l t up d u r i n g the 22 years of L i b e r a l  government.  1 0 7  On the other hand i n f o r m a t i o n from extra-governmental sources has i n c r e a s e d s i n c e 1957 thus compensating p a r t i a l l y f o r the decreased volume of government-released r e c e n t changes  The  i n technology have g i v e n r i s e to numerous new  s t u d i e s on problems of s t r a t e g y  1 0 8  ;  and Canadian newspapers  and j o u r n a l s have become f a r more i n t e r e s t e d defence.  information.  i n the problems o f  149 But i n f o r m a t i o n simply does not e x i s t . o b t a i n e d through i n g e n u i t y and energy. each i n d i v i d u a l member w i l l v a r y .  I t must be  And the sources  of  Thus although G e n e r a l Pearkes  had admitted that the r e c o r d s of the American C o n g r e s s i o n a l Committees "are v e r y c o m p l e t e "  1 0 9  ,  h i s former c o l l e a g u e M r . Harkness  has w r i t t e n t h i s author that " f a r l e s s i n f o r m a t i o n was o b t a i n e d from American C o n g r e s s i o n a l Committee I n v e s t i g a t i o n s Canadian and other s o u r c e s . " ^  than from  In c o n t r a s t to t h i s M r . H e l l y e r  1 1  has informed the author t h a t these American hearings are h i s primary source of i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t the C . C . F .  1  and M r . C o l d w e l l has i n d i c a t e d -  drew h e a v i l y on both B r i t i s h and American  The p o i n t being made here i s  party's  t h a t most of the r e q u i r e d  sources.  intelligence  does seem to be a v a i l a b l e but o f t e n i n p l a c e s where members have difficulty  i n g a i n i n g access to i t .  i n f o r m a t i o n was g i v e n b e f o r e  A l t h o u g h more f i r s t - h a n d  1957 than i n the years s i n c e ,  i t would  be unwise to exaggerate the volume or use of much t h a t was p r o vided i n either period.  Neither o f f i c i a l opposition party  was g i v e n l a r g e amounts of u s e f u l  f i r s t - h a n d information.  Most  o f what they accumulated came through hours o f homework w i t h the records of i n v e s t i g a t i o n s countries,  of the l e g i s l a t u r e s  and other non-Canadian s o u r c e s .  of  other  In s h o r t ,  neither  i n the pre-1957 p e r i o d nor i n the years s i n c e has the Canadian P a r l i a m e n t been p r o v i d e d w i t h adequate i n f o r m a t i o n on  defence.  150 In the f i n a l a n a l y s i s ,  therefore,  and improved q u a l i t y o f o p p o s i t i o n s i n c e to no s i n g l e  cause a l o n e .  the changing p a t t e r n  1957 can be a t t r i b u t e d  There seems to be l i t t l e  doubt,  however, but that the o r g a n i z a t i o n and experience of the L i b e r a l P a r t y members has been one of the major reasons f o r t h i s  change.  Other f a c t o r s have a l s o a s s i s t e d the L i b e r a l o p p o s i t i o n i n effecting  p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l and not the l e a s t important of  these has been the w i l l i n g n e s s  of the Prime M i n i s t e r to  the House of Commons as a forum f o r debate.  use  But perhaps most  important of these other f a c t o r s has been the r e v o l u t i o n i n technology and the d i f f i c u l t i e s policy-makers.  official  defence  W i t h the l i n e between p o l i c y and s t r a t e g y  becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y b l u r r e d , effective  t h a t t h i s has caused f o r  the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l have grown r a p i d l y .  of  exercising  Thus, a new  o p p o s i t i o n , a c o o p e r a t i v e government and a changing  environment have a l l helped to make the House o f Commons a <•>  more e f f e c t i v e  instrument i n the c o n t r o l of defence p o l i c y .  by no means i n d i c a t e s a defence p o l i c y .  t h a t the House has been a b l e to  I t does s i g n i f y ,  however,  This  determine  that through  continuous c r i t i c i s m , much of which has been w e l l - f o u n d e d ,  the  Commons has a s s i s t e d i n a r o u s i n g p u b l i c o p i n i o n , and by so d o i n g , i t has made the government f e e l with i t s  defence  policy.  the p r e s s u r e of p u b l i c concern  151 CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 1  The procedure o f s e p a r a t i n g istrative  the more important admin-  d e c i s i o n s from the r o u t i n e ones w i l l be employed  a g a i n here as i t was i n chapter  three.  In approaching Commons c o n t r o l over the f i r s t c a t e g o r i e s (important a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) method w i l l not be u s e d ,  however,  v a r i e t y of reasons, more d i f f i c u l t  it  i s not n e c e s s a r y .  First,  I shall  study  for a is  far  examine  first.  In the e a r l i e r p e r i o d , there was s u f f i c i e n t i n t h i s intermediate  these  to 1957 p e r i o d .  Second, i t  to choose t y p i c a l d e c i s i o n s .  t h i s second reason  the case  as i t was f o r the 1945  I am a v o i d i n g t h i s technique f o r two r e a s o n s .  