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A study of a regional peace machinery in the Pacific Kuo, Chang-Lu 1944

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If r, < O -A STUDY OF A REGIONAL PEACE MACHINERY IN THE PACIFIC •By •Chang-Lu Kuo A T h e s i s S u b m i t t e d i n P a r t i a l F u l f i l m e n t of The Requirements f o r the Degree of • MASTER OF ARTS • .in t he Department • o f ECONOMICS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND SOCIOLOGY .THE U N I V E R S I T Y OF B R I T I S H COLUMBIA TAPRIL, 1 9 4 4 . TABLE OF CONTENTS I . INTRODUCTION 1 I I . HISTORY OF REGIONAL MACHINERY IN THE PACIFIC ...14 I I I . WAR AIMS AND PEACE AIMS IN THE FAR EAST. 49 IV. BASIC CONDITIONS OF THE PEACE TO THE FAR EAST. . .96 V. PROPOSED REGIONAL PEACE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE. . .152 PACIFIC AREA YI. CHINA AND JAPAN'S POSITION IN THE NEW PACIFIC. .195 ORDER V I I . CONCLUSION 235 BIBLIOGRAPHY A STUDY OF A REGIONAL PEACE MACHINERY IN THE PACIFIC CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Regionalism and universalism are two general methods of approach to the creation of an international authority. The former can be reached through a tight organization in a limited region, while the l a t t e r may be attained by a loose or t i g h t organization covering a wide area* The League of Nations, set up i n 1920, was an attempt at the l a t t e r approach. It had to be loose because i t was designed to include a large number of states. At one time, i t did have f i f t y - t h r e e members including a l l the great powers in the world except the United States. It i s generally admitted that there are some advantages of a universal international organization over a regional system. F i r s t , i t does not divide the world on a simple basis of balance of power into armed camps which sooner or l a t e r operate against each other and thus provoke rather than prevent war. Secondly, i t provides a common basis and generally a more ef f e c t i v e one for n o n - p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s i n which p r a c t i c a l l y a l l nations have a common in t e r e s t . T h i r d l y , i t does not exclude by reason of geo-graphic location any state that wishes to jo i n . And fourthly, i t would give better protection to i t s members because of i t s very s i z e . The chief weakness of the universal system l i k e the League of Nations l i e s i n the fact of i t s d i f f u s i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The problems presented themselves to an organization which includes a large member of states with differences i n interest and in form of government are inevitably confusing with one another. It i s very d i f f i c u l t for member states to take action in dealing with a c o n f l i c t a r i s i n g among them. When war or threat of war takes place, a distant member cannot be expected to undertake the same burden as near-by nations i n stopping the aggressor. Even on n o n - p o l i t i c a l matters, remote control would be handicapped by distance and u n f a m i l i a r i t y . Regionalism was introduced by nations with a view to free from such defects within the universal system. The o r i g i n of i t was motivated primarily by considerations of national security and p a r t i c u l a r l o c a l circumstances, and i t was also nearly always based on the desire to exploit more f u l l y the p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s presented by the physical propinquity of organized people or sovereign states l i v i n g or located within a p a r t i c u l a r area. In the postwar period of World War I, advocates of the regional plan d i f f e r e d in t h e i r interpretations of the term. But i t was generally conceded that regional organiz-ations would not be completely independent of the universal system and i t would be within the framework of the world structure. Within the l a t t e r organization group of nations located i n a p a r t i c u l a r region should bind themselves s t i l l more closely together for mutual safety and a i d . Regionalism may tend to make a tighter and a more e f f i c i e n t organization and also have a stronger executive power which would enable i t to do many things that the looser universal organization i s unable to do. It i s more easily organized because of the proximity of i t s members, as well as a greater l i k e l i h o o d of common interest between them, Moreover, regionalism would not only contribute peace and security to the area i n which i t has been organized, but also to the world as a whole, because i t ^ royjJleS & possible s t a r t i n g point f o r a better wider union. When the advantages of a limited regional pact become apparent, other pacts might be,formed elsewhere t i l l eventually a l l nations might be drawn together to form a universal organization. . In the history of world p o l i t i c s , regionalism i s not a new idea. In the l a t t e r part of the nineteenth century, the world began to have experience on t h i s type of organization for promoting international understanding and mutual benefit i n areas where t h i s great novelty was introduced. The best known i l l u s t r a t i o n of i t representing the oldest regional system i n the world was the Inter-American Conferences which were held p e r i o d i c a l l y by twenty-one American Republics ever since 1890 and resulted i n a network of treaties and agreements for t h e i r common interest, In 1910 the Conference changed i t s name to Pan-American Union. It i s directed by a Governing Board consisting of representatives of a l l the American Republics who annually elect their own Chairman and appoint a Director General and an Assistant Director. The greatest success that has been achieved by the Union has mostly been i n n o n - p o l i t i c a l f i e l d s , such as cooperation for s o c i a l or i n t e l l e c t u a l purposes. Development of r e a l l y close p o l i t i c a l relations among the twenty-one American States was slow, u n t i l the threat from Germany and Japan and the outbreak of the present war made i t clear that the nations of the western hemisphere must act together i n self-defense. This Inter-American machinery, set up to meet quite s p e c i f i c needs a r i s i n g from the trend of events, proves to be the f i r s t and a good example of region-a l organizations i n the world. During the postwar period, in view of the inadequacy of the League of Nations to meet the s p e c i f i c demand of security i n some de f i n i t e areas, attempts were made to form regional organizations within Europe to supplement the League i n the maintenance of peace. They included the L i t t l e Entente, the Balkan Union, the Cooperation of the Scandinavian States and the B a l t i c Pact. The L i t t l e Entente was organized i n 1920 and 1921 by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania f o r the purpose of keeping i n t a c t the Treaty of Trianon. In March 1921, more-over, Rumania signed a treaty of al l i a n c e with Poland. Each signatory agreed to give m i l i t a r y aid to the other i n case of unprovoked attack from abroad. In 1933, permanent organizations which included a Permanent Council of Foreign Ministers, a Permanent Secretariat and an Economic Council were established in order to strengthen t h e i r c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s and f u r n i s h a concrete basis f o r mutual assistance. The L i t t l e Entente succeeded i n a remarkable degree of p o l i t i c a l cooperations, but, i n the economic f i e l d , i t showed no r e a l accomplishment. (1) The Balkan Conference afforded another example of the regional system i n Europe. The Balkan Union i s not a new idea. Even before the F i r s t World War, vain attempts were made to secure a Balkan Cooperation. But i t was not brought into being u n t i l 1934 when four Balkan nations-Greece, Turkey, Rumania and Yugoslavia - signed a non-aggression pact. It was the resu l t of a growing recognit-ion that the Balkan states were dependent on each other, and t h e i r agreeing i n effect to l e t bygones be bygones i n th e i r former disputes and to deal with each other as friends i n the future. (2) Just l i k e the Balkan countries, the Scandinavian nations contended with one another i n the past centuries. 1 Linden A. Mander, Foundations of Modern World Society, (Stanford University Press, Stanford University, C a l i f o r n i a 1940) pp.800-801. 2. R. J . Kerner and H. N. Howard, The Balkan Conference and the Balkan Entente.1930-1935 (University of C a l i f o r n i a Press Berkeley, 1936) pp. 239-263. Their c u l t u r a l s i m i l a r i t y did not prevent wars among them. During the period of the World War of 1914-1918, there were many elements that forced them to approach each other. Then they began to develop a f i n e regional international co-operation. Through the e f f o r t s of the Foreign Ministers of Scandinavian countries, the regional understanding enabled them to advance not only in p o l i t i c a l cooperation but i n economic, l e g a l and c u l t u r a l relations as well. (3) The B a l t i c Pact was signed by the three B a l t i c coun-t r i e s , Lithuania, Esthonla and Latvia i n 1954 i n order to cope with the precarious s i t u a t i o n a f t e r the advent of H i t l e r i n Germany and for the purpose of meeting t h e i r common needs i n the B a l t i c areas. It provided conferences to meet at regular i n t e r v a l s by t h e i r representatives and a joint council to be set up. A l l the regional organizations i n Europe did spendid work within t h e i r respective regions.Nevertheless, the complicated conditions and i n s t a b i l i t y i n European p o l i t i c s and the unsound foundation of the League made the regional system play only a limited part. Apart from the regional organizations which had been formed by the European nations, there were many projects 3. Mander, op. c i t . , pp. 804-806. which were designed by statesmen or p u b l i c i s t s with a view to bringing about a regional organization of Europe for certain p o l i t i c a l and economic objects. Due de S u l l y , one time French Superintendent of Finance i n the seven-teenth century, set out i n his memoirs a great plan of European organization which he claimed to have advised with his royal master, Henry IV. It has always been known as "The Grand Design of Henry IV", and combines regional and general organization i n much the same way as many plans produced i n our own time. (4) After the establishment of the League of Nations, there were many Europeans whose passionate desire for security was s t i l l not s a t i s f i e d . Not only did successive French governments press for supplementary guaranties, but u n o f f i c i a l groups also sprang up to urge a close and stronger union. In 1922, Count Goudenhove-Kalergi founded at Vienna an association devoted to the cause of Pan-European Union. A r i s t i d e Briand was an Honorary President of the association, and in 1925 Herriot, then Prime Minister of France, gave the association h i s approval i n the Ghambre. At i t s present headquarters i n Berne, i t s t i l l continues i t s work. Briand made a proposal f o r a United States of Europe and l a i d i t before the League of Nations i n 1929. The proposal known as "The Memorandum on the Organization of 4. P. 1. Corbett, Post War World ( I . P. R. Inquiry Series, Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1942) p. 28.. a System of European Federal Union" i s a curious mixture of a draft constitution and mere suggestions to be worked out by proposed series of constituent conferences. It speaks of "future Federal Union","the European Commonwealth", etc. It advocates a European Conference composed of representatives of a l l the European members of the League of Nations to act as "the primary d i r e c t i n g body", and an executive body consisting of a c e r t a i n number only of the members of the European Conference. But i t leaves the powers, the exact composition, the organization of these bodies and the procedure to be followed by them to be s e t t l e d by future meetings of the states of Europe. (5) None of these plans was put into p r a c t i c e , but they aroused a great interest i n Europe. At the present time they are already of some h i s t o r i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . Shortly before and during the period of the present war, regionalism is s t i l l .interested; i n the world. In Great B r i t a i n and the United States, the idea of federalism has prevailed. Some of the federal plans work out a fed-eration of the whole world, others advocate a li m i t e d regional federation, such as a federation of Anglo-American countries, a federation of democracies, and a federation of Europe or a federation of Western Europe excluding Soviet Russia. Among the thinkers of federalism, two of th-em are the most well-known at present; one i s Lionel Curtis 5. Ibid., pp. 29-30. - 8 who was an English lawyer and spent much of his l i f e f o r building constitutions i n the B r i t i s h Commonwealth. In his well-known book "Givitas Dei", he selects Great B r i t a i n , Australia and New Zealand to form a federal union which would have a joint legislature and executive operating always upon the i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n and c o l l e c t -ing tax for federal purposes. (6) The other one i s Clarence S t r e i t , an American correspondent at Geneva who watched at close hand the crumbling of the League. S t r e i t writes i n his book "Union Now" a federal plan urging the immediate federation of f i f t e e n democracies. Only democracies, according t o S t r e i t , are chosen, because the preservation and increase of man's freedom i s the prime objective of world government and t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m cannot cooperate i n i t s r e a l i z a t i o n . (7) Simultaneously, regionalism has played i t s part not only i n theory but i n r e a l p o l i t i c s of Europe. Some of the Governments i n e x i l e are giving considerable thought to larger p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n i n Europe. Their planning runs along the l i n e of a regional association. On November 4, 1941, representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland Yugoslavia and Greece, i n the Conference of the Internation a l Labour Office i n New York, signed a declaration i n favour of establishing a conference of the Central European and Balkan states which would act not only as an economic 6. Lionel Curtis , CiVitas Dei, (Oxford University Press, London, 1958) pp. 45-47. 7. Clarence S t r e i t , Union New, (Harper & Bros. New York, 1959) pp. 49-57. unit, but also as a union of defense against any resurgence of German imperialism. This was followed by an agreement between Greece and Yugoslavia, signed i n London on January 15, 1942. The exiled Governments of the two are to serve as "General foundation for the Organization of the Balkan Union". Other Balkan states, ruled by governments f r e e l y and l e g a l l y constituted w i l l be invited to jo i n . (8) Eight days l a t e r , on January 23, 1942, the Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia agreed on the broad l i n e s of t h e i r "Future Confederation". These include common p o l i c y i n foreign a f f a i r s , defense, economic and f i n a n c i a l matters, s o c i a l questions, transport and posts and telegrams. (9) The Polish-Czechoslovakia agreement concludes with an a r t i c l e mentioning of what has been made i n the previous week by Greece and Yugoslavia and promises collaboration with the Balkan Union. "Only the cooperation of the two regional organizations"runs the text "can assume the sec-u r i t y and develop the prosperity of the vast region stretching between the B a l t i c and Aegean Seas". (10) In the Far East, since the nineteenth century, the 8. New York Times, January 16, 1942. 9. Ibid., January 25, 1942. 10. Ibid. - 1G -government of the United States has t r i e d to secure i n t e r -national cooperation i n the Far Eastern a f f a i r s . In 1899 Secretary of State John Hay addressed his famous "Open Door" note to the great powers i n attempting to prevent China from p a r t i t i o n by the powers. The Washington Con-ference in 1922 set up f o r the maintenance of peace i n the P a c i f i c a diplomatic machinery which was the f i r s t regional organization in the Far East and would be discussed i n d e t a i l i n the next chapter. Moreover, the general systems of the c o l l e c t i v e security, such as the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact have covered the Far East, so the regional machinery operates hand i n hand with the general systems. For some time, the Far Eastern states, e s p e c i a l l y China, resorted to the regional as well as the general organizations i n an attempt to s e t t l e t h e i r disputes. Since the Mukden Incident, Chinese government submitted the Sino-Japanese disputes to the League and appealed over and over again to the League Powers to f u l f i l l t h e i r obligations under the Covenant against the aggressor. The League with i t s c a p i t a l i n Europe was primarily European and European-minded, and the major Powers backing i t l i k e Great B r i t a i n and France being European Powers were not interested i n the Far Eastern imbroglio. Therefore, the League f a i l e d onee more to curb the arrogant aggressor, and the c o l l e c t -ive security was displayed as an empty formula* - 11 -With the experience of the League i n handling i n t e r -national controversies i n the P a c i f i c , i t was proposed to strengthen the regional structure i n the Far East. In 1931, at the Hangchow and Shanghai Conferences of the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, there were dif f e r e n t proposals to improve or to create a new diplomatic mach-inery of the P a c i f i c . Furthermore, at the Banff Conference 1933, two Japanese professors recommended a regional organization i n the P a c i f i c with a treaty of security, non-aggression and a r b i t r a t i o n . (11) Among western writers similar ideas were not lacking and Raymond L e s l i s Buell was the f i r s t one of them to make suggestions f o r the reorganization of the regional machinery i n the P a c i f i c . ( I S ) After Pearl Harbour, there has been a growing tendency among the United Nations to plan a better world for the future. Some thinkers have paid t h e i r attention to the P a c i f i c to make blueprints of peace conditions and regional machinery through which a l a s t i n g peace can be attained. A l l these provide ample evidence of the need for a s p e c i a l P a c i f i c organization. Even though the United Nations are ready f o r a powerful general organization of the world,(13) the peculiar and complex problems of the Far Eastern area 11. I n f r a . pp„ 46-48," 18. Infra, note 25, p. 36, 13. The Declaration of the Moscow Conference by the four great United Nations at Novermber 1, 1943, provides that they recognize the necessity of establishing "a general i n t e r -national organization on the p r i n c i p l e of sovereign equality of a l l peace-loving states and open to membership by a l l such states" for maintaining peace. - 12 -would require a regional machinery decentralized and adopted to t h i s p a r t i c u l a r environment. When the War i s over, i t seems that there .will be an urgent need to set up a machinery on a regional basis for the re-establishment of peace i n the P a c i f i c . Just as the Far Eastern c r i s i s was the precursor of the present world-wide c o n f l i c t , so restoration of peace i n the P a c i f i c w i l l be a prerequisite condition for a universal peace of the world. It i s due time f o r us to study the problems and s t a r t peace planning at present i n order that the United Nations w i l l not be caught unprepared for making peace at the moment when peace conference i s opened. What w i l l be the basic conditions, however, to the peace of the Far East i n advance to the setting-up of a regional mach-inery? How and when can i t be organized? And what w i l l be China and.Japan's p o s i t i o n i n the postwar world? A l l these problems w i l l be discussed i n the following chapters of t h i s t h e s i s . - 13 -CHAPTER II HISTORY OF REGIONAL MACHINERY IN THE PACIFIC Before we go through the history of regional machinery in the P a c i f i c , i t i s desirable to become acquainted with some ideas of the peace machinery on bases other than reg-ional i n order to understand the general scope of peace structures i n the P a c i f i c areas. The contemporary his t o r y shows that, i n addition to the regional machinery, there was also, i n the Far East, organizations set up on b i l a t e r a l and universal bases. The b i l a t e r a l machinery is based upon b i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s between the P a c i f i c powers. After the f i r s t Hague Peace Conference i n 1899 and e s p e c i a l l y since the inauguration of the League of Nations i n 1920, the European as well as American States made a very large number of b i l a t e r a l a r b i t r a t i o n and c o n c i l i a t i o n -treaties. These tended to grow not only i n number but also i n the comprehensiveness of the obligation to submit disputes to p a c i f i c settlements. The United States had a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s with f o r t y nations and most of the European countries had almost an equal number of such t r e a t i e s , the obligations i n general being more far-reaching than the American type of t r e a t i e s . China, Japan and Siam made very few such t r e a t i e s . Japan had only two a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s , - 14 -one with the Netherlands and one with Switzerland. China had c o n c i l i a t i o n and a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s with the United States and a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s with B r a z i l and the Netherlands. Siam had a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s with Great B r i t a i n and the Netherlands, and old a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s with Austria, Hungary, Belgium, I t a l y , Sweden and Norway. (1) The general t r e a t i e s providing for a universal machinery f a l l into three groups, which may be distinguished as the Hague, the Geneva and the American systems. The f i r s t group i s the Hague system containing some of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which though le s s used since the F i r s t World War than formerly, are s t i l l i n force among a large number of states and have been u t i l i z e d in some cases since the war. • The f i r s t part of the Hague Convention that provides a universal basis f o r peace machinery i s the Hague Con-vention of 1899 and 1907 f o r the P a c i f i c Settlement of International Disputes which i s i n force between f o r t y four states. A l l of the P a c i f i c powers, except the B r i t i s h Umpire and the Dominions are par t i e s to the 1907 Convention. This Convention set f o r t h procedures of 1. Quincy Wright, Diplomatic Machinery in the P a c i f i c Area (A Conference paper prepared for the Six Conference of the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, 1936, International Secretariat, I. P. R., New York, 1936) pp. 12-13 - 15 -mediation, inquiry and a r b i t r a t i o n i n some d e t a i l and establishes the Permanent Court of International A r b i t r a t -ion at the Hague. (2) This i s , i n r e a l i t y , only a panel of names and procedure for s e l e c t i n g a t r i b u n a l ad hoc i n case the parties desire a f t e r a dispute has arisen. The second part of the Convention i s the Hague Con-vention of 1907, respecting the l i m i t a t i o n of the employ-ment of force f o r the recovery of contract debt which was i n force between twenty states, including a l l the P a c i f i c powers except Siam. Under t h i s Convention, the p a r t i e s agree "not to have recourse to armed force f o r recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one country by the government of another as being due to i t s nationals", unless "the debtor state refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of a r b i t r a t i o n , or after accepting the o f f e r , prevents any compromise from being agreed on, or after the a r b i t r a t i o n , f a i l s to submit to the award". (5) s The t h i r d part i s the Hague Convention of 1907, r e l a t i n g to the opening of h o s t i l i t i e s which is i n force among twenty eight states i n c l u d i n g a l l the P a c i f i c powers. (4) This Convention was w e l l observed during the F i r s t World War, but i t was not observed by Japan i n her undeclared war waged against China since 1931 and her subsequent 2. Jame Brown Scott, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, (Oxford. University Press, London and New York, 1915) pp. 41-88. 3. Ibid, p. 90. 4. Ibid, p. 99. - 16 -treacherous attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941. The second group of general treaties contains the League of Nations 'Covenant and other t r e a t i e s made in pursuance of or to supplement i t s provisions. The League of Nations Covenant i s i n effect among f i f t y eight states including a l l the P a c i f i c powers except the United States and Japan. The l a t t e r gave notice to withdraw from the League according to the terms of a r t i c l e I, paragraph 3 of the Covenant on March 27, 1953, and ceased to be a member on March 27, 1935. The p o l i t i c a l obligations of the Covenant relate to disarmament, prevention of war, renunciation of war, p a c i f i c settlement of international disputes, sanctions against war, peaceful changes, and regional understandings, Besides, the Covenant s t i l l provides a c t i v i t i e s f o r economic and s o c i a l prosperity of the member-states. After the Sino-Japanese c o n f l i c t occurred i n 1931, the Chinese government r e l i e d upon the League of Nations for the settlement of i t s disputes with Japan. Consequent-l y the League sent i n 1931 a Commission of Inquiry headed by Lord Lytton to China to investigate the r e a l s i t u a t i o n of Manchuria. After making an inquiry the Commission made a report i n which i t was recommended that any settlement of Manchurian disputes must be made i n accordance with the Covenant, the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of P a r i s . (5) 5. The O f f i c i a l Texts and Summary of the Lytton Report, (International C o n c i l i a t i o n , No. 286, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1933) p. 79. - 17 -Subsequently, after outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, China resorted to the League again. As a r e s u l t , several resolutions were passed to give moral support to China, but no strong measure was adopted to stop the aggressor by the League of Nations. The American system which i s represented by the Kellogg-Briand Pact generally known as the Pact of Paris i s i n force among sixty three states, p r a c t i c a l l y a l l the states of the world of any p o l i t i c a l importance except Argentina, B o l i v i a , Salvador and Uraguay. A r i s i n g out of the American movement for the "outlawry of war" i t was formally i n i t i a t e d by the United States and France, and signed o r i g i n a l l y by f i f t e e n states and dominions. The preamble of the Pact recognizes that "any s i g -natory power which s h a l l hereafter seek to promote i t s national i n t e r e s t s by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by the Treaty". By this Pact, "the Parties solemnly declare i n the names of t h e i r respective peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of i n t e r n a t i o n a l controversies, and renounce i t as an instrument of national p o l i c y i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with one another". ( A r t i c l e I) They "agree that the settlement or solution of a l l disputes or c o n f l i c t s of whatever nature or whatever o r i g i n they may be, which may arise among them, s h a l l never be sought except by p a c i f i c means." ( A r t i c l e II) (6) - 18 The f i r s t instance of the application of the Pact of Paris to the Far East f e l l i n the case of the Sino-Soviet controversy over Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929. At the height of the c r i s i s the United States and forty-one other co-signatories of the Pact of Paris reminded the Soviet and Chinese governments of th e i r o b l i g a t i o n to s e t t l e the quarrel by peaceful means. This move apparently had l i t t l e e ffect on the p a r t i e s concerned. (7) During the Sino-Japanese disputes, i t was applied again. In identic notes to the Chinese and Japanese governments on January 7, 193£ the United States declared through Secretary of State Stimson that " i t does not intend to recognize any s i t u a t i o n , treaty or agreement which may be brought" about by means contrary to the Covenant and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928 to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are p a r t i e s . " (8) Since the Mukden Incident in 1931, the American government re i t e r a t e d the o b l i g a t i o n under the-Pact of Paris to the Tokyo government, with no r e s u l t . From the above survey of conventions for the e s t a b l i s h -ment of diplomatic machineries, i t w i l l be observed that 7. Arnold J . Tpynbee, Survey of International A f f a i r s , 1929, (OxforA..University Press, London, 1930) pp. 344-351. 8. Henry L. Stimson, The Far Eastern C r i s i s , - (Council on Foreign Relations, Harper & Bro., 1936 New York) pp. 96-97. - 19 -b i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s do not provide a comprehensive network among the P a c i f i c powers. On the other hand, the general t r e a t i e s providing a machinery more comprehensive i n scope have been widely accepted by the P a c i f i c powers. The Hague Conventions, however, provide only voluntary procedures and have been weakened by comparative disuse since World War I. The Geneva group of tre a t i e s provides the most workable machinery, but the United States, Japan and the Philippines are not parties to them, and the e f f e c t i v e -ness of these t r e a t i e s has been weakened by th e i r f a i l u r e to deal e f f e c t i v e l y with the Manchurian and other episodes. The American group of treaties i s the most far-reaching i n t h e i r negative obligations to r e f r a i n from war or the use of force. In t h i s group, the Pact of Paris has been r a t i f i e d by a l l of the P a c i f i c powers, but i t lacks d e f i n -i t e procedure f o r enforcement, and i t s f a i l u r e to prevent h o s t i l i t i e s both i n the Far East and elsewhere has weakened the confidence of the public i n i t . It i s generally recognized that the history of region-a l machinery i n the P a c i f i c started from the Washington Conference i n 1922 which resulted i n several Washington t r e a t i e s i n connection with m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l problems of the P a c i f i c . The Washington Conference was e s s e n t i a l l y a disarmament conference aimed to promote the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of peace of the world not only through the cessation of competition i n naval armament but also - 20 by the solution of various other disturbing problems which threatened the peace of the world, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Far East. The background of the Washington Conference may be scrutinized i n three aspects: 1. The increasing ambition of Japan i n China; 2. The competition of naval armament among the f i v e great powers; 3. American attempt to abolish the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . Japanese ambitions i n China during the F i r s t World War had endangered American i n t e r e s t s and had been contra-dictory to the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of the United States i n the Far East. The fundamental p r i n c i p l e of American foreign p o l i c y toward China was the p r i n c i p l e of equality of commercial opportunity among a l l nations i n dealing with China and the preservations of China*s t e r r i t o r i a l and administrative i n t e g r i t y . As early as 1899, Secretary of State John Hay had made a formal enunciation of t h i s p r i n c i p l e to the Powers as the guiding p r i n c i p l e of their p o l i c y i n dealing-with China, which was known as the "Open Door" p o l i c y toward China. As a r e s u l t of the F i r s t World War, t h i s p o l i c y had been upset and Japan had taken advantage of the s i t u a t i o n to e s t a b l i s h i t s predomin-ance i n the Orient. On May 11, 1915, Secretary Bryan of the United States protested against the Japanese Twenty-One Demands on China, d e c l i n i n g to "recognize" any agreement made by Japan and China i n v i o l a t i o n of the Open-Door p r i n c i p l e . Although the Lansing-Ishii agreement of November 2, 1917 recognized that Japan had " s p e c i a l - 21 -i n t e r e s t s " i n China, the United States never accepted the interpretation given to t h i s phrase by Tokyo, and the agreement i t s e l f was cancelled on A p r i l 14, 1923. Mean-while the United States government and American public opinion remained h o s t i l e to Japanese ambitions. One of the reasons why the Senate of the United States defeated the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s was that i t turned over to Japan German right i n Shantung and the north P a c i f i c Islands Mandates. During the World War, Japan's expansionist p o l i c y , supported by the t h i r d largest naval force i n the world, had clashed sharply with B r i t i s h and American i n t e r e s t s throughout Eastern Asia and the P a c i f i c . As f o r the United States, President Wilson, demanding "the most adequate navy i n the world", had adopted a naval program, the purpose of which was to create a navy second to none. (9) This program was i n fact a challenge to the p o s i t i o n of Japan i n the Orient as well as to the B r i t i s h supremacy of the seas. In the straitened f i n a n c i a l circumstances i n which the war had l e f t her, England could i l l afford to hold up her end:in an Anglo-American naval race. Naval supremacy had become such a f e t i s h to her that she would not have relinquished i t to any power without a struggle. At the end of the war i t was hoped that armaments would generally be reduced by international agreement. In the 9. A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern P o l i c y of the United States, (Harcourt, Brace.& co., New York, 1939), p. 271. - 22 -United States President Harding and his i n f l u e n t i a l support-ers were deeply convinced that competition i n armament had been one of the chief causes of the World War and the United States should now take the lead i n promoting universal disarmament. Meanwhile opinion in America and i n Canada was aroused over the existence of the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e , which committed B r i t a i n to defend Japan i n the event of war. The United States was aware that i n 1921 there would come up the question of a renewal of'the Anglo-Japanese all i a n c e that had been extended in 1911 f o r a decade. 7/ashington had also noticed with considerable disquietude that the Far Eastern p o l i c i e s of Great B r i t a i n and Japan were harmonious and that the B r i t i s h were gradually disregard-ing the p r i n c i p l e of Open Door. Thus the American govern-ment considered the very existence of the a l l i a n c e as one of the main f a c t o r s that served to encourage Japanese expansion. On the part of Canada, she feared the b e l l i g -erent o b l i g a t i o n imposed upon her against the United States should the American-Japanese war occur. It was hoped that the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e would be cancelled and sub-stituted by a general t r e a t y c l a r i f y i n g the awkward si t u a t i o n among the United States, Great B r i t a i n and Canada. For these purposes, President Harding of the United States issued an i n v i t a t i o n i n 1921 to eight powers to attend a conference at Washington on the l i m i t a t i o n of naval armaments and the settlement of outstanding i n t e r -25 national problems i n the P a c i f i c and the Far East. The eight powers to whom the i n v i t a t i o n to the parley was extended included a l l states, except Russia, that had interests i n the Far East: Belgium, China, France, Great B r i t a i n , I t a l y , Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal. A l l governments but that at Tokyo w i l l i n g l y responded to the c a l l . Japan agreed to part i c i p a t e only on condition that there would be no discussion of matters that were "of sole concern to cert a i n p a r t i c u l a r powers", or that might "be regarded as accomplished fact".(10) The conference sat from November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922, and concluded seven t r e a t i e s , the three most important of which were the Four Power Treaty, tlae Five Power Naval Treaty and the Nine Power Treaty. The Four Power Treaty was a substitute f o r the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e . It was signed by Great B r i t a i n , France, Japan, and the United States. In A r t i c l e I of the Treaty, the Powers pledged themselves "to respect t h e i r rights i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i r insular possessions and insular dominions i n the region of the P a c i f i c Ocean". Should these rights be threatened by aggressive action of any other power, the contracting parties agreed "to communicate with one another f u l l y and frankly i n order to arrive at an understanding 10. Raymond L. Bue l l , The Washington Conference, (Appleton & 'Co., New York, 1922,) pp. 14-18. as to the most e f f i c i e n t methods to he taken, j o i n t l y or separately, to meet the exigencies of the p a r t i c u l a r situation". The treaties were to remain i n force f o r ten years, subject to automatic renewal, unless terminated by any signatory on twelve months' notice. The Five Power Naval Limitation Treaty was one of the most important i n international r e l a t i o n s because i t succeeded i n concluding the f i r s t naval l i m i t a t i o n agree-ment i n modern histo r y . (11) It Includes I t a l y i n addition to the parties to the Four Power Treaty, It provides naval r a t i o s , size and t o t a l tonnage of cap i t a l ships and a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s , and for the maintenance of the m i l i t a r y and naval status quo i n the P a c i f i c Islands. The basis of l i m i t a t i o n was the 5-5-3 naval r a t i o accepted by B r i t a i n , the United States, and Japan for capit a l ships and a i r -c r a f t c a r r i e r s . Tokyo was w i l l i n g to accept a pos i t i o n of technical i n f e r i o r i t y in accordance with the r a t i o on condition that B r i t a i n and the United States should promise not to build new naval f o r t i f i c a t i o n s i n the Pac-i f i c during the l i f e of the naval t r e a t i e s . Since then the United States has f a i l e d to construct any f i r s t - c l a s s base west of Hawaii. This p r o v i s i o n made i t v i r t u a l l y impossible for the American f l e e t , acting alone, to attack Japan i n i t s home waters* Moreover, the Powers at the conference signed the Nine Power Treaty which i s related to the "principles and 11. With the exception of the l i m i t a t i o n of armaments on the Great Lakes as the result of the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817 - 25 -p o l i c i e s to be followed i n matters concerning China" by the signatory states. (12) The preamble of the treaty states that the signatories desire "to adopt a p o l i c y designed to s t a b i l i z e conditions i n the Far East, to safe-guard the rights and i n t e r e s t s of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other powers upon a basis of equality of opportunity," An analysis of the separate a r t i c l e s of the treaty w i l l show the extent to which the signatories defined their objectives and the manner i n which they obligated themselves to carry out the pr i n c i p l e s and p o l i c i e s defined* A r t i c l e I, the most quoted a r t i c l e of the treaty, reads as follows: The contracting powers , other than China, agree: 1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the t e r r i t o r i a l and administrative i n t e g r i t y of China; 2. To provide the f u l l e s t and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an e f f e c t i v e and stable government; 3. To use their influence for the purpose of e f f e c t u a l l y establishing and maintaining the p r i n -c i p l e of equal opportunity f o r the commerce and industry of a l l nations i n the t e r r i t o r y of China; 12. The o r i g i n a l signatories were: Belgium, China, France, I t a l y , Japan, Portugal, the B r i t i s h Empire, the Netherlands and the United States. In addition, B o l i v i a , Denmark, Mexico, Norway and Sweden have adhered to t h i s treaty. Germany signed but did not r a t i f y i t . - 26 -4. To r e f r a i n from taking advantages of conditions i n China i n order to seek special rights or pr i v i l e g e s which would abridge the righ t s of subjects or c i t i z e n s of f r i e n d l y states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states. The f i r s t paragraph i s a restatement of the p r i n c i p l e voiced by Secretary of State John Hay i n 1899 as a corollary to Open Door. The second paragraph is a declaration of the kind of policy to be followed i f the sovereignty, independ-ence, and t e r r i t o r i a l and administrative i n t e g r i t y of China i s to be preserved. Paragraph three is a statement of the Open-Door policy as i t was expanded from the o r i g i n a l idea of "equal treatment" f o r trade to that of "equal opportunity" f o r the commerce and industry of a l l states i n China. The fourth paragraph is a restatement of the secret clause of the Lansing-Ishii notes, a dras t i c self-denying obligation designed to implement and make eff e c t i v e the Open-Door policy as stated i n the preceding paragraph. (13) To carry out the pr i n c i p l e s set forth i n t h i s a r t i c l e , the parties undertake not to enter into any treaty or agree-ment which would infringe or impair, these p r i n c i p l e s (Art-i c l e I I ) ; to apply the Open-Door p o l i c y of equal opportunity for a l l by not supporting attempts by their nationals to secure special p r i v i l e g e s , monopolies, or preferences i n "respect of the economic or commercial development of China ( A r t i c l e I I I ) ; not to support agreements designed to create 13. William C. Johnstone, The United States and Japan's New Order (Oxford University Press, London & New-York,1941) p. 131. - 27 -spheres of influence ( A r t i c l e IY). China, on the one hand, and Contracting P a r t i e s , on the other, agree not to- exercise or permit unfair discrimination on the railway system of China ( A r t i c l e V) and the Powers agree to respect the neut-r a l i t y of China i n any war i n which she i s not involved and China agrees to observe n e u t r a l i t y ( A r t i c l e VI). This t r e a t y represented a c a r e f u l l y developed and matured international p o l i c y intended to assure to a l l of the contracting parties t h e i r r i g h t s and interests i n and with regard to China and to assure to the people of China the f u l l e s t opportunity to develop without molest-ation t h e i r sovereignty and independence. It was a coven-ant of s e l f - d e n i a l among the signatory powers i n deliberate renunciation of any poliey of aggression which might tend to interfere with that development. A l l the three t r e a t i e s made in the Washington Confer-ence were not independent from one another. They were, according to Secretary Stimson, i n t e r r e l a t e d and i n t e r -dependent. In his l e t t e r to Senator Borah on February 23, 1932, he pointed out "No one of these t r e a t i e s can be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at i n their entirety - The problems were a l l i n t e r r e l a t e d . The willingness of the American government to surrender i t s commanding lead i n battleship construction and to leave i t s p o s i t i o n at Guam and i n the Philippines without further f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , was predicated upon, among other things, the self-denying covenants contained i n the Wine Power Treaty, which assured the nations of the world not only of equal opportunity f o r t h e i r Eastern trade but also against the m i l i t a r y aggrandizement of any other power at the expense of China. One cannot discuss the p o s s i b i l i t y of modifying or abrogating without considering at the same time the other promises upon which they were r e a l l y dependent. n (14) The Washington Conference t r e a t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y the Nine Power Treaty, met i t s f i r s t test as an eff e c t i v e instrument f o r maintaining peace i n the Far East when the Japanese armed forees occupied Mukden on September 18, 1931. The action that followed resulted i n Japanese occupation of the whole Manohuria and the establishment of the so-called Manchukuo. On September 22, while the League was engaged i n the matter, American Secretary Stim-son summoned the Japanese Ambassador and through him transmitted an "earnest memorandum!1 to the Japanese gov-ernment saying "It i s not exclusively a matter of concern to Japan and China. It brings into question at once the meaning of certain provisions of agreements,such as the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922 and the Kellogg-14. Stimson, op. c i t . , pp. 101-109. The Japanese did not agree with this view. In one of the Conferences of the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, Profess-or Ichihashi who was interpreter at the Conference asserted in.a round table, that i n his view the Washington Treaties did not form a connected whole; they were independent of each other and d i d not stand or f a l l together. - 29 -Briand Pact." (15) Afterwards when i t became apparent at the beginning of 1932 that no action of consequence was to be expected of the League of Nations, the United States proceeded to carry further i t s "moral protest" p o l i c y by enunciating the Non-Recognition p o l i c y . In a note to Japan and China of January 7, 1932,(16) the United States declared that i t did not intend to recognize any treaty or agreement made in v i o l a t i o n of the Open Door or the Pact of P a r i s . Mr. Stimson sent the draft of t h i s note i n advance to the B r i t i s h and French Ambassadors, hoping to obtain the endorsement of their governments. Committed to League procedure, London gave the proposal a cool reception. In a communique of January 9, the Foreign Office declared that i n view of Japanese Statements declaring adherence to the Open Door, i t was not deemed necessary to address any note along the l i n e s of the American Statement.