PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF DEFENCE IN CANADA, 1945-1962

by

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B.Sc., McGill University, 1960

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department
of
ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

April, 1963
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the degree to which the Parliament of Canada was able to control the defence policy, administration and expenditures of the Canadian government in the 1945-1962 period. Because of the distribution of power between the two houses of Parliament, the thesis is primarily concerned with the House of Commons. In the second last chapter, however, the role of the Senate is analyzed.

The House of Commons has four principal (although not mutually exclusive) techniques through which it attempts to exercise control. These include critical debate, control of finances, select committees and the question period. The use of each of these techniques is analyzed separately. Also, each of the four is analyzed with reference to the party in opposition. Hence for each technique, the 1945-1957 and the 1957-1962 periods were dealt with separately.

The analysis of the defence debates and question period indicated striking differences in the pattern of opposition between the two periods. In the 1957-1962 period the Liberal opposition was concerned primarily with destroying the prospects of the government for the ensuing election. Hence the Liberals strove to discredit the defence programme of the government. Policy and politics were the major issues. Both in the debates and the
question period the opposition dealt harshly and exhaustively with the defence policy of the government. The Liberal opposition virtually ignored, however, the administration of the defence departments.

In contrast, the Progressive Conservative opposition of the 1945-1957 period devoted most of its energies, during question time and the debates, to the implementation of policy and administration of defence. Their efforts were culminated by their success in obstructing the 1955 amendment to the Defence Production Act. On the other hand, the Progressive Conservatives did not debate critically the major steps taken in the development of Canadian defence policy. Indeed, they never questioned the broad defence road that the government chose to follow.

House of Commons control of defence expenditures was a myth. No direct control over the estimates was exercised. Nor did the debates in Supply serve, even indirectly, to indicate that the House of Commons still retained control of the purse. Moreover, statutory controls were less effective for defence than the other functions of government.

In the 1945 to 1957 period, select committees were appointed with post-audit functions only. In five of these years the Public Accounts Committee dealt with irregularities in defence expenditures as a result of its examination of the
annual Report of the Auditor General. Because of its broad duties, circumscribed powers and partisan atmosphere, however, this Committee was not especially effective. In 1951, however, after completing its examination of the Auditor General's Report, the Public Accounts Committee dealt specifically with defence expenditures and served usefully to inform members of current developments in the defence establishment.

The work of the 1951 Public Accounts Committee was continued by the Special Committee on Defence Expenditures that met between 1951 and 1953. This Committee, despite the lack of permanent staff, received an enormous amount of evidence on the administration of defence. Its usefulness was cut down, however, by the partisan atmosphere which prevented the Committee from making constructive reports to the House. After dealing with the Currie Report in 1953, the Committee was not re-appointed.

Thus, the only effective and continuous post-audit scrutiny was carried out by the Defence Branch of the Office of the Auditor General. Its efficacy was hampered too, however, by the failure of the House to develop a technique for dealing regularly with Report; for the House proper never debated the Auditor General's Report and the Public Accounts Committee did not meet regularly during these years.

Since 1957, the Public Accounts Committee has met
annually and reported to the House without partisan interference, examples of ineffective administration and waste. Constructive recommendations have often been included. The Committee thus has not only strengthened its own usefulness as an effective organ of post-audit control. It has also increased the effectiveness of the Auditor General by guaranteeing more publicity for his annual report than it had been receiving in earlier years.

These years also marked the initial ventures in pre-audit control through select committee. In 1958 and 1960 the defence estimates were dealt with through these committees. Although the work of these committees, especially the 1958 committee, was an improvement over the performances of Committee of Supply, they appeared to have no inherent advantages over what a better informed Committee of Supply could reasonably be expected to accomplish. Moreover, there was evidence that these select committees might be used as the focal point for interest group pressures. Finally, the defence policy discussions which accompanied the review of the estimates clearly would have been more effective had they been held in the House of Commons.

Thus, since the Senate played no significant role, the record of Parliament in controlling defence was very poor. There was no effective pre-audit control of expenditure and
post-audit control was at no time comprehensive. Defence debates in the 1945-1957 period seldom probed into the implications of policy decisions. In more recent years, although the debates have been more comprehensive, they have not been at a very high level of sophistication. Both these shortcomings, it might be noted, were closely related to the dearth of information available on defence.

It is suggested that a select standing committee of the House might possibly help to strengthen parliamentary control. Such a committee, if left to investigate problems of administration, technology and weaponry, as well as past expenditures (all matters of fact) might serve two purposes. First, it might accumulate sufficient relevant information to permit more sophisticated policy debates and more informative discussion of the estimates. Second, it would permit better control of past expenditure through detailed and comprehensive investigation of defence.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to thank Professor Donald V. Smiley for his assistance and patience in the preparation of this thesis. Although we have disagreed about many of the ideas set out in the thesis, his numerous criticisms and suggestions have been invaluable. Naturally, however, for all the opinions and conclusions expressed in the thesis, I alone assume responsibility.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Miss M. Joan O'Rourke, Miss Maureen F. Wilson, Miss Audrey Malin and especially Miss Susan L. Anderson of the Social Sciences Division of the University of British Columbia Library. Without their cooperation and assistance the task would have been impossible.

Finally, I would like to thank Miss Mollie Chapman for her many hours of work in the typing of the thesis.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: SCOPE AND METHOD

Perhaps the greatest single challenge confronting the Canadian government of today is that of providing for the country's security. Threatened by an arsenal that could end civilized life on this continent, and hindered by the limited economic resources of the nation, the government is faced with a predicament that apparently defies solution.

And yet none oppose the idea that some answer to the seemingly inevitable disaster must be found. Indeed, it is to avoid such a calamitous end that the defence and foreign policies of this government are primarily directed; and an important prerequisite to both of these is strong and flexible executive leadership.

The problem of defence gives rise in turn to a second difficulty, that of reconciling the growth in executive power with the traditional liberal values. It is with a particular aspect of this second problem that I shall be concerned in the pages that follow - the record of the Canadian Parliament in controlling defence
policy, administration and expenditures since the Second World War.

In the first half of the twentieth century, peacetime Canadian defence policy, because of friendly relations with the United States of America, the supremacy of the British Navy and the level of contemporary military technology, was little concerned with the possibility that a direct attack might be launched against Canada. It is true that a tiny permanent force and a somewhat larger militia were maintained during these years, but their primary raison d'être was not the defence of Canadian territory against external aggression but rather to serve as a nucleus around which larger forces might be mobilized in the event of a war overseas. This "perfect security" enjoyed by Canadians during these years made the defence function a simple one and a relatively unimportant aspect of the business of Canadian government.

By the end of World War Two, the era of "perfect security" had drawn to a close. The permanent revolution in military technology brought to an abrupt end Canada's isolation from areas of armed conflict. And with the emergence of the Soviet Union as a potential enemy, it became necessary for the government to re-appraise its function if Canadian security were to be maintained in the years ahead. Thus, for the first time since the nineteenth century, a Canadian government was forced to take positive measures to ensure the territorial integrity of Canada and the physical
safety of its inhabitants.

To cope with this problem, the Canadian government turned both inward, to its own manpower and resources, and outward, to other western democracies that were faced with similar difficulties. As a result, the Canadian defence establishment multiplied many times growing from an inter-war average of fewer than 10,000 (civilian staff and regular forces) to one that now numbers well over 165,000 (civilian staff and regular forces). During the same period annual defence expenditures grew from less than $35 millions to sums roughly fifty times greater. Defence became not only the biggest but also the most widespread business in Canada, reaching into and affecting almost every constituency in the country. And to further help secure the goal of peace came membership in the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North American Air Defence Command.

As a result of these post-war developments, as well as other factors that have always been inherent to the organization and administration of defence forces everywhere, the defence function in Canada has a sufficient number of special qualities to set it apart as markedly different from the other functions of government. I shall look briefly at five of these qualities.

First, the size of the defence organization is of particular significance. It is not simply that the defence
department is the largest of the numerous departments of government. Rather, it has become so much larger than the others, and so geographically dispersed\(^4\) that it has become a much more difficult department to administer than any other in the government.

Second, because of the permanent revolution in technology, the defence function is an extraordinarily complex one. The defence organization therefore has at its disposal highly trained military, scientific and technical personnel. Moreover, because defence is a government monopoly, there are few who are trained in these fields who are not in the employ of the government.

Next, because of her membership in the organizations mentioned above, particularly N.A.T.O. and N.O.R.A.D., Canadian defence planning has been integrated into the grand strategy of the western alliance. Although Canada does participate in the decision-making process, she necessarily lacks the independence in this field that she has in such others as veterans' affairs, health, welfare, northern affairs and labour. Perhaps more important, a whole host of decisions that are made by friendly foreign governments, both directly and indirectly, have a most far-reaching impact on the defences of Canada. And, of course, since defence is a matter of relative strengths, decisions and developments in the Soviet Union also have an effect on defence planning in Canada.
Fourth, for reasons that are too obvious to need to be elaborated here, the defence function, unlike most others, is enshrouded in a good deal of secrecy.

Finally, because of the nature of contemporary military technology and the superiority of weapons of offence over those of defence, it is necessary that governments be sufficiently free of external checks that they can react instantly to changes in the type of threat or to changes in the areas of greatest pressure. Speed and flexibility, therefore, are of major importance in performing the defence function.

THE CANADIAN PARLIAMENT

Especially since the days of the Great Depression, the role of the state in the Canadian society and economy has been expanding at a very rapid rate. As a result of this expansion, increasingly greater amounts of power have been concentrated in the executive branch of government.

One of the major interests of those concerned with the future of parliamentary democracy has been to ensure that these new executive powers are employed both effectively and in harmony with the ideals of democratic government. Before deciding exactly what it is that is expected of the Canadian Parliament, however, it is necessary to look broadly at the functions of
A survey of the literature on the British parliamentary system reveals quite clearly that there is no consensus on the functions that Parliament should perform. What in fact has happened is that these functions have evolved through hundreds of years gradually changing to accommodate themselves to the politics and distribution of power in each historical period. Less than a hundred years ago Bagehot argued that the selection of a Prime Minister was the most important of the duties of Parliament. More recently, Friedrich wrote that it is "legislation that is traditionally looked upon as their (Parliaments') primary function." Despite this latter viewpoint, Parliament has never had exclusive control of legislation. For many years it has been the cabinet which has introduced most, although not all, major bills into the House of Commons. And the right to introduce financial legislation has long been the privilege of the executive only. But Parliament was able to influence the type of legislation that was introduced. Members were not totally dependent on a central party organization and therefore the government of the day was uncertain of its majority in the House of Commons. Indeed, members of the House were so independent that Professor Corry has concluded that "seventy-five years ago, the cabinet was continuously dependent on the will of the
legislature, which might be asserted against it at any time."7

With the extension of the franchise, important changes in the party system developed. Strong central party organizations matured and gradually the political leaders of these organizations, either members of the cabinet or the shadow cabinet, came to dominate their supporters in the back benches of the Commons. Leaders of majority governments, by "putting on" the whips, were able to ensure passage of almost all government sponsored legislation.

Almost simultaneously there was a growth in the administrative and technological complexity of many of the ever-increasing functions of government. Because of this development most members became less competent, through their lack of a sophisticated understanding of each of the departments, to deal with and sabotage government legislation. Thus, not only did the price of unsuccessful rebellion become great; but also the complexities of modern government diminished the possibilities of effectively undermining a government bill. Certainly on the subject of Canadian defence, where matters of size, secrecy, international complication and technological complexity are all involved, the Canadian Parliament has proved willing to give the executive considerable independence. On occasions Parliament has attempted to influence defence legislation, but such cases have been so
few since the Naval Bill of 1913 that it would require more than just a little exaggeration to look upon such cases as the fulfillment of the traditional legislative function.

Moreover, in the period when Parliament was still able to influence legislation, policy flowed primarily and directly from statutory law. In more recent years, much policy, through delegated legislation and other techniques, is made without special legislation (although generally such policy requires an increase in the required estimates). In defence and other government functions, most important decisions are made without the introduction of a specific bill.

Thus, the de jure legislative power that is still retained by Parliament is not all-embracing. More important, almost all the de facto power that remains now rests with the cabinet and civil service.

Despite the lack of agreement on the role of Parliament it is possible to identify (at least) two distinctive duties that Parliament seeks to fulfil (apart from the now near vestigial legislative function). First, members of the Canadian Parliament attempt to represent the interests of certain individuals and groups. Second, they seek to control the executive. Other functions, such as the educational one, can be related to the two that I have suggested here. 8
A good deal has been written on the nature of political representation. At one extreme Rousseau has argued that representation is the pathology of democracy and that the interests of no single man can be represented by any but himself. Therefore, much as in the days of the ancient Athenians, it is necessary that every citizen take his place in the popular assembly.\(^9\)

At the other end is Hobbes who defended his leviathan by stating:

> A multitude of men are made one person when they are by one man or person represented. ... For it is the unity of the representers, not the unity of the represented, that makes the person one.\(^10\)

Even in democracies there is no unanimity on the purposes of the representation function. In a classic speech on the duties of a member of Parliament, Edmund Burke told his Bristol constituents that "... not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole."\(^11\) Accordingly, Burke placed the national interest above those of his constituents. Nor surprisingly, he failed to retain his seat at the ensuing election.

At the opposite end of the democratic spectrum were the delegates sent to the Canadian House of Commons by certain agrarian constituencies during the general election of 1921. Chosen as representatives of the Progressive Party, they were free to pursue neither their own concept of the national interest
nor that of any highly centralized parliamentary party organization. Rather, they were the delegates of the farmer interests in their own constituencies and subject to the discipline enforced by the constituency organization. To ensure such behaviour, many of the western Progressives were required, in advance of their departure to Ottawa, to deposit a formal resignation with the committees of the conventions that had nominated them. Through the use of this coercive recall technique, many Prairie members of Parliament were forced to adopt a very precise view of their representative function.

The examples cited above point to one of the primary problems facing most representatives in modern democratic assemblies - reconciling demands and pressures of constituents and pressure groups with the necessity of promoting the general welfare. Since the time of Burke, however, the party system has changed sufficiently to make it easier to avoid, at least partially, this dilemma.

Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons run on platforms that are prepared by the national political parties that they represent. By voting in the Commons according to the decisions of these political parties, therefore, members may legitimately claim to be acting in accordance with the wishes of their constituents (and other interest groups that supported
them). They may also argue that they are voting in the national interest; for as Professor Ward has pointed out:

A member of Parliament, by following without question the dictates of his party leaders is perhaps not far from the ideal of using his free judgment in the national interest. This is because the party leaders, assuming on their part a modicum of enlightenment, will be doing their best to please the electorate in order to win the next election.\(^\text{13}\)

Members of Parliament, therefore, with few exceptions, of which the Progressives were the outstanding example, are first and foremost representatives of political parties and their party's concept of the national interest.\(^\text{14}\)

A careful perusal of Commons debates, however, reveals that the great majority of members also feel an obligation to represent the interests of their constituencies and constituents. Thus, although members of the House of Commons invariably support the national policies adopted by their party in caucus, they seldom have much to say on these national issues when they are debated in the Commons. Generally, backbenchers discuss national issues only to the degree that they affect their constituencies (or the interest groups that they are concerned with). Moreover, on numerous other occasions members rise with the sole purpose of talking about persons and problems in their home constituency. This aspect of the representative function will be discussed again below.\(^\text{15}\)
As a product of the Great Depression and the Second World War, the executive branch of government has acquired numerous new functions. This development has permitted the executive to wield enormous power over the life of the individual citizen.

To ensure that these powers are used effectively and in accord with the traditional liberal rights, it is necessary that the executive be subject to some form of control by an independent body or bodies; for without this there would not only be the danger of cabinet dictatorships (which would under the British North America Act be limited to five years)¹⁶; but, more menacing, the possibility of rule by a permanent technocratic elite that would be accountable neither to Parliament nor to the electorate, and therefore answerable only to the dictates of its own conscience. The job of preventing the growth of both these types of dictatorship, or any combination or variation of them, falls primarily to the Canadian Parliament.

Before attempting to present a definition of the control function, I shall glance briefly at the techniques that have gradually evolved through which Parliament attempts to control the executive. These include: the right to debate critically and to discuss; the right to ask questions; the right to approve of methods for raising moneys and the privilege of approving expenditures; the use of committees. Each of these
techniques may be thought of in two separate ways - ways that are suggested by the two types of dictatorship mentioned above.

First, each may be viewed in relation to the custom of regularly scheduled free competitive elections in which the government is forced to appeal to the voters of the country to renew its mandate. In attempting to secure re-election, the government must be able to point to the success of its policies and the effectiveness of its administration. On the other hand, the other political parties seek to achieve power not only through the appeal of their own platforms and candidates, but also by the degree of their success in discrediting the work of the past government. It is with this future election in mind that these four parliamentary techniques mentioned above can be understood.

A strong and skilful Parliament is able to put the government on the defensive. It can force the government to explain why it has adopted a certain policy and why that policy is superior to all others. When there are alternate policies that have some electoral appeal, Parliament can present these to the people. By closely examining administrative practices and scrutinizing expenditures, Parliament does have in its possession techniques whereby it can bring to the attention of the voters some of the inadequacies of the executive.
Control therefore may be defined as the power of Parliament to influence cabinet policy and administration so that it will remain broadly acceptable to a majority of the electorate. The cabinet fears the debates, criticisms, and investigations of Parliament only to the extent that they may weaken its future electoral chances. If the government is confident of its ability to secure re-election regardless of parliamentary criticisms, it may then be assumed that the use of the techniques of control will provide Parliament with little power. In Canadian federal politics, however, where a ten per cent increase in the popular vote of the official opposition, at the expense of the party in power, is generally sufficient to throw out the government, such confidence can seldom be absolute (as it apparently tends to be in some of the provinces). The amount of power that Parliament is able to wield will vary with a number of factors including the skill with which the techniques of control are used and the prospects of each party, as viewed by that party, at the forthcoming election.

This definition of control is suitable only to the degree, however, that the political executive is able to dominate the vast bureaucracy under it. And there is reason to believe that this is not always the case. Stated in its simplest terms the problem is that it is necessary to ensure that the
bureaucracy is doing its most, at all times, to promote the ends of government policy while at the same time taking care to preserve the rights traditional to the liberal democratic state. Because of the well-entrenched concept of ministerial responsibility there is the danger that instead of looking to uncover mal-administration and illegal arbitrary bureaucratic activity, the minister will instead seek to conceal it. And if this idea is belittled, as perhaps it might be, there is still the very real possibility that because of their experience, special knowledge and security of tenure, senior departmental officials will be able to dominate their political master. Thus control of the political executive will be insufficient to guarantee the future of parliamentary democracy. It is necessary therefore to define control in a second way in order to supplement the first definition although not to replace it.

Control, in this second sense, is defined as the power of Parliament to ensure that the permanent bureaucracy (the civil service and armed forces) is doing its maximum to achieve the ends of government policy while at the same time taking care to preserve the rights traditional to the liberal democratic state. Throughout this thesis therefore, the term "political control" will be used for the first type of control and "bureaucratic control" for the second.
Members of Parliament thus have the duty to represent and the duty to control. As representatives of parties they almost invariably follow the policies laid down by their leaders. Whatever influence backbenchers do have is exerted behind closed doors and not subject to examination by outsiders. This aspect of the representation function, backbench influence in caucus, is therefore not investigated in this thesis.

As already seen, however, members also represent constituencies, sectional interests and other groupings. The motivation for executing this function undoubtedly stems at least in part from the desire of members to secure re-election. From one viewpoint the impact of the representations of a Commons member may be to secure redress for an individual citizen or win favours for a special organization. From another, however, the attempt is to influence the personnel of the department dealing with the particular case. Thus from this second viewpoint, the exercise of the representative function is a form of control and it is from this perspective that the representative function will be viewed below.

Control of the executive is thus the most significant of the functions that the Parliaments of today seek to fulfil. It is true that there are others, each with varying amounts of importance, but each of those is of far less significance than
the control one. It will be the control function that is examined in the pages to follow.

I have already pointed out that it is the purpose of this thesis to investigate the degree to which the Canadian Parliament has been able to control defence policy, administration and expenditures since World War Two. The several qualities which are characteristic of the defence organization - size, technical complexity, monopoly of trained personnel, dependence on foreign decisions, secrecy, and the necessity of a strong flexible executive - it no doubt has already been observed, make control of defence a more difficult job than control of the other functions of government.

But these special qualities have not been the only problem that has faced the Canadian Parliament. It must also be remembered that "big defence" is a post-1945 phenomenon in Canada. Before then there was little concern with security in peacetime and not surprisingly, therefore, it was seldom the subject of parliamentary inquiry. In coping with the defence programme, therefore, the post-war Parliaments were dealing with something new to them. Thus, in addition to all its other difficulties the Canadian Parliament was very inexperienced in dealing with defence.
ORGANIZATION AND METHOD

In the remainder of this chapter I shall deal first with the organization of the thesis and second with the criteria used for evaluating critical debate as a technique of control. The Senate, for reasons that will be made clear in the chapter that has been devoted to it, is not particularly useful as a control body. Hence the discussion of methodology and criteria that follows, although applicable to the Senate, is primarily concerned with the House of Commons.

As mentioned earlier, there are four principal techniques through which the Commons attempts to perform its control function. The next seven chapters will consider successively the technique of critical debate (three chapters), the financial and committee control (three chapters) and the question period (one chapter). The role of the Senate will be dealt with in chapter nine. The last chapter will deal with the results of the entire investigation, conclusions and suggestions for improvement.

In the next three chapters, critical debate, as a technique to control the executive, will be investigated. Before proceeding to the substantive discussion, however, it is first necessary to deal with some preliminary facts about defence debates and then with the procedures used in the analysis.

Although the government of the day, for the most part,
is able to control the time of the House, opportunities are provided for members whereby they can debate defence policy and administration. Amongst these are the Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne, the motion to enter Supply, the first item of Supply, the motion to refer the estimates of the Department of External Affairs to the Standing Committee on External Affairs, the introduction of defence legislation, the first item in Supply for Defence Production, motions to adjourn to discuss a matter of urgent public importance, the motion to enter Committee of Ways and Means and the Budget Debate.

The last four of these have been of negligible importance in the years under study. The motion to enter Ways and Means was never used as an opportunity to debate defence. Not once, since 1945, has there been a full-scale discussion of defence during the Budget Debate, although occasionally an important statement is made at this time. Almost as insignificant has been the motion to adjourn to discuss a "definite matter of urgent public importance". Only seven times since the end of the Second World War have such motions (re defence) been put to the Commons - only twice debated. As will be seen later in more detail, there also has been surprisingly little debate in Supply for Defence Production.

The Address provides members with an excellent
opportunity to discuss almost any topic that they wish. Usually, however, the remarks of the opposition frontbenchers are determined by the content of the Throne Speech itself, or by conspicuous omissions from it, so that it is during years of defence innovation, extreme crisis, war or scandal that defence has been of major concern during the Address. Thus, on only four occasions since 1945 were important debates on defence held at this time.\textsuperscript{22}

Debates on defence legislation generally fall into three categories. First, the introduction of defence legislation is often used as an opportunity to debate defence policy generally or a particular aspect of it, without regard to the nature of the bill. Occasionally, there are protracted debates, at the resolution stage or on second reading, on major policy or administrative considerations arising out of the terms of the bill. An excellent example of this was the Defence Production Act of 1953. Finally, quite often discussion is limited to the details of the legislation.

More than 90\% of defence discussion (excluding external affairs) occurred on the motion to enter Supply, or during Supply itself.\textsuperscript{23} It was on those occasions that defence received its most thorough airings for before dealing with the estimates and their details, it was (and still is) customary for frontbenchers to review policy and administrative developments and for some
backbenchers to discuss the organization and expenditures of the defence department as it affected their own constituencies.

One other point is worth noting. On an average, since 1948, some 50.7% of the budgetary estimates have been on defence. In other words more of our budgetary estimates have been for defence than for all other departments combined. Despite this, only sixteen per cent of the time in Supply has been on defence and defence production. The other 84% has been on the remaining half of the estimates. The figures seem to suggest, therefore, that the House scrutinized defence expenditures less thoroughly than it did the other expenditures of the government. More will be said about the significance of this fact towards the end of the thesis.

The rest of the chapter deals with the criteria that have been selected to evaluate the effectiveness with which the technique of critical debate has been used to control the executive. In attempting to select criteria two problems in particular have troubled the investigator.

First, on matters of broad policy, the government will seldom discard or modify their plans regardless of the soundness of opposition criticism. Jennings, in writing on the British Parliament, has argued that "no matter how great the Government's effective majority, it can be compelled to give way to a combination of criticism in the House, complaints in the lobbies, and
agitation outside. In Canada, there is little evidence that this is true. On this point Professor Dawson has written:

The cabinet must. . . avoid even the appearance of defeat or of weakness. . . . Criticism by the Opposition casts its shadow before it invades the Cabinet meeting and the Government caucus; it is most influential before it is formally voiced. How will the Opposition attack this project? . . . What will the farmers think of it? How will it affect the Government vote in Ontario? . . . These will be anticipated as far as possible when the measure is being drafted, and the Cabinet will then defend it ardently and refuse to accept amendments of any consequences.

Professor Corry apparently agrees, pointing out that: "One great service of the opposition lies not in its spoken criticisms, but in the mere face of being there." Thus, it is not possible to measure control solely by measuring the impact of opposition criticisms and alternatives on government policy for it is only on the rarest of occasions that suggestions will be openly accepted. Much more often, they will be anticipated and discounted in advance.

A second difficulty in measuring the control function is that government backbench influence is largely felt in party caucus and not in the public debates of the House. Hence, although government backbenchers do assist the House in carrying out the control function, this is done behind closed doors and not easily measured in this analysis.

Four criteria have been used to evaluate the skill with which the House employs the technique of critical debate to
control executive policy.

Despite the above qualifications, the ability to cause withdrawal or modification of government policy has to be used as the first standard for evaluating the ability of the House to control the executive.

The second criterion that I have used is the quality of defence debate as judged by two separate considerations. First, does the House fully understand and debate the reasoning behind the decision? Second, does the House effectively debate the implications of such policy decision?

This second criterion requires some explanation. I have pointed out above that in making policy, the government will anticipate the quality and nature of opposition criticisms, and the appeal that these criticisms will have for the electorate. In so doing, the government may, although not necessarily, modify or alter its original or preferred plans in favour of those that will avoid antagonizing the voters. The extent to which the government is willing to "pre-modify" its plans therefore may depend in part upon the degree to which it fears the ability of the opposition parties to discredit its policies in the eyes of the voters. If the House shows little aptitude in debating defence, the government will feel free to ignore the potential impact of the Commons debates on the voter. On the other hand,
if the more recent debates have shown that the House is able to debate intelligently the advantages and disadvantages of a particular defence policy, and attract the interest of the electorate, there seems little doubt but that the government will feel restrained by the Commons. (The actual amount of restraint will depend, in part, on the extent to which the cabinet fears that the criticisms are hurting its future election chances).

The third criterion that has been used is the ability to form rational and coherent alternatives to government policy. I am arguing here that opposing, without presenting some alternatives, is only half of the task of the opposition. It is useful for the House (and in this thesis this invariably means the opposition parties) to offer at least a general programme for that which it would wipe out.

Finally, and related to the above criteria, is the ability of the opposition parties to take and hold the initiative in debate. If the House is able to do this it can make certain that it goes into detail on the subjects in which it is most interested. On the other hand the ability of the government to side-track debate away from the controversial issues to the peripheral ones, is a good sign that the House is ineffectively performing its duties. 28

But debate on defence does not deal with policy alone.
It is also concerned with the whole spectrum of the policy-administration continuum.

Between the two extremes on the continuum lie a whole range of issues that cannot simply be called policy or administration. It is relatively clear that the decision to join N.A.T.O. was a policy one. Similarly the decision to alter the division of labour in the kitchens of Camp Petawawa would be an administrative one. But what of the numerous administrative decisions with political repercussions? Thus the decisions to move Prairie Command Headquarters from Calgary to Edmonton, to construct frigates in Canada that could be purchased less expensively in the United Kingdom, and the decision to scrap the Arrow were all administrative ones with varying amounts of political content. Indeed, even such a vital decision as the one on nuclear weapons, if newspaper reports are correct, will be based at least partially if not wholly, on strategic considerations, despite its enormous political significance.

It is clear therefore that no simple policy-administration dichotomy exists. It might be possible to develop a theory with x categories between the two extremes on the continuum and investigate the role that Parliament plays in handling each of the categories. But unless an infinite number of categories were established, it would be impossible to select a sufficient
number to achieve a high degree of accuracy in the analysis.

Because the writer feels that there is little to be gained in accuracy by breaking up the continuum into six or seven categories, he has decided to divide all decisions into but two. Since the division is being used only to establish an analytical framework, the lack of precision will not seriously damage the investigation.

The method of dividing what I loosely refer to as policy and administration one from the other is to set up the criterion of political implication. Every single decision or action which in itself is sufficiently important to damage seriously the electoral possibilities of the government I refer to as policy. Decisions in this category would include broad policy, important strategic decisions, decisions involving large amounts of money and important administrative policy decisions. On the other hand, decisions and actions which in themselves do not appear sufficiently important to damage the electoral possibilities of the government I refer to as administration. This does not mean that these cannot have political significance for the cumulative political impact of several of these might be far greater than any single policy decision. But taken alone, they would be hardly noticeable. Such a criterion, of course, has the disadvantage of leaving the author with the problem of
determining which decisions and actions are in themselves sufficiently important to damage seriously the electoral possibilities of the government. Despite the subjectivity involved here, the criterion is sufficiently useful, I believe, to allow for a meaningful analysis.

Because of the definition that has been ascribed to administration, the criteria for evaluating parliamentary control in this range of executive decision and action are not all similar to those for policy control. The ability to develop alternatives is less important. Rather, the standards that are used include aptitude in extracting information; the number of problems investigated; the general quality of debate; and the ability to uncover maladministration including the skill with which such revelations are exploited as indicated both by modifications in administrative procedure and also proficiency in winning headlines.

It has often been argued that the many years the Conservative Party was out of office left its members without any realistic concept of how government operates and hence handicapped them in fulfilling the role of the opposition. And it is true that after 1945 there were only eleven Conservatives who had been in the House before 1935 and only two of these had been cabinet ministers, although it is of some interest to note that one had been a Minister of National Defence. If the handicap was as
serious as some have suggested, it might be expected that the record of the House of Commons since 1957 would be considerably different from that of the twelve years previous. To test this thesis, for each of the techniques of control, the 1945-57 and 1957-62 periods will be considered separately, so as to facilitate comparison.

In the next three chapters I will deal with the technique of critical debate. The first will cover control of defence policy under the Liberal government and the second, control of Liberal administration. The third (chapter four) deals with House of Commons control of policy and administration since 1957.
CHAPTER II

CONTROL OF DEFENCE POLICY, 1945 - 1957:
THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE

In this chapter I have examined the technique of critical debate as it was used by members of the House of Commons in attempting to control defence policy. Rather than inquiring briefly into the degree of Commons influence over each policy decision made during these years I have decided to examine a few in detail.

To begin with, however, it must be understood that there has been almost complete unanimity in Canada on the basic goal of the defence organization. This goal has been to maintain the territorial integrity and physical security of Canada by opposing Communist aggression. And this basic agreement on defence has been very necessary as it is in any democracy; for if there were sharp differences on the fundamental ends, the framework of our democratic institutions would be menaced dangerously.

To implement this basic goal, several key decisions were made during the period. These I refer to as broad policy.
Examples include the Joint Declaration of February 12, 1947, and the formation of N.A.T.O. To achieve the ends of broad policy, administrative and strategic decisions are required. Some of these have virtually no political significance. Others, however, most certainly do. In the early post-war years the government embarked upon a policy of repatriation and demobilization. The method and regulations employed in implementing the programme affected directly hundreds of thousands of servicemen and their families. As such it was a problem with many political pitfalls. It is this type of decision that I refer to as administrative policy. Ones of similar significance but of a strategic nature I have labelled strategic policy.

Two basic criteria have been used in selecting the case studies for this chapter. First because of the difficulties involved in separating policy from administration, I have selected decisions which were of such great importance that there could be but little doubt that they fall very close to the policy end of the policy-administration spectrum. Second, I have attempted to use a balanced sampling by examining administrative policy and strategic policy decisions as well as those on broad policy. On this basis, House of Commons control over five key decisions has been investigated. To clarify the purpose here it should perhaps be added that in the context of this chapter alone, the
word "influence" might seem more desirable than "control", but in the light of the definition of political control given earlier, and it was defined in terms of influence, the author sees no reason to succumb to this temptation.

Finally, toward the end of the chapter, a few pages will be devoted to the House as policy-maker.

DECISION TO DEMOBILIZE AND REPATRIATE

The decision to embark upon a policy of large-scale repatriation and demobilization was the most important defence decision of the early post-war years. It was influenced by several considerations including the total collapse of the enemy, peaceful relations and wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union, confidence in the machinery of the United Nations and the American monopoly of atomic weapons. Perhaps more important than all these, the pressure of domestic politics contributed to what at the time appeared to be an irresistible decision.

With the advantage of hindsight it can now be seen that demobilization, on such a vast scale, was a serious error for within several months the Soviet Union had ceased cooperating with the western world, and the United Nations, as a guarantor of international peace, was proving less effective than had been hoped for. Thus, at least two of the premises that the decision
had been based upon proved to be ill-considered.

What was the role of the House of Commons in this vital decision? Had it cautioned against such a step? Did it debate the implications of such a step? Did it propose any alternatives?

I shall look first at the reaction of the official opposition, the Progressive Conservative Party. The Conservatives had the opportunity to debate demobilization during the Address, the debates on post-war problems that were generally labelled Demobilization, and again in Supply. But they did not do so. Their stand was virtually indistinguishable from that of the Liberal government. There was no critical analysis of the premises on which government policy was based. Nor did the Conservative spokesmen concern themselves with the impact of demobilization on future security. If, in a thorough debate, Conservative members had explained their reasons for accepting this major decision, by carefully dissecting both its premises and implications, it could be argued that these parliamentarians, unlike the writer, lacked the advantage of hindsight, and that in the light of the domestic and international environment, nothing more could be expected. But this was not what happened for at no time did Conservative critics ever come to grips with the fundamental importance of the steps that had been taken.

The contribution of the Cooperative Commonwealth
Federation was similar. Urging that the realities of the world situation be carefully investigated, the leader of that party, Mr. Coldwell, rejected his party's isolationist policies of the inter-war years. Indeed, citing the dangers of modern warfare, he urged that until the United Nations was ready to assign Canada its role under Article 43 of the charter that "we have to gear our policy to what this house, this government and this country believe to be in the best interest at the present time." But despite these brave words, neither Mr. Coldwell nor his colleagues attempted to debate critically the decision to demobilize. Instead, Mr. Coldwell went on from his interesting remarks to urge that the Canadian government spend more money to promote social and economic progress around the world as the best method of promoting international peace. Thus, much like the Progressive Conservatives, the C.C.F. contributed nothing constructive in the debate on the decision to demobilize.

Only the Social Credit Party hinted at the possibility of dangers in the future. The argument of its members, seldom comprehensive, and not at all based on a rational analysis of the forces at work internationally, did nevertheless caution against excess optimism. In particular, they were suspicious of the United Nations and its utility in preserving peace. Wishful thinking about the United Nations, Mr. Blackmore reminded
the House, should not permit us to "forget the lesson of the League of Nations. . . I suggest" he said, "that if we trust too far in the security council we shall probably find it weighed in the balance and found wanting, just when we need it." 8

The Social Credit Party went further than mere destructive criticism. It urged that instead of the United Nations, a collective security policy be centred around a vigorous and strengthened Commonwealth. 9 Although no specific mention was made of the Soviet Union, the emphasis on the necessity of collective security indicated considerable scepticism about the future international atmosphere. Having warned the government and country about its unwarranted optimism it seemed logical that Social Creditors might caution the government against too rapid demobilization. Yet the Social Credit Party offered no direct resistance to demobilization, forced no debate on the implications of demobilization, and in its time-honoured way continued to hint at international conspiracies but offered no evidence to substantiate such accusations.

The post-war decision to demobilize was one of the most significant of all defence decisions ever taken in Canada. Its importance certainly merited a thorough investigation by the Canadian House of Commons. Although it is possible to argue that the circumstances at the time made such a step almost
obligatory for the government, it surely should not have been accepted without question by the House. The Commons should have forced a careful consideration of the background and premises to the decision, and even if all the parties were in substantial agreement with the government, they should nevertheless have discussed the impact that such an action would have on the future of Canadian security. But the members of the House did none of these. They in no way caused any modifications in policy. The quality of debate was poor. Indeed, the government exercised such great control over Parliament that there never was a debate on the significance of the decision to demobilize.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

On April 4, 1949, Canada and eight other western democracies signed the North Atlantic Treaty. By article 5 of it the signatories pledged:

An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed forces, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.10

The decision to enter into a regional security pact, as
a **peacetime** step, was a radical new development in the traditionally isolationist Canadian defence policy. The decision came as no surprise, however, to those who had been giving careful attention to the public statements of those in charge of Canadian foreign policy. On March 17, 1948, the day that the Treaty of Brussels was signed, the Prime Minister stated that Canada was prepared "... to give substance to the conception of an effective system of collective security by the development of regional pacts under the charter of the United Nations." Thus, well in advance of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty it had become clear that the Canadian government was most anxious to be a part of such an organization.

Each of the opposition parties supported the government. Indeed, the Progressive Conservatives had anticipated the treaty by more than fourteen months. Speaking to the House early in 1947 Mr. Bracken stated that if the United Nations were not effective in guaranteeing security, then, "the democracies, by close collaboration with each other, must see to it that their combined strength is such as will deter any aggressor." When in a speech outside the House Mr. St. Laurent, apparently trying to sound out American opinion, implied that there would be little purpose in Canada entering an Atlantic security pact without the United States, he was sharply rebuffed by Mr. Pearkes, the
senior defence critic of the Conservative Party. Contrary to this, the latter argued, Canada should take the initiative and join with or without the Americans.15

In 1947, in presenting his party's ideas on defence, C.C.F. spokesman Mr. Probe stated that the defence function should be primarily a civilian one.16 By 1947, however, the C.C.F. had officially announced its approval of plans for a regional collective security pact. The C.C.F., Mr. Coldwell stated:

Believes that Canada should support and join... a north atlantic security pact. Efforts must be continued to build the world security system called for in the united nations. But until such security is achieved, a regional pact, in line with the provisions of the charter, will increase the degree of mutual aid and assistance among western democracies.17

In subsequent speeches C.C.F. spokesmen emphasized two points in particular. First, they persisted in implying that the Atlantic pact organization was more closely linked to the United Nations than in fact it was. Second, they urged that the pact be an economic one, as well as a military one. On this second point they had a close ally in the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Article 2 of the Treaty, often attributed to the efforts of the latter, does stress the importance of economic cooperation. It does seem unlikely, however, and there is no empirical evidence to support the idea, that the C.C.F. had any
influence on the decision to include the article. One other point should be noted. By emphasizing these two aspects of the Treaty, in addition to the concept of civilian defence, the C.C.F. gave the impression that they could not face up to the fact that this was first and foremost a military alliance.

Like the other parties, the Social Credit group had also indicated its approval well in advance of the signing.

The debates on N.A.T.O. stretched over a period of approximately eighteen months. During this time, there were five debates on it.

The first two occurred during the foreign policy debates of April and May of 1948, following Prime Minister St.Laurent's statements favouring a peacetime regional security pact. As already seen, the three main opposition parties were unanimous in supporting this concept. None of them, however, seemed to grasp the significance of the Prime Minister's statements nor the implications for Canada.

In the Address, on January 31, 1949, both the C.C.F. and the Social Credit Party went on record as supporting the formation of an Atlantic security pact. On the next day, the new leader of the opposition, Mr. George Drew, moved that the House be adjourned to discuss a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely, a statement that had been made that the signing
of the Treaty might result in a war with the Soviet Union. At last, it appeared, the House of Commons was showing concern with the ramifications of the proposed alliance on the future of Canadian security. The Speaker ruled, however, that the motion was out of order. Nevertheless, he pointed out, the matter could be discussed almost immediately as the Address was about to be re-opened. Strangely, and without explanation, the Conservatives did not seize this opportunity. Not a single Conservative member mentioned the Treaty in their speeches. The climax of this episode occurred when Mr. Pearson condemned severely the Progressive Conservative Party for failing to indicate its viewpoint. Clearly, the loyal opposition was having difficulty in securing the initiative in the debate.

In March, 1949, the Commons debated a resolution that Canada participate in an international conference with a view toward creating an alliance of Atlantic powers under the terms of the United Nations charter. Mr. Coldwell warned the government that signing might initiate an arms race, but apart from his valid contribution, little that was new emanated from the front benches.

The backbenchers were enthusiastic if not especially profound. One member interpreted the pact as a solidification of the forces of Christianity in their opposition to atheism. Others argued that Spain, since it is "really a democratic nation,"
be invited to join. Only the Bloc Populaire's Mr. Maxime Raymond opposed the alliance. Because Communism had its roots in social injustice, it had to be fought by social reform, not a military alliance. One does not fight an ideology with guns, argued Monsieur Raymond.

The debate on ratification on April 28 and 29 was brief, all parties except the Bloc Populaire maintaining their united front. The two members of the Bloc Populaire abstained from voting.

In all five debates on the North Atlantic Treaty, the opposition parties, except the Bloc Populaire, were in harmony with the thinking of the government. The quality of debate, as far as it went was passable. But it didn't go deep enough. Members, with but a few exceptions, neither asked nor answered such absurdly simple questions as - is this the best way to contain Soviet aggression? or, are there any alternatives? would this render Canada more or less liable to attack? At times the Progressive Conservatives appeared ready to come to grips with the implications of such a treaty and hinted at some possible repercussions. The two minor parties scarcely went this far. With not too much exaggeration the debate can be likened to that which might be expected from the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. The lack of curiosity and questioning were particularly
noteworthy. No alternatives were debated, no modifications suggested and no significant questions asked or answered. The House did debate the background to the step. But in attempting to determine the impact this would have on Canadian security, the House performed no useful service for the Canadian polity.

REMOBILIZATION

On June 24, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. On June 27 the Security Council of the United Nations recommended to the members of that organization that they should provide such assistance to the South Koreans as would be necessary to repel the aggressor. Within three days the Canadian government made known that three destroyers were being dispatched at once to western Pacific waters to assist United Nations forces. In August it announced that a brigade, to be known as the Canadian Army Special Force, would be recruited to carry out obligations under the Charter and North Atlantic Treaty. Before the year was out, these troops had arrived in Korea.

In his review of the world scene during the Address that year, the minister of external affairs stressed not only the war in Korea, but also the danger of a conflict with China, instabilities in the Middle East and Persia, and the precarious position in
western Europe. It was in the light of this background that defence minister Claxton spoke to the Commons three days later. The government had decided, he announced, to remobilize and re-arm. To carry out the programme that was planned, it would be necessary to spend some $5 billion over the following three years. On May 8 he requested that the House approve the expenditure of $1.6 billion (47% of government estimates) for defences in order that the programme might be started. Thus did Canada respond to the instabilities in the world about her.