of  debate  range o f the p o l i c y - a d m i n i s t r a t i o n continuum  (important a d m i n i s t r a t i o n )  to permit the w r i t e r to s e l e c t  certain  d e c i s i o n s which c o u l d be s t u d i e d as t y p i c a l cases o f the more g e n e r a l phenomenon. difficult. discussion  In the more r e c e n t p e r i o d t h i s i s more  The f i r s t reason i s because there has been f a r i n t h i s range.  less  There have been f a r fewer debates  and perhaps e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t , when there were debates, House was more concerned w i t h p o l i c y matters  the  than i t was i n  the 112  pre-1957 y e a r s ,  and much l e s s concerned w i t h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Or i t might be f a i r e r to s t a t e t h a t because there was concensus  152  on broad p o l i c y i n the f i r s t p e r i o d , there was more time  to  c o n s i d e r the methods and machinery of implementation, whereas i n the 1957 to 1962 p e r i o d there has been l e s s time f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n because o f the c o n t r o v e r s y r a g i n g over p o l i c y . regardless  Thus,  of the reason emphasized the i n s u f f i c i e n t  o f debate makes i t  d i f f i c u l t to choose t y p i c a l  I also stated that i t case s t u d i e s .  i s not necessary  quantity  decisions. to choose such  W i t h the advent of the new methods of  delivery,  a g a i n s t which there are no known d e f e n c e s , and w i t h growing refinement  of the means o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n , a g r e a t e r and  g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n o f the s t r a t e g i c  and weapons d e c i s i o n s  become matters w i t h p o t e n t i a l l y g r e a t p o l i t i c a l F o r w i t h the s u b j e c t  significance.  o f n u c l e a r armament c o n s t a n t l y  i n mind,  and w i t h the v e r y s e c u r i t y of N o r t h America d i r e c t l y problems o f weapons technology primarily administrative. is  have  threatened,  can no longer be passed o f f  Probably the b e s t example of  the Arrow - Bomarc d e b a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y  CF-100 debates of the e a r l i e r p e r i o d .  i f compared to  as  this the  But p o s s i b l y the same  c o u l d be s a i d , a l t h o u g h a d m i t t e d l y to a l e s s e r degree,  of  such  s u b j e c t s as the F - 1 0 4 b , the Honest John and other weapons which to be e f f e c t i v e r e q u i r e  n u c l e a r weapons.  Thus, i t  is  b e i n g suggested t h a t numerous problems i n the defence  function  which were p r e v i o u s l y t r e a t e d as a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ones,  albeit  t h i s was no doubt a v e r y a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n , would now have be c o n s i d e r e d p o l i t i c a l - ( a s c h a r a c t e r o f the defence  defined)  to  because of the changing  function.  F o r purposes o f t h i s  t h e s i s , however,  it  l i t t l e whether these matters are c o n s i d e r e d to be  matters strategic  p o l i c y or important a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , f o r r e g a r d l e s s of how they are l a b e l l e d , much o f what has a l r e a d y been s a i d i n e v a l u a t i n g House of Commons c o n t r o l over L i b e r a l p o l i c y holds t r u e a g a i n here. Debate was o f a r a t h e r h i g h q u a l i t y .  Both o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s showed a b i l i t y i n debating the v a r i o u s s t r a t e g i c and weapons d e c i s i o n s ,  and i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s on  Canadian defence preparedness.  The debate was r e s t r a i n e d and  f o r the most p a r t r e s p o n s i b l e a l t h o u g h there can c e r t a i n l y be no doubt that the v a r i o u s matters debated were c o n s i d e r e d to be f a i r " p o l i t i c a l game".  There was no n o t i o n of b i p a r t i s a n s h i p .  Arguments put forward tended to be more d e t a i l e d and b e t t e r documented than they were when the C o n s e r v a t i v e s were i n opposition.  On numerous o c c a s i o n s  the o p p o s i t i o n was a b l e  f o r c e the government v e r y much onto the  to  defensive.  The L i b e r a l P a r t y , much l i k e the P r o g r e s s i v e Conserva t i v e s of the e a r l i e r p e r i o d , were p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e whatever debate o c c u r r e d a t t h i s  level.  for  Government supporters  154  said l i t t l e . C.C.F.  In c o n t r a s t to the 1945 - 57 e r a , however,  (and N . D . P . ) proved to be e f f e c t i v e  the  and e n e r g e t i c c r i t i c s .  T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y noteworthy i n l i g h t of the f a c t t h a t  there  were but e i g h t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h i s l e f t wing group i n the Commons. D e s p i t e a l l t h a t has been s a i d , there are some i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t l e s s c o n t r o l was e x e r c i s e d than when the C o n s e r v a t i v e s were the o p p o s i t i o n . administration,  First,  on departmental  there was f a r l e s s debate than there was d u r i n g  the p r e v i o u s three P a r l i a m e n t s .  It is  t r u e t h a t the f i r s t  item  i n the defence esti