(17) The London Times declared that the Foreign Office had acted wisely. (18) 15. Ib i d . , pp. 46-47. 16. Loc. c i t . 17. Stimson, op. c i t . , pp. 101-109. 18. S i r John P r a t t , then i n the Foreign Office of the British-Government, has given the most authoritative B r i t i s h explanation of t h i s Communique. In a l e t t e r published i n the London Times of November 30, 1938, S i r John wrote: "I am not revealing any very closely kept secret when I say that the Foreign O f f i c e have never attempted to defend t h i s Communique and have always regretted that a s l i p was made wfcich has, i t would seem, proved a r e a l obstacle i n Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s . The Communique was drafted and approved i n haste by the permanent o f f i c e r s at 1 P. M. on Saturday and i t was not r e a l i z e d u n t i l i t appeared i n the Press on the following Monday that i t read l i k e a rebuff to / ^ i c a . T h i a i s r e a l l y a l l there i s to i t " . See London Times,Nov.40, 1 9 ^ . - SO _ . • Apparently emboldened by this Anglo-American d i f f e r -ence, the Japanese attacked Shanghai i n January 1932, Secretary Stimson r e a l i z e d that the time might come when he would wish to recommend to Congress the imposition of an embargo on Japanese goods, i n co-operation with other countries. And he believed that such a proposal would have more chance of being adopted, to quote his account of this period, " i f i t were recommended following the invoc-ation of the Nine-Power Treaty than i f i t had been recommend-ed so l e l y by the League of Nations." (19) Overlooking his e a r l i e r rebuff, Mr. Stimson again approached the B r i t i s h to see whether they would join the United States i n invoking A r t i c l e YII of the Nine Power Treaty i n accordance with the provision for " f u l l and frank communication" between the powers whenever a situation arose which i n the opinion of any one of them, involved the application of the t r e a t y . In a number of trans-a t l a n t i c telephone conversations with S i r John Simon, then B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, Mr. Stimson t r i e d to induce the B r i t i s h government to join the United States i n making a statement that the Nine Power Treaty s t i l l remained i n force. S i r John never a c t u a l l y declined the proposal, but discouraged Mr. Stimson from believing that he would accept i t . The B r i t i s h government f i n a l l y assented to the Stimson*s proposal only on condition that a l l the other League powers who were part i e s to the Nine Power Treaty join i n invoking i t - a condition which Stimson 19. Stimson, op. e i t . , p. 161. - 31 -deemed impossible to f u l f i l . (20) In the renewed Japanese h o s t i l i t i e s of July 1937, the Nine Power Treaty was e x p l i c i t l y alluded to in the League of Nations resolutions and the United States Statement. The League Assembly accepted a report of i t s Far Eastern Advisory .Committee on October 6, 1937 showing that Japan had violated i t s treaty obligations and i n v i t i n g those members of the League who were parties to the Nine Power Treaty to i n i t i a t e consultation i n accordance with A r t i c l e VII. On that very day, the United States govern-ment through Secretary H u l l formally declared that the action of Japan i n China was contrary, to the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of P a r i s . On the suggestion of Great B r i t a i n and supported by the United States, the Belgian government issued i n v i t -ations f o r a conference on October 16, to a l l of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty,, to the f i v e States that had adhered to the treaty, and to Germany and Russia. Japan refused to attend, l a r g e l y on the grounds that the terms under which i t was being call e d amounted to a con-demnation of her action i n China, which she regarded as measures taken solely i n self-defense and not coming within the scope of her obligations under the Nine Power 20. Ibid., pp. 161-166. - 32 -Treaty. (21) Germany also refused to attend, but a l l the other states that were Invited accepted. In accepting the i n v i t a t i o n , the United States govern-ment states that the purpose of the meeting was to examine " i n conformity with A r t i c l e VII of the treaty, the situation in the Far East", and to study "peaceable means of hastening an end of the regrettable c o n f l i c t which prevails there."(22) After the opening of the meeting, the conference made a vain attempt to get Japan to send a representative, but the l a t t e r refused to attend again. Confronted by t h i s a t t i t u d e , the conference had either to "quarantine" Japan or give way. By this time the United States had no zest to i n i t i a t e economic sanctions which were very d i s t a s t e f u l to the American i s o l a t i o n i s t s at home. 21. The reply stated i n part that "The action of Japan i n China i s a measure of self-defense which she has been com-pelled to take i n the face of China's f i e r c e anti-Japanese p o l i c y and p r a c t i c e , and e s p e c i a l l y .'by her provocative action i n r e s o r t i n g to force of arms; and consequently i t l i e s as has been declared already by the Imperial govern-ment, outside the purview of the Nine Power Treaty." See the Conference of Brussels (U. S. Government P r i n t i n g Office, Washington, D. C. 1938) p. 9. The Japanese government always t r i e d to j u s t i f y i t s m i l i t a r y operation i n China as a measure of self-defense, but nobody i n the world was deceived by this pretext. For instance, a resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations on Oct. 6,1937 asserted that "the m i l i t a r y operations carried on by Japan against China by land, sea and a i r are out of a l l proportion to the incident that occasioned the conflict"; that such a c t i o n cannot poss-i b l y f a c i l i t a t e or promote the f r i e n d l y cooperation between the two nations that Japanese statesmen have affirmed to be the aim of t h e i r p o l i c y ; that i t can be j u s t i f i e d neither on the basis of e x i s t i n g l e g a l instruments nor on that of the right of self-defense." See League of Nations O f f i c i a l Journ-a l , October 1937, pp. 56-57. 22. Ibid., p. 7. - 33 The Netherlands and other powers made i t clear that they would run the r i s k of an attack on the i r A s i a t i c colonies by Japan as a r e p r i s a l against sanctions, only i f the United States would join i n an agreement guaranteeing the security of the i r possessions. Foreign Minister .Eden-, who headed the B r i t i s h delegation, made i t clear that B r i t a i n would go just as far as the Americans i n stopping Japan, but no further - thus reversing the B r i t i s h p o s ition taken in 1931. Under such circumstances, there was nothing to be done. A l l that the Brussels Conference did was to reaffirm the pr i n c i p l e of the Nine Power Treaty and to suggest that the settlement ultimately arrived at must be consistent with the p r i n c i p l e of the treaty and sa t i s f a c t o r y to the confer-ence* (23) On November 24, 1937, the conference suspended i t s meeting, to be called together again whenever the chairman and two of i t s members should so desire. It was a c r u c i a l test of the Nine Power Treaty. After that time i t was apparent that the treaty had been seriously weakened and could not be regarded as a safe-guard of the pr i n c i p l e s and p o l i c i e s followed by the Washington Conference. The f a i l u r e of the powers to use the Washington tre a t i e s i n attempting to settle the Sino-Japanese c o n f l i c t s proved the inadequacy of the regional machinery for the maintenance of peace i n the P a c i f i c . Some p o l i t i c a l factors contributed 23. Ibid, pp.76-77. 34 -to the f a i l u r e of the trea t i e s , but i n addition the treaties themselves, i n t h e i r very foundations, were unsound. Of the three WasMrngton t r e a t i e s , the Five Power Naval Treaty was denounced by Japan on December 29, 1934. The denunciation was to take effect according to the terms of the treaty i n two years. The remaining t r e a t i e s s t i l l i n effect are the Four Power Treaty and the Nine Power Treaty. The Four Power Treaty provides for a vague machinery and the purpose of the treaty is l i m i t e d . There i s i n the treaty a consultation a r t i c l e i n which i t i s stipulated that " i f the said r i g h t s are threatened by the aggressive action of any other, the Parties s h a l l communicate with one another f u l l y and frankly i n order to arrive at an understanding." Nevertheless, according to the Declaration accompanying the treaty, consultation s h a l l not be taken to embrace questions which l i e exclusively within the domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n of the respective powers. Meanwhile, the object of the treaty i s limited to insular possessions and insular dominions only. Thus a dispute on the mainland involving Japan with China or the Soviet Union does not come within the scope of the treaty. Moreover, when an aggression takes place, i t cannot be expected that the major contracting power of the treaty, the United States, would take arms to defend i t , because a statement issued by. the government of the United States on r a t i f i c a t i o n of that treaty contains "no commitment to armed force, no a l l i a n c e , no obligation to - 35 join i n defense." (24) And the Four Power Treaty was signed only by Great B r i t a i n , the United States, France and Japan, while China and Soviet Russia were not signatories. The weaknesses of the Nine Power Treaty may be divided into two parts, p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l . On the p o l i t i c a l side, the f a i l u r e of the treaty may be attributed to several f a c t -ors: F i r s t , the importance of the Soviet i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East was a p o t e n t i a l factor i n P a c i f i c r e l a t i o n s . Though the Soviet p o s i t i o n in the Far East was i n f a c t recognized -during the Washington Conference and i n the League of Nations discussion of 1931-1932, the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the o r i g i n a l l i s t of signatories deprived the provisions of the treaty of much r e a l i t y . In the second place, i t was always considered by some American writers that the s p i r i t created at the Washington Conference was destroyed by the government of the United States, when i t u n i l a t e r a l l y terminated the Gentleman's Agreement and i n the Immigration Act of 1924 excluded Japanese from entering the United States, since they were i n e l i g i b l e for c i t i z e n s h i p . (25) The Smoot-Hawley t a r i f f of 1950 did further i n j u r y . Therefore a distinguished American scholar expressed the opinion to the effect that " i f the United States had paid more attention to the moral and economic necessities of Japan, pos s i b l y Japanese l o y a l t y to the 2 4 . Problems of the P a c i f i c , 1931, (proceeding of the Fourth Conference of the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, University of Chicago.Press, I l l i n o i s , 1932) p. 228 :25, Raymond L. B u e l l , Isolated America (Alfred A. Knopf, New.York, 1940) p. 52. _ 36 Washington t r e a t i e s might have been maintained." (26) In the t h i r d place, the revived naval competition among B r i t a i n , the United States and Japan after 1930, culminating i n the Japanese denunciation of the Five Power Treaty and London Naval Treaty, undermined the psychological value of the Nine Power Treaty (27) and made the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n even more unstable and strained. On the l e g a l aspect, the weakness of the Nine Power Treaty i s , i n the f i r s t place, that i t provides no permanent organization as an agency to carry out functions of c o n c i l i a t i o n and inquiry at a time when c o n f l i c t occurs between the contracting p a r t i e s . Indeed, i t was agreed at the Washington Conference that a Board of Reference was to be established i n China, to which any question a r i s i n g under other provisions of the treaty might be referred f o r investigation and report and i t was resolved furthermore that a s p e c i a l .committee with r e f e r -ence to Chinese t a r i f f " s h a l l formulate for the approval of the Powers concerned a detailed plan f o r the constitution of the Board." A number of d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the way of the smooth functioning of such a Board within reasonable l i m i t s of authority had been mentioned i n the course of discussion before the r e s o l u t i o n was adopted. (28) 26. Quincy Wright, The Legal Background i n the Far East. ( I . P. R. Inquiry Series, International Secretariat, I n s t i t -ute of P a c i f i c Relations, New York, 1941) p. 103 notes. 27. Henry F. Angus, The Problem of Peaceful Change i n the P a c i f i c Area (Oxford University Press, London & New York, 1937) P. 167 . 28. B u e l l , op. c i t . pp.294-297. „ 37 _ ; 1 I Subsequently, the whole scheme f e l l through, owing to the fact that the t a r i f f conference subsequently held, i n 1925, ended in a deadlock, so that no Board of Reference was set up. As a r e s u l t , no r e a l machinery was established and the powers were made impotent to carry on the functions of the treaty. Secondly, the Nine Power Treaty is not treaty, of guaranty, so the obligation of the powers under the treaty i s vague. The Nine Power Treaty does not provide a tribunal for i t s own interpretation but i t does provide " f u l l and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned" on any s i t u a t i o n involving the application of the s t i p u l a t i o n of the treaty. ( A r t i c l e YII). Under the provision, l e g a l l y i t obliges the p a r t i e s to do no more than exchange views and does not l i m i t their freedom to act independently i n any emergency involving the application of the treaty. It has been contended that the parties ttare committed of co-operative action"; (29) nevertheless, the scope of the obligation of the-parties to the Nine Power Treaty to work i n i t s enforcement has been a matter of controversy and causes the powers concerned to take no d e f i n i t e action i n the event of a v i o l a t i o n of the treaty. F i n a l l y , the treaty provides no sanction against any party which acts i n v i o l a t i o n of i t s terms. It i s generally 29. S. K. Hornbeck, China & American Foreign P o l i c y , Annals of American Academy of P o l i t i c a l & Social Science, July 1928, p. 37. 38 -c a l l e d a treaty "without teeth". The Nine Power Treaty was drawn in the form of a l e g i s l a t i v e multipartite treaty. In such a treaty every party i s recognized to have a l e g a l interest i n the observance of the entire treaty by each of the other p a r t i e s . Thus a v i o l a t i o n of i t i s a legal injury to each party and e n t i t l e s i t to protest or to invoke any procedure which may be provided by the treaty. The general right of protest, i n the event of a v i o l a t i o n of a multipartite treaty, does not imply a general o b l i g -ation to take sanctioning measures unless i t i s e x p l i c i t l y accepted i n the treaty i t s e l f . (30). The ambiguity of the Nine Power Treaty on t h i s point may account in large part f o r the f a i l u r e of the signatories to cooperate i n every case where i t s v i o l a t i o n was alleged. In view of the apparent inadequacy of the e x i s t i n g international machinery i n the P a c i f i c , there were some groups and individuals who devoted t h e i r attention to working out a plan to improve or supplement the existing machinery or to create a new one acceptable to a l l the P a c i f i c powers concerned for the maintenance of peace in the Far East. Since 1929, the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations has held round table conferences in discussing the diplomatic machinery i n the P a c i f i c . In most of the round tables there seemed to be a tendency to assume that the e x i s t i n g diplomatic machinery i n the P a c i f i c was 30. Wright, op. c i t . p. 86. - 39: -inadequate and there was a need for new forms of organiz-ation. At the Kyoto Conference of 1929, the necessity for some regional organization was stressed. It was argued that the League of Nations' success had been mainly i n Europe and i n many important respects i t might be regarded as a European regional organization, while i n the P a c i f i c , due to i t s p a r t i c u l a r circumstances, there seemed apparent a need for a regional organization i n addition to the League of Nations. (51) After the outbreak of Manchurian dispute between China and Japan i n 1951, much attention was devoted to using the e x i s t i n g machinery to se t t l e the question* In the same year, at the Eangchow and Shanghai Conference of the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, the subject that had been presented at the Kyoto Conference was continually discussed. In the former conferences, questions concerning diplomatic machinery came almost l a s t on the agenda, but i n the 1951 conference, these questions took precedence and led the discussion into more s p e c i f i c sources of f r i c t i o n . The main question raised i n t h i s section at the conference was whether i t would be better to improve, revise and supplement the e x i s t i n g machinery or to create a new machinery. In favour of the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e , i t was agreed that a m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of instruments tended only to weaken t h e i r general e f f e c t , and that the existing machinery would be adequate provided that steps were taken 31. Problems of the P a c i f i c , 1929,(Proceedings of the Third Conference of the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, University of Chicago Press, I l l i n o i s , 1930) pp. 241-242. - 40 -to adopt or implement such an instrument to cope with the rea l s i t u a t i o n . On the other hand i t was stated that the League organization was viewed i n China with some suspicion and that the United States and the Soviet Union were opposed to membership i n i t . The Washington treaties did not include either Ghina or the Soviet Union, and the procedure provided by them was both vague and limited. While the Pact of P a r i s might be implemented, i t would be better, i t was suggested, to devise some form of P a c i f i c pact which would take into account the different p o l i t i c a l outlook of, f o r example, China and the Soviet Russia and would be acceptable to the idea of foreign p o l i c y i n the United States. (32) The advocates of the improvement of the e x i s t i n g machinery devoted t h e i r attention to making suggestions for extending the influence of the League of Nations i n the P a c i f i c . To a t t a i n this goal, they made four proposals as follows: F i r s t , the appointment of a League of Nations commiss-ion of Inquiry to the Far East not only with a view to meet-ing the immediate emergency but also as a desirable perman-ent organ was considered by some members, e s p e c i a l l y by Chinese members. A Chinese member reminded one of the round table conferences that, even before the incident of September 18, Ghina had appealed to the League to send a 32. Problems of the P a c i f i c , 1931, pp. 229-230. 41 -commission to Manchuria to study the whole situation. Japanese members, however, voiced an objection against the proposed procedure on the ground that a special inquiry would take on the character of a court. In t h i s respect, another suggestion was that the League Council instead of sending a commission of inquiry from Geneva should appoint a number of foreign ministers already i n the Far. East to act i n that capacity. There were several objections to t h i s proposal. China was suspicious of a; body composed of foreign diplomats, primarily as a res u l t of her long experience of adverse decisions on the part of such a diplomatic body. (35) Next, the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a standing committee of the League f o r Far Eastern a f f a i r s , with i t s seat i n the Far East, were explored. The League already had adopted the p r a c t i c e , i t was pointed out, of appointing p a r t i c u l a r agencies of the Secretariat to deal^with problems of p a r t i c u l a r areas. It was believed that a branch Secretar-i a t i n the Far East would have the advantage not only of keeping the League i n touch with Far Eastern a f f a i r s , but also that of creating i n Geneva i t s e l f a gradually increasing personnel of informed o f f i c e r s i f s t a f f members were given the opportunity of being detailed to the Far Eastern post f o r two or three years. (54) i t was believed that such an arrangement would go far to offset the 33.Ibid., pp. 259-260. 54..Ibid. pp. 260-261. _ 42 -remoteness of the League center from the Far East. As to the scope of such an organization, i t was f e l t that prob-ably i t would not be wise to li m i t i t only to a single and p a r t i c u l a r area where at that time acute d i f f i c u l t y was present, but that i t might be better to co-ordinate in such an o f f i c e a l l - t h e varied a c t i v i t i e s carried on by the League i n the P a c i f i c area. For the location of such a bureau i n the Far East, i t was considered that i t should have no permanent habitat but tr a v e l through the whole area wherever i t s services were most needed at any one time. (35) This suggestion, however, did not seem part-i c u l a r l y p r a c t i c a l . A question raised was: why should the Far East or the P a c i f i c area be singled out for such a special attention on the part of the League; were hot other parts of the world equally i n need of i t ? The reply was not e n t i r e l y s a t i s f a c t o r y . Chiefly, i t seemed that from considerations of prestige and influence on world-opinion many members remained un-convinced that a Secretariat branch o f f i c e of the League would best answer the purpose i n mind. Why should not the Council of the League i t s e l f be subdivided, so as to have a permanent international body i n the P a c i f i c area, d i r e c t l y appointed by the member-states, to balance the Europe-centered League Council i n Geneva? A Chinese member who f o r many years had worked i n behalf of the League said "It i s most desirable that a regional council 35. Ibid., pp. 261-262. - 43 -or standing committee of the council be established i n the Far East - with the United states and the Soviet Union as members," (36) B r i t i s h members objected to t h i s view on the ground that "additional councils", as suggested for t h i s area, would add too great a burden to the League which some of the member-states now have d i f f i c u l t y in helping to support. (37) As a possible alternative, the r e l a t i v e advantages of occasional Far Eastern meetings of the League Council as a whole were considered. A Chinese member stated that the National Government of China had i n e a r l i e r stages of i t s existence held p o l i t i c a l council meetings in Peking, Wu-han, and other c i t i e s ; and that these councils were only afterwards united, into a central government. Why could not the League once every few years meet i n some other place than Geneva? Tokyo, Nanking and Mukden were mentioned by various speakers as suitable l o c a l i t i e s for an early Far Eastern meeting of the League Council to consider the Manchurian c o n f l i c t s . (38) The chief d i f f -i c u l t y anticipated was that the League at a l l times had many problems to consider, large and small, which required continuous attention. If council meetings were held at a great distance from Geneva, those most concerned i n these 36. Ibid, p. 262. 37. Ibid. 58. Ibid.,pp. 262-263. - 4 4 -matters might be unable to attend; or important decisions might be held up simply because the time of the council was absorbed by regional a f f a i r s . On the other hand, as to the creation of a new machinery, the Conference paid special attention to Mr. Stephen A. Heald's suggestions which are made in his writing e n t i t l e d "The Draft Syllabus for the Study of Diplomatic Machinery i n the P a c i f i c " . In his memorandum he sets forth s i x proposals for the new machinery i n the P a c i f i c . The six proposals are b r i e f l y : 1. A P a c i f i c Locarno; an instrument of thi s nature, i . e. pledge with guarantees, does not appear applicable to the P a c i f i c . 2. A Pan-Pacific Union of governments on the l i n e s of the Pan-American Union provided with mechanisms such as a resolution condemning war, Inter- P a c i f i c t r e a t i e s of a r b i t r a t i o n and c o n c i l i a t i o n , a Pan-Pacific Court and a procedure for the use of good ©ffices. While such an arrangement might be accepted by other states, the attitude of the United States and the Soviet Russia would 'be uncertain. 3. A Pan-Pacific Pact of Friendship and Non-aggression on the Soviet Model, supplemented by agreements f o r the submission of disputes to c o n c i l i a t i o n . 4. A P a c i f i e C o l l e c t i v e Treaty of Non-aggress-ion on the l i n e s of League Model Treaty "S". 5. Combination of elements in various t r e a t i e s . 6. A regional agreement for the implementation of the Pact of P a r i s , providing procedure for c a l l i n g Pact into operation. Further, i n the Report of the League of Nations - 45 -Commission of Enquiry on the Sino-Japanese Dispute, which was in the main adopted "by the League Assembly in i t s own Report on February 24, 1933, the Commission recommended among other things, the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese Treaty of C o n c i l i a t i o n and A r b i t r a t i o n , Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance, i n which the U. S. S. R. might p a r t i c -ipate in part.through a separate t r i p a r t i t e agreement. In the Commission's opinion, such a treaty "would provide for a board of c o n c i l i a t i o n , whose functions would be to a s s i s t i n the solution of any d i f f i c u l t i e s -as they arise between the Government of China and Japan." "It would also establish an a r b i t r a t i o n tribunal composed of persons with j u d i c i a l experience and the necessary knowledge of the Far East. This t r i b u n a l would deal with any disputes between the Chinese and Japanese Governments regarding the interpretation of the declaration or of the new t r e a t i e s , and with such other categories of disputes as might be specified i n the treaty of c o n c i l i a t i o n " . (39) As i s generally remembered, the well-meant project of peace machinery f a i l e d to materialize, since Japan f l a t l y refused to accept the League's recommendations for the settlement of the Sino-Japanese disputes. For some years p r i o r to 1937, when Japan resumed h o s t i l i t i e s against China, there was s t i l l talk of a Pact of P a c i f i c as a regional security system i n the Far East. Thus, among the data papers for the Banff Conference of 39. See Note 5, pp. 98-102. the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations i n 1953 is. one e n t i t l e d "Some Considerations on the Future Reconstruction of Peace Machinery i n the P a c i f i c . " The authors are Professors Takaki and Yokota of the Tokyo Imperial University. (40) One of the causes to which they at t r i b u t e the f a i l u r e of peaceable settlement i n the P a c i f i c i s the absence there of a society of nations for the prevention of war and they recommend a regional organization with a treaty of security, non-aggression and a r b i t r a t i o n . The p r i n c i p a l parties to t h i s treaty would be China, Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union, Great B r i t a i n and France. It would be an amalgamation of the Nine and Four Power Treaties, the Briand-Eellogg Pact, and Non-aggression t r e a t i e s of the type i n i t i a t e d by the Soviet Union. The consultative procedure of the Four Power Treaty of 1922 i s improved by the suggested use of conferences to examine disputes or threats of c o n f l i c t and issue findings which, i f concurred i n by a l l members other than the disputants, would bind those members to act i n accord-ance with t h e i r terms. The authors are anxious to avoid any s a n c t i f i c a t i o n of the status quo, and desire that t h e i r consultative process should be used as an instrument of peaceful change removing the causes of disputes before they develop. They, therefore, hope that the conference 40. The Problems of'the P a c i f i c , 1933, (Proceeding of the F i f t h Conference of the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, University of Chicago Press, I l l i n o i s , 1934) pp. 440-450* - 47 -may meet p e r i o d i c a l l y . Their treaty would prohibit recog-n i t i o n of any si t u a t i o n brought about by force and would require the submission of a l l disputes, whatever t h e i r nature, to c o n c i l i a t i o n , a r b i t r a t i o n or adjudication. Permanent c o n c i l i a t i o n commissions are to be set up between each pair of contracting parties for the s e t t l e -ment of any dispute not submitted to an a r b i t r a l tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. (41) 41. Ibid. - 48 -CHAPTER III WAR AIMS AND PEACE AIMS IN THE PAS EAST As a result of the f a i l u r e of the regional machinery in maintaining peace i n the P a c i f i c , the Ear Eastern situation became worse from 1931 onward, and thus gave opportunity and encouragement to ambitious aggressors in Europe to break the European status quo and make the world sit u a t i o n precarious. There i s a large body of opinion which thinks that i f Japan had been stopped i n 1931 there would have been no conquest of Abyssinia, no i n t e r -vention in Spain, no Austrian annexation, no Munich and no Pearl Harbour. Although there i s no ground for arguing that the cause of our present trouble was through the f a i l u r e of the regional machinery alone, i t i s certain that i t s collapse had important consequences upon l a t e r international developments, leading to confusion and per-p l e x i t i e s i n the world at large. After China had fought alone with the Japanese invaders for four years and f i v e months, there was a sudden attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941 by the Japanese bombers and submarines. Following t h i s treacherous attack on American t e r r i t o r y and the B r i t i s h - 49 Far Eastern colonies, the United States and the B r i t i s h Empire declared war on Japan. So i t welded the wars i n Europe and i n Asia together and produced the greatest conflagration that the world has ever seen. The ambition of Japan to crush the United States for the purpose of conquering China and Asia was revealed in the Tanaka Memorial which was presented by Premier Baron G i i c h i Tanaka to the Emperor of Japan on July 25, 1927. It reads, i n part, as follows: '•In future i f we want to control China, we must f i r s t crush the United States just as i n the past we had to f i g h t in the Russo-Japanese War. But i n order to conquer China we must f i r s t conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must f i r s t conquer China. If we succeed i n conquering China, the rest of the A s i a t i c countries and the South Sea countries w i l l fear us and surrender to us. Then the world w i l l r e a l i z e that Eastern Asia i s ours and w i l l not dare to violate our r i g h t s . This i s the plan l e f t to us by Emperor M e i j i , the success of which i s essential to our national existence."(1) If we trace the history of Japan's expansion, we may fin d that the Tanaka Memorial was not an innovation i n 1927* It resulted from Japanese mi l i t a r i s m which occupies a conspicuous place i n both Japanese"history and t h e i r national culture. The influence of m i l i t a r i s m i n Japan may be understood from a work of Iwasaki, a Japanese scholar. In his book e n t i t l e d "Working Force i n Japanese P o l i t i c s " , he said: "From the ninth-to the nineteenth cent-1. The Memorial of Premier Tanaka, World Peace Movement,_ The Q±na C r i t i c . September 24, 1939, p. 11, and c f r l Crow. Japan's Dream of World Empire (Harper, New York. 1942) p.. - 50 -ury Japan was ruled by the sword. The power of the state was the m i l i t a r y power. The r u l i n g classes were the m i l i t a r y classes. The sword was a symbol of God. For ten centuries the nation was engulfed i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n . " (2) Again, i t i s claimed by Dr. Hu Shih that h i s t o r i c a l l y Japan was always t o t a l i t a r i a n in p o l i t i c a l organization, m i l i t a r i s t i c i n t r a i n i n g and i m p e r i a l i s t i c in aspiration. (5) Japan's p o l i c y of i m p e r i a l i s t i c expansion dates back three and one half centuries. In 1590, Hideyoshi, the great m i l i t a r y hero of medieval Japan, sent l e t t e r s to Korea, China, the P h i l i p p i n e s and the Liuohu Islands to inform them that he was planning to embark on a program of world conquest. In h i s l e t t e r to King of Korea i n s t r u c t -ing the l a t t e r to join the Japanese campaign, Hideyoshi said that he was destined to extend his authority to a l l parts of the world where the sun shines and that i n s t a r t i n g his conquest he planned to send the Japanese forces to China and to compel the people there to adopt Japanese customs and manners. (4) Two years l a t e r Hideyoshi mobilized an army of 305,000 men and sent that huge force across the sea to invade Korea. At the end of May 1592, his army occupied Korea and from there he sent a l e t t e r to a friend disclosing a 2. V i c h i Iwasaki, Working Forces i n Japanese P o l i t i c s , (Macmillan, New York, 1921)pp. 64-65. 3. Hu Shih, Conditions i n China and the Outlook, (An address before the Union League Club, February 6, 1941) p. 4. 4. Carl Crow, op. c i t . pp. 3-^ 4. - 51 -detailed timetable of bis campaign. According to his time-table his army was to proceed from Korea onward to take Peking, the c a p i t a l of China, before the end of 159£. By June 1593 the Imperial Segent would proceed to Peking to assume the t i t l e of the Imperial Regent of China. Although his timetable was upset by the combined forces of Korea and China and the war lasted f o r seven long years, Hideyoshi has continued to be the i d o l and id e a l of the Japanese nation. (5) Three hundred years l a t e r , Hideyoshi's dream of world conquest were revived by the Japanese m i l i t a r i s t s i n their war against China 1894-1895 on the pretext of securing independence f o r Korea from China.(5) At the end of the war, the Japanese began to t a l k about " I l l o Junjang" (which means Russo-Japanese war) and "Ilmi Junjang" (which means American-Japanese war). Ten years l a t e r the Russo-Japanese War was r e a l l y fought on the t e r r i t o r y of China. As a r e s u l t of the war Russia was defeated. The v i c t o r y for Japan i n the Sino-Japanese War enhanced Japan's p o s i t i o n from a minor country to a big power of the Far East, while the res u l t of the Russo-Japanese War made her one of the world powers. After 1904 the reputation of the m i l i t a r i s t s was enormously increased, and the m i l i t a r y prestige of Japan was so high that there was no question on the policy of world 5. E. Krueger,Sino-Japanese Relations Reviewed, China Quarterly, F a l l , 1937, p. 578. - 52 -conquest. In 1915 Japan, taking advantage of the European War, presented to China the notorious Twenty-One Demands designed to subdue China with the threat of force as the f i r s t step towards world domination. The Nine Power Treaty had postponed the outbreak of the "Far Eastern c r i s i s " for about ten years, but the Japanese m i l i t a r i s t s regarded i t as a great obstacle to Japan's i m p e r i a l i s t i c design and they always t r i e d to abolish i t by action. It was asserted by Tanaka: "The Nine Power Treaty i s en t i r e l y an expression of the s p i r i t of commercial r i v a l r y , and i t was the intention of England and America to crush our influence i n China with t h e i r power of wealth." (6) Then there came in 1931 the Mukden Incident, which was the f i r s t step of Tanaka's continental policy "to conquer China, f i r s t to conquer Manchuria and Mongolia." Events following the Mukden Incident s u f f i c i e n t l y showed that the Japanese ambition was not limited to seizing Manchuria but went so far as to invade China proper. On March 1st, 1934, Japan made a puppet regime in Manchuria and Henry Pu Y i was proclaimed at Changchun "Emperor of Manchukuo." Meanwhile Japan steadily pushed forward.beyond the Great Wall into China. Thus, following the barbaric destruction of Chapei, Shanghai, i n 1932, Japan advanced into Jehol and North Chahar i n 1933, 6. Ibid., pp. 29-30. - 53 -established puppet regimes in East Hopei and Chahar i n 1934-1935, invaded Suiyuan i n 1936 and on one pretence after another, attempted to wrest from China's control a huge area of North China including the fiv e northern provinces of Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi and Shangtung, to organize them into a separate p o l i t i c a l and economic unit dependent on Japan. Apart from her m i l i t a r y actions, Japan employed diplomatic pressure compelling China to co-operate with Japan; i n other words, to accept the l a t t e r ' s m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l domination i n China. In a speech to the Japanese Diet on 21st January 1936, Hirota, then Japanese Foreign Minister, stated that the Japanese policy was based upon three fundamental p r i n c i p l e s ; F i r s t , a cessation of a l l anti-Japanese a c t i v i t i e s i n China; second, co-operation between Japan, China and "Manehukuo"; and t h i r d , an understanding for joirrt Sino-Japanese co-operation against communism i n China. (7) Although the Chinese reply to t h i s statement was co n c i l i a t o r y to a marked degree, yet the National Govern-ment of China r e a l i z e d that performance of the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e would be a boon to Japanese trade i n China and meant economic and f i n a n c i a l control by Japan over China. The second p r i n c i p l e necessarily involved a formal 7. George W. Keeton, China, The Far East and the Future, (Jonathan Cape, London, 1943) p. 178. - 54 -recognition by China of existence and independence of "Manchukuo". The t h i r d p r i n c i p l e would permit Japan to send armies to any province i n China which, i n the opinion of the Japanese army leaders, might be menaced by Chinese Communist armies. Whether this p r i n c i p l e would also involve joint Sino-Japanese m i l i t a r y action against Russ-ian Communists was never made verbally e x p l i c i t , but there was no doubt that Japan's r e a l intention was to compel China to adopt an anti-Soviet policy under Japan's di r e c t i o n . In a word, i f China accepted these three p r i n c i p l e s to co-operate with Japan, she would become a protectorate under Japan. Undoubtedly, i t would not be acceptable to the Chinese Government. At the end of 1936; the negotiations reached a deadlock, The Chinese government s t i l l resorted to every possible means to keep the peace. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek exercised such inimitable forbearance that even on the eve of the Marco P olo Bridge Incident, whieh took place on July 7, 1937, he declared, "While there i s the s l i g h t e s t hope f o r peace we w i l l not abandon i t ; so long as we have not reached the l i m i t of endurance , we w i l l not t a l k l i g h t l y of s a c r i f i c e . " (8) But, bent on her program of conquest, Japan deliberately precipitated the f a t e f u l incident. It was the second step of Tanaka's 8. An address delivered by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek before the Kuo Min Tang Congress on March 2, 1935, translated from the Chinese text. - 55 -expansion policy to conquer China after the conquest of Manchuria. Japan j u s t i f i e d her aggression on China on the pretext that Japan's purposes with respect to the campaign in China were "to establish a new order i n East Asia in order to bring about peace and s t a b i l i t y to that region of the world." (9) On November 5, 1938, Premier Konoye issued the following statement announcing the establishment of .the so-called new order i n East Asia: What Japan seeks i s the establishment of a new order that w i l l insure the permanent s t a b i l i t y of East Asia. In t h i s l i e s the ultimate purpose of our present m i l i t a r y campaign. (10) What does the "new order of East Asia" mean? No body can f i n d any precedent i n the history of international r e l a t i o n s . It i s a new term created by Japan to j u s t i f y her unlawful actions i n China. Interpretation of i t by Japan was made i n statements by both/ Premier Konoye and A r i t a . In a statement issued by the Premier on December 22, 1938, the so-called new order i n East Asia includes three major points: First,China should recognize "Mah-chukuo"; second,China should join the anti-Comitern agreement concluded between Japan, Germany and It a l y ; t h i r d , China and Japan should promote economic co-operation. (11) In a press interview of December 14, 1938, Konoye also said that the end of the China incident 9.—Johnstone5 op. c i t . , p. 18. 10.iw. W. Willoughby, Japan's Case Examined (John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1940) p. 94. 11. Tokyo Gazette, February 1939, p. 24. - 56 -l i e s not only i n m i l i t a r y success but also in the re b i r t h of China and the creation of a new order i n East Asia. The foundation of the new order w i l l be l a i d after the r e b i r t h of China and upon the cooperation between Japan, "Manchukuo" and Ghina. (18) Moreover, A r i t a referred to the "new order of East Asia" i n his statement on December 19, as that i t means p o l i t i c a l , economic and cu l t u r a l co-operation between Japan, "Manchukuo" and China, suppression of communism, protection of the status of China from a semi-colonial state to f u l l statehood, and s t a b i l i z a t i o n of the Far East. (13) What i s the r e a l intention of Japan's new order behind her public utterances, and what i s the Chinese attitude towards the "new order"? To answer these ques-tions , i t w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t to cite a statement issued by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on'December 26, 1938, in which he discloses the Japanese intrigues i n creating the so-called new order: We must understand that the. r e b i r t h of China i s taken by the Japanese to mean destruction of an independent China and ereation of an enslaved Ghina. The so-called new order i s to be created after'China has been reduced to a slave nation and linked up with made-in-Japan Manchukuo* The aim of the Japanese i s to control China m i l i t a r i l y under the pre-text of anti-communism, to eliminate Chinese culture under the cloak of protection of Oriental culture and to expel European and American influences from the Far East under the pretext of breaking down economic walls. 12. Tokyo Gazette, p. 16. 13. Ibid., pp. 38-39. - 57 -The f o r m a t i o n of the " t r i p a r t i t e economic u n i t or "economic b l o c " i s . a t o o l to c o n t r o l the economic l i f e - l i n e of C h i n a . I n o t h e r words, c r e a t i o n of a new o r d e r i n A s i a means d e s t r u c t Ion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r i n the F a r E a s t , • enslavement of Ch i n a and do m i n a t i o n of the P a c i f i c and the.whole w o r l d . (14) A f t e r the f i r s t shock of t h e Lukouchiao. i n c i d e n t , the h e r o i c r e s i s t a n c e of the Chinese army to the "new o r d e r " o f Japan, q u i t e unexpected by the Japanese m i l i t a r -i s t s , broke the t i m e t a b l e of t h e a g g r e s s o r . Impatience and o v e r - a m b i t i o n made the Japanese Navy d r i v e southward. On F e b r u a r y 10, 1939, the o c c u p a t i o n o f Hainan I s l a n d , l y i n g o f f the c o a s t o f In d o - C h i n a , was the b e g i n n i n g of Japan's v a s t d r i v e southward. S h o r t l y a f t e r , on March 31, the Japanese government announced a g a i n the_ a n n e x a t i o n o f the S p r a t l e y I s l a n d s . W i t h the German i n v a s i o n of H o l l a n d on A p r i l 15, 1 9 4 0 J a p a n e s e F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r A r i t a made an important s t a t e m e n t , i n d i c a t i n g Japan's i n t e r e s t s i n and con c e r n w i t h t h e Dutch E a s t I n d i e s . A f t e r the def e a t o f France i n Europe i n J u l y 1940, .Japan f o r c e d the V i c h y government t o a c c e p t her demands of n a v a l m i l i t a r y and a i r bases i n . I n d o - C h i n a , and su b s e q u e n t l y her i n f l u e n c e p e n e t r a t e d t o Siam through m e d i a t i o n of f r o n t i e r c o n f l i c t s between Siam and Indo-China. W i t h the e x p a n s i o n of her conquests to the South Seas the Japanese government extended t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of her d o c t r i n e o f a."hew o r d e r " from 1 "East A s i a " t o 14. China fifeekly Review, January 4, 1939. - 58 "Greater East Asia" and a new term was soon invented to c a l l most of the South Sea Islands as a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" of Japan. The term "Co-Prosperity" was f i r s t used by A r i t a i n his statement made regarding the position of the Dutch East Indies. He said: With the South Seas region, es p e c i a l l y the Dutch Indies, Japan i s economically bound by an intimate rel a t i o n s h i p of mutuality i n ministering to one another's needs.... Should the h o s t i l i t i e s i n Europe be extended to the Netherlands and produce repercussions i n the Dutch Indies, i t would not only interfere with the maintenance and furtherance of the above-named relations of economic interdependence and co-existence and co-prosperity, but also give r i s e to an undesirable situation from the standpoint of the peace and the s t a b i l i t y of East Asia.