Most of the members in the Commons enthusiastically supported the actions of the government. If anything, the Conservatives argued, greater preparations, and not fewer, were required. Quite accurately Mr. Pearkes pointed out that in the past few years "... the opposition had frequently taken a lead in urging more effective defence measures and asking for more adequate forces than were being provided in the minister's forecasts in previous years." And on the new recruitment goal of 115,000 full-time active service personnel, he admitted that he didn't "believe 115,000 men will be sufficient to meet all those commitments." That the minister had referred to. His only complaint was that the moneys requested were to be spent in such a short period that serious inflation might result. Had the government begun three or four years earlier and spread the
programme out over a greater period, such complications could have been avoided. Finally, he suggested that in the light of the changing technology at least three dollars should be spent on the air arm for every one on the other two services.\textsuperscript{37}

Mr. Harkness, vice-chairman of the Progressive Conservative defence committee, was even more explicit:

> Will his (the minister's) programme give us the minimum forces necessary for the defence of Canada and to meet our commitments under the United Nations and the Atlantic pact? I would respectfully suggest that it will do neither.\textsuperscript{38}

Instead of the single brigade group maintained for the defence of Canada, he maintained". . . that the very minimum that we need now. . . is three. . .."\textsuperscript{39} In addition, other troops would be required to fulfil overseas obligations.\textsuperscript{40} Finally, he urged with the support of much of his party, although not that of defence committee chairman Pearkes, that a system of compulsory training for the reserve forces be introduced.\textsuperscript{41}

The criticisms and suggestions of the Conservative Party were individually sound. They were based on logical arguments and there was no shortage of constructive alternatives. But the programme offered by the Conservatives, when viewed as a whole, was irresponsible, i.e. it was not the kind of programme that the Conservatives could have implemented had they been voted into power. For if all the suggestions of the Conservative critics
had been carried out, defence expenditures alone would have been greater than all the money (including defence) spent by the government in 1951. Doubtless because of the lack of agreement among the Conservative critics themselves, the overall programme of the Party showed little concern for the resources or wealth of the Canadian economy.

The C.C.F. reaction was more passive. Referring to Mr. Claxton's announcement Mr. Thatcher stated:

He said that during the next year $1.6 billion will be spent on national defence. It is of course virtually impossible for opposition members who have not taken part in the many conferences under the Atlantic pact, who have not attended the military talks, to know whether this is too much or too little. As opposition members we have little choice but to accept the words of the minister that this spending is vital and essential.

And Mr. Noseworthy contented himself by remarking that "government policy I am confident will have the fullest possible support of every member in and of every political party here represented." C.C.F. debate on the Address went no deeper. And in Committee of Supply, the C.C.F. added nothing new. Indeed on the decision to rearm it is impossible to evaluate the quality of C.C.F. debate for their members made no contributions. To a man they silently acquiesced to the major decision.
The Social Credit Party also supported the re-armament programme. Mr. Low, speaking on the plans enumerated by the defence minister, admitted that with broad contours of the programme his "group" was in substantial agreement. Social Creditors, like part of the Conservative Party, also incorporated into its programme the Canadian Legion recommendation "that a complete programme of preparedness including compulsory training in the reserve forces for home defence be executed with the greatest possible degree of equality of sacrifice and service." Along with the Progressive Conservatives the Social Credit Party stressed the need for greater steps and greater speed in building Canadian defences.

Like the debates on the decision to demobilize and on N.A.T.O., the remobilization debate was characterized by an aura of unreality. The Commons seemed not to grasp the significance of the steps that it was facilitating. Almost before it had begun the House passed over the vital decision. As especially in the case on demobilization, the premise for House criticisms was the basic decision itself. It is true that in the 1948-51 period both Conservatives and Social Creditors had made numerous suggestions that defences were inadequate. Nobody had even hinted, however, that full remobilization would be necessary. And yet, when the step was taken, the argument raised was that it went not far enough.
DEMOBILIZATION POLICY: AN ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY DECISION

In the period immediately following V-J Day, Canadian defence policy, like that of all western democracies, was rigidly channelled into one programme - repatriation and demobilization. The basic principle upon which demobilization is based "is that of first-in first-out, the principle that the man with the longest and hardest service should be the first discharged." \(^47\)

As already seen, the House exercised absolutely no control over the decision to demobilize; nor, it seems, did it even attempt to do so. It was more energetic, however, in debating the principles upon which demobilization had been based.

In an amendment to the Speech from the Throne, the leader of the opposition, Mr. Bracken, charged that the government "had failed to demobilize our armed forces on a fair basis and, in particular, have failed to present serious disadvantages to overseas personnel." \(^48\) In the debate that followed, criticisms of policy by Tory defence critics, Mr. Pearkes \(^49\) and Mr. Merritt, \(^50\) led the government to give a more thorough statement of policy. \(^51\) Again, in the debate on the estimates, Mr. Harkness criticized what he described as government discrimination against those who had seen active service overseas. \(^52\) A relentless attack by Conservatives, with moderate support from the C.C.F. \(^53\) had no affect
on government policy. The suggestion by Mr. Merritt, that extra credits be given those who had been in active combat, although debated by the government, was ultimately rejected.54

But the House, on demobilization policy, did much that it failed to do on the broader decision to demobilize. It offered specific proposals thus causing the government to debate alternatives. Its criticisms, often supported by concrete examples of injustice, forced the government to re-assess policy continuously in the light of the criticisms emanating from the House. But perhaps most important the opposition succeeded in putting the government on the defensive. It forced the minister to spell out in considerable detail the reasons and justifications for policy. It forced the government to investigate and answer for the numerous cases of injustice cited by the various members. In performing these functions with considerable logic and energy, the House of Commons effectively used the technique of critical debate to control the government.

THE DETERRENT - A STRATEGIC POLICY DECISION

On January 12, 1954, the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, told the Council on Foreign Relations that in the future American foreign policy "would be placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on defensive power."55
In particular, Mr. Dulles cited two drawbacks to the post-war policy of containment. First, it gave the enemy the advantage of being able to select the time, place and method of attack. Second, it cost an astronomical amount of money - more than $50 billion per year. Under the new strategy, although not abandoning local wars, we shall be able "... to depend upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing." Over the following six years this so-called Dulles doctrine came to have a most far-reaching influence on the strategy of all N.A.T.O. countries, including that of Canada.

In a white paper issued early in 1952 the Canadian defence minister listed the objectives of defence policy as:

(1) The immediate defence of Canada and North America from direct attack;

(2) implementation of any undertakings made by Canada under the Charter of the United Nations, or under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or other agreements for collective security;

(3) the organization to build in a total war.

The identical three objectives were listed in the white papers published the following two years. By 1955 these had been partially changed and by 1956 Mr. Campney's white paper revealed significant alterations:

1. The aim of Canada's defence programme and planning is to provide for the security of
Canada. Under present and foreseeable conditions this can be done most effectively by close co-operation with our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and especially with the United States in relation to the North American area. Our defence plans must also include a capacity to carry out obligations that may arise out of Canada's membership in the United Nations Organization.

2. The primary objective recognized by Canada and our allies is to prevent the outbreak of a third world war. This requires that there must be a powerful strategic bomber force, backed by the means to ensure that this force can be immediately effective under any circumstances, and supported by the forces-in-being required to blunt an attack by a would-be aggressor for long enough to permit the West's retaliatory forces to carry out their role. This combination of forces constitutes the best possible deterrent under present conditions.}

In the early 1950s, the defence of North America, as an objective of defence policy, was not at all difficult to comprehend. The main danger to the continent was air attack. To combat this required the integration of three separate sets of operations - detection and identification of enemy aircraft; communication of this intelligence to air and ground units; finally, "trained personnel, aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons must be able to annihilate or drive off the attackers." The defence of North America thus meant the ability to drive off those who would attack.

As early as mid-1954, these basic ideas had begun to change and by 1956, due to the continuing revolution in weapon
technology and the impact of the Dulles doctrine, primary emphasis had shifted to the retaliatory power of the United States Strategic Air Command\textsuperscript{61} and its ability to deter aggression. The many developments in defences, particularly the new radar lines, were justified more as a method of protecting the S.A.C. against surprise attack than as a direct means of saving the lives of Canadians. Moreover, the new master strategy changed much of the thinking behind the role and purpose of Canada's mobile brigade group, interceptor squadrons, and civil defence preparations. Each of these came to be looked upon as having a role in the building of a more balanced deterrent.

There will be no attempt in this work to evaluate this change in strategy. That is not the function of this thesis. But it should be remembered that these changes had a most far-reaching impact on all Canadian defence thinking and on the role of Canada in North American defence. Hence the new strategy most certainly merited the closest investigation of the Canadian House of Commons.

The first point to note is that no great amount of time was devoted to the subject. On two occasions, in Committee of Supply for National Defence in 1954\textsuperscript{62} and again in 1956,\textsuperscript{63} the changing strategy received some attention. At two other times, in an external affairs debate in 1954,\textsuperscript{64} and in Supply for National
Defence in 1955, it was discussed by a handful of speakers. No single full debate, however, was devoted wholly to this new strategy.

Although Parliament was in session when Mr. Dulles first gave voice to his new doctrine, the initial Canadian response came not from the House of Commons but from the external affairs minister and the Canadian press. It was some two-and-a-half weeks before Mr. Diefenbaker, in the middle of a long speech on foreign policy, asked Mr. Pearson several questions concerning the implications of the pronouncement made recently by Mr. Dulles:

Have there been any discussions between Canada and the United States that this new policy means retaliation by atomic bombs? To what extent was Canada consulted when that announcement of policy took place?

Two months later Mr. Pearson endeavoured to explain to the House what was meant by this new concept of the deterrent. Numerous clarifications by the American government since the January 12 speech, Mr. Pearson pointed out, had made it clear that the key word in the Dulles address was "capacity". Local defence would not be abandoned. The nature of the response to all Soviet aggression would be determined by the circumstances. When the circumstances were favourable, the western alliance, if it so chose, would be able to retaliate massively. This
statement by Mr. Pearson was warmly welcomed in the House where some had feared that massive nuclear retaliation would henceforth be the response to every form of aggression.

Mr. Pearson also pointed out that the new strategy in no way signalled a return to American isolationism. The United States, he contended, would consult with her allies before resorting to massive retaliation.69

Pertinent criticisms were raised by several Conservative critics. Surely, the leader of the opposition told the House, it is unreasonable to expect that valuable time would be sacrificed for consultation while bombs were falling on the cities of the United States or one of her allies.70 The member for Kamloops argued that Mr. Dulles could only mean that consultation would be held in advance and only on the general conditions that would provoke massive nuclear retaliation.71

Some six weeks later the chiefs of staff of the N.A.T.O. countries met in Paris. Almost immediately after these meetings had ended, debate on national defence was resumed, this time in Committee of Supply.

It was at this time that members of the House were first informed of the impact that these new weapons would have on Canada's defence function. The deterrent, to work effectively, Mr. Claxton pointed out, required not only destructive power but
also the means of delivery. "That ability must be protected. This consideration brings into focus and gives new emphasis to the whole question of continental defence." 72 He explained that the communications in the system "are hooked up so that within seconds or a minute or so of an aircraft being found on the radar-scope at one of the radar stations the intelligence of that is received at air defence command and at Colorado Springs where the United States strategical air force is located." 73 Mr. Claxton also mentioned, although only secondarily, the importance of such warnings for civilian defence and security purposes. 74

Mr. Pearkes, speaking immediately after the Minister, analyzed the implications of the latter's statement. He pointed out how vulnerable Canada's cities were to Soviet striking power "It is of little comfort to those cities to know that if they are attacked United States bombers are available to retaliate." 75

General Pearkes appeared uncertain in which direction Canada should face. At the beginning of his statement he stressed the necessity of more rapid development in the early warning system, the requirement of larger interceptor forces, and the importance of civil defence preparations. 76 These remarks, although not incompatible with a strategy of deterrence, seemed to indicate that he preferred to place primary emphasis on defensive defence, as opposed to deterrence. He did not, however,
give a final evaluation of the new strategy.

During the following year, 1955, there was little debate on the matter. Mr. Harkness, however, did take the time to try to analyze the more recent developments. He began by pointing out that for the first time in several years, the wording of the objectives of defence policy, as spelled out in the annual white paper, had been altered. The new terms, he charged, were ambiguous. What do they mean? Do they indicate that we are to become more dependent upon the United States? "Is it, shall we say, a first indication of an over-all command which Air-Marshall Slemon in his speech not long ago indicated was a necessity as far as North America's air defence was concerned?" We are not objecting if this is the case, he explained, but we do have a right to be informed.

Mr. Harkness also renewed the theme that Mr. Pearkes had emphasized a year earlier. The Canadian people and Canada's industrial centres are exposed to thermonuclear attack. The fighter squadrons that had been sent to Europe therefore ought to be brought back at once. And as for civil defence, a most vital part of the defence function, it was time that the government began to take positive measures in this field.

Mr. Campney, in a brief reply, indicated rather abruptly that the Honourable Member for Calgary West had excited
himself over what was little more than a change in the wording of the objectives of defence policy. But in introducing his estimates the next year, Mr. Campney made it quite clear, although only implicitly, that Mr. Harkness had indeed been accurate in his criticisms. The defence minister began by reminding the House that no strategy could guarantee security. As long as the threat of war continues, he explained:

Our best hope is, undoubtedly, in the maintenance of a strong compelling deterrent. Primarily, of course, this deterrent at present is based on the strategic air force of the United States, now being augmented by that of Great Britain. But, to be effective, such strategic air forces must be supplemented by warning lines to enable their retaliatory planes to get off the ground immediately an attack is launched on the free world anywhere. They must also be supplemented by fighter air power to blunt the edge of the thermonuclear attack. They must also again be supplemented by well-trained efficient ground forces to form a shield to prevent Europe being suddenly overrun by the ground forces of an aggressor. All these factors are just as much part of the deterrent as the retaliatory forces themselves.

Mr. Pearkes, and other Conservative critics, approved of the substance of the defence minister's speech. Thus, in less than a year, opposition scepticism with the strategy of deterrence had been cleared away. Along with the government they too decided that the best guarantee of Canadian security was a carefully guarded deterrent.
C.C.F. critics Cameron and Gillis were less sympathetic with the planning of the government. The former stated:

It is true enough that the D.E.W. line may still be of value in providing sufficient warning for the United States strategic air command to get those bombers into the air to proceed with massive retaliation. In that regard, it is of inestimable value... but I would point out it has nothing whatever to do with Canada's part in the protection of North America. 

Whether or not the C.C.F. understood fully the strategy of deterrence is not easy to determine from the remarks that were made. It is clear though that members of that party were not at all satisfied with Canada's contribution to continental defence. No one from this party, however, elaborated on the role that Canada should play in continental defence.

Finally, it must be observed that the Social Credit Party offered little in the debates by way of criticisms or suggestions.

Debates on the important strategic innovations were brief and scattered. They caused no modifications in Liberal policy. The initiative or upper hand in the debate rested neither with the government nor the opposition but passed back and forth from one to the other.

On the whole, the debate, especially from Conservative critics, was informed and intelligent. They were able to grasp the significance of the changes that were being implemented, and
at times they even hinted at one of its major shortcomings - its failure to offer physical protection to the inhabitants of North America. (They ignored, however, its inappropriateness for so-called "brush-fire" wars).

Perhaps the most important and useful result of the debates was in clarifying and informing both the House of Commons and the people of Canada of their new role in the protection of North America. For a long time there was much ambiguity on the meaning and significance of the new strategy and the Commons debates did much to tear away the mantle of mystery that was for so long clothing it.

THE COMMONS AS A POLICY MAKER: THE POST-WAR POLICY VACUUM

The early post-war years were ones of drift and uncertainty in defence policy. Although a bare outline of the future role of the armed forces was released by the government, no statement was issued explaining the underlying political, economic, strategic or technological considerations behind these plans.

For the most part, the House was sympathetic with the problems facing the government and the difficulties in formulating policy during the twilight years of 1945 and 1946. This attitude did not prevent each of the opposition parties, however, from gradually developing broad defence policies of their own.
As mentioned above, the Social Credit Party was most anxious that Canadian defence be built around a Commonwealth collective security pact. In this they were warmly supported by the Imperialist from Toronto Broadview, Mr. Tommy Church, and within six months by the defence committee of the Progressive Conservative Party. Discussing the necessity of planning for the years ahead, the leader of the opposition pointed out that geography no longer protected Canadian shores. New weapons and the new technology make it necessary, he argued, that Canada adopt a positive international policy and not one of appeasement.

The background argument was essentially sound and the fundamentals endorsed by the other three Canadian parties. Mr. Bracken went on to conclude "that the presentation and strengthening of the commonwealth of British nations is at this stage in our history the best hope of permanent peace in a world dominated by three spheres of influence."

Mr. Bracken was moved by at least two separate stimuli. First, he feared that Canada, if she failed to direct her policy toward the Commonwealth, would gradually become a satellite of the United States. Many would argue that history has proved him an excellent prophet. Second,
he believed that Great Britain, bolstered by the Commonwealth, would be strong enough to take its place in the post-war world, as an equal with the two super-powers that were emerging. In this history thus far has proved that he was sadly mistaken. More important, the suggestion that the British Commonwealth might serve as a third sphere of influence indicated or implied that Canada, as part of the Commonwealth, might serve as a balancer in the event that the other two powers might collide, an idea that within a very short period was repugnant to many Canadians.

By the summer of 1946, the C.C.F., as well, had developed its own eleven-point programme for the defence of Canada. Probably its central thesis was the argument that Canadian defence policy should be channelled through the United Nations. In his speech the C.C.F. spokesman, Mr. Probe, contended that a peacetime military force should be operated as a part of the Canadian contribution to the United Nations.

Thus, during the years of Liberal indecision, each of the opposition parties did develop defence policies that it was able to place before the House. In so doing the parties were performing one of their most important functions, presenting alternate policies to both the government and people of Canada.

The policies of all three political parties, however, seem to have had little influence on the Liberal policy that
subsequently emerged, and one explanation for this, although not necessarily the primary one, is that the policies as put forward by the opposition had little rational appeal. I am not judging here the policies themselves but rather the empirical data and rationality of argument on which they were based. In all three cases, a logical and coherent argument, based upon the necessary minimum of intelligence and information, was sadly lacking.

By 1947, however, the government had given opposition critics more substantial targets. The withdrawal of Canadian troops from the occupation zone in Germany and the decision to reduce the size of the post-war forces resulted in severe criticisms from the opposition benches. The government, it was charged, was abandoning its international responsibilities by withdrawing the occupation army from Germany. Is this, asked Conservative critics, a return to the policy of the inter-war years? The decision to lower recruitment totals, they maintained, would seem to indicate that the question was being answered in the affirmative.

Lest this be the case, the Tories reminded the government that we could no longer enjoy the privilege of leisurely mobilization. "Schemes which provide for the mobilization of a first division to take the field six months after the outbreak of war or after mobilization has been ordered," Mr. Pearkes warned, "bear no
relation whatever to modern warfare." The conclusion of the Progressive Conservative Party was that Liberal Party contradictions and indecisiveness stemmed from the fact that it had not been able to formulate a general defence policy.

Speaker after speaker from the Conservative benches attacked the indecisiveness. Mr. Harkness stated this lack of a defence policy made it "clear... that all plans so enthusiastically expounded by the ministers concerned during the past two sessions were not based on any sound foundation of general policy, and, as a result, amounted to nothing, and have not in effect been scrapped." Mr. Merritt continued on the same theme. "If I were to try to put my finger on the basic trouble of the government" he said, "I would say it is the fact that ever since the end of hostilities there has been an uncertain purpose behind our forces and an uncertain amount of money wherewith to carry out that purpose." This undoubtedly, he told the Commons, could be traced to the policy of waiting for concrete action from the security council. The time had now come to start planning outside the framework of the United Nations. The cornerstone of policy must be that the primary function of our defences is to defend our shores against invasion "until our friends can come to our aid."100

The response of the government to the criticisms of the opposition, and the criticisms were both responsible and
accurate, was for the most part one of indifference. The withdrawal from the occupation zone was briefly "explained away" by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and continued questioning from the opposition did little to provoke a more comprehensive answer. The decision to recruit only up to three-quarters establishment was excused as a temporary measure although one Tory preferred to give it a different interpretation. This step, Mr. Merritt charged, was an economy measure, taken in the light of Liberal losses in the recent by-elections. And finally, Conservative criticisms of government indecisiveness on a policy for the reserve forces were for the most part ignored.

The first full statement on post-war policy was not delivered to the House until July 9, 1947, some five months after the Conservative onslaught. Inasmuch as the government had pledged itself to disband the interim forces by September 30, 1947, and it is obvious that a full statement of policy was necessary before recruitment to the permanent forces could begin, it seems that the criticisms of the opposition did little to speed up the formation and announcement of government policy. A survey of Canadian periodical literature, during this period, indicates that these organs of public opinion were as little influenced by the criticisms of the Conservative Party as the
government. Indeed the failure of the Conservatives to win over to their side these various periodicals and magazines, and the apathy of these organs seems to have been roughly indicative of public opinion, is perhaps a reasonable explanation for Liberal indifference toward the Conservative attacks.

During this period the House of Commons attempted both to create and destroy by serving both as a policy-maker and critic. In neither role did it either control or influence the government. This was not so much because of the failure of the Conservative Party, for their criticisms were both accurate and responsible. Rather it seems more likely that it was due to the emotional fatigue of the population toward all talk of military preparedness which made the job of the opposition all but impossible.

THE PACIFIC PACT

While the Atlantic Pact was still being negotiated, Communist forces were driving the forces of the Kuomintang off the mainland of China. Soon after they succeeded, there were rumours that the United States was about to conclude a multilateral Pacific security pact.

On February 1, 1949, the member for Vancouver Quadra, the Honourable Howard Green, stressed to the House of Commons that Canada had more than one coastline. There is "$\ldots$ a need"
he urged, "for a Canadian policy in the Pacific... If a regional pact is to be set up for the Pacific, I urge that Canada should become a full partner in that pact." 107

By the following year Mr. Green's ideas had grown in popularity, certainly among British Columbia Conservatives. 108 Mr. Pearkes drew to the attention of the House the lack of a submarine defence on the West Coast 109 and Mr. Fulton reminded the Commons that greater precautions were being taken on the Atlantic seaboard than the Pacific. 110 By September, 1950 a Pacific security pact had become part of the policy of the entire Progressive Conservative Party.

The government at first claimed ignorance concerning the rumoured pact. Mr. Pearson did argue, however, that the Atlantic pact would be felt the world over. 111 He also stressed that Canada did have responsibilities in the Pacific area through the Charter of the United Nations. To add to these with more specific ones would "be a very rash course." 112 More important than Mr. Pearson's generalizations, however, in explaining government reasoning, was the admission by his colleague, Mr. Claxton, that a fundamental premise of defence strategy was the belief that the Atlantic was the more exposed of the two coastlines. 113

The Conservative Party was dissatisfied with Liberal reasoning and Mr. Green, 114 with the able assistance of his
party leader, and the Conservative senior foreign affairs critic, continued to raise the matter in almost every debate on foreign policy.

The Pacific pact concept was dropped by the Conservatives by the middle 1950s and was not an issue in the elections of 1957 or 1958. And from the Tory governments that were subsequently formed there were no indications that a Pacific security alliance was still considered desirable.

Thus the second major attempt at policy-making in the House won as little success as the efforts of 1945 to 1947.

This chapter has been filled with much (perhaps too much), descriptive analysis. By reviewing and dissecting the reaction of the House to each of these decisions, however, I have tried to give some idea of the impact of the Commons on government defence policy. It would be naive, however, to hope that control could be measured simply by perusing the debates for as has already been mentioned, there is much in the workings of the parliamentary system that cannot be understood by reading Hansard. Within the limitations of the method, however, it is possible to draw some general conclusions.

On broad policy there was general agreement among all the parties (except the Bloc Populaire) in the House of Commons. Policy was formed by the government and supported by
the other parties. There were no indications that the ideas of the opposition groups in any way helped to shape those of the government.

Within the contours of broad policy there were differences in emphasis between the parties, especially after beginning of rearmament in 1951. Where these differences occurred, however, the opposition parties achieved no notable success in discrediting government policy. The primary contribution of the House of Commons throughout these debates was to focus public attention on matters the government apparently preferred not to discuss in detail. Through their criticisms, suggestions and questions, members of the House were able to shed more light on defence developments than might otherwise have happened. They thus assisted in making an understanding of the defence effort a simple matter for the general public.

It is important to note that it was when the opposition parties, especially the Progressive Conservatives, directly attempted to influence policy that they were most useful. Although their ideas did not result in changes of policy, they did force the government to spell out in greater detail the reasons for their own policy decisions. Thus, the absence of alternatives to broad policy decisions seems certainly to have been one of the primary reasons for the shallowness of the broad
policy debates. Perhaps the best that can be said of the House was that it did appear to mirror Canadian public opinion.
In this chapter, control of Liberal administration through the technique of critical debate will be examined.

It will be recalled that in order to establish an analytical framework, policy was separated from administration by a criterion that was referred to as potential political implication. Administration was defined as an act or decision that, taken by itself, is not important enough to assist or to damage significantly the prospects of the government in a forthcoming election. It should be noted, however, that an administrative matter need not be free of all political implications; for seemingly insignificant matters are raised periodically by the opposition and these often embarrass the government. When a series of apparently insignificant matters is raised, it is possible that their cumulative impact may qualitatively change
the significance of the entire issue and the total impact may be one of great political importance. The Petawawa irregularities of 1950 - 51 are the outstanding examples of such an occurrence in the defence department.

The range of decisions in the administration group is great and includes important administrative, strategic and tactical ones as well as the more routine activities. Within this chapter the important (administration) has been divorced from the routine (administration), much as policy was divided from administration, and each considered separately. The more important aspects of administration are considered first in this chapter. The routine parts afterwards. Toward the end, control of legislation is covered.

In chapter two, several typical decisions were used as case studies and from investigating these it was possible to draw some general conclusions. At the level being studied now, however, it is more difficult to find typical decisions for special study. Despite this difficulty, it has been possible to select several, not so much because they are typical as because the effectiveness and pattern of Commons influence throughout the range is such that the study of almost any few decisions would yield similar results. To demonstrate the general validity of this opinion, three have been selected and they were chosen for
two reasons. First, they reveal the characteristic pattern perhaps a little more clearly than totally random choices would have. Second, they are dissimilar enough in subject matter that it is impossible to interpret the results as indicating that the House is either effective or ineffective only for a particular subject within the range. The three are the unification of services, the development and production of the CF-100 aircraft and the role and preparedness of the mobile brigade group.

UNIFICATION OF SERVICES

During the early post-war period there was considerable uncertainty concerning the future organization of the armed forces. The 1945 Speech from the Throne stated that a "consolidation of all defence services under one minister of the crown will be made in due course." In July 1946, however, the government introduced Bill 304 which gave it the right to appoint as many as three extra defence ministers (with deputies), in addition to the Minister of National Defence. The bill provided that these three ministers might be appointed to head separate departments for each of the three forces. Thus the bill clearly contradicted the promises that had been made in the 1945 Throne Speech.

Opinion in the House of Commons ran strongly against
the bill. Mr. Pearkes pointed out the desirability of inter-service cooperation in planning and spending and suggested that as a start "perhaps the medical, dental, pay or commissariat services might... be combined, instead of there being a separate service for the army, the navy and the air force." Mr. C.Power, the wartime Liberal Associate Minister of National Defence and Minister of National Defence for Air, criticized the separate air arm maintained by the Royal Canadian Navy. This means, he argued, "... a double set of aerodromes, a double set of technical schools... a double set of staff officers... a double set of planners and a double set of designers." The opposition did not speak out for a single department, however, until the government introduced Bill 304. But when the government did, the senior Conservative critic stated:

An argument may be put forward for retaining a minister for air for a limited period while demobilization is going on and while the air force is readjusting to peacetime conditions. But if we are to have any common doctrine between the services, I think the first step should be to get those services under one minister.

Cooperative Commonwealth Federation critic, Mr. Probe, supported Mr. Pearkes' thesis.

On December 12, 1946, as part of an important shuffle in the Mackenzie King Cabinet, it was announced that the Honourable Brooke Claxton had been appointed Minister of National Defence
and that the three armed services were to be united in a single department under him. The purpose of the step was to ensure the "maximum possible degree of coordination and to eliminate duplication of functions in the Navy, Army and Air Force." Immediately after introducing the necessary legislation, the Prime Minister announced to a press conference that the integration of the forces into one department was a step that he had long planned.

Some six days earlier Mr. Pearkes had attempted to take the credit for this development:

I am pleased that the change has been made, and also that other recommendations coming from this side of the house have been adopted. We have suggested that the administrative services of the three departments might be amalgamated and... that course is being followed.

The truth seems to be somewhere between the assertions of Prime Minister King and Mr. Pearkes. Certainly, the former's statement has to be queried in the light of Bill 304. By the same token, however, there is no evidence to suggest a direct relationship between criticisms in the House and the legislation that was ultimately passed.

In the face of a hostile House of Commons the government permitted Bill 304 to lapse. The subsequent legislation did include the major changes that had been recommended by the opposition parties. Considerable control (bearing in mind
the definition given to the word) thus appears to have been exercised by the House of Commons.

It is perhaps useful to add that over the following four or five years the Progressive Conservative Party continued to criticize the government for its failure to eliminate duplication of services within the defence department. Numerous suggestions were made by the critics of this party and some of them were later incorporated into the government's programme. While no doubt it would be absurd to attribute these changes solely to the opposition, for many were already under review in the department, it seems equally clear that by bringing the various issues out into the open, the House of Commons did have some indirect influence over the decisions taken by the government.

THE CF-100 AIRCRAFT

Through much of the 1950s, Canada's chief contribution to the air defence of North America was the twin-engine all-weather fighter aircraft numbered the CF-100 and nicknamed the "Canuck". Because this plane was both developed and produced in this country, it cost the Canadian taxpayer many millions of dollars. Not only for strategic reasons, therefore, but also for financial ones, the CF-100 was of considerable interest to members in the Lower House. At first this interest was restricted
primarily to the government's success in development and production. Later it came to include the tactical use of the aircraft.

After the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the House not unnaturally became increasingly concerned with the forces and weapons immediately available and under development for the defence of Canada. Among these was the CF-100 and members set out to determine how soon this aeroplane would be ready. The defence minister, however, was less than cooperative:

I do not suggest really for a second that the disclosure of this (the date for operational use of the plane) information will either hurt or help our prospective enemy in any important way except perhaps this: It would enable him to tell exactly what kind of force for the interception of any air attack on this continent he might first have to meet, and at what time it would be ready. Then it would indicate to him whether or not his own intelligence was efficient, accurate, reliable, and which of his intelligence officers could be relied upon.\textsuperscript{15}

The House learned nothing from the minister. Nor would his colleague Mr. Howe reveal the information although the latter's remarks indicated that he was less concerned with problems of security than with the difficulty of predicting exactly when the first plane would be off the assembly line. Mr. Howe did tell the House, however, that the planned rate of production was twenty planes per month - information Mr. Claxton apparently had been afraid to reveal only six months earlier.\textsuperscript{16}
By the spring of 1951 members of the House were becoming restless. The international atmosphere had not improved. Millions of dollars had been spent (and despite the fact that the government had been telling the people of Canada how excellent a weapon was the CF-100) the Royal Canadian Air Force still had no Canucks. These criticisms apparently were sufficient to put the government at least temporarily on the defensive for Mr. Claxton hastened to assure the House that the planned rate of production would be reached early in the following year. In October 1951, amidst much fanfare and publicity that some felt had unnecessary political overtones, the first CF-100 was turned over to the R.C.A.F. and Mr. Howe argued that although full scale production "... was necessarily still many months off. ..." that Canada's record, in comparison to the speed of aircraft development in the United States and United Kingdom, was an "enviable" one. The government had silenced its critics in the House.

Soon thereafter the government suffered several setbacks in its programme, however, and the Progressive Conservative Party returned to the attack. Harshest of the critics were Messieurs Dinsdale and Harkness. The latter notably accused the government of having tried to exploit its early successes with the aircraft for political purposes.
The Minister of National Defence attempted to "brush off" his critics but nevertheless was forced to admit full production would now not be commenced until 1953.\(^{23}\) The Minister of Defence Production acknowledged that "set-backs and delays" had occurred. The opposition continued to bring pressure and publicity of this kind to the production programme until it was nearly complete.\(^{24}\)

The Progressive Conservatives also attempted to exercise some influence over the tactical use of the CF-100. In particular, they questioned the wisdom of the government in equipping ten squadrons of the Auxiliary Air Force with CF-100s.

Almost from the outset, the Conservative Party registered its doubts. Mr. Dinsdale argued: "With the present type of training going on in the reserve squadrons, I am very sceptical whether it will be possible to bring the reserve crews up to the standard of efficiency required for radar-equipped CF-100 all-weather fighters and necessary to cope with any possible airborne attack."\(^{25}\) Mr. Harkness stressed the difficulty in training and maintaining navigators at operational efficiency.\(^{26}\)

It was not until the summer of 1955, more than two years after these first suggestions, that the Minister of National Defence even mentioned the subject and then it was only after further inquiries by Mr. Dinsdale. An intensive study of the
problem was in progress, he told the House, and he admitted that the situation was "doubtful". 27 By the following June, in line with the criticisms of the Conservative members, he admitted that conditions were too exacting to equip Auxiliary personnel with the Canuck and that the department had decided to abandon that plan. 28

The Progressive Conservative Party kept the CF-100 programme under careful scrutiny from 1949 until 1957. Criticisms by its members were both responsible and, as it turned out, quite accurate. Through their continued effort members were able to put the government on the defensive on several occasions each time forcing the responsible ministers to go through the painful experience of justifying questionable actions. In those cases members were able to acquire a good deal more information on the programme than the government might otherwise have decided to provide. Finally, the suggestion concerning the use of the aircraft by the Auxiliary is an indication of the extent of opposition influence. It is not suggested here that the government simply accepted an opposition criticism for according to Mr. Campney the matter was under review in the department even before the first Conservative criticisms. 29 Rather it is being argued however that the opposition, through its energetic work, was able to bring into the public eye one of
the major weaknesses in the programme of the government thus putting pressure on the government to make certain that it was making the right decision.

THE MOBILE STRIKING FORCE (AIRBORNE BRIGADE GROUP)

In the autumn of 1945, while discussing plans for the future forces, defence minister Abbott announced that Canada's post-war army would contain a "small formation of essential units" ready to meet whatever dangers might arise. Under careful questioning from Mr. Pearkes, the minister revealed that the formation he had referred to was a brigade group augmented by additional armour and artillery. The units that were to form the brigade, he admitted, would not be stationed at a single location but rather they would be scattered across Canada.

The position of the Conservative Party on the brigade group was ably summarised by Mr. Harkness:

If we had a brigade group that could be a fighting force and that was ready to go some place I would say that would at least be a good start. But if we are to have a so-called brigade group which is scattered all over the country in dribs and drabs and in that position, is no good for anything as far as fighting is concerned, then the government have nothing and are wasting the money of the taxpayer.

Through until 1950 this continued to be the main criticism of the Progressive Conservative Party.
In June 1950 the defence minister expressed his confidence to the House that the force was well-organized, mobile and very experienced. The minister's remarks provoked an onslaught from the Conservative benches. Mr. Hees pointed out that members of the striking force were being used to train the Emergency Force for Korea and he enquired how their own state of preparedness could be retained while training other troops. Mr. Harkness stressed that although 80% of the establishment had been recruited, there was still much imbalance between the three battalions and that two of them had considerably fewer than the 80% average. Finally, Mr. Pearkes attacked the entire purpose of the brigade group by questioning the idea that the only type of attack that would be launched against Canada would be a diversionary one, the strategic premise on which the airborne brigade group had been based.

In 1951, the Conservatives repeated but broadened their criticisms. They continued to stress that the formation was not a brigade group since it didn't even train together. Also, they began to emphasize that it was not airborne for there were insufficient transport planes to move the units. In replying the minister admitted that the necessary transport planes were lacking but he argued that the basic
strategic considerations had altered and that the defence department no longer visualized using the brigade group as a whole. Rather it was expected that no more than one battalion with supporting units would be required in any one place at one time. Conservative criticism of the immobility of the force persisted through until the middle 1950s, however, when eventually they developed this criticism into a positive demand for a small fully mobile army in which armour and artillery, as well as infantry, could be rapidly transported anywhere in Canada. By 1956 the government had come around to the opposition viewpoint; for on June 20 of that year Mr. Claxton announced plans for a more mobile army and admitted that the plans were "in line with views expressed by some hon. members last year."

The three cases studied in this chapter are typical (although perhaps a little too flattering to the Conservative Party) of opposition debate and criticism at the level of what has loosely been called important administrative decisions. Generally the debate was characterized by several factors.

First, it was restrained and responsible. Opposition critics, especially those of the Conservative Party, seemed to recognize that as members of a potential alternative government, their criticisms and suggestions should be ones that they could honestly attempt to enforce should they achieve power.
Second, the Conservative Party tended to be persistent and hardworking in following all developments in the organization, administration and state of preparedness of the defences of Canada. Their record in criticizing and suggesting was somewhat mixed. On most occasions, they had sufficient information at their disposal, combined with the necessary personnel, to put the government under effective pressure. On this point it should perhaps be pointed out that all members of the Progressive Conservative House of Commons Defence Committee had served in the armed forces. The chairman, Mr. Pearkes, had achieved the rank of Major-General in the permanent Army and the vice-chairmen, Mr. Merritt (1945-49) and Mr. Harkness (1949-57) had held the office of Colonel during the war years. Thus they were not unqualified in evaluating the information available. The validity of their criticisms and suggestions, on more than one occasion, were confirmed by subsequent modifications in the government's programme.

On the other hand, as the years wore on from 1945 to 1957, these men became further and further removed from the defence organization. The rapid changes in the defence function, together with the perennial shortage of information on defence, made their job increasingly difficult. In particular it became extraordinarily hard for defence critics to document substantively their criticisms.
To give an air of validity to their criticisms, therefore, members began turning to newspaper reports and editorials and articles in periodicals. In the last few years of Liberal government, the remarks of retired senior military personnel served as an added reservoir. The opposition were aware of the shortcomings of these various sources, however, and therefore waged a continuous battle with the government over the lack of first-hand information. Indeed the central theme of several of the Supply defence debates was the lack of information and not the administration of national defence.

A third general comment may be made with reference to the political parties. Liberal members almost never criticized the government. On the other hand, on the few occasions when a government supporter did speak out, his words were given careful consideration. This was especially true of the infrequent remarks of the member for Quebec South, Mr. Power. Social Credit criticisms were almost as few as Liberal ones and of little importance. The C.C.F., although more active than the Social Credit Party, nevertheless contributed very little at this level. In contrast to the above three parties, the Progressive Conservatives were energetic and conscientious and it was they alone who sustained debate at this more or less intermediate range in the policy-administration continuum.

In general, the Progressive Conservative Party made it
impossible for the government to run roughshod over Parliament and the country. By continually asking for information, opposing and criticizing, they forced the government to reveal, explain and justify, which in itself is of great value. Although there is no proof that any of their suggestions resulted directly in modifications in the Liberal administration, the fact that many of their ideas were incorporated into the subsequent Liberal programme does indicate at the very least that their criticisms were for the most part reasonable. Therefore it seems to be safe to argue that the government did feel somewhat restrained by the knowledge that an energetic and reasonable opposition was waiting to deal with its programme.

It will be recalled that "political control" was defined in terms of elections and electoral appeal. It is argued here that although the opposition failed to discredit the government in the eyes of the voters, by proving maladministration to them, it did keep up sufficient continuous pressure that the government probably was forced to re-appraise its programme periodically in the light of opposition scrutiny. It perhaps should also be added that much of the decision-making at this level is of a general but not a political nature, thus making it difficult to wage an election in terms of issues of this kind.

Finally, where the intention of the House of Commons
was to influence rather than to oppose and discredit government policies the words of the Honourable Ralph Campney are of no small importance:

I would also add that not infrequently members of the opposition go to the Minister of National Defence to make private suggestions which are well received and occasionally bear fruit in the determination of Government policy, and this is a much more effective way of influencing Government policy by members of the opposition than to bring such matters up initially in the House of Commons. 46

This makes it clear that not only is there much that cannot be measured by a simple reading of the public documents. It also indicates that although closely related, influence and control (as defined here) are decidedly not synonymous.

ROUTINE ADMINISTRATION

The next problem that is investigated in this chapter is Commons control of routine administration. The discussion is divided into two parts. The first deals with what might be called regular annual performance in attempting to exercise control. The second covers two important variations from this pattern.

After the general discussion of policy, administration and strategy in Committee of Supply, debate is less the monopoly of the few defence experts and more open to the backbenchers and
their investigations into the details of administration. In this part of the debate there were several categories of issues that were typically discussed.

First, there was some scrutiny of defence expenditures, particularly in Supply for the Department of Defence Production. Control of finance, however, is investigated in another chapter.47

Second, there was much questioning of the minister, part of the great search for information. Despite numerous charges to the contrary, careful perusal of the debates has revealed that with very few exceptions, the Minister of National Defence (or his Parliamentary Assistant) was willing to provide the information requested by the members in the Commons. On the other hand, it has to be admitted that members rarely attempted to penetrate beyond the wall of security. In this respect members of the Progressive Conservative and the Social Credit Parties tended to be more tolerant toward security considerations than were members of the C.C.F. These informal question and answer periods were valuable as a method of removing much of the mantle of secrecy that covered the defence department. Equally significant, they provided the opposition parties with much of the basic intelligence required to develop a general understanding of the government's defence programme.

Two additional points should be noted on this second
category of issue. First, opposition members were not able to "dig up" sufficient instances of corruption, maladministration or waste to disgrace the government. Indeed, more than one attempt to "blow up" insignificant issues reflected more discredit on the member than on the government. 48

Second, the usefulness of the question period was limited by the ability of members to ask questions that would provide information useful in making a sound general appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the defence programme. Apart from questions on their own constituencies, members, especially after 1949, showed little aptitude in this field. During the 1945-49 period, the defence function was close enough to the numerous war veterans in the House that they were able to question usefully the administration of the Department, especially on demobilization and repatriation. But in the twenty-first and twenty-second Parliaments, this important skill was restricted primarily to Mr. Harkness, and to a much lesser extent, Mr. Pearkes. Other members, although they might accumulate much information from their questions during the discussion, seldom seemed quite certain of the significance of the answers they received and how they might be turned to their advantage in the general debates.

A third type of issue raised during these debates
was the grievance of the individual citizen. Indeed, this was the only contribution of some backbenchers to the defence debate. Mr. X, from my riding, claims one member, despite an excellent war record and fine health, has been rejected from the post-war force. A long tirade on Mr. X's patriotism and his inability to find alternate employment follows. The discussion typically closed with the minister's promise to investigate the case.

Throughout Supply, two, three or more times each year, members seized the opportunity to air the grievances of their constituents. The record generally was mixed. Many of the cases presented, particularly by C.C.F. members, were well-documented and sophisticated. Numerous other cases, however, quite often presented by French Canadian members although certainly not exclusive to them, indicated that the members were protesting against the rules and regulations of the defence department, and not merely an unfair interpretation or implementation of them. So what, shouted the fiery "brass-hat" hunter Mr. Pouliot, if Romeo Santerre lacks the minimum education required for the forces. Let us look at the human side of the story and forget the bureaucracy and its regulations. In many cases of the latter kind, the irrational and poorly documented presentation seemed to suggest that the member was less concerned with influencing the government than in assuring his constituents
that he was working on their behalf.

Despite the mixed record, the opportunity to ventilate grievance did serve as an important safeguard against possible arbitrary actions of officials of the Department of National Defence. In almost all cases presented the minister promised that the matter would be reviewed. Although modifications in the original decision were secured on only a few occasions, a full explanation was seldom denied the House.