(15) The enunciation of the doctrine of a Co-Prosperity Sphere i n the South Seas lends more c r e d i b i l i t y to the Tanaka Memorial, f o r i t proves the t h i r d step of Tanaka's po l i c y to secure the South Sea countries after "conquest of China." / The p o l i t i c a l domination and economic monopoly under the Japanese policy i n the Far East since 1931 were completely inconsistent with the Far Eastern policy of Great B r i t a i n and the United. States, p a r t i c u l a r l y the United States. The p r i n c i p l e s of the Far Eastern policy of the United States as represented by the Washington Treaties are Open Door in China and s t a b i l i t y in the P a c i f i c . Thus the general s h i f t i n g i n the Far East of force caused by Japan's m i l i t a r y actions destroyed the 15. Keeton, op. c i t . , 241-242. . . - 59 -foundation of the Washington Treaty system. To Japan, the United States represents a p o l i t i c a l economic and Ideological threat to the policy of unlimited expansion. Japanese m i l i t a r i s t s had foreseen and prepared for a f i n a l clash with the United States hut they deliberately delayed action as long as they f e l t their power was not strong enough. Therefore the Japanese government t r i e d at f i r s t to convince Western Powers with false stories and statements to j u s t i f y what her army had done i n China, and then i t openly repudiated:, the Open-Door p r i n c i p l e through her spokesman. A statement issued by Amau, a spokesman of the Tokyo Foreign O f f i c e , on A p r i l 17, 1954, was one serving such a purpose.. It reads: "Japan at a l l times i s endeavouring to maintain and promote her f r i e n d l y relations with foreign nations, but at the same time we consider i t only natural that, to keep peace and order i n l a s t Asia, we must ever act alone on our own respon-s i b i l i t y and i t is our duty to perform i t . At the same time, there i s no country but China which i s i n a position to share with Japan the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the maintenance of peace i n East Asia..."(16). It was the f i r s t o f f i c i a l statement of the Japanese government to warn the Western Powers against their upholding of the Open-Door p o l i c y under the treaty r i g h t s . 16. China United Press, The Puppet State of "Manchukuo" (China United Press, Shanghai, 1955) p. 141.. - 60 -The exposure of the " A s i a t i c Monroe Doetrine" was another example of Japanese spokesmen, both o f f i c i a l and u n o f f i c i a l , to defend Japan's actions i n China. It i s the o r i g i n of the current Japanese slogan "Asia for the A s i a t i c s " . The argument of the so-called A s i a t i c Monroe Doctrine ist evidently intended p r i n c i p a l l y for American consumption, as a hint to that power to l e t Japan work out alone her "special mission" in Asia i n her own lawless manner. The main p r i n c i p l e of the doctrine i s worked out in an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "A Dis-cussion on the A s i a t i c Monroe Doctrine" by Professor Kisaburo Yokoda of the Tokyo Imperial University. The g i s t of his thesis i s as follows: "There are three main p r i n c i p l e s under-l y i n g the Doctrine. F i r s t l y , as Japan is situated i n Asia, she claims p r i o r i t y to Europe and America in special r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s i n that continent, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the neighbouring country of China, including the right of intervention.... Secondly, as Europe and America are incapable of under-standing the s p e c i a l conditions of Asia, they should be barred from matters and disputes r e l a t i n g to that Continent. Thirdly, Asia i s to be disposed of by the A s i a t i c s . The colonies of Europe and America i n Asia should be liberated and the races therein made independent." (17) Since 1931, t h i s doctrine had always been used by the Japanese government i n asking the Western Powers to take "Hands Off" p o l i c y towards China. After Japan's influence encroached on the South Seas, i t s application was extended to those areas. On June 29, 1940, Mr. A r i t a 17. The Puppet State of "Manchukuo", pp. 150-151. r- 61 » made a speech i n which he claimed that Japan was establish-ing a Monroe Doctrine f o r Eastern Asia and the South Seas. "These countries," he said, "are closely related to one another; Japan expects that the Western Powers w i l l do nothing that w i l l exert any undesirable influence on the s t a b i l i t y of East Asia." (18) Meanwhile, since the League of Nations f a i l e d to check the Japanese aggression i n China and the Western Powers refused to recognize the puppet state of Manchukuo and continually protested against the disregard of t h e i r rights and interests by Japan i n China, many Japanese became quite outspoken i n their threats of war against the United States, Great B r i t a i n and Soviet Russia. The following m i l i t a n t statements made by prominent Japanese w i l l show the intention' of Japan. In 1935, General Sadao Araki, Minister of War, i n "The Problems of Japan i n the Showa•Era", restated Japan's mission of world domination i n these words: "Now, to f u l f i l l the v i s i o n to conquer the world" and embrace the universe as our state has been our t r a d i t i o n . If the actions of any of the Powers are not Conducive to imperialism, our blow s h a l l descend on that Power. Our Imperial morality must be preached and spread over the whole world." (19) 18. Keeton, op. c i t . , p. 342. 19. L i n Lin, Japan - Our Common Enemy in Her Own Eight, China Monthly, April,.1942, p. 8. - 62 -In his book, "Japan Must Fight B r i t a i n " , Lieutenant Commander Tota Ishimaru declared: "So long as Japan chooses the right moment for her f i r s t act-of war, she needs have l i t t l e to fear from England." (20) Senior Lieutenant Ishimaru F u j i t a , i n his book "Japan's war against the Whole World", also referred to the coming Anglo-Japanese war and predicted that i f Japan i s v i c t o r -ious, India w i l l be l o s t to Great B r i t a i n forever; and Aust r a l i a , New Zealand-, as well as the Chinese market w i l l pass to Japan. (21) With regard to Soviet Russia, General Sadao Araki had this to say: "Soviet Russia i s for the despotism of the p r o l e t a r i a t and i s against the monarchical regime. It is clear that her p o l i c y i s absolutely incompatible with the policy of this country which i s ruled by the Emperor. Japan must defend herself against these wolves which are sharpening th e i r fangs and castaway bats showing t h e i r teeth for attack." (22) Prophetically are these words found i n Captain Adachi Rukudzo's book e n t i t l e d : "The East Smells Bloodi" "If c o n f l i c t breaks out with America, i t w i l l break out unexpectedly. The Japanese are famous f o r t h e i r m i l i t a r y prowess, as well as for t h e i r diplomatic s k i l l . 20. Tota Ishimaru, Japan Must Fight B r i t a i n , (Maruzen, Tokyo, 1934) p. 5. . 21. L i n L i n , op. c i t . 22. Ibid. - 65 -Therefore, choosing the proper moment they, perhaps, w i l l start the attack." (23) It i s of great significance to note that even detailed plans for the invasion of continental America had already been mapped out some time ago. In his work e n t i t l e d , "The Imminence of a Japanese-American War", Lieutenant General Kiyokatsu Sato out-lined Japan's war plans as such: f i r s t , to occupy Hawaii Islands; secondly, to destroy the Panama Canal; t h i r d l y , to begin landing of Japanese forces on the American Western Coast. (24) Indeed, when Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the Gommander in Chief of the Japanese Imperial Navy, wrote to his fr i e n d , Ito, on January 24, 1941, that he would not be happy merely to capture Guam and the P h i l l i p p i n e s and to occupy Hawaii and San Francisco, but that he was looking forward to d i c t a t i n g peace to the United States in the White House at Washington, (25) he was not boasting, but merely echoing the s p i r i t of Hideyoshi, M e i j i and Tanaka. What did the Western Powers do under such circum-stances i n the face of these growing dangers? The major powers having interests i n the P a c i f i c are the United States, Great B r i t a i n and Soviet Russia. Among them the United States played a leading role in the Far l a s t since 23*Ibid. 24.Ibid., p. 9. 25.New York Times, December 17, 1941. - 64 -the Washington Conference. Especially after the outbreak of the European War i n 1959, as B r i t a i n and the Soviet Union were preoccupied with the European situation, the United States took more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the P a c i f i c . What did the American government do after the Mukden Incident? In the f i r s t place, the Government of the United States, by notes and protests, made i t clear to Japan from 1951 onward, that there would be no o f f i c i a l recognition of the Japanese conquests on the continent. Before the t r i p a r t i t e Pact of Alliance was signed among the three Axis Powers in 1940, protests were the only measures adopted by the United States i n dealing with Japan's aggress-ion i n the Far East and i t was never considered i n that country to stop Japan with measures other than peaceful means. There are many people who c r i t i c i z e the American government fo r what they call e d a timid p o l i c y and argue that economic sanctions should have .been imposed upon Japan to bring her to reason. (26) After the f a l l of Holland and France i n the. spring of 1940, the intention of Japan became so clear that the United States immediately took a l l possible steps to discourage Japan from s t r i k i n g at Southeast Asia. The f i r s t measure was to help China more p o s i t i v e l y , -by including China i n the Lend-Lease Act, sending -~ an adviser to Generalissimo Chiang and following t h i s with a m i l i t a r y mission, so as to make i t clear that the 26. George E. Taylor, America:* in the New P a c i f i c (Mac-millan Co., Hew-York, 1942) p. 62. - 65 -United States considered Ghina as valuable counter-n i weight to the Japanese threat to Southeast Asia. In the second place, the United States assisted the Netherlands Indies i n t h e i r defense preparations. By conversations with Great B r i t a i n and the Dominions, she prepared the way for a joint naval strategy. The Anglo-American-Dutch talk i n Manila i n A p r i l , 1941, seemed to imply that the three powers had plans for joint defense. (27) Furthermore, the United States hastened to build up around Japan a ri n g of a i r bases equipped with long-range bombers which, i t was hoped, would discourage Japan from aggressive action. Work was rushed on the strengthening of Pearl Harbour, on construction of new naval and a i r f a c i l i t i e s i n Alaska, on f o r t i f y i n g Midway, Guam and the P h i l i p p i n e s . In the t h i r d place, the American government exerted economic pressure on Japan, a pressure not strong enough to compel her to f i g h t , i t was hoped, but s u f f i c i e n t to embarrass her war e f f o r t . The more c r i t i c a l became the relations between the United States and Japan, the more pressure was exerted. On July 25, 1940, a l l trade r e l a t -ions were stopped between the two countries. Meanwhile, i n an -endeavour to bring about a sat-isfactory settlement by peaceful means while there seemed s t i l l to be a chance, the United States entered into discussions with Japan. For nine months these 27. Ibid., p. 64. - 66 -conversations were carried on. At the l a s t stage a Jap-anese special envoy, Mr. Kurusu, reached Washington on November 15, 1941 and negotiations were continued u n t i l December 7. During that time the Japanese government advanced troops to the Siamese border in Indo-China, and announced that America and Great B r i t a i n must accept her p o l i c y i n Eastern Asia and leave the Chinese to th e i r fate. Nevertheless, the American government struggled to f i n d a means of averting war. Thus, on November £6, Mr. H u l l delivered to the Japanese representatives a note setting out the American position. It was extremely con c i l i a t o r y i n tone but steadfastly advocated certain basic p r i n c i p l e s which should govern international relations In spite of the fact that Japan's h o s t i l e moves i n the Far East continued, the Japanese Cabinet was reported to be studying the American note, and on December 1, i t was declared that the Japanese government wished to continue the negotiation f o r "at least two weeks." The next day, however, President Roosevelt called Japan's attention to the fact that large reinforcements of her forces were reaching Indo-China, and on December 6, he despatched a personal appeal to the Japanese Emperor, urging him to co-operate i n removing the menace of war i n the P a c i f i c . The reply was delivered from bombers and submarines at Pearl Harbour the following morning. - 67 As was the ease of things happening i n the Far East following the Mukden Incident, the attack on Pearl Harbour which came as a surprise to many people i n the United States, had long been prepared by Japan. The decision to fight America just l i k e that to invade China was no sudden unprepared action carried out by irresponsible younger o f f i c e r s of the Japanese forces. It came as the l o g i c a l conclusion of many decades of fixed policy even before the Mukden Incident. It was a natural r e s u l t of the Japanese aggression on China. It was indicated i n hundreds of statements by Japanese m i l i t a r i s t s and p o l i t i c i a n s . It was a necessary step towards the achievement of aims and ambitions of militarism and expansionism of Japan. The c o n f l i c t was fo r e s t a l l e d and delayed many times by diplomatic pressure, by economic boycott, and by treaty agreement. Unless the United Stated accepted the ways of Japanese expansion and shifted away her treaty obligations, the war was ine v i t a b l e . Today we are engaged i n a t o t a l war of resistance to the t o a l aggression of the Axis Powers. This is neither a regional battle nor a r a c i a l c o n f l i c t . This i s a warfare involving every continent, every man and woman and a l l the peoples on earth without regard to race, colour or creed. In th i s war, we may ask what we are fi g h t i n g for with Japan? In other words, what are the - 68 -war aims of the United Nations in the Far East? Are we fighti n g for independence and anti-aggression? Are we f i g h t i n g for imperialism or democracy? As already mentioned, we Chinese engaged in war for the purpose of resistance against aggression, because our t e r r i t o r y was invaded by a foreign country without provocation. China's war with Japan was due to the fact that her three Eastern Provinces were occupied and her northern Provinces invaded by armed aggression of Japan. The United States i s at war with Japan because Japan attacked Pearl Harbour, and Great B r i t a i n because her colonies in the Far East were attacked by Japan. It goes without saying that the primary cause dragging us into war was the foreign aggression; thus our war aims, negatively speaking, are to stop aggression and to defend our national independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . A complete defeat and destruction of the m i l i t a r y force of our enemy w i l l contribute to such a goal. Nevertheless, t h i s war i s a war on a scale unprecedent ed i n history and the United Nations should have l o f t y ideals and farsighted ideas. There are many things more for the United Nations to do than only to f i g h t for the status quo on the negative side. As for China, the war aims which were announced by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on November 17, 1942, at the! New York Herald Tribune Forum embrace not only our own independence but also the l i b e r a t i o n of every oppressed nation. He said: "When victory comes at the end of this war, we s h a l l have f u l l y achieved national independence .. China not only fi g h t s for her own independence, but also f o r the l i b e r a t i o n of every oppressed nation. For us the Atlantic Charter and President Roosevelt*s proclamation of the four freedoms for a l l peoples are cornerstones of our f i g h t i n g faith..."(28) The same idea was also expressed by Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who in her speech at the American Congress on February 18, 1945, said: "We in China, l i k e you, want a better world, not for ourselves alone, but for a l l mankind." (29) President Roosevelt, in his message to the American Congress reviewing American relations with Japan on December 15, 1941 referred among other things to the war • aims of the United States as follows: "We are now at war. We .are f i g h t i n g i n self-defenee. We are f i g h t i n g i n defence of our national existence, of our right to be secure, of our right to enjoy the blessings of peace. We are f i g h t i n g i n defence, of p r i n c i p l e s of law and order and j u s t i c e , against an effort of unprecedented f e r o c i t y to overthrow those p r i n c i p l e s and to impose upon humanity a regime of ruthless domination by unrestricted and arbitrary force." (50) Shortly af t e r t h i s message to the Congress, President Roosevelt made another speech restating the war aims again 28. New York Herald Tribune, November 17, 1942. 29. New York Times, February 18, 1943. 30. New York Times, December 15, 1941. saying that "We are f i g h t i n g today for security, for progress, and for peace, not only for ourselves hut for a l l men, not only for one generation but f o r a l l gener-ations. We are f i g h t i n g to cleanse the world of ancient e v i l s and ancient i l l s . " (51) From the above statements of the leaders of the United Nations, i t may be concluded that the war aims i n the P a c i f i c involve three objects: f i r s t , • • self-defence; second, cleansing the wa-rld of ancient e v i l s and i l l s , making i t a better world for a l l mankind and t h i r d s the l i b e r a t i o n of every oppressed nation. To f u l f i l l the war aims only w i l l not f i n i s h our jobs. The ultimate object that we are f i g h t i n g f o r i s peace and the war i t s e l f i s but a measure used to reach the ultimate object. It Is commonly understood that m i l i t a r y victory alone w i l l not give us peace and i t w i l l be useless unless we do win the peace. Victory, however .essential, i s c h i e f l y important for the? p r i v i l -ege i t w i l l give of shaping the era of peace f o r the world; that i s to say, peace i s not established by winning the war; winning the war merely clears the path. Then, questions a r i s e : supposing•that we have reached the war aims through v i c t o r y , what then? What shall we do? Shall we win the peace as well as win the war? It i s unsound for those to think of winning the war as one thing and of winning the peace as another, quite 51. Ibid., Jan. 6, 1942. ~" ~ ~ - 71 -d i s t i n c t and separate. From an h i s t o r i c a l point of view, i t i s clear that war and peace were interwoven with one another. They stand also as cause and consequence of each other. As Mr. Willk i e has pointed out: "We s h a l l win i n the future peace only what we are now winning i n the war". (32) Unless a durable peace can be established after the war, the s a c r i f i c e of m i l l i o n s of men and b i l l i o n s of dollars in t h i s war w i l l be wasted and the th i r d tragedy i n the history of human beings w i l l be destined to come. Comparatively speaking, to win the war i s easy but to win the peace is d i f f i c u l t . History t e l l s us that i t i s harder to prepare i n t e l l i g e n t l y for peace than f o r war'. In the F i r s t World War, f o r instance, we won the war but l o s t the peace. At that time, President Wilson participated i n a war i n order to "make the world safe for democracy" and to win"the war to' end a l l wars". Those were not merely slogans but high purposes of the President with a hope of achievement through the accept-ance of a set of p r i n c i p l e s known as the Fourteen Points, and the setting up of a f u l l - f l e d g e d international structure to be known as tne League of Nations. But when the time came to execute i t i n the Peace Conference of V e r s a i l l e s , selfishness brought conspiracy and intrigue 32. Wendell L. W i l l k i e , One World (Simon & Shuster, New York, 1943) p. 69. 72 -into f u l l play to serve narrow ends and the net result was the abandonment of. most of the purposes for which the war had supposedly been fought. Under the promise of self-determination, the A l l i e s acquiesced i n trading m i l -l i o n s of European people into Irredentas. They allowed Japan to have Shangtung, they imposed heavy indemnity on the German people and they disposed of Germany's and Turkey's t e r r i t o r i e s under the name of mandates. Because those purposes were abandoned, no new idea and new goal rose from the ashes of the s a c r i f i c e of millionsof people who had l o s t t h e i r l i v e s i n the b a t t l e - f i e l d for the purpose of constructing a better world. This i s a tragic h i s t o r i c a l lesson that we should never forget. And i n the present war, we should win both the war and the peace. If we want to win the peace, we should c l e a r l y set for t h the peace aims when the war i s s t i l l being fought. To plan now for- the coming peace i s becoming a subject of great controversy. Some people are e n t i r e l y opposed to any plan whether good or bad. In t h e i r opinion, the essential job i s to win the war and l e t the peace that is to ensue take care of i t s e l f . They fear that discussions about the future may d i s t r a c t e f f o r t s from the present gigantic task. Others think that the consideration of different plans on world order may create confusion and disunity among the United Nations. Their argument i s that while some kind of 73 -unity exists already around the necessity of winning the war, a debate about what i s to follow after the war might serve disunity. A t h i r d category believes that i t i s premature to formulate peace aims, so long as the end of the war i s hidden from view, and there i s , as a matter of f a c t , not much that i s useful that can be said on t h i s subject. Otherwise, i t wooild only be an expression of wishful thinking on the part of the old incurable i d e a l i s t s who have always dreamed of a world Utopia. The fourth group of those who opposed p u b l i c i z i n g the proposed peace terms raises the objection that this w i l l make our enemies fi g h t on with renewed and desperate determination. For these reasons, .some governments of the United Nations, f o r example, Great B r i t a i n , refuse to give any def i n i t e peace plan for the post-war world. In spite of the clamour fo r war aims and for peace aims started quite early i n the most enlightened sections of the B r i t i s h opinion, the response from governmental c i r c l e s was for a long-time more than halting. In the United States, the Hearst-Patterson-McCormiek Press, Westbrook Pegler and others are now vigorously attacking planning for the post-war settlements on the ground that i t distracts attention from the war and that i t i s i d e a l i s t i c and impractical.(33) 33. An observer, Ostrich into Eagle, Far Eastern Survey, November 30, 1942. 74 -As a New York newspaper e d i t o r i a l put i t that thinking about the postwar world and postwar planning i s solemn guff by professors on "How to cook your rabbit before you catch i t . " (34) In the l i f e and death struggle i n which the globe i s involved, surely m i l i t a r y considerations should come f i r s t and i t seems to many people that the time i s not ripe to talk about winning the peace u n t i l war i s over. We can agree that detailed peace aims and blueprints for a world government cannot be worked out now when no one can fore-see what the s i t u a t i o n w i l l be in the future* But what can and should be done i s that we attempt to reach agree-ment on the general p r i n c i p l e s which w i l l govern our solutions of these postwar problems when the time comes-. For i f the A l l i e s cannot, devise some general structure for international collaboration under the powerful incentive of seeking to defeat a common enemy, there i s l i t t l e reason to hope that they can do so when that incentive has been removed. As S i r Stafford Cripps wrote recently: "During the time of war, when the f e e l i n g of co-operation i s s t i l l strong, i s the moment to concert common action for the period after the war. To wait u n t i l h o s t i l i t i e s have ceased and danger i s no longer present, i s to miss the chance of common agreement." (35) 34. Harry D. Gideonse, The Challenge of Post-war Planning (An address delivered for Freedom House on September 15, 1942, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, New York 1943) P. 9. 35. Cited i n "Can*the United Nations Unite i n War and Peace", Amerasia, March, 1943, p. 2. - 75 -Furthermore, i f we do not prepare peace planning now, after the war i t w i l l be too l a t e . We were told in the la s t war:"Destroy the Kaiser f i r s t . Discuss peace afterwards." Today again, i t i s " H i t l e r , Mussolini and Tojo must be f i r s t destroyed; we cannot discuss peace u n t i l that i s done." We went to the Peace Conference of 1919 animated by the l o f t i e s t and most disinterested ideals, but we were t o t a l l y unprepared for the special problems that had to be met at the peace table. We secured neither peace, freedom nor prosperity. It was an h i s t o r i c a l mis-take ;... we should not make i t again. As Messrs. Hoover and Gibson assert: "When the day of the armistice or any other end to m i l i t a r y action comes, nations w i l l be exhausted and many of them starving.... The whole world w i l l be crying for haste. There w i l l be l i t t l e time then to think out the problems of l a s t i n g peace. They must begin now." (56) As to the second contention that planning peace terms now would create controversy and disunity among the United Nations, naturally the complicated and Important issues being involved i n postwar settlements would inevitably give r i s e to controversies among the United Nations sooner 56. H. Hoover & H. Gibson, The Problems of Lasting Peace (Doubleday, Doran & Co., New York 1942) pp..2-3. 76 -] j or l a t e r . But disunity now i s not so probable; disunity after the war i s more l i k e l y . Even disunity now i s not so serious i n disturbing the c o r d i a l relations of the United Nations as that at end of the war. Professor S. R. Chow has pointed out that "Indeed we prefer to see such controversies arise during the war rather than at i t s end. I n t e r a l l i e d controversies i n the midst of the war would not result in the breaking up of the bond of the United Nations who are bound to stand together against the Axis powers; while at the end of the war separate national interests may drive nations to take an uncompromising attitude i n controversies even at the r i s k of a rupture". (37) Gn the contrary, the fact that we are thinking about the future i s i n i t s e l f a stimulus for the war e f f o r t , because we are emphasizing a better world order. It i s a p o l i t i c a l war i n the best sense of the word. It i s the greatest moral factor at the disposal of the United Nations. Moreover, post-victory planning means that the United Nations w i l l be able to undertake immediately the task of reconstruction; that i s to say, no time w i l l be l o s t i n salvaging what w i l l have remained after this t e r r i b l e war. To those who believe that i t i s premature to formulate peace aims and that i t would;be an expression of wishful 37. s. R. Chow, A Permanent Order for the P a c i f i c (A data paper submitted to Eighth Conference of the I. P. R., December 1942, Mimeographed) pp. 1-2. - 77 -thinking about world Utopia, an answer would be that although the end of war i s not in sight, we are going to win and at lea s t , we should have such assumption or determination. If victory i s not ours, the question w i l l be answered by the Axis powers. There are indeed many plans now under discussion to preserve the peace. Some are Utopian ideas, f o r they stimulate thought, imagination, and discussion. Without dreamers, mankind might never have emerged from savagery. The "aims" and "ide a l s " are not part of the binding words of the peace. They are only background to be expressed i n undertaking of concrete character. F i n a l l y , the objection to p u b l i c i z i n g the proposed peace terms on the ground that i t makes our enemies fight on with renewed and desperate determination can be easily over-ruled. The leaders of Nazism, Japanism and Fascism know that they have either a l l to gain or a l l to lose and they w i l l fight on and on so long as their peoples support them. A proclamation of clear and right peace terms may help to convince the people of enemy countries that the end of the war i s not so harsh to their future l i v e s . This would upset to some extent the vul n e r a b i l i t y i n the war of propaganda of the enemy leaders. No one who remembers the effect of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points inside Germany can deny that such a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of peace aims can have the - 78 -greatest possible m i l i t a r y importance. Such an opportunity exists again t h i s time. In the P a c i f i c , the war suffers from the attitude \ which sees Asia and the P a c i f i c as a secondary front. It i s a l o g i c a l consequence from t h i s attitude that the peace i n the P a c i f i c i s overlooked by most people of the United Nations. Before Pearl Harbour only two or three isolated writers were r a i s i n g f a i n t protests against the overwhelming preoccupation of the planners with Germany and Europe to the complete neglect of the majority of mankind that l i v e around the P a c i f i c and the Indian Oceans. Today the Far East is beginning to receive some attention from the postwar planners and there i s small but steadily growing output of a r t i c l e s and books i n which the aims and consequences of the United Nations' struggle i n the P a c i f i c are discussed. Such plans, however, are s t i l l of minor importance as compared with those concerning the postwar Europe and they do not arouse as much interests as the l a t t e r plans do. . It has been generally admitted that the pr i n c i p l e of i n d i v i s i b i l i t y of peace i s applied to everywhere i n the world. World peace would not be possible without peace of the Far East, To most of the Chinese people, neither security nor l i b e r a t i o n can be expected from the result of the war unless a durable basis for peace : can be l a i d i n the Far East. It must be remembered that the disregard of the importance of the P a c i f i c . a f f a i r s i n world p o l i t i c s after 1931 was one of the causes of the present world-wide c o n f l i c t . So the peace of the wo;rld can be made possible only when the peace of the P a c i f i c i s also brought about. For p r a c t i c a l purposes, i t i s easier to bring about the peace i n the Far East than i n Europe. The p o l i t i c s of Europe are so deeply entangled in i n t e l l e c t u a l , emotional and s p i r i t u a l problems, and so deeply embedded in the past, that i t seems almost hopeless to t r y to bring order out of chaos that has been s o l i d i f i e d by long t r a d i t i o n . It i s ent i r e l y otherwise i n the Far East. There the p o l i t i c a l problem i s not complicated by any long heritage of hatred or memory of ancient wrongs. The causes of war are v i s i b l e . Once the causes are removed, there i s a good prospect of l a s t i n g peace which can be made i n the P a c i f i c a f t e r the'War. Notwithstanding the fact that there are no de f i n i t e and comprehensive peace aims announced by the governments of the United Nations i n connection with the postwar settlement i n the P a c i f i c , i t is generally considered that the proclamation of the four freedoms declared by President Roosevelt and the Eight-Point Program known as the A t l a n t i c Charter proclaimed by President Roosevelt - 80 -and Prime Minister Churchill are the common goal and the peace aims to be achieved by the United Nations in the postwar world. In his message to Congress on January 6, 1941 President Roosevelt stated the pr i n c i p l e of four freedoms as follows: In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The f i r s t i s freedom of speech and express-i o n - everywhere i n the world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God i n hi s own way - everywhere in the world. The t h i r d i s freedom from want - which, translated into world terms,; means economic understandings which w i l l secure to every nation a healthy peacetime l i f e f or i t s inhabitants - everywhere i n the world. The fourth i s freedom from fear - which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and i n such a thorough fashion that no nation w i l l be i n a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbour - anywhere i n the world. That is no v i s i o n of a distant millennium. It i s a d e f i n i t e basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation.(38) The A t l a n t i c Charter was made on August 14, 1941 as a joint declaration by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister C h u r c h i l l "to make known certain common p r i n -ciples i n the national p o l i c i e s of t h e i r respective ' 38. United Nations Agreements and Documents i n the B u l l e t i n of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, New York, July, 1942, p. 3. - 81 -countries on which they base their hopes for a better future of the world." It contains eight points, as shown below: F i r s t , t h e i r countries seek no aggrandize-ment, t e r r i t o r i a l or otherwise; Second, they desire to see no t e r r i t o r i a l changes that, do not accord with the f r e e l y expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; Third, they respect the right of a l l peoples to choose the form of government under which they w i l l l i v e ; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been f o r c i b l y deprived of them; Fourth, they w i l l endeavour, with due respect for t h e i r existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by a l l states, great or small, v i c t o r or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity; F i f t h , they desire to bring about the f u l l e s t collaboration between a l l nations i n the economic f i e l d with the object of securing, for a l l , improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security; Sixth, a f t e r the f i n a l destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which w i l l afford to a l l nations the means of dwelling in safety within t h e i r own boundaries and which afford assurance that a l l the men i n a l l the lands may l i v e out t h e i r l i v e s i n freedom from fear and want Seventh, such a peace should enable a l l men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance; Eighth, they believe that a l l of the nations of the world, for r e a l i s t i c as well as s p i r i t u a l reasons, must come to the abandon-ment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained i f land, sea, or a i r armaments continue to be employed by nations - 8 2 -which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of the i r f r o n t i e r s , they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that disarmament of such nations i s essential. They w i l l likewise aid and encourage a l l other practicable measures which w i l l lighten for peace-loving' people the crushing burden of armament. (39) The A t l a n t i c Charter was proclaimed at the i n i t i a l stage of the Second World War f i f t e e n months before Pearl Harbour, when the United States was not at war with the Axis Powers. The name "Atlantic Charter" which has been given to t h i s declaration does not refer only to the A t l a n t i c region or - to powers having interests i n the A t l a n t i c . The Charter derives i t s name from the place where i t was signed. The immediate results of the promulgation of the Charter marked a definite stage i n the strategy of the peace and of the war i n Europe. In comparison with the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, i t lacks any definiteness of plan to approach. Its ambiguity and mystery, are often attacked by the people as a vain promise. Yet others who- admire i t say that the greatness of the A t l a n t i c Charter l i e s rather in the sober statement of a complex goal. It i s a promise, not a f u l f i l m e n t , a challenge and not an answer. Everything remains to be done by the people and governments of the United Nations. (40) 39. Ibid. , pp. 2-3. 40. J u l i u s Stone, Peace Planning and the Atlantic Charter, Australian Quarterly, June 1942, p. 22.. - 83 -After P e a r l Harbour,, the Atlantic Charter was endorsed by the United Nations as their common object to be achieved to defeat the enemies and to establish a l a s t i n g peace. In the preamble of the United Nations Joint Declaration announced on January 1, 1942, i t is stated that the United Nations "subscribe to a common program of purposes and pr i n c i p l e s embodied i n the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great B r i t a i n and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atl a n t i c Charter." (41) Since then, the A t l a n t i c Charter has been regarded not only as an Anglo-American joint declaration but also as common charter of the United Nations. In the Far Eastern countries, notably in China, the declaration of the Atl a n t i c Charter was enthusiastic-a l l y received without any reservation long before the proclamation of the United Nations Joint Declaration. On August 18, 1941, Dr. Quo Tai-Chi, then Chinese For-eign Minister, issued the following statement: "The Chinese Government arid people wholeheart-edly welcome and endorse the Joint Declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on the fundamental aims of the democratic powers in resistance to aggression and the aspirations of a l l peaceful and. freedom-loving peoples, including the peoples i n the Axis countries themselves, fo r a r e a l new world order .... China i s prepared to make f u l l contribution just as she has for the past four years made untold 4E! United Nations Agreements, op. c i t . , p. l . - 84 -s a c r i f i c e s of her manpower and national resources toward the democratic cause and continues to play her essential part in the world-wide c o n f l i c t . . . . " (42) The question of application of the Atlantic Charter raised by the B r i t i s h government aroused much controvers and disappointment not only i n the Far East but also in the United States. From the text of the Charter, i t i s generally believed that the application i s world-wide. As mentioned already, the Charter derives i t s name from the place where i t was signed. There i s not any q u a l i f i c a t i o n or reservation to l i m i t the regions to which i t w i l l be applied. Indeed, i n exposition of American p o l i c y , responsible American o f f i c i a l s , notably Vice-President Wallace and Under-Secretary of State Welles, appeared to give endorsement to the widest possible application of i t . "The p r i n c i p l e s of the At l a n t i c Charter", declared Mr. Welles, "must be guaranteed to the world as a whole - i n a l l oceans and in a l l continents"; (43) Vice-President Wallace further said: "Those who write the peace must think the world. There can be no p r i v i l e g e d peoples". (44) In a speech to the people of the United States on February 23, 1942, President Roosevelt f i r s t emphatically stressed that 42. The Chinese Declaration of War Aims, Contemporary China, November 5G, 1942, p* 3. 43.Sumner Welles, Post-War Specifications (An address delivered on Memorial Day, May 30, 1942, Arlington National Amphitheatre, The Woodrow Wilson Foundation, New York) , p. 4. - T r. . 44. Henry A. Wallace, The Price of Free World Victory, Free. World, June 1942, p. 11. - 8 5 -the A t l a n t i c Charter applies to the whole world; second, he held for t h the four freedoms to the people of the P a c i f i c ; and f i n a l l y he declared i n a l l solemnity that a prime objective of th i s war i s the establishment of the r i g h t of self-determination for a l l people. (45) In spite of the unambiguous statements of the American government as to the scope of application of the Atlantic Charter, a shadow of doubt was east over i t by the speech of Prime Minister C h u r c h i l l . Three weeks after the signing of the A t l a n t i c Charter on September 9, 1941, Mr. Ch u r c h i l l delivered a speech i n the House of Commons, saying: "At the At l a n t i c meeting we had i n mind primarily the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national l i f e of the States and Nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke, and p r i n c i p l e s governing any al t e r a t i o n i n the t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries - which may have to be made. So that i s quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of the self-governing i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the B r i t i s h Grown." (46) The world was surprised and disappointed by Mr. Churchill's statement. In some quarters, people did not acquiesce i n the C h u r c h i l l reservation. Guenther Stein, reporter of the Christian Science Moniter, wrote from Chungking: "The independence of a l l other nations of East Asia from c o l o n i a l rule i s generally regarded 45. New York Times, February 23, 1942. 46. New York Times, September 10, 1941. - 86 -as absolutely e s s e n t i a l . " (47) Wendell Willkie i n a public statement i n which he referred to a conversation with Madame Chiang Kai-shek, voiced a similar view. A t y p i c a l and humorous c r i t i c i s m of Mr* Ghurehill's reservation was made by Senator Pepper. He said: "How can I whisper into the ears of the young men we have sent overseas that, after a l l , they are fig h t i n g for the restoration of the B r i t i s h Empire." (48) Even i f the At l a n t i c Charter covers Europe as well as Asia, on some v i t a l P a c i f i c questions the Charter has nothing to say and on others i t gives only ambiguous guidance. The need of a P a c i f i c Charter in addition to the Atlantic Charter i n coping with the pa r t i c u l a r demand of the P a c i f i c region has been urged for a long time among the i n t e l l i g e n t and far-sighted persons in the United Nations. Mr, Willk i e i s the f i r s t one who, after t r a v e l l i n g 31,000 miles around' the world, gives the r e a l Ideas of the people i n the East asking for a P a c i f i c Charter. In a radio broadcast to the people of the United States, Mr. Wi l l k i e said: "The people of Russia and China are bewildered and anxious. Many of them have read the At l a n t i c Charter. Rightly or wrongly, they are not s a t i s f i e d . They ask: What about a P a c i f i c Charter? Is there to be a Charter only for the mil l i o n s 47. The Chri s t i a n Science Moniter, September 22, 1941. 48. Cited i n "War and Peace in the P a c i f i c " (International Secretariat, I. P. R., New York, 1943) p. 121. - 87 of the Western Hemisphere? Is there to be no Charter of freedom f o r the b i l l i o n s of the East?" (49) Mr. H a l l e t t Abend, a well-known newspaper corres-pondent for many years i n the Orient, said again i n his timely book, e n t i t l e d P a c i f i c Charter, "The urge to nationalism and freedom and the hatred of imperialism f e l t by hundreds of millions of As i a t i c s could be turned into a gigantic asset f o r the United Nations i f a s p e c i f i c postwar program for Asia were to be announced at once. The Atlantic Charter, sweeping as are some of i t s declarations, does not su f f i c e . What is urgently needed i s a P a c i f i c Charter." (50) Further-more, Mr. Joaquin M. E l i z a l d e , the Philippine Resident Commissioner to the United States, i n his a r t i c l e , "The Meaning of a P a c i f i c Charter" (51) stresses the need of a P a c i f i c Charter to encourage the people i n the Far East to fight f or the United Nations. A similar idea i s expressed by Mr. P h i l i p F. J a f f e , the Managing Editor of AMERASIA, i n an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d , "A Charter for Asia". (52) Judging from a l l the statements, i t may be understood that the reasons for a P a c i f i c Charter are twofold: In the f i r s t place, a declaration of pr i n c i p l e s - a P a c i f i c 49. Cited i n "A Strategy for Victory in War and Peace", Amerasia, November, 1942, p. 414. 50. H a l l e t t Abend, P a c i f i c Charter (Doubleday, Doran & Co. ,. New York, 1943) pp.83-85. 51. Joaquin M. E l i z a l d e , The Meaning of a P a c i f i c Charter, Amerasia, A p r i l 1942, pp. 83-85. 52. P h i l i p F. Jaffe,A Charter for Asia,Amerasia June 194.3, pp. 161-164. - 88 -Charter - can be worked out, proposing the extension of a l i b e r a l , progressive and free democracy to Asia. Such a declaration, p a r a l l e l l i n g the Atlantic Charter, would be a mighty appeal to the people of lands over-run by the Axis or threatened with invasion. This proposed P a c i f i c Charter should assert unequivocally the right of a l l people to choose the form of government under which they w i l l l i v e , and should guarantee s o c i a l and economic justice for a l l . In the second place, the promulgation of such a P a c i f i c Charter would s t r i k e a f a t a l blow at Japanese e f f o r t s to turn aggression into a holy war of Asia against the world. It would serve with notice that the war i s not being fought for the furtherance of i m p e r i a l i s t i c supremacy, but for the p r i n c i p l e s of l i b e r t y and the right of a l l men to l i v e . Whereas those ideals and p r i n c i p l e s are established i n the l i v e s of the people of Asia, they would be warmly embraced and cherished as fundamental values. Asia can and must be made to understand the simple truth that this war i s also i t s war and that victory would be Asia's victory as w e l l . Although the need of a P a c i f i c Charter has been demanded by statesmen and authors, yet the concrete proposals for such a charter are s t i l l not worked out. Whether i t should include p r i n c i p l e s l i k e those of the - 89 -Atlantic Charter to be used p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the P a c i f i c i s not yet known. At any rate, the proposed Charter should contain certain general p r i n c i p l e s to be achieved as peace aims for the postwar settlement of the P a c i f i c . Some s p e c i a l i s t s on the Far Eastern a f f a i r s have suggested general p r i n c i p l e s of the peace of the P a c i f i c which might be termed as proposed P a c i f i c Charters. Professor S. R. Chow believes that four essential requirements must be met before a permanent order can be b u i l t in the P a c i f i c . First,Japan must be completely disarmed after her defeat in the war. Second, there must be a fundamental adjustment in the relationship of China with foreign powers. Third, the r a c i a l and national problems of the region must'be solved equitably. Fourth, a regional organization must be formed to establish security and maintain peace. (53) Dr. Hu Shih, formerly Chinese Ambassador to the United States, considers that a just and durable peace in the P a c i f i c area must f i l f i l l the three following basic conditions: F i r s t , i t must not result in vindicating any t e r r i t o r i a l gain or economic advantage acquired by the use of brutal force i n open v i o l a t i o n of international law and solemnly pledged treaty obligations. Second, i t must s a t i s f y the legitimate demands of the Chinese people f o r an indep-endent, u n i f i e d and strong national state. SS.Ghow, op. c i t . , p. 3. 90 -Third, i t must restore and greatly strengthen the international order for the P a c i f i c area and i n the world at large so that orderly international relationships may always pre v a i l and aggressive war may not recar. (54) A t h i r d proposal as to the peace terms of the Far East i s enumerated by Professor Nathaniel Peffer. In his hook e n t i t l e d "Basis for Peace in the Par East", he works out f i v e proposed terms which wil l , assure such a peace/ Those are: F i r s t , as a necessary preliminary, Japan must he not only defeated but crushed -maimed and l e f t helpless, beyond p o s s i b i l i t y of recovery f o r a long period. It must be returned to the geographical position i t occupied when i t emerged from"seclusion. Second, China must be made completely indep-endent .... The r e l a t i o n of other powers to China must henceforth be exclusively that of one country trading with another, Third, such economic'arrangement must be made i n the Far East as w i l l assure to Japan l i v e l i h o o d on a standard common to the modern I n d u s t r i a l people. This means that no a r t i f i c i a l obstructions must be interposed against i t s access to raw; mater-i a l s and markets 1 i n Asia on equal terms with any other country. Fourth, there must be fundamental change i n the position of those parts of Eastern Asia that hitherto have been colonies of western Empires. This does not necessarily require complete evacuation or grant of f u l l indep-endence i n a l l instances, but i t does require, as a minimum,material concessions i n the form of a greater native autonomy and systematic preparation for independence with withdrawal by the empire i n stages. F i f t h , China must be not only restored to 54. Hu Shih, Two Papers on Post-War Asia (A data paper submitted to the Eighth Conference of the.I. P. R. December 1942, mimeographed) p. 1. - 91 -f u l l independence but strengthened. This can most e f f e c t i v e l y be done by way of large scale economic assistance to enable i t to i n d u s t r i a l i z e as rapidly as possible.(55) F i n a l l y , Mr. H. J". Timperley, an adviser to the Ministry of P u b l i c i t y of the Chinese government, i n s i s t s that any proposal looking towards a settlement i n the Far East must conform among -other things to the following basic p r i n c i p l e s : F i r s t , they must provide for a strong and independent China, sovereign i n her recog-nized t e r r i t o r y . Second, they must also provide for a Japan able to take her proper place i n the comity of nations. Japan's legitimate economic needs and problems.must be recognized and adequate provision made to meet them. Third, they must deal constructively with the r i c h but p o l i t i c a l l y undeveloped colonial areas of ••' ;Southeast Asia. (56) A l l these are not o f f i c i a l i n character. They are just personal opinions expressed by experts with a hope of building a genuine international order i n the Far East i n the postwar world. They represent high purposes and ideals which must be r e a l i z e d i f we want a permanent peace i n the P a c i f i c * I f power p o l i t i c s i s not to dom-inate the postwar settlement as i t did at the end of the 0?' F i r s t World War, the United Nations should give t h e i r consideration to the plans suggested for the r e a l i z a t i o n of peace and security of the P a c i f i c area* bb. Nathaniel P e f f e r , Basis f o r peace of the Far East "(Harper!.-Bros. New York, 1942) pp. 56-58. 56.H. J..Timperley, Peace Aims.in the P a c i f i c , Asia, July 1942, p. 398. -- 92 President Chiang Kai-shek, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt held a conference at Cairo in November 1943. The momentous meeting resulted i n a Three-Power Joint Communique i n which the three great A l l i e s reaffirmed unconditional surrender of Japan, promised no t e r r i t o r i a l expansion and agreed to expel Japan from a l l t e r r i t o r i e s stolen from China or taken by violence and greed. A part of the text of the Cairo Communique concerning the t e r r i t o r i a l change of Japan runs as follows: "It i s t h e i r purpose that Japan should be stripped of a l l the islands i n the P a c i f i c which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the world war in 1914, and that a l l the t e r r i t o r i e s Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pascadores, s h a l l be restored to the Republic of China. "Japan w i l l also be expelled from a l l other t e r r i t o r i e s which she has taken by violence and greed. . / "The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that i n due course Korea s h a l l become free and independent." (57) It i s the f i r s t o f f i c i a l document formally declared by the three great United Nations-in connection with the postwar t e r r i t o r i a l adjustment of the Far East. The announcement of the Cairo decision gave the people great encouragement and they accepted i t as what they called a P a c i f i c Charter. Public opinion used the words, "what 57. The New Times, December 2, 1943. - 93 -might be termed a P a c i f i c Charter", to describe the importance of the Three-Power Communique. Wo doubt i t serves as a very important document i n the peace settlement of the Par East. But i f we c a l l i t a P a c i f i c Charter, i t seems that there are s t i l l some other import-ant things l e f t undone. It f a i l s to mention anything about disarmament and d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of Japan; i t has nothing to say on the problem of security in the P a c i f i c and i t keeps s i l e n t upon the colonial status of Southeast Asia. In a word, this declaration i s by no means a f i n a l and complete one to be regarded as a charter f o r the P a c i f i c region. An Australian paper, The Brisbane Telegraph, asserts that the Cairo Commun-ique f a l l s far short of a P a c i f i c Charter which i s becoming increasingly necessary to show the teeming mi l l i o n s of that area our postwar intention. ( 5 8 ) Prom the foregoing statements, 'the declaration of war aims and peace aims i s s i g n i f i c a n t to make peoples in Asia r a l l y to our side and shorten the path to vic t o r y . Uncounted columns of words have been issued about war aims and peace intentions, yet as a matter of fact war aims and peace intentions have been obscured by the very mist of words. Pronouncement of good intentions, vague promises, ambiguous pledges such as those contained i n the A t l a n t i c Charter are 58. The Christian Science Monitor, December 2, 1945. not urgently needed and may not apply i n s p e c i f i c cases i n the P a c i f i c . What i s urgently needed i s a f a i r , clear and complete P a c i f i c Charter. The Cairo Communique is clear enough hut not complete enough. Except for some personal suggestions, the .most important problem", . that .of security i n the P a c i f i c area, has. been almost e n t i r e l y overlooked i n recent years. How to prevent P a c i f i c war from recurring and how to make a permanent P a c i f i c order stable and secure are s t i l l l e f t to be worked out by the United Nations. 95 -CHAPTER IV BASIC CONDITIONS OF THE PEACE TO THE FAR EAST Machinery alone cannot maintain peace. International peace organization for the avoidance of war can only be expected to succeed i f the conditions existing both within states- and between states are not such as to cause international s t r i f e . Those conditions contributing to-wards eliminating a l l causes of c o n f l i c t or f r i c t i o n in international relationship as well as towards checking a l l . vicious force which make for war should be made available before any form of international organization is set up. It is believed that one of the causes for the f a i l u r e of the League of Nations'is the fact that no such conditions were made when i t was established i n 1920 under the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . The past experience can be used to prevent the same mistake from occurring again. Once a peace settlement has been made, the United Nations should set down indispensable conditions to the peace of the future before any question of international organization i s taken into consideration. So f a r as the Far East i s concerned, the basic conditions of the peace should include at least the following three categories: 96 F i r s t , prevention of the recurrence of Japanese aggress-ion i n the Far East; second, Japan's eviction from the continent as well as from the P a c i f i c islands; t h i r d , a new order for Southeast Asia and India. It is evident that the Japanese aggression has been effected by the long-rooted militarism of Japan as stated in the l a s t chapter. The best measure, therefore, to prevent from any recurrence of the Japanese aggression would be to wipe out militarism of Japan within and without. The problem of extinguishing Japanese m i l i t -arism i s very complex and i t can be achieved through dif f e r e n t ways and by different measures. M i l i t a r y defeat alone of Japan i s not enough nor can Japan's unconditional surrender i t s e l f be regarded as the ultimate step to reach t h i s goal. The nature of Japan's defeat w i l l be determined not only by the decisiveness of the f i g h t i n g but also by the complete eradication of Japanese militarism. The meaning of the eradication of the Japanese m i l i t a r i s m has been expressed by different writers with various explanations. Walter Lippmann defines "Conclusive defeat" as meaning that Japan must never again be able to seek empire over China and the Indies. (1) Nathaniel Peffer goes further to suggest that Japan must be not only defeated but crushed. (2) 1. Walter Lippmann, U. S. Foreign Policy; Shield of the Republic ( L i t t l e , Brown Co., Boston, 1943) p. 144. 2. Supra.. p. 91, Again, Ambassador Grew made i t clear that victory i n i t s e l f i s not enough and the f i r s t thing i s u t t e r l y to crush, discredit and render impotent for the future the Japanese m i l i t a r y machine and a l l i t s p o l i t i c a l ramifications. (3) The f i r s t thing that would contribute to crushing Japanese m i l i t a r i s m would involve the punishment of the war criminals who have committed crimes i n their war conducts i n contravention to international law and humanity. To the Japanese m i l i t a r i s t s , war, has been in the l a s t generation an agreeable diversion and since 1905 at least i t has been a safe and satisfying adventure. They have enjoyed an exceptional degree of impunity and thei r past experiences have encouraged Japanese soldiers to do any thing i n t h e i r war conducts regardless of law or humanity of the c i v i l i z e d nations. During the present war, Japanese forces i n many theatres of war have committed inhuman a t r o c i t i e s . The rape of Nanking, the outrages i n other parts of China, the barbarous treatment of Chinese, Indian, B r i t i s h , Dutch, American and F i l i p i n o c i v i l i a n s and prisoners of war already have a notable place in the long history of wartime cruelty. There are several proposals for dealing with the problem of punishment of Japanese war criminals. Some persons urge that those Japanese charged with ordering 3. Joseph C. Grew, Report from Tokyo (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1942) p. 86. - 98 -a t r o c i t i e s should, be i n d i v i d u a l l y t r i e d by a United Nations tribunal established i n Japan and punishied i n accordance with the tribunal's findings. It i s suggested that the resolution for the post war t r i a l of Nazi criminals, adopted by the European, governments in e x i l e , at St. James Mace, London, January 13, 1942, and endorsed by Great B r i t a i n , the United States and the Soviet Union must be applied to Japan. (4) Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan of China, makes another suggestion to the e f f e c t that a l l the Japanese m i l i t a r y o f f i c i a l s above the rank of major general must be shot, for the o f f i c e r s of the Japanese army have shown themselves as brutal and cruel arch-criminals and as a body they should be t r i e d and dealt with. (5) Others claim that instead of adopting the procedure of t r y i n g the war criminals by the United Nations, i t would be more p r a c t i c a l to t r y them in the'national court of the country to which the crime was committed, for the country would know best what the enemy have done - in i t s t e r r i t o r y and to i t s people. The purpose of such a t r i a l i s not revenge but a matter of convenience. In the Moscow parley of the representatives of Great B r i t a i n , the United States and the Soviet Union i n November 1943, i t was agreed by the three powers that those German o f f i c -ers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been 4. The United States i n a New World, II P a c i f i c Relations, Fortune, Supplement, August. 1942, p..16 5. Sun Fo, A Chinese Plan to Beat Japan Now,The New York Times, July 11, 1943. - 99 -g u i l t y of a t r o c i t i e s w i l l be taken back to the seene of their crimes after the war and there t r i e d according to the laws of the country concerned. This procedure seems to be favoured i n China. It i s announced by the Chinese government that a committee has been set up in Ghina to investigate war crimes committed by the enemy i n China and the persons who are accused of such crimes w i l l be l i a b l e to be t r i e d and prosecuted. The prosecution of any war criminal must be i n that place where the crime was committed. With regard to the prosecution of war criminals, indiscriminate prosecution for a l l m i l i t a r y leaders above some rank as suggested by Dr. Sun Jo i s not only unfair but also unwise, for i t would present Japan with an array of p a t r i o t i c martyrs. Those o f f i c e r s to be t r i e d should be t r i e d only for acts whose criminal nature is apparent . They could be martyrs only to the m i l i t a r y clique, not to the Japanese people. As soon as the t r i a l s of the g u i l t y are over, senior o f f i c e r s s t i l l interned and not found g u i l t y should be released. When a person i s found g u i l t y , the penalty imposed on him should be severe i n order to teach a lesson to the Japanese people that war i s not a diversion and that e f f o r t s must be made to prevent i t s recurrence in. the future. - 100 -A r t i c l e 8 of the Atl a n t i c Charter c a l l s for the disarmament of aggressors. It must he applied to Japan as well as to Germany. Dr. Hu Shih i n s i s t s that this a r t i c l e should be applied s p e c i f i c a l l y to Japan by stating that China would give f u l l support to the d i s -arming of Japan as one of the necessary factors i n the maintenance of Peace i n the P a c i f i c area. (6) The d i s -arming of japan has also been demanded by the thinking public of the United Nations and i t i s considered to be the best way to prevent from any renewal of aggression in the Far East on the part of Japan. In addition to Peffer and Ambassador Grew, Professor Chow asserts that Japan, the age-long aggressor i n the P a c i f i c region, should be disarmed a f t e r her m i l i t a r y defeat. (7) Dr. Sun Fo advocates this measure fervently. The Foreign Minister of Aus t r a l i a , Dr. H. V. Evatt, observes that peace and s t a b i l i t y i n the P a c i f i c i n the postwar period require achievement of disarming of Japan. (8) Furthermore, S i r George Sansom states i n his data-paper that the f i r s t step towards depriving Japan of aggressive power must be to enforce her disarmament. (9) In the Eighth Conference of the Institute of P a c i f i c 6. Hu Shih, op. c i t . , p. 4. 7. Chow, op. c i t . , p. 5. . 8. Ch r i s t i a n Science Monitor, A p r i l 4, 1942. 9. George B. Sansom, Postwar Relations with Japan (a data paper submitted to the Eighth-Conference of the I. P. R. , 1942, mimeographed) p. 2. - 101 -Relations held in Mont Tremblant, Canada, 1942, i t was agreed that Japan's armed forces should be demobilized and disbanded, and her m i l i t a r y and naval establishment wholly destroyed or confiscated. (10) As to the nature and extent of disarming Japan, opinions d i f f e r . Dr. Hu Shih considers that some steps w i l l most probably include the surrender of the remaining Japanese navy, a i r force and a r t i l l e r y ; the international control of the Mandated islands; the destruction of Japanese naval bases and f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , (11) Another Chinese writer suggests that the only effective way to hold Japanese militarism i n check i s to disarm the country completely. That means Japan's a i r and naval forces should be liquidated except for a limited number of small warships to re t a i n for use by her police and customs services. Naval shipbuilding works and munitions factories should either be closed down altogether or reduced i n number and size to the extent i n which they w i l l be just s u f f i c i e n t to f u l f i l l ordinary purposes. Moreover, her land forces should be s t r i c t l y limited to a number necessary to maintain internal order. (12) A similar idea i s given by Dr- Sun Po, but special attention i s paid on the detailed plans of disarmament. (15) 10* War and Peace i n the P a c i f i c (International Secretariat I. P. R. New York, 1943) p* 45. I I . Ibid., p. 8. 12. Chow, op. c i t . 13. Sun Fo , op. ci t. - 102 -A group of American writers regards the disarmament of Japan as one of the essential terms of capitulation, which should include the surrender of a l l remaining Japanese warships, a l l combat planes, tanks and a r t i l l e r y ; the dismantling of a l l naval bases and defensive works on the Japanese islands' coast; the demobilization of a l l Japanese soldiers and sai l o r s called to colours a f t e r July 1, 1937, and the confiscation of th e i r arms, equipment and supplies other than food. (14) On the other hand, while declaring that Tokyo should surrender i t s war materials and dismantle i t s arsenals, a B r i t i s h student asks the United Nations to give Japan after disarmament undeserved commercial advantages, as in the case of Germany after 1918, to r e l i e v e Japan of the burden of the sudden destruction of her economic structure. At the same time, he considers that harsh peace terms and severe conditions as to disarmament are- desirable i n the interest of security and f o r the sake of just r e t r i b u t i o n . (15) How long should Japan be kept disarmed? The question was f i r s t answered by Dr. Sun Fo that Japan should be kept disarmed for at least f i f t y years. American writers doubt whether such long-term control of disarmament would be f e a s i b l e . (16) Mr. Peffer believes that Japan cannot be disarmed permanently and points out that i t w i l l be very d i f f i c u l t to t e l l whether s t e e l m i l l s or automobile 14. Fortune, p. 12. 15. Sansom, op. c i t . pp. 142-143. 16. Fortune, p. 15. - 103 -plants are intended f o r c i v i l i a n or mi l i t a r y purposes. (17) In this connection, i t i s rather a question of how to pre-' vent Japan from rearming af t e r her complete disarmament. To the problem of preventing Japan from rearming, there are three plans to be worked out. F i r s t , as indicated by Professor Chow, an international commission should, at least temporarily, set up agencies to inspect and investigate Japanese armaments continuously on the spot. U n t i l a general plan of rarld disarmament i s adopted, the importation to Japan of arms and ammun-it i o n s , including m i l i t a r y planes, should be completely banned. Severe penalties should be set for the v i o l a t i o n of any of the disarmament clauses prescribed by the United Nations as a condition of armistice. (18) Second, Dr. Hu Shih thinks that the basic deficiency of Japan in minerals and metals needed for her industries must be considered as amost important f a c t o r i n any future scheme of c o l l e c t i v e security. So effe c t i v e international control of st r a t e g i c a l minerals and metals as an"integral part of the system of c o l l e c t i v e security w i l l be another method fo r the prevention of Japanese rearmament. (19) Third, American thinkers believe that the v i t a l importance of the a i r arm i n modern war does make possible a very 17. P e f f e r , Basis for Peace, c i t e d , pp. 135-136. 18. Chow, p. 4. 19. Hu Shih, op. c i t . , This, factor was also stressed several years ago by S i r Thomas Holland. - 1G4 -effective check. I f , as part of the Japanese capitulation an American-Chinese-British-Dutch group w i l l be able to take over the Japanese aviation monopoly and i t s i n s t a l l -ations under a contract to run for twenty-five or f i f t y years, i t s operation can preclude any effective secret Japanese rearmament. (SO) There i s a general f e e l i n g that m i l i t a r y occupation of Japan proper would serve the purpose of preventing Japanese rearmament and v i s i t the Japanese people the humiliation which, i t is argued, would impress Japan with the f u t i l i t y of war and the high cost of f a i l u r e . While most agree that prolonged mi l i t a r y occupation of Japan w i l l be impossible and unwise, for i t would produce increased hatred and intransigence and obstruct the way to the internal progress of the Japanese people i n setting up a n o n - m i l i t a r i s t i c regime, there i s some opinion i n favour of a temporary occupation of Tokyo, strategic points or the. six largest c i t i e s of Japan. It has been suggested that, i f occupation does occur f o r the purpose of control of disarmament, i t should l a s t . l e s s than a year and i t i s also important that any occupation should be directed c l e a r l y against Japan's m i l i t a r i s t s - not against the entire nation - and that there be no manifest-ation whatever of a s p i r i t of revenge. (21) 20. Fortune, p. 13. 21. Sansom, op. c i t . , p. 147. - 105 -It i s doubtful whether, i n the postwar Japan, m i l i t a r y influence w i l l dominate the entire nation; thus mil i t a r y occupation aimed at m i l i t a r i s t s seems to be unnecessary. To this point, the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations gives i t s f a i r opinion that occupation should take place by a United Nations force which would convince the Japanese that a l l Asia i s against them i n the war and their m i l i t a r y leadership has made a p o l i t i c a l error i n i t s poli c y . Even more important, i t i s asserted, i s that i t would l e t troops from the adjacent areas see that Japan i s not all-powerful and make i t possible for them to return home and say that they themselves have i n fact defeated and occupied-Japan. (22) From th i s opinion, the m i l i t a r y occupation of Japan i s used not only to the Japanese m i l i t a r i s t s but also to the Japanese nation as a whole. Barring the m i l i t a r y significance, i t w i l l also have some psychological value t-o the weary A s i a t i c people. The fact that no highly i n d u s t r i a l i z e d country is l i k e l y to remain disarmed permanently has led one commentator to suggest the complete destruction of Japanese industry, "So that not one brick of any Japanese factory s h a l l be l e f t upon another, so that there s h a l l not be i n Japan one e l e c t r i c motor or one steam or gas-oline engine, nor a chemical laboratory, nor so much as 22. War and Peace i n the P a c i f i c , p. 90. - 106 -a book which t e l l s how these things are made." (25) Another advocates the demolition of Japan's war industry, heavy industries and machine-building industry, or their transfer to devastated areas in Asia as reparation. Japanese l i g h t industry would be limited to production f o r c i v i l i a n use, preventing quick recovery of the country's m i l i t a r y power. (24) A thir d writer declares that i n the prosecution of the war the A l l i e s must destroy the main Japanese c i t i e s and Japanese i n d u s t r i a l machines from the a i r . (25) On the other hand, one writer thinks that i t would be wise for the United Nations to allow Japan to ret a i n her entire remaining industry. He bases his opinion on the ground that the destruction of Japanese industry would be to condemn many mil l i o n s of Japanese to starv-ation and death, and force Japan to resort to older, inadequate means of l i v e l i h o o d under>• conditions of indescribable chaos* (26) It would be advisable that the war industries and other kind of heavy industries which w i l l be e a s i l y convertible from peace time industry to war industry should be demolished and remaining industry be allowed to r e t a i n . Supervision of the output of Japanese industry may be necessary through the operation of United Nations Commissions. Any production of war 23. George F i e l d i n g E l l i o t , Japan's Industry and Disarmament New York Tribune, A p r i l 25, .1945. 24. Sun Fo, op. c i t . • . . 25. Pe'ffer; pp. 72-75. „ 26. Lawrence K. Rosinger, What Future For Japan, Foreign Policy Reports, September 1, 1945, pp. 144-145. - 107 -tools should be s t r i c t l y forbidden. There is a peculiar problem i n connection with the disarmament of Japan, namely, what"shall we do with the Japanese emperor? In view of the fact that the Emperor' worship has been one of the causes for modern Japanese militarism and that i n the postarmistice period the United Nations should as s i s t Japan to create a new government t r u l y representative of the Japanese people after the war, t h i s question assumes an overwhelming importance. Two schools of thought ex i s t . One advocates the prompt a n n i h i l a t i o n of the Japanese i n s t i t u t i o n , while the other urges i t s retention in the new regime. Those who argue that we must keep the Japanese emperor maintain that i n the future, as in the past, no regime can hope to function except in his name. They claim that the.Emperor as an individual i s a t h r i f t y , methodical hard-working person who has been obliged to go along with the m i l i t a r i s t s , despite frequent disagreement with them. (27) And that, although he i s t h e i r puppet today, he may be equally suitable as a puppet of n o n - m i l i t a r i s t i c group aft e r Japan's defeat. Indeed, there is a b e l i e f that, under favourable conditions, Japan may develop a more modern and democratic type of constitutional monarchy. (28) No less important, i t i s suggested, i s that the Emperor w i l l be the most effe c t i v e symbol of national k'/'Hugh. Byas, Government by Assassination (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1943)pp. 295-306. 28.Hu Shih, op. c i t . p". 10. - 108 -u n i t y and s t a b i l i t y i n t h e d i f f i c u l t postwar p e r i o d , and even more cogent i s the f a c t t h a t the A t l a n t i c C h a r t e r a l l o w s the p e o p l e , whether v i c t o r or v a n q u i s h e d , t o cheese the f o r m o f government which they d e s i r e and the Japanese people s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e be p e r m i t t e d t o make t h e i r own c h o i c e . (29) On the c o n t r a r y , those 1 who o b j e c t t o d e a l i n g w i t h the Emperor argue t h a t h i s p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and i n c l i n a t i o n a re of l i t t l e consequence, because the a c t u a l r o l e of the I m p e r i a l Household s i n c e the R e s t o r a t i o n has always been-to s e l l the d o c t r i n e of m i l i t a r i s m t o the Japanese p e o p l e . B o t h the f a n a t i c a l z e a l of the common man i n Japan t o s a c r i f i c e f o r h i s emperor and the Dual government i n Japan's p o l i t i c s c o n t r i b u t e t o the development o f Japanese m i l i t a r i s m . , (30) Moreover, the b e l i e f i n a d i v i n e emperor, descended from t h e Gods and d e s t i n e d t o r u l e Japan upon age e t e r n a l , w i l l always be a s t u m b l i n g b l o c k to the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a' -regime on which we can .. p l a c e c o n f i d e n c e . A t t e m p t s to a c h i e v e democracy w i t h i n the framework of t h e d i v i n e - e m p e r o r i d e a l o g y w i l l meet w i t h the same f a i l u r e as d i d the attempt to l i b e r a l i z e the t h r o n e i n the e r a f o l l o w i n g World War I . (31.) 29. Kenneth W, C o l e g r o v e s , What S h a l l We Do w i t h . t h e Japanese Emperor? A m e r a s i a , October 1942, pp. 576-581. 30. I b i d . 51. W i l l i s Church Lamott, What of Postwar Japan? Asia-, October:1942, p. 575 and see B. A. L i u , The Mikado Must Go,- Contemporary C h i n a , November 1, 1943.. - 109 To the statement that the United Nations should permit the Japanese to choose the form' of government in accordance with the A t l a n t i c Charter, the reply i s made that the right of self-determination included i n the Charter does not carry with i t the right of any govern-ment anywhere i n the world to eommit wholesale murder or the right to make slaves of i t s own people or of any other people i n the world. (32) It is d i f f i c u l t to balance the various arguments upon the important issue. Some writers believe i t would be better to leave i t to the Japanese people for t h e i r decision. (33) They do not propose to force the abdication of the Japanese emperor or any other constit-utional changes i n Japan.. If the Japanese people, aroused by defeat, wish to do away with the trappings of the monarchy and the Imperial Dynasty, the United Nations should c e r t a i n l y not stand in t h e i r way. (34) Professor Chow has put the matter cogently i n the suggestion that i t should be determined by an internation-a l j u d i c i a l commission set up i n order to investigate war r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and crimes on the part of the Axis c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y leaders as well as their r u l e r s . Should i t be established that the Emperor has been in 32. The New York Times, February 13, 1943. 33. Roslnger, op. c i t . , 'pp. 152-153. 34. Fortune, p. 14. - 110 -fact personally responsible along with, the m i l i t a r i s t s , then there would be su f f i c i e n t ground for removing the Emperor from Japanese p o l i t i c s . On the other hand, i f i t i s proven to the contrary, then whether the Japanese emperor should be kept as head of Japan w i l l be determined by the Japanese people. He, l i k e Hr. .Iff, S. Bates, regards the question as purely an internal a f f a i r of Japan. (35) This suggestion i s very p r a c t i c a l and reasonable and may be regarded as a sound answer to the issue for the time being. T e r r i t o r i a l adjustment after the war i s the seeond basic condition to the peace of the Far East. It requires Japanese e v i c t i o n not only from the Continent of Asia but also from P a c i f i c islands which Japan occup-ied by violence or by conquest from the l a t t e r part of the nineteenth century up to the present. The break-up of the Japanese Empire w i l l constitute one of the most ef f e c t i v e measures to prevent future Japanese aggression. To some writers, the loss of Japanese col o n i a l empire w i l l bring about what has been aptly called the "geograph-i c a l disarmament" of Japan. (56) Since the Japanese m i l i t a r i s t s have used those t e r r i t o r i e s as bases f o r further expansion, i t is obvious that without a 35. Chow, p. 6. 56. Byas, op. c i t . , p. 351. continental foothold and island bases, the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of aggression will.be greatly reduced. It has been generally agreed that Japan must not only lose a l l control over t e r r i t o r i e s conquered since 1917, but also over Formosa, seized i n 1895 after the war with Ghina; Korea, which was annexed in 1910; the mandated P a c i f i c islands, secured after Germany's defeat i n World War I; and "Manchukuo", taken from China i n and after 1931. These t e r r i t o r i e s have three things i n common; f i r s t , they are a l l inhabited by non-Japanese populations; second, they have a l l suffered from Japan's harsh colonial p o l i c y ; and t h i r d , they a l l have played a major role i n Japanese expansion. Although the withdrawal of Japanese control over these t e r r i t o r i e s i s generally approved by writers on the subject, different opinions exist as to whom these t e r r i t o r i e s w i l l belong after Japanese e v i c t i o n . Be-fore the Cairo decisions were announced, jthe question was not without much controversy. In the case of Manchuria, even after Pearl Harbour, there were s t i l l writers who advocated that i t not be returned to China and offered suggestions on the status of Manchuria of the future. Some suggested that Manchuria should be a special area of Japan (37) and others recommended an 37. Nicholas, J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World P o l i t i c s , (Harcount, Brace, New York, 1942) p. 58. - 112 -independent state under international control for a period of years and l a t e r a p l e b i s c i t e to decide eventual national allegiance (38) and s t i l l another writer pro-posed that Manchuria should be a separate p o l i t i c a l administration from China. (39). Manchuria i s a h i s t o r i c a l name of the three north-eastern provinces of China, which include the provinces of Liaoning, K i r i n and Heilunkiang. It was, since the dawn of history, inhabited by various Tungus tr i b e s , but colonization by Chinese s e t t l e r s was practiced at a very early date. For two thousand years a permanent foothold has been maintained by the Chinese and Chinese culture has always been active i n Manchuria. In recent years, the population has exceeded t h i r t y m i l l i o n s , more than 95 percent of which i s Chinese. For many years, since the Chin Dynasty, Manchuria has been divided into the three provinces, mentioned above, each of which constituted a p o l i t i c a l unit of China and was governed i n the same way as the provinces in China Proper. Economically, Manchuria has been proved to be an unseparable area from Chinese economic l i f e . About 40 .percent of China's coal and iron reserves i s in Manchuria; and i n addition to the great and f e r t i l e 38. Cited i n Abend, " P a c i f i c Charter", p. 57. 39. Ty&er Dennett, Postwar Administration, a comment on Timperley's summary of postwar settlement i n the P a c i f i c , Asia, August, 1942, p. 465. - 113 plains which produce essential grains l i k e soyabeans, mi l l e t and wheat, the Manchurian forests contain nearly 50 percent of a l l of China's standing timber. Both p o l i t i c a l l y and economically speaking, Manchuria is an integral part of Ghina, just as New England i s an integral part of the United States, or B r i t i s h Columbia of Canada. The Chinese w i l l never give up Manchuria, just as Americans w i l l never concede New England or Canadians concede B r i t i s h Columbia to any foreign aggressor. Accordingly, Chinese w i l l never accept any suggestion of special status on Manchuria after the war as already mentioned. The Chinese p o s i t i o n i n thi s matter is best stated by Mr. Owen Lattimore, a p o l i t i c a l adviser to Generalissimo Chiang, i n his recent a r t i c l e which says, "Victory for China i s inconceivable without vindication of China's t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and f u l l sovereignty. This, i n turn, i s inconceivable i f a special p o s i t i o n i n the northeastern provinces i s preserved f o r Japan or transferred to any other nation or international organ". (40) Since the Lukouchiao incident, President Chiang has repeatedly said that he w i l l ' f i g h t on u n t i l China regains control of Manchuria and liberates the 35,000,000 people held i n Japanese bondage there. In ^ece nt years since Pearl Harbour, most writers i n the 40. Owen Lattimore, Asia i n a Blew World Order , foreign P o l i c y Reportsj September 1, 1 9 4 2 , p., - 114 - ' United Nations have agreed that Manchuria should be returned unconditionally to China and Japanese investments there must be completely surrendered to her i n l i e u of an indemnity. (41) The Cairo Conference makes i t d e f i n i t e that. Manchuria shall be restored to China a f t e r the war and the controversy over i t s future i s thereby s e t t l e d . Different opinions have arisen as to the status of Formosa too. Formosa was Chinese t e r r i t o r y and was extorted by Japan after China's defeat of war i n 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Actually the Japanese ac q u i s i t i o n of Formosa accompanying with Liuchiu Islands was r e a l l y made by m i l i t a r y conquest before 1895. Chinese population was estimated at 2,600,000 when the Japanese came into control; today i t has grown to more than 5,000,000 whieh constitute over 90 percent of the population there. (42) Formosa i s not only a r i c h land i n a g r i c u l t u r a l goods but also i n mineral products. Lying along the coast of Fukien and Kwangtung provinces, i t i s s t r a t e g i c a l l y important for national defense of South China. Formosa w i l l offer no problem involving future status, for the population i s overwhelmingly Chinese i n blood and i n language and China's interests are c l e a r l y 41. Abend, op. c i t . , p. 60 and Timperley. p. syo. 42. Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Formosa Today (Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, New York, 1942) p. 5.. _ 115 -predominant. In some quarters of the United States, however, the opinion exists to place Formosa under international control for the sake of u t i l i z i n g i t as an international base in the P a c i f i c . "In recog-n i t i o n of China's predominant interest", according to this view, "Formosa should be included i n the Chinese t e r r i t o r y seems impolitic in view of the necessity for a United Nations base there." (43) On the contrary, other writers i n s i s t that Formosa should not be i n -cluded i n any international arrangement, but should become at once an i n t e g r a l part of China. (44) The Chinese government and public opinion have never recognized any proposal of the postwar status of Formosa other than i t s unconditional return to China at the end of the war. To the suggestion to make i t an international base, Ta Kung Pao, China's leading independent newspaper, and nearly every a r t i c u l a t e person i n Chungking have made objection. To a current inquiry (45) whether the strategic value of Formosa in the P a c i f i c defense may not outweigh other consider-ations, Ta Kung Pao r e p l i e s : "This l i n e of thought i s l i k e t h i s : Why cannot a people's freedom be surrendered for the sake of strategic value." (46) 43. Fortune, p. 11. 44. Abend, op. c i t . , p. 226. 45. Mr. John K. Jessup, A postwar planner for Time and Fortune magazines of the United States._ 46. Translated from Chinese text of Ta Kung Pao, May 15, 1943* - H 6 -Dr. T. V. Soong, Chinese Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s , has reiterated that Formosa should be restored to China. At a press conference i n Chungking, regarding China's t e r r i t o r i a l aims at the end of the war, he said: "We w i l l get back Manchuria, Formosa and Riukiu (Liuchiu) Islands. We have no t e r r i t o r i a l aspirations beyond what i s r i g h t f u l l y ours." (47) .The proclamation of the Cairo decision that Formosa and the Pescadores s h a l l be restored to China, roused public opinion both i n China and i n the other United Nations, to support the reasonable and momentous arrangement. In Chungking, For mosan leaders gave their heartiest welcome to the decision and wired the governments of the United Nations expressing the willingness of Formosans to reunite with China. Aside from Formosa and Liuchiu Islands, the e v i c t i o n of Japan from the P a c i f i c inlands requires her withdrawal from the Japanese mandated islands, which include the Marianas, Carolines and Marshall Islands l y i n g south of the P a c i f i c . A l l of the islands belonged to Germany before the F i r s t World War and were held by Japan under mandate from the League of Nations. C o l l e c t i v e l y the area i s only about 950 square miles and the t o t a l population i n 1935 was given as 98,500.(48) 47. Voice of China, November 30, 1943 (Chinese News Service, New York) p. 2. , . ... 48. Poul Hebbert Clyde, Japan's P a c i f i c Mandate (Macmillan, New York,-1935) pp. 7-9. " 1 1 7 -Under her mandate from the League, Japan was pledged not to f o r t i f y these islands, but th i s pledge was flouted, League inqu i r i e s were snubbed, neutral investigators were denied access to the islands and f i n a l l y Japan refused to reply to inquiries from Geneva. Although they are tiny i s l a n d s , their offensive value has been f u l l y demonstrated since the outbreak of the P a c i f i c war. The declaration drawn up at Cairo provides that Japan i s to be "stripped of a l l islands i n the P a c i f i c which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the F i r s t World War in 1914." This raises the question what i s to be done with them after the Japanese have been driven out; One American writer suggests that they should belong to the United States on the ground that the l a t t e r s h a l l be assured of safe access to the Phi l i p p i n e s . (49) A similar idea was expressed by American members i n the Eighth Conference of the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations in 1942. (50) Moreover, i t i s pointed out that Australia and New Zealand are p a r t i c u l a r l y interested in them (51) and consequently one American professor proposes that they should be divided between America and Aus t r a l i a . (52) On the other hand, there are many writers who i n s i s t that the islands should be solely under international 49. Abend, op. c i t . p. 220. 50. War and Peace i n the P a c i f i c , p. 44. 51. The Christian Science Moniter, December 2, 1943. 