Yet the record in the House of Commons is deceiving, for most questions raised in that chamber, affecting individual citizens had already been brought to the attention of the minister, or his parliamentary assistant, in private, and given careful consideration. Most cases mentioned in the House thus were ones where the results of the minister's investigations had been unsatisfactory to the member and were an attempt to force the former's hand. Thus, if the record for securing redress appears to have only been mediocre, it must be borne in mind that numerous amicable settlements were made outside of the Commons and that the cases recorded in Hansard were only the exceptions.51

On numerous occasions members used the debates simply as an opportunity to extol their constituency and its contribution to the defence effort. They discussed the record of the local reserve regiment and its desperate need for a new armoury.
They praised the training camps, exercise areas, airports and service academies located in their constituencies. On such occasions, mild censure of the government, even by a Liberal member, was often added. Never, however, were discussions on local issues broadened by the opposition parties into a general attack on the government.

A similar but more significant type of criticism was the never-ending attack by maritime and western members against the concentration of defence expenditure and industry in central Canada. Indeed a reasonable method of describing the Committee of Supply for Defence Production would be to call it an open, divided and weak pressure group in which most of the members were working on behalf of the economy of their own constituency. There is no evidence, however, that these representations had any influence on the several Liberal administrations.

Perhaps the critiques that evoked the most cautious replies from the government were the ones on the number, place and role of French Canadians in the defence forces. The proportionately small number of French Canadians among the senior personnel in the forces, the difficulties in securing promotion and the lack of a special military academy for French Canadians were among the most thoroughly debated of the problems.

In answering the various charges the minister always
took great pains to spell out the attitude of the defence department
toward French Canada, often emphasizing the special considerations
it was receiving and he inevitably closed with assurances to the
members that the matter would be re-examined. Undoubtedly
because of the political significance of French-English relations,
the various matters raised for discussion were reviewed carefully
by the government and inasmuch as there were modifications in
the defence programme that coincided with suggestions of French
Canadian members, it seems likely that their representations did
have some influence on the government.

In general, the debate on routine administration was
not a part of the organized opposition of the parties in the
House of Commons. Certainly the information and evidence
accumulated were not translated by the opposition defence
committees into general attacks on the administration of the
department.

Much of the debate on routine administration arose out
of the role of backbenchers as representatives of constituents,
constituencies and interest groups. Apart from airing the
grievances of the individual citizens and some representations
on behalf of French Canada however, these contributions had little
influence on the minister or cabinet. On the other hand, the
usefulness of this type of debate to control the bureaucracy is
of some importance. It is regrettable, therefore, in the light
of this, that so few backbenchers energetically pursued these duties.

In most years the debate on routine administration was made up of contributions in the four or five categories that have been mentioned. Generally, they were free from the most overt political motives.

On two occasions, however, the politics became the primary issue. The first was in April 1949 when charges by Mr. Drew concerning certain North Star aircraft were answered incorrectly by the Minister of National Defence. Subsequent evidence brought out by Mr. Drew undermined the minister's position. Two days after the original accusations, Mr. Claxton admitted to the House of Commons that he had been partially in error and "that the truth of this matter lies somewhere between what the leader of the opposition says today as to the situation... and the perhaps too emphatic denial of what he said the other night (by myself)."

Even before this admission, the leader of the opposition demanded that the minister resign. "If the minister still respects our parliamentary system, he owes this house his resignation now." This suggestion was supported by at least one other member of the party and considerable publicity was given to it in the pro-Conservative press. The minister did not resign, however,
and within a few weeks the matter was forgotten.

The second was by far the more important of the variations. On April 21, 1952 defence minister Claxton informed the House of Commons that due to thefts and other irregularities at Camp Petawawa, he had engaged Mr. George S. Currie, chartered accountant and a former Deputy Minister of National Defence, "to make a full investigation of the situation, security and accounting procedures for engineering stores, equipment and services at Petawawa and elsewhere; his powers and terms of reference have no restrictions whatever."\textsuperscript{57}

Moments after the announcement by the minister, the leader of the opposition under standing order 21 moved: "the adjournment of the house for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely, the necessity for an immediate inquiry into the administration, and especially the accounting methods, of the Department of National Defence, the laxity of which has been revealed by the wholesale looting of military property" and numerous other irregularities.\textsuperscript{58} The motion, however, was ruled out of order on technical grounds and although the matter was discussed occasionally during the remainder of the session, it was not debated fully until the seventh and last session of the Parliament, after the Report had been tabled. Finally, on December 15, with Mr. Claxton in
Paris for N.A.T.O. meetings, the Prime Minister tabled the Currie Report.

The Report written by Mr. Currie was subject to two diametrically opposed types of interpretation. Members and supporters of the government stressed that "it was only at Petawawa that extensive irregularities over a long period of time took place." They pointed out that it "does not fit the facts to indict or to smear the whole army works services personnel because of the sins of a handful of crooks." They emphasized that "the total loss resulting from misappropriations and irregularities by military personnel at Petawawa was not large," and finally that many of the difficulties and shortcomings in the army works services had "been caused... by the tremendous and sudden expansion of its activities brought about by the Korean war and by the large-scale defence programme involved in carrying out our NATO activities."

Naturally enough, opposition members concentrated on other aspects of the Report. If the more serious irregularities had occurred at Petawawa, they could point to "the general breakdown in the system of administration, supervision and accounting" and it was to the credit of personnel at other depots that they had not walked through a "door which a fundamentally loose situation had opened before them." They emphasized the view
"that the generally lax administrative situation would give rise to waste and inefficiency far more costly than that covered by actual dishonesty." Finally they continually referred to the fact the degree "of intelligence and responsibility" required was frequently missing "higher up" in the echelons of the army and defence department.

Between December 15 and December 17, the date of the Christmas recess, the Currie Report was dealt with in the debates on the Address. At the outset, in tabling the document, the Prime Minister expressed the hope "that in a matter of this kind no one would feel that any political advantage could be gained by taking broad, general statements out of their context in any way which might reflect in a wholesale manner on the great majority of loyal officers and men . . . and hard-working civil servants." Moments after, the leader of the opposition announced that he agreed with Mr. St. Laurent's suggestion.

Some two days later the C.C.F. member for Vancouver East commented on the Prime Minister's aspirations:

The first thing I would say in regard to the very fine statement made by the Prime Minister is that he must be naive - and I think he is not - if he believes that an opportunity of this kind could be let pass without political use being made of it by the opposition. That is the nature of our political institution. As a matter of fact there is nothing that the government could do here that could please the opposition except the mistakes it might make,
and the same would be true if those who are on the government side of the house were on this side and those who are on this side were on the other side of the house. 69

Naturally enough it was the latter's statement, not that of the Prime Minister, that properly described the way in which Canadian democracy functioned. For between the fifteenth and the seventeenth, almost every senior critic in the Conservative ranks, including its leader, dwelled at some length, and no doubt with considerable pleasure, on the choice quotations and details of incidents, that were so numerous in Mr. Currie's Report. Members of all three opposition parties called for the resignation of the Minister of National Defence 70 (still overseas) and many others emphasized that the government as a whole had to bear the responsibility for the maladministration and waste.

It was not until the night before the last sitting that the government decided to answer its critics. In performing this duty, the Acting Minister of National Defence, Mr. Campney, belittled the charges of the opposition, defended Mr. Claxton and enumerated the several recommendations in the Report that had already been implemented. Perhaps most important, he reminded the Commons that Mr. Currie had been appointed by the minister and it was only at the latter's indulgence, and not due to any obligation, that the Report had been made public. 71 On December 17, the Commons adjourned for its Christmas recess.
It was not only among the politicians that the Report had created a stir. In the major newspapers it was the subject of headlines and editorials for several days and among the senior military personnel (many of whom were present in the Parliamentary galleries), it caused considerable unrest. Indeed, when the Prime Minister originally tabled the Report he made public a memorandum from the Chief of the General Staff in which the latter expressed the fear that the Report would be incorrectly interpreted as serving to censure the army as a whole. Between December 17 and January 12 rumours were numerous throughout Ottawa concerning possible scapegoats from among the military, the resignation of the minister and a stolen copy of the Report. Thus, there was considerable tension when the House reconvened on the afternoon of January 12.

On the following day the Prime Minister moved the appointment of a select committee to examine defence expenditures and it was on his motion that the debate on the Currie Report was re-opened. The first speaker on the motion was Mr. Claxton and he spent some one-and-a-half hours discussing the Report. He gave absolutely no indication that he planned to resign and assured the Commons, although undoubtedly his words were also intended for the senior military personnel, that "there will not be any effort to find a scapegoat." He
closed by moving an amendment that called on the Defence Expenditures Committee "to give priority in their examination to the expenditures and commitments of the Canadian army works services dealt with in the Report of G.S. Currie. . ." Much of the debate that followed dealt with the propriety of the amendment. This aspect of the dispute will be studied in a later chapter, however, when the work of the Defence Expenditures Committee is investigated. What is of interest here is the attempt of the House of Commons to use the cumulative impact of these several examples of maladministration to discredit the government even further.

The debate on the motion was held over a period of ten days between January 13 and 22. It covered a wide variety of matters including the Report proper, civilian-military relations, stolen copies, government procedure in dealing with the Report and a variety of specific issues the most repeated of which were the horses on the payroll and the comedy of the stolen railway tracks. All three opposition parties supported the idea of re-applying Mr. Currie under broader terms of reference and a sub-amendment to that effect was moved by Mr. Knowles. Throughout the debate, continuous pressure was exerted and government members were not especially successful in taking the initiative away from their opponents.
The Currie Report provided the Commons with one of its most controversial topics in years. Press reports indicate that galleries were full and the spectators included even the wives of cabinet ministers. Once again, as in mid-December, the Report was in the headlines and editorials of the country's newspapers, and perhaps most prominently, the object of innumerable cartoons.

Undoubtedly it has already been noticed that both the North Star incident and the Currie Report debates occurred only a few months before a general election. The 1949 incident was only seized upon by the press for a few days and it gradually drifted into insignificance. The Progressive Conservatives therefore built no part of their election campaign upon it. In contrast, much of the 1953 campaign of the Tories was centred on the notion that there was waste, extravagance and inefficiency in Ottawa. According to Professor Spencer "the criticism of the Defence Department . . . suggested that the tide was running against the Liberals." And of Mr. Claxton, Spencer has argued that "he was widely viewed as an electoral liability." 

Unfortunately there has been no systematic study of the 1953 election and there is therefore no way of evaluating the impact of Mr. Currie's findings, and the way these were exploited by the parties in the Commons, on the election results.
Liberal Party won close to half of the popular vote and 171 of 265 seats. In 1949 it had won 50% and 190 of 262. Although Mr. Claxton's majority fell by 4700 votes, he nevertheless came close to doubling his Conservative opponent's return in a constituency election in which minority parties played virtually no role. Thus, although the Petawawa incidents and the Report on them were exploited throughout the election campaign, there is no evidence that they had an important effect on the result.

The two incidents cited above, particularly the latter, are of interest as the only attempt to effect "political control" of the government by exploiting ineffective administration. It should not be forgotten, however, that they were far from typical and at the lower levels of administration debates of this type were very much the exception. In most years, the only type of control that the Commons tried to carry out was bureaucratic, and as has been shown, the results there were substantive but not exceptionally impressive.

CONTROL OF LEGISLATION

There is one other aspect of control that must be considered and convenience, as much as logic, has led me to examine it as a part of this chapter. I am speaking of Commons control of defence legislation.
Unquestionably the major bill introduced during the period was the national defence bill of 1950. By this bill the government attempted to bring all the laws on defence into a single act. The bill incorporated and condensed into 251 sections over 600 sections from several defence acts. As such, it was the largest bill to have been brought before Parliament since 1934. It is important to note therefore that it was introduced into the Senate first (1949) and only after this upper chamber had considered it in detail and amended it extensively did it come before the Lower House.

Two debates on the bill were held in the House of Commons. Both at the resolution stage and again before the second reading, general discussion was held. A few controversial points were raised including parliamentary control over the size of the forces, and the role of courts-martial. From the outset, however, it was agreed that the bill would be referred to a special committee for detailed consideration and such a committee was appointed toward the end of May.

The Special Committee of National Defence appointed consisted of twenty-five members of whom seven were opponents of the government. It was given the "power to send for persons, papers and records..." and requested to report to the Commons.

The Committee held some thirteen meetings on eight days.
Attendance varied between fourteen and twenty-two and averaged 17.9 or almost 72%. Witnesses summoned included the deputy minister, the judge advocate general, the judge advocate of the fleet and other senior officials in the legal branch of the Department of National Defence. The bill was introduced by the minister, who was a member of the Committee, and thoroughly reviewed by its members. An air of bipartisanship prevailed and amendments were introduced freely by all members and accepted or rejected with a very minimum of political controversy.

In total some 47 amendments were presented, 30 of which were introduced by government supporters at the instance of the officials of the department. Of the other seventeen amendments, which were the genuine product of Committee deliberations, most were textual although a few were of a substantive character. The latter ones tended toward increasing unification between the services and improving the guarantees of accused servicemen before military tribunals.

The bill was reported back to the House and the amendments accepted. Spokesmen of all parties announced their approval of the workings of the Committee and expressed pleasure that it had been free from party politics. Inasmuch as the bill had already received second reading, however, this was not at all surprising or revolutionary. It therefore seems to this
writer that the opposition parties expressed approval primarily in order to document their case that a standing committee on defence was required rather to voice their pleasure at the influence the Committee had exercised over the terms of the bill, for although the bill was dissected section by section, and scrutinized in much detail, the changes that emanated from the Committee as has been seen were very few. Thus, although the Committee did function effectively, and secured explanations for most of the sections, it did not exercise much influence over the final terms of the bill. Certainly it had less influence than the Senate.

Prior to 1950, there were a variety of bills introduced that aimed at amending the various defence acts. All of these were debated in general and then considered in Committee of the Whole. Most were passed over quickly as they were only of minor importance. Where major changes were suggested in these bills, however, the Commons was far from lazy and proved a jealous guardian of parliamentary rights. Section 22 of the 1947 Militia Bill provided that the minister would determine the size of the Militia, a decision which considerably exercised the opposition members who claimed that parliamentary control over the size of the defence forces was one of the most important parliamentary guarantees against an arbitrary executive. Although
such control could still be exercised through granting of Supply, members were dissatisfied and one after the other they dragged out the lessons of English history and the significance of such control.\textsuperscript{95} The government bent to the will of the opposition parties and finally introduced a satisfactory amendment. This, it might be noted, was only one, although the most important, of four or five amendments introduced due to opposition criticisms.\textsuperscript{96}

In the post-1950 period the custom arose whereby all amendments to defence legislation were introduced annually in a single bill called the Canadian Forces Bill. Most of these were of minor importance and there was little debate, therefore, on second readings. Each however was carefully scrutinized in Committee of the Whole and on several occasions amendments introduced by opposition members were accepted. In each case the effect of the amendments was to tighten the legislation.\textsuperscript{97}

The one defence bill of the period to provoke controversy was the National Defence Act Amendment Bill of 1952 under which the government appointed an Associate Minister of National Defence.\textsuperscript{98} In introducing the resolution the Prime Minister expressed the hope that the Minister would deal primarily with problems of policy and the Associate Minister with administration. The proposed legislation, however, did not spell out the definite areas of responsibility.
From the very outset opposition members objected to the indefinite responsibilities of the Associate Minister. The leader of the opposition expressed the opinion that the new minister would be little more than a glorified parliamentary assistant unless he was given specific duties\textsuperscript{99} and Mr. Pearkes pointed out that it would be impossible to separate policy from administration.\textsuperscript{100} An opposition amendment requesting that the bill not be read a second time was defeated by the government\textsuperscript{101} and a second one in Committee of the Whole calling for an Associate Minister for Air was similarly beaten down.\textsuperscript{102} On third reading the bill was passed on division.\textsuperscript{103}

More interesting were the several defence production and defence procurement bills passed between 1950 and 1955. In 1950 the Defence Supplies Bill and the Essential Materials Bill were introduced. Although the first was passed without heated debate,\textsuperscript{104} despite a division, the latter was opposed strongly by the Progressive Conservative Party and especially Mr. Diefenbaker who claimed that the powers requested were too broad and would have the effect of giving the Minister of Trade and Commerce absolute and unlimited control of the nation's natural resources.\textsuperscript{105} Amendments subsequently moved were defeated by the government with the support of the two minor parties and the bill received third reading.\textsuperscript{106}
Even more vigorous opposition greeted the Defence Production Bill of 1951 which called for the establishment of a Department of Defence Production. Almost every senior Conservative critic spoke out against the powers being entrusted to the minister and in Committee of the Whole several of the sections were passed only on division. Probably the only reason the bill was not opposed on third reading was because section 41 limited the life of the bill and therefore of the minister's special powers to only five years.

In 1955 an amendment was introduced in order to give the 1951 Act permanence. The bill was deceivingly short. It contained but two sections of which only the latter was of interest for it provided for the repeal of section 41 of the Department of Defence Production Act of 1951.

Progressive Conservative spokesmen pointed out that the Act and the special powers it provided had been introduced during the Korean crisis. The situation was no longer the same and to give permanence to these powers would seriously damage the rights of Parliament and the individual citizen.

The case of the Liberals was summarized ably by Professor Corry in an article shortly after the issue had ended:

The international situation is still extremely grim. . . No defence against the hydrogen bomb has yet been devised, so we must go on trying.
The government has undertaken programmes which make heavy demands on materials that are still scarce, which involve complicated arrangements with private industry. . . There is much experimental work being undertaken in electronics, supersonic planes and guided missiles which may involve scores of millions of outlay over a period of years before even test results can be secured. It was urged that, unless the government has adequate powers to push these projects over a long period of years and to intervene in the private sector of the defence industry where necessary to guard against failure, great sums of money may be squandered and effective defence measures fail of completion.\textsuperscript{112}

The Liberals gave no satisfactory reason, however, for refusing to include a new terminal date for these powers which government members had admitted earlier were extraordinary. Even the C.C.F., whose members were naturally suspicious of the motives of private industry, demanded a new terminal date.\textsuperscript{113} Finally, after considerable pressure had been exerted from the House, Mr. Howe promised that the terms of the bill would be reconsidered.\textsuperscript{114}

On second reading, the latter announced, however, that no changes would be made.\textsuperscript{115} To the Progressive Conservatives, here was a most flagrant example of the arrogant Liberal government belittling the rights of Parliament. They therefore set about to obstruct the passage of the bill. Speaker after speaker attacked the government and in particular the Minister of Defence Production, Mr. Howe. Several concessions were offered by the government\textsuperscript{116} but the opposition would not relent. Altogether, over 100 speeches were made between March and July,
including more than 75 by Conservative members and these filled more than 500 pages of Hansard. 117

Finally, the Prime Minister introduced amendments not only providing for a new terminal date thus affirming that the powers were as the opposition had claimed decidedly extraordinary, but also that all regulations enforced under sections 23 to 31 (the ones giving the minister his powers) would be tabled in the House. 118 The amendment further provided that at the request of any ten members of the Commons, any regulations tabled under the Act had to be debated and within four days of the petition. 119 "In persuading the government to retreat the Progressive Conservatives won" what Professor Corry called "their greatest victory in twenty years of opposition." 120 And Professor Meisel has implied that the protracted Liberal intransigence on the Defence Production Act amendment contributed to the image of a Liberal Party that was both autocratic and arrogant 121, an image that helped to defeat it in the 1957 election.

If Commons influence over government legislation was not particularly great in the years under review, this undoubtedly was in part because opposition criticisms were anticipated and discounted in advance. For the House proved itself energetic in scrutinizing all legislation, and where the rights of Parliament were being seriously undermined, important amendments
were obtained. Nevertheless it has to be admitted that legislation passed during these years did increase the power of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature and the results of Parliament's efforts were only to cut down the amount of the executive gain. Thus, although the Commons did serve as a useful instrument in scrutinizing and amending defence legislation, much of the legislation it was reviewing served to strengthen the powers of the executive.
CHAPTER IV

CONTROL OF DEFENCE POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION, 1957-62:
THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE

In 1958, after less than a year of minority government, the people of Canada returned the Progressive Conservative Party to power with the greatest majority in the history of Canadian government. As a corollary, naturally, the opposition was numerically the weakest in Canadian history. The Social Credit Party elected no members, the C.C.F. but eight and the Liberal Party some 49. To these opposition members fell the job that the Conservatives had been attempting to perform for 22 years - that of controlling the ever-increasing growth in executive power. And a part of this job was to control defence policy and administration. Control of defence policy is dealt with first and as in chapter two several case studies have been examined to determine the extent of Commons control over defence policy.

THE NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE COMMAND

On August 1, 1957, Air Marshal Slemon was appointed through order-in-council deputy commander of an integrated
air defence system for North America. In this way was the public informed of the establishment of N.O.R.A.D. The government released no other statement.

Soon thereafter members in the House began to ask questions about N.O.R.A.D. and request information concerning its impact on Canadian defence and sovereignty.¹

On November 13, the Prime Minister explained to members of the House the reasons why there had been no formal debate. The decision, he argued, involved no new principles but was simply the continuation and logical conclusion of steps taken earlier by the Liberal administration. He traced the history of Canadian-American defence co-operation since Ogdensburg and placed special emphasis upon the statement of defence co-operation that had been announced on February 12, 1947. He pointed out that Canada and the United States were formally bound together in the Canada - United States regional planning group of N.A.T.O. and that the House of Commons had already debated the N.A.T.O. issue and that N.O.R.A.D. was merely a further step in the effort to implement the objectives of the Canada - United States regional planning group. The decision had been made known to the N.A.T.O. Council before it was announced publicly.²

The decision to establish an integrated operational air defence system, the Prime Minister added, could not be a
surprise to the Liberals because on May 11, 1956 there had been an agreement between the chiefs of staff of the two countries to refer the matter to a joint study group. This group had reported in favour of establishing an integrated operational control system for North America under a single commander. The matter had come before the St.Laurent cabinet, the Prime Minister claimed, but the decision had been postponed. Mr. Diefenbaker then suggested that the reason for the delay had been the approaching general election.

The Prime Minister raised three further points. First, he argued that the agreement was a continuation of the activities of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and that the business of that board had never in the past been debated in the House.

Second, in reply to the argument that full debate had been permitted on N.A.T.O., he maintained that this had been necessary because the North Atlantic Treaty committed Canada to sending troops abroad, a matter which required the consent of the Parliament of Canada.

Third, the Prime Minister attempted to convey the idea that any further discussion would be a breach of security. "If the opposition will take the responsibility of saying they want these matters, which can be of dangerous impact if given full publicity in the house, discussed in detail ... it will be done,
It was clear to all that the Prime Minister preferred to avoid a full discussion of his hastily concluded agreement.

The most straightforward statement of the Liberal position was given by Mr. Paul Martin. "We are a nation dedicated to the principle of parliamentary democracy and under our system of government while the cabinet, the executive is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy and also responsible for its execution, nevertheless either during the stage of negotiation - and that is a matter to be determined by the government - or after negotiations have been concluded and policies decided on it is the obligation of government to submit its policies to the representations of the people for approval."

"In this particular matter" he stressed "... we have no document whatsoever, no interim agreement, no order in council, no minute of cabinet." We have received no information and been permitted no debate.

On December 5, the Committee of Supply began its debates on the defence estimates for the coming year. The new defence minister, Mr. Pearkes, took the opportunity to provide some further information on defence and at the time he revealed that the final formal note for N.O.R.A.D. had not yet been completed. When it was completed, he announced, it would be presented to
the House of Commons. On May 19, 1958, some nine-and-a-half months after the original announcement, external affairs minister Smith tabled the agreement in the Commons. Mr. Smith announced, in reply to a question by the leader of the opposition, that the government did not plan to submit the agreement to the House of Commons in the form of a resolution. The reason, he explained, was that the "government regards this as an amplification of and extension under the North Atlantic Treaty." Mr. Smith did suggest, however, that there would be ample opportunity to discuss the agreement during other debates.

It can be seen that the government wished to avoid a "full-dress" debate on the N.O.R.A.D. agreement. Its justification for this attitude rested on two key points. First, the government insisted that no new principles were involved in the agreement. Second, it attempted to show that other agreements of a similar type had been concluded by Liberal governments but never presented to the House in resolution form. The second point, however, to be of any importance, rested on the first; for if it could be shown that the agreement involved basic changes, it was clear that precedent favoured the opposition parties and not the government.

Although it raised numerous peripheral issues the
fundamental basis of the government position was that the N.O.R.A.D. agreement was merely a further step to implement the goals set out by the North Atlantic Treaty. As a result, no resolution was required.

The case of the government was relatively simple. The commander of N.O.R.A.D., as he would be seeking to implement the goals of the Canada - United States regional planning group of N.A.T.O., and since he would be protecting part of the Strategic Air Command, upon which N.A.T.O. depended, would be reporting to the North Atlantic Council. Therefore, the government contended, N.O.R.A.D. could be likened to any of the other military commands of N.A.T.O.  

The opposition parties, however, easily destroyed the government's case. The leader of the opposition pointed out quite correctly that the commanders of the various N.A.T.O. commands not only report to the North Atlantic Council but receive political and military guidance from it. In contrast, the commander of N.O.R.A.D. was responsible to the governments of Canada and the United States. N.O.R.A.D. therefore does not, he maintained, derive its authority in any way from the N.A.T.O. Mr. Knowles of the C.C.F. party announced that his party agreed with Mr. Pearson's reasoning. Even the Prime Minister, thereafter, emphasized only the principles involved and not the
legality of the case he had presented.  

The other peripheral objections raised by the Conservatives were also demolished by members of the House. Mr. Pearson pointed out that in the original N.A.T.O. debates it had not been known that Canada would be sending troops abroad. And he also repudiated the notion that the subject of such an agreement had ever been considered by the Liberal cabinet. On the question of security, Mr. Martin explained that the House was not requesting the details of the agreement but only its general principles and that the responsibility for security rested with the government and not the opposition.  

The conclusion seems inevitable that the Prime Minister and government did attempt to place a number of "straw-men" in the way of the Commons. The agreement was in operation for many months before the opposition was able to get any discussion and even then it was only under the most trying of circumstances. Ultimately, after much pressure was exerted, both in the House and outside, the Prime Minister consented to present the agreement to the House in the form of a resolution. The resolution read:

That it is expedient that the houses of parliament do approve an exchange of notes constituting an agreement between the government of Canada and the government of the United States of America concerning the organization and operation of the North American air defence command (NORAD) signed
at Washington May 12, 1958 and that this house do approve the same.

The debate that followed on June 10 and June 11 concentrated on two points. First, there was much discussion of the procedure followed by the government. As much of it was a rehashing of arguments presented over the previous six months, and these have been discussed above, there is no need to repeat them here in detail. The essential feature of these was the assertion that the government had flown in the face of Parliament by attempting to eliminate the rights of the representatives of the electorate.

The Liberal Party reaction to the substance of the agreement was one of cautious and inquisitive acquiescence. The leader of the opposition began by emphasizing the bilateral character of the agreement. Although he agreed that N.O.R.A.D. did have some connection with N.A.T.O., he pointed out that it was not responsible to nor did it receive instructions from the latter organization. He quoted a statement by the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O. as the very best possible proof that N.O.R.A.D. was not a command of N.A.T.O.

Mr. Pearson went on to argue that the agreement was very difficult to analyze for it did not give the final conditions or circumstances upon which its commander could act. Rather, it only stipulated that negotiations should be continued
until a final decision could be reached. It was then only an agreement to agree to do something. Finally he contradicted a point emphasized several times by Mr. Diefenbaker - that the agreement was purely defensive. N.O.R.A.D. communications, he pointed out, aren't divorced from the retaliatory power of the Strategic Air Command. Indeed it was N.O.R.A.D. intelligence that would send the bombers of S.A.C. winging on their missions.

Mr. Pearson and other Liberals asked several questions concerning the relationship of the commander and deputy commander to the two governments and the extent of their autonomy. In particular, Mr. Martin questioned discrepancies in statements between General Partridge and the government. The Liberals concluded by suggesting that there should be an effort to put N.O.R.A.D. further under the control of the N.A.T.O. Council.

The C.C.F. reaction was more dogmatic. Mr. Herridge repeated the points made earlier by Mr. Pearson concerning N.O.R.A.D.'s relationship to N.A.T.O. This agreement, he stated, is a bilateral one and nothing more and although defensive, it is closely integrated into the offensive system. N.O.R.A.D. instantly alerts S.A.C. and of course S.A.C. is totally independent of N.A.T.O. and under the control of the United States alone, he contended. It is one thing, he went on, to surrender
sovereignty to an international organization such as the United Nations or N.A.T.O. It is something quite different for Canadian air units to be serving under an American commander. Finally, he stressed the economic implications of such a step. It would, he reasoned, and later events proved him correct, force Canada into greater dependence upon the technological skills and economic abilities of the United States. "As defence requirements become more and more complex it would seem that our economy will become more and more inter-dependent with that of the United States." Because it was clear that it would be impossible to combine defence with economic sovereignty it was imperative that we take great care to preserve our political sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States. Ways and means should be explored, therefore, to bring the North American defence arrangements directly under the N.A.T.O. Council. Because the C.C.F. still had reservations, and desired further clarifications, Mr. Herridge requested that the agreement be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

By the following morning, however, it was clear that the government had no intention of complying with the request of the C.C.F. Mr. Howard, therefore, moved an amendment to the resolution so that the agreement would fall "within the structure of N.A.T.O." This was supported in the intelligent if somewhat
repetitious speeches of Messieurs Winch and Regier. The latter closed his speech with a demand that the Prime Minister answer some of the inquiries and accusations brought against the agreement, including a rather poorly explained C.C.F. theory that it would weaken N.A.T.O.  

The Prime Minister, in a method characteristic of many of his contributions to defence debate, ignored many of the criticisms and instead attacked those who had questioned the agreement. The members of the C.C.F. who had spoken were all from British Columbia. They wished to bring N.O.R.A.D. under N.A.T.O. control. Yet at a convention on June 2, 1958, the C.C.F. of British Columbia had urged that Canada withdraw from N.A.T.O. Who is ambiguous, he asked?  

Mr. Diefenbaker made a similar attack upon the Liberal Party. In the recent election, he stated, the Liberals had argued that unless favourable trading terms were received from the United States we ought not co-operate in continental defence. He bitterly criticized them for playing politics with Canadian security. This technique of the counter-attack, it might be noted, was frequently used by the Prime Minister in replying to opposition criticisms.  

Despite some qualms, the Liberal Party voted in favour of the resolution. The C.C.F., however, opposed it. Thus, for
the first time since World War Two, the unanimity of the House of Commons on major defence policy was broken. 35

On this occasion, both before and during debate, the government had attempted to run roughshod over the House of Commons. The agreement was in operation for over ten months before the House was allowed to debate it. In the interim, little information was given to the House. Finally, after being returned with a huge majority in the 1958 election, some debate was permitted. It is tempting to speculate that the Prime Minister avoided debate for fear that his minority government might be forced to the polls on what perhaps he conceived to be an undesirable issue. But if this was the reason, it does not explain the restrictions on the debate which followed his sweeping victory. For even in this debate, little new information was provided. Indeed, the final impression received from these debates was that the government had showed little regard for the rights of Parliament.

THE ARROW DEBATE

On February 20, 1959, the Prime Minister announced to a surprised House of Commons that the government had decided to terminate development and production of the CF-105 aircraft (and the Iroquois engine). 36 Although the cancellation of two
associated projects (the Astra fire control system and Sparrow missile) some six months earlier had been widely interpreted as the death-knell of the Arrow, subsequent equivocation by the defence minister\textsuperscript{37} and the outspoken approval of the Arrow by the commander of N.O.R.A.D.\textsuperscript{38} together had served to re-kindle the doubts concerning the future of this aircraft. All that seemed certain was that a final decision would be made on March 31, when the operative contract had lapsed. Thus, the Prime Minister's statement, coming as it did five-and-a-half weeks earlier than expected, not only shocked the Canadian public, but also played havoc with a substantial segment of the aircraft industry.

The reasons for the decision were several. The first reason put forward by Mr. Diefenbaker was strategic. In recent months, he argued, intelligence reports concerning the bomber threat have changed markedly. The CF-105, designed to combat the manned bomber, would not be operational until 1962 and by that time, he indicated, the danger from the bomber would be greatly reduced.\textsuperscript{39}

Second, he emphasized the prohibitive cost of the aircraft. Original plans, he explained, called for 500 to 600 aircraft to be ready by 1958. It was expected that these
would cost $1.5 to $2 million each. The present need was but 100 planes and the estimates from A. V. Roe indicated that they would cost a total of $780 millions excluding the $303 millions that had been spent up to September 1958. Our only hope, therefore, had been to sell some to our allies. The United States had indicated that it was not interested and Canada had received no favourable answers from overseas despite recent negotiations with the United Kingdom.  

Before proceeding to discuss the new defence plans, the Prime Minister admitted frankly that there was no alternate contracts available for the companies involved but that since defence expenditures could be justified only by defence requirements, he had but little choice in the matter.  

Almost two years before the Prime Minister's statement, opposition members had begun to debate the CF-105. On one occasion the C.C.F. member for Assiniboia had drawn the attention of the minister to the "dead duck" label that Lieutenant-General Simonds had pinned on the craft. A second representative of the same party had stressed the exorbitant cost of the airplane. Never again, he argued, should Canada embark upon such a costly programme without the endorsement of other countries that would guarantee orders. Members of the C.C.F. continually peppered the government with questions on the project and intermittently
urged the government to make a critical review of the project.  

The Liberal Party had been less harsh than the C.C.F. but nevertheless considerably concerned about the future of the Arrow. On August 8, 1958, the leader of the opposition had told the Commons:

A decision has to be taken as to whether or not to go ahead to the point where these planes will be introduced into our squadrons. . . or do we abandon the project in the light of developments in the last two years which seem to be emphasizing the importance of other forms of air defence, which may not replace but will certainly have to supplement the CF-105? 

By the following January he was less inquisitive and more censorious. The Liberal Party, he explained, had reconsidered the project every six months while it was in office. It is obvious, however, that the Progressive Conservatives have not done so since they came to power. Mr. Pearson charged the government with indecision, vacillation and contradictions. 

In return, he was told by the Prime Minister that it was the Liberal Party that was too indefinite.

It is clear then that well in advance of its final decision, the government had been under fairly continuous pressure from the House of Commons to come to an early and definite decision. And from the tone of opposition comments, although neither party chose to commit itself irrevocably, it appeared
that both expected a conclusion in the negative.

The statement of the Prime Minister, in which the cancellation of the Arrow was announced, was made on a Friday afternoon. The following Monday the defence critic of the Liberal Party moved the adjournment of the House to discuss a definite matter of urgent public importance "namely the crisis in the aircraft industry. . . involving mass lay-offs and threatened disintegration of this important sector of our Canadian defence production."48 The Prime Minister indicated that he welcomed an opportunity for discussion.49 Thus, the first of two full debates on the Arrow was begun.

The strategic bases for the decision of the government were discussed but briefly. C.C.F. spokesman, Mr. Argue, ignored them totally50 and from the Liberal Party only Mr. Hellyer questioned the validity of Mr. Diefenbaker's reasoning. Although he didn't doubt that the inter-continental ballistic missile would be the major threat by the mid-1960s, Mr. Hellyer explained he didn't understand how this could be related to an absolutely diminished bomber threat. Even if by the mid-1960s the bomber is only a supplementary weapon, he contended, the information of the Liberals indicates that there would still be 1000 - 2000 such aircraft that could be sent against the North American continent. 51
Mr. Pearkes, in rebuttal, revealed that the government intelligence showed that the Russians had far fewer bombers that could fly to North American targets and return to Russia than had been suggested by Mr. Hellyer. More important, the Russians had no new ones in production and had cut off their development programme. Liberal critics accepted these comments and did not question the accuracy of Mr. Pearkes' information.

A second issue debated was the problem of Canadian sovereignty. Our failure to sell the CF-105 to the United States, maintained Mr. Argue, showed as predicted in the discussion on N.O.R.A.D., that our partnership for continental defence is a decidedly unbalanced one. We are not getting a fair share of the defence production orders. We are becoming increasingly dependent on American technical skills. Canadian sovereignty is being swallowed up by the economy of the United States.

But both the strategic and sovereignty issues were peripheral in the debate. The subjects discussed most thoroughly were the future of the Canadian aircraft industry, the unemployment problem that had been created and perhaps most important, the procedure and timing of the government action.

Mr. Hellyer stated the Liberal position quite succinctly:
If the government decided that the Avro Arrow was not the most important machine necessary to our defence at the present time we would be obliged to go along with that decision and it must be accepted, but the fact which cannot be accepted is that at a time when there is obviously a very urgent military requirement for some defence machinery the government should and after eighteen months, simply cancel the contract overnight without giving adequate consideration as to what it should do in lieu thereof.  

It has taken years, he continued, to acquire the engineering and technical skills required for our aircraft industry and now by one ill-considered step, these are to be lost probably forever.

Other members attacked the failure of the government to cushion the blow and questioned the responsible minister concerning the possibilities of alternate employment.

The position of the Prime Minister was a sound one economically. "The production of obsolete weapons as a make-work programme is an unjustifiable expenditure of public funds." In shifting the blame to the A.V. Roe Company, however, and in emphasizing that it had received sufficient prior warning, he was on less firm ground.

If the comments in the House were to be judged in the manner of a university debate, there would no doubt be many who would give the verdict to the government. The logic of the Conservative case, however, seemed relatively unimportant in light of the fact that quite suddenly thousands had been thrown
out of work.

The debate was renewed a week later on the motion that the House go into Committee of Supply. On such motions it is the prerogative of the official opposition to choose the topic for debate and on this occasion their leader indicated that his plan was "to raise certain questions concerning defence policy and defence planning in the country with special reference to the necessity of planning defence production."\(^{57}\)

In constructing his argument, the leader of the opposition stressed three key factors that occurred between August 27 and October 4 of 1957. These were the launching of the first Russian inter-continental ballistic missile,\(^ {58}\) the completion of the first Arrow, and the successful launching of the first Sputnik. At that time, and not a year-and-a-half later, the necessary information was available for making a final decision. The government, he claimed, had blundered disastrously.\(^ {59}\)

Finally, Mr. Pearson went on, to replace the Arrow with the American produced Bomarc would make us more dependent on United States defence production capacity than ever before.\(^ {60}\) In closing, he moved an amendment that "this house regrets that the prolonged delay of the government in determining air defence policy and planning in cooperation with our allies is preventing the effective use of Canada's defence production facilities and manpower."\(^ {61}\)
To this, the C.C.F. spokesman added "and is so contributing to the erosion of Canadian sovereignty." Subsequent C.C.F. members placed primary emphasis on the numerous unemployed whereas Liberal representatives attacked the lack of government policy. Both parties, however, supported both the sub-amendment and the amendment each of which was crushed by the government's majority.

Debate on the Arrow decision was intelligent and informed. Both the background and the implications of this step were considered carefully by the opposition parties. The government was put on the defensive by these parties. It was forced to spell out, and in great detail, the motivation for its action. Due to the excellent coverage of the debates by the media of mass communication, the general public was therefore given an opportunity to evaluate the wisdom of the government's procedure in the light of the government's own defence and the opposition's criticisms. Possibly one indication that the opposition did successfully discredit the government position was that on practically all subsequent opportunities, the opposition parties had little hesitation in bringing the matter up in debate and dwelling on it.
at considerable length, no doubt with the voter in mind. And if one wished to speculate, it would perhaps be interesting to attempt to trace out the relationship between cancellation of the contract and Conservative failures in traditionally "Tory Toronto" in the 1962 general election.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE GREAT (IN)DECISION

The most continuous and extended debate on Canadian defence since the Second World War has centred on Canadian acceptance or non-acceptance of nuclear weapons. The problem is a most complex one and closely connected to a number of additional matters not all of which are directly related to one another. These include the influence of public opinion and the future electoral possibilities of each of the parties, Canada's role in N.A.T.O. and N.O.R.A.D., the necessity of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and perhaps most important broad policy and the direction into which Canada's defence effort should be channelled. The nuclear weapons debate thus has many faces each of which is of considerable importance.

Probably the greatest single challenge that faced members of Canada's twenty-fourth Parliament was that of securing from the government a definite commitment on whether Canada would accept nuclear weapons. Before looking at the attitude of the
government, however, I shall examine first the position of the other parties.

From the election of 1957 until August 1960 the Liberal Party put forward no specific policy. Policy-making, they claimed, was the role of the government. Thus, much of their energy was directed toward obtaining from the government clear statements of the defence programme. At times, however, after carefully acknowledging the difficulties involved in making such a decision, the Liberal leaders put forward vague suggestions of what a Liberal policy might be.

Concerning North American defence, the leader of the opposition made no definite commitment. But he did question the propriety of having Canadian and American Bomarc squadrons under a single command (N.O.R.A.D.) in which the latter would be better armed than the former. The possibility of such a situation, he suggested, is intolerable.

Soon thereafter, members of the Liberal Party began to attack the defensive value of the Bomarc, the weapon for which it was most likely that nuclear warheads would be obtained. In this action, they were supported strongly by the C.C.F. Toward the end of May, while this missile was still under considerable fire in Parliament, the Congress of the United States cut one-third
of its appropriations for this weapon. Despite this, although no doubt with some uneasiness, the Minister of National Defence insisted that development of the Bomarc "B", the mark which Canada was to receive, was proceeding on schedule. 68

On February 20, 1959, the Prime Minister had admitted:

The full potential of these defensive weapons (Bomarc) is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads. The government is therefore examining with the United States government questions connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Bomarc and other defensive weapons for use by the Canadian forces in Canada, and the storage of warheads in Canada. Problems connected with the arming of the Canadian brigade in Europe with short range nuclear weapons for N.A.T.O.'s defence tasks are also being studied. 69

To prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons to many countries, however, the Prime Minister announced that it was the policy of the government to prevent the production of such weapons in Canada although he was quite certain that the required scientific and technical "know-how" was available. 70

The position of the C.C.F. was clear from the outset. There is no defence against the I.C.B.M. the argument went, and therefore no reason to accept defensive weapons with nuclear warheads. Both in North America and in Europe it is only the deterrent power of S.A.C. that is preventing aggression. There is no need for Canada to contribute to this force. 71 As a result, the C.C.F. claimed that in "Canada there shall be no attempt
to either manufacture atomic or nuclear weapons, to use them, or, for that matter, to store them on Canadian soil."\(^72\)

The Liberals criticized the usefulness of the Bomarc\(^73\) but offered no definite policy concerning nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in Canada. Mr. Pearson did come very close, however, to advocating that the brigade group in Europe be armed with such weapons:

If these weapons were not used, N.A.T.O. forces in Europe would be facing armies which had them and would not hesitate to use them. Unless we can get international agreement on this matter, the resulting military disparity created might well be considered intolerable to N.A.T.O. morale. If the Canadian forces were deprived of these weapons or were not permitted to use them. . . their morale could hardly be expected to remain very high if they were serving alongside N.A.T.O. forces which had these tactical nuclear weapons.\(^74\)

By January of 1960 the policy of the Liberal Party had begun to solidify. Canada should accept no nuclear weapons, it was argued, that she does not control or are not controlled by N.A.T.O.\(^75\) The Prime Minister, in reply, accused the opposition of inconsistency, pointed out that American laws upheld the principle of United States ownership and he closed by assuring the House of Commons that there "shall be Canadian control of use in Canada."\(^76\)

In the meantime, the United States had experienced further difficulties with the Bomarc. Finally, toward the end of
March, 1960, the Congress cut appropriations for the Bomarc from $421 million to $50 million, a step which indicated very clearly its disenchantment with the missile's effectiveness. On March 25, the senior defence critic of the Liberty Party, with C.C.F. support, urged the House to refuse interim supply to the government on the grounds that it would be spent on the useless Bomarc. He therefore moved that the government's request be cut by one million dollars. On a straight party vote, the government defeated the amendment.  