52. Peffer, op. c i t . , p. 68. - 118 -administration. (53) The Cairo Communique clear l y affirms that none of the three powers has t e r r i t o r i a l ambitions, so the islands should not come under dominatio of a single nation. In the li g h t of general welfare of the native population and security of the P a c i f i c , these mandated islands would be better administered under international supervision. On the continent, i t has been already indicated that Japan must be evicted not only from Manchuria but also from Korea. Korea i s a peninsula jutting out from the northeastern coast of the As i a t i c mainland. It has an area of 85,£28 square miles and a population of around 24,000,000, among whom about 250,000 are Japanese. The peninsula has 1,700 miles of coast l i n e , many fine natural harbours and ample wealth and resources. S t r a t e g i c a l l y Korea i s of the utmost importance i n the Far l a s t . On the west i s the Yellow "'Sea, on the South the China Sea, and on the east the Sea of Japan. The distance from Moji in Japan to Fusan, the great Korean port, i s only about 160 miles across the Tsushima S t r a i t . For many centuries, China exercised some kind of loose suzerainty i n Korea and during Hideyoshi's invasion the armies of the Ming Dynasty came to the aid of Korea. It was a dispute over China's right to send troops there to restore order which led to the Sino-53. See, Chow, p.; 5; Rosinger, p. 146; and Fortune, p. 11 - 119 -Japanese War of 1894-1895. As a result of the war, .China was compelled to renounce a l l claims to Korea, and Japan remained in there i n m i l i t a r y occupation. At f i r s t Japan proclaimed a protectorate over Korea and then i n 1910 formally annexed i t . For over t h i r t y years, Korea has been under the swords and daggers of the Japanese m i l i t a r i s t s and the Korean people have undergone t e r r i b l e experiences of exploitation and slavery under their r u l e . (54) In the long history of Japanese rule there has been no evidence of any attempt to placate this helpless and disarmed people by any showing of justice or humanity. The peaceful and unarmed demonstrations i n favour of freedom of 1919, when the Koreans placed f a i t h in President Wilson's promise of self-determination, resulted in 7,501 executions and mass k i l l i n g s and in the imprisonment of more than 2,000,000 of the demonstrators. (55) Another hopeless uprising i n 1929 was also punished with Draconian severity. But the Koreans never give up and are s t i l l f i g h t i n g oh. Now a de facto exiled government of Korea headed by Mr. Kim Koo has been established i n Chungking and General.Li Ching-tien has been appointed by that government as commander of the Korean armies in Free 54, George Kent, Korea - Exhibit "A" in Japan's New Order, Asia, Ap r i l . 1942, pp. 250-253. 55. Abend, op. c i t . , p. 85. - 120 -China. These Korean forces fight with the Chinese troops against the Japanese. They are supported partly by donations from p a t r i o t i c Koreans i n the United States and partly by subsidy from the Chungking government, A r t i c l e ;5 of the A t l a n t i c Charter provides that sovereign rights and self-government w i l l be restored to those who have been f o r c i b l y deprived of them. Under this a r t i c l e , Koreans have good reason to believe that they w i l l enjoy sovereign rights and self-government after the war. (56) To most thinking persons i n the United Nations, Korea would seem to merit the reward of independ-ence for her suffering under Japan's yoke and effort against the common enemy i n the present war. Nevertheless, they lack administrative experience as a result of over t h i r t y years under Japanese rule ; i t might well appear that immediate independence of Korean people at the end of the war would not be advantageous i n the interest of Koreans themselves. Accordingly, the suggestion has been put forward to make Korea a mandate under Japan (57) or under the United States. American delegates to the Eighth Conference of the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations categorically rejected the l a t t e r proposal on the ground that t h i s would be a d i f f i c u l t assignment technically for the United States and much more important, i t would 56 * Syngman Rhee, Freedom f o r Korea, China at War, A p r i l 1942, pp. 9-15. 57. Byas, op. c i t . , pp. 559-560. - 121 -be regarded by the United States public opinion as an extremely retrogressive step of parcelling out colonies among the v i c t o r s . (58) Many people urge independence f o r Korea at the end of a t r a n s i t i o n a l period i n which there should be internation-a l aid i n rebuilding Korea's national l i f e under the auspices of an international body i n the P a c i f i e area. With regard to the character of such an international body, there are three proposals: f i r s t , i t should be an internationally selected Korean c i v i l serviee headed by a high commissioner appointed by a P a c i f i c council; (59) second, i t should be a commission made up preferably from the minor Powers; (6G)third, i t should be an organization under some successor to the League of Nations or under a benevolent protectorate of Koreans' own choosing. (61) The Cairo declaration made i t clear that " i n due course Korea s h a l l become free and independent." It i s a wise policy of the United Nations for the correction of h i s t o r i c a l mistakes i n the Par East and f o r the l i b e r a t i o n of an enslaved people under the Japanese oppression. But what the phrase " i n due course" means? There i s no o f f i c i a l - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n upon i t . One newspaper predicts that i t means that Korea w i l l be 58. War and £eace i n the P a c i f i e , p. 44. 59. Fortune,'p. 50» 60. Peffer, op. c i t . , p. 68. 61. Abend, op. c i t . , p. 95. - 122 -under some kind of protectorate, possibly that of China,.until she can be made self-governing. (62) At any rate, i t means an inde f i n i t e time which the United Nations deem necessary for the completion of an indep-endent and free Korea. Dr. Sun Yat-sen prescribed a period of " p o l i t i c a l tutelage" for the Chinese people. It seems desirable that the Korean people, too, should receive tutelage before they become independent. Whether the tutelage w i l l be exercised by an international body or by a single advanced neighbouring state remains to be settled by the United Nations at the end of the war. But at least Korea, according to the Cairo agreement, i s to be rescued from a predatory empire and brought within the scope of a worldwide reign of law. The t h i r d basic condition of the. peace of the Far East i s a new order f o r Southeast Asia and India. This new order i s not the "new order" proclaimed by Japan as a pretext for her aggression, but a genuine new order with the object of economic prosperity, s o c i a l welfare and p o l i t i c a l freedom of the native peoples as a whole. In the postwar period, peace would not be assured i n the Far East, i f the United Nations did not take account of the co l o n i a l areas i n Southeastern Asia and the p o l i t i c a l status of India, It i s commonly conceded that the 62. New York Times, December 2, 1943. - 123 -disregard by the colonial powers of the national aspir-ations and economic welfare of the native people after the F i r s t World War was one of the causes of the f a i l u r e of the A l l i e s to r e s i s t the invasion of Japan in Southeast Asis. In the Seoond World War, the same mistake should be avoided in the interests of a durable peace in the Far East. Southeast Asia i s not a single unit but includes French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, B r i t i s h Malaya and B r i t i s h and Dutch Borneos. Here there are about 150,000,000 people, diverse i n race and culture and often inextricably intermingled. P o l i t i c a l l y , except i n Thailand, a l l of them are under the sovereignty or protection of western nations and imperial rule is the general pr i n c i p l e invoked i n the governments of these areas; while the economy of the region i s a 'typically colonial system, under which the region exports raw materials and imports manufactured goods generally for the benefit of the imperial powers. A l l these areas have been occupied by the Japanese troops a f t e r Pearl Harbour and at the end of the war following her defeat Japan must relinquish control of a l l the t e r r i t o r i e s , as already announced by the Cairo Conference. After the e v i c t i o n of Japan, what s h a l l the United Nations do i n disposing of the t e r r i t o r i e s recovered in Southeast Asia? W i l l those be returned to the old imperial powers f o r the restoration of the colonial system or should the United Nations l e t the native peoples have an immediate independence? To many writers and s e m i - o f f i c i a l quarters, the restoration of the old colonial system i s unimaginable for i t w i l l be i n -consistent with the p r i n c i p l e s of the four freedoms and the A t l a n t i c Charter. On the other hand, an immediate independence f o r a l l the native people seems to be pre-mature i n some areas at the end of the war. It is agreed that i n none of the colonial dependencies of the region should there be a simple return to the status quo ante bellum. . A l l e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l relations between a c o l o n i a l power and a native people or between a colony and t h i r d parties should be regarded as subject to change; and a l l e x i s t i n g s o c i a l and economic relations i n the region should be adjusted and improved. For such changes i n the postwar Southeast Asia, same di s t i n c t i o n s must.be made. It has already been mentioned that Southeastern Asia cannot be regarded as a single unit. It i s composed of a number of parts with many variations and to discuss the status of the colonial dependencies in Southeast Asia and of India, each part must be discussed separately. The ease of the Philippine Islands i s probably the least complicated of a l l , f o r the United States by the - 125 -Tydings-McDuffy Act established the Philippine Commonwealth and pledged the grant of independence i n 1946. It i s a settled policy of the United States towards the Philippines, especially as during t h i s war F i l i p i n o s have fought shoulder to shoulder with Americans against the common enemy - Japan. The heroic resistance of the F i l i p i n o s in the battle of Bataan inspired American people and although the war has changed the situations and delayed the normal course of events in the Phi l i p p i n e s , yet there i s no reason why the d e f i n i t e steps provided i n the Tydings-McDuffy Act should not be followed after the recovery of the Islands. There are s t i l l persons who are doubtful of the p o s s i b i l i t y of p o l i t i c a l independence of the Philippines in view of her economic p o s i t i o n . They think that to put the Philippines after independence on the same basis as a l l other countries with reference to American t a r i f f s would undermine the whole economic structure of the Islands and imperil the p o s i t i o n of the government. (63) So they hesitate to consider the problem of absolute independence of the Philippines at the end of the war. But i t i s not an irreparable obstacle i n the way to her independence. The economic d i f f i c u l t y of the Philippines can be solved by a gradual increasing t a r i f f policy of the United States to the imports of the Philippines and 63. Nathaniel Peffer, Southeastern Asia in Escrow, Foreign A f f a i r s , A p r i l 1942, p. 506. - 126 -a d i v e r s i f i e d development on production and foreign trade on the part of the Philippines i t s e l f . (64) The Thailand problem i s also r e l a t i v e l y simple but not so simple as that of the Philippines. Thailand i s the new name adopted i n 1959 for Siam which was an ancient kingdom i n Southeast Asia. In modern times the t e r r i t o r i a l r i v a l r i e s of Great B r i t a i n and Prance alone permitted Siam to be an independent nation; i t served as a neutral buffer state between Malaya and Indo-China. The revolution of 1952 transformed Thailand from an absolute monarchy into an oligarchy with a paper constitution somewhat l i k e that of Great B r i t a i n . (65) After that time the Japanese influence i n Siam steadily increased. In 1959, encouraged by the Japanese slogan "Asia for the A s i a t i c s " , the Government of Thailand co-operated with Japan with a similar slogan "Thailand for the Thais" and through the Japanese influence i t succeeded i n what i t c a l l e d "the redressing of ancient wrongs", by having a new f r o n t i e r l i n e drawn at the expense of French Indo-China. After Pearl Harbour, Thailand eventually declared war against the United Nations. 64. Bruno Lasker, Welfare and Freedom i n Postwar South-east Asia (a data paper of the Conference of the I. P. R., 1942,.mimeographed) p. 55. 65. Emerson, M i l l s and Thompson, Government and National-ism i n Southeast Asia. (Inquiry Series, I. P. R; Haddon Craftsmen, New York, 1942) p. 118. There are several plans for the postwar status of Thailand. One i s to destroy Thailand as a nation and to make her a unit of a proposed Indonesian state on the ground that Thai independence has always been more formal than r e a l and that she w i l l have a better chance of self-government inside the Indonesian state. (66) Other suggestions are a condominium government of several powers of the United Nations or a mandate under a single power to be established i n Thailand a f t e r the war to assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for bringing about self-government of Thailand. (67) An experienced observer advocates for Thailand a government of p o l i t i c a l tutelage and guardian-ship under some kind of international authority u n t i l she has been educated s u f f i c i e n t l y to preserve freedom. (68) Peffer rejects the idea of destroying Thailand as an independent state for certain p o l i t i c a l purposes and asks for the restoration of the status quo ante after the war. He argues that i f s t a b i l i t y i s to be achieved i n that c r u c i a l part of Asia there should be no talk" of penalizing Thailand for having a l l i e d herself with Japan, since i t would appear that she could not help herself. (69) In the United States, there i s a groundless inform-ation that China has favoured a plan for Chinese control of Thailand. Accordingly those who i n s i s t upon the 66. Fortune, p. 7. 67. Lasker, op. c i t . , p. 30. 68. Abend, op. c i t . , p. 140. 69. Peffer, op. c i t . , p. 508. - 128 -destruction of Thailand give as their reason that i t would reli e v e Thailand of the p o s s i b i l i t y of Chinese control. (70) In fa c t , there i s no such plan favoured either by the government leaders or by the people of China. But as to the i l l treatment of three m i l l i o n Chinese in Thailand, the Chinese government has a good reason to demand that necessary-arrangement should be made for a just treatment of Chinese i n the postwar Thailand. The general public i n China hopes to see an independent Thailand rather than as a unit of a big new state in Southeast Asia. As for Indo-China, the sit u a t i o n is di f f e r e n t , For many years the princes and kings of the region paid tributes to the Chinese emperor at Peking and the• influence of Chinese culture penetrated into the native people of Annam. French ac q u i s i t i o n of Indo-China began about i860 but actual consolidation was not completed u n t i l 1907. French Indo-China was the worst example of the white man's imperialism to be found i n a l l of East Asia and the South Seas. Generally speaking, French po l i c y towards th i s colony was s e l f i s h and greedy. Although there was maintained a pretense of "indirect r u l e " , the administration of a l l these areas was centralized under a governor-general appointed by the French government. The entire area of Indo-China was 70. Fortune editors' reply to the Thai Minister's protests, Fortune, October, 1942, p. 9. - 129 -r e a l l y ruled by the French completely in the interest of France and French investors.. After the collapse of France i n Europe, the subsequent submissivenesses of the Vichy proconsuls to brusque commands of the Japanese m i l i t a r i s t s was not only detrimental to China's defence of her southwest border but also gave a strong foot-hold to Japan f o r her later invasion i n Southeast Asia. By numerous B r i t i s h statements and the American note of A p r i l 13, 1942 the United Nations are pledged to a restoration of French sovereignty over Indo-China. in the sense that neither the United States nor B r i t a i n intends to seize any former French t e r r i t o r y for their own use or expansion but i t can scarcely mean that the United Nations w i l l work against themselves by preserving a status quo incompatible with further improvement of colonial system. Undoubtedly no one of the United Nations favors a restoration of old French rule along the l i n e of s e l f i s h and greedy p o l i c y . At a l l events, something i s needed to change and improve the old colonial structure in Indo-China. The l e a s t objectionable way out of the situation i s r e s t i t u t i o n to France but on e x p l i c i t con-ditions which would assure l o c a l autonomy more educational f a c i l i t i e s f o r the native people and an economic and t a r i f f p o l i cy devised with more regard for native welfare. (71) It i s doubtful whether France, emerging from the 71. P e f f e r , op. c i t . , pp. 511-512. - 130 -war so shattered and so impoverished, would be able to undertake such measures for the benefit of the native people. To most thinkers an international regime for a cer-t a i n period with the object of preparing ultimate independence of the native people i s desirable. This international regime may take the form of international commission (72) a mandate (73) or condominium of the United Nat ions.(74) In such an international government, France w i l l be given a large representation on account of her past interests i n Indo-China. Whatever the status i n the future of Indo-China, China's outlet to the South China Sea through Haiphong would be a matter not only i n the interest of China but also for the development of economic relations of Indo-China i t s e l f . With regard to Burma, her relations with the B r i t i s h government should be surveyed f i r s t . For many years Burma was an Indian province under B r i t i s h control u n t i l 1937, when i t was partitioned from India and became a separate dependency under the B r i t i s h Imperial government. Burma remained a crown colony but to some extent the Burmese were granted a measure of administrat-ive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The Burmese long aspired to a 72. Abend, p. 121. 73. Chow, op. c i t . p. 14. 74. Lasker, op. c i t . , pp. 30-31. - 131 -degree of independence or Dominion Status within the B r i t i s h Empire. The B r i t i s h were convinced that because of native lack of education and training i n government, supervision could not be further relaxed. In recent years, nationalism developed i n Burma to a remarkable degree. This situation led to c o n f l i c t s , repressive measures and sullen resentment. (75) In 1959,the governor was authorized to promise Dominion Status for the future Burma. In the following year, a public demand was put forward that the B r i t i s h government grant to Burma a constitution which would enable her to take at once her due place as a f u l l y self-governing and equal member of any Commonwealth or Federation of free nations that might be established as a result of the war. The governor stated i n reply that "the B r i t i s h government would continue to use t h e i r best endeavours to promote the attainment of Dominion Status as 'being the objective of Burma's constitutional progress." (76) When the terms of the Atl a n t i c Charter were published in 1941, the B r i t i s h government sought for a definite declaration as to i t s application to Burma and then Mr. Churchill announced: "The Joint Declaration does not qualify i n any way the various statements of po l i c y 75* Emerson, op. c i t . , pp. 159-168. 76. Royal Institute of International A f f a i r s , Problems of the Post-war Settlement In the Far East, B. Burma (a data paper of the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, I. P...H., New York, 1942, mimeographed) p. 19. - 152 -which have been made from time to time about the develop-ment of constitutional government i n Burma. Burma is covered by our considered policy of establishing Burmese self-government and by measures already i n progress..."(77) Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State of the B r i t i s h government again stated i n November, 1941 that i t was the, objective of the B r i t i s h government to help Burma to attain Dominion Status as speedily and as f u l l y as may be possible i n certain contingencies, immediately after the conclusion of a victorious war.(78) Thus i n the postwar period, there are two alternatives for the status of Burma. The former alternative w i l l be the grant to Burma of a Dominion Status immediately after the end of the war to f u l f i l the B r i t i s h promise. In p r i n c i p l e , the B r i t i s h government has promised a Dominion Status for Burma "as speedily and as f u l l y as may be possible", but as to when the autonomous government w i l l be established, no d e f i n i t e date has been given. I am inclined therefore to propose an immediate autonomy afte r the conclusion of the war to s a t i s f y the p o l i t i c a l aspirations of the Burmese people. If the B r i t i s h government thinks that the time would not be ripe f o r Burma's autonomy at that date, an alternative i s contained i n the suggestion that i n t e r -national trusteeship take over the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of government i n Burma, i . e. that Great B r i t a i n , through 77.Ibid., pp. 19-20. ' ~~ ' " 78.Ibid. - 153 -an act of the Imperial Parliament, transfer her rights in Burma to an international commission on which Great B r i t a i n , India, China and the United States should be strongly represented and which should undertake the development of education, p o l i t i c a l tutelage, economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n with a view to the eventual establishment of f u l l autonomy and independence of Burma. (79) Geographically, Malaya has been only a r e l a t i v e l y small part of the B r i t i s h Eastern dependencies and the t o t a l area of the region i s less than a quarter of Burma. Malaya has, however, certain dominating features which have given her a d i s t i n c t i v e p o s i t i o n amiong these t e r r i t o r i e s . She i s r i c h i n economic resources, of which the most outstanding i s rubber and t i n . In 1958 she was producing over 50% of the world's t i n and 40% of the rubber. (80) The area to which the term Malaya i s applied consists of a peninsula and"a number of outlying islands. There are four native states, Selangor, Pahang, Negri Sembilan and Perak, formed a joint B r i t i s h protectorate in 1894 under the name of the Federated Malay States. In addition there are f i v e unfederated Malay States - Johore, Kelantan, Kedah, Trenggann and P e r l i s . In the Federated States, B r i t i s h stationed Residents and the Unfederated States were governed 79. Fortune, pp. 8-9. _ 80. Problems of the Post-war Settlement in the Far East, C. Malaya, p. 1. - 154 -through advisers. Actually a l l nine native rulers were bound by treaty to follow the advice of the Governor of the S t r a i t s Settlement, who was also High Commissioner and representative of the King of England. Malaya i s not wholly Malay, of a population of more than 5,000,000 the Malays comprise only 47%. The rest i s Chinese and Hindu, with almost three times as many of the former as of the l a t t e r . The Malays are a people of l i t t l e or no p o l i t i c a l consciousness and there exists no strong urge to unity or to nationalism. They have almost no economic capacity or interest i n the modern sense of the word. The average native is desperately poor and the wealth has been mostly amassed by foreigners and native r u l e r s . There are two schools on the question of Malaya in the future. One school suggests that Malaya must be returned to B r i t i s h r u l e , saying that since Malaya i s not a nation, there can be no question of giving her national independence, that i f Malaya were to be eman-cipated from B r i t i s h r u l e , the _ government would not necessarily go to the Malayas but probably to the Chinese. Moreover, Malaya i s the greatest rubber and t i n producing area i n the world and as such i s of c r u c i a l importance to the western nations and to the economy of the modern world; under the circumstances the country cannot be run by Malays. But the advocates - 135 -of t h i s school do not propose an unconditional restor-ation of B r i t i s h rule in Malaya but a return to Great B r i t a i n with the q u a l i f i c a t i o n that a larger share of the wealth produced there should be turned back into education for the natives, that s o c i a l services of a l l kinds should be expanded and that the peasants and workers should be guarded against exploitation. (81) Another school proposes a plan for the international control of Malaya instead of returning i t to B r i t a i n , on the ground that the international importance of her t i n and rubber, the international character of her mixed population and the small size and strategic position of the peninsula, cause Malaya to stand i n p a r t i c u l a r need of some form of international c o n t r o l . (82) For the general welfare of the native people and security i n the P a c i f i c , Malaya would be better under international control.than under the domination of a single c o l o n i a l power. It i s a general tendency to put backward t e r r i t o r i e s under international guardian-ship for the promotion of material and c u l t u r a l development. On the question of security i n the future P a c i f i c , Singapore and Malaya l i e at the center f o r control of Southeast Asia. It is more, important i n strategic value f o r the security of the P a c i f i c Powers 81. Peffer, op. c i t . , pp. 513-514. 82. Lasker\ op. c i t . , pp. 52-33. - 156 as a whole than i n economic interests for a single nation. The Netherlands East Indies w i l l also present many problems. The Dutch have been i n this area f o r more than three centuries. They went there f i r s t for trade. As t h e i r commerce expanded, p o l i t i c a l penetration naturally followed. The people were wild and inamicable Most of them were small-scale farmers or l i v e d i n v i l l a g e s . The great bulk of the 70,000,000 people of the islands are i l l i t e r a t e and e n t i r e l y devoid of p o l i t i c a l t r a i n i n g , except for the Javanese of Batavia, who are the most cultured of the group. The Dutch have t r i e d to Javanize the rest of the islands with considerable success. The Duteh have done much in recent years to retrieve the unfortunate effects of brutal exploitation of t h e i r e a r l i e r imperial colonization. There has been a r e a l beginning of native representation in l o c a l government. And there has been a managed economic development with a view to safeguarding native interests both economic and c u l t u r a l . Before the Japanese conques the p o l i t i c a l organization of the Dutch East Indies was roughly as follows: The Governor-General i s i n charge of the administration and i s responsible to the crown; he is assisted by an advisory council of the Indies and a number of department heads. Laws concerning domestic matters must pass the People's Council - 157 -(Volksraad) and must be approved by the Governor-general. The Netherlands subscribed to the Atlantic Charter by signing the Joint Declaration of the United Nations early i n January 1 9 4 2 , but the leaders of the Netherlands have made i t clear that they have no intention of relinquishing any degree of sovereignty over any part of t h e i r Empire. Addressing a joint session of the American Congress on August 6, 1 9 4 2 , Queen Wilhelmina referred to the East Indies i n the following words: "Throughout my reign the development of democracy and progress i n the Netherlands Indies has been our constant p o l i c y . . . . We want nothing that does not belong to us. We want to resume our place as an independent nation on the fringe of the A t l a n t i c , on the dividing l i n e of the P a c i f i c and Indian Oceans." ( 8 3 ) To the question of postwar settlement, one writer favours a r e s t i t u t i o n of the Dutch East Indies to the Netherlands as the only p r a c t i c a l course to follow after the war. ( 8 4 ) He thinks there i s not yet i n the islands which constitute the colony either a s u f f i c i e n t l y stout nationalism or a soc i a l order which makes independence necessary, feasible or desirable. Others desire to make the islands a unit of a proposed Indonesian.', state ( 8 5 ) or Malay Federation. ( 8 6 ) In my opinion, although the Indies w i l l not be ready 8 3 . New York Times, August 6, 1 9 4 2 . 8 4 . Peffer, op. c i t . , pp.512-515. 85 . Fortune, p. V. 8 6 . Lasker, op. c i t . , pp. 5 5 - 5 4 . - 1 5 8 -for sudden and complete independence d i r e c t l y after the war, the way should be opened to the attainment of the ultimate goal of autonomy. Notwithstanding the fact that there i s no stout nationalism i n the Indies, there has marked a beginning of a nationalist movement i n recent years against the Dutch for their economic exploitation and p o l i t i c a l control. To cope with the n a t i o n a l i s t influences in the future, there should be a new status f o r the Indies after the war. It would not be part of the Indonesian state or of Malay Federation, because time i s not ripe for such an organization and the design which i s based upon an old p r i n c i p l e of balance of power is inadequate as a guiding p r i n c i p l e to be pursued i n the international relationship of a new world. It seems better to put the Indies as a mandate under the Netherlands with a view to taking the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of -'political tutelage • for the native people. Under the mandatory system, there w i l l be at least two advantages; f i r s t , the-welfare and progress of the natives become an international concern against any a r b i t r a r y rule of a single country in the future; second, a provision of a definite date for the eventual independence of the Indies would be made c l e a r l y i n the mandate. Barring a l l of the countries i n Southeast Asia, the remaining problem would be that of India. Though India - 139 -i s not a P a c i f i c country and does not come within the geographical area which the present thesis i s discussing, she i s a big country in.Asia with a population of 393 m i l l i o n and with a l l the resources for a gigantic indust-r i a l development and she i s f i g h t i n g side by side with the United Nations for a common cause against the common enemy. Both i n war and i n peace, the P a c i f i c problems cannot be well settled without p a r t i c i p a t i o n of India, thus the Indian problem should be treated i n the same way as other places i n the P a c i f i c . P o l i t i c a l l y India i s divided into two parts: the eleven Provinces of B r i t i s h India which were placed d i r e c t l y under the B r i t i s h Crown in 1858 and the 562 Indian states ruled by Princes who have treaty r e l a t i o n -ship with the B r i t i s h Grown. The Indian states, comprising about two f i f t h s of the area of India and one-quarter of the t o t a l population, are scattered a l l over the sub-continent. The n a t i o n a l i s t movement i s led by the A l l -India National Congress Party with leaders as Gandhi and Nehru to achieve the p o l i t i c a l objectives of independence and unity of Ih'dia, while the other p o l i t i c a l group i s the Moslems League led by Jannah openly in favour of Pakistan or the p a r t i t i o n i n g of India between Moslems and Hindus. Apart from the two parties i n the Indian p o l i t i c s , there are native Princes who rule by autocratic methods the t e r r i t o r y not included i n B r i t i s h India. 140 The present government of India was set up by the India Act of 1935 which provides a step for parliamentary self-government i n the Provinces, as well as an a l l -India Federation comprising both B r i t i s h India and the Indian states. Under the Act special r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are assigned to the B r i t i s h Viceroy i n matters of peace and order, finance and minorities, as well as defense and foreign a f f a i r s . The Act was not accepted by the Indians, however, as a l l groups rejected the proposal for an A l l - I n d i a Federation. In the absence of an agreement, the Central Government continued to function as i t did before 1935. Authority remains vested i n the B r i t i s h Viceroy and his appointed Executive Council. When the European War broke out i n 1939, the Viceroy announced the suspension of that part of the Act which created the Federation with a view to c o n c i l -i a t i n g the Indians. Nevertheless, the Congress Party opposed to taking part i n any war, save by the consent of the Indian people. Gn October 17, the Viceroy issued a White Paper giving the promise of ultimate Dominion Status for India at the end of the war, but a l l groups were s t i l l not s a t i s f i e d with t h i s statement and the p o l i t i c a l controversy became more complicated as Mr. Churchill's declaration that the A t l a n t i c Charter was not applying to India i n 1941. (87) 87. Supra, p. 86 9 - 141 -When the outbreak of the P a c i f i c war and the rapid Japanese success in Hongkong, and Southeast Asia enormously i n t e n s i f i e d the importance of India i n the United Nations' war e f f o r t , the London government was made aware that the settlement of the Indian c r i s i s could not be further delayed. After Generalissimo Chiang's v i s i t to India, the B r i t i s h government for the purpose of solving t h i s c o n f l i c t decided i n March 1942 to send S i r Stafford Cripps to India with a hope of reaching a settlement in Anglo-Indian r e l a t i o n s . On March 29, the following Declaration was made public as the B r i t i s h policy towards India: "The object i s the creation of a new Indian Union which s h a l l constitute a Dominion, assoc-iated with the United Kingdom and other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown but equal to them i n any aspect of i t s domestic or external a f f a i r s . " (88) After a number of interviews and conversations with the Indian leaders, S i r Stafford's Mission f a i l e d . The Congress Party did not accept the proposals of B r i t i s h War Cabinet offered by him for several reasons. F i r s t and foremost, the Congress Party desired complete indep-endence of India, not Dominion Status, Second,the B r i t i s h government insisted on observing i t s treaties with the Rajas or native Princes, which was regarded as involving the duty of maintaining i n the Rajas' t e r r i t o r -ies a form of government which is antiquated and often 88. New.York Times, March 29, 1942. - 142 -very bad. Third, the offer allowed any Province to remain outside the Dominion, or to combine with other dissenting provinces to form a separate Dominion. To t h i s point, the Congress leaders i n s i s t e d that India must be treated as a unit. F i n a l l y , the Congress leaders asked the B r i t i s h government the right for Indians to manage the i r own national defense, which was rejected. A deadlock then ensued. Following S i r Stafford's return to England, the Congress Party adopted Mr. Gandhi's resolution c a l l i n g for "the immediate withdrawal of B r i t i s h rule from India" and a c i v i l disobedience movement began. At the height of the r i o t , Mr. Gandhi was arrested. There are a number of suggestions by groups and individual writers for breaking the deadlock i n India. Since space does not allow me to enumerate each of them, I take the following three as typieal opinions representing different viewpoints. At the Mont Tremblant Conference of the Institute-of P a c i f i c Relations i n November, 1942, the following three steps were proposed: F i r s t , three key p o r t f o l i o s i n Indian cabinet, namely Finance, Home A f f a i r s and War Transport should be f i l l e d by Indians and that the Exec-utive Council, not the Viceroy conduct the Government of India; second, i n order to st a r t preparations for postwar independence, an Exploratory Commission including a l l - 145 -Indian p o l i t i c a l leaders should be set up; t h i r d , this Commission should study a l l the questions requiring con-sideration i n framing a new constitution. A United Nations Advisory Committee set up in the Commission should serve as foreign experts and give assistance and advice. After the Commission has worked for some time and examined methods of adjusting the various differences, i t would have a basis f o r a settlement acceptable by a l l groups and the: next step would be to work out an Indian constituent assembly. (89) The editor of the New Republic Magazine proposed f i v e points to solve the Indian c r i s i s : First., the reservation by which Mr. Churchill excluded India from some term of the A t l a n t i c Charter should be withdrawn; second, the veto powers of the Yiceroy and the Secretary of State for India should be abolished without delay; t h i r d , the Indianization of the Viceroy's Council should be completed fourth, India should be assured that she w i l l be aided at once in building up defense industries, regardless of the effect of t h i s upon the postwar international economic situations; f i f t h , the United States should pledge again, preferably through President Roosevelt, that.India's postwar aspirations w i l l be received without prejudice at the council table and judged there solely i n the l i g h t of democratic p r i n c i p l e s . (90) 89. War and Peace i n the P a c i f i c , p. 65. 90. E d i t o r i a l , New Republic, August 17, 1942. - 144 -A well-known English thinker gives his opinion on this question with the following suggestions: India should be promised, with a United States guarantee, complete independence of the B r i t i s h Empire after the war and India should be encouraged to raise defense forces hot to be employed outside of India and the c i v i l i a n side of the control of the defense force should, however, be in Indian hands. (91) In the opinions of most wri t e r s , the B r i t i s h govern-ment should give a definite date for Indian complete freedom (92) taking the precedent of American procedure of assuring the Philippines independence, in order to secure co-operation of Indian leaders i n the war e f f o r t . Furthermore, i t has been also suggested by Bertrand Russell that a l l int e r n a l questions, such as the p o s i t i o n of Rajas, the relations of Hindus and Moslems and the rights of Provinces or groups of Provinces to contract out, should be l e f t to an Indian Constituent Assembly to be convened at the e a r l i e s t possible moment after the war. In the present juncture, although Indian freedom i s a primary question to the B r i t i s h government, yet at 91. Bertrand R u s s e l l ; "T'cTEnd the Deadlock i n India, Asia, June, 1942, p. 340. 92. See Anne O'Hare McCormick's A r t i c l e i n the New York Times, "A Discoverer of the New World i n the East",New York Times, Oct. 28, 1942; and A l v i n Johnson's l e t t e r to the Editor, Ibid., Nov. 8, 1942. - 145 -the same time i t has become the concern of a l l the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . I t i s c e r t a i n t h a t I n d i a cannot be p r o p e r l y h e l d w ithout the good w i l l of the people and an easy and speedy v i c t o r y * w i l l not be ours w i t h o u t the c o l l a b o r a t i o n of the 393 m i l l i o n I n d i a n p e o p l e . As f a r as China i s concerned, we hope t h a t the I n d i a n n a t i o n a l a s p i r a t i o n s w i l l . . b e r e a l i z e d as soon as p o s s i b l e not o n l y because o f h i s t o r i c a l f r i e n d s h i p between our two c o u n t r i e s but a l s o because i t i s an i n d i s p e n s a b l e c o n d i t i o n f o r a d u r a b l e peace and p r o s p e r i t y of the Far l a s t . P r e s i d e n t Chiang K a i - s h e k when he v i s i t e d I n d i a i n the S p r i n g o f 1942, urged the B r i t i s h to g i v e I n d i a r e a l p o l i t i c a l power, d e c l a r i n g : " I s i n c e r e l y hope and c o n f i d e n t l y b e l i e v e t h a t the B r i t i s h , w i t h o u t w a i t i n g f o r any demand on the p a r t of the p e o p l e of I n d i a , w i l l as s p e e d i l y as p o s s i b l e , g i v e them r e a l p o l i t i c a l power so t h a t they may be i n a p o s i t i o n to f u r t h e r develop t h e i r s p i r i t u a l and m a t e r i a l s t r e n g t h and t h u s r e a l i z e t h a t t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war i s not m e r e l y a i d t o the a n t i - a g g r e s s i o n n a t i o n s f o r v i c t o r y , but a l s o t h e t u r n i n g p o i n t i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e f o r I n d i a ' s freedom." (93) J u d g i n g f r o m the above f a c t s , the t e r r i t o r i e s i n Southeast A s i a v a r y so g r e a t l y i n i n t e r n a l c h a r a c t e r and development t h a t they n e c e s s a r i l y f a l l i n t o d i f f e r e n t c a t e g o r i e s of t r e a t m e n t . At one end t h e r e are • communities w h i c h have reached an advanced stage of p o l i t i c a l development; a t the o t h e r , t h e r e a r e compar--93. C i t e d i n Chow, op. c i t . , p. 11. - 146 -atively u n c i v i l i z e d areas in which the people have pract-i c a l l y no p o l i t i c a l conception of their own. In spite of the diff e r e n t circumstances existing i n the t e r r i t o r i e s of the region, the ultimate object of po l i c y must be to secure, at the e a r l i e s t possible moment, conditons that w i l l permit their complete self-government i n accordance with A r t i c l e 3 of the A t l a n t i c Charter. Before the ultimate object, is reached, a l l the colonial powers should observe the following common conditions to be pursued as their guiding p r i n c i p l e s to rule their respective colony or dependency i n Southeast Asia. F i r s t - o f a l l , the p r i n c i p l e of international author-i t y must be accepted i n a l l areas i n which the people have not yet reached the stage of p o l i t i c a l maturity.. Such an international authority may take a form of i n t e r -national commission d i r e c t l y to rule t e r r i t o r y i n which an o r i g i n a l c o l o n i a l power i s deemed'*'inadequate or un-desirable to rule the area, or i t may exercise i t s function of international supervision in holding's co l o n i a l power to i t s obligations under the pr i n c i p l e of trusteeship or stewardship towards the rest of the powers concerned. > In the second place, a colonial power should be obliged to promote the enjoyment by a l l states of access on equal terms to the tradei.,and raw materials of the world needed for economic prosperity and the f u l l e s t - 147 -collaboration between a l l nations. Henceforth, not only should trade monopoly and t a r i f f r e s t r i c t i o n s be'abandoned but also the quota limitations on export and discrimination in the outflow of strategic raw materials must be r e l i n -quished by the c o l o n i a l powers so as to maintain an "open door" p o l i c y i n those areas. In the t h i r d place, the primary object of colonialism after the war must not be an imperial exploitation i n the interest of an empire but should be the promotion of welfare and prosperity of the native peoples. In this connection the r i s i n g of standard of l i v i n g , the progress of education and the development of economic reconstruction should be regarded by the colonial power as minimum measures to be achieved as speedily as possible. Unless economic and educational progress reaches a certain standard enabling the native people to be-independent, p o l i t i c a l freedom w i l l be an empty promise. As most of the colonies and dependencies i n Southeast Asia were under B r i t i s h or Netherlands rule before Japan's invasion, the achievement of such a new order i n those parts of the Far l a s t must largely depend upon the c o l l a b -oration of those two~countries. In spite of numerous statements and e d i t o r i a l s i n Great B r i t a i n urging a new c o l o n i a l p olicy of the B r i t i s h government i n the postwar period (94) the world has been puzzled by Mr. Churchill's 94. See Colonial Charter, Economist, March 12, 1942; Col-onies i n the Future, London Times, Oct. 16, 1942; and Lord Haily, Agenda:Colonial Po l i c y & Some of i t s Postwar Problems. May 13', 1942. - 148 -statements. In an address to the London Lord Mayor's dinner, he said: "I have not become the King's f i r s t minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the B r i t i s h Empire."(95) Again he declared i n the House of Commons on March 17, 1943, "the government i s convinced that the administration of the B r i t i s h colonies must continue to be the sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of Great B r i t a i n , " (96) These statements are widely interpreted by comment-ators to mean that the B r i t i s h government has no intention of changing B r i t i s h colonial p olicy and w i l l reject any new scheme for the postwar reconstruction of colonies. As regards the Netherlands^ i t has been already mentioned that Queen Wilhelmina declared that Holland has no intention of giving up any co l o n i a l t e r r i t o r y after the war. On the contrary, the Government of the Netherlands is preparing a tight control to make the Dutch East Indies an integral part of the Netherlands Empire. Dr. George Hart, Chairman of the Board for Economic and Financial A f f a i r s of the Netherlands Indies, outlined a program for such a purpose. He made publie a plan called the Netherlands Charter according to which the Netherlands East Indies w i l l comprise one of the f i v e component parts incorporated into a newly organized Netherlands Commonwealth. (97) From t h i s f a c t , there 95. Quoted i n Vancouver Daily Province, November 18,1942. 96;.Ibid., March 18, 1943. 97. George Hart, The Netherlands Indies and Her Neighbours, P a c i f i c Affairs,. March 1943, pp. 21-32. - 149 -seems not much hope that the Netherlands government w i l l adopt any new plan other than her own for the future of the East Indies. For the peace and s t a b i l i t y of the P a c i f i c , colonialism and imperialism should be ended in the future of Southeast Asia. P o l i t i c a l domination and economic exploitation must cease to be the main factors of the European rule in the backward areas of Asia. We have disclosed the r e a l mean-ing of the Japanese slogan exhorting "Asia for the As i a t i c s " as representing an intention of Asia only for the Japanese, but at the same time no nation i n Asia recognizes any idea of Asia for the Europeans. "White men's burden" was the old story of the Europeans' expansion and colonialism was a r e l i c of the nineteenth century. After t h i s war a l l nations, great and small, must have equal opportunity for development. Exploitation i s s p i r i t u a l l y as degrading to the exploiter as to the exploited and new ideals should replace the old ones i n dealing with colonial relations in the postwar world. As Mr. Willk i e has point-ed out: "We believe t h i s war must mean an end to the empire of nations over other nations" (98) and Mr. Sumner Welles said: "The age of imperialism i s ended. The right pf a people to th e i r freedom must be recognized."(99) Liberation of the people in Southeast Asia will.be one 98. Supra, p. 72. 99. Supra, p. 85. - 150 -of the basic conditions to the peace of the Far East. Without achieving i t , there w i l l be neither peace nor security nor economic welfare for the nations of the world. - 151 -CHAPTER V PROPOSED REGIONAL PEACE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AREA After the achievement of the basic peace conditions enumerated i n the l a s t chapter, a regional machinery should be set up immediately i n order that l a s t i n g peace be maintained and international co-operation promoted i n the P a c i f i c as well as i n the Far East. As previously stated, since the Lukouchiao incident and especially after Pearl Harbour, there has been a steadily growing tendency of the United Nations in favour of regionalism in the P a c i f i c . At the V i r g i n i a Beach meeting of the Insti t u t e of P a c i f i c Relations in December of 1 9 3 9 , i t was emphasized that some form of permanent peace machinery should be set up i n the P a c i f i c to coordinate the work of postwar adjustments and to provide a means of continuing negotiations among the powers. ( 1 ) Among indi v i d u a l writers, Prof. Peffer gives his view that the setting up of a regional organization i n 1. Kate M i t c h e l l and W. L. Holland, Problems of the P a c i f i c , 1 9 3 9 (proceeding for the Seventh Conference of the I . P. R. , University of Chicago Press, 1 9 4 0 ) pp. 1 S 7 T 1 2 8 . - 1 5 2 -the P a c i f i c i s one of the prerequisites to the Peace in the. Par East. (2) A similar view i s given in his book by Mr. Bue l l . He recommends that for the peace of the Par East there should be a permanent Sino-Japanese con-c i l i a t i o n commission, a P a c i f i c conference and a P a c i f i c secretariat, to carry on the duty of promoting peace and co-operation among the P a c i f i c powers concerned. (3) In an unpublished memorandum, Mr. W. L. Holland sets f o r t h a plan of P a c i f i c organization of peace with three stages or c i r c l e s of groupings and a part of this plan is endorsed by Dean P. E. Corbett. (4) Statesmen have also advocated regionalism. In a speech given on December 28, 1942, Vice-President Wallace said that the regional principle i s of considerable value in international a f f a i r s and that purely regional problems ought to be l e f t i n regional hands. (5) Dr. Wang Chung-hui, China's eminent international j u r i s t and the Secretary General of the Supreme National Defense Council of China, further develops t h i s idea and suggests the establishment of three regional systems: f i r s t for Europe and the A t l a n t i c ; secondly f o r the Western hemisphere; 2. Nathaniel P e f f e r , Prerequisites to Peace i n the Par East (Inquiry Series, Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, New York, 194G) pp. 62-74. 3. Buell, op. c i t . , pp. 369-371. 4. Corbett, op. c i t . , pp. 71-80. 5. Henry A. Wallace, America's Part i n World Reconstruction (An Address given i n the Woodrow Wilson Foundation) Public Administration Review, December 1945. - 153 and t h i r d l y for East Asia and the P a c i f i c . (6) Furthermore Dr. Alexander L oudon, the Ambassador of the Netherlands to the United States, also urges these regional plans, claiming that "Pax A t l a n t i c a " and "Pax P a c i f i c a " w i l l best be achieved and maintained i n the postwar world by regional organizations of nations whose v i t a l interests are in those spheres rather than through any single i n t e r -national organization similar to the League of Nations.(7) Except the o f f i c i a l or s e m i - o f f i c i a l statements mentioned above i n favour of regionalism i n the P a c i f i c , there are a number of writers not only advocating i t in p r i n c i p l e but also working out detailed plans of such a regional organization. Professor Chow, Mr. Bruno Lasker and the editors of the Fortune Magazine have made contrib-utions to the study of the problems. On the part of some research bodies, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, in i t s Preliminary Report, recognizes that there may be regional variations i n any p r a c t i c a l plan f o r world society. The Soviet Union, the Far East and the Near East constitute regions with d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . In certain matters variations must be provided within the d i s t i n c t i v e regions (8) 6. Christian Science Moniter, October 2, 1942. 7. New York Times, A p r i l 17, 1943. 8. Commission to Study Organization of Peace, Preliminary Report (Commission to Study Organization of Peace, New York, 1942) p. 42. - 154 Again, i n the Eighth Conference of the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, the need for a regional devolution of the postwar tasks was mentioned i n the opening remarks of Indian, .Chinese and American as well as B r i t i s h mem-bers. A round table was devoted to a discussion of a regional council i n the P a c i f i c and i t s functions, obligations, composition and detailed problems of the council were also examined. It was generally agreed at the round table that a regional P a c i f i c council within a world-wide p o l i t i c a l body would be desirable in the postwar world for the maintenance of peace i n the Ear East. (9) Even before the war i s over, regionalism has played a possibly s i g n i f i c a n t part i n the international relations of the P a c i f i c area. In January 1944, Australia and New Zealand formed a regional Empire group i n the P a c i f i c and foreshadowed closer association 'of the Dominions with the.colonies and dependencies in close proximity to them. The two Dominions propose to establish a permanent secretariat and means of consultation on a l l matters of common interest i n peace and war and to undertake a f u l l exchange of views on any matter of importance before they engage i n discussion elsewhere. It i s the f i r s t regional association in the P a c i f i c formed by two members of the B r i t i s h Empire with a view to seeking security and promoting their mutual 9. War 'and Peace 'in the' P a c i f i c , p. 8s. - 155 -interests. The character of proposed regional organization since Pearl Harbour d i f f e r s i n various proposals. Some writers prefer a ti g h t organization. For example, Mr. Lin Yutang proposes a federal union formed by China, Russia and India with a view to counter S t r e i t ' s plan of making a federal union among western democracies. (10) Moreover, many western writers advocate the establishment of an Indonesian Union either as an ultimate formation of the P a c i f i c regional organization or as a sub-unit to form a larger regional grouping i n the Far l a s t . On the other hand, some writers prefer a loose organization i n the P a c i f i c area, taking the form of a league of nations,(11) a P a c i f i c Council (12) or a P a c i f i c Association of Nations. (15) In an area such as the P a c i f i c ,in which r a c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n s , economic development, cult u r a l standards and degrees of p o l i t i c a l consciousness, are at such var-iance there would seem to be l i t t l e hope for a tight organization to work s a t i s f a c t o r i l y f o r common interests. A successful organization w i l l have to be loosely constit-uted i f i t i s to bind together the many various elements in the region for t h e i r mutual benefit and common purposes. The scope of a region i n which a regional organization 10. L i n Yutang, Union Now With India, Asia, March, 1942. 11. W. L. Holland, Far East i n a New World Order, cited i n Corbett, op. c i t . , p. 73. 12. Fortune, p. 5, and War and Peace i n the Pacific,p.82. 13. Chow, op. c i t . , p. 20. - 156 -• 1 I I i s projected to be set up d i f f e r s in each plan. Some j regional plans cover merely one or two parts of the | region within the P a c i f i c but not the whole area., on | the grounds that the most vulnerable places i n the : P a c i f i c must of necessity be organized into a regional group for t h e i r security against invasion. For example, Kennedy proposes two regional councils for the Far East: one a regional council f o r Southeast Asia with the Neth-erlands Indies as a nucleus at f i r s t which l a t e r w i l l develop into a unified or.federated state of Malaysia, including Malaya, the Philippines and the Indies into an Indonesian Union; the other a proposed federation of China, Tibet, Thailand, Indo-China and Korea to form a Greater China. (14) Searle advocates the establishment of some kind of world organization with regional co-operation i n the Far East; the l a t t e r should effect an Indonesian Union on a federal basis as a framework for the international treatment of Southeast Asia immediately after the war. (15) To the above writers, the establishment of an Indo-nesian Union i s s u f f i c i e n t to maintain peace i n the P a c i f i c without the formation of a larger P a c i f i c Council. They think that i t would enable each member to increase i t s national strength against any unexpected 14. Raymond Kennedy, The AgelesTIndies (John Day, New York, 194S) pp. 142, 184-189. . -15. Bates M. Searle, Half of Humanity (Cnurch Peace Union, New York, 1942). pp. 165-174. - 157. -danger and to be co-existent along with other powers i n the Far East. But according to other thinkers, a P a c i f i c Council consisting of a l l of the P a c i f i c Powers should be organized in addition to the Indonesian Union ln< order to promote regional co-operation and keep the peace i n the P a c i f i c region as a whole. Timperley's view i s that i n the postwar P a c i f i c , an Indonesian Fed-eration might be developed, which would take i t s place beside China and Japan as a Far Eastern grouping. Simultaneously, China, Soviet Russia, the United States, Great B r i t a i n , A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand, the Netherlands East Indies, India, the P h i l i p p i n e Islands, possibly Indo-China and Burma, to be joined, whenever postwar conditions permit, by Japan, Korea and Thailand, should work out together, within the framework of the global international program, the i r own s p e c i f i c a l l y regional agreements and organization for the purpose of common welfare and security. (16) A similar plan i s worked out by the editors of "Fortune", which envisages a P a c i f i c Council composed of the United Nations whose interests d i r e c t l y touch the P a c i f i c Ocean. It would be a supreme organization of the Bowers i n dealing with P a c i f i c a f f a i r s . On the other hand, an Indonesian state would be established. It would consist of Thailand, B r i t i s h Malaya, a l l the B r i t i s h and 16. Timperley, op. c i t . , p. 599. - 158 -Dutch islands in Indonesia and Portugese Timor. The p o l i t i c a l status of the Indonesian state would be that of an international republic ruled and administered by representatives of the United Nations. (17) W. L. Holland and Corbett make another contribution to the international organization of the P a c i f i c region. Holland's idea i s that the P a c i f i c organization of peace should consist of three stages or c i r c l e s of grouping of the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines, Burma and B r i t i s h Malaya into an Indonesian Union which both Thailand and Indo-China would be invited to join after the war. Then in the next stage there would be a Far Eastern grouping i n which China, Manchuria, Japan, the Indonesian Union and India would be placed. This wider group might be called an Eastern League. As for the interests of such P a c i f i c powers as the Soviet Union or the United States, these might be safeguarded by a s t i l l wider P a c i f i c Association which would embrace the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Australia, the p r i n c i p a l countries on the west coast of South America and a l l the units of the Far Eastern Group. ...(18) Corbett agrees with Holland's suggestion of an Eastern League but doubts whether th i s wider P a c i f i c Association w i l l be necessary; He assumes that a world-17. Fortune, op. c i t . , pp. 4-7. 18. W. L. Holland, op. c i t . , pp. 73-80. - 159 -wide organization w i l l be established with membership and representation open to individual states. Problems involving a l l countries touching on the P a c i f i c , as distinguished from those peculiar to Eastern Asia, can be adequately handled by the world organization without the further complication of a d i s t i n c t security system for the P a c i f i c as a whole. He also thinks that the Soviet Union, A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand should f i n d their place in the world organization. Whether these countries should also form part of special regional groupings i s a question that may be l e f t to be decided l a t e r as these associations develop. The essential nucleus of an Eastern League w i l l be formed by China, Japan, India and the Indonesian Union. (19) The above plans are based on the assumption of the prospect of a great s h i f t i n g of balance of power i n this region and the poten t i a l danger which confronts the r i c h but weak area of Indonesia. The alleged reason for the establishment of an Indonesian Union,; i n the " f i r s t place, i s that p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n of this r i c h and highly strategic area would be an i n v i t a t i o n to aggression, while a p o l i t i c a l union would safe-guard their interests against invasion. In the second place, diverse economic interests i n t h i s area make the federal union desirable. Actually, these plans are based upon the princip l e of balance of power in the Ear East as already mentioned. 19. Corbett, op:: c i t . , p. 80. - 160 -Those who make the plans r e a l i z e that the age of western imperialism over the Far East i s almost past and an Indonesian union would be kept useful i n checking any new influence growing there. After careful study, i t would appear that those plans which make a regional and a sub-regional machinery co-existing i n the P a c i f i c areas, are not only unnecessary but also overlap to such a degree as to make i t d i f f i c u l t to use the structure s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . Holland's plan, written before Pearl Harbour went so far as to include Manchukuo as one of the members i n the proposed Eastern League. This would be absolutely inconsistent with the policy of the United Nations and the Cairo decisions which promise the unconditional return of Manchuria to China. Furthermore, plans f o r a l i m i t e d Eastern Group such as suggested by Holland and Corbett f a i l to meet the re a l demand' of the P a c i f i c .region; for they proceed with t h e i r project without mentioning the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the great Far Eastern Powers, l i k e the' Soviet Union and the United States. As Chow comments:"How could a regional organization be in a p o s i t i o n to assure peace and security for the P a c i f i c without either the Soviet Union or the United States forming part of the organization? Nor could the scheme of having two organizations, a small Eastern group and a wider P a c i f i c organization, set up side by - 161 side, be a satisfactory solution; for the existence of such over-lapping international agencies in the same region would complicate the matter so much that the whole scheme would not work either smoothly or e f f e c t -i v e l y . " (20) To meet the r e a l needs of the P a c i f i c , there should be a single organization whose j u r i s d i c t i o n covers the whole area of the P a c i f i c as well as the Far East. This organization might be c a l l e d the P a c i f i c Association of Nations as named by Chow. Its membership should include China, Soviet Russia, the United States. Australia New Zealand, Great B r i t a i n , the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines, Thailand and Korea when she has reached p o l i t i c a l maturity. Japan would be allowed to join when she becomes a peaceful nation w i l l i n g to co-operate with other nations for the reconstruction work of the Far East. 1' Other c o l o n i a l areas would also become members upon attaining independ-ence or other self-governing status. Most planners agree that the following agencies should be established as the essential i n s t i t u t i o n s to carry out and enforce the decisions of the regional body: F i r s t , a P a c i f i c general conference, composed of 20. Chow, op. c i t . , p. 20. - 162 -representatives of the member states, meeting regularly once a year and in special session,if necessary. It would be the supreme organ of the P a c i f i c organization with power to discuss and decide upon the p o l i c i e s and the problems of general interest to the region as well as controversial issues between member states. It should act as a l e g i s l a t i v e authority in matters of common con-cern, to direct and supervise the whole work of the organization, to enact i t s budget, scrutinize i t s expend-iture and provide for r a i s i n g the necessary funds. There are three different opinions as regards the composition of the General Conference. Buell, preoccupied With- the idea of making a new Nine-Power Treaty as an effect i v e means i n the maintenance of peace of the P a c i f i c proposes that the General Conference should be composed of delegates of the contracting powers of the treaty. (21) Corbett, on the other hand, i n s i s t s that i t should consist of representatives of every party concerned, but with an equal number of delegates from each party,(22) Chow's view i s that member nations should not be represented equally i n the General Conference and the rel a t i v e numbers of the delegations might be fixe d according to the areas and population of the respective countries, their economic resources and other p o l i t i c a l or c u l t u r a l factors. (.23). . 21. B u e l l , op. c i t . , p. 370. 22. Corbett, op. c i t . , pp. 80-81. 23. Chow, Op. c i t . , p. 22. - 163 -Second, a P a c i f i c Council, composed of seven member four permanent members representing four of the United Nations, namely, China, The United States, Great B r i t a i n and the Soviet Union, and three members elected at the annual General Conference for a term of one year. The duties of the council should include seeing that the decision and resolutions of the General Conference are carried out by the appropriate agencies and taking any action to meet an emergency or c r i s i s which might occur during the recess of the General Conference, The P a c i f i c Council should meet regularly every three months with extraordinary sessions i f necessary. In some regional plans, there i s no such P a c i f i c Council provided i n the. whole structure of the organiz-ation. Corbett and Buell only provide for an assembly and other subordinate agencies to perform the functions of the regional machinery. Chow is/content with a P a c i f i c Council. (24) The editors of the Fortune have proposed a supreme authority of the United Nations in the P a c i f i c with j u d i c i a l power to set t l e disputes a r i s i n g among the P a c i f i c Powers. (25) The r e l a t i o n b.etween the General Conference and the P a c i f i c Council are mainly twofold: f i r s t , the General Conference should meet in extraordinary session on the initiative of the Council or at the request of a majority of the member states. Second, the Counoil 24. Ibid., p. 21. 25. Fortune, p. 5. - 164 -should be required to submit regular reports to the meeting of the Conference and be responsible to the duties conferred on i t . Judging by the experience of the League of Nations, unanimous rule has almost always seriously handicapped the organization i n taking effective measures for dealing with a c r i s i s . Therefore i n the regional organization of the P a c i f i c , i t would be unwise to ret a i n the rule i n either the Conference or the Council. The necessary number of votes to make a decision v a l i d would depend upon the importance and character of the question. In general matters, a two-thirds majority would probably be enough, but i n matters concerning sanctions or other momentous p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y actions, a three-fourths majority excluding the interested parties would be required. Third, a P a c i f i c Court, composed of from f i v e to seven Judges elected by the General Conference for a term of f i v e years from a l i s t of j u r i s t s recommended in equal number by each of the member states. The Court should have compulsory j u r i s d i c t i o n over a l l j u s t i c i a b l e disputes among the member states. It may also give i t s advisory opinion on matters referred to i t by the Conference or the Council. Corbett suggests that the Judges of the Court be appointed by the General Conference on nomination by - 165 a Judicature Committee, which s h a l l be one of the standing committees of the Conference and contain representatives of a l l the members. (26) What the other functions of the Committee are except the nomination of the Judges he does not explain. If i t i s organized merely for the purpose of the nomination of the Judges to the Conference, i t can be dispensed with, because i t i s better to nominate a Judge by respective member states d i r e c t l y to the Conference. Fourth, a Permanent Colonies and Mandates Commission appointed-by the Conference with ten to f i f t e e n members. It should have power to receive information and to make inspections: to recommend that a p a r t i c u l a r area i s f i t for self-government; and-to recommend that the conditions of a mandate have been so f l a g r a n t l y and so persistently: violated that a new mandatory authority must be appointed A recommendation of the Commission should be submitted to the Conference which should have di s c r e t i o n to accept or reject i t . But i f a resolution has been passed at the Conference upon recommendation of the Commission, i t should be executed by the Commission or by. other approp-ri a t e agencies concerned. F i f t h , a Permanent M i l i t a r y Commission, appointed by the General Conference, with the function of effecting the reduction of national forces and equipment and the 26. Corbett, op. c i t . , pp. 80-81. - 166 -formation of a regional defense and police force. An international force should be i f ormulated .arid m i l i t a r y sanctions: should be. executed by the Commission,, Sixth, a Permanent Secretariat, appointed by the Council and approved by the Conference and acting under general direction of both these bodies should undertake research studies in the p o l i t i c a l , economic and social problems of the P a c i f i c ; organize intergovernmental comm-ittees <to make recommendations upon concrete problems and formulate agreement; and prepare for the regular meeting of the Conference and the Council and see that their decisions are executed. Each member state except the four United Nations with permanent seats i n the Council should be ent i t l e d to put forward a candidate for election to the Council by the General Conference but not more than one person of the same n a t i o n a l i t y should be e l i g i b l e -for membership on the Council or the P a c i f i c Court at the same time. This would prevent any single nation from dominating either of these basic i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Association. The seat of the P a c i f i c Association should be at an internationalized place where the Permanent Secretar-i a t , the P a c i f i c Court, the M i l i t a r y Commission and the Colonies and Mandates Commission should be located permanently. Meetings of the General Conference or the Council may be held at any place deemed necessary and - 167 desirable. The location for the meetings should be recommended by the Secretariat or should be decided by the Conference or Council themselves at the end of eve: meeting. The general functions of t h i s regional body, accordin, to the views of the Institute o f ' P a c i f i e Relations, would include the following tasks: f i r s t , creating conditions in which threats to the security of the region would not ar i s e , i . e. establishing the conditions of peace; second, resolving disputes at the i r sources and as soon as they arise by methods of c o n c i l i a t i o n and a r b i t r a t i o n ; t h i r d , i n the exercise, when necessary, of police power. (27) Chow gives a similar view of the general functions of the regional body; i t should avert war by exercising joint influence or taking joint preventive measures and i n case war does occur, to help the victims and to enforce sanctions against the aggressor; and i t should promote such progressive measures as the common interests of the region require. (28) From the foregoing statements, the object of the regional association i s mainly for the maintenance of peace and security and for the promotion of welfare of the member states. Recent history "tells us that peace and security are not easily, achieved unless states impose upon themselves some li m i t a t i o n s on sovereignty 27. War and Peace i n the P a c i f i c , p. 82. 28. Chow, op. c i t . , pp. 20-21. - 168 -and give international authority power to'take preventiv measures in case of a c o n f l i c t which threatens war. To the attainment of the goal of peace and security, the member states of the Association should agree to confer on the regional body adequate power i n the matters of disarmament, p a c i f i c settlement of international dispute peaceful change and international police power. The question of disarmament i n the P a c i f i c region w i l l concern not only the P a c i f i c Powers; i t w i l l be a world-wide as well as a regional problem. The Atlantic Charter provides that "pending the establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security, the disarmament of such nations is e s s e n t i a l . " (29) In the preceding chapter, i t has been proposed that a complete disarmament of Japan i s one of the basic conditions to the peace of the Far East. The experience after the F i r s t World War shows that disarmament of an enemy country cannot be expected to be successful, unless i t constitutes the f i r s t step to the general disarmament of the world as a whole. Accordingly, one writer asserts:"disarmament of Japan w i l l be most l i k e l y to succeed i f , after a time, a l l nations agree to a plan for general l i m i t a t i o n of armaments and i n t e r -national inspection of the arms of each country. This would remove from Japan the stigma of being i n a sub-ordinate p o s i t i o n and would indicate that measures for 29. Supra., p. 83, - 169 -i t s own temporary and p a r t i a l disarmament were not simply of a punitive character." (30) Although a regional plan of disarmament should not be envisaged before a general disarmament i s worked out i t would be helpful i f a p r i n c i p l e of disarmament could be set f o r t h i n advance. The general f e e l i n g regarding postwar disarmament i s that a drastic disarm-ament of a l l states should be carried out by stages fixed i n advance and by the end of a certain period that national land and sea armaments should be reduced to the lowest l e v e l compatible with the imposition of eff e c t i v e c o l l e c t i v e m i l i t a r y sanctions and internal police functions. National a i r armaments should be either scrapped or transferred to an International Air Force. In the postwar world, should this p r i n c i p l e of disarmament be carried out by the powers as a general plan f o r the world, the regional body of the P a c i f i c , taking account of the world armament situ a t i o n , should adopt a regional plan f o r the reduction and l i m i t a t i o n of armaments. The de t a i l s of the measure should be l e f t to experts or to a special commission set up for such purpose. Here we just mention i t i n broad p r i n c i p l e only. With regard to the second measure to keep the peace, 30. Rosinger, op. c i t . , p. 144, - 170 -member states of the Association must undertake an unqualified obligation to s e t t l e t h e i r disputes by peaceful methods. For this purpose, they should have to make, a pact of non-aggression, a r b i t r a t i o n and con-c i l i a t i o n , solemnly pledging themselves to submit their disputes to a r b i t r a t i o n , j u d i c i a l decision or c o n c i l i a t i o n According to the s t i p u l a t i o n of the general tr e a t i e s made since the F i r s t World War, both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris are provided with a provision of general p r i n c i p l e of p a c i f i c s e t t l e -ment of a l l disputes. A r t i c l e 12 of the Covenant binds members to submit th e i r disputes either to a r b i t r a t i o n or j u d i c i a l settlement or to inquiry by the Council. A r t i c l e 15 i s more sp e c i f i c i n that i t undertakes to indicate what classes of cases are arbitrable or judic-i a b l e . (31) A r t i c l e 2 of the Pact of Paris provides that the settlement or solution of a l l disputes or c o n f l i c t s of whatever nature or whatever o r i g i n they may be, which may arise among them shall:never be "sought except by p a c i f i c means. These general p r i n c i p l e s of p a c i f i c settlement of international disputes should be contained and strengthened i n the proposed pact of ar-bitration and c o n c i l i a t i o n among the P a c i f i c Powers. 51. The classes of cases include disputes as to the i n t e r -pretation of a treaty, as to the question of international law as to the existence of any fact which, i f established would constitute 'a breach of any international obligation or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach. - 171 -Apart from the general p r i n c i p l e , the pact should provide various procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. These procedures must be made in such a way •as to operate automatically and progressively u n t i l a f i n a l and d e f i n i t e solution of the controversy has been obtained. It has been previously stated that the proposed P a c i f i c Court should have compulsory -jurisdiction on j u s t i c i a b l e disputes; thus, among the various proced-ures f o r the p a c i f i c settlement of international disputes, the P a c i f i c Court should be selected as the most desirable organ for the solution of legal disputes. This function of the Court i s generally recognized as a fundamental . requirement of setting up any effective peace machinery in the P a c i f i c area. (32) Regarding p o l i t i c a l or non-legal disputes, i t has been a general tendency to use procedure of c o n c i l i a t i o n for the settlement of ench kind of disputes. Since 1918 the p r i n c i p l e of c o n c i l i a t i o n has gained wide treaty recognition. A number of t r e a t i e s combine a r b i t r a t i o n and c o n c i l i a t i o n , while a dozen or more provide for c o n c i l i a t i o n alone. (33) Under the l a t t e r treaties L"-;. the parties are bound to r e f e r to a C o n c i l i a t i o n Commission 32. There are opinions that i f any effective peace machin-ery i s to be set up i n the P a c i f i c area at a l l , i t i s absolutely necessary that obligation to submit at least the l e g a l disputes to a r b i t r a t i o n or j u d i c i a l settlement should be accepted by the P a c i f i c Powers, see The Problems of the Pacific", 1933, p. 449. 33. Edmund C. Mower, International Government, (D. C. Heath & Co., New York, 1931) p. 582. - 172 -or Commissioners, a l l disputes not settled through dip-lomatic channels or submitted to a r b i t r a t i o n or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Buell before Pearl Harbour suggested a Sino-Japanese treaty establish-ing a permanent c o n c i l i a t i o n commission, composed of an equal number of Chinese and Japanese, possibly meeting at regular i n t e r v a l s . (34) It has been mentioned that this organ was also proposed by the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry on the Sino-Japanese Manchurian Dispute in 1933, and by two Japanese professors at the Banff Conference of the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations in t h e i r hypothetical security pact for the P a c i f i c area. (35) The c o n c i l i a t i o n procedure as a peaceful means to se t t l e international disputes w i l l be s t i l l useful i n the future of the P a c i f i c regional body. It should be provided i n the pact discussed above"' that any disputes a r i s i n g among the member states, of whatever nature they may be, s h a l l when ordinary diplomatic proceedings have f a i l e d and the states concerned do not have recourse to adjudication, by the P a c i f i c Court, be submitted to a Co n c i l i a t i o n Commission to be established ad hoc. I do not agree with the suggestions of a Permanent Co n c i l i a t -ion Commission to be set up in the P a c i f i c area, (36) because i t would encourage the Powers to use the procedure 54. B u e l l , op. c i t . , p. 370. " 35. Supra., p. 47. 36. Loc. c i t . - 173 -of c o n c i l i a t i o n rather than that of adjudication or ar-b i t r a t i o n , thus obstructing the way of extending the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the P a c i f i c Court over most cases a r i s i r among the Powers. Any disputant state, during or a f t e r submission of i t s disputes to any procedure of p a c i f i c settlement, s h a l l not be allowed to resort to violence. In default of obedience by the states concerned to a decision rendered under the provision of a r b i t r a t i o n or adjudic-ation, the General Conference or the P a c i f i c Council s h a l l decide what measures s h a l l be taken to stop the violence or to enforce the said decision. It i s understood that one of the reasons advanced for the recognition of war as a legal i n s t i t u t i o n i s the absence of an international body with complete authority to make such changes in existing treaties or international r e l a t i o n s as demanded by circumstances. The argument i s that l e g a l i z e d violence i s better from the point of view of expediency and even of moral-i t y than a p e t r i f i e d status quo. (37) If war i s to be ousted from i t s place as a regrettable but necessary method of desirable"reform, there must be found a sub-s t i t u t e device for changing outworn i n s t i t u t i o n s and situations that have become unfair or intolerable. 37. J.J'.Dulles, War, Peace and Change (Harper & Bros. New York, 1939) p. 12. - 174 • -The p r i n c i p l e of peaceful change i n international relations has long been recognized as an effective means to keep the international s i t u a t i o n from becoming worse and to make rel a t i o n s among states more desirable. (38) Ar t i c l e 19 of the League Covenant provides that "the Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsider-ation by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." Under this a r t i c l e , the League as well as the member states were obliged at occasional periods to survey p o l i t i c a l , legal,economic and social factors among the member states - such factors as helped produce war and to consider measures of adjustment to changing factors. The d i f f i c u l t y of making states accept revisions and modifications of the status quo prevented the League from,using t h i s a r t i c l e to set t l e some disputes between the members. Thus when B o l i v i a and Chile, sought to have the League s e t t l e t h e i r boundary disputes at the Second Assembly, i t was eventually ruled that the League could not"of i t s e l f modify any treaty." (39) The Institute of P a c i f i c Relations has studied the question of peaceful change with a view to working out a plan f o r the adjustment of international controversies 38. F. S. Dunn, Peaceful Changes (Council on Foreign Relations,-New York, 1957) p. 5. . 39. Ibid., pp. 68-71. - 175 -i n the P a c i f i c region without resort to war. At the Yosem-ite Conference, 1936, this question aroused much attention of members. An Australian member said: "The main problem in the P a c i f i c , as i n other parts of the world, i s change and the adjustment of change." (40) A review of the research works undertaken by the Institute during the past years, shows that the problem of peaceful change, insofar as i t has been faced, has been considered rather as the culmination of international co-operation and international planning than as a mere device for avoidance of the immed-iate causes of war.(41) It i s s u f f i c i e n t , however,-to ind-icate that the question i s no less important among the P a c i f i c nations than among the Western countries. During the present war, a large number of students of international relations i n s i s t that for the future world, peaceful change should be used so widely and so often ,as to make i t more e f f e c t i v e as' an important element i n the community of nations. (42) Mr. Arthur . H. Sulzberger, Publisher of the New York Times, asserts: "Change i s an invariable law of nature. Nothing that l i v e s i s s t a t i c . If we are to achieve the functioning, eff e c t i v e peace, we must provide the means p e r i o d i c a l l y to adapt the treaty structure of the world to changing 40. Problems of the P a c i f i c , 1936, p. 182. 41. Henry F. Angus, The Problem of Peaceful Change i n the P a c i f i c Area (Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1937) p. 185. 42. Dunn, op. c i t . , p. 46. - 176 -conditions." (43) Dr. Evatt expresses the same idea of peaceful change i n a coming P a c i f i c order as a means to the attainment of security in that region. (44) It w i l l be one of the tasks among the member states of the P a c i f i c Association of Nations to devise and carry out a workable method ,of peaceful change i n international relations as well as colonial problems. The changes which would concern the P a c i f i c nations would be changes In the rights and duties of states. The inte r n a l changes which affect the well-being of people - changes i n the per capita income and the standard of l i v i n g , changes i n p o l i t i c a l organization, changes i n the rights of minorities, the emancipation of subject races, changes in private law - would also include the categories i n which the. regional body would take action. Claims by states f o r changes in the status quo should, i n the f i r s t place, be made before the P a c i f i c Court, which, a f t e r giving an opportunity to a l l parties concerned to be heard, should make recommendations to the General Conference as to what changes are necessary. The Conference should be f r e e , a f t e r hearing the parties either to adopt or not to adopt the recommendations, or to adopt the same with amendments. Adoption by the 43. Arthur H. Sulzberger, Successful Peace Requires E l a s t i c i t y , - C h r i s t i a n Science Monitor, June 7, 1943. 44. Ibid., February,24, 1942. - 177 -Conference of the recommendations ought to he only by a majority consisting of three-fourths i n number repres-ented. In default of obedience by the states concerned to a decision duly taken by the Conference that a change in the status quo i s necessary, such decision shall be enforced by c o l l e c t i v e measures of coercion similar to those provided for the suppression of a resort to violence in ease of disobedience of a decision of the P a c i f i c Court. F i n a l l y , on the question of international police power, i t has been generally agreed that any international body of the future would have to have an armed force i n order to impose i t s w i l l upon member states. Recent history has brought home the painful truth that in the modern world no nation, however powerful, can single-handedly defend i t s e l f against determined armed aggress-ion by powerful aggressor states; so mankind must seek peace by means of a system of c o l l e c t i v e security. .The clamour for an international force i n the future world order i s not only voiced by the thinking public but also by the statesmen of the .United Nations as well. In an address to the people of the United Nations, President Chiang Kai-shek said: "to safeguard international justice and c o l l e c t i v e security and to insure the successful functioning of democratic governments aft e r the war, there must be a postwar world organization with the s o l i d backing of international force." (45) 45. The Voice, of .China, China News Service,New Yorfcwuiy 7, 1943. - 178 -President Roosevelt revealed t h i s idea too i n his speech to the overseas American Forces on December 24, 1943. S i r Stafford Cripps, speaking i n a constituency on January 15, 1942, advocated the formation of an international a i r force of the United Nations to stop aggressors in the future. (46) Subsequently, the B r i t i s h government o f f i c i a l l y expressed i t s willingness to establish an international police power after the war. In response to a question i n the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Eden said: " B r i t a i n i s anxious to co-operate with the United States and other United Nations i n the creation of an international police force after the war." (47) Nearly a l l the current plans of organized peace designed by writers agree on the need for a police force under supranational authority powerful enough to operate successfully against states r e s i s t i n g the common w i l l . But they d i f f e r considerably i n t h e i r treatment of the matter. Some make sanctions purely regional a f f a i r s . (48) Others add to the i r arrangements for regional police a powerful protective and d i s c i p l i n a r y establishment of world-wide scope and responsible ultimately to a single world authority. Thus Buell, having linked up his regional associations i n a world society of nations under a world council, gives that council command over a 46. Vancouver Daily Province, January 16, 1942. . 47. Ibid., February 24, 1942. '. 48. Corbett, op. c i t . , p. 139.. - 179 -"symbolic and preventive" police force which would be available i n addition to the 'regional forces to check aggression. (49) On the other hand, Chow's view i s that a permanent international m i l i t a r y force should be formed and placed under the control of the regional organization but the economic and m i l i t a r y sanctions of the organization might be reinforced by the co-operation and support of a wider world organization. (50) How would the international police force be created in the P a c i f i c region a f t e r the war? Four possible methods may be used: the coordination of national contingents, the integrated international force, the quota international force and the specialized i n t e r -national forces The national contingent system leaves m i l i t a r y forces i n the hands of national states but provides for a combined general s t a f f which works out plans fpr common use and gains t h e i r acceptance by national m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s . At the opposite pole from the system of national contingents i s the Integ-rated system which would transfer p r a c t i c a l l y a l l heavy armaments to an internationalized force under direct control of the international authority. Quota systems are those which are quantitative d i s t r i b u t i o n s , leaving the states with armies, navies and a i r forces of a prescribed size, but giving the international authority a m i l i t a r y force including a l l type of arms, 49. B u e l l , op. c i t . , pp. 440-442. 