On the Monday next, the cuts in Bomarc appropriations by the American Congress were made the subject of a Liberal motion that the House be adjourned to discuss a definite matter of urgent public importance. As on the CF-105 cancellation, the Prime Minister announced he was more than willing to permit such a debate. The Bomarc, and defence policy generally, were debated quite fully but no new statements were made on nuclear weapons policy. The government continued to defend the value of the Bomarc. Thus, when some five weeks later by a vote of 327 to 3 the United States House of Representatives decided to cease spending funds on the Bomarc, the Diefenbaker administration was put in a most embarrassing position.

By the spring, 1960, the defence policy of the government (or the lack of one) had been thoroughly discredited, not
only by the opposition parties, but by the numerous organs of public opinion, including even a considerable segment of the Conservative press. In the Commons members time and again tried to press the government into making a definite statement. Replies similar to the following were the best they could draw out however.

On July 14, the Prime Minister stated:

It is a well known fact that United States law requires that the ownership of nuclear weapons must remain with the United States. At the same time, as I have said before in the house, if and when nuclear weapons are acquired by the Canadian forces, these weapons will not be used except as the Canadian government decides and in the manner approved by the Canadian government.

One determines a course by first taking the necessary steps as to the principles on which nuclear weapons would be accepted. Then when we have arrived at that point a determination will be made on the basis of international situations existing, which are very grave, and in the light of any subsequent circumstances that may develop between now and the time we would be in a position in any event to have atomic weapons.

Three weeks later defence minister Pearkes argued:

The Bomarc, the CF-104, the Honest John will not be coming into service with the Canadian forces until late in 1961. What we are undertaking and what has already been made perfectly clear is that we are discussing with the United States arrangements which will be acceptable to both countries as to conditions under which such weapons will be available to Canada if and when required. We are. We are. going ahead with the procurement of vehicles which can use these nuclear weapons, but the decision as to the acquisition of the nuclear warheads depends on circumstances which might develop in the future.
Thus, up until August 1960 only the C.C.F. had taken a definite stand on nuclear weapons and defence policy. North American security, it was their feeling, depended solely on the Strategic Air Command and its ability to deter. Much the same was also true in Europe. Therefore there was no purpose in accepting tactical nuclear weapons. The strategy of N.A.T.O. should be centred on the development of strong conventional forces and it was toward this goal that Canada should channel her efforts. Very much in contrast, the Liberal Party had made no such definite policy statements. In the meantime, government policy was to make no definite commitments but to "play things by ear."

On August 4, 1960 the senior Liberal defence critic, Mr. Hellyer, delivered an important address in Committee of Supply. In it he announced several important decisions of the Liberal Party defence committee. He criticized the adoption of the Sage-Bomarc system and argued that Canada's role in continental defence should be one of identification (called "bird-watching" by the supporters of the government). To this end, the CF-100 should be replaced by a supersonic jet interceptor. Such a step, he claimed, would strengthen the alert system for the deterrent. Naturally, it would also eliminate the necessity of storing or accepting nuclear warheads in Canada. Finally, to increase Canadian independence of the United States N.O.R.A.D. should be
made a part of N.A.T.O.\footnote{84}

On the following day, the leader of the opposition made known the nuclear weapons policy of his party for Europe. No N.A.T.O. forces should have nuclear weapons under national control. All, including the United States and United Kingdom, should be under the control of N.A.T.O. thus decreasing the number of agencies which could independently begin a nuclear war.\footnote{85}

Concerning the Canadian brigade group in Germany, Mr. Pearson announced that it was now the policy of his party, in contrast to what he had suggested a few years earlier, to avoid arming them with tactical nuclear weapons. He gave three reasons for the change. First, the information that was now available indicated that they would not provide the increased security that had formerly been anticipated. Second, it might discourage the western European allies from building up their own conventional forces. Third, recent tests had shown that small nuclear bombs were proportionately "more dirty" than large ones, that is, they gave off vast amounts of dangerous fall-out.\footnote{86}

The Conservatives had an instant advantage in the debate for Mr. Hellyer's speech had irresponsibly been published by one newspaper in advance of delivery to the House, thus permitting the defence minister, Mr. Pearkes, to answer it even before it was presented. Even with this advantage and
Mr. Diefenbaker's harsh criticisms of Liberal inconsistency, the Conservatives could scarcely answer the charge in the pro-Conservative Province that they had no policy. "The Liberal defence policy may or may not be the right one. We aren't going to argue that here. What is important is that it is a POLICY, a positive one."

Toward the end of 1960, a new light was shone on Conservative indecisiveness with the considerable references, both in the Commons and outside of it, to the so-called "split" within the Cabinet on nuclear weapons policy. On January 31, 1961, the member for Burnaby-Coquitlam raised a grievance - that the Minister of National Defence had requested members of the armed forces to use their influence to counter "ban the bomb" movements. Subsequent speeches dwelled on this attitude in the light of the encouragement that the minister of external affairs had given to another group with a similar viewpoint.

In the Supply debates of 1961 Liberal Party and C.C.F. speakers reiterated their viewpoint on nuclear weapons. The Progressive Conservative minister could do no better than to draw an analogy between the weapons being purchased for Canada and the rifle of a hermit. The analogy, as it turned out, was more appropriate than he at first realized:

The situation is much the same as that of a man
living in a lonely cabin in the woods who fears
he may be attacked by a bear. He does not wait
until the bear actually attacks him to buy a rifle,
but secures it beforehand and has it ready in the
event of need.91

Not unnaturally, Mr. Harkness, the new defence minister,
was asked whether the hermit would purchase his ammunition before
or after he was attacked.92 Although the minister did make some
excellent criticisms of the policies advocated by those in opposition,
he again refused to clarify government plans. Member after member
tried to force the minister's hand until finally, in reply to a
harsh riding by Mr. Martin, he retorted:

What the hon. member is trying to do is bludgeon
me into making a yes or no statement at this time
as to the securing of nuclear weapons. I tell him
right away that he is not going to bludgeon me into
making any statement before the government is ready
to make it.93

The last occasions, in the twenty-fourth Parliament, for
debating the nuclear arms question were the Address at the outset
of the fifth session, and the brief Supply debates that followed
not long thereafter. By this time, both the Liberal and New
Democratic Parties94 policies had been developed fully. The former
group saw no need for nuclear weapons in North America on the grounds
that such weapons would protect neither the deterrent nor the centres
of population. Like the N.D.P., they had come to the conclusion
that the only defence against a pre-emptive strike was deterrence
and because the deterrent was mobile, there was no longer any need to protect it. And in Europe, both parties agreed that the greatest emphasis should be placed on conventional weapons. They differed, however, in that the Liberal Party advocated tactical nuclear weapons under N.A.T.O. (as opposed to national) control, although not for Canadian forces whereas the N.D.P. objected vehemently to a nuclear strategy for N.A.T.O. Thus both opposition parties brought coherent and rational defence policies before the country. And with a general election soon in the offing, both, but the Liberals in particular, lost little opportunity to embarrass the government.

During the Address numerous opposition speakers attacked the inability of the government to develop a policy. In the month of March alone, questions both formal and informal, on nuclear weapons, were hurled at the government on at least six occasions. In particular, Liberal speakers asked the government to rationalize the decision to accept a strike reconnaissance role in Europe, which required tactical nuclear weapons, without a political decision first on whether they were willing to so arm their forces. Almost every senior critic in the Liberal Party chose to debate the matter. Indeed, so often was it raised that even N.D.P. member Mr. Herridge questioned whether the Liberals were not playing politics with the swelling tide of
opposition to nuclear weapons.  

The last words of the defence minister on the matter, however, before closing debate, were a mere repetition of statements made on numerous earlier occasions. Thus did the debate on nuclear weapons in the twenty-fourth Parliament draw to an end.

COMPARISONS TO THE 1945-57 PERIOD

The nuclear weapons and policy debates of the twenty-fourth Parliament, I would submit, were the very antithesis of those that had been held between 1945 and 1957.

In the earlier years, there had been consensus on broad policy although considerable disagreement on method of implementation in the area of administration and sometimes strategic policy. But the overwhelming impression was one of agreement - agreement to demobilize, agreement to join N.A.T.O. and agreement to remobilize. In contrast, the post-1957 period has been one of disagreement. The government and opposition have divided on nuclear weapons policy, on continental defence including N.O.R.A.D., and on the role of N.A.T.O. The opposition parties however have done more than criticize. They have also put forward detailed and rational alternatives to government policy. And where policy has been lacking, as on nuclear weapons, proposals
have been suggested to fill the vacuum.

Debate, on the whole, was of a considerably higher quality than it was in the pre-1957 period. Both opposition parties showed ability not only in debating the background to the various policy problems, but also in discussing their implications. Arguments on the whole were more comprehensive, more detailed and better documented than they were when the Conservatives were the official opposition.

On numerous occasions the government was forced very much onto the defensive, something that seldom occurred in the 1945-57 period. Indeed, the opposition parties were apparently so convinced that they had discredited the government's defence programme that both Liberals and New Democrats attempted to make defence one of the major issues of the 1962 general election campaign. In the next few pages I have attempted to account for the differences in the pattern of opposition between the 1945-57 and 1957-62 periods.

It will be recalled that the reason for separating the study into chronological periods was to test for differences in the functioning of the opposition in the two periods. The first explanation, therefore, that naturally comes to mind is that the Liberal Party was more capable of handling the duties of an opposition than was the Conservative Party and differences
in the organization and personnel of the two parties do suggest reasons to support this thesis.

In the 1945-57 period the Progressive Conservatives handled defence through a House of Commons Defence Committee which was made up of all Conservative members of Parliament who wished to belong to it. At the beginning of each session the committee elected a chairman, vice-chairman and secretary. Inasmuch as "there were no meetings of the 'Shadow Cabinet'" the defence programme of the Conservatives was determined by this Defence Committee in the House of Commons with the assistance at times of the party leader.

In contrast, Mr. Hellyer informed the author that Liberal policy since 1957 has been formed by what might be referred to as the Defence Committee of the Shadow Cabinet. Thus major defence decisions were made at Shadow Cabinet level by the Liberal opposition; at the Commons committee level by the Conservatives.

Differences in the composition of the Conservative and Liberal Defence Committees are also noteworthy. Without exception, the senior critics of the Progressive Conservative Party were all inexperienced in the operations of government. None had served in a federal or even a provincial cabinet. On the other hand, the party's chief critic, Mr. Pearkes, had been a
professional soldier and many of its other members had achieved senior ranks while serving with the armed forces during one or the other of the two world wars. Thus the Conservative critics were more familiar with military organization than with the general administration of government.

In contrast, the personnel of the Liberal committee contained no professional soldiers and fewer men with wartime experience. But the composition of this Liberal committee is less important than that of the Shadow Cabinet for it was at the latter level that Liberal decision-making was carried out. The two senior defence critics, Mr. Pearson and Mr. Hellyer, were experienced in the administration of the government, and several other key figures in the Shadow Cabinet had held important portfolios in the King and St. Laurent governments. The Liberals thus brought a decidedly different set of credentials to the job of opposing from those borne by their Conservative predecessors.

And with these differences there evolved decidedly different patterns of opposition. On administrative and strategic methods of implementing broad policy the Progressive Conservatives were energetic critics. But in preparing a comprehensive defence programme which they could offer in opposition to the government they were totally unsuccessful nor does it appear that they made serious efforts to do so. The control that they did
exercise, although probably not by design, tended to bureaucratic control rather than political.

The pattern of Liberal control has been almost the direct antithesis of that weaved by the Progressive Conservatives. The former ignored implementation of broad policy far more than the Conservatives. But whereas the Conservative oppositions had been prepared to accept broad policy, the Liberals have not. Defence policy has been one of the subjects most criticized by the Liberal opposition and alternatives certainly have not been lacking. Moreover, the Liberal Party has shown little hesitation in taking their case to the people by making defence a major issue in the 1962 election. Thus it is clear that political control and not bureaucratic has been the primary goal of Messieurs Hellyer and Pearson.

The differences in the pattern of opposition, therefore, and the differences in the success of the opposition apparently can be explained by the differences in the personnel, experience and organization of the two parties. In any event these factors do offer one explanation for the differences in quality of opposition between the two periods.

Several other explanations for this changing pattern are also worthy of note, however, for although none contradict this first theory, they do supplement it by bringing in other
facts which are decidedly relevant.

A second explanation, and one which has been consciously or unconsciously approved by all three parties, is that the range of possible alternative defence policies has increased markedly in the post-1957 (post-Sputnik, post-I.C.B.M.) period. The argument here is that the basic concept of defence since prehistoric times - the idea that defence is secured by destroying the persons and weapons of offence - has been placed under considerable strain by recent technological developments. Because of these basic changes, through which the methods of attack have completely outdistanced the means of defence, a fundamental reassessment of defence has been required. In making such an analysis, the alternative policies that are available, and the ease with which any single policy may be criticized, has made it a simple task for almost any opposition to put any government under considerable pressure. It is thus possible to argue that the improved debates in the Commons are due in part to the changing character of the defence function which has facilitated the job of the opposition. And to strengthen this contention, it can be argued that the recent improvements in the defence debate have not been confined to the House of Commons alone, but rather have occurred throughout Canada in the numerous speeches, booklets, articles and textbooks that have
been prepared on the defence dilemma.

Another theory that must be considered is that which states that in defence and foreign affairs, policy should be bipartisan. To this principle numerous Conservatives have stated their approval. Concerning this idea Professor Keirstead's remarks are well worth considering. On March 25, 1962, the *Ottawa Evening Journal* stated editorially:

> We are being told that there is now a good chance of Canada retaining a bipartisan foreign policy! . . . Foolish unrealistic talk. . . Actually a bipartisan foreign policy has no place whatever in a British Parliamentary system . . . Opposition is not consulted beforehand regarding what the policies are to be about. 103

In reply Professor Keirstead wrote:

> This view is surely a correct though incomplete statement of the role of the Opposition in a parliamentary system. It is incomplete because it omits to state that the Parliamentary system for its proper operation depends on an agreement on the fundamental aims of policy. When the nation becomes split between hopelessly irreconcilable philosophies, then the state cannot exist and a decision is normally left to the abitrament of force. 104

If some credence be given to the idea that between 1945 and 1957 the Conservatives were motivated in part by the desire for bipartisanship in defence, then thus another reason, one which does not reflect on the ability of the opposition, appears for explaining the unanimity on broad policy before 1957.
Finally, a fairly good case can be made that with the exception of the abbreviated N.O.R.A.D. debate, the Diefenbaker government has been more willing to discuss controversial issues than were the various Liberal governments. On all five occasions between 1945 and 1957 when defence matters were the subject of opposition motions to adjourn (to discuss a definite matter of urgent public importance), the Liberal government purposely avoided such debates. In contrast, the Diefenbaker government on the only two occasions that they have been moved, has welcomed such motions and on such politically controversial topics as the Arrow and the Bomarc.105 This impression is strengthened by changes in the committee system since 1958 at the initiative of the government which has also encouraged rather than discouraged parliamentary inquiry.

It was mentioned earlier that the Liberals have presented better documented and more detailed criticisms and alternatives than did their Conservative predecessors. It is useful therefore to compare the information that has been available to the two oppositions; for if the Liberals were given much more information on defence than the Conservatives, this might account for their superior brand of opposition. But it was the Conservatives, and not the Liberals, who were supplied with greater information. Not only were there annual reports for the defence departments but also there were numerous white
papers. And between 1951 and 1953 close to 1500 pages of evidence was gathered by the Special Committee on Defence Expenditure. In contrast, the annual report for the Department of National Defence was halted by Mr. Pearkes after 1957 and white papers have been extremely irregular. Furthermore, a Liberal spokesman has argued in an interview with the writer that members of the Progressive Conservative opposition were permitted a considerable amount of leeway in talking informally to senior military and civilian personnel of the defence establishment, a courtesy, he contended, that the Tories have not granted to the Liberals since the 1957 election. In justice to this viewpoint, it must be pointed out that there have been some indications of inamicable relations between the Diefenbaker cabinet and some of its senior personnel no doubt stemming from the close Liberal - Civil Service ties that were built up during the 22 years of Liberal government.

On the other hand information from extra-governmental sources has increased since 1957 thus compensating partially for the decreased volume of government-released information. The recent changes in technology have given rise to numerous new studies on problems of strategy; and Canadian newspapers and journals have become far more interested in the problems of defence.
But information simply does not exist. It must be obtained through ingenuity and energy. And the sources of each individual member will vary. Thus although General Pearkes had admitted that the records of the American Congressional Committees "are very complete"\textsuperscript{109}, his former colleague Mr. Harkness has written this author that "far less information was obtained from American Congressional Committee Investigations than from Canadian and other sources."\textsuperscript{110} In contrast to this Mr. Hellyer has informed the author that these American hearings are his party's primary source of information\textsuperscript{111} and Mr. Coldwell has indicated that the C.C.F. drew heavily on both British and American sources. The point being made here is that most of the required intelligence does seem to be available but often in places where members have difficulty in gaining access to it. Although more first-hand information was given before 1957 than in the years since, it would be unwise to exaggerate the volume or use of much that was provided in either period. Neither official opposition party was given large amounts of useful first-hand information. Most of what they accumulated came through hours of homework with the records of investigations of the legislatures of other countries, and other non-Canadian sources. In short, neither in the pre-1957 period nor in the years since has the Canadian Parliament been provided with adequate information on defence.
In the final analysis, therefore, the changing pattern and improved quality of opposition since 1957 can be attributed to no single cause alone. There seems to be little doubt, however, but that the organization and experience of the Liberal Party members has been one of the major reasons for this change. Other factors have also assisted the Liberal opposition in effecting political control and not the least important of these has been the willingness of the Prime Minister to use the House of Commons as a forum for debate. But perhaps most important of these other factors has been the revolution in technology and the difficulties that this has caused for defence policy-makers. With the line between policy and strategy becoming increasingly blurred, the possibilities of exercising effective political control have grown rapidly. Thus, a new official opposition, a cooperative government and a changing environment have all helped to make the House of Commons a more effective instrument in the control of defence policy. This by no means indicates that the House has been able to determine a defence policy. It does signify, however, that through continuous criticism, much of which has been well-founded, the Commons has assisted in arousing public opinion, and by so doing, it has made the government feel the pressure of public concern with its defence policy.
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION

The procedure of separating the more important administrative decisions from the routine ones will be employed again here as it was in chapter three.

In approaching Commons control over the first of these categories (important administration) however, the case study method will not be used, as it was for the 1945 to 1957 period. I am avoiding this technique for two reasons. First, for a variety of reasons, it is not necessary. Second, it is far more difficult to choose typical decisions. I shall examine this second reason first.

In the earlier period, there was sufficient debate in this intermediate range of the policy-administration continuum (important administration) to permit the writer to select certain decisions which could be studied as typical cases of the more general phenomenon. In the more recent period this is more difficult. The first reason is because there has been far less discussion in this range. There have been far fewer debates and perhaps equally important, when there were debates, the House was more concerned with policy matters than it was in the pre-1957 years, and much less concerned with administration. Or it might be fairer to state that because there was concensus
on broad policy in the first period, there was more time to
consider the methods and machinery of implementation, whereas in
the 1957 to 1962 period there has been less time for administra-
tion because of the controversy raging over policy. Thus,
regardless of the reason emphasized the insufficient quantity
of debate makes it difficult to choose typical decisions.

I also stated that it is not necessary to choose such
case studies. With the advent of the new methods of delivery,
against which there are no known defences, and with growing
refinement of the means of mass destruction, a greater and
greater proportion of the strategic and weapons decisions have
become matters with potentially great political significance.
For with the subject of nuclear armament constantly in mind,
and with the very security of North America directly threatened,
problems of weapons technology can no longer be passed off as
primarily administrative. Probably the best example of this
is the Arrow - Bomarc debates, especially if compared to the
CF-100 debates of the earlier period. But possibly the same
could be said, although admittedly to a lesser degree, of such
subjects as the F-104b, the Honest John and other weapons
which to be effective require nuclear weapons. Thus, it is
being suggested that numerous problems in the defence function
which were previously treated as administrative ones, albeit
this was no doubt a very arbitrary decision, would now have to be considered political-(as defined) because of the changing character of the defence function.

For purposes of this thesis, however, it matters little whether these matters are considered to be strategic policy or important administration, for regardless of how they are labelled, much of what has already been said in evaluating House of Commons control over Liberal policy holds true again here.

Debate was of a rather high quality. Both opposition parties showed ability in debating the various strategic and weapons decisions, and in discussing their implications on Canadian defence preparedness. The debate was restrained and for the most part responsible although there can certainly be no doubt that the various matters debated were considered to be fair "political game". There was no notion of bipartisanship. Arguments put forward tended to be more detailed and better documented than they were when the Conservatives were in opposition. On numerous occasions the opposition was able to force the government very much onto the defensive.

The Liberal Party, much like the Progressive Conservatives of the earlier period, were primarily responsible for whatever debate occurred at this level. Government supporters
said little. In contrast to the 1945 - 57 era, however, the C.C.F. (and N.D.P.) proved to be effective and energetic critics. This is especially noteworthy in light of the fact that there were but eight representatives of this left wing group in the Commons.

Despite all that has been said, there are some indications that less control was exercised than when the Conservatives were the opposition. First, on departmental administration, there was far less debate than there was during the previous three Parliaments. It is true that the first item in the defence estimates was entitled "departmental administration" and there was invariably considerable discussion on it, but this was because policy debates are always held under the first item in the estimates and not because the subject matter debated was the administration of the department. In the 1945 -57 period, there were numerous discussions and inquiries into such subjects as unifications of services, the civilian-military ratio, the role of senior military and civilian personnel, and general departmental effectiveness. In defence production debates, as brief as they were, there was at least a little discussion of contract arrangements and other such similar items. In the more recent period, there were far fewer debates on such significant matters.
ROUTINE ADMINISTRATION

In drawing some general conclusions on control of routine administration between 1945 and 1957, I wrote in the previous chapter:

Much of the debate on routine administration arose out of the role of backbenchers as representatives of constituents, constituencies and interest groups. Apart from airing the grievances of individual citizens and some representations on behalf of French Canada, however, these contributions had little influence on the minister or cabinet. On the other hand, the usefulness of this type of debate to control the bureaucracy is of some importance. It is regrettable, therefore, in the light of this that so few backbenchers energetically pursued these duties.113

The regrets expressed in the previous chapter must be reiterated again for the 1957–62 years. Indeed, careful perusal has indicated that the record of backbenchers has been increasingly less impressive and far fewer have even troubled to pursue this line of work in this latter period. There were scarcely more than four or five inquiries into particular contracts over the entire two Parliaments114 and the author noted but one example of ventilation of grievance.115 Although this of course does not mean that other cases were not brought before the minister privately, it is quite probably a good indicator of the relative disinterest of members during these years.
No doubt this dismal performance is related to the overwhelming majority enjoyed by the Conservative Party in the House of Commons. But if this serves as a reason it is unsatisfactory as an excuse; for no backbencher need feel so obliged to his party leaders that he give up the right to speak with an independent voice on non-policy matters of particular concern to his own constituency. The record of the past five years, therefore, appears to stand as an indictment against the general quality of backbencher who has sat in support of the government.
CHAPTER V

HOUSE OF COMMONS

CONTROL OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURES

In earlier chapters it was seen that despite some improvements in recent years, the House of Commons has exercised little control over government defence policy.

But what of the power of the purse, historically perhaps the most significant of Parliament's powers? On this subject, Paul Einzig has written:

It was through . . . control of the nation's purse-strings that the Commons became the guardians of human rights. . . Control over finance enabled Parliament to secure the safety of the life, liberties, and rights of the subject against arbitrary acts by the Executive. It was because the Commons were in a position to withhold supplies that they had been able to secure freedom and impartial justice for the citizens, to safeguard the interests of the weak and defenceless, and to enable the formerly destitute masses to attain a standard of living in conformity with human dignity.\(^1\)

Surely, if these traditional powers exist only in an attenuated form today, it is possible not only for the Commons
to control the administration of the defence departments, but also, albeit indirectly, to influence defence policy. In this chapter, therefore, I shall examine Commons control of defence expenditure.

The House of Commons (as opposed to its standing and special committees and officers) has two opportunities to control defence expenditures and both occur in Committee of Supply. First, it has the power to scrutinize and decide on the estimates of the Department of National Defence. Second, it performs the same function for the Department of Defence Production. I shall discuss the first of these immediately below. Before investigating the role of the House, however, it is important to take note of the task that faced honourable members by looking both at the form of the estimates and also at the information with which members were supplied.

From 1945 until 1947, the bulk of the defence estimates were divided into two main votes and listed under the general heading of Demobilization and Reconversion. One provided the moneys for army, naval and air force establishments; the other for defence research and development. In 1948 these two items were transferred to the estimates of the Department of National Defence. In 1953, they were combined into a single nearly all-inclusive vote. For example, the amount voted in 1955-56.
was $1,769,680,500 and of this $1,729,285,194 were included in vote 236. This method of presenting the estimates, it must be pointed out, was radically different from that of other departments where it was customary to break the departmental estimates into a number of separate items some of which might be as much as $20,000,000 or $30,000,000, but most of which were much less.

The average backbencher (if there is such a person), when confronted with item 236, was no doubt overwhelmed. To assist him in his task, therefore, the government supplied him with two primary sources of information.

First, he had the "details of services" printed in a separate section of the estimates "bluebook". Generally these details were seven or eight times the length of the estimates proper. For the single major defence item they ran to thirty or thirty-five pages and were set up under eight major divisions including Minister of National Defence, Departmental Administration, Inspection Services, Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Air Force, Defence Research and Development and Mutual Aid. Under these were sub-divisions and under each of the latter, the minor particulars. The amount of money requested for each particular, as well as the sum voted the previous year, were (and of course still are) given.
But the details in the "bluebook" did little to simplify the problem of the backbencher. Although members were given some idea of where the moneys were being spent, the details provided few suggestions as to why. Moreover, complete details were provided (and continue to be) where they were of least value and few details where they could be usefully employed. Thus, the position and salary of every grade of civil employee was listed in every year after 1952, e.g. under Royal Canadian Navy one finds:

Royal Canadian Navy - Active Force and General. Civil Staff -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Amount 1955-56</th>
<th>Amount 1954-55</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Engineer, Grade 8 ($7,300-$7,900)</td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Engineers, Grade 7 ($6,420-$7,200)</td>
<td>33,540</td>
<td>13,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Engineers, Grade 6 ($6,120-$6,840)</td>
<td>40,080</td>
<td>50,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Engineers, Grade 5 ($5,820-$6,540)</td>
<td>61,320</td>
<td>41,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Engineers, Grade 4 ($5,960-$6,180)</td>
<td>52,740</td>
<td>35,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Engineers, Grade 3 ($5,100-$5,820)</td>
<td>109,440</td>
<td>99,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Engineers, Grade 2 ($4,680-$5,400)</td>
<td>70,800</td>
<td>52,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Engineers, Grade 1 ($3,540-$4,620)</td>
<td>45,780</td>
<td>42,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director of Studies, Royal Roads</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>7,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Professor, Grade 2, Royal Roads</td>
<td>6,860</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Professors, Grade 1, Royal Roads ($6,120-$6,800)</td>
<td>39,600</td>
<td>23,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Associate Professors, Royal Roads</td>
<td>11,880</td>
<td>10,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Registrar, Royal Roads ($5,160-$5,500)</td>
<td>5,580</td>
<td>5,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Assistant Professors, Royal Roads ($4,680-$5,400)</td>
<td>31,440</td>
<td>33,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lecturer, Royal Roads ($3,360-$4,620)</td>
<td>4,620</td>
<td>4,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Instructor in Radio Theory ($5,980-$6,580)</td>
<td>6,580</td>
<td>5,980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Royal Canadian Navy - Active Force and General.  
Civil Staff - (cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Instructors, Grade 2, Nat'l Def. ($3,570-$4,320)</td>
<td>16,980</td>
<td>14,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Instructors, Grade 1, Nat'l Def. ($3,150-$3,800)</td>
<td>57,150</td>
<td>45,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Administrative Officer, Grade 7 ($6,900-$7,800)</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>7,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Administrative Officers, Grade 6 ($6,080-$7,000)</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>12,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Administrative Officers, Grade 5 ($5,720-$6,360)</td>
<td>12,480</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Administrative Officers, Grade 4 ($5,330-$5,970)</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>10,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Administrative Officers, Grade 3 ($4,750-$5,550)</td>
<td>48,750</td>
<td>56,160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In fact, the excerpt given above includes but one-seventeenth of the details under Royal Canadian Navy - Civil Staff for the year 1956. Thus the member of Parliament was presented with an enormous array of facts, figures and salaries which, although very exhaustive, hardly did much to explain the role and necessity of the individual civilian staff members in the entire organization. The member "could not see the forest for the trees".

On the other hand, there were instances of the very opposite. Consider the following "details" under Air Services.
### Royal Canadian Air Force

#### Regular and General

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Details</th>
<th>1955-56</th>
<th>1954-55</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major procurement of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft and Engines</td>
<td>293,534,000</td>
<td>395,381,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Equipment,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including Transport</td>
<td>4,763,000</td>
<td>9,785,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament Equipment</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>2,552,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal and Wireless Equipment</td>
<td>34,773,000</td>
<td>30,111,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Training Equipment</td>
<td>9,178,000</td>
<td>10,665,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Technical Equipment</td>
<td>8,919,000</td>
<td>9,195,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition and Bombs</td>
<td>15,972,000</td>
<td>12,714,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairs and Upkeep of Equipment</td>
<td>119,292,000</td>
<td>124,947,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first table for the benefit of members, the government broke less than $700,000 in expenditure into 132 positions. In the latter on an expenditure of close to $300 millions for aircraft and engines, no breakdown was provided. While no doubt the matter of security is more important for expenditures on aircraft and engines than for civilian personnel, this in no way begins to account for the total lack of information on aircraft and for equipment generally. Indeed, the word ludicrous does not seem inappropriate for details of this kind.
The difficulty in understanding the purpose of the estimates was partly alleviated by the annual white paper published by the Minister of National Defence. This dealt with such subjects as training, manpower, equipment and construction. The paper, entitled *Canada's Defence Programme*, was first published in 1949-50 and made available to members before consideration of the estimates. Although short on details, it did provide sufficient information on current developments to enable members to understand much that the estimates "bluebook" did not explain. The last of these was published in 1955-56, with a promise from the minister that in the future the white paper and annual departmental report would be combined into a single document. Intermittent white papers and annual reports (only three in number) have been published since then. Finally, in May 1961, a new booklet called *National Defence: Explanatory Material Relating to 1961-62 Estimates*, was issued to assist members. This last paper devoted some twelve pages to explaining reasons for increases and decreases in the various estimates and because of this, it was more useful than earlier ones which generally were but half as long on these explanations. When compared to the "Explanatory Notes" which accompany the estimates of the British armed services, however, it can be seen that the 1961-62 paper was no doubt less illuminating than well it might have been.
Thus the two sources of information together provided both a broad outline and numerous details. Unfortunately the details proved to be almost useless as they provided little insight into the operations and administration of the defence department. Perhaps the best proof of this was that members based very few questions in Supply on these details. And the white papers dealt too much with policy, which was later repeated in the minister's policy address to the House, and not enough with current expenditures and the progress of current programmes. Together the two sources went only a very short way toward assisting the backbencher in understanding the purposes of the defence expenditures.

With these brief introductory remarks it is now possible to look at the record of the House of Commons.

First, in each of the years under investigation, the defence estimates were passed by the Commons as originally presented. In no single instance was any member able to secure any modification, no matter how small, in the government's defence estimates. Thus, no direct control was exercised over expenditures.

Moreover, the debates on details seldom served as an investigation into the financial operations or financial efficiency of the Department of National Defence. Apart from
the very rare occasions when a member delved into the specific purposes, arrangements and methods of expenditure in his own constituency, the debates on details tended to be debates on administration, technology, equipment or tactics and not on the "minor particulars" in the estimates details. Although there were often general questions on the reasons for increases or decreases in the estimates, these did little except to illuminate trends in spending. Moreover they were only useful to the degree that members were acquainted with the basic financial operations of the department and all too often the indications were that this fundamental knowledge was lacking. In short, in no single year did the Committee of Supply acquire a truly detailed understanding of the destination of the appropriated moneys.

Perhaps even more important is the fact that the "details" of estimates were not (and still are not) of any legal significance.

If, as is the case, Parliament grants to the Crown a certain service in a given year, without any more definite appropriation in the terms of the grant, it is legally competent to the executive to expend that sum at its discretion in the year upon that service. That is, to say, since the parliamentary enactment deals with the vote only, the Government is not legally bound to adhere to the details submitted to Parliament, provided the expenditure is restricted to "the four corners of the vote". Morally, however the Government must adhere to those details as far as is consistent with the interests of the public service, since its good faith is pledged by the details given to Parliament, and the Comptroller and Auditor General would correctly bring divergencies to notice.
As has already been mentioned, for many years almost the entire estimate of the defence department, unlike that of every other department, was passed under a single vote. Thus, in effect, there were no legal restrictions on the department to prevent it from spending its $1.5 or $2.0 billion as it saw fit, without reference to the details considered and approved by Parliament. This was partially modified by the Financial Administration Act of 1951 which required that any such changes be approved by the Treasury Board; but it is also well to remember that this body is a committee of the cabinet and its decisions are seldom debated in the House of Commons. Thus, the single restraint on the government was the moral one. And there is evidence that this was not exceptionally strong. Consider the reply of the Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance to a member of the 1950 Public Accounts Committee which although given with reference to the Department of Finance has particular significance for the point being developed here.

Q. Would the grouping of these small votes into larger items tend to avoid the necessity for supplementary estimates.
A. Perhaps to a small degree but it would do so at the expense of perhaps some of the detailed control which parliament now has over the purpose for which the money can be spent. . . There would not be the same measure of control as is now exercised by the House.

It can readily be seen that the danger that the assistant deputy
minister was referring to already existed in National Defence.

Moreover, there is evidence that the Department of National Defence has employed these unique powers. Certainly the testimony of the deputy minister to the 1958 Estimates Committee indicates this:

The Chairman: Repairs and upkeep of equipment.
Mr. Bourget: Do you know how much of the item of $21 million was spent last year?
Mr. Armstrong: $28,186,034.
Mr. Bourget: Did you borrow from some of these other items?
Mr. Armstrong: In these estimates we may transfer between the various headings that are shown here within the total amount of the vote. The authority for such a transfer is the treasury board...
Mr. Benidickson: Within the total vote?
Mr. Armstrong: Yes.
Mr. Benidickson: So you have pretty wide freedom within the $1,600 million?
Mr. Armstrong: There is freedom to transfer within the amount of $1,600,000, that is right. 10

This situation was recognized as undesirable by the 1958 Estimates Committee and as a part of its fifth report to the Commons it recommended:

No. 220 of the Main Estimates, an amount of over $1,600,000 should be divided into a number of smaller items. The Standing Committee on Estimates then could more easily consider the expenditures and be in a position to better recommend what savings could be effected in a particular area, and Parliament would have more control over expenditures as the opportunity to transfer funds within smaller votes would be lessened. 11

Although no change was made in the 1958-59 estimates, the validity
of the criticism implied in the Committee's recommendations was acknowledged by the form in which the defence estimates were presented to the House in the years thereafter; for since 1959 they have been presented as some fifteen separate votes. It thus has become more difficult for the government to spend moneys where Parliament had not intended.

One indication that this new method has improved parliamentary control has been the increased frequency and size of the supplementary estimates requested by the defence department. Although I was unable to obtain a complete record of supplementary estimates since World War Two, the record was such between 1954 and 1957 to indicate that they were resorted to only occasionally. In contrast, since 1958, supplementaries have been requested annually and in 1961-62 totalled some $70 millions as a result of the Berlin crisis. It is clear, however, that from 1945 to 1958 it was much easier for the defence department to avoid detailed parliamentary control than it was for other departments and there is every indication that it did so.

Even today this is true although no doubt to a lesser degree; for votes 235, 237 and 239 of the 1961-62 Estimates provided the Department of National Defence with $208,135,049, $359,572,000 and $536,666,000 respectively, thus making the shifting of funds still
a rather simple matter. 12

One final point remains to be made and this stems from the paradoxical but accurate position that this writer has presented on supplementary estimates. I have argued that the increased use of supplementaries is evidence of improved parliamentary control. The paradox arises from the fact that supplementaries are usually associated with diminished parliamentary control; for they indicate the extent of executive power over the legislative branch by providing the executive with a technique whereby it can obtain an almost limitless supply of money. And yet even this is an improvement over the previous situation for at least under such circumstances Parliament knows something about the purposes of the expenditures for which it is granting moneys. In the earlier period, it lacked even this knowledge. Finally, it has to be admitted that even since 1958 the supplementary and further supplementary have been used moderately by the defence department; for only in 1961-62 did they exceed one per cent of the original estimate and in most years they were much lower. Unfortunately it is impossible to conclude whether this moderation is a reflection of accurate departmental budgeting and good parliamentary control or simply an indication that the votes are still great enough to permit shifting of funds without requesting supplementaries. Regardless of which
is the more accurate answer, it is obvious that even today very little control over defence expenditure is exercised by Committee of Supply for National Defence.

On April 1, 1951, the Department of Defence Production was established to replace the Canadian Commercial Corporation as the procurement agency of the rapidly expanding defence department. It thus received exclusive authority to purchase and acquire defence supplies and construct defence projects (through Defence Construction Limited) required by the Department of National Defence. Naturally, therefore, close scrutiny of its work was necessary to ensure that the moneys of the defence department were not wasted.

In an earlier chapter a brief summary of Defence Production debates was given. In this chapter, two years, 1953-54 and 1959-60, are analyzed more closely.

In the first, 1953-54, the estimates of the Department of Defence Production were scrutinized and approved in less than five hours. This amount of time, although slightly less than for most years, was not exceptionally brief.\(^{13}\)

The Progressive Conservative Party concentrated its criticisms upon the strategic and economic dangers of over-centralizing defence industry. The C.C.F. questioned the general purchasing policy of the Defence Production Department.
In addition, there were the usual representations on behalf of constituency and provincial interests.

Thus little time was devoted to investigating the details of expenditure. Questions were asked on the terms of contracts for such assorted items as bearings, anthracite, nails and ships. Government capital investment into several defence industries was discussed. In each case the minister provided detailed explanations on the purpose and method of the particular expenditures. In effect, therefore, the government was being forced to account for at least a small amount of the money that made up the defence estimate. On one enquiry the minister admitted that there had been waste. In a second instance he agreed that the original estimate for a particular item had quadrupled in a period of four years. Debate was on the substantial operations and expenditures of government and not enmeshed in abstract generalities. But the discussions of concrete expenditures lasted but a half-hour. Control of defence expenditures, therefore, was not exercised through the estimate debates of the Department of Defence Production.

Since the Progressive Conservative Party has come to power there has been only one debate in the Commons on Defence Production estimates. In all other years discussion lasted only a few minutes. Thus the single debate described below cannot be called typical of those between 1957 and 1962 but...
rather the only one of this period.

In many respects the discussion introduced by the Liberal opposition in 1959 was similar to the ones that were led by the Progressive Conservatives when they were in opposition. Policy, and not financial details, was the subject of much of the debate. Defence production-sharing with the United States, the powers of the minister, decentralization of defence industry and the development of secondary industry were all discussed. And as usual, backbenchers revealed constituency, provincial and sectional interests. 17

Honourable members of the Liberal Party queried the government on the liquidation of the "Avro Arrow" and did secure new information on the topic. Estimates of expenditures on the F-104 aircraft were reviewed. Sweeping criticisms of the Mid-Canada Line as recorded in Saturday Night were put on record by a representative of the C.C.F. and much new data on the financing of that project was given. On these and other more minor matters, despite the fact that the opposition was far more partisan than was ordinarily the case in Committee of Supply, the minister was quite cooperative in setting forth the reasoning and history behind the particular expenditure.

But, like the discussion of the estimates for 1953-54, the debates in 1959 only began to "scratch the surface". Perhaps
the most frustrating part for one who is concerned with greater control over expenditure is that the brief discussions in Supply (for defence production) have been extremely useful. They have dealt with problems and methods in awarding contracts and in procuring equipment. They have shown how the individual back-bencher, simply by being aware of government defence activity in his own constituency, can keep watch on defence expenditure. And yet, despite all this, the House of Commons has for the most part ignored the estimates of the Department of Defence Production and the opportunity that the debate on these provides for scrutinizing the expenditure for national defence.

It must be concluded, therefore, that neither the Liberal nor the Conservative oppositions have been able to achieve any notable success in controlling the defence expenditures of the Canadian government. The C.C.F. has played a peripheral role; the Social Credit Party in the years that it was represented, scarcely even attempted to assist in this function. In fact, then, House of Commons control of defence expenditures must be written off as being little more than a myth.

Indeed, even some of the statutory controls that have been devised by Parliament have been partially by-passed. Section 30 of the Financial Administration Act reads in part:
(1) No contract providing for the payment of any money by Her Majesty shall be entered into or have any force or effect unless the Comptroller certifies that there is a sufficient unencumbered balance available out of an appropriation or out of an item included in estimates before the House of Commons to discharge any commitments under such contract that would, under the provisions thereof, come in course of payment during the fiscal year in which the contract was entered into.\(^{18}\)

But the annual vote for the defence department permits the government to commit moneys in excess of its request. Thus, in 1955-56, vote 236 stated:

To provide for the Canadian Forces, the Defence Research Board and other expenditures relating to defence. . . and not withstanding Section 30 of the Financial Administration Act to authorize total commitments for the foregoing purposes of \$4,269,726,540\) regardless of the year in which such commitments will come in course of payment (of which it is estimated that \$2,443,441,346 will come due for payment in future years).\(^{19}\)

The reason for waiving section 30 stems from the special nature of the defence function and the necessity of planning ahead. A defence programme is always a long-term one and not prepared on a twelve month basis. The authorization permits the defence department to place contracts in excess of estimates in the expectation that some contracts will not be fulfilled until future years. In effect, therefore, it is necessary for the defence department to calculate correctly the rate at which
goods will be delivered and hence the moneys to be paid to contractors. And there has been no opposition in the Commons to this necessary step.

Since the Commons cannot bind itself for future years, the future commitment in a vote such as 236 is a purely moral one. In practice, however, it does tie the hands of the House, especially if rate of delivery exceeds departmental expectations so that goods are received for which no money is available. Thus, when in 1949-50 $415 million was committed but only $348 million voted:

The Comptroller of the Treasury operated his accounts as though he had $415 million available for commitments. . . Actually when we (the staff of the Auditor General) were making the audit of this year. . . we discovered there were about $12 million worth of accounts which were ready for payment but which were not paid in the year . . . suppliers made deliveries faster than the department had anticipated.21

Therefore, at the very least, there can be no doubt that the Commons of the following years was bound, in advance, at least for the $12 million.

Not much objection can be raised against this practice. The only purpose here is to point out that the statutory safeguards over expenditure, as guaranteed by the Financial Administration Act, are somewhat weaker for defence than they
are for other departments.

Another important privilege, peculiar only to the defence departments, is that provided for under section 17(1) of the Defence Production Act which gives the Minister of Defence Production far greater discretion in entering into contracts than is permitted to other ministers under sections 36 (and 16) of the Public Works Act. Under section 36 of this latter Act it is written:

Where a work is to be executed under the direction of a department of the Government, the Minister having charge of that department shall invite tenders by public advertisement for the execution of the work except in cases where

(a) the work is one of pressing emergency in which the delay would be injurious to the public interest,

(b) the work can be more expeditiously and economically executed by the employees of the department concerned, or

(c) the estimated cost of the work is less than fifteen thousand dollars, and it appears to the Minister, in view of the nature of the work, that it is not advisable to invite tenders.22

In contrast, the Minister of Defence Production is given far greater freedom to negotiate contracts. Indeed, he is free to negotiate every contract if he wishes, subject only to the approval of Governor in Council (and not Parliament).23

In practice, by far the greater number of contracts are let by competitive tender but these generally turn out to be the
smaller ones. For example, in the last six months of the 1950-51 fiscal year, 53,704 contracts were made of which 42,632 were fixed price through competitive tender. Despite this, the value of those decided by tender was only $94 million whereas the total value of the other types was $429 million.\textsuperscript{24}

In a number of very important cases the calling of tenders is not possible. There may be a lack of competing sources of supply, specifications may not be precise enough to provide a suitable basis for firm price tenders, security considerations may restrict the range of possible suppliers, or an isolated delivery point may have the same effect; or a requirement may be so large as to tax the facilities of any single plant.\textsuperscript{25}

Even where tenders could be called this is not always done. In the construction of ships, for example, contracts are allocated to shipyards across the country because "it is considered desirable to maintain a working team in the various shipyards so that we can always have a nucleus of trained shipwrights, riggers and so forth, in case at any time it is necessary to expand as was necessary in 1950."\textsuperscript{26}

The reasons for so many negotiated contracts stem from the unique nature of the defence function and the general principle that these are sometimes necessary has never been challenged by any of the Canadian political parties. But this does not detract from the fact that a great deal of power is left with the executive and that the results are not always
satisfactory. After investigating one "cost-plus" contract and finding evidence of considerable waste, the 1959 Public Accounts Committee concluded:

Your Committee is of the opinion that it would be in the public interest were
(a) legislation to regulate more stringently and comprehensively cost-plus awards
(b) the regulating provision of the Defence Production Act reserved to indisputable defence projects of such a nature that it is not possible to let by tender, and
(c) that substantial contracts should not be let until plans and specifications are complete.27

Thus far, no amendments have been introduced into Parliament to implement these recommendations.

Another important statutory control over public moneys is section 35 of the Financial Administration Act:

The balance of an appropriation granted for a fiscal year shall lapse.28

This wording differed slightly from the 1931 Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act which stated:

Balance of appropriations which remained unexpended at the end of a fiscal year shall lapse and be written off.29

Although no reason for this change was given to the Committee of the Whole or the Standing Committee which dealt with it,30 nor was any requested, it is interesting to speculate about the alteration in the light of the Defence Appropriation
Act of 1950. By section three of this Act the cabinet was given authority to provide equipment, services, supplies and facilities for the armed forces of Canada and her North Atlantic Treaty allies; "and from and out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund there may be paid and applied for these purposes at any time, notwithstanding section thirty-two of the Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act, 1931, in addition to any other grants of Parliament, sums not exceeding a total of three hundred million dollars."\(^{31}\) The Act further provided that when any transfer of defence equipment of supplies is made to such an ally, and the costs were not paid from the three hundred million dollar appropriation, that "the estimated present value of such equipment or supplies shall be charged to that appropriation and a corresponding amount shall be paid into a special account of the Consolidated Revenue Fund which may be used at any time, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council, to purchase equipment or supplies for the naval, army or air services of the Canadian Forces."\(^{32}\)

It appears, therefore, that the change in the 1931 Act was made in order to permit this continuing appropriation. Perhaps more important, the 1950 legislation created a special fund, used until the late 1950s, over which Parliament had no control. Although there was no opposition to these developments,
they are noteworthy both as reminders of the uniqueness of the defence function, and also as indication that the defence departments are less restricted by the statutory safeguards of Parliament than are other departments.

In the examples I have given above, I am not suggesting that the defence departments are free from statutory controls for most certainly the Comptroller of the Treasury, the Treasury Board, the Auditor General and even the Civil Service Commission (all creatures of Parliament) do play a most important role in controlling the expenditures of the defence departments. The few examples that I have given, however, do indicate that some of the statutory controls, at least, are less effective for defence then they are for the other functions of government.

Thus not only is Commons control virtually non-existent; but also, there are grounds for questioning the utility of the statutory methods. Although no doubt both these conclusions can be attributed to the special character of the defence function, this in itself does not serve as a justification for perpetuating what I would suggest is a most undesirable state of affairs.34

Indeed, the House of Commons has not been unaware of its ineffectiveness in controlling government expenditures and it has been partly out of its attempt to solve this problem that the committee system has arisen. Three committees, in
particular, have been employed to control the expenditures of the defence departments. These are the Standing Committees on Public Accounts and Estimates and the Special Committee on Defence Expenditures. Each of these is examined thoroughly in the next two chapters. In the remainder of this chapter it is my purpose to review briefly the historical development of committee control of defence expenditure.

THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE

The oldest of these committees is the one on Public Accounts which dates back to Confederation. Up until World War One it met regularly and according to Professor Ward it was very active in scrutinizing government expenditures. Gradually the Committee fell into disuse and between 1930 and 1945 it met but four times.

Post-World War Two developments, however, have been more encouraging for the Committee has met twelve times since 1945 and even more important, it has convened annually since the 1957 change in government.

The House of Commons recommends to the Committee the scope of its activity for each session. The orders generally include a request that the Committee review and report on the Public Accounts and that it comment on the Report of the
Auditor General for the fiscal year just ended. In fact, the Committee decides, through its sub-committee on agenda and procedure (steering committee) which aspects of the departments it wishes to investigate in detail. Thus the generality of the orders from the House permit the Committee to exercise a great deal of independence in determining the agenda.

What are the aims of the Committee? The orders are extremely vague. It is "empowered to examine and inquire into such matters and things as may be referred to it by the House, and to report from time to time its observations and opinions thereon, with power to send for persons, papers and records."36 Because the "all such matters and things" invariably includes the Public Accounts and the Auditor General's Report, it is clear that the aims of the Committee are closely related to the functions of the Auditor General and the purposes for which he keeps the Public Accounts.

In the words of a past incumbent the functions of the Auditor General are to ascertain whether:

(a) the accounts were faithfully and properly kept;
(b) all public money was fully accounted for, and the rules and procedures applied secured an effective check on the assessment, collection and proper allocation of the revenue;
(c) expenditures were for the purpose for which appropriations were made as authorized, and
(d) essential records were maintained of public property, and the rules and procedures applied suitably safeguarded and controlled.37
Following from this it could be argued that the aims of the Public Accounts Committee have been at least three-fold. First, it has the job of ensuring that the moneys spent by the departments are used for the purpose that Parliament voted them. Second, it ensures that all necessary legal procedures are followed in handling public moneys. Finally, and more generally, it attempts to ensure that economy is used in the expenditure of public moneys.

The aims of the Committee, however, cannot be interpreted solely by determining the functions of the Auditor General; for the Auditor General belongs to no party whereas the Public Accounts Committee is made up of members who are representing political parties.

The post-war history of the Committee has been a changing one. Although less dominated by political considerations than most Commons committees, the Public Accounts Committee, up until 1958, was not at all similar in type to the non-political British model. After the general election of 1958, however, the Diefenbaker administration instituted important changes and one of these was to secure the appointment of a chairman from the opposition. Since then, the atmosphere of the Committee has changed markedly, and with this change its goals have come very close to the
three non-political ones suggested earlier.

THE DEFENCE EXPENDITURES COMMITTEES

Soon after the close of the Second World War, members of the opposition parties began to press for a committee of the House to investigate the defence programme of the government. 38 Although not all who spoke were specific, most envisioned a committee with far-reaching powers, certainly one that would deal with more than finances. 39

In 1949 defence spending turned upward and by 1951 the government had embarked on a programme of large-scale re-armament. Toward the end of 1951 the Prime Minister met with leaders of the opposition parties and out of their discussion came an understanding whereby the government agreed to the establishment of a Special Committee on Defence Expenditures.

On November 13 the Prime Minister introduced his motion:

That a select committee be appointed to examine all expenditures of public moneys for national defence and all commitments for expenditure for national defence since March 31, 1950, and to report from time to time their observations and opinions thereon, and in particular, what, if any, economies consistent with the execution of the policy decided by the government may be effected therein, with power to send for persons, papers and records and to examine witnesses; and that notwithstanding Standing Order 65, the committee shall consist of twenty-six Members to be designated by the House at a later date. 40
The purpose of the committee, Mr. St. Laurent announced, is "... to see to it that within the policies recommended by the government and accepted by parliament, the country is getting full value for the appropriations that have been provided." He hoped, he stated that this would be a continuing committee.

Messieurs Drew, Coldwell and Shaw, the latter speaking on behalf of the Social Credit Party, all indicated their approval of the terms of reference. Only Mr. Gillis of the C.C.F. announced dissatisfaction. The scope of the committee has been too restricted, he argued. Moreover, how does one define policy? He did not indicate, however, that despite his doubts, he planned to oppose the government's motion.

Thus was the Defence Expenditures Committee created. Its terms of reference provided it with slightly greater powers than the Public Accounts Committee; for it was not, like the Public Accounts Committee, restricted to past expenditures, as reported in the Public Accounts. It could, in addition, examine "commitments for expenditure", i.e. it could look into the current expenditures of the government.

The committee was re-appointed in 1952 under identical terms of reference and again in 1953. In the latter year, however, the initial government motion, which was not different from those of the two previous years, was amended by the
government so that the committee would initially "give priority in their examination to the expenditures and commitments of the Canadian Army Works Services as dealt with in the Report of G.S. Currie, Esquire, Chartered Accountant, tabled in the House of Commons on December 15, 1952. . ." The amendment was moved by defence minister Claxton and although vehemently opposed by opposition members who variously called it an investigation into an investigation ("we need no inquiry into the report of another inquiry"), and an attempt to "whitewash" the Currie report with the committee's Liberal majority, it was passed on division by the government's supporters.

From 1953 until 1960, despite Mr. St. Laurent's aspirations that it be a continuing committee, the Defence Expenditures Committee did not meet. Nor were the opposition parties anxious for a committee to be re-appointed unless it were given wider powers. Members did request, however, an expenditures committee that would deal with estimates as well as accounts; some even went so far as to indicate that they would wish a committee to hear independent witnesses.

The Defence Expenditures Committee did not meet during this period for two reasons. First, the leader of the opposition indicated to the government that he was not interested in a committee of the 1951-53 vintage. Second, the government was
unwilling to submit the defence estimates to a House committee as requested by Mr. Drew both through correspondence with the Prime Minister and in the debates in the Commons. By 1956 all opposition parties were clamouring loudly for a Standing Committee on Defence but the government refused to relent. During the twenty-third Parliament (1957-58), the chorus was led by the C.C.F. and Social Credit Party, but once again their appeal fell on deaf ears.

THE ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

In February 1955 the Liberal government introduced a motion calling for the création of a select committee on estimates "to consider such of the estimates as may be referred to it. . . ." It was the intention of the government that the estimates of a different department would be referred to the Committee each year for detailed study.

It was to this Committee that the Diefenbaker government turned to satisfy the demands of the C.C.F. and Social Credit Party. On June 3, 1958, for the first time since Confederation, the estimates of the defence department(s) were referred to a select committee of the House, the Standing Committee on Estimates, for examination and approval. The Defence Expenditures Committee thus appeared to be an instrument
of the past.

Surprisingly, however, a Defence Expenditures Committee was appointed again in 1960 to deal with both accounts and estimates. Since then, there have been no indications that another would be set up. Thus, it is impossible to predict what place this Committee will hold in the House of Commons of the future. What is clear, however, is that the House, up until now, has evolved no permanent apparatus to deal specifically with defence expenditures.

In this chapter it has been seen that the Committee of Supply has been unable to exert control, direct or indirect, over defence expenditures. In the next two, I shall examine the work of the committees of the House that have dealt with defence and the degree to which these have been useful in controlling the expenditure of the defence dollar.
Prior to the Korean crisis, there were no attempts to control defence through the appointment of select committees of the House of Commons. The War Expenditures Committee had finished its work in 1946 and in the following year the Standing Committee on Public Accounts had been summoned for the first time since the end of the Second World War. The Committee met no fewer than twenty-two times during the 1947 session, but its investigations excluded the defence department. The Committee was not called together in 1948 and met but once in 1949.

The lack of interest in defence displayed by the House (and its committees) did not mean that the defence department and its procurement agency, the Canadian Commercial Corporation, were free from all controls except those enforced by the executive; for although the Public Accounts Committee showed little interest in defence expenditure, the same was not true of its servant, the Auditor General of Canada.
THE OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL

The Auditor General is appointed by the Governor-in-Council and holds office "during good behaviour until he attains the age of sixty-five years." He can be removed by the Governor General only "on address of the Senate and the House of Commons." Like federally-appointed judges, his salary does not come from an annual appropriation, which the governing party could block, but directly from the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

In 1937, the United States President's Committee on Administrative Management concluded:

A true audit can be conducted only by other officers than those charged with the making of decisions upon expenditures. No public officer should be authorized to audit his own accounts or financial acts and decisions. The maximum safeguard is provided when the auditor is entirely independent of the administration and exercises no executive authority. The control of expenditures is essentially an executive function, whereas the audit of such expenditures should be independent of executive authority or direction.

Such a position of independence is enjoyed by the Auditor General of Canada.

The Office of the Auditor General is divided into five branches. Two are mainly concerned with the audit of large civil spending departments; a third deals with the audit of large revenue departments; most Crown Corporations are handled
by a fourth; the final one deals almost exclusively with the Departments of National Defence and Defence Production.

In the Office of the Auditor General is a staff numbering close to 150 and of these some 32 are attached to the Defence Branch including 21 in National Defence and eleven in Defence Production. Although these men are not permanently attached to the Defence Branch in the sense that their entire careers are spent within it, they are not rotated frequently. Therefore, many have spent more than a few years in the Defence Branch making it possible for them to become familiar with the complex and large-scale expenditures on defence.

It is of course impossible for such a small staff to even begin a full audit of the defence department and indeed this is not even attempted. Rather, a test audit is employed and the extent of the test varies with the nature of the expenditure, the amount involved, the system of internal control, and the degree to which weaknesses are discovered as the audit progresses. On travelling expenses, an item which lends itself to extravagance, the test may run as high as 70 to 80% of the expenditure. On most items, however, a ten per cent test is considered sufficient.

Normally, vouchers are test-checked daily as they are received from the Comptroller General. The audit is thus
continuous and seldom falls more than thirty days behind expendi-
ture. In addition, the Auditor General employs the technique
of a "project" examination through which Defence Branch auditors
make an "on the spot" check of a particular camp, project, office
or other centre of expenditure. These are primarily investigations
into the system of internal audit employed and the reports of the
internal auditors are carefully perused by officers of the Auditor
General's office for signs of laxity in the internal controls. 6

In the Department of Defence Production, the initial
audit is carried out by the Treasury cost accounting sections
and the Treasury reports are examined by the auditors of the
Defence Branch attached to the Department of Defence Production.
If these reports indicate anything doubtful the expense is
investigated thoroughly. In addition, all expenditures in excess
of $100,000 are automatically given special attention. For some
of the larger suppliers, such as Canadair and A.V. Roe, the
"project" test is also used. 7

As cases of unauthorized, extravagant and non-productive
expenditures are revealed, and other irregularities discovered,
they are reported to the departments concerned. If the items
are minor and amended satisfactorily by the department, they may
not be mentioned in the annual Report of the Auditor General to
Parliament. But regardless of the actions taken, the Auditor
General is bound legally to report all cases in which

(a) any officer or employee has wilfully or negligently omitted to collect or receive any money belonging to Canada,
(b) any public money was not duly accounted for and passed into the Consolidated Revenue Fund,
(c) any appropriation was exceeded or applied to a purpose or in a manner not authorized by Parliament,
(d) an expenditure was not authorized or was not properly vouched or certified,
(e) there has been a deficiency or loss through the fraud, default or mistake of any person, or
(f) a special warrant authorized the payment of any money.

Furthermore, the Auditor General has the right to include any other cases that he considers should be brought to the notice of Parliament.

The Office of the Auditor General is especially useful in assisting in the control of defence expenditures for section 66 of the Financial Administration Act provides that "Notwithstanding any Act, the Auditor General is entitled to free access at all convenient times to all files, documents and other records relating to the accounts of every department, and he is also entitled to require and receive from members of the public service such information, reports and explanations as he may deem necessary for the proper performance of his duties." Thus, unlike the House of Commons, the Auditor General is not hindered in his task by security regulations.
Returning to the early post-war years it can be seen therefore that the defence department was not as free from parliamentary control as the work in the House and lack of work in committee would indicate. The test audit by the Auditor General brought to light numerous irregularities. Thus in his report for 1947-48 the Auditor General informed the House that the department had made charges to appropriations although the money had not actually been paid until the following year. He mentioned several procedural and legal irregularities, moneys spent under wrong votes, losses due to fraud and numerous other incidents. One report noted the failure to take advantage of discounts for ten-day payments, another an omission in collecting revenues. On a third occasion haphazard accounting procedures in the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve were brought to light. Thus, the staff of the Auditor General did keep the defence department under independent observation.

Although the Auditor General has the legal power required to make his investigations, he cannot compel the defence department to implement his recommendations. He can only suggest changes and record irregularities in his report. The extent of his influence, therefore, is related to the interest that the
House of Commons shows in his reports, the action the House takes upon receiving these reports, and the amount of publicity the Commons secures for the reported irregularities.

Although very occasionally during a debate a member may cite irregularities noted in the Auditor General's Report, the House does not have any established procedure for dealing with these reports nor are they ever debated. It is the custom, however, when the Public Accounts Committee meets, to refer the Auditor General's Report to this Committee. Because the Public Accounts Committee met during only one session in the late 1940s (apart from the single meeting in 1949) the Auditor General received but a minimum of assistance in performing his tasks. Due to the lack of aid from Parliament, therefore, control of defence expenditures was not as effective as well it might have been.

Except during the year 1951, all investigations of the Public Accounts Committee into defence expenditures have stemmed from the Reports of the Auditor General. Since the Committee did not meet regularly during the years of Liberal government, the Report was examined on only five occasions, 1947, 1950, 1951, 1952 and 1956 and it was only during the latter four years that defence expenditures were discussed.

In 1950\(^{18}\) and again in 1951\(^{19}\), members of the Committee
raised the several defence items mentioned in the Report. But because members lacked the necessary background information to conduct an intelligent investigation, the discussion seldom went beyond a request that the Auditor General explain and expand upon the remarks in his Report. Indeed, possibly because of his personal characteristics, great experience and considerable influence, it often seemed that the Auditor General, Mr. Watson Sellar, was not the witness of the Committee, but its leading member, so much did he tend to dominate the hearings. In no case was there a thorough investigation and none of the irregularities raised by the Auditor General's Report were mentioned in the Committee's reports to the House. It should nevertheless be noted that the Committee's questions were not so much limited by a lack of curiosity as the assurances of the Auditor General that the matter was being watched closely or that the pathology had already been cured.

In 1952 and 1956 the Committee displayed greater initiative. In both years cases arose in which the Committee, after examining the Auditor General, was still unsatisfied with the explanations and sought further information.

In 1952, the Committee brought before it Commander E. J. Apps to explain the reason that a radar equipment contract had been placed without a call for tenders. The members,
unquestionably showing the benefit of the full briefing on defence contracts they had received a year earlier\textsuperscript{20}, quizzed the Commander in some detail. His testimony, for the most part, did justify the action taken. Simultaneously, however, the Armed Forces were warned that the Auditor General was beginning to acquire teeth.\textsuperscript{21}

Item 36 of the 1956 Report of the Auditor General brought to the attention of the Commons that the Department of National Defence was paying more for naval guns manufactured in Sorel than was the Government of the United States. Again the Committee decided to obtain first-hand information and therefore requested the presence of the Deputy Minister of Defence Production, Mr. A.D. Golden. His explanation, presented in considerable detail\textsuperscript{22}, did not satisfy Committee members from the opposition parties and although this item was not noted in the Committee's report to the House (all reports during the period tended to be innocuous and certainly of no interest on defence), this contract was the subject of some debate in the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{23}

Despite the increased interest of the Committee in the Reports of the Auditor General, it was the Report for 1952, one that the Committee did not deal with, that was the most influential of all those prepared during the years of Liberal administration. To understand the reason, it is necessary to look first at the
background to that Report.

Toward the middle of December, 1952, the Minister of National Defence made public the highly controversial report of Mr. Currie's investigations into the accounting and administrative procedures of the Army Works' Services. The report, as noted in chapter three criticized severely the "general breakdown in the system of administration, supervision and accounting." The ensuing session of Parliament turned out to be one of the most turbulent years and the point most strenuously argued was the intended breadth of Mr. Currie's criticisms. Were they restricted to the Army Works' Service or did they apply to the entire Canadian Army? Was the loss only $35,000 or had far greater losses been incurred due to the generally lax administration?

Early in January 1953, Mr. Watson Sellar tabled his annual report for 1952. In it he noted several substantive losses (including one for $80,000 at Churchill when gasoline off tankers was inadvertently pumped into tanks already containing oil) and then devoted no less than twelve items to accounting procedures in the Armed Forces. "Surveys made of accounting systems - there are at least eight - indicate that no sustained effort has been made to achieve uniformity in systems within the Services." The Auditor General went on to list seven specific charges, all very harsh, against the department's procedure and
from there he went farther afield to attack such related topics as tardiness in issuing pay and allowances.\textsuperscript{25}

So serious were the criticisms that the department took the unprecedented step of replying to the report and attempting to belittle its findings. For two days the Currie Report was forced to share page one headlines and the editorial pages with the Auditor General's findings. Opposition members looked upon Mr. Sellar's report as strong supporting evidence to justify their demand that a wider investigation into the entire defence department be authorized. The impact of the Report, with the great amount of publicity it received, both in the press and in the House, put enormous pressure on the department and the government which they attempted to resist but which eventually resulted in changes, although only minor, in accounting procedures.

COMMITTEES AND DEFENCE, 1951-53

The bulk of committee investigations into the defence departments was concentrated into three years, 1951 to 1953. During that period the Public Accounts Committee (1951) devoted eighteen meetings to the defence accounts and over the three year period, the Special Committee on Defence Expenditure held no fewer than forty-seven meetings.\textsuperscript{26}

In 1950, at the request of C.C.F. member Ross Thatcher,
the Public Accounts Committee was summoned to deal with the Public Accounts. Although the Committee met some 26 times, it spent fifteen of these meetings on a memorandum (on the form of the estimates) submitted by the Auditor General, seven more on the Auditor General's annual Report and one on the accounts of War Assets Corporation. This agenda, adopted by the sub-committee on agenda and procedure, was opposed by C.C.F. members who felt that the main committee was being side-tracked from its most important duty, an examination of the Public Accounts and in particular, the defence accounts. During the fourteenth meeting C.C.F. members voted against continuing with the Auditor General's memorandum and moved an amendment to the steering sub-committee's report. In the amendment they urged that the committee deal specifically with the Public Accounts at the next meeting.  

It was largely as a result of the continuous badgering by the C.C.F. party, although by the following year they also had the support of other opposition groups, that the 1951 Committee determined to devote its attention to the defence accounts. The main Committee, approving a motion by Mr. Thatcher, decided to spend six meetings on the Auditor General's Report and then begin directly with the expenditures of the defence department up until March 31, 1950.  

By the sixth meeting,
the Committee was ready to deal with the defence accounts.

Early in its discussions the Committee fell to bickering over its terms of reference and the powers that they provided. Rather than begin with the items in the Public Accounts, the hearings started with the presentation of a memorandum by Mr. C.M. Drury, Deputy Minister of National Defence, on the department's internal control of defence spending. In the course of the next three meetings, in which members questioned Mr. Drury on numerous items including the memorandum, unification and coordination of services and equipment, three disputes rapidly came to the fore.

On April 17, Mr. Fleming began to ask questions on expenditures incurred after March 31, 1950. The chairman being absent, the vice-chairman, Mr. Croll, unofficially ruled that Mr. Fleming had gone beyond the Committee's terms of reference. Opposition members instantly rallied to the latter's support and C.C.F. representatives, Messieurs Thatcher and Stewart, also complained that the Committee was too circumscribed by its orders to be of significant value. At the following meeting, a week later, the chairman Mr. Picard, took a more moderate position:

I would not like to rule definitely that any question implying projection past March 31, 1950, should be ruled out of order just for that reason. We should not, however, go into a study of any expenditures made after March 31, 1950; but we may
question as to whether or not, since March of 1950, a recommendation or decision of the department may have bettered the service or made it worse. I would not rule against that. 31

Before the next meeting was over, however, Mr. Fleming decided to test the extent of the chair's leniency by requesting detailed information on the period after March 31, 1950. The Committee divided on government-opposition lines and the chair's ruling, that the request was out of order, was upheld by a vote of nine to seven. 32

Not as yet discouraged Mr. Fleming initiated the proceedings at the next meeting by moving a resolution that the Committee recommend to the House that the terms of reference be enlarged to include expenditures up until March 31, 1951. The debate on the motion again revealed the cleavage between government supporters, most of whom did little except vote, and the opposition. Once again, the motion was defeated. 33 Despite this, the chairman tended to be lenient on this matter and it was only in cases where members persisted in requesting detailed statistics on the 1950-51 expenditures that he ruled such questions out of order.

A second dispute revolved around the discussion of policy. The orders from the Commons did nothing except refer the Public Accounts and Auditor General's Report to the
There was no indication that the Committee should be permitted to investigate government policy. As seen in an earlier chapter, however, defining policy is not a simple matter.

The issue was raised on a request that the deputy minister explain the reasons that the government had decided to purchase the American rifle and not the British model, which was less expensive. Immediately Mr. Croll, not in the chair, complained that the deputy minister should not be forced to express opinions on government policy. Once again a dispute arose in the Committee. Shortly thereafter, opposition members resumed their line of questioning and without opposition from the chairman. This time, government supporters Croll and Benedickson, questioned the chair, and the former in particular was harsh in complaining that too much leeway was being accorded. The chairman, however, upheld the opposition members and Mr. Croll did not go so far as to request a vote.

A third controversy arose from the matter of security. Progressive Conservative and Social Credit Party members never challenged witnesses who refused to deal with questions on grounds of security. Indeed, it was not uncommon for members of the Conservative Party to preface their remarks with "subject to security considerations" and other similar phrases. C.C.F. members, however, were more sceptical, although they never
directly challenged witnesses on these points. "I do not want to object" Mr. Thatcher stated on one occasion, "but I do not see how we can figure or decide when such a vast sum of money has been spent, whether we are getting value for it if we do not know what we got." This feeling, perhaps stemming from the socialist's natural distrust of the military, characterized the attitude of the C.C.F. through much of the Committee's hearings.

Despite these three controversies, and the partisan atmosphere that they engendered, the work of the Committee was far from inconsequential.

The Committee spent six meetings on some of the more general problems of the department. It dealt at length with internal control of expenditure, unification and coordination of services, other administrative problems and with equipment. During these meetings the Committee was dominated by a few members, especially Messieurs Fleming, Thatcher and chairman Picard. The relationship between the Committee and its chief witness, the deputy minister, was cordial. Throughout, the latter was frank and seemed anxious to cooperate.

It is customary for writers dealing with parliamentary control to refer to the salutary impact upon the departments of committee investigations into their administration and finances.
In this case, the very opposite was true. The spokesman of the department had a salutary effect upon members of the Committee and all others who chose to read its minutes and proceedings. Between 1945 and 1951 there had been no parliamentary mechanism whereby members could keep abreast of administrative developments in defence. Debates in the House, with occasional exceptions, had been general and not very informative and departmental publications few and of limited value. The 1951 Committee hearings did much to fill the breach. Especially in the early meetings the members of the Committee, apparently recognizing how much they had to learn, spent almost all their time in asking questions and accumulating information.

On one occasion some general questions on recruiting and advertising expenditures showed that there was considerable doubt about successes being achieved, particularly for the reserve forces. Under more careful examination the deputy minister explained that the problem was not so much in securing recruits for the reserves, but in retaining them. This frank admission, hardly one that would have been easily secured in the House, became the subject of another dispute. Mr. Thatcher suggested recommending an independent inquiry into the problem. The motion was ruled out of order by the chairman, and this
decision was upheld on a straight party vote.\textsuperscript{39}

Despite the politics, a Captain Carrick was brought before the Committee at the next meeting and questioned at some length on the training programme of the reserve forces.\textsuperscript{40}

Through the added publicity provided at the hearings, therefore, considerable pressure for a quick solution (the problem was already under departmental study) was brought to bear on the department.

The following six meetings covered the individual items in the Public Accounts and in handling these Mr. Drury was assisted by the associate deputy minister, Mr. A.E. Ross. The hearings once again became a rapid-fire question period. Thus, while doubtlessly searching for political advantage, members were simultaneously acquiring the necessary basic information on which they could base sound criticisms of the entire defence programme. Although questions were naturally more specific than during the general discussions following the deputy minister's memorandum, inquiries were for the most part devoid of any indications that the member was well informed on the subject. There were exceptions, however, when members were able to inform themselves in advance on a particular expenditure, usually because it was in their home constituencies. Then, with the advantage of independent information, members on a few
occasions were able to give departmental officials several anxious minutes with their documented inquiries.

Despite the desire evinced at the outset for scrutinizing defence expenditures, the six meetings on the defence accounts were poorly attended. Those who did show began to drift out well before the meeting had ended so that in five of the six meetings the quorum was lost in advance of the usual hour for adjournment. Equally important, the great majority of the members seldom uttered a word. Indeed were it not for the energy and curiosity of Mr. Fleming it is questionable if more than two meetings would have been required for he at most times was the only force keeping the Committee at work. House defence critics, Messieurs Harkness and Pearkes, contributed little, and Liberal members said even less.

The last six meetings of the Committee dealt with the Canadian Commercial Corporation, the defence department's procurement agency during the year under review. Its Managing Director, Mr. W.D. Low, was chief witness, although for one meeting, at the invitation of the Committee, the responsible minister attended (as a witness) to explain departmental policy.

The pattern of earlier meetings was repeated. Mr. Low opened with a statement on the role of the Corporation. In it, he traced out in considerable detail the method of awarding
contracts. Close to half of the discussion during the ensuing six meetings dealt both generally and particularly with contracts and related problems. A wealth of information was given to the Committee and interested members were able to master this intricate problem as discussions in the House of Commons and in Defence Expenditure Committees of later years clearly revealed. Much of the remaining time was devoted to the problems in decentralizing defence industry and policies were explained by the minister, C.D. Howe. On this point even a few Liberal backbenchers showed initiative, although for the most part it was again Mr. Fleming, and to a lesser extent Mr. Thatcher, who were the outstanding members.

The fifth and final report of the Committee to the House of Commons was a factual summary of the Committee's work. It was non-committal, however, about the "efficiency and economy" of the department. No recommendations were included:

Your Committee. . . . was not able to go deeply enough into all the detailed amounts of each of the numerous items totalling $380,948,197.62 to express a definite opinion as to the propriety of all these items of expenditures, or as to the efficiency of all operations performed by these departments, but it is pleased to note that through the evidence adduced and the documents produced, it has no grounds to cast blame on the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Commercial Corporation, or their officials, on any of the items looked into.
The report was accurate to the extent that the Committee was unable to uncover evidence to criticize the department. There is, however, at least a trace of irony in that the report, largely the work of the Liberal members of the steering committee, defends the administration of a department that Liberal members were unwilling to question from the very outset of the hearings.

The Committee in no way resembled the bipartisan British Public Accounts Committee. The more influential Liberals present acted only to protect the interest of the government and the remainder of the government supporters, except perhaps for Mr. Cruickshank, contributed nothing. This was an opposition committee and the representatives of the Liberal Party accepted this from the beginning.

The primary value of the Committee undoubtably lay in its usefulness in educating its members. It was given great amounts of information thus providing most members with their first real understanding of the operations of the defence department.

It is therefore difficult to call the Committee a success or a failure. If its purposes were bipartisan, it was partially successful in that it did accumulate much information and thus lay part of a reasonably good foundation for future
investigations. (In this sense its value can be analyzed only after a careful consideration of the remainder of the 1945-57 period.)

If the view be held that there is no place for bipartisanship in our party system, and therefore that the goal of the opposition parties in the Committee should be to reveal irregularities that would assist them in winning the next election, then clearly the Committee was a failure.

THE DEFENCE EXPENDITURES COMMITTEES

As seen in the previous chapter, the decision to establish a Defence Expenditures Committee was the result of a meeting among the heads of the four parties in the House of Commons. As such it was the culmination of five years of continued pressure by the opposition parties both within the House and outside of it.

The first Committee was appointed on November 13, 1951. Its terms of reference restricted it to examining all expenditures "... and all commitments for expenditure for national defence since March 31, 1950." It was to report its observations and opinions to the House and like the Public Accounts Committee, its recommendations were to be consistent with government policy. Like all standing committees it had the power to send for persons,
papers and records. It was somewhat smaller than the Public Accounts Committee, however, numbering only twenty-six members including six Progressive Conservatives, two C.C.F. members and one representative of the Social Credit group.

There can be no doubt but that the official opposition attached great importance to this new Committee. There are at least three indications of this. First, when speaking in the House of Commons, the leader of the opposition expressed his satisfaction with its orders of reference. "I do not propose to discuss the terms of reference because I am satisfied that so long as the committee or the majority of the committee carry forward the intentions expressed by the Prime Minister the terms of reference will be adequate." Second, the quality of Conservative representation on the Committee indicated the high hopes that Mr. Drew had for it. To serve on the Committee he chose five of his ablest parliamentarians including four future Conservative cabinet ministers, and in addition, he decided to sit on it himself. (The Liberal contingent, although less impressive, did include four parliamentary assistants including both assistants to the defence minister and the one assistant to the Minister of Defence Production as well as a former Minister of National Defence for Air.)
Finally, the excellent attendance record indicates the importance members attached to the Committee. For the four business meetings held in 1951, an average of 22.5 members were present and for the last of these meetings the names of all nine opposition members appear in the minutes.

The 1951 Committee held its organizational meeting on November 29, a little more than two weeks after it was created. Exactly one month later the fifth session of the twenty-first Parliament was prorogued.

From the outset, therefore, members realized that they were working against a fast-approaching deadline. Because of this there was considerable pressure from opposition members, especially the leader of the opposition, to schedule additional meetings. On three occasions Mr. Drew's requests were defeated by the Liberal majority. It should be noted that there was a general although unofficial understanding, to which Mr. Drew subscribed, that the Committee would be set up again early in the following session and that the best the 1951 Committee could hope for was to begin to clear the way. It is difficult to understand, therefore, why Mr. Drew persisted in causing unnecessary friction thus awakening partisan feelings even before the investigations had begun. Although recorded votes were not taken on the first two of these occasions, in the third case,
C.C.F. members voted with the government. (No Social Credit member was present.)

The first two meetings were rather general and during these the Deputy Ministers of National Defence, Defence Production and Finance, presented memoranda on the role of their respective departments in the financial administration of defence. The presentation, in each case, was followed by a general question period in which Committee members attempted to acquire a broad knowledge of how each of the three departments helped to guarantee that the defence dollars were spent with the proper economy.

At the last two meetings (there were only four) considerable information was tabled in response to questions asked at earlier meetings. In total some 70 pages of detail were submitted including information on such various topics as cost and construction of barracks, purchase and lease of lands and buildings, orders placed by the Canadian Commercial Corporation and Department of Defence Production, pay and allowances, and estimates, allotments and expenditures.

The 1951 Committee, because it had time to deal only with basic background information, and because it was certain that it would be re-constituted the following year, did not make a final report to the House of Commons. In but four meetings, however, it had accumulated an enormous amount of information.
on defence expenditures.

The 1952 Committee was appointed with identical terms of reference as the 1951 Committee and began sitting in late April.

The 1952 Defence Expenditure Committee contained nine newcomers including one from each of the opposition parties. Most notably, Mr. Drew gave up his seat on the Committee. Government membership was considerably strengthened when three new parliamentary assistants were added (two were dropped) and two of the more outspoken Liberal backbenchers appointed. Yet more important than the newcomers were the seventeen returning members and the re-election of the chairman. They indicated that continuity would be preserved and hence that it would be unnecessary to go back over material covered at the 1951 meetings. Indeed, this continuity was emphasized at the outset when some 33 pages of answers to questions asked in 1951 were tabled.49

Attendance declined, but only slightly, from the 1951 record. The members at each meeting ranged between seventeen and 23. The average "turn-out" per meeting was 20.2 and of these, 6.9 were opposition members.

At the first business meeting the nine man sub-committee on agenda and procedure (five Liberals, two Conservatives, the
C.C.F. member, one Social Crediter) reported to the main Committee. In its report, it recommended that the Committee began by dealing with expenditures and commitments relating first to mechanical equipment including transport; then to armament excluding aircraft and ships; third to aircraft; and then finally to ships. The recommendation was unanimously approved and hearings began with Mr. Mackenzie, the Deputy Minister of Defence Production, giving a short summary of the first topic, mechanized equipment. At the same time he tabled (not on record) a booklet entitled Canadian Defence Orders: April 1950 - January 1952). This was an exhaustive 46-page compilation of the principal items of operational equipment ordered by the Canadian Commercial Corporation and the Department of Defence Production on behalf of the Department of National Defence. It served, through most of the hearings, as the Committee's most ready source of information.

During the first two meetings, Mr. Mackenzie and Mr. Drury, with the assistance of Mr. K.O. Grant, head of the Mechanical Transport Division of the defence production department, dealt in detail with financial, technical and tactical questions on this subject. Detailed discussion of the comparative value of Centurion and Sherman tanks was prolonged over several meetings, with full information given from the
departments. Equally fruitful investigations were made into jeeps, trucks and other equipment. The initial impression, after but three meetings, was that if the evidence continued to come forth as completely and as rapidly in the following meetings, then by the end of the session, members would have a very full picture of the state of preparedness of the armed forces, something all admitted they were lacking.

But such was not to be the case. The Committee's early meetings coincided with the news of theft, fraud and fire at Petawawa and Ottawa and the opposition members were distracted. Even at the second meeting Mr. Harkness brought the problem to the attention of the committee:

> I think the general public will consider that we are probably remiss in our responsibilities if we do not go into the thefts at Petawawa.... The Minister of National Defence practically invited us to make this investigation when he spoke in the House of Commons on Monday last....

And indeed Mr. Harkness was correct for the minister had announced that if the Committee wished to look into stock-keeping, accounting or auditing procedures, or any related matter, all facilities would be provided. In rebuttal, however, Mr. Drew had paradoxically argued that such matters were not within the terms of reference of the Committee, a position it can be seen that his party soon found expedient to abandon. The dispute was put off for a few days with the decision to refer
it to the steering sub-committee.

In the sub-committee Mr. Harkness moved a resolution which called for the Committee to investigate the administration at Petawawa. He also recommended that the Committee deal with the Currie Report when this report had been completed. The sub-committee did not support the resolution, however, and Mr. Harkness was also stymied in the main Committee. The reason most often given by Liberals for opposing the resolution was that they doubted the propriety of a parliamentary inquiry into a matter which was still sub-judice. They suggested instead a more general investigation, rather than one that dealt particularly with Petawawa, and an amendment was so moved by a Liberal backbencher. Thus, after but three meetings the Committee was diverted from its original agenda and it began an examination into administrative procedures within the department "for the receipt, stockkeeping, issue and accounting of stores, material and equipment at military camps and establishments and in particular the steps taken to prevent, discover, and eliminate the loss, misuse or wastage of government property of every kind."

But before long the Petawawa issue was again before the Committee. A Conservative member, within the terms of reference of the revised agenda, began asking questions on the Petawawa
incidents. The Committee split with the government majority again triumphant. The Liberal position was explained quite clearly by Chairman Croll:

The purpose of this request was to obtain information of thefts or materials missing in Petawawa. I have repeatedly stated. . . in view of the investigations now proceeding at Petawawa, criminal prosecutions - and there may be others still who may be charged - it would seem a better course not to deal with Petawawa at the particular time; but there is no reason why other requests cannot be made. The point made. . . was. . . that this was no desire to stop you from pursuing that course of questioning in any camp with the exception of the camp where prosecutions are now proceeding as a result of shortages.55

To the Conservatives however it was just another attempt by the government to prevent them from inquiring into irregularities which required investigation. "We are allowed to investigate everything except that which needs to be investigated,"56 complained Mr. MacDonnell and with considerable bitterness.

The identical subject was raised again nine days later and was once more the subject for bitter partisan argument. The motion was raised "That as soon as Mr. George S. Currie has completed his investigation at Petawawa, his report be placed before this committee and that he be called for questioning on it."57 On each of these occasions, the Committee was tumbled into hours of bickering.
The remainder of the inquiry was exhaustive and illuminating. Full facts were disclosed on the much publicized "disappearance" of the army camp at Farnham.\textsuperscript{58} A detailed document was presented, in reply to a request by a Conservative member, that included all losses due to theft, fraud, fire and other write-offs, that had been incurred in all installations during the two fiscal years just past.\textsuperscript{59} It was on this document that much of the subsequent investigation was based.

Based on the information in the document the Committee began a detailed investigation into fire losses at the Central Ordnance Depot in Ottawa.\textsuperscript{60} The report of the Court of Inquiry was studied and to ensure that the department was proceeding with the Court's recommendations, members of the Committee made a first-hand examination. Most expressed satisfaction that they were shown as much as was necessary to confirm that the recommendations were being implemented. Only Mr. Stewart, an accountant by profession, felt that he was given insufficient leeway and a return visit was arranged especially for him. After he told fellow Committee members, "I saw in detail what I had wanted to see previously and from what I did see I am quite satisfied that the system down there is as good as human ingenuity can make it."\textsuperscript{61}

A similar but less extensive inquiry was carried out into
losses due to fire at No. 6 repair depot at Trenton and other losses were considered before the Committee returned to its original agenda.

The reversion to the original agenda led to calmer and generally more useful inquiries. With the assistance of senior officials from the Departments of National Defence, Defence Production and Finance a rather thorough investigation into armaments was carried out. On one occasion, when the witness was apparently being forced to answer a question on what appeared to be a matter that was on the policy side of the fuzzy line that separates policy and administration, Liberal objections were overruled by the chairman. On many types of equipment, information was provided on quality, price, contracts and possibilities of allied standardization.

The agenda was altered again for the fifteenth meeting, and opposition members given the opportunity to go "scandal-hunting". Mr. MacDonnell's favourite subjects, including serving forks, teapots, rugs, carpets and lamps, were examined by the Committee. Departmental officials were able to explain, without any difficulty, however, the reasoning for each of the orders except the first.

This first matter had initially been raised when Mr. MacDonnell had put a question on the order paper of the House
requesting information concerning a tender for 63,000 serving forks. Subsequently, while all the time Mr. MacDonnell was giving the matter as much publicity as possible, the order was decreased to 40,000 and again to 14,000. Not unnaturally, Mr. MacDonnell chose to attribute the savings to the extraordinary publicity he had given the matter. The explanation given before the Committee made light of Mr. MacDonnell's claims and reasoned that the changes had been as a result of the internal check within the department as well as a changing international atmosphere that no longer necessitated a good deal of stockpiling. For years afterwards, however, Mr. MacDonnell continued to refer to departmental waste and invariably his lone example was serving forks.

Having lost considerable time due to the two additions to its agenda, the Committee had but two meetings to deal with aircraft and it never made a start on ships.

The final report of the 1952 Committee was long (nine pages) and factual. It neither censured the government nor made any recommendations.

To this rather colourless report, certainly a little too factual to correctly represent what the evidence had suggested, Messieurs Fulton and Harkness offered a rather long amendment which claimed, in part, that there had been "laxity and
negligence in the Defence Department with respect to designing and enforcing measures to prevent loss to the public of Canada by fire, theft and fraud." To alleviate this situation they proposed an independent inquiry into the entire problem.

The amendment also censured the department for accepting American type weapons when there were superior British type ones available.

Finally, in a catch-all paragraph it was stated that the Committee was "... concerned over the high cost of defence installations and strongly recommends that the Department of National Defence and the Department of Defence Production consider positive measures to reduce such costs." The amendment was resolved in the negative.

Although this writer feels that the evidence did not justify the latter two points in the Conservative amendment, it did, at least partially, support the first observation. In this respect the report is more useful in representing the general state of mind of the government supporters on the Committee than as an accurate analytical account of what was accomplished. They were there to protect the government, not to inquire into defence expenditures. On many occasions Liberals phrased questions to help hard-pressed witnesses. This was especially true of the several parliamentary assistants who
although not members of the government, almost always behaved as if they had a cabinet minister's responsibilities. As a result, the final report failed to say certain things that needed saying. And if the opposition amendment caricatured what the evidence indicated, it was not more inaccurate than the excessively factual report that the government supporters did send to the House of Commons.

The legacy of the 1952 Committee was two-fold. On the one hand there were encouraging factors. A great deal of information on the state of preparedness had been accumulated and doubtless would be useful in making a comprehensive evaluation of Canada's defence programme. The inquiries into the fire, fraud and theft losses were thorough and unquestionably served to remind the department that Parliament was able to check into its administrative efficiency when it so desired.

There was a negative side, as well, however, to the 1952 Committee, although it seems not to have been recognized as such at the time. The Committee had served as a forum for hours of totally partisan haggling. The Conservatives had attempted, and not without good reason, to employ the Committee as a mechanism to investigate the Petawawa irregularities and examine the Currie Report. They stated their case, and after a good deal of discussion, they were defeated.
Yet the Conservatives persisted in raising the same issue time and time again. Surely they knew the Liberals were not about to relent on the matter. The government had made this clear from the outset. The only other explanation for the Conservative's action, therefore, is that they wished to use the Committee to give added publicity to the Petawawa irregularities. In so doing, they set a precedent that helped to destroy the Committee.

Thus, the 1952 Committee had two faces. One was objective (as objective as Canadian committees ever are), relatively non-partisan (government supporters did not hinder investigations although they seldom assisted), and unquestionably of great value in throwing light upon current developments in the defence effort and the state of national preparedness.

The second face was a "scandal-hunting" one. It threw government supporters violently against the wall separating the parties and reminded them that the first purpose of the opposition members was to turn the government out of office.

In 1952, however, the second face was hardly noticed. Only historical perspective clearly brings it out. Indeed, at the end of the 1952 session, there was a general consensus that the Defence Expenditures Committee had thus far proved to be an encouragingly successful experiment.
This experiment might have succeeded too, were it not for the Petawawa incidents and the Currie Report. As mentioned in the previous chapter\textsuperscript{68}, despite the bitter opposition of Conservative members, the subject of this highly controversial Report was referred to the 1953 Committee.

Professor Ward, in his analysis, implies that the decision of the government to use the Committee for its own purposes resulted in the destruction of the Committee as a useful organ of control\textsuperscript{69}. In this thesis, it is argued that Ward's explanation for the collapse of the Committee, although partially true, is far from complete.

The first point that Ward ignores is that the 1952 Committee had been far from devoid of partisan activity. Viewed in this light, the decision of the government was only another step, albeit a much larger one, in the direction that the 1952 Committee had headed. Indeed, in the debates in the House of Commons Mr. Croll took considerable pleasure in reminding the opposition that less than a year earlier it was they that had been clamouring for the right to examine the Petawawa irregularities in the Defence Expenditures Committee.\textsuperscript{70}

In defending his argument Ward mentions the Conservative thesis "that the examination of the Currie report by the Committee on Defence Expenditures could serve no purpose beyond preventing
the committee from doing anything else." This is hardly compatible, however with the fact that the Committee held fifteen meetings on subjects totally unrelated to the Currie Report.

Again, Ward mentions that several of the meetings were "virtually boycotted" by Conservative members, implying that they did so to show their displeasure or disgust with the decision to refer the Report to the Committee. In fact, all six Conservative members attended every meeting at which Mr. Currie was present. The only "virtual boycott" was at the twenty-second meeting and the reason for this action was that the Minister of National Defence was simultaneously making a policy statement in the House. It is true that members of the Conservative Party refrained from questioning Mr. Currie (possibly this is what Ward means by "boycott") but they did participate in the other 23 meetings of the Committee.

There was little demand after 1953 for a Defence Expenditures Committee of the 1951-1953 type and it does seem likely that by referring the Currie Report to the 1953 Committee the government hastened its end. But this certainly was not the only reason.

Both in 1952 and again in 1953, the opposition did not hesitate to "play politics" with the Committee. At no time did
they treat it to a non-partisan committee (as the British Public Accounts Committee): To the extent that it was such a non-partisan committee, even in 1953, it was an extremely useful organ. Therefore it seems quite likely that it was as much the inability of the opposition to achieve political advantages through it (by uncovering headline-making irregularities) as much as any Liberal action, that led to its sudden demise.

The 1953 Committee, like its 1952 predecessor, revealed a good deal of continuity. It re-elected Mr. Croll as chairman for a third consecutive year. Of the twenty-six members, only five had not served in 1951 or 1952 and of these only two, one of whom was Mr. Fleming, were opposition members.

Attendance improved over 1952. An average of 21.6 members attended each meeting and of these 7.3 were members of the opposition. Attendance did taper off during the last ten meetings (average 18.9), no doubt due to the heavier schedule facing Commons members toward the end of the session.

The first six meetings of the Committee were devoted to the expenditures and commitments of the Army Works Services, the branch of the Canadian Army that had been investigated by Mr. Currie. The hearings began with a short chronological report of the Petawawa irregularities by the judge advocate general. Subsequently, with great publicity, Mr. Currie was
summoned as witness to give evidence pertaining to his investiga-
tions and Report. The long expected "fire-works" were about
to begin!

To the surprise of the press and the nation, however, they failed to materialize. Conservative members, although all six were present, refrained from asking any questions. Liberal members did the majority of the work but they did not deal with the sections of the report that they had denounced in the House of Commons, particularly the charges that there were horses on the payroll. Only the C.C.F. members attempted to contribute usefully. They concentrated their questions on Mr. Currie's recommendations but the Committee was uninterested and their inquiries soon petered out. On numerous occasions there were awkward silences when no members spoke. Finally, after two meetings, the chairman thanked Mr. Currie and expressed the opinion that "it is quite probable we will need you again at which time I will communicate with you." 72 The need did not arise.

The hearings had been an anti-climax to the entire Petawawa irregularities. Liberal members, for the most part, had asked questions on those sections of the report that were not controversial and they had phrased their inquiries to ensure the answer most favourable to the government. Mr. Fleming's
observations were quite accurate when in the subsequent debate (by this time the discussions had almost all the characteristics of a full-dress political battle in the House of Commons) he pointed out:

Liberal members were so far away in their questions, so far removed from the real essentials of contentious points in the Currie Report, that their abstention from asking Mr. Currie questions was really marvellous to behold. . . . My weren't they models of discretion and delicacy in their approach. . . Now that Mr. Currie is gone they are as brave as lions and as roaring, too, but when Mr. Currie was here they were like little cooing doves.73

Liberals naturally concentrated on the silence of Conservative members. "It is quite obvious. . . that they are trying to run away from the loose charges they have made throughout this discussion" argued Mr. Jutras, referring to the debate in the House, "and it is also quite obvious that they made a lot of charges and are now going to try to close the committee, and close any investigations, so that all loose charges will remain upon Hansard."74 In rebuttal, Conservative members claimed that they saw no need for questioning Mr. Currie. They accepted his report in toto, they argued and saw no reason for re-hashing it in committee.

At the beginning of the fourth meeting the steering sub-committee reported and suggested an agenda whereby the Committee
would deal first with Appendix B of the Currie Report, then with defence construction and finally with the production and acquisition of aircraft. Several controversial amendments and sub-amendments were proposed on the motion to accept the report. The debate on these stretched out over three meetings but all were eventually rejected by the government supporters and the sub-committee's agenda adopted.

Appendix B of the Currie Report was a summary of irregularities, other than the Petawawa ones, listed by the Chief Auditor of the Department of National Defence in some of his intra-departmental reports. Almost four full meetings were devoted to it and for the most part they were a waste of time. Conservative members went into considerable detail on several of the cases and they did acquire a little added information. But at the end of the question period they only re-established what had already been established by the chief auditor and publicised in Appendix B. The Conservatives soon realized this and requested (for a second time) the original reports of the chief auditor, hoping perhaps to find some useful political morsels in these reports. Instead, the chief auditor himself was called but little new information was obtained.75

It was only when the Committee turned to the second
item on its agenda, construction, that it began to function again as it had through much of 1952. The Committee began by listening to general statements by the Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence (Real Estate Adviser)\(^76\) and by the Superintendent of Engineering and Construction Requirements from the Office of the Assistant Deputy Minister (Requirements).\(^77\) The former spoke on the acquisition of property and the latter on the principles of the defence construction programme. Subsequently there was questioning, both general and specific, on the two statements and a large amount of information, much of it tabled in the appendices, was provided.

Eight locations were investigated closely by the Defence Expenditures Committee. For each documents containing statements of purpose and details of expenditures were tabled. Of the eight inquiries, the ones at Cold Lake and Penhold were most exhaustive.

The Cold Lake inquiry was initiated and led by the Liberal backbencher representing the constituency next to the one in which Cold Lake is situated. He began by tabling ten questions and on the basis of the answers returned, a thorough investigation into the prices paid for the tracts of land was commenced.\(^78\) One member presented a letter from an irate deposed
landholder complaining of the difficulty in achieving an amicable settlement for the land that had once been his. Officials were summoned and forced to explain the reasoning behind the price paid for each land tract. Before finishing, the Committee was able to account for each dollar that had been spent and at least a handful of officials were reminded of the powers of Parliament.

Like the Cold Lake inquiry, the investigation into contract delays at Penhold was led by the member representing a constituency bordering on the one where Penhold is located. Each contract was investigated carefully, along with the reasons for delays. The use of government equipment by contractors was looked into. Contract changes were carefully scrutinized and officials called in to explain the reasons in each case. In a very real sense, every dollar of expenditure was examined. Despite this, however, the government did not come out too badly. A motion was made by Mr. Fleming calling for a complete investigation by Mr. Currie into the construction of the R.C.A.F. station at Penhold. Although he had received full information from the department's officials, he said, he felt the need for independent engineers and contractors to go out on location and check their accuracy. 79

Liberal members, quite rightly I feel, argued that there was no justification for such an inquiry. Exhaustive
questioning and full information had brought out no substantive reasons for requesting further inquiry. With this opinion, C.C.F. member Mr. Herridge was in agreement and the motion was defeated nine votes to five, Mr. Thomas (Social Credit) voting with the opposition.

Apart from these inquiries, which I would submit were an excellent synthesis of objective inquiry and political expediency, the Committee went into various other problems including schools, churches, married servicemen's quarters and a host of other items. Evidence was presented by the senior officials of Defence Construction Limited and of Central Mortgage and Housing.

The final fifteen meetings (unlike the first eleven) were amongst the very best that the Committee held over its three year history. Not only were further amounts of information placed on record but equally important there was detailed inquiry both into the efficiency of expenditure and also into the work of numerous departmental officials.

The final report of the 1953 Committee did come very close to whitewashing the Currie Report. It ignored several of Mr. Currie's most serious accusations and made light of others by incorporating government explanations for them. It constituted
an unfair summary of what Mr. Currie's report, together with the Committee hearings, indicated to be the truth.  

The report factually summarized the results of the Committee's inquiries into the department's construction programme and concluded that "the construction programme in the face of numerous difficulties has been well conceived and carefully supervised and the public has received good value for its money." A more accurate report would have indicated only that no serious irregularities had been revealed by the Committee's inquiries.

The closing paragraph of the report stated that "the deliberations of your Committee have proved of constructive assistance to the Departments of National Defence and Defence Production in the administration of a large and complicated defence programme and have served as a constant reminder to those responsible of the degree to which economy must be achieved in the making of public expenditures." With this conclusion this author is in substantial agreement.

As had happened a year earlier, a Conservative amendment was offered. This time it was so extensive (four pages) that it cut out the core of the actual report and replaced it with an opposition version of what had happened.

First, it presented the reverse picture of the Currie
Report and recommended that Mr. Currie be re-appointed to carry out an "unrestricted inquiry into all aspects of the organization, accounting, and administration of the Department of National Defence. . ." 83

The report complained that the Committee's investigations into other irregularities as mentioned in Appendix B had been "stultified and frustrated" by their inability to examine the original reports of the chief auditor. (It did not mention these were highly subjective intra-departmental reports from the chief auditor to the assistant deputy minister (finance) and hardly fair game for a parliamentary committee). Despite this handicap, the Committee had found, it argued, that there was an "inexcusable lack of a responsibility in relation to the expenditure of public funds. . ." 84

As a result of its investigation into the construction programme, the amendment suggested that the "Committee was again impressed by the free-and-easy ways in which large amounts of public money were spent." 85

The Conservative amendment, like the final Liberal report, had some conclusions that were justified and others that were not justified by the evidence accumulated. As might be expected, a more accurate report would have incorporated features of both of these.
The final report, we can see then, not unlike the 1951 report of the Public Accounts Committee and the 1952 report of the Defence Expenditures Committee, showed that despite the fact that the 1953 Committee did have some relatively non-partisan characteristics (which were most obvious during the Cold Lake inquiry which was led by a Liberal), in the last analysis, all three committees were political first and non-partisan investigations into defence expenditures only second.

It is now possible to draw certain conclusions concerning committee control of defence expenditures during the 1945-1957 period.

First, there was no pre-audit control. Both the Auditor General and the Public Accounts Committee, by the very nature of their functions, had no pre-audit function. The Special Committee on Defence Expenditures, by its orders of reference, was limited to past expenditure.

Second, continuous post-audit control was carried out by the Auditor General and a staff of nearly thirty who were at work on defence expenditures. They were able to keep a careful watch on a day-to-day basis, through test audits, on departmental finances. Most of their many criticisms were accepted by the two defence departments and alterations were
made by these departments to accommodate the Auditor General's viewpoints. It is noteworthy that the man who was Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance) of National Defence during most of this period, has indicated to this writer his very high opinion of the Auditor General's staff and the necessity of their function.

The Auditor General received sporadic assistance from the Public Accounts Committee, on the five occasions when it received his annual report. The Committee, on two occasions, made detailed inquiries into items mentioned by the Auditor General and the impact of these certainly was to increase the power and prestige of the Auditor General vis-à-vis the defence departments.

The 1952 Report of the Auditor General, however, was by far the most significant of those he presented, within the terms of reference of this thesis; for it showed the defence department that the Auditor General was capable of putting it in under the most extreme kind of public pressure.

Although it is impossible to mathematically measure the extent of the control effected by the Auditor General, there seems to be little question but that he served as a highly effective organ in controlling defence expenditures during these years. That a more virulent Public Accounts Committee
would have improved it even more does not detract from the fact that the Auditor General and his staff did keep a continuous watch over the public moneys being spent for defence purposes.

Finally, there was the work of the four committees between 1951 and 1953. At the time that these committees were meeting, the government was in the midst of its five billion dollar three-year defence programme and there is no doubt but that all four committees served, very usefully, to keep members abreast of defence developments and thus helped them in evaluating the entire programme. Their greatest value, therefore, was in informing and educating members. By the same token, however, the fact that the Defence Expenditures Committee ceased meeting after 1953 unquestionably served to diminish, although not to destroy, its long-run value. Had the Defence Expenditures Committee been a continuing one, as Mr. St. Laurent had first indicated it would be, the information and experience accumulated between 1951 and 1953 would doubtless have assisted further inquiries and eased the problems in controlling the executive and its expenditures.

The committees also made several detailed investigations
into specific expenditures and in so doing forcibly reminded departmental officials of the power of Parliament and of the fact that they were accountable to the representatives of the electorate. Unfortunately, this aspect of the committees' work was hampered by the primarily partisan attitude of almost all the members. From the viewpoint of the opposition parties, this attitude would have been easily understandable had they had the opportunity of achieving really significant political ends through these tactics. But the committees received so little day-to-day publicity, such restricted orders of reference and government supporters were so well disciplined that from the outset it was very unlikely that these committees could be used successfully for political purposes.

As a method of controlling the bureaucracy and as a source of information, the committee meetings were occasionally useful. By attempting to change them into debates of a miniature House of Commons, the opposition sacrificed the opportunity of exercising strong bureaucratic control, without achieving political advantage. Simultaneously, they gave up the committees as a source of information upon which sounder criticisms of policy might have been constructed. Undoubtedly, as a result of this, the long-run losers were the Canadian public for they were deprived of the reasonably strong bureaucratic control that might have been exercised and the improved debate that almost certainly
would have followed.
CHAPTER VII

COMMITTEE CONTROL OF DEFENCE, 1957-1962

Control of defence expenditures during the twenty-fourth Parliament was for the most part carried out by the same organs of the House of Commons as were used during the previous thirteen years. There was the Public Accounts Committee, the Auditor General and a Special Committee on Defence Expenditures. (In addition, the Standing Committee on Estimates dealt with the defence departments in 1958.)

But it was in name only that these committees resembled the committees that had been employed in the four previous Parliaments; for both in spirit and in organization and powers, they differed remarkably from those that had been appointed by the Liberal governments. In the pages that follow, I shall discuss the changes that have occurred in recent years and the impact they have had on the defence control function of the House of Commons.
Soon after the 1958 election the Diefenbaker government proposed to the House of Commons that a member of the official opposition be chosen as chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Alan McNaughton, Liberal member for Montreal Mount-Royal, was selected. He retained his position throughout the twenty-fourth Parliament.

As seen in the previous chapter, the chairmen of the Public Accounts Committees between 1945 and 1957 had been both reasonable and non-partisan in presiding over the committees. On more than one occasion Mr. Picard had permitted opposition members such extensive leeway in their questioning that he had been queried by members of his own party. The selection of a chairman from amongst the ranks of the opposition did not necessarily mean, therefore, that the opposition members would have greater freedom to pursue their work than they had had in earlier years. But it was a sign of a new attitude on the part of the government toward the Public Accounts Committee. It reflected the notion that much like the British Public Accounts Committee, the Canadian Committee ought to carry on its business with a minimum of partisan activity.

A second change was inaugurated by the Conservative
government. Before 1958, the Committee had assembled only when a member requested such a meeting by petitioning the chairman. As a result, the Committee did not meet regularly. Under the new government it "became understood" that the Committee would meet annually if for no other reason than to examine the Report of the Auditor General.5

The Standing Committee on Public Accounts made no direct investigations into defence expenditures or administration during the twenty-fourth Parliament, but it did deal with numerous irregularities in the defence departments as a by-product of its examinations into the annual Reports of the Auditor General. In this chapter I shall examine the Report of the Auditor General for 1959, one which I believe was typical of those presented to the House of Commons during the period under review, and the method with which the Public Accounts Committee handled it.

The 1959 Report of the Auditor General devoted numerous items to irregularities and points of interest in the defence departments. Two referred to a rather complex legal situation whereby existing federal legislation was preventing the defence department from receiving a $93,000 rebate from a contractor whom the department felt had been overpaid.6. In subsequent weeks witnesses were summoned from the Departments of National Defence,
Defence Production, Transport and Justice and from the Air
Transport Board. The final legal opinion given by the Depart-
ment of Justice expressed the view that there was no method
whereby the government could compel the contractor to grant the
rebate. This did not, however, prevent the Committee from making
a recommendation to the House of Commons. "Your Committee is of
the opinion," it read, "that it would be in the public interest
were appropriate consideration given to the pertinent provisions
of the Aeronautics Act, and also those in the Defence Act which
treat with the powers of the Minister of Defence Production
where he is satisfied that a party to one or more contracts has
been paid an amount in excess of the fair and reasonable cost of
performing the contracts together with a fair and reasonable
profit."8

Several items in the Auditor General's Report questioned
the regularity of defence contracts that had been negotiated by
the responsible government departments. One case, an inter-
departmental one that was handled by the Department of Transport,9
although considered a defence project, was raised in the Committee's
report and in terms that would never have been used between 1945
and 1957:

Your Committee was informed that departmental
technical opinion now is that cost might have
been $600,000 less had tenders been invited and a firm-price contract entered into. The estimate is, of course, conjectural but does aggravate doubt with respect to the efficiency of contracting on a cost-plus basis.

The Report then went on to say:

It is recognized however that use of this form of contract may sometimes be unavoidable in situations of urgency or of novelty, remoteness of location etc. but your Committee is of the opinion that it would be in the public interest were (a) legislation to regulate more stringently and comprehensively cost-plus awards (b) the regulating provisions of the Defence Production Act reserved to indisputable defence projects of such a nature that it is not possible to let by tenders, and (c) that substantial contracts should not be let until plans and specifications are complete.  

Three other items in the Report of the Auditor General were highly critical of "Unusual Transportation Costs."  

The first of these brought to the attention of the Committee the expenditure of some $29,000 in transporting by Trans-Canada Airlines a Newfoundland militia unit to summer camp at Petawawa. The Report noted that the cost would have been $7,000 less had Royal Canadian Air Force planes been used. (Indirectly, it also raised the considerations that permitted a militia unit to be moved such great distances to receive such a brief period of training.)

The Committee summoned the deputy minister and a full
explanation was provided. He disclosed that the troops had refused to travel by the R.C.A.F.'s C-119 transport aircraft and that as a result the higher costs had been incurred. He also admitted that the military officer who had authorized the expenditure had neglected to ask the permission of the Treasury Board and although it had subsequently approved of the expenditure, there was no question but that the officers responsible had "incurred the displeasure" of the Board. 

A second case, the worst of numerous ones that had been uncovered originally by the Chief Auditor of the Department of National Defence, revealed that $313.88 had been paid to move the furniture and effects of a serviceman and his family a distance of one half mile. This too was thoroughly investigated by the Committee and in its report to the House the Committee was again critical of the defence department. It recommended that along with a "review of regulations and practices, consideration be given to extending the financial role of the civilians in the Department (as opposed to its military personnel) to prevent the recurrence of similar extravagances in the future." 

Finally, the report to the House of Commons recommended that a new method be devised for listing "National Defence Expenditures on Education," a matter that had also been originally
raised by the Auditor General. The Committee found that expenditures were distributed under several separate misleading sub-items so that it was difficult if not impossible for members to determine the amount being expended on education:

Your Committee is of the opinion that it would be more informative were the Department of National Defence costs (for education) consolidated and suitably disclosed. Whether this may be more efficiently done by use of a special vote or otherwise is regarded as a matter for the Treasury Board to consider.14

The Public Accounts Committee was not satisfied with simply criticizing and recommending economies. It also decided to determine the extent to which the recommendations were being implemented. This task it assigned to the Auditor General and beginning in 1960 he started submitting memoranda (printed as appendices to the proceedings of the Public Accounts Committee) on the actions taken by the departments in response to the Committee's recommendations.15

1959 was not an exception, but rather a typical year for the "new" Public Accounts Committee. A person reading its proceedings, unaware of members' party affiliations, would have much difficulty in determining which of its members were supporters of the government and which ones in opposition. For the same spirit that led it to select an opposition member as chairman also permeated much of the rest of its work. It was
not perfectly non-partisan, albeit its reports to the House of Commons certainly were; but it was closer to being such a non-partisan Committee than any that were appointed between 1945 and 1957. Certainly, it would have been impossible, in these earlier years, to watch "a deputy minister being browbeaten by a member of the government" as one member charged Mr. Pratt in 1961.16

By examining the Report of the Auditor General each year, the Committee has not only been able to guarantee that the Report would receive more publicity than the Auditor General could otherwise have anticipated; it has also ensured him of a public forum from which he can express his ideas and expand upon the remarks in his Report.

These changes have been felt both in the Office of the Auditor General and in the Department of National Defence. An official of the Auditor General's office expressed the opinion in a letter to the author that "Ministers of departments and departmental officials have probably become increasingly aware of, and sensitive to, the annual report of the Auditor General to the House of Commons, owing to the widespread publicity given to it and the study made of it by the Public Accounts Committee."17 This view has been corroborated by a former Auditor General also
in correspondence with this writer. More important, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, during an interview, expressed the opinion that the post-1957 Committees have been far more effective than their predecessors, through the added publicity they bring to the Auditor General's Report and defence irregularities. Thus the usefulness of the Office of the Auditor General has been directly related to the effectiveness of the Public Accounts Committees.

But since the work of the Public Accounts Committees, in so far as they have dealt with defence, has been a product of the investigations of the Auditor General, it can be seen that the relationships between the two bodies has not been unidirectional. Therefore by strengthening the position of the Auditor General, the Public Accounts Committee has simultaneously been strengthening itself.

Thus, both the Office of the Auditor General and the Public Accounts Committee have become more useful organs of control during the past five years. This has resulted primarily because the Public Accounts Committee has cast aside the largely partisan characteristics it possessed under the King and St.Laurent governments and instead devoted itself to controlling expenditures and fostering administrative economy. Although it is still too
early to determine how successful this experiment will be, there can be no doubt but that both institutionally and in spirit, the Public Accounts Committee has taken a giant step toward becoming an effective organ to control defence expenditures.

THE ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

Before the election of 1957 the Progressive Conservative Party was harshly critical of the Special Committee on Estimates and had pledged itself to making it into a more useful legislative organ for controlling the executive. This promise was fulfilled not long after the 1958 election with the announcement that in the future the Committee was to have the powers of a standing committee.

The 1958 Standing Committee was appointed in early June and ordered to examine and report on the main and supplementary estimates of the Department of National Defence. Possibly to help keep the enormous number of government backbenchers occupied, the government decided to make this a large committee and the House therefore appointed some 60 members to it of whom 45 were supporters of the government.

The Committee adopted a procedure not totally dissimilar to the one used normally in the House of Commons. The Minister of National Defence was summoned and made an extensive
statement including in it basic policy and recent developments in strategy, armaments and equipment. This was not followed by a "full-dress" debate, as in the House, but rather by an informal question period that lasted two meetings. During this time, members were able to learn a good deal about the attitude of the new government on several vital issues. Under a constant bombardment from Messieurs Winch and Pearson, the minister answered inquiries on the role of the S.A.C. in western defence and its relationship to N.A.T.O. and N.O.R.A.D. Questions on Canada's N.A.T.O. contribution were answered. Continental defence was discussed in relation to the growth of a missile threat and the diminishing value of the Distant Early Warning Line. A statement on administrative policy was tabled by the deputy minister, and he was quizzed for two hours on it. By the middle of the third meeting, the Committee was prepared to examine the details of the estimates.

In examining the details, the Committee achieved two separate ends. First, much as the Defence Expenditures Committees of 1951 to 1953, it served as a forum for the education of its members. So many were newcomers to the House of Commons that at the first meeting the chairman requested that before members speak, they "introduce themselves not only for the benefit of the
members of the committee but also for the benefit of the members of the press and the official reporters.\textsuperscript{23} The expert evidence presented by the minister and his senior civilian aides to the many newcomers, therefore, could not help but raise the general level of defence intelligence not only in the Committee but also in the House.

Second, the Committee scrutinized the defence estimates in a more effective manner than had been customary in the House of Commons. More explanatory information was revealed than in Commons' sittings and as a result members were better able to acquaint themselves with the purposes for the expenditures than they had been in the Commons.

Despite this, the Committee was unable to recommend specific reductions in the estimates. This was not however because the government supporters forced through each sub-item. Rather, it was due to the inability of the Committee to become expert enough in any one single field that it could honestly recommend a cut in the estimate. The frustrations felt by one Conservative backbencher were not untypical of the general atmosphere in the Committee:

When we think of the two billion dollars here and that we are trying to save the people's money, I think the job I am trying to do here is absolutely useless. . . You have to have an accountant go in
and check these figures. . . I have a feeling of frustration, in trying to deal with something when you have not got the facts before you.\textsuperscript{24}

The Committee also decided to deal with the estimates of the Department of Defence Production, and after receiving the permission of the House,\textsuperscript{25} these were covered with much the same procedure as the estimates of the defence department.

The Committee passed on the estimates of the Department of Defence Production and Defence Construction Limited in roughly three meetings. In this instance, unlike with National Defence, there was no indication that the Committee's work was an improvement over the dismal displays that the House had put on before. Of particular significance, the Department of Defence Production was able to avoid many of the questions that members had occasionally raised on expenditures within their own constituencies, a type of question that was shown earlier to have had a most salutary impact upon departmental officials.

The final report of the Committee recommended the estimates of both departments, without change, to the House of Commons. It did, however, make a number of recommendations which it suggested would lead to "actual savings and improvements in the efficiency and the operation of the Department"\textsuperscript{26} if effected.

In one of these, as noted in an earlier chapter, the Committee urged that the estimates of the defence department be
presented piecemeal and not under a single vote.  

In a second it mentioned that it was not "satisfied that it is necessary to maintain separate provost corps, padre services and medical corps." Within two years the padre services and medical corps had been integrated on a tri-service basis, and a partial step taken in this direction in the provost corps. These changes had been under consideration within the department for several years and hence cannot be attributed solely to the Committee's recommendations; but it is noteworthy that according to the deputy minister these (and all other) recommendations received "very serious attention." Hence, it would seem fair to speculate, in the light of the deputy minister's remarks, that the Committee was at least a secondary influence but probably not the primary cause of these changes.

Other recommendations, including those on civil defence, jet training, the Royal Military College, civilian personnel and the Interservice Equivalent Board were ignored or dealt with in such a general way (the recommendations were also general) that no substantive changes occurred.

Two specific recommendations were also made for the Department of Defence Production.

In the first, the Committee urged that the department make a review of the use of "cost-plus" type contracts for the
shipbuilding programme. In subsequent years it did turn to "target-plus-incentive" type contracts. 31

Also, after a trial period, the department decided to accept "performance bonds and/or pay-and-performance bonds to secure Department contracts. . ." 32 as the Committee had recommended.

The recommendations of the Committee, almost all of which carried with them implicit criticisms of the defence departments, were not the product of an energetic opposition but rather of a non-partisan committee. Much as in the Public Accounts Committee, members apparently were able to work at achieving economies within the defence departments without jeopardizing primary party goals. Indeed, the great majority of the recommendations came as a result of the initiative of government backbenchers who were concerned with a particular aspect of the organization or administration of one of the departments.

The work of the 1958 Estimates Committee was of particular interest for it broke fresh ground in two places. It was the first attempt at pre-audit control of defence expenditures in committee. Also, it was the first time defence policy had been discussed in committee.

The experiment in pre-audit control was especially
notable. As mentioned above, there were no recommendations made urging specific cuts in the estimates. But despite the lack of concrete reductions this writer came away from a careful reading of the proceedings with the feeling that recommendations for reduction were not impossible in a committee of this type. Perhaps the main point that must be remembered, in this respect, is that the Committee was one of novices. Not only did it contain a large number of newcomers to the House of Commons; but also the more experienced members were the products of a committee system in which partisanship had priority over the objective scrutiny of expenditure. In other words, this was an entirely new type of committee, and therefore all members were inexperienced in making a committee of this sort work. In this light it should not be viewed as surprising that the Committee was unable to accomplish what no other Canadian pre-audit committee had been able to do - make cuts in the estimates. What was surprising however was the ability of the Committee to scrutinize effectively the estimates and the fact that its recommendations did have an impact upon the administrative changes that occurred in subsequent years.

The second point made just above was that this was the first time defence policy was discussed in committee. The feeling was that if the Committee was to pass on the estimates, it
was necessary that members fully understand the policy on which they were based. To this end, the Committee was briefed quite fully on policy.

The Committee was not a policy-making organ, however, nor did it serve as a forum for policy criticism. Discussions initiated by the critics of the opposition parties aimed less at embarrassing the government than at acquiring some knowledge and understanding of plans and policy. Questions were framed not so as to incite the minister but to elucidate replies. Thus, defence policy was discussed in a remarkably non-partisan atmosphere.

The reasons for this atmosphere were at least twofold. First, the Liberals had only recently suffered the worst defeat in their history. At the time they were just beginning to reorganize. They had adopted no definitive defence policy of their own. Nor were there grounds for attacking the government defence programme as the government had not yet made its first comprehensive policy statement. The Liberals had to be content, therefore, with asking questions.

Second, it had long been the attitude of the Liberals that defence policy was not properly the subject for a committee of the Commons and they had denied such a committee to the House of Commons on several occasions. To do a complete "about-face", therefore, and turn the 1958 Estimates Committee into a miniature
House of Commons would have been a dangerous step for a party that only recently had been defeated in part because of its treatment of Parliament in the debates on the Pipe-Line and the Defence Production Act Amendment. Indeed, if properly exploited, such a step could have been used by the government as a further example of Liberal contempt for the rights of Parliament.

THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE EXPENDITURES

It has been shown above that in recent years the Public Accounts Committee has come to acquire certain characteristics that have made it a useful legislative organ for executive control. It has well-defined procedures and objectives and it appears to have achieved for itself a permanent place in our parliamentary system.

The Standing Committee on Estimates, Professor Ward has suggested, has at least been "an enormous improvement over... the Special Committee (on Estimates) of 1955-57," and if it is still too early to evaluate its final position in the Canadian system, it can be argued that it has made more progress in four years than the Public Accounts Committee did in the first 50 years of the century.

No such generalizations are possible for the Special Committee on Defence Expenditures. In 1960, for the fourth time since World War Two, such a committee was appointed.
On March 17, 1960, Defence Minister Pearkes introduced a resolution in the House of Commons:

That a special committee be appointed to examine all expenditure of public moneys for national defence and all commitments for expenditure for national defence since April 1, 1958, as reported in Public Accounts, and to report from time to time their observations and opinions thereon, and in particular which, if any, economies consistent with the execution of policy decided by the government may be effected therein, with power to send for persons, papers and records, and to examine witnesses; and that in accordance with Standing Order 17, the committee shall consist of not more than fifteen (15) members...

At the time the resolution was moved the minister announced it was the intention of the government to refer the estimates to the Committee but at a later date. On May 2, true to his word, the minister asked the House to refer the main estimates (1960-61) of the Departments of National Defence and Defence Production to the Committee. Although the orders of reference did not mention policy it was understood that as in the House of Commons on the introduction of the estimates, the Committee would have an opportunity to discuss policy and not only the details of estimates. Thus, from the orders of reference, it can be seen that the Committee was not identical to the Defence Expenditures Committees of 1951-53 but rather a synthesis of this Committee and the Standing Committee on Estimates and if anything,
more similar to the latter kind than the former.

At its very first meeting the Committee disagreed on an agenda. The sub-committee of five (despite the opposition of its Liberal and C.C.F. members) recommended to the main Committee that it review the 1958-59 expenditures first and only after these had been completed should it turn to the 1960-61 estimates.38

This was opposed by the opposition groups. According to Mr. Hellyer the estimates were the more pressing matter, and these should be examined first. If insufficient time were available for the defence accounts then they could be referred to the Public Accounts Committee. He proposed that the hearings begin with a policy statement by the minister and "at his (the minister's) discretion, we might be given some in camera briefings on intelligence and following that we should call witnesses."39 An amendment along these lines was proposed by Mr. Hellyer but defeated on division, six votes to four.

The hearings began with a statement by the minister comparing the estimates and expenditures for the 1958-59 fiscal year. Then, after but a brief moment of general questions, the Committee began what was to be an item by item discussion of the defence accounts.

Undoubtedly because they were more concerned with the
estimates than the public accounts, the opposition members refused to discuss almost every item read by the chairman despite the fact that in numerous cases there were rather large discrepancies between the amounts that had been spent and the sums that had been estimated. Thus, in rather short order the hearings became what must be described as a "farce" as item after item was passed over without examination.

It was not until the third meeting of the Committee that opposition members showed much interest and then for reasons that were all too obvious - a $246 million discrepancy between expenditures and estimates due to the cancellation of the infamous Arrow. At this point the Liberals, particularly Mr. Hellyer, chose to use the Committee as a forum for the revival of the Arrow debate. For reasons that can only be called political, the economic, strategic and political issues that had been raised several times before in the House of Commons were "re-hashed" again. Close to three full meetings were devoted to the issue, and evidence presented by the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Pearkes, the Deputy Minister of Defence Production, Mr. Golden, and the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Mr. Miller. Most of the questions were asked by Mr. Hellyer and on the basis of the evidence he attempted once again to belittle the government.
Although it may well be that the publicity attracted by the renewal of the Arrow debate did further damage the election prospects of the government, certainly a legitimate aim of the opposition, the value of this must be measured against the loss of what was apparently intended to be a non-partisan Committee (like the Public Accounts and Estimates Committees); for after the Arrow debate the Committee was not able to acquire a non-partisan atmosphere.

After finishing with Arrow, opposition members chose to ignore the remainder of the items in the defence accounts. After a brief discussion of the Defence Research Board, the Committee was prepared by its eighth meeting to begin with the defence estimates. Thus, scrutiny of the defence accounts was carried out far less effectively than it would have been by the Public Accounts Committee.

During the discussion of the estimates the Minister of National Defence read five prepared statements. The first was entitled "Information for the Special Committee on Defence Expenditures" and included data on policy, personnel, construction, equipment, development and mutual aid. The latter four statements were on Canadian policy and strategy within the United Nations, N.A.T.O., N.O.R.A.D. and the Emergency Measures Organization.

The minister was questioned in considerable detail on
each of the policy statements. To the extent that he was able, he provided information on all questions asked by the members.

But the opposition members, for the most part, were interested in obtaining information on the Canadian contribution to each of the international organizations in which Canada was a participant and that their curiosity invariably led to questions on nuclear weapons policy. Here, as in the House of Commons, the Committee was unable to obtain a definitive reply from the government, and in the attempt to do so, numerous hours were lost by the Committee. Thus, although there were fruitful discussions on strategy, armament and equipment, and other matters, the Committee was largely frustrated by its inability to get the answers it sought on nuclear weapons and its failure here overshadowed its utility in other areas.

When it began to deal with the individual items in the estimates, the Committee worked at its most effective level. Each of the items was carefully examined, and as a result of these investigations, several concrete recommendations were made. Like the 1958 Estimates Committee, the 1960 Special Committee on Defence Expenditures suggested no cuts in the estimates, but despite this it did in a general way recommend that the government reconsider expenditures (or the lack of expenditures) for several items.
The final report from the Committee to the House suggested a number of areas in which economies and administrative efficiency might be improved. It recommended continued effort to achieve standardization of equipment and co-ordination of research within N.A.T.O. It suggested possible changes in the organization of Civil Defence and urged "the Minister to intensify his efforts toward the establishment of a fully integrated recruiting system for the three services."  

The Committee also examined the matter of the number of architects and engineers employed by the Department of National Defence and recommended "a careful examination be made to determine whether the use of such personnel for other than advisory and supervisory functions is of real value and more economic than the placing of greater reliance on independent consultants."  

Finally, the report stated:

The Committee noted with regret the loss to the service of the country of senior air officers due to accidents while flying. In the interests of continuity of command in the R.C.A.F. your Committee recommends that an investigation be made by the department into the whole question of flying by senior officers of the R.C.A.F.  

It will be noted that each of these recommendations suggested possible economies in the defence departments. Perhaps more interesting were some of the other suggestions for the Committee
in its report to the House of Commons also in part recommended that:

Air Defence

in view of the opinion expressed by the Minister that the period of effectiveness of the CF-100 is limited, . . . an early decision . . . be taken as to the advisability of obtaining a replacement for this aircraft.

Anti-submarine Defence

the government conduct an intensive study of the advantages of acquiring submarines for anti-submarine operations which could also meet peacetime training requirements of the R.C.N.

Canadian Brigade in Europe

if the development of the Bobcat is completed successfully, a decision be taken as soon as is practicable with respect to equipping the brigade with these vehicles and with helicopters.

Allowances to Overseas Personnel

while recognizing that the payment of family allowances is not the direct responsibility of the department. . . . that further consideration should be given by the departments responsible with a view to removing financial discrimination suffered by any service personnel on overseas duty.

Finally it observed that:

Research and Development

there has been some reduction in the budgetary allocation for research and development. Your Committee believes that it is in the best interest of the growth of Canada's industrial and scientific
activity to continue in the field of research and development.45

These five recommendations are of particular interest in this study, for rather than recommending economies, there was a rather strong implicit suggestion that for each of these items, greater and not less expenditures were required. The effect of implementing these recommendations, therefore, would be that the Committee was doing the very opposite of what it was appointed to do - suggest economies. This finding, it might be noted, is in harmony with Professor Ward's observation "that the various committees receiving estimates. . ." are not only investigating bodies but also "a forum for members, departments, and outside pressure-groups, and each new forum provides another opportunity for someone to request a further expenditure of public funds."46

Apart from the Arrow Debate, the Defence Expenditures Committee showed such little interest in the accounts that it can be looked upon as an estimates committee and its worth examined in this light alone. The results of this second attempt at pre-audit were superficially at least very similar to the ones achieved by the 1958 Committee. The Committee recommended no specific cuts but its final report, a non-partisan one, did contain suggestions similar to the type that the 1958 Committee had put forth. This report, however, conceals an important
fact. The 1958 Committee worked very hard in looking for areas where estimates might be slashed. At no time did the 1960 Committee do so.

This is explained in part by the fact that the members of the Liberal Party had adopted a new attitude by 1960 toward the idea of discussing defence policy in committee. It was seen earlier that while in power, the Liberals had opposed the idea of discussing defence policy in committee. Liberals retained this attitude during the proceedings of the 1958 Estimates Committee with the result that policy was discussed at that time in an almost incredibly non-partisan manner. As a result, the atmosphere of that Committee was essentially one of cooperation.

By 1960 the Liberal viewpoint on committees had changed and defence had become a controversial issue. Hence a partisan spirit, rather than a non-partisan one, was engendered. No strong feeling of common purpose existed between the members of each of the parties and at no times did the Committee, as a whole, grapple with the difficulties in securing reductions in the estimates.

The 1960 Defence Expenditures Committee was appointed to deal both with the defence accounts and defence estimates. In its first job, it was a total failure. In its second, it was
less successful than the 1958 Committee. It spent a greater proportion of its time on policy and strategy than the earlier Committee but accomplished little. This does not indicate its policy criticisms were without validity but only that policy criticism did not seem to fit logically into the framework of the Committee. It is true that the opposition put government policy in the public eye, but this could have been done better in the House of Commons and was so done a few weeks later when the House debated the defence estimates.\(^47\) Only in dealing with the details therefore, was the Committee useful, and it was only then that the Committee approached the level of the 1958 Estimates Committee.

There can be no doubt but that the select committees appointed by the House of Commons between 1958 and 1962 were a great improvement over the pre-1958 variety.\(^48\) In the committees of the earlier period the defence departments had been shielded, and not investigated, by the supporters of the government. Hence not one was able to report the defence departments adversely to the House. As seen earlier, these reports were often inaccurate and an unfair analysis of the committees' works.

In contrast, the post-1958 committees were primarily concerned with promoting administrative economy and effectiveness and therefore they were able to bring broader pressures to bear
upon the departments by calling to the attention of the whole House many of the incidents of waste and inefficiency. (Simultaneously the hand of the Auditor General was strengthened thus making his continuous post-audit examination a more effective weapon of control than it had been a few years earlier.) Post-audit committee control thus became more continuous, and if less comprehensive than in the 1951 to 1953 period, it was more effective because of the almost unanimous desire within the committee to "get things done."

One very important qualification must be added to all of these conclusions. The partisan committees of the pre-1958 years tended to resemble a miniature House of Commons. They sought primarily to discredit the government and although they were largely unsuccessful in this respect, this does not mean that the Ministers of National Defence and Defence Production were not given many anxious moments. In contrast, the purpose of the non-partisan committees of the 1958-1962 period, despite their critical findings, was not to discredit the government. Hence their impact was to remove defence administration from politics. Although this did not make the ministers totally irresponsible for the workings of their departments, it seems to me that it did shift a good deal of the responsibility for maladministration from the minister to the senior officials of the departments concerned.
Thus the control that was exercised was largely bureaucratic and not political.

It is obvious that well-run committees of the non-partisan type are more useful than the ineffective partisan ones, as has been the case in the period being studied; but it should be added that this in itself is not enough to indicate the non-partisan committee is necessarily the best kind. What can be stated is that the Canadian experience thus far has indicated that the non-partisan defence committee seems to work more effectively within the framework of our political system than does the partisan defence committee.

The initial attempt at pre-audit control was very encouraging if without immediate positive results (in the form of cuts in the estimates). The optimism that was genuinely justified by the 1958 Committee was tempered somewhat, however, by the recommendations of the 1960 Committee which indicated that increased expenditure, rather than decreased, could result from committees of this kind. Thus the committee system, if modelled on the American type, could eat into ministerial responsibility.

These years also marked the initial effort to deal with defence policy in committee. The results indicate that only to the extent that the committees were an informal forum for the explanation of policy did they work well. They, and especially
the Special Committee on Defence Expenditures, however, proved an ineffective arena for criticizing policy, certainly inferior to the House of Commons. Indeed there was no apparent purpose to criticizing policy in the Committee as opposed to the House unless the Committee was to have a policy-making function and this was not the case.

In summary, the years between 1958 and 1962 may be best looked upon as years of encouraging experiment but not as an ultimate solution. The most effective post-audit control was carried out by the Public Accounts Committee and the Auditor General and neither of these bodies was dealing exclusively with defence. Certainly this cannot be ignored. And pre-audit committee control obviously was nowhere near maturity. Indeed there were no positive indications that attempts in this category would outlive the twenty-fourth Parliament.

Finally the experiments of the 1958-62 period did indicate one important thing - that a stronger type of control than had existed in the 1945-57 period was not incompatible with peculiar characteristics that set defence apart from the other functions of government.
In discussing the question period in the British House of Commons, D.N. Chester has written:

The number of testimonials, British and foreign, to the value of Question time is legion. Professor Lowell of Harvard could say, 'the system provides a method dragging before the House any acts or omissions by the departments of state, and of turning a searchlight upon every corner of the public service... it helps very much to keep the administration of the country up to the mark, and it is a great safeguard against neglect or arbitrary conduct, or the growth of bureaucratic arrogance which is quite unknown in England.' Sir Ivor Jennings refers to the 'practice of asking questions... now of the utmost constitutional importance'. Mr. J.R. Clynes wrote: 'The freedom of the House is never better illustrated than during the daily question hour. Important Ministers may be questioned by the humblest Members; and if the Members master the rules and procedure, they can often render substantial service to their constituents.' In 1906 Mr. Speaker Lowther declared: 'If I had the decision of it, I would not limit the right of asking Questions at all. I think it is a very valuable right.'... And so we could go on. Few elements in the British House of Commons, indeed in the British constitution itself, have attracted so much attention or been so universally praised as the system of allowing Members to question Ministers.
In contrast to the numerous testimonies on behalf of the question period in the British House of Commons, until recently virtually nothing analytical had been written on the use of questions in the Canadian Commons. Despite the lack of a careful study, it seemed generally agreed, however, that the right to ask questions of the ministry was a most important privilege of members of the House and even if used less effectively than in the United Kingdom, that it was an excellent safeguard against an arbitrary bureaucracy. Recently, in the first analytical study of procedure in the Canadian House of Commons, Professor William Dawson devoted almost a full chapter to the question period, and in it he has corroborated the seemingly general consensus on the usefulness of the question period. To complete this analysis on House of Commons control over defence, therefore, it is necessary to examine the technique of the question period as a method of controlling the executive. As with the other techniques of control, the 1945-1957 and 1957-1962 periods are considered separately.

Although the purpose of studying the two chronological periods separately, is to facilitate a comparison between the records of the two oppositions as was done with the other techniques of control, it should also be noted that one extra
result of this procedure will be to permit a few remarks on
the two systems for the question period that have been used in
the Canadian Commons since World War Two. For between 1957
and 1962 several procedural innovations in the question period
were made which altered its gross anatomical structure.5

The standing order which governed the question period
between 1945 and 1957 provided:

Questions may be placed on the Order Paper
seeking information from Ministers of the Crown
relating to public affairs; and from other
Members, relating to any bill, motion, or other
public matter connected with the business of the
House, in which such Members may be concerned;
but in putting any such question or in replying
to the same no argument or opinion is to be
offered, nor any facts stated, except so far as
may be necessary to explain the same; and in
answering any such question the matter to which
the same refers shall not be debated.6

The order also required any member who desired an oral answer to
distinguish his question with an asterisk, thus giving rise to the
term "starred question." All others were answered in writing
but the answers nevertheless were included in Hansard. In fact
the custom evolved whereby ministers would answer orally only
those starred questions that they so chose despite the standing
orders.7

Between 1957 and 1962 several experiments were tried.
Starred questions were placed in a completely separate category
from other written questions and one full hour set aside for these on Wednesdays and ministers, when answering starred questions, were required to give oral replies. The other written questions were not called by the Speaker but the answers simply deposited by the ministers with the Clerk of the House and printed at the end of the Hansard of the same day. In contrast, during the previous period, questions, starred and unstarred, were handled Mondays, Wednesdays and Thursdays without time limit, and answers printed regardless of type, in the order they were called by Mr. Speaker. In both periods members were limited to having three starred questions on the Order Paper at any single time. And in all cases, ministers were not obliged to reply.

In addition to the formal written question, members for many years have been able to ask oral questions, without notice, when the Orders of the Day were called. This has not been done under the authority of any standing order and therefore the Speakers of the House of Commons have been able to exercise considerable discretion in permitting or disallowing particular questions. On this practice Beauchesne wrote:

The practice has been so long and so regularly in the House that, if not impossible, in my opinion, it would be inadvisable to stop it . . . It would be arbitrary to deprive members of putting certain questions of immediate urgency on the Orders of the Day being called . . . A question which could be inserted on the
order paper is not allowed on the Orders of the Day being called. 11

Although only questions of urgency are supposed to be permitted, by custom Mr. Speaker has been very liberal in interpreting what is or is not urgent. Thus members have received a good deal of leeway and few have hesitated in employing this device of the oral question. 12

To examine the uses for which members have employed the question period, I have analyzed a number of the questions asked on defence in each of the Parliaments, except the brief twenty-third, since World War Two. For each Parliament, I have covered all the questions in at least one session, and when the sessions were so short as to indicate the possibility of an unrepresentative sample, two or more sessions were covered. 13 As a result, the number of pages of Hansard analyzed for each Parliament was not the same. The differences were not so great, however, that they destroyed the value of comparing quantitatively the questions. 14

Below, I have set up a table which indicates the number of defence questions asked in each of the sample periods covered, the types of questions asked, the party of the questioners, the content of the questions and the number of supplementaries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>No. of Supplementaries</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oral</td>
<td>Starred</td>
<td>Unstarred</td>
<td>P.C. Lib.</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>97</td>
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<td>24th</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>13</td>
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A full explanation of the method employed in this table is contained in Appendix "A".

Perhaps the first noteworthy fact to be observed in the table is that although unmentioned in the standing orders, orals asked on the Orders of the Day never accounted for fewer than 30% of all defence questions and in the twenty-fourth Parliament they accounted for 80%. This sharp percentage rise was due not only to the increased popularity of orals but also to the small number of written questions. Despite the new regulations, only thirteen starred questions were asked during the entire third session of the twenty-fourth Parliament. At the same time, the number of unstarred questions dropped by almost one-half.
from the twenty-second Parliament. Equally impressive is the fact that some 170 supplementary orals were asked on the Orders of the Day so that it is clear that in the twenty-fourth Parliament the oral and not the written question was the technique favoured by members of the House in attempting to control the executive.

In the 1945 to 1957 period neither the written nor the oral question was neglected so much as was the written question in the 1957-1962 period. But for most of this period the written was decidedly the more popular of the two. How can the sudden demise of the written question on defence be explained then, particularly in the light of the new regulations which were expected to increase the popularity of the starred question?

It will be recalled that in analyzing the changing pattern of opposition in an earlier chapter, it was seen that the Liberal opposition of the past five years had put far less emphasis on problems and details of administration than had earlier Conservative oppositions and considerably more on policy. Since the standing order on the question period provides that no argumentative questions may be asked, it was only natural for the Liberal opposition, pre-occupied as it was with the task of discrediting government defence policy, to employ extensively the
oral question on the Orders of the Day. Certainly, it would have been impossible to ask almost all of the more than forty questions on nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems that were put during the third session of the twenty-fourth Parliament had the technique of the written question alone been used. Moreover the Liberals were no doubt aware that the possibilities of embarrassing the government were considerably greater when the minister had no time to prepare a reply, as was the case with the oral question, than they were when the written questions were placed first on the Order Paper.

Thus, the most plausible explanation for the sharp increase in oral questions with the concomitant fall in written ones, is that both have resulted from the changing pattern of opposition.

And lest there be any doubt concerning the role of the oral question, it should be pointed out that the frequent use of this technique was part of the organized frontbench opposition rather than that of the unorganized backbench variety. Of the 104 questions asked by Liberals on the Orders of the Day in the 1960 session, 75 were put by Messieurs Hellyer (36), Pearson (31) and Chevrier (eight). Furthermore, an even greater proportion of the supplementaries came from the front benches. Thus, it
would appear that one of the primary reasons for the decreased use of the written question was its inappropriateness or rather its inferiority when compared to the oral as an instrument for the political control of the executive. As long as the first goal of the opposition was to exercise bureaucratic control, the written question served admirably. But increasingly after 1958, the opposition tended to ignore administration and concentrate on politics and policy. And accompanying this changing pattern of opposition was the decrease of the written question on defence and the marked increase in the popularity of the oral question.

Although the Liberals showed no hesitation in employing the question period for purely partisan ends, it should by no means be imagined that it was they who introduced partisanship into the question period. Rather it simply happens that defence has been a major political issue over the past five years whereas in the pre-1957 period it was less so. Moreover, during the period of the debates on the Petawawa irregularities and Currie Report, oral questions on the Orders of the Day were employed occasionally by the opposition to pressure the government.17 (Indeed, the Petawawa incidents and the Korean crisis were two of the major causes for the great increase in questions, both on the Orders of the Day and written, that occurred during the
Finally, it is interesting to observe that the close relationship between the level of political debate on a particular subject and the frequency of the oral question on the same subject indirectly supports Professor William Dawson's remarks on the question period:

The opposition parties in Canada have taken full advantage of the political aspect of the question period. The prevalence of the oral question on the orders of the day has, of course, affected the whole procedure. There is little subtlety in any of the questions asked. They cannot be read by the Speaker or the Clerk before they are put, and so have a much higher political content than do their British counterpart.\(^1\)

One of the most effective parliamentary methods of controlling the bureaucracy is through investigations by backbenchers into the expenditures and administration of the defence departments in their home constituencies. It was observed above that between 1945 and 1957 the performance of backbenchers in Commons debates, although disappointing, had been better than their records in the 1957-1962 period.\(^2\) The same conclusions have also been reached in comparing performances during the question period. Not only did the number of constituency questions diminish sharply in comparison to the two last Parliaments under the Liberal régime; their quality declined also.
although less noticeably.

The numerical decrease is even more striking than the table indicates when certain additional factors are considered. Although some constituency questions are asked on the Orders of the Day, generally most constituency questions are placed on the Order Paper and they deal with factual matters or statistical data. Contrary to this, more than two-thirds of the constituency questions asked during the third session of the twenty-fourth Parliament were orals and most of these dealt with the impact of broad defence policy on constituency developments. The questions were generally phrased in a manner that indicated the member was more interested in discrediting defence policy than in protecting the welfare of his constituency or in checking the efficacy of defence department administration on defence installations located therein. A good example of this were the numerous questions asked by the members representing the two constituencies in which the Bomarc stations were being built.20 Thus the decline of written questions in the twenty-fourth Parliament appears to have been related not only to the increase in defence politics and hence the preference for the oral questions, but also to the inability and lack of initiative on the part of many of the numerous new backbenchers.

Between 1945 and 1957 the question period was used in
a manner quite different from the way that it was used when the Liberals were in opposition. The starred and unstarred written questions were employed frequently. For example, no less than 107 written questions on defence were put by Conservative members during the seventh session of the twenty-first Parliament. Equally interesting is the fact that only 39 were asked by Messieurs Harkness, Fulton and Pearkes, the Conservatives who posed the most questions. Conservative backbenchers put close to one-third of the total indicating clearly that they played a more prominent role in the question period than did the Liberal backbenchers of the twenty-fourth Parliament. Questions were asked on a wide variety of subjects including personnel, recruitment, administration, and projects such as the CF-100 and greater emphasis placed on the non-political aspects of these than on the more controversial issues such as the Petawawa irregularities. Politics were not ignored. But they were assigned to a secondary outpost and the question period used primarily to inquire into the administration of the defence departments.

If the notion be accepted that inquiries into administration do have a salutary impact upon departmental officials - and there does appear to be general agreement on this - then it must be acknowledged that the Conservatives did not ignore the task of controlling the executive. On the other hand, they seldom
attempted to employ the answers to their questions in the defence debates suggesting once again not only their inability to evaluate the significance of the information they received and relate it to the overall programme but also their professed desire to avoid playing politics with defence. Whatever the explanation that is accepted, the use of the question period by the Conservative Party is another example of the Conservative opposition's concern with administration and disinterest in policy.

One final point should perhaps be noted. The changes in the question period inaugurated in 1957, although made to strengthen the House of Commons in dealing with the government, in practice turned out to be of little significance. Although members were able to receive oral answers to starred questions, they seldom used this device. And for good reason. Not only did they have to place their questions on the Order Paper giving the minister the time required to prepare a careful answer; but more important they were not permitted supplementaries. The only important difference between the starred and unstarred question, therefore, was that the minister would reply orally to the first and in writing to the second. If the purposes of the questioner were non-political, the unstarred question would no doubt be sufficient; if his purposes were political, then the starred question was
inadequate. In a period when the politics of defence was one of the most important issues in all of Canadian politics, therefore, the changes in the question period were not far-reaching enough to satisfy an opposition striving to throw out the government. Thus, although the changes in the question period did not hinder the opposition, they did not assist it and it must be concluded therefore that the innovations tried out during the twenty-fourth Parliament had little influence on the different records of the Liberal and Conservative oppositions.

The differences in the pattern of opposition detected earlier in analyzing the defence debates have been observed again in studying the question period. Through most of the 1945-1957 period both the Progressive Conservative Party and the C.C.F. used the question period in attempting to control both defence policy and defence administration, although administration received the greater attention. In contrast, in the 1958-1962 period both the Liberal Party and the C.C.F. directed the great majority of their inquiries toward policy matters.

A few other trends indicated in the table are worth noting. During the twenty-first Parliament, due primarily to the war in Korea and the Petawawa irregularities, there was a marked proliferation of questions. But with the end of the Korean War
and the failure to turn up new irregularities, the interest of the opposition in the defence departments subsided considerably. The ever increasing remoteness of the numerous World War Two veterans in the House of Commons from the defence establishment also contributed to the decrease in questions. It should be noted that the sharpest decrease came in factual questions, as opposed to policy or constituency questions, and it was this decrease that accounted in large part for the enormous drop (from 185 to 47) in written questions between the sample periods covered for the twenty-first and twenty-second Parliaments.

By the middle of the twenty-fourth Parliament defence had become a major political issue and the oral question the primary technique through which the Liberals and C.C.F. members attacked the government. For the oral question permitted continuous pressure to be exerted against the government. Members did not have to wait for the Address, the Supply debates or the Budget to draw attention to defence policy inadequacies and inconsistencies. On almost a daily basis, they were able to bring the defence issue before the press and the electorate of the country. The excellent use of the oral and supplementary by the opposition parties kept the major (in)decisions daily before the people of Canada. Finally it should be remembered,
however, that this use of the question period is quite inconsistent with the notion that the question period is dominated by back-benchers exercising their privilege of dragging the most minute details of administration before the minister and general public. Rather, it served as a major technique for the political opposition of the Liberal and C.C.F. frontbenchers.
Almost forty years ago Professor Mackay reminded Canadians of Sifton's words:

Under our system the power of the Cabinet tends to grow at the expense of the House of Commons. . . . The Senate is not so much a check on the House of Commons (as originally intended) as it is upon the Cabinet, and there can be no doubt that its influence in this respect is salutary.¹

Although the accuracy of this sweeping statement cannot be fully tested in this thesis, it is the purpose of this chapter to examine a very small part of Sifton's hypothesis by determining the extent to which the Senate has been able to control defence policy, administration and expenditure between 1945 and 1962. The analytical framework that was adopted in evaluating the role of the House of Commons will be used again, as far as it is logically possible, in this chapter.

THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL DEBATE

The House of Commons has numerous opportunities (at least
eight)\(^2\) to debate defence policy. For a variety of reasons, both constitutional and practical, the Senate has far fewer. In the years under review all defence debate and discussion occurred either during the debate on the Address, on the introduction of defence legislation or following resolutions requesting the Senate to approve defence agreements or treaties.

In estimating the influence of the House of Commons on defence policy, six key policy problems were investigated. These same six have been looked at anew in this chapter but this time in order to determine the extent of Senate influence upon them.

The decision to demobilize in 1945 (and demobilization policy), the 1950 remobilization decision, the scrapping of the Arrow and the nuclear weapons problem for Canada - all four of these - were not debated by the Senate. To begin with therefore, it can be seen that the Senate has not taken the time to deal with some very major steps in the development of defence policy.

On March 30 and 31, 1949, the Senate considered the principles behind the proposed North Atlantic Treaty. Discussion was brief, lasting but one hour, and only five senators participated.\(^3\) No opposition was raised and a month later, after an even shorter debate\(^4\), the Senate unanimously approved the Treaty.

Debate of the N.O.R.A.D. agreement was more thorough
than on the North Atlantic Treaty, but nevertheless still very superficial. The leader of the government in the Senate introduced the agreement, and explained a little of its purpose and background\(^5\), after which it was sent to the Senate Standing Committee on External Relations.

In committee, the Minister of National Defence presented a rather full statement on the agreement. For perhaps an hour and a half members questioned him on it, and in particular, on the financial and strategic role Canada was to play within it. The Undersecretary of State for External Affairs then made a few remarks on the diplomatic aspects of the agreement after which it was referred back to the Senate with the Committee's approval.\(^6\)

Debate in the Senate lasted two hours. There was no disagreement on the principles behind the agreement, although a few of the points brought up in the Commons, including N.O.R.A.D.'s relationship to N.A.T.O. and the necessity of securing parliamentary approval\(^7\), were discussed again.\(^8\) Like the North Atlantic Treaty, the N.O.R.A.D. agreement secured unanimous approval.

In the light of the above evidence it is clear that the Senate has played no constructive role in the evolution of Canadian defence policy. It has had no influence on policy. It has served neither as a forum for the critical discussion of defence policy nor as a centre for the dissemination of new ideas.
on defence.

And on the more minor items in the policy-administration continuum the Senate showed even less interest than it did on policy. Strategy, administrative policy, and the general level of defence expenditures were scarcely even mentioned by members of the Upper House. On matters of local or provincial concern, where it was seen that members of the House of Commons have been able at times to bring the defence departments to account, senators have shown no initiative whatsoever. The Senate has not served as a forum for the ventilations of grievances nor as a legislative pressure group on behalf of provincial or local interests. Thus, the notion that it is the Senate, and not the House of Commons, that is the guardian of provincial interests, scarcely contains an iota of truth when related to defence expenditures and the distribution of the defence dollar across the country.

In short, therefore, the Senate has not used the technique of critical debate as an instrument to control or influence the defence function of the government, nor, it seems, has it even attempted to do so.

CONTROL OF FINANCES

"The Senate's role in parliamentary control of finance"
Professor Ward writes, "... is negligible and has been since Confederation." 9

Every year the Senate receives the final appropriation bill from the House of Commons in the dying hours of the parliamentary session. Much like the several (generally three or four) interim Supply bills that it has been approving throughout the parliamentary session, the final bill is read twice, debated for perhaps a half-hour, approved, and read a third time. Invariably, this all occurs in a single day. 10 In approving of these expenditures the Senate probably has less knowledge of the destination of the moneys it is voting than any other Upper House in the western world.

The final appropriation bill that is approved in the House of Commons is introduced only after the Commons has approved, in Committee of Supply, the requests of each of the spending departments and corporations of government. Because this never occurs until the last few days of the session, the Senate has no chance to deal with the estimates until this time. Equally important, however, is the fact that the Senate, as a body, has no established mechanism for familiarizing itself with these estimates. It has no Supply Committee, nor has it any standing committee, for that matter, that deals with the estimates in a
manner analogous to the Commons Estimates Committee. Senators, therefore, know nothing of the estimates except that which they are able to learn on their own. "We have studied them (the estimates) in our rooms;" one Senator admitted, "and I might add that, to make myself as well informed as possible, I have been a faithful attendant in the gallery of the House of Commons, where I listened to the explanations with reference to hundreds of items." Because there is no Supply Committee, the discussion and vote on appropriation bills provide the sole opportunity for the Senate to exercise any influence. In fact what generally happens is that the bill turns out to be the last substantive item in the session and it is rushed through just minutes before Parliament is prorogued. This indeed was the case even last year when the bill was introduced a few minutes before midnight on the last business day of the session and hastily approved despite the fact that members had no opportunity to read the bill in advance. It is thus clear that in practice the Senate has been exercising no pre-audit control whatsoever. Although there are no constitutional limitations upon it, the Senate also has failed to develop organs for post-audit control. The Senate never receives the defence accounts (or any public accounts) nor does it review the Annual Report of the
Auditor General.

It can be seen, therefore, that the Senate, in the period under review, exercised no control, direct or indirect, over the expenditures of the defence departments.

COMMITTEE CONTROL

In an earlier footnote on page 293, it was pointed out that there were possibly some grounds for challenging the assertion that the Senate had no committees analogous to the Commons Estimates Committees; for one committee, the Standing Committee on Finance, has superficially, at least, dealt with the subject matter of the estimates seven times since 1945. In the late 1940s, the Committee was appointed on three occasions to "examine expenditures proposed by the estimates laid before Parliament, and by other financial legislation which has been, or may be dealt with during this session of Parliament."¹⁴ The Committee did not report back to the Senate, nor did it publish its proceedings. As a result, there is no public record of its work.

Beginning in 1951, however, the Committee began publishing its proceedings and making reports to the Senate. In its orders of reference for that year the Committee was given detailed instructions:
To examine the expenditures proposed by the Estimates laid before Parliament. . . in advance of the Bills based on the said estimates reaching the Senate; That it be empowered to send for records of revenues from taxation collected by the Federal, Provincial and Municipal governments in Canada, and records of expenditures by such governments, showing sources of income and expenditures of same under appropriate headings, together with estimates of gross national production, net national income and movement of the cost-of-living index, and their relation to such total expenditures, for the year 1939 and for the latest year for which the information is available, and such other matters as may be pertinent to the examination of the Estimates. . . 15.

The Committee was re-appointed in 1952, 1955 and 1956 under substantially identical orders of reference. In each of these years the Committee served primarily as an instrument to investigate the dangers of inflation and only incidentally as a pre-audit estimates committee. Although a few of the reports did mention defence expenditures and administration 16, concern with these was only peripheral to the inquiry into inflation. This was indirectly acknowledged when the 1959 Committee was appointed solely to inquire into "the threat of inflation in Canada." 17

The most useful work of the Senate has been performed by its Standing Committee on Banking and Commerce, the body that has been used to deal with defence legislation. Between 1945 and 1962, some thirty-three defence bills were made into law, and of
these, seventeen (or slightly more than half) were referred to this Committee. On nine occasions the Committee submitted recommendations for amendment, and in all of these cases both Houses accepted them.

The amendments to six of the bills were basically textual. While doubtlessly useful in tightening or improving the wording of the legislation, they do not indicate that the Senate was exercising significant influence over the government.

Two others were minor but nevertheless substantive. In 1951, the Committee virtually re-wrote the Canadian Forces Bill sent to it by the House of Commons. The impact of this, however, was not to enable Parliament to exercise greater control over the executive but rather to clarify the legal powers accruing to the government. In 1959, the Committee held a single meeting on proposed amendments to the National Defence Bill, listened to evidence from the judge advocate general and two of his deputies, and then reported to the Senate suggesting several substantive amendments that in a very minor way did contribute to making the defence departments more easily accountable to Parliament.

Finally, and most important, the major piece of defence legislation since Confederation was introduced in the Senate during these years. On November 2, 1949, the leader of the government
in the Senate presented Bill J-5, an Act respecting National Defence. On November 8 the Minister of National Defence appeared before the Senate and explained the principles and purposes of the bill. Thus the Senate began work on the bulkiest piece of legislation to reach Parliament in more than twenty years.

The bill was referred to the Standing Committee on Banking and Commerce. In committee, some 74 amendments were made which although described by the defence minister as primarily "of a technical nature or affecting the wording" were also noteworthy for strengthening the position of individual members of the armed forces before courts martial and other disciplinary bodies.

The bill did not receive a third reading until December 8, however, and because Parliament was prorogued but two days later, there was no opportunity to send the bill on to the House of Commons. A new but similar bill was passed in 1950, however, and all 74 Senate amendments were contained in it.

The Banking and Commerce Committee has thus contributed, in a very minor way, to improving defence legislation. It has proved incapable, however, of dealing with problems of fundamental substance. This was particularly noteworthy on the introduction of the Defence Production Bill, a controversial matter
that was dealt with above. One provision of the bill prolonged
the special powers given to the minister beyond the life of the
Parliament. Liberal Senators, as well as Conservative, warned
against according such powers over such a long period:

I have a high regard for the Honourable C.D. Howe,
but I view with alarm the handing over of powers
extending beyond the life of this parliament. . .
I think we are going a little too far. . . I
would like to point out that if we hand over
these powers for a period beyond the life of
parliament, we are establishing a somewhat dangerous
precedent. . . The powers granted under this bill
are greater than any we have ever handed out before,
and when we are asked to grant them beyond the life
of this parliament, I think it is time we gave a
second look at what is happening, and I rise to
voice my protest from this point of view. . . I
agree with the sentiments expressed by the leader
of the opposition when he said that in our efforts
at fighting a dictator, we must take care and see
to it that our children will not one day wake up
to find themselves completely regimented and under
state control.25

But in Committee, the seemingly overwhelming opposition
to this part of the bill did not materialize and it was approved
without much difficulty. Thus, although it is clear that the
Banking and Commerce Committee has been useful, it would be a
serious error to look upon it as having during these years been
an organ to control the executive.

To carry out effectively the defence functions a
government requires a certain amount of independence from external
(including parliamentary) checks and in Canada, it does possess this. In the past, the House of Commons has not been able to control, or even challenge, this autonomy that the defence executive possesses; but on at least one occasion, the Naval Bill of 1913, the Senate has been able to do so.\textsuperscript{26}

The desirability of this type of control, from a non-elective Upper House, when no military strategist would deny the necessity of executive flexibility, is a point well worth pondering. Although the question is largely an academic one at times when the government has a majority in the Senate, it is decidedly a practical one when the situation is reversed, as the Liberal majority in the Senate demonstrated in 1913. Certainly it is not difficult to visualize the contemporary Senate, with its opposition majority and sporadic signs of independence, delaying government legislation or slowing down other government activities where parliamentary approval is necessary.

The majority of government defence decisions do not require the approval of Parliament (and hence of the Senate). But some do and amongst these are a number of potentially "hot" ones including a possible Canada-United States agreement or treaty for Canadian use of American-produced nuclear weapons.

The small amount of evidence available indicates that
the Senate, at least the Senate of the twenty-fourth Parliament, consciously avoided becoming embroiled in defence politics; for on three of the most bitter issues in Canadian politics since World War Two - the Arrow, nuclear weapons, and the Bomarc - Liberal senators did not attempt to provoke partisan debate.27

While this would seem to suggest that the Senate no longer exercises the type of power that enabled it to reject Prime Minister Borden's Naval Bill, one perhaps minor fact must be added. The government of the twenty-fourth Parliament was returned to power with a greater majority than any other in Canadian history. For the Senate to have opposed a major defence decision of this government, it would have been necessary for its members to acquire greater courage, in the face of threats of sweeping Senate reform, than had been the custom in the past and there were few indications that its members had been suddenly injected with these qualities. On the other hand, the position of the government in the twenty-fifth Parliament is much weaker and because of this there is the chance that its Liberal senators will be more ready to hinder the government than they were in the past five years.

With this one precautionary note thrown in as a warning, it can be concluded that the Senate, between 1945 and 1962, did not serve as a restraining influence on the government in defence matters.

Hence it can be seen that the Senate has exercised no
control over defence since World War Two. It has made minor contributions in the area of defence legislation but these have been primarily of a peripheral nature and no great importance can be attached to them.

Finally two other conclusions can be made. Within the terms of reference of this study, the Senate has failed to serve either as a restraining force or as a representative of provincial interests, two of the historical justifications for creation of this body. Thus, once again within the narrow terms of reference of this study, it can be seen that the notion of parliamentary control must be equated with the idea of Commons control for the Senate has made no notable contribution in this field.
CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS

Since the end of World War Two peacetime defence has been a matter of fundamental importance in Canada. The growth of the military establishment has been rapid - very rapid. In 1938-39, it numbered fewer than 10,000. Today it is fifteen times as large. 25 years ago annual defence expenditures were roughly $30 million. Since 1951 they've ranged between $1.5 and $2 billion. In the 1930s Canada enjoyed the perfect security guaranteed by three oceans, a powerful British Navy and amicable relations with the United States. Today Canada stands exposed to the dangers of nuclear warfare. The growth in the numbers of the military establishment together with the sharp increase in defence spending gives rise to two dangers. The first is the growth of a politically virile military-industrial complex, as in the United States, and the second is economic dislocation arising from the heavy cost of modern defence. Finally there is the
danger of total annihilation through the weapons of mass destruction. Each of these three dangers, although to varying degrees, casts its shadow against the future of Canadian democracy. None is apparently about to destroy the fabric and yet the history of democracy and of warfare teaches us that it would be unwise to deny the existence of these potential threats.

The complexity of the problem is increased by the fact that in attempting to avoid annihilation, more economic and political power may fall to the senior military and industrial leaders than is desirable for the proper functioning of a healthy democracy. The military-industrial complex naturally has a vested interest in a perpetuation of the status quo for it is due to the status quo conditions that they exercise their power. In order to retain their position in Canadian society, therefore, it is conceivable that they might overtax the economy and cause it long-run damage by adopting a selfish viewpoint of the general good. It is also possible that such a military-industrial complex would exercise its considerable influence to discourage a relaxation of international tensions.

Such a powerful complex apparently does not exist today in Canada. On the other hand the state of preparedness in Canada is most discouraging. The dilemma lies in the fact that
if Canada were to attempt to strengthen her defences and make a more substantial contribution to western defence, she might simultaneously do irreparable damage to her economy and democracy and ironically enough, without increasing her security significantly.

I have not attempted to solve the defence dilemma in this thesis. Indeed, dilemmas, by their very nature, are not soluble. Rather, they are "lived with." And so Canadians must find the most effective method of living with the defence dilemma that faces them.

One of the major difficulties has been in determining the role that the Parliament of Canada should play. To this end the record of the past seventeen years has been examined to determine the amount of influence Parliament has exercised over defence policy, administration and expenditures.

In analyzing the degree of control that Parliament has exercised over the defence departments, the various techniques of opposition were investigated separately. It is now necessary to examine more broadly the cumulative impact that these have had on the defence establishment. It is also equally important to question the desirability of further controls and where, if necessary, changes are required.
CONTROL OF POLICY

In the parliamentary system of government, defence policy is generally made by the cabinet or its defence committee, on the advice of its senior military personnel. It sometimes happens, however, that a cabinet is tied down by the national convention or congress of its party, although typically such conventions leave some flexibility in their resolutions. Although there is no uniform rule, both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties, unlike the C.C.F. (N.D.P.) and British Labour Party, have been relatively free from extra-parliamentary controls. Since 1945, therefore, defence policy has been the product of the various Canadian cabinets.

It is clear, therefore, that when I speak of parliamentary control of defence policy or the lack thereof, I am not suggesting that policy is or should be made by the House of Commons. Rather I am referring to the political process whereby members of Parliament, by debating, criticizing and offering alternatives, force the government to defend and justify its policies before the House of Commons and country. In this process if the government's policies are broadly acceptable to the public, debate will probably have little impact on the government's defence
on the other hand where the public is broadly dissatisfied, the government will permit modifications in its policy (although as unobtrusively as possible) or face defeat or at least a loss of strength at the ensuing elections.

This study has indicated that in the 1945 to 1957 period, the House of Commons failed dismally to execute or fulfill this role. Although no doubt many reasons can be given including the shortages of necessary intelligence, international and technological complexities, the problem of security and the several others discussed at the outset, these serve unsatisfactorily to justify opposition indifference.¹ A familiar theory is provided by the occasional reference to the idea that it was patriotism that stimulated the opposition to avoid playing politics with defence and foreign policy. But investigation has indicated that this is at least in part a rationalization;² and equally important, it suffers from the assumption that politics are necessarily an evil.

Throughout the period, the opposition showed little hesitation in accepting the broad defence policy of the government. The result was to leave the government with the rather secure feeling that it had little to fear from the opposition or Commons opinion in general. Only the C.C.F. offered broad
alternatives and these, dealing as they did with the role of the United Nations in international relations and world social and economic conditions, were so far removed from contemporary concepts of immediate practicable defence that the government had no need to oppose them but only to pay "lip-service" to these ideas and subsequently ignore them.

The opposition was not totally disinterested in debating defence policy as revealed by the excellent debate on demobilization policy (as opposed to the decision to demobilize) and the informative if scattered debates on the changing role of Canada in western defence. Indeed, within the framework of broad policy, the House energetically pursued the government's programme, and although unable to discredit it significantly, the House did keep it under closer public scrutiny than the government at times apparently desired.

The House of Commons was unable to foment any debate on broad policy, however in the periods of the twentieth to the twenty-second Parliaments. In part this can be attributed to government intransigence as indicated by the narrow orders of reference of the committees it appointed and its unwillingness to permit debate on several adjournment motions. But for the most part, the cause was the attitude of the opposition, perhaps
an emotional "hang-over" from the years of wartime cooperation. The question period was seldom used to deal with policy. And in debates, the House of Commons did not once question the broad road that the government chose to follow.

The Commons, it must be admitted, did serve to reflect Canadian opinion which apparently did approve of the decisions to demobilize, to join N.A.T.O., to remobilize and to dispatch troops abroad to both Korea and western Europe. Although in each of these decisions, the background was thoroughly debated, the implications were not. The Commons was thus satisfied to mirror public opinion but not to lead it.

In most of these major policy decisions, rational alternative policies were perhaps not always available. There was a dearth of ideas on defence from the entire country, including its intellectuals, journals and newspapers. Nevertheless, the absence of alternatives did not necessitate the shallowness of much of what was said (and not said) in the House of Commons. The interests of the country were not served best by acquiescence without questioning.

Even if the record of the twenty-fourth Parliament was not outwardly much different from that of the Parliaments that sat between 1945 and 1957, its intentions were. Broad defence policy
was subject to close Commons scrutiny. Beginning with the abbreviated debates on the N.O.R.A.D. agreement through to the nuclear weapons controversy, the House of Commons worked energetically at focusing attention upon policy. First through requests for information, later through criticisms and finally by proposing policies of their own, the opposition parties kept the defence matter in the public eye. Despite the efforts of the opposition, however, the government made no outward modifications in its defence policy.

Then it may be asked how does the record of the House of Commons in the last five years differ from that of the 1945-1957 one? Can it not be said that it simply talked more but accomplished as little?

Such a view, I would submit, ignores the complexities involved in defence decision-making today. The selection of a defensive role for Canada and a weapons system to implement that role are tied down very closely to the rapidly changing scientific, technological, economic, and political environment. With these several variables involved, the number of alternatives in defence policy has increased markedly in recent years. The Canadian contribution to continental defence in the early 1950s, if compared to the role in North American defence that Canada is
attempting to play today, serves admirably to illustrate this argument. In the earlier period, the government developed and produced the CF-100 fighter aircraft for the defence of North America against enemy attack. The potential enemy was only one, the threat the bomber, and the cost a burden that the Canadian economy could bear. More recently, the government has had difficulty in choosing between the Arrow, the Bomarc and the Voodoo and indications are that it is still dissatisfied with its contribution. And for good reason. The problems of defence are more complex today. The potential enemy is no longer Russia alone. The world political situation has become more fluid. The threat is no longer the bomber alone, but the bomber, the I.C.B.M. and missiles launched from moving bases. Finally the cost of developing and producing a weapons system for the defence of Canada is no longer economic without guarantees of large orders from allies and the experience with the Arrow indicated that potential purchasers evaluate and buy only a proven product, not plans on a drawing board. Thus, the difficulties in formulating a useful defence policy are indeed formidable.

The problems in evolving a practical defence policy and the temptations of the large defence "pork barrel" both suggest that a vigilant Commons is very necessary. If there were few
alternatives to broad policy ten years ago, the same can hardly be said for the contemporary situation. And the easiest road is perhaps not the one best suited to promote the ultimate if distant goal of Canadian security. More perhaps than ever before, it is necessary to have the range of alternatives considered carefully.

Such was the role of the twenty-fourth Parliament. Daily, through the use of oral questions, twice in committee, occasionally on motion to adjourn and the Address, annually in Supply, and irregularly in other debates, the Commons focused attention on the defence policy of the government. Moreover, the opposition parties were so successful in stirring up public opinion that they were able to make defence a major issue in the 1962 election. And no doubt there are many who would argue that the defence debates influenced significantly the outcome of that election. If therefore control is too strong a word to use to describe the process that occurred, it is nevertheless true that the House of Commons did serve as the main arena for the vast debate on Canadian defence that has been carried on over the past five or six years and that the impact of this debate has influenced greatly Canadian politics and the environment in which defence decision-making occurs.
If it be acknowledged that decision-making in defence is now carried out in a decidedly political environment, a second matter must be considered. Given the stakes of today, which are no less than the survival of life on this planet, is it desirable that defence decisions continue to be made in this type of atmosphere? In short, is parliamentary control of defence policy, involving as it does politics and the future prospects of the various parties, a desirable goal?

No doubt depending on one's intrinsic philosophy, the problem may be viewed from two separate angles.

From one viewpoint the argument might sound like this. At a time when the very future of civilization is at stake, can Canadians afford the luxury of forcing those who make defence policy to cope with the problems of politics as well? Surely, the international, economical and technological considerations are sufficiently complex without throwing in the additional problem of political acceptability? Today the making of defence policy cannot be separated from technology and economics and these are the field of the professionally-trained specialist. Even the most foolhardy would not argue that the general public or even the member of Parliament is capable of making an adequate defence policy?
But from another perspective, the argument might sound very different. In an age when the search for peace is connected not only to the military balance of power, but world political, economic and social conditions as well, would it not be dangerous to leave defence policy, with its significant political and economic implications, to the military mind? The backbone of our democratic society is the political process which permits no single person or group of persons to wield total power and surely on a matter as vital as national survival, it would be folly to abandon this process to a handful of generals and air marshalls.

The goal is to get what is most desirable out of both viewpoints - a firm understanding of the military requirements from the military staff and the best possible defence policy (bearing in mind its relationship both to foreign policy and the economic capability of the nation), through the functioning of the parliamentary process.

The military have never occupied a revered position in Canadian society and today is no different. The military advisers to the cabinet carry out their jobs quietly. They are in the public eye only infrequently and are as far removed from being national heroes as military men anywhere in this world.
Moreover most have a deep respect for parliamentary democracy, and the role of the military within it. Thus, although I am in no position, of course, to evaluate the military advice given by the chiefs of staff to the defence minister and cabinet, I do feel it should be emphasized that the military-civilian relationship in Canada is a relatively healthy one for the proper functioning of the Canadian parliamentary process.

But there are grounds for questioning the desirability of the type of political debate that the country has been exposed to in recent years. Although it is my argument that the political debate permitted reasonably effective control of defence policy to be exercised by the House of Commons, I would also suggest that the debate was nevertheless at many times irresponsible. For the public was left not only to evaluate policy criticisms and alternatives, but also all the lies, half-truths and equivocations on a host of issues including the relationship of N.O.R.A.D. to N.A.T.O., the reasons and methods for the cancellation of the Arrow, the value and purpose of the Bomarc and finally the nuclear weapons issue. And although the blame does not rest with one single party, in large measure the Progressive Conservative government must accept responsibility for on most issues it was too hesitant in giving full information. If the parliamentary
process is to work most effectively it should not be hampered by the type of environment that has surrounded it in recent years. The idea surely is to convince the electorate, not to deceive it.

The weakness then has been the level of political debate. What is required primarily to ensure more sophisticated and informed debate is a fundamental change in the attitude of the politician. But inasmuch as there is no immediate prospect of this it would be helpful to build a parliamentary mechanism to ensure greater honesty and more complete information, subject only to well-defined security limitations.

The problem is a complex one but some effort must be made to solve it. This writer is not prepared to turn blindly to a bipartisan parliamentary committee to determine policy as the leaders of the Liberal and Social Credit Parties have suggested on occasion. If a policy recommended by such a committee were implemented by the government and then proved ineffective, whom would the voters hold responsible? Such sweeping powers, without concomitant responsibility, runs completely against the grain of parliamentary government.

Equally confusing would be the relationship of the chiefs of staff committee to such a parliamentary committee. Should a member of the chiefs of staff committee contradict the policy
of the government, the man's close and confidential relationship to the Minister of National Defence would be destroyed. The practical functioning of such a Commons committee, therefore, would be most difficult to work out.

I am arguing, therefore, that the suggestion of Mr. Pearson, without further clarifications, appears undesirable.

What is needed then is not a policy-making committee but one which would make it possible for the public and indeed the member of Parliament, to evaluate policy. What is required is more information, first-hand information about the problems of Canadian defence and such information should emanate from the Government of Canada and not British, American and United Nations sources.

Then the debate on Canadian defence could be waged on broad policy and not on matters, which although of political significance, are really not suitable for political debate. I am arguing that the political parties and the electorate do have a right to disagree about the Canadian role in N.A.T.O., the desirability of N.O.R.A.D. and the advantages of neutralism. These are matters that are rightfully the subject of controversy.

But for Parliament and the electorate to decide which lie about the Bomarc is more acceptable, whether the Voodoo is less useful than the Arrow and if the strike reconnaissance role in
Europe is strategic or tactical is to give these two bodies jobs they are not suitably qualified to perform. They are jobs which require a specialist's knowledge.

Lest it be felt that I am arguing that these matters of tactics and weaponry should be given less attention than broad policy let me end all doubts. The broad policy decisions are not made in a vacuum. They are related to the technological and economic environment. But they are not the same. Far more than the Canadian role in N.A.T.O. or the problem of neutralism, they are matters of fact and not of opinion.

What is required, then, is a select committee of the House of Commons, to get at these matters of fact. Such a committee would be appointed to look into the technological and military capability and financial feasibility of a weapons system. As far as humanly possible it should be restricted to matters of fact. It should have the right to summon witnesses both from the government and without. As far as possible its hearings should be public although no doubt some in camera sessions would be required. Its role would be to obtain sufficient information to permit the parties and country to debate policy. To this end its proceedings and report would be non-partisan - the product of the desire to establish facts, not make policy.
To experiment with such a committee is no doubt perilous. Although it would damage the lines of responsibility less than a policy-making committee, it would nevertheless be naive to assume such a committee would have no power. And of course it is merely repeating an old story to reiterate that the line between broad policy and weapons policy is of course fuzzy. Yet the stakes are great and innovation is necessary. If there are dangers in experiment there are also risks in complacency and stagnation. The level of debate in recent years suggests new remedies should be tried.

PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION AND EXPENDITURES

If the defence policy of the country is worthy of special attention because it is related to the problem of survival, defence administration and expenditures are also somewhat unique. Administration is set apart from the rest of the government by the combination of its size and diversity; expenditures by size and the necessity of long-range commitments and programming.

The record of the House of Commons in controlling administration between 1945 and 1957, although not bright, was, in view of the numerous complexities surrounding the defence function, a reasonable one. If the opposition was acquiescent
on broad defence policy, certainly it was energetic in investigating
the implementation of policy as indicated by the debates in the
Commons during Supply, External Affairs resolutions and on occasion
during the Address. Committee investigations between 1951 and
1953 were useful in raising the general level of understanding in
the House of Commons concerning the operations of the two depart­
ments. A steady barrage of written questions served as a useful
reminder to officials of the continuous interest of Parliament in
the defence department. Finally the Auditor General was constant­ly busy examining expenditure procedures. Through each of these
techniques the House of Commons was able to keep watch on the
defence establishment.

On the other hand, the strength of Commons control should
not be exaggerated. By 1949 defence expenditures had begun to
rise markedly and by 1952 totalled almost half of annual govern­
ment expenditures. Despite the rapid expansion of the defence
departments, no serious irregularities or significant examples of
maladministration were uncovered by the House of Commons through
the question period or the committees that were appointed. The
Office of the Auditor General was more successful but it is note­
worthy that the Petawawa irregularities were not discovered by any
organ of Parliament but through an anonymous letter to the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police. Although constructive criticisms and suggestions were not lacking, especially during the first five or six years after World War Two, and it was not uncommon to find the validity of such ideas acknowledged in subsequent government decisions, the House in general was lacking in power.

The Auditor General was hampered by the lack of strong support from the Public Accounts Committee and a staff that grew not nearly as rapidly as did defence spending.

The committees of the period, as they became better informed, grew a first set of teeth and took one or two very small bites from the administration. But the committees were hampered by the orders of reference which circumscribed their powers, and the partisan attitude which prevented recommendations to the House and hence to the defence departments. The demise of the Defence Expenditures Committee ended all hopes of detailed parliamentary inquiry into defence and subsequent meetings of the Public Accounts Committee were hardly designed to inspire fear in departmental officials.

The House of Commons did make a strenuous effort to control defence legislation. Its success in obstructing the 1955 amendment to the Defence Production Act was the most noteworthy of its accomplishments but should not be thought of as its
only significant contribution. On the other hand, it must be
recognized that the power of the executive in the defence
establishment did grow and at times at the expense of the
legislature.

And, of course, parliamentary control of expenditure
was clearly a myth. No direct control was exercised over the
estimates. That situation was admirably summarized by Lieutenant
General Foulkes in a letter to the author: "In my fifteen years
in Ottawa in which there was a continuous battle for funds,
parliament never figured at all, it was the administration mostly
the Treasury Boards." 6

Moreover indirect control was also negligible. Supply
debates were virtually devoid of specific inquiries into expend-
itures. Select committees were not empowered to deal with
estimates. And although there were mechanisms for dealing with
past expenditures, the Auditor General and Public Accounts Committee
throughout the period and the Defence Expenditures Committee on
a few occasions, none was really effective in controlling defence
expenditures. The former two, although useful, did not deal
specifically with defence whereas the defence committee was
abandoned after showing some early promise.

Largely due to the government's unwillingness to
cooperate therefore, Parliament really had no control of the defence dollar.

It is impossible, therefore, to be impressed with the record of the Commons during this period. That it was not better was primarily the result of the government's sensitivity toward all inquiries into its administration. This was revealed by the occasional effort to avoid debate, the limited powers of the committees it appointed and the attitude of Liberal backbenchers. That even a mediocre record was achieved, therefore, must be registered as a significant accomplishment of the Progressive Conservative Party, and to a lesser degree, the C.C.F.

The post-1957 period was marked by several innovations in Commons procedure. The chairman of the Public Accounts Committee was chosen from the official opposition, the question period was altered, and pre-audit control in select committee was attempted for the first time. Also noteworthy is the fact that after the disagreement on the abbreviated N.O.R.A.D. debates, the government proved more responsive to the desire of members of the House and permitted more debate than had been customary under the King and St.Laurent administrations. And yet, despite these steps, control of administration by the House of Commons proper weakened.
The reason for the weaker control, it was seen, was not the procedural changes in the House of Commons but the changing pattern of opposition. In debates and the question period it was politics and policy that were of most concern to members and not the more mundane subjects such as manpower, personnel and rifles.

Once again, there was no direct control of expenditures. And in Committee of the Whole, even less emphasis was placed upon the defence dollar than there was during the earlier period. Especially were the Supply debates for the Department of Defence Production devoid of value.

On the other hand, the Office of the Auditor General and the Public Accounts Committee were both strengthened. The former was given greater publicity through the Public Accounts Committee than it had received in earlier years. The Public Accounts Committee, dominated by an atmosphere that was decidedly non-partisan, reported uneconomic and ineffective administration to the House and took steps to ascertain if its recommendations were being fulfilled by the defence departments. Post-audit control in select committee thus was improve quite noticeably.

The experiments in pre-audit select committee control, however, provided as much ground for caution as enthusiasm.
Indications were that the committee might serve as a focal point for interest group efforts leading to pressure for greater expenditures. Also, although perhaps a little more effective than Committee of Supply, these committees did have serious drawbacks and not the least important of these was that they cut down inquiries by backbenchers into specific expenditures within their own constituencies. Moreover a careful reading of the proceedings of the 1958 and 1960 committees seemed to suggest that before any pre-audit committee could responsibly propose cuts, it would be necessary for it to be equipped with a trained staff which could pursue detailed inquiries into items that members thought were doubtful.

I am not suggesting that pre-audit control in select committee was a total failure. Indeed, the work of the 1958 committees was very impressive - more so certainly than Committee of Supply in any of the years studied.

On the other hand, if more useful information were provided to the House, if the estimates were presented so as to facilitate the job of members of the House and if the estimates were introduced early enough in the session to permit full inquiry, I can perceive of no reason why the House of Commons could not scrutinize the defence estimates as effectively as did the 1958
Standing Committee on Estimates. The kind of committee suggested earlier in this chapter would do much to ensure that the first of these requirements was satisfied by providing members with much first-hand information of the kind they need. The form of the estimates would facilitate Commons inquiry were greater emphasis placed on the programme or activity for which the expenditure was being made rather than on the kind of expenditure. Finally, it would be helpful, bearing in mind the competing demands of public business, were a rotating procedure for the estimates of the various departments adopted so that the defence estimates would be considered early in the parliamentary session at least every second year.

The defence department, in recent years, has been spending a little more than one-quarter of all government expenditures. It is the largest and most diverse of all government departments. And along with its great size and enormous expenditures are indications that much money is wasted through ineffective administration. Both the Currie and Glassco Reports have indicated that there is a need for more economy in handling the defence dollar and more efficacious administration.

It is not the role of Parliament to serve continuously
as a team of administrative management experts. Parliament does have a duty, however, to keep continuous pressure on the defence departments to improve their administrative and financial effectiveness. This it can do by revealing examples of mal-administration and waste through investigation into the operations of the departments.

The past inability of the House of Commons to control defence administration and expenditure suggests that some modifications in the powers and procedure of the House of Commons are required. It has been noted above that there is no shortage of opportunities for members to debate defence. Indeed, as pointed out several times in this thesis, members often fail to avail themselves of those that are available. Defence Production debates are generally very short and of poor quality. The Address and Budget debates are seldom used. Motions to adjourn are made very infrequently although apparently becoming of increasing importance. Thus, although there is perhaps a dearth of debate on defence, especially in view of the importance of the defence function and size of expenditures, this is not attributable to a shortage of opportunities available for debate but to other causes. These include lack of information on which to base debates, competing matters of public interest and at times
the method of arranging the estimates so that they are presented to the House of Commons close to the end of the parliamentary session. This causes members to pass them more rapidly than they would perhaps otherwise desire.

The question period requires some modifications. Its usefulness as a technique of political control was never better demonstrated than in the twenty-fourth Parliament when the barrage of orals kept the defence issue continually in the public eye. On the other hand, the written question period was largely ineffective despite the privilege of requesting oral answers by starring questions.

Modifications are required in both oral and written question periods. The oral question period, although useful, is quite definitely being abused. Although supposedly to be employed only for matters so urgent that the member cannot wait 48 hours for reply, in fact the oral is often unjustified by any grounds except political expediency. As no limit is placed on the number of orals and supplementaries that can be asked on the Orders of the Day, time, a commodity most precious to the House, is often wasted as member after member asks questions on matters which are not urgent or repeats questions already answered. It is necessary, I would suggest, for Mr. Speaker to
begin to exercise more often his power of discretion in over-ruling questions that are not urgent or that are redundant. At the same time, it might perhaps be best to give official recognition to the right of asking orals by including the proper regulations in the Standing Orders of the House of Commons.

In the twenty-fifth Parliament, the House of Commons abandoned its experiments with the written question period and reverted to the pre-1958 procedure. Although Professor William Dawson has suggested that this was a retrograde step, in practice it has made little difference not because of the value of the present system but due to the ineffectiveness of the one adopted between 1958 and 1962. The right to request oral replies by starring a question was of little value without the privilege of asking supplementaries and this was not granted.

I would suggest, therefore, that the 1958-1962 system be re-adopted with the right to ask the supplementary included. Not only would this increase the effectiveness of the written question period; it would also make it less necessary for members to abuse the oral period on the Orders of the Day. The product of the suggested changes would be, I suggest, a more effective technique to control the sprawling defence bureaucracy. At the same time the political value of the question
period would be not at all endangered and the time of the House better conserved.

Although a skilfully employed question period is of inestimable value, it is obvious that this in itself is insufficient to control administration and expenditures. What is requires is some sort of permanent apparatus to perform detailed investigations into departmental administration and expenditures in order to keep continuous pressure on the department for necessary administrative reforms.

The starting point for any reappraisal of the role of Parliament must be a firm recognition of the inadequacy of the theory of absolute ministerial responsibility. Under the present system, the minister of each department must accept the responsibility for the action of each employee in his department. No doubt there was the day, 40 or 50 years ago, when a minister could sensibly be held responsible for every action because the small size of his department made this task physically and mentally a feasible one. Surely, however, to believe that the Minister of National Defence could exercise similar control today over his department is to preserve an unnecessary fiction.

Also, the proliferation of statutory control agencies removes from the Departments of National Defence and Defence
Production much of the responsibility for its activities. The Civil Service Commission, Comptroller of the Treasury and others, although well-designed to prevent unfair arbitrary treatment of department personnel, or illegal expenditure of public funds, make it difficult for the departments to have all the required power and discretion to deal completely with any single programme. Although not responsible for the activities of these statutory agencies, the minister is responsible for the success of the different programmes in his department and success or failure can often be determined by the flexibility or rigidity of these statutory instruments which are outside of his control.

Both because of the size and diversity of the defence establishment, and the restrictions imposed by legislation, the defence ministers do not have sufficient control of their departments to justify prolonging the principle of absolute ministerial responsibility. It is my argument here that although responsible for departmental administration generally, it would be preferable if the ministers, especially the defence minister, were relieved of the responsibility for the activities of every official, especially lower officials, in the defence departments.

If it is illogical to hold a minister responsible for the minutiae of departmental administration, it is equally illogical
to make the parliamentary investigation of departmental administration and expenditure primarily a political objective. It must be recognized that as the substance of government changes, the political processes surrounding it must be modified.

In essence, what is required is what I would call, for the lack of a better name, a counter-bureaucracy. It was suggested above that a non-partisan fact finding committee was required in order that the politicians could get on with the policy and politics of defence and leave the scientifically-verifiable facts to the scientists, engineers and strategists. Such a committee, it was argued, would restore some of the responsibility to defence politics. It is suggested here that this committee be given a second function - that of a counter-bureaucracy.

The formation of any committee is no guarantee of success in an endeavour. Indeed cynics, and not without reason, have often claimed that committees are formed when somebody doesn't want action to be taken and the job to be done. In any event, a parliamentary committee is only as good as the men that form it, the powers it is given, and the atmosphere that pervades it. Therefore what is required is a select committee, high in quality, with emphasis on continuity. Such a committee, subject
to proper security regulations, would have the right to deal with defence accounts, instead of the Public Accounts Committee, and all aspects of departmental administration.

Even such a committee would be lost however, or hopelessly inadequate, without some permanent staff. As senior clerk or official, I would suggest the appointment of an official with powers similar to those of the Auditor General to deal exclusively with the defence departments. He, and his staff, might work within the Office of the Auditor General or outside of it. The key fact is that he would be free to serve as servant, witness and guide to the defence committee. Whereas the Auditor General could bring only a generalist's knowledge to such a committee, an independently appointed Defence Auditor could bring a more intimate knowledge of the defence departments' operations.

Nor would I stop here. I would also experiment, on a temporary basis, with an entirely new concept. Officials of the defence departments and officers of the armed services are in intimate contact with the routines and procedures of the defence establishment. They, perhaps more than anyone else, are aware of the failings of their departments.

To assist the defence committee, therefore, it might be useful for the House of Commons to select eight or ten men from
the upper middle ranks of the defence establishment and to appoint them as assistants to the defence committee for a limited period, approximately two years. For this period these men would work as the servants of Parliament and not of the defence departments. Their job would be to work hand in hand with the Defence Auditor and his staff, in examining expenditures and administrative effectiveness. They would bring to their job the intimate knowledge of the administration of defence that comes with fifteen or more years of experience working within the establishment. With the assistance of such a group, and with the power of Parliament behind it, the defence committee no doubt could keep the department under careful scrutiny. Certainly post-audit control of expenditures would be greatly improved. Greater effectiveness in administration would also arise. And arbitrary conduct by departmental officials would be far more hazardous.

One great advantage of such a committee would be that although able to impose forceful controls, these would not necessarily have to be inflexible ones as inevitably follows from statutory controls. A committee concerned with control of expenditure, administrative effectiveness and the rule of law would not necessarily give rise to greater rigidities, more red-tape and less effectiveness. Rather, assuming that it would
be concerned with good administration, it might well serve to help eliminate many of the rigidities long associated with big government.

For such a committee to work effectively would require a certain amount of sophistication within the defence establishment. The men appointed from the defence establishment would have to be anxious to promote economies and improve administration. And the remainder of the establishment would have to learn to accept that in serving Parliament for a few years their colleagues were not dealing unfairly or "double-crossing" the defence departments.

Although such a committee would operate in a non-partisan atmosphere, much as the Public Accounts Committee under the Diefenbaker government, and there would be a limited concept of ministerial responsibility, the general effectiveness of defence administration would still be a political topic. An ineffective recruitment campaign, waste in a shipbuilding programme or repeated examples of poor administration even in the lower reaches of the defence establishment would much as ever be the legitimate object of opposition criticism. But no longer would the ministers, faced as they are with difficult policy problems, be forced to fight for their "lives" each time the opposition
was able to uncover the smallest example of maladministration.

The purpose of such a committee would be to keep the efficacy and economy of the defence department under continuous surveillance. It would not be the function of such a committee to suggest the types of reform required, although it might do so occasionally, but rather to determine where the departments were working least effectively and then to suggest the necessity of change and improvement. In other words its role would be primarily critical rather than constructive.

It might finally be noted that such a committee, in view of the experiments of the 1958-1962 period, would not be out of step with recent developments. The impact of the Public Accounts Committee, apart from improving parliamentary control of expenditure, was to remove much of the more minor aspects of administration and finances from the realm of politics. Criticisms in the reports of the Committee were occasionally mentioned in Commons debates without partisan objectives. Members seemed to accept the idea that the objective promotion of administrative effectiveness and economy was compatible with their other parliamentary and partisan functions. Thus the type of defence committee I am proposing is not really revolutionary.
The 1945-1962 period was one in which Parliament exercised little control over defence. Certainly control of defence expenditure and administration, even when at its best, was almost negligible and control of estimates was non-existent. Effective controls are required and with such an enormous task, small alterations in Commons or committee procedures are not likely to produce significant changes.

Control of broad defence policy was not even attempted in the 1945 to 1957 period. Much of the control exercised since then, although no doubt considerable, has been of an irresponsible nature.

The appointment of a committee could be the machinery for change and improvement. But it is no guarantee of change and improvement. Its usefulness would be determined by the attitude of the government and opposition toward it, the quality of the men who sit on it, the attitudes these men hold and the demands and pressures from the general public. Given the proper conditions, however, it could serve admirably to improve control of expenditures, promote administrative effectiveness and clarify confusing debates on what should be non-controversial issues such as the purpose and effectiveness of a particular weapons system. And with sufficient information emanating from such a committee,
defence policy, and the estimates which are based upon it, could be debated at a level more beneficial to the defence departments and the general public alike.
In tabulating questions on page 277, considerable care was taken to guarantee a representative sampling. The number of pages analyzed for each Parliament was never fewer than twenty per cent of the total number of pages in the entire Parliament. In the analysis, I dealt with a few full sessions rather than small sections of several. This was necessary because the number of questions decreases rapidly toward the end of each session, when members are burdened with a heavy schedule. By analyzing one or more full sessions for each Parliament, therefore, greater accuracy was ensured. It should be remembered finally that the statistical data in the table is for the sample periods and not the full Parliament.

Most of the headings in the table are self-explanatory. Some clarification on "content", however, is necessary. It was originally my intention to employ the system used by William P. Irvine in The Functioning of the Opposition in Canada and Great Britain (Appendix A). In this Mr. Irvine divided questions into three categories - policy, factual and constituency. I originally analyzed my sampling in this way but I found that over a period of
weeks it was impossible to maintain consistency in separating policy from fact. I therefore grouped policy and fact into a single category and contrasted these with constituency questions. The latter type dealt with developments, installations and expenditures of the defence departments as they affected the constituency of the member making the inquiry. Included in this category also were questions in which the member asked questions which made it appear as if his primary purpose were to represent the interests of his province.

Finally, it should be noted that all supplementary questions followed from orals asked on the Orders of the Day and not from the written question period.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

1. During the inter-war years the permanent establishment generally numbered between 4000 and 6000. By early 1939 it had increased to just under 8000. The peak year for the militia was 1930-31 when it totalled 54,376.

2. Hereafter abbreviated N.A.T.O.

3. Hereafter abbreviated N.O.R.A.D.

4. In addition to having installations in many of the most remote areas of Canada, it has personnel scattered through Indo-China, the Middle East and West Europe.


8. For example, the educational function can be related to that of control for the process of control depends in part upon Parliament informing the general public and thus helping to shape public opinion.


14. On this point it is perhaps noteworthy that the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation parliamentary party at times indicated that it was responsible to its national non-parliamentary convention. Although the discussion in this chapter is confined almost entirely to the House of Commons there are equally good grounds for regarding senators as representatives of political parties as their appointments are generally rewards in return for services rendered to a particular party.

15. See below p.16.

17. For a brief discussion of this role see Harold Laski, op.cit., p.163.
18. Although Jennings does not define control, he nevertheless writes: "The tactics of the Opposition are therefore directed to the conversion not of the Government's party - but of the electorate outside." See Ivor Jennings, op.cit., p.172.
20. On nine occasions since 1945, three times each by the Minister of National Defence, the senior defence critic of the official opposition and the leader of the opposition, a full speech has been devoted to defence in the Budget Debate.
21. Such motions require the approval of the Speaker (although his ruling may be challenged) and 20 members of the Commons. See Arthur Beauchesne, Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, (4th Edition), Toronto, 1958, p.74.
22. The years were 1950 (Second Session), 1951 (First Session), 1952-53, 1960. Amendments attacking the defence programme were introduced in each of these years except 1952-53. In addition, in 1945 (Second Session), an amendment was introduced.
23. The first six Mondays in any session that there are motions to go into Supply, the Speaker leaves the chair. The subject of the debate which follows is generally chosen by the opposition and it may be defence. When it is, there is generally little discussion of defence policy on the first item in the defence estimates. The debates may last no more than two days. When defence is not debated on one of these six motions, a full-scale debate is held on item one in the defence estimates.
24. See below p. 326.
25. Ivor Jennings, op.cit., p.146. For a full discussion of this point see pp.143-147. See also H. Laski, op.cit., pp.157-158.
28. If the four criteria sound a little too general these are nevertheless an improvement over those presented by James Eayrs who claims simply that "legislative influence on foreign policy" can be measured by two standards. "One is the extent to which the Cabinet allows legislators time and opportunity for constructive criticism. The other is the quality of such parliamentary discussion as may result." See James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada, Toronto, 1961, p.104.
29. By 1949 the number had dwindled to six and by 1953 to three. In 1934 the Hon. Grote Stirling was appointed Minister of National Defence and in 1935 the Hon. Earl Rowe, Minister without Portfolio. Several members had held provincial portfolios.

CHAPTER II
1. Exceptions include members of the Canadian Communist Party, fellow travellers and other Communist sympathizers.
2. See Canada: Official Report of the Debates of the House of Commons, February 12, 1945, pp.345-348. (Hereafter the following abbreviation for this source will be used. Deb., H.C.).
5. Hereafter abbreviated C.C.F.
7. Letter from M.J. Coldwell, October 24, 1962. In this letter Mr. Coldwell admits that he made suggestions of this type on numerous occasions and reiterates his belief that defence policy should centre around such ideas.
11. For a contrary viewpoint see James Eayrs, Northern Approaches, Toronto, 1961, pp.57-59. He argues that the decision to join came primarily as a solution to "two of the most fundamental problems of Canadian external policy, preserving a measure of influence vis-à-vis the United Kingdom and the United States and avoiding an agonizing choice between the policies of each." p.59.
17. Ibid., January 31, 1949, pp.92-93.
18. In a letter to the author, M.J. Coldwell has implied that the article was included at his request. Letter from M.J. Coldwell, October 24, 1962.
21. Spencer has argued that the speech by Mr.L.R. Beaudoin was the only one that dealt with the implication of Mr.St.Laurent's speech. I feel that the speech was not worthy of special attention. See Spencer, Canada in World Affairs, p.256.
23. Deb., H.C., February 1, 1949, p.117.
24. Ibid., p.118.
25. Ibid., February 4, 1949, p.239.
27. Ibid., pp.2075-2076.
28. See speech by Mr. Heon, ibid., pp.2089-2090.
33. Ibid., February 5, 1951, pp.92-98.
34. Ibid., May 8, 1951, p.2797.
35. Ibid., p.2805.
36. Ibid., p.2807.
38. Ibid., February 15, 1951, p.376.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., pp.379-380.
42. The final figure, calculating roughly all the proposed expenditures, was $2.8 - $3.7 billions. This includes close to $2 billion on air defences alone.
44. Ibid., February 5, 1951, p.107.
46. Ibid., p.339.
47. Deb., H.C., September 11, 1945 (2nd Session), p.97.
48. Ibid., September 10, 1945 (2nd Session), p.34.
49. Ibid., September 11, 1945 (2nd Session), pp.77-79.
50. Ibid., pp.103-105.
51. Ibid., pp.99-101, Mr. Abbott.
52. Ibid., October 29, 1945 (2nd Session), pp.1589-1591.
53. Ibid., October 29-30, 1945 (2nd Session), pp.1589-1675.
54. Ibid., October 30, 1945 (2nd Session), p.1646.
56. Ibid. My emphasis added.
61. Hereafter abbreviated S.A.C.
64. Ibid., June 20-22, 1956, pp.5208-5324 and July 18-July 20, 1956, pp.6117-6275.
68. Ibid., March 25, 1954, pp.3329-3331.
70. Ibid., March 26, 1954, p.3372.
73. Ibid., p.4905.
74. Ibid., p.4906.
75. Ibid., p.4913.
76. Ibid., pp.4913-4916.
78. Ibid., pp.4908-4909.
79. Ibid., p.4910.
81. Ibid., June 20, 1956, p.5209.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., pp.5217-5222 and June 21, 1956, p.5259.
84. Deb., H.C., June 20, 1956, p.5223.
86. See above p.34.
87. Deb., H.C., August 23, 1946, pp.5258-5259. The word "Imperialist" here refers to the British Empire and not to imperialism as the last stage of capitalist development.
89. Ibid., p.40.
90. Ibid.
92. Ibid., August 19, 1946, pp.5036-5038.
93. Ibid., 5037.
94. It was announced that the post-war forces that were to number some 51,000 would only be recruited up to three-quarters establishment.
95. Deb., H.C., February 6, 1947, p.171.
96. Ibid., p.172.
97. Deb., H.C., February 6, 1947, p.173
100. Ibid., p.389.
102. Ibid., February 13, 1947, p.413.
103. Ibid., p.388.
104. Ibid., July 9, 1947, pp.5267-5272.
105. Ibid.

106. All periodical literature catalogued in the Canadian Index for this period (February-June, 1947) was perused. None of it stressed the need for a more definite defence programme.


110. Ibid., June 8, 1950.
113. Ibid., June 8, 1950, p.3380.

CHAPTER III

1. Deb., H.C., September 6, 1945 (2nd Session), pp.7-9.
2. Ibid., p.8.
5. Ibid., October 4, 1945 (2nd Session), p.783.
7. Ibid., August 19, 1946, p.5044.
8. Hereafter abbreviated C.C.F.
11. See e.g. The Province (Vancouver), December 13, 1946, p.2.

16. Ibid., March 5, 1951. On April 1, 1951, Mr. Howe was appointed Minister of Defence Production.

17. Hereafter abbreviated R.C.A.F.


20. Ibid., October 19, 1951, p.214.


22. Ibid., April 4, 1952, p.1131.


25. Ibid., April 15, 1953, p.3897.


28. Ibid., June 20, 1956, p.5210.


31. Ibid., November 1, 1945, p.1712.

32. Ibid., pp.1712-1713.

33. Ibid., August 19, 1946, p.5055.

34. Deb., H.C., October 16, 1945, p.1135.

35. Ibid., September 6, 1950 (2nd Session), pp.335-336.

36. Ibid., September 2, 1950 (2nd Session), p.159.

37. Ibid., September 1, 1950 (2nd Session), p.132.

38. Ibid., September 6, 1950 (2nd Session), p.320.

39. Ibid.


41. Ibid., June 17, 1955, p.951.

42. Ibid., June 20, 1955, p.5211.

43. See e.g. Supply debates in 1951. Deb., H.C., May 8-10, 1951, pp.2812-2915. This subject is examined again in the concluding chapter. See above, pp. 324-325, 335-337.

44. In a letter to the author Mr. Campney has argued that he could recall no single occasion when the opposition made a constructive suggestion. He claims that it was the habit of the Conservative Party to get the drift of what was happening in the defence department and then to throw out to the government these ideas as their own suggestions. I submit that even if Mr. Campney is correct, it still requires some instinctive ability and research to pick out the rumours most based on fact.

45. I am of course making the assumption, perhaps unfair, that government decisions are rational decisions.


47. See above chaps.5-7.
48. See e.g. Deb., H.C., June 23, 1956, the case of the regimental billy-goat.
49. See e.g. cases presented by Mr. Coldwell, October 29, 1945, pp.1594-1595.
50. See e.g. case of Romeo Santerre, Deb., H.C., March 17, 1950, pp.869-870, 878-879. See also other case on same day, pp.879-880.
52. See statements by French-Canadian members of Parliament, e.g. Deb., H.C., March 9, 1951, pp.2863-2864, June 27, 1951, pp.4781-4782, June 27, 1951, pp.4786-4787. For ministerial statements see Deb., H.C., May 8, 1951, pp.2801-2802. 1951 was not an exceptional year.
54. Ibid., April 6, 1949, pp.2389-2390.
55. Ibid., pp.2390-2391.
56. Ibid.
58. Ibid., pp.1424-1425.
68. Ibid., pp.640-641.
71. Ibid., December 17, 1952, pp.861-870.

74. Several days before the Report was made public a copy of it was given to Mr. Coldwell without the knowledge of Mr. Currie or Mr. Claxton. Subsequently, an employee of the company that printed the Report was convicted of theft. As might be expected, this was the subject of heated debate, especially since the Report that was made public was less severe than the draft in the possession of Mr. Coldwell.

77. See below pp.227-231.
80. The Annual Register, Toronto, 1954, p.76.
81. Ibid.
82. The first such study was done by John Meisel on the 1957 general election. See The Canadian General Election of 1957, Toronto, 1962.
83. The Progressive Conservative Party won 50 seats; the C.C.F. 23; the Social Credit Party 15.
84. The Progressive Conservative Party won 41; the C.C.F. 13; the Social Credit Party 10.
85. It dropped from 15,104 to 9,082. But the number who cast ballots also dropped by approximately 7,000.
86. The C.C.F. and Labour Progressive Party candidates together polled less than 1,000 votes.
87. To the extent that policy is implemented through legislation it might even have been more satisfactory to include this section in chapter 2.
88. It was introduced on April 18, 1950. See Deb., H.C., p.1682.
89. See below pp.296-297.
91. Ibid., May 16, 1950, p.2562.
92. Ibid.
94. Ibid., pp.3318-3319.
97. Ibid., e.g. April 22, 1953, pp.4204-4210.
CHAPTER IV

4. Ibid., November 22, 1957, p.1409.
5. Ibid., p.1410.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. See points mentioned above on pp.110 and 113.
350

17. Ibid., June 19, 1958, p.1426.
20. Ibid., June 10-11, 1958, pp.999-1061.
23. Ibid., p.1005.
24. Ibid., pp.1026-1028.
25. Ibid., p.1004.
26. Ibid., pp.1018-1019.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p.1021.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., June 11, 1958, p.1048.
32. Ibid., pp.1059-1060.
33. Ibid, p.1060.
34. Ibid., pp.1060-1061.

35. The disagreement on West German entry into N.A.T.O. was more a disagreement on foreign policy than on defence.
37. See speech by Mr. Pearson tracing Mr. Pearkes' equivocation, Deb., H.C., February 23, 1959, pp.1288-1290. The content of the speech was not refuted by Mr. Pearkes.
38. See unfuted reference in speech by Mr. Pearson, Deb., H.C., February 23, 1959, p.1289.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., November 15, 1957, p.1205.
43. Ibid., August 8, 1958, p.3235.
45. Ibid., August 8, 1958, p.3229.
46. Ibid., January 19, 1959, p.45.
47. Ibid., pp.56-57.
49. Ibid.
50. See, Ibid., pp.1284-1288.
51. Ibid., p.1273.
52. Deb., H.C., February 23, 1959, p.1280.
53. The entire debate took place on February 23, 1959. All statements attributed to different speakers can be found in Deb., H.C., February 23, 1959, pp.1271-1310.


55. Ibid., p.1300.

56. Ibid., pp.1304-1306.


58. Hereafter abbreviated I.C.B.M.


60. Ibid., pp.1503-1504.

61. Ibid., p.1508.


64. See e.g. Deb., H.C., August 8, 1958, pp.3226-3231.

65. Ibid., p.3230.

66. Ibid., e.g. March 3, 1959, p.1558, Mr. Hellyer.

67. Ibid., e.g. August 8, 1958, p.3234, Mr. Peters, or February 23, 1959, p.1509, Mr. Winch.


70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., July 2, 1959, pp.5375-5376.


73. Ibid., pp.5363-5365.

74. Ibid., p.5371.

75. Ibid., January 1u, 1960, p.40.

76. Ibid., p.72.


78. Ibid., March 28, 1960, p.2496.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid., pp.2513-2515.

81. See e.g. The Province, editorial of August 9, 1960, p.4.


83. Ibid., August 4, 1960, pp.7556-7557.


85. Ibid., August 5, 1960, pp.7599-7610.

86. Ibid., pp.7603-7604.

87. The Liberals, it no doubt has been observed, were having considerably difficulty making a decision on nuclear weapons.

88. The Province, editorial of August 9, 1960, p.4.


90. Ibid., pp.1599-1611.


92. Ibid., p.8234.
93. Ibid., September 14, 1961, p.8339.

94. N.D.P. policy was almost identical to the policies adopted by the C.C.F. national convention in September, 1960. In their resolutions the C.C.F. demanded withdrawal both from N.A.T.O. and N.O.R.A.D. and the acceptance of a neutral role in world politics. The N.D.P. also called for withdrawal from N.O.R.A.D. but gave conditional support to N.A.T.O. - the condition being that no other N.A.T.O. countries, except those already in possession, be equipped with nuclear arms.

95. Deb., H.C., e.g. March 30, 1962, pp.2337-2338.


98. Letter from Mr. Pearkes, March 12, 1962.

99. Interview with the Hon. Paul Hellyer, March 23, 1962. Mr. Hellyer has provided all the information that I was able to acquire concerning the parliamentary organization of the Liberals. The letters from Mr. Pearkes, March 12, 1962, and Mr. Harkness, March 15, 1962, provided the information on the organization of the Progressive Conservative Party.

100. The Hon. Grote Stirling had served as defence minister for one year but after 1945 his was a relatively minor position in the Conservative defence committee. On a few occasions he was authorized to give Conservative naval policy to the House of Commons.

101. This idea was first put to me in the interview with Mr. Hellyer, March 23, 1962. I at first viewed it with some amusement and considerable scepticism since he was using it to justify the need for a Commons defence committee to deal with policy. Since then, however, I have found that this notion was also subscribed to by Mr. Pearkes, Deb., H.C., August 8, 1958, pp.3221-3222 and by a representative of the C.C.F. Ibid., p.3233.

102. This point was corroborated by Mr. J.M. Macdonnell in a letter to the author, October 25, 1962.


104. Keirstead, op.cit., p.133.

105. See above pp.124 and 133.

106. Interview with Mr. Hellyer, March 23, 1962.

107. Although it is difficult to document this point, it should be noted that numerous senior civilian personnel have resigned since the 1957 general election and that many of these men had not yet reached the retirement age. Included in this group were the Deputy Ministers of National Defence and Defence Production. The former has since been elected to the House of Commons as a Liberal member.

Letter from Mr. Pearkes, March 12, 1962.
Letter from Mr. Harkness, March 15, 1962.
Interview with Mr. Hellyer, March 23, 1962.
It must be realized that it is easier to draw generalization for a thirteen year period that it is for five years. The task was made even more difficult by the fact that two select committees dealt with defence between 1957 and 1962, thus cutting down the work carried out in debates.

See above, pp.90-91.
See e.g. Deb., H.C., December 5, 1957, p.1928 (Mr. Bryce), July 2, 1959, p.5433 (Mr. Hellyer), July 2, 1959, pp.5426-5427, 5450-5454 (Mr. Dinsdale).
No section has been included on control of legislation because of the lack of defence legislation introduced during this period.

CHAPTER V

5. It was not published in 1950-51.
11. Ibid., August 1, 1958, p.592.
15. Ibid., pp.6467-6468.
16. On two occasions, however, in 1958 and 1960, they were dealt with by select committees of the House of Commons.
20. At this time the relevant statute was the "Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act," Statutes of Canada, 1931, chap.27, p.119; section 29 of that act was roughly similar to section 30 of the 1951 "Financial Administration Act."
29. Statutes of Canada, 1931, chap.5, p.120.
32. Ibid., section (3), p.20.
33. See above, pp.3-5.
34. This matter is dealt with quite fully in the concluding chapter See below pp. 331-337.
36. See e.g. P.A.C., March 8, 1956, p.3.
39. Ibid., April 28, 1949, p.2673, Mr. Drew.
40. Ibid., Deb., H.C., November 13, 1951, p.954.
CHAPTER VI

4. Ibid.
9. Ibid., sect.66, p.2286.
10. The enabling legislation during these years was the "Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act", 1931, under which the Auditor General's powers were similar but broader. See Statutes of Canada, 1931, chap.27, sect.50, p.126.
12. Ibid., 1948-1949, p.21, item 76 or ibid., 1949-1950, p.12,item 32.
17. Ibid., 1947-1948, p.20, item 66.
20. See below pp.207-208.
26. The numbers used are those employed in the official proceedings of the committees. It sometimes happens that two meetings are put under a single number. Thus in fact there were more than fifty meetings.
28. Ibid., March 1, 1951, p.9.
30. Ibid., pp.159-163.
32. Ibid., April 26, 1951, pp.225-228.
33. Ibid., May 1, 1951, pp.235-239.
34. Deb., H.C., February 19, 1951, p.443.
35. P.A.C., May 1, 1951, pp.246-247.
36. Ibid., pp.248-249.
38. Ibid., Meetings No.6-12, April 7-May 10, 1951, pp.151-346.
40. Ibid., May 10, 1951, pp.327-344.
41. P.A.C., June 5, 1951, pp.531-534.
42. Ibid., Fifth report to H.C., June 29, 1951, pp.691-693.
43. Deb., H.C., November 13, 1951, p.954.
44. Of these some 24 had served with the Armed Forces.
46. It should be noted, however, that to be recorded as present, a member had only to attend for a few minutes.
47. Special Committee on Defence Expenditures, House of Commons, (hereafter abbreviated D.E.C.), Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, December 13, 1951, p.130. For record of vote see the minutes of that day.
49. At the close of the 1951 meeting, the chairman left the record open an extra day so that members might put further questions. In this way, with the answers ready before the 1952 meetings began, it
was hoped members would be better informed and hence be able to
derive greater value from the committee proceedings.

51. Deb., H.C., April 21, 1951, p.1424.
52. D.E.C., minutes of proceedings of April 29, 1952, p.83,
contains sub-committee motion.
53. Ibid., pp.83-84.
54. Ibid., p.84.
56. Ibid., p.178.
59. D.E.C., May 8, 1952, p.163. A document was filed for each
of the three services but not included in the public record. The
document presented was typical of the cooperation the Committee
received from the defence department. The request was made
Tuesday morning and by Thursday the reply was ready. The R.C.A.F.
section alone totalled 74 pages and required 442 man hours to compile.
63. Ibid., pp.307-309.
64. Ibid., June 3,1952, pp.344-345.
65. Ibid., June 10, 1952 meeting.
67. Ibid., p.460.
68. See above pp.185-186.
70. Deb., H.C., January 22, 1953, pp.1224-1225.
75. D.E.C., See meetings February 19-March 5, 1953, pp.157-301.
77. Ibid., pp.309-316.
79. Ibid., March 26, 1953, pp.483-494.
81. Ibid., p.815.
82. Ibid.

CHAPTER VII
1. In fact none of the committees relevant to this study met
during the brief twenty-third Parliament.
3. See below pp.200-203.
4. I am arguing that in serving as chairmen, both Messieurs Picard and Cannon acted in a non-partisan manner. As members of the Public Accounts Committee, however, their behaviour in interrogating witnesses was occasionally motivated by party considerations.
22. Ibid., June 12, 1958, pp.31-52.
24. Ibid., June 19, 1958, p.95. My impression was that members were very anxious to recommend reductions in the estimates. Ward, The Public Purse, p.271, apparently agrees. In contrast the Deputy Minister of National Defence told me that in his view any cuts would have been viewed by the government as a vote of non-confidence.
27. See above pp.167-168.
29. Interview with Deputy Minister Armstrong, October 12, 1962.
30. Fifth report, Estimates Committee to H.C., August 6, 1953, p.590.
33. This varied for there were numerous changes in membership.
34. The Standing Committee on External Affairs also at times tended to be non-partisan.
37. Ibid., May 2, 1960, pp.3443-3444.
42. Ibid., p.631.
43. Ibid., p.632.
44. Ibid.
48. It took a full year for a non-partisan atmosphere to be established. The 1958 investigation into the Printing Bureau in Hull was very partisan. The expenditure had been made by the Liberal government.

CHAPTER VIII
2. The only study was a short paper by Harry W. Walker, "Question Time in Parliament", *Queen's Quarterly*, vol.59, 1952, pp.64-71. This was primarily descriptive although it did contain a few suggestions for improvement.
5. Standing Orders of the House of Commons, no.39.
6. Ibid.
9. Letter from the Clerk of the House of Commons, no date.
12. Thus there are three types of question. The reader should take care not to confuse the oral question with the starred question which is written but for oral reply.
13. The sessions covered include the third and fifth of the twentieth Parliament; the third, fifth and seventh of the twenty-first Parliament; the third of both the twenty-second and twenty-fourth Parliaments.

14. The number of pages of Hansard analyzed was 8920 for the twentieth Parliament, 8763 for the twenty-first, 7600 for the twenty-second and 7957 for the twenty-fourth.

15. See above pp.140-141.


19. See above, pp.155-156.

20. See e.g. Deb., H.C., May 3, 1960, pp.3491-3492, Mr. Garland.

21. See above, p.80.

CHAPTER IX

2. See above p.19.


4. Ibid., April 28, 1949, pp.338-341.


7. See above pp.109-120.


10. See e.g. Deb., Sen., August 10, 1960. Appropriation Bill No.6 was introduced at 9.20 p.m. on this day which was the last day of the session. See p.1256. The bill was read a third time approximately an hour and a half later. See p.1264.

11. This statement perhaps could be challenged on the grounds that the Finance Committee of the Senate has occasionally been referred the estimates. This is dealt with later. See below, pp.294-295.


13. Ibid., April 18, 1962, pp.540-549. Two appropriation bills were approved in one and a half hours.


20. Unfortunately the proceedings of the Standing Committee on Banking and Commerce were published irregularly. Before 1954 they were not published although since then their proceedings have been published. As a result much of the analysis in the text is second-hand coming from the reports of the Committee to the Senate and references in the debates to the work of the Committee.
27. I read only one speech on these three subjects which I would classify as motivated primarily by partisan considerations and this was made by a senator who had only recently left the Commons. See Deb., Sen., February 24, 1959, pp.213-217.

CHAPTER X
1. See above pp.4-5.
2. See above p.146. It should be noted that such a theory does not stand up against a careful consideration of all developments in defence and foreign policy after 1945. The most obvious example of disagreement was the Suez Crisis.
4. See above pp.109-140.
5. It should also be noted that numerous candidates seeking a House of Commons seat in the 1963 general election indicated they would accept the decision of such a committee.
7. It is noteworthy that this idea was only contained among the recommendations of the Glassco Commission. See the Royal Commission on Government Organization, vol.1, p.100. On the other hand it also recommended reducing the number of votes which I feel would decrease parliamentary control by increasing the room for shifting moneys from one programme to another.

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III. ARTICLES AND PAMPHLETS


IV. NEWSPAPERS


V. CORRESPONDENCE

In response to inquiries, I received letters from the following men:-


3. Clerk of the House of Commons, no date.


VI INTERVIEWS