50. Chow, op. c i t . p. 21. - 180 -P r a c t i c a l l y most peace planners agree with this system for the creation of an international police power in the post-war P a c i f i c . (51) The round tables of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations i n 1942, when discussing the problem of international police power are almost based upon the system. The fourth system i s a specialized system which gives certain types of armament to the world authority, leaving others to the nations. The proposal of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace for an international a i r force i s of t h i s type. (52) Whatever kind of system of international police force i s created i n the postwar P a c i f i e , t h i s force should belong to the regional body under the command of the M i l i t a r y Commission impowered to act within the lim-i t s of the P a c i f i c region. The units of the force should wear the United Nations' uniform, thus symbolizing the fact that i t s authority i s derived from the. United Nations as a whole. i n t e r n a t i o n a l bases should"be created for the stationing and for other m i l i t a r y purposes of the force, and the bases of the United Nations should open "to i t when necessary. It i s suggest-ed that the l o c a l command would have to possess s u f f i c i e n t authority to take immediate police action in some instances without p r i o r reference even to the regional 51. Tyler Dennett, Security in the P a c i f i c and the ifar East,(a conference paper submitted to Conference of I. P . R. 1942, mimeographed p. 7, and Chow,op . c i t -P-^; 52. Commission to Study the Organization of f ^ e c u r i t y and World Organization,Fourth Report,New York,Nov.l943,p.27 - 181 -body, although i n most cases i t would act only after deliberation by the regional organization. (53) Broadly speaking, the international police force should be used for the sole purpose of preventing aggression, that i s , to prevent preparation of, threat to use, or-actual use, of armed force contrary to international obligations. The League of Nations dev-eloped a body of law and practice on the subject and i t may be said that the problem of determining aggress-ion did not prove d i f f i c u l t . (54) On each occasion the League members agreed by substantial unanimity as to who was the aggressor, but they lacked the force to prevent aggression. An international police force at the disposal of an international organization would overcome the weakness of the League and make i t s function of maintaining the peace more h e l p f u l . Peace and the s a t i s f a c t i o n of man's material and s p i r i t u a l wants are so intimately connected that i t i s almost equally true to say that no lasting peace can be hoped f o r so long as large masses of people suffer from or fear recurrent privations. Hitherto attempts to organize peace have emphasized the p o l i t i c a l motive, concentrating on the construction of machinery to settle 53. War and Peace in the P a c i f i c , p. 84 " 54. Charles Howard-Ellis, The Origin Structure and Working of the League of Nations (Allen and Unwin, New York,1929)pp. 48-50. - 182 -1 disputes and to prevent aggression i n the belief that, given order and security, economic, s o c i a l , or i n t e l l e c t -ual relations would look after themselves.. The economic organization of the League of Nations was of a f a c t - f i n d -ing and advisory nature with no power of decision and execution, while the s o c i a l justice promoted by the International Labour Office was always handicapped by indifference and preoccupation of national issues of delegates from the member states. In the li g h t of these facts there i s now a marked tendency to i n s i s t that ways and means of heightening standard of l i v i n g , and inter-national economic and i n t e l l e c t u a l co-operation must occupy the forefront of any new eff o r t at international organizations. Must the P a c i f i c regional organization control economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l relations of the member states? To t h i s question, there are two contrasting views. Chow believes that the P a c i f i c regional assoc-ia t i o n should also perform certain positive functions, for peace can be l a s t i n g only i f i t is constructive. In economic and so c i a l matters, member states should be obliged to co-operate through international agencies. (55) On the other hand, J. B. Condliffe claims that, on the economic side, i t i s impossible to carve out limited area of regional s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . Attempts to do so w i l l canalize trade into uneconomic bilateralism 55. Chow, op. c i t . , p. 21. - 185 -and bolster up i n e f f i c i e n t vested interests in the areas so organized. (56) No doubt, on the economic side, regional blocs have sometimes been regarded as a barrier to the development of international trade, but a regional association in collaboration with a universal body c o n t r o l l i n g and regulating the economic and soc i a l matters within the area w i l l ; help somewhat the economic relations among the member states as well as outside countries. It i s asserted that an inclusive world organization i s too remote to allocate either market or loan or subsidies among a number of neighbouring countries with similar conditions and products and that a regional economic organization,representative of both the world organization and of the separate p o l i t i c a l units within the region and able to create such f a c i l i t i e s and perhaps make them f a i r l y , would be im a position to safeguard the interests of both the member states and of the world at large. (57) - . In a region l i k e the P a c i f i c , where i t s various parts are more competitive with each other, the e s t a b l i s h " ment of a unifying authority over certain aspects of thei r respective economies could in i t s e l f do much to improve the internal economic relations and insure the most advantageous use of the resources of every part of the region. Apart from the promotion of more i n t r a -56. J . B. C o n d l i i ' f e A g e n d a , f o r a Postwar World (W. W. Norton & 00. New York) p. 78 57. Lasker, op.cit.,p.18. - 184 -r e g i o n a l t r a d e , i t c o u l d a l s o s o f t e n c o m p e t i t i o n i n r e g u l a t i o n , i n t h e j o i n t i n t e r e s t , o f the output of c e r t a i n commodities, o r import quotas, or a l l o c a t i o n o f c a p i t a l , s h i p p i n g and l a b o r and so f o r t h . I t c o u l d a l s o i n t r o d u c e new c r o p s and undertake new schemes of s e t t l e m e n t and p u b l i c works. What are the e s s e n t i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of the economic o r g a n i z a t i o n i n the P a c i f i c r e g i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n ? I propose they s h o u l d i n c l u d e a t l e a s t the f o l l o w i n g t h r e e d i v i s i o n s : F i r s t , an Economic and F i n a n c i a l Commission f o r the j o i n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e s p e c i a l economic i n t e r e s t s o f the r e g i o n . I t s duty p r i m a r i l y s h o u l d c o n s i s t of p l a n n i n g f o r the development o f i n d u s t r y and a g r i c u l t u r e and s u p p l y c a p i t a l s f o r such development. T h i s Commission, l i k e the two f o l l o w i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s , would work i n c l o s e c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h the c o r r e s p o n d i n g body of a w o r l d a s s o c i a t i o n and may c o n s t i t u t e a r e g i o n a l b r a n c h of t h a t body. F o r t h i s purpose, i t would be charged w i t h t h e s p e c i a l d u t y of s e e i n g t h a t whatever economic o p e r a t i o n i t performed i n b e h a l f of the w o r l d economic o r g a n i z a t i o n would r e s u l t i n i n c r e a s e d w e l f a r e and economic i n t e r e s t s f o r the r e g i o n as w e l l as f o r t h e w o r l d a t l a r g e . Second, a P a c i f i c Development Commission w h i c h sh o u l d guarantee e q u a l a c c e s s t o a l l s t a t e s t o the raw - 185 -materials of the region and plan the development of the resources of the areas. The natural resources of this area should, except where the Commission decides otherwise, be placed under public ownership or regulatio and they should, i n any case, be administered primarily for the benefit of the population of the t e r r i t o r i e s . ' International investments might be made through this Commission and would be used i n accordance with the purpose and terms l a i d down by the Commission. Third, a Migration and Settlement Commission, to deal with temporary problems l i k e that of the present fl u x of refugees and with the general movement of population i n the P a c i f i c area. The general principles of equality and indiscrimination which should govern migration and settlement should be set forth by the Commission. Henceforth, there should be no r a c i a l discrimination i n the countries-of the P a c i f i c region, especially the attitude of western countries towards Oriental immigrants should be r a d i c a l l y changed. The Commission should regulate the issues of Oriental emigration at least in accordance with the following two p r i n c i p l e s : 1.'Orientals should everywhere be admitted on the same basis as other people; 2. there should be no discrimination against residents of i Chinese o r i g i n once they have been admitted. With the advancement of industry and other big - 186 -enterprises, there must come the labor problems. To avoid the danger of new social d i f f i c u l t i e s and c o n f l i c t s a Commission on Social Legislation and Administration should be set up to devise common measures of public health, labor regulation and control of injurious t r a f f i c . The f i r s t duty of this Commission would be to protect labor standards i n certain colonial areas which provide important raw materials and food-stuffs to t h e world. International agreements governing wage standards, working conditions and soc i a l services should be an integral part of the schemes of the Commissi on'. There i s a strong opinion i n favor of achieving i n t e l l e c t u a l co-operation i n the postwar P a c i f i c to advance international understanding and collaboration. I t has been pointed out by some writers that a c u l t u r a l regional organization should be established i n the P a c i f i c region, because i t would do much to ass i s t the progress of native mental adjustment to the demands of a new era. (58) In t e l l e c t u a l co-operation has proved to be an important a c t i v i t y both in the work of the League of Nations and some regional organizations since the l a s t war. For the future cultural development, there should be a Commission on In t e l l e c t u a l Co-operation i n the regional association of the P a c i f i c . The chief task of this Commission would be the control and planning 58. Ibid., p. 26. ~ ' • ~ ~ ' ~ of education in the colonial areas and i n t e l l e c t u a l co-operation between member states, such as to supply ex-perts i n arts and sciences, educational procedure and exchange students and professors, of books, of musics and other modes of c u l t u r a l expression f o r the promotion of mutual understanding of the peoples. The regional organization i s projected upon the assumption that the whole plan is within the framework of a world organization and the l a t t e r organization w i l l most c e r t a i n l y have to be b u i l t on the foundations of regionalism. Relations between the various regional groups and between the regional body and the world organization w i l l form one of the most important and complicated problems which w i l l confront the world. Shall coordination of relations between them, be given structural form or be sought merely i n the realm of action or procedure? Shall different regional bodies subordinate to each other and members of one body be not allowed to join another regional body? Or s h a l l i t be sought by giving the central organization power to impose i t s w i l l upon the regional organization? Recently, the question of regionalism versus universalism has become one of the most sig n i f i c a n t issues i n the problems of the postwar international reorganization. (59) There i s the c o n f l i c t between the 59. Pitman B. Potter, Universalism versus Regionalism i n International Organization, American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, October 1943, p. 850. - 188 -view that the international organization should proceed upon a regional basis and the view that i t should proceed upon a world-wide basis. The partisans of these two views are vigorous i n their advocacy from both a theor-e t i c a l and a p r a c t i c a l standpoint.-The u n i v e r s a l i s t s condemn the regional idea as being tainted with the continentalism of "Geopolitik". Staley has pointed out that a continental neighbourhood i s in many cases merely a cartographic i l l u s i o n . (60) Another professor has noted that the tie that binds people together are common c u l t u r a l , economic and strategic i nterests; and these do not by any means depend upon continental proximity. (61) On the other hand, the r e g i o n a l i s t s c r i t i c i s e universalism as s u p e r f i c i a l . The idea that a l l nations, just because they are independent, are substantially a l i k e , is p i t i f u l l y naive.. It i s not clear that "democracy" means the same thing i n Iowa, Yorkshire, Moscow and Chungking. (68) The r e g i o n a l i s t s think that t e r r i t o r i a l propinquity counts for a great deal i n inter-state r e l a t i o n s , inter-state co-operation and inter-state organization. In current discussion the two doctrines are often put forward by t h e i r advocates as though they are r i v a l 60. Eugene Staley, The Myth of the Continents, Foreign A f f a i r s , A p r i l , 1941. 61. Condiiffe, op. c i t . , p. 78. 62. Potter, op. c i t . , p. 851. - 189 -and i r r e c o n c i l a b l e p r i n c i p l e s . But i t i s not absolutely necessary that the two ideas of regionalism and univ-ersalism should clash or come into sharp c o n f l i c t ; indeed, their r e c o n c i l i a t i o n constitutes the main task of world peace and security. If universalism without regionalism is impotent, regionalism without universalism i s dangerous. Regional groupings, uncon-t r o l l e d by a world organization, may lead to the devel-opment of continental r i v a l r i e s , such as H i t l e r has attempted to i n c i t e i n Europe against the United States. (63) A centralized world organization without due respect to regional interests would not operate success-f u l l y i n certa i n regions. Therefore, a world organiza-tion f o r the coordination and control of regional grouping w i l l be a necessary complement to the regional pattern, and regional groupings would certainly f a i l to achieve t h e i r objectives unless they are a part of the world organization. (64) Regarding the relationship between different region-a l groupings and between the regional body to a world organization, no d e t a i l s can be worked out unless the character of the world organization and different regional groupings can be foreseen. 63. Kingsley and Petergorsky, Strategy for Democracy, (Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1942) p.-59. ' 64. Josef Hanc, Regionalism i n Central and Eastern Europe (an address delivered at the American University in Wash-ington, D. C., September 11, 1942, Czechoslovok National Council of America, New York) p. 4. - 190 -As to the future world organization, there are many projects being advocated by a number of thinkers, such as a reorganized League of Nations, a world.Federation, a world State or a world Association of Nations. No one of such plans has been o f f i c i a l l y accepted by the United Nations as a pattern for the future system of general security. In the Moscow Conference of November 1943, a general princi p l e with regard to the future world organization was set fort h by the four powers, i . e., that they recognize the necessity of establishing a general international organization, based on the p r i n c i p l e of sovereign equality of a l l peace-loving states and open to membership by a l l such states for maintaining peace. (65) From this p r i n c i p l e of world organization alone no one can envisage the exact character of the future world peace structure. Owing to the uncertainty of the future world organization, no hard and fast rules,therefore, can be l a i d down regarding the exact relationship between the regional association of the P a c i f i c and the world organization. But a general p r i n c i p l e has been espoused by some writers. Buell takes the world organization as an appeal machinery of regional unit for p o l i t i c a l dispute Any p o l i t i c a l disputes arising' between states within a regional unit should be submitted f i r s t to the machinery 65. New York Times, November 1, 1945. - 191 -of the regional unit, with provision for an appeal from the regional body to a world council in a l l non-justic-iable disputes; other controversies going i n the last resort to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague. (66) This arrangement seems to be favored by another writer who looks upon the Permanent Court of International Justice as an agency for the adjudic-ation of disputes involving members of different regional associations. (67) According to Professor Chow, matters of purely l o c a l concern should be l e f t e n t i r e l y i n the hands of the regional organization except f o r such special advice and assistance as i t might formally request. Regarding matters which by their nature tend to affect the interests of the world as a whole, such as access to key raw materials, problems of national or r a c i a l freedom, and' sanctions against aggressors, the world organiz-ation should have the l a s t word. Before taking any decisive action on such questions, therefore, the P a c i f i c Association should, except for necessary precautionary measures, seek the approval and co-oper-ation of the world organization. (68) In my opinion, these questions should be treated separately. In regard to the r e l a t i o n between 66. Buell, op. c i t . , -p. 439. 67. Corbett, op. c i t . , p. 151. 68. Chow, op. c i t . , p. 25. - 192 -different regional authorities, the following may be suggested as general p r i n c i p l e s . F i r s t , the postwar world w i l l have to recognize differences between region a l organization; for i t w i l l be necessary to have various types of regional set-up, and each regional organization must stand as an equal to other corres-ponding bodies . A European federation, quite c l e a r l y , w i l l d i f f e r considerably from the P a c i f i c Association; and the Pan American Union w i l l hardly be i d e n t i c a l with that of the Soviet Union. These differences w i l l have to be recognized i n the legal system of the postwar international organizations. Second, i t w i l l have to be possible for a country to belong to more than one regional organization. This, of course, i s an application of the pri n c i p l e of the necessary f l e x i b i l i t y of the regional organisms. America and the Soviet Union for example, w i l l be two separate regional units; but the United States and Soviet Russia w i l l have to be associated in the administration of the problems of the P a c i f i c area. With regard to the r e l a t i o n between a regional body and the world organization, two general rules w i l l be l a i d down as follows: On l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l side universal competence upon some matters i s necessary. Among the. problems especially requiring universal treatment are - 193 the l i m i t a t i o n of armaments and international violence beyond regional l i m i t s , and the prevention of obstruct-ion to international trade and economic co-operation. In the present world, each nation may have controversies with any other; the effects of war are world-wide and no regional l i m i t s can be drawn to commercial i n t e r -dependence. While subordinate regional authorities may be useful in these f i e l d s , p a r t i c u l a r l y for organ-i z i n g m i l i t a r y sanctions, a world court, a world organization for l i m i t i n g armaments and determining aggression, and a world economic authority are s t i l l needed. Administrative authority i s by i t s nature more limited by geographic and c u l t u r a l condition than i s l e g i s l a t i v e or j u d i c i a l authority, so i t w i l l come within the scope of regional competence. M i l i t a r y and police action i s by nature locale. Any contingent of an international police would have to be based upon certain points which define i t s effective radius of action. Much of the work, such as i n t e l l e c t u a l and technical co-operation, sanitary services, improve-ment of communication f a c i l i t i e s , public works, and so f o r t h , are more within the province of the regional than within the domain of a universal organization. In a word, excessive concentration of power i n the world organization would conduce to i n e f f i c i e n c y , - 194 -but n o t h i n g c o u l d prove more d i s a s t r o u s than t o l e t a r e g i o n a l b l o c develop i n o p p o s i t i o n to w o r l d i n t e r -e s t s . Thus t h e r e i s no d e t a i l e d r u l e to be made upon the r e l a t i o n between the . r e g i o n a l body to a w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n a t p r e s e n t . I t w i l l have to be worked out i n t h e f u t u r e . - 1 9 5 -CHAPTER V I CHINA AND JAPAN'S POSITION IN THE NEW PACIFIC ORDER I t must be borne i n mind t h a t the problems of the F a r E a s t and the P a c i f i c w i t h which the r e g i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n s h o u l d d e a l a r e many and d i s t i n c t , but the main one. a f f e c t i n g the f u t u r e P a c i f i c Order i s t h a t of C h i n a and Japan's p o s i t i o n i n the Far E a s t . The f a c t o r s w h i c h dominated the h i s t o r y of t h e F a r East f o r the p a s t c e n t u r y were a weak and r i c h China con-t e n d i n g w i t h a s t r o n g and a m b i t i o u s Japan. I t was t h e a m b i t i o n of Japan f o r mastery and e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l o f China w h i c h l e d the Sino-Japanese c o n f l i c t i n t o a huge world-wide c a t a s t r o p h e . Throughout h i s t o r y , China and Japan have been the f o c a l p o i n t of the Far East and w i l l remain so. I f China i s secure and s t a b l e and i f a t t h e same time Japan i s subdued but e c o n o m i c a l l y sound, t h e r e i s a s o l i d b a s i s f o r s t a b i l i t y and peace i n t h e F a r E a s t . S i n c e 1937, China has won t h e r e s p e c t and admir-a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d , because, i l l - a r m e d and w i t h l i t t l e e x t e r n a l a i d , she has g a l l a n t l y f o u g h t the Japanese i n v a d e r f o r more than s i x y e a r s . I t has been - 196 -noted that China i s fighti n g for her independence, p o l i t i c a l freedom and economic justice. Through the more than s i x year's struggle, though the f i n a l victory i s s t i l l not yet completely won, China has enhanced her national p o s i t i o n from the status of a so-called "sub-colony" to be one of the four chief powers of the United Nations. By their "blood, sweat and tears", the Chinese people have been regarded i n the eyes of the United Nations as an equal not as an i n f e r i o r and steps have already been taken by the l a t t e r to discard their former unequal and discriminatory treatment towards China. Through the new Sino-American and Sino-British t r e a t i e s signed on January 11, 1943, a century of extra-t e r r i t o r i a l system has come to a d e f i n i t e end; thanks to the .raew Chinese immigration b i l l passed by the American Congress i n November 26, 1943, the attitude of r a c i a l inequality of the American people towards Chinese immigrants has been removed; and by the Cairo Communique on November 1, 1943, the restoration of the Chinese t e r r i t o r i e s taken by the Japanese from 1954 has been pledged. Nevertheless, China i s hardly s a t i s f i e d with such above arrangements, nor has her national aspiration been achieved entire l y through them in the minds of every a r t i c u l a t e Chinese. Complete freedom and justice for China w i l l by no means have been realized merely - 197 -by ousting Japan from Chinese t e r r i t o r y and by slackening bondage, national or international, imposed upon her people by tr e a t i e s or national laws in the past century, but i t requires the Powers with interests in the Par East profoundly to modify their p o l i c i e s toward China. It i s the f i r s t time in modern history, that China has been granted the status of freedom and equality with other nations; so in the postwar world, China 's national aspirations w i l l be, in the f i r s t p l a C e , the undisputed exercise of sovereignty within her own domain and an equal treatment of the Chinese by the Powers abroad; and, i n the second place, China has to be strong,-so strong as to become unassailable and as to make possible for her .as a great nation to f u l f i l l her duty to maintain enduring peace i n the Ear East. In the f i r s t category, China expects the return of those t e r r i t o r i e s , s t i l l i n the hands"'of her A l l i e s , taken from her by force or by the threat of force during the years of her m i l i t a r y weakness. What t e r r i t o r i e s w i l l China want returned? The answer c a l l s f o r some explan-ation. Before the Chinese Empire began to disintegrate i n 1842, i t was an immensely greater country than China is at present. It has been asserted by a Chinese profess-or that i t would be neither p r a c t i c a l nor just for China to ask the return of a l l t e r r i t o r i e s from other countries and of a l l tributory states now owing allegiance elsewhere!1) 1. T. "8". Chien, New China's Demands,Foreign A f f a i r s , J u l y 1943, p.694. - 198 -What China is j u s t i f i e d i n demanding are those places which constitute an integral part of China and contribute to the economic development and national s e c u r i t y of her future. In this connection, we expect not only the return of Hongkong and Macao but also hope f o r the complete with-drawal of the influence exercised by the B r i t i s h i n Tibet and by the Soviet i n Outer Mongolia. Hongkong remains an outstanding issue i n Sino-British postwar r e l a t i o n s . It was ceded to.Britain i n 1842 by the Treaty of Nanking and has been a Crown colony of the B r i t i s h Empire since then. Although the o f f i c i a l attitude of the Chinese government regarding this issue remains in abeyance, the Chinese public and most i n t e l l i g e n t persons ask that i t w i l l be returned to China. The Chin-ese demand i s based upon the following reasons: F i r s t , Hongkong i s geographically a part of the Province of Kwangtung, and the population i s almost e n t i r e l y Chinese; second, although Hongkong was formerly considered nearly as powerful a fortress and naval base as Gibraltar, the airplane changed Hongkong from an almost impregnable m i l i t a r y and naval base to one of extreme weakness and consequently i t w i l l be no longer very useful as a B r i t i s h strategic post i n the Far East; t h i r d , i t i s a natural port of entry f o r South China and the natural terminus of the railway connecting Kwangtung with the Yangtze and f o r the security of South China, i t has tremendous m i l i t a r y significance which w i l l affect the national defense of China herself. The problem of Honkong i s somewhat made confusing by the assertion that B r i t i s h control of the port i s unrelated to e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y . (S) But B r i t i s h control of t h i s port and the leased t e r r i t o r y of Kowloon has been regarded by the Chinese as part of the system of special foreign p r i v i l e g e s exacted from them i n the nine-teenth century. Indeed, there is no objection in the United Nations, even among the English themselves, to the Chinese demand of returning Hongkong to China. For instance, a recent leading a r t i c l e in the London Times pointed out that any future consideration of the status of t h i s colony would necessarily have regard to the wishes of the Chinese. (5) In the Mont Tremblant Con-ference of the Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, the B r i t -i s h I n s t i t u t e Group supported the Chinese view. (4) Although there was an argument in the Conference over the' use of Hongkong with s a t e l l i t e a i r f i e l d s as an international security base, the idea did not receive much support from the experts present. Chinese speakers stressed the u n s u i t a b i l i t y of Hongkong (a crowded commer-c i a l center) f o r a defense base. (5) In short, the future 2. William C. Johnstone, The Price of Security i n the P a c i f i c , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , March 1943, p. 67. 3. Cited i n George W. Keeton. Some Factors i n a Far Eastern PeaCe Settlement (a data paper submitted to the Eighth Con-ference of the I. P. R. 1942,mimeographed) p. 18. 4. A Group of members of the Royal Institute of Internation-a l A f f a i r s , Problems of the Post-war Settlement i n the Far East, D. Hongkong(a data paper submitted to: the. Eighth Con-ference of the I . P. .R.1942, mimeographed) p. 12. 5. War & Peace i n the Pacifie,p.37. status of Hongkong must be determined by the character of the Chinese national interests established there; so far as there i s no fundamentally i r r e c o n c i l i a b l e view on this issue between the Chinese and the B r i t i s h , i t should not be d i f f i c u l t to find an equitable solution. The question of Macao is r e l a t i v e l y simple. The Portuguese have been i n Macao for nearly four centuries, since they persuaded China to recognize i t as a leased t e r r i t o r y i n 1563. Since the B r i t i s h made Hongkong into one of the great seaports of the world, the p o l i t i c a l and economic importance of Macao to the Portuguese has steadily declined. For many years, Macao has been a center of vice, smuggling, gambling and the opium trade. It has long been a plague spot in South China and has degraded the moral l i f e of the Chinese there. In such circumstances, the Chinese government has good reasons for asking'the return of Macao to China by the Portuguese, not to mention i t s importance to the security of i t s Southern f r o n t i e r s . Referring to Tibet and Outer Mongolia, these problems are more complicated. Tibet's close association with China stretches back into distant ages. From China, Tibet has derived most of her material c i v i l i z a t i o n and the most f e r t i l e d i s t r i c t s of her realm l i e along the border of western China, whose, magistrates governed them for the l a s t two hundred years. (6) Since the B r i t i s h 6. S i r Charles Bell,Tibet's P o s i t i o n in Asia to-day, Foreign Affairs., October 1931, p. 135. penetration of Tibet at the close of the nineteenth century, China's p r a c t i c a l control over Tibet was lost though her suzerain right there was recognized by the B r i t i s h i n the Convention 1906. (7) In 1912 China declared Tibet an integral part of China. In recent years, the relations between China and Tibet have been more close than before. In 1940, General Wu Chung-hsin, Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan A f f a i r s Commission, was appointed by the Chinese government to Tibet to con-duet the ceremony of enthroning the fourteenth Dalai Lama. In 1943, some Tibetan Monks went to Chungking to pay respects to President Chiang and contributed a large amount of money to the National government. For many years Mongolia has been a dependency of China and the Mongols have recognized the suzerainty of China. The. T z a r i s t Russian government attempted f o r a long time to establish i t s influence over Outer Mongolia and an ostensible autonomous government backed by the Russian's troops was established i n Outer Mongolia i n 1911. In July V.., 1915, a t r i p a r t i t e agree-ment was signed between China, Russia and Mongolia. 7. The A r t i c l e 2 of this convention provides that the Government of Great B r i t a i n engages not to annex Tibetan t e r r i t o r y or to i n t e r f e r e i n the administration of Tibet; and the Government of China also undertakes not to permit any foreign State to interfere with the t e r r i t o r y or internal administration of Tibet. See John A.. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China ,Vol. 1, (Oxford University Press, New York) p. 575. - 202 -In t h i s agreement, Outer Mongolia, though remaining autonomous, recognized, the Chinese suzerainty over her. (8) In 1924, there was another agreement, signed by China and the Soviet, providing that the government of the U. S. S. R. recognizes Outer Mongolia as an integral part of China and respects China's sovereignty therein.(9) To the Chinese Republic, Tibet and Mongolia are inhabited by the two of the f i v e component races which constitute the greater nation of China. For the t e r r i t -o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , China shows her usual tenacity in wishing to regain l o s t relations whenever the opportunity comes. China believes that i f the B r i t i s h and the Soviet influences are l i f t e d from Tibet and Mongolia, neither province w i l l i n s i s t on remaining a separate entity. China has consistently avoided ra i s i n g the issue of either Tibet or Mongolia because the time is not mature. But after this war we expect that both G-reat B r i t a i n and the Soviet Union should give us f a c i l i t i e s to resume our h i s t o r i c a l r e lations with Tibet and Outer Mongolia. At that time, the Chinese government would adjust i t s re l a t i o n s towards Tibet and Outer Mongolia and undertake a l i b e r a l p o l i c y towards a l l minority people within i t s borders. If the l a t t e r w i l l r e a l l y desire to be auton-omous, the Chinese government might grant them regime of self-government f o r them provided that i t is not incom-patible with the Chinese sovereignty. 8.Ibid., p. 1240. ~ ' ~ 7 ~ T ~ ~ 9.'Harriet Morre, a Record of Soviet Far Eastern Relations, Secretariat Paper, No. 4,1. P. R., 1942, p. 41. - 203 -Closely connected with the t e r r i t o r i a l issues between China and her A l l i e s i s the general question of the post-war r e l a t i o n s among China and the United Nations, espec-i a l l y the Sino-Soviet r e l a t i o n s . An American writer suggests that c o n f l i c t s of interests i n the postwar period are bound to develop possibly between China and Russia. (10) This assertion, we should l i k e to examine. The Sino-Spviet relations i n recent years have been quite f r i e n d l y , p a r t i c u l a r l y since the signing of the Non-Aggression Treaty in 1937 between the two countries. In spite of the fact that Moscow s t i l l maintains peace with Japan, and that the Soviet government never declares i t s intentions about the post-war peace settlement in the Far East, the Eussian peace aims, generally speaking, w i l l not necessarily fundamentally contradict tljose of China, especially as S t a l i n has endorsed the A t l a n t i c Charter and the p r i n c i p l e of the Four Freedoms by sign-ing the United Nations Joint Declaration on January. 1, 1942. For the sta b i l i t y - a n d prosperity of the Far East, China and the Soviet not only should not c o n f l i c t with each other; they should also take some positive steps to promote mutual understanding. But, across the path of the Sino-Soviet understand-ing., i n addition to the Outer Mongolian issue, there s t i l l l i e problems. F i r s t , the problem of the Chinese 10. Tyler Dennett, op. c i t . , p. 19. - 204 -Communists who are said to have some connections with the Soviet, i s always a source of anxiety to the Chinese government. With the dissolution of the Third Inter-national i n May 1943, the situation seemed to be c l a r i f i e d . Hitherto this problem has been regarded by the Chinese government as a matter i n which no foreign power would be allowed to interfere. (11) And we hope that the Soviet Union w i l l adopt a non-interference policy and l e t the Chinese government s e t t l e t h i s matter without hindrance; the Chinese government w i l l then be able to solve this perplexing problem i n a r a t i o n a l way. Second, i t i s alleged that the lengthy land frontier between China and Russia may create controversies in their future r e l a t i o n s , (12) but this issue also i s not absolutely i r r e c o n c i l a b l e . Dr. Hu Shih has expressed his view on t h i s matter, thus: "With a common f r o n t i e r extending nearly f i v e thousand miles/, China and Russia should work out a permanent scheme of peace, non-aggress-ion, mutual assistance, and general security, somewhat along the same li n e s as the lat e s t British-Soviet Treaty. The h i s t o r i c a l example of 3500 miles of undefend-ed common f r o n t i e r between Canada and the United States can be emulated by Ghina and Russia to our mutual 11. It was announced by President Chiang Kai-shek that "the Chinese communist problem is purely a p o l i t i c a l problem and should be solved by p o l i t i c a l means". See New York Times, September 17, 1943. 12. Chow, op. c i t . , p. 26 - 205 -benefit." (13) It is true that, i f China and Russia seek for peace and co-operation i n the Far East, the fr o n t i e r question should not become an outstanding issue between the two countries i n the future. It i s asserted by a Chinese professor that China has fought side by side with the United States and B r i t a i n , and hopes to collaborate i n the same way with Russia before the war in the Far East i s over. It i s to be hoped that the wartime collaboration between the United Nations w i l l continue into the postwar period, and China i s prepared to go more than half-way to meet her A l l i e s ; she i s confident that, with an equal s p i r i t of willingness on every side, ex i s t i n g differences can in time be ironed out. (14) Another matter of deep concern to China i s the question of migration. This i s a general problem but i t i s p e c u l i a r l y important to the future of China. During the l a s t s i x or seven decades overseas Chinese have been subject to a series of discriminatory laws and regulations i n Latin America, the United States and the B r i t i s h Commonwealth of Nations. Whatever motives these countries might have had f o r such measures i n the past, their actions have been detrimental to the dignity and the economic l i f e of the overseas Chinese. For a long time, Gkina has hoped that the discriminatory laws 15. Hu Shih, Asia and the Universal World Order, cited.p726 14. ¥uan Chen, POst-war Foreign P o l i c y , Foreign Po l i c y Reports', November 1, 1943, p. 227. - 206 -and regulations would be repealed or modified so that the Chinese immigrants and residents i n foreign countries would be treated on the same footing as those of other n a t i o n a l i t i e s . On account of this discriminatory t r e a t -ment, China has been deeply s o l i c i t o u s of the welfare of her overseas people, and t h i s concern i s increased because of the great and l o y a l support that the nation has received from them for over six long years i n which she has been f i g h t i n g Japan. Of the countries that have passed discriminatory laws against the Chinese Cuba has been the f i r s t to abolish them. In the Treaty of Amity between China and Cuba signed on November 12, 1942, i t i s stipulated that the nationals of each country sh a l l be at l i b e r t y to enter or leave each other's t e r r i t o r y . (15) Following Cuba, the United States promulgated a law, repealing the Chinese exclusion laws on December i f , 1943, which puts Chinese immigration on a quota basis and makes Chinese e l i g i b l e f o r nat u r a l i z a t i o n i n the United States." (16) But in Canada, Au s t r a l i a , N ew Zealand and certain Latin American countries, there are statesmen and public leaders who are opposed to the Chinese exclusion laws, and thus far no l e g i s l a t i o n has been contemplated. 15. The Sino-Cuban Treaty of Amity, White Book, No. 172, published by the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , Chungking, China. . • . 16. Current History, February 1944, p. 188. - 207 -When the war is over, the establishment of a stable government, the change of the social conditions and the i n d u s t r i a l development w i l l undoubtedly increase the Chinese population, so that the problem of the Chinese emigration w i l l probably become more acute. It i s certain .that during the war and i n the postwar years China w i l l make every e f f o r t to end any discrimination in any part of the world against her nationals on account of race. In short, while not asking for any special favors for them, China w i l l ask that they be treated by other powers on as favorable terms as are other residents or traveling a l i e n s . It i s believed that this expectation i s i n conformity with the general p r i n c i p l e of equality treatment of . a l l nations. As i t has been noted, postwar China needs to be strong How can China become strong? The answer i s by the modern-i z a t i o n of i t s economic l i f e so as to bring China into harmony and actual equality with the rest of the advanced Powers. It goes without saying that no country can be p o l i t i c a l l y stable without economic prosperity. In China, economic prosperity i n the postwar years w i l l be desperately dependent upon i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . The question of< China's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n w i l l be discussed l a t e r i n t h i s chapter; here we s h a l l refer to the attitude of some Americans regarding a strong China in the post-war world. 208 Some writers i n the United'States fear that China may become too strong, even become i m p e r i a l i s t i c . Representing th i s attitude are Professors N. J. Spykman and W. C. Johnstone. Spykman,insisting on a policy of a new balance of power as the basis of world p o l i t i c s after the war, takes the view that a strong and prosperous China i s just as much a potential threat to America, as a strong and pros-perous Japan. Thus he strongly advocates that after Japan i s defeated, America should s t i l l be on good terms with her and see to i t that her m i l i t a r y strength i s duly restored, thereby serving as an effective check on a resurgent China. (17) Johnstone adheres to the opinion that a new China w i l l develop aggressive tendencies that can be kept i n check only by a strong Japan, a strong Russia and a United States w i l l i n g and able to exercise i t s power across the P a c i f i c . (18) Both professors base th e i r views on the p r i n c i p l e of a new balance of power in the Par East. It i s an old worn-out tune of"check and balance sung very much to the r e f r a i n of the g e o p o l i t i c school of thought. If world could have been maintained by a balance of power, we should not have had-this catastrophic war, nor the F i r s t World War t h i r t y years ago, and i f mankind per s i s t s i n t h i s old way of attempting to f i n d world peace, i n t e r -national situations w i l l never be c l a r i f i e d and power p o l i t i c s w i l l s t i l l be a dominating factor i n the post-17. Spykman, on. c i t . , pp. 273-278. ~ ~ ~~1 18. William C. Johnstone, Must We Keep Japan Strong? Far Eastern Survey, I. P. R., New York, November 2, 1942. - 209 -war international world. In the minds of far-sighted people, there is nothing to fear i n a strong China; on the contrary they hope China to he strong for the sake of enduring peace i n the Far East. Peffer said: "The key to peace i n the Ear East i s a strong China, so strong that i t w i l l never again tempt as a prize;of conquest and invite r i v a l attempts to capture the p r i z e . " (19) Undoubtedly, i n the history of international relations of the Far East, i t was the competitive aggression of foreign Powers towards China that r o i l e d the p o l i t i c s of the Ear East, that led to the establishment of r i v a l outposts designed for future advance, that kept armies and navies i n a high state of preparation in.the P a c i f i c . But with China united, strong, self-sustaining and under no obligation to any great Powers a l l these can be prevented i n the future. Thus a strong China i s not 'only i n the interests of China herself but also f o r the benefit of the world as well. As to those who fear that a strong China w i l l become i m p e r i a l i s t i c i n the P a c i f i c , t h e i r ideas are apparently based upon a groundless suspicion. Throughout-the world, i t i s well known that the Chinese are a most peace-loving people. Irrefutable evidences of t h i s fact can be found not only i n the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l philosophy of the Chinese people but also, more impressively, i n 19J?effer, Basis for Peace i n the Far East, c i t e d , p. 98. - 210 -the f i v e thousand years of h i s t o r i c a l records of the Chinese race. China would not go on fighting for a day i f she were not convinced that the very foundations of her s u r v i v a l as a nation were threatened. In the history of China there was no war waged by .the Chinese people against other people for t e r r i t o r i a l expansion or p o l i t i c a l dominance. Her leaders have announced that i n the post-war years she w i l l cherish not any i m p e r i a l i s t i c designs on the people of Asia. President Chiang Kai-shek declared on November 18, 1942 with regard to China's position in Asia that: ".... among our friends there has been recently some talk of China emerging as the leader of Asia, as i f China wished the mantle of an unworthy Japan to f a l l on her shoulders. Having herself been a victim of exploitation, China has i n f i n i t e sympathy for the submerged nations of Asia and towards them China feels she has only r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s - not rights. We repudiate the idea of leadfership of Asia because the rFuehres prineiple'has been synonymous for domination and exploitation, precisely as the 'East Asia co-prosperity sphere' for a race of mythical supermen lording over groveling subject race." (20) To some Chinese writers, a strong China w i l l serve not only as a s t a b i l i z i n g factor i n the P a c i f i c but also a way leading to democracy i n Asia. (21) Economically, i t w i l l help to make world economy prosperous by offering a big market to a l l nations and supplying of their demands.^22) 20. Supra, see"note 28, p„ 70„ 21. See Chow, op. c i t . , p. 27, and N. C. L i u , A Strong postwar China and the New World Order, China Monthly, December 1943, p. 20. 22. L i u , op.cit. - 211 -So, p o s i t i v e l y or negatively speaking, a strong China would, do no harm to the American interests as some geopoliticians fear; on the contrary, i t would be com-patible with the needs of the United States and other United Nations. The main factor i n making China strong w i l l be the accelerated i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n which w i l l enhance the national strength of China and increase the material welfare of lier people. In the l a s t two decades, i n d u s t r i a l revolution has r e a l l y begun i n China, but interest was concentrated i n developing l i g h t industries. Although some attention has been also paid to the devel-opment of heavy industries, no heavy industry on a large scale was i n s t a l l e d on account of shortage of capit a l and experts as well as of internal and external limitations* Early i n 1919 immediately aft e r the F i r s t World War, Dr. Sun Yat-sen proposed an international development scheme for Chinese economic reconstruction. The pro-posal was published i n 1922 under the t i t l e "The International Development of China", the objective of which was to solve "three great world problems, which are international war, commercial war and class war."(23) The schemes that Dr. Sun proposes are along the following l i n e s : 1. Development of a communication system; 2. Dev-elopment of commercial harbors; 3. Modern c i t i e s i n a l l 23. Dr. Sun Yat-sen,International Development of China, translated from the Chinese text, p. 11. - 212 -railway centers and termini and alongside harbors; 4. Water power development; 5. Iron and steel works and cement works; 6. Mineral.development; 7. A g r i c u l t u r a l development; 8. I r r i g a t i o n works in Mongolia and Sinkiang; 9. Reafforestation in Central and North China; 10. Colonization in Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Kokonor and Tibet. Dr. Sun suggests the three necessary steps which must be taken i n order to carry out- this project success-f u l l y : F i r s t , the'various governments of the capitbal-supplying powers must agree to joint action and a unified p o l i c y to form an International Organization with t h e i r organizers, administrators and experts of various l i n e s to formulate plans and to standardize materials i n order to prevent waste and to f a c i l i t a t e work. Second, .the confidence of the Chinese people must be secured i n order to gain t h e i r co-operation and enthusiastic support. If the above two steps are accomplished, then the third, step is to open formal negotiation for the f i n a l contract of the project with the Chinese government. (24) Unfortunately, -this proposal was not carried out, pa r t l y because China was then s t i l l under a weak, f e u d a l i s t i c and reactionary government and p a r t l y because the A l l i e s a f t e r the war were not ready to start such a gigantic international scheme. 24. Ibid., pp. 49-62; 67-78. : - 213 -D u r i n g the pre s e n t war, some f a c t o r s have c o n t r i b u t e d t o s t i m u l a t e the development of heavy i n d u s t r y i n China . F i r s t , b e i n g m a i n l y an a g r i c u l t u r a l c o u n t r y , China has no modern m i l i t a r y equipment t o r e s i s t a s t r o n g and i n d u s t r i a l i z e d enemy, whi c h f o r c e s her to develop some k i n d s of war i n d u s t r y i n the r e a r t o d e a l w i t h the urgen t needs o f t h e war. D u r i n g the course o f the war, China has r e a l i z e d t h a t h er m i l i t a r y impotence w i l l never be remedied u n l e s s heavy i n d u s t r y can be f u l l y developed. Second, the a b r o g a t i o n o f t h e unequal t r e a t i e s and s i g n i n g of the new t r e a t i e s between C h i n a and Anglo-American c o u n t r i e s convince Chinese t h a t p a s t b a r r i e r s t o her i n d u s t r i a l e x p a n s i o n have been removed. I t w i l l h e l p to develop h e r i n d u s t r y i n t h e postwar y e a r s w i t h o u t e x t e r n a l o b s t a c l e s . T h i r d , a f t e r t h i s war, China i s g e n e r a l l y e x p e c ted t o be not o n l y an equal member of the postwar s o c i e t y of n a t i o n s , but *a l e a d i n g member i n the F a r E a s t . H e r - a b i l i t y t o p l a y t h i s r o l e c l e a r l y depends upon an e x t e n s i v e development of her i n d u s t r i a l s t r e n g t h . The u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e of China's i n d u s t r i a l r e c o n -s t r u c t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to t h e g e n e r a l o p i n i o n and the o f f i c i a l p o l i c y , i s to b u i l d an adequate defense system and r a i s e the l i v i n g s t a n dards of the masses. At p r e s e n t , Chinese p l a n n i n g f o r postwar e x p a n s i o n o f heavy i n d u s t r y emphasizes t h e s w i f t development of defense p l a n t s , and - 214 -o f an e x t e n s i v e system of i n l a n d t r a n s p o r t , r a t h e r than p r o j e c t s which might conduce more d i r e c t l y t o t h e w e l f a r e of t h e Chinese p e o p l e . I t i s g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t when the e x i s t e n c e of a n a t i o n has been a t stake f o r many y e a r s , the people n a t u r a l l y t h i n k t h a t the improvement of c i v i l i a n l i v e l i h o o d i s l e s s important t h a n t h e guarantee of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . (25) The l a s t decade has taught China a l e s s o n t h a t i s never to be f o r g o t t e n , namely t h a t she must never be a v i c t i m of a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n under any c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n the f u t u r e . The above i d e a s have been c r y s t a l l i z e d i n t o p l a n s , b o t h o f f i c i a l and u n o f f i c i a l , as the p r i n c i p l e of China's economic r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . The "Program of Armed R e s i s t -ance and N a t i o n a l R e c o n s t r u c t i o n " adopted a t an Emergency S e s s i o n of the Kuomintang N a t i o n a l Congress on March 29, 1939, l a i d down t h a t "economic r e c o a s t r u c t i o n s h a l l c o n cern i t s e l f m a i n l y w i t h matters of m i l i t a r y importance, and i n c i d e n t a l l y w i t h m a t t e r s t h a t c o n t r i b u t e t o the improvement o f the l i v e l i h o o d of the p e o p l e . " ( A r t i c l e 17) (26) F u r t h e r m o r e , the D r a f t O u t l i n e of the P r i n c i p l e s f o r C h i n a ' s Postwar Economic R e c o n s t r u c t i o n " compiled and p u b l i s h e d by the Chinese Economic R e c o n s t r u c t i o n 25. C h i n a ' s Postwar Economic R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , Contemporary C h i n a , January 25, 1942, p. 1. 26. The Program of Armed R e s i s t a n c e and N a t i o n a l R e c o n s t -r u c t i o n , p u b l i s h e d i n Chinese language by the S e c r e t a r i a t of t h e C e n t r a l E x e c u t i v e Committee of Kuomintang, t r a n s l a t e d f r om the Chinese t e x t . - 215 -S o c i e t y p r o v i d e s t h a t "economic r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s h a l l aim p r i m a r i l y a t s t r e n g t h e n i n g n a t i o n a l defense and second-a r i l y r a i s i n g the, s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g . " ( A r t i c l e 102)(27) Such Chinese economic p o l i c y should not be wondered at i n view of China's f u t i l e a ppeals i n the pa s t f o r a s s i s t a n c e f r o m the League of N a t i o n s and from the g r e a t Powers, and of the h a r r o w i n g e x p e r i e n c e she has s u f f e r e d i n consequence of h e r t e c h n o l o g i c a l unpreparedness f o r war. Hence i n d u s t r i a l p l a n n i n g i n China appears to s t r e s s the development o f the n a t i o n ' s m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l r a t h e r t h a n the improvement of t h e st a n d a r d o f l i v i n g . A l t h o u g h we have t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d t h a t the system o f c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d i n the P a c i f i c by the s e t t i n g " up o f the r e g i o n a l peace, machinery; yet some Chinese opine t h a t China can r e l y on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r her n a t i o n a l s a f e t y and a t the same time t h a t China may hope f o r the be s t but s h o u l d be prepar e d f o r the w o r s t . That i s t o say, China s h o u l d be f u l l y armed a g a i n s t f u t u r e e v e n t u a l i t i e s . (28) The immediate t a s k a f t e r the war, a c c o r d i n g t o c u r r e n t o p i n i o n i n C h i n a , i s the development of such k i n d s of heavy i n d u s t r y as power ana f u e l i n d u s t r i e s , m e t a l l u r g i c a l i n d u s t r i e s , machinery i n d u s t r i e s , and b a s i c c h e m i c a l i n d u s t r i e s w i t h o u t w h i c h China w i l l ever remain a p o s s i b l e 27. D r a f t O u t l i n e of the P r i n c i p l e s f o r Postwar Economic R e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n C h i n a , t r a n s l a t e d from the Chinese t e x t by K. Y. Y i n , p. 7. -28.. Ching-Chao Wu, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic Development, F o r e i g n P o l i c y R e p o r t s , November 1, 1943, p.215. - 216 -victim of aggression and without which the l i v i n g standards of the people cannot be raised appreciably. Of course at the same time, the Chinese w i l l establish many lig h t industries, such as cotton and s i l k and w i l l improve the methods of agriculture and other enterprises in connection with the development of heavy industries. What kind of economic system w i l l emerge i n China af t e r the war i s a question that ho one can answer with certainty. The present opinion seems to be i n favor of a "planned economy". In the same a r t i c l e of the Draft Outline of the P r i n c i p l e for Postwar Economic Reconstruction of China, i t i s c l e a r l y pointed out that an economic planning program s h a l l be carried out with these objectives in view. (29) But the planned economy i s neither complete communism, nor unbridled capitalism, but somewhere between the two extremes. It i s certain that China w i l l not be communistic find i t is equally certain that China w i l l not develop an economic system that i s based purely upon private i n i t i a t i v e . Thus i t is pointed out by one Chinese economist that " i t i s most l i k e l y that China w i l l develop a sort of mixed economy which would- be a compromise between the Soviet pattern on the one hand, and the American or English pattern on the other." (30) 29. K. Y. Yin, op. c i t . 30. Ching-Chao Wu, op. c i t . , p. 216. - 217 -In 1919, Dr. Sun Yat-sen l a i d down the general p r i n c i p l e concerning this question. He said: "The international development of China should be carried out along two li n e s : 1. by private enterprise and 2. by national undertaking. A l l matters that can be better carried out by private enterprise should be l e f t in private hands. A l l matters that., cannot be taken up by private concerns and those that possess monopolistic characters should be taken up as national undertakings."(3D The Chinese Economic Reconstruction Society has re-cently advocated the following p r i n c i p l e regarding the demarcation between states-owned or private-owned' industcles: Eey industries, related to the direc t need of defense, and other p r i n c i p a l industries requiring planning or control by the state s h a l l be state enterprises,- leaving the rest to private i n i t i a t i v e . (32) The Chinese Economic Recon-struction Society, being a private organization, does not necessarily represent the view of the Chinese government but i t does express the opinion of an i n f l u e n t i a l group of bankers, manufacturers, engineers and professors. The greatest problem of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n i s c a p i t a l , f o r China i s a capi t a l - d e f i c i e n t country. Even though the demarcation i n Industries has been properly made, c a p i t a l i s indispensable f o r the establishment of state 31. Sun Yat-sen, op. e i t . , p. 48. 32. K. Y. Yin, op. c i t . - 218 and private enterprises. For the raising of enough cap-i t a l , i t w i l l be necessary to adopt methods of developing, national .-capital, and controlling private c a p i t a l . For the development of national c a p i t a l , special attention should be paid to taxation and p r o f i t s made out of state-owned enterprises. The increase of savings among the people and the control of the use of capital are the two methods for the control of private c a p i t a l . (33) Fast experience has showed that the process' of accumulating cap i t a l i n China has been very slow. If we r e l y on our own resources alone, the work of i n d u s t r i a l -i z a t i o n would be greatly retarded. Therefore, negotiations should be started with foreign countries with a view to a t t r a c t i n g investments to China. As Dr. Sun Yat-sen was the f i r s t one who advocated the*use of foreign c a p i t a l i n the development of China, i t i s very l i k e l y that the present government w i l l spare no e f f o r t to interest foreign countries in cooperating with China i n carrying out our program of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . -Foreign assistance may be accepted to make up f o r the deficiency i n manpower, resources and capital.. To complete i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n i n a short period we need the technical personnel and the capital of foreign countries. Immediately a f t e r the war, every country w i l l be busy with demobilization. China should u t i l i z e this opportunity to accelerate her program of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and should 33. China*s-Postwar Economic Problems,A summary or conclus-ions reached at a forum of 23 university prof e'ssors,Chinese Contemporary Review,June 1943. - 219 -negotiate with foreign countries for the purchase of a portion of t h e i r machine works, automobile and airplane, to be used as an introduction to China's program of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . At.the same time China should take a l l the machinery and the materials we need for indust-r i a l i z a t i o n from Japan as compensation for the destruction that Japan caused us during the war. The long history of foreign investments in China presents a l i v e l y picture of the struggle for special p o l i t i c a l p r i v i l e g e s and advantages. Some ambitious powers, l i k e Japan and Tzarist Russia, which were them-selves debtor countries, even went to the length of borrowing heavily from Western States i n order to invest i n China for purely p o l i t i c a l reasons. (34) The d i s -integrating effect of this practice on China's develop-ment as an independent nation can hardly be overestimated. Past, experience has made such a deep'" imprint that many Chinese s t i l l regard imports of foreign capital with suspicion. Only i n the l i g h t of t h i s h i s t o r i c a l "and psychological background can one understand, for example, the regulations effective from the early 1930s u n t i l recently that, i n any joint Chinese-foreign enterprise, foreign ca p i t a l was not to exceed 49 percent of the t o t a l and both the chairman of the b&ard of directors and the general manager were to be of Chinese nationality. 34. Choh-ming L i , China in World Economy, Foreign Policy Reports, November 1, 1943, p. 217. - 220 -With the relinquishment of the e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s , aliens in. China have become subject to and come under the protection of China's law and. j u r i s d i c t i o n along with the Chinese c i t i z e n s . Foreign cap i t a l , fearing that investments in China may not enjoy f u l l l e g a l guarantees, might hesitate to enter the China market. On August 11, 1943, the Executive Yuan, the highest executive organ of the Chinese government, ordered the ministries concerned to draft new regulations providing due protection of law so that foreign c a p i t a l and. technique might be u t i l i z e d f u l l y i n China's .program of reconstruction. (35) Subsequently, a resolution was passed by the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on September 18 to serve f o r such a purpose. The resolution on foreign investment s p e c i a l l y eliminates the fixed r e s t r i c t i o n s on the r a t i o of foreign c a p i t a l investment i n joint enterprises the designation of the nationality of personnel, except for the chairman, who must be Chinese. (36) In spite of the encouragement of foreign investment by the Chinese government, foreign loans w i l l be accepted only i f they are made on reasonable ..and mutually advant-ageous terms. Chinese are unanimous on some of the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s to which these terms must conform.(37) 55. New York Times, August 11, 1945. " 36. Chr i s t i a n Science Monitor, September 25, 1943. 57. Choh-ming L i , op. c i t . , p.220. - 221 -In the f i r s t place, a l l postwar foreign investments i n China must be purged of " i m p e r i a l i s t i c " motives. Foreigi lending as a means of economic or p o l i t i c a l exploitation w i l l no longer f i n d any place i n China. Second, a l l foreign capital i n China must be subject to Chinese laws and j u r i s d i c t i o n . There w i l l , of course, be no discrim-ination against foreign investors; indeed, in the new tre a t i e s signed with the United States and B r i t a i n on January 11, 1945, the Chinese government has promised foreign nationals and enterprises the same treatment as the Chinese i n regard to the matter of taxation. (58) F i n a l l y , foreign investments must not be taken at any time as a pretext for encroachment or infringement by other nations on China's sovereign r i g h t s . Should a clash occur between her sovereign rights and the rights of foreign investors, whether private or governmental, the former must be given precedence In accordance with international law and j u s t i c e . A l l these p r i n c i p l e s , i t w i l l be r e a d i l y observed have long been recognized and practiced by the l e s t e r n Powers among themselves. Aside from the problem of c a p i t a l , China's rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n w i l l be.hampered by a shortage of s k i l l e d labor and technical management, although the abundance of unskilled labor, p a r t i c u l a r l y demobilized sol d i e r s , may provide some quantitative compensation 58 The Sino-American Treaty and the Sino-British Treaty, The White Book, Ho. 186 and 187, The Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , Chungking, China. - 222 -for this qualitative lack. The bulk of China's require-ments for s k i l l e d workmen and managers' must be supplied by technically trained Chinese, many of whom would acquire t h e i r s k i l l i n expanding plants, but some foreign experts w i l l s t i l l be needed, especially at the early stage of Industrial expansion. Past experience, however, t e l l s us that f o r e i g n experts i n China sometimes took a position of quasi-independent status and quasi-diplomatic function not as experts giving t h e i r technical assistance to the enter-p r i s e s . Hence, in.the future of China's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n foreign technicians, whether managing directors of r a i l -ways or factory superintendents, must be engaged as employees of China, subject to the authority of those who employ them and not as "advisers" with the quasi-independent - status and quasi-diplomatic function. Closely connected with her i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n w i l l be China's trade p o l i c y in the future. It i s the general view in China that i t should adopt neither the l a i s s e z -f a i r e attitude of the 19th century nor an over-all protective t a r i f f p o l i c y . (39) With available natural resources and manpower, there w i l l doubtless be developed a number of industries capable of existing without the a r t i f i c i a l support of t a r i f f . Only i n the incipient stage of t h e i r development i s a certain amount of 39. See Loc. C i t . Notes 54. - S23 -protection necessary. The industries i n urgent need of protection w i l l be what are generally called the " l i g h t industries", such as t e x t i l e s , f l o u r , matches, etc. These were precisely the f i e l d s i n which the Japanese offered the most formidable competition before the war. Thus a protective t a r i f f on these f i e l d s i n China w i l l not come into direct c o n f l i c t with the interests of highly i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries i n the west, whose exports of machinery and i n d u s t r i a l equipment w i l l c e r t a i n l y long be needed by the Chinese. As China needs foreign help in her postwar reconst-ruction her general economic policy w i l l be based upon mutual benefit towards foreign countries f r i e n d l y to us. In the f i r s t place, China must follow the Atlantic Charter' the Chinese-American lend-lease agreement and the new t r e a t i e s between China, the United States and Great B r i t a i n . In the second place, China should specify as early as possible at the end of the war what she ex-pects from the.United States, Great B r i t a i n and the Soviet Union, Such expectations include the purchase and sale of goods; the purchase of machinery, communic-ation materials; and the employment of foreign technical personnel. Those United Nations themselves, especially • the United States, w i l l enter the postwar period with an economy i n which consumer-goods industries have been sacrificed- i n the war production. To a considerable extent the productive capacity in heavy industries, - 224 -•• b u i l t up to meet wartime r e q u i r e m e n t s , w i l l be govern-mental c o n t r o l l e d . (40) Domestic demands f o r such goods would be g r e a t l y reduced. China t h e n w i l l expect to be a market f o r the consumers of those goods, thus h e l p i n g t h e s e n a t i o n s i n a q u i c k c o n v e r s i o n o f p r o d u c t -i v e p l a n t s t o peacetime purposes. On a l o n g - t e r m view, t h e f r u i t s of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n i n China w i l l b e n e f i t not o n l y the Chinese but also, the pe o p l e of f r i e n d l y n a t i o n s as mentioned above. With the i n c r e a s e o f Chinese pur c h a s i n g power,. a new and r i c h .  market w i l l be opened t o f o r e i g n p r o d u c t s and China w i l l be a b l e to s u p p l y c e r t a i n raw m a t e r i a l s as w e l l as s p e c i a l e x p o r t p r o d u c t s f o r t h e consumption of o t h e r p e o p l e s . B e s i d e s the b e n e f i t s from the products themselves, i t w i l l improve China's p o s i t i o n i n r e g a r d t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a l a n c e o f payments. The advantages o f Ch i n a ' s i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n t o the Western Powers have been apprehended by some q u a r t e r s i n the: U n i t e d S t a t e s and i n Great B r i t a i n . N a t h a n i e l P e f f e r p o i n t s o ut: "as China proceeds w i t h i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n by means o f the c a p i t a l .goods p r o v i d e d by o u r s e l v e s on c r e d i t i t s n a t i o n a l income w i l l r i s e i n equal measure and t h e r e f o r e , i t s p u r c h a s i n g power.....It i s i n the i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n o f China t h a t t h e r e l i e s t h e best p r o s p e c t f o r the West's r e c o v e r y from t h e ravage of war, f o r .the adjustment from u n h e a l t h y war p r o s p e r i t y t o r p . 5 normal productive equilibrium. S t i l l more, therein l i e s the best hope for the delaying of that more fund-amental c r i s i s i n Western institutions"(41). P o l i t i c a l l y •an.'industrialized China i n the P a c i f i c i s quite welcomed by the United States. It i s asserted by the editor of "Fortune":"China, transformed into an i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nation of 450 m i l l i o n , must outweigh, once the threat of Japan i s removed, any other p o l i t i c a l unit that could emerge in the western P a c i f i c . T h i s . i s , i n fact, exactly what we expect and what we seek." (42) In Great B r i t a i n , some i n d u s t r i a l groups have expressed th e i r opinion on the question of the indust-r i a l i z a t i o n of China as a f f e c t i n g the interests of Great B r i t a i n . They say: "With the growth of China's industries, B r i t a i n may lose much of her 'muck and ruck' trade, but as the industries grow, and the standard of l i v i n g i n China is accordingly raised, she w i l l ; .• i . ... become a better customer for high-class goods with a greatly increased purchasing power." (45) Apart from the problem of. the postwar position of China, the p o s i t i o n of Japan in the postwar world w i l l constitute another problem, which requires discussion-41. Peffer, op. c i t . , pp. 210-211. 42. Fortune, v. 18. 45.China Today and Tomorrow, Postwar Industrial Needs, Great B r i t a i n and the East, November 21, 1942, p. 35. - 226 -It i s pointed out by one writer (44) that there are very few P a c i f i c problems which can be treated apart from the problem of the postwar position of Japan. The problems of the postwar Japan w i l l be manyfold, the most important of Which w i l l be how Japan can exist as a nation and get subsistence for her people. Before,the present war, Japan's economic structure was seriously out of balance because of her abnormal emphasis upon heavy industry contributing to war aims and her neglect of consumer's goods i n both manufactures and imports. In 1941 the standard of c i v i l i a n l i v i n g declined to about 50$ from what i t was in 1936 and 1937. (45) Ultimate defeat in t h i s war would ruin'Japanese economy, Japan would become an impoverished nation. Most of th i s poverty must be regarded as s e l f -i n f l i c t e d . Japan made her choice between guns and butter, and the b i l l s for guns cannot be defaulted. In the : . course of the war, Japan's s o i l has been depleted of f e r t i l e substances that i t w i l l take years to replace. Many of her peace time fa c t o r i e s have been stripped of equipment, and outside the armament works, technical progress has halted-. Japan's domestic transportation system i s worn out. A f r i g h t f u l t o l l has been levied on Japanese manpower: d i r e c t l y , by death on the b a t t l e -f i e l d or the high seas; i n d i r e c t l y , by the general 44. Sansom, op. c i t . , p. 2. 45. Fortune, op. c i t . , p. 17. - 227 -impairment of the Japanese people's health. The f u l l b i l l f or the guns w i l l ultimately have to be assessed not i n yen but i n the loss of millions of l i v e s . It i s suggested in some quarters of the United States that the United Nations should extend to Japan, as soon as fight i n g has ceased, the benefits of their general program of r e l i e f . The excess of frozen Japan-ese funds i n gold, d o l l a r s and s t e r l i n g i n America, B r i t a i n and Holland against Japan, or the payments for the charter of Japanese ships, should be u t i l i z e d f o r such r e l i e f . (46) Without question the general r e l i e f works of the United Nations should extend to both countries, victor and vanquished, but a permanent term of economic advan-tage should be cautiously given and made on certain conditions to Japan. In the interests of l a s t i n g peace i n the Far East, i t i s necessary to/put Japan out of action and beyond p o s s i b i l i t y of early recovery as a m i l i t a r y menace; therefore i t would be unwise to. give Japan opportunities for quick economic recovery. Before the United Nations allow Japan to part i c i p a t e in;a new P a c i f i c order, they should do two things which would help to enable the Japanese to become a peaceful nation. F i r s t , p o l i t i c a l l y , the United Nations should encourage and support these l i b e r a l , elements in Japan's , 46. Ibid. - 2SS -internal l i f e which gave support to Japan's membership of the League of Nations. It would seem that such groups wouB be responsive to the new order of the P a c i f i c . Second, consideration of Japan's educational p o l i c i e s f o r the past ten or f i f t e e n years shows how closely these have been integrated with the p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s of the present regime.. There has been emphasis upon Japanese race super-i o r i t y ; the cult of emperor-worship has been i n t e n s i f i e d . This educational p o l i c y cannot be ignored by the United Nations i f the peace of the P a c i f i c i s to rest on a firm basis. In the l a s t resort, the problem is one which can only be solved by the Japanese themselves, but much can be done i n the immediate postwar period towards the stim-u l a t i o n of Japanese a c t i v i t i e s by the supply of foreign instructors and insistence upon standards of democratic ideas which are generally accepted by the United Nations. (47) Should these two things be done.'effectively, r e i n - ' tegration of Japan with the new P a c i f i c order to follow the second world war w i l l be possible i f Japan succeeds i n restoring some form of parliamentary popular government; If the pre f e r e n t i a l p o s i t i o n now enjoyed by. the army and navy i s not revived^ i f the neighboring countries are convinced that Japan i s law-abiding with no idea of aggression. When a government operating along these or sim i l a r l i n e s has proved i t s a b i l i t y to survive and gain 47.-George W. Keeton, Some Factors i n a Far Eastern Peace Settlement, Cited, pp. 26-28. - 229 -popular support, the Japanese nation should be permitted to become e n t i t l e d to international equality. By equality we mean gradual p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the work of the P a c i f i c regional association and i n the international arrangement for the welfare and security of the Par East. We do not propose to propitiate Japan or to confess that, after a l l , the Japanese actions at Mukden, at the Marco Polo Bridge, at Shanghai and Nanking, at Pearl Harbor, Hongkong and Manila were not so bad and outrageous as they appear to us no?/. We sh a l l simply acknowledge the existence of a new Japan. U n t i l the United Nations can be certain that the postwar Japanese government i s capable of peaceful cooperation i n the maintenance of a stable or-der i n the Far East, they should be free to intervene • i n Japan's domestic a f f a i r s . • The form of intervention cannot yet be d e f i n i t e l y f i x e d . It would be unwise to proclaim i t now. i n a general joint declaration of the United Nations„ ' A proposal i s made by one American writer that, a f t e r Japan has been made m i l i t a r i l y impotent, p o l i t i c a l wisdom dictates that certain concession be made to i t to assure conditions of li v e l i h o o d on a standard i t can reasonably expect, so that i t w i l l not have to resort to force in order to feed, clothe and shelter her people. (48) Others urge that arrangements might be made to f a c i l i t a t e trade between Japan and her former colonies to secure essential 48. P e f f e r , op. c i t . , p. 137. - 230 -food. (49) These concessions or aggangements can be made only on condition that they should not jeopardize Japan's neighbors i n the Far l a s t and help ind i r e c t l y to a resur-gent Japanese militarism. Hitherto, Japanese apologists claimed that Japan's economics suffered great injustice at the hands of other Powers which imposed r e s t r i c t i o n s upon her export trade, denied her access to raw materials, or put discriminatory laws on her immigrants so as to prevent outlet for her overpopulation. Indeed, i n the past years, the barriers were thrown up against Japan's products and emigration in the Western Colonies i n Eastern Asia and i n Western countries themselves. By t a r i f f s , quota agreements and other devices Japan was prevented from getting as much trade as i t would have obtained i n normal competition. By immigration laws the Japanese were p r a c t i c a l l y de-barred from entering some Western countries and their colonies. ' It is equally true that Japan lacked most.of the raw materials essential to i n d u s t r i a l production. For cotton, iron, petroleum products , lead, zinc, t i n , rubber, alumin-um, n i c k e l , chrome, manganese, and other materials and metals, Japan is dependent i n large part and i n some cases almost wholly on outside sources. Nevertheless, had Japan not over-expanded her munition industries for the prepar-ation of war, import of those materials from outside might 49. Fortune, p. 17. - 251 -have been s u f f i c i e n t f o r the p r o d u c t i o n o f goods f o r c i v i l i a n use. From 1931 on, Japan's p o p u l a t i o n problem has become a catchword i n a l l d i s c u s s i o n on the-Far E a s t , so much so as t o f a l s i f y the i s s u e s . The problem of o v e r - p o p u l a t i o n i s one t h a t a c o u n t r y cannot e x t r a c t from her own s o i l t he produce w i t h w h i c h to f e e d and c l o t h e her people and a l s o cannot f a b r i c a t e goods or commodities w i t h which t o buy from w i t h o u t f o r f e e d i n g and c l o t h i n g her p e o p l e . T h i s i s t o say t h a t p r i m i t i v e l a n d s o r even t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y backward c o u n t r i e s such as China and I n d i a may be o v e r -p o p u l a t e d , but not such a c o u n t r y as ^apan, which has e n t e r e d the system of machine i n d u s t r i a l i s m , and i s or can be i n the w o r l d market. I n the case of Japan, i t cannot be d e n i e d t h a t the c o u n t r y ' s economic b a s i s i s i n -s e c u r e , but the e x p l a n a t i o n l i e s s t i l l i n Japanese m i l i t -a r i s m . I f Japan's i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y had p a i d more a t t e n -t i o n to the p r o d u c t i o n of consumer goods, the problem of o v e r - p o p u l a t i o n might not have become ser i o u s . . Japan h e r s e l f i s t o blame. T h e r e f o r e , some s t u d e n t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s today a re i n c l i n e d t o t r e a t w i t h s c e p t i c i s m the Japanese-c l a i m t h a t war was brought about i n e v i t a b l y by the p r e s s -ure o f p o p u l a t i o n upon the means of s u b s i s t e n c e and by the s t r u g g l e f o r o v e r s e a s markets. C e r t a i n l y i t can be shown t h a t some of Japan's economic g r i e v a n c e s were of her own making. (50) However, w i t h a l l the f a l s e 50. Bee Sansom, p. b, Jr'effer, p. l o y . - 232 -a c c e n t u a t i o n and d i s i n g e n u o u s a p o l o g i e s s t r i p p e d o f f , Japan's economic d i f f i c u l t i e s must be t a k e n i n t o account. Japan,must be a l l o w e d to f i n d a secure b a s i s f o r her economy. As one American w r i t e r s a i d , j u s t c u r b i n g her i n a g g r e s s i o n i s not enough. I t w i l l break bounds a g a i n and have t o be curbed once more u n l e s s w i t h i n the l i m i t s t o which she i s c o n f i n e d her p e o p l e can f i n d a way of l i f e t h a t s a t i s f i e s t h e i r needs. (51) To the q u e s t i o n of s a t i s f y i n g Japanese economic needs, the r e are t h r e e ways which would improve Japanese economic l i f e i n the f u t u r e . F i r s t , the U n i t e d N a t i o n s should g i v e Japan an o p p o r t u n i t y to buy raw m a t e r i a l s e s s e n t i a l t o machine p r o d u c t i o n s u b j e c t t o the c o n d i t i o n t h a t the s t r a t e g i c m a t e r i a l s imported to Japan must be made on a quota b a s i s j u s t s u f f i c i e n t f o r her c i v i l p r o d u c t i o n . Second, the Powers s o v e r e i g n i n the c o l o n i e s of E a s t e r n A s i a must abandon o l d t r a d e p o l i c i e s . I t i s n e c e s s a r y to extend b e t t e r t r e a t m e n t to Japan i n each c o l o n y or a t l e a s t i n s t a g e s t o d i s m a n t l e the t a r i f f b a r r i e r s r a i s e d a g a i n s t Japan. And t h e quota agreements must be dropped o r m o d i f i e d i n the d i r e c t i o n of g r e a t e r l i b e r a l i t y to Japan. T h i r d , the Powers sh o u l d a l l o w more Japanese immigrants t o e n t e r the c o l o n i e s o f E a s t e r n A s i a and a l s o t h e i r own c o u n t r i e s ; t h u s i t w i l l s l a c k e n what i s c a l l e d the p r e s s u r e of t h e Japanese p o p u l a t i o n problem. 51. P e f f e r , op. c i t . , p. 140. - 233 -As f a r as China i s concerned, her economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h Japan i n the postwar y e a r s would be based on r e c i p r o c i t y o r mutual b e n e f i t . China would be no l o n g e r an economic c o l o n y and an o u t l e t f o r Japan's s o - c a l l e d o v e r p o p u l a t i o n . I f Japan becomes a p e a c e f u l n a t i o n and r e a l l y abandons her a g g r e s s i v e p o l i c y f o r e v e r , t h e r e might be a p r o s p e c t of economic c o o p e r a t i o n between China and Japan. For one t h i n g , the economic r e c o v e r y of Japan to support her p e o p l e ' s l i v e l i h o o d w i l l be the u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e of the U n i t e d N a t i o n ' s p o l i c y towards p o s t -war Japan, but i t w i l l not come so immediately a f t e r the war. Too q u i c k a r e c o v e r y would negate the pedagogic e f f e c t s of t h e c r u s h i n g d e f e a t . But Japan can r e t u r n to normal economic l i f e at a s t e a d y , i f not f a s t , pace. The U n i t e d N a t i o n s would a l l o w Japanese r e c o v e r y m e r e l y f o r purposes o f k e e p i n g . t h e i r people a l i v e but not f o r purposes of resuming a m i l i t a r y - o f f e n s i v e of Japan. - 254 -CHAPTER V I I CONCLUSION To sum up, the e x i s t i n g r e g i o n a l i s m of the P a c i f i c under the Washington t r e a t y system has f a i l e d t o f u l f i l i t s purpose of m a i n t a i n i n g peace and o r d e r i n the P a c i f i c a r e a . The inadequacy of t h i s r e g i o n a l machinery a l o n g w i t h the weak u n i v e r s a l i s m under the League of N a t i o n s was at l e a s t p a r t -i a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the war i n the F a r East as w e l l as f o r i t s l a t e r development i n t o t h e Second World War. The hypo-t h e t i c a l new r e g i o n a l i s m , d i s c u s s e d i n the pr e s e n t t h e s i s d i f f e r s f r o m the o l d one w i t h the f o l l o w i n g r e s p e c t s : F i r s t , i t s e t s f o r t h p r e r e q u i s i t e c o n d i t i o n s to t h e peace of the F a r E a s t , t h u s e l i m i n a t i n g elements of i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r i f e i n the f u t u r e ; second, under the new r e g i o n a l i s m , China w i l l never be a mere b e n e f i c i a r y as under the Nine Power T r e a t y , but w i l l c o n s t i t u t e an equal, p a r t n e r w i t h o t h e r P a c i f i c • Powers i n d e v o t i n g h er n a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h t o an en d u r i n g peace i n the P a c i f i c ; t h i r d , t h e importance of the S o v i e t U n i o n i n the F a r E a s t i s r e c o g n i z e d by b e i n g a s s i g n e d a permanent seat i n the proposed P a c i f i c C o u n c i l of the P a c i f i c A s s o c i a t i o n of N a t i o n s ; f o u r t h , i t i s p r o v i d e d w i t h adequate, i n s t i t u t i o n s backed by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c e power n e c e s s a r y f o r the maintenance o f peace and f o r the - 255 -p r o m o t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n . The fundamental requirement of a s u c c e s s f u l i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n l i e s not o n l y i n the machinery i t s e l f but a l s o i n the g o o d w i l l and d e v o t i o n on the p a r t of i t s p r i n -c i p a l members. I t may be conceded t h a t a common d i a g n o s i s of t h e League's f a i l u r e i s due to the combined s t u p i d i t y -and s e l f i s h n e s s of the g r e a t powers, r a t h e r t h a n t h e ' d e f e c t of the machinery. I t i s a t r u i s m t h a t , w i t h g o o d w i l l and d e v o t i o n , g r e a t ends may be a c h i e v e d w i t h the weakest o r g a n i z a t i o n . I n t h e r e g i o n a l peace o r g a n i z a t i o n , the p r i n -c i p a l members are supposed to be C h i n a , Great B r i t a i n , t h e S o v i e t Union and the U n i t e d S t a t e s . What may we expect them t o do i n the f u t u r e ? On t h e p a r t of China,- t h e r e w i l l be no q u e s t i o n of her g o o d w i l l and d e v o t i o n t o the new machinery; but the q u e s t i o n i s t h a t China would not become a s t a b i l i z i n g f a c t o r i n t h e F a r E a s t u n l e s s she had been s t r o n g as mentioned above. I n o t h e r words, what China can devote t o the peace of the P a c i f i c depends upon how a c c e l e r a t e d and how much a i d t h a t C h i n a w i l l r e c e i v e from the Powers f o r h e r i n d u s t -r i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . The more China becomes i n d u s t r i a l i z e d the b e t t e r the P a c i f i c s i t u a t i o n w i l l be.. As . r e g a r d s , t h e . . B r i t i s h , the main c o n t r i b u t i o n which she w i l l be e x p e c t e d to make to the peace of the Far E a s t w i l l be the s l a c k e n i n g of her i m p e r i a l r u l e i n the F a r E a s t and. g r a n t i n g the p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s of her c o l o n i e s and dependencies . which t h e y d e s i r e . H e r e a f t e r the B r i t i s h - 256 -w i l l not r e g a r d the F a r E a s t j u s t i n terms of r u b b e r , t i n and e x p l o i t a t i o n ; f o r economic e x p l o i t a t i o n may l e a d sooner o r l a t e r to p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o v e r s y . I f we hope t h a t the f u t u r e p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n w i l l become c l a r i f i e d , the c o l o n i a l q u e s t i o n s h o u l d be s e t t l e d on the b a s i s of economic j u s t i c e and p o l i t i c a l freedom. The s e c u r i t y of the P a c i f i c demands such a c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t on the p a r t of the B r i t i s h t o c r e a t e i n t h i s zone those economic and p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t -i o n s which w i l l p r e v e n t l o c a l causes of f r i c t i o n o r c o n f l i c t , t hus making the F a r E a s t e r n r e l a t i o n more s t a b l e and more se c u r e . The a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the S o v i e t Union i n the new P a c i f i c s t r u c t u r e w i l l be a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y i f the r e g i o n a l body of the P a c i f i c i s to succeed. P a s t i n d i f f e r -ence o r h o s t i l i t y to the S o v i e t i n the Far E a s t s i n c e 1918 has been p r o v e n to be one o f the f a c t o r s t o the Japanese e x p a n s i o n , and the r e g i o n a l i s m under the Washington t r e a t y was impotent w i t h o u t the S o v i e t ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n does not mean t h a t Moscow w i l l pursue i t s o l d -f a s h i o n e d p o l i c y of the T z a r i s t regime, but i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e Moscow government i n c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h C h i n a , A merica and the B r i t i s h should do i t s b e s t f o r the work of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i n the Far E a s t . The S o v i e t Union s t i l l r e m a ins an unknown q u a n t i t y i n the postwar P a c i f i c , and i t i s p r e d i c t e d t h a t R u s s i a w i l l more l i k e l y choose Europe as the scene of a c t i o n r a t h e r t h a n E a s t e r n A s i a . However, peace i s i n d i v i s i b l e . A l t h o u g h the S o v i e t needs peace i n - 237 -Europe, she should not remain aloof from the concert of the Bowers i n the postwar development In the P a c i f i c . American devotion i n this regional organization w i l l be p a r t i c u l a r l y needed. The degree of accomplishment of the regional security in the P a c i f i c depends largely upon American cooperation. If the United States were ready to take a f u l l share of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y with respect to the' P a c i f i c , there would be a bright prospect i n that area. Before the Fulbright and Connally's resolutions passed at the American Congress, there was genuine fear among the United Nations that American Congress might not accept future commitments. After the American Congress passed the resolutions indicating that the American people intend to p a r t i c i p a t e sincerely i n an effort to bring order into the world, the p r e v a i l i n g view seems to be that the strong trend i n the United States today i s i n the direction of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a general security system especially i n r e l a t i o n to the P a c i f i c and the Far East. It i s pointed out by Tyler Dennett that without c u r t a i l i n g any power of Congress, and without placing i n p e r i l any national in t e r e s t , the United States could probably go even farther in the way of an international engagement i n the Far East. America w i l l undoubtedly emerge as the strongest m i l i t a r y Power i n the Far East at the victorious end of the war. There w i l l be no nation with equal power to challenge her leadership i n the P a c i f i c . Therefore the American co-operation i n the new regional system i s regarded by the Fa - 238 -E a s t e r n n a t i o n s as most i m p o r t a n t and d e s i r a b l e . The r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n should, s t a r t i t s work i m m e d i a t e l y a t the end o f the war. No t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d w i l l be needed f o r t h e purpose of c o o l i n g o f f n a t i o n a l h a t r e d , because t r a d i t i o n a l a n i m o s i t y among the Ear E a s t e r n n a t i o n s i s not so c o m p l i c a t e d and so deep as that.among the European c o u n t r i e s . At t h a t time whether a g e n e r a l s e c u r i t y system i s formed or n o t , the r e g i o n a l body s h o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d i n the P a c i f i c . As i t has been n o t e d , r e g i o n a l i s m p r o v i d e s a p o s s i b l e s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r a b e t t e r w i d e r u n i o n , so t h a t a good P a c i f i c r e g i o n a l body o r g a n i z e d p r i o r t o a u n i v e r s a l o r g a n i z a t i o n might g i v e an advantage i n f o r m i n g a b e t t e r w o r l d u n i o n l a t e